

INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND CHILD NUTRITION IN MUKONO DISTRICT,
UGANDA

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PHD (Economics) THESIS
1999
SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES



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ABSTRACT

This thesis initially reviews the current state of economic theory on the intra-household allocation of resources. It examines the 'game theory' framework within which the models are constructed, suggesting that such a framework, as yet, has been unable to deal with the complex combination of power, altruism, and trust that lead to the conflictual/cooperative nature of spousal relationships. It examines the problems of constructing indices of power, and suggests a way in which, in this particular case, some of the problems may be overcome.

Using qualitative and quantitative evidence from Uganda, the thesis describes how bridewealth, division of household assets on death or divorce, attitudes to women earning an income and accumulating assets, and marital violence effect the financial relationship and the balance of power between spouses. Issues such as household budgeting systems, secrecy, female participation rates, and division of responsibility for household expenditure are seen as important elements of this relationship. Data collected on child nutrition is used to examine the impact that these factors have on child welfare.

Acknowledgements

This study was carried out with financial support from the Economic and Social Research Fund, School of Oriental and African Studies and the Central Research Fund of London University. I am much indebted to my supervisor John Sender and also to Ben Fine for many words of encouragement and critical insight. The fieldwork could not have happened without Betty Rukundo, Kenneth Khana, who worked long hours in sometimes difficult conditions, and Margaret Ssali, who kept us fed and watered despite the rats and the night dancers. I wish also to thank Richard and Okello and all the respondents who put up with our prying questions.

"The men are not grateful. You come a long way from a grass thatched hut, you build a house with iron sheets roof, you have bought a bicycle. But it does not shame him to tell you to get out. He can't remember that you worked together. He chases you with nothing. Sometimes he may even take away your clothes too. They know how to make you go naked."
(Zitwe Women's FGD)

"There are some who say that if my husband does not beat me, I do not feel that he loves me." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

"In fact even if she earns money, if you are not very careful it may result in separation between you. Because whenever a wife gets money, she asks herself the reason for which she is being 'ruled'. [Prolonged laughter laced with comments like "Then the home dies", "The home falls apart", "In fact you have killed the marriage."] (Ggunda Men's FGD)

"If you have your cash like that in your basket, he can get it and use it. He can also beat you. Money, that belongs to you, can make you be beaten." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

"If you are taking [the children when you leave your husband], are they yours? We just give birth." (Kirangira Women's FGD)

"When a woman does not produce, the man will chase you away, and he will say he cannot remain with you. 'You are eating my food for nothing. You are just filling the toilet.' "
(Zitwe Women's FGD)

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence, in the last decade, of literature on intra-household resource allocation is important because it tackles the issue of gender inequality within the household. Recognising the extent, and the forms of, gender inequality is important in itself, but it is also crucial for understanding the determinants of both household and individual outcomes, such as household and individual production decisions, female labour supply, consumption patterns, savings behaviour, and welfare outcomes.

For example there is considerable literature attempting to understand the processes of economic growth. If such analyses are only conducted by using comparisons between households, or at the firm level, there will be little understanding of the obstacles within the household that women face in their attempts to accumulate wealth.

In the literature common determinants of female labour supply are the potential wage that women may receive, women's education, age, the number of young children, and husbands' income. Yet a wife may not necessarily have access to her husband's income. The husband's contribution to household expenses, rather than his level of income, may lead to a wife participating in the economy.

Similarly, there is an increasing econometric literature attempting to identify the determinants of child nutrition (Alderman 1990, Behrman 1987, Behrman 1988, Thomas 1990). This literature often includes parental education, and, when the data are available, maternal and paternal income. Yet, while acknowledging the importance of women's role in improving nutrition, it does not include issues such as the contribution of both spouses to household expenditure as opposed to income, control over income and decision-making. As Bennett puts it:

"One of the key steps to understanding women's role in the

determination of child health and nutrition may be careful investigation of the process of resource allocation within the household. It is essential to understand gender-specific priorities for expenditure and the degree to which men and women control or influence various areas of decision-making." (Bennett 1990:100)

Another justification for intra-household studies is that without knowledge and understanding of internal household dynamics, development projects may not achieve their aims, and, in some instances, have negative effects on welfare. Projects that assume that household income and assets are pooled may cause considerable inequity. For example, a project in Sudan and the Sahel which aimed to restore cattle after herds were lost in a severe drought, granted cattle to male 'heads-of-households', not realising that cattle were owned individually, not by households, and that women had also lost cattle (Cloud 1978, cited in Rogers 1990). Blumberg (1988) cites several development projects where payment for cash crops was given to men on the assumption that income is pooled. Instead much of the work was done by women who received little reward for their labour (Cameroon - Jones 1983, Kenya - Apthorpe 1971, Kenya - Broche-Due 1983, the Gambia - Carney and Watts 1990). Projects may assist some members of the household, but place heavy burdens on others. For example, children can be important contributors to household labour, and projects that encourage their education can have unanticipated effects. If the child's work is seen as 'women's work', women may have to increase their working hours to make up for the loss of labour. In Muslim communities, where women's movements outside the home are restricted, children may be women's means of selling agricultural produce. Loss of children's labour may severely reduce women's income. In the Gambia, a well-documented irrigated rice project obtained low yields because women eventually refused to contribute their labour since they did not own the land and were unsure of the returns they would obtain from their labour (Dey 1981). Messer (1990) describes the depth of information necessary to understand internal household dynamics, in order to prevent such mistakes.

"(In order) to anticipate potential project impacts, it is necessary to examine marriage rules, residence rules, social and biological processes leading to cycles of shared residence, work and consumption of individuals and the domestic unit.... This includes understanding how labour is recruited, the sex and age division of labour, the rules for transmission of property within and across generations, concepts of ownership of material possessions, skills, information and time, as well as rules for sharing such resources." (Messer 1990:52)

By ignoring intra-household issues, it would appear that standard household surveys have underestimated the extent of inequality and may have failed to identify the poorest. For example, household surveys assume that all

members have an equal share of household income, when in fact a member of a wealthy, unequal household may have access to fewer resources than a member of a poorer household. Studies that have examined this issue suggest standard household surveys do significantly underestimate the level of inequality and therefore provide a misleading picture of the patterns of poverty. Haddad and Kanbur (1990), using data from the Philippines, suggest that a household survey underestimated the level of inequality by somewhere between 35% to 60% depending on the index used. ¹ Using data from the U.S. and Italy, Findlay and Wright (1996) come to a similar conclusion. Lacking access to individual data, they simulated unequal sharing of household resources and calculated rates of male and female poverty.

There have been a great many studies on nutrition, and a growing number attempting to understand issues of control and decision-making within the household, and how these affect women's position. But there are few that combine both a qualitative and quantitative approach to understanding social relations and structures that determine women's control over resources and their impact on child welfare. This study aims to fill that gap.

The initial question that provided the motivation for this thesis was to what extent is the nutritional status of children is determined by women's control over resources, rather than the 'household' as a whole. ² The policy implication being that raising household income, or increasing employment opportunities for women may not have to desired effect on nutrition if it is women's actual control over cash income that matters. The international evidence on the link between nutritional status and household income is mixed (Basu 1996, Casterline et al 1989). Mencher's study (1988) shows in South India that if household income is held constant, malnourishment is lower if the woman is working. Kumar (1977) suggests that rising income has a better income on nutritional status if the wife is working. Yet earning is not synonymous with control of the income. Kennedy (1995) in a study on the impact of commercialisation of agriculture on health argues that it is female-controlled income that makes a substantial difference. One aim of this thesis was to collect household level data in Uganda to assess the relative importance of household income, women's income, and women's control over income for nutrition. The broader aim of this thesis was to: a) use the allocation decisions concerning child nutrition as an example in order to examine the broader processes of negotiation within the household; b) to assess the validity of the current theoretical framework used to analyse intra-household decisions; and b) to study the socio-economic factors that are important in that decision-making process within a particular community.

¹ Haddad and Kanbur also suggest that if the sample is stratified, the estimate of inequality in each strata does not alter much, according to whether the household or individual measure is used, suggesting the location of inequality did not vary with the method of measurement (Haddad and Kanbur 1990).

² The debates surrounding the problem of defining a 'household' are discussed in chapter 3.

The bargaining model literature attempts to develop a theoretical framework within which to examine issues of intra-household allocation.³ This literature is reviewed here, particularly with a view to assessing its practical relevance as a guide to conceptualising the dynamics within the household. Does it clarify the process by which the levels of contributions to household needs are decided? Does the framework suggest relevant questions that have to be asked of the data in order to reveal the processes at work? It is argued that the implicit social relations, that inevitably form the basis on which allocation decisions are made, are not dealt with adequately.⁴ Without a knowledge of the social (or gender) relations it is not possible to understand the motivation and rationale behind individuals' decisions.

The subsequent chapters go on to show the importance of the social context in which intra-household allocation decisions take place for understanding household and individual outcomes. The role of marriage customs and bridewealth in shaping the conjugal contract are examined. Attitudes to the association between money and authority are discussed, and how they lead to the unacceptability of women controlling income and assets. The intra-household decisions that influence female labour supply are explored. The interrelationship between women's decision to work, household budget management, women's control over income and assets, and, women's shares of household expenses are also examined. It is concluded that models that do not acknowledge the importance of individuals' gender in limiting their activities through social relations fail to explain the causes of gender inequality, how inequality is maintained, and the intra-household allocation driven by that inequality.

The main body of the thesis is based on qualitative and quantitative evidence collected during a year's fieldwork in Uganda. By using both types of methodology it is hoped that the strength of qualitative, sociological / anthropological approaches are combined with the quantitative methods of economics.

Why Uganda?

An analysis of intra-household resource allocation is, in a sense, a valid exercise for any society, rich or poor, in order to increase our understanding of the dynamics of gender relations and its effect on

³ Doss (1996) gives a recent summary

⁴ For example, female labour supply may be more dependent on husbands' propensity to forbid their wives from working, than any material needs or practical possibilities of working.

household outcomes. However it is particularly relevant in poorer communities where the use of resources is all the more important because they are scarce, and because that scarcity in itself can place additional pressures on gender relations, increasing any conflict. Uganda is one of the poorest countries with GDP per capita at US\$ 547 (World Bank 1996). A World Bank report (1992) classified 56% of the population in the central region as living below the poverty line, and 20% as living in deep poverty.⁵ The use of household income in such circumstances is crucial for nutrition levels and child survival, let alone education.

Uganda is also interesting because there has been rapid economic growth, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.5% in the period 1987-1997. This has resulted in increasing levels of female participation in income generating activities.⁶ A switch from a situation where one spouse is earning the household income to joint contribution may shift the balance of control over income, or lead to pressure for a change and conflict over control. Where the data allow there will be a discussion of the impact of these changes on household outcomes below.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature on intra-household allocation of resources. **Chapter 3** deals with methodological issues: the choice of the field site; the problem of defining the 'household' and the possible alternatives; the qualitative and quantitative methodologies used; how representative the sample is of the broader population and the construction of variables used in subsequent chapters. **Chapter 4** examines the gender gap in Uganda between men and women's education levels, involvement in market activity, income levels, assets and health. It also compares the situation of married women with that of single women.

Chapter 5 discusses three aspects of the Bugandan marriage contract: the implications of bridewealth for spousal relations; division of household assets on divorce, or on death of husband; and, attitudes towards marital violence and any changes in its likely prevalence. **Chapter 6** examines attitudes towards women who earn a monetary income on their own account, and towards those who are economically independent. It examines data on the determinants of men's decision to prevent women from working, female

⁵ Living poverty was defined as having an income of below 5000 Ush per capita per month which is required in order to have a sufficient intake of calories plus some reasonable non-food expenditure (eg clothing & fuel); living in deepest poverty was defined as having an income of below 2500 Ush per capita per month which is required in order to have the bare minimum for adequate food intake (World Bank 1992)

⁶ See chapter 4.

participation rates, and the extent of labour market segmentation.

Chapter 7 discusses different household budgeting systems and the implications each has for the degree of shared control over household resources. It also looks at attitudes towards the allocation of responsibility for meeting household expenditures, and the importance of secrecy. A significant proportion of this chapter will examine data on household contributions, and how they differ according to likely control over joint household assets, education, wealth of household, and the rural/urban divide. **Chapter 8** will examine the impact of these circumstances on the nutritional status of children, in an attempt to judge the impact of spousal inequality on children. Each chapter discusses the qualitative evidence - and then looks at the statistical evidence to determine the degree to which the data support the claims made in the first part. The remaining sections of this introductory chapter will examine, firstly, the areas of academic debate that form an important context to this thesis, and secondly the broad categories of intra-household allocation decisions that form a central part of this thesis.

This thesis draws on research from a variety of fields - anthropology, family research, feminism, history as well as economics. There are a number of thorny theoretical issues that should be discussed in order to clarify the approach that forms the background to the thesis: firstly, the importance of analysing how gender is constructed; secondly, the usefulness of the term 'patriarchy'; thirdly, the relationship between class and gender; and fourthly, the relevance of a materialist approach as a means of dealing with these problems.

Deconstruction of gender versus 'sex roles'

In any discussion of the relationship between men and women it is relatively easy to make assumptions about the static nature of male and female identities. Attempts to contrast men and women's situation, in order to reveal the extent of gender inequality, can lead to a failure to examine how men and women's relative positions are changing, along with changing perceptions of what it is to be male or female.

In a review of the impact of feminism on family research, Ferree (1990) discusses the advantages of a 'gender perspective' over a 'sex roles' approach, suggesting that while the latter 'assumes a certain packaging of structures, behaviours and attitudes. The gender model analyses the construction of such packages.' (Ferree 1990:868). Ferree asks the rhetorical question of how the 'construction of gender' maintains such an unequal balance, and in doing so explains the importance of a critical

analysis of gender.

"How is the illusion of gender dichotomy constructed and maintained in the face of between-sex similarity and within-sex difference? (It is) through a constant process of engendering behaviour as separate and unequal. By 'doing gender' individuals claim a gender identity for themselves, and convey it to others.....Social structures provide the concrete resources and constraints that shape the ongoing interactions, and all sorts of objects and relationship, not just individual people, have gender meanings." (Ferree 1990:868).

Gender identities, and how they change, are crucial to understanding the relationship between men and women. Gender identities delimit what men and women can and cannot do, and can restrict women's activities considerably. For example, in Uganda a husband can refuse to allow his wife to visit her relatives, can forbid her to work, and can claim her assets. Such norms that define acceptable behaviour can be used as a means of control over women's activities, and maintain women's subordinate position. Yet in order to understand how gender inequality is perpetuated it is important to examine how gender identities change with changing circumstances, such as, for example, women's increasing employment. This thesis attempts to not only to explore the relationship between men and women, but also to see how gender identities are changing, particularly in a situation of economic growth that is occurring in Uganda, as women increasingly become involved in the market economy.

The problem with patriarchy

Notions of patriarchy are still common in discussions of gender inequality (for example, Walby 1990), and it is important to point out the extent of the validity of the concept. Pollert (1996) explains the limitations of patriarchy as an analytical term. She argues that viewing patriarchy as an explanation for women's position requires a description of the material basis on which the 'patriarchal system' rests. Yet such descriptions slip into ahistoricism. As an example, Pollert cites Hartmann: 'The material base upon which patriarchy rests lies most fundamentally in men's control over women's labour power. Men maintain this control by excluding women from access to essential productive resources... and by restricting women's sexuality' (Hartmann 1979:11, cited in Pollert 1996:642). Men's control over women is explained through acts of exclusion and control, which in turn can only be explained by themselves. Patriarchy can only be used as an exploratory tool and not an explanatory one (Fine 1992).

Class and gender

Another debate that has plagued feminist analyses is the relationship between class and gender (Acker 1988). Does a woman fall into her husband's class by virtue of the benefits that she gains through him, or does she fall into another category because of the inequality that women face at home and in the wider arena? In essence the problem here is in the attempt to classify individuals into a particular category/class, and in not allowing several 'systems' to run concurrently where an individual occupies a place in each. In fact 'gender and class are mutually determining' (Moore 1988:80), because men and women hold both gender and class positions simultaneously. For example, a husband's decision to allow his wife to earn an income is influenced by the household's need for an extra income (i.e. class position). And, in turn, that decision may well influence the wealth and the class position of the household, and the nature of gender relations between the couple.

This inter-dependency between class and gender plays a critical role in the process of change. For example, a period of hardship may force a husband to allow his wife to work; her new income may increase her bargaining power; and her husband may either accept a sharing of authority, or retract his initial decision because the challenge to gender identities is too great to be absorbed. His decision may depend on the wealth (or class) position of the household. It is an analysis of this type of interaction, which occurs in the face of change, which enables an understanding of how the relative positions of men and women ebb and flow.

A materialist approach

Pollert proposes that historical materialist analysis is the most suitable means of carrying out such an exercise - an analysis 'that is not confined to the economy or employment relationship...but one that presupposes that there is a material existence and experience 'out there' to be explored' (Pollert 1996:647); that economic relations are embedded in broader social relations, and in particular, in gender relations. Structures and social relations impinge on individuals, not only in their work, but at home, in links with kin, and in their emotional and sexual lives. This thesis adopts such an approach in order to describe the nature of the relationship between husband and wife, and how this relationship impacts on economic decisions and welfare outcomes.

Defining 'intra-household allocation of resources'

The phrase 'the intra-household allocation of resources' has to be dismantled, and the areas of interest specified, before the term can be analysed in any practical sense. It is insufficient to determine who consumes what, as this will only cover consumption decisions over such items as food, clothes etc. The decision to earn cash, or to contribute labour to household production are decisions of allocation, as are expenditure decisions. Allocation decisions fall into several broad categories: allocation between market and non-market production⁷, private and public household consumption⁸, current and future consumption, and parent versus child allocation.

In this study the particular allocation decisions examined are:

- * whether a married woman works for an income, as well as contributing to non-market production;
- * her allocation of that income between household recurrent expenditure, personal consumption, and accumulation of assets;
- * whether a married woman chooses to keep those assets at her marital home for current use, or elsewhere as future security;
- * the male spouse's decision to contribute to public household expenditure.

The social structures that are studied are those that impinge on these decisions. These include

- * the marriage contract;
- * the likely divorce settlement, including custody over children;
- * the opportunities in the market economy.

The aspects of the social relations that are examined are:

- * prevailing attitudes towards authority within a marriage and their link to control over resources;
- * the acceptability of women earning an income, and accumulating assets;
- * the responsibility for meeting household expenditure.

The measure of outcome chosen is the nutritional status of children. It is

⁷ Market production is defined here as earning an income on an individual's own account. It does not include production of marketed goods where the income is retained by the other spouse. Non-market production includes that for home consumption, and unpaid labour for another's market production.

⁸ This distinction is used throughout the thesis. Private consumption refers to personal items such as: clothes, transport, hair & cosmetics, alcohol etc. Public household consumption refers to shared items such as: food, water, tables, chairs, pots and pans etc.

argued that nutritional status is the cumulative outcome of allocative decisions in the four areas mentioned:

- * the maternal decision to earn an income;
- * the parental decision to choose household consumption over private consumption;
- * the parental choice of current consumption over future security;
- * meeting their children's needs over their own.

Despite the need for specificity, the main motivating forces behind the social relations within the community studied can be generalised and are outlined in the following few paragraphs. They are frequent and central themes in subsequent chapters.

The decision to earn an income on her own account is not automatic for a married woman. It is influenced by the social norms concerning the acceptability of woman's control over income, contributions to the household made by the other spouse, by the level of poverty of the household, as well as the potential wage rate and the number of young children.

The decision how to divide personal income between private consumption and household expenditure is affected by social norms concerning responsibility for household expenditure, and the likely control over assets once they are within the public household domain. A low level of control over these assets may act as a disincentive to contribute to the acquisition of public household goods.

A distinction has to be made between current consumption that occurs during the marriage, and savings for future consumption should the marriage end. Such an allocation decision will be influenced by the likely division of assets at divorce, (or on the death of the other spouse) and the likelihood of divorce itself. If divorce is a possible outcome, and one spouse is unlikely to be able to retain an equitable share of the assets, an incentive to save outside the marital home exists. Thus, educated women who are relatively more able to support themselves, and their children, may be more willing to initiate a divorce. Uneducated women who have no means of being economically independent, may go to considerable lengths to maintain the marriage. This latter category includes women from poor households who have to earn a significant portion of the household income, but who are unable to accumulate sufficient assets to 'make a go of it' alone.

Also at issue is the extent to which parents meet the needs of their children at the cost of sacrificing their own. This may be affected by differing parental rights over children, and probable custody, since these factors may determine who is likely to benefit from the children's future

income streams. If one parent has few rights over the children, is unlikely to gain custody, and even less likely to benefit from future income streams, this may create a disincentive to contribute to her children's welfare, if, for example, the alternative is to ensure her own future economic security.

All of these decisions take place within a social structure that to some extent is encapsulated within prevailing marriage contracts. For example, the marriage contract and the bridewealth may determine the extent of the husband's control over his wife's labour and income. It may also determine any divorce settlement or the custody of the children.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSEHOLD:

BARGAINING POWER, ALTRUISM AND TRUST

Theoretical conceptions of the household have been the subject of considerable debate over the last twenty years. The inability of the unitary model to explain certain household outcomes has led economics to reconsider its aggregative assumptions about the household, and to examine internal processes within family units - for example female labour supply, fertility, and certain production decisions. The main purpose of this chapter is to consider how the theoretical perspectives have changed, and to examine the new alternatives. It will be argued that the new alternatives not only face considerable problems, but that they reveal problems in the standard approaches within economics.

2.1 Unitary Models

A basic precept of neo-classical consumer theory is that preferences, expressed by the utility function, are exogenously given, and that each individual has a hierarchy of preferences which is internally consistent. Within unitary models of the household it is assumed that individual preferences can be expressed in aggregate, household form. Analysis of consumer behaviour is based on a set of responses to changing prices and wages, and preferences are deduced from behaviour.

$$U_h = U (X_h, L_h)$$

where:

U_h = utility function of the household

X_h = consumption of household

L_h = leisure of household

The relevant demand function is:

$$X_h = X(P, I_h)$$

where:

I_h = household income

P = market prices

In 1956 Samuelson acknowledged that households consist of individuals whose preferences differ, so that individual demands may lead to conflict over how household income is spent. His solution was to specify individual utility functions, but to combine them in a household function.

$$U_h = U [U_f (X_f, L_f), U_m (X_m, L_m)]$$

This function is maximised subject to total household income in order to derive the demand function:

$$X_h = X (P, I_h)$$

In practical terms the model remains unchanged, and Samuelson gives the following explanation for this:

"since blood is thicker than water, the preferences of the different members are interrelated by what might be called a 'consensus' or 'social welfare function', which takes into account the deservingness or ethical worth of the consumption levels of each of its members. The family acts as if it were maximising their joint welfare function."
(1986:10)

It would seem that altruism abounds within the family. As Folbre (1988) has pointed out, this is in stark contrast to the neo-classical view of the wider economy where self-interest predominates.

In his theory of marriage, Becker (1965,1973,1974) portrays a more differentiated household, where the head of the household is altruistic. He devises a theory of a rotten kid/benevolent father where efficiency and consensus is achieved through paternalistic manipulation possible because of his superior economic position. As Hirschleifer (1977) has pointed out, this rests on the assumption that the altruist always gets the last word. Bernheim and Stark (1988) argue that in repeated games freeloading may force the altruist to act 'unaltruistically', and inefficient outcomes will result.

2.2 Validity of the unitary model

There is an extensive literature arguing that the unitary model makes unacceptable assumptions. Firstly, that household income is pooled - or that

contribution and distribution of resources are independent of one another. There is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that this assumption is rarely valid (Tripp 1981, Guyer 1988, Bruce and Dwyer 1988, Guyer and Peters 1987, Whitehead 1984, Fapohunda 1988, and evidence given in chapter 7). Under conditions of poverty, where disputes about expenditure are likely to be more frequent, separate budgets and secrecy are likely to be common (Engle 1990).

An econometric rejection of the unitary model is provided by Browning et al. (1994) where consumption goods are divided into two categories; public household goods (such as tables, chairs etc) and private individual goods (clothes etc). Their French data reveal, firstly, that the expenditure on private individual consumption goods is dependent on members' relative incomes not total household income. Secondly, the differences in the age structure and the total expenditure of the household affects the degree of inequality in the distribution of private goods.¹

Due to the requirements of efficiency in the unitary model, a wage increase will shift one spouse's labour toward the more profitable activity, and it is assumed that the other spouse will make up some of the short-fall in domestic labour. Often the sexual division of labour can be fairly inflexible. For example, a woman may begin working outside the home, yet her husband may not increase the amount of housework that he does. 'There is no simple trade-off of wage and family work hours between husbands and wives, nor do partners allocate family work based on time availability.' (Thompson and Walker 1989:856). 'Some husbands may sabotage their wives' attempts to go out to work, other will increase their contribution to household labour to help her out' (Ferree 1990:876). It would appear that it cannot be assumed that the labour of one spouse is substitutable by the other.

Thirdly, the notion that households operate under a joint welfare function is invalid. A joint welfare function requires consensus, yet negotiation is a common process, and can often result in conflict or a failure to cooperate. The nature of these processes and the bargaining strength of different members will influence the outcome. In response to these shortcomings, a series of models have been developed that attempt to encompass more accurately the internal process of household allocation.

¹ Thomas (1993), Thomas and Chen (1993), Doss (1996), Lundberg, Pollack and Wales (1995), Horney and McElroy (1988) and Schultz (1990) also provide econometric evidence that invalidates the unitary model.

2.3 Bargaining Models

Some writers have turned to the Nash co-operative bargaining framework used in game theory (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy 1990, Ulph 1988). Individuals' preferences are delineated separately, and each has a fall-back or threat position which will be the outcome if co-operation fails. Failure results in an individual preferring to be single rather than married. The threat points represent the relative bargaining power of each person on the principle that the better an individual's non-cooperative solution is, the less she/he has to lose, and therefore the greater her/his bargaining power. Despite an unequal outcome both parties have an incentive to co-operate if the final solution is an improvement on their fall-back positions.

McElroy (1990) has represented this process in the following way:

$$U_m = U(X_m, L_m) \quad U_f = U(X_f, L_f)$$

where:

U_f, U_m = two utility functions

X_f, X_m = consumption goods consumed by husband and wife

L_f, L_m = leisure time

$$V_m = V(P, W_m, I_m; A_m) \quad V_f = V(P, W_f, I_f; A_f)$$

where:

V are the two threat points (indirect utility functions)

P = prices

W_f, W_m = wage of husband and wife

I_f, I_m = non-wage income

A_f, A_m = 'extra-household environmental parameters'

The extra-household environmental parameters refer to exogenous variables that may alter an individual's attainable utility outside marriage (for example, the sex ratios in the marriage market, the ability of women to return to their natal homes and prohibitions on women working outside the home).

The Nash solution is:

$$N = (U_m - V_m) (U_f - V_f)$$

The demand functions are:

$$X_i = X_i (P, W_m, W_f, I_m, I_f; A_m, A_f)$$

where $i=f,m$.

With its acknowledgement of individual characteristics that may affect outcomes, this approach is an improvement on that of Becker and Samuelson, but it has its own problems. Sen (1990) has criticised the basic Nash model for the assumption that the member with the lower fall-back position will always achieve a worse position than the other member. Bargaining power is more complex than the availability of alternatives outside marriage. An individual's option outside marriage is unlikely to have a significant impact on the day-to day negotiations (Ulph 1988). The threat of divorce is not credible if it is used repeatedly. (This is not the case with violence. The threat of, or actual violence, can be used time after time.)

Ulph argues it is necessary to specify the utility levels that would prevail if the household members stayed together, but failed to reach an agreement - a non-cooperative framework. He suggests members may agree on a certain number of consumption items, but disagree on others. In such a situation members may take strategic action, and make certain purchases over which there is disagreement, prior to negotiation in order to precommit the household before income is pooled. This process is represented in the following way:

Utility functions:

$$U_f = U (X_1, D(X_2;X_1)) \quad U_m = U (X_1, D(X_2;X_1))$$

Demand functions:

$$X_1 = D(P, I_f, I_m)$$

$$X_2 = D(P, I_f, I_m)$$

where

U_f, U_m are utility functions

X_1 = strategically purchased private goods

X_2 = agreed household goods

$D(X_2;X_1)$ = demand for agreed household goods depends on previously purchased private goods

Lundberg and Pollack (1992) provide a different interpretation of the threat points, developing what they call the Separate Spheres model. They argue a non-cooperative stand-off may well occur where 'traditional' gender roles and gender role expectations decrease the need for negotiation.

"Specialisation reduces the need for complex patterns of co-ordination, and traditional gender roles serve as a focal point for tacit division of responsibilities" (1992:35). Members can still benefit from the economies of scale that result from joint consumption. Household (public) goods are still produced, but in smaller quantities than if a co-operative agreement had been reached.

According to Lundberg and Pollack failure to reach a cooperative agreement arises from

"the inability of players to make binding, costless agreements. The negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of such agreements give rise to transaction costs. The non-cooperative default allocation point avoids these costs. Contributions are determined by social enforcement of the obligations corresponding to generally recognised gender roles. [As a result] couples with high transaction costs or low expected gains from cooperation will remain at the stereotypical non-cooperative solution" (Lundberg and Pollack 1992:160).

(It would be difficult to distinguish empirically between the Ulph and the Lundberg and Pollack models. It would be necessary to have detailed knowledge of the tacit division of responsibilities and individual intentions, so that a purchase that is a precommitment due to disagreement, and a purchase that is the result of a division of responsibilities can be differentiated.)

Woolley (1988) uses a slightly more sophisticated model with two additional features. Each individual's action is based on a guess of what the other spouse's response will be. (This is modelled using a reaction function in which the derivative of one spouse's demand function is substituted into the other's demand function.) This enables a decision about future action to be made on the basis of past behaviour of the other spouse. This is a considerable improvement on the previous models where each individual maximises his/her utility irrespective of how it will affect his/her partner. The second feature is a 'sympathy' co-efficient. Each individual has a welfare function that contains the utility functions of both husband and wife. The 'sympathy' co-efficients are the weights given to the two utility functions, within each welfare function. They represent the degree to which one spouse benefits from enabling the preferences of the other spouse to be met.

$$W_f = s(U_f) + (1-s)U_m$$

where:

W = welfare function

s = sympathy co-efficient
Uf = female utility function
Um = male utility function

Kapteyn and Kooreman (1991) attempt to estimate husband and wife labour supply equations that are derived from the above welfare function. Yet there is an identification problem concerning the co-efficient 's'. They argue in order to estimate the degree of sympathy it is necessary to compare actual working hours with preferred working hours. The gap indicates the degree to which an individual's preferences have been frustrated, and it is assumed that the spouse with the larger gap between actual and preferred working hours has more sympathy for the other spouse.

Carter and Katz (1992) approach the problem of interdependent utilities rather differently. The husband and wife have separate utility functions and budget constraints. The interdependence takes the form of a conjugal contract. This contract has two components: a) the labour that both contribute to the production of household goods; b) transfers of money from one spouse to the other. If, for example, the husband receives a wage increase and decides he wishes to spend more time earning money and less in the production of household goods, he will have to compensate his wife through a transfer of money for the reduction in his household labour. (This allows consumption and labour decisions to be interdependent, which they are not in earlier models.) The Carter/Katz model specifies the following representation:

$$U_f = U(X_f, Z; T) \quad U_m = U(X_m, Z; T)$$

where:

Z = goods produced in the home

T = transfers between members.

These utility functions are maximised subject to individual budget constraints.

Demand function:

$$X = X(P, I_f, I_m; T)$$

Carter and Katz bring in a concept that they call 'voice' - the degree to which either partner can influence, or bargain over the size of the transfer. If the wife has a low level of 'voice' she will not demand adequate compensation for the reduction in her husband's contribution to household production.

'Voice' is not formalised in the form of a co-efficient, it is just conceptualised as the socially recognized right (or ability) to bargain over the conjugal contract. In a strongly patriarchal society, a woman may not have such a right. Carter and Katz allow for some level of economic autonomy to be achieved, even when a woman has no 'voice'. Through secrecy, or in neo-classical terminology 'asymmetric information', a woman is able to use her income as she wishes, without negotiating with her husband. Although 'voice' and the 'sympathy' co-efficient are conceptualised in different ways, they effectively represent the same characteristic - the degree to which the outcomes achieved by one spouse are different from his/her original aim due to the influence of the other spouse. (In the 'sympathy' version the first spouse has willingly changed his/her aims; in the 'voice' version weaker bargaining power has forced the first spouse to accept an alternative solution.)

Katz (1992) has argued that because the McElroy model assumes income is pooled, "the potential importance of accrual of individual income to the realisation of household members' consumption and labour allocation preferences is neglected." (1992:42). "There is growing empirical evidence that income itself, and not just the goods and services it can buy, is most appropriately seen in many cultural contexts as the private property of the individual who earns it, although it may be subject to the claims of other household members." (1992:42)

The claims of other members may be strong. In many cultures a husband has a claim over his wife's income. This is often the case where a brideprice has been paid which may entitle a husband to his wife's labour or the product of her labour. In such circumstances secrecy, rather than negotiation, may enable an individual's preferences to be attained.

As they stand, these models have no empirical features that enable differentiation between the various possible bargaining processes (Haddad et al 1994, Chiappori 1992, Kooreman and Kapteyn 1991). It is possible to test, however, whether the outcome is Pareto-efficient or not - whether the outcome is such that no-one can be made better-off without someone-else being made worse-off - which may indicate whether the bargaining process was cooperative or not. For example, in a study in Northern Cameroon, Jones (1983, 1986) found that although the profit from rice was higher than from sorghum, men and women continued to grow sorghum because sorghum was cultivated separately, whereas rice was cultivated jointly. Udry (1994) finds a similar result from a study in Burkino Faso. Household output/income would be higher if fertilizer and labour were reallocated from men's plots to women's plots - fertilizer and labour were not allocated according to the highest returns for the household as a whole (cited in Doss 1996). These are

both Pareto-inefficient outcomes that must have resulted from uncooperative bargaining processes, rather than a cooperative one. Yet the Pareto-efficient outcome is not necessarily a cooperative one. An individual may refuse to give a little so that the other may gain - this may either be the best joint option in the current 'game', or an uncooperative stalemate. ²

Earlier it was mentioned that Kooreman and Kapteyn (1991) proposed to compare preferred with actual working hours as a means of assessing the weights given the utility functions. In theory, this would produce clearer representation of the bargaining process. But it highlights the flaw in using a game theoretic approach in analysing the household allocation process - preferences are not exogenous to the bargaining process, but are determined during the 'game'. The following section examines some of the theoretical problems entailed in the bargaining approach and at the same time highlights themes that are developed in later chapters.

2.4 Validity of the bargaining approach

** How valid is it to conceptualise the negotiating process as either cooperative, where binding agreements hold participants to their word³, or non-cooperative, where division of responsibilities is determined by gender roles?*

As many of the theorists acknowledge, binding agreements cannot be made. Yet, cooperation can take place without the agreements being enforceable. Circumstances may arise such that one spouse is unable to fulfil his/her side of the bargain, yet there may well be an acceptable explanation, and the other spouse will not necessarily penalise her/him. Marriage entails a stream of complex social interactions through which trust is built up and depleted. To view a marriage as being in one of two possible states - cooperative or non-cooperative - belies the complexity of the situation. This simplification hides a spectrum of fluctuating levels of co-operation, with temporary separations.

** How valid is this notion of separate spheres, where the division of responsibility for household work and expenses on the basis of predetermined norms, reduces the need for negotiation ?*

Separate gender identities, sexual division of labour, and separate

²This to some extent depends on what is viewed as being uncooperative. If individual A could give a little such that B could gain considerably, but refuses - this would be viewed as uncooperative. Yet if the loss and the gain were equal, the outcome could be viewed as cooperative given that this is one 'game' in a series of 'games', where B may lose today, but gain tomorrow.

³The assumption is that unless agreements can be enforced, default will occur, and participants will be unwilling to make cooperative agreements.

responsibility for different components of household expenses all have an important part to play in understanding gender relations. Yet without care such an approach will result in attempts to define gender spheres or roles, and therefore delimit them. This would be a return to the use of sex roles as an explanation of women's subordination, rather than an analysis of the construction of gender and how gender relations actually vary.

The notion of separate spheres is at fault not only theoretically, but also in a practical sense. For example, it is possible to imagine household chores being allocated to individuals so that a stable routine is established. Similarly, if only one spouse earns any money s/he may be solely responsible for expenditure. However, problems emerge when both spouses are earning and both are responsible for purchases. Given that the more an individual spends on public goods the less he/she has for personal consumption, and that there may be a tendency to assume that if one spouse spends less on public goods the other spouse will spend more, negotiation may be unavoidable.

Further light is thrown on this issue if the nature of the household public goods that are being purchased is examined, and this requires a digression from the theoretical discussion to a particular cultural context. In Uganda, it is possible to group household public goods into three categories:

a) *Recurrent expenditure* (Food, paraffin, water, charcoal, medical expenses, school fees) This group is likely to be the source of considerable conflict. With small daily or frequent purchases, such as food, a routine may well be established. In rural and semi-rural areas the bulk of the food is produced at home; the purchase of food is not a regular event, and its purchase is subject to dispute. Education and medical bills are large irregular expenses, which are difficult to allocate equitably between the spouses, without negotiation. This is particularly true when income flows are uncertain and fluctuate in amount. One of the benefits of being married is the ability to smooth the unevenness of income and expense flows through intra-household transfers, but these are likely to require negotiation.

b) *Household durables* (beds, tables, chairs, saucepans, plastic basins etc). These items tend to be bought with the cash earned by one spouse, used by both spouses, and should the marriage end in divorce, maybe divided up according to the original purchaser. Division of responsibility may be less of an issue if spouses have the facility to hold on to any assets.

c) *Household production.* In Uganda norms have developed for how the agricultural work is divided between husband and wife.⁴ If cash is required to purchase one or more inputs, the crop then becomes the responsibility and property of the spouse who provided the cash (eg tomatoes, greens, passion fruit). Rarely is such a crop intended for home consumption; it is usually sold. If household labour is required for cash crops, the amount of labour and the appropriate compensation will have to be negotiated. This is less true for coffee - it is common practice for women to pick and dry coffee, but the men are responsible for selling it and will retain the income. As a form of payment for women's labour men may buy their wives a new dress. Coffee has been established as a cash crop since the early 1900s and this may explain the existence of these particular social norms related to its joint production.

Owing to these problems, particularly uneven cash flows, it is difficult to envisage a household that continues to function on the basis of established social norms without resorting to negotiation. The notion of separate spheres also begs the question of how the social norms are established, maintained, and adjust due to changing circumstances without negotiation. For example, a relatively stable division of labour may exist over domestic work and agricultural production for home consumption. If, however, women's participation in the market economy is increasing, this may (or may not) lead to increases in bargaining power, which in turn may cause the established spheres to be challenged (Chapters 6 & 7).

** The bargaining approach does not capture the social relations embedded in the marriage contract.*

The importance of social relations becomes apparent in the context of Uganda. If bridewealth has been paid by the extended family, then the husband, and to some extent his family, have appropriated rights over the new bride. These rights can include control over the wife's assets, and whether she can earn an income. Often unstated at the marriage are the likely division of assets should the marriage end in divorce. The division may well follow a pattern established by social norms, rather than any considerations of equity. Both the implicit marriage contract and expectations of what will happen on divorce shape the social relations of the marriage itself, and act as a framework in which all negotiations take place. (The relevance of these issues to the Kauga/Ngogwe study is examined in chapter 5.)

⁴ Considerable evidence was collected in the focus group discussions on division of agricultural labour, but it has not been presented to any great extent in the thesis.

McElroy's use of 'extra-environmental parameters' acknowledges the importance of the social context, and its impact on negotiations. Yet in many cases such parameters must be based on qualitative information that is specific to a particular context - ie. the factors in a society that affect women's position. These could vary from norms about the acceptability of women moving outside the home, to the extent of provision of child care by the state.

** Income, and the control of resources is seen as a crucial determinant of power within bargaining models. Yet the social relations within a marriage affecting a woman's decision to earn an income and to accumulate assets are not examined.*

For example, husbands may forbid or actively discourage their wives from working outside the home. Assets above a certain value may be considered unsuitable for a woman to own, and may be forcibly appropriated by the husband. In such circumstances women cannot be seen as free agents who control their income (Chapter 6). Moore makes the same point when she argues that although having access to "an independent income or productive assets does have an impact on gender inequalities within the household...what is important is the context in which women's economic participation takes place." (Moore 1993:133) She reiterates Roldan's point that "the existing power imbalance between spouses mediates between the wife's access to an independent income and its later control and disposal." (Moore 1993:134) Women's position in the home may not depend on whether she chooses to go out to work, but whether the conjugal contract is such that she is able to go out to work.

As well as failing to provide an analysis of the social relations behind the formal interaction, the bargaining approach fails to appreciate the complexity of the interaction between different aspects of marriage. The social relations that discourage a woman from earning an income, may act as a disincentive to contribute to the household, leading her to accumulate assets outside the home.

** To what extent is the bargaining framework an improvement of our ability to predict household outcomes, or to estimate the importance of particular determinants of household outcomes?*

Estimation using the bargaining approach still involves reduced form equations that relate household outcomes to exogenous changes such as income, prices etc. Any shift in the internal processes is not represented. It may be argued that such a shift may be the result of external factors,

but it would be impossible to distinguish between the two effects. For example, female labour supply may increase without an increase in the female wage rate. The cause may either be a change in the wife's opportunity cost of time relative to that of her husband, or her level of bargaining power may have increased, giving her greater control over her income, and so encouraging her to increase her working hours (Behrman 1990). The unitary model assumes it is the former case; in the bargaining approach it could be either.

Further identification within the equations requires a variable that represents how the preferences of the two spouses are weighted in the negotiating process - effectively the balance of power. (It would then be possible to test whether women's bargaining power had increased.) Yet bargaining power is very difficult to deal with empirically. A common strategy used by spouses is to acquiesce in one area in order to prevail in another. It is not possible for one data set to represent the balance of power across the whole range of possible interactions. Given this, the benefits of econometric analysis have to be weighed against the disadvantages of the simplification required. The subsequent discussion examines how the bargaining approach conceptualises power, and the problems that arise when attempting to include power in an estimation framework.

** To what extent do the bargaining models encapsulate an adequate theory of power?*

The game-theoretic framework used in the bargaining models was first formulated by Nash (1950, 1953). His work has generated an extensive literature on game theory and the bargaining process between two actors. The most common application is the behaviour of two firms in various market conditions. Some of the theoretical literature refers simply to two 'anonymous' actors, devoid of any social context. In the introduction to a game theoretic text 'Economics of Bargaining', Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) reveal the extent to which they perceive the economics of bargaining not as an analysis of social interaction, but as a purely theoretical formulation:

"(T)he solution of a game can be identified with a whole continuum of possible outcomes called the negotiation set or core of the game. To identify a particular outcome within the core, (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) suggest, is an enterprise outside the scope of the game theorist on the grounds that the outcome on which the players finally agree will depend on their bargaining powers and such psychological factors that elude adequate formalisation. Nash himself makes a reference to a similar behavioral notion of 'bargaining skill' in 1950, but corrects himself in a later paper (1953) where he

asserts that... 'with people who are sufficiently intelligent and rational there should not be any question of 'bargaining ability' a term which suggests something like skill in duping the other fellow'.
..... Such events are only suitable for behavioral analysis, but what is being attempted here is game theoretic analysis." ⁵ (1987:6)

It would appear that the process of bargaining between two individuals can be discussed without reference to human behavioural responses, or what is commonly understood as social interaction. Within this framework there seems to be very little concept of power. Social interaction or bargaining is a process of attempting to second-guess what the other actor will do in response to your next move. There is no acknowledgement that 'rational' individuals cajole, bully or even threaten one another. This flaw in game theory has been acknowledged by authors of the bargaining models when they conceptualise power in terms of 'voice' or 'sympathy', but these concepts have not been encapsulated within the models in an empirical form, partially owing to the enormous problems in doing so.

Power is integral to all social interaction. It is part of all levels of social life, from social institutions, and political groups to the interaction between two individuals. In a discussion of Giddens's concept of power, Davis (1991) defines the relationship between power and social interaction. "Any social interaction has three elements: a/ its constitution as meaningful; b/ its constitution as a moral or normative order; and c/ its constitution as the operation of relations of power" (Davis 1991:71). To rephrase this in a way that is more relevant to the concerns of this chapter, there are three aspects to decisions concerning intra-household allocation: a/the definition and formulation of an individual's needs and deserts; b/ the determination of which needs and deserts are legitimate; c/the decision as to whether those needs and deserts are met. ⁶

These three elements are subject to negotiation. They are strongly influenced by a society's particular perception of gender identities. For example, the construction of motherhood as a suitable role, creates expectations that constrain the kind of strategies that an individual can employ in the process of bargaining. If a woman does not perform her given role adequately she will not be able to make demands on others (Moore 1993:138). The perception of an individual's role influences decisions about need and desert. "The sexual division of labour, income distribution within the household, educational provision of sons and daughters are all outcomes of ideas about the appropriate behaviour of men and women...

⁵ My emphasis.

⁶ Moore makes a similar point following Fraser's (1989) approach to the politics of need (Moore 1993:139).

