

POL POT AT BAY: PEOPLE'S WAR
AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE 1991 PARIS AGREEMENTS

Stephen Russell Heder

School of Oriental and African Studies

University of London

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies

1999



ProQuest Number: 10672972

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10672972

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

ABSTRACT

This study traces the attempt by Pol Pot's Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) - renamed the *partie* of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) in 1982 - to regain the power it lost in January 1979 as a result of a Vietnamese invasion. It describes broadly the CPK/PDK armed struggle from 1979 to 1991 and examines in detail PDK efforts to return to power through the 1991 Paris Agreements, a peace settlement implemented by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

The study reinterprets the determinants of PDK political behaviour between its signature of the Paris Agreements and its decision in June 1992 not to implement the Agreements' provisions for demobilization of its armed forces under UNTAC auspices. It argues that despite the bitter souring of relations between Pol Pot and the Vietnamese Communists, PDK's turn-around can only be understood by taking seriously the doctrinal roots of PDK thinking within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, and in particular by treating it as an offshoot of the Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese Communist Party that gave birth to the CPK. It shows that the key concept upon which Pol Pot relied to fight his enemies after 1979 was the Vietnamese doctrine of "people's war", including its tactical prescriptions on Communist participation in parliamentary struggle and "peace agreements", such as that which the Vietnamese had signed in 1973.

A major theme of the study is the self-delusional aspects of PDK's obsession with the Vietnamese-derived notion of people's war. The key self-delusion was the belief that by ever-more-correctly following properly-selected aspects of the script of people's war, PDK could renew the political support among the Cambodian peasantry that had supposedly been the basis of Pol Pot's seizure of power in 1975. The study shows how such hopes were revealed as illusory under the domestic political circumstances resulting from UNTAC's implementation of the Paris Agreements. UNTAC created political openings that PDK's non-Communist rival, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), was able to exploit, while PDK was too unpopular to take advantage of similar opportunities and thus floundered.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	2
Table of Contents	3
Abbreviations and Acronyms	4
Map I: Cambodia's Provinces	5
Map II: PDK Sectors, ca 1982	6
Map III: PDK Sectors, ca 1991	7
Map IV: Route 12/Battlefield Number One	8
Map V: PDK Sectors, ca mid-1992	9
Introduction	10
Chapter One: People's War and Parliamentary Struggle	43
Chapter Two: People's War by War of Political Settlement	59
Chapter Three: Illusion, Reality and Paris Conferences	85
Chapter Four: UNAMIC: Waiting for UNTAC	115
Chapter Five: PDK Stymied in Political Struggle	135
Chapter Six: PDK Reassesses and Reacts	152
Chapter Seven: Pol Pot Weighs in as Failure Generates Division	179
Chapter Eight: PDK Versus UNTAC and the UN Secretary-General	204
Chapter Nine: PDK Resorts to Conventional and Militarized People's War	230
Chapter Ten: The Peace Process Ends	256
Chapter Eleven: Popular Sentiments Vis-à-vis PDK, SoC and FUNCINPEC	289
Conclusions	307
Bibliography	317


ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANKI: National Army of an Independent Kampuchea
CGDK: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CPAF: Cambodian People's Armed Forces
CPK: Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP: Cambodian People's Party
DK: Democratic Kampuchea
FUNCINPEC: National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
ICP: Indochinese Communist Party
KPRLF: Khmer People's National Liberation Front
NADK: National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
PDK: *partie* of Democratic Kampuchea
PRK: People's Republic of Kampuchea
SoC: State of Cambodia
SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMIC: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
VGNUFC: Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia
VoDK: Voice of Democratic Kampuchea
VoNADK: Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea


Map I: Cambodia's Provinces




Map II: PDK Sectors, ca 1982




Map III: PDK Sectors, ca 1991



Map IV: Route 12/Battlefield Number One (Showing District Names)



Map V: PDK Sectors, ca mid-1992



INTRODUCTION

The Collapse of Democratic Kampuchea and the Emergence of the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea

On 7 January 1979, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) collapsed in the face of large-scale military operations against it by the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which then oversaw the establishment of a rival regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The rapid collapse of the DK regime reflected the unpopularity ensuing from the results of the CPK's three-year, eight-month, 20-day rule, during which perhaps 1.7 million of Cambodia's population of more than seven million had died of execution, starvation or disease. It also reflected institutional weaknesses brought about by ever-widening waves of murderous purges within the CPK that had eliminated perhaps half its membership and were continuing to tear its top leadership apart. Purges earlier in 1978 had liquidated four of the nine members of the CPK's top leadership body, the Standing Committee of the Party's Central Committee. The Standing Committee members left alive were Party Secretary and DK Premier Pol Pot, Party First Deputy Secretary and DK Assembly of People's Representatives Chairman Nuon Chea, Party Second Deputy Secretary Ta Mok (who was concurrently Secretary of several of the "zones" into which the CPK divided Cambodia, including his old base area in the Southwest Zone), DK Deputy Premier in Charge of Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary (whose wife was the sister of Pol Pot's spouse), and alternate member Son Sen, who was DK Deputy Premier in Charge of National Defence and had also, until late 1978, overseen the CPK's purge apparatus on behalf of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea. By the end of the year, however, Pol Pot had set the purge apparatus against Son Sen and against almost all of Ta Mok's closest associates. The purges that were in process when the Vietnamese invasion was launched in late December 1978 continued into early 1979, but were then

suspended in an attempt to rally and consolidate the remaining leadership to fight the Vietnamese and the PRK. Among those thus saved was Son Sen.¹ Despite his survival, however, decades-old suspicions about him lingered in Pol Pot's mind,² and a long-standing animosity between Ta Mok and Son Sen remained barely below the surface. As a confidant of Ta Mok later said with reference to 1975-1978, Mok denigrated Son Sen as "a very arrogant intellectual type" who was "was good at talking and using big words, but ... lacked practical experience with the grass-roots and the front-lines on the battlefield."³ Former cadre speaking about events after 1979 continued to talk in terms of "profound rivalries" and "severe tensions" between the two men "linked to their ... theory and practice of war".⁴

Most of 1979 spelt destruction and chaos for the CPK and its armed forces, which were repeatedly hammered by the

¹ For accounts of CPK in power, see Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People* (Second Edition) (New York: Simon and Schuster, forthcoming); David P Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); David P Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Bangkok: Silkworm, 1993); Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Steve Heder, "Racism, Marxism, Labelling and Genocide in Ben Kiernan's *The Pol Pot Regime*", in *South East Asia Research* (Vol 5, No 2: July 1997); Karl D Jackson, ed, *Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), François Ponchaud, *Cambodia Year Zero* (London: Penguin Special, 1978); Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

² According to Ieng Sary, Pol Pot had had doubts about Son Sen's "courage" since at least the early 1960s, when the three men and a number of other senior Cambodian Communists had taken refuge in Vietnam. Author's interview, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 December 1996.

³ Author's interview with former courier for the Southwest Zone office, Thai-Cambodian border, 27 July 1990.

⁴ Christophe Peschoux, *Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-1990* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp.64-65. The English rendering is from a translation prepared by Peschoux.

Vietnamese military and shunned by a population profoundly alienated from it politically. However, by the end of the year, the CPK moved to reconsolidate itself politically and militarily. Overt political and military organizations were reshuffled, and its armed forces were renamed. In December, the CPK staged a series of meetings that announced decisions "to improve the composition of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea"⁵ in the hope of regaining some popular support. These included removing Pol Pot as Premier and replacing him with Khieu Samphan, a member of the CPK Central Committee who also retained his pre-invasion position as Chairman of the DK State Presidium. Although Khieu Samphan was deeply implicated in the pre-1979 purges and had been unswervingly loyal to Pol Pot, these facts were not well-known among Cambodians generally, with whom Khieu Samphan retained a reputation for incorruptibility and political moderation dating from the early 1960s.⁶ Whatever might have been gained by replacing Pol Pot with Khieu Samphan was probably offset, however, by the retention in the government of Ieng Sary and Son Sen, whose reputations were much more sullied, as Deputy Prime Ministers in charge of Foreign Affairs and National Defense, respectively. Moreover, Pol Pot was publicly designated the Chairman of a "Supreme Commission" of the "National Army of Democratic Kampuchea" (NADK), the new name for the CPK's armed forces, of which Pol Pot was also designated Commander-in-Chief. Nor did the appointment of Ta Mok as Vice-Chairman of the NADK Supreme Commission help. This was because of his reputation for arbitrary brutality, which was well-known in CPK circles and reinforced at the popular level through the

⁵ Democratic Kampuchea, "Press Communique and Statement of the Congress of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Kampuchean People's Representatives, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Representatives of the Democratic Kampuchea National Army and the Representatives of the various Government Departments", nd.

⁶ See Stephen Heder, *Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan* (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No 70, 1991).

role played by Southwest Zone cadre in large-scale and widespread executions of ordinary people before these cadre were themselves targeted for liquidation in the second half of 1978. Although less well-known, Kæ Pok, a CPK Central Committee member who was named Commission Under-Secretary-General (under Son Sen), was also notorious for involvement in killings.

By 1981, CPK and NADK had been revamped by the creation of a secret substructure that divided Cambodia into six politico-military sectors for which specific leading cadre were responsible and in which reorganized or newly-established NADK divisions operated. Running anti-clockwise around Cambodia starting from its northeast, the sectors were designated 1001, 1002, 1003, 102, 32 and 505 (see Map II). Sector 1001, comprising northeast Cambodia and Cambodia east of the Mekong, was headed by Son Sen. Sector 1002, which comprised central Cambodia, was headed by Kæ Pok. Sector 1003, which comprised north-central Cambodia, was headed by Ta Mok. Sector 102, comprising the northwestern quadrant of Batdambang, was headed by Ieng Sary. Sector 32, comprising a swath of Batdambang reaching from its western border down to the Tonle Sap lake, was headed by Ni Kân, Son Sen's younger brother. Sector 505, comprising southwestern Cambodia, was headed by Central Committee member Sam Bit, who had been Deputy Secretary of Ta Mok's old Southwest Zone. Sectors 32 and 505 were overseen by Pol Pot and Nuon Chea after the headquarters of the Central Committee was moved from Preah Vihear in Sector 1003 to Posat in Sector 505.⁷

⁷ This summary is based on a collection of CPK organizational data and NADK order of battle information gathered by the author in Thailand and Cambodia between 1979 and 1983. The sources included various political and military organigrams and orders of battle drawn up by Thai, Chinese, Vietnamese and US intelligence and diplomatic services and by the intelligence services of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces and the Sihanoukist National Army. This information was supplemented by the author's interviews with former NADK combatants in 1979-1983.

Each sector was governed by a Party-designated Battlefield Committee, which in turn supervised the Party Committees of the military units and organs for the administration of civilian populations under CPK control. General administrative work was assigned to committees composed predominantly of non-military cadre. However, almost everywhere, military cadre were predominant in the Battlefield Committees. This meant that civilian administrative bodies functioned to ensure that the people under their political control were fully mobilized to serve the NADK's military needs.⁸

One exception to this rule was Ieng Sary's Sector 102, the only place where the population and the administration were not fully organized "military style". This was in part because it had a relatively large civilian population, in part because it was the window on the movement which the CPK allowed the world to see, and in part because of Ieng Sary's political preferences.⁹ However, even in Ieng Sary's sector, military cadre formed the most powerful bloc within the Battlefield Committee to which the sector's military units and administration answered.¹⁰

As the new substructure was being consolidated without publicity, the CPK announced its self-dissolution on 6 December 1981.¹¹ This was another move aimed at allaying

⁸ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Kampuchea: After the Worst* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1985), pp.182-184.

⁹ Author's interviews with a former CPK administrative cadre, Thai-Cambodian border, 11 November 1984; and with a former member of Ieng Sary's staff, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1993.

¹⁰ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview of Ieng Sary, 10 November 1985.

¹¹ Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, "Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Concerning the Dissolution of the Communist Party of Kampuchea" (English typescript in the author's possession, dated

popular fears and hatreds focused on memories of what PRK and Vietnamese propaganda incessantly called "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique". By this time, the CPK Standing Committee had been expanded by the co-option into it of two Central Committee members: Khieu Samphan and Kæ Pok. Both ranked as alternates. Son Sen, meanwhile, had been granted full Standing Committee membership.¹²

In reality, the Party only went into deep clandestinity under Pol Pot's leadership. He and other cadre continued to play the same roles, relate to each other in the same way and function in the same manner as they had when the CPK's existence was publicly admitted. The Communist Party ceased to exist only in the sense that the terminology used to describe its structures, ideology and practices was euphemized. As Son Sen explained in a "guiding view" presented to former Party members on 17 January 1982, "we have ... stopped using any terms which belong too obviously to the old Communist regime and which may lead others to suspect that we haven't changed."¹³

The fictitious dissolution of the CPK nevertheless paved the way for the formation in mid-1982 of a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), in which what now called itself the *partie* of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)¹⁴ joined in a "loose" coalition with two non-Communist, anti-Vietnamese groupings: the National United Front for an

6 December 1981), pp.3-5.

¹² This conclusion is based on the author's discussions with former CPK cadre, Chinese journalists, Thai military intelligence officers and US diplomats in 1980-1981.

¹³ See the author's translation of the notebook of a senior PDK cadre: *Dossier of Documents: 80-81* (sic), pp.148-150. I am grateful to Nate Thayer and David W Ashley for providing me with a copy of this document.

¹⁴ The French term *partie* is used here to translate the Khmer term *pheaki*, which like *partie* refers to a party to an agreement, rather than a political party.

Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). FUNCINPEC was headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's chief of State from 1941 until 1970, while the KPNLF was headed by Son Sann, a former prime minister under Sihanouk. Both FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were constructed in 1979-1981 on the basis of dozens of small anti-Vietnamese, anti-CPK movements that had emerged under mostly local leadership in the period of political chaos and thus opportunities that had followed the collapse of CPK power but preceded the consolidation of the PRK. The core of movements upon which FUNCINPEC was built believed they could become popular by offering Cambodians the eventual prospect of social and political peace. While remaining anti-Pol Pot and anti-Vietnamese, FUNCINPEC thus presented itself as a core for national reconciliation among most followers of both PDK and PRK, under the flag of restoration of Sihanouk's pre-1970 constitutional monarchy. KPNLF, the leadership of which was heavily influenced by professional military officers, was more stridently anti-Communist and more or less overtly critical of royalism. While some civilian KPNLF leaders, including Son Sann, talked seriously about making Cambodia into a parliamentary democracy, the movement's overall vision for the country's future was rule by highly-educated technocrats.¹⁵

Along with FUNCINPEC, KPNLF was forced into the CGDK arrangement by China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the US. However, the terms of the coalition allowed all three *parties* to retain their own armed forces and administrative structures in separate "liberated zones", although these never extended far into Cambodia from the Thai border areas in which all three *parties* were given sanctuary.

¹⁵ These characterizations are based on numerous conversations with leaders of the movements upon which FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were based, who were interviewed by the author on the Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia during 1979-1981.

Ironically, the formation of the CGDK marked a further militarization of PDK at both the symbolic and substantive levels. The establishment of the CGDK meant the dissolution of the DK government. Its structures were replaced by a three-man CGDK "inner cabinet", chaired by Sihanouk, who was declared President of the DK state. Khieu Samphan, who became DK state Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Affairs, was its number two figure. The third member was Son Sann, who was designated CGDK Prime Minister. The remainder of the CGDK Council of Ministers comprised four "Coordination Committees": Finance and Economy, Defence, Culture and Education, and Health and Social Affairs. Each committee had one representative of the three *parties* to the CGDK, and all members were of "ministerial rank". PDK's ministers included Ieng Sary for Finance and Economy and Son Sen for Defence.¹⁶

The structure of the CGDK might have suggested that within it, PDK was headed by Khieu Samphan, with Ieng Sary, Son Sen and other ministers working beneath him. These lines of authority, however, were never formalized. Instead, the Supreme Commission of the NADK, still headed by Pol Pot, became the only publicly identified centre of PDK policy-making,¹⁷ an arrangement that perhaps inadvertently revealed the reality of domination of PDK by Pol Pot and NADK cadre. At lower levels, this situation was reflected in complaints inside PDK ranks that after the formation of the CGDK, military men moved into posts previously held by non-military cadre and were "monopolizing" political influence in PDK

¹⁶ See Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Information and Press, Document No 01/82/CG, "Declaration of the Formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea", dated 22 June 1992; and Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Press Release, "Proclamation of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, Signed on July 9 and Announced by the Radio of Democratic Kampuchea on July 11, 1982", dated 9 July 1982.

¹⁷ *After the Worst*, p.182.

administrative bodies.¹⁸

PDK and the Indochinese Communist Party

The outbreak of full-scale war between DK and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1978, and the contest between PDK and PRK for administrative control of Cambodia after 1979, marked the final disappearance of the dream of Indochinese Communist solidarity originally fostered by the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Founded in 1930 to cover the whole of French colonial amalgam of Indochina, it had staged its dissolution in 1945, providing the script for CPK in 1981. CPK's leading troika, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, had all become members of the ICP during the First Indochina War (1945-1954). That conflict pitted Communist forces against what they denounced as French colonialism, US imperialism and their local lackeys, which in Cambodia meant then King Norodom Sihanouk. Nuon Chea and Ta Mok had first become connected to other senior leaders like Ieng Sary and Son Sen through Pol Pot, who had been peripherally involved in a Communist-sponsored circle of "Marxist-Leninist" students in France, of which Ieng Sary and Son Sen remained members when Pol Pot returned to Cambodia in 1953. Their sojourn abroad also connected them to Khieu Samphan, who later studied in France and headed a leftist student organization there, after the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina had brought a period of peace and promised non-violent political party contestation to Cambodia.

The covert ICP ceased to exist in Vietnam in 1951, when it was replaced by the public, Vietnam-specific Vietnam Workers' Party (later the Vietnam Communist Party). However, the ICP had continued to function secretly in Cambodia until the mid-1950s, after which a separate Communist Party had been

¹⁸ Personal Communication on 22 February 1985 from a source who wishes to remain anonymous, citing information from persons who left PDK zones in 1982-1983.

clandestinely constructed, first as the Cambodia Workers' Party in 1960, and then as the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1971. Attempts by Cambodian Communists at legal political struggle through a front organization that participated in elections and through covert infiltration of government political institutions were violently repressed by Sihanouk, and eventually they launched an armed struggle in 1968. The Party remained clandestine after the overthrow of Sihanouk by his adversaries to the right in 1970, and throughout its ultimately successful, Vietnamese Communist-backed guerilla war of 1970-1975, to which the deposed Sihanouk had lent his support. The CPK only publicly revealed its existence, with Pol Pot as Secretary, in 1977, two years after it had won power.

Despite the intertwined origins of the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist parties in the ICP, they had become increasingly antagonistic to each another in the late 1960s, during the Second Indochina War, when the US intervened with troops and airpower on the side of anti-Communist forces in the civil war in Vietnam. Similarly, despite the appearance of cooperation between the overtly Communist Vietnamese and their covert Cambodian comrades after Sihanouk was overthrown, relations remained severely strained and deteriorated after both parties seized power in April 1975. Border conflicts fed into wider political differences and erupted into public hostilities in late 1977, which initiated the Third Indochina War and led to the Vietnamese invasion that overthrew Pol Pot the next year.¹⁹

¹⁹ For accounts of the CPK's ICP origins and the deterioration into war of the relations between the two Communist Parties see Christopher E Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Report Series No 28, 1995); Motoo Furuta, "The Indochinese Communist Party's Division into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Cambodia and Laos, 1948-1951", in Takashi Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta, *Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1992); Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E Goscha, *Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy*

This Study

This study examines the attempt by CPK to recoup the political power it lost in January 1979. It looks broadly at the CPK/PDK armed struggle from January 1979 to October 1991 and in detail at PDK efforts to position itself for a return to power through the political settlement crafted by the Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, which Khieu Samphan and Son Sen signed on PDK's behalf in Paris on 23 October 1991. This manoeuvring was subsumed in what PDK called a struggle to resolve one of two "key issues" of the implementation of the Paris Agreements by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In PDK's negotiations with UNTAC, this issue was cast in terms of the extent to which political power was to be taken away from the State of Cambodia (SoC), the successor to the PRK, and bestowed on the Supreme National Council (SNC) of Cambodia, the membership of which included PDK, SoC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. In practice on the ground, the issue was engaged through PDK's attempts to seize power in the Cambodian countryside through what it initially defined as primarily political means.²⁰

Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975 (Monash: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Paper on Southeast Asia: 35, 1995); Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975* (London: Verso, 1985); Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War, A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986); Stephen Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming); and Becker, *When the War Was Over*.

²⁰ This study does not cover the second "key issue", PDK allegations that Vietnamese "forces", including not only military forces but civilians who were supposedly Vietnamese military personnel "in disguise", remained present in massive numbers in Cambodia, contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreements. As noted below, this allegation was false. Further discussion of the issue is precluded by space limitations. However, the author believes that the evidence shows that the ways in which PDK's "anti-Vietnamese" struggle was conceived and pursued were very much Vietnamese Communist in origins and inspiration.

The study attempts to reinterpret the determinants of CPK/PDK political behaviour between 1979 and mid-1992, in particular through an examination of PDK's decision to sign the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 and then - in June 1992 - not to implement the Agreement's key military provision, which required the demobilization of NADK under the auspices of international troop contingents operating under UNTAC command. This came amidst a resumption of NADK guerilla warfare in violation of the Agreements' cease-fire requirements, and amidst clear signs that PDK was going to boycott their main political clause, which provided for UN-organized elections throughout Cambodia.

The study attempts to fill a recognized gap in the literature on PDK's interaction with the Paris Agreements and the UN. Writing in 1996, peace-keeping researcher Wang Jianwei lamented that "exactly why the PDK changed its strategy" between October 1991 and June 1992 remained "anybody's guess".²¹ In 1997, Cambodian political scientist Sorpong Peou similarly wrote that "why the UN failed to coax" PDK "to play the political game" by the rules of the Paris Agreements was "a puzzle". PDK's "true motivations" in rejecting UN coaxing were still the subject of inconclusive debate.²² Certainly, literature on peace-keeping has continued to put forward alternative interpretations of PDK motivations, as overviews by conflict resolution scholars Michael Doyle²³ and Trevor Findlay²⁴ show. In particular,

²¹ Wang Jianwei, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia* (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), pp.45-51.

²² Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.177-178,270.

²³ Michael W Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.24,32,68-69.

²⁴ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.49-51.

questions remained about the extent to which, as international law scholar Steven Ratner put it, PDK signed the Paris Agreements "with the deliberate, hidden, intent of violating them".²⁵ PDK behaviour left international organizations theorists like Stephen Stedman, who attempted seriously to work it into an overall taxonomy of what calls he "spoilers" of peace processes, perplexed. Even while fitting it into his category of "total spoilers", he described as "inconsistent" PDK's behaviour between the signature of the Paris Agreements in 1991 and the middle of 1992.²⁶

The study argues that despite the bitter souring over many years of relations between Pol Pot and the Vietnamese Communists, the PDK's turn-around can only be fully understood by taking seriously the doctrinal roots and parameters of PDK thinking within the Marxist-Leninist tradition. It argues in particular that although the general canons of Stalin and Mao Zedong thought laid out the broad parameters of its doctrine, the CPK/PDK is better understood as an offshoot of the Vietnamese Communist movement that gave birth to it in the 1940s and against which it violently turned in the 1970s. In this sense, the study conceptualizes CPK/PDK as a "post-colonial" product of the Vietnamese Communist project of an Indochina-wide revolution. It suggests that despite the bloody transformation of the Cambodian Communist movement from an Vietnamese-led auxiliary force of an Indochinese revolution into a vehemently anti-Vietnamese organization, it did not escape from reliance on Vietnamese Communist doctrine and tactics. It did not do so even though in 1975-1978 Pol Pot had purged tens of thousands of Cambodian Communists who were labelled "Vietnamese agents", and even though it was a

²⁵ Steven R Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.158-159.

²⁶ Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security* (Vol 22, No 2, Fall 1997), p.27.

Vietnamese invasion that precipitated the collapse of his Democratic Kampuchea regime in 1979. PDK nevertheless continued very much to carry within it more or less reworked, internalized and inverted elements of Vietnamese Communist doctrine, alongside other elements. Thus, "Pol Pot-ism" remained embedded in the original wider project of Indochinese Communism.²⁷

The key concept upon which Pol Pot relied to fight his enemies after 1979 was the Vietnamese doctrine of "people's war", including its tactical prescriptions on Communist participation in parliamentary struggle and "peace agreements", such as that which the Vietnamese had signed in 1973, two years before they seized power throughout Vietnam. Within this framework, this study therefore insists on the need to take seriously what it portrays as PDK's self-understanding. Doctrine is treated not as a justification or pretext for action, but rather something that "really" informs and constrains political behaviour.

The study also argues that although Pol Pot relied on the Vietnamese model, at the same time he characteristically assumed and demanded that the Cambodian revolution could and should out-do, out-achieve and thus somehow surpass the

²⁷ For general presentations of this argument as applied to anti-colonial movements in the "Third World", see Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, "Shifting Imaginaries: Decolonization, Internal Colonization, Postcoloniality", in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, *Decolonization of Imagination* (London: Zed, 1995), pp.2-9; Catherine Hall, "Histories, Empires and the Post-Colonial Moment", Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, eds, *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.69; Gareth Griffiths, "Representation and Production: Issues of Control in Post-colonial Cultures", in Harish Triverdi and Meenakshi Mukherjee, *Interrogating Post-Colonialism: Theory, Text and Context* (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996), p.24; and Helen M Hintjens, *Alternatives to Independence: Explorations in Post-Colonial Relations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), p.4.

original.²⁸ This particular nationalist twist in doctrine stretched the spectrum of potential disagreement within its terms. Dissent took place as a debate about the extent to which the Cambodian revolution would be able to achieve more than the Vietnamese had tried to attain, although only occasionally was explicit reference made to the origins of the terms of debate in the doctrine of those who were now the enemy.²⁹ Although the elasticity of a doctrine like people's war provided room both for self-interested behaviour and intense disagreement, it was not merely window dressing or a source of points for political debate by politicians manoeuvring for power position in a deadly political game.

This Study and the Literature on "Pol Potism"

This study thus contradicts the conclusions of works by

²⁸ In his interview with the author Ieng Sary said the CPK Standing Committee had decided in September 1975 "to establish a more formidable communist foundation for the country more quickly than that of Vietnam," such that the Vietnamese Communist "wouldn't be able to keep up" with Cambodia's revolution. This, he said, "was the common view, the common understanding, of the leadership".

The post-colonial ambiguities in the CPK attitude toward the Vietnamese was summed up in the dictum of Party Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea that the Cambodian Communist movement was "racing to put distance" between itself and the Vietnamese "in every way". While he glossed this as meaning the CPK should not "owe them anything or be entangled with them in any way", the phrasing also contained the notion of outpacing them. See the "confessions" of Chou Chet alias Si, "IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978" (handwritten document with pagination illegible dated 9 May 1978; pagination starting from p.1 supplied), p.13. The original Khmer versions of this and other "confessions" cited here and in subsequent chapters are on file in the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, the site of the CPK's "S-21" Central Security Office when it was in power. Often extracted under torture or other forms of severe duress, these documents nevertheless provide largely factual autobiographical frameworks detailing the political careers and relationships of those detained at S-21, into which forced and fantastic "confessions" of their supposed "betrayal" of the CPK are woven.

²⁹ As will be seen, however, Pol Pot himself was to do so in a speech in February 1992.

historians such as Ben Kiernan and Michael Vickery, who have portrayed CPK/PDK as only superficially "Communist" or simply masquerading as Communist, and who suggest it is better understood as a racist, (auto)-genocidal, ultra-national, peasant populist and/or anarchistic organization. The argument here does not deny that CPK/PDK displayed some or most of these characteristics. Rather, it suggests that to the extent that it did, they were embedded in and acted out through self-beliefs that were thought by the actors in a particular set of historically-determined Marxist-Leninist terms. In this regard, the study also challenges the emphasis placed in the work of comparative political scientists such as Karl Jackson and Kenneth Quinn on "Maoist" influence over CPK/PDK. Again, the point is not to deny such influences, but to reveal extent to which the earlier, more formative and direct influences of Vietnamese Communism remained at least as important.

This study also suggests that these authors have overestimated the significance of "Cambodian culture" and the fact that some senior CPK leaders had once been students in France as explanations of CPK and PDK behaviour. Here they are echoing arguments originally put forward in the seminal book by the Jesuit historian François Ponchaud. Ponchaud identified Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan as the key "ideologists" of what he called CPK's "revolution of the ultras". He explicitly dismissed what he considered the fantastic belief of many Cambodians that the CPK's behaviour was "inspired by the Vietnamese" Communists. Instead, according to Ponchaud, "the methods employed" by the CPK showed "every mark of the Cambodian character", which he proclaimed reflected a "way of reasoning" that was "bewildering to Cartesian minds", even if it adhered "strictly to the rules" of its own culturally-specific "internal logic", which he denigrated as simple, absurd and unrealistic.³⁰

³⁰ Ponchaud, *Year Zero*, pp.156,159-160,164,214.

Kiernan's view that the CPK can neither be understood as a Marxist-Leninist movement nor comprehended in terms familiar from the practices of other Communist parties has been elaborated in a series of works since the late 1970s,³¹ culminating in his 1996 book on the CPK in power. In the latter, he imputes a more generic totalitarianism to a CPK that he says is best understood in terms of the "racialist ideology and the quest for total power" by "the French-educated Pol Pot group" within its leadership.³² Such characterizations of CPK form the basis for the understanding of PDK behaviour vis-à-vis the Paris Agreements put forward by Kiernan in a 1993 book, where he also characterizes the PDK leadership not as Communists, but genocidists.³³

Vickery is even more extreme in arguing that CPK and PDK were not Communists. He suggests that Pol Pot and other CPK/PDK leaders only claimed to be Communists on a few occasions when they hoped this would help bestow popular "affective value" on what they were doing, that is, help them tap pro-Communist sentiments among Cambodians. In his view, Pol Pot and those loyal to him consistently chose "a different path from any of the Asian" Communist movements that "could be considered either as potential models or relevant subjects for comparison." He suggests it would be better to explain both CPK policies in 1975-1978 and PDK policies thereafter in terms of Thomas More's Utopianism, Mikhail Bakunin's or Spanish anarchism, Pitrim Sorokin's peasantism or of some sort of

³¹ For an early summation, see Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds, *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981* (London: Zed, 1982).

³² Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, pp.vii,26.

³³ Ben Kiernan, "Introduction" and "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences", in Ben Kiernan, ed, *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community* (New Haven: Monograph Series No. 41, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993).

Cambodian "old tradition". He argues that PDK's post-1979 behaviour in particular proves its non-Communist nature.³⁴

This study broadens and further refines my counter-case that CPK/PDK was very much inspired by the Marxist-Leninist tradition elaborated by Stalin and endorsed not only by the Chinese but also the Vietnamese Communists.³⁵ It provides further evidence of the ahistorical nature of the picture constructed by Ponchaud, elaborated by Kiernan and endorsed by Vickery and others of a CPK and PDK leadership increasingly dominated (as Kiernan puts it) by a "Pol Pot Group" comprised of "most of Pol Pot's Paris friends", or (as Vickery puts it) resulting from a process whereby "an original group of Cambodian communists, closely tied to Vietnamese Communism, were gradually pushed aside by a group of young French-educated intellectuals" who abandoned Cambodian Communism's origins. It adds post-1979 evidence against the notion that "orthodox Marxist" elements were increasingly excluded from the CPK/PDK leadership by some sort of coherent "urban, French-educated, radical and anti-Vietnamese" faction. It buttresses my argument that this picture of a French-educated faction is a misleading political label with little explanatory power. It furnishes more proof that Pol Pot's purported "friends" from Paris days were not by definition his permanent political allies. Its documentation of the marginalization by mid-1992 of former students-in-Paris Ieng Sary and Son Sen shows that Pol Pot tended as before 1979 to place more faith both in Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, whose backgrounds were similar to that of cadre whom Kiernan describes as leaders of "the old, pro-Vietnamese generation of Khmer communists".³⁶ It demonstrates that just as when CPK

³⁴ Vickery, *1975-1982*, pp.256-257,264,275,278-279,281-290.

³⁵ For a full-fledged critique of Kiernan's perspective on CPK in power, see Heder, "Racism, Marxism, Labelling and Genocide".

³⁶ Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, pp.6,11,14,33,59-60,64,93,186.

was in power, opposition to Pol Pot was just as likely, perhaps more likely, to come from within French-educated milieux as from other circles.

Contrary to Vickery, this study also shows that Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan were Communists who eschewed a label they feared would scare off many Cambodians, but dogmatically followed Communist policies and practices even if they disguised, in public at least, all debt to the Indochinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties.³⁷ The post-1979 data is incomprehensible from the perspective of Vickery's argument that it contains no trace of any Asian Communist model. Ironically, it is precisely by Vickery's criterion of the extent to which CPK and PDK policies and practices are identifiable as Communist, including Vietnamese Communist, that the origins of CPK and PDK can best be identified, and it is precisely PDK's post-1979 behaviour that demonstrates its particular Communist origins.

Whereas Kiernan and Vickery seem to be proactively assisting in camouflaging CPK/PDK's Marxist-Leninist origins, political scientists Karl Jackson and Kenneth Quinn seem to be more naively taken in by its concealment of the extent of its doctrinal debt to Vietnamese Communism. Moreover, their essentialized Maoist-cultural explanations of CPK's policy choices in the 1970s cannot be squared with the evidence adduced in this study of PDK's readiness to negotiate in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s, its eagerness to participate in parliamentary struggle and its willingness to reduce its armed strength.

Thus, Jackson's notions of the CPK's "radical egalitarian political culture" help little to explain PDK's behaviour vis-

³⁷ Vickery, 1975-1982, pp.256-257. Disguising was part of the same thinking that informed Son Sen's guiding view about using Communist terminology, while the denial of the debt was in line with Nuon Chea's insistence that Cambodian Communists should put distance between themselves and the Vietnamese.

à-vis the Paris Agreements. Nor does his characterization of the CPK leaders as "sectarians". Even if they were "radicals" and "sectarians", that does not explain how they understood and approached the implementation of the Paris Agreements. It is difficult to reconcile his picture of a "peasant-led, completely egalitarian revolution" directed by those CPK leaders prone to act "immediately and with zealotry" to achieve "total revolution" in 1975-1978³⁸ with the choices later made by the supposedly most "radical" and "sectarian" of them all (eg, Pol Pot and the survivors of his purges).

The problem here is not an implausible general denial of Marxist, Leninist or Communist roots. Jackson has no difficulty in seeing that Pol Pot, et al, "were communists", or in including Stalin's and Mao's teachings in "amalgam of nostrums of the left" that were among their "intellectual antecedents". He stresses that the goals sought by the CPK when it was in power "were far from unique", and parts of them mirrored "the thinking of radicals surrounding Mao Zedong during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution". However, influenced by Ponchaud and Kiernan, he accepts the notion that these goals were pursued mainly by a "small elite of French-educated intellectuals". Thus, not only does Jackson's work suffer from an overemphasis on the Maoist elements in CPK policies and practices,³⁹ but wrongly hypothesizes that departures from it can be explained by Khieu Samphan's reading in Paris of Frantz Fanon and Samir Amin.⁴⁰

³⁸ Karl D Jackson, "Introduction: The Khmer Rouge in Context", in Karl D Jackson, ed, *Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.5-9.

³⁹ Jackson, "Introduction", pp.7-8; "Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge", pp.241,245; and "The Ideology of Total Revolution", pp.38-39, all in *Rendezvous*.

⁴⁰ Jackson, "Intellectual Origins", pp.241,247-249. There is no evidence to support the idea put forward by Jackson and others that Khieu Samphan's doctoral dissertation, completed in France in the late 1950s, was a basis for CPK policy. Moreover, although Khieu Samphan eventually became totally loyal politically to Pol Pot, the relationship was one of Pol Pot

Other deviations are explained in terms of "centuries-old Khmer" beliefs.⁴¹

Jackson accepts at face value the CPK leadership's expressions of "contempt" for Vietnamese models and precedents. He thus reproduces Ponchaud's rejection of the possibility of Vietnamese influence on CPK and aligns himself with Kiernan and Vickery in not taking into account the extent to which this contempt masked emulation. In this regard, it is important to notice how Jackson misreads the significance of evidence that in seizing and exercising power, Pol Pot and other CPK leaders seemed "to glorify revolutionary violence for its own sake" and "relied disproportionately on raw physical coercion rather than on party organization, re-education or the mass media to accomplish their ends". For him, it is significant precisely because of the extent to which they thus acted "in sharp contrast with their Vietnamese communist contemporaries". Indeed, he argues that their relative non-use of "political mobilization" was their key deviation from the Vietnamese Communist model. This seems in turn to be his explanation for their tendency to resort to "a steady stream of executions" in 1975-1978.⁴² The post-1979 evidence presented in this study, and particularly the evidence of Pol Pot's personal obsession with the importance of "political mobilization" as opposed to military struggle, suggests that the problem was not the lack of aspirations to adhere to the Vietnamese model, but what to do when doing so proved unworkable and thus unsuccessful. This was not simple deviation, but rather a resort to violent methods in an attempt to appear to achieve what others, including the Vietnamese, had achieved (or more).

domination of Khieu Samphan, not one in which Khieu Samphan influenced Pol Pot. Heder, *Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan*, pp.3,8-22.

⁴¹ Jackson, "Intellectual Origins", pp.249-250.

⁴² Jackson, "Ideology", pp.63,73,77-78; "Intellectual Origins", pp.243-244.

Kenneth Quinn similarly overlooks CPK's Indochinese Communist origins and overestimates the importance of other influences. He goes too far in arguing that the CPK's "radical Communist programs in Cambodia were derived almost in toto from left-wing Chinese Communism". In his attempt to explain CPK violence and terror, Quinn also tries to fill in the gap that remains after Chinese Communism and Stalinism are factored in by falling back on Cambodian "cultural factors" and relating them to the supposed predominance in the CPK leadership of a small group of "alienated" intellectuals educated in France.⁴³

The Vietnamese Model and the PDK's Approach to the Paris Agreements

This study's alternative emphasis on the internalization within CPK/PDK of Vietnamese Communist doctrine is woven into its account of the interaction between the PDK and its two main adversaries inside Cambodia from October 1991 to the middle of 1992. These were SoC and UNTAC. PDK had for years denigrated SoC officials as "puppets" of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and resumed doing so shortly after the Agreements were signed. It eventually condemned UNTAC as dominated by "the Allies". This term, apparently drawn from the World War Two-era historiography of the Vietnamese Communists, was used by PDK to refer to "Western Superpowers" of the early 1990s, above all the US.

This study does not attempt a detailed assessment of the PDK assertion that SoC and UNTAC were dominated by external powers in the alleged manner. However, the extensive evidence on which it is based suggests that both assertions were very dubious. It indicates instead that the proclaimed withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 indeed marked the

⁴³ Kenneth Quinn, "Explaining the Terror", in *Rendezvous*, pp. 219, 231-236, 240.

end of substantial Vietnamese control over SoC,⁴⁴ and that the numerous cross-currents of international influence upon UNTAC from the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and other signatories of the Paris Agreements meant that it was not a tool of any one superpower or group of powers, but a much more diffuse and relatively autonomous embodiment of the "international community" in Cambodia.

If the evident falseness of PDK's doctrinally-based beliefs about patterns of external domination of SoC and UNTAC is an aside of the study, the major theme is the self-delusional aspects of PDK's obsession with the Vietnamese-derived notion of people's war. One key self-delusion was the belief that by ever-more-correctly following properly-selected aspects of the script of people's war, PDK could eventually

⁴⁴ UNTAC ultimately concluded that by the time of the October 1991 Paris Agreements, all former Vietnamese military units had withdrawn from Cambodia. Although several thousand Vietnamese former troops may have remained in the country, most were "deserters or retired from the Vietnamese army" and had "no formal connection with the Vietnamese government". UN military analysts believed some still had weapons and connections with the SoC armed forces. Some of these individual Vietnamese may have "performed training and technical duties, such as armoured vehicle gunnery and maintenance and logistics coordination", or occupied staff positions in "operational planning or intelligence". However, most were unarmed and unaffiliated with SoC. UN information also suggested that although there were possibly some "Vietnamese forces in Cambodia working for [their] government", these were "small in number". Finally, some of the settled Vietnamese communities living in Cambodia were "'rather well-structured and organised' into Associations of Overseas Vietnamese (*Hoi Viet Kieu*) with quasi-governmental functions often encadred by demobilized officers and men" of the Vietnamese armed forces. These Vietnamese ex-armymen were typically "not formerly residents of Cambodia, but had remained there after demobilization from the Vietnamese armed forces. ... As cadre in the association structure, they exerted some authority over people of Vietnamese extraction coming from families with generations of residence in Cambodia." However, except to lobby SoC on behalf of the Vietnamese communities, these former soldiers had little influence on the political process. UNTAC, *Report on UNTAC's Activities: The First Six Months (15 March-15 September 1992)*, p.17; UNTAC, *Cambodia: A Military Assessment of the Situation*, "The Vietnamese Issue", pp.1-2; and UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Background Note to the Vietnamese Massacre in Kampung Tralach", 6 February 1993, np.

recapture the power CPK had lost when Pol Pot's regime had collapsed in the face of Vietnam's 1979 invasion. Another key delusion was that implementation of the script would make possible a recapturing of power through renewal of the political support among the Cambodian peasantry that had supposedly been the basis of CPK's original seizure of power in 1975. In this make-believe world, PDK was increasingly well-placed, as the result of its protracted implementation since 1979 of people's war, to build on popular support in the Cambodian countryside in order to switch over from military to political struggle. Participation in peace treaties and elections was fully compatible with accentuating and relying upon the "popular" aspect of "people's war", as long as precautions were taken to ensure that a return to armed struggle remained possible if it was judged necessary.

However, as this study shows, the reality was that the PDK was simply unable to erase or otherwise overcome popular memories of the CPK (auto-)genocide, which Pol Pot and other top leaders denied and probably believed had not occurred.⁴⁵ In this regard, this study takes up where earlier detailed research on popular attitudes towards PDK policies and practices has left off. This includes my own field inquiries between 1979 and 1983 and the work of Christophe Peschoux in

⁴⁵ According to what Pol Pot told journalist Nate Thayer on 16 October 1997, the leadership reviewed the events of 1975-78 in 1987 and came to a consensus view on what had occurred. The results of the review were made public in a pamphlet issued in the name of the Office of The Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Foreign Affairs (ie, Khieu Samphan), entitled "What Are the Truth and Justice About the Accusations Against Democratic Kampuchea of Mass Killings from 1975 to 1978?" (np: 15 July 1987). It vastly underestimated the true death toll and shifted almost all the responsibility for it to alleged "enemies" of the PDK. According to personal communications to the author from Thayer, in his interviews with Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan in 1997-1998, they did not deviate significantly from the position outlined in the pamphlet. Ieng Sary conceded in his interview with the author that a genocide had taken place, although he argued it was not the result of a "planned genocide aimed ... at making a race disappear", but of a confluence of various other policies.

1989-1990.⁴⁶ Like these earlier efforts, it combines data from interviews with former PDK personnel and "ordinary" Cambodians with close readings of internal PDK documents to build up a picture of PDK's self-understanding and popular reactions to it. It extends into the 1990s the conclusion that PDK remained politically crippled by its genocidal past, even if it had previously managed to obtain enough tactical popular acquiescence to persuade parts of itself and some foreign observers that it had overcome this past.

The study thus shows how the PDK leadership consistently misinterpreted popular dislike of SoC and tactical popular accommodation with its own armed forces as evidence of positive, dedicated support just waiting to be tapped and manifested in various ways, including through a "free and fair" election organized by the UN or anyone who would not rig the results against the revolution. It shows that, in fact, despite exhortations from the top to be more "political", PDK's guerilla insurgents *cum* would-be electoral activists could only advance to the extent that they relied on military means, and only under circumstances where Cambodian villagers had no political alternatives other than living with SoC or supporting PDK against SoC.

The article of faith that the political attitude of the peasantry was a critical political factor, itself embedded in the notion of people's war, was not implausible, if only because the peasantry comprised the overwhelming majority of Cambodia's population. The problem, this study suggests, was

⁴⁶ For published and unpublished results of my own research see Steve Heder, *Kampuchea: Occupation and Resistance* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1980); Steve Heder, "Kampuchea: October 1979-August 1980" (typescript, 1980); Steve Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-Mortem", *Indochina Issues* (No 12, January 1981); Steve Heder, "From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages" (typescript, 1981); Steve Heder, "The National Army for the Liberation of the Khmer Populace and the National Front for the Liberation of the Khmer Populace" (typescript, August 1983).

that peasant animosity vis-à-vis SoC, like urban opposition to it, rebounded not to the advantage of PDK, but above all to FUNCINPEC. Yet for the PDK leadership, this was simply not possible because it was contrary to every tenet of people's war. There was no place in the theory for this danger, which was contrary to the basic Marxist-Leninist manichaeism that underpinned the notion of people's war. Just as no credible third force had emerged in the course of the Vietnamese (or Chinese) Communists' struggle against their enemies, PDK assumed, no such thing could well up from Cambodian sources. In the PDK view, FUNCINPEC (and KPNLF) could ultimately be but bit players on the people's war political and military battlefield. Even if they could at times tip crucial balances in PDK's favour, ultimately what mattered for PDK was the political attitude of the peasantry, and PDK believed that peasant support for it meant that it would hold the whip hand over its former coalition partners in any political process, whether electoral or mobilization for political violence.

This study shows how such hopes were revealed as mistaken under the domestic political circumstances created by PDK's initial and partial commitment to the terms of the Paris Agreements and the way in which UNTAC carried out those Agreements. Above all, UNTAC's implementation of the Paris Agreements created openings for FUNCINPEC and KPNLF to try to enhance their popularity, which FUNCINPEC soon began to do and which KPNLF was also able to do to some extent, even while PDK was unable to exploit similar opportunities and thus floundered. For Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders, however, the fact that PDK was not advancing politically vis-à-vis SoC once the Paris Agreements were signed meant that their implementation was being sabotaged by Vietnamese and the US through SoC and UNTAC, just as the Vietnamese Communists argued the peace pact they had signed in 1973 was sabotaged by the US and its Vietnamese "lackeys". Pol Pot and other PDK leaders interpreted PDK's lack of popular support as a justification for withdrawing from an electoral contest that

they believed was being rigged against them, and then for falling instead back on violence. This formula for snatching military victory from the jaws of political defeat, however, also assumed much more popular support than PDK really had. Its popular base would not sustain even the kind of political fig-leaf for a military onslaught that characterized the offensive by the Vietnamese Communists in which they bypassed their 1973 peace agreement and "liberated" the whole of Vietnam of 1975. Instead, PDK's resort to violence only further isolated it from the population. The facts on the ground thus made a nonsense of Pol Pot's theory-based revolutionary optimism and determination that if only PDK adhered even more tenaciously to the formula that the Vietnamese Communists had successfully used in 1973-75, it could not fail to do as well if not better than that in Cambodia.

This study's narrative of events during the eight months from October 1991 to June 1992 also reveals more clearly than earlier treatments why PDK could find reasons for blaming its popular weakness not only on SoC, but also UNTAC. It comes as no surprise that SoC was determined to prevent PDK political advances, and was prepared to use violence to do so. However, some may be surprised at the extent to which the record demonstrates that UNTAC cannot be characterized as having appeased PDK, either in intent or in action. Overall, UNTAC's policies and practices did not facilitate PDK military or political advances, and to the extent that UNTAC tended occasionally to show bias, this was more against PDK than for it.⁴⁷ Thus, while PDK was wrong to imagine that SoC was

⁴⁷ In this regard, the evidence suggests that the direct cause of this tendency was not the influence of the US or other foreign political actors, but of Sihanouk, who had turned over leadership of FUNCINPEC to his son, Norodom Ranariddh, in 1991, and who from October 1991 aligned himself de facto with SoC against PDK. A full treatment of Sihanouk's motivations are beyond the ambit of this work, but an initial reading of Sihanouk's actions suggest his primary political goal was to achieve a position of direct influence over the existing SoC

controlled from behind by the Vietnamese Communists and UNTAC by an alliance structure headed by the US, it is clear from the record that the combined effect of what SoC and UNTAC did (or did not) do was such as to ensure that PDK was forced to test its belief that the movement enjoyed widespread support among the Cambodian people.

The PDK's sole solution when it failed the test was to rejig the balance between the political and military aspects of people's war in favour of greater violence. It continued to assume that the political support was there; that if it was not manifest, then it was being repressed by SoC (acting as a puppet of Vietnam) with the help of UNTAC (subverted by the US); and that the repression could be swept away by renewed resort to revolutionary violence. The PDK presumption was that FUNCINPEC, Sihanouk and KPNLF would be swept along in the upsurge, and that UNTAC would be powerless to resist the popular tide. PDK's belief in its peasant support was so overwhelming that it was prepared to risk almost complete diplomatic isolation in order to capitalize on that support through whatever means. If the international community was prepared to allow the popular will to be manifest through elections, that was fine; but if it was not, then the domestic gains PDK thought would be achievable through using NADK to arouse the peasantry to revolutionary violence far outweighed the international risks.

But there was no pro-PDK upsurge, before or after PDK began increasingly returning to violence. On the contrary, the more violent it became, the more the population turned away from PDK toward FUNCINPEC. Thus, while SoC repression was real enough, and there was a popular will to sweep it away

administration and work through it to reestablish contacts with "his" erstwhile "subjects", while his primary policy goal was to work through SoC to restore the flow of international aid to Cambodia to hasten its economic reconstruction. In this case, too, PDK could only surmise that Sihanouk's perfidy was due to some sort of teleguiding by the US.

electorally, there was no popular enthusiasm for rising up violently against SoC in order to restore PDK to power. As a result, this study shows, PDK's stepwise re-escalation of its guerrilla war had by mid-1992 gotten it nowhere militarily and was already proving diplomatically and politically counter-productive.

Indeed, it is the argument of this study that by mid-1992 the broad outlines of the outcome of the implementation of the Paris Agreements had been set. With hindsight, at least, PDK's political and therefore military and diplomatic failures were evident. Military escalation in a context of political weakness and diplomatic isolation only exacerbated the weakness and deepened the isolation, until the remnants of the movement finally self-destructed totally in 1996-1998 with the open defection of Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's assassination of Son Sen, Ta Mok's arrest and trial of Pol Pot, the "breakaway" of almost all NADK troops first from Pol Pot and then from Ta Mok, and their integration into political and military structures dominated by erstwhile SoC officials.

Sources, Style, Substance and Acknowledgements

As readers will see, many of the materials used in this study were collected while I was working for UNTAC, as a Deputy Director of its Information/Education Division. A few sources used were written by me in that capacity. I cite myself as the author of these documents. However, other UNTAC sources are cited with reference only to the UNTAC component in which they were produced. This is in part because of the difficulty of tracking down all the individual authors to obtain their permission to name them, and in part because some documents were bureaucratically produced, so that the name of the person that appears on the document is not necessarily the author, but merely the head of the component in question. I apologize in advance to anyone who feels slighted by not being named. However, I trust that my former colleagues at the

Information/Education Division, including its Director, Tim Carney, and my fellow "information officers" David Ashley, Penny Edwards, Kate Frieson, Jay Jordens, Judy Ledgerwood, John Marston and Christophe Peschoux, will appreciate being thanked for producing or passing on many of the UNTAC documents cited.

Other materials used in this study include interviews that I conducted with what UNTAC called "self-demobilizers" from the PDK armed forces. These were combatants who voluntarily left NADK ranks and agreed to speak to UNTAC, but with a promise of anonymity. That undertaking is maintained herein.

In addition, this study makes use of a number of PDK internal documents, mostly texts used within its ranks to indoctrinate its cadre about PDK policies and plans. Almost without exception, these documents came to me not through UNTAC channels, but from journalists and researchers interested in PDK motivations and intentions. Here I am glad to thank Christophe Peschoux (in his pre-UNTAC capacity), Nate Thayer and Nayan Chanda for their generosity.

In weaving the study's narrative, I have also made extensive use of public PDK propaganda as broadcast over its radio stations.⁴⁸ These broadcasts, which were obligatory listening for all PDK cadre, NADK combatants and people under PDK control, signalled and explained PDK policy to those who were not made privy to or otherwise lacked access to relatively more sophisticated, explicit or secret

⁴⁸ These broadcasts were monitored by the United States' Foreign Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), by wire services such as Kyodo and Associated Press, and by UNTAC. For most of the period covered by this study, the author had access to the raw results of such monitoring, only some of which was ultimately published by FBIS or its British counterpart, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB). This is why there are no citations to FBIS or SWB.

instructions. Sometimes wrongly dismissed as meaningless propaganda, the broadcasts in fact clearly revealed to experienced listeners key developments and shifts in the thinking of the PDK leadership, even if they intentionally left many things deeply obscured.

My use of UNTAC sources raises questions of ethics, selectivity and objectivity. The ethical problem of making use of material obtained while working for UNTAC appears to be moot. Many other authors, including both former UNTAC employees and scholars with no connection to the UN, have already relied on internal UNTAC sources in published books and articles, and to my knowledge neither the UN nor anyone else has suggested that they have acted unethically. Selectivity is always a danger in the use of any body of source material. On this front, I can only say that I have attempted to be as comprehensive as humanly possible when consulting sources. For example, the sometimes perhaps excessive detail contained in accounts of military activities reflects an effort to collate and synthesize every last daily military report from opposing Cambodian forces and from UNTAC's military information system.

The question of the objectivity of a study by a participant-observer is more vexing. Some might suspect that the study attempts to justify and even glorify UNTAC's role (and thus my own) in the context of one of the polemics that the study engages: whether or not UNTAC "appeased Pol Pot". Readers will have to judge from the evidence adduced whether this study's conclusion that UNTAC did not is tendentious or justified. More generally, I draw readers' attention to accounts by myself and my fellow information officers that describe the activities and characteristics of the Information/Education Division, and argue that it was hardly inclined to sing UNTAC's praises or reach any pre-ordained

conclusions.⁴⁹

Other readers, particularly those with some combination of academic and bureaucratic background, may object not so much to the study's conclusions as to the style in which it attempts to make a contribution to knowledge. This involves not just the way in which it deploys the acronyms of UNTAC's bureaucrat-ese, but the extent to which it can be read as a somewhat cross-dressed "end of mission report" that, as such documents typically do, paste together earlier documents in order to create a record of what was done and thought at the time. I apologize for the acronym use. It is inelegant but it saves words and space. I apologize less for the "end of mission" format. First, even if it was little more than that, it would still set out the narrative with a degree of accuracy that I believe has not hitherto been achieved. I also believe that, at some risk of tedium, its narrative "gives a feel" for the quotidian contest between PDK and its adversaries that in-and-of-itself reveals the tenacity with which it pursued its objectives and the extent to which it consistently failed to achieve them. The narrative helps thereby to capture the frustration that PDK must have felt, and thus to explain why it resorted to the violence of guerilla warfare. For PDK, it was not a matter of a few snubs or setbacks; rather, it was a daily struggle during which it found itself blocked at every turn.

I hope that this narrative, laid out in the eleven chapters that follow, develops and demonstrates the validity of my counter-arguments against the literature reviewed above, but it does not directly confront the works of the authors

⁴⁹ See Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, "The Politics of Violence: An Introduction", in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-Keeping* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996), pp.33-37; John Marston, "Cambodia 1991-1994: Hierarchy, Neutrality and Etiquettes of Discourse" (unpublished PhD Dissertation: University of Washington, 1997), pp.275-387.

covered until the conclusion. There, I attempt such a confrontation, and the counter-arguments I have tried to build up on what I believe is a painstaking use of sources are made explicit and pointed.

Finally, before leaving readers to the mercies of the narrative, I would like to thank all those who have contributed to making this study happen in ways other than providing sources. Both Bob Taylor and John Sidel gave supervision without which this project could never have been completed. David Chandler and Demelza Stubbings read complete drafts and provided editorial comments and corrections that led to numerous improvements. And only my wife Marianne Lilliebjerg and our daughters Nina and Ella can possibly understand how much I owe them in terms of years of moral and other support, without which this study could not even have been begun.

CHAPTER ONEPEOPLE'S WAR AND PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLEPDK's People's War

In the eyes of the PDK leadership, its post-1979 struggle, like the one that had brought the CPK to power in 1975, was a "people's war" in which the emphasis was in theory on political mobilization of the peasantry.¹ Its thinking in this regard remained profoundly influenced by its internalization of both Chinese and particular Vietnamese Communist dogma. Lin Biao's famous 1967 codification of Mao Zedong's concept of "people's war" laid great stress "on the establishment of rural base areas and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them." To expand Communist control to "the enemy-occupied ... villages", it was necessary to "combine ... legal with illegal struggle, unite ... the basic masses and all patriots, and divide ... and disintegrate ... the political power of the enemy so as to prepare ... to attack the enemy from within in coordination with operations from without when conditions [are] ripe."²

¹ According to Pol Pot, the CPK's 1970-1975 struggle had been a "people's war" that took its strength politically from the "peasant people". Pol Pot, *Chayô Khuop Ti-17 Pak Kommuynih Kampuchea* ("Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea") [Pol Pot, *Chayô*] (Democratic Kampuchea, 30 September 1977), pp.26,32,34. The extent to which the CPK in fact enjoyed popular peasant support in 1970-1975 and why remains disputed. For contending arguments see Kate G Frieson, "The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants, 1970-1975" (unpublished PhD dissertation: Monash University Department of Politics, 1991); Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975* (London: Verso, 1985), chapter 8; and Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp.15-25.

² Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.10-12,22,24.

According to texts produced during the 1960s by Vietnamese military theoretician Vo Nguyen Giap, "people's war" required building up a "political force" of "all the people" to "participate in all types of uprisings" to seize administrative power. These political forces "must erode, annihilate, disperse and [harass] the enemy everywhere". To extend revolutionary bases into "areas under the enemy's temporary control" required the use of "various forms of struggle - from illegal to legal struggle, from economic to political and armed struggle." These could include "partial uprisings" carried out by "secret political and armed organs" to "overthrow the enemy's local administration ... in preparation for the general thrust to wrest political power by force". A people's war armed struggle aimed at "annihilating the enemy's military forces" in order "to support the revolutionary masses in conducting their political struggle". It would help the "people's political forces" to "advance ... from the ordinary aspects of political struggle toward conducting an armed uprising" to set up a "revolutionary administration."³ In the meantime, the "political army of the masses" must oppose enemy military conscription, labour *corvée* and economic policies and do "agitation work among the puppet soldiers" to urge them to come "over to the side of the people" in preparation for the day when it would "rise ... up and smash ... to pieces the enemy's rural administration".⁴

In accordance with such received Communist wisdom and its interpretation of the reasons for its success in 1975, the CPK defined its people's war against the Vietnamese invasion as one in which "the fundamental factor" was the "political factor, ie, popular strength". Thus, right from 1979, CPK

³ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Banner of People's War, the Party's Military Line* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), pp.23,25-29,34,44,57-58.

⁴ Vo Nguyen Giap, "The South Vietnamese People Will Win" (19 July 1964), in Russell Stetler, ed, *The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp.214-217.

armed forces were to devote themselves to "fashioning ... political bases among the people ..., especially in areas temporarily controlled by the ... enemy, in order to strengthen and expand ... popular forces in every domain ... so that they will become forces of opposition to the ... enemy right in the areas that the ... enemy temporarily controls." This required "fashioning and leading" the people "as underground and covert forces ..., such as underground nuclei to propagandize, mobilize and whip up popular anger", to "act as couriers and guides for our cadre and guerillas" and to "provide food supplies to our guerillas and cadre at work in the grassroots, etc." This formation of covert CPK support nuclei in the villages aimed to transform areas under the administration of its People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) adversaries into "guerilla areas belonging to" the CPK politically.⁵ By 1980, its National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) was already being instructed to try to intensify "mass popular work" to in order to foment "mass popular general uprisings" in the countryside. To create conditions for rural insurrection, it was to conduct "propaganda-education" among the people. Those who were successfully proselytized should be left in place as "two-faced" elements secretly assigned by NADK to carry out "clear-cut duties". Those who did well at their tasks would be selected as underground "leadership nuclei" and function as "strategic leading forces" for village uprisings. Such political work was the "utmost priority duty" of the armed forces, equal in importance to its military work and a precondition for it.⁶

⁵ [Communist Party of Kampuchea], *Teuh Næ-noam Muoy Châmnuon Ney Meakear Yôthea robâh Pak Knong kar Thwoe Sângkream Pracheachun Vai A-Khmang Yuon Chhlean-pean, Veat-ti, Lep Toek-dei, Bâmbat Pouchsah Aoy Parachey Teang Srong Ti Chong Bâmphot* ("A Number of Guiding Orientations of the Party's Military Line for Making People's War to Attack and in the End Totally to Defeat the Contemptible Yuon Aggressor, Expansionist, Territory-Swallowing, Genocidal Enemy") (29 June 1979), pp.21,17-18.

⁶ [Communist Party of Kampuchea] Sector 32, *Kar-ngear 5 Chumhean* ("Five-Step Work"), May 1980, pp.1-2,6-7,9-10,12-14.

For several years, such plans were almost impossible to implement due to peasant fear and hatred of the CPK. The CPK's "political and popular isolation" remained "severe, despite a repudiation of its former radical policies, proclamation of a 'moderate' political programme, an open-door call for the creation of a broad united front and a gradual, but significant reduction in the amount of violence and brutality involved in [its] dealings with the population." Thus, "most of the populated countryside was off limits to [PDK] fighters and agents" because villagers would summon ... security forces to deal with them if they appeared. There remained "such a large hard core of people completely and absolutely opposed to any return to power by [PDK] that no really fundamental shift in national sentiment seemed even remotely possible." Thus, it appeared unlikely that PDK would "be able to make any significant breakthrough" politically.⁷ However, by 1983, there were signs it had begun to convince some elements of the population in areas it had penetrated that it no longer carried out systematic executions, and thus managed to gain a degree of peasant tolerance. Although the number of people prepared to cooperate with it remained small, the marginal increase was thus enough to encourage PDK visions of an ever-rising tide of popular support and to alarm its adversaries.⁸

NADK was constantly reminded that the key to turning hopes into facts was to "regard itself as both a political and a military army".⁹ It was to strive to go beyond simple

⁷ Steve Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-Mortem", *Indochina Issues* (No 12, January 1981), pp.1,6-7.

⁸ Marcel Barang, "Rebirth of the Khmer Rouge", *South*, November 1983.

⁹ Radio Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [VoNADK], 2 March 1983. By convention, broadcasts by VoNADK and its sister radio station, Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VoDK) are dated at Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Because Cambodia is seven hours later than GMT and VoNADK/VoDK normally transmitted at 06.30, Cambodia time, broadcasts were heard in Cambodia a day

military operations to organize rural uprisings carried out with the "direct participation" of villagers.¹⁰ The NADK's job was to create conditions for such peasant insurrections by militarily destroying "all the positions of the enemy" in villages that had already been penetrated politically, and then to declare the establishment of local administrations that supposedly answered to the recently-formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Senior PDK officials claimed these new administrations incorporated elements loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC and the third coalition *partie*, Son Sann's KPNLF.¹¹ However, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF both dismissed these claims, saying that in fact NADK was setting up committees composed exclusively of its own underground nuclei. They demanded that PDK stop the pretending that these committees were structures of CGDK political power.¹²

PDK was thus left politically on its own to begin implementation in late 1983 of a plan that it hoped would accelerate village base-building activities in the five provinces around the Tonle Sap lake (Batdambang, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, Kampong Chhnang, Posat), which were designated NADK's "Battle Zone Number One". The orders were for NADK to concentrate its military efforts on attacking the subdistrict, the next administrative level up from the village. This aimed to create conditions to "mobilize" and "liberate" the population of nearby villages politically and to "persuade"

later than the date of transmission. For example, in this case, the broadcast would have been heard in Cambodia on 3 March 1983.

¹⁰ VoNADK, 20 May 1983.

¹¹ Author's translation of a journalist's interview with Ieng Sary, 22 May 1983.

¹² Interviews with Nong Hean, G-1 and G-2 of the General Staff of the Sihanoukist National Army, and with Thach Reng, member of the General Staff Committee of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces, May-June 1983.

local PRK militia forces to "disperse".¹³ NADK was to promote "secret meetings of two, three, five or ten participants" to support NADK "deep operations".¹⁴ In describing NADK activities in 1984, cadre thus said that their first objective was to "establish contact with more villagers, explain our policy and gain their support". This took priority over efforts to "attack and knock out ... enemy forces", although the two goals went "hand-in-hand" and reinforced each other.¹⁵

No rigorously-collected evidence exist about the extent to which the hopes embodied in these plans were realized in the mid-1980s. However, evidence from later in the decade clearly indicates that the gap between theory and practice, plan and outcome, intention and result, remained enormous. The gap seems to have been covered up by wildly exaggerated propaganda claims that vastly overestimated NADK's successes, even if the statistics sometimes inadvertently revealed trends that suggested NADK was facing problems in making truly political gains.

