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Ph.D.

1963.

(Indian Philosophy.)



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ANALYSIS OF MATTER (RŪPA) IN THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ABHIDHAMMA

by
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Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of London
1963

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ABSTRACT

This study constitutes an inquiry into the analysis of matter as expressed in the sources of Theravāda Buddhism, specially in the later systematizations known as the Abhidhamma. The introductory chapter is devoted to an examination of the many senses, and contexts in which rūpa - a term often used in the sense of matter - occurs; the definition of rūpa in the sense of matter; and the general nature of the rūpa-dhammas, i.e., the ultimate factors into which matter is analysed. These rūpa-dhammas, twenty eight in all, are classified into two categories as primary and secondary. Chapter II deals with those that constitute the primary category and shows how they represent four properties of matter: solidity and extension; visciduity and cohesion; the temperature of cold and heat; distension and mobility. Chapter III examines the position of the secondary rūpa-dhammas in relation to the primary and indicates how some of the former category stand for certain facts intimately connected with matter. Chapter IV deals with those secondary rūpa-dhammas which in the Abhidhammic commentaries came to be recognized as real entities. This involves a discussion of five material sense-organs, four varieties of sense-objects, two faculties of sex, the material faculty of life, the

nutritive "quality" of matter, and the physical basis of mental activity. Chapter V deals with those secondary rūpa-dhammas which in the Abhidhammic commentaries came to be recognized as nominal entities with no autonomous objective counterparts. This involves a discussion of two modes of self-expression, three characteristics and four phases of the matter of the body, and the space delimited by matter. Chapter VI introduces the many ways in which the rūpa-dhammas are sought to be classified, and Chapter VII explains how their inter-dependence and inter-connection are sought to be established with reference to laws of causation and conditionality. Chapter VIII introduces the theory of rūpakalāpas - the Theravāda form of atomism - and shows how it presents a close analogy to the atomic theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. The concluding Chapter endeavours to determine the philosophical and the ethical basis of the Buddhist analysis of matter, and to understand the whole subject in the context of Buddhism as a religion.

PREFACE.

The work here presented is an attempt to interpret the Buddhist view of matter as advocated in Theravāda Buddhism, and is mainly based on the scholastic systematizations known as the Abhidhamma, both of the earlier period containing the seven manuals of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and of the later period containing the Abhidhammic commentaries (aṭṭhakathā), sub-commentaries (ṭīkā) and such compendiums as the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddha.

General observations on the Buddhist theory of matter are met with in almost all books dealing with Indian Philosophy or with Buddhism in particular. These books, covering a wide period of oriental research, are too numerous to be mentioned here. Studies on some special aspects of the subject, undertaken mainly with a view to determining the nature of ^{the} earliest form of Buddhism - still a matter of controversy - have appeared from time to time in the form of articles and monographs. Prof. St. Schayer's article, Precanonical Buddhism (Archiv Orientalni, Vol. VII, 1935), and Mrs. Maryla Falk's monograph, Nāmarūpa and Dharmarūpa (Calcutta, 1943), (e.g.) are representative of this category. Translations of four of the original texts, namely, the Dhammasaṅgani and its commentary, Atthasālinī, the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa and the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddha -

wherein the subject under consideration is dealt with in greater detail - have also been made available. Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation of the Dhammasaṅgani, under the title: A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (London, 1923) and Dr. S.Z.Aung's translation of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha under the title: Compendium of Philosophy (PTS., London, 1927) - both with introductory essays, copious notes and critical observations - deserve special mention.

The works indicated above have brought into relief some important aspects of the Buddhist view of matter as expressed in the sources of Theravāda Buddhism. However, so far no clear picture of the subject has emerged. Attention has tended to be largely concentrated on the broad philosophical implications arising from the Buddhist theory of matter. Consequently, the Buddhist analysis of matter as such remains less exhaustively dealt with. Hence it is that a critical and detailed examination of the Theravādins' list of rūpa-dhammas - these are the ultimate irreducible factors into which material existence is analysed - has become all the more necessary.

Furthermore, the extant writings tended to be based more on the earlier sources such as the Pāli canonical texts and less on the later sources such as the post-canonical commentaries and the kindred literature. In the comparatively

late works of the Theravādins, e.g., the Pāli *ṭīkā*s and the Sinhalese *sannēs*, the Abhidhammic compendiums of the twelfth century and later, one meets with valuable data relating to the subject. That they have so far failed to attract much attention is shown by the absence of detailed accounts on the comparatively late developments of Theravāda scholasticism, such as (the Theravāda forms of) atomic theory, the theory of moments and the denial of motion. Herein an attempt has been made to sift the material embodied in the works referred to, with a view to presenting a comprehensive account of the subject.

What has so far been observed about the Theravāda is less true about the other schools of Buddhism. For Prof. Stcherbatsky's works, notably, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (London, 1923), Prof. O.K.J. Rosenberg's *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1924) and Dr. McGovern's *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, Vol. I* (London, 1923) (e.g.,) have gone a long way in elucidating the Buddhist theories of matter as expressed in the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese sources. Along with this should be mentioned Prof. De la Vallée Poussin's monumental translation of the Hiuan Tsang version of the *Abhidharmakośa*, under the title: *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Vols. I-VI* (Paris, 1923-31). With its voluminous notes and critical observations, this translation

is an indispensable source book for a study of the doctrines and theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

Although, as indicated by its title, the present study is concerned with the Buddhist analysis of matter as expressed in the sources of Theravāda Buddhism, an attempt has been made to take into consideration the parallel data found in the sources of non-Theravāda schools of Buddhism. This has been done with a view to bringing the subject into a wider perspective and to presenting it with a greater measure of precision. In this connection, the emphasis has fallen more on the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism. These were two of the leading Hīnayāna schools with whom the Theravādins had much in common. Both subscribed to a realistic view of existence; the former had a tendency to naïve realism and the latter a predilection for - but certainly not a committal to - subjectivism. Although less emphatic, these two trends are observable within the Theravāda itself. In the later works of the Theravādins, there is a marked tendency to declare as nominal what in the earlier works are recognized as real. In view of these circumstances, it was deemed proper that special attention should be paid to the theories and doctrines of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas in elaborating the Theravāda analysis of matter.

Finally, I must take this opportunity of recording my deep sense of gratitude to my ācārya, Dr. D. Friedman under whose guidance this study was pursued. His constant encouragement, no less than his valuable suggestions and criticisms, has sustained me throughout these labours.

I must also express my gratitude to the authorities of the School of Oriental and African Studies for granting me a Studentship, but for which it would not have been possible to undertake this study.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.	Aṅguttaranikāya
AA.	Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā
Abhd.	Abhidharmadīpa (with Vibhāṣāpṭabhāvṛtti)
Abhmṛ.	Abhidharmāmṛta
Abhvk.	Abhidhammatthavikāsinī
Abhvt.	Abhidhammāvatāra
ABORI.	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
ADS.	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha
ADSS.	Abhidharmārthasaṃgraha-sannaya
ADSVṬ.	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā
AK.	L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu
AKvy.	(Sphūṭārthā) Abhidharmakośavyākhyā
AM.	Asia Major, Leipzig
AMG.	Annales du Musée Guimet, Paris
AO.	Archiv Orientalni, Journal of the Czechoslovak Oriental Institute, Prague
Asl.	Atthasālinī (Dhammasaṅgani Aṭṭhakathā)
BB.	Bibliotheca Buddhica, St.Petersberg
BEFEO.	Bulletin de l'École Française de l'Extrême- Orient, Hanoi
BSOAS.	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London

- CJS. Ceylon Journal of Science, Colombo
- Cpd. Compendium of Philosophy
- CP.Mdhy.Vrt.Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti
- D. Dīghanikāya
- Dhp. Dhammapada
- Dhs. Dhammasaṅgani
- Divy. Divyāvadāna
- Dkp. Dukapaṭṭhāna
- ERE. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vols.
1-13, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh, 1908-1926
- HJAS. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Cambridge,
Mass.
- IC. Indian Culture, Calcutta
- IHQ. Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
- It. Itivuttaka
- JA. Journal Asiatique, Paris
- JOIB. Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
- JPTS. Journal of the Pali Text Society, London
- JRAS. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
- KSP. Le Traité de la Demonstration de l'Acte
(Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa)
- Kvu. Kathāvatthu
- KvuA. Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa
- La Siddhi La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang

M.	Majjhimanikāya
MA.	Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā
MCB.	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, Bruxelles
Mdhy.Vrt.	Madhyamakavṛtti
Mh.Nd.	Mahāniddeśa
Mh.NdA.	Mahāniddeśa Aṭṭhakathā
Mil.	Milindapañha
Mvn.	Mohavicchedanī
NRP.	Nāmarūpapariccheda
NRS.	Nāmarūpasamāsa
PBO.	PolSKI Biuletyn Orientalistyczny, The Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies,
Peṭ.	Peṭakopadesa
PIPC.	Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress
Psm.	Paṭisambhidāmagga
PsmA.	Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā
PTS.	Pali Text Society, London
PTSD.	Pali-English Dictionary of the Pali Text Society.
Pugā.	Puggalapaññatti Aṭṭhakathā
S.	Samyuttanikāya
SBB.	Sacred Books of the Buddhists

SBH.	Sacred Books of the Hindus
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jainas
Sn.	Suttanipāta
SnA.	Suttanipāta Aṭṭhakathā
SS.	Saccasamkhepa
ThīgA.	Therīgāthā Aṭṭhakathā
Tkp.	Tikapattāna (with commentary)
Triṃś.	Triṃśikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
UCR.	University of Ceylon Review, Colombo
UdA.	Udāna Aṭṭhakathā
Vbh.	Vibhaṅga
VbhA.	Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā
VBQ.	Viśva-Bharati Quarterly, Calcutta
VG.	H.Kern, Verspreide Geschriften onder zijn Toezicht Verzameld, Vols.1-15, s'Gravenhage, 1913-36
Vimś.	Vimśatikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
Vism.	Visuddhimagga
VismS.	Viśuddhimārgasannaya
VismT.	Visuddhimagga-tīkā
VS.	Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kanāda
Yam.	Yamaka
YamA.	Yamaka Aṭṭhakathā

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On the basis of its occurrence in the philosophical terminology of the Pāli Canon, at least four meanings of rūpa can be distinguished: Frequently it occurs in the (generic) sense of matter, and with almost equal frequency in the more specific sense of what is visible, to be more precise, "the sphere of visibility". Rarely it is seen to figure as a simple substitute for the more specific compound, rūpa-dhātu (-loka) which signifies the second of the three planes of existence recognized in Buddhist cosmology - what Mrs. Rhys Davids calls "the realm of attenuated matter", and with almost equal rarity, as referring to four stages of ecstatic experience, technically and more specifically known as rūpajjhāna. These four may be represented as the generic, the specific, the cosmological and the "psychological" meanings of the term.

Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla - the two illustrious commentators of Theravāda Buddhism - collate as many as nine meanings (attha) in which the term in question is said to occur in the canonical works, namely

- (1) rūpakkhandha - material aggregate
- (2) sarīra - the physical body of a living being
- (3) vanna - colour

- (4) saṅghāna - form, figure, configuration
- (5) kasina-nimitta - the "meditation" - object
- (6) paccaya - condition, cause
- (7) sabhāva - nature

The 8th and 9th are what we have introduced as the cosmological and the "psychological" meanings. That the number is not exhaustive is recognized by the addition of the word, ādi, "etc".¹

Some of these items could, however, be brought under rūpa in the generic sense of matter.

Rūpakkhanda (no.1) is the first of the five aggregates into which Buddhism analyses the empiric individuality, the other four being vedanā (feelings), saññā (perceptions), sankhāra (synergies, formations) and viññāna (consciousness). Sometimes it is used in a wider sense to mean the totality of matter (sabbam rūpam).² It may also be noted here that in the Nikāyas sometimes it is used in a subjective sense, too³ - a meaning which does not seem to have been retained in the post-Nikāyan works. For the moment, we may overlook this latter usage. Sarīra (No.2) can be considered as

1. See AA.i 21 and ThigA.98; see also Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci, ed. Sabhūti (Colombo, 1938), 304 ff.

2. See e.g. S.ii 252; Mii 68, 80

3. See below, 46 ff.

referring to the matter that enters into the composition of a living being.

That rūpa sometimes occurs in the sense of vaṇṇa, colour (No.3) is said to be supported by the oft-recurrent canonical statement: cakkhūñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññānaṃ¹ = because of the eye and because of rūpa (the visible) there arises visual consciousness. In the opinion of the Pāli commentators, rūpa in this context means colour.² But according to the Pāli Canon, colour as well as shape, form or figure, constitute the sphere of visibility (rūpāyatana).³ The commentators, however, ousted the latter from its traditional domain on the ground that, in an absolute sense, it was not visible and as the Sautrāntikas did, explained it as a mental construction⁴ "super-imposed on the difference of coloration".⁵ It is in the light of this subsequent development that we should understand why rūpa in the quoted sentence is sought to be interpreted as colour.

The mention of saṅghāna, form, figure (No.4) is perhaps in order to recognize one of the general meanings of

1. See e.g. M.i 111, 259

2. See Asl. 317

3. See Dhs. 139

4. See Asl. 317

5. Stcherbatsky, Cent.Concep. 11; see below, 146

rūpa. But its mention separate from vaṇṇa, colour (No.3) is also a logical necessity arising from the above-mentioned development.