Differentiated social identities are related to the exercise of power because the very definitions of those identities are connected to normative or conventional explanations for the social order, as well as the legitimation of that order. " (Moore 1993:135)

In such a context, the assumption that an individual has well-defined preferences, that can be represented by an ordinal utility function, prior to the start of the negotiation process, is inadequate. "Bargaining power consists in part of the capacity to challenge and redefine the rules, and cannot therefore be captured simply by specifying fixed or threat points or fall-back positions in relation to a given set of rules." (Hart 1993:120)

It would appear that there are two unresolved issues troubling econometric approaches: how to quantify bargaining power that is used to achieve objectives, and how to represent the fact that those objectives themselves may well be determined by the level of bargaining power - that preferences are endogenous. The following sections will look at both of these issues, but first the notion of voice is examined in the light of the previous discussion on power.

** How valid is the concept of 'voice'?*

Carter and Katz's notion of voice captures the idea that the division of the product or fruits of household labour may be unequal due to differing abilities to assert one's own interests. This is true, but in a sense it does not go far enough. It does not acknowledge the complex link between social identities and debates over rights and needs - the emphasis is on ability without recognising that ability/capacity may be limited by the definition of differentiated social identities.

In Carter and Katz's model 'voice' determines transfers between husband and wife. Moore develops this theme further with what she terms 'a system of redistribution' (Moore 1993:139). She argues that the division of labour between production and reproductive tasks within the household necessitates the redistribution of the fruits of productive labour between spouses. Given that the division of labour and the system of production is gendered, so is the process of redistribution. This enables a shift of emphasis away from a preoccupation with the system of production as the source of women's subordination and the related debate between class and gender, to a wider arena that includes relations within the household (between spouses, and between adults and children), within the lineage, and with the state. The importance of the gendered distribution is taken up in following chapters in several instances - the distribution of marital assets on death or divorce, the control of income and assets, and the distribution of the household

product between children.

Endogeneity of preferences⁷

* *If preferences are endogenous, what are the implications for policy analysis?*

Sen (1990) discusses this issue in a way that reveals the practical implications. Family identity may exert such a strong influence on a person's perceptions that s/he may not find it easy to formulate any clear notion of his/her own individual welfare. "...if a typical Indian rural woman was asked about her personal 'welfare', she would find the question unintelligible, and if she was able to reply, she might answer the question in terms of her reading of the welfare of her family." (Sen 1990)

Sen highlights the particular problem that these issues pose for Nash bargaining models. "(There is) the need to distinguish between the perception of interest (of different parties) and some more objective notion of their respective well-being." (Sen 1990:133).⁸ In essence Sen is arguing that an individual's preferences/choices may not necessarily be the ones that will lead to an improvement in their well-being - the Indian woman who puts her family before herself. (The bargaining models allow for a gap between preferences and outcomes, but due to problems of scarcity and allocation, rather than the endogeneity of preferences.) He discusses the importance of information on "perceptions of desert and legitimacy, contribution and interest". These are ultimately ingredients that play a part in the operation of power discussed above.

Hart (1993) points out Sen's analysis contains the assumption that it is possible to distinguish between perception of interests and contributions that influence the bargaining process, and some objective level of these categories. It is as "if ideology and meaning are essentially illusions that must be stripped away to reveal the 'objective' condition that they mask" (Hart 1993:121).⁹ From a theoretical perspective Hart is correct - the removal of one layer of ideology will simply reveal another. Yet, Sen's discussion contains a sense of a practical imperative that is missing in Hart. "The 'ill-fare' associated with morbidity or undernourishment has an immediacy that does not await the person's inclination or willingness to answer detailed questions regarding her welfare. Indeed, the well-being of

⁷ The endogeneity of preferences is the same as the issue of false consciousness.

⁸ Sen uses the phrase 'perception of interest' rather than 'preference'.

⁹ This is a similar point to one made above in explaining the inadequacy of Kooremen and Kapteyn's attempt to quantify bargaining power.

a person may plausibly be seen in terms of a person's functioning and capabilities" (Sen 1990:126).

There is a second difficulty with Sen's analysis of the problem. Just because a woman does not conceptualise her own needs as distinguishable from those of her family, or because her needs are at the bottom of the priority list, doesn't necessarily mean a woman is unaware of what her needs are. She may be in a situation where her family is her only means of survival, and to challenge the hierarchy may lead to a breakdown of the family structure. To suggest that what is needed is to separate an individual's perception of interest from their actual level of well-being implies that the individual does not know what his or her needs are, and that the policy maker does! In Sen's example preferences may be endogenous, but he does not provide proof that they are. Preferences are generated by the social context that surrounds the individual, and therefore are by definition endogenous. Yet there are additional reasons that can lead individuals to do something that is not in their own best interest: a) intentional self-sacrifice; b) a lack of power to carry out their own interest; as well as c) endogeneity of preferences leads them to confuse their own interests with those of others.

Behrman (1990) asks whether the endogeneity of preferences has an impact on the estimation framework used for policy decisions. If the aim of estimation is to identify the relative importance of the determinants of malnutrition with the purpose of assisting policy, and if this can be achieved relatively accurately without allowing preferences to be endogenous, does it matter that the model is incorrectly specified? Behrman answers his own question by saying that it depends on the circumstances, and gives the following example. If nutritional status is influenced by a mother's education, and her preferences and her actions are determined by education, it would not matter that preferences are assumed to be exogenous. The relevant variables are in the equation - nutritional status and education - and there would be no bias due to an omitted variable.

Perhaps a fuller answer to this question would be that the estimation procedure attempts to identify important determinants of particular outcomes. It does not attempt to model a complete social context. Yet an awareness of the social context enables the identification of certain factors that may determine preferences for a particular outcome. To add one further layer of analysis, individuals have to prioritise their aims and the preference for one outcome may be influenced by the preference for another outcome. Outcomes do not occur independently of one another, but it is assumed that they do when they are modelled as discrete, and separate events. Preferences are endogenous because their prioritisation depends on the constraints and opportunities that individuals face. Behrman's justification for mis-specification assumes that a mother has one priority

which is a healthy child, and lack of education prevents her from achieving that end. Women often have to juggle a variety of priorities, which may compete with one another for her resources and time. (For example, paying for education of other offspring or ensuring her own economic security.) Rather than single equations that model particular outcomes, perhaps what is needed is a range of equations that model household outcomes simultaneously, thereby allowing for competing priorities.

To summarise, preferences are endogenous for two reasons: a) the influence of others may lead an individual to confuse his/her interests with those of others; b) preferences for one outcome are dependent on preferences for, and the ability to meet, other outcomes. Yet Sen's suggestion that an attempt to measure the extent of endogeneity and its effect requires the means to distinguish endogeneity from other factors that motivate individuals to put the interests of others before their own.

Indices of power

It was suggested above that Kooreman and Kapteyn's attempt to compare preferred with actual working hours to determine the level of 'sympathy' for the other participant, is invalid due to the endogeneity of preferences. This needs further explanation. For example, consider a situation where a woman is working for 14 or 16 hours a day. Woman A may only consider her family's needs and opinions, and may state that her actual and preferred working hours are one and the same. The degree to which she is prepared to sacrifice her own needs for those of her family - the level of her sympathy - would be recorded as relatively low. (Or her bargaining power would be recorded as relatively high.) Woman B may work the same number of hours as woman A, but would work considerably fewer hours if her husband would assist with household chores. A large gap would be recorded between actual and preferred hours and a higher level of sympathy would be deduced. In reality aims and actions are both influenced by the social environment, and the gap between the two does not indicate sympathy for others, or bargaining power.

Various empirical studies have attempted to establish a link between access to resources, involvement in economic activity, and influence over important decisions as a way of assessing different levels of bargaining power. Acharya and Bennett's (1981, cited in Engle 1990) study in Nepal finds a link between extent of the decision-making in various spheres of influence and women's involvement in economic activity. Lee and Peterson define the access to resources as the percentage of total household subsistence base attributable to the labour of particular individuals. They then relate this to the level of conjugal power - the extent of independent decision-making - in a study covering 113 'patriarchal cultures' (Lee and Peterson 1983).

There are numerous problems with this approach. Firstly, the relationship between access to resources and influence may be circular - it is impossible to say which is the causal factor. Secondly, contributing labour is not an indicator of control - a husband may well appropriate the fruits of that labour. Thirdly, there may be a genuine difference of opinion over who makes the decisions (Rogers 1990). Spouses may not admit to the true allocation of influence (Rogers 1990). Fourthly, control over resources may not amount to very much if, due to poverty, it is a question of allocation shortages and fending off creditors. Fifthly, contribution is the other side of the coin to control over expenditure decisions. Both spouses may be earning the same wage, but their levels of contribution may differ, and influence in spheres of decision-making can depend on contribution levels.

In order to devise possible empirical solutions that could be used within the context of this thesis, the discussion would perhaps be clarified by examining an example of an estimation problem, for example, the nutritional status of children. An estimation of the determinants of nutritional status might include husband's income, wife's income, education levels as well as various household sanitation features, medical service provision, breast feeding and inoculation practices. Income is assumed to be a measure of the resources that a parent has available to improve nutrition. Within the bargaining framework it is also assumed to represent the degree to which a spouse can influence expenditure decisions. As such it is an indicator of power to influence this particular outcome.

Yet, using income level in the equation assumes a simple relationship between individual income and child welfare. It does not recognise that earning an income does not necessarily imply controlling the allocation of the money. Nor does it account for the fact that the contribution to child welfare may differ from the income level. In the analysis in the following chapters of the intra-household processes in the survey area, two data series have been chosen as representing these characteristics. The willingness to contribute is measured by the 'percentage contribution of household recurrent expenditure' and 'percentage contribution of household consumer durables'. The control over income has been broadened to include control over household assets, and is measured by the disposal rights over household assets - assets that a spouse would expect to take on divorce.¹⁰

This approach avoids assessing power by asking: 'Who makes decisions?' and all the related measurement problems. It yields a measure of differential control over resources on the assumption that resource control and power are closely linked. Yet these two variables have their share of problems. For

¹⁰ The construction of these variables is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

the percentage of contribution, it is a question of accurate measurement when faced with issues of inaccurate recall, and of constraints of time and money. Using the expected divorce settlement as a measure of asset control has the advantage of representing disposal rights over household assets. But it is only an 'expected level' and not an actual level. Secondly, again, it is not clear whether assets will be left behind because of endogeneity, self-sacrifice, or insufficient power, but the result is still a measure of control over resources whatever explanation.¹¹ As mentioned above, the balance of power between two individuals will fluctuate according the type and circumstances of the interaction. Any index will inevitably be a simplification. Perhaps ultimately the data used to construct an index of power/influence must vary according to the issue being considered, as well as the cultural context, and its limitations must always be kept in mind.

** Does an analysis of power adequately deal with the nature of a conjugal relationship: conflict or cooperation?*

Much of the discussion so far has been about bargaining and levels of power, and has essentially referred to a conflict situation. Folbre (1988) points out that although unitary models assumed that altruism is unbounded within the household, the bargaining models appear to assume a constant state of conflict between spouses - the market now exists within the household.¹² On the other hand, Sen calls for 'an analysis of the existence of both co-operating and conflicting elements in family relations' (Sen 1984).

If it is feasible to assume that altruism is more prevalent amongst household members than in the market place, why should this be the case? Becker's explanation for his assumption of altruism is that 'small is beautiful' - that it is possible within a small intimate unit (Becker, cited in Folbre 1988). Folbre (1988:261) argues that socialisation is a more convincing answer - 'sharing inside the family is viewed as a responsibility, but outside it is little more than charity'.

** How should altruism be dealt with on a theoretical level?*

Kooreman and Kapteyn encapsulate the notion of altruism in their 'sympathy' variable - the benefit gained from someone else's welfare. Each individual chooses a site on a spectrum with altruism at one end and self-interest at the other. Although it is not included in Kooreman and Kapteyn's model,

¹¹ In the data on disposal rights over household assets, it would be possible to distinguish between the endogeneity, self-sacrifice and lack of power using the following question: "Why would you leave items that you purchased with your husband on divorce?" Possible answers could be: "Because they belonged to him (endogeneity); for the benefit of the children (self-sacrifice - fathers normally have custody); because my husband would prevent me." Unfortunately this data was not collected.

¹² It is only the non-cooperative bargaining models that make this assumption.

socialisation influences the choice of that position, and power enables the enactment of it.

So far the frameworks discussed are all essentially static. Do individuals change their level of altruism? Altruism can be constant irrespective of circumstances, but most individuals will cease making sacrifices if their actions are unreciprocated (or perhaps unappreciated) after a period of time. Perhaps the series of incidents that make up daily life produce either altruistic or self-interested responses. The effect is the intermingling of cooperation and conflict, that can have a long-term cumulative effect - the creation or depletion of trust between spouses.¹³ The reactions functions used in the non-cooperative bargaining models could apply here. Yet the assumption in the non-cooperative models is that the aim of a spouse's response is to obtain the 'best deal' for themselves given the actions of the other. An extra layer could be added such that a mixture of cooperative and non-cooperative actions occurs that builds or deplete trust - that a spouse's reaction is not only dependent on the other's last action but also on the level of trust.

Structures that maintain the status quo (principally through socialisation), and those that transmit change have a part to play. Changing circumstances can lead to action outside of the expected roles and engendered spheres (for example a married woman earning an income). Once the guidelines to acceptable behaviour have been broken, the other spouse's sphere can become encroached upon, gendered ideologies that maintained identities are challenged, and trust that is nurtured through remaining within given boundaries can be threatened. Change may lead to the renegotiation of the conjugal contract, or to a possible hostile response that attempts to prevent the change (Chapters 6 and 7).

2.5 Conclusion

The bargaining approach provides useful concepts for analysing processes of negotiation between spouses - reaction functions, economic threat points, voice, gender spheres. Yet many of these notions could be developed further. Reaction functions could be the result of cooperative and non-cooperative actions that lead to the creation or depletion of trust, rather than simply a response to the previous action. The notion of 'voice' acknowledges that individuals may have unequal abilities to assert their own interests, but fails to recognise that the 'system of redistribution' may be gendered. The concept of gender spheres points to the importance that gender roles/activities play in the interaction between men and women, but fails to

¹³ Using less accurately descriptive neo-classical terminology - the interaction between, and movement of, short-term and long-term equilibria.

examine how these spheres are established, and adapt to changing circumstances, through negotiation over gender identities.

It is the use of gender identities to determine the legitimacy of need and desert, and the negotiation over such identities, that leads to the endogeneity of preferences. Because the process of defining gender identities is part of the 'game', so too are the preferences that arise out of those identities. Given that negotiation over identity is possible, and to some extent dependent on resource control, bargaining power itself is also endogenous. To put it another way, given the circular nature of the relationship between influence/power and control over resources, it is not possible to assume which is the determining factor.

Much of the rationale behind the bargaining approach is an attempt to explain the process by which gender inequalities exist within the household. The models highlight one particular explanation - a lower level of resources (income and assets) that leads to a lower level of bargaining power, which in turn leads to a lower share of household resources. As pointed out, this argument is circular. The discussion above argued that there are three possible interpretations: a) preferences are endogenous (women confuse their own interests with those of others; b) intentional self-sacrifice; c) lack of power/resources to assert one's preferences. A few attempts to measure/identify these factors were mentioned - Sen's difference between perceived interest and actual wellbeing (endogeneity), Kooreman and Kapteyn's 'sympathy' variable (self-sacrifice), and Acharya and Bennett's link between involvement in economic activity and influence in decision-making (power to assert preferences). None of these attempts succeed in separating what they intend to measure from the other factors. (Kooreman and Kapteyn claim to measure sympathy, but in fact the difference between preferred and actual working hours could be due to endogeneity or lack of power.) Does this matter? It may do if the intention is to improve women's situation.

In criticising economic models it is important to recognise that their aim is ultimately to examine the statistical relationship between different variables for the purposes of policy. Such an exercise cannot encompass the complexity of the social environment. The issue then becomes whether the simplifications chosen are justified, or whether too much is lost in the process of abbreviation. Is it simply a question of methodological preference where model building and more qualitative approaches both contribute to our understanding, but that neither approach is superior to the other? It is my belief that approaches that attempt to grapple with the complexity and variation of social relations and structures are more likely to improve our understanding. Modelling and statistical analysis can suggest possible linkages and explanations, but qualitative understanding of

the data is necessary to verify these hypotheses. The process of testing models against data, and against more qualitative evidence is essential to ensure their relevance. Without an understanding of the social context - relations and structures - it is not possible to be confident of the validity of a model.

There is also a sense in which the workings of power (including the endogeneity of preferences) and the role played by gender identities must be at the heart of any discussion of bargaining between men and women - this is what the bargaining models fail to do. If a particular index is chosen to represent the balance of power, a discussion is required as to the relevance of that index given the social relations in which the negotiations are embedded. To assume that income is a universal indicator of power fails to acknowledge the variety of factors that influence whether a woman works or not and whether she controls the allocation of that income. The following chapters use data from Uganda to show the importance of social relations for understanding intra-household allocation processes.

METHODOLOGY:**COMBINING QUALITATIVE WITH QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES****3.1 Introduction**

This chapter examines the way in which theory meets practice: theoretical preconceptions lead to certain assumptions in the field; practical constraints may lead to misleading findings, and therefore, to false theoretical conclusions. This chapter will look at some of the methodological issues that bedevil fieldwork: defining such terms as 'household' and 'marriage', ensuring representativity without sacrificing detailed qualitative research, and devising accurate data collection techniques suitable for difficult and particular circumstances. It will give a flavour of the problems faced, and some of the attempted solutions. The fieldwork took place between June 1995 - May 1996 in Mukono District, Uganda.

3.2 Choice of the field site.

Given that large national surveys are not possible (or perhaps desirable) with limited PhD funding, the choice of the field site becomes important. Uganda was chosen because I had been resident there for one year prior to the PhD, and had visited the country many times. Mukono district was chosen primarily because it is experiencing the economic growth and stability that is occurring in the southern part of Uganda. With support from the ESRC I was able to purchase a second-hand 4-wheel drive vehicle. (It took three months to come by one within my means, and I learnt a considerable amount about vehicle repair.) This enabled the study to include two field sites, one semi-urban and one rural, in an attempt to enable analysis of the effect of infrastructure, and of different levels of economic activity.

The choice of villages was both mine, and that of the local officials. On approaching the district official I specified that I would like to work in

four villages on the perimeter of Mukono town, and two villages in a rural sub-county called Ngogwe, close to Lake Victoria and inaccessible by tarmac road. I was introduced to a female sub-county official from a village outside Mukono town, who was responsible for women's issues. The motivation for this choice may have been the emphasis that I placed on 'gender' being the subject of the research project, (which was simply interpreted as meaning women's issues) or the knowledge that this particular woman was likely to be cooperative. Whatever the reason, her assistance was invaluable. In Ngogwe, halfway through the fieldwork new officials were elected and one of the new representatives was not as cooperative as his predecessor. Unfortunately, he was regularly intoxicated, and would go out of his way to avoid us. In this case we were able to call on the help of the previous officials.

There has been a considerable amount of literature on the difficulties, (and the necessity), of working with local officials (Devereux and Hoddinott 1992, Razavi 1992). In the belief that there may be some financial gain to be had, officials may choose some households while ignoring others. In theory this problem did not occur, as every household within the village boundary was interviewed in the early stages, and the sample was chosen from the resulting population list. Yet we had to rely on the official for information on where the boundary was, and to trust that he/she did not include or exclude households for his/her own political reasons. Once the official had introduced the enumerator to the respondent, the official left, so that the interview could be confidential. There were one or two occasions where the occupants of a household were uncooperative and where, perhaps due to previous experience, the officials were unwilling to assist us in our attempts at persuasion.

Given that the rural field sites in Ngogwe were 3 hours drive from Mukono, daily commuting would have required 6 hours of travel a day. A local catholic mission was able to give us accommodation. (Built in the 1960s, originally the mission must have had around 30 residents, but currently there were only 3 sisters. It is on a hill-top with magnificent views over the lake and adjacent rain forest. The remnants of a white colonial culture prior to the civil war were scattered across the property; an abandoned flower garden, a badminton court, a library. We shared a kitchen with a disused stove now inhabited by rats.)

It should be said that there were various false starts to the fieldwork. The final field site was by no means the first choice. Work initially started on some tea estates, but it became obvious that resident employees formed a community that was in many ways separated and distinct from the surrounding villages, and as a result the village communities were chosen in

preference. Initially one assistant was hired, but after one month she left to work elsewhere. The decision to employ 2 assistants was to some extent to prevent reliance on a single individual. ¹

Description of field site

Mukono district stretches along the northern shore of Lake Victoria from Kampala (population of 840,700), the capital city, to Jinja, the second largest town (population 65,000) (See maps pgs 68-69). ² It also stretches northwards towards Lake Kyoga. Mukono town (population of 7400), is a 30 minutes drive outside Kampala, on the trans-African highway that links Mombassa and Nairobi with Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi. ³

Mukono district is part of the fertile crescent north of the lake that was rainforested prior to increased settlement. The area is used mostly for smallholder agriculture in which the main crops are coffee and bananas. There are, however, several large sugar and tea estates, providing both permanent and casual employment.

Both its situation, the fertility of the land and the local climate have given the district advantages over other areas in Uganda. This is reflected in its high population density (179 persons per sq km) (Table 3.1). The population density for Uganda as a whole (85 persons per sq km) is relatively high in comparison with the rest of East Africa (31 persons per sq km) and that of Africa (21 persons per sq km). As shown in table 3.1, Mukono's population has slightly better vital statistics than those recorded for the country as whole (including nearly double the level of per capita income). ⁴

¹ The decision to employ research assistants, their selection, and training are discussed below.

² Source: Ugandan 1991 Census.

³ The current crisis in Kenya, and the resulting neglect of their road infrastructure, has made it more difficult for goods to come in and out of Uganda, affecting other East African economies.

⁴ The predominate ethnic group living in Mukono district are Baganda, and the central region as a whole is known as Buganda.

Table 3.1: Vital statistics for Uganda and Mukono district

Statistic (1991)	Mukono district	Uganda
Population density (persons per sq km)	179	85
Infant mortality (Deaths per 1000 live births)	102	122
Life expectancy at birth (yrs)	50	48
Crude death rate (Rate per 1000 per population per year)	16	17
Per capita income per annum (Ush)	220,000	124,000
Percentage of population 0-17 yrs with only one parent living	10.9	11.6

Source: Government of Uganda National Integrated Household Survey 1991, Government of Uganda Abstract of statistics 1997

Four of the chosen villages are within Kauga, a sub-county on the edge of Mukono town (Namubiru, Kirangira, Ttakajunge, and Llwanyonyi). Two others are in Ngogwe (Zitwe and Ggunda), a sub-county 3 hours' drive on a murum road south-east of Mukono. The two sites were chosen as being typical of peri-urban and rural communities respectively. Average per capita income in 1992-3 gives an indication of the differences between the rural and urban communities in the central region as a whole: 140,000 Ush per annum in the rural areas and 365,000 Ush for urban areas.^{5 6}

Mukono is an economically active town, supporting a sizeable evening food and clothes market, three health clinics, three secondary schools, approximately 200 shops, a large hotel and conference centre. There is also a theological college that is part of Makerere University and attracts students from all over Uganda⁷.

Ssi, the main trading centre in Ngogwe, is approximately 2 hours walk from the study villages. (There is no public transport, and only a few residents have bicycles.) In the two villages there are 3 shops, one primary school, and one clinic at the catholic mission. The items on sale in the shops are maize flour, tomatoes, sodas, eggs, bananas and matches. (In contrast, in Mukono, it is possible to buy a television, obtain photocopies and a whole

⁵ Source: Govt of Uganda National Integrated Household Survey 1992-1993.

⁶ The Kauga/Ngogwe survey did not collect data suitable for comparison with these statistics. Income data were collected from the two spouses, not all working individuals within the household, and therefore neither income per household, nor per capita income, could be calculated. (Per capita income is defined as total household income divided by the number of working and non-working residents.)

⁷ I was able to rent a small house on the campus.

range of relatively sophisticated building equipment⁸, as well as the basic food and household items.)

The peri-urban villages are adjacent to one another around Mukono, but show considerable variety despite their close proximity. Namubiru and Kirangira are smaller communities, both in population and area, and perhaps as a result appeared to be slightly closer-knit. Both had active local councillors and resident former councillors who had been elected to higher office, and as a result had some resources at their disposal. Ttakkajjunge is a more disparate community stretching along a tarmac road running north into a more rural area. Unlike Namubiru and Kirangira, the local councillors in Ttakkajjunge did not know all the residents within their community. In Lwanyonyi, many of the residents are non-Bugandans, typically Acholi (Nilotic rather than Bantu) from northern Uganda. There has been a long tradition of migrant labour flowing south from Acholi, and some residents were second or third generation. Others were recent refugees from the current civil war in the north. The village bordered a sugar estate, which was a source of waged employment for some residents. Alcoholism was a visible problem, with two or three drinking groups congregating each day.

The two rural villages showed similar variation. Zitwe had residents who were active former councillors who had moved up to the second or third tier of local government. Ggunda was once an active fishing village, and a landing site for smugglers bringing in goods from Kenya. With the new government the tariff system has changed and little smuggling occurs, other than fuel. Fishing is also difficult because of the spread of the water hyacinth over the surface of the lake. Again alcoholism was a visible problem.

3.3 Testing representativity

Defining marital status

Given the wide range of marital relations, it is difficult to choose one definition that captures the extent of the variation. A woman with a regular visiting lover may consider herself to be married. Yet, the number of 'female-headed households' within a society is becoming a more commonly quoted statistic (Appleton 1996, Buvinic 1997, Peters 1995). This statistic assumes that there is a simple division between dual-spouse and female-headed households.

⁸ The number of retail building suppliers and visible construction are indicators of the current economic growth.

In the Ugandan 1991 census the number of female-headed households is determined by two questions: 'Name of all those who slept here last night?' and 'What is their relationship to head of household?' The list of those who slept in the household the previous night may only include permanent residents, and not part-time residents. A polygamous husband, or one who is only resident part-time due to work, may be excluded from the household, and the household may be classified as 'single female' when it is not. As discussed above, to assume that these households are poor on the basis of this classification may be a mistake. Both polygamous and part-time husbands may make substantial financial and labour contributions.⁹

In the Kauga/Ngogwe study, information on marital status was gathered using the following questions: 'Are you married/co-habiting, divorced, widowed, not married?' 'Do you / your husband have other wives or partners?' 'Do you / your husband stay here all the time, once a week, once a month, or several times a year?'¹⁰ The data are therefore specific on how often the husband is resident, and whether he has other commitments in terms of other households.

According to the definition used by the Ugandan census (1991-2) 30% of households are female-headed in the Mukono district (Table 3.2). The Kauga/Ngogwe survey produced a much smaller estimate of 17.2% of households in the female-headed category - because women with part-time resident or polygamous husbands were registered as married. If, using the Kauga/Ngogwe data, single women and women with part-time husbands are placed in one category, i.e. using a definition equivalent to the one used in the Ugandan census, the total of female-headed households is 33.9% - a result similar to the census figure of 30.0%. This suggests that the census figure classified households with part-time resident husbands as female-headed. It also indicates that the Kauga/Ngogwe results are broadly comparable to those of the Ugandan census.

⁹ There is considerable debate as to whether targeting female-headed households is an effective way of reducing poverty, owing to the problem of defining of headship and conflicting evidence of poverty (Appleton 1996, Buvinic et al 1997).

¹⁰ The question was designed so that the respondent could either be the wife or the husband, but the subject of the question is the husband.

Table 3.2: Percentage distribution of households according to marital status and head of household

Marital status		Kauga/Ngogwe ¹¹	Kauga/Ngogwe data Census definition	Mukono District Census 1991
Married	Full-time monogamous	53.9%	66.0%	
	Full-time polygamous	12.1%		
	Part-time monogamous	8.0%	33.9%	
	Part-time polygamous	8.7%		
Single women		17.2%		
Male head of household				70.0%
Female head of household				30.0%

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey and Ugandan Census 1991.

Stratification and representativity

Representativity requires ensuring that the proportion of respondents in the different strata is representative of that in the population. For example the ratio of urban to rural residents in the sample should be similar to the population ratio. In order to achieve a reasonable sample size in each stratum, each of the more common categories would contain 100+ respondents. Given the district ratio of urban:rural residents of 1:8, a sample of 30 urban residents would require a sample of 240 rural residents. Because of the need to keep the total sample size to a manageable level, the emphasis in this research was placed on obtaining 30 respondents from each of the socio-economic strata, identified in the fieldwork census.¹² Table 3.3 gives the sample size for each stratum, and table 3.4 compares the between strata ratios within the sample with those in the population.

¹¹ The data used here are from the Kauga/Ngogwe census prior to the exclusion of those with no children under 5 years.

¹² In some cases this was not possible because of the insufficient number of respondents in the original census list.

Table 3.3: Number of respondents in each category of the sample

Stratum	Housing index			Total
	Wealthy	Middle	Poor	
Full-time monogamous husband	35	39	32	106
Polygamous husband	12	19	4	35
Part-time resident husband	9	11	12	32
Married	56	69	48	173
Single	11	32	28	71
Semi-urban	58	73	54	185
Rural	9	26	21	56
Total	67	101	76	244

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Table 3.4: Comparison of married/single and rural/semi-urban ratios in sample and district populations

Ratio	Sample population	District population from Census 1991
Married women/Single women ¹³	2.4 : 1	4.8 : 1
Rural women/Semi-urban women	0.3 : 1	7.3 : 1

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey and Uganda 1991 Census, Mukono district figures.

In order to obtain sufficient numbers of single women in each wealth stratum, for the results of the statistical analysis to be likely to be significant, single women are over-represented. This was justified because it enabled comparisons between married and single women in order to examine the effect of being married on resource allocation. The predominance of urban residents, despite a low level of urbanisation within the district, was intentional because of an interest in an area with a greater level of economic activity and variation amongst the population.

An indicator of the extent of representativity is income distribution - a similar distribution should exist in the sample and district population. Table 3.5 compares the Kauga/Ngogwe distribution with that of the central region which includes the capital city as well as 7 other districts. (Unfortunately no income distribution is available for Mukono district alone.) Both total and rural central region distributions appear similar to that of Kauga/Ngogwe, with Kauga/Ngogwe achieving a slightly higher variance. (This may indicate a better representation of the poorest and the

¹³ Using the Kauga/Ngogwe definition specified above and not the census definition.

richest, or a greater level of accuracy in collecting income data.) The urban central region distribution is significantly different because it contains the capital city. This suggests that although the Kauga respondents have been called 'urban or semi-urban' within this study for purposes of comparison with the Ngogwe residents, in fact their income levels are actually closer to those termed 'rural' in the other Ugandan data sources. (A comparison between urban and rural income levels in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey is made in chapter 4.)

Table 3.5: Percentage distribution of households according to income class

Monthly household income class ('000) Ush	Kauga/Ngogwe (n=225)	Central Region TOTAL (IHS 1992-3) (n=1,136,060)	Central Region RURAL (IHS 1992-3) (n=816,250)	Central Region URBAN (IHS 1992-3) (n=319,810)
0-50	66.7%	54.3%	64.0%	29.6%
50-100	14.2%	28.1%	25.1%	35.8%
100-150	7.6%	8.4%	7.2%	11.7%
150-200	3.1%	3.6%	1.8%	8.1%
200-300	3.6%	2.4%	1.0%	6.0%
300-400	1.3%	1.2%	0.4%	3.1%
Above 400	3.6 %	2.0%	0.5%	5.7%

Source: Government of Uganda Integrated Household Survey 1992-3, Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The housing index was an attempt to collect data on socio-economic status prior to the main survey to ensure that both the poorest and the richest were represented. Table 3.8 above suggests that this was achieved. Table 3.6 matches the housing index with other more specific wealth variables that were collected in the main survey, and shows the degree to which the housing index is an accurate indicator of income and ownership of consumer durables.



Table 3.6: Average value of consumer durables¹⁴ and income by socio-economic status and marital status (sample size)

Socio-economic status (a)	Married 'households'		Single 'households'	
	Consumer durable score (Ush) (b)	Income (Ush per month)	Consumer durable score (Ush)	Income (Ush per month)
Wealthy	424,320 (59)	166,000 (45)	272,830 (9)	10,000 (9)
Middle	326,000 (70)	105,000 (63)	197,390 (30)	9,000 (32)
Poor	232,700 (46)	75,000 (40)	193,730 (25)	6,000 (25)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Socio-economic status is derived from a housing index, the construction of which is discussed below.

(b) Consumer durable score is the replacement value (Ush) of durables within the household. The construction of this score is described below.

(c) Sample size varies according to the variable under consideration because of incomplete data.

It would appear that both ownership of consumer durables and income is higher in the higher socio-economic status groups denoted by the housing index - for both married and single women households.

A fourth area where the sample design may have caused a bias is age.

It may be possible that the exclusion of households with no child under 5 years of age led to a higher representation of younger families than exists in the population as a whole. A comparison of the adult age distribution for Mukono district from the Ugandan 1991 Census with the equivalent data from the Kauga/Ngogwe data shows the extent to which this has occurred (Table 3.7).

¹⁴ A explanation of the construction of these values is given above.

Table 3.7: Percentage of respondents in particular age groups by marital status

Age	Single Women		Men		Married women	
	Kauga/ Ngogwe	Mukono District	Kauga/ Ngogwe	Mukono District	Kauga/ Ngogwe	Mukono District
Teens	2.7	3.5	0.6	2.4	<u>5.7</u>	<u>13.6</u>
20's	20.3	11.5	<u>24.9</u>	<u>31.3</u>	43.2	41.6
30's	21.6	19.9	35.3	26.5	31.8	23.3
40's	<u>8.1</u>	<u>17.5</u>	15.6	15.4	13.6	11.6
50's	27.0	17.0	10.4	11.6	2.8	5.9
60's	13.5	12.3	8.7	7.4	1.7	2.7
70 +	6.8	10.6	4.6	5.4	1.1	1.1

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey and Ugandan 1991 Census

Note: Underlined number indicates age group is under-represented in Kauga/Ngogwe survey, **bold number** indicates age group is over-represented.

Married women in their teens are under-represented in the sample, either because few have children, or because they are still living within a larger parental household, and have been missed by the survey. Married women in their 30's are over-represented, because of the high proportion with young children. The same is true of married men both in their 20's and 30's.

Single women in their 20's are over-represented in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample as a high percentage have young children. Single women in their 50's are also over-represented because they are caring for their grandchildren. Those in their 40's have neither young children of their own nor grandchildren and are therefore under-represented.

The anticipated bias was that adults over 40 years would be significantly under-represented. Given that marital relationships change over time, with perhaps negotiations developing into a more stable pattern, an emphasis on the younger group may have given a biased view of intra-household allocation of resources. However, this bias does not exist in the case of married men and women. It is true for single women in their 40's, but those in their 50's are over-represented. It is unlikely that the characteristics of single women in their 40's differ so much from those of single women in the 50's such that the survey missed a significant proportion of single women in their 40's with young children. It is more probable that this group is less likely to be caring for under fives, and as a result this bias is an unavoidable consequence of choosing to measure nutritional status. It may have affected the analysis of the situation of single women in that the offspring of women in their 40's may be less likely to be able to support

their mothers than those their 50's. For example, a son of a 40 year old woman is likely to be in his mid-twenties, and may not be as well established as a son of a 50 year old woman who is in his mid-thirties. (The implications of mother-child relationships for the economic strategies of women is discussed in chapter 8 below.)

3.4 Defining the unit of analysis

In theory

There has been considerable literature on the problems of choosing a unit of analysis for both theoretical and fieldwork purposes. Much of the recent literature has berated the sometimes blind reliance on the concept of discrete households (Peters 1995, Guyer 1981, Guyer/Peters 1987, O'Laughlin 1995). Yet, as these authors explain, it is important to understand the reason for this emphasis. Much of the early, anthropological literature on Africa concentrated its efforts on the study of kinship principles - explaining the 'constitution and dissolution' of lineages. This emphasis on ethnic variation did not fit with the need to pursue goals of national integration after decolonisation. Nor did this approach lend itself to examining the relationship between domestic groups and between such groups and larger political units such as the state, or the international arena. The notion of the peasant household was in part a solution to these problems. It also suited the methodological needs of many economists. But precisely because inter-household kinship links are important in Africa, the use of 'household' has a chequered past.

As Rogers (1990:9) points out the definition of the household is an intractable theoretical problem. There are a variety of possible defining characteristics - joint residence, joint consumption, joint production - yet no one attribute fits all situations. Households may contain a variety of overlapping units and actual boundaries of the household are far from clear - or, to use Peters' term, the boundaries are 'permeable' (Peters 1995). For example, a polygamous husband may have two wives who carry out agricultural production separately, yet live under the same roof. Or the two wives may live in separate houses in different villages, yet the husband has one plot of land from which he financially supports both wives. (In the Kauga/Ngogwe census 20% of men were polygamous and 17% of men were part-time residents in household.) A single mother may be living on her brother's or father's compound and yet obtain financial support either from other members of the household, or from a visiting lover. (41% of single women lived other adults.)

Imposing the notion of a coherent and discrete household has generated misleading images of domestic life. Much of the economics literature (prior to the bargaining literature discussed in chapter 2) has treated the household as a unitary social actor, with no internal sub-divisions. It has also tended to ignore the importance of *inter-household* linkages in resource distribution and labour allocation.

In practice

So where does this leave us when faced with doing field research? Peters (1995) recognises the need to identify key social units for policy purposes, yet suggests that this must entail an acknowledgement of the plurality of social, domestic units. She suggests that more emphasis must be placed on how households survive or change over time and on the extent of flows between households. 'In this way, one is led to enquire simultaneously into both units and processes.' (Peters 1995:101)

Guyer and Peters (1987) suggest looking at smaller and larger domestic units and the overlapping membership, where an individual may be member of the small unit but not the larger encompassing unit, or how one unit (for example a mother and child) may be nested within another larger unit. Gastellu (1987) recommends looking at the activities and relationships involved in production and consumption in order to map the 'flows'. Rogers (1990) suggests choosing the definition that best suits the situation and the purpose of the study.

The emphasis in this thesis is the relationship between spouses - detailed information was collected from both husbands and wives. Questions concerning income, education, social position and assets kept separately from the 'household' were directed at the individual concerned - either the husband or wife. Without the need to collect data on all 'household members' from one particular respondent, it was not necessary to list members as distinct from non-members, and therefore the surveys did not depend on defining the boundaries of the household. Questions about apparently 'joint household' assets and recurrent expenditure were directed to the adult female (with children) in the dwelling - contributors to household expenses were not categorised by their 'membership' but by their relation to the adult woman concerned. Questions concerning the nutrition and education of the children were also addressed to the adult woman. In a sense the unit of concern was the married couple, and how their interactions impacted on the children for whom they cared. All resident children, irrespective of their relation to the adult respondents, and all non-resident biological children were

included.

By including, and identifying, households with polymous and/or part-time men, and single women living with other adults, as well as dual spouse households, a variety of household forms were encompassed by the survey. This particular allocation of questions contains to some extent the assumption that the mother and child form a closer-knit unit than the father and child. (For example, it assumes that the woman is more likely to know about a child's recent illnesses.) As such it follows Guyer and Peters' (1987) recommendation to examine smaller units with the larger ones. It was also chosen to suit the needs of collecting nutrition data.

In theory it was also possible to cross-check information on 'household' assets obtained from the wife by also asking the husband. This was only done in one instance - both spouses where asked who 'owned' the house and the land. Only a few discrepancies emerged - mostly in polygamous households where the woman felt the need to assert her right to retain usage over her portion of the household land. This may have revealed a fear that her husband may allocate her land to another wife.

For the purposes of this thesis, it was assumed that one of the key variations in the nature of spousal relations is the degree to which a husband/father contributes financially or otherwise. It was necessary to stratify the sample accordingly to ensure that it was representative of the varying levels of male contribution. Rarely in fieldwork is it possible to collect detailed information on financial contribution prior to the stratification of sample. Ostensible substitutes, such as residency or marital status, may not give accurate impressions of the actual level of financial contribution. For example, a migrant worker may contribute more than an alcoholic, permanently resident father. Or, if marital status is used, an apparently single woman may gain substantially from an informal relationship, or a brother.

In this instance information gathered during a census of the survey villages on marital status (married/cohabiting, single), residency (part-time or full-time), type of marriage (polygamous/monogamous) were used as indicators of the level of contribution by the relevant male. In terms of the debate above, this assumed that children would be living with an adult female who was primarily responsible for their care, and that men's contribution in terms of time and money was more variable. (This proved to be an inaccurate over-simplification - see chapter 7 and 8.)

Table 3.8 makes an after-the-fact comparison between the husband's contribution and type of marriage and residency. It would appear that as a

husband's share rises he is less likely to be either a part-time resident or polygamous, and that residency and type of marriage may be reasonable indicators of spousal contribution. It is also interesting to note that the households that are more likely to be wealthy are not those where the husband meets all the costs, or where the wife contributes more than half, but where husband meets the majority share 48-99%.

Table 3.8: Percentage of part-time and polygamous husbands by share of recurrent expenditure paid for by husband (sample size). ¹⁵

Husband's share of recurrent expenditure	Percentage of husbands who are part-time residents	Percentage of husbands who are polygamous	Percentage of HH in the highest housing index category ¹⁶
0 - 48 %	37.8 (45)	22.2 (45)	30.2 (43)
49 - 99 %	32.4 (37)	18.9 (39)	45.9 (37)
100 %	20.0 (30)	10.0 (30)	40.0 (30)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: Sample size varies with according to the variable under consideration because of incomplete data

It is also possible to compare the distribution of married and single female households according to contribution either by husband, ex-husband or relative (Table 3.9). (The relative tended to be either a brother, father, or an adult son or daughter.) It would appear that 30% of single women are dependent on someone else for more than 50% of their recurrent expenditure, whereas nearly 17% of married women have to meet more than 50% of recurrent expenditure. In the case of single women, marital status does not seem to be a good indicator of the level of financial support, and financial dependency on a husband cannot be inferred from being married.

Table 3.9: Percentage distribution of married and single women by share of recurrent expenditure met by husband, ex-husband or relative (sample size).

Percentage share met by either husband, ex-husband, or relative	Percentage distribution of single women (48)	Percentage distribution of married women (118)
0 - 49 %	70.8	16.9
50 - 100 %	14.6	57.6
100 %	14.6	25.4

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

As mentioned above, the emphasis on this thesis is on the spousal

¹⁵The collection and construction of the percentage contributions to recurrent expenditure are discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁶The definition and construction of the housing index used is discussed below.

relationship, and therefore the level of financial dependence does not invalidate the division of the sample into married and unmarried women. There is, however, an implicit assumption that single women (divorced or widowed) no longer have to contend with spousal authority. But actually single women may be dependent on male relatives, and therefore, to some extent, subject to their authority. A young divorced woman with young children may be unable to set up a household on her own but may have to rely on the charity of a relative, usually male. Table 3.10 shows the percentage of single women who are living with other adults.¹⁷

Table 3.10: Percentage of households with extra adults and relation of extra adult to female respondent (sample size).

Relationship of extra adult to female respondent	Percentage of single women living with extra adult (55)
No extra adult	58.2
Son/Daughter	7.3
Grandchild	14.5
Niece/Nephew	1.8
Mother	3.6
Father	5.4
Brother	3.6
Sister	12.7

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Over 50% of single women lived alone with children under 18 years. Of these, 7% live with their adult children, 14% with their adult grandchildren and nearly 13% with a sister. Only 9% live with their parent(s), and only 9% live with either a brother or father. On the assumption that it is resident male relatives that are likely to impose restrictive authority, it would appear that only a small proportion of single women are subject to such authority.

3.5 Combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies

In theory

The underlying aim behind the chosen methodology was to blend qualitative

¹⁷ During the child survey a list of all resident members and non-resident children was compiled. Because these individuals were not considered crucial to the survey, no attempt was made to distinguish between those more frequently resident and those rarely resident.

and quantitative methods gaining, hopefully, the advantages of both. Scrimshaw (1990) argues that there are two methodological questions that vex field research in intra-household allocation. 'The first is how to measure accurately the actual behaviours, motivations, feelings and outcomes related to intra-household resource allocation. The second is how to ensure an accurate understanding of the meaning of the behaviours and concepts measured' (Scrimshaw 1990:86). Quantitative methods aim to achieve the first, and qualitative the second. (The difference between the two approaches can be encapsulated in an appreciation of how the two methods use 'words'. In a quantitative approach the interaction between the interviewee and interviewer is structured such that the meaning of a particular word is determined by the researcher prior to the interview. In a qualitative approach, the aim of the research is to understand the meaning (or intention) behind the interviewee's use of a particular word.) Qualitative methods are designed with the aim of achieving validity, quantitative methods are designed with the aim of being representative of a broader population. The former generates hypotheses and the latter tests them.

In practice

In reality there are a number of possible interview styles ranging from participant observation, conversations/group discussions and informal interviews to formal/structured interviews. It was decided to use group discussions as a means of understanding the respondent's perception of the issues being studied, and structured interviews to gather data on individuals' behaviour. One issue was whether my language skills would be sufficient to gain most from both types of interviews, or whether the benefit in employing local research assistants would be lost due to myself being one step removed from the process.

Cultural meaning and language are intertwined.¹⁸ I spent three months prior to the fieldwork learning the language, and six months while working in the field. Yet given the constraints on time, and the need to acquire a detailed knowledge of the language in order to conduct sensitive interviews, I decided to employ two research assistants. As both had university degrees in the social sciences, and previous fieldwork experience, it was hoped that good communication between myself and the assistants would make up for the short-comings of my language skills. Owing to the sensitivity of research and the need to interview both men and women, one female and one male research assistant were chosen. The research assistants also acted as moderators in the single-sex group discussions.

¹⁸An interesting example of this is the connection between the verb 'to cook' (okfumba) and the question 'Are you married?' when directed to a woman (Ofumbirwa?), literally translated as 'Do you cook?'

If the benefits of a small-scale, detailed project were not to be lost, it was necessary to ensure that the assistants had a good conceptual grasp of the subject. Two weeks' training preceded the fieldwork, and 3-4 days at the beginning of each stage. The training included a theoretical discussion, and an outline of the current literature. The formal questionnaires, and a topic list for the focus groups were prepared in a rough format in advance of the training. The questionnaires were translated into Luganda, and re-translated back into English. This procedure enabled the checking of the meaning and the local understanding of words prior to going into the field. Role plays were also carried out to see how long each questionnaire took, whether it flowed easily, and to check for errors. The topic list for the discussions was also tried out in role plays. The training was also a two-way process. As a background to this practical task it was possible to discuss the purpose and aims of the fieldwork, enabling me to discover/discuss my own preconceptions about what I expected we would find.

The fieldwork was organised in the following way:

- * A census of all 'dwellings' in the chosen villages to collect data required for selection of a stratified sample - marital status, residency, quality of housing, and the number of children under five years.

- * Focus group discussions with a random selection of the respondents from each strata of the chosen sample. Male and female groups were conducted separately.

- * Structured interviews with each spouse and a sample of single women.

The census generated a list of all the households within the six communities. It gathered information on marital status, residency of husband, the number of children under 5 years, and the quality of the building (Appendix A). This information was used to choose the sample for the household survey ensuring that it included a proportion of dual-spouse, 'single female households', and households with part-time and polygamous husbands. ¹⁹ Only households with children under 5 years were included in the sample because of the decision to collect nutritional status data of under fives as an outcome variable.

The information on the quality of housing from the census was used to

¹⁹No unmarried men were included in the sample.

stratify the sample according to socio-economic status. A housing index was constructed, giving a total score of 1-3, based on the materials used for the construction of the roof and walls, and their state of repair.

Single gender group discussions, with approximately 10-12 respondents, were held in each community. The moderator and assistant were the same gender as the group to encourage a full expression of views. The conversations were recorded on a tape cassette, and a full English transcription was completed at a later date. The purpose was to understand the respondents' perception of the issues relating to intra-household allocation of resources. A subject list was used as a guide by the moderator (see appendix B). It included topics such as bridewealth, polygamous marriage, division of household and agricultural production tasks, decision-making, control of income and assets, custody of children and assets on divorce or death of husband, and marital violence.

The transcriptions of these discussions provided some evidence of how these issues are perceived, where there is apparent conflict between different viewpoints, and an impression of how cultural norms are changing. It provided an understanding of the cultural context in which the statistical data had to be analysed. It also helped to ensure that the questionnaires used in the quantitative survey were culturally relevant, both in terms of general questions and the translation of particular phrases. For example it became apparent during the group discussions that spouses rarely pool their finances, often kept their income a secret, and that there was considerable disagreement over whether purchase of household durables conferred disposal rights over the asset. Questions were designed accordingly.

The purpose of the structured interviews was to collect quantitative data from each spouse in such a way that it was possible in the analysis stage to match the information from one spouse with the other. There were four questionnaires, carried out in two rounds. The asset and income survey targeted both men and women, asking questions on education, training, positions of responsibility within the community, crops grown, income, recurrent expenditure, personal and household assets, inheritance and property ownership (appendices C, D & E).

Women were the respondents for the child survey. Details of the education, nutrition and health were collected for all resident children, irrespective of their relationship to the adults. Information on the survival rate of the respondent's children and education of non-resident children was also collected (see appendix F). ²⁰

²⁰The data on child survival rate and education of non-resident children were not included in the final analysis, but may be used at a later date.

A proportion of the sample were also chosen for a life history survey. The respondents were asked about previous stages of their life - who had cared for them while young, what other places had they lived in, with whom, why they had moved on, had there been any previous marriages, why had they ended. The aim was to provide a form of explanation for the respondent's current situation captured in the asset/income and child survey. ²¹

The collection of data on intra-household allocation of resources presents some specific problems. Only a few surveys have attempted to collect intra-household data simply because of the expense of interviewing both husband and wife. Many surveys ask the 'head of the household', often the husband, for data on their spouse and other household members. For example, the standard approach to income in the majority of household surveys is to ask the 'head' of household what the household income is. When there are difficult negotiations over who should contribute what to general household goods, it is common for spouses not to reveal to one another what they earn (Faphounda 1988, Engle 1990, Roldan 1988). This enables the retention of a certain proportion of income for personal consumption. Asking one spouse about the other will not provide accurate information. This is also the case with assets - many women accumulate assets outside the marital home as a form of security. Secrecy is often essential for women to retain control of these assets.

Obtaining accurate information on income is notoriously difficult, even when the questions are concerned with the respondent's income. Respondents may be unwilling to discuss their income, due to suspicion of the authorities. Rather than offend the interviewer by refusing to give any information, some may give inaccurate details. During the fieldwork all attempts were made to allay fears about the confidentiality of the interview. Only two or three respondents refused outright, and one or two hid on our arrival.

Respondents may be involved in a range of informal activities: casual wage labour, part-time self-employment business activities, as well as more formal wage labour. The questionnaire has to be designed to elicit information on a range of informal, as well as formal, activities. This is particularly true if the aim of the survey is to gain accurate information on the income of women, who are less likely to be involved in formal employment. Asking the respondent concerned for a total monthly income figure may be pointless, as he/she may not know his/her own income, let

²¹ This was not very successful because both time allocated and the form of the questionnaire did not encourage the discussion to flow freely sufficiently for interviewer to get a real sense of the respondent's life history that had shaped his/her current situation. In retrospect the research assistants should also have been retrained in the skills of conducting unstructured interviews. As a result this information was not used in the analysis.

alone that of a spouse.

In this survey, there was a separate question for each different type of economic activity - wage labour (formal and informal), self-employment, and property-related income. One typical cycle of each economic activity was discussed with the respondent and details of the costs of each input and the revenue per cycle were recorded. (A cycle could be a two hour session of producing pancakes that were then taken to town and sold the same day, or a week's fishing trip, or one season's production of tomatoes.) The profit was calculated for each cycle and then translated into a monthly figure according to how many times the cycle took place in a month. The cycle recorded was the respondent's notion of typical costs and revenue, but the information may not represent average monthly incomes.

In order to determine household membership the Ugandan data sets use the question: 'Who slept here last night?' The results are often used to determine whether there is a permanently resident and therefore contributing adult man in the household. As discussed above, in a society where polygamy (de-facto or de-jure), and part-time residency are common, a husband who plays a major role in the household may not have spent the night there. Questions about marital status and residency have to be quite direct and specific. ²²

Surveys often assume that household durables are owned 'jointly' by the two spouses ('by the household'), but this is rarely so. There are often joint usufruct rights, but rarely joint disposal rights. In order to gain an accurate asset position for each spouse the questionnaire has to be written with an understanding of how to delineate the fault lines of that 'joint' ownership. Simply the payment of bridewealth may entitle the husband to disposal rights of durables purchased with the wife's income. Or a wife may be entitled to dispose of items she purchased with her own income, but not those purchased with the husband's income, although she was contributing to domestic production at the time of purchase. Women's rights over household assets vary across different communities, and focus group discussions are one method of ensuring that the questionnaire is worded in a way that will elicit the correct information. Women were asked how many of a particular item there were in the household, how many of those items she herself had purchased with her own income, and how many of those items did she think that she would be able to take upon divorce. The items purchased were assumed to represent an indicator of wealth, whereas those expected to be taken upon divorce were assumed to indicate disposal rights and control over

²² It is now common in the major international data sets to use a variation of: "Who slept here for 14 days in the last month?" as a definition of a household resident, and "Who slept here for 14 days in the last year?" as a definition of a household member. The distinction between resident and member is to enable the identification of migrant workers who sent remittances back home.

household assets. The data collected in this manner are used in the analysis in the following chapters. Specific scores were calculated for ease of analysis and the details of the construction of these scores are discussed in the following section of this chapter.

Men may consider the involvement of women in surveys or discussions as leading to a possible threat to their authority, and as a result prevent their wife from participating. Ensuring that both men and women are involved, and to attempt to communicate inclusiveness of the word 'gender' can be important to the success of the fieldwork project. Several respondents refused to cooperate because they felt the questions were too personal in nature.

If the aim of the survey is not only to obtain an assessment of the economic situation of women, but also of the obstructions that they face in improving their own situation, and that of their household, it is important to understand how the attitudes surrounding authority, money and power are 'engendered'. For example: Do men prevent their wives from working? What is the attitude of other men to a husband whose wife earns more than he does? What is the attitude towards single women who are economically independent? Are women encouraged to be economically successful?

Any attempts to obtain representative results can fall foul of the timing of interviews. A particular section of the community may be missed due to interviews taking place during the day. Interviewing began at around 10-11am when respondents had finished their digging for the day. Yet those respondents who had businesses elsewhere, or full-time jobs, were unlikely to be present during the day. After the main body of interviews had been carried out by the research assistants returned to each village on different occasions, including Sunday to catch those not present in the first round. Despite such efforts several respondents were available for one part of the survey but not others. At the analysis stage this lead to varying sample sizes according to which variables were being analysed.

With the employment of research assistants misunderstanding can occur, and it may not be noticed until the data are keyed into the computer at the analysis stage. One of the benefits of doing a small study, and only starting interviewing at around 10 am, was that there is a portion of the day available for checking previously completed questionnaires. Checking the questionnaires in the morning had the advantage of not being at the end of a long day, when there is a strong desire to go home, for all parties.

3.6 Construction of wealth scores

A variety of wealth scores, used in the analysis in subsequent chapters, were constructed from the data.²³ For the sake of clarity, the process of that construction is described here.

As indicated above, the female respondents were asked the following questions:

** How many of the following items are there in your household?*

There were three categories of items: *consumer durable items* (charcoal and paraffin stoves, jerry cans, basins, saucepans, chairs, benches, tables, cupboards, sleeping mats, mattresses, beds, radios, tape cassettes, and TVs); *agricultural assets from which income could be derived* (hoes, pangas, hens, goats, sheep, pigs, cattle); *other items that could also generate wealth* (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, and sewing machines). The reason for these distinctions was that if agricultural activity was associated with a low level of wealth, a high level of agricultural assets did not necessarily indicate a high level of general wealth.

** Whose money purchased these items? (Possible answers: wife, husband, both, or other.)*

If the woman was married she was also asked:

** Which of items in the household would you be able to take on divorce or death of your husband?*

If the woman was not married she was asked:

** How many items were there in your household before your husband died / or you were divorced?*

** Which of those items were you able to take with you?*

The resulting data were used to construct a series of scores. A consumer durable, and a total possession score including all items, (consumer durables, as well as agricultural and other wealth generating assets), were calculated for each household. A consumer durable score and a total possession score were calculated for each individual (male and female),

²³The 'scores' are monetary values, not a point system with a limited range.

according to the items the individual purchased. The consumer durables were treated separately because wealth-generating assets may be more related to the source of income rather than the level of wealth. (A poor individual may be more dependent on agriculture, and so have a greater number of agricultural assets.) An expected divorce score was calculated for married women, and an actual divorce/widowed score was calculated for single women.²⁴ In each case a standard value was assigned to each item, and the sum of the values of the items gave the score.²⁵ The resulting scores are closer to the replacement value of the assets, than to an accurate current value.

The household scores were assumed to represent household wealth.²⁶ The individual consumer durable scores were assumed to represent an individual's (past) ability to generate wealth. The divorce scores were assumed to represent an individual's ability to control the wealth that had been generated - or more simply, disposal rights over property within the household.

If the divorce score was to represent the degree of control of assets, the value of assets 'controlled' is not as important as the share that this represents of total household assets. For example, in a wealthy household a wife may be able to take only a small share of the household assets with her, yet the value of these items may amount to more than the value of the assets taken by a woman from a poor household; yet the second woman may have a greater degree of control in comparison to her husband, than does the first, even though it is control over fewer items. As a result the divorce score used is the percentage of assets taken/expected to be taken of total household assets.

In many instances, though not all, the items women expected to take were those they had purchased. In such cases, as described so far the divorce score represents the items purchased. However, given that women often do a greater proportion of domestic work and household production for consumption, but earn a lower proportion of household income, there is a sense in which equity would suggest that they be entitled to some of the assets purchased by the husband. A measure of control over household assets should include this. The *final divorce score* - used in subsequent chapters - is the difference between items that a wife expects to take on divorce and

²⁴Both of these scores only included consumer durables.

²⁵The following are the values in Uganda shillings assigned to each asset: hoe 3,500; panga 3,500; wheelbarrow 35,000; charcoal stove 2,500; paraffin stove 10,000; jerry can 1,500; basin 1,000; saucepan 5,000; chair 10,000; bench 8,000; table 35,000; cupboard 35,000; sleeping mat 5,000; mattress 30,000; bed 30,000; hen 4,000; goat 40,000; sheep 30,000; pig 60,000; cow 150,000; bicycle 70,000; radio 15,000; tape-cassette 45,000; sewing machine 100,000; TV 125,000; motorcycle 800,000; vehicle 2 million.

²⁶Sender and Smith (1992) use a similar system of scores to measure wealth.

those purchased, as a percentage of the household score. A positive score indicates that a woman expects to take a greater proportion of household assets than she purchased - she has control over some of assets generated by her husband, while she was doing domestic work. A negative score indicates she expects to take a smaller proportion than she purchased - that she does not have disposal rights over all items that she purchased.

There are various problems with the interpretation of this divorce score. Firstly, some women said they would leave certain items behind so that their children could benefit from them. (The question could have been adapted to take account of this, but unfortunately the problem was not identified until too late.) Secondly, what women expected to take on divorce or widowhood may not necessarily be the same as any actual outcome, should divorce or death occur. This was to some extent tested against the scores for divorced or widowed women. (A tabular comparison is given in chapter 5.)

Married women were also asked:

* *How many assets do you own independently of the household, that are stored elsewhere?*

* *Does your husband know about each of these items?*

Using the same method as described above, a score was calculated for each married woman of the value of the assets that she owned outside the marital home, and for the value of the assets of which her husband had knowledge. Women may keep assets away from the marital household for a number of reasons: a) the assets may be part of joint inheritance shared with other siblings; b) they may be on loan to a friend or relative; or, c) they may be a form of insurance against marriage failure. Women were not asked directly about their motives (except in the focus group discussions), but if the husband has not been told it would suggest that the woman wanted to ensure that she retained control of the items concerned. It was assumed, though it need not be the case, that secrecy was more likely to be associated with a desire to have some form of future insurance. (Secrecy, or rather husband having no knowledge of the items, could also arise from the item being insignificant, and not worth informing him; but given the average level of income, and the cost of the items concerned, this is unlikely.)

3.7 Methodology for collection of nutritional status data

Information on height, weight and age was collected on all children of five years and younger. A measuring mat was used for babies and a standing rule

was used for older children. An electronic scale was used for weighing children. To avoid the difficulty of weighing babies, mothers and babies were weighed together, and then mothers on their own - the difference being the weight of the baby. The data assembled by the United States National Centre for Health Statistics were used as a reference population to determine whether the Ugandan population was malnourished in comparison with this standard. ²⁷

The indices used to describe a child's anthropometric status were weight-for-age, height-for-age, and weight-for-height. Malnourishment is present if an index was two standard deviations below the median (-2SD's) of the reference population. The number of standard deviations away from the median is termed the z-score. If a child's height-for-age is more than -2SD's away from the median, s/he is considered to be "stunted". A low weight-for-age is considered to be "underweight", and a low weight-for-height is "wasting".

Stunting results from chronic/long term undernutrition, and is the result of growth retardation over a long period of time. The functional consequences can be increased vulnerability to disease, and reduced mental development. In a child, stunting reflects poor diet, health and inadequate child care. Fresh high-bulk foods with low nutrient density are commonly used in Uganda, often with only one or two meals a day with a few snacks (Kakitahi 1985, Vella et al 1988). Such food satisfies hunger but can starve the body of nutrients, particularly those important for energy. In adulthood, stunting results in poor reproductive performance, low physical work capacity and perhaps social stigma. Wasting (weight-for-height) is seen as sign of acute/recent malnourishment, where any long-term loss of height is not captured, but low weight for actual height achieved is. In Uganda, where many children are already stunted, wasting is often less significant. The underweight measure does not distinguish between current or past malnourishment, but is a more general indicator.

For the analysis of the Kauga/Ngogwe data it was decided to combine the z-scores for the three indices (height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height) into one 'score' for each child. ²⁸ This combination score is used unless the results are being compared with another data set. Unfortunately only a few of the Kauga/Ngogwe results are statistically significant. In

²⁷ The World Health Organisation recommends the use of data produced by U.S. Centre for Health Statistics as a reference population. The same data set was used by the Demographic Health Survey of Uganda. Work being done by Stephan Klasen examines the weakness of using a such reference population, particularly for an African community, where the genetic diversity is thought to be much greater than in other ethnic groups (Personal communication 1997). As there is currently no alternative, this study will continue using the U.S data.


²⁸ Nutritional score = height-for-age score + weight-for-age score + weight-for-height score. Construction of height-for-age score: If z-score is -3SDs, -2SDs, -1SDs away from median, score is 1, 2, 3 etc. respectively. The weight-for-age and weight-for-height scores were constructed in a similar way. Poor nutritional status = score of 3-9, good nutritional status = score of 10-24

some cases this may be due to the size of the sample. Despite this weakness it was still decided to present the data. Further research would have to be done before any strong conclusions can be drawn about the relevance to the total population.

3.8 Significance testing

Much of the statistical analysis of the nutritional data involves the comparison of sample means. The probability that the sample means would differ to the observed extent, even if the population means are equal is tested using a separate variance t-test. If the probability of obtaining a particular result is less than 0.05, (or 0.01 for a more stringent test) then the hypothesis that the two population means are equal is rejected. Results of the T-tests are only discussed where they are significant, and sample sizes are included in order to give an indication of the validity of the results.


UGANDA



LEGEND



- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

0 20 40 60 80 100 Km




MUKONO DISTRICT

POPULATION DENSITY (PERSONS PER SQ. KM-LAND AREAS)



LEGEND

- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- COUNTY BOUNDARY
- SUB-COUNTY BOUNDARY
- T.C. TOWN COUNCIL
- KAYUNGA T.C. (1,852)
- LUGAZI T.C. (1,136)
- MUKONO T.C. (4,970)
- NJERU T.C. (855)



THE GENDER GAP:**HEALTH, WEALTH AND EDUCATION**

The aim of this chapter is to examine indicators of well-being, and the gap between the male and female indicators in the Kauga/Ngogwe study area. The statistics examined are those on education and literacy, economic activity, income, assets and health.¹ The results from the study area are compared with national statistics to give an impression of how the study area fares in comparison with the rest of the country. They are also compared with other Mukono district figures, where they are available, to give an indication of how representative the Kauga/Ngogwe survey is of the district. Married women are compared with single women with children, where possible, to gain an impression of the impact of having a spouse.

As outlined in the introduction, much of the thesis examines the allocation decisions that men and women make, the different contexts in which they are made, and their impact on nutritional status of children. It does not examine statistics that reveal the differential impact of the allocation decisions on the well-being of men and women themselves. This is partly because it would be difficult to relate a 'snapshot' of allocation decisions to indicators that are the result of a life-time of discrimination between men and women, but also because the allocation decisions are both the cause and result of the socio-economic situation that the indicators represent. As a result the purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the results of discrimination between men and women as a background to the thesis, with the aim of establishing the different situations that men and women face.

4.1 Education

Education is important in enabling resource control, firstly through increasing an individual's potential wage/profit rate, and secondly, by improving an individual's ability in any negotiating process.

¹ There are other indicators of well-being that are not examined, for example, safety and security, sanitation & water, housing. The latter two are only relevant to the household and not the individual, and so a gender comparison cannot be made. No statistics on safety and security were collected in the survey.

There is a considerable gap in the education levels achieved by men and women. According to the Kauga/Ngogwe survey 25% of women in the sample have no education. In comparison, only 9% of men have not attended school, and 34% of men have reached secondary level. Only 13% of women have done so (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Distribution of men and women by education levels according to different data sources

Data source		Percentage of individuals who have...education			
		No education	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Census 1991 All Uganda	Men	28.4	58.9	11.1	0.4
	Women	45.9	47.1	6.7	0.1
Census 1991 Mukono district	Men	23.8	58.4	12.6	**
	Women	32.9	57.2	8.7	**
Kauga/Ngogwe 1995/6	Men	9.2	56.1	34.1	0.6
	Women	26.6	60.2	13.4	1.2

Source: Government of Uganda 1991 Census, and Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The Kauga/Ngogwe figures show higher attendance levels than the Census figures for Mukono or at the national level. It might be assumed that this reflects the preponderance of peri-urban respondents over rural respondents in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey² or that as a rural area Ngogwe has relatively high attendance rates in comparison with other parts of the district. Table 4.2 suggests that it is the latter.

Table 4.2: Percentage of individuals with at least primary education by gender, marital status and location (sample size).

Gender and marital status	Semi-urban	Rural	All
Men (178)	92.4	85.0	90.8
Married women (178)	75.2	81.0	77.0
Single women (76)	69.8	26.7	69.7

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

It would appear that urban men are more likely to be educated than rural men (92% and 85% respectively), but this is not the case for women (75% and 81% respectively). Perhaps in poorer families with lower education levels, and less land available for division between siblings, brothers may be given

² The rural/urban ratios of the different surveys are discussed in chapter 3.

preference over sisters when it comes to land allocation. With a lower possibility of inheriting land, and fewer employment opportunities, uneducated women are more likely to migrate to urban areas. Uneducated men on the other hand will probably inherit land from their fathers, and may have greater opportunities in rural areas than uneducated women. This factor seems more pronounced among single woman than married women. Perhaps it is because once women are either divorced or widowed - without the support of a husband, that uneducated women with fewer opportunities migrate to the urban areas.

The last column in table 4.2 (above) suggests that uneducated women are less likely to be currently married than educated women. Table 4.3 below supports this, showing the percentage of women who are married rising with education.

Table 4.3: Marital status by women's education level (sample size).

Women's education level	Percentage of women currently married
None	71.4 (63)
Primary	72.0 (150)
Secondary	82.4 (34)
Tertiary	100.0 (3)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

It could be argued that education increases women's access to marriage - perhaps making them more desirable wives.³ If both marriage and education facilitate women's ability to accumulate wealth, is it possible to say which is the more important factor? Table 4.4 compares wealth and marital status with education levels.

Table 4.4: Distribution of women across socio-economic levels (based on housing index) according to marital status and education (sample size).

Women's education level	Married women		Single women	
	% in wealthiest group	% in poorest group	% in wealthiest group	% in poorest group
Secondary	42.9 (28)	14.3	33.3 (6)	50.0
Primary	34.6 (104)	25.0	11.9 (42)	40.5
None	22.5 (40)	40.0	11.1 (18)	33.3

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

³ When one respondent was asked why he had divorced his first wife, and married another, his response was that the first did not have primary education, so she was unable to assist in the running of his shop. Presumably the second one was chosen partly because she did have primary education.

Amongst married women better education is associated with higher socio-economic status - women with secondary education are more likely to be in the wealthier group, women with no education are more likely to be in the poorest group. Amongst single women there is not an equivalent pattern - 50% of women with secondary education are in the poorest group in comparison with 33% of women with no education being in the poorest group. This suggests that education can facilitate a 'good' marriage, which in turn can lead to wealth, but whilst a woman is single, education is less likely to lead to wealth. Because of unequal access to resources, single women are unable to use their education as effectively as married women.

Yet the wealth indicator used in the above table is 'household socio-economic status', and one of the main questions that this thesis attempts to answer is to what extent a measure of 'household wealth' is applicable to the individual members - in particular the wife. She may enjoy usage rights over household assets, and benefit from a husband's high income, but what is her level of control over household income, or of decision-making over household assets? The married women who are recorded as having a high socio-economic status in the table above do so because they are living in a certain household, not because they themselves are necessarily in control of a certain level of wealth. (This issue is discussed in chapter 7.)

Literacy

Both the Census, Integrated Household survey, and the Kauga/Ngogwe survey show that a much higher percentage of men are literate than women - the male literacy rate is approximately 20% better than the female rate (Table 4.5). There are, however, large discrepancies between the actual levels of literacy given by the different sources - the male rate varies between 73% down to 57%, the female rate varies from 57% to 38%. There may be several reasons for this inaccuracy. Firstly, respondents may have an incentive to claim literacy in the presence of a probably secondary, if not tertiary educated, interviewer. Secondly, when asked whether he/she can read and write, it is not clear in what level of literacy the interviewer is interested, and the question is open to interpretation. For example, is it sufficient to be able to read and write the respondent's own name? The Kauga/Ngogwe was the only survey to test the respondent's literacy by asking him/her to read a sentence on the questionnaire, and to write a sentence of their choice. Given this, and that the Kauga/Ngogwe figures show a lower level of literacy than the other sources, it is probable that Kauga/Ngogwe figures are more accurate. (This lower level of literacy is despite the higher attendance rates for the Kauga/Ngogwe survey, suggesting that the Kauga/Ngogwe respondents simply received a poorer education, or more likely,

it confirms the inaccuracy of the data from the other sources.)

Table 4.5: Percentage of literate adults.

Source of data	Percentage of literate adults	
	Men	Women
Uganda IHS	72.7	51.5
Uganda 1991 Census	63.5	44.9
Mukono 1991 Census	65.7	56.9
Kauga/Ngogwe survey	57.3	38.2

Source: Government of Uganda Integrated Household survey 1992-3, Government of Uganda 1991 census.

Improvements in education levels

Education levels have improved over the past 40-50 years. If the level of education reached is analysed by age, the figures reveal improvements made by both men and women. There has been a steady decline in the number of men and women who have not attended school (Table 4.6). The gap between men and women has also narrowed - from 35% down to -1.3%. The current generation of girls seems to be faring better than their mothers, and their male peers.

In the 6-10 age group approximately 40% of both boys and girls have not attended school, with girls having a slightly higher attendance rate than boys. It may be that girls are more likely to attend school while under 10 years, but will drop out after 10 years of age. Boys may be kept at home while relatively young to look after the animals, and then stay at school until a later age than girls.

Table 4.6: Percentage of individuals with no education according to age in Mukono district

Age	Men	Women	Gap
6-10 years	41.4	40.1	-1.3
10-20	10.5	13.1	2.6
20-30	14.4	22.9	8.5
30-40	18.4	36.4	18.0
40-50	29.2	55.5	26.3
50-60	38.5	73.7	35.2
60-70	49.8	73.6	23.8
70+	62.3	81.2	18.9

Source: Government of Uganda 1991 Census

Despite the fact that by the age of 20, the current generation of teenage boys are more likely to have attended school than girls, girls that do attend are more likely to attend all possible years for their age. In the age group 5-10 years, 25% of girls have attended during all possible years at school (Table 4.7)⁵. 18% of boys have the same record. In the age group 11-18 years far fewer of either gender have achieved 100% - 5.9% of girls and 2.2% of boys, but the gap between girls and boys has halved. Despite the low record of full attendance at secondary level, those girls that do attend appear to be doing better than boys.

Table 4.7: Percentage of children who have achieved 100% of total potential years of education for their age

Age	Percentage of boys who have achieved....	Percentage of girls who have achieved.....	Gap between girls and boys
10 years and under	18.5	25.0	- 6.5
11 - 18 years	2.2	5.9	- 3.7

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Table 4.8 compares households where the children have a good secondary school attendance rate, with those than do not. (The chosen dividing line was children that had achieved above 50% of total potential years, whatever their age.) As might be expected, children with high attendance rates are more likely to have better educated parents, and a higher socio-economic status. (16% of children with BELOW 50% potential years have a mother with

⁴ The Kauga/Ngogwe data are not used here as the bias in the sample, due to the selection of only households with children under five, distorts the age distribution.

⁵ A pupil has attended all possible years, if, for example at age 13 years s/he has received 8 years of schooling when the starting age is 5 years. Or, if aged 15 s/he has received 10 years.

secondary education, whereas 25% of children with ABOVE 50% potential years have a mother with secondary education. 25% of children with BELOW 50% potential years live in a poor household, whereas only 13% of children with ABOVE 50% potential years live in a poor household.)

Table 4.8: Children with either above or below 50% of potential secondary school years by education of mother, father and socio-economic status of household (sample size)

Percentage of children with/in...	Children with BELOW 50% potential secondary years	Children with ABOVE 50% potential secondary years
Mother with secondary education	16.3 (260)	25.5 (55)
Father with secondary education	38.1 (260)	48.7 (55)
Wealthy household	27.9 (405)	31.9 (94)
Poor household	25.7 (405)	13.8 (94)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Table 4.9 compares boys with high attendance levels with girls with the same record. 10% of girls with ABOVE 50% of potential secondary years have an uneducated mother. 8% of boys with ABOVE 50% of potential secondary years have a mother with no education. The opposite is true when the father's education level is considered. 12% of boys with ABOVE 50% of potential years have an uneducated father, whereas only 10% of girls with ABOVE 50% of potential years have an uneducated father. The difference between the numbers is small, but a possible conclusion is that mothers may be more concerned that their daughters receive an education, whereas fathers are more concerned about their sons' education. Tansel (1997) finds a similar result when examining Ghanaian data - the mother's education level has a greater effect on her daughters' level of education than on her sons'. (This theme of differential parental discrimination is taken up in chapter 8 in the discussion of nutrition levels.)

Table 4.9: Percentage of boys and girls with uneducated parents, or who live in a poor or wealthy household, who have above 50% potential secondary years of education (Sample size)

Percentage of children with/in...	BOYS with ABOVE 50% potential secondary years	GIRLS with ABOVE 50% potential secondary years
Mother with NO education	8.0 (25)	10.0 (30)
Father with NO education	12.0 (25)	10.3 (29)
Wealthy household	38.6 (44)	26.0 (50)
Poor household	4.5 (44)	22.0 (50)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

4.2 Participation in economic activity

As suggested in the methodology chapter, accurate statistics on the level of women's involvement in economic activities are difficult to collect for several reasons. Some women consider their cash activities as unimportant and marginal, particularly in comparison with their main activity of unpaid domestic work, and in comparison with their husband's income. If asked to select only one category of activity, women may often choose domestic work, rather than paid work, in which case the latter activities would not be recorded. Secondly, women tend to be involved in several small-scale activities, and to record an accurate picture of women's market activities it is necessary to allow for such a situation on the questionnaire. Thirdly, women also tend to be involved in the informal sector, on which statistics are, by definition, notoriously poor.⁶

Table 4.10 shows figures from three sources - the 1996 Kauga/Ngogwe survey, 1992-3 Integrated Household survey, and 1991 Census. The Kauga/Ngogwe figure for involvement in income-generating activities is significantly higher at 62%, in comparison with 42% of Mukono District (1991 Census), and 44% for the Central region (Integrated Household survey 1992-3). There are three possible explanations for this variation: a) the difficulty in obtaining accurate figures; b) each survey used a different question; c) the Kauga/Ngogwe sample was not representative of the broader population; d) the female labour participation rate may have increased over the period 1991-1997.

⁶ Anker/Dixon-Mueller (1988) give a discussion of the problems of collecting accurate female participation rates.

Table 4.10: Percentage of women involved in income generating activities according to different data sources

Country/District	Gender	Percentage of individuals involved in income generating activities ⁷
Mukono District Census 1991	Women	42.0
Central Region IHS 1992-3 ⁸		44.7
Kauga/Ngogwe survey 1995-6		62.1
Kauga/Ngogwe survey 1995-6	Men	96.7

Source: Household Budget Survey (BHS) 1989-90, Integrated Household survey (IHS), and Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The Census asked: *What was the activity status of this person in the last week?* The Integrated Household survey asked: *What is the usual activity (of this person)?* The range of possible categories include employed, self-employed, unemployed, looking for work, student, unpaid family helper, domestic worker, too old, too disabled. ⁹ Both of these questions only allow for an individual to specify one activity, which for women in most cases will be unpaid family worker, or domestic worker. Generally, the male head of the household will answer the questions for the other members of the household, and may identify a different activity than the actual person concerned would choose.

The Kauga/Ngogwe survey was designed so that it would record a range of economic activities for each respondent, and as a result probably obtained a more accurate (and therefore higher) figures on the level of involvement in economic activity. It used the following questions: *Do you work for wages? Do you earn cash by doing business, selling things etc? Can you list the different business activities that you are involved in?*

The unrepresentativity of the Kauga/Ngogwe survey may also be a problem. It may be possible that the higher Kauga/Ngogwe figure is due to a preponderance of semi-urban residents. Yet if the data is split according to the rural/urban divide, the participation rate is 64% for urban respondents and 51% for rural respondents. The latter is still higher than the earlier data sources, indicating that higher figure cannot be completely accounted for by the place of residence. Similarly with marital status - 53% of married women in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample were earning an income, which is

⁷ Includes the employed and self-employed, but not the helper in the household enterprise.

⁸ The central region is the fertile crescent on the north side of Lake Victoria, including the following districts: Kalangala, Kampala, Kiboga, Luwero, Masaka, Mpigi, Mubende, Mukono, Rakai.

⁹ The two questionnaires had a different set of labels, but each was a variant of those listed.

again still higher than the other sources.

Table 4.11 shows the percentage real growth rate in GDP from 1983-1996, showing 3 years of poor, or negative, performance from 1984-6 during the civil war, followed by relatively high growth that fluctuated between 4.5% to 10%. Unless such growth is only due to increases in capital utilisation rates (unlikely, given that the Ugandan economy is dominated by small, uncaptialised agriculture), or increases in productivity, employment or self-employment must have occurred. (During the period of 1992-1996 the increase of informal activity was actually visible on the streets of Kampala and Mukono.) This suggests that the difference between the figures may be due to an increase in activity, and not just differences in methodology or issues of representivity.

Table 4.11: Yearly percentage growth rate in real GDP (at 1987 prices)

Year	Percentage growth rate	Year	Percentage growth rate
1983	7.5	1990	5.5
1984	-6.5	1991	5.2
1985	2.0	1992	4.5
1986	0.6	1993	6.3
1987	6.7	1994	10.1
1988	7.1	1995	8.4
1989	6.4	1996	5.0

Source: Government of Uganda: Statistical Abstracts 1997, 1993.

Nearly all men were reported to be earning an income (96.7%). Involvement in economic activity varies with marital status, as well as gender. Only half of married women were earning (52.7%), but the figure is much higher for single women (82.4%) - presumably due to a lower level of financial support (Table 4.12).

Table 4.12: Women's involvement in income-generating activity by marital status (sample size)

Marital status	Percentage involvement rate
Married (178)	52.7
Single (76)	82.4

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

4.3 Income, working hours and type of activity

The average monthly income of married women is approximately a third of the men's average (Table 4.13). Single women earn about a tenth of the male average. These figures to some extent reflect the hours spent involved in cash generating activities, but also the lower hourly profit/wage rate. The difference between men and women's wage/profit rate can be explained by different education levels and access to resources, as well as discrimination. However, gender-based discrimination does not explain why the single women's rate is lower than the married women's rate. It may be that single women are discriminated against because of their marital status, but it is more likely they do not have access to the capital, through a husband, required to engage in the more productive activities. (This is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.)

Table 4.13: Average income, hours per month and profit rate by gender and marital status (sample size in brackets)

	Income (Ush per month)	Hours per month	Average profit rate (Ush per hour)
Men	90,770 (148)	196 (123)	460
Married women	33,210 (87)	96 (84)	340
Single women	9,590 (61)	63 (53)	152

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: Sample sizes vary according to the variable under considerable because of incomplete data

The latter argument is supported by comparisons of the type of activities in which married and single women are involved. Married women are more likely to be involved in artisanal work and types of home production that require capital. Single women are more likely to be casual labourers, or involved in roadside trading, and in production that requires little or no capital (Table 4.14) because of their desperate poverty. This difference between married and single women is probably compounded by the endogeneity of marriage suggested earlier. If education facilitates marriage, the difference between the two groups may be due to a difference in the women's potential earning power as well as access to capital.

Table 4.14: Type of economic activity by gender and marital status (sample size)

Activity	Men (148)	Married Women (87)	Single women (61)
Casual worker	6.2	8.8	10.3
Permanent wage worker	4.5	0.7	0
Skilled wage worker	6.2	0	0
Artisan/little capital	21.5	32.4	11.5
Artisan/more capital	14.9	6.8	4.6
Agriculture/no capital	29.1	31.1	56.3
Agriculture/capital	9.3	6.8	0
Trader	6.9	13.5	17.2

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

This overall picture hides rural/urban differences. Married women and men have similar wage/profit rates in urban areas, which are considerably higher than those of single women (Table 4.15).

Rural men have a higher average income than urban men. These data may be skewed due to a small number of rural men who have abnormally high incomes because they are involved in shopkeeping and fishing. Shopkeeping and fishing are highly profitable activities in rural areas. Both of these activities require substantial capital outlay, and as a result there are high entry costs, and monopoly rents. Due to the isolation of the study site, a shopkeeper requires his/her own means of transport. Fishermen with an outboard engine are able to get away from the coastal infestation of water hyacinth, to where the fishing is more productive.

Both married and single women have lower income levels in the rural areas which match the generally lower level of economic activity. Married women are still slightly better off than single women, but either rural men are less willing to provide capital or there simply are not the equivalent female opportunities in rural areas that would allow married women to make use of their husband's capital.

Table 4.15: Average monthly income and profit/wage rate by location (sample size).

Location	Men (148)		Married women (87)		Single women (61)	
	Income (Ush pm)	Profit/wage rate (Ush ph)	Income (Ush pm)	Profit/wage rate (Ush ph)	Income	Profit/wage rate (Ush ph)
Urban	71,340	340	42,890	350	9,910	130
Rural	98,320	680	11,260	220	4,510	40

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

4.4 Assets: Land, dwellings and consumer durables

As might be expected, men are much more likely to own land and property than women (Table 4.16 & 4.17). The marital home is normally owned by the husband.¹⁰ 55% of married men own the land used by the household, and 72% own the house. 7% of married women own the land used by the household, and 9% own the house. Single women are in better position than married women, but they are not equal to a male head of household. 30% own the land, and 40% own the house. Separated or divorced women often return to their parents' village, and some will be given land on which to support themselves. Others will have to rely on the generosity of relatives for space in the house, and simply assist the others in agricultural production, rather than being able to farm on her own account.

Table 4.16: Land ownership by gender and marital status (percentage)

	Married households (169)	Single women households (68)
Wife	7.7	30.8
Husband (or ex-husband)	56.8	13.2
Husband & wife jointly	1.2	0
Somebody else ¹¹	34.7	55.9

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

¹⁰ Wives do sometimes own the marital home. The implications of this are discussed in chapter 6.

¹¹ Unfortunately data were not collected on the relationship of the owners to the respondents.

Table 4.17: Dwelling ownership by gender and marital status (percentage)

	Married households (176)	Single women households (76)
Wife	9.1	40.8
Husband (or ex-husband)	71.9	10.5
Husband & wife jointly	0.6	0
Somebody else ¹²	18.8	48.7

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The data on the inheritance of land show that single women are just as likely to have inherited land as men (Table 4.18). If parents have land to pass on to their children, it would appear that sons and unmarried or separated daughters tend to be treated equally. (As suggested above this may not be the case in poorer families where there is greater competition between siblings for land.) It is assumed that married daughters have no need of land because they will have access through their husbands.

Table 4.18: Inheritance of land by gender and marital status (sample size).

	Percentage of individuals who inherited land
Men	31.8 (179)
Married women	20.1 (179)
Single women	31.6 (79)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The implication is that gender differences in land ownership between men and single women are not due to discrimination through inheritance, but that single women are less likely/less able to buy land than men. This may be due to greater poverty, unequal access to capital, or reluctance to sell land to women. (This is discussed further in chapter 6.)

Women own fewer productive assets and consumer durables than men (Table 4.19). Despite earning a lower income, single women own a greater number of farm assets and consumer durables than married women. Without the support of a husband, single women are forced to obtain the basic items themselves, leaving even less income for recurrent expenditure. Given that married women may have access to their husbands assets, their low score does not represent their current position accurately.

¹² As above.

Table 4.19: Average ownership score of productive assets and consumer durables (sample size)¹³

	Productive assets (Ush) (a)	Consumer durables (Ush) (b)
Men	106,014 (178)	361,440 (178)
Married women	59,960 (177)	60,310 (177)
Single women	72,510 (64)	201,210 (73)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Replacement value of productive assets owned by individual; (b) replacement value of consumer durables owned by individual

4.5 Nutritional status of adults

Chronic energy deficiency (CED) is defined as "low body weight and low energy stores, but due to the energy intake equalling energy expenditure, the adult is not in a state of prolonged continuous loss of body weight and energy. But by never growing to a normal size or having experienced one or more stages of energy deficiency, the individual has arrived at a reduced body weight with possibly limited physical activity."¹⁴(Shetty and James 1994). A lower basal metabolic rate (BMR) and reduced amounts of activity are balanced against a lower intake.

The body mass index (BMI) is considered to be a reliable anthropometric measure of CED. A person's weight is a general measure of the steady state of energy balance, yet it is influenced by the individual's height. Body mass index (weight/[height x height]) is less dependent on variations in height, and as a result is a relatively good measure of the body's energy stores.

Shetty and James (1994) argue that a low BMI is an indicator of socio-economic status, reflecting low household income and food consumption. It can also reflect changes that occur as a result of agricultural seasons, particularly during the harvest season when there may be food shortages, but considerable demand for physical activity. The functional consequences of a low BMI are a reduced capacity for physical work, and tendency to be more sedentary during leisure activities.

Much of the literature on gender inequalities within developing countries points to the longer hours that women work on a daily basis, as they often

¹³ The construction of these scores is described in detail in chapter 3.

¹⁴ Acute energy deficiency is defined "as a state of negative energy balance, where energy intake is less than energy expenditure. Despite changes in metabolic efficiency or physical activity patterns, there is a progressive loss of body weight and body energy stores" (Shetty and James 1994).

are involved in economically productive work as well as domestic chores. The literature also places much emphasis on the unequal access to resources, whether it be land, labour or capital. It could be argued that BMI is a long-term measure of an individual's average energy expenditure and energy intake. Significantly longer working hours, and difficult access to resources, should be reflected in a low BMI. As such, the BMI may be a good indicator of the impact of intra-household allocation of resources on spouses. Higgins and Alderman (1992) use Ghanaian data to show that women's poor nutritional status is affected by length of their working day and their fertility levels.

A BMI below 18.5 for men and 17.5 for women is considered as a sign of chronic energy deficiency. The difference is due to men, on average, having a heavier body weight for the same height as women. It would appear that only marginally more women suffer from chronic energy deficiency than men (Table 4.20). Yet if women are divided by marital status, single women have a lower level of nutritional status (Table 4.20), and married women in the sample have a better nutritional status than married men.¹⁵

Table 4.20: Percentage of adults with chronic energy deficiency (CED) by gender and marital status (sample size)

	Percentage of individuals with chronic energy deficiency
Men	4.0 (173)
All women	4.7 (242)
Married women	0.6 (179)
Single women	10.3 (63)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Poor nutritional status in single women is associated with a variety of characteristics: living in a rural area, not receiving financial support from a relative, and earning income as well as looking after a child (or children) under five years. The following table examines the impact of these factors on the nutritional status of single women (Table 4.21).

¹⁵ Given the prevalence of AIDS in Uganda, and its likely effect on BMI data, these results may be problematic. Yet it is unlikely AIDS would explain the high percentage of single women suffering from CED, unless they are single due to their husbands' AIDS-related death. Only one of the single women who suffers from CED is a widow, the other are divorcees. It is more likely that AIDS affects men, women, married or single alike, and therefore does not prejudice these results.

Table 4.21: Percentage of single women with chronic energy deficiency by socio-economic characteristics.

Socio-economic characteristics	Percentage of single women with CED (63)
Earning cash	12.0
Not earning cash	0.0
Urban	8.5
Rural	18.2
Receiving financial support	8.8
No financial support	12.5

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has described the backdrop against which intra-household negotiation takes place - the 'un-level playing field' that inevitably affects household outcomes.

To summarise, it would appear that the current generation of secondary school-age girls have better enrolment rates than their mothers, but not as high as their male peers. However, those girls who do enrol are likely to attend more years than their male peers.

Women are less likely to be involved in cash generating activities than men. Single women (with children under five years) have higher involvement rates, but work fewer hours and earn a lower hourly rate than married women. Married women appear to have access to capital through their spouses, capital that is necessary for involvement in the more productive types income generating activity.

Women are less likely to own land or a house than men. If single, women are as likely to inherit as men, but are less likely to buy property. Married women are unlikely to inherit land or property.

The nutritional status of single women appears to be much poorer than married women. The nutritional status of married men appears to be lower than that of married women, suggesting that the gains from marriage for women should not be underestimated.

Given these results it is possible to argue that married women receive considerable support (financial and otherwise) from their husbands, that leads to a differential between the circumstances of single and married

women. Despite this difference there is still a substantial gender gap between men and women in terms of income, ownership of assets, education, wage/profit, and access to capital.

BUGANDAN MARRIAGE CUSTOMS:

BRIDEWEALTH, DIVORCE AND VIOLENCE

The study of lineage and kinship has been one of the basic building blocks used by anthropologists to understand social and political structures in different cultural contexts. The term lineage implies a political/jural unit, as well as collective ownership, responsibility, and political representation in a wider arena. Much anthropological work and descriptions of kinship have concentrated on the most visible and, as a result, male kinship relations and spheres of influence. In 1981 Guyer argued 'kinship systems disguise too much of the variability of the way things get done.... how children are brought up, livings made, authority achieved and assigned' (Guyer 1981:89). She describes kinship as the study of '(h)ow land, labour and incomes are controlled, ...involving a complex of rights and duties, sanction and consequences... that are bargained and fought over'. If anthropological studies are undertaken from the point of view of women, the important questions become 'whether women can or cannot own land, manage their own incomes, absent themselves from their husband's home, be received in their natal home in case of divorce, or make a living in any other sector of the economy...'. The answer to these questions creates an image of the structures (or strictures) within which women have to operate and the range of alternatives that they face. It is within this framework that women have to make everyday decisions about how to ensure that their children are fed and clothed, that school fees are paid, and that their own needs are met, including the issue of their own (and therefore their children's) long-term economic security.

In a book entitled 'Gender, kinship and power' Maynes *et al* aim to explore 'how despite the presumption of male domination written into many rules, in practice men are often unwilling or unable to fulfil the roles proscribed to them' (Maynes *et al* 1996:7). The authors document situations in which men's theoretical responsibilities towards women and children are unmet, in which men's authority over women is far from complete or absolute, and cases where men are marginal to the domestic scene.

This chapter will first argue briefly that the conjugal tie and its inter-

relationship with class has been neglected, and secondly, examine the literature on bridewealth. The main body of the chapter will discuss Bugandan marriage and bridewealth. One of the first landmarks in the increasing interest in domestic kinship was a conference on 'The history of the family in Africa', that resulted in an series of articles in the Journal of African History (Volume 24, 1983). In their introduction, Rathbone and Marks argue that much of the early literature examines kinship in terms of 'cultural zones' that form broad sweeps of Africa. Murdock echoes Engel's thesis with the argument that the shift from matrilineal to patrilineal societies is the result of the development of private property in the colonial era - in order to amass the newly available assets men exercised control over women's labour (Murdock 1949).¹ Douglas makes a slightly more sophisticated argument. As long as women's labour is more valuable than any fixed asset, matriliney will survive. Once the predominant aim is to accumulate wealth, rather than simply to control labour, men will be willing to exchange women for assets (ie. cattle) (Douglas and Kaberry 1969). Yet Douglas recognised the importance of matrilineal links particularly for poor and vulnerable women, despite the apparent dominance of patriliney. Megan Vaughan's (in same issue of JAH) work in Malawi provides an example of this by showing the significance of non-kin relationships in terms of sharing food (Vaughan 1983).

O'Laughlin (1995) argues that descent theory under-emphasises the importance of the conjugal relationship. For example, although Elizabeth Colson (1962) noted the importance of matrilineal links in patrilineal systems, she emphasised the importance of women's kinship links over their conjugal ties.

'Colson suggested that cash cropping, land shortages, wage employment, labour migration and changes in legal codes tended to strengthen matrilineal ties at the expense of patrilineal ties and gave new independence to nuclear families based on a woman and her children rather than the conjugal tie' (O'Laughlin 1995:72).

O'Laughlin points out that the strength of kinship links in Africa, and women's apparent independence in comparison with Asia and Latin America, have led other authors to categorise the conjugal bond as 'weak'². McNicoll and Cain (1990) claim that weak conjugal bonds, or rather strong kinship links have contributed to poor economic performance: it supposedly encourages population growth, lineage rights hamper the development of the market, and it has been seen as an explanation for the large numbers of female-headed households. O'Laughlin correctly argues that 'weak conjugal ties cannot be derived a priori either from the structure of African lineage systems, or from the pre-colonial gender division of labour'. She uses her

¹ Kitching (1980) makes a similar argument in his study of Kenya.

² O'Laughlin cites both McNicoll and Cain (1990) and Lesthaeghe (1989b)

research experience in Tchad and Mozambique to show both the variation in conjugal relations, and that historical forces are the source of that variation. By creating a dualism of the dependence versus autonomy of women, we are unable to examine the nature of the inter-dependence between spouses.

O'Laughlin also points out the neglect of class relations, and how class and conjugal relations can be mutually determining. For example, wage labour, and accompanying migration can lead to many women-headed households, some unsupported by remittances from wage-earning men. The financial contribution of both husband and wife is important for determining the class position of the household.

'Households of either a nuclear or extended type that integrated men on a regular basis were more likely than mother/child units to establish title to prime commercial land through regular use, and sometimes through formal registry. Some households were more likely to be able to pay school fees and to withstand the loss of their children's labour through school attendance. Their children commanded better wages or took over positions in state employment that gave them access to economic as well as political resources. The strength of conjugal ties thus came to have important consequences for the class position of men and women.' (O'Laughlin 1995:73).

Sender and Smith approach this issue from another angle. They argue that contrary to economic theory (both neo-classical and Marxist) it is not necessarily poverty (or the marginal wage being higher than gains from subsistence) that leads to proletarianisation. Unmarried / divorced / deserted women living in wealthy households have neither a husband to appropriate their labour, nor the right to access to land as the means of production through marriage. Sender and Smith show how these women turn to wage labour (Sender and Smith 1990). Whether married or unmarried women are being considered, their marital status and conjugal relations can determine class, whether it is defined by involvement in wage labour, or income.

The study of bridewealth within anthropology is an area where the nature of the conjugal relationship might have come under the spotlight. In a theoretical overview of the study of bridewealth, Ekong (1992) argues that the three main schools of anthropology tended to treat women 'as mere pawns willing to act out marriage games devised in the interest of men' (Ekong 1992:10).

"In jurial models of the structuralist-functionalist approach bridewealth (is viewed) as a means of regulating the sexual access to women, legalising marriage and clearly defining the affiliation of the

children to a particular descent group.... In models of reciprocity of the structuralists, women are treated as objects exchanged by men to ratify their alliances.....Marxist approaches postulate the 'exploitation' of young men by elders though the control of the means of reproduction (women and surplus product)' (Ekong 1992:10).

Ekong argues that there has been little consideration of how this control over women is achieved, the extent to which women comply, what happens when they resist, or how this supposed control of women by men affects relations between the sexes. In essence, what has been left out is a discussion of the nature of the relationship between men and women - both the conjugal and kin relationships. It is insufficient to assume that because women are important in agricultural production, both because of their own labour, and their ability to 'reproduce' labour, that the most important component of their relationship with men is men's dominance over women's labour, sexuality and fertility.

The aim of this chapter and the following one is to discuss the nature of the Bagandan marriage, particularly how it affects women. This chapter is concerned with the structures that women face in terms of the current social rules/norms surrounding marriage, divorce and the control of resources, as well as the part played by marital violence. The following chapter deals with how the conjugal relations affect a woman's ability to earn an income and accumulate assets. Later chapters examine the realities of how men and women share domestic responsibilities, of how the norms/structures described in this chapter effect day-to-day decisions, and the impact of these structures on the well-being of children.

5.1 Bugandan marriage customs

Much of the following discussion relies on the accounts by Kisekka (1973), Akelo (nd, 1980s?), and Obbo (1980) as well as conversations during the fieldwork. It is intended as a brief overview of common ceremonies that still occur during marriage today.

Marriage in Bugandan society requires two ceremonies. The first is called the 'introduction', the second is the 'wedding'. Arranged marriages are not very common amongst the Baganda, and young people have a considerable amount of freedom of choice of their partner (Kisekka 1973). At the introduction ceremony the husband-to-be, accompanied by his family, arrives to meet the bride's parents. The purpose is to ensure that the bride's family know whom she is marrying, and where she will be living. The husband will know where his wife is from. If she is sick, or there is a problem, he will know where

to go for help. In a rural environment where it is difficult to give practical map directions, such information is important.

The second purpose of the ceremony is the negotiation over the extent and value of the bridewealth. Some of the items the husband will bring with him, others will be delivered either before or after the wedding. Many young men rely on their family for financial assistance in order to make the required payment. In some cases the payment of the bridewealth is not complete until several years after the wedding. In urban areas young couples may live together for several years and have children before getting married. In such circumstances it will be unacceptable for the husband to meet the wife's family until they are ready to get married, and to pay the bridewealth.

If the families are Christian, a church wedding is followed by a 'honeymoon' (kisenge) in the couples' new home, accompanied by the aunt.³ The bride is supposed to be demure and quiet without smiling on her wedding day (Kisekka 1973). The bride does not 'join' her husband's clan, but maintains close links with one of her brothers, who will provide refuge should the marriage fail.⁴ Such provision is no longer common, and will to some extent depend on the brother's ability to support his sister and possibly her children. Single women have to either impose on relatives' generosity, who may give begrudgingly, inherit or buy land, or obtain employment in their own right.⁵ The in-laws maintain a relationship of avoidance, where for example, father and daughter-in-law, do not touch one another, or look into one another's faces. Breach of such a custom is said to strike the offender with disease, but the intention is presumably to prevent sexual relations⁶.

Any wealth accumulated during the marriage belongs to the husband's clan. The children belong to their father - he has the custodial rights on divorce.

³ Kisekka states that the aunt's role is seen as instructing the couple in sexual intercourse, and she may have intercourse with the husband (Kisekka 1973). Informal conversations revealed that this was rare by the 1990s.

⁴ Such linkages are often the result of a tradition where bridewealth received is used to obtain a wife for a son.

⁵ Only 3% of single women in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey were living with a brother.

⁶ One female respondent, whose father-in-law was the local official, was unable to inform us of her husband's name because he had been named after his father, and it is disrespectful of her to mention her father-in-law's name.

5.2 Impact of the colonial era

The imposition of a new political structure, and the influence of a new religious and moral order had considerable impact on women, particularly through the legislation concerning marriage. Chanock has argued and effectively shown that 'customary law', reported in colonial records and anthropological accounts of the first half of this century, was a creation of the colonial era. He describes how "claims came in front of the court system, where they were given in evidence and 'proved' and from whence they emerged as customary law." (Chanock 1985:60). He uses two examples from Northern Zambia to illustrate his argument: the issue of returning the bridewealth and adultery. Cases came before the British courts on the issue of inheritance of widows - women who refused to become the wives of their dead husbands' heirs." If a widow married again, her father would gain a second bridewealth, while the dead husband's family remain with nothing. Rather than force a woman into marriage, the answer appeared to be to order the return of the bride wealth. The British courts began an inquiry into 'native law and custom' to decide whether there was a legal basis for such a ruling." (Chanock 1985:60)

Chanock's examination of the recorded discussions between the colonial officials and local chiefs reveals two points: that much of the evidence consists of categorical statements, followed by qualifications that were more descriptive of real life. For example, in theory bridewealth was returnable, but it was rarely claimed because this would mean a severing of the relationship with the wife's family; because it would mean that the husband 'had his eye on the neighbour's wife.' If the wife had died, a successor could be claimed, but if one was not provided the matter would be left open in the hope that one day a successor would be provided. As these qualifications were less amenable to 'legalisation' they were often forgotten, and the return of bridewealth became 'customary law'. Secondly, the chiefs giving evidence were concerned with "the increasing rejection of elders' control over the sexual relationship by the young" (Chanock 1985:59). Statements about the 'customary' punishments for adultery - death, mutilation, slavery - although they were again followed by qualifications, led "the colonial legal system to abandon its initial practice of treating adultery as a civil offence, and to punish adulterers as criminals instead." (Chanock 1985:60). This remained the case until 1933 when Judge Hall issued a circular stating that adultery was to be civil, rather than a customary offence.

Chanock's research concerns Zambia, and similar research has not been done for Uganda. Yet there are several pieces of evidence in an account of Ugandan customary marriage law by Morris (1960) that would suggest that the

situation was very similar. Morris states quite clearly that: "The termination of the customary marriage contract (involves) the return of the wife to her father and the handing back to the husband of the bridewealth...". On the issues of customary treatment of adultery, Morris states "Adultery is in all cases treated as a crime, that is to say, a punishment is imposed as well as an order for compensation."

Several pieces of colonial legislation directly affected women's rights. The 1904 Succession Ordinance attempted to provide some protection for widows. It provided a widow of man who died intestate with half of his estate if she had children, and a third if not. If the husband chose to leave his property elsewhere the Ordinance provided no protection. In reality this legislation is likely to have had little effect. In most situations those individuals in positions of authority would be those who had most to gain - the deceased's male relatives. Few women would have been in a position to ensure that this legislation was carried out. If the husband did leave his property to his wife in a will, it was not difficult to overturn the will due to some technical irregularity, enabling the male relatives to claim the land.

The 1900 Bugandan Agreement with the British enabled women to inherit freehold land or rent or purchase land under customary tenure. Obbo (1980) argues that this offered Bugandan women the possibility of economic independence. Initially probably only the daughter and wives of chiefs benefitted, while few other women were in a position to save sufficient money to buy land. This is still the case today for the majority of Bugandan women, although there are now a significant number of women who do own land.

In addition to the British government officials, the religious authorities had a significant impact on Ugandan marriage. The aim of both the Catholic and Anglican missionaries in Uganda was to encourage Christian monogamous marriage. In 1897 there was an attempt to abolish the payment of bridewealth, but leading African Christians convinced the mission of its social value, its contribution to strengthening the marriage ties, and providing security for the woman. Instead limits were set on its value, but despite efforts by the mission these were in no way enforceable (Hansen 1984). A Christian marriage bestowed considerable prestige in Bugandan society, particularly the wearing of a ring. Women married in church were often called 'ring wives' (Brown 1983). At the time, the missions expressed the concern that church marriages were conducted simply for social prestige, rather than religious commitment (Obbo 1980). It is probable that the 'new' type of marriage did much to upset the delicate balance between co-wives.

The missions were convinced that polygamy was incompatible with the church's teaching. Yet many of their converts continued to be polygamists, with one

public/church wife, and other private ones. Marriage to many wives was after all a sign of wealth and social standing, and an 'insignia of chieftainship, on which the political system rested' (Akello nd). The church was faced with the dilemma as to the procedure when a polygamous man wished to be baptised. Their concern was that to recognise his current marriage would be to legalise polygamy, yet without some kind of formal acknowledgement of his current union, the church had no option but to consider the man to be 'living in sin', and therefore not suitable for baptism. Their solution was to insist that one wife was chosen, and the others divorced. One or two officials did raise objections to this policy due to the hardship suffered by the divorcees. Yet the Buganda Regents, supported by the missions, argued that no hardship would occur (Hansen 1984). The repercussions of this legislation are still being felt today. In the early 1990s a society for the legal recognition of second wives was formed. A politician who had divorced his customary wives, in favour of a church marriage, was defeated in his election campaign due to public disapproval of his conduct in his private life.

5.3 Bugandan marriage today

The following quotations are taken from transcripts of single gender focus group discussions that were held in the 6 survey villages in the Mukono area. Various topics were raised for discussion,⁷ and in some cases disagreement stimulated heated debate. The core topics that emerged as important were bridewealth, distribution of household property on the death of husband or on divorce, acceptability of economically independent women, and marital violence. The views expressed in the first section describe the social importance of bridewealth and its effect on women today. In the second section, the divergent views expressed by respondents indicate the level of disagreement as to the appropriate social behaviour of both men and women. These views represent both forces for change and maintenance of the status quo, that are being precipitated by the changing economic and political conditions. The purpose of the commentary that accompanies the following quotations is to highlight the opposing viewpoints and suggest how these views may be linked to changes in social behaviour.

⁷ For list of discussion topics see appendix.

Bridewealth

An important reason given for payment of bridewealth is that the parents are losing a young and trained worker, who may well have cost a considerable amount of money to educate. They should therefore be compensated for the loss of their offspring.

"From the time a child is born she/he takes a lot of money. You take her and she bears you about 10 children and yet at her father's place you took nothing - it is very difficult. That thing hurts. A child deserves to be valued for the money which I will have told you. I don't want you to take my daughter for free." (Ggunda Men's Focus Group Discussion)

The husband-to-be is gaining a valuable worker who will look after his home, grow food, bear him children and may well earn money.

"A man should pay bride price, because the profits that this girl is going to make are too much... she is going to produce, she has given them riches. Digging, she has dug everything, buys food, cows and everything." (Llwanyonyi, Women's FGD)

The payment and the size of the bridewealth conveys honour to the woman.

"When a wife is bought she feels that she has honour in the home. But if you did not buy her, she will even ask you: 'What did you buy me with?' (Laughter) But if you went and gave in that appreciation to her parents, she also feels that she is an honoured person, and you also have to take her as a wife who is 'precious', rather than being a useless thing you found and decided to take." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

The aim is to encourage a husband to treat his wife well.

"It is good because my parents eat things because of me (receive bride wealth), and I do not just go, the man will also respect me. The man does not despise me: 'You who I picked up on the road, uuh, even I just helped you, what did I give at your home, do they know me?' These are some of the questions he can ask you." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Women face a double-edged sword. It is an honour to be 'bought' for a high price, but the exchange gives the husband considerable authority over his wife. The following respondent recounted the views and actions of men whose abuse of their wives was legitimated by the payment of bridewealth.

"For my part, most people who bought wives, often have a bad behaviour, thinking: 'Let me buy this woman'. However much I oppress her, there is nowhere she is going to go. Let me buy her and use her until my money is finished. Even if you run off to anywhere, I'll catch you; I bought you.'" (Ggunda Men's FGD)

Many respondents indicated that it was acceptable for a husband to 'rule' over his wife, with the word 'rule' being used frequently when discussing marital relationships.

"The reason you pay for her, is that all responsibility for her is yours and you'll rule her because you paid for your 'thing⁸'." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

This combination of honour conveyed by bridewealth and submission to the husband's authority is apparently contradictory - it is not an honour to submit unconditionally to another's control. Conveying honour on married women is part of the sanction against women who choose to remain single. Some of those who choose to remain single, and who have independent economic means to do so, are regarded with suspicion. (Bugandan society's views on financially independent women are discussed below.)

The following male respondent is aware of the indignity that women suffer when they are bought and sold.

"The buying of a wife hurts a lot. She knows you are ruling over her in the sense that you bought her. If you did not buy her, you would not use her like that." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

One respondent argued that to treat a woman like an inanimate object by buying and selling her is inhumane.

"Sir, on my part, for a person to sell his child, is the funniest thing of the last order. Many things are sold; a man sells his bicycle and it is no longer his, even if the buyer destroys it or does whatever, it is no longer his. But to do that to a child that you have borne for yourself and you say: 'Now I've sold you, whether they kill you, or they eat you⁹, or do what, I've sold you,' that is not a wise thing." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

⁸ This is the literal translation of the word used.

⁹ The district where this discussion took place is called Ssi Egunja. The name originates from a phrase: "They don't take dead trees, they take live ones." This is a reference to cannibalism. During the fieldwork there was much informal conversation about the naked night dancer, a cannibal, who will carry away unsuspecting victims. It is difficult to assess whether the possibility of a young bride being eaten is (or was) a real threat.

If the bride's father demands too high a price, many expressed the view that the husband would force his wife to work exceptionally hard in order to pay back the wealth given to her parents.

"If you ask for a lot of his things and he goes and gets a debt, your daughter will be the one who will work to pay the debt once she is married. He makes you dig in the morning and in the evening, and on top of that you are producing (children). By the time you get to 30 years, you look like a woman of 60 years." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Bridewealth and change

It became clear that a proportion of the respondents felt that the custom should change. The following respondent is happy with the introduction part of the ceremony, but he argues that the young couple should decide on what to give the bride's parents on the basis of what they can afford.

"Let the idea come from the two 'children', who are getting married, depending on their capacity. So they come and please their parents. But to make it a rule to 'buy' a person - buying with cows or 'omutwalo'¹⁰ should be stopped." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

A respondent in the same group disagreed with the above respondent, arguing that the custom of negotiation between the two families should be maintained, because that is the tradition. However, rather than talking in terms of a bridewealth being used to purchase a wife, it should be considered as a sign of appreciation for what the bride's parents have done for their daughter. The intention appears to be to give the practice more humane overtones, without having to make significant changes.

"The reason for giving things, is that first of all it is something we found being done. From our great, great forefathers, that is how it was. Now we also have to follow that. Also these things that are given - we should not say that is buying, it is appreciation. I still support [the practice], but I do not want to talk of buying." (Agreement by about half of the participants.) (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

Another suggested that he and his wife would work together, and take what they could afford after the marriage. Instead of the men of the husband's clan contributing to the bridewealth, and negotiating on his behalf, he is proposing that payment of the bridewealth be something that the new husband and wife do together. In informal conversations with university graduates it

¹⁰ Bridewealth. Literal meaning - a bundle of ten thousand shillings.

was apparent that this practice is common among the educated, urban Bugandans.

"The practice I want for myself is, I get my little sugar, take it there and bring this girl, we work and we shall take things [to her parents] little by little." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

These quotations signify several quite fundamental changes. Firstly, the extended family is beginning to play a smaller role in the process of marriage, and the young couple take the initiative and the responsibility for the ceremony. Secondly, it is something they do together. Previously, this was not the case. Marriage is something done by one person to another - 'the man marries the woman' and she moves into his home. (If she is economically independent and he moves into her home, then 'she has married him'.) Normal marriage was synonymous with the wife leaving home, and going to live with her husband and (inevitably) his clan. It did not mean setting up home together, independently of both sets of parents, as this last quotation implies.

As an indication of the diversity of views, the following quotations are part of a debate that took place in one of the men's groups as to whether 'omutwalo' is necessary for the success of a marriage. Respondent 2 is of the opinion that it is payment of the bridewealth that ensures the loyalty of the wife. Respondent 1 argues that the success of the marriage depends on whether the wife chooses to begin a relationship with someone else, and payment of the 'omutwalo' is unlikely to prevent this.

Respondent 1: "Does the 'omutwalo' make a marriage? Are you saying the 'omutwalo' gives her the status of a married woman? That I do not agree with. That is not what makes a marriage." (Other respondents give positive nods and noises.)

Respondent 2: "She knows that she is a married woman and she did not come to play around."

Respondent 1: "What I see, what I am basing my argument on, what really makes a marriage is to first meet your partner and agree - and there is understanding. That is what makes a marriage. How many tens of thousands have got married and their marriages have died? Yet a man can get a woman from a bar, they talk, and stay in marriage for years because they understand each other. But for me, to say that because that woman was bought for 'mitwalos' (many tens of thousands) she will be compelled to stay in a marriage - I do not support this. "

Respondent 2: "Me, I support it. If I meet her in your house, I lock you up, I really get hold of you. But if we just had an understanding with a woman, and my 'omutwalo' is not there, you can say I am joking, I am just a hanger-on. "

Respondent 1: "If she decides to leave you who has paid 'omutwalo' and she looks for another, your breaking the house is a waste of time. The one who says: 'Discussion is better', he is right, because if you discuss, you agree on one thing. But if you break the house she will still go to so and so anyway...." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

Underlying this debate are two different perceptions of the nature of a marital relationship, one being characterised by the rule of authority, and the other by consensus. The latter position must be more conducive to both men and women benefitting from economic development, to say nothing of human rights.

Comparison with Haakanssan's study of bridewealth and social change amongst the Gusii of Kenya, shows similarities between the Gusii and the Baganda, and suggests further explanations for the changes in the importance of bridewealth amongst the Baganda. The study took place just over the Ugandan border, in western Kenya. It is a productive cash crop area, that has experienced economic growth as well as population growth. Most men have at least experience of intermittent employment and/or business activities as, for example, farm labourers, tea pickers, construction workers, watchmen, or drivers. Haakanssan describes the socio-economic differentiation in the following way: 'a small elite of wealthy and politically influential families; wealthy farmers with early school attendance and long experience of off-farm employment; young men and women with high levels of education and well-paid jobs; farmers with little education and access to unqualified employment' (Haakanssan 1988:126).

Such a description is as apt for the Baganda as it is for the Gusii, with perhaps two important differences. Firstly the population per sq km in Kisumu district (Kenya) is nearly double what it is in Kauga sub-county (Uganda) (460 as opposed to 270 persons per sq km). In Kisumu there is considerable pressure on the land, and sub-division has made much of the land unprofitable. Secondly, the burgeoning of the informal sector in Buganda has created a class of particularly men, but also women, with primary education, who, as well as some agricultural activities, are involved in a variety of profitable business activities (for example trading, fishing, shopkeeping, butchery, baking etc).

The Buganda and the Gusii share many similar marriage customs, including an

avoidance relationship between in-laws, paternal rights in children only being conferred on payment of bridewealth, women's main access to land being through marriage. The payment of bridewealth places a woman under the authority of her husband, and gives him right to the fruits of her labour or her monetary income.

Haakanssan argues, as did Murdock above, that in the precolonial era women had greater independence, but the increasing prevalence of the cash economy and the institutional change of colonialism encouraged men to increase their rights in women's labour and children. Sender and Smith (1986) portray a different picture - as coercive methods used to obtain labour, such as slavery, were replaced by the development of a market for labour, women could turn to wage employment as an alternative to an undesirable marriage, or being supported by their natal kin.

With the diversification of the East African economy in the past 50 years, young men are no longer dependent on marriage and women's agricultural labour for economic independence. 'The importance of formal marriage had declined because education, work and earning money are sources of wealth and respect, all of which a young man can attain without being married' (Haakanssan 1988:141). Previously sons were only allowed to participate in community affairs if married, and they were dependent on the clan for the provision of the bridewealth. Now sons pay their own bridewealth, even if their fathers conduct the negotiations. '[Today] most unions are established upon the initiative of the couple themselves' (Haakanssan 1988:138). 'Many old men and women complained that despite their explicit orders, their sons were [co-habiting with a woman] and had not paid bridewealth' (Haakanssan 1988:141). This description appears to be similar to the changes occurring amongst the Baganda.

In an explanation of these changes, Haakanssan argues that the decline of polygamy due to the reduced need for agricultural family labour and educational expenses involved in rearing children, has led to an increase in the number of women wishing to marry. Unlike young men, young women are still accorded respectability through marriage, economically independent women being considered 'loose'. They also probably have fewer employment opportunities, and marriage is an important means to obtain access to land and the economic means of production. And in turn fathers and brothers may well be keen for young women to leave the natal home due to the need for land for their wives. Haakanssan provides evidence that many young women are co-habiting in order to be effectively married, in the hope that their partner will pay bridewealth at a later date.

The insecurity that is caused by the non-payment of bridewealth is the other

side of the coin to the importance of honour that payment conveys. 'Women constantly expressed the dissatisfaction, stress and fear they felt due to the insecurity of a non-bridewealth union. ...Leaving the man will result in economic insecurity and poverty, and will expose her to her parents anger at her elopement, the community's branding of her as a 'loose woman' and her ostracism by its members.' (Haakanssan 1988:181)

Women who are employed or self-employed face a very different prospect. Such women are reluctant to leave home without the payment of bridewealth as compensation to their parents in return for money spent on education. A wife who has a monetary income is an attractive prospect for a man, particularly as payment of the bridewealth gives him authority over her income. Yet, employed or self-employed women are able to exert more control over their income than women who are involved in a joint agricultural enterprise. Cash income is easy to hide, and can be spent without the knowledge of a husband. This is not the case with agricultural produce - many husbands keep account of how many bunches of bananas (matooke) there are in the household plantation to ensure that a wife cannot sell any without their knowledge. ¹¹ The argument articulated by Haakanssan above - that it was the introduction of the cash economy that enabled men to increase their rights over women - is incomplete. The cash economy did provide an alternative for some women. But it was/is men's ability to prevent women from having equal access to the market, and equal opportunities within it, that helps to sustain the asymmetric balance of power. (This is a major theme of chapter 6.)

Haakanssan asks whether there is any incentive for a change in the system of bridewealth. The status quo is to men's advantage because of the legal component of bridewealth, entitling the husband to the rights over the children and the wife's labour. ¹² Once married, it validates women's status, and defines their position in the hierarchy, leading many women to support it. If, as the respondents suggest in the following chapter, marriage entails loss of control over income and accumulated assets for employed women, it may be such women who push for a change in men's bridewealth rights. Yet perhaps further research could determine to what extent men are still able to 'rule' their wives in unions where no payment is made. If this is the case, a change in the system of bridewealth would have little impact on women's situation. A more fundamental change in the perception of conjugal rights would then be necessary to ensure a greater degree of equality.

¹¹ Matooke is a savory banana that is used as the main carbohydrate, and is a cash crop due to the demand from the urban Kampala population.

¹² Disputes occur between young and old men over the level of the bridewealth - the young wanting a low price, and old

5.4 Widowhood

The cultural practices that surround the beginning of a marriage have direct implications for the division of assets when the marriage ends. Payment of brideprice 'traditionally' implies that the product of the wife's labour belongs to the husband. As a consequence of this the household assets acquired during the marriage belong to the husband or his relatives. (The cultural rationale was/is to prevent assets being transferred through inheritance from one clan to another through the wife.) In the focus group discussions many respondents described situations where widows were forced to leave with nothing. The following quotation is a dialogue that took place between the respondents and the moderator. It indicates, firstly, that widows are 'traditionally' not allowed to take any of the household assets. Secondly, widows (and wives) are viewed as the property of the clan, and it is acceptable that they should be passed on to another male member of the clan.

Respondent 1: "On that matter, there is a practice that has not gone well, in our nature. Our brothers, where there is no clear will, come from somewhere knowing that in so and so's homestead there are things like this and that. Once he comes, he says: 'I am the head of the homesteads.'¹³ When he gets there he starts barking: 'The big cow is for the head of the homestead. A good chair is for the head of the homesteads.' The children are left to inherit insignificant things, with those who should have been responsible, the head of the homesteads, having just taken care of themselves."

Moderator: "Is there no thought for the wife, as far as those things left behind are concerned?"

Respondent 1: "You see, those we call the heads of the homesteads, once they come, they don't take the wife as someone important. They take her as something acquired, theirs that they bought (property). Yet the wife is not property, but they take her in that view. The one who says: 'I have finished the funeral rites', the one who is the guardian, he goes into the house and starts eating the things of the children. The widow he beats because he is the one who has completed the funeral rites."

Respondent 2 (cutting in): "Even chasing, he chases her away."

Respondent 3: "Most of them would take them (as wives.)"

arguing for a higher one - due to their position in giving and receiving.
A clan title

Respondent 2: "She looks for where to go, but she cannot see where."
(Ggunda Men's. FGD)

This last quotation illustrates the dire circumstances in which many widows find themselves. A female respondent narrated the following story.

"For me, I saw a woman, who was at Namayuba, the husband got sick for a long time. But when the car was taking the body, the brothers and sisters were lifting things. One lifted a T.V. , another a radio-cassette, the tablecloths that were folded neatly on the table - for the woman thought that they were helping her to pack her things. But then, that was the end. They took the body to be buried, and on coming back she only found chairs with no cushions, beds with no mattresses, tables with most of the things taken off." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

The respondents were nearly unanimous in condemning such events, which indicates it may no longer be as common as it used to be. Statistics collected in the survey showed that 47% of widows took between 75-100% of the household assets, but 23% were allowed to take less than a quarter (Table 5.1).¹⁴

Table 5.1: Percentage of total household durables taken by widow (sample size)

Percentage of household durables taken by widow (a)	Percentage of widows (17)
0-25%	23.5%
25-50%	17.7%
50-75%	11.7%
75-100%	47.1%

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Calculated from the total replacement value of items taken on death of husband.

¹⁴ It could be argued that the wife being left with 75-100% is a reasonable share, given that the husband may have wished to leave something to his other relatives. However less than 25% does not appear to be equitable.

5.5 Divorce

Data on the number of marriages that end in divorce was not collected. However, 11.5% of the respondents during the census (men and women) were found to be currently divorced/separated (Sample size: 641). (This figure does not include divorcees who have remarried.) 35% of married women have children by another man other than their current husband (The sample (150) includes widows who have been remarried.) The divorce rate is probably somewhat less than the sum of these two figures (46%), perhaps between 30-40%. It appeared that divorce was relatively easy, with little legal procedure involved, with one of the spouses simply packing up and leaving.

A woman's contribution to the household (either in terms of labour or income) does not necessarily entitle her to take some of the assets on divorce. This view still predominated amongst male respondents. The general perception was that a woman would get married again, and her second husband would provide consumer durables. A female divorcee has neither any right to, nor any need of the household assets.

"Most things - radio, saucepans, plates, bedding, whatever, even if I bought the radio when she was the one cooking the food - the radio is mine for the home. She, wherever she goes, marries another man. So a woman does not have the responsibility of getting things in the home except on your death." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

'Although he is using his wife's money, all property is registered in his name, and if there is a divorce she will lose everything for which she has paid.' (Haakanssan:201)

In reality, it would appear that some women assert ownership rights over items they have purchased. A discussion took place indicating that if women purchase items with their own income, some will insist on taking those items. The first respondent concludes that if husbands allow their wives to buy items, when it comes to separation she will take everything with her. Such a conclusion reveals the threat that men feel.

Respondent 1: "You may go off to your work, and your wife sells five or so heaps of cassava or ten. She sees hawkers moving around with saucepans and buys one out of that money. She will show you I sold my cassava and bought a saucepan with the money."

Respondent 2: "That is not yours (ie. the saucepan). In fact when she

leaves your home, she will go with it." (A chorus of voices agree.)

Respondent 1: "That saucepan cannot be yours, and when she starts leaving your home, she will say: 'My saucepan, I worked for it, I am taking it.' She will throw it outside (ready to be packed). If you say the woman should buy things, you will have nothing, even the mattress she will take." (Many voices agree). (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)

In both male and female groups respondents mentioned engraving of the items that they purchased or keeping purchase receipts. When asked during the survey which household items she had purchased, one female respondent produced all the purchase receipts that she had carefully been keeping. A male respondent recounted the following.

"I was in a seminar of 'gender balance' in which women were educating their fellow women. They were telling them to engrave those things (their property). It was a powerful conference. A woman said that things you buy while in the homes of your husbands should be engraved but in an inconspicuous manner." (The speaker is Local council level 3 committee member). (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)¹⁵

The predominant view among the female respondents was that wives are allowed to take very few assets with them on divorce. Many women expressed resentment at the unfairness of this situation.

"The men are not grateful. You can get married to him when you are still poor and you suffer the way the home situation is - there is no bedding, nice clothes. You come a long way from a grass thatched hut, you build a house with a sheet iron roof, you have bought a bicycle. But it does not shame him to tell you to get out. And he doesn't even give you something small to take with you. He can't remember that you worked together. He chases you out with nothing. Sometimes he may even take away your clothes too. They know how to make you go naked." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Christine Obbo describes hearing of several incidents and witnessed four cases where the men would not let their wives take clothes on divorce (Obbo 1980). Apparently, it is common for a woman to store her clothes of value with friends, with knowledge of the friend's husband, so that he will not destroy them by mistake (Obbo 1980).

In a discussion of marriage in Zambia, Munachonga (1988) retells a respondent's account of how his particular family settled this issue. "Each

¹⁵ The new Government's policy of ensuring that women are elected to all levels of its hierarchy seems to have some

time a spouse purchased a major household item, relatives from both sides of the family were called in to witness who purchased it, and who therefore owned it. Other husbands... appear to have been forced into this arrangement by their wives. " (Munachonga 1988:193)

Women use a variety of practical strategies in order to retain their possessions. It would appear that the options are to remove items secretly, or to enlist the support of the community.

"There are two types of divorce. There is when I am sitting there in the marriage, but when I divorced a long time ago. I started removing one by one of the property when even my husband does not know that I am taking the property slowly. The day I am leaving, the man does not know. When I wake up and say I am going for a visit. He even escorts me. He keeps hoping that I am coming back, when I am not.

Then there is this divorce of fighting. You fight each other at the night. You first go to the local council, or the elders, or his brothers and sisters. The woman says that she wants her things, and the man refuses. The people tell the man that if he has made a decision to let her leave, he should give her the things that belong to her. He has to give you some of the property." (Zitwe Women' FGD)

The statistics from the Kauga/Ngogwe survey revealed that 93% of the divorced women took between 0-25% of the total household durables. Only 3% were able to take between 25-50%, and another 3% above 50% (Table 5.2).¹⁶ It would appear that currently married women are optimistic, with 24% estimating that they will take between 25-50%. This difference may be due to the problem of a self-selecting sample. It is likely that the marriages of divorced women may not have been as cooperative as marriages that still exist. Perhaps in a more cooperative marriage, a woman could expect to take a more equal share. (Or perhaps several of the women in the sample may have divorced 10-15 years ago, and attitudes may have changed during that period. It was argued in chapter 4 that women's involvement in income generating activities on their own account is increasing. Perhaps as women's earning power is rising, they are purchasing a larger proportion of household assets, and as a result intend to assert their rights over such items.

effect in raising awareness, with women devising ways of asserting their rights.
¹⁶ It is assumed that 50% would be an equitable division.

Table 5.2: Percentage of household durables taken by divorcees and estimates by currently married women (sample size)¹⁷

Percentage of household durables taken by divorcees (a)	Percentage of divorcees (29)	Estimates by married women (153)
0-25%	93.1%	70.6%
25-50%	3.4%	24.2%
50-75%	3.4%	3.2%
75-100%	0.0%	1.3%

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: Calculated from total replacement value of items taken on divorce or estimate of items that would be taken on divorce.

As divorce is inevitably the result of disagreement between husband and wife, the wife is dependent on support from family and the local community to defend her claims against a potentially hostile husband. This requires the intervention in a marital dispute which may well incur the wrath of both parties. Many individuals may be reluctant to play such a role. It is far from certain that a woman will gain the support from the community that she requires. She may even be accused of theft.

"Even the things that you buy (while at) the man's place, when you pack them, they say that you stole the man's things." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

It would appear that the norms surrounding marriage create an unequal balance of power between men and women. On divorce or widowhood, women are not entitled to a share of the household assets acquired while they were involved in household production. Such a situation is unlikely to encourage women to contribute to the acquisition of household assets. Yet, some women appear to be able to assert their right to a proportion of the assets that they have purchased. This may signify a more equal balance of power due to women's involvement in the cash economy. Women's work and its impact on the balance of power is discussed in the following chapter.

¹⁷ These estimates were obtained in response to the question: "Which items would you be able to take if you and your husband divorce?"

5.6 Violence

Often social sanction is a sufficient form of control to enable the husband to maintain his position of authority, but in many households it is supported by the use of violence. In such circumstances women's ability/willingness to protest against their situation is diminished. Women may either be dependent on the community's willingness to take action against marital violence, which may not be forthcoming, particularly if violence is accepted as a tool of authority; or dependent on her parental family as a refuge.

After 20 years of civil war, physical violence is part of life in Uganda. Many soldiers during the civil war were boys of 10-12 years old, orphaned by the war, who became accustomed to watching and carrying out acts of violence at a very early age.¹⁸ Marital violence is seen as part of the course, with only a few prepared to condemn it outright. In a survey carried out by the Association of Ugandan Women Lawyers, 46% of women reported being beaten by a partner (Wakabi and Mwesigye 1991). (The local officials in one survey village had a positive policy for dealing with domestic violence. The police would be called in and the offender would spend the night in a police cell.)

Many male respondents argued that it was the only way to ensure that your wife was obedient.

"What brings men to beat their wives? For my part, I think that is the only punishment you can give a wife which will remind her all the time and make her fear. She will say: 'The other time I did this, I was beaten.' And when you are beaten on the body, you feel the hard, dry thing (ie. stick or cane used). What causes these women to be beaten, is that they are 'mind disturbers' - causing the brain to turn." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

There is the perception that women are like children, who can stray because they are weaker individuals. The only way to teach the difference between right and wrong is corporal punishment.

"A woman is like a young child in her attitude to things. If you beat her the mind comes back on track." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

But by no means all men hold this view.

"I do not have the wish to beat a wife, an adult, whom you have married. She came as an adult and found you. You have to talk to

¹⁸ A common practice in the civil war, that is still continuing in the north of Uganda, is to capture young boys and girls to force them to be soldiers or wives. Should one try and escape, his or her sibling will be forced to kill the escapee.

her. If she is 'mad' she will not heed what you have said, but if she understands it, what will she lose?" (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

The respondent asserts that women are adults. As long as she is not 'mad', she will understand and agree. The implication is that any disagreements are due to her being 'mad', rather than there being an alternative point of view.

Many admitted that much of the violence is due to alcohol.

"Nobody is really supposed to be beaten, but there is anger. These days women have got out of hand. Women know how to drink, even more than us. Now if you are also a taker of alcohol, you may go somewhere, come back and find that she is more inebriated than you are. Sometimes she has not fulfilled her duties at home....."
(Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

"[Men beat women] because of alcohol...even if you have done nothing. The biggest part of his brain gets influenced by alcohol...even if it is a minor issue, he has to beat you." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

Both men and women expressed the view that women feel they are not loved unless they are beaten. This is a strong indication of the acceptability of marital violence. Beating is seen as a suitable method of dealing with adultery. If a wife forms a relationship with another man, to ignore it would be show indifference on the part of the husband. Indifference to a wife's general behaviour, and a lack of disciplinary beatings, may indicate that the husband has another woman.

" For us men, if you do not beat your wife, she will not know that you love her. But if you spend a year without beating your wife, she will think (or know) that you have another woman somewhere, he does not care about me. So wives are controlled through beating."
(Ttakajunge Men's FGD)

"There are some who say that if my husband does not beat me, I do not feel that he loves me." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

The following respondent described the circumstances under which she would expect physical abuse from her husband.

"It is not right for the man to beat the wife, because you are all adults. But the reason why I would want my husband to beat me, is

walking (committing adultery).¹⁹ Because the woman has no law that permitted her to have two men.²⁰ If he gets me red handed, I want him to beat me. But I want it to be between me and him, and the issue to be finished. I do not want him to beat me [where the affair was committed]. I want him to beat me in the bedroom, and he tells me that: 'My fellow I do not want you to behave like this.' But beating me in front of many people is not what I want." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

In 1991 there was an 'incident' at a boarding school just over the Ugandan/Kenyan border, approximately 400 km from Mukono. A group of boarding-school boys went on the rampage. They broke into the girls' dormitories, killing 19 of their female classmates and raping 71 of them. The precipitating event was a strike, started by the boys, which the girls had refused to join. Bradley (1995) looks for possible sociological explanations for this horrific event. She argues that women are gaining access to education, land and credit in an atmosphere of unemployment, job insecurity and shortage of places in the higher education system. Women are placed in direct competition with men. Bradley maintains that the boys' action was the result of the pressure they felt of an uncertain future in the face of increased competition for scarce resources. She also argues that it reflects an increased level of gender conflict within society as a whole - men's dominant position is being threatened by increasing awareness of women's rights.

No data on violence were collected in the Mukono survey. There is no direct evidence that marital abuse is on the increase. But given that men openly state that women's increasing economic freedom is a threat to their authority (this is discussed in detail in the next chapter), and that violence is an acceptable way of resolving disputes, it would seem to be likely that the incidence of physical abuse has risen. In a study of 90 societies, Levinson identified four factors that appear to be associated with high levels of domestic violence: economic inequality between men and women, male authority and decision-making in the home, a pattern of using physical violence for conflict resolution, and divorce restrictions for women (Levinson 1989). The first two factors - economic inequality and male authority - are prevalent in Buganda and are the subject of chapters 4 & 6. It is also likely that individuals' experience of physical violence as a means of conflict resolution increased during the civil war. There are no restrictions on divorce for women, other than the fact that the resulting economic hardship, and possible lack of support from natal kin, may prevent a wife from leaving an undesirable marriage. During any period of

¹⁹

It is interesting to note the use of the word 'walking' to imply adultery, and that some women have to ask permission before they are allowed to visit friends and relatives. Perhaps there is an assumption that women who walk round the village, visiting neighbours, are committing adultery.

sociological change there are forces that attempt to maintain the status quo, as well as those driving the change. Some men are unwilling to accept women's new freedom, others realise that it may well be beneficial - marital violence is an indication of those attempting to maintain their authority.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, although a typical Bugandan marriage contract and likely settlement on divorce does not encourage women to contribute towards the purchase of household assets, there are signs of significant changes. There has been a change in the attitude towards bridewealth. Some men expressed the view that it should be seen as a sign of appreciation, rather than a payment, and that, in some cases, it is something that the couple do together, independently of their kin. Despite this, bridewealth is still symbolically important, and is associated with a husband's rights to the product of his wife's labour.

Some women are beginning to assert their rights on divorce over household property that they purchased with their own income. With increasing female participation rates, womens' independent purchasing power may have also risen. With both spouses earning, and purchasing, (rather than simply contributing to household production) it is much easier to see whose labour produced which items, and to assert disposal rights over those items.

This chapter has also argued that, in some instances, women's increasing economic independence may come at a price - that of increased marital violence. The link between money, power and the challenge that women's economic independence poses for male authority is examined in the following chapter.

It would appear that the marriage contract between two families, attitudes towards female ownership of household assets, and marital violence are all important factors that affect intra-household allocation of resources.

²⁰ Having multiple partners is acceptable for men - ie.polygamy - but not for women.

WOMEN'S WORK:

PARTICIPATION, CONTROL OVER INCOME AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL

In an introduction to an edited volume on women and household income Dwyer and Bruce (1988) emphasise how the importance of women's 'perception of themselves and how they value what they do, may in part determine what they can attain'. A woman's negotiating skills are to some extent dependent on her perception of her strengths. In the outline of his co-operative/conflict model, Sen (1985) argues perception is an important parameter in determining household allocation. Yet these perceptions in turn are shaped by the social norms that delimit gender identities - what are 'suitable' activities for men and women. And, as suggested in chapter 2, gender identities are used to perpetuate the social order.

Gender identities can affect the type of work that men and women do, and the remuneration that they receive. In the introduction to an edited volume, Sinclair (1991) highlights how gender stereotypes can be used as a language of control. Men and women are assumed to have different characteristics that provide them with different skills. The engendering of skills generates value judgements about the importance of the different skills, which in turn influences the wage paid. Value is defined culturally as well as by the possibility of monetary exchange. For example, in a study of the division of labour in a department store, Broadbridge shows how saleswomen may be employed to sell low cost items with a high turnover, while male assistants were employed in departments with the opposite characteristics (Broadbridge 1991). Men's higher basic pay is sometimes said to result from the higher market value of the goods that they produce or sell (Craig et al. 1982:82, cited in Sinclair 1991). Broadbridge shows how female sales assistants were expected to display an attractive appearance and to be tolerant to sexual harassment. Ecevit's account of factory workers in Turkey documents how manual jobs were 'allocated on the basis of women's assumed dexterity, cleanliness, and patience, while men's jobs were said to require characteristics of greater strength' (Ecevit 1991). Often defining the difference between not necessarily unequal skills, and their association

with a particular gender, facilitates the payment of different wage rates. Women's low level of pay often does not reflect their skills, but rather their low level of bargaining power. ¹

At the other end of the scale, gender identities can determine the type of work available to women by prescribing their confinement to confined spaces. In South and West Asia religion and culture dictate a high degree of physical seclusion, limiting women's freedom of movement outside the home, despite poverty that necessitates women's involvement in income-generating work. ² The situation in Buganda is not as extreme as this, yet gender identities determine women's ability to earn an income, the type of work they can do, ability to accumulate assets, and in some cases, permission has to be given by the husband before a wife can visit relatives or friends.

The first part of this chapter explores how Bugandan gender ideologies function as means of controlling both women's access to market activities, and their ability to accumulate assets. Evidence from the focus group discussions reveal the prevalent attitudes towards women who are earning an income. The second section uses the Kauga/Ngogwe data in order to assess the actual impact of these attitudes on women: the extent to which women are prevented from working, whether they are able to accumulate assets, the extent to which women contribute financially to the household income. The third part compares men and women's market activities and rates of return to ascertain whether, once engaged within the market, women face further inequalities. (Women's unpaid work, either domestic chores or agricultural production for household consumption, is not dealt with in thesis. It is important in the sense that the sexual division of labour within the home is closely linked with gender identities and any negotiation over the division of labour has to deal with the identities from which the division of labour derives. Yet the emphasis in this thesis is on work that generates an income, because it has much greater potential to influence the balance of power. In this chapter the term 'work' refers to any activity that generates an income that is initially controlled by the individual concerned ie. employment or self-employment, but not labour that is contributed to a household enterprise where the husband sells the product and therefore initially receives the income.)

¹ Cockburn and Furst-Dilic (1994) have written about the interaction between gender and the development of white goods technology in Europe. Various accounts in an edited volume show how all-male design teams 'contribute to introduce women, real or imagined, in to their thinking process....Despite many devices used by some designers to imagine the woman user she remains....'Other' to the designer.' (Cockburn 1994:11). Cockburn has also documented how the computerisation of the newspaper industry in London has led to the reduction in number of 'male' jobs preparing the type for letter press printing, and an increase in 'female' typists. The unions openly organised to exclude women from typographical work, in an attempt to preserve the jobs of their male members (Cockburn 1983).

² Several studies in Afshar and Agarwal (1989) document the impact of gender ideologies on Asian women's lives.

6.1 Money, marriage and power

Men's control over women's economic activities is apparent in their attitude and behaviour towards women. Husbands may prevent their wives from working, confiscate their earnings or purchases, or beat them because they have money in their possession. Women with independent economic means face the judgement that they are unlikely to have successful marriages.

A commonly expressed sentiment is that a wife who is dependent on the husband for cash, leads to a harmonious relationship, whereas a wife who is earning an income, may assert her independence.

"Understanding may be there when one side is poor, sometimes it is eroded when both of you have money. As it is said: "If all the wood for lighting a fire is of the same big size, the fire cannot be lit."

You may have mutual understanding when you the husband is the one with the money and the wife listens to you well, as she is poor. But if she has (money) and you also have, you tell her: 'Put on tea for me', she replies: 'Can't you put it on for yourself. Don't you see I'm busy? How many hands do I have?' (Laughter) But if she doesn't have money, she will listen to whatever you say." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

Many men stated once a woman is allowed to assert her independence, the result may well be divorce. A woman who has her own income is unlikely to accept being 'ruled' by her husband.

"In fact even if she earns money, if you are not very careful it may result in separation between you. Because whenever a wife gets money, she asks herself the reason for which she is being 'ruled'.³ [Prolonged laughter laced with comments like "Then the home dies", "The home falls apart", "In fact you have killed the marriage."]
(Ggunda Men's FGD)

A husband may also lose his authority if he fritters his money unwisely. He will be subject to the taunts and scolding of an angry wife.

"Money is authority. Whenever you do not have money you do not have proper authority. It is just like our leaders who 'rule' over us - the man wants to be a president, a minister, chairman RC5 - he wants to control money, not us. So in the same way when you control income in the home you have authority. If she knows about your income and learns that now you have nothing left, eeh! (emphasis), she will even want you to wash her legs (Laughter). Your authority will have gone."
(Ttakajunge Men's FGD)

³ The word used was 'emufuza', the direct translation for which is to 'rule'.

Some men forbade their wives to earn an income.⁴ If such a husband discovered that his wife did have money, or had been able to buy an item, some men said they would want a clear explanation about how the money was obtained to ensure it was not stolen.

"(If she has) money I will have to know where she got it from, and in what way. Is it mine which she has picked from where I place my head? Because she may buy, and when I go to check (on the money), a rat has pulled off 50,000 Ush and I think it is the money she took. She has to explain to me clearly, what is she going to buy and how she got it. Then I allow her to buy." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

Numerous women recounted how the feelings that the men expressed above can lead to them to physically abuse their wives.

"Now, there are some husbands who cannot allow the woman to buy anything at home. He can ask you that: 'You who do not work, where did you get the money? Who gave you permission to buy that thing?' He can beat her because she decided to buy such an article." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

It would appear that some men view a working wife as a threat to the stability of their marriage, as well as a threat to their authority. As a result he feels justified in using violence in order to ensure her subjugation.

"If you have your cash like that in your basket, he can get it and use it. He can also beat you. Money, that belongs to you, can cause you to be beaten." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Just as it is acceptable to prevent a woman from working, it appears to be legitimate to expropriate a wife's income or her assets. The following female respondent explains how such a situation makes it very difficult for a woman to accumulate assets. Cash flow problems may prompt a husband to demand that his wife hand over her income or sell an asset and give him some of the proceeds. Although women are legally allowed to own cattle, it is actually very difficult to do, because such a prominent asset is likely to attract a man's attention.

"The rights we women have are like, let me say, you buy a pig from Mrs Lubuga and you rear it, and it belongs to you. Even when he knows that it belongs to you, he will be on your 'bumper' (pestering you) to sell it. When you sell it for 20,000 Ush he wants you to give him

⁴ Approximately 10% of husbands prevent their wives from working (Table 6.1 below). This figure rises to 28% among

10,000 Ush as if you reared it together. Therefore we have rights, yet we do not have them. That is why we fear to buy cattle - because we do not have rights. When you sell a pig you want to spend the money quickly on a child or on cloth, so that the money does not cause a fight. The men are against us." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

It appears there is an informal hierarchy of agricultural livestock. Women are allowed to own the less valuable ones.

"A wife should know her chicken and sell it because it is hers. About a cow that we have, she cannot say anything. A goat that she bought herself is hers. But a sheep is not hers. That is the husband's." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

The one asset that it is exceptionally difficult for a woman to own is land. If a woman owns land it is seen as an outright threat to her marriage, because she has the ultimate means by which to live independently. Any man that sells to a woman will be subject to the rage of the husband.

"For us village women it is hard to buy a plot of land. When you come to get married, you will not have the heart (intention) to say: 'Let me go to Mr Sowedi and I buy a plot'. If he (your husband) knows that Mr Sowedi sold you a plot for around 20,000 Ush, he will want to burn Mr Sowedi inside his house, because he has spoilt your home." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

In rural areas, there is still a general sanction against selling land to women. If a woman approaches somebody selling land, they may well meet the response: "Where is your husband? We will sell to him" (Obbo 1980).

"Men fear that once you have bought a piece of land it is a sign that you are planning to leave them." (Obbo 1980:44)

Some argued that the whole household would benefit financially.

"Some (women) get money and listen to you. Like my wife, she has more money than me. When she gets money it is for our children, it supports our children. What I haven't got (in terms of cash) she provides." (Namubiru Men's FGD)

One or two respondents argued that not all women wish to spread their wings and assert their new-found economic freedom. Conflict need not necessarily be the result of a wife earning money.

"There is that wife who brings money into the home, but even if you, the husband, has not kept pace with her (i.e. she earns more), she is calm/settled. In other words she does not have a restless heart that desires to be free and break away." (Ggunda Men's FGD)

It is unclear whether the wife is calm because the husband is not so eager to impose his will, or whether the wife is still prepared to be submissive.

Several male respondents acknowledged that men do abuse their position of power within the marriage.

"Another thing is that we men also mistreat women. You may find a man who has built a home and makes money. At the end of the month, the wife does not get anything. In the second month you have not even bought her a dress, she does not get any money - you spend it in alcohol. You run with young girls. It gets to the third month, she sees nothing, she decides to do her own thing. That brings separation." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

One female respondent argued that if a husband does give his wife freedom, it is important for the wife not to boast that she governs him:

"We have spoken mostly about men's bad behaviour. But also women we have a bad habit. When a man gives you freedom because he sees you as an adult, you will say: 'My man, I have softened him, I even cook any time I want to.' (Laughter) Then you spoil the freedom he has given you. You tell your fellow woman: 'I am the one to buy salt and his shirt.' You intervene in the business, and you say things that are wrong. Then you spoil yourself before him. (He has a bad opinion of you). When another man thinks of giving his wife freedom, he will see how you behave, and will think that his wife will behave similarly." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

The majority of the respondents expressed how closely linked money and authority are within the home. Culturally, the husband is the 'head' of the household, and money and control of assets ensure his power. This situation has been challenged with the growing involvement of women in generating income. Many men see this trend as a direct threat to their authority, and to the stability of their marriage. Many forbid their wives to work, others are prepared to use violence to ensure their dominance. Others are able to discuss financial matters with their wives, and achieve agreement on how to manage their finances in a way that will benefit the whole household.

6.2 Men's honour and women's independence

The views expressed about women who are economically independent neatly illustrate the relationship between gender, money and power. In Buganda, economically independent women are called 'nakyewombekedde' (meaning literally 'I prepared this myself'). They are normally women who have a house and land of their own, and who do not depend on a husband for an income. Such women are not seen as suitable marriage material, because they are generally uncompliant. It is often assumed that they have been through several failed marriages, and sometimes there are overtones of prostitution. 'Nakyewombekedde' is not perceived as a complimentary term, nor as something that women generally aspire to be, despite the freedom that financial independence brings. (In such a cultural context, economic models that assume that women wish to maximise their income are simply inaccurate.)

As an indicator of the prevalence of such economically independent women in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample 14% of women owned the house.⁵ If such a woman should get married, and her husband moves into her home, it is said: 'She has married him', not vice versa. If a disagreement should occur, between husband and wife, she is at liberty to tell him to leave. Traditionally, for a man to be in such a situation, is to severely compromise his honour and his manhood, because the wife is effectively the dominant partner. Just as a man buys a wife, in this case, the woman will have bought the man.

"We have women here whom we call 'Nakyewombekedde' . Those women have the authority that is different from that of those women who have been married. She can even chase away the man that she will have brought"
(Ttakajjunge Men's FGD)

The following respondent recounts his situation where he is living with a 'nakyewombekedde', who is able and willing to help him pay the local tax collected from male heads of household.

Respondent 1: "I found a Nakyewombekedde. Any time when graduated tax comes up, she helps me with it (Laughter). Because she has more money than me, I say: 'Nyabo (madam), I don't have money'. They often help us, those who are of good heart."

A fellow respondent in the same group declares that he finds such a situation unacceptable. The husband has effectively agreed to be ruled by his wife. By accepting financial help, the husband has lost his authority.

Respondent 2: "For my part, I take it to be a very bad thing, because it is the man who should control the wife. But if a woman takes

⁵ This statistic includes both married and single women.

(marries) you because of the wealth which she has, anytime she can send you away and you remain with nothing. Or she may find a wealthy man and she leaves you in tears. For my part, I take it as one of the worst things, for a wife to see that she is wealthier than you, so as to rule you."

Respondent 1: "I continue to try to convince this son here. She has not taken your authority in the home. In your home you remain the owner of the home. What appears to bring about your loss of honour is that she gives you money to pay graduated tax. When she gives this child money to pay for school fees, she does not take it as a debt you have to pay. Where will she base herself to take you as a labourer?"

The first respondent is eager to state that the house belongs to the man, and as such, in his position, he cannot be told to leave. He does not see accepting financial help as a challenge to his control, but the money can help contribute to household expenses. It is interesting to note that respondent 1 chooses to argue in terms of honour not being lost, rather than the benefits of sharing responsibility equally. The subsequent quotations reveal that the other respondents are far from convinced that the benefits of the financial assistance outweigh the indignity suffered. The core of their argument is that money is the source of power, and they do not see the possibility of an intimate relationship mitigating this fact.

Respondent 2: "Ssebo (sir), you will remain with her because of your wretchedness. You will tolerate her because of your poverty, not because of your manliness or authority. (Laughter) The wretchedness you are in (allows) her to rule you because of her money, but not because of your authority."

Respondent 3: "Once a wife is better off in the home, she may have a motor car, you'll see her driving off and she goes. She will come back and ask 'Is there food?' (Laughter) You will have become something else." (More laughter)

Respondent 4: "Then you will have become the wife and she the man/husband." (Laughter) (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)

Much of this conversation takes the form of teasing the first respondent. It is easy to see how the insults may constitute considerable pressure to conform to the normal behaviour of the community. A man who allows his wife considerable freedom, and treats her as an equal by allowing her to share the financial responsibility, may well be subject to taunts from his fellow men.

6.3 Women and money: The data

The previous discussion raises a series of questions. Scott, in his work on Brazil, deals with the gap between an ideology of male dominance and a lived-in reality of matrifocal households (Scott 1996). Ako's work on the impact of the seaweed project in Paje village, Zanzibar, leads her to state: 'Most men interviewed did not even want to acknowledge the truth that in many cases the daily source of household maintenance was from the women (who participated in the project)' (Ako 1995:171). 'They claimed there was no rich woman in Paje.' (Ako 1995:171) Such studies show that reiterations of the ideology of male dominance can be insufficient to describe a situation accurately. It is necessary to provide data to substantiate men and women's claims. Where applicable, comparisons will be made with single women to ascertain the impact of male restrictions imposed on married women.

** To what extent do husbands prevent their wives from working?*

By preventing his wife from earning, a husband is ensuring that her only access to cash is through him. Without an independent source of income women's actions are severely constrained. As illustrated above, the justification given by many men is that allowing their wife access to money will simply cause disagreements and eventually separation, or by working their wife may find another man. If the wife is only involved in domestic production, the husband is able to control the products of her labour, her movements and her access to other men much more easily.

Table 6.1: Percentage of women prevented from earning an income by their husbands (sample size)

Housing Index	Rural	Urban
Wealthy	28.6 (7)	13.5 (37)
Middle	12.5 (16)	7.9 (38)
Poor	0 (15)	7.4 (27)
All	10.5 (38)	9.8 (102)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey

Although there is little difference at the aggregate level between rural and urban prevention rates, these figures hide wider variations in rural areas. Due to the greater poverty, none of the rural poor husbands prevents his wife from working. But rural husbands that can afford to keep their wives at home are twice as likely to do so than their urban counterparts (28% compared to 13%). Perhaps due to the influence of a more diverse environment and more opportunities, urban women from wealthy households are able to assert their independence to a greater degree than rural women. ⁶

If the correlation between the level of prevention and the husband's education level is examined, the data show that more 'autocratic/patriarchal' views are more predominant in men with no education. Men with the lower level of income are also more likely to prevent their wives from working, even though the household would benefit considerably from an extra income (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2: Percentage of women prevented from earning by husband's education and income level

Husband's education level	Percentage of women prevented from earning	Husband's income level	Percentage of women prevented from earning
Secondary education	6.7	Wealthy	7.1
Primary education	9.9	Middle	9.3
No education	16.7	Poor	10.8

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

It is not the case that poorly educated necessarily implies poor in terms of income. (For example, 39% of men with no education fall into the high income

⁶ The literature on Asia documents similar differences between wealthy and poorer households (Afshar and Agarwal 1989, Ram 1989, Lessinger 1989). 'Upper-class women, for instance, may on the one hand be more strictly bound by the dictates of certain types of representations and cultural practices; on the other hand, their class position and /or higher education may enable them individually to challenge these dictates and bypass conventions from which women living under poverty conditions may have no easy escape' (Afshar and Agarwal 1989:1)

group, but only 28% of men with primary education are the high income group.) Where the characteristics do coincide, it would appear that gender ideologies are perpetuating poverty, due to men's attempts to limit women's economic activities. The correlation between the husband's income level and prevention could reflect the impact of education, and associated values, or there could be a more direct link. Husbands with low incomes may feel more threatened by a working wife, who is more likely to be able to match her husband's low income; or the authoritarian relationship involved in preventing a spouse from working minimises any returns that can arise from cooperation and mutual assistance, and as such reduces income levels.⁷

This last table appears to contradict the previous one - men with a low income have a high prevention rate, but men in households with a poor socio-economic status have a lower prevention rate. This reveals the different nature of the two variables - the housing index is related to wealth over a long period of time, whereas income is a current variable. It may be that a relatively wealthy husband, who, for some reason, has a low current income, may still prevent a wife from working.

It would appear that the younger a wife, is the more likely she will be prevented from working (Table 6.3). It may be believed that younger women are more likely to form relationships with other men. Older couples are more likely to have developed a greater degree of trust and understanding, and a husband's need to control his wife's activities may have reduced.

Table 6.3: Percentage of women prevented from working by their husbands by age of wife (sample size)

Age of wife (years)	Percentage of women who are prevented from working
Up to 19	22.2 (9)
20-29	12.5 (64)
30-39	7.0 (43)
40-49	0 (15)
50-59	0 (4)
60-70	33.3 (2)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

⁷ Arvanitaki and Stratigaki (1994) argue that the less power a man has outside the home, the more he is likely to restrict his wife's freedom and control household expenditure.

* To what extent do married women own assets?

Married women own/have purchased fewer assets than either men or single women (Table 6.4). There also appears to be a form of hierarchy of assets. Men are more likely to own items such as cattle, radio, tape cassette, bicycle, motorcycle or vehicle, followed by single women and then married women. Items such as hens, sheep, goats and pigs are predominately owned by single women, followed by married women and then men. Chapter 4 provided data showing that single women have a lower income than married women. Yet despite this they have been able to accumulate a greater number of assets.⁸ These data suggest that married women are discouraged from owning assets, whereas single women have a greater discretion over their income. It also substantiates the claim made in the group discussions that there is a hierarchy of assets, in which women are able to own the less important ones.

Table 6.4: Percentage of respondents owning particular assets (sample size)

Asset	Percentage of men (178)	Percentage of married women (178)	Percentage of single women (79)
Hen	30.9	37.6	46.7
Goat	11.8	10.7	21.3
Sheep	0.6	1.2	6.7
Pig	14.6	20.8	24.0
Cattle	14.6	2.3	6.6
Radio	21.3	3.4	16.0
Tape cassette	49.4	9.0	12.2
Bicycle	59.6	2.8	13.5
Motorcycle	1.7	0	0
Vehicle	1.7	0	0

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe

* Given the assumption that men are the main providers and controllers of the household monetary income, how important is women's contribution to the household?

28% of working women earn more than their husbands. (Or 13.7% of all women earn a higher income than their husbands.) This is a surprising result,

⁸ Without a husband, single women may have had to purchase necessary items for the household. This could be the case with the consumer durables, but it is less likely with agricultural assets.

given both men and women's comments on the importance of income as a source of authority. Either a third of men with working wives are happy to earn less than their wife, or, more likely, they are unaware of the amount their wives are earning. 75% of women earn less than 20% of household income, with 50% of women earning no income directly (Table 6.5).⁹

Table 6.5: Distribution of households by percentage of total household cash income earned by wife (sample size)

Percentage of total household income earned by wife	Percentage of households that fall into each percentile (160)
0 %	50.0 %
1-20 %	24.4 %
20-40 %	8.1 %
40-60 %	5.0 %
60-80 %	7.5 %
80-100 %	5.0 %

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The importance of the wife's financial contribution varies with the wealth of the household (as defined by the housing index) (Table 6.6). At 28% women's contribution in the middle group is lower than both the poorer and wealthier groups. Perhaps the combination of neither the desperate need of the poorer households for an extra income, nor the better opportunities in the wealthier households due to access to capital and education, has led to 'middle class' women earning a lower level of income. (This is supported by evidence given on income levels in chapter 7).

Table 6.6: Average share of income earned by wife by socio-economic status (based on housing index) (sample size)

Socio-economic status	Average share of income earned by wife
Wealthy	33.7 (28)
Middle	28.5 (33)
Poor	39.5 (18)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

⁹ Women may be earning indirectly through labouring in their husband's crops.

6.4 Female participation rates

Within the framework of orthodox economics, material factors are seen as the main determinants of female labour supply - wage levels, education, number and age of children, ratio of wife's potential wage to husband's (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). From this theoretical perspective, it is human capital and productivity (which both depend on education) that determine the wage level. Alternative economic theories turn to institutional characteristics that create a segmented labour market - men employed in the highly paid, secure primary sector, women employed in the poorly paid, part-time or temporary secondary sector (Cain 1976, Taubman and Wachter 1986). Institutional factors can be the role played by trade unions, pay bargaining procedures, and/or the perceptions of employers that men are likely to show a greater attachment to the organisation (Hamermesh and Rees 1988). Others turn to women's role within both biological and social reproduction as not only a material constraint, but as a source of gender identities that constrain women's choices (Harris and Young 1981, Mackintosh 1981).

Any explanation of female participation rates has to look at all of these issues - material, institutional as well as ideological. The previous section has shown that Bugandan gender ideologies discourage women from earning an income or accumulating assets. The following section will show that material factors such as the number and age of children, education, and potential wages have an effect. It will also show that economic activities (self-employment rather than employment due to the predominance of the informal sector) are segmented, not due to the employer preferences, or the behaviour of trade unions, but due to different access to capital. ¹⁰

In the Kauga/Ngogwe survey only 49% of married women were earning an income. In comparison, 82% of single women and nearly all men (97%) earn a cash income. The Kauga/Ngogwe participation rate for all women was 61.7% (Sample size: 243). (The problems of collecting accurate female participation rates are discussed in chapter 4, where these results are compared with data from other sources.)

Education

Table 6.7 suggests that there is a correlation between the education and wage/profit rates, indicating that education is a determinant of income.

¹⁰ Given the emphasis in this thesis on the interaction between spouses, it is married women's participation rate that is examined and not that of single women. The lower level of financial support received by single women means that the two

Table 6.7: Married women's average wage/profit rate by education (sample size)

Education	Married women's wage/profit rate (Ush per hour)
Secondary	900 (14)
Primary	690 (42)
None	580 (5)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Higher education levels are associated with a greater proportion of women choosing to work (Table 6.8). A greater range of income-earning opportunities are open to educated women. They are also able to earn a higher hourly rate, raising the incentive to participate.

Table 6.8: Percentage of married women earning an income by education level (sample size)

Married women's education level	Percentage of women working
Secondary	64.7 (29)
Primary	57.6 (85)
None	17.2 (17)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Household wealth, husband's income and women's control over household assets

The relationship between total household wealth and a woman's decision to work is multifaceted, and it can contain a number of opposing elements: i/ a wealthy household may reduce the need for a woman to work; ii/ a household may be wealthy because the wife is working; iii/ an educated, high earning man is likely to marry a similarly educated wife, who has a high earning potential and is more likely to want to work; ¹¹ iv/ as table 6.2 shows, men with low incomes are marginally more likely to prevent their wives from working. Table 6.9 shows the percentage of married working women increasing with household wealth, suggesting that in this situation a wealthy households encourages and facilitates a married woman to work, and

groups must be considered separately.

¹¹ Haakansan (1988) noted that the educated elite, among the Gusii in Kenya, are choosing spouses from a similar social strata, irrespective of their ethnic origin. In contrast among the less well-educated spouses are more likely to be from the same ethnic group, and often from families of different social standing and wealth. Similar changes may be occurring in the peri-urban area of Kauga.

may be the result of her working, rather than deterring her from finding work.

Table 6.9: Percentage of married women who are earning cash by class and rural/urban divide (sample size)

Class (Housing index)	Percentage of women working		
	All	Urban	Rural
Wealthy (41)	53.7	55.9 (34)	42.9 (7)
Middle (50)	50.0	52.9 (34)	43.8 (16)
Poor (41)	43.9	42.3 (26)	46.7 (15)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

However, this picture hides rural and urban differences, and appears to be valid for urban but not for rural areas. It appears that in rural areas, wealth slightly reduces the need for a married woman to earn an income, and poverty increases the need. Perhaps the difference between the two areas is the level of opportunity for earning an income. In rural areas the opportunities are small, and poorly paid and are therefore taken up out of necessity. In urban areas the opportunities are greater and better paid for those with the capital/education to take advantage of them - encouraging wealthier (and better educated) women to participate.

As might be expected, the effect of the level of a husband's income is similar to that of socio-economic class. In the urban area, husbands in the low income group are more likely to have a working wife than those in the middle income group - 54% and 45% respectively - due to poverty (Table 6.10). In the wealthiest income group the factors encouraging wives to work seem to predominate, as 69% are working. A comparison of tables 6.9 and 6.10 seems to show that low current male income, rather than low socio-economic status, appears to lead to higher female participation rates. This would suggest that poor housing (low socio-economic status) does not necessarily imply low current income. ¹²

¹² A relatively recent increase in income may not necessarily be invested in housing, or a previously wealthy man who invested in housing may now be earning a lower income.

Table 6.10: Percentage of married women who are earning cash by husband's income level (sample size)

Husband's income level (pm)	Percentage of women working		
	All	Urban	Rural
75,000 & above	60.4 (48)	68.6 (35)	38.5 (13)
25-75,000	44.2 (52)	45.7 (35)	41.2 (17)
0-25,000	56.0 (49)	53.8 (39)	60.0 (10)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Faphounda (1978) notes that any discussion of the association between husband's income and a woman's decision to work assumes a correlation, if not equality, between his income and contribution to household expenses. Yet this need not be the case. Unfortunately data on contribution levels to recurrent expenditure in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey were only collected in terms of shares or percentages rather than levels. (If the husband's share of recurrent expenditure is 100%, the wife is unlikely to be earning - and therefore it is not possible to compare participation rates with changing contribution levels. The data are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.)

In a discussion of UK female labour supply, Morris (1989) argues that a lack of control over household spending, as well as a low level of household income, may encourage a wife to enter the labour market. This is likely to be the case in Uganda, but it is counteracted by the fear that a woman may not be able to retain control over her income, and that it may simply be confiscated by her husband. (The extent to which this acts as a disincentive may be dependent on a woman's ability to keep her activities secret). If the percentage of total household goods that a woman expects to take on divorce, (over and above those purchased), is taken as proxy for control over household income/assets, table 6.11 shows the percentage of working women rising with control over household assets. This suggests that the greater a woman's control over household income and assets, the more likely she is to work and therefore perhaps to contribute. (The construction of this score is discussed in detail in chapter 3).

Table 6.11: Percentage of married women earning an income according to percentage of total goods expect to take on divorce (sample size)

Household goods married women expect to take on divorce (a)	Percentage of married women who are working
More than purchased	67.4 (43)
Less than purchased	45.7 (35)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Calculated from total replacement value of household goods that women expect to take on divorce.

Number of children under five years

The number of children under five years that a woman is caring for also has an impact on involvement in cash activities - participation rates fall as the number of children rises (Table 6.12).

Table 6.12: Percentage of married women earning an income by number of children under 5 years (sample size)

Number of children under 5 years	Percentage of married women who are working
0	(no data)
1	53.7 (67)
2	45.3 (53)
3 and above	41.6 (12)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Yet the above table hides the different patterns that occur due to the wealth of the household. For example, this pattern does not hold amongst the poorest women, where those with 3 or more children under 5 appear to be more likely to earn an income than those with fewer children - presumably due to desperate need (Table 6.13). In comparison, neither of the two wealthy women with 3 children under 5 earn an income. (The sample sizes are too small to be confident about these results.)

Table 6.13: Percentage of married women earning an income by number of children under 5 and household status (sample size)

Housing Index	Number of children under 5 years		
	One	Two	Three or more
Wealthy	54.5 (22)	58.8 (17)	0 (2)
Middle	51.9 (27)	50.0 (18)	40.0 (5)
Poor	55.6 (18)	27.8 (18)	60.0 (5)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

On the other hand, wealthy women with two children are more likely to go out to work than women from poorer households. Perhaps with two children a wealthy woman may pay for some form of child care, but with three the domestic load is such that the woman wishes to remain at home. Women with two children from poorer household perhaps cannot afford to child care, or the potential income is not sufficiently greater than the cost of child care.

It would appear that if a woman is caring for only one child under 5, the wealth status of the household has a small impact on her decision to work. (Both the poor (due to need) and the wealthy (due to opportunity) are more likely to earn an income.)

Women's age

Married women's involvement in income generating activities increases with age (Table 6.14). There are several possible explanations. Firstly, younger women are more likely to have young children to look after. Secondly, there may be a proportion of women who are not directly prevented from working, but whose husbands would disapprove and discourage their wives. This proportion is presumably higher amongst the younger age groups, given the evidence in table 6.3.

Table 6.14: Percentage of women working by age of woman (sample size)¹³

Age of wife (years)	Percentage of married women who are working
Up to 19	33.3 (9)
20-29	42.9 (63)
30-39	56.8 (37)
40-49	71.4 (14)
50-59	50.0 (4)
60-70	33.3 (3)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The results of a logistic regression examining the determinants of the female participation rate are set out in table 6.15. The results confirm the significance of both women's education level, their age and husbands' income but not socio-economic class, number of children under 5 or expected divorce score.

Female participation rises significantly with education, except at the tertiary level. This result may be due either small sample bias at the tertiary level, or because tertiary educated women are likely to be married to men with high incomes and therefore do not need to go to work. Socio-economic status is positively associated with the participation rate, suggesting that higher socio-economic status is associated with better education, which in turn encourages participation because of the higher rewards. The fact that the socio-economic coefficients are insignificant further suggests that education is the main motivating force.

The coefficient associated with the number of children under 5 years is insignificant, which is expected since the effect of this variable depends on socio-economic status (See table 6.13 above). As it is positive it would appear that need for another income due to more children dominates the greater need for child care.

Husbands' income is negatively associated with female participation - as husbands' income falls, women's involvement rises due to poverty. It is only the contrast between low and middle income that is significant, confirming that there is a lower level of participation in the middle class.

Participation rises with women's age, again confirming the discussion above.

¹³ For a discussion of possible age bias, see chapter 3.

It also rises with women's expected divorce score, except this variable is not significant.

Table 6.15: Logistic regression results, where dependant variable is Female Participation (0 or 1)

Independent Variables (n=137) (Model chi-squared: 26.148, df: 10, sig:0.0035)		Coefficient (Sig)
Woman's education level	Primary education wrt no education	1.67 (0.0010)
	Secondary education wrt no education	2.59 (0.0018)
	Tertiary education wrt no education	-4.90 (0.8255)
Socio-economic class	Middle socio-economic class wrt poor	0.375 (0.4677)
	Wealthy socio-economic class wrt poor	0.351 (0.4486)
Number of children under 5 yrs		0.071 (0.7701)
Husband's income	Middle wrt poor	-0.995 (0.043)
	Wealthy wrt poor	-0.473 (0.383)
Woman's age		0.038 (0.0366)
Woman's expected divorce score over and above items purchased		0.014 (0.3478)
Constant		-2.521 (0.6525)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

6.5 Segmented and unequal opportunities

One important indicator of unequal opportunities is the gap between hourly rates for similar activities. There is an apparent hierarchy, with men having a higher hourly rate than married women, who in turn earn more than single women (Table 6.16). There are a range of possible explanations for the gender-based wage gap - differing levels of education, access to capital, market opportunities, and simple discrimination. As Lee and Hudson point out a lower wage rate 'bolsters justifications, material and ideological, for the particular immutability of women's domestic priorities' (Lee and Hudson 1990).

Table 6.16: Average wage/profit rate by gender and marital status (sample size)

Gender and marital status	Average wage/profit rate (Ush per hour) ¹⁴
Men	820 (152)
Married women	730 (61)
Single women	540 (38)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Perhaps more interesting is the difference between single and married women. Again there is a range of interconnected explanations. Single women do not have the advantage of another earning adult who can help to relieve cash flow problems. Any attempt to maintain household savings in order to make a capital investment during a period of cash shortage is likely to be more difficult. Returns to self-employment activities are likely to be lower without any capital equipment. Married women may benefit from a capital investment made by their husbands - either an item that he has purchased for his own use, but which can also be used by the wife, for example a bicycle, or items that he may purchase for his wife.

Another indicator of a segmented market is the types of activities that men and women are involved in. For the purposes of clarification, activities were classified into groups according to whether they were wage work or self-employment (artisanal, or agricultural). The groups were further divided according to whether the wage work was casual or not, and the level of capital required for the particular type of self-employment. Table 6.17 displays the classification.

¹⁴ Data were collected on the hours spent on each cash-generating activity. There is a difficulty in separating the time spent on home production for sale from that for consumption, particularly when only the surplus is sold. As a result, all data on home production are excluded from the discussion of wage rates.

Table 6.17: Categorization of activities common in Kauga and Ngogwe

Wage work		
Casual wage worker	Permanent wage worker	Skilled wage worker
Fetching water Slashing Digging Laundry Birth attendant	Construction worker Stone quarrier	Tax collector Teaching Driver Nurse

Self-employment				
Artisan/ Little capital	Artisan/ More capital	Agricultural /No capital	Agricultural/ Capital	Trader
Food manufacture (pancakes, cooked maize & groundnuts) Mechanic Charcoal production Brewing Brick production Crafts (Mats & baskets)	Baker Shop Video Shack Carpenter Butcher Tailor Saloon Restaurant	Maize Bananas Cassava Coffee Potatoes Sugar cane	Goats Poultry Figs Cattle Greens Tomatoes Passion fruit	Hawker Road stall

Table 6.18 examines the percentage of men, married and single women involved in particular activities. A greater percentage of women, particularly single women, are involved in casual wage labour (8% of married women and 10% of single women as supposed to 6% of men). There is a similar pattern for trading at makeshift road-side stalls (13% of married women, 17% of single women in comparison to 6% of men). It is predominantly men who have the permanent and skilled waged jobs. 32% of married women are involved in artisanal self-employment with little capital. The number of single women is much lower at 11%, presumably because they don't have access to the little capital required. If the artisanal self-employment requires a higher level of capital, men are more likely to be involved (15% in comparison with 6% for married women and 4% for single women). 50% of single women are involved in agricultural production with no capital - crops where the seeds or tubers can be obtained free from neighbours and do not require fertilizers or pesticides. Both men and married women are less dependent on this form of agriculture. No single woman grows a crop that requires capital investment, but 10% of men and 7% of married women do.

These statistics indicate that married women have better access to capital than single women, presumably through their husbands. Single women have to rely on non-capitalised agriculture, trading at makeshift roadside stalls

and casual wage work. Married women are more likely to be involved in artisanal work with or without capital, and in capitalised agriculture. The implication is that even artisanal work with low capital requirements (cooked food production and sale, brewing, crafts) requires cash resources that some single women (and some married women) do not have. (A study by Unni (1992) lends support to this thesis. Using data from rural India, she finds that a married woman's decision to become self-employed is dependent on her access to capital.) Single women's poor access to capital may in turn be the cause of their low income level discussed in chapter 4.

Table 6.18: Percentage of individuals involved in particular activities (sample size)

Type of activity	Men (169)	Married women (169)	Single women (71)
Casual worker	6.2	8.8	10.3
Permanent wage worker	4.5	0	0
Skilled wage worker	6.2	0.7	0
Artisan/little capital	21.5	32.4	11.5
Artisan/more capital	14.9	6.8	4.6
Agriculture/no capital	29.1	31.1	56.3
Agriculture/capital	9.3	6.8	0
Small-scale trading	6.9	13.5	17.2

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The data on average profit/wage rates for different types of activity, unfortunately suffer due to small sample bias. The rates for agricultural self-employment are unlikely to be accurate given the problem of obtaining good data on the number of hours spent on the produce that is sold, as opposed to that which is for domestic consumption. Despite these weaknesses, as might be expected, capital-intensive activities and skilled wage work generally offer higher rates per hour than uncapitalised activities or casual wage labour (Table 6.19).

Table 6.19: Average profit/wage rate per hour from particular category of activity by gender and marital status

Category	Men (169)	Married women (169)	Single women (71)
Casual wage worker	310	840	460
Skilled wage worker	680	(3,300)	-
Permanent wage worker	360	-	-
Artisan/Little capital	860	790	540
Artisan/More capital	1,320	440	190
Agriculture/No capital	740	2530	1,890
Agriculture/Capital	900	2550	-
Trader	830	520	180
Average total hours per month	199.7	93.6	72.9

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

In rural areas, there is a much greater reliance on activities with no cash inputs. In urban area, greater opportunities and higher returns enable higher levels of capitalization. There is also a greater demand for casual labourers and more opportunities for trading, as might be expected. Tables 6.20 and 6.21 look at the involvement of married women and men according to the area.

Table 6.20: Percentage of married women involved in particular work category by area (sample size)

Work Category	Rural (46)	Urban (123)
Casual wage labour	6.9	13.3
Skilled wage labour	0	1.2
Artisan/little capital	44.8	28.9
Artisan/more capital	0	7.2
Agriculture/no capital	37.9	24.1
Agriculture/capital	0	9.6
Trader	10.3	15.7
AVERAGE WAGE RATE	1.22	1.34

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe

Table 6.21: Percentage of men involved in particular activity by area

Work Category	Rural	Urban
Casual wage labour	7.9	13.5
Permanent wage labour	2.6	11.4
Skilled wage labour	5.2	10.4
Artisan/little capital	63.2	31.3
Artisan/more capital	13.2	30.2
Agriculture/no capital	81.6	36.5
Agriculture/capital	7.9	13.5
Trader	18.4	13.5

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

6.6 Conclusion

To what extent do the data substantiate the claims made by respondents in the first part of this chapter? 10% of men do prevent their wives from working - in the wealthier sections of the sample it was nearly as high as 30%. Preventing a wife from working can be interpreted as clear attempt to restrict a woman's access to money and the ability to accumulate assets. Married women do own fewer assets, fewer than even single women who do earn a lower level of income. It would appear that for a married woman, earning money for the household and children is more acceptable than accumulating assets.

A married woman with assets and therefore independent economic means is an affront to her husband's honour. Even with their husband's approval, once participating in the cash economy, women face further obstacles - a lower wage/profit rate, poorer access to capital and fewer opportunities. They are more likely to be involved in casual labour, non-capitalised agriculture, low capitalised artisanal work and roadside trading than men.

Both social attitudes towards women, their potential wealth and economic activity, and the market segmentation affect women's access to resources, and therefore determine intra-household allocation and household outcomes.

RENEGOTIATING THE CONJUGAL CONTRACT:**HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES, CONTRIBUTION AND CONTROL**

Guyer (1988) outlines the history of budget studies in Africa, showing how the initial preoccupation with documenting the wages of men in the formal sector and their household expenditures ignored the majority without formal jobs and other sources of household income. Many writers have now documented the marginalisation of women and their economic activities. However, the inclusion of women does create a methodological problem. The acceptable approach has become to collect data from both spouses (unfortunately rarely carried out because of the expense), assuming that resources are individually controlled. Men and women often have separate economic activities, both of which have to be accounted for. They also have different priorities and agendas for the purposes of expenditure, yet their expenditure patterns are interrelated (Guyer 1988). The division of labour between home production, domestic work and cash-generating activities are by definition interdependent. Changing circumstances can lead to a redefining of the conjugal contract - of rights and obligations to one another. Budget studies are rarely able to capture the shifting interrelationships.

The original aim of budget studies, conducted by the colonial authorities in the 40s and 50s, was to document the absolute levels of living at the bottom of the wage scale as a basis for commentary and reform, with the purpose of highlighting the wage/price relationship. The subjects of such studies were working-class men with dependent families. Out of this research grew the image of the 'breadwinning' man handing over his wage packet to his dependent wife who was responsible for household management. Such a unit was seen as completely interdependent - individual priorities were submerged in the greater whole. It is the interest in feminism that has led to the dismantling of this image.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which women's increasing involvement in economic activities has led to the renegotiation of men and women's rights and obligations to one another. The particular

area of the conjugal contract under the spotlight is the organisation of household finances - what are the contribution shares, and who has control of the income? The first section will outline the research on allocation of household finance from developed countries. Numerous studies have been done in developing countries using the theory developed in the first world as framework, and they reveal the extent of applicability of such an exercise.

The second section will look at the type of budget systems used by the respondents in the fieldwork area. The third part will examine evidence from focus group discussions about the social norms that surround the decision to contribute to the household in Uganda. The fourth part will discuss the data collected in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey on the percentage shares of spousal contribution and their determinants.

7.1 Household Budget management

In the 1970's a considerable body of UK research established the association between money and power in marriage (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Safilios-Rothschild 1970, Gillespie 1971, Cromwell and Olson 1975). The attention shifted in the 1980s to examine in more detail the financial arrangements used to manage the household income. Pahl (1983) suggests a classification consisting of four different possibilities: whole wage system (husband gives wage to wife who makes the decisions about household needs); allowance (husband gives wife an allowance for household expenses); shared management (common or partial pool); and independent management (separate income and budgets). There are problems in using any classification system. Each of these 'systems' is only a one point on a continuum. Campbell et al (1995) argue that the use of typologies can lead to assumptions of homogeneity of custom and practice across the community. Often a change in the household structure - for example the addition of a new member - can lead to changes in the negotiating process. Careful research is required to deal sensitively with the complexity of the situation.

From the UK research, Pahl highlights three factors that can affect which general type of system is used within a household: the level of household income, source of income (who is the earner), and normative expectations about the allocation of income. The whole wage system is common among poor households, but as household income rises other practices are used. The level of income operates in conjunction with the identity of the earner. If the wife earns and the household income is low, the funds are either managed by the wife or jointly by both husband and wife. If the wife is earning and the household income is high the management of the funds tends to be either joint or independent with each managing her/his own income. If the wife does not work and the income level is high, the husband may organise the

household budget alone. There appear to be two trends operating here - if a wife earns she is likely to have more control over the household budget, and as total income rises the husband is playing a greater role. Several writers have pointed out that if managing money is a question of allocating shortages and making ends meet, it is often a chore that is allotted to the wife. (Given the fact that women are normally concerned with the day-to-day running the household, this is probably the most efficient solution.) Purchasing extra-budgetary items is the responsibility of the husband. A third determinant is the normative views that shape the individual's expectations. In Pahl's research husbands were viewed as rightfully in control of family finances and wives subordinate because of this. This view may be held by a working woman. A wife's inclination towards deference may not necessarily be affected by the experience of work and earning an income.

Campbell et al (1995) examine the relevance of this typology for an urban community in Dar es Salaam. Their results show neither the whole wage nor the common pooling system being used. The allowance system is very common, and independent management occurs when the wife has her own income and is relatively independent. Partial pooling is used if partners are of a similar social status.

Munachonga (1988), working in Zambia, again did not report households using a whole wage system. The allowance is most common, with husbands retaining their own spending money and providing an allowance that, according to the wives was inadequate. Working wives are able to reduce the level of conflict over money by being able to use their own income to buy extra items without having to ask their husband. However, Munachonga raises the issue of whether husbands reduce the allowance once their wives are working, expecting her to make up the shortfall. Both separate budgets and pooling arrangements were used by wealthy households, as in Pahl's results. A fourth arrangement not mentioned by Pahl is much more autocratic - the husband retains his income and gives out small amounts for specific purchases. The wife has to request each payment, presumably explaining what each sum is for. The wife cannot choose how to allocate the money, nor does she have any personal spending money, and as a result her activities are severely limited by her husband.

Much of this discussion assumes that there is a link between the budget systems and the level of control exercised by each spouse. This can probably be deduced under the autocratic system and perhaps the whole wage system, but rarely for the others. Under the allowance, separate and joint budget systems the level of control can vary. It is the actual contribution shares that determine financial power - the size of the allowance and the proportion that the husband retains, the proportion of total income that the

wife earns, the proportion of the pool that the wife spends. The pooling or joint system implies some level of equality simply by the choice of terminology, rather than proof of its existence. Work by Pahl and Vogler (1994), supported by evidence given by Munachonga (1988) suggests that the control over the pool is unlikely to be equal.

The link between women earning an income and their control over the household budget is problematic and complex. Engels was perhaps the first to point to this link in a broader sense by suggesting that as women enter the productive economy their status is likely to rise. Peters (1995) makes the point that it was in response to such claims that much of the literature on women's double burden (domestic and paid work), segmented labour markets and persistent ideologies emerged, suggesting that there are many obstacles that women face. Yet there are numerous examples that provide evidence that women's power/control does increase with earning an income. Ako (1995) notes an increase in women's participation in decision-making as a result of the seaweed project in Zanzibar. Tripp (1989) documents how the economic crisis in Tanzania forced women to find alternative sources of income, which has led to a higher level of independence and autonomy. Caplan (1995) shows the weakness of women who have no independent income.¹ Using data from Thailand, Shultz (1990) shows that women's unearned income, but not men's unearned income, is associated with women's fertility levels. Doss (1996) suggests that this can be interpreted as women's unearned income shifting their bargaining power - that women's contribution to household wealth can effect negotiations in other spheres such as fertility.

However, there are examples of husbands appropriating wives' income. For instance, Blumberg discusses the impact of a project in Guatemala involving women where payment is made on a monthly basis only to the husband (Blumberg 1988). There is evidence that in some cases husbands will reduce the level of the allowance, once a wife is working (Munachonga 1988, Hoodfar 1988).

Vogler and Pahl's 1993 article tackles the question of whether women's increasing participation in the labour market has led to a greater equality in household financial arrangements directly. The study compares the financial arrangements used by different age groups, and examines the change in financial arrangements when there is a change in work status. The results suggested that there was a shift away from the allowance system to some form of pooling of income, both amongst the younger generation and when an individual woman starts work. However, only a small proportion of the pooling systems used were egalitarian. The majority were controlled by one or other spouse. The authors argue that the wife-managed pool and the

¹ (Also see Obbo 1980, Oppong 1981, Fapohunda 1978, Roldan 1988).

allowance system represent systems of inequality because the wife is having to meet her own needs and those of the household out of a limited budget, whereas the husband is controlling the extra-budgetary items. They conclude that for greater equality the stereotypical roles of husband as the 'breadwinner' and wife as 'housekeeper' need to be challenged.

This conclusion is supported by Engle's observations from the perspective of psychology (Engle 1990). She states that psychologists have been concerned about the effects of the role and status changes associated with women becoming major contributors, and possibly the main providers to the household budget. It may be so difficult to assimilate these changes that women may cease to earn an income.² This suggests that a renegotiation of the conjugal contract is necessary to enable a woman to continue earning an income without destabilizing the current identities, rights and obligations. This renegotiation may in itself be an important factor that allows a shift in the power balance.

As suggested above, research that examines the actual contribution to household income appears to establish a closer link with control over income, than does the budget systems literature. Campbell argues for the need to move away from typologies of budget systems to the specific details of actual contribution to household expenditure, but is unable to provide such data within his study (Campbell 1995).

Roldan (1988) categorises the subjects of her study according to their contributions to the household, and makes some general points about similarities in the spousal relationships of those households within the same contribution group. Where the wife is contributing *less than 40%*, and the husband is fulfilling his obligations, the wife appears to be in a weaker position. This group of women are conscious of their low earnings that prevent them from assuming a more dominant economic position. They tend to be unable to insist that the husband disclose information about his earnings, nor to influence the level of his personal spending. The husband has control over her activities - whether she can work outside the home, or visit friends and relatives.

On the other hand, women who contribute *more than 40%* appear able to escape their husbands' strict control. Husbands are less likely to control their activities, and women are more likely to decide about contraception, the number of children the couple will have, and when they will have sex. The husband will not necessarily know her whereabouts when she is working, and she is able to make her views known even if this involves 'answering back'.

²This was the case amongst some of the miners' families during the 1984-5 miner's strike in the north of England.

This level of autonomy may create some conflict, with husbands threatening to withdraw economic support, and may lead to violence.

Wives who contribute *over 40% and whose husbands are no longer fulfilling their financial obligations* assume nearly complete independence. They no longer respect their husbands and will go out without asking permission. They may not wash, iron and cook for him, and may be willing to resort to foul language and violence in conflicts. This group contrasts with relatively high earning women whose husbands are fulfilling their obligations, who remain submissive in order not to challenge the husbands' role/identity. These husbands may attempt to control a wife's income, or at least insist that the wife does not 'show off' her economic independence, forcing him to lose face. It is this kind of information that gives a clear picture of the 'balance of power' in a relationship, rather than a categorisation of the different type of budget systems. The following section will discuss the budget systems used by the respondents - their description of household financial arrangements portrays a vivid picture of the decision-making process. The last section will look at the actual contributions.

7.2 Budget management in Uganda

During the focus group discussions in Kauga/Ngogwe three general types of 'budget systems' were described: 'autocratic management' with or without discussion, 'allowance system' and the 'independent management'. The respondents' attitudes, revealed in the descriptions of each system given below, provide an indication of the distribution of decision-making control within each budgetary system. It is argued that these attitudes suggest that greater equality exists when a woman has (is allowed to have) her own source of income.

In an 'autocratic management' system the husband retains his income, not revealing to his wife the amount he has earned. When something needs to be purchased, the wife informs him, and he gives her the specific amount required or purchases it himself (or simply refuses).

Respondent 1: "Some husbands, we (wives) have not known the arrangements of money in the home. Because when he gets his money, it is here (in his pocket). When you tell him that there is no salt, he gets 200 Ush for salt and gives it to you, or he buys it."

Respondent 2: "You can tell him, and he decides not to buy and he says that he does not have money, and he keeps quiet. You have told him, but he has refused to buy." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

The following respondent gives a colourful description of the frustration she feels.

"The men, in our homes, know that a woman from time immemorial is the one who is supposed to tell him that there is no salt. We are the ones who humble ourselves before them. "Please there is no salt". He responds: "Why do not you go to the neighbour and ask for some. Mrs So and So came here to ask for salt last time." (All respondents laugh). Then you go when you are annoyed to Mrs So and So to ask for salt. How long will the process continue? Just because you are the one who has the responsibility of telling him that your 'kadde' ³ is too old, you have to make sure it is gets very old and in rags and your breasts move out, then he realises that you need 'kaade'." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

It is only when he becomes embarrassed, that the husband feels the need to spend money on his wife's clothes. Inter-household exchanges-in-kind are a means of coping with an irregular household income. But it can create conflict between husbands and wives. When a husband has purchased a can of paraffin, a wife may 'lend out' a substantial proportion of it in order to maintain reciprocal links with other women. The husband may simply see the household's store of paraffin disappear at an unusual rate, without being aware of the small 'loans' that come back in return.

Several respondents argued that it was necessary for the husband and wife to come to some agreement on which items should be bought. Some informants felt that the husband should still retain control of the money, but discussion was necessary to decide what should be bought. The following comments are in response to the question: 'Do husbands and wives share money?'

"You sit down and discuss your budget: 'What would you like?' 'I would like a pair of shoes.' 'How is this child's position?' 'He owes this much in school fees.' 'Do we have sugar, etc.' You make a budget and take the money you have got and go and buy things. So that is how we share money. It (sharing) does not mean that if we get 50,000 Ush, he will say: 'Here, wife, have 25,000 Ush and I'll keep 25,000 Ush.' It does not happen that way, because the wife will not have to buy anything (it is not her responsibility), unless you tell her to go and buy herself a dress. If you give her the money she will take all of it and put it away or use it for something else, yet you have to look for this and that to maintain the home." (Kirangira Men's FGD)

³ Every day dress; literal meaning: old or worn out.

The implication is the husband is responsible for consumption decisions. The second part of the quotation is open to two interpretations. If the wife is given money she will spend it on her own personal needs or save it, either because that is her allotted role, or she is unwilling to contribute her share of the income to the household. The latter explanation implies that there is not much of a consensus, despite the discussion.

The following respondent describes the 'allowance system'. The husband hands over a portion of his income to the wife. The wife is then responsible for the majority of household expenditures. The respondent argues this is favourable to the husband retaining control, where the wife cannot plan consumption effectively. Disputes are less likely to occur if both husband and wife know how much income there is available.

- "My wife, she is the one to clear matters at home as long as we understand each other. She also has the responsibility to handle the money as she sees fit, because, if I handle it she will hear that ah Waiswa (respondent) has already gone to Sekandi's to drink. So I give her a chance so she can handle that cash. I can also say to her: 'My friend, give me 500USh so I can go to Mr Sekandi's '. So when she says: 'The money is spent', I know the money is actually spent. Rather than it being that I go and sell and put the money in my pocket. She tells me: 'We have no match box'. I touch into my pocket and give her 50Ush. If I say later on: 'I do not have any money', she will say: 'But when I asked you for 50 USh you gave me. So you should still be having money.'" (Namubiru Men's FGD)

The phrase 'as long as we understand each other' indicates the agreement and co-operation required for this arrangement to work. The husband needs to be confident that his wife is going to use the money on items he believes to be necessary.

Other respondents argue for an 'independent management' system. The husband and wife both earn their own income over which they have control. The following respondent argues that allowing your wife to have her own spending money will relieve the tension and may reduce the wife's need to use underhand ways of obtaining money.

"What I think about the home, is we both should be equal. Let the wife have her side which she controls as she has a little money, which will prevent her from selling things you have worked on together. And you, the husband, also have some money; both of you have money and a

bag in which you each put your money. If you (the husband) are responsible for everything, it encourages the wife to want to 'steal' your coffee and sell it. But if you discuss things together, there is no reason why the wife won't run things well in the home." (Kirangira Men's FGD)

This respondent has a much clearer sense of the importance of discussion, and of reaching some mutual agreement. If a husband imposes his will, the wife may attempt to achieve her objectives in a devious manner.

There was no evidence to suggest that spouses pooled their income in an egalitarian manner. There appeared to be nearly a unanimous response of 'No' in the focus group discussions to the question whether spouses knew one another's earnings. Division of responsibility for certain items of expenditure appeared to be the main means of sharing responsibility and control.

The difference between these systems is the degree to which women are involved in both household cash management and the wider cash economy. Differing levels of incentives to encourage accountability and co-operation exist in each of the budget management systems. In the 'autocratic management' system, the husband is the sole earner, and the wife's involvement in household decision making is to inform the husband that certain items need to be bought. There is no incentive for the husband to account for his consumption decisions to his wife. Without resorting to theft or other devious means, the wife has to abide by the husband's decisions. The 'allowance' system requires more cooperation. The husband is still the main income earner, but he has decided to make his wife responsible for the majority of expenditure decisions. If a wife cannot provide the husband with some spending money, presumably she would have to explain why. Or if she should run out of money without meeting all the expected household needs, the husband may want to know where it has gone before he provides any more. But she is able to manage the household budget.

In the 'independent management' system both spouses are earning and are able to make their expenditure decisions independently. If the benefits of living together are not to be lost, some degree of negotiation and compromise will have to occur. This is particularly true with public household goods. Each spouse can either spend on public or private consumption.⁴ One spouse can precommit to private expenditure, in an attempt to force the other to spend more on public goods. Without some agreement on how the responsibility should be shared, insufficient funds may be left for

⁴ Public household goods are those that are used jointly by household members, eg pans, jerry cans, tables, chairs. Private goods are those that are only used by an individual, eg clothes, shoes, hairdressing, beer.

public goods.

This evidence supports Pahl's claim that the source of household income (who is the earner) affects the budget system used. It also suggests that the level of contribution may be important for determining the balance of power. If, as was argued in chapter 4, female participation rates are increasing, it is likely that their control over domestic finances is rising.

7.3 The social norms of contributing to household expenditure

Much of the discussion above relies on men's description of how the household finances are organised. There was an assumption by the respondents that men had a duty to contribute financially to the household. But this was not the case for women. The extracts below recount women's attitudes towards contributing their own income to household expenses.

One female informant recalled a time when it was a husband's responsibility to earn the income and the wife could expect him to provide all cash purchases.

"The past times, the times I remember, the law (right) of the woman was to be looked after like a child. You would look to the man for everything that he would give you. From shoes up to everything. But today, it seems that to buy household goods, a man touches himself (buys), and I also touch myself." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

Approximately half of the married women, who do not earn any income, are still dependent on their husbands for all cash purchases. The following exchange reveals how who meets necessary household expenditure has become an issue for debate. The second respondent felt strongly that a woman should share the responsibility with her husband.

Respondent 1: "He must buy things. It is his responsibility to buy things in the home."

Respondent 2: "Also the woman has responsibilities. You can also buy such things for the home. Let me say we buy them for the home and we use them together." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Some women expressed resentment that a husband should force a wife to spend her income on household items. The following respondent claims that men do not want women to 'develop'.

"Most men especially from this way, they have to peep around, even though what you are doing is as small as a needle. He may not want you to develop, so he will tell you that: "Get some of your money, and also buy." " (Zitwe Women FGD)

This respondent clearly believes it is not her responsibility to purchase household items.

Others are critical of women who, once they are earning, do not contribute to the home. Instead she invests her money in property 'outside' - normally at her parental home - and neglects her children and household responsibilities. Saving outside the marital home can provide security on divorce. This respondent feels that it is important for women to do both - save money for their own use and contribute to the home.

"The man might allow the woman, let me say, to do business. But when she feels that she has got money, she does not look after her home. She arranges outside (setting aside property) that is why most men get annoyed. Yet at home the man may not have money. The woman does not look after the home. The children are not given things. Yet he allows her to do all the business. For me I say, if a man has given you money you can arrange outside while you also look after the home."

(Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

Obbo (1980) in her study of Bugandan women shows that a majority of women save separately from their husbands. One of her informants states that it is only educated women who save jointly.⁵ Ako examined the impact of a seaweed project on Zanzibar and states that 'women claim that they build houses as assets and security against divorce, and also for their children' (1995:171). Guyer cites two examples of studies that document women saving for divorce. Akan women may set up cocoa farms to provide economic security (Hill 1975:131, cited in Guyer 1988). Hausa women purchase small livestock that is safe from confiscation by husbands (Hill 1972:317, cited in Guyer 1988). Fapohunda (1988) also cites two examples of studies that suggest that a wife's decision not to pool her resources is a rational decision to avert risks or to invest in indigenous insurance (Lewis 1977, Karanja-Diejomaoh 1978, cited in Fapohunda 1988).

Other women argued that it was not possible for women to neglect their children while accumulating wealth elsewhere.

"You go and work so that you can have something. But when he sees

⁵ Apparently there was a sarcastic edge to her voice implying that the husbands of educated women are spending their joint savings, perhaps on other women.

that you have done something, eeeh, even an older person will be the one who will give him these thoughts. 'Do not allow her to work. She will take it to her father's home.' ..(But) that cannot happen.

For example, when you have your brother's child and your own child, whose fees do you first pay at school? You first pay your child's fees. But some men do not understand that. Yet it helps (for a woman to earn) because it helps the home." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Women's ability and willingness to contribute to the household appears to be determined by a delicate balance of trust on both sides. The husband will allow her to earn income if he is sure she will contribute to the home, and not store items she has bought at her parental home. The wife will contribute if she is sure she will not lose control and will therefore benefit from her income, either through confiscation or on divorce. It would appear that this trust is essential for the household to prosper.

In a discussion with an urban Ugandan (who worked as a researcher at Kampala University and whose wife was a telephonist at a polytechnic) he revealed that his wife refused to contribute to household expenditure. According to him, she reserved her income for her clothes and hair. She was unwilling to contribute something to starting a small business. He expressed frustration at his wife's unwillingness to combine their resources for, as he saw it, the benefit of the whole household. She may have felt that in combining their resources she would lose some control over her income. The couple had two children but were not married. She wished to get married but only if the husband could provide a European-style wedding dress, a Mercedes Benz to travel to the church and a wedding cake. It was a source of great pride that her husband should be able to provide all the necessary regalia, and perhaps a sign of his commitment to her. He saw such an expense as a waste, and refused. Since the conversation the couple have separated.

In this particular example there seems to have been a mismatch of expectations as to the roles each spouse would play. The husband perceived it to be the responsibility of both spouses to contribute financially to all areas of expenditure; the wife preferred to retain the gendered allocation of responsibility. To sustain co-operation, there has to be agreement about who should play which role to prevent misunderstandings, and this is particularly difficult when the social norms are undergoing change.

The extent to which a husband contributes to the household is a matter of great pride to the wife. This is especially true for women of polygamous households. There is an enormous amount of jealousy expressed in terms of what the husband has brought home, whether it be a new dress or meat, and whether one wife is being favoured above another.

The following respondent describes how his wife threw away the vegetables that he had brought home for supper one night, because she felt these were not good enough. She knew he had received his salary and was angry that he had not brought meat.

"Perhaps what I would say is that our women have not got to the standard where we can show them where we put our money, because if she sees money she desires meat. When I was still in the forces (army) I bought a basket of bitter tomatoes, but my wife threw them away because she knew we had got our salary. In other words she refused to eat or cook them because in the barracks she had heard that we had got our salary and the other soldiers were having a good time. She thought I had just refused although I had got money. From that time, I learnt, and I had my way of confusing her so that even if I had got money or not, I would buy things." (Ttakajjunge Men's FGD)

Women's involvement in the cash economy has led to greater incentives for men to reach some degree of consensus with their wives. In order to encourage women to put their income towards household expenditure, husbands have to be prepared, firstly, to allow the decision-making process to be a more joint affair and, secondly, to convince her that should the marriage end in divorce, she will not leave empty-handed. But both men and women have something to lose from reaching an equitable compromise. As was shown in the last chapter, being in control of the household income is seen by men as being the source of their authority. By sharing that control, they lose some of that authority. For women, on the other hand, with increased economic freedom comes increased responsibility for household expenditure. It is 'traditionally' the man's responsibility to make all cash purchases, and it is in women's interest to maintain this gendered allocation of responsibility so that she is free to spend her income on private consumption. As a result both men and women face incentives to keep their income secret. The remainder of this chapter will look firstly at secrecy, and secondly, at the actual level of women's contribution to recurrent expenditure and consumer durables, as given by the data.

7.4 Secrecy

There are substantial incentives, particularly for women, to be secretive about their income and assets, given the sanctions against women earning 'too much' money or owning assets. The following respondent admits that she and her husband hide their income from one another. This situation appears to be very common.

Respondent 1: "It is hard for me to know what is in his pocket (income). Even at times when he gets money, I do not know where he keeps it. He does not show you, he hides it."

Moderator: "Does he know your earnings?"

Respondent 1: "I also have to hide it, because when he knows that I have a certain amount of money in my pocket, he will ask me for the money, so that I have to spend it on household items and finish it."
(Zitwe Women's FGD)

Secrecy about income is frequently reported in the literature. In a study based in Lagos, Nigeria, Fapohunda finds 80% of wives do not know their husband's income (Fapohunda 1988). Engle (1990) reports that in a Guatemalan town, from a sample of 300 women, 41% reported that their husbands did not know how much they earned. In study of Mexico city, Roldan reports that 45% of women do not know what their husband earn (Roldan 1988).

By being secretive about their income, spouses do not have be accountable to one another for their consumption decisions. If a husband or wife reveals his/her income, their spouse may lay claim to that money. If a wife knows her husband has a certain amount of money, but does not know how the money has been used, she may assume that her husband has another woman.

"If you tell the wife how much you have, and if it gets finished without her knowing how it was used, (there will be problems). You may lend your friend 100,000 Ush. She no longer can see the capital of 100,000 and she thinks you have another woman. This brings the wife to leave the home. That is why, for our business here in the village, it is not necessary to let the woman know the money you have. That ended because we no longer have women of good hearts. We no longer understand each other. You will have a wife who looks that way and you look this way." (Ttakajjunge Men's FGD)

It would appear that the above respondent is not prepared to tell his wife he has lent the money to a friend, because there is insufficient trust, and his wife will not believe him. Secrecy removes the need to discuss his decision or be accountable for his actions, or admit that she may have a greater claim than the friend. Trust is required to come to a mutual understanding, and secrecy can sometimes be an easier option.

This respondent believes the degree of understanding between husband and wife has decreased due to their diverging agendas. But presumably,

differing objectives have always existed, but until the wife had access to cash she had only limited means of pursuing her objectives. As many of the respondents argued in the last chapter, money is the source of power. If the wife is dependent on the husband to meet all her cash needs, she is less likely to challenge his decisions. The increased discord this respondent is referring to is the result of greater equality in access to cash, and therefore in the balance of power.

Both evidence from the focus group discussions and data collected during the survey show that, as well as not revealing their income, women are also buying household goods and land secretly.

Respondent 1: "The women usually buy property in secret."

Moderator: "Why?"

Respondent 1: "Because if he knows, he will allow you. They (women) buy them (property) little by little."

Respondent 2: "When I have money I can have them."

Moderator: "Do you buy it openly, and does your husband know?"

Respondent 2: "Aah (no), he would not know."

Moderator: "Why?"

Respondent 2: "Because if he knows he will take them from me." (All respondents laugh). (Zitwe Women's FGD)

During the survey, information was collected on two separate cases where female respondents had bought land without their husband's knowledge. The reason in both cases was that the husband had married a second wife. One woman sold beer brewed from the banana plants on her husband's land, saved sufficient money, and only informed her husband when she moved out. The second woman had a clerical job and was able to save sufficient funds. In both of these cases, the women lived in the wealthier area. Very few women have such possibilities open to them.

The survey results show that all women who currently own land in their own name also inherited land, and that 5% of husbands did not know that their wives owned land. (Women were asked whether they currently owned land, and whether they inherited land. Because of the problems of measurement, data on plot sizes were not collected, and therefore it was not possible to tell

whether any women had increased their land holdings through purchase.) 20% of women owned moveable assets (either consumer durables or agricultural assets), that were kept outside the marital household. These assets on average amounted to a third of the woman's total asset score. And on average husbands did not know about 60% of these assets (in terms of value).

To summarise, secrecy occurs for a variety of reasons: a) because of sanctions against women owning assets; b) to avoid confiscation; c) to avoid being accountable for consumption decisions; d) to avoid contributing to household expenses. But, in turn, the decision to be secretive about income pre-determines the type of possible household budgeting systems. Pooling is obviously out of the question in such a situation, and single/autocratic or independent management are the only options.

7.5 Contribution shares to household expenditure and assets, and accumulation outside the marital home

The Kauga/Ngogwe household survey collected data on earnings, contributions to recurrent expenditure and household consumer durables. The data are examined to see the extent to which men and women contribute to household public goods. It is argued that three factors - the level of education of both husband and wife, household wealth and the rural/urban divide - affect the extent to which women contribute to household expenses. Attitudes vary according to these household characteristics. For example, a more educated, urban husband may have more 'liberal' views on whether his wife should be allowed to earn money and control the income. A wealthy husband may be able to afford to insist that his wife stay at home. A poorer man may be forced to allow his wife to earn money in order to meet household needs. Women's level of education is likely to affect the way they respond. It will affect their ability to retain control over assets and their bargaining ability in any conflict situation.

This section will first examine the behaviour of three variables: a) the share of household income earned by the wife; b) the percentage of consumer durables that women expect to be able to take with them should the marriage end in divorce. This is taken to be an indicator over control of resources; c) the ratio of the value of the wife's assets accumulated outside the home to those inside the home. An understanding of these three variables lays the groundwork for the rest of the analysis. Secondly, the relationship between women's share of income, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and proportion of assets that women have accumulated outside the marital

home is examined in relation to socio-economic status and education.

Income

The income data collected in the survey includes wage employment, self-employment and rental income. The percentage earned by the wife does not represent a contribution to the household per se, as it does not convey how the income is divided between public and private goods, but it does give an indication of the extent to which the wife is able to contribute and therefore is an important basis for the following discussion.

As shown in chapter 6 the level of a woman's income is related to the husband's attitude to women earning wealth, her access to capital, education and location. The following table looks at how the percentage of total household income earned by the wife changes according to these and other socio-economic variables (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Percentage of total household income earned by wife according to socio-economic characteristics

Household characteristics		Percentage earned by 'cash earning' wife
Location	Rural (22)	6.6
	Semi-urban (74)	19.9
Socio-economic status (Housing Index)	Poor (19)	18.8
	Middle (40)	14.3
	Wealthy (37)	18.7
Husband's education	No education (9)	23.4
	Primary education (52)	17.5
	Secondary education (35)	13.8
Wife's education	No education (20)	7.0
	Primary education (61)	16.2
	Secondary education (14)	34.0

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Rural women earn a lower proportion due to fewer opportunities (6% as opposed to 20%). Women from the middle ranking households earn a lower proportion of household income in comparison with both the poorest and wealthiest groups (14% in comparison with 18%). Women from wealthy and from poor households earn a similar proportion of household income - the former due to the need to supplement household income, the latter due to the

ability to earn reasonable returns. As male education rises, presumably along with their earning power, the women's contribution becomes less significant. As might be expected, women's education has a positive effect on the their share of household income.

Assets expected to take on divorce

Two measures of assets expected to be taken on divorce are examined in table 7.2: a) percentage of total household assets⁶; b) percentage of total household assets over and above those purchased⁷. (A negative score indicates a wife expects to take less than she purchased, a positive score indicates she expects to take more than she purchased where the range is -40% to +60%.) Both of these scores only relate to consumer durables and not to wealth-generating assets. It is assumed that women contribute to the household through domestic production to a greater extent than husbands, while husbands earn a greater proportion of the cash. An equal division of the household assets would result in the wife taking some of those purchased with income earned by the husband. This statistic is an indication of how confident women feel about their rights over assets within the household. It is assumed to represent women's disposal rights over household assets, and therefore in some sense is a measure of control over household assets.⁸ The following table examines how the separation scores changes with other socio-economic variables.

⁶ (Value of consumer durables expected to be taken on divorce/value of total household consumer durables)×100

⁷ [(Value of consumer durables expected to take - value of those purchased by wife)/Total household consumer durables]×100

⁸ A fuller discussion of the construction of this statistic, its interpretation and problems is given in chapter 3.

Table 7.2: Estimated disposal rights over household assets by socio-economic variables (sample size)

Household characteristics		Percentage of total households assets expected to be taken on divorce	Percentage of goods above those purchased expected to be taken on divorce by wife
Location	Rural (22)	5.7	0.6
	Semi-urban (74)	21.9	2.8
Socio-economic status (Housing index)	Poor (19)	22.6	2.5
	Middle (40)	17.3	0.9
	Wealthy (37)	16.9	3.8
Husband's education	No education (9)	8.5	- 0.6
	Primary education (52)	16.5	2.6
	Secondary education (35)	23.9	2.9
Wife's education	No education (20)	10.2	-1.8
	Primary education (61)	17.9	2.7
	Secondary education (14)	31.5	6.8
Female participation	Not earning (42)	12.8	1.7
	Earning (54)	22.4	2.8

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Semi-urban women feel able to assert their rights over household assets more effectively than rural women. They have disposal rights over a larger percentage (22% in comparison with 6%), and they are also able to take a slightly larger proportion of assets purchased by the husband (2.8% and 0.6% respectively). Similarly, women who are earning appear to be in a better position than those who are not (22% compared to 13%). Higher education of both men and women is associated with women having better control over resources - women having greater confidence and negotiating abilities, and husbands perhaps being more 'liberal'. Women from the poorest and the wealthiest households appear to be able to assert their rights over items purchased by the husband (2.5% and 3.8%), but those from the middle ranking household seem to be in a weaker position (0.9%). Maybe they are neither forced into earning due to the lack of contribution by their husband, nor do they have higher expectations of wage/profit levels that result from high education that would encourage them to earn. As the household is less dependent on the wife's income, she has a lower level of bargaining power. (This is corroborated by their lower level of income shown in table 7.1 above.) It would appear that the Kauga/Ngogwe data supports the claim made in the first part of this chapter that contributing to household income can

affect women's power within the household.

Independently owned assets outside the marital household

These are assets owned by the wife that are kept outside the marital home. In the tables below, their value is expressed relative to the value of the woman's assets within the home. This ratio is interpreted as the extent to which a woman feels the need to keep her assets away from the household, possibly away from the control of her husband.⁹

Table 7.3: Ratio of value of assets owned by the wife outside the marital home to those inside

Household Characteristics		Ratio of value of assets outside the marital home to those inside
Location	Rural	24.2
	Semi-urban	34.0
Socio-economic status (Housing index)	Poor	16.6
	Middle	20.0
	Wealthy	50.6
Husband's education	No education	23.9
	Primary education	53.3
	Secondary education	3.8
Wife's education	No education	34.1
	Primary education	36.5
	Secondary education	12.5

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Semi-urban residence and higher socio-economic status provide women with greater opportunities to accumulate assets outside the household (34% and 50% respectively) (Table 7.3). Primary education also increases women's ability to fund the purchase of such assets (53%), yet it would appear that secondary education reduces the need to accumulate outside, despite the probable ability to do so (3.8%). Perhaps with education comes greater capacity to discuss and rationalize conflicting views, a more equal balance of bargaining power, and as a result a greater level of cooperation. With greater confidence in their rights to dispose of household assets, women

⁹ A fuller discussion of the construction of this variable is given in Chapter 3.

with secondary education (or women with husbands who have secondary education), feel less in need of the additional security of assets outside the home. In contrast, living in a household with low socio-economic status means that although women have a higher income share (table 7.1), and as a result have better disposal rights over household assets, they have fewer opportunities to accumulate assets outside the home (16%).

Public household consumer durables

Public household consumer durables are those items that are used jointly, for example, tables, chairs, jerry cans, basins, pans, paraffin or charcoal stoves, cupboards, beds, mattresses. A woman's contribution to household durables is to some extent dependent on her income level, but it is also dependent on the level of the husband's contribution.¹⁰ A woman who earns very little may find that because her husband does not provide cash for household needs, she has to spend what little money she has on basins, pans and jerry cans. A woman with a wealthy husband may have a lower consumer durable score than a woman with a poorer husband, despite a higher personal income. The consumer durable score also represents the degree to which a wife is willing to contribute to the household's assets. It will be argued below that this depends on her likely ability to assert her rights over assets should the couple part, which in turn, as argued above, is dependent on education, household wealth and location.

Recurrent expenditure

In order to obtain an estimate of who contributes to recurrent expenditure, female respondents were asked:

**' Whose money normally pays for...food, paraffin, charcoal, school fees etc?'*¹¹

In the National Household Budget Survey (1989-90) data were collected on monthly household expenditure by item. It is presented as the average percentage that each household spends on a particular item. Combining these percentages with the Kauga/Ngogwe data, the percentage of the household recurrent expenditure met by the wife, husband, both spouses, and other

¹⁰ The construction of scores indicating the contribution to these consumer durables is discussed in chapter 3.

¹¹ The full list of items was: food, charcoal, woodfuel, paraffin, water, your clothes, husband's clothes, children's clothes, school fees, school uniform, school books, school lunch, your transport costs, husband's transport costs, clinic bills, hospital bills, rent and electricity.

individuals was calculated. ¹² A score of 50% implies that the wife meets 50% of the total household recurrent expenditure. (Many households do not buy food, but for those that do it is a major expenditure. The sample was split into two groups - those that purchased food and those that did not - and the scores were calculated separately for the two groups.)

On average, women contribute more to recurrent expenditure (26%), but less to consumer durables (15%) than their income share (17%) (Table 7.4). This suggests that contribution to recurrent expenditure may be in response to an immediate or daily need, whereas the decision to purchase a consumer durable is more of a long-term issue and more dependent on likely disposal rights over assets.

Table 7.4: Married women's average percentage share of income, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside the marital home (sample size)

	Average percent income share	Average percent contribution to recurrent expenditure	Average percent contribution to consumer durables	Average ratio of assets outside marital home to inside
All women (96)	16.9	26.6	14.9	31.8

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Table 7.5 examines the impact of socio-economic status on women's contributions to recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and assets outside the household. It would appear that women's percentage share of contribution to both recurrent expenditure and consumer durables falls as the wealth of the household rises, despite the same income share in both the wealthier and poorer groups. In richer households men are able to meet a larger share, and there is less need for woman to contribute. Women in the poorer group contribute double their income share to recurrent expenditure (37%), probably due to a greater level of household poverty.

Women from the wealthier groups have amassed a significant proportion of their assets outside the marital home (50%) - possibly because of their lower share of household expenses and greater earning potential. Women in the poorer households have a lower level of assets (17%), because of their higher contributions to the household expenses.

¹² If, in response to the question above, a respondent answered that the wife normally pays for the food, and in the BHS food purchases, on average, account for 40% of recurrent expenditure - then, in this case, the wife is responsible for 40% of recurrent expenditure.

Table 7.5: Married women's average percentage of total household income earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside the marital home, by socio-economic status of household (sample size)

House index	Percentage of hh income earned by wife	Percentage contributed to recurrent expenditure	Percentage contributed to consumer durables	Ratio of value of assets outside marital home to those inside
Poor (19)	18.8	37.1	19.6	16.6
Middle (40)	14.3	24.7	15.9	20.0
Wealthy (37)	18.7	23.5	11.4	50.6

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Higher levels of female education are associated with higher levels of contribution (20% of recurrent expenditure with no education and 30% with secondary education) (Table 7.6). There are two possible explanations, which may operate concurrently: a) higher education associated with higher incomes enables greater contributions; b) as argued above, better education may encourage greater cooperation and a more equitable balance of bargaining power, so that women are more willing to contribute to household expenses. Better education and higher contributions are also associated with fewer assets outside the home (2% compared to 34% and 35%).

Table 7.6: Married women's average percentage of total household income earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside the marital home, by her education level (sample size)

Women's education level	Percentage of income earned by wife	Percentage of total recurrent expenditure	Percentage contribution of consumer durables	Ratio of value of assets owned by wife outside to inside marital hh
None (20)	7.9	20.1	11.4	34.1
Primary (61)	16.2	27.6	14.3	36.5
Secondary (14)	34.0	30.2	22.9	1.5

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Women's share of consumer durables also rises with men's education, despite their falling share in household income (23% to 15%) (Table 7.7). Again the explanation is probably that wives of educated men may feel able to assert their rights over household assets, and are therefore more willing to contribute and accumulate fewer assets outside.

Women married to husbands with no education appear to make lower contributions to both recurrent expenditure and consumer durables (17% and 5%), despite a high income share, and presumably a greater level of poverty

associated with the lack of education. Perhaps this is due to uncertainty about whether they will be able to retain control over assets either during the marriage or on divorce.

Table 7.7: Married women's average percentage of total household income earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside the marital home, by the husband's education level (sample size)

Husband's education	Percentage of hh income earned by wife	Percentage contribution to recurrent expenditure	Percentage contribution to consumer durables	Ratio of value of assets owned by wife outside to inside marital hh
None (9)	23.4	17.0	5.2	23.9
Primary (52)	17.5	28.3	13.5	53.3
Secondary (35)	14.8	26.7	19.5	3.8

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

7.6 Conclusion

From this discussion 3 or 4 themes emerge. High socio-economic status is associated with women having similar income shares to the poorer group, lower contributions but slightly better disposal rights, and a greater number of assets outside. Women in households with poor socio-economic status make larger contributions and have reasonable disposal rights, but do not have the opportunity to accumulate assets outside. The distribution of responsibility for meeting household expenditure appears to affect control over household assets. Better education of both men and women is associated with larger contribution shares from women, better disposal rights and fewer assets outside. It would appear that education (of both men and women) improves women's economic security so that they do not need to prepare for the possibility of being destitute on divorce or losing control of assets during marriage, and encourages them to contribute more to the household. The need to contribute due to poverty also improves women's position within the marriage, despite low education, but it does not allow women to secure their own economic future should they need to do so.

This chapter has shown that the approach of bargaining models to use the level of income as an indicator of resource control is insufficient. Income shares, contribution shares as well as education are all factors that determine the balance of power, and the decision-making process.

One final issue should, perhaps, be touched on in this chapter. Do the

conclusions, from the evidence presented here, lead to broader conclusions about the impact of commercialisation/capitalism on women's lives?'¹³ It has been suggested here that women's increasing engagement with the market has improved their situation by leading to an increase in the proportion of household income under their control. However, this does not mean that their economic future is secure. It would appear that commercialisation on its own is insufficient - education is also necessary.

This chapter has not dealt with women's *double burden*. Commercialisation can increase women's work loads considerably. Earning an income does not necessarily imply that a woman's domestic chores will be reduced. As suggested in chapter 2, substitutability of labour within the household does not occur easily. Much of the evidence from time use studies indicates that if domestic work is included, women work longer hours than men. (The World's Women 1995: Trends and Statistics quotes figures for three countries. In India women work on average 69 hours per week to men's 57 hours, in Bangladesh women work on average 53 hours a week to men's 46 hours, and in Nepal 77 hours and 56 hours respectively (United Nations 1996).) Weatherall *et al* have examined evidence from England and Wales on whether combining employment with caring for children had any impact on female mortality (Weatherall *et al* 1994). Their results suggested that mortality had not increased, but Higgins and Alderman's results using Ghanaian data show that women's nutritional status is affected by long hours of physical labour (Higgins and Alderman 1992). It could be argued that the burden of being both a major financial contributor to the household, ensuring personal economic security should the marriage end as well as being the main provider of child care, may have detrimental effects on women's health. Yet the evidence presented in chapter 4 indicates that in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample, it is single women, with little financial support, who are affected nutritionally.

¹³ Although national census figures quoted above include an increase in female waged employment, few respondents in the survey are wage labourers, and therefore cannot be said to be involved in a growing capitalist economy. Many, however, are involved in the increasing commercialisation of household production.

WOMEN'S DILEMMA:**CHILD NUTRITION OR ECONOMIC SECURITY**

One of the main motivating themes of this thesis is the importance of intra-household resource allocation for determining welfare outcomes. This chapter will discuss how the issues explored in previous chapters impact on child nutrition.

The competing priorities that married women face affect the extent to which they are able to care for their children. Given paternal custody and that most future benefits may accrue to the father, women may be forced to consider their own economic security before their children's'. Particular circumstances in Buganda may lead married mothers to have varying levels of commitment to children they may see as belonging to the father. There is considerable evidence in the literature that women's income has a greater impact on child welfare than men's. Explanations that rely simply on the universal assumption of maternal altruism are inadequate and are liable to miss the cases where women are forced to make children a second rather than first priority. Much of the literature suggests that parents discriminate between children on the basis of investment decisions for their future security. If spouses face different economic futures, do they not discriminate between children differently?

The chapter is organised in the following way. The first part will look at the evidence from the focus group discussions on how parents view their responsibility towards their children. A variety of issues emerged as important: a) how the rights and responsibilities are shared (or not) between spouses; b) what are the social customs concerning custody of children, and does this match reality, and c) women's need to ensure their own economic security. The second section will examine the nutritional status data collected in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

8.1 Parental rights and responsibilities over children

It has been documented in the anthropological literature that in southern and eastern Africa the payment of bridewealth assures paternal rights over children. In a survey of marriage customs of the Bantu groups in Southern Africa, Kuper recounts the proverb 'Cattle beget children' meaning that it is the payment of cattle as a form of bridewealth that gives a husband legal right to children (Kuper 1980). Haakansson, in his study of the Gusii in Kenya, states: 'According to the cultural definition of fatherhood, his biological children can never be his unless he pays bridewealth.' (Haakansson 1988: 141)

A husband is entitled to divorce a barren wife, because her part of the bargain has not been fulfilled. In response to the question of what issues lead to separation, one respondent gave the following answer.

"Not producing (children). When a woman does not produce, the man will chase you away, and he will say he cannot remain with you. 'You are eating my food for nothing. You are just filling the toilet.'
(Zitwe Women's FGD)

Kisekka (1973) quotes a proverb from Buganda: 'Losing all the way, like paying for a barren and lazy wife.' A wife has two functions - producing children and working. If a man pays for a wife who does neither, he has 'lost out.'

There is another Bugandan saying: 'Women do not have children' implying that women are effectively purchased to give birth to children for men, not themselves.

"If you are taking them, are they yours? We just give birth."
(Kirangira Women's FGD)

A discussion between informants revealed both an acute sense of the injustice of this situation, along with the belief that men have 'paid' for their children and are therefore entitled to custody.

Respondent 1: "[It] is ... oppression. I call it oppression because in most cases children should belong to the wife. From the day you conceive, your husband has the time to sleep when you are not

¹ Digging a pit latrine is a major task.

sleeping. Your husband has the time to eat. He eats well and drinks well, while you are vomiting [due to morning sickness]. Later, when it is time to give birth, you can leave him in the bed asleep, and you go to hospital. If he has helped you and taken you to Berna's place [to deliver], he leaves you there and he comes back to enjoy himself, or if he wants to sleep, he sleeps. You might spend the night awake [!] until the time God helps you and you deliver.² Just imagine [what you have done for the child] from the time you have given birth up to the time he is a fully grown up person. And when he is at the stage when you can send him to fetch water, that is when your husband says that: 'Leave my son behind.' That is when ownership begins."

This respondent has pointed out that women provide the care that young children need, yet when the child is of an age that s/he is useful within the household the father claims his offspring. It is also likely that the other benefits that arise from having children - bridewealth from daughters, and income from sons - accrue to the father rather than the mother.

Respondent 2: "Where ownership comes in, we [women] do not have legs.

The legs are for the men, our counterparts. [Women are not able to support themselves financially.] Once you conceive, you say: 'Give me money so that I go to the hospital'. He takes care of the pregnancy. When it comes to giving birth you say: 'Can I have the hospital dues.' He is also the one who gives it to you. After delivery: 'Can I have the child's clothes.' All this means that the child is not yours. You don't have power over the child. When it comes to naming the child: 'Here is the child.' You cannot [even] give it a name. It is similar to when you buy a dress from a shop. You have bought a dress, but it was not you who made it. If you buy that dress, it is yours. Therefore, the man also in that sense, will have bought the child. That is why the child is not regarded as belonging to the mother. When the child goes to school, it is the husband who pays the school fees. We can take that man to prison when he refuses to pay school fees. In that case, hasn't he bought his child? If the child is yours, why don't you have them on your own?"
(Kirangira Women's FGD)

It is the father's financial contribution, both in the form of bridewealth and payment of the children's expenses, that entitle him to custody of the children. Little importance is given to the physical care and nurturing provided by the mother. This illustrates the differing values that Bugandan society places on different types of work. Work that generates cash is

² The phrase 'until the time God helps you, and you deliver' conveys something of the dangers of child birth in rural areas. The respondent believes that it is only with God's help that you will give birth. Without the benefits of modern medicine, mortality rates in childbirth are high.

perceived to have a greater value than work that does not.³ This evidence suggests that Bugandan women do not consider children as belonging to them.

Custodial rights in reality

The practical implication of strong paternal rights is that on divorce it is the father who has custody of the children. 'It is very unusual that men do not keep their children after a divorce.' (Haakanssan 1988:152). Respondents in Kauga/Ngogwe expressed the view that the general rule is that young children would stay with the mother, but then go to live with the father when old enough.

"The children stay with the man, except if a child is still being breast fed, and when it is weaned it is taken back to the man."
(Llwanyonyi Women's FGD.)

In reality the situation seemed to vary considerably. The following respondent describes how her husband would respond.

"The children are not mine, they belong to my husband. He can tell me: 'Leave my children and go. Do not go with my children.' He can even remove the young child from you: 'Did you come with these children? The children are mine.'" (Zitwe Women's FGD)

During a survey interview, one female respondent was in tears. She recounted the following tale. Her husband had left her a while ago, and she was living in the village with her young son. One of the local council officials had told her that day that her son was due for immunisation, and that he would take him to the clinic. In fact the official took the child to his own house, from where the father collected the child, while the survey interviews were being carried out. The official had deceived the woman in order to assist the husband to assert his legal right over the child. In this case and many others, women are dependent on the support of the local community to assert their rights. Without such support women may have little control over the situation.

However, one or two men did admit to the amount of work involved in looking after a young child.

³ This respondent has also raised the issue of new legislation that requires the father to pay school fees, even if the parents are divorced. It is unlikely that many mothers are able to ensure that the judicial system takes up the case of their children. In conversation with the women's secretary (Mary Adugo) on a nearby sugar estate, it was learnt that she had been able to do so. Her husband was now living with another woman. She was left with the three children. In order to persuade her ex-husband to pay the school fees for her children, she went to the district welfare officer in Mukono. A letter was sent threatening jail, should he not pay. The two girls are now at one of the better schools in the area.

"Most times women do not accept to walk off with the children, even there is one who is just sitting. She wants to leave it there. Because when she gets there (to where ever she is going) she has a plan to get married again. She leaves it and you stay with it; you will have to find a way to cope. You pick it and take it to your sister, or grandparent. When you realise how much work there is, you say: 'Beh! this wife truly should not be demeaned.'" (Zitwe Men's FGD)

Another expresses pride in the fact that he has successfully cared for his children on his own.

"My wife left me. She left me the children and I have brought them up. They have even given me grandchildren. Let that man ask me. There they are, standing there. Haven't I brought them up?" (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

It would appear that in some cases women decide to take their children. The female respondents had very differing views as to whether women should, or are in a position, to take the children. One respondent expressed the view that her own family would not assist her in looking after a child, whom they perceived as belonging to another family. Women clearly face major problems in taking their children with them.

"It is hard to take those children, whether you go to your brother's place or father's place. If the child gets a slight sickness, they tell you to take the child to its home. Therefore you are without peace. The child belongs to the husband, the child is not yours." (Zitwe Women's FGD)

Another woman argued that because single women are often in economically precarious circumstances, the children are better off with their father.

"But how is it possible when you are going from home to home, looking for refuge? If you have three or four children, would you take them when you have no where to go? Why do you not leave them with the man and walk alone." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

Another expressed the concern that if a woman leaves with her children, but finds she cannot manage on her own, her husband may refuse to help later on.

"You may want to take them, but when you do not have any support ! And you may decide to go back for help and he refuses. You therefore say: 'Let me leave them behind and they stay with their father.'"

(Kirangira Women's FGD)

An additional concern was if the child should die while living at the maternal grandparents, the husband may refuse to allow the child to be buried at the paternal homestead.

"They belong to the man. Your husband can tell you: 'You leave my children behind when you go.' This is the power we talked of before. 'If you have gone, and you take my children, and you bring one back, when he is dead, you should not bring him back! Leave it there, as yours.' If you bury that child at your parents' home, it is not good in Buganda."⁴ (Kirangira Women's FGD)

Many expressed misgivings about how their children would fare if they were cared for by a stepmother.

"I would take my children, because their stepmother would be harsh with them." (Llwnanyonyi Women's FGD)

Another recounted the tale of her own childhood, and how she was deprived of an education by her stepmother.

"I would go with my children. Because my mother left us and our father told her to take us and she refused.... Whenever our maternal uncle said he would take us up and pay for our school fees, our stepmother would say she would not tie goats, so we grew up tying goats⁵." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)

The following respondent tells the story of her own child who was beaten so severely that his back was broken. Because of this particular experience this respondent argued very strongly that women should take their children, whatever their financial situation, instead of leaving the children with a stepmother.

"I support the woman who takes her children because of the problems the children experience, as mine did. When my husband chased me away, he stayed with my child. They beat him and broke his back. I have suffered with the child for two years. It is only recently that he has got life (stabilized and healed). So I agree that a woman should go with her children, if you are someone who can support yourself and your children. But there is no-one who cannot support herself if she

⁴ The reason behind this social custom was unclear.

⁵ It is normally the task of children to tether the small livestock.

have hands. You can work for wages with your children. Even the government made it clear for us we can go to the government, and the man gives you help through the government welfare officer. So the other woman also comes into that home, she also produces her children." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)⁶

A male respondent put the other side of the argument.

"A woman is free to go and leave my children here. If she has gone, she is free to look for a man, to stay/sleep with her. [If she has the children], she may leave my children with the neighbours and go to a man. And yet you [the husband] cannot sleep in the village when you have a house, in fact you bring the woman to your children here." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)

"If my wife [leaves and] finds another man, he won't be interested in my children. Even if she pressured him to look after her children, the children won't have peace of mind as if they were with their father. I say: 'If you are leaving, leave my children here, because I know they are my property [actual words used].' If you take them, fine. I leave them to you, because a bean plant germinates from two lobes of a bean seed, and not one.' If they fall into wrong ways and are wild, they will be her responsibility." (Ttakajunge Men's FGD)

Despite his reluctance this respondent agreed that both parents have rights and responsibility for children.

A cruel dilemma: Child's welfare or mother's economic security

It was argued in the last chapter that given the tenuous rights that married women have over household assets, and their likely impoverishment on divorce, women are compelled to attempt to accumulate sufficient assets to provide some economic security.

"You have to work hard so that you get your own land or house. Because when you realise that things are tending to be bad, if you have already prepared your place, you can go and stay there. If you go to your brother's place, it is your child whom they will accuse of stealing the sugar. We have to strive hard to put up our own house, in case your husband proves himself to be bad." (Ttakajunge Women's FGD)

⁶ Kisekka (1973) quotes the following Bugandan proverb: 'One who is not the parent makes the child carry a big stone.'

Chapter 7 discusses the evidence in greater detail, both from the Kauga/Ngogwe discussions and survey and other sources, that some women feel the need to accumulate assets outside the marital household, beyond the reach of a husband. The Kauga/Ngogwe survey showed 20% of married women accumulating assets outside the household. More women may wish to accumulate outside assets, but were unable to do so.

A central theme of Christine Obbo's study of Bugandan women is their constant struggle for economic independence. She cites the following quotations from her informants:

"It is better to be married to a man with many wives, because it gives each woman more control and autonomy since the man cannot control them all. In a monogamous marriage the man claims all your labour. Sometimes he even brings illegitimate children home." (Obbo 1980:39)

(Owning land) makes life easy for a woman.... (I)n the event of separation or divorce (she) can at least be assured of somewhere to go. In the past a woman would go and stay with her brother, but nowadays it is not so easy to stay in people's homes" (Obbo 1980:44)

Obbo gives accounts of women earning money while visiting relatives and investing it in land or a house for future security. She summarises the situation of Bugandan women in the following way:

"While some rural women may have been resigned to their station in life as producers of children and food, dependent on men for land, status in the community and economic distribution of the fruits of their labour, others were doing something about it. These women either migrated or tried to make rural life viable by exploiting every available opportunity to make themselves economically independent of men. Accordingly women were constantly devising strategies for achieving some degree of economic autonomy." (Obbo 1980:39)

It would appear that some Bugandan women face a cruel dilemma between securing their own future and looking after their children's welfare. In the following section statistical evidence is given to suggest that this has an impact on children's nutritional status.

8.2 Nutritional status: The evidence

Physical and socio-economic factors are both important in determining nutrition. Often the socio-economic factors provide explanations for the physical ones - sanitation, quality and availability of water, provision of health services, inoculation and breast feeding practices etc. This chapter is concerned with socio-economic factors, in particular women's situation - marital status, education, income, control over income, contribution to household expenses, working hours - and how these factors determine child welfare.

As an introduction to the Kauga/Ngogwe data, this section will firstly discuss the comparative data from other sources, the effect of location on the results and the linkage between nutritional status and health. The main part of this section will then examine the link between women's socio-economic situation and child nutrition.

Comparative Data

The Ugandan Demographic and Health survey (1988/89) was carried out by the Ministry of Health and various other Ugandan organisations, with technical and financial support provided by the Institute for Resource Development in Columbia, US. Table 8.1 makes a comparison between Kauga/Ngogwe data with the DHS data. There are two important differences in the methodologies used that affect the results. Firstly, the DHS only collected data on sons and daughters of the adult women in the household. No information was collected on stepchildren, nephews/nieces or grandchildren. Secondly, the children were predominately from rural areas, which reflects the distribution of the whole population. (The ratio of rural:urban was 11:1 in the DHS survey). In comparison, the Kauga/Ngogwe survey put more emphasis on the semi-urban area around Mukono. (The ratio of rural:semi-urban was 1:3). The results, therefore, reflect the economically active, peri-urban area.

Both surveys show a relatively high level of stunting. The Kauga/Ngogwe survey produced a higher stunting rate than the DHS data for the Mukono district. DHS data do not reveal where in the district the sampling was done. The district itself stretches from the outskirts of the capital city, Kampala, to 200km deep into the rural centre of the country (see map on page ****). Jinja, the neighbouring district along the lake shore, recorded a much higher rate of stunting (47%), despite having the second largest city.

Table 8.1: Nutritional status of sons and daughters, comparing Kauga/Ngogwe and DHS data, using district and national data (sample size)

Country/District	Data source	Percentage of sons and daughters who are.....		
		stunted	underweight	wasted
Uganda	DHS (4078)	44.4	23.0	1.9
Mukono	DHS (190)	19.9	15.3	0.9
	Kauga/Ngogwe (252)	32.0	16.0	3.6
Jinja	DHS (196)	47.0	21.8	2.3

Source: Jitta et al 1992 for study using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data p142. Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.

Location

As might be expected, the nutritional status is better in the semi-urban areas - due to better health facilities and higher incomes (Table 8.2). There is also considerable variation within the two locations. The wealthier communities with active current and previous local officials (Kirangira, Namubiru and Zitwe) have lower rates of malnourishment. Villages where alcoholism was a visible problem have higher rates (Llwanyonyi and Ggunda).

Table 8.2: Nutritional status of sons and daughters, comparing DHS and Kauga/Ngogwe data, by area (sample size)

Area	Village	Percentage of sons and daughters who are		
		Stunted	Underweight	Wasted
Urban	DHS (335)	25.3	12.6	1.0
Peri-urban Kauga	Kirangira (25)	25.0	12.0	0
	Namubiru (25)	20.0	24.0	8.0
	Ttakkajjunge (59)	30.5	11.9	3.4
	Llwanyonyi (71)	37.7	14.5	2.3
Rural	DHS (3743)	46.0	24.0	2.0
Rural Ngogwe	Zitwe (40)	30.0	15.0	2.5
	Ggunda (31)	41.9	22.6	6.7

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Health

Poor health can lead to low food consumption and malnourishment. Inadequate calorie and vitamin intake can lead to poor health. Information on a child's recent state of health was used to construct a health score. If the child has had a cough in the last week s/he was given a score of 3, past month a score of 2, past two months a score of 1, or if the child had no cough for the past two months a score of 0. Similarly scores are calculated for fever and diarrhoea. The total health score is the sum of the three scores relating to the three types of illness (cough score + fever score + diarrhoea score). Table 8.3 shows a significant association between health and nutrition in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample, suggesting there are feedback linkages between the two.

Table 8.3: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by state of health (sample size)

Health score of children	Percentage of malnourished children
Good health	9.6 (52)
Medium health	30.5 (210)
Poor health	36.9 (65)
Chi-squared prob.	0.0028

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

8.4 Intra-household resource allocation and nutrition

Previous chapters have been concerned with the extent of gender imbalance between spouses - control of income and assets, contributions to household expenses and division of assets on divorce. This chapter has already shown that spouses view their responsibility and rights over children differently, partly because of differential control over household resources. The following discussion examines the impact on child nutrition. Firstly, the link established in the literature between women's income and child welfare is discussed, and it is argued that women's control over income and their contribution to household expenditure are important parts of this relationship.

Secondly, the assumption of maternal altruism in explaining this link is questioned. It is argued that women face a variety of competing priorities - between different child-related needs (nutrition & education, time & income); between different children (sons & daughters, their own children & other resident children); between their own economic security and child welfare. These competing priorities ensure that the link between women's

income and nutrition is more complex than is assumed in the literature - that child nutrition is not necessarily a first priority.

Women's income and nutrition

There are numerous studies that provide evidence that women's income level has a greater impact on child welfare than household income (Engle 1983 - Guatemala, Kumar 1978 - India, Mencher 1987 - India, Roldan 1987 - Mexico, Guyer 1980, 1987, 1988 - Cameroon, Tripp 1981 - Ghana, Thomas 1990 - Brazil. See Blumberg 1988 for a review). Various explanations have been suggested. Blumberg argues that Engel's law is more likely to play a part - the lower the income, the greater the proportion spent on food. Given that women's income is generally lower than men's, perhaps this induces a different expenditure pattern. But the original motivation for Engel's law was that each individual needs certain basic necessities to survive, and those items will be purchased first and other items with the remaining income. Engel's law refers to the proportion that is spent on food, not the actual amount. The thesis requires an explanation of why women are prepared to spend a higher level of income (and not simply a higher proportion) on life's necessities than men. His suggestion is that children are a better investment for women, who have a lower earning potential and are less likely to be able to accumulate assets than men.

Engle (1990) turns to psychological theory for an explanation. She argues that 'differential spending patterns could depend on differences of attachment between the parents and children, on mother's and father's proscribed roles (in child care), or on differences in each parent's ability to perceive the needs of a child.' This has been called the 'good mother, bad father' theory, which Engle claims is an unfortunate misunderstanding. Yet this theory does need to be counterbalanced by acknowledging that women may face other priorities, or that maternal altruism is not a universal constant. For example, Engle discusses evidence from Guatemala that women weave mats in order to earn a very small amount of money each day, which they use immediately to purchase milk, suggesting that women will go to considerable lengths to meet the needs of their children. Yet there may be other factors at work as well. If a woman's income is liable to be confiscated by a husband, making a purchase immediately may pre-empt loss of control of the cash. Women may prefer to engage in an activity that provides a small amount on a daily basis, rather than an infrequent/monthly lump sum due to the pressures of household daily requirements, and because large sums are more likely to attract the attention of a husband.

In discussing the evidence from India, Harriss (1990) outlines a "general thesis that has been borrowed from the female mortality literature - that nutritional neglect, leading to mortality, is greatest not amongst the poor but those with assets where women are banned from participation in productive agricultural work" (Harriss 1990:372). This would suggest that women's control over household resources and freedom and ability to meet their children's needs as they see fit, rather than any particular link between mother and child, is important for nutrition. Evidence from the northern areas of the Indian continent refutes this thesis. Sen and Sengupta's study (1983) reveals that gender differences are greatest in landless labouring households.

The Kauga/Ngogwe evidence suggests that women's income does have a greater impact on child welfare than household income has. But it also suggests that women's ability to use their income on children's needs depends on: a) whether the time spent working is acting as a negative factor on child care; b) the extent to which a husband is meeting other household needs; and c) whether women have control over the income they earn. The following discussion examines the Kauga/Ngogwe evidence on the effect of these factors. Other literature has shown that provision of medical services, sanitation, inoculation and breast-feeding practices are crucial to nutrition (Alderman 1990, Strauss 1988, Jitta et al 1988). Data were not collected on these factors, and therefore they do not form part of the discussion.

Table 8.4 compares the degree of malnourishment in different strata of household wealth (housing index), household income and women's income level. Only women's income level shows a positive association with nutrition. In an overview of the effects of commercialisation of agriculture on nutrition, Kennedy (1995) finds that increases in household income are not associated with any decrease in child morbidity.⁷ Her explanation is that wealthier households tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on non-food items - education, improved housing. Secondly, malnutrition may be endemic - wealthier parents may not perceive that there is a problem if their children look like everyone else's. And thirdly, parents may not be able to improve their children's health significantly with income alone - provision of health services and sanitation in rural areas may also have to be improved.⁸ In a review of the literature, Casterline et al (1989) come to a similar conclusion as regards the weak link between household income and child survival.

⁷ The countries included in the study are the Gambia, Rwanda, Kenya, Malawi, Philippines and Guatemala.

⁸ The aggregate data may hide an age difference. Evidence from the Gambia suggests that higher income has little impact on 0-5 year olds, but a positive impact on 6-10 year olds. In answer to the question - why the younger children are not benefiting? - Kennedy suggests that "because of a generalised anorexia, preschoolers feel satiated before their 'true' calorific needs have been met. It is also not surprising that parents would not assume that children need more food if the children have indicated that they have had enough food." (Kennedy 1995:98)

Table 8.4: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by socio-economic status of household, household income and women's income (sample size)

Socio-economic status	Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters	Household income per month (Ush)	Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters	Women's income per month	Percentage of malnourished S&D
Wealthy	23.9 (67)	100,000 & above	37.2 (43)	10,000 & above	21.4 (42)
Middle	27.6 (87)	20,000 - 100,000	22.2 (72)	100-10,000	24.6 (65)
Poor	25.0 (92)	0-20,000	20.6 (68)	No income	26.9 (93)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The negative association between household income and nutritional status in the Kauga/Ngogwe results needs discussion. If the households with under-nourished children are examined separately within each income class, a possible explanation emerges. In the high household income class, mothers of the poorly nourished children contribute 42% of recurrent expenditure in comparison with 20% for the better nourished group, when the average percentage of household income earned by the wife is 6% and 23% respectively. Despite having a high household income, malnourishment appears to be related to the fact that the wife is having to meet a large proportion of the household expenses out of a very low proportion of the income. (This is confirmed by table 8.5 below.)

Kennedy argues that "female-controlled income has a positive and significant effect on household food intake in many cases. Female-controlled income is more likely than male-controlled income to be spent on food." ⁹ Data discussed in chapter 7 suggest this last statement may be true for respondents in Kauga/Ngogwe. On average women's share of the expenditure on recurrent items, including food, was higher than both their income share and their share of expenditure on consumer durables.

Table 8.5 examines women's contribution in terms of percentage of total household income, recurrent expenditure and consumer durables, controlling for any effects due to the level of income. The level of nutrition is slightly worse if a woman has no income and presumably has little say in how her children's needs are met (26.7%). At the other end of the scale, if a woman has to earn a considerable percentage of total household income, which suggests that she is meeting most of the costs, malnourishment also rises (25%). If her contribution is between 1-30% of total income, malnourishment is marginally lower at 23.8%.

⁹ This conclusion is based on three studies looking at the impact of commercialisation in agriculture on nutrition - in Kenya (where the percentage of income controlled by women is a significant determinant of daily household calorie intake), the Gambia (where a reduced share of cereal production by women lowered calorie consumption significantly), and Rwanda (where female headed households consumed higher levels of the staple food per capita).

Table 8.5: Nutritional status of children by the contribution of wives to household income and recurrent expenditure (sample size)

Percentage of household income	Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status	Percentage contribution of recurrent expenditure	Percentage of sons & daughters with poor nutritional status
0%	26.7 (90)	0 %	33.3 (11)
1-30%	23.8 (42)	1-48%	12.5 (32)
30-100%	25.0 (24)	49-100%	26.5 (49)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

A similar pattern exists with differing levels of recurrent expenditure. Not contributing limits a woman's impact on nutrition (33.3%), as does having to meet most of the expenses (26.5%). Better results emerge if the woman is meeting between 1-48% of the expenses. By comparing the income and recurrent expenditure figures, it is possible to see that contribution to recurrent expenditure has a greater impact than income share. It would appear that it is important for nutrition that both: a) the husband contributes financially, and; b) the wife's income is high enough to contribute a significant proportion to the household income, and that she is therefore able to meet a significant proportion of household expenditure. Children may be at risk if either of these is not the case.

Education versus nutrition

Malnourishment is also affected by the particular items of recurrent expenditure which the woman is paying for. The following two tables look at the effect of who pays the school fees and food (Tables 8.6 and 8.7).

Table 8.6: Percentage of malnourished sons & daughters by person responsible for paying school fees (sample size)

Who pays the school fees	Percentage of malnourished sons & daughters
Wife	29.2 (24)
Husband	24.3 (107)
Both	16.7 (6)
Other	14.3 (7)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

If a woman has to meet school fees, this appears to reduce her income available for the children's other needs and therefore lowers their nutritional status (29.2%).¹⁰ If both husband and wife are contributing to

¹⁰ In a study on intra-household resource allocation in Zambia, Wang (1997) finds a similar result. Although she does

school fees the rate of malnourishment is low (16.7%). Perhaps this latter category consists of households where the degree of cooperation is relatively high, with less secrecy about income and better use of resources.

However, if the woman is purchasing the food, this appears to have a positive effect on nutrition (15.8%) (Table 8.7). If the household does not buy food, nutritional levels are low. Most households experience a shortage of food from the garden at some point in the season, and being unable to purchase food to make up the shortfall may result in lower nutrition levels.

Table 8.7: Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters by person responsible for buying food (sample size)

Who normally buys food	Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters
Wife	15.8 (19)
Husband	25.0 (68)
Don't buy	27.9 (104)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Women's income versus infrastructure

Women's control over income and whether it is diverted towards other expenses appears to be important for nutrition. But are these factors more or less important than the availability of health infrastructure, such as accessible clinics stocked with the necessary drugs? The following table shows the effect of location on nutrition. Living in an urban area with better health services reduces malnourishment to 24%, but from table 8.5 contributing between 1-48% of recurrent expenditure reduces malnourishment down to 12.5% - women's contribution to recurrent expenditure appears to be more important than infrastructure.

Table 8.8: Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters by place of residence (sample size)

Location	Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters
Urban	24.4 (176)
Rural	28.6 (70)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

not isolate the effect of one spouse paying for school fees as opposed to the other, she does find that the price of a school uniform has a negative effect on child health, indicating that children's nutritional and educational needs are competing for scarce resources.

Working long hours to earn an income versus child care

A closer examination of mothers who are working reveals that there is a trade-off between the negative effect on children of working long hours, and the positive effect of the income gained (Table 8.9). This trade-off exists only amongst married women. Children with mothers who either earn a low income and work few hours, or those that work long hours and earn a higher income, have a lower nutritional status than those whose mothers fall in the middle category. The results are statistically significant, suggesting that long working hours are marginally better than a low income (assuming that those who work longer hours earn more money).

Amongst single women the extra income is put to good use without the extra hours spent working having a detrimental effect. This difference between married and single women implies there is some other factor at work. Perhaps when married, time becomes more of a crucial issue, as a woman has to provide for her husband's needs as well as her children's.¹¹

Table 8.9: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status by marital status of mother and hours spent earning cash (sample size)

Number of hours per month	Married	Single
0-20	25.0 (112)	45.5 (11)
20-70	21.4 (14)	33.3 (6)
70+	24.1 (29)	6.7 (15)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Discrimination between children: Gender bias

The literature on intra-household allocation has examined the ways in which parents allocate resources between children. Behrman (1990) outlines possible allocation rules, asking whether parents reinforce or compensate inequalities. Parents can either provide maximum resources for the child that is likely to yield the most benefit to his/her parents in the future. Or parents can maximise each child's return, reducing the inequality between children. Alternatively, a middle road is possible, where parents are neutral to the differences between children and allocate resources equally. Behrman asks whether these rules lead parents to favour one type of child above others due to gender or age. The evidence that he quotes suggests that parents in the United States are neutral. Similarly in India,

¹¹ Seventy hours per month in itself is not a large proportion of women's time, yet it is an added burden on top of the time spent on food production for domestic consumption and on domestic work.

but only in the surplus season. In the lean season parents use an investment strategy and favour boys.

Other research in India has produced different results. In Gujarat, Pushpamma found no gender differences in adolescents in Andhra Pradesh (Pushpamma, Geervanni and Lakshmi Devi 1982). In Tamil Nadu, Pereira found that girls were better nourished than boys (Pereira et al 1979). Sen found that in West Bengal girls bore the brunt of growth retardation in children under 6 years (Sen 1981). Bangladeshi evidence in a study by Khan (1984) shows boys and young men (5-19yrs) were not affected by household energy supplies, whereas girls were. Perhaps the time-consuming work of collecting firewood or providing other forms of fuel is detrimental to the nutrition of girls.

This evidence suggests that it is difficult to make general statements about gender bias - it is more complex than Behrman's typology would allow. Nutrition is not simply the result of pre-meditated choices by parents. Gender ideologies can determine the type of work that boys and girls do, their presence in the household at certain times of the day as well as the amount and type of food that they eat.

The evidence for sub-saharan Africa is also controversial. Svedberg argues that in the majority of countries there is no bias, but where there is a bias it is in favour of girls (Svedberg 1996:937 Table 3). The evidence he uses to support his claim is nutritional status data showing that boys suffer from a greater level of stunting than girls. Svedberg's explanation for this pro-girl bias is rather general, suggesting that female labour participation is high and parents are likely to benefit from their daughters' income. He claims that the prevalent polygamy leads to a demand for wives, so that marriage occurs early and parents receive bridewealth without having to support unmarried daughters for too long.

Klasen disputes the existence of a pro-girl bias, arguing that broader indicators such as mortality and population statistics have to be examined in addition to nutrition to see how resource allocation impacts on survival. He argues that there is a rising anti-girl bias, due to the deteriorating economic position of women (Klasen 1996:928). Again this is a difficult claim to make across a whole continent. But Haakanssan's work discussed in chapter 5 would offer some support to Klasen's argument due to the changes in marriage customs. Haakanssan shows that polygamy has declined, and as men's social status is becoming more dependent on income and wealth rather than marriage, there is a greater time lag between cohabiting and payment of bridewealth.

Thomas (1992) pointed out that the anthropometric standards from the reference population used by Svedberg differ for male and female children, and therefore 'gender differences can only be identified relative to the standards.' (Thomas 1992:2 cited in Haddad and Reardon 1993:261). The outlay equivalent approach used by Haddad and Reardon (1993 - Burkino Faso), Deaton (1989 - Burkino Faso) and Haddad and Hoddinot (1990 - Cote d'Ivoire) avoids this problem by assessing econometrically whether 'parents alter their expenditures on adult goods differently for boys and girls.' (Haddad and Reardon 1993:261). The results from all three studies show no compelling evidence of either a pro-girl or pro-boy bias.

Haddad and Reardon (1993) go on to stratify their sample according to agro-ecological zones and household income to test Svedberg's thesis that gender discrimination may be due to the respective value of male and female labour. The assumption is that in different agro-ecological zones men and women's labour contributions vary, and gender differences in child nutrition also differ. But their results do not support this thesis, and therefore suggest that Svedberg's explanation is also problematic.

In the Kauga/Ngogwe data from Uganda there is a pro-girl bias in nutrition status data that is statistically significant (Table 8.10).¹²

Table 8.10: Percentage of boys and girls who are malnourished (sample size)¹³

Gender	All children (a)	Sons and Daughters only
Girls	22.9 (179)	20.5 (132)
Boys	34.2 (149)	31.6 (114)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Includes nephews and neices, stepchildren and grandchildren as well as sons and daughters.

Svedberg's explanation may be relevant here, but there is evidence that the bias is the result of women's particular preference for girls. Caplan cites the following quotation.

"It is better to have girls. A girl will pound for you, she'll fetch water for you, she'll go for firewood for you, and when you die she'll wash your body. But a boy doesn't pound, he doesn't fetch water, he doesn't do anything - maybe he'll dig your grave !" (Caplan 1989:205

¹² This apparent discrimination does not occur in the DHS data.

¹³ The table in Appendix C shows how the gender difference varies according to the particular measure used. Boys appear to suffer more from stunting/long-term malnourishment (height-for-age) than girls. With a lower rate of stunting, wasting (recent malnourishment / weight-for-height) is more visible amongst girls.

cited in Bryceson 1995)

In a study of the World Bank Living standard survey data from the US, Brazil and Ghana, Thomas finds evidence suggesting a similar preference (Thomas 1991). His results show that a mother's education has a bigger impact on her daughter's height than on her son's, and similarly the father's education has a bigger impact on his son's height than on his daughter's.¹⁴ Thomas' explanation is that the parent of the same gender is more important for a child's development - a sexual division of labour in child-rearing. He offers evidence from research by psychologists to support this claim (Thomas 1991:24). He also examines the birth interval after the first child. In the US, amongst Caucasian women the birth interval is independent of the gender of the first child. Amongst Afro-American women, the birth interval is shorter if the first child is a son, suggesting that this group of women prefer daughters.

In Buganda there is reason to believe their parents show a similar preference. The incentive to discriminate may arise due to the different inheritance lines for sons and daughters. Boys inherit from their father, and daughters from their maternal aunt. A daughter cannot be named as her father's heir. In addition, sons may require assistance with paying bridewealth, while girls will bring in the equivalent payment. For these two reasons, daughters and mothers have mutual incentives to maintain close ties. Sons on the other hand often wish to remain in close contact with their father to ensure their inheritance. This may lead married mothers to conclude daughters are a better investment than sons - that she is more likely to see the benefits. Research on street children in Kampala by Kenneth Khana showed boys are more likely to be abandoned than girls. The female respondents stated that there were more problems involved in 'bringing up' boys than girls (personal communication 1996).

This theory is supported by the fact that in female-headed households in semi-urban areas the pro-girl bias disappears (Table 8.11), and boys are likely to be slightly better nourished than girls. (This does not appear to be the case in the rural areas, though the small number of single women in the rural area makes any conclusion tentative.) If a woman has been able to set up house on her own, which is more feasible in semi-urban areas, and been able to take her children with her, the incentive to discriminate between boys and girls may disappear. Perhaps due to the non-payment of bridewealth, the mother has custody over the children and is confident of her son's future loyalty. The implication is that the different kinship ties, and resulting economic connections of married and single women lead to

¹⁴ Wang Mei (1997) finds a similar result with parents' income - an increase in the mother's income having greater impact on the nutritional status of her daughter than that of her son, and the reverse for an increase in the father's income.

different preferences in children. Perhaps in addition to this, once a woman is single, the workloads of her children change. It is possible that single women rely heavily on their daughters to do some of the chores that they not longer have the time to do because of the need to earn an income - for example, fetching firewood and water, and child care. This extra labour may lead to poorer female nutritional status.

Table 8.11: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status by area, marital status of mother and gender of child (sample size)

	Semi-urban		Rural	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Married	22.3 (94)	31.3 (60)	26.1 (46)	42.4 (33)
Single	27.6 (29)	24.0 (25)	0.0 (8)	60.0 (10)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Discrimination between children: Offspring/Foster child bias

Evidence was found in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey that parents discriminate between children in their care according to whether they are biological offspring or not. Data were collected on all children living in the household, irrespective of their relationship to the adult woman of the household. Sons and daughters of the adult woman do better than any other group - 25% were malnourished (Table 8.12). Of children living with their father but not their mother (stepchildren), 30% are malnourished. The common concern expressed above that step-parents are particularly harsh would support this result.

With neither natural parent present in the household, nephews/nieces have a higher rate of malnourishment (35%).¹⁵ This may be the result of neglect on the part of their 'foster' parents, or that this group of children, whose parents for some reason are unable to look after them, may tend to come from poorer backgrounds. There is a Bugandan custom where nephews must call their paternal uncles 'father', and nieces their maternal aunts 'mother'. Similarly for a woman to distinguish between her children and her sister's children would cause offence. Given the extent of fostering, the purpose of this social custom may be to limit the level of discrimination that the data show exists.

Ester Goody's work examines the impact of fostering on success in later adult life (measured by social position and marital stability), and finds no

¹⁵ No data were collected on whether the nephews/nieces were related to the husband or wife, but it probably safe to assume that in most cases they would be relatives of the husband.

evidence of detrimental effect (Goody 1982). Yet the explanation given by respondents in her study of fostering is that foster parents can act as firmer and better teachers than biological parents. She does not mention poverty - sending a child to a better placed family, or the need to take in kin who have been orphaned due to aids, where the fostering family has little to spare.¹⁶ Nor does she examine the nutritional impact.

Grandchildren appear to suffer most (38%). Elderly grandparents may not have the energy for the frequent and time consuming process of feeding a young infant adequately. This problem would be compounded if the household is getting no financial support from the parents, and the grandparents are having to earn cash to support their grandchildren. (It is often the middle generation who are afflicted with aids, leaving only grandparents to care for young children.)

Table 8.12: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by relationship with adult female (sample size)

Relation of child to adult woman	Percentage of malnourished children
Son/Daughter	25.4 (248)
Stepchild (child of current husband)	30.0 (10)
Niece/nephew	35.3 (17)
Grandchild	38.0 (50)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

There is evidence to suggest that spouses discriminate differentially against foster or step-children (Table 8.13). If the husband is resident part-time, this seems to have a positive effect on the sons and daughters. This may well be because households with part-time husbands tend to be wealthier than those where the husband is a full-time resident. (Some activities that require travel (fishing, trading) are comparatively profitable (see chapter 6)). But this effect does not seem to carry through to 'other' children - they appear to be more malnourished. These 'other' children may be the relatives of the husband, and without the husband present to 'guard their interests', they may be discriminated against more than they would be otherwise.

¹⁶ Informal conversation suggests that the latter situation is common in Uganda, where at the funeral of the deceased parents, the children are divided up amongst the relatives.

Table 8.13: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by residency of husband (sample size)

Relationship of child to adult female	Full-time resident husband	Part-time resident husband
Son/Daughter	27.5 (193)	18.2 (55)
Other (a)	34.3 (67)	41.2 (17)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.

Note: (a) Refers to nephews, nieces, stepchildren and grandchildren.

A similar pattern appears when the marital status of the husband is examined. Sons and daughters of polygamous husbands do better than those with monogamous husbands - polygamous household tend to be wealthier in this sample. But this positive effect does not seem to have affected 'other' children (Table 8.14). These results suggest that parents/adults do not share the same preferences for allocating resources to children.

Table 8.14: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by marital status of husband (sample size)

Relationship of child to adult female	Monogamous husband	Polygamous husband
Son/Daughter	27.4 (168)	21.3 (80)
Other (a)	35.6 (45)	35.9 (39)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Refers to nephews, nieces, stepchildren and grandchildren.

Rather peculiarly, much of the literature on intra-household allocation of resources has assumed that parents share preferences about how to allocate resources between children. Explanations of discrimination have been based on the premise that parents make *joint* investment decisions on their children. This may be the case, but it should not be assumed, given the unequal control and access to resources that occurs between spouses. Explanations of child bias are more convincing if the preferences of the parents are examined separately.

Women's economic security versus child welfare

In the previous chapter the extent to which the wife chooses to contribute her income to the household was discussed. Women contribute different levels to the household, not simply because of the different levels of their income, but because they face different situations. It was shown that the level of a wife's contribution is affected by both spouses' education, income level and location. These factors are indicators of the

household/gender relations and therefore influence the 'incentives' to invest in the household. Some of the literature assumes that men face pressures to direct resources away from the household (such as expenditure on alcohol, or other wives), but there is little acknowledgement that women may face a similar range of pressures.

One area of the literature that adds support to the thesis that women are more able/willing to meet the needs of children, is the evidence that some children with single mothers fare better than those with married (or cohabiting) mothers. It is as if women are able to use resources more efficiently without the interference of a spouse. This is despite greater levels of poverty often recorded for female-headed households (Handa 1996, Kennedy 1994, Barros et al 1997, Johnson 1993 et al). Buvinic and Gupta (1997) review the literature and conclude that approximately half of the studies reported positive and half reported negative effects of female-headship.

The Kauga/Ngogwe data show slight positive effects of female headship. Although the result is not significant, children with a single mother appear to do better than children with a married mother, even if the husband is the child's father (Table 8.15). This is despite the evidence that on average a female-headed household is likely to be poorer than a married household (see chapter 4).

Table 8.15: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by marital status of mother female (sample size)

Marital status of mother	Percentage of malnourished S&D
No resident man	23.7 (38)
Resident father	25.9 (201)
Other resident man	28.6 (7)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

If the data are split according to area, this appears to be a semi-urban phenomena - it is only in semi-urban areas that single mothers have better nourished children (Table 8.16).

Table 8.16: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status by area and marital status of mother (sample size)

Area	Semi-urban	Rural
Married mother	25.0 (148)	28.3 (60)
Single mother	21.4 (28)	30.0 (10)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

The DHS data also show a similar result, again insignificant (Table 8.17).¹⁷ This is within a predominately rural sample. Given evidence that this is a peri-urban phenomenon, the DHS result may have been significant if it were possible to separate the rural and urban respondents.

Table 8.17: Percentage of sons and daughters that have poor nutritional status according to marital status of mother (sample size)

Marital status of adult female	Stunted	Underweight	Wasted
Married (3438)	44.7	23.4	2.0
Single (507)	42.4	20.4	1.9

Source: Jitta et al, DHS survey.

There are two possible explanations. The implication is that single women themselves fare better in urban areas, perhaps because they face less prejudice, and because there are more opportunities for generating cash open to them in urban areas (see chapter 6). They are therefore better able to look after their children. Single mothers may be able to use their scare resources more effectively towards the nutrition of their children when she can develop a survival strategy that does not have to meet, or comply with, needs/demands made by her spouse.¹⁸

There may also be a second explanation. As well as resources being diverted towards the husband's needs, perhaps married women embedded in different social relations (or incentive structures) that lead them to consider their children as sunk costs rather than investment. Given financial inequality within the household, discussed in chapters 5 & 6, future benefits that come from investing in children may well not accrue to the mother. The evidence from the focus group discussions shows many fathers claim custodial rights over their children, and that some women are concerned about their future economic security, and therefore accumulate assets outside the home. This may mean that women's need to ensure their own long-term economic security conflicts with the immediate welfare needs of their children¹⁹.

¹⁷ The question used to determine marital status in the DHS survey was: "Who spent the night here last night?" As a result women with either part-time or polygamous husbands may well have been classified as single women (See chapter 3).

¹⁸ Buvinic and Gupta (1997) make a similar argument.

¹⁹ It would be interesting to examine the counterfactual argument: do single women who have brought up their children on their own obtain greater support from their children than married women? Unfortunately it was not possible with the Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.

Parental education

Table 8.18 examines the relationship between parental education and nutrition. The effect of paternal education and that of single mothers appears to be what would be expected - nutritional status improves the better educated the parent. This relationship does not hold when examining the effect of married maternal education - the relationship is reversed. This is a peculiar result, and may indicate that there are sampling errors.

Yet why should sampling errors exist for married women, and not for fathers or single women? It would also appear that this unusual result is only true for urban women (Table 8.19). Amongst married rural women the relationship between parental education and nutrition is positive.

Table 8.18: Percentage of poorly nourished children according to parental education level (sample size)

Education level	Single women	Husband	Married women	
	All children (a)	All children	All children	Sons and daughters only
None	38.9 (18)	41.2 (17)	20.0 (45)	23.1 (39)
Primary	25.0 (44)	31.3 (128)	29.9 (134)	25.2 (107)
Secondary	11.1 (9)	16.1 (62)	36.7 (30)	34.6 (26)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Note: (a) Includes nephews, nieces, stepchildren, and grandchildren as well as sons and daughters.

Table 8.19: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by area (sample size)

Married women's education level	Urban	Rural
None	13.5 (37)	50.0 (8)
Primary	27.6 (87)	34.0 (47)
Secondary	42.1 (19)	30.0 (10)

Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

Using data presented by Hobcraft (1991) the United Nations publication 'Population and Women' (1995) discusses the impact of maternal education on child survival. The results find that the majority of 25 countries show a statistically significant improvement in child survival with maternal education. In 6 countries the relationship is not significant, and five of those 6 are in sub-saharan Africa (Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Uganda and Zimbabwe).²⁰ The study acknowledges that 'this result is not due to the lower penetration of education in African countries, because several of the

²⁰ Earlier studies have also suggested a weak link between maternal education and child survival - Hobcraft, McDonald and Rutstein 1984, and United Nations 1985).

countries where the link is weak have quite advanced educational systems'. (United Nations 1996:261). The study also rejects Caldwell's suggestion that the weak connection may be due to a greater level of autonomy of many women in sub-saharan Africa, so that rising education does not make that much difference, in comparison with Asian and Muslim societies. This argument does not take account of Latin America and the Caribbean, where women also have considerable autonomy and the link between maternal education and nutrition is nevertheless more significant. The study examines the possibility that the cause may be weaker health infrastructures, inhibiting women from making use of their education. Yet Botswana and Zimbabwe have relatively low levels of child mortality by African standards, due to relatively good infrastructure. The study concludes that, despite its various suggestions, it has been unable to find a convincing explanation.

Closer analysis of the Kauga/Ngogwe data suggests an explanation that may be relevant. Firstly, table 8.18 shows that the 'negative' factor appears to be greater amongst non-biological children, than amongst biological children, even if they are living in the same household. This suggests that allocation decisions within the household are important, rather than simply a factor exogenous to the household. Secondly, if the data relating to women with secondary education and malnourished children is analyzed as a group that is distinct from the others in the sample, it would appear that this group of women are more likely to have polygamous or part-time resident husband; more likely to have to pay for the school fees (18% as supposed to 14%); none of them purchases food; and the average wife's share of recurrent expenditure is higher than the sample as a whole (41% in comparison with 27%). 93% of school age-children are still at school as opposed to 68% in the sample as a whole. (All the girls are still at school, whereas only 66% are still at school in the main sample. The equivalent figures for boys are 85% and 71%). It would appear that educated women's desperate attempt to ensure that their children are able to obtain the same level of schooling as they themselves did (particularly girls as well as boys), with little support from husbands, is resulting in resources being directed towards school fees rather than to the nutrition of the younger children. Parents have to balance the different needs of children - limited resources may not meet all the nutritional needs of younger children as well as the educational needs of the older siblings.

(The Ugandan Government has recently introduced user charges for education. It would be interesting to know whether there are similar changes in the other countries in the United Nations study discussed above. Perhaps the removal of state provision has caused families to stretch meagre resources further to pay for school fees to the extent that the nutritional status of

younger children is being affected.)

Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that the level of household income is less important than women's income. Contribution shares to recurrent expenditure also appear important - children seem to be more at risk if the mother is making no contribution, or is responsible for most of the expenses, than if the spouses are sharing the financial burden.

Education appears to have a series of cross-cutting effects - it improves women's earning potential, but may increase their desire to educate their children. The decision to allocate resources to education or nutrition may differ according to socio-economic status, parental education, and according to the resources of the spouse responsible for the necessary expenses. The result may be relatively wealthy households, with low-earning but well-educated women, that contain poorly nourished children, with older siblings who are still in school.

The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that maternal altruism probably is a cultural universal, but it has to be set in the context of women's lives. The short-term needs of children may conflict with their mothers' long-term needs for economic security (without which they will be unable to assist their children) and with educational needs of older siblings.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the thesis, the current state of theory on the bargaining models was reviewed, and several points were raised: the inadequate analysis of power, the endogeneity of preferences, the unsuitability of a separate spheres formulation. It was argued that any analysis of the bargaining process must include a full analysis of the workings of power - the importance of gender identities in defining needs and rights, and whether they are met. Without such an analysis power becomes detached from its social context, and is purely a characteristic determined by economic wealth that does not acknowledge the social relations and structures that delimit individual activity.

The imperative behind formal modelling is to statistically identify the determinants of a particular outcome for the purposes of policy and to improve our understanding of the processes concerned. Its apparent ideological neutrality is deceptive, given its neglect of the workings of power in social interaction. This is particularly true for household bargaining models that claim to deal with relationship between men and women.

However, it is untrue to say that the bargaining models do not acknowledge the unequal balance of power between men and women. They do - in a variety of ways: through including variables that determine an individual's bargaining power (such as income and assets), through the notion of separate spheres, and through the unquantified/unquantifiable concept of 'voice'.

The concept of separate spheres does incorporate the influence of social structures in determining the division of labour. Yet it is as if a layer in each sphere is missing - that of the gender ideologies leading to the construction of different identities. There is a similar problem with the theory of the conjugal contract - it allows for transfers in labour and money, but does not allow for a 'contract of identity', based on the assumption that men are responsible for income, from which they derive authority, and women are responsible for domestic work. Neither the spheres nor conjugal contract theory deals with the problem of change - how

and under what circumstances the contract or the spheres are renegotiated, and what the likely impact is.

It is only Behrman and Sen that acknowledge the endogeneity of preferences - that an individual can have influence over another's view of what is in the own latter's interest. Sen develops his model on the basis of perceptions of contribution and on perceptions and legitimisation of needs and deserts. When he suggests that the informational base be widened to encompass these factors, he is attempting to strike a middle path, acknowledging the importance of formal modelling, and of power in social interaction. A simpler middle path is attempted here - using qualitative methodology to examine the social relations and structures that govern gender relations; utilising the understanding gained to choose certain pieces of information that reflect the balance of power/control over resources in a particular cultural context and are relevant to the welfare outcome being considered; and statistical analysis of the chosen indicators of power and the welfare outcomes. Hopefully, the result is an analysis of spousal relations in Bugandan society that reveals the importance of gender identities in determining the balance of power.

Lessons from Mukono for theoretical formulations

A discussion of marriage in Buganda highlighted four particular aspects of the conjugal contract that are neglected by the theoretical formulations: firstly, the symbolic and economic importance of bridewealth in subjecting women to men's authority and yet conveying honour; secondly, men and women's unequal dependence on marriage as a source of wealth. Thirdly, evidence was given on the unequal division of household assets on death or divorce, and on the importance of violence in prejudicing any outcome of marital negotiations. Notions of gender identity enable the perpetuation of such particular forms of social relations and their influence on household outcomes - for example the acceptability of male-on-female violence, or divorced or widowed women being left destitute. Without an understanding of the social relations that constitute the environment in which 'bargaining' takes place, data used in a theoretical model become 'detached from their roots'.

The importance of gender identities in perpetuating unequal relations becomes explicit in the discussion of women's involvement in income generation. The evidence from the focus groups showed how male identity and male authority, are closely aligned with control over income. A proportion of men prevent their wives from working in order to limit their access to income, women with an independent source of income are thought to cause marital instability, and accepting financial assistance from a woman is

thought to compromise a man's position. Yet, despite these notions of acceptable behaviour associated with gender, women's financial contribution was significant, despite lower incomes and a poorer asset position. Secrecy about income was found to be important for both men and women, either to reduce accountability for personal consumption decisions, prevent confiscation, or to avoid contribution to household goods - despite the disadvantages of non-co-operation. Rights over household assets were found to differ according to the socio-economic status of the household, male and female education and female contribution to household income.

It was argued that this situation not only affects women's ability to improve their economic situation, it also affects outcomes within the household. The distribution of household income and disposal rights over household assets have an impact on spousal contributions to household expenditure. A proportion of women were found to accumulate assets secretly outside the marital home - presumably with income that could have been contributed to household expenses - in an attempt to ensure their own economic security.

The debate as to whether participation in the economy improves women's control over resources does not capture the complexity of the situation in Buganda. Participation may be prevented by a husband because it represents a challenge to his authority and control over household finances. Participation does not ensure control over income or resources. Poverty may force a woman to participate in the economy in order to meet a large proportion of household expenses. But it is education that enables a woman to ensure her own economic security and control over household assets. A renegotiation of the conjugal contract is necessary to challenge the stereotypical roles of a husband who controls household assets and income and provides the 'sauce/meat', and those of a dependent wife who cares for the children and produces the 'food'. It is such a renegotiation that improves women's position within the household.

Intra-household resource allocations are an important determinant of child nutrition. In answer to the question that originally motivated this research, the Kauga/Ngogwe data suggests that the share of recurrent expenditure met by the mother, and the level of income that she has available to meet those household needs are more important than household income. Her control over food purchases improves nutrition, but if a mother has to meet educational costs as well it appears to be detrimental. The data show that these effects are more important than location and the accessibility of health infrastructure. Given women's insecure economic position, and the strong paternal rights over children, women appear to show

¹'Food' and 'sauce/meat' are the literal translations of the Luganda words used, where food refers to a starch food - bananas, potatoes or cassava.

a preference for allocating resources towards their daughters. This apparent bias disappears once a woman is single, and has presumably established custody over her children. When examining the determinants of nutrition, a universal maternal altruism cannot be assumed when women have other, conflicting priorities such as education of older siblings and their own long-term economic security.

This thesis has attempted to build a picture of the distribution of rights, responsibilities and power between spouses in Bugandan semi-urban and rural households. It has argued that the marriage contract - which is symbolised by the bridewealth - sanctions men's control over household income, their ability to forbid their wives from participating in the economy, and their claim over the majority of household assets and children on divorce. Faced with the possibility of economic impoverishment on divorce, some women are faced with the cruel choice between their own children's welfare and their own economic security. It is only education that ensures women's future security within marriage and enables them to increase contributions to household expenses.

This study of Uganda has shown the necessity of obtaining qualitative, as well as quantitative data on gender relations in order understand the process of intra-household allocation and the resulting outcomes. Women's own economic security as a marriage partner, attitudes towards responsibility for household expenditure, and rights over household assets and children and women's earnings all affect household outcomes as well as more readily quantifiable data such as income and education levels. An understanding of the relevant social relations can lead to appropriate data being collected to illustrate the balance of power and how it affects intra-household allocation.

The resulting statistical findings central to this study are:

- * 10% of husbands refused to allow their wives to earn an income. (This figure rises to 28% amongst the wealthier households.)

- * Married women are more likely to be involved in capitalised activities than single women, presumably because they were able to obtain access to capital through their husbands.

- * 20% of women accumulate assets that are stored outside the marital home. In terms of value, 60% of these assets are stored without the knowledge of the husband.

- * Most women contribute a greater proportion of recurrent expenditure than the proportion of 'household' income that they earn. (On average

women earn 17% of 'household' income, contribute 27% of household recurrent expenditure and 15% of consumer durables.)

* Women's income has a greater impact on child nutrition than household income.

* If women pay school fees, it has a negative effect on child nutrition; if women pay for food (as opposed to the husband, or household not purchasing food) it has a positive effect on nutrition.

* Parents do not have the same allocation preferences towards children.

* Married women appear to favour girls, whereas single women appear to marginally favour boys, because future inter-generational transfers in favour of the mother are more certain.

Implications

Gender relations (or rather feminism) has begun to make in-roads into economics. This study shows, at a micro level, the importance of gender relations and its impact on the female participation rate, the type of work women do, management of household finances, contribution to household finances and child welfare. Gender relations can determine a household's socio-economic status, whether a household is able to improve its situation, and whether women can improve their own situation and that of their children.

An adequate legal system is necessary to ensure equitable settlements on death and divorce in order to encourage pooling of resources. Unequal rights over household assets encourages secrecy, and the need to ensure independent, personal economic security. The result is the loss of the benefits of co-operation within the household and the diversion of resources away from the household.

Women's involvement in the predominant informal sector in Uganda appears to be determined by their access to capital through their husbands. Alternative sources of finance capital for women may increase participation rates and women's income.

Projects that attempt to improve child nutrition must take account of dynamics within the household. A woman may face obstacles to improving her economic situation from within the household, as well as competing

priorities for the few resources that she has.

Future research

One area that has been neglected in this study is the sexual division of labour - how spouses allocated housework, child care and household production. Although evidence was collected in the group discussions, in essence this would require a time use study - a major research project in itself. Yet such data would enable further exploration of the importance of gender identities, and how the division of labour and therefore identities are changing with women's increasing participation in the market economy.

Only a limited amount of multivariate analysis was carried out on the Kauga/Ngogwe data, primarily because of the small sample size. One possibility would be to use the methods tested in this study in a larger research project that would enable more sophisticated statistical analysis.

This would be of particular interest in assessing the determinants of child nutritional status. Further examination of intra-household dynamics will assist in building a more complete picture of the causes of malnutrition.

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APPENDIX A

INITIAL CENSUS

RESPONDANTS SHOULD BE EITHER MARRIED OR CO-HABITING COUPLES WITH CHILDREN
 OR SEPARATED OR WIDOWED FEMALES WITH CHILDREN.
 SINGLE MALES SHOULD NOT BE INTERVIEWED

CDATE _ _ / _ _ / _ _

First two digits: Village or RC1 number. CHOUSNO _ _ _ _ _
 Second three digits: House number

1. Name
 2. Village/RC1
 3. Location of House.....

4. Male/Female respondent (1=female, 2=male) CSEX _ _
 5. Are you currently married=1, separated=2, widowed=3, co-habiting=4, not married=0 CMARITAL _ _
 IF MARRIED AND FEMALE GO TO 15
 IF SINGLE FEMALE GO TO 24

IF MARRIED AND MALE
 6. Do you live here; CHUSRES _ _
 1=fulltime 2=once a week 3=once a month
 4=several times a year 5=does not live here
 7. Do you have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives) CWIVES _ _
 8. Do you do any work for wages ? (Yes=1, No=0) CHUSWORK _ _
 9. Type of work CHUSTYPE _ _
 10. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CHUSREG _ _
 11. Does your wife do any work for wages ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK _ _
 12. Type of work CWIFTYPE _ _
 13. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG _ _
 14. Do you or your wife have the use of any land ? (Yes=1, No=) CHSHAMBA _ _

IF MARRIED AND FEMALE
 15. Does your husband live here; CHUSRES _ _
 1=fulltime, 2=once a week, 3=once a month, or
 4=several times a year ?
 16. Does you husband have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives, incl respondent) CWIVES _ _
 17. Do you do any work for wages ?(Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK _ _
 18. Type of work CWIFTYPE _ _
 19. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG _ _
 20. Does your husband do any work for wages ?(Yes=1, No=0) CHUSWORK _ _
 21. Type of work CHUSWORK _ _
 22. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CHUSREG _ _
 23. Does you or your husband have the use of any land ? (Yes=1,No=0) CWSHAMBA _ _

IF SINGLE FEMALE
 24. Did your husband live here; CHUSRES _ _
 1=fulltime 2=once a week 3=once a month
 4=several times a year
 25. Did you husband have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives) CWIVES _ _
 26. Do you do any work for wages ?(Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK _ _
 27. Type of work CWIFTYPE _ _
 28. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG _ _

ALL RESPONDENTS
 29. How many children are living in the household ? (Number of children) CCHILD _ _ _ _
 30. How many of them are under 5 years ? CUNDERS5 _ _

BY OBSERVATION
 31. Material of walls of house: CWALLMAT _ _
 1=Plaster over brick
 2=Plain brick
 3=Mud
 32. State of repair of walls CWALLQU _ _
 1=Good
 2=Medium (Wind and water proof, but in disrepair)
 3=Poor (Barely wind and water proof)
 33. Material of roof; CROOFMAT _ _
 1=Tiles
 2=Tin sheeting
 3=Grass thatch
 34. State of repair of roof CROOFQU _ _
 1=Good
 2=Medium (Wind and water proof, but in disrepair)
 3=Poor (Barely wind and water proof)

APPENDIX B

SUBJECT LIST FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Work

WHAT WORK DO MEN DO, WHAT WORK DO WOMEN DO ?

Which farming tasks do men do, which farming tasks do women do ?

Which crops do men look after, which crops do women look after?

Who makes decisions about work to be done in the garden

Who sells which crops ?

Which household chores do men do, what household chores do women do ?

Decisions within the household

IS MONEY SHARED, DO HUSBANDS AND WIVES KNOW WHAT THE OTHER EARN ?

DOES A WIFE HAVE TO ASK PERMISSION ABOUT CERTAIN THINGS. WHAT THINGS ?

Who decides which household goods should be bought

Women's economic security/independence

DO WOMEN OWN THEIR OWN LAND OR PROPERTY IN THEIR OWN RIGHT?

Is it necessary ? Why ? Are they buying it secretly ?

DO MEN FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH A WIFE WHO IS WEALTHY, OR IN A BETTER PAID JOB ? WHY ?

What do men inherit, what do women inherit from their parents ?

What happens to the household goods/property when a husband dies ?

Bride price

IS BRIDE WEALTH A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING ?

Does it affect the woman's position in household/in society?

Polygamous marriages/Other partners

WHAT ARE THE GOOD THINGS ABOUT BEING IN A POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE, WHAT ARE THE BAD THINGS ?

How is the household organised in a polygamous household

Separation/Divorce

WHAT DO HUSBANDS AND WIVES ARGUE ABOUT THAT LEADS TO DIVORCE/SEPARATION ?

Custody over children

Who takes the household belongings

The role that in-laws play in one's marriage

Violence (Wife beating)

DOES IT OCCUR

ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT IS JUSTIFIED OR IS IT NEVER JUSTIFIED ?

APPENDIX C

OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE : ONE WIFE HOUSEHOLD

COWDATE __ / __ / __

Female respondent in a monogamous family, or polygamous where one wife in the household.

Name of interviewer COWASST __

FILL IN * QUESTIONS BEFORE THE INTERVIEW**

***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala, 05=Mulange, 06=Kanyogoga, 7=Mukono DFI, 08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 10=Casual employers, 20=Namubiru, 30=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira, 50=Takkajunge, 60=Ggunda, 70= Iwanyonyi.
 ***Second three digits: House no. COWHOUSNO __

***1. Name of respondent COWPERSONO __
 2. Name of husband
 3. Age COWAGE __
 4. Sex (1=female, 2=male) SHOULD BE FEMALE ! COWSEX __

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION

We wish to talk about your education.

5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) COWEDUC __
 IF NO, GO TO Q10:
 6. How many years were you at school? COWEDYRS __ (yrs)
 7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) COWLEVEL __
 IF REACHED SECONDARY EDUCATION GO TO Q10
 8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
 9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE

10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) COWTRAIN __
 IF NO GO Q12:
 11. Type of education;
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) COWTYPE1 __
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) COWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Dav COWTIME1 __
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) COWTYPE2 __
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) COWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Dav COWTIME2 __
Religious Training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify) COWTYPE3 __
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) COWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Dav COWTIME3 __
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) COWTYPE4 __
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) COWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Dav COWTIME4 __
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) COWTYPE5 __
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) COWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Dav COWTIME5 __

12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=1;No=0) COWMEDUC __
 IF NO GO TO 14:
 13. What level of education did your mother reach?
 (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) COWMLEVEL __

14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) COWFEDUC __
 IF NO GO TO 16:
 15. What level of education did your father reach?
 (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) COWFLEVEL __

17. Have you ever held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) COWRESPON __
 IF NO GO TO 19:

18. Have you ever been or are you a?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT1 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS1 __
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT2 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS2 __
LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT3 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS3 __
an official at church/mosque ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT4 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS4 __
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify.....) COWPOSIT5 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS5 __
'Traditional' healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT6 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS6 __
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify) COWPOSIT7 __
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS7 __

QUESTIONS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND EXPENSES

We wish to talk to you about property owned by either you or your husband. One of the purposes of this study is compare property owned by the husband with that owned by the wife. It is often said that although women contribute towards a household, that if the husband and wife separate, or the husband dies, the woman is chased away with nothing. We wish to learn about what women contribute to the household, what property they purchase and what women are able to keep if they should separate from their husband. This is why I wish to ask you property in your household. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.

***19. Does this household have any land where you can grow crops or graze animals?(Yes=1, No=0) COWHLAN1 __
 IF NO, GO TO 22:

20. Do you own this land (=1), does you husband own it (=2), or is it owned by somebody else(=3)?COWHLAN2

21. Which crops do you or husband cultivate on this land ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 coffee COWCOFF __
 matooke for eating COWMATOO1 __
 matooke for beer COWMATOO2 __

beans	OOWBEAN	___
g'nuts	OOWGNUTS	___
cassava	OOWCASS	___
maize	OOWMAIZE	___
sweet potato	OOWPOTAT	___
tomatoes	OOWTOMAT	___
greens	OOWGREEN	___
cabbage	OOWCABB	___
vanilla	OOWVANIL	___
sorghum	OOWSORG	___
finger millet	OOWMILL	___
sugar cane	OOWSUGAR	___
other Specify	OOWCROP	___
22. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), your husband (=2), or somebodyelse (=3)	OOWHOUSE	___
23. Whose money normally pays for the following items:		
You can choose from the following answers: You=1;Husband=2;Both=3; Other=4, Don't buy=9 ?		
Food ? (If Other, Specify.....)	OOWFOOD	___
Charcoal ?(If Other, Specify.....)	OOWCHAR	___
Woodfuel ?(If Other, Specify.....)	OOWWOOD	___
Parafin? (If Other, Specify.....)	OOWPARAF	___
Water ? (If Other, Specify.....)	OOWWATER	___
Your clothes? (If Other, Specify	OOWWCLOT	___
Your husbands clothes? (If other, Specify	OOWHCLOT	___
Childrens' clothes? (If Other, Specify	OOWCCLOT	___
Do you have any children living with you who are at school (Quantity or No=0) IF NOT, go to transport costs.	OOWCHILD	___
School uniform ? (If Other, Specify	OOWSCHU	___
School books ? (If Other, Specify	OOWSCHB	___
School lunch ? (If Other, Specify	OOWSCHL	___
School fees ? (If Other, Specify	OOWSCHF	___
Your transport costs ? (If Other, Specify	OOWTRAN	___
Your husbands transport costs? (If Other, Specify	OOWHTRAN	___
Clinic bills? (If Other, Specify	OOWCLIN	___
Hospital bills? (If Other, Specify	OOWHOSP	___
Rent ?(If Other, Specify	OOWRENT	___
Electricity ?(If Other, Specify	OOWELEC	___

ITEM	24. How many of the following are there in this household ? (Quantity)	25. Who purchased these items ? W=wife H=Husband B=Both O=Other (Quantity)				26. If you and your husband were to separate which of the following items would you be able to take with you ? (Quantity)
		W	H	B	O	
Hoes						
Panga						
Wheelbarrow						
Charcoal stove						
Parafin stove						
Jerry cans						
Basins						
Saucepans						
Chairs						
Benches						
Table						
Cupboard						
Sleeping mats						
Mattresses						
Beds						
Hens						
Goats						
Sheep						
Pigs						
Cattle						
Bicycle						
Radio						
Radio/Tape cassette						
Sewing machine						
TV						
Motorcycle						
Vehicle						
Other						

(Codes for 'other': S=son, D=Daughter, F=Friend, R=Relative, N=Nephew/Niece)

QUESTIONS ABOUT ITEMS THAT YOU OWN INDEPENDANTLY OF YOUR HUSBAND

We wish to talk you about items that you own independantly of your husband that are not part of this household. Because this study is about equality between husbands and wives, it is important for us to know whether women are beginning to own property independantly in order to provide themselves with some financial security. This is why we wish to ask you questions about the property that you own. As I said before, what you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.

27. Did you personally inherit any of the following:
 land ? (0=No; or number of acres)
 buildings ? (No=0, or number)
 cattle ? (0=No; or quantity)
 goats ? (0=No; or quantity)
 coffee trees ? (0=No or number of acres)
 banana trees ? (0=No; or number of acres)

OOWINHL ___ (Acres)
 OOWINHB ___
 OOWINHCA ___
 OOWINHG ___
 OOWINHCO ___ (Arces)
 OOWINHEA ___ (Arces)

28. Can you tell me what has happened to that/those.....?
 Do you still own them/it(=1),
 They are/it is in your husband's name (=2)
 have you sold them/it (=3),
 your husband has sold them/it (=4),
 or has somethingelse happened (=5) ? Specify

.....
 Land
 Buildings
 Cattle
 Goats
 coffee trees
 banana trees

OOWLAND ___
 OOWBUILD ___
 OOWCATTLE ___
 OOWGOAT ___
 OOWCOFF ___
 OOWBANA ___

ITEM	29. Which of the following do you own, independantly of your husband, that are not used in this household? (Quantity)	30. (IF OWNS SOME ITEMS) Does you husband know about these items ? (Quantity)	31. (FOR THOSE ITEMS THAT THE HUSBAND KNOWS ABOUT) If you separate, which will you be able to keep ? (Quantity)
Hoes			
Pangas			
Wheelbarrow			
Charcoal stove			
Parafin stove			
Jerry can			
Saucepans			
Chairs			
Benches			
Table			
Cupboard			
Sleeping mats			
Mattresses			
Beds			
Hens/Ducks			
Goats			
Sheep			
Pigs			
Cattle			
Land			
Buildings			
Bicycle			
Radio			
Radio/Tape cassette			
Sewing Machine			
TV			
Motorcycle			
Vehicle			
Other			

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK

We would like to ask you questions about your work and income. We wish to compare the wives income with the husbands. As I said before, what you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.

***32. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (Yes=1;No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWWAGE ___

IF NO:

33. Does your husband forbid you from working ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPREVEN ___

NOW GO TO Q45

IF YES:

***34. Employer 1 OOWEMPL1 ___
 (Type of business/organisation)

35. Type of work (See codes)..... OOWWORK1 ___

36. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate) ? OOWWAGE1 ___ , ___

37. How many hours do you work per day ? OOWHOURS1 ___
 38. How many days do you work a week ? OOWDAYS1 ___
 39. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1;No=0) OOWOTHERW ___
 IF NO, GO TO 45;
 40. Employer 2 (Type of business/organisation)..... OOWEMPL2 ___
 41. Type of work OOWWORK2 ___
 42. How much are you paid per month/week/day ? OOWWAGE2 ___
 43. How many hours do you work per day? OOWHOURS2 ___
 44. How many days do you work per week? OOWDAYS2 ___
 ***45. Do you earn cash by doing business, or selling things ? (Yes=1, No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWCASH ___
 46. What type of work do you do ? (Use work codes, or specify)
 WORK 1 Specify OOWTYPE1 ___
 WORK 2 Specify OOWTYPE2 ___
 WORK 3 Specify OOWTYPE3 ___

WORK 1
 47. How many days do you work per week/month? OOWDAYS1 ___
 48. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS1 ___
 49. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

WORK 2
 50. How many days do you work per week/month? OOWDAYS2 ___
 51. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS2 ___
 52. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

WORK 3
 53. How many days do you work per week/month? OOWDAYS3 ___
 54. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS3 ___
 55. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

56. Do you own any buildings, or land that other people are using ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWLANDLORD __

57. Do they pay you something for using that building/land ?
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT1 __ __ __'__ __ __
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT2 __ __ __'__ __ __
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT3 __ __ __'__ __ __

58. Do you own:
dresses for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OOWDRESS __ __
shoes for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OOWSHOES __ __
a watch ? (No=0, Yes=1) OOWWATCH __

***59. Which is your home district ?OOWDIST

Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ? OOWLANG __
No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4
If YES:
Which language would they rather use ?

ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWCOMPR __
COMMENTS.....
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Literacy Test:

For those who only have primary education.
7. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)

Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde OOWREAD1 __

Swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidizi wako OOWREAD2 __

English: thank you for your help OOWREAD3 __

8. Please can you write any sentence for me here ?(No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OOWWRITE __

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APPENDIX D

OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE: SEPARATED OR WIDOWED WOMEN

Name of interviewer OSFDATE ___/___/___
OSFASST ___

FILL IN * QUESTIONS BEFORE THE INTERVIEW**

***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala, 05=Mulange, 06=Kawolo Hosopital, 7=Mukono DFI, 08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 10=Casual employers, 20=Namubiru, 30=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira, 50=Ttakkajjunge. 60=Ggunda, 70=Lwanyonyi.
***Second three digits: House no. OSFHOUSSNO ___

***1. Name of respondant OSFAGE ___
2. Age OSFSEX ___
3. Sex (1=Female, 2=Male) SHOULD BE FEMALE ! OSFMARITAL ___
***4. Is this woman separate(=2) or widowed (=3) ?

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION

5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFEDUC ___
IF NO, GO TO Q9:
6. How many years were you at school? OSFEDYRS ___ (yrs)
7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary) OSFLEVEL ___
IF REACHED SECONDARY EDUCATION GO TO Q9
8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWTRAIN ___
IF NO GO Q12:
11. Type of education;
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) OOWTYPE1 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME1 ___
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) OOWTYPE2 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME2 ___
Religious Training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify) OOWTYPE3 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME3 ___
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) OOWTYPE4 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME4 ___
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) OOWTYPE5 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME5 ___
12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFMEDUC ___
IF NO GO TO 14:
13. What level of education did your mother reach? OSFMLEVEL ___
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary)

14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFFEDUC ___
IF NO GO TO 16:
15. What level of education did your father reach? OSFFLEVEL ___
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary)
16. Have you ever held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) COWRESPON ___
IF NO GO TO 18:
17. Have you ever been or are you a?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT1 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS1 ___
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT2 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS2 ___
LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT3 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS3 ___
an official at church/mosque ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT4 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS4 ___
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify) OOWPOSIT5 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS5 ___
'Traditional' healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT6 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS6 ___
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify) OOWPOSIT7 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS7 ___

QUESTIONS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND EXPENSES

We wish to talk to you about your household property. It is often said that although women contribute towards a household, that if the husband and wife separate, or the husband dies, the woman is chased away with nothing. We wish to learn about what women own after separation or death of the husband, what property they purchased and what women are able to keep if they should separate from their husband. This is why I wish to ask you property in your household. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.

***18. Does this household have any land where you can grow crops or graze animals?(Yes=1, No=0) OOWHLAN1 ___
IF NO, GO TO 21:
19. Do you own this land (=1), (if separated) does you ex-husband own it (=2), or is it owned by somebodyelse(=3)? OOWHLAN2 ___
20. Which crops do you cultivate on this land ? (Yes=1, No=0)
coffee OOWCOFF ___
matooke for eating OOWMATOO1 ___
matooke for beer OOWMATOO2 ___
beans OOWBEAN ___
g'nuts OOWGNUTS ___
cassava OOWCASS ___
maize OOWMAIZE ___

sweet potato
 tomatoes
 greens
 cabbage
 vanilla
 sorghum
 finger millet
 sugarcane
 other Specify

OOWPOTAT ___
 OOWTOMAT ___
 OOWGREEN ___
 OOWCABB ___
 OOWVANIL ___
 OOWSORG ___
 OOWMILL ___
 OSFSUGAR ___
 OOWCROP ___

21. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), (if separated) your ex-husband (=2), or somebodyelse (=3)
 22. Have you made any improvements to your house in the last 2 years ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 23. What was the alteration ?
 1=new house, 2=kitchen/extension, 3=roof/walls/floor, 4=painting

COOWHOUSE ___
 COMHOUSE ___
 OMALTER1 ___
 OMALTER2 ___

24. Whose money normally pays for the following items:

You can choose from the following answers : You=1;Relative=4, Don't buy=9
 Food ? (If relative, Specify.....)
 Charcoal ? (If relative, Specify.....)
 Woodfuel ? (If relative, Specify.....)
 Parafin ? (If relative, Specify.....)
 Water ? (If relative, Specify.....)
 Your clothes? (If relative, Specify))
 Childrens' clothes? (If relative, Specify))

OMALTER3 ___
 OSFFOOD ___
 OSFCHAR ___
 OSFWOOD ___
 OSFPARA ___
 OSFWATER ___
 OSFWCLOT ___
 OSFCLOT ___

Do you have any children living with you who are at school ? (Quantity)
 IF NOT, Go to transport costs.

OSFCHILD ___

School uniform ? (If relative, Specify))
 School books ? (If relative, Specify))
 School lunch ? (If relative, Specify))
 School fees ? (If relative, Specify))

OSFSCHU ___
 OSFSCHB ___
 OSFSCHL ___
 OSFSCHF ___

Your transport costs ? (If relative, Specify))
 Clinic bills? (If relative, Specify))
 Hospital bills? (If relative, Specify))
 Rent ? (If relative, Specify))
 Electricity ?(If relative, Specify))

OSFWTRAN ___
 OSFCLIN ___
 OSFHOSP ___
 OSFRENT ___
 OSFELEC ___

ITEM	25. How many of the following are there in your household now? (Quantity)	26. IF SEPARATED /WIDOWED. How many items were there in the household when you separated/your husband died ?	27. IF SEPARATED, /IF WIDOWED, how many of these items were you able to keep for yourself.	27. Were there any items that were yours that you were not able to keep ?
Hoes				
Panga				
Charcoal stove				
Parafin stove				
Jerry cans				
Basins				
Saucepans				
Chairs				
Benches				
Table				
Cupboard				
Sleeping mats				
Mattresses				
Beds				
Hens				
Goats				
Sheep				
Pigs				
Cattle				
Bicycle				
Radio				
Radio/Tape cassette				
TV				
Motorcycle				
Vehicle				
Sewing machine				
Other				

(Codes for 'other': S=son, D=Daughter, F=Friend, R=Relative, N=Nepnew/Niece)

28. Did you personally inherit any of the following:

- land ? (0=No; or number of acres)
- buildings ? (No=0, or number)
- cattle ? (0=No; or quantity)
- goats ? (0=No; or quantity)
- coffee trees ? (0=No or number of acres)
- banana trees ? (0=No; or number of acres)

OOWINHL ___ (Acres)
 OOWINHB ___
 OOWINHCA ___
 OOWINHG ___
 OOWINHCO ___ (Acres)
 OOWINHBA ___ (Acres)

29. Can you tell me what has happened to that/those.....?

- Do you still own them/it (=1),
- have you sold them/it (=3),
- did your husband sell them/it (=4),
- or has something else happened (=5) ? Specify

- Land
- Buildings
- Cattle
- Goats
- coffee trees
- banana trees

OOWLAND ___
 OOWBUILD ___
 OOWCATTLE ___
 OOWCOAT ___
 OOWCOFF ___
 OOWBANA ___

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK

We wish to ask you questions about your work and income. For this study it is important to compare the income women who are married, with the income of those who are not. As I said before, everything that you

tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.

***30. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (Yes=1;No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWWAGE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q42

***31. Employer 1 OOWEMPL1 ___
 (Type of business/organisation)

32. Type of work OOWWORK1 ___
 (See over for codes.)

33. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate) ? COWWAGE1 ___
 34. How many hours do you work per day ? OOWHOURS1 ___
 35. How many days do you work a week ? COWDAYS1 ___

36. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1;No=0) OOWOTHERW ___
 IF NO, GO TO 42:

37. Employer 2..... OOWEMPL2 ___
 (Type of business/organisation)

38. Type of work OOWWORK2 ___

39. How much are you paid per month/week/day ? (Delete as appropriate) COWWAGE2 ___
 40. How many hours do you work per day? OOWHOURS2 ___
 41. How many days do you work per week? COWDAYS2 ___

***42. Do you earn cash by doing business, or selling things ? (Yes=1, No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWCASH ___

43. What type of work do you do ?
 (Use work codes, or specify type of activity not on code list)

WORK 1 Specify OOWTYPE1 ___
 WORK 2 Specify OOWTYPE2 ___
 WORK 3 Specify OOWTYPE3 ___

WORK 1

44. How many days do you work per week? COWDAYS1 ___
 45. How many hours do you do per day ? COWHOURS1 ___
 46. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

WORK 2

47. How many days do you work per week? COWDAYS2 ___
 48. How many hours do you do per day ? COWHOURS2 ___
 49. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

WORK 3

50. How many days do you work per week? COWDAYS3 ___
 51. How many hours do you do per day ? COWHOURS3 ___
 52. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

53. Do you own any buildings, or land that other people are using ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWLANDLORD ___

54. Do they pay you something for using that building/land ?
 BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT1 ___ ___ / ___ ___
 BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT2 ___ ___ / ___ ___
 BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT3 ___ ___ / ___ ___

55. Do you own:
 dresses for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OSFDRESS ___ ___
 shoes for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OSFSHOES ___ ___
 a watch ? (No=0, Yes=1) OSFWATCH ___ ___

QUESTIONS ABOUT HUSBAND

We wish to ask you questions about your husband

56. Was he older or younger than you ? By how many years ? (Delete as appropriate:YOUNG/OLDER) OSFAGE ___ ___

57. Did he attend school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFEDUC ___

IF NO, GO TO Q60:
 58. How many years was he at school? OSFEDYRS ___ (yrs)
 59. What level did he reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OSFLEVEL ___

60. Did he have any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) COWTRAIN ___
 IF NO GO Q62:
 61. Did he attend...
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) COWTYPE1 ___
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Day COWTIME1 ___
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) COWTYPE2 ___
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Day COWTIME2 ___
Religious Training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify) COWTYPE3 ___
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Day COWTIME3 ___
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) COWTYPE4 ___
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Day COWTIME4 ___
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) COWTYPE5 ___
 For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Day COWTIME5 ___

62. Did he ever hold any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) COWRESPON ___
 IF NO GO TO 64:
 63. Was he ever or is he a?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT1 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS1 ___
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT2 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS2 ___
LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT3 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS3 ___
an official at church/mosque ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT4 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS4 ___
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT5 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS5 ___
'Traditional'healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) COWPOSIT6 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS6 ___
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify)COWPOSIT7 ___
 For how many years has/was this position held? COWYRS7 ___

64. ***Which is your (the respondant's) home district ?..... OSFDIST ___
 Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ? OSFLANG ___
 No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4
 If YES:
 Which language would they rather use ?

ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWCOMPR ___
 COMMENTS.....

Literacy Test:

For those who only have primary education.
 7. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)

Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde OOWREAD1 ___
 Swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidizi wako OOWREAD2 ___
 English: thank you for your help OOWREAD3 ___

8. Please can you write any sentence for me here ?(No
difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OOWWRITE ___

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.....

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APPENDIX E

OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE: MEN

INDIVIDUAL MARRIED MEN

OMDATE _ _ / _ _ / _ _

Name of interviewer

OMASST _ _

FILL IN * QUESTIONS BEFORE INTERVIEW**

***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala, 05=Mulange, 06=Kawolo Hosopital, 7=Mukono DFI, 08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 20=Namubiru, 30=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira, 50=Ttakkajunge
 ***Second three digits: House no. OMHOUSNO _ _ _

- 1. Name OMPERSONO _ _ _
- 2. Name of wife OMPERSONO _ _ _
- 3. Age OIMAGE _ _
- 4. Sex (1=female, 2=male) (SHOULD BE MALE !) OMSEX _ _

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION

- 5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) OMEDUC _ _
IF NO, GO TO Q10:
- 6. How many years were you at school? OMEDYRS _ _ (yrs)
- 7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OMLEVEL _ _
IF REACHED SECONDARY LEVEL, GO TO Q10:
- 8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
- 9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
- 10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OMTRAIN _ _
IF NO GO Q12:
- 11. Type of education;
 - Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) OOWTYPE1 _ _
 - For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME1 _ _
 - Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify) OOWTYPE2 _ _
 - For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME2 _ _
 - Religious training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify) OOWTYPE3 _ _
 - For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME3 _ _
 - College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) OOWTYPE4 _ _
 - For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME4 _ _
 - Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify) OOWTYPE5 _ _
 - For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME5 _ _
- 12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=1;No=0) OMMEDUC _ _
IF NO GO TO 14:
- 13. What level of education did your mother reach? OMMLEVEL _ _
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary)
- 14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) OMFEDUC _ _
IF NO GO TO 16:
- 15. What level of education did your father reach? OMFLEVEL _ _
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary)
- 16. Have you held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) OMRESPON _ _
IF NO GO TO 18:
- 17. Were or are you a
 - LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT1 _ _
 - For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS1 _ _
 - LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT2 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS2 _ _
 - LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT3 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS3 _ _
 - an official at church/mosque ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT4 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS4 _ _
 - an official in the 'Traditional' authority ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT5 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS5 _ _
 - 'Traditional' healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWPOSIT6 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS6 _ _
 - Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify) OOWPOSIT7 _ _
 - For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS7 _ _

QUESTIONS ABOUT PROPERTY AND LAND

I wish to ask you questions about your property and land. One of the purposes of this study is to compare the property owned by the husband with the property owned by the wife. Many people have claimed that there is much inequality, and we wish to discover whether this is true. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your wife, any RC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.

- 18. Did you inherit any land ? (Yes=1, No=0) INHLA _ _
IF NO, GO TO 20
- 19. How many separate plots did you inherit ? INHPLOTS _ _
- 20. Do you own any land now ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWNLA _ _
IF NO, GO TO 35
- 21. How many separate plots do you own ? OWNPLOT _ _
- 22. How many of these plots benefit this household ? PLOTTH1 _ _
IF NONE, GO TO 33

I wish to talk about each plot that benefit this household:

PLOT 1

23. Is it yourself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1, Somebodyelse=2) WHO1 ___
 24. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, Other=3, specify USE1 ___
 IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
 25. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it? (Yes=1, No=0) PAY1 ___
 How much do they pay per week/month/year OOWRENT1 ___ , ___ , ___

PLOT 2
 26. Is it yourself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1, Somebodyelse=2) WHO2 ___
 27. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, Other=3, specify USE2 ___
 IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
 28. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it? (Yes=1, No=0) PAY2 ___
 29. How much do they pay per week/month/year OOWRENT2 ___ , ___ , ___

PLOT 3
 30. Is it yourself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1, Somebodyelse=2) WHO3 ___
 31. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, Other=3, specify USE3 ___
 IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
 32. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it?(Yes=1, No=0) PAY3 ___
 How much do they pay per week/month/year OOWRENT3 ___ , ___ , ___

IF THE ANSWERS TO Q22 AND Q21 ARE THE SAME, GO TO 35
 33. Do you have any plots do not benefit this household, that perhaps benefit another household of yours, or are lying idle ? How many plots ? PLOTHH2 ___
 IF IDLE, GO TO 35

34. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, Other=3, specify
 PLOT 1 USE4 ___
 PLOT 2 USE5 ___
 PLOT 3 USE6 ___

IF USED FOR FARMING,
 Which crops do you grow there ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 coffee OOWCOFF ___
 matooke for eating OOWMATOO1 ___
 matooke for beer OOWMATOO2 ___
 beans OOWBEAN ___
 g'nuts OOWGNUTS ___
 cassava OOWCASS ___
 maize OOWMAIZE ___
 sweet potato OOWPOTAT ___
 tomatoes OOWTOMAT ___
 greens OOWGREEN ___
 cabbage OOWCABB ___
 vanilla OOWVANIL ___
 sorghum OOWSORG ___
 finger millet OOWMILL ___
 sugar cane OOWSUGAR ___
 other Specify OOWCROP ___

35. I need to ask whether you inherited any of the following:
 Cattle ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHCA ___
 Goats ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHG ___
 Coffee trees ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHCO ___ (Arces)
 Banana trees ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHBA ___ (Arces)
 Buildings ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHBU ___

36. How many of the following do you own, that do not benefit this household, that maybe benefit another household ?
 cattle OMCATTLE ___
 goats OMSHEEP ___
 sheep OMSHEEP ___
 hens OMHEN ___
 hoes OMHOE ___
 pangas OMPANGA ___
 buildings OMBUILD ___

31. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), your wife (=2), or somebodyelse (=3) OOWHOUSE ___
 32. Have you made any improvements to your house in the last 2 years ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOMHOUSE ___
 33. What was the alteration ? OMALTER1 ___
 1=new house, 2=kitchen/extension, 3=roof/walls/floor, 4=painting OMALTER2 ___
 OMALTER3 ___

QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK

I wish to ask you questions about your work and income. As I mentioned above one of the purposes of this study is to compare the income earned by the husband with the income earned by the wife. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your wife, any RC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.

***34. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (SEE CENSUS FORMS) (Yes=1;No=0) OOWWAGE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q46
 35. Employer 1 OOWEMPL1 ___
 (Type of business/organisation)
 36. Type of work OOWWORK1 ___
 (See over for codes.)
 37. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate)? OOWWAGE1 ___ , ___ , ___
 38. How many hours do you work per day ? OOWHOUR1 ___ , ___ , ___

39. How many days do you work a week ? OOWDAYS1 ___
40. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1;No=0) OOWOTHERW ___
 IF NO, GO TO 46:
41. Employer 2..... OOWEMPL2 ___
 (Type of business/organisation)
42. Type of work OOWWORK2 ___
43. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate) ? OOWWAGE2 ___
44. How many hours do you work per day? OOWHOURS2 ___
45. How many days do you work per week? OOWWDAYS2 ___
- ***46. Do you earn any cash by doing business or selling things ? (Yes=1, No=0) OMCASH ___
47. What type of work do you do ?
 (Use work codes, or specify type of activity not on code list)
- WORK 1 Specify OOWTYPE1 ___
- WORK 2 Specify OOWTYPE2 ___
- WORK 3 Specify OOWTYPE3 ___
- WORK 1
48. How many days do you work per week? OMDAYS1 ___
49. How many hours do you do per day ? OMHOURS1 ___
50. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

- WORK 2
51. How many days do you work per week? OMDAYS2 ___
52. How many hours do you do per day ? OMHOURS2 ___
53. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

- WORK 3
54. How many days do you work per week? OMDAYS3 ___
55. How many hours do you do per day ? OMHOURS3 ___
56. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
 What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?

	Ush	Item and Frequency	Ush per week/day/month	TOTALS
Cost 1				Total cost
Cost 2				
Cost 3				Total revenue
Revenue 1				
Revenue 2				Net profit
Revenue 3				

57. Do you own a watch? (Yes=1;No=0, or quantity) OMWATCH ___
58. Do you own a:
 suit/kanzu for special occasions? (Quantity) OMDRESS ___

pair of shoes for special occasions ? (Quantity)

OMSHOES __ __

59. Which is your home district ?

OMDIST __

60. Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ?

OMLANG __

No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4

If Yes:

Which language would you rather use ?

OMWEIGHT __ - __ kg

61. Can I please measure your weight ?

OMHEIGHT __ - __ - __ cm

62. Can I please measure you height ?

ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0)

OOWCOMPR __

COMMENTS

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Literacy Test:

For those who only have primary education.

8. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)

Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde

OOMREAD1 __

Swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidizi wako

OOMREAD2 __

English: thank you for your help

OOMREAD3 __

9. Please can you write any sentence for me here ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OMWRITE __

.....
.....
.....

17. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
18. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

19. Name

20. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
21. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months ___
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q23. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
22. Does her/his biological father live in this house? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
IF YES GO TO Q24. IF NO, CONTINUE:
23. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support? (Yes=1, No=0) CFINANCE ___
24. How many years has she/he spent at school? CYEARS ___
25. What level has he/she reached? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
26. Is she/he still at school? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q28. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
27. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity? (Yes=1, No=0) eg houseboy/girl. Specify CWORK ___
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
28. Has the child ever been immunised? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
IF NO, GO TO Q30. IF YES, CONTINUE:
29. Do you have the card from the health clinic? Can you show me? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
30. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
31. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
32. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

33. Name

34. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
35. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months ___
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q37. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
36. Does her/his biological father live in this house? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
IF YES GO TO Q38. IF NO, CONTINUE:
37. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support? (Yes=1, No=0) CFINANCE ___
38. How many years has she/he spent at school? CYEARS ___
39. What level has he/she reached? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
40. Is she/he still at school? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q42. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
41. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity? (Yes=1, No=0) eg houseboy/girl. Specify CWORK ___
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
42. Has the child ever been immunised? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
IF NO, GO TO Q44. IF YES, CONTINUE:
43. Do you have the card from the health clinic? Can you show me? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
44. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
45. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
46. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

47. Name

48. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
49. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months ___
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q51. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
50. Does her/his biological father live in this house? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
IF YES GO TO Q52. IF NO, CONTINUE:
51. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support? (Yes=1, No=0) CFINANCE ___
52. How many years has she/he spent at school? CYEARS ___
53. What level has he/she reached? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
54. Is she/he still at school? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q56. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
55. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity? (Yes=1, No=0) eg houseboy/girl. Specify CWORK ___
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
56. Has the child ever been immunised? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
IF NO, GO TO Q58. IF YES, CONTINUE:
59. Do you have the card from the health clinic? Can you show me? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
60. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
61. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
62. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

63. Name

64. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
65. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months ___
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q67. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
68. Does her/his biological father live in this house? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
IF YES GO TO Q70. IF NO, CONTINUE:
69. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support? (Yes=1, No=0) CFINANCE ___
70. How many years has she/he spent at school? CYEARS ___
71. What level has he/she reached? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
72. Is she/he still at school? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q76. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
73. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity? (Yes=1, No=0) eg houseboy/girl. Specify CWORK ___
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
74. Has the child ever been immunised? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
IF NO, GO TO Q78. IF YES, CONTINUE:
75. Do you have the card from the health clinic? Can you show me? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
76. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
77. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
78. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

81. Name

82. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
83. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months ___
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q85. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:

84. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
 IF YES GO TO Q86. IF NO, CONTINUE:
 85. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ? CFINANCE ___
 (Yes=1, No=0) CYEARS ___
 86. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CLEVEL ___
 87. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CSCHOOL ___
 88. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q90. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
 89. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWORK ___
 eg houseboy/girl. Specify
 IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
 90. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q92. IF YES, CONTINUE:
 91. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
 92. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
 93. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
 94. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

95. Name CSEX ___
 96. Sex (1=female, 2=male)
 97. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months
 IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q99. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
 98. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
 IF YES GO TO Q100. IF NO, CONTINUE:
 99. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ? CFINANCE ___
 (Yes=1, No=0) CYEARS ___
 100. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CLEVEL ___
 101. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CSCHOOL ___
 102. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q104. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
 103. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWORK ___
 eg houseboy/girl. Specify
 IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
 104. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q106. IF YES, CONTINUE:
 105. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
 106. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
 107. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
 108. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

109. Name CSEX ___
 110. Sex (1=female, 2=male)
 111. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months
 IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q113. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
 112. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
 IF YES GO TO Q114. IF NO, CONTINUE:
 113. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ? CFINANCE ___
 (Yes=1, No=0) CYEARS ___
 114. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CLEVEL ___
 115. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CSCHOOL ___
 116. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q118. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
 117. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWORK ___
 eg houseboy/girl. Specify
 IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
 118. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q120. IF YES, CONTINUE:
 119. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
 120. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
 121. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
 122. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

123. Name CSEX ___
 124. Sex (1=female, 2=male)
 125. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months
 IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q127. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
 126. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
 IF YES GO TO Q128. IF NO, CONTINUE:
 127. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ? CFINANCE ___
 (Yes=1, No=0) CYEARS ___
 128. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CLEVEL ___
 129. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CSCHOOL ___
 130. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q132. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
 131. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWORK ___
 eg houseboy/girl. Specify
 IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
 132. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE ___
 IF NO, GO TO Q134. IF YES, CONTINUE:
 133. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
 134. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
 135. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
 136. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

137. Name CSEX ___
 138. Sex (1=female, 2=male)
 139. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years ___ Months
 IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q141. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
 140. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER ___
 IF YES GO TO Q142. IF NO, CONTINUE:
 141. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ? CFINANCE ___
 (Yes=1, No=0) CYEARS ___
 142. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CLEVEL ___
 143. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CSCHOOL ___
 144. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
 IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q146. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
 145. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWORK ___
 eg houseboy/girl. Specify

IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.

146. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) C IMMUNE ___
IF NO, GO TO Q148. IF YES, CONTINUE:
147. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
148. Has the child had diarrhoea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR ___
149. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER ___
150. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH ___

FOR ALL NON-RESIDENT CHILDREN (All ages)

151. Name
152. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
153. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
154. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
155. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
156. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
157. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

158. Name
159. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
160. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
161. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
162. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
163. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
164. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

165. Name
166. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
167. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
168. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
169. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
170. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
171. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

172. Name
173. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
174. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
175. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
176. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
177. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
178. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

179. Name
180. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
181. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
182. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
183. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
184. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
185. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

186. Name
187. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
188. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
189. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
190. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
191. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
192. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

193. Name
194. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
195. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
196. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
197. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
198. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
199. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

200. Name
200. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
201. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
202. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
203. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
204. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
205. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

206. Name
207. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
208. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
209. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
210. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
210. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
211. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

212. Name
213. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
214. Age CAGE ___ Years ___
215. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
216. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
217. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
218. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

219. Name

220. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
 221. Age CAGE ___ Years
 222. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
 223. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
 224. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
 225. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

226. Name
 227. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
 228. Age CAGE ___ Years
 229. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
 230. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
 231. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
 232. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

233. Name
 234. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
 235. Age CAGE ___ Years
 236. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
 237. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
 238. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
 239. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

240. Name
 241. Sex (1=female, 2=male) CSEX ___
 242. Age CAGE ___ Years
 243. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS ___
 244. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ___
 245. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL ___
 246. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT ___

247. So, you have.....(number) biological children ? Is that right ? (Quantity) CALIVE ___
 (COUNT CHILDREN FROM 1ST AND 2ND TABLES)

248. Can you tell me the total number children that you have given birth to alive, including those who have died?
 CBIRTH ___
 249. So,(number) children have died ? Is that right ? (Quantity)
 CDIED ___
 IF NONE HAVE DIED, GO TO NUTRITIONAL STATUS TABLE. IF SOME HAVE DIED CONTINUE:

250. Can you tell me the ages of the children when they died ?
 Age of 1st child CAGE ___ YEARS
 Age of 2nd child CAGE ___ YEARS
 Age of 3rd child CAGE ___ YEARS
 Age of 4th child CAGE ___ YEARS
 Age of 5th child CAGE ___ YEARS

MEASURING NUTRITIONAL STATUS

I would now like to weigh and measure the children under 5 years

(COPY NAMES OF RESIDENT CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS INTO THE FOLLOWING TABLE.
 PLEASE DON'T CARRY OR HOLD THE CHILD YOURSELF. MEASURE THE HEIGHT RATHER THAN LENGTH IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.)

NAME	JOINT WEIGHT OF MOTHER AND CHILD	WEIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL	HEIGHT (Children over 1.5 years) LENGTH (Children under 1.5 years)
MOTHER	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM
	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ KG	___ . ___ CM

COMMENTS

.....

APPENDIX G

Table 1: Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters by gender and age using all three indicies (Sample size).

Nutritional status	Percentage of malnourished children 0-5 years	
	Sons (118)	Daughters (133)
Wasting (a)	2.6	6.0
Stunting (b)	40.7	26.3
Underweight (c)	19.5	15.0

(a) Weight for height / Wasting / Acute, recent malnourishment
 (b) Height for age / Stunting / Chronic, long-term malnourishment
 (c) Low weight for age.
 Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.

