

SOME CULTURAL CHANGES IN THE CHINESE
MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:

A Study in Political Geography with
Special Reference to Singapore.

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Being academically preoccupied with problems of Southeast Asia for the last two years, I must admit a certain feeling of sympathy with the peoples and ethnic groups living there. This is largely due to an indirect influence of Prof. Fisher, for which I am no less grateful to him.

Abstract

The first of the three parts of this work deals with the Chinese identity and solidarity in China, and with its expansion southwards during the last three millennia. Initially, this involved overland movement within China itself; later, migrations by sea introduced the Chinese into the Nan Yang. As these immigrants have generally retained their Chinese identity maintaining links with China, a detailed discussion of politico-cultural developments in 20th century China has been included.

The second part deals with the historico-geographical development of the Southeast Asian countries with special reference to the 20th century. The need for a separate discussion of each country arises from the effects of their political sovereignty, which, in some sense, enclose their respective Chinese communities within a specific state-culture, and limit the latter's extra-state relations with Chinese communities abroad. It thus occurs that, from a geographical-cultural point of view, each of the Nan Yang Chinese communities constitutes an almost closed cultural system with its proper cultural hierarchy. And yet, some similarities in indigenous-Chinese relations exist in all the Southeast Asian countries.

The third part discusses the historical geography of Singapore and, in particular, various geographical conceptions of its character and role as well as the build-up of the attachment values to its territory. A special emphasis is given to the period of Singapore's independence with relation to its becoming a Chinese cultural node for the Nan Yang communities, ideologically different from and extra-territorial to China. This process occurs as a result of a popular cultural perseverance in Singapore and in the Nan Yang communities, and definitely does not constitute part of the official Singaporean state-idea.

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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the extent to which Singapore is becoming a Chinese cultural node, extra-territorial to China, mainly with respect to the Nan Yang Communities. The study is made from the standpoint of cultural and political geography, and it is necessary first to clarify some of the basic concepts involved. Many of the described phenomena were chosen from the cultural, social, economic and political life of the countries under study, and the reason for their inclusion stems, among other things, from their significance to a major concept of this work: group attachment to territory, or the cultural values bestowed by a group on territory.

The term "culture" in this work represents two distinct concepts. The first one, which may be called a culture of identity, denotes "the whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual, of a given society" (1), and more precisely, the specific traits and patterns, ideas and their attached values (2), which govern group identity and solidarity. Thus, "Chinese culture", inasmuch as it defines a group with a common identity, is conceived as a culture of identity. The second concept of "culture" connotes a specific mode of relationship between human groups and their environment and the kind of their social institutions(3). This concept may be called a culture of adaptation, and may be common to otherwise unrelated groups such as Thai and Burmese wet-rice growers. Thus, the culture of adaptation of the Sinicized people of Japan, Korea and

Vietnam may be common, although each has a different culture of identity and solidarity (4).

Although Huntington's view that the physical environment is a shaper of human characteristics may be contested, his view that the environment determines the character of cultures is more plausible (5). It is doubtful, however, whether the premise of cultural geography that culture is a means of classifying areas according to the character of human groups occupying them (6), follows Huntington's views. The environment may or may not shape cultures, but human groups certainly modify the environment, and in so doing they evaluate it ^{inter alia} from economic, strategic, ~~strategic~~ artistic and locational aspects. In addition, culture, as a residue of the group's creativity involves spiritual attachment to some of its manifestations. As these are territorially distributed, it follows that different areas have different values attached to them for the same group, and different groups are differently attached to the same area.

Raumsinn, a concept coined by Ratzel from observations on vegetal and animal ecologies and extended to states, races, tribes and families (7), is perhaps a basic notion implying the space consciousness of these groups in relation to their numerical and territorial expansion. This consciousness becomes a mode of conception as the culture of the human group develops and attaches value to the culturally modified territory. The existence of these ~~the~~ values is evident in families' attachment to

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their places of residence (8), in peasants' attachment to their plots of land and in the almost sanctified view ~~of~~ ^{which} peoples ^{hold} of their states' boundaries. On the international level the concept of Raumsinn may become more sophisticated, and, within an atmosphere of conflicting territorial values of different peoples over the same territory, may develop a Lebensraum conception. In conflict situations, mainly on states' level, the values attached to different parts of the territory, whether occupied, exploited or aspired for acquisition by the nation, vary in degree. The occupied oikumene, and especially the area which has been historically inhabited, and has served as the origin of the national culture, is deemed the most valuable, sometimes for its material value, but more often for spiritual and symbolic reasons. Within the national area there may exist sparsely populated marchlands, which could command much lower values of attachment. In addition, there may exist territories, which the national group or its leadership aspire to acquire, in spite of the fact that they are not inhabited by members of the group. These constitute Ergänzungsräume, mainly of material and/or strategic value.

The geographical distribution of those differently evaluated areas may resemble in their idealized form concentric circles beginning from the cultural core area and continuing outwards to the cultural oikumene and from there to the marchlands, while the Ergänzungsräume constitute the outer circle, sometimes not contiguous with the former. The evaluation of those areas is wholly

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ethnocentric (10), and though the conception of Raumsinn and Lebensraum has been implicitly inherent in human culture even in ancient times (11), the fairly modern sanctification of state boundaries and their representation in ubiquitous maps, may add symbolic value to the national territory in conflict situations. But the Raumsinn and Lebensraum conceptions are only part of a more general geographical conception (12), which may be termed as a cultural environment conception or as a geographical conception. This conception may be common to both kinds of cultural groups, while the Lebensraum conception relates to a cultural group of common solidarity. The cultural environment conception (the geographical conception) of a specific culture grasps, as it were, the possibilities offered by the territory (and the physical environment) to the cultural group's living conditions according to their actual material abilities and values, and according to the spiritual values attached to that territory (13). Thus, nomad herders may not recognize the possibilities offered by good arable land, a Chinese or an Indian trader may prefer a noisy road junction to establish his shop-house, while a Malay or Thai villager will prefer living in his remote kampong in proximity to a running stream. Even states may change the geographical conception of their environment after undergoing some cultural changes (14). Thus, Communist China included its Mongolian marchlands into the Chinese oikumene for politico-strategical reasons, and a significant change is going on in the delineation of the influence zones (15) of the three world Super-Powers.

Also, in this category, the 1965 separate independence of Singapore produced a new geographical conception of its environment (16), as ~~was~~^{did} the recent independence of the formerly colonial states in Asia and in Africa.

The concept of human attachment to territory has been partly clarified by the discussion on values attached to territory. It is accepted, however, that value-wise there can be no clear-cut division between the social milieu and its related physical environment. People may feel attached to a certain house because it is their family home, but there is no doubt that even after a family moves house, some sort of sentimental attachment to the old house still exists among the family members (17). Another example may represent some additional difficulties in analyzing that phenomenon. Muslims all over the world feel an attachment to Mecca, although most of them may not have any relatives there. Also, extra-territorial minority groups may feel an attachment to their cultural centre and still remain abroad, thus definitely dividing their loyalties between their familial place of residence, the host country cultural centres (inasmuch as they are integrated into the local society), and their ethnic or religious cultural centre. Without belittling the complexity of the problem, it is safe to assume that there exist measureable indices to determine not only the existence or absence of attachment to territory, but also to quantify it. Although people individually differ in their emotional and sentimental expression, the phenomenon within a fairly numerous group may render significant results (18). Some of the indices

for measuring attachment to territory are: location of the family home, of the job, of the capital and the sentimentally cherished possessions, and of the place where one has spent his childhood. In addition, and still concerning individuals, the degree of social integration to the milieu of the majority group and assimilation provide other good indications as it is assumed that integration into a local society signifies the adoption of its territorial values and a decrease in values attached to the territory of origin. Also, visits, pilgrimages, remittances and communication by letter or phone may constitute reliable gauges in this respect. The total summation of these indicators in a group may provide a fairly good measure of its degree of attachment to the territory in question. But there exist specific indices concerning the group as a whole, mainly: the perseverance of original institutions, educational, religious and social. In fact, the less the minority group is integrated into the local society, the more it keeps its attachment to the territorial values of origin.

It may be futile to try and construct a hierarchic system of cultural centres according to the intensity of emotions they produce. It is possible, however, to create a hierarchy according to the kind of "cultural service" offered by each place and the number of its "customers". This leads to linking the hierarchy of cultural centres to an existing theory in marketing geography (19). Some preliminary observations must first be discussed. Many, and perhaps most of the cultural centres which distribute

services are fixed in place (20), such as homes, schools, temples, social clubs, newsstands and cinemas. Cultural centres' spatial distribution, not unlike retail trade establishments, follows the pattern of population distribution. The kind of cultural services rendered in one establishment cannot be easily analyzed, while the opposite is the case in the geographical marketing theory, but certain services are more common than others although they involve fewer "customers", and certain others are more rare and involve a more numerous clientèle. All this permits us to discuss the question of the hierarchy of cultural centres within a nation-state society.

The most numerous cultural centres, which provide similar cultural services and are spatially fixed are the family homes, but each of them serves few "customers". They render the basic services, which enable children to socialize. The village in rural areas, or a neighbourhood in the urban ^{area} provide less common cultural services but care for more "customers". These services include a school, a newsstand, a place of worship and perhaps a social club. Although hierarchically this level is higher because its establishments are rarer, they seem to command a lower sentimental attachment to place than the home. A small town or a ward in a city may provide cinemas, libraries, higher educational institutions, political party organizations, sport clubs and some facilities for mass meetings. A city may provide a radio and television station, a publishing house, local newspapers, sometimes a university and a cultural elite. Again, this level of cultural centres is

characterized by the high numbers of its clientele while the services it renders usually do not command face-to-face relationships. Within a nation-state the capital usually constitutes the highest cultural centre. In addition to its various services, it usually commands a special attachment, as it is the seat of the government, of the highest education and religious centres, and also sometimes is the cultural centre around which the nation-state culture has been built up. Moreover, as a seat of the government, it is the place from which the state-idea is promulgated. This centre also affects the cultural life of extra-territorial communities of that same culture by actually maintaining cultural links with them, or by "cultural induction" (21).

The Chinese extra-territorial cultural centres are discussed at the end of part two of this work, and that of Singapore at the end of part three.

FOOTNOTES : INTRODUCTION

- (1) Encyc. of Phil. term "culture and civilization" by Williams.
- (2) Following the definition of Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p.181.
- (3) Following Du Bois, 1949, pp. 11-12.
- (4) ~~W~~ Tylor, 1958 (1871) p.1 disregards the differentiating character of culture with respect to human groups. ~~But~~ Thus, his ~~definition is irrelevant~~ *definition is irrelevant* for this work.
- (5) Huntington, 1951 (1920).
- (6) Wagner and Mikesell, 1962, p.2. Also Encyc. Soc. Sci. term "cultural geography" by Sauer.
- (7) See Cahnman, 1944, pp.456-457, and Buttmer, 1971, pp.33-34.
- (8) See for example, Sorre, 1957, pp.56, 111, and Kroeber 1952 p.217.
- (9) See its biological and social manifestations in Wagner, 1960, pp.51-53.
- (10) See Bidney, in Kroeber (ed) 1953, p.689, on ethnocentricity as a cause of conflicts.
- (11) The Chinese traditional World Order may be regarded as an example. See Ginsburg in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, p.77 map 1.
- (12) Already mentioned before.
- (13) For instance, territorial waters' boundaries are traced at greater distances from the coastlines as naval armament improves and as new techniques enable the extraction of oil from continental shelves.
- (14) Nation state cultures are by definition not only identity and solidarity cultural groups, but also cultural groups defined by similar modes of adaptation to the environment, as the former is a sub-set of the latter.
- (15) Which constitute a modern form of strategic Ergänzungsräume.
- (16) This will be discussed in part three of this work.
- (17) This sentimental evaluation seems due to the symbolic meaning bestowed upon cultural things. See Whyte in Montagu (ed) 1962, p.41, and p.60 footnote 6.

- (18) This is due in part to "group pressure" or "social climate" within the group. See Goldenson, 1970, vol. I, pp.521-522.
- (19) See Berry, 1967, pp.13-20, 26-28.
- (20) A cultural service is here defined as that which enables a person to socialize with its milieu. Also, that which enables a person individually to communicate with his culture. Those who receive the service may be called "customers".
- (21) A simile from principles of electronics, which may suit for qualifying the relations of Jewish communities in the diaspora with historical Jerusalem.

PART ONE: ORIGINS

Present day Chinese culture is the product of an exceptionally long and continuous process of evolution. Geographically speaking, the extension of the culture transcends mainland China, to include all the extra-territorial communities which identify themselves, at least in certain circumstances, as Chinese. All these communities share in common a sentimental attachment to China; in the past this was expressed in family, business and cultural terms, but today it involves national considerations as well. When we consider the history of Chinese expansion to the South from Chou times onwards, it seems that the Chinese cultural and organizational superiority over the Thai and tribes peoples, caused the Chinese settlers, whether in conflict or in accord with the rulers of China, to retain a cultural and political loyalty to the Chinese cultural centre. The present situation in Southeast Asia, and more especially in its peninsular part, seems to worry politically and historically aware nationals of those countries, as a similar cultural and geographical loyalty seems to pervade the cores of the Chinese minorities of the region. To a significant extent this anxiety arises from the historical image of China as an expansionist power, and the related image of the Chinese as aggressive emigrants.

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The Chinese claim a cultural continuity of over four millennia. In the politico-geographical context, this claim constitutes a reality surpassing in importance both the facts and the myths of Chinese history (1). Moreover, the claim sometimes emits undertones of cultural superiority innate in the traditional ethnocentrism (2) and supported by the present power of China.

The Chinese Culture Until the Opium War.

Vigorously expansionist, the original Chinese culture extended from its cradle area towards other lands where intensive agriculture could be pursued. Wherever Chinese settlement followed armies, or by infiltration paved the way for political annexation, this culture prevailed over its indigenous counterparts. Wherever settlement did not follow in considerable numbers, local cultures, though Sinicized in their material and institutional patterns, usually retained their ethnic and national identity. Vietnam, Korea and, to a certain extent, Japan exemplify the latter process of Sinicization, which strengthened them and made them more resistant to further Chinese intrusion. Central and South China, as well as 19th century Manchuria and later, Inner Mongolia, represent the former process by which indigenous peoples lost their ethnic and national identities.

The vigour of the Chinese culture expressed itself not only in times of political expansion, but also in periods of subjugation (3). It withstood Nomad

occupations of parts or even the whole of the Chinese oikumene and assimilated or rejected the invaders. Nomad bids to conquer China and small scale foraging occurred also in prehistoric times but, as throughout history, were only occasionally successful. The steppe nomads created what Eickstedt has called an Unruhezentrum in times of drought or political upheavals, which clashed with the Druckzentrum of the fairly densely populated Chinese culture area since prehistoric times (4). While the Unruhezentrum intermittently produced disturbances in the form of mobile military raids seeking Raub (pillage), the Druckzentrum tended to expand in search of Raum (space) (5), a process of slow seepage.

The First Three Millennia. Mythical or historical personages like those of the "Yellow Emperor (who) had a prominent place in Taoism", or Yao, Shun and Yü the legendary rulers who became idolized by Confucianism (6), were incorporated into the Chinese national ethos at a very early period. Written language, urban settlement and a complicated body of customs and rituals distinguished the Chinese from surrounding tribal cultures since the second millennium B.C.. The fact that in feudal Chou times a unique Chinese culture and identity had already expanded from its cradle area to cover the Hwang Ho River Valley, the Middle and Lower Yangtze valleys and the areas between them, gave rise to the myth of an ancient united empire of the Hsia (7). This expressed perhaps a kind of proto-nationalism by educated people,

who recognized the uniqueness of the cultural identity in a feudalistic political reality.

The cultural unity of the second millennium B.C. was derived from the singularity of the cultural area, its superiority since time immemorial and the lack of influence from other cultural centres (8). The cultural centre moved from its birth place to Anyang in Shang times and moved by steps eastwards along the lower bend of the Hwang Ho during Chou times (see map I-A). This was due to nomad pressure from the West as well as in search of a better central location to control the vassals (9). Further shifts of the Capital to Chang-an, Loyang and Kaifeng still maintained it in the same cultural-geographical region as was the cradle area. The absence of rival cultural centres contributed to the Chinese strong ethnocentric view of the world (10), which regarded itself as the Central Kingdom, the highest in the culture-political hierarchy. The reasons for the Chinese cultural superiority must be sought in the geographical setting of North China in the second millennium B.C..

To the north of the line delimited by the later Great Wall there extended the steppes, where nomads had roamed the area perhaps ever since the horse was first domesticated. The area of Inner Mongolia, between the

MAP I-A
SHANG and CHOW
DOMINIONS

Capitals	Boundaries
△	== Shang
□	- - - - Early Chow
○	- · - · - Late Chow

After Goodrich, 1969(1948)



MAP II-A

THAI DISTRIBUTION
About 1000 B.C.

After Eickstedt, 1944.



Gobi Desert and the Great Wall, could support several millions of people depending on meat and milk from sheep and horses. Effective grazing in these vast areas, a proper balance between sheep and horses and optimal meat consumption could presumably increase the human population number. However, the possession of horses must have been culturally linked with honour especially as it gave power to the owner, and not unlike present day African tribes of herdsmen the Asiatic nomads must have sacrificed economic efficiency to consecrated cultural values. In addition, though the great mobility of horsemen could compensate for their inevitable dispersion in wide grazing areas, it seems that mobility as a cultural value must have been inimical to the creation of cities and towns, the basis of civilization (11).

To the south of the Chinese oikumene of Shang times lay the mountainous and forested divide between the Hwang Ho and the Yangtze. Beyond those ridges lay the great river, with a swampy flood-plain and jungle-covered flanks. To the east extended the swamps of the Hwang Ho, the Hwai and the Yangtze Delta. Thai swamp-rice cultivators inhabited the lowlands and hill tribes lived on forested hills and mountains. The sparse population of the hill tribes originated from their hunting and collecting culture, which is believed to have supported about one person per square kilometer. Moreover, the difficulty of communications hindered those

peoples from living in agglomerated settlements. However, being rice growers and perhaps fishermen, the Thais lived in an area which the Chinese later incorporated into their irrigated system, learning from the Thai the basic knowledge of rice growing (12). This raises the question why the Thais themselves had not thrived culturally along the Yangtze river, and it seems that the answer may be sought in environmental and cultural conditions. In the first place, swamp or floating rice cultivation, climatically suitable for the river flood-plain, did not put great demands on social organization within Thai society. Wood and not stone was naturally the main building material (13) and it demanded less specialization in its working. The need for irrigation in the Yangtze was much less than in the Hwang Ho, Wei and even the Han river plains (14). Although the Thais had a much superior culture to that of the hill tribes and were settled astride an excellent fluvial route (see map IIA), they did not create a Druckzentrum. It seems that when the Chinese reached the Yangtze in early Chou times (see map IA), the Thais had not yet extended their primitive rice agriculture over the entire vastness of the Yangtze valley. Nevertheless, the Thais did not yield voluntarily to the Chinese, though they could present only weak resistance (15) to them. Fundamentally, the Thais seem to have lacked population pressure, and were not themselves pressurized by the footed hill tribes. Their low numbers were perhaps

due to diseases which naturally affected the warmer swampy and forested Yangtze lowlands more than the Wei, Han and Hwang Ho valleys with their longer dry seasons. In fact, irrigation and drainage canals led to an increase in population by improved sanitation resulting from water regulation as well as by increased food production (16). The Chinese settlement of the Yangtze and the lower reaches of the Hwai and Hwang Ho seems then to have been made possible by improved sanitation (17). This health problem did not exist in North China as the local food crops needed shorter periods of flooding and the area had very cold winters. The Chinese demographic superiority manifested itself against the Thais by originally occupying a healthier oikumene and later introducing more efficient agricultural methods, while against the steppe nomads its trump card was sedentary agriculture which produced more food and definitely decreased infant and old people mortality.

Chinese population pressure was also due, at least sporadically, to the northern nomads' encroachments, which must have followed drought cycles in the latter's oikumene. Population pressure underlay the improvement of agricultural techniques, which depended on a fairly elaborate socio-political hierarchy system. Grain surplus became a cause and a consequence of China's hydraulic techniques. The government system, when institutionalized, naturally sought power and control, and indeed all economic developments of importance emanated from the state's needs,

each of them contributing to the power of the state. Navigation canals, drainage and irrigation works and fortifications (18) were the most prominent culturo-economic achievements of early China.

(i) Pre-Han North China. Apart from the perhaps legendary Hsia Kingdom of the first half of the second millennium B.C., Chinese cultural history may be said to begin with the Shang Kingdom in the latter half of that millennium. This feudalistic state had a system of government officials, a priesthood and organized urban communities. These rested upon relatively highly developed agricultural activities in the countryside and certainly held ritual ceremonies and developed the calendar. Jade carvings and bronze artifacts as well as architecture indicate the existence of craftsmen. The Shang Kingdom expanded along the Wei River Valley, the Lower Hwang-Ho and the Hwai, but it did not reach the Yangtze, except perhaps near its lower end. This fact was due to difficulties of forest clearing in the Yangtze Valley, as the culture was still neolithic, bronze being mainly used in religious artifacts and arms.

Between the 12th and the 3rd centuries B.C., the feudal state, under the Chou dynasty, expanded southwards into and through the Han River valley towards the Yangtze (19) (see map IIA). By 1000 B.C., many enclaves of barbarians still remained in the midst of the Chinese fiefs, especially in forested mountains and in swampy and jungle tracts. During late Chou times, the Szechwan

Basin as well as the entire Middle and Lower Yangtze valleys were already incorporated into the feudal state (20), which thus enjoyed two conspicuously different climatic regimes on both sides of the Tsin-ling mountains and their eastward extension (21).

If in the earlier Chou era, Chinese spiritual culture was characterized by fairly complex religious rituals in worship of ancestral, terrestrial and celestial spirits (22), the later Chou, the so called Classical Age, saw spiritual life flourish in many fields. Prose and poetry of higher artistic value were produced, the legal code was improved and philosophical schools appeared (23). Material culture progressed no less: iron replaced bronze in artifacts and weaponry, irrigation and fertilization as well as craftsmanship improved.

The Confucian school approved of literature, rituals and music as comprising the aesthetic manifestations of human life (24), and asserted that society depended on the mutual sympathy of men. Sympathy emanated from each individual, decreasing in intensity through the series of concentric social circles surrounding him. Sympathy created harmony among all named people of society. He was worthy of a name, who correctly performed his social duties. "The sum total of well defined names, then, comprises a well defined system of human society in general"(25). Dignity and tradition stabilized society

and rites governed behaviour. Each individual having a function in society (name), had his dignity in an appropriate sphere of rights and duties. Antiquity and tradition constituted a universally acceptable authority of everlasting value, highly superior to fortuitous change.

Perhaps Confucianism made the Chinese "the most history-conscious of all the great civilized peoples" (26); certainly it made them easily accept tradition and social norms. The Chinese have been known to cooperate effectively in their social groups by searching the groups' protection and by contributing to the groups' power. "L'individu isole n'est rien; il succomberait infailliblement s'il ne se joignait a d'autres individus" (27).

If Taoism was not interested in "the study of a fixed objective tradition, but the inward contemplation of cosmic conditions" (28), and thus was the negation of Confucianism, the Legalist School elevated the state and government to be ends in themselves, as it were. The Legalists introduced a totalitarian conception of government (29), which had perhaps existed in practice in Shang times (30), but the omnipotence the state involved obedience of both high and low to the law (31). Despotism in ancient history was not confined only to great states with a complex irrigation system, yet, under certain legal restrictions, it seems to have been a

necessary condition for the maintenance and development of such states. Thus in ancient China, the philosophy of the Legalists constituted a logical addition to Confucianism.

(ii) The First Empires. Late Chou China was culturally and topographically well suited for the creation of a centralized state. At least 60 percent of its area lay below 600 feet of elevation and much of it was alluvial land. Its rivers were suitable for navigation over long stretches and had long been supplemented by roads and canals. Hill tribe enclaves were isolated and unimportant, and the Chinese identity was well established. Moreover, the greater part of the population of Central China was by this time of northern derivation so that dialect differences within the state area must have been minimal (32). In addition, nomad pressure, from the steppe border zone necessitated a strong centralized power for its containment. For instance, the separate walls built against nomad incursions since the 5th century B.C. had to be incorporated into an integrated system. This was achieved by Shih Hwang-ti the first emperor, in the 3rd century B.C. (33), who introduced a policy of expansionism by conquest and settlement. The Chinese, by then already organized in extended families and practising ancestor worship, were not inclined to emigrate to newly conquered lands (34). Emigration to the South was enforced, while the Great Wall in the North, marking the boundary between the steppe and the sown,

defended the Chinese, and also delimited their agricultural expansion. The emperor energetically enforced a law code, customs, unified weights and measures, and utilized corvee work in constructing canals, waterways and highways. A navigation canal between the Yangtze and the Hsi Kiang was one of his greatest achievements (35).

The Han dynasty, which inherited the centralized empire from the Ch'in, extended their rule from the Red River delta to the upper reaches of the Sir-Darya and Amu-Darya, and to Mongolia, South Manchuria and Korea (see map IIIA). Under the Han dynasty China maintained overland trade routes with the West and India, and its seamen penetrated deep into Southeast Asia (36).


When the Hsiung Nu stopped direct links with Bactria, the Han conquered Kweichow in a bid to open a new land route to India (37). Three hundred years of Chinese rule in Kweichow Sinicized most of its tribal population; (38) ^{however,} ~~though~~ Tibet, Taiwan and Yueh remained outside the effective rule of the Han empire.

Great technological inventions and improvements mark the Han period. Better astronomical observations brought about the improvement of the calendar, glazed pottery and bronze mirrors exhibited a development in known techniques, and early attempts in porcelain and deep drilling of wells manifested newly acquired techniques. Sculpture, painting, architecture and

MAP III-A
CH'IN and HAN


After Goodrich, 1969(1948)

--- HAN
- - - CH'IN
= = = GREAT WALL



MAP IV-A
THE THREE KINGDOMS

After Goodrich, 1969(1948)



literary expression greatly improved in artistic value, and the unified language and script facilitated communications, education and the functioning of the bureaucracy. Improvement in agriculture was brought about by "drought resistant rice; intertillage; early and late crops; improved crop rotation with beans" (39) and by agricultural instruction. The adaptation of this unified culture and state to physiographical conditions over a wide range of latitude, from the Red and Hsikiang deltas in the south to southern Mongolia in the north, brought about an economic diversity, which in turn supported a steadily growing volume of internal trade. On the other hand, the inability of the Chinese to adapt themselves to nomad life in the steppes, presumably for cultural reasons, caused a perpetual shortage of horses which entailed grave military consequences. Nevertheless, the cultural unity and the strength of the Chinese traditions invariably ensured either the assimilation of nomad conquerors into the Chinese culture or their eventual rejection from China.

Of the three original Yueh territories, Min Yueh was the most difficult to absorb, and indeed retained its independence throughout Ch'in and Han times. This was mainly because of the mountain barrier which isolated it from great valleys inhabited by the Chinese, whereas Tung Yueh, bordering on the Yangtze Delta, was easily accessible and Nan Yueh, broadly corresponding with the

modern Kwangsi and Kwangtung provinces, was relatively easily conquered by the armies crossing the Nan-ling passes into the Hsikiang basin (40). The lowlands of both these conquered Yueh kingdoms were later populated by Chinese settlers (41).

As an epilogue to this chapter it is worthwhile to point out the politico-cultural difference between the feudal and the unified empire eras of China. It seems that the difference in geographical extension resulting from the increase in power of the central government was a paramount feature of that dissimilarity. In four centuries of government the Ch'in and Han more than doubled the Chinese domain which developed during the nine centuries of Chou times. This opened the territories south of the Yangtze to Chinese settlement, and thus, diversified agricultural production. This in turn promoted internal trade over the extended roads and canals. The communications network, the power of the central government and the non-hereditary posts of provincial governors (all imperial achievements) guarded against separatist cultural tendencies which could potentially develop under feudal rule over such a vast area. Although during Chou times, rice cultivation had already spread northwards, and wheat-growing southwards, and Confucianism and Chinese customs had been ubiquitous, the geographical isolation (42) of the main productive areas of China could ~~develop~~ ^{have developed} separate cultures, had

feudalism persisted. In addition, it seems improbable that a feudal China would have populated the South as effectively as did Shih Hwang-ti. The Han conquest of the lands of the nomads, although neglecting to settle them in substantial numbers, pushed many of the nomads to remote areas with poorer grazing capacities thus diminishing their military capabilities. The expansion towards Central Asia opened the way to the silk trade through Bactria (43), and hence to cultural exchange with the Romans, while the capture of the Pearl and Red river mouths certainly promoted maritime links with Southeast Asia.

From a politico-geographical point of view, it seems that the extension of the Chinese oikumene to the South was the most significant achievement of early imperial China. This brought population changes in contemporary peninsular Southeast Asia by waves of Thais migrating there.

The shift of the overall distribution of Chinese population into South China, which continued until the era of industrialization is illustrated in the following table.

Table A-1 - Distribution of Population in China. ⁽⁽⁴⁴⁾⁾ (in percents)

<u>Region/Date</u>	<u>2 A.D.</u>	<u>740 A.D.</u>	<u>1102 A.D.</u>	<u>1491 A.D.</u>
N.E: Shansi, Hopei	23	29	14	12
C.E: Shantung, Honan Hupei, Anhwei, Kiangsu	53	31	24	28
N.W: Szechwan, Shensi Kansu.	16	13	22	11
S. : Provinces South of the Yangtze	8	27	40	49

(iii) From the Fall of the Han to the Yuan. Between the 3rd and the 13th centuries A.D., periods of dynastic imperial rule were interspersed with spells of political fragmentation. The "dynasty cycle" sometimes reached its end when nomads invaded North China, or when wars and corruption reduced the country to disorder, which undermined the effective control of the imperial power over its territory. In such circumstances, one of the feuding lords usually gained enough power to reestablish unity. Like all new brooms, he would indulge in huge^e building projects, for example, fortifications, canals, and in a new capital city (45), activities which in turn promoted economic development and prosperity. But during the rule of later successors, neglect and corruption tended to return, as also did enormous military expenditure (46), which together caused depression and decay of the infrastructure, gradually bringing about the collapse of the dynasty. Thus the wheel came full circle.

The successors of the Han, namely the kingdoms of Wei, Shu and Wu (see map IV-A) occupied three distinct economic areas. ~~The~~ Wei, based on the Hwang Ho, Hwai, Wei and Han rivers, inherited the area of the longest Chinese cultural tradition, which in 2 A.D. accounted for about 75 percent of the population. Not surprisingly it was that the next dynasty, the Tsin, originated from this powerful kingdom. ~~The~~ Shu was centered on the Szechwan basin, its main grain production area, while ~~the~~ Wu controlled the

Yangtze valley as well as the newly acquired Hsi-kiang and Red valleys (47). In cultural terms, Shu and Wu were by then still preoccupied with the problems of lowland and highland tribes (48). The Red River Delta, which was not settled by Chinese peasants, was governed by mandarins, who Sinicized the Viets (Yueh) by imposing upon them their more advanced Chinese institutions, the Chinese form of writing and superior Chinese agricultural practices. While this process certainly modernized the Viets, it could not assimilate them, i.e. make them lose their original identity, so that eventually in the 10th century A.D. they regained their independence.

The Tsin unification was short lived and, indeed, a period of disunity prevailed until the rise of the T'ang (49), while North China was again invaded by ⁿ nomads. It would be mistaken to think that the expansion of Chinese settlement into the South ceased as a result of the political disunity. The contrary may perhaps be more true. Especially when governments changed hands and nomad pressures affected the elaborate irrigation system in the North, internal disorders must have generated more migration than the forced transfers of people experienced in Ch'in and Han times (50). The essential steps of cultural expansion were taken by peasants, merchants, refugees and adventurers (51). Those people coming to inhabit the South during the first millennium A.D., had already known the use of paper, of coal for heating and


smelting, porcelain and gunpowder. The mandarin officials, governors of the new provinces and districts came from a developing system of education which prepared scholars for examinations.

In the first century A.D., Buddhism, which was introduced from India in Han times (52), spread among large parts of the Chinese people. It provided spiritual comfort in the daily struggle for life and in the hour of death, and the ideas of Karma and soul transmigration appealed to those who did not find peace of mind in canonized Confucianism. Buddhism was perhaps the only important external cultural influence which became widely accepted by the ethnocentric Chinese. Returning Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who had travelled to and from India either by land or sea, introduced Indian culture to Chinese scholars and officials. The land route to India followed the ancient Silk Road through Bactria and thence continued through the North West frontier into the Indus Valley and other parts of India. The maritime route went through Southeast Asia to Ceylon and the Bay of Bengal (see map V-A). ~~When~~ In a geographical sense, Buddhist pilgrimages which ceased only when India was Islamized, must have modified the Chinese view of the world, which was thus forced to recognize the existence of another highly developed civilization outside the orbit of the Chinese World Order (53).

The T'ang dynasty extended the Chinese possessions into Manchuria and to parts of Central Asia. In the southern part of the empire, they conquered Yueh and pacified the

MAP V-A
CHINESE PILGRIMS


Fa Hsien (399-414)
Hsuan Tsang (629-645)
I Ching (689-695)



After Goodrich, 1969 (1948)

MAP VI-A

THE CHINESE TRADITIONAL WORLD ORDER



After Ginsburg in
Tang Tsou (ed) 1968

Viets in the Red River delta, naming the area Annam, the "pacified South". However, they did not transfer Chinese settlers into that delta but continued to rule it through their officials and local rulers. In the south east of China however, the indigenous Viet population must have been totally assimilated. Eickstedt discerned racial differences between the Südsinider of this area and the Nordsinider, and perhaps the term T'ang People (54), which the local population use to refer to themselves, may also indicate a small proportion of Han Chinese immigration into the area (55). While the map of the territorial expansion of the Chinese empire in T'ang times indicates a shift of its geographical centre of gravity towards the north west and the north, the "centre of gravity" of the population, nevertheless, shifted southwards, with 40 percent of the population in the area which had broadly constituted the former Wu and Shu kingdoms. In view of the lack of nomad pressure during the heyday of the T'ang, this shift of the "centre of gravity" of the population must have been due to the assimilation of Thais and Yueh people as well as to voluntary or government planned emigration from the North. The scarcity of lowlands in the South, which would suggest less food production than in the North, was in fact compensated by a climate favouring multiple cropping.

The traditional view of Chinese society recognized the existence of four classes: the ^{sc}scholar-administrator (or warring aristocrat of former days) the farmer, the artisan

and the merchant. This order of decreasing importance expressed an idealized outlook on Chinese society as basically an organized state of agriculturalists (56). In fact, the mandarins were to a large extent landed gentry, and it seems plausible that many of the farmers, in the North ~~at~~ Manchuria, were actually landless farm hands or tenants (57). The farmer class was thus in itself hierarchically organized, and the system of tenancy tended to decrease the density of the rural population by rents passed on to the gentry. This may also have constituted a cause for migration to the South, although the Chinese were loath to leave their ancestral graveyards and family homes.

Social values emphasized the primacy of the family over the individual and even over the state or church (58). Filial piety was the most admired of virtues (59). In a society where tradition was extremely venerated and old age was equated with knowledge and authority, normal social pressures, such as those originating from a generation gap or from a natural will for social mobility, were put into a strait-jacket with minimal opportunities to vent themselves. Even familial life became "a regulated system of relations, in which the action befitting each age was fixed by edict" (60). It seems then that wars, expansionist settlement and corvée work mobilizations provided opportunities for the youth to exhibit their pent up non-conformity. Wars, expansionist settlement, and possibly relations with foreign traders in cities or with

surrounding hill tribes offered some of the Chinese an opportunity to come across "barbarians" and to experience a national solidarity when facing an out-group. The literati had even greater awareness of national superiority, which they must have felt when realizing the poverty of adjacent cultures.

The Last Three Empires. At the end of the 11th century, China, under the Sung, was an advanced country compared with the contemporary European and Moslem worlds. Some of its state institutions seem exceedingly modern for their age: a statistics bureau, laws nationalizing commerce, state loans to the needy, income tax, conscription and a postal service (61). Nevertheless, the Sung lost all the territorial possessions beyond the Great Wall, immediately behind which the Hsi-Hsia and the Liao empires were pressing. In the South they lost Annam and showed no interest in the Yunnan based Nan Chao kingdom.

The decline of the Sung represents a recurring process in the cyclic vicissitudes of Chinese dynasties. Neither the people's welfare nor the state's needs constituted motivation for efficient administration in that stage. The maintenance of agriculture was neglected, and tax collection benefited personal and local interests.

Although the Sung had no expansionist ambitions, the strong nomad states to the North compelled them to mobilize and train an army of a million soldiers (62). When laxity and internal feuds brought about the breakdown of the infrastructure, sheer distances became a factor in the

disintegration of the government, thus paving the way for the Mongol conquest.

Kubilai inherited the administrative and military skills of his grandfather Jenghis, and applied them to his kingdom in China. He transferred his capital to Cambaluc (Peking), ^{and} introduced Mongols and other aliens ^{into} the administration, for whose incorporation he had to abolish the system of examinations. The Pax Mongolica reestablished the links with the West and with Inner Asia, diplomatic, commercial and cultural, which gave a more cosmopolitan character to the main Chinese cities. Mongol troops garrisoning Chinese cities and towns contributed to the peaceful administration of the country, but also confronted the Chinese as an outgroup. A proportion of the literati, who could not integrate into the administration swollen by numerous alien officials, must have had real reasons to resent the Mongol rule. And yet, during Kubilai's rule anti-Mongol sentiments did not find organized expression, so that he was able to pursue some costly and unsuccessful campaigns. He secured Yunnan for China, but his campaigns in Burma and Vietnam, as well as his sea attacks on Champa and Java eventually failed.

Kubilai's misadventures in Southeast Asia do not seem to have had any intention of opening those countries for Chinese settlement. He must have tried to reestablish in unequivocal terms the tributary relations of the Southeast Asian countries with China. His strict regulations for tribute missions changed the former affable attitude with which the Chinese emperors had treated

tributaries. He demanded that the tributary seek audience personally, send his sons as hostages, undertake a census of population, provide military corvee, pay taxes and accept a Mongol governor (63). These innovations added a new dimension of hard headed and efficient Mongol Realpolitik to the Chinese concept of the World Order (64).

Resentment against non-assimilated Mongols developed into uprisings during the rule of Kubilai's incompetent successors (65), ^(which ended when the) ~~the~~ Ming reestablished the economy and restored law and order. By 1430, they reduced the Mongols in the north to political impotency from which they have never recovered. The Ming emulated the Mongols in foreign trade relations by sea and land. The great maritime expeditions exhibited the peak of Chinese seafaring achievements (66), which seem to have aimed at reestablishing the tributary system over what seemed to them as included within the Chinese sphere of influence (67). The tribute system, however, was in a sense a sanction for trade relations, and in this light the maritime excursion may seem less extravagant. The expeditions were suddenly stopped, marking a complete volte-face in maritime policy and returning to the pre-Mongol concept of tributary countries. When considered in terms of foreign trade, the Chinese policy seems inexplicable, as during the second half of the Ming period trade with Southeast Asia added tin from Siam and silver from the Philippines to the former forest produce imported to China. Moreover, new powers appeared in tributary Southeast Asia in that period: Islam in Malacca and North

Java, Portuguese and Catholicism as well as the Spanish, all possible/rivals of Chinese/political influence in the region. Yet, instead of supporting the Chinese traders and miners, who had already established small communities in Southeast Asia, the Ming made no attempt to protect them and reimposed earlier bans on emigration (68).

The Ming however, did not hermetically close China to foreign influences. Catholic missionaries introduced European innovations and science, and new food crops from abroad were adopted, which enabled the population growth in late Ming and Ch'ing times (69). Cotton, maize, sweet potatoes, peanuts as well as tobacco revolutionized food production as they did not compete with rice for the better alluvial soils, and yielded generously on the contemporary non-arable uplands. By 1491, 49 percent of the Chinese population lived south of the Yangtze, which area was climatically most suitable for the new foodcrops.

The Ch'ing were Manchu descendants of the Jurchen, who harassed the Ming over a long period and, finally in the 17th century, replaced them as rulers of China. The Ch'ing willingly adapted themselves to the Chinese culture, in fact they identified themselves as Chinese, endeavouring "to maintain orthodoxy with all the zeal of conscious converts"

~~When~~

(70). They reenacted the Ming ban on emigration, but the laws were loosely applied. Trade trickled in through Canton and missionaries came in increasing numbers. It seems however, that the Ch'ing, being harassed from the start by Ming supporters based in Taiwan (headed by Koxinga)

abandoned real interest in their tributary states in Southeast Asia. They mainly concentrated on conquering the steppes of the North and the heights of Tibet, and imposing their suzerainty over Korea. Though they eventually captured Taiwan, they did nothing to contest the European encroachment into the East Indies, the Malacca Straits or even to peninsular Southeast Asia.

Even before the Opium War, the Ch'ing came to face the gravest of all problems encountered by Chinese rulers, namely, the population explosion. In 1794, the population of China reached the phenomenal figure of 313 millions. The problem seems to have stemmed from difficulties in collection and distribution and from disturbed production of food rather than from shortage in means of production. This was brought about primarily by: the high rate of tenancy, natural calamities, the inadequacy of the transportation system, taxes and banditry. The North was more vulnerable to droughts and floods, but even the South had its share of calamities. Upland provinces suffered most, as they were less extensively irrigated and lacked major waterways. The imperial grain reserves were as a general rule neither invested in efforts to extend the cultivated area nor to increase yields or improve roads (71), but in maintaining armies in unproductive steppe provinces and to acquire luxuries. As famine affected rural areas, banditry increased and in turn contributed to further deterioration of the food supply situation. This vicious circle metamorphosed into a flywheel, which gained momentum

from local rebellions in 1774-1813 and culminated in the Taiping ^e Rebellion. The precarious balance between production and consumption further deteriorated, when irrigation canals were not maintained and land fell into disuse. Rostow (72) estimated that in 1658, there were 5.43 cultivated mou (73) per capita, decreasing to 2.49 in 1873. The disorders affected social life no less than they affected the economic life. Peasants lost their lands to usurers and absentee landlords, life in extended families was maintained only by those who profited from the increasing ^o pverty of others, even nucleated families could hardly hold together in times of famine. In those conditions some of the literati joined secret societies with an anti-Manchu character (74). Thus, the decaying dynasty became the target for proto-Chinese nationalism, who recalled that the Court were alien intruders. It is estimated that the rebellions and famines of the second half of the 19th century cost the Chinese 44 million lives (75), largely during the Taiping rebellion. The socio-economic disruptions in 19th century China, created the conditions described by many authors as the "push factor" in Chinese emigration.

The Manchu name has been linked in Chinese history with Opium. The plague of smoking opium began at the end of the 17th century, though the plant had been known as a medicine centuries before (76). When piracy began harassing the Chinese coasts, the Chinese themselves began cultivating the plant, but could not satisfy local demand. Europeans, Arabs, Chinese and Indians indulged in the trade

to the detriment of the Chinese people. In 1729, an imperial decree forbade the sale of opium and in 1800, importation was prohibited (77), yet, the evil continued to afflict the Chinese in China as well as in the Nan Yang. The inability of the Manchu to stop their officials from conniving with opium traders and to check smuggling also manifested the corruption of the regime.

X X X X X X

Looking back on the development of relations between China ^{and} the Nan Yang, as conceptually incorporated into the Chinese World Order, it seems that it underwent several phases. On the whole, China did not have a distinct expansionist intention of settlement, but rather at times, showed some irrationally strong interests in, or ignorance of the region. During the Shang and Chou periods, Southeast Asia, which had not yet been subject to Indian influence, was a cultural extension of tribal South China. This seems to have been the period, when Deutero-Malays came with their superior material culture to displace the Proto-Malays from the richer soils and the better coasts. The limited power of the Chou and their interests in inland China did not produce maritime links of consequence with Southeast Asia.

Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti was preoccupied with the area of the ^{Eighteen Provinces} ~~the ~~the~~ provinces~~, and at this stage backward Southeast Asia had no relations with China. The Han invaded the Red River Delta, perhaps with the intention of promoting settlement, but this process stopped when they encountered opposition. The Han could not or would not deal with the state of Nan Chao, which from its position in Yunnan,

blocked the southward land route to India and to peninsular Southeast Asia. They may have maintained tribute and trade relations with the region which implies that they could be well informed on developments there. These sea expeditions were too costly as in return for Chinese gold and silk they brought back curios and rare animals etc. (78).

The T'ang improved on the Han achievements in relations with Southeast Asia. They conquered the seafaring Min Yueh, thus securing an important coastal stretch in times when Chinese shipping used to hug the coasts and they also traded with the Philippines and pacified Annam. The Yuan however, showed the most powerful Chinese interest and intervention in the region, aggressively trying to impose the Chinese World Order on it. Its invasions into Peninsular Southeast Asia, shook Burma and Vietnam and indirectly led to the downfall of the Khmers, and both Champa and Java were invaded with the help of the great Mongol fleet. The failure to maintain the Chinese occupation of Southeast Asia resulted directly from unsuccessful battles, but in a broader sense the entire Mongol effort in this area seems irrational in its conception. China had no need for territorial expansion in those days, as population pressure had not become a problem, and during Kubilai's reign the state enjoyed internal economic prosperity; conversely, Southeast Asia did not constitute any threat to China, except perhaps by piracy. The Mongol war effort seems to have been wasted on reestablishing trade and tributary relations, a policy which was definitely irrational in terms

of cost efficiency.

Theoretically, the non aggressive maritime expeditions of the Ming and their growing trade with the Nan Yang, might have developed into a Chinese monopolization of the trade with the region. Muslim traders had no real power to back them against such a Chinese bid, and the Portuguese were not to be seen in the area until almost a century later. Why the Ming did not engage in a maritime trade policy is a matter of speculation. It seems however, that China had no similar spice problem as Europe had in those days, and that other tropical produce also was marginal to its economy. In any event China certainly did not show any real knowledge of European market demand before the arrival of the Portuguese missionaries (79). In the early 15th century, China had not yet experienced the population explosion of the 17th century, and hence did not experience an acute need for emigration. Internal migration to South China could solve the problems created by disorders and depression, whereas in the 19th and 20th century, with all arable land practically occupied, only emigration could relieve the population pressure. The Ming, however, had at their disposal enough people to man trading stations in Southeast Asia without suffering from chronic man power shortage which bedevilled the Portuguese. By turning inwards, China lost its chance to develop as a maritime power, as a monopoly of the trade with Southeast Asia could have initiated real maritime developments and perhaps a will for world exploration.

The Ch'ing suffered from the maritime handicap inherited from the Ming although external trade was gradually developing (80). By the time of the Ch'ing ascent to power, the Spanish and the Dutch had already been established in the region. Their naval superiority over the Chinese in construction, gunnery, tactics and navigation stemmed from their superior scientific knowledge, which the Chinese ignored at their peril. The Europeans, including the British, navigated through the South and East China Seas, and challenged the Chinese belief of Yuan times that those were Chinese territorial waters. This was perhaps the first successful intervention of the West in Chinese political affairs, which in effect did not seem to perturb the Chinese Court.

Within the overall Chinese traditional view of the world order (81) (see map VIA), Southeast Asia was divided into three categories. Presumably because of its proximity and its related experience of Sinicization, the Red River Delta belonged to the Periphery like Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia for example. The rest of peninsular Southeast Asia, as well as northeast Sumatra, British Borneo and Palawan (82), were included in the Inner Asian Zone, of which the Periphery formed part. They shared the same status as Bactria and sub-taiga Siberia, perhaps as countries traditionally incorporated into the tribute system. The rest of Southeast Asia belonged to the Outer Asian Zone, like India for instance. This implies that status in the hierarchy was assigned less by the development of the country, and more according to proximity

and accessibility to China. The traditional frontiers of China were traced between the ~~Inner~~ ^{Inner} ~~Asian~~ and Outer Asian Zones, thus including the Straits of Malacca within them, and implying that the South and East China Seas were considered as mare nostrum. (83)

If however, the Chinese World Order is a reality in the sense that it may become an ideology leading to political and military actions, the Chinese may attempt to revive the claims to sovereignty over the East and South China seas, especially in view of the possibility that important oil deposits may be found in the continental shelves. Thus the Chinese World Order, though at present a dormant conception, may be harnessed to a new Realpolitik, if step by step China develops sufficient strength to give effect to such a policy. The reconquest of Tibet, the border disputes with India and the Soviet Union, as well as implicit political moves in Southeast Asia and the Ryukyus may indicate such tendencies (84).

Nationalism and Communism.

The profound cultural/changes which China experienced in the last 130 years, gradually introduced the concept of a nation state as ^avalue commanding a high degree of allegiance. In practice, this meant that primordial loyalties ~~inherent~~ ^{inherent} in the familial and parochial levels were subject, more especially in times of crisis, to the ~~former~~ ^{former} allegiance.

The 1839-1894 period was characterized by foreign invasion and the formation of new ideas in the minds of an ever increasing number of politically aware Chinese (85). This period may be called the Hatching Period as it

produced the socio-economic conditions necessary for modern nationalism. The period from 1895 to 1911 saw progress in revolutionary strength until the successful revolution. The internal disturbances and foreign invasions experienced during the days of the Republic and especially during the Kuo Min Tang (K.M.T.) rule, tended to decrease the unity of mind, which had been achieved before. Loyalty to the nation-state declined as warlords and corrupt officials exploited the population, who had hoped that the change of regime would bring the end to socio-economic evils.

The communist victory in 1949, perhaps did not initially produce more positive popular sentiments than the usual at the beginning of a new dynastic cycle. But from that time ~~on~~^{onwards} the country enjoyed peace and underwent^e substantial socio-economic developments within an atmosphere of intense party ideological activities. As a result, the great majority of the people harnessed themselves to produce a wide popular positive response to a sacrifice demanding state-idea.

The Impact of the West. The economic deterioration which afflicted China before the Opium War did not essentially differ from former periods of waning dynastic power, and had the West interfered not in Chinese affairs, the normal expectation would have been the ascent of a new dynasty. But, the second half of the 19th century was marked by an intense rural-urban migration (86) which created a new proletariat, largely underemployed, which increasingly came under the spell of those literati, well versed in

modern social and political ideas of the West. These developments exposed traditional Chinese customs to attack, and it became clear that traditional superstitions and cultural stagnation (87) could not match the rational vigour of the material culture introduced by the West. As a result, the new urbanites, especially in the open ports of Southeastern China and the lower Yangtze valley, became more open to modern socio-economic ideas. The process was naturally facilitated by the fact that many of the immigrants were uprooted from their traditional familial setting and usually were young.

(i) Political Developments. It has been argued that "patriotic and loyal devotion to the conception of an abstract sovereign state did not exist until after the establishment of the Republic" (88). This, however, seems to overlook localized phenomena, which though largely ineffective at the time, had important influence on the growth of Chinese nationalism. The Boxer Rebellion is a well known example, but even xenophobia and localized riots and strikes manifested a sort of nationalist devotion to the state. It must be remembered in this respect, that the West penetrated China at a time when socio-economic conditions were also causing growing hatred against the Manchus, but that not until the first decade of the 20th century, ^{did} any alternative government ^{seem} ~~appeared~~ possible.

The socio-economic changes in China must have occurred without the Court's comprehension. The self-imposed Manchu isolation from external affairs was in a sense extended to internal matters at least in respect of

modern social developments (89).

The Treaty of Nanking opened five ports, from Canton to Shanghai, to European trade, and ceded Hong Kong to the British. Later, low tariff schedules and extra-territorial rights were conceded to other European countries, while Christian missionaries received permission to ~~operate~~^{operate} in the port cities and in the countryside. The concessions seemed to the Chinese unequal, in the sense that they were extorted under armed threats, yet, the Europeans deemed them insufficient. After the second Opium War (1856-1860), ten new ports were opened in North China and on the Yangtze, which gave the Europeans open access to vast and densely populated areas.

The two wars lowered the prestige of China in international politics, and indirectly enabled the Russians to gain the Chinese territories north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri, while the French gained three provinces of the tributary Annamite lands. They were followed by the Japanese, who, having defeated the Chinese in 1894, received Taiwan, got war indemnities and established the independence of Korea, as well as favourable trading-rights. It was perhaps the Open Door policy, which regulated the spheres of influence, tariffs and trading rights, which saved the political integrity of China, though it continued to harm its economy (90).

The contacts with the West affected a wide range of social classes in China. The least culturally affected were the peasantry and the rural population in general (91). Urban workers were indirectly affected either by Chinese

employers, who under European influence introduced modern industry into China, or by Chinese traders and compradores. The traders were swift in learning the mechanisms of world trade, finance and shipping. Some of the literati, perhaps through informal relations with Western diplomats, missionaries or intellectuals, acquired modern Western social, economic and political ideas and organization systems. The political humiliation of China and ^{the} social unrest, especially in the lower Yangtze and the Southeast, drove some intellectual groups of provincial and national significance to seek reform by modernizing China. The Japanese model of their time and China's past cultural grandeur suggested the feasibility of that task. A group headed by the Great Viceroy envisaged a technologically advanced China, loyal to the dynasty and to Confucianism. K'ang Yu Wei had a more "radical social and political philosophy" (92), but did not anticipate the abolition of the Court. Sun Yat Sen led a republican movement, radical both in social and in political ideas.

The Court in ignorance or contempt of the changes in the Chinese urban society and of the power of the West, suppressed the reformers and let loose the Boxers (93), only to suffer more humiliation and more European penetration. Its inability to unite the Chinese, who basically hated the Westerners, spelt its doom.

(ii) Cultural Development. Of all the Europeans, the missionaries had the most profound contacts and knowledge of the Chinese and their culture (94).

Nevertheless, European merchants, soldiers, and diplomats, though usually leading a segregated life, brought about a more intense change in the Chinese culture, firstly by representing the Westerner in his imperialist attire, and secondly by actually thrusting Western material culture and customs upon the Chinese mind. Thus,

→ Anti-foreignism, whether conscious or unconscious in attitude, and implicit or explicit in behaviour, immediately unified the Chinese in-group in a political context.

Another response to the Western impact, when particularized, produced the following reactions: emulation, rejection or adaptation, sometimes distinctly separated, sometimes interwoven.

Emulation befits the Chinese reaction to Western technology, commerce, finance, weaponry, tactics and communications system. Chinese men of action in those fields responded to European initiative by a similar reaction. Officials, the military, scientists and the private entrepreneur as well as the factory worker represented the group who emulated the European material culture. Their acquisition of new skills and changes in attitudes brought about the development of the Chinese railway system, port facilities, industrialization in the larger cities and the modernization of the armed forces.

Rejection in an extreme form was the reaction of small circles of zealots, but in addition a much larger part of the population, rural and urban, practised it to a more limited extent. The former manifested their attitude in The Boxer Rebellion, and in the spectacular purchase for

its destruction of the first railway from Shanghai to Wusung (95). Moreover, the vast majority of the population who came to know the work of the missionaries totally rejected their teachings, feeling that their own beliefs were superior to those of the Westerners.

Adaptation mainly concerned the political, social and economic ideas of the West. Whereas technologies and scientific knowledge had to be copied, social ideologies had to be adapted. Modern ideas of democracy, social organization and their underlying economic base became known to active groups of reformers. Though they were not incorporated into ideologies before the early decades of the 20th century, they gave rise to discussions, enriched thinking and educated a new intellectual elite.

Imported foreign-made manufactured goods and also the products of the new industries in Shanghai and other cities outmarketed the traditional cottage industries and so increased rural poverty. Modern Western transportation coastal, riverine and overland reduced Chinese owned companies to secondary roles. Foreign owned companies in services and manufacturing were not bound by restrictions against remitting profits abroad, while foreign investment in general kept pouring in (96). And it goes without saying that the Westerners monopolized both the import and export trade.

The Court of Japan, in contradistinction to that of China understood the importance of, and favoured, economic modernization. Since 1868 the former had invested state capital in building the basic infrastructure (97), while the latter, in general, neither invested nor fostered

private capital investment. In particular, the nascent Chinese capitalism did not get any protection from the government of the Manchu (98), but it should be noticed that the West put much more military pressure on China than on Japan. It thus happened that in 1887, out of a total budget of 25.5 million taels the Chinese allocated 18.7 million to military purposes (99).

During the late Manchu period the reformists strongly opposed the traditional education system with its complicated examinations based on historical texts (100). In 1905/6 the examinations for officials were abolished (101), and in 1910 there were already 52,000 modern schools with 1.6 million pupils (102).

Thus, China underwent the 1911 revolution when a considerable number of its intelligentsia, urban businessmen, and proletariat had already been influenced by the West. Moreover, those emigrating to the Nan Yang during that period, though most non-intellectuals, usually belonged to the group thus influenced.

Nationalism under the Kuo Min Tang. As European books on the social sciences were translated into Chinese by the end of the 19th century, and young Chinese meanwhile went to study abroad, the radical intellectuals extended their ranks. New ways of organizing mass movements in political parties became known and popular support increased. This support came from urban workers rather than from rural areas, and was primarily based on the cities of the Southeast and the Lower Yangtze (103). These cities, in effect, secondary

cultural nodes, constituted traditional centres of anti-Manchu activity, while the cultural core area in the North, and especially Peking were traditionally pro-Manchu.

Sun Yat Sen's importance as an ideologist exceeded his achievements in actual leadership. Besides European political thought, including Marxism and Communism, he was deeply influenced by Japanese modernization and by their victory over the Russians. This proved that the Europeans were not invincible and that Asians could be more than a match for them, given material means (104). He saw in the European intervention in China an evil no less dangerous than the Manchu Court itself. Expulsion of the Europeans was essential for reasons of national pride as well as for protecting the embryonic Chinese industry.

The Three Principles became the official ideology of the K.M.T. and after its access to power, it promulgated this ideology by propaganda and the school curriculum both in China and among the Chinese communities abroad (105).

According to Sun Yat Sen, the first principle, namely: Nationalism, was non-existent in China. Its absence resulted from the Confucian tradition which did not approach problems practically in a modern politico-economic setting. However, Sun Yat Sen revered the teachings of the ancients and believed that "Chinese nationalism had to be based on the old morality of China" (106). The Chinese constituted a race but not a nation

as they ~~had~~^{were bound by} kinship, common language and livelihood, common religion and habits (107), but their loyalties ended at the family and clan levels (108). Thus the Chinese people were in danger of being assimilated by the industrialized countries, which not only had a higher population growth rate, but also exerted a stranglehold upon the Chinese economy. Sun Yat Sen's conjuring up of a White Peril (109) added a new dimension to the ~~recent~~^{growing} anti-foreignism of the Chinese (110).

Democracy was the second principle of Sun Yat Sen. According to him it had existed in ancient China (111) and meant an egalitarian social system. In contemporary China, the Manchu government showed no interest in the welfare of the whole nation, favouring a small elite group at the expense of the majority. Sun Yat Sen's criticism of Western democracy suggests that he regarded the second principle as subordinate to the first (112). This may have meant that a strong government had to be involved in people's affairs, and that individual rights were secondary to those of the state. This outlook of Sun Yat Sen is not at all surprising, if one takes into account the influence of Marxism-Leninism on the several stages of his political thought (113). His division of people into three intelligence and capability categories, namely: "discoverers", "promoters" and "operators" (114), sharply contrasts with Western democratic thought, and anticipates perhaps a hierarchy of party leaders, functionaries or cadres, and the common people (115).

His third principle, Livelihood, represented the

material basis of the Chinese nation state. To realize this would involve land reform and the regulation of capital, "nationalization of transportations and communications, direct taxation or income tax and socialized distribution or cooperative societies" (116). Livelihood was to be achieved by evolution and peaceful methods, for Sun Yat Sen rejected the Marxist class struggle as "pathological" (117).

The revolution broke out on the 10th of October 1911 in Wuhan, and provincial capitals followed suit declaring their own independent republics. On the 1st of January 1912 Sun Yat Sen was proclaimed president of the provisional Chinese republic with its headquarters in Nanking. But in order to prevent a threatened political cleavage between North and South, Sun Yat Sen resigned his presidency in favour of the traditionalist Yuan Shi Kai, who had little sympathy for the ideas of the republic and aspired to found a new dynasty of his own. Thus in 1917 Sun Yat Sen set up the first of a series of rival governments in Canton, as far as possible from Peking, yet in a position to command a widely developed rural area, and in close contact with Hong Kong and the Nan Yang, from where material support could be raised. Thereafter, the cleavage between Peking, the bastion of the former Manchu regime, and Canton, the centre of the radicals, increased.

While the government in the North was preoccupied with warlordism and factionalism the K.M.T. in the South began to create a modern army under Chiang Kai Shek, which eventually advanced northwards to capture Wuhan and Nanking,

controlling the main Yangtze lowlands. However, within the K.M.T., perhaps under the influence of Russian communist advisers and Chinese officers returning from studies in the U.S.S.R., a communist left wing was organized in the early 1920's. Chiang Kai Shek, who meanwhile succeeded Sun Yat Sen (118), purged the K.M.T. from the communists by a bloody massacre in 1927, and after continuing his military advance to Peking in 1928, formally inaugurated a new National Government at Nanking on the 10th October 1928. Although in a superficial sense the unity of China had thus been restored, personal rivalries, warlordism, and the deep enmity between the K.M.T. and the Communists continued.

Between 1927 and 1937, the government was increasingly preoccupied on several fronts. While it continued to oppose the Communists, the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. Although some economic progress was achieved during that decade, an enormous army had been mobilized to fight the warlords, Japanese, and the communists. This strained the economy of China; but, the loss of Manchuria with its heavy industrial resources was a national disaster of the first magnitude. ←

→ Belatedly the K.M.T. and the communists united in the Anti-Japanese Front in 1937, but could do practically nothing against a Japanese superiority in armament, military skill and organization, and but for the outbreak of W.W.II and the Allied defeat of Japan in 1945, China would have remained part of the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere.

While during the radicals' struggle against the Manchu,

the Nan Yang Chinese as a ~~whole~~^{whole} supported the former, not the least as a result of the geographical origin of that movement, which conformed with the parochial loyalties of the emigrant communities, ~~whereas~~ the K.M.T. - Communist struggle politically divided these communities. By the 1920s nationalism had already absorbed the minds of many of the Nan Yang Chinese, but class differentiation which generally occurred in their countries of residence, made them experience some facets of that crucial struggle. However, they tightened their ranks again in 1937, when the Anti-Japanese Front was created and supported China by increased financial contributions and by boycotts of Japanese goods.

After W.W.II, the K.M.T. government returned to the better part of China including Manchuria, when both itself and the Communists were engaged in a scramble for territory. However, since 1947, when open war between them broke out, the K.M.T. lost entire armies and provinces almost at a stroke, and at Peking on the first of October 1949, the Communists proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese Peoples' Republic.

The basic socio-economic evils which had plagued 19th century China, could not be got rid of during the K.M.T. rule. Landlordism (119), high land rents (120) and the small size of holdings (121) aggravated the ~~poverty situation~~ situation of the peasants. Military campaigns, banditry over-taxation and the corruption of officials could reduce entire districts to sub-subsistence level, at least temporarily. The K.M.T. could never implement its promises

of land reform. In the first place, large rural tracts were excluded from its effective control, being under communist rule (122) or under warlords. In the second place, the revolutionary zeal of the K.M.T. officials seems to have relaxed after the K.M.T. gained control of the government. Following the Three Principles, they did not practise class struggle, and as many of their officials originated from the wealthier classes, they had little interest in capital redistribution. In addition, the K.M.T. faced the Japanese invasion and they could not afford to create a further split in Chinese society. Perhaps also they underestimated the value of peasants' support, having made their revolution mainly in the urban areas of the Southeast and the centre.

Migration from the countryside to the towns must have continued under both the Yuan Shih Kai republic and under the K.M.T., as the rural areas continued to be plagued by warfare of one kind or another. This and the shift from craftsmanship to industrial production changed the social structure of Chinese society. When education became more modernized and propaganda more efficient, changes in values also occurred. Craft guilds, secret and religious societies and clan associations gave place to modern voluntary associations of trade unions, political parties and students' associations. As a result of population movements into the urban sector, traditional values became less operative in individual and group behaviour, and modern values and ideologies took their place. Anti-imperialism, communism, and nationalism became slogans of

workers and students, who manifested their new values by participation in actual combat, riots and strikes.

X The introduction of Pai Hua (123) into literature and Kuo Yü (124) as a common spoken language improved communication among the youth of various provinces. The modernization of the media and of the transportation system brought the voice of nationalism to remote parts of China, and more people into the centres of cultural change. In the 1920s nationalism affected almost every household in China.

Women, though relatively inactive politically, gained from the collapse of the rigid traditional laws and customs. The civil code of 1931 stated that "a male heir was no longer a vital necessity to the family" and marriage required the consent of both partners. The emancipation of women was a spectacular aspect of China's social modernization. Although it only marginally affected the Chinese overseas communities, which did not experience the process of modernization ~~whenever~~ taking place in China itself, the Chinese emigrants of the 1920s and 1930s had all come under its influence.

In striking contrast to the almost total lack of interest shown under the Manchu regime, the new Republic sought to establish contacts with the Overseas Chinese, and in particular with those of the Nan Yang. The almost complete diplomatic introversion of the Manchus was replaced under the Republic by active diplomatic and consular relations, a process whose origins can be traced to the radicals' and reformists' indoctrination and fund raising

missions of the early 1900s. Later, when financial and moral support from the Nan Yang, combined with remittances on a familial basis, enabled the Chinese government to balance its trade deficit, Chinese consulates and government officials actively influenced overseas K.M.T. branches and the Chinese education system in the countries concerned. Assimilation of the Chinese communities would have served China's interests badly. The split between communists and K.M.T. supporters in China was faithfully reflected in the Nan Yang, and the Chinese government, anxious to maintain the inflow of foreign currency from the communities abroad, tried hard to maintain K.M.T. leadership in them. To this effect, the K.M.T. government had to restrain its extreme anti-imperialist propaganda, and in 1932, following protests from the British, the Chinese authorities supplied special text-books to the Chinese schools in Malaya and the Straits Settlements, from which anti-imperialist propaganda, formerly included, had been removed. Moreover, in its concern to maintain the inflow of remittances to itself and to decrease the communists' possibility to raise funds, the Chinese government collaborated with the British in Hong Kong against communist agitators.

Nevertheless, this reduction in anti-imperialist propaganda did not ~~weaken~~ ^{weaken} the Chinese government's claim of sovereignty over the Chinese communities in the Nan Yang; they still maintained their jus-sanguinis citizenship laws, and had a specified number of seats in the parliament ^{allocated} for Overseas Chinese (125). Unofficially the Chinese government

also sponsored any Chinese activities in the Nan Yang, which increased Chinese awareness and confrontation with the imperialists, so long as this did not threaten the flow of remittances. In this context it sometimes unofficially referred to some countries in the Nan Yang as tributaries, perhaps trying to instil hopes in the Chinese communities ~~and~~ specifically in Malaya and the Straits Settlements.

The geographical pattern of the struggle between the Manchu, the K.M.T., and the Communists, each representing an ideological sub-culture endeavouring to spread over the entire cultural area of China by annihilating its opponents, was closely linked with extending intensive control over a significant cultural region as a preliminary base for later expansion (126).

The cultural core area of the Manchu, like those of the Ming and the Yuan, was Peking and depended on the lower Hwang-Ho as a food producing area, although in density of population and in agricultural and, later, in industrial production the Yangtze lowlands constituted the major productive area of China. Distance and absence of geographical obstacles made both the lower Yangtze and the lower Hwang-Ho basins almost inseparable although climatically they were two significant entities. However, the remote and relatively secluded Hsi-kiang and Pearl River lowlands in the vicinity of Canton constituted an isolated cultural zone (127). This made it a traditional centre of anti-Manchu movements, as were the port cities of Fukien. The impact of the West differentially affected these distinct cultural regions of China in time and in mode of influence,

and thus sharpened the differences between them.

Kwangtung and Fukien felt the influence of the West first, mainly as a result of commercial activities. Second, in that respect, came the lower Yangtze basin in association with the modernization of transport, industry and commerce, and lastly the northern centres of Peking and Tientsin were affected mainly in the form of commerce and diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, towards the end of the 19th century, the Russians began industrializing south Manchuria, but were replaced in this, as in other respects, by the Japanese early in the 20th century, thus creating an additional distinct cultural region.

As the moderate reformers had no intention to topple the regime by force, they did not need a specific cultural region as a base to mobilize an army, and thus they mainly operated in the cultural core area of Peking. Conversely, the radicals needed a secure base as an "hatching area" for future military activities. The choice of the Hsi-Kiang and Pearl River region seemed natural for its distance, difficult approach overland in relation to the naval weakness of the Manchu, the political attitude of the population as well as for its excellent links with Hong Kong and the Nan Yang communities (128). The radicals, having built up their strength, emulated the first strategic movement of the Taiping rebels by moving north and capturing the Yangtze basin. Although because of its proximity to the Manchu (and later to the Yuan Shi Kai Government) core area and its lack of natural defences, the Yangtze basin could not have served as a "hatching centre", it was in fact

the main source of China's livelihood and the river was a vital artery connecting the Szechwan basin to the sea. The importance of the Yangtze basin was further enhanced with the development of modern industry, and after the creation of the Nanking government in 1928, the Yangtze basin became the core area of K.M.T. China. Chiang's choice of Nanking as capital was determined, among other factors (129), by its central position, not too close to the Japanese in Liaotung and not too far from the Communist centre in the mountains of Hunan and Kiangsi.

Despite its control over the geographical core area of China i.e. the Yangtze basin, the K.M.T. regime did not achieve lasting success. In brief, it was faced with a combination of problems which it proved unable to solve. The K.M.T. failure to tackle the socio-economic problems of China undermined its political appeal. In addition, it was under constant and heavy pressure from the Japanese, and also from the communists in China, who claimed to offer drastic solutions to China's socio-economic problems (130). The K.M.T. failure to solve China's problems involved two more shifts of their political centre from the geographical centre of China. The first, under Japanese pressure, was into the Szechwan basin, and the second, under Communist pressure, was from the mainland into Taiwan. The Szechwan basin, like the Canton region, offered an agricultural area encircled by natural defences. But in view of the Japanese naval superiority, Canton was deemed unsuitable. On the other hand, the choice of Taiwan was governed by considerations of Communist naval inferiority (131). Both the Szechwan and Taiwan bases were considered by the K.M.T. as "hatching areas" for a future recapture of China.

The Emergence of Communist China. The Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) claimed to be the sole legitimate heirs of Sun Yat Sen's K.M.T., which, as noted, was politically advised by Soviet experts. After the expulsion of the communists from the K.M.T. they had to reorganize from scratch, not unlike the beginning of Sun Yat Sen's government in Canton. Their "hatching area" in the mountains of Hunan and Kiangsi, though the best available, was far from ideal. It was too close to the K.M.T. bases in the Yangtze lowlands and too far from the U.S.S.R. borders through which arms could be brought in. The Long March to the North West brought the communists to a better base, centred around Yen-an. After W.W.II, the Communists outmanoeuvred the K.M.T. — partly with Russian help — but not before long, the first signs of political friction between China and the Soviet Union appeared, although their common ideological and political affiliation seemed strong as ever before.

(i) Political and Economic Development. The Chinese Communist state proved stronger and less amenable than European satellites of the U.S.S.R.. Instead, it emphasized the Chinese nature of its revolution and refused to accept Russian hegemony over the Communist World (132). This presumably resulted from the Chinese achievement in defending and administering their base in Yen-an, which they did practically without foreign aid, and from their success in routing the K.M.T. as well as their performance in the Korean War. Their administration of the Yen-an base made the standard of living in this area not worse than in government-held areas during the 1930s and 1940s. According

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to Communist sources, the C.C.P.-controlled areas contained 83 million people in 1944/45. These areas were less rewarding than the government held Szechwan basin, but observers agreed that inflation in them was less rampant than in Chungking, and that the leadership showed more dedication and evoked in return popular solidarity (133). In addition, by 1949, the C.C.P. survived almost 30 years of intra-party struggle from which it emerged more cohesive than ever under the leadership of Mao Tze Tung (134).

Even before 1949, the C.C.P. had some reasons for suspecting the goodwill of, and cooperation from the Soviet Union. If Russian pressure on the C.C.P. to avoid attacking the Japanese in 1944/45 was perhaps justified for strategic reasons, Stalin's suggestion in 1948, that the Chinese Red Army should consolidate on the Yangtze line before attacking South China (135), must have seemed a transparent move to establish a division of China by allowing Chiang to regroup behind the river. However, between 1949 and 1960 China seemed an integral part of the Communist Bloc. It supported the Soviet global policy by intervening in Korea and South Vietnam, and this attitude was reinforced by renewed political introversion resulting partly from the American inspired diplomatic boycott of China, and from the American policy of "containing China". During this period of isolation, China regained Tibet, presumably because it considered the latter as a territory traditionally belonging to ~~China~~ ^{itself}, and severed its relations with India because of borderline disputes indicating that the C.C.P. followed the K.M.T. policy of

non recognition of territorial arrangements concluded under Unequal Treaties. Although the Bandung Conference constituted an interlude in China's isolation by seeking international cooperation mainly in Southeast Asia, China indulged itself even further in political isolation when its relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in 1957 (though it became known only in 1960). A Soviet refusal to supply, or aid in developing, an independent Chinese nuclear arsenal seems to have been the main reason.

In its extreme isolation, Chinese Communism seems to have been alternately dominated by two main political forces, namely, leftists and rightists. The former, driven by spiritual zeal, tried to brush off economic laws and political realities, when they tried to turn mass labour into capital at a stroke during the Great Leap Forward (G.L.F.) period, or when they made a bid to evoke revolutionary agitation among the Nan Yang Chinese during the Cultural Revolution (136). The rightists demonstrated a more balanced approach to internal economic problems and to world politics as well as to the Overseas Chinese (137). But however unstable the period of 1957-1973 was, toward the end of it China emerged as a World Power. In 1964 it joined the nuclear club, and in 1967 — the "thermo-nuclear club" (138), and having abandoned its policy of isolationism after the Cultural Revolution, it replaced Taiwan in the U.N.O., extended its diplomatic relations, and, most important of all, improved its relations with the U.S.A.

It is doubtful whether this change of policy by China

has erased its image as an expansionist power of invading hordes or by subversive ideology, in the eyes of the Southeast Asian peoples and governments (139). But the Nan Yang Chinese of all political shades have generally relished the growth of China's prestige as it has been accrediting the whole Chinese cultural group (140).

Not unlike its political prestige, the economic progress of China has been inconsistent in trend as a result of the leftist-rightist confrontation (141), but its overall achievements seem to lag behind its political performance. Land reform and later collectivization (142) culminated in the creation of the communes (143). Although they did not totally solve the pressing agricultural problems of China, they increased food production, equalized its consumption and produced surplus for industrial development (144). The growth in industrial production was more spectacular than that of the agricultural sector. Iron, steel, coal, cement, paper and in fact all other economic products significantly rose in output (145), and this was achieved with a growing output per capita, as the increase in average wage per worker has proved. Also, government control slowed down price rises (146).

Industrial, but mainly agricultural production suffered considerable setbacks during the ~~Cultural Revolution~~ (G.L.F.) period, and presumably during the Cultural revolution as well. The Three Bitter Years which followed the G.L.F. may have been an official word coinage designated to put the blame of the economic flop on a climatic force majeure. Only in 1965, the net domestic product per capita regained the level of

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1957 (147), after the "rightist bureaucracy" had taken over control from Mao (148).

As the massive expatriation of Chinese nationals from Indonesia painfully took place during the Three Bitter Years, this did not tend to improve the image of China among the Nan Yang Chinese, and it is doubtful whether China will be in a position to take in any more Chinese refugees, or whether these refugees will choose China but for the extreme cases involving life and death situations.

(ii) Cultural Developments. The C.C.P. inherited from the K.M.T. Republic a Chinese society whose family, clan and speech group loyalties must have grown in frustration of the socio-economic failures of the K.M.T.. This growing solidarity within traditional groupings, inasmuch as it decreased allegiance to the state or increased inter-group pugnacity, had to be supplanted by the Communist state idea (149).

One of the main features of China's state-idea, as in most of the communist countries, has been a strong demand for personal sacrifices for the state's benefit. It has mainly materialized in demand for high production and low personal consumption for state-owned capital creation. The communists have instilled this state-idea by three major agents: cadres' personal example, the propaganda system, and formal education.

While the literati officials of the Manchu period and K.M.T. cadres of Chiang's Republic were involved in cheating in examinations, buying official posts, nepotism and illegal wealth accumulation (150) thus abusing

the state-idea of the Republic period, the Communists introduced a new leadership at all levels of society, which was almost completely non-corrupt. These communist cadres came from a non "bourgeois" origin, which increased their loyalty to the state and their credibility in the eyes of the people. Since 1935, when Mao suppressed factionalism and Comintern manipulations inside the party, they all were of one mind as regards their loyalties to the state (151), and would follow party directives without a second thought (152). Even the rightist-leftist controversy, which must have affected their ranks, did not corrupt them. To guard against human laxity, commune cadres had to perform manual work in the field for 60-120 days a year (153), and university staff and students likewise had to do manual work.

Perhaps the best known propaganda means have been the ubiquitous loudspeakers and slogan posters in China, but the media was no less effective. Yet, propaganda was hammered in also in small group meetings where face-to-face relations were intended to achieve "automatic reconciliation with the collective spirit" (154). More violent means of propaganda presumably also existed, as already in 1942 Mao had laid down instructions for terrorizing ideological recalcitrants by shouting and frightening (155). This was extensively practised during the early days of the Cultural Revolution, when millions of youths roamed the country and clashed with the army and party cadres eventually turning the political tide in Mao's favour. But excessive propaganda must have created some disbelief of charismatic leadership in the eyes of the people, who at present

seem to be more inclined to accept pragmatic administration rather than a fanatic messiah (156).

Cadres' devotion and constant propaganda are a common characteristic of communist leadership and especially among the Chinese communists of the Nan Yang. The prolonged and stubborn guerrilla activities in border regions of Malaysia and Thailand and the continued existence of clandestine urban communist groups, may be explained in part by the quality of their leadership. It has been known that China used to train picked up Chinese and other Southeast Asian communists (157), and also used to recruit communist activists from the Nan Yang students who had come to China for studies. Some communist Chinese of the Nan Yang countries have infiltrated official Chinese organizations in their countries, but while this in itself is not sufficient to subvert entire organizations, it may keep alive a communist element in many Chinese key organizations.

An education system existed in Communist held territories since 1934, its primary role being political indoctrination (158). Since 1951, the Communists geared the education system towards production and "unity of theory and practice". This required that indoctrination prevail over individual thought as regards many fields of study, and stressed that education existed "to perpetuate the State, and serve the State policy" (159).

20th century modernizing China was supposed to have been faced with linguistic difficulties in tackling technological and scientific problems. It was said that traditional Chinese thinkers were satisfied with a language more powerful

in orientating action than it was capable of formulating concepts and theories (160). As late as 1936, doubts were expressed, regarding that alleged inadequacy, and therefore it was suggested that the Chinese learn Western science in European languages (161). In that same year Chinese universities had been already teaching modern science for years, proving the linguistic adaptability of the Chinese language. The communists extended technical and scientific studies seemingly without encountering insurmountable difficulties. But the Communists attachment to the Chinese script may seem anachronistic in view of their general deprecatory attitude towards traditional customs and cultural patterns through their quest ^{for} ~~an~~ economic efficiency (162). Romanization or Cyrillization of the Chinese written language would have shortened considerably the necessary period to become literate, and would have brought about other advantages. In fact, the Communists had some intentions to that effect but seem to have put them off. The main reason seems to have been certain difficulties in written communication among the different dialect groups inside and outside China (163). Romanization in China would certainly leave the Chinese deprived of a persistent cultural pattern, which seems to have been a major factor in bringing about the solidarity of the Chinese cultural group inside China and abroad.

FOOTNOTES: PART ONE.

- (1) On myth and reality of a national spirit, see Shafer, 1955, p.7.
- (2) See Fairbank in Fairbank (ed) 1968, pp.2-3. But also Schwartz in *ibid*, p.277, on difficulties in generalizations embracing thousands of years and millions of people, as well as on ethnocentrism in other ancient cultures.
- (3) Lattimore, 1962 (1940) p.56, also Wittfogel and Feng, 1949, p.25.
- (4) Eickstedt, 1944, pp.68-69. Prof. C.H. Fisher suggests a "pressure centre" or "anti-cyclone" as an English substitute for Druckzentrum, and "turbulence centre" or "cyclone" for Unruhezentrum.
- (5) *ibid*.
- (6) Latourette, 1943 (1934) pp.37, 39.
- (7) See Fitzgerald, 1964, pp.5-6.
- (8) Lattimore, 1964, p.5 states that the use of metals was diffused into the area by wandering smiths. Fitzgerald, 1964, pp.2-3, suggests that it was locally invented.
- (9) See Roxby, 1934, pp.5-6.
- (10) Fitzgerald, 1964, p.7.
- (11) See Huntington, 1945, pp.3, 7-5, on the passage from primitive culture to civilization.
- (12) The Thais were skilled bronze workers and craftsmen in ivory, silver, silk and brocade. See Kolb, 1971 (1963) p.40.
- (13) The Thais lived in bamboo huts. Kolb, 1971 (1963) p.40.
- (14) Irrigation needs not only knowledge in canal and dyke building, but also needs record holding and astronomical observations, which imply a written language.
- (15) Eickstedt, 1944, pp.69-70. The Chinese expansion was actually an overspill. Fitzgerald, 1972, p.XXI.
- (16) The Mongol devastation of Mesopotamia was due to the breakage of the irrigation system which spread diseases besides reducing the sown area.

- (17) In Chou times the Chinese assessed the Lower Yangtze Valley as unhealthy as well as of poor soil quality. See Roxby, ~~1934~~, pp.6-7. See also Spencer and Thomas, 1971, pp.110-116, on the superiority of North China in respect of diseases in modern times.
- (18) Wittfogel, 1970 (1957) p.33.
- (19) Roxby, 1930, pp.66-67. He attributes the expansion to droughts and floods in the Hwang Ho Valley and to nomad pressure.
- (20) The forests of the Yangtze slowed down the Chinese settlement in the area. See Bishop, 1922, p.34.
- (21) Wiens in Ginsburg (ed) 1959, p.214 fig.43.
- (22) Wilhelm, 1929, pp.103-105, 107-108.
- (23) Goodrich, 1969 (1948) p.24.
- (24) Maspero, 1955, pp.380-381.
- (25) Wilhelm, 1929, p.144.
- (26) Lattimore, 1964, p.2.
- (27) Wilhelm, 1929, pp.147-148.
- (28) Favre, 1933, p.23, commenting on 20th century China.
- (29) Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960 (1958) p.83.
- (30) Fisher, 1970, p.540.
- (31) Needham, 1954, vol. II, p.205.
- (32) This can be implied from the present distribution of Mandarin dialects. See Roxby, ~~1934~~, p.15, fig. 6.
- (33) Sen-Dou Chang, 1970, p.63. Lattimore, 1964, pp.7-8 states that the Great Wall was erected with the intention to delimit Chinese settlement expansion.
- (34) On Chinese kin relationships as a hindrance to emigration see Hsü in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds) 1968, pp.589-590. Also Roxby, 1930, p.65.
- (35) Latourette, 1943 (1934) p.98. The Siang and Kan river valleys provided the main avenues of approach to the Hsi Kiang. Roxby, 1930, p.68.
- (36) Chinese silk reached Rome via the land route, Hudson ~~1961~~ (1931) p.68. On the development of land and sea routes, see Needham, 1954, vol.I. pp.176-183.

- (37) Wan Chee Shu in Drake (ed) 1967, pp.132-134.
- (38) The China-Burma-India land route was in use in the first century A.D., Chen Yi-Sein, 1966, p.81.
- (39) Goodrich, 1969 (1948) pp.56-57.
- (40) Roxby, 1934, p.13.
- (41) "In the South East more than in the North the process of cultural assimilation followed rather than preceded political incorporation". *ibid.*
- (42) See Buchanan, 1968, pp.165-167.
- (43) By sheer distance or by geographical barriers.
- (44) Roxby, 1934, p.12.
- (45) See Wittfogel, 1970 (1957) p.42 for a detailed table of imperial works.
- (46) *ibid.*, pp.65-66, on sizes of armies on the eve and during the imperial period.
- (47) Needham, 1954, vol.I. pp.114-115, attributes the creation of these three distinct political entities to the economic realities. Later a fourth centre rose around the Hsi Kiang Delta.
- (48) Conflicts with tribal minorities in the areas occupied by Shu and Wu continued from Chou to Ch'ing times. Chi Jen Chang, 1956, pp.1,4.
- (49) Formally until the Sui, about 40 years before the T'ang.
- (50) For example, the Hakka of South China are believed to be refugees from the North emigrating as a result of the Yuan conquest of China.
- (51) Fitzgerald, 1972, pp.XV-XVI.
- (52) Its spread in China was closely connected with larger trading centres, not unlike the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia. Eichhorn, 1969 (1964) pp.165-166.
- (53) See Ginsburg in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968 p.77 map I, on the geographical layout of that conception. It is reproduced in this work as map VI.A.
- (54) Roxby, 1934, p.13.
- (55) Fitzgerald, 1972, p.21.
- (56) See Lattimore, 1962 (1940) pp.53-102, on differences between Chinese and steppe agriculture and the ensuing social dissimilarities.

- (57) See Lattimore, 1964, pp.8-9.
- (58) Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960 (1958) pp.27-28.
- (59) Granet, 1930, pp.310-311. This implies parochial loyalties though with reverence to the emperor. Whitney, 1969, p.29.
- (60) ~~ibid~~ Granet, 1930, p.427.
- (61) Soothill, 1950 (1927) p.49.
- (62) Wittfogel, 1970 (1957) p.66.
- (63) See Wang Gungwu in Fairbank (ed) 1968, pp.48-49.
- (64) On the Chinese World Order see Ginsburg in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, p.77, map I.
- (65) This ethnic distinction overruled race affinities also in the 20th century against the assimilated Manchu dynasty.
- (66) See Willetts in Hinton (ed) 1964, pp.25-30.
- (67) Wang Gungwu in Fairbank (ed) 1968, pp.54-60.
- (68) See Fisher, 1970, p.547.
- (69) Ping-ti Ho, 1959, p.25, quotes 108 million people in China in 1651, Goodrich, 1969 (1948) p.202, quotes 57 million in 1661.
- (70) Latourette, 1943 (1934) p.328.
- (71) 19th century China was by then in The Traditional Society stage of its economic development, which though not static in progress, was still "pre-Newtonian" in concept. See Rostow, 1960, pp.4-5.
- (72) *ibid*, 1954, p.3.
- (73) There are about six mou in one acre.
- (74) The Manchu lost ~~all~~ hope of manpower reinforcement when they opened Manchuria to Chinese settlement and thus to assimilation in 1803.
- (75) Ta Chen, 1967 (1923) p.6.
- (76) Known in China since the 7th century A.D., the plant was introduced through India from its origin in the Eastern Mediterranean countries. It was cultivated in China from Yünnen up to Manchuria. Encyc. Britannica.
- (77) Most of the trade was transacted by the East India Company. Cheong, 1965, pp.279-280.

- (78) See Goodrich, 1969 (1948) pp.39-40.
- (79) Had the Ming Court appreciated the profits of a monopolized external trade, as the Thai Court for instance, they may have promoted maritime development, but this was contrary to Chinese social ethics.
- (80) Involving 400 million dollars in the galleon trade in 1565-1815, and an annual 7 million dollar trade with the British during 1784-1834. See Cheong, 1965, pp.287, 289.
- (81) Ginsburg in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, p.77 map 1.
- (82) The Sulu Archipelago should perhaps have been included.
- (83) With possible serious present day implications.
- (84) See for example Lowenthal in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, pp.4-5, Ginsburg in *ibid*, p.83. Also Fitzgerald, 1972, pp.XLV-XV. However, opinions expressing the present dissolution of the concept of a Chinese World Order are expressed by Schwartz in Fairbank (ed) 1968, p.284 and Herman, 1959, pp.167-168. Lamb, 1968, pp.210-213, expresses a neutral opinion between the two extremes.
- (85) Li Ch'en nung, 1969 (1956), p.9.
- (86) Hsiao Hsia (ed) 1959, p.58.
- (87) One of the striking examples of cultural irrationality was the degradation of the compass, a Chinese invention, from its navigational use to ritual use in grave-site location. Harvey, 1933, p.2.
- (88) Peake, 1932, pp.120-121.
- (89) On the Manchu underestimation of the change coming from the West, see Fisher, 1970 (1968) p.552.
- (90) See *ibid*, pp.553-554.
- (91) Although rural off-season handicrafts were hard hit by cheap manufactured goods imported from the West, contributing to the rural-urban migration.
- (92) Latourette, 1943 (1934), p.412.
- (93) Anti-foreign groups in China date back to the 17th century, when missionaries and traders made their early appearance. Teng and Fairbank, 1954, p.14.
- (94) For example Doolittle, 1868, writing on Fukien.
- (95) Teng and Fairbank, 1954, pp.116-118.
- (96) Hsü, 1970, pp.519-524.

- (97) Thus Japan became a model of Asian modernization for the Chinese.
- (98) Fitzgerald, 1952, p.21.
- (99) Wu, 1934, pp.22-23.
- (100) Galt, 1951, passim, and Ping-wen Kuo, 1915, pp.33-63.
- (101) Peake, 1932, pp.46-49.
- (102) Ping-wen Kuo, 1915, p.106.
- (103) Of these areas the Southeast had a longer history of Western influence and most of the emigrants to the Nan Yang came from there.
- (104) Sun Yat Sen, 1927, pp.13-16, 126-135.
- (105) Peake, 1932, p.130 and Purcell, 1936, pp.163-164.
- (106) Linebarger, 1937, pp.70-73.
- (107) Sun Yat Sen, 1927, pp.8-11.
- (108) In current terms it would mean that the Chinese constituted a cultural and ethnic group but showed no loyalties to a state-idea.
- (109) Sun Yat Sen, 1927, pp.22-28, 42-54 and Purcell, 1936, p.175.
- (110) This had serious effects on the relations between the Chinese and the colonialists in Southeast Asia, yet it did not improve the former's relations with the exploited indigenes in Southeast Asia.
- (111) Linebarger, 1937, pp.90-91, 96.
- (112) *ibid*, pp.96-97 and footnote 6.
- (113) See Wittfogel, 1927, pp.16-17.
- (114) Sun Yat Sen, 1927, pp.296-299.
- (115) With some reminiscence of Plato's Politea.
- (116) Sun Yat Sen, 1927, p.410.
- (117) Linebarger, 1937, pp.140-142.
- (118) Who died in 1925.
- (119) Chen and Galenson, 1969, p.4 and table 1.
- (120) Donnithorne, 1967, p.32.
- (121) Buck, 1937, p.268.
- (122) The Communists had their own land reform policy.

- (123) Chinese spoken language.
- (124) The national language based on Mandarin.
- (125) The People's Republic of China emulated this by allocating 30 seats to the Overseas Chinese of which 18 were destined for Nan Yang Chinese. Fitzgerald, 1972^A, p.19.
- (126) The Japanese invaders of China also advanced from one significant cultural region to another although their initial base was outside China.
- (127) The Szechwan basin resembled the Hsi kiang region, and served as a base for the K.M.T. for its struggle against the Japanese.
- (128) A base in isolated Szechwan would have deprived the radicals of Overseas Chinese and foreign aid.
- (129) See Fisher, 1971 (A), p.292-293
- (130) The communist alternative to the K.M.T. will be discussed in the next chapter.
- (131) The Communist weakness in naval power enhanced the suitability of Taiwan, not unlike the conditions in Canton during the K.M.T. - Manchu struggle.
- (132) See Rostow, 1954, pp.51-54, on nationalist differences. Also footnote 2, on the Manchurian issue. The Russians never thought of returning either the territories north of the Amur or east of the Ussuri, which had been conceded under Unequal Treaties. Also, Harris in Wint (ed) 1965, p.419.
- (133) Van Slyke, 1968, pp.140-141, 147, 155-156. This must have been due also to the "membership-character in the group" of these leaders. See Brown, 1936, pp.342-348 for elaboration on this.
- (134) Rostow, 1954, p.49.
- (135) See Goodrich, 1969 (1948) p.240.
- (136) In Burma and Cambodia for example.
- (137) See Fitzgerald, 1972^A, pp.37-38, 162-170.
- (138) Clemens, 1967, pp.125-127.
- (139) See Liu, 1972, p.68, on China's overwhelming military superiority over the combined forces of the Southeast Asian states.
- (140) See Herman, 1959, p.165, for basic values of Chinese nationalism.

- (141) See Eckstein in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds) 1968, pp.703-710.
- (142) See Dumont, 1965, p.45.
- (143) Besides the socio-economic functions of the communes, they were also organized as defensive territorial units in view of the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union.
- (144) See Murphey, 1967, p.327.
- (145) Hsiao Hsia (ed) 1961, p.539.
- (146) Chen and Galenson, 1969, pp.169, 171-172.
- (147) *ibid*, p.169.
- (148) Schram, 1969, p.104.
- (149) On mutual attitudes of speech-groups see Kulp, 1966 (1925) p.80.
- (150) Skinner, 1957, pp.92-93. Marsh, 1961, pp.15, 132 table 20, for statistics.
- (151) See Lewis, 1963, pp.9-10.
- (152) Maoist interpretation of the events leading to the Cultural Revolution mentions Chinese preparations for war against the U.S.A. without Soviet Russia's support for China. Devillers, 1969, (1967) pp.260-265. This may have been acceptable only with extreme loyalty of cadres.
- (153) Some shirking naturally occurred. Donnithorne, 1967, pp.67-69.
- (154) Lewis, 1963, pp.160-161.
- (155) Fraser (ed) 1971, p.15.
- (156) "Once he [Mao] is gone elements of pragmatism are likely to return" Dutt and Dutt, 1970, p.46. Resistance to the party or state ideology was offered by intellectuals and peasants during the collectivization years of 1956-57. Etienne, 1962, p.126, quoting Chou En-lai.
- (157) This must be related to the fact that all the communist parties in Southeast Asia have a Chinese and not a Russian orientation. See Harris in Wint (ed) 1965, pp.427-428.
- (158) Fraser (ed) 1971, p.22.

- (159) Fraser (ed) 1971, p.53.
- (160) Granet, 1950 (1934) p.31. But see also Forrest, 1948, pp.76-77.
- (161) Purcell, 1936, pp.110-111, 159-160. But see also Forrest, 1948, p:241, for his objections to the theoretical issue, see among others: Whorf in Maccoby et al (ed) 1966, pp.1-3, 5; Carroll and Casagrande in ibid, pp.1920; Brown and Lenneberg in ibid, pp.10-16, ~~and~~ Hymes (ed) 1964, p.19.
- (162) For example their disrespect of ancestral graveyards and the abolishment of religious ceremonies.
- (163) For an extreme example: Japanese and Chinese can correspond by their partly common script without very great difficulties, but their spoken languages are mutually unintelligible.

PART TWO: THE BACKGROUND AND THE SCENE.

Ancient Cultures.

"Borders encapsulate social groups with highly diverse primordial sentiments (1)" seems a good qualifying phrase for physiographical and human conditions in Southeast Asia before its urban development. Compared with China, the region has been largely culturally fragmented throughout its history, and not unlike Europe, developed around separate cultural nodes. Again, compared with China's history, Southeast Asia is young in human achievement; therefore, centripetal as well as centrifugal socio-political forces still operate within its sub-regional areas and within its states. However, justification, for generalizing on such a vast and versatile area has been academically and practically justified (2).

The Physiographical Setting. Location and land - sea configuration endowed Southeast Asia with the control of the southern land-route and the maritime route between the Chinese and Indian culture areas (see map ^{I-B} ~~II~~). The region thus became centrally located in a sense opposite to that of the central location of China (3), because as a maritime route nexus, Southeast Asia's cultural nodes were influenced by the cultures of the penetrating seafarers, while China's central location on land was related to its geographical isolation as a cultural area.



The geomorphology of peninsular Southeast Asia has been dominated by the north-south foldings of Burma, Yunnan,

MAP I-B
SOUTHEAST ASIA:
LAND CONFIGURATION
and WIND DIRECTIONS

Limit of Continental
Shelf

Wind Directions:

July ←←←
January ←←←



MAP II-B
POLITICAL DIVISIONS
of SOUTHEAST ASIA
Late 11th Century A.D.

- 1 Pagan
- 2 Pegu
- 3 Thaton
- 4 Lopburi
- 5 Angkor
- 6 Indrapura
- 7 Vijaya
- 8 Pattani
- 9 Melayu
- 10 Palembang
- 11 Kaling
- 12 Kadiri

the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China, which directed major rivers to the shores of the region. These rivers carried heavy loads of silt to produce the great productive river plains and deltas of the region (4), and the process of silting is still active in pelagian Southeast Asia as well. This is in part due to the shallow waters covering the extensive continental shelf between Java and peninsular Southeast Asia. The Mesosoic foldings of Malaysia have lost much of their original prominence, while the Tertiary-Quaternary foldings of the Archipelago (and also the volcanoes) have not been subdued to the same degree. It is worthwhile to note, that during the Pleistocene glacials large parts of the Southeast Asian continental shelf were traversible on foot. Also in connection with the continental shelf, vast coastal swamps have been created mainly in pelagian Southeast Asia, which deny dense settlement of those areas (5), and exclude large stretches of coasts from being suitable for ports.

In most generalized terms, the climate of the area, excluding very high ground, permits minimum clothing throughout the year. Sheltering from rain is ubiquitously necessary and on low ground also from seasonal flooding. With the exception of the "dry zones" of Burma and Thailand, forests and undergrowth respond vigorously to climatic conditions, forcing the ancient organized states of Indian cultural influence to seek location where vegetation was less profuse (6). In the wet areas, secondary bushes and low trees rapidly follow the cutting down of primary forests; both these vegetation types, however, constitute a difficult

barrier to communications, sometimes more than relief itself (7). Climate also intensifies chemical decomposition and increases leaching to render most of the soils in the area poor in agricultural quality. However, river-plain consistent alluvium and neutral or basic volcanic soils are fertile and suitable for wet rice cultivation. People have sought after these soils, which location determined human settlement distribution (8). A wide river mouth opening into deep waters, ~~on suitable upper river banks in proximity to the sea~~, in most cases closely linked with an agricultural hinterland, provided conditions for the development of cities. In fact, the five "one million cities" of Southeast Asia in 1950 were ^{all} ports (9). Climate ~~might~~ ^{must} have affected cultural life as well, as hot and humid air certainly affect physical and perhaps also mental performances (10). A low probability of climatic catastrophes renders reserve accumulation almost unnecessary and, with no need for heating nor for solid shelter, productive activity has been reduced (11). Traditional life in these conditions may thus have created a distinct contrast between the indigenous Southeast Asian and the Chinese and Indian ways of life. The former are still characterized by a "take it easy" attitude towards productive activities.

It has been said that during the last glacial period all of Southeast Asia became a "gene and cultural pool", but after the sea had transgressed, the parts became isolated. However, when maritime sailing progressed about 3,000-5,000 years ago, the area regained its internal communications (12).

This compartmentation not only fostered isolated cultural life of distinct ethnic groups, but sometimes favoured cultural deviations from a common cultural source of one and the same stock. Where vegetation and relief did not constitute impenetrable barriers, cultural exchange existed and, as Coedes (13) points out, this actually happened between Indochina and Indonesia in prehistoric times. Whether this common culture of pre-Aryan Indian traits resulted from or produced any common group consciousness is however doubtful.

As in other tropical and equatorial lands, Southeast Asia has had a low population to area ratio, although to a lesser degree. This population scarcity, which relatively retarded great cultural achievements even in historic times, was due in part to the profusion of diseases in the area. Humidity and heat created optimal conditions for endemic diseases, which sporadically burst into epidemics (14). These latter must have been more devastating in big agglomerated settlements than in small isolated ones, thus retarding the appearance of urban centres. These health conditions improved in the 20th century; nevertheless, in 1960, most of Southeast Asia had a relatively high infant mortality rate (15).

Asian Cultural Influences. The oldest existing human stocks indigenous to Southeast Asia seem to be some primitive tribes of the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines. They are considered to be direct descendants of the Mesolithic hunters and gatherers, who must have had *Common* cultural affinities at least over the area embracing Indochina, Malay and Sumatra (16). Whether Mesolithic

man of the region is a direct descendant of the hominids of the early Pleistocene is still an open question. The Neolithic peoples of the region are relatively newcomers, but occupying the better economic niches they outnumber the older stocks many times over. The Neolithic peoples brought the use of metals to the area; they, however, came from two different human stocks, whose dissimilarity is still politically significant.

Sarasin hypothesized a wave of Proto-Malays of advanced Neolithic culture and a succeeding one of Deutero-Malays of bronze-iron culture, but others maintain that foreign traders diffused the use of metals into the area. A more recent hypothesis has suggested an "overspilling" of the two stocks, the Proto-Malays of Caucasoid affinities coming through the Assam-Burma border, and the Deutero-Malays, of Mongoloid stock, from Southwest China and the Tibet border. Eventually, the Deutero-Malay "overspilling" progressively increased (17), while the Proto-Malay one stopped. Recorded historical events concerning overland migration into the area give evidence in support of the overspilling theory.

The initial cultural diversity of these migrants and the geographical compartmentation of the land favoured the continuance of cultural fragmentation. However, human distribution at present shows that the Proto-Malays generally live on high ground in interior areas, while the Deutero-Malays inhabit coasts and river plains, suggesting that the latter, by strength of their advanced material culture, ~~usurped~~ ^{usurped} the better economic niches from the former.

(1) Chinese and Indian Influences. Until the end of

the 19th century, direct Chinese cultural influence limited itself to the areas of present North Vietnam and eastern Burma, but maritime links date back to the Chou dynasty, when Yueh traded with Southeast Asia. Between 200 B.C. and the 10th century A.D., the Chinese governed the Red River delta, at first through local vassals, and later as a Chinese district. In the first century A.D., Chinese officials arrived and rapidly spread their customs, language and religion, as they had no indigenous counterparts to match in high culture. The Chinese introduced the metal plough, which displaced the local hoe, established schools, militia service, and recruited local officials into their system of government, with a "disintegrating effect on the old feudal order" (18). Early revolts only intensified the Chinese hold on the area, which became organized as a Chinese prefecture. From the late Han period, Chinese became the only learned language, pervading literature, institutions and intellectual life. Nevertheless, the Chinese culture failed to convert the Vietnamese allegiance from their national past values, successive revolts, perhaps with the aid of Indianized Champa, maintaining the flame of the Vietnamese spirit of freedom. The T'ang rulers considered their temporary pacification of the area as a great success renaming the country Annam, the "pacified South".

With an estimated population of 95-100 thousand (19), the Red River delta constituted an extension of the Chinese culture area but only in its material traits and values and not in national identity. Chinese methods of water control,

centralized political rule and social organization adopted by the Vietnamese, provided them with an efficient means to strengthen and free themselves, when opportunity presented itself in the 10th century. Generally speaking, Vietnam, like Korea being located at the extremity of the Chinese cultural expansion limit, could retain its national spirit although it was materially Sinicized. In a sense, the Chinese cultural expansion, which was not followed by Chinese settlers created a "hardened crust" on adjacent "soft" cultures situated on the edges of its areal expansion. That marginal "hardened crust" is still politically significant and apparent in the Sinicized cultures of Korea, Japan, and Vietnam providing more effective resistance capabilities to further Chinese intrusion, than the non-Sinicized states.

Chinese historical influence on eastern Burma came through low cultured miners and traders from Yunnan. They had little influence on the Shan princes, and except for mining metals and semi-precious stones, showed little interest in local peoples, though they returned each year for very long periods. Several other Chinese communities introduced mining practices into other parts of Southeast Asia, and although these communities, some organized in Kongsis, were permanent residents, they generally neither spread their techniques, nor culturally influenced local peoples. The Chinese gold miners of West Borneo and tin miners of Malaya and South Thailand are the best known in that respect. Their unintentional political influence came to notice, when they fought among themselves or against

the colonial powers and local governments.

Historical Chinese trade directly regarded only a thin stratum of high class indigenes and colonialists, and neither Chinese naval architecture, nor their navigational abilities, nor their armament left any impression on the local material culture. Uninterested in intellectual activities and lacking in missionary zeal, the Chinese traders came and left with the monsoon cycle, having to do chiefly with local Chinese traders. Political Chinese interference in the region generally ended in demand for tribute missions which have left practically no cultural trace.

Indian cultural influence came as early as the first or second centuries A.D., and following ancient trade links, affected almost all the low-lying regions of Southeast Asia. Three separate or combined motives lay behind that cultural expansion: emigration due to disturbed conditions in India; Indian trading posts attracting priests and literati; or Brahmans answering calls of local chiefs, who wanted to enhance their prestige by the former's magic powers (20). It is beyond any doubt that the Indian kingdoms had no territorial expansionist intentions, and that trade, and perhaps war spoils, could be their only material motivation in intruding into Southeast Asia.

Compared with the Chinese cultural influence, the Indian one was more extensive but in some respects less intensive. Customs, language, institutions and religion affected the elite, ^{only superficially} but the common people ⁽⁻⁻⁻⁾ only superficially. Literary expression in Sanskrit was

confined to a small group of literati. Princes' courts adopted Brahman rituals, yet outside the immediate neighbourhood of the Capitals the caste system did not catch hold. "Indian law never succeeded in forming more than a framework within which local customary law was free to maintain itself" (21). However, in contradistinction to Brahmanism, Buddhism was full of missionary zeal, it established monasteries and introduced pilgrimage to India. Only few princely courts converted to Buddhism when it appeared, but the common people responded much more favourably, especially when the Theravada religious offshoot appeared. That kind of Buddhism created a "semi egalitarian religious community" where monarchs became symbolic members, so that the monks had some restraining power over the rulers. The frugality of the monks and their daily mixing with the people in undertaking education and other social roles, enhanced their religious appeal, while the Mahayana monks retained their aloofness (22). (See Map B for the present distribution of Hinduism)

(ii) The Ancient States. Myths and historical facts combined to produce a modern national interpretation of the political history of the Southeast Asian countries. It must be taken into account that, before the 13th century and to a lesser extent even afterwards, "peaceful" infiltration was more decisive in its cultural-political effects than military conquests. The latter usually involved the reduction of provinces or states to feudalistic vassalage, while the former generally brought

about assimilation and sometimes the disappearance of state cultures. Although each of the ancient kingdoms was generally geographically and ethnically differentiated, some degree of central control was maintained over the area by each of them. Some of these loosely controlled states enjoyed, however, a long lifetime of more than a millennium (see map ^{II-8} ~~II-8~~).

Champa existed from the 2nd to the 15th century as a Hinduized kingdom located along the coast-line of present day central Vietnam. It failed to expand into a major deltaic area, where good communications and grain reserves could have brought about a strong centralized form of government. Its relief features favoured its feudal hierarchy; some of the barons showing militant ambitions against the Chinese in Annam (23). If its past existence has any present day significance, it is due to the perseverance of a small Cham minority in South Vietnam, which may in a remote future reformulate national aspirations.

Funnan also dates from ^{the} ~~the~~ 2nd century A.D. (24). Favourably located in the Mekong delta area, it eventually expanded to the Cambodian basin and thence, by easy routes, to the Menam delta. In its heyday it held sway over the area extending from the Tenasserim coast to Champa (25). In the 6th century, the non-Hinduized Khmers of Chenla in the middle Mekong, revolted and took over the government (26). The Khmers became indirectly Hinduized by Funnan as regards irrigation techniques, art, religion and the "concept of a universal sovereignty", and by Champa as regards architecture (27).

Chenla's history represents the pre-Angkor Khmer period, and as such, it is politico-culturally significant in the national identification of the present day Khmers in Cambodia. Throughout the Chenla period, and also during the halcyon days of the Angkor period, Thai tribes infiltrated into the Menam plain. They were Hinduized by the ruling Khmers, but sometimes revolted though without significant political success.

Since the 7th century several kingdoms experienced their political ups and downs in parts of Burma (28). The most important was Pagan, which extended from the Irrawaddy delta to the Kyaukse plain. This Buddhist Burman kingdom acquired material ~~stability~~ ^{knowhow} to irrigate the Dry Zone of Burma. In the 11th century it expanded northwards ^{or} to Bhamo, north-eastwards to the confines of Nan Chao and eastwards to the Khmer kingdom borders. In the south, it reached the Martaban Gulf and, in the west, the Arakan. The size and power of Pagan overshadowed the existence of the former Mon kingdoms of Pegu and Thaton. In view of the present ethno-political fragmentation of Burma, it seems that the ancient kingdoms still influence modern political conceptions in their centrifugal tendencies.


After the downfall of Funan, the hegemony of trade with China and perhaps also with India, lay wide open to competition from the Indonesian principalities of which Sri-Vijaya emerged the victor. Unlike the other kingdoms, this "Venice of the East"(29) gained its wealth from

maritime trade and not from agricultural production. Its powerful navy led a sustained series of campaigns to keep the maritime routes open. Situated on the east coast of Sumatra (30), Sri-Vijaya conquered Melayu in the same island, and imposed its suzerainty over the Straits principalities, West Java and over the west coast of Borneo. Sri-Vijaya was a Buddhist kingdom as was Java at that time, and one could expect to find vestigial temples and statues in the area of both. But while these regularly occur in Java, East Sumatra is largely devoid of them, perhaps because Sri Vijaya's commercial orientation was inimical to a spiritual and artistic flourishing (31).


The location of Sri Vijaya astride the Malacca Straits, controlling one of the major world maritime routes, has influenced pan-Malay nationalists prone to ideas of territorial grandeur. Especially in Indonesia voices were calling for the recreation of a state which would include, besides Indonesia, the area of present Malaysia and Singapore. The Malaysians could perhaps profit from the reestablishment of a state with the politico-geographical conception of Sri Vijaya, which would have shifted the politico-cultural centre from Java northwards, but the Indonesians must have had in mind the conception of a Majapahit, which would have stressed the primacy of Java over the Outer Provinces and Malaysia. It seems that at present no political entity of the region lays claim either to the territorial or to the cultural legacy of Sri Vijaya.

(iii) The Pre-Colonial Kingdoms. (see Map ^{III-B} ~~IV~~). The

MAP III-B
POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Late 15th Century



MAP IV-B
RELIGIOUS DIVIDES



13th century Yüan invasions into Southeast Asia were extensive in area and significant in their socio-political outcome, though they failed as military enterprises. The Chinese invaded Pagan, Cambodia and Vietnam by land routes, and Champa as well as Java — by sea. The Hinduized elites in most of those countries were considerably weakened as a result. This brought about the decline of Sanskrit, Mahayana Buddhism and Brahmanism, while the popular Theravada Buddhism flourished. Pagan and the Khmers, nearly exhausted after the Chinese invasions, could not check the emergence of several Thai principalities at the territorial expense of both kingdoms. The Thai tribes, which had infiltrated the Menam river plain during the Khmer rule (32), consolidated into two Thai kingdoms, Sukhodaya in the Upper Menam and Ayudhya in the Lower. In political terms, the change mainly entailed the replacement of the Khmer dominant elite by a Thai one, the rural majority being already "Thaified". In the 13th century Sukhodaya extended from Luang Prabang to Pegu. It sent tribute to China and maintained close religious links with Ceylon, the origin of Theravada Buddhism. In the 14th century, it acknowledged the suzerainty of Ayudhya. The latter, known as the Kingdom of Siam, conquered Malaya as far as Tenasserim and Malacca, and, ruling by then most of the Thai people in the peninsula, introduced the concept of Thailand, the land of the Thai. The Thai dominant elite, of common racial origin, language, customs and religion with the people, introduced a specific social order which became accepted, as a matter of course, by the common people (33).

The social system and the common culture thus became crystallized and withstood the crisis of the Burmese conquest of Ayudhya in the 18th century. This military crisis was followed by a political disintegrative bid of several Thai chiefs, who established independent principalities. However, once the Burmese were gone the geographical and cultural unity of land and people, favoured the reintroduction of a centralized state. The socio-economic organization of the Thais depended on a lower stratum of serfs, usually of non-Thai former origin, who served the Free Men, the Thai warrior aristocracy proprietors of land and serf. High dignitaries and princes of royal blood constituted the higher class in the capital and the principal provincial towns. Although non caste conscious, the social stratification and old Khmer influences made the Court in Ayudhya follow strict pompous customs, while Sukhodaya only loosely practised them (34); in both countries, however, corvée work and taxes made the government system work.

In the 14th century, the Thai Kingdom of Lan Ch'ang ruled the Lao branch of the Thai people in the upper reaches of the Mekong. It spread Theravada Buddhism, Khmer customs as well as Siamese and Burmese architecture into the area. Between the 14th and 16th centuries the state experienced a stage of "inauguration and organization"(35). There followed a century of wars with the Burmese, after which the country divided into two kingdoms, with Luang Prabang and Vientiane as capitals. ~~This is the view that presently divides it into two historical origins.~~

From the 13th, to the end of the 16th century, Khmer history was closely linked with that of Ayudhya by a succession of wars. In the 17th century, the Khmer people resisted the introduction of Islam by Malays and Javanese through the Khmer Court, manifesting the popularity of Theravada Buddhism and the cultural gap between Palace customs and the essentially democratic village life. Also in the 17th century, the Vietnamese occupied most of the Mekong delta, and the Siamese annexed Battambang and Siemreap districts. In the 19th century, before the advent of the French, Siamese and Vietnamese armies used Cambodia's territory to wage their wars reducing the state to political impotence. However, despite its low political reputation, Cambodia's old cultural influence is still evident in Laos and Thailand.

From the Yüan invasion and until after the Ming occupation of Dai Viet (North Vietnam), Vietnam was hard pressed by Chinese from the north and by Chams from the south. In the mid 15th century, Dai Viet arrived at imposing its sovereignty over Laos and Champa, and the 16th century saw the reduction of the latter into an administrative district of Vietnam. This was achieved through continuous infiltration rather than by an openly waged war, pattern of "Chinese expansion" which resulted perhaps from the Sinicized material and institutional culture of Dai Viet. In the 17th century, the Nguyen family ruled the southern

provinces of Vietnam, the Trinh family ruled the northern with the king as a de jure monarch. The Nguyen flourished, while the Trinh felt insecure after the Ch'ing ascent in China (36). By far the more politico-economically active of the two ruling families, the Nguyen traded with the Dutch and Portuguese, and also extended their agricultural basis to the Cambodian held Mekong delta; here again, infiltration preceded the official takeover. The Nguyen political career almost came to an abrupt end, when a revolt succeeded in wiping out the entire family, except for a sole survivor who, however, eventually subdued the rebels and proceeded to conquer North Vietnam and unify the country under his imperial rule.

As already mentioned, the Vietnamese could regain their national independence perhaps as a result of their adoption of the Sinic culture of adaptation (37), which enabled them to rekindle their national identity flame (38) after the Chinese withdrawal. The national revival intensified especially in the 15th century, when ancient Vietnamese laws were codified, local legends reintroduced and new original institutions, concerning fiscal and agrarian matters, were established. Writers of the Lê dynasty showed great interest in historical studies, sometimes manifesting nationalist inspirations.

After the fall of Pagan, Burma remained politically divided until the 16th century, when it became reunited. The capital of unified Burma, in Pegu, was well located to control the maritime connections in the south as well as the agricultural basin in the Dry Zone. Later, Chinese invasions

and wars against Arakan, Ayudhya, Laos and the Shan Thais, as well as internal revolts, demanded the shift of the capital further north to Ava. This shift alienated the kingdom from its maritime relations and enabled the Mons to develop aspirations for independence. It also distracted the Burmese attention from ^mmaritime developments, eventually offering the British an opportunity for strategic surprise in the first Burma War. To the present day student, the history of unified Burma reads like a chronicle of successive wars, the most important of which (before the advent of colonialism) was the Burmese conquest of Ayudhya in 1776. They, however, had to retreat in order to face a Chinese invasion, a second one since the Toungoo times, realizing anew the aggression of Imperial China.

Between the 13th and 17th centuries, political developments in the Archipelago had a limited relation to those of peninsular Southeast Asia. Two major political events occurred in the Archipelago during that period, namely: the fall of Sri-Vijaya and the defeat of the Yüan invasion. The former enabled Kediri of West Java to unite the island under its rule, and the latter brought about a new centralized state with a capital in Majapahit, which extended its rule over Madura, Bali and Melayu and perhaps even farther afield. However, external trade activities continued and attracted Arab, Gujerati and other traders to the islands. This trade enabled the centralized state of Majapahit to diffuse Javanese Hinduized culture to its

possessions in Borneo, Bali, Makassar, the Bandas and the Moluccas, ^{while} (Sumatra had already been Hinduized). Also parts of present Malaysia may have been included within Majapahit, and if this was the case (39), government control of the inter-island trade and over the Malacca Straits must have made it a powerful state in contemporary Southeast Asia. Majapahit must have had trade links with the Bay of Bengal and with China on the eve of the European advent into the region. The internal organization of this Hinduized state left the highest administrative functions with the royal family, who were aided in daily matters by a class of officials. The people divided into classes according to occupations, reminiscent of Hindu caste influences. Administrative regulations governed the maintenance of the army, land tenure, tax assessments, corvée labour, payment of official revenues and gifts to officials. This degree of organization and the political importance of the state would suggest a long period of vital existence of Majapahit, yet, for reasons still unravelled, the kingdom collapsed even before the European advent. However, Majapahit has left a political legacy unconsciously operative in the minds of the Dutch colonialists, and consciously affecting the Javanese of independent Indonesia with regard to the centrality of Java in the context of a pelagian colony or state.

(iv) The Spread of Islam. The missionary spirit of Islam began to assert itself in Southeast Asia after Gujerat and Bengal had been converted. Indian traders from these provinces must have spread the new faith to their

counterparts in the region. Malacca, being the most important principality and emporium of Southeast Asia was the first kingdom to be Islamized (40), and consequently directed to and boosted the process in Southeast Asia. Ayudhya, ~~a suzerain of~~ ^{the suzerain of} ~~suzerainty over~~ Malaya seems to have had neglected the spreading of Buddhism among the nations, leaving the field open to Islam. This amplifies the statement that the more important cultural changes in the region have been brought about by "seepage" rather than by military conquest and imposition from above. As the Javanese principalities of the post-Majapahit period, practised extensive trade with Malacca, princes and elites who were directly involved in its operation, must have come under the influence of Arab, Indian or even Javanese Muslim traders of Malacca. This hypothesis concerning the Islamization of Java and Sumatra, is contested by another contention, i.e. the Islamization of the throne of Majapahit and diffusion of Islam through the state's institutions (41). However, facts indicate that when the Portuguese came to Java, the northern coast ports had already been Islamized (42), constituting a barrier between Christianity and the Buddhist principalities of the interior. Van Leur (43) maintains that the spread of Islam in the Archipelago got a special impetus from the Islam-Christianity struggle in the Iberian Peninsula. Rumours of that strife reached Java ahead of the Portuguese, by pilgrims returning from Mecca; as a result, the Muslims deliberately accelerated the process of islamization to create a buffer between the Hinduized interior and the Portuguese.

The diluted form of Islam in Java is attributed to

Sufism, which readily incorporated local beliefs and usages, resulting in Adat law maintaining its position side by side with the law of Islam. This Javanese Islam, which is the religion of the majority of the people of Indonesia, affected not only internal relations between the fervent and the moderate muslims, but also the attitude of the local population to intermarriage with the local Chinese, making it much more lenient than in other Muslim communities. As the spread of Islam followed the spice-trade routes, it reached the southern Philippine islands when the Spanish arrived in the Visayas and barred its further expansion. This left the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao in Muslim hands, with later political consequences significant even in these days.

(v) Some Politico-Geographical Remarks. The ancient states of the pre-Yüan invasion period, have left only a small impression on 20th century politics in the way of historical ^{values of,} territorial ~~values~~ ^{attachment} and national attitudes. But, some of these states must have directly influenced the post 13th century states, and through them the present political frame of mind in the Southeast Asian countries. The possibility of a future revival of Cham culture, perhaps with independent territorial aspirations, seems to depend on the Cham's ability to persist in their culture, increase in number and gain economic power. In view of the Vietnamese preponderance in the lowlands and their political and economic sophistication, this does not seem probable in the foreseeable future. Also, the traditionally tense political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, and Cambodia and Thailand seem to be a legacy of the post 13th

century period. The fairly rapid territorial changes due to wars between these countries has left open the question of the "true" territorial boundaries of each state. One of the main reasons for the lack of a consensus in that matter may have resulted from the fact that the weakest of the three, Cambodia, was by large the most culturally influential, and united under its rule the middle and lower Mekong basins during the pre-Angkor period. Similarly in Burma, the Shan states, mostly of Thai origin, constitute a traditional problem for unified Burma. The Burmans, adopting the political legacy of Pagan and later of Burma, confront the Mons, who still exhibit strong attitudes of dissension aspiring to realize the legacy of the ancient Mon kingdoms. This is ^{also} largely true of other minorities ^{who are still} opposed to the official state-idea of Burma. All these historical disputes, concerning territories in peninsular Southeast Asia, may be nowadays overshadowed by the modern political and ideological strife in the region, but they indicate that present agreements constitute superficial reconciliations of basic disagreements, despite a common religion and racial origin. In addition, some present political divisions with culturally unified nations, date back for some centuries. The Trinh-Nguyen divisions in Vietnam and the Luang Prabang-Vientiane division in Laos both have their geographical and historical backgrounds to support current ideological breaches.

The question of Chinese historical aggression in Southeast Asia, a burning issue of present day politics, may seem exaggerated perhaps with the exception of its

manifestation in Vietnam. Chinese invasions into Burma were wide and far between, in relation to the long period involved; no wonder that with the exception of Vietnam, the idea of Chinese aggression acquires its cultural significance through political propaganda rather than by national folklore. However, Vietnam's cultural and national identity has been fortunately preserved as its Sinicized culture of adaptation strengthened and made her successfully resist Chinese expansionist tendencies, when China experienced its population explosion during Ch'ing times. The barriers put before the Chinese southwards expansion, of cultural and human character north of the Red River basin, and of physiographical nature northeast of the Burma and Laos boundaries with China, decided the Northern borders of Southeast Asia as a world region. These barriers did not check the Chinese expansion southwards, although they changed its character and direction from overland seepage and agricultural settlement to maritime emigration with trade and labour occupations.

In the Archipelago, the politico-geographical legacy of Sri-Vijaya has remained unclaimed by a distinct nation. Although it enjoyed a long independent political existence, its mercantile character and its fragmented area over several islands, linked by sea traffic, must have been inimical to the creation of a unified culture of identity. Distinct customs, folklore and institutions seem to have more efficiently developed within a single agricultural area where traditions could be better developed and where no constant foreign influence from abroad could undermine the cultural unity. However, in view of the recent

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secessionist tendencies of the Outer provinces of Indonesia, it seems that the bids to contest Java's centrality may be regarded as a Sri Vijayan political legacy. In contrast to this legacy, there remains that of Majapahit, ~~which may represent earlier centralized states~~. The creation of a strong centralized state in Java, primarily dependent on agriculture, and only in the second place on trade, had no perpetual effect on the pelagian peoples as decentralization preceded the Chinese invasion and followed the fall of Majapahit. It seems that ethnic and geographical diversity dictated the fragmentary nature of the political setting in the Archipelago. Even Islam, which in other more propitious parts of the world, ~~conduced~~ conducted the creation of large states or empires, failed to unite politically the Archipelago. The elevation of Majapahit to the symbol of Indonesian unity and past grandeur in the 20th century, really sanctified an historical exception rather than expressed normal past conditions, and was due more to modern propaganda than to values retained by folklore.

Colonial Rule until the Beginning of the 20th Century.

Until the 19th century, Western colonialism in Southeast Asia exploited local produce, mainly spices, exotic products, precious metals etc., and only marginally invested in plantations or industry. There was no talk of profit reinvestment in land conservation, nor in labour conditions improvement. The colonialist powers limited the areas under direct occupation to the minimum necessary to perpetuate

control of the economically rewarding districts. Great profits characterized the first period of the spice trade. On some occasions, when profits declined, taxes and customs duties helped to maintain the colonial administration. There generally was no direct rule over the indigenes, and local chiefs ruled their people according to customary and religious laws. The greatest contributions of the West during that period, were perhaps the introduction of American food crops, European organization, and security, which perhaps decreased inter-group wars, while missionary activities introduced education and health control.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, economic activities extended in space and volume and intensified in variety. Plantations became more and more profitable as maritime transport modernized its techniques and as routing became more efficient (44). Control of the indigenous population, if not becoming fully direct, at least showed more liberal signs in considering their problems. Western geopolitical ideas of Ergänzungsräume and colonial rivalry drove the colonial powers to extend their effective control over areas, which beforehand had been considered as "zones of influence". If until the 19th century the "true religion" provided moral justification for exploitation, later "progress and education" acquiesced bad conscience. During the pre-19th century Western colonial period, Chinese came to Southeast Asia in fairly limited numbers. They occupied an intermediary position between large Western trading firms and the indigenous people supplying skilled labour and services, and continued in mining activities, which

they had begun before the European advent. Some of them intermarried with local women and eventually produced the peranakan and mestizo groups, which lost many of their Chinese traits. The small-scale immigration, due to the small extent of economic activities in Southeast Asia, favoured Chinese assimilation.

When during the 19th century, and especially in its second half, the Southeast Asian economy expanded, immigration increased and coolies, workers and traders came from war and famine stricken China. The newcomers usually began their careers as wage earners, and those who advanced towards business occupations, generally remained in their new countries, leaving their former jobs to a growing influx of new immigrants. The increase in the newcomers proportion in the Chinese communities tended to slow down assimilation.

Portuguese and Spanish Colonialism. The 16th century marked the hegemony of Portuguese and Spanish colonialism in Southeast Asia. The Portuguese "garrison empire", suffering from chronic man power shortage (45), established fortified trading posts in the area, ^{Malacca} being the principal one. Portuguese missionary work was even less significant than their commerce, which latter involved a small volume compared with local, Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Arab trade (46). After the Portuguese had left Southeast Asia, their legacy amounted to not much more than Portuguese names given to their Eurasian descendants and some architectural vestiges.

Forty years after their discovery by Magellan, the

Spanish returned to the Philippines, but only when a better sailing route to Mexico had been found did the islands' importance grow, as trade increased from 6 junk-loads in 1574 to 30-40 annually later on. The peculiar route of the Spanish-Chinese trade, via the Philippines and Mexico, was determined by the Philippines political status as a colony under the viceroy of Mexico and also by Mexican silver serving as a means to finance the Galleon Trade (47). As a result of trade considerations, proximity to China became important and as food shortage plagued Cebu, the Spanish shifted the capital to Manila. The peculiarity of the Philippine trade routes, the Catholic church cultural influence (and later the American rule) contributed to the alienation of the Philippines from the general developments in Southeast Asia.

Although the Spanish rulers disappeared from the Philippines before the end of the 19th century, the Spanish legacy is still relatively strongly felt. The main reason may be sought in the intensive involvement of the Catholic church in rural and urban life. On the whole, backed by government support and blessing, the Church dominated education and health services and was strongly influential in rural social life. Its wealth was enormous and mainly came from its extensive land ownership, which latter was a major factor in its influence over the peasants. In fact, the Church more than the administration made the Philippines the first country to be directly ruled by the Europeans in Southeast Asia. This direct European rule must have been a factor in the phenomenal growth of the population from

half a million in the 16th century to seven millions three centuries later (48). Thus, the real conquerors of the Philippines were the clergy who, with little reinforcement coming from Spain, increased their hold on the population by mobilizing and educating indigenous priests. Although this incorporation produced social problems, the clergy achieved a perpetuation of their non-reproductive group by that unique non-discriminatory approach of the Catholic Church. Already in 1536, Filipinos were trained for priesthood, and in 1750, 142 parishes out of 569 were under native priests (49). Besides extensive primary education in churches at the parish level (50), they introduced secondary education before any other colonial power in Southeast Asia, and also a Catholic university. That system of education is said to have aimed at teaching "moral and religious subjects through the medium of Castilian language" (51), yet its indirect effects on every walk of life had special political significance.

Chinese relations with the Philippines date back to the T'ang dynasty (52) and a thousand years later, at the end of the 19th century, the Chinese population ~~numbered~~ numbered about 100,000. The early steps of Chinese settlement in the Philippines under Spanish rule were, however, humbler in figures involved and in the range of their economic pursuits (53). During the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Spaniards' jealousy of the Chinese economic success, combined with real or imaginary fears of Chinese conquest and piracy, made the latter suffer discrimination, massacres and expulsions. Usually when their numbers

augmented ~~and~~ ^{they} were considered a security risk to the Spanish. "The Chinese numerical build up during that period fluctuated therefore from several tens of thousands and several hundreds" (54). The Spanish hatred for the Chinese resulted from their inability to compete with them ~~Chinese~~, as the former avoided commercial pursuits and manual occupations. Among the restrictions laid upon the Chinese were ^a head tax, tributes and tariffs to limit their trade, and a confinement to residence in the parian, the Chinese walled quarter, which was enforced until 1860 (55). The Spaniards, nevertheless, needed the Chinese proficiency in trade and skilled labour, and especially their competency in the latter (56). A summary of Chinese persecutions by the Spaniards may be illustrative of the Spanish-Chinese relationship during the Spanish rule in the Philippines. Expulsions were decreed in 1596, 1606, 1620, 1632, 1769 (and in 1804 against non agriculturalists). Restrictions on immigration were enacted in 1849 (57). During the 17th and 18th centuries several ~~massacres~~ almost annihilated the Chinese communities in the Philippines, and to these persecutions the Chinese reacted by sporadic rioting, and by collaborating with the British during the 1762-1764 conquest of Manila (58).

After Spain had lost Mexico its links with the Philippines became institutionally and geographically direct. Some Spanish immigrants began settling down in the country, and discarding traditional aristocratic attitudes, they engaged in trade. This long established Chinese occupation was difficult to penetrate for the new Spanish

settlers. The government, willing to favour the Spaniards, encouraged the Chinese to take up agriculture by lifting legal restrictions from those who would abandon trade occupations. Some of the Chinese responded and introduced improved methods into agriculture, although the majority remained urban and mainly occupied in trade. New Spanish immigrants and older settlers created partnerships with the Chinese using the latter's skills (59) during the economic expansion period after 1820. On the whole, the Chinese relations with the Spanish and Filipinos improved during the 19th century (60). Although intermarriage of Chinese with Filipinas occurred ever since the Spanish came, giving rise to a considerable Chinese mestizo group in 1750-1850 (61), intermarriage was specially encouraged by the government during the 19th century when dowries were allocated for those who married outside their ethnic groups (62). The mestizos were a legally recognized group apart and were not taxed as heavily as the Chinese. In 1810, the mestizos constituted about five percent of the population (63). Catholic in religion, and inheriting the industry of their forefathers, their customs were not Chinese and especially family relations within this group differed from the Chinese (64). Usually, by the second or third generation Chinese Mestizo families tended to Filipinize altogether (65).

During the entire Spanish rule in the Philippines, conversion to the Catholic faith enabled the Chinese to evade economic and social restrictions (66). Some of them were fully converted, and this generally facilitated their eventual assimilation; some others converted pro forma in order to benefit from material advantages (67). But, throughout the Spanish period bribery was perhaps the surest way to

by-pass restrictions.* Thus, the Chinese extended their business and residence to provincial towns, where they built small parians in inconspicuous places (68), and generally kept business going without much government interference. The 19th century improvement in the conditions of the Chinese and the general economic development in the Philippines after the stoppage of the Galleon Trade, resulted in a conspicuous overall Chinese population growth and a marked proportional shift from Manila into the provinces. The 30,000 Chinese of 1876, augmented to 66,000 (official figures) or 90,000 (unofficial) in 1886, and while in 1849 Manila had 92 percent of the Chinese in the Philippines, this proportion decreased to 77 percent in 1886 and to 48 percent in 1894 (69). At the end of the 19th century, the Chinese community was almost entirely Hokkien with a five percent proportion of Cantonese, the latter constituting 10 percent of the Manila Chinese and residing in their specific places (70).

Dutch Colonialism. The Dutch were driven out of the East Indies half a century after the Spanish had been forced out of the Philippines, yet the former's legacy is much less culturally marked than the latter's. This resulted from the direct rule of the Spanish, who came to a country with much less past experience in any form of advanced political organization, with an intention to convert and civilize. The Dutch came to trade, and for at least 200 years realized it through "buying cheap and selling dear" (71), maintaining the traditional social system and showing little, if any,

interest in "civilizing" the indigenes.

During the early 17th century, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Arab, Europeans and indigenes participated along with the Dutch in the highly profitable spice trade. As this low-volume-high-value trade could easily saturate the European markets without central control, the Dutch East Indies Company (V.O.C.) introduced a policy of economic monopoly spreading armed trading stations, which were centred on Batavia. Mobile naval forces tried to wipe out smugglers and maintain undisturbed links among the stations, while the interior of the islands did not interest the Dutch, who left them to indigenous vassal rule (72). This early policy of sweeping the Archipelago of rivals while limiting military expenditure to the minimum was changed, when the V.O.C. extended its monopoly over large parts of Java reducing Bantam and Mataram, the indigenous kingdoms, to political decay. In the mid 17th century the V.O.C. held stations in all the prominent ports of northern Java, in the Moluccas and in Macassar. In 1691, the Dutch captured Malacca (73) and supporting the Minengkebau of Sumatra, reduced the danger from Atjeh. The Company imposed a tribute system over the local princes, which continued into the 18th century and extended as the Dutch expanded over the whole interior of Java (74). This tribute system, in fact, provided the bulk of the V.O.C. income (75) and strengthened its financial standing, when the spice trade returned low profits. Within that geographical expansion into interior Java the Dutch introduced coffee plantations and as a result increased contacts with low-level indigenous officials.

The V.O.C. policy may be regarded as a political success, since it secured the Archipelago to Holland, but as an economic failure, since it went bankrupt after 200 years of operation. The reasons for the economic collapse may be sought in the growing military expenditure due to the expansion into Java, to incompetence of directors (76) and corruption. However, there existed a reason beyond the V.O.C. control: the decline in the Spice Trade. The bulkier export crops of coffee and sugar suffered competition in the European markets and were still uneconomical, despite the shortened way to the East Indies through the Roaring Forties. Had the Dutch not impoverished Java by decreasing its purchasing power, ships from Europe could return laden with European manufactured goods to balance the freight fare of the export crops.

The British interregnum in Java was too short to leave a significant imprint of its liberal economic approach, except perhaps in its unintentional influence on the Dutch policy. In fact, before 1811, some isolated voices in Holland demanded improved conditions for the indigenes in the East Indies, not as an end in itself but as a means to develop Java's market capacity (77). However, in 1830, the Dutch policy towards the East Indies changed when they introduced the Culture System. Its essence lay in the shift from land taxes, the revenue of which consisted of rice (and this had little value for the Dutch), to export crops. The Dutch envisaged that the peasant would have to contribute as tax a fifth of his working time instead of two fifths of his crop. In fact, the realization of the

plan abused much of its preconceived merits, as the peasants had to cultivate 20 percent of their land with indigo, sugar or coffee, and were remunerated by a certain percentage of the value. This was in contrast to the originally unrealizable plan, according to which the peasants would have cultivated government land. In addition, local headmen colluded with the Dutch to decrease the peasants' share in the revenue, in order to induce them to increase the proportion of land under export crops.

The Culture System proved an economic success for the Dutch, but it affected local food crop production during 1830-1860, a period during which the population of Java increased from 6 to 9.5 million. In some districts famine spread, following the negligence of sufficient rice production (78). Local chiefs, Chinese and European contractors, as well as the Dutch authorities squeezed a large share of the profits from the peasants, disorganizing the Javanese traditional social order and introducing a "plural character of the social order" (79).

In 1848, the East Indies ceased to be a Crown monopoly, and private enterprise was allowed to participate in the colony's economy. This change followed a growing public interest in the administration of the Archipelago demanding a liberal approach to the local people (80). The effects of Dutch liberal public opinion brought about the gradual abolishment of ordinances concerning the obligatory cultivation of export crops and labour services. Between 1860 and the end of the century, the Culture System gradually faded away. But, the liberal benefactors of the Dutch East Indies, did not anticipate the outcome of private enterprise

encroachments into Java's economy, which coincided with the appearance of the steamship, and which rendered export-crop production even more profitable than in the first half of the 19th century. In 1856, the government sector exports amounted to 64.4 million guilder and the private sector to 34.3 million, but in 1885 the respective figures were 16.3 million and 168.7 million. The emphasis on export-crop production reintroduced the evils of the Culture System by endangering food supplies and by exploiting ignorant peasants, many of whom lost their land titles to usurers. Land alienation spread so fast, that the government had to restrict ownership by, and leases to non-indigenes. But, on the entire colony level economic expansion prevailed as the steamship transport increased its efficiency by bigger and faster vessels and by shortening the route through Suez. As a result, coal and other minerals became economically exploitable and the Dutch, reconsidering the new conditions, decided to spread their effective rule over the entire Outer Provinces. This brought about a long sustained war with Atjeh and a campaign against piracy, which eventually almost cleared the interpelagian waters from that plague (81). Also, in the context of the general economic boost of the second half of the 19th century, the harbours, sea and land transport, mining and general technology were modernized. The following figures of external trade amply illustrate the economic boost in Indonesia: in 1870, it amounted to 152 million guilder, but in 1900 it rose to 434 million.

Although Chinese settlers and traders preceded the

Dutch in the Archipelago, the advent of the latter attracted many more of the former to Java and the Outer Provinces. Already Coen found builders and craftsmen among the Chinese, when he decided to make Batavia the prime city of the East Indies. By then, other Chinese lived in the interior operating sugar mills and arrack distilleries (82). In general, the V.O.C.'s policy of non-intervention in indigenous internal affairs was extended to the Chinese minority. This community was headed by a Kapitan China, who served as administrator and judge for Chinese internal affairs (83). ~~and the V.O.C.~~

~~and the community was really a Chinese support to establish a Chinese school and hospital.~~ Besides trade and the crafts, some Chinese practised usury, becoming absentee landlords, others bought monopolies of tax and produce collection; both these occupation, which involved face-to-face relationships of exploiter and exploited, aroused indigenous hatred for the Chinese. In 1733, there were 80,000 Chinese in the Batavia district alone, and in 1740 they revolted for unexplained reasons, but were soon crushed. As a result of that bloodshed ethnic groups were confined to specific residential wards, but these regulations were never rigorously observed.

The Chinese newcomers usually were young bachelors and, before the community began bringing in Chinese women, they used to marry local women, the offspring being peranakans (84). These usually lost active command of Chinese by the third generation (85) and grafted many local traits on their Chinese "cultural trunk". They even

performed drama and opera in Malay language though in a Chinese setting (86). The peranakan society of late 17th century, must have had little ethnic solidarity with the Chinese newcomers, as they put pressure on the V.O.C. to restrict further Chinese immigration, but the peranakans never fully dominated the Chinese society, as newcomers constantly flowed in, and as not ^{all} veterans adopted Indonesian cultural traits.

The Chinese of the Outer Provinces also antedated the Dutch arrival and, similarly to those of Java, increased their numbers during the European rule. In the 18th century, some Chinese communities in West Borneo engaged in gold mining, pepper cultivation, forest ^{produce} ~~product~~ extraction and subsistence agriculture. They were organized in kongsis, a sort of semi-democratic society derived from Chinese village life, and for some time became so powerful as to defy the authority of local chiefs. In 1830, there were 150,000 Chinese in Borneo, of whom 90,000 are supposed to have lived in kongsis controlled areas. Later in the 19th century, when the Dutch extended their effective rule over the entire Outer Provinces, they put an end to this kongsis semi-independence. The kongsis of Bangka and Billiton consisted of Chinese indentured labourers hired by the mining company, and thus both islands greatly increased their Chinese population during the economic expansion years of the late 19th century. Bangka, in contrast to Billiton, developed a variety of occupations besides mining: pepper growing, market gardening and trade. Similar economic developments increased the Chinese

population of the Outer Provinces, which in 1900 reached 250,000, while that of Java and Madura was 277,000.

Of all the Chinese occupations trade remained the most characteristic during the 19th century, and it gave them a specific economic niche between the broad base of the indigenous primary producer and the apex of European merchants. However, they infiltrated every other occupation except rice growing, which they only marginally practised. The energy and acumen of the Chinese in each of their economic pursuits gave rise to several generalizations concerning their practices (87). Usury, pilfering, profiteering and all sorts of exploitations were attributed to them in the late 19th century, despite the fact that by then the majority of them were wage earners and labourers. Inasmuch as they used dishonest methods in dealing with the indigenes, it must have been true for only a certain proportion of them. But, with all their business acumen, they failed to displace the Europeans from business in Indonesia and this has been attributed to their inability to manage large anonymous companies due to their familial solidarity (88). Remaining in small and intermediate trading businesses, they constantly confronted the indigenes in daily face-to-face business relations in urban and rural Java. This resulted in ~~innumerable~~ allegations of their dishonesty and in increased Indonesian hostility against them, while Dutch big business hid behind anonymous companies and thus evaded that hostility. The small and intermediate scale of the Chinese businesses was also

determined by the Dutch political dominance which until the end of the 19th century restricted, in principle, Chinese residences in Java to ghettos, and kept the indentured labourers in the tin mining islands. Had not these restrictions existed, Java would have been commercially dominated by the Chinese (89), as the indentured labourers would have moved to take up trade in that island. This situation contrasted with the conditions in Indochina and the Philippines where a higher percentage of the Chinese population pursued trading occupations. Neither in Java nor in the Outer Provinces did the Chinese assimilate. The peranakans of Java lived their lives apart, and though the cultural Indonesian traits they had adopted enabled them to communicate easily with the indigenes, there did not follow full assimilation or identification of the Chinese with the Indonesians (90). The Chinese newcomers (totoks), as well as those incorporated into kongsis, lived even more segregated from the Indonesians than did the peranakans. The widespread labelling of the entire Chinese community as dishonest businessmen, and a Chinese aloof attitude towards the Indonesians, brought about a fair degree of suspicion between these groups. Chinese superior airs were exhibited during their political campaign to come under the jurisdiction of European courts; a privilege enjoyed by the Japanese. Until 1824, Chinese civil affairs constituted a matter for European courts of justice, and criminal cases for courts of natives. Between 1824 and 1855, all matters returned to the courts for natives. After the latter date and following Chinese protests, the pre-1824 arrangement was reestablished. Marriage and inheritance

remained subject to Chinese laws during the entire period.

British Colonialism. Until the mid 19th century, British colonialism in Southeast Asia limited itself to the defence of the Bay of Bengal and Assam, and the security of the trade with China. There was only marginal interest in economic exploitation of inner areas through productive enterprise. In the third, but mainly in the fourth quarters of that century, British economic interests augmented as maritime transport rendered the area more economically efficient, and as potential European rivalries added their weight to the economic ones. Thus, the first ~~Anglo-Burmese~~ Burma War as well as the establishment of the stations in Penang and Singapore may be said to have had officially only secondary economic motivations, while Intervention in Malaya and the full conquest of Burma seem to have been brought about primarily by politico-economic reasons. The period until the mid 19th century, has been labelled as "reconnaissance and retreat" (91), the following half century, concerning Southeast Asia, may be defined as "true colonialism".

(i) Burma. King Bodawpaya restored unity to turbulent late 18th century Burma by indulging in endless campaigns, at the end of which he conquered Assam and Arakan. The pugnacious self-assertive Burmans used to send punitive missions into British held Bengal, in order to retaliate against Bengal based Arakanese guerrilleros. The East India Company (E.I.C.) tried to negotiate a modus vivendi, but when the Burmese prepared to capture Chittagong, the British struck in the rear, captured Rangoon and defeated the

Burmese army. Peace terms, concluded in 1826, accorded the British Assam, Arakan and Tenasserim. However, tension still remained during the second quarter of the 19th century, which saw deteriorating relations between British and Burmese along the newly created borders. Army chiefs and bandits roamed Burma and sporadically clashed with the British, who in retaliation captured Pegu in 1852, and linking Arakan and Tenasserim created the province of Lower Burma.

After the second Burma War, King Mindon of Burma, a Buddhist by conviction and manners, tried to recover Pegu through understanding with the British. But, the British refusal weakened his position vis à vis Burmese dissidents, especially when the British declined his request for arms supply for his loyal supporters. Thus, army leaders and Buddhist monks, who had traditionally been among the influential groups in Burmese history, and most of these were extremely anti-British, increased their political influence, and welcomed the successor of Mindon, who shared their political views. Consequently, the British found a trivial excuse and entirely conquered Burma declaring it a province of British India in 1886.

Prior to 1866, the British administered Lower Burma by indirect methods, leaving intact the existing social order. After that, "the old policy of laissez-faire was abandoned and new forms of governmental interference, aiming at improved efficiency or social welfare, were invented" (92). The five years following the conquest of

Burma, passed in an atmosphere of pacification of guerrilla bands led by former district officials. These lost their former authority under the new British direct rule, and were indignant about the abolition of the kingdom and the imposition of foreign rule. In that delicate situation the British made an administrative blunder (as British and Indian civil servants in Burma, belonging to the Indian administration, saw their future careers in India, they underestimated the importance of Burmese rural social organization) when they abolished the authority of the myothugyis, the traditional "circle" chiefs. These had owed services to the king, mobilized and commanded army units at wartime, collected taxes and settled disputes (93). The British conveyed authority to newly appointed village headmen with a view to holding a community responsible for crimes committed on its tract. The township officer became a civil servant, and thus a traditional hierarchical system of authority was replaced by a foreign system at one stroke.

Another effect of British direct rule regarded the tremors affecting the clergy, the Sangha. Theravada Buddhism had been the religion of the state and the ecclesiastical organization received its authority from the king; and though the Sangha had no hierarchical organization similar to the Catholic church, there was no strict differentiation between clergy and political power. The king appointed a monk to preserve religious discipline and the purity of the faith (94). The British denied the head of the Buddhist monks practical authority over the priesthood (95), who represented the "embodiment of moral

order", and thus foreigners brought about conditions of moral deterioration among the clergy, and the disappearance of discipline towards a central authority (96). The policy in Burma entirely contrasted with that of ~~the~~ ^{the} East Indies, which left the traditional social order fairly intact; and though the British administrative changes were no more drastic than those introduced by the Spanish in the Philippines, the Burmese were more socially developed than the Filipinos of the 16th century.

The British also shifted the economic centre of Burma from the Dry Zone and its capital Mandalay to Lower Burma and its new administrative centre in Rangoon (97). The process actually began after the second Burma War, and in its conception the British envisaged a change from a subsistence economy to cash crop production, providing for Lancashire textile purchases. The realization of the plan involved the opening of the Irrawaddy delta to rice cultivation by government-built navigation canals, distributaries and embankments erected with the help of Indian labour. Prospective cultivators were allocated 15 acres per family and, by clearing their plots, became land owners. Rapid immigration to the delta followed and, by 1901, the Delta rice exports reached 1,416,000 tons, the Dry Zone with its variety of subsistence crops losing its former economic primacy.

During the long history of Sino-Burmese relations, there has never been a real danger of Sinoization (98) of Burma. The distance, the physiographical nature of and ethnic diversity along the land route between the economic-cultural effective areas of both cultures, a priori

excluded such a possibility. As history showed, wherever Chinese settlers could not gradually advance, creating a continuous Chinese cultural oikumene, no real indigenous assimilation followed. Sinicization, as occurred in Vietnam could be effected by Chinese literati officials, but neither peasants nor literati came to settle in Burma.

Until the 19th century, "land-route" (99) Chinese lived in North Burma, mainly traders in Amarapura and Bhamo. Yünnanese merchants came to trade with the Shan principalities and miners came to buy temporary mining rights in Mogaung. As a result of the Panthay rebellion and the Burmese royal monopoly on cotton, many of the seasonal "land-route" Chinese traders failed to come, decreasing trade with China, while Burmese-British trade increased since mid 19th century. Chinese traders shifted, as a result, to store keeping and trading in British made piece goods (100). "Sea route" immigrants came via Rangoon, following the economic boom due to the opening of the Irrawaddy delta. These were coolies, agriculturalists and traders and some of the latter moved north with the hope of reopening the caravan route to Yünnan. In 1891, there were 37,000 Chinese in Burma, "more than half of whom had come by sea routes" (101).

Until 1900, the Chinese in Burma, though very distinct in life style from the Burmese, had good relations with the latter. Their low numerical power, as compared with the Indians, made them relatively inconspicuous and accorded them only a second place in socio-economic standing among the Asian minorities. Thus, geographical proximity to, and

familiarity with the administrative system of Burma, as well as a better starting point of well established clansmen gave the Indians the economic upperhand. As in Malaya the Chinese reversed their relative economic position in regard to the Indians, it seems that among the three above mentioned factors governing the relative economic position of immigrant ethnic groups, a superior starting point was dominant, in view of the specific kinship ties in these groups (102). The Chinese initial superiority in the Dry Zone and northern Burma, was annulled when the British shifted the economic centre of gravity to the Delta and Rangoon.

(ii) Malaya. The pivotal location of the Malay Peninsula in relation to the East - West trade, historically concerned parts of its western coasts and some off-shore islands, and perhaps also, but certainly to a lesser extent, the Kra isthmus (103). Physiographic conditions spelled the political backwardness of that area until mid 19th century. In 1850, its population numbered an estimated 300,000, and its increase to 2,670,000 in 1911, suggests immigration as the major factor. Immigrant Indonesian Malays easily integrated into the indigenous society as they had common ethnic and racial affinities. Sultans ruled over local chiefs and petit rajahs, the latter governing small isolated economically effective areas, separated by swamps, and jungle covered highlands. This pre-colonial political setting fitted thus into the grain of the country. Within Malay society there existed a gulf between aristocracy and the common people. "The latter existed only to serve

and obey the former and ^{to} administer to their comfort" (104). Local chiefs and rajahs paid tribute to the sultan, but kept private armies and maintained some political independence in many instances. Sultans had the power of life and death over the people, and besides tributes they also imposed corvée works. Religion was all pervading but adat law sometimes attenuated it, though certainly not in the case of debt-slavery, which had its origin in early Hindu customs. The common people living in kampongs, grew rice as staple food, and adding Muslim fatalism to Malay easy going, they seem to have accepted their ~~lot~~ ^{fate} with little or no social strife. The Chinese miners and traders usually maintained business contacts with rulers, without making social contacts with the commoners, perhaps with the exception of occasional traders in rural areas, and in Malacca.

The E.I.C. acquired Penang, made it a Presidency, and the admiralty installed there a shipyard and an arsenal. It was meant to become a port of call, a trading post and a strategic outpost of the Bay of Bengal (105). Malacca, first taken by the British from the Dutch in 1795, and again in 1824, was consequently stripped of its fortifications and its merchants were advised to move to Penang. After the establishment of Singapore in 1819, Penang's merchants were likewise advised to shift to Singapore, again to reduce mutual competition. During the first three quarters of the 19th century, British policy, in principle, avoided interfering with the inner politics of the Malay sultanates. Some intervention occurred however, when the British tried to pacify intransigency among the latter and keep Siamese political influence at low ebb.

More intensive intervention was enforced in the fourth quarter of the 19th century, when the British installed residents in the sultans' courts and extended protection to the sultanates. This initiative by the governor of the Straits Settlements came without first consulting the Colonial Office (106), perhaps under pressure from British merchants in Singapore. In 1896, the Malay states, under British protection, federated to create the Federated Malay States (F.M.S.), while Johore and the four northern states constituted the Unfederated Malay States (U.F.M.S.) (107).

The reasons behind British Intervention were similar to those driving Holland to extend its effective control over the Outer Provinces, as well as pressure from Singapore's merchant community. This latter pressure signified that Malay's tin had been a valuable commodity even before British intervention, and indeed, the most important economic activity of ^{the} late 19th century was distributed along the Tin-Belt of western Malaya (108). Those ~~was~~ ^{in tin mining} engaged were mostly Chinese, who constituted the majority in the mining and urban centres of that belt. The existing mining activities justified British investment in infrastructural projects in this area, which eventually, as Fisher pointed out, attracted rubber plantations into the same developed belt. This developed area was within the F.M.S., which political creation had a distinct economic raison d'etre i.e. to enable British capital and Chinese entrepreneurship to be expanded (109).

Chinese communities in Malacca and in mining centres of the Tin Belt date back to the 15th century (110). This

is established from Chinese sources, and as regards Malacca also from Portuguese sources. There exists a gap in knowledge about the Chinese in Malaya almost until the 19th century when the British increased their contacts with the area. During that period, there occurred a phenomenon specific to the special links of the Chinese and Malays in Malaya and Indonesia, namely, the creation of the peranakan, or in the case of Malaya, the baba society. This was typical to Malacca and not to the mining kongsis, the latter living in isolation from the Malays. The babas were offspring of Chinese and non-Muslim or Malay slave women. This hybrid group lost most of its Chinese cultural traits, spoke a Malay patois and practised Malay and some Chinese customs (111), but kept their Chinese names, a fact which later had a great significance in the group's reassimilation into the Chinese society.

The babas of the Straits Settlements and locally born Chinese who did not adopt baba traits, and were known as Straits Born (112), lived culturally apart from the mass of Chinese society. In the 19th century, they were urbanites of the Straits Settlements, Anglicized to a certain degree, and British subjects by status. Those newcomers who remained in Malaya as coolies, miners, cultivators and petit traders, kept their original Chinese cultural traits and retained specific characteristics of the Chinese immigrant society. These characteristics consisted of a very high proportion of young bachelor males, and their socio-economic organizations consisted of huis and kongsis, which usually were secret societies divided according to district of origin in China, hence

according to speech-group. The kongsis had specific mining or plantation rights over a certain tract usually near a river (113). The major secret societies contained several kongsis, and had extensive but patched geographical areas of influence. As there always existed rival enclaves in the areas of influence, and as more mining sites were discovered, the secret societies often warred against each other, some Malay rulers taking part in these wars (114). Kongsis and huis usually bought monopolies for opium, spirits (115), and porc supplies and operated gambling houses within their territories, while their main income came from mining and some plantation enterprises. Also, the Chinese kongsis and huis provided social services for their members and for newcomers. Besides providing a social milieu, they acted as labour exchange offices and employers. Labour conditions were, however, very poor and the Chinese entrepreneurs (towkays) usually exploited their labour to the extreme. When in 1880, the British introduced the administrative post of Protector of Chinese, they linked the Chinese closer to the government and extended protection to them in matters of labour conditions (116).

During the 19th century Chinese formal education was traditional in form and small in extent. Chinese communities supported and administered it through local boards. With all its shortcomings it perpetuated an important facet of the Chinese culture. (117).

Ethnic relations in Malaya during the 19th century may be defined as Malay rejection of the Chinese mainly on

religious grounds, while the Chinese felt culturally aloof, yet these relations lacked the acerbity which was introduced by nationalism in the 20th century.

French Colonialism. During the better part of the 19th century, the Vietnamese court at Hué exhibited a negative attitude towards French missionaries and traders, which continued even after the former became aware of the Opium War sequel. In 1859, the ^{French} conquered Saigon, and later also the entire area of Cochinchina and Cambodia, and in order to reduce Siamese fears, conceded the Siemreap district to them. During the 1860's, the French, emulating the British in Burma, unsuccessfully tried to find a navigable avenue to the interior of China through the Mekong. The failure to find this fluvial route was one of the reasons which diverted French attention to Tongking and the Red River. In 1873, the French temporarily captured Hanoi, and in 1882 they came back to stay. There followed three years of "pacification wars" against natives, Chinese and Thai refugees of the Panthay Rebellion, as well as against Chinese troops who had come to suppress the refugees at the request of the Vietnamese. The French encountered popular resistance also in Cambodia. This popular involvement in combats made the occupation of Indochina perhaps the bloodiest of all colonial conquests in Southeast Asia. The reasons for such an involvement may be sought in nine centuries of national independence of the Vietnamese, rather than in religious fanaticism, like that encountered by the Dutch in Atjeh. When French rule over Indochina had been established, Sincized Vietnam and Hinduized Cambodia and Laos came under

a single political entity blurring the fundamental division between both cultures (118).

Latecomers to the region, the French energetically undertook the development of the Mekong delta. The newly opened lands consisted of large estates rented by indigenous absentee landlords (119) to peasant families for 40 percent of the crop. The opening of the Mekong Delta for efficient rice production increased rice exports from 284,000 tons to 747,000 per annum during 1850-1900 (120), but the main share of profits went to Annamite landlords, to money lenders and to Chinese dealers, as rice collection, transportation, milling and trade had been monopolized by the Chinese even before the French arrival. Besides rice growing, the French introduced coffee and rubber plantations before the end of the century, diversifying the grain monoculture of Cochinchina. Still in the 19th century, the French developed coal and mineral extraction in Tongking, and making use of the dense population in the area, began industrializing the region. In addition to developing water conservation in the Red River delta, the French also developed the communication and transport network in both deltas and improved port facilities at Haiphong and Saigon. Having laid the basic infrastructure in both economically effective deltas, they undertook to develop land communication between these two regions. These economic activities laid down the basis of the future economic development of Vietnam, in comparison with which Hinduized Laos and Cambodia remained largely undeveloped.

The Chinese minority in the Annamite kingdom were

traditionally traders, rice-millers and craftsmen. In 1778, they built Cholon, strategically situated to facilitate their control of the rice trade and procession. By a 1814 edict of the Gia Long, they were organized in bangs (121), or communities, which enabled them to live socially apart from the indigenes, and which existence seems to have preceded the edict (122). The bang headmen, nominated by the Annamite authorities, maintained order, collected taxes, settled litigations and authorized residence of newcomers. The Court exempted the Chinese from corvée work and from military service, and only interfered in Chinese life to banish defrauding traders or opium dealers (123).

The French discriminately heavily taxed the Chinese (124), restricted their travels in the country and ordered them to carry identity cards. This almost stopped coolie immigration and decreased Chinese commerce in Haiphong, and as a result, in the 1890's, European plantation owners complained of labour shortage, and French merchants — of collection and distribution difficulties; consequently, the restrictions were almost altogether lifted. The French interests in Chinese residents in Indochina was expressed by a contemporary Frenchman: "Nous aurions besoin d'agriculteurs, nous n'avons que des commerçants" (125). This deplorable situation for the French, was brought about by their failure to recognize the rapid socio-economic mobility of the Chinese in the presence of which a continuous inflow of coolies had to be maintained to fill the low-paid jobs. Although the French imposed direct rule over indigenes in Indochina, they maintained the bangs renaming them congrégations, and left their headmen the same rights and

responsibilities they had enjoyed under the Annamite and Cambodian rule (126). The congrégations managed traditional schools, temples, cemeteries and hospitals. Usually there existed one congrégation for each town, but where larger Chinese communities in cities justified it, each major speech-group had its own congrégation. Under French rule, the major occupations pursued by the congrégation members were general commerce and the rice procession and trade. In addition, some Hakka rice growers lived near the Chinese border, and pepper and mulberry-tree growers lived near the Gulf of Siam, while market gardeners cultivated plots near cities. The Chinese usually did not own estates in the Terres Rouges area, nor were they coolies in plantations (127). Chinese traditionally monopolized the fishing rights in the Tonlé Sap, which they used to sub-lease to Vietnamese and Cambodians. They also practised deep-sea fishing, avoiding competition with native coastal fishermen. In the urban sector, Chinese craftsmen and skilled workers provided indispensable services for the whole population and the government.

Between 1880 and 1900, the Chinese population of Cochinchina doubled, while the indigenes increased by about 40 percent (128). In 1896, there were 72,454 Chinese in Indochina and in 1902 there were 108,598 (129). This growth may have resulted largely from the increase in rice production in the Mekong delta, which trade and procession was dominated by the Chinese. The system of rice collection, procession and distribution demanded the employment of kinsmen or at least Chinese agents, ramasseurs, millers and distributors. On the lowest level of the system were the

Ramasseurs who used to ply the delta distributaries and canals, collect the rice and also sell imported goods and serve as "news chroniclers". This system of rice trade must have provided the Chinese with a high income, which was naturally unevenly distributed among them. A calculation of a speculative nature may be interesting. By assuming the population of Cochinchina to be 90 percent indigenous, and 80 percent rural dwellers before 1900, it may be safe to conclude that half of these gained their livelihood from rice growing. The Chinese, according to contemporary sources, constituted 5 percent of the population of Cochinchina. Assuming that 25 percent of the Chinese earned their bread and butter through occupations linked with rice trade and procession, it remains only to decide the added value on rice after its harvesting, to compare the average gross income of the Chinese and indigenes occupied in the rice industry. If the added value was 50 percent, then about 36 percent of the population received through production twice as much as about 1.25 percent of the population received through collection, milling and distribution. This means that, on the average, a Chinese family occupied in the rice business got about 14 times more income than an indigenous one. If costs are to be introduced into the calculation, then the average peasant had to pay 40 percent in rent and additional sums to money lenders, which could not be higher than the costs incurred by the Chinese. This calculation is based only on average figures, and totally disregards profits of European exporters. In any event, the rice monopoly must

have provided the Chinese with the capital for the further economic enterprises they pursued in the 20th century.

Siam Until the 20th Century. During the 17th century, the Dutch had some trade privileges in Siam maintaining two factories, one in Ayudhya and one in Patani, while Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese and British competed with them (130). Later, the Japanese dropped out of the scene and the Europeans had their ups and downs in their relation with the Court; trade was accordingly affected. In 1680, the French, invited to counterpoise the Dutch position, came with an intention to drive out European competition, which they achieved, and with an aim to convert the Court and establish bases in Bangkok and Mergui, which they failed to achieve. Later, the French became the object of anti-European hostility and riots, which made them leave the country. The 18th century saw no substantial change in the Siamese negative attitude towards the Europeans. *This continued* almost until 1855, when King Rama IV reopened the country to the ~~Europeans~~. The Bowring Treaty accorded the British trade prerogatives by fixing a ^{three} percent duty limit on imports and by the permission to sell opium. In addition, the British got extra-territorial rights; European countries and the U.S.A. later signing similar treaties with Siam. Rama IV's decision followed his conviction that Siam could not remain backward in the modernizing world.

Consequently, he invited European advisers and administrators, ^{to} ~~who~~ reorganized the government and ^{to} produce plans ^{for} ~~to~~ building a modern economic and educational infrastructure. Rama V

improved on his predecessor by abolishing slavery, corvée service and gambling houses. He also reformed taxation, the military organization, the customs and revenue departments and, in 1901, introduced the first state budget. These measures only relatively improved on the old system, as officials lacked modern education and Western type efficiency values (131). In the past, before direct taxation was introduced in 1892, the provincial administration used to enrich itself by farming out monopolies on tax collection and on some commodity distribution. It was estimated that, out of annual taxes to the value of five to six million sterling, only just over one million reached the treasury before 1892 (132). The reorganization of the provincial administration also involved a new geographical administrative sub-division, and reformed judicial and police systems. Also within the plan of modernization, the transportation network improved and extended under European planning and by Thai and Chinese labour, the latter supplying low and medium entrepreneurial initiatives. The urban sector enjoyed modern education in primary and secondary levels, traditional Buddhist schooling losing much of its former position, while, under European supervision, technical schools for law, medicine, survey and military arts began operating in the late 19th century.

After the mid - 19th century, Siam became involved in a British - French rivalry in peninsular Southeast Asia, both powers endeavouring to secure the flank of their respective future land-routes into China. The British extended their rule over the Shan States and eventually

over the northern states of Malaya, while the French conquered the Kingdoms of Louang Prabang and Vientiane, by then nominally under Siamese sovereignty. It was only the Entente Cordiale (1904) which put an end to that rivalry and saved Siam from an imminent colonial occupation.

Until mid-19th century, the Chinese in Siam had trade preferences especially when anti-European feelings were high (133), but from 1855 onwards, the Europeans acquired preference at the expense of the Chinese (134). ~~was~~ In public works, especially in engineering, the Chinese undertook construction works under European planning. Before that year, the Chinese served as contractors to the king in the China trade, by then, under royal monopoly. They provided transportation, necessary connections in China, and knowhow in profit maximization. Besides their domination in the rice trade, the Chinese also pursued the crafts, agriculture, mining, smelting and petit trade (135). Some owned pepper, tobacco and sugar plantations, the produce of which was processed also by Chinese (136). During that period, economic activity was low, and the Chinese population was fairly small, maintaining a low rate of immigration. This relative stability of the Chinese community, and inter-marriage, brought about assimilation into the receptive Thai society (137). The offspring of Chinese males and Thai women, Lukchins, usually became completely absorbed by Thai society after two or three generations; absorption being defined as the inability to speak Chinese, negligence of ancestor worship, and change of surnames (138).

The economic boost of the second half of the 19th

century saw a great increase in Chinese immigration and population numbers. Chinese became builders, construction workers and servicemen and vegetable growers (139) near the expanding Bangkok and other urban centres, inside of which they increased their occupation in retail trade.

~~Generally~~ ^{Generally} speaking, the growth of the urban sector in Thailand was closely linked with Chinese new-immigrant activities. The 19th century Thai and Chinese population numbers developed as follows:

	<u>1825</u>	<u>1850</u>	<u>1870</u>	<u>1875</u>	<u>1890</u>	<u>1900</u>	
Thais	4.75	5.20		5.95		7.32	in millions (140)
Chinese	230	300	383		497	608	in thousands (141)

The "pull" of economically developing Thailand coincided with that of the other Southeast Asian countries, and likewise augmented towards the end of the century. Also, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it was European high level initiative which created the conditions for the increased influx of Chinese (142). The latter, when they came, did not fail to find an "economic niche", lying between and in symbiosis with the high commerce of the Europeans and local nobility, and the low basis of indigenous primary producers, (143).

The organization of the Chinese society in the 19th century, followed speech-group, guilds and secret society patterns, which socially meant a vertical rather than a horizontal grouping, cutting across economic standings and classes. Solidarity, loyalties and social services followed these vertical structures (144). Concerning the Thai-Chinese

relations in the first half of the 19th century, the Chinese were subject to a special tax, which exempted them from corvée labour and from military service, but tax rates could be changed at the whim of the monarch or provincial governor. On such occasions, secret societies usually reacted by rioting, which in turn entailed Thai retaliation. The years 1830, 1847, 1889 and 1895, recorded Chinese-Thai riots, generally localized events, which did not create very serious and lasting anti-Chinese feelings.

Southeast Asia's Socio-Cultural Fabric on the Verge of the 20th Century. With all the shortcomings of historical generalizations, one cannot dispense with them when one's concern extends over long periods of human activities spread over a vast and versatile geographical space. Lacking quantified evidence, one should evaluate undisputably qualified facts in relation to general principles governing human relations and interests in every society.

The extension of colonial rule over the entire territories of their former "zones of influence", which occurred in the second half of the 19th century and specifically during its last few decades, ~~which~~ brought more Europeans and Chinese into contacts with the indigenes. The economic boost, which followed the introduction of the steamship, mainly developed the urban sector of the Southeast Asian countries, the plantation branch of the rural sector, and also rice production as a cash crop in the Irrawaddy and Mekong deltas. The

indigenous peoples of all countries, or at least the lowland dwellers, increased in number, diversified their occupations, enjoyed improved education, formal and informal, and came closer to Western techniques, institutions and ideas. These phenomena constituted necessary conditions for the appearance of indigenous educated people, who could think of their countries in terms derived from the political thought of the West, thus consecrating the political unity imposed on the area by the colonial powers.

The Philippines with its extensive education system produced the first modern anti-colonial movement. During the 19th century, Burma and Vietnam did not lose their anti-colonial feelings, though they perhaps failed to realize them in terms of modern organization. The political unification of the entire areas corresponding to contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia under effective colonial rules, produced at least the setting in which future national aspirations could define themselves in geographical terms.

The development of the urban sector, the increase in Chinese immigration and the improved knowledge of modern socio-economic mechanisms by the indigenes, must have lit the Chinese problem from a new angle. In addition to localized friction stemming from low-level ^{economic} competition and ~~the~~ ^{from} basic hostility towards out-groups, some of the indigenous people must have considered the problem of the special socio-economic position of the Chinese in its general context, i.e. in relation to the colonialist - indigenous political setting. If there was no political

expression of these considerations, there at least existed the conditions for such thoughts, though perhaps not the social organization for making them public political issues. Two social prerequisites were ostensibly lacking: an attitudinal change in the existing traditional elite, or the creation of an unsatisfied educated element essential to social revolutions. The development of this latter characterized the early decades of the 20th century.

During the later part of the 19th century, the Chinese enormously increased their rate of immigration into Southeast Asia; for example, between 1881 and 1901, more than 3 million Chinese arrived in Penang and Singapore alone (145). Though many of the immigrants returned to China, a large proportion still stayed. The majority of the newcomers became labourers and skilled workers, but some went up the ladder of success to become entrepreneurs. However, during that period, the traditional vertical structure of the Chinese society remained unchanged, with speech-groups, guilds and secret societies dominating the social scene. The failure of the Chinese to cooperate with the indigenes on a class basis, stemmed from, among many other reasons, the high proportion of Chinese bachelors among the coolies, who having failed to stabilize themselves by marriage or business occupations, usually considered their stay as temporary. Thus, the growing proportion of new-comers and their relatively short stay increased the "Chineseness" of the entire community in each country of Southeast Asia by counterpoising local cultural influences affecting the established Chinese residents.

Nationalism and Independence.

Generally speaking, the nationalists of Southeast Asia inherited from the colonial governments a new politico-geographical conception of the territories, which had been politically established by the late 19th century. In essence, it boiled down to the consecration of the extended and demarcated boundaries of the colonies, and to the less conspicuous system of direct rule. The territorial and ethnic vassalage of minorities and the open marchlands of olden days were gone forever. This new conception was in striking contrast not only to past experiences, but also to the contemporary traditional elite outlook, which still thought in ethnic-group solidarity terms. The Nationalists (146), at least in theory, considered all the indigenous ethnic groups as constituent parts of the nation; however, both the nationalists and the traditional elites excluded the non-indigenous minorities, eminently composed of Chinese, from the national multi-ethnic entity. The changing socio-economic conditions of the period and education opportunities, favoured the "popular acculturation" or "political socialization" (147) of the indigenous groups. This facilitated the political work of the nationalists and acted against the traditional elites' political conception (148).

Western political thought directly influenced the intellectual nationalists, and liberals from the West gave support by political pressure in the metropolitan capitals. London, The Hague, Paris, Madrid and later Washington became the scene for political lobbying by local liberals and Southeast Asian students and leaders, but Western political

thought also came indirectly, in Asian attire. India's Swaraj party had close links with Burmese nationalists. Japan's modernization was naively taken by the nationalist leaders to be merely a natural outcome of its independence (149), reassuring them of their own ability to lead their countries independently. Chinese nationalism affected Southeast Asia mainly through its influence on the Chinese minorities ~~in Southeast Asia~~ ^{there}. These communities became strongly anti-imperialist as a result of European intervention in China, and later developed a considerable stream of leftists. But, the leftists' nationalism expressed their allegiance to China more than to their host countries. This increased the breach between the Chinese minorities and the indigenous nationalists, not because China by then had a menacing expansionist image, but rather as a result of the Chinese immigrants' traditional economic power (150), their increasing inner solidarity and their cultural aloofness. Thus, the Southeast Asian nationalism, was in part stimulated by xenophobia before fully expressing its positive ideas, a common characteristic of various nationalist movements (151).

The supreme ethical principle of the nationalist movements became the progress towards self rule and independence. The questions of the strength of the local economy, its dependence on metropolitan markets, danger from other colonial powers, and the indigenous leaders' ability to administer a country in a modern world, were usually disregarded. Also, special rights to minorities were deemed evil as they tended to perpetuate the ethnic diversity of those countries.

Increasing dependence on export-crops, and, as a result, on imported goods, which continued into the 20th century, changed

the taste of local consumption. Besides dealing a severe blow to cottage industries, imports and exports naturally increased the share of trade in the national incomes, privileging the Europeans and Chinese at the expense of the indigenes. The landed elite did not protest against that economic development, neither did they invest capital in industry nor in commerce. They had no real interest in nationalism, as those who first committed themselves to that cause were largely urban dwellers, and as their economic interests did not suffer from Chinese or European encroachments. Moreover, both latter groups supported the indigenous elite's hold on the rural areas, the Chinese by providing essential trade, the Europeans by perpetuating the elites' economic position through denying the Chinese large-scale land ownership. It generally was the indigenous middle-class which first became acculturated to nationalism. Indigenous traders, in direct competition with the Chinese, naturally became supporters of this movement, as did the religious leadership. The latter usually had little economic assets but preceded even the nationalists in raising the people against the oppressing groups (152).

The indigenes' relations with the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia during the first half of the 20th century was largely dominated by the former's uncompromising nationalistic geographical loyalties, and by their lower economic position. In terms of mutual group feelings, this definitely manifested itself in a growing suspicion. In the second half of the century, when the Southeast Asian countries got their independence, the status of the Chinese worsened by economic indigenism and citizenship laws. The Chinese, nevertheless, improved their

economic position from the abyss of W.W.II., and the wealthier among them even arrived at adapting themselves to space left open through the meshes of the legal net; sometimes enlarging their freedom of activity through collusion with corrupt officials.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Thailand was outstanding in its independence, and the Philippines was experiencing a "Filipinization" of its municipal and provincial governments. On the other extremity stood the Malay states with a very low degree of national consciousness. Within that range each Southeast Asian country constituted a particular case.

The Philippines. The disintegration, in the 19th century, of the Spanish Empire in Latin America led the Spanish to use the direct route to the Philippines, and entailed an economic development in the islands after the 1820s(153). This led to the appearance of a Spanish, mestizo and Chinese middle class, of which the two former groups had received good Catholic education. This catholic education was available in Manila at all levels and provided various provincianos with a common language (Spanish) and with a possibility to exchange modern political ideas. Catholic education had been fairly extensive also at the parish level, and the dispute between Spanish and Filipino clergy over the administration of parishes, especially aggravated after the return of the Jesuits in 1952 (154), raised anti-Spanish feelings among the lower classes as well. Thus the Philippines led all the other Southeast Asian colonies in their political acculturation.

The Catholic nature of Filipino education made it racially tolerant, at least in principle, and European

political thought influenced the Liga Filipina, created by Rizel. Thus, it aimed at the remedy of political injustices, of agricultural exploitation, and at the creation of a unified policy for the entire archipelago (155); by then, however, the Spanish had only nominal control over the Moro Province. Later, in the 1890s, the Katipunan secret organization initiated a subversive war against the Spanish. It is of great interest to note that the Katipunan political plate-forme contained some anti-Chinese statements ~~concerning their~~ ^{concerning their} ~~grip~~ ^{grip} on the economy (156).

(i) Political Developments. Commodore Dewey promised Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, future independence for the Philippines; yet, the U.S. senate only affirmed progress towards municipal and district self government, sympathetic legislation and administration, a just settlement of disputes concerning land owned by religious orders, and free primary education in local languages. The breach of promise led to the continuation of the Filipino armed struggle until 1901. However, between 1901 and 1908, many Filipinos were incorporated into local governments, and the same process also progressively developed in the central government; a Filipino Popular Assembly was introduced, and Filipinos were incorporated into the Commission (an equivalent of a government). In 1914, there were 2,148 Americans and 7,283 Filipinos in the administration, and in 1920 — 582 and 12,651 respectively (157).

In 1916, Congress unanimously voted an "ultimate independence" to the Philippines, which only diverted the Filipino-American political strife over the final aim to the timing. In government, the Jones Law of 1916 gave the

executive power to the American governor general, legislative power to the Filipino senate and chamber of deputies, and judicial power to the supreme court. The governor general could veto acts of Filipino legislation and held responsibility to the U.S. president, with whom remained ultimate financial control. In the first cabinet, Filipinos held 5 out of 6 governmental departments. During the early 1900s, two political parties exhibited real difference in political conception. The Federalists aimed at an ultimate federation within the framework of the U.S., ^{while} ~~and~~ the Nationalists' ^{aim was} ~~was~~ full independence. *The latter carried the vote in* the first elections and for long remained the major political factor, and, since 1923, when it became practice to elect cabinet members from the majority party, they even increased their importance.

During the first two decades of the 20th century, the Americans pacified the Moro Province (Sulu and Mindanao), and following punitive missions, construction of a transport network and education opened this frontier area. When the Sultan of Sulu abdicated his sovereignty rights in 1915, retaining only his religious function, the road was paved for the extension of the modern state-idea over the area, not as a vassal entity but as an equal constituent part of the state (158).

In 1934, the Philippines achieved its independence act, which envisaged a 10 year period of Commonwealth beginning in 1936. Defence and foreign affairs had to remain under U.S. control during the 10 years period, after which tariffs would be imposed and Filipino immigration stopped. This Commonwealth period introduced women's suffrage, independent armed forces and a commission for the safeguard of honest

elections. The Nationalists were in full power during that period which passed fairly peacefully. Only some communist agitation in Central Luzon aroused intermittent public interest from 1924 onwards.

During the Japanese occupation, an "independent" government, under Laurel, collaborated with the Japanese. The administration largely remained in their posts (159), while the majority of the population viewed the Japanese occupation with disgust, as atrocities, ~~currency~~ inflation, forced labour and commandeering of goods were ubiquitous. Passive resistance and guerilla warfare marked the attitude of the population, more than collaboration. Japanese slogans such as "Asia for the Asiatics" and a Filipino equivalent: "The Philippines to Filipinos", however, aroused nationalist feelings bringing about the expansion of Tagalog learning (160).

The independent republic held elections in 1946, and the Nationalist party, by then divided on the collaboration issue, lost to the Liberal Party of Roxas, who himself had allegedly collaborated. Both the Liberals and Nationalists have had close ties with reactionary land owners and they definitely did not constitute a two-party democratic system (161), but rather two groups of different personal loyalties. The new republic signed a treaty with the U.S. according to the latter military bases and rights in exploitation of national resources equal to those of Filipinos, in return for an eight year period of free Filipino exports to the U.S., and another 20 years of gradually increasing tariffs. Generous U.S. grants supported the post-war Filipino economy and maintained the traditional mutual sympathy between the two nations. It is no wonder, that

the Philippines almost fully aligned itself with the American policy in Southeast Asia and the Far East, becoming a staunch adversary of the People's Republic of China and the Communist Bloc. The Philippines participated in the Korea War, signed a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, maintained cordial relations with Taiwan, and became an ardent member of S.E.A.T.O.. Moreover, Macapagal anticipated that in the event of a U.S. recognition of the People's Republic, the Philippines would still maintain relations with Taiwan (162). He also silenced Filipino voices demanding the opening of trade relations with Mainland China.

In addition to S.E.A.T.O., two major political issues linked the Philippines with Southeast Asia during the two decades following W.W.II., namely: Maphilindo, and Confrontation with Malaysia. The former has never culturally appealed to the Filipinos, who regarded it as a political combination of a temporary nature. They must have been surprised to learn of the religious Muslim overtones of the original Malay racial solidarity (163). Concerning the Malaysian issue, the Philippines tried to leave open the question of Sabah (164), overtly claiming for themselves the rights of the Sultan of Sulu over the territory, and actually trying to gain an outer defensive post for themselves.

The post W.W.II. years were characterized by the Hukbalahap rebellion. Ideologically motivated by communism, it expressed social unrest created by oppressive tenancy conditions in central Luzon. The Huks fought a guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, and when in 1946, their elected leaders were denied their seats in the House of Representatives, they took once more to the hills with their arms. Roxas and Quirino tried

to solve the problem by force and later by amnesty, but failed. Liberal legislation concerning land tenancy rates could not be realized through the medium of the corrupt administration. Only Magsaysay took effective steps to eradicate the social evil, personally by-passing the administration (165). During his term of office the Huks resistance was declining.

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The cultural diversity of the Philippines is represented by its over 80 dialects and languages in current use (166), which ~~form~~^{constitute} a major criterion for regional differentiation (167). Spanish, English and Tagalog are the official languages, the latter, a "demotic lingua franca" (168), is increasingly suggested for official use. In 1939, 25,4 percent of the population read and spoke Tagalog, while 26,2 percent read and spoke English. An estimate for 1966 showed that the proportions were 46 and 40 percent respectively, while in 1960 only 2.1 percent read and spoke Spanish (169). However, when Tagalog was introduced outside Luzon, strong opposition to its acceptance followed, especially in the Visayas. The ethnic diversity of the Philippines is held together by the cultural matrix of Catholicism to the extent that the religious divide in the South is politically more meaningful than are ethnic borders (170). The mestizos, largely of Chinese descent, unlike the Eurasians in other countries, politicized the Indios, and constituting a large proportion of the middle-class and elite, became a cohesive force in Filipino society.

American educational activities improved on the Spanish achievements. Between 1905 and 1939, schools increased in number from 3,500 to 11,000, and to 22,000 in 1951-52. Pupil

enrolment went up from 300,000 in 1905, to 1,250,000 in 1935 and to 4,000,000 in 1950-51 (171). In 1962, there were 4,500,000 pupils in schools comprising 16% of the population (172). The Philippines' investment in education was relatively high, however; the 1961 figures showed that only 72.7 percent of the primary schools male graduates and 34.6 of the female were employed. For college graduates the figures were 76.0 and 50.8 percent respectively (173). In view of the social dangers offered by a high proportion of educated socio-economically unintegrated persons, the 1960s conditions in the Philippines were rapidly leading to political instability. The process has been in progress within a society, whose education system resembled the totalitarian countries' in its predominant emphasis on moulding the national character (174), and must have had a strong influence on the hostility towards the local Chinese community.

The improvement in health services, brought about mainly by the Americans, constituted a major factor in the rapid population growth. However, the annual growth rate was geographically unevenly distributed as is shown by the percentages below (175).

Period	1903-1960	1903-1939	1939-1960	1939-1948	1948-1960
Luzon	2.13	1.87	2.61	2.16	3.24
Visayas	1.75	1.92	1.54	1.48	1.72
Mindanao	3.66	3.36	4.24	3.24	5.57
Philippines	2.24	2.06	2.51	1.91	3.06

Population pressure in the Philippines has been enormous, especially in the Visayas and Luzon, where practically all the arable land is cultivated. Mindanao has provided an outlet for pressure-relief during the 20th century, yet immigration seems

to have filled most of the vacant areas, and the late Muslim riots may prove that Mindanao is soon becoming overpopulated. Urban squatting has become the second major plague of the Philippines after Caciquism, and socially seems more damaging than corruption of officials. This problem is directly linked with that of economic progress and income distribution. In 1938, the G.N.P. per capita was 88 U.S. \$, in 1946 it was reduced to 43 as a result of the war; but the growth to 99 in 1954, and to 112 in 1960, represents a 1.12 percent annual increase in real terms between 1938 and 1960, a 3.18 percent increase between 1948 and 1960, and only 2.70 percent in 1951-1960 (176). As income has been unevenly distributed, the per capita averages disguise a serious problem of economic stagnation or deterioration for a large sector of the Filipino society (177). The danger of that process in inner politics is enhanced by the presence of the Chinese minority largely occupied in trade, and quite well off.

The ascent of the mestizo elite in the 19th century, introduced nationalism into the Philippines, as they could overcome the language barrier existing between other groups by means of Spanish or English (178). Being incorporated into the administration in the Spanish era, but more so during the American rule (179), the mestizo leadership usually allied themselves with the Caciques and the oligarchy, who controlled the peasant vote by economic pressure (180). The intimate alliance favoured both parties, and though "Filipinos do not expect their public men to be saints" (181), corrupted administration did much to perpetuate the unbalanced distribution of wealth in the country. Limitation of suffrage to

literates and idolizing of the mestizo national heroes, may be interpreted as a means undertaken to perpetuate the mestizo elite dominance (182).

During the Japanese occupation, the Philippines, not unlike other Southeast Asian countries, experienced a cultural confrontation with the Japanese. The latter had no experience in ruling non-Sinicized countries before 1942, but came to rule "Malay cultured" countries during W.W.II. The Japanese could not transcend their own Sinicized culture which had inherent efficiency values. Wartime needs were pressing and the Co-Prosperity Sphere policy must have induced them to act, as "to the Japanese mind, there was a prime need of a forcible 'moral, cultural and spiritual rejuvenation' of the Filipino people"(183). They tried to change the Filipino traditional attitude towards work, industriousness and regimentation, by introducing their own primary education values and vocational training. Mass singing, and group calisthenics were introduced as morale boosters (184), and the value of manual work was propagandized. In order to improve and control popular response, the Japanese introduced neighbourhood associations of 5-15 families, which came under local headmen and were incorporated into bigger associations, having responsibility for production, criminal offences and mutual aid. Besides an inherent cultural antagonism, the Japanese found in the Filipino society also an aversion for the Japanese war machine and its ends.

From mid 19th century and onwards, but mainly during the American rule and post W.W.II. years, the Philippines experienced an increasing trend of external trade in their economy. In 1938, for instance, about 75 percent of the exports and two


thirds of the imports were traded with the U.S. The increase in export crops caused a continuous decrease in the home produced share of the national diet. Rice production increased mainly by expanding the cultivated area, but per capita production was decreasing. Maize and root crop output increased chiefly through better yields (185). However, with 27 million dollars worth of rice imports in 1963, it seems that sugar ~~production~~ may lose its competitive position against rice for suitable lands, when in 1974 tariff agreements with the U.S. expire, or when world market prices fall down.

The problem of the Filipino economy is social in nature, as the country has maintained an above average rate of economic development within the frame of Southeast Asian standards. Major economic evils are: the high rate of unemployment, the low efficiency of agriculture, where 60 percent of the labour force generate about one third of the G.N.P., and the traditional system of land tenure (186). Mining and industry are the more efficient sectors of the economy and as they develop with American, Filipino and local Chinese investment, they may alleviate social pressures.

(iii) The Chinese Minority. Figures of the Chinese community in the Philippines have been confusing, but the problem of this minority has been as acute throughout the 20th century as ^{ever} before. By the end of the 19th century, there were about 100,000 Chinese in the Philippines, and an estimate of 1909 quoted their number as 120,000. The 1903 census, however, returned 43,000 for some unexplained reason, while the 1960 census quoted 181,000 Chinese nationals and 120,000 naturalized (187). However, the estimates used by researchers to measure

MAP V-B THE PHILIPPINES: CHINESE DISTRIBUTION

M - Major Concentrations
S - Secondary Concentrations



After Atlas Narodov Mira, Academy of Science, Moscow, 1964 and Fisher, 1964.

the extent of the political issue raised by the Chinese identity in the Philippines are the 450,000 given by Willmott and Williams, ^{or} ~~and~~ 300,000 quoted by Taiwan, both figures for 1965 (188). A 400,000 estimate of 1968 (189) may be as good a guess as the 600,000 for 1972 (190). It was estimated that in the 1940s, about 0.75 million Filipinos had noticeable Chinese facial features (191).

The spread of Chinese nationalism in the Philippines resulted from political influences from China and from common grievances experienced by that minority in the Philippines. This experience definitely strengthened the Chinese identity and solidarity even during the period of the American rule. Although jus solis was adopted for citizenship considerations, the Exclusion Act still aroused Chinese resentment and consequently they boycotted American goods until 1907 (192). The Hokkien preponderance in the community, made it practically homogenous and the high concentration in Manila, although by then on the decline, facilitated this Chinese concerted reaction to discriminatory laws (193).

By the early 20th century, the Chinese Board of Commerce was ^a created and undertook, besides its natural functions, to support social welfare, education, hospitals and cemeteries, organizing the Chinese cultural life and providing for its perpetuation in an atmosphere of Filipino nationalism. By then, the Chinese mestizos were generally losing their uniqueness as an ethnic group and were shifting towards Filipino society. Chinese immigration practically stopped, and the community was faced by a dangerous situation concerning its cultural perpetuation. The Chinese community organizational framework

offered the Reformers and the Radicals of China a suitable arena to try and attract sympathy, funds and followers (194). There appeared two distinct groups with different approaches to Chinese politics, in the second decade of the 20th century. The K.M.T. group, which seemed perhaps too extreme to the second group of Chinese traders controlling the Board of Commerce; in 1914, both these groups constituted the two political factions of the community (195). In later years, the Chinese Consulate General undertook to activate politically the Chinese community. It helped administer modern Chinese education, diffused current information on China, raised funds and reported the local Chinese grievances to the Chinese government.

The liberal economic policy in the Philippines under the Americans enabled the Chinese to shift easily from manual labour to trade and services. This economic mobility left vacancies in the lower paid jobs, as no Chinese immigration was allowed, and as the Filipinos were slow in filling the vacancies; as a result, some voices in Filipino public life and in the American congress recommended the resumption of Chinese immigration (196).

In 1932, the Chinese owned 75 percent of the retail trade, but in wholesale trade their proportion was much lower. In 1938, Chinese assets in the non-agricultural sector amounted to 180 million pesos out of a 1,278 million total, in commerce they held 149.5 million out of a 588 million total, and in manufacturing — 26 million out of a 356 million total (197). These figures show that 14.2 percent of the non-agricultural assets were owned by Chinese, but whereas their share in commerce was about 27 percent, in industry it was only 7.2

percent. The Chinese urban concentration explains their overall share in non-agricultural assets but not the high concentration in commerce. This latter must be interpreted as a cultural pattern specific to Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia (198). Indeed, when restrictions on Chinese trade and commerce later followed, Chinese capital flowed into industry, as a sign of a cultural readaptation to new environmental conditions, without affecting their urban concentration (199). However, the Chinese control of the retail trade and their remittances to China brought about their being labelled as dishonest traders and as damaging to the economy; in actual fact, remittances to China during 1937-1941 amounted to 6 million dollars, and their profits from the rice industry were not excessive (200). However, this label tended to obscure an important Chinese contribution to economic development, which did not receive appropriate recognition: their follow-up of the Americans into the Moro Province. A Chinese tienda keeper would usually settle down in a village supplying goods, advancing loans and collecting the produce in a region devoid of communications, transport and credit facilities.

The grudge against Chinese traders provided a political issue during 1921-1936, when the Bookkeeping Law eventually reached the American Congress. The sequel was a compromise authorizing a translation of account books instead of using one of the official languages. The long debates over the issue and the appeal to the Americans exposed the Chinese to much public criticism and introduced Chinese trade into the limelight. This helped the landed Caciques and their supporters in diverting public attention from the agricultural problems.

The liberal American approach to the Filipino economy facilitated the Chinese relative progress in their economic standing but not their socio-cultural integration into the Filipino society. Chinese nationalism and Filipino resentment could not compromise in an atmosphere of economic liberalism, as "dependence upon and inability to compete" (201) still characterized Filipino - Chinese relations. Thus, with a growing Chinese solidarity facing the economic discriminatory laws after 1936, the Chinese continued to improve their (F/M) sex ratio from 0.012 in 1903 to 0.76 in 1960 (202). This meant that their proportion ^{of people} (integrated into families (See Appendix A) rose from about 0.24 percent to 86; this presumably in pure Chinese families. However, the Chinese solidarity of the 1930s was not complete, as in the 1930s, there appeared a Chinese leftist group, which numbered a mere 1,000 at the end of the decade. This small number, in comparison with Indonesian and Malayan Chinese communists, may be explained by the small proportion of Chinese labourers in the Philippines, in contrast to countries where Chinese immigration proceeded unchecked well into the 20th century. A more recent social breach will be discussed later.

The post-independence economic discrimination against the local Chinese continued although Philippine - Taiwan relations were improving. In 1948, only 38 percent of the retail trade remained in Chinese hands (203), in 1961 rice and corn-trade became Filipinized and more than 100 bills restricting Chinese economic activities were enacted (204). In the late 1950s, the Chinese held only 13 percent of the retail stores and 37 percent of the assets in the trade. This brought about a shift of Chinese capital into manufacturing. In 1961, the Chinese owned

1,068 large industrial enterprises out of a total 4,085 (205), mainly producing textile, tobacco and garments (206). The shift of Chinese capital from trade to industry was not voluntary, and yet it must have increased the attachment to the Philippines of those thus involved as a preliminary step in their social integration. As capital invested in industry is less liquid than that invested in trade, and as owners and managers must have close and frequent contacts with officials for the smooth operation of their businesses, this group of the wealthier Chinese must be economically conducted to increased Filipinization. Had the Filipino economic indigenism been unique in Southeast Asia, Chinese capital would have been smuggled out of the country, but with nowhere to emigrate and economic indigenism being rife throughout the region, the Chinese capitalists are led to closer integration with the local higher classes.

Discrimination against the Chinese occurred also in citizenship laws. The Commonwealth, and later the republic governments, actually regressed to a jus sanguinis policy, which seemed in a way not to effect Chinese reaction. Children of Chinese and Filipinas could choose their nationality when they reached legal maturity, but the China born were discriminated against by the distinction between a "native born Filipino" and a naturalized citizen. In the fifteen years following independence, only 2 percent of the Chinese petitioned for naturalization. This resulted perhaps from the illegal entry of many Chinese or of their parents (207). Other reasons for the Chinese reluctance to naturalize were perhaps the mutual suspicion and hostility between them and the Filipinos (208), the disappearance of the mestizo class (209), the growth of

Chinese consciousness (210) and the strong diplomatic position of Taiwan in the Philippines until the early 1970s. Also, the naturalization procedure became a means to extort large sums of money from the applicants and only wealthy Chinese could afford it, but citizenship could be easily repealed (211). Relationships between Chinese and Filipinos were smoother in rural areas and assimilation has been there easier than in Manila (212).

In absence of new immigration Chinese education seems to be one of the major factors perpetuating the culture. This is amplified by the statement that "The minority of Chinese who attend or have attended non-Chinese schools are affected most of all [by Western and Filipino cultural traits]" (213). The situation in 1963/64, when 57,000 Chinese pupils attended about 137 vernacular schools on primary level alone (214), indicates a strong hold of the Chinese education system on the community. In proportions, it means that for an estimated Chinese population of 425,000 about 13.4 percent attended vernacular schools, which means that almost all the relevant age-group received Chinese education.

Virtually beginning after the American conquest of the Philippines, Chinese education eventually adopted Mandarin as a means of instruction, and in 1926 added English into its curriculum for pragmatic reasons. In 1936, under the Commonwealth government, the schools had to be registered, but by W.W.II. only 23 complied, although in 1935 there already had been 52 schools (215). After W.W.II, Chinese education flourished with 154 registered schools and 52,395 pupils attending in 1959. A Chinese teachers college also functioned, yet out of 1,882 teachers only 126 had Filipino citizenship (216).

The syllabus divided into an English section under the supervision of the ministry, and a Chinese section controlled by the Taiwan embassy. This followed a post W.W.II. Sino-Philippine treaty; later however, under public opinion pressure, the entire syllabus came under the control of the ministry. In addition to formal Chinese schooling, Chinese daily newspapers appeared in the 20th century, with more than 23 printed until the 1920s. Discussing Chinese specific subjects, they contributed to strengthening Chinese identity and solidarity. In 1932, there were 28 daily newspapers in the Philippines with a total circulation of 208,000, and in addition, 5 Chinese dailies, with a circulation of 32,000 (217), served the Chinese community. In 1968, there were 4 Chinese dailies in Manila, only one having a nationwide circulation (218).

In the present atmosphere of economic indigenism, and with the waning political power of Taiwan, Chinese businessmen tend to cooperate with Filipino officials in economic and social matters. Many of the ^awealthy Chinese moved to suburbia and increasingly alienated themselves from the Chinese cultural core in the Chinatown (219). This class differentiation tends to divide the Chinese community, but the wealthy still keep their official leadership in the community.

The cultural centrality of Manila in the Chinese community life is apparent from the high concentration of the Chinese population there. For instance, in Cebu with 1,333,000 total population in 1960, there were less than 9,500 Chinese nationals, while in Manila with 1,139,000 total population, there were more than 69,000 Chinese nationals. While historical reasons were operative in this concentration, it is evident that the

centrality of Manila in Philippine economic life, has provided special attraction for the Chinese. In addition to the highest complex of Chinese cultural institutions in Manila, there was the Taiwan embassy and easy links with both Taipei and Hong Kong. If both latter cities lose their cultural and economic importance, and political conditions still alienate the Philippines from Peking, Manila, as a Chinese centre may find in Singapore a non-communist Southeast Asian centre of culture and business. Cultural and economic links with an overseas Chinese centre, where no restrictions are imposed on the Chinese, is essential not only for education and trade, but perhaps more for maintaining international links for Chinese companies. These links enable the Chinese to shift capital from one country to another as a means of overcoming economic indigenism in their countries of residence.

Indonesia. Four major peoples and tribes inhabit Sumatra, five live in Kalimantan, three in Java, seven in Sulawesi, four in the Lesser Sundas and one each in the Moluccas and West Irian, besides many "lesser" peoples (220). However, traders of the coastal areas could communicate with their counterparts in various islands by the common demotic language, which later developed to become Bahasa Indonesia. In addition, there exist 200 "provincial languages" (221), and perhaps more, as Borneo is linguistically largely an unknown territory (222). "On Java for instance, Bahasa Indonesia in different varieties, Sundanese and Javanese are often spoken within one and the same household" (223), which emphasizes the extent of the ethnic diversity of Indonesia.

At the end of the 19th century, Indonesia definitely lagged behind the Philippines in national awareness. Both were ethnically variegated, and each had a common major religion. Differences, however, mainly concerned the extent and level of education, which had been favouring the Philippines, the degree of urbanization, which at a 10 percent level was lower in Java, and the political attitude of the mestizo group. In Indonesia, they fully identified with the Dutch, in the Philippines they constituted the avant-garde of independence. In both countries the big land owners depended on the colonialist who in the early stages of nationalism, did not express any enthusiasm for that urban originated phenomenon. Again, in both countries the indigenous clergy served the cause of nationalism: in the Philippines, through the dispute over controlling the parishes, in Indonesia through a religious revival involving an increased pilgrimage to Mecca and through a sharpening of Muslim consciousness.

By 1900, the Dutch clearly discriminated against the Muslim Javanese ethnic majority in education, as Java with over 26 million inhabitants had 562 primary schools, while the Bataks had 200 for a population of 321,000 and Menado had 366 for a population of 423,000. Indonesia with 36 million people had only 1,501 schools. In the European primary and secondary schools most of the students were Eurasians with some Chinese and Europeans. The enrolment of indigenes in these schools was 1,545 on the primary level, and 13 on the secondary (224). Two schools provided higher education: the School of Administration, which had branches in several provinces, the students of which were of the rural elite class and could

expect government jobs upon graduation, and the Medical School, to which students came from all the provinces, usually from inferior classes. This latter school spread nationalist ideas from early 20th century.

The Dutch favouritism towards Christianized indigenous groups did not affect the position of the Chinese, as it gave preference to the former groups in fields which the Chinese had voluntarily abandoned, such as administration and Dutch education. But, the Dutch attitude towards the Chinese could not be interpreted as indifferent. In fact, during the Ethical Policy period, influential Dutch expressed hostility towards the Chinese exploiters of the indigenes and the Dutch press and officialdom in the Indies continued in the same view. (225), without however restricting their occupations or immigration.

(1) Political Developments. Early political party organization in Java included the Budi Utomo, the Indische Partij and Sarekat Islam (S.I.). The first one, founded in 1908 by graduates of the Medical School, aimed at improving education for the indigenes. The second fought for legal equality for all races and for an eventual separation from Holland. The third, the only one to have a significant popular appeal, originated from Muslim traders' reaction to Chinese economic activities under the stimulation of Chinese socio-economic organization. In 1914, the S.I. had a membership of 367,000 (226) and, spreading to the Outer Provinces, lost its original economic and religious raison d'etre adopting the common objectives of a nationalist party. The Dutch, becoming aware of this growing political consciousness, conceded to the indigenes a

suffrage to municipal councils, and created a Volksraad with advisory status to the Governor General. This Volksraad had some elected and some nominee members, and enabled the new political elite to express themselves and train side by side with the rural traditional elite in parliamentary activities. But, the haughty airs of the Governor General towards that advisory body frustrated the moderate Budi Utomo representatives (227).

In 1923, a left-wing group within the S.I. broke away to create the Indonesian communist party (P.K.I.). This new movement advocated international class-struggle and popularized communist militancy among coolies, cultivators and poor shopkeepers, but stern Dutch reaction soon follows (228). Still in the 1920s, Indonesian students in Holland created a political club with liberal Dutchmen's support, and advocating a complete separation from Holland, they introduced the name "Indonesia" as a substitute for the "Dutch East Indies". Both the S.I. and the P.K.I. considered this group to be chauvinistic (229). But, the group went further to found the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.), and their leader Sukarno, tried to unite both the P.K.I. and the S.I. with his own party under the slogan, "Nationalism, Islam and Socialism". In 1927, the parties federated proclaiming their common ideal of independent Indonesia. However, the political acculturation of the masses, undertaken by the political parties, had only a superficial effect. Each party centred around personalities and a small circle of intellectual supporters, thus enabling the Dutch to paralyze party activities almost completely by arresting the leaders. This mainly occurred during the depression years,

By then, however, Sukarno abandoned his policy of political non-cooperation and shifted his activities to the Volksraad.

Between 1931 and 1938, about one third of the Volksraad members belonged to the extremists, left and right, and two thirds constituted the moderates, who favoured the preservation of close contacts with Holland (230). These latter directed their efforts to promote economic and cultural activities: the creation of an Indonesian bank, cooperatives, farmers' unions, native schools and the spreading of Bahasa Indonesia (231). In 1936, the Volksraad unanimously petitioned the queen for a reform looking towards self-rule within a commonwealth with Holland (232). The rejection of this plan disappointed the moderates and brought them closer to the extremists; they also adopted the ideal of free Indonesia.

While in the 1930s, the political scene consisted of 3 main blocs, these contained more than 20 parties. This fragmentation resulted from the nature of loyalties to personalities rather than to ideals, and, by 1940, ^{it} enabled the Dutch to suppress party activities by the imprisonment of leaders. Thus, ~~decreasing~~ ^{party} the total membership ^{decreased} to 81,000, with about 200,000 politically aware but uncommitted people. By then, 287,000 Indonesians were literate in Dutch, while over 6 million were literate in indigenous languages. It seems that "on the outbreak of the second World War, the Indonesian independent movement did not constitute a threat to the colonial government" (233), and so, Holland remained adamant to Indonesian demands for reform even after it fell prey to Germany.

During the Japanese occupation, the conqueror paid no heed to the demands of the nationalists, who had cultivated

political hopes for such an eventuality. As early as W.W.I., Japanese expansionist intentions towards Indonesia were published in the Japanese press, suggesting the desirability of its conquest (234); this must have been known to the Indonesian nationalists. After the occupation, the Japanese divided Indonesia into 3 military commands in 1942 (235), and did not promise any future independence unlike the political status they accorded Burma and the Philippines. Yet, Sukarno and many other local leaders totally harnessed themselves to the Japanese cause. By thus committing themselves, Sukarno and other prominent leaders became established as recognized leaders of the people. "However hollow the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere promises were, three years of anti-colonial propaganda and prestige and power exercised by local leaders, was more than anything else ever allowed or enjoyed by the nationalist leaders" (236). Sukarno, in the meantime, drafted his Pantja Sila of Nationalism, Humanity, Popular Sovereignty, Social Justice and Faith in One God, and achieved an all-party consensus for his ideology (237).

In their efforts to increase Indonesian production to help the war machine, the Japanese sponsored a regimented popular movement. At first they turned to the nationalist leaders for support in harnessing the rural population, but those had only limited influence there. The Japanese then tried to appeal to the rural nobility and corps of officials, and later to the Muslim leadership for similar support. They created a Muslim volunteer army with Indonesian command up to battallion level. But the efforts did not meet Japanese expectations, either in Indonesia or in other parts of Southeast

Asia, where the Japanese faced a similar Malay cultural attitude towards production (238). Initial enthusiasm could be high, but the indigenes lacked the capability of sustaining it for long periods in their daily activities.

When the tide of the war changed in favour of the Allies, Sukarno's popularity decreased, mainly among the youth organizations (239); still, his oratory power enabled him to maintain the leadership. This became evident when the youth demanded that ^{he} declare independence just before the war ended, while he preferred to await the Japanese consent for the new constitution. The opposition manifested itself even more strongly, when between ^{the} Japanese surrender and the Allies' landings, Sukarno, by then president of the republic, had to concede some of his constitutional but dictatorial rights and accept democratic limitations to the presidents' power.

The Dutch return in force proved a failure as did the talks with Indonesian representatives in Holland. The colonial system, where few thousands of Europeans relying on minorities could rule masses of exploited people, became outdated after W.W.II.. In the meantime, young Indonesia overcame a communist rebellion in 1948 (240), and officially amalgamated its states into a unitary republic in 1950. The 1951 distribution of parliamentary seats did not show any party predominance, and the 1955 elections gave representation to 27 political parties, with almost equal power to Muslim and non-Muslim groups (241). The MASJUMI party which suffered, since its appearance in 1945, from schisms and splits, had a traditional and a Western educated groups of leaders, and with other Muslim parties got 45 percent of the votes (242). The

elections clearly proved the decline^c of the traditional official leadership by its inability to control the rural vote.

In the 1950s, the Outer Provinces and their army garrisons fomented against the central government in Java. In 1958, a ~~army~~ rebellion in Sumatra necessitated intervention by loyal troops from Java to restore unity to the Republic. As a reward the army under Nasution got 35 seats in the parliament thus becoming an important political factor. The centrifugal tendencies of the Outer Provinces did not express themselves under colonial rule, yet they had been inherent in the Indonesian setting due to human and geographical diversity, and the artificial centrality of Java.

After the expulsion of 45,000 Dutch citizens in 1957, following the unsuccessful talks over West Irian, and the 1958 revolt in the Outer Provinces, and in view of the increasing economic difficulties, the 1945 constitution was reinstated in 1959. Sukarno dissolved the constituent assembly and governed with the legislative aid of his ardent followers. He tried time and again to instil in the people an idealistic spirit and improve the economy suppressing Chinese trade in rural areas, and accusing the parties of undermining the principles of Pantja Sila. When in 1960, parliament seemed to reject the proposed budget, he dissolved it. Thus, during the 1957-1965 period of Guided Democracy, the army and the communists (243) emerged as the only politically effective groups. The Muslim bloc, by then divided over the education issue (244), could not produce a common political front, as it lacked the discipline inherent both in the army and the P.K.I.. The two latter counterbalanced each other's influence by their rivalry. While the army enjoyed a favoured position, inflating

its ^vranks to half a million, and modernizing with Russian arms, the Communists, who did not participate in the government, held no responsibility for the deteriorating economy and thus enjoyed a favourable public opinion. They agitated the peasantry, to which the army harshly reacted. In 1964, they gained control over the propaganda systems; consequently, a clash with the army seemed inevitable. Yet, both Army and Communists supported Confrontation (245).

The communist coup, in anticipation of a possible army takeover, failed, and led to the downfall of Sukarno (246). Suharto, the successor, changed the Indonesian policies towards Malaysia, the U.N.O. and the West leaving relations with China to deteriorate. Thus, Indonesia stepped out of its political isolation in relation to Southeast Asia and the world. However, in inner politics Suharto showed no liberalism towards the Papuans or the Chinese minority (247). The army takeover destroyed the political power of the P.K.I. as well as the non-communist Left and the Centre (248) and, indeed, the army emerged as the dominant power in the country (249).

During 1945-1965, Sukarno's leadership dominated the political scene in Indonesia. He seems to have been driven by a messianic belief in his personal role as saviour of Indonesia (250). His astuteness in manipulating leaders of lesser calibre, and in casting his spell over the masses, must have made him believe in the power of the word, and in the importance of emotive confrontation situations. He maintained his oratory power through long years of ~~actual~~ separation from common people's lives, yet, remained linked to them by "mytho-mystical common experience" (251). Together with some other Asian leaders he was misled into believing that the people could share

his own devotion (252), or perhaps that he could change their basic attitudes towards sustained service to the state. Though his regular direct appeals to the masses, by-passing the administrative hierarchy, must have arisen from his personal aptitudes, there is no reason to discard the opinion that the lack of backing by a loyal unified elite class made him resort to those means (253). Yet, his inability or reluctance to deal with details, and his over consciousness about his image, perhaps drove away valuable assistants. His frequent travels abroad (254), where respect and honour could be more easily gained than in confronting burning internal issues (255), represented perhaps spells of escapism, no less than his unexplicable semi-apathy during the 1965 rebellion. His charismatic personality made him disregard the value of tradition in political institutions, hence his constant constitutional changes and undemocratic handling of rival parties. This may have brought about the conditions for the advent of the military regime or, if luck had not turned its face from them, to a communist government.

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The 20th century demographic development of the East Indies has been characterized by a fast population growth, and by a decrease in the proportional preponderance of Java's population. In 1900, Java had a population of 28.7 million, while the Outer Provinces had only 7.6 million in 1905, but already in 1930, the proportion declined to 41.7 million in Java as against 19 million in the Outer Provinces (256). In 1962, it stood at 63.1 million in Java and 34 in the Outer Provinces, with a national average growth rate of 2.3 percent per annum (257). By then, 72 percent

of Indonesia's population were occupied in agriculture, which generated 55 percent of the national income, and the average per capita income was 46 £ per annum (258). In 1970, the population rose to 122 million and is projected to reach 155 million in 1980 (259).

Java is still maintaining the centres of government, education, industry and commerce. Though lacking in natural resources, its marketing possibilities and its relatively developed infrastructure still economically justify its centrality. Nevertheless, historical centrifugal tendencies in the Outer Provinces still exist, and the integrity of Indonesia is largely maintained by the strength of a central government and the centripetal force of developed Java. It seems that within the ethnic and economic diversity of Indonesia, the maintenance of a developed centre and less developed outlying provinces increase the cohesivity of the state, while multi-centre development on a basis of equality may strengthen the centrifugal forces.

Until the early 1900s, class stratification in the East Indies was fairly rigid, and in the urban sector it followed an ethnic division. The Europeans constituted the apex of the pyramid in government and big business. The Eurasians occupied high and medium administrative posts and the Chinese, the majority of the Foreign Oriental group, constituted the middle-class of traders and the skilled working class. The indigenes largely remained at the base of the pyramid. The rural sector from base to summit was largely indigenous. The nobility dominated the peasantry through the hierarchic system of indigenous officials (prijaji). The common peasants divided into four classes distinct by their land ownership or rights of

tenancy (260). The lowest of the four were mere farm hands, while the clergy and religious teachers, the ulama constituted a class apart. This traditional classification must have been quite rigid for long periods, as is apparent from the elaborate linguistic sets of pronouns expressing social distance between inferior and superior (261). Traditionally, the peasantry showed negative attitudes towards trade occupations and consequently the field was left open to the Chinese. For the indigenes, an appointment as a prijaji was considered a desirable social status change, families sometimes making great efforts to enable one of their members acquire education and qualify for the post. Expectations on their part, to be accordingly rewarded by the nominee seemed the only natural. In the Outer Provinces, however, the indigenes showed more individualism and had a knack for trade, (262) and, thus, rich farmers and traders demanded social status similar to that enjoyed by Adat chiefs, and could expect to marry into their families (263).

In the 1920s the rate of social change within the indigenous society was increasing, the trend continuing until the present day. More indigenes entered government service until 1938, when almost 99 percent of the low ranking government personnel, 60 percent of the low-medium and 38 of the high-medium ranks were occupied by indigenes; not to mention 6 percent of the high officials (264). The indigenous government officials used to communicate with the public in Bahasa Indonesia, and thus helped to spread the language over many urban centres. This increase in indigenous officialdom as well as changing attitudes towards trade occupations achieved ~~was~~ by early S.I. activities, improved education, and rural-urban

migration, due to agricultural land overfragmentation, increased the numbers of urbanites.

Formal primary education in local vernaculars, and informal agricultural training had been introduced by the Dutch as a result of their Ethical Policy (265). In 1900, there were 75,000 pupils in local vernacular modern schools. The number rose to 266,000, of whom 50 percent in the Outer Provinces, in 1907. Primary education increased the demand for higher education, where Dutch was a prerequisite, and this handicapped the indigenes, who only after preparation could enter higher schools. In 1900, there were 17,025 Europeans and Eurasians in the More Extended Lower Instruction schools, but only 1,615 natives and 352 foreign (266) orientals. In 1930, the numbers were 38,236; 71,618; and 24,807 respectively. The numbers, relatively small as they were, produced more than the government service could absorb and so many of the educated must have produced leadership for the new urban associations, such as political parties and trade-unions.

The Japanese occupation revolutionized the social status of the ethnic groups reversing the relative position of the indigenes and the Chinese. In addition, wartime conditions caused a geographical shift of millions of young men, some leaving villages to serve in labour units, youth organizations and auxiliary military formations. The military units officered by those indigenes, who had been considered as unloyal during the Dutch period, constituted not only a striking contrast to the former units officered by Dutch and Eurasians (267), but the kernel around which the army of independent Indonesia was organized. All this social and geographical

mobility decreased the authority of the rural nobility, the ulama and the prijajis. The early days of independence saw another increasing social mobility, when the new political, military and administrative elites overshadowed the traditional elites. Some of the new elite, mainly army officers after 1965, became absentee landowners by acquiring land from impoverished peasants (268).

Until the Guided Democracy period, the private sector of the economy operated fairly freely. It was alleged that the Foreign Asiatics, a euphemism for the Chinese, produced more speculation than real economic development (269) during that period. This must be taken with a grain of salt, as by then a large part of the economic entrepreneurs were Indonesians of former prijaji origin. The Guided Economy of that period created a huge government sector of the economy, whose efficiency must have been low. Expenditure on armed forces was ~~also~~ high and government extravagant show-off expenditure in general, brought about a rampant inflation and a flight of capital from the country.

The 1965 army takeover introduced a more liberal economic policy, which favoured traders and entrepreneurs, for whom army officers became protectors, figureheads or partners. General economic development increased as Indonesia's political isolation faded away and foreign investment began flowing in. The stabilization of the currency and increased oil production (270) represent that development, which manifested itself in other fields as well. The state of agricultural production in Indonesia was sometimes the subject of conflicting reports. For instance, rice production in 1950-1965 increased from 11.6 million tons to 19.4 million; in yields: from 20.3 quintals per

hectare to 26.4 and in per capita output from 150 kg. to 181 (271). Another source reporting on the total agricultural production in 1954-1968, shows a compound annual growth of 0.5 percent per annum in yields, and 1.9 percent in output for 1954-1969, the lowest in Southeast Asia, which averaged 4.5 percent (272). In fact, the Indonesian budget of 1967 allocated 70 million dollars for rice imports (273). In 1960-1967 the aggregate output increased 2 percent annually i.e. less than the population rate of growth, but in 1966-1969, it increased 4.3 percent annually and an increase in gross capital formation was also reported (274). Economic progress is still precarious and difficult to sustain owing to corruption, inefficiency of the government and unpredictable and arbitrary national drives (275). The projected compound annual growth rate in G.N.P. for 1965-1980 is 3.8 percent, the lowest in Southeast Asia, except for Laos and South Vietnam (no figures for Burma) (276). In 1966, the per capita G.N.P. stood at 91 U.S. \$ (the lowest excepting Laos) and the population growth rate was 2.5 percent per annum (277). However, in educational achievements, the 2.5 million pupils of 1942, trebled in 1959, and surpassed 16 million in 1966. The 800 university students of 1942 increased to 109,000 in 1961 and to 278,000 in 1965. Yet, the estimated number of agricultural faculties graduates in 1967-71, was only 2,545.

The above mentioned socio-economic conditions and the authoritarian nature of the government neither exclude future nationalist drives against the Chinese as a scapegoat for economic difficulties, nor do they prevent future collusion between Chinese entrepreneurs and corrupt government officials.

(iii) The Chinese Minority. In the 20th century the

Chinese were relatively less concentrated in Java and Madura than in the Outer Provinces, in comparison to the demographic distribution of indigenes in Indonesia. In 1900, 277,000 Chinese lived in Java, while 260,000 lived in the other provinces. In 1930, the relative numbers were 582,000 and 651,000 respectively. The total number of Chinese rose from 537,000 in 1900, to 809,000 in 1920, and to 1,233,000 in 1930 (278). An estimate for 1950, quoted their number as 2,100,000, from which figure Purcell deduced that in 1960 they numbered 2,500,000 (279). This figure implies that the Chinese constituted about 2.6 percent of the total population, and for a fairly short span of time their proportion does not seem likely to change significantly. Chinese immigration to the East Indies averaged 28,000 in 1900-1930 and 17,000 in 1932-1938 (280), while from 1940 onwards, Chinese immigration showed a net loss (281). The pre-1940 rate of immigration exceeded that of the 19th century, and yet in 1930, 79 percent of all the Chinese in Java were locally born (282). Purcell estimated that 750,000 of the Chinese population of 1930, had been locally born and 500,000 of them had Indonesia born fathers, while 450,000 were new immigrants (283). It was said, that whereas the Chinese immigrants rapidly moved into peranakan society prior to the 20th century, where "an active command of Chinese was generally lost by the third generation", the situation must have changed afterwards (284).

The Chinese population distribution of 1930, is described by map ~~VI-B~~^{VI-B} and the general urban distribution by map ~~VI-B~~^{VI-B}. The urban nature of the Chinese settlement in Java in comparison with the Outer Provinces is immediately evident. While practically every urban centre of the East Indies with 10,000

MAP VI-B
EAST INDIES: 1930
CHINESE DISTRIBUTION




Fig. 25. Distribution of the Chinese population

B Batavia	J Jogjakarta	Po Pontianak
Ba Bagansiapiapi	M Malang	S Soerabaja
Bn Bandoeng	Ma Makassar	Se Semarang
Bu Buitenzorg	Me Medan	So Soerakarta
C Cheribon	P Palembang	T Tandjoengpandan

Source: Folding map at end of *Volkstelling, 1930, Deel VII. Chinezen en Andere Vreemde Oostelingen in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia, 1935).

Enlarged from a map in *The Netherlands East Indies, 1944*.




Fig. 23. Distribution of chief towns and cities

- | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| B Batavia | K Koedoes | Pa Palembang |
| Ba Bandjermasin | M Magelang | Pe Pekalongan |
| Ban Bandoeng | Ma (Java) Malang | S Soerabaja |
| Bu Buitenzorg | Ma (Celebes) Makassar | Se Semarang |
| C Cheribon | Me Medan | So Soerakarta |
| J Jogjakarta | P Padang | |

Source: *Indisch Verslag*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 19-21 (Batavia, 1938).

■ Enlarged from a map in the *Netherlands East Indies*, 1944.

people and over was inhabited by a Chinese community, only few rural Chinese concentrations of 7,500-15,000 existed in Java, mainly in the West. Chinese rural concentrations of importance existed in West Borneo, Bangka, Biliton and on the east coast of Sumatra. These concentrations, constituting a semi-circle south of Singapore (285), were brought about by the attraction of the gold mines of Pontianac, the tin of Bangka and Biliton, and the Dutch estates on the Sumatran east coast. There is no supporting evidence that proximity to Singapore had a significant relevance to this pattern of distribution, though some trade relations have long existed between those rural concentrations and the port city.

About 1900, the Dutch abolished the Chinese monopolies on opium, gambling, and salt and restricted land alienation in Java. They also gradually lifted the residential confinement imposed on the Chinese declaring, in 1910, that the Chinese were subjects of the Crown (286). This coincided with the Chinese government adoption of the jus sanguinis principle bringing about the problem of dual citizenship. The new Dutch policies opened up rural Java to Chinese permanent settlement. This decided the pattern of the Chinese distribution in Java until the late 1950s, when restrictions on Chinese trade in rural Java, must have changed that pattern again. A vivid description of Chinese domination of the economic life of a town of 20,000 including 1,800 Chinese is given by Geertz (287). This relates to the 1950s but seems also to illustrate conditions in the 1930s.

The speech-group distribution of the Chinese community had been influenced by historical factors. The Hokkiens were the first to come to Indonesia and constituted the largest speech-

group. In 1930, only 22 percent of them were born outside Indonesia, while 66 percent of the Cantonese and 62 percent of the Teochiu were born outside the country (288). In 1930, there were 550,000 Hokkiens in the East Indies, constituting the majority of the community in Java and Madura, and also in Sumatra's West Coast Division. In West Borneo, East Sumatra, Bangka and Biliton, the Hakka and Teochiu constituted the majority (289). The Hakka numbered 200,000 in West Borneo, 45,000 in Bangka and Biliton, about 14,000 in the East Coast of Sumatra, and some 65,000 in East Java. There were also 135,000 Cantonese, fairly evenly distributed over the Archipelago, but slightly more numerous in East Sumatra, South Borneo, East Borneo and Celebes. Of the 90,000 Teochius about 32,000 lived in the estates area of Sumatra's east coast, and almost 22,000 in the northwest part of Borneo. Djambi and Riouw also had Teochiu concentrations.

In 1930, the sex ratio of the Chinese community in the East Indies was (F/M) 0.642, with a low 0.385 for the Teochiu, and a high 0.795 for the Hokkiens (290). This corresponds with 88 percent integration into families (or a stability index, see Appendix A) for the Hokkiens, 55 percent for the Teochiu and about 78 percent for the entire Chinese community. The specific geographical distribution of these groups indicates that Java and West Borneo had long established permanent Chinese residents, while the permanent residents' proportion among the tin miners and the Sumatran east coast Chinese was lower. This was due to the specific low-paid occupations as well as to the contemporary increase in immigrants into the latter areas.

Indigenous resentment against the Chinese, which resulted from ethnic and economic reasons until the beginning of the 20th

century, later, acquired the modern dimension of nationalism. While the Christianized indigenes, who exhibited more loyalty to the Dutch were still considered as having geographical loyalties to Indonesia, the Chinese were considered as having extraterritorial loyalties. This, and Chinese nationalism, tended to decrease the differences between Chinese speech-groups as well as between totoks and peranakans. But as late as 1930 there still existed a significant occupation difference between these latter groups. Only half a percent of the foreign born Chinese pursued agriculture, as compared with about 11 percent of the locally born, and 59 percent of the asli Indonesians. About 65 percent of the newcomers and 52 percent of the Java born Chinese were engaged in small and medium trade, and 21 percent of the former and 10 percent of the latter were occupied in industry, as well as about 17 percent of the asli Indonesians (291). The peranakan society of the 1930s, were thus culturally and occupationally situated between the Indonesians and the totoks. In fact, the core of the peranakan society were not only locally born Chinese but those of mixed marriages, who spoke an Indonesian language although without being totally assimilated. By this definition many of the locally born Chinese were considered totoks when their mother tongue was Chinese (292). As new-comers brought Chinese nationalism to Indonesia and naturally spread it through the totok society, and as the latter were considered by the peranakans to have retained all the virtues which pure Chinese blood could inherit (293), the peranakans slowly became acculturated to Chinese nationalism. Thus, peranakans and totoks drew closer together during the first half of the 20th century (294), because of their new common ideology and of

Indonesian anti-Chinese feelings. However, some peranakans still made common cause with Indonesian nationalists through their Indonesian Chinese party, which did not collaborate with the Dutch (295). At the other extreme, some Chinese, mainly totoks, became active P.K.I. members (296). This, and the non-discriminatory policy of the P.K.I. towards the Chinese damaged the party's image among the Indonesians. On the whole, however, Chinese political activity mainly confined itself to Chinese organizations. This naturally followed from their being labelled as "capitalist and European" (297), the first label alluding to their economic position, and the second - to their alienation from the Indonesian nationalists.

Chinese education under Dutch rule virtually began in the 19th century. In 1899, there were 217 Chinese schools in Java with a total enrolment of 4,452 pupils. There were also 152 schools with 2,170 pupils in the Outer Provinces. Beginning in 1901, the modernization of Chinese education took place, and in 1908, there were 75 modern schools with 5,500 pupils (298). The numbers rose to 30,000 pupils in 600 schools in 1931 (299). These schools, were supported by Chinese organisations, and English was taught as a European language instead of Dutch. The Chinese also attended the European schools and the Dutch-supported schools, where higher education was available. The Dutch policy aimed at moderating the nationalist spirit, which had been brought to the Chinese schools by the totoks. They had some success in that moderating policy, as the leadership of the peranakans passed into the hands of the Western educated and reinforced pro-Western attitudes among them (300). This, however, neither contradicted peranakan new interest in Chinese culture nor undermined the process of

increasing solidarity.

With increasing Chinese and Indonesian nationalisms, Indonesian animosity towards the Chinese can be definitely said to have grown during the Japanese occupation and during independence days (301). Indiscriminate Indonesian violence during the Japanese occupation drew the peranakans and the totoks even closer together, alienating the former from the Indonesians. Peranakans and totoks realized that they had to fear the Indonesians more than the Japanese (302), and after the fall of Japan, during the revolution days of 1946, anti-Chinese riots proved again this. Later, the Republic of Indonesia declared that all the Dutch subjects of Chinese descent were Indonesian citizens, while foreign born totoks remained aliens. However, 300,000 peranakans chose Chinese nationality, while 1,200,000 became technically Indonesians (303). This must have left about 1,000,000 Chinese aliens in Indonesia. While unselective riots against the Chinese increased their solidarity, selective economic and citizenship discrimination slowly began undermining that solidarity. This process may be illustrated by the post W.W.II. state of the Chinese education, which flourished with 800-1,000 schools and 250,000 pupils attending, while only 50,000 were enrolled in government schools. This reached a peak of 1,600 Chinese schools and 300,000 pupils in 1957. Following the discriminations of the Guided Democracy, these numbers dwindled to 490 schools and 100,000 pupils, mainly totoks (304). In addition, the differential discrimination between totoks and peranakans introduced a tendency among the latter to integrate into the Indonesian society, and, to this end, many of them officially adopted Indonesian ^anames. Also, the

peranakans became again involved in Indonesian politics, some being elected to the parliament through local parties in the early 1950s. Many more were members of the BAPERKI peranakan party. Established in 1954, the party collected 145,552 votes in the 1955 elections, a 63-74 percent of the peranakan votes (305). The peranakan regression from their former idealistic return to Chinese culture aroused consternation among the totoks, yet, from a rational point of view, that is weighing sacrifice against results, they could do little good to themselves or to the totoks, to China or to Taiwan by declining Indonesian citizenship. Neither China nor Taiwan (with whom Indonesian relations had been broken in the early 1950s) could protect them, protests being the only counter measures taken by both. The situation changed considerably in respect to expressing Chinese nationalist feelings in common with the totoks, after the Dutch rule. There was no longer a government, independent of public opinion providing not only full protection and economic opportunity ~~and~~ ^{but} also enabling the Chinese to eat their cake and have it. During the Japanese occupation, there was no alternative but to stick together and hope for a better future. But the 1950s Indonesian nationalism provided an alternative: one could become legally Indonesian.

The situation changed, however, when a new distinction was introduced: a non-ethnic citizen. The peranakans as well as the alien totoks had to take pure-blood Indonesians as partners or figureheads for their businesses, in order to get government credit and to overcome administrative difficulties. Although the indigenization of the retail trade in Java cost the Chinese 25,000 out of 83,738 businesses they had previously owned there (306), and thus must have hit the totok aliens,

^{more}~~rather~~ than the peranakan citizens, unofficial and unselective discrimination later developed and disillusioned the peranakans (307). In 1963, anti-Chinese riots broke out and put Sukarno's protective measures to safeguard Chinese lives under heavy strain of popular pressure. Also, during the months following the 1965 P.K.I. coup, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Atjeh and other parts of north Sumatra, in Central and East Java and in Celebes (308). Anti-Chinese riots occurred in Borneo in the late 1960s. These riots and danger to life strengthened the Chinese solidarity more than the unselective economic discrimination. The exodus of 1960-1961, did not solve the problem of the alien Chinese, as those remaining do not want to return to China, and China does not seem overenthusiastic to take any more in.

In the Suharto period, the legal situation of the Chinese was perhaps even worsened, though actual conditions might have been no worse (309). The liberalization of the economic system and the involvement of military personnel in management and ownerships, may indicate that the Ali-Baba (310) partnerships and collusion with corrupt army officials, still enable the Chinese to remain in business. ^{But,} Suharto reinforced anti-Chinese laws wherever they were loosely applied. He totally ~~blamed~~ ^{banned} Chinese education (311) and the use of the language in public communication, and the Chinese were accused of Mephistophelian machinations, for instance, of a "silent cultural imperialism" (312). Thus, at present, there is still real danger that the community may become scapegoats in case, for some reason, public attention is intentionally directed to them. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the Chinese in the urban

centres of Java still enjoy a higher standard of living, have a higher income, receive a better education and master Bahasa Indonesia in a greater proportion than the indig^enes (313).

The political attitude of the Chinese in Indonesia towards extra-territorial Chinese centres during the 1950s was summed up as follows: 40 percent opted for local citizenship, 30 percent lined up with the People's Republic of China hoping for its protection, 10 percent continued to support Taiwan, and 20 percent were fence-sitters (314). The failure of China and of Taiwan to protect the Chinese in Indonesia lowered the credibility of both countries and especially of the former. In the 1960s, the Chinese could not but adapt themselves to the situation by seeking whatever arrangements they could find to remain in business. Their current precarious situation in the ^ucontry suggests that with nowhere to emigrate, they try to send part of their capital abroad, where it can be better secured. Also, with no Chinese education officially available, some sort of arrangem^ent will be devised to maintain cultural links with a Chinese cultural centre outside Indonesia.

Burma. In 1900, many of the Dry Zone Burmans still had fresh recollections of their independent kingdom, but there were no signs of any future change in the contemporary colonial status of the country. The disappointment of the traditional elite was especially profound as they lost their power to the new administration of British, Indian and newly appointed Burmese. Only the Buddhist clergy, the sangha, retained some of its authority (315) by operating 17,000 vernacular schools throughout

the country (316). However, the sangha largely detached themselves from mundane problems and from modern political thought and, therefore, could not rekindle old national sentiments by use of modern apparel (317). Contemporary modern education available for the Burmese consisted of missionary schools, some primary and secondary government schools, technical and normal schools and the Rangoon College. This latter prepared students for an external degree in the Calcutta University.

(i) Political Developments. The secularization of monastic education, the repercussions of the Russo-Japanese war, and Burmese soldiers returning from service abroad after W.W.I., had great effects on the modernization of Burman nationalism. In addition, political developments in adjacent India also contributed to the process. In 1917, Burmese nationalists organized the Young Men's Buddhist Association (Y.M.B.A.) and demanded a political separation from Indian administration (318). In 1920, the University act concerning educational standards, became a national political issue, involving student strikes and political reorganization. The nationalists tried to mobilize the Chinese and Indian minorities' support at that stage, exhibiting a naive disregard of the political power innate in ethnic hostility; however, when nationalism spread to wider circles of the Burmese society, the antagonism of Burman nationalism and the national minorities' interests reappeared, sometimes in violent form. For instance, the issue of the minorities' representation in the Legislative Council, discussed by the Whyte Committee, had only mild effects on relations between the Burmans and the minorities, but Burmese resentment of Indian and Chinese economic exploitation sometimes caused

serious clashes.

The political acculturation of the villages resulted from the "political pongyis" (319) activities, who followed a fanatic leader and gave a religious touch to their xenophobia. Also the G.C.B.A. (320) operating in the villages emphasized the ethnic Burman nature of nationalism by calling their organization: "own race" associations. The G.C.B.A. and the pongyi-led group boycotted the 1922 elections, only the "21 group", which defected from the G.C.B.A., participated. The 93 percent boycott proved that the public supported these groups, even after due allowance had been given to administrative imperfections and to public disinterest. The dacoity and rural unrest of the 1920s, manifested nationwide resistance to tax collection, and hostility to Indian economic activities, mainly to Chettyar usury. It ended up in the anti-Indian and anti-Chinese riots of 1930-1931, which were limited to Lower Burma with its Indian and Chinese concentrations. By then, assured of vast public support, the nationalist leaders abandoned the policy of non-cooperation with the British.

The Anti-Separationist League won the 1932 elections. It made a complete volte face when it supported a separation from India and direct dependence on the British Parliament (321). The new Constitution, to be implemented in 1937, aimed at alienating from Burma the ethnic minorities areas: Shan States, Karenni and the Tribal Hills, which comprised 43 percent of Burma's territory and 16 percent of its population (322). The bi-cameral legislature had a senate of 36, half of them elected by the House of Representatives and half - governor's nominees. Of the 132 members of the latter House, 92 had to be elected by territorial ~~constituencies~~ ^{constituencies} and the

remainder, to represent special interests (323).

Burmese internal politics manifested inefficient indigenous administration and factionalism. Ba Maw's government (1937-1939) tried to solve burning agricultural problems, but faced an agitating opposition from the Thakins party, but later he himself joined the Thakins in the "Freedom Front" to oppose his successor's bid to solve the same problems. The Thakins made early contacts with the Japanese and, before 1942, created the Burma Independent Army (B.I.A.) in Thailand, and after the Japanese occupation, the Freedom Front established a civil government under Japanese sponsorship. In 1943, the Japanese accorded Burma full independence over its entire territory including the ethnic minorities areas. However, in 1944, in view of the changing tide in the war, Aung San created a secret political front to oppose the Japanese, and got full recognition from the Allies as a resistance movement (324).

After liberation, Aung San founded the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.), and adopting a socialist ideology, gained a vast popular support. When left out of government by the British, he agitated amongst his supporters and practically paralyzed public services; the British had no choice but to give him government. In his turn, Aung San faced communist agitation and opposition, to which he reacted by expelling them from the A.F.P.F.L.. In 1946, he received British consent to independence within one year, and secured the Karenni and ^{the} Shan States for Burma.

From 1948, and, almost incessantly, until the present day, Burma has experienced national ethnic group and communist rebellions (325). The Burmese army became the only organization

which really tried to impose the Burmese state-idea over the entire area by military operations as well as by serving as a political elite among the rural people. The vicissitudes of the civil war sometimes left U Nu's government in control of merely the urban sector, and sometimes extended government rule well into the rural areas. Ne Win replaced U Nu in 1958, and introduced military administrators into the central and provincial governments, for some time reducing subversion to a minimum. The military administration proved more effective than the civil one, and Ne Win finally deposed U Nu. Lacking U Nu's Buddhist tolerance he rigidly handled the ethnic minorities, only to increase their militancy. In 1966, Ne Win admitted that the situation in Burma was worse than in 1962 (326), and showed no signs of future improvements.

In external politics Burma has maintained strict neutrality. In 1960, it signed a treaty of amity with China, conceding a small disputed territory (327). Apart from this, Burma became increasingly introvert from the political point of view. In the politico-geographical context, its location may constitute a Chinese avenue of approach towards the Indian Ocean, by-passing pelagian Southeast Asia, or it may offer a route, evidently, not to the conquest of China, but to arousing the ethnic minorities in Yunnan (328) and Tibet. In this sense Burma is aware of its buffer state situation, and yet its introversion may reflect a stage of over anxiousness (329). *This politico-economic closure, affects also the Chinese minority in relation to the Nanyang.*

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The opening of the Irrawaddy delta to rice cultivation involved immigration and the creation of new villages within an atmosphere of "scramble for land". The cultural centre of Burma also moved to the South

as a result of the new educational facilities available in Rangoon, the latter's political centrality and the increase of its population. In the delta, rice acreage rose from 1.3 million to 9.9 between 1860 and 1930 (330). The increase in production concurred with a deterioration of peasants' welfare, who fell prey to Chettyar, Burmese and Chinese money lenders. Indebted peasants lost their land titles while rents were rising. In 1925-26, more than a quarter of the occupied land in Lower Burma belonged to absentee landlords, and following the depression years, that proportion rose to 47 percent in 1937-38 (331).

During the British rule, European firms owned most of the industrial enterprises, but medium size rice mills and saw mills belonged to Indians and Chinese, and the import and export trades were mainly in Indian hands (332). Competition of cheap European goods damaged Burmese cottage industries, and the "laissez faire" policy clearly impoverished the Burmese peasant, who faced, unprotected, alien mercantile and financial skills. In 1931, the Burmese constituted 36 percent of large town dwellers, 73 percent in medium towns and 94 in the rural areas, indicating their socio-economic handicap.

The rural indigenous administration left much to be desired as regards preparation for self rule. Natural contempt of urbanites to rural people (333) augmented the intellectuals' disapproval of British policy as "the allocation of onerous administrative responsibilities, without official direction, to elected ... local bodies ... lacking in experience, while dyarchy denied to the more competent Burmans in the legislative council control ... over finances ... Especially disliked were

the repeated affirmations ... that ... Burman performance ... in local self government would be the criterion for their fitness to enjoy a larger degree of self government in the future" (334). For Burman nationalists, independence had priority over administrative or economic development, and so, for them, Burmese performance in government, local or central, was irrelevant to the question of independence.

Besides primary schooling, which enabled the modern political acculturation of the masses, high schools and the university of Rangoon produced more officials and politicians than technocrats and businessmen (335). But, ~~was~~ the socio-economic conditions before W.W.II., clearly showed a gradual impoverishment of the rural areas, and the enrichment of the alien urban sector. ^{Thus,} the growing number of educated Burmese urbanites could not integrate into the socio-economic rewarding sector, ~~thus~~ ^{thereby} constituting a frustrated social layer ripe for political activity. In addition to the unfair economic system, the country was twice overrun by armies using "scorched earth" tactics, during 1942-1945. Had the British landed in Rangoon instead of reconquering the country overland, the development of Rangoon's port would have contributed to the economy of the land (336). Burma had thus an enormous economic reconstruction problem at the end of W.W.II.

After independence the government nationalized the major economic enterprises as well as land, with a view to putting an end to landlordism and to encourage collective farming. The Pyidwatha plan envisaged a welfare state with a system of community self-help (337). However, the results were poor, as the country suffered from constant civil wars, high military

expenditure, administrative incompetence and a primitive infrastructure (338).

(iii) The Chinese Minority. An estimate of the mid-1960s Chinese population in Burma quoted their number at 300,000 with a trend of increase (339). In 1931, they constituted 1.3 percent of the total population, and in 1962 - 1.8 percent, if Skinner's estimate of 400,000 is accepted.

The Chinese played a secondary role in business and trade to that of the Indians, who outnumbered and preceded them in settling ^{down} in Lower Burma. Both the Chinese and Indians mainly resided in urban centres, and in 1931, the Chinese constituted 6.7 percent of the big town population, 3.5 percent in medium towns and 0.9 percent in rural areas (340). The occupations/distribution of racial groups in 1931, was as follows:

Table B-1 Occupations Distribution by Racial Group, 1931 (in %)
(341)

	Burmese	Indians	Chinese	All races.
Agriculture and Raw Materials.	75.3	27.3	16.0	70.2
Industry and Commerce	19.3	55.7	77.2	23.3
Public Services.	4.1	7.3	2.6	4.4

The table depicts a situation which echoes the Burmese unacquisitiveness, and their disdain of trade and business occupations (342). It definitely proves the adoption of opposite values by the Chinese and Indians.

Chinese - Burman social relations were thus defined:

"There has never been a 'Chinese Problem' in Burma, and there is not one today" (343). Also, the readiness of the Chinese to learn Burmese, in contrast to the Indians led to the following

generalization: they "came to regard the country as their own" (344). Yet, the Chinese community organization was said to be "a major danger to race relationships" (345). These organizations included chambers of commerce, trade unions, schools, temples and hospitals (346). In trade the Chinese could rely on a network of economic information and on financing through Chinese banks. However, their system of education had a low reputation, and, as a result, only 3,308 pupils attended those schools in 1937, while the age group of 5-10 consisted by 1935 of 12,707 Chinese children (347).

It seems that Chinese nationalism, agitating the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia during the first half of the 20th century, only slightly affected Chinese social life in Burma. Some Chinese played a part in local politics, though K.M.T. branches existed in Burma and even two seats in the Chinese National Assembly were allocated for representatives of the Chinese minority in Burma (348). In its first years, independent Burma left much latitude to the Chinese education system. In 1962, 39,000 pupils attended 259 Chinese schools (349), but as these schools reflected a tendency of political shift to the left, following the improvement of relations with China, the military government later put restrictions on them (350).

Until the early post W.W.II. years, the Chinese community leadership was pro-K.M.T., and had close cultural contacts with China. When, however, Chinese Nationalist troops retired from China and occupied some border areas inside Burma, the Chinese minority leadership exhibited a pro-Burmese attitude and shifted its loyalties towards Communist China. This shift to the left greatly increased during the 1950s and 1960s to the

extent that Chinese youths openly demonstrated in sympathy with the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, to which the government and the Burman public violently reacted (351).

Rumours quote many dead Chinese in the 1967 Rangoon riots.

Economic indigenism in its initial phases in Burma favoured a shift of private ownership from aliens to Burmans, and later it changed to nationalization (352). Remittances outside the country became illegal and immigration stopped altogether. Banks, insurance businesses and pawn shops were nationalized or closed to non-Burmans. When the Chinese tried to move into the professions, they found that ethnic Burmans had preference in government services. Burmese indigenism imposed difficulties also on naturalization, practically adopting the jus sanguinis principle and discriminating between naturalized Burmese and ethnic Burmans. This "more radical and xenophobic" (353) indigenism may prove that after all there still exists a Chinese problem in Burma.

Malaya and Malaysia. Spatially linked to peninsular Southeast Asia, Malaya culturally belongs to its pelagian component. Its political development into Malaysia has further emphasized its pelagian traits, yet subversion on its northern borders is an ominous reminder of its inseparability from peninsular Southeast Asia.

The plural nature of its society antedated the British rule, yet was intensified by their preference of Chinese and Indian labour to that of the indigenous Malays (354). However, this ethnic problem resulted, in a sense, from the distribution pattern of tin mines in Southeast Asia and would have affected Bangka and Biliton had they constituted a separate political

entity from Indonesia. In this sense, the tin belt of Southeast Asia (355) being divided between three producer states, attenuated this ethnic problem, yet left Malaya with the main political burden. ~~(356) (357)~~

(i) Political Developments. Until W.W.II., three administrative entities existed in Malaya, namely: the F.M.S., the U.F.M.S. and the Straits Settlements. The three were economically, culturally and politically bound together. Nevertheless, the administrative disunity facilitated the neglect of a responsible policy towards a possible unified independent indigenous state. In fact, in the 1920s, the British considered a suggestion to decentralize government in the F.M.S.; the sultans favoured it while European and Chinese businessmen did not (356); and in the 1930s, a similar plan was also discussed. Paradoxically enough, in a geographically divided country (357), the major ethnic disunity was man made, and intensified by British economic preoccupations, which entailed an enormous Chinese population inflow. Later, in the 1930s, when the Chinese had already constituted a large proportion in the population, restrictions on Chinese and favouritism towards Malays, could not merge the two cultures, "cultural pluralism" being the inevitable outcome.

The sultans grip hold on the Malays was the major reason for the social, economic and political stagnation of that people, in a country which was economically developing since the last decades of the 19th century. Only in 1884, debt slavery was abolished and corvée replaced by wages and a land tax, indicating that money economy in the Malay rural sector was a fairly new phenomenon. As late as 1947, three quarters of the Malays were agriculturalists and two thirds of these

were rice planters (358). Thus, the underdevelopment of the Malay urban sector delayed the appearance of a middle-class and of modern education leading to a "political somnolence" of the majority of the Malays. The physiographic conditions and the fairly equal power of the sultans also hindered the development of a state-idea. However, traditional peasant life, and customary leadership and practices seemed a safeguard against the destruction of the Malay cultural identity (359). Thus, when the Malays encountered Chinese nationalism they were in no position to react (360), but had to rely on British support. The latter, aware that a culturally Chinese Malaya would constitute a threat to their interests more than a Malay independent state, suppressed Chinese nationalism.

After W.W.II., the British scheme towards self-rule envisaged a Malay Union excluding Singapore. This conformed with their thoughts of a Malay Malaya, through the exclusion of the strong Chinese element of Singapore, and would have left the Colony within a festoon of bases extending from Gibraltar to Hong Kong. The sultans would have lost their political power under the Union, retaining only honorary status. The scheme was perhaps conceived under the fresh recollection of the sultans' cooperation with the Japanese, though without acknowledgement of the part played by the M.C.P. during the War. The Malays resented the scheme, and the traditional Chinese leadership, by then, largely attending to their private businesses, showed no enthusiasm for it.

In 1948, Federation was introduced over entire Malaya excluding Singapore, the governor in Kuala Lumpur becoming a High Commissioner and the legislature, of Malay predominance, coming under the Conference of Rulers (the sultans). To

maintain a Malay majority rule, immigration and naturalization laws discriminated against the Chinese, the majority of whom remained non-citizens. This seemed a breach of moral obligation to the Chinese as a whole and to the communists in particular, and, as a result, the latter took up arms in rebellion, which lasted during 1948-1960, and revived in the early 1970s. This rebellion emphasized to the Malays that the Chinese were ready to use force for achieving their political ends and thus it sharpened the Malay hostility towards the Chinese, and also their political awareness in general. In practice, the Malays began to fill the new and old administrative posts dominating the executive agencies of the government, and enjoying special treatment in education and agricultural development.

The creation of U.M.N.O. in 1946 and that of the M.C.A. in 1949 (361) produced an opportunity for moderates, in both the Chinese and Malay ethnic groups, to coalesce against the extremists in the 1951 elections. In 1955, both parties and the Indian M.I.C. again cooperated creating the Alliance party ~~and gaining~~ a sweeping victory in the Federal elections. In 1957, Malaya became independent, with a constitutional monarch elected every five years from the group of sultans. The legislative became bi-cameral and each state retained responsibility over "land, agriculture, forestry and local government as well as Muslim law and custom" (362). The Alliance, retained its majority in the 1959, 1964 and 1969 elections.

Malaya avoided participation in S.E.A.T.O., relying on a defence agreement with Britain. It did not recognize the People's Republic of China, and in regional politics did not

commit itself to the Maphilindo projected federation of the Malay world. When it undertook to become the cornerstone of Malaysia, Sukarno and Macapagal immediately showed their hostility to the plan. The merger with Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah improved Malaya's political standing in Southeast Asia, and when Singapore seceded, Malayasia significantly increased the Malay proportion in the population of the country. Sarawak with 229,200 Chinese out of a total of 744,500 people in 1960 (363), added about 48,000 sq. miles to the Federation, and Sabah with 137,500 Chinese out of a total population of 635,600 in 1969 (364), added 15,380 sq. miles to the Federation. Both territories had a lower Chinese proportion in the population than Malaya proper; but it is doubtful whether the indigenous tribes really consider themselves as ethnic Malays. The very low population-to-resource ratio of both Sarawak and Sabah and the backwardness of their peoples ensure, at least for the near future, no political difficulties in administering a federation of an uncontinuous land configuration.

In 1972, the prime minister of Malaysia visited Peking after increased trade activities between the two countries had taken place. It seems that the British military withdrawal, the increasing detente in Southeast Asia in general, and the improved relations between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in particular, will bring about a more independent external policy by Malaysia.

It may be interesting to add a comment on Maphilindo. Without rejecting the idea as a possible future political situation, it seems that the Malay elite who had envisaged independence and enjoyed the power and freedom it conveyed,

preferred to coexist with the Chinese problem, rather than be reduced to a status of an "Outer Province". Indonesia, especially under the leadership of Sukarno, had an image of a centralized administration in overpopulated Java trying to exploit the Outer Provinces. It also had a low economic and administrative reputation, which definitely was inferior to similar Malay institutions.

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. During the British rule the "plural society" of Malaya had a clear economic expression. While the Malay economic system was agrarian, non-commercial and directed towards a subsistence economy with a preponderance of wet-rice cultivation, the Chinese and also partly the Indian systems were directed towards primary production of tin and rubber. These systems were urban in part, commercial and trade oriented (365).

Until 1913, the Chinese dominated tin production with about three quarters of the output, but by 1930, the Europeans produced 54 percent and, in 1961, they increased their share to 65 percent (366). Labour, entrepreneurship and trade in tin remained non-Malay even after independence, when production rose from 52,000 tons in 1960 to 69,000 in 1966 (367).

Rubber planting began in British financed estates with small holdings following the initial success. The geographical expansion of rubber usually followed into the areas already developed by the infrastructure laid for tin transport. Between 1910 and 1930, Malaya's share in world production rose from 6.7 percent to over 50, but it declined to about one third in the 1940s and the 1960s (368). In 1953, about 70 percent of

the plantations were European owned, the Chinese and the Indians owned 23 and 6 percent respectively. Ownership of the small holdings divided between the Malays, Chinese and the Indians with 47, 40 and 9 percent respectively (369). Labour in estates was largely Indian.

Palm oil production increased after W.W.II., reaching 345,080 tons in 1969 (370), most of it from estates almost exclusively owned by Europeans (371). Coconut cultivation in small holdings, a traditional Malay occupation, easily competed with plantations as copra producers. Since the 1950s, iron ore extraction rapidly increased with a 1.5 million tons output in 1955 reaching 7.3 million in 1963. Ownership was almost exclusively European and exports went mainly to Japan.

Malaya has been a deficit country in rice, but it improved its production from 26 percent of the local consumption in 1926-1930, to 54 percent in 1961 (372); yet, yields are still low and there is little incentive for double cropping. Although, in 1960, 65 percent of the area under paddy was linked to government irrigation projects, land tenure, among other factors, remained inimical to increased production, as only between one third and one half of the paddy growers were land owners, and as rents were fixed proportionally to output, varying between one and two thirds of the crop. In addition, leases were often short termed and went to the highest bidder, creating inefficient mobility and insecurity of lease renewals. As paddy growers often became indebted through "extravagance in poverty" (373), even government credit could not eradicate usury, which often charged 100 percent interest per annum. Malay landlords and money lenders thus exploited the status symbol of a paddy grower, which attracted the Malays to this occupation and tried to

perpetuate the situation by opposing the introduction of English education to Malay peasants, and by obstructing Chinese and Indian infiltration into that sector.

The occupational distribution of the racial groups in Malaya began to lose its extreme characteristics during the 1929-1932 depression years, when Chinese turned to foodcrop cultivation, and also during the Japanese Occupation when the same phenomenon recurred. In post W.W.II. years, a new trend in Malay society appeared, the shift to government service occupations. The following table summarizes the situation:

Table B-2, Ethnic Occupational Distribution (in thousands) (374)

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Malays</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Indians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Primary	760	350	181	1,291
Secondary	48	130	22	201
Tertiary	190	269	101	561
Total	998	750	305	2,053

The Chinese seem to be the best occupationally balanced among the three ethnic groups, as is apparent from table B-2, but taking into consideration the specific characteristic of the country as a primary producer, their share in the tertiary sector of the economy is indeed high, especially when their small numbers in the administration is taken into account. This is even more apparent in the secondary sector, where it seems that they dominate the majority of the industrial enterprises.

In 1957, as in 1947, the Chinese sector of the economy generated 60 percent of the national income and the Malay only 20 percent. This was the economic reward of the Chinese for leaving the political dominance to the Malays, implicitly agreed upon, when the M.C.A. joined U.M.N.O. in the Alliance. However, income

distribution within each industry was uneven, as is apparent from land holdings of 3.3 million acres under peasant crops and 2.2 million in plantations (375). The following table portrays the economic standing of the population, where the Chinese proportions among the middle-class was twice that of the Malays and almost fivefold in the upper classes.

Table B.3 Class Distribution within Racial Groups. (376).

	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others
Upper Class	4,778=0.5%	17,798=2.3%	4,979=1.6%	3,185= 5.8%
Middle Class	58,144=5.8%	89,414=11.8%	27,841=9.1%	11,822=21.4%
Lower Class	937,659=93.7%	648,662=85.8%	273,471=89.3%	40,304=72.9%
Total	1,000,581	755,834	306,291	55,311

Although the class distribution within the ethnic groups (table B.3) shows a clear Chinese advantage, the majority of them still belonged to the lower class.

Table B.4 Ethnic Proportions in the Urban Sector. (in percents)
(377).

Year	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others
1931	19.2	59.6	17.8	3.4
1947	21.1	62.3	13.8	2.8
1957	20.0	67.7	8.7	3.6

It is significant that the urban attraction for the Malays, largely due to administrative occupation, just enabled them to hold their ground, while the Chinese, largely attracted by industrial and service occupations, increased their proportion at the expense of the Indians. It must be noted however, that between 1931 and 1957, the urban sector in Malaya greatly developed in numbers.

It is interesting to compare the proportional strength of the cultural blocs in the "plural society" of Malaysia before and after Singapore's secession.

Table B-5 Broad Communal Blocs (in percents) (378)

	Pre-Separation	Post Separation
Chinese Bloc	42.3	35.7
Muslim Bloc	41.6	47.0
Indian Bloc	9.9	10.1
Iban dominated bloc	3.2	3.7
Kedazan dominated bloc	1.8	2.2
Others	1.3	1.3

The net decrease in Chinese proportion is spectacular. Moreover, the change especially favoured the Malays as small minority blocs generally tend to coalesce with the dominant majority, thus decreasing even further the Chinese chances of gaining political dominance.

The Malayan government considered education a means to improve the status of the Malays vis a vis the Chinese and Indians, and also an implement to decrease the heterogeneity of the population. To that effect, the Malayan government increased its expenditure on education fourteen-fold between 1947 and 1962, and since 1969 restricted secondary education to English and Bahasa Malaysia. The post W.W.II. figures for school attendance are shown in the following table. Still in 1957, within the 10-15 age group of all races, the literacy level was two thirds for males and one third for females.


Table B-6 School Attendance (in thousands) (379).

Language	1947	1952	1954	1962
English	71	123	231	407
Malay	171	311	428	489
Chinese	189	239	392	390
Indian	36	39	49	62
Professional	2	6	11	37
Total	468	717	1,111	1,385

The Malay schools' enrollment improved in relation to that of the Chinese schools as is apparent for the figures of 1947 and 1962.

With a projected population of 14.9 million in 1980, of which 12.7 million in West Malaysia (380) (a 3.7 million increase for Malaysia during the current decade) the resource situation of the country and the rate of economic development seem satisfactory and promising.

(iii) The Chinese Community. The activities of K'ang Yu Wei and Sun Yat Sen wound up in the creation of K.M.T. branches in Malaya in 1912, and further political acculturation directed the loyalties of the Chinese from their parochial loyalties to China to the national level (381). These geographical loyalties were only one manifestation of the reflection of China's internal politics on the Chinese in Malaya. Thus, the leftist radicalism ~~of Malaya~~ reflected itself in Malaya almost as soon as it appeared in China affecting mainly Hakka and Hainanese workers. They organized anti-British riots and boycotts and, as a result, the British out-lawed the K.M.T. in 1925. The left wingers tried to spread their




M-Major Concentrations

S-Secondary Concentrations

- AS-Alor Star
- KB-Kota Bharu
- P-Penang
- KT-Kuala Trengganu
- IP-Ipoh
- TA-Telok Ayer
- KLP-Kuala Lipis
- KL-Kuala Lumpur
- ML-Malacca
- JB-Johore Bahru

Scale: - 1:5,000,000

Scale: - 1:7,500,000



After Atlas Narodov Mira, Academy of Science, Moscow, 1964
and Karta Narodov Mira, Academy of Science, Moscow, 1959.

international communist ideology to the Malays, but to no avail, the Nan Yang Communist Party of pre-1930 years, remained mainly of Chinese membership and kept control of the communist parties in Southeast Asia (382).

The break between the K.M.T. and the communists in China mirrored itself in the Chinese community in Malaya, the leftists generally finding supporters among labourers, and the rightists among the middle-class and entrepreneurs. Both parties, however, exhibited strong anti-British feelings, and when suppressed always reappeared under new guises (383). This Chinese - British confrontation in Malaya was mainly concerned with Britain - China politics; it however, reflected older friction aroused by British intervention in Chinese communal life in Malaya, which involved the reduction of the secret societies to secondary social importance and eventually to their abolishment. In addition, British policies hit the Chinese economic primacy in tin mining (384), restricted immigration ^{since} ~~the~~ the depression years ~~and the 1930s~~, and introduced educational discrimination. With fairly little contact with the politically "unconscious" Malays, the only other political power the Chinese met in the political field was British colonialism. From the Chinese point of view, Malaya was created as a modern country by Chinese labour and entrepreneurship, and particularly the leftists had strong convictions about their rights in Malaya to the point of planning a Malayan insurrection against the British in 1935. Although direct membership in the K.M.T. and in the M.C.P. was never very high (385), both parties had a large number of supporters, which made their public demonstrations spectacular and effective. This was especially manifest during the United Front period of 1937-1941, when both parties diverted

their political agitation against Japan.

Before Chinese nationalism came to Malaya, the internal division within the community was much more variegated than afterwards. Hostile relations between rival guilds, secret societies and speech-groups became less politically significant after the advent of nationalism. This latter period was characterized by a dichotomy of alignment according to Kuomintang - Communist, later of M.C.A. - M.C.P. "and the more recent dichotomy of English educated and Chinese educated" (386). The cultural background of this dichotomy pertained to class origin, wealth and education, though in later years it tended sometimes to relate to political convictions.

Speech-group organizations in Malaya, seem to have played less important roles in Chinese social organizations than did ^{Chinese} ~~Chinese~~ speech-groups in other countries. This is implied from the lesser speech-group awareness, which existed in Malaya (387). The speech-group distribution of 1947, revealed that the Hokkien constituted 31.6 percent of the Chinese community, the Cantonese - 24.6 percent, the Hakka came third with 16.7 percent, the Teochiu - 13.9 and the Hainanese constituted only 6 percent of the community (388). The Hakka were much stronger in numbers in the F.M.S. than in the Straits Settlements, and in 1911, their proportion in the F.M.S. Chinese population made them the strongest speech-group there, with the Cantonese immediately following; but in 1921, the Cantonese overtook them (389). This resulted perhaps from the Hakka agricultural and extractive occupations, with a proportional lesser participation in trade and other employment-producing pursuits. This assumption may be strengthened by the Hakka's 0.83 (F/M) sex ratio, tending

more to equality than the Hokkien's (in 1947) (390). As in Singapore, the Cantonese had the best balanced sex ratio of all speech-groups, though numerically they were placed second to the Hokkien. As a whole however, there was ^{some} a positive correlation between numerical strength and the sex ratio in Malaya as well as in Singapore (391). The Chinese unbalanced sex ratio indicated a low proportion of permanent residents among their numbers, and this statement is amplified by the figure of 19 million Chinese arrivals in Malaya and the Straits Settlements between the early 19th century and W.W.II., most of whom were bachelors who returned to China (392). The following table may provide an insight into the question of the attachment to Malaya and the Straits Settlements of each of the ethnic groups through the correlation of sex ratio with integration into families (see Appendix A), and hence to permanence of residence. It seems incontestable that the Malay group and not the Chinese or the Indians initially saw Malaya as their homeland, but both latter were improving in this respect.

Table B.3 Sex Ratio of Ethnic Groups, (393).
Malaya and the Straits Settlements (figures in 10,000)

	1911			1921			1931		
	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
Malays	142	72	69	163	83	79	193	98	95
Chinese	92	74	18	118	85	33	171	113	58
Indians	27	21	6	47	34	14	62	42	20

In terms of integration into families this table indicates that the Malays had 98, 95, and 98.5 percent integration respectively, for the above mentioned years, while the Chinese had

39,56 and 67.5 percent respectively. This shows a remarkable trend of increasing the proportion of permanent residents and thus an extension of attachment to Malaya and the Straits Settlements by the Chinese. The table is significant from the aspect of the Chinese "threat" of dominating Malaya by force, as besides constituting the majority in the urban centres, the Chinese males outnumbered their counterparts in the Malay group. In their society, their male age-group distribution must have had a higher proportion of potential fighters.

During the Japanese occupation, the Chinese community as a whole suffered persecutions and hardships. Some of the Chinese were particularly singled out for execution (394), some collaborated, the majority complied with Japanese orders under pressure; all, however, developing an "ever growing hatred towards [the Japanese]" (395). The M.C.P. organized a guerrilla army (M.P.A.J.A.) with some 5,000-7,000 active fighters supported by the working class and Chinese peasants. Being the only organization actively opposing the Japanese, the M.P.A.J.A. drew plans for liberation of Malaya from the British by the end of the war (396). Immediately after the armistice, the M.P.A.J.A. took the law into its hands taking vengeance on Chinese and Malay collaborators. In 1946, the M.C.P. managed to organize a strike of 150,000 workers in protest of food shortages and of economic difficulties. This was much larger in scale than the M.C.P. had achieved in form of strikes during the 1930s and reflected the Chinese support for the M.C.P. Even though the M.P.A.J.A. had been officially disbanded by the British after the war, the M.C.P. still could organize underground units with active or passive support of the Chinese masses, as the

traditional anti-communist elite was still preoccupied with restoring their businesses leaving the political field open to leftist dominance. This was the situation in towns, but Chinese support, and very active at that, came also from half a million subsistence peasants squatting on the fringe of the jungle (397). ~~The~~ ^{cause of} rural basis, the success of the communist takeover in China, and the Indonesian resistance to the Dutch underlay the M.C.P. determination to try and forestall by armed rebellion the creation of the Federation. Although the rebellion officially lasted for twelve years, the British found an appropriate strategic counter-measure as early as 1950, when, according to the Briggs Plan, about a million people, squatters and peasants in isolated hamlets were resettled in guarded "new settlements". This denied food and information from the rebels, but also involved the creation of 557 new villages, 399 of which were Chinese, 147 of Hokkien predominance and 136 of Hakka (398). In addition to this denial of rural support, the British arrived at neutralizing the labour unions as potential urban supporters of the Guerilla (399). In both the rural and urban sectors the improving economic conditions in post W.W.II. Malaya helped the British to achieve their goal. This gave a respite to the traditional Chinese leadership to assume its functions and cooperate with the moderate Malays in the spirit of the Federation's Constitution.

In 1949, the M.C.A., which was originally founded as a welfare organization (400), tried to ~~erase~~ ^{erase} the image of the Chinese as communists, ~~and added nearly 500,000 members~~. By 1948, it is said to have had already 100,000 members (401), but as 80 percent of its leadership were members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce or guilds (during 1949-1965) it alienated itself from

workers and trade unionists (402), the latter expecting a less compromising attitude on the M.C.A. part in Chinese affairs and social policies. The M.C.A. adopted, nevertheless, what appeared to them as an acceptable policy of coexistence between the Chinese and the Malays in a plural cultural setting. Trying to change the 1948 citizenship laws, and getting the support of G general Templar, they achieved their goal and enabled the community to increase the number of citizens from 375,000 in 1949, to more than a million (403). The Constitution of the M.C.A. included among other objectives: to safeguard the "rights of minorities", "to preserve and sustain the use and study of the Chinese language" and to act "for the well being of the Malayan Chinese Association generally" (404).

The political coalition between U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. implicitly compensated the Chinese in economic matters for their secondary role in politics. The conformism of the M.C.A., primarily served the interests of the Chinese middle and upper-classes, but seemed to fall short in protecting national interests and the welfare of the working class (405). These shortcomings did not escape ^{the attention of} the M.C.A. leadership itself as well as that of U.M.N.O. but the compromise worked well in X other respects. This did not prevent the P.A.P.-sponsored party (D.A.P.) to contest the M.C.A. leading role in the Chinese community just before merger and during the 1964 elections. The D.A.P., in the absence of organized left-wing ideology, provided an image of a party keen on the welfare of workers, and though non-nationalist in its communal approach its Chinese character was evident. After the D.A.P. failure in the 1964 Malayan elections, Lee Kwan Yew shifted his attacks from the M.C.A. to U.M.N.O. "to make sure of at least their [the Chinese]

community's support" (406). After secession, with no real threat from the P.A.P., the president of the M.C.A. advocated cooperation with Singapore not only in "defence matters alone" (407), reflecting the general line of the Alliance policy. The conformist leadership of the M.C.A. acquiesced, though under protest, to the abolition of Chinese secondary schooling from the official education system. Also, the constitutional favouritism of Malays in scholarships, professional licences, public services, business permits and the land reservations (408) aroused dissatisfaction within the Chinese community. In the 1969 elections the Alliance got 66 seats out of 104 in West Malaysia, with 49.1 percent of the vote. The M.C.A., however, seem to have lost some of its seats to the D.A.P. (409). This seemed to the Malays a Chinese treacherous handling of the Alliance, and the May 1969 riots which ensued seem to have resulted from the intercommunal suspicion following the elections. This intercommunal fear, on the Malay side: from a Chinese domination by collusion of the Malaysia and Singapore Chinese with the help of China, and on the part of the Chinese: from a pan-Malayan union with Indonesia, is said to be one of the factors keeping Malaya together (410). However, fear is often likely to express itself in violence, which is precisely what happened in 1969.

The history of Chinese modern education in Malaya began after 1917. The schools in great measure served as centres for promulgating Chinese nationalism and anti-colonialism, but when the British became aware of that development, they imposed official control over the Chinese system of education (411). Enrollment in Chinese schools, as a percentage of the population, rose from 1.5 in 1931-32 to 9 percent in 1949, and to 14 percent

in 1956, and stabilized around 16 percent in the 1957-62 period.

(412) Enrollment in Chinese primary schools slightly increased from 291,200 in government schools, and 40,500 in private schools in 1956, to 383,600 in government and 4,900 in private schools in 1969 (413). Secondary schooling went up in 1956-1961, from 27,000 in government schools and 3,100 in private schools to 56,800 and 17,900 respectively. Since 1962, there remained only private Chinese secondary schools with 34,400 pupils in that same year, decreasing to 18,500 in 1969 (414).

The education problem may prove more hard pressing for the M.C.A., than the social welfare and labour issues. The leadership has kept down any Chinese nationalist expression, and refused to raise the issue of elevating Chinese to official language status (415). It also dismissed the proposal to establish a Chinese university for the Chinese Educated, recommending that they mix with the Malay and English Educated. Only feeder colleges for preparation to university were deemed necessary (416).

With all its shortcomings the M.C.A.-U.M.N.O. alliance, has proved a reasonable solution to a highly sensitive political situation. Its precariousness until the present days has been due to external forces, i.e. the Chinese in Singapore and Malay extremists. With increasing M.C.P. activities, the equilibrium may deteriorate, but this is no less a Malaysia government problem than it is a Chinese problem.

Vietnam. Vivid memories of past independence still existed in Vietnam in 1900 as they did in Burma, but this was not the only resemblance. There were the socio-economic similarities: a gradual impoverishment of peasants and workers within a general

economic expansion and, to some extent, the displacement of the traditional elite by colonialists' favourites. This latter phenomenon was particularly true of Cochinchina, as in Annam and Tongking the traditional administrators maintained their positions alongside the French civil servants. In addition, a consultative National Assembly, elected from a limited group of trustworthy indigenes, made French rule more palatable to the natives. Again, not unlike Burma, Vietnam had experienced a shift southwards of the geographical distribution of its human activities. This was less marked than in Burma, since mining and industry as well as agriculture were developing in the densely populated North, and the shift of the administrative centre was only partial; in fact, it was Hué which suffered more than Hanoi in this respect. The shift southwards which opened the Mekong Delta to rice cultivation and the region of the Terres Rouges to plantations, favoured capitalists and traders in export crops more than it did the primary producers. The capitalists were mainly French in anonymous companies and Chinese in daily confrontation with the indigenes. It followed that the hostility of the indigenes became directed against the Chinese, when in the 20th century modern socio-economic ideologies became operative in their minds, while hostility towards the French was anti-colonialist in nature.

(i) Political Developments. "French colonial policy in Vietnam moved between two extremes of 'assimilation', which meant the cultural and institutional Gallicization of Vietnam, and 'association', which implied the maintenance of traditional Vietnamese institutions as legitimizing props for French rule" (417). The application of these two policies suffered also

from the rapid succession of Governor Generals (23 between 1902 and 1945 (418), who had to interpret the changing policies of Paris.

In the early 20th century, guerrilla resistance to the French, which had intermittently continued between 1858 and 1896, had already subsided, and the traditional mandarin elite increasingly collaborated with the French. However, during the first three decades of this century, a new, modern educated, elite rose and gradually resumed political opposition to the colonialists. Not until 1930, had the moderate collaborationist party or the younger radical elite any popular response. The ambivalent political scene may be illustrated by the situation in 1923, when the Constitutionalist Party of moderate literati promoted Franco-Vietnamese collaboration, demanding free press, greater opportunities for Vietnamese in the Administration, and an increase in local legislative authority, while the new intelligentsia groups operated underground and later produced the Vietnamese communist party. Although in 1930-1931, the communists tried to lead a "bourgeois and democratic" rebellion against the French (419), the French policy against communist and nationalist groups, during the 1930s, fluctuated from legalization (420) to suppression, according to the current attitudes of the governments in France. The communists in Vietnam, however, thought it wiser never to abandon their clandestine organization, while the popular support they received made them the prime movers in nationalist resistance to the French.

In 1940, the French gradually gave way to Japanese political demands and, in 1941, Indochina became practically

harnessed into the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere, though still under French nominal rule. The Japanese, inline with their anti-Western indoctrination policy, aroused anti-French subversion of politically active Buddhist sects (421), hoping to attract sympathy from the majority of the population. The communists, who did not collaborate, founded in the meantime the Viet Minh military organization, which established its bases in the hilly area adjacent to China, with full support of the latter.

After Japan's surrender, the Viet-Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam in Hanoi and, together with other nationalist groups, also in Saigon. The Potsdam Agreement, however, authorized the French to return and control the country south of the 16th parallel, while Chinese troops controlled the area north of it. The Chinese finally left the country after the French had formally abandoned their rights in some Chinese ports. The French consequently concluded an agreement recognizing the independence of the Indochina Federation within the French Union. The neo-colonialist intentions of the French popped out of their disguise as they had created the Cochinchina Republic and an autonomous region in the Annamite hill-tribe area, even before the Fontainebleau talks ~~was~~ began.

The French nominated Bao Dai ~~as~~ emperor (to which he accorded his consent only in 1949) but his government of landlords and collaborators had no success in rallying the anti-communist nationalist leaders. Popular support for the Viet-Minh was especially strong in the industrialized North, and there, with Russian and Chinese armaments they defeated the American supported French. In 1954, the French left the

country, and the Geneva Treaty kept Vietnam separated as it had been during 200 years of feuds between the Nguyen and the Trinh families.

The decolonization of South Vietnam progressed since the French return, primarily as the civil service became Vietnamized, and as an indigenous army under French supervision was created. The West recognized the independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and the Russians and Chinese recognized North Vietnam. Thus, with a rudimentary administrative machinery South Vietnam began to function as wholly independent in 1954, Ngo Din Diem replacing the former unpopular regime. Ngo was a Catholic, anti-communist and nationalist, shrewd in politics and keen on nepotism (422). In 1955, he proclaimed Vietnam a republic and himself president, restricting personal liberties to oppose his government, and centralizing authority; but later he had to decentralize his direct grip on the executive agencies of the government. American aid was keeping the country economically afloat and sustaining the armed forces. Ngo emerged the victor of the 1961 elections, after having led a campaign of intimidation against the opposition, which included army officers, many of the middle-class, the peasantry, urban workers (423), and the Buddhist clergy. His assassination brought an end to 9 years of autocratic rule, which had introduced some improvement in land reform and in foreign aided public works.

Between 1963 and 1968, ten successive governments ruled Vietnam, none of which enjoyed real public support. In view of the major preoccupation of the government in the war against the Vietkong and North Vietnam, a military control of the government seemed an inevitable solution in a country suffering from

internal subversion and external military invasion. The army, however, without strong ideological supervision by a party, continued its rule alongside, and in collaboration with, a corrupt administration. When American public opinion began earnestly expressing its disgust with that war, a hasty plan of "Vietnamization" of the war was implemented. The precarious peace of 1973, with almost a total American withdrawal may prove the first stage in a profound change in the American policy in Southeast Asia and the Far East.

After the French left Hanoi in 1954, Ho Chi Min had greater problems of economic rehabilitation in the North than there were in the South. He, however, faced no real political opposition, save for a revival of new Buddhist sects in the post W.W.II. years (424). The land reform, in emulation of the Chinese (425), annihilated the landlord class. Heavy labour investments in economic projects and restricted private consumption produced economic development, but also created dissatisfaction among peasants, workers and intelligentsia. Party cadres and army officers became the dominant elites, and introduced a policy of the reunification of Vietnam through support of the Vietkong and by a costly direct military intervention. It seems plausible that the implicit policy of North Vietnam has envisaged a total reunification of French Indochina under North Vietnamese communist hegemony, supporting to that end, the Pathet Lao (426) and the Khmer Issarak.

Excepting direct sufferings from military activities, living conditions in South Vietnam have been better than those of the North. This resulted not only from the massive inflow of American dollars through military and economic aid, but also

from the basic geographical facts of overpopulation in Tongking. This adds a major economic consideration to the political and cultural ones, which govern the North's efforts to reunite Vietnam. The Vietkong in the South constitutes an ideological avant-garde not only of the communist North, but also of the reunification policy. Besides controlling patchy areas in the countryside, the Vietkong leads a symbiotic underground existence in the urban sector (427) with tentacles spread in many institutions. In view of the Vietkong's strength, and notwithstanding the South's Sinicized culture it is doubtful whether the latter will be able to achieve what South Korea has achieved in similar political and cultural circumstances.

The change in the American global policy of 1972, and that of the Russians since the 1960s, have affected the political situation in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and particularly in Vietnam. It seems that a quarter century of American policy of containing China is going to be substituted by a more peaceful one. The Russians, however, with their strengthened navy, intensify their involvement in Monsoon Asia, perhaps with a view to weaken China on its margins opposite to the Russo-Chinese boundary. It seems plausible that a strong unified and culturally Sinicized Korea and Vietnam under communist rule could resist the Chinese much more effectively than corrupt pseudo-democratic regimes. This policy, following an ancient political maxim that "my enemy's enemies are my friends", may underlie Russia's support to North Korea, North Vietnam and India. It follows then, that it is a Russian natural interest to support North Vietnam's aspirations for unifying and controlling the South and even entire Indochina, which will give them control of almost the entire Mekong basin. Adopting that

same politico-geographical principle, it is the interest of China to leave Vietnam separated, in view of their historical mutual strife. It seems, however, that China, at least explicitly, supports the unification of Vietnam, as it cannot reverse its declared policy of the 1950s and 1960s, when the Americans had military bases close to its borders; nevertheless, China's contemporary policy may represent an intention to crystallize the present political situation in Vietnam. In addition, the road it built from Yunnan to Laos, and the refuge they accord to Sihanouk may ^{indicate} ~~show~~ that they will oppose a Vietnamese bid to conquer the entire area of French Indochina.

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. While the entire population of Indochina was about 23 million in 1936, the anticipated population of 1980 of South Vietnam alone is 23.7 million (428). The population of North Vietnam was 14.2 million in 1955, and that of the South was 18.3 million in 1970. The proportion of Chinese, Khmers and hill tribes in the 1962 population of South Vietnam was seven percent out of a 14.8 million total.

The French colonial policy of confiscating temporarily abandoned lands and of distributing newly opened lands to collaborating landlords and to French colons, increased the landless peasant class. In 1930, the average peasant holding was smaller than before the French had come, though riceland area quadrupled (429). The newly French-created landlord class, practised money lending but did neither invest in agriculture nor in industry (430). Also, the French agrarian policy preferred export-crop estates to rice exports, and as a result the average share of rice in the general export value fell ~~from~~

from 65,3 percent in 1913-1917 to 35,8 in 1938, while that of rubber went up from 0,8 percent to 21,8 during the same period (431). This did not mean that rice production fell but, clearly, that the developing agricultural sector was that which least remunerated the workers.

Extreme poverty made the landless-peasantry receptive to communist ideas which represented anti-colonialism as well as nationalism. Work in plantations and mines did not attract labour for permanent jobs, as labour conditions were extremely exploitative. The underdeveloped Vietnamese middle-class consisted of a surprisingly high proportion of professionals in comparison to traders and businessmen, the latter being mainly Chinese. Excepting the landlords, no Vietnamese class or major group materially gained from the French rule; as a result, the French-speaking intelligentsia had no loyalties to France. The French themselves, perhaps with the exception of some companies and individuals, did not greatly profit from their possession of Vietnam, figures of 1822-1913, show that Vietnam only very marginally affected the external trade of France (432).

The Vietnam war has brought a younger leadership to the fore. The French educated intelligentsia and the Buddhist clergy were replaced by the military and party cadres elites. These sometimes showed more character than judgement and understanding in their leadership, lacking experience in human relations. In the North, in contradistinction to the South, the dominant elite remained uncorrupted and has shown no sign of relaxation in its extreme ideology and sacrifice demands. There seems to have existed three pressure groups in North

Vietnam of the 1950s: the intellectuals, the urban labour force and the peasantry (433). Their political significance, however, must have remained low in a continuous atmosphere of a national crisis, which has existed throughout the entire independence period of the country.

Since 1963, the army has become the most powerful political group in the South. This body cannot be considered as a one minded entity, yet its economic position in relation to the war economy of the country, which was acquired by power, may conduce its development into a socio-economic class, (434). The Buddhist clergy has lost much of its political influence, which it had enjoyed until 1960. The middle-class, which has developed since the mid 1950s in connection with the war economy, largely support the present economic and political policy as they are its direct beneficiaries. Peasants and workers have little political influence and seem to be preoccupied with survival rather than with politics.

The social disruptions of the Vietnam War constitute a direct continuation of the conditions existing during the French bid for neo-colonialism. Internal migration from North to South, from Vietkong to government-held territories or vice versa, and dislocation of hill tribes broke down community solidarity and family ties. The rural migrants suffered much more than the urban population of the South, who usually remained under the government's continuous rule. Some resettlement programs got under way during the 1950s and 1960s, with remarkable success, yet, the fluid nature of the campaigns, must have lately damaged much of the former achievements. The 1973 spatial distribution of the government and Vietkong held territories, and the

retreat of the North Vietnamese army, leaves the country in a precarious situation, which is bound to stabilize perhaps by another partition of the South, changing the patchy pattern of the present territorial possessions. Also, combats may still continue as the government endeavours to keep open the communication arteries between the urban centres, and as the more active communists may try to extend their ~~territories~~ ^{area} ~~territories~~ ~~etc.~~.

With better agricultural potential and with foreign aid the South has perhaps better chances of economic development. The North, however, is endowed with more extractive resources and with more efficient government. The South, with American aid, developed its formal education enrolling 78 percent of its related age groups in primary schools. In 1968, there were 471,000 high schools students, of whom only 3 percent were in technical schools. University attendance was 32,600 (435). The figures should be considered with some criticism, as school attendance in insecure areas was declining during the 1960s. However, a steady increase was achieved in primary and high school attendance (436). The low proportion of formal technical education, must have been supplemented by informal education in agriculture by government officials, by technical skills acquired in war-time conditions and by developing entrepreneurial skills in that atmosphere of intensified activities and easy money making.

The war changed South Vietnam from a rice exporting country to a net importer. Other export crops also declined, and only the massive economic aid and military expenditure of the Americans kept the country's economy going. Vietnam's total agricultural production increased by 2.9 percent annually between 1954 and 1969, the lowest rate but one in Southeast

Asia (437). The G.N.P. annual increase between 1965 and 1970 was 2.5 percent, the lowest in Southeast Asia (438). With more American aid coming during the presently concluded peace, it remains to be seen whether South Vietnam will follow the South Korean example or the Indonesian one.

(iii) The Chinese Minority. Estimates of the Chinese population in South Vietnam for the year 1965 vary between 500,000 and 1,200,000 (439). This wide range was due to the lack of a census as well as to difficulties in defining a Chinese. During the French colonial period figures were more reliable, ~~thus~~ in 1908 the Chinese of Cochinchina numbered 90,000 among 117,000 Foreign Asiatics (440). In 1921, there were 32,000 and 7,000 Chinese in Tongking and Annam respectively, and in 1931 their numbers rose to 52,000 and 10,000 (441). The 171,000 Chinese in Cochinchina, in 1937, more than doubled their number reaching 380,000 in 1940 (442), presumably because of "push" factors existing in China during the Japanese aggression. Most of this immigration was illegal, and seems to have come through land routes. ~~was~~ The better part of the influx settled down in Cochinchina which offered more economic opportunities than the congested North.

Purcell (443) remarked that circa 1937 four fifths of the Chinese in Vietnam lived south of the 17th parallel and that this proportion does not seem to have changed since then. But, the communist government in the North and its political affiliations with China may have produced a drastic change in the economic position of the Chinese minority in North Vietnam, which makes the problem of those who still remain in the country uncharacteristic in respect of the Chinese minority problem of Southeast Asia. It thus follows that the ~~problem~~

Chinese concentration in Cochinchina becomes even more representative of their conditions in South Vietnam in view of their small proportion in Annam. ^{In addition} ~~Moreover~~, post W.W.II. information on the Chinese population mainly concerns those in South Vietnam and its development went as follows: (444)

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1958	
Saigon - Cholon	583	542	429	421	440	107	(in 1,000)
Other Provinces	95	116	115	112	181	17	"
Total	678	657	544	541	621	124	"

These figures pertain to Légale et Controlée Chinese population, but Ngo Dinh Diem and Taipei quoted the number of Chinese in the 1950s as one million (445). The table also fails to show the 40,000 Chinese who crossed the 17th parallel after the French withdrawal in 1954, and thus it may serve only as an indicator of the Chinese shift from Saigon-Cholon to the provinces. The astonishingly small figure of 1958 is due to the naturalization law of 1956, which does not signify any considerable change in the Chinese identity of the naturalized persons, and is thus irrelevant to our study. The more reliable figures of 1955 quote 800,000 Chinese in South Vietnam distributed as follows: 573,000 in Saigon-Cholon and 227,000 in the 21 provinces. There were only five provinces with 20,000 Chinese or over, and 11 with 10,000 or less, and the overall number of village dwellers was 131,500, while townsmen numbered 95,700 (446).

Par excellence entrepreneurs, the Chinese not only practically control the rice industry (447), except for cultivation, but also to a large extent the crafts, retail

trade, commerce and banking; they have usually avoided, or rapidly moved from plantation labour and agriculture (448). Their diligence, skill and clannishness made them snatch the wide opportunities offered by the post W.W.II. war economy by moving into manufacturing industries and services. In 1951, out of 70,698 enterprises of all sorts, 66 percent were Vietnamese owned and 30 percent belonged to "legal Chinese", but about one third of the Vietnamese enterprises really belonged to Chinese, increasing their proportion to 50.9 percent (449). In the 1950s, about 37 percent of the Chinese enterprises in Saigon-Cholon produced and traded in foodstuffs and 15 percent in textile, the absolute numbers were 3,543 and 1,439 respectively; in addition, 949 Chinese enterprises dealt in foreign trade and 862 in scrap metal (450). Many of the Chinese enterprises come under the supervision of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce which was established in the 1900s. It maintains close ties with its counterparts outside the country not only for business purposes, but also to mobilize their support when the government exerts economic pressure on the Chinese (451).

In 1956, the government issued economic and civil-rights restrictive acts discriminating against the Chinese, with an official aim of integrating them into the Vietnamese society. Vietnamese citizenship was automatically imposed on all the Vietnam born Chinese (452). The non-citizens could not enter the retail and rice trades, and scrap-metal dealings. Those already thus occupied had to cease their activities within a 6-12 months period. The Chinese generally did not comply with these regulations, and boycotts on Vietnamese rice in Hong Kong and Singapore sufficed to bring about face-saving changes in

the government policy (453). In 1958, the line against the Chinese hardened again, when the government restricted Chinese education and reacted against those who had declined Vietnamese citizenship by refusing to accept identity cards. In 1963, when Vietnam became a rice deficit country, and when the army took over the government, the aggravation in the war situation became a justification for the anti-Chinese hard-liners to stiffen discriminative enactments. Restrictions on Chinese education became more conspicuous, but in the economic field, Chinese businessmen could unofficially compromise with army officers and civil servants without too much publicity.

The Chinese speech-groups ~~in South Vietnam~~ in South Vietnam still have a strong significance in the socio-economic life of the entire group. This is manifested in occupational specialization, in speech-group labour recruitment and in the specific labour relations of the still existing guilds; all this in addition to the specific speech-group socio-cultural institutions such as hospitals, temples (454), cemeteries and welfare organizations. This phenomenon, relatively more emphasized than in most other Southeast Asian Chinese communities, presumably stems from the congregation system, which was based on speech-group membership. And although it was formally changed into a territorial system by China's formal request in 1946, in practice, the traditional system remained as in the past (455).

In 1950, Skinner produced the following figures concerning the speech-groups in South Vietnam:

					(in 1,000)				
Cantonese	Teochiu	Hakka	Hokkien	Hainanese					
337.5	45%	225	30%	75	10%	60	8%	30	4%

The distribution in Saigon Cholon in 1948 was as follows (456):

Cantonese	Teochiu	Hokkien	Hakka	Hainanese
128 41.3%	114.4 36.9%	24.2 7.8%	32.9 10.6%	10.6 3.4%

Although the Cantonese are only marginally more numerous than the Teochiu, ~~they represent~~ ^{is/} their dialect ~~is~~ ^{predominant} ~~speech-groups~~ in Saigon-Cholon. The Teochiu are linked with those of Cambodia by fish imports from the Tonlé Sap, and they also specialize in the sugar industry and transport. Hokkienese specialize as traders in villages and in scrap metal dealing, and the Hakka predominate in the bread, textile and leather industries. The Hainanese specialize in restaurants, but their chefs who are ~~so~~ sometimes lessees are Cantonese (457).

Besides the several speech-groups of the Chinese community there exists in Vietnam a Chinese mestizo group (Minh Huong), which dates back to the pre-colonial times. It seems that this group has lost its Chinese identity as it had been a legally separated group, differentially taxed from the Chinese and generally classed by the French as subjects of the French Empire in Asia, while the Chinese remained aliens (458). The Minh Huong mostly live in the ~~country~~ ^{countryside} and this increases the possibility of their assimilation. They ~~numbered~~ ^{numbered} 73,000 in Cochinchina in 1931 (459), but their number in 1960 was estimated at 150,000 - 300,000 (460), although Chinese intermarriages with indigenous women must have decreased in number during the 20th century.

French colonialism being, in some sense, less tolerant to the Chinese in 20th century Indochina, than other

colonialist powers to the Chinese in their respective domains, denied Chinese nationalism from politicizing the Chinese communities, and, as a result, to a certain degree also, from introducing Chinese modern education. It ensued that literacy in Chinese in Vietnam was the lowest among the Nan Yang communities (461). Also, the congregation system and the low proportion of labourers unintegrated in guilds reduced Chinese radical nationalism during the French rule. After W.W.II., the K.M.T. political activities were less attractive than ever before, and Chinese communist activities could endanger the lives of those who practised them. The net result of all this was the explicit political disinterest of the Chinese community in Vietnam (462) and its low literacy in Chinese. For example, in 1955 there were 13,860 books in the Chinese library of Cholon, but the number of loans for that year was only 2,375 (!) (463). There are however, 11 Chinese daily newspapers and 5 weeklies, the former with a 62,000 circulation.

The first modern Chinese school was established in 1910, but a bilingual high school had existed in 1907. By 1937, there were 137 schools and 7,000 pupils all supported by Chinese associations and private individuals. Kuo Yü was the means of instruction and French was a secondary language. In 1953, there were 35,000 Chinese pupils in South Vietnam, and in 1955 - more than 62,000. In 1963, Chinese language instruction was restricted to 6 hours a week and compulsory instruction in Vietnamese was stepped up (464).

Cambodia. Cambodia and Laos constituted the backward region of French Indochina and the recent internecine war in both

damaged much of the progress achieved ever since. The land-locked position of Laos, its ethnic diversity and extreme economic underdevelopment as well as the tense political situation, all combine to render doubtful the viability of this state (465). Cambodia has been economically better endowed, and with a commanding location on the Gulf of Siam as well as a higher ethnic homogeneity, but still politically divided, perhaps owes its viability to its "buffer state position" (466). Although this state of affairs was geographically true when Cambodia filled the gap between Vietnam and Siam in the pre-colonial era, its position (and that of Laos) at present is more related to the China-Vietnam-Russia power relations.

(i) Political Developments. Throughout the French rule, Cambodia retained a pro forma monarchy, but a "resident general" held real government. The Vietnamese nationalism did not produce any resonant vibrations among the Cambodians, and even successive concessions and reannexations of provinces in 1887, 1904, 1941 and 1945 passed virtually politically unmarked, as Cambodia lacked a "nationalist movement of any consequence" (467). In 1945, the Japanese made Sihanouk declare Cambodia's independence within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and when the French returned, Cambodia became an autonomous kingdom within the French Union. In anticipation of a growing nationalist and communist sentiments in post W.W.II. years, Sihanouk became the leader of a group demanding full independence. In 1949, the French accorded "the first prerogatives of internal independence" (468), but Sihanouk, unsatisfied with it, went into exile in protest of the slow transfer of administrative power.

Meaningful political public life began in Cambodia in 1946, when a Constituent Assembly was elected and drafted a Constitution. The Democratic Party won the first elections, and having had close links with the Khmer Issarak, obstructed legislation sponsored by the king. In 1951, the party again emerged the winner of the elections, and began replacing the civil servants with its own followers. However, Sihanouk took a royal mandate "to restore order and security" in the country. In 1954, Cambodia became fully independent, and Sihanouk's Sangkum party carried the 1955 elections, and indeed every single seat in the 1958 and 1962 assemblies.

Though Sihanouk abdicated in 1955, Cambodia becoming a republic, the Sangkum party besides manning the Administration and practically every important economic and social post, introduced a personality cult of Sihanouk. This brought about an atmosphere of a "guided democracy" with party officials ensuring popular support to Sihanouk's policy. Sihanouk's personal abilities in handling political and factional leaders, as well as the masses, was second perhaps only to Sukarno's. He created a split within the Khmer Issarak rebel movement. The non-communists of that movement joined Sihanouk and were integrated into the Khmer army (469), as they resented the Vietnamese influenced communist faction in the Khmer Issarak, and Vietnamese activities in Cambodia in general.

The Communist Party of Cambodia began its activities among the Vietnamese minority group, which constituted the principal labour force in Pnom Penh, a large proportion of the rubber plantations labour, as well as the group of fishermen on the Tonlé Sap. Since 1950, the communists operated a political school within Cambodian territory under effective rule of the

Vietkong. The Vietnamese influence in the Communist Party brought about much of its own unpopularity among the Cambodians, who regarded Sihanouk as the real national leader opposing the French and later the Americans and the Vietnamese.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Cambodia chose a neutral line in foreign politics. As a result, both the U.S. and China economically aided the country; the U.S. share amounting to 228 million dollars between 1954 and 1959 and the grand total reaching 335 million. However, when the Vietkong and leftist guerrillas infiltrated large rural areas, Sihanouk requested that the American aid be stopped in 1964, and severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1965.

Capitalizing "on the strength of the Khmer tradition of ruler worship" (470), Sihanouk underestimated the American evaluation of the strategic importance of Cambodia to the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. Thus, the military coup, aided by the Americans, established an anti-communist and anti-Sihanouk regime, which exhibited its chauvinism by a massacre of thousands of Vietnamese residents. However, the army remained in control mainly in the larger urban centres leaving most of the countryside to Vietkong and Free Khmer control (471).

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The traditional division of the Cambodian society followed an occupational line: bureaucracy, clergy and peasants. Families of royal descent and nobles usually became government officials and clergymen, and, indeed, clerical life provided a respectful solution to social mobility needs of the peasantry as well. During Sihanouk's period, the royal family and the old nobility held high government positions, and the educated Khmers served as civil

servants and professionals. The clergy held its popularly venerated position and the Chinese minority and to some extent the Vietnamese, with some proportion of Cambodians constituted the middle-class. After W.W.II., the army with its hierarchical structure provided an outlet to social pressure and leadership expression alongside the temporary and the professional priesthood. In this sense, the Khmer Issarak provided similar opportunities.

The rural society of Cambodia has been favoured by an abundance of cultivable land, absence of landlordism (which suggests minimal class distinction), and until the Vietnam war ~~with stability~~ social stability. However, when war hit the Cambodian soil, stability gave way to social and spatial mobility. In post W.W.II. years, the Cambodian economy developed, not the least, because of its adjacent location to the Korean and Vietnamese war-zones, which promoted Cambodian exports. With international aid agricultural and industrial projects were constructed and the infrastructure developed. But when the war invaded Cambodia itself, many of the projects were damaged, and overland as well as riparian transport greatly shranked.

Education in Cambodia, experienced a rapid progress, and in 1962, about 10 percent of the population attended primary schools (472), but high schools attendance reached only 0.82 percent and university students amounted to 27 per 100,000 (473). This, nevertheless, represents more than a tenfold expansion of modern education in 12 years, while in that period the proportion of pagoda schools sank from 50 to 12 percent. As in most other Southeast Asian countries education mainly affected the urban sector.

In the 1930s, agriculture provided livelihood for 85 percent of the Cambodian population, and produced an annual surplus of 200,000 tons of rice for export, while corn, sugar-palm, tobacco, kapok, oil seeds, rubber and pepper constituted the other major export crops (474). Animal husbandry provided all needs in meat, and fishing in rivers and the Tonlé-Sap produced about 250,000 tons per annum, much of the catch being exported to Vietnam. In post W.W.II. years, with foreign economic aid and cultural stimulation, several measures were introduced to increase agricultural production. However, the Buddhist peasantry did not respond in a favourable way. A possible explanation for the negative attitude of the peasantry may be their lack of cultural values of acquisitiveness. Prestige in rural society still could be acquired "by means of righteous conduct and faithful service to the Pagoda" (475). Also, the physiographical conditions of Cambodia have never demanded the accumulation of surplus, and although "extravagance in poverty" has been a traditional Cambodian characteristic, peasants preferred to indebted themselves to Chinese money lenders rather than produce surplus, as laws against land alienation to foreigners assured them of the means for their subsistence. Government credit provided loans only for economic investment, while the Chinese lent cash for any purpose. Also, government irrigation projects sometimes came to nothing, when peasants neglected to maintain the distributary canals.

Since independence, the industrial sector and public services have constituted the more advanced sector of the economy, but government policies and especially their application, and ~~in addition~~ also the political situation, did not provide the necessary conditions for commercial foreign investment in

the economy. The economic projects initiated by foreign aid were government owned, the banking and insurance were nationalized in 1965, and the "guided economy" of Cambodia adopted a policy of indigenization of trade and services. Since 1963, both external and internal trade became monopolized by state agencies, and national minorities directly suffered from that and from restrictions on some commercial, transport and other skilled occupations. Public services experienced perhaps the highest rate of development, in education, civil service, defence and transportation. The creation of the port of Sihanoukville and the road linking it to Pnom Penh, had an ostensible value as a national enterprise, and a politico-economic justification for trying to become independent of the port of Saigon for external trade. In 1966, however, Cambodia, with a population of 6.3 million, was outstanding in Southeast Asia in having a decreasing G.D.P. rate in absolute and in per capita terms (476). The situation does not seem to have changed until the present days.

(iii) The Chinese Minority. In contrast to the trend in Cochinchina, the Chinese in Cambodia tended to concentrate in the capital during the first half of the 20th century, thus increasing the proportion of their community in Pnom Penh from 11 percent to about 33 (477). Between 1908 and 1963, the Chinese population grew from 90,000 to 425,000 (478), but this growth was unevenly distributed over the years, as in 1936/37 there were only 106,000 Chinese in the country (479). It has been said that at the beginning of the century 40 percent of them lived on agriculture, and were more attached to the land than in any other part of Indochina (480). In 1963, about 77

percent of the community was Teochiu, and their congrégation social organization would imply even a higher homogeneity in 1900.

The congrégation constituted the highest organizational institution in the Chinese community. In 1935, there were 70 of them in Cambodia, 39 of which included more than one speech-group; as by law, if more than 100 members of one speech-group lived in the same locality, they were entitled to create a congrégation. From the speech-group point of view, this was highly beneficial, as the chefs de congrégations, besides collecting taxes and reconciling disputes, had the authority to accept or reject new immigrants by issuance of permanent resident permits, and to issue laissez passer to their members. The congrégations administered the social functions of the Chinese society: the school, cemetery, temple, welfare and dispute reconciliation (481), and cooperated among themselves in social and religious matters (at least as reported from Pnom Penh). The Cambodian congrégations had ties with those of Saigon-Cholon; ~~the~~ the Teochiu fishing monopoly holders on the Tonlé Sap exported their catch to their counterparts in the former cities, and ~~the~~ many Chinese businesses in Pnom Penh were affiliates of Saigon-Cholon companies. Thus the homogeneity of the congrégations, which was culturally preferable for communal life, was also perpetuated by the authority it had over the acceptance of new immigrants, and by the practical control of the speech-group members over the employment producing enterprises. Two additional points of politico-geographical significance are noteworthy. The first one was the importance of the colonial boundaries of Indochina, which minimized the links between the Teochiu groups of

En-lai's visit to Cambodia speeded up the change in political loyalty of the Chinese community. Sport clubs and mass daily calisthenics in emulation of China became popular, in a bid to revive a new Chinese nationalism of the communist version. This certainly could occur only under a government with a pro-Communist China policy. In internal Chinese affairs, the revival materialized in a prosperity of Chinese education, which increased school enrollment from 1.5 percent of the Chinese population in 1931-32, to 11 percent in 1959, and to 12 percent in 1963 (482). However, the government also imposed on the Chinese schools 12-15 weekly hours of Khmer language instruction. The Chinese schools divided in political affiliation to pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan, with books printed in Hong Kong, Singapore and Peking.

The marked swing to the left of the Chinese leadership, did not bring about a total breach in relations between the old and the new leaderships. Chinese solidarity in an alien and discriminating environment, and the practical financial support that conservative businessmen could donate kept the community together. As a consequence, in 1956, the Teochiu mutual aid association undertook to aid the newcomers who were denied the pursuit of 18 occupations. This "economic indigenism" was imposed during Sihanouk's rule, who, speaking of the French, Vietnamese and Chinese (perhaps only of the post W.W.II. newcomers) said: "Cambodia is not their homeland, we don't have minorities, only foreigners" (483). The Chinese did not openly protest against the restrictions, they usually preferred "unofficial arrangements" to public resistance, especially as Chou En-lai advised them to cool off their political agitation when he was

visiting Cambodia (484).

At present, the Chinese situation in Cambodia is extremely insecure not so much because of war risks, as because of the possibility that Cambodia would become communist. To the Chinese workers this would mean the loss of a chance to move socio-economically into the middle-class and thus to lose the raison d'être of their living outside China. The Chinese big businessmen, who had begun their businesses as family enterprises, each family member contributing to profit maximization by hard work and ~~frugal~~ ^{frugal} life (485), and who transformed their initial successes into firms and companies, would find difficulty in expanding and may even lose their property. However, it is likely that besides sending tentacles outside the country to find safer places to invest and live, they actually connive with the military and civil servants in by-passing ~~known~~ economic restrictions. It is worth noting that by its essentially trading nature the interests of the Chinese community in Cambodia, and in Southeast Asia in general, are against communist governments.

Thailand. Fisher's suggestion that Thailand may be studied as a control for the Southeast Asian countries which experienced colonial rule (486), is academically stimulating and may produce practical benefits as well. Total generalizations may miss the suggested point, but the study of particular phenomena is likely to produce valuable results. One of these may be a comparative study of the difference in attitude of the indigenes towards the Chinese minority. Historical evidence exists, which supports the opinion that the colonialists intentionally sharpened the hostility between the indigenes and

the Chinese minorities. However, as the colonial legacy becomes a remote recollection, and as by feedback the Chinese problems in Southeast Asia tend towards more uniform solutions, Thailand may lose its unique position among the countries of the region in relation to its Chinese community.

(i) Political Developments. British and French reluctance to confront each other on a common colonial boundary may have constituted the major reason for Siam's independence. It thus happened that the slowly modernizing country had been governed by the traditional elite until the early 1930s. However, cuts in civil servants' salaries in the 1920s (487), resentment among army officers from the promotion system, and a more general dissatisfaction in ^{the} depression years of the 1930s, increased the ranks of a "small group of foreign trained young intellectuals" (488), who hoped to reform the government of the country.

In 1932, army officers staged a bloodless coup with a view of breaking the political power of the arrogant royal princes and nobility without, however, creating a representative government. The Peoples' Party, representing the intellectuals, which comprised a circle of left-wingers headed by Pridi, allied itself with the officers and drafted a constitution. According to it, the king, jointly with the Assembly, appointed the cabinet, but the Assembly could be dissolved by the king.

In 1933, Pridi promulgated a plan aiming at nationalizing the economy, but communist agitation having existed in the country (489), made the government seize the opportunity to make Pridi resign, outlaw communism, impose censorship, and restrict political activities. Later, Pahan became prime minister and in

1934, he nominated Pridi and Pibun (the latter representing the army) as ministers, while Pahon himself acted as a moderator between the two factions. Pibun's ambitions increased his popularity in army circles and made him prime minister in 1939. Trying to emulate Germany and Japan, he endeavoured to introduce a popular patriotic drive. Renaming the country Thailand, which suggested perhaps some territorial claims, he tried to change the popular attitudes towards production and loyalties to the state.

In 1941, Pibun aligned himself with the Japanese war machine, and Pridi had to resign from the wide cabinet, which had been created in anticipation of the patriotic drive initiated by Pibun. In foreign politics Pibun had little scope for independent manoeuvring during W.W.II., at the end of which he resigned. In 1946, with the world political atmosphere influenced by the collaboration issue, Pridi became prime minister. He liberalized political activity and received enthusiastic popular support, but the new constitution he drafted actually aimed at consolidating and perpetuating his party's hold on the government (490). In 1947, however, the army, dissatisfied with the minor political role it had played since 1944, reestablished itself in government by a coup. Pibun became prime minister in 1948, when the Cold War was already in progress, and when his premiership could be accepted by the Americans. During his second rule, Pibun enjoyed much less authority than he had during his first premiership. He had to reconcile the army and the police factions and suppress two navy coups. This strife among armed forces factions was a typical phenomenon in Thailand where holding government office provided the officials with opportunities to enrich themselves.

This political unrest, supported by Pridi's followers, brought about the reintroduction of the 1932 Constitution.

Since 1948, Thailand became increasingly aligned with the American policy in Southeast Asia, suppressing ~~and~~ communists inside the country, and supporting American policies in Southeast Asia and the Far East. Thailand joined S.E.A.T.O. in 1954, perhaps more in anticipation of American aid than as a result of anti-Thailand policies manifest in the creation in China of the Autonomous Thai State in 1953. However, during the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai assured the Thai delegation that the autonomous Thai government in Yunnan had not been created with aggressive intentions towards Thailand, and as a result a rapprochement policy towards China was adopted. As by that time no American troops were stationed in Thailand, and as U.S. aid to Thailand, in per capita figures, was less than half that accorded to neutralist Cambodia (491), it seems that the Thai move towards China had perhaps an original intention of increasing the American involvement in Thailand. However, personal animosity of Pibun towards the Americans, and a sort of Asian solidarity on his part or a loss of his prestige in army circles, may have been the real causes for that rapprochement. In practical policy, that period (1955-1957) manifested itself in the resumption of trade relations with China, in cessation of suppressing the Thai communists, in lifting economic restrictions put on the Chinese in Thailand, and in open criticism of the U.S.

In 1957, Sarit removed Pibun from his office by a military coup, and realigned the policy of Thailand with that of the U.S., receiving a 100 percent raise in economic aid. In 1958, Sarit took dictatorial authority suppressing the

communists, ^{and the} free press, ^{and the} banning political parties and labour unions. Trade with and travel to China were prohibited, but no further restrictions on the Chinese community were imposed. In regional politics it seems that events in Laos between 1959 and 1962, justified Thai efforts to bring about American intervention in the former state. In fact, Thailand's commitment to S.E.A.T.O. exposed it to communist reprisals, and without active American intervention it would have rather become neutralist (492). The net result of the American involvement was the stationing of American troops in Thailand in 1962, without real American intervention in force in Laos (493).

The 1973 truce in Vietnam may give Thailand a temporary respite from subversive activities on its northeastern borders. Yet, by the general nature of communist subversion, underground activities will gradually rebuild up, unless socio-economic conditions in the Northeast will produce a society immune to communist ideology and infiltration. Communist harassment also exists in South Thailand, where Muslim Malays and communists defy Thai government authority, and where the M.C.P. of Malaya maintains an active force of 800 guerrilla fighters, which can eventually grow to 2,500. These insurgents identify themselves as Malays, and the Thai policy against them is of aggressive vigilance, having no willingness to solve Malaysia's problems at their own expense (494). In mid 1967, there were 2,000 estimated active communist guerrilla fighters and 10,000 supporters in the Northeast, who played on secessionist themes, such as a union with Laos for the Thai-Lao of the Northeast. The insurgents of the South, try to activate the Malays of Thailand by the same themes, advocating a reunification of the

South with Malaya (495).

(ii) Social and Economic Developments. Thailand ranked third among the most populated states of Southeast Asia in 1970 having 34.152 million inhabitants (496) and an annual population growth rate of 2.66 percent. But, while the Central Region rate of growth was 2.31 percent, that of the Northeast reached 2.95, and both those of ^{the} North and South nearly matched the state's average with 2.70 (497). From the ethnic point of view, Thailand has long been a fairly homogenous country with 80 percent Thais, about 10 percent Chinese, and the rest Malays and hill tribes.

Rural life in Thailand has been dominated by rice cultivation and its annual life cycle. Social life is not clannish (498) and the usual household is of a nucleated family; this enables young families to settle in other villages without great difficulty, as rural life in rice growing communities is similarly patterned. Family ties are easily broken when young Thais migrate to the urban areas (499). Women have equal inheritance and ownership rights as men, and village life is pervaded with equality (500); there is little ambition for social mobility. Values are still attached to religious merit, official position and old age. For example, the average cash expenditure on religious practices in a rural Thai family reached 8 percent of the cash income, excluding food and labour contributions (501). Leadership in the village is held by an elected headman and an unofficial but influential council of elders. Loyalties to king and country constitute current popular values, which however, have not been put to test under circumstances of crisis. The decline in royal authority and the

change in the dominant elite, which followed the 1932 coup, and also market economy and lay education, gradually produce changes in values and in traditional patterns of life.


In the urban sector, personal ambitions and expectations concerning socio-economic mobility are usually greater and the gap between them and their fulfillment is usually wider. The specific inner political conditions in Thailand brought about the building of political parties around personalities rather than on different ideologies (502), when political organization was not forbidden. The restriction on political organization on ideological or territorial basis, and the extreme centralization of government, with fairly low provincial initiative, has intensified the long established exceptional political and economic importance of Bangkok. In addition, Bangkok sets an example in style, customs and attitudes, which is imitated by the provincial elite. All other conditions being equal, residence in Bangkok conveys additional status in comparison to provincial residence.

The social classes observed in the 1950s, divided into 5 categories (503). The Aristocracy were a closed class of royal descent and old nobility, in the veins of some of which flowed a certain proportion of Chinese blood, but no ethnic Chinese belonged to them. Their wealth had originated from land ownership, but they had invested little in trade and industry and, as a result, tended to lose their economic primacy. Some of them held high government positions, some were devoted to the Thai cultural tradition and some added their names to boards of big companies. As a class they were generally on the decline. The active dominant elite consisted of high ranking

Bangkok Social Structure

Occupations


Social Class



Chinese 

Thai 

Europeans 

Civil Servants
(Thai only) 

Source: Blanchard et al., 1958.

army officers, government officials, and of outstanding businessmen and industrialists. They wielded together wealth and political power and were largely influenced by Western material values. Chinese entered their ranks by intermarriage and by creating partnerships with high officials. The pure Thai bureaucratic elite of this group has since 1932 increased its closure to further mobility by allocating scholarships in foreign universities for its own class members, and also enhanced its economic standing by cooperating with Chinese business (504). The higher middle-class were more differentiated along ethnic lines. While the Thai component of this group consisted of "white collar men" in business and government service, the Chinese component was mainly mercantile and business oriented. The latter have ^{had} close connections with Chinese counterparts in other Nan Yang communities, and modeled their lives after them rather than after their Thai colleagues. The class as a whole, constituted about 50 percent of Bangkok's population (505), demonstrating the high degree of socio-economic centrality of the capital. The lower middle-class was overwhelmingly Chinese and consisted of craftsmen, skilled labourers and shopkeepers. They exhibited a constant drive to move socially upwards. The lower class consisted of unskilled labourers and vendors, and was mainly preoccupied with providing for their daily needs. Lately, some occupational organization has been introduced into it, and leftist ideas have begun to infiltrate the labourers' minds. The Thais constituted the majority of this class, which generally represented fairly recent rural urban migration (506). In 1963, there were 1.3 million urban workers, who since 1958, could not organize in labour unions (507).

In 1962, 14.2 percent of the population attended primary

schools, but only 8.5 percent "academically" survived through the first 6 years of their schooling. One percent of the population attended high schools (508). In 1969, the proportions improved with 5,675 million pupils in primary and 449,000 in secondary schools, more than half of the latter were in private schools (509). University student enrollment was 45,763 in 1969 (510), but "Education in Thailand is still regarded as a means to a job rather than as an end in itself" (511). This is a natural and legitimate drive, though it practically crowds the humanities and social-sciences faculties with potential job seekers, leaving vocational schools and science faculties fairly unoccupied. Vocational education marked, however, a steady increase in the 1960s.

Thailand has been economically developing throughout the 20th century. Between 1952 and 1965, the share in G.D.P. generation of agriculture fell from 44 to 33 percent, transport increased from 4 to 7.5 percent and commerce and services went up from 35 to 41 percent. Mining, manufacturing and construction kept their share in G.D.P. generation (512). Tin extraction rose in particular from 10,364 tons in 1950, to about 30,000 average in 1966-70, and a new smelter was established in 1965 (513). The trend in G.D.P. and G.N.P. per capita continued to increase during 1966-1969 (514). However, since the 1950s, the G.D.P. distribution by sector marked an increase in the share generated by occupations generally strongly held by Chinese, and mutatis mutandis specific Thai occupations decreased their share.

In 1957, the manufacturing sector consisted of 16,000 establishments, 300 of which had more than 50 workers. In 1960, 3.4 percent of the labour force were engaged in manufacturing

In 1964 (515), there were 3,584 establishments with more than 9 workers, totalling 154,956 workers. Total wages and salaries in these amounted to 967,050,000 Baht, costs totalled 6,453,615,000 Baht and total receipts - to 11,277,174,000 Baht. There were also 16,707 establishments with less than 10 workers, totalling 66,259 people. Their wages and salaries amounted to 165,100,000 Baht, their other costs to 724,163,000 Baht, and their receipts - to 1,237,560,000 Baht. The efficiency of the bigger establishments and the better wages they paid is remarkable; consequently, it seems that capital investment in Thailand is highly rewarding. In such conditions, the relative lag of Thailand behind Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore in industrial development seems to stem from its late starting point. The relatively slower development may have resulted in part from the government policy of economic indigenism, which has favoured government enterprises (516) by administrative regulations. In addition, Thailand's population has largely lacked industrial skills in the low level of production, the medium level of management and technical planning, while Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have enjoyed a longer history of industrial skill improvement, vocational education and management experience. There exists another decisive factor: the Sinic attitude towards regimented work in factories, which is a matter of fact in the above mentioned countries, but is uncommon among the Thais.

Since the 1950s, strategic and socio-economic considerations combined to give priority to the development of the Northeast region. A road and railway systems enabled the agricultural development of the region, but the road network lay-out still reflects the nodality of Bangkok (which is augmented by the

grain of the country). Consequently, it seems that the provinces, with their primitive industrial development, can maintain separate existence from the capital only on a "subsistence level", which affects Thailand's strategic position.

(iii) The Chinese Minority. Between 1917 and 1955, the ethnic Chinese population of Thailand rose from 0.9 to 2.3 million, positive net immigration contributing to that increase throughout that period, except between 1936 and 1938 (517). An estimate for the 1960's quoted their number at 2.5-3.0 millions (518), while Skinner's estimate of 1965 was 2,609,000. The Chinese Economic Yearbook, estimated the number as 3,799,000 (519). It seems then, that a 10 percent proportion of the total population of the country represents fairly well the ethnic Chinese population, though the 1960 census admitted only 461,695 Confucians and 409,508 Chinese nationals (520) in the entire population of the country.

Chinese nationalism in Thailand, not unlike that of other Southeast Asian countries, revived the Chinese awareness of the community. It introduced a new dimension to their parochial attachment to China, to a country which was bound to regain its past political glory. It also added modern social organization, which transcended clan and speech-group barriers. This new organization became important after W.W.I., while between the beginning of the 20th century and ~~1917~~ 1917, clans, speech-groups and secret societies, representing a horizontal social organization were still dominant. This is not to assert that clans and speech-group organizations disappeared since then, but that the political activities in K.M.T. branches, ~~and~~ ~~in~~ in communist circles and labour unions became significant and in many instances prevailed over traditional cultural

activities. But, the significance of these new associations undoubtedly resulted also from the Thai political reaction they had produced. This was due to Thai suspicions over Chinese loyalties to Thailand, which perhaps were first published in the anti-Chinese pamphlet allegedly written by the king (521). Also, European merchants seem to have instigated anti-Chinese riots in order to decrease Chinese competition (522), spreading the image of a Yellow Peril. The political aspect of the Sino-Thai friction was thus only a 20th century creation, ^{even though} ~~while~~ sporadic anti-Chinese feelings, which stemmed from the Thai attribution to the Chinese of social and economic vices (523); had existed even before.

In 1910, the year the anti-Chinese pamphlet was published, the Thai government imposed a capitation tax on the Chinese, in protest of which the latter closed their businesses in Bangkok (524). All this did not stop Chinese immigration to Thailand, although in 1927 the Thais increased taxes on newcomers in a bid to limit their numbers. On the one hand, Chinese labour could not be dispensed with for economic reasons, and on the other "push" factors in China were too strong; ⁿ ~~but~~ immigration practically stopped only in 1947. The Thai measures to suppress the Chinese generally failed and made the latter turn on themselves "in search of strength through unity" (525). It is very improbable that the Thai anti-Chinese enactments of the first half of the 20th century contributed to more rapid Chinese assimilation. The Chinese unity, referred to by Skinner, must have been due also to the growing nationalist solidarity as well as to restrictive Thai measures. From the beginning of the 20th century Chinese immigrant women also contributed to the revival of Chinese consciousness (526) by increasing the number

of families where both parents spoke Chinese and, consequently, where offspring did not speak Thai as a mother tongue.

Chinese modern education in Kuo-Yü, an attribute of Chinese nationalism, developed from 1917 onwards until official restrictions diminished its extent. School numbers rose from 48 in 1925, to 271 with 8,000 pupils in 1933 (527). After Pibun rose to power, he introduced stiffer restrictions than those imposed following the 1932 coup. For instance, the 193 Chinese schools of 1934/35, consisting of 291 teachers and 4,742 pupils (528), increased to 230 schools and 16,711 pupils in 1937/38 but, in 1940, only 16 Chinese schools functioned, and in 1944 - only 2 (529). This reduction in Chinese schools resulted from Pibun's policy of enhancing Thai patriotism (530) rather than from a Japanese intervention in Thai affairs. After W.W.II., Chinese education upsurged within an atmosphere of elation over the Japanese collapse and the political status of World Power which China had acquired. As some of the Chinese schools became a source of leftist agitation, the Thais, especially since the second Pibun regime, reimposed their restrictions. In 1947, the last of the Chinese secondary schools was closed down, but not before 450 Chinese schools had existed in Thailand (531). In 1962, there were only 211 Chinese primary schools with a 83,606 pupil enrollment and with 3,958 teachers, most of whom were Thai; ~~where~~ the greater number of the schools taught only 6 hours of Chinese language a week. It has been said that after 4 years of studies the pupils cannot practically use their Chinese. However, night classes and tutorials are still operating in Thailand for Chinese language studies (532).

As regards Chinese economic occupations in the 20th century, rice procession and trade was practically dominated by

the Chinese until W.W.II., ~~Chinese~~ Tin production, a traditional occupation introduced by the Chinese in the 14th century (533), was strongly infiltrated by European capital which employed Chinese labour. In the rubber industry the Chinese have maintained a strong position, though Malay and Thai small holders have increasingly participated in that field. In 1954, 42 percent of all holdings of 20 acres or more were owned by Chinese nationals alone (534). The timber industry, especially the bigger companies, belonged to Europeans, but management in processing and retail trade of the finished products as well as exports remained in Chinese hands. Pork, fish and vegetable production and trade constituted Chinese dominated occupations, as well as sugar milling and general retail trade.

Between 1910 and 1950, the "Chinese provided between 60 and 75 percent of all skilled and unskilled, non agricultural labour" (535). Since W.W.II. however, the typical occupational distribution of the Chinese has been ~~undermined~~ ^(~~undermined~~), partly because of Chinese socio-economic mobility in absence of new immigrants, who usually used to take up the lower paid jobs, and partly because of Thai economic indigenism. Nevertheless, specific Chinese occupations still provide a better distinguishing criterion between Thai and Chinese, than dress or physical features (536). The Chinese occupations usually positively correlated with urban dwelling, and, for cultural persistence reasons and/or defence considerations, the Chinese usually concentrated in their proper wards and streets. For example, out of a total 757,636 inhabitants there lived 214,743 alien Chinese in Bangkok, half of the latter living in two municipal wards out of the extant eight. In one of those wards the alien Chinese constituted 40 percent of the population, and in the

other - 53 percent. This concentration was voluntary (537). The Chinese urban concentration was also well illustrated by their proportion in provincial capitals: in the vicinity of 28 of these lived more than 39.9 percent Chinese inhabitants, or more than four times their proportion in the country's population, and around 16 others the Chinese proportion ranged between 10 and 39.9 percent. In all, there were 58 provincial capitals, and mostly those of the North and Northeast had a lesser Chinese proportion than their average proportion in the country (538). This may have resulted from the late development of these regions, ~~the latter being developed~~ ^{which occurred} after Chinese immigration had stopped.

During the 20th century, the Thais gradually imposed economic restrictions on the Chinese, not the least as the result of Thai resentment of Chinese remittances to China. In comparison with the government expenditure between 1892 and 1941, which totalled 380 million Bahts, Chinese remittances in 1890-1941 amounted to 1,250 million. Landon estimated the remittances as not exceeding 2 percent of the Chinese created capital and not more than 10 percent of their net profits (539). Although most of the money was remitted as private transactions, communal enterprises such as the China Relief Fund of 1937, which united K.M.T. and leftist Chinese, aroused special Thai resentment. After the advent of the communists in China, remittances were drastically cut down, but rose again between 1953 and 1957, only to decrease sharply ever since (540).

Before discussing the economic restrictions proper imposed on the Chinese, a word should be said on the discriminating citizenship laws. Since 1913, birth in Thailand accorded

automatic citizenship, but during 1953-1956, at least one parent of the infant had to be Thai to ensure the citizenship of the child. In 1956, the jus solis was reestablished. Between 1911 and 1952, a 5 year period of residence in Thailand sufficed as a naturalization requirement. During 1952-1956, the necessary period of residence was lengthened to 10 years and a knowledge of Thai language also became a prerequisite. After 1956, the ~~residence~~ demand was again reduced to 5 years, but naturalization fees in recent years ranged between 2,000 and 5,000 Baht. The number of naturalized Chinese was 4,652, or less than half the applicants, during 1935-1958. In 1959-1960, 1,883 Chinese applied and 1,650 were granted naturalization (541). A similar number of Chinese became naturalized in 1965-1968 (542). The number of Chinese nationals in Thailand was 524,062 in 1937 (543), 409,508 in 1960 (544) and 335,763 in 1968 (545). This group must be rapidly disappearing, not because of direct naturalization, but presumably because it is non-reproductive in the sense that they constitute a small proportion of the Chinese community; and as they are culturally non differentiated from most of the other Chinese, they usually marry Chinese of Thai citizenship, the children being born into Thai citizenship.

Thai law recognizes 3 categories of citizens, namely: native born to Thai parents, native born to alien parents, and naturalized. The two latter are discriminated against in voting rights and by the fact that their citizenship may be suspended (546). Alien Chinese must carry identity cards and have been harassed by surprise checks; this has continued from the 1950s until the present days (547).

Economic discrimination against the Chinese seems to have had 3 different aims: a) to decrease the economic power of the

Chinese, b) to Thaiify certain occupations where Thais could reasonably well perform, or where Chinese monopolies endangered the national economy, and c) to reward Thai officials by inducing the Chinese to accept them as partners. The laws against land alienation to, and the denial of 27 occupations from the Chinese during W.W.II., may have represented the first category. The Thaification of the rice trade, the railway services, the army and the civil service may have represented the second category. The third type of discrimination concerned the distinction between the alien, naturalized and the citizens of non pure Thai parenthood. This type of discrimination became significant during the second Pibun regime and has been practised ever since. Thai officers and officials became partners in Chinese businesses and companies as figureheads and "connection operators", as companies had to have a high share of "pure Thai" ownership and as proper connections with government agencies became necessary for economic survival. Aware of this atmosphere, the Chinese themselves try to make the best of the situation. They are said to be keeping an eye on Thai officers who have promotion chances with a view of using them as figureheads (548).

A random sample of 7,723 inhabitants of Bangkok and Thonburi (549), comprising 37.1 percent Chinese (in fact, households where at least two people spoke Chinese at home), and 53.5 percent Thais revealed that while 21.8 percent of the socio-economic upper-class were Thais, only 2.4 percent were Chinese and 67.6 percent were Europeans. In the upper middle-class 64.8 percent were Thais and 8.1 percent Chinese, and in the lower middle-class 63.7 percent were Thais and 33.3 percent were Chinese. In the two lower classes, Thai and Chinese proportions were almost equal. The sample does not necessarily depict a

deterioration of the Chinese socio-economic standing when compared with that of the 1950s (550), as wealthy Chinese must have referred to themselves as Thais. This was not only in view of diverting public opinion from the wealth acquired by the Chinese, but also because of the increased number of Thai-Chinese partnerships and mutually beneficial arrangements, which has blurred the picture of true ownerships and income. The present Thai-Chinese economic arrangements seems to satisfy the Thai elite, as is implicit from a recent article (551) advocating the perpetuation of the present situation without demanding full Chinese assimilation.

Although Amado (552) defined the Chinese problem in Thailand as economic in nature, this observation must have overlooked many historical facts of the 20th century, when Chinese nationalism in Thailand motivated the community by pure idealism. The majority of the Chinese show a wide range of integrative trends towards Thai society. However, as long as they keep themselves as a distinct cultural group, a process of retro-assimilation may occur in the future among similarly to what happened in the Straits Settlements. The 20th century saw the rise and later a certain fall in Chinese nationalism in Thailand. The conflict between the Thai and the Chinese nationalist movements brought to the fore the question of national allegiance, as the ascent of China began affecting the minds of the Thais. A large proportion of the Thai people and the elite suspected the Chinese attitudes towards the country and the government (553). The K.M.T. ideology definitely demanded Chinese allegiance to China, while the communist one added class-struggle, and hence anti-government activities to its ideology. This meant that

besides the economic loss by remittances, K.M.T. nationalism endangered the Thai dominant class only in the eventuality of a China - Thailand war, while Chinese communist nationalism was permanently subversive. Although Chinese communism in Thailand was very limited in extent and K.M.T. nationalism, albeit more popular, was relatively less extreme than in Malaya, the long established labelling and stereotyping affected the Chinese community as a whole.

Chinese communist agitation in Thailand began in the 1920s mainly affecting the labour unions. During W.W.II. the communists, Chinese and Thai, opposed the Japanese and consequently gained, if not general public support, enough prestige to influence the labour unions before the second Pibun regime. Chinese communists operated in the Chinese schools, the press and other Chinese associations. There were 1,000 active Chinese communists and tens of thousands of supporters in 1948 (554). In the mid 1950s, 20,000 young Chinese went from Thailand to China, many infiltrating back after having received training in subversion (555). Since 1949, the K.M.T. ideology and party lost much of its previous appeal, and during 1953-1958 they also lost many of their leadership positions within the community, as Chinese public opinion swung left (556). After the Sarit coup of 1958, the authority of the old leadership was reestablished, following a strong anti-communist policy of the government. The Chinese official leadership, by nature of its double role in the Chinese society and towards the government cannot be nationalistic or even adopt an extreme Chinese cultural attitude.

Since 1958, Chinese political convictions are not openly discussed, and, though cultural persistence problems personally preoccupied Chinese people and institutionally also the

The leadership, integration and assimilation into Thai society has increased. Amyot is of opinion that conditions for Chinese assimilation in Thailand are the most favourable in Southeast Asia, and that assimilation is actually on the increase in the country, the Thais' only prejudice against them being economic in nature (557). He says: "Generally speaking, the degree of assimilation is related to the actual contact with Thai society and culture". It is greatest in families of long residence in Thailand, and with individuals who spent their formative years in Thailand, particularly those who attended schools where Thai and not Chinese was the means of instruction. Some Chinese may define themselves as Thai or Chinese according to different circumstances, having both Thai and Chinese names (558). Also, Coughlin, writing in the early 1950s, noticed the adoption of Thai names by the Chinese, ^{but} ~~and~~ attributed it to business purposes (559). Dibble, writing in 1961, was of the opinion that relations between Thais and Chinese were improving (560). This may have resulted from the decline in Chinese overt nationalism after the Sarit coup and from the increasing number of economic links between Thai officials and Chinese businessmen, which decreased political suspicion and economic prejudice. Skinner asserted that Chinese assimilation still went on in Thailand at the rates experienced in 1800 and in 1900, which was "no less than in any other Southeast Asian country". He pointed out four factors favouring assimilation: a) A decrease in China born parents. b) Dispersion of the Chinese communities. c) Stoppage of journeys to China, d) Thaification of the education (561). Guskin, while noting that Chinese assimilation ranges from full - to non-assimilation, remarks that it varies individually and on a personal basis. While he seems to accept the last three

factors mentioned by Skinner, he points out that Chinese social organizations on a speech-group or locality level provide an effective socialization system for the Thailand born Chinese (562). Tobias, writing on the Chinese community of Ayutthaya, reports a growing Chinese integration into Thai society and a decline in proficiency in Chinese language of the younger generation. There, however, Chinese social organizations still maintain cultural influence on the community, many members belonging to clan and other associations in Bangkok (563). A research, carried out by Boonsanong, revealed that there was differential assimilation of the Chinese according to their level of education. Though the Chinese usually learned additional Chinese dialects as well as Thai, the data distinctly showed that in the conspicuous facets of integration/assimilation the educated Chinese led the less-educated, and were preceded by those who held official Thai positions. But even the less educated were integrating (564).

Some of the Chinese who adopted Thai names have preserved some sound of their original name in it. Thai names and fluency in the language lead to acceptance into Thai society. In education, a Thai name is almost a prerequisite, and adoption of Thai customs and way of life accompanied by wealth paves the way to entry into Thai elite society (565). Ichikawa stressed the similarities in value systems and the lack of a rejecting colonial elite, as reasons for Chinese upward mobility and assimilation into Thai society. He noted that the Chinese upper-class assimilated more readily, mainly because of business ties (566).

It is generally expected, that in the process of assimilation behavioural modifications precede attitudinal

changes, at least when external conditions bring about the assimilation. These conditions exist in Thailand and consequently the process has followed those lines. Where external conditions are more demanding, such as with those seeking government posts, better business possibilities or higher education, assimilation gathers greater pace. Those Chinese whose activities begin and end within the Chinese society, mainly in the Chinatown, are likely to be more culturally persistent. In general, those Chinese who have a Chinese name and use it in their intimate milieu still belong to the Chinese "cultural recruiting space" and may change their loyalties according to future circumstances.

Some Politico-Geographical Aspects of the Chinese Identity in Southeast Asia. Although "in the last analysis, being a Chinese is, in Southeast Asia essentially a matter of self definition" (567), the Chinese group identity is clearly felt, not only by the Chinese themselves, but also by the indigenous societies.

Chinese assimilation into indigenous societies in Southeast Asia has been a continuous process, which has varied in extent ~~now~~ and in intensity. Assimilation was swinging in extent from individual cases to entire groups. For example, the mestizos in the Philippines lost the Chinese identity and the minh huong in Vietnam will probably follow the same course. The babas and the peranakans lost many of their Chinese cultural traits but later were reabsorbed. Also, social integration into indigenous societies may indicate possible future assimilation, but, as a general rule, the Chinese in Southeast Asia still maintain their identity as a separate ethnic group with specific economic occupations and skills. This identity and its ensuing solidarity

have constituted a grave concern of the Southeast Asian countries, especially with their "acute awareness of Peking's growing power" (568). Formerly, some colonialist powers of the region experienced a similar consciousness in relation to the K.M.T. republic. But, even much earlier, during the first two centuries of the Spanish rule in the Philippines, the power of Imperial China, real or false, made the Spanish repress the Chinese communities there. However, before nationalism affected Southeast Asia, anti-Chinese sentiments ^{generally} resulted from jealousy of a prosperous ethnic out-group *without regard to politics.*

Chinese nationalism introduced reintegration into the cultural identity of some culturally deviating groups, and emphasized loyalties to China as a state extending the former parochial loyalties. In addition, the modernization of Southeast Asia by new technologies and methods clearly favoured the Chinese minorities, whose aptitude and skills provided them with better economic opportunities than those offered to the indigenous masses (569). It thus transpired, that the bulk of publications, written during 1960-1970, on the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia deal with the distribution of power and resources in the states, and also with the hypothesis that those minorities constitute a "fifth column" for Chinese expansion (570). In this context, the independent states of the region produced anti-Chinese legislation in order to weaken their economic power, and with a view to increase their assimilation, the states also debilitated the Chinese education system. Most of the countries have lately further toughened this line against the Chinese (571). But, the economic restrictions brought about on the one hand more cohesion into the Chinese minority, and on the other, a corrupt cooperation between the dominant elite and the Chinese

businessmen. This did not make the Chinese apolitical although they pretend to be so (572). Common economic interests of the Chinese businessmen and the indigenous elite may prove to widen the social-class breach in the Nan Yang Chinese communities, which had been developing in the 1920s and 1930s.

According to Amyot (573), there are four discernible processes in the assimilation of the Chinese: a) progressive adopting of indigenous cultural traits substituting the Chinese ones, which is typical to Thailand; b) a new culture superimposed on the Chinese and the indigenous sub-cultures in a plural society, typical to Malaysia; c) a creation of a specific Nan Yang Chinese culture in total disconnection with the host culture, and with aspiration to the real Chinese culture as typified by China; d) a peranakan or baba cultural creation which is neither Chinese nor indigenous. The core of the Chinese community is stereotyped by the third type mentioned above, and though these Chinese may have lost the old fashioned Chinese customs and may have been educated in non Chinese schools, their identity is Chinese by any definition (574).

The political problem of the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, may seem to the dominant elites as a race between the states' assimilatory measures and China's efforts to take control of Southeast Asia either, by direct military intervention, or, more probably, by a Chinese inspired communist revolution. Nevertheless, those elites are invariably satisfied with the economic symbiosis they have created with Chinese businessmen, and usually leave room for further "personal arrangements" in bypassing anti-Chinese laws, with the exception of those concerning Chinese education.

The hierarchy of the Chinese cultural centres in the Nan Yang (575) begins from below with the home as a basic unit. Although, the Chinese cultural identity may vary over a wide range from one home to another, the home is still the first source of Chinese socialization through informal education, customs and especially ancestor worships. Of all the Chinese cultural objects provided by the home the Chinese surname and blood ties may be the most important from the cultural identity point of view. Next in the hierarchy comes the neighbourhood, sometimes of a small isolated Chinese community of agriculturalists like those found in some parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, but more often of a number of Chinese families in an indigenous village or small town (576). Where many Chinese families are concentrated, as in more important towns and cities, the neighbourhoods as social groups tend to merge because of urban social conditions, but still maintain some significance through the territorial distributary pattern of social services, or by speech-group territorial concentrations. Neighbourhood institutions may provide a temple, perhaps a club and a small school, but, more important, they provide a scope for Chinese cultural leadership, which on that level and in those circumstances can express its dedication to the perpetuation of the Chinese culture. The town or the small city include several neighbourhoods, in many instances with speech-group differentiation, and sometimes also with some differentiation between old established families and newcomers. The "cultural division of labour" in a town is more elaborate and depends on the size of the Chinese population extant. For example, in Ayutthaya, where 1,200 pure Chinese families lived, there were

14 neighbourhood shrines. The entire community contributed to the organization of religious festivals and even brought in a Chinese opera troupe from Bangkok, and they also maintained Chinese schools (577). This community was not closed and had strong business, kinship and marriage ties with the community in the capital (578). A bigger town or city provides a wider variety of cultural services non-existent in smaller towns. Class differentiation is more developed as relations tend to be more anonymous. Labour unions and clandestine clubs may sometimes provide socialization institution for the lower-class and for students of leftist conviction. The middle-class certainly has its Chamber of Commerce usually affiliated to that of the capital. Religious festivals are artistically richer and more frequent, sometimes held by specific speech-groups. There usually are several primary schools, and a secondary school, where permitted, as was the case in Semarang in the 1950s (579). Also in some instances, pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan clubs and journals may appear. Leadership is usually held by the wealthier Chinese, who in most cases try to subdue the Chinese political overtones of those institutions and emphasize their cultural and welfare characteristics. The capital of a Southeast Asian country normally has the highest Chinese concentration, usually centred in the Chinatown. The capital has not only social and kinship ties with dispersed Chinese communities in the country, but also provides cultural services in publishing newspapers and distributing Chinese periodicals, books and films from abroad. But what is more important, it is economically linked with extra-territorial communities, and as economic activities are dominant features of the Chinese society, it ensues that an important part of the local Chinese

cultural socialization is strongly connected with economic activities with Chinese communities abroad. With all its variety of cultural services, the capital, by strength of its Chinese population figures and its modern urban nature, is characterized by anonymous relations, and face-to-face socialization is usually achieved on its neighbourhood level and mainly in the Chinatown (580).

Amyot has characterized the Chinatown "Chineseness" as having a population of distinct Chinese racial features (581), Chinese costumes, names and etiquette. It is distinctly Chinese in its religious and artistic life. If the indigenous language is spoken, it is done so with a heavy Chinese accent. Life is frugal, and economic occupations rely on family ties; the habitat is typically Chinese and inhabitants are usually members of Chinese associations. When an inhabitant has relatives in China, he has close ties with them by letter or remittance. Usually, his attitude is nationalist Chinese, having pride of race and culture, and he tries to instill these values in his descendants (582).

From the geographical point of view, the conditions in a Chinatown provide an example of a compact cultural group having a low boundary to surface ratio, thus limiting the external contacts with other groups to a minimum. Dispersed habitation increases that ratio, produces more cultural contacts and, consequently, enhances integration and assimilation, as is the case in rural areas.

The hierarchical cultural contacts of the Chinese community within a specific country are usually quite obvious. However, the cultural links with other Chinese communities beyond the state's boundaries, are less conspicuous; some of

these have an ideological nature, some are purely cultural, some derive from kinship ties and some are economic; the latter, as already mentioned, by no means of no cultural significance.

All those Chinese who still have pride in their race and culture must still have some values attached to China as a country. This is independent of their political conviction and is strongly discernible in Taiwan, whose dominant elite are fervent anti-Communists. This attachment of the Overseas Chinese to China has very little to do with a religious feeling of a specific geographical nature. Unlike Judaism or Islam, there is not an outstanding sacred place which serves as a central theme of the religion, preaching permanent residence in, or at least pilgrimage to it. For the majority of the Nan Yang Chinese, the attachment to China must be directly related to the fact that China is the source of the Chinese culture throughout history. Since every event in that history occurred in China, and since almost the entire cultural inherited achievements remain in China, the attachment is inevitable. This, notwithstanding communist denigration of ancestor worship, the abolishment of religious festivals, and the imposition of a social and economic order unpalatable to the majority of the Nan Yang Chinese.

Communist Chinese of the Nan Yang, and mainly young workers and students, very readily accepted these changes in the Chinese culture of China. Some went to China, for education and for ideological indoctrination, a few remaining, others returning to amplify Chinese communist activities in their countries of residence. Other Chinese, mainly totoks from Indonesia, but also from other countries, returned to China (583) as a result of economic difficulties and persecutions or for pure Chinese idealism.

Attachment to China is by no means only culturally derived. The growing power of China, China's nuclear arsenal, its command of communist subversion in Southeast Asia and its recent world prestige, have made it very unwise for even Chinese big businessmen to pronounce themselves as anti-Communist. In the first place, they look upon their enterprises as continuous family interests, which should survive any future political vicissitude; in the second, there is a prospect of a growing trade with China and existing bridges should not be burnt down.

China itself has been anxious to maintain good relations with the Chinese minorities of the Nan Yang, even with their bourgeois stratum, usually without deteriorating their relations with the host countries (584). The Communist government realized the economic value of the remittances (585) and in the 1950s made arrangements for the Nan Yang Chinese to invest in companies administered by the government (586). They also continued the K.M.T. policy of reserving seats in the All China People's Delegates Conference for Overseas Chinese (587). The Nan Yang Chinese also are indispensable merchants, distributors and consumers of Chinese export goods, which fact also provides a good reason for maintaining good relations with them (588). Also, although China has not expressed any specified intentions of political dominance in Southeast Asia, cultural relations with the Chinese communities there may provide eventual supporters if conditions change. Thus, besides ideological links with the communists among the Nan Yang Chinese, cultural relations with the major part of non-communists is of certain importance to China. But, its relative inability to separate ideology from its cultural relations, especially during

cultural drives periods, and its relatively undeveloped external trade render its cultural relations with the Nan Yang Chinese inconsistent and incomplete, not to mention obstacles imposed by the Southeast Asian governments.

As a possible Chinese cultural centre, Taiwan has lost much of its appeal for the Nan Yang Chinese. One reason may be its recent political isolation, another may be the People's Republic's implicit threats against Taiwan's regime. ~~but~~ On the whole, the Nan Yang Chinese have no specific attachment to that island, they ^{neither} ~~did not~~ originated from there, nor has Taiwan ever constituted a significant place in Chinese history. Loyalties to Taiwan still existing in South Vietnam and the Philippines, besides being ideological, manifest the conformity of the Chinese to the foreign politics of their host countries rather than a cultural attachment. Other manifestations of political links with Taiwan are limited and represent a group of K.M.T. supporters, or fervent anti-Communists. Considering themselves as the rightful leaders of Mainland China, the dominant elite in Taiwan developed Taipei into a distinguished centre of Chinese studies, transferring besides many art collections also numerous learned people in Chinese culture. It invited Overseas Chinese to use its educational facilities (589) and also allegedly to engage in para-military training. The Taiwan government also organize national festivals on the Double Tenth and on the birthday of Chiang Kai Shek, ^(etc) which several thousand Overseas Chinese used to attend. It has not neglected to develop its trade and other economic relations with the Overseas Chinese. To that effect a World Chinese Traders Convention has been organized in Taipei, which holds bi-annual conferences in Chinese communities throughout the world, and its 1972 book of mailing

addresses ~~contained~~ ^{listed} about 450 businesses in the Nan Yang countries (590). Taiwan has also fostered overseas Chinese capital investment in the island, and its export to Southeast Asia, as may be inferred from the figures pertaining to its trade with Singapore, was increasing between 1961 and 1971 (591).

Taiwan's role as a Chinese cultural centre may be maintained as long as Communist China will not fully develop the research of China's traditional culture and invite culturally dedicated Overseas Chinese to study there. But, although this may directly involve only relatively few students, these may be the future teachers of the Chinese cultural traditions in the Nan Yang ~~and those~~ ^{who would} satisfy these persistent cultural demands. Chinese artistic creation in Taiwan is still influencing the Chinese communities in the Nan Yang through films, theatrical troupes and newspapers as well as radio broadcasts. However, in pure economic matters, the precarious political situation of Taiwan seems to be reducing the inflow of investment and will perhaps also affect other economic links in the future.

Hong Kong has become another centre of Chinese culture outside China itself. Publishing houses, a Chinese film industry, a Chinese university and study centres of Chinese affairs made it a focal point for the Chinese communities of the Nan Yang. But most of all, it has become a cultural centre through its economic development and population growth.

Enjoying a neutral status vis à vis Taiwan and Peking, Hong Kong has become a necessary station for trade and cultural links with either of them, by those who wish to keep these links anonymous. But, as an economic focus, Hong Kong suffers from congestion and lack of space for further development. Wages are higher than those in Taiwan and its political future is no less obscure than

that of Taiwan; therefore, it may become less and less attractive for further investment. Moreover, like Taipei and Peking, it is situated outside Southeast Asia, and so it lacks the advantage of being a centrally located free port in the region. Hong Kong, less though than Peking and Taipei, must have relatively reduced familial links with the Nan Yang communities because of its Cantonese preponderance. It also may experience a reduction in entrepôt trade with China, as the latter is beginning to trade directly with the Southeast Asian countries (592), in a new bid to improve its political relations with the Southeast Asian countries, or as a result of ~~developing~~ developing its own trading agencies on a worldwide level.

FOOTNOTES: PART TWO.

- (1) Tilman (ed) 1969, p.7.
- (2) Fisher, 1971, pp.1-2 and Fisher, 1964, pp.3-10.
- (3) Shabad, 1956, p.3.
- (4) See Dobby, 1969 (1950) p.56, on the rate of coastal advance seaward of some major rivers.
- (5) Robequain, 1954, p.26.
- (6) Fisher in Tilman (ed) 1969, pp.58-59.
- (7) Fisher, 1964, pp.43-45.
- (8) Broek, 1944, p.182.
- (9) Fryer, 1953, p.475.
- (10) See Hodder, 1959, pp.94-99, on reflexive and conscious human response to climate in Malaya.
- (11) Also, wood instead of stone as a building material may have led to reduced human productive efforts.
- (12) See Dunn, 1970, pp.1044-1048.
- (13) Coedes, 1967 (1962) pp.43-44.
- (14) See Souda in Higashi (ed) 1968, p.8.
- (15) *ibid*, pp.4-5, table 1.
- (16) Hall, 1964, pp.5-6, and Coedes, 1967 (1962) pp.11-12. The Mesolithic peoples showed greater cultural uniformity than those of the Neolithic. See Sharp in Tilman (ed) 1969, p.50.
- (17) Fisher, 1964, p.67.
- (18) Coedes, 1967 (1962) pp.43-44.
- (19) *ibid*, p.46.
- (20) Hall, 1964 (1955) pp.15-22.
- (21) Quaritch Wales, 1961, p.227.
- (22) Benda in Tilman (ed) 1969, p.30.
- (23) Coedes, 1967, (1962) pp.77-80.

- (24) In the 3rd century A.D. it sent embassies to India and China. Quaritch Wales 1937, p.83.
- (25) Fisher, 1964, pp.103-105.
- (26) *ibid*, p.105. Fisher attributes it to overspilling of people from the Yunnan - Tibetan border.
- (27) Coedes, 1967, (1962) p.91.
- (28) Two Indianized kingdoms date back to the 5th century. Quaritch-Wales, 1937, p.116.
- (29) Purcell, 1965, p.17.
- (30) At that time much less silted than at present.
- (31) Hall, 1964 (1955) p.55.
- (32) Central Siam got its Hinduized influence not only from the Khmers, but also from the Mons in Burma, See Le May, 1954, pp.61-62.
- (33) As opposed to the period of Khmer rule.
- (34) Coedes, 1967 (1962) pp.145-146.
- (35) *ibid*, p.173.
- (36) Fitzgerald, 1972, p.29.
- (37) See the introduction to this work on the two concepts of culture.
- (38) On their culture of identity and solidarity. See the introduction.
- (39) Hall, 1964 (1955) pp.82-83. Also on objections to this statement.
- (40) This happened in the early 15th century, when the royal court converted to Islam. See Wake in Hinton (ed) 1964, pp.120-122.
- (41) Hall, 1964, (1955) p.199.
- (42) So was Atjeh by the end of the 15th century. Vlekke, 1943, p.79.
- (43) See Hall, 1964 (1955) pp.200-201.
- (44) Better routing through wider knowledge in climatology, helped the Dutch and Spaniards acquire tactical advantages over the Portuguese during the 16th and 17th centuries. Here, however, the ~~statement~~ ^{statement} pertains to the Suez Canal.

- (45) Fisher, 1964, p.130.
- (46) Van Leur, 1955, pp.164-165.
- (47) Fisher, 1964, pp.131-133, 700, and Liao in Liao (ed) 1964, pp.19-20.
- (48) See Benitez, 1954, (1926) p.40.
- (49) De la Costa in Anderson (ed) 1969, pp.73-75, 87.
- (50) In 1877, there were 1602 schools with 177,000 pupils. Robles, 1969, p.225.
- (51) Isidro, 1949, p.2.
- (52) Fox in Liao (ed) 1964, p.99.
- (53) Commerce with China averaged 300,000 coins annually before 1586 and half a million later in the Century. Chen Ching Ho, 1963, p.15.
- (54) Tan, 1969, pp.19-25, 32-33.
- (55) On "parians" see Santamaria in Felix (ed) 1969, vol.1, pp.67-119.
- (56) A sample of non-Christian Chinese in 1659, showed less than 240 traders among a population sample of 774. Felix (ed) 1969, Vol. 1, pp.187-188.
- (57) Liao in Liao (ed) 1967, p.27. Tan, 1969, pp.22-25 gives a fuller list of expulsions and massacres.
- (58) The small number of Spanish people in the Philippines ^{brought about} a restriction on the Chinese population growth, as the former considered them a security risk. This is implied from Wickberg, 1965, p.9.
- (59) Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo in Felix (ed) 1969, pp.35-36.
- (60) Since 1857 the Chinese could ^{acquire} ~~not~~ tax collection monopolies, and since the 1860s they could own land and practise any occupation. Wickberg, 1965, p.59.
- (61) *ibid*, p.25.
- (62) Liao in Liao (ed) 1964, pp.29-30, 32. Rizal was of mestizo descendance. See de Campo in *ibid*, pp.91-95.
- (63) Wickberg, 1964, pp.62, 71-72.
- (64) Merino in Felix (ed) 1969, pp.47-48.
- (65) During 1750-1850, the mestizo group rose to socio-economic prominence. Wickberg, 1965, pp.27-31.

- (66) Conversion increased towards the end of the 16th century. Chen Ching-Ho, 1963, p.16.
- (67) The Kapitan China was chosen among the Catholics. Amyot, 1972, p.27.
- (68) Arensmeyer, 1970, pp.90-91. Also, Tan, 1969, p.91.
- (69) Wickberg, 1965, p.61.
- (70) *ibid*, p.177.
- (71) Day, 1966, (1904) p.45.
- (72) Vlekke, 1943, p.120, and Day 1966 (1904) pp.51-52.
- (73) This however did not return to Malacca its former high commercial standing as the Dutch trading policy emphasized the centrality of Batavia.
- (74) Steinberg (ed), 1971, p.147.
- (75) Furnivall, 1939, pp.37-38, also Day 1966 (1904) p.79.
- (76) Day, 1966, (1904) pp.88-90.
- (77) *ibid*, pp.129-130.
- (78) Furnivall, 1939, pp.135-139.
- (79) *ibid*, pp.141-144.
- (80) On liberal influences, see Woodman, 1955, pp.139-140.
- (81) Resinck, 1968, pp.317-318.
- (82) Cator, 1936, pp.11-12.
- (83) *ibid*, pp.16-17, and Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.407-408.
- (84) Somers, 1965, p.4, defines the 20th century "peranakans" as those of Chinese origin, who speak an Indonesian language as their mother tongue, disregarding place of birth.
- (85) Skinner in Fried (ed) 1958, pp.2-7.
- (86) Purcell, 1966, (1965) pp.412-414.
- (87) *ibid*, pp.431-433, ^{of} Reports the impressions of Furnivall, Day and Earl.
- (88) *ibid*, pp.431-432 ~~reporting the impressions of Day.~~
- (89) Cator, 1936, p.35.

- (90) Unlike in Thailand, assimilation did not bring one to the highest elite status or to the highest economic position. Moreover, the Islam faith made some Indonesians (and Malays) the least receptive of all indigenous societies in Southeast Asia.
- (91) See Rose 1962, pp.15-25.
- (92) Hall, 1964, (1955) p.693.
- (93) Cady, 1958, pp.27-29.
- (94) Maung Maung Sein, 1964, pp.134-137.
- (95) Mainly concerning new nominations.
- (96) In Lower Burma; this occurred since the British occupation.
- (97) On the comparison between the centrality of Mandalay and Rangoon which followed that shift, see Spate in Embleton (ed) 1968, pp.155-168.
- (98) Meaning the adoption of a Chinese culture of adaptation without becoming Chinese by identity.
- (99) Land-route Chinese i.e. those coming by land through or from Yunnan, in contradistinction to sea-route Chinese who immigrated through Rangoon.
- (100) An estimate of 2,000 Chinese families in Amarapura alone is reported by Purcell, 1966, (1965) pp.60-61.
- (101) *ibid*, p.67.
- (102) The Indians in Malaya were more familiar with British administration and were nearer their homeland than the Chinese to theirs. But, the Chinese preceded both the British and the Indians in the country, thus enjoying a better starting point.
- (103) A dozen or more land routes remained in use until the beginning of the 19th century for portage between small ports across the Kra Isthmus. Hanna, 1965, p.2.
- (104) Purcell, 1965, p.71.
- (105) Rose, 1962, pp.27-28, and Cowan, 1961, p.9.
- (106) Cowan, 1961, p.176.
- (107) Siam ceded the northern states to the British in 1909.
- (108) In Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan.
- (109) See Fisher in Fisher (ed) 1968, p.100.

- (110) Blythe, 1947, pp.64-65. See Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.236-239 on difficulties to establish the fact of Chinese settlement in Malacca before the 16th century.
- (111) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.248 and Freedman, 1965, p.10.
- (112) Png Poh-seng in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.95.
- (113) Purcell, 1966, (1965) pp.258-262.
- (114) See *ibid*, pp.263-266, and Blythe, 1969, pp.242-248.
- (115) Blythe, 1969, p.250.
- (116) Ta Chen, 1967 (1923) p.88.
- (117) Purcell, 1948, p.228.
- (118) This division has been largely underestimated by the West. Buchanan, 1967, p.35. Also, the colony status of Cochinchina as opposed to that of Annam and Tongking, tended to intensify the North-South differences in Vietnam.
- (119) Who ^{received} ~~lost~~ the land from the French for collaboration.
- (120) Fisher, 1964, p.540 and table 69.
- (121) Lafargue, 1909, pp.23-24. The French accepted that organization.
- (122) As some Chinese communities in Vietnam originated from deserters and demobilized soldiers during Ch'ing times. See Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.22.
- (123) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.184, and Willmott, 1970, pp.9-17.
- (124) Lafargue, 1909, *passim*.
- (125) *ibid*, p.278.
- (126) Under French rule they also issued laissez passer to congregation members. Lafargue, 1909, p.24.
- (127) Chinese coolie presence affected, however, the labour market. When the market was short of Chinese coolies, labourers usually left the plantations where working conditions were very poor.
- (128) This is an interpolation from Fisher, 1964, p.541.
- (129) Lafargue, 1909, pp.295-296.
- (130) Hall, 1964 (1955) pp.335-337.

- (131) See Thompson, 1967 (1941) pp.41-42, for European's impressions of government and court routines.
- (132) Hall, 1964 (1955) p.637.
- (133) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.92, quoting Landon.
- (134) *ibid*, p.102.
- (135) Itinerant Chinese vendors are still visiting Thai villages. de Young, 1966, p.105.
- (136) Skinner, 1957, pp.109-113.
- (137) And also less biological differences than between Malays and Chinese, as is implied from Steinberg (ed) 1971, pp.243-244.
- (138) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.22-23, quoting Kumut Chandruang.
- (139) Credner, 1966 (1935) p.195. They also introduced commercial sugar production in 1816, and exported it to Penang and Singapore. Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.110.
- (140) Skinner, 1957, p.66.
- (141) *ibid*, p.79, table 5.
- (142) Jeromin, 1966, pp.13-17.
- (143) Solich, 1960, pp.62-63.
- (144) Skinner, 1957, pp.138-140.
- (145) Ta Chen, 1967 (1923) p.84 table 15.
- (146) Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.245, says that the locus of the new ideas was the town, the vehicle — modern education, and the recipients — the new urban elites.
- (147) As defined by Levine in Geertz (ed) 1963, pp.280-282.
- (148) In later years, this division between the two political elites developed by further fragmentation and a more bitter struggle among them. See Bottomore, 1966 (1964) pp.101-102, 107.
- (149) By that naive approach they derived more political advantage than if they had academically analysed Japan's modernization. The Japanese model became even more attractive after the Russo-Japanese war.
- (150) For example, the anti-Chinese Pamphlet allegedly written by the King of Thailand in 1910, and the anti-Chinese paragraphs in the Katipunan plate-forme deplored the economic power of the Chinese.

- (151) See Goodman, 1971, his "fragment theory".
- (152) Bastin and Benda, 1968, pp.93-99.
- (153) See Wickberg, 1965, p.45.
- (154) On differences between Regular and Secular clergy, see Steinberg (ed) 1971, pp.46-47.
- (155) Mahajani, 1971, p.60.
- (156) Jan, 1960, p.76.
- (157) Benitez, 1954, (1926) p.309.
- (158) The late and slow Filipinization of the Moro Province has not produced total integration of the area into the state-idea of the Muslim indigenes. See Hayden, 1947, p.4 and Fisher, 1964, p.725. Lately, local disturbances proved their assertions.
- (159) Government officials and employees had to join the Kalibapi political party, which collaborated with the Japanese. Alip, 1959 (A), p.68.
- (160) *ibid*, pp.70-71.
- (161) Mills, 1964, pp.18-19.
- (162) Halpern (ed) 1965, p.291.
- (163) See Bernd, 1971, p.574.
- (164) Nelson, 1968, pp.91-92, and Halpern, 1965, pp.291-293.
- (165) Mills, 1964, p.20.
- (166) Fisher, 1964, p.727.
- (167) Eggan in Guthrie (ed) 1968, p.6.
- (168) Hunter, 1966, p.126.
- (169) Fischer, in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, p.401.
- (170) "Philippine Christian lowland culture is today relatively uniform from north to south". Eggan in Guthrie (ed) 1968, p.5.
- (171) Benitez, 1954 (1926) pp.338-340.
- (172) Hunter, 1966, p.15.
- (173) Danielsen, 1966, pp.153-154.
- (174) Hayden, 1947, p.513.

- (175) Danielson, 1966, p.182, table B-7. This implies a steady shift of population into Mindanao.
- (176) *ibid*, p.123, table 20. But see Fryer, 1970, p.165 for different figures.
- (177) For example, the 45 percent rise in the cost of living compared with the 27 percent increase in wages during 1958-1967. Computed from Nelson, 1968, p.155, fig. 2.
- (178) Hayden, 1947, p.18.
- (179) Although by then they had lost their legal group status.
- (180) Mills, 1964, p.17. On the expansion of the oligarchy, see Steinberg, 1972, p.179.
- (181) *ibid*, p.22, also Wurfel in Kahin (ed) 1965 (1959) pp.726-728.
- (182) Yet, since 1898, the Mestizo group was officially unrecognized. Wickberg, 1964, p.63. There was social prestige in being a mestizo, *ibid*, p.87, which seems prevalent to some extent even today.
- (183) Buenafe, 1950, p.166.
- (184) Benitez, 1954, (1926) pp.429-431
- (185) See, Fisher, 1964, p.711, table 97, and Fryer, 1970, p.175.
- (186) The proportion of landless peasants increased as follows: 18 percent in 1903, 37 percent in 1948, and 70 percent in 1963. See Dow, 1966, p.90, table 8.
- (187) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.493-494, and Alip in Liao (ed) 1964, p.251.
- (188) Fitzgerald, 1972, p.196, Appendix A.
- (189) Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1969, p.68.
- (190) Amyot, 1972, p.25.
- (191) Purcell, 1966, (1965) p.538.
- (192) Tan, 1969, pp.100-101, 108.
- (193) Wickberg, ¹⁹⁶⁵ pp.61, 177.
- (194) Tan, 1969, p.99.
- (195) *ibid*, p.158.
- (196) Ta Chen, 1967 (1923) pp.105-106, and Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.535-538.
- (197) Golay et al. 1969, p.31, table 1.

- (198) This is typical of immigrant groups who feel unsafe and tend to maintain their liberty by pursuing occupations, which permit a quick liquidation of their assets.
- (199) In 1966, 1.3 percent of the Philippine population was Chinese, but their proportion in major urban areas was 3.4 percent. Goodman, 1971, p.120, table 1.
- (200) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.547, 550.
- (201) Golay et al. 1969, p.21.
- (202) *ibid*, p.25.
- (203) See McIntyre, 1955, p.79, on Chinese clinging to retail trade in Manila after they were expelled from the Manila market stalls.
- (204) Halpern, 1965, p.289.
- (205) Golay et al. 1969, p.86, table 5, and Wickberg, 1970, p.12.
- (206) Amyot, 1972, p.31.
- (207) Smith, 1958, pp.222-223, also Amyot, 1972, p.33.
- (208) Weightman, 1967, pp.227-231 and Weightman, 1967/68, pp.315-323.
- (209) "One is either Chinese or Filipino nowadays". Wickberg, 1970, p.12.
- (210) Amyot, 1972, p.40.
- (211) Alexander, 1973, pp.200, 202-203. Area Handbook of the Philippines, 1969, p.70 says that naturalization became practically impossible.
- (212) Amyot, 1972, p.41.
- (213) *ibid*, p.41.
- (214) Murray, 1964, p.73, table 3, and p.86. Also, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1969, p.128.
- (215) Perpiñan in Liao (ed) 1964, p.333 and Alip, 1959, p.126.
- (216) Alip, 1959, pp.127-128.
- (217) Tan, 1969, pp.150-151.
- (218) Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1969, pp.224-225. Three of these had a circulation of less than 10,000.
- (219) Wickberg, 1970, pp.12-14.
- (220) Wertheim, 1959, p.25. Fisher counts 27 major groups.

- (221) Woodman, 1955, p.297.
- (222) Uhlenbeck, 1971, p.215.
- (223) *ibid*, p.218.
- (224) Dahm, 1971, pp.16-18, tables, 1,2,3. For conditions of education prior to 1900, see Furnivall, 1939, pp.218-221.
- (225) Williams, 1961, pp.37-38.
- (226) Dahm, 1971, pp.39-40, also table IV.
- (227) Nagazumi, 1967, pp.300-317.
- (228) Wertheim, 1959, p.72.
- (229) Dahm, 1971, p.63.
- (230) *ibid*, p.71, table VI.
- (231) This involved a shift from demanding Dutch education, and the modernization of Bahasa Indonesia. Alisjahbana, 1966, pp.61-67.
- (232) Perhaps following the Philippine example.
- (233) Dahm, 1971, p.77.
- (234) Harper, 1957, pp.87-88.
- (235) This may have had political significance in addition to military considerations.
- (236) Maki, 1961, p.107.
- (237) The use of slogans as a substitute for a detailed political plate-forme was typical of Sukarno's leadership. However, in practice it neither bridged ideological differences nor personal rivalries.
- (238) On Malay attitude towards ^{ea}wealth, and later European influence on the urban Indonesians, see U.S.Army Handbook for Indonesia, 1964, pp.149-151, 154-156.
- (239) Which later constituted the basis for the Indonesian army. Harper, 1957, p.108.
- (240) Said to have been a local event unauthorized by the P.K.I. central authorities. See McLane, 1966, pp.407-408.
- (241) Mills, 1964, pp.68-69.
- (242) Anwar in Tilman (ed) 1969, pp.116-119.
- (243) Since the 1950s under the Chinese Communist Party influence rather than that of Moscow. Racial affinities with the Indonesians gave the Chinese an easier access to P.K.I. leaders. McLane, 1966, pp.415-416, also McVey in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, *passim*.

- (244) In 1954, there were 1.5 million pupils in Madrasa modern schools and 2 million in Pesantren traditional schools. Geertz in Tilman (ed), 1969, pp.205-210. This stemmed from the basic dichotomy of Santri and Abangan Muslim cultures, which had profound socio-political effects on the society. See Utrecht, 1972, pp.188-190.
- (245) The Communists supported Confrontation to show their anti-imperialism, ^{and} the Army—to seek a new "raison d'etre" after West Irian became secure. See Buchanan, 1967, pp.121-122.
- (246) In 1965, the P.K.I. had 3 million members and 15 million supporters. Perhaps half a million of them were massacred in 1965-66. Devillers and Cayrac Blanchard in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.383-386.
- (247) Dahm, 1971, pp.257-259.
- (248) McVey in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, p.391.
- (249) Sundhaussen, 1971, pp.206-209.
- (250) Grant, 1964, pp.34-37.
- (251) Tilman (ed) 1969, pp.182-183.
- (252) Levi, 1968, p.29.
- (253) ~~NYNYNYNY~~ Kahin (ed) 1965 (1959) p.240.
- (254) Between 1959 and 1963, Sukarno spent no less than 319 days abroad visiting 42 countries. Modelski, 1963, pp.51-53.
- (255) Levi, 1968, p.11.
- (256) Furnivall, 1939, p.347.
- (257) Hunter, 1966, p.14, table 1.
- (258) Golay et al. 1969, p.112.
- (259) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.125, table 9.
- (260) Wertheim, 1964, p.221, quoting Pelzer. Wertheim, 1959, p.133. Utrecht, 1972, pp.187,189.
- (261) See Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.19.
- (262) Especially the Minengkeban, Atjehnese and Bataks. Somers, 1965, p.32.
- (263) Wertheim, 1959, p.142.
- (264) *ibid*, p.149.
- (265) ~~NYNYNY~~ ^{Wertheim} 1964, p.214.
- (266) Furnivall, 1939, pp.369-370.

- (267) This was typical in other Southeast Asian countries as well. Benda in Tilman (ed) 1969, p.43.
- (268) Utrecht, 1972, p.193.
- (269) Chou Yu-Min, 1960, pp.46-47.
- (270) Koesoemadinata and Nelson in Beers (ed), 1970, pp.120, 123, tables 7:1, 7:2, report an increase from 22 million ton of crude oil produced in 1960, to 30 million in 1968.
- (271) Hdiwidjada in Beers (ed) 1970, p.22, table 3:2.
- (272) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.117, table 3.
- (273) Penny and Gittinger, in Beers (ed) 1970, p.261, footnote 3.
- (274) Mangkusuwondo, 1970/1971 pp.75, 77, 81.
- (275) Arkhipov, 1970/1971, pp.69-70.
- (276) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.129, table 11.b.
- (277) *ibid*, p.451, table 1.
- (278) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.386.
- (279) *ibid*, p.384.
- (280) Cator, 1936, p.38, and Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.465.
- (281) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.383, and taking into account the repatriation of 1960/61. Also Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1959, pp.14-15.
- (282) Skinner, in Fried (ed) 1958, p.7.
- (283) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.385-386.
- (284) Skinner in Fried (ed) 1958, pp.2-7.
- (285) This pattern was reported by Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.387-388.
- (286) Ta Chen, 1967, (1923) p.61, also Willmott, 1960, p.19.
- (287) Geertz, 1960, pp.2-4.
- (288) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.387, footnote 9.
- (289) *ibid*, p.387.
- (290) Cator, 1936, p.29.
- (291) Skinner in Fried (ed) 1958, pp.2-7, and Somers, 1965, p.24 table I, 2.
- (292) Somers, 1965, p.4.

- (293) Willmott, 1960, pp.94, 105. In 1940, the Chinese government deplored intermarriages when blood was mixed and customs degenerated. Fitzgerald, 1972A, pp.8-9.
- (294) Freedman, 1965, pp.16-17. Willmott, 1960, p.28. Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.446.
- (295) Go Gien-tjwan, in Leifer (ed) 1970, pp.64-65.
- (296) McVey, 1965, pp.225-226, and Somers, 1965, pp.91-92.
- (297) Furnivall, 1939, p.242, also McVey, 1965, p.225.
- (298) Somers, 1965, pp.48-49.
- (299) Cator, 1936, pp.84-85.
- (300) Somers, 1965, p.63.
- (301) For example see Devillers and Cayrac-Blanchard in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, p.357. Concerning the 1950s.
- (302) Somers, 1965, pp.110-112.
- (303) Golay et al. 1969, p.129.
- (304) Murray, 1964, p.73 table 3, pp.76-77.
- (305) Somers, 1965, pp.145-147.
- (306) Golay et al. 1969, p.194.
- (307) Amyot, 1972, p.65. This entailed difficulties in retail distribution in Java and increased tension with China. Devillers and Cayrac-Blanchard, in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.373-374.
- (308) Mazingo, in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, pp.344-345.
- (309) Sporadic pogroms against Chinese continued as well as expatriation to China. See Alexander, 1973, pp.137, 196. After 1968, Chinese coming of age had to take the nationality of their father. *ibid*, p.199.
- (310) Alluding to a Muslim-peranakan partnership.
- (311) See Mazingo in Tang Tsou (ed) 1968, pp.344-345.
- (312) Tirtawidjaja, 1970, p.45.
- (313) See Weldon, 1972, *passim*.
- (314) Amyot, 1972, p.63.
- (315) See Spate, 1945, p.531, on the importance of the pagoda in rural Burma.
- (316) Hall, 1964 (1955) pp.702-703.

- (317) Maung Maung Mya, 1961, p.98.
- (318) The Y.M.B.A. originally had conservative leadership and was interested in religious matters. Perrin in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.49-50.
- (319) Pongyi - a Buddhist monk of full standing.
- (320) General Council of Burmese Associations.
- (321) Hall, 1964 (1955) p.700.
- (322) Fisher, 1964, p.446.
- (323) Hall, 1964 (1955) p.701.
- (324) Tinker, 1967 (1957) pp.12-14.
- (325) See Silverstein, in Kahin (ed) 1965 (1959) pp.147-149, and Trueblood, 1954, p.200. Also McLane, 1966, pp.376, 383-384, on communist rebellions in Burma and Chinese communist support to them.
- (326) Tinker, 1967 (1957) p.61.
- (327) But the treaty remained silent over the problem of the Chinese minority although Chou En-lai proposed such an agreement. See Perrin in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.93-95.
- (328) On the ethnic diversity of Yunnan see, for example, Davies, 1909, p.337.
- (329) For example the Indian-Burmese border treaty was attacked by China as offensive. In addition the deterioration in foreign relation between Burma and China, see Holmes, 1972, p.251, may have proved to the Burmese that such a deterioration could result from a Chinese unilateral decision.
- (330) Maung Maung Mya, 1961, p.170.
- (331) Golay et al. 1969, p.221, table 15.
- (332) *ibid*, p.206.
- (333) Bastin and Benda, 1968, pp.115-116.
- (334) Cady, 1958, p.262.
- (335) Rose, 1962, p.69.
- (336) Trueblood, 1954, pp.202-203.
- (337) Tinker, 1967 (1957) p.104.
- (338) Had Burma followed the Malayan example of delayed independence, it could have overcome some economic difficulties at the expense of political concessions to minorities.

- (339) Tinker, 1967 (1957) pp.189, ~~189~~. Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.41-42, 47 and Murray, 1964, p.80.
- (340) Golay et al. 1969, p.205, table 12, quoting Furnivall.
- (341) See Maung Maung Mya, 1961, p.134, table 4.
- (342) *ibid*, p.98.
- (343) Tinker, 1967, (1957) pp.188-189.
- (344) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.69. But see also the opinion of Lehman in Kunstader, 1967, vol.I. p.114.
- (345) Hunter, 1966, p.43.
- (346) *ibid*.
- (347) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.72.
- (348) *ibid*, pp.70-72.
- (349) Murray, 1964, p.79.
- (350) After 1964, the government seized 136 Chinese schools and 4 newspapers. Perrin in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.110-111.
- (351) See Perrin in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.110-111.
- (352) This affected the economic life of 300,000 Chinese. See Perrin in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, pp.110-111.
- (353) Golay et al. 1969, pp.215-217.
- (354) See for example the opinion of Vlieland, 1934, p.66.
- (355) The tin being historically the generator of other economic activities.
- (356) Nam, ~~1969~~, 1969, p.16. ~~Also see the opinion of (1969) 1969~~
- (357) Alluding to the marked division between East and West.
- (358) Ginsburg and Roberts, 1958, p.195, table 42.
- (359) Roff, 1967, p.126.
- (360) Indonesian nationalists influenced, however, intellectual Malays as early as the 1920s. Gullick, 1969, p.86. On the stages which the small nationalist Malay movement in Malay underwent between 1896 and 1941, see Soenarno, 1960, pp.7-11.
- (361) 1948, according to Roff, 1965.
- (362) Allen, 1968, p.108.

- (363) Annual Bulletin of Statistics Sarawak, 1971, pp.5-7, table 3.2.
- (364) Annual Bulletin of Statistics Sabah, 1970, p.47, table 4.2.
- (365) Ginsburg and Roberts, 1958, p.363.
- (366) Lim, 1967, pp.54, 57, 67, tables 2.1, 2.18, 2.8.
- (367) Courtney, 1970, p.10, table 1.
- (368) Lim, 1967, p.94, table 6.3
- (369) Tregonning, 1964, p.117, table 4.3
- (370) Malaysia Yearbook, 1969, p.209.
- (371) Allen and Donnithorne, 1957, pp.143, 145.
- (372) Lim, 1967, p.145, table 6.2.
- (373) *ibid*, p.172.
- (374) Golay et al. 1969, p.351, table 28.
- (375) Ooi Jin Bee, 1963, pp.157-159, tables 23, 24.
- (376) MacDougall, 1968, p.25, table 2.2. Classes defined according to occupation, see *ibid*, pp.21-23.
- (377) Ratnam, 1965, p.2, table 1.
- (378) MacDougall, 1968, p.15, table 1.3.
- (379) Lim, 1967, p.299, table 10.8.
- (380) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.125, table 9. It should be noted that in 1850, the estimated population of Malaya was about 0.5 million. See Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.244.
- (381) On Chinese political activities in Malaya during 1898-1911, see Png Poh Seng, 1961, pp.2-9.
- (382) Hanrahan, 1954, pp.6-8.
- (383) Purcell, 1966, (1965) pp.297-298.
- (384) Modernization in tin mining decreased the labour force from 225,000 in 1913 to 73,000 in 1939, without decreasing the output, but presumably creating underemployment among the Chinese miners. See Blythe, 1947, pp.66,107-108.
- (385) In 1933, there were 96 K.M.T. sub-branches with 12,346 members in the Straits Settlements and the F.M.S. In the Straits Settlements 0.76 percent of the Chinese were K.M.T. members. Png Poh Seng, 1961, pp.33-34.

- (386) Wang Gungwu in Wijeyewardene (ed) 1968, p.209.
- (387) Newell, 1962, pp.4-5. In 20th century Malaya.
- (388) *ibid*, p.2, table 1.
- (389) Winstedt, 1923, p.119.
- (390) This was due to the agricultural occupation (not work in plantations) of the Hakka. However, this occupation was not conducive to create new jobs for new immigrants as did trade and mining.
- (391) See Newell, 1962, p.2 table 1.
- (392) Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.244.
- (393) Smith, 1952, p.8.
- (394) For details see Purcell, 1960 (1956) pp.33-34.
- (395) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.307.
- (396) Miller, 1965, p.159. The plans date from 1943.
- (397) Dow, 1966, pp.19, 23-24.
- (398) *ibid*, pp.60,64-65.
- (399) McLane, 1966, p.388.
- (400) Chan Heng Chee, 1965, p.142.
- (401) Roff, 1965, p.42.
- (402) Chan Heng Chee, 1965, p.142, table 5, and p.145.
- (403) *ibid*, pp.46-52. Amyot, 1972, pp.11-13 says that in 1954 over half the Chinese still were non citizens, while Chan Heng Chee asserts that 50-60 percent had already been citizens in 1952.
- (404) From the M.C.A. Constitution and Amendments.
- (405) Also, the more culturally conscious, even among the Chinese Chamber of Commerce members, accused the M.C.A. leadership of betraying the Chinese cause in the education issue and in neglecting Chinese interests. Roff, 1965, pp.49-50.
- (406) Chan Heng Chee, 1965, p.149.
- (407) Tan Siew Sin, 1968.
- (408) This was termed as "mild Malay indigenism". Golay et al. 1969, pp. 369, 383-384, 387.
- (409) Gagliano, 1970, pp.11-13.

- (410) Gagliano, 1970, pp.4-5. Meaning the maintenance of the U.M.N.O. - M.C.A. Alliance.
- (411) Purcell, 1948, pp.229-230, 232.
- (412) Murray, 1964, p.72, table 2.
- (413) Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1938-1967, 1968, and Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1969, 1971.
- (414) *ibid.* The enrolment in secondary schools (English medium) in 1948, was 10,658 Chinese, 1,210 Indians, 511 Malays and 891 Eurasians and Europeans, Frisby, 1949, p.39. This proves the Malay handicap in education in comparison to the Chinese for immediate post W.W.II. years.
- (415) See A.R.M.C.A., 1966, p.19.
- (416) Tan Siew Sin, 1968.
- (417) Steinberg (ed) 1971, p.181.
- (418) Fall, 1963, p.31.
- (419) Buttinger, 1969, p.179.
- (420) During the days of the Front Populaire in France.
- (421) Schrock et al. 1966, pp.1021-1041, and Buttinger, 1969, pp.193-197.
- (422) Fall, 1963, pp.245-246.
- (423) Buttinger, 1969, p.444.
- (424) Smith, 1968, pp.74-83.
- (425) Weiner Normand in Kahin (ed) 1965, (1959), pp.463-464.
- (426) Langer and Zasloff, pp.60-62, 106-108, 151-153.
- (427) Duncansson, 1968, pp.293-294.
- (428) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.125 table 9.
- (429) Buttinger, 1969, p.163.
- (430) Lancaster, 1961, pp.65-67. Duncansson, 1968, p.115, attributes it to lack of industrial stock to invest in.
- (431) Robequain, 1948, p.202.
- (432) See Fall, 1963, p.29.
- (433) See Fall in Honey (ed) 1962, p.61.
- (434) See King in Scott (ed) 1970, p.117.

- (435) Joint Development Group, 1970, p.405.
- (436) Eaton, 1971, pp.259, 262, table 2.
- (437) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.117, table 3.
- (438) *ibid*, p.129, table 11.b.
- (439) Schrock et al. 1966, p.932 and other sources.
- (440) Lafargue, 1909, p.279.
- (441) Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.41, table-III.
- (442) *ibid*, pp.38-41.
- (443) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.167.
- (444) Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.69, table VI, p.72 table VII.
- (445) *ibid*, p.70.
- (446) *ibid*, p.75 table IX, quoting Tschen K'i-tsing.
- (447) On the credit and transport links of the Chinese rice trade see Robequain, 1948, pp.194-195. Also Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, pp.155-162.
- (448) Schrock et al. 1966, pp.986, 992-993.
- (449) Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.136.
- (450) *ibid*, p.146 table XXVI.
- (451) Schrock et al. 1966, pp.986-987.
- (452) Skinner, 1959, p.140.
- (453) Diplomatic intervention from Taipei failed to achieve similar results.
- (454) There are 24 religious edifices in Saigon-Cholon, three of which are churches. Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.219.
- (455) *ibid*, p.35.
- (456) *ibid*, p.85 table XVI.
- (457) It is doubtful whether a detailed sociological research has been done among all the gainfully occupied, but the system of speech-group recruitment and guilds assures good reliability of these qualifications from a simpler study of business owners.
- (458) The Vietnamese, and later the French, endeavoured to assimilate this group as if to profit from the Chinese qualities inherent in their blood, without the "evil" of a non-assimilating identity. This is reminiscent of the Philippines and Cambodia, and contrasts events in Malaya and Indonesia.

- (459) Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, pp.54-56.
- (460) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.179, 216.
- (461) Murray, 1964, p.84, quoting Skinner.
- (462) "The average Chinese is... a neutralist, with pro-Peking but not necessarily pro-Communist leanings". Schrock et al. 1966, p.997.
- (463) Tsai Maw-Kuey, 1968, p.246 table XL.
- (464) Murray, 1964, pp.84-85.
- (465) See Halpern, 1964, pp.2-4.
- (466) See Fisher, 1964, p.567, questioning the viability of both countries.
- (467) Vandebosch and Buttwell, 1966, p.221.
- (468) Steinberg et al. 1959, p.15.
- (469) See Girling, 1971, pp.4-5.
- (470) Golay et al. 1969, p.421.
- (471) The military force of the pro-Sihanouk groups.
- (472) In Southeast Asian societies a 16-18 percent proportion normally indicates practically full attendance of the primary age group.
- (473) Hunter, 1966, p.15, table 3.
- (474) Golay et al. 1969, pp.422-423.
- (475) Steinberg et al. 1959, p.91
- (476) Asian Development Bank, 1971, p.451, table 1.
- (477) Lafargue, 1909, p.285 and Willmott, 1970, pp.5-7.
- (478) Lafargue, 1909, p.284 and Willmott, 1970, pp.5-7, tables 1,2.
- (479) Indochina, 1943, p.254.
- (480) Lafargue, 1909, pp.285-286.
- (481) Willmott, 1970, pp.36-37.
- (482) See Murray, 1964, p.72, table 2, p.73, table 3, p.82, but see also Willmott, 1970, p.75. Though figures are disputable the increase is incontestable.
- (483) Kunstadter (ed) 1967, p.24, footnote 13.
- (484) Leifer in Halpern (ed) 1965, p.335.

- (485) Willmott, 1970, pp.105-108.
- (486) Fisher, 1964, p.484.
- (487) Thompson, 1967 (1941) p.61.
- (488) Nuechterlein, 1965, p.29.
- (489) Thai sources attribute it to Vietnamese refugees and to Chinese communist immigrants. See Somchai Rakwijit, 1967, pp.1-4.
- (490) Nuechterlein, 1965, p.50.
- (491) Dommen, 1971 (1964) p.105 table 2.
- (492) Neuchterlein, 1965, p.222.
- (493) Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1966, p.314.
- (494) MacMichael, 1968.
- (495) Somchai Rakwijit, 1967, pp.28, 33-34.
- (496) Q.B.S. Dec. 1971, p.8.
- (497) Statistical Yearbook Thailand, 1970/71, pp.37-39.
- (498) This is also apparent from the general use of first names in situations where other societies will normally use surnames.
- (499) Blanchard et al. 1958, pp.9, 399.
- (500) On democracy within Thai villages, see Fitzsimmons (ed) 1957, p.119, who says that this is a "face-to-face democracy".
- (501) Blanchard et al. 1958, p.115, table 3.
- (502) See Fitzsimmons (ed) 1957, p.126. also Coughlin, 1953, p.145.
- (503) See diagram in Blanchard et al. 1958, p.410.
- (504) Evers, 1966, p.483, table 1, p.484, table 2, pp.485-487.
- (505) Blanchard et al. 1958, p.414.
- (506) In discussing the classes, I mainly followed Blanchard et al. 1958, pp.408-414, and Skinner, 1958, pp.17-19.
- (507) Smith and assoc., 1968, p.362.
- (508) Hunter, 1966, p.15, table 3, and p.109, table 14.
- (509) Q.B.S. Dec. 1971, p.21.
- (510) *ibid*, p.24.

- (511) Thompson, 1967, (1941) p.784.
- (512) Fryer, 1970, p.137, table 4-1.
- (513) Courtney, 1970, p.10, table 1, and p.15.
- (514) Statistical Yearbook Thailand, 1970/1971, pp.442-443.
- (515) *ibid*, pp.248-251.
- (516) See Blanchard et al. 1958, p.247.
- (517) Skinner, 1957, p.175, chart 3, and p.183, table 8.
- (518) Department of (U.S.) Army Pamphlet, 1970, p.87.
- (519) Kunstadter in Kunstadter (ed) 1967, p.371.
- (520) *ibid*, pp.371-372.
- (521) The Chinese were nicknamed the Jews of the East in that pamphlet.
- (522) See Mitchison ~~1961~~, 1961, p.22.
- (523) Skinner, 1957, pp.164-165.
- (524) Belen Tan-Gatue, 1955, p.2.
- (525) Skinner, 1957, p.253.
- (526) Belen Tan Gatue, 1955, p.2.
- (527) Dibble, 1961, p.223, table 17.
- (528) *ibid*.
- (529) Golay et al. 1969, p.293, table 24. ~~and 1961~~
- (530) Murray, 1964, p.74.
- (531) Dibble, 1961, p.296.
- (532) Amyot, 1972, p.90. Also Murray, 1964, pp.72-73, tables 2, 3, who reports somewhat different numbers of schools and pupils.
- (533) Jiang, 1966, p.46, quoting Landon.
- (534) Amyot, 1972, pp.79-80.
- (535) Skinner, 1957, p.217.
- (536) Amyot, 1972, p.79.
- (537) Coughlin, 1953, p.286.
- (538) Department of (U.S.) Army Pamphlet, 1970, pp.85-86.

- (539) Ingram, 1955, pp.204-205.
- (540) Bank of Thailand, 1961.
- (541) Amyot, 1972, p.88.
- (542) Statistical Yearbook Thailand 1970/1971, p.98.
- (543) Dibble, 1961, p.216.
- (544) Kunstadter in Kunstadter (ed) 1967, pp.371-372.
- (545) Statistical Yearbook Thailand 1970/1971, p.99.
- (546) Amyot, 1972, p.89.
- * (547) Belen Tan-Gatue, 1955, p.3 and Bangkok Post, 8 Nov. 1972.
- (548) Salisbury, 1967, pp.57-58.
- (549) Business Research L.T.D. 1966, p.7, table 3.
- (550) Blanchard et al. 1958, pp.408-414, and Skinner, 1958, pp. 17-19.
- (551) Kukrit Pramoj, 1972.
- (552) Amado, 1964, pp.24-25.
- (553) Guskin, 1968, p.2.
- (554) Somchai Rakwijit, 1967, pp.5-6.
- (555) *ibid*, pp.17, 19-21.
- (556) Dibble, 1961, p.418.
- (557) Amyot, 1972, p.83.
- (558) *ibid*, ~~1972~~
- (559) Coughlin, 1953, p.537.
- (560) Dibble, 1961, p.496.
- (561) Skinner, 1964, pp.83-87.
- (562) Guskin, 1968, pp.3, 11, 61-63, 5-6.
- (563) Tobias, 1971, pp.65, 70-71, 74-76.
- (564) Boonsanong Ponyodyana, 1971, pp.13-15, tables 2.1, 2.2, and p.69.
- (565) Dalad, 1968, pp.14-15.
- (566) Ichikawa, 1968, pp.148-149.

- (567) Skinner, 1959, p.144.
- (568) *ibid*, p.144.
- (569) The increase of trade and services share in the national income associated with modernization, indicates the strengthening of the Chinese economic position.
- (570) Nevadomsky and Li, 1970, pp.VIII-IX.
- (571) Sarasin Virapohl, 1972, pp.3, 12-13.
- (572) *ibid*.pp.12-13.
- (573) Amyot, 1972, pp.97-98.
- (574) *ibid*, p.102.
- (575) See the related discussion in the introduction to this work.
- (576) Such neighbourhoods may be geographically distributed at the major street corners where retail trade is usually transacted.
- (577) Tobias, 1971, pp.64-70.
- (578) *ibid*, p.71.
- (579) Willmott, 1960, p.171.
- (580) Coughlin, 1953, p.286, says that Chinese concentration in the Chinatown of Bangkok was voluntary and had a high concentration of alien Chinese.
- (581) However Chinese facial features in Southeast Asia are much more widespread than the Chinese identity.
- (582) Amyot, 1972, pp.100-101. Also Uchida, 1960, p.15, on Chineseness of the Southeast Asian Chinatown.
- (583) About 200,000 in the 1950s, according to Simoniya, 1961, p.109.
- (584) Political drive periods in China were exceptions.
- (585) About 200 million U.S. \$ in 1935 and 1936 alone, covering the trade deficit of those years. Lu Yu-sun, 1956, p.3. The 1929-1941 average was 80-100 million US. \$. In post-war years it averaged 66-130 million. Fitzgerald 1972A, p.121.
- (586) Simoniya, 1961, p.110.
- (587) Lu Yu-sun, 1956, p.24. Also Fitzgerald, 1972A, p.19.
- (588) Thus China accepted Singapore's conditions for trade and banking relations. See Fitzgerald, 1972A, p.241 footnote 5.

- (589) In 1951-1971, 34,676 Overseas Chinese studied in Taiwan mostly in universities. Most of the Students came from the Nan Yang; as personally communicated to me by Mr. D. Liu, Vice Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Commission in the Executive Yuan, Taipei, 2nd November 1972.
- (590) World Chinese Traders Convention, 1972.
- (591) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.81.
- (592) Sometimes even by passing Chinese middlemen in those countries and operating directly with governmental agencies. Alexander, 1973, p.244.

PART THREE: SINGAPORE AS A CHINESE CULTURAL NODE.

Singapore Under the British.

The politico-geographical conception of Raffles, which gave life to Singapore, proved well justified for its time, and showed foresight for later years. It did not, however, envisage the modern development of an independent city-state with only marginal British involvement. Though the Chinese were encouraged to come in during the 19th century, it was not until the early 20th century that the British fully apprehended the real political issues concerning a Chinese identity in Singapore. Thus, the conception of Singapore as an imperial base and a regional emporium, under effective British rule, was incomplete in that it failed to anticipate the 20th century issues of Chinese nationalism. Throughout the 19th century, and even after the naval base had been built in the 1920s, military importance was secondary to that of trade. This made Singapore, together with Penang and Hong Kong, a group apart from the other predominantly naval bases linking Britain and China.

Raffles' Conception of Singapore. Essentially an Empire Builder, Raffles combined vision and practical sense in overcoming British inertia and Dutch opposition, to create an economically viable imperial pivot, which retained its significance for almost a century and a half. As a naval base and emporium, Singapore was conceived by Raffles with the intention of denying the Dutch control of the entrances of the Archipelago, and of securing for the British the

Maritime route to China (1). This conformed with the wishes of the policy makers in London, yet conflicted with their judgement of the profitable and the politically possible.

By 1819, Raffles could not boast great previous successes either in politics or in economic exploits. He had exhibited more vision than business acumen, when he failed to make Java self supporting; that perhaps decided the issue when London turned down his proposals for a British presence in the East Indies (2). Neither did his plans to expand spice plantations succeed, as demand and prices fell, and so he remained governor of remote Bencoolen. However, "in view of his temperament and the capacities of the man, this was equivalent to penning up a lion in a dog kennel" (3). This raises the interesting question whether Raffles' visit to St. Helena (4) was made simply from sheer curiosity or from admiration to Napoleon. If the latter was the case, it would support the contention that he was more of a grand strategist than a meticulous administrator. It seems that when it came to bringing home his political ideas, Raffles demonstrated no mean ability, as Hastings finally undertook the responsibility, against the Central Government's wishes, to establish a station "to secure the free passage of the Straits of Malacca, the only channel left for us [by] the establishment of a station beyond Malacca, such as may command the southern entrance of those Straits" (5). This politico-strategic duty, placed on Raffles, involved the persuasion of the Sultan of Johore to agree to the creation of the station, and later to induce him to relinquish his rights over the entire island, again attesting to Raffles' astuteness in politics.

Besides the politico-geographical judgement, there was the economic Weltanschauung of the man: a liberal mercantilist conception of colonialism, demonstrated during his office in the East Indies under the British interregnum. While the V.O.C. policy of short sighted profit maximization impoverished Java, Raffles' economic and social reforms (6) were intended to increase the indigenes' purchasing power in order to buy imported manufactured goods. Realizing that conception in Singapore by declaring it a free port, he established the economic basis of the city. However, in addition to thriving on China-India and China-Europe trade, it could also profit by smuggling to and from the East Indies, a fact of which Raffles must have been aware.

Contemporary political considerations dictated further instructions given to Raffles; the unwillingness to arouse Dutch enmity limited the possible location of the station to the north of the equator and excluded Dutch held Riouw as one of the alternatives (7). In addition, the mission to command the southern entrance to the Straits geographically delineated a limited "solution-set" to the problem. As, by then, the Outer Provinces of the Dutch East Indies were held only by isolated stations, the east coast of Sumatra or adjacent islands could probably have provided some alternatives. However, the political concept of the Dutch East Indies was already well established; Raffles and others must have been influenced by the image of territorial continuity regarding the location of the station (8).

Singapore was singularly well located to solve the

problem defined by Hastings' orders and their attached political limitations, and also to realize Raffles' implicit intention to penetrate the inter-island trade. Since Singapore was an island, its occupation did not indicate any intention of expanding into its Malayan hinterland. Land configuration and wind directions favoured it as a port of call for sailing ships of the China trade. Calm waters, fresh water supply, a navigable river-mouth, fairly good drainage, all combined to render the island's southern tip an exceptionally propitious place.

Singapore's phenomenal development indicated that a latent economic need had existed in the area for such a port-city. This immediately raises the question why Penang, Singapore's senior by a quarter of a century, did not fulfill that need as Wellington had forecast in 1797 that it would. Established to defend the Bay of Bengal against a fleet enjoying a favourable monsoon blowing landwards, Penang became a free port and developed export crop plantations, and yet its development lagged behind that of Singapore. The reasons seem mainly locational: Penang was too remote to participate in the Malay-Indonesian trade, although it was nearer than Singapore to the tin mining centres of South Siam and Malaya. However, Singapore's focality was incontestable, as it was situated where the ocean route (9) penetrated into and met the prahus of the inter-island trade. The geographical projection of the Malayan Peninsula into Indonesian waters, which physiographically combined them into a single entity, played a big part in unifying the basic culture of that

region, until political boundaries superimposed by the colonial powers produced a new differentiation. This peninsular penetration also favoured Singapore over Penang as a waiting station for seasonal wind direction change.

In a purely locational sense Malacca was better situated than Penang in its proximity to the centre of the Archipelago, and as regards the monsoon directions, but it lacked port facilities befitting the size of the 19th century merchantmen and men of war. Its exposed coastline made anchorage hazardous especially when squalls came off the Sumatran coast, and its river was too narrow to accomodate the new larger ships. In any event, it was held by the Dutch, who left it to stagnate after it had experienced a long period of trade hegemony from the 14th to the 17th centuries. Behind Malacca's stagnation lay the V.O.C. policy of elevating Batavia to supreme position in administration and commerce. This diminished the possibilities of each station in the Outer Provinces to develop according to its geographical advantages. Moreover, the V.O.C. was inimical to private enterprise competition and did not tolerate free ports in its territory. (When between 1829 and 1855, the Dutch opened 10 free ports (10), realizing their mistake and trying to emulate Singapore's success, they largely failed, as their Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij got a trade monopoly there (11)).

After the restoration of the East Indies to the Dutch, they made "an energetic attempt to regain commercial and political domination throughout the Archipelago and the Malayan Peninsula" (12). That attempt created friction

between the British and the Dutch authorities at the local level concerning the establishment of Singapore. However, at central government level, relations were improving to the extent of acquiescence to the new station (to which territory the Dutch claims were legally doubtful (13)), and to the point of exchanging Malacca for Bencoolen (14). The Malacca Straits thus became the dividing line of colonial influence between the Dutch and the British in the northwestern part of the Archipelago.

In rudimentary form Raffles' anticipation of Singapore's commercial role, as a free port, was outlined in his letter to the Supreme Government (15). It pointed out three "concentric circles" of activity, namely: the "outer circle" involving European trade (mainly with the U.K.), an intermediate one linking China with India, and an "inner circle" of Southeast Asian trade. The latter, by virtue of its dispersion and the small craft involved (prahu) was conducive to the development of entrepôt trade. Port activities and other services also could increase the demand for labour, and so would promote agricultural production, craftsmanship and local trade.

The prospects of a fast growing economically active population must have dictated Raffles' preferential policy in land allocation and taxation. External trade being the prime income generator, merchants, artisans and agriculturalists received preference — in that order. A central business district got the better part of the waterfront. Administrative and military areas were given generous allocation according to tactical assessments of

land features, and the Europeans were also largely favoured. The Chinese and Indians business/residential quarters and the Malay, Arab and Bugis wards were ethnically and geographically well defined (16). This racial division came as a necessary result of the variety of languages and the occupational specialization, which followed ethnic lines. The town planning scheme of 1828 (17), assumed to represent Raffles' micro-geographical conception of Singapore as of 1822-23 (18), reflects contemporary socio-economic conditions. In principle, these conditions did not greatly change until the 1950s, leaving their mark on the fairly stable geographical location of the ethnic groups. The inert nature of the ethnic-group location in Singapore became enhanced by the fact that it was not imposed against the will of the public (19), as, further unplanned, sub-ethnic divisions voluntarily followed. Later on, sheer population pressure and social mobility brought about some geographical changes in residential areas. The Chinese followed, and densely settled the evacuated European quarter, which ~~previously~~ had been thinly inhabited. The Muslims concentrated near the Sultan's Gate, while the Europeans moved out towards the hilly ground of the interior (20). All these changes only marginally affected the persistent multi-racial and segregated setting, as the immigrant nature of the population, and the shophouse building type encouraged that segregation.

Raffles welcomed Chinese and Indian immigration as he considered them better workers, traders and entrepreneurs than the Malays. They brought in their urban cultural traits in architecture, high density living, high male migratory

rates and hence a socially dangerous sex ratio, to create a sort of a "Wild West" society. Gregariousness, low hygiene and violence caused high mortality among a population whose age-group distribution would suggest strong vitality. The Chinese, more than others, introduced industriousness, frugality and profit consciousness, which made Singapore highly competitive to existing or potential rivals. The adaptation of the Chinese to high activity - low consumption conditions, their overall more diversified occupations in comparison to other ethnic groups, as well as "push" factors operating from China gradually brought about their preponderance in Singapore's population. The early dominance of the Chinese in trade and plantations, the two prime income generators of that early period, made them control also the related occupations generated by the multiplying factor. This was primarily because the system of employment followed ethnic lines in Singapore's segregated society, and also because of the Chinese occupational adaptation. This cultural adaptation, which would imply survival in demographic terms, occurred in a society whose negative natural growth was more than offset by immigration.

Thus, throughout the period of British rule, Singapore remained under Raffles' spell in its macro-geographical role as an imperial pivot and commercial centre, and in its divided micro-geographical character as a multi-ethnic city. The Europeans played a decisive role in the macro-geographical sphere, in politics, economics and higher social life, while the Asians mainly fitted themselves into the micro-geographical setting, supplying labour, low and

intermediate entrepreneurship and socio-politically leading their own segregated life.

Singapore's Development until 1867.

(i) Economy. Trade constituted the motive power for Singapore's development to such an extent that the history of the city virtually became the history of its trade. By 1825, Singapore eclipsed both Malacca and Penang as trading centres taking some of their population as immigrants (21), and becoming the capital of the Straits Settlements in 1832 (22). Trade brought development by its increasing value, and also by ^{an} independent increase in volume. With bulkier merchandise and more numerous vessels, demand for manpower was ever increasing (23). The introduction of the steamship and the establishment of Hong-Kong further contributed to the growing strategic importance of Singapore as a coaling station (24).

Although agricultural activities have always been marginal to Singapore's economy, their importance cannot be neglected. Rice growing failed because of unfavourable soil conditions and a discouraging tax policy (25), and nutmeg, pepper and gambier also had their ups and downs as a result of soil exhaustion, plant diseases and price fluctuations (26). In 1849 for example, there were 26,834 acres under gambier and pepper (27).

It was, however, external trade which decisively dominated Singapore's economic scene. Already in 1822-24 it amounted to 18.6 million Spanish dollars, and in 1821, at least 12,311 tons of shipping called at Singapore on

their way to Canton, while 11,204 tons went South towards the islands (28). During 1822-24, 208 European ships and 2,500 prahus traded with Singapore, the latter doing a 5 million dollar trade in two and a half years (29). In 1836, Singapore's external trade totalled 9.2 million (Spanish) dollars, of which food, drink and tobacco amounted to one quarter of the value, opium - to one fifth (with a net import of 0.6 million dollars worth), piece goods constituting another fourth of the value, and unwoven textiles, metal ore and concentrates amounting to just over one fifth (30).

The following figure (C-1) illustrates the growth of trade (in millions of dollars (31)) and the population growth (in thousands (32)) for the period 1823-1874. A computed graph of per capita trade figures is in the inset.

The dip in per capita trade figures may be attributed to the large influx of immigrants during the sailing-ships period, when spice plantations were still profitable. The increase in figures experienced since 1853, is due perhaps to the appearance of the steamship. The trade percentage breakdown according to world regions for the 1823-24 - 1868-69 period ^(fig. C-2) (33) proves that trade with the U.K. and the Continent, the "outer circle", kept a more or less steady proportion of over 22 percent for the entire period.

Fig. C-1.

Trade in 10^6 dollars
Population in 10^3 .

Total Trade Value of Singapore vs. Population.

(By interpolation from Wong Lin Ken, 1960, p. 254)





Fig. C-2 Singapore's External Trade Breakdown, 1823/4-1868/9.



After Courtney, 1972.

Trade with Manila was negligible. Trade with the East Indies was significantly greater than that with the Straits Settlements and Malaya.

The "intermediate circle" represented by the China and the India trade indicates a fairly steady 14.5 percent proportion with China and a fluctuating trend in the trade with India. The latter was increasing towards 1841-42, and on the whole decreased towards the end of the period. The total average trade with India was more than 16 percent, and altogether the "intermediate circle" provided almost 31 percent of Singapore's external trade. The "inner circle" trade proportion averaged more than 40 percent for that period with a marked trend of increase since the early 1830s. It was estimated that 90 percent of the manufactures imported from Europe found their way further east from Singapore, while less than 5 percent of the produce exported to India and the West came from local production (34). The appearance of the steamship shortened the sailing time from Singapore via the Cape to the United Kingdom from 3 months to 5 weeks (35) with marked positive effects on Singapore's trade. This change in transport technique brought about the eventual shift of the port from the river-mouth to Keppel Harbour with its deeper and larger docking facilities and storage space. It was only by chance that a geological fault provided an excellent local solution to a problem which plagued many other ports.

(ii) Society. Throughout the period of E.I.C. rule in Singapore, social conditions reflected a "society devoted to making money [where] all appreciated the absence of official restraints, the unrestricted immigration of labour, and the freedom of all taxation upon commerce, even upon luxuries of life. Only man's vices were taxed; the government

remained largely inactive, its administrators being too few to do much at all" (36). In that atmosphere whatever refinement could be found came from the British community, which though in large measure responsible for those conditions, still derived from a middle-class disposing of a sophisticated culture. The Asian immigrants and indigenes mainly belonged to the lower classes in their countries of origin and were mostly illiterate. Their cultural ties with their homelands, strong as they might have been, emanated from family and kinship ties, more than from a general attachment to a state, nation or culture. Even within Singapore, blood ties played a decisive role in group consciousness, while solidarity based on language and customs and hence on district of provenance, prevailed over other cultural ties in group consciousness. Each of the main ethnic groups introduced its own customs, apparel, architecture and recreation patterns, and together with the different religions, not to mention the language and the local geographical segregation, Singapore's society reflected its geographical division into Landsmannschaften. The most one can say of sentimental attachment to Singapore during that period is perhaps that it was commensurate with material success. It is no wonder then, that the British were most concerned with the proper functioning of the city for business and quality-of-life reasons, and exerted political pressure on the E.I.C. to improve the administration with a view to becoming independent of the Company (37).

The following table depicts some demographic changes which occurred during the first fifty years of Singapore (38).

Table C-3. Some Demographic Data.

Year	Total		Chinese		
	pop. X1000	F/M ratio	Number X1000	% in tot.	F/M ratio
1824	11	0.504	3.4	31.0	0.122
1830	17	0.362	6.8	39.4	0.089
1836		0.317		45.9	0.068
1849	53	0.255	28.0	52.9	0.087
1860	82	0.166	50.0		0.069
1871	96	0.304	54.7	56.8	0.162

(Table C-3 cont'd.)

Year	Malays			Indians			Others	
	Number X1000	% in tot.	F/M ratio	Number X1000	% in tot.	F/M ratio	% in total	
1824	6.6	60.2	0.945	0.8	7.1	0.170	1.7	
1830	7.8	45.9	0.875	1.9	11.5	0.096	3.2	
1836		41.9	0.855		9.9	0.104	2.6	
1849	17.0	32.2	0.703	6.4	11.9	0.159	3.0	
1860			0.600			0.118		
1871	26.0	27.1	0.790	11.5	11.9	0.242	4.0	

From this, two striking facts stand out, namely: the proportional increase of the Chinese in the total population, and the abnormal sex ratio of theirs and the Indian communities. The proportional increase of the Chinese population has been explained by their better adaptivity and by their popular cultural esteem for achievement values, in contradistinction to the Malays. In addition, labour recruitment usually gave the advantage to kinsmen and

secondly to people with whom the employer could communicate. The Chinese entrepreneurs had then every reason to recruit Chinese labour especially as the Chinese were considered the better workers.

The analysis of the sex ratio of the ethnic groups in Singapore by applying the function described in Appendix A produces the data of table C-4.

Table C-4. Population Stability within Ethnic Groups.
(Discrepancies because of rounded figures)

Year	% Integrated				Number Integrated				Non Integrated			
	T	C	M	I	T	C	M	I	T	C	M	I
1824	67	24	96	29	7.4	0.9	6.4	0.2	3.6	2.5	0.2	0.6
1830	53	16	94	18	9.0	1.1	7.3	0.3	8.0	5.7	0.5	1.6
1836	48	13	92	19								
1849	41	16	83	27	21.7	4.5	14.0	1.7	31.3	23.5	3.0	4.7
1860	29	13	75	21	24.3	6.5			57.7			
1871	48	28	89	38	46.1	16.0	23.1	4.4	49.9	41.4	2.9	7.1

Numbers X1000. T = total, C = Chinese

M = Malays, I = Indians.

The study of table C-4 in connection with table C-3 conveys useful information regarding socio-cultural changes in Singapore as derived from demographical data. The cultural geography aspect of these changes concerns the attachment values of Singapore's population during the period under consideration. Between 1824 and the 1860s, there occurred a steady decrease in the stable element of the

whole population. The fairly high stability of 1824, due perhaps to the immigration of families of Chinese traders from Penang and Malacca Babas, but mainly to the high proportion of the stable Malays in the population, gradually gave way to Chinese immigration, mainly of single males. These came in fairly large numbers and decreased the stability of the Chinese community by half, from 24 percent to 13 (39). The Malays themselves must also have immigrated as their stability proportion declined from 96 percent in 1824 to 75 in 1860. In absolute figures, the example of 1849 is illustrative: The 21,700 persons integrated into families, must have constituted some 5,000 families; ~~but~~^{yet} at the same time there existed 31,300 non-integrated bachelors in Singapore. The social anomaly is well illustrated by histories of that period giving details of crimes, lawlessness and miserable living conditions (40).

Until the 1860s, the Chinese immigrants, who gradually began dominating the demographic and the ethnic scenes of Singapore, usually used sailing ships as means of transport from China. Costs, risks and travel-time added to difficulties in bringing women to the city. The changing trend of stability in 1871, may be due besides to individual economic progress, to the steamship regular service between China and Singapore.

In comparing ethnic stability proportions, it is worthwhile to note that the Malays, although reduced to 27.1 percent of the population in 1871, still comprised 50 percent of the stable population. But, the Chinese with almost 55 percent of the population, had only 16,000 stable people

out of a total of 46,100 i.e., just about 35 percent. This cannot be wholly explained by the Malays cultural evaluation of Gemütlichkeit, nor by the availability of women at short distance, and the relatively easier transport for whole families. The Malays emigrating to Singapore came to a British held Malay country with a Malay sultan. They came to stay whether they made money or not. The Chinese on the other hand, being driven by a will to make money, usually returned home when their hopes failed to materialize.

Another illustration of the Chinese instability is useful. Between 1840 and 1871 the Chinese population rose from 17,704 to 50,043 (54,700 according to Saw Swee-hock). This increase was brought about by immigration to a society with a negative natural increase (41), ~~while~~ a low estimate of the immigration figures averaged 8,000 annually, for that period (42). This means an immigration of 250,000 in 31 years. Assuming that 50 percent of the immigrants used Singapore as a transit port for other destinations, it ensues that at least 90,000 Chinese (the difference between 125,000 and the population growth) stayed in Singapore for fairly short periods. This amplifies the statement that the Chinese immigrants in Singapore showed a low attachment to the city.

Some additional indices to measure the quality of residential stability and the development of sentimental attachment to the place of settlement, may be derived from the material quality and number of sacred places, from investment in buildings of aesthetic value and acts concerning the improvement of the environment. In addition,

the fixation of capital in immovable property rather than keeping it liquid, may sometimes serve for that purpose. Besides Christian Baba churches, Chinese places of worship (Confucian, Taoist and Mahayana Buddhist) of solid construction numbered only 2 in the 1820s, and 10 in the 1860s (43), yet, there were also attap covered Joss Houses. The figures seem low in view of the diversity of Chinese sub-groups. This must account for a low level of sentimental attachment as well as for the down to earth character of the "Chinese low culture".

During the first fifty years of Singapore, socio-economic standing must have had special significance as an indicator for sentimental attachment to the place. By this criterion the Babas and Straits Born stood first among the Chinese groups. They enjoyed better trade relations ^{with} ~~of~~ the Strait Settlements, and closer links with the British, to whom they had more cultural affinities than to the Chinese (44). Still bearing Chinese names, they had lost their familial and parochial links with China as well as the ability to speak Chinese, and socially kept aloof from the Chinese newcomers.

The China born towkay and the shop-house owner must have had ambivalent feelings towards Singapore, as regards their sentimental attachment to the place. On the one hand they were permanent residents and materially did well, and at least part of their capital was invested in immovables. In addition, they had real interest in the efficient running of the city, as their businesses were sensitive to social disorder. They belonged to Chinese social institutions and

organizations: secret societies, speech-group associations, guilds and religious associations and did not move towards the British in a cultural sense. In business and administration the towkays had limited relations with Europeans, their main activities, social, political and economic being within the Chinese society. ~~But~~^{This} offered their commercial and entrepreneurial abilities a vast field of activity in labour exploitation, supply of opium and satisfying gambling needs (45), besides their usual trading activities. Still closely linked to their provinces of provenance (46), they sent remittances, children to be educated, and sometimes the dead to be buried in the family graveyard. The merchants, oftentimes according to speech-group, had commercial relations with other Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Especially known are those among Teochiu rice merchants in Singapore and those of Bangkok and West Borneo (47), and between Hokkiens of Singapore and Burma (48). The nature of these relations must have emphasized the central position of Singapore in trade relations and does not seem to have contrasted the towkays' attachment to Singapore.

The coolies, shop assistants and labourers, who constituted the majority of the population, and who, as a rule, were not integrated into families, must have had no real attachment to Singapore. Their familial links turned to China, and though they got social support from their secret societies and guilds in Singapore, their miserable conditions led them to rioting and civil disorders, which may be considered a protest against those inhuman conditions. Although most of them came with the hope of making money,

the majority had to return frustrated to China.

During Singapore's first fifty years, Chinese society resembled that of Imperial China in manners, customs (49) and in its internal leadership (50). There were two hierarchical leadership systems in Singapore, as in most other Southeast Asian countries, and this double system has remained, in some sense, to this day. One ~~of them~~ was wholly Chinese, where the head or heads of the system did not come under British authority, and, in fact, usually were not known to them as such. The other operated through different institutions and its head was appointed by and responsible to the British authorities. The latter system headed by the Kapitan China took the responsibility for law and order, and revenue collection from the community, as "the government desired not only maximum revenue but also minimum bother" (51). The Kapitan's duties presented him with various opportunities to enhance his wealth and thus establish a high status among the Chinese as well as the British. As a local leader he had a double role: of a key leader towards his subordinates, and as an agent of the authorities. This denied him the possibility of playing the extremist within the Chinese community (52) and thus tended to decrease his authority among the Chinese socially unstable element.

The wholly Chinese system of leadership, the secret societies, held sway over the Chinese community in Singapore. Their influence was relatively higher than in other Southeast Asian countries (Java, Philippines, Cambodia), where the Kapitan system was firmly established. The societies indulged in "robbery, piracy and murder" (53); yet,

they fulfilled a social function which had not been undertaken by the British nor by the Kapitan. They provided welfare services, an intimate social milieu, and labour exchange services to newcomers. Receiving only minimal fees from the newcomers, although exploiting their labour, they largely relied on protection money, secondary monopolies and robberies for their income. The secret societies operated within speech-group limits, but also along occupational lines and locality; as all these never perfectly conformed, some cross cutting occurred (54). Moreover, the compactness of Singapore activated the "contact zone" of these societies, and, therefore, the friction among them. An overall organization of the secret societies usually performed dispute reconciliation functions in disregard of British law courts, as the secret societies' penal code forbade members to give evidence against other members.

In 1848, gang robberies brought about armed confrontations between the societies, the police and the other Asian communities. In 1851, the societies rioted against the Christian Chinese and caused 500 dead (55). Again in 1853-54, rebels from China arrived in Singapore with loads of arms, and perhaps caused the Hokkien-Teochiu riots which ended with 400 dead (56). It was, however, in the interest of the secret societies to exist symbiotically with the developing economy, but their high intransigency resulted from the nature of their leadership which did not come under British supervision, and from the geographical "strait-jacket" of the compact Singapore environment.

When in 1857, the government proposed a registration act for secret societies, spirits were aroused (also as a result of the second Opium War), and confrontation with the police became imminent, but later things quietened down.

During that period Chinese formal education virtually did not exist in Singapore. Babas sent their children to English and missionary schools and to the Raffles Institute. There is a report of a Chinese school operating in 1829, and of a Chinese school attached to the Raffles Institute between 1833 and 1845, but since ~~the institution was~~^{then} the institute retained only the English section (57). Some children of the wealthier Chinese went to China for higher education. This did not seem to have improved the "low Chinese Culture" (58) of the community. The "low culture" of speech, customs and religion seemed to perpetuate itself very easily as immigration and other cultural links with China went on uninterrupted.

Singapore from 1867 to W.W.I. The second half century of Singapore elapsed within an atmosphere of economic expansion throughout Southeast Asia. The steamship, telegraph communications and the opening of the Suez Canal, contracted the world, as it were, and combined to render extractive activities highly profitable. French, German and later Japanese economic and political pressures began being felt in the area, to which the British and Dutch reacted by extending their effective control over Malaya and the entire Archipelago, respectively. While the Europeans in Southeast Asia supplied capital, planning and high level management,

for ^{the} expanding economy, the indigenes, the Indians, but mainly the Chinese supplied labour and low level entrepreneurship. As food demand increased with the growing population, and with increased needs ^d in Europe, the traditional rice production areas were extended, and the Irrawady and the Mekong deltas were virtually opened for the plough. The Chinese immigrants throughout Southeast Asia in ever increasing numbers indulged in mining, construction, trade and services, and occupied an intermediary niche in trade between the Europeans and the indigenous primary producers.

Singapore's trade flourished during the economic expansion years, and the Chinese increasingly came to dominate the life of the city. The Malays more and more contracted and segregated themselves in Kampong Glam and the Malay Muslim areas of the city, not the least for the sake of cultural persistence (59). With their ascriptive status values and the lack of incentive to lead a life of intense hard work and competition, the Malays had to leave the arena for the economically aggressive Chinese.

Towards the end of the 19th century, Asian nationalism which had been still in the bud during the second half of that century, began to make its imprint on the political scene of Southeast Asia and Singapore. It emulated related developments in India, China and Japan and in some countries, affected the Chinese minorities, before it impressed the indigenes. In Malaya and Singapore it mainly affected the Chinese population during the period under consideration.

(i) Economic Development. Singapore's export-crop agriculture was declining during that period. Though some increase of gambier and pepper acreage is reported in the 1870s, the peak of 1849 with 26,834 acres, dwindled to 11,000 in the 1890s and cultivation completely stopped in 1913 (60). At the beginning of the 20th century, rubber production increased, and by 1918, occupied 46,000 acres. Coconut and pineapple for canning occupied a fairly large acreage, and market gardening showed a constant increase commensurate with the population growth (61). ~~Agenda,~~ ^{But} during ¹⁸⁶⁷⁻¹⁹¹⁴ ~~that period~~ agriculture constituted a less significant factor in the economy in proportion to trade and services, than in the first fifty years of Singapore.

Trade characterized Chinese occupations in Singapore, yet, in numbers employed, manual labour prevailed over other activities. This must be again asserted: if labour was exploited by the Chinese, it was mainly Chinese labour and "entrepreneurial talents" (62). It came as a result of labour-market saturation (63) and the system of labour recruitment. The incoming workers fell into three categories, namely: "indentured" - they usually went to the F.M.S.; "free" - who could apply for the best paid vacancy, or engage in petit trade, and "credit ticket holders", who had to repay their transport fare and usually took whatever job was assigned to them. "Indentured" and "credit ticket holder" labourers became objects of exploitation by towkays and secret societies, the system operating until the British liberalized it (64). Craftsmen, traders and their apprentices continued to belong to the Chinese classless

guilds, usually on a speech-group basis. Not until the 1920s, did class differentiation in skilled labour institutionalize itself (65). The guilds exploited apprentices and workers, though the human relations inherent in them, made exploitation less conspicuous than in the unskilled labour market. However, labour conditions in Singapore were better than those in the F.M.S.

British intervention brought economic development to Malaya, and it gradually increased its share in Singapore's trade, mainly in tin and rubber (66). Tin exports, mostly effected through Singapore, reached 26,029 tons in 1889 and 51,733 in 1904. In 1887, a smelter was built in the island (67), which diversified related secondary activities. Also, rubber trade provided secondary sources of income by grading, processing and packing. Quantities reached a mere 533 tons in 1912, but rose to 31,668 in 1918 (68). The rubber industry began as a par excellence European initiative. Even plantation labour was, on the whole, not Chinese, yet, the Chinese penetrated the industry and found a whole range of gainful activities between the producers and the grand wholesalers. This compensated the Chinese for their loss incurred by European penetration into the tin industry. Chinese commission agents and merchants in the rubber industry made great profits and progressed in economic importance, by acquiring European knowhow in Western World commerce and finance. These, and other Chinese big businesses, made possible the development of Chinese banks between the Wars (69).

Tin mining in the Southeast Asian "tin belt" in general,

and in Malaya in particular, had been introduced by the Chinese before the Europeans showed interest in its production. When it became highly in demand, European capital and technology began competing with the Chinese traditional methods of extraction. In 1913, however, the European share in production reached only 25 percent. It thus occurred that both tin and rubber, open to competitive economic efficiency, became a cultural "contact zone" between Europeans and Chinese, as was general trade.

In addition to tin and rubber, which emphasized a growing interdependence between Singapore and Malaya, the Europeans initiated new enterprises into Singapore, increasing the number and proportion of skilled workers among the Chinese. The development of the new deep water port, the entrepôt trade in fuel oil, and a modern finance and banking system (70), constituted the major activities, which must have generated subsidiary skilled activities. The case of banking is interesting, as it did not attract Chinese attention for over 60 years. The first bank, established by the British in 1840 was followed by other European ones, but the Chinese who had had no banking experience in their homeland could generally ignore the system due to kinship ties among their compatriots overseas, which facilitated money transfers. Also, the small scale of the transactions during that period, and the specific Chinese financing system, the tontine, proved adequate. When however, business expanded and capital had to be concentrated, they easily emulated the Europeans opening their first bank in 1903 and a second in 1907 (71).

The growth in the number of skilled workers in trade, finance, industry and services introduced a new social layer of fairly well paid wage earners, who had fixed jobs and a higher status than the coolies. They could support families and thus increase the proportion of stabilized people in Singapore. This in turn must have changed their sentimental and material attachment to Singapore, bringing their attitude closer to that of the traders and towkays without, however, conforming with the latter's social class views.

Trade figures for the second half century of Singapore continuously rose. In 1891, they totalled 243.3 million British dollars (72), in 1901- 549.6 millions (73) and reached a peak during W.W.I. Though figures represent current prices, the 2,000 dollar per capita external trade of 1901 is an impressive figure, which proves that a trading centre at the southern tip of Malaya was essential to the economy of the region.

(ii) Political and Social Developments. British intervention in Malaya seemed a process in which the inert authorities in London followed the initiative of their Straits Settlements staff. As disturbances among Malay chiefs and Chinese mining kongsis jeopardized the smooth inflow of tin into Singapore, English and Chinese merchants put pressure on the local authorities to introduce order into the tin mining areas by immediate intervention. The London authorities gave their consent, perhaps because they ~~also~~ were aware of possible European encroachments into the area. By that time, Singapore had become an important coaling station and a rear base for the fleet operating in and off Chinese waters, and

a long established commercial outpost for British trade. As a result of Singapore's increasing importance in strategy and economy the "public opinion" of Singapore's European community became increasingly weighty, and accordingly, the Straits Settlements got the status of a Crown Colony in 1867. Local organizations: the municipality and the Legislative Council, were accorded more freedom in the issuance of by-laws concerning health, internal trade, land-use and the administration of English and Malay education. Permanent residents received the legal status of British Subjects, bringing them under British law, rather than their own ethnic group jurisdiction. The Straits Chinese took much pride in ~~the~~^{of whom} status which brought them closer to the British, ~~whose~~^{the} customs (they sometimes tried to emulate. It simultaneously increased the social distance between them and the non-resident Chinese, guarding the former from nationalist Chinese influences (74). The status of British Protected Subject accorded to the F.M.S. permanent residents gave less prestige to its holders, still both statuses ensured Chinese law breakers and politically active persons from expulsion. Banishment constituted a severe punishment for those Chinese already economically established in both Singapore and the F.M.S.

Before Chinese nationalism in its early 20th century form reached Singapore, a proto-nationalist sentiment had been diffused in Singapore by Chinese newcomers. It took the form of hostility to the British, and to things West, discernible since the 1850s and following the second Opium War. It spread among the Chinese coolies and hawkers who,

due to British indirect rule, remained under the full authority of the secret societies (75), and who constituted the geographically and socially unstable part of the Chinese population.

At the other extreme, still representing a Chinese attitude towards the British, were the Straits Chinese, not all of whom at that time were Babas. They manifested their pride in their Anglophile attitudes by creating the Strait Chinese - British association (76), by educating their offspring in the English schools, and by emulating British customs. Their ties with the British, besides being sentimental and social, had clear economic origins, yet it is said that these relations developed on a "love-hate" syndrome basis (77).

Most of the Chinese traders and merchants did not adopt these extreme attitudes at least as far as their behaviour was concerned. Their intermediate situation between British business and administration and the lower-class Chinese, which enabled them to communicate with and profit from both sides, made them generally unresponsive to political agitation (78). Only grave social injustice or an economic crisis could shake their political non commitment. All this resembled historical conditions in Fukien and Kwangtung, where disputes were solved within the lineage, and as long as the government got its taxes and there appeared no sign of sedition, it did not meddle in the affairs of the people (79).

Towards the end of the 19th century, Chinese secret societies were losing much of their power and significance as a result of improving internal security conditions, brought

about by the Crown Colony administration. The Protectorate of Chinese assumed part of the social role of the secret societies by regulating labour conditions and by dispute reconciliation. It also arrived at spreading some sort of information network into the previously tightly closed Chinese lower-class circles. This enabled the Protector to enforce the 1889 ordinance of registration of societies, banning those which failed to produce their regulations and the list of their members (80). The extent and intensity of the societies' activities may be illustrated by the fact that in 1885, the press compiled the names of 20 societies in Singapore, 9 in Penang and 7 in Malacca (81). Since then, the secret societies have generally deteriorated into outlaw gangs with little political significance, but their existence is still felt in the present day Singapore underworld.

The suppression of the secret societies and the liberalization of labour regulations marked a substantial change from British indirect rule to efficient government. Yet, if the British had in mind anything like changing the attitude of the Chinese majority in their favour, their measures came too late and were incomplete. The British did not offer a proper substitute to the intimacy of social relations which the young bachelors got in their secret society milieu, neither did they meaningfully improve income, nor lodging conditions nor provided vocational education. In sum, they could not fulfill the hopes of the newcomers in any material sense. But, except for humanitarian purposes and the efficient running of the city, there were no

contemporary real political reasons, why the British should invest in winning the hearts of the Chinese coolies. The Empire stood safe and sound, China was politically on her knees, the economically significant part of the Chinese community exhibited a friendly or at least^a neutral attitude towards the British, and there always existed the Indians and Malays, who could eventually counteract Chinese unrest with government help.

The decline of the secret societies left the internal leadership of the Chinese community in the hands of legal associations, who increasingly undertook welfare and religious tasks within speech-group limits. In 1905, all the speech-groups participated in the establishment of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (82), as a unified head organization for the Chinese traders, and businessmen. ~~but~~ Later, it gradually undertook leadership functions in social and cultural matters as well. This organization represented the Chinese community and became officially accepted as the leading Chinese organ. However, it had no direct authority over the Chinese unskilled labourers, since its institutionalization into the British system, its inherent class interests, and its inability to adopt extreme nationalistic policies, ruled it out as a means to revolutionize the socio-economical misery of those labourers. These still had to await modern nationalist and social ideas to find their natural leadership and organization.

The following table represents some demographic changes during the 1871-1911 period.

Table C-5. Demographic Changes in Singapore. (83)

Year	1871	1881	1891	1901	1911
Total pop. X1000	96.1	137.7	181.6	226.8	303.3
Chinese %	56.8	63.0	67.1	72.1	72.4
Malay %	27.1	23.9	19.7	15.8	13.8
Indian %	11.9	8.8	8.8	7.8	9.2
Others %	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.7
<u>(F/M) sex ratio.</u>					
Total pop.	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.41
Chinese	0.16	0.20	0.21	0.26	0.36
Malay	0.79	0.77	0.72	0.78	0.85
Indian	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.23

Operating the stability function on the sex ratio of the ~~table~~^{previous} table and on the population figures, we get the following tabulated data.

Table C-6. Population Stability within Ethnic Groups.

Year	% Integrated				Numbers in 1,000.							
	T	C	M	I	Integrated				Non-Integrated.			
	T	C	M	I	T	C	M	I	T	C	M	I
1871	48	28	89	38	46.1	16.0	23.1	4.4	49.9	41.4	2.9	7.1
1881	49	33	88	40	67.5	28.7			70.2	58.1		
1891	46	35	84	34	83.6	42.7			98.0	79.2		
1901	50	41	88	39	113.4	67.2			113.4	96.8		
1911	58	52	92	39	175.7	114.2			127.6	105.4		

Numbers X 1000. T = Total, C = Chinese, M = Malays
I = Indians.

Tables C-5 and C-6 may lead us to realize the scale of the problem represented by the non-integrated Chinese unskilled labour and compare it with other ethnic groups. Although the proportion of non-integrated Chinese declined after the

1860's, absolute numbers rose to about 100,000 in the first decade of the 20th century. Not before 1901, ^{did} the integrated part of the population outnumber ~~the~~ the unstable section. It will later be seen that during the ~~second~~ ^{second} fifty years of Singapore, the Straits Born increased their numbers, and although births naturally have a 1:1 sex ratio, births alone could not ~~out~~balance the ~~Chinese male influence on the~~ sex-ratio of the group. It is assumed that increasing numbers of skilled workers with fixed jobs reaching a stage where they could support a family, brought females from China ~~improving~~ ^{improving} ~~the~~ ~~stability~~ of the sex-ratio and residence stability. The existence of over 100,000 non-integrated male Chinese in extremely difficult working and living conditions had significant modern political meaning, though by then still greatly latent. As a group they were divided, like the entire Chinese community, into speech-groups, but common conditions and a strong unifying ideal could easily unite them in a common cause.

The increasing proportion of the Chinese who were integrated into stable units, did not uniformly proceed in every speech-group. By 1881, there were six major groups, namely: Cantonese, Hainanese, Hokkienese, Hakka, Straits Born and Teochiu. Table C-7 gives a speech-group breakdown in absolute figures for both sexes (84).

Table C-7. Chinese Speech-Group Population
According to Sexes.

	1881			1891		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Cantonese	9,699	5,154	14,853	15,750	7,647	23,397
Hailam	8,266	53	8,319	8,596	115	8,717
Hokkien	23,327	1,654	24,981	41,776	4,080	45,856
Hakka	5,561	609	6,170	6,558	844	7,402
Straits Born	4,531	5,014	9,527	6,084	6,721	12,805
Teochiu	20,946	1,698	22,644	21,682	2,055	23,737
Others	259	13	272			
Total	72,571	14,195	86,766	100,446	21,462	121,908

	1901			1911		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Cantonese	19,963	10,766	30,769	28,934	18,566	47,500
Hailam	9,237	214	9,451	10,206	298	10,504
Hokkien	49,061	10,056	59,117	68,370	22,378	90,748
Hakka	7,252	1,262	8,514	9,516	2,431	11,947
Straits Born	7,719	7,779	15,498	20,369	23,193	43,592
Teochiu	24,186	3,378	27,564	29,705	7,708	37,413
Others	238	42	280	5,463	129	5,565
Total	130,367	33,674	164,041	161,648	57,929	219,577

It immediately stands out that there were differences among the speech-groups in respect to their attitude towards Singapore as a place of permanent residence. The Hainanese not only suffered initially from the most unbalanced sex-ratio, but also failed to improve it in any substantial measure. On the other extreme, the Straits Born of whom increasingly greater numbers virtually belonged to "original" speech-groups as regards social solidarity, had some female

numerical preponderance within their ranks. The Cantonese had throughout 1881-1911 the second best sex ratio, and it is very likely that among the Straits Born a significant number actually were Cantonese. In 1881 and in 1891, there were more Cantonese women than in all other Speech Groups combined, (except the Straits born). This must have had a strong stabilizing effect on the Cantonese, and in fact, they have been known to be one of the least inclined speech-groups to create social disorders. The Hainanese at the other extreme, had a reputation for being irascible and socially intransigent.

The Hokkien and Teochiu constituted the largest groups in 1881, but while the former proportionately increased their numerical standing from about 32 percent in that same year to about 41 percent in 1911, the Teochiu decreased from 29 percent to 17 percent in the same period. However, in absolute numbers this means an increase from 22.6 thousand to 37.4 thousand. In terms of sex-ratio the Hokkien, as well as the Teochiu, had about ten males per female in 1891, and an even worse ratio in 1881. This improved to about 3:1 for the Hokkien and something less than 4:1 for the Teochiu in 1911. The Hakka constituted the smallest of the six groups, but overtook the Hainanese (the smallest but one) in 1911. While the former improved their sex-ratio during that period in a similar way to the Teochiu and Hokkien, the Hainanese remained exceptionally highly imbalanced in that respect, as until 1918 Hainanese women were prohibited to emigrate and men forbidden to marry outside the speech-group (85). When the ¹⁸⁸¹sex ratio of the speech-groups is interpreted in relation

to the integration into families function (Appendix A), it seems that the Cantonese had 69 percent of their members thus integrated, the Hakka had 20 percent, the Teochiu had 15 percent, the Hokkien - 13 percent and the Hainanese only one percent. In 1911, the proportions improved to 78 percent for the Cantonese, about 50 percent for the Hokkiens, 41 percent - Teochiu, 40 - Hakka, and 5 percent Hainanese.

Between 1881 and 1911, a balanced sex-ratio had little effect upon the order of numerical importance of the speech groups. Immigration was the decisive factor in population growth of the various speech-groups, and the employment potentials of each of them was a major factor in the number of immigrants. For example, the Hokkiens increased their proportional strength against the Cantonese from about 25:15 to 91:48, although they had a less balanced sex ratio. The overall Chinese sex-ratio improvement from (F/M) 0.198 to (F/M) 0.358 during 1871-1911 representing an absolute increase from 14,200 females to 57,900, shows a growth of proportional integration into families from 33. to 53 percent and, must have resulted from economic standing improvement, which allowed more and more Chinese to support a family in Singapore. But besides economic consideration, cultural attitudes of each speech-group also influenced the proportion of women among the group members. The case of the Hainanese has already been noted and as for the Hokkien, their inclination to maintain "small women" in Singapore, perhaps Malay or other concubines, may explain their low (F/M) sex ratio inspite of their economic standing. Also, China's official recognition of the right of their people to emigrate (86) must have had

some effect on female emigration, but certainly less than on male emigration.

As already noted, the Hokkien maintenance of the numerical supremacy of the speech-groups may be explained by their good starting point in numbers and economic position, at the beginning of the period under consideration, i.e. 1867. It seems that by then, though similar in number to the Teochiu and practising virtually similar occupations, they began to profit from the decline of the Teochiu trade with their lingual brothers in Thailand and West Borneo, which increasingly came under severe competition from the steamship. The Teochiu of Singapore operated a junk trade with those communities, and as Hodder remarked, their business-residence location up the Singapore river mouth indicated the size of the craft in use. In addition, the increase in immigration to Thailand, where the Teochiu have always been the predominant speech group, might have affected the numbers immigrating to Singapore. These two reasons seem very plausible in view of the Chinese system of ^{urban} ~~workmen~~ labour recruitment, which gave preference to kinsmen, and in any event to the same speech-group members. The more a speech-group had been economically established in occupations offering employment, the better chance it had to increase its numbers.

The original Babas and Straits born, though undoubtedly in dominant economic position until the beginning of the 20th century, had only little human reserves to rely upon in increasing their numbers in Singapore (87). The Hokkien seem to have adapted themselves to the economic expansion

of the period. The Cantonese growth may be explained by their domination in the diversifying skilled-occupations, which flourished as subsidiaries to the development of trade. The Hakka trailed behind, being disfavoured by a worse starting point than the four other major groups. The Hainanese lagged behind, as they usually were occupied as unskilled labourers and owned only very few businesses of their own. Thus, the sex ratio differences between the speech-groups, largely brought about by economic conditions and cultural attitudes, also indicated differential attitudes towards permanent residence and geographical attachment to Singapore.

At least before W.W.I., the interrelations among the Chinese speech-groups were oftentimes aggressive, and their mutual attitude was "analogous to racial stereotypes in other parts of the world" (88). However, within the city, face-to-face relations between different speech-groups must have been ubiquitous and daily, and many of them must have spoken more than one dialect. The fair degree of mutual intelligibility between Hokkien and Teochiu and to a lesser degree between Hakka and Cantonese must have facilitated these lingual links. In this sense, it created conditions to confusion of the clear cut social boundaries between the speech-groups, even before the appearance of Chinese nationalism. Behind all that lay simple geographical congestion, which increased the "boundary to area" ratio of the groups, and the social mobility which tended to blur geographical segregation. Generally speaking however, distinct speech-group residence patterns still existed (89),

as speech group-specialization in certain occupations and the custom of having servants and apprentices living on the premises of the shophouse rendered change difficult.

(iii) Changes in the Geographical Conception of Singapore.

Between 1867 and W.W.I., the British community of Singapore and the Straits Born clearly constituted the higher classes in Singapore. While only few of the British made Singapore their permanent place of residence, they were, as a whole, more interested than the other ethnic groups in the quality of life in their residential areas as well as in Singapore as a whole. Their move inland into the hilly ground in the north west represents their cultural attitude in that respect, rather than a shift of sentimental attachment from Britain to Singapore. London was still their capital in political decision-making and economic links, and Britain was still the country of familial ties, personal property and socio-cultural norms. The Babas had evidently no such links with Britain, and their family relations did not transcend the Strait Settlements or perhaps the East Indies. Their attitude towards Singapore must have been determined by the fact that they usually had been born and spent their childhood there, and thus saw it as their homeland. They certainly took pride in being British Subjects and they did not raise any question concerning the political future of Singapore.

Concerning their sentimental and material attachment to Singapore, the Chinese community divided along a distinct line of permanent and temporary residents. But before the advent of Chinese nationalism to Singapore, the Emperor did not symbolize for the immigrants the unity of China, to which

unity no loyalties were sanctioned by the Five Confucian Relationships. As a rule, all those established in Singapore with their families, owning property and ^{having} fixed jobs there, must have developed a sentimental attachment to the place in addition to their attachment to families, clans, villages and ancestral graveyards in China. The bachelor temporary residents must have lacked that attachment to Singapore, as their needs for community services was much less and as family responsibilities did not cast upon them the kind of sedentary outlook on that place. In a sense, their outlook was "nomad" as regards their attitude towards "conservation" of the social and physical environment. They, more than the "sedentary" Chinese, lived in overcrowded conditions and in extreme frugality, although the entire Chinese community shared these characteristics (90). In addition, the temporary residents did not become British Subjects and were liable to banishment for breaking the law. In 1901, the Chinese in Singapore numbered 164,000 and in 1911 - almost 220,000. If the index of integration into families correlates well with a sedentary attachment to place, as is actually assumed (table C-6), then about 97,000 Chinese did not consider Singapore as their home, while some 67,000 did so in 1901. In 1911, the respective figures were

x 105,000 and 114,000.

During the second fifty years of Singapore and especially in the 20th century and increasingly until W.W.II, the British and the Chinese in Singapore modified their macro-geographical conception of the city. This concerned the notion of the dependence of Singapore on Malaya for its

economic viability, definitely a non-Rafflesian conception, but in effect, it eventually conformed with later British political policies. The tin and rubber trade and the financial and commercial services Singapore provided for Malaya justified the modified conception, and the "centrality" of Singapore in linking West and East Malaya (91) added a temporary weight to this new role. This economic dependence of Singapore on Malaya was real but not necessary. Among many other factors, it resulted from a traditional characteristic of Chinese economic enterprise, namely: following the Europeans in grand economic decisions. This was true in Singapore as it was in Southeast Asia in general, and did not change until the 1960s, when independent Singapore initiated big scale industrialization into the city.

From W.W.I. to the Japanese Occupation.

(i) Chinese Nationalism in Singapore. Prior to 1911, Kang Yu Wei, Sun Yat Sen and other Reformers and Radicals came to Singapore and Malaya to establish cultural and political associations and to raise funds. These activities of the pre-Republic era were characterized by two distinct Chinese approaches to the solution of China's problems. The Reformers with Kang Yu Wei tried to raise Chinese support in Malaya and Singapore for the dethroned emperor in his strife with the empress dowager, without destroying the imperial rule. They raised 100,000 dollars and obtained 1,000 signatures from middle-class and wealthy Chinese, many of whom were Straits born (92). Kang introduced modernized Chinese education into Malaya and Singapore, by establishing

6 schools in 1906.

In contradistinction to the mild and gentlemanly nature of the Reformers' activities, the Radicals adopted down-to-earth straightforward methods. Popular appeals and mass rallying brought the message of the Radicals to the entire Chinese community, while reading clubs and newspapers intensified the political acculturation of the more dedicated (93). Sun Yat Sen became personally known to thousands of Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, and when later his prestige in China rose, his supporters could not but regard it as their personal victory (94). This may have been one of the reasons why the Chinese in Singapore showed less parochial solidarity with South East China than those of the Philippines during the Fukien army revolt against Chiang Kai Shek (95), although Hokkiens constituted the majority in both communities.

Until 1912 the Radicals' major theme of political activity in Malaya and Singapore was anti-Manchu and pro-Republican, with the T'ung Meng Hui (96) as the leading Chinese political organization. From 1912, the political themes changed from ^{anti-}anti-Manchu to anti-colonialist, that is against all those who had been responsible for China's plight, and ^{who} ~~which~~ were still economically exploiting and politically degrading it. Since by 1912, the Radicals absorbed the Reformers, it ensued that the entire Chinese nationalist movement in Malaya and Singapore became hostile to the British, the suppressors of China. The unified Chinese nationalist movement in Malaya and Singapore organized K.M.T. branches (97), which spread pro-Chinese and anti-British

propaganda affecting the feelings of increasing numbers of Chinese from every speech-group. Many of the Straits Born also became actively involved in politics. For example, ~~seven~~^{eight} out of ~~the~~ K.M.T. officials in Singapore belonged to that group in 1913 (98). It seems also, that the Chinese schools and night classes enabled, at least, some Babas to learn Chinese and reintegrate into the community (99).

The British had to react against the K.M.T. agitation, and as a result the party practically went underground during 1914-1922. During that period, however, agitation, realized by demonstrations, an anti-Japanese boycott in 1919 and general political activity through reading clubs and schools, almost uninterruptedly continued. In the 1920s, following the appearance of a left wing group within the K.M.T. of China, leftist nationalist groups appeared in the Nan Yang Chinese communities. In Singapore this coincided with the appearance of class stratification in the Chinese society. Coolies, labourers and wage-earners naturally favoured the leftists who added a class-struggle to their nationalist ideology. No wonder that Hainanese and Hakkas, the most economically underprivileged Chinese groups, were among the most active in the leftist group (100). The middle-class supporters of the K.M.T. could not identify themselves with a group who preached class-struggle, especially when Sun Yat Sen considered it irrelevant to the Chinese national revolution.

The split of 1927, between the K.M.T. and the leftists reintroduced the pre-1912 political division within the Chinese community, the K.M.T. reversing their role from

radicals to moderates in relation to the communists. This role reversal logically followed from socio-economic conditions. Not unlike the secret societies' leadership in its time, the leftist leadership of the 1920s ~~was not~~ did not participate in the hierarchy of Chinese formal institutions, and had little to do with the British. They directly responded to the communists in China and later to the Comintern. Being thus totally independent of the British, the leftist leadership could easily adopt extreme political views. These views, among which class-struggle and anti-imperialism were prominent, appealed not only to the working class but also to the youth, who by nature of their age, were inclined towards extremist ideologies.

The K.M.T. officials in Singapore, with all their nationalist radicalism, still depended on the traditional leadership of the Chinese community. While the K.M.T. government of China, endeavoured to maximize the financial contributions of the Chinese abroad, it gave its blessings to the links between the Chinese leadership in the Nan Yang and the British. Thus, the pro-K.M.T. leaders constituted a system interfixed between Chinese masses and British authority playing a double role of leaders to the Chinese and, to a certain degree, as respondent to the British. This latter role also stemmed from the diplomatic relations between Britain and China, which both sides were anxious not to sever. Moreover, being related to the middle-class, the K.M.T. officials came under the influence of a group, whose natural interests were inimical to social revolution. In practice however, K.M.T. propaganda was very much anti-British.

and, even after 1927, the British suspected that the Chinese government considered Malaya as "terra irredenta" (101).

During the 1920s and the 1930s, the leftists extended their influence among the Chinese community. This resulted from the leftist control of many of the trade unions, and also from the increase in absolute numbers and proportion of Chinese high-school students. The leftists, whose official organizations were banned by the British, resorted to infiltration into neutral and K.M.T. organizations, in order to increase their political influence. For example, the Overseas Chinese Union established for anti-Japanese action, following the 1931 aggression, was especially affected in that respect (102).

In the late 1920s, the leftists came under the control of the Comintern, which naturally emphasized the class-struggle role and the anti-imperialist mission of the communists in Malaya and Singapore, at the expense of Chinese nationalism. Under Comintern instructions, the Chinese communists in Malaya and Singapore tried to spread communism among, and collaborate with, indigenous Malays to create a common organization. The Malay response was practically negative, and, accordingly, it was agreed that the Chinese would create a separate Nan Yang Communist party (103). This party, renamed the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) in 1930, had an overwhelming Chinese membership, who engaged not only in subversive class-struggle, but also in actions supporting China's cause. The class-struggle activity could not appeal to the Malays for socio-religious reasons, and the nationalist Chinese activity made the Malays suspicious

towards the real intentions of Chinese nationalism.

On the outside Chinese nationalism exhibited a strong group solidarity, and its manifestations, for instance, in anti-Japanese agitation (especially after 1937), endangered the Malays, according to Malay interpretations (104). The fragmented Malay ethnic solidarity and the relative political indifference of the Indians, made the entire Chinese community seem politically more dangerous-looking than they really were. In terms of territorial attachment, the situation in Malaya gave the impression that: "most Malays gave their allegiance to the sultan, the majority of Chinese to China, and most of the Indians, so far as they were aware of loyalties, to India" (105). In that political atmosphere, the growing proportion of the Chinese in the entire population of Malaya and Singapore could not but raise anxiety among the politically aware Malays and among the British authorities. The latter, for their own political reasons, maintained restrictions on Chinese immigration, although after the depression years the economic justification thereof became doubtful.

As regards the sentimental attachment to territory of the K.M.T. supporters in Singapore; nationalism brought China and its current affairs into their minds, yet, it generally did not occur to them that allegiance to China entailed reemigration. If there was talk of regarding Singapore and Malaya as tributary parts of China, it was mooted and obscure. In general, their attachment to Singapore, largely stemmed from their evaluation of the city as a place where at least a decent living could be gained, as opposed to their attachment to China which was ~~spiritually~~ ^{ethnically} and ideologically inspired.

The M.C.P. supporters, by nature of their political conviction, must have acquired a sentimental attachment to Malaya and Singapore. This stemmed from the M.C.P. politico-geographical conception that Malaya and Singapore, as an integral part of it, constituted a land where both ^{Chinese} ~~China~~ and Malays would live happily under a socially just and independent government. As a result, the political conviction became a substitute to property ownership in what regards the territorial attachment of the Chinese proletariat. As for Chinese attachment to China, nationalism transformed the former parochial attachment to districts of provenance into a unified allegiance to China in its entirety (106).

(ii) Economic Development and British Politics. Except for the depression years, which affected world-trade — a sensitive barometer of Singapore's economy — the general trend of the economy, between 1914 and 1941, marked growth and expansion. In the slump years of 1931-1933, trade figures went down to half the 1918-1920 average, but the economy recovered during 1934-1938, when the average annual trade exceeded by 20 percent that of the immediate post W.W.I. years (107). In 1926, for example, 16,000 ships [†] totalling 12.5 million tons called at Singapore harbour, while in 1935, the tonnage rose to 16 million (108).

During the slump years, it was mainly the economically weak layer of the Chinese population who were the hardest hit. Net migration to Singapore became deficit for the first time in its history. For instance, the number of Chinese immigrants to the Straits Settlements in 1929 was about 80,000 less than

in 1927, and those of 1930, about 10,000 down over the 1929 figure. The number of outgoing Chinese in 1929 was 60,000 less than in 1927, but that of 1930 was 72,000 more than the 1929 figure (109). It seems that property and business ownership in Singapore besides providing reserves for lean years, must have had some stabilizing effect (in the physical sense of the word besides its emotional connotation).

At the end of the 19th century, the British decided to fortify Singapore and build there a naval base. In view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 the plan was postponed and priorities given to the Home Fleet. After W.W.I., work began on the base and dockyard (110), and when it terminated in the 1930s, it had already been presumed that a future war would be fought against the combined forces of Japan and Germany. Singapore became thus the "keystone on which the survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend" (111). The construction and the maintenance of the base directly affected labour specialization in Singapore and created new permanent jobs, but it also expanded production and services, which became more technical in indirectly related sectors such as processing of foodstuffs and non-durable commodities. These permanent jobs demanded certain skills and individual sophistication and consequently were well paid. All this was conducive to the development of trade unionism and to the increase of the sedentary part of the population. While the base depended in many respects on Chinese and Indian labour, the nationalism of the former and especially their anti-colonialism presented some danger to its smooth operation. The M.C.P. members and supporters,

hostile to the British in every respect, could subvert work, while the K.M.T., though hostile to the British only in matters concerning China, provided a "recruiting space" (112) and a cloak for the communists. Effective internal security measures had to be taken, and their existence until the present time indicates that political subversion has remained a constant factor throughout Singapore's 20th century history.

Although during the 20th century, Singapore and Malaya were increasing their mutual economic activities, the growing strategic importance of Singapore led the British to adopt a policy of alienation between the two. It seems that the British thought they could strategically maintain their maritime routes by holding fortified naval bases at critical points, in the event of a future independence of ~~the~~^{their} major colonies. These bases could best be held when backed by friendly or at least neutral territories. Since the British must have anticipated that Malaya would eventually receive its self-rule, they preferred a Malay-dominated Malaya to a Chinese predominance there. The socio-political reasons were obvious, as by holding Singapore the British would have reduced the Chinese proportion in Malaya's population and that, in addition to the protective laws favouring the Malays, would have ensured Malay political domination in a self-rule eventuality. The British deemed they could take the risk of Chinese subversion in Singapore as their experience in Hong Kong did not prove the contrary.

(iii) Social Changes. Some demographical data are pertinent:

Table C-8. Demographical Data (113).

(Pop. numbers X 1000)

Year	1911	1921	1931	1947
Total Population	303	418	558	941
F/M Sex Ratio	0.408	0.490	0.584	0.822
% Integrated	58	66	73	90
Chinese Population	220	317	422	730
F/M Sex Ratio	0.358	0.470	0.603	0.882
% Integrated	52	64	75	94
% of Chinese born in Malaya.	20	25	36	60

Between 1911 and 1921, the Chinese increased their proportion in the population from two thirds to over three quarters and generally kept that ~~proportion~~ ^{proportion} until 1947. Also between 1911 and 1921, Singapore's population growth reached 115,000, despite a natural "growth" deficit of 38,000. Only in the following decade the natural growth became positive, but with only 9,600 births in excess of deaths. The trend improved during 1931-1947, when out of a total ^a increase of 310,800, the share of the natural increase was 117,500 (114). The growth in the proportion of the integrated part of the Chinese community represents the improvement of the economic conditions, and indicates that the Chinese increasingly became attached to Singapore as their place of residence.

Figures concerning migration to and from the Straits Settlements are the following (115):

Table C-~~10~~⁹. Chinese Migration - Straits Settlements.

(in thousands)

		1923	1925	1927	1929	1930
East-Indies	from	48	52	60	74	92
	to	52	75	86	85	93
China	from	158	191	347	267	232
	to	95	80	184	146	203
India and Burma	from	1	1	2	-	2
	to	4	1	6	2	4
Other Ports	from	10	12	27	13	18
	to	9	13	27	10	15
Total	in	217	255	436	354	344
	out	160	169	303	243	315
Total net increment		56	91	132	111	29
Men "		33	50	66	59	- 11
Women "		10	15	29	25	17
Children "		14	27	37	37	23

In 1930, the government enforced immigration restrictions in the Straits Settlements cutting the quota down to 6,000 a month, and in 1932, to 1,000 a month. Until 1938, no restrictions were imposed on female and child immigration, but in 1938 the overall quota went down to 500 a month. These restrictions, economically justified as they might have been, seemed to have stemmed from the British policy of Malay protection. This must have had a decisive influence on the proportional growth of the Chinese in Malaya and in Singapore, which emphasized the strategic aspect of that same policy, but, also increased the stability of the Chinese population. In terms of sex ratio and population stabilization, the

Chinese have done well between the two World Wars: from (F/M) sex-ratio of 0.358 in 1911, they improved to 0.882 in 1947, and this meant an increase in percentage of the stabilized population from 52 in 1911 to 94 in 1947. At least since 1931, the Chinese bettered the average sex-ratio of the entire population of Singapore.

The above mentioned developments introduced a new stabilizing factor into the Chinese society. The increasing number of locally born Chinese naturally had a 1:1 sex ratio, and in addition, the fact of having spent one's childhood in a place where one's culture was dominant, must have increased sentimental attachment to the birth-place. This qualification must be kept in mind, when the following figures concerning Malaya (and Singapore) born Chinese are considered: 1911 - 20 percent, 1931 - 36 percent, 1947 - 60 percent. The proportional growth of Malaya born Chinese must have indicated an increase in the number of children, and with the ensuing improvement of the sex ratio, also in the number of families. This development naturally increased stabilization through integration into families, yet it must have introduced also an important socio-cultural phenomenon, namely, the growth of the teen-ager group (116). These, inasmuch as they got Chinese education, largely came under leftist political influences. It is safe to assume, that the age-gap and the leftist influences brought about political splits within the traditionally closely knit families.

In general, the increase in the numbers of teenagers and in the proportion of organized labour ~~and the increase~~ in the population tended to augment the absolute number of

potential M.C.P. supporters. An estimate for 1941 quotes 5,000 active M.C.P. members in Malaya and 100,000 sympathizers (117). The party being radical, compared with the K.M.T., the members and sympathizers must have been more efficiently ideologized and politically responsive, improving the quality and enhancing the overall political weight of the M.C.P.. To this one may add the quality and dedication of the leadership. Their independence of the British authorities has already been discussed, in addition, however, they were of the working class, and usually had no substantial property. Unlike the traditional leadership they did not exploit their leadership functions to promote personal ends, which fact must have enhanced their ideological appeal.

The socio-cultural changes, brought about by the Chinese nationalism in Singapore, differentially affected individuals according to their personalities. As in similar political acculturation processes, the population affected must have been distributed over the whole range of: active idealists, sympathizers, fence-sitters and the apathetic. It seems safe to assume that the M.C.P. got the more politically active part of the public, as their followers were younger and economically underprivileged. They had less to lose than the K.M.T. supporters in case they failed, and more to gain in the event they succeeded.

(iv) Chinese Education. Since the time Chinese education was introduced in Singapore, the dilemma of choice presented itself to the Chinese with three possible solutions: a) Chinese education alone; b) English education alone;

c) Double attendance of Chinese and English schools. The Chinese resorted to all three possible solutions.

English education was indispensable for "bread and butter" purposes and it gave a "passport to a sedentary occupation" (118). Chinese education could not prepare its students for modern occupations in professions, administration, commerce or any job which had to do with close relations with Europeans. Those attending both systems profited from the cultural and nationalistic schooling offered by the Chinese system and from the knowledge acquired through the English system, which opened their way for advanced Western education. It may be assumed that those attending the English schools alone, belonged to the higher middle-class, who still remained loyal to the British and at most, felt some national pride in the revival of China without actively taking part in K.M.T. politics. Those who attended Chinese schools alone, mainly came from families of the middle-class, the majority of whom were K.M.T. sympathizers, and also from the skilled working class. In both cases these families must have been quite strongly dedicated to the nationalist cause as they knew they limited the child's opportunities. Those attending both systems, spending their mornings in English schools and their afternoons in the Chinese, must have belonged to the less idealistic, and more materially minded group, which still under the pressure of the new nationalist norms, or for purely cultural motives tried to have the best of two worlds.

The commencement of Chinese education originated from a daily Chinese newspaper, and from the Singapore Educational Institute, which promoted studies of English and Chinese in

night classes (119). Besides these night classes, there also developed a fairly broad primary school system, which since 1917 taught Kuo Yü, geography and history of China, and ex curriculum also interpreted current politics of China. From 1917 until 1926, a single Chinese secondary school represented that level of Chinese education (120). Those who finished Chinese secondary schools could either go to China for further studies, or relinquish further educational aspirations, unless they had an English Matriculation.

Chinese education Statistics render the following figures:

Table C-10. Chinese Education in Singapore.(121)

Year	Schools	Pupils	Pupils in Govt.aided schools and in English schools.
1918	39	1,950	6,288
1928	205	14,321	8,194
1938	329	28,411	10,591

Speech-group or district associations voluntarily sponsored the Chinese schools. Fees were low, yet through the student figures one realizes that only part of the relevant age-group had access to education (122). As the schools promoted anti-British sentiments, the government in accordance with its Malay protection policy only marginally accorded grants to these schools. Since the 1920s, the schools came under British official supervision, but only in 1932, there appeared the new Chinese text-books free of anti-British propaganda, especially prepared for use in Malaya. The Registration Ordinance of the schools became "a carrot

and stick" means to control them, as it offered grants in aid to registered schools. In 1928, the British closed down 13 schools for political agitation (123), and only during the depression years the financial situation of the schools made them comply with the ordinance. However, in 1937, besides health control and book censorship, the British provided only 4.1 percent of their expenditure on education for Chinese schools, while 71.4 percent went for English education, and 20 percent to the Malay, the total expenditure being for that year 3.9 million dollars (124). The Chinese government supplied the schools with books and teachers, retaining control of the curriculum. They do not seem to have sent any direct financial support (125).

On the whole, Chinese education helped to perpetuate the Chinese culture in Singapore, introducing, if not the "high Chinese culture", at least an important element of it. Besides Kuo Yü, which in some sense helped to decrease the differences among the speech groups, Chinese education introduced a common ideal, that of the Chinese politico-cultural revival. With all the shortcomings of this education in meeting the demands of a modern economy under a British government, the majority of Chinese school children still utilized it. The idealist reason behind the decision to send a child to a Chinese school is evident; but from the material point of view, it seems that between the two World Wars, the Chinese community improved its economic position and created numerous jobs where English education was not necessary.

From the Japanese Occupation to the City-State.

Between 1942 and 1965, Singapore experienced the most profound political changes in its history. The period may be divided into 3 distinct phases: a) the Japanese Occupation, b) the British Comeback and Self Rule and, c) Merger and Secession. These three political phases were also socio-economically distinct. The first one was traumatic and involved the breakdown of the British and Chinese institutions reducing the population to almost sub-human living conditions. The second saw the reestablishment of the crumbled institutions, an increase in political power of leftist groups, and an eventual victory of the moderates. The third phase was characterized by a bid to federate Singapore within Malaysia ~~and~~ followed by disillusion. All three phases were governed by distinct macro-geographical conceptions of Singapore. The Japanese considered Singapore as a strategic point during the war, and accordingly established there a regional military command. Since they did not envisage an immediate independence of Malaya, it seems probable that they would have maintained Singapore as a colony within their Co Prosperity Sphere. After the British comeback, the conception of Singapore's dependence for its economic viability on the British Empire, on the reestablished base, and on Malaya was reintroduced and seemed so natural that ^{almost} no political party in Singapore contested the idea. And yet, the British politically separated Singapore from Malaya to fit into their postwar strategy. But, the belief in the inseparability of Singapore from Malaya led to Merger, which was dissolved, however, when suspicion between

the two major ethnic groups overrode mutual economic interests. Singapore's independence followed, but not before some foundations of industrialization had been laid even before Merger, perhaps with an unadmitted anticipation of that eventuality.

The political background in Southeast Asia was marked by the Japanese Occupation during 1942-1945 and by the neo-colonialist bid to regain control of its colonies in 1945-1954. The latter phase varied in mode from the honorable retreat of the Americans and British from the Philippines and Burma respectively, to the violent comebacks of the Dutch and the French. This breach of the Atlantic Charter contributed to the growth of suspicion of the European powers among the newly created states of Southeast Asia.

The Japanese Occupation. Forced contributions to the Japanese war effort, forced labour (126) and mass killings were the lot of the Chinese community in Singapore under the Japanese occupation. Twenty years after the war had ended, those ferocious injustices still burnt in the memory of the Chinese (127). The Japanese meted out different treatment to the various ethnic groups, sub-groups and individuals within each community in Singapore. For example, M.C.P. and K.M.T. X activists, when spotted, were usually executed, while those individuals who spied for the "Kempeitai" (128) creating mistrust within and among ethnic groups improved their standing. This issue sharpened the hostility between the groups bringing it to a high pitch (129).

The Indian and Malay nationalists who identified themselves with a political future in relation to the Japanese

Co-Prosperity Sphere, were politically privileged in comparison to the Chinese. But, the Japanese did not fail to notice the fact, that their demands of the Chinese community to identify themselves with the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei in China received only a forced insincere response. ~~When~~ The Japanese received more positive economic collaboration and political support from the Malay Sultans. These responded favourably having every reason to believe that in the event of permanent Japanese presence in Southeast Asia, the Chinese community would lose its political power, while an eventual British return seemed more harmful to them in that respect. However, as time elapsed, the Japanese failed to promulgate a plan concerning the future independence of Malaya, while the Allies were getting the upperhand; consequently, the sultans' quiet approval changed to reticent censure. Also, some Indian nationalists showed intensive activity within the Japanese political manipulation of the Asian peoples in their empire. In fact, the Provisional Government of Free India and the National Indian army made their debuts in Singapore ⁱⁿ 1943 (130).

As the war continued, economic conditions were deteriorating. Food was short and daily commodities had to be substituted by locally manufactured low quality goods. The island became a grower of tapioca, and some people migrated to Malaya to open new lands for rice cultivation. Whatever trade in tin and rubber still existed was taken by Japanese firms, ~~who~~ ^{who} also monopolized the transport means. Unemployment, inflation and military control of the economy degraded the once prosperous city into a shadow of itself.

Of the two Chinese political streams, the situation of

the wealthy and middle-class, the backbone of the British and of the K.M.T. supporters of pre-war times, was in a sense the more tragic. They lost more wealth than the leftist sans avoir, but still retaining their immovable property, were reduced to inactivity as far as subversion was concerned (131) hoping to save whatever property was still left. The M.C.P. adherents showed active resistance to the Japanese. Their few thousand fighters in the Malayan jungle were supported by tens of thousands of Chinese workers, peasants and traders. The popular esteem that the M.C.P. acquired, resulted more from its uniqueness in offering armed resistance, than from the strategic value of its operations. (This perhaps led the M.C.P. to overestimate its military capabilities in 1948). However, within Singapore itself subversion was minimal, as the island was geographically unsuitable for guerrilla warfare although the majority of its Chinese population were hostile to the Japanese.

The British Comeback. After their return, the British modified their politico-geographical conception of Malaya and Singapore. If before the war both were considered economically inseparable, the war years convinced the British that Malaya would sooner or later get its independence. There was no more question of a British Empire, but of holding of a chain of small bases between Britain and Australia. Malaya's eminence as a tin and rubber producer demanded, from the British point of view, that it would remain friendly to Britain. This implied a Malay dominated Malaya, and to that effect the British created in 1946 a Malayan Union including Penang, Malacca, and the federated and non-federated states, excluding Singapore.

The exclusion of Singapore decreased the Chinese proportion in the population of Malaya and left the island in a Crown Colony status. The naval base was supposed to provide employment besides the usual trade activities. Naturally, presumed the British, the local population would not disturb the function of the base, which would have provided them with jobs. The official reason for the creation of the Malayan Union was economic (132), although the economic dependence of Singapore on Malaya was generally accepted at that time (133). However, the political considerations were easily discernible because they were unjustified by what befitted the Malay sultans for their misdeeds during W.W.II, and by moral obligations due to the Chinese.

(i) Political Developments 1945-1959. The Occupation, having shattered the Chinese social and economic organizations, broke the traditional leadership of the wealthy traders and businessmen who were either supporters of the K.M.T. or loyal to the British. After the war had ended, they tried as best they could to regain their economic position, leaving the leadership of the community to whoever was in a position to undertake the responsibility (134). In 1947, when the communists in China began their victorious campaigns against Chiang Kai Shek's forces, the traditional leadership found themselves supporting a losing side, a regime labelled reactionary and supported by colonialist powers. This further reduced their self confidence and intensified their involution towards their families, kinfolk and their private business. Whatever posts of leadership they still held, lost much of their significance in a political atmosphere of a

general shift to the left of the Chinese public opinion (135).

The leftist leadership extreme and moderate, though suffering from Japanese persecutions during the war years, emerged afterwards hardened by adverse conditions, more sophisticated through its experiences and morally uncorrupted in the public eye. They came to dominate the politically active part of the Chinese community, who had increased their social and class-struggle consciousness in the immediate postwar years. The socio-economic atmosphere of general poverty and unemployment favoured the popular acceptance of leftist leadership (136), and the shift towards political radicalism was enhanced by the tolerant British attitude towards the M.C.P. between 1945 and 1948. This party exploited the circumstances in propagating its ideas through newspapers, mass meetings, street propaganda, strikes (137), and small-group indoctrination. The official non-ethnic character of the M.C.P. based on its politico-geographical conception of the unity of Malaya and Singapore appealed somewhat to non-Chinese workers, mainly Indians, who fared as badly as the Chinese masses. Some young liberal non-communist leaders also appeared during that period. They were ^{were} mainly English educated and motivated by the economic plight and the post-war years' idealistic drive of political emancipation and social justice. The former leaders who had collaborated with the Japanese, did the best they could to either destroy evidence of their malfaisance or vanish (138).

The constitution of the Malayan Union of 1946, which handicapped the Chinese democratic rights not only by excluding Singapore but also by discriminating citizenship laws in Malaya,

did not bring about a Chinese violent reaction (139). Only in 1948, when the Federation was established, did the M.C.P. take up arms in rebellion. They seem to have needed reassurance of the Indonesian nationalists' success against the Dutch and the victories of Mao against Chiang. Again, just as during the Japanese occupation, they deemed Singapore unfit for guerrilla warfare although they had many supporters there. This was in accordance with communist Chinese strategy: to begin in remote rural areas and gradually advance on the urban. The rebellion strengthened British suspicions that the Chinese communists in Malaya and Singapore looked upon China as their homeland, and constituted a vanguard of subversion for an ultimate danger of Chinese military invasion (140).

In the early days of the rebellion, Chinese workers and peasants in Malaya generally supported the ~~revolution~~^{communists}. Chinese middle-class traders and entrepreneurs, anxious about their future in the event of a communist victory and envisaging self rule for Malaya, created the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) and coalesced with the U.M.N.O. in 1953 to create the Alliance party, which latter won 51 out of 52 seats ^{in the parliament} with almost 80 percent of the Malayan vote in the elections of 1955 (141). The union of the two ethnic parties became feasible after the Malays conceded a relaxation of the citizenship laws for Chinese, the Chinese conceding other political rights to retain their economic standing (142).

The majority of Singapore's population was Chinese by ethnicity and workers by class, therefore their loyalties could be won either by a Chinese or by a leftist ideology; preferably by both (143). Thus, the M.C.P. made good ground in Singapore

during 1945-1948; ^{and/} ~~but~~, when it was outlawed in 1948, some of its supporters clandestinely dispersed among other parties and organizations trying to gain control. During the early 1950s when self rule was in the offing, several political parties made their appearance. Some experienced only ephemeral existence, and most were characterized by their dependence on personal connections rather than on distinct ideologies (144).

The ban on the M.C.P. was followed by strict security measures, which constricted the development of major communist disturbances but did not totally suppress agitation. Threats of deportation and administrative detention prevented the smooth operation of the communist organizations exposing the rank and file to the moderating influence of other leaders, or reducing them to political apathy. In 1948 and in 1951, the respective votes in the Singapore elections were 15,000 and 24,000 out of an electorate of 250,000. However, the Chinese in Singapore, especially high-school students, both leftist and nationalist, revived their cultural links with China (145). They agitated against the M.C.A. - U.M.N.O. alliance, and for the revival of Chinese education as well as against the introduction of English as a second language in Chinese schools (146). The next elections, those of 1955, preceded the accordance of a limited self rule to Singapore. By then, economic conditions had greatly improved, the M.C.P. had been banned and the Banishment Law effectively restrained leftist leaders. Again, the voters constituted only a small proportion of the electorate (147); consequently, a loose amalgamation of small, mainly workers' parties carried the majority of the

seats. Some leftists participated under an innocent cloak and thus achieved some representation, but the Alliance and a Chinese Chamber of Commerce sponsored party totally failed.

The moderate labour government headed by Marshall, and later by Lim Yew Hock, firmly reacted against the leftist agitation (148) trying to erase the contemporary image of Singapore as a potential "outpost of Communist China, in fact a colony of Peking" (149). The ban on the M.C.P. only directed communist activity to operate through front organizations, and thus they infiltrated the P.A.P., making it a militant leftist party. By then, the P.A.P. realized that its failure to participate in the 1955 elections was a mistake, as the Singapore government had substantial authority notwithstanding British presence. By 1959, the Emergency nearing a successful end, Singapore got its independence except for defence and external affairs.

(ii) Social and Economic Changes. In 1947, living conditions in the city of Singapore were abominable: 327,500 people, just under half the population of the municipality, lived on 2,285 acres, a density of 143 per acre in the inner city, but the density in the outer city was 19 per acre (150). About 15 percent of the households lived in what was termed as "space". This included "bunks in passageways, the tiered bed-lofts so common in Singapore, sleeping shelves under or over staircases" etc. Another 32 percent lived in what was termed as "cubicles" (151). The socio-economic status distribution of wage-earners according to ethnic groups and to the head of the household birth-place was represented by the following sample.

Table C-11

Percentage Distribution of Wage Earners according to Occupation. (152)

	Chinese		Indian		Malay		Others			Total
	IM	IN	IM	IN	IM	IN	Europ	Eur asian	other	
1. Highest prof. & Big Busin.	1.1	2.5	1.7	-	0.9	1.7	81.5	10.8	8.3	2.1
2. Medium Business	2.4	1.7	1.9	1.2	-	-	-	-	-	1.9
3. Minor Profession	3.7	5.8	4.2	1.2	0.6	3.2	6.9	18.5	22.9	4.3
4. Clerks	4.1	16.3	6.8	34.6	1.7	10.5	2.3	50.8	43.7	8.5
5. Shopkeepers & Assistants	18.6	13.1	15.7	6.2	1.7	1.7	-	3.1	4.2	14.9
6. Overseers, Foremen	0.7	1.4	0.6	4.9	0.9	5.2	9.3	3.1	2.1	1.2
7. Skilled Workers	9.5	16.1	4.9	11.1	4.7	12.2	-	7.7	-	10.5
8. Semi Skilled Workers	39.6	27.2	30.0	33.3	68.2	48.3	-	1.5	10.4	36.8
9. Unskilled Workers	18.5	13.4	32.5	4.9	18.3	15.1	-	-	6.3	17.7
10. No Occup.	1.9	2.4	1.7	2.5	2.0	2.3	-	4.6	2.1	2.1
Number Classified	3772	1661	527	81	343	344	43	65	48	6887
Number Unclassified	69	29	7	1	9	14	3	2	2	133

(IM = Head of household born outside Malaya, IN - in Malaya)

The table demonstrates that, on the whole, the Malaya born families were better off no matter to which ethnic group they belonged. Another striking feature, which reflects the inertia of a long tradition, may be observed by the high percentage of Indians and Eurasians occupied in clerical work. It dates perhaps back to the 19th century when the Indians and Eurasians were the only ones who could easily communicate with

the British. The Chinese, as a whole, constituting three quarters of the population, strongly influenced the total average in each occupation. The inferior position of the Malays and the highly superior of the Europeans is eminently demonstrated. It seems plausible to define the first three occupations of the table as providing opportunities for greater wealth accumulation, the next four as providing economic security, and the last three as - precarious. It seems that over half the population sample lived precariously, that is, in addition to the low incomes involved, the workers had no assurance of permanent employment. In fact, a survey carried out in 1953-54, revealed that the standard of living of 25 percent of the population did not reach the absolute minimum of 18 dollars per month for expenditure on food, and that 40,000 new babies were annually born into a society which suffered from unemployment (153).

It is no wonder that in the existing conditions not only communist activists and adherents but also many of the liberally educated became conscious of the social evils, and were prepared to bring about social change through political activity.

In 1947, within the framework of its social survey, the government researched into the matter of the links between the Singapore population and their countries of origin. For a sample of 3,841 non-Malaya born Chinese, two parameters were chosen as indicators: the number of returns to the homeland and the annual number of remittances.

Table C-19 Frequency of Remittance and Number of Returns
per 1,000 Chinese (154)

Frequency of Remittance	Number of Returns to Homeland.							Total
	Nil	1	2	3	4	5+	Unknown	
12 times a year	78	27	13	8	4	3	1	133
6-11 times a year	21	11	5	3	-	1	1	42
3-5	47	20	9	7	1	2	-	86
2	32	11	6	2	1	1	1	53
1	11	4	1	1	-	1	-	18
"Occasionally"	31	13	7	2	2	1	1	54
Nil	499	52	25	8	5	3	12	604
Unknown	5	1	-	10	-	-	-	7
Total	724	139	66	31	13	11	16	1000

Among those who did not remit and did not return (half the sample) there must have been a proportion who just could not afford it. These must have at least corresponded with their families in China, and perhaps some of them had stronger feelings towards their relatives than those who remitted or returned to China. It would, however, seem advisable to stick to the statistics, as both parameters characterize an immigrant society, and the 50 percent proportion of those who either remitted or returned to China, manifest the strong familial links of the Chinese society in Singapore. The percentage of immigrant Chinese heads of households in the ~~entire~~ ^{general} survey was about 60%, the rest being Malaya born (155). The immigrant heads of households also distinguished themselves as constituting 87% of the single person households, while the percentage of that category among the non-immigrant Chinese did not much exceed the corresponding figures in the U.K. (156).

Rehabilitation began in Singapore almost as soon as the British arrived. In addition to trade in rubber and tin, by then in heavy demand, the British reestablished their military base and further developed it in the 1950s and 1960s to serve as a future base for counter guerrilla and nuclear warfare. The base occupied some 10 percent of the island's area and, as it developed, it generated an important proportion of Singapore's G.D.P. (157). In addition, the restoration of Malaya's economy provided Singapore with increasing service and trade activities. Also, the Korea and Vietnam wars, contributed to the prosperity by increased prices of raw materials and intensified shipping activities in the area adjacent to the theatres of war. In view of the political atmosphere in Singapore, the economic activities related to the Korea and Vietnam wars incurred surprisingly subdued leftist opposition. Strikes and riots occurred, but of inexplicably small importance. This was perhaps due to the efficient security net, which the British had imposed on Malaya and Singapore especially since 1948, but it also seems that sympathy for the M.C.P. could not outbalance the effects of relative prosperity on popular satisfaction. Thus, the British repression of the leftist agitators spared Singapore socio-political disturbances at the time when world economic activities presented good opportunities for a rapid economic recovery of the island. However, this repression was not the sole reason for Singapore's economic restoration. Chinese industriousness, frugality and perhaps an inherent optimistic view that hard work would improve their economic situation, also lay behind that revival. In relative terms, Singapore's economic expansion surpassed all of the

other Southeast Asian countries during that period.

After W.W.II., the Chinese community with some help from the British administration undertook to restore the Chinese education system in order to satisfy the needs, which had been heavily suppressed under the Japanese Occupation. Thus, Chinese vernacular schools opened immediately after the British return, numbering 124 in 1946 and increasing to 154 with 53,478 pupils in 1947, and to 184 with a 58,096 enrolment in 1948. This pertained to primary schools, but ^{a considerable proportion of} ~~in the highest secondary~~ Chinese pupils attended English secondary schools ~~and the majority of them were Chinese~~ (158). Further developments in 1949-1963 are illustrated in the following graph (see figure C-13).

While the Malay and Temil streams of education practically maintained the same enrolment throughout that period i.e., about 8,000 and 1,300 respectively (159), the Chinese and English streams greatly increased theirs, the English stream enrolment maintaining a higher rate of increase. English Education student numbers surpassed those of the Chinese Educated in 1954, ^{showing} ~~reaching~~ a 209,070 to 156,302 preponderance in 1963. At that latter year, 31,207 pupils attended integrated bilingual schools (160). The development of the English stream of education signifies that a high proportion of the Chinese still considered "bread and butter" ends as primordial, and sent their children to English schools in spite of nationalistic agitation against English schooling. As late as 1956, only 75 out of 250 Chinese schools were accepting government aid (161), which fact did not contribute to their educational quality. It should be noted however, that as Singapore progressed on her way to self rule and independence, and as the Emergency was

Fig. C-13. Chinese and English Education, Singapore 1949-1963.

Sources: Singapore Ministry of Education
Annual Reports.


Young, 1953.

Chinese and English

~~English~~ English

~~Chinese~~ Chinese

Number of Pupils.



Year

reaching its end, hostility towards the British was subsiding. Singapore, in some sense or other became more Chinese in the Chinese community political conception, consequently, the dilemma of choosing between the two educational streams lost much of its political actuality, and retained its acuteness only among those who still held extreme views.

The post W.W.II. expansion of the English and Chinese education streams reintroduced the problem of educational background dichotomy of the Chinese society. Even the introduction of bi-lingual integrated schools in the early 1960s, did not change the fact that the English Educated were increasing in number. These latter usually formulated their knowledge of the world through studies of Western textbooks and, through their occupations, usually came to have contacts with the British, with European firms and generally with things West. They must have also adopted in part the British macro-geographical conception that Singapore was necessarily linked with Malaya for pragmatic interests and, in any event, with the British Commonwealth for economic and strategical reasons. However, this is not to say that they were losing their Chinese awareness; indeed, they kept their Chinese names, generally spoke at least one Chinese dialect and still had some, perhaps undefined, attachment to China. Since most of them must have belonged to the higher socio-economic strata, they generally could not identify themselves with the communist government of China. In fact, this group did not exhibit total ideological homogeneity. There were the more extremely Westernized, perhaps with an educational background of British universities, and a familial background of 19th century Straits Born, whose attachment to China was non-existent or minimal,

and who could not even speak Chinese, though they had Chinese names. On the other extreme, were those who got their English education for pragmatic purposes, and therefore showed only external signs of Westernization, still feeling greatly attached to China, and experiencing great pride in its military, political and socio-economic achievements. These also could not conceive of Singapore as a totally independent state disconnected from Malaya or the Commonwealth. On the one hand, their educational background, their economic links with the British and the contemporary political situation in the world, did not suggest any chance of viability to independent Singapore. On the other hand, being "more Chinese" than the other ~~part~~ part of their group, they must have felt that the Chinese majority in a unified Singapore-Malaya state, would enhance the chances of the Chinese to govern Malaya and mutatis mutandis a separation from Malaya would harm the Chinese community there.

The Chinese Educated must have formulated their politico-geographical conception of Singapore along Chinese cultural patterns, not necessarily of the traditional ones, but perhaps through the modern Chinese concepts, which permeated their system of education. For them, China was the homeland, though they themselves were immigrants, and its culture deserved their full allegiance, at least in theory. Both K.M.T. and Communist China supporters envisaged a unified Malaya with a Chinese majority enjoying its right to lead the country, without political links with the Commonwealth. Their ideology being more idealistic and less pragmatic than that of the British Educated, they preferred economic difficulties rather than political dependence on the British in a Commonwealth setting,

especially as they knew the British opposition to Chinese political dominance in Malaya. In any event, a semi-independent Singapore under British military supervision must have been considered by them as politically inferior to full rights in a unified Malaya.

The Chinese Educated did not constitute a monolithic group. As already mentioned, they were politically divided, and naturally the "normal distribution" of the fanatics, the dedicated, the supporters, the fence-sitters and the "semi-apatetic" must have existed within their ranks. Moreover, they still failed to overcome all speech-group differences as is proven by the existence of Chinese welfare, religious and business associations operating on those traditional lines, though with an overall declining significance. The group, in part, retained traditional Chinese customs which had been abandoned and even denigrated in Communist China. This disenchanted those attached to ^{the} traditional Chinese culture, who could be potential supporters of the Communists in China. Filial piety and family relations values, ancestral grave yards and religious procession still constituted a profound concern for that part of the Chinese Educated.

The failure of Kuo Yu' to become the sole or, at least, the major spoken dialect must have been related to the fairly strong and positive kinship relations among the Chinese in Singapore. Besides an "objective" difficulty inherent in the identical characters used for all dialects, which rendered impossible the promulgation of Kuo Yu' ~~through~~ ^{through} written media, it had only fairly limited time on the radio among programmes in Hokkien and Cantonese, not to speak of English, Malay and Tamil. Chinese classes alone could not elevate Kuo Yu' to ^a dominant

position, and as a result, it remained a largely unspoken dialect though to a great measure understood. But, as the contracted living quarters of Singapore made inter speech-group confrontations ubiquitous, and as residential areas became more heterogenous during the post W.W.II. days, it seemed that Kuo Yu was in a position to spread over the entire Chinese population. This did not occur, although the expansion of that national vernacular became an official policy in China. Many of the Chinese in Singapore had a speaking proficiency in more than one dialect, especially the non Hokkiens. It is worth adding that even in China, where a constant propaganda campaign to spread Kuo Yu has existed and where the education system was harnessed for the task, the South East is still largely dialectal.

Merger and Secession.

(i) The P.A.P. Until Merger. Created in 1954 as a moderate left ^{-wing} party, the P.A.P. was later infiltrated by radical ~~W.W.II. period~~ and officially symbolized extreme anti-imperialism. Its ranks increased by massive propaganda, which differentiated it from personality orientated parties of the post W.W.II. period. Between 1955 and 1957, the leadership of the party divided between those with strong communist affiliations and the moderates, mainly of English Educated liberal leftists. The party avoided a direct bid for power in the 1955 elections as government under the contemporary constitution seemed unfavourable for a radically oriented party.

Lim Yew-hock's strict security measures hit the leftist leadership of the party by administrative detention, and this

brought Lee Kwan Yew and Toh Chin Chye, the moderates, to the fore (162). The moderate leadership was acceptable to the chief minister and the British, but had difficulties in controlling the extreme leftist low-level party activists and hence the rank and file (163). With 141,000 union members in 1957 (164), the "basic factor in Singapore's political development had been the proletarian nature of Singapore's society, a condition conducive to the growth of extreme left wing, and in this case communist dominated labour activity" (165). This greatly hampered Lee Kwan Yew and the moderates in taking effective control of the party machinery. Nevertheless, after some internal friction, personnel changes and secession of some extremists, Lee remained in control of the party, though still not in full authoritarian command of it (166).

In 1959, the party wholeheartedly harnessed itself for the election campaign, and emerged victorious with 54 percent of the votes and 43 seats out of 51 in parliament. The impressive victory came as a result of the reorganization of the party after the 1957 crisis, at the end of which no other party showed any similar degree of organization and grass root penetration. The party practically dominated the political scene during the election campaign. The disorganization of the parties on the P.A.P.'s right (167) and the dislocation of the groups to the left before the elections, provided the party with the conditions, and after the election also with governmental machinery, to reestablish its political dominance from the succeeding elections to the present time.

The P.A.P. government introduced a democratic political setting which is almost unique in Southeast Asia, although

relations between party and government in Singapore lie somewhere between those existing in Western Democracies and those in the communist countries. When it came to power in 1959, still under a constitution which denied it total independence, it could choose between a policy of demanding full separate independence or that of merger with Malaya. As already mentioned, the vast majority of the population did not favour separate independence. There were the economic links with Malaya, the fear of isolation in the midst of a Malay world surrounding a Chinese dominated Singapore, and a prospect of concerted Chinese political action within a united Malaya.

Since the mid 1950s, the Alliance coalition in Malaya, dominated by U.M.N.O. did not regard merger as favourable for itself. Merger would have jeopardized the precarious Malay majority, and would have added an organized leftist, presumably communist led, entity into a country, which had just undergone the disturbances of the Communist rebellion. Therefore, the rejection~~on~~ as formulated by the Tunku (168) was trenchant, though termed in fairly vague terms emphasizing the inability of Singapore to accept the Malayan constitution. ~~But~~ ^{However,} in order to change the image of Singapore and make it more palatable to the British and to Malaya, the P.A.P. government decided to cooperate with both in internal security matters, an arrangement which was also beneficial to the P.A.P. government itself. As the P.A.P. was open to all ethnic groups from its inception, it decided, after its political victory, to adopt a "Malayan Culture" policy in order to increase its credibility in Kuala Lumpur. Talks concerning the conditions of merger between

Singapore and Malaya continued between 1959 and 1961, when the Malays accepted Singapore as a possible partner in a suggested Malaysian Federation to also include North Borneo. In 1961, it became clear that Singapore's ultimate conditions for merger amounted to the right for independent labour legislation and an educational system. The latter condition did not seem compatible with the "Malayan Culture" policy, and the former was essential in view of the developed trade unionism in the city.

In 1961, leftist members of the P.A.P., including some M.P.s, defected to create the Barisan Sosialis party (B.S.). They opposed Merger, not in principle but on the conditions of acceptance, and specifically: the unfair representation of Singapore in the proposed Federal Government and the discriminating citizenship laws against the Chinese (169). They based their argument on the precedence of the acceptance of Penang and Malacca to the Federation in 1948 (170). The acceptance on those terms was impractical, and the B.S. proposal must be interpreted as ^{a bid} ~~an attempt~~ to undermine a political development, which almost followed their declared ideals, in order to embarrass the P.A.P.. Lee publicly committed himself to Merger declaring full independence to be "ludicrous" in the existing circumstances (171).

It was estimated that 80 percent of the P.A.P. members defected when the B.S. was created in 1961 (172), while another estimate put the proportion at two thirds (173). Nevertheless, by new nominations of cadres the party rebuilt itself in a very short time, as, in retrospect, the successes in the 1962 referendum and the 1963 elections may prove.

Citizens Consultative Committees were created by the P.A.P. and became widespread to bring the party activity nearer to the public, and a reshuffle in trade unions' cadres introduced moderation into the activity of those organizations with a resulting decrease in industrial stoppages in 1962 (175). Success in the referendum reassured the P.A.P. leadership that the public was under control and that their policy of "independence through merger" would meet only weak opposition. The 1963 elections gave the P.A.P. 37 seats in parliament with 47 percent of the vote, the B.S. got 13 with 33 percent of the vote and one seat went to a small party; the Alliance^t totally failed.

By 1961, merger became the official common policy of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. It remained during the two following years to decide its detailed conditions, which finally could be generalized as: according Singapore economic advantages at the expense of its democratic political representation and citizenship rights (176). For example, the representation quotas to the Federal parliament envisaged a one per 30,000 representation for North Borneo, one per 60,000 for Malaya and only one per 113,000 to Singapore (177). Nevertheless, during the negotiations for Merger, pragmatism prevailed over principles and ideologies, yet concealed intentions later began to float over the seemingly clear water of mutual accord.

(ii) Further Political Developments. The first cracks in the Merger foundation appeared during the negotiation period, as both the M.C.A. and the P.A.P. announced their

intentions of future political action in Singapore and Malaya respectively. The P.A.P. envisaged a political cooperation with leftist non-communist parties in Malaya, which parties, however, rejected that bid. This intention presented a real danger to the M.C.A. supremacy in the Chinese community of Malaya. That community provided a potential "recruiting space" for a possible P.A.P. expansion into Malaya, which could displace the M.C.A. from its position in the Alliance. A journalist well posted near P.A.P. sources, put it bluntly: "He who speaks of the Chinese in Singapore speaks as well for all the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Sibn ..." (178). This P.A.P. - M.C.A. confrontation seemed as if restricted to inter-Chinese relations, yet, the Tunku well understood the difficulties which would have followed, had the politically aggressive P.A.P. outplayed the docile M.C.A. The racial bloc constitution of the proposed Malaysian Federation showed that the Chinese had 42.3 percent of the population, the Muslim bloc - 41.6 percent, the Indian - 9.9, and the North Borneo tribes - 5 percent. The distribution in case of Singapore's exclusion would consist of only 35.7 percent Chinese, 47.0 - muslim, 10.1 percent Indian and 5.9 percent North Bornean tribes (179). The percentage difference could seem marginal, yet, excluding Singapore would have meant getting rid of a Chinese aggressive element, which eventually could destroy the Malay political dominance in the Malaysian Federation.

The M.C.A.-P.A.P. dispute, not unlike the pro-K.M.T. - Communist confrontation, divided the Chinese middle-class in Malaya and Singapore, and demonstrated that, at least at the leadership level, politico-economic considerations, and perhaps

also personal ambitions, outweighed ethnic and even blood ties solidarities (180). Another political initiative, undertaken by the P.A.P. in 1963, exhibited disregard, if not a direct insult, towards Malaya and the Tunku's authority. This was the proclamation of Singapore's independence and, following Lee's persuasion, also that of Sarawak and Sabah before Merger. This could be interpreted as a combined bid of the subaltern partners to contest the primacy of Malaya in the new Federation. Discipline and practical acceptance of the constitution as well as courtesy towards the senior partner, constituted a field in which the P.A.P. continued to commit several faux pas before and during merger. Lee's visits to Africa, Australia and Southeast Asian countries were intended perhaps to promote Singapore's external trade (181), yet, they embarrassed the Tunku as the constitution excluded foreign affairs from the responsibility of all federated states. But, the crucial act occurred in 1964, when the P.A.P. took part in the elections in Malaya. This was said to have caught the Alliance by surprise, perhaps as regards timing rather than intention. Though the P.A.P.-sponsored party got only 13 seats, and, in general, the first appearance in public of the P.A.P. could be interpreted as a failure, it nevertheless caused a "Malayan Malay" resurgence in U.M.N.O., the "M.C.A. acquiescing approvingly at the elimination of this political threat to themselves as well" (182). As a result of a growing political tension between the P.A.P. and the U.M.N.O., ethnic riots broke out in Singapore in 1964, and similar riots were imminent in Malaya. This led to final secession, or in reality to the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia.

When ~~the~~ secession occurred, one of the significant reasons for the creation of merger, had already ceased to exist i.e. the communist take-over threat. Internal security administration in its centralized form became superfluous when the B.S. in Singapore lost much of its "teeth", and the M.C.P. continued to "hibernate" after its defeat in Malaya. This tended to accentuate disputes rather than mutual links with Malaya (183).

An Independent City-State.

The politico-geographical implications of Singapore's secession in 1965 were twofold. On the one hand, total sovereignty affected the relations of its government with other states as well as with its own people through its newly acquired direct links of voter with the supreme government. On the other hand, the various ethnic groups' relations with their counterparts in the extra-territorial cultural centres and in other countries also changed. Neither of the ethnic groups showed much delight over the new political status, and the government clearly demonstrated its worries over the uncertainty of the ^{politico-economic} ~~economic-political~~ outcome of secession. The P.A.P. government still considered the perpetuation of Singapore's primacy in Southeast Asia in income per capita as a major goal for achievement. In the new circumstances, it became a special challenge and, therefore, the former liberal and capitalistic economic policy was reaffirmed. The related policy of ethnic tolerance was also maintained to the point of virtually declaring Singapore a non-Chinese city, as in the contemporary atmosphere of Southeast Asian economic indigenism a Chinese city-state would have had small chances of cooperation

and sympathy. Thus, in order to obviate a potential image of a "Third China", Singapore became unique in Southeast Asia in proclaiming a policy of "multi-racialism" or "plural culturalism", although, at least theoretically, considering its democratic régime, this could produce difficulties in imposing a cohesive state-idea.

The idea of Singapore's economic dependence on Malaya had been established ever since tin, and more especially rubber, became important trading and processing commodities in Singapore's external trade. It was further augmented when subsequent trading relations followed, yet, this originally British idea also implicitly induced the notion (amply proven through the non-existence of a contradictory example) that the Asians had to have European economic leadership in high business and governmental levels. Not only the British educated Chinese leaders of all parties, but also the leftist leadership accepted the idea of Singapore-Malaya inseparability, when independence was in the offing after W.W.II. (184).

The P.A.P. leadership was the first to undertake to prove the fallacy of that idea by adapting Singapore to the new conditions existing in the mid 1960s in Southeast Asia. Without underestimating the importance of Malayan trade, they had already realized that they could make use of the skilled labour force in increasing the industrial manufacturing share in income generation. Hong Kong had provided a good example in that respect, and Singapore had also indulged itself in that direction. As for their capacities to lead the economy on the governmental level, their past experience in power showed neither less efficiency than the British had demonstrated, nor worry about the big Chinese merchants' abilities. Moreover, Confrontation

with Indonesia, which greatly affected trade between it and Singapore, did not produce an economic crisis, though in terms of value, ^{this trade} ~~it~~ must have been close to that of Malaysia. It ensued that with good political judgement and effective control of the population, Singapore had substantial chances of success in its new independent way.

The Political and Economic Background. When Singapore became independent in 1965, neither the World Powers nor Japan and Britain changed their policies and commitments in Southeast Asia. Especially the British base in Singapore provided for the new independent state, a deterrent against Indonesian aggression (185). Thus, in the immediate neighbourhood Indonesia was reduced to verbal attacks, while the more remote Philippines were attenuating their political attitude towards Malaysia in general and Singapore in particular.

The eviction of Singapore from the Federation did not, ~~however~~ create any immediate hostility between it and Malaysia, not the least because of the Tunku's affability and the net territorial gain Malaya got through its remaining partners in Malaysia. Though some "public declarations" were exchanged between Lee and the Tunku, they did not sever their relations. Also, the Chinese in Malaya did not agitate, when secession decreased their proportion in the population of Malaysia, mainly because of the M.C.A. political enmity with the P.A.P. and also as a result of the M.C.P. political and military impotency. In addition, the weakness of P.A.P. supporters in Malaya and the official policy of Singapore, of minimizing the ill effects of secession, ^{decreased} ~~minimized~~ the danger to political stability from that quarter. Peace was especially essential for Singapore in its

first years of independence, but, apparently, Confrontation and the reality of a Chinese island in the midst of a Malay ocean of 120 million people did not portend ~~immediate~~ political stability. However, maintaining Malay as a national language and proclaiming a non-Chinese identity, Singapore expected to reduce Malay resentment of its creation, and Confrontation could produce for Singapore opportunities of survival through the playing off of Malaysia and Indonesia. As a last resort there were the British, whose armed forces could defend Singapore against an Indonesian invasion and whose conciliatory influence could reduce Malayan hostility. Moreover, Singapore still held two trump cards against Malaya: the possibility of Singapore, if not becoming communist at least to align itself to a communist bloc hostile to Malaysia (186), and the importance of Singapore to the economy of Malaya, from purely economic considerations as well as internal politico-economic ones. This was perhaps in Lee's mind when he said before secession that Singapore was no less vital to Malaya, than Malaya to Singapore (187). The interpretation of that statement ^{may} have taken into account the pure economic fact that port services, trade and financial facilities for Malaysia's economy were still more economical to operate from Singapore. In the event that Malaysia would fast develop these services on its own territory in order to strangle Singapore, the Malayan Chinese would inevitably benefit economically from that development. From a bumiputra point of view, it seemed preferable that the Singapore Chinese and not those of Kuala Lumpur ^{would} increase their economic strength. In addition, there always remained the possibility of smuggling, for which geographical proximity, shallow tree covered shores, swampland and calm waters provided optimal conditions, and

indeed, which had never stopped. The recent smuggling between Indonesia and Singapore (188) must have been known to the Malaysian government. In the last resort, had Malaysia broken its trade relations with Singapore, the latter could still expect an improvement of its trade with Indonesia, as Lee himself declared (189). With all these political and economic considerations, Singapore's leadership officially declared its regrets for secession and its hopes for a future merger.

Singapore more than Malaya bore the economic brunt during Confrontation. Its external trade in 1964 and 1965 went down 1,500 and 1,300 million Singapore dollars respectively over the 1963 total figure of 7,754 million (190), which must have been the result of its loss of the Indonesian trade. This is verified by the 1955-1959 figures, which for a slightly smaller annual average total external trade, Indonesia's share exceeded 1,200 million S. \$ (191). Nevertheless, former planning resulted in increasing added value by industrial production, which in 1964 and 1965 improved both its "per worker" figure and the number of workers involved (192).

The industrial development realized among other smaller places in the Jurong Industrial Estate project, justified the government economic planning of pre-Merger days which envisaged a total investment of 871 million S. \$ for the 1961-64 period; 58 percent were allocated for economic investment and 40 percent to social development. By 1963 about 75 percent of the objectives planned had been achieved (193). The plan and its successful achievement must have increased the P.A.P. leadership's self assurance in their governmental abilities.

The expansion of the economy through investment in industry increased the Gross Domestic Expenditure (estimated figures) in

1964 and in 1965 over that of 1963, and though the per capita index slightly decreased in 1964 over 1963, it considerably increased in 1965 to reach 1,550 S.\$. Also, the Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation increased in 1964-1965 (194). Thus the setback suffered by the decline in entrepôt trade, which had been foreseen by the government, was more than offset by other sources (195). But despite merger and confrontation the Singapore - Malaysia trade did not show a spectacular "jump" in the sense that it did not compensate for the loss of trade with Indonesia. Nevertheless, it was increasing with a positive balance of payments for Singapore and, especially with the decrease in Indonesian trade, the Malayan share in the total external trade proportionally increased (196).

The relatively favourable economic prospects in combination with the West's unwillingness to see Singapore setting out in quest of a Communist bloc support, enabled the P.A.P. to continue their close economic and political relations with the West. Had secession occurred during a "rapprochement" period between ~~Indonesia and Malaysia~~ Indonesia and Malaysia, it could have happened that the West would have sacrificed Singapore in favour of a united Western-Malay alignment in the event that the latter would have been hostile to Singapore. Also, as things stood in 1965, the P.A.P. held full sway in Singapore (197): the leftists were disorganized (198) and the potential resistance from the Chinese Educated to its multi-racial policy ~~in the event of secession~~ did not materialize, as they were organized in multifarious small associations, lacking central control.

Inner Political and Social Developments. The liberal economic system of Singapore has favoured owners, investors and

entrepreneurs in order to maintain a high rate of development (199). However, for positive popular response through social justice, it has been following a policy of government expenditure favouring the lower-income strata of the population (200) decreasing unemployment and maintaining relatively reasonable wages. This socialist touch of the democratic government has been supported by government ownership of considerable economic assets. Government investment has been increasing and, since 1967, has outweighed the private sector's share.

Speaking on behalf of the Singaporeans, and "echoing" Lee Kwan Yew, Josey said that that they wanted: "more than parliamentary democracy on Western lines, [a] good government by good men"; and to be in a position if they so wished, to reject an oppressive or incompetent government by secret ballot (201). The theme of a good government and of a tough and responsible leadership was oftentimes expressed by Lee, stressing that it was the only possible democratic system of government. "A soft people, faced with tough problems electing a soft government, soon find themselves in chaos and confusion, which in turn inevitably lead to the imposition of a military rule" (202). In the case of Singapore the alternative was a communist rule by the B.S./M.C.P. (203). Considering the socio-political circumstances of 1962, with the B.S. mass rallying people into the streets, and Chinese high schools serving as hotbeds for leftist agitation, the theme of "tough leadership" becomes understandable as regards the perpetuation of the democratic system.

The referendum of 1962 and the elections of 1963 demonstrated that the P.A.P. could match the B.S. in activating

the political field. Emulating leftist methods of political work at grass root level, increasing their number of non-corrupt cadres and organizing them into a closely knit party organization (204), they reaped their political reward from the ballot box. Moreover, internal security and administrative detention, indeed a British legacy, enabled the P.A.P. to waylay the leftists; in early 1965, 200 of them were under detention (205). The P.A.P. political activities and the security measures constituted, however, only one aspect of the measures leading to its success; provision of better social services to ease off social pressure was ~~more significant~~ more significant, and it directly depended on the economic success of Singapore.

Under P.A.P. rule education facilities improved, not so much on the primary level, which had been quite widespread even before 1959 (206), as on the secondary and university levels. Secondary school attendance almost doubled during 1961-1966, rising from 67,857 to 132,088 (207), and university-level enrolment rose from 8,966 to 13,807 during 1961-1965 (208). In later years, the increase was not at as fast a rate, seemingly as a result of satisfying most of the demand. But education in itself could not ease social pressure, in certain conditions it has been known ^{to be} the actual cause of that same pressure, especially when economic conditions did not lead to socio-economic integration of the graduates according to their expectations. Smooth integration, nevertheless, followed in Singapore as, among other things, the economy was expanding and a conscription army was established.

Besides promulgating its socio-economic policy through education and propaganda, the P.A.P. took effective control of the trade unions. Relieving them from leftist leadership,

the government drastically reduced labour stoppages, but it also maintained wages commensurate with the rise in the retail price index. The figures concerning labour stoppages illustrate the net economic gain, but the social benefit must have been even greater.

Table C-14 Industrial Stoppages (209).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Workers Involved</u>	<u>Man-day Lost.</u>
1961	43,584	410,889
1962	6,647	165,124
1963	33,004	388,219
1964	2,535	35,908
1965	3,347	45,800
1966	1,288	44,762
1967	4,491	41,322
1968	172	11,477
1969	-	8,512
1970	1,749	2,514
1971	1,380	5,499

Population figures according to ethnic groups are shown in the next table.

Table C-15 Demographic Data. (210).

	<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Malay</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>(Pop. in 1,000)..</u>
Census	1947	938	730	114	69	26	
"	1957	1,446	1,091	197	124	34	
Estimate	1960	1,646	1,252	232	128	35	
"	1965	1,887	1,440	277	135	35	
Census	1970	2,075	1,580	311	145	38	

The table shows that within an increasing population the ethnic groups generally kept their former proportions with only minor changes.

Table C-16 Demographic Data (211).

Year	1961	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71
Pop. growth per 1,000	29.3	27.9	27.5	25.9	24.1	22.9	20.2	18.0	16.8	17.0	16.9
Inter group Marriages absolute numbers	361	451	425	508	505	538	527	659	675	788	

The decline in natural growth (table C-16) came as a result of a decrease in the birth rate, as the death rate for that period remained between 5.0 and 5.9 per thousand (212). This index of modernization of the Singapore society directly attests to changes in cultural values concerning quality-of-life questions. Yet, another aspect of social modernization, that of cultural integration and amalgamation, remained essentially unchanged as proved by ethnic group intermarriages figures (Table C-16). The official cultural policy of letting each ethnic group maintain and develop its specific way of life, certainly was not conducive to higher intermarriage figures. Without actually forcing the issue, the government ~~nevertheless~~ hoped that, as time went by, the state-idea of Singapore would catch hold and bring about socio-cultural amalgamation. The separate cultural persistence proves that not all developments correspond with the government's hopes, and may even run counter to official policies of greater significance.

The annual contingent, which presented itself to the labour market increased from approximately 27,000 to about 51,000, during 1957-1971 (213). However, actual figures must have been considerably lower as, at least not all the females actually demanded work. Nevertheless, this contingent constituted a heavy burden on the labour market by any standard. As by 1971, the numbers of all those gainfully occupied

totalled 487,464, the extent of the problem is remarkable, yet, "live" registrations at employment exchanges decreased during 1961-1963 from 54,058 to 42,777. It later increased from 50,667 in 1964 to 72,350 in 1967, from which latter date it gradually decreased to reach 35,953 in 1971 (214). In that same year, unemployment must have been about 8 percent, if numbers actually represented all those unemployed.

As already mentioned, the creation of a conscription army offered a respite for industrial expansion improving the labour intake capacity of the market. This may have brought about the decrease in absolute numbers of employment seekers in the 1967-1971 period.

Former poor living conditions (215) and the annual increase in population put great pressure on the government in housing projects. The Housing and Development Board (H.D.B.) projects eased living conditions while substantially helping to sustain the economic expansion. In 1959 and 1960, it built ~~some~~ *some* 1,650 flats and shops, the numbers increasing to 7,320 in 1961, to 12,230 in 1962 and to 10,085 in 1963 (216). In 1965, 69,660 units were under H.D.B. management, increasing to 126,710 in 1971 (217).

Between 1960 and 1971, the consumer price index in Singapore rose only 13.6 percent, about a one percent compound annual increase. Food, constituting almost 51 percent of the price index rose 14.3 percent in price, and housing constituting about 15 percent of the index increased by 16 percent (218). During 1960 and 1965, private consumption at fixed 1960 prices rose 34 percent from 1,742 million S.\$ to 2,330 million (219), while the population increased 14.5%. Adding the 5 percent

increase in consumer prices to the increase in population during that period, it transpires that about 14.5 percent constituted the increase in private consumption in real terms.

As already mentioned, the Singapore Armed Forces (S.A.F.) have fulfilled a socio-economic function as a pressure outlet for the labour market, and it may continue so to serve at least until a smaller age-group is annually released to the labour market, or until the economy is ^{able} to absorb greater numbers. The main reason for the creation of the S.A.F. was indeed politico-strategic: to maintain independence and sovereignty. Planning envisaged British presence until 1975, and two army brigades, to be set up in five years, were deemed sufficient, but in view of the early British withdrawal the phases had to be accelerated in 1968 (220).

The defence policy of Singapore has been based on several long term strategic and political considerations, which still seem valid in 1973. The basic assumption was the strategic importance of Singapore in global terms, to the world blocs, with ~~which~~ ^(of which) one Singapore ~~would~~ have to associate itself. Although a reduction of tension between the World Powers would entail a decline in the Third World's political importance, Singapore's strategic location would still render her a bargaining power in her choice of a grand ally (221). Independent armed forces were deemed an imperative necessity for participation in a regional collective defence agreement, as otherwise Singapore's neighbours could have ignored it. Singapore naval and air units were assigned with the defence of the immediate approaches to the island, while security of free passage in the Straits of Malacca was deemed outside of its military abilities (222).

Regional military cooperation with a friendly Malaysia under the Alliance government, involving joint defence projects, undertaken when the British would have left, seemed a natural expectation after secession. Later, when Sukarno tumbled, it was assumed that the Suharto regime would not exhibit an offensive attitude towards Singapore. Nevertheless, a possibility of either neighbour turning hostile at short notice seemed a reasonable longer view of the situation, which was summed up: "we can find no ground for complacency" (223).

Reaction to the creation of the S.A.F inside Singapore varied from total hostility demonstrated by the B.S., to public scepticism, and to a probable support from the P.A.P. members. The B.S. finding fault with everything initiated by the P.A.P., and for whom Malaysia was a "U.S.-British base" and Singapore - "a bogus republic" (224), tried to arouse public opinion against the creation of the S.A.F. The public, who traditionally considered security, and mainly defence, as a British responsibility, generally believed that this was a wastage of money. The public, still not acculturated to the independent Singapore state idea, considered business and the professions as providing higher status than military service. Nevertheless, the P.A.P. decidedly undertook to create the S.A.F. and based it on a two to three year period of national service.

The decision against the establishment of a regular army stemmed from negative and positive reasons. The negative one postulated that "no regular army in Asia has ever been built up and been demobilized. This has a momentum of its own: as it grows bigger, its appetite grows with it, and it begins to swallow the whole" (225). In the existing economic conditions of Singapore, the postulate seemed out of context; though the model

of such a political change had been perceived by political scientists, it pertained to economically frustrated underdeveloped countries (226). The positive reason for the creation of a conscription army could be resumed to be as follows: a multi-ethnic army under good leadership could acculturate itself and the public with the state idea, bringing about a situation where everybody would identify Singapore's survival with his own. When Lee spoke to school principals, he referred to the Swiss, Israeli and Finnish armed forces as political acculturation agents for the state-idea of small countries (227).

By 1968, the P.A.P. beat all opposition in the elections, and emerging as a totally dominant party, left no room for opposition in Parliament.

Prelude to and Formulation of the Ideology. Most of the characteristics modifying a state-idea exist in various degrees of intensity in the Singaporean one, whether it be the territorial sovereignty, the demand for sacrifice from the population, the propaganda system or the hostility to minorities resisting values of political integration. Furthermore, Singapore, like most states, possesses both overt and covert policies in that respect, and sometimes makes temporary concessions to internal and external opposition for tactical reasons.

Total and indivisible sovereignty as a value inherent in the state-idea was introduced by the government in 1965, but, the idea of Singapore's uniqueness within the former political entities of Malaya had been historically established. Although this uniqueness was socio-economically derived, it always manifested itself in a political construction of one sort or another. This must have created pride within Singapore's

sedentary population ~~not~~, and certainly reduced the resentment of those groups which did not directly benefit from Singapore's independence. The leftists who adopted the communist politico-geographical conception of the unity of Malaya and Singapore opposed Singapore's independence. Their communist conception of the economy made them denigrate the role of trade, and their political conception of strife between the World Powers and between the communist and non-communist countries would suggest that they were ready to relinquish a priori the commercial position of Singapore for political unity with Malaya. The implementation of this state-idea would have involved excessive economic sacrifices from Singapore's population of all political shades. It would be interesting to speculate on a possibility in which Malaya turned communist and the British clung to Singapore, ~~or remained independent~~. In that situation, relations between Malaya and Singapore might have developed, not unlike those of the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, still enhancing Singapore's uniqueness vis a vis Malaya, but also emphasizing its complementary role to the Malayan economy.

Historical events, however, brought about a leadership whose image of Singapore, in its macro-geographical conception, greatly resembled that of Raffles. They could not separate the city from its international and regional commercial ties. That leadership, dependent on popular suffrage, like Raffles, understood the importance of trade in the city's economy. Trade generated employment for the mass of workers, whose interests the leaders were guarding. Marshall, Lim Yew Hock and later Lee Kwan Yew represented that leadership, the former in its fairly unorganized form, the latter in its efficient regimented expression. While since the 1960s industrial production began

encroaching on the entrepôt trade's share in the national income, its dependence on trade for raw materials as well as for marketing did not change the basic conception of the city's role. However, the post-W.W.II. Singaporean leaders, either by virtue of their British education, or - in the case of leftist leaders - by their adoption of the M.C.P. politico-geographical conception, accepted the inseparability of Singapore and Malaya, a British modification to Raffle's original conception. It is with that image in mind that Singapore's official leadership endeavoured to bring Singapore into federation with Malaya after the 1950s. They were ready to sacrifice sovereignty in foreign affairs and defence for economic cooperation. It is most unlikely that they would have integrated with a centralized state or that, in 1963, the P.A.P. would have merged without retaining its rights over education and labour legislation. These indicated the advanced position of Singapore in Southeast Asia in social modernization.

The slogan adopted in the early 1960s was "independence through merger" which could be interpreted either literally, or that merger provided a means by which independence would be achieved through the P.A.P. penetrating into Malaysia (228). In any event, in 1963 the P.A.P. could not think of separate independence as practical, as on the one hand, the B.S. was still strongly agitating, and the Chinese Educated would not waste a chance of combining with the Chinese in Malaysia in a possible bid to dominate ^{the country} ~~Malaysia~~. On the other hand, in 1963, Singapore, having no armed forces of its own, thought it wiser to ally itself with a Malay entity, thus ^{reducing the danger from a} ~~and integrating with~~ the Malay World in the midst of which it constituted an island of aliens. In short,

Singapore's "dependent state-idea" before and during merger was governed by pragmatic policies of maintaining its economic primacy in the region, and of commensurately remunerating its people. ~~as well as by maintaining~~ ^{Both the} political cleavage between Malaysia and Indonesia and ~~maintaining~~ ^{the minimization of the} opposition inside the city, *seemed beneficial to Singapore in 1963.*

(i) Singapore's Independent State-Idea. Had Singapore remained within Malaysia, and the P.A.P. democratically presented itself before the entire electorate of Malaysia, the party would have undoubtedly enhanced its Chinese character and perhaps also its social radicalism. This would have been due to the nature of the potential supporters of the P.A.P., which resembled those of the 1950s in Singapore, i.e. Chinese ~~and~~ ~~Indians~~ wage earners and shopkeepers. It so turned out, however, that secession brought about a more moderating influence on the implementation of Singapore's independent state-idea. As already mentioned, the basic tenets of their moderate policy were to destroy the image of a Third China, which would have impaired Singapore's external trade relations, and also, being democratic, to remunerate its people in order to get their vote at the expense of maximizing the state's wealth.

The character of the Singaporean identity, besides being defined by its citizenship laws and geographical boundaries, lay in the creation of a "multi-racial" society, or a "cultural pluralistic" community. Lee Kwan Yew said of the uniqueness of Singapore, that with 80 percent Chinese, it was a distinct community, neither Chinese, Malay nor Tamil. In this sense, the policy of 1965 in its explicit formulation remained unchanged: "I do not think, and I never did think that race or ethnic affinity was the fundamental basis of any national unity" (229). Also the M.C.P., as its name implies, had embarked on

a similar policy, albeit with an almost totally Chinese membership. This line, besides being ethnically just was perhaps adopted out of grave concern for the fate of the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, who might be subject to persecutions and deportation to the new Chinese political entity. A single culture state-idea in Singapore would have been difficult to impose upon the multi-racial society, ^{although it} ~~was~~ ~~impossible~~ ~~to~~ ~~ensure~~ ~~at~~ ~~least~~ ~~the~~ ~~immediate~~ ~~support~~ ~~of~~ ~~75~~ ~~percent~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~population~~. But, as this culture would have entailed the image of a third China, the method chosen by the P.A.P., totally contrasting that of the other Southeast Asian countries, was to maintain the cultural pluralism while awaiting the slow integration of the elites of the various ethnic groups (230). However, the low proportion of Malays among the socio-economic elite of Singapore constituted an obstacle for Malay integration, as no priorities were anticipated for this weaker ethnic group.

To the P.A.P. leadership, whose only organized opposition in Singapore was the B.S., the adoption of a Singaporean identity has been associated with their own party (231), and support for the P.A.P. actually meant support for a Singaporean identity. Thus, the party political division became the divide between two opposing state-ideas. The Malays and Indians could gain very little from supporting separate ethnic political parties. These could not coalesce with an ethnic Chinese opposition party against the P.A.P., who dominated the parliament.

There remained the possibility that the B.S., rebounding from its relative inactivity and allying itself with those Chinese

Educated dissatisfied with the education policy, would create a centre of opposition in a bid for political power in Singapore. Indeed, the cultural policy of the government provided some reasons for Chinese dissatisfaction with some aspects of its application. The lack of government support for the Nan Yang university, for Chinese associations, and the lingual problem were outstanding. The language issue seemed especially incompatible with the government policy of ethnic equality. With almost 80 percent Chinese in Singapore, Chinese and Tamil had the same official standing, while Malay remained, at least pro forma, the national language, and English the official one. The latter was supposed to facilitate the learning of Western techniques, yet China had proved that even the most modern science and technology could be taught in Chinese. However, English provided a better means for inter-ethnic communication and helped to efface a potential image of a Third China Singapore.

Also, in connection with the state-idea, the P.A.P. leadership, following Lee's formulation, promulgated the theme of a "strong government". This must have been the democratic manifestation of a firm governmental hold on the political, social and economic activities of the population. With practically no *other* political party ~~adhering to~~ supporting Singapore's independence, a change in government would mean another state-idea, communistic or racially intolerant, or perhaps military backed by plutocrats.

"Strong" or "tough" government did not mean an irrational government. The high population-resource ratio of the island did not permit any eccentricities in external relations, such as exhibited by Sukarno's Indonesia or Ne Win's Burma. Both could let the economy deteriorate to subsistence level by embarking

on unusual political policies. In this sense, some governments may be tough in disregard of people's needs and rights. The term "tough" itself may have derived from Lee's educational background in the British school system, which had a long reputation of character formation, yet cherished the democratic way of life.

Toughness meant an efficient government inflexible in pursuing its aims of remunerating its working people and controlling essential socio-economic sectors, where private enterprise was likely to fail. There was no question of corruption being tolerated or inefficiency accepted. People and leaders had to work hard and abide by (Chinese and Indian) achievement values, rather than by (Malay) ascriptive values. Government intervention in labour relations was deemed crucial and thus the labour unions came under unofficial control. Public services and the media came under government control and ownership (232). The government ~~also~~ invested in developing the infrastructure and also became owners of industrial enterprises. Toughness meant also providing all ethnic groups with equal opportunities in education, jobs and the use of public services. This actually resulted in less opportunities for the underprivileged Malays. Moreover, the P.A.P. dominating the political scene of Singapore, whose Chinese and Indian population have had a long tradition of hard work almost without social security, did not consider social welfare (excepting housing and health) as demanding a high priority. This again handicapped the Malays. In addition, the government banned "hippies" and Western long hair style as representing decadence and lack of achievement values.

The small size of the island and the excellent communication network facilitated efficient government control, while larger

neighbouring countries lacking in communications had to resort to provincial and local governments and sometimes to ethnic traditional institutions to control the people. Singapore could dispense with all these agencies with their centrifugal tendencies and literally maintain~~ing~~ direct government control (233). This control has provided besides direct information on people's grievances and attitudes, a means to prevent corruption of the civil service, and to facilitate the taking of a palliative or other desired measure without delay. To this one may add the developed and reliable statistical service which constantly feels Singapore's demographic and economic heartbeat (234).

Information on the state of the people's affairs and the promulgation of the ideology would have been useless unless the government disposed of its own economic resources. The capitalistic nature of Singapore's economy did not exclude government participation in economic exploits, though usually the government tended not to interfere with private enterprise. Besides owning the statutory boards, the government's share in the total investment in commerce and industry was about one seventh in 1970 (235). It also augmented its reserves, holding 1,085 million S.\$ in Singapore and 2,200 million in foreign assets in 1969, while in 1959, when it came to power it inherited only 362 million S.\$ in foreign assets (236).

The expansion of industrial production largely resulted from government investments in the infrastructure, mainly in Jurong (237). Consequently, it was natural that the government gained through the increase in value of its land and water reserves. The development of the infrastructure was rapidly achieved as a result of the tough government legislation of land

acquisition for economic development. Brushing aside individual owners' rights was only one part of the toughness, remunerating according to market prices was the other part. The government's resourcefulness was also demonstrated when money was poured into the economy to minimize the ill effects of the British withdrawal, through economic investment, building projects and the creation of the S.A.F.. Few Southeast Asian countries showed that degree of shrewd judgement in choosing methods and in timing.

The theme of toughness concerned the entire population as well as the government. Though within a normal society only about 2 percent constitute the leadership prone (238), their importance is crucial in maximizing the performance of the entire society. Singapore had to develop so as to provide for that elite a field sufficient for their capacities, otherwise they would flee the country through "brain-drainage" (239). To that effect the tough society had to provide a fast rate of development through increasing competitive abilities. These had to be maintained by restricted consumption, a high investment rate, and technical skills. The latter depend on education, mainly on the English stream. However, not to arouse unnecessary opposition, a bi-lingual integrated school system has been established to ~~provide~~ ^{enable} those who prefer a Chinese education, also to advance economically. Restricted consumption in itself would increase discontent and might shrink the local market. Furthermore, the government with all its "toughness", still adhered to democratic principles and their ensuing social implications. They committed themselves to improving material remuneration to the public, and this largely materialized in education, housing and some direct wage increases. All these

measures tended to attenuate the ill effects of the essentially capitalistic economy. By controlled government expenditure and by attraction of industrial investment, the employment situation considerably improved. Also, the housing projects have alleviated the miserable living conditions of a large proportion of the population, and contributed to diversifying the former speech-group and sub-ethnic geographical concentrations, thus decreasing speech-group solidarities and creating better condition to gain thereby more allegiance to the state.

Direct remuneration in wages, has always had much more tangible popular response than indirect expenditure on social services. However, government policy had to keep control on excessive wage demands, and proportionally match them with actual production. In his 1971 new year's message to the people, Lee Kwan Yew said: "The government believes in a more liberal sharing of profits, where they have been exceptional". This statement has been realized through a joint meeting of the government and the trade-unions which suggested a level of wage increases commensurate with the growth in efficiency of the previous year. In 1972, the "problem of the year" was not to create jobs as in 1965 and 1968, but to upgrade skills and increase productivity "to create a gracious Singapore worthy of a people who have striven hard ... and deserve to go up the ladder of success" (240). With the approval of the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, wage increases substantiated the Prime Minister's declaration (241). This trend in improving the average share of employees in profits can be traced back to 1969, but, the government also fostered new industrial investment and this was perhaps the reason for the more rapid increase in profits.

(242).

Table C-17 Industrial Production and Employees' Remuneration.

Year	Establish- ment	Workers	In S. \$ Millions.				
			Input	Output	Value Added	Employees Remuner- ation	Capital Expenditure
1961	595	33,885	1,207	1,415	204	86	11
1962	642	35,533	1,495	1,741	241	93	36
1963	897	43,184	1,295	1,592	292	112	19
1964	965	46,284	1,227	1,545	310	122	54
1965	1,036	51,999	1,311	1,686	368	142	60
1966	1,159	57,521	1,531	1,980	438	162	76
1967	1,236	63,195	1,733	2,254	510	183	86
1968	1,626	80,533	2,138	2,806	649	226	96
1969	1,758	107,235	3,349	4,291	915	338	219
1970	1,790	126,361	3,437	4,627	1,141	415	425

With regard to the policy of workers remuneration, table C-17 may be analyzed by the following table.

Table C-18 Analysis of Employee Remuneration.

Year	A	B	C	D
1961	2,540	2,530	6,000	
1962	2,620	2,540	6,750	21,800
1963	2,590	2,510	6,750	2,480
1964	2,620	2,500	6,700	17,500
1965	2,710	2,570	7,050	10,500
1966	2,810	2,620	7,600	13,700
1967	2,880	2,610	8,050	14,300
1968	2,800	2,540	8,000	5,500
1969	3,140	2,830	8,500	8,250
1970	3,280	2,860	9,050	22,200
1971			9,950	

For explanation see footnote (243).

This table shows that workers remuneration in the industrial establishments employing more than nine workers was practically stagnant in 1961-1968, but considerably increased in

in 1969. In 1970 it remained at that ^{same} level, and according to official statements seems to have grown since then. However, ^{the} per capita value added was rising at a more rapid rate than wages during 1961-1971.

The toughness of the government in its socio-economic activities may justify a definition of Singapore as a capitalistic entity governed by a democratically conscious government, which has empowered itself to exercise a certain control of the economy and provide essential social services to the working class (244). In internal politics, however, the democratic nature of Singapore must be judged with regard to the nature of the opposition to the government. The communist inspired opposition has been known to resort to illegal and subversive activities in Southeast Asia. As a result, the government maintains the old regulations of administrative detention, which it uses to guard against groups who made no pledge to abide by democratic laws (245). However, the nature of administrative detention, makes it sometimes impossible to verify whether it is used against subversive or democratic oppositions.

(ii) The State's Viability: Opposition, Scepticism, Doubts and Hopes. Since its full independence, Singapore received official recognition from the West, from the Third World countries and from the East European communist bloc. China, North Korea and North Vietnam diplomatically ignored it, though they continued mutual trade relations, as they had done before and during merger. For example, the trade with China amounted to about 140 million S.\$ in 1961, rose to 247 million in 1965, and reached 454 million in 1971 (246), with an increasing trend in 1972 (247).

The failure of China to recognize Singapore, may be interpreted as political support for the M.C.P. and the B.S. and their state-idea. Although China expressed its disinterest in intervening with internal politics of other countries, and after the Bandung Conference went further and tried to help Indonesia solve the Chinese minorities problems, its policy towards Malaya and Singapore was totally different. The strength of communist supporters, and especially the proportion of the Chinese in the population, made it worthwhile delaying recognition of those countries (248). In 1972, following the détente in world politics, the prime minister of Malaysia visited Peking and mutual recognition was seriously considered. It must have had some reassuring effects on Singapore, and indeed Lee envisaged a thaw in diplomatic relations with China. ~~But~~ This does not mean that China does not or will not support subversive movements in the area.

The clean sweep of the 1972 elections, with a 70 percent majority and a win of all the seats in Parliament (249), proved a great victory for the P.A.P.. The main reasons may have been the socio-economic success of the government in realizing its plans, the economic expansion of Singapore, and also the disorganization of the opposition with only one faction of the B.S. participating in the elections. As previously, the P.A.P. limited political activities between election, and shortened the election campaign period, while legal restrictions made life particularly uneasy for the opposition. The 30 percent of the votes opposing the P.A.P. must have split among ethnic oriented groups, the B.S. and intellectual circles resenting a one party dominance in Parliament. The amount of opposition must have surprised the P.A.P. leadership, as this is the only way to

explain Lee's unexpected announcement, that he would consider the participation in Parliament of a non-elected opposition consisting of university teachers and intellectuals.

Following secession, some academic circles in Singapore expressed scepticism as regards the economico-political viability of the state. The scepticism, in contradistinction to ideological opposition, did not result from a belief in a utopian future, but from what seemed a rational evaluation of the situation. But, relying on general principles rather than on political reality, the sceptics underestimated Singapore's viability. Perhaps more than evaluation of the situation, declarations and formulae expressed by ministers may have created an atmosphere of crisis just after ~~secession~~^{secession.} Also some doubts concerning Singapore's future, expressed by leaders to the press, might have been interpreted as disenchantment or decrease in optimism, though it seems that they were originally intended to arouse public response through creating an atmosphere of crisis; a gimmick well known in mass leadership. It seems that the mood of crisis affected the academics and crept into titles of their works (250), and perhaps with the aim of consolidating the people's spirit also into Josey's book (251). However, the contents of the book with its demands, hopes and judgements of P.A.P. ministers, make its title mean reassurance through hard work, rather than loss of hope and indecision (252). It could be that owing to difference in personality and to the choice of words some speeches and declarations seem less assured than others.

Public response to the promulgation of Singapore's independent state-idea is difficult to assess, although some partial researches have been made to that effect. The Malays,

more than any other ethnic group, may delay their positive response as their allegiance has traditionally gone north of the causeway. The recent secession and their lower economic standing are not conducive to rapid political integration. The Indians, marginally better off than the Chinese (253), had not by 1971 entirely stabilized themselves. Their 0.667 (F/M) sex ratio of that year (254) indicated about 80 percent integration into families. Another indication of their instability may be derived from the figures of departures and arrivals by sea and air from and to Singapore during 1967-1971. The 369,000 Indians thus registered amounted to two (times) and a half their 1971 number of Singapore residents, while the Chinese thus registered numbered 938,000, or only 60 percent of their 1971 population (255). These indices may prove close familial connections with India constituting some sort of hindrance to full integration.

The Chinese, who traditionally have lent their hand to efficient governments, may prove to be the more politically acculturated to the state idea. Though Singapore is not a Chinese state by law and practice, providing no special privileges to Chinese of other countries, and though the Chinese language has officially a lesser standing than the Malay, political reality tends to ~~diminish~~ ^{diminish} their relations with China and with Taiwan. Sober thinking may have proved to them, that an image of a Third China is presently harmful to the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, and as identification with the state-idea of Singapore does not prevent them from having territorial values attached to China, their culture not being suppressed by the government, they seem likely to adopt the state-idea to a higher degree than the other ethnic groups. As for P.A.P. members of all ethnic groups, these seem to have their territorial values

attached to Singapore.

The policy of multi-racialism, perhaps with the tacit consent of the ethnic groups, did not provide any possibility of becoming ethnically a Singaporean. The ethnic groups being strictly defined, create a situation where offspring of ethnic intermarriages, few as they may be, must be identified by law as members of one of the existing ethnic groups. The perpetuation of these groups thus hinders assimilation and integration; bilingual education may also be thus categorized. Thus, it may well be that in the future Malays will demand a Malay university, following the example of the Nanyang university. However, education in English is spreading and increasing in importance and recognition. English language, national service, and "meritocracy" have been considered to structure the emergent Singaporean national identity, which in the long run may tend to homogenize the separate groups (256). Conscious of the long period needed to instil the state-idea in such conditions, the government makes great efforts to render Singapore free of what it deems external demoralizing effects (257), and launches "cultural drives" to initiate community activities to improve the quality of life in Singapore.(258)

In the meantime, partial indices show that people in Singapore are generally socially and economically content and that at least some progress has been made in the diffusion of the state-idea. The indices are: a subjective perception by people of socio-economic facts which definitely indicate a steady and fairly rapid development (259), and social researches into the matter. One of the latter postulated that "satisfaction with life provides the bread and butter basis for identification with a livable social system" (260). The study revealed that

90% of the sample called themselves Singaporeans, that 74% preferred being called Singaporeans rather than Chinese, Malays, Indians, Eurasians or Europeans, that 48 percent considered Secession a good thing, while 32 percent were undecided and 20 percent preferred Malaysian identity, and 74 percent declared that they were fairly willing to fight and die for Singapore. As for ethnic integration, "tolerance was high but acceptance was low". "The electorate perceived and endorsed equal treatment for all groups, but rejected the governments' language policy" (261). A 1968 small sample of peasants showed a shift in their vote from generally supporting the B.S. to a substantial support for the P.A.P. (262), indicating the extension of P.A.P. political work into the rural areas of the island, and also perhaps popular response to the improvement in peasants conditions.

The rehousing projects in Singapore accomodating 35 percent of the population or 760,000 people, improved dwelling conditions by decreasing the average occupancy of dwelling units from 6.4 in 1966 to 5.7 in 1970, the average being 10 in 1954 (263). A research into the attitudes of the rehoused people, as reflected from a 10% sample, demonstrated a marked improvement in satisfaction over their conditions (264). Rehousing further decreased residential segregation and created better prospects for group integration. Figures concerning the Chinese speech-groups show a population distribution in which sub-ethnic concentrations, on a project area basis, are only marginally discernible (265).

It still remains to be seen whether the P.A.P. premise that socio-economic satisfaction will override primordial ethnic sentiments in bringing about a unified state culture is a valid one.

The P.A.P. Environment Conception of Singapore. Projections in time of the resource-to-population ratio of states, have had various impacts on the dominant elites' environment conception. Generally speaking, in its time, it created stress in colonialist European countries which practised tariff barriers, leading them to invade adjacent countries or to acquire colonies. However, after W.W.II., nationalism in the Western World declined in intensity, and the dominant elites became aware that new technologies, cooperation, and free trade could produce better economic results and less injustice than colonialism and economic segregation. As a result, more extensive politico-economic entities were created, and governments' concern diverted to population and environment control in relation to their effects on the quality-of-life. This is not to assert that such considerations had not come under governments' judgement before that period, yet their evaluation tended to be guided more by military strategy and economic production principles than by quality-of-life precepts. The modern change in guidelines has been brought about more by popular pressure than by governments' initiatives.

In a sense, contemporary Singapore has reached a stage where its projections for future economic development may become crucial in determining its politico-economic policies. With almost 10,000 people to the square mile and with one of the world's highest population to resource ratios, it seems that even open space, unoccupied shorelines, fresh water and unpolluted air will become scarce in the future. That danger had lain in the back of the minds of some people in the past; nevertheless, since the 1960s, when industrial production was expanding, only conventional measures to minimize pollution were

taken. However, land reclamation proved very successful on the Jurong and the Changi shores. The shallow continental shelf around Singapore facilitated such undertakings. But, when it comes to filling material calculations, the island is lacking even in this because of its fairly subdued relief.

Industrial development has remained the government motto for the 1970s. Foreign investment is flowing in, creating almost unselective labour shortage, which the contemporary 60,000 foreign labourers from adjacent countries (266) have only partially satisfied. Industrialization has brought about an increasing demand in labour, ~~unemployment and underemployment~~ rapidly increasing ^{its} share in the G.D.P. ~~and unemployment~~ ^{generation} (267). There is no doubt that the P.A.P. fostered industrialization has improved employment and living conditions in Singapore, as improvement in economic conditions had been badly needed and has remained a P.A.P. tenet. By and large, pollution considerations were neglected by the government, without popular reproach. Traditionally, both the Chinese and Indians in their "lower culture" used to regard living conditions as secondary in importance to business and occupation. Quality of life meant wealth rather than leisure, and central location in busy areas prevailed over quiet and wide space in marginal location (268); only when reaching a fairly high economic status quality-of-life considerations became important. The Malays had a different attitude towards that question but, remaining politically less influential than the majority in Singapore, the government had not come under public pressure in that matter until it made quality-of-life a public issue. If industrialization progressed at the present rate and selectivity considerations for new industries had remained those of the 1960s conducing to a

maximum rate of economic progress, there could arise an irreversible situation of an industrially polluted area (269).

Public acceptance of a proposed government "minimum pollution" policy has not been verified, yet some reasons may lead to expect a future positive response from the public against traditional values. In the first place, there is the Modern World concern about the problem with the acute example of Japan's deteriorating conditions. With more and more people in Singapore coming under the cultural influence of the West new values substitute the traditional ones. In the second place, there is a growing proportion of the population in wage earning jobs, which have more leisure than ever before, and which real standard of living is improving. These, the majority of the population, constitute a potential pressure-group for quality-of-life improvement in Singapore.

(i) The Socio-Economic Environment Conception of 1980

Singapore. The government concern with quality-of-life in Singapore found its expression in speeches delivered by ministers in 1972. ~~It~~^{These} directly tackled the problem of regulating the economic progress in rate and quality so as to minimize pollution. Types of industry and an optimal rate of economic growth would be chosen according to the image of Switzerland rather than of Japan. Lee spoke (270) of "comfortable homes", "green spaces", unpolluted beaches and aesthetic amenities. However, he added that a clear-cut decision had not been reached by the government, which is perhaps deferring its commitment until a technological breakthrough in "depollution" is proved to have failed, or until public opinion becomes conditioned.

The theme of quality-of-life in its socio-cultural meaning, without relation to specific geographical conditions had

previously been mentioned in speeches and addresses (271). Artistic and aesthetic expressions were encouraged: "Let us not provide our critics the opportunity to say that we are a successful nation, but have no aesthetic value" (272) said the minister for Home Affairs. The defence minister attacked the continuous pursuit of wealth and its non-cultural expenditure on big houses, entertainment and jewellery, recommending art, literature and music ^{as substitutes} (to elevate the quality-of-life, as well as sports and daring pursuits (273). The building of the national theatre and an unsuccessful bid to create a philharmonic orchestra had been undertaken in the same vein. Cultural drives reinforced by suitable laws were intended to decrease the evils of a rapid urbanization. Tree planting, litter disposal, orderly queueing became the subject of these drives which were followed by severe punishment for law breaking to an extent which gave rise to murmurs of infringement on personal rights. The government image of quality-of-life excluded modern socio-cultural eccentricities which had sprung up in the West such as "hippyism" (274), sexual promiscuity in wider circles, or even a fully developed welfare state which had perhaps brought about these phenomena as by-products. They would rather adopt an image of sober, thrifty hard working Switzerland (275).

That image remained in line with the principles of a state-idea as had been adopted by the government even before Secession. The stress on aesthetic expression and enjoyment could produce stronger sentimental attachment to Singapore, and especially to distinguish it from other places in Southeast Asia. Embellishment of Singapore and the cultural refinement of its people could make ~~was~~ ^{it} more attractive to tourism which, in pollution terms, has been a clean industry.

Family planning had been of great concern to the government in previous years, but since 1972 it has been qualified and quantified in connection with the general theme of quality-of-life. The decrease in natural growth, experienced since 1957 (276), has been already mentioned. The significant drop in death rate preceded a considerable and continuous decline in birth rate, which between 1966 and 1969 expressed itself in an absolute loss of 10,000 births annually and in relative terms from 28.6 per thousand in 1966 to 22.1 in 1970. The aim for 1975 was fixed at 18 per thousand, bringing about a 1.3 percent annual growth rate (277). One of the main reasons for advocating birth control was to reduce the unbalanced living densities which had been inherited from the Chinatown and, which, to some degree, were transferred to the new H.D.B. houses: "Our problem is that while families who live in 3-4 room public housing flats have two to three children, those in the 1-2 room flats have six to seven children" (278). The downward trend in birth rate affected the Chinese and Indian communities, but much less so the Malays. The government, rejecting any idea of becoming a Western style welfare state and in line with its toughness policy, reduced income tax relief to big families, increased accouchement charges and reduced paid maternity leave.

Perhaps the first quantification of the quality-of-life policy could be found in a suggestion concerning economic conditions in late 1970s Singapore (279). According to that paper, the 1970s growth rate of Singapore's G.D.P. per capita, could produce a G.D.P. per capita in 1977 Singapore similar to that of the U.K. in 1970. It was recommended that industrial growth should stop when half a million workers would be engaged in industrial production. The anticipated date for that to occur

was 1978, involving an estimated import of 180,000 foreign workers in 1977-78 alone (280). But workers' remittances and overseas companies' profits drawn out of the country, would perhaps delay the achievement of a 1970 European standard of living to the 1990s. The aim of achieving that level without incurring the damage of pollution seems to underlie the proposed selectivity in industrial expansion.

(ii) The Politico-Economic Environment Conception of Future Singapore. Although from the British point of view, Singapore has lost much of its strategic importance, the island still remains, by nature of its location, one of the strategic loci of the world. The land configuration of pelagian Southeast Asia ensures its strategic status, which will be enhanced in the future by increased shipping through the Straits of Malacca. Japan, China and most of peninsular Southeast Asia depend upon this maritime route for their external trade. The modernization of shipping and trade services which has been introduced into the region by Singapore, still remains a great asset of the island in its economic competition with its neighbours. Thus, in 1965 Singapore's government embarked on its policy of independence with increasing confidence developing its shipyards and refuelling facilities.

Besides the natural will ^{of the elite} to lead independently its own affairs (281), some recent ^{of the elite} will ~~to~~ ^{to emphasize} the uniqueness of Singapore and its independent existence. To this effect a reformulation of Singapore's economic destiny seems to have been adopted by the P.A.P. leadership. From 1961 to 1971, Singapore's trade with Southeast

Asia in general, and with Malaysia in particular, relatively declined (282) in proportion to that with the rest of the world. Trade with Western Europe, the U.S.A. and Japan, nearly doubled during that period (283). Moreover, most of the foreign investment and technological knowhow came from those sources, and visitors from those countries significantly increased their share in arrivals at Singapore (284). The changing trend in Singapore's "hinterland" did not escape the notice of the government, and it received a sort of official formulation and ideological approval around 1972. The minister for Foreign Affairs elaborated on the concept of the Global City, the Ecumenopolis - a world embracing city. This future city spreads its control through electronic communications and the jet airlines, and is supplied by supertankers and big craft. Thus, it will be the global hinterland and not the regional, which will decide whether Singapore will prosper or decline: "Once you see Singapore as a global city the problem of hinterland becomes unimportant because for the global city the world is the hinterland" (285). To prove his case, the foreign minister could base his assertion on links with international and multinational companies which supplied most of the 1,700 million \$ foreign investment in Singapore, in addition to external trade figures. For example, between 1968 and 1970, American companies increased in number from 60 to 262, in personnel employed: from 1,500 to 10,000, and in output value: from 100 million S.\$ to 300. They invested 150 million S.\$ in fixed assets and were committed to invest another 400 million (286).

For obvious political reasons, the changing balance ~~of trade~~ ^{areas} of trade between the regional and the global ~~regions~~ strengthened Singapore's politico-economic viability. However,

political changes in the region may greatly affect foreign investment in Singapore as this capital is highly sensitive to political instability before and after its investment. This is only one reason why Singapore is still strongly demanding that free regional trade and goodwill continue. Though, after Confrontation, relations with Indonesia have improved, and though the trade with Malaysia did not decrease after Secession, both countries prepare alternatives to their trade with Singapore. This is why in January 1970, Goh Keng Swee deplored the state of regional trade by saying that "greater freedom of movement of goods, people and capital [had existed] during the Colonial times than there [was] today", and that because of the attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia towards Singapore, regional trade would maintain a low level of activity (287).

The extra-regional politico-economic attitude of Singapore manifested itself in its disagreement to a "territorial" division of the Straits of Malacca among the three bordering states as suggested by both Malaysia and Indonesia (288), Singapore feared that the division would lead to a cold war situation (289). Neither the 20 Hunter jets (290) nor its guided missile patrol boats (291), could enable Singapore to lead a political policy of its own in the Straits. Leaving the question of the Straits open, Singapore is trying to improve relations with both her neighbours and to agree on any reasonable project for regional cooperation. Lee declared (292): "We shall play our part in regional economic cooperation" as "the better off [the neighbouring states] are the better it is for us", he however, left some sort of way out: "We will participate in all joint projects for mutual benefits. Provided there is no sudden deterioration in the stability of the area".


(iii) Resource Limitations and its politico-geographical

Implications: The Case of Water. The discussion on water resource limitations in Singapore serves as an illustration of the politico-geographical situation of Singapore within its immediate environment. Size, location and land configuration may serve as other good case studies to that same effect. These are more basic than the "conventional" economic resources such as raw materials, in the sense that it is harder to find substitutions for the natural setting than to the conventional resources' distribution.

Resource limitation in its basic manifestation dictates Singapore's policy of controlled population growth and conditions Singapore's politico-economic policy. Being a small country, and, as yet, of unconsolidated national spirit, resource limitation has been an important factor preventing the development of nationalistic aggression (293). Nevertheless, resource shortage awareness can be discerned in political declarations as well as in actual political and economic moves, even in those unrelated to the matter. Singapore's direct policy in relation to the resource shortage may be defined as naturally ambivalent. On the one hand, it adopts an attitude favouring regional cooperation, on the other, it strives to acquire freedom of political action by trying to resolve the problem through developing its own resources.

In his 1971 new year's message, the prime minister of Singapore found it proper to deal with the water supply problem of 1975-1980. He envisaged the collection of 25-35 percent of Singapore's average daily rainfall of 700 million gallon in that period. But previous studies into the matter of water resources in Singapore, revealed the following facts: ground

MAP 1-C,
 SINGAPORE'S WATER SUPPLY
 After Geno-Ohlers and Wikkramatilike in Embleton (ed), 1968.



-.-.-.- International Boundary

----- Major Pipeline

R.-River
 Rs.-Reservoir
 PN-Pontian
 S-Seletar

P.-Pierce
 M-Macritchie
 □ River Intake
 o-Artesian Well

water was scarce, evaporation reached 67 inches while annual rainfall averaged 95 inches (294), morphology and soil texture favoured silting and land reclamation, rather than water storage (295). Even the older alluvium of the eastern part of the island provided poor aquifers. Daily water consumption for all purposes rose from 31.3 million gallons in 1950 to 64.5 million in 1960 and to 102.4 million in 1970. During 1970, domestic use accounted for 41.8 percent of the total consumption, commercial and industrial for 21.0 percent, government and statutory boards to 18.8 and armed services - 2.1 percent, while shipping consumed 1.3 percent of the total. It was expected that by 1984, Singapore's water consumption would exceed 200 million gallons a day for a population of 2.7 million (296).

In 1965, the three Singapore reservoirs had a catchment area of 7,573 acres, while the four Johore reservoirs had 6,456. The river intakes of Tebrau and Scudai in Johore, had a combined catchment area of 78,080 acres (297). This did not include the extended Seletar reservoir opened in 1969, (298), nor did it take into account the Johore River Scheme. At present, only 24.3 square miles, or 11 percent of Singapore island area, are utilized for water collection. The three existing reservoirs, Seletar, Peirce and MacRitchie comprise 12.3 square miles, while the remainder constitutes the unprotected catchment area of eight streams in the partially pumped storage area of the Seletar Scheme. There is a theoretical possibility to utilize 75 percent of the island's area, or 156 square miles, as a catchment area, which may satisfy needs from own resources up to 1980 (299). For instance, the Kranji Padan Scheme with a catchment area of 41 square miles could store 4,600 million gallons and yield 40 million a day (300). On 29 Dec. 1970, the Straits Times

wrote that the Kranji Padan Scheme was to be built at a cost of 51 million S. \$.

Shortage in land for other economic projects will increase with time, and it seems that the allocation of 75 percent of the island area for water catchment purposes will limit the economic possibilities in that area. As desalinization is unlikely to produce revolutionary techniques until 1980, the water pipeline from West Malaysia to Singapore will constitute, perhaps more than trade, or more than the causeway, their umbilical cord. From an economic point of view, it would be profitable to continue to use and even further develop the water sources in Johore. If the entire increment of 100 million gallons a year were to be brought from Malaysia at the present cost of 80 Singapore cents per 1000 gallons, it would cost Singapore approximately 29 million S.\$ a year. In view of the area under water of the projected reservoirs, and the costs of special drainage and land use limitations, in the catchment areas, the decision to develop Singapore's own resources seems to result from concessions to strategy rather than from pure economic judgements. In fact, Lee Kwan Yew (301) expressed the strategic background of the water resource development plan, when he said that in case of subversive attack on the waterworks of Johore or a unilateral stoppage of water supply, Singapore's proper resources would be able to supply 20 million gallons a day for domestic use and 10 million gallons for high priority industries. However, should it occur, he thought that Singapore would only react by diplomatic means and not by the use of force. The development of Singapore's proper resources to maintain limited water supply for a fairly long period during which, eventual repairs or diplomatic reconciliation can be effected, seems a

balanced solution to ^{this} politico-economic problem. Singapore's dependence on Malaysia in water supply may produce (or has already produced) a sobering effect on the former's politico-geographical conception, directing it towards more regional cooperation and averting any extremist inclination of its present or future leadership. While Hong Kong's dependence on Chinese water supply only superficially resembles that of Singapore-Malaysia relations, Hong Kong's image of a hostage in Chinese hands may affect future investment in that city. Singapore, anxious to maintain capital inflow, must simultaneously ensure uninterrupted water supply from Johore and maximize its own resources. The continuous operation and even the extension of water supply along the causeway has withstood all the vicissitudes of Malaysia-Singapore relations. The Central Government and the State of Johore have honoured their obligations inspite of sporadic extremist Muslim pressure to cut off the water supply. The S.A.F. and Singapore's "nuisance value" in the context of the Chinese community of Malaysia, may have proved their efficiency by their potential reaction. Historical instances, however, have shown that an image, fallacious or real, of economic insufficiency and dependence on another country for vital resources, sometimes lead to diplomatic stress and wars, but sometimes also to enriching cooperation.

Regional Cooperation. In view of resource scarcity of the most fundamental nature, Singapore's role as a Global City will be greatly modified or put within a reasonable context. In the first place, there is no such pure entity in the world and it is unlikely that one is going to function that way in the "national world" scene as, for example, the Provincial Town had

developed in its specific environment. In the second place, a development by which a City State will flourish, while its immediate political neighbourhood impoverishes or remains economically stagnant, leads to political instability especially when there is ethnic strife between the city and its neighbourhood (302).

(i) Singapore's Future Cooperation with its Immediate Neighbours. While Singapore's capital accrues and foreign investment adds to modify its industries into capital intensive enterprises, development in neighbouring countries (Malaya excepted) is slow and does not produce conditions to ease socio-political pressure. Besides the lack of efficient administration and knowhow, those countries are short of capital. If the process of capital intensification of Singapore's industry is not reasonably paralleled in Malaysia and Indonesia, the political and cultural alienation of Singapore would increase. But Singapore is in a position to maintain its historical lead in per capita income and still invest capital, knowhow and entrepreneurship abroad.

Singapore's avowed willingness to cooperate has been publicly announced on ^{the} condition that stability does not suddenly deteriorate. Stability in relations with Southeast Asia has been achieved, at least as regards the attitude towards Singapore on governments level. As it is rather good administration that Malaysia and Indonesia lack, ~~corruption and mismanagement~~ constituting a hindrance to effective cooperation, ~~there seems to be a wide field for cooperation, which is in a large measure and which~~ does not irretrievably fix capital. Generally speaking, Singapore has done very little in joint regional projects, even

the airline company MA.S. jointly owned with Malaysia was split between the partners in 1972, and almost nothing has been done in common with Indonesia. In view of the high economic risks involved in territorial capital fixation, regional cooperation must begin by joint government projects. These must in their early stages transcend pure economic considerations of profit realization, and must serve as an investment in building the "human infrastructure" for further development. It seems that to begin with, those projects where minimum capital will be definitely territorially fixed, are mostly suitable until success and mutual understanding reach a certain degree. Shipping and airline companies, technological aid, tourism and construction companies seem to have the better chances of success (303). Corruption and nationalist favouritism may render cooperation difficult, yet Singapore, which is likely to lose more than others if cooperation is not achieved, should undertake to suffer some financial loss as its initial contribution to the project. In addition, there may be also moral justification for Singapore leading the way in taking economic risks. ~~From another view point~~ Between 1961 and 1972 ~~Malaysian~~ ^{in Singapore} customers' deposits in commercial banks increased from 893 million S.\$ to 4,171 million (304). Some part of that money must have come from countries where "non indigenous" private enterprise has little scope for profitable reinvestment, as a result of government monopolization, discrimination or restriction. That capital if secured by the Singapore government, perhaps with international financial organizations backing, could gradually be reinvested in the Southeast Asian countries and mainly in Indonesia. Unless this matter is delicately handled, it may backfire and produce political tension instead of economic benefit.

The nature of the economic cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, as proposed for the initial stages of the process, may in the long run spread to industrial production. As Singapore is progressing in that direction, it is very likely that its developing skills in technology and management will enable it to serve the other countries as well (305). It will be only fair if the three countries themselves exploit the low-wage advantage for industrial production of their proper ownership. In the meantime, however, tourism (306), can be attractive if several conditions combine to add to the natural suitability of the region. In that respect, a wider cooperation in Southeast Asia may be preferable to the narrower one among the three countries.

Distances from Europe and the U.S. to the region may render fares prohibitive to the average-income traveller, unless several countries are included in a tour. The countries involved should have fairly equal facilities and thus be in a position to distribute the tourists among all ^{of them} ~~of them~~. Thus, for example, each country could build only ^{a part} ~~one~~ ~~of~~ of the needed capacity in hotel accommodations. Also, favourable weather conditions, (from the viewpoint of the tourist) will permit the spread of tours all over the year, which may also reduce costs for the industry, and the ethnic diversity of the countries can produce low cost attractions for visitors. Joint air companies can participate in tourist transport between the ~~of them~~ countries and also presumably from Japan, Europe and the U.S. (307).

Becoming less and less economical to operate by countries of high standard of living, shipping and eventually high-seas fishing may become attractive to operate and invest in for Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The use of flags of

convenience is widespread, yet the traditional seamanship of the people in the region, the experience of Singapore in maritime transport and a governmental control on personnel quality, safety regulations and perhaps regional cooperation in maritime insurance, may prove such a joint project promising for the three countries.

(ii) The P.A.P. Anticipation of Future Politics in Southeast Asia. Anticipation of future political developments, especially those excluding one's ability to interfere with, may prove incorrect, sometimes in direct relation to the time span under consideration. However, short period evaluations may be of no practical use, as political developments of substantial importance take time to unfold themselves.

According to Lee Kwan Yew's appreciation of future developments concerning the region (308), the recent developments in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations, foretell the peaceful reintegration of Taiwan into China, a peaceful though tense agreement in Vietnam and a possible Chinese intervention to safeguard the independence of Laos and Cambodia, placing both on the side of Thailand and against Vietnam.

The latter part of his appreciation concerning Laos and Cambodia, may at first seem wishful thinking, but not so after a second thought. Vietnam had opposed Chinese occupation and withstood Chinese assimilatory influences during almost a thousand years. It exhibited independent policies during almost the entire following millenium, expanding south at the expense of the Chams and the Cambodians. The North Vietnamese come out of the war well organized, self assured, and in the event that North and South Vietnam reintegrate, they possibly could overrun

Laos and Cambodia, occupying the economically rich Mekong Basin. As two adjacent strongly nationalistic countries may eventually develop friction across their common border, the political principle that "my neighbour is my enemy and hence, my neighbour's neighbour is my friend", may govern the three-partite relationship of Russia, China and Vietnam. This contention is supported by Russia's aid to Vietnam as well as by Chinese political support to Suphanowong and to Sihanouk. The Chinese newly built road from Yunnan to Laos may have been built eventually to support Laos against Vietnamese encroachments. The Chinese support to North Vietnam in its war with the U.S., may prove to have been undertaken in a period when idealism prevailed over economic and political pragmatism, or as a concession to what might have proved an inevitable development without Chinese support. Moreover, China's political image might have been damaged had it remained impartial to what was defined as the post W.W.II. most important anti-colonialist war.

Lee also anticipated continued American presence in Thailand (309) and named it the key to Southeast Asian stability, on which Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore must depend. He also foresaw the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the three former, of which Singapore would be the last one to do so.

It seems according to early 1973 events that Lee's anticipation of the peace agreement in Vietnam may prove correct. American presence in Thailand may materialize only in air power presence. As the ^{Americans} reshape their army to be based on regulars, they may or may not share Lee's views that their presence is the key to Southeast Asian stability. In any event, the efforts that they will be ready to make in order to maintain stability is

an "unknown quantity".

The Geographico-Cultural Centrality of Singapore. The significance of Taiwan and Hong Kong as Chinese cultural centres outside China in relation to the Nan Yang communities was discussed in B.38. It is now pertinent to assess Singapore's centrality in this respect.

The officially promulgated state-idea of Singapore is multi-racial and the Indian community's success there proves that it is generally applied de facto. As already discussed earlier, that same state-idea perpetuates the cultures of each ethnic group hindering the cultural integration by letting primordial sentiments of ethnic solidarity transcend the state's boundaries. The statement is true for all three major ethnic groups, and not the least for the Chinese majority.

Blood ties between the Chinese of Singapore and those of Malaysia, and to some extent with those of Indonesia, make the conditions of the Chinese communities in the latter countries a sensitive issue of paramount importance for the Singapore Chinese. Primordial sentiments of family, clan, speech-groups and ethnic group still exist between them and other Southeast Asian Chinese communities. These sentimental links sometimes underlie business partnerships and other economic relations. As Singapore's government is democratic, it cannot disregard public pressure from its majority group, when Chinese lives are endangered in the Nan Yang communities. The government being conscious of its own population problem and anxious of a Third China label can do practically very little to save those Chinese lives. A labelling as a Third China is undesirable to the Chinese opposition in Singapore no less than to the government.

Both, however, will support rescue operations at least of relatives from Malaysia and Indonesia. In recent years, Singapore accorded refuge to Chinese who had fled riots in Indonesia, and it also granted visas to the Yuitung brothers, unfortunately after their deportation to Taiwan (310). Luckily for Singapore, most of the Chinese refugees from Indonesia during the post 1965 pogroms were accepted by China or put in concentration camps in Indonesia. Thus, Singapore provides a potential safe haven for, at least, the wealthier Chinese in the Nan-Yang and for those having relatives in the city-state. In politico-geographical terms this issue of refugees proves one aspect of Singapore's centrality in relation to the Nan-Yang Chinese. It transpires that uncontrolled ethnic solidarity may conduce the government to pursue a policy, which in normal circumstances seems undesirable to it.

The Nan Yang Chinese have found Singapore a most desirable place to invest part of their capital, because of the mild capitalistic economic policy, the commercial and industrial development, the strength of the currency and the financial facilities. Most of the money comes from countries where Chinese capital cannot be safely invested, as liquid capital smuggling is not difficult in a region of such traditional practices. In addition, family links across political boundaries make it easy for one company to "lose" money to another in Singapore. This attraction for Nan Yang Chinese capital constitutes yet another aspect of Singapore's centrality. Again, this aspect concerns the bourgeois layer of the Chinese groups.

Singapore also imports cheap labour mainly from Malaysia but also from Indonesia. As already mentioned, the majority of these are Chinese, the preference for Chinese workers being

understandable as most of the employers are Chinese and as these workers are considered more efficient than those of other ethnic groups. However, the workers do not acquire a Singaporean citizenship even after a long period of service in the city as, not unlike Switzerland, Singapore maintains a strictly selective policy in that respect, preferences being given for the wealthy. However, the number of foreign workers envisaged for the late 1970s is 180,000, as already mentioned (311).

In view of the ubiquitous suppression of Chinese cultural institutions in Southeast Asia, the ^{cultural} role of Singapore ~~in the~~ ~~world~~ may augment in the near future. Hong Kong still provides a much greater variety of Chinese cultural needs, from newspapers through films, books and educational facilities, to specific Chinese foods, religious objects and clothes. Taiwan, however, rapidly loses its former position as the shade of China looms in the background. With the creation of the Nan Yang University and with the practical closure of Chinese high schools in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore's location seems preferable to that of Hong Kong, for those Chinese who still endeavour to give a Chinese education to their children (312). Other cultural services may also flourish in Singapore for the benefit of the surrounding countries' Chinese communities, for the same locational reasons. This is to imply that some imports of cultural goods will be permitted in the Southeast Asian countries. The reasoning for that latter statement is based on an apparent contradiction in those countries' policies towards the Chinese minorities. On the one hand, they seem to favour Chinese assimilation by abolishing Chinese education and newspapers; on the other hand, their dominant elites' connivance

with Chinese big business, and lower officials' collusion with Chinese smaller businessmen, in bypassing anti-Chinese laws, indicate a symbiosis financially beneficial for both sides. This seems the reason for the indigenous "subconscious" interest for the perpetuation of the Chinese identity in those countries, a sort of unwillingness to kill a laying hen (313). The existence of a scapegoat in form of an alien group also sometimes serves inner political ends diverting public opinion from governmental failures.

As already mentioned, Singapore's centrality in Chinese cultural matters is a process in which ethnic sentiments contest the government official policy, sometimes with certain success. This could not be done once Singapore remained within the Malaysian Federation because of certain Malay opposition. Singapore's independence becomes thus a major factor in that specific centrality. Moreover, independence and democracy may generate a hope in the Chinese Educated non-communists, that the government may be less selective in accepting Chinese refugees and immigrants in the future.

Anxious as it is about the Third China image of Singapore, the government can justify its activities in accepting the refugees by humanitarian reasons; it is, however, more difficult to find a pretext for accepting smuggled capital; and therefore no official statistics are issued concerning that matter. Apparently, it would be difficult to ascertain the source of the money even if the government wanted to find out its origin. The issues, of the refugees, foreign workers and of Chinese capital, are loaded with an ideological weight as well. Denying citizenship from the workers and practically accepting the

wealthier Chinese and their money, emphasizes Singapore's centrality in almost a unique relation to the Chinese bourgeois class. This is true from an opposite aspect, as Communist China and its followers abroad deny any cultural importance of Chinese extra-territorial centres. Moreover, they do not accept the political breach of Malaya and Singapore as final. It seems that the non-communist Chinese Educated of Singapore, may acquiesce to the political reality that an independent Singapore serves an important role in the Nan Yang Chinese life and may become supporters of the government state-idea.

The selective and ambivalent nature of Singapore's centrality in relation to the Nan Yang society does not stem only from its own policy. The non-conformity of the Chinese identity group in the Nan Yang with the Chinese solidarity group in that area, is no less responsible for that phenomenon. There are the dichotomies of Peking supporters and non-communists, between the wealthy and the poor and between the culturally devoted and the semi-assimilated. There is also the division of communities according to state boundaries, which seems most harmful if the Nan Yang Chinese are expected to show overall solidarity. The waves of Chinese persecutions do not coincide in all the countries together and economic benefits blur memories of past experience. China is not becoming a centre of attraction for resettlement of the Nan Yang Chinese, and its policy explicitly favours Chinese political integration into their host states. This not only decreases Singapore's moral obligations towards the Nan Yang Chinese but also its Chinese population's solidarity with them. In the future, this may lead to a ~~more~~ selective acceptance by Singapore of Chinese refugees

and immigrants, favouring those who have relatives in Singapore.

FOOTNOTES: PART THREE

- (1) Raffles' letters quoted in Moore and Moore, 1969, pp.48-50.
- (2) Bastin, 1954, pp.89, 100, 109-111. Raffles hoped that the British would impose their rule over the entire Malay World linking Australia with India. See Fisher, 1963, p.316, quoting Würzburg.
- (3) Marks, 1959, p.19.
- (4) Collis, 1966, pp.101-102.
- (5) Hastings' letter quoted in Marks, 1959, p.31.
- (6) Boulger, 1897, pp.167-168, 333.
- (7) Coupland, 1949, pp.22-24.
- (8) The exchange of Malacca for Bencoolen (1824), must have been partly affected by such considerations.
- (9) The Dutch, however, sailed to the East Indies by the Cape, the "roaring forties" and the Sunda Straits.
- (10) Courtney, 1972, pp.75-76.
- (11) Wong Lin Ken, 1960, p.200.
- (12) Cowan, 1950, p.9.
- (13) According to Winstedt, 1932, pp.69-70.
- (14) Tarling, 1969, pp.11-12, 21.
- (15) Egerton, 1897, pp.180-181.
- (16) Buchanan, 1972, p.29.
- (17) Hodder, 1953, p.26, fig. 1.
- (18) Pearson, 1953, pp.200-204.
- (19) Ethnic and occupational segregation typified all Southeast Asian cities of the colonial era. See McGee, 1967, pp.63-64.
- (20) Hodder, 1953, pp.30-31.
- (21) Buchanan, 1972, p.31.

- (22) Nam, 1969, p.18, attributes Singapore's success also to its political and strategic importance. This, however, seems only marginally justified in view of the small scale government employment and expenditure figures during the first 50 years.
- (23) See an opposite example in low-volume - low-labour spice trade in Wright, 1958, pp.91-94.
- (24) Tregonning, 1964, pp.117-118.
- (25) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.255.
- (26) Price in Makepeace et al. (eds) 1921, vol. II, pp.79-80. Also, Buckley, 1965, (1902) pp.405-406.
- (27) Niew Shong Tong, 1969, pp.343-344 and p.342 table 5-1. For a concise resumé of local agricultural produce consumption and export crops, see Isher Singh Sekhon, 1960/1961, pp.16-21. He states (p.19) that in 1847, 10,700 Chinese were occupied in pepper and gambier cultivation.
- (28) Wong Lin Ken, 1960, p.33.
- (29) Tregonning, 1965, p.156, and Courtney, 1972, pp.72-73.
- (30) Buchanan, 1972, p.33, table 1.
- (31) From Wong Lin Ken, 1960, p.254.
- (32) Saw Swee-hock in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.39, table 1. and Freedman, 1970 (1957) p.25.
- (33) Courtney, 1972, p.75, fig. 7.
- (34) Cameron, 1965 (1865) pp.179-180. Tregonning, 1964, p.120, gives somewhat different figures.
- (35) Turnbull in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, pp.30-31.
- (36) Tregonning, 1964, p.114.
- (37) Braddell in Makepeace et al. (eds) 1921, vol. I. p.23 and Cowan, 1961, pp.125-126.
- (38) Compiled from Saw Swee-hock in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.41, table 2 and p.42, table 3.
- (39) The system of guilds and the practice of kinfolk recruitment actually attenuated the situation. In principle, however, it was still acute, as integration through recruitment into family business was no substitute for real family life. Moreover, when the guilds later ceased to exist the situation must have resembled that which is later described.

- (40) An estimate of Chinese opium addicts in Singapore gives their number as 15,000 in 1848. See Moore and Moore, 1969, p.502.
- (41) By extrapolation from Saw Swee-hock in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969 p.46, table 4.
- (42) Tregonning, 1964, p.174.
- (43) Tan Hui-Sen, 1961/62, pp.58-61.
- (44) Png Poh-seng in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.99.
- (45) Wee Mon Cheng, 1972, (1970) pp.2-3, calls the first fifty years of Singapore, the period of primitive exploitation of contract labour.
- (46) On social organization in Fukien and Kwangtung see Freedman, 1970, (1957) p.17, Also Uchida, 1960, p.16.
- (47) Hodder, 1953, p.34.
- (48) Uchida, 1960, p.47.
- (49) Vaughan, 1971, (1879) passim.
- (50) Although the society lacked the educated elite class, and in this sense it was "decapitated", to follow the expression of Clarkson, 1968, p.150.
- (51) Skinner in Wijeyewardene (ed), 1968, p.196. In accordance with British Indirect Rule philosophy.
- (52) *ibid*, pp.191-196.
- (53) Blythe, 1969, pp.76-77 and Braddell in Makepeace et al. (eds), 1921, vol.I. pp.246-247.
- (54) Freedman, 1956, pp.154-155.
- (55) Blythe, 1969, p.70 and Buckley 1965 (1902) pp.464,470-473.
- (56) ~~*ibid*~~ ^{Blythe, 1969,} pp.76-77 and Braddell in Makepeace et al. (eds) 1921, vol.I. pp.246-247.
- (57) Cheng Tung-choy, 1950, p.152 and Chelliah, 1940, p.115.
- (58) Freedman, 1970 (1957) p.17.
- (59) Roff, 1967, pp.35, 126.
- (60) Niew Shong-tong, 1969, pp.343-344 and p.342, table 5-1.
- (61) Isher Singh Sekhon, 1960/61, pp.27, 31, 35.
- (62) Neville, 1967, pp.410-411.

- (63) In spite of the economic expansion; but the saturation, in part, created the conditions for that expansion.
- (64) Chai Hon-chang, 1967 (1964) pp.109-112.
- (65) Awberry and Dalley, 1948, p.20.
- (66) Kennedy, 1962, pp.214-215.
- (67) Mills, 1970 (1942) p.179.
- (68) Hughes and You Poh-seng (eds) 1969, p.8 and Price in Makepeace et al. (eds) 1921, vol.1. p.87.
- (69) Wee Mon-Cheng, 1972, (1970) p.3.
- (70) On the importance of finance institutions for the rubber trade see Wilson, 1958, p.3.
- (71) Tan Ee Leong, 1953, pp.113-115.
- (72) Minted in Bombay for trade in the Eastern Colonies. Drake, 1969, p.15.
- (73) *ibid*, p.18, table 4.
- (74) Png Poh-seng, Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.100.
- (75) On Pickering's view on the problem, see Jackson, 1965, p.80.
- (76) They marched in a procession after the fall of Pretoria in 1900. See Moore and Moore, 1969, pp.532-533.
- (77) *ibid*, p.538.
- (78) The marked division into speech-group subdivisions also restricted their capacity to act on a unified Chinese basis.
- (79) Freedman, 1965 (1958) p.114.
- (80) Ryan, 1967 (1963) pp.190-191. They sometimes "manufactured" seemingly unharmed regulations in order to mislead the police. See Vaughan, 1971 (1879) pp.117-126.
- (81) Comber, 1959, pp.252-253.
- (82) Song Ong Siang, 1967; (1927) pp.387-388.
- (83) Saw Swee-hock in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, pp.39, 41-43, tables 1, 2, 3. The 1881 column and percentages pertaining to 1901 from Neville, 1967, tables 1.1, 1.45. Freedman, 1970 (1957) p.25, gives marginally different percentages. For the 1901 Chinese M/F ratio, Freedman's figures signify a 3.92 ratio, this changes the integration proportion by half a percent only.

- (84) Marriott in Makepeace et al. (eds) 1921, vol. I. p.362.
- (85) Uchida, 1960, p.30.
- (86) In the 1960s, Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.29.
- (87) In the 19th century, some forms of Babaization still continued in Singapore, but when the Babas economic power was waning in the 20th century, they began regaining their membership character in the Chinese community. The Chinese law of jus sanguinis and their retention of their Chinese names facilitated the process of "retro-assimilation". Freedman, 1956, pp.117,180-181.
- (88) *ibid*, pp.178-179, But, Newell, 1962, pp.4-5 states that relations in Malaya were far better.
- (89) Hodder, 1953, p.35, fig. 7. The overall pattern during that period was less well defined than in the Chinatown.
- (90) See *ibid*, pp.30-31, concerning the entire Chinese community.
- (91) See Fisher in Steel and Fisher (eds), 1956, p.320, fig.7(a), the road network of Malaya in 1924. Also pp.318-319.
- (92) Tregonning, 1964, pp.175-176.
- (93) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.294, who reports also of subversive activities.
- (94) Tregonning, 1964, p.179.
- (95) Tan, 1969, pp.387-388, on the attitude of the two communities.
- (96) Established in 1906.
- (97) Established since 1912.
- (98) Purcell, 1966 (1965) p.295.
- (99) Yong Ching Fatt, 1970, p.77, maintains that many of the Straits Born remained loyal to the British until 1941.
- (100) On Hakka political radicalism see Uchida, 1960, p.28.
- (101) Mills, 1970 (1942) p.41. This, however, did not involve direct action for independence as undertaken by the leftists.
- (102) Brimmell, 1959, p.146.
- (103) *ibid*. pp.92-94.
- (104) Ryan, 1967 (1963) pp.195-196. Also commemoration of the "double tenth" and Sun Yat Sen's birthday manifested overall Chinese solidarity. Yong Ching Fatt, 1970. p.80.

- (105) Mills, 1958, p.9.
- (106) Yong Ching Fatt, 1970, p.25.
- (107) Mills, 1970, (1942) pp.118-119.
- (108) German, 1927, p.54 and Willmott 1939, p.17.
- (109) Freedman, 1970 (1957) pp.22-23. Also Saw Swee-hock, 1970 (1967) p.43, table 41. In 1929, the economic effects of the depression years must have been less strongly felt than in 1930. The lag in the trend of the numbers returning to China in comparison with those of the immigrants may be explained by a certain inertia.
- (110) Existing docks in 1921 could not accommodate the dreadnoughts. Northcote Parkinson, 1955, p.19.
- (111) McIntyre in Singapore 1819-1969, 1969, p.84.
- (112) A "recruiting space" may be defined as a cultural group, which members may be ideologized by its subgroups.
- (113) Rounded figures, compiled from Neville in Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai-ding (eds) 1969, p.71, table 3. Saw Swee-hock, 1970, (1967) p.28, table 3.4 and Freedman 1970 (1957) p.25.
- (114) Compiled from Saw Swee-hock, 1970 (1967) p.28, table 3.4.
- (115) Freedman, 1970 (1957) pp.22-23.
- (116) The increasing proportion of the 15-19 age group from 9.8 percent in 1957 to 12.4 percent in 1971 is illustrative for the statement. Figures computed from Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.14, 16.
- (117) Brimmell, 1958, p.148.
- (118) Mills, 1958, p.10.
- (119) Chen Tung-choy, 1950, pp.172-174.
- (120) *ibid*, pp.331-332
- (121) *ibid*, p.335.
- (122) According to computations from Saw Swee-hock, 1970, (1967) pp.64-65, tables 5:5, 5:6, the relevant age group in 1921 comprised 60,000 children.
- (123) Mills, 1970 (1942) p.348.
- (124) Chelliah, 1940, table between pages 277 and 277a.
- (125) The contrary may be the case, as the Chinese overseas besides investing in commerce and industry in their provinces of provenance, also contributed money to improve education there. Yong Ching Fatt, 1970, p.79.

- (126) Lee Ah Chai, 1956, pp.37-38.
- (127) Moore and Moore, 1969, p.638, and Purcell, 1960 (1956) pp.33-34.
- (128) The Japanese military police charged with security.
- (129) Lee Ah Chai, 1956, pp.38-39, and Nam ~~Wang~~ ~~Wang~~, 1969, pp.18-19.
- (130) McIntyre in Wang Gungwu (ed) 1964, p.146.
- (131) K.M.T. resistance did only symbolically exist. See Purcell, 1966, (1965) pp.308-309.
- (132) Fisher in Steel and Fisher (eds) 1956, p.333.
- (133) See Dobby, 1940, p.106.
- (134) This was true of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce leadership as well as that of the Straits Chinese British Association. The former ~~were~~ mainly Chinese Educated, the latter ~~—~~ English Educated, but they maintained good relations. See Yong Ching Fatt, 1968, pp.262, 271-285.
- (135) Not all necessarily becoming communists.
- (136) Lee Ah Chai, 1956, pp.50-51, on shift to the left of the leadership.
- (137) In 1946, the M.C.P. influenced trade unions of Singapore organized a strike of 150,000 workers. Pistie in L'Asie du Sud-Est, 1970, p.168.
- (138) Gilmour, 1950, p.86; Moore and Moore, 1969, p.644.
- (139) The Chinese in Singapore resented this British political scheme considering it discriminatory. See Fisher in Fisher (ed) 1968, pp.114-115, 118.
- (140) See Cole, 1956 (1924) pp.197-198. Also Fitzgerald, 1972, p.194.
- (141) Miller, 1965, pp.187, 195-196.
- (142) The complete support of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for the M.C.A. indicates ~~their~~ bourgeois tendencies.
the latter's
- (143) Osborne, 1964, p.3.
- (144) Bellows, 1967, pp.124-125, 127-128, also Starner in Ratnam and Milne, 1967, p.313.
- (145) Spector in Fried (ed) 1958, p.23.

- (146) Jones, 1959, p.9.
- (147) Bellows, 1967, p.128.
- (148) Lim, 1957.
- (149) Miller, 1965, p.211.
- (150) Singapore Department Social Welfare, 1947, p.24.
- (151) *ibid*, p.69-71, table XXVI. For living conditions in the Chinatown see McGee, 1967, p.166, quoting Barrington Kaye.
- (152) *Singapore Department Social Welfare, 1947,*
~~(152)~~ *ibid*, p.52, table XVI. Figures in percents.
- (153) Bellows, 1967, pp.122-123.
- (154) Singapore Department Social Welfare, 1947, p.119, table IV.
- (155) *ibid*, p.30, table VII.
- (156) *ibid*, p.31. Single person households indicate people non-integrated into families.
- (157) In 1960, it generated 13.6 percent of the G.D.P.. In 1967, it employed 43,150 people. Since then its economic importance declined. Benoit in Asian Development Bank, 1971, pp.656-657, 659, table 17 and p.661, table 18.
- (158) Frisby, 1949, pp.33, 39.
- (159) Young, 1953, p.20.
- (160) Ministry of Education Annual Reports, 1963, p.33, table 3.
- (161) Jones, 1959, pp.8, 10.
- (162) Osborne, 1964, p.6.
- (163) "From 1954 through 1961 the cadres of the P.A.P. were trade unionists and student leaders in the Chinese middle schools" they got the loyalties of workers as well as of those committed to Chinese tradition. Sports, cultural and economic associations became the media of the P.A.P. political acculturation. Bellows, 1967, pp.129-130.
- (164) M.D.S.S. 1962, vol.I., No.1, p.24.
- (165) Starner in Ratnam and Milne, 1967, p.314.
- (166) He still did not fully clean up the leftist low-level cadres and even some potential M.P.s did not back him in every political issue.
- (167) Also perhaps the decrease in external trade in 1958 and 1959. See M.D.S.S. 1962, vol.I., No.1, pp.40, 47.

- (168) Tunku's declaration. S.N.S. vol.IV, No.2, 31 Jan. 1957.
- (169) It is noteworthy that the party adopted a Malay name.
- (170) Osborne, 1964, p.20.
- (171) Lee Kwan Yew in S.T. 26 Sept. 1962.
- (172) Pang Cheng Lian, 1971, p.14, table 1.
- (173) Bellows, 1967, p.131.
- (174) Osborne, 1964, p.20.
- (175) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.33. It increased again in 1963 only to decrease ever since.
- (176) Osborne, 1964, pp.40-42, 55-59. On the citizenship issue see Simandjuntak, 1969, pp.189-190.
- (177) Indorf, 1969, p.272.
- (178) Josey, 1963.
- (179) 1964 figures. MacDougall, 1968, p.15, table 1.3.
- (180) Some P.A.P. and M.C.A. leaders belonged to the same families.
- (181) Indorf, 1969, pp.337-338.
- (182) MacDougall, 1968, p.16.
- (183) Fletcher McHenry, 1969, pp.72-76.
- (184) The leftists could have adopted the idea through their primordial consideration of political unity between Malaya and Singapore.
- (185) See Mezerik (ed) 1965, p.33, quoting Sudjarwo.
- (186) See Lee Kwan Yew, 1967.
- (187) Osborne, 1964, p.14.
- (188) F.E.E.R. Yearbook, 1970, p.259.
- (189) Chan Heng Chee, 1971, p.34.
- (190) Y.S.S. 1971/1972, pp.79-80.
- (191) Development Plan 1961-1964, 1961, pp.13-14, tables 1.12 and 1.13.
- (192) Y.S.S. 1970/1971, p.46.
- (193) Development Plan 1961-1964, 1961, p.35, table 3.1 and First Development Plan 1961-1964, 1964, p.3.

- (194) Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.146. Also in 1960 fixed prices, there was an increase in per capita Gross Domestic Expenditure. See Abrahams and Tan, 1970, p.46, tables 1 and 2.
- (195) Y.S.S. 1971/1972, p.149.
- (196) *ibid*, pp.81-82.
- (197) On the efficiency of the P.A.P. see Bellows, 1970, p.101 and Pang Cheng Lian, 1971, pp.23-28, 58.
- (198) Chan Heng Chee, 1971, pp.21-22, 25-27.
- (199) Labour legislation while aiming at the workers welfare, also projected an image of Singapore among foreign investors as a disciplined country, where they could expect economic success. Goh, 1972, p.265.
- (200) In education, housing, public works etc.
- (201) Josey (compiler) 1968, p.III.
- (202) Lee Kwan Yew in *ibid* p.41, also Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A) on social stratification according to leadership capabilities, also Lee Kwan Yew, 1967, pp.47-49 on leadership of the working-class.
- (203) Josey (compiler) 1968, p.III.
- (204) Pang Cheng Lian, 1971, pp.27, 34, 58, on hierarchy, discipline and secrecy in the P.A.P.
- (205) Osborne, 1964, p.35 and Wurfel, 1971, p.11.
- (206) Yet the increase in enrolment was from 266,625 to 336,163 during 1959-1963. Goh, 1972, p.259.
- (207) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.154.
- (208) *ibid*, p.166.
- (209) *ibid*, p.33. The man-day lost in 1969 pertain to stoppages which began in 1968.
- (210) *ibid*, p.12.
- (211) *ibid*, pp.18-19.
- (212) Between 1946 and 1957, the birth rate was on the increase. You Poh Seng, 1963, tables 1, 6. The birth rate was declining since 1957.
- (213) Computed from Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.14-16.
- (214) *ibid*, p.31.
- (215) In 1963, more than 200,000 people lived as squatters in Singapore according to McGee, 1968, p.60.

- (216) Goh, 1972, p.260.
- (217) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.74.
- (218) *ibid*, p.139.
- (219) Abraham and Tan, 1970, p.46, table 1.
- (220) Lim Kim San in Josey (compiler) 1968, p.44.
- (221) Lee Kwan Yew, 1967, p.45, and Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (B).
- (222) Lim Kim San in Josey (Compiler) 1968, p.47.
- (223) *ibid*, p.45.
- (224) *The Plebeian*, 6 Sept. 1966, and 25 April 1967.
- (225) Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A).
- (226) Deutsch and Dominguez, 1972, pp.463-465.
- (227) Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A). Yet, in Holland and Switzerland national identity preceded compulsory military service. Daalder, 1971, p.360.
- (228) Among other arguments this may be supported by the proportion of Chinese in Malaysia. Also in the 1950s, the trade with Indonesia resembled in value that of Malaya, yet there was no question of merger with Indonesia with 2.5 percent Chinese. Merger with Malaysia must have produced among the Chinese some thoughts about their relative weight in the population.
- (229) Lee Kwan Yew, 1966, (B). But, according to Kristoff, in Fisher (ed) 1968, p.345, national cohesion operating from below supplements the state-idea which is imposed from above. In Singapore no such national cohesion combined the three ethnic groups.
- (230) See Daalder, 1971, pp.359-360, 367, regarding the process in the plural societies of Switzerland and Holland.
- (231) The B.S. state idea resembled that of the M.C.P.
- (232) Kwa Chong Guan, 1971, p.35, and Soh Tian Keng, 1971.
- (233) Centrifugal tendencies of local governments are well known in the Philippines, Indonesia and practically to some extent in most other countries.
- (234) Tan in You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (eds), 1971, pp.386-417.
- (235) Q.E.R. 1970, pp.8-9.
- (236) Goh, 1972, pp.210-212.

- (237) By the end of 1966, out of a total of 7,836 acres acquired or undertaken to acquire by the government for industrial development, 7,340 acres were in Jurong. Lefeber and Chudhuri, 1971, p.182.
- (238) According to Lee Kwan Yew, 1969, pp. 1, 3.
- (239) *ibid*,
- (240) Lee Kwan Yew in S.T. 1st May 1972.
- (241) S.T. 2nd and 6th May 1972.
- (242) Y.S.S. 1971/1971, p.47, for establishments of more than 9 employees.
- (243) A-Average per capita worker remuneration in current prices Singapore \$. B-Average per capita worker remuneration in 1960 fixed retail prices. See Y.S.S. 1970/71, p.139.
C-Average Value Added per worker in current prices.
D-Capital expenditure per added worker in S.\$.
- (244) In 1970, Amnesty International claimed that over 100 people were administratively detained. Alexander, 1973, p.218.
- (245) On governmental involvement in the economy as owners, see Lee Soo Ann in You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (eds) 1971, pp. 81-100.
- (246) Y.S.S. 1971/72 pp.81, 82.
- (247) M.D.S.S. vol. XI, No. 8, 1972, p.35.
- (248) Both Malaya and Singapore had no interest in diplomatic relations with China before 1972.
- (249) Sun. T. 3 Sept. 1972.
- (250) For example, "Singapore is Afraid that Time is Running Out", Emery in Peng-Khaung Chong (ed) 1968, pp.106-109. "Politics of Survival", Chan Heng Chee, 1971, Some milder allusions regarding Singapore's existence in the midst of a Malay World. Wilson, 1971, p.238.
- (251) "The Crucial Years Ahead". Josey (compiler)1968, pp.49-51.
- (252) See especially Lee's demands and hopefulness. *ibid*, *passim*. Goh's good planning of economic and strategic problems, but also a ~~different~~ mood of Rajaratnam, *ibid*, pp.11 and Toh Chin Chye, pp.4, 22.
- (253) The 1957 Percentage distribution of ethnic socio-economic classes was as follows:
- | | Malay | Chinese | Indian | Others |
|--------------|-------|---------|--------|--------|
| Upper Class | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 16.6 |
| Middle Class | 15.6 | 17.9 | 20.3 | 56.6 |
| Lower Class | 83.9 | 80.5 | 77.9 | 26.8 |
- Macdougall, 1968, p.25.

- (254) M.D.S.S. vol. XI. No. 8. p.3.
- (255) Computed from M.D.S.S. vol.XI, No.8, 1972, pp.62-63.
- (256) Tan Seong Chee, 1971, pp.5, 14-17.
- (257) Men's hair should be short cut by statutory law, and hippies find difficulty in visiting Singapore.
- (258) The drive for cleanliness was very effective, making Singapore one of the cleanest cities of its size.
- (259) In 1959-1969, the compound rate of G.D.P. increase reached 9.4 percent. Goh, 1972, p.254.
- (260) Chiew Seen Kong, 1971, p.IV. This is a premise of the P.A.P.
- (261) *ibid*, pp.V-VI. It was postulated in that research that national identity varied directly with: social integration, integrativve attitudes, bilingualism, legitimation of government policies of nation building, mobilization and satisfaction with life.
- (262) Gibbons and Chan Heng Chee, 1971, pp.101-102, 112.
- (263) Yeh and Kwok Chuon Wei, 1972, vol.III, pp.2-5.
- (264) *ibid*, p.5, table III. For a detailed report see Yeh, 1972.
- (265) Yeh, 1972, pp.14, 205. This indicates integration within the ethnic group and not a national integration, but it proves that the traditional sub-group segregation is fading out.
- (266) Largely of Chinese ethnicity. Personal communication from Jek Yeun Thong, minister for culture, 14 Oct.1972. The figure is from Goh, 1972 (B).
- (267) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.149.
- (268) The indifferentiation of classes in residence areas in Chinese and Indian towns partly resulted from that cultural environment conception. Caste differentiation in India only ~~marginally~~ *marginally* changed that situation.
- (269) The three booming economic fields in the late 1960s were the hotel industry, ship building and offshore oil prospection. See Lim Chong Yah and Ow Chwee Huay in You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (eds) 1971, pp.30-34.
- (270) Lee Kwan Yew, 1972.
- (271) For example, Toh Chin Chye, 1971.
- (272) Wong Lin Ken, 1972.
- (273) Goh, 1972 (A).

- (274) Rajaratnam, 1972.
- (275) Goh in S.T. 9 Aug. 1971.
- (276) It was not planned, yet when the government later became aware of it, it helped to reduce it. Goh, 1972, pp.151-153.
- (277) Chua Sia Chin, 1972.
- (278) *ibid.*
- (279) Goh, 1972, (B).
- (280) Most of whom would be Chinese, thus enhancing Singapore's centrality.
- (281) World diplomatic recognition of Singapore undoubtedly adds to the political executives self esteem. If future conditions favour a new merger with Malaysia, relinquishment of the independent state status may prove the hardest obstacle to overcome.
- (282) Also the relative decline in air mail and air freight in proportion to the rest of the world during that period, is indicative of that trend. Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.93.
- (283) Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.81-82.
- (284) *ibid*, p.97.
- (285) Rajaratnam, 1972.
- (286) Q.E.R. No.3, 1970, p.10.
- (287) Goh, 1972, pp.122-123, 125-126.
- (288) S.G.P.S. 16 Nov. 1971.
- (289) Rajaratnam, 1972, (B).
- (290) S.T. 4 July 1968.
- (291) S.T. 10 Aug. 1970.
- (292) S.T. 9 Aug. 1971.
- (293) Not by sheer lack of resources, but by the need to compromise in order to get substitutes.
- (294) Chou Tai Choong, 1972, p.5 and *passim*.
- (295) Wong in Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (eds) 1969, *passim*. Also Geno-Oehlers and Wikkramatileke, 1968, p.194.
- (296) Khong Kit Soon, 1972, p.3.

- (297) Geno-Oehlers and Wikkramatileke, 1968, p.192, tables 1,2.
- (298) S.T. 10 Aug. 1969.
- (299) Soong Tsoon Tuh, 1972, p.4.
- (300) ibid, p.8.
- (301) S.T. 8 May 1971.
- (302) See Wilson, 1967, p.50, for hatred to the Chinese in Singapore expressed by inhabitants of a remote village in Malaya.
- (303) N.N. 21 Oct. 1972 on cooperation in building projects and tourism. Also S.T. 22 March 1971 and 10 May 1972 on joint training of Malaysian and Indonesian armed forces, and on Malaysian and Singaporean military cooperation respectively.
- (304) Y.S.S. 1971/72 p.115 and M.D.S.S. vol.XI, No.8, 1972, p.78.
- ! (306) For prospects in Indonesia see Withington, 1961, pp.418-423.
- ! (305) While industrial cooperation will help Malaysia and Indonesia, it will not damage Singapore, as by strength of its economy it can shift to more sophisticated low-pollution industries.
- (307) In fact, Singapore had anticipated a possible increase in tourism and business trips, for which it provided the most extensive facilities in the entire region.
- (308) Lee Kwan Yew, 1972 (A).
- (309) ibid.
- (310) Alexander, 1973, p.159.
- (311) In the event of a deterioration in the conditions of the Chinese in their countries of origin, they may remain in Singapore as refugees.
- (312) Non Singapore citizens' enrolment in the Nan Yang University (mainly from Malaysia and Indonesia) was as follows:

Year	Total Students	Non Singaporeans.
1965/66	2,273	1,431
1966/67	1,851	1,006
1967/68	1,750	666
1968/69	1,991	525
1969/70	2,242	615
1970/71	2,039	457

Source: Nan Yang Univ. Calenders for the appropriate years. Although the number of non-Singaporean students greatly declined during that period, they were still impressive in respect of the level of education concerned.

(313) The corrupt government of Southeast Asian countries suggest that anti-Chinese laws are devised to be broken.. at Chinese expenses.

Appendix A.

The abnormal sex ratio of the immigrant Chinese communities calls for a special discussion concerning its relation to permanent residence and to attachment to the place of residence.

It is assumed here, that within a society where migratory figures greatly exceed natural population growth and mainly involve young males, the sedentary part of the population is represented by families, while the bachelors, as much as they are not integrated into families, usually constitute the unstable element of the population both socially and demographically. They will normally have much less sentimental attachment to their temporary place of residence (1). It is further assumed that Chinese families had a 1:1 sex ratio during the 19th and 20th centuries. The assumption may be justified by the following reasoning: Malay women married to Chinese, who might not have appeared as Chinese females in the censuses, could be balanced, as it were, by second and third wives of those wealthy Chinese who had more than one wife, by Chinese prostitutes and by mui tsai servant girls (2).

A normal society with a 1:1 sex ratio is entirely organized in families, except for marginal anomalies. A society with less than 1:1 female to male (F/M) ratio, will have a lower percentage of the population integrated in families, the non integrated males constituting the unstable part of the society. Frontier towns and "Gold Rush" ^{settlements} ~~communities~~ provide a good example of such communities.

Assuming that a normal society has a 1:1 sex ratio in

its families and that a 1:1 sex ratio indicates full integration into families, we get the following function representing the ratio of the number of people integrated into families stable population over the total population:

$$f\left(\frac{F}{M}\right) = f\left(\frac{M}{F}\right) = \begin{cases} \frac{2F}{M+F} & \text{for } F \leq M \\ \frac{2M}{M+F} & \text{for } F > M \end{cases}$$

M denoting the number of males, and F — of females.

The range of the function extends over fractions in $[0, 1]$. The proof is trivial, and since no assumption has been made as regards the size of families, the function is independent of it. For the ratio of the non-integrated persons over the entire population we get:

$$g\left(\frac{F}{M}\right) = g\left(\frac{M}{F}\right) = \begin{cases} \frac{F-M}{F+M} & \text{for } F \geq M \\ \frac{M-F}{F+M} & \text{for } F < M \end{cases}$$

Now, "g" + "f", for each specific sex ratio, equal 1, ~~and~~ ^{the sum} of the functions representing the integrated and the non-integrated proportions of the population.

The graph representing the function "f" follows, and may be useful in research of communities, where only ^{the} sex ratio is known, to decide the proportion of integration into families and hence to stability of residence and the territorial values attached to the place.

Two samples from 1947 Singapore may ~~prove~~ ^{strengthen} the validity of the function. The first one, (3) returned 961 single-person households out of a total 15,698 persons or, approximately a 6.1 percent proportion of people non-

Integration into Families Graph.

% of Pop.
in Families

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

Sex Ratio

Sex Ratio	% of Pop. in Families
0	0
0.1	19
0.2	32
0.3	43
0.4	53
0.5	64
0.6	73
0.7	81
0.8	89
0.9	95
1.0	100

integrated into families. The contemporary Chinese 0.882 (F/M) sex ratio indicates according to the "f" function a 94 percent integration into families. The second sample (4) involved 19,380 persons of all ethnic groups with an (F/M) sex ratio of 0.865, while the average sex ratio for all the ethnic groups in 1947 was 0.822. The former figure indicates a 7.2 percent of non-integrated population, and in fact, the sample included 1,343 persons in single person households, or 6.9 percent of non-integration.

FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX A.

- (1) This is where residential stability becomes a concept in cultural geography.
- (2) Purcell, 1966 (1965) pp.274-275 and Song Ong Siang, 1967 (1922) pp.391-395.
- (3) Figures from Freedman, 1970 (1957) p.30.
- (4) Singapore Department Social Welfare, 1947, p.28 table IV.

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The key words of the footnotes are here underlined for easier reference. Wherever Chinese authors' surnames follow their first names, this is the order in the reference sources.

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