From the mid-1980s on, PDK propaganda talked increasingly about NADK actions to "disperse", "dismantle" and "liberate" subdistricts and villages. The emptiness of this talk was indicated by the lack of any explicit definition of such terms. However, it was clear from how they were used that dispersing and dismantling referred at best to fleeting disruption of PRK administrative control, and that even liberation could be a temporary phenomenon. In practice, liberation did not necessarily signify either permanent NADK occupation or full-fledged reorganization of the existing political structure to bring it under explicit PDK domination.

¹³ VoNADK, 6 January 1985; Permanent Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea to UNESCO "Press Release" [PDDK-UNESCO], 11 February 1985.

¹⁴ VoDK, 11 February 1985.

¹⁵ *Nation Review* (Bangkok), 19 July 1984.

Rather, it was a term of self-congratulation for supposed success at serious disruption of PRK domination and at finding greater opportunities for recruiting or otherwise implanting covert or semi-covert PDK sympathizers. Already exaggerated statistics about NADK operations could be further upped because by these vague definitions, the same village or subdistrict could be "dispersed", "dismantled" and/or "liberated" again and again during repeated NADK attacks. According to an optimistic reading of the numbers, these were evidence of a process according to which these villages and subdistricts would gradually but eventually be brought under total PDK control, or would at least create conditions making this possible. To the extent that the numbers meant anything at all, however, they could also be read pessimistically as evidence that NADK was attacking again and again by force of arms to no positive political effect.

Still, during 1984, the Vietnamese military became increasingly alarmed that the NADK had "created infiltration corridors to put forces and weapons inland for "building counter-revolutionary forces", and decided that in order to prevent further inroads, it must destroy NADK and other opposition rear military and logistics bases along the Cambodian border with Thailand.¹⁶ It did this with the help of PRK auxiliary units in a series of operations in late 1984 and early 1985.

The Vietnamese operations initially seemed to have no great impact.¹⁷ In May 1985, PDK claimed that despite the Vietnamese offensive, NADK attacks that "dispersed 160 subdistricts and liberated 82 others" had made it possible to

¹⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review* [FEER], 7 February 1985, quoting an article by Vietnamese Senior General Le Duc Anh in the Vietnamese armed forces journal *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*.

¹⁷ *FEER*, 9 May 1985; *Christian Science Monitor*, 22-28 June 1985; "Thai Marines Still Battling Vietnamese on Border", Reuter, Bangkok, 9 May 1985.



"liberate" 972 villages in various parts of Cambodia during the six dry season months from October 1984 to April 1985.¹⁸ Such NADK operations had supposedly "encouraged" villagers to "closely cooperate" with the NADK.¹⁹ However, NADK claims about its activities during the six rainy season months from May to September 1985 suggested the Vietnamese operations had a major delayed effect and belied any optimism about PDK political progress. NADK said it had been able to disperse only 82 subdistricts while liberating 30 others, and to liberate only 347 villages. Such a massive fall-off indicated that military disruption of the NADK had belatedly but clearly revealed PDK political weakness. It certainly gave a hollow ring to propaganda claims that NADK was continuing to get the people to "better understand the policies" of PDK and to "more vigorously assist" the NADK.²⁰

Armed Struggle and Elections

The setback to the effectiveness of NADK's people's war to which the 1985 rainy season statistics pointed was reflected in shifts in the PDK's political and military tactics. Politically, it softened its stance toward the PRK and toward the notion of a "political solution" to the "Kampuchea problem" via internationally-supervised elections, something that Sihanouk and the United Nations had long been promoting.

Received Communist wisdom informed the PDK attitude toward elections just as much as its concept of people's war. According to the Stalinist, Chinese and Vietnamese doctrine codified in texts stretching from the 1930s to the 1970s, renunciation of armed struggle in favour of parliamentary struggle is not only permissible but necessary if this will

¹⁸ VoNADK, 5 May 1985.

¹⁹ VoDK, 30 June 1985.

²⁰ VoNADK, 9 October 1985.

further the objective of destroying a Communist Party's political enemies. However, such situations are rare and fleeting, and thus such a renunciation can only be tactical and temporary.

Stalin had insisted it was "absolutely wrong" for Marxist-Leninists to ignore opportunities offered by parliamentary struggle or peace agreements to further their interests. The key was to use "revolutionary tactics" to transform such opportunities "into an instrument for disintegrating" the power of the enemy.²¹

In their noisy polemics with post-Stalinist Soviet "revisionists", Chinese theoreticians had similarly admonished Communists that if "practical possibilities for peaceful" struggle "were to arise", they should "make timely use" of them "to win the support of the masses", while remaining "prepared at all times to repulse counter-revolutionary attacks ... by armed force if" their enemies used "armed force to suppress the people's revolution".²²

In texts in the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnamese also advocated tactical flexibility, but ultimate reliance on force. Thus, Giap explained that in organizing "the large mass of peasants" to carry out "revolutionary violence" to "win political power" via a people's war, Communists should always remember that there might be periods when the Party would rely exclusively on "the strength of the masses for ... political struggle" while surreptitiously making "preparations for an armed uprising". Properly handled, such episodes of "acute political struggle" could be developed "afterward into

²¹ JV Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism: Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University", in *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp.45,47,89-90,94-95.

²² "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition (November 10, 1957)", in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) [*Polemic*], pp.105-107.

political struggle combined with armed struggle".²³ In endorsing the use of "a multitude of flexible and manifold forms of organization and activity", veteran Communist Party Secretary-General Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders pointed out that these included the utilization of legislative bodies, even those "set up by the ... colonialists". This was one of the ways in which Communists could succeed in promoting "struggles sweeping towns and countryside".²⁴ Theoretician Truong Chinh recalled periods during which the Party had used parliamentary activities "to trigger off a seething movement of political struggle." This helped make it possible for it later to advance "from political struggle to the mobilization for armed struggle ..., properly combining ... political and armed struggle" into armed insurrection.²⁵

Thus, "while always taking illegal action as the foundation", Communists should "skilfully combine ... it with all possibilities for legal action" and, in certain situations, "start an all-out drive for legality ... with a view to ... amplifying the influence of the revolution." At the same time, they had to remember that "Communist activity requires the strictest secrecy," and must therefore adhere to the "Party's principle of secrecy in organization" in case "there is a sudden shift in the situation, when the enemy attacks the revolution, and when the Party has to effect a quick and complete change-over to illegal action."²⁶ Even in periods of political struggle, it was also imperative to have "places where ... armed forces could be hidden", either in a

²³ Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Political and Military Line of Our Party" (22 December 1964), in Stetler, ed, *Military Art*, pp.163-170.

²⁴ Le Duan, *The Vietnamese Revolution: Fundamental Problems, Essential Tasks* (February 1970) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978), p.47.

²⁵ Truong Chinh, *Forward Along the Path Charted by K Marx* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969), pp.60-64.

²⁶ Le Duan, *Vietnamese Revolution*, pp.51-52,58.

"strongly organized rear" or in "secret political bases" established among networks of politically loyal people.²⁷

Misgivings About Elections: Disasters After Geneva

Doctrinal canons about the need for both flexibility and scepticism with regard to parliamentary struggle had particular resonances for Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and other senior PDK figures, who had first attempted to implement them under Vietnamese guidance and then later on their own. Their experiences suggested that any attempt to transform people's warfare into parliamentary struggle was likely to be fraught with dangers unless the transformation took place under circumstances that guaranteed a fundamental neutralization of the political structures and armed forces of their enemies. This had been shown in the "internationally-supervised" elections held in Cambodia in 1955 as a result of the Geneva Agreements that ended the First Indochina War (1945-1954), in which the Communists won no seats. At the same time, however, this apparent confirmation left unanswered questions about how well Cambodian Communists would have done if the elections in which they attempted to compete had been really "free and fair". It left room for a completely untested belief that they were so popular among the peasantry that they would have "won" (or at least done well) in a genuinely open contest.

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 had provided for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of French colonial and Vietnamese Communist forces from Cambodia, the demobilization on the spot of Cambodian Communist and other armed Cambodian opposition forces, and elections by secret ballot in which all parties could freely participate. The Royal Government of Norodom Sihanouk, to which France had ceded independence in 1953, promised to ensure that "no reprisals shall be taken" against members of the former armed opposition, and that they would

²⁷ Giap, "Political and Military Line", p.179.

enjoy "all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of ... democratic freedoms". The Agreements provided for an International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) comprising representatives of India, Poland and Canada, to "fulfil the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation" to guarantee their fulfilment.²⁸ However, Sihanouk and his supporters successfully questioned whether the ICSC had a full mandate to supervise the elections. In practice, it mostly limited itself to "general observation" and did not attempt to ensure the neutrality of the state apparatus vis-à-vis the electoral process.²⁹

The 1955 elections thus took place with the Cambodian state in the strong grip of Sihanouk and those politically loyal to him. They used the elections to preclude the possibility that anyone could challenge their political primacy via parliamentary representation. Through the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* political organization that they formed, they thus shut the Cambodian Communists veterans of armed struggle who tried their luck with the parliamentary path completely out of the national assembly.

Pol Pot played a significant role in Cambodian Communism's early electoral gambits. After an introduction to Marxism-Leninism while a student in France, he had returned to Cambodia in 1953 to participate in armed resistance activities. He joined a rural branch of the Indochinese Communist Party in which the leading Cambodian cadre was Tou Samut. After the Geneva Agreements, Tou Samut took charge of underground Cambodian Communist activities in Phnom Penh, and brought Pol Pot with him to help set up the overt, Communist-

²⁸ See appendices 1 and 2 in Robert F Randle, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia", Articles 6,11,13; and "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indochina, July 1954", Articles 3 and 7.

²⁹ Randle, *Geneva*, pp.491-500.

front *krom pracheachun* (People's Group). Both Tou Samut and Pol Pot continued to take their political lead from a Vietnamese Communist cadre who also accompanied them to Phnom Penh, Pham van Ba.³⁰ His advice mirrored Communist policies inside Vietnam, where the Geneva Agreements also applied.³¹

In competing against Sihanouk, the Democrats and Pracheachun were up against a popular adversary. In particular, there can be no doubt that Sihanouk's accomplishments in achieving Cambodia's formal independence from France in 1953 helped significantly to make him popular within the ranks of the civil service and the population at large, and it is generally agreed that this was a major factor underlying the electoral success that Sihanouk scored later in 1955.³² However, the overwhelming extent of that success can only be understood in terms of his increasing takeover of the state apparatus and his use of it before and during the actual

³⁰ Author's interview with Mey Man, then a member of the Communist Party organization in the capital, Phnom Penh, 1 July 1997.

³¹ See Carlyle A Thayer, *War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp.1-91.

³² For discussions of the elections and the political context in which they took place, see David P Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.74-84; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot*, pp.153-164; Marie Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society*, translated by Mark W. McLeod (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.62-63; Philippe Preschez, *Essai sur la Democratie au Cambodge* (Paris: Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Serie C; Recherches, No 4, October 1961), pp.55-64; VM Reddi, *A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement, 1863-1955* (Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara University Press, 1970), pp.220-223; Philippe Devillers, "Livre VI: Cambodge", in Philippe Devillers, Pierre Fistié and Le Thanh Khoi, *L'Asie du Sud-est* (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1971), pp.610-614; Michael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-76", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, pp.96-97; and Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp.89-99.

balloting. The key to Sihanouk's electoral destruction of the Communists was his control of the state, particularly the local administration and its security and information services, which Sihanouk and government officials used to harass, arrest, muzzle and sometimes kill their opponents, to stuff ballots and to doctor results when other measures failed to produce victories. Thus, a Sangkum victory was made total.³³ The final official count confirmed the Sangkum sweep with 82 percent of votes cast and the Pracheachun at just four percent.³⁴ Privately, the three members of the ICSC engaged in a "bitter debate" about whether the elections had been "free". The Indian and Polish representatives believed they had not been. However, after the Canadian representative threatened to disavow this view publicly, they agreed to comprise wording that left the opposite impression.³⁵

The fact that the Communists had clearly been cheated meant that a greatly exaggerated myth of what might have been could be formulated and nurtured in the minds of Pol Pot and other victims of electoral unfairness. Assessing the elections 22 years later, he asserted that "popular forces throughout the country supported the revolution and the progressives", but that "the people were unable to cast their ballots for the progressives because the power-holding classes were in possession of the guns, the weapons, the law, the courts, the prisons and of other tools with which to repress our people." Pol Pot declared "the victorious fruits" of the "popular revolutionary struggle" of 1945-54 thus "vanished into thin air". This "lesson in the fresh blood" of Communist martyrs had suggested that if it was to avoid future "defeats and destruction", it must recognize that "armed struggle is the highest form of struggle". However, this did not mean

³³ [US Embassy,] Phnom Penh, "Joint Weeka No 38" [hereafter: JW+No], 21 September 1955.

³⁴ Preschez, p.62; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot*, p.162.

³⁵ JW46, 9 October 1955.

eschewing other forms of struggle that might be useful for what he presumed had always been and would always be a "mass revolutionary movement".³⁶

In line with Communist orthodoxy about the need for tactical flexibility, therefore, the 1960 Cambodian Communist Party Congress at which Pol Pot rose to number three in its leadership did not reject in principle further participation in parliamentary struggle. Instead, as Pol Pot approvingly recalled, the stance was that "the parliamentary struggle was a struggle in which the Party must engage", although it was secondary and subordinate to covert and illegal organization of the peasantry in order to overthrow the existing regime with "revolutionary political violence and revolutionary armed violence."³⁷ However, the Communists decided that it was pointless to put forward candidates of their own, even in the form of the Pracheachun. Instead, they attempted to infiltrate the Sangkum, and through it, to achieve a voice in parliament and even in government. Its main asset in this regard was Khieu Samphan, who had come back to Cambodia in mid-1959 after earning a doctorate in economics in France. Upon his return, he had opened a French-language newspaper, *l'Observateur*.³⁸ This publication, which was the result of

³⁶ Pol Pot, *Chayô*, pp.13-14,18-20. The Vietnamese Communists took a similarly dark view of the results of the Geneva Agreements in their country. They blamed US imperialism for having prevailed upon France so that, among other things, national elections were never held. Thayer, *War By Other Means*, p.41. They concluded that events after the Geneva Agreements proved that "to overthrow the enemy, ... there was no other way than to wage a revolutionary struggle" in which "persistent political struggle" must be "bolstered by an armed struggle". Through "hard-won experiences", it became clear that "the most correct path to be followed by peoples to liberate themselves" was "revolutionary violence and revolutionary war". Vo Nguyen Giap, "The South Vietnamese People Will Win" (19 July 1964), in Stetler, *The Military Art*, pp.186,190-191,213.

³⁷ Pol Pot, *Chayô*, pp.20,24-25.

³⁸ Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction", in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper Number 11,

an initiative by Pol Pot,³⁹ was soon shut down by Sihanouk, but not before Khieu Samphan gained a reputation for probity and sympathy for the poor. On this basis, he won election as a Sangkum candidate in elections in 1962, and was for a while a government minister.

Commenting on this two years after coming to power in 1975, Pol Pot declared that the Party's "action line" had achieved victories during the 1960s in part because it had found ways to continue legal activities to the greatest extent possible. He credited the Party with judicious decisions about "who was to work as a representative in the assembly". While stressing the need for primary reliance on preparations for armed struggle in the countryside, he congratulated the Party for having "been able to struggle both in the assembly and in the government". He warned that neglecting such work constituted a "leftist" doctrinal error, just as overemphasizing its significance constituted a "rightist" deviation,⁴⁰ either of which could presumably result in the Communists failing to make real their assumed popular support.

March 1979), p.8.

³⁹ According to the "confessions" of Pracheachun leader Non Suon, Pol Pot "created" the Party's French-language press, a statement which it appears must refer to *l'Observateur*. See "Responses of XII: The First Step Toward Confession: Concluding Part: Part Six: XII Talks About a Number of Brothers in the Leadership Organ", 21 November 1976, p.2.

⁴⁰ Pol Pot, *Chayô*, pp.20-21,25-26.

CHAPTER TWO**PEOPLE'S WAR BY WAY OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT****Vietnamese Communist People's War By Way of Paris Agreement**

Whatever the reality of the Communist movement's popularity and popular potential, Pol Pot's account of its electoral struggles in the 1950s and 1960s suggested severe scepticism about the chances for Communist exploitation of parliamentary path to make gains if it faced conditions like those of 1955. Things might be different, however, if PDK could get a better deal than the 1954 Geneva Agreements, a deal incorporating international supervision that would neutralize an enemy state rather than leave it overwhelmingly predominant as in the Sihanouk era.

In contemplating the possibilities in the latter half of the 1980s, PDK leaders also had more recent experiences than Geneva to draw on. In 1972-1973, in the midst of the Second Indochina War, Pol Pot had rejected as a rightist mistake a political settlement with his then adversary, the Khmer Republic. He had decided instead to fight a people's war on his own even after the Vietnamese Communists reached an agreement with the US in Paris in January 1973 to end armed conflict in Vietnam. Pol Pot reminded the Vietnamese that "in spite of all the support given by the Kampuchean people" to the Cambodian revolution during the First Indochina War, it "had obtained nothing from the elections" of 1955. In 1972-1973, Pol Pot refused to negotiate for a deal comparable to that obtained by the Vietnamese because, he said, fighting on would mean victory, whereas accepting a political solution could set off a chain of events that would allow the "US imperialists" and Khmer Republic to "extend the areas under their control, get more people, develop their economy and continue to further extend themselves, until the collapse of

the revolution."¹

Pol Pot's argument seemed to concede the possibility that in the absence of armed struggle, the Communists would not be able to manufacture the appearance of popular support. Certainly continuation of armed struggle made the extent of such support more difficult to ascertain and easier to mystify. Thus, although the CPK's seizure of power on 17 April 1975 seemed to vindicate Pol Pot's intransigence, it left unclear the underlying reasons for that success.

On the other hand, the Vietnamese Communists' capture of Saigon less than two weeks after 17 April 1975 suggested that their decision to sign the 1973 Paris Agreement had not been wrong given their circumstances, and persuaded them of their popularity among the Vietnamese people, even if the evidence for this was problematic.² In any case, the Communists had

¹ Democratic Kampuchea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Press and Information, *Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea* (Phnom Penh: September 1978) [*Black Paper*], pp.73,75.

² In the academic literature, vigorous but often still tendentious debate about the extent to which the Communist victory was a political or a military one cannot obscure the dearth of serious research, which can be explained in part by the great difficulties of widespread free access by independent researchers to ordinary Vietnamese in both the late wartime and early post-war period. For a sampling of the most serious efforts, see James W Trullinger, *Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp.167-213; Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp.271-352; Gabriel Kolko, *Vietnam: Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp.457-544; Donald W Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia* (Westport: Praeger, forthcoming), especially chapter 7, "Secondary Insurgency and the American Reaction"; Timothy J Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Salem: University of North Carolina, 1996), pp.85-130; Michael A Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), pp.143-187; Eric M Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder: Westview,

successfully manoeuvred to turn the settlement into a seizure of power. Events would show that this path remained an inspiration for PDK in the late 1980s, even if Vietnam was now portrayed as Cambodia's greatest enemy.

As Gareth Porter has pointed out, the central issue in the negotiations that led to the 1973 Paris Agreement had been the sovereignty of the Saigon-based Republic of Vietnam. The US and Republic President Nguyen Van Thieu had insisted that any political solution had to maintain the Republic's constitutional structure, and that the Communists could participate in elections only on that condition. The Vietnamese Communists had initially rejected this, and demanded the formation of a coalition government. However, they had eventually accepted what was for them a disappointing compromise that "fell short of the removal of the US client regime in Saigon," and even though the Agreement provided for a cease-fire but failed to oblige the Republic to reduce its armed strength. The Communists nevertheless hoped such a "temporary compromise with their enemy" might "be advantageous". This was because although "the Saigon regime remained intact under the agreement," it "was obliged to loosen its grip over the political process before an election. If Thieu balked at this, the Agreement would still "provide a new legitimate basis for carrying on a political struggle and, at an appropriate time, an armed struggle, in order to overthrow [his] regime and replace it with one consistent with the objective of ... revolution."³

1993), pp.283-335; Dale Andrade, *Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle* (New York: Hippocrene, 1994), pp.527-545; Ken Post, *Revolution, Socialism and Nationalism in Viet Nam Volume Five: Winning the War and Losing the Peace* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp.237-355.

³ D Gareth Porter, "The Paris Agreements and Revolutionary Strategy in South Vietnam" [Porter, "Paris Agreements"], in Joseph J Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, *Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives* (Lexington: DC Heath, 1975), pp.61,73-74.

The Communists seize the opportunity of the cease-fire to intensify a village-oriented political offensive that was supposed to capitalize upon and further previous successes of people's war in the countryside. The revolution's "immediate task" was now to put forward slogans like "peace, democracy and national reconciliation" to "disintegrate and seriously collapse the puppet army and government, take over control of the rural areas [and] seize power at the base level."⁴

The strategy also called for promoting mass struggle actions against the revolution's enemies via new platforms provided by the Agreement. These included not only the representative political institution that was supposed eventually to be elected in "genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision", but also two bodies to be formed beforehand. These were a symbolic "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord", in which the Communists were supposed to be represented alongside the Republic and resolve remaining political disputes, and a "Joint Military Commission", in which the two sides were supposed to sort out cease-fire violations and other military problems. While trying to advance the revolution's prospects in these forums, the Communists hoped to "maintain peace" and "prevent large-scale [military] conflicts" with Republic forces in order to proceed toward participation in the elections. They calculated this would help "bring the ... revolution toward the fulfilment of its basic objectives."⁵

However, the Paris Agreement was vague on how "international supervision" would guarantee free Communist participation in elections, and the National Council for which

⁴ "COSVN Directive 02/73 'On Policies Related to the Political Settlement and Cease-fire, 19 January 1973," as reproduced with a commentary by Gareth Porter, ed, in *Vietnam: A History in Documents [Documents]* (Pine Plains: Meridian, 1981), pp.425-427.

⁵ "Directive 02/73".

it provided gave little promise of weakening Thieu's Republic.⁶ Given this the Agreement's failure to require either side to demobilize their armed forces, the Communists decided that even while preparing for elections, they "must build guerilla forces, armed security forces" and "make proper use of these forces to support the people's struggle movement" in the rural areas. Communist armed forces must stand by to "smash all enemy schemes to sabotage the Agreement". For the Communists, therefore, implementing the agreement meant "simultaneously ... to build and develop our political and armed forces."⁷

Thus, as Porter explains, the Communists' post-Agreement strategy "relied primarily on political struggle in order to weaken the hold of the Saigon regime on the countryside as well as the cities and force the ultimate implementation of the Agreement's political provisions." Although the Party did not consider the Agreement a "complete weapon" that could fully "replace other types of struggle", new political struggles would be keyed around its provisions. Political action by "overt organizations" could be combined with intensification and expansion of mostly unarmed aspects of people's war at the village level. In contested and enemy areas, people would be urged to "disregard the enemy's reactionary policies and regulations". This was to be combined with attempts to persuade Republic soldiers not to use force against such political disobedience or against Communist military personnel. If such efforts failed, then Communist troops could always support political actions by "killing cruel tyrants and destroying enemy units".⁸

⁶ See "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 27 January 1973", Articles 9(b), 12(a) and 18(c); and "Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, Articles 2 and 3(a).

⁷ "Directive 02/73".

⁸ Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.61-66.

According to Republican accounts, implementation of this line meant that Communist activities in south Vietnam actually increased after the Paris Agreement. "Large Communist units were ... broken down ... to occupy hamlets and villages" while cutting "main roads". While "urging people to fly National Liberation Front flags to present 'proof' of Communist sovereignty", they tried to persuade local officials to join or at least not to resist them, arguing that "peace had come", but threatened "villages and hamlets that did not cooperate ... with attacks and shellings". In follow-up Communist actions, "military, political and proselytizing activities" were "closely coordinated to ... entice" the population "to rise up" to demand political change and the disbanding of anti-Communist armed forces. However, all this was countered by "forceful reactions" by the Republican side that frustrated Communist "land and population grab" tactics.⁹

The Communists denounced these "police operations" when they concluded in March 1973 that they had been right to expect sabotage of the Agreement by Thieu. The revolution's advance was being blocked because the US was "shielding its puppets" in Saigon "in their not implementing the cease-fire order and in violating the Agreement." The Communists decided that the proper response was not to abandon the Agreement, but to insist that the Communists were the ones who wanted its proper implementation. The way forward was to try to take advantage of the fact that "the puppets" were "still bound by the Paris Agreement," and use this as a "weapon with which to attack the enemy" and thus to bring into play the Communists' popular support. Thus, the Communists must "bring the political and military-proselytizing movements of the masses up to meet requirements" and with their support the situation would "develop every day more to [their] advantage." They must use the Agreement as a "legal sanction" to give a "cutting edge" and thus "a new considerable strength" to the

⁹ Cao van Vien, *The Final Collapse* (Washington: Center of Military History Indochina Monographs, 1983), pp.29-31,39.

Communist "assault posture" in the villages and other struggles where they could rely on popular support. And given that their enemies still had a repressive political structure and suppressive armed forces at their disposal, they had to continue building up Communist military strength.¹⁰

However, according to Porter, it was only after Republic troops seized "a significant chunk" of Communist-controlled territory that, in October 1973, the Party authorized its main force military units to launch coordinated offensive operations aimed "at Saigon's rear bases and at other points" of Communist choosing. The attack order told combatants that the solution to problems in the implementation of the Agreement was for them to attack to save the Agreement by fighting "the Saigon administration ... any place and with appropriate forms and force." Saigon responded with "a new escalation of military force" and "continued its efforts to expand its area of control in the populated plains in late 1973 and early 1974." This was coupled with open calls for attacks on Communist base areas.¹¹

As the fighting escalated into 1974, the Communists issued a statement blaming their enemies for sabotaging the negotiating and consultative bodies set up to help implement it. They maintained that the function of these bodies had been "torpedoed" in such a way as to paralyse them and destroy all the "capacities of negotiation" with which they were supposed to be endowed. They asserted this had created "a complete deadlock in the implementation of the Agreement".¹²

This analysis laid the basis for a Communist directive in

¹⁰ Porter, "Paris Agreements", citing a Vietnamese Communist document, pp.66-68.

¹¹ Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.68-71; for the Communist text ("People's Liberation Armed Forces Command Order, 15 October 1973") and Porter's commentary, see *Documents*, pp.438-439.

¹² *Documents*, pp.439-442.

August 1974 that concluded that the Agreement could not be implemented with the Saigon administration still intact. This determination came after Communist forces successfully overran a major Republican military base and a district town. The Party saw itself as operating from a position of unprecedented popular strength after having scored these "major full-scale and firm gains" against Saigon. Even though it admitted the Party's "offensive at the grassroots" level in the countryside had achieved only "spotty" results and its political struggle in urban areas had achieved only "slow growth", the situation had evolved in a way that was greatly in the Communists' favour. The "road to success for the revolution" was now to translate popular support into an escalated offensive through "violence based on political and military forces." The Communists would thus be able to "wage a decisive revolutionary war to defeat the enemy to win total victory".¹³

As Porter concludes, the Communists were confident that a much more favourable balance of forces was developing that meant that escalated military action would help create a political "turning point" by encouraging an upsurge in popular anti-Thieu struggle. "Thus began a major shift in revolutionary strategy, in which an offensive military posture, combined with stepped-up political struggle, would be aimed at forcing Saigon into a general crisis, from which there would be no exit except by a change in government." A Communist military campaign launched in early 1975 "aimed at forcing a political solution either by threatening to cause the disintegration of Saigon's forces or actually causing it". It began with an attack on one province. A second province-level attack in March precipitated a more rapid and complete collapse than the Party had expected.¹⁴

¹³ "COSVN Directive 08/CT 74, August 1974", *Documents*, pp.442-445

¹⁴ Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.68-71.

As Communist troops positioned themselves for the final assault on Saigon in April 1975, the Party characterized the impending attack as the last step in an effort to force implementation of the political settlement. This now required popular insurrection to overthrow the Saigon regime, which the attacking Communist main force military units were supposedly only supplementing in order to give an additional, if final and decisive, impetus to people's war. The Party declared that what it described as the "popular uprisings" that were bringing the Republic down were "the culmination of [the] fierce struggle by our people to safeguard and implement the Paris Agreement." While the Communists had "scrupulously" implemented the Agreement, the people backed the Party's "combined ... struggle against the enemy on three fronts - political, military and diplomatic" - to seize total, nationwide power.¹⁵

Regardless of the extent to which the Communist victory was in fact a political triumph or a military conquest, Pol Pot seems to have continued to believe in the script the Vietnamese had laid out, as long as it was properly implemented.

Negotiating the PRK's Destruction as a Condition for Participation in Election

The script suggested that continuation of people's war by peace agreement could be the correct path for Communists who were not in a position to win an outright military victory, but were popular enough to take advantage of the terms of a political settlement. Ideally, such a solution would give them some direct and immediate access to power. However, even if it did not, a peace settlement might substantially neutralize enemy strength and create a situation in which demands for a share of power could be more effectively pursued

¹⁵ "Editorial" in *Hoc Tap*, April 1975", *Documents*, pp.448-449.

through mobilization of political and - ultimately - armed pressure. By the second half of the 1980s, Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders evidently came to the conclusion that some such continuation of people's war via a political settlement was in the best interests of the Cambodian revolution.

The shift was, of course, tactical. As one internal PDK document warned the rank-and-file in 1987, ultimately "everybody" was "lying" when they "utter[ed] the phrase 'political solution' of the Cambodia problem". Even if PDK must be prepared to play the parliamentary game in order to take advantage of its popularity, it must always concentrate on building up its strength for all eventualities.¹⁶ On the other hand, PDK warned its cadre in April 1988, no one should underestimate the popular strength PDK had generated in nine years of people's war, or misunderstand the bitter lessons of the Geneva Agreements. Thus, an internal document gave reassurances that PDK was at that time already in a stronger politico-military position than the Cambodian Communist movement had been at the time of the Geneva Agreements and the elections of the 1950s. On the presumption that PDK would therefore obtain a more favourable settlement than Geneva, it should not be "worried" that it would suffer the same devastation as it had suffered while attempting to conduct political struggle in the post-Geneva period.¹⁷

This bravado was predicated in practice on its hopes that a political settlement would give PDK what the Vietnamese had

¹⁶ [PDK], *What Will Cambodia's Situation Be Like in the Upcoming Decades?* [Decades] (author's translation of Khmer typescript document obtained by Christophe Peschoux; dated by context to 1987), pp.23 [pagination in original].

¹⁷ [PDK], *Viewpoints on How Always to Organise and to Establish the Conditions for Ensuring Well the Livelihood of Our Ranks and Our People and Ensuring Well the Preservation, Defense, Consolidation and Expansion of the Forces in Our Ranks and Our People* [Viewpoints] (author's translation of a Khmer typescript document obtained by Nate Thayer), 11 April 1988, pp.3-4 [pagination in original].

been unable to attain in 1973: a major share in political power in the country before the elections took place. Thus, while the Vietnamese model remained relevant, PDK hoped to improve on what the Vietnamese had in fact achieved. This hope was in turn based on a belief that its people's war would recover from the Vietnamese offensive of 1984-1985 and intensify sufficiently to bring about an internationally guaranteed agreement that would achieve this objective. To do this, people's war would in theory have to further capitalize on PDK peasant support to create a political situation within the country and sustain a diplomatic posture that would force such a settlement. However, since such a deal would ensconce PDK partially in power without a popular vote, PDK would still be able to bypass even the semblance of such a test of the sentiments of villagers and other Cambodians.

Between 1985 and 1989, the PDK put forward or endorsed a series of initiatives formulated either on its own or by its coalition partners in the CGDK calling for a "political solution" that would achieve something like what the Vietnamese Communists had originally demanded in the negotiations that led to the 1973 Paris Agreement. PDK's initiatives were centred around demanding that the enemy political structure be "dissolved" or "dismantled" and replaced by a quadripartite political administration in which PDK would hold a full quarter of the power. They envisaged neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, either by placing them under quadripartite command or outright disarmament. They glossed over whether such domestic basis for the settlement as might appear to exist reflected PDK popularity or was being achieved by military means that imposed PDK political progress on a reluctant or fearful population.

A March 1986 proposal declared that a quadripartite political administration incorporating ex-PRK elements but dominated by CGDK figures was a pre-condition for a United

Nations (UN) -supervised cease-fire and UN-supervised elections.¹⁸ A proposal of February 1989 explained that this meant dismantling the PRK's "political and administrative apparatus" from "top to bottom" and its replacement "equally from top to bottom" by a provisional quadripartite government, which was to "organize free elections" with the help of the UN, which would "control and verify" the ballot. PDK warned that a political solution was inconceivable "if the regime installed in Phnom Penh were to be maintained in one way or another".¹⁹

Changing the Face of the PDK Leadership

To facilitate the Cambodian revolution's prospects of obtaining a favourable "political settlement" including elections, PDK's and NADK's public faces had been refurbished in September 1985. This was the first of the series of moves by which the top CPK triumvirate of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok retreated further back into clandestinity in which the CPK had been shrouded since 1981. This was in line with the Vietnamese Communist script dating back to the 1940s, which justified such clandestinity as a necessity in order ensure correct but safely covert leadership of the longer-term struggle to achieve greater goals by whatever means necessary.²⁰ However, it was also an inadvertent admission

¹⁸ "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea's Proposal for a Political Settlement to the Problem of Kampuchea", *National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK]* (Year 2 No 4: April 1986), pp.10-12.

¹⁹ "The Five-Point Peace Plan of HRH Samdech Norodom Sihanouk", "Modalities for the Implementation of the Five-Point Peace-Plan of HRH Samdech Norodom Sihanouk", "Note on the International Control Mechanism of the UN", and "The Sincerity, Realism and the Overture of the Five-Point Peace Plan Through the Modalities for Its Implementation", *NADK* (Year 5 No 21: February 1989), pp.4,5-6,7.

²⁰ For the Vietnamese Communist precedent in the 1945 "dissolution" of the Indochinese Communist Party, see Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) pp.328-332, citing works by Communist

of the enormous unpopularity particularly of Pol Pot and Ta Mok, because of their close association with the mass executions, starvation and death from disease under Democratic Kampuchea. Thus, the public announcement of their withdrawal was a manoeuvre that would avoid giving the electorate a chance to judge PDK for what it was, but in fact marked no loss of power by the three.

For this latter reason, the announcement did not resolve internal differences within the old CPK hierarchy dating back to its time in power. Thus, as the negotiations for an internationally-guaranteed settlement became more serious, there appears to have been some genuine dissent in PDK's top ranks about the troika's role. Son Sen, who had been slated for purge before the Vietnamese invasion, reportedly challenged continuation of their leadership. He is said to have questioned their advocacy of unreasonable negotiating demands and what he believed were unrealistic expectations about PDK's immediate political and military prospects. Although Pol Pot nominated Son Sen as his successor, in the meantime Pol Pot and Nuon Chea maintained their primacy with the backing of Ta Mok, whose animosity toward Son Sen remained deep, and Khieu Samphan, whose unswerving loyalty to Pol Pot remained intact.

On 24 August 1985, a new PDK "presidency" was established replacing the DK-era State Presidium. Khieu Samphan was named PDK President, reconfirming him in his perennial function as Pol Pot's chief front man. Son Sen became PDK Vice-President. Another decision abolished the old NADK Supreme Commission headed by Pol Pot and replaced it with an NADK Supreme Command headed by Son Sen as NADK Commander-in-Chief in place of Pol Pot. No other officers of the Supreme Command were named, which suggested that Ta Mok and Kæ Pok had lost their top NADK

historian Nguyen Kien Giang and giving his own analysis; and William J Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p.112.

jobs along with Pol Pot.

A third decision set the obligatory retirement age for PDK "civil and military cadre" at 60.²¹ As Pol Pot had purportedly turned 60 on 25 May 1985,²² his formal "retirement" is dated from 25 August.²³ Although nothing was said publicly at the time, the retirement age also had implications for Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, whose 60th birthdays were coming up in July and January 1986, respectively. It therefore suggested that by the middle of 1986 the old CPK triumvirate comprising the Party Secretary and his two deputies would somehow be less powerful.²⁴

However, the decisions had noted that retired cadre retained the right to be involved in "decisions on big and small issues" as "experts, advisers [or] teachers". Moreover, the decision that replaced Pol Pot with Son Sen "nominated" the former "to the position of director of the Higher Institute for National Defence". This body, of which nothing had previously been heard, was given "the task of ... summing up ... experiences in the field of national defence." This was Pol Pot's publicly admitted foothold in the decision-making process. Khieu Samphan explained in late 1985 that Pol Pot was not going to cease his "political or military" activities until the PDK had obtained a satisfactory peace

²¹ VoNADK and VoDK, 1 September 1985; PDDK-UNESCO, 4 September 1985; Xinhua News Agency, 2 September 1985.

²² On Pol Pot's "official" birthdate, see Pyongyang Domestic Service, "Biography of Comrade Pol Pot, Secretary of the KCP Central Committee and Prime Minister of Democratic Cambodia," 3 October 1977.

²³ VoNADK, 1 January 1986 and 4 June 1989.

²⁴ The decision gave a few more years to other members of the old CPK Standing Committee. Officially, Ieng Sary and Son Sen would be 60 in January and June 1990, while Khieu Samphan would be 60 in July 1991. Government of Democratic Kampuchea, "Biography of Members of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea", 18 December 1979 (typescript in the author's possession).

agreement.²⁵

In fact, although formal retirement may have signalled that Pol Pot was less involved than previously with day-to-day matters,²⁶ he continued to dominate leadership functions together with Nuon Chea and Ta Mok.²⁷ The only reality was that Kæ Pok was genuinely retired some time after the announcement and his old Sector 1002 integrated into Son Sen's Sector 1001.²⁸ Moreover, the announcements did nothing to resolve long-standing conflicts between Ta Mok and Son Sen, nor did it mean that there was complete unity within the old Standing Committee membership. In late 1986, the "split" between "followers of Son Sen ... and Ta Mok" resulted in "armed combat" between them "on several occasions".²⁹ This fighting occurred with Pol Pot absent in China for medical treatment. After his return, the leadership met to designate a successor to him as the head of the covert leadership structure. To the surprise and consternation of Ta Mok and Ieng Sary, Pol Pot proposed Son Sen, and this nomination was supported by Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan and thus carried.³⁰

²⁵ VoNADK, 1 January 1986. Khieu Samphan said that Pol Pot would stop his activities once PDK and Vietnam had signed an agreement "on the withdrawal of the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressor forces from Cambodia."

²⁶ Interview of a PDK representative abroad by a non-Cambodian source, September 1985. (The author has been asked to keep the identities of the representative and the interviewer confidential.)

²⁷ Christophe Peschoux, *Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-1990* [Peschoux, *Khmers Rouges*] (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), p.72.

²⁸ Christophe Peschoux, "DK-Bio and Military Data (June-September 1992)" [typescript in the author's possession]; author's interview of a 28-year-old former NADK combatant, 24 October 1992; Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.

²⁹ *International Herald Tribune*, 8 December 1986.

³⁰ Interview of Ieng Sary, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 December 1996.

In 1988, Son Sen tried to push the succession issue by arguing that Pol Pot and Nuon Chea should genuinely remove themselves from the scene by going into exile in China. He also put forward a set of "reformist" ideas, some of which were supported by Ieng Sary. However, the desire of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea to stay on was supported by Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan, who argued that the presence of the old Party Secretary and First Deputy Secretary remained indispensable to the struggle. Therefore, it was agreed that they would promise to relinquish all political influence once there was a "genuine settlement" of the Cambodia problem. However, what such a settlement constituted was also in dispute at this time. Son Sen was prepared to accept a formula that achieved relatively less for the PDK than that demanded by its other leaders, perhaps something that was less of an improvement on the Paris Agreement of 1973 than they hoped for. A harder line was promoted by Ta Mok, whom Son Sen criticized for being "difficult".³¹

Internal PDK Preparations for Parliamentary Struggle

The PDK was meanwhile preparing its ranks for participation in elections under conditions of quadripartitism. It did so in ways that implied that everything PDK had achieved so far was proof that it need not worry about its popularity, but that at the same time seemed to provide further evidence that the contrary was true.

On the one hand, PDK's 1987 internal study warning against illusions about parliamentarism nevertheless affirmed that PDK could take advantage of its rural support base by "walking down the path of liberal democracy".³² Its April 1988 study document confidently discussed in detail how the

³¹ Interview with a non-Cambodian source who requested anonymity, Bangkok, 23 July 1990. This source enjoyed access to Son Sen, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary.

³² *Decades*.

PDK was planning to set up its "forces and leadership apparatus to conduct work in the context of a bourgeois system in which a variety of political parties must compete". It confidently foresaw a situation in which PDK participation in elections in a "liberal democracy" would give it cabinet posts in a future government. On the other hand, this document went into a pessimistic mode when it suggested that PDK might only be "able to a certain extent to obtain a role and representation in legislative organs". It pointed indirectly to why this might be: the association of Pol Pot and most of his senior colleagues with the policies and practices of 1975-78. It indicated that it would be possible to put forward only one of them as a candidate, Khieu Samphan, who had retained his earlier reputation for probity and sympathy for the poor. It suggested that the party should be led by Khieu Samphan because he enjoyed more popular "political influence" than Pol Pot and his other superiors in the covert PDK leadership, and that the rest of the candidates should include only relatively powerless but palatable political personalities in the PDK ranks. The document thus implicitly admitted that because Pol Pot and other real leaders were likely to be un-electable, only a false and sanitized "political face" of the PDK could "be clearly displayed to the nation and the people."³³

A secret speech eight months later by Pol Pot to the Democratic Kampuchea Women's Association³⁴ insisting on the importance of PDK participation in parliamentary struggle was similarly full of blustering confidence, but also contained indications of profound anxiety. Pol Pot looked optimistically forward to a national assembly in which up to

³³ *Viewpoints*, "precis" and pp.3,6-7,13-17.

³⁴ Pol Pot, *What is the Current Situation in Kampuchea? What Will It Be Like in the Future?* [Pol Pot, *Situation*] (author's translation of a Khmer typescript document obtained by Christophe Peschoux), December 1988.

40 percent of the membership was PDK. He expressed certainty that even if PDK had a smaller number of seats, it would "inevitably have some representatives in the government" who could advance the interests of the people and of the struggle. On the other hand, he expressed fears that if the PDK did not achieve parliamentary representation, it "would definitely be compelled to collapse and disintegrate and be completely dispersed, and our people would suffer further exploitations." He did not explain why the only way for PDK to have "a voice in parliament", and thus "to protect to an important extent the interests of the people", was to field a party comprised of what were, from a PDK point of view, relative or total political non-entities.

Revitalizing People's War

Meanwhile, NADK's people's war tactics had been rejigged in line with the notion of a political settlement and on the basis of the presumption that PDK's growing popularity among the peasantry was beginning to influence local PRK authorities in its favour. Thus, in July 1985, NADK vowed to begin attempting to "mobilize" and "win over" not only PRK militia and soldiers, but also PRK "civil servants" in the local "administrative apparatus".³⁵ PDK pretensions aside, this policy of including PRK local officials in NADK proselytizing activities aimed ultimately to exclude them from political power unless they agreed to join covert networks of PDK counter-administrations in formation. It thus became part of what PDK dubbed the "two eliminations", that is, the neutralization of both the political and military foundations of the PRK in the countryside.³⁶

Son Sen would preside over the publication of encouraging statistics that initially suggested that this new approach

³⁵ VoNADK, 16 July 1985.

³⁶ VoDK, 20 and 31 December 1985.

defining local PRK officials and security personnel as forces with which PDK could develop "solidarity and collaboration" revitalized NADK operations. According to the statistics, between October 1985 and April 1986, NADK "attacked over and over again" 682 subdistricts and also "attacked and liberated on several occasions" some 1,200 villages. Son Sen boasted that "the most striking fact" about these actions was the extent to which "the population, Khmer soldiers, self-defence guards and Khmer civil servants ... increasingly joined" in NADK activities.³⁷ The purported success of this new NADK orientation was reflected in PDK propaganda claims that by 1987 NADK had "repeatedly dispersed and destroyed" 3,500 village and 440 subdistrict administrative networks". As a result, in 1,560 villages the PRK was said to have "lost all village administrative agents".³⁸

NADK was soon praised again for supposedly having done "well to promote" the inclusion of local PRK personnel in PDK support networks while "relying on the people and by actively and repeatedly attacking villages" and liberating "a greater number of village and subdistrict officials".³⁹ As a result, Son Sen claimed, during the 1987-1988 dry season, NADK dismantled 4,033 village committees and 236 subdistrict committees. He described "thousands of villages" as "liberated", which he implied meant NADK had free access to them.⁴⁰

By April 1988, PDK told itself that as a result of this people's war, a "nation-wide state power ... predicated on the foundation of ... people in the villages" was taking shape under its control. This would form the basis for its

³⁷ PDDK-UNESCO, 22 May 1986.

³⁸ VoNADK, 6 October 1987.

³⁹ VoDK, 20 February 1988.

⁴⁰ PDDK-UNESCO, 24 May 1988.

participation in elections through which it would attain representation in parliament and a role in government. This was now portrayed as the immediate reason why a people's war must continue to "fashion forces in the villages" by establishing various covert peasant support nuclei. A hint of problems was contained in a caution to the effect that no one should think PDK was already in a position immediately to seize total power as the CPK had done in 1975. However, if it were successful in expanding its support nuclei in the villages, PDK would be in a position to "emerge ... everywhere" and further its struggle via a legal political party that would reflect its support. It would be able to "conduct political party battles in every field by depending on ... the peasant people". At the same time, the PDK hope was that a political solution would give the PDK "even more possibilities" for doing rural organizational work in preparation for whatever "sorts of battles might take place within the bourgeois system" in the future.⁴¹

Plans to conduct electoral battles through liberal democracy were portrayed as a correct extension of a people's war line. In particular, it was an extension of the 1979-1988 "struggle to fight the ... enemy" by using "the countryside (the peasants) as the base and mainstay for advancing upward (liberating the countryside step-by-step ... and surrounding the urban areas)." Thus, "the struggle via a political party in the days to come" would be following "the practices and principles ... adopted successfully in the past" to win support and find appropriate means to transform it into advances down the road toward revolution.⁴²

PDK's People's War Falters

⁴¹ *Viewpoints*, pp.3-4,6-7,13-14,16-17.

⁴² *Viewpoints*, pp.6-7,16-17.

However, over the following six months of 1988, even PDK's own statistics suggested that something was wrong. The number of PRK village administrations supposedly "scattered and destroyed" per month steadily and dramatically declined, dropping from 560 in May to a mere 55 in October.⁴³ Son Sen's pronouncements about the level of NADK's 1988 rainy season achievements revealed a drop of one-third as compared to the 1987 rainy season.⁴⁴ This decline indicated that for some reason, PDK's rural people's war had peaked and was faltering. At best, it suggested that PDK was perhaps overextended either militarily or politically, or both, that PDK people's war was spreading itself so thin as to become ineffective. At the least, it implied a need either to consolidate existing advances or find some way to give a new impetus to the war. At bottom, however, it pointed to on-going problems of popular support, and suggested an irony of false optimism in this regard; that the more PDK operated on the basis of an assumption that it had regained popularity, the more likely it was to take steps that would reveal the opposite.

However, in instructions that an NADK cadre who later defected said were given to a gathering of NADK cadre in September 1988, Pol Pot seemed to eschew any notion of a need for political consolidation and to be oblivious to the implications of the decline for the underlying strength of support for PDK. Instead, he called for a further extension of NADK actions to more villages, as if the only problem was a lack of effort on the part of NADK. The defector would quote him as saying that during 1989 and 1990 the PDK must accelerate its work of building up peasant support networks to surround the cities from the countryside, and portray him of being confident that this would ensure that the PRK would "fade" away politically after the departure of Vietnamese

⁴³ VoNADK, 11 June, 3 July, 5 August, 4 September and 5 November 1988.

⁴⁴ PDDK-UNESCO, 1 November 1988.

troops from the country. Pol Pot saw no political reason why NADK units of three to four men could not enter villages undefended by CPAF to establish support networks. It should be perfectly possible for the nuclei recruited in villages then to be sent to do initial propaganda work and gather intelligence in villages with substantial PRK troop presences as a prelude to NADK attacks. NADK should then "root out" PRK administrative and security personnel by seizing them for "re-education" in NADK base areas. The cadre of the attacking NADK units would then face no obstacles to going "personally to every house to greet the villagers" and asking them to talk about their grievances against the PRK. Thus, both in villages that NADK was able to enter unopposed and those that it attacked militarily, it could and should be able to avoid use of force or violence against peasants and instead "use the weapon of the mouth" to expand and consolidate PDK popularity.

However, in an inadvertent recognition of problems, Pol Pot chastised those who were suggesting that PDK was too politically weak to proceed in this manner and declared that failure by NADK units to build up political support networks reflected their lack of understanding of the PDK strategy. He warned that unless the PDK accelerated its village "political warfare", the PDK struggle could be "set back many years", especially if a political settlement were imposed on it according to which elections would be held before it could achieve its goals in terms of building up a rural power base. Pol Pot described the threat of premature elections as a "big worry", and explained Khieu Samphan was using diplomatic tactics to try to "delay elections" until NADK had achieved "80 percent" of its current "military objectives". He explained that once Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, the PDK "must greatly accelerate" its village political work. NADK combatants would be instructed "to go to the villages and live in them immediately" to build up support networks. The PRK would then "disintegrate in one to one-and-a-half years maximum" after a Vietnamese withdrawal, because it enjoyed no

real support. Pol Pot suggested that if PDK achieved its goals, it could hope to get up to half of the rural vote.

However, other remarks contradicted Pol Pot's protestations of belief that the PDK's popular political strength was what gave it electoral potential. Perhaps most self-contradictory of all was Pol Pot's ~~was~~ a comment to the effect that PDK would want to hold elections only once PDK cadre living in the villages were in a position to "lead the vote" more or less throughout the rural areas. Also revealing, however, was his argument that if for some unspeakable reason PDK and its political allies did not win the elections, its rural networks would nevertheless somehow be able to "continue ... political warfare until the end" and ultimately "exercise power". It would merely be "a matter of spending more time" before PDK would be able to "control the country" as a whole. Meanwhile, he admitted, the PDK would have to keep "important forces" in the jungle, apparently including not only the covert leadership, but also troops capable of fighting in "self-defense". He suggested that such combat might be necessary if, for example, PDK was attacked to overturn the electoral successes he expected it was in a position to achieve. Although Pol Pot did not say so, some NADK cadre assumed that such armed forces might also be used to "fight militarily" if "the elections are lost".⁴⁵

In his speech to the PDK Women's Association in December 1988,⁴⁶ Pol Pot again surveyed the situation but now shifted his emphasis to the need to consolidate PDK's village networks

⁴⁵ See "Interviews with Khmers Rouges" conducted by Roger Normand in Sok Sann, July 1989, citing conversations with former NADK cadre and combatants; and *Banhcheak Ampi Ekasar Ni-muoy Ni-muoy Sangkhep* ("Synopsis of Each Document"), January 1990, a report prepared by a former NADK battalion cadre. I am grateful to Christophe Peschoux and Roger Normand for copies of these materials.

⁴⁶ Pol Pot, *Situation*.

qualitatively. The way in which he did this again revealed unself-conscious anxieties. He expressed satisfaction that PDK could claim its "liberated" and "semi-liberated zones" were "spread out into a lot of provinces". However, even in the liberated zones, he admitted, the PDK's enemies were still able to come and go, at least "occasionally". Apparently referring to a supposed improvement on the figure of 1,560 villages that Son Sen had given as the number in which the PRK administration was basically eliminated as of 1987, Pol Pot asserted that the PDK had already penetrated "more than 2,000" of the 7,000 to 8,000 villages in Cambodia to some extent and gone "all out refashioning them". However, he complained, this penetration was "not yet solid ... because our nuclei still aren't good enough." He said, only NADK units "working in some localities" had "been able to do a good job of refashioning villages" and create a situation in which "the people themselves" were able to "administer things politically and deploy guerilla militia to defend their villages" without NADK assistance. In "a lot of places", no such village power had been established because NADK cadre still did not "comprehend the line", had "no practice in popular work" and simply did not "believe in or rely upon the people".

Instead of seeing this as indicative of fundamental obstacles to PDK popularity, Pol Pot criticized the "upper-level leadership" of the PDK for having long failed "to concentrate on giving training in and nurturing popular strength-building work". This was the "primary reason" why troops on the front lines and other PDK elements still did not "have much experience in building up popular strength". Recently, however, the PDK finally begun^a "fashioning an army that knows how to do popular work". Obviously there was still a long way to go, although of course everything would be fine if NADK would only conduct proper political work.

Pol Pot declared that if his instructions were followed, the result would be an ever-expanding PDK rural political

administration in which more and more villages would be autonomous and self-contained bastions of support for PDK. PDK's popularity would "constantly ... swell and be solidified in an ever-increasing number of villages, starting in one village and moving on to two and then to four and then ten villages, to hundreds and then many thousands of villages."

Pol Pot warned, however, that until this happened, PDK would not be in a position to expect the kind of political and diplomatic solution that would make it possible for PDK to benefit from an electoral process. He declared that "only once 4,000 to 5,000 of the 7,000-8,000 villages throughout the country have been attacked a lot and well to eliminate two and build four" would the situation in Cambodia be ripe for a political solution. Once this goal of such penetration of something like 60 percent of the country's villages was achieved, the unpopular PRK would not "be able to hang on" politically. The majority of PRK forces and administrators at the village and subdistrict levels would "dissociate themselves" from it "and go back to being ordinary people", thus leaving PDK's network of popular support nuclei in a position to take over the countryside. Then, once the cease-fire for which a political settlement would provide was in place, "the majority" of those in the ranks of the NADK and other PDK organizations would disperse themselves everywhere throughout the entire country to get a grip on thousands of villages and millions of people." Pol Pot did not explain the contradiction in his own presentation between the assumption of PDK political possibilities and the need for a "grip" of control over its supposed supporters. In fact, without being able to admit it to himself or others, Pol Pot was through such slips admitting that the establishment of PDK political control over the countryside was the basis for its hopes of successful participation in parliamentary struggle. As he put it in another unself-conscious moment, only by "being in possession of people in the villages and then having more and more committees to lead the villages" could PDK exert

influence over how people voted.

NADK propaganda from late 1988 through the middle of 1989 suggests that it tried to focus first on political consolidation and then further expansion of the village war. Before the end of 1988, NADK had talked about the "liberation" of villages and NADK involvement in "dismantling" village structures of political administration, but did not report the establishment of new structures. From the end of 1988, however, it started highlighting claims that after having "attacked to disperse and dismantle the village administration of the ... enemy", the NADK was enlisting cooperation of villagers to "reestablish a village administration belonging to the nation" by setting up "new village committees".⁴⁷ In other words, NADK attacks were supposedly now making it possible for the covert counter-administrations it had been striving to create through political work finally to begin coming out into the open and formally replacing PRK power structures. By mid-1989, this qualitative consolidation had supposedly laid the basis for a new quantitative expansion. Son Sen resumed putting forward extraordinary statistics suggesting that NADK was accelerating PDK's rural political advance, even if there remained a considerable way to go before reaching Pol Pot's targets. He claimed that NADK had done twice as well as during the 1988 dry season, crediting it with having "repeatedly attacked to eliminate, disperse and dissolve" the administrations of "more than 4,000 villages" and 300 subdistricts.⁴⁸ At the end of the year, PDK was claiming that NADK was again hitting more than 500 villages a month.⁴⁹ Independent research, however, demonstrated that in reality PDK was achieving much less both in terms of support and control.

⁴⁷ See for example, *NADK* (Year 5 No 21: February 1989), pp.15,18,26, where events in late 1988 are discussed.

⁴⁸ *NADK* (Year 4, No 23: June 1989), pp.5,9,16,19.

⁴⁹ *VoNADK*, 6 January 1990.

CHAPTER THREE

ILLUSION, REALITY AND THE PARIS CONFERENCES

The Reality of PDK People's War

The research of Christophe Peschoux, the only person who seriously investigated PDK activities in the late 1980s, showed not only how vastly exaggerated Son Sen's statistics were, but more fundamentally the extent to which the political conclusions based on them were built on self-delusion.

Peschoux interviewed former NADK cadre and combatants, Cambodian peasants and other Cambodian sources to draw a composite picture of the reality of PDK's "people's war". He concluded that most NADK forces had indeed in theory been "primarily mobilized [for] political and not military work in the countryside". As one of his sources put it, ever since 1979, the "strategy was not to make military gains but to build up ... networks inside the country and build up ... forces politically." Thus, for NADK "attacking the villages" was not supposed to mean taking them over militarily, but politically, albeit using the military as a necessary tool to isolate the enemy from the population. NADK cadre and combatants were indoctrinated that even "if weapons are the key that give access to the villages, once they are opened, the guerillas" must concentrate on "winning over popular support".¹

However, peasant testimony gave credibility to PRK allegations that NADK visits to villages were often little more than looting raids. Villagers recounted thefts during attacks in which NADK guerillas burned government buildings, blew bridges and seized villagers as porters to carry what was

¹ Christophe Peschoux, *Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-1990* [Peschoux, *Khmers Rouges*] (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp.21-22,27-30,198-202,209-215.

being stolen from them. Even more seriously, NADK attacks often "resulted in the loss of numerous civilian lives". Even though NADK combatants were formally "forbidden to kill or harm a villager or captured soldier or civil servant," those "accused of collaborating closely with the Vietnamese or government" against PDK, such as alleged "spies" or "intelligence agents" or those who had allegedly "committed repeated violent abuses against the population", were "usually executed". If some peasants might otherwise have been willing to "forget the past", it was hard for them to do so given such reminders of indifference to death.²

It was in this context that NADK went about trying to "persuade" villagers "to withdraw their support for the enemy and to collaborate with the resistance against it", and to get villagers to tell them what they wanted to hear: that PDK was more devoted to the "nation and people" than any other Cambodian political movement, and that therefore villagers were happy to support its struggle. The key was to try to conjure away popular memories of the executions, starvation, disease and overwork under Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok in 1975-1978. Claims that the three old men were no longer in charge were coupled appeals for villagers to cooperate with a PDK now supposedly led by Khieu Samphan, in order to render the PRK "powerless" in the countryside. At the same time, cadre and combatants were instructed simply to refuse to discuss the past in the hope that this would make it vanish as a political problem. Yet by avoiding this key issue, NADK cadre and combatants were creating a new unreality for themselves that allowed them to believe PDK had been truly able to put the past behind it. Non-discussion of the past made it possible for some to imagine that PDK was as popular as they wanted it to be, that "people's war" was working according to its script, and that therefore PDK participation in elections could advance the revolutionary cause, as long as

² pp.141-143,168-171,175-180,204-209,255-266,271-280.

conditions for elections were such as to allow "the people" to express their support.³

Peschoux thus shows how formal moderation combined with the threat or reality of violence gave the PDK the semblance of cooperation with NADK and of agreement with its self-image, but not much more.⁴ "Spontaneous and sustained adherence" was lacking. Instead, PDK cadre were mistaking peasant fear of and deference to the armed authority of NADK combatants with popular support. One ex-cadre claimed that people supported PDK because it did not abuse them and helped the poorer strata by distributing medications and other material aid, and that the peasantry therefore accepted that PDK reforms were real. Others closer to the reality saw this as self-delusion, like a former combatant who explained, "when we enter the villages, we are armed, and the people do not dare to oppose us." A typical peasant view was expressed by a villager from Siem Reap, who declared of NADK combatants, "they are strong because they are heavily armed, not because of their politics." Peasants interviewed by Peschoux insisted that although they did not like PRK, they simply did not trust PDK. One from Kampong Speu province complained that PRK was "very oppressive", but of PDK he said, "I am afraid they may regain power and resume their past policies."⁵

Peschoux concluded that PDK had been able to "gradually erode ... hatred and suspicion" toward it only among a few "fractions" of the population. Such support as did exist was "more passive than active". "Superficial cooperation" was the best PDK had obtained. Thus, more than a decade after the CPK had lost power, PDK still seemed to have "no chance to amass again the kind of large-scale support" that Pol Pot and other senior leaders attributed to their implementation of

³ pp.27-30,135-136,198-202,209-215.

⁴ pp.27-30,141-143,107-115,180-186,198-203.

⁵ pp.151-154,189-193,232-241,249-266,280-284.

"people's war" in the early 1970s, and that they assumed had laid the foundation for their military victory of April 1975. Nor, according to a peasant from Takæv, was it in a position to advance politically via elections. He told Peschoux that the PDK's continued underlying unpopularity meant elections were not a viable option for it. He suggested that unless its foreign or domestic allies conspired to put it in power, it would have no choice but to resort increasingly to force to achieve its objectives.⁶

Peschoux also concluded that PDK claims and self-delusions about popular support were matched by the unreliability of NADK statistics about the number of villages under PDK control or influence. In fact, "the real number of liberated villages under PDK's permanent control or to which its units had regular access" was "very small". His interviews with PDK veterans indicated that although the number of PDK "liberated villages" grew in the late 1980s, the increase was slight.⁷

The First Paris International Conference on Cambodia

If neither PDK statistics nor the reality were such as to suggest that Pol Pot's preconditions for a favourable settlement had been met, the PDK leadership as a whole was not prepared to back down from its demands for quadripartitism. Thus, public events in 1989 reconfirmed the defeat both of Son Sen's attempt to manoeuvre Pol Pot and Nuon Chea out of the way and of his advocacy of agreeing to less in terms of a political settlement than they were demanding. The former defeat was signalled in the run-up to the First International Conference on Cambodia, which opened in Paris in July 1989, after Vietnam had announced that it would be withdrawing all its troops by September. The latter was demonstrated by PDK

⁶ pp.232-241,255-260.

⁷ pp.226-232.

demands at the conference for quadripartitism.

A month before the conference began, PDK backed off from the promise that Pol Pot would cease "all activities, whether political or military" once the Vietnamese signed an agreement to withdraw their troops. While PDK insisted the withdrawal announced by the Vietnamese would be a sham, Pol Pot gave a more qualified undertaking that suggested he would not fully retire until a "genuine settlement" had been "properly implemented". This was signalled in a letter addressed to PDK President Khieu Samphan and Vice President Son Sen dated 4 March 1989, but not made public until 5 June. Taking another step into clandestinity, he requested to be allowed "to resign as head of the High Institute for National Defence". He said, however, he "would like to remain as a researcher" there "until all the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors are driven out of Cambodia." The reply said that after "several meetings" to discuss Pol Pot's "case", a "joint meeting of the Central Committee of the PDK and the Supreme Command held on 3 June" had "decided to follow [his] wishes."⁸ Nuon Chea and Ta Mok quickly chimed in. They now finally claimed publicly, three years after the supposed fact, that they had retired in 1986. However, these retirements and their promises as regards the future were at least as ambiguous as those of Pol Pot.⁹

The troika's determination to avoid exile and push their hard negotiating line was based on their on-going domination of NADK from behind the scenes. Yet again, little or nothing had changed. The reality was that Pol Pot's primacy continued to be manifest via his responsibility for "study and research" of all political and military affairs. He and Nuon Chea were still directly responsible for the western and southern parts of Cambodia covered by PDK Sectors 505 and 32, and it appears that worries about Ieng Sary's "liberalism" had resulted in

⁸ VoNADK, 4 June 1989.

⁹ VoNADK, 9 and 11 July 1989.

him and his Sector 102 being placed under Nuon Chea's supervision. However, Ta Mok retained full direct responsibility for the northern part of Cambodia covered by Sector 1003, while Son Sen was in full direct control of the eastern Cambodia Sector 1001.¹⁰

The Paris Conference provided a forum at which Khieu Samphan laid out in formal detail the troika's hard-line position of out-doing the Vietnamese achievements. In opening speeches to the Conference, Khieu Samphan demanded it "put an end ... to the Phnom Penh regime". He said an end to the NADK armed struggle could come only "after the formation of a provisional quadripartite Government under the leadership of ... Sihanouk". He insisted said that the old PRK, recently renamed the State of Cambodia (SoC)¹¹ must be "dismantled" along with the CGDK "so as to enable the Cambodian people to freely, and without coercion, exercise their sacred right" to vote. Also required was either the "total disarming" of the armies of the four *parties*, or their "partial disarming" down to a force of 10,000 men each, and the "confining in barracks" of all their reduced forces. A UN Peace Keeping Force would assist in maintaining these measures in order to help "prevent any attempt at seizing or monopolizing power by one party to the detriment of others".¹² Echoing Pol Pot's analysis of elections under Sihanouk in 1955 and 1958, he warned that if SoC handled "electoral preparations", it would "exert all sorts of pressure and coercion on electors so as to prevent them from voting for" the opposition and would "force them to vote" for the SoC ruling party, the Revolutionary People's

¹⁰ FUNCINPEC-ANKI Intelligence Report, "Activities of the Khmer Rouge", 12 July 1990.

¹¹ The name change took place in April 1989.

¹² "Address by HE Mr Khieu Samphan to the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, 31 July 1989", in Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée, and Sorpong Peou, eds, *Cambodia: The 1989 Paris Peace Conference, Background Analysis and Documents [1989 Paris Conference]* (Milwood: Kraus International Publications, 1991), pp.20-29.

Party of Kampuchea (later renamed the Cambodian People's Party - CPP).¹³ PDK's insistence on the dissolution of SoC and its replacement by a political administration in which the PDK held a quarter of the power was a major reason for the failure of the First Paris Conference to achieve an agreement. Nevertheless, the PDK continued to stick to this position.

A Shift in NADK Strategy

Khieu Samphan thus bought more time for NADK to pursue its people's war. However, it seems that after the CGDK's failure to achieve its goals in Paris, NADK military strategy shifted away from the village contestation toward concentration of troops to begin fighting "battles of annihilation" and other "decisive engagements"¹⁴ against major SoC targets. The objective was evidently to seize district towns and one or more provincial capitals in order to neutralize large numbers of enemy troops and to back up PDK demands for a one-quarter share in the national political administration. This shift neatly side-stepped the problems that NADK was having in winning over villagers politically by proceeding on the basis of a false assumption that PDK's rural support was already so solid that it was time now to turn to a more purely military push.

However, in an interview in early October 1989, Son Sen explained the new NADK approach in a way that tried to find excuses for PDK's political problems, but also seemed to signal some circumspection about what it could be expected to achieve. He said NADK would continue its war in the interior

¹³ "Statement by HE Mr Khieu Samphan, President of the Democratic Kampuchea party, to the Ad Hoc Committee, 22 August 1989", *1989 Paris Conference*, pp.328-330.

¹⁴ Mao Zedong, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.223-239,248-249; and "On Protracted War", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.157-182.

"to liberate villages and eliminate the enemy's village-level political administration", but said that this war involved "hardship" for NADK because of logistical difficulties. This excuse covered up for political failures that could not be directly admitted. Anyway, Son Sen stressed, the extent to which the village war had already succeeded now made it possible for NADK units operating along the Thai border "to liberate more and more territory," and he highlighted PDK's hope that this "military aspect" of its struggle would "give an impetus to ... a diplomatic solution" that would open up the political prospects he asserted PDK enjoyed. The diplomatic solution would allow the people to manifest their supposed desire for PDK "to come and liberate them right away". It would allow PDK to capitalize on the years of work to "propagandize and educate the people" carried out by NADK, as a result of which the peasantry was already "in substance ... in serious opposition" to SoC, whose local administration was "isolated from the people". He unself-consciously insisted that although villagers might "seem to be with the enemy", and might "not dare to oppose" SoC "openly", they were "standing by, anticipating" the day when they would be able to manifest their support for PDK. Through this bit of logical acrobatics, he simultaneously explained away their lack of support for PDK and professed his confidence in the existence of that support.¹⁵

Son Sen also explained that in order to make it possible for the people to switch from pretending not to support PDK to openly supporting it, NADK would make "every effort" to liberate district and provincial towns. However, he also admitted that NADK forces were "limited" and could not easily be expanded, not - of course - for a lack of volunteers, but "because troops necessitate huge expenditure". Moreover, PDK's "constant desire to liberate places, to liberate as many as possible" might be thwarted not by a lack of popular

¹⁵ Author's translation of a journalist's taped interview with Son Sen, 3 October 1989.

enthusiasm for liberation, but some sort of non-popular "resistance". Son Sen promised NADK would do its "best", but in conceding that it would have to "proceed step by step" because of its "limitations", he continued to insist that these were non-political in nature. Similarly, he argued that although the PDK leadership wanted "things to be ended quickly", Cambodia's people might have to "go on struggling for a long time to come" for the liberation by PDK he said they wanted. The reality was instead that PDK might have to wait a very long time indeed before the Cambodian people would want to be liberated again by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, or even by their front-man, Khieu Samphan.

In accordance with the change in military strategy outlined by Son Sen, NADK began pulling back guerillas from their attempts at political work deep inside Cambodia to concentrate forces for a series of conventional multi-division attacks on static SoC positions near the Thai border. The first campaign seized the district town of Pailin in October.¹⁶ In two more conventional battles, the NADK seized the redoubt of Phnum Malai in western Banteay Meanchey and the district town Anlung Veng in northern Siem Reap.¹⁷ The capture of these three objectives proved to be the highwater mark of NADK's conventional campaign, and in the absence of other advances, Pailin and Anlung Veng would have to serve as the "capitals" of PDK in western and northern Cambodia, respectively.

Maintaining the Hard Line

PDK tried to build on NADK's limited conventional

¹⁶ Capt P Bartu, "Background History on Major Battles in Cambodia After the Withdrawal of the Vietnamese in September 1989", 19 November 1992, pp.1-3; NADK (Year 4, No 26: December 1989), pp.22-27. VoNADK, 22 October 1990; "Khmer Rouge Hold Pailin", AFP, Bangkok, 24 October 1990.

¹⁷ NADK (Year 5, No 27: February 1990), pp.12-13,20-21.

successes by maintaining its political demands. The hard line was reiterated in a letter from Khieu Samphan addressed on 4 February 1990 to Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, one of the Co-Chairmen of the suspended Paris Conference. Khieu Samphan reiterated PDK insistence on "formation of a provisional equal quadripartite government ... charged with the duty of organizing free, fair and democratic elections". He endorsed the concept "that the UN should play a vital, enhanced supervisory role" with regard to elections. He warned that if SoC and its army were "preserved", the UN could not fundamentally alter the situation in Cambodia even "with ... 10,000 or 20,000 personnel". Unless the PDK demands were met, "neither a settlement of the war nor the restoration of peace in the country could be achieved."¹⁸

However, SoC was determined to preserve itself. In February, it launched a major counter-offensive that recaptured some of the territory recently seized by NADK, although both Pailin and Anlung Veng remained in PDK hands.¹⁹ Moreover, although Peschoux's research shows that the Vietnamese withdrawal and first Paris Conference had indeed been followed by intensified NADK activity in some parts of rural Cambodia during which its guerillas penetrated into new areas,²⁰ by mid-1990 SoC was countering these advances. Most notably, it initiated a programme of compulsory relocations of villagers out of contested territory into zones under solid SoC control. By July, some 100,000 people were thus put beyond NADK reach.²¹

The effect of such measures was reflected at a meeting on

¹⁸ VoNADK, 10 February 1990.

¹⁹ Sina Than, "Cambodia 1990: Towards a Peaceful Solution?", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1991* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), pp.94,97.

²⁰ Peschoux, *Khmers Rouges*, pp.249-284.

²¹ Sina Than, p.97.

13 April 1990 of senior NADK cadre from Sectors 1001 and 1003, over which Ta Mok presided. According to SoC intelligence reports corroborated by FUNCINPEC sources, he expressed concern that PDK had yet to achieve the objectives that had earlier been put forward as preconditions for PDK participation in an electoral process. Ta Mok had to admit that the situation in the countryside was still such that the PDK would "not be able to seize a victory over [its] rivals" in a general election. He also admitted PDK might nevertheless be unable to avoid imposition of a peace settlement by the "big powers" that fell short of quadripartitism, in which case its only choice would be to try to take advantage of whatever it was offered to "infiltrate" the existing political administration and apply "'rust eating away the iron' tactics". Anyway, Ta Mok predicted, under such circumstances, "the parties engaging in the conflict will not be able to compromise with each other" for any length of time. Instead of looking forward to elections, he foresaw that an armed confrontation would "break out soon" after the imposition of any agreement unfavourable to PDK. This gritty realism, however, was no less based on false assumptions of PDK popularity than Son Sen's argument about the need for NADK to move into conventional warfare or Pol Pot's soothing talk about PDK having 40 seats in some future national assembly. Warning against a collapse of NADK morale, Ta Mok expressed his confidence that - even under an unfavourable international agreement - PDK would benefit from the fruits of its subversive tactics, because "the masses whom we have been indoctrinating will certainly support us". If the path of advance via elections was blocked, PDK would thus still "be able to seize the final victory" through resumed armed struggle.²²

The Peace Plan of the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council

²² VoCP, 2 September 1990; "FUNCINPEC-ANKI Intelligence Report: 12-7-90 'Activities of the Khmer Rouge'".

Ta Mok's evocation of something resembling the Vietnamese model of 1973-1975 was followed at the end of May 1990 by indications that PDK might be prepared to back away from its insistence on the establishment of a quadripartite political administration. This apparent shift coincided with meetings of the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council,²³ during which they began formulating a settlement that they hoped would be acceptable to both SoC and to its PDK, KPRLF and FUNCINPEC adversaries. It offered PDK much less than it wanted, but significantly more than the Cambodian Communist movement had been promised by the 1954 Geneva Agreements and than the Vietnamese Communists had gotten in 1973. PDK reacted with public vacillation that reflected internal disagreement, but ultimately settled in form for what was on offer while continuing to hope and push for more in terms of actual political substance.

The Permanent Five approach rejected the concept of a quadripartite administration in favour of a formula according to which Cambodia would be represented symbolically by a quadripartite Supreme National Council (SNC) but its administration overseen by the UN pending elections.²⁴ On 29 May, VoNADK declared support for a communique issued by the Permanent Five describing the elements of their proposed settlement.²⁵

However, by late June, the PDK reiterated its insistence on quadripartitism by demanding that the SNC be endowed with executive and legislative functions. Moreover, there should "be representatives of the four Cambodian *parties* on an equal

²³ China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the US.

²⁴ "Background Note on the Negotiating Process" ["Background"], in UN, Department of Public Information, *Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict* (DPI1180-92077-January 1992-10M), p.iv.

²⁵ VoNADK, 28 May 1990.

footing" not only in the SNC, but also "from top to bottom, in ... all the ministries, as well as at the provincial, district, sub-district and village levels."²⁶

This renewed intransigence coincided with NADK's next major operation, which was launched in June in coordination with FUNCINPEC troops in Kampong Thom province. However, the operation had disappointing results. Although a district town was temporarily seized, and the provincial capital was penetrated for a few hours, the people did not flock to PDK's cause and SoC drove the attackers back.²⁷ The Permanent Five then definitively rejected quadripartitism when it proceeded on 28 August 1990 to agree the text of a "framework document" to "define the key elements of a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict based on an enhanced UN role".²⁸

The framework called for the establishment of an SNC composed of "representative individuals" from the four *parties* as the "unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout [a] transitional period, [Cambodia's] national sovereignty and unity would be enshrined". This political shrine "should be composed of representative individuals with authority among the Cambodian people". The Five said they would welcome a Cambodian decision that

²⁶ "Proposal of the PDK for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Problem Within the Framework of the Summary of the Conclusion of 26 May 1990 of the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, dated 29 June 1990", VoNADK, 30 June 1990.

²⁷ Bartu, pp.5-6.

²⁸ UN, General Assembly, Security Council (A/45/472-S/21689), 31 August 1990, Annex: *Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia (28 August 1990); Appendix: Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict [Framework]*.

Sihanouk be SNC president.²⁹ Once a comprehensive political settlement was signed, the SNC would "delegate to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive agreement, including those relating to the conduct of free and fair elections and relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia." It specified this meant that all "administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections" would "be placed under direct UN supervision or control", particularly those responsible for "foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information". UNTAC was to be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN and was to "exercise such control as is necessary to ensure the strict neutrality of the bodies responsible for" these subjects. The framework did not refer to the existence of any government or governments in Cambodia, but only to "existing administrative structures".³⁰

Accepting a Less Favourable Political Solution While Pushing for More

While the framework thus did not provide for the establishment of a quadripartite political administration at any level, it held out the prospect of neutralizing SoC's political authority via a large-scale UN presence. It also envisaged total cantonment and de facto disarming of CPAF, as well as NADK.³¹ The PDK leadership evidently concluded that - for the time being at least - this was the best PDK could

²⁹ Sihanouk had by this time relinquished his positions as President of the CGDK and of FUNCINPEC, leaving the latter under the leadership of his son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh.

³⁰ *Framework*, Section 1, paragraphs 1, 4,5,8,9,10 and 12.

³¹ The framework provided for the "regrouping and relocating to specifically designated cantonment areas" of all armed forces "under the supervision of UNTAC" and for the storage of their arms "under UNTAC supervision". *Framework*, Section 2, paragraphs 15,17,18, and 19.

hope to get. Thus, on 2 September, VoNADK declared that the PDK and its allies had "expressed their full support" for what it described as the framework's provisions for a UN "role to administer Cambodia during the transitional period" and in the "disarming of the armed forces engaged in fighting on the battlefield".³² In a meeting in Indonesia on 10 September, the PDK, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC and SoC agreed to a joint statement in which they declared their acceptance in principle of the framework document and to form the SNC.³³ However, the meeting failed to achieve the PDK objective of designating Sihanouk as SNC president, and also resulted in an SNC in which the PDK received one-sixth representation rather than one-quarter, while SoC held half the membership. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen were the PDK figures named to the SNC.³⁴

PDK's loud proclamation of its agreement with the approach of the Permanent Five masked its unhappiness about not yet having achieved quadripartitism, but reflected its recognition that the plan could create conditions for weakening SoC. SoC also recognized this threat, and was treating the plan as a basis for discussions while demanding significant revisions of it. PDK's unhappiness with the plan and its concerns that SoC might obtain revisions of it were manifested in PDK's public defiance of the Permanent Five's call on all Cambodian parties to exercise maximum military "self-restraint so as to create the peaceful climate required to facilitate the achievement and implementation of a comprehensive political settlement".³⁵ This defiance was

³² VoNADK, 1 September 1990.

³³ "10 September 1990 Joint Statement of the Informal Meeting on Cambodia, Issued at Jakarta on 10 September 1990".

³⁴ Of the remaining ten, six were from SoC and two each from the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. The statement envisaged the possibility of Sihanouk joining as a thirteenth member.

³⁵ UN, General Assembly, Security Council (A/45/472-S/21689), 31 August 1990, *Annex: Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia (28 August*

justified internally as necessary to compel immediate and total SoC compliance with the Five's plan, and aimed at subverting it in a way that reintroduced quadripartitism. At a secret meeting in late September and early October convened in the presence of Pol Pot, leading NADK cadre resolved that NADK activities must continue in order to "force" SoC to "abide by" the Jakarta declaration of 10 September and Permanent Five framework.³⁶ This was one of a series of gatherings of PDK diplomats and military cadre at which the leadership declared that given what it said was the attitude of the population, PDK should support the Permanent Five initiative while refocusing and further intensifying its people's war political struggle to take account of their plan.³⁷

This reflected hopes that, via a new twist in NADK's village-organizing tactics, PDK might be able to use what the Five were offering to achieve more than the plan in fact conceded. This military riposte to rejection of PDK demands for quadripartitism aimed to achieve the semblance of quadripartitism. This was to be done by describing NADK's ongoing war in the countryside with a revised terminology that replaced the notion of village administrations "belonging to the nation" with that of village "national councils" supposedly belonging to Sihanouk. This switch also allowed PDK again to sidestep the problems of popularity that it was unable to confront directly. It would be organizing at the village level neither in the name of the "nation" or of a supposedly Khieu Samphan-led PDK, much less in the name of Pol Pot, but in the name of Sihanouk. Even if it scored some successes, these would only demonstrate the usefulness of the ruse, not PDK popularity, although Pol Pot would certainly

1990).

³⁶ Sina Than, p.95, quoting a statement by a "senior Khmer Rouge".

³⁷ *Bangkok Post*, 19 March 1991.

interpret any sign of success as proof of just that.

PDK set the stage for a new armed offensive by announcing a set of "political slogans" to welcome the formation of the SNC. The slogans insisted that the SNC should be considered "Cambodia's sole legitimate body: *there is no other state organ apart from the SNC*"³⁸. They called on SoC "administrative staff in villages and sub-districts" to cease fighting NADK and instead to "accept and respect the SNC".³⁹ A PDK claimed that after "the 10 September 1990 Jakarta Joint Statement", Cambodians had "refused to recognize" the SoC. Instead, they had begun cooperating with the NADK "in attacking and dismantling the village and sub-district state authorities" of SoC and had "successively set up national councils to replace these state authorities".⁴⁰ This terminology was accompanied by an intensified propaganda push for installation of Sihanouk as SNC president. One asserted that with "the establishment of an SNC, with ... Sihanouk as Chairman", SoC "should no longer exist".⁴¹ This was more wishful thinking.

PDK also attempted to enforce acceptance of the Permanent Five's peace formula by launching NADK into new conventional military actions. However, this came amidst indications that SoC rainy season use of air power and artillery against NADK had succeeded in disrupting its logistics and thus PDK's apparent hopes of launching attacks on major provincial capitals like Siem Reap, Batdambang and Kampung Thom.⁴² In November, NADK nevertheless concentrated forces for a multi-division operation aimed at Batdambang provincial town, but it

³⁸ emphases added.

³⁹ VoNADK, 22 September 1990.

⁴⁰ VoDK, 28 March 1991.

⁴¹ VoNADK, 2 and 3 October 1990.

⁴² Sina Than, pp.95,97.

"ran out of steam after 15 days", and there was no more of a popular uprising in favour of PDK than there had been in Kampung Thom.⁴³

Nevertheless, Khieu Samphan made another try to get a better deal. He warned that unless SoC was dissolved, the UN would in fact "enjoy no rights whatsoever nor any means to supervise and organize elections".⁴⁴ However, the Permanent Five pushed ahead to elaborate a draft agreement based on the framework. On 26 November 1990, the Five and the Paris Conference Co-Chairmen France and Indonesia finalised a "Proposed Structure for the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict". The main text of the draft agreement followed closely the language of the framework in spelling out "arrangements during the transitional period" as regards the administration of Cambodia.⁴⁵

However, an annex to the draft broadened the powers of the UNTAC head vis-à-vis the SNC and UNTAC's mandate of supervision and control vis-à-vis existing administrative structures, SoC and PDK alike.⁴⁶ The draft furthermore now specified that cantoned PDK, SoC and other Cambodian armed forces would also be demobilized, albeit according to a timetable still to be discussed.⁴⁷

⁴³ Bartu, p.6.

⁴⁴ VoNADK, 18 November 1990.

⁴⁵ UN, Security Council, "Proposed Structure for the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict" ["Draft"], Sections I, II and III.

⁴⁶ "Draft", "Annex 1, Proposed Mandate for UNTAC", Section A, paragraphs 2,4,5,6 and 7.

⁴⁷ "Draft", "Annex 2, Withdrawal, Cease-fire and Related Measures", Article I, paragraphs 1,2,4 and 6; Article 3, paragraph 3; and Article V, paragraph 1.

PDK welcomed the draft agreement⁴⁸, which could be interpreted as potentially more favourable to it than the earlier framework, but it was opposed by SoC. As the then SoC chief of state Heng Samrin put in a speech marking the anniversary of the collapse of the Democratic Kampuchea regime in 1979, the "draft agreement ... must be improved with the participation of the SoC's SNC members."⁴⁹ In particular, SoC hoped to mitigate the powers of UNTAC vis-a-vis its administrative structures and to reduce the extent to which its armed forces would be disarmed and demobilized.

National Councils as Counter-Administration

After the Permanent Five put forward the draft agreement, the PDK put even greater emphasis on use of the NADK to establish local national councils, and it appears a few may have been established at the village and sub-district levels as a result of NADK actions. PDK also began to make much less plausible claims that National Councils had been established in certain provinces. VoDK asserted that provincial-level national councils were set up in Batdambang, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap and Kampong Thom in early December. The radio argued that the supposed existence of such bodies demonstrated that SoC was "disintegrating and will completely disintegrate soon."⁵⁰ This contention seemed intended to set the stage for what PDK hoped would eventually be successful NADK conventional attacks in these provinces that could be presented as proof to itself and others of PDK's popularity. It pointed toward a scenario according to which provincial National Councils would emerge as the culmination of its village-level people's war, of conventional NADK attacks on district and provincial targets and the psychological impact of an enhanced political role for Sihanouk. If Sihanouk or

⁴⁸ For an example, see VoNADK, 31 December 1990.

⁴⁹ VoCP, 5 January 1991.

⁵⁰ VoDK, 20 December 1990.

the UN gave some credit to PDK's claims that a hierarchy of local councils from the village right up to the provincial level was being created, then it could put that hierarchy forward as an alternative to SoC. It could try to demand that the UN interact with this hierarchy instead of that of SoC and - supposedly - instead of the PDK's own "existing administrative structures".

SoC Foils NADK's Renewed War Effort

In a new year message for 1991, Khieu Samphan urged the NADK to intensify actions to set up local national councils. He proclaimed that Cambodia was still "moving toward liberation" and optimistically predicted it would "certainly be liberated in the near future". However, he also indicated that the PDK's position was "not yet conclusive," and that achieving liberation would require further "tenacious struggle".⁵¹ Son Sen said on the same occasion that diplomatic achievements had "enabled progress towards ending the ... war ... to make another step forward," but indicated that in order to make further steps, NADK would have successfully to resume big-unit warfare. He explained that its "current struggle" was aimed "directly against ... the core of the puppet army," especially on the largely conventional battlefields in Batdambang, in Siem Reap and Kampong Thom, where NADK operations might give provincial national councils a chance to surface.⁵²

However, NADK plans were spoiled by SoC counter-measures that outclassed NADK (and the armies of its CGDK partners) in conventional combat through the use of heavy artillery, tank-led assaults and airpower.⁵³ Already in October 1990, SoC had

⁵¹ VoNADK, 30 December 1990.

⁵² VoNADK, 1 January 1991.

⁵³ *Bangkok Post*, 6 April 1991.

launched attacks in the direction of Pailin,⁵⁴ and, as one SoC commander in western Cambodia declared in late January, its forces were "on the offensive, not the defensive any more."⁵⁵ An attempt by NADK in early February to regain the military initiative by launching "major attacks" to capture Batdambang⁵⁶ soon fizzled out.⁵⁷ SoC attacks in Kampong Thom drove FUNCINPEC forces that had cooperated with NADK there in 1990 out of their forward headquarters,⁵⁸ and were allegedly accompanied by operations against NADK in Siem Reap.⁵⁹ Further SoC probes in northwestern Cambodia in late March precipitated emergency meetings between Son Sen and other PDK leaders "to discuss the war situation".⁶⁰ Perhaps at his urging, they began considering whether PDK might have to accept "revisions" of the Permanent Five plan in SoC's favour.⁶¹

Preemption of NADK's conventional war plans almost certainly undermined its subsidiary efforts to transform NADK's "people's war" into a village-based campaign for the establishment of local National Councils. As ever, these efforts were the subject of much propaganda, but had few concrete results. A set of "new political slogans" put forward by the PDK for 1991 again stressed that there should be no more SoC administration in Cambodia. VoNADK called on

⁵⁴ VoNADK, 13 March 1991.

⁵⁵ "Cambodia: Gunfire", Reuter, Sre Ambel, 24 January 1991.

⁵⁶ *Bangkok Post*, 5 February 1991.

⁵⁷ VoNADK, 27 February 1991.

⁵⁸ VoCP, 18 February 1991. In March, "resistance" sources admitted to having lost "some ground" in Kampong Thom. *Bangkok Post*, 22 March 1991.

⁵⁹ VoNADK, 22 February 1991.

⁶⁰ Xinhua, 28 March 1991.

⁶¹ "Rebels Prepared to Discuss Plan Revisions", AFP, Bangkok, 27 March 1991.

NADK to join forces with PDK peasant supporters "to attack, scatter and dissolve the village, sub-district, district, provincial and municipal administrative networks of the ... enemy ... and to replace them with national councils."⁶²

The only place where this scenario seemed even briefly possible was Kampot province, which was weakly defended by SoC, but even with the opportunities this offered, NADK was unable to consolidate temporary gains there. VoNADK lauded the success of NADK's "guerilla warfare and people's war to launch military and political offensives at the same time" in the province by attacking "mostly in villages" with the aim of "dismantling the state authorities" of SoC.⁶³ In fact, NADK forces in Kampot managed briefly to overrun one district town and penetrate to the outskirts of the Kampot provincial seat, taking advantage of the particularly poor quality of local SoC troops. However, while the population fled to avoid PDK control, counter-attacks by SoC reinforcements in early April pushed NADK "back to the mountains".⁶⁴

In view of the overall course of military events since early 1991, it is not surprising that when reviewing them in April, Khieu Samphan once again evinced optimism while admitting that PDK's enemies were "not dead yet" and were still "trying militarily". He lamented that they might still have "adequate ... forces" to oppose NADK "on battlefields throughout the country" and spoke of their efforts "to prevent" NADK actions "to cut off major strategic roads ... and besiege and attack major townships, especially the cities in various provinces." Although he claimed in general terms that PDK had "set up, reinforced and expanded national councils in many villages, subdistricts, districts and even

⁶² VoNADK, 1 January 1991.

⁶³ VoNADK, 13 March 1991.

⁶⁴ "Warships Land SRV Troops in Siege at Kampot", AFP, Kampot, 4 April 1991; *Le Monde*, 30 May 1991.

some provinces," he offered nothing as proof. As Ta Mok had done a year before, he revealed concern about NADK morale, even if he could not consider the possibility that it was discouraged because of poor popular response to its propaganda and military efforts. He called on it not to give up, but instead to uphold its "fighting spirit" and "constantly sharp sense of combat ... in continuing to fight."⁶⁵

Khieu Samphan's message came up against new international calls for an end to NADK attacks. On 22 April 1991, the UN Secretary-General and the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference issued a joint appeal for a temporary cessation of hostilities, "as a gesture of good faith", and the PDK indicated that it was in principle prepared to accept a stand-still cease-fire as of 1 May.⁶⁶ This would have confirmed NADK territorial losses during the 1990-1991 dry season, which were most noticeable in Siem Reap and Kampung Thom. It left SoC with a clear capability to resume offensive operations against Pailin and otherwise to exploit its proven superiority in terms of conventional firepower.⁶⁷

While it appears that both SoC and PDK initially respected the cease-fire,⁶⁸ PDK immediately began questioning its validity and soon announced it would no longer adhere to it. It made clear that it would not give up the military option until SoC agreed to at least UN supervision and control, and it seems that it still had lingering hopes of getting more than this through military feats. However, earlier NADK claims to have blunted the SoC offensive in

⁶⁵ VoNADK, 11 April 1991.

⁶⁶ "Background", p.vi.

⁶⁷ *Bangkok Post*, 21 May 1991.

⁶⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, 30 May 1991.

northwest Cambodia⁶⁹ and hopes that the onset of the rainy season would frustrate renewed attacks, particularly in the Pailin area,⁷⁰ were belied by further SoC operations in late May that prompted fears that NADK might not be able to ensure defence of the town.⁷¹ This SoC thrust that reached within a few kilometres of Pailin resulted in "huge seizures of weapons" from fleeing NADK troops, the apparent rout of which brought into question their fighting ability and boosted SoC confidence. Moreover, foreign journalists who visited the battlefield found that peasants in Batdambang to whom NADK had been preaching PDK's political message for years remained unconvinced.⁷²

At the end of May, one foreign correspondent who had covered Cambodia for decades concluded that over the past year and a half, NADK had hardly gained any territory, although almost 200,000 people had been relocated under SoC auspices to deny PDK access to them. Some recent NADK activities had allowed it to confirm its presence in the interior, such as in Kampot, but it had suffered major casualties. SoC, not PDK, was showing a new confidence⁷³ based on the battlefield evidence that NADK could "not occupy and maintain large tracts of territory."⁷⁴ SoC head of state Heng Samrin seemed to be justified when he declared that its "1990-1991 counter-attack campaign" had "inflicted considerable losses" on NADK.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ "Khmer Rouge Claim to Roll Back Phnom Penh Offensive", Reuter, Bangkok, 4 April 1991.

⁷⁰ VoNADK, 8 April 1991.

⁷¹ *Bangkok Post*, 4 June 1991.

⁷² "Phnom Penh Army Rolls Back Khmer Rouge in Western Rice Bowl", Reuter, Batdambang, 29 May 1991; *FEER*, 30 May 1991.

⁷³ *Le Monde*, 30 May 1991.

⁷⁴ *Bangkok Post*, 21 May 1991.

⁷⁵ VoCP, 19 June 1991.

PDK reacted to such setbacks by making another attempt to recoup its position militarily, and thus to turn the diplomatic situation around. In the end, it officially stuck to the cease-fire only until 6 June 1991. Allegations that SoC was violating it and being diplomatically recalcitrant laid the groundwork for an official return to warfare. As early as 14 May, VoNADK broadcast an "open letter" to Khieu Samphan from cadre and combatants of Ta Mok's Sector 1003 Division 616 in Kampong Thom province alleging that CPAF had launched continuous attacks against it from the first day of the truce.⁷⁶ VoNADK warned that if SoC continued "to oppose the UN documents", PDK would unleash the "people's force" against it.⁷⁷ However, the only visible manifestation of this "people's force" was NADK, so in order to make the threat real PDK announced on 18 May that NADK would no longer observe the cease-fire after 5 June unless SoC signed up to the draft agreement.⁷⁸ Finally, on 6 June 1991, the NADK formally issued "an order to all ... troops on all battlefields ... to stop implementing the ... cease-fire." They "should ... actively and constantly fight ... through ... people's war until the UN documents are accepted and implemented."⁷⁹

In late June, PDK indicated it still hoped thereby to get endorsement of its demand for the dissolution of SoC political authority throughout Cambodia. VoDK expressed hopes that the framework document and draft agreement would be "fully implemented" by "the dismantling of the state authority, both military and civilian," of SoC.⁸⁰ PDK got no joy on this renewed demand. Instead, under pressure from the Permanent

⁷⁶ VoNADK, 13 May 1991.

⁷⁷ VoNADK, 15 May 1991.

⁷⁸ VoNADK, 18 May 1991.

⁷⁹ VoNADK, 5 June 1991.

⁸⁰ VoDK, 22 June 1991.

Five, its delegation⁸¹ agreed at an SNC held in Phathayaa, Thailand, "to call for an open-ended and unconditional cease-fire"⁸². However, PDK immediately indicated that it considered this an agreement in principle only that did not prohibit NADK from trying to make real PDK claims about the emergence of a counter-administration based on national councils. As early as 28 June, VoDK suggested there was no cease-fire and the NADK should continue fighting to achieve its political goals.⁸³

PDK also tried to take advantage of the fact that the Phathayaa SNC meeting had agreed in principle that the SNC would be moved to Phnom Penh after a final settlement was reached to give further impetus to NADK efforts to bring about the collapse of SoC. On 16 July VoDK optimistically declared that because of the announcement that the SNC was to be set up in the capital, the SoC "administration in all areas is shaking and collapsing morally and organizationally."⁸⁴ PDK took further encouragement from the results of the SNC meeting convened that day (in Beijing), at which Sihanouk was installed as the body's President. Still, PDK was taking no chances: while continuing to treat popular support as a reality and not a dream, it still considered the cease-fire a prospect rather than a fact. PDK had been explaining since early July that what had been agreed was a "cease-fire ... under UN supervision", and that its "concrete implementation" was still to be discussed by the SNC.⁸⁵ VoDK clarified that "without strict UN verification, ... the cease-fire ...

⁸¹ The PDK was formally represented by Khieu Samphan and Son Sen. Pol Pot reportedly was secretly present. Nayan Chanda, "Pol Pot Directs Cambodia Peace Talks, Sparking Concerns About Future Role", *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, 5 August 1991.

⁸² "Background", p.vi.

⁸³ VoDK, 27 June 1991.

⁸⁴ VoDK, 15 July 1991.

⁸⁵ VoNADK, 5 July 1991.

cannot materialize - no ifs, ands or buts about it."⁸⁶ Khieu Samphan reiterated this position in late July,⁸⁷ and PDK evidently held to it right through to the signing of the Paris Agreements on 23 October 1991.

However, there were no reports of major NADK actions between July and October. Although both PDK and SoC reportedly attempted "consolidation of territory",⁸⁸ there are no indications that PDK was able to reverse SoC's "relative military success" of earlier in the year⁸⁹ or was suddenly able, after years of trying and failing, to persuade the peasants of Batdambang or anywhere else to give it positive, enthusiastic support.

Signing the Paris Agreements

Given PDK's at best unimproved position in 1991, it is not surprising that renewed debate took place among PDK's covert leadership about whether the movement could benefit from and should participate in a negotiated settlement. By 1991, the first echelon of this leadership is believed to have comprised Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen, Sam Bit and Meah Mut. Ieng Sary had reportedly been excluded de facto from the inner leadership circle because of the "liberal" tendencies that were associated with his lack of a "military style". He was criticised by Pol Pot, Ta Mok and even Son Sen, who pointed to the frequent conflicts between Sector 102 and the neighbouring Sector 32, which remained

⁸⁶ VoDK, 12 July 1991.

⁸⁷ VoNADK, 27 July 1991.

⁸⁸ "Guerillas Accused of Ignoring Cease-Fire", AFP, Phnom Penh, 7 October 1991.

⁸⁹ FEER, 30 May 1991.

under Son Sen's brother, Ni Kân.⁹⁰

This shift rebounded to the advantage of Ta Mok, whose retention of the number three position in the innermost circle seemed reinforced by the presence within it of his former deputy from the old Southwest Zone, Sam Bit, and his son-in-law, Meah Mut. Sam Bit was ensconced deep inside Cambodia at a base in Kampot province from which he exercised direct control over PDK activities throughout southwestern Cambodia. Meah Mut's position seemed to have been recently strengthened by a transfer that brought him down to the leadership team's headquarters area in Sector 505. After ten years operating as his father-in-law's Deputy in Sector 1003, Meah Mut had reportedly joined Nuon Chea in Sector 505, and he was soon said to be in charge of "political work".⁹¹

This was important because despite Ta Mok's remarks in April 1990 to the effect that PDK would be able to wrest advantages even from an imposed settlement, he reportedly continued to be the most sceptical of the senior leaders and began arguing that PDK should not accept the terms being offered. The decision to go ahead and sign the Paris Agreements in October 1991 is said to have been made at Pol Pot's insistence even though Mok neither "wanted or liked" the deal.⁹² Pol Pot's position reportedly attempted to "rally" elements who like Ta Mok were to the old Party Secretary's

⁹⁰ These conclusions are based on the author's interviews with various current or former PDK and NADK cadre in 1992-1993 and on the similar interview material compiled in Peschoux, "DK-Cadres-biographie" (1990) and "DK-bio and Military Data (June-September 1992)". See also Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992. Ieng Sary told the author in 1996 that by 1991 he was no longer invited to participate in high-level discussions about PDK's negotiating position.

⁹¹ Peschoux, "DK-Bio ..."; Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Kbal Toek-Voat Serei Utdam, 30 May 1992".

⁹² Heder, "PDK Leadership and Policy".

"left" and elements to his "right", of whom Son Sen was perhaps one. Pol Pot's compromise view was that the deal offered by the Permanent Five was the PDK's "best bet for regaining power", and the PDK should be "very happy" about it.⁹³

It certainly brought PDK much closer to obtaining what the Vietnamese would have liked to have gained in 1973, even if not as much more as Ta Mok would have liked. The consensus engineered by Pol Pot rested on the logic that even though the Agreements fell far short of quadripartitism, their terms were certainly more favourable than the 1954 Geneva Agreements had been for the Cambodian Communists and the 1973 Paris Agreement had been for the Vietnamese. They provided for more neutralization of the enemy's state structure and armed forces under better international guarantees. UNTAC was clearly a much more formidable body than the International Commission for Supervision and Control that had done so little to help the Cambodian Communists in 1955 and the International Commission of Control and Supervision described in the 1973 Paris Agreement. The SNC was clearly more substantial than the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord that had been of so little use to the Vietnamese Communists after 1973. Unless things went terribly wrong, PDK should do much better than Cambodian Communists after Geneva and at least as well as the Vietnamese after 1973. And, according to the script, things could not go terribly wrong unless PDK was somehow denied its political due by gross manipulation of the Agreements or unless its prospects were somehow sabotaged by treason, or at least incompetence, within its own ranks. The possibility that PDK was much less popular than Pol Pot and most other senior leaders believed it to be was simply not in the script.

⁹³ Notes on an interview by an UNTAC official with a Chinese diplomat intimately familiar with the PDK leadership, 21 November 1992, np.

Pol Pot's confidence in PDK's popularity was reflected in the fact that by signing the Paris Agreements of 1991 PDK was agreeing to go even further down the road away from military toward political struggle than the Vietnamese Communists had by the terms of the treaty they signed in 1973. He was demanding and expecting that PDK achieve even greater political results than the Vietnamese, despite less reliance on military means. Thus, PDK's signature of the Agreements revealed the breathtaking depth of the extent to which its isolated leadership that lived in a world of false optimism about PDK's political prospects. And as has been seen, despite other differences, this was an illusion that was manifest in the statements Pol Pot, Ta Mok and Son Sen had all made in support of their arguments about how PDK could best advance via people's war.

CHAPTER FOUR**UNAMIC: WAITING FOR UNTAC**

PDK's main hope in signing the Paris Agreements was to transform implementation of them into an intensification of the political aspects of people's war in the countryside. It wanted to use the Agreements as an opportunity for expanding its rural political infrastructure, in particular by using cadre and combatants released from strictly military duties to do what Pol Pot had said they should have been concentrating on all along: deploying the weapon of the mouth to foment mass rural uprisings by PDK supporters. Its expectation was that the cease-fire provisions of the Paris Agreements would allow demobilizing NADK cadre and combatants to enter villages more freely than ever before, indeed to do so "legally" as political activists. PDK hoped a cease-fire would preclude SoC armed forces from obstructing PDK political advances, and that disarmament of SoC armed forces, including local militia, would leave the countryside even more wide open to political work by ex-NADK and manifestations of popular enthusiasm for PDK. Thus, the Paris Agreements would achieve one of the two eliminations that NADK had been fighting for, that is, the elimination of the enemy's armed forces.

By activating village administrations that might incorporate former SoC officials but in which elements responsive to PDK would play a predominant role, demobilizing NADK would use the cover of the Paris Agreements to achieve the other elimination, that of SoC's local administrative structure. PDK nuclei stiffened by NADK cadre and combatants would mobilize popular forces propagandized during year after year of attack to rise up along with sympathetic SoC militia and local officials to establish these structures. In order both to undermine SoC and evade UNTAC's control mandate, these structures, from the village level on up, would be portrayed as local National Councils and be presented as such to

Sihanouk and the UN. They would purportedly answer to Sihanouk and, like the SNC itself, be shrines of Cambodian sovereignty that UNTAC would consult but would not control. To facilitate what PDK expected would be the emergence throughout the countryside of the pro-PDK "popular forces" supposedly built up since 1979, it hoped to maximize the extent to which the SNC itself functioned as a ruling body, and that Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPRLF would back it up in this effort. Through the Paris Agreements, diplomacy in the SNC could thus be substituted for dramatic military action as a means for achieving political concessions in PDK's favour.

In order to undermine SoC as quickly and greatly as possible and thus unleash its supporters, PDK hoped to achieve a rapid deployment of UNTAC and to get the UN to focus on control of SoC. At the same time, it hoped to prevent any real UN control of PDK from above and avoid reminding Cambodians of the past by continuing to shroud Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok and additional key PDK leaders other than Khieu Samphan and Son Sen in clandestinity. Meanwhile, selected political and military cadre would join Khieu Samphan and Son Sen and try openly to enter Phnom Penh, provincial towns and other parts of Cambodia under UN protection, including those areas previously most tightly controlled by SoC, to create more fronts for garnering popular support to attack SoC politically.

Finally, despite Pol Pot's fantastic optimism about PDK political prospects, PDK hoped to hedge this bet by partially evading demobilization of NADK and using NADK participation in demobilization to project PDK political influence. Evasion was to be achieved by disguising a substantial proportion of NADK as "civil police", while projection would be achieved by getting UNTAC to move NADK forces as close to key contested areas as possible. NADK rechristened as police would not only provide protection for PDK leaders and forces, but ensure that PDK had enough armed strength to supplement political struggle

as and when necessary, and that it would be in a position to resume full-fledged armed struggle whenever the circumstances warranted. NADK elements moved forward by UNTAC would also have greater opportunities not only to use "the weapon of the mouth", but to threaten with guns, especially if the whole process broke down, as some, like Ta Mok, expected.

Hopes for a Pincer Movement to Destroy SoC

PDK thus viewed the continued undermining of SoC from below, destabilization of it from the side and neutralization of it from above as necessary conditions for achieving a "proper" implementation of the Paris Agreements that would allow its popular support to emerge. This would make PDK participation in elections worthwhile and open up a myriad of other possibilities for advancing the revolution toward ultimate victory. PDK propaganda thus looked forward to an implementation of the Paris Agreements that would turn into a multi-prong pincer attack on SoC. In broadcasts just before and just after the signature of the Agreements, PDK publicly expressed its hopes that the combined effect of its actions to dismantle SoC and UNTAC's control of it would be to allow PDK to "crush" its enemies. The broadcasts also expressed fears that the implementation of the Paris Agreements would not allow PDK to proceed in such a manner. One commentary called on "every Cambodian" to cooperate in "dismantling the ... administrative networks in the villages, subdistricts and districts and replacing them with National Councils under the auspices of the ... Sihanouk-headed SNC." It explained that it was "only by effectively fulfilling" this task that implementation of the Agreements could be achieved. It was left unsaid, for the time being, what would happen if Cambodians declined to rally to bodies that ostensibly answered to Sihanouk but in fact were controlled by PDK, and thus failed to cooperate.¹ However, another broadcast called

¹ VoDK, 10 October 1991.

on the Cambodian people "to constantly heighten their vigilance in order to check" the "perfidious schemes" of PDK's "overt and covert enemies", who it said would "seek all means to sabotage" the kind of implementation of the Paris Agreements PDK wanted. It said that they would have to be equally vigilant with the UN.² A third broadcast expressed anxiety that the UN might not act speedily to despatch "peacekeeping force with adequate staff members ... to supervise and control the ... general situation in Cambodia", thus leaving SoC a free hand against PDK supporters.³

The Reality of UNTAC's Slow Deployment

Such worries about the UN reflected clear indications that UNTAC would not arrive quickly, and that the UN's focus was on preventing further NADK military activity, not on neutralizing SoC's political dominance. Indeed, it was already clear that unless something changed, there was no prospect that the signing of the Paris Agreements and respect for its standstill cease-fire would bring about any immediate weakening of SoC by the UN.

The issue of how quickly UNTAC would begin its work had been engaged at meetings in mid-1991 to finalize the Paris Agreements, during which PDK calls for the rapid deployment of UNTAC had been rejected as impractical by UN negotiators.⁴ The Agreements provided no specific time-table for the formation and deployment of UNTAC, and at the Paris Conference, UN officials predicted that it would take until February or March 1992 to work out UNTAC's structure and

² Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia (VGNUFC), 27 October 1991. VGNUFC was the successor to both VoDK and VoNADK.

³ VoNADK, 9 October 1991.

⁴ VGNUFC, 25 December 1991; author's interview with UN official Raffeurdin Ahmed, Paris, October 22, 1991.

budget and obtain Security Council approval for them. Full deployment would take an additional six months.⁵ The UN's capacity for deployment of large-scale, complex missions such as UNTAC was indeed so inadequate that it was impossible for the organization to do so expeditiously.⁶ It was thus not until the end of February that the Security Council approved an UNTAC "implementation plan".⁷ However, even once the structure and budget of UNTAC were agreed, it had to be recruited and supplied. Again, serious constraints were built into the UN system which meant inevitable delays. UNTAC did not formally begin deploying in Cambodia until 15 March 1992, when its head Yasushi Akashi arrived to take up residence in Phnom Penh. Thereafter, the deployment of "essential equipment, contingents and officials" still proceeded at a "snail's pace".⁸

The UNAMIC Stop-gap

To fill the gap until the arrival of UNTAC, the Security Council had on 16 October approved the deployment of a United

⁵ Ahmed interview.

⁶ Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?", in *The New York Review of Books*, 12 May 1994, p.29; US General Accounting Office, *Report to Congressional Requesters: U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions* (Washington: GAO.NSAID-94-9, December 1993), pp.3,5,10,13,16-17,30-38.

⁷ See UN, General Assembly, *Addendum, Initial Phase of the Implementation Plan Report of the Secretary-General* (A/46/235/Add.1), 31 January 1992; UN, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia* (S/23613) [hereafter: *SG Report*], 19 February 1992; UN, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, Addendum* (S/23613/Add.1) [hereafter: *Addendum*]; and UN, Security Council, *Statement by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, delivered to the Security Council on 28 February 1992*.

⁸ General Accounting Office, pp.41-44; Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peace-keeping" (paper delivered at the Third Charles Rostov Lecture on Asian Affairs at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 14 October 1993), pp.22-23.

Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).⁹ Contrary to PDK desires, the political work of UNAMIC did not include any of the powers of control or supervision set forth in the Paris Agreements.¹⁰ Its head was mandated merely to establish "liaison with the SNC on the preparations for the deployment of UNTAC", and his tiny office was to comprise just five professional staff. Its main purpose was to internationalize a freezing of the battlefield situation to preclude military advances by any *partie*, but most of all by PDK. Its 116 mostly unarmed military officers and men, who constituted the overwhelming majority of UNAMIC personnel, were to use its "good offices" to "assist the Cambodian *parties* to maintain [a] cease-fire."¹¹ Ataul Karim, a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, was named UNAMIC head. He arrived in Phnom Penh on 9 November.¹² The military chief of UNAMIC, French Brigadier General Jean-Michel Loridon, arrived four days later.¹³ SoC welcomed them with a broadcast endorsing UNAMIC's non-political objectives and its concentration on stabilizing the military situation.¹⁴

Trading Military Information and a Military Stand-down for Opportunities to Launch a Rural Political Offensive

In order to take advantage of the political prospects offered by the Paris Agreements, PDK had to comply

⁹ Security Council Resolution on UNAMIC and Political Settlement of the Cambodia Situation (S/RES/717 1991), 16 October 1991, in UN, Department of Information, *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995* (New York: UN Publications, 1995), pp.131-132.

¹⁰ Interview with Ataul Karim, Phnom Penh, 11 December 1991.

¹¹ *SG Report; Addendum.*

¹² VoCP, 13 November 1991.

¹³ *The Nation* (Bangkok), 14 November 1991; VoCP, 14 November 1991.

¹⁴ VoCP, 13 November 1991.

sufficiently with their military provisions to create pressure for SoC compliance. As a first gesture, it began revealing facts about its armed forces, as required by the Paris Agreements. More fundamentally, however, it had to stop fighting, at least temporarily, and begin going through at least some of the motions of demobilization. All of this PDK was willing to do.

The Paris Agreements specified that PDK and other *parties* must provide the UN "immediately" with information on their military force structure. PDK handed over an outline of the information required at the Paris Conference,¹⁵ and eventually gave up some additional data. Much of the information appears to have been accurate, at least as far as it went.

One document said the NADK included a "regular army" with a troop strength of 25,175 combatants and porters, plus "guerilla forces" totalling 2,510 men. It noted that "on average, 65 percent of regular army units are armed". In other words, PDK claimed to have an average of 18,874 regular army combatants and militiamen under arms at any one time.¹⁶ These figures were within the upper range of earlier estimates of NADK troop strength made by SoC and Vietnamese officials on the basis of their military intelligence. They also agreed with the figures arrived at through independent research.¹⁷

In other documents, the NADK High Command provided details about the chain of command, nomenclature, deployment, strengths and leading cadre of the units it said comprised the NADK. An organisational chart placed all regular units under

¹⁵ Ahmed interview.

¹⁶ [Partie of Democratic Kampuchea], "The armed forces of the Democratic Kampuchea party (translation)", 20 September 1991, p.1; National Army of Democratic Kampuchea High Command, "The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea" [hereafter: "The NADK"], August 1991, np.

¹⁷ Peschoux, *Khmers Rouges*, pp.127-130.

the control of the High Command, headed by Commander-in-Chief Son Sen, assisted by a General Staff of whom five members were later named.¹⁸ The deployment information generally corresponded with what was known about NADK activities before Paris and with information obtained from defectors afterward.¹⁹

Although the documents depicted the NADK as widely and deeply deployed, they also indicated that in many places it was very thinly spread. Some 60 percent of the total NADK strength of 27,325 was said to be in rear base areas near the Thai-Cambodian border, leaving only some 10,798 troops dispersed in forward battlefields.

Partial Compliance with the Cease-Fire: Standing Down Militarily, Curtailing Military Resupply, Getting Ready for a "Troop Cut"

The data on division and regimental cadre provided by NADK corresponded well with that available from other sources before the NADK provided lists, and with later information given by defectors from NADK ranks. Like the data on NADK troop strength, therefore, it seems to have been accurate, as far as it went.²⁰ However, except for reaffirming that PDK

¹⁸ National Army of Democratic Kampuchea High Command, "Deployment of forces of NADK Divisions and Independent Regiments", and appendices, nd.

¹⁹ This conclusion is based on a comparison of the official NADK data with, on the one hand, NADK orders of battle prepared by Thai, US and FUNCINPEC sources and obtained by the author during trips to Thailand and Cambodia in 1989, 1990 and 1991, and with, on the other hand, the NADK orders of battle produced by UNTAC military intelligence officers in late 1992 and mid-1993. See UNTAC, Military Component [hereafter: UNTAC-MC], "NADK Orbat", December 1992; and UNTAC-MC, "NADK Order of Battle, 28 June 1993".

²⁰ Again, this conclusion is based on a comparison of the official NADK data with, on the one hand, NADK orders of battle prepared by Thai, US and FUNCINPEC sources and obtained by the author during trips to Thailand and Cambodia in 1989, 1990 and

Vice-President Son Sen was NADK Commander-in-Chief, the data gave away nothing about the higher levels of the NADK command structure. It thus denied that any role was being played in NADK affairs by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok. It also appears to have intentionally denied and thus hidden the existence of important intermediate levels of political and military command (see Map III).²¹

Selective disclosure of information was accompanied by partial compliance with other aspects of what the Agreements referred to as the cease-fire's "Phase One", which was to precede demobilization. PDK seemed prepared to "order [its] armed forces immediately to disengage and refrain from all hostilities" of an overtly military kind,²² but remained intensely wary of SoC intentions and coupled these orders with insistence on the need to be ready to fend off any SoC cease-fire violations.

Evidence to this effect comes from former NADK cadre and

1991, and with, on the other hand, the NADK orders of battle produced by UNTAC.

²¹ Although it referred to a military Front 250, which was apparently a public name for NADK Sector 32, it did not name its leadership. It pretended that Sectors 1001, 1003, 102 and Sector 505 and their leading cadre simply did not exist. Internal PDK documentation demonstrates that this was false. See, for example, "Message Number 05 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 20 November 1991, in which Son Sen mentions the existence of Sectors 1001, 1003 and 102, as well as "the South of Sisophon Sector", which was apparently another name for Sector 32 or "Front 250". Author's translation of a document obtained by Christophe Peschoux from the PDK compound in Phnom Penh that was ransacked on 27 November 1991. In addition, see the author's translation of Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992" [hereafter: Pol Pot, "Clarification"], which refers to Sector 505. These two documents were obtained by Nayan Chanda.

²² UN, Department of Public Information, *Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict* (DPI1180-92077-January 1992-10M) [hereafter: *Agreements*], Annex 2, Article 1, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 6. "Forces" were defined as including "all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary, and other auxiliary forces".

combatants who later defected from NADK ranks and is broadly corroborated by SoC reports. The NADK defectors - or "self-demobilizers" as UNTAC dubbed them²³ - stressed that they were under instructions from higher up within the NADK chain of command to cease all offensive military operations, and to restrict themselves to self-defence. They asserted that they adhered to these instructions, sometimes despite significant SoC pressures and probes. Almost all self-demobilizers also reported that soon after the Paris Agreements, their units began making serious preparations to comply to a considerable extent with the demobilization procedure set forth as "Phase Two" of the Paris Agreements' cease-fire.²⁴ Above all, preparations were made to stand by for "demobilization of at least 70 percent" of each Cambodian Partie's armed forces.²⁵ Self-demobilizers described drawing up lists of troops and of arms and ammunition, selecting troops for demobilization, stocking arms, and constructing accommodation in which UNTAC personnel were to stay while overseeing the process.

SoC allegations of cease-fire violations up through the end of 1991, even if taken at face value, appear to corroborate the defectors' consistent assertions that NADK was ordered to cease offensive military operations. While

²³ This and subsequent material from UNTAC interviews with NADK defectors is presented more fully in Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds, *Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-keeping* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996). These interviews were conducted by the author and several of his Khmer-speaking colleagues in the Analysis/Assessment Unit of the Information/Education Division, who spoke to ex-NADK under circumstances that guaranteed them anonymity. Thus, where their testimonies are cited below, their identities are protected.

²⁴ *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article 1, Paragraph 3; Article III, Paragraphs 1 and 3.

²⁵ *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article V, Paragraphs 1 and 4.

alleging scattered attacks²⁶, they suggest only minor and declining NADK military activity in the weeks after 23 October.²⁷

The preparations for what NADK combatants colloquially described as a "troop cut"²⁸ were made throughout the country, including in the sceptical Ta Mok's Sector 1003. A defector who later left the Sector 1003 headquarters at Anlung Veng in northern Siem Reap recalled that "right after the Paris Agreements," the chairman of his unit convened a meeting at which he told its combatants that "now everybody would be disarmed, all but 30 percent," who would evidently hold on to their arms pending cantonment itself. He said that very soon after the Paris Agreements, a process began of "gathering up all the weapons" belonging to combatants from combat divisions with rear bases at Anlung Veng "and putting them into storage".²⁹ Testimony from Posat province indicates that disarmament in advance of and in preparation for demobilization was also practised in this part of northwestern Cambodia.³⁰ However, evidence given by self-demobilizers serving on the front lines in Son Sen's Sector 1001 and Ta Mok's Sector 1003, while confirming preparations for demobilization, indicates that arms were kept by some combatants to maintain a self-defense capability. A self-demobilized combatant from Sector 1003 Division 980 said that at the time of the Paris Agreements, "a register was made of the names of those in the 70 percent" who were to be cut from

²⁶ See SPK [SoC News Agency], 2 November 1991; "Phnom Penh Claims Khmer Rouge Attacks After Peace Agreement", Reuter, Bangkok, 2 November 1991; "Phnom Penh Forces Say Cambodian Fighting Diminishes", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 November 1991; and VoCP, 13 November 1991.

²⁷ "Phnom Penh Forces Say Cambodian Fighting Diminishes", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 November 1991.

²⁸ *kat toap*.

²⁹ Interview of 29-year-old source on 11 November 1992.

³⁰ Interview of 29-year-old source on 10 May 1993.

the division in Siem Reap province. Those designated for demobilization were told "they would be going home" once demobilization took place, but "while they were waiting for the demobilization, they remained armed and organised in their units."³¹

Subverting Demobilization

At the same time, numerous and consistent testimonies from self-demobilizers revealed that PDK plans to appear to comply with the demobilization process were belied by a scheme to subvert it in order to maintain a substantial military force in the guise of "civil police", and this evidence is corroborated by official PDK information. The scheme aimed to turn into a loophole the Agreement's provisions that all parties would be allowed to maintain police forces in order to perform "law enforcement" in the zones under their control. NADK cadre apparently hoped to engage in a sleight of hand whereby NADK elements would either jump to the police before demobilization, or would join it afterwards. This would give PDK much more than a police force.

Several self-demobilizers described plans by NADK units to fiddle demobilization through the creation of new "police forces" either manned by combatants transferred from regular units or armed with weapons taken from combatants, or both.³² Some perhaps overly candid remarks which NADK cadre made to UNTAC Civil Police officers after they deployed into rural Cambodia appear to confirm that the PDK plan was to move some of the best NADK cadre and combatants out of the "army" into the "police" in order to keep them under arms.³³

³¹ Interview of 28-year-old source on 11 November 1992.

³² Interviews of 34-year-old source on 6 June 1993 and of 31-year-old source on 4 May 1993.

³³ UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Special Report About NADK Civilian Police Banteay Meanchey Province", 14 October 1992; See also UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Meeting with Khamerues

However, successful implementation of these plans to maintain formed units that could resume the military aspects of people's war would require a degree of UN acquiescence. As with their armies, the Paris Agreements required each Cambodian *partie* immediately to provide to the UN information on their police forces similar to that which they were required to give about their military forces.³⁴ Moreover, the head of UNTAC was empowered then to determine how many police were "necessary to perform law enforcement", albeit "after consultation with the Cambodian *parties*".³⁵ Pursuant to these obligations, PDK and SoC both gave information to a UN public security survey mission that visited the country between 19 November and 17 December 1991. SoC told the UN it had 47,684 police, of whom almost 40,000 were deployed outside Phnom Penh from the provincial down to the village level.³⁶ PDK claimed to have a grand total of 9,435 police answering to the High Command of the NADK via its subordinate divisions and independent regiments. This number was 37 percent of the previously-stated strength for NADK regular armed forces as a whole, and 58 percent of what PDK had said was the armed strength of the NADK regular army. PDK furthermore claimed that 5,559 of these police were performing law enforcement duties deep inside Cambodia, which was 47 percent of the army forces it had said were deployed in front-line areas.³⁷ It

(NADK)", 9 September 1992.

³⁴ *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article 1, paragraph 3, subparagraph d.

³⁵ *Agreements*, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 5, subparagraphs a and b.

³⁶ SoC, "Data Informations Concerning Military Forces and Police of the State of Cambodia", 24 September 1991, p.4; and UN, "Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd, pp.19,28-33. See also *SG Report*, paragraph 115.

³⁷ See "Civil Police of the Democratic Kampuchea Party: Organisation Chart", nd, np. This appears as an annex to UN, "Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd.

seems likely that these forces in fact to a significant extent did not yet exist. Although pre-Paris official PDK material and accounts by independent observers demonstrate that the NADK had for many years had a military police that functioned as an auxiliary force, they do not suggest that the size of such forces was anything like what the PDK was claiming.³⁸

The cantonment and demobilization of SoC's Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF), including its militia forces, and the acceptance of a PDK "civil police" of more than 9,000 men composed of elite elements from NADK would have brought about a significant shift in the ratio of armed power in Cambodia. Previously an NADK with 16,364 men under arms in regular units and 2,510 armed guerillas had faced a CPAF of 120,000 regular and regional troops and 220,000 militia, plus more than 47,000 SoC police³⁹, and was thus outnumbered more than 20 to one. After cantonment and demobilization of the military, 9,435 PDK civil police would face 47,684 SoC civil police nation-wide, and although they would be outnumbered five to one, this would reduce SoC's advantage by a factor of four. Regardless of how much popular support PDK enjoyed, its military position would be greatly improved.

Non-Compliance With Regroupment: Regroupment as a Projection of Power

Moreover, a close examination of other evidence suggests that hidden within the PDK's readiness to demobilize the NADK was an intent to use the demobilization process to project the

³⁸ See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Kampuchea: After the Worst* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1985), pp.183-200; and Peschoux, *Khmers Rouges*, pp.124-125.

³⁹ SoC, "Data Informations", p.2. The authorized CPAF strength was 140,000, but it admitted that those in "permanent attendance" could be as low as 120,000. These figures were roughly confirmed after the arrival of UNTAC. See UNTAC-MC, "Force Structure and Organizations of Armed Forces SoC", 16 September 1992, p.3.

PDK's political power. On 14 December 1991, Son Sen met with a UN Military Survey Mission. The two sides discussed 26 points where the NADK wanted to regroup in preparation for demobilization.⁴⁰ These included forward regroupment points for NADK personnel now said to be deployed in front-line positions and rear regroupment points for the remainder. The figure Son Sen gave for total NADK strength was thus the same as that provided in August 1991, ie, 27,325. However, the proportion he now claimed were deployed in front-line areas was one-quarter larger than before. Moreover, the points Son Sen proposed for regroupment of the front-line troops of many units represented a forward movement for them compared to locations where they were said to have been deployed four months earlier.⁴¹ The pattern suggests that the NADK planned to use regroupment in Sectors 1001, 1003 and 32 (Front 250) to concentrate increased numbers of troops near population centres under SoC control and communications routes of importance to SoC. This would create opportunities for expanding PDK political influence power in these areas. And if, as Ta Mok had predicted, the political process quickly collapsed, then these concentrations would be well placed to break out of regroupment and attack strategic points militarily.

A General Political Offensive

PDK's demobilization ploys, however, were only a subplot

⁴⁰ See PDK, "26 Regroupment Points of the NADK Were Discussed and Agreed Between HE Mr Son Sen, Member of the SNC and the High Commander in Chief, and the UN Military Survey Mission on December 14, 1991 at Malay Region", np. Although the title of this PDK document implied that the regroupment sites had been agreed by the UN, in fact the survey mission had no authority to designate them. This power was vested in the commander of the military component of UNTAC. *Agreements*, Annex 2, Paragraph 4.

⁴¹ This conclusion is based on a comparison of the map coordinates provided by the NADK for deployment of front-line troops in "The NADK", and for their regroupment in "26 Regroupment Points of the NADK".

in plans for a nation-wide political offensive to use NADK cadre and combatants to stiffen, assist and where necessary lead popular uprisings by the covert nuclei they had recruited, trained, organized and in some cases armed in those repeated dispersals, dismantlings and liberations of villages and subdistricts throughout Cambodia reported by PDK propaganda since the 1980s. They were ordered to take advantage of the cease-fire by stepping up activities to dissolve SoC local administrations and set up PDK-controlled local National Councils, all the while pretending they answered ultimately not to Pol Pot, but to Sihanouk. This would intensify the basically political people's war activities they were supposed to have been conducting since 1979, even though the results would contravene the Phase One requirement that NADK forces refrain from "any deployment, movement or action that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to a resumption of the fighting."⁴² Self-demobilizers typically reported that when they ceased offensive military action, they attempted to escalate subversive political activity. They said this included efforts to propagandise and agitate among peasants in contested and SoC-administered zones, but that in at least some instances, the NADK elements involved in such "political work" did not rely solely on the "weapon of the mouth", even a disingenuous mouth that misrepresented the real political import of local national councils. Instead, contrary to the script, but perhaps prudently given the reality of popular attitudes, they remained armed.

The shift in the pattern of PDK activity was remarkably consistent throughout the various sectors into which PDK had divided Cambodia, suggesting that despite differences among them, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan agreed that PDK should be able to advance the revolution through political tactics by relying on the popular strength

⁴² *Agreements, Annex 2, Article 1, Paragraph 1.*

built up through people's war. In Son Sen's Sector 1001, combatants of Division 802 who stopped fighting focused instead on an intensified "programme of political education of the people".⁴³ Units in Ta Mok's Sector 1003 were also instructed to marshall their strength for political action. A defector from Division 607 said that after the Paris Agreements, the "first priority" for it in Preah Vihear province was "to do popular work by remoulding the people to support the PDK".⁴⁴ A ex-combatant of Sector 1003 Division 912 said that starting in October 1991, its troops in Siem Reap province began political work in preparation for elections by telling "the people that they were free to vote for whomever they wanted, but that they should vote for the political party that served the people and the nation."⁴⁵ The presumption was that "the people" would support a PDK party led by Khieu Samphan.

A similar offensive was ordered in Sector 505, over which Ta Mok's former deputy Sam Bit presided, NADK were told they should "do political work among the people and also try to convince CPAF troops to join us in implementing the Paris Agreements by setting up little National Councils at the village and subdistrict levels," although they were also told they could "take their guns if they liked".⁴⁶ In Mong Reuhsei district of Batdambang province, Sector 505 Division 36 combatants "were supposed to do political work to convince the people not to support or assist the SoC side." They were also to explain to the people that SoC should co-operate "properly with the PDK, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF" so that elections could be held.⁴⁷

⁴³ Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.

⁴⁴ Interview of 34-year-old source on 6 June 1993.

⁴⁵ Interview of 27-year-old source on 27 November 1992.

⁴⁶ Interview of 18-year-old source on 28 October 1992.

⁴⁷ Interview of 22 year-old-source on 16 January 1993.

SoC Reacts

SoC recognized that PDK was not trying to seize territory in the same way as before the Paris Agreements, and even conceded that many NADK elements had been gathered "to defend the areas [PDK] controls along the border" with Thailand. However, it was deeply concerned that PDK was also "seeking by every method to move its forces into infiltration pincers around villages and subdistricts by increasing propaganda and conversion actions." It was not about to allow NADK to conduct such "propaganda actions combined with threats" to displace SoC administration with local National Councils. SoC therefore moved to establish new police posts at the village level and dispatched police reinforcements to the countryside to strengthen "the effectiveness of the work of administrative governance and public order" there.⁴⁸

NADK efforts at propaganda work, and particularly armed propaganda work, in SoC-administered areas thus led to confrontations between NADK and SoC forces, both CPAF and police. Defectors from NADK later described incidents in which NADK elements who entered SoC-administered or contested villages were greeted with gunfire or found themselves detained. A defector from Sector 505 Division 36 described how NADK combatants were repulsed when they went armed to try to visit in SoC-controlled villages of Batdambang province. He said "when they did this, CPAF opened fire and the NADK returned the fire to defend themselves."⁴⁹ In interviews about the situation in the opposite end of Cambodia, two self-demobilizers from Sector 1001 Division 709 described similar

⁴⁸ Cambodian People's Party, *Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robâh Kâmpuchea Kraoy Pel Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dâl Pel Bâh Chhnaot* ("The Most Recent Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections"), nd, pp.1-2. This document apparently dates from late January or early February 1992.

⁴⁹ Interview of 22 year-old-source on 16 January 1993.

clashes in Steung Treng province, which they said were the only military engagements that had occurred in their area of operations in the immediate post-Paris period. They said these firefights had broken out when they "were visiting people in the rice fields" and "trying to do political work," but "CPAF had a defensive line there and opened fire."⁵⁰

Sometimes, NADK appeared to gain some successes in its attempts to displace the local SoC political administration with PDK-controlled National Councils or other such efforts. One former Division 802 combatant said that his detachment managed to set up such grass-roots renditions of the SNC in several villages in Kampung Thom.⁵¹ A former Division 36 combatant said that in Posat parts of his unit were able to arrange a meeting with local CPAF as a result of which they succeeded in instituting a local cease-fire.⁵²

However, SoC's resistance was not the fundamental reason why few self-demobilizers reported such feats. SoC counter-measures certainly hindered PDK from mobilizing such support as it enjoyed, but the underlying cause of the failure of PDK efforts to bring about the disintegration of SoC in the countryside was that PDK had so little positive popular support to draw upon. Without the actual threat of NADK military operations, NADK people's war could get almost nowhere. Thus, although NADK was trying to step up political action, its military standdown may actually have reduced its ability to achieve even the semblance of rural insurrection. Moreover, there is evidence that its few apparent successes were politically hollow. In the wake of the Paris Agreements, Cambodian agents working for Thai military intelligence were instructed to collate reports from inside Cambodia about the

⁵⁰ Interview with 22-year-old source on 6 November 1992, and with 26-year-old source on 8 November 1992.

⁵¹ Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.

⁵² Interview of 29-year-old source on 10 May 1993.

results of PDK activities. A summary report covering the last several months of 1991 could cite only one instance of a PDK political "success". It described how two NADK combatants, probably from Sector 1003 Division 785, entered a village Kampung Thom where they had family connections. They treated a relative and three other villagers to a feast of chicken stew and liquor. During the meal, they tried to persuade them to declare themselves the village National Council and to promise that in this capacity they would conduct propaganda on behalf of the PDK. The combatants explained NADK would provide them every support if they agreed, but warned it would attack the village and kill them and their families if they refused. The four assented only out of fear.⁵³

⁵³ From *Robaykar Poramean VI. Nayobay Khmær Krahâm* ("Information Reports: VI. Khmer Rouge Policy"), nd. This document was obtained from a senior Cambodian intelligence analyst working for the Thai military.

CHAPTER FIVE**PDK STYMIED IN POLITICAL STRUGGLE****The SNC in Phnom Penh: PDK Beset by Political Isolation and Violence**

With UNAMIC performing no supervisory role vis-à-vis SoC, the PDK's hopes of undermining SoC from above were contingent upon using the SNC to do so. This in turn depended on Khieu Samphan's and Son Sen's efforts to enlist the backing of its President Sihanouk and its FUNCINPEC and KPNLF members. The PDK's gameplan rested in particular on convincing Sihanouk to accept the position that with the signature of the Paris Agreements all SoC, PDK, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC "governmental structures" had ceased to exist, and that the SNC, with the Prince at its head, should henceforth "administer Cambodia with UNTAC".¹ PDK continued to assert the existence of local National Councils that were offered up to Sihanouk as "his" administration.² It also hoped to parlay the Prince's return to Phnom Penh on 14 November into a situation in which "the entire Cambodian people" would "recognize only the SNC ... as the unique legitimate body" of Cambodian political authority and the "civilian, military and police officials" of SoC "from top to bottom" might be persuaded to "join the SNC".³

PDK hopes of thus facilitating uprisings by the peasant supporters it believed it could count on throughout the countryside were not only obstructed by SoC, but also dashed by Sihanouk himself and FUNCINPEC. First, its request that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen join SoC premier Hun Sen and FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh on the plane that was to carry Sihanouk from Beijing to Phnom Penh on 14

¹ VGNUFC, 31 October 1991.

² VGNUFC, 7 November 1991.

³ VGNUFC, 15 November 1991.

November was rejected.⁴ This followed the failure of PDK to gain acceptance for its proposal for the establishment of a UN-protected neutral enclave and "safe corridors" in Phnom Penh over which SoC would have no authority in order to ensure that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen could return safely to Phnom Penh.⁵ PDK decided that only Son Sen would follow Sihanouk to the capital to assess the security situation and make arrangements for Khieu Samphan to join him.⁶

Unable to enter Phnom Penh at the side of the Prince, PDK still tried to exploit the opportunity of his homecoming dramatically to penetrate the outskirts of the capital under his banner and that of the SNC. Cadre of Sector 505 military units were assigned to lead peasants from PDK-controlled zones in Kampot, Takæv and Kampung Speu provinces and converge on the airport to welcome Sihanouk. The effort, however, came to naught and showed that Sihanoukist and SNC trappings afforded no cover for PDK actions. SoC police in Kampung Speu preempted PDK with a series of arrests which began the day before Sihanouk's scheduled arrival and prevented any marches.⁷

⁴ "KR Plan Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, Bangkok, 2 November 1991; VoCP, 14 November 1991; Voice of the Khmer (VoK) (VoK was a Thailand-based radio station run jointly by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF), 14 November 1991; author's interview with Tim Carney, then of the US National Security Council, Washington, DC, 8 November 1991.

⁵ "Khmer Rouge Want Protected Zone", Reuter, Paris, 23 October 1991; "Sihanouk Attacks Khmer Rouge", AFP, Paris, 23 October 1991; "Sihanouk, in Eccentric Form, Talks of Foie Gras and the Vatican", Reuter, Paris, 24 October 1991; Khieu Samphan interview with "international reporters" in Paris, VoDK 23 October 1991; SPK [SoC News Agency], 27 October 1991.

⁶ "KR Not Interested in Fighting Anymore", AFP, Phnom Penh, 12 November 1991.

⁷ Amnesty International, *State of Cambodia: Human Rights Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992* (AI Index ASA 23/02/92, April 1992), pp.33-34 [hereafter: *Human Rights*]; and *Appendices* (AI Index: ASA 23/02/92/APP), pp.74-76.

The arrests provoked no protest from the Prince. Instead, immediately after stepping off the plane from Beijing on 14 November, Sihanouk signalled strong support for SoC. He effusively expressed his "greatest satisfaction" at its "excellent achievements", declaring it had "proved to be capable of bringing prosperity to the country and of promoting unity and freedom".⁸ At a public rally organized by SoC two days later, he rejected the PDK position. He spurned any suggestion that SoC should be dissolved, or that PDK had disappeared into a nation-wide structure of National Councils, insisting that their administrations should "be maintained" and declaring that "those who say the SNC is a government are wrong." He stressed it had no powers of administrative control, and that the Paris Agreements had specified that the UN would "rely on the existing administration" of SoC, which he described as a "de facto government" and said he "recognized". While characterizing the SoC leadership as "wise and patriotic", he excoriated covert PDK leaders like Pol Pot and Ta Mok as "Hitlerites" who had "committed the most heinous crime of murdering innocent and nationalist compatriots". For this, he said, they should be tried by an international tribunal.⁹ Although Sihanouk did not mention Khieu Samphan and Son Sen in this connection, such talk had negative implications for their security, since both had been deeply involved in the kinds of crimes against humanity the Prince was denouncing, Son Sen as Pol Pot's chief for security and Khieu Samphan as Pol Pot's chef de cabinet.¹⁰

Moreover, instead of endorsing a structure of "National

⁸ VoCP, 15 November 1991.

⁹ VoCP, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Recognizes Hun Sen Government", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Plans to Visit Hanoi", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Hun Sen, Sihanouk's Son Forge Electoral Alliance", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991.

¹⁰ Steve Heder, *Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan* (Clayton: Monash University, 1991).

Councils" under PDK control, Sihanouk backed the formation of an alliance between the FUNCINPEC organization he had formerly headed and the SoC ruling party, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). This alliance presaged the possible amalgamation of FUNCINPEC into a coalition government of SoC, marginalized the SNC and suggested the results of the elections envisaged in the Paris Agreements were being transformed into a foregone conclusion, according to a scenario reminiscent of the Sangkum sweep of 1955. This dealt another severe blow to PDK's hopes of destroying SoC from above. Certainly, prospects for rallying the population behind organs of political administration ostensibly answering to the Prince but in fact dominated by PDK seemed to be fast disappearing. PDK was being put into the position where it would have to rely on its own political support in the countryside, and could not borrow the legitimacy or popularity of anyone else.

The CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance had been announced on the eve of Sihanouk's and Ranariddh's arrival in Phnom Penh by Hun Sen, who explained that the two political organizations would be working "hand-in-hand" in "many fields".¹¹ Sihanouk revealed that CPP and FUNCINPEC had already agreed that they would share power after elections, while noting his belief that the CPP would "certainly ... win" these, probably with an "absolute majority".¹² Hun Sen was meanwhile trying even more obviously than Sihanouk to warn PDK against sending Khieu Samphan and Son Sen into Phnom Penh. On 15 November, he prophesied that if they arrived in the capital, they might be greeted by violent demonstrators wielding "sticks and

¹¹ "Phnom Penh Authorities Fear Violence Will Greet Khmer Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 November 1991.

¹² VoCP, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Recognizes Hun Sen Government", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Plans to Visit Hanoi", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Hun Sen, Sihanouk's Son Forge Electoral Alliance", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991.

stones".¹³ He said that certain "groups and individuals" wanted to demonstrate against PDK leaders and would "probably go into the Khmer Rouge residence and maybe commit some violence" if they dared to establish a presence in Phnom Penh.¹⁴ Despite such threats and a political situation rapidly changing to PDK's disadvantage, VGNUFC announced on 16 November that Son Sen was coming into town the next day to "set up PDK's permanent office there".¹⁵ Upon arrival, Son Sen and his party were whisked to a SoC state hotel.¹⁶ The next day, Son Sen was told he could continue looking for a residence with a SoC escort.¹⁷ This courteous cocooning had been accompanied by more threatening noises from Hun Sen, which were endorsed by Sihanouk. As Son Sen arrived, Hun Sen alluded to the possibility of putting him and Khieu Samphan on trial by describing them as "murderers", after which Sihanouk said he and Hun Sen held "identical views".¹⁸

Meanwhile, Sihanouk suggested that the international community should provide SoC with extensive economic aid. After anointing the CPP as the direct successor to his Sangkum political organization,¹⁹ he called upon foreign governments and international organizations to provide economic aid

¹³ "Phnom Penh Authorities Fear Violence Will Greet Khmer Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 November 1991.

¹⁴ *Human Rights*, pp.34-35.

¹⁵ VGNUFC, 15 November 1991.

¹⁶ "KR Leader Meets Hun Sen", Reuter, Phnom Penh 18 November 1991; "Hun Sen Visits Khmer Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 19 November 1991; VGNUFC 20 November 1991.

¹⁷ "[Message] Number 03 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", dated 21 November 1991 and signed Khiev [Son Sen]. (Author's translation of a document obtained by Christophe Peschoux.)

¹⁸ VoCP, 17 November 1991.

¹⁹ VoCP, 18 November 1991.

directly to the Hun Sen government.²⁰ SoC then formally incorporated Sihanouk into its political fold by declaring he was again "the legal and legitimate head of state of Cambodia just as he was before the coup d'état of 18 March 1970".²¹ This paved the way for a firming up of the CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance,²² which was made official in a memorandum between what Ranariddh called two "Cambodian nationalist political movements".²³ They agreed "to cooperate in the framework of the future national assembly resulting from free elections organised by the UN and, if necessary, to set up a coalition government".²⁴ The "agreement was that if CPP won" the elections, "it would give 50 percent of the power to FUNCINPEC, and if FUNCINPEC won, it would give 50 percent of the power to CPP". This aimed to make possible the establishment of a government strong enough to deal with any threats to it that might be posed by PDK.²⁵ As a CPP circular to its members indicated, a situation had now been created making it possible for them to cooperate with FUNCINPEC to "prevent the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime."²⁶ Meanwhile, Ranariddh began making plans to bring together members of the FUNCINPEC underground, border and exile organizations in Phnom Penh to transform it into a political party. He also made plans to visit SoC-administered rural areas to launch pre-campaign organizational activities. He predicted that FUNCINPEC and CPP would "be the only two

²⁰ VoCP, 19 November 1991.

²¹ VoCP, 20 November 1991.

²² *Bangkok Post*, 2 December 1991.

²³ VoCP, 21 November 1991.

²⁴ VoK, 11 December 1991.

²⁵ UNTAC-MC, "Interview with General Kan Rat, Former ANKI Now with CPAF", 18 May 1993.

²⁶ VoCP, 21 November 1991.

winners" in the election.²⁷ Paris was becoming another Geneva.

On 19 November, VGNUFC warned that PDK's "enemies, old and new," were already striving to sabotage the Paris Agreements.²⁸ Later that day, Ranariddh visited Son Sen and suggested that PDK could avoid further isolation if it was willing to join FUNCINPEC and CPP in a pre-election coalition government of SoC in which Hun Sen would remain premier, Ranariddh would become a deputy premier and PDK would take the number three post.²⁹ Initially, PDK appeared negative, and VGNUFC again bitterly complained that its "enemies - both near and far, and both open and secret" were trying to wreck the Paris Agreements.³⁰ FUNCINPEC meanwhile initialled a military agreement with SoC on 23 November, according to which its National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI) was to cooperate with CPAF by "every possible means".³¹ Because of the interspersing of ANKI and NADK forces in several parts of the country, this pact represented an immediate threat to some NADK units.

The same day, Sihanouk announced that a CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government would be established by 30 November, and that they had agreed that they would run joint slates of candidates in the elections.³² On 26 November, Hun Sen

²⁷ *The Nation*, 19 November 1991.

²⁸ VGNUFC 18 November 1991.

²⁹ "Message Number 05 to 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nân [Khieu Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen], 20 November 1991.

³⁰ VGNUFC, 20 November 1991.

³¹ VoK, 11 December 1991; "Ranariddh Defends Alliance with Phnom Penh", AFP, Bangkok, 26 November 1991; *The Nation*, 26 November 1991; VoCP, 25 November 1991.

³² "Sihanouk Announces New Coalition Government" and "Coalition Government Plan Detailed", AFP, Phnom Penh, 23 November 1991.

confirmed that Ranariddh was slated to become SoC deputy premier and said that other FUNCINPEC figures were being invited to become deputies to SoC ministers and to head SoC provincial administrations.³³

On 22 November, Son Sen requested in a secret message to Pol Pot that the PDK leadership reassess whether participation in a tripartite coalition would shift the balance of forces in PDK's favour or against it,³⁴ and it began considering the potential "good and ... bad factors" of such a possibility.³⁵ Son Sen nevertheless remained wary about developments. On 23 November, he announced Samphan's arrival would be delayed because an appropriate residence had not yet been found.³⁶ In another message to Pol Pot, he expressed concern that the situation in Phnom Penh was "chaotic" and advised caution.³⁷ However, the next day, PDK informed SoC that Khieu Samphan would be arriving in Phnom Penh on 27 November,³⁸ and on 26 November the PDK delegation moved out of the SoC hotel into private accommodation which it had finally managed to find. It appeared PDK was hoping to set up a kind of open house at which it would be able to establish wide contacts with people

³³ "Ranariddh to Join Government as Deputy Premier", Kyodo, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991; "Ranariddh Named Deputy Premier", AFP, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991.

³⁴ "Message Number 06 to 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nân [Khieu Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 22 November 1991. (Author's translation of document obtained by Christophe Peschoux.)

³⁵ Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992" [hereafter: Pol Pot, "Clarification"].

³⁶ "SNC Meets Without Khieu Samphan", AFP, Phnom Penh, 23 November 1991; "Son Sen: I'm Happy to Be Here", AFP, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991.

³⁷ "To 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nân [Khieu Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 23 November 1991. (Author's translation of a document obtained by Christophe Peschoux.)

³⁸ "Cambodia's Prince Ranariddh, SNC Member, in Bangkok for Ten Days", Reuter, Bangkok, 24 November 1991.

in Phnom Penh.³⁹

Clearly, it had been decided that Khieu Samphan's presence in the capital was urgently needed. PDK appeared to be reversing its position on a SoC-dominated coalition, perhaps hoping that it might not be too late to explore Ranariddh's suggestion that it join in. Khieu Samphan was PDK's natural choice to be second deputy premier.

On 26 November, Son Sen signalled the turn-around when he declared that PDK was not worried about plans for the formation of a CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government. Describing them as a legitimate part of "the game of democracy", he declared the PDK "choice [was] to respect their decision".⁴⁰ At dawn the next day, as Khieu Samphan boarded a plane in Bangkok for Phnom Penh, VGNUFC broadcast an NADK communique in a sudden new tone of approving friendliness and optimism. It declared that since Sihanouk's arrival in Phnom Penh the "four Cambodian *parties* in the SNC" had "gradually begun to trust each other".⁴¹ In adopting this new position, PDK had perhaps been encouraged by indications that SoC had backed off from threats of violence against Khieu Samphan and Son Sen. For example, on 21 November, CPP Chairman Chea Sim had declared that SoC had "persuaded the public not to stage demonstrations" against PDK's SNC members.⁴²

The 27 November Attack on the PDK Residence

However, such assurances proved of no value, and any

³⁹ "Son Sen: I'm Happy to Be Here", AFP, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991.

⁴⁰ "Son Sen Declares No Need to Speak About the Past", AFP, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991.

⁴¹ VGNUFC, 26 November 1991.

⁴² *Human Rights Developments*, p.35.

prospect that PDK might be allowed freely to organize politically in Phnom Penh was shattered later that day by a violent attack on Khieu Samphan at the PDK compound rented by Son Sen. The attack proceeded in exactly the manner that had been outlined in advance by Hun Sen. It was lauded in CPP internal documents as a "popular violent demonstration opposing the return of Khmer Rouge leaders to Phnom Penh".⁴³ Some ten thousand people converged on the PDK residence after CPP-organized students denouncing Khieu Samphan and Son Sen as murderers lined the route that the two men had taken from the airport to the compound. At the compound, some among a core of several hundred to a thousand active demonstrators who were shouting "kill them, kill them" breached the perimeter and climbed up into the house. While Hun Sen stood on a balcony of a building across the street making statements urging the crowd to remain calm and commit no killings, a few demonstrators armed with makeshift weapons cornered Khieu Samphan and strung up a wire from which to lynch him. He received a gash on the head before armed SoC security forces intervened, removed him and Son Sen from the compound and escorted them to a plane which flew them out of the country.⁴⁴

In a message to the nation on 28 November, Hun Sen described the violence against Khieu Samphan as "regrettable" and "unplanned", and declared that "violent demonstrations that cause damage to property or bodily injury or death" were unacceptable, and that "attacks or murders of a few Khmer Rouge leaders cannot solve the problems of the entire nation." Despite such statements, the violence against Khieu Samphan was probably part of the pre-arranged script that Hun Sen

⁴³ CPP, *Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robâh Kâmpuchea Kraoy Pel Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dâl Pel Bâh Chhnaot* ("The Most Recent Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections") [hereafter: "Recent Situation"], nd, p.2. By context, this document dates from January 1992.

⁴⁴ *Human Rights Developments*, pp.34-36.

himself had laid out.⁴⁵ It is likely that this was an early example of the use of what the SoC security apparatus dubbed "reaction forces" against the CPP's enemies. Such "reaction forces" were purportedly "ordinary citizens" who were covertly encouraged by SoC security personnel to attack opposition elements so that such attacks would be carried out by people whose connections to the security apparatus could be plausibly denied. To further hide SoC complicity, its officials were publicly to condemn and oppose the attacks, and even to appear to be cooperating in efforts to prevent them.⁴⁶ It may be that in this case, the "reaction forces" went further than at least some SoC officials wanted, or that they simply followed orders intended to make it appear that this is what happened. In either case, they succeeded in showing, as Hun Sen asserted during the demonstration, that there was "no safe place in Cambodia" for PDK representatives.⁴⁷

An Enemy "Alliance"

The attack on Son Sen and Khieu Samphan certainly helped convince PDK that its hopes for implementation of the Paris Agreements were being thwarted, and it reacted by blaming the turn of events on a group it dubbed "the alliance".⁴⁸ Pol Pot would define the alliance as comprising "the Western Great Powers and the West" in general, with the US at its core.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Cf, *Human Rights*, pp.35-36.

⁴⁶ On "reaction forces", see "Text of Undisclosed UN Report on Undercover Units Formed by the Phnom Penh Regime to Oppose Political Rivals", appendix "Part III" to Asia Watch, a Committee of Human Rights Watch, *An Exchange on Human Rights and Peace-Keeping in Cambodia* (New York: Volume 5, Number 14, 23 September 1993).

⁴⁷ Serge Thion, "Cambodia 1992: United Nations Traditional Apathy in Cambodia", in his *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodia Tangle* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993), pp.192-193.

⁴⁸ The group was sometimes referred to as "the allies" or the "entente".

⁴⁹ Pol Pot, "Clarification".

Son Sen's brother, Ni Kân, identified the chief members of the alliance as the US, France, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan. He said its objective was at least "to bring about the dissolution" of PDK and at worst to "annihilate" it.⁵⁰ The alliance was cast in the same sabotage role that the Vietnamese had accused the US of playing vis-à-vis the 1973 Paris Agreement, except that in the 1991 PDK version the US was in cahoots with the Vietnamese Communists in support of SoC instead of fighting against them. It also cast the US in the same role that the Vietnamese said American imperialism had played throughout Indochina after World War Two and after the Geneva Agreements.⁵¹ From this point on, PDK's lack of political success could and often would be attributed to alliance machinations, thus further severing its problems from the question of its popularity.

The first public PDK reaction to the events of 27 November blamed the attack on unidentified group of foreigners who VGNUFC said had masterminded it as part of a plot to sabotage the Paris Agreements.⁵² On 2 December, VGNUFC publicly introduced the concept of the anti-PDK "alliance" and broadly hinted US leadership of it.⁵³ A series of follow-up broadcasts drove home the idea that "the alliance" was manoeuvring to turn Sihanouk against PDK, destroy the SNC and to scrap the Paris Agreements while relying on hard-line SoC elements to do its dirty work.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "A Note on PDK Attitudes and Intentions" [hereafter: Heder, "PDK Attitudes"], 4 May 1992.

⁵¹ See *An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers Party (1930-1970)* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970), pp.44,50; and Carlye A Thayer, *War By Other Means: National Liberation in Viet-Nam, 1954-1960* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p.41.

⁵² VGNUFC, 29 November 1991.

⁵³ VGNUFC, 1 December 1991.

⁵⁴ VGNUFC, 2,3,5,6 and 9 December 1991.

The 3 December SNC Meeting in Thailand

These broadcasts implied the possibility that the alliance might also be eager to use the UN against PDK as well. Nevertheless, PDK apparently continued to hold out hope that the UN in some guise or another would eventually vitiate or at least dilute the alliance's schemes and thus allow PDK to obtain some real benefit from the implementation of the Paris Agreements. PDK was still watching and waiting as regards the stance of the UN.

Thus, in its diplomatic correspondence with the UN about 27 November, PDK held its rhetorical fire. It omitted mention of the alliance, while pressing its demands that steps be taken to make it possible for PDK to establish a presence in Phnom Penh. On 28 November, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen wrote to Sihanouk and to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asking the Prince to convene an SNC meeting to discuss the issue and calling on the UN to "take appropriate measures" to ensure the security of SNC members.⁵⁵ On 30 November, Sihanouk left Phnom Penh to hold an SNC session in Thailand. He came with a SoC offer to provide PDK with a "well-defended" new house guarded by SoC police who would constantly monitor the situation, supposedly in order to ensure there were no further outbreaks of violence.⁵⁶ This offer of virtual house arrest was understandably turned down by PDK, which demanded instead a UN "involvement in the protection of its representatives" that would give them more freedom of political action.⁵⁷

On 2 December, PDK delegates indicated they would not return to Phnom Penh unless the UN undertook to increase its

⁵⁵ VGNUFC, 29 November 1991.

⁵⁶ *Bangkok Post*, 2 December 1991; VoK, 30 November 1991.

⁵⁷ "Khmer Rouge Wants UN Military Protection in Phnom Penh," AFP, Pattaya, 1 December 1991; *Bangkok Post*, 2 December 1991.

military strength in the capital rapidly up to 800 troops.⁵⁸ NADK then issued a statement that not only condemned SoC, but also for the first time publicly rebuked the UN, thus revealing mounting PDK concern that its enemies were subverting the world body's activities. It warned the UN against using "technical reasons" as a cover for rejecting its latest proposals.⁵⁹ PDK's proposals were nevertheless rebuffed by the UN that same day.⁶⁰ Instead, in a meeting with Sihanouk on 3 December, the Permanent Five proposed that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen take up residence at the SNC's headquarters at SoC's Voat Phnum state mansion and be joined in residence there by a small number of UNAMIC officials.⁶¹ Khieu Samphan and Son Sen accepted the offer at the SNC meeting later that day, after Sihanouk agreed to make a public appeal for the establishment of a "neutral political atmosphere" throughout Cambodia.⁶² Nevertheless, neither Khieu Samphan nor Son Sen would be returning immediately. Instead, a lower-ranking advance team would go to Phnom Penh first to test the waters.⁶³

Weakening of the Sihanouk-CPP-FUNCINPEC Alliance

The terms under which they were returning meant there was little chance they could take any direct advantage of the

⁵⁸ "Khmer Rouge Demand UN Troops Sent Immediately," AFP, Phatthaya, 2 December 1991.

⁵⁹ VGNUFC, 3 December 1991.

⁶⁰ "UN Unlikely to Undertake Protection of Khmer Rouge", AFP, Pattaya, 2 December 1991.

⁶¹ "Khmer Rouge Seek Security for Their Lives, Political Future" and "Khmer Rouge to Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, Pattaya, 3 December 1991; "Khmer Rouge Close to Compromise on Returning to Cambodia", AFP, Pattaya, 3 December 1991.

⁶² "Khmer Rouge to Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, Pattaya, 3 December 1991.

⁶³ "Khmer Rouge Close to Compromise on Returning to Cambodia", AFP, Pattaya, 3 December 1991.

popular reaction against the violent way in which Khieu Samphan and Son Sen had been forced to leave Cambodia. Regardless of how unpopular PDK was, there was considerable public revulsion at what were seen as violent tactics that were antithetical to prospects for political peace more generally.⁶⁴ These were precisely the kinds of sentiments PDK wished to promote and exploit, but semi-confinement of PDK representatives to a building belonging to SoC made trying out their hopes at best difficult.

The 27 November incident had also shaken FUNCINPEC in a way that PDK might exploit, but it was given little room to do so. The attack seems to have wrecked prospects for a FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition government of SoC, although the political alliance between the two parties survived for the time being.⁶⁵ Ranariddh declared that the idea of him and Hun Sen forming a coalition had been put off.⁶⁶ Some senior FUNCINPEC officials believed that PDK had been intentionally duped by SoC into thinking that it was safe for its representatives to come to Phnom Penh, and that the incident showed that the CPP could not be trusted to fulfil the commitments it had undertaken in the memoranda it had signed with FUNCINPEC.⁶⁷ However, Ranariddh maintained his distance from PDK. While he condemned the attack on Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, he still characterised his pre-Paris Agreements alliance with PDK as "perverse" and said continued FUNCINPEC-CPP cooperation against PDK was more "natural".⁶⁸

Sihanouk's position remained even less favourable to PDK,

⁶⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 December 1991.

⁶⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 1991.

⁶⁶ "Hun Sen Says Cambodia Factions to Meet This Month", Reuter, 4 December 1991.

⁶⁷ Author's interview with Nhek Bunchhay, commander of ANKI Division 2, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1991.

⁶⁸ *Der Spiegel*, 9 December 1991.

as became clear on 6 December, when he made his promised speech to appeal for a neutral political atmosphere. Instead, he condemned PDK, declaring that it was during its rule that the Cambodian people "suffered the most serious disaster", and expressed sympathy for those who had demonstrated against PDK's entry into Phnom Penh.⁶⁹

Hun Sen confirmed that a pre-election coalition government of SoC was off, but declared the original CPP-FUNCINPEC compact remained valid and expressed hopes that CPP and FUNCINPEC would still run joint slates of candidates in the elections and form a coalition government after them.⁷⁰ While accompany Hun Sen on a provincial tour, Sihanouk lauded SoC's "highly patriotic, capable and astute leadership", especially Hun Sen, whom he described as his "darling" and whom he said he wanted "to lead the country" after elections. He called again for foreign countries to provide economic aid directly to SoC "without strings attached."⁷¹

PDK Still Stymied in the Countryside

SoC was meanwhile intensifying the measures by which it was successfully thwarting PDK subversion in the countryside. While complaining bitterly that NADK involvement in attempts to set up local National Councils were serious cease-fire violations and were causing numerous casualties among civilians and local officials, senior SoC figures indicated that few villages were actually changing hands. In interviews on 5 and 16 December 1991, Hun Sen admitted that "generally speaking", NADK was implementing the cease-fire "in major strategic areas", and cited only one specific case where NADK had succeeded in its subversion: an incident in Kampung Chhnang on 2 December during which it had "captured one

⁶⁹ VoCP, 6 December 1991.

⁷⁰ SPK, 9 December 1991.

⁷¹ VoCP, 9, 11 and 12 December 1991.

village and dissolved" its administration, "setting up the SNC at the village level".⁷² On 18 December, Sin Sen, a SoC deputy minister in charge of "political security", alleged that in course of such attempts nation-wide, the NADK had killed 52 people since the Paris Agreements, mostly ordinary villagers and local SoC authorities in outlying villages and subdistricts. Sin Sen said SoC was reacting vigorously to NADK attempts to establish local National Councils. He stressed that the main task of CPAF and SoC police forces was to prevent such NADK subversion, and that they were being concentrated in specific areas to counter them.⁷³

By any objective measure, PDK was dead in the water politically. Its limited political potential left it without prospects for advancement in the absence of military back-up. Its political forays were being easily repulsed by SoC, whether in Phnom Penh or in the countryside. It had gotten no help from the UN and was getting nothing from Sihanouk. It could still blame its troubles on SoC and "the alliance", but the superficial plausibility of such scapegoating only hid the real problem that Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders were simply unable to face.

⁷² "Cambodia's Hun Sen Accuses Khmer Rouge of Peace Violations", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 5 December 1991; VoCP, 17 December 1991. The Reuter dispatch characterized SoC's allegations as "sporadic reports of clashes", and noted they referred to areas in which the NADK had been operating before the Paris Agreements.

⁷³ *Human Rights*, pp.26-27. This report's account has been supplemented by the author's notes on Sin Sen's remarks to Amnesty International.

CHAPTER SIX**PDK REASSESES AND REACTS****The 13 December Gathering of the PDK Leadership Team**

By the second week of December, the self-deluded PDK leadership was gathering covertly for what was evidently its first major meeting since the signing of the Paris Agreements. As it did, UNTAC was nowhere in sight, UNAMIC had yet to conduct any significant military or political activities, the SNC had never met in Phnom Penh, the Sihanouk-CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance was shaken but still intact, and the NADK's political offensive in the countryside appeared to have achieved nothing except to provoke effective SoC counter-measures. There was certainly no sign of a popular upsurge in favour of PDK in the villages. PDK was still standing by to provide selected information about the NADK to the UN and to put into motion its plans to subvert the Agreements by using demobilization to project its power and by forming a large "civil police" force. PDK had vociferously if somewhat cryptically denounced the Western alliance, but its public criticism of the UN remained minimal.

In a commentary broadcast on 12 December, VGNUFC summed up the PDK view of events since the signing of the Agreements. It declared: "An alliance of a small group of culprits ... continues to oppose the peace process." Expressing both the PDK's fantastic hopes and implausible demands, VGNUFC went on: "the Cambodian ... people ... want the SNC headed by ... Sihanouk to join hands" with PDK "to implement the peace accord ... at the earliest date." However, the commentary also for the first time hinted what PDK would do if in fact most people did not want Sihanouk or anyone else to join hands with it. It ominously warned that PDK would "eradicate" anything it considered was "bad" for "splitting" the people off from it. It thus threatened violence against anyone who

was supposedly preventing the people from manifesting their support for PDK.¹

The warning was combined with a PDK attempt to reactivate its diplomatic and political work via the SNC in Phnom Penh. PDK informed Sihanouk that its "advance party" was scheduled to arrive in Phnom Penh on 17 December. Sihanouk's response indicated that PDK still faced an uphill battle with him. He warned that at least until Khieu Samphan and Son Sen also arrived, he would "continue to work with SoC" for the economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.²

The Decision of 13 December 1991

At their meeting to discuss the implementation of the Paris Agreements, Pol Pot and other PDK leaders endorsed the notion that PDK had been "implementing the Agreements" by trying to activate its popular support base to overthrow SoC from below, but condemned "old enemies" like SoC for resisting and "new enemies" like Sihanouk and the UN for not helping to neutralize SoC from above. While the leadership reaffirmed that PDK policy was "to push for the implementation of the Agreements" by attacking SoC "from all angles using mostly political struggle as the base", it confirmed the public threat of violence by agreeing to supplement this with a degree of resumed reliance on military force. PDK was to redouble its efforts to try "to make breakthroughs in dissolving the village and subdistrict political administrations" of SoC. Although these attempts would be "taking political strength as the more important" tactic, PDK would now be attacking "both militarily and politically". Meanwhile, renewed attempts must still be made to facilitate NADK activation of PDK nuclei in the villages by opening "up a battlefield in Phnom Penh." Pol Pot explained this meant

¹ VGNUFC, 11 December 1991.

² *Bangkok Post*, 13 December 1991.

"negotiating for the implementation of the Agreements" in the SNC and other forums. If things went well, PDK could soon move "from politics ... to organization and from organization to action" both in the villages and the towns.³ The bottom line, however, was the beginning of a shift back toward violence that would - although of course this was not admitted - close the gap between the PDK's beliefs about its popularity and the reality of a lack of popular enthusiasm for its political offensive in the countryside.

The meeting produced a "Decision 13-12", the general outlines of which can be gleaned from a discussion document produced about it produced by Sector 1001.⁴ The document confidently declared that it was "plain" that the Paris Agreements would "be implemented first by one step and then the next," even if it would "require a period of time during 1992" to make things happen according to the script. Still, in order to ensure this, PDK would have to strike at its enemies with both its "right and left hands". The right hand would "eliminate and disperse the political administration" of SoC and replace it with local National Councils. While trying to do this by "regular leafleting" and organizing popular "protest demonstrations" against SoC, the right hand could also punch "militarily [and] psychologically ... by cutting the roads, denying it rice, frightening the enemy somehow or another."

Discussing follow-up punches by the left hand, the document emphasized the importance to the PDK strategy of

³ Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992". [Pol Pot, "Clarification"].

⁴ Author's translation of "Document for Study in Every Location. This Document Elaborates on the Leadership Team's Decision Document of 13 December 1991: Decisions of the Meeting of 1001 Leading Cadre, 10 January 1992" [hereafter: "Decision Document"]. This document was obtained by the author from Nayan Chanda.

"infiltrating forces from the rear to the front", that is, moving cadre, combatants and civilians from base areas near the Thai border to base areas deeper inside Cambodia. Such infiltration would serve PDK's "strategic objective" of enhancing its "position as a national force ... within a bourgeois system" of electoral politics. The document warned, however, that those moving from the rear to the front "shouldn't be going without" proper security. Decision 13-12 thus required the establishment of secure corridors through which the various categories of PDK forces could move from the Thai-Cambodian border to the Cambodian interior. This people's war by moving people was seen as a prerequisite to the success of the PDK "political party" which was supposed to operate within the "bourgeois" political system.

The Decision's approval of the use of military means in connection with the establishment of local National Councils suggested that such means might also be used to establish secure infiltration corridors. This general shift seemed to be confirmed in a VGNUFC broadcast that authorized the use of "all activities ... to completely do away with" whatever obstacles were placed in the way of PDK political progress by "near and distant enemies".⁵

Implementation of Decision 13-12: Beginning of an Escalatory Spiral on Route 12

Decision 13-12 seems to have been implemented with the earliest and greatest military vigour by troops of Sectors 1003 and 1001 operating along Route 12 in north-central Cambodia. Route 12 was a derelict secondary road running through northern Cambodia from the provincial town of Kampong Thom across Preah Vihear province to the Cambodian-Laos border in Steung Treng province. In Kampong Thom, it formed the boundary between NADK Sectors 1003 and 1001. For SoC, it was

⁵ VGNUFC, 18 December 1991. Emphasis added.

a lifeline connecting Kampung Thom town to CPAF outposts in Kampung Thom and Preah Vihear provinces. For the NADK, it was a vital membrane lying between its "liberated zones" in northwestern and north-central Cambodia, on the one hand, and northeastern and eastern Cambodia, on the other. It was a logistics line across which anything coming from supply bases west of it in Sector 1003 had to pass to reach "liberated zones" east of it in Sector 1001. (See Map IV.)

Apparently in implementation of Decision 13-12, cadre of Sectors 1001 and 1003 began trying to convince people to move from the NADK rear base at Anlung Veng in Siem Reap into Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham, and also to move from the PDK-administered camp of Au Trav in Thailand to Anlung Veng and beyond.⁶ According to defectors from Sector 1001 Division 802, the immediate political goal of the infiltration was "to expand the NADK political base prior to elections." Infiltration began in December 1991, with Sectors 1001 and 1003 apparently working together to try to send families "to every province" east of Route 12. Thus, after the period during which Division 802 was only supposed to do "political work to set up National Councils in the villages and subdistricts," some detachments of it were ordered in December to cooperate with Sector 1003 Division 616 in securing "unhindered crossing" of Route 12. Their objective was to make it possible for civilians and combatants alike to cross the road "without fear of CPAF observation or interdiction".⁷

Although only parts of Divisions 616 and 802 were

⁶ Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlung Veng to Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 1992)", p.1.

⁷ Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP" [hereafter; "MMWG LO SITREP"], 1 May 1992, pp.1-2.

mobilized to secure a corridor across Route 12,⁸ the NADK's efforts to prevent CPAF from contesting its ability to establish safe passage for civilians and others across Route 12 very quickly turned the road into a place of military confrontation. Almost immediately after 13 December, SoC complained of NADK cease-fire violations along infiltration routes in Siem Reap that connected Anlung Veng to Kampung Thom and on Route 12 itself.⁹ CPAF responded to NADK movements by shelling areas controlled by PDK in Kampung Thom.¹⁰

SoC was also continuing to respond vigorously to NADK's increasingly violent people's war to establish local National Councils. These efforts were reflected in SoC allegations about continuing NADK harassment of people in several other remote areas. These included Kravanh (Leach) district of Posat province, where the NADK was accused of having "launched various operations ... in a number of subdistricts";¹¹ Tbaung Khmum district of Kampung Cham province, where a SoC subdistrict chief was said to have been killed;¹² and Prek Koy subdistrict in Kang Meah district of Kampung Cham, where Division 785 allegedly opened fire on peasants in four villages, killing three and wounding 19, setting fire to eleven houses and prompting some 3,500 people to flee the area. How SoC reacted to such NADK activity is suggested by its account of the incident in Kang Meah, according to which

⁸ Interviews on 12 November 1992 of 20-year-old and 22-year-old sources.

⁹ "UN Peace-keepers Meet Khmer Rouge in Guerilla Territory", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1991; VoCP, 25 December 1991 and 6 February 1992.

¹⁰ VoK, 31 December 1991 and VGNUFC, 22 January 1992; Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Phum Sophi (Kanda[o?]l Thmei), 22 June 1992", p.5.

¹¹ SPK [SoC News Agency], 24 December 1991.

¹² SPK, 21 December 1991.

a CPAF counter-attack killed 29 men of Division 785.¹³

With CPAF thus fending off PDK, SoC Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong conceded on 1 January that NADK had "generally respected" the cease-fire despite "instances of violations and land-grabbing",¹⁴ and a week later, foreign news reports concluded that the "cease-fire appears to be holding".¹⁵ However, SoC was determined to respond vigorously to NADK efforts to move people and troops across Route 12, and decided that the best way to do this was to take the war to PDK.¹⁶ In early January, CPAF launched a new round of the fighting by attempting to "seize key villages around Kampung Thom".¹⁷ CPAF detachments were trying to clear NADK out of contested villages and also entered PDK-administered areas, thus escalating the fighting in the province into "a little local war".¹⁸ At the same time, "CPAF made it difficult to cross" Route 12. NADK immediately counter-escalated and launched "a major operation ... to bust open a corridor through which it would be possible to send families or troops" to areas east of Route 12 "even during the daytime".¹⁹ All this provided grist to the mill of those in the PDK leadership like Ta Mok who were eager to declare that the Paris Agreements had broken down, and that it was time to escalate the level of violence even more in order to make it possible for the people to show their support for the revolution.

¹³ SPK, 28 December 1991.

¹⁴ VoCP, 1 January 1992.

¹⁵ "Cambodia Cease-fire", AFP, Phnom Penh, 9 January 1992.

¹⁶ *The Nation*, 24 January 1992.

¹⁷ "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampung Thom", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992.

¹⁸ *Bangkok Post*, 31 January and 22 February 1992.

¹⁹ Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992; "MMWG LO SITREP", pp.1-2.

Opening the Phnom Penh Battlefield

Meanwhile, in Phnom Penh, the PDK advance team had arrived on 17 December, hoping to relaunch preparations for a diplomatic and political offensive in the capital in accordance with Decision 13-12. The delegation, headed by PDK "senior ambassador" Chan Yourann, the former head of the Democratic Kampuchea embassy in Beijing, took up temporary residence in a SoC guesthouse and then moved to the SNC headquarters in Voat Phnum as soon as premises for them there were furnished.²⁰

The tasks of Chan Yourann and his delegation no doubt included assessing security measures around Voat Phnum and the general political atmosphere in the capital.²¹ It was immediately obvious that the former were lax,²² while the latter remained highly volatile. As the advance team arrived, Hun Sen pointedly declared that SoC had "no right to ban people from demonstrating" peacefully, including against a PDK presence in the capital.²³

Hun Sen's statement inadvertently opened the floodgates of anti-SoC feeling in Phnom Penh. A series of initially non-violent demonstrations broke out on 17 December that were directed not against PDK, but against corruption among SoC officials. Then, during a demonstration on 20 December, a house which protesters complained had been misappropriated by

²⁰ "Khmer Rouge Delegation Arrives in Phnom Penh", AFP, Phnom Penh, 17 December 1991.

²¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 18 December 1991.

²² As regards security measures, the author notes that on 19 December, he and another foreign researcher simply walked past SoC and UN guards on duty on the perimeter of Voat Phnum by smiling and adopting a composure suggesting that we were authorized access to the SNC headquarters.

²³ Amnesty International, *State of Cambodia: Human Rights Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992* (AI Index ASA 23/02/92, April 1992) [hereafter: *Human Rights*], p.36.

a SoC minister was ransacked and burned, and the unrest spilled over into a nearby market. Looting took place while some demonstrators threw rocks at police. After this incident, SoC municipal officials began conferring with SoC police and CPAF officers about the deployment of additional security forces at key points around the city. SoC leaders became concerned that dissatisfaction was spreading from the specific issue of corruption to general opposition to its political administration, and that unrest might take on increasingly mass proportions.²⁴

A golden opportunity for PDK to attack SoC from above and within had arisen, an opportunity that seemed to be taken straight from the people's war script, but which also would provide a test of PDK's real political potential. If PDK could take advantage of the popular unrest, SoC might begin to disintegrate from the top down, and the people's war from below might suddenly take off. A PDK-fabricated "National Council" for Phnom Penh might even get a chance to emerge.

PDK hastened to exploit the situation. On 19 December, VGNUFC had announced that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen would arrive in Phnom Penh on 21 December to attend a full-fledged SNC session earlier scheduled by Sihanouk for that day. Referring to the demonstrations, it warned that "the foreign alliance" might again sabotage the peace process, and that this might involve repression of opposition forces in Phnom Penh using SoC "Interior Ministry's secret agents", SoC municipal police forces and CPAF troops from the capital's garrison. Hoping nevertheless to capitalize on the unrest, it contended that the only way to prevent repression of the

²⁴ *Human Rights*, pp.36-37; CPP, Central Committee, *Robaykar Neung Kar Veay Tâmlay Ampî Preuttekar Batokam Nôv Roattheani Phnum Penh Pi Thngay Ti 17 Dâl Thngay Ti 22 Khæ Thnu Chhnam 1991 Prom Teang Tih-dav Neung Vitheanakar Sâmrap Royea' Pel Khang Muk* ("Report and Evaluation of the Events of the Demonstrations in Phnom Penh Capital City from 17 to 22 December 1991 and Objectives and Measures for the Future") [hereafter: "Report and Evaluation"], 8 January 1992, pp.1-3.

popular will was to reinterpret the Paris Agreements to allow PDK to play a role in running SoC ministries responsible for the five "fields" of administration slated by the Paris Agreements for direct UNTAC supervision or control.²⁵ With SoC perhaps beginning to crumble, PDK apparently hoped that its reintroduction of outright quadripartitism might succeed.

Phnom Penh Becomes a Battlefield Between SoC and Demonstrators

However, after the confrontation between the demonstrators and the police, Sihanouk contacted Khieu Samphan and Son Sen and advised them to postpone their return to the capital. They heeded the Prince's clear implication that he did not want to see them trying to foment a mass popular uprising in the capital. Instead of plunging into the erupting Phnom Penh battlefield, they decided to "wait for a few days to see how the situation develops".²⁶

Even in their absence, it deteriorated from SoC's point of view. At 8.00 am on 21 December, Hun Sen appealed for an end to violent protests and reversed the SoC position on demonstrations in general by declaring that they could no longer be allowed unless the authorities granted permission in advance.²⁷ However, as Hun Sen's speech was being broadcast, police officers arrested several young people whom they suspected were part of a group about to launch an anti-corruption action at Phnom Penh University's Faculty of Medicine. Their detention precipitated a series of spontaneous protest marches by students and others that resulted in violent confrontations with some of the SoC police and CPAF units about which VGNUFC had warned. In the ensuing riots, at least eight people were killed, some as the result of indiscriminate firing by angry and undisciplined individual

²⁵ VGNUFC, 18 December 1991.

²⁶ VGNUFC, 21 and 22 December 1991.

²⁷ *Human Rights*, pp.38-39.

police and soldiers. In public, SoC officials alleged that the unrest was part of "an armed insurrection with a political aim . . . instigated by armed reactionaries" who they said had "ordered and incited students" to demonstrate. They denied any wrongdoing by SoC police or CPAF and hinted that PDK was behind the whole incident. However, internally the CPP admitted that SoC was unable to unearth any "clear evidence" to substantiate its assertion that the demonstrations were orchestrated by PDK, KPNLF or FUNCINPEC. It also conceded that the SoC police and CPAF forces had "in some cases opened fire unnecessarily".²⁸

PDK Attempts to Take Advantage of the Reaction Against SoC

The political fall-out from the events of 17-21 December was similar to that of 27 November, but more intense. It generated a strong popular political reaction against SoC.²⁹ PDK tried to take advantage of this with radio statements aimed at fomenting further unrest in Phnom Penh³⁰ and in the provinces, particularly those where provincial National Councils had supposedly been set up in 1990.³¹ However, these efforts to promote the collapse of parts of the SoC political superstructure came to naught. No one answered the PDK call to insurrection. If the part of the script about unbridled enemy repression was confirmed, the course of events indicated that SoC's unpopularity did not equate with enthusiasm for PDK. Instead, the majority of the student and other leaders of the demonstrations who decided to continue their anti-SoC

²⁸ *Human Rights*, pp.39-50,61; "Report and Evaluation", pp.3-6; author's interviews with two leaders of the demonstrations, Siem Reap, 20 July 1998.

²⁹ "Diplomats Blame Violence on Frustration, Anger", AFP, Phnom Penh, 23 December 1991.

³⁰ VGNUFC, 23 December 1991.

³¹ VGNUFC, 25 December 1991. The radio's propaganda focused on Kampong Cham and Batdambang.

activities began gravitating toward FUNCINPEC,³² which according to the guesses of many diplomats before the Paris Agreements was possibly already the most popular of the Cambodian *parties*. However, they had not seen FUNCINPEC as overwhelmingly popular, and unlikely to get more than "20 percent to 35 percent" of the vote in a free election.³³ The drift of demonstration leaders toward FUNCINPEC was an early sign of what would later become a growing trend suggesting Ranariddh's organization might be able to improve on those estimates.

While generating support for FUNCINPEC, the suppression of the demonstrations also turned it and Sihanouk away from SoC. PDK tried to use the opportunity to enlist their support to push again for a rapid deployment of UNTAC. However, its apparent hopes that it would thus be able to undermine SoC control from above before SoC could recover from the unrest were not fulfilled.

Although for the time being, FUNCINPEC continued to adhere to some aspects of its alliance with SoC,³⁴ Ranariddh reacted to the killings of demonstrators by distancing himself from popular anger against SoC, declaring that the FUNCINPEC arrangement with CPP was "really a very, very loose" affair and might be abandoned.³⁵ He moved toward a complete break with SoC by securing Sihanouk's permission to change FUNCINPEC's name to the "Sihanoukist Party" in order to contest openly against CPP in elections. After SoC persuaded Sihanouk to reverse this decision, Ranariddh angrily declared

³² Author's interviews with two leaders of the demonstrations, Siem Reap, 20 July 1998.

³³ *The Australian*, 4 June 1991.

³⁴ Most notably, on 24 December, a CPAF deputy chief of staff had a working meeting with his ANKI counter-part in Phnom Penh. VoCP, 26 December 1991.

³⁵ *Bangkok Post*, 2 January 1992.

that the CPP had "never been sincere" in its dealings with him.³⁶

Similarly, in a statement on 22 December, Sihanouk had publicly criticized SoC for the first time since the Paris Agreements, rebuking its "use of force of arms resulting in deaths". However, he hinted that the best way to achieve the goal of restoring order was to endow him, not PDK, with "political or material power" and "administrative or governmental power".³⁷

The events also forced CPP into a re-think that revealed that if PDK's hopes for an unravelling of SoC as a result of a pro-PDK uprising were fanciful, CPP itself recognized that a collapse of SoC was not impossible. Internally, it concluded that promoting popular anger at PDK risked unleashing dangerously threatening anti-SoC forces. This had to be "avoided at all costs" lest it "fan the flames of the situation and lead to a state of chaos" and further "undermine ... the popularity" and "influence" of SoC. In a worst case scenario, SoC might indeed be compelled to "turn over its existing administrative structures to the SNC" or the UN, especially if the unrest spread to other towns and the provinces. At the same time the analysis stressed CPP's determination to regain and maintain a strong political advantage by "using violence and military measures" if necessary, while rushing legislation regulating demonstrations into force.³⁸

Preparing Again to Open the Battlefield in Phnom Penh

PDK attempted to take advantage of Sihanouk's vacillations by declaring it hoped the Prince agreed with its

³⁶ VoK, 17 January 1992.

³⁷ VoK, 22 December 1991; *Bangkok Post*, 3 January 1992.

³⁸ "Report and Evaluation", pp.4-8.

desire for "an early dispatch of UNTAC to Cambodia, specifically to Phnom Penh". However, in a renewed criticism of the UN, it characterised any reasons put forward for delays in UNTAC's arrival as "pretexts".³⁹ Sihanouk responded to PDK concerns by using a meeting of the SNC Secretariat to call for the urgent dispatch to Cambodia of the UN Special Representative who was to head UNTAC, noting that no one had so far been designated to take up this post.⁴⁰ Sihanouk's agreement with PDK about deployment of UNTAC did not extend to other issues, however, particularly not to any use of military means to achieve its ends. Thus, after Mâk Bân, a member of the PDK advance team who attended the meeting, warned that if there were any more "attacks" on Khieu Samphan or Son Sen, PDK "would return to the battlefield,"⁴¹ Sihanouk urged UNAMIC to convene an early meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) envisaged in the Paris Agreements as the forum for preventing cease-fire violations.⁴² This move threatened to put the focus on NADK activities contrary to the Paris Agreements.

PDK on the Defensive in the MMWG and SNC

A first meeting of the MMWG was duly convened on 28 December under the chairmanship of UNAMIC General Loridon and with NADK represented by Mâk Bân. It satisfied Sihanouk's hope that the MMWG would concentrate on allegations of NADK cease-fire violations and ignored a PDK request that NADK be allowed to expand its presence into SoC-administered zones. UNAMIC chief Ataul Karim opened the meeting by saying the

³⁹ VGNUFC, 24 December 1991.

⁴⁰ VoCP, 24, 25 and 28 December 1991; *Bangkok Post*, 26 December 1991; VGNUFC, 24 December 1991 and 1 January 1992.

⁴¹ VoCP, 25 December 1991.

⁴² *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article 2.

purpose of the MMWG was to maintain the cease-fire.⁴³ Concerned by allegations against the NADK, Loridon obtained from Mâk Bân an affirmation of PDK's commitment to the truce.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the MMWG meeting did not discuss a letter from Son Sen to Karim in which the NADK Commander-in-Chief reintroduced the notion of quadripartitism, suggesting that NADK should enter SoC-administered territory under UN protection. The letter asked that NADK be represented in the positions that UNAMIC was establishing in the SoC-administered towns of Batdambang and Siem Reap and in eight more UNAMIC locations he wanted set up in SoC territory.⁴⁵

The proposal was discussed but not agreed at a follow-up MMWG. Instead, Mâk Bân assented in principle that CPAF, ANKI and KPNLF liaison officers would be posted to Pailin and that MMWG meetings would be convened there as part of an arrangement by which representatives of the four armies would meet weekly in each other's headquarters.⁴⁶ Moreover, although the meeting took place at a time when CPAF was reacting to NADK implementation of Decision 13-12 by attacking areas under PDK control, Loridon only expressed concern about NADK actions in Kampung Thom. He appealed to it to "give orders" to its combatants "to stay in place" and to implement "a real cease-fire".⁴⁷

PDK was thus being kept almost entirely bottled up. It

⁴³ "MMWG Holds First Meeting", AFP, Phnom Penh, 28 December 1991.

⁴⁴ SPK, 31 December 1992; *Bangkok Post*, 3 January 1992; VoCP, 31 December 1991.

⁴⁵ VGNUFC, 1 January 1992.

⁴⁶ "Factions Agree to Meet in Each Other's Camps", AFP, Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992.

⁴⁷ "Cambodia Says Cease-fire Holds Despite Claims", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992; "Factions Agree to Meet in Each Other's Camps", AFP, Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992; SPK, 3 January 1992.

could not enter provincial towns either on the crest of a popular insurrectionary wave or in UN vans, and it was being kept on notice that NADK military actions, for whatever purpose, would not be countenanced. PDK also achieved little when a full-fledged SNC finally met in the capital on 30 December. This was its opportunity to exploit the broad reaction against SoC's suppression of the demonstrations. SoC, however, was taking no chances that PDK might take advantage of the meeting to parlay anti-SoC sentiments into support for PDK. On 27 December, as Hun Sen announced that "security had been prepared" for Khieu Samphan's return to Phnom Penh,⁴⁸ the SoC National Assembly adopted a law that required anyone wishing to hold a demonstration to apply for a permit three days in advance. It empowered the authorities to "categorically prohibit" any gatherings which they considered might be "detrimental to public tranquillity, order or security".⁴⁹

Part of the PDK agenda for the SNC meeting was revealed in VGNUFC broadcasts that repeated the demand that PDK should be "jointly responsible for the ... five ministries" of SoC along with the other Cambodian *parties* to the SNC and UNTAC.⁵⁰ Boarding a plane in Bangkok bound for Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan revealed another part by demanding that an UNTAC troop contingent of 1,000 should be deployed to Cambodia in January, with 800 put in Phnom Penh.⁵¹ Meanwhile, a VGNUFC "press communique" confirming Khieu Samphan's attendance announced that Son Sen would not accompany him.⁵² NADK issued a statement endorsing "Khieu Samphan's decision to go to Phnom

⁴⁸ "Hun Sen: Khmer Rouge Leaders to Return 30 Dec", AFP, Phnom Penh, 27 December 1991.

⁴⁹ *Human Rights*, pp.51-53

⁵⁰ VGNUFC, 29 December 1991.

⁵¹ *Bangkok Post*, 31 December 1991.

⁵² VGNUFC, 27 December 1991.

Penh alone ... because ... Phnom Penh is not a neutral place". Its declaration that the capital could "only be a neutral place with the stationing there of at least 1,000 staff of UNTAC" stepped up PDK demands and suggested this was a condition for Son Sen's presence.⁵³

Upon arrival in Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan was escorted to the Royal Palace by hundreds of CPAF soldiers and SoC police.⁵⁴ The first session of the SNC to be held on Cambodian soil was thus finally convened. Sihanouk opened the meeting by introducing a letter appealing to the UN Secretary-General for the quick dispatch of UNTAC, which all present approved.⁵⁵ However, it also adopted the "view" that "what is needed for a smooth peace process is respect for the cease-fire",⁵⁶ and thus implicitly credited SoC allegations against the NADK with regard to events in Kampong Thom and elsewhere. Moreover, it did not take up the PDK demand for a role in running SoC ministries. Although PDK seemed to have gained on the issue of UNTAC deployment it had made no progress on others. Moreover, the appeal for deployment of UNTAC was just that, and did not bring about any immediate change in the situation in Phnom Penh. Thus, Khieu Samphan left the capital on 31 December, after spending only 24 hours there.⁵⁷

NADK Re-escalation on Route 12

With so little or nothing to show as a result of its diplomatic and political combat in Phnom Penh, NADK went ahead with moves to turn the situation on Route 12 around through

⁵³ VGNUFC, 29 December 1991.

⁵⁴ "Khieu Samphan Returns to Phnom Penh, Cambodian Council Meets", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 30 December 1991.

⁵⁵ VGNUFC, 31 December 1991; SPK, 31 December 1991.

⁵⁶ VoCP, 31 December 1991.

⁵⁷ "Khieu Samphan Departs", AFP, Phnom Penh, 31 December 1991.

the more reliable method of armed attack.⁵⁸ However, although NADK troops advanced, at least for the time being, PDK attempts to translate this into political and diplomatic gains backfired. NADK in Kampong Thom made a mockery of Mâk Bân's assurances and Loridon's pleas in the MMWG context for a genuine cease-fire by carrying out large-scale ground, mortar and rocket attacks in response to CPAF's efforts to prevent it from seizing a permanent corridor across Route 12.⁵⁹ The NADK attacks killed at least 13 peasants and wounded some 34 others. They also generated the flight of some 10,000 people,⁶⁰ who appeared to prefer refuge in SoC zones to participation in NADK-led actions, military or political.

Sihanouk invited SoC to fight fire with fire in a public statement on 6 January condemning PDK "terrorism" against villagers in Kampong Thom. He said he put his trust in CPAF and SoC police "to effectively combat, prevent and suppress" such acts.⁶¹ These remarks overshadowed his calls for the early dispatch of UNTAC and suggested he was more concerned about NADK attacks than the problems of security in Phnom Penh raised by PDK and FUNCINPEC.

In the run-up to the next SNC, PDK tried to turn the spotlight back onto Sihanouk's calls for UNTAC deployment to Phnom Penh.⁶² That SNC was convened on 11 January, on the heels of an announcement that Boutros Boutros-Ghali had designated Yasushi Akashi, a senior UN career official, to head UNTAC as his Special Representative. Khieu Samphan

⁵⁸ Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992; "MMWG LO SITREP", pp.1-2.

⁵⁹ SPK, 14 January 1992; VoCP, 23 January 1992; VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.

⁶⁰ "Khmer Rouge Kill 13 in Worst Breach Since Peace", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1992; *The Nation*, 21 January 1992.

⁶¹ VoK, 6 January 1992.

⁶² VGNUFC, 7 January 1992.

welcomed his appointment, as did Sihanouk and the representatives of other *parties* in attendance, but the PDK Chairman made it clear it was far from satisfied with this. He proposed that this SNC gathering and all future ones should focus on agenda items of most concern to PDK. He gave highest priority to discussion of SNC-UN action "to create a neutral atmosphere in Phnom Penh for the smooth functioning of the SNC" by urgently dispatching an initial "team of 1,000 to 2,000 men" to the capital. He suggested rather than waiting for approval of an UNTAC budget, which was still pending, "existing UN funds be used" for this. The placement of discussion of arrangements for demobilization of NADK and other armies lower in Khieu Samphan's list suggested that PDK wanted to make disarmament conditional on solution of the first problem.⁶³

PDK got only apparent satisfaction when the SNC resolved to continue pressing for the rapid deployment of UNTAC, because there was no guarantee the UN would respond. Moreover, the meeting's communique suggested that although Sihanouk was willing to take Khieu Samphan's proposed agenda items into account, he would not necessarily accept any of them. Although this left the door open for consideration of PDK concerns, it did the same for matters raised by SoC.⁶⁴ These included SoC complaints about action by NADK "announcing the dissolution of local authorities at the village level and ... appointing there the SNC as the local authorities".⁶⁵

The day after the SNC, SoC counter-attacked in Kampung Thom.⁶⁶ PDK condemned the SoC attack as an "open and

⁶³ VGNUFC, 13 January 1992.

⁶⁴ VoCP, 12 January 1992; "Cambodia Council Meets, Minus Three Members", AFP, Phnom Penh, 11 January 1992.

⁶⁵ *The Nation*, 13 January 1992.

⁶⁶ VGNUFC, 20 and 22 January 1992.

deliberate violation" of the Paris Agreements,⁶⁷ but its protest fell on deaf ears because of the credibility it had lost through its own actions. Sihanouk continued to excoriate PDK for NADK's "dreadful and malevolent acts" in Kampong Thom,⁶⁸ and to declare the CPAF was not guilty of cease-fire violations because the villages from which the population had fled earlier in January were "under control of [SoC]."⁶⁹ FUNCINPEC and KPNLF also focused on and denounced the NADK attacks, which they characterized as "fierce" and as "bullying the people".⁷⁰ PDK was similarly taken to task in the next MMWG, to which the NADK General Staff had dispatched a cadre named Mav Savy to represent it, with Son Sen's brother Son Chhum accompanying him to Phnom Penh as an "adviser". On 16 January, Mav Savy was confronted at his first MMWG in Phnom Penh with questions about NADK actions in Kampong Thom and elsewhere, for which he had no answer.⁷¹

A Glimpse of the Future: Akashi Visits Cambodia

Although there was no sign that the SNC's call for a more rapid deployment of UNTAC was resulting in any significant improvement on the timetable mooted by Boutros-Ghali and UN planners back in October 1991, the newly-appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Akashi arrived in Phnom Penh on 22 January for a one-week familiarization tour⁷² that gave PDK and other Cambodian *parties* a glimpse of what UNTAC might be like once it deployed. For PDK, the

⁶⁷ "Khmer Rouge Accuse Phnom Penh forces of Large-Scale Attacks", AFP, Bangkok, 19 January 1992.

⁶⁸ VoK, 15 January 1992.

⁶⁹ "Sihanouk to Visit Area", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 January 1992.

⁷⁰ VoK, 21 and 25 January 1992.

⁷¹ VoCP, 21 January 1992; VGNUFC, 21 January 1992.

⁷² VoCP, 22 January 1992.

initial signs were not encouraging.

Akashi attended two SNC meetings, on 23 and 26 January. He was treated to further accounts of the NADK's early January attacks in Kampong Thom and to reports of NADK obstructionism in the MMWG. He met with PDK's most clear-cut declaration yet that it would not cooperate in implementation of the Paris Agreements unless its concerns were addressed and resolved and its first explicit public proclamation that in the meantime the NADK would engage in military action in exercise of its "right of self-defence" if they were not. He witnessed Sihanouk's vociferous and vigorous rejection of PDK on several crucial points, including the use of the NADK to establish local National Councils and the PDK pretence that its political administration belonged to him, not to its covert leadership structure.

On the eve of Akashi's arrival, PDK emphatically warned that "if UNTAC has not yet come to Cambodia and the SNC and UNTAC are not yet prepared" to take its position into account, "other ... problems cannot be resolved."⁷³ S i h a n o u k responded to this open threat of non-implementation of the Paris Agreements by declaring on 22 January that he and PDK were "living on two different planets".⁷⁴ In statements broadcast on the morning of the SNC gathering, PDK responded in kind. One implicitly attacked Sihanouk by rejecting "propaganda" it said was turning PDK into "offenders" and its enemies "into innocents".⁷⁵ Another proclaimed an NADK right to exercise self-defence "retaliating" against its adversaries.⁷⁶

⁷³ VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.

⁷⁴ "Sihanouk to Visit Area", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 January 1992

⁷⁵ VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.

⁷⁶ VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.

Meanwhile, detailed descriptions of the results of the NADK attacks in Kampong Thom were reverberating in Phnom Penh. PDK hopes they might create a sense of urgency about the need for a rapid deployment of UNTAC as a whole⁷⁷ had proved ill-founded. Instead, they prompted the diplomatic envoys of the Permanent Five in the capital to call for the urgent stationing of UNAMIC military observers in Kampong Thom to prevent further attacks.⁷⁸

Khieu Samphan thus found himself on the diplomatic defensive in a bilateral meeting with Akashi on the morning of 23 January. He highlighted the PDK ultimatum that the "major" political clauses of the Paris Agreements must be implemented if "other issues" were to be resolved. Akashi responded by urging PDK to defer its demands and immediately to "respect the cease-fire" and "cooperate with UNAMIC".⁷⁹

On 24 January, the Phnom Penh battlefield shifted to the MMWG, at which Loridaon protested to Mav Savy about NADK actions in Kampong Thom. When Savy tried to stonewall by refusing to discuss the matter,⁸⁰ UNAMIC moved to subject NADK to greater scrutiny in the province. On 25 January, UN military personnel were redeployed to Kampong Thom to establish an initial presence in the provincial capital.⁸¹

⁷⁷ *Financial Times*, 21 January 1992.

⁷⁸ "Khmer Rouge Kill 13 in Worst Breach Since Peace", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1992; "Sihanouk Urges Peace as Khmer Rouge, Phnom Penh Cry War", AFP, Phnom Penh, 21 January 1992.

⁷⁹ "Khmer Rouge Says It Is Victim of Violations", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 23 January 1992; VGNUFC, 24 January 1992.

⁸⁰ UNAMIC, "Cooperation in Progression of the Peace Process", 14 February 1992.

⁸¹ "Cambodia's Generals Make Significant Progress in Peace Transition", AFP, Phnom Penh, 24 January 1992; "Government Concerned by New Khmer Rouge Conditions", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 25 January 1992; "UN to Send Observers to Cease-fire Violation Site", AFP, Phnom Penh, 25 January 1992.

Four days later, a second contingent of UN military observers was sent to Kampung Thom to keep an eye on NADK.⁸²

The next day, PDK found itself under further attack in the second SNC meeting attended by Akashi. That morning, before the meeting, it made another attempt to portray itself as a supporter of Sihanouk and to present NADK efforts to set up local National Councils as a form of political homage to him.⁸³ However, at the SNC meeting, Sihanouk dealt the final blow to PDK's hopes of obtaining his legitimization for PDK-controlled local National Councils. He declared that PDK had no right to set up such bodies or otherwise extend its territorial control. This was agreed by FUNCINPEC and the KPNLFF.⁸⁴ Sihanouk also declared at this SNC that PDK had no right to fly the SNC flag in territory under its control.⁸⁵ This signalled his rejection of any PDK argument that its administration was an SNC administration rather than a PDK "existing administrative structure".

On military matters, Sihanouk manoeuvred Khieu Samphan into joining with SoC and the other Cambodian parties to express "deep sorrow" about "the loss of lives" and displacement of villagers resulting from its attacks in Kampung Thom. In a move aimed at outflanking Mav Savy's refusal to discuss specifics at the MMWG, Sihanouk also obtained Khieu Samphan's assent that further allegations of cease-fire violations would be mediated by the UN.⁸⁶ Adopting the proposal urged by the Permanent Five that UNAMIC focus on

⁸² "UNAMIC Deploys Observers to Fifth Post", AFP, Phnom Penh, 29 January 1992.

⁸³ VGNUFC, 25 January 1992.

⁸⁴ "KR Said Refusing to Cooperate with SNC", AFP, Phnom Penh, 27 January 1992; VoK, 2 February 1992.

⁸⁵ VoCP, 27 January 1992.

⁸⁶ "Factions Pledge Support for Peace Agreement", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 26 January 1992; SPK, 27 January 1992.

Kampung Thom rather than Son Sen's 28 December request to spread NADK representatives around the provinces, the SNC also approved the establishment of a "joint post of UNAMIC and the four Cambodian parties" in Kampung Thom.⁸⁷ While Akashi promised to return to Phnom Penh in March along with "fully qualified UN civilian officials" to begin implementation of the control and supervision aspects of the Agreements,⁸⁸ he added that it was unlikely that UNTAC could begin serious deployment before April.⁸⁹ PDK's deep dissatisfaction with Akashi's remarks was expressed by a VGNUFC warning that unless UNTAC was deployed "as soon as possible", PDK would be compelled to conclude that the UN was "lying to others, to itself and to the victimized Cambodian people" about implementation of the Agreements.⁹⁰ This was the strongest anti-UN rhetoric broadcast so far. It suggested that PDK saw Akashi's appointment as a blow to its hopes that UNTAC would serve its interests more than those of its enemies.

PDK Under Further Pressure from Sihanouk, Akashi and Lorida

Indeed, things seemed to be going increasingly badly for PDK. After the SNC meeting of 26 January, Sihanouk tilted even further back toward SoC and against PDK. On 27 January, in the presence of Akashi, the Prince resumed his earlier practice of criticising PDK and praising SoC during provincial tours.⁹¹ Moreover, Sihanouk indicated that the setbacks suffered by PDK in the SNC in January would be followed by worse. He pointedly ignored PDK's calls for urgent strengthening of the SNC and insistently rejected its agenda

⁸⁷ SPK, 27 January 1992; VGNUFC, 2 February 1992.

⁸⁸ VoK, 2 February 1992.

⁸⁹ "Akashi Sees April Deployment as 'Difficult'", AFP, Phnom Penh, 27 January 1992.

⁹⁰ VGNUFC, 27 January 1992.

⁹¹ VoCP, 28 and 29 January 1992.

in favour of one it opposed. He announced that he was going to leave Cambodia at the end of February for a two-month trip to China and north Korea, and that the next SNC meeting would not be held until mid-April in Beijing. Thus, it would cease functioning for two and a half months. Moreover, the Prince said once it resumed functioning it would concentrate on his abiding concern with "national reconstruction",⁹² and not the agenda put forward by Khieu Samphan on 11 January.

Son Sen countered by using a meeting with Akashi in Bangkok on 28 January to convey the contents of a letter he had written to Karim that reintroduced quadripartitism on a new front. It proposed that NADK be represented at eight joint UNAMIC observation posts in SoC-administered points in eastern Cambodia, along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.⁹³ Loridon shunted this aside at the next MMWG, which was convened under the close but indirect watch of Son Sen. The NADK Commander-in-Chief had arrived in Phnom Penh on 30 January to act for a brief period as senior PDK representative there, making his first trip to the capital since the anti-PDK violence of late November. The MMWG failed to discuss his new proposal for an NADK presence in SoC territory. Instead, Mav Savy agreed that two CPAF liaison officers could be posted to Pailin, and that the first NADK liaison officers to deploy in the provinces would go to Kampong Thom.⁹⁴

Political Violence in Phnom Penh

However, as will be seen in the next chapter, these minor concessions were already being belied by other PDK moves, public and private, that presaged a new wave of NADK military

⁹² "Next Meeting in April in Beijing", Kyodo, Batdambang, 27 January 1992; SPK, 28 January 1992.

⁹³ VGNUFC, 1 and 2 February 1992.

⁹⁴ "All Factions to Be Represented in Military HQs", AFP, Phnom Penh, 31 January 1992; "Rival Factions Agree to Deploy in All Zones", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 31 January 1992.

activity and a further hardening of attitude vis-à-vis the UN. These moves took place in the context of continuing indications of political insecurity in Phnom Penh. Khieu Samphan's ability to attend the SNC meetings since 30 December without incident suggested that the CPP was now prepared to acquiesce in at least a temporary PDK presence in Phnom Penh. However, other events suggested that it remained intolerant of opposition political party activities, and that at least some elements within it were prepared to resort to political assassinations to prevent them. Although CPP actions suggested it realized that non-PDK opposition posed the greatest threat to it, these events allowed PDK to continue to imagine that ~~the~~ in the absence of enemy repression, its political fortunes would flourish. At the same time PDK fears of SoC repression deterred it from political action in Phnom Penh and apparently prompted it to continue not to allow both Khieu Samphan and Son Sen to be present in the capital at the same time. The repression also deeply worried FUNCINPEC and the KPMLF, and their fear of SoC reinforced PDK suspicions.

In December, several former political prisoners who had been jailed by SoC in 1990 for organizing a Liberal Social Democracy Party (LSDP) decided to begin reorganizing it, despite death threats and other warnings from SoC security force personnel that they not resume political activities. They planned to contest the elections envisaged in the Paris Agreements, possibly by forming an alliance with FUNCINPEC against the CPP. In mid-January, the LSDP's original leader, Ung Phân, publicly declared that the Party had already been re-established de facto and steps would soon be taken to register it de jure.

A few days later, Tea Bunlong, a former KPMLF member who had become a SoC official but was involved in discussions about formation of an opposition political party, was abducted from his home. His body was discovered dumped outside Phnom Penh on 24 January. Mourners at Tea Bunlong's funeral said he

was the victim of a political assassination and revealed that he had been criticizing CPP corruption and CPP Chairman Chea Sim. On 28 January, an attempt was made to assassinate Ung Phân. He was hit by three bullets, but survived after surgery. The perpetrators were almost certainly elements of the SoC security apparatus. The events convinced Ung Phân and other members of the LSDP to cease their activities at least temporarily, and created fears of a SoC willingness to engage in political terrorism that generally prevented opposition political activism in Phnom Penh.⁹⁵

The shootings also convinced Ranariddh that the situation in Phnom Penh still did not allow him to live there, and that it was unsafe for FUNCINPEC supporters among "citizens, civil servants, civilian and military workers, pupils, students, intellectuals" and others to "come forward" and make contact with the party.⁹⁶ KPNLF member of the SNC Ieng Mouly voiced similar anxieties.⁹⁷ VGNUFC asserted that Tea Bunlong had been murdered by members of a unit of SoC Interior Ministry special police, and connected it with the incidents of 27 November and 21 December.⁹⁸ In another statement, PDK described "the execution of Mr Tea Bun Long ... and the armed attack on Mr Ung Phân" as further evidence of a strategic plan by SoC to destroy the Paris Agreements.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ *Human Rights*, pp.10-12. Author's interview with LSDP founding member Kan Mân, Phnom Penh, 5 July 1992.

⁹⁶ VoK, 15 February 1992.

⁹⁷ VoK, 24 February 1992.

⁹⁸ VGNUFC, 28 January 1992.

⁹⁹ "Communique of the PDK Rejecting the Phnom Penh Faction's Accusation that the PDK Has Shot a Helicopter of UNAMIC", 27 February 1992.

CHAPTER SEVEN**POL POT WEIGHS IN AS FAILURE GENERATES DIVISION****"Full Rights to Struggle"**

VGNUFC commentaries broadcast on 29 and 31 January 1992 publicly signalled PDK's cumulative reaction to the failures, setbacks and pressures that it had confronted since Decision 13-12. They were tantamount to a warning that PDK was prepared to reinstate any and all of the military aspects of people's war in order to achieve political goals that it believed the implementation of the Paris Agreements had so far denied it by preventing "the people" from supporting it. The broadcasts insistently asserted an NADK right to fight freely to counter alleged violations of the Paris Agreements and to accelerate their "correct" implementation, at least until the arrival of UNTAC. They argued it had "full rights to continue [to] struggle and fight against" PDK's enemies¹ and to "destroy" enemy "stratagems" by doing "whatever [it] can do to implement the Paris ... Agreements."²

NADK self-demobilizers interviewed later revealed that, meanwhile, detachments of Divisions 802 and 616 assigned to secure a corridor across Route 12 were being resupplied. Even as the rest of both units were generally denied replenishment of military supplies, new shipments of ammunition allowed these detachments to replace expended stocks or lay in reserves in preparation for renewed fighting.³ A defector from Division 616 recalled that the unit's chairman, Pech Nhân, explained that NADK "had to struggle more in order to liberate our country ..., so that we could get peace as soon

¹ VGNUFC, 28 January 1992.

² VGNUFC, 30 January 1992.

³ Interview of 22-year-old source on 13 November 1992; interview of 35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.

as possible."⁴

A Meeting of PDK Leaders "On Station Higher Up"

This acrobatic logic was the same as that enunciated by Pol Pot and apparently agreed among the predominant elements in the PDK "leadership team", who met in early February to make "an all-round assessment of the workings of all the many aspects" of the Paris Agreements.⁵

In his speech summing up the results of the gathering, Pol Pot combined utter fantasy with prescient foreboding about PDK's political prospects, although the latter was shrouded in a bizarre form of denial. Pol Pot's vague assertion that PDK was already "on the march" in rural areas masked the fact that the combined result of PDK's lack of popularity, SoC's use of CPAF to block NADK actions at the village and subdistrict level and Sihanouk's refusal to countenance PDK territorial expansion had been to prevent any significant shift of local power.

Pol Pot insisted that PDK's people's war had given it and would continue to give it the popularity it needed to do well both in elections and if elections were blocked. He put forward fantastic statistics about the extent to which PDK had already liberated the countryside and even more fantastic targets for quickly liberating what was left. At the same time, he admitted that PDK seemed weaker than before the Paris Agreements, blamed its problems on sabotage of the Agreements by the alliance and SoC, on treachery by FUNCINPEC, the KPRLF and Sihanouk, and on dissidence and deviance within senior PDK ranks. While still optimistically predicting extraordinary PDK electoral victories if conspiracies to prevent people from

⁴ Interview of 35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.

⁵ Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992". [Pol Pot, "Clarification"].

voting for PDK could be defeated, he also revealed profound worries that a cabal of unpopular enemies and rivals would be able not only to do just that, but somehow even reverse the gains made by people's war since 1979 to the point that PDK's very existence would be threatened. While dismissing out of hand the possibility that any other Cambodian *parties* could be anything but vastly less popular than PDK, his treatment of FUNCINPEC seemed inadvertently to point to a kind of subconscious recognition that it posed a popular threat not only to SoC, but to PDK.

Pol Pot referred his listeners back to the model established by the Vietnamese Communists in their implementation of agreement reached in negotiations with the US in 1973, presenting it as something to be emulated but surpassed. He suggested this approach would help arm the PDK with "a view and stance" that would ensure it would not "tremble" in the face of its enemies. He stressed that when their progress was obstructed, the Vietnamese Communists had taken "advantage of the 1973 Paris Agreement ... to marshal their forces, and then in 1975 they launched an offensive and were able to seize Saigon." He said the main lesson was that "in the battle to gain advantage" in the implementation of the 1991 Agreements, victory or defeat will come to whoever is the more tenacious" in political, military and diplomatic combat.

In making these points, Pol Pot drew on the World War Two Indochinese Communist image of a US-led "alliance", which he said was now aiming at "gathering forces to ... attack Democratic Kampuchea" and "prop up" SoC, while using UNAMIC as a proxy in its efforts "to dissolve the SNC". In explaining how to be tenacious in confronting these "protagonists" of PDK diplomatically, Pol Pot brought the discussion back to the Vietnamese model of the 1970s. He noted that "in negotiations" in those days, the Vietnamese had just said "no and no, until those negotiating with them" got "fed up" and the Vietnamese won what they wanted. In doggedly pursuing

their victory, the Vietnamese did not "get a headache no matter how much they are cursed by anyone." Twenty years on, PDK should behave even more tenaciously. It would thus be "able to beat" its enemies "into submission".

Pol Pot re-affirmed that in the long term, PDK remained determined "to take the whole" of Cambodia just as his Communist Party had done once before. He cautioned that such a seizure of total power was not yet the immediate PDK goal, but argued that by signing the Paris Agreements, PDK had put itself into a position to make steps in that direction because the Agreements' "contents" were to PDK's "advantage". The problem was not a lack of popular support, but that PDK's enemies had been actively attempting to turn the situation around by subverting the Agreements. They had been "diverting and twisting the Agreements" in order to "defeat" PDK. The alliance had been responsible for the UN Security Council Resolutions that had "decided the mandate of UNAMIC" and made the UN unable "to do the work of implementing the Agreements" that PDK wanted done. The alliance had also decided "there would be ... a delay" in the deployment of UNTAC.

To pursue its goals, the alliance had from the beginning maintained the initiative as regards "the problem of security in Phnom Penh". It had "set things up" in the capital so that PDK's enemies were in a position to "do something" against PDK representatives "whenever they want[ed] to". Their "clear objective" had always been "to eliminate the [PDK] presence in Phnom Penh", to ensure that any PDK representatives who came to the capital "to engage in negotiating battles" were "not allowed to stay".

Militarily, CPAF had been "attacking ... all the time. ... with impunity" to blunt PDK attempts at "consolidation and expansion" in the countryside. Indeed, he complained, it seemed that it was "easier" for CPAF to attack the NADK than before the Agreements. Pol Pot suggested that the anti-PDK

statements that had been made in the SNC, MMWG and on other occasions were merely the diplomatic flip side of this SoC military activity. This was shown by the fact that these statement always accused NADK "of violating the Agreements", while maintaining "Phnom Penh isn't committing any violations". Pol Pot added that another angle of attack on PDK had been accelerating plans for "aid from ... international organizations" and "humanitarian aid" for SoC. Such assistance aimed to prevent the disintegration of SoC and to make CPAF attacks on NADK financially possible.

In sum, PDK's enemies had "already got a foot in the door on the military, political and diplomatic battlefields" and were "already diverting the Agreements in accordance with their objectives." Pol Pot conceded that after three months of being "constantly barraged," PDK had suffered some "attrition of the forces lower down" in its political and military structures. Its enemies were still trying to make PDK "disappear," hoping that "then they can just snap everything up". Efforts to eliminate its "presence among the four parties" and roll back its rural political offensive were aimed at ensuring that PDK would not be "allow[ed] ... to win elections", because as long as PDK's enemies could make certain that the voters remained vulnerable to SoC coercion, they would "be able to beat [PDK]" through the ballot box and thus "prevent PDK from having a presence in the National Assembly".

Although there was much reason to be concerned that PDK's chances for gaining something from elections were therefore fading, Pol Pot insisted PDK should not despair: it still had a vast popular rural support base and an enormous potential to expand it further through intensification of the political and - as necessary - military aspects of people's war. This remained the key to achieving all PDK's immediate and long-term goals. First, it would accelerate the capture of rural power in a way that should scare the alliance into deploying

UNTAC. Second, if the alliance interminably delayed the deployment of UNTAC, PDK's advances in taking control of SoC-administered villages would render UNTAC's presence no longer necessary for further PDK political advances. Third, in either case, PDK's long-term objective of winning complete power would be served by forging ahead toward seizure of "the entire countryside".

In making his case, Pol Pot made an utterly fantastic claim that revealed the extent to which PDK planning was based on a gigantic overestimation of the achievements of its people's war. He declared that, "according to the most recent statistics", PDK had already "liberated" one-third of Cambodia's villages, and that "villages that are contested between us and the enemy comprise another one-and-a-half thirds."⁶ He called on these "forces already in [PDK] possession" to "continue the offensive" to dissolve the SoC political administration in villages and subdistricts following the basic combat line and "strategic orientation" adopted on 13 December 1991. He imagined PDK had virtually unlimited prospects for further rapid advances. If it implemented people's war correctly and tried tenaciously enough, there was no good reason why it could not - within a matter of months - "take these one-and-a-half thirds of the villages that are contested and the half-third of villages that are temporarily controlled by the enemy." He looked

⁶ In his speech in December 1988, Pol Pot had claimed a degree of PDK political penetration of some 2,000 of the 7,000 to 8,000 villages he said existed in Cambodia. He had said a political solution to the Cambodian problem would only become possible "once four to five of the seven to eight thousand villages throughout the country have been attacked a lot and well" to dismantle their SoC administration. The statistics he presented in February 1992 entailed a claim that PDK had now "liberated" some 2,300 to 2,700 villages, and achieved political penetration of another 3,500 to 4,000, leaving only 1,200 to 1,300 under uncontested SoC administration. There is no evidence to suggest that PDK had made such spectacular advances in expanding its political influence in the countryside in the three years since the end of 1988.

eagerly forward to being informed of "how many villages we get in February" and "then in March, how many more villages will we have got." He envisioned that by March PDK could and should "have, counting old and new villages, two-thirds of them," and predicted that this would provoke an anti-PDK outcry which the PDK could exploit diplomatically to bring about the deployment of UNTAC. This was because what made the alliance "afraid" was evidence that PDK was "always able to get [its] hands in everywhere". And if UNTAC still did not appear, the success of PDK's people's war would render alliance sabotage of the Paris Agreements meaningless. Thus, Pol Pot said, "if by March the new and old liberated villages are increased to two-thirds, if by April the number goes up again, and if by May it still keeps going up, we therefore won't have to be worried that UNTAC isn't coming quickly, because if UNTAC doesn't come, then" PDK's enemies would "simply be left with nothing at all".

In highlighting the village people's war, Pol Pot argued that the purely military battlefield was still of less importance than before. The situation remained one "in which the level of military combat has been reduced to a certain extent". As a result, "the extent of political and diplomatic combat" remained relatively high "both in terms of its substance and of the elements involved", and was relatively important. On the other hand, purely military activity was taking on a new importance as a supplement to village people's war in pushing the diplomatic process forward. Here, Pol Pot insisted that, contrary to reality, NADK action on Route 12 had not been counter-productive. He stuck to the hopes earlier mooted by PDK that NADK attacks had concentrated the minds of the international community on the need to accelerate the deployment of UNTAC. Indeed, he argued that spectacular military action was the key to this, declaring that it was only when PDK "scared these Westerners" the way it had done in Kampung Thom in early January that they would "decide quickly that UNTAC must come in a hurry."

Pol Pot also expressed complete confidence that, fundamentally, there was "nothing too wrong with the military situation" facing PDK. NADK remained deployed "everywhere" throughout Cambodia, still had "arms and ammunition" and it would be able to deal with CPAF because CPAF lacked real "muscle power". He recommended that the NADK respond to any CPAF probes with "strong" counter-attacks, and indicated that these could include not only operations aimed directly at retaking lost territory, but also at punishing CPAF and diverting it by attacking some nearby target.

Meanwhile, to enhance its chances of success even more, PDK must also maintain the Decision 13-12 line of launching storming diplomatic attacks in Phnom Penh "with no modifications". This was essential because PDK would be in the best position to "win in the implementation of the Paris Agreements" if it was as "tenacious" in engaging now UNAMIC and later UNTAC on the diplomatic battlefield as in countering CPAF militarily. PDK must not "abandon the Phnom Penh battlefield". Rather, it was "imperative" for PDK representatives to keep going back to Phnom Penh "to make sure that the SNC gradually becomes active, so that we will have a presence in the SNC, so that both us and the Prince will have a presence in Phnom Penh." In this way, PDK would attack in "Phnom Penh to capture things politically" in order to "set right the objectives for the implementation of the Agreements". Although attacking in this way "on the Phnom Penh battlefield" did not mean that it could "fight there and take the whole thing", it would still "make things more complicated" for SoC, which no longer had "the initiative 100 per cent" in the capital because of the presence of the SNC and the UN. This was why "the role of the SNC must ... be grasped firmly and constantly."

Pol Pot had some specific advice for PDK negotiators in Phnom Penh. First, because of the apparently intractable problem of establishing a secure PDK residence in the capital,

its representatives would "not take up continuous residence" but go there "rotation style". Second, in using "the documents of the Agreements to combat" the PDK's enemies, its negotiators must "specify when there are ... things that are different from" what PDK defined as "the objectives in the documents". If anyone raised "new problems" contrary to PDK objectives, then the PDK tactic should be to argue that the only way out would be "renegotiation" of the peace treaty. Pol Pot seemed here to be thinking among other things about Sihanouk's advocacy of economic aid directly to SoC, and he advised that if the Prince "gets angry with us, let him be angry for the time being. What has to be done to prevent anything that is contrary to the main issue, that would constitute a new modification of the Agreements." The PDK position should be that aid from international organizations must go exclusively to the SNC. Concretely, it must not be handed over to SoC officials for disbursement. Instead, "it must be the SNC which manages its administration."

Pol Pot still saw reasons for optimism about the UN. He argued that although UNAMIC had been functioning as a proxy of PDK's enemies, it was internally split along national lines. He depicted Loridon as primarily responsible for compelling UNAMIC to serve the alliance. The Frenchman and other Caucasian "long-noses" in UNAMIC had been "setting up things however they damn please" in order to achieve their anti-PDK aims. Pol Pot suggested they had been running roughshod over politically "correct" non-Western UNAMIC figures like Ataul Karim, who was allowed a "merely ... formal presence". Pol Pot was sceptical about whether the newly-designated Akashi would act according to PDK interests. He doubted whether the Japanese UNTAC head would be as correct as the Bangladeshi Karim. Although Akashi might "pretend to be flexible" with PDK, this was probably "merely part of how" PDK's adversaries would continue taking "turns playing theatre" in their efforts to destroy it. Nevertheless, Pol Pot's analysis implied that UNTAC would also be internally divided, and this was something

of which PDK should be able to take advantage. This was why, despite his misgivings about Akashi, Pol Pot insisted that bringing about the rapid deployment of UNTAC was still a PDK objective.

The flip-side of Pol Pot's bravura about PDK's political, military and diplomatic prospects was his dark foreboding about the possibility of its demise. Pol Pot seemed inadvertently to recognize signs that, contrary to the people's war script according to which only PDK could have an extensive popular base, FUNCINPEC was somehow doing rather better than PDK among the people. However, he attributed FUNCINPEC's successes to the machinations of the "alliance". Thus, he argued, PDK was endangered not only by direct sabotage of the Paris Agreements by "the alliance" and direct repression of PDK and the people by SoC, but also by the alliances' promotion of treacherous collusion with SoC by Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. The picture Pol Pot painted suggested that FUNCINPEC's and KPNLF's electoral hopes were based in the possibility that the alliance SoC would arrange for them to receive votes and seats as a reward for their treacherous behaviour, not because many people might be genuinely enthusiastic about voting for one or another of them. Pol Pot could not imagine that FUNCINPEC was continuing to keep its distance from PDK because FUNCINPEC's greater and growing political potential gave it real electoral prospects that PDK did not have.

Pol Pot alleged that the alliance had been assiduously using "various kinds of persuasion and peaceful alliances" with Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF to create splits between them and PDK. They were being offered "inducements" as part of the plot to make PDK "disappear". They were susceptible to inducements because of their "hopes for the elections and the like". This had made them turn "tepid" about their relationship with PDK.

On the other hand, Pol Pot also indirectly admitted that FUNCINPEC, at least, had a significant political organization of its own that gave it some room for political manoeuvre and even independence. This became clear when Pol Pot suggested that because Sihanouk had no armed forces or organized political party that remained strictly his own, he would tend to rely upon PDK whenever SoC did something to repel him. Implicitly, at least, the same might not be true of FUNCINPEC. This may explain why Pol Pot seemed particularly agitated about what he saw as negative traits that had emerged in Ranariddh. Of course, Pol Pot insisted, Ranariddh was virtually a puppet of the alliance. It was because Ranariddh needed Western aid and was otherwise "influenced by the West" that he had been pursuing "a calculus of accommodation" with SoC.

Still, what worried Pol Pot most was what would happen if FUNCINPEC and PDK's other former coalition partners pursued an electoral calculus rather than following PDK's lead. He warned that without them, PDK could not "be strong all on its own". If the alliance isolated PDK with its popular strength, it could "drag" FUNCINPEC and KPNLF "into joining with Phnom Penh" to attack PDK. The resulting unity between the West, SoC, FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and possibly Sihanouk against PDK would mean that SoC would continue to dominate Cambodia's political administration and deny PDK electoral opportunities, and might ultimately somehow smother PDK's people's war. Pol Pot said it was in order to avert such an end that "the bottom line" for PDK was that it needed "friends" like Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF "until the day we die".

The solution to PDK's troubles with its former coalition partners was, predictably, more people's war. Pol Pot argued that if PDK was to reverse the process by which they were becoming politically cool to it, it must act on its own to "heat them back up again both in the countryside and in Phnom Penh" by "jump[ing] into a renewed offensive". The resulting

popular pressure for an implementation of the Paris Agreements that would "accept the existence of quadripartitism" in the political realm would bring FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and Sihanouk back into coalition with PDK and ensure the bleak scenario he had outlined would not come true. Thus, spreading insurrection in the countryside not only would put pressure on the alliance, but also help reestablish the life-or-death united front with Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF.

However, it was not only the perfidy of FUNCINPEC about which Pol Pot was worried: there were also problems within PDK ranks, and this was Pol Pot's other way of explaining away why, so far, PDK's acting out of the people's war script was not achieving the expected results. There were, it seems, "left" and "right" deviations in thought and deed. The "leftists" were underestimating the diplomatic aspects of people's-war-by-peace agreement, and thus undermining attempts to facilitate revolutionary advance from above. The "rightists" were slighting the political aspects of people's war insurrection from below and were also soft on the UN and the alliance. By blaming internal problems for PDK failures, Pol Pot seemed to be sliding back toward the kind of blood purging through which he had virtually destroyed his Communist Party in 1975-78. This pointed to the deepening crisis for PDK as a whole, which other parts of the speech had both denied and revealed.

Pol Pot clearly indicated that the members of the PDK leadership team were not entirely agreed on their assessment of events since Paris and the way forward. Some of his remarks seemed to be elliptically alluding to Ta Mok's "leftist" stream of thought that was sceptical about the wisdom of having signed the Paris Agreements in the first place, about the possibilities for deriving any benefit from professing continued adherence to them, about the usefulness of courting Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, and about continuing to accord importance to the SNC and other aspects

of the Phnom Penh battlefield. He appeared to be speaking against such doubts when he called on everyone to recognize that "the contents of the Agreements" were to PDK's advantage and to maintain the "perspective" that the Agreements were "the weapon that we must use to defeat" the PDK's enemies. He also seemed to have leftist doubters in mind when he warned again and again against squandering the PDK's remaining advantages by failing to engage tenacious struggles on all fronts, declaring, "we cannot allow a situation which is evolving" badly from the PDK point of view "to continue to evolve further".

Pol Pot was more explicit, although hardly straightforward, about what he seemed to be saying was a "rightist" deviant tendency - associated with Son Sen - that was intentionally or unintentionally undermining PDK's rural struggle. He attacked this tendency not for advocating an approach that would fail, but for having brought about the failure of the implementation of the line that had been pursued since Paris.

Pol Pot discussed the problem in general terms while also suggesting it was worst in Sector 1001. He expressed concern about discouragement, disillusionment and inactivity within the PDK ranks. He noted that some comrades had reported "there's not much hope" in the ranks, and that the PDK's situation was generating an attitude of "either waiting to see or something like desperation, like a sinking feeling". Indeed "a certain number" were "simply standing by for peace". He complained that PDK strength had been undermined by such attitudes, which he said would only invite a "frontal attack" on PDK politically and diplomatically. He castigated cadre whose perspective was allegedly that the best approach to disagreements with the UN was to try "to smooth things over" with it.

Pol Pot did not identify any erroneous leading cadre at

the leadership team level. However, he singled out two Sector 1001 division cadre for criticism by name. He said one had been "pretty inactive" and another had become "distracted" when it "appeared to him that the situation" in Cambodia "was about to be resolved" by the mere signature of the Paris Agreements. Therefore, actions to dissolve the SoC local administration in Sector 1001 had been "not so active".

Pol Pot also seemed to imply that such shortcomings should not be blamed entirely on the cadre at the division level, but had resulted from a failure of their superiors to give them proper leadership. He asserted that "as long as things are explained to them," such cadre would "agree immediately" to do what was required. Thus, with proper leadership, such problems should pose "no severe difficulty". He suggested "the only problem remaining" was for PDK leading cadre "to improve their grip on the situation", "to push" their subordinates into action and then to "keep on pushing" to ensure the disintegration of the local SoC administration.

The results of the leadership gathering were summed up in a succinct internal directive, "Guiding Views for All Locations", dated February 1992. Echoing the language of Decision 13-12 and conforming to Pol Pot's perspective, it called on PDK to "carry out storming attacks in accordance with the slogan that the right hand carries out break-through attacks militarily and politically, adopting politics as the basis, in particular to eliminate, disperse and dissolve the village political administration" of SoC. The way to go "all out to have the Paris Agreements implemented" was thus still to "consolidate and expand liberated villages". To do this it was "imperative to use" NADK cadre and combatants "as the key weapon to open the door for fashioning core forces and popular strength" in SoC-administered areas. While the immediate purpose of this was to make sure that the UN was sent to Cambodia to begin carrying out its control functions, if it did not, this would be no "headache" for PDK. PDK would

"simply strive to move forward with both military and political attacks to bring about the liberation of from 50 to 60 per cent of the villages" in the heartland of Cambodia during February 1992 and "from 70 to 80 per cent of these villages in March 1992".⁷

The directive was more explicit than Pol Pot had been about leadership problems. While naming no one, it attacked "some ... leading comrades, leading committees and cadre" who it said were "half-hearted, vacillate and ... confused in one way or another ... by pacifism and a desire to wait." It suggested that they were not "fully aware of the situation and of the activities of ... the Western Great Powers, who are wrecking, opposing and not implementing the Paris Agreements." They had therefore failed to ensure that there was "no let-up in consecutive storming break-through attacks to eliminate, disperse and dissolve the village political administration" of SoC. It was because of them that the PDK had failed to "incessantly consolidate and expand". It implied that unless their views were rectified or they were eliminated, the PDK's work would not "move ... ever onward and upward" and might even "fall back". It hinted they had to change their minds or be purged if PDK was to force the "Western Great Powers to act against their will and dispatch the UN" to Cambodia. For the time being, however, it said they had to "cleanse" their "perspective" and "stipulate plans for February and March so as to maintain the initiative".

It appears that the criticism by Pol Pot and in the directive signalled an at least *de facto* loss of control by Son Sen over Sector 1001. By February 1992, Son Sen had left Sector 1001 for good and was working out of an office at a place called Au Da, in southwestern Batdambang in Sector 505. Starting that month, many of the cadre who had previously staffed his Sector 1001 office in Preah Vihear province were

⁷ "Guiding Views for All Locations", 5 February 1992. (Author's translation of a document obtained by Nayan Chanda.)

dispersed. Some were relocated to Au Da, while others were eventually transferred to Front 250 to work under his brother, Ni Kân.⁸ While Son Sen continued to function as deputy to Khieu Samphan's presidency of PDK, separating him from his troops left him in a much weakened power position and vulnerable to further marginalization or worse.

The Military Battlefield: The Fight for Route 12

Pol Pot's argument that PDK would gain diplomatically and politically from attacks in Kampong Thom was transmitted to units there by the weakened Son Sen⁹ and immediately launched NADK into sustained actions along Route 12 in some other parts of the province. These actions continued right up to the moment that UNTAC was finally initiated with the return of Akashi to Phnom Penh on 15 March. A new round of attacks began immediately on 5 February, when NADK seized "several rice-rich villages". After CPAF recaptured at least one of them,¹⁰ fighting intensified.¹¹ NADK reportedly began mobilizing more troops, ammunition and artillery for use in Kampong Thom¹² and allegedly started shelling CPAF positions in Siem Reap province.¹³ CPAF also reinforced and tried but failed to push NADK off Route 12.¹⁴ Instead, NADK forces mobilized "to make a big counter-attack", forced CPAF to

⁸ Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng to Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 1992)", pp.2-3; UNTAC-MC, "A Talk with Christophe Peschoux, 20 September 1992".

⁹ Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992.

¹⁰ *Bangkok Post*, 13 February 1992.

¹¹ SPK, 16 February 1992.

¹² *The Nation*, 1 March 1992.

¹³ SPK, 7 March 1992.

¹⁴ *The Nation*, 27 February 1992; VGNUFC, 15 March 1992.

abandon two villages,¹⁵ blew more bridges on Route 12, attacked more CPAF outposts along the road,¹⁶ and carried out new ground probes which on 14 March brought it to within ten kilometres of Kampong Thom provincial town.¹⁷ When Akashi returned to Phnom Penh on 15 March, NADK held this ground, as well as "many strategic parts of Route 12" and "a number of villages" along the road.¹⁸ Thus, the net result of NADK's "well-coordinated" offensive" since 5 February¹⁹ had been finally to secure a reasonably well-held corridor across Route 12 in Kampong Thom which also denied CPAF the possibility to use the road to resupply outposts in Preah Vihear.²⁰

Although, contrary to Pol Pot's argument, NADK's attacks had not hastened Akashi's arrival, its successes on Route 12 did make possible full-scale implementation of Decision 13-12's calls for infiltration of PDK "forces" from the rear to the front. Thus, in February, the earlier trickle was replaced by "important movements" of people out of the Anlung Veng area into Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces.²¹ The opened corridor also made it possible for the NADK to move military supplies across Route 12 easily in order to sustain the detachments west of the road that were involved in

¹⁵ *The Nation*, 1 March 1992; "UNAMIC Chief: Factions Battling for Land", AFP, Phnom Penh, 10 March 1992; VoCP, 27 March 1992.

¹⁶ SPK, 13 March 1992; VGNUFC, 14 March 1992; VoK, 14 March 1992; VoCP, 21 March 1992; VoCP, 27 March 1992.

¹⁷ "Fighting Called 'Worst' Violation", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampong Thom", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; VoK, 15 March 1992.

¹⁸ VoK, 15 March 1992.

¹⁹ "Cambodian Factions Discuss Truce Violations", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992.

²⁰ UNTAC-MC, *Cambodia: A Military Assessment of the Situation* [8 April 1993], "Background to the Current Situation", pp.1,3,4-5.

²¹ Peschoux, "Investigation", pp.5-7.

ensuring safe passage.²² All this did not mean, however, that NADK units on the Kampong Thom battlefield abandoned preparations for demobilization. Thus, an ex-combatant of from the Route 12 front revealed later in the year, even as this fighting intensified, "preparations were made toward the implementation of Phase Two" by the whole division.²³

Nor did it mean that PDK was succeeding in the more important task of bringing about a fundamental change in the balance of rural power. Indeed, there is no evidence of any significant gain in terms of the number of "liberated" villages under PDK control, anywhere in Cambodia, between early February and mid-March. None of the ambitious targets outlined in the directive of 5 February and Pol Pot's speech had been met in the least. There was no outcry against PDK advances, and the situation certainly had not become one in which PDK was in control of so much of the country that the possibility of the UN neutralizing SoC politically and disarming CPAF had become irrelevant.²⁴ PDK's rural people's war was still dead in the water.

Sihanouk versus PDK on Reconstruction Aid

The situation suggested that the only thing about which Pol Pot had been right was that in the absence of success in the countryside, PDK could not win victories on other fronts. Thus, despite a new diplomatic and political offensive spearheaded by Khieu Samphan, neither PDK's former allies nor

²² UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp.1-2.

²³ Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992.

²⁴ On 25 March, a SoC military spokesman summed up allegations of NADK cease-fire violations during the five months since 23 October 1991, alleging it was responsible for 47 such breaches. The data suggests most of these were conventional military operations, and that they had taken place in Kampong Thom and Siem Reap. The spokesman said nothing about any NADK takeovers of villages by means of establishment of local National Councils. VoCP, 25 March 1992.

the UN came round to PDK's position on crucial issues like how international financial and other assistance to Cambodia would be distributed.

PDK, SoC, Sihanouk and the UN had all become convinced that unless aid to SoC included budgetary support, its administration might collapse. PDK continued to hope that obstructing such support and aid in general might spark another, bigger popular uprising or have equally destabilizing effects that would rebound massively in its political favour, even though this had not happened in December 1991. The battle over this issue was therefore a crucial contest between PDK and SoC.

SoC had concluded internally that budget-related problems like the slow payment of salaries to its civil servants were a major source of popular dissatisfaction and had fed the unrest of late December. It had decided to make "all-out efforts for a maximum solution of the salaries problem" in order to avoid a recurrence of events it feared could lead to a collapse of its political administration.²⁵ This was the immediate reason why SoC was so happy about having Sihanouk's enthusiastic public support for taking "advantage of the implementation of the Agreements to pull in foreign aid from international organizations". It was also confident that reconstruction aid would help it win popular support by giving the people under its administration a "comfortable standard of living".²⁶

²⁵ CPP, Central Committee, *Robaykar Neung Kar Veay Tâmlay Ampi Preuttekar Batokam Nôv Roattheani Phnum Penh Pi Thngay Ti 17 Dâl Thngay Ti 22 Khæ Thnu Chhnam 1991 Prom Teang Tih-dav Neung Vitheanakar Sâmrap Royea' Pel Khang Muk* ("Report and Evaluation of the Events of the Demonstrations in Phnom Penh Capital City from 17 to 22 December 1991 and Objectives and Measures for the Future"), pp.5,10.

²⁶ CPP, *Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robâh Kâmpuchea Kraoy Pel Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dâl Pel Bâh Chhnaot* ("The Most Recent Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and

In all this, it had already obtained the backing of the future UNTAC head, and new international moves were afoot to accelerate assistance. Akashi had concluded from what he had learned during his familiarization tour that because of the parlous financial state of SoC, steps should be taken to prevent it from unravelling.²⁷ Khieu Samphan's warning in a message to Sihanouk of 12 February against taking "advantage of the Paris Agreements" to advocate provision of aid to SoC thus seemed a little late,²⁸ but PDK then tried to make up lost ground. On 14 February, VGNUFC denounced proposals by international financial institutions and UN agencies "to provide the Phnom Penh faction with aid totalling more than 84 million [US] dollars". The commentary said PDK was "categorically opposed" to all such aid, and - echoing Pol Pot's dictum - said instead "aid of all kinds should be given to the SNC".²⁹ Sihanouk's counter-punch came in a speech in which he praised CPP leaders for their "clear-sighted leadership" of "work toward rebuilding" Cambodia, and revealed that he himself had contacted UN and other organizations asking them for help in this regard.³⁰

The SNC Meeting of 22 February and Sihanouk's Visit to Pailin

Sihanouk then suddenly cancelled his plans to visit China and north Korea and announced that he would convene the SNC on

Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections"), nd, pp.11-13.

²⁷ Timothy Carney's notes on the UNTAC Senior Staff Meeting [hereafter: SSM] of 11 June 1992, at which the UNTAC economic advisor recalled that "Akashi himself had decided this" and it had been reflected in an "economic and financial report". Carney was the Director of the UNTAC Information/Education Division, and senior staff comprised other UNTAC officials who headed its major components.

²⁸ VGNUFC, 13 February 1992.

²⁹ VGNUFC, 13 February 1992.

³⁰ VoCP, 16 February 1992.

22 February. Khieu Samphan flew back into Phnom Penh, but Sihanouk's decision to reactivate the SNC was not a victory for PDK.³¹ The SNC was called so UNAMIC could present UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 19 February "implementation plan" outlining the structure and timetable for the deployment of UNTAC.³² The timetable did not improve on the promises Akashi had made at the end of January, and which PDK had so vociferously denounced. Moreover, the plan contained major blows to PDK's schemes to maintain an armed force by transforming NADK elements into police forces and to use demobilization to project NADK power. It followed the advice of an UN public security survey team that had recommended that the Secretary-General correct the "imbalance of police power" that would be created if the UN accepted PDK's "police" figures. The plan declared PDK certainly had no need for a "police force ... of over 9,000 men", and that "a strength of about 5,000 men would seem sufficient." Even this figure would be subject to "further verification" and thus further reduction. On demobilization, the plan superseded the proposals Son Sen had put forward in December for some 26 NADK regroupment points that would move NADK forward in key areas like central Cambodia. Instead, it allowed NADK only ten regroupment points and a mere three cantonment sites.³³

Sihanouk also used the meeting to highlight what he described as progress toward the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. He taunted PDK by saying that the

³¹ "Sihanouk Lauds Peace Process", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 February 1992.

³² VoCP, 22 February 1992; VoK, 24 February 1992.

³³ *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23613)*, 19 February 1992, paragraphs 67, 117, 120 and Annex I; and UN, "Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd, p.36.

SNC had "done a lot of work already" in this area.³⁴ This was followed by more bitter propaganda war between PDK and the Prince. While VGNUFC inveighed against the "huge amount of assistance" which it said had flowed to SoC,³⁵ Sihanouk on 6 March offered "special thanks" to "foreign friends ... for their very kind assistance" to SoC, and suggested that because SoC was making such good "progress in all fields", Cambodians should vote for CPP in the upcoming elections.³⁶ Sihanouk followed this up with his most direct and explicit criticism of PDK to date. With the scheduled arrival of Akashi little more than a week away, he publicly accused it of being "the cause of all problems" relating to the Paris Agreements.³⁷

The MMWG

PDK was faring no better in the MMWG than the SNC. First, PDK's "long-nosed" *bete noire* Loridon was unwilling to accommodate the kind of "rotational" representation of NADK that Pol Pot had recommended. The day after Pol Pot's speech, the MMWG held a working meeting with no NADK cadre in attendance.³⁸ The officers present from the other three armies went ahead without NADK to agree that their officers should deploy to Pailin and officers from all four armies should join UNAMIC in setting up a local MMWG in Kampung Thom.³⁹ PDK could only respond *in absentia* that it wanted priority given to placing NADK cadre alongside UN personnel in

³⁴ "Sihanouk Lauds Peace Progress", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 February 1992.

³⁵ VGNUFC, 28 February 1992.

³⁶ VoCP, 6 and 7 March 1992.

³⁷ "Sihanouk: Khmer Rouge 'Deliberately Stalling'", AFP, Phnom Penh, 7 March 1992; *Le Monde*, 12 March 1992; VoCP, 8 March 1992.

³⁸ UNAMIC, "Cooperation in Progression of the Peace Process", 14 February 1992.

³⁹ VoK, 9 February 1992.

SoC provincial towns and in checkpoints in SoC-administered areas of Cambodia's eastern frontier.⁴⁰

On 14 February, Loridon held another MMWG without the NADK at which he "vehemently criticized" its absence and condemned it for continued "truce violations".⁴¹ Son Sen responded on 16 February by formally nominating two new NADK representatives to the MMWG: Nuon Bunnau and Mon Keumthon.⁴² They flew to Phnom Penh along with Son Sen's brother Son Chhum, who was again described as an adviser to the NADK delegation.⁴³ At the same time, Bunnau made his first attempt at diplomatic tenaciousness on the NADK's behalf by writing to Loridon⁴⁴ urging UNAMIC to give further consideration to the NADK's proposal for NADK to be deployed alongside UNTAC in provinces throughout Cambodia and along its border with Vietnam.

On 18 February, UNAMIC officers in Phnom Penh met with the newly arrived Nuon Bunnau to complain again that the NADK had failed to provide any NADK liaison officers for deployment in Kampong Thom.⁴⁵ At an MMWG on 20 February, Loridon dismissed NADK allegations of cease-fire violations against it, declaring that its "fears of attack from other parties" were "unfounded." Loridon warned that unless NADK liaison officers were dispatched to Kampong Thom by the end of February, he would consider PDK was operating in bad faith.

⁴⁰ VGNUFC, 9 February 1992.

⁴¹ SPK, 17 February 1992.

⁴² NADK, "Nomination of Military Officers of the NADK to the MMWG", 16 February 1992.

⁴³ NADK, "Message Telegraphique", 17 February 1992.

⁴⁴ *Armee Nationale du Kampuchea Democratique, Délégation au Groupe de Travail Militaire Mixte, Pailin*, 17 February 1992; VGNUFC, 22 February 1992.

⁴⁵ UNTAC-MC, "Meeting with NADK on 18 February 1992 at 1900 hours", nd, np.

He said that in the meantime, he would inform the SNC and the UN Secretary General of the NADK's non-cooperation with UNAMIC.⁴⁶ At an MMWG on 28 February, Loridon showed "anger and frustration" when the NADK said it still could not meet the deadline UNAMIC had imposed for deploying its liaison officers to Kampong Thom and for accepting officers from other armies in Pailin.⁴⁷

This was still the situation when the MMWG met on 9 March, as NADK was blowing up bridges on Route 12 and advancing on the ground toward Kampong Thom provincial town. UNAMIC's agenda for the meeting centred on the need to implement an immediate cease-fire in the province. Loridon again criticized NADK non-cooperation.⁴⁸ VGNUFC replied with renewed threats that NADK would "carry out all types of activities to smash and rout" PDK's enemies until the UN did what PDK wanted.⁴⁹

On 14 March, as NADK troops advanced closer to Kampong Thom provincial town,⁵⁰ Karim met with Son Sen, who had come to Phnom Penh to welcome Akashi. Karim appealed to Son Sen to order a cease-fire as a gift to UNAMIC on the eve of its dissolution. However, at another emergency meeting of the MMWG that day, Nuon Bunnau rejected a cease-fire proposal put forward by Loridon. Loridon replied that his priority was to

⁴⁶ UNAMIC, "Record of MMWG Seventh Meeting, Thursday, 20 February, 0910-1050 Hours, SNC Building"; UNAMIC, "Large-Scale Incursions by CPAF", 10 February 1992, np.

⁴⁷ "UN Complaints Detailed", AFP, Phnom Penh, 28 February 1992.

⁴⁸ "Khmer Rouge Officials Missing from Army HQ", AFP, Phnom Penh, 9 March 1992; VoCP, 15 March 1992.

⁴⁹ VGNUFC, 10 March 1992.

⁵⁰ VoCP, 21 March 1992.

send additional UN forces into Kampong Thom.⁵¹ For his part, Khieu Samphan welcomed the impending arrival of Akashi with another warning that NADK would continue to fight unless UNTAC accepted PDK positions.⁵² PDK was edging closer and closer to substituting military force for a political popularity PDK could not admit it did not have, to using armed struggle to preempt UN exposure of the gap between NADK (military) strength and PDK political weakness that Pol Pot refused to concede but could not totally ignore, and to preempt a popularity that FUNCINPEC was not supposed to enjoy by putting a premium on violence, not voting.

⁵¹ "Fighting Called 'Worst' Violation", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampong Thom", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; VoK, 15 March 1992.

⁵² VGNUFC, 14 March 1992.

CHAPTER EIGHT**PDK VERSUS UNTAC AND THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL****The First Days of UNTAC: Akashi, Sanderson and Sihanouk Versus PDK**

The misgivings that Pol Pot had expressed in February about the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Yasushi Akashi and thus about UNTAC seemed justified from the very beginning. From the moment he set foot back in Phnom Penh, Akashi concentrated on halting NADK military activities and was determined rapidly to demobilize NADK along with other Cambodian armed forces. The SRSG declared that his priority was "the establishment of peace".¹ He warned PDK that further cease-fire violations might be met with Security Council "enforcement" of the Paris Agreements.² Akashi's political position also fell far short of satisfying PDK demands. First, while he promised to deploy UNTAC "expeditiously", he said its arrival would be "incremental".³ Second, he indicated that the UNTAC personnel arriving first would focus not on neutralizing SoC but on ensuring that demobilization of NADK and other armies could "begin by June".⁴ Third, although Akashi vowed to strengthen the political role of the SNC, he said he would achieve this by doing "everything possible to work with Prince Sihanouk towards" this objective.⁵ This linked UNTAC to Sihanouk's consistent rejection of PDK's attempts to transform the SNC

¹ *The Times* (London), 16 March 1992.

² "Cambodia Accord Problems Worry UN Mission Head", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 15 March 1992; *The New York Times*, 16 March 1992.

³ UNTAC, "Statement by Mr Yasushi Akashi, SRSG for Cambodia, upon his Arrival in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992".

⁴ "UN Peace-keeping Operation Leaders Arrive", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 March 1992.

⁵ "Cambodia Accord Problems ...".

into a political body through which PDK could neutralize SoC from above or be linked to PDK-led insurrections from below, should they ever materialize. It indicated a readiness to follow Sihanouk's political lead in his confrontation with PDK over rehabilitation aid and with the Prince's condemnations of PDK's past and present acts of violence and human rights violations. The latter point was immediately driven home at an SNC to "clarify the role of UNTAC",⁶ at which Sihanouk proposed that the SNC sign human rights conventions⁷ fulfilling Cambodia's Paris Agreements obligations to "ensure that the policies and practices" pursued by PDK in the past would "never be allowed to return".⁸

Demobilization Versus PDK's "New Slogans"

In a set of "New Slogans" made public on 15 March, PDK voiced hopes that it might still find some way of using the SNC as a vehicle for facilitating people's war. While the slogans studiously avoided any mention of the wayward Sihanouk, they asserted that the SNC and UNTAC must act as "the two legitimate authorities *administering* Cambodia in the transitional period". The slogans also warned that war in Cambodia could be ended only if "UN peace-keeping forces, including the four Cambodian *parties*," were "deployed at ... checkpoints in eastern Cambodia" along the Vietnamese border.⁹ This renewed demand to ensconce NADK cadre under UN protection in parts of Cambodia hitherto under solid SoC control aimed to take advantage of UNTAC's Phase Two obligations under the Paris Agreements to establish such checkpoints to "verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return" of Vietnamese forces and to "monitor the cessation" of Vietnamese military assistance

⁶ "Parade of UN Troops Marks UNTAC Start", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 16 March 1992; SPK [SoC News Agency], 16 March 1992.

⁷ VGNUFC, 30 March 1992.

⁸ *Agreements*, Article 15.

⁹ VGNUFC, 14 March 1992. Emphasis added.

to SoC.¹⁰ As in the UNAMIC period, it was a cutting edge for reintroduction of quadripartitism in all things.

This demand was accompanied with hints that if UNTAC was prepared to settle the armed conflict in Kampong Thom along lines advantageous to PDK, a cease-fire to halt NADK advances there was possible, but if PDK demands were not met, NADK military operations would continue.¹¹ Apparent corroboration of a shift in the PDK position came from Son Sen, who remained in Phnom Penh as the sole PDK member of the SNC.¹² He reversed PDK's earlier refusal to accept a truce in Kampong Thom by declaring that he had ordered "a new cease-fire" by NADK. However, Son Sen tied this undertaking to fulfilment of a new twist on PDK's old demand for rapid deployment of UNTAC. He indicated that NADK could be expected to maintain the cease-fire only if some 800 UNTAC troops were immediately deployed to Kampong Thom to stabilize a truce, thus confirming NADK's advances. In one of his first acts, the UNTAC Force Commander, Australian General John Sanderson, in turn implied that UNTAC would not allow PDK to achieve its political and military goals by dictating how the UN would deploy its armed forces.¹³

A Hardening of PDK Negotiating Position Combined with Relative NADK Restraint

Son Sen tried to do precisely this on 17 March, when he challenged Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 19 February implementation plan by demanding an increase in the number of UNTAC checkpoints in eastern Cambodia at which PDK

¹⁰ *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article VI, paragraphs 2,3, and Article VII, paragraphs 2,3.

¹¹ VGNUFC, 14 March 1992.

¹² "Cambodia Accord Problems ..."; "Parade of UN Troops ...".

¹³ "... Operation Leaders Arrive".

wanted NADK cadre present.¹⁴ However, this request was ignored at the first MMWG to be held under UNTAC auspices, which was convened on 20 March. Instead, it focused on "the mutual disengagement" of NADK and CPAF troops in Kampung Thom.¹⁵ Sanderson obtained agreement from NADK representative Nuon Bunnau and CPAF officers to negotiate a cease-fire in Kampung Thom,¹⁶ which UNTAC hoped to transform into an "unconditional truce".¹⁷ However, SoC alleged attacks by Sector 1003 Division 616,¹⁸ and CPAF launched what it described as a "counter-attack" on Route 12 on 25 March.¹⁹

The next day, Son Sen made what he described as NADK's "final proposal" on the establishment of UNTAC checkpoints with NADK representation in eastern Cambodia, asking for another increase in their number.²⁰ In a meeting with Sanderson, he also insisted that demobilization of NADK should proceed much faster than envisaged in Boutros-Ghali's implementation plan, asked for an increase over the number of NADK cantonment sites for which the blueprint provided, and tried to get around its attack on the NADK "police" scheme by claiming that the proportion of NADK under arms had turned out to be significantly lower than the 65 percent originally reported to the UN. In internal discussions, UNTAC decided it would not countenance Son Sen's attempts to turn NADK demobilization into a political revolving door, to use

¹⁴ VGNUFC, 19 March 1992.

¹⁵ UN Information Service (Bangkok), "Press Conference of Mr Yasushi Akashi, SRSG, Noon, 19 March 1992".

¹⁶ "Military Group Fails to Agree to Stop Fighting", AFP, Phnom Penh, 20 March 1992.

¹⁷ "Peace-Keepers Helpless as Cambodia Fighting Rages", Reuter, Phum Serei, 26 March 1992.

¹⁸ VoCP, 25 March 1992.

¹⁹ "Cambodians Fight on as Faction Commanders Meet", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 27 March 1992.

²⁰ VGNUFC, 28 March 1992.

demobilization to project NADK political power and to evade demobilization by under-reporting the number of guns in NADK hands.²¹

Sanderson nevertheless publicly expressed hope that NADK and CPAF might agree at an MMWG on 27 March to his proposals for a separation of forces in Kampong Thom.²² At the meeting, Sanderson demanded that NADK present a specific proposal for solving the Kampong Thom conflict.²³ Son Sen proposed an "unconditional cease-fire on the spot" that would have the effect of preserving NADK gains and included a demand that SoC remove from Kampong Thom all "intervention" units previously sent into the province to reinforce CPAF there.²⁴ This proposal countered a CPAF call for mutual pull-backs to positions occupied before 25 February.²⁵

Son Sen's proposal was accompanied by signals of flagging PDK hopes about the usefulness of UNTAC. VGNUFC warned that the Cambodian people were about to lose "confidence and trust" in the UN.²⁶ Moreover, SoC was making bellicose noises, which were soon followed by military action. On 29 March, SoC warned that it was about to launch a full-fledged CPAF operation "to open Route 12".²⁷ It began the next day with an endorsement from Sihanouk for SoC's "strong measures"

²¹ Timothy Carney's notes on the UNTAC Senior Staff Meeting [SSM], 26, 27 and 31 March 1992.

²² Antara (Jakarta), 27 March 1992.

²³ "Second Day of Peace Talks Ends Without Results", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 28 March 1992.

²⁴ NADK, "Democratic Kampuchea Party's Proposal for Solving the Issue of Fighting in Kampong Thom", 28 March 1992; VGNUFC, 30 March 1992.

²⁵ "Second Day of Peace Talks ...".

²⁶ VGNUFC, 27 March 1992.

²⁷ SPK, 30 March 1992.

against NADK.²⁸ By 31 March, CPAF achieved most of its objectives and thus "gained the upper hand" on Route 12, advancing "after meeting little resistance" from NADK.²⁹

As CPAF reversed earlier NADK gains, General Loridon picked up two Division 616 liaison officers by helicopter from a jungle rendezvous to fly them to Kampung Thom town to negotiate a truce.³⁰ At an MMWG there, Loridon proposed a resolution to the fighting that would halt the CPAF counter-offensive but roll back NADK gains while providing for withdrawal of CPAF intervention units from outside Kampung Thom. CPAF representatives indicated agreement in principle with Loridon's package, but said they could not fully commit CPAF to it without further consultations with Phnom Penh. Despite this and the chairmanship of the UN official most derided by Pol Pot, NADK's liaison officers said their unit would in the meantime carry out a "unilateral" cease-fire,³¹ and it appears that CPAF suspended its offensive.³² NADK also responded positively to Loridon's pleas at a follow-up MMWG for an at least "temporary cease-fire" that would allow him to "show the UN flag" in contested areas.³³ It agreed "to withdraw to its initial positions"³⁴ and immediately began pulling back from Route 12, while CPAF began demining the

²⁸ "Generals Meet; Kampung Thom Fighting Continues", AFP, Sisophon, 30 March 1992.

²⁹ "Peace Talks Make 'Headway' in Kampung Thom", AFP, Phnom Penh, 31 March 1992; "UN Peace Team Due in Embattled Cambodia Region", Reuter, Kampung Thom, 1 April 1992.

³⁰ SSM, 31 March 1992; SPK, 1 April 1992.

³¹ SSM, 31 March 1992.

³² "Peace Talks Make 'Headway' ...".

³³ "UN Peace Team Due ...".

³⁴ VGNUFC, 8 April 1992.

road.³⁵

The Political Atmosphere in SoC Zones

However, the tentative movement toward a cease-fire in Kampung Thom had meanwhile been undermined by the death of an activist of Ung Phân's Liberal Social Democracy Party, who was fatally injured in what appeared to be a traffic accident. Suspicions voiced by his family that he had been killed by SoC provoked new fears about security for opposition political activities.³⁶ PDK's issuance of "new slogans" supplementing those it had broadcast the day of Akashi's arrival seemed to be connected to the incident. They highlighted PDK's demand of 15 March that UNTAC and the SNC should administer Cambodia.³⁷ Son Sen reacted by renewing the PDK demand for a concentration of UN forces in the capital.³⁸ A VGNUFC broadcast on 1 April then reiterated the call for "immediate deployment" of UNTAC troops to eastern Cambodia and other SoC-administered areas in which PDK wanted to follow with a presence of its own.³⁹

Such posturing got PDK nowhere, however, because Sihanouk remained much more interested in presiding over the rehabilitation of Cambodia via the SoC administration than in curbing SoC power and certainly showed no signs of fulfilling Pol Pot's prediction that he would soon begin accommodating PDK. The Prince down-played concerns about possible SoC political violence and instead stressed the close interrelations between himself, SoC and the "international

³⁵ SSM, 1 April 1992; Carney's notes on Sanderson's remarks at Akashi's press conference of 1 April 1992.

³⁶ "Press Conference of Mr Yasushi Akashi, ... 19 March 1992".

³⁷ VGNUFC, 25 March 1992.

³⁸ VGNUFC, 30 March 1992.

³⁹ VGNUFC, 31 March 1992.

and humanitarian organizations that have come in to help and assist" Cambodia. In a virtual campaign endorsement, he called on Cambodians to "follow the good policy" of CPP Chairman Chea Sim and characterized the CPP as a "big party" that had "the national interest at heart".⁴⁰

Moreover, Akashi's statements of support for Sihanouk were being transformed into a close working relationship that further isolated PDK and seemed to provide additional evidence that the two men's plans for strengthening the SNC would thwart rather than promote PDK desires to use it against SoC. In particular, the way in which Akashi and Sihanouk handled the rehabilitation question revealed the extent to which things were going against PDK. To coordinate their approach, the SRSG and the Prince met to discuss plans for a visit by Boutros-Ghali to Cambodia and the agenda for upcoming SNC meetings. They aimed to make sure that during his visit the UN Secretary General would issue an appeal for aid for Cambodia⁴¹ pursuant to the call in the Paris Agreements for "international, regional and bilateral assistance" in achieving Cambodian rehabilitation and reconstruction.⁴² Sihanouk's obvious enthusiasm about Boutros-Ghali's appeal⁴³ was boosted by news that potential donors among international organizations and governments were gathering in Tokyo for a meeting attended by a senior UNTAC official. On 31 March, they announced a decision to convene a ministerial-level international conference on rehabilitation and reconstruction aid to Cambodia in June.⁴⁴ Thereafter, internal UNTAC discussions on rehabilitation turned to worries about how

⁴⁰ VoCP, 25 March 1992; VoCP, 26 March 1992.

⁴¹ SSM, 27 March 1992.

⁴² *Agreements, Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.*

⁴³ SSM, 28 March 1992.

⁴⁴ "Tokyo Meeting Sets June Date for a Cambodian Reconstruction Conference", Kyodo, Tokyo, 31 March 1992.

SoC's budgetary problems in general and inability to pay its civil servants in particular might make rehabilitation impossible.⁴⁵

In their discussions on upcoming SNCs, Sihanouk and Akashi also ignored PDK concerns in favour of proceeding with preparations for elections and formalizing the Council's substructure. Sihanouk and UNTAC agreed that UNTAC itself should alone draft the electoral law that the Paris Agreements empowered it to adopt "in consultation with the SNC".⁴⁶ Sihanouk also accepted Akashi's proposal that strengthening of the SNC take the form of the establishment of joint UNTAC-Cambodian "technical advisory committees".⁴⁷ UNTAC's conception of these was diametrically opposed to PDK's hope that the SNC could be made to function as an administrative organ. UNTAC saw the committees as working forums in which Cambodian *parties* could express views about matters over which UNTAC was mandated to exercise "direct supervision or control" and about which UNTAC might take advice from or was required to consult the SNC. Given the SRSG's ultimate authority to determine what was in line with the Paris Agreements, UNTAC held it could never be bound by any "advice" the Cambodian *parties* might give in an "advisory committee". Moreover, committees established in areas over which UNTAC had a mandate for direct supervision or control could not have any "consultative" functions.⁴⁸

The SNC Meeting of 1 April

Sihanouk and Akashi faced Son Sen with these agenda items at an SNC meeting on 1 April. After Akashi expressed the hope

⁴⁵ SSM, 2 April 1992.

⁴⁶ *Agreements*, Annex 1, Section D, paragraphs 1 and 3a.

⁴⁷ SSM, 28 March 1992.

⁴⁸ SSM, 2 April 1992.

that NADK was prepared to cooperate with UNTAC about demobilization, he moved to obtain assent to UNTAC's notion of technical advisory committees and proposed that the first to be established should comment on a draft electoral law that he immediately tabled. Sihanouk backed both proposals. Son Sen was evidently caught without authority from Pol Pot to respond, and did not comment. Akashi swiftly declared UNTAC's proposals adopted. Son Sen could only present a prepared text calling for NADK demobilization to be conducted within a quarter of the time proposed by Boutros-Ghali. Akashi shot back that too short a period for cantonment would defeat its purpose. The SRSG and Sihanouk also ignored Son Sen's call for a quick build-up of UNTAC troops in Phnom Penh.⁴⁹

A Shaky Cease-Fire in Kampong Thom and the Struggle for Access to PDK Zones

The SNC revealed Akashi as more than a match in terms of tenaciousness and nimbleness for PDK's wooden dogmatism, which was backed politically by nothing except Pol Pot's flights of fantasy about the past successes and future prospects of people's war. UNTAC's senior staff concluded that the SNC demonstrated the UN's ability to assert its will,⁵⁰ and decided to follow it up by pressuring NADK to stick to a cease-fire in Kampong Thom, so that UNTAC could move immediately into its "liberated zones" there. UNTAC intervened to defuse renewed fighting that broke out on 2 April, when NADK launched shelling attacks while alleging that CPAF forces had assaulted "liberated villages" on or near Route 12.⁵¹ However, after UNTAC complained about the

⁴⁹ UNTAC, Office of the Political Adviser, "Report of the SNC Meeting" [hereafter: UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 1 April 1992; Carney's notes on SNC Meeting [hereafter: Carney-SNC], 1 April 1992; SSM, 2 April 1992; VGNUFC, 2 April 1992.

⁵⁰ SSM, 2 April 1992.

⁵¹ VGNUFC, 3 April 1992.

shelling to Division 616, the firing ceased.⁵² A local MMWG on 2 April to discuss the cease-fire thus seemed to take place in a "constructive atmosphere" as some 200 Indonesian UNTAC infantry arrived⁵³ "to open up roads and villages" in Kampung Thom.⁵⁴ On 4 April, Sanderson declared that UNTAC was "on the verge" of "moving ... in greater depth into the countryside and ... deploying troops" into contested villages.⁵⁵

However, a PDK that had been making military concessions but no political gains suddenly shifted NADK in Kampung Thom back into an offensive gear. After a VGNUFC broadcast warned that PDK enjoyed "a clear basis, legal and concrete," to "struggle" against "those opposing ... and delaying the implementation" of those parts of the Paris Agreements it considered most important,⁵⁶ the military situation unravelled again. According to SoC, Sector 1003 Division 616 and Sector 1001 Division 802 initiated a series of ground and shelling attacks along Route 12. Although CPAF artillery counter-fire blunted the NADK action, the renewed fighting put further UNTAC deployments on hold⁵⁷ as Khieu Samphan flew into Phnom Penh to replace Son Sen at the SNC.

The SNC of 6 April: Khieu Samphan Presents a Hardened PDK Position

Khieu Samphan came to the 6 April SNC bringing a hardened

⁵² SSM, 2 April 1992.

⁵³ SSM, 3 April 1992.

⁵⁴ "Indonesian Peacekeepers Sent to Cambodia Province", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 2 April 1992.

⁵⁵ SPK, 4 April 1992.

⁵⁶ VGNUFC, 4 April 1992.

⁵⁷ VGNUFC, 6 April 1992; UNTAC-MC, "NADK LO KPT", 6 April 1992; "Landmine Threat Postpones UN Cambodian Mission", Reuter, Phum Rundas, 7 April 1992; VoCP, 9 April 1992; SPK, 10 April 1992.

PDK negotiating position. It reflected Pol Pot's continued hopes of kick-starting PDK political struggle from above but a readiness to accede to Ta Mok's desire to fall back on much greater use of military means if Pol Pot's political dreams did not begin to come true. It undercut Son Sen's attempts to facilitate people's war by keeping both military and diplomatic options open through trying to find opportunities at least to appear to be reasonable.

Khieu Samphan declared that demobilization of NADK was conditional on the fulfilment of PDK demands with regard to deployment of UNTAC military personnel and NADK representatives in SoC-administered locations in eastern Cambodia, specifying that PDK would not be satisfied with the placement only of unarmed UNTAC military observers at the border posts. He demanded "the urgent deployment" of three UNTAC infantry battalions to the Vietnamese frontier, where they could provide security for NADK representatives against attacks. Akashi and Sihanouk forcefully rebuffed Khieu Samphan's attempt to dictate UNTAC's deployment and repudiating any notion of preconditions for demobilization of NADK.⁵⁸ On 16 April, UNTAC formally inaugurated three border checkpoints, but they were manned by UNTAC military observers, not troops.⁵⁹ They thus fell far short of what PDK believed was necessary in order to ensconce NADK cadre in eastern Cambodia to do political work safely under UNTAC protection.

Khieu Samphan's hardened line at the SNC was also apparent in a statement that challenged the way in which Akashi and Sihanouk had been setting the SNC agenda without reference to PDK priorities, and that put forward a counter-agenda. In addition to the deployment of UNTAC armed forces

⁵⁸ VGNUFC, 6 April 1992; UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 6 April 1992; Carney-SNC, 6 April 1992; "Foreign Minister on KR Stance on UN Troops", AFP, Phnom Penh, 7 April 1992.

⁵⁹ UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Proposed Questions and Answers", 20 April 1992.

and NADK cadre in SoC-administered territory, it gave priority to the issues of the "rights and power of the SNC as the sole legitimate source of power in Cambodia, and relations between the SNC and UNTAC"; and the "elimination of the terrorist atmosphere and the establishment of security and a neutral atmosphere in Phnom Penh and in the provinces."⁶⁰ Akashi indicated that the upcoming SNC would instead concentrate on discussion of UNTAC's draft electoral law. He did agree to discuss delineation of authority between SNC, UNTAC and existing administrative structures,⁶¹ but gave no reason to expect that UNTAC would come round to the PDK position on this issue.

Relative Calm in Kampong Thom

Nevertheless, in a letter to UNTAC on 12 April, Son Sen revealed a willingness to compromise that virtually made public a split in the PDK senior leadership. He backed away from Khieu Samphan's position of pre-conditionality on demobilization, and said he was prepared to accept simultaneity instead: NADK would proceed toward cooperation with UNTAC on demobilization at the same time as UNTAC deployed in eastern Cambodia. UNTAC access to NADK for purposes of demobilization would proceed step-by-step as UNTAC troops deployed in eastern Cambodia. He indicated that NADK would meanwhile maintain a cease-fire in Kampong Thom,⁶² and events in the first few days after the SNC seemed to suggest NADK restraint.⁶³ CPAF began withdrawing some of its troops from the province in line with the cease-fire agreement

⁶⁰ VGNUFC, 6 April 1992.

⁶¹ UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 6 April 1992; "Communique of the SNC Meeting, 6 April 1992".

⁶² VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.

⁶³ SSM, 8 April 1992.

brokered by Loridon at the end of March.⁶⁴ However, a senior SoC military official confirmed that some CPAF intervention forces remained when he said they would not be "withdrawn completely" from Kampong Thom until SoC was convinced NADK had really ceased its "destructive activities" in the province.⁶⁵ Moreover, by 11 April NADK began contradicting UNTAC by privately asserting that the CPAF was not withdrawing but merely rotating troops in Kampong Thom.⁶⁶ The next day Son Sen wrote to Sanderson from Pailin warning that CPAF must withdraw all of its reinforcements from the province if further NADK-UNTAC discussions were "to bear fruit".⁶⁷ The situation became more ominous when VGNUFC went public on 14 April with the claim that "the Phnom Penh side" had staged a "troop withdrawal farce" in Kampong Thom.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, NADK remained inactive in the province until 19 April,⁶⁹ and UNTAC troops continued to advance up Route 12 into areas previously seized by NADK.⁷⁰

A Gathering in Pailin

As UNTAC troops advanced up Route 12, PDK cadre from all over the country began gathering near Pailin for a major unpublicized meeting, evidently the first such conclave since UNTAC's arrival.⁷¹ They were coming to report on their experiences in implementing Decision 13-12 and the 5 February

⁶⁴ SSM, 10 April 1992.

⁶⁵ VoCP, 11 April 1992.

⁶⁶ SSM, 11 April 1992.

⁶⁷ VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.

⁶⁸ VGNUFC, 13 April 1992.

⁶⁹ "Khmer Rouge Thwart UN in Northern Cambodia", Reuter, Kampong Thom, 26 April 1992.

⁷⁰ SSM, 15 and 16 April 1992.

⁷¹ SSM, 15 April 1992.

directive in preparation for a meeting of the PDK leadership at the end of April.⁷² The gathering at Pailin came amidst increasing public indications of disagreements within the leadership. VGNUFC broadcasts since the 6 April SNC revealed disarray in the PDK line vis-à-vis UNTAC. For example, on 9 April, the radio gave a quite positive evaluation of that SNC.⁷³ The next day, however, VGNUFC broadcast an unprecedentedly harsh public assessment of the SNC and UNTAC. The radio said that it was "obvious" that both bodies were under the control of PDK's enemies because they had not created the kind of neutral political environment in SoC-administered areas that would allow PDK safely to organize overt political activities.⁷⁴

A VGNUFC commentary broadcast on 17 April seemed to cut through the confusion to pose a stark question for the gathering cadre. It suggested what the main item for discussion by them should be and what they should decide. It asserted that UNTAC was allowing the implementation of the Paris Agreements to "be carried out under the authority" of PDK's enemies. It asked rhetorically whether PDK should implement the Paris Agreements or resort to military means, and implicitly warned it would adopt the latter course unless UNTAC took "stringent measures to deploy its monitoring force" into SoC-administered parts of "eastern Cambodia without delay".⁷⁵ This appeared to endorse the hardline position presented by Khieu Samphan on 6 April, but it would turn out that the more conciliatory position put forward by Son Sen had not yet been totally rejected by Pol Pot. PDK was veering between "leftist" and "rightist" positions, but the lurches back and forth were indicative of a crisis to which there was

⁷² Steve Heder, UNTAC Information/Education Division [UNTAC-IED], "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.

⁷³ VGNUFC, 8 April 1992.

⁷⁴ VGNUFC, 9 April 1992.

⁷⁵ VGNUFC, 16 April 1992.

no happy solution, and perhaps no solution at all. With Ta Mok chaffing at the military bit, with Son Sen as in the past prepared to be (relatively) more realistic than Pol Pot about PDK's immediate prospects, all possibilities remained profoundly constrained by PDK's weak popular base.

VGNUFC's 17 April threat was accompanied by a new series of attacks in Kampong Thom that significantly escalated the level of fighting there, both in terms of the numbers of NADK troops involved and the type of targets attacked, which included district towns. It was also accompanied by the initiation of small-scale actions in a second province, Kampot. Although these actions seem to have aimed to extend geographically Decision 13-12's demand for establishment of secure corridors for movement of PDK "forces" from the border to the interior, they also seemed to be a substitute for PDK's failure to provoke a political and diplomatic panic through popular uprisings. Instead, more purely military means were being used to dramatize PDK's diplomatic and political interests in the context of the visit to Cambodia of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who arrived on 18 April and stayed in the country for two days to assess the Cambodian peace process.

NADK attacks in Kampot reportedly began on 17 April and were apparently carried out on the instructions of senior Sector 505 cadre Sam Bit, the former Deputy Secretary of the Southwest Zone under Ta Mok.⁷⁶ An ex-NADK later affirmed that starting in April 1992, "a lot of people" from Sector 505 rear bases on the Thai border were moved by his unit deep into Cambodia.⁷⁷ SoC allegations about NADK activities in Kampot described them in terms reminiscent of those that had accompanied the early stages of implementation of Decision 13-

⁷⁶ Interview of 28-year-old source on 9-10 January 1993.

⁷⁷ Interview of 25-year-old source on 30 April 1993.

12 in north-central Cambodia in December 1991.⁷⁸

The attacks in Kampong Thom reportedly began on 19 April. They moved the focus of the fighting from Route 12 to the valley of the Steung Sen river, which bisects Sandan and Prasat Sambaur districts in northeastern Kampong Thom before flowing past the provincial capital and into the Tonle Sap lake.⁷⁹ As a defector from Division 802 explained, Ta Mok had "ordered NADK forces to secure a 'gateway' across the [Steung] Sen river similar to the gateway secured by the Route 12 operation." While the defector explained that the actions in the Steung Sen valley were still part of PDK preparations for eventual elections because they aimed to ensure the free movement of what PDK presumed were its supporters from the Thai-Cambodian border to eastern Cambodian provinces like Kracheh and Kampong Cham, he added that the establishment of such infiltration corridors would also allow NADK to open up new military fronts there.⁸⁰ Thus, if the civilian supporters moving in from below could not link up with NADK cadre brought in under UNTAC protection, or if their arrival did nothing to give a boost to PDK-led rural insurrections, troops answering to Ta Mok would be in place to use weapons other than their mouths to make people's war happen.

According to SoC, between 19 and 21 April, NADK shelled the outskirts of the district seat of Sandan and launched ground assaults on two villages in the Steung Sen valley.⁸¹ NADK seized at one village, provoking a "small fight".⁸² A new upsurge in NADK action on 26 April gave further substance

⁷⁸ VoCP, 12 May 1992.

⁷⁹ Notes by the author and Tim Carney on an MMWG in Kampong Thom on 10 May 1992.

⁸⁰ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp.1-2; UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to Phum Phæ, 28 April 1992".

⁸¹ SPK, 24 April 1992; VoCP, 29 April 1992.

⁸² SSM, 23 April 1992.

to threats that unless PDK negotiating demands were met, the war would never end. Some 800 NADK⁸³ launched five separate artillery and ground attacks, hitting targets up and down Steung Sen valley, including the outskirts of Kampong Thom provincial town.⁸⁴

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Visit

VGNUFC had meanwhile greeted Boutros-Ghali's 18 April arrival with a full-force propaganda barrage in the form of a very negative assessment of the results of the first six months of the implementation of the Paris Agreements and UNTAC's performance since its arrival. It called upon the Secretary-General to recognize that "the true essence of the Paris Agreements is not being implemented." It wanted him to agree that UNTAC was failing in its duties to "consult" with PDK via the SNC about "all administrative tasks in Cambodia".⁸⁵

Instead, Boutros-Ghali's visit confirmed UN opposition to PDK demands. It proceeded according to a scenario UNTAC had discussed on 15 April in which it would use the Secretary-General's presence to focus authoritative pressure on PDK to demobilize NADK and to confirm that rehabilitation aid for Cambodia would include budgetary assistance to SoC.⁸⁶ At an MMWG on the morning of the day Boutros-Ghali arrived, Sanderson advised Nuon Bunnau that it would be in PDK's own best interests to "offer some encouraging news to the Secretary-General" about readiness to demobilize, and suggested that PDK might otherwise face Security Council

⁸³ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp.1-2.

⁸⁴ SPK, 1 and 2 May 1992; "Factions Refuse to Be First to Mark Minefields", AFP, Phnom Penh, 28 April 1992.

⁸⁵ VGNUFC, 17 April.

⁸⁶ SSM, 15 April 1992.

action.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, UNTAC drafted a rehabilitation appeal in the Secretary-Generals's name and containing budgetary aid⁸⁸ for presentation to Sihanouk and the SNC.⁸⁹

Statements by Sihanouk and Boutros-Ghali on 18 April threw cold water on PDK hopes to use the Secretary-General to turn UNTAC around. Sihanouk's welcoming speech rejected PDK's contentions that UNTAC could be blamed for problems with the Paris Agreements.⁹⁰ The Secretary-General highlighted the UN's "unreserved support" for the Prince. He indicated he intended to discuss with PDK "the means to promote ... cooperation" with UNTAC on demobilization of NADK, and warned PDK must prove it had the "political will ... to ... take up the challenge of peace." SoC media gave full play to Boutros-Ghali's praise for Sihanouk, which reproduced its own and thus seemed to associate the UN with SoC.⁹¹

Moreover, while Boutros-Ghali also made statements that seemed intended to reassure PDK, the content of his undertakings were hardly in line with PDK demands. When the Secretary-General declared that his visit aimed to "stress the importance ... of ... full realization of the mandate assigned to UNTAC," he said nothing to suggest this involved an UNTAC role in administering Cambodia. While he vowed that "everything will be done to speed up the deployment" of UNTAC, he indicated this aimed to ensure that conditions were created

⁸⁷ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Fourteenth Meeting, Saturday 18 April 1992 UNTAC Headquarters"; VGNUFC, 20 April 1992.

⁸⁸ SSM, 11 April 1992.

⁸⁹ SSM, 17 April 1992.

⁹⁰ UNTAC-IED, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News Media: State of Cambodia (Broadcast Media)" [hereafter: UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC], 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April 1992.

⁹¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing VoCP and SPK, 20 April 1992.

"for the elections to be held in twelve months."⁹² He thus endorsed Akashi's and Sihanouk's emphasis on moving straight ahead with election preparations.

On the morning of 19 April, VGNUFC stipulated that PDK wanted more than vague promises from the Secretary-General. It expressed the hope that he would get UNTAC to ensure "most quickly the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in eastern Cambodia" and urge "the SNC and UNTAC to take over all administrative duties in Cambodia". It warned that otherwise, Cambodia would not "enjoy genuine peace."⁹³ However, Boutros-Ghali's internal discussions with UNTAC senior staff later that morning revealed no inclination to give in to PDK's political demands. He said UNTAC must "avoid the impression of creating ... a [UN] state within a [Cambodian] state" and advised UNTAC to adopt "a humble approach" in implementing its mandate. A similarly cautious tone was evident in the remarks made by several UNTAC senior staff present. One warned against any "unrealistic expectations of the UN's ability to correct human rights problems". Another said there could be no question of putting Cambodia under UN "tutelage". Discussions about rehabilitation also went badly for PDK. UNTAC urged Boutros-Ghali to support budgetary aid for SoC, and in agreeing he suggested it should be used as a "carrot" to maintain SoC's cooperation in the peace process.⁹⁴

Provisions for budgetary and balance of payments support were thus prominently maintained in the Secretary-General's

⁹² UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April 1992.

⁹³ UNTAC-IED, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News Media: *Partie of Democratic Kampuchea (Broadcast Media)*" [hereafter: UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK], 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.

⁹⁴ UNTAC, [no component indicated], "Notes: Meeting with UNSG, 19 April 1992".

draft rehabilitation appeal⁹⁵ that was conveyed to PDK on 19 April. Khieu Samphan immediately assessed it as "a violation of the Paris Agreements".⁹⁶ He said it aimed "to legalize and consolidate" SoC.⁹⁷ PDK's account of the discussion that followed suggests that the Secretary-General nevertheless did not back away from fiscal assistance to SoC. Although he said the text would be presented "for discussion [and] ... agreement within the SNC before ... any decision" about its final contents was made, he would go ahead to "make a short appeal" as scheduled.⁹⁸ This approach in fact kept the substance of the draft appeal intact, and by putting it before the SNC left the ultimate decision up to Sihanouk and Akashi.

While thus finessing PDK's opposition to the rehabilitation package, Boutros-Ghali also used his dialogue with Khieu Samphan to back up UNTAC's threats to subject PDK to Security Council censure. Taking what SoC lauded as a "a strong line",⁹⁹ he told PDK that if it wanted to get any benefit out of the Paris Agreements, it would have to cooperate with UNTAC on demobilization. He explained that otherwise, the UN Security Council might "postpone" the UNTAC operation,¹⁰⁰ and thus do nothing at all to undermine SoC. In public, Boutros-Ghali vigorously rejected PDK's criticisms of UNTAC's performance. As SoC media happily reported, he declared that UNTAC was doing "wonderful work".¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ SSM, 17 April 1992.

⁹⁶ VGNUFC, 26 April 1992.

⁹⁷ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 April 1992.

⁹⁸ VGNUFC, 26 April 1992.

⁹⁹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 21 April 1992.

¹⁰⁰ "Notes: Meeting with UNSG, 19 April 1992".

¹⁰¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April 1992.

The SNC Meetings of 20 April

VGNUFC's disappointment was expressed on the morning of 20 April. For the first time since the end of 1991, the radio publicly attributed moves against it to foreign "allies" of SoC within UNTAC. It warned once more that unless things changed, the war could never end.¹⁰² PDK faced further disappointment in the two SNCs held on that day. At the earlier meeting, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, together in Phnom Penh for the first time since November 1991, joined other SNC members in agreeing to Sihanouk's earlier proposal that Cambodia accede to two human rights conventions. This was an occasion for embarrassment of PDK. Boutros-Ghali's remarks at the signing ceremony highlighted the implications for PDK, and SoC exploited the Secretary-General's intervention to its advantage, describing it as a "strongly-worded statement" that "reminded the Khmer Rouge of their past."¹⁰³

The second SNC took place after the Secretary-General had left Cambodia. At a press conference before departing, however, Boutros-Ghali foreshadowed what was going to happen. First, he went ahead and launched an abbreviated rehabilitation appeal that called for assistance to the "supportive institutions" of existing administrative structures, an easily decodable reference to financial aid for SoC. Second, he put PDK on the spot by expressing the expectation that the main impact of his visit would be to convince PDK to begin allowing UNTAC into PDK areas to prepare for NADK entry into Phase Two, that is demobilization.¹⁰⁴

PDK's unpropitious position was confirmed by UNTAC's

¹⁰² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 April 1992.

¹⁰³ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing VoCP and SPK, 21 April 1992.

¹⁰⁴ "Transcript: Press Conference of Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, 10:00 am, 20 April 1992".

agenda for the second SNC. It largely ignored PDK priorities, and to the extent that it covered matters that PDK wanted discussed, it contradicted PDK demands. PDK found itself isolated on almost every item on the agenda and failed in its attempts to impede the immediate adoption of UNTAC proposals. Akashi overrode PDK by exercising his authority under the Paris Agreements to make decisions in the absence of consensus, thus giving further evidence of how unlikely it was that PDK could use the SNC against SoC.

The full version of the Secretary-General's appeal presented to the meeting indeed maintained provisions on budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC to prevent its "disintegration".¹⁰⁵ A report on the situation of refugees from the fighting in Kampong Thom was a reminder of the human cost of NADK activities in the province and called for aid to be distributed to them via SoC.¹⁰⁶ An UNTAC proposal about procedures for investigation of human rights violations was not to PDK's liking because it denied PDK a role in investigations. When Akashi asked for comments,¹⁰⁷ Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SoC approved the procedures. When Khieu Samphan expressed reservations and asked for more time for further consideration, Akashi pre-empted him by making it clear that UNTAC would go ahead and implement the procedures unless PDK came up with valid objections to them. A progress report by Sanderson on the deployment of UNTAC proved to be an opportunity for the Force Commander to keep after PDK about preparations for Phase Two. He insisted that full UNTAC access to NADK areas would be necessary to oversee

¹⁰⁵ "The Secretary-General's Consolidated Appeal for Cambodia's Immediate Needs and Rehabilitation".

¹⁰⁶ "Needs Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons In Kompong Thom Province, 9-10 April 1992".

¹⁰⁷ UNTAC, "Investigation of Human Rights Complaints: Principles for UNTAC Involvement", 20 April 1992.

its demobilization.¹⁰⁸

This was Khieu Samphan's cue to speak from a prepared text to announce the concessions that Boutros-Ghali had pressured PDK to make.¹⁰⁹ He dropped all reference to his own demand of 6 April for the deployment of armed UNTAC forces in eastern Cambodia, and even backed down from Son Sen's 12 April proposal that UNTAC could begin to gain access to NADK areas only as troops deployed in the east.¹¹⁰ Instead, Khieu Samphan outlined a schedule for UNTAC reconnaissance of cantonment sites in PDK territory between 25 and 28 April, which included visits to cantonment sites near Anlung Veng for troops from Sectors 1001 and 1003 and for Sector 505 troops at Kampung Ropov, near the covert PDK headquarters area in southwestern Batdambang. In addition, Khieu Samphan seemed to drop PDK's demand that the SNC and UNTAC go further than the Paris Agreements provided and play an administrative role. Instead, he more vaguely insisted that "the SNC ... and the UNTAC, acting in close cooperation," should be "in charge of putting into practice all the provisions of the Paris Agreements".¹¹¹

Khieu Samphan's sudden softening was confirmed on the morrow of the SNC by VGNUFC. Although the radio warned that if the SoC was allowed to continue "to decide everything at will in Phnom Penh and the provinces," the Paris Agreements were "meaningless", it left open the possibility that PDK might be satisfied if UNTAC neutralized SoC by aggressive implementation of its mandate for direct supervision and

¹⁰⁸ UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 20 April 1992; Carney-SNC, 20 April 1992; "Communique of the SNC Meeting of 20 April 1992".

¹⁰⁹ "Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS a la Réunion du CNS, au Palais Khemarin, le 20 avril 1992".

¹¹⁰ VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.

¹¹¹ VGNUFC, 9 April 1992.

control.¹¹² However, PDK closed this opening the next day in reaction to UNTAC's insistence on inclusion of budgetary support for SoC in the rehabilitation package. Decrying the subversion of UNTAC by "foreign groups" that wanted to "shore up" SoC financially, VGNUFC declared that the SNC and UNTAC were "duty-bound to administer" Cambodia's "internal and external affairs".¹¹³ This new lurch toward a hard position, while signalling continued dissent in the PDK leadership, remained rhetorical hot air in the absence of political support or military punch.

PDK denunciations merely increased UNTAC's determination to out-manoeuvre it on the rehabilitation issue. On 22 April, anticipating that PDK would attempt to use UNTAC's quadripartite technical advisory committee on rehabilitation to obstruct Boutros-Ghali's appeal, UNTAC decided simply to by-pass this forum¹¹⁴ and instead to deal bilaterally with SoC.¹¹⁵ A letter from Khieu Samphan to Akashi on 26 April complaining that the rehabilitation appeal "only help[ed]" SoC and demanding that "all aid must be given to the SNC"¹¹⁶ did not budge UNTAC. Nor did UNTAC change its position when PDK warned that it would not allow elections to take place until its demand that UNTAC and SNC should "run all affairs in Cambodia" was met.¹¹⁷

¹¹² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 April 1992.

¹¹³ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 27 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 22 April 1992.

¹¹⁴ SSM, 22 April 1992.

¹¹⁵ SSM, 24 April and 16 May 1992.

¹¹⁶ VGNUFC, 4 May 1992.

¹¹⁷ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 8 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 27 April 1992.

In the absence of Akashi¹¹⁸, his Iranian deputy Behrooz Sadry, a career UN official, held that UNTAC should not back off from the substance of the rehabilitation appeal already presented to the SNC. In a letter that also rejected PDK's position on elections, Sadry wrote to PDK on 30 April to remind it that no "specific SNC/UNTAC administrative agencies" were "foreseen in the Paris accords", and that neither the SNC nor UNTAC were "administratively equipped to implement" aid projects. Therefore, rehabilitation would be implemented through "the active cooperation of the existing administrative structures" of SoC and the other *parties*.¹¹⁹ Sadry's behaviour closed off another of Pol Pot's fond hopes: that "Third World" UN officials could be counted on to be more sympathetic to PDK than those from big capitalist powers closely allied with the US. Sadry had shown a potential for being just as tenacious with PDK as the Japanese Akashi, and further evidence would soon confirm that PDK could expect no respite from the Iranian.

Meanwhile, Sanderson had flown to Pailin on 24 April to explain to Son Sen that unless access to NADK areas was widened immediately, the imminent rainy season would delay the whole demobilization process for months, leaving CPAF totally intact. Discussing UNTAC deployment to eastern Cambodia, Sanderson told Son Sen that reconnaissance of Vietnam border checkpoints was continuing,¹²⁰ but offered no concessions to PDK's earlier position.

¹¹⁸ Akashi was at this time visiting UN headquarters in New York.

¹¹⁹ Letter from Behrooz Sadry to Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, 30 April 1992.

¹²⁰ SSM, 23 April 1992.

CHAPTER NINE**PDK RESORTS TO CONVENTIONAL AND MILITARIZED PEOPLE'S WAR****Decision 30-4: From Politics and Diplomacy Toward Violence**

As Pol Pot and other top PDK leaders discussed PDK's prospects and options in late April, they had somehow to come to terms with the failure of PDK efforts to displace SoC political authority at the local level and to achieve other goals, political, military and diplomatic. Whatever statistics may have been put forward about the supposed liberation of villages, the reality was that political efforts to overthrow the SoC administration at the local level had borne no fruit. Instead of an outcry reflecting panic about such PDK advances, SoC and UNTAC complaints were focused on NADK's conventional military operations in Kampung Thom. Moreover, the situation on Route 12 had barely changed since the end of the UNAMIC period, and NADK may have suffered a net loss, having failed to recapture the ground retaken from it during the CPAF counter-attacks up the road in late March. The more recent operations in the Steung Sen valley had given NADK control of one or two villages, but there was no indication that NADK momentum could be sustained, and UNTAC had not been scared into doing anything PDK wanted. UNTAC was continuing to pressure PDK on access and for an end to the fighting in Kampung Thom. UNTAC had ignored PDK attempts to get it to go further than the Paris Agreements as regards neutralization of SoC. It had shown that it was prepared to override PDK in the SNC, and it seemed determined to push through budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC. The attempt to use Boutros Boutros-Ghali against UNTAC also had come to naught. Finally, there was no sign that FUNCINPEC and KPRLF were politically closer to PDK than they had been in December 1991 or February 1992.

In their deliberations, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son

Sen and Khieu Samphan reportedly had little difficulty agreeing that UNTAC was being seriously subverted by elements who wanted to use it to strengthen SoC.¹ Khieu Samphan maintained that the experience with Boutros-Ghali's rehabilitation appeal demonstrated that PDK's interests were not receiving "due consideration by UNTAC", regardless of their merits.² Ta Mok underscored the disadvantages of the Paris Agreements. He urged an end to PDK cooperation with UNTAC, apparently arguing that given its "essential reality", allowing UNTAC to oversee demobilization of NADK would be suicidal and leave PDK and its supporters vulnerable to destruction. He advocated intensified NADK military action, claiming this was necessary in order to counter the CPAF attacks. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen argued back that although the Agreements were being undermined as a result of subversion of UNTAC, they still might offer PDK opportunities for political advancement that could be exploited through diplomatic interaction with the UN. They also warned that outright non-cooperation with UNTAC and the Paris Agreements would result in a further breakdown of PDK relations with KPNLF and FUNCINPEC, which would isolate PDK politically and thus leave it more vulnerable to attack. As he had done with the Paris Agreements themselves, Pol Pot then brokered a compromise that combined the main elements of both outlooks. Limited cooperation with initial UNTAC preparations for Phase Two would continue for the time being, while the question of NADK participation in demobilization remained under review, pending a further assessment of the extent to which UNTAC was siding with PDK's enemies. At the same time, Pol Pot backed Ta Mok's demand for an intensification of NADK military action, maintaining his view that such pressure would increase the chances that UNTAC would adopt positions beneficial to PDK. However, in general, NADK was to remain on stand-by

¹ Steve Heder, UNTAC Information/Education Division [UNTAC-IED], "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.

² UNTAC, [no component indicated], "DK's Views on the Peace Process", 17 November 1992, p.1.

pending entry into Phase Two and could still not attack CPAF unless first attacked.³ The discussions and the compromise kept PDK well within the parameters established by the Vietnamese people's-war-through-peace-agreement script, but still, in the face of all the mounting evidence to the contrary, reflected Pol Pot's insistence that his revolutionary movement was fundamentally more popular than that of the Vietnamese had ever been.

The results of the meeting were codified in a "Decision 30-4".⁴ It implicitly recognized that PDK was failing in its political and diplomatic efforts to wrest significant new advantages from the implementation of the Paris Agreements. It inadvertently admitted not only that in the absence of more sustained and widespread purely military action by NADK, PDK was unable to make advances in the countryside, but also that PDK might have to fall back on military means merely to sustain its position.

The new line combined resumption of full-fledged conventional warfare in north-central Cambodia with militarization of people's war everywhere. Decision 30-4 thus declared that "in order to promote to the maximum extent possible" the "good implementation" of the Paris Agreements, it was "imperative to conduct storming attacks on three major battlefields". Kampung Thom became "Battlefield Number One", and the decision added - no doubt to Ta Mok's delight - that it was "to be expanded to the east and the north", into the adjacent provinces of Preah Vihear and Kampung Cham. These operations were now to be PDK's *de facto* main priority. The

³ "PDK Leadership and Policy"; Nate Thayer, "Shake-Up in KR Hierarchy", *Phnom Penh Post*, 28 January-10 February 1994.

⁴ The contemporary text of Decision 30-4 is not available to the author. The following reconstruction of its contents is based on the references to it in a later document obtained by Nayan Chanda and translated by the author: "Learning, Supervising and Re-fashioning in Accordance with the Seven Precepts and Eight Precepts, Altogether Making 15 Precepts", dated 6 July 1992.

objective was evidently to seize district towns in order to neutralize significant numbers of enemy troops, to back up PDK's renewed demands for a share in the national political administration and maybe to materialize some provincial National Councils.

A lower priority was assigned to "Battlefield Number Two": the rural areas "of the country as a whole". The objective here was to try again to conduct "storming attacks ... to remove, eliminate, disperse and dissolve the political administration belonging to the contemptible puppets ... in the villages and sub-districts". In particular, efforts were to be made "starting in May to do so in 30 to 40 villages per month on active battlefields, 20 to 30 villages in medium battlefields, and four to five villages on weak battlefields." This suggested an impossible target of bringing about a change in the administration of something like 20 villages per day nation-wide.⁵

Despite their implausibility, these optimistic statistics still pointed to the failure so far of the PDK political campaign at the village and sub-district level. In early February Pol Pot had called on PDK to use the methods outlined in December to displace SoC administrative influence at a rate of 35 to 50 villages per day. The data suggests that the number of SoC-administered villages "liberated" between Pol Pot's February speech and the end of April had fallen far short of what he had demanded be achieved in a single day. Decision 30-4 was, very distantly, conceding this catastrophic fact by halving the quota and by the means it advocated for achieving this reduced target. It called for an intensification of resort to murderous violence and a further militarization of PDK's people's war to overthrow SoC from

⁵ This calculation is based on the presumption that, as in earlier periods, each NADK division and independent regiment was responsible for one "battlefield", and that the resulting 27 battlefields were more or less equally divided among those categorized as strong, medium and weak.

below. It specified that in order to liberate villages, NADK cadre on each battlefield should aim at "removing, eliminating or dispersing an average of ten to 20 agents of village and sub-district political administrations per month." This authorized a full return to the practice of kidnapping and killing local SoC officials. It suggested that 400 local SoC officials should be seized or executed every month.⁶ Moreover, PDK's goals were also to be achieved by "joining guerilla attacks with the political and armed strength of the people". These not only authorized the use of armed guerillas, but seemed to call for arming PDK sympathizers - its "guerilla nuclei" - so that they could cooperate with NADK in overthrowing SoC from below.

The lowest priority - "Battlefield Number Three" - was now assigned to the diplomatic and political contest in Phnom Penh. The bottom rank assigned to it was an indication of the extent to which PDK was increasingly unlikely in reality to pay great attention to it. PDK would still try to win support there for dismantling of SoC by trying to "gathering in upper [class] strata forces" like Sihanouk and members of KPRLF and FUNCINPEC, but this was now a defensive effort to prevent SoC from further "seizing" such forces politically. The only other serious combat in Phnom Penh was "at the negotiating table and over the contents of the ... Paris Agreements." On this diplomatic front, PDK must continue to probe in hopes of finding some sympathetic UN officials who might help it "isolate" PDK's "diehard enemies" in UNTAC and eventually get UNTAC to agree that the SNC must "function as the unique source of authority in Cambodia".

Decision 30-4 combined this pipe-dreaming with a further recognition of problems: scapegoating those who had supposedly sabotaged people's war from within. Taking a step further down the road toward a return to Pol Pot's destruction of his

⁶ This figure is based on an average of 15 such actions on each of 27 battlefields.

own Communist Party apparatus in 1975-78, the decision called for punishment of those responsible for the failure of the implementation of people's war to live up to his expectations. It followed up earlier expressions of concern about the quality of some PDK cadre with calls for the replacement of those leaders who had not been performing well. It indicated that this would have to be done if they failed to maintain "their status as persons who regularly struggle and fight" or to maintain "their status in terms of constant storming attack". The decision implied that if there continued to be serious failures as regard their "work attitudes", it would be necessary "to fashion new leadership teams to maintain the initiative" and do so "in a timely manner".

Implementing Decision 30-4 on the Kampung Thom Battlefield

The impact of Decision 30-4 was very soon felt in Kampung Thom. However, an NADK offensive there only served to confirm that without a political base, purely military action could not fundamentally improve PDK's position. Not only was little achieved, but what was achieved could be lost to CPAF counter-attacks.

On 4 May, Divisions 616 and 802 launched province-wide actions that targeted villages, subdistrict seats and district seats in a way that clearly went beyond the needs of establishing safe infiltration corridors, even if some of the attacks also took place in areas where this effect could also be achieved.⁷ Amidst shelling of district and subdistrict towns throughout the province, the units seized three villages. However, despite concentrating ground forces of up to battalion strength and continued heavy fire support, attacks on ten more villages between 5 and 7 May failed, and

⁷ Author's notes on briefing by UNTAC military observers, Kampung Thom, 10 May 1992.

villagers did not rise up to support PDK but fled NADK.⁸

After four days of provocation, CPAF launched a counter-offensive on 8 May during which it recaptured the three villages Division 802 had seized on 4 May, the only targets NADK had been able to hold. This undid most of the gains NADK had made in the Steung Sen valley and demonstrated that SoC had the capacity to regain the initiative in the area.⁹

Criticising the Rehabilitation Appeal: Akashi as "Bad Element"

The NADK offensive was accompanied by a drumbeat of new diplomatic assaults via VGNUFC, which combined criticism of the rehabilitation draft appeal with increasingly serious public condemnation of UNTAC and insinuations that Akashi and other senior UNTAC officials were guilty of bad faith. The solution, the radio insisted, was to strengthen the SNC along the lines advocated by PDK. The alternative was an ever widening war. On 3 May, VGNUFC echoed Decision 30-4 by supplementing PDK's March "slogans" with proclamations that there should be "no other state authority" in Cambodia except the SNC, and that "all kinds of economic assistance should ... go through the SNC and not through the Phnom Penh side." Referring to Akashi and others in UNTAC who had shown themselves as supportive of the draft rehabilitation appeal, the radio said darkly that "some bad elements" wanted SoC "to administer the country." It warned that unless something was

⁸ For SoC reports and UNTAC confirmations, see VoCP, 8 and 18 May 1992; SPK, 15 and 20 May 1992; SSM, 6 May 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Seventeenth Meeting, Saturday 09 May 1992 UNTAC Headquarters" and "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters".

⁹ Briefing by UNTAC military observers, Kampung Thom, 10 May 1992; Carney's and the author's notes on the MMWG in Kampung Thom on 10 May 1992; UNTAC-MC, "Situation Report" [hereafter: MilsitRep], 9 May 1992.

done to prevent this, the "war will continue."¹⁰

On 5 May, PDK reiterated its position in a meeting during which UNTAC presented a slightly revised version of the Secretary-General's appeal that changed some language but kept the substance intact.¹¹ In reply, VGNUFC excoriated both Sihanouk and senior UNTAC officials as "bad elements who want to ... upgrade the role of the regime installed at gunpoint by the Vietnamese."¹²

The SNC of 7 May: Cornering PDK on Rehabilitation

UNTAC was ignoring all this invective. At UN headquarters in New York, Akashi had already on 4 May expressed hope that it would soon be possible to finalize recommendations by international financial institutions "on how to cope with over-expenditures and lack of revenues in the Phnom Penh administration".¹³ On the military front, Sanderson used an MMWG on 2 May to inform NADK that until its forces began entering cantonments under UNTAC supervision, UNTAC would "not expect" CPAF to demobilize; and that because of NADK's obstructionism, UNTAC could not meet the original target date of 1 June for the commencement of Phase Two.¹⁴ This made it clear to PDK that CPAF was being left in a position to counter NADK militarily.

For his part, deputy SRSG Sadry used the SNC of 7 May to corner PDK on rehabilitation. Taking advantage of the support of Sihanouk and the backing of both FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF on

¹⁰ VGNUFC, 2 May 1992.

¹¹ VGNUFC, 7 May 1992.

¹² VGNUFC, 5 May 1992.

¹³ UN Secretariat, "Press Briefing by Special Representative for Cambodia", 4 May 1992.

¹⁴ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Sixteenth Meeting, Saturday 02 May 1992 UNTAC Headquarters".

this issue, he demonstrated that when faced with PDK obstructionism, he was just as prepared as Akashi to use procedural gambits to override it. Sadry stressed that a consensus must be urgently achieved on the "outline" of the Secretary-General's appeal so that approaches to potential donors could be made before the Tokyo conference scheduled for June. Asserting that the very discussion by the SNC of the rehabilitation programme was evidence of the SNC "control" of such matters that PDK wanted, Sadry called upon the SNC as a whole to "agree unanimously to presentation of the appeal to donor countries and to the Tokyo Conference". Khieu Samphan responded that everything should be discussed further, but Sadry said more talk was "not timely", and Khieu Samphan did not challenge Sadry's comment.¹⁵ On this flimsy basis, UNTAC drafted a communique in the name of the SNC that read: "Mr Sadry invited the SNC to agree that the appeal for the rehabilitation programme ... would go forward. It was so decided." This formulation was passed on to Sihanouk, who approved it.¹⁶ Khieu Samphan immediately sent a message to the Prince to object to the appeal, to UNTAC's "improper" tactics during the meeting and to the public announcement that the SNC had adopted the rehabilitation programme,¹⁷ but the deed had been done in a way that could only undermine hopes of finding PDK sympathizers in UNTAC.

The MMWG of 9 May: Cornering PDK on Phase Two

A further sign that such hopes were a chimera was Sadry's use of the SNC to call upon PDK to comply with all the conditions necessary for participation in demobilisation.

¹⁵ Carney-SNC, 7 May 1992; and UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 7 May 1992.

¹⁶ "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 7 May 1992". The author's copy of this document includes Sihanouk's handwritten notation "vu et approuvé".

¹⁷ VGNUFC, 9 May 1992; SSM, 9 May 1992.

Khieu Samphan's refusal to offer concessions¹⁸ was coupled with VGNUFC insinuations in advance of an MMWG scheduled for 9 May to follow up the SNC that Sanderson was manoeuvring to sabotage the Paris Agreements. The radio demanded that UNTAC "monitoring forces ... be completely deployed ... along the eastern border" by the end of May, and said that otherwise NADK would not begin cooperating with UNTAC on demobilization.¹⁹

For his part, Sanderson came to the 9 May MMWG determined to get NADK to recommit itself to a cease-fire in Kampung Thom and elsewhere and to allowing UNTAC access to PDK zones throughout the country. In return he offered to go ahead with setting a date for Phase Two and to establish more checkpoints in eastern Cambodia, but continued to insist that UNTAC itself would decide where UNTAC troops would be sent and for what purpose. He warned PDK that unless NADK proceeded with Phase Two, it could not expect UNTAC to establish the "neutral political environment" necessary "for ... free and fair elections".

Sanderson's tactic to obtain NADK commitments was to present the meeting with a text of an announcement on behalf of UNTAC, NADK, CPAF, ANKI and KPRLF to be made public immediately after the MMWG. The text condemned NADK attacks in Kampung Thom and said NADK had given specific assurances that it would prevent cease-fire violations and give complete "freedom of movement for UNTAC" throughout PDK zones to oversee demobilization of NADK. It announced that Phase Two would begin on 13 June. It said nothing about Vietnam border checkpoints, although in presenting the text, Sanderson said UNTAC was "striving" to establish more, manned by unarmed military observers, on a "priority" basis. PDK diplomat Tep

¹⁸ Carney-SNC, 7 May 1992; UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 7 May 1992; "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 7 May 1992".

¹⁹ VGNUFC, 7 and 8 May 1992.

Khunnal, a rising young protégé of Pol Pot,²⁰ who had replaced Son Sen's brother Son Chhum as Nuon Bunnau's "adviser", promised that if the process of checkpoint establishment was completed by the end of May, NADK would implement "a formal cease-fire" in Kampong Thom "commencing on 2 June". After Sanderson revealed UNTAC was planning to have three more checkpoints in place by the middle of May, Tep Khunnal said that PDK was prepared to accept Sanderson's text "in principle" if UNTAC established these plus an eleventh that PDK wanted at the Sra Ambel road junction in Kah Kong province. However, he explained, PDK still wanted UNTAC armed forces deployed in addition to military observers.

Sanderson replied that UNTAC would not and could not accept such demands. He then proceeded to press for NADK acceptance of conditions for announcing that Phase Two would begin on 13 June. These included the NADK assurances that Sanderson had included in his prepared text, and despite his earlier demands, Tep Khunnal said "yes" when asked to confirm each one.²¹

Recommitting Son Sen and NADK in Kampong Thom

Sanderson moved quickly after the MMWG to try to solidify the concessions he had extracted from Tep Khunnal by writing for confirmation to a Son Sen who had been shorn of his troops but still enjoyed the opportunity to correspond. Son Sen telegraphed back to affirm that Tep Khunnal's commitments, which Son Sen may have genuinely felt were justifiable diplomatic tactics, were "the position of the NADK".²²

²⁰ This characterization of Khunnal is based on a series of conversations between the author and Nate Thayer, who repeatedly interviewed Khunnal between 1992 and 1998 and observed the relationship between him and Pol Pot in July and October 1997.

²¹ "MMWG Level One Seventeenth Meeting ...".

²² UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Eighteenth Meeting, Saturday, 23 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters".

However, this was the last time Son Sen would speak on PDK's behalf, and UNTAC realized his telegram might not count for much when Sanderson flew to Kampong Thom on 10 May to try to get further reconfirmation directly from NADK in the province and the immediate reestablishment of a cease-fire there.

Although CPAF's 8 May counter-attacks had driven NADK out of the villages it had captured in Kampong Thom and apparently blunted the unit's ground offensive,²³ NADK was allegedly continuing to launch artillery attacks on district towns in Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces.²⁴ At the MMWG in Kampong Thom, Sanderson declared to Sector 1003 Division 616 liaison officer Chou Chin that NADK had agreed to a truce and free UNTAC access throughout Cambodia. To this Chou Chin replied that he could not promise to comply until Sanderson's assertions were confirmed by the NADK High Command. The CPAF representative then protested that although CPAF had earlier reduced its forces in Kampong Thom, NADK artillery harassment had continued. He said that fighting would not stop unless NADK desisted from further military activity; withdrew its troops from Route 12 and villages along it; and allowed UNTAC to establish "control" of the road. He warned that if NADK seized more villages, CPAF would "again ... counter-attack to retake them".²⁵

Back in Phnom Penh, Tep Khunnal tried to forestall such CPAF moves by calling for SoC adherence to Loridon's original formula for a Kampong Thom cease-fire,²⁶ while in Kampong Thom NADK stood down militarily, perhaps because division cadre

²³ Carney's and the author's notes on the MMWG in Kampong Thom on 10 May 1992; MilSitRep, 9 May 1992.

²⁴ SPK, 20 May 1992.

²⁵ Notes on the MMWG in Kampong Thom on 10 May 1992.

²⁶ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 May 1992, 28 May 1992, citing VoCP, 25 May 1992.

there gave Sanderson's assertions the benefit of the doubt as they sought clarification from the High Command. SoC reported only one NADK ground attack in the province, which UNTAC could not confirm, before the next MMWG in Phnom Penh on 23 May. CPAF, however, took advantage of this to seize the military initiative. It captured two villages on and demined parts of Route 12, "without encountering NADK resistance".²⁷

More Rebukes for PDK, the Powers of the SNC and New Threats of NADK Military Action

VGNUFC meanwhile relaunched PDK's demands about border checkpoints, specifying that PDK wanted UNTAC forces already in the country redeployed to put "infantry troops at each" post.²⁸ On 11 May, VGNUFC demanded that one-third of the some 4,000 UNTAC troops that had arrived in Cambodia should be "immediately deployed" to its eastern border.²⁹ However, that day, acting SRSG Sadry and Sihanouk made public statements to the effect that PDK would not be allowed to dictate UNTAC troop movements.³⁰ VGNUFC responded by implying the Cambodian people were "furious" with Sihanouk and UNTAC.³¹ PDK's ire was further inflamed by Sihanouk's hammering of PDK for trying to obstruct the rehabilitation of Cambodia via SoC and by the Prince's renewed heavy hints that people should vote for the CPP in the future elections.³²

In the face of what they clearly perceived as

²⁷ MilSitRep, 16, 18 and 21 May 1992.

²⁸ VGNUFC, 9 May 1992.

²⁹ VGNUFC, 10 May 1992.

³⁰ "UNTAC Deputy Chief Says No SRV Troops Found So Far", AFP, Phnom Penh, 11 May 1992; VoCP, 11 May 1992.

³¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 24 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 May 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 May 1992.

³² VoCP, 11 May 1992.

provocations, those PDK leaders in favour of the most militant, optimistic and unrealistic reading of the people's war script escalated PDK political demands while upping threats of NADK military action. While on the one hand demanding that UNTAC dismantle SoC completely, even though there was no sign UNTAC was at all likely to do so, PDK warned of a politico-military conflagration if these demands were not met, even though there was no evidence of a PDK capacity to conjure up such a maelstrom.

Immediately after the SNC chaired by Sadry, VGNUFC had set the end of May as the deadline for UNTAC and the SNC to begin consultations about running "all administrative services" in Cambodia.³³ The radio then began declaring that the only way to prevent war "in Cambodia, both in Kampung Thom and nationwide," was to have "the SNC and UNTAC ... administer ... all ... matters nationwide until the election."³⁴ The threat of war was given a new edge when VGNUFC began stressing the legitimacy and necessity of NADK self-defense action in broadcasts that contradicted the reassurances contained in Son Sen's confirmation of Tep Khunnal's pledges at the 9 May MMWG. One warned that if SoC was "allowed to further control state affairs", the Cambodian people were not about to "remain idle to be massacred at will".³⁵

On 14 May, a letter to UNTAC from Khieu Samphan put forward additional demands that went beyond calling for the SNC and UNTAC to play an administrative role to insisting that UNTAC's mandate for direct supervision and control of SoC be displaced by a formula according to which PDK would be given a significant supervisory role vis-à-vis a rump SoC authority structure. This was the logical extension of PDK's conclusion

³³ VGNUFC, 7 May 1992.

³⁴ VGNUFC, 8 May 1992.

³⁵ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 14 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 11 and 12 May 1992.

that UNTAC was too subverted by the alliance to be of much use to it: if there was to be any "neutralization" of SoC from above, PDK would have to be deeply involved in control SoC itself. Khieu Samphan thus said it was necessary that PDK representatives "take part . . . in the supervision of every matter relating to the civilian administration" mentioned in the Paris Agreements.³⁶ Finally, in a VGNUFC broadcast on 15 May that greeted Akashi upon his return to Cambodia from New York, PDK signalled that pre-conditionality was being applied across the board. PDK would demobilize NADK only if UNTAC deployed infantry along Cambodia's eastern border and only after SNC-UNTAC "joint control" had been imposed on SoC in such a way that SoC's "existing old or new personnel" would function as "only the technical machine at offices that should come under the control and administration of the SNC and UNTAC."³⁷ The next day it explained this meant that SoC's "so-called ministers and prime minister" should no longer be in "charge or in control" of its administrative structures. Instead, UNTAC and the SNC should "run ministries, services, and other administrative organs and decide by a consensus of UNTAC and the SNC" what should be done.³⁸

Sihanouk immediately rejected any suggestion that SoC leaders should be neutralized,³⁹ and continued to tour the provinces with senior CPP officials, calling on all Cambodians to join hands with them to rehabilitate Cambodian economically.⁴⁰

³⁶ VGNUFC, 16 May 1992.

³⁷ VGNUFC, 14 May 1992.

³⁸ VGNUFC, 15 May 1992.

³⁹ VoCP, 17 May 1992.

⁴⁰ VoCP, 20 and 21 May 1992; SPK, 21 May 1992; see also UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 May 1992, 28 May 1992.

New NADK Activities: Outside Kampung Thom

VGNFUC's suggestions that NADK should not "remain idle" were immediately followed by a serious clash between Division 320 of Front 250 and CPAF forces in Bavel district of Batdambang province.⁴¹ On 24 May, VGNUFC warned that the fighting in Bavel could escalate to the level already reached in Kampung Thom.⁴² Meanwhile, NADK in Sectors 1003 and 1001 were becoming more active in provinces north and east of Kampung Thom⁴³ by, among other things, stepping up exterminations of SoC officials.⁴⁴

Both Sihanouk and UNTAC responded with denunciations of NADK violence.⁴⁵ Loridon used MMWGs in Phnom Penh on 14 and 16 May to raise CPAF grievances about NADK attacks, describing them as "most serious, unacceptable violations" of the Paris Agreements.⁴⁶ UNTAC also responded by working out plans for deployment of military observers to the CPAF headquarters at Sala Visai (Sala Vichey) on Route 12 and to the district seat of Kulæn in Preah Vihear.⁴⁷ The plans for Sala Visai were part of an effort to stabilize the situation on Route 12, while those for Kulæn reflected UNTAC's assessment that if NADK were to widen its military efforts, this part of Preah

⁴¹ MilSitRep, 13, 14 and 15 May 1992; SPK, 20 May 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"; SSM, 18 May 1992; Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Demobilization of NADK Division 450 and Other Information on the NADK", 9 June 1992.

⁴² VGNUFC, 23 May 1992.

⁴³ MilSitRep, 14, 15 and 16 May 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 May 1992, 28 May 1992, citing VoCP, 23 May 1992.

⁴⁴ SPK, 21 May 1992.

⁴⁵ VoCP, 17 May 1992.

⁴⁶ UNTAC-MC, "Report on MMWG Level II, 14 May 1992".

⁴⁷ MilSitRep, 11, 12 and 13 May 1992.

Vihear would be a likely target. UNTAC infantry was in place at Sala Visai by 18 May,⁴⁸ and its first military observers were in Kulæn by 19 May.⁴⁹

Impasse

Upon his return to Cambodia, Akashi met with Sihanouk and then with Khieu Samphan to discuss rehabilitation and "military matters."⁵⁰ On the morning of the meeting, VGNUFC launched its most direct attack yet on UNTAC's leadership, warning that "the Cambodian nation and people" could "never agree" to its "foul play" aimed at "eliminating" PDK.⁵¹ Akashi used the meeting to present a list of complaints about NADK violations of the Paris Agreements in Kampung Thom, Kampung Cham and elsewhere.⁵² Khieu Samphan simply refused to talk about any of these points.⁵³ Akashi also reiterated that PDK concerns about rehabilitation could only be taken care of by imposition of UNTAC control over SoC finances, as envisaged in the Paris Agreements.⁵⁴ Khieu Samphan responded by dwelling on PDK's opposition to budgetary support for SoC in whatever form, and the need for the SNC to take on a more governmental role, but Akashi replied that PDK representation in technical advisory committees provided it with sufficient input to fulfil the requirements of the Paris Agreements.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ MilSitRep, 18 May 1992.

⁴⁹ MilSitRep, 19 May 1992.

⁵⁰ SSM, 15 May 1992.

⁵¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 May 1992.

⁵² UNTAC-MC, "Areas of Concern with NADK, 20 May 1992", p.1.

⁵³ MilSitRep, 20 May, 23 May 1992.

⁵⁴ SSM, 20 May 1992.

⁵⁵ SSM, 21 and 22 May 1992.

Four days later, VGNUFC made its first broadcast threatening UNTAC personnel. It called on the Cambodian people to "decimate the criminal, foul plays" of those it accused of being "accomplices" of its enemies.⁵⁶ NADK was also making propaganda attacks on UNTAC. An NADK High Command "note" dated 15 May criticized Sanderson for not saying "anything about the deployment of UNTAC forces ... along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border".⁵⁷ A week later, an NADK High Command "press communique" excoriated Sihanouk and the UNTAC leadership as "ill-intentioned ... partisans" of its enemies, and proclaimed that NADK would "never agree" to do what they wanted, "no matter what".⁵⁸

Confirmation of the impasse came at an MMWG on 23 May. Sanderson opened by complaining to Nuon Bunnau that despite Tep Khunnal's commitments on 9 May and Son Sen's subsequent assurances, NADK was responsible for "further cease-fire violations". Nuon Bunnau tried his best to turn the meeting toward discussion of PDK's demand that UNTAC "deploy all the way on the eastern border".⁵⁹ Sanderson responded that UNTAC had "concluded the positioning of the checkpoints on the border", and that it simply would "not accept any conditions placed on [it] ... by the NADK".⁶⁰

VGNUFC's broadcast greeting the 26 May SNC thus fumed that the "actual deeds" of "the allies" inside UNTAC "at the negotiation table" had now "clearly proved" that they were "definitely not implement[ing]" the Paris Agreements. The radio declared that PDK must therefore "heighten ... its

⁵⁶ VGNUFC, 23 May 1992. Emphasis added.

⁵⁷ VGNUFC, 15 May 1992.

⁵⁸ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 21 May 1992.

⁵⁹ "MMWG Level One Eighteenth Meeting ...".

⁶⁰ MilSitRep, 25 May, 25 May 1992.

vigilance" to "check all" their "tricks and schemes".⁶¹ Akashi and Sihanouk were indeed ready with tactics to use against anticipated PDK stonewalling and to ensure PDK isolation in the SNC. Akashi had already decided to ensure that PDK suffered maximum public embarrassment if it remained obstructionist on demobilization.⁶² After reading a letter from Boutros-Ghali reminding PDK of earlier Security Council calls on it to comply fully with the Paris Agreements, Akashi took PDK to task for having failed to take the steps necessary for NADK to demobilize.⁶³ He demanded that it join the other three armies in taking these steps.⁶⁴ He said that if PDK did not begin doing so within a few days, he would "have no choice but to ask the Secretary-General to convene the Security Council to review the whole question." Sihanouk, fulfilling promises made to Akashi in their discussions before the SNC, voiced his full support for the UNTAC position.⁶⁵

Warning that this SNC gathering was of "particular importance", Khieu Samphan answered with a prepared statement that restated the hard line of pre-conditionality PDK had adopted since 14 May.⁶⁶ He came up against an equally solid wall of rejection. In particular, Akashi was determined to deflect PDK political demands by pushing forward implementation of UNTAC's plans for the kind of modest supervision and control of SoC that had been agreed between

⁶¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 25 May 1992.

⁶² SSM, 22 May 1992.

⁶³ "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 26 May 1992".

⁶⁴ "Statement by Mr Akashi at the SNC Meeting, 26 May 1992".

⁶⁵ Author's notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.

⁶⁶ "Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS du Cambodge, Président de la partie Kampuchea Démocratique à la réunion du CNS du 26 Mai 1992, Palais Khémarin".

UNTAC and Boutros-Ghali back in April.⁶⁷ To facilitate this, Sihanouk emphasized that Akashi was entitled to "the last word" in the absence of SNC consensus, and that he wanted the SRSG to exercise this power in order to avoid delay in implementation of the Paris Agreements. Akashi proclaimed his readiness to use this authority whenever necessary. Although armed with a militant stance, Khieu Samphan was rendered flatfooted when confronted with specifics about which he had no clear instructions from the covert PDK leadership, but managed to remark PDK would consider Akashi's exercise of the SRSG's powers appropriate only if he acted "in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Agreements".⁶⁸

This pathetic performance set the scene for SNC discussion of UNTAC proposals regarding its mandate for control and supervision of existing administrative structures. The contents of the proposals and the way in which PDK was consulted about them only served to highlight UNTAC's refusal to give in to the substance of PDK demands and seems to have intensified PDK's anger that UNTAC was impervious to its influence. Akashi's presentation dealt with the extension of UNTAC supervision or control to administrative bodies that "could directly influence the outcome of elections".⁶⁹ It gave no hint of any concession to PDK demands for more direct PDK involvement in UNTAC's control or supervision work or to any of PDK's various calls for the de facto dismantling of SoC. Sihanouk and SoC spoke in favour of the presentation. When Khieu Samphan asked for "time to study the document before responding", Akashi ruled that it was "adopted with the proviso that Khieu Samphan may reflect upon it". When Khieu Samphan reiterated his "desire to have time for examination", Sihanouk cut him off to proclaim "I'm sure the Cambodian

⁶⁷ *Ordre du jour de la réunion du CNS du 26 mai 1992.*

⁶⁸ Notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.

⁶⁹ "Note du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général au Conseil National Suprême (CNS)", 20 May 1992.

people will welcome all decisions Yasushi Akashi makes."⁷⁰ Akashi then declared the UNTAC proposals adopted *ad referendum*.⁷¹ This prompted Khieu Samphan to criticize him for acting improperly.⁷² The public communique of the SNC nevertheless went ahead to state that Akashi's recommendations had been "generally accepted".⁷³

NADK Resumes the Offensive in Kampong Thom and Expands the Battlefield North, East and West

The MMWG scheduled to follow the SNC was used by Sanderson to remind NADK of Akashi's warning that if UNTAC's requirements regarding preparations for demobilization were not quickly met, the matter would be taken to the Security Council, and to reiterate that PDK had no right to set pre-conditions about UNTAC troop deployments. Tep Khunnal replied that he would be leaving Phnom Penh on 29 May to attend a meeting in Pailin at which the PDK political leadership and NADK "field commanders" would make a "major decision" about what PDK should do next.⁷⁴

NADK actions, of course, had already signalled the direction PDK was taking. By 23 May, the confusion resulting from Son Sen's telegram and Sanderson's presentation of it to division cadre in Kampong Thom had been cleared up. On that day, NADK resumed ground attacks in Kampong Thom by sending

⁷⁰ Notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.

⁷¹ Memo from Yasushi Akashi, SRSGC, to Mr Marrack Goulding, USGPKO, "Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 26 May 1992".

⁷² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 1 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 27 May 1992.

⁷³ "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 26 May 1992".

⁷⁴ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Nineteenth Meeting, Tuesday, 26 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters".

troops against a village on Route 12.⁷⁵ On 28 May, NADK operations expanded into "a multiple violation of the cease-fire ... north of Kampung Thom, with attacks by artillery, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms," resulting in two civilian casualties.⁷⁶ NADK also fired on SoC-administered villages in Kampung Cham,⁷⁷ and NADK activities in Siem Reap took on a new quality, going beyond previous efforts to maintain logistics lines and suggesting that an order had been given to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield to the west as well as the north and the east. On 29 and 30 May, NADK 980 shelled the district seat of Svay Loe and launched several ground attacks on CPAF positions in Angkor Chum district.⁷⁸

But the most dramatic NADK offensive action was launched in Kulen district of Preah Vihear on 28 May. Reportedly acting under direct instructions from Ta Mok, NADK attacked three CPAF battalion positions in villages west and south of Kulen district seat. By 30 May all three positions had been abandoned after the CPAF units in them disintegrated, and many of the inhabitants of the villages had fled. The district seat itself then came under artillery fire. On 31 May, after the UNTAC military observer team in the town managed to contact the NADK gunnery commanders and demand a halt to the shelling, there was a lull when they consented. However, they warned they would resume firing if so commanded by their headquarters. They soon did so more intensely, such that shells were falling at a rate of one per minute. Meanwhile, NADK mined approaches to the town and concentrated infantry in two places in apparent preparation for a ground assault to

⁷⁵ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:25-28 May 1992, 30 May 1992, citing VoCP, 27 May 1992; MilSitRep, 25 May 1992.

⁷⁶ MilSitRep, 28 May 1992.

⁷⁷ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 June 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2 - 1 June 1992".

⁷⁸ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 June 1992.

seize or at least enter the town, as NADK had done twice in early 1991.⁷⁹

NADK shelling of Kulæn district seat was an apparent demonstration of PDK readiness to move beyond threatening words aimed at deterring UNTAC encroachments on PDK areas to violent action that genuinely put the lives of UNTAC personnel at risk. NADK may well have expected to be able thus to drive UNTAC out of Kulæn and thereby clear the way for its capture. Indeed, after NADK artillery fire escalated on 31 May, the UNTAC observer team withdrew, but when Sanderson learned of this, he ordered it immediately to return, which it did on 1 June in the midst of continued shelling.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, UNTAC was also moving to set up mobile military investigation teams, as envisaged in Boutros-Ghali's implementation plan, to look into violations of the military provisions of the Paris Agreements.⁸¹ By 29 May, UNTAC had formed two such "strategic investigation teams" each comprised of several military observers.⁸² Its announcement that they were becoming operational indicated that their primary function was to investigate NADK attacks⁸³ like the NADK offensive in north-central Cambodia.

The direction in which UNTAC was moving was put starkly at an MMWG chaired by Loridon in Phnom Penh on 30 May. He

⁷⁹ MilSitRep, 1, 2, 3 June 1992; SSM, 1 June 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May- 4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 June 1992; UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Trip to Tbeng Meanchey-Phum Kulæn, 8 June 1992".

⁸⁰ MilSitRep, 1 June 1992; "Report on a Trip to Tbeng Meanchey ...".

⁸¹ *Agreements*, Annex 2, Article VI, paragraphs 2,3 and Article X, paragraphs 1,2.

⁸² MilSitRep, 29 May and 2 June 1992.

⁸³ UNTAC, "Press Release: Mr Akashi Visits Border Checkpoints, Faction Headquarters; UNTAC Establishes Mobile Investigation Teams", 29 May 1992.

said that forces remaining "outside the ... cantonment process contrary to the Paris Agreements" could also be considered "outside the protection of the Paris Agreements and ... the law". He explained they might thus be "subject to law enforcement action by police forces under UNTAC control and supervision", and that where the strength required to deal with such forces exceeded "the capacity of police forces, UNTAC might be called on to assist and has measures at its disposal under the UN Charter". This put PDK on warning that if it did not demobilize, it might become fair game for joint SoC-UN armed police action against it.⁸⁴

However, at emergency MMWGs convened by Sanderson on 31 May and 1 June, NADK representatives Mon Keum Thon and Nuon Bunnau would not entertain the Force Commander's demand for a halt to fighting in Preah Vihear. Sanderson denounced this as "unacceptable" and said that UNTAC was reporting the NADK attack to Boutros-Ghali with a view to having it discussed by the Security Council.⁸⁵ Sanderson also decided UNTAC should not only remain in place in Kulæn, but be reinforced there as part of an overall policy that available UNTAC armed forces must, as he put it, "not move away from wherever there is trouble", but be "persistent" and "move in strength to establish [a] presence in order to prevent cease-fire violations". He ordered one of UNTAC's two mobile investigation teams into the district and that plans be quickly drawn up to station a company of Pakistani infantry there.⁸⁶ He also directed that other UNTAC armed detachments that were beginning to deploy in Kampung Thom, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap should respond to NADK initiatives by spreading out as much as possible throughout the countryside in these

⁸⁴ UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level Two, Saturday, 30 May 1992, Agenda"; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 June 1992; MilSitRep, 30 May 1992.

⁸⁵ SSM, 1 June 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2, 1 June 1992"; MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.

⁸⁶ MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.

provinces.⁸⁷ By 11 June, UNTAC troops were in location throughout non-NADK areas of Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham.⁸⁸ It thus became clear that UNTAC's priority was to use its armed forces to deter NADK attacks and not to provide protection for the cadre PDK had hoped to place in SoC-administered areas in eastern Cambodia.

The widening NADK offensive was accompanied by an escalating VGNUFC rhetorical war that intensified as UNTAC resisted NADK pressure. Radio calls on NADK to be prepared for more fighting and other actions to weaken SoC that were, whatever PDK tried to say or wanted to believe, outside the terms of the Paris Agreements and hardly indicative of mass support,⁸⁹ were followed by rising hostility against Akashi and Sanderson. It insinuated that the "Chief of UNTAC and the UNTAC Military Representative" had "arduously sought by every means to get rid of the PDK".⁹⁰ Another broadcast characterized Akashi and Sanderson as "unjust and biased".⁹¹ On 31 May came VGNUFC's most menacing denunciation of UNTAC itself to date. It declared that during "recent negotiations," Akashi and Sanderson had "used their rights and power beyond the framework of the Paris Agreements." They "did not pay any attention to the opinion of" PDK. Instead, "they decided upon all problems arbitrarily, thus clearly showing their stance as the advocates" of SoC. They were applying "pressures of threats morally and with brute force" in a manner similar to that of a "foreign aggressor", and their "work procedures" were "of colonialist nature." This

⁸⁷ SSM, 3 June 1992.

⁸⁸ MilSitRep, 11 June 1992.

⁸⁹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 1 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 26 May 1992; and UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 3 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 28 and 29 May 1992.

⁹⁰ VGNUFC, 29 May 1992.

⁹¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 3 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 29 May 1992.

was something that "the Cambodian ... national resistance forces absolutely cannot accept". This rhetoric brought PDK close to a public suggestion that it was preparing to resist UNTAC in the way that it would resist any external enemy.⁹² It also laid the foundation for a VGNUFC broadcast on 2 June indicating that PDK was about to implement measures to prevent UNTAC from entering PDK-controlled areas to oversee demobilization or do anything else.⁹³

UNTAC was not about to make any substantial concessions in response to such bluster. In a letter addressed to Khieu Samphan on 30 May, Akashi revealed he had written to Boutros-Ghali advising the Secretary-General "to alert the Security Council" to PDK intransigence and proposing that "specific measures" be taken against PDK "if the situation does not improve in the next few days".⁹⁴ The next day, he publicly denounced PDK for its "total lack of cooperation" on demobilization and reiterated UNTAC's demand that PDK halt cease-fire violations. He warned that "strong measures" might be taken against PDK if NADK failed to begin taking steps to enter Phase Two.⁹⁵ PDK faced a situation where virtually everything it had hoped to achieve through the Paris Agreements and everything it had attempted to do in connection with them had been obstructed or at least blunted. From PDK's earliest ruses to NADK's most recent gambits, the people's war script was being invalidated, even if Pol Pot and other senior leaders living in their splendidly isolated world of dogma and faith refused to see this.

⁹² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 2 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 30 May 1992.

⁹³ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 1 June 1992.

⁹⁴ Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Khieu Samphan, 30 May 1992.

⁹⁵ UNTAC, "Text", 1 June 1992; SSM, 1 June 1992.

CHAPTER TEN**THE PEACE PROCESS ENDS****Debate and Purge within the PDK Leadership Team**

The pattern of the NADK attacks that began on 23 May in Kampong Thom and expanded by 28 May to Preah Vihear and Siem Reap and the tenor of VGNUFC broadcasts over the same period suggest that the "major decision" to which Tep Khunnal had referred on 26 May had in fact already been made by the covert leadership team. The gathering he attended, which reportedly opened on 27 or 28 May near Pailin, was evidently an opportunity for the participating NADK division leading cadre to ratify the pre-ordained results, including a harder line against UNTAC.¹ Talking to Sanderson on 2 June, after attending the Pailin meeting, Tep Khunnal gave an account of it in which he distanced himself from his earlier association with Son Sen. Khunnal said the PDK leadership had decided not to proceed with Phase Two unless Khieu Samphan could wrest further concessions from Sihanouk, SoC and UNTAC. Echoing the leadership's fears of a repetition of the events of the 1950s, he indicated that unless things changed substantially, PDK figures would only be exposing themselves to the danger of assassination if they emerged to contest elections. He suggested that if the concessions PDK wanted could be obtained, the leadership remained prepared to go ahead with demobilization of NADK on PDK terms. However, he noted this view had been opposed by certain NADK "field commanders" who wanted "to keep fighting to the last drop". All the evidence suggests this was an allusion to Ta Mok and cadre closely associated with him.

Tep Khunnal also hinted that there was another line of

¹ Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Demobilization of NADK Division 450 and Other Information on the NADK", 9 June 1992.

thinking within the PDK leadership that was concerned about the danger that PDK would suffer political and diplomatic damage as a result of the course that had been adopted. He implied that this viewpoint had been overruled by Pol Pot with the argument that in the end, "the people will be the judge" of whether the decision was right.² Contemporary circumstantial evidence and subsequent reports make it clear that the voice that had been overruled was Son Sen, and that the putative NADK Commander-in-Chief and PDK Vice Chairman had been on the losing side in internal PDK policy debates since late April.

There had been several public indications since the end of April that the long-standing and deep-rooted internal disputes within the senior PDK leadership had been exacerbated by the crisis in the implementation of the Paris Agreements in such a way as to result in Son Sen's *de facto* exclusion from the inner circle. Thus, although Son Sen had previously signed PDK public correspondence to UNTAC jointly with Khieu Samphan on both political and military matters, he suddenly ceased, without explanation, to do so. His last jointly signed letter was dated 26 April, when he and Khieu Samphan had objected to the Secretary-General's rehabilitation appeal and Sanderson's threat to postpone Phase Two.³ Son Sen's telegraphed support for the commitments to a cease-fire and NADK demobilization made by Tep Khunnal at the MMWG on 9 May was never publicized by VGNUFC, and the commitments were then explicitly repudiated and blatantly violated. Finally, on 24 May, VGNUFC had hinted at splits within the PDK leadership in a broadcast that called on listeners to be "resolved to further vigorously uphold solidarity" in their determination to decimate PDK's enemies. As an UNTAC analysis noted at the time, this appeared to be an attempt to rally PDK rank-and-

² UNTAC-MC, "Record of a Conversation Between Lt Gen Sanderson and Mr Tep Khunnal, 3 June 1992".

³ VGNUFC, 3 May 1992.

file behind the increasingly hard and violent line that PDK was adopting.⁴

A subsequent report by journalist Nate Thayer, based on his conversations with several PDK cadre and spokespersons, suggested that Son Sen had argued that PDK hopes of keeping people's war going over the longer term could best be served under the existing circumstances by continuing to emphasize political as opposed to military struggle. The report indicated that Son Sen believed that the course of intensified military action and threatened non-participation in Phase Two would reduce PDK's chances for capitalizing on PDK's popular support to gain a governmental role through participation in elections. Thayer concluded that Son Sen's arguments "did not prevail during high-level meetings of the leadership ... in May 1992". He reported that as a result, Son Sen was relieved of whatever real functions came with his nominal position as NADK Commander-in-Chief and was obliged to undergo "reeducation" starting from June.⁵ In 1996, Ieng Sary would declare that Son Sen had still "wanted to implement the Paris Agreements" in order to be able "to join in the elections with UNTAC". Sary said Son Sen had argued in favour of sticking to what had previously been "the general view: that given the situation, to avoid further defeats, [PDK] had to change the form of the struggle" to a parliamentary one. However, Pol Pot had switched to the position that this route "was no good, that [PDK] would end up with nothing, smashed to smithereens like after [the Geneva Agreements of] 1954." Pol Pot's position was that it had become clear it was "impossible" for PDK to advance unless it relied more on armed struggle to translate its popular support into concrete gains.⁶

⁴ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 23 May 1992.

⁵ Nate Thayer, "Shake-Up in KR Hierarchy", *Phnom Penh Post*, 28 January-10 February 1994.

⁶ Interview with Ieng Sary, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 December 1996.

Ta Mok was no doubt delighted that Son Sen, whom he had long criticized for impractical theorizing, had lost the internal debate and been reduced to a voiceless cipher. Moreover, although Pol Pot had not come completely around to Ta Mok's position, the political eclipse of Son Sen was accompanied by a formalization of Mok's takeover of Son Sen's old troops in Sector 1001. The sector was officially abolished and incorporated along with Sector 1003 into a new geo-political and geo-military unit, Sector 1005, answering to Ta Mok.⁷ With the formation of Sector 1005, all of PDK Cambodia except Front 250 and Sector 102 was answerable either to Ta Mok or to his former Southwest Zone deputy, Sam Bit, who remained in direct charge of Sector 505. (See Map V.) Ta Mok was well-positioned to push for a further militarization of people's war. And with both Ieng Sary and Son Sen outside the decision-making loop, Khieu Samphan was left more than ever as nothing but a mouthpiece for Pol Pot.

As the covert leadership imploded, PDK relied on resumed conventional warfare in another futile attempt to kickstart its unsuccessful village offensive and scare the alliance into directly or indirectly facilitating rural insurrection. In other words, the old troika continued to believe that a gradual return to people's war combining conventional with village warfare would, if successful, shift the rural power balance and force a return to a sufficient degree of quadripartitism at the national level to make elections attractive to PDK. However, as Son Sen may have believed, NADK's conventional military actions were immediately blunted by SoC counter-actions that were supported by UNTAC and the international community and left PDK politically no better off. No doubt egged on by Ta Mok, PDK then further escalated its conventional military actions, but Pol Pot evidently

⁷ Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng to Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 1992)", pp.2-3; UNTAC-MC, "A Talk with Christophe Peschoux, 20 September 1992".

concluded that PDK had little choice but to climb down from some of its political demands. However, the gap between what Pol Pot's people's war could obtain in the villages and on conventional battlefields and what he considered preconditions for an electoral process that would be advantageous to PDK was too enormously wide to be bridged by new lurches in what Khieu Samphan was instructed to say.

The Failure of NADK's Conventional Warfare

The failure of the NADK offensive on its Battlefield Number One in north-central Cambodia, which remained centred on Kulæn district of Preah Vihear, proved how wide the gap was on the conventional military front. Not only did NADK attacks fail, but they failed in the context of condemnation by Sihanouk and UNTAC and support from them for CPAF counter-attacks.

Initially, it had appeared that NADK might achieve some of its Battlefield Number One objectives. By 4 June, continuous shelling had prompted the flight of all villagers from Kulæn town, leaving only CPAF infantry and UNTAC observers in place.⁸ Meanwhile, SoC alleged, NADK launched simultaneous ground attacks in three districts of Siem province starting on 3 June, capturing one major objective in Svay Loe district, the village of Ta Siem, the next day.⁹

Instead of prompting UNTAC to agree to a greater degree of weakening of SoC than the Paris Agreements provided, PDK provoked SoC into successful counter-attacks that were backed by UNTAC and PDK's former coalition partners. Sihanouk reacted to the NADK attacks by condemning its attempts to

⁸ MilSitRep, 4 June 1992.

⁹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 4 June 1992", 8 June 1992, citing a press communique from the SoC Ministry of Defence; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 8-10 June 1992: 15 June 1992, citing VoCP, 9 June 1992; MilSitRep, 3,4 and 5 June 1992.

seize CPAF positions. He coupled this with a statement effusively praising Hun Sen for working hard for Cambodia's "defence" against PDK.¹⁰ UNTAC's position increasingly reflected Sihanouk's conviction that only SoC counter-force - and not mere international condemnation - could thwart NADK military activities.¹¹ It thus backed SoC's immediate counter-operations. At a press conference after an SNC meeting on 5 June, Akashi indicated that SoC should enjoy a right of self-defence vis-à-vis PDK analogous to that which a UN member state could legally exercise under Article 51 of the organization's charter. His remarks suggested that CPAF could fight back as long as Security Council actions were unable to prevent NADK attacks.¹²

SoC had been creating conditions for countering NADK militarily since 4 June, when CPAF began bringing in reinforcements to Kulæn and reorganizing its besieged forces there.¹³ This process continued the next day¹⁴ while SoC officials capitalized on the propaganda value of SRSG's remarks during their own post-SNC press conferences.¹⁵ CPAF in Kulæn then began a counter-attack that by 6 June had compelled NADK to pull back its artillery, mortars and troops. This brought a temporary end to the shelling,¹⁶ as a result

¹⁰ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2, 3 and 4 June 1992.

¹¹ MilSitRep, 12 June 1992, citing remarks by the Prince on 11 June 1992.

¹² Article 51 declares that nothing "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace and security".

¹³ MilSitRep, 4 June 1992.

¹⁴ MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.

¹⁵ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:8 June 1992, 11 June 1992, citing VoCP, 8 June 1992.

¹⁶ MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.

of which some villagers had by 8 June begun to return to the town and an UNTAC humanitarian assessment team was able to visit it in order to determine the extent of need for emergency aid to people who had fled the NADK offensive. As CPAF launched a second major counter-attack into areas seized by NADK,¹⁷ Pol Pot reportedly visited Ta Mok to confer about the situation.¹⁸ This was followed by an attempt by NADK to push CPAF back into Kulæn.¹⁹ However, by 11 June, CPAF had retaken the two villages west of Kulæn that NADK had captured at the end of May, and by mid-month it was following this up with attacks into areas in western Preah Vihear under NADK control since before the Paris Agreements.²⁰ SoC also counter-attacked successfully in Siem Reap province immediately after the 5 June SNC. The one position CPAF had lost, Ta Siem in Svay Loe district, was regained on 7 June.²¹ This halted serious NADK offensive action west of Kampung Thom.²²

NADK attempted to keep military pressure on SoC, but was unsuccessful in turning the tide of battle back against CPAF. PDK allegations that UNTAC was failing to prevent CPAF from resupplying itself in Preah Vihear, Kampung Thom and Siem Reap provided the justification for NADK attacks on SoC targets in

¹⁷ MilSitRep, 6 June 1992; "Report on a Trip to Tbeng Meanchey ...".

¹⁸ MilSitRep, 8 June 1992. According to the report, the conference took place on 5 or 6 June.

¹⁹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:10-15 June 1992, 19 June 1992, citing VoCP, 13 June 1992.

²⁰ MilSitRep, 12 June, 16 June, 17 June, 19 June, 20 June 1992.

²¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:11-12 June 1992, 18 June 1992, citing VoCP, 12 June 1992.

²² UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:16-18 June 1992, 22 June 1992, citing VoCP, 16 June 1992; VoCP, 13 and 20 June 1992; MilSitRep, 11 June 1992.

these provinces.²³ This was followed on 10 June by the shelling of one CPAF outpost in Rovieng district of Preah Vihear and a ground attack on another. The latter, however, failed to achieve its objective,²⁴ and NADK efforts to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield were still essentially forestalled.

Moreover, with UNTAC approval, CPAF was extending its self-defence counter-attacks to Route 12. As the SoC defense minister warned that CPAF would fight back where it had been "violated militarily",²⁵ and Sihanouk blamed PDK for the continuing fighting,²⁶ CPAF initiated a full-scale counter-offensive with artillery barrages and armour thrusts on 14 June. While UNTAC reconnoitred up the road behind CPAF lines, reinforced CPAF infantry launched into a "major battle"²⁷ described as the "most violent act of war in many months",²⁸ and the outnumbered NADK fell back.²⁹ CPAF simultaneously launched harassment attacks on rural areas into which PDK had moved families since the Paris Agreements.³⁰ In announcing the Route 12 operation, SoC officials said it had moved after getting the "green light" from UNTAC, and that its objective was to reopen the road. Akashi described its attacks as

²³ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June and 21 June 1992, citing various VGNUFC broadcasts between 2 and 18 June 1992.

²⁴ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:10-15 June 1992, 19 June 1992, citing VoCP, 13 June 1992.

²⁵ VoCP, 14 June 1992.

²⁶ "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting, New Blow to Peace", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 June 1992.

²⁷ MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.

²⁸ "Northern Counter-Offensive Begins", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 June 1992.

²⁹ "'Heaviest Fighting' Since Accord" and "Phnom Penh Forces Regain Positions", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 June 1992; SPK, 17 June 1992.

³⁰ MilSitRep, 16 June 1992.

"necessary to maintain military equilibrium on the battlefield",³¹ and internally UNTAC was pleased that CPAF appeared "very determined" to clear Route 12.³² KPNLF meanwhile warned that unless PDK agreed to enter Phase Two, its remaining armed forces might have "to take action to fight against" NADK in Kampung Thom and elsewhere.³³ Sihanouk backed the CPAF counter-offensive with a new condemnation of PDK, this time launched from Beijing on 18 June. The SoC defense minister responded to all this by expressing CPAF's "most profound gratitude" for the contribution he said was being made to "the success of the search for peace in Cambodia" by the Prince, other "fair-minded nationalist forces", the "international community" and Akashi.³⁴

Another round of NADK attempts to regain the military initiative on Decision 30-4's Battlefield Number One achieved at best negligible results. Minor advances met with CPAF counter-attacks³⁵ that demonstrated CPAF's "capacity to take on the NADK", "give it a thrashing" and take the war into PDK-controlled territory.³⁶ In short, almost two months after Decision 30-4 had called on NADK to use conventional military means to expand PDK territorial control north and east out of Kampung Thom, the situation had hardly improved from the PDK point of view and in some ways had worsened.

³¹ SPK, 16 and 17 June 1992.

³² MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.

³³ "KPNLF May Switch Alliance", AFP, Phnom Penh, 17 June 1992.

³⁴ VoCP, 18 and 19 June 1992.

³⁵ UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to Phum Sophi (Kand[o?]l Thmei)", 22 June 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:10-15 June 1992, 19 June 1992, citing VoCP, 13 June 1992; MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.

³⁶ MilSitRep, 15,16,17,18,19 and 20 June 1992.

On-Going Failure of People's War at the Village Level

PDK was doing no better with rural people's war on Battlefield Number Two. Although the results of Decision 30-4's authorization of the use of a greater degree of violence in attempts to overthrow the SoC local administration throughout the country were reflected in the increasing number of reports to UNTAC headquarters from its military observers in the field, they revealed that PDK was achieving very little except scattered killings. The reports showed that the call for PDK to seize control of 500-600 villages a month by means short of outright NADK attack, to arm politically friendly peasants everywhere, and to kidnap or kill 400 local SoC officials was barely implemented if at all in May, and that although it was carried out a little more actively in June, implementation remained at a much lower level than Decision 30-4 had demanded. It also suggests that in fact those villages that did change hands did so as a result of military force, not political persuasion. Finally, it indicated that CPAF often took back villages temporarily seized by NADK and sometimes retaliated by temporarily occupying villages in PDK zones.

Reports refer to the killing of a SoC police officer in northeast Cambodia in late May³⁷ and the killing of two more in Siem Reap on 15 June.³⁸ They cite the distribution of weapons to villagers in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap.³⁹ There were allegations that NADK "robbed ... people" and "raided" one sub-district in Mongkulborei district on 6 and 9 June, that it shelled a village Mong Reuhsei district in Batdambang province on 9 June, and that it launched shelling attacks on two positions and a ground assault on one village in Rattanamondul and Ek Phnum districts of Batdambang province

³⁷ MilSitRep, 25 May 1992.

³⁸ MilSitRep, 17 and 18 June 1992.

³⁹ MilSitRep, 11, 12 and 13 June, 8 July 1992.

on 14 and 15 June, respectively.⁴⁰ The evidence indicates that CPAF retaliated for the shelling attack in Batdambang by launching a three-day operation on 15 June, which resulted in the temporary occupation of one PDK "liberated village".⁴¹ Elsewhere, NADK allegedly attacked one village in Siem Reap around mid-June and "captured" two hamlets in Chi Kreng district in late June, but faced immediate CPAF counter-pressure. NADK "plundered" one SoC-administered village in Kampong Cham province in early June and captured another on 24 June. In Kampot, NADK carried out two small operations in the first half of May, initiating one clash north of the district seat of Kampong Trach early in the month and attacking a sub-district in the province at mid-month. Toward the end of the month, there were unconfirmed allegations that it attacked a village in Kampong Trach. It attacked in Angkor Chey district of Kampot province on 25 June and south of the district seat of Dang Tong in the province on 26 June, but was repulsed both times. There were also attacks on villages in Steung Treng province.⁴² In Kah Kong, CPAF surrounded, fired on and expelled a group of NADK who had come into a village hoping to go house to house contacting villagers.⁴³

The data suggests that in the almost two months since Decision 30-4, PDK had liberated fewer than the 20 villages that the directive suggested they should seize in a single day. Its quota of displacing SoC from the administration of perhaps a thousand villages by the end of June remained an absurdity.

⁴⁰ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:16-18 June 1992, 22 June 1992, citing VoCP, 16 June 1992; VoCP, 13 and 20 June 1992; MilSitRep, 11 June 1992.

⁴¹ VGNUFC, 25 June 1992; MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.

⁴² MilSitRep, 8,15 and 26 May and 12,17,18,24,25 and 27 June 1992.

⁴³ MilSitRep, 24 June 1992.

The Parameters of Breakdown

As Pol Pot had expected, the failure of both the village and conventional aspects of NADK's people's war had meant the failure of PDK's political demands. Moreover, the crisis engendered by attempting to use conventional warfare to turn the situation had not been of the sort that Pol Pot had predicted. Even during initial NADK advances, Sihanouk and UNTAC had not flinched, and their position was firmer than ever after SoC's counter-attack. Military failure was increasingly being translated into political and diplomatic isolation. The Pol Pot-Nuon Chea-Ta Mok troika was nevertheless more and more inclined to fall back on armed struggle to recoup its deteriorating position, even if this meant further isolation, including international condemnation. PDK thus responded to threats of isolation by signalling its readiness to oppose UNTAC's implementation of the Agreements regardless of the extent to which PDK might be opposed by Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and the international community. It repeatedly warned that isolation would not work, that it would fight to maintain its position even if it had to do so all alone. The essence of this threat was the prospect of a further escalation and generalization of the armed struggle aspects of people's war with a view toward trying to repeat the feats achieved by the Vietnamese Communists when faced with a similar situation when the implementation of their Paris Agreement had not gone to their liking.

Bilateral discussions between Khieu Samphan and Akashi on 3 June provided additional confirmation - if any was needed - that PDK had no reason to be optimistic that its diplomacy was vis-à-vis UNTAC was succeeding. While Khieu Samphan damned UNTAC as "a Western operation", he probed Akashi to find out whether any of UNTAC's personnel might be sympathetic to the

PDK position. Akashi disabused him of this hope.⁴⁴ This was combined with warnings to PDK that further NADK military action would preclude any UNTAC neutralization of SoC,⁴⁵ while Boutros-Ghali signalled his support for UNTAC's position by writing to Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan to criticize PDK for not having met any of UNTAC's demands.⁴⁶

In a letter to Sihanouk the same day as his meeting with Akashi, Khieu Samphan made a last-ditch attempt to persuade the Prince to re-establish his earlier coalition with PDK. Only if Sihanouk shifted his ground would PDK participate in "a liberal democratic system" with the hope of being "given duties and a role in the future government".⁴⁷ PDK was also "strongly lobbying" FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF "to support a delay of Phase Two".⁴⁸ Private efforts toward this end were combined with public propaganda.⁴⁹

However, a PDK statement on 4 June indicated that it no longer harboured any real hope that this high-level political work would succeed, at least in the short run. It implied publicly for the first time publicly implied that Sihanouk and PDK's former coalition partners were betraying the nation by failing to back the PDK position, and vowed that PDK would nevertheless maintain its stance, regardless of how isolated

⁴⁴ SSM, 3 and 4 June 1992; MilSitRep, 3 June 1992.

⁴⁵ UNTAC, [no component noted], "*La stratégie des Khmers rouges et leur perception de l'avenir*", 9 June 1992, pp.1-6; UNTAC-MC, "Future Possible Operations by NADK", 30 May 1992, pp.1-4.

⁴⁶ SSM, 5 June 1992; author's notes on Akashi's press conference of 5 June 1992.

⁴⁷ VGNUFC, 5 June 1992.

⁴⁸ MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.

⁴⁹ See, for example, VGNUFC, 2 June 1992.

it became.⁵⁰

Sihanouk's response to Khieu Samphan's letter indicated that PDK was right to be pessimistic. In another slap that was publicized by SoC media, he condemned PDK for "malevolent deeds", "human rights violations" and "terrorism" in Kampong Thom, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap and other provinces.⁵¹ Sihanouk also stood fast at "Cambodians-only" SNC on 4 June, at which Khieu Samphan threatened that PDK would not enter Phase Two unless it got some concessions.⁵² The Prince echoed Akashi's earlier admonition to Khieu Samphan⁵³ by warning that unless NADK demobilized, PDK would face the Security Council action.⁵⁴ Sihanouk privately told UNTAC he believed that PDK was now determined to "sabotage" the Paris Agreements, even if it might continue "to pay lip service to" them. Thereby encouraged "to be prepared for the worst" and resolved not to be "sucked in" by PDK tactics aimed at weakening SoC, UNTAC began to formulate elements for inclusion in a Security Council Resolution condemning PDK. In this context, it also began internal discussions "about possible ways to put the economic squeeze" on PDK by imposing international economic sanctions on it.⁵⁵

This had been UNTAC's thinking when it decided to use the SNC of 5 June to "sharply display" that PDK was "solely

⁵⁰ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 3 June 1992.

⁵¹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:4 June 1992, 8 June 1992, citing VoCP, 4 June 1993.

⁵² UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992.

⁵³ Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Khieu Samphan, 30 May 1992.

⁵⁴ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2, 3 and 4 June 1992.

⁵⁵ SSM, 1 June 1992; MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.

answerable" for obstruction of Phase Two⁵⁶ and thus prepare the ground for Security Council action against it, including sanctions.⁵⁷ At the same time, Akashi was determined not to allow PDK to undermine prospects for getting donor pledges of rehabilitation aid, which he feared it might be able to do if it appeared that the whole peace process was blocked by PDK refusal to demobilize NADK. In order to maintain at least the appearance of continued momentum towards an end to military conflict, he decided that UNTAC should adhere to the formal launch of Phase Two on 13 June. However, he insisted that cantonment of SoC, FUNCINPEC and KPRLF armed forces should proceed initially in what he described internally as a "symbolic" way, and in particular that nothing should be done to expose CPAF to "danger".⁵⁸

Sihanouk opened the 5 June meeting by declaring his continued full support for Akashi in all matters. Akashi reiterated UNTAC's position that PDK was obliged to implement the Paris Agreements "in their entirety", including above all demobilization of NADK. Khieu Samphan responded with a prepared statement that focused on dismantling SoC. He chastised Akashi and other UNTAC officials who he said were "taking pleasure" in maintaining co-operation with SoC. He declared that PDK must not simply "participate in the SNC" but through it "jointly manage state affairs". Akashi and Sihanouk roundly denounced Khieu Samphan for setting political pre-conditions for demobilization of NADK, and FUNCINPEC and KPRLF supported this stance. Akashi insisted that the Paris Agreements allowed UNTAC to "interact with" SoC, and Sihanouk chided Khieu Samphan for attempting to renegotiate the treaty. He called on PDK to proceed with Phase Two and then on that basis attempt to sort out remaining problems. FUNCINPEC and

⁵⁶ SSM, 3 June 1992.

⁵⁷ "UN Chief Challenges Khmer Rouge Leader on Impasse", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 3 June 1992.

⁵⁸ SSM, 5 June 1992.

KPNLF backed this position. Ranariddh stressed that ANKI forces had been entering regroupment sites since 3 June, and KPNLF declared that its armed forces would also very soon regroup and canton.⁵⁹ With the backing of everyone else thus stated, Akashi announced his decision that UNTAC would initiate a modified cantonment process without PDK rather than allow its opposition to bring the implementation of the Paris Agreements to a halt.⁶⁰

Threats of Sanctions

At a post-SNC press conference, Akashi called for a "concerted international effort" to pressure PDK to demobilize NADK. He expressed confidence that the Security Council would take "action" to try to get it to comply with its Paris Agreements obligations and revealed that the Permanent Five members of the Council were "already discussing what measures to adopt."⁶¹

However, PDK had already defiantly reiterated that it was prepared to struggle alone against Sihanouk's unchanged stance, UNTAC's threats of international and domestic isolation and CPAF military actions. Declaring, as the Vietnamese Communists had done when they were planning to escalate their military struggle in 1974, that it considered the situation "deadlocked", PDK indicated it was prepared to fight both biased individuals in UNTAC and an international cabal of hidden enemies who were implementing a secret pact aimed at the destruction of PDK.⁶² On 9 June, an NADK letter

⁵⁹ UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992; and "Statement by Mr Akashi, Meeting of the Supreme National Council, Item 1: Readiness of Parties for Phase II, 5 June 1992".

⁶⁰ UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992.

⁶¹ Author's and Carney's notes on the conference.

⁶² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 11 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 5 June 1992.

to Sanderson formally barred UNTAC from entering PDK-administered zones for any purpose, except to maintain its UNAMIC-era foothold in Pailin.⁶³ This was followed by an NADK "joint communique" that again signalled the PDK's readiness to fight alone. It condemned "plans to violate the ... Paris Agreements" by those who it said were "continuing to maintain" SoC "to rule the country". It recalled that "in the past, ... NADK" had "joined ... other national and international forces" like Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, the West and the UN to "achieve the Paris Agreements". Now, however, even if these forces would "not implement the Paris ... Agreements" according to PDK demands, NADK would "earnestly do so" without them.⁶⁴

The SNC of 10 June thus opened with UNTAC officially barred from entry into PDK zones but with CPAF having demonstrated an ability to hold its own against NADK. Akashi began by damning the NADK letter of 9 June as "a clear breach of the Paris Agreements". Sihanouk's criticism of the PDK's refusal to proceed with demobilisation was again backed by FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. While announcing that the initial steps to regroup and canton "selected" SoC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF armed forces would "commence as planned", Akashi reiterated that they would continue to enjoy the right "to legitimate self-defence". UNTAC would not "do nothing to destroy the military balance" or otherwise weaken CPAF, ANKI or the KPNLF vis-à-vis NADK, which would not "be permitted to take advantage of the cantonment process".⁶⁵ UNTAC's policy was that CPAF regular forces should not "be ... disarmed unless the security situation permits", that SoC provincial forces should "continue defensive duties and not canton in

⁶³ SSM, 9 June 1992; MilSitRep, 10 June 1992; "Statement by Mr Akashi, Readiness of the Parties for Phase II, 10 June 1992".

⁶⁴ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 11 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 10 June 1992.

⁶⁵ UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 10 June 1992.

areas where there is insecurity", and that SoC militia should "stay in place as long as" NADK "marauders" threatened SoC local authority.⁶⁶

Khieu Samphan replied by insisting that the only solution to the deadlock was to strengthen the SNC vis-à-vis SoC.⁶⁷ Akashi cast aside this argument by declaring that UNTAC would proceed to establish "control mechanisms" in SoC-, FUNCINPEC- and KPNLF-administered areas along the procedural lines that Khieu Samphan had refused to accept in earlier SNCs.⁶⁸ The SRSG then turned to preparations for the Tokyo conference on rehabilitation that UNTAC had been busily planning with various governments and international organizations, and which was now slated to open on 22 June. Laying down a justification for budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC, he explained that SoC must be "able to function adequately" in order for rehabilitation to work.⁶⁹ The SRSG then revealed in order to ensure that PDK could not use the SNC to sabotage rehabilitation, UNTAC would for the time being unilaterally "take the decisions it deems appropriate" on this matter.⁷⁰ Moreover, Akashi's proposal for by-passing PDK objections was, as the post-SNC communique put it, "adopted while [a] reservation was made by one *partie*".⁷¹ This prompted Khieu Samphan to repeat the criticism of Akashi's decision-making tactics that he had made on 26 May, and this time to add a new admonition. Khieu Samphan vowed not only

⁶⁶ MilSitRep, 12 and 13 June 1992.

⁶⁷ "Intervention of HE Mr Khieu Samphan, Member of the SNC and President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party, at the SNC Meeting on 10 June 1992: Agenda Item 1".

⁶⁸ "... Readiness of the Parties for Phase II ...".

⁶⁹ "Statement to the SNC By Mr Akashi, 10 June 1992".

⁷⁰ "Statement on the Procedure for the Clearance of Rehabilitation Projects, 10 June 1992".

⁷¹ "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 10 June 1992".

that PDK could "not be forced to comply" with Akashi's decisions, but that it would not "remain idle" when confronted by his supposed breaches of the political settlement.⁷²

However, as Akashi told the press after the SNC, UNTAC was not prepared to allow rehabilitation to be blocked by Khieu Samphan's "rigid position",⁷³ which UNTAC believed aimed to make Cambodia financially "ungovernable". UNTAC therefore began conveying specific rehabilitation plans individually to the Cambodian *parties* in preparation for the gathering in Japan.⁷⁴

UNTAC combined this position with exploration of ways of putting economic pressure on PDK. It began pursuing a route to which the Permanent Five had alluded at the 5 June SNC, which was to have Thailand convince PDK to change course.⁷⁵ After the SNC of 10 June, Akashi seems to have suggested to Boutros-Ghali that the Security Council consider requesting the Thai Government to close the Thai-Cambodian border to end Thai military dealings with PDK. While the US, Australian and French Governments worked to convince the Thai Government that it should do so, Boutros-Ghali began to apply step-by-step diplomatic pressure on PDK. In a report to the Security Council, he stressed persuasion but warned of further action when he declared it should continue to "consider what action it could take to achieve [its] objective" of obtaining PDK compliance with Phase Two.⁷⁶ A statement by the Council's

⁷² UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 11 June 1992.

⁷³ SPK, 11 June 1992.

⁷⁴ SSM, 11 June 1992.

⁷⁵ "Statement of the 'Permanent Five Plus' Coordinator", 5 June 1992.

⁷⁶ SPK, 13 June 1992, quoting AFP, 11 June 1992; "UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on Phase Two", AFP, New York, 12 June 1992.

president on 12 June expressed deep concern about the PDK's refusal to allow UNTAC deployment and called upon PDK to comply strictly with its commitments under the Paris Agreements.⁷⁷ UN headquarters had already decided that if this démarche had no effect, then a Security Council resolution incorporating stronger terms should follow.⁷⁸

UNTAC's steadfast position reflected its growing confidence, based on direct evidence, that PDK was militarily weak, diplomatically isolated, bereft of organized political allies and also, from everything it could surmise, lacked popular backing.

PDK Withdraws From the Phnom Penh Battlefield as SoC Threatens All-Out War

SoC was meanwhile laying out its preferred longer-term scenario if PDK continued to violate the Paris Agreements despite Security Council censure. It said the Council should in that case declare the PDK "rebels" who could have no part in the SNC and also endorse "the use of force" by the international community against it.⁷⁹ It also mooted the possibility that PDK leaders - overt and covert - would be tried for genocide.⁸⁰ After SoC warned that it was contemplating resumption of a full-scale war against PDK, "with or without the support of the international community",⁸¹ PDK effectively withdrew from Battlefield Number

⁷⁷ UN, Security Council, "Statement of the President of the Security Council", 12 June 1992.

⁷⁸ MilSitRep, 12 June 1992.

⁷⁹ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:8 June 1992, 11 June 1992, citing VoCP, 8 June 1992; "Hor Nam Hong Warns KR to Comply with Plan", AFP, Phnom Penh, 17 June 1992.

⁸⁰ UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:8-10 June 1992, 15 June 1992, citing VoCP, 8 and 9 June 1992.

⁸¹ "Foreign Minister Warns of 'Inevitable War'", AFP, Phnom Penh, 12 June 1992.

Three, thus abandoning a theatre of diplomatic combat that Pol Pot had insisted in February was essential to PDK survival. Apparently fearing that its representatives in Phnom Penh might be at severe risk from an attack like that of November 1991, PDK started to remove them.⁸² Ever since Khieu Samphan had permanently replaced Son Sen as PDK's sole SNC representative, he had made only brief visits to Phnom Penh. Over the next fortnight, the PDK junior diplomats who manned PDK offices in the absence of Khieu Samphan stopped appearing at technical-level quadripartite gatherings they had previously attended. By 20 June, Nuon Bunnau, Tep Khunnal and all but the most junior PDK cadre who were assigned to MMWG duties had also left Phnom Penh, and from 22 June, NADK began failing to appear at MMWG gatherings in the capital.⁸³

On 12 June, PDK declared that it would not attend the Tokyo Conference on the economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.⁸⁴ UNTAC interpreted the declaration as a PDK attempt to "doom major donor commitments" by giving donors the impression that the peace process was collapsing.⁸⁵ It thus decided to compel it to attend. As part of this strategy, Akashi upped the diplomatic ante by warning PDK that the conference would be an opportunity for the foreign signatories of the Paris Agreements "to take stock of the situation" during sideline discussions about how to react to PDK intransigence.⁸⁶ The PDK took this hint that unless it attended, it would give UNTAC an unopposed "opportunity to build up solidarity" against it. It could not help seeing that UNTAC was "shifting to a hard approach vis-a-vis the PDK" that ultimately aimed

⁸² SSM, 6 June 1992; MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.

⁸³ MilSitRep, 20,22,26,28 and 30 June 1992.

⁸⁴ "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting ...".

⁸⁵ *International Herald-Tribune*, 13-14 June 1992; MilSitRep, 16 June 1992.

⁸⁶ "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting ...".

"to isolate [it] internationally in such a way as to cut off [its] opportunities for resupply" if NADK did not demobilize.⁸⁷

UNTAC's determination not to give in to PDK's political demands was coupled with a conviction that it must proceed with implementation of the supervision and control aspects of the Paris Agreements vis-à-vis SoC, but in a way that was mindful not to weaken unfairly victims of NADK action.⁸⁸ At the SNC of 5 June Akashi had implied that the failure of NADK to demobilize might mean "no sure UNTAC administrative control of the administrative apparatus" of SoC, "no neutral political environment; and "no certainty that human rights will be respected."⁸⁹ However, proceeding with formal commencement of control of SoC was, like the symbolic beginning of Phase Two, a way of trying to maintain a peace process momentum in defiance of PDK non-cooperation. By moving toward supervision and control of SoC, UNTAC also undermined PDK's chances of carrying out united front work to take advantage of SoC's on-going efforts to prevent or curtail FUNCINPEC and KPNLF political activities, including what UNTAC considered "absurd" justifications for threatening to arrest FUNCINPEC and KPNLF activists.⁹⁰ It aimed to prevent PDK exploitation of "FUNCINPEC and KPNLF fears about finding themselves face-to-face with a CPP attempting to suffocate them and prevent the development of their activities among the population".⁹¹

UNTAC therefore decided to announce that it was going formally to inaugurate control and supervision of SoC on 1

⁸⁷ MilSitRep, 12,13 and 15 June 1992.

⁸⁸ "*Stratégie des Khmers rouges*", pp.1-6; "Future Possible Operations by NADK", pp.1-4.

⁸⁹ "Statement by Mr Akashi, Meeting of the Supreme National Council, Item 1: Readiness of Parties for Phase II, 5 June 1992".

⁹⁰ MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.

⁹¹ "*Stratégie des Khmers rouges* ", pp.1-6.

July, despite the serious delays and other deficiencies that were denying it the quantity and quality of civilian staff needed to effect its civil administration mandate.⁹² It would stick to this date despite recognition that the planned announcement was, as the senior UNTAC official in charge of this part of UNTAC's work put it, mere "cinema, not effective control". It would continue to insist that however imperfect UNTAC's attempts even at modest control of the SoC civil administration might realistically have to be, it was the only answer to PDK concerns about whether the SNC was accomplishing its mission.⁹³

PDK's 14 June Proposal

PDK tried to regain the initiative on the political front on 14 June by for the first time clearly specifying what it wanted in terms of empowering itself vis-à-vis SoC. In a partial climb-down that conceded that PDK involvement in control of SoC must be subordinate to UNTAC, it called for the establishment of quadripartite commissions "under the direct control of UNTAC" in which PDK, the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC would sit alongside SoC "to carry out policies and decisions made by UNTAC and the SNC" in the five main administrative fields of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information. It implied that these commissions would displace SoC's ministers, deputy ministers and the like, although "some section heads and personnel of the existing administrative structure could be maintained" under UNTAC "control or supervision" in order "to carry out the policies and decisions of UNTAC and the SNC".⁹⁴

⁹² SSM, 6 June 1992.

⁹³ SSM, 11 June 1992.

⁹⁴ PDK, "Some Main Ideas of the Democratic Kampuchea Party to Make the Supreme National Council Become a Legitimate Body and Acquire Power and Means to Administer, Together with UNTAC, All Cambodian State Affairs and to Ensure the Implementation of the 23 October 1991 Paris Agreements During the Transitional Period,

Internally, UNTAC was "very opposed" to a proposal that it saw as a thinly disguised "call for the dismantling of the SoC" and a "recipe for paralysis of the administration", with which UNTAC could allow no compromise.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, with the Tokyo meeting looming, UNTAC wanted to maintain and to be seen as maintaining a dialogue with PDK.⁹⁶ It therefore decided to treat the 14 June proposal as "an opportunity to have a meeting" with PDK, but one at which UNTAC would simply reiterate its existing position. The resulting appearance of dialogue would buy time for UNTAC to get ready for "other measures" if PDK, as UNTAC expected, it did not back down.⁹⁷

UNTAC thus continued working on ways to put economic pressure on PDK. It elaborated a concept, broached by Sihanouk at the SNC of 7 May,⁹⁸ of establishing an SNC technical advisory committee on the environment.⁹⁹ The objectives of this body included curtailing Thai military and commercial involvement in PDK's environmentally-damaging exploitation of gemstones and timber, thus using the environmental issue to reduce PDK revenues from taxation of such ventures. SoC, meanwhile, continued to demand that unless NADK demobilized, PDK should be written out of the Paris Agreements and UNTAC's mandate "be enhanced" to allow it to initiate military action.¹⁰⁰

14 June 1992".

⁹⁵ MilSitRep, 15 and 17 June 1992.

⁹⁶ SSM, 6 June 1992; MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.

⁹⁷ MilSitRep, 17 and 18 June 1992.

⁹⁸ "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 7 May 1992".

⁹⁹ Author's notes on Akashi's briefing to UNTAC senior staff, 26 June 1992.

¹⁰⁰ VoCP, 20 June 1992.

Showdown in Tokyo and Remobilization of NADK

Faced with such cajoling and threats, PDK backed down and announced that Khieu Samphan would go to Japan with the now powerless Son Sen, whose function would be to appear but not to speak.¹⁰¹ Even though the military and political situations on the ground in no way lent strength to the already beleaguered PDK diplomatic position, it attempted to derail calls for an anti-PDK sideline meeting. Khieu Samphan addressed a letter (which the *de facto* non-person Son Sen was not allowed to sign) to Boutros-Ghali and Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister and a co-chairman of the Paris Conference, proposing "that all signatories of the Paris Agreements should meet in order to reaffirm the implementation of the various points" in them.¹⁰²

Upon arrival in Tokyo, Khieu Samphan indicated that PDK wanted to attend both the ministerial conference on reconstruction and the sideline discussions on wider political issues,¹⁰³ which it now appeared would take the form of an expanded SNC attended by the various foreign ministers who had come for the rehabilitation gathering.¹⁰⁴ UNTAC informed Khieu Samphan that although it wanted to maintain dialogue with PDK, it was not prepared to drop budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC and not prepared to meet any PDK demands that went beyond the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreements. While UNTAC told donors in meetings from which Khieu Samphan was excluded that fiscal assistance to SoC was necessary to underpin rehabilitation by ensuring the

¹⁰¹ "Khieu Samphan to Attend Tokyo Conference", Reuter, Bangkok, 19 June 1992.

¹⁰² VGNUFC, 22 June 1992.

¹⁰³ "Khmer Rouge Agree to Join Cambodian Conferences", AFP, Tokyo, 21 June 1992.

¹⁰⁴ "Cautious Optimism as Khmer Rouge Comes to the Party", AFP, Tokyo, 21 June 1992.

functioning of Cambodia's "administrative machinery",¹⁰⁵ the Permanent Five conveyed a three-point message to PDK via Sihanouk. The Permanent Five had decided they would never allow PDK "to reopen major political questions" related to the Paris Agreements in a way that would rebound in its favour.¹⁰⁶ The Prince therefore told PDK, first, that there was no question of reconvening the Paris Conference to consider the PDK's demands; second, that the international community was determined to insist on demobilisation of NADK; and, third, that it should resolve any differences with UNTAC by compromise. Khieu Samphan rejected these appeals as Son Sen said nothing.¹⁰⁷

As VGNUFC blamed the continuing "deadlock" on the "allies" and warned that unless someone helped PDK to ensure that the "illegitimate puppet regime" of SoC ceased ruling Cambodia, war would resume,¹⁰⁸ UNTAC and the Permanent Five were drafting a "non-paper" for presentation to a special SNC session scheduled for after the rehabilitation conference. The document aimed to establish clearly the limits of what the international community was prepared to offer PDK politically and to present PDK with an ultimatum about demobilization.¹⁰⁹

Drafting took place as the ministerial conference went into session and proceeded to decisions that showed PDK had

¹⁰⁵ "Presentation by the Director of Rehabilitation, UNTAC, Bernt Bernander, Ministerial Conference on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia, Working Group Meeting, 20 June 1992".

¹⁰⁶ MilSitRep, 17 June 1992.

¹⁰⁷ UNTAC, "The Special Session of the SNC Meeting at Tokyo on 22 June: The summary of the meeting and various moves made before the meeting", 23 June 1992.

¹⁰⁸ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 28 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 21 June 1992.

¹⁰⁹ "Special Session of the SNC Meeting ...". "Non-paper" is diplomatese for an officially "unofficial" policy document.

utterly failed to undermine donor confidence.¹¹⁰ To UNTAC's pleasantly surprised delight, nearly \$880 million in aid was pledged¹¹¹, close to \$300 million more than Boutros-Ghali had requested. This success prompted a standing ovation from all participants except Khieu Samphan and Son Sen. Both sat silently while others applauded, and Son Sen looked particularly "wrought".¹¹² The conference declaration crowned their discomfiture by calling on PDK to "cooperate with UNTAC in the full and timely" demobilization of NADK and praising UNTAC for the "progress" it was making toward organizing elections. It ignored PDK's 14 June proposal and instead called on the UN to "accelerate" the deployment of UNTAC so that "all essential UN civil administration personnel" could be deployed "as soon as possible" in order to effect UNTAC's supervision and control mandate according to the terms of Paris.¹¹³

The "Non-Paper"

PDK was then confronted with the non-paper put together by the Permanent Five. It demanded "as of this day a binding commitment" by PDK "to assure full and effective cooperation with UNTAC" to take the steps necessary for demobilization under UNTAC supervision. Reversing the conditionality that PDK had attempted to establish, it suggested that PDK compliance was necessary in order to make it possible for the SNC to "assume a more active role in developing advice" for UNTAC". In a phrase that seemed intended to entice PDK into the meeting that UNTAC wanted to have in response to PDK's 14 June proposal, the paper further suggested that compliance would mean that the establishment of new SNC-UNTAC

¹¹⁰ MilSitRep, 23 June 1992.

¹¹¹ "MCRRC, Tokyo, 22 June 1992, Commitments Made for the Rehabilitation Period".

¹¹² MilSitRep, 25 June 1992; SSM, 25 June 1992.

¹¹³ "Declaration on peace", *Japan Times*, 23 June 1992

"consultative mechanisms" could "be considered". However, the paper also endorsed "multilateral assistance and budget support activities" for SoC and other cooperating parties. UNTAC, not the SNC, would "coordinate" the aid and "supervise the delivery of assistance or expenditure of money."¹¹⁴

In what Khieu Samphan described as a "preliminary assessment" of the non-paper, he argued that the SNC needed to be strengthened not only vis-à-vis SoC, but also vis-à-vis an UNTAC that could no longer be trusted. Ali Alatas, to whom PDK had fruitlessly written to request a reconvening of the Paris Conference, then rose to ensure that PDK was not allowed to distort the meaning of the non-paper and to put a stop to its attempts to twist the Paris Agreements themselves. He said the issue at hand - and the main thrust of the non-paper - was what needed to be done to provide the SNC with the means of realising its advisory and consultative role without reopening negotiations about the "nature" of the SNC. Alatas' presentation made it clear that the non-paper rejected the substance of PDK's demands. In particular, while it promised PDK that UNTAC would talk to it about its proposal to establish quadripartite commissions in between UNTAC and the SoC administration, it gave no ground toward transformation of the SNC into an administrative body or the replacement of UNTAC control of SoC by PDK supervision of it.¹¹⁵

Upon his return from Tokyo, a buoyed Akashi insisted that UNTAC would stand fast that the SNC could not "function as a government", and that SoC's administrative structures must "continue to exist". It would not accept suggestions that this position might have to be changed because of any "weaknesses or delays in UNTAC's implementation of supervision and control in the field of civilian administration". It

¹¹⁴ "Tokyo Non-Paper, 22 June 1992".

¹¹⁵ UNTAC, "Report on the Special Ministerial-level Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting, Tokyo, 22 June 1992".

would not accommodate PDK demands even if SoC was able "to get away with things which it should not be able to do". At the same time, UNTAC would continue to "welcome the participation" of PDK in existing forums, like the SNC. It would not "exclude anyone", but would make "contingency plans" for "a fundamental reassessment of UNTAC's mandate" if PDK and NADK should continue "excluding themselves". In the meantime, UN armed forces would remain "just outside NADK locations, ready to go into them at any time", and UNTAC would continue to "not push for cantonment" of CPAF where there was insecurity.¹¹⁶

PDK Climbs Down Politically While Remobilizing NADK

The enormity of PDK's diplomatic defeat in Tokyo, which stunned PDK as much as it brought unexpected jubilation for UNTAC, placed in even more stark relief the extent to which PDK's future would be decided by the level of popular support that it could mobilize through people's war. Certainly, as the people's-war-through-peace-agreement script suggested, SoC was not going to cede any real power to "the people" without a fight, and "the alliance" was not going to give anything of substance to PDK unless forced to do so. Although taken aback by them, PDK did not have to give up any illusions about the nature of "the alliance" because of what had happened in Tokyo. Similarly, although stung by incidents of SoC repression and successive CPAF counterattacks, such behaviour by "the enemy" was for PDK perfectly in character. The illusions remained with regard to the behaviour of "the people". If they were not acting according to the script, it still must be not because there was something wrong with the script, or even something wrong with the people, but for some other reason. That reason should not be sabotage at the decision-making level, since decision-making authority was more than ever in the hands of the old troika. Bad implementation of good decisions was always a possibility, and

¹¹⁶ Author's notes on Akashi's report to UNTAC senior staff, 26 June 1992.

the solution would then be, as it had been in 1975-78, purges all up and down the hierarchy. For the time being, however, the leadership was convinced that they could still make the script work by adding more violence to the fight against SoC, rather than turning violence downward and outward. On the other hand, until violence could make popularity happen, PDK would also have to scale down some of its demands vis-à-vis UNTAC, so that when people's war finally got off the ground and created the necessary pressures, the process of working through UNTAC and the SNC to weaken SoC from above could be put back on track.

VGNUFC initially responded to Tokyo by repeating PDK's futile request that a reconvened Paris Conference consider its demands. In a broadcast that suggested the situation had become totally polarized, it said PDK and its enemies were "two essences" that were "completely different like oil and water" and therefore could not mix.¹¹⁷ It characterized Akashi and other senior UNTAC officials as "crooked" and "dishonest people" who had "used trickery at negotiating tables" in Tokyo to "sustain and allow the Phnom Penh puppet regime ... to further administer Cambodia". Apparently referring to UNTAC backing for CPAF counter-offensives in Kulæn, on Route 12 and elsewhere, the radio also condemned UNTAC's leaders for having "militarily used threats ... to subdue" NADK. It warned that PDK would nevertheless continue to "unrelentingly insist" on its position.¹¹⁸

This rhetoric was, however, belied by a PDK diplomatic climb-down a few days later, which was contained in a new PDK "proposal ... on cooperation between UNTAC and the SNC" put forward on 27 June. It conceded that the SNC was "not a government", and for the first time in months, there was no

¹¹⁷ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 28 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 22, 23 and 24 June 1992.

¹¹⁸ UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 2 July 1992, citing VGNUFC, 25 June 1992.

suggestion that the SNC should play an administrative role. Moreover, for the first time since the Paris Agreements, it also admitted the reality that there were four "existing administrative structures", including one belonging to PDK, in the country. In addition it said all four, including SoC, should "be maintained and continue to operate in conformity with the provisions of the [Paris] Agreements" and dropped calls for the removal of senior SoC officials. However, it tried to stretch the passage in the non-paper offering talks about establishment of new SNC-UNTAC "consultative mechanisms" into a suggestion that an agreement had already been reached that such mechanisms would "be ... created as need be". To implement this supposed deal, it proposed that "within the existing administrative structures ... of all Cambodian parties, Consultative Committees of the SNC be set up."¹¹⁹

The Peace Process Is Dead

Although UNTAC read the PDK climb-down as an "essentially positive" signal, it internally rejected its proposal for the establishment of consultative committees as something "for which the Agreements do not provide".¹²⁰ The gap on this point had been narrowed, but was still very far from closed.

It never would be. Despite Akashi's successful efforts to persuade international donors otherwise, the peace process that would include PDK was in fact dead. As an internal UNTAC assessment suggested, PDK leaders were now totally convinced the political and diplomatic situation was such that, as Ta Mok had insisted, they would be "nothing without their armed forces". Certainly, if they allowed NADK to be "disarmed and demobilised" by UNTAC, they would have no way of creating the appearance of popular strength or launching conventional NADK

¹¹⁹ PDK, "Proposal of the Democratic Kampuchea Party on the Cooperation Between UNTAC and the SNC", 27 June 1992.

¹²⁰ MilSitRep, 28 June 1992.

operations against CPAF, and there would no longer be any reason why anyone should accommodate PDK's position on any issue.¹²¹

On the battlefield, CPAF's counter-offensive actions in Kulæn, on Route 12 and in Kampung Cham evidently prompted a decision in Sector 1005 to take the next step up the escalatory staircase: to begin local remobilization of its force structure. While this was justified to NADK combatants as a reaction to the threat that CPAF counter-offensives might pose to PDK "liberated zones",¹²² it was in fact a part of NADK efforts to sustain its so far failed attempts to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield and finally to realize its goals in this regard.

The first steps toward remobilization in Sector 1005 included giving guns back to NADK combatants at Anlung Veng and sending them to the front. They also included giving weapons to porters previously conscripted to carry ammunition and other supplies in front-line areas. A defector from Anlung Veng reported that starting June-July 1992, "the troops who had previously been disarmed were re-armed and sent forward." He noted that "the rumour among the troops was that maybe there was going to be an attack to take Preah Vihear, Kampung Thom and Siem Reap." Although they went forward "without an attack plan", they "were told to establish the pre-conditions for launching an attack at a later date, if necessary."¹²³

At the same time, Sector 1005 combatants were told that demobilization plans had not been dropped but merely put "on

¹²¹ UNTAC, [no component indicated], "Leaflets Aimed at NADK", 26 June 1992, p.2.

¹²² Peschoux, "Investigation", pp.3-4; author's interview of 35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.

¹²³ Interview of 29-year-old source on 11 November 1992.

hold", as an Division 802 ex-combatant put it. Thus, despite renewed efforts to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield and ward off CPAF counter-attacks, Division 802 and other NADK units in his area were "still standing by to demobilize".¹²⁴ However, demobilization would never take place. Instead, the process of NADK remobilization would continue while PDK was politically condemned on all sides, domestically and internationally. Its only option was to continue further down the paths of remobilization of its armed forces and re-militarization of its struggle in the hopes that its popular support would thus finally be materialized. Instead, the opposite would happen.

After another round of diplomatic dancing with UNTAC between June and September, PDK decided to resume all-out militarized people's war throughout the country in October 1992. This effort peaked on the eve of elections in May 1993, when NADK troops briefly entered the capital of Siem Reap province, only to be driven out within hours amidst no sign of popular support. NADK attempts to disrupt voting failed almost totally, and to the surprise of both PDK and a SoC that UNTAC hardly neutralized, FUNCINPEC won the elections with a plurality of the popular vote. People's war had failed, and PDK was left in much deeper political, military and diplomatic isolation than before the Paris Agreements.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.

¹²⁵ For discussions, see the chapters by Penny Edwards, Judy Ledgerwood, David Ashley, Kate Frieson and myself in Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds, *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-keeping* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996).

CHAPTER ELEVEN**POPULAR SENTIMENTS VIS-A-VIS PDK, SOC AND FUNCINPEC****PDK and the Growing Unpopularity of SoC**

Despite some clear indications, the popular dynamics that would lead to all-round failure of PDK's people's war, electoral defeat for CPP and electoral victory for FUNCINPEC were not entirely obvious when PDK moved toward full-fledged remobilization of NADK in mid-1992. Regardless of all the circumstantial evidence of and historical reasons for PDK's unpopularity, there was still uncertainty about just how popular or unpopular PDK was vis-à-vis its old enemy SoC or its former coalition partners FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, and about how its resumption of armed struggle would affect popular sentiments.

Since Peschoux's 1989-1990 research showing that PDK appeared to enjoy the semblance of cooperation because of peasant deference to the armed authority of NADK combatants but not "spontaneous and sustained adherence", no one had attempted any similar inquiry. This had left the field open for academic speculation right up into 1992, which despite different political inclinations and disagreements on other points, had not ruled out the possibility that Pol Pot might be right to think that PDK had some popular prospects, that these had been growing since 1990, and that by 1992 they might be growing faster. All these speculations pointed to evidence of the growing unpopularity of SoC. Even those scholars whose political sympathies were most anti-PDK or pro-SoC concluded that SoC was in political trouble and PDK might be able to capitalize on this under certain conditions. To the extent that Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders based their illusions about PDK popularity on facts, the increasing unpopularity of their main adversary gave them one reason for believing in PDK's prospects and disregarding all the contrary

indications.

Academic Speculations

The by far best-informed Peschoux, writing in early 1992 about the possibility of PDK participation in the kind the electoral and other non-military competition with SoC for which the Paris Agreements provided, had not excluded that it could achieve some successes, but argued that these would be less a reflection of PDK's popular strength than of SoC's increasing popular weakness. He warned that SoC "mistakes and excesses" might "play into the hands" of PDK. Among SoC's political errors he noted its reluctance to consider political reforms, long-term propensity to resort to systematic repression to deal with political opponents and its "authoritarian mobilization" methods, all of which had tended to increase "popular discontent". He stressed that "poor peasants" had "often been the first victims of these measures". He suggested that SoC had already lacked "any substantial popular base in the country" before what it portrayed as "economic reforms" had reduced the political system to its one-party monopoly and security apparatus, while giving rise to "perverse consequences, nurturing and generalizing corruption". Between the time these privatizing reforms were introduced in the late 1980s and the signing of the Paris Agreements, they had increased "the difficulties of the most vulnerable social groups", thus creating more "potential clients" for PDK. Peschoux warned that PDK would certainly be going all out to try to identify itself with the "afflictions" of these groups and to promise "them an improvement in their condition", to make itself into their only political alternative to SoC. Peschoux predicted that "in the long run," the continuation of a situation in which a repressive government became increasingly corrupt would "favour" PDK.¹

¹ Christophe Peschoux, *Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-1990* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp.232-246.

Other assessments had concurred in the basic outlines of Peschoux's position that SoC was politically weak and getting weaker, and PDK might be able exploit this trend, especially if it continued to enjoy international favour. Writing about the situation as of the end of 1991, historian Michael Vickery, a self-proclaimed supporter of SoC, insisted that PDK was "unpopular", and predicted that if an election were held in that year, PDK's showing would be "insignificant". However, he suggested that although SoC might have enjoyed "a burst" of enthusiastic support among the peasantry for privatizing land as part of its economic reforms, this could be short-lived. Like Peschoux, he considered that the "explosive corruption" that more and more characterized SoC was generating popular "disgust" that might increasingly rebound to the advantage of PDK, and especially of figures with a moderate, rational image, like Khieu Samphan. He saw PDK as having some prospects for taking advantage of the reaction to poor governance by SoC of a free-market system.²

Writing in 1990, the long-time scholar of Cambodian politics Laura Summers, whose perspective on SoC had always been critical, had refrained from making predictions. She recognized that PDK had "clear plans for transforming" the military power through which it had backed its coalition with FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF "into an electoral mandate". She argued that it hoped the Paris Agreements would signal to Cambodian voters that SoC "could no longer ... command the status respect or deference which is associated with state power in Khmer political culture". However, she noted, this could only be achieved through demobilization of CPAF and neutralization of SoC. Under such circumstances, PDK hoped that "with no party possessing an *a priori* claim to state power," PDK, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF could "together outpoll" SoC in a national election. While not directly endorsing this

² Michael Vickery, "Cambodia After the 'Peace'" (unpublished "Samizdat" paper, Penang, Malaysia, December 1991), pp.1, 17, 33, 47-50.

expectation, Summers suggested that SoC was becoming more and more vulnerable to electoral defeat because of Cambodians' "clear disaffection" from its political administration as a result, among other things, of its "corruption at all levels" and various exactions on the population.³

The ethnographer Marie Martin, whose profound anti-Communism was matched by open sympathies for FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, also argued that the PDK was in a position to benefit from the post-Paris Agreements situation because of growing popular unhappiness with SoC and disappointment with both Sihanouk and the international community for their failures to curb SoC politically or otherwise. She asserted that, as a result, PDK increasingly appeared "to part of the people ... as true patriots" and "the only ones capable of defending the sovereignty of Cambodia".⁴ Sociologist Serge Thion, whose generally critical approach to all four Cambodian *parties* was nevertheless tinged with a tendency to be dismissive of FUNCINPEC and KPNLF and "understanding" of SoC, similarly stressed the political significance of the "social inequalities" that emerged with "incredible speed" to the detriment of society's "weakest elements" as result of SoC's granting of property rights in real estate and paddy land. This had generated "disgust in the population" as a whole and a "moral reaction" among intellectuals. He suggested that PDK would only be able to make use of "the enormous advantage of being able to come back on to the open political scene" offered by the Paris Agreements to advance by undermining SoC control over the rural population and isolating SoC's "corrupt

³ Laura Summers, "Cambodia: The Prospects for a UN-Controlled Solution", in *Asian Review* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies, Vol 5, 1991), pp.46-47,52-53,58.

⁴ Marie Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.295-296. This is revised and updated edition in translation of her *Le Mal cambodgien: histoire d'une société traditionnelle face à ses leaders politiques, 1946-1987* (Paris: Hachette, 1989).

political elite".⁵

UNTAC's Assessments

UNTAC's earliest impressions of PDK's popular potential were based on fleeting observations in PDK-administered zones and contested areas. UNTAC's first tours of PDK-administered villages (those that it was allowed to see) suggested that they were "prosperous",⁶ and that because individual NADK cadre seemed to be well-received by the population in their zones of operation, PDK's political prospects were perhaps not entirely bad.⁷ In contested areas of Kampong Thom, peasants seemed to be more angry about CPAF ill-treatment than afraid of NADK.⁸ As UNTAC spread out into contested parts of Kampot, its initial assessment was that villagers "were sympathetic to" PDK "objectives" because "the actions of corrupt local officials" meant the SoC administration was "hated". This suggested to UNTAC military observers that peasants might be susceptible to PDK attempts at "switching from military activity to a hearts and minds campaign to win over the local rural population".⁹

More concerted UNTAC investigations, however, eventually pointed to the illusory nature of support for PDK. While they confirmed again and again the unpopularity of SoC, they suggested that as PDK acted to try to transform this into active support for PDK by ratcheting up armed struggle, the

⁵ Serge Thion, "Cambodia 1992: United Nations Traditional Apathy in Cambodia", in his *Watching Cambodia* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993), pp.187-188,206-207.

⁶ Carney's Notes on the Senior Staff Meeting [SSM], 27 and 28 April 1992.

⁷ SSM, 10 April 1992.

⁸ SSM, 21 April 1992.

⁹ "UN Says Khmer Rouge Strength Dwindling", Reuter, Chhouk, 28 August 1992.

violence this entailed only turned a population fearful that such violence presaged an eventual return to pre-1979 practices even more against it.

An analysis of NADK efforts to take advantage of opportunities afforded by the Paris Agreements and continuing SoC abuses to portray themselves as "defenders of the poor and the oppressed" in contested parts of Kampot indicated that they had at best "limited effect". Careful examination of opinions expressed by villagers revealed that "they regarded both the PDK and the government army as equally oppressive forces," but that although they had more immediate grievances against SoC than PDK, this "by no means meant a preference" for the latter. One woman aptly summarized what appeared to be the prevailing view, "We like neither side and we will certainly not vote for the Khmer Rouge, but we won't vote for the present government either". Another villager predicted that in a free and fair vote neither PDK nor CPP would win more than 10 per cent of the votes. A third stressed the underlying mistrust with which the PDK was viewed: "They never do what they advocate. People know that, they are cautious. People say yes with the mouth, but no in their heart."¹⁰

Villagers in a contested part of Kampong Speu province were even more damning. They told UNTAC visitors that PDK "just want to make us miserable forever", even though they also complained of ill-treatment by CPAF.¹¹ In contested parts of rural Siem Reap, the fear of violence that came with NADK actions after it resumed guerilla and then conventional warfare there became "uppermost on the minds of villagers".¹² Similarly, in Preah Vihear, the threat of NADK violence was a

¹⁰ UNTAC, Information/Education Division [UNTAC-IED], "Visit to Kampot Province", 26 January 1992.

¹¹ UNTAC-IED, "SIT Visit to Amleang", 4 October 1992.

¹² UNTAC-IED, "Sector 2 Report", 28 October 1992.

cause of "much concern" among villagers.¹³ An assessment of political sentiments in Kampung Cham province pointed to the negative impact on SoC popularity of its campaigns of "political intimidation" against the population, but stressed that at the same time, "the population fears ... the NADK". It suggested that the only real "strength of the NADK lies in [its] ability to terrify the population".¹⁴ A villager who was subjected to NADK propaganda actions in forested parts of Kampung Cham recalled that although PDK behaviour was "indeed different than" what it "had been in the DK period", he did not believe in the PDK propaganda about its future policies.¹⁵ In those parts of Kampung Speu where especially abusive behaviour by particularly violent CPAF units had engendered intense unpopularity and widespread fear of SoC, UNTAC found that the activities of underground NADK political propagandists could not transform this into solid support for PDK.¹⁶ Soundings in rural Batdambang showed why: popular desires for a lessening of "the iron grip" of "SoC repression" was matched by "great concern" about the threat of NADK violence.¹⁷ Even though the population was "sick of SoC corruption", it remained but "fearful of the PDK".¹⁸ Although people seemed "terrified of SOC", viewed it "as completely corrupt" and responsible for a widening gap between a CPP *nouveaux riches* and an increasingly impoverished and sometimes landless rural poor, this class stratification and

¹³ UNTAC-IED, "Trip Report to Sector 3", 31 August 1992.

¹⁴ UNTAC-IED, "Summary Report on Kompong Cham Province 20-26 April 1993", 27 April 1993.

¹⁵ UNTAC-IED, "Report on Conversations with Residents of Kampung Cham City and the Vicinity", 31 August 1992.

¹⁶ UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to Amleang, 14-16 September 1992".

¹⁷ UNTAC-IED, "Report on 'Local Perceptions of Batdambang Politics'", 7 December 1992.

¹⁸ UNTAC-IED, "Report on FUNCINPEC in Batdambang Province, 7 December 1992".

polarization did not mean the population was in favour of PDK. Indeed, when an UNTAC analyst "asked if people were so unhappy with SoC that they would choose to support the PDK, people seemed shocked at the idea and said no." This was true even though on an individual and immediate basis, "the relations between the NADK and the local population" were seemingly not unfriendly. The analyst "was told that there are many people who go back and forth and have contacts on both sides. People know each other so such relations are not problematic." Nevertheless, "no one wants to have a PDK government."¹⁹ Similarly, in Siem Reap, people viewed SoC local officials as "repressive and brutal", blamed "pocket-lining" by them as the cause of widespread social deprivation and degradation, were "outraged" by SoC "corruption and neglect" and "very angry" about various forms of SoC "intimidation" and "pressure", but they still "expressed grave fear of potential and actual NADK attacks" and long term prospects that PDK might somehow regain power.²⁰

The situation was fundamentally the same in areas administered by PDK's ex-coalition partners. In parts of Banteay Meanchey province controlled by FUNCINPEC, people complained that SoC was continuing to "threaten" them with imprisonment and even execution, but their "chief concern" was the threat of PDK violence.²¹ FUNCINPEC troops explained that although there were issues about which the PDK was "right", they did "not like the Khmer Rouge nor do we agree with them. We don't support and won't join them."²²

¹⁹ UNTAC-IED, "The Political Environment of Battambang Province", 9 December 1992.

²⁰ UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province", 6 April 1993.

²¹ UNTAC-IED, "Visit to Au Smach (CT3) 14-17 November 1992", 5 December 1992.

²² UNTAC-IED, "Political Environment in FUNCINPEC-ANKI-Controlled Zones: A Report on the Perceptions and Feelings of ANKI Soldiers and Officers, and Civilians Toward Their Leaders",

UNTAC's attempts to gauge PDK's appeal in urban areas painted a similar picture of support for some of PDK's criticisms of SoC but not for PDK itself. They suggested that although there was support for PDK positions, this would not mean votes for a PDK-formed party, even one headed by Khieu Samphan.

UNTAC's first systematic effort to "assess the impact of PDK broadcast propaganda in Phnom Penh" solicited the views of "street-vendors, cyclo- and moto-drivers, small business-holders, university students, monks and temple-boys". They described VGNUFC as "dull," "repetitive" and "dishonest", but the evidence suggested it was nevertheless listened to because "the chief alternative, SoC radio", was "also considered to be extremely boring and full of untruths". The assessment found that people were "listening to PDK radio because they identify with some of the messages." A majority of those interviewed "expressed support for the PDK's platform on the need for the SNC to have more power". Many capital residents were in agreement with its calls "for SoC's powers to be more effectively curbed" and for an end to "SoC land corruption, the rental of villas and offices to UNTAC and foreign business interests". Some clearly shared PDK concerns that most or all rehabilitation aid for Cambodia would go to SoC. The assessment thus concluded that PDK clearly had "a receptive audience across the social and political spectrum" in the capital. It also suggested that popular willingness at least to listen to PDK propaganda reflected a belief that it was "not ... the party of Pol Pot but ... the party of Khieu Samphan". Younger people seemed especially prone to "see Khieu Samphan as separate to Pol Pot". They identified Pol Pot as the main architect of genocide in DK period, but credited Khieu Samphan with "a positive identity as an able diplomat and leader" who might even be prepared to help to

bring Pol Pot to justice for crimes against humanity. However, the report also stressed that even given Pol Pot's potential to hide behind Khieu Samphan, Phnom Penh residents generally "did not think that the PDK, if it did participate" in elections, could come "anywhere near to winning" them. This was true although the urban poor believed corruption in SoC circles meant CPP would be unable to solve their "greatest current concern", namely that inflation had left them with "hardly enough to eat because of price rises".²³

A follow-up assessment pointed again to popular agreement with PDK demands for bestowing more power on the SNC, "considerable fear" of SoC, "favourable views about Khieu Samphan" and unanimous "fear/hatred of Pol Pot".²⁴ Former SoC officials in Phnom Penh who had become "highly critical" of its administration regarded PDK non-cooperation with UNTAC as a legitimate way of attempting to check what they saw as excessive UNTAC readiness to work with SoC and failure to provide a neutral political environment. However, they did not favour inclusion of PDK in a future Cambodian government.²⁵ An assessment of public opinion in suburbs around the capital made it clear that popular hopes for a diminution of SoC power were often combined with hopes for protection against PDK.²⁶ Another analysis looked at a group describing themselves as "students and intellectuals", and who had voiced support for PDK demands for a strengthening of the SNC vis-à-vis SoC. It discovered that they did "not trust or support the PDK". Although outraged by what they characterized as "glaring social inequalities", including

²³ UNTAC-IED, "Some Current Concerns of Cambodians in Phnom Penh", 2 November 1992.

²⁴ UNTAC-IED, "Recent Conversations with Visitors to the Information Centre", 23 December 1992.

²⁵ UNTAC-IED, "Conversations at Democratic Party Congress", 19 October 1992.

²⁶ UNTAC-IED, "Analysis Report: Kandal Province", 9 November 1992.

differences between urban wealth and rural poverty, they expressed a distrust of PDK figures that echoed those of peasants. They complained that PDK leaders' "deeds never match their words", and that they did "not put into practice the ideas they profess." Moreover, like poor villagers, they had no sympathy for PDK's advocacy of armed struggle.²⁷

As PDK escalated its use of military forces, capital residents continued to wish that something be done about "SoC repression and corruption", and they still wanted UNTAC to take seriously the demands put forward by Khieu Samphan, whom "many people ... appeared to perceive ... as distinct and separate from the 'Khmer Rouge'." However, UNTAC's soundings showed that most of them would rather "jump in the river today than live under the Khmer Rouge again tomorrow". It found they had increasingly "grave fears about the possibility of a 'Khmer Rouge return'" to power, and were in favour of "us[ing] force against the PDK/NADK, at a minimum, [to] prevent the NADK from gaining any more territory."²⁸

The FUNCINPEC Alternative

If people wanted neither SoC nor PDK, they had to look elsewhere for hope, and from early in the UNTAC mission there were indications of political gains by FUNCINPEC in Phnom Penh, despite the hardly neutral political atmosphere there. These indications were not fully corroborated until after the middle of 1992, but research in the latter half 1992 and into 1993 amply confirmed the general trend.

This research revealed that it was its growing popular strength that allowed FUNCINPEC to work through fears of

²⁷ UNTAC-IED, "Analysis Report: Preliminary Findings on the Khmer Students and Intellectuals Association (KSIA)", 7 December 1992.

²⁸ UNTAC-IED, "Field Trip Report: Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 1993", 18 January 1993.

insecurity in Phnom Penh that kept PDK paralysed. PDK plans of late 1991 to establish a legal, overt political organization had been completely abandoned, not only because of anxiety that SoC could at any time arrange a repeat of the November 1991 attack on Khieu Samphan, but more fundamentally because PDK could only generate support for its policies, not for itself. It was thus the only *partie* that, even after UNTAC arrived, "did not open, even try to open, a place where it could receive the population of Phnom Penh." While PDK remained in Phnom Penh, its rotating leaders and cadre there continued to "surround themselves in the greatest secrecy" and to "avoid as much as possible contact with the outside. ... access to their offices and residences was constantly prohibited to anyone who was not a member of their movement." On Pol Pot's Battlefield Number Three, their "political activities totally sidestepped the Cambodian population."²⁹ FUNCINPEC, by contrast, was able cautiously but successfully to organize both overtly and covertly in Phnom Penh and elsewhere in the country.³⁰

As of mid-April, according to one credible Cambodian source, FUNCINPEC was already making "a strong popular showing" in ^{the} capital. Significantly, "many members of the [C]PP, civil servants in the SoC" were "surreptitiously joining FUNCINPEC without telling the [C]PP about it," FUNCINPEC seemed in good position to defeat the CPP electorally in the capital.³¹ UNTAC's first full-fledged attempt to analyze the political strength of Cambodia's main political parties indicated that FUNCINPEC was strong nation-

²⁹ UNTAC, [no component indicated], "*Le Kampuchea Démocratique: 6 mois après l'arrivée de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Cambodge*", 12 May 1992, pp.1-3.

³⁰ Author's interview with Duong Khâm, who was responsible for FUNCINPEC's underground organizing networks throughout Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 17 April 1992.

³¹ Author's interview with a leading official of the Cambodian Human Rights organization ADHOC, Phnom Penh, 17 April 1992.

wide and getting stronger. This prescient September 1992 report suggested that a FUNCINPEC election victory was likely, and that the CPP was in serious political trouble. It explained that FUNCINPEC was "very present throughout the country" had "made a strong impact among the population." The CPP, on the other hand, seemed "incapable of responding to such mounting opposition and has an image among the population of being a party which although powerful is less attractive." The report stressed that the emplacement of FUNCINPEC in the provinces very much predated the Paris Agreements. This long-standing presence made it possible for them quickly to become "well-organised". FUNCINPEC had "throughout the country a very coherent and extended structure ready to make contact with the whole of its population". It enjoyed the political services of "personalities known generally among the population and inspired by a genuinely militant enthusiasm". Most of these were of the younger generation, but also in the FUNCINPEC ranks were those with education and professional qualifications dating from before 1970 and who seemed to be popularly associated with the "good old days". These activists were feeding on popular desires for "modernity" and "democracy" as well as anti-SoC feelings. The assessment noted that it was "remarkable that Prince Ranariddh sees his popularity rising rapidly in the provinces, even though he has still not acted to spread his wings, and FUNCINPEC is embodying the hopes of large segments of the population (peasants, petty 'bourgeois' merchants and those nostalgic about the past)."

The SoC political system was having "great difficulties adapting to this new situation". CPP officials in the provinces seemed "seized with doubt" and only able to react with repression. While superficially expressing support for the Paris Agreements and the presence of opposition parties, such declarations were "almost systematically accompanied by psychological - if not physical - harassment and by guileful measures." They could only think in terms of applying a

modified version of "the classic neo-communist police state model". In the countryside, the CPP was unable to capitalise politically on its alliance with Sihanouk because "in fact, it is very difficult for the population to associate their sub-district chiefs ... with the Prince." They naturally associated Sihanouk with FUNCINPEC and with Prince Ranariddh.

According to the report, FUNCINPEC was thus very much a political threat to a CPP "which remains powerful but is beset by many maladies". FUNCINPEC enjoyed "a power of attraction" that it appeared might well grow as the elections came nearer, and be particularly accelerated once they opened permanent political offices in the provinces.³²

Further UNTAC research revealed the extent to which anti-SoC feelings expressed in popular agreement with PDK positions did not constitute support for PDK. Instead, they were evidence of a vote bank for FUNCINPEC, which echoed many of PDK's complaints about SoC, but had no genocidal past and eschewed violence despite SoC repression and UNTAC's failures.

Thus, while "PDK's continual demands for the SNC to be given more power" were "striking an important chord with people, they did not want this additional power to accrue to PDK, but either to UNTAC or other non-CPP forces."³³ Although the population shared PDK worries about allocation of rehabilitation aid, it was concerned not that aid would be denied to PDK, but that it might be denied to other non-CPP parties, especially FUNCINPEC. Other evidence that FUNCINPEC was "emerging as the strongest rival to SoC" in both urban and rural areas suggested that as soon as FUNCINPEC media became available, it was "likely less and less people" would listen

³² UNTAC, [no component indicated], *Evaluation du rapport de force des partis politiques au niveau national*, 11 September 1992.

³³ "... Kandal Province".

to VGNUFC or otherwise pay attention to PDK propaganda.³⁴

An UNTAC field report noted that while people in Kampung Cham province were still listening to VGNUFC and "did not totally dismiss the ideas they heard there", the best available "specific evidence" indicated their political preference was FUNCINPEC. "Residents often talked about suffering during the DK period and expressed hatred" of PDK. One peasant explained that although VGNUFC "said good things", NADK "in actual practice" still "killed people". Even a CPAF trooper, however, admitted that FUNCINPEC forces "were different from the NADK".³⁵ Villagers in contested areas of Kampot clearly looked forward to elections as "the first chance in decades to bring about an alternative" to PDK and SoC. Here, as elsewhere, the indications were that the favoured alternative was FUNCINPEC. An UNTAC investigation found that "villagers said their preference was going to the FUNCINPEC, and that FUNCINPEC was the most popular party in the district."³⁶ In contested areas of Batdambang, villagers who appeared to have concluded that UNTAC was "ineffective in dealing with SoC repression", seemed to place their hopes in FUNCINPEC, about which they were positive even where fear of SoC meant they were most guarded in expressing their opinions.³⁷ In short, where SoC was most unpopular, FUNCINPEC and not PDK was the beneficiary.³⁸

These gains pointed toward the possibility that FUNCINPEC could advance in such a way as to obviate the need to side either with the SoC-Sihanouk alliance or rejoining a de facto coalition with PDK. PDK therefore not only increasingly fell

³⁴ "Some Current Concerns ...".

³⁵ "... Conversations with Residents of Kampung Cham ...".

³⁶ "Visit to Kampot ...".

³⁷ " ... Local Perceptions of Batdambang ...".

³⁸ "Political Environment of Battambang ...".

politically behind FUNCINPEC, it also was not in a position to take advantage of the common interests it had with FUNCINPEC opposing SoC to revitalize the pre-Paris coalition arrangement. Despite SoC's pressures on it, FUNCINPEC was not caught in the double-bind of a forced choice either of joining Sihanouk in a near-total alignment with SoC or of aligning themselves with PDK on the key questions of demobilization and election participation. Unlike PDK, FUNCINPEC could afford to demobilize its armed forces under UNTAC auspices and did not have to rely on violence forcibly to create the illusion for itself of "popular support", as long as it had some room for political organization and could look forward to reasonably free and fair elections. PDK was the one in a double-bind. Its pre-Paris political support had proved literally more apparent than real. Pol Pot's response - to purge Son Sen and move toward Ta Mok's position of intensifying violence in order to reveal and create political support through resumed armed struggle - only had the opposite effect, and with SoC still engaged in repressive activities and UNTAC seen as ineffectual, support flowed more and more to the party perceived to be the least violence-prone: FUNCINPEC.

Thus, while FUNCINPEC gave up its military capabilities except for a very minimal capacity for self-defense in parts of its old zones of administration, its political potential in SoC-administered zones, by contrast, continued to grow despite CPP efforts to prevent or at least curtail its activities. While PDK was drawing down its already small representation in Phnom Penh and gearing up for intensified armed struggle, FUNCINPEC was expanding in the capital and trying to do so in the provinces by relying on popular support rather than militarized people's war. By 23 June, FUNCINPEC had been able to enrol 20,000 new members in Phnom Penh, some of whom had provincial residences.³⁹ Recruitment was much harder but nevertheless beginning in the provinces. Around the beginning

³⁹ Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Meeting with FUNCINPEC Officials, 23 June 1992".

of June, FUNCINPEC had started taking steps to open provincial party offices. By the middle of June, it had decided on locations for nine, and custodial staff had occupied the premises of some. Local SoC authorities reacted to FUNCINPEC's initiatives with acts of petty harassment. These seemed aimed in general at discouraging contact between FUNCINPEC and the population and in particular at deterring contact between the party and potential supporters within the SoC administration itself. Then, during the Tokyo conference, CPAF entered the newly-rented FUNCINPEC office premises in Batdambang and arrested the occupants.⁴⁰ FUNCINPEC nevertheless remained determined to push ahead with provincial organizing,⁴¹ even though UNTAC declined to treat the incident as a violation of the Paris Agreements.⁴²

Thus, by the time the elections were held on 23-28 May 1993, although more than 200 FUNCINPEC and other political activists had been killed or injured by SoC in election-related political violence,⁴³ FUNCINPEC had built up a nationwide membership of several hundred thousand.⁴⁴ Although PDK had killed at least 416 and perhaps as many as 676 people since the Paris Agreements, wounded at least another 655 and

⁴⁰ "... Meeting with FUNCINPEC Officials"; UNTAC-Military Component, "Situation Report" [MilSitRep], 23 June 1992.

⁴¹ Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to FUNCINPEC Offices, 2 July 1992".

⁴² MilSitRep, 28 June 1992.

⁴³ Most of the victims were FUNCINPEC. Others were members of successor parties to the KPNLF or other, small non-Communist political parties. UNTAC, Human Rights Component, "Human Rights Component Final Report, September 1993", pp.27-29.

⁴⁴ By October 1992, FUNCINPEC claimed a membership of 120,000. Author's interview with Ung Huot, Phnom Penh, 2 October 1992. By February 1993, it claimed 346,000 members. FUNCINPEC, *Sechkadey Reaykar Kariyalay Bâh-chnnaot Pracham-Chhnam 1992-1993* ("1992-1993 Annual Report of the Electoral Office), 28 February 1993.

caused 362 to "disappear",⁴⁵ the population ignored its call for a boycott of the elections, and 1,824,188 Cambodians, 45 percent of those casting ballots, voted for FUNCINPEC, as opposed to 38 percent for CPP.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ "Human Rights ... Final Report", "Appendix Three: Investigation Statistics", pp.78-80, lists 417 people (CPAF, SoC officials and ordinary people) killed in combat and non-combat situations involving NADK, 655 wounded and another 362 who went missing, many of whom were probably also killed or wounded. According to SoC, by the eve of the elections NADK had killed 288 CPAF and SoC officials and 388 other people. Cambodian People's Party, Central Committee, "Number of CPAF, Police and Population Died, Injured and Arrested After Paris Peace Accords", 20 May 1993.

⁴⁶ UN, *A Vote For Peace* (Bangkok: Sriboon, 1993), p.92

CONCLUSIONS

Works that have denied, underestimated or ignored PDK's (Indochinese) Communist roots have not been able to deal with the apparent paradoxes in PDK behaviour that resulted from Pol Pot's hyperfaithfulness to the people's war script. In attempting to resolve these paradoxes, they have typically overestimated the determining impact on PDK of the immediate international context and glided over or misinterpreted the importance of popular Cambodian political preferences. This can be illustrated by returning to an examination of the otherwise very different, even opposing analyses put forward by the historian Kiernan, the Cambodian political scientist Sorpong Peou, the international organizations theorist Stephen Stedman and other scholars of peace-keeping. If Kiernan's contention that PDK behaviour can in part be explained by UN assistance to it is factually untenable, other more plausible accounts that try variously to explain PDK behaviour in terms either of accommodation to foreign pressure or reaction against such pressure nevertheless also overestimate the importance of the foreign factor relative to doctrinal determinants and the impact of popular preferences. They put too much weight on the extent of influence exercised over PDK by such (erstwhile) foreign "friends" as the governments of China and the US. They overemphasize the extent to which PDK's plans were keyed around the SNC in Phnom Penh, underestimate the importance PDK attributed to the "people's war" at the village level, and fail to understand how delusions about the reasons for failure at this level drove PDK toward violence more fundamentally than any other factor.

Kiernan's attempt to explain PDK behaviour as resulting from the leadership of genocidists as opposed to Communists leaves him analytically lost in a sea of misinterpretations and misrepresentations. He takes no account of Pol Pot's good Communist ambitions to make a tactical shift in PDK's village-oriented people's war from primarily military to primarily

political struggle. He makes an unconvincing case that PDK never intended to go along with the Paris Agreements, and arrives at the untenable conclusion that while violating them all along, PDK also from 23 October 1991 onward benefited more than anyone else from them. In attempting to make this case, he lists a litany of PDK attacks and failures to meet various deadlines set by the Paris Agreements or the UN, above all its decision in early June 1992 not to proceed with demobilization under UNTAC auspices. He argues that this demonstrates a consistent pattern proving his point about PDK intentions, and particularly that it never seriously contemplated a shift from military to political struggle.¹

Kiernan recounts instances of NADK violations of the cease-fire as if they all resulted in PDK advances, ignoring evidence of SoC counter-measures and counter-attacks. Through this empirical sleight-of-hand, he leaves a misleading impression of how the military situation shifted between October 1991 and June 1992. On the basis of his false picture, he tells readers that PDK then "withdrew from the peace process with the gains" he says "they had made from it". He is ironically expressing PDK's hopes, but ignoring the reality, when he declares that PDK "gained the most" from the Agreements because they allowed it "to move into the political arena without abandoning ... military options". His contention that PDK was allowed to make gains because UNTAC was soft on it due to some combination of wishful thinking, appeasement and on-going habits of sympathy or support for PDK within UN circles is contradicted both by the internal UNTAC documents and the open record of UNTAC's behaviour vis-à-vis PDK.²

¹ For a more complete discussion of Kiernan's work on PDK and the Paris Agreements, see my review of it in the *Phnom Penh Post*, 16-29 June 1995.

² Ben Kiernan, "Introduction", in Ben Kiernan, ed, *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community* (New Haven: Monograph Series No. 41, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993), p.21.

In suggesting that the US and China crafted an implementation of a peace process that would make possible massive PDK gains at the expense of the SoC, Kiernan implies that they ran roughshod over Cambodian public opinion. However, the views of Cambodian people themselves remain largely absent from his analytic schema. He asserts that "within Cambodia, the balance of forces favoured the incumbent SoC," but it appears that he is referring to the military balance, and he in fact fudges the extent to which SoC enjoyed popular legitimacy. Similarly, he does not venture a straightforward assessment about the extent of popular backing for FUNCINPEC. Instead, he insinuates it was politically weak because it was supposedly a mere creation of foreign (mainly US) interventionist designs in Indochina, with no domestic support in Cambodia. By skirting round popular preferences in this way, Kiernan is unable to make sense of the broader implications of PDK's unpopularity for the whole peace process.³

Kiernan concludes that PDK "called the world's bluff" by refusing to go along with the Paris Agreements they had signed.⁴ In fact, it was the other way around: SoC, Sihanouk and the UN all called PDK's political bluff, and so did Cambodians who were fed up with SoC, but who instead of following PDK down the path of people's war turned in their hopes for political peace toward FUNCINPEC.⁵

While rejecting the explanatory utility of Kiernan's "moralistic" focus on PDK's genocidal characteristics, Sorpong

³ Ben Kiernan, "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences", in *Genocide and Democracy*, pp.208,213.

⁴ Kiernan, "Inclusion", p.241.

⁵ For further discussion, see "Politics of Violence: An Introduction", in Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds, *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-keeping* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996).

Peou portrays PDK in a manner that also washes away key aspects of its ideology and doctrine. Peou presents PDK as just another Cambodian *partie*, with no particular objectives other than security, other than wanting, like the other *parties*, "to be certain that it would not fall victim to the other either during or after the elections". This analysis is not plausible, even when qualified by Peou's suggestion that PDK might have been somewhat (but not fundamentally) distinctive because its past gave it needs in terms of security guarantees that were higher than other Cambodian *parties*. He is missing much when he interprets PDK's desire for parliamentary seats as aimed at nothing more than securing its "existence", even if he is right that Pol Pot, at least, believed that without parliamentary representation, "PDK would face persecution, prosecution, and ultimately extinction".⁶

Peou's logic is good that if PDK's plan all along "had been to destroy the peace process at all costs, [it] would never have signed the peace agreements that exposed [it] to the international community and the UN mission in the first place." However, his analysis goes seriously amiss when he denies the possibility that PDK tactics involved attempts at "undermining the peace process to ensure [its] eventual monopoly of power." His argument is that this could not have been so, because then PDK would have "waged a new war while UNTAC remained most vulnerable, at the early stage of its operation", and more particularly would have started a war aimed "at capturing or expanding territory".⁷ His reasoning here is flawed because he almost entirely ignores the importance of the political tactics of PDK's people's war to establish local National Councils.

⁶ Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.viii,40,205,230.

⁷ Peou, pp.183-184,269-270.

There is some justice in Peou's effort to be evenhanded by arguing that although PDK became guilty of "refusal to abide by the established rules of the democratic agreement," both PDK and SoC "repeatedly violated the cease-fire". However, he puts too much of the overall onus onto SoC for precipitating mutual violations. While he highlights SoC's attack on Khieu Samphan and Son Sen in November 1991, he gives insufficient attention to PDK's people's war efforts in the villages. He fails to notice the pattern of increasing PDK reliance on violence to make people's war move forward in the absence of political support, dismissing NADK actions as mere "sporadic incidents". Thus, although he is right that PDK "cease-fire violations were not the end in themselves; they were rooted in unresolved political problems,"⁸ he fails to situate them in PDK's failure to advance via more political people's war in the villages.

Thus, while Peou's warning that PDK's "behaviour must not be taken at face value" is well taken, his argument that the best way to understand PDK is to "turn ... attention away from the concept of power and focus on that of security" is unpersuasive. The real problem for PDK was not security, but unpopularity. It was not the threat from SoC, which was real enough, but the lack of protection from ordinary Cambodians, that made PDK so vulnerable, and pushed it towards violence. PDK was unwilling "to disarm and compete in the electoral process" not only because of the extent to which "UNTAC failed to show it merited ... confidence", but because unlike FUNCINPEC, PDK could not generate enough popular support to compensate for UNTAC's shortcomings. To argue, as Peou does, that PDK chose "to remain outside the electoral process" because UNTAC was "in no position to create a safe political environment" for PDK, and thus its "perceived security needs" were not satisfied,⁹ is at best a partial explanation. The

⁸ Peou, pp.51-54,57,61,76.

⁹ Peou, pp.270-274.

effects of this were so devastating because in the absence of better UNTAC protection from SoC, PDK had nowhere to turn, especially after Cambodians began looking politically toward FUNCINPEC in increasing numbers. Moreover, they did so because they feared PDK wanted not just security, but power, and that PDK wanted UNTAC to provide it with security so that PDK could put itself in a position to seize power.

Stedman is well aware of some of the pitfalls of the assumptions underlying Kiernan's and Peou's analyses. Thus, he warns against assuming that actors like PDK must either simply be seeking "total power",¹⁰ as Kiernan suggests, or be "solely motivated by insecurity and only seek party survival",¹¹ as Peou suggests.¹² Instead, Stedman develops a generalized taxonomy of participants in peace processes that connects the degree of extremeness of their social, political and economic goals and the degree of their commitment to achieving their goals to the extent to which they "desire exclusive power and recognition of authority"; "want dominant power"; "seek a significant share of power"; or "desire to exercise power subject to democratic controls". However, his attempt on this basis to divide spoilers into "limited, greedy

¹⁰ Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security* (Vol 22, No 2, Fall 1997). Stedman's critique of this view is based on Richard K Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol 73, No 6, November/December 1994), pp.20-33.

¹¹ Here Stedman cites Barbara F Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail", PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994, *passim*.

¹² He points out that the latter view implies that any violation of the peace must be committed "out of fear, not some other motivation", and thus "peace" could be maintained by much improved international guarantees for security of parties to peace agreements, which is precisely what Peou appears to believe. As Stedman indicates, application of this argument to PDK is seriously misleading, since it takes no account of PDK's other goals in addition to security. Stedman's argument here is paraphrased from Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.66.

and total" still leaves him with difficulties in dealing with the nuances of PDK's people's war tactics. His analysis is unable clearly to relate Pol Pot's immediate determination to achieve electoral representation with his equal, but long-term, determination to retake power. PDK fits into his category of a "total spoiler" to the extent that Pol Pot and other PDK leaders were ultimately still pursuing "total power and exclusive recognition of authority", and that PDK's long-term goals were in this sense "immutable preferences". However, this does not mean PDK's goals were - as Stedman's taxonomy would have it - "not subject to change". While PDK's "commitment to peace" was indeed "tactical", the precise nature of its tactics were determined by the canons of people's war, which produced the anomalous behaviour that Stedman's analytical framework cannot handle. This is why, in the terms of his taxonomy, PDK's behaviour was "inconsistent".¹³ In particular, Stedman has difficulty reconciling PDK's initial commitment to parliamentary struggle, preparedness to reduce its armed forces to a defence-only posture and obsession with attempting to launch a *political* offensive in the villages with its later reversion to violence. This flip-flop within the terms of Pol Pot's ultra-optimistic twist on the Vietnamese people's war through peace agreement script is contrary to his characterization of total spoilers, which he argues will only comply with peace agreements to the extent it helps them "convince others of their goodwill", but will never voluntarily weaken their "*offensive* military capability."¹⁴

Because Michael Doyle's approach does not recognize the extent to which PDK signed the Paris Agreements in part out of a belief that it had the popular backing necessary for it to take advantage of the "open political space" the Agreements promised, he overstates the extent to which PDK signed only

¹³ Stedman, pp.9-12,19,27.

¹⁴ Stedman, pp.5,7-8. Emphasis added.

because of "heavy pressure from [its] big-power sponsors".¹⁵ This emphasis on external factors is also expressed in Steven Ratner's contention that PDK "ultimately accepted the Permanent Five's plan" only because of "external pressure",¹⁶ and echoed in Trevor Findlay's suggestion that PDK was against a political settlement that had been "imposed" on it by foreign powers.¹⁷ It underlies Wang Jianwei's puzzlement about why PDK's foreign backers had the "clout" to push it into signing the Agreements but not to force PDK to "turn the Agreements into reality". Wang's confusion arises from his assumption that "PDK was sceptical about the peace settlement from the very beginning because it realized that there was no chance for it to regain power through a democratic election given its track-record".¹⁸

Overestimation of the extent to which PDK was concerned about the UN and not the countryside is again apparent in Wang's treatment of the reasons for PDK's eventual refusal to go through with demobilization. He stresses that already in the UNAMIC period, PDK was "disappointed" with UN "powerlessness" and questioned the UN's legitimacy because UNAMIC's "limited mandate and resources" meant it could not be used for PDK's purposes. He emphasizes that the slow deployment of UNTAC further undermined PDK hopes in the utility of political as opposed to armed struggle, and argues that the way in which the UNTAC attitude toward PDK seemed influenced by the "Western powers" was a major factor behind

¹⁵ Michael W Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.24,32,68-69.

¹⁶ Steven R Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.158-159.

¹⁷ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.16-17.

¹⁸ Wang Jianwei, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia* (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), pp.83-86.

PDK's boycott of demobilization. Here he points in particular to PDK unhappiness with UNTAC's failure "to do much substantial to address [the] issue" of effective neutralization of "SoC's key government agencies".¹⁹ Even if all of these points are well-taken, this does not mean that UNTAC's non-neutralization of SoC was the most fundamental reason for PDK's boycott of demobilization and step-by-step resumption of armed struggle. Rather, it was the combination of a consistent pattern of UN actions with the even more consistent failure of PDK to achieve its political objectives that led to these PDK decisions.

In sum, a lack of attention to PDK's Vietnamese-derived doctrine and self-deluding belief in the popular results of its supposedly super-successful implementation of that doctrine is at the root of most of the mistaken hypotheses about the reasons both for its participation in and for its withdrawal from the Paris Agreements peace process. Taking the hypotheses collated in Trevor Findlay's overview one-by-one, this study's account incorporating these factors disproves the hypothesis that PDK had "never intended to comply" with the Paris Agreements, but was simply "buying time to regroup in preparation for a resumption of military hostilities". It shows why an only incomplete explanation of PDK behaviour can be based on the hypothesis that it "genuinely believed that UNTAC would dismantle the SoC administration to a point where a [PDK] takeover, either before or after the election, would be possible". PDK may have hoped this, but its main hopes were focused on the villages. It shows why the hypothesis that PDK had "calculated its electoral prospects as good until the political landscape began to change after the Accords were signed" is also misformulated: the political landscape did not so much change for the worse in a way that prevented PDK from manifesting its support electorally, as it did to reveal the

¹⁹ Wang, pp.15-16,45-51,83-86.

non-existence of that support, even as PDK refused to be realistic about its political prospects. Finally, this study shows the element of naiveté in the hypothesis that everything PDK did was part of an attempt "to effect a long-planned transition from military to political action": Pol Pot indeed hoped to oversee a continuous politicization of PDK's struggle, and was prepared to preside over such a transition, but his long-term plans were still much more ambitious and sinister.²⁰

However, he could not realize his dreams because his "people's war" was not a magic formula for Communist success in Cambodia, but a recipe for disaster. It constrained PDK political choices in a peculiarly self-defeating way. It kept very much alive the temptation to violence, even while precluding certain military options. Even if it allowed tactical reliance on elections and peace treaties, it insisted on the ultimate utility of violence. This had a seductiveness that PDK could not resist, but giving into the seduction meant paying an enormous political cost in terms of keeping alive fears of an eventual return to (auto-)genocide. At the same time, adherence to the script required an effort to win popular support that, given PDK's past, was an impossibly uphill battle. Yet, even if Pol Pot's guerillas relied on sheer terror to fill the gap (and dismissed it as a small dose of justifiable revolutionary violence), a residual adherence to the script meant that PDK's military assets were not converted into a terrorist force pure and simple. That might have been a militarily more "rational" choice than reminding everybody of the murderousness of 1975-78 by somewhat more measured use of killing. Giving up on violence entirely also might have been less suicidal than attempting to use it in a politically-correct manner. Certainly, the success of the 1996 "breakaway" from PDK of Ieng Sary, long reviled as Pol Pot's other half, suggests that this was the case. For Ieng

²⁰ Findlay, pp.49-51.

Sary and the NADK forces who proclaimed loyalty to his Democratic National Union Movement, genuine adherence to a cease-fire proved to be a way of maintaining a separate political identity and de facto autonomy of control over people and land. If PDK as a whole had done this five years earlier, it might have better escaped its past and even have won some votes through a posture of non-violence, as some guerilla movements with histories of horrific violence as insurgencies, but which were less ideologically self-constrained, have done.²¹ However, faithfulness to a people's war script originally written by what later became the enemy paradoxically stood in the way of such realism and cynicism.

²¹ One example of this is the *Resistencia Nacional Mocambique* (RENAMO). For a discussion, see Alex Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Centre for South African Studies, University of York, Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996). Despite its origins as a tool of sabotage and terror for South African military intelligence, RENAMO's adherence to the Mozambican peace process served it well, and it managed to win a very considerable proportion of the vote against a regime not dissimilar to that of SoC.

BIBLIOGRAPHY**Published and Forthcoming Books and Articles**

Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée, and Sorpong Peou, eds, *Cambodia: The 1989 Paris Peace Conference, Background Analysis and Documents* (Milwood: Kraus International Publications, 1991)

Amnesty International, *State of Cambodia: Human Rights Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992* (AI Index ASA 23/02/92, April 1992) and *Appendices* (AI Index: ASA 23/02/92/APP)

Dale Andrade, *Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle* (New York: Hippocrene, 1994)

Asia Watch, "Text of Undisclosed UN Report on Undercover Units Formed by the Phnom Penh Regime to Oppose Political Rivals", appendix "Part III" to *An Exchange on Human Rights and Peace-Keeping in Cambodia* (New York: Volume 5, Number 14, 23 September 1993)

Marcel Barang, "Rebirth of the Khmer Rouge", *South*, November 1983

Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People* (Second Edition) (New York: Simon and Schuster, forthcoming)

Eric M Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder: Westview, 1993)

Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War, A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986)

David P Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991)

David P Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Bangkok: Silkworm, 1993)

Cao van Vien, *The Final Collapse* (Washington: Center of Military History Indochina Monographs, 1983)

Philippe Devillers, "Livre VI: Cambodge", in Philippe Devillers, Pierre Fistié and Le Thanh Khoi, *L'Asie du Sud-est* (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1971)

Michael W Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995)

William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981)

Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E Goscha, *Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975* (Monash: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Paper on Southeast Asia: 35, 1995)

Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

Motoo Furuta, "The Indochinese Communist Party's Division into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Cambodia and Laos, 1948-1951", in Takashi Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta, *Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1992)

Christopher E Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Report Series No 28, 1995)

Gareth Griffiths, "Representation and Production: Issues of Control in Post-colonial Cultures", in Harish Triverdi and Meenakshi Mukherjee, *Interrogating Post-Colonialism: Theory, Text and Context* (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996)

Catherine Hall, "Histories, Empires and the Post-Colonial Moment", Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, eds, *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons* (London: Routledge, 1996)

Donald W Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia* (Westport: Praeger, forthcoming)

Steve Heder, *Kampuchea: Occupation and Resistance* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1980)

Steve Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-Mortem", *Indochina Issues* (No 12, January 1981)

Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, "The Politics of Violence: An Introduction", in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-Keeping* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996)

Stephen Heder, *Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan* (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No 70, 1991)

Steve Heder, "Racism, Marxism, Labelling and Genocide in Ben Kiernan's *The Pol Pot Regime*", in *South East Asia Research* (Vol 5, No 2: July 1997)

Michael A Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972* (Westport:

Praeger, 1997)

Helen M Hintjens, *Alternatives to Independence: Explorations in Post-Colonial Relations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995)

Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982)

Karl D Jackson, ed, *Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)

Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds, *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981* (London: Zed, 1982)

Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975* (London: Verso, 1985)

Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996)

Ben Kiernan, ed, *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community* (New Haven: Monograph Series No. 41, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993)

Gabriel Kolko, *Vietnam: Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986)

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Kampuchea: After the Worst* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1985)

Le Duan, *The Vietnamese Revolution: Fundamental Problems, Essential Tasks* (February 1970) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978)

Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967)

Timothy J Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Salem: University of North Carolina, 1996)

Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol I and II* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967)

Marie Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society*, translated by Mark W. McLeod (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994)

Stephen Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming)

Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1997)

Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)

Christophe Peschoux, *Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-1990* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992)

Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, "Shifting Imaginaries: Decolonization, Internal Colonization, Postcoloniality", in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, *Decolonization of Imagination* (London: Zed, 1995)

François Ponchaud, *Cambodia Year Zero* (London: Penguin Special, 1978)

D Gareth Porter, "The Paris Agreements and Revolutionary Strategy in South Vietnam", in Joseph J Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, *Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives* (Lexington: DC Heath, 1975)

Gareth Porter, ed, in *Vietnam: A History in Documents* (Pine Plains: Meridian, 1981)

Ken Post, *Revolution, Socialism and Nationalism in Viet Nam Volume Five: Winning the War and Losing the Peace* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994)

Philippe Preschez, *Essai sur la Democratie au Cambodge* (Paris: Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Serie C; Recherches, No 4, October 1961)

Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994)

Robert F Randle, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969)

Steven R Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (London: MacMillan, 1997)

VM Reddi, *A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement, 1863-1955* (Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara University Press, 1970)

JV Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975)

Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security* (Vol 22, No 2, Fall 1997)

Russell Stetler, ed, *The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970)

Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction", in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper Number 11, March 1979)

Laura Summers, "Cambodia: The Prospects for a UN-Controlled Solution", in *Asian Review* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies, Vol 5, 1991)

Sina Than, "Cambodia 1990: Towards a Peaceful Solution?", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1991* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991)

Carlyle A Thayer, *War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1989)

Serge Thion, *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodia Tangle* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993)

James W Trullinger, *Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994)

Truong Chinh, *Forward Along the Path Charted by K Marx* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969)

Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?", in *The New York Review of Books*, 12 May 1994

Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982* (Boston: South End Press, 1984)

Alex Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Centre for South African Studies, University of York, Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996)

Vo Nguyen Giap, *Banner of People's War, the Party's Military Line* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970)

Wang Jianwei, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia* (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996)

An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers Party (1930-1970) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970)

The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965)

Unpublished Dissertations, Articles and Manuscripts

Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peace-keeping" (paper delivered at the Third Charles Rostov Lecture on Asian Affairs at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 14 October 1993)

Capt P Bartu, "Background History on Major Battles in Cambodia After the Withdrawal of the Vietnamese in September 1989", 19 November 1992

Kate G Frieson, "The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants, 1970-1975" (PhD dissertation: Monash University Department of Politics, 1991)

Steve Heder, "Kampuchea: October 1979-August 1980" (typescript, 1980)

Steve Heder, "From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages" (typescript, 1981)

Steve Heder, "The National Army for the Liberation of the Khmer Populace and the National Front for the Liberation of the Khmer Populace" (typescript, August 1983)

John Marston, "Cambodia 1991-1994: Hierarchy, Neutrality and Etiquettes of Discourse" (PhD Dissertation: University of Washington, 1997)

Christophe Peschoux, "DK-Bio and Military Data (June-September 1992)"

Christophe Peschoux, "DK-Cadres-biographie" (1990)

Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng to Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 1992)"

Michael Vickery, "Cambodia After the 'Peace'" (unpublished "Samizdat" paper, Penang, Malaysia, December 1991)

Documents of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Published and Unpublished)

"The armed forces of the Democratic Kampuchea party (translation)", 20 September 1991

Armee Nationale du Kampuchea Democratique, Délégation au Groupe de Travail Militaire Mixte, Pailin, 17 February 1992

Banhcheak Ampì Ekasar Ni-muoy Ni-muoy Sângkhep ("Synopsis of Each Document"), January 1990

"Biography of Members of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea", 18 December 1979

"Civil Police of the Democratic Kampuchea Party: Organisation Chart"

"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Concerning the Dissolution of the Communist Party of Kampuchea", 6 December 1981

"Communique of the PDK Rejecting the Phnom Penh Faction's Accusation that the PDK Has Shot a Helicopter of UNAMIC", 27 February 1992

"Declaration of the Formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea", 22 June 1992

Democratic Kampuchea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Press and Information, *Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea* (Phnom Penh: September 1978)

"Democratic Kampuchea Party's Proposal for Solving the Issue of Fighting in Kampong Thom", 28 March 1992

"Deployment of forces of NADK Divisions and Independent Regiments"

"Document for Study in Every Location. This Document Elaborates on the Leadership Team's Decision Document of 13 December 1991: Decisions of the Meeting of 1001 Leading Cadre, 10 January 1992"

Dossier of Documents: 80-81 (sic) (Notebook of a senior cadre)

"Guiding Views for All Locations", 5 February 1992

"Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS a la Réunion du CNS, au Palais Khemarin, le 20 avril 1992"

"Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS du Cambodge, Président de la partie Kampuchea Démocratique à la réunion du CNS du 26 Mai 1992, Palais Khémarin"

"Intervention of HE Mr Khieu Samphan, Member of the SNC and President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party, at the SNC Meeting on 10 June 1992: Agenda Item 1"

Kar-ngear 5 Chumhean ("Five-Step Work"), May 1980

"Learning, Supervising and Re-fashioning in Accordance with the Seven Precepts and Eight Precepts, Altogether Making 15 Precepts", 6 July 1992

"[Message] Number 03 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", dated 21 November 1991 and signed Khiev [Son Sen]

"Message Number 05 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 20 November 1991

"Message Number 06 to 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nân [Khieu Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 22 November 1991

"To 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nân [Khieu Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 23 November 1991

"Message Telegraphique", 17 February 1992

"The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea", August 1991

"Nomination of Military Officers of the NADK to the MMWG", 16 February 1992

Pol Pot, *Chayô Khuop Ti-17 Pak Kommuynih Kampuchea* ("Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea"), 30 September 1977

Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992"

Pol Pot, *What is the Current Situation in Kampuchea? What Will It Be Like in the Future?*, December 1988

"Press Communique and Statement of the Congress of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Kampuchean People's Representatives, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Representatives of the Democratic Kampuchea National Army and the Representatives of the various Government Departments"

"Proclamation of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, Signed on July 9 and Announced by the Radio of Democratic Kampuchea on July 11, 1982", 9 July 1982

"Proposal of the Democratic Kampuchea Party on the Cooperation Between UNTAC and the SNC", 27 June 1992

"Some Main Ideas of the Democratic Kampuchea Party to Make the Supreme National Council Become a Legitimate Body and Acquire Power and Means to Administer, Together with UNTAC, All Cambodian State Affairs and to Ensure the Implementation of the 23 October 1991 Paris Agreements During the Transitional Period, 14 June 1992"

Teuh Næ-noam Muoy Châmnuon Ney Meakear Yôtheat robâh Pak Knong kar Thwoe Sângkream Pracheachun Vai A-Khmang Yuon Chhlean-pean, Veat-ti, Lep Toek-dei, Bâmbat Pouchsah Aok Parachey Teang Srong Ti Chong Bâmphot ("A Number of Guiding Orientations of the Party's Military Line for Making People's War to Attack and in the End Totally to Defeat the Contemptible Yuon Aggressor, Expansionist, Territory-Swallowing, Genocidal Enemy") (29 June 1979)

"26 Regroupment Points of the NADK Were Discussed and Agreed Between HE Mr Son Sen, Member of the SNC and the High Commander in Chief, and the UN Military Survey Mission on December 14, 1991 at Malay Region"

Viewpoints on How Always to Organise and to Establish the

Conditions for Ensuring Well the Livelihood of Our Ranks and Our People and Ensuring Well the Preservation, Defense, Consolidation and Expansion of the Forces in Our Ranks and Our People, 11 April 1988

What Will Cambodia's Situation Be Like in the Upcoming Decades?, 1987

"Confessions" of Communist Party of Kampuchea Cadre on File at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

"Confessions" of Chou Chet alias Si, "IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978" (handwritten document dated 9 May 1978)

"Confessions" of Non Suon alias Chey, "Responses of XII: The First Step Toward Confession: Concluding Part: Part Six: XII Talks About a Number of Brothers in the Leadership Organ", 21 November 1976

Official Documents of the State of Cambodia

Cambodian People's Party, *Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robâh Kâmpuchea Kraoy Pel Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dâl Pel Bâh Chhnaot* ("The Most Recent Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections")

Cambodian People's Party, Central Committee, "Number of CPAF, Police and Population Died, Injured and Arrested After Paris Peace Accords", 20 May 1993

Cambodian People's Party, Central Committee, *Robaykar Neung Kar Veay Tâmlay Ampî Preuttekar Batokam Nôv Roattheani Phnum Penh Pi Thngay Ti 17 Dâl Thngay Ti 22 Khæ Thnu Chhnam 1991 Prom Teang Tih-dav Neung Vitheanakar Sâmrap Royea' Pel Khang Muk* ("Report and Evaluation of the Events of the Demonstrations in Phnom Penh Capital City from 17 to 22 December 1991 and Objectives and Measures for the Future"), 8 January 1992

"Data Informations Concerning Military Forces and Police of the State of Cambodia", 24 September 1991

Official Documents of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia

FUNCINPEC-ANKI Intelligence Report, "Activities of the Khmer Rouge", 12 July 1990

Sechkadey Reaykar Kariyalay Bâh-chhnaot Pracham-Chhnam 1992-1993 ("1992-1993 Annual Report of the Electoral Office), 28 February 1993

Official Documents of the US Government

"Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,
27 January 1973"

US Embassy, Phnom Penh, "Joint Weeka", various dates

US General Accounting Office, *Report to Congressional Requesters: U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions* (Washington: GAO.NSAID-94-9, December 1993)

Official Radio Stations and News Services

Antara (Indonesia)

Permanent Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea to UNESCO "Press Releases" (*Partie of Democratic Kampuchea*)

Pyongyang Domestic Service (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Sapoaramean Khmæx (SPK- State of Cambodia)

Voice of the Cambodian People (VoCP - State of Cambodia)

Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VoDK - *Partie of Democratic Kampuchea*)

Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia (VGNUFC - *Partie of Democratic Kampuchea*)

Voice of the Khmer (VoK - National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia and Khmer People's National Liberation Front)

Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (VoNADK - *Partie of Democratic Kampuchea*)

Xinhua (People's Republic of China)

Wire Services, Newspapers and Magazines

Agence France Press (AFP)

Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly

Associated Press (AP)

The Australian

Bangkok Post

Christian Science Monitor

Daily Telegraph

Far Eastern Economic Review

Financial Times

International Herald Tribune

Japan Times

Kyodo News Service

Le Monde

The Nation Review/The Nation (Bangkok)

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

New York Times

Phnom Penh Post

The Times (London)

Renmin Ribao

Reuter

Der Spiegel

Documents of the Supreme National Council

"Communique of the SNC Meeting", various dates

"Needs Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons In Kompong Thom Province, 9-10 April 1992"

Ordre du jour de la réunion du CNS du 26 mai 1992

"*Note du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général au Conseil National Suprême (CNS)*", 20 May 1992

"Statement by Mr Akashi at the SNC Meeting, 26 May 1992"

"Statement by Mr Akashi, Meeting of the Supreme National Council, Item 1: Readiness of Parties for Phase II, 5 June 1992"

"Statement by Mr Akashi, Readiness of the Parties for Phase II, 10 June 1992"

"Statement to the SNC By Mr Akashi, 10 June 1992"

"Statement of the 'Permanent Five Plus' Coordinator", 5 June 1992

"Statement on the Procedure for the Clearance of Rehabilitation Projects, 10 June 1992"

Documents of the United Nations, United Nations Advance

Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the United Nations and United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

UN, *A Vote For Peace* (Bangkok: Sriboon, 1993)

UN, Department of Information, *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995* (New York: UN Publications, 1995)

UN, Department of Public Information, *Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict* (DPI1180-92077-January 1992-10M)

UN, General Assembly, Security Council (A/45/472-S/21689), 31 August 1990, *Annex: Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia (28 August 1990); Appendix: Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict*

UN, General Assembly, *Addendum, Initial Phase of the Implementation Plan Report of the Secretary-General* (A/46/235/Add.1), 31 January 1992

UN Information Service (Bangkok), "Press Conference of Mr Yasushi Akashi, SRSG, Noon, 19 March 1992"

UN Secretariat, "Press Briefing by Special Representative for Cambodia", 4 May 1992

UN, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia* (S/23613), 19 February 1992

UN, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, Addendum* (S/23613/Add.1)

UN, Security Council, *Statement by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, delivered to the Security Council on 28 February 1992*

UN, Security Council, "Proposed Structure for the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict"

UN, Security Council, "Statement of the President of the Security Council", 12 June 1992

UN, "Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia"

UNAMIC, "Large-Scale Incursions by CPAF", 10 February 1992

UNAMIC, "Cooperation in Progression of the Peace Process", 14 February 1992

UNAMIC, "Record of MMWG Seventh Meeting, Thursday, 20 February, 0910-1050 Hours, SNC Building"

UNTAC, [no component indicated], "Notes: Meeting with UNSG, 19

April 1992"

UNTAC, [no component indicated], "DK's Views on the Peace Process", 17 November 1992

UNTAC, [no component indicated], "*Le Kampuchea Démocratique: 6 mois après l'arrivée de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Cambodge*", 12 May 1992

UNTAC, [no component noted], "*La stratégie des Khmers rouges et leur perception de l'avenir*", 9 June 1992

UNTAC, [no component indicated], "Leaflets Aimed at NADK", 26 June 1992

UNTAC, [no component indicated], *Evaluation du rapport de force des partis politiques au niveau national*, 11 September 1992

UNTAC, "Text", 1 June 1992

UNTAC, "Investigation of Human Rights Complaints: Principles for UNTAC Involvement", 20 April 1992

UNTAC, *Cambodia: A Military Assessment of the Situation*, 8 April 1993

UNTAC, "Statement by Mr Yasushi Akashi, SRSG for Cambodia, upon his Arrival in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992"

UNTAC, *Report on UNTAC's Activities: The First Six Months (15 March-15 September 1992)*

UNTAC, "Report on the Special Ministerial-level Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting, Tokyo, 22 June 1992"

UNTAC, "The Special Session of the SNC Meeting at Tokyo on 22 June: The summary of the meeting and various moves made before the meeting", 23 June 1992

UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Special Report About NADK Civilian Police Banteay Meanchey Province", 14 October 1992

UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Meeting with Khamerues (NADK)", 9 September 1992

UNTAC, Human Rights Component, "Human Rights Component Final Report, September 1993"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Proposed Questions and Answers", 20 April 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News Media: State of Cambodia (Broadcast Media)", various dates

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News Media: *Partie* of Democratic Kampuchea (Broadcast Media)"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Phum Phæ, 28 April 1992"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Background Note to the Vietnamese Massacre in Kampung Tralach", 6 February 1993

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Trip to Tbeng Meanchey-Phum Kulæn, 8 June 1992"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Visit to Kampot Province", 26 January 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "SIT Visit to Amleang", 4 October 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Sector 2 Report", 28 October 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Trip Report to Sector 3", 31 August 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Summary Report on Kompong Cham Province 20-26 April 1993", 27 April 1993

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on Conversations with Residents of Kampung Cham City and the Vicinity", 31 August 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Amleang, 14-16 September 1992"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on 'Local Perceptions of Batdambang Politics'", 7 December 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on FUNCINPEC in Batdambang Province, 7 December 1992"

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "The Political Environment of Battambang Province", 9 December 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province", 6 April 1993

UNTAC, Information/Education, "Visit to Au Smach (CT3) 14-17 November 1992", 5 December 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Political Environment in FUNCINPEC-ANKI-Controlled Zones: A Report on the Perceptions and Feelings of ANKI Soldiers and Officers, and Civilians Toward Their Leaders", 14 March 1993

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Some Current Concerns

of Cambodians in Phnom Penh", 2 November 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Recent Conversations with Visitors to the Information Centre", 23 December 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Conversations at Democratic Party Congress", 19 October 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Analysis Report: Kandal Province", 9 November 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Analysis Report: Preliminary Findings on the Khmer Students and Intellectuals Association (KSIA)", 7 December 1992

UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Field Trip Report: Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 1993", 18 January 1993

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Phum Sophi (Kanda[o?]l Thmei), 22 June 1992"

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Demobilization of NADK Division 450 and Other Information on the NADK", 9 June 1992

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Kbal Toek-Voat Serei Utdam, 30 May 1992"

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "A Note on PDK Attitudes and Intentions", 4 May 1992

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Meeting with FUNCINPEC Officials, 23 June 1992"

Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to FUNCINPEC Offices, 2 July 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Force Structure and Organizations of Armed Forces SoC", 16 September 1992

UNTAC, Military Component, "A Talk with Christophe Peschoux, 20 September 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level One Seventeenth Meeting, Saturday 09 May 1992 UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Report on MMWG Level II, 14 May 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Areas of Concern with NADK, 20 May

1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Situation Report", various dates

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992

UNTAC, Military Component, "Interview with General Kan Rat, Former ANKI Now with CPAF", 18 May 1993

UNTAC, Military Component, "Meeting with NADK on 18 February 1992 at 1900 hours"

UNTAC, Military Component, "NADK LO KPT", 6 April 1992

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level One Fourteenth Meeting, Saturday 18 April 1992 UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level One Sixteenth Meeting, Saturday 02 May 1992 UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level One Eighteenth Meeting, Saturday, 23 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level One Nineteenth Meeting, Tuesday, 26 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2 - 1 June 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Level Two, Saturday, 30 May 1992, Agenda"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Record of a Conversation Between Lt Gen Sanderson and Mr Tep Khunnal, 3 June 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2, 1 June 1992"

UNTAC, Military Component, "NADK Orbat", December 1992

UNTAC, Military Component, "NADK Order of Battle, 28 June 1993"

UNTAC, Military Component, "Future Possible Operations by NADK", 30 May 1992

UNTAC, Office of the Political Adviser, "Report of the SNC Meeting", various dates

UNTAC, "Press Release: Mr Akashi Visits Border Checkpoints, Faction Headquarters; UNTAC Establishes Mobile Investigation Teams", 29 May 1992

"Transcript: Press Conference of Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, 10:00 am, 20 April 1992"

"Presentation by the Director of Rehabilitation, UNTAC, Bernt Bernander, Ministerial Conference on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia, Working Group Meeting, 20 June 1992"

Memo from Yasushi Akashi, SRSGC, to Mr Marrack Goulding, USGPKO, "Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 26 May 1992"

"MCRRC, Tokyo, 22 June 1992, Commitments Made for the Rehabilitation Period"

Letter from Behrooz Sadry to Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, 30 April 1992

Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Khieu Samphan, 30 May 1992

Interviews

Raffeudin Ahmed, Paris, 22 October 1991

Tim Carney, Washington, DC, 8 November 1991

Duong Khâm, Phnom Penh, 17 April 1992

Journalist's interview with Ieng Sary, 22 May 1983

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview of Ieng Sary, 10 November 1985

Ieng Sary, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 December 1996

Ataul Karim, Phnom Penh, 11 December 1991

Kan Mân, Phnom Penh, 5 July 1992

Mey Man, Phnom Penh, 1 July 1997

Nhek Bunchhay, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1991

Nong Hean, May-June 1983

Journalist's taped interview with Son Sen, 3 October 1989

Thach Reng, May-June 1983

Nate Thayer, various dates

Ung Huot, Phnom Penh, 2 October 1992

Former CPK administrative cadre, Thai-Cambodian border, 11 November 1984

Personal Communication on 22 February 1985 from a source who

wishes to remain anonymous, citing information from persons who left PDK zones in 1982-1983

Interview of an anonymous PDK representative abroad by a non-Cambodian source, September 1985

"Interviews with Khmers Rouges" conducted by Roger Normand in Sok Sann, July 1989

Interview with an anonymous non-Cambodian source who enjoyed access to Son Sen, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, Bangkok, 23 July 1990

Former courier for the Southwest Zone office, Thai-Cambodian border, 27 July 1990

Interview with a leading official of the Cambodian Human Rights organization ADHOC, Phnom Penh, 17 April 1992

Notes on an interview by an UNTAC official with a Chinese diplomat intimately familiar with the PDK leadership, 21 November 1992

Former member of Ieng Sary's staff, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1993

"Self-demobilizers" from the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, various dates

Interviews with two leaders of the December 1991 demonstrations in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, 20 July 1998.

Miscellaneous

Tim Carney's notes on Akashi's press conference of 1 April 1992

Tim Carney's notes on an MMWG in Kampong Thom on 10 May 1992

Tim Carney's notes on the UNTAC Senior Staff Meetings, various dates

Robaykar Poramean VI. Nayobay Khmæar Krahâm ("Information Reports: VI. Khmer Rouge Policy") [document obtained from a senior Cambodian intelligence analyst working for the Thai military]

"The Secretary-General's Consolidated Appeal for Cambodia's Immediate Needs and Rehabilitation"

"10 September 1990 Joint Statement of the Informal Meeting on Cambodia, Issued at Jakarta on 10 September 1990"

"Tokyo Non-Paper, 22 June 1992"