For the moment let us confine ourselves to the Pāli Canon and take both items (Nos. 3 & 4) as being represented by rūpa in its specific sense of what is visible. This, as interpreted in Buddhism, constitutes one of the sub-divisions of rūpa in the sense of matter.¹

Why rūpa is sometimes used to refer to kasīṇa-nimitta, the "meditation"-object (No.5) is of course not far to seek. This is a name given to an object which could be profitably used for the practice of concentration which has the attainment of jhāna (Absorption, Ecstasy) as its end. According to the classical account given in the Visuddhimagga, at the initial stage of concentration the selected object is called parikamma-nimitta, the preparatory image. As the process of concentration gathers more and more intensity there comes a time when the original sensuous object is replaced by its corresponding mental image called uggaha-nimitta, the acquired image. With further progress in concentration there sets in what is called paṭibhāga-nimitta, the counter image which is subtler than the immediately

1. See below, 142 ff.

preceding one.¹

Image, figure, sign, appearance - these are some of the general meanings of rūpa. And if the object of concentration is sometimes referred to by rūpa, then it is one of these general meanings that comes to our mind.

That rūpa is at times used in the sense of paccaya, condition (No.6) does not seem to be supported by the example cited - a quotation from the Anguttaranikāya, which runs as follows: "Sarūpā bhikkhave uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā dhammā no arūpā".² The Commentary notes that rūpa in "sarūpā" and its negative "arūpā" should be understood as synonymous with paccaya.³

When the original passage where the sentence occurs is taken into consideration, considerable doubt arises on the validity of this explanation. Therein we find nine similar sentences, each differing only in respect of the first and the last words. Five of them come before the above sentence; they begin with (a) sanimittā, (b) sanidānā, (c) sahetukā, (d) sasankhārā and (e) sappaccayā, and end with the respective negatives. Four of them come after it; they begin with (f) sevedanā, (g) sasaññā, (h) saviññanā and (i) sankhatārammaṇā, and end with the respective

1. Op.cit. 143 ff.

2. Op.cit., i 83

3. See AA.i 21 and ii 154

negatives.¹

Commenting on them the Commentator observes that *nidāna*, *hetu*, *sankhāra*, *paccaya* and *rūpa* in (b), (c), (d), (e) and *sarūpā* are all synonymous with *kāraṇa*, reason.² That *nidāna*, *hetu* and *paccaya* as used in the Pāli texts carry more or less the same sense is, of course, understandable. But one fails to understand why *sankhāra* and *rūpa*, too, should be treated similarly. For one cannot fail to notice here the names of the five *khandhas* in *sarūpā*, *savedanā* (f), *sasaññā* (g), *sasankhārā* (d) and *saviññanā* (h). However, it should be noted that in the passage in question the names of the five *khandhas* do not occur in the same order as they are usually enumerated. For the sentence beginning with *sasankhārā* does not come between the two beginning with *sasaññā* and *saviññanā*.

It is to be noted that in respect of *savedanā*, *sasaññā* and *saviññanā* the same treatment is not given. It is specifically stated that *savedanā* means "vedanāya sati", i.e., when there is or because of *vedanā*. And it is also stated that the other two terms (and *sankhatārammaṇā*), too, should be understood in the same manner.³

1. A.i 82-83

2. "Nidānaṃ hetu sankhāro paccayo rūpan ti sabbāni pi hi etāni kāraṇavevacānā'eva. - AA.ii 154

3. Ibid.loc.cit.,

This explanation fits in well with the context. And it seems to us that sarūpā and sasankhārā, too, should be approached in the same way. That is to say, sarūpā = when there is or because of rūpa, and sasankhārā = when there is or because of sankhāra. Viewed in this way, the two terms rūpa and sañkhāra cannot be understood as synonymous with cause or condition. On the contrary, it shows that the two aggregates, rūpa and sañkhāra, are causes or conditions in relation to something, i.e., the arising of evil and unwholesome states of mind (pāpakā akusalā dhammā).

It is of much significance that in the list of meanings given by Dhammapāla, rūpa in the sense of paccaya does not occur. Along with this may be mentioned that in one of the manuscripts collated by the PTS. Editor of the Anguttara-nikāya Atthakathā 11, the statement that rūpa and sañkhāra are synonymous with nidāna, hetu and paccaya is missing.¹

Coming to No.7, the example cited to show that rūpa sometimes means sabhāva, nature, appearance is: "Piyarūpe sātārūpe rajjati"² = "One delights in what is of pleasant nature, in what is of delightful nature". This is reminiscent of a passage in the Yamaka of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka where in the form of questions and answers an attempt is made

1. See AA.ii 154, n.1

2. ThīgA. 98

to unfold and delimit the implications of the term, rūpa:

Question: Rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho ti? (Is rūpa rūpakkhandha?)

Answer : Piya-rūpaṃ sātara-rūpaṃ rūpaṃ, na rūpakkhandho;
rūpakkhandho rūpaṃ c'eva rūpakkhandho ca.

(Piya-rūpa and sātara-rūpa are rūpa but not rūpakkhandha; rūpakkhandha is rūpa and is also rūpakkhandha)

Question: Na rūpakkhandho na rūpan ti? (What is not rūpakkhandha is also not rūpa?)

Answer : Piya-rūpaṃ sātara-rūpaṃ na rūpakkhandho, rūpaṃ.
Rūpaṃ ca rūpakkhandhaṃ ca thapetvā avasesā na
c'eva rūpaṃ na ca rūpakkhandho. (Piya-rūpa and
sātara-rūpa are not rūpakkhandha, but rūpa. Apart
from rūpa and rūpakkhandha, the rest are
neither rūpa nor rūpakkhandha).¹

This catechism is rather enigmatic. At first sight it seems to suggest that the Yamaka has recognized certain kinds of matter (rūpa) which it ^xexcludes from the aggregate of matter (rūpakkhandha).

Shwe Zan Aung, while agreeing that rūpa is often used in the sense of matter, refers to this catechism to show

1. Yam.i 16 ff.

that sometimes the term is used to express states of mind. He translates and understands it as follows:

"Does [everything that is called] rūpa [belong to] the "material group"? [The eighty one worldly classes of consciousness and their concomitants called] rūpa that is 'attractive' and 'pleasant' are called rūpa, but they do not belong to the 'material group'. The twenty eight material qualities (...) that go to make up the material group are designated rūpa and they belong also to the 'material group'.

[Again] is anything that does not belong to the 'material group' ever called rūpa? [such is the question.] Things attractive and desirable are called rūpa though they do not belong to the material group. Those things and that group apart, the remainder [viz. the eight classes of ⁿtranscendental, i.e., lokuttara, consciousness and their concomitants, and Nibbāna] are neither called rūpa nor do they go to make up the material group".¹

It will be seen that this translation, with what is given within the square brackets, explains satisfactorily the whole catechism. It will also be seen that the whole translation has become coherent and meaningful because of

1. Cpd. (appendix) 273

the two interpretations, underlined¹ and given within square brackets.

To repeat:

(i) "Piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ" is interpreted to mean the eighty one wordly classes of consciousness and their concomitants.

(ii) "na c'eva nūpaṃ na ca rūpakkhandho" = "awasesā" (neither rūpa nor rūpakkhandha = the rest) is interpreted to mean the eight classes of transcendental consciousness, their concomitants, and Nibbāna.

It is implied that the items in (i) can be described as piyarūpa and sātārūpa and that the items in (ii) cannot be so described.

On the basis of this interpretative translation one could certainly say that in this particular passage of the Yamaka rūpa is used not only to refer to the material aggregate but also to express states of mind. The same explanation appears in Mrs. Rhys Davids' Introduction to the Yamaka.² And, Surendra Dasgupta, too, seems to have understood the passage in the same way when he refers to Yamaka, 1, p.16 as an instance where rūpa is sometimes used

1. underlining is ours

2. Yam.i X1

in a subjective sense.¹

There are, however, certain difficulties that militate against such a conclusion. At the very outset it should be stated that neither in the Yamaka nor in the Commentary is it explicitly said that "Piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ" and "avasesā" are to be understood in the same way as they are interpreted above. Could it, then, be taken as implied in the catechism and demanded by the context?

This, too, does not seem to be possible because of more positive difficulties. It may be noted here that in the Nikāyas a wide variety of things, mental as well as material, are described as piyarūpa and sātārūpa² - a fact pointing to the generality of their usage. Coming closer to the Yamaka: the same situation obtains even in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In the Vibhaṅga, for instance, we find sixty items enumerated as an answer to the question: What is piyarūpa and sātārūpa? Among them ten are the first five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields.³ These ten items, it may be noted here, are included in the rūpakkhanda. It may then be asked that if some items included in the rūpakkhanda are describable as piyarūpa and sātārūpa,

1. Hist. of Ind. Phi. 1, 94

2. See e.g. S. ii 108-9; Iti. 114; Psm. i 40

3. Op. cit., 101 ff

why is it that in the Yamaka the things which are piyarūpa and sātārūpa are completely excluded from the rūpakkhandha.

The question does not arise if the catechism is understood in the light of certain exegetical methods pursued in the Yamaka. In unfolding the implications of terms, sometimes it lays emphasis on what appears to be obvious and seems to make more complicated what is manifestly clear. The nature of the work is summarized by Nyānātiloka when he observes: "To me it looks, as if this book was composed for examination purposes, or to get versed in answering sophistical and ambiguous or captious questions, on all the manifold doctrines and technical terms of Buddhist philosophy. The questions of identity, subordination and co-ordination of concepts are playing a prominent part in our work, which tries to give a logical clearing up and delimitation of all the doctrinal concepts as to their range and contents".¹

Following is an example of how it attempts to unfold the import of the term, gandha.

Question: Is gandha the gandhāyatana, the sphere of the smell?

Answer : Sīlagandha (fragrance of virtue), samādhigandha (fragrance of concentration), paññāgandha

1. Guide through the Abh. Piṭaka, 32.

(fragrance of wisdom) are gandha but not
gandhāyatana.¹

The purpose is to show that gandha in its figurative usage (e.g., pañña-gandha) should not be confused with gandha when it stands for smell, the objective field corresponding to the olfactory organ.

To take another example:

Question: Is sota the sotāyatana (the organ of hearing?)

Answer : (Yes, but not always, e.g.,) taṇhāsota (the stream of craving) is (also) sota but not sotāyatana.²

Here, both sotāyatana, the organ of hearing and taṇhāsota, the stream of craving are called "sota" because it occurs in both words - although of course sota in sotāyatana is different in meaning from sota in taṇhāsota. In the former it means "ear" and in the latter "stream". And, it is precisely in order to point out this difference that the whole catechism is set forth.

The catechism in question, too, should be understood in a similar way. In this particular context "Piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ" should be translated, not as "Things pleasant and desirable" (= Aung) but as "of pleasing and delightful nature" (= Nyānātiloka).³ Usually (but not always) when

1. Yam.i 54; also 167

2. Ibid., i 54; also 168

3. Guide through the Abh.Pitaka, 33

Pāli works refer to things pleasant and desirable they use the words: $yam\ piyar\bar{u}pa\bar{m}\ s\bar{a}tar\bar{u}pa\bar{m} \dots$ ¹ = that which is pleasant and desirable ... But that is not the main argument here. The moment we understand it as "Things ...", we are at a loss to understand why they are completely excluded from the rūpakkhandha. For, as observed above,² in the Vibhaṅga what is included in the rūpakkhandha, is also described as piyarūpa and satarūpa. And it is very unlikely that the Yamaka has deviated from this tradition.

Taking all these facts into consideration we may then explain the four points of the catechism as follows:

(i) "Piyarūpaṃ satarūpaṃ" (of pleasing and delightful nature or appearance) is called rūpa in the same way as tanhāsota is also called sota.

(ii) Rūpa (= Piyarūpaṃ satarūpaṃ) is excluded from rūpakkhandha (material aggregate) in the same way as sota (= tanhāsota)^{is} excluded from sotāyatana. The exclusion of piyarūpa and satarūpa from rūpakkhandha is tantamount to saying that the meaning of rūpa in the first two words is different from the meaning of rūpa in the compound rūpakkhandha. In the former it means (of pleasant and delightful) nature or appearance; in the latter, (aggregate of) matter.

1. Cf. e.g. S.ii 108; Psm.i 40

2. See above, 38

(iii) Rūpakkhandha is called rūpa as well as rūpakkhandha in the same way as sotāyatana is called sota as well as sotāyatana. Here only one meaning of the term is taken into consideration.

(iv) The last statement: "Apart from rūpa (= Piya-rūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ) and rūpakkhandha, the rest (avasesā) are neither rūpa nor rūpakkhandha", could be understood in the same way as: "Apart from chairs and tables, the rest are neither chairs nor tables". The words, "the rest" (avasesā), according to this explanation, cannot be interpreted as referring only to the eight classes of transcendental consciousness, their concomitants, and Nibbāna. They, too, are certainly included. But "the rest" means much more, i.e., all except rūpa (Piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ) and rūpakkhandha.

The explanation we have given here may look strange. But when one considers how the Yamaka seeks to unfold the implications of gandha and sota, strangeness ceases to be a disqualification. Be it also repeated here that neither in the Yamaka nor in its Commentary is it stated that "Piya-rūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ" and "avasesā" (the rest) should be understood in the same way as they are interpreted in the quoted translation (underlined and given within square brackets).¹

1. See above ,36

Moreover, the present explanation does not contradict but falls in line with the situation which obtains in the Vibhaṅga. The whole purpose of the catechism is to clarify the implications of the term rūpa in the compound rūpakkhandha and to avoid its being confused with rūpa as it occurs in piyarūpa and satarūpa. In point of fact, the Commentary rightly observes that the questions in this catechism are asked for the sole purpose of clarifying the implications of terms - vacana-sodhanattam.¹

We may then conclude that, as far as this particular Yamaka catechism is concerned, it is not correct to say that rūpa is used to express states of mind.

In the foregoing pages we have referred to many of the senses and contexts in which the term rūpa occurs in the canonical texts. Our purpose was not so much to examine them all - although of course we have had the occasion to examine some - as to give an indication of how even in the technical terminology it occurs in a plurality of senses. For we are not concerned with all the meanings of rūpa as

1. Yamā. 59

a technical term,¹ let alone its many meanings as a general term. Within the purview of this study will come an examination of rūpa in what we have called its generic sense, i.e., in the sense of matter. Stated otherwise, ours will be a study of rūpakhandha in its widest scope, i.e., as sabbaṃ rūpaṃ, the totality of matter.

Rūpakhandha:

Concerning the meaning of rūpakhandha there is, however, one important fact that should not be overlooked.

According to the Abhidhamma the compound denotes twenty seven² (in some works twenty eight)³ items called rūpa-dhammas (material elements) classified into two categories as primary and secondary. They are often referred to as sabbaṃ rūpaṃ. This, however, is not to overlook that sometimes the compound is used in a "narrower" sense to mean the rūpa-dhammas that enter into the composition of a living being.⁴ On the

1. On the subject of rūpajjhāna and rūpaloka, see Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, the ch. on "Buddhism and Yoga"; Aung, Opd. 53 ff.; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Bud. Psy. 94 ff., "Dhyāna in early Buddhism", IHQ. Vol. 3, 1927 (pp. 689-715); M. Aneski and J. Takakusu, "Dhyāna", ERE, Vol. 2 (pp. 702-704); E. J. Thomas, "State of the dead (Buddhist)", ERE, Vol. 2 (pp. 829-833); Y. N. Sinha, Ind. Psy. : Perception, 355 ff.

2. See Vbh. 12 ff.; Dhs. 124 ff.

3. The commentaries add hadaya-vatthu as the 28th, see below, 171 ff.

4. See Vbh. 3

other hand, the situation in the Nikāyas is rather complex. For as we have already indicated,¹ therein sometimes rūpa in rūpakkhandha is seen to occur in a subjective sense, too. We may first clarify its position in the Nikāyas.

As in the Abhidhamma, in the Nikāyas too rūpakkhandha is sometimes used to mean the matter that enters into the composition of a living being.²

Sometimes, as is also the case in the Abhidhamma, it is given a wider scope: The four primary elements (mahābhūta) and the matter that is dependent on them (upādārūpa) are rūpa.³ They are either internal (ajjhataṃ, ajjhattika), i.e., as part of the complex that makes a living being, or external (bahiddhā, bāhira), i.e., matter other than that which enters into the composition of living beings.⁴ In combination both refer to the totality of matter (sabbam rūpaṃ). The other usual way of referring to all matter is: "whatever matter, whether it is past, future or present, whether it is internal or external, whether it is low or dehonair, whether it is far or near, (in other words) the

1. See above, 29

2. See e.g. M.i 299

3. Cf. yam kiñci rūpaṃ sabbam rūpaṃ cattāri mahābhūtāni catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ ti - M.

4. See M.i 421 ff.

totality of matter.¹ With necessary adjustments, this kind of description is extended to the other khandhas, too.

Where, how and why rūpa (kkhandha) is sometimes used in a subjective sense may now be considered. In the Khandha Saṃyutta of the Samyuttanikāya² one reads:

Ruppattī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpan ti vuccati.

Kena ruppatti? Sītena pi ruppatti uñhena pi ruppatti jigacchāya pi ruppatti pipāsāya pi ruppatti dāmsamakasaṅvātātapa-siriṃsapāsaṃphassena pi ruppatti.

It will be seen that the most significant and central word in this passage is the verb ruppatti, which in the PTSD is explained as: to be vexed, oppressed, hurt, molested. Buddhist exegesis, too, recognizes the same meaning when it paraphrases it as: is disturbed or excited (kuppatti), hurt or impressed (pīḷīyati), broken or disintegrated (bhijjati).³ In the Abhidharmakośa version of the passage (somewhat different) it occurs in the Sanskrit form as rūpyate and is commented: être rompu (rūpyate) signifie être endommagé (bādhyate).⁴

There is, however, this fact to be noted. According

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1. yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahi-
ddhā vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbhaṃ
rūpaṃ - S.ii 252; also iii 47, 68, 80
 2. iii, 86
 3. See VbhA.14; Mh.NdA.13; SA.ii 290
 4. AK.Ch.i 24; see also AKvy.i.34

to the Buddhist exegesis ruppatti occurs in two different contexts. In the first it refers to distress, excitement, or dissipation as a state of mind;¹ in the second, to disturbance, mutability or changeableness of matter.² In the first it is disturbance in a psychological and subjective sense and in the second it is disturbance in a physical and objective sense.

In the opinion of the scholiasts ruppatti in the quoted passage occurs in the latter context; that is to say, the verb implies disturbance in what we have described as the physical sense. The disturbance implied by the verb ruppatti - it is suggested - is the disturbance of the physical body of a person. It is disturbed (ruppati) by cold (sīta), heat (unha), "hunger" (jigacchā), "Thirst" (pipāsa) and by the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun, and reptiles (ḍaṣamakasaṅgāṭāpasirimsapasamphassa).³

We are given to understand that "hunger" (jigacchā) and "thirst" (pipāsā) as used in the present context do not mean hunger and thirst as a subjective experience or as two organic sensations but the physical factor that

1. See Mh.Nd.i 5; VismS.v 51

2. See FsmA.i,109; AbhvK.245; VismS.v,51

3. See VismS.v 51

brings them about, that is to say, the heat inside the belly (udaraggisantāpa).¹

This incidentally reminds one, of the Vaibhāṣikas who too used the two terms, hunger (bubhuṅṣā) and thirst (pipāsā) in two distinct senses. In the first they mean a variety of subjective experience, a state of mind (jighatsā caitasiko dharmah ... evaṃ pipāsā pi vaktavyā).² In the second they mean the physical factors which bring about the two organic sensations in question. If the physical causes are also called after the psychological effects, this, it is said, should be understood as a case of hypallage, of cause being designated after the effect - kāraṇe kāryopacārād. It is like the saying: appearance of the Buddhas is happiness. What, in point of fact, is meant to say is that the appearance of Buddhas is the cause of happiness and not happiness in itself.³

To come back to the passage: it was noted that according to the scholastic interpretation the term rūpa which in the passage is defined as "that which is disturbed"

1. Ibid.loc.cit.,

2. AKvy.i 27

3. See AK.ch.i 12 ; cf. attum-icchā jighatsā caitasiko dharmah. tasya kāraṇam. antar udare kāyendriyena yah sprśyate. sā jighatsā nāmopadāya-rūpaṃ. yathā buddhānaṃ sukham utpāda ity-ādi abhyudaya-niḥśreya-sa-sukhakarāna tvāt buddhotpādasya sa sukham ity ucyate. tadvat. - AKvy.i 27

(ruppatī ti) means the physical body because it is disturbed or affected by the factors enumerated. It is, however admitted that when the body is disturbed the mind, too, is disturbed, in this sense. When the body, to be more precise, the organ of touch which is spread all over the body, comes into contact with heat, cold, etc., there arise tactile sensations. Hunger and thirst (i.e., in the psychological sense) are also explained as tactile sensations. They are brought about when "hunger" and "thirst" (i.e., in the physical sense = udaraggisantāpa) come into contact with the organ of touch which, as stated above, is spread all over the body. But it is not admitted that this "mental disturbance" (tactile sensations) is either meant or represented by the term rūpa in the quoted passage.¹

For all its precision of statement one is tempted to doubt whether this interpretation represents the original meaning of the passage. The given interpretation seems to be a reversal of what the passage was meant to convey. If we understood the items enumerated in a direct way, the resulting conclusion would certainly be different.

In the Nikāyas the verb ruppati is mostly, if not always, used in a subjective sense to mean "distressed, grieved or pained". Its extension to refer to the disturbance or mutability of matter appears to be the work of later

1. See VismS.v, 51 ff.

scholasticism - although of course such a use is perfectly understandable. Prof. Kern's study of the verb as it occurs in the Jātaka and the Cariyāpiṭaka has also brought into relief its implication of grief.¹ In understanding the above passage the Suttanipāta gāthā sentence, "sallaviddho'va ruppati"² = "is pained, distressed or molested like unto one pierced by an arrow", is of much significance. In paraphrasing this ruppati the Niddesa uses, among other words, domanassito hoti³ = becomes sorrow-stricken. Commenting on the Sanskrit version of the sentence, Yaśomitra observes that herein it is proper that rūpyate should be understood as indicative of disturbance in a psychological sense, i.e., the painful feeling (duḥkha-vedayitṛdvād bādhyata).⁴ It will thus be seen that as recognized in the Buddhist exegesis itself ruppati in the sentence refers, not to the physical disturbance of the body created by the passage of the arrow, but to the mental affliction, the painful experience which results from the latter.

Ruppati of the quoted passage, too, could be understood

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1. Verspreide Geschriften, ii 261
 2. Sn.151 (verse 767)
 3. Mh.Nd.i 5
 4. AKvy.i 34

in a similar (direct) way. "Sītena ... ruppatti jigacchāya ... ruppatti" could well be taken to mean "is disturbed or affected by cold, hunger". This is another way of saying that one is experiencing the disturbance or affections, namely of cold and hunger. The other items, too, can be understood in the same manner. When understood in this way the resulting conclusion is that in the quoted passage the term rūpa is used in a subjective sense, i.e., as referring to certain organic affections.¹

This, moreover, is not the only Nikāya passage where rūpa (kkhandha) is used in a subjective sense. In the Majjhimanikāya, ii, 98 it seems to refer to the visible, sounds, smells, tastes and the tangible in their appearance as sensations.

From this it should not be concluded that in the Nikāyas rūpa (kkhandha) is always used in the sense of, and understood as, sensations. This is only one of the senses

1. See Dasgupta, Hist.Ind.Phi.i 94. The quoted passage seems to give an indication of the type of afflictions which often assailed the monks in their solitary retreats. Cold, heat, hunger, thirst, the touch of mosquitos, the sun, wind and reptiles - these would have often visited the monks who often betook themselves to forests and solitary haunts for purposes of meditation. In fact the self-same items are enumerated elsewhere (see e.g.M.ii,8) and the good monk is described as one who could put up with them (khāyī).

in which the term is sometimes used. For, as noted earlier,¹ more often than not it is used in the sense of matter whether it is understood as a part of the complex that makes a living being (ajjhattam) or otherwise (bahiddhā). Some degree of elasticity in the use of terms is more evident in the Nikāyas than in the post-Nikāyan works. Such a situation is understandable, for at the earlier phase of Buddhism the emphasis seems to have been more on practice than on theory. As yet, it was too early for the need to demarcate clearly the range and use of the terms to be felt. Rigid and standard definitions, delimitation of the implications of the doctrinal concepts and terms, coinage of more and more technical terms were more the work of Abhidhamma scholasticism. A glance at the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka would show, among other things, how and to what extent the process of "vacana-sodhana" (clarification of the implications of terms) was carried out. And we saw² how the Yamaka sought to clarify the apparently obvious fact that taṇhā-sota, the stream of craving is quite different from sotāyatana, the organ of hearing. Since our immediate concern is with the term rūpa (kkhandha), let us narrow down the field and see how it came to be explained

1. See above, 45

2. See above, 40

and defined with more and more precision.

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka there is certainly some uniformity in the application of the term rūpa (kkhandha). It was observed that in the Nikāyas although it stood as a general term for matter at times it was also used to express certain subjective phenomena. Herein, on the other hand the latter use is given up. Rūpakkhandha includes a group of twenty seven items called rūpa dhammas, material elements. However, the constituents of the group are not as uniform as might be expected. Some represent certain elements of matter and the others certain facts connected with matter - all postulated as rūpa-dhammas.¹ Thus although the term is delimited as to its application, yet the diversity of the items denoted by it suggests that ⁱⁿ the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, too, it was used with some degree of elasticity.

In the post-canonical Abhidhammic works this situation, too, was reformed. On the basis of a classification as nipphanna and anipphanna the real elements of matter (nipphanna) were distinguished from the nominal.² A contribution more positive than this, too, was made. It is true that in the Dhammasangani of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka each rūpa-dhamma

1. See Dhs. 124 ff.

2. See Vism. 381-2; Asl. 343; Abhv. 74

is given a short and laconic definition. It is also true that on the basis of these individual definitions one could understand how it interpreted matter. Nevertheless, it has not provided us with what might be called a formal and general definition of matter. The later scholiasts took up the matter and fulfilled the need. And this is the next aspect that we propose to consider here.

Definition of matter:

We have already discussed the significance of ruppatti in the quoted Samyuttanikāya passage and shown that therein rūpa is used to refer to certain organic affections.¹ That ethical edification was one of the reasons in using this verb here and elsewhere (but not everywhere) is fairly obvious. For conveying as it does the idea of grief, affliction, molestation, is very suggestive of the fact of suffering (dukkha-sacca) which is one of the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism. In the commentaries and the kindred works this verb along with its noun, ruppāna were made use of to develop a definition of rūpa in the sense of matter. And in these latter contexts they came to assume, so to say, a less religious and more scientific tone. This association of ruppatti with matter could certainly be traced to the Sutta

1. See above, 46 ff.

passage. Could it then be concluded that in the Sutta passage, too, rūpa was used in the same sense? Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. We believe sufficient evidence was adduced to show that the reference is to certain subjective phenomena. What seems to have happened is this. The Sutta passage provided a clue to develop a definition of rūpa in the sense of matter. And once this was done the passage itself was sought to be interpreted so as to fall in line with this definition. The apparent connection between ruppati and rūpa (matter), too, seems to have encouraged the scholiasts in associating the former with the interpretation of the latter. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes suggested that ruppati is the etymological base of rūpa.¹ Such attempts at postulating etymological bases to suit given interpretations are, in fact, met with in the Buddhist exegesis.

It hardly needs mention that the verb, ruppati and the noun, ruppana when associated with the definition of matter are indicative of disturbance in a physical sense or on a physical level. The commentators' statement, namely ruppana-lakkhaṇaṃ rūpaṃ, expresses the mutability, changeableness

1. See Abhv. 245; see also Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci, 350

or disintegration of matter or its susceptibility and receptivity to being disturbed, obstructed, scattered or dispersed.¹ In the Abhidharmakośa the agency of ruppana is given as the hand.² The implication is that material things could be subjected to ruppana by other material things. And, the fact of ruppana in matter is said to take place by way of its modification (vipariṇāmotpādana) and by way of its scattering, dispersal (vikriyotpādana).³ In the Theravāda sources the phenomenon of ruppana is often illustrated with reference to cold (sīta) and heat (unha). When a physical object is confronted with such contrary forces as cold and heat, the climatic disturbance which it undergoes is a case of ruppana in matter.⁴

The above definition is certainly not very specific. To say that matter is that which^{is} subject to ruppana is too general a statement, just as rūpaṃ aniccaṃ (matter is impermanent). What is more, as recognized in the Buddhist exegesis itself, ruppana could also mean disturbance on a

1. Cf. UdA.42; VbhA.3-4; VismS.v 51; PsmA.i 79

2. Op.cit., Ch.i 24

3. Ibid.loc.cit.,

4. Cf. Ruppati ti sītunhādīhi vikāraṃ apajjati, apādiyati ti attho. Vikārappatti ca sītādivirodhappaccayasannidhāne visaduppatti yeva. - AbhvK.245; see also VismS.v 52

psychological level.¹ It was perhaps the recognition of this generality that led certain Buddhists to advance another definition, more specific than the above. According to this definition, given in the Abhidharmakośa and its Vyākhyā, "pratighāta" is the fundamental characteristic of matter.

Pratighāta is "l'impénétrabilité, le heurt ou résistance, l'obstacle qu'un rūpa oppose à ce que son lieu soit occupé par un autre rūpa".² This definition points to the fact of extension (occupation in space) and to the fact of resistance as the fundamental characteristics of matter. Matter is that which is sapratigha, i.e., that which covers or is extended in space - yad deśam āvr̥ṇoti.³ Where there is one sapratigha object there cannot be (at the same time) another sapratigha object - yatraikaṃ sapratighaṃ vastu tatra dvitīyasyotpattir na bhavati.⁴

Thus the definition of matter as sapratigha brings into relief its characteristic of "covering" (āvaraṇa-lakṣaṇa), i.e., extension in space and its power of resistance

1. See above, 47

2. AK.Ch.i 24-25

3. AKvy.i 24

4. Ibid., i 56; see also Stcherbatsky, Cent.Concep.ll n.2

or impenetrability (pratibandhana).¹

In the Theravāda Abhidhammic works paṭigha is often used as indicative of the contact, actual or potential, between the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects. The ten items in question are therefore described as (rūpaṃ) sappatighaṃ.² Nevertheless, the characteristics implied by the above definition are recognized in the Theravāda, too. This is shown by the conception of the four primary elements of matter (mahābhūta).

As we shall see in detail in the next chapter, although the four are named paṭhabhī, āpo, tejo and vāyo, they are not understood in the popular sense as earth, water, fire and air respectively. The first represents solidity (kakkhalatta) and extension (pattharana); the second fluidity (davata) and cohesion (bandhanatta); the third, the temperature of cold and heat (sīta, unha); and the fourth, distension (thambhitatta) and mobility (samudīrana). They are positionally inseparable (padesato avinibhoga) and necessarily co-existent (niyata-sahajāta) and are present in varying degrees of intensity (ussada-vasena) in all instances of matter, beginning from the smallest material

1. See AKvy.i 58

2. See Dhs. 134 ff. and 147

unit (rūpa-kalāpa)¹ to anything bigger than that.

Now the fact that paṭhavī-dhātu, which represents solidity and extension, is said to be present in every instance of matter, is another way of saying that every instance of matter is characterized by solidity (whatever be the degree) and extension (whatever be the extent). In the Abhidharmakośa and its Vyākhyā the four primary elements are defined in more or less the same way. Hence it is very likely that when they take pratighāta as the fundamental characteristic of matter they have built up this general definition on the same basis.

Elements of Matter:

Useful though these general definitions are, how Buddhism interpreted matter would not be quite clear before a study of what are called rūpa- (rūpino)-dhammas has been made. A clearer picture would emerge only when the individual definitions given to these items were examined. This will be the subject of study in the next four chapters. However, a few preliminary observations on their general character may be made here.

By rūpa-dhammas Buddhism means the ultimate irreducible factors or data that make up the physical world. Any given

1. See below, ch.viii

material thing is analysable into these (ultimate) factors. Apart from them, no other matter is recognized. That elusive metaphysical entity called "matter" is explained away as an illusion.

Although each rūpa-dhamma is postulated as if it were a discrete entity, this does not imply that it has an independent existence. It is only for the purposes of description, that it is so postulated. In actual fact, it always exists in inseparable association with a set of other rūpa-dhammas. Even when the analysis of matter "ended" in atomism, this theory of "co-operate" existence was not abandoned. For even the so-called atom (paramāṇu) is again a collection or group (kalāpa) of rūpa-dhammas, one inseparable from another, and all forming a unity.

Their interconnection is sought to be explained with reference to laws of causation and conditionality. One does not inhere in another; nor is one a substance of another. In brief, no distinction between substance and quality is introduced. A distinction is, however, made between primary and secondary. Even here the dichotomy is sought to be established with reference to certain causal laws.

Finally a word may be said concerning the list of twenty seven (sometimes twenty eight) rūpa-dhammas. Some of

the items in the list represent certain facts (e.g., phases, modes, limitation) connected with matter. To translate them as material elements would certainly be a misnomer. However, there is this justification for our doing so: Buddhists themselves observe that they are not true rūpa-dhammas, but nominal "entities". Yet, as a matter of convention - rūḷhiyā - they themselves refer to them by the same term.¹ Hence if we, too, keep on translating all the items as "material elements", this, be it noted, is done as a matter of "rūḷhi".

1. See below, 127, 183

CHAPTER TWO

THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS

Most of the schools of Indian thought, notably the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta and the medical tradition as represented by Caraka and Suśruta, recognize five mahābhūtas (elemental substances), viz. pṛthivī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), vāyu (air) and ākāśa (ether).¹ That ākāśa is the fifth is admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, too. But in many respects it differs from the other four: It is a non-corporeal (amūrta) substance devoid of tactility (sparśa) and characterised by ubiquity (vibhū), absolute continuity and infinite magnitude. As such, unlike the other four substances, it is not, in the ultimate analysis, composed of atoms. Thus although ākāśa is introduced as a bhūta, in view of its peculiar characteristics, it has to be distinguished from the other four and is, in a way, on a par with such intangible substances as kāla, time.² In Jainism, on the other hand, it is not ranked with what is called bhūda-catukka, "the elemental tetrad" which consists of pṛthivī, ap, tejas, and vāyu. Both ākāśa and bhūda-catukka are brought under the general heading, ajīva, non-spirit; but only the latter is brought under the more specific,

1. See Seal: Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, Ch.1.

2. See Bhaduri: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, Ch.111

puggala, matter.¹

The position of Buddhism in regard to this question is similar to that of Jainism. That is to say, only paṭhavī, āpo, tejo and vāyo are brought under the heading, mahābhūta. It is of course true that in the Nikāyas sometimes ākāsa is enumerated immediately after, and apparently as co-ordinate with, the above four items.² But this does not mean that ākāsa is the fifth mahābhūta, just as much as viññāna (consciousness), which, too, is sometimes enumerated after the five items in question,³ is not the sixth mahābhūta. It may be noted here that when ākāsa and viññāna are mentioned along with paṭhavī, āpo, tejo and vāyo, the (general) designation used in respect of all the six items is dhātu. On the other hand, the term, mahābhūta is always used in a more specific sense, i.e. as referring only to the last four items.

In the later scholasticism, too, the situation remains unchanged. True, on the nature of ākāsa, the scholiasts advance more than one interpretation.⁴ But on its non-recognition as a mahābhūta, they all agree.

1. See Pañcastikāyasāra, 79 ff.

2. Cf. e.g. D.iii 247; M i 421 ff.

3. Cf. e.g. M iii 31; A i 176

4. See below, 239

With this clarification as to the number of mahābhūtas, we may now proceed to consider how they are understood in Buddhism. In the Nikāyas they are defined in simple and general terms and are illustrated mostly with reference to the constituents of the body: Paṭhavī-dhātu is that which is hard (kakkalaṃ) and rigid (kharigaṭaṃ) e.g; hair of the head or body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, etc. Āpo-dhātu is water (āpo) or that which is watery (āpogaṭaṃ), e.g: bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, tears, etc. Tejo-dhātu is fire or heat (tejo) or that which is fiery (tejogaṭaṃ), e.g: the heat in the body which transmutes food and drink in digestion. Vāyo-dhātu is air (vāyo) or that which is airy (vāyogaṭaṃ) e.g: "wind discharged upwards and downwards, wind in the abdomen or belly, vapours that traverse the several members, inhalings and exhalings of breath."¹

What one can gather from these definitions is that from the very beginning Buddhism did not make a radical departure from the popular conception of the mahābhūtas. There are, however, some Nikāya passages² which seem to imply that they were understood in a more "abstract" way, i.e. as interpreted in the Abhidhamma. (To this we shall come

1. See M i 421 ff.

2. Cf. D i 215 ff.; D.iii 87; S i 15

soon). But within the Nikāyas themselves such implications are not worked out into a clearly formulated theory.

It is really in the Abhidhamma that we meet with such a situation. Here we are presented with a different conception of the mahābhūtas. Much of the earlier terminology is retained, but the earlier definitions are modified. The subject is presented in greater detail and with more precision. New theories have been evolved and new interpretations advanced so as to bring the whole subject in line with the other subsequent developments of the doctrine.

For the Abhidhamma, too, kakkāḷa and khara which mean hard and rigid respectively bring out the essential nature of paṭhavī-dhātu, the earth element.¹ The first is said to represent its characteristic (lakkhaṇa) and the second its mode (ākāra).² The question is raised whether kakkhāḷatta, i.e. hardness is itself not the paṭhavī-dhātu. It is maintained that although this is the case, yet for the convenience of definition paṭhavī-dhātu is said to possess the characteristic of kakkhāḷatta.³

It will be seen that according to the Nikāyan

1. See Dhs.177; Vbh.82

2. Tattha paṭhamam lakkhaṇa-vacanam dutiyam ākāra-vacanam - Vism.

3. Cf. Nanu ca kakkhāḷattameva paṭhavīdhātūti? Saccametaṃ.

Tathā pi viññatāvinnātasaddatthāvasena abhinne pi dhamme kappanāsiddhena bhedena evaṃ niddeso kato. Evaṃ hi atthavisesāvabodho hoti ti. - Vism. 362-3

definition what is (comparatively) kakkala is pathavī, whereas according to the Abhidhammic definition kakkhalatta (the fact of hardness) is itself pathavī.

The conception of pathavī-dhātu in this way is not peculiar to the Theravāda alone. Parallel definitions are met within other schools of Buddhist thought. In its chapter on the Genesis of the World, the Mahāvastu says that when the living beings who lived at a new evolution of the world began to eat whole mouthfuls of the essence of this earth as food, their bodies came to possess the characteristics of gurutva, heaviness, kharatva, roughness and kakkhaṭatva, hardness.¹ The implication is given that gurutva, kharatva and kakkhaṭatva represent the essential nature of pathavī-dhātu. The Abhidarmakośa and its Vyākhyā, too, use the latter two terms in defining the pṛthivī-dhātu.² In the Abhidharmasamuccaya it is defined as kaṭhinatā,³ a term which could be interpreted as meaning rigidity or solidity. As such, ^{this} interpretation is almost the same as that given by the Theravādins. Thus there is general agreement among the

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1. Op.cit; i 339: cf. Yato ca bhikṣavaste satvā taṃ pṛthivī-rasamalopakarakamāhāramāhārensuh atha teṣāṃ kāye gurutvam ca kharatvam ca kakkhaṭatvam ca upanīpate.
 2. AK Ch. i 22; AKvy. i 57,66
 3. Op.cit; 3

Buddhist scholiasts in maintainig that what is called paṭhavī-dhātu stands for the phenomenon of hardness, rigidity, solidity or compactness in matter.

Paṭhavī-dhātu is also explained as that which extends or spreads out (paṭtharatī ti paṭhavī).¹ Extension is occupation in space. "Tridimensional extension gives rise to our idea of a solid body. As no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, Buddhists derive their idea of hardness (kakkhaḷatta-lakkhaṇa) from paṭhavī."² Thus the interpretation of paṭhavī-dhātu as the element of extension brings into relief a different method of approach.

In the commentaries we get further discussions on the peculiar function of this element. Buddhaghosa observes that it acts as a foundation, a sort of fulcrum and that it manifests itself as receiving (sampaṭiccana-paccupaṭṭhāna).³ This has been further explained to mean that the other three primary elements are established on it (paṭhavī-patiṭṭhitā) and that therefore it serves as a support, a basis (patiṭṭhānam) for them.⁴ That this view is shared by the Vaibhāṣikas is shown by their contention that the "bearing-up"

1. Vism. 364; Abhv. 64.

2. Cpd. 155, n.1

3. Vism. 365; see also Asl. 332; Mvn 58

4. Vism. 368; see also Asl. 332; Mvn 58; Abhvk. 249

or supporting (saṃdhāraṇa) of ships by water (= ocean) is a sufficient ground for the inference that the pṛthivī-dhātu is present in water.¹

The above conception of the function of paṭhavī-dhātu appears to be only a refinement of the popular view that the earth as it is ordinarily understood is a receptacle, a sort of dumping ground for all types of material things. It is, in fact, significant to note that the Vibhāvinī Tikā observes that just as what we conventionally call earth is the support of trees, mountains, etc., even so the earth element is a support for the other material elements.²

Āpo-dhātu represents the fact of viscosity (sineha) and cohesion or binding together in matter (rūpassa bandhanattaṃ).³ Bandhanatta or cohesion refers more to its function. "For the āpo-dhātu binds together iron, etc., in masses, makes them rigid. Because they are so bound, they are called rigid; similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palm-seeds, elephant tusks, ox-horns, etc., All such things the āpo-dhātu binds and makes rigid; they are rigid because of its

1. See AKvy. i 33

2. Tarupabbatādīnaṃ pakatipaṭhavī viya saha-jātarūpānaṃ patiṭṭhānabhāveṇaḥ pakkhāyati, upaṭṭhātī ti vuttam hoti - ADSVT. 110

3. See Dhs. 177; Vbh. 83

binding."¹ Paggharana, flowing, and nissandabhāva, state of streaming, are also cited as two other characteristics of āpo-dhātu² - a view which suggests the popular and common sense idea of water. However this does not mean that āpo-dhātu, as it came to be interpreted in the Abhidhamma, is identical with water. No primary element can exist independently of, or in isolation from, the other three.³ Hence āpo-dhātu is present not only in water but also in air, fire, etc.

In the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, too, the āpo-dhātu is defined in a similar manner. It stands for dravatva, liquidity and snehatva, viscosity in material things.⁴ It may be noted here that the "ap" substance of the Vaiśeṣikas, too, has the same two characteristics; āpo dravāḥ snigdḥāḥ.⁵ But, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, liquidity and viscosity are qualities inherent in the "ap" substance. No such dichotomy is recognised by the Buddhists. Notwithstanding these metaphysical differences, the parallelism goes still further. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that saṃgraha, cohesion or agglutination,

1. Ayapindi-ādāni hi āpodhātu ābandhitvā thaddhāni karoti, tāya ābaddhattā tāni thaddhāni nāma honti. Pāsānapabbata-tālatthitthidantagosingāsu pi es'eva nayo. Sabbāni h'etāni āpodhātu eva ābandhitvā thaddhāni karoti, āpdhātuyā ābaddhattā va thaddhāni honti. - Asl.335 (tr. from Expositor).

2. See Vism.365; Asl.336; Abhv.250; Mvn.58

3. See below, 78

4. See AK.Ch.i 23, n.3;

5. VS. 55

is a distinct quality produced by fluidity and viscosity operating together.¹ The Buddhists maintain that āpo-dhātu, which stands for the facts of liquidity and viscosity, performs the function of saṃgraha. Hence it is that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the phenomenon of cohering or non-broken continuity in a blazing fire is due to the presence therein of āpo-dhātu.² The same view is recognized by the Theravādins, too, when they say that āpo-dhātu manifests itself by its action of cohesion (āpodhātu saṅgahapaccupaṭṭhānā).³

Tejo-dhātu signifies the phenomenon of heat, the terms being used are usma and usuma.⁴ In the Sanskrit sources we get uṣṇatva, and its corresponding Pāli form, uṇhatta is the standard term used in the Pāli commentaries and the ṭīkāś.

One significant feature of the Theravāda conception of tejo-dhātu concerns the question of śīta, cold. The Vaiśeṣikas, for instance, maintain that uṣṇa, heat is the peculiar quality of the fire-substance (tejasaḥ uṣṇatā) and that śīta, cold is that of the water-substance (apsu śītatā).⁵ Since the natural touch of water is cold "other substances (bodies) are cold only in proportion to the extent to which

1. See Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 126.

2. AKvy. i 33.

3. Asl. 332; Abhvt. 65 ; Abhvk. 250

4. See Dhs. 177; Vbh. 83

5. VS. 81

water enters into their composition."¹ That the Vaibhāṣikas, too, associate śīta with āpo-dhātu is shown by their contention that the touch of cold in wind points to the presence therein of āpo-dhātu.² Śrīlābha's view: "Le feu élémentaire existe dans l'eau, puisque celle-ci est plus ou moins froide,"³ carries the implication that heat and cold are represented by tejo-dhātu and āpo-dhātu respectively.

The position taken by the Theravādins in regard to this question is quite different. In the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka we do not get any explicit statement concerning the position of śīta, cold in relation to the primary elements. Nevertheless there is no possibility of its being considered as represented by āpo-dhātu because this particular primary element, as maintained by the Theravādins, does not come within the sphere of the tangible (phoṭṭhabbāyatana).⁴ It is only in the ṭīkā literature that we are presented with a clear statement on this subject: "Although cold (sītata) is known by the sense of touch, it is really tejo. The sensation of cold (śīta-buddhi) is obtained when the heat

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1. Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 129.
 2. Akvy. i 33
 3. AK.Ch.ii 146
 4. See below, 94 ff.

is less, for there is no distinct quality (guṇa) called cold.... Hence it is that during the summer season when people having first stayed in the sun enter the shade they experience the sensation of cold. And when they stay there for a long time they experience the sensation of heat.¹ Thus in the view of the Theravādins, cold is not the peculiar characteristic of āpo-dhātu (as is believed by the Vaibhāṣikas), but is the relative absence of heat. And heat is represented by tejo-dhātu.

The characteristic function of tejo-dhātu is paripācana, i.e. ripening or maturing.² For this is the element which heats, matures, sharpens and imparts heat to all other material elements.³

Vāyo-dhātu, the air element, as defined in the Dhammasaṅgani, signifies thambhitatta, inflation or distension, and chambhitatta, fluctuation or mobility.⁴ While the other

1. Kiñcāpi hi sītata phusitvā gayhati, sā pana tejo yeva. Mande hi unhatte sītabuddhi, sītataṣaṅkhātassa kassa ci guṇassa abhāvato. ... Tathā hi ghammakāle atāpe thatvā Chāyaṃ pavitṭhaṇaṃ sītabuddhi hoti, tatth'eva cirakālaṃ thitāṇaṃ unhabuddhi. - ADSVT.111; see also VismT.459; VismS.v 75 ff.

2. See Asl.332

3. Cf. Tejete paripāceti niset vā tikkhabhāvena sesabhūta-ttayaṃ usmāpeti ti tejo. - ADSVT.110

4. Op.cit.,177; see also Vbh.84

three primary elements stand for the facts of solidity, cohesion and heat this represents the more restless and dynamic aspect of matter.

The standard term used in the commentarial works to describe the vāyo-dhātu is samudīrana which means mobility or motion.¹ In the Sanskrit sources samudīranatvaṃ occurs in combination with laghu or laghutā (light or lightness).² For the Theravādins, lahutā represents one of the secondary elements of rūpa.³ This seems to be the reason why they do not associate it with vāyo-dhātu which is one of the primary elements of rūpa. The Abhidharmakośa takes note of a similar problem. It observes that according to a Sūtra the vāyo-dhātu is laghutva and that according to the Prakaraṇas laghutva is a secondary rūpa. It seeks to reconcile the two views by stating that "le dharma qui a pour nature la motion (īraṇātmake), c'est l'élément vent: sa nature (légèreté) est manifestée par son acte de motion (īraṇākarmaṇ)".⁴ As the Theravādins conceive lahutā as a secondary element of rūpa, in their opinion it is not associated with one particular primary element but is dependent on all the four.⁵

1. See Asl.332; Abhv.251.

2. See AK.Ch.i 23, n.2; AKvy.i 33

3. See below, 98 ff.

4. AK.Ch.i 23.

5. See below, 204 ff.

These are only minor differences. There is general agreement among the scholiasts that vāyo-dhātu is representative of mobility or motion (īraṇa, samudīraṇa). With the development of the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇika-vāda),¹ the above definition of vāyo-dhātu could not be retained without modification. We shall discuss this theory in a later chapter. Suffice it to note here that according to it, all elements of existence, mental as well as material, are of momentary duration; they are momentary appearances or momentary flashings. Closely connected with this theory is the denial of motion. As the Abhidharmakośa observes: "Le conditionné n'existe pas au delà de l'acquisition de son être: il périt à la place où il est né; il ne peut de cette place aller à une autre."² If vāyo-dhātu is representative of mobility or motion, how is this statement to be reconciled with the denial of motion?

In keeping with the theory of momentariness motion too is given a different interpretation: "Par motion, on entend ce qui fait que la série d'états qui constituent une chose va se reproduisant dans des lieux différents; de même qu'on parle de la motion d'une flamme."³ Accordingly,

1. See below, 220 ff.

2. Op.cit., Ch.iv 4-5

3. AK.Ch.i 22-23.

motion has to be understood, not as the movement of an element from one locus in space to another (deśāntaragamana), but as the appearance of different elements in adjacent locations (deśāntarotpatti).¹ For in the case of momentary elements wherever appearance takes place/itself takes place there disappearance: yatraivotpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ.² The classic example given in this connection is the light of the lamp. The so-called light of the lamp, it is contended, is nothing but a common designation given to an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing points. When the production changes place one says that the light has changed. But in reality other flames have appeared in another place.³

It is interesting to note that this new definition of motion has somehow or other found its way to Theravāda scholasticism that flourished after the time of Buddhaghosa. In the earlier Pāli commentaries vāyo-dhātu is understood as indicative of motion; but therein motion is not denied. In the later works, notably the ṭīkāś, motion is denied; that is to say, it is interpreted as desantaruppatti, the

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1. Akvy.i 33, see also KSP: MCB.iv 219-20
 2. AKVy.i 33
 3. See, Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, i 99

appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations.¹ This new development has necessitated a modification in the earlier definition of vāyo-dhātu. Hence it is that the scholiasts seek to define vāyo-dhātu as the cause of "motion" (= desantaruppatti). It is that which causes or brings about the arising of momentary elements in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti-hetu-bhāvena... gametī ti).² The recognition, on the part of the Theravādins, of this new definition of motion is no matter for surprise for, as we shall see in a later chapter,³ they too developed a theory of momentariness which, except for minor details, presents a close parallelism to that of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

From the foregoing description of the four mahābhūtas it would appear that, as interpreted by the Ābhidhammikas, paṭhavī stands for solidity and extension, āpo for viscosity and cohesion, tejo for heat and maturing and vāyo for motion or (according to the later interpretation) the cause of motion. The four are not the qualities or attributes of what is called bhūta-rūpa, the primary matter; on the contrary, they are its constituents. In this respect, they are like the

1. See Vism[†].359; ADSV[†].110; Abhv[†].249,251

2. Vism[†].359

3. See below, 223 ff.

three guṇas of Sāṃkhya, which form the constituents of prakṛti, the ultimate causal nexus of the world of nonself. The four mahābhūtas are co-ordinate and represent four distinct forces or phenomena in the realm of matter. The characteristics (lakkhaṇa), functions (rasa), and manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna) of one are different from those of another.¹ The non-alteration of their characteristics is constantly alluded to. However much one mahābhūta is influenced by the others, it never abandons its essential nature. In this connection the Atthasālinī refers to a Sutta passage where it is stated that the four mahābhūtas might alter their characteristics sooner than it were possible for the Ariyan disciple endowed with assured faith in the Buddha to alter.² The implication is that both are impossibilities. What all this amounts to is that the four mahābhūtas which stand for four distinct ultimate data of all material phenomena are neither transmutable into one another nor reducible to a common ground.

There is, however, a way in which they group themselves into two pairs, each having one common characteristic.

1.... sabbāsam pi dhātūnaṃ salakkhaṇādito nanattam. Annan' eva hi pathavīdhātuyā lakkhaṇarasapaccupaṭṭhānāni, annāni apodhātu-ādinam. - Vism. 366

2.Op.cit., 336.

Buddhaghosa notes that paṭhavi-dhātu and āpo-dhātu are similar in heaviness (garukattā sabhāgā) and that tejo-dhātu and vāyo-dhātu are similar in lightness (lahukattā sabhāgā).¹ This theory seems to have been developed from the observation of some of the features of the mahābhūtas as understood in the popular or literal sense. It is also reminiscent of the contention of the Vaiśeṣikas, namely that weight is possessed by only two elemental substances - earth and water.²

Another fundamental feature of the mahābhūtas is that they always exist together (sahajāta, sahabhū). No mahābhūta can exist independently of the other three.³ The nascence, subsistence and the evanescence⁴ of one do always synchronize with those of the others. It is precisely for this reason that their relation is described as one of reciprocal co-nascence (aññam'añña-sahajāta).⁵ That is to say, since no mahābhūta can come into being independently of the others, in this sense, each is postulated as a condition by way of co-nascence (aññam'añña-sahajāta-paccaya) in relation to the other three.⁶

1. See Vism. 368

2. See Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 125.

3. See Tkp.3,14,36 ff.; AK.Ch.ii 248

4. See below., 223 ff.

5. Tkp.3,14

6. Ibid.loc.cit.

The commentators seek to explain the mutual conditionality of the mahābhūtas under all possible combinations and permutations: Taking each one beginning with "earth" there are three others whose occurrence is due to that one, thus with three due to one, their occurrence takes place in four ways. Likewise each one beginning with "earth", occurs in dependence on the other three, thus with one due to three, their occurrence takes place in four ways. But with the last two dependent on the first two, with the first two dependent on the last two, with the second and fourth dependent on the first and third, with the first and third dependent on the second and fourth, with the first and fourth dependent on the second and third, with the second and third dependent on the first and fourth, they occur in six ways with two elements due to two.¹ The fundamental principle involved in the relation by way of reciprocal co-nascence is that when one element arises, the other three too must arise simultaneously. With this as the basis, the commentators have shown how each of the mahābhūtas becomes, at one and the same time, the condition as well as the conditioned in relation to the others, under different combinations and permutations.

1. Path of Purification, 405 (Vism. 370)

Closely connected with this is the inseparability of the mahābhūtas. They exist in inseparable (avinibhoga) association: they are not positionally resolvable; one mahābhūta cannot be separated from the rest.¹ Buddhaghosa explains this characteristic of inseparability in a rather mysterious way: "And just as, whomsoever the great creatures such as the spirits grasp hold of (posses), they have no standing place either inside him or outside him and yet they have no standing independently of him, so too these elements are not found to stand either inside or outside each other, yet they have no standing independently of one another."² What is attempted to show is that they have no thinkable standing place relative to each other.

This explanation as to the relative position of the mahābhūtas is sought to be justified on the following grounds: If they were to exist inside each other, then they would not perform their respective functions. If they were to exist outside each other, then they would be resolvable and in such a case the theory of inseparability (avinibbhuttavāda)

1. See Vism. 368

2. Path of Purification, 401; (Vism. 367 :Yathā ca yakkhādīni mahābhūtāni yaṃ gāhanti n'eva nesam tassa anto na bahi thānam upalabbhanti, na ca taṃ nissāya na tiṭṭhanti, evam' eva etāni pi n'eva añnam'aññaṣṣa anto na bahi thitāni hutvā upalabbhanti. Na ca añnam'añnam nissāya na tiṭṭhanti ti)

would have no validity. Therefore their standing place cannot be shown.¹

Each mahābhūta assists the remaining three by performing its peculiar function: The earth element which is held together by water, maintained by fire and distended by air is a condition for the other three great primaries by acting as their foundation. The water element which is founded on earth, maintained by fire and distended by air is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their cohesion. The fire element which is founded on earth, held together by water and distended by air is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their maintaining. The air element which is founded on earth, held together by water, and maintained by fire is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their distension.² Thus each mahābhūta depends on, and is depended on by, the other three. Theirs is a case of mutual co-operation, a remarkable policy of give and take.

Since the four mahābhūtas exist always together, and since they are not separable, one from another, the position taken by the Buddhists in respect of the question how they

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1. Yadi hi imā dhātuyo aññam'aññassa anto thitā na sakicca-karā siyūṃ ... Atha bahiṭṭhā vinibbhuttā siyūṃ. Tathā sati avinibbhuttavādo hāyeyya. Tasmā na niddisitabbatṭhanā.
- VismT. 364; see also Abhyk.248
 2. Path of Purification, 403 (Vism. 368-9)

enter into the composition of different material aggregates is quite clear: In every instance of matter all the four mahābhūtas are necessarily present. On this view there is general agreement among the Buddhist schools. The Vaibhāṣikas, for instance, maintain that the presence of jala, tejas, and vāyu in an earthy substance (pṛthivīdravye) is inferred from its cohesion, maturing and expansion respectively; the presence of pṛthivī, tejas and vāyu in water is shown by its support of ships, its heat and motion; the presence of pṛthivī, udaka and vāyu in a blazing fire is shown by its solidity (sthairya), cohesion or unbroken continuity and mobility; and the presence of pṛthivī, ap and tejas in the air is shown by its action of holding up, its touch of cold and its touch of heat.¹

Accordingly all material things or aggregates are necessarily "tetra-bhautic". With this may be contrasted the Vedāntic view according to which there can be "mono-bhautic" substances as earthy, watery, etc. But this statement needs qualification.² For in the view of the

1. pṛthivī-dravye saṅgraha-pakti-vyūhana-darśanāc cheṣānām jala-tejo-vāyūnam astitvam anumīyate. apsu nau-saṁdhār-anoṣṇāterana-karma-darśanāt. pṛthivī-tejo-vāyūnam astitvam. agni-jvālāyam sthairyā-saṁpīḍana-calana-darśanāt pṛthivī-udaka-vāyūnam astitvam. vāyau saṁdhārana-sītoṣṇa-sparśa-darśanāt pṛthivī-ap-tejasām astitvam iti Vaibhāṣikāh. -

AKvy. i 33

2. See Seal; Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, Ch.1,

Vedāntins: there are five sūkṣma-bhūtas (subtle) corresponding to the five mahābhūtas (gross). And according to the theory of pañcīkaraṇa, quintuplication, "the five sūkṣma-bhūtas are present as ingredients, though in different proportions, in each mahābhūta."¹ Hence from the standpoint of the sūkṣma-bhūtas each and every material object turns out to be "penta-bhautic."

It is in fact the view of the Vaiśeṣikas that stands in contrast to the Buddhist theory. The differences between the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas in regard to this question will be clear if we consider how they explain the constitution of the human body. According to the former it is composed of all the four mahābhūtas (cātummahābhūtiko'yaṃ kāyo). According to the latter it is essentially earthy. The other substances do not enter it as its substantative or material causes.

The Vaiśeṣika theory is based on the following arguments: The conjunction of things perceptible and imperceptible is itself imperceptible. Hence, since ākāśa and vāyu ~~are~~ are imperceptible, to maintain that the human body is a

1. Ibid.loc.cit. ,

conjunction of the five bhūtas is tantamount to saying that it is itself imperceptible.¹ Secondly, it is one of the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas that the quality in the effect is preceded by the corresponding quality in the cause.² It is also maintained that no effect can take place except through the combination of two component elements. Therefore if earth unites with water to form a compound, the compound will be devoid of odour, for odour is present only in earth. Similarly a compound of earth and fire will have no odour and taste, for they are possessed only by earth. Likewise a compound of earth and air will be odourless, tasteless and colourless, for odour, taste and colour belong to earth and not to air. Now all the foregoing qualities are present in the human body. Therefore it is to be concluded that it is not a combination of all the five bhūtas.³

The above arguments of the Vaiśeṣikas is partly based on the contention that air possesses only touch, fire possesses colour and touch, water possesses taste, colour and touch and that earth possesses smell and all the foregoing qualities. For the Buddhists smell, taste, colour, etc., are not the qualities of the mahābhūtas; they are a set of secondary

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1. Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 152
 2. Kāraṇaguṇapurvakah karyaguṇdarśah// - VS. 74
 3. Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 151 ff.

elements dependent on the latter. In point of fact, a theory similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas is cited by Buddhaghosa only to be refuted as unsatisfactory. The main theme of his argument, may be stated as follows: If smell were the special quality of earth, then the smell of cotton which has an excess of earth in it should be greater than that of fermented liquor which has an excess of water in it. Again, if colour were the special quality of fire, then the colour of hot water which has an excess of fire in it should be brighter than that of cold water. Neither of these things is true. Therefore the theory in question should be abandoned.¹ It is also observed that of the mahābhūtas which are not separable, one from another, one cannot say that this is a quality of that one or that is a quality of this one.²

The fact that Buddhism does not conceive the mahābhūtas as eternal and ever-perduring substances has also some relevance to its attitude towards the composition of material aggregates. A piece of ice, according to Buddhism, is

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1. Cf. Te vattabbā: iccheyyāma yadi apādhikassa āsavassa gandhato paṭhavī-adhike kappāse gāndho adhikataro siyā, tejādhikassa ca uñhodakassa vannaṇato sītūdakassa vanna pariḥayetha. Yasmā pan'etaṃ ubhayam pi natthi, tasmā pahayeth'etaṃ p'etesam nissāyabhūtānaṃ visesakappanaṃ. Vism.444
 2. Avinibbhogavuttisu hi bhūtesu, ayaṃ imassa guṇo ayaṃ imassa guṇo ti na labbhā vattun ti. - ibid.loc.cit.

composed of all the four mahābhūtas. Its solidity, cohesion, etc., point to their presence therein. For the Vaiśeṣikas, ice is essentially a watery (ap) substance. In their view, all matter is ultimately reducible to the four kinds of eternally existing atoms, namely, the earthy, the watery, the fiery and the airy. Since no substance is destroyable, decomposition of a compound means its reversal to the original position. Hence when ice is melt it becomes water and water is ultimately composed of watery atoms.¹ From the Buddhist standpoint whether ice remains as it is, or whether it becomes water when melt, or vapour when excessively heated, in all these different states the four mahābhūtas are present.

Although all the four mahābhūtas are present in every instance of matter, yet there is no quantitative difference between them. In other words, they enter into the composition of material things in equal proportion.² There is as much āpo-dhātu in a blazing fire as there is in wood or water. It is argued that if there were to be a quantitative difference between the mahābhūtas that enter into the composition of material objects, then the thesis that they

1. See Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas Metaphysics, Ch.vi
 2. See VismT.450 ff.; AbhvK.273 ff.

are inseparable would not be logical (na yujjeyya).¹ This theory is not confined to the Theravāda alone. This is what the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism call "tulya-bhūta-sad-bhāva."²

If the mahābhūtas are present in equal proportion in each and every material thing, what explains the diversity of the latter? For it is a matter of common experience that, in many respects, a comparatively hard stone is different from water and both from a blazing fire. Or to put it differently: Now the Therāvādins say that the mahābhūtas with the exception of āpo-dhātu are tangibles (phoṭṭhabbāyatana) while the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism say that all the four are tangibles (spraṣṭavyāyatana).³ Such being the case, what accounts for the diversity in tactile sensations? For it is a matter of common experience that one does not get the same sensation when ^{one} touches, say, a flower and a blazing fire.

The diversity, it is maintained, is not due to a difference in quantity (pamāṇa) but due to a difference in capability (sāmatthiya) or extrusion (ussada).⁴ That is to say, in a given material object one mahābhūta is more intense than the others. For instance, in a comparatively solid

1. Aññathā hi avinibbhogavuttitā na yujjeyya. - Vismṭ. 451; see also Abhv. 273 ff.

2. See AKvy. i. 124

3. See below, 94 ff.

4. See Vismṭ. 451; Abhv. 273

thing, say, in a stone, although all the mahābhūtas are present in equal proportion, yet the paṭhavī-dhātu is more intense or more extruded than the others. So is āpo-dhātu in water, tejo-dhātu in fire and vāyo-dhātu in air.

In the Atthasālinī we get more details on this subject. It says that the mahābhūtas (except āpo-dhātu) reach the avenue of the sense of touch simultaneously. Although they strike the sentient body simultaneously, yet bodily cognition of them does not arise at once. For the object of touch is determined by one of two alternative factors, namely, deliberate attention (ābhūñjita-vasena) and extrusion (ussada-vasena).¹

The first alternative is illustrated as follows: when the bowl is filled with food and brought, one who takes up a lump and examines whether it is hard or soft is considering only the element of extension, though there may be heat and mobility present. One who investigates by putting the hand in hot water is considering only the element of heat, though

1. Kim pana etāni tīni mahābhūtāni ekappahāren'eva āpātham āgacchanti udāhu no ti? Āgacchanti. Evaṃ āgatāni kāyappa-sādam ghaṭṭenti ti? Ghaṭṭenti. Ekappahāren'eva tāni āram-manam katvā kāyaviññanam uppajjati n'uppajjati ti? N'uppajjati. Kasmā? Ābhūñjitavasena vā hi ussadavasena vā āram-manakaranam hoti.- Asl. 333

extension and mobility are present. One who lets the wind beat upon the body by opening the window in the hot season, is considering while the wind beats gently and softly, only the element of mobility, though extension and heat are present.¹

The other alternative, where the element of deliberate attention is absent, is explained with reference to *ussada*, i.e. extrusiveness of one element in relation to the others: "But he who slips or knocks his head against a tree, or in eating bites on a stone takes as his mental object only the element of extension on account of its extrusiveness, though where he slipped, etc., heat and mobility were present. One treading on fire makes only the element of heat his object owing to its extrusiveness, although extension and mobility are present therein. When a strong wind blows striking the ear as if to make one deaf, although extension and heat are present therein, the element of mobility alone is made the object owing to its extrusiveness."²

It is very doubtful that the Pāli commentators had developed this theory of *ussada* by themselves. That intensity determines as to which element should become the object of touch is recognised by many of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism

1. Expositor, ii 434 (Asl. 333-4)

1. Expositor ii 434 (tr. Slightly changed); Asl. 334

too. The Abhidharmakośa, too, poses the question as to why all the elements do not become the object of touch simultaneously. And the answer is almost the same as that which we mentioned under the second alternative: "On perçoit dans un agrégat donné celle des substances (dravya, terre élémentaire, etc.) qui s'y trouve la plus vive (paṭutama, sphuṭatama), et non pas les autres. De même, lorsqu'on touche un faisceau de brins végétaux et d'aiguilles (sūcītūlikalāpa), on perçoit les aiguilles; lorsqu'on mange de la bouillie salée, on perçoit la saveur du sel."¹

From the Abhidharmakośa one gathers that the scholiasts had advanced more than one explanation in respect of this subject. In the first place, there is the opinion of Bhadanta Śrīlābha according to whom "les agrégats comportent les quatre grands éléments, puisque, étant donnée l'action de certaines causes, les choses solides deviennent liquides, etc. Le feu élémentaire existe dans l'eau, puisque celle-ci est plus ou moins froide, ce qui s'explique par la présence, en quantité plus ou moins grande, du feu élémentaire."²

This view attempts to explain the differences in the objects

1. AK.Ch.ii 146.

2. AK.Ch.ii 146

of touch as being due to a quantitative difference of the mahābhūtas. Thus the degree of hotness in water is dependent on the quantity of tejo-dhātu with which it is mixed (miśrībhāva, vyatibheda).¹ The Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas refuse to believe in a quantitative difference; such a conception, says the ṭīkā to the Visuddhimagga, does not accord well with the theory of the inseparability of the mahābhūtas.² Śrīlābha's interpretation is criticised in the Abhidharmakośa itself. It says that the variability, say, of cold is due to the variability of the intensity of the ab-dhātu, and not due to the fact that it gets mixed with its opposite, i.e. heat, which is represented by tejo-dhātu.³

Still more different is the explanation given by the Sautrāntikas: "les grands éléments qui ne sont pas perçus dans un agrégat donné y existent à l'état de semence (bījatas, śaktitas, sāmāthyatas), non pas en acte, non pas en soi (svarūpatas). C'est ainsi que Bhagavat a pu dire: 'Dans ce morceau de bois, il y a beaucoup de dhātus ou substances minérales.' Bhagavat entend que ce bois contient des semences, des potentialités (śakti) de nombreux dhātus;

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1. Ibid.loc.cit.
 2. Op.cit., 451
 3. Op.cit., Ch.ii 146

car l'or, l'argent, etc., n'existent pas actuellement dans le bois." ¹ This theory of the Sautrāntikas appears to be analogous to that of the Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas. There is, however, this fundamental difference to be noted: For the latter excess (adhikatā) of one element means that it is characterized by more intensity or capability. They do not say that the other elements are in an "état de semence." All what they say is that in a given object of touch all the elements are present and that those elements which are comparatively intense become the object of touch.

Closely connected with this principle of intensity (ussada) is another sense in which the names of the mahābhūtas are used. According to the Abhidhammic interpretation of the mahābhūtas one cannot speak of material things as paṭhavī, āpo, tejo and vāyo. For in each and every instance of matter all the mahābhūtas are present. However there is a sense in which the Abhidhammikas speak of material aggregates named after the mahābhūtas. This has been established with reference to the above-mentioned principle of intensity. If in a given material aggregate the paṭhavī-dhātu is characterized by a comparatively high degree of intensity (ussada) or capability

1. AK.Ch.ii 147

(sāmatthiya), then (as a matter of convention) that material aggregate is also called paṭhavī. In such instances the term is sometimes followed by adhika, "excessive" (in intensity or capability), e.g., paṭhavī-adhika. Similarly are used the names of the other three mahābhūtas.¹

This kind of description is, in a way, an attempt to accommodate the Nikāyan conception of the mahābhūtas according to which hair, nails, teeth etc., are paṭhavī, blood, mucus, etc., are āpo and so on.² However, as interpreted in the later scholasticism, strictly speaking, no mahābhūta is visible. The attribution of visibility, as the Abhidharmakośa says, is from the point of view of the common usage: "Dans l'usage commun, ce qu'on désigne par le mot 'terre', c'est de la couleur et de la figure" - pṛthivī varṇasamsthānam ucyate lokasamjñayā.³ According to the Kathāvatthu and its commentary⁴, the Andhakas object to the recognition of the mahābhūtas as not visible: "But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain, water, fire blazing, trees waving in the wind ... ?"⁵ This objection, it needs hardly any mention, has hardly any relevance to the Abhidhammic interpretation of

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1. Vism. A and Abhv. 274
2. See above, 64
3. AK.Ch. i 23
4. Kvu. 331 ff and KvuA. 93
5. Points of Controversy, 194

the mahābhūtas. It is only reminiscent of their earlier conception.

The inclusion of the mahābhūtas in phoṭṭhabbāyatana shows that although not visible they are tangible. They can be known by the sense of touch. From the point of view of the Theravādins this statement needs qualification. For as we have already indicated in their opinion only three mahābhūtas, namely, paṭhavī, tejo and vāyo come under phoṭṭhabbāyatana.¹ In contrast, the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism include all the four in the sphere of the tangible.²

Why the Theravādins have excluded āpo-dhātu from the sphere of the tangible is partly explained by what we have observed about the position of sīta, cold in relation to the mahābhūtas.³ Unlike, for instance the Vaibhāṣikas, the Theravādins do not associate cold with the āpo-dhātu. For the latter, cold is not a force distinct from, but is only the relative absence of, heat (= tejo-dhātu). As such, in the view of the Theravādins both cold (sīta) and heat (uṇha), in other words, all degrees of temperature are represented by, and therefore testify to the presence of, tejo-dhātu.⁴

1. See Dhs. 143, 179; Vbh. 72

2. See AK.Ch.i 18 ff.

3. See above, 71-2

4. Cf. Kimidam phoṭṭhabbam nāma? Paṭhavī-tejo-vāyo-dhātuttayaṃ. Kasmā pan'ettha āpodhātu aggahitā? Nanu sītata phusitva gayhati? Saccaṃ gayhati. Na pana sa āpodhātu. Kiñcarahīti. Tejodhātu eva. Mande hi unhabhāve sītābuddhi. Na hi sītāma nāma koci guṇo atthi. - Vism. 459; see also ADSVT 111;

Āpo-dhātu, as stated above, is representative of bandhanatta, the fact of "binding together" or cohesion and davatā, fluidity. But these, according to Buddhists, are not felt by the sense of touch.¹ The point is illustrated by Aung when he says: "when one puts his hand into cold water, the softness of water felt is not āpo, but paṭhavī,² the cold felt is not āpo, but tejo; the pressure felt is not āpo, but vāyo."³ Its cohesion and fluidity, whatever be their degree of intensity or capability, are not felt by the sense of touch. Hence āpo-dhātu is excluded from phoṭṭhabbāyatana and is included in dhammāyatana.⁴ That is to say, it cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (mano). It is known by a process of inference.

The general position assigned to the mahābhūtas may now be considered. If one were to examine how the mahābhūtas are interpreted in other systems of Indian thought one would notice that in Buddhism they were assigned a comparatively primary position. What the Sāṃkhya considers as mahābhūtas are not the ultimate irreducible constituents of matter, for they are evolved immediately from the tanmātras and

1. See ADSVT 111; VismS.v 75 ff.

2. because softness is relative absence of hardness = paṭhavī.

3. Cpd.155,n.6

4. See Dhs.179

ultimately from the prakṛti, i.e., the uncaused first cause of the world of non-self.¹ According to the Vedāntins the mahābhūtas are produced from the sūkṣmabhūtas. The former are a species of gross matter and the latter a species of subtle matter.² For the Jaimas the ultimate constituents of puggala, matter are not the four elements (dhādu-catukka) but the homogeneous atoms (paramāṇu). The latter are recognized as the essential causes of the former.³ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas postulate four kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elemental substances, namely, earth, water, fire and air.⁴ This may be described as an attempt to reconcile the older theory of the mahābhūtas with the later atomic theory. Because of this fact the four substances in question are not reduced to a secondary position.

In Buddhism, unlike in many other systems of Indian thought, the mahābhūtas are assigned a primary position in the sense that they are recognized as the ultimate irreducible data of matter. It is of course true that a given instance

1. See Seal, Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, Ch.1

2. Ibid., Ch.1

3. Cf. Adesamattamutto dhāducatukkassa kāraṇam jo du/
so neo paramāṇu parināmaguno sayamasaddo// - Pāncastī-
kāyasāra,

4. See Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, Ch.111

of matter consists of not only the four mahābhūtas but also of a set of upādā-rūpas such as colour, smell, etc. But these so-called upādā-rūpas, as conceived by the Buddhists, are always dependent on, and therefore secondary to, the mahābhūtas.¹ Even the development of the theory of rūpakalāpas, i.e., the Theravāda form of atomism,² did not, in any way, reduce the mahābhūtas to a secondary position. For in every rūpakalāpa, the smallest unit of matter, all the four mahābhūtas are present.³ Although they are postulated as the ultimate (primary) elements of matter, the mahābhūtas are not to be understood as uncaused or as ever-perduring entities. They too come under the laws of "phenomenal" (sankhata) existence. As Buddhaghosa says, they are anicca in the sense of liability to destruction (khayaṭṭhena aniccā), dukkha in the sense of causing terror (bhayaṭṭhena dukkhā) and anatta in the sense of having no ever-perduring essence (asāraṭṭhena anattā).⁴

1. See below, 101

2. See below, ch. viii

3. Cf. Annamāññen' upatthaddhā sesarūpassa nissayā
Catudh'evam kalāpesu mahābhūta pavattare - NRP.34

4. See Vism., 368

CHAPTER THREE

SECONDARY ELEMENTS, I

The distinction between the mahābhūtas - the four primary elements - on the one hand, and the upādā(ya) rūpas - those that take hold of, cling to, in other words, those that depend on, the mahābhūtas - on the other, is alluded to in the Nikāyas themselves.¹ However, therein no attempt is made to explain how and why the latter are dependent on, and therefore secondary to, the former. As far as this particular question is concerned even the Dhammasaṅgani, where we get the most exhaustive canonical analysis of matter, does not go beyond the Nikāyas. Some data on the relative position of the two groups could, however, be elicited from the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, which seeks to explain the causal relation of all elements of existence in their temporal sequence as well as in their spatial concomitance.

The four mahābhūtas, according to the Paṭṭhāna, constitute conditions (paccaya) by way of co-nascence (sahajāta), support or foundation (nissaya), presence (atthi) and non-abeyance (avigata) in relation to the upādā,rūpas.² The implication that could be drawn from the first is that the upādā rūpas, whenever they arise, arise simultaneously with

1. See e.g., M.i 53, 185

2. See Tkp.3,4,6,7

the arising of the mahābhūtas. As a rule their genesis is necessarily concomitant with that of the mahābhūtas; they cannot come into being independently of the latter. All rūpa-dhammas whether primary or secondary with the exception of certain ones of the latter group¹ exist for the same length of time. Hence we might as well say that, since the upādā rūpas arise concurrently with the arising of the mahābhūtas, the existence as well as the cessation of the majority of the former coincide with the existence and cessation of the latter.

With this may be compared the view of the Vaibhāṣikas, namely that the mahābhūtas are a janana - or janma-hetu "cause génératrice" of the bhautikas (= upādā rūpas).² Following, as pointed out by De la Vallée Poussin,³ a definition given in the Vibhāṣā, the Abhidharmakośa illustrates this further by saying that "les bhautikas naissent d'eux comme l'enfant de ses parents."⁴ This illustration, it seems to us, should not be construed to mean that the mahābhūtas arise first and that the bhautikas arise subsequently as is really the case in the relation between

1. Cf. the significance of anipphanna-rūpas; discussed in Ch.V

2. See AK.Ch.ii 314; AKvy.i 239

3. AK.Ch.ii 314, n.3

4. Ibid., Ch.ii 314

the parents and the child. For elsewhere in the same work it is stated that in the view of the Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāstivādins) the bhautikas do always arise simultaneously with the arising of the mahābhūtas.¹ In this particular context, therefore, it is a case of the parents and the child being born at one and the same time.

A clue as to why one group is compared to the parents and the other to their child although both are co-nascent may be had from the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of sahabhūhetu. When two or more co-existent (sahabhū) things are dependent, one on the other, they are said to be sahabhūhetus in relation to one another. The relation between the four mahābhūtas is one of this kind. However, all co-existent things are not recognized as sahabhū-hetus in relation to one another. The mahābhūtas and the bhautikas are cited as a case in point.² The Theravādins, too, are of the same opinion: That the upādā rūpas are co-nascent (sahajāta) with the mahābhūtas is admitted; that the two groups are related by way of reciprocal co-nascence (aññamañña-sahajāta) is, however, denied.³

1. See AK.Ch.ii 252; this is implied in the Vaibhāṣika atomic theory, too, see AK.Ch.ii 143 ff.

2. Ibid., Ch.i 253

3. See Tkp.3,14,36 ff.

What both schools attempt to show by this device is the necessary dependence of the upādā-rūpas (bhautikas) on the mahābhūtas. Although the upādā-rūpas arise together with the arising of the mahābhūtas their arising is not a necessary condition for the arising of the latter. But the reverse is true: The arising of the mahābhūtas is a necessary condition for the arising of the upādā-rūpas. Hence the comparison of the former to the parents and the latter to their child is not without significance although both groups are said to be co-nascent.

The mahābhūtas, as stated above, are also a nissaya for the upādā rūpas. This only means that the former are a basis, a support or a foundation of the latter.¹ This aspect of the relation between the two groups is explained in more detail by the Vaibhāṣikas. The mahābhūtas wield influence on the bhautikas like an ācārya on his pupil (niśraya-hetu); support them like a wall^a painting (pratiṣṭhā-hetu); maintain them in uninterrupted continuity (upasthambha-hetu); and constitute a condition for their growth and development (vr̥ddhi- or upabr̥mhaṇa-hetu).²

The recognition of the mahābhūtas as atthi - and natthi-paccayas³ in relation to the upādā-rūpas means that

1. See below, 321

2. See AK.Ch.i 314; AKvy.i 239 ff.

3. See above, 98

that the presence and non-abeyance of the latter is due to the presence and non-abeyance of the former. This only amounts to a general statement of what has been stated so far about the relation between the two groups.

Thus what are called upādā rūpas are those material elements which are always co-existent with, are necessarily dependent on, and are thus secondary to, the mahābhūtas.¹ The mahābhūtas, too, are dependent, one on the other and are always co-existent. But there is this fundamental difference to be noted: While the upādā rūpas are dependent on the mahābhūtas the mahābhūtas are not dependent on the upādā rūpas. The difference is summed up by the Vibhāvinī Tīkā when it says: "That which clings to the mahābhūtas and is also clung to by others is not upādā rūpa; but that which clings to the mahābhūtas and is not clung to by another is upādā rūpa."²

However, in certain cases the fundamental difference between the two groups tends to get obliterated. The relation between āhāra (nutriment) which is one of the

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1. Cf. Atthasālinī (300) definition: Cattāri mahābhūtāni upādāya nissāya amuncitvā pavattarūpan ti attho.
 2. Yam hi mahābhūte upādiyati sayañ ca aññehi upādiyati na tam upādā-rūpam; yam pana upādiyateva na kena ci upādiyati tadeva upādāya rūpan ti. - ADSVT.110

upādā rūpas and the four mahābhūtas is a case in point. The former, it may be noted here, is recognized as a rūpa-samuṭṭhāna-paccaya, i.e., a generative condition of matter, primary as well as secondary.¹ From this it follows that those mahābhūtas, brought about by āhāra, are dependent on an upādā rūpa. Therefore in so far as this particular situation is concerned, the usual argument that the mahābhūtas are not dependent on the upādā rūpas needs qualification.

More important than this are the implications arising from what is called avinibhoga-rūpa. According to the Theravādins the category in question includes the four mahābhūtas and four of the upādā rūpas, namely, rūpa (the visible), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and āhāra (nutriment).² According to the Vaibhāṣikas it (avinirbhāga-rūpa) includes the same items but for this difference: in place of āhāra is included bhautika-spraṣṭavya (the secondary tangible).³ The reasons for this difference will be explained in a later chapter.⁴ Suffice it to note here that according to both schools the eight items are not separable, one from another (avinibhoga, avinirbhāga). As a rule, they always

1. See Vism, 369

2. See ADS.28; VismS.v 58

3. See AK.Ch.ii 145 ff.; AKvy.i 123 ff.

4. See below, 372-3

arise together (sahajāta, niyata-sahotpanna). None of them can arise independently of the other seven.

From this it follows that just as much as those secondary elements cannot arise independently of the four primary elements, even so the four primary elements cannot arise independently of those secondary elements. Both groups are equally dependent on each other. Hence so far as those secondary elements are concerned the independent genesis of the primary elements is questionable. For none of the eight items in question can arise independently. In view of this situation it is understandable why the Sautrāntikas should have criticized the Vaibhāṣika (Sarvāstivāda) interpretation of sahabhū-hetu. Their criticism implies that even certain bhautikas should be recognized as constituting sahabhū-hetu in relation to the mahābhūtas.¹

Attention may also be drawn here to the observation of Prof. Stcherbatsky, namely that the classification of the material elements into primary and secondary, as that of the mental elements into fundamental (citta) and derivative (caitta), approaches very nearly the relation between substance and quality.² Although this observation is made with

1. Cf. AK.Ch.ii 254

2. See Cent.Concep. 35/6

reference to the Sarvāstivāda, it applies equally to the Theravāda. It is of course true that the material elements, primary as well as secondary, are described as discrete entities. It is also true that the connection between them is sought to be explained by the postulation of causal relations. Nevertheless, as has been observed, since the secondaries are always supported by the primaries and since this connection is said to be inseparable, the relation between the two groups is not much different from the relation between substance and quality.

It is not without significance that the division of matter into primary and secondary was not accepted by all the scholiasts. Buddhadeva, one of the celebrities of the Sautrāntika school, objects to the introduction of any such distinction. His objection is likewise directed to the distinction drawn between citta (consciousness) and caitta (consciousness-concomitants). In his opinion the ten āyatanas, i.e., the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are made up of only the mahābhūtas. And apart from the mahābhūtas there is no distinct category called bhautika rūpa. Likewise apart from citta there is no distinct category called caitta.¹

Buddhadeva's attempt is to discard all distinctions

1. See AK.Ch.1 64 and n.2

in terms of primary and secondary not only from the sphere of mental phenomena but also from the domain of matter, and thereby to assign equal status to each and every element of existence (dhammā). This attempt did not appeal to the majority of the Buddhists. The author of the Abhidharmakośa objects to it on the ground that it is contradicted by a Sūtra passage where the distinction in question is upheld. Buddhadeva, too, invokes the authority of a Sūtra to substantiate his thesis: According to the Garbhāvākṛānti Sūtra man consists of six elements (saddhātur ayaṃ bhikṣo puruṣaḥ), namely the four mahābhūtas, ākaśa (space) and vijñāna (consciousness).¹ The counter-objection is that this Sūtra, in this particular context, purports to describe the essence of a living being (mūlasattvadṛavya) and therefore that it does not amount to an exhaustive definition.²

These objections and counter-objections show that although the division of matter into primary and secondary was one of the well-established tenets of the Buddhist

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1. References as these in the Buddhist works to six dhātus are, in the view of St. Schayer, traces of a pre-canonical vijñānavāda. For further details on this theory, see his article: Pre-canonical Buddhism, Archiv Orientalni, Vol. vii, 121 ff.
 2. See AK.Ch.1 64 ff

schools, it was not unchallenged by the Buddhists themselves.

According to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the category of secondary matter (upādā rūpa) consists of twenty three items, namely the first five sense-organs - (1) cakku, (2) sota, (3) ghāna, (4) jivhā and (5) kāya; the first four sense-objects - (6) rūpa, (7) sadda, (8) gandha and (9) rasa; three faculties - (10) itthindriya, (11) purisindriya and (12) jīvitindriya; two modes of self-expression - (13) kāyaviññatti and (14) vacīviññatti; three characteristics of matter - (15) lahutā, (16) mudutā and (17) kammaññatā; four phases of matter - (18) upacaya, (19) santati, (20) jaratā and (21) aniccatā; (22) ākāsa-dhātu; and (23) kabalīkāra-āhāra.¹ To this list the commentators add another, namely, (24) hadaya-vatthu.² Thus, according to the Theravādins there are in all twenty four upādā rūpas.

These twenty four upādā rūpas and the four mahābhūtas are represented in the classical list of āyatanas as follows:

The first five upādā rūpas (Nos.1-5) constitute the first five ajjhattika āyatanas: cakkhāyatana (no.1) sotāyantana (no.2.), ghānāyatana (No.3), jivhāyatana

1. See Vbh.1 ff.; Dhs. 125 ff.

2. See Vism.354 ; Abhv.69; Abhvk.270

(No.4) and kāyāyatana (No.5). (The sixth ajjhattika āyatana, i.e., manāyatana is mental). The next four upādā rūpas (Nos.6-9) constitute the first four bāhira āyatanas: rūpāyatana (No.6), saddāyatana (No.7), gandhāyatana (No.8) and rasāyatana (No.9). The mahābhūtas except āpo-dhātu constitute phoṭṭhabbāyatana, i.e., the fifth bāhira āyatana. Āpo-dhātu and all the remaining upādā rūpas (Nos.10-24) constitute a part of dhammāyatana, i.e., the sixth bāhira āyatana. For the scope of dhammāyatana is very wide: it includes all things, mental or physical, past, present or future, real or imaginary which become the objects corresponding to mano (the mental organ).

Ajjhattika	Bāhira
Cakkhāyatana = No.1	Rūpāyatana = No.6
Sotāyatana = No.2	Saddāyatana = No.7
Ghānāyatana = No.3	Gandhāyatana = No.8
Jivhāyatana = No.4	Rasāyatana = No.9
Kāyāyatana = No.5	Phoṭṭhabbāyatana = pathavī+tejo+vāyo
(Manāyatana)	<u>part of Dhammāyatana</u> = āpo+Nos.10 to24

It will be seen that altogether sixteen rūpa-dhammas, one primary and fifteen secondary are included in dhammāyatana. These sixteen items are collectively known as "dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna-rūpa."¹ They are cognized only by the mind (mano);

1. See Dhs.179; Vbh.14, 72

their existence is known by a process of inference. In this connection it must be mentioned here that as interpreted in the Abhidhamma the first five sense-organs, (Nos.1-5), too, are of this nature. That is to say, they, too, are cognized only by the mind (mano).¹ Hence, strictly speaking, they should also be included in the dhammāyatana. However, since they are already represented by five separate āyatanas, they are not designated as dhammāyatana-rūpa. We shall be using the term dhammāyatana-rūpa(s) to mean only those sixteen items which, in the Abhidhamma, are so designated.

There is general agreement among the Buddhist schools that the first five ajjhattika - and the corresponding five bāhira-āyatanas are rūpa. From the point of view of the nikāyas, too, this is so.

It is in regard to the category of dhammāyatana-rūpa that the opinion differs. As we have seen, according to the Theravādins it consists of sixteen items. For the Vaibhāsikas, on the other hand, there is only one dharmāyatana-rūpa,

1. Because they are a variety of very subtle and delicate matter (pasāda-rūpa), see below, 131-2

namely, avijñapti-rūpa.¹ However, seven of the items which the Theravādins have included in the category of dhammāyatana-rūpa are recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas, too, but not as dharmāyatana-rūpa. Of the seven, six, i.e., nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, 22 and āpo-dhātu are considered as parts or sub-divisions of other āyatanas, and the remaining one, i.e., no. 23 as a combination of three āyatanas.² Such a difference as to the position of these items in relation to the list of āyatanas presupposes a difference in their interpretation. But this need not concern us here. The Theravādins do not recognize under any guise the avijñapti-rūpa which, for the Vaibhāṣikas, is the one and only dharmāyatana-rūpa. The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to its recognition, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas, as a real dharma.³ What is more, they do not seem to have included any item of rūpa in the dharmāyatana. The Darṣṭāntikas are recorded to have challenged the very conception.⁴ That this had been a subject of controversy among the Buddhist scholiasts is suggested by a Vibhāṣā passage according to which the Abhidharma definition of

1. Cf. katamo rūpaskandhaḥ/ sarvam catumahābhūtakṛtam dvādaśāyataneṣu vyapahāya manāyatanaṃ sarvānyānyāyatanaṇi dharmāyatana-saṃgrhītamavijñaptirūpaṃ ceti rūpaskandhaḥ//
- Abhinr.; see also AK.Ch.i 14; AKvy.i 29

2. See AK.Chs.1,11,1V

3. See AK.Ch.IV.14 ff.

4. See AK.(Introduction, etc.,)liv

rūpaskandha as consisting of the ten rūpa-āyatana (= the first five ajjhattika and the first five bāhira) and the rūpa that is included in the dharmāyatana, was meant to refute the Dārṣṭāntikas who had denied the dharmāyatana-rūpa.¹

Two facts emerge from the fore-going observations. One is that all schools of Buddhism do not recognize a category called dhammāyatana-rūpa. The other is that two of the leading schools who have recognized such a category are totally disagreed on what it should constitute. Both suggest that the inclusion of certain items of rūpa in the dhammāyatana is an Abhidhammic innovation or at least that it did not have a place in early Buddhist thought.

The only significant evidence that could be adduced in support of such a category is a passage from the Sangīti Sutta of the Dīghanikāya. Therein it is stated, but without any attendant explanation, that rūpa is of three kinds, namely, (i) sanidassana-sappaṭigha, (ii) anidassana-sappaṭigha and (iii) anidassana-appaṭigha.²

The two positive terms and their negatives are used in the Abhidhamma in a technical sense. Sanidassana which

1. See AK. (Introduction, etc.,) li

2. D.iii 217

may be rendered as "visible" is used as an exclusive adjective of rūpāyatana because of the simple reason that this particular āyatana stands for what is visible, the "fact of visibility." All the other rūpa-dhammas are anidassana, invisible.¹ Paṭigha is used in more than one sense. But as it occurs in this particular context it is understood as indicative of the contact, actual or potential, between the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects. The contact between manāyatana and dhammāyatana is not covered by the term. Hence the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are described as sappatigha and all the other rūpa-dhammas as appatigha.²

Thus, as explained in the Abhidhamma, (i) rūpāyatana is sanidassana-sappatigha, (ii) cakkhāyatana, sotāyatana, ghānāyatana, jivhāyatana, kāyāyatana, saddāyatana, gandhāyatana, rasāyatana and phoṭṭhabbāyatana are anidassana-sappatigha, and (iii) the sixteen rūpa-dhammas included in the dhammāyatana are anidassana-appatigha.

Since it is claimed that the phrase "rūpaṃ anidassanaṃ appatigham" of the Saṅgīti Sutta denotes the dhammāyatana-rūpas given in the Abhidhamma, let us see, as briefly as

1. See Dhs.146

2. See Dhs.147

possible, whether these items are known to the Nikāyas, and if known, how they are conceived therein. Considering their position in relation the Nikāyas, we can arrange them into two main groups.

The first group includes thirteen items, namely, Nos.10-22. Some of them, e.g., itthindriya (No.10), purisindriya (No.11), ākāsa-dhātu (No.22), etc., figure in the Nikāyas.¹ But none of them appear to have been brought under rūpa, let alone their being conceived as separate rūpa-dhammas forming a part of the dhammāyatana.

The second group includes two items,² namely, kabalīkāra-āhāra (No.23) and āpo-dhātu (one of the mahābhūtas.) It is true that according to the Nikāyas as well as the Abhidhamma, both come under rūpa. But what should not be overlooked is that in the former, unlike in the latter, they are not interpreted in such a way as to justify their inclusion in the dhammāyatana, i.e., as two items of rūpa which can be cognized only by the mind (mano).

Thus none of the above items appear in the Nikāyas as dhammāyatana-rūpas. Nor do the Nikāyas give any indication of some other item or items of rūpa being included

1. See e.g.S. v 204; A.iv 57 (= itthindriya, purisindriya); D.iii 247; M.i 421 (= ākāsa-dhātu)

2. We have not brought hadaya-vatthū (No.24) under either of these groups; its inclusion in the list of rūpa-dhammas is the work of the commentators.

in the dhammāyatana. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to understand the phrase, "rūpaṃ anidassanaṃ appaṭighaṃ" of the Sangīti Sutta in a way different from the interpretation given to it in the Abhidhamma. The situation that obtains here is rather strange: Although the above Nikāya phrase presupposes one or more dhammāyatana-rūpas, yet there is no evidence to suggest that the Nikāyas have included any item of rūpa in the dhammāyatana.

As pointed out by many scholars, the Sangīti Sutta approaches the Abhidhamma not only in methodology but also in contents.¹ This is indicative of the fact that as a compilation it is of comparatively late origin. Its resemblance to the Sangītiparyāya, the first of the six pāda-supplements to the Jñānaprasthāna of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma,² points, at least indirectly, to the same conclusion. What is more, its arrangement of the subject matter is so mechanical that new contents could easily be interpolated.

It seems very probable therefore that when the Sangīti Sutta was compiled the Theravