FUKUZAWA YUKICHI

A Study in the Introduction of Western Ideas into Japan in the Meiji Period.

by

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Abstract

Fukuzawa Yukichi's writings have been treated in this study as examples of the literature of the _keimoo_ movement - the movement which sought to 'enlighten the darkness' of the Japanese people by urging them to rethink, in the light of Western science, the whole of their traditional way of thought. Though the primary impetus behind the movement was the need to understand Western science in order to make Japan strong enough to defend herself agains the threat of Western aggression and exploitation, the _keimoo_ writers quickl found that a proper comprehension of science involved drastic changes in othe branches of thought seemingly unrelated to science. Fukuzawa's plea that science should be regarded as the basic discipline in the new 'learning' led him to urge that this new learning, and the new view of the external world which it demanded, was incompatible with the old ideas of ethics, of history, of political theory and of international relations. He was hence led to tr to give these sweeping changes a 'higher' justification than the mere need f a _fukoku-kyoohei_ - a rich country and a strong army - by positing, with the aid of the Western theory of Progress as revealed in the works of Buckle, Guizot and Herbert Spencer, that increase in scientific knowledge would lead men up a ladder of progress whereby they would become continuously more know-ledgeable and virtuous until they eventually reached the very perfection of human nature. This perfection as described by Fukuzawa, however, was not unlike the perfection of the Neo-Confucians whose opinions Fukuzawa was so anxious to refute. Revered though Fukuzawa became in Japanese intellectual circles, his suggestions for new interpretations of the old virtues - a re-vised view of filial piety, of loyalty and of conjugal fidelity necessarily complementary, as he claimed, to science - were not destined to become orthodox opinion in Japan for the half-century after his death.

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List of Abbreviations

DNSZ	Dai Nihon Shisoo Zenshuu.
FEQ	Far Eastern Quarterly.
FS	Fukuzawa Senshuu.
FYD	Fukuzawa Yukichi Den.
FZ	Fukuzawa Zenshuu.
HSR	Hompoo Shigakushi Ronsoo
JWM	Japan Weekly Mail.
MBZ	Meiji Bunka Zenshuu.
ZFZ	Zoku Fukuzawa Zenshuu.

Note

Japanese personal names are given with the family name first.

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Chapter 1.

Short Biography

Fukuzawa Yukichi was born on January 10th 1835 into a family of lower samurai of the Okudaira clan of Nakatsu in the province of Buzen in Kyuushuu. His father, Fukuzawa Hyakusuke, had the low rank of nakakoshoo, the low stipend of thirteen koku plus rations for two, and the uncongenial duties of supervising the clan treasury at Oosaka. In this city Yukichi spent the first eighteen months of his life, until his father's early death sent the family back to Nakatsu.[1]

From an early age Yukichi seems to have harboured a strong resentment against the hierarchical system under which he lived and which most of his contemporaries took for granted as part of the order of nature. "I hated the feudal system," he recalled, "as though it were my father's murderer."[2] Certainly for samurai of his low status in the Nakatsu clan life was at the time both hard and dull. Their stipends were usually so inadequate as to make 'sidework' imperative - humble tasks such as making umbrellas or paper lanterns, more suited to artisans than to samurai.[3] Their duties were confined to pedestrian tasks such as accounting or gate-guarding.[4] But more galling than poverty and boredom was the strict feudal discipline, which stressed

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1. Fukuzawa's own account of his parents and early life may be found in the first chapter of his autobiography Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII.
2. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, 304.
3. Kyuuhanjoo, FZ VI, 680. For further examples of the humble tasks to which the lower samurai were reduced by their poverty, see Honjoo Eijiroo Social and Economic History of Japan, Chapter 6.
4. Kyuuhanjoo, 680-1.

in almost every conceivable context of daily life the lower samurai's inferiority to the upper. In language, in accent, in handwriting, in marriage, in education and all the innumerable minute prescriptions for daily human intercourse which characterised the feudal system, the lower samurai had to abase himself before the upper.[1] He was, moreover, forbidden to deviate in the smallest degree from the path prescribed for him by his inherited status. However able or energetic he might be, "he would no more hope to enter the ranks of the upper samurai than would a four legged beast hope to fly like a bird."[2]

Discontented though many of them might be with their lot, however, it was only very few who were able to give any kind of expression to their resentment. They accepted unquestioningly the distinctions of feudal status "almost as though they were laws of nature rather than inventions of man."[3]

Neither of Fukuzawa's parents however seem to have had much regard for distinctions of rank. His mother cultivated acquaintances among merchants and peasants, and even beggars and eta.[4] His father was known to have disliked the feudal system because it had condemned him to a task contaminated by money and calculation, and therefore utterly repugnant to his gentle and scholarly nature. He had even considered making Yukichi into a Buddhist priest in the hope that he might thereby escape from the groove to which his inheritance would otherwise condemn him.[5]

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1. Kyuuhanjoo, 677-685.
2. Ibid. 677.
3. Ibid. 678.
4. Fukuoo Jiden, 312.
5. Fukuzawa-shi Kosen Haibun no Ki, FZ X, 487; Fukuoo Jiden, 304.

Yukichi himself conceived an early and violent dislike of feudal convention - a dislike which a good education on the customary Chinese classical lines - he recalled that he read the Tso Chuan all through no less than eleven times - did nothing to mitigate.[1] Indeed, it was his contempt for the 'narrow stiffness' of Nakatsu which originally launched him on his career as a 'western' scholar. He welcomed the opportunity of going to Nagasaki in 1854 to learn Dutch and gunnery simply because it enabled him to escape from Nakatsu. He knew nothing of the West at the time, but, he recalled, "I would have welcomed anything, literature or art or anything at all, so long as it gave me an excuse to get away. I still remember telling myself that this was the happiest day of my life... and how I looked back and spat on the ground, and then walked quickly away." [2]

In Nagasaki he acquired the Western alphabet and a certain theoretical knowledge of gunnery,[3] but his Dutch studies proper started in 1855, when, rather than return to Nakatsu, he entered the Tekijuku - a school in Oosaka run by the physician Ogata Kooan, one of the foremost Dutch scholars of the time, for the purpose of teaching any branch of Western learning for which

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, 306, 309. The Chinese works which Fukuzawa mentions having read include, besides the Analects and Mencius, the Shih Ching and the Shu Ching, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and a number of historical works. His teacher, Shiraishi Tsuneto, belonged to the school of Kamei Nammei, and upholder of Ogyuu Sorai's views. Fukuoo Jiden, 306
2. Ibid. 318-9. See also Yo ga Yoogaku ni kokorozashitaru Yuen, FZ X, 76-80, where Fukuzawa later reflected that Dutch studies, commonly held to be extremely difficult, may have had a particular attraction for him in view of the traditional 'spirit' of the samurai to be attracted towards difficult things.
3. Ibid. 320

books could be found.[1] Here Fukuzawa and his eighty or ninety fellow students, a wild crowd of penurious lower samurai like himself, strove to master the Dutch language and the mysteries of Western physics, chemistry and medicine.

The difficulties in the way of the aspiring student of Dutch were at the time very considerable. In the Tekijuku there was only one Dutch dictionary, and the scarcity of text books was such that a student would have to copy laboriously any passage he wished to possess for his own use.[2] Against students of foreign learning, moreover, the weight of feudal and Confucian disapproval and even the assassin's sword were directed. Fukuzawa found himself confronted with the hostility of "everyone in Nakatsu including all his relatives" with the sole exception of his mother.[3]

But the Ogata students, Fukuzawa recalled, worked with fanatical zeal, making little distinction between night and day.[4] They would not only

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1. Ogata Kooan was a lower samurai of the Ashimori clan in Bitchuu. He studied Dutch medicine in Osaka and Edo, and finally in Nagasaki under a Dutch physician. His school, the Tekijuku, also know as Tekitekisaijuku, was, with Itoo Gemboku's Shoosendoo, one of the most influential of the private schools of Rangaku founded before the Bakumatsu period. It lasted for twenty-four years, in all more than 600 students seeking instruction there. Ogata was obliged unwillingl to abandon it in 1862 on being ordered to Edo to take up the position of head of the Western Medical Institute (Seiyoo Igakusho). He died in 1863 at the age of 54. FYD I, 124-8; Numata Jiroo, Bakumatsu Yoogakushi, 175-8; Ookuma, Fifty Years of New Japan, II, 145.
2. Fukuoo Jiden, 476-9. The Doeff-Halma dictionary, a translation of a Dutch-French one, was virtually the only complete dictionary available to students of Dutch, and consequently much prized. A penurious student could often earn a living by copying pages of it for a pro-western daimyoo. Ogata's copy was a manuscript one, said to be very difficult to read. It was compiled by Hendrik Doeff, with the help of ten Nagasaki interpreters, during the ample leisure he enjoyed as head of the Dutch factory on Deshima from 1803. FYD I, 194, 227.
3. Fukuoo Jiden, 338
4. Ibid. 373.

construe the text books of chemistry and medicine in Ogata's library, but would also try to put the principles they found there into practice by conducting their own chemical experiments and making their own dissections - of stray dogs or decapitated criminals.[1] They worked, however, with no other motive than the pleasure of acquiring rare and difficult knowledge. "It was rather", Fukuzawa recalled, "as though we were taking a bitter medicine without knowing whether it would do us any good or not, simply because we knew we were the only people capable of taking it."[2]

In 1858 Fukuzawa's own hard work bore fruit of a practical kind, for he was ordered by the clan authorities to proceed to the clan mansion at Edo, there to start a school for teaching Dutch to the young clan samurai. This small school, quartered in the clan's <u>nakayashiki</u> at Teppoozu, and equipped in the most rudimentary way, was later to grow into what is now Keioo University.[3]

It was not long, however, before he came to realise that a knowledge of Dutch alone would be entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the times. A visit to the primitive foreign settlement at Yokohama in 1859, when he found to his chagrin that he could neither read any of the notices nor make the merchants understand anything he said, convinced him that it was not Dutch b English which was to be the language of the future.[4] Though the difficulties i

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1. <u>Fukuoo Jiden</u>, 380-2.
2. Ibid. 386.
3. It was in the same <u>nakayashiki</u>, or secondary mansion, at Teppoozu that Maeno Ryootaku, a samurai of the Nakatsu clan, and Sugita Gempaku had started their translation of the Dutch treatise on anatomy <u>Tafel Anatomica</u> in 1771 - an undertaking which marked the beginning of Rangaku proper in Japan. <u>Yoogaku no Meimyaku</u>, FZ X, 415. See FYD I, Chapter 11, for a description of the school during its Teppoozu perio
4. <u>Fukuoo Jiden</u>, 392-3.

one of his low status and connections were even more formidable than those which beset the student of Dutch, he was by then sufficiently convinced of the importance of Western studies to set about learning English at once.[1]

In 1860 he contrived to be taken on a voyage to America, in the capacity of personal servant to the captain of the Kanrin Maru, a Japanese vessel acting as escort to the battleship carrying three Japanese envoys to Washington for the purpose of ratifying the Treaty of 1858. The crew of the Kanrin Maru went no further than San Francisco, but there Fukuzawa was able to see such wonders of science as the town could boast at the time, and, even stranger, the wonders of Western everyday life such as had never appeared in text books of physics, medicine or astronomy.[2]

Fukuzawa's second voyage to the West was made in 1862 in the capacity of 'translator' to the delegation sent to Europe to negotiate a postponement of the opening of Hyoogo to foreign trade and of Edo and Osaka to foreign residence. The delegation visited France, England, Holland, Germany, Russia and Portugal, their hosts in each of the capital cities taking pains to show them the most impressive examples of Western civilization that their country could muster. Fukuzawa lost no opportunity for learning all he could, particularly in the fields of politics, economics and the small things of everyday life which nobody bothered to write down in books. "Whenever I met anyone whom I thought to be of any consequence I would do my best to learn

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, 393-8.
2. Ibid, 398-416.

something from him. I would ask questions and put down everything he said in a notebook." [1] Much of the information he received he found very difficult to understand, and it was often five or ten days before he was able to even dimly comprehend what it was all about. "I shall never forget," he recalled, "the terrible trouble I had in understanding how the postal system worked." [2]

The information hecollected on this tour later went to form the basis of the book which first made him famous as an authority on the West - Seiyoo Jijoo, or Conditions in the West. Seiyoo Jijoo was indeed an epoch-making work. Of the first volume alone, which appeared in 1866, 150,000 copies were sold almost at once, and pirated editions soon raised the number to 250,000. Its success was largely due to the fact that it contained precisely the kind of information about the West which the Japanese at that time were needing to substantiate their shadowy vision of the Western lands - namely simple, concise accounts of ordinary, everyday social institutions such as hospitals, schools, newspapers, workhouses, taxation, museums and lunatic asylums. The book's success was due also to its literary style, which was so simple and lucid as to be easily comprehensible by any Japanese of any degree of literacy. It was a style which, contrary as it was to all the canons of scholarly writing of the day, Fukuzawa cultivated consciously

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, 426-7. One of the notebooks Fukuzawa used is now in the possession of Keioo Gijuku. It contains jottings in English, Dutch and Japanese, on such subjects as the cost per mile of building a railway, the number of students in King's College and the correct process of hardening wood. See Nomura Kanetaroo, Fukuzawa Sensei no Taioo Techoo, Shigaku, Vol. 24, No. 2, October 1950.
   Accounts of this delegation may be found in Osatake Takeshi, Bakumatsu Kengai Shisetsu Monogatari, Chapter 1; Sir Rutherford Alcock: The Capital of the Tycoon, II, 377-383. The Times reported regularly on its activities in England during May 1862.
2. Fukuzawa Zenshuu Chogen, FZ I, 33.

and at first painfully, with the object of enabling his works to be read by as wide a public as possible. Indeed, to test the comprehensibility of his writings Fukuzawa would sometimes make his housemaid read his manuscripts through, and would alter any word or phrase she did not understand.[1]

The immense success of Seiyoo Jijoo established Fukuzawa's reputation as a writer and an authority on the West, and ensured the success of his succeeding publications - of which seven appeared before the fall of the Bakufu. All of these, as also the eight works published during the first year after the Restoration, were concerned to expound either elementary science or elementary information about Western everyday life. Seiyoo Tabi Annai (1867), for examphe, was a guide book for prospective travellers to the West. Seiyoo Ishokuju (1867) gave neat illustrated descriptions of Western clothes, food, and furniture. Kyuuri Zukai (1868) explained, with illustrations, some common everyday scientific principles.

Sekai Kunizukushi (1869) described the different continents and countries of the world in the easily memorable 'seven-five' metre of the old terakoya text books.[2]

It was not until a year or so after the fall of the Bakufu, however, that Fukuzawa came to realise his 'mission' in life. Western studies, from

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1. Fukuzawa Zenshuu Chogen, 30-36, 3-6. See also ibid. 9-11 for Fukuzawa's remarks on the difficulties he encountered in coining new words to represent the wealth of new ideas. A notable example of one of his 'new' words which caught on was the character for steam. See also Mazaki Masato, Fukuzawa Yukichi no Seiyoo Jijoo, Shigaku Vol. 24, No. 2, October 1950.
2. These short works, and all Fukuzawa's others before 1872, are in FZ I and II. Remarks about what prompted him to write them may be found in Fukuzawa Zenshuu Chogen, FZ I.

attracting him because of their sheer difficulty and because they represented wider horizons than the petty confines of the feudal clan, had turned into a successful source of income and foreign travel. But the discovery that the new government was itself pro-western made him realise that Western studies held much wider possibilities.

"The Confucian civilization of the East seems to me to lack two things possessed by Western civilization; science in the material sphere and a sense of 'independence' in the spiritual sphere. I see now that this is the reason why Western statesmen govern their countries so successfully and Western business men are so successful in their commerce and industry, and why the people are so patriotic and their family circles so happy. If nations, and, on a longer view, mankind itself, are to survive, we cannot escape the laws of science, and must place our trust in the principle of independence.

But in Japan these important principles had been quite neglected, and while this was so, I was convinced, Japan could never be on an equal footing with the countries of the West. I was convinced too that the blame for this lay with Chinese studies - and so, though I couldn't do much with no capital and no facilities for specialised courses in my school, yet I did all that was in my power to base my system of education on the principles of science. Nor did I lose any opportunity for advocating the principle of independence, in speeches, in my writings and in casual conversations, and tried in all kinds of ways to put it into practice in my daily life." [1]

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, 502.

To teach the Japanese the value of science and the spirit of independence, however, was a large task.

> "I felt as though. . . .I must try to change the whole people's way of thinking from its very foundations. Thereby I could help to make Japan into a great new civilized nation in the East, comparable with England in the West." [1]

To this task of 'enlightening' (keimoo) the Japanese people Fukuzawa devoted the rest of his life. It was to this end that he now devoted his writings, which, from merely expounding elementary and innocuous information about the West, became with remarkable suddenness didactic and critical, concerned to point out to the Japanese the errors arising from their traditional neglect of 'science and the spirit of independence.' Of these later writings, a continuous stream of which appeared from his pen almost up to the time of his death, the most notable were Gakumon no Susume - seventeen pamphlets which came out at irregular intervals between 1872 and 1876, and which were written in so easy a style and contained so many startling criticisms of accepted ideas, that their total sales reached the very large figure of 3,400,000;[2] Bummeiron no Gairyaku (1876), a longer work attempting to enquire in a more academic manner into the nature of 'civilization'; Tsuuzoku Minkenron and Tsuuzoku Kokkenron (1878), two essays on the vexed questions of people's rights and the rights of the nation; Jiji Shoogen (1881), a lengthy critique of the trends of the times; a number of essays on the position of women, notably Nihon Fujinron (1885),

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, 617.
2. About 200,000 copies of each pamphlet were printed, so that the total sales of all seventeen were something to the tune of 3,400,000 FZ I, 45.

Onna Daigaku Hyooron and Shin Onna Daigaku (1898); the collections of essays on miscellaneous subjects Fukuoo Hyakuwa and Fukuoo Hyakuyowa (1897), and his autobiography, dictated to a secretary, Fukuoo Jiden (1898).

To this end also he founded the daily newspaper Jiji Shimpoo, in which many of his writings after 1882 appeared in serial form. He had originally undertaken to start the paper at the request of Itoo, Inoue and Ookuma with the object of explaining in a balanced and responsible manner the government's policy in the light of the projected opening of the Diet. The political crisis of 1881, however, in which Fukuzawa found himself accused of 'conspiring' with Ookuma and the Mitsubishi, brought his connection with these Ministers to a sudden close and he decided to embark on the venture of the newspaper on his own responsibility.[1] Its avowed policy, announced in the first edition, was to disseminate the principles of 'independence' which for twenty-five years had been the guiding principle of Keioo Gijuku.

> "We want out learning independent, not licking up the lees and scum of the Westerners. We want our commerce independent, not dominated by them. We want our law independent, not held in contempt by them. We want our religion independent, not trampled underfoot by them. In short, we have made the independence of our country our lifelong objective, and all who share these aspirations with us are our friends, all who do not are. . . our enemies."[2]

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1. Accounts of Fukuzawa's part in the political crisis of 1881 may be found in Osatake Takeshi, Nihon Kenseishi Taikoo, II, Chapter 8, Part 2. Nakamura Kikuo, Nihon Kindaika to Fukuzawa Yukichi, Chapter 3, and Watanabe Kuriyama, "Meiji Juuyonen no Seihen ni Tsuite", in Meiji Bunka Kenkyuu, Vol. 2.
   Fukuzawa's own account of the affair may be found in the essay Meiji Shinki Kiji, FYD III, 52-62, in the long letter he wrote to Itoo and Inoue on October 14th 1881, Ibid. 71-72, and in the letter to Inoue of December 25th, ibid, 87-89.
2. Jiji Shimpoo Hatsuda no Shushi, FYD III, 131.

To this end also he devoted the education of his students. His school had grown steadily since its modest start in 1858, taken the name Keioo Gijuku and moved into the spacious quarters of an abandoned feudal mansion on a hill in the Mita district. By means of strict, and at that time very unusual discipline, and by a carefully planned curriculum, Fukuzawa had endeavoured not only to give his students a thorough grounding in science, but also to cultivate in them a particular kind of morale (Kifuu), in which the 'spirit of independence' figured prominently.[1] The students of Keioo Gijuku were to be models of 'civilized students' (bummei-gakusei), living proofs that Western studies were the pursuit of upright gentlemen and not the resort of immoral and undisciplined eccentrics.[2]

To this end also Fukuzawa developed the art of public speaking in Japan. Though the Japanese language had been traditionally thought by scholars to be unintelligible if used to address large audiences, Fukuzawa proved by his own eloquence that public speaking in Japanese was not only possible, but an effective medium for propagating the gospel of independence.[3]

In his private life too Fukuzawa lost no opportunity for trying to uproot the old ways of thinking. In his Autobiography he recorded how once when he was walking along the beach at Kamakura with his children he met a farmer riding a horse. As soon as he saw the Fukuzawa family and

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1. FYD I, Chapters 11, 15, 18; Keioo Gijuku Shingi, ZFZ VII, 73; Keioo Gijuku Kaikaku no Gian, ZFZ VII, 80.
2. Yoogaku no Meimyaku, FZ X, 419.
3. It was Fukuzawa who coined several commonly used words in connection with public speaking, including the word enzetsu, a public speech, itself. He convinced the doubtful members of the Meirokusha that speeches were indeed possible in Japanese by promptly making one before them himself. FZ I, 66-73.

recognised that they were samurai, the farmer jumped down from his horse.

"I caught hold of his bridle and said, "What do you mean by this?"

The farmer looked terrified and began to apologise volubly.

"No, no," I said, "Don't be a fool. This is your own horse, isn't it?"

"Yes, sir."

"Then why can't you ride your own horse? Get on at once and be off!" But still he wouldn't get on, so I said, "Get on at once, I say. If you don't I'll beat you!" . . .I forced him back on his horse and sent him off. But the incident made me realise what a terrible power the old customs still had." [1]

"It was no use," he later declared, "simply talking about these things. I felt I must put it all into practice in the way I lived, so that there would be no discrepancy between my words and deeds. So in the way I conducted myself and my family I determined never to be dependent on others. At the same time if I saw anything which would advance the cause of civilization I never hesitated to try to carry it out, irrespective of what the general opinion might be." [2]

In September 1898 Fukuzawa had a stroke from which it was feared for some tim that he would not recover. He rallied, however, and though he published nothing more, he continued his activities fairly vigorously until, in January 1901, he was visited by a second stroke, from which he did not recover. He was buried in the Shin temple Zempukuji in Mita, his funeral

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1. *Fukuoo Jiden*, 526.
2. Ibid. 529.

procession consisting of about 1500 students and as many as 10,000 mourners, all on foot. "No style of funeral," the Japan Weekly Mail declared, "could have been better suited to the unostentatious simplicity that marked the life of the great philosopher."[1]

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1. *Japan Weekly Mail*, February 16th 1901.

Chapter 2.

Jooi and Kaikoku

At the time when Fukuzawa was a boy the knowledge that the Japanese had managed to glean from and about the West was almost entirely confined to the natural sciences. It was medicine, astronomy, geography and chemistry which, together with gunnery, the Japanese were most anxious to learn from Dutch books and the few Dutch on Deshima competent to teach such things. A few intrepid spirits such as Shiba Kookan and Hiraga Gennai ventured further afield into the sphere of painting, and Honda Toshiaki saw the western alphabet to be a vast improvement over the Chinese ideographic script - but in general it was only the various scientific 'techniques' which the Japanese felt they could profitably learn from the west. Of western ethics, economics, literature and history scarcely anything at all was known, and, even had the books to teach such subjects been available, it is doubtful if any but the most curious and intrepid Japanese would have cared to read them.

The reason for this was that during the two or three decades before Perry's arrival, the general attitude of articulate Japanese towards western knowledge was governed by two considerations: naiyuu or the internal worries at the disintegration of the original feudal model and the consequent discontent in almost all classes of society; and gaikan or the foreign threat from without. The foreign threat had been felt vaguely since the beginning of the century, and particularly since the Opium War of 1840. Britain's victory over China, hitherto believed to be omniscient and invincible, was unanimously interpreted not only as proof of the enormous might and predatory intentions of Britain, but also as a warning that her next victim

might be Japan.[1] The consciousness of gaikan was closely connected with that of naiyuu in the minds of most thinking Japanese, but over the question of which of these considerations was the more urgent and important two schools of thought arose.

The school which later came to be called Jooi, after its central tenet that the Barbarians should be Expelled, gave entire priority to naiyuu. The external threat, these writers thought, was very alarming, but it was useless to expect to be able to deal with a barbarian invasion until the degenerate state of Japanese society itself had been remedied. Long years of peace and inactivity had sapped the martial spirit traditional to the Japanese samurai, most of whom had become lazy and effete. Moral habits of discipline and frugality traditionally common to all four classesof society had also become distressingly lax, ostentatious luxury among the choonin, or tradesmen, the lowest of the Four Orders, being particularly marked and reprehensible. Until these degenerate habits were reformed and some of the original 'will' and 'spirit' associated with martial valour, austerity and diligence were inculcated into the Japanese, no weapons would be of any avail against the foreign menace.[2]

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1. For Japanese reactions to the Opium War, see Van Gulik, "Kakkaron, a Japanese echo of the Opium War." Monumenta Serica, IV, 481-511. Yoshino Sakuzoo, "Ishin Zengo no Haigai Shisoo," in Meiji Bunka Kenkyuu p. 125. W.G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, p. 32-42.
   For Honda Toshiaki and Shiba Kookan, see Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, Chapter 4.
2. See, for example, Aizawa Seishisai's Shinron (1825), in Meiji Bunka Zenshuu, Shisoohen, and summarised in Watsuji Tetsuroo's Nihon Rinri Shisooshi, II, p. 633. Also Fujita Tooko's Hitachi-obi in Mitogaku Zenshuu Vol. 1.
   For a most useful account of the ideas behind the jooi and kaikoku persuasions, see W.G. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868, p. 3-18.

One of the greatest potential impediments to the reform of this 'spirit' however lay in western learning. Western learning appeared to these thinkers to rest on a 'spirit' and a scheme of values entirely opposed to those which they conceived to be Japan's glory and safeguard. To allow it to gain any footing in Japan would therefore simply be hastening the country's corruption. China herself was an only too clear warning of what happened to a country which allowed pernicious western influences to undermine her ethical foundations. Her ignominious defeat by Britain in the Opium War was attributed entirely to demoralization through several decades at the hands of the west.

The most usual charge levelled by the Jooi writers at the western spirit and scheme of values was preoccupation with profit (ri) and material considerations to the neglect of duty (gi). Even the concept of convenience and usefulness (benri), which had long been the Rangakusha's chief argument in favour of western scientific studies, was branded by one jooi writer as an immoral extension of the profit-making spirit and no concern of true samurai.[1] Such being its character, western learning could not fail to exacerbate the degenerate tendency for samurai to become inbued with the choonin-konjoo (tradesman's spirit), and encourage the choonin themselves in their immoral luxury.

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1. Cohashi Totsuan, Hekija Kogoto, in Meiji Bunka Zenshuu, Shisoohen, p. 72 An example of the deplorable western preference for ri over gi, given apparently in all seriousness by this writer, runs as follows: A Dutch sailor was mending a sail when the ship's captain came up and asked to borrow the sailor's scissors. The sailor passed the scissors to the captain in his toes instead of his fingers, and the captain took them without any show of surprise. Such disrespect arose because the sailor thought it would be furi (unprofitable) to stop using his hands in mending the sail, and hence threw gi to the winds and used his foot instead. Ibid, p. 111.

Neglect of the 'distinctions' proper to the ethical hierarchy was another charge frequently levelled against western learning. The west failed to make any 'distinctions' between high and low, thus reducing all Five Relations to terms of the last and least important - friend and friend. The west made no 'distinction' between the samurai and merchant class, since it allowed its officials to go round the world trading. It made no distinction between yin and yang, since it paid far too much deference to women, particularly in the practice of monogamy.[1]

Lastly the spirit of western science (kyuuri) itself was not compatible with the Way of the Sages, since it encouraged a preoccupation with entirely the wrong sort of values - with the external forms of things to the neglect of their inner and ultimately unanalysable moral 'essence.' Judged by the standards of the orthodox gakumon (learning), of which the pursuit of morality was the main theme, investigating 'every tree and every flower' was at the best an irrelevant waste of time, and at the worst a pernicious temptation away from man's proper task of moral self-improvement. It encouraged, moreover, an irreverent attitude towards Nature itself - inducing men to regard it as a collection of dead things, or as a machine or plaything with which man was at liberty to amuse himself as he liked.[2]

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1. Aizawa Seishisai, Tekiihen, Iwanami Bunko edition, p. 275. Oohashi, op.cit, p. 111. In the greater deference they paid to yin and yang the westerners resembled birds and beasts, who knew their mother but not their father.
The criticism most frequently levelled against America by Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami during his trip to Washington in 1860 was its complete failure to observe the distinctions between high and low. See the quotations from Muragaki's diary contained in Ienaga Saburoo, Gairai Bunka Sesshu Shiron, p. 107-116, and Osatake Takeshi, Bakumatsu Kengai Shisetsu Monogatari, Chapter 1.
For views on monogamy, see below p.
2. See, for example, Aizawa Seishisai's Kagaku Jigen, Mitogaku Zenshuu Vol. II, p. 233-4.

Plainly contradictory though the western spirit and scheme of values appeared to those of Japan, these writers could not deny that western guns and ships were more efficacious means of defence than the swords so closely bound up with the samurai spirit. Though the imponderable spiritual influences of the west would tend insidiously to undermine the country's defences, the bare techniques of constructing guns and battleships, provided they were acquired on a firm foundation of the proper Japanese spirit, would be not only advantageous but even essential in the struggle with the west. Hence it was urgently desirable for the Japanese to acquire these techniques, though extreme care would have to be exercised that nothing western beyond them should be allowed to infiltrate. Aizawa Seishisai, the author of Shinron (1825) a classic of jooi thought, wrote that while western guns and battleships could undoubtedly be of service to the country, their adoption was not unmixed with danger. The Rangakusha who studied the techniques of constructing and using them might well become so besotted with things western as to accept the less material aspects of western culture as well - the spirit of kyuuri, for example, or even the principles of Christianity - thus producing a vulnerable spot in the country's defences of which the vigilant western nations would be quick to take advantage.[1]

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1. Shinron, MBZ, Shisoohen, p. 12.
   Fujita Tooko wrote on much the same lines in Hitachi-obi. Guns and battleships were vitally necessary - indeed bronze Buddhas and large bronze bells should be melted down to make cannons - but foreign trade and in particular any suspicion of foreign religion would, in the prevailing frivolous and degenerate mood of the people, cause irreparable harm to the country's morale. Mitogaku Zenshuu, Vol. 1, p. 381-390.

The _jooi_ writers were hence landed finally in a somewhat uneasy compromise. Though convinced of the superiority of the East over the West in matters ethical and spiritual, they were yet unable to maintain that material achievements were powerless against, as well as secondary to, the forces of 'will' and 'spirit.' They could not quite bring themselves to declare that swords, even if wielded by samurai imbued with the highest spirit of duty, valour and self-denial, would prevail over guns and ships such as the British were known to possess. Hence, though the chief safe-guard for the Japanese was a strong rededication to the traditional feudal spirit and ethic, yet at the same time a knowledge of western weapons was an indispensible means of defence. In other words, considerations of _naiyuu_ had priority over those of _gaikan_, though no one went so far as to advise that once the _naiyuu_ was taken care of, the _gaikan_ would take care of itself.

To the other party, known as _Kaikoku_ from its central principle that the Country should be Opened to limited foreign intercourse, the _gaikan_ problem was far too urgent and critical to wait for the reform of the traditional spirit. To these writers, the Opium War appeared as an object lesson in what happens to countries which neglect to study western science. China had been defeated, not because she had allowed pernicious western influences to corrupt her ethical foundations, but because she had not given sufficient attention to the western techniques themselves. With Japan's coast defences so pitiably weak and her knowledge of gunnery and navigation so rudimentary, it was absurd to think that she could stand up for a day against the powerful and predatory England, and equally absurd to think that either England or Russia would pause in their aggressive designs while Japan cultivated anew her traditional ethical spirit. It was vitally necessary

that Japan should forestall an attack by opening her doors peaceably to qualified foreign trade and intercourse, and thereby learn enough about modern scientific methods to put herself in a position of equality with the west in strength and wealth. Then , if necessary, she could expel the foreigners.

These writers however, no less than the jooi men, believed that western knowledge was competent to deal only with the gaikan menace, and that the naiyuu problem was soluble only by appeal to the traditional ethical principles. It was only in the field of kyuuri - in matters of gunnery, medicine, astronomy and geography - that the West had anything of value to offer Japan. In matters of ethics or the art of government - any study, in fact, involving man - the traditional teachings of the Confucian Sages were believed to be unquestionably superior to anything that the West could produce. Yokoi Shoonan, for example, a confirmed kaikoku advocate, while allowing the West unconditional superiority in devising techniques for constructing machines and weapons for purposes of fukoku-kyoohei (a rich country in a strong army), was nevertheless convinced that the West possessed no body of moral teaching by which a virtuous character might be cultivated. Western learning had, in fact, concerned itself too much with technicalities to the great detriment of virtue. The only really virtuous character in Western history was George Washington.[8] It was because their 'techniques' had outrun their moral qualities (shintoku) that the Western nations were constantly having wars. Hence the Japanese, though it was right and proper

1. Shoonan Ikoo, p. 325. Quoted in Kada Tetsuji's Meiji Shoki Shakai Keizai Shisooshi, p. 215.

that they should open their doors and associate with the Western nations on the basis of reason, had nothing save 'techniques' and kyuuri to learn from them.[1]

Sakuma Shoozan too, though an enthusiastic amateur scientist who spent much of his leisure time making glass, electric batteries and seismographs, was nevertheless equally convinced that the West had nothing to offer in the field of virtue. For the needs of the present day, he considered, neither Kangaku nor Rangaku would alone be adequate. Kangaku through its neglect of kyuuri, was apt to fall into idle and empty theories; western learning contained no study of duty or morality. A combination of the two was therefore the most desirable solution. Tooyoo dootoku, Eastern ethics, combined with Seiyoo geijutsu, Western techniques, should henceforth be the ideal scheme of education.[2] Seiyoo geijutsu was undoubtedly the only means of coping with the foreign threat. Tooyoo dootoku was equally the only way of coping with the internal demoralisation. Only an amalgamation of the two could therefore save the situation.

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1. Shoonan Ikoo, p. 216.
   Compare also the attitude of Hoashi Banri, famous some years earlier as a 'Dutch' scholar for his Kyuuritsuu (1837), one of the largest and most comprehensive compendia of Dutch science then in existence in Japan. Though admitting that westerners had progressed further than the east in the study of kyuuri, Banri nevertheless preferred to class them, through their ignorance of the Sages' teachings, with animals rather than men. How was it possible, he asked in his Preface, that a Japanese kunshi, familiar with the works of the Sages, could find anything to learn from a people ignorant of these teachings? In just the same way, was the answer, as animals have been endowed by Heaven with superior knowledge of certain particular minor points - the cock traditionally rules the dawn, for example, and the old horse knows the road - so have the westerners a greater knowledge of kyuuri which the kunshi might profitably learn.
   For Chu Hsi's views on the intelligence of animals, see Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, II, 553.
2. Letter to Kobayashi Matabei. Quoted in Nagata Hiroshi, Nihon Tetsugaku Shisoshi, 291.

The kaikoku writers were therefore advocating a compromise if anything even more uneasy than had the jooi men. Whereas the jooi writers had rejected kyuuri as a pernicious pastime encouraging a 'spirit' incompatible with the Way of the Sages, the kaikoku writers enthusiastically advocated all branches of kyuuri, not only as perfectly compatible with the orthodox 'learning' but as an indispensable concomitant to it.

The argument between the two schools was further bedevilled by the fact that the word kyuuri was used in two entirely different ways. The jooi writers understood the word strictly in the manner intended by Chu Hsi, through whose works it had first become current in the Japanese language. Kyuuri meant the 'exhaustion' or exhaustive investigation of the metaphysical li (Jap. ri) - principles unequivocally 'above shapes' (hsing erh shang), which prescribed the norm or ideal form of all the things in the universe, and the investigation of which formed an essential part of Chu Hsi' theory of moral self-cultivation.[1]

With the rise of Rangaku in Japan however, concerned as it was almost entirely with scientific studies, the word came to be used for the ethically neutral investigation of the laws of nature essential to the scientific method. Ri as used by the Rangakusha signified not the moral essences of things, but simply the way in which they worked - in short, something thoroughly 'within shapes.' That this was a dangerous misuse of the word some of the jooi writers recognised and deplored. Oohashi Totsuan, for example, a strict follower of Chu Hsi, contended forcibly that ri were

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1. A further discussion of Chu Hsi's kyuuri will be found below, p.

entirely 'above shapes' and unanalysable. "They can never be apparent to the eye," he wrote, "even with the aid of hundreds of microscopes." The Westerners by concerning themselves exclusively with the unimportant considerations of form and matter (keiki no matsu) necessarily debarred themselves from ever understanding ri.[1] Satoo Issai, too, distinguished the ri of the Sung Confucianists favourably from the ri of the West. "The kyuuri of the West," he wrote, "is a suuri 'within shapes'. The kyuuri of the Confucianists is a doori 'above shapes'. Doori is the root and trunk of things, suuri the branches and leaves." The root being ontologically superior and antecedent to the branches, the student is counselled to proceed by way of the kyuuri of the Confucianists.[2]

The kaikoku writers on the other hand were able to make use of the ambiguity of the word to argue that kyuuri was quite compatible with the Way of the Sages. Without making clear exactly how Chu Hsi's ri differed from the Rangakusha's ri, they argued that western kyuuri was simply a further development of Chu Hsi's and was therefore something of which that Sage would have thoroughly approved. Sakuma Shoozan, for example, who had purposely chosen the doctrines of Chu Hsi for their emphasis on kyuuri in preference to the Wang Yang-Ming leanings of his own teacher Satoo Issai, was able to write:

"The branches of Western kyuuri are quite consistent with the ideas of

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1. Hekija Kogoto, p.88, 89.
2. Satoo Issai, Genshi Shiroku, Iwanami edition, p. 275.

Chu Hsi and the Ch'engs, so that we may say that their theory of the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things is something which will apply all over the world. If we follow the ideas of Chu Hsi and the Ch'engs, we may see that even Western learning and techniques are not something external but a branch of our own learning."[1]

Nor did Yokoi Shoonan see any fundamental discrepancy between Western science and the Way of the Sages:

"The manufacture of guns and battleships depends upon the Five Elements. The various inventions which have appeared recently in the West are quite in harmony with the Way of the Sages. They are part of its teaching."[2]

For the kaikoku thinkers of this period therefore, western studies were brought respectably into line with the Confucian tradition by a precarious verbal confusion, possibly only vaguely recognised. Their thought thus involved a compromise even less tenable than that propounded by the jooi writers. The jooi writers were being entirely consistent in denouncing the kyuuri of the Rangakusha. The kaikoku combination of Eastern Ethics and Western Science was held together only by a verbal ambiguity.

Both parties were agreed however in maintaining that the West had nothing to offer of moral or spiritual value - nothing in fact within the current definition of gakumon. Merely a set of ingenious techniques, belonging more properly to the sphere of the artisan than of the scholar,

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1. Shoonan Zenshuu III, 408-9. Quoted in Itazawa Takeo, "Rangaku to Jugaku to no Kooshoo oyobi Bakufu no tai-Rangaku Seisaku", in Kinsei Nihon no Jugaku, 648-9.
2. Quoted in Ienaga, op. cit. p. 340.

which the force of circumstances had rendered necessary as a means of defending and preserving the things of ultimate value - the traditional spirit and morality of the Sages - from the humiliations suffered by a too conservative China.

Until the time of Perry's arrival, therefore, the difference between the two parties did not reach much further than the relative priority of naiyuu and gaikan, and the compatibility or incompatibility of kyuuri and the Way of the Sages. Perry's arrival however naturally exacerbated the differences. Instead of tacitly agreeing, as they had done before, that the internal problems should be solved by traditional moral prescriptions and the foreign threat averted with the help of western weapons, some of the jooi writers now began to emphasise and extend the sphere of Tooyoo dootoku. Oohashi Totsuan in his Hekija Kogoto, a violent document probably written soon after Perry's arrival, denounced as evil even the scientific techniques which his predecessors had acknowledged as useful means of defence.

> "To say that we should reject western religious teachings as evil and wrong but at the same time believe in western science, is like telling people that although a river is poisoned they can safely drink from its sidestreams."[1]

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1. Hekija Kogoto, p. 133. Totsuan here insisted on the correct distinction between doo and gei. Doo lay in a man's basic, essential morality - the Five Virtues and a few subsidiary ones. Gei were the various arts, skills and techniques. It was essential to realise that doo was the proper, necessary basis of gei. Gei without doo were hollow, useless accomplishments. Hence it was quite wrong to say that the westerners were not barbarians merely because their gei was good, for doo and gei were not separable things. If a man's doo was wrong, it followed that his gei was wrong too. To say that although his doo was wrong yet his gei was unexceptionable

Guns, Totsuan asserted, could certainly be used to advantage, provided their users possessed the proper 'spirit' (seishin, kakki). But used without spirit, they were no more efficacious than any other weapon and would certainly be powerless against an enemy possessing spirit, in however great strength they might be employed. Fortunately of course the West knew nothing of the power of spirit, its most recondite military principle being that big guns vanquish small guns, so that the Japanese should have no difficulty in defeating the western intruders with their own weapons in the event of any immediate conflict.[1]

On the kaikoku side the equivalent extension of their trend of thought - to extend the sphere of Western learning so that it should answer the internal as well as the external problem, and provide some alternative to the feudal system and the ethic on which it rested - was late in becoming articulate. It was not until ~~well~~ after the fall of the Bakufu that the idea gained currency that the foreign threat could only be dispelled when the feudal system with all its contradictions was swept away; that the feudal system and its ethic was not after all a safeguard against invasion but rather the chief source of Japan's weakness.

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was like saying that although his heart was wicked yet his actions were good. Ibid. p. 126-134.

The distinction between doo and gei may be compared with the distinction between t'i and yung which exercised Chinese philosophers towards the end of the 19th century. The views of the 'Self-Strengtheners' such as Chang Chih-tung in holding that the t'i or substance of Chinese traditional ethical teaching could be kept in a separate, watertight compartment from the yung or function of western science, are surely comparable to Sakuma Shoozan's views on Tooyoo dootoku and Seiyoo geijutsu.

Totsuan's rejection of western gei as incompatible with the traditional doo can perhaps be paralleled by Chinese such as Wo-Jen - except that Totsuan would not, as Wo Jen did, try to make out that western science was something which the east had already tried and found wanting. See J.R. Levinson, "History" and "Value": The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China." In Studies in Chinese Thought, edited by Arthur F. Wright.

1. Ibid. p. 117, 133.

The reason why the idea should not have been expressed until so late was simply that it was not safe to do so. Had it been at all possible, there seems little doubt that Fukuzawa for one would have taken Western learning beyond the stage of scientific techniques and advocated it as a weapon against bullying feudal officials as well as against bullying foreigners. His trip to Europe, by showing him, however dimly, that alternatives to the feudal system were possible and workable, had increased the dislike he had always felt for the mombatsu system and for the Bakufu itself.[1] For him it was responsible for all that was worst in the feudal system; for the galling distinctions of status which had embittered so many of the small things of everyday life, as well as for the exasperating acts of arbitrary tyranny perpetrated by wearers of the hollyhock crest.[2] The Bakufu's attitude towards foreign learning - which approximated fairly closely to Sakuma Shoozan's combination of Tooyoo dootoku and Seiyoo geijutsu - Fukuzawa considered contemptible. It encouraged scientific studies, it was true, sending students abroad to study science and arranging courses in chemistry, geography and mathematics at the Kaiseisho. But its essential outlook was moulded by Tooyoo dootoku, which after all contained the sanction of its own rule. It made no attempt to adapt its strict Confucian moral principles to the circumstances of the time.[3]

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, No. 15, FZ VII, p. 268-271.
2. See, for example, the diatribe in Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, p. 473.
3. Fukuzawa quoted as an instance of the narrowly conservative outlook of the Bakufu the reaction of a Bakufu official to his translation of Chamber's "Political Economy, for use in Schools and for Private Instruction". The official objected to his translation of the word 'competition' as kyoosoo, saying that the character soo, arasou, was not a 'tranquil' word, even though it might correspond to what actually happened between competing merchants. It did not fit in with his preconceived idea of moral conduct, and therefore could not be shown to the roojuu. FZ VII, p. 478.

After his return from Europe Fukuzawa would often give vent among his friends to his dislike of the feudal system; would ridicule the daimyo as effete and capricious, their chief ministers as old idiots, and the Shoogun and all his retainers as a crowd of empty braggarts and cowards. Yet neither he nor any of his friends dared do anything further than discuss these dangerous thoughts in secret, or at most try to instigate trouble indirectly.[1] It was impossible for them to express their resentment in any public form, for the reason that the Bakufu, though weakening, was quick to round on any criticism of its rule. The Great Purge of Ansei, in which Yoshida Shooin was convicted, had warned people that public criticism of any kind was foolhardy. The execution in 1863 of Wakiya Usaburoo, condemned to death for the innocent remark in a letter to a relative that he was anxious about the trend of the times and hoped that some great and wise minister might appear to guide the country to safety, was a lesson taken well to heart by Fukuzawa.[2]

Not only would it have been foolhardy to invoke western learning in attacking the feudal system; in the terms of the political allignments of the early and middle sixties it would have been virtually impossible. By that time a policy of kaikoku had become firmly linked with one of sabaku or Supporting the Bakufu, while that of toobaku or Overthrowing the Bakufu was linked with jooi. The only possible political alternative to supporting the

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, No. 15. FZ VII, p. 269.
2. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, p. 450-1. Fukuzawa recounted how, while working in the translation bureau of the Bakufu, he had been in the habit of learning by heart a number of the secret documents which passed through his hands and transcribing them when he got home in the evening The news of Wakiya's execution made him realise that men were put to death for crimes far less than his, and in consequence he burned all the transcripts.

Bakufu was a policy involving Expelling the Barbarians, and of these two undesirable alternatives Fukuzawa naturally preferred _Kaikoku-sabaku_. It was better to put up with the obscurantism and petty tyrannies of the Bakufu if the only alternative was an even more obscurantist and anti-foreign Imperial government.

It was probably for a combination of these reasons that Fukuzawa did not permit himself at this period any written criticism of the accepted Japanese values, and that his works up to the time of the Restoration were concerned solely with expounding ethically neutral facts about the west, with little or no implication that the western nations were in any way superior to Japan in matters outside those of _fukoku-kyoohei_.

Seiyoo Jijoo for example, the work which first made his reputation as an authority on the west and which attracted more public attention than any other work he ever wrote, was concerned with simple and concise accounts of ordinary uncontroversial social institutions such as hospitals, schools, newspapers, museums, taxation and lunatic asylums. Even the later volumes, which appeared after the fall of the Bakufu and which dealt with wider issues of economics and politics, remained entirely unpolemical in tone, and the numerous other shorter works which appeared from his pen up to the year 1871 were concerned largely to expound elementary and innocuous information about western physics, geography and ordinary everyday life, with none of the critical, didactic or admonitory note so characteristic of his later writings.

The fall of the Bakufu did not immediately release the pent-up forces of criticism of the feudal system, for the reason that it was some time before

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1. See Chapter 1, p. 8

most people could realise that the new government was any more pro-western than the Bakufu had been. The Imperial party, from which it sprang, had shown itself before the Restoration to be so anti-foreign that it was difficult to realise that the new government would prove any better. From what Fukuzawa saw and heard of the new government in its early days of power, he could only judge it to be "a collection of fools from the various clans got together to form another archaic anti-foreign government which would probably drive the country to ruin through its blunders."[1]

For this reason, despite the signal success of all his writings - so signal that at that time all works about the west came to be popularly known as Fukuzawa-bon - Fukuzawa never believed that they would prove to be of any lasting value or that the knowledge they imparted would bring any benefits beyond a source of income to himself. When Seiyoo Jijoo was first published he recalled,

> "I had no idea whether people would read it or not, and naturally did not expect anything I had written in it actually to be put into practice In short, I rather felt as though I were writing fairy tales about dream lands in the west."[2]

With a government committed to Tooyoo dootoku, the west would always remain dreamlike and fantastical. Yoogaku, Western studies, could never become a matter of foremost national importance, nor could its practitioners ever be regarded by the general run of people as anything but weird and disagreeable eccentrics, or by the government as anything but labourers hired to do menial work in the way that the eta, or outcasts, were used for lowly and disgusting tasks.[3]

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, p. 493.
2. Ibid. p. 617.
3. cf. Fukuzawa's remarks in ibid, p. 462.

Chapter 3.

Keimoo

The discovery that the government was not a collection of ignorant fools committed to carrying on the anti-foreign policy of the Imperialist party, but rather a collection of energetic, ambitious young men prepared to build up a new Japan on thoroughly Western lines, was for Fukuzawa and his friends a momentous one. In seeing the new government enact measures of Westernization which they had long desired but never dared openly to advocate, they felt, Fukuzawa recalled, as though they were seeing enacted on the stage a play which they themselves had written.[1] This event meant, indeed, that it had at last become possible to resolve the uneasy and ultimately untenable compromise to which the 'western' scholars of the Bakumatsu period had been forced, willy-nilly, to resort, and to point out that yoogaku, Western studies might supply an alternative, not only to swords and spears, but to the stratified feudal system as well.

It had become possible, in short, to point out that the combination of Eastern Ethics and Western Science was untenable. Like rice-wine and fish-oil they simply did not mix. It was impossible to understand the Western science while remaining rooted in the beliefs of the Eastern ethics, for the reason that the Eastern ethics had produced a certain 'spirit' or mental attitude to the universe, nature and society which was impossible to reconcile with the assumptions of Western science. Hence the feudal system and the moral 'spirit' on which it rested, far from being Japan's safeguard,

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, No. 15, FZ VII, p. 269-70.

was the chief source of her weakness. Western weapons, far from being effective only if wielded by men inbued with the traditional spirit, as the jooi writers had insisted, would in fact be useless unless used by people with a spirit comparable to that which had enabled the Western nations to produce the weapons. The jooi writers had been quite right in emphasising the importance of 'spirit', and quite right in supposing the spirit of kyuuri to be incompatible with the Way of the Sages. They had merely been very wrong in supposing the traditional morality and spirit to be the right one. The kaikoku writers too had been quite right in the importance they attached to kyuuri, but quite wrong in supposing it to be compatible with the Way of the Sages. In short, if Japan was to be strong enough to stand up to the threats and bullying of the West, it was not enough simply to learn the superficial techniques of gunnery and shipbuilding. She would have to make much more strenuous efforts to alter the spirit and habits of thought engendered by two hundred years of feudal and Confucian discipline - and this would mean rethinking many of her most unquestioned assumptions in the sphere of Tooyoo dootoku. Yoogaku must henceforth cease to be an inferior though useful appendage to kangaku, and become rather a gakumon in itself with a dignity and moral purpose not only comparable to but substitutable for kangaku.

How precisely did the traditional 'spirit' of the Japanese appear to the scholars of early Meiji to be misguided? What was the psychological or spiritual secret by which the western nations had succeeded in making themselves so strong and prosperous?

To a small minority of Japanese the essence of the Western spirit seemed

to lie in Christianity. Christian ethics were the natural complement of Western science and to attempt to adopt the latter without the former was like taking the skin and flesh of a body without its life blood. "The industry, patience and perseverence displayed in their arts, inventions and machinery," Nakamura Keiu wrote in 1872, "all have their origin in the faith, hope and charity of their religion." The strength and wealth of the Western nations was nothing but the "outward leaf and blossom" of their religion, and hence to try to imitate the inventions and machinery without comprehending the religion was "more ridiculous than the mimicry of apes."[1]

This line of thought however, though naturally encouraged by the missionaries, was never widely held during the decade of the 70s. There was far greater agreement among influential 'Western' scholars that the 'spiritual' secret of the strength and wealth of the Western nations lay in the fact that their people were equal and therefore free. It was because the western peoples enjoyed freedom and equal rights and were hence imbued with the spirit of enterprise, initiative and responsibility that the western nations had succeeded in becoming strong, rich and united. It was because of the hierarchical 'distinctions', in the strict observance of which the advocates of jooi had seen Japan's strongest safeguard, that the Japanese had become imbued with the qualities of servile obedience, uncritical meekness and anxiety to avoid responsibility - qualities which, if not soon corrected were

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1. Nakamura's article appeared in English in the Japan Weekly Mail of May 25th 1872 before the Japanese text appeared in the Shimbun Zasshi of August of the same year.
   See Otis Cary, History of Christianity in Japan, II, p. 75.
   Robert Schwantes, "Christianity versus Science: A Conflict of Ideas in Meiji Japan." FEQ, February 1953, p. 124.

likely to bring about the nation's downfall. It was, indeed, the quality in the western peoples which had most shocked and disgusted the earlier jooi men - their entire disregard of the hierarchical distinctions proper to the feudal society - which now appeared to be the one most to be emulated.[1]

Another western quality of mind seen to be desirable was 'rationality' - commonly rendered by the old and respectable Confucian word doori. The word was not very clearly defined, but it carried strong moral Confucian associations which lent considerable respectibility to western thought.

It was thus in qualities of mind and spirit, rather than in material objects and techniques, the scholars now decided, where lay the essence of the 'civilization' which Japan must at all costs learn from the west. In the preface to his translation of Smiles's Self-Help, published in 1871, Nakamura Keiu stated boldly that the reason why the western nations were strong was not that they possessed armies, but that they possessed the spirit of liberty. It was for that very reason, he declared, that he had chosen to translate Smiles rather than a military treatise.[2] Elsewhere he specifically refuted

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1. For a further discussion of the view that a free people enjoying rights would necessarily become strong and wealthy, see the remarks on the identification of minken and kokken below, p.
   See also Ienaga, op.cit. p. 316-335 for various quotations from keimoo writers to illustrate this point.
2. Quoted in Ienaga, op.cit. p. 261. cf too Katoo Hiroyuki's early work Tonarigusa, where he stated explicitly that guns and battleships were not enough in themselves to make a country strong and its soldiers brave. They would become effective only when their users possessed the proper 'spirit' - which was that which proceeded from freedom and harmony between government and people. At that early date, 1862, however, Katoo could not safely express such opinions openly, and was obliged to pretend that the country to which his remarks were directed was not Japan, but China. MBZ, Seijihen, p.4.

Sakuma Shoozan's famous slogan:

> "The spirit of western science is the natural complement of virtue. I doubt very much if it is correct to distinguish East from West on the score of ethics and science."[1]

There was no writer, however, who stressed this point more clearly and forcibly than Fukuzawa. 'Civilization' was not a matter of 'things', but of the way people thought. "Schools, industries, armies and navies," he wrote in 1872,

> "are the mere external forms of civilization. They are not difficult to produce. All that is needed is the money to pay for them. Yet there remains something immaterial, something that cannot be seen or heard, bought or sold, lent or borrowed. It pervades the whole nation and its influence is so strong that without it none of the schools or the other external forms would be of the slightest use. This supremely important thing we must call the spirit of civilization."[2]

Once people were thinking on the right lines - were imbued, in other words, with the proper 'spirit of civilization' - the material 'things' which were so dazzling an aspect of western civilization would appear spontaneously and uninvited.[3]

This 'spirit' appeared to Fukuzawa to be one characterised chiefly by 'independence'.[4] It was because the western nations had cultivated a spirit

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1. Shoozan Sensei Shishoo Hyoogen, quoted in Ienaga, p. 262.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No. 5, FZ III, p. 37.
3. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 15-17.
4. Fukuzawa chose as his watchword the old word dokuritsu, which already had respectable Confucian associations, rather than the comparatively new word jiyu, later to acquire extreme and inflammatory overtones.

of independence, initiative and responsibility, he averred, that they had been able to develop their sciences and thence to become strong and prosperous and self-confident. It was for lack of such a spirit that the Japanese had fallen behind - and the blame for this deficiency was to be laid at the door of Kangaku. Two hundred and fifty years of orthodox Kangaku, and of the stratified feudal system of which Kangaku was the philosophical justification, had entirely smothered any spirit of independence with which the Japanese might naturally be endowed and had encouraged instead a disgraceful tendency to rely, both in thought and action, on others - on the Sages, on the government, on social superiors. Hence, though there might be certain outward and visible signs in Japan which might lead people to suppose that a certain degree of 'civilization' had been achieved, these signs were misleading because

> "The spirit of the common people has not changed in the least. In speech and behaviour they are slavish and servile. When they meet a superior they are incapable of uttering a single sensible sentence. When you tell them to stand up, they stand up. When you tell them to dance, they dance. They are just as meek and obedient as pet dogs. . . ."[1]

And while this state of mind prevailed, such material evidence of civilization as the Japanese might acquire - armies, navies, schools, hospitals, gaslamps and beef-shops - would be so much irrelevant dross. In short, to reorganise the people's habits of thought was the first and essential step towards becoming in the least civilized.

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1. Gakumon no Susume, No.3, FZ III, p. 21.

This anxiety to reform the kifuu or spirit of the Japanese people became the basis of the movement during the early 70s known as keimoo or Enlightenment. The nucleus of the movement was the group of 'western' scholars who formed themselves into the society known as the Meirokusha in 1873, and who disseminated their views through the organ of the society's journal, the Meiroku Zasshi. Many of the most influential keimoo writers - Katoo Hiroyuki, for example, Mori Arinori, Tsuda Shindoo and Nishi Amane - were goyoogakusha, scholars holding official positions in the government. Others, such as Nakamura Keiu and Fukuzawa himself, preferred towork outside government circles. But all were concerned to raise Japan into the realm of bummei-kaika (civilization), and were convinced that to accomplish this end the first essential was a radical reform in the Japanese kifuu.[1] Keimoo meant, in fact, 'enlightening the darkness' of the masses, educating them not merely to a knowledge of new facts, but to an entirely new outlook on the universe, to a rethinking of some of their most unquestioned assumptions about man, nature and value. For the cultivation in the Japanese of a spirit of independence, initiative and responsibility such as characterised a people enjoying freedom and equal rights, involved just such a revolution in thought. A 'spirit of independence' was hardly compatible with the traditional Japanese view of the external world, for example, or with the moral relations traditionally prescribed for man in society, with the traditional view of history or of government. All these basic conceptions would have to be re-thought before Japan could begin to call herself civilized, and keimoo was the process of guiding this re-thinking.

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1. The word keimoo has been fully discussed in a recent series of articles in Shisoo. (1954, Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12). Also the common ground between the Meiji Enlightenment and that of the French philosophes of the 18th century. A useful resumé of the underlying ideas of the keimoo movement may be found in Nagata Hiroshi's Nihon Yuibutsuronshi, Part 2, Chapter 1.

Fukuzawa's own declaration of his mission to disseminate keimoo is to be found in his Autobiography. "I felt," he wrote,

> "that I must impart as much as I could of western civilization - in fact change the whole people's way of thinking from its very foundations. Thereby I might help to make Japan into a great new civilized nation in the East, comparable with England in the West."[1]

Fukuzawa's declaration illustrates clearly how the primary motives which impelled the keimoo men to advocate changes in thinking so sweeping and revolutionary differed little from those which had led the earlier generation of 'western' scholars to advocate Seiyoo Geijutsu. The new 'spirit' was invoked first and foremost because it would endow the Japanese with the qualities necessary to achieve a fukoku-kyoohei (a rich country and a strong army). The spirit of independence and rationality, by harmonising with the assumptions of science, would enable the Japanese to comprehend science more fully and therefore use its products more efficiently. The qualities of responsibility, initiative and self-reliance were essential to patriotic and 'one-minded' citizens. The new spirit therefore was the best possible means of guaranteeing the safety and integrity of Japan from rapacious and unscrupulous foreigners. "To defend our country against foreigners," Fukuzawa wrote in 1873,

> "we must fill the whole country with the spirit of independence, so that noble and humble, high and low, clever and stupid alike will make the fate of the country their own responsibility and will play their parts as citizens."[2]

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, p. 617.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No. 3, FZ III, p. 20.

And four years later:

> "Western civilization is the best possible means of making our country (kokutai) strong and our Imperial line flourish, so why should we hesitate to adopt it?"[1]

The spirit of independence, in short, was a safeguard in just the same way as the jooi men had regarded the traditional spirit as a safeguard. Just as Aizawa Seishisai, indeed, had pleaded the degenerate state of the traditional moral spirit as the most cogent reason for not opening the country to foreign intercourse, so Fukuzawa pleaded the lack of a spirit of independence as a reason for opposing the proposal to allow foreigners to travel and reside beyond the ten-mile limit around the open ports laid down in the treaties. Though two prominent keimoo writers, Nishi Amane and Tsuda Shindoo, favoured 'inland travelling and mixed residence' (naichi ryokoo, naichi zakkyo) on the score that greater opportunities for contact with foreigners would promote the spread of 'civilization' in Japan, Fukuzawa and his followers at Keioo opposed it on the ground that the Japanese were not yet sufficiently imbued with the 'spirit of civilization' to be able to stand up against the violent, arrogant and predatory behaviour of so many of the foreign merchants. The ten-mile limit, Fukuzawa wrote, had been devised originally to protect foreigners from the murderous attacks of roonin, but it had soon come to serve rather as protection to the Japanese people from the rapacity of the foreign merchants, no less violent in their way than the roonin had been. It was nonsense to think that 'civilization' could be acquired from mere intercourse with foreigners or by copying western things. It lay in the spirit which enabled a people to make these things for themselves. Increased

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1. Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 31.

contact with foreigners, far from promoting this spirit, would tend rather to smother it, and was therefore, highly dangerous and undesirable.[1]

It was hardly enough, however, to advocate such a revolution in thought merely as a means to a short term objective such as a _fukoku-kyoohei_. If civilization was no more than a means towards wealth and strength the implication might well be that once this objective was achieved, the stronger, richer Japan could safely revert to her old ways of thought. 'Civilization' must therefore be shown to possess a higher, more permanent value - and this the _keimoo_ writers found in the western theory of Progress, as revealed in the works of Buckle, Guizot and Herbert Spencer. These writers showed very plausibly that _bummei_, civilization, was not merely a means to strength and wealth. It was a stage in man's destiny - that destiny being a continual and inevitable, if erratic, climb upwards towards a final stage of perfect bliss and goodness unimaginable by men today. Man had passed through lower stages of barbarism - _konton_, primitive chaos, _yaban_, savagery, and _hankai_ semi-civilized - and had finally, in certain parts of the world such as western Europe and America, achieved the stage of _bummei_ - which, though still very far from the final goal, was higher than any stage so far achieved by other nations.[2] Somehow therefore it would have to be proved that the

1. See Fukuzawa's article in the _Minkan Zasshi_ of January 1875, MBZ, Zasshihen, . 291-295. Also the article by Obata Tokujiroo, Fukuzawa's right-hand man, in the February number. Ibid. p. 299-302. Also the letter to Baba Tatsui, October 12th 1874, ZFZ VI, 108.
2. Man's climb upwards was conceived by some _keimoo_ writers as taking place in a series of recognisable and well-defined steps or stages. As early as 1869 Fukuzawa had described humanity as divided into four 'kinds' (_shirui_). Of the lowest kind, _konton_, the aborigenes of Australia and New Guinea were an example. The second lowest kind, _banya_, were represented by the nomads of Mongolia and Arabia, the third lowest, _mikai_, by Asiatic countries such as China, Turkey and Persia, while the highest kind, _kaika-bummei_, was exemplified by western nations such as America, England, France and Germany.

differentiating quality or 'civilized' peoples - the rational spirit of independence which produced science and a fukoku-kyoohei - would also promote the moral destiny of man along the path of Progess to the Utopia of bliss and perfection. Somehow, in short, it must be proved that bummei would make men not only richer, stronger and more comfortable, but also better. Attempts to formulate precise and detailed theories to cover this question involved the keimoo men, as will be seen later, in serious difficulties - but these by no means served to dampen their enthusiasm for the theory of Progress.

The reason why this theory, though undoubtedly a departure from previous Japanese ideas on the underlying processes of history, was nevertheless accepted with such alacrity and enthusiasm in keimoo circles, was doubtless primarily that it gave the keimoo scholars a moral justification, sometimes almost a religious inspiration, for the changes they recommended.[1]

(Shoochuu Bankoku Ichiran, FZ II, p. 356-8.) In Bummeiron no Gairyaku, 1876, he distinguished three of these kinds as stages in the development of the human species. Yaban were illiterate savages. Hankai were peoples such as the Chinese and Japanese, who, though they might possess flourishing literatures, yet had no curiosity about the natural world, no original ideas for inventing new things, and no ability to criticize and improve on accepted customs and conventions. Bummei people were, of course, those who had developed all these virtues. (FZ IV, p.11.)

1. An example of the almost fanatical enthusiasm with which the idea of Progress inspired some Japanese may be found in the sentiments of one Kawano Kidoo, writing in the second number of the magazine Shimpo. Awake or asleep, he declared, he could never forget the idea for a single moment; he would give up his life for it; when he remembered the old feudal ideas he felt physically ill; the thought of the constan progress of civilization, the light of freedom burning ever brighter the while, was like a fierce tiger breaking down the bamboos or a dragon riding on the clouds. Quoted in Ono Hisato: "Nihon Kaika Shooshi to sono Jidai", in the collection of essays on Japanese historiography entitled Hompoo Shigakushi Ronsoo, Vol. II, p. 1319.

It was, moreover, by no means a complete break with the ideas they had previously held on man's moral destiny. The idea that man must perfect himself in this world rather than hope for salvation in the next, that each generation must strive to contribute to the capital sum of virtue and knowledge accumulated by its forefathers so that some day in the future the human race would achieve perfection, was merely lengthening in time the process of individual moral struggle to become a Sage - the end and object of the Confucianist's striving. The Confucianist hoped to perfect himself during his own lifetime. The believer in Progress hoped to enable posterity, albeit innumerable generations hence, to do the same.

The theory served very well, moreover, to exorcise any feelings of inferiority which the total abandonment of their traditional way of thought roused in some Japanese. Many, it is true, appeared to regard the urgent need for safeguarding the future of the nation as justifying an ungrudging rejection of the past - an unhesitating admission that tradition had been wrong and that the west, for the time being at any rate, was undeniably superior. For some, however, the sudden total rejection of the past needed to be explained away in such a way as to absolve the Japanese from the stigma of having been wrong. The theory of Progress told them that the essence of _bummei_ was the free exercise of independent reason, a faculty inborn in all men alike, not something attained by a genius peculiar to the western peoples. It was therefore something which the entire human race must inevitably sometime attain, and to attain which the Japanese possessed potentialities in just as full a measure as did the western nations. By a fortuitous combination of circumstances the western peoples had been able to exercise their rational faculties in such a way as to achieve a measure of

bummei - but the circumstances which had prevented the Japanese from doing likewise had been equally fortuitous. Those circumstances were simply that the Japanese had in a misguided moment adopted Chinese civilization. It was purely because they had been misled by the teachings of the Sages that their faculties of independent reasoning had been so atrophied through disuse that they had failed to recognise the perennial values inherent in western civilization. The blame for the Japanese standing for the moment on a rung considerably lower than the west lay therefore at the door of China. There was no necessity to try to justify the past - to reconcile bummei with the Confucian tradition by making out, as the early advocates of kaikoku had done, that western science was what Chu Hsi had been trying to say all the time. Justification by Sages was no longer necessary, for bummei was part of the natural order of things.

Bummei was thus strictly speaking not western at all- or at any rate only fortuitously and temporarily so - so that for the Japanese to adopt it was neither adulation nor emulation of the west, but simply the exercise of the innate faculties given to man that he might promote his own destiny.[1] Similarly it was no shame to abandon kangaku and all its links with the past - first because it was not Japanese, and second because it had obscured the Japanese recognition of the values subsistent in bummei.

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1. cf Taguchi Ukichi in Seiyoo to Nihon: "Physics, economics and the other sciences should be learnt not because the west discovered them, but because they are uchuu no shinri, universal truth. The Japanese wished to set up constitutional government, not because it was western, but because it accorded with man's own nature. The Japanese should not say that they were endeavouring to make their learning, law, government etc. western, but that they were setting them on the road of progress most proper to man." (Quoted in Ienaga, p. 335.)

Bummei could therefore be invoked for a variety of reasons: as a simple, direct and expedient method of avoiding foreign exploitation and derision; as a long-term moral justification of such expedient methods, and at the same time a recondite way of saving face. In Fukuzawa's writings these two motives are sometimes clearly distinguished: the promotion of Progress towards the final utopia he called seidoo, the right, proper, moral Way. The safeguarding against foreign attack and mockery be called kendoo, the temporary, expedient Way - a necessary condition, always, to the ultimate pursuit of seidoo, even though it might temporarily call for measures which might seem contradictory to it.[1] But both 'ways' towards bummei required the cultivation of the necessary 'spirit' - so that from every point of view this was the most urgent of the keimoo tasks.

There were only too many Japanese, unfortunately, who entirely failed to cultivate the new spirit, and against whom, therefore, the keimoo men directed their arguments. There were those who failed to do so through hostility, who still remained convinced Confucian believers in Tooyoo-dootoku, undazzled by the glamour of Western science. There was also the great bulk of the common people who did exactly as their superiors told them simply because they had never learnt to do anything else. But there were also those who had responded in to eager and volatile a way to the government's lead in Westernization; those, in the first place, who professed themselves to be eager seekers of bummei, but who persisted in associating it with nothing further than the 'external forms;' and also those who accepted, uncritically and undiscriminatingly, all aspects of western civilization,

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, p. 249-252.

material or immaterial, which came to their notice. Neither of these last two groups of people, the keimoo men maintained, had even begun to understand the proper spirit of bummei.

That the first group should have comprised the great majority of Japanese to have any contact with the west was only natural. 'Things' were very much easier than ideas to understand, and it was only too easy to associate bummei with the material manifestations of Western science so familiar to the inhabitants of Tokyo and the open ports. In order to be civilized, it was consequently thought, all one had to do was to wear shoes and hats, patronise beef-shops, ride in jinrikishas and cultivate a Western hair-style.[1] The writings known as bummei-kaikamono, in general popular interpretations or adaptations of the more difficult keimoo works, were much preoccupied with correcting this misapprehension and translating into easily understood terms the keimoo stress on the 'rational' spirit of bummei. Civilization, one such work maintained, was not so simple that it could be attained merely by copying indiscriminately things and practices which were new and Western. One was not a civilized man because one ate pork, or carried a bat-umbrella, or wore one's shoes in the best front room, or brought one's dog into the house, or blew one's nose on the sacred paper charms, or smashed the Buddha-shelf. 'Things' were not civilized because they were Western, the essay declared, but because they were reasonable. It was certainly civilized to cultivate a Western hair-style, for example, but not simply because it was western. It

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1. Some people however seem to have been genuinely under the impression that scientific discoveries and inventions would only occur in heads which had received a western hair-cut. See, for example, the edict of 1873 from the Nagasaki prefecture ordaining that in future western hair styles were to be adopted. Quoted in the article by Ishii Kendoo, Meiji Ishin Fuuzokujoo no Ichi Koosatsu, in Meiji Ishinshi Kenkyuu, p. 734.

should be done purely because it was reasonable to do so. The 'reason' for cultivating such a hair-style, the essay affirmed, was that every part of the human body was invested with some specific function. It was therefore unreasonable to shave off the hair on the top of one's head, the function of which was specifically to keep one's head warm. Similarly it was entirely reasonable to wear western hats. For whereas the lower orders of creation had been given hair, feathers, scales or shells with which to cover themselves, man had been equipped instead with the mental faculties whereby he could devise for himself coverings for both his body and his head. To leave his head uncovered was therefore unreasonable.[1]

It was certainly true too that only too much of Japanese culture was not civilized, but deserved instead the opprobrious term kyuuhei, (old abuses), - but purely because it was not rational. To believe in possession by foxes and badgers was not rational. To believe in tengu, long-nosed goblins, and sennin, immortals, was not rational. To build houses of wood and to avoid eating meat was not rational. Rationality, in short, was the only criterion by which one should judge whether western customs should be adopted and Japanese ones rejected. The things in themselves, however new and western they might be, were no indication of bummei, and those who thought they were still had much hard thinking to do.[2]

Equally in conflict with the spirit of bummei, however, were those enthusiasts who, under government stimulus, had become so besotted with western civilization as to lavish undiscriminating praise on everything

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1. Katoo Yuuichi, Bummei Kaika. MBZ, Bummei-Kaikahen, p. 5-9.
2. Ibid. p. 19-23.

western which came to their notice. These kaika-sensei, ('teachers of civilization'), Fukuzawa declared, were fundamentally very little different from the old fanatical haters of the West. They were bringing exactly the same spirit to bear on things western as had the former advocates of jooi on things Japanese. They were merely "believing in the new with the same belief that they had believed in the old"[1] - with an uncritical, unquestioning acceptance which was entirely contrary to the independent, sceptical spirit of bummei. Some, indeed, went to ludicrous lengths in their adulation of the west, and became easy butts for Fukuzawa's ridicule.

"Let us for a moment change over some of the customs of East and West, and imagine what the kaika-sensei would have to say. Western people have a bath every day, Japanese only once or twice a month. To this the kaika-sensei would say that civilized people observe the laws of hygiene by taking frequent baths, whereas the uncultured Japanese know nothing of these laws. Japanese always keep chamber-pots in their bedrooms and never wash their hands on emerging from the lavatory. Westerners always get up to go to the lavatory even in the middle of the night and never fail to wash their hands. To which our disputants would say: civilized people respect cleanliness, uncivilized people hardly understand what dirtiness is. They are just like children who, with their undeveloped intelligence cannot distinguish what is clean from what is dirty. As they advance into the realms of civilization, however, they may be expected to imitate the beautiful customs of the west. Westerners always use paper for blowing their noses and immediately throw it away after use. Japanese use cotton cloth instead

1. Gakumon no Susume, No. 15, FZ III, p. 123.

of paper, which they wash and then use again. To which our disputants with ready wit would apply the grand principles of economics. The inhabitants of a country which is deficient in capital, they would say, always unconsciously follow the precepts of retrenchment. For the Japanese to blow their noses on paper as the westerners do would entail a waste of resources. That they have to put up with the unhygienic practice of using cotton handkerchiefs is therefore a measure of economy exacted by their deficiency in capital. If Japanese women were to bind their stomachs tightly in order to improve their figures, our disputants would frown and say: How terrible that uncultured peoples should be unable to comprehend the laws of nature. . . For a woman to bind up her stomach, her most vital part, so that it becomes a wasp waist, will interfere with her pregnancy and so endanger her delivery. The least of the ills engendered by this practice is to bring misery into many homes. At its worst it will injure the growth of the whole population. . ."[1]

The kaika-sensei, in short, were just as lacking in the spirit of independence as were the staunch Confucianists, the ignorant peasants, or the fashionable young men who carried bat-umbrellas and ate beef. The old spirit manifested itself in forms many and various, making the task of 'enlightening the darkness' of the people the more complex and far-reaching.

The first step in this direction was, however, undoubtedly to reform the current conception of what kind of knowledge was useful and significant - to inculcate, in short, a new conception of learning.

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1. Gakumon no Susume, p. 125-6.

Chapter 4.

The New Learning

If science was to 'work' in Japan, and if the Japanese were to comprehend it properly, it must be treated, qua knowledge, in a different way. It must be understood to be something more than a mere gei, gi or jutsu, a mere technical accomplishment - useful, certainly, as a means of warding off a temporary danger but unrelated to the 'learning' which was part of the serious business of life. Knowledge of 'things', their physical properties and the way they worked, would have to be raised from the inferior position of matsu (branches as opposed to roots, secondary and irrelevant) to that of a true gakumon with a dignity and serious purpose of its own.

A new learning was therefore the basis of keimoo. The word gakumon would have to be entirely re-thought.

Into the old meaning of gakumon, 'things' and the way they worked entered scarcely at all. Gakumon, most Confucian moralists urged, was the process of learning which man must undergo if he is to accord with the moral Way proper to the human species (hito no michi). Kaibara Ekken, for example, an orthodox follower of Chu Hsi, declared gakumon to be the foremost moral duty of man. Man had been equipped by Heaven (tenchi) with a nature (honsei) which was fundamentally good because it was essentially a projection of the nature of tenchi itself. It was, however, obstructed and befogged by the matter or physical endowment (kishitsu) which was also innate in man, but being impure, was not derived from Heaven. It was man's chief moral task in life, therefore, to overcome the innate obstructions and distortions caused by his

matter and to 'return' to his original good nature.[1] To accomplish this task be must 'learn' - and the best way of thus learning was to study the works of the Sages. For the Sages, being ideal men, had left to posterity instructions of eternal validity as to how man might best return to his original good nature and accord with his own moral Way. Gakumon for Ekken, therefore, consisted primarily of a diligent and singleminded study of the Confucian Classics with the sole end of attaining the Way proper to men.[2]

Nakae Tooju too, though latterly a follower of the rival school of Wang Yang-Ming, held a view of gakumon substantially the same as Ekken's. Man was innately equipped, he thought, with a 'jewel' (takara) known as meitoku which, like Ekken's honsei, was a projection of the moral nature existing in heaven and earth. To make this meitoku 'clear' was the moral Way of man and the sole object of gakumon. Again, study of the writings of the Sages was the basis of gakumon, for the Sages were men born with their meitoku already clear who had deliberately left their works behind them as a guide to posterity. Gakumon for Tooju, just as for Ekken, was therefore a moral duty of man prescribed by his nature. For a man not to take the trouble to 'learn' was to abdicate from his position as chief among the ten thousand things and to put himself on a par with birds, beasts and plants.[3]

For Yamaga Sokoo too, to take a last example from the Kogaku school,

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1. Yamato Zokkun, Dai Nihon Shisoo Zunshuu edition, Vol. 5, p. 198-205. 210-11. Ekken's idea of tenchi was a good deal more personal and anthropopathic than was Chu Hsi's. He envisaged tenchi as 'loving' all creatures, but according man special favour in equipping him with a mind which was essentially the same as its own. Man thus owed a great obligation (taion) to tenchi, and it was his moral Way to repay this obligation by according with the mind of tenchi.
   A very interesting discussion of the Confucian conception of gakumon may be found in R.P. Dore's The Aims of Education in the Tokugawa Period, (unpublished).
2. Yamato Zokkun, p. 204-6.
3. Okina Mondoo, DNSZ edition, Vol. 2, p. 3.

man was chief among the ten thousand things, a privilege which carried the corresponding moral duty of 'learning' the Way proper to himself. To neglect learning was therefore to abuse his privileged position in the universe and to lower himself to the level of birds and beasts.[1]

In short, the old gakumon was a moral, almost religious duty, enjoined on man by his privileged position in the universe. It was 'learning' moreover, defined strictly in relation to a certain end. Other kinds of knowledge might and did exist which did not conduce directly to this end, but they were wrongly called gakumon. They were 'false' or 'empty' learning (nise-gakumon, kyogaku or zokugaku) which diverted man's attention from the proper end of becoming a Sage. Confucian writers were strong in their condemnations of 'false' learning, particularly of the kind known as kinko-kishoo no gakumon, or the mere knowledge of words and facts unrelated to human conduct. To read the works of the Sages was certainly very necessary, but aspirants should be careful, it was constantly stressed, not to lose sight of the fact that it was not mere knowledge of what the Sages had said that was important, but an inner comprehension of the meaning of the words so thorough that it would always issue in corresponding moral conduct.

Nakae Tooju, for example, explained that the Classics could be regarded from three different aspects: kinko, or the words; ato, or the actions and utterances of the Sages, and kokoro, or the spirit of essential goodness lying behind these utterances. The essential part of gakumon was of course to understand the kokoro - for the aspirant so to model himself upon it that eventually it became one with his own kokoro. Regrettably many so-called

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1. Takkyo Doomon, Yamaga Sokooshuu Vol. 6, p. 228.

Confucianists, however, took note of nothing further than the words. They were unable even to distinguish the exact meaning of the _ato_, let alone the all-important _kokoro_, but wasted their time on mere 'mouth and ear learning.'[1]

Kaibara Ekken too enumerated several kinds of false learning: _kinko no gaku_, which he defined as detailed textual criticisms of the Classics; _kishoo no gaku_, or a wide knowledge of mere facts, accumulated as ends in themselves; and _shishoo no gaku_, or dilettante composition of prose and poetry. Such forms of knowledge, he declared, were entirely useless and irrelevant unless accompanied by a true knowledge of the Way.[2]

Yamaga Sokoo too was strong in his denunciation of false learning (_zokugaku_). 'Scholars of empty words' (_moji no gakusha_) he roundly condemned for their entire ignorance of the affairs of everyday life and for their absorption in sterile literary pursuits. Perniciously false also was the kind of learning practised by certain Buddhists, who distorted the essentially social nature of man by renouncing the claims of the Five Relations and going off to remote places to practise _zazen_ (Zen meditation). All such people, Sokoo maintained, were entirely ignorant of _jitsugaku_, the true, useful and practical learning directed to the proper moral end of enabling men to accord

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1. Op.cit., p. 47-49. Tooju's condemnation of 'mouth and ear learning' was probably inspired by Wang Yang-ming's principle of _chikoo-gooitsu_, or the unity of knowledge and action. Knowledge and action were rightly aspects of the same process, and true knowledge or 'good knowledge' must necessarily issue in action. See Fung Yu-lan, _History of Chinese Philosophy_, II, p. 601-605, and David Nivison, "The Problem of Knowledge and Action in Chinese Thought since Wang Yang-ming", in _Studies in Chinese Thought_, edited by Arthur F. Wright.
2. Op.cit, p. 212-3. Ekken went on to condemn the prevalent low taste for fiction, particularly illustrated fiction, as an indication of the degenerate state of the times. He too insisted on the equal importance to _gakumon_ of knowledge and action, which were, he said, like the two wings of a bird or the two wheels of a cart.

with his Way, and were hence liable to do more harm than people with no learning at all.[1]

Though a knowledge of the external world, of 'things' and the way they worked, would appear from this point of view to be thoroughly false and zoku, yet it by no means followed that Confucian scholars paid no attention at all to the natural world. 'Nature' was, on the contrary, invested with great importance - but from a standpoint which made a disinterested investigation of things and their physical properties an irrelevant waste of time. Nature to the Confucianists was of importance because of the close correspondance and interaction, or rather the fundamental identity, which they envisaged between it and man. Indeed, the Neo-Confucian Idea of Nature was in this way simply another manifestation of one of the most characteristic traits of Chinese thought - its refusal to separate Man from Nature, and its insistence that through the all-pervasive forces of Yin and Yang and through innumerable numerical correspondances, man, in the construction of his body, in the innate tendencies of his mind, and in the ideal social relationships which those tendencies dictated, reproduced a microcosm of the larger nature about him. The universe, in short, was a vast organism permeated by moral forces and principles which governed not only the workings of the external world but also the nature of man both as an individual and a social being.[2]

Chu Hsi had conceived man as bound to Nature by the ordering principle of li. Li, which, together with ch'i or matter formed the dualism from which the entire universe was constructed and ordered, was the Principle

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1. Takkyo Doomon, p. 236-8, and Jihei Kyuuji, Yamaga Sokooshuu Vo. 1, p. 537-8.
2. An interesting exposition of this aspect of Chinese thought may be found in Granet, La Pensée Chinoise, Livre III.

which prescribed the ideal form of each separate thing. Everything that had any kind of existence in the universe, whether animate or inanimate, and including even incorporeal moral ideas, possessed a li which prescribed the norm or ideal of its particular nature. The Universe itself had a li, known as the T'ai Chi or Supreme Ultimate, which at the same time was the summation of all the lis in the universe brought into a single whole. Every separate object therefore was conceived to possess within itself not only its own specific li, but also the Supreme Ultimate.

> "This is like the moon, of which there is but one in the sky, and yet, by scattering (its reflection) upon rivers and lakes, it is to be seen everywhere."[1]

All the principles in the universe, therefore, were ultimately one and the same in so far as all alike reflected in themselves the Supreme Ultimate. To this unity man was no exception. His hsing or Good Nature, as li was called when it referred to man, was just as much a reflection of the Supreme Ultimate and therefore just as much fundamentally one with the external world as was the li of any other of the ten thousand things. The Virtues, therefore, which were thought to constitute his Good Nature, were not uncommonly identified with parallel manifestations in the external world. Kaibara Ekken, for example, made a clear statement of this principle of tenjin-gooitsu or the Unity of Man and Nature. The Four Virtues, jin, gi, rei and chi, which constituted man's Good Nature, were, he declared, simply

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1. Fung Yu-lan, op.cit, p. 541; J.P. Bruce, Chu Hsi and his Masters, p. 133-141. I have also found most useful Maruyama Masao's account of Chu Hsi's thought in section 2 of his essay, "Kinsei Jukyoo no Hatten ni okeru Soraigaku no Tokushitsu narabi ni sono Kokugaku to no Kankei," in Nihon Seiji Shisooshi Kenkyuu.

the expression in man of the 'mind of Heaven', the same mind which expressed itself in Nature in the form of the Four Seasons, gen, koo, ri and tei.[1] Hayashi Razan too declared that the fact that some men were 'higher' than others was simply the manifestation in human society of the same principle which in the natural world ordered that Heaven should be higher than earth.[2]

External Nature appeared therefore as a vast moral organism, ordered on principles which at the same time ordered the ideal workings of the mind of man and the manner in which he should live in society. The passage of the seasons and the movements of the stars, the way a hawk flies and a fish leaps, were manifestations of the same ultimate principle as that which prescribed that men should be filial to their parents and loyal to their lords, that there should be a proper distinction between husband and wife and mutual trust between friends.

The particular predicament of man, however, was, as we have seen, that his Good Nature had become beclouded and obscured by his material endowment, and hence that his chief task in life was to overcome these innate material obstructions and 'return' to his original nature. To accomplish this task, therefore, the principle of the Unity of Man and Nature might be plausibly invoked. Indeed, it was this very doctrine which had led Chu Hsi's Neo-Confucian predecessor Ch'eng Yi, and later Chu Hsi himself, to recommend a theory of moral self-cultivation which appeared, though somewhat equivocally, to embrace the 'things' of the external world.

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1. Gojookun, DNSZ, Vol. 5, p. 261-2.
2. See the quotation from Keiten Daisetsu in Maruyama Masao's Nihon Seiji Shisooshi Kenkyuu, p. 204.

If man's own principle was ultimately the same as the principles of all the other things in the universe, a good way of arriving at a knowledge of his own principle would surely be to investigate thoroughly the principles of other things. These, though they might appear to be external, were in fact all contained within men's minds, and hence by learning to recognise them in external things, man could become aware of them within his own nature. As Ch'eng Yi wrote, "There is a single principle in things and in me: as soon as 'that' is understood, 'this' becomes clear. This is the way to unite the external and the internal."[1]

The best way to understand principles exhaustively, Ch'eng Yi thought, was by investigating the 'things' in which they inhered, for the principles themselves, being transcendant and 'above shapes' (hsing erh shang) could not be investigated except through the medium of their substance. Ch'eng Yi recommended various methods by which the aspirant might proceed in his investigations. He might read the Classics and the commentaries on their moral principles; he might discuss prominent historical figures and discriminate between what was right and wrong in their conduct; or he might experience practical everyday affairs. He should also, Ch'eng Yi added, investigate 'every tree and every grass'[2] - but on the whole there seems little doubt that the 'things' which he thought could be most profitably investigated as means to understanding principles were not objects in the physical world, but rather the abstract moral ideas contained in the Classics.

1. A.C. Graham, The Philosophy of Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan and Ch'eng Ming-tao, (unpublished thesis, University of London) p. 198. Also Fung Yu-lan, op. cit, p. 531.
2. Graham, op.cit, p. 197-8, 202. Fung Yu-lan, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 305-6.

Chu Hsi likewise recommended an investigation of as many different principles as possible, for the reason that:

> "When one has exerted onself for a long time, finally a morning will come when complete understanding will open before one. Thereupon there will be thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external or internal, fine or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete enlightenment."[1]

Chu Hsi however gave no directions as to how precisely this 'investigation' was to be carried out, further than saying that the activity should be accompanied by another known as 'attentiveness of the mind' without which the investigation was likely to degenerate into a mere intellectual exercise and fail to achieve the sudden 'complete understanding' desired.[2] There seems little doubt however that Chu Hsi, like Ch'eng Yi, intended not a study of physical objects, but something more approaching a meditation on the moral principles of the Classics. The idea of investigating physical objects had anyway been rather summarily discredited by Wang Yang-Ming, who, taking Chu Hsi at his word in saying that every tree and every grass had principles which should be investigated, attempted to investigate the li of a bamboo. "But though he pondered diligently he had no success and finally fell ill."[3]

A Japanese follower of Chu Hsi in giving directions for investigating principles stressed the teleological aspect of the principles. After cultivating the tranquil and concentrated state of mind (jikei) necessary as

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1. Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, II, p. 561. The theory of the 'investigation of things' was given classical sanction by the enigmatical phrase in the Ta Hsueh, ke wu chih chih, the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things. (Par.4.)
2. Fung Yu-lan, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 286, 305-6.
3. Fung Yu-lan , History of Chinese Philosophy, II, p. 597.

a preliminary to the investigation, one should ponder with all one's might as to what are the principles; why they should be unchanging; why the eye does not hear nor the nose see; why the hawk does not leap nor the fish fly; why we should feel commiseration when we see a poor frightened ox going to its death. One should investigate these things by consulting books and talking to teachers and friends.[1]

In short, the questions the aspirant should bear in mind asked not 'how' but 'why'. Principles, being transcendent and 'above shapes', could never be comprehended as answers to questions which merely asked 'how' about the physical properties of things.

The stress laid by Chu Hsi on the fact that li were 'above shapes', and that what was above shapes had ontological priority and superiority to what w was within shapes, automatically made his followers consider the techniques of western science to be an irrelevant waste of time. Li was an ideal norm, to which anything possessing physical form could be no more than an inadequate approximation. The physical form was therefore fundamentally irrelevant, and any study of its properties as ends in themselves, unconnected with the teleological quest for li, was undoubtedly a reprehensible form of 'false' learning.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that the Japanese followers of the Chu Hsi school should have been highly incensed to find the early Rangakusha using the sanctified words kyuuri (the 'exhaustion' of principles) and kakubutsu (the investigation of things) to describe the process of investigating not transcendent principles but physical forms and properties.

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1. Oohashi Totsuan, Hekija Kogoto. MBZ, Shisoohen, p. 87.

To call such a foolishly useless pursuit kyuuri, one writer declared, was a wickedly misleading use of the word - like pointing to a horse and calling it a stag. The westerners' sole concern was with analysing the material substances of things - pointing out that A was a compound of B and C, or that A was of the same family or kind as B - a pursuit which bore no relation at all to the true kyuuri. For principles, being above shapes, could never be perceptible by the senses "even with the aid of hundreds of microscopes." No analysis of mere substances, however exhaustive, would lead the westerners to any understanding whatever of principles. It might enable them to assert, certainly, that the eye could distinguish colours owing to the presence in it of a certain liquid, or that the ear could distinguish sounds owing to the presence in it of a certain organ. But it could never enable them to understand why eyes should always be horizontal and noses vertical, or why their functions should never be confused. How could mere analysis, for example, reveal to the westerners the principle of the Four Virtues which existed in the human heart? Between father and son there existed the principle of affection (shin) and between lord and vassal the principle of justice (gi) - but these principles could scarcely be discovered by examining lords and vassals with microscopes. There was no harm in calling this pastime, foolish and irrelevant though it was, an investigation of mere matter (keishitsu), but it was very wrong to call it an investigation of principle.[1]

The pastime was wrong not only because it was irrelevant, but also because it was irreverent. The techniques of astronomy in particular

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1. Ibid, p. 88-90.

treated Nature (ten) like a collection of toys or dead things. Though Nature was intimately bound up with man in what amounted to the relation of parent to child, since man's nature derived from Nature (ten no sei), the westerners had the temerity and impertinence to treat Nature, particularly the phenomena of the heavens, as mere playthings to be copied, measured and computed - a pastime which was as irreverent and insulting as it would be to twist our parents' faces about and comment on and criticise their shape and colour. They deliberately ignored, moreover, the close relation of cause and effect (kannoo) which existed between man and Nature. It was well known that the flouting of the moral Way proper to man (jindoo), particularly by rulers, would produce in Nature prodigies such as white rainbows, winter thunder or summer snow. The westerners, however, expounded theories which treated white rainbows and winter thunder as normal and ordinary occurrences, thus, by treating Nature as dead and mechanical, plainly denying the teachings of the Sages.[1]

It was against ideas of this kind that the new gakumon advocated by the keimoo men had to contend. For this new gakumon was, in fact, precisely the study of the kind of kyuuri so disliked by the Confucianists.[2] The keimoo mission in the field of learning was to convince people that it was after all the li within shapes rather than the li above shapes which should be investigated - the 'laws' or predictable regularities according to which physical objects behaved, in other words, rather than the unverifiable moral essences of the Confucianists.

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1. Ibid, p. 95-100.
2. The word kyuuri was used extensively in text books of elementary science during the period 1869-1877. cf. Fukuzawa's Kyuuri Zukai.

That there was an important distinction between moral and non-moral 'principle' was first pointed out by the leading exponent of *keimoo* doctrines, Nishi Amane. The Sung Confucianists had, he wrote, utterly confounded under the general name of *li* two completely distinct types of principle. These were *butsuri*, or the mechanical laws by which all objects in the external world were governed, and *shinri*, or the innate capacity of men for making moral judgments. The Sung Confucianists had confused these two distinct types by postulating an interaction between human moral conduct and the operations of the external world, thus investing the external world with a moral dimension which in fact existed only in human nature. Hence their absurd beliefs, such as that eclipses were the result of bad rule, or that the wind which wrecked the Mongol Armada was caused by the gods at Ise or the prayers of Nichiren. The truth was, Nishi affirmed, that all objects in the external world were governed by *butsuri*, principles or laws which were strictly mechanical and entirely unalterable by human actions, moral or otherwise. There were specific causes of eclipses, for example, which bore no relation to the moral conduct of rulers. The wind which drove off the Mongol Armada was the storm which occurred regularly, through specific meteorological causes, every 210th day of the year.[1]

Nishi's distinction between moral principle and non-moral law was a necessary preliminary to the propaganda for the new *gakumon*. For the new *gakumon* was essentially the study of *butsuri*, emphasising that the knowledge revealed by such a study was not an irrelevant or irreverent sideline, but

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1. *Hyakuichi Shinron*, MBZ, *Shisoohen*, p. 268.

rather the kind of knowledge which should in future be considered as the basic educational discipline. This new learning - astronomy, chemistry, medicine, economics - was, the keimoo men claimed, the true jitsugaku, solid, practical, useful learning. The old learning pertaining to the morally organic Nature - transcendant li and the apparatus of Yin and Yang and the Five Elements - was now, they affirmed, kyogaku - empty learning.

Jitsugaku and kyogaku were, of course, old familiar terms. The Confucian writers had used them to indicate the kinds of knowledge of which they did or did not approve. Jitsugaku was the useful, solid, practical knowledge conducive to what they conceived to be the proper end and object of learning. Kyogaku was the empty, useless learning which diverted men from that end.[1] The keimoo men took over the words and used them in a precisely similar way.[2] Both were agreed that knowledge ought to be useful and practical; both condemned recondite literary knowledge unrelated to the ordinary affairs of everyday life. It was in their conception of what precisely was useful knowledge that they differed. To the Confucianists knowledge was 'useful' if it helped man to follow his moral Way. To the keimoo men it was useful if it increased his knowledge of the external world, and thereby helped to raise him to a higher rung on the ladder of Progress.

Hence Fukuzawa's blunt plea for jitsugaku in the first pamphlet of Gakumon no Susume, the first statement of the new view of gakumon to attract

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1. See, for example, Yamaga Sokoo's views on jitsugaku and zokugaku, in Takkyu Doomon, p. 232.
2. It was Fukuzawa who first popularised these words in their keimoo uses in the first pamphlet of Gakumon no Susume, but other scholars were quick to take them up. cf Tsuda Shindoo's "Kaika wo susumuru Hoohoo wo ronzu," in Meiroku Zasshi No. 3, MBZ, Zasshihen, p. 65.

the public notice, reads on first sight remarkably like a Confucian condemnation of kinko-kishoo no gakumon:

"Learning does not consist merely of knowing difficult characters, reading difficult old books, and composing poetry. These dilettante literary pursuits may be quite a pleasant way of passing the time, but they hardly deserve all the praise which has been heaped on them in the past by the Confucianists and the scholars of Japanese literature. Up till now there have been very few Chinese scholars who were good at running their households, and very few clever merchants who were also good at poetry. No wonder then that sensible merchants and peasants, seeing their children display a taste for learning, should worry lest thereby they fritter away all their fortune. This proves that the old kind of learning is quite unpractical and useless in everyday life. Thus the kind of learning we should work at now is jitsugaku - practical learning which is close to men's everyday lives. The other unpractical kind of learning we can ignore for the time being."[1]

And again:

"Words are nothing more than the tools of learning, as hammers and saws are the tools necessary for building houses. We would hardly call a man a carpenter who knew all the names of his tools but did not know how to build a house. Nor would we call a man a scholar who was able to read but knew nothing about the way things behaved in real life. . . Someone who can recite the Kojiki but does not know the current price of rice I would say knew nothing of the 'learning' of managing his

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1. Gakumon no Susume, No. 1, FZ III, p. 2.

household. Someone who has penetrated the mysteries of the Confucian Classics and Books of History but cannot conduct a simple business transaction I would say knew little of the 'learning' of commerce. . . Such people are mere store-houses of words, of no more use than rice-consuming dictionaries. From the point of view of the country they are white elephants, even parasites on its economy. Thus managing your household is learning, business is learning, seeing the trend of the times is learning. But why should merely reading Chinese and Japanese books be called learning?"[1]

But though he might echo earlier Confucian writers in condemning dilettante literary pursuits and the purposeless accumulation of book knowledge, and in extolling the knowledge of ordinary everyday things and activities, Fukuzawa parted company with them summarily in the following statement:

"Things come before moral relations. It is quite wrong to think that moral relations exist first and afterwards generate the things. How wrong to allow wild guesses about moral relations to distort the laws of physics!"[2]

The reason why knowledge of ordinary everyday things was important, in short, was not that thereby the moral Way could the better be put into practice, but that it was in these very everyday things and activities, even

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1. Gakumon no Susume, No. 1, FZ III, p. 9.
2. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 46. Compare Oohashi Totsuan's insistence that principles come before things. It was owing to the existence of the li of seeing and hearing, he declared that eyes and ears came into existence. Hekija Kogoto, p. 85.
   I am much indebted here to Maruyama Masao's article "Fukuzawa ni okeru "Jitsugaku" no Tenkai," in Tooyoo Bunka Kenkyuu No. 3, March 1947

in such humble household chores as lighting a fire or boiling rice, that the laws of nature 'within shapes' were to be discovered.[1]

For it was their knowledge of these laws, he insisted, which had enabled the western countries to 'progress' so much further than had China and Japan.

> "Western scholars studied these laws for many years and found that everything in the world was reducible to fifty elements. Then after further research they found that there were sixty, and then eighty. They examined their properties and expounded their uses, and then went on to turn the immaterial forces of heat, light and electricity to practical use in developing productive industries. It was sad indeed that while all this was going on the scholars of the Orient should have rested content with the theories of Yin and Yang and the Five Elements, given no thought to progress and relegated industry, manufacture and suchlike to the lower classes of society. In the education of our samurai there was certainly dignity, refinement and high moral principles of which they had no cause to be ashamed, and indeed in which they were far superior to the West. But in the one matter of physical laws our Confucian scholars, despite all the learned tomes they read, knew no more than an ignorant maidservant."[2]

The fundamental difference between western and Chinese medicine, for example, was that the former was securely based on the laws of nature, whereas the latter relied on 'chance skill' (guuzen no jukuren). Chinese medicine might make correct diagnoses occasionally, but its pronouncements

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 32, FZ VII, p. 65.
2. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, p. 258.

could never have certain validity, any more than a farmer could tell for certain what the weather the next day would be like by simply relying on the 'feeling' (kan) he might have about the sky and the distant mountains.[1] Certain validity could only come through knowledge of laws. Similarly in so far as the East had succeeded in putting natural things to the use of men - making swords from iron or building houses of wood and stone - she had done so by mere luck and not from any systematic knowledge of the laws which ultimately make these operations possible. Any improvements in technique which might have been accomplished had been due to blind chance, so that no real progress could be expected from such methods.[2]

Indeed, unless knowledge was based on laws, there could be no hope of any progress at all, for unless it was formed in terms of precise, easily communicable laws it would die with its possessor. The weather-wise farmer who based his predictions on 'feeling' did so in exactly the same way as his ancestors had done for generations back, since it was scarcely possible to teach the techniques of 'feeling'.[3]

It was therefore due to lack of interest in the laws of nature, Fukuzawa was convinced, that Japan had failed to progress to the blessed state of bummei. She had put far too much emphasis on one particular kind of knowledge, ethical knowledge, at the expense of ethically neutral scientific knowledge. She had believed that ethical knowledge was the sole element in 'civilization', whereas it was abundantly clear that what caused 'progress'

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1. Isetsu, FZ X, p. 42.
2. Seiyoogaku to Kogakuryuu, FZ IX, p. 567.
3. Isetsu, FZ X, p. 42.

in civilization was not virtue but knowledge. There had been no very startling progress in virtue since ancient times, for moralists and saints had been unable to do more than merely comment on the principles laid down by Christ and Confucius. They had never been able to turn the Ten Commandments into eleven, or the Five Relations into six. Whereas in the sphere of ethically neutral knowledge "we know a hundred things where the ancients knew one. We despise what they feared, mock what they marvelled at."[1]

The new jitsugaku therefore required a shift of the 'queen bee', the prototype of all the branches of knowledge, from ethics to science. But if such a shift was to take place and science become a gakumon instead of the mere gei it had been before, a new 'spirit' would be necessary - a spirit requiring an entirely new attitude towards those basic constituents of knowledge, man and Nature.

In the first place anyone who engaged in jitsugaku would have to understand that Nature was not a Great Parent, not a complex of moral principles fundamentally the same as those which constituted his own nature and which therefore formed a vast moral organism of which he was a part. It was rather a vast machine, marvellously and intricately constructed, working according to regular and predictable and entirely non-moral laws which man was not only at liberty, but in duty bound, to discover and understand. It was therefore neither irreverent nor insulting to poke and pry and experiment with Nature. Man's relation to Nature was no longer that of a part of a whole, inescapably bound by the laws of the whole, but rather something active working on

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 107. This argument, developed through Chapter 6, "Chitoku no Ben", was probably inspired by Buckle's History of Civilization in England, Chapter 4, wherein it is stated that 'progress' in civilization consists of intellectual not moral progress.

something passive. Man was still, certainly, bambutsu no rei, the lord of creation - but simply because he happened to be the most intelligent of living creatures. There was no need for him to feel any debt of gratitude to nature for this privilege, and therefore to feel that he should 'serve' and revere Nature as he might a beneficent parent or creator.[1] His environment was no longer a moral scheme of things looming over him unquestionably sacred, but rather a collection of mechanical objects which he was in duty bound to question, analyse, measure, and finally turn to his own use.[2]

Jitsugaku was, moreover, a kind of knowledge which everybody alike should take steps to possess, a discipline of the mind which should be given a place of primary importance in school education.[3] People should not leave the comprehension of the laws of nature to professional scholars and content themselves with merely saying that the products of civilization were wonderful and marvellous.[4] If they went to a photographer they should consider the chemical principles involved in photography. If they watched a house being built they should take note of the mechanical laws involved in building. They should try, in short, to make themselves continuously aware of the

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 6, FZ VII, p. 16-20.
2. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 17, "Zooka to arasou," FZ VII p. 36-7. Two of Fukuzawa's favourite phrases were: 與造化争境, Zooka to sakai wo arasou, 'dispute territory with Nature', and 束縛化翁是開明, Kaoo wo sokubaku su kore kaimei, 'enlightenment is to capture old man chemistry.'
3. Subjects of study, Fukuzawa considered, could be divided into 'material' (yuukeigaku) and 'immaterial' (mukeigaku). The former category comprised physics, chemistry, geography and mathematics - subjects which in short could be classified as sciences. The latter category comprised subjects which could not, at first sight at any rate, be treated as sciences - namely history, ethics and economics. An important feature of the Keioo curriculum was that 'material' subjects were always studied before 'immaterial'. "On no account," Fukuzawa wrote, "should this order be reversed." Keioo Gijuku Kaikaku no Gian, 1876, ZFZ VII, 80-1.
4. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 32, FZ VII, p. 66.

physical laws which entered constantly into their daily lives.[1] If they used the products of civilization but were too lazy to find out the principles on which they were based, they were no better than the old Confucianists who remarked that rain fell from Heaven but never troubled to enquire what caused it to fall, no better even than horses who ate their food without wondering what it was made of.[2]

If people should content themselves with merely remarking that electricity was wonderful and marvellous without attempting to find out how it worked they were trying to bring about an impossible compromise between old and new. They were approaching the new knowledge in the old 'spirit', and believing in the new with the same belief that they had believed in the old. They were, in short, bringing to the new, mechanical, exploitable Nature the same attitude of wonder and reverence that they had brought to the old moral, 'spiritual' Nature. Such a compromise, Fukuzawa insisted, was impossible. Like sake and fish-oil, the two points of view simply did not mix.[3] For a people to use the products of a civilization based on 'reason', and yet to continue thinking in terms of 'feeling' (joojitsu) would be like an apricot grafted on to a plum tree.[4] Hence electricity and steam engines might exist in Japan, understood by a few experts, but until the ordinary general public had learned to comprehend the thinking that gave rise to their discovery, they would remain something extraneous and freakish.

The 'spirit' of the new jitsugaku was therefore essentially one of doubt

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1. Seiyoogaku to Kogakuryuu, FZ IX, p. 569.
2. Butsurigaku no Yooyoo, FZ X, p. 1.
3. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 34, FZ VII, p. 71.
4. Chi to Joo to, GZ X, p. 275.

and experiment. It was only by constant experiment and by taking nothing for granted that the laws of nature could be discovered. For Fukuzawa the world was one of experiment (shiken no yo-no-naka)[1] and the spirit which led to such a world was one of 'independence.' By denying the close relationship, or ultimate identity, between man and nature, the keimoo men had made man 'independent' of nature.

The new jitsugaku did not imply a substitution of material for spiritual values. It simply postulated a spirit which should view man and nature in such a way as to require an entirely different approach towards ethical and spiritual values. Man's task might still be to perfect himself, but the new gakumon implied that the road by which he could attain this perfection had entirely changed.

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 52.

Chapter 5.

The New Ethics

The new _jitsugaku_ implied that man and Nature worked according to entirely different kinds of laws. Nature worked according to _butsuri_, mechanical and non-moral regularities. Man lived and moved not only by _butsuri_ but also by _shinri_, principles of a moral kind which had nothing to do with _butsuri_. Gone was the fundamental identification of man and Nature, and the consequent justification of the moral precepts laid down for man on the score that they were natural, as much part of the warp and woof of the universe as were the rotation of the seasons and the succession of night and day. The new _jitsugaku_, by shifting attention from moral principle to non-moral law, thus necessitated an entire re-thinking of the nature of value. The old ethic could no longer stand; not only had its support and justification disappeared with the 'demoralization' of the universe, but its precepts actually conflicted in many ways with the spirit of the new _jitsugaku_.

What was needed, therefore, was a new moral scheme which would prove a necessary complement to the new _jitsugaku_; which might show that the investigation of a mechanical Nature could have some bearing on moral improvement in man - in a word, a definition of good and bad which would not only sanction but also justify the pursuit of _jitsugaku_ by giving it a higher, nobler end than a mere _fukoku-kyOOhei_.

Such a scheme was particularly urgently needed in the early 70s, because at that time the traditional Confucian criticism of western knowledge as amoral and neglectful of ethical studies would really seem to have been

justified. Fukuzawa's plea for jitsugaku in Gakumon no Susume had been interpreted with great enthusiasm by the framers of the Education Act of 1872, with the result that not only was the traditional Confucian ethical learning despised as narrow and useless, but moral teaching of any kind had been virtually dropped from the school curriculum. Shuushin or ethical studies, hitherto the focal point of all branches of study, was now accorded the lowest position of any subject on the curriculum, and the text books prescribed for its teaching were a ludicrous collection of translations of obscure foreign works on ethics and law.[1] It would seem, therefore, almost as though official confirmation had been given to the stock Confucian charges, making it all the more necessary for the keimoo men to prove that the pursuit of jitsugaku did not imply a corresponding neglect of ethics.

No sooner therefore had the keimoo men succeeded in separating man from Nature than they found themselves confronted with the much more difficult problem of joining them together again. The problem proved the more bewildering because, in this particular case, the west could give singularly little help. It could offer ethical schemes, certainly, but none which seemed adequately to solve the problem of bridging the gap between the pursuit of butsuri and that of shinri.

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1. The text books for use in Primary Schools, for example, included Seihooryaku, Kanda Koohei's translation of a Dutch legal treatise; Doomoo Oshiegusa, Fukuzawa's own translation of an obscure American work on moral science; and Taisei Kanzen Jummoo, Mitsukuri Rinshoo's translation of a work on ethics based on the Christian conception of duty towards God, man and oneself. See Watanabe Ikujiroo: Meiji Tennoo to Kyooiku, Ch. 6.
   There are marked similarities of thought and expression in Gakumon no Susume and the Ooseidasaresho or Preamble to the Education Act of 1872. The first number of Gakumon no Susume appeared in February 1872, and the Education Act was promulgated in July of that year, so that it would appear that the writer of the Ooseidasaresho had received a number of hints from Gakumon no Susume. See Kobayashi Sumie: Fukuzawa Yukichi to Shin-Kyooiku 217.

It could offer Christianity, of course, and indeed many missionaries made a point of stressing that Christianity was the 'natural' western complement of science; that it was the virtues of perseverance and fortitude inculcated by Christianity that had brought the western countries to their power and prosperity. But Christianity plainly would not 'do' as a substitute for Tooyoo dootoku, Eastern ethics. Too much of the traditional distrust of and aversion to its teachings still remained, and its own western opponents moreover pointed out convincingly how antagonistic to science many of its beliefs were.[1]

The west could also offer the beliefs of these very opponents - evolutionary materialism. This creed sought to solve the problem by denying the existence of shinri altogether, and proving that not only external Nature but human nature and conduct as well were governed entirely by butsuri. These views did, in fact, become fairly popular among 'advanced' thinkers during the middle 70s, particularly after the doctrines of evolution had been popularised by the lectures of Edward S. Morse,[2] and for a time the works

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1. There were later a few attempts to make Buddhist doctrines into a more acceptable ethical standard by combining them with science - notably Inoue Enryoo's Shinri Kinshin (1886) and Bukkyoo Katsuron (1887), but these never attracted many adherents. See Nagata Hiroshi: Nihon Yuibutsuronshi, p. 190-1.
2. Morse was a naturalist from Salem, Massachusetts, who became the first Professor Zoology at Tokyo Imperial University. He gave a series of three lectures on evolution in 1877, which was later expanded into a longer series given before the Koodankai in 1878. See Robert S. Schwantes: "Christianity versus Science; A Conflict of Ideas in Modern Japan." FEQ, February 1953. Morse himself describes the lectures on p. 339-40 of his charming book Japan Day by Day.

of Darwin, Spencer, Alexander Bain and the positivist historian Buckle were widely read in intellectual circles.[1] Materialism seemed, after all, to supply a coherent and satisfying answer to the problem of how to become thoroughly western and civilized without embracing Christianity. It could not supply an ethical complement to science, but at least it dispensed with the bewildering gap between the way in which men's minds and the way in which the rest of the universe functioned. They were, after all, all of a piece. To strip the external world of its moral dimension and show it to work according to regular and mechanical laws had been possible, it seemed, by dint of exercising 'reason' in a sphere which before had been dominated by <u>moosoo</u>, or irrational superstition and delusion. Was it not possible, therefore, that other branches of knowledge hitherto thought to pertain to morals might, through an even more searching exercise of reason, be discovered to be ethically neutral, ultimately analysable into fixed and regular laws of cause and effect, verifiable by observation and induction? History, economics and the other branches of knowledge pertaining to human conduct might now be proved to be, not the branches of moral philosophy hitherto imagined, but merely descriptions of the regular way in which men tended to act under certain given sets of circumstances. To imagine them as having any connection with

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1. Western materialism proved to be a greater thorn in the flesh of the missionaries than did Buddhism or Shinto. cf the Rev. J.T. Gulick's verdict that the chief opponent of Christianity was "not the religion and superstitions of old Japan, but the Skepticism of modern Europe." Otis Cary: <u>History of Christianity in Japan</u>, II, 143. Archdeacon Shaw complained that the conversion of the students of Keioo presented unusual difficulties, since the school was "one in which the most advanced opinions on all subjects are held, and in which Mr. Mill's and Mr. Spencer's writings are used as text books." Unpublished letter to the Secretary of the SPG, December 27th 1875.

ethics was to be guilty of moosoo - and in fact the whole conception of ethics had been one enormous moosoo all along.

The most systematic and influential keimoo advocate of such materialist opinions was probably Katoo Hiroyuki. In his work Jinken Shinsetsu (1881) he sought to prove that everything in the universe, animate and inanimate, was governed by a necessary chain of cause and effect. All organic beings were endowed with an energy which, obeying fixed laws of cause and effect, sought for its possessor's preservation and advantage, but which manifested itself in different forms according to the stage of evolution of its possessor. Reason, conscience and will - in fact all the attributes of the human mind to which moral philosophers generally appealed - were simply evolved forms of this energy. For Katoo, therefore, morality in the accepted sense of the word disappeared, and 'moral' behaviour became merely that kind of behaviour which would best ensure the preservation of the individual man and his species.[1]

But when confronted with the question of how to teach ethics in schools, Katoo was driven to the lamest and most unconvincing of compromises. 'Moral philosophy', he declared, had nothing whatever to do with 'moral teaching.' His own moral philosophy was suitable for three people out of every two thousand, but for the remaining 1,997 religion was the only effective way of

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1. Katoo started his scholarly career in the firm belief that man differed from other animals in so far as he was endowed with natural rights and a morality granted from Heaven. About 1877 however, his reading of Buckle, Darwin and Spencer persuaded him that the doctrine of natural rights was merely moosoo, and that the world could be understood entirely in terms of 'natural' cause and effect. In 1881 he withdrew from circulation his earlier works Shinsei Taii and Kokutai Shinron, and propounded his new views in Jinken Shinsetsu.

   An account of Katoo's views may be found in Nagata, op. cit. Part III Chapter I. Jinken Shinsetsu is in MBZ V, 353.

teaching morality. For this purpose no one religion was better than any other; all would do equally well.[1]

The west providing no workable ready-made solution, several <u>keimoo</u> men made earnest attempts to devise for themselves suitable new synthetic moral standards and codes. Most of these bravely purported to combine the virtues of both East and West - but the results were either so unworkably complicated and imprecise or so loftily vague that there was little chance of their being adopted into popular practice.[2]

Fukuzawa was as much concerned as any of the <u>keimoo</u> men with the problem of proving the new <u>jitsugaku</u> to be morally respectable. He was naturally concerned, in the running of his school, to disprove the traditional popular

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1. <u>Tokuiku Hookooron</u>. The Japan Weekly Mail considered Katoo's treatment of these problems to be "one among a number of caricature systems, devised by minds hovering between the old and the new and hoping to blend them into some kind of harmony." JWM, March 22nd, 1890.
2. Notable among these attempts to devise a synthetic code of morals was that of Mori Arinori, published, during his term of office as Minister of Education, in the Mombushoo text book on ethics in 1888, and purporting to be based on the "broadest and most incontestable deductions of moralists eastern and western." The standard by which he declared right should be distinguished from wrong was styled 'equality of self and others' (<u>jitaheiritsu</u>). Self and others, it urged, had an equal right to consideration in the settlement of moral questions, so that right conduct was conduct which would treat both on an entirely equal basis. The <u>Japan Weekly Mail</u> remarked that "none but the most practised ethical mathematician could ever cast up an egoistic and altruistic sum so as to show clearly where the balance lies." JWM, June 29th 1889.
   Another attempt was that of Nishimura Shigeki who tried to prove, in his <u>Nihon Dootokuron</u> 1886, that an emasculated version of Confucian morals was the necessary and inevitable complement of science. Only select what is good and pure in Confucian ethics, and what it has in common with western philosophy, and you will then arrive at a 'universal truth' (<u>tenchi no shinri</u>). It is difficult to see, however, where the necessary and inevitable connection with science lay, for Nishimura's amended version of Confucian ethics does not seem substantially different from the original model. <u>Nihon Dootokuron</u>, Iwanani edition 1925. Shortened versions may be found in Watsuji Tetsuroo: <u>Nihon Rinri Shisoo shi</u>, II, 765-770, and Nagata, op. cit, Part II, Chapter 1.

conception of the student of Western subjects as immoral, undisciplined and dirty, and to show that in ordinary everyday life a 'civilized' man could be just as much a <u>kunshi</u>, a Confucian gentleman, as were the followers of the old ethic.[1] But to this end it was of course necessary to prove that the old conception of the nature of value had been mistaken; that the old definitions of the virtues were not the static, revealed truths they had been believed to be, but could understandably give way to other definitions more compatible with the new learning. To this end Fukuzawa drew inspiration from the Western theory of Progress.

To Fukuzawa, as to many of the <u>keimoo</u> writers, the idea of Progress was an article of faith. It was first of all obvious from the most cursory glance at history, he considered, that man had progressed in Knowledge since ancient times. Modern civilized man'knew' a hundred things where his ancestors had known but one.[2] But a narrower glance at history would reveal that he had become, not only more knowledgeable but at the same time more virtuous - for had not tortures, cruel punishments and cannibalism disappeared from civilized societies?[3] If such was the evidence of the past, there was

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1. Fukuzawa always took particular pains to inculcate a strict discipline into his students on the broad moral principles of cleanliness, tidiness, common courtesy and sexual morality, while allowing them to disregard the more formal feudal conventions of dress, etc. "Our strictly moral behaviour," he recalled, "was a kind of self-defence. We were liable to be regarded with disfavour by the public because of the new and strange theories we were expounding, and if our moral conduct had not been irreproachable, we should have been the objects of plain mockery. Hence we were particularly careful never to lay ourselves open to criticism on this point. <u>Yoogaku</u> was the pursuit of gentlemen; <u>Yoogakusha</u> themselves were pure and upright gentlemen. This was the position on which we made our stand." <u>Yoogaku no Meimyaku</u>, FZ X, 419. See also FYD, I, Chapters 15-18.
2. <u>Bunmeiron no Gairyaku</u>, FZ IV, 107.
3. <u>Fukuoo Hyakuwa</u> No. 3, FZ VII, 11.

every reason to infer that the same process would continue into the future. Indeed, one of the most crashing misapprehensions of the Confucianists was their conception that man's golden age lay in the past. It was clear that man's past, far from being golden, was dark with ignorance and barbarism; it was his future that was bright with the unimaginable joys of complete Knowledge and Virtue. Men today regarded Confucius at the age of seventy as a paragon of perfect Virtue, and Newton as a Sage of Knowledge - but no one could deny that people of this calibre were exceedingly rare. It might be confidently expected, however, that the future would produce not only innumerable Newtons and Confuciuses, but also innumerable people who combined in themselves the wisdom of Newton and the virtue of Confucius - people who had, in short, achieved the very perfection of their nature. "This golden age," Fukuzawa wrote,

> "is no vain dream. It is simply foretelling the future on the basis of past experience. Our hopes for the future are like a vast spring sea. To call this present age degenerate is like mistaking east for west, morning for evening, or the rising for the setting sun."[1]

The chief difficulty was, of course, to prove what possible connection there might be between a Newton and a septuagenarian Confucius; how greater 'knowledge' of an admittedly ethically neutral kind could possibly lead to greater virtue.

But Fukuzawa had read enough of the works of Guizot and Herbert Spencer to be convinced that one of the most important characteristics of Progress in civilization was an increasing 'diversity' and 'complexity'. Whereas

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 4., FZ VII, 12-14. Also No. 86, Yo wa Gyooki narazu, p. 178-181, and Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 197-8.

societies in the various stages of barbarism were characterised by a primitive uniformity and simplicity, civilized societies showed an increasing diversity of opinion and complexity of organization.[1] This diversity was, moreover, not merely an incidental characteristic of civilization; it was a necessary condition of its progress. For it was from the clash of these diverse and opposing opinions that yet more new opinions could emerge - and these in their turn would enable society to advance a step higher up the ladder. If a society was to progress, therefore, it must be allowed the scope for a constant flux of ideas, and for the freedom of argument necessary to stimulate this flux.[2] Hence it followed that ideas which on one rung of the ladder were useful and meaningful might well become entirely irrelevant and meaningless on another. It was wrong, therefore, to suppose that, so long

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1. The idea that progress in civilization implies passage from unity to diversity, simplicity to complexity, may well have been suggested by Guizot's General History of Civilization in Europe. In his second lecture Guizot asserted that whereas ancient civilization had been characterised by a 'remarkable unity', modern European civilization showed an equally remarkable diversity. In ancient times "excessive preponderance of a single principle led to tyranny," but "in modern Europe the diversity of elements of the social order gave birth to the liberty which now prevails."
   The idea is similar to Spencer's definition of evolution in First Principles as passage from an "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" to a "definite, coherent heterogeneity". Fukuzawa's own copy of First Principles however has the date 9-5-10 written on p.1, suggesting that none of his writings before 1876 may have been influenced.
2. See, for example, Machigai no Shimpo, FZ X, 157, where Fukuzawa declares argument to be the essential preliminary to progress. Also Kyokugai Kiken, FZ VIII.
   Also the very interesting article by Maruyama Masao, "Fukuzawa Yukichi no Tetsugaku", in Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, September 1848, where the author discusses Fukuzawa's conception of 'fluid value.' Also Fukuzawa's censure of the Japanese tendency to become too engrossed in one thing (koru) - in one particular art or activity, to the exclusion of everything else, allowing no freedom. Shakai no Keisei Gakusha no Hookoo, FZ X, 218.

as man was in the throes of his struggle upwards, his conceptions of good and bad could be fixed and unchanging. In such a state of flux no one set of ethical ideas could be sustained from generation to generation. This did not imply that there were no values which could be accounted constant, true and unchanging. Such values certainly existed, but they were knowable by man only in his perfect state, at the end of the long process of Progress. While still in hisundeveloped, unperfected state he could not be expected to have more than rudimentary apprehensions of perfection - to understand more, in fact, than what was merely expedient; what temporary definitions of good and bad, right and wrong, would be most suited to his own stage of Progress.[1]

It was therefore essential, Fukuzawa insisted, not to confuse these two conceptions of value. What men thought to be good at the present moment was not equivalent to what was ultimately and permanently good. It was merely what necessarily was best suited to the present situation, and was liable to shift and change as the general situation changed.

It was because they were guilty of precisely this confusion that the teachings of the Confucian moralists were so pernicious. These scholars had presumed to define with minute precision the various virtues they considered proper to human nature and, even further, to claim that their own particular definitions of these virtues were immutable and eternal laws of nature, ethically imperative for all time.[2]

This conception of fixed, intrinsic value, value conceived as inherent in certain words and deeds by their very nature, was ultimately responsible,

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, No. 100 Jinji ni Zettai no Bi nashi, FZ VII, 220-7.
   Dootoku no Shimpo, FZ IX, 424-8.
2. Tenri-jindoo, FZ IV, 541-5.
   Dootoku no Shimpo, FZ IX, 424-8.

Fukuzawa considered, for the many deplorable instances of wakudeki. Wakudeki was the term Fukuzawa applied to the habit of continuing to value things which had outrun their proper time and become irrelevant to the existing facts of life. It was wakudeki, for example, for the samurai of the Tokugawa period to continue to value the swords they had forgotten how to use and which they hardly even bothered to keep sharp, merely because during the medieval civil wars swords had proved useful and significant as a means of self-defence.[1] For would-be patriots to fuss about the Japanese kokutai, as though it possessed some value or sacrosanctity in its very nature irrespective of whether it functioned well in preserving the country from aggression, was wakudeki.[2] For rulers to arrogate to themselves divine rights irrespective of their abilities as governors, was wakudeki.[3]

Value for Fukuzawa lay, therefore, not in things themselves, but in the way they worked. Nothing was in itself either good or bad; it was only the way in which it was used which made it so.[4] Ideas would 'work' well in one context, or on one rung of the ladder, and ill on another - so that no imperative could be more than temporarily categorical. "Taken by itself," he wrote,

> "nothing can be said to be good or bad. . . The doctrine of loyalty to one's master, the doctrines of Christianity, of Buddhism, of Confucianism, are neither wise nor foolish in themselves, but only in the way

1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 32.
2. Ibid, 36-7.
3. Ibid, p. 33.
4. See, for example, the remarks on absolute and conditional good in Oboegaki, FS I, 250-1. Also the first chapter of Bummeiron no Gairyaku, Giron no Hon-i wo sadameru koto, on the general relativity of value judgments.

in which they are carried out. . . The principles of the distinction between lord and vassal and between high and low, and of respect for lineage and family, should not be condemned out of hand, since it is possible to view them in a context in which they may be noble principles of conduct, promoting civilization. But whether or not they will be of any benefit to the world depends on how they are used."[1]

The difficulty remained, however, as to how man was supposed to have the wisdom to distinguish correctly between all the different alternatives confronting him. Greater knowledge might lead to greater diversity - but how, amid this constant clamour of dissentient voices, was he to know which one spoke the most truth?

Fukuzawa's answer was simple: because Progress was a _ten no yakusoku_ - a natural law. Man's own nature was 'suited' to progress because it contained within it a guiding principle in the form of a _honshin_ - an original, essential nature which was absolutely good.[2] It was because he possessed this _honshin_ that man could be called perfectible; the perfection of his own nature, which he could confidently hope that his remote descendents would achieve in the final stage of Progress, was nothing more nor less than the 'liberation' of this _honshin_. Once his _honshin_ was enabled to function entirely freely, man would spontaneously and immediately act in accordance with the true and ultimate values. It followed, however, that the true and ultimate values could not be described or defined in terms of the ordinary moral words which had been used to define the various expedients. Ultimate

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1. _Bummeiron no Gairyaku_, FZ IV, 261.
2. Ibid, 18.

goodness, Fukuzawa insisted, because it was knowable only by enlightened minds, was indescribable by means of the words which were commonly used by the unenlightened. Hallowed moral words such as Loyalty and Filial Piety, though useful enough in the preliminary stages, would have to be discarded once man's progress was completed. The absolutely good acts of the free honshin were always jihatsu, not tadoo - spontaneous, not dictated. Separate moral names and precepts would simply serve to 'sell virtue by the piece' - to demand that certain acts be performed in certain situations, and hence make what should be spontaneous into something dictated.[1]

There is not much of the 'new' ethics, it will be immediately remarked, about those ideas on man's ultimate perfection. Fukuzawa might make man struggle for innumerable generations along an unfamiliar path, but his picture of the perfected man at the end of his journey is remarkably reminiscent of the Neo-Confucian perfect man who has 'returned' to his original good nature.[2]

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1. These ideas may be found in Fukuoo Hyakuyowa No.8, Chitoku no Dokuritsu, No.9, Dokuritsu no Chuu, and No.10, Dokuritsu no Koo. FZ VII, 251-8.
2. The Neo-Confucians insisted that true knowledge was knowledge which spontaneously and immediately issued in action. The truly virtuous man was not bemused by problems of ethical choice, but recognised good and evil immediately and effortlessly. He regarded evil 'like dipping his hand in boiling water', or like a man who has been mauled by a tiger regards a tiger. Ch'eng Yi spoke of this kind of knowledge as an inward 'grasping' (te) of a principle. "If you have grasped it in yourself, the action will be as simple as using your hand to lift a thing. If you have to think it is not yet within yourself, and action is like holding one thing in your hand to take another." (A.C. Graham, op.cit, p. 204-6). Wang Yang-ming's liang chih or 'good knowledge' - a term derived from Mencius (VIIa, 15) who declared that "the knowledge possessed without the exercise of thought is the 'good knowledge'" - was intuitive knowledge of this kind, necessarily issuing in good conduct. (Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, II, 601-5; David Nivison, op.cit.) Wang Yang-ming's ultimate good had of course already been defined and described by the Sages, and required from the ordinary man merely a different kind of apprehension. Fukuzawa's ultimate good was unknowable and hence properly indefinable at the present stage, but in postulating an intuitive, unreasoned apprehension of the good, he was entirely in the Neo-Confucian tradition. His term honshin was in itself a Neo-Confucian term for the original good nature of man.

It was the old perfection, in short, towards which Fukuzawa recommended a new road - and one which at first sight appeared a good deal more roundabout. The Confucianist had, after all, hoped to achieve this perfection within the span of a single lifetime. For Fukuzawa it was something set in the dim future, realizable only as the culmination of a process of Progress which must stretch over innumerable generations. Fukuzawa's means too would seem to be oddly remote from this particular end. The Confucianist had believed that his material nature might be overcome and the Good Nature realized by a definite course of moral study. From Fukuzawa's writings we understand that man can only become a Confucius by way of becoming a Newton; that it is only when Nature and Nature's laws are no longer hid in night that man's good nature can be properly liberated.[1] The problem of bridging the awkward gap between Knowledge and Virtue - proving that Knowledge was after all necessary to Virtue - could only be solved, it seemed, by postulating a mystic joining of the two parallel movements at a distant utopian vanishing point.

"La postérité pour le philosophe," Diderot remarked, "c'est l'autre monde de l'homme religieux." For the French Philosophers, the idea of Progress served as a satisfying substitute for Christianity. For the Christian hope of ideal bliss in the next world, the idea of Progress substituted the hope of the perfect life in this world. For God, as the ultimate judge of conduct and dispenser of due rewards and punishments, the idea of Progress substituted posterity. It assured those who had hoped for immortality in this world by living on in the memory of posterity. Those who felt that the present generation had misjudged them could be comforted by the thought that posterity

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuwa No. 3, Tendoo Hito ni Ka nari, FZ VII, 6-12.

would award them the praise they deserved - and that hence, by suffering for truth and justice, they were laying up treasures for themselves, not in Heaven, but in the utopia which would one day reign on earth. In short, by bringing tidings of comfort and joy no less than did Christianity, the doctrines of Progress and perfectibility could hope to become at least a comparable alternative.[1]

Posterity for Fukuzawa was an alternative not to the next world, but to the static moral universe of the Sages; somewhere where the new and the old could conveniently be reconciled - the new necessity for independent thought and discovery, and the old perfection, for which after all there seemed to be no substitute.

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1. See Carl L. Becker: The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers, Chapter 4, "The Uses of Posterity."

Chapter 6.

The New Ethics (Cont.)

1. Important though a general theory of value might be which would at least plausibly embrace and justify science, equally important and a good deal more urgent was practical advice as to what could be considered good or bad conduct in the new age. Fukuzawa, though he declared ultimate values to be for the time being unknowable and present expediencies to be no more than temporary, nevertheless did not neglect to give clear and forceful advice as to how, in ordinary everyday life, the old prescriptions for moral conduct might be replaced. What was deemed good and bad might be constantly changing, as the changing context of society revealed new ends towards which 'good' conduct should be a means - but this did not at all imply that these ends were not, for the time being at any rate, unmistakably clear.

For Fukuzawa, as for the greater part of conscientious and educated Japanese, the immediate aim and object, towards which the present definitions of good and bad should be oriented, was to make the country strong and unified enough to resist foreign aggression and thereby avoid the humiliating fates of India and China. To Fukuzawa at this period it seemed entirely self-evident that life under the domination of foreigners would not only be insupportable but would spell the end, while it lasted, of any hopes of climbing higher up the ladder of Progress. National independence, he wrote in 1876, was of course very far from being the highest and noblest end of man, but at that particular time it was by far the most immediately urgent. It was a condition without which no progress of a higher kind would be possible. For the time being, therefore, it was necessary almost to put the cart before the horse and to regard the adoption of western 'civilization' as a means

towards preserving national independence. Once the latter was assured and only then would it be seen that in reality this means and end were reversed, and that independence was a condition of progress in civilization.

"Our task now is to promote civilization with a definite objective in view - and that is to distinguish clearly between our own country and others in such a way that we may preserve the independence of our own country. The only means of thus preserving our independence is to adopt western civilization, and this is the reason why I now urge the Japanese people to adopt it. Thus the country's independence is the end, and her civilization is a means towards this end. . . People may object that man is destined to aim for far nobler and higher things than merely preserving his country's independence. This is certainly true. Of course man may expect higher things of his knowledge and virtue than this, and of course civilization does not merely consist in avoiding the contempt of other countries. But in the present state of the world we are prevented by the conditions of international relations from considering these noble ends. . . Only when we are certain that we have a country and a people can we begin talking about its civilization. That is why I make my theory so narrow and say that civilization is a means towards independence. It is Japan's present needs and present welfare that I have in mind. I don't pretend to advance an abstruse doctrine of permanent significance."[1]

What then were the moral qualities needed to achieve this particular short-term end? To Fukuzawa they appeared to coincide very largely with

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1. Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 255-6.

those needed for the longer climb up the ladder of Progress. It was the 'spirit of independence', without which man could not hope to progress along his destined path to perfection, which, Fukuzawa was convinced, would at the same time serve as the strongest armour against foreign attack.[1] The chief source of Japan's danger was therefore the conspicuous lack of this spirit in the great bulk of the Japanese people, a lack produced by centuries of life under the Confucian ethic. But why precisely should the feudal Confucian ethic have been so inimical to this spirit, and have produced instead such a deplorable tendency to rely and depend on others?

The root of the trouble, Fukuzawa declared, lay in a piece of entirely fallacious reasoning on the part of the ancient Confucianists. These

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1. In 1899, Fukuzawa supervised the compilation of a kind of moral code, the Shuushin Yooryoo, in which Independence and Self-Respect were held up as the moral standard which Japan needed to follow at that time. 'Independence' was given the most comprehensive of definitions. A man of independence was one whose convictions were unaffected by prevailing currents of opinion; who was not a slave to his own lusts; who did not lose his equanimity through fortune or misfortune; who fulfilled his duties to society at the same time as making a living for himself and his family; who respected the rights of others and who had a high sense of responsibility etc. etc. Although the compilers appeared to have forgotten no quality calculated to make for a tranquil and enlightened society, yet the "Mita System of Ethics", as it came to be called, had a host of critics. Christian writers accused Fukuzawa of materialism and worldliness. How could Fukuzawa advocate Self-Respect when, with no religious convictions, he could not be expected to entertain a view of the self worthy of respect? Dr. Inoue Tetsujiroo, in a speech in Sendai in May 1900, declared Fukuzawa's principle of independence to be the very doctrine which had led to the horrors of the French Revolution, and that its practice could result only in a reign of selfishness, covetousness and self-aggrandisement of every kind. See Walter Dening's Article "The Mita System of Ethics" in the Japan Weekly Mail June 23rd, 1900, and the report of "Dr. Inoue Tetsujiroo's Sendai Speech" in the edition of May 26th, 1900.

ancients, observing the relationship which generally existed between parents and children to be beautiful and harmonious, inferred thence that it should be the pattern and ideal of all other social relationships - particularly of that which existed between a ruler and his subjects. For the Confucianists, therefore, the ideal form of government was one in which a Good Ruler cherished his subjects in the same way as a father cared for his children and in which, therefore, the state functioned like one vast family. Just as a father was thought to be justified in wielding a virtually unlimited authority over his children on the score that they were ignorant, untutored and irresponsible, so also was the ruler. His subjects should therefore obey his every behest with the same uncritical meekness with which well brought-up young children obeyed their parents or well trained pet animals their masters. This idyllic picture of enormously magnified domestic bliss rested, however, on the big assumption that:

> "the people are always good but stupid, and hence need constant help and guidance, and must therefore be taught to obey their superiors blindly in everything they do. . . It assumes also that the Ruler is holy and enlightened, and that the ministers who aid him are wise, upright, free from selfish desires and passions, pure as water and straight as arrows. They love and cherish the people, feed them when they are hungry, house them when their homes are burnt down. . . Moral influence blows from above like a fragrant south wind, and the people yield to it as grasses bend before a breeze. . . Certainly an idyllic state of peace and harmony between high and low. . . But where, may I ask, is one to find this ideally wise and good ruler, and these ideally meek and obedient

people? And what kind of teaching will produce them? Certainly the Chinese have not since Chou times produced people conforming with these requirements."[1]

In short, it was quite fallacious to try to extend the loving sentiment which characterised the relationship between a father and his children to the inevitably more distant and impersonal relationship between a ruler and his subjects - for the reason that these feelings were simply not capable of being universalised. It was absurd to suppose that the ruler of a large modern state could govern his subjects, many of whom he had never even seen, by means of the same human feelings as those by which a father brought up his own children. Yet, far from letting the obvious facts open their eyes to the absurdity of the situation, the Confucian moralists had, on the contrary, crystallised their notions into a philosophical doctrine, in which form they had remained set for hundreds of years.

The basic idea of this doctrine Fukuzawa saw to be jooge-kisen no meibun - 'meibun of high and low'.[2]

Meibun was a Confucian term largely popularised by the writers of the Mito school and by people of a similar persuasion such as Rai Sanyoo. It implied that each man possessed a mei, a 'name' which not only defined his position in the social hierarchy, but at the same time summed up in itself the moral qualities required by that position. The name 'ruler', for example, implied the particular combination of moral qualities which a man

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1. Gakumon no Susume, XI, FZ III, 89.
2. Jooge-kisen no meibun is discussed in Gakumon no Susume, Nos 8 and 11.

would have to exemplify if he was to be called a ruler. The name 'son' involved more than the mere fact of having been born of recognised parents; it required a whole scheme of moral conduct to be observed in relation to one's parents and which, if not observed, made a man unworthy of the name of 'son'. All such names, in short - lord, vassal, father, son, husband, wife - were normative, not merely descriptive, defining what persons in these positions ought ideally to be, not merely what in fact they actually were. Hence it followed that each man's bun, his 'share', 'lot' or proper station in life, differed according to his mei. A man with the name 'ruler' enjoyed a bun which in the scheme of things was entirely different from that enjoyed by one with the name of 'subject'. In short, men were naturally unequal.[1]

The most pernicious aspect of the doctrine of 'meibun of high and low' was, Fukuzawa thought, 'preponderance of power' (kenryoku no henchoo). By preponderance of power Fukuzawa meant a relationship in which the party superior in the hierarchy possessed a power over the inferior party which was unconditional and unlimited, and in which the inferior party possessed no 'rights' by which that power might be limited. This unconditional power, modelled, of course, on that which a father possessed quite justifiably over his children, Fukuzawa recognised as being present not only in the relation between ruler and subject, but in almost every conceivable social relationship in Japan.

"In relations between men and women, the man has preponderance of power over the woman. In relations between parents and children the parent

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1. The word was probably originally used in connection with the Confucian theory of the 'rectification of names'. cf Fujita Yuukoku's "Seimeiron". Mitogaku Zenshuu, Vo. IV, 342.

has preponderance of power over the child. In relations between elder and younger brother, and between young and old in general, the same principle holds good. Outside the family circle we find exactly the same thing. Preponderance of power exists in relations between teacher and pupil, master and servant, rich and poor, high and low. In feudal times it existed between large and small clans, head temples and subordinate temples, head shrines and subordinate shrines. In fact, whenever men gathered together in groups, there was preponderance of power. Within the government too there is great preponderance of power among the different grades of officials. Government officials are oppressed by their superiors more than the people are by the government. A junior official, for instance, will behave with disgusting arrogance towards a village headman, but his relations with his superior officials make us smile with pity for him. Thus A is oppressed by B, and B is tyrannised over by C in an extraordinary and unending sequence."[1]

Hence it was fundamentally to the false and unrealistic conception of meibun and its corollary of preponderance of power that the Japanese owed their deplorable lack of independence and responsibility. After all, if people were treated like irresponsible children, it was surely asking too much to expect them to behave like responsible adults. It was hardly surprising that they should have developed habits of deceit, cringing servility and trembling apprehension. In a shop, for example, the master was the only person to see the accounts. His clerks and apprentices simply did as he ordered them, and could only tell by his expression how the business was going. They were

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 177.

given no responsibility whatever, so that it was hardly surprising if they should not scruple to make as much as possible for themselves by underhand means.[1]

This very lack of a sense of responsibility and independence resulted too in traits of conduct which might be deplorable and even disastrous for the country in its dealings with foreigners. It was responsible, for example, for the habits of cringing servility of the Japanese merchants:

> "When foreign merchants first came to this country, our merchants were alarmed at their great stature, hugh buildings and fast ships. In their fear and apprehension they incurred great losses, bringing disgrace and loss not only on themselves but also on the country."[2]

Worse still, this lack of independence had produced the apathy and unconcern of the majority of Japanese people with the larger affairs of their country. Where subjects were treated as irresponsible dependents, it naturally followed that they became mere unconcerned spectators of the country's fortunes. They cared not who ruled them except in so far as they were taxed more or less. When the Tokugawa conquered the Kantoo, for instance, the people accepted their new masters at once, unquestioningly and apathetically. How different from European countries, Fukuzawa declared, where it was impossible for one nation to occupy another without either very severe military oppression or fulsome promises to the people of future rights, privileges and comforts.[3]

If the present crisis was to be successfully averted, therefore, it was imperative that the scheme of values should be redefined so as to eliminate

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1. Gakumon no Susume, FZ III, 90.
2. Ibid, 22.
3. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 186-7.

the moral premium on habits of apathetic servility on the one hand, and empty and useless arrogance on the other. The conception of 'meibun of high and low' would have to be replaced by a different set of values whereby the premium should be placed instead on independent and responsible initiative.

Although appearing, as Fukuzawa pointed out, in almost every conceivable social relationship in Japan, the evils of meibun were naturally most pronounced in those particular human relationships prescribed and defined in the Confucian canon - namely the Gorin or Five Relations. Of these five, four were by definition hierarchical and therefore subject to preponderance of power, but it was to the first three - kunshin, lord and vassal, fushi, father and son, and fuufu, husband and wife - that Fukuzawa paid particular attention, making detailed attacks on the old canons and specific recommendations for suitable new standards of conduct by which they might be replaced.

First and most urgently in need of reform were undoubtedly the relationships which made up the family circle. Vitally important though a more enlightened relationship between government and people might be, it could not find expression unless people had first learnt to cast off the toils of meibun in their own homes.[1] And there was certainly, Fukuzawa considered, something very rotten in the present state of both the Parent-Child and the Husband-Wife Relations.

2. The Parent-Child Relation.

The parent-child relation, being, as Fukuzawa had himself pointed out, the prototype of meibun, showed as practised in Japan, all the worst features of 'preponderance of power'. Here was to be found exemplified in the most

1. Nakatsu Ryūbetsu no Sho, ZFZ VII, 397.

flagrant way

> "that characteristic of the Confucian teachings whereby nearly all moral admonitions are directed at children and the weaker parties generally, while the stronger parties are given scarcely any cautions and injunctions at all. They are careful to teach children filial piety, but make no mention at all of the duties of parents. They insist that children labour for the sake of their elders, yet demand of the elders absolutely no return for these labours."[1]

In short, in so far as it made filial piety an unconditional duty, binding on children irrespective of whether or not their parents accorded them affectionate and considerate treatment, the parent-child relation as prescribed by the Confucian canon provided an excellent example of preponderance of power. The duty, certainly, of parents to exercise 'kindness' (ji) towards their children was given occasional mention in the Confucian Classics, but on the whole was accorded negligible importance by comparison with the duties of filial piety, and was never under any circumstances made the condition of children rendering filial duties. Indeed, it was commonly held that the more querulous, exacting, unreasonable and cruel the parents were, the greater would be the merit acquired by children in behaving with the uncritical and uncomplaining meekness (kyoojun) which was the outstanding characteristic of filial piety.[2]

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1. Hinkooron, FZ VI, p. 84-5. In writing this section I am much indebted to Watanabe Tokusaburoo's paper, Fukuzawa Yukichi no Kookooron, which I heard read at Keioo in July 1953 and which is now published in Shigaku, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1954.
2. Nakae Tooju, for example, writes: Filial piety made easy by kindness and moral consideration from parents can hardly be properly called filial piety. It is the filial piety practised in the face of unkindness and immoral treatment from parents which is the true filial piety." Okina Mondoo, Dai Nihon Shisoo Zenshuu Vol.2, p. 22-3.

As early as 1870 Fukuzawa inveighed against this particular manifestation of the injustice of the Confucian ethic. Though everyone, he complained, censured lack of filial piety in children, scarcely anyone censured lack of loving kindness in parents.[1] In an attempt to combat this injustice he launched, four years later in one of the Gakumon no Susume pamphlets, a broadside against the all too frequent selfishness and cruelty of parents and parents-in-law.

> "A young wife may be tormented by her mother-in-law. . .so much that waking, sleeping or eating she never has a moment's peace and freedom - just as though she had fallen into the Hell of Hungry Ghosts. If ever she should go against the will of her parents-in-law in the slightest way she is dubbed unfilial, and though people who see her may know in their hearts that this is thoroughly unreasonable, yet because they do not wish to take any responsibility on themselves they support the parents and blame the girl, contrary to all reason."

In the parent-child relationship, just as in any other, the duties of preserving harmony should be borne by both parties. Parents could not reasonably expect filial behaviour from their sons and daughters unless they in their turn cherished, cared for, educated and set them a good example. If parents behaved in a dissolute and profligate manner, or dissipated the family fortunes in the gratification of their personal whims, it was "brazen and shameless effrontery" to expect their children to support them when they became senile.[2] The extreme of parental selfishness was perhaps reached by

1. Nakatsu Ryūbetsu no Sho, ZFZ VII, p. 398-9.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No. 8, FZ III, p. 70.

those parent who, though often still quite capable of work, allowed or even encouraged their daughters to sell themselves into prostitution in order to maintain them in greater comfort. Such conduct, Fukuzawa declared, was just as horrifying as cannibalism. Parents battened on their daughters' filial virtue just as they might on her flesh.[1]

Nor was it any excuse to argue that filial piety, involving constant sacrifice and even suffering on the part of children, was the due and reasonable recompense for the sufferings and anxieties undergone by their parents at their birth and during their infancy.[2]

This argument, advanced by certain Japanese moralists, appeared to impart a certain specious reciprocity to the parent-child relationship, declaring that the duties of filial piety in children were the logical and reciprocal repayment of the on laid upon them by their parents. This argument from on did not imply, however, that it was in return for favours and kindnesses that children should offer their parents filially dutiful behaviour. On towards parents was conceived to lie, not in continued loving kindness and consideration to children, but rather in the trials undergone by parents in the very act of bringing children into the world and in caring for them during their helpless infancy.[3] Nakae Tooju, for example,

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1. Dootoku no Giron wa Keisoo ni Handan subekarazu, FZ IX, p. 352.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No. 8, FZ III, p. 70.
3. Tsuda Sookichi considers that to relate koo (filial piety) with on in any way at all is more characteristic of Japanese than Chinese moralists. No such idea appears in the Hsiao Ching, though there is a passage in the Analects (Book 17, Chapter 21, v.6) which would appear to indicate that the three years mourning on the death of a parent is in some way a recompense for the first three years of a child's life during which it cannot leave its mother's arms. But in general, Tsuda maintains, filial piety in China was a virtue invested with such importance and stern authority as to transcend any idea of mere requital of on, and to belong rather to the very order of Nature, the raison d'etre of which it was scarcely fitting to enquire. Jukyoo no Jissen Dootoku, p. 62-64.

described on towards parents to lie in the pain, discomfort and anxiety of pregnancy, the agony of childbirth and the unremitting worry and self-sacrifice involved in the care of young children. Because we owed our entire bodies, even down to the smallest hair, to our parents, he wrote, it was rightly written that on to parents was higher than the heavens and deeper than the sea.[1]

Higher than the heavens and deeper than the sea implied, of course, that this on was limitless and by definition incapable of repayment. However long and patiently children might practise uncomplaining meekness, and however selflessly and imaginatively they might strive to gratify their parents' smallest whim, they would yet be unable to repay more than one ten thousandth of their debt of obligation. To define filial piety as the logical repayment of an on towards parents therefore did nothing to mitigate its rigours, nor did the concept of on require from parents any greater kindness and consideration to their children.[2]

To Fukuzawa the whole of the 'argument from on' was misleading nonsense. Bringing children into the world and nurturing them during their helpless

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1. Okina Mondoo, Dai Nihon Shisoo Zenshuu, Vo. 2, p. 18, 20. Kawashima Takeyoshi enumerates several parental acts, other than merely bringing children into the world, which were commonly thought to produce on. Among these were the choosing of a suitable spouse for sons and daughters, and the handing on of the family property to the eldest son. Nihon Shakai no Kazokuteki Koosei, p. 84.
2. cf also the views of Kaibara Ekken in Wazoku Doojikun: Fubo no on wa takaku atsuki koto tenchi ni onaji. Fubo nakereba waga mi nashi. Sono on hoojigatashi. Koo wo tsutomete semete manichi no on wo mukuubeshi. The on towards parents is like Heaven and earth in its depth and warmth. Were it not for our parents we should not exist. It is impossible to repay this on, but by practising filial piety we should endeavour to repay at least one ten thousandth of it. Nihon Kyooiku Bunko, Gakkoohen, p. 461.

infancy was, he declared, a practice common both to the human race and to animals. The only way in which human parents differed from animals was in the practice of feeding, clothing and educating their children - a practice in which only too often they appeared to fall deplorably short. The argument from on was therefore no justification at all for parental absolutism.[1]

In a 'civilized' society therefore, parental authority over children should be subjected to certain limitations. In the first place parents should cease to exert absolute authority over their sons and daughters once these had come of an age to think and act for themselves. It was ridiculous to treat responsible adults as though they were irresponsible children on the plea that the way of filial piety was constant and unchanging. Particularly immune from parental interference should be married children, who should as far as was convenient live in separate establishments away from the parental roof.[2]

A further legitimate limitation should be that supplied by reason. Children should not be expected to obey unreasonable or immoral commands or demands of their parents. Parental injunctions to kill or steal, or to daughters to sell themselves into prostitution in order to relieve the family's financial straits, should therefore be ignored.[3] As a general

1. Gakumon no Susume, No. 8, FZ III, p. 70. Fukuzawa invoked the behaviour of animals to prove the foolishness of the conception of filial piety as the logical requital of on towards parents. It is interesting to note that Nakae Tooju invoked it to prove the very opposite. Even birds, he wrote, possess the rudiments of filial piety for they feed their parents in their old age. So do lambs, who kneel down to suck their mothers' milk. If lowly animals can behave in this way, how much more is it incumbent on man to doso. Okina Mondoo, p.21
2. Fukuoo Hyakuwa, Nos. 26 and 29.
3. Not to obey unreasonable (muri) demands of parents or husbands was a lesson Fukuzawa included in his series of writing exercises Moji no Oshie, 1873. FZ III, p. 694.
   The argument against girls selling themselves into prostitution for noble motives is developed in Fujo Kookooron, FZ IX, p. 353-357.

principle, indeed, no one should relax their moral principles for the welfare of their relatives.[1]

This led to Fukuzawa's final criticism of the traditional canons of filial piety - that the examples of conduct lauded as ideally filial in literature, drama and song were almost always extreme, unnatural, violent or superhuman. The conduct of the famous Twenty-Four Paragons in particular was sometimes frankly ludicrous, sometimes positively inhuman.

> "It is not humanly possible to sit out on ice all night stark naked in the middle of winter in the hopes that it will melt. On a summer's night rather than drenching one's body in rice-wine in order to entice the mosquitos away from biting one's parents, would it not be more sensible to buy a mosquito net with the money one would have spent on the rice wine? Is he not a demon or a serpent who would bury alive his innocent child because he can find no work by which to support his parents? Such conduct is an offence against nature and against human feelings."[2]

Indeed, this criticism applied not only to the canons of filial piety, but to the Confucian ethic as a whole.

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, No. 19, FZ VII, p. 289.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No.8, FZ III, p. 69-70. Fukuzawa refers to the following three of the Twenty-Four Paragons: Wang Hsiang, who was ill-treated by his stepmother, but nevertheless gratified her longing for fish in the middle of winter by lying on the ice until the warmth of his body caused it to melt, enabling him to catch two carp and present them to his stepmother. Wu Mêng, who drenched his body in wine in order to entice the mosquitos away from his parents. Kuo Chü, who, finding himself too poor to support his aged mother, determined to bury his own child alive in order to relieve the strain on the family. When digging a hole for this purpose, however, he discovered a bar of gold, which put an end to the family's troubles.

   Descriptions of all twenty-four Paragons may be found in Mayers's Chinese Reader's Manual, and of a selection of them in B.H. Chamberlain's Things Japanese.

"The wise words and virtuous conduct of the ancients were always exemplified by the most violent and arduous feats, quite beyond the capacity of ordinary people. We are regaled with stories of how people who lived thousands of years ago achieved eternal fame by killing themselves; how a heroic woman defended her chastity by hanging herself; how an aged mother fell on her sword for the sake of her child. . . Deeds of extraordinary loyalty and piety are performed in extraordinary times and circumstances. They are doubtless very glorious deeds, but from the point of view of the nation it is not very desirable that they should be multiplied. They should be deeply impressed on men's minds but not very much discussed, like a Masamune blade kept safely in its bag."[1]

The result of extolling such extreme and unnatural conduct was not only misery but hypocrisy as well. Standards of conduct which perverted and distorted human nature inevitably produced nise-kunshi, false gentlemen - men who were moral only in outward and visible form but not in their hearts. Being unable to comply with such standards, men came to value only the appearance of goodness, not goodness itself. Hence, despite the overwhelming stress laid on the virtue of filial piety in countries like China and Korea, there were probably more people in these countries than in any other who were conspicuously lacking in true filial piety - as was only too clearly evinced by the quarrels between the Korean king and his son. "From the spate of talk about filial piety all that remains is the external ceremonial, and people weep crocodile tears and make false obeisences."[2]

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1. Dootoku no Hyoojun, FZ IX, p. 429-430.
2. Gakumon no Susume, No. 11. Meibun wo motte nise-kunshi wo shoozuru no ron. FZ III, p. 87-92.
   Also Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, No. 10, Dokuritsu no Koo, FZ VII, p. 258.

The traditional precepts being thus dismissed as unjust, unnatural and altogether impracticable in a 'civilized' society, what then should be the 'civilized' interpretation of the virtue of filial piety? The new canon, Fukuzawa thought, should be based on the natural and spontaneous affection which existed between children and their parents. Ideally filial conduct should be considered to lie in the natural desire of children to rejoice the hearts of their parents, not in violent and unnatural feats of self-sacrifice or in long-suffering and purposeless patience. It should not be necessary, moreover, to have to learn the principles of filial behaviour by studying the precepts in the Classics or in volumes of moral tales. The love and affection which was the basis of true filial piety was inborn in man by reason of his <u>honshin</u> - it was, in other words, a manifestation of his innate Good Nature.[1]

Fukuzawa's assertion that true filial piety was natural to man and did not need to be acquired by assiduous study of the Classics, presents an interesting comparison with the claim of certain Confucian moralists that their own version of filial piety was natural to man. Nakae Tooju, for example, considered filial piety to be supreme among the virtues characterising the Good Nature which man received from Heaven, and which reflected the larger order of Nature about him. Filial piety was therefore supremely natural to man, but like the other attributes of his Good Nature, had been obscured by the desires of his lower, material nature, making it necessary for him to study the works of the Sages in order to recognise the virtues latent in himself. Filial piety therefore, though natural, yet also had to

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1. <u>Fukuoo Hyakuyowa</u>, No. 10, FZ VII, p. 256-258.

be learnt. But what precisely the Confucianists considered to be 'natural' in filial piety was not the love and affection which Fukuzawa emphasised. Indeed, they seem scarcely to have mentioned love (ai) as an ingredient of filial piety. The dominant characteristic seems rather to have been 'respect' (kei) - due reverence to those superior to oneself in the family hierarchy. It was this respect, therefore, - this awareness of the high and low in things, which was the natural reflection in man of the hierarchical order of the universe.[1]

Fukuzawa's proposed new family circle, in which the authority of the parents was curtailed and in which the members should rightly be considered as "a group of friends"[2] bound by ties of mutual affection rather than by hierarchical respect, was one, therefore, which could manifestly no longer be considered as the prototype of meibun. It was one rather wherein, Fukuzawa hoped, the members could be allowed the scope for the 'spirit of independence' so necessary for the safety of the country and the progress of mankind.

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1. cf, for example, Kaibara Ekken: "If parents are stern and strict in bringing up their children, the latter will fear and respect them and obey their teachings, thus putting the way of filial piety into practise. If parents are lenient and over-affectionate, the children will not respect or obey them. They will despise their parents and the way of filial piety will be neglected. op.cit. p. 461.
   Tsuda Sookichi points out that in Chapter 5 of the Hsiao Ching it is laid down that to its mother a child should show ai, love, and to its father kei, respect. But since Confucian thought has always insisted that filial piety is due more to the father than to the mother, it would follow that kei was a more important ingredient in filial piety that ai. op. cit. p. 59.
2. See Fukuoo Hyakuyowa, no. 7, Bummei no Katei wa Shinyu no Shuugoo nari. FZ VII. Fukuzawa here attacked the traditional domestic ideal of fugen-boji, a stern father and a kind mother, as entirely out of place in a 'civilized' family.

3. The Husband-Wife Relation.

Of all the Five Relations however, it was perhaps the third - the relation between Husband and Wife - about which Fukuzawa felt most strongly. It was here, he believed, that the Confucian moral precepts were most injurious, since the behaviour they counselled as 'moral' was most calculated to distort human nature.

Fukuzawa's championship of women's rights seems to have been based on a deep-rooted, though at that time very unorthodox, belief that monogamy was the only 'reasonable' matrimonial relationship.[1] "The foundation of human morality," he wrote as early as 1870, "lies in the relation between husband and wife. Both men and women are human beings living between Heaven and earth, and there is no reason to suppose that one is more important than the other." The ancient Chinese custom of keeping concubines, on the pretext of insuring the continuance of the family line, was low and disgraceful and, above all, unreasonable. "If a man has the right to keep two women, there can be no reason why a woman should not possess two men."[2] Furthermore, it

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1. On the assumptions of the Japanese family system that at all costs the ie must continue unbroken, there was nothing particularly moral about monogamy. Indeed, if the wife had no children it was considered positively immoral for the husband not to take in a concubine. cf Aizawa Seishisai's sentiments: "The Westerners are like beasts. They have a system of monogamy which forbids them to keep concubines, even though the wife may be childless and the family line in danger of dying out." Monogramy was also a violation of the principle of yin and yang. Because yang and noble things were few and yin and lowly things were many, it followed that one man should rule many women. TeKiihen, Iwanami ed. 275.
2. Nakatsu Ryūbetsu no Sho, FS V, p. 380. This document was a letter addressed to one of the conservative elders of the Nakatsu clan. It was first printed in 1873, when it appears to have been used as a primary school text book in Kanazawa.
   Fukuzawa's belief that jinrin no taihon wa fuufu nari - the foundation of human morality lies in the relation between husband and wife- differed from the old morality, which saw the foundation to lie in the parent-child relation.

was unnatural and irrational because of the objective fact disclosed by western research that for every twenty-two men only twenty women were born. "Hence for one man to marry two or three women is a flagrant violation of nature (tenri). Such men are no better than birds or beasts."[1]

Marriage was moreover, Fukuzawa was convinced, not the hierarchical relationship required by the Confucian canon, but a contract in which both parties participated equally.[2]

These convictions naturally brought Fukuzawa into sharp conflict with the existing body of moral precepts governing the matrimonial relationship and the relations between men and women in general - conveniently summed up in the famous treatise Onna Daigaku - the Great Learning for Women. Indeed, throughout his entire literary career he kept the problem of women and their legitimate position in society constantly before the public eye in a series of essays which together amounted to a searching criticism of the prevailing precepts as expounded in the Onna Daigaku, and a series of proposals for a new Onna Daigaku more suited to the new age.[3]

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1. Gakumon no Susume, No. 8, April 1874. FZ III, p. 68.
2. Onna Daigaku Hyooron, FS V, p. 260. Fukuzawa's ideas on marriage as a contract were shared from an early date by Mori Arinori, who both practised and preached the doctrine. He published in the Meiroku Zasshi of May 1874 an article entitled Saishooron, On Wives and Concubines, wherein he condemned the current marriage system as degrading husbands to the position of slave owners and their wives to that of purchased slaves. He advocated marriage as a contract between two individuals, in which both should participate equally. (MBZ, Zasshihen, p. 93-4, 127-8.) Mori's own marriage to Hirose Tsune was a contractual one, wherein each undertook to love and respect the other, and to refrain from selling or lending such property as they owned jointly without the other's consent. Fukuzawa acted as a witness at the wedding. (FYD, II, p. 463).
3. Fukuzawa's main essays on the subject of women are:- Nihon Fujinron, 1885; Hinkooron, 1885; Danjo Koosairon, 1886; Onna Daigaku Hyooron, 1899; Shin Onna Daigaku, 1899.
   The first group of essays, (first published in serial form in the Jiji Shimpo), was written at a time when anxiety to secure revision of the unequal treaties was particularly acute, and when it was felt

Fukuzawa's first objection to the Confucian precepts was that the behaviour between men and women which they upheld as 'moral' was so unnatural that it caused not only great unhappiness and even ill-health among women, but positive immorality among men.

It was unnatural in the first place because it imposed such absurdly heavy restrictions on the natural social intercourse between men and women. The Onna Daigaku had laid down that:

"From their early childhood girls should be kept strictly apart from boys. The old rules of etiquette lay down that men and women should not sit together, should not put their clothes in the same place, should not bath in the same place, should not pass things directly from hand to hand. When they go out together at night they should always take lighted lanterns. These rules apply to husbands and wives and brouthers and sisters, as well as to unrelated persons."[1]

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in certain quarters that if the western nations were to be convinced that the Japanese were 'civilized' enough to be considered as equals, both the position of Japanese women and the prevalent standards of morality among Japanese men would have to be drastically improved.

A number of essays on the subject appeared by other writers at the time, a list of which may be found in Ooita Gentaroo's Nihon Josei Hattatsushi, p. 255. The last two essays Fukuzawa wrote just before his first stroke, in a last effort to urge an improvement in morality before the impending revision of the treaties in 1899 should inaugurate an era of 'mixed residence' with foreigners. FYD IV, 173.

In the spring of 1899 the Jiji Shimpoo started a campaign urging Japanese women to revolt against the immorality of their husbands. "The tacit consent which they now give to their husband's infidelities tends not merely to encourage the sinner, but also implicate the sufferer indirectly. The near approach of mixed residence is urged as an additional incentive to reform.. Foreign ladies, the Jiji predicts, will have nothing to do with their Japanese sisters if they see that the latter countenance such abuses. ." One of the worst features of the new Civil Code was that although it enabled the husband to claim divorce on the grounds of his wife's infidelity, no such provision was made for the wife. (Reported in the JWM, April 1st 1899)

1. Fukuzawa's Onna Daigaku Hyooron gives the text of the Onna Daigaku point by point, followed by criticisms of its content. A translation of the Onna Daigaku may be found in B.H. Chamberlain's Things Japanese, 5th ed. p. 502.

The chief fault of these teachings, Fukuzawa wrote, was that they assumed that the only level on which men and women could associate with each other was the purely physical. They were designed entirely to curb excesses in this one direction, to the complete neglect of the higher and more dignified levels on which men and women could consort together naturally and with perfect propriety. Western men and women talked together, sat, ate and laughed together, passed things from hand to hand and even grasped each other's hands. Yet they were as morally pure and firm as wood and stone - simply because they had risen above the level of mere physical desire. The precepts in the Onna Daigaku were suitable for savages, certainly - for savages conceived relations between men and women almost entirely in physical terms. It was insulting however, to attempt to apply them to civilized people.[1]

Worse still, the relation between Husband and Wife as prescribed by the Confucian canon was just as flagrant an example of 'preponderance of power' as was the relation between Parent and Child. The entire burden of preserving tranquil harmony in the relationship was laid on the women, the man being saddled with scarcely any duties at all. Hence, however much Japanese husbands might neglect or illtreat their wives, they were never blamed. But if ever the wife should disturb the harmony of the matrimonial relation by any word of complaint, however justified, she was censured for jealousy, ill temper, wilfulness or disobedience. Under no circumstances, the Onna Daigaku laid down, was a woman justified in disputing with her husband or going against his wishes. She must regard him as she might regard Heaven and bear in mind that she would incur divine punishment if she

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1. Onna Daigaku Hyooron, FZ V, p. 244-5.

disobeyed him.[1] Her nature was, moreover, innately subject to five evils: wilfulness and disobedience; rage and illwill; tendency to slander and abuse others; jealousy, and shallow understanding. Seven or eight out of every ten women, it declared, possessed all five of these evils.[2] To jealousy they were particularly addicted and required stern counselling:

> "A woman should never be jealous. If her husband is licentious, she should admonish him gently, without anger or ill-will. Jealously will make her face and speech fierce and threatening, so that her husband will abandon her in disgust. If her husband does not heed her gentle admonitions and flies into a rage, she should wait a little and then admonish him again after he has recovered his temper. She should never on any account dispute with her husband with rough looks or voice."[3]

All these allegations, Fukuzawa wrote, were poisonous slanders. Far from being naturally characterised by 'rage and ill-will' and 'wilfulness and disobedience', women were far more often than not naturally endowed with gentleness, meekness and forbearance. Rage, ill-will and wilfulness were on the contrary far more characteristic of men than women. It was possible, certainly, that women were often made through accumulated humiliations and ill-treatment to _feel_ in these ways, even though they might not show their feelings. But to brand women as slanderous, ill-tempered and disobedient because they uttered a word of complaint in natural reaction against such treatment was like shutting someone up in a room and pouring boiling water down their throat - and then branding them as 'lacking in patience' and

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1. _Onna Daigaku Hyooron_, FS V, p. 257.
2. Ibid. p. 278.
3. Ibid. p. 259.

fortitude' if they should cry out in pain.[1]

Similarly with the accusation of jealousy. In the first place the word was misused. 'Jealousy' (shitto) properly meant bearing ill-will towards a person over an issue which had nothing to do with oneself - such as hating one's next door neighbour because his house was finer than one's own. But the 'jealousy' against which the Onna Daigaku railed was not really jealousy at all, for no one could pretend that a husband's immorality had nothing to do with his wife. Was it not a flagrantly unjust code that would allow a man to divorce or even kill his wife for immorality, while demanding that she should bear her husband no ill-will in like circumstances? The word 'jealousy' had, in fact, simply been used as a threat or as a defensive weapon to ward off legitimate attack. It was as though a man had committed a theft in broad daylight, and when caught and questioned should defend himself by accusing his captors of 'rapacity'.[2]

As for the charge that a wife should obey her husband in everything, this might be reasonable if he were a paragon of perfect wisdom and virtue. But she should under no circumstances feel obliged to obey him when he made demands of her that were contrary to reason. The statement that a woman should regard her husband as Heaven was so stupid as hardly to merit serious criticism.[3]

The Onna Daigaku declared, moreover, that women were subject to these defects by reason of their yin nature - but this, Fukuzawa declared, was simply primitive nonsense. It was natural for unenlightened savages to

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1. Onna Daigaku Hyooron, FS V, p. 279-280.
2. Ibid. p. 260-1.
3. Ibid. p. 258-9.

divide everything in the universe into two categories of masculine and feminine, genders in western languages being survivals of this primitive dualism. The yin and yang categories propounded by Chinese scholars had no more significance than this, for the classification had no correspondance in reality. Man was put into the yang category because he was strong and active, women into the yin category because she was weak and quiet. But it would be just as meaningful to put woman into the yang category because her bright and smiling face resembled spring flowers, and man into the yin category because his rough manner resembled withered trees and autumn water.[1]

A further unnatural feature of the teaching was to deny women the simple pleasures of life. The Onna Daigaku demanded that

> "A woman should get up early and go to bed late, should never lie down during the day, should busy herself about the house, not neglecting her spinning, weaving and sewing. She should avoid drinking much of beverages such as tea or sake, and should never see or hear Kabuki plays, kouta, jooruri and other such wanton entertainments. She should avoid going to shrines, temples and other crowded places before she is forty years old."

To forbid her to go to plays and shrines, Fukuzawa commented, was both cruel and unnatural. It was natural that life should bring both pleasure and pain, and hence to forbid women such pleasures merely because they were women and not for reasons of economy, would seem to indicate that the writer wanted women to have all the pain and men all the pleasures in life - which was very absurd.[2]

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1. Onna Daigaku Hyooron, FS V, p. 282-3.
2. Ibid. p. 265-7.

Finally the famous Seven Reasons for Divorcing a Woman (shichi-kyo)[1] enumerated in the Onna Daigaku were almost without exception ridiculous. Licentiousness, the third Reason, for example, was far more applicable to men than to women. Jealousy, the fourth Reason, was as we have seen, a misnomer. If the wife should be so unfortunate as to contract "leprosy or some other foul disease", the fifth Reason, her husband ought to nurse her back to health rather than divorce her, as she was expected to do if he contracted such a disease. As for 'talking much', the sixth Reason, there was no hard and fast standard as to what exactly constituted 'much'. It was entirely a matter of opinion.

Most ridiculous of all however, was the second Reason - having no child. Modern medicine had proved that childlessness was frequently the man's fault rather than the woman's; hence it would be just as legitimate to get rid of an adopted son on this count as it would be to divorce a wife.[2] But the whole theory behind this second Reason was not only ignorant and wrong, but also immoral and insulting. It implied that the sole purpose of taking a woman to wife was to procreate children to carry on the family line - just as one might buy a cauldron for the sole purpose of cooking rice.

> "Which leads to the conclusion that if one does not want children a wife is quite superfluous, just as a cauldron would be superfluous if one did not cook rice. There is no mention whatever of the mutual help, mutual

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1. The Seven Reasons were disobedience to parents-in-law, having no child, adultery, jealousy, leprosy, talkativeness and thieving. In Japan, however, even strict avoidance of these seven crimes was no safeguard against the 'lifelong disgrace' of divorce. The mikudarihan, or document of three and a half lines by which a husband divorced his wife, frequently advanced no better reason than Kafuu ni awazu sooroo, or Kokoro ni kanawazu sooroo - she did not 'fit in with the family ways', or simply 'was not pleasing'. See Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon Joseishi, p. 158.
2. Ibid. p. 249-252.

love and affection and the joy and happiness which is the natural promise of marriage; the sole reason alleged is that it is in order to carry on the family line.

This is a false starting point, which inevitably gives rise to all kinds of evils. If you say that a wife's purpose is to give birth to children, as a cauldron's is to cook rice, you make her into a kind of tool. From this standpoint, certainly, you can divorce a childless wife, just as you throw away a caudron which is incapable of cooking rice. Or you can take in concubines instead of a wife, just as you can cook rice with saucepans instead of with a cauldron. These are the effects of looking on the human body as though it were a tool."[1]

From this line of thinking had come the well known adage Hara wa karimono - 'the womb is a borrowed thing' - which implied that the children belonged entirely to the father, the mother's body having been merely 'borrowed' for purposes of gestation, much as this year's rice was thought to have been germinated entirely from the seed of last year's rice, the soil in which it grew having merely been 'borrowed'. "Such abysmal ignorance is quite astonishing," was Fukuzawa's comment - ignorance of modern genetics which might be excusable among savages, but not among people making any claim to being 'civilized'.[2]

The wrong and insulting custom of looking on women as tools - insulting because women had just as much claim to being bambutsu no rei, lords of creation, as had men - derived in part from the idea of the ie in the Japanese family system, wherein the family was carried on strictly and exclusively by

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1. Nihon Fujinron, FS V, p. 55-56.
2. Ibid. p. 56-57.

the male line. The whole idea of the _ie_, sanctified and inviolate though it had been for so long in Japan, was in fact, Fukuzawa declared, no more than a mere name. The fact that children could be adopted from entirely different families to carry on the line proved that blood ties were not an essential part of the _ie_, and hence that the strict male line of inheritance had no significance in reality. It was therefore, a fundamentally false system which had combined with the Confucian teachings to debase the position of women. It was owing to the _ie_ system that women were debarred from inheriting any kind of property, and that men treated their wives with deliberate harshness and lack of consideration in the presence of others, even though they might not so feel in their hearts. "Such behaviour is indeed insane - but in a false world falsity is prized."[1]

In short, the _Onna Daigaku_ and the Confucian precepts it enshrined were nothing more than an attempt by licentious men to sanctify the principle of doing exactly what they pleased, and the _ie_ system was nothing more than an empty word. Neither possessed any abiding significance.

What were the results of these unnatural teachings? To women, as might be expected, they brought both unhappiness and ill-health. Japanese women were like dwarf trees. The artificial restraints imposed by the precepts had stunted and frustrated their lives in almost every conceivable way. They were undeveloped intellectually - indeed it was considered a mark of virtue in a woman to be stupid. They were unfulfilled emotionally by reason of the artificial restraints on their intercourse with men, and because there was in fact a moral premium on unhappiness. The more exacting and querulous

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1. _Nihon Fujinron_, FS V, p. 60-61.
2. _Ibid._ p. 16-22.

her parents-in-law, and the more licentious her husband, the greater chance she had of acquiring merit through uncomplaining meekness. Japanese women too were unfulfilled sexually, and this was at the root of many of their ills. In feudal times a daimyo kept many concubines, so that his wife seldom received his favours. For six months of the year, moreover, she would be entirely separated from him, since the Sankin-kootai system required him to spend that time in his clan territory, leaving her behind as a quasi-hostage in Edo. Many samurai too had to spend long periods of duty away from home, but rarely did they take their wives with them. Women were bound to a definition of chastity which forbade them to remarry, however young and nubile they might be when their husband died. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that their sexual desires were starved. This, Fukuzawa declared, was the reason why so many Japanese women suffered from headaches, hysterical and nervous complaints, depression, sleeplessness and indigestion. Medicine did them no good, and though most doctors were perfectly well aware of the cause of their afflictions, they were prevented by social pressure from proposing the obvious remedies. It was no wonder that children born of such parents should be puny and sickly. Here lay, incidentally, one of the numerous shortcomings of the old Chinese medicine; it concentrated on discouraging excess of appetite to the grave neglect of remedying deficiencies. It counselled moderation in eating and drinking and an almost complete disregard of sexual desire - under no circumstances recommending that people's emotions should be nourished through pleasure. These counsels might certainly be most applicable to men, but not at all to women, who suffered from deficiency rather than excess.[1]

1. Nihon Fujinron, FS V, p. 16-22.

It was not only on women, however, that the teachings had had disastrous effects. On men their effects had been almost equally undesirable, for their unnatural requirements had driven them into habits of disgraceful and unashamed licentiousness. It was impossible that men could derive the smallest pleasure from the formal and 'correct' intercourse with women required by the precepts, so that in order to find the happiness which their nature demanded men were driven to break all moral rules and to find escape in the world of brothels and concubines. Because the precepts were so unnaturally strict, men were driven to the opposite extreme - to ignore moral rules altogether. Because 'morality' had no beauty, taste or feeling in it, men had to be immoral to find these things. It was as though they were forced to wear a heavy ceremonial robe all the time, so that when it became unbearable they took it off and wore nothing at all.[1]

At the door of the of the Confucian teachings could therefore be laid most of the blame for the disgracefully immoral conduct of so many Japanese men. If Japan was to be thought in the least civilized, if the westerners were not to be outraged and disgusted when the time came for 'mixed residence and travel in the interior', and in particular if they were to be given adequate grounds for thinking Japan civilized enough to warrent a revision of the 'Unequal Treaties', drastic steps would have to be taken to reform the current conceptions of matrimonial morality.[2]

In the first place it was not enough, Fukuzawa declared, merely to make provisions for 'educating' girls, as the Meiji reformers hitherto appeared to

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1. Danjo Koosairon, p. 152-155.
2. See note 3, p. 106.

have thought.[1] Unless their position in society were improved and the Confucian ideas on their innate inferiority dispelled, education would simply serve to make their position after marriage more unhappy. What was the point of educating girls before marriage, if after marriage they were called upon to believe in the precept Joshi sai naki wa kore wo toku - stupidity is a virtue in women? Or of declaring that among the defects implanted in her inescapably by her yin nature was a shallow understanding? Education in the new western subjects in particular would scarcely prepare her for believing that her husband, however foolish he might be, was the equivalent of Heaven to her earth, and hence that he knew better than she in all things. A knowledge of science, economics or law would in the present state of public opinion be worse than useless to a girl - for she would merely be asking for trouble if she ever mentioned such subjects. "Marriage will at one blow make all her learning vain."[2]

The essential requisite of women was rather property. Under the existing system she had nothing she could really call her own. The ie system debarred her from inheriting any property whatever. Even if she were the only child of a rich father, the property which should rightfully have been hers went to the man who was adopted as her husband. Even the clothes and furniture she took with her when she left her father's house to be

1. Though the numerous reforms of the early Meiji period included no specific measures to improve the status of women, the authorities gave their education a certain amount of attention. As early as 1870 a few of the more progressive clans opened schools for girls where a mixture of 'old' and 'new' subjects was taught. The Education Act of 1872 made elementary education compulsory for girls as well as for boys, while provisions for education on a higher level were made by establishing the Tookyoo Jogakkoo. See Ooita Gentaroo, op.cit. p. 256.
2. Nihon Fujinron, p. 10.

married could be sold by her husband should be need the money.[1] The adage Joshi wa sangai ni ie nashi, a woman has no home in the Triple World, was only too true because the house she lived in was never her own, but the property of her father, husband or son.[2] Even her children, as we have seen, were not her own. "The house she lives in belongs to a man. The children she brings up belong to her husband. Without property, without rights, without even children, she is no more than a parasite in her husband's home."[3]

If Japanese women were given property, they would first acquire responsibility, which was essential towards a full, properly developed and therefore happier life. Property, furthermore, would give women rights which would compel their husbands to respect them. They would be no longer dependent on their husbands' fancy, and therefore liable to be divorced as soon as they began to lose their looks. With independent means of their own, their husbands would have to pay more attention to their requirements - and mutual respect would lead to a fuller, more dignified and more intimate relationship. Hence the ie system whereby property was inheritable only by men should be thoroughly overhauled, and women made just as rightful legatees as men. One possible method of distribution, Fukuzawa suggested, would be to allow women always to inherit fixed property.[4]

Once possessed of the responsibility and rights arising from the ownership of property, women could be expected to derive some benefit from

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1. Nihon Fujinron, p. 7-8.
2. Ibid. p. 6.
3. Ibid. p. 10.
4. Ibid. p. 29-32. Fukuzawa also suggested that, as husband and wife were equally important in the partnership, the new family should not take the husband's name, but a new name compounded of both the husband's and the wife's. eg. If a Hatakeyama man married a Sakakibara woman, the new family's name might be Yamabara. p. 29.

education in modern western subjects. In the education of girls, just as much as in that of boys, physics should be the basic discipline - for it was important that all young people alike, irrespective of their sex, should thoroughly understand that physics was the staple principle of learning, just as rice was the staple food of the Japanese and bread of the westerners. Girls should in addition be given a thorough grounding in economics and law, ignorance of which lay at the root of many of their troubles; also in hygiene and physiology. Such knowledge would undoubtedly prove to be <u>bummei-joshi no kaiken</u> - the Civilized Girl's Dagger, with which she could effectively defend herself should need arise.[1]

Thus equipped with a more modern education, girls should be given opportunities for wider contacts with men than had hitherto been permitted. The notion that the only possible level of association between men and women was the physical one should be recognised as belonging to a primitive, unenlightened age, and steps should be taken to encourage 'civilized' and dignified occasions - flower and moon viewing parties, tea parties, poetry reading, and musical parties - on which men and women could mix together normally and naturally without haunting fears of impropriety.[2] A wider acquaintance with men would also enable a young girl to know her own mind better when the time came for her parents to suggest a young man to her as a possible bridegroom.[3] Newly married couples should always live apart from their parents

1. <u>Shin Onna Daigaku</u>, FS V, p. 291-2.
2. <u>Danjo Koosairon</u>, FS V, p. 158.
3. <u>Shin Onna Daigaku</u>, p. 296. After reading <u>Shin Onna Daigaku</u>, I was disappointed to learn from Mrs. Shidachi, Fukuzawa's only surviving daughter, that Fukuzawa failed entirely to put his precepts into practice in the upbringing of his own daughters. He left their education entirely to their mother, who was 'very conservative' and convinced of the innate inferiority of women. As a result, Mrs. Shidachi was never allowed out alone, never allowed to express her opinion in the presence of her elders, and never allowed to speak to guests whey they came to the house, though she was able to pick up odd scraps of information by listening to her father's conversations from the next room. Far from going on mixed moon-viewing parties, she was allowed next to no contact with men until her marriage at the age of 18, and even in that her

in-law, if not under a separate roof, at least in a separate part of the house. A young wife should always have her own kitchen and do her housekeeping without interference from her mother-in-law - and in general every step should be taken to minimize the inevitable friction between the husbands's mother and her daughter-in-law.[1] Women should, moreover, be allowed to marry a second time just as freely as men. The ancient precept Teifu nifu ni mamiezu - a chaste wife never looks upon a second husband - was absurd and injurious to women's health.[2]

Fukuzawa's proposals for the rights of women could, of course, scarcely be called revolutionary. No suffragette would have looked twice at Shin Onna Daigaku. It contains no mention of votes for women, no plea for their 'higher' education, no suggestion that the doors of any of the professions or walks of life outside the home should be opened to them. Fukuzawa was concerned, in short, solely to improve women's position 'within' the sphere traditionally thought to be theirs. But at the particular time when the essay was published, soon after the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education, Fukuzawa could scarcely have proposed more far-reaching reforms without being dismissed as a tiresome fanatic. Certainly the tributes paid by women to him at his death indicated that his 'new gospel' had brought tidings of comfort to some.[3]

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opinion was not consulted. Her education was, in fact, very little different from other girls' except in so far as she learned English. (Personal communication from Mrs. Shidachi, July 1st 1953).

1. Ibid. p. 299-300.
2. Ibid. p. 310.
3. An example is the letter left with some flowers by an anonymous 'women of Mita' for Fukuzawa's widow soon after his death. "I have often read your husband's articles on Japanese women in the Jiji Shimpoo, and when the news of his death was brought to me I could not help feeling as though I had lost a dear friend. If I, a total stranger, can feel in this way, what must be the grief of you and your family. Though they will express only a tiny fraction of the gratitude I feel for his goodness, I offer these poor flowers as a gift to his departed spirit. . I will pray that his noble spirit will always remain in this world as a friend for Japanese women." FYD IV, p. 227.

Chapter 7.

The New History

The idea of Progress, so essential to the keimoo teachings, inevitably involved a study of the past. The very basis of the inference of the glowing future to come was, after all, an appeal to the barbarous past that had gone before; the evidence that today way a good deal better than yesterday was surely telling proof that tomorrow would be better still. It was by means of a careful study of the past, moreover, that one could discover precisely where the glories of bummei lay; precisely how the present had come to be so much better than the past and hence in what way the process might be expected to continue in the future.

The study of history, therefore, would have to take its place among the keimoo teachings. But it would have to be a study conducted on different lines from any previous historical researches in Japan. The traditional idea of history indeed embodied a view of the past entirely irrelevant to keimoo thought, for the reason that it had been an integral part of the old learning dominated by ethics. History was, in fact, a study primarily in the service of ethics. To the Confucian historian the events of the past were interesting in so far as they provided concrete examples of the way in which the moral principles enshrined in the Classics had worked out in practice. His task, therefore, was not simply to record the events of the past, but also to award praise and blame to the actions of historical personages in accordance with these principles; he must show, in so far as it was possible, that 'good' rulers and ministers had brought peace and prosperity to the land, and 'bad' ones turmoil and decline, and that as a general principle virtue brought its own reward and sin its wages.

During the Tokugawa period, when historians were almost without exception Confucian scholars, it is scarcely surprising that the bulk of historical writing should have been of this orthodox Confucian 'praise and blame' kind. The compilers of the official chronicle Honchoo Tsuugan, for example, were specifically enjoined to apportion praise and blame to their characters in accordance with Confucian moral principles.[1] Arai Hakuseki's Dokushi Yoron was written avowedly to point out to the Shoogun Ienobu the moral lessons to be learnt from history,[2] while many other writers of history acknowledged their debt to Chu Hsi's Tung Chien Kang Mu, in which the moral view of the past was particularly persuasively stressed.[3]

It was not merely that the old history served the wrong kind of gakumon. Its teachings as to the underlying movements of history were also scarcely reconcilable with the keimoo views. To most Confucian historians man's golden age lay not in the future but in the past. No later ruler, they

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1. Kiyohara Sadao, Zootei Nihon Shigakushi, p. 101.
2. See W.G. Beasley: Historical Writing of Arai Hakuseki. Unpublished paper written for the conference on Historical Writing on the Peoples of Asia, July 1956. p. 6-7.
3. The influence of Chinese history in general on Tokugawa historiography is discussed by Ookubo Toshikane in Nihon Kindai Shigakushi, Chapters 1 and 5. The influence of Chu Hsi's Tung Chien Kang Mu is discussed by Nakamura Kyuushiroo in "Shushi no Shigaku, toku ni sono Shiji Tsuugan Koomoku ni tsukite", in Dokushi Kooki, p. 80. Also by Ookubo Toshikane in "Kinsei ni okeru Rekishi Kyooiku", in Hompoo Shigakushi Ronsoo, Vol.2. The work appears to have influenced historians of the Chu Hsi school, particularly Hayashi Razan and his followers, and also of the Mito school. Having suffered a temporary decline owing to the opprobrium of Sorai, it was revived in the late Tokugawa period by Bitoo Nishuu, Rai Shunsui and Sanyoo, and Shibano Ritsuzan. Chu Hsi's preoccupation with the question of legitimacy of succession is said to have helped to enflame sentiments of kinnoo during the Bakumatsu period, while his stress on kunshin jooge no meibun and on naigai-ka-i-no betsu (the proper distinction between internal and external, Middle Kingdom and barbarian) was very acceptable to writers of the jooi persuasion.

believed, could equal the ancient Sages in goodness and wisdom, so that no society in the modern world could experience the perfect harmony and tranquility enjoyed by the subjects of Yao, Shun and the Great Yu. Later rulers might, indeed, emulate in a certain measure the Sages' goodness and wisdom, so that their people could hope to enjoy comparative peace and prosperity. But it was too much to hope that such 'good' rulers would be very numerous. Sooner or later they would be succeeded by bad ones, who would plunge the land into chaos and misery. To Confucianist historians, therefore, the course of history was marked by an initial sharp decline from the golden age of the Sages, followed by a series of cyclical rises and falls (chiran-kooboo) in which the rises never quite reached the heights achieved by the founding Sages. The ever-circling years might bring, at fairly regular intervals, an age of comparative refulgence, but never quite an age of gold.[1]

1. In a pre-Tokugawa work, the Gukanshoo, written in 1220 by the Abbot Jichin, the history of Japan is divided into seven periods, during each of which the fortunes of the land rose and fell. Each of these periods contained less doori (justice, virtue, reason) than its predecessor, the last containing no doori at all. This work therefore envisaged both a general overall moral decline, and a cyclical movement within that decline. Confucian historians however did not necessarily look upon the world as progressively degenerating, but merely as having suffered an initial fall in remote antiquity. The long-term pessimism in the Gukanshoo is probably derived from Buddhist mappoo-shisoo, or the doctrine of the latter days of the Law. See Tsuda Sookichi, "Gukanshoo oyobi Jinnooshootooki ni okeru Shina no Shigaku Ronsoo", in Hompoo Shigakushi Ronsoo, Vol.2.
   An interesting example of a cyclical theory propounded during the Tokugawa period is that of Ogyuu Sorai. Sorai saw the course of history since the Hsia dynasty as a succession of states or dynasties, each separated by a period of civil war. This succession of states was not merely fortuitous, but one of the cyclical movements of nature, comparable with the succession of the seasons or of night and day. The length of the life of the state depended on the First Ruler or Sage, who laid down the institutions along which the state developed. The longest dynasty was the Chou, since it was securely founded on the Rites and Music, which were the best institutions. Later synasties were all shorter because they were not so founded. See J.R. McEwan, Ogyuu Sorai (Unpublished thesis, Cambridge University.) p. 100-109.

Nor were the Confucian ideas of historical causation, such as they were, any more useful to the purposes of keimoo. In many histories of the chronicle type, indeed, such ideas were conspicuously lacking. The events recorded were treated as separate and discrete, with no attempt to explain any causal connection between them. In histories of the praise and blame type, causation was attributed largely to the moral conduct and character of the ruler and his ministers, while events which could not be explained by human agency were laid at the door of fate and the will of Heaven. (ten-un, temmei.)

The keimoo men obviously needed to look at the past in a very different light. They wished to find in the course of history not a decline from a golden past nor an endless repetition of cyclical rises and falls, but a continuous, if erratic, climb upwards. For this purpose they would have to show plausibly how one historical event could lead to another in such a way as to fulfil the process of Progress. Neither the chronicle of discrete events nor the didactic cautionary tales for rulers would suit their purpose. Finally, they would have to fit the study of history into the body of knowledge dictated by their new jitsugaku, in the same way as the old history had fitted neatly into the old gakumon. History would have to ba made at least reconcilable with the demands of scientific truth.

The keimoo men were fortunate in discovering a school of western historiography admirably suited to their needs. Buckle's History of Civilization in England and Guizot's General History of Civilization in Europe were examples of the supremely optimistic school of positivist historical writing which grew up in western Europe during the second half of the 19th century. Both these writers were convinced that the underlying process of history was one of Progress, and that it was discoverable in the same way as

were the truths of natural science. There were, they believed, laws in human behaviour which could be discovered, by the apparatus of historical criticism, to be as constant and immutable as those which regulated the natural world. Buckle thought that by the "statistical method", which would show, for example, that the total number of murders, suicides, marriages and misdirected letters remained constant year by year in great cities, it could be incontrovertibly proved that the actions of men "are in reality never inconsistent, but however, capricious they may appear, only form part of one vast scheme of universal order."[1] The historian's task, he believed, was to show that the study of human nature was not fundamentally different from the study of natural phenomena, and hence to reconcile the two hostile camps of moralists and scientists.[2]

Both Buckle's and Guizot's works were translated early into Japanese[3] and became the guiding scriptures of the keimoo school of historiography known as bummeishiron (history of civilization) - so called because its chief purpose was to discover from the past the answers to questions pertaining to the nature of civilization: what exactly was civilization and how did it

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1. H.T. Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Thinker's Library ed. p. 20-21.
2. Ibid. p. 22.
3. Buckle was translated by Ooshima Sadamasu in 1874 under the title Eikoku Kaikashi, and again in 1879 by Doi Kooka and Kayoo Taizoo under the title Eikoku Bunkashi. Some indication of the sensation caused by this work in keimoo circles is given by the number of translations of extracts which appeared in keimoo journals in 1874-5. See Meiroku Zasshi, No. 7, May 1874, and Minkan Zasshi, June and July 1874 and January 1875. All are in MBZ, Zasshi-hen. Katoo Hiroyuki declared that it was his reading of Buckle which first influenced him towards his complete renunciation of metaphysics in favour of 'evolutionism.' See his Jijoden, p. 47, quoted by Ono Hisato in "Nihon Kaika Shooshi sono jidai", in HSR, Vol. 2, p. 1317. A Keioo man recalled, "When Buckle's Civilization in England first appeared the whole atmosphere of Keioo Gijuku suddenly changed. People ceased altogether to study

come to be what it is? The most notable work of this school was undoubtedly Taguchi Ukichi's Nihon Kaika Shooshi - a history of Japan which reproduced most of the salient characteristics of the Buckle school of thought. Human society, Taguchi sought to prove, had its own laws of progress and development, in the same way as a plant had its own laws of growth. Just as plants were destined, by their very nature, to grow to a certain shape and size, so society was bound to progress along certain lines, and according to laws which were just as observable and discoverable as were those governing the natural world.[1]

Fukuzawa never made any attempt to write a detailed history of Japan, but he is nevertheless counted among the bummeishi historians because his writings on the subject of 'civilization' led him to make what was in fact the first consistent criticism of the traditional school of historiography.

In the first place, he contended, previous historiography was totally misleading in the importance it attached to the moral conduct of the ruler and his ministers. It was absurd to imagine that a country could be contented and prosperous merely because its rulers happened to be morally good. Whether a people were contented and prosperous depended on what stage they had reached on the ladder of progress - and this in its turn depended, not on the moral character of the ruler, but on the state of Knowledge and Virtue of the

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the Bible." Quoted in Ookubo Toshikane, Nihon Kindai Shigakushi, p. 239.

Guizot's work was translated in 1872 by Murota Atsumi under the title Seiyoo Kaikashi, and again in 1877 by Nagamine Hideki under the title Yooroppa Bummeishi.

1. Nihon Kaika Shooshi, Iwanami ed. 1937. p. 241.

Accounts of the bummeishi school of historical writing may be found in Izu Kimio, Nihon Shigakushi, Chapter 2; Itoo Tasaburoo, "Yoogaku to Rekishikan" and Ono Hisato, "Nihon Kaika Shooshi to sono Jidai" - both in HSR, Vol. 2. Also Ookubo Toshikane, Nihon Kindai Shigakushi, Part 3, Chapters 1 and 2.

whole people - in a word, on what Fukuzawa called *jisei*.[1] For *jisei*, the general state of public opinion, inevitably exerted a limiting and determining influence on the actions of great men. Great men were like navigators and *jisei* like the given horsepower of a ship's engine. No navigator, however skilful, could make the ship go faster than its engine would allow. Nor was it any particular credit to the navigator if the ship went at her proper speed, though it might be attributed to his lack of skill if she went at less than her proper speed. Similarly heroes and great men could not hope to initiate events outside the scope of *jisei*. They would meet with success only when they worked within its scope and saw that nothing interfered with its course.[2]

It was unfortunate, therefore, that so few 'great men' in Chinese and Japanese history should have been conscious of *jisei* and hence succeeded in 'fitting in with the times'. Confucius and Mencius were certainly great men but neither was aware of *jisei*. Mencius counselled rulers to think of the condition of their people and to see that they all had five-acre plots at a time when the land was in a state of such unrest and upheaval that for the ruler to think of anything but attack and defence and macchiavellian strategy would have imperilled his life as well as his throne. Confucius counselled government by goodness on the principles laid down by Yao and Shun in similarly chaotic circumstances when to rule by such methods would only have invited ridicule. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the doctrines

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1. Fukuzawa used a number of other words to express this idea of the 'general opinion' or the 'general level of Knowledge and Virtue' - e.g. *shuuron*, *jinshin*, *minjoo*, *koogi-yoron*.
2. *Bummeiron no Gairyaku*, FZ IV, 66.

of Confucius and Mencius; they merely happened to be entirely unsuited to the times. Previous historians who blamed the feudal lords of Chou for not carrying out the Confucian precepts of government were therefore being very unjust. It was not the fault of the feudal lords that they ignored the precepts; they were simply prevented from taking proper note of them by <u>jisei</u>.[1]

In the same way the usual interpretation of the events of the Kemmu Restoration was quite mistaken. Previous historians had insisted that Go-Daigo, after the overthrow of the Hoojoo, rewarded Ashikaga Takauji above everyone else, neglecting Kusunoki Masashige and all the loyal followers below him in rank. This foolish act of the Emperor gave rein to Takauji's wicked ambition and led to a second downfall of the Throne. Scholars were wont, indeed, when reading this passage of history, to grind their teeth and roll up their sleeves with rage at the wickedness of Takauji, and to sigh over the foolishness of Go-Daigo. But in doing so they showed that they knew nothing of <u>jisei</u>.

The correct interpretation of the events of the Kemmu Restoration was as follows: At the time all real power lay with the military families of the Kantoo and virtually none with the Emperor himself. It was the Kantoo warriors who had overthrown the Hoojoo and restored the Emperor to his Throne. The Ashikaga were a famous and popular family, and the Restoration certainly could not have been accomplished without their aid. Hence their reward, on the accomplishment of the Restoration was in fact not the Emperor's personal recognition of their services, but the requiting of their power and popularity in accordance with <u>jisei</u>. Takauji had never, however

1. <u>Bummeiron no Gairyaku</u>, FZ IV, p. 68-9.

been loyal to the Emperor at heart, having masqueraded as a loyal follower only as an excuse for overthrowing the Hoojoo. Masashige, on the other hand came from a small and relatively insignificant Kawachi family, with no fame or popularity comparable to that of the Ashikaga. Hence it was only natural that the Emperor should follow the general opinion in rewarding Takauji above Masashige. Masashige derived all his power from the concept of loyalty to the Emperor, whereas Takauji derived none. Hence the fact that the Emperor was powerless to reward Masashige above Takuji was due to the lack of a general spirit of loyalty to the Emperor.

But why was this general spirit of loyalty lacking? Because for years back there had been innumerable Emperors conspicuously foolish and unvirtuous - so much so that no adulations of historians could cover up their crimes. Go-Daigo was certainly very far from being a wise ruler, but he was noteworthy by comparison with his predecessors. Hence it was hardly fair to saddle him alone with the blame for the decline of the Throne. For years back the Emperors had thrown away their own power and allowed others to assume it. Thus even if Go-Daigo had possessed the wisdom of a Sage, and even if he had had ten Masashiges as his generals, he would still have been helpless under the legacy of weakness left him by his predecessors.

Hence neither Takauji's success nor Masashige's death were fortuitous; they were the proper results of proper causes. "Masashige's death was due, not to Go-Daigo's foolishness, but to _jisei_. He did not die fighting Takauji; he was defeated in the struggle with _jisei_."[1]

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1. _Bunmeiron no Gairyaku_, FZ IV, p. 70-73. It is possible that Fukuzawa developed his idea of _jisei_ from the hints given in Rai Sanyoo's _Nihon Gaishi_. Sanyoo used the idea of _jisei_ to get himself out of the difficulty of reconciling the orthodox praise and blame technique with the fact that all his heroes had been conspicuous failures and a his villains rather signal successes. The fact that his greatest he Kusunoki Masashige, had been finally defeated and killed could hardly

Similarly the outcome of the Franco - Prussian War had nothing to do with the skill of Bismarck or the bungling of Napoleon III. It was due to the Prussian people's morale being strong and united, and the French people's weak and divided. Bismarck simply gave free rein to the determined spirit of the Prussian people. Napoleon III was powerless against the weakness of the French morale. The outcome of battles thus had little to do with generals and much with the general spirit of the people - which was jisei.[1]

Previous historians had therefore been very misled in attributing to the conduct of rulers and great men the vicissitudes of the various ruling houses, and the prosperity and disasters which overtook the land. Rulers and great men might encourage and guide the mass of the people, but they could scarcely be held personally responsible for the country's fortunes, since their ideas would prove effective only in so far as they were capable of being assimilated into the general opinion. Pioneers too much ahead of their times would be ineffective, however great and good they might be, simply because they were trying to make the ship go faster than its engine would allow. Indeed, to imagine that a few men in the position of rulers were solely responsible for the fortunes of the world, was like imagining that a few merchants could persuade a whole people to buy ice in the middle of winter and charcoal balls at the height of summer.[2]

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be treated according to the usual Confucian assumption that virtue brought its own reward. Hence Sanyoo invoked the idea of jisei - which he seems to have regarded as a kind of moral legacy left by one's predecessors capable of limiting and determining the actions of great men. Fukuzawa used the idea to a very different purpose, but it may well have been Sanyoo who suggested it to him. In connection with Go-Daigo's foolishness, for example, Fukuzawa used the same word sekijaku, accumulated weakness, as Sanyoo had done. See Nihon Gaishi, Dai Nihon Shisoo Zenshuu, Vo. 15, p. 38-9.

1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, p. 73-4.
2. Ibid. p. 67.

Further still, previous historians had been misled in attributing so much importance to the rises and falls of the ruling houses themselves. Once the really important historical questions were seen to be the changes which jinshin underwent in the process of progress, the mere changes in the ruling houses at once became secondary and superficial. Arai Hakuseki's much talked of Nine and Five Changes were therefore ultimately of little historical importance:

"According to Arai Hakuseki's theory, the land underwent Nine Changes before the age of Military Houses, and the age of Military Houses itself underwent Five Changes before the beginning of the Tokugawa period. Other scholars hold theories on much the same lines. But these 'changes' of which he speaks are in fact nothing more than alterations of those wielding political power. History in Japan till today has been concerned merely with investigating the genealogy of the Imperial House, with arguing over the merits and demerits of rulers and ministers, or with tales of victory and defeat in battle like those of any professional story-teller. . . In short, there is no history of Japan, only the history of Japanese governments. This is indeed a great shortcoming. Arai Hakuseki's Dokushi Yoron is a history of this kind. It talks about changes in the land, but in fact these are not general changes in the trend of the times. This trend was established long before during the age of Kings, when rulers and ruled became differentiated into two elements, and has continued until today without a single change."[1]

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, p. 183.

The Heike, Genji, Hoojoo, Ashikaga and so on differed from each other only in so far as they ruled well or badly. The same class of people remained as rulers, the same as ruled, so that from the point of view of the ruled no changes at all occurred during the vicissitudes of these ruling houses. What Arai Hakuseki called Nine and Five Changes were more like nine and five repetitions of the same play at the theatre.[1]

From this it followed that what had been written down as history was often futile and tedious.

> "In the history of the Han dynasty we read: King Wu of Chou was the son of King Wen. He vanquished King Chou of Yin, brought peace to the land, and died after a reign of twenty years. He was succeeded by his son, who became King Ch'eng. In histories of Japan we read: In the ninth month of the fourth year of the Eiroku period, Uesugi Kenshin, at the head of 13,000 soldiers, invaded Shinano and joined battle with Takeda Shingen at Kawanakajima. The struggle was indecisive.
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> Most of what is written in the histories of China and Japan is this kind of thing. I have no idea why such writing should have been so valued and described as history. At that rate we might also call this kind of thing history: A dog called Black of Front Street was the son of a dog called Spot. He bit to death a dog called White of Side Street, and lorded it in Side Street. He died afterwards of eating globefish's liver. Or this: During the rainy season of June 1876, three toads jumped out of that ditch, and three out of this ditch. They had a tremendous battle, each one blowing himself out as large as he

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, p. 185.

could, but the struggle was indecisive.

These are histories of dogs and toads indeed, but no one, not even the greatest idiot, would listen to such rubbish. Yet the chronicles of the dog Black are chronicles just as much as those of the King of Chou, and the Battle of the Ditches was a battle just as much as the Battle of Kawanakajima. Why should we think one more important than the other?"[1]

But it was not only that past historians had attached too much importance to personal praise and blame. The standards by which they meted out their praise and blame had frequently been misguided. The correct standard of moral judgments of this kind was, of course, whether or not a ruler had served the country's interests in promoting Progress. But Rai Sanyoo, for example, had been far more concerned with the entirely secondary consideration of the genealogy of the ruler's family. He had been very parsimonious in his praise of the Hoojoo, whose rule had after all been very beneficial to the land, for no other reason than that he considered them to have usurped the power of the Minamoto. Even Hoojoo Yasutoki's meritorious deeds in keeping peace in the land he branded as "insufficient to atone for the crimes of his family" in usurping the Minamoto power. Hoojoo Tokimune's glorious and immortal achievement of driving off the Mongol invasion he grudgingly admitted to be "barely enough to atone for the crimes of his forefathers."[2]

But, if great men were powerless to promote the process of Progress, what historical principle was to account for it?

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1. Kyooiku no Koto, Part 2, FZ IV, 489.
2. Shiron, Fukuoo Hyakuwa No. 96, FZ VII, 208-211.

Simply, Fukuzawa believed, because Progress was a ten no yakusoku - a natural law. Man's nature was such that he was bound and destined to progress, and hence would naturally, even unconsciously, fulfil the conditions which would lead to progress. The process could, certainly, be arrested artificially for a certain time, but ultimately it would prove to be like a tide which would sweep all obstacles out of its way. In such cases jisei might start as the opinion of only a small minority of people, but because it was the expression of this inevitable process it would sooner or later manifest itself as the general opinion - the next rung on the ladder. The Meiji Restoration was a good example of the way in which this process worked itself out. The true cause of the upheaval which led to the Restoration was not, as some scholars seemed to think, a sudden uprush in the people's hearts of feelings of taigi-meibun, but simply the fact that people had had enough of tyrannical Bakufu rule. For years the Bakufu had been obstructing the natural growth of knowledge, until finally the process had refused to be bottled up any longer. It had suddenly burst out, carrying the Bakufu away with its force.[1] At the beginning of the Tokugawa period there had been little or no criticism of the Bakufu, but the longer the natural process of Progress was arrested the stronger became its pent up force - which gave expression to itself in criticisms of the Bakufu and yearnings for a return to Imperial power. Thus, though the immediate cause of the Restoration was Perry's arrival and the weak and incompetent manner in which the Bakufu dealt with the situation, yet the underlying cause was

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1. Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 230-232.

simply the natural growth of Progress.[1]

Fukuzawa did not attempt to develop the positivist theme that the study of history would reveal regular laws in human behaviour analogous to those which science had revealed in the natural world. The idea interested him, certainly. His early interest in economics seems to have been stimulated largely by the thought that human economic behaviour would reveal just such infallible laws.[2] In a late essay too he intimated that progress would

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, p. 80-84. On another occasion Fukuzawa declared the underlying stimulus to the progress of jinshin or minjoo to lie in improved means of communication - particularly the four forms of steam locomotion, the electric telegraph, the postal system and movable-type printing. These inventions would bring about an improved dissemination of information and hence a greater clash of differing opinions such as could not fail to raise the level of the 'general opinion', even though some of their side effects might make for greater strife and unrest. This explanation would of course account for no more than the last spurt of progress achieved in the west during the 19th century. It would scarcely explain what prompted societies to climb up through the lower stages of konton, yaban and hankai - to be negotiated before trains and electric telegraphs were ever dreamt of. The theory is, however, an example of several which appeared at this time attributing the advancement of civilization to technical or material agents. Fujita Mokichi's Suikaron, for example, stated that the basic agents of progress were fire and water - water as it appeared in steam engines, and fire as it appeared in guns. Yamaji Aizan too declared that it was the introduction of guns into Japan which was ultimately responsible, by altering the relationship between lord and vassal, for the separation of samurai and peasant and the segregation of samurai into castle towns. Kinsei Busshitsuteki no Shimpo, 1892. See Nagata Hiroshi, Nihon Yuibutsuronshi, Part 2, section 2.
2. The early works on economics which Fukuzawa read - Chambers's Political Economy, for example - tended to stress this view. Hence in Seiyoo Jijoo, Gaihen FZ I, 511, he declared that the laws of economics were not man-made, nor alterable by any human agency, but were just as constant as those of the natural world. See also his remarks in Mita Enzetsu Dai Hyakkai no Ki, where he recalled that when he first started to read economics he found it to be of such compelling fascination that he even forgot to eat.

reveal more and more branches of knowledge as conforming to a constant pattern of observable cause and effect on the model of physics.[1] But evidently he did not consider the study of history to be particularly useful to this end. History could simply be invoked to prove the continuity of progress, and in particular to prove that, contrary to previous convictions, rulers, governments and great men had very little to do with the country's safety and prosperity.[2]

Voltaire remarked that history is no more than a pack of tricks we play on the dead. Certainly the Confucian historians had seen in past events just the pattern which would best confirm their moral convictions. The keimoo men did no more than give the kaleidoscope a shake and see the pieces settle down in the pattern which best confirmed their own particular persuasion.

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1. Fukuoo Hyakuyowa FZ IV, No. 17, 578, Butsurigaku, FZ VII, 278-285, and Fukuoo Hyakuwa No. 100, Jinji ni Zettai no Bi bashi, FZ VII, 220-227.
2. An interesting comparison with Fukuzawa's denigration of the role of great men in history if Liang Ch'i Ch'ao's elevation of it. To Liang, the Carlylean idea that great men alone were responsible for the triumphs of civilization, with the ensuing implication that the actions of great men were themselves uncaused and spontaneous, was a convenient defence against any imputation of failure in Chinese culture. 'Western' civilization was on these premisses not really 'western', but simply the result of the efforts of certain individual men, who might just as well have arisen in China. cf Liang's remark about Voltaire, Tolstoy and Fukuzawa himself: If these men had not lived, it is doubtful whether their countries could have advanced. See J.R. Levinson: Liang Ch'i Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, p. 106-7.

Chapter 8.

The New Politics

If a correct historical perspective showed clearly that rulers, governments and great men played a comparatively insignificant part in the promotion of Progress, it followed that the traditional views justifying rulers and governments would also need to be thoroughly revised. Indeed, the evils of meibun and its corollary of 'preponderance of power' were just as marked in the Relation of kunshin, Ruler and Subject, as they were in the more intimate family Relations of Parent and Child and Husband and Wife. Rulers, just as much as parents and husbands, were thought to be justified in wielding virtually unconditional power over their subjects.

Hence the words with which Fukuzawa started the first of the Gakumon no Susume pamphlets proved to be some of the most sensational he ever wrote - "Heaven," he announced, "made no man higher than another and no man lower than another."[1] However much men might differ in their circumstances and conditions - some were rich and strong, others poor and weak - in one important respect, in the matter of rights, they were all equal.[2]

These words contradicted one of the most fundamental assumptions of the traditional political philosophy. Hitherto it had been commonly believed, not that men were naturally equal, but that society was naturally hierarchical. Some men were naturally 'higher' than others because the nature of the universe itself was hierarchical and human society was merely a reflection of this larger pattern. Some men were higher than others by the same

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1. Gakumon no Susume, I, FZ III, 1.
2. Ibid, 10-11.

cosmological necessity which made Heaven higher than earth.[1] The 'vertical' quality of the Five Relations was thus part of the essential nature of a properly ordered human society. The superiority of ruler to ruled, husband to wife, parents to children, was necessary because the universe was an organism which would be properly ordered only when high and low were in their proper places. For the hierarchical structure of society to be levelled would be a distortion of nature calculated to result only in chaos, disorder and disturbing prodigies.

But if rulers were a natural and inevitable function of human society, what was to determine who should hold this position? Confucian political theory had invoked the idea of _temmei_ - the mandate of Heaven. _Temmei_ was something which was vouchsafed to the reigning dynasty and by virtue of which the ruler derived his right to rule. It was a divine right, but a conditional one. It required that the ruler observe certain canons of moral conduct and that, if he violated these canons, he automatically lost _temmei_ and ceased to be a ruler by definition. A 'bad ruler' was thus strictly a contradiction in terms, since a man ceased to be a ruler if he was bad. In Japan however these moral limitations on the ruler and the right of rebellion which they implied, had never been recognised. However profligate, tyrannical or unjust the Tokugawa Shooguns might be, there was no doctrinal justification in Japan for deposing them.

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1. Hayashi Razan, an orthodox authority on Chu Hsi, wrote, "Heaven is naturally high and earth is naturally low. When things naturally have their positions thus fixed high or low, those which are high are noble and exalted, and those which are low are mean and humble. Thus we know that there is order in the principles of nature. Men's minds are ordered on the same principles. Only when high and low, noble and humble are in their proper places will men be properly moral. Only when men are properly moral will the state be properly governed." From _Keiten Daisetsu_, quoted by Maruyama Masao in "Kinsei Nihon Seiji Shisoo ni okeru 'Shizen' to 'Sakui'", in _Nihon Seiji Shisooshi Kenkyuu_, p. 204.

The ruler's authority, moreover, could be legitimately exercised in every conceivable sphere of his subjects' lives. A good ruler, it was stated in the Classics, looked on his subjects as a father looked on his children[1] - which implied that his authority over them was as unlimited as that of a father over his small and incapable infants. For Confucian political theorists therefore there was no problem of the right and proper limits of the ruler's power to interfere with the lives of his subjects. He could properly exercise his power in every sphere.

There was thus a wide gap between the traditional ideas on the functions and justification of government, and Fukuzawa's statement that Heaven made no one higher or lower than anyone else. The gap was not however entirely unbridged. The way had been prepared to a certain extent for Fukuzawa and the keimoo men by the ideas of a rival Confucian school, influential if unorthodox - that of Sorai.

Ogyuu Sorai's ideas acted as a bridge in so far as they denied that the hierarchical structure of society was natural. Following the lead given by Itoo Jinsai, Sorai declared that the moral laws of man (jindoo) were separate from the laws of nature in the external world (tendoo), and not, as Chu Hsi had affirmed, different emanations of the same basic principle. "The moral Way of man (michi)," Sorai wrote, "is not the way of the natural world. It is the Way created by the Sages."[2]

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1. Legge's translation of the Ta Hsueh, Chapter 9.
2. Sorai Sensei Toomonsho, Nihon Rinri Ihen VI, 188. Quoted by Maruyama Masao, op.cit. p. 209. Most of what I have written on Sorai is based on this essay, and the preceding one "Kinsei Jukyoo no Hatten ni okeru Soraigaku no Tokushitsu narabi ni sono Kokugaku to no Kankei." Also J.R. McEwan's unpublished thesis, Ogyuu Sorai.

Sorai thus denied that human society was naturally hierarchical in the sense that it was a reflection of a cosmological hierarchy. The moral precepts differentiating high from low were not expressions of natural law. They were invented by the Sages who, in their wisdom, perceived that a society with a hierarchical order would be the easiest to govern. Thus the Five Relations, instead of being part of nature, were for Sorai manifestly inventions of the Sages - with the single exception of the relation between parent and child. Even the relation between husband and wife was not natural, but the invention of Fu Hsi. The Four Orders of society (shi-noo koo-shoo or samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants) were also inventions of the Sages to facilitate government.

The reason why Sorai took the trouble to contradict Chu Hsi on this point of the 'nature' of human society was because he was convinced that society as it stood in his day was far from perfect and because he wished to propose certain reforms. So long as the social order was considered 'natural', it was difficult to suggest convincingly that it might be improved, but once declare it to be the work of man, and immediately it became possible to argue about its merits and demerits. Possibly too, the signs of disintegration apparent by Sorai's day in the original feudal model were convincing enough proofs that the prescribed model was not natural.

The idea that the hierarchical social order was man-made was undoubtedly a step forward on the path leading from Chu Hsi to the keimoo men. Had it not been for Sorai's theories, it is doubtful if the keimoo ideas could have made the rapid progress they did in the early years of Meiji. The idea that the relation between ruler and ruled was artificial was of course a useful, indeed essential, preliminary to the idea that all men were naturally equal.

Hence when Fukuzawa wrote the following passage, it was only the context in which he put it which was new. The idea itself was as old as Sorai.

> "In China and Japan the moral tie between lord and vassal is said to be natural (tensei) and innate in man, in the same way as are the relationships between husband and wife, and parent and child. . .But if we examine the laws of nature calmly and without prejudice, we will certainly discover that the relationship is entirely fortuitous. As soon as we realise that it is fortuitous, we must decide whether it is useful or not. And to be able to discuss whether or not a thing is useful, means that it is capable of improvement. And something which can be improved and changed is not a law of nature. A child cannot become its father. A wife cannot become her husband. The relations between parent and child, and between husband and wife cannot be reversed - but that between lord and vassal can."[1]

If rulers, then, were artificially elevated, in what sense were men all equal? They were equal, the keimoo men sought to prove, in so far as their 'rights' were equal.

But to make the Japanese people understand the concept of rights was one of the most difficult of the keimoo tasks. At the beginning of the Meiji period the enormous majority of Japanese were entirely ignorant of its meaning, for the reason that there had been no idea even remotely equivalent to it in the old Confucian philosophy.[2] As Fukuzawa complained, the idea of meibun had produced 'preponderance of power' in almost all social relations - and

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 44-5.
2. Osatake Takeshi: Kenri to iu Jukugo. Hooritsu Jihoo, Vol. 2, 32.

preponderance of power meant that those possessing power possessed it unconditionally, their subordinates having no 'rights' by which it might be limited. Superiors possessed dignity and might, subordinates owed duties - and in this scheme of things the concept of rights played no part ar all. It was recognised, certainly, that if their condition became too intolerable, the lower orders would revolt - but this behaviour was never conceived as rightful; it was merely natural. The feudal ethic too insisted that the claims and interests of the individual person should always be subordinated to those of some larger group - the family or the clan. In this light therefore, to value one's own rights - which are after all no more than claims generally recognised as legitimate - smacked much more of coveting the despised profit (ri) than of following in the path of the revered duty (gi).

Having no idea of rights, the Japanese naturally had no word to express the idea - and their difficulty in grasping its meaning is well illustrated by their difficulty in choosing a suitable word. The word kenri, now the accepted term, was first used by Mitsukuri Rinshoo in his translation of the French Penal Code in 1869. The word was not his own invention, but taken from William Martin's Chinese translation of Wheaton's Elements of International Law, where the words kenri and gimu were used to translate the terms rights and duties.[1] The word was rather an unfortunate choice, since the character ken 權 carried a strong connotation of 'might' rather than 'right' - previous compounds containing the character, kensei, 權勢 kemmon 權門, taiken 大權, all having had this meaning.[2] The word therefore made it even more difficult for the Japanese to grasp the meaning

1. Ibid.
2. Watsuji Tetsuroo: Nihon Rinri Shisooshi, Vol 2, 745.

of rights. Professor Osatake writes that a legal friend of his took a year to understand it.[1] When Mitsukuri Rinshoo translated the words 'droit civil' in the French Civil Code as minken, no one in the committee of the Dajookan discussing the matter understood what the word could mean.. How could the people possess ken? they all asked. Eventually the discussion grew so heated that the question had to be temporarily shelved.[2]

Several other words were, however, also currently used during the 60s and 70s. The influence in the legal field of natural law theories, in which the character 理 was much used, led some writers to prefer the word kenri 權理 to the more vulgar looking kenri 權利.[3] Fukuzawa used the word tsuugi 通義 in Seiyoo Jijoo, where he attempted to explain the meaning of the term with the aid of translations of extracts from Chambers Political Economy for Use in Schools[4] and from Blackstone.[5]

In Gakumon no Susume he attempted to explain the term in simple language of his own such as any Japanese might understand. People's rights he declared, had nothing to do with their circumstances (arisama) or social status. However much people's social status might differ, their 'rights' were always the same, for every man possessed equally the 'right' to preserve his life, property and honour. For a samurai to strike down a merchant, or for a daimyoo to tax a peasant unjustly was a violation of the rights of the merchant and peasant. A coolie had a right, just as much as a daimyoo had, to protect his life. A poor pedlar of sweetmeats had as much right to

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1. Osatake, op. cit.
2. Hozumi Nobushige: Hoosoo Yawa, 212.
3. Osatake, op. cit.
4. Seiyoo Jijoo, Gaihen, FZ I, 426.
5. Ibid. Part II, FZ I, 547.

preserve his four mon as a wealthy merchant his million ryoo.[1]

Another approach which Fukuzawa tried was via the feudal idea of bun - one's allotted station in life. The idea of rights, he declared, was not so very different from the idea of bun. A samurai if he were insulted would declare that his bun had been infringed (ichibun aitatanu) - which was much the same as saying that his rights had been infringed. An employer had the right to treat his employees in accordance with his original contract, but if he should try to go beyond and regulate, say, the amount of food they ate, he would be infringing their bun, and at the same time their rights.[2]

In fact there was little in common between the idea of bun and that of rights. Bun had generally been used to mean a sphere which one must not exceed. It was one's bun which forbade one to live more luxuriously than one's station warranted, or to behave inappropriately to one's superiors. It was scarcely regarded as a sphere particular to oneself within which others must not encroach. A person of inferior status could not have appealed to his bun to protect him against unjust treatment by a superior. Bun contained no idea of claims that could be made against superiors; it was simply something which prevented people from having ideas too big for their status in the hierarchy. But by invoking the idea of bun as a part or portion, and stressing the fact that, rather than worrying about whether one is exceeding the portion, one should pay attention to what is one's own within that portion, Fukuzawa may have succeeded in clarifying the difficult concept of rights to the Japanese.

1. Gakumon no Susume, FZ III, 11.
2. Tsuuzoku Minkenron, FZ V, 41-42.

Having declared all men to be endowed with equal rights, how did Fukuzawa proceed to justify the institution of government? On what grounds could some men be set up in positions of authority over others?

Solely, Fukuzawa believed, in order to guarantee those very rights in a society which was as yet so imperfect that the strong might infringe the rights of the weak. The government's task (shokubun) was to make laws by which good people might be protected and wicked people punished and restrained.[1] If society consisted of Yaos, Shuns and Confuciuses, governments would be unnecessary and unjustifiable, since they would merely hinder the practice of virtue. But since society was not yet made up of Yaos and Shuns, there was no guarantee that the strong would not infringe the rights of the weak.

> "Men have a right to preserve their property, life and honour - rights which may not be infringed in the least without due reason. . .But the individual alone is not strong enough to protect his rights in a society where good and evil are so intermingled in human character and behaviour. It is for this reason that governments are set up to protect people's rights."[2]

If protecting people's rights was its sole task and function, it followed that the government's legitimate sphere of authority was strictly circumscribed. It did not possess the limitless scope of power of the Confucian ruler, for such power would contradict the very reason for its existence.

"The functions of the government of a country should be limited to

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1. Gakumon no Susume, II, FZ III, 13. An excellent account of Fukuzawa's views on politics, both internal and international, is to be found in Maruyama Masao's introduction to FS IV.
2. Jiji Taiseiron, FZ V, 413.

holding military power, regulating war and peace, enacting laws to preserve order in the country, and protecting the people's interests by preventing various evils. Sometimes it may lay down laws for the promotion of the people's interests, but only in order to overpower hindrances in the way of their development. The government is thus concerned solely with negative hindrances, not with positive welfare."[1] In other words, the functions of the government should be limited to those of hindering hindrances to the development of the people's welfare. Its very nature therefore was that of a temporary expedient. Far from being required by the very nature of man as Chu Hsi had taught, it was merely an instrument devised by him to tide him over the period until he should be wise and good enough to dispense with it. It was therefore a necessary evil - no more than a warusa kagen.[2]

With such limited functions, it was clear that the government was no more than a "small part of men's affairs."[3] Members of the government had their task, like any other members of the community, but the mere fact that they were entrusted with that particular task was no reason whatever why they should be respected and venerated more than those performing any other task. The people were under no obligation to the government for its keeping of the peace, for after all they made a contract (yakusoku) with it to pay it taxes in order that it might do this.[4]

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1. Anneisaku, FZ VIII, 288.
2. Seifu no Kootstsu mizukara Rieki naki ni arazu, ZFZ III, 677
3. Oboegaki, FS I, 234.
4. Gakumon no Susume, II, FZ III, 13.

The Bakufu had committed arbitrary and unreasonable acts merely by virtue of the false position it had arrogated to itself. It never paid coolies or ferrymen or innkeepers, and it increased taxes merely to pay for its own luxuries, under the pretext that payment of taxes was 'requiting the obligation to the country.' (go-kokuon wo mukuiru). The whole idea of kokuon was of course manifestly absurd. No on was created towards the government because it enabled the people to lead quiet and secure lives; it was simply its business to see that they did so. If doing this created an on, the people would equally be creating an on towards themselves by paying taxes for the contractual relation between government and people was always reciprocal.[1]

The government's proper functions being thus defined, it followed that the people might legitimately indulge in any activities outside the government's sphere. The sphere of private enterprise might therefore cover foreign trade, industry, reclamation of land, transport, teaching in schools, publication of books and newspapers - anything, in fact, which did not specifically impinge on the government's allotted activities.[2]

It was essential, however, that the government and private spheres should be kept separate. Government activities should not be taken into private hands, nor should those which properly belonged to the people be encroached on by the government.

That the government should not encroach on the private sphere meant that it should have nothing to do with such activities as religion, schools,

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1. Gakumon no Susume, II, FZ III, 13-14.
2. Gakusha Anshinron, FZ IV, 269.

agriculture or commerce - and in particular that it should not attempt to emulate the Confucian Good Ruler in telling the people how to lead good lives. In a civilized community this was no business of the government's, for the reason that its members were no 'better' than anyone else and hence not qualified to give moral advice.[1]

Similarly the people should not encroach on the government's sphere and attempt to take decisions on matters involving law or punishment into their own hands. For this reason private vengeance (katakiuchi) was to be condemned. For a private citizen to take it upon himself to avenge the murder of his father was not only meddlesome, impertinent behaviour, but was also a violation of the contract by which citizens invested the government with the power to punish criminals. If a citizen considered the government's treatment of a criminal to be unjustly lenient, he should do no more than appeal to the government in the name of reason. It was therefore a great mistake to glorify the Forty-Seven Ronins as heroes. When Kootsuke-no-suke insulted Asano, Asano should have appealed to the government rather than trying to kill Kootsuke. When the Bakufu then made the unjust decision of condemning Asano to seppuku but allowing Kootsuke to go free, the forty-seven Asano retainers should have appealed one by one to the Bakufu in the name of reason (kotowari). The Bakufu, tyranny that it was, would doubtless have condemned the first appellant to death - but it could never have withstood forty-seven successive appeals to reason.[2]

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 146.
2. Gakumon no Susume, VI, FZ III, 42-51.

In the same way if the government should exceed its proper limits and become tyrannical, the only right and effective course for private citizens was to appeal to reason, if necessary sacrificing their own lives in so doing. It was quite wrong meekly to acquiesce in its tyranny. It was equally wrong to oppose its tyranny with violence, for this was merely substituting one kind of violence for another. No government, however tyrannous, could fail to be moved by reason, particularly if people risked their lives in its support.[1] Death in such a cause was true martyrdom, and very different from the useless deaths - uchijini and seppuku - so common in Japan.[2]

The reason why it was so important for the government's and people's respective spheres to be kept separate was that in the proper balance between the two lay one of the secrets of progress in civilization. In the people's

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1. Gakumon no Susume, VII, FZI III, 57-60. This argument is based on Francis Wayland's Elements of Moral Science, Boston ed. 1874, p. 366-368, where it is recommended that "Suffering in the cause of right" is the only proper course of action against a tyrannous government. Fukuzawa owed many of the ideas in Gakumon no Susume to the less bible-banging parts of this book. See Itagura Takuzoo: "Gakumon no Susume to "Wayland's Moral Science". Mita Seiji Gakkaishi, No.9.
2. Ibid, p. 61. On this view, Fukuzawa continued, nearly all the deaths revered as heroic in Japan were useless. The loyal hero who died in battle after slaying 10,000 of the enemy was really on a par with Gonsuke, who hanged himself because he lost one ryoo of his master's and felt he could make no amends other than suicide. The only true martyr in Japanese history was Sakura Soogoroo.

   This passage produced a considerable outcry in the press. Several newspapers leapt to the conclusion that Fukuzawa had insulted Kusonoki Masashige, for whom a particular cult had arisen at the time owing to the popularity of Rai Sanyoo's Nihon Gaishi. Angry articles appeared in various newspapers, and Fukuzawa received so many threatening letters that at one time his friends feared for his life. The clamour eventually died down when Fukuzawa wrote a long explanatory article in the Chooya Shimbun of November 7th 1874 under the pseudonym Keioo Gijuku Gokuroo Semban. FYD, II, 327-342, 349-358. The story of Sakura Soogoroo may be found in Mitford's Tales of Old Japan, "The Ghost of Sakura."

sphere, where the activities should be as many and varied as possible, allowing plenty of scope for argument and experiment, lay theenergy and initiative to progress. In the government's sphere lay the power to hinder hindrances to the expression of this energy.

It was precisely in her failure to appreciate the importance of this balance, Fukuzawa was convinced, where Japan's greatest weakness lay. Her people, owing to their long subjection to the doctrines of meibun and their consequent lack of any spirit of independence, had always made the mistake of overvaluing the government's sphere and failing to appreciate the importance of their own. They either imagined that the government could do everything much better than they could, and consequently that they ought to leave all activities of any importance to the government, or, if they were fired with the initiative and energy to do things themselves, they imagined that they must become members of the government in order to do so. They looked on the government as the one and only efficient agent, and also as the one and only channel for the fulfilment of ambition. Private scholars might, indeed, go so far as to discuss questions of commerce, religion, language, education and the various other activities which properly belonged to the people's sphere - but all action on them they invariably left to the government.[1] Only too often - and this went for the so-called 'western' scholars too, who ought to know better - their chief ambition was to be given a government post. Like the Confucian scholars of feudal days, they knew how to behave in the government, but not under it or outside it. This was not solely because

1. Gakusha Anshinron, FZ IV, 271

they coveted a government salary:

"All their lives they have been brought up to look to the government as the only means of getting things done. They feel that if they are to fulfil their long-cherished ambitions they must rely on the government. Even eminent and distinguished scholars do not seem to be able to get out of this rut. . . Promising young men are all just the same. . . A student has only to read a few books and he will be hoping for a government career. An ambitious merchant has only to collect a few hundreds of capital, and he will be trying to do business under the government name. Schools are government-sponsored. Sermons are government-sponsored. Cattle-rearing and silkworm culture are government-sponsored. Seven or eight out of ten of the people's activities have some connection with the government. Thus the people fear the government, flatter the government, rely on the government, and have not the very least independence of spirit - a most disgusting spectacle.

The recent newspapers and petitions are a good example. The Press laws are not particularly strict, yet the newspapers publish nothing which might incur the displeasure of the government, and praise and extol out of all proportion to its true merits anything good which it may happen to do - just like prostitutes flattering a customer. And then all those petitions - they are written in such a humble, cringing style of reverence that the government might be gods and the writers criminals . . . They read as though the writers could only be excused on the score of insanity. Yet those who write these newspapers and petitions are neither prostitutes nor madmen; they are all 'western' scholars. The

> reason for their absurd insincerety is that there is no precedent for advocating people's rights, and therefore they simply go on in the old servile spirit . . . In short, it would not be far wrong to say that Japan has a government but no people."[1]

It was for this very reason, Fukuzawa wrote in 1872, that the government had so largely failed to carry out its plans, despite the fact that it consisted of able men. It could do nothing while the people themselves remained ignorant and apathetic - because civilization could never progress by the power of the government alone.[2] A government must necessarily be a reflection of its people in its nature and degree of wisdom. One could no more expect stupid people to produce an enlightened government than egg-plants to grow on water-melon vines, or a mirror to reflect an ugly face as beautiful.[3] It was essential therefore that the people should come to value and recognise the importance of their own sphere, and to realise that the country could only progress when the respective spheres of government and people were properly balanced. As long as the government monopolised the talent and energy of the country, there was little likelihood of progress.

Strictly circumscribed though the government's functions might be, however, yet within its allotted sphere it should be strong and unified. A limited government by no means implied a weak one, nor did a strong government imply a tyrannous one. It was important, in fact, to distinguish

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1. Gakumon no Susume, IV, FZ III, 29-31. This fourth pamphlet, entitled Gakusha Shokubunron, not unnaturally incensed those keimoo men who happened to hold government posts, and provoked indignant but rather ineffectual replies from Katoo Hiroyuki, Mori Arinori, Tsuda Shindoo and Nishi Amane in the second number of the Meiroku Zasshi. See MBZ, XVIII, 58-61.
2. Ibid. 27-8.
3. Gakusha Anshinron, FZ IV, 276.

between <u>assei</u> and <u>gensei</u>. <u>Assei</u> implied arbitrary tyranny - "ruling men contrary to natural reason." <u>Gensei</u> was a strong government which was yet just because it governed in accordance with a previous pledge. Neither could avoid using force, but one used it illegitimately and the other legitimately. No government could hope to please all its citizens; there was bound to be discontent somewhere, so that the first principle of any government, whatever its form, was to see that its laws, once formed should be obeyed.[1]

Contrary to common persuasion, however, it was impossible to lay down categorically that one particular form of government was 'better' than another - for the reason that one form might work well at on one stage of human development and badly at another. Far too many people made the mistake of allowing themselves to be deluded by the <u>names</u> of different forms of government and of associating these names with certain values. It was wrong, for example, to associate the <u>word</u> 'monarchy& with tyranny and therefore evil, and the word 'republic' with justice and therefore good - and hence to be deluded into thinking that monarchies are always bad and republics always good. What mattered was not the form the government took, but whether or not it did its job well in safeguarding people's rights and preserving the nation from foreign aggression. An in a constantly changing society it was too much to expect that any one form would always work well in all situations.[2] To attach value to the name of a thing meant attaching value to the thing itself, irrespective of whether or not it worked well in its context. An this, of course, was <u>wakudeki</u>.

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1. <u>Jiji Shoogen</u>, FZ V, 315.
2. <u>Bummeiron no Gairyaku</u>, FZ IV, 44.

There was nevertheless discernible, Fukuzawa believed, a tendency for forms of government to evolve along a certain recognisable path. As man moved steadily towards his own perfection, the forms of government he devised tended to move from autocracy towards democracy.

> "Careful study of politics will show us that there is an unceasing force causing autocracy to change to freedom, just as water always flows towards the low ground. There may certainly be reversals of this tendency, but they are only temporary fluctuations. The facts show indisputably that the long-term trend stretching over tens of thousands of years is for monarchy to give way to democracy, and for tyranny to give way to liberalism."[1]

In an ignorant and barbarous society, the Confucian Good Ruler was perfectly suitable. Where the people were like children, it was not unfitting to treat them as such - to rule by methods of kindness and stern authority (<u>on</u> and <u>i</u>) just as the Confucianists recommended. But once people's knowledge began to grow it was not longer necessary to treat them like children, and such methods became quite inapplicable. Good Rulers became irrelevant because they were no longer 'better' than anyone else.

> "In both China and Japan, and in the west, it was only in remote antiquity that Good Rulers appeared and ruled the country well. In recent times neither China nor Japan have had any success in producing Good Rulers. And in the West, they have been getting steadily fewer from about 1600 or 1700 A.D., until by 1800 there were no good rulers at all, and no wise ones either. This was not because of a decline in

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1. <u>Kinrai no Heiji</u>, ZFZ III, 684.

virtue in the genus of ruler, but because the people in general were were increasing in knowledge and virtue, so that there was nowhere where the knowledge and virtue of the ruler could be reflected. If a Good Ruler had appeared in the West, he would have been like a lantern on a bright moonlight night."[1]

The conclusion of the evolutionary process in government was, of course, the disappearance of the institution altogether. Once man had perfected himself and society had become composed wholly of Yaos and Shuns, the institution of government would automatically become not only irrelevant but even harmful. At the best, therefore, it was a 'necessary evil', nothing more than a means towards its own extinction.

It was unfortunate, therefore, that neither the Meiji government nor the _minkenronsha_ - the members of the People's Rights Movement - appreciated the force of these views. Neither understood the need for a proper balance between the government's and the people's respective spheres of activity.

The Meiji government, in the first place, fulfilled neither of the two essential requirements of a government - limited sphere of power and strong and united action within that sphere. It exceeded the sphere of power proper to a government, encroaching on that rightly belonging to private enterprise in a way reminiscent of an arbitrary police state. Yet at the same time, except during crises such as the Satsuma Rebellion, it had shown itself to be weak, divided and vacillating.[2] In its methods of dealing with

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1. _Bummeiron no Gairyaku_, FZ IV, 147.
2. _Hambatsu Kajin Seifuron_, FZ VIII, 18.

the _minkenronsha_, for example, it had shown itself to be thoroughly irresolute and irresponsible. In the case of the petition of 1880 to open a Diet, for instance, the government had wavered to and fro for so long over the entirely insignificant question of whether or not it was proper to receive it, that finally the petitioners, wearied and bewildered by arguments with secretaries and janitors, quite lost sight of their original purpose. It was only natural that such vacillation should have led to even greater friction with the people.[1]

Yet the fault by no means lay entirely on the side of the government. The _minkenronsha_ were very little better. In the first place, though they were very noisy and clamorous over the subject of people's rights, in fact they had only a very hazy idea of what the word meant. They were still unable to grasp that the relation between the government and people was one of equality and reciprocity. They still appeared to think that the government was in some way of a higher status than the people, and could not convince themselves that the tasks entrusted to the government were in no way superior to those performed by the people.

They therefore tended to put far too much stress on the people's right to participate in government (_sanseiken_) to the neglect of their private rights within their own sphere (_shiken_) - which of course was putting the cart before the horse. To want to set up a Diet was all very well, but the whole raison d'être of the institution was to protect people's private rights (_shiken_) against infringement by a tyrannical government. In the West, Parliaments were always established as a result of popular discontent over

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1. _Hambatsu Kajin Seifuron_, FZ VIII, 32-3.

violation of private rights - which proved that Western people were conscious of their private rights before they thought of participating in government. But in Japan it was the very opposite. The minkenronsha were clamouring about participation in government before they had a proper understanding of the value of their own private rights - which went to prove that they had not yet shaken off the feudal belief that the government was superior to the people, as also that they too were activated by private interest just as much as the government. They wanted to invade the government merely in order to secure lucrative positions for themselves, and gratify their own private ambition.[1]

They seemed very muddleheaded, moreover, about their purpose in setting up a Diet. Many of them talked as though their only object in doing so was to cut down the power of the government, in the belief that what they succeeded in taking away from the government would automatically accrue to the people, and that the people would thereby benefit. They talked a great deal about the desirability of a 'liberal' government - but in fact this vague liberalism of theirs would only result in inefficiency. They confused tyranny (assei) and strong and just government (gensei) in such an unrealistic way that some of them even intimated that all taxation was evidence of tyranny and should be abolished altogether.[2]

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1. Shikenron, FZ VIII, 178-197. Many of the minkenronsha, too, Fukuzawa considered to be fundamentally frivolous. On one occasion a young enthusiast from the country came to Fukuzawa and declared that he was going to call on a certain Prince and expound to him the arguments for setting up a Diet. Fukuzawa told him that he would never be admitted without a proper introduction, whereupon the young man said that even if he got no further than arguing with the janitor, at least he would have an amusing story to take home to his friends and relations. FYD III, 26. cf also Fukuzawa's remark in Seifu no Tomo, ZFZ III, 137. "They may profess to advocate liberty and people's rights, but strip off a layer of skin and you will find underneath the old feudalism."
2. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 269-270, 317-9.

Their policy of uncompromising opposition to the government was in fact highly misguided. Laudable though their object in setting up a Diet might be, driving out the present government was not the way to achieve it. For the present government, realising that one of the results of acceding to the requests of the _minkenronsha_ was to be its own destruction, was hardly likely to view the idea of a Diet with the sympathy it might otherwise do.[1] The tragedy of all the futile friction between government and people was that fundamentally both were of the same way of thinking. Both were fundamentally agreed on a progressive rather than a reactionary or conservative policy, (unlike the Russian government and people whose views were diametrically opposed) so that all the quarrels and violence were really over nothing more than secondary issues, and foolishly petty and personal ones at that. The _minkenronsha_ accused the government officials of thinking only of their own private interests. The government officials in their turn accused the _minkenronsha_ of venting their own private spleen on the government. Jealousy bred suspicion. Each side set spies to watch the other, and the spies came back with tales which were half guesswork and half elaboration to suit the expectations of their employers. They would report, for example, how Mr. A. called on Mr. B. and spent hours in 'secret discussion' - when really all these gentlemen were doing was playing chess or drinking or flower-viewing.[2]

Though most of the friction between the government and the _minkenronsha_ arose from purely petty and personal causes, some of the _minkenronsha_ did

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1. _Hambatsu Kajin Seifuron_, FZ VIII, 35-41.
2. Ibid. 57.

appear to base their attacks on the government on the strange idea that Diets had to undergo a certain necessary process of evolution before they could be properly established. They saw that in Europe parliaments had been established after a certain sequence of events - tyranny, resistence, greater tyranny, parliament - and they were convinced that Japan must necessarily pass through the same process, like a set sequence of scenes at a theatre. For this reason, they thought, the government must be accused of tyranny and resisted; only thus could the Diet come into existence.[1] Such beliefs were of course quite mistaken. There was no such necessary process of evolution. The members of the present government were not tyrannous reactionaries - but former minkenronsha, and the best way to establish the longed-for Diet would be to collaborate with them on the basis of the common ground between them - in short by befriending the government rather than antagonising it.[2]

On the controversial question of establishing the Diet itself, Fukuzawa was for some years cautious. In his essay Tsuuzoku Kokkenron (1878) he contended that the time was not yet ripe for such a step. Neither the government nor the people as yet understood what the institution really stood for or how it should be worked, nor what should be the proper demarkation between the functions of the Diet and those of the executive. It was obvious therefore that an immediate establishment could only result in futile bickerings for power between the government and members of the Diet, in the course of which both sides would lose sight of their true purpose and function - much as a samurai learning swordsmanship might forget that the

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 295-6.
2. Ima no Chooroo Seikyaku wa Naniyue ni wa-sezaru ka, ZFZ IV, 688-690.

true purpose of his efforts was proficiency on the battlefield, and come to regard mere competitions in the doojoo as his ultimate end.[1]

The following year, however, his views changed. He described in his Autobiography how an article he wrote advocating the immediate establishment of a Diet started a wave of violent enthusiasm for the subject which culminated in the government's promise in 1881 to set up a Diet in 1889.

> "Soon after the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 when everything had settled down quietly and people were suffering rather from the lack of excitement than too much of it, the idea suddenly came into my head that if I wrote an article advocating the opening of a Diet, people would probably agree with me. So I wrote the article and showed it to Fujita Mokichi and Minoura Katsundo, the editors of the Yuubin Hoochi Shimbun - for this was before the Jiji Shimpoo started - and said to them, "If you can use this article as an editorial in your newspaper, please do so. I am sure that people will be pleased. But if you publish it as it is, people will certainly recognise my style - so change the wording as you may think best, so long as you don't interfere with the meaning. It will be interesting to see how the public receives it." Fujita and Minoura, being young and energetic, were glad to take my article and published it immediately as a series of editorials in the Hoochi Shimbun. At that time there was very little argument in favour of a Diet and we didn't have much hope of the articles becoming particularly popular. The subject filled the whole of the editorial columns every day for about a week, and Fujita and Minoura also wrote articles challenging the other

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1. Tsuuzoku Kokkenron, FZ V, 295-6.

papers to state their attitudes on the subject.

Then, extraordinary to relate, after two or three months, the argument spread through all the Tokyo newspapers, even into the country papers, until enthusiasts from the provinces began to come up to Tokyo to present petitions for the opening of the Diet. This was certainly amusing, but I couldn't help feeling rather alarmed at the same time at the extent to which the movement had gone. For on thinking it over I had to admit that I had written the article largely for fun, though I hoped it might do something towards promoting civilization. My whim had unexpectedly shaken the whole country, and there was no knowing where it might end. I felt just as though I had started a heath fire in autumn. Certainly the seeds of interest in the Diet had been sown at the time of the Restoration, and people had been talking about it from the first years of Meiji - so that the origin of the movement lay many years back and I certainly couldn't claim to have been the originator myself. But my long article of several hundred words was the immediate cause of widespread public discussion, and really could be said to be the fuse which ignited the whole."[1]

This series of articles, entitled Kokkairon, appeared in the Yuubin Hoochi Shimbun from July 29th to August 10th 1879. From this time until the government's promise in 1881, Fukuzawa lost no opportunity of advocating the immediate establishment of a Diet.

Fukuzawa hoped and expected that the Japanese Diet would follow the model of the English Parliament. The advantages of the English Cabinet

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, 602-3.

system in his eyes were that it enabled the government in power to be strong and efficient on a firm basis of public approval, but at the same time prevented it from becoming tyrannical by allowing for frequent changes of government according to public opinion.[1] The device by which the government consisted of men taken from the majority party in the House of Commons would undoubtedly give the government a sure basis for firm and resolute actions.[2] One of his doubts about the Meiji government in the late 70s and early 80s was that its basis of power was so dubious. Its members could give no satisfactory answer to the question as to why they and no others should hold the reins of government, beyond the fact that to do so was their due reward for their merit in accomplishing the Restoration. This argument might have had something in it two hundred years before, but the fact remained that at present the public thought that they held their position not by right of their merit in accomplishing the Restoration, nor by right of the fact that they were more able and intelligent than other people - but simply because they happened to belong to the clans of Satsuma, Chooshuu, and Tosa. Theywere therefore regarded in the light of uninvited guests.[3] A Diet would give the government a strong and rational basis in public approval, and would therefore strengthen rather than weaken it, as the <u>minkenronsha</u> so misguidedly believed.[4]

A Diet on the English model would also have the inestimable advantage of possessing the machinery for frequent changes in government, should public

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1. <u>Jiji Shoogen</u>, FZ V, 326-7.
2. Ibid. 321-2.
3. Ibid. 280-2, 301.
4. <u>Jiji Shimpoo Hatsuda no Shushi</u>, FZ VIII, 5.

opinion desire them. In this way the institution of government would be accommodated to the times; it would move with the times and thus avoid the danger of wakudeki - of becoming valued for its own sake rather than for the way it worked. Frequent changes in government, Fukuzawa contended, were demanded by human nature itself and hence was the only way in which a country could achieve harmony and stability. A glance at history would prove this. In Chinese history for example, if a minister succeeded in staying in power for more than ten years he was invariably accused of treachery and evil practices. Look at Li Lin-fu of the T'ang dynasty, who was accused of suppressing free speech and other tyrannies, when in fact his only crime had been that he retained power for nineteen years. Had he resigned after three years or so he would probably rank as one of the wise statesmen of the T'ang dynasty. The English system, however, was so flexible that it enabled changes in government to be effected before popular discontent had time to ferment. It would not prevent discontent itself arising, but the changes would succeed in soothing one lot of grievances while another lot matured, like eating last year's grain while this year's ripened.[1]

The English Constitution was also to be emulated in its treatment of the institution of the Throne. Fukuzawa's views on the position to be held by the Emperor in the new Constitution, to be found in his two essays Teishitsuron (1882) and Sonnooron (1888), were indeed remarkably similar to those in Bagehot's English Constitution. The Emperor must at all costs be

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1. Minjoo Isshin, FZ V, 220-228. Fukuzawa gives a list of all the English Prime Ministers from 1784 to 1879 and the lengths of their tenures of office. The average length he works out to be just over three years, a laudably short period. Ibid. 233-5.

kept above politics. He must on no account ally himself with any political party or embroil himself in political strife.[1] His function should be to provide a focus for the people's loyalty such as could not be found in mere laws. Laws could deal only with the outward aspects of people's behaviour; they could not command the emotion of loyalty. Rates of pay and hours of work alone could not command the loyalty of an employee towards his employer. He must have some 'feeling' of loyalty. It was the Emperor who should be the focus of this emotional (joo) side of the people's relations with the government.[2]

It seems clear that Fukuzawa was confidently expecting a Parliamentary Cabinet in the new Constitution, not a transcendental one. In a letter to Itoo and Inoue in 1881, he wrote; "We have decided that whatever kind of political parties arise, the reins of government must fairly and squarely be given to the party with a majority of popular votes."[3]

The possibility of the promised Consitution developing into an instrument of absolute government seems never to have occurred to him. Even after the promulgation of the Constitution in which a transcendental Cabinet was announced, Fukuzawa continued to believe that the Cabinet would in practice, if not in theory, be composed of those of the majority party in the Diet.

> "Whatever its theory may be," he wrote in 1893, "it will show itself in practice to be a responsible Cabinet, whose members will change in accordance with the majority in the Diet."[4]

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1. Teishitsuron, FZ V, 439-442. Bagehot's work was in Fukuzawa's library.
2. Ibid, 443-4.
3. Letter to Itoo and Inoue, 1881. Quoted in Maruyama Masao's introduction to FS IV, 408.
4. Seifu no Chii Uramu ni tarazu, ZFZ III, 654.

It is perhaps strange that Fukuzawa, who showed himself to be so perspicacious in diagnosing the feudal weaknesses of the Japanese, should have been so entirely wrong over the constitutional future of the country. Possibly he was blinded by his optimistic faith in an inevitable evolution in politics towards the freedom of the individual and the disappearance of the institution of government. He believed the yoke of Tokugawa autocracy to have been thrown off by the inevitable force of progress among the people; it was _jisei_ which ordained that knowledge should increase among the people until they were emancipated from the autocratic government which had been hindering and stifling their natural progress. It was therefore scarcely conceivable that Japan should retrogress once more to an autocracy.

Holding the opinions he did of the government and the _minkenronsha_, it is scarcely surprising that Fukuzawa should not have been anxious to ally himself with either party. He preferred to remain outside, in the hopes, first, of setting an example of 'independence' to all those engaged in the undignified scramble for government posts, like insects swarming round a plate of food.[1]

> "To show people how wrong they have been over this, and to point out the true principles of independence and civilization, someone must be an example. . . I felt I would like to make myself an example, whether or not I should succeed. I decided that whatever might happen to me I should not care in the least, but would be completely free from care in

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1. _Fukuoo Jiden_, FZ VII, 592-7. Fukuzawa enumerated three more reasons why he had no desire for a government post. He disliked the feudal arrogance of government officials, their low morality, and those of them who had formerly served under the Bakufu and professed loathing and contempt for the new government, but who before very long had secured for themselves lucrative posts in it.

> my independence. If I should be the poorer for it, I should simply spend less money. If I should make money, I should spend it as I wished. But at least I should not have to depend on the government and its officials."[1]

It was more urgent and important, in fact, to try to promote the principle of <u>kammin-choowa</u> - harmony between government and people - by pointing out to both parties that their quarrels were petty and insignificant compared with the dangers which threatened Japan from without. If they persisted in their present wasteful bickering they might well one day find themselves in the position of the shellfish who thought himself safe and sound inside his shell until the day, hearing unusual sounds outside, he looked out to find that both he and his shell were on the chopping board in a fish market.[2]

> "All in all," he wrote in his Autobiography, "my activities in politics have been those of a 'diagnostician.' I have no idea of taking a government post and wielding political power myself in order to cure the nation's illnesses. But in everything I have done my great wish has always been to lead the whole country into the ways of civilization, and to make Japan a great nation, strong in military might, prosperous in trade."[3]

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1. <u>Fukuoo Jiden</u>, FZ VII, 597.
2. <u>Teishitsuron</u>, FZ V, 454.
3. <u>Fukuoo Jiden</u>, FZ VII, 604.

Chapter 9.

International Relations

There finally remained the problem of what should be the 'enlightened' attitude to the foreign threat, and hence the 'civilized' view of the principles which should govern the relations between different countries.

Fukuzawa's own ideas on the subject underwent a remarkable change in the course of his career. From the first, of course, he had been an advocate of kaikoku, but not for some years was he troubled by the fear of foreign aggression. His early arguments for opening the country to foreign intercourse were based, indeed, not on fear for Japan's weakness, but on the idea that both duty and self-interest required that she should renounce her isolation and participate in the comity of nations. In an early work Toojin Oorai, written about 1865 and circulated in manuscript, he attempted to counter several of the current anti-foreign arguments.[1] It was very foolish and in fact scarcely human, he declared, to think of foreigners as an inferior species of greedy and predatory animals, with whom it was not fitting for the citizens of divine country to associate. It was quite wrong factually to think that trade with foreigners would only result in bringing demoralising luxuries into the country, while articles of good and true worth were drained out; or that foreign trade was responsible for the deterioration in the quality of toofu and the rise in the price of rice. It was quite wrong too to imagine that the foreigners, in seeking intercourse

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1. Toojin Oorai was written with the object of convincing Kanda Koohei's old and obstinate servant that her fears and dislike of foreigners were unreasonable. Kanda himself had quite failed to persuade her that all the ills from which Japan was then suffering were not directly caused by the foreigners. Fukuzawa regarded the old lady as a typical case of anti-foreign prejudice and therefore an interesting challenge to the persuasive powers of 'reason'. FZ I, p. 12.
   Fukuzawa did not publish the essay, probably because of the risk of assassination which all pro-foreign writers ran at the time.

with Japan, were bent only on conquest and exploitation. They were seeking intercourse in accordance with the Law of Nations, wherein was enshrined the 'rational principle in the world' (sekai futsuu no doori) which insisted on moral behaviour between nations just as much as it did between individuals.

> "There is a proverb which says 'Strangers are always robbers.' When we first saw the foreigners and knew nothing whatever of their intentions, we were naturally concerned for our country's safety and feared lest they might all be hostile robbers. But now that some months have gone by, we should really try to consider them more calmly. They have not come to Japan to seize the country by force. They have already despatched envoys to conclude treaties in accordance with the proper etiquette. . .so that we too should place our trust in them in accordance with the rational principle which exists in the world. If by any chance a nation were to behave so disgracefully as to try to seize our country, even though we had placed our trust in her, that nation would violate the rational principle and would become a criminal in the eyes of the world."[1]

A substantial proof of the efficacy and the binding power of this 'rational principle' was the existence of a weak nation like Portugal. It would be only too easy for England or France to capture her, but the fact that they respected her integrity proved that:

> "A country which abides by reason (doori) cannot be assailed from without. If any other country should attack her without reason, another will always come to her aid. If France were to attack her,

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1. FZ I, p. 23.

for example, England would send forces to support her. . . Thus if a country should start an irrational war, not only will she be defeated, but she will also incur the eternal contempt of the entire world. If she abides peacefully by reason, she need not fear the hostility even of great countries."[1]

This rational principle, in which Fukuzawa believed at this time, was not merely a vague moral ideal which countries ought to follow in their relations with each other. It was something which they did in fact follow in practice. England's conduct in the Opium War, for example, was perfectly understandable and justifiable on these terms. The Chinese knew nothing of the existence of doori between nations. They were obstinately mistrustful and contemptuous of all foreigners. If only they had reasoned quietly with England over the import of opium, explaining calmly and politely that the drug was harmful and requesting that the imports be stopped, England would have had no 'reason' at all to harm China and would have immediately prohibited the import of opium. As it was, however, the Chinese had violently burned and destroyed the English opium - so that England had 'reason' in plenty to grow angry and wage war on China. "Nobody in the world blames England. They simply laugh at China."[2]

The affair of the "Arrow" in 1857 could also be explained away on the grounds of 'reason' to the discredit of the Chinese. A ship with an English captain and flying an English flag came to Canton to trade. Chinese officials forced their way on board and seized the Chinese crew of twelve on

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1. FZ I, p. 25.
2. Ibid. p. 24. The Opium War was, of course, the event which, more than any other had served to stir up Japanese fears of Western aggression, and hence most needed to be explained away if the foreigners were to be considered amiable and reasonable.

the rumour that they were pirates. The English captain appealed to the English consul, who appealed to the Chinese governor - and after a complicated series of events in which the Chinese always behaved unreasonably and untrustworthily, the English quite justifiably brought armed force to bear on them.[1]

In 1873 he was still writing in the same vein, and rather more explicitly as to the nature of the 'rational principle'. It was reason which ordained that all men had equal rights, he declared. It was the same principle of reason which ordained that all nations had equal rights.

> "If there is no reason for one man to harm another, there is no reason for two men to harm two, or for a million or ten million to harm each other. The rational principle in things takes no account of numbers."[2]

The 'rational' distinction between circumstances (arisama) and rights (kengi) applied just as much to nations as to individuals. Some nations might happen to be stronger and richer than others, just as a sumoo wrestler happened to be stronger than a bedridden invalid. But the strength and wealth of nations were merely their arisama; they had nothing to do with the question of rights, in which all nations were equal.

> "Japan and the Western countries lie between the same heaven and the same earth. They are warmed by the same sun, and their peoples have the same human feelings. . . Thus countries must teach and learn from each other, pray for each other's welfare, and associate with each other in accordance with the laws of nature and man (tenri-jindoo). We must respect even a black African slave if he has reason on his side. We need not fear to

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1. Shin-ei Koosai Shimatsu, FZ II, 578.
2. Gakumon no Susume, Part III. FZ III, 17.

oppose all the battleships of England and America for the sake of what is right (<u>michi</u>)."[1]

"Both individuals and countries possess freedom based on natural reason (<u>ten no doori</u>). A country should not fear to defend its freedom against interference, even though the whole world is hostile. An individual should not hesitate to defend his own freedom, even though the entire government were against him."[2]

At this period Fukuzawa seems to have rejected any ideaof compromise between reason and force or between right and might. See, for another example, his <u>Hibi no Oshie</u>, written for children in 1871:

"They say that Momotaroo went to Onigashima to get the treasure there. Don't you think that was disgraceful? The treasure belonged to the demons and they had been guarding it carefully. If Momotaroo went to take away treasure which belonged to someone else, then he was a wicked robber. If he had gone to punish the demons for being wicked and troublesome that would have been very good. But simply to take the treasure home to the old man and the old woman was a greedy and low thing to do."[3]

Fukuzawa's surprising faith at this period in the efficacy of the law of Nations, not only as a moral imperative, but as a description of the way in which nations actually behaved towards each other, may have been promoted to some extent by the verbal confusion through which these legal doctrines became known to the Japanese.

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1. <u>Gakumon no Susume</u>, Part III. FZ III, p. 4.
2. Ibid, p. 5.
3. <u>Hibi no Oshie</u>, ZFZ VII, 406-7.

Until the middle 1860s the Japanese had virtually no knowledge of the Law of Nations or of any body of international law. Other nations they had tended to regard in the light of what was known as the ka-i or Flower-Barbarian view - according to which all foreigners were ignorant barbarians surrounding an enlightened Middle Kingdom and tending to become more barbarous the further away they were from the middle. This view had, of course, originated in China, but it had been adopted by the Japanese as a useful justification for the policy of isolation.[1] It was obviously a far cry from a Law of Nations ordaining that all countries had equal rights - but not so far, perhaps, for the Japanese as for the Chinese. The Chinese had never found it difficult to believe that Japan was one of the surrounding barbarians, but the Japanese were always hard put to prove that China held that position in relation to Japan. Even a fanatical advocate of jooi like Oohashi Totsuan found difficulty in proving that it was indeed Japan which was the Middle Kingdom. He attempted to argue that both China and Japan were Middle Kingdoms because they respected duty (gi) while all other nations counted as barbarians because they cared only for profit (ri). And again that China under the Manchu dynasty had so degenerated that it was now Japan which was the true Middle Kingdom.[2] But such arguments carried little sublime

1. It agreed also with the Shinto assumptions of Japan as a shinkoku, or divine country, her divinity naturally making her superior to every other nation.
2. Hekija Kogoto, MBZ Vol. 15, p. 125. All countries, Totsuan asserted, which followed gi, duty, by observing the teachings of the Sages, where ka countries. But if a country which had once followed the teachings later turned against them, it automatically joined the ranks of i, barbarian countries. China was of course once a ka country, since she was the birthplace of the Sages, but lately she had suffered the teachings to become quite perverted and had therefore fallen to the status of barbarian. For China to call herself a ka country still would be like foxes and badgers calling themselves bambutsu no rei because they lived in abandoned human dwellings. Japan was the only country which had preserved the teachings properly and therefore the

conviction, and in any case were not the pure, unadulterated *ka-i* view, since they implied that it was possible for more than one country to hold the position of Middle Kingdom and hence, logically, to be on equal terms.

A more powerful medium, however, inducing the Japanese to accept the unfamiliar doctrines of the Law of Nations was the highly ambiguous terminology first chosen to express these ideas.

The first school of international law to be brought to Japan was that of Grotius - first introduced through William Martin's Chinese translation of Wheaton's *Elements of International Law*.[1] This work, entitled *Bankoku Koohoo* was one of the many books about the West to be imported from China during this period. It was published in Peking in 1864 and reproduced in Edo the following year, where it seems to have been received in scholarly circles with an enthusiasm almost amounting to reverence. Three years later it was supplemented by the essays of Nishi Amane and Tsuda Shindoo, based on the notes they had taken of the lectures of the Dutch legal scholar Vissering during their period of study in Leyden.[2]

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only country which merited the title *ka*.

On this point see also Maruyama Masao: "Kindai Nihon Shisooshi ni okeru Kokka Risei no Mondai", *Temboo*, January 1949. There is also an interesting discussion of the way in which Chu Hsi's ideas acted as a medium between the *ka-i* view and the Law of Nations.

1. William Martin (丁韙良) was an American missionary born in Indiana in 1827, who lived 67 years in China and contributed greatly to the spread of Western knowledge there. He wrote a number of books in good Chinese, several of which, on religious and scientific subjects, were imported into Japan and used for *keimoo* purposes. See Yoshino Sakuzoo: "Waga Kuni Kindaishi ni okeru Seiji Ishiki no Hassei", in *Meiji Bunka Kenkyuu*, p. 57-66. That the legal terms *kenri* and *gimu* were first taken from William Martin's book has already been noticed.

   An account of the various branches of Western knowledge which came to Japan by way of China can be found in Nakayama Kyuushiroo: "Kinsei Shina yori Ishin Zengo no Nihon ni oyoboshitaru Shoshu no Eikyoo," in *Meiji Ishinshi Kenkyuu*.

2. Nishi's essay *Bankoku Koohoo* and Tsuda's *Taisei Kokuhooron* are both in MBZ Vol. 8. Nishi and Tsuda were the first official Bakufu students to go abroad to study a subject other than the sciences. See Yoshino

Both Wheaton and Vissering belonged to the school of Grotius, Pufendorf and Wolf, and hence stressed that relations between nations were based on Natural Law. Natural Law, Grotius had believed, was the law emanating from man's reason, with which he was naturally endowed and the deliverances of which were absolutely valid independently of the will of God. God could no more reverse the rational principles of Natural Law ~~any more~~ than he could cause two times two not to make four.[1]

This conception of Natural Law, as a moral pattern or norm inherent in man's nature, was easily identifiable with Chu Hsi's doctrine of man's Good Nature - again a moral pattern or norm inherent, albeit in an obscured state, in man's nature. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Japanese, with no legal terminology of their own to correspond with the Western concepts, should have tried to render the ideas of western Natural Law by means of old and familiar Confucian words expressing the roughly similar idea of a pattern or norm in nature. Words such as *tenri*, *tendoo*, *seihoo*, *shizen-no-hoo*, were used to translate the ideas of Grotius - words which were all either Confucian in origin or very easily associated with Confucian doctrine. In Uryuu Mitora's translation of Wheaton, for example, the phrase *jus gentium* is rendered *bankoku no koodoo*, and defined, in purely Confucian terms, as *tendoo no joori yori idetaru jindoo no ikka* - part of the moral Way of man proceeding from the laws of Nature.[2] These early works on international law, therefore,

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Sakuzoo's introduction to the essay, MBZ VIII, p. 2. Also Suzuki Yoshio; *Waga Kuni ni okeru Seiyoo Hoogaku no Ranshoo*.

1. A.P. D'Entreves: *Natural Law*, 51-53.
2. Quoted in Osatake Takeshi: *Ishin Zengo ni okeru Rikken Shisoo*, p. 176 cf also Shigeno Yasutsugu's *Wayaku Bankoku Koohoo* where it was stated that Grotius's theory was based on Mencius's theory of man's innate good nature (*seizen-ryoochi*) and was also identifiable with the doctrines of Wang Yang-ming. Quoted in Yoshino, op.cit., p. 71.

not unnaturally led the Japanese to believe that Bankoku Koohoo or the Law of Nations was something akin to tendoo or sen-oo no michi, the Confucian Way of the Sages, or at any rate was something of the nature of a moral Way in the Confucian sense.[1] The misapprehension was encouraged, further, by the government's use of the words koohoo and koodoo in the early years of Meiji. The Meiji government, feeling the need to justify its sudden and surprising policy of friendliness to foreigners, found a convenient excuse in these words. In the past, they announced, they had imagined foreigners to be no better than beasts and birds, but they now discovered this to have been a mistaken idea, and that in fact there existed a 'universal principle' in terms of which it would be perfectly right and proper for the Japanese to associate with them. This principle they named koohoo or bankoku koohoo, or alternatively unai no daidoo or tenchi no koodoo. The foreigners were perfectly justified, they declared, in seeking intercourse in accordance with this principle, and for Japan to refuse to cooperate would give them ample and just cause for hostility. The government used these phrases with great frequency, so that before long they became highly fashionable with the general public. Most Japanese, however, had little clear idea of what the words meant, but tended to associate them with familiar Confucian moral terms such as sen-oo no michi, the Way of the Sages, and in particular to invest them with the emotion and moral fervour which the old Confucian words had always evoked - rather as the words doori, reason, and bunmei-kaika, civilization, a few years later came to be enthusiastically though impre-

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1. Yoshino, op.cit., p. 67-75.

impossible for tenchi no koodoo to prevail against it, particularly when it came to relations between peoples as totally different as those of East and West.[1]

By 1876 therefore Fukuzawa had decided that relations between nations were on an entirely different footing from relations between individuals. It is not surprising to find him writing two years later in the following vein:

> "International law and treaties of friendship have high-sounding names, it is true, but they are nothing more than external, nominal forms. In fact international relations are based on nothing more than quarrels over power and profit. Look at the facts, past and present. Everyone is well aware that there is not a single example of a small and weak nation maintaining its independence by relying on treaties and international law. In relations between large countries too, let alone small ones, none will ever let slip an opportunity of taking advantage of the other. . . A few cannons are worth more than a hundred volumes of international law. A case of ammunition is of more use than innumerable treaties of friendship. Cannons and bullets are not means of asserting a reason already existing. They are instruments for making a reason of their own."[2]

In other words, the vaunted rational principle had no authority whatever in international relations, whether as a moral ideal or as a description of what actually happened. The Law of Nations was a name with no correspondence

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1. Bummeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 251-2. Maruyama Masao thinks that Fukuzawa's word hempashin may be derived from the word 'bias' as used by Herbert Spencer in "the bias of patriotism", in Chapter 9 of The Study of Sociology. FS IV, 418.
2. Tsuuzoku Kokkenron, FZ V, p. 119.

cisely used.[1]

Thus Fukuzawa's initial optimistic estimate of the binding power of the Law of Nations may have been unconsciously influenced by the Confucian terminology. If Bankoku Koohoo was indeed a moral Way of the same nature as the Confucian michi, then it was to be expected that the western nations would take as serious pains to act in accordance with it as most samurai took in regard to the Confucian ethic.

The illusion did not last long, however, for by 1876, he was writing in a very different vein.

Some scholars, he now declared, imagined that international relations were based on the principle of tenchi no koodoo. They believed that countries never meant to harm each other, and therefore all that was necessary was to leave everything to nature, letting people travel and trade as they liked. If a country should find its rights or interests threatened, it was probably its own fault, for so long as it behaved sincerely and honestly it had nothing to fear. This might all be very true in relations between individuals, Fukuzawa continued, but it would not work in relations between nations, for the reason that it was impossible to get rid of the sentiment (joojitsu) which bound groups of people together into clans or nations. It was ridiculous to think that this powerful and persistent feeling of joojitsu could be dispelled by simply invoking tenchi no koodoo. One should recognise the feeling for what it was - an irrational bias (hempashin) in favour of one's own clan or country. For the time being at any rate it was

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1. Osatake Takeshi: Kinsei Nihon no Kokusai Kannen no Hattatsu, Chapter 3. In Gendai Shigaku Taikei, Vo. 5. Also Yoshino, op.cit. 67-75.
Osatake writes, op.cit. p. 50, that when the standard term for the Law of Nations was changed in 1881 from Bankoku Koohoo to Kokusaihoo, the word lost all its potency.
See also Osatake's Bakumatsu Gaikoo Monogatari, p. 19-22, for the strange ways in which the word koohoo was used.

whatever in reality. The theory, certainly, talked a great deal about the brotherhood of man and mutual help, but:

"When we leave theory and take a look at what is actually happening at present in international relations, we are astounded to find that practice bears no relation whatever with the theory. Since ancient times it has been the custom for countries to make treaties with each other. These documents always profess in the most solemn terms principles of friendship between the two countries. But what is the point, may I ask, for such solemn and high-sounding principles? Is one to suppose that the countries really respect the treaties because they think it immoral to break them? I have never been able to discover any evidence for such an idea. . . When did Napoleon I ever respect a treaty or let it halt him in his designs of conquest? And what about Frederick the Great? And Louis XIV? And what of the recent relations between Russia and Turkey? There are any number of examples. . . Nations are just like merchants, who care only for profit and give no thought to duty, and who exchange contracts with each other only to watch for the first opportunity of breaking them. Merchants however will hesitate to break their bonds for fear of proceedings in a law court. But there is no law court in the world to deal with broken bonds between countries. Thus the factor deciding whether promises shall be kept or not, and whether treaties possess authority or not, is the relative wealth and strength of the two countries. . .

But the point I am trying to make now is that our country is in the greatest danger. Moralists may tell us to sit back and wait for the day when war will cease, but as I see it the Western countries have already

greatly developed their military techniques and are likely to develop them even further in future. Lately they have been inventing new and curious weapons every day, and their armies have been daily increasing in size.

All this may be useless and stupid, but when others treat one stupidly one can only do the same back to them. When others use violence, we must be violent too. When others use deceitful trickery we must do likewise. And when one is taken up with stupidity, violence and trickery, one has no time to think of right and proper moral behaviour. I said before somewhere that nationalism (kokkenron) was a temporary expedient (kendoo) - but I confess myself to be a follower of this expedient."[1]

And again, the following year:

"A nation does not come out on top because it is in the right. It is right because it has come out on top."[2]

In other words, the proverb Kateba Kangun - roughly equivalent to 'might is right' - was entirely applicable to international relations.

It was, indeed, difficult to continue to believe in the existence of a Law of Nations based on reason in the face of the brute facts of the behaviour of the Western nations towards the Eastern. European imperialism as seen and felt in practice hardly bore out the European professions of the Law of Nations. As early as 1876 Fukuzawa was writing:

"It is not long since the foreigners came to our country, and up till

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 255-6.
2. Heiron, FZ V, 510.

now they have not had time to harm or disgrace us very much so that most people are not particularly worried about them. But those who truly have their country's welfare at heart must judge the foreigners by what they have done and are doing in the rest of the world. To whom did the present America once belong? The Red Indians, who were originally masters of the country were driven out by the white men, so that the position of host and guest has entirely changed. The civilization of America is thus not really America's at all, but the white man's. And besides, what about the various Eastern countries and the Pacific Islands? Have the European countries really respected the rights and interests and integrity of the countries with which they have come into contact? What about Persia? And India? And Siam? And Luzon and Hawaii? The Sandwich Islands since their discovery by Captain Cook in 1778 are said to have progressed in civilization much more quickly than the neighbouring islands. But their population, which was 3,400,000 when they were discovered, had dropped to 140,000 by 1823 - so that in the space of 50 years the population had decreased each year by 8%. There are many causes of increase and decrease in population, but let us ignore these for the time being and ask what exactly is this thing known as 'civilization'. For the people of these islands it meant that they gave up the bad custom of cannibalism, but also that they became slaves of the white man. In the case of an enormous country like China, the white men have not yet been able to penetrate into the interior and have left their mark only on the coast - but it looks very much as though in the future the Chinese Empire will become European territory. Wherever the Europeans come, the land ceases to be

productive, and trees and plants cease to grow. Worse, still, the human race sometimes dies out. If people understand these things clearly, and at the same time realise that Japan is an Eastern country, they must inevitably fear for the future, even though up till now Japan has suffered no great harm from foreign intercourse."[1]

It was impossible to believe that the so-called Law of Nations applied to all nations indiscriminately when confronted with the way in which the Western nations treated the Eastern.

"Western nations", Fukuzawa wrote in 1881, "call themselves 'Christian nations' and make a clear distinction between themselves and everyone else. The word 'nations' in their so-called Law of Nations does not refer to all the nations in the world, but only to those that happen to be Christian. The Law of Nations has never been seen to operate in non-Christian countries. It is thus something based entirely on custom and sentiment. . . There are some Western scholars, certainly, who deplore this and advocate a truly fair and impartial Law of Nations, but in practise it usually works out in the very opposite way. Take, for example, the cruel way in which the British have ruled the Indians for some years past. Their relations with the Indians could hardly be described as human intercourse. But if one says that the Indians are treated in this way simply because they are weak, it should follow that the many weak countries in the West would also be treated in the same cruel way. The fact that they are not treated in this way proves that it is not differences in strength but difference in race and kind which

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1. <u>Bunmeiron no Gairyaku</u>, FZ IV, 249-50.

are the cause of differences in treatment. Indeed, if it should happen that one of the small countries of their own kind should suffer calamity, someone will always go to their aid. This is what they call the Balance of Power. Some people try to maintain that the Balance of Power is governed by considerations of political advantage, but this is not to be believed. What really underlies it in practice is the sentiment men bear towards people of their own kind. For whatever excesses Westerners may commit in Eastern countries, no one would dream of lifting a finger against them."[1]

At the time when he wrote Toojin Oorai, Fukuzawa had interpreted the independence of a weak country like Portugal to be proof of the supremacy of doori in relations between nations; but in 1881 he regarded the same fact as proof of its failure to operate between Christian and non-Christian countries.

Nor did the foreigners resident in Japan at the time help to dispel the unfavourable impression.

"People say that foreigners are righteous, reasonable and deeply charitable, and probably the foreigners themselves are all convinced of this. But the evidence of my own eyes tells me that it is rubbish. I speak only of the foreigners in this country, mind - there may well be wise, virtuous and charitable gentlemen in England for all I know. But just take a look at the foreigners living in our open ports. One would hardly think that 99 out of a hundred of them were virtuous gentlemen. They tell me that all foreigners believe in a future life - but I should judge that only very few of those in our open ports will succeed in

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 350-1.

getting to Heaven. They eat and drink, and then leave without paying. They ride in rikishas without paying. They accept payment in advance for a contract, and then fail to deliver the goods. . . Not only are they grasping about money; they often break laws and offend against propriety. They fire guns near people's houses, push their way through closed streets, gallop about on horses. . ."[1]

In short, many of the resident foreigners were hardly a good advertisement for the moral principles their envoys so sanctimoniously preached.

This progressive disillusionment, which by 1878 brought Fukuzawa to the belief that international relations were governed not by reason but by the principle of jakuniku-kyooshoku[2] - the strong devouring the weak - landed

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1. Posthumous manuscripts, FZ I, 414. Sir Rutherford Alcock recorded that the only prohibitive regulations imposed on foreigners in Japan in the early days of intercourse were "furious riding; firing loaded arms in the settlement; taking the wrong side of the road, which is often filled with large retinues and processions composed of Daimios and their followers. . .; sleeping in distant localities. . .; and lastly shooting game." Such regulations Sir Rutherford considered to be essential where "British subjects of a very promiscuous character might take up their residence." But even these mild rules, it seems, were resented by many of the foreign community as "abominable restrictions on the liberty of the subject, really repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen", and calculated only to "oppress and lower them in the eyes of the natives." The Capital of the Tycoon, II, 391-2.
2. Fukuzawa was by no means alone in these fears. The minken newspapers of the late 70s and 80s shared his conviction that international relations were governed, not by reason or by 'right', but by the principle of jakuniku-kyooshoku. See Oka Yoshitake: "Meiji Shoki no Jiyuu-minkenronsha no Me ni eijitaru Tooji no Kokusai Joosei", in Seiji oyobi Seijishi Kenkyuu, 1935, for the reactions of the minken press to the current European policy of Imperialism. Great interest was taken in so apparently remote a subject as the fall of Disraeli's government in 1880. The transition from Disraeli's Conservative government to the Liberal administration under Gladstone was thought to imply a slackening of the policy of Imperialism in England and hence materially to affect the Far East.

him at the same time in the quandary of advocating two entirely different reasons for the adoption of western civilization. Civilization, and the spirit of independence which inspired it, might be ultimately a means towards man's perfection. But at the same time it was the only means of holding one's own in the brutal international struggle. It would unashamedly make Japan stronger - and this consideration was, until she was strong enough to be out of danger, of paramount importance.

Thus minken, the rights of the people, was not only an end in itself, but also a necessary condition of kokken, the rights, or rather might of the country. Only a people conscious of their own rights could be expected to prove the responsible, realiable and above all united citizens capable of preserving the country's freedom. But, Fukuzawa still stressed, it was important to remember that kokken was by no means the sole reason for minken. On a longer view it was kokken whichshould be regarded as the means leading back to minken. "Tennen no jiyuu-minkenron wa seidoo ni shite, jin-i no kokkenron wa kendoo nari", he wrote in 1881. "Man's true path of righteousness lies in the theory of natural freedom and rights. State power, which is devised by man, is a temporary expedient." Kokken was nothing but a kendoo, an expedient, necessary merely while man was as yet imperfectly civilized. It was not man's natural or proper state to live in separate countries under separate governments wielding separate spheres of power, any more than it was his nature to be in bad health. But his 'natural' state assumed an ideal society of Yaos and Shuns which as yet did not exist. Hence kokken, like the institution of government itself, was a means of dealing wit a temporary state of imperfection, which, once it had served its turn, must necessarily lead back again to jiyuu-minkenron, freedom and people's rights,

which was the seidoo, the morality proper to man.[1]

From 1882, however, until the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the tone of Fukuzawa's writings underwent a startling change. Influenced, probably, by the current high feeling on the question of Treaty Revision, he ceased to stress minken, either as the necessary condition or as the ultimate object of kokken, and devoted all his energies to impressing on people the importance of kokken. "The one object of my life," he wrote in 1882,

"is to extend Japan's kokken. Compared with considerations of kokken

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 249-252. The writers of the minken movement, on the other hand, seemed very often to forget that minken had any deeper significance than as a means of strengthening the country. The memorial demanding the establishment of a Diet, for example, presented by the Aikoku-kootoo to the government in 1874, argued that public discussion in a Diet would be the best way of developing in the people the spirit of initiative necessary towards strengthening and unifying the nation. (See W.W. McLaren: Japanese Government Documents, TASJ, Vol. XLII, Part I, 429-430). Itagaki declared that to give the people political power would be to bind them together in such a way as to create a fukoku-kyoohei. (See R. Scalapino: Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan, 49.) Ueki Emori, one of the most gifted writers of the movement, constantly stressed that only when its people were free, self-reliant and in possession of their rights could a country be strong. The English were able to defeat the Spanish Armada because they were free. (Minken Jiyuuron, MBZ V, 191). These writers appeared to regard minken as solely a means towards kokken, thus denying, as Scalapino has pointed out, one of the basic assumptions of liberalism - the freedom and worth of the individual as ends in themselves. See, for example, the article entitled Gishiron, On Dying for Duty, in the fourth number of the short-lived minken journal Sookai Zasshi, June 18th 1876, for an extreme expression of this view. "One's personal happiness, compared with the happiness of the country, is no more than a bubble in the ocean, or a clod of earth on the mountain. It is the people's duty to value the country's happiness without giving a thought to their own, and to repay their debt to the country with their lives." Quoted by Toyama Shigeki in "Seikanron, Jiyuu-minkenron, Hookenron", Part V, in Rekishigaku Kenkyuu, May 1950 - where there is a full discussion of the relations between minken and kokken in Meiji politics.
   On this point also see Maruyama Masao: "Meiji Kokka no Shisoo", in Nihon Shakai no Shiteki Kyuumei, compiled by the Rekishigaku Kenkyuukai. Also Marius B. Jansen: "Ooi Kentaroo: Radicalism and Chauvinism," FEQ, May 1952.

> the matter of internal government and into whose hands it falls is of no importance at all. Even if the government be autocratic in name and form, I shall be satisfied with it if it is strong enough to extend our _kokken_."[1]

Questions of internal government were, in other words, to be unashamedly subordinated to those of strength in international relations. _Minken_ and _kokken_ were no longer interdependent. _Kokken_ transcended _minken_. If an authoritarian government could ensure a stronger nation than could a liberal one, then let there be an authoritarian government. In a sense this was a plain denial of the very arguments by which Fukuzawa had justified the overthrow of the Bakufu: because the Bakufu was authoritarian and the people not free, it could not strengthen the country.

The country's military strength, moreover, seemed suddenly to assume unprecedented importance in Fukuzawa's mind. Before 1881 he had insisted that it would be positively harmful for Japan to try to emulate the West in the size of her armed forces without a corresponding increase in wealth and strength in other fields. She could never guarantee her independence merely by equipping herself with a strong army and navy. Some would-be patriots, indeed, declared that

> "If England has a thousand battleships, we should be a match for her if we had a thousand battleships too. But such people have no idea of the proportion of things. England does not possess only 1000 battleships, for if she is to have these she must also have ten thousand merchant

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1. _Hambatsu Kajin Seifuron_, FZ VIII, 23-4. For a full discussion of Fukuzawa's change of attitude during this period, see Tooyama Shigeki: "Nisshin Sensoo to Fukuzawa Yukichi", in _Fukuzawa Kenkyuu_, No. 6, p.36.

ships, and a hundred thousand seamen and the learning wherewith to teach them."[1]

To pile up armaments out of proportion to the country's real strength would only succeed in putting her into debt.

By 1881, however, we find him complaining that Japan was neglecting bu, things military, in favour of bun, things civil. A wrong emphasis, he insisted, because it was only by virtue of its bu that a country's bun derived its substance and strength. England's success in world trade was entirely due to her numerous battleships.[2]

If Fukuzawa's sudden neglect of minken in favour of kokken at this period might appear illiberal, the policy he recommended Japan to adopt towards the other Asiatic countries was frankly imperialistic.

The countries of Asia must, he now declared, combine together to resist the West. Since Asian countries were so vastly different from those of the West that mutual friendship and understanding were impossible, hostility was inevitable. The Asian countries should therefore make a united stand. But the question was which of them should take the lead? Korea and Persia were of course out of the question. China was certainly the largest, but she was entirely unfitted for the task of leadership. Though she had been in contact with the Western nations for over a hundred years she had not troubled to learn a single thing about their civilization, but had remained stolidly complacent in her own superstitions of astrology, dragons and kirins.[3]

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1. Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, FZ IV, 254-5.
2. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 331-2.
3. Ibid. 352.

It followed that the only country capable of assuming leadership in the Far East was Japan. For her own sake Japan should take it upon herself to try to strengthen the other Asiatic countries. A man with a stone house was no more secure against fire than a man with a wooden house, if his neighbour's house was made of wood. He must go to his neighbour and persuade him to build a stone house like his own if he was to feel secure against fire.

> "If need be he is justified in using force to make him do so. If a crisis should be at hand, he is justified in arbitrarily invading his neighbour's land - not because he covets his neighbour's land or hates his neighbour, but simply to protect his own house from fire."[1]

Japan facing the threat of Western aggression was in just the same predicament as the man in the stone house facing the threat of fire. She must use her armed forces to protect her neighbours in order to ensure her own safety. Korea, for example, was firmly set in obstinate xenophobia. The Koreans were incapable of looking after themselves, had no idea how to live decently and honourably, and were maltreated by their own government.

> "Hence if England or Russia were to invade their country they would let them do so, for they would be only too happy to become subjects of England or Russia. To be invaded by another country is not at all pleasant, but rather than live in hopeless misery and die in disgrace, it is at least a blessing in the midst of troubles to receive the protection of a strong and civilized country and to have one's life and property made secure."[2]

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1. Jiji Shoogen, FZ V, 354.
2. Choosen Jimmin no tame ni sono Kuni no Metsuboo wo kasu, ZFZ II, 65-67.

The argument that it was better to be colonised by a civilized country than remain in independent misery and barbarism Fukuzawa would obviously never allow to apply to Japan, at any stage of her history. As applied to Korea, however, it formed a convenient premiss for an invasion of that country by Japan herself.

> "We cannot wait for our neighbour countries to become so civilized that all may combine together to make Asia progress. We must rather break out of formation and behave in the same way as the civilized countries of the West are doing. . . We would do better to treat China and Korea in the same way as do the Western nations."[1]

Japan's intervention in Korea could thus be justified on the plea that it was for the sake of promoting civilization,[2] and of strengthening the whole of Asia against the West. The same argument might also be applied to decadent China.

> "It is quite useless to think that with the Manchu government in the state it is in today the Chinese people can be led to civilization. If the old government were overthrown there might be a change of heart among the people, but nothing can be done while it still stands, however great its statesmen may be - even though it should produce a hundred Li Hung-changs. To destroy the government is the only way to direct the people towards civilization. There is no guarantee that this would work out as well for China as the Restoration did for Japan, but for the sake of their own independence they ought not to scruple

1. Datsuaron, ZFZ II, 42.
2. Choosen Seiryaku, ZFZ I, 29-36.

> to overthrow the government, or at any rate to make the attempt. Even the Chinese should have enough gumption to know whether the government exists for the people or the people for the government."[1]

If the Chinese should rise up to overthrow the Manchu government, however, there was no doubt that the Western powers would take advantage of the disorder to step in and partition the country - which would mean a serious threat to the independence of Japan. Were this to happen, Japan could hardly stand and look on with her hands in her sleeves. She must bestir herself and join in the chase for the prize.[2]

Fukuzawa's nationalistic sentiments reached their climax during the Sino-Japanese War. He published a series of articles in the Jiji Shimpoo urging the vital need for government and people to work together for victory, and calling on the people to support the government.

But with Japan's victory in the war, Fukuzawa's anxieties over the threat to her independence melted away. She had proved herself strong enough at last to set at rest the fears which had beset him since 1872. Now at last, he believed, the Japanese could begin to look forward to the steady progress towards a society of Yaos and Shuns which was their true and ultimate object in life. Kokken was after all, he once again declared, merely a kendoo - a temporary expedient. Countries might struggle against each other like beasts and birds, killing and being killed, plundering and being plundered - but such behaviour should be regarded as no more than a temporary disease. That man, the highest of the 10,000 things, should

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1. Fukuoo Jiden, FZ VII, 560-1.
2. Heiron, FZ V, 522.

behave like beasts and birds was obviously unfitting - yet because he was as yet only half civilized his world was still to some extent a beast's world. And in the beasts' world a struggle for existence reigned in which it was not always possible to 'choose one's means'. Loyalty and patriotism were, therefore, of the nature of medicines to cure mankind of a passing disease.

> "From the point of view of man's true and perfect nature, patriotism is merely laughable. But what I earnestly hope for now is that we shall not forget that man's thought is infinitely profound and mysterious, and that even though we may argue that the struggle for existence is necessary and even though we may follow up our arguments in practice, deep in our hearts we must widen the range of our thoughts and realise that this is all nothing more than an necessary remedy for a sick world."[1]

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1. *Fukuoo Hyakuyowa*, No. 11, *Rikkoku*, FZ VII, 259-261.

Chapter 10.

Conclusion

The keimoo 'movement' did not sustain itself for long as a homogeneous group of writers and thinkers. By the end of the decade of the 1870s many of its most influential members had departed on their several ways. Katoo Hiroyuki became a thorough-going materialist, believing that the activities of the human mind as well as of the human body were analysable in terms of fixed laws of cause and effect. Nishimura Shigeki reverted to the Confucian ethic, albeit to an ostensibly modified version of it. Nakamura Keiu returned to the Chinese studies on which he had been brought up, becoming Professor of Kangaku at Tokyo University. There was hence no body of responsible, scholarly opinion which might have combatted the policy of the government to return to the canons of the Confucian ethic - a policy which became apparent after 1881 and culminated in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, by which the old virtues were effectively perpetuated for several more decades.

Fukuzawa however, with his students in various influential walks of life[1] and his books and essays selling in thousands, became in his latter years

1. Private business, politics and journalism were the occupations most favoured by Keio students. In November 1890 Fukuzawa was invited to a dinner by more than 30 members of the Diet, all of whom had been his former pupils at Keioo. (Japan Weekly Mail, November 22nd 1890). The Tookyoo Kooron commented on the 'common odour' of the ex-Keioo students in whatever walk of life they happened to be. "All the Fukuzawa men have an odour of their own. Whether it be a sweet odour or an offensive odour we do not pretend to say. But we find it significant that such a number of men should be held together by a common tie and should wield such a powerful influence in society." (Reported in the JWM, April 26th 1890). KeioO men were to be found too in unexpected fields. The famous Zen abbot Shaku Sooen studied at Keioo, and it was thought that his advanced habits of smoking and listening to gramophone records, for which he was criticized by other Zen priests, had been stimulated by Fukuzawa's teachings of things western. (Personal communication from Inoue Zenjoo, abbot of the Zen temple Tookeiji in Kamakura, July 28th, 1952.)

something of an institution in himself. At the time of his death the *Japan Weekly Mail* reported that

> "The Tokyo newspapers . . . declare that nearly every Japanese subject who has attained any eminence during the Meiji era owes something, directly or indirectly, to his instruction or influence. He is described as the great motive force of Japan's modern civilization; the man who did more than all his contemporaries to promote the spread of a spirit of true liberalism. His publications were numerous. . . When we say that their total issues amounted to between three and four millions of volumes, we have a basis for estimating the immense influence he exercised upon contemporary thought. It is noticeable that his pure and blameless life elicits as much praise at the hands of his journalistic biographers as his scholarship or his. . . mental endowments. . ."[1]

The House of Representatives recorded a vote of condolence for "Mr. Fukuzawa Yukichi, who led the van of civilized progress and contributed largely to the cause of education."[2]

Yet, revered though his teaching and personality were by his students, respected and honoured though his name was throughout Japan at the time of his death, Fukuzawa's aspirations for changing the way of thinking of the whole people from its very foundations were not destined to be fulfilled, even during the lifetime of his children. His stress on the need for *jitsugaku*, on a thorough comprehension of science, was of course fully

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1. *Japan Weekly Mail*, February 9th 1901.
2. Ibid.

recognised; but the implications which, he had urged, the basic discipline of science had in the moral sphere, were not destined to become generally accepted. His pleas for a new Japanese family circle, in which the members behaved towards each other like a 'group of friends', and for a government regarded simply as a group of ordinary men invested with a task no more exalted than any other, made little headway against the august injunctions of the Imperial Rescript to observe the ancient and eternally valid doctrines of filial piety, of loyalty to superiors and of duty to the state as a moral entity.

Western studies, in fact, were destined to remain for several more decades substantially in the position of a _gei_. The _doo_, or moral Way or purpose in life, was to shift from the comparatively peaceable domain of the Sages to realms of a more dangerous divinity. Fukuzawa died before he could discover that the increase in scientific, ethically neutral knowledge did not lead inevitably to states of greater virtue; did not necessarily make men less unreasonable, bellicose, selfish or silly - before he could discover, in fact, that combined with the wrong kind of _doo_, science as a _gei_ might lead away from rather than towards the utopia of Yaos and Shuns in which separate, specified virtues, governments and above all national states would wither away naturally as irrelevant and unwanted.

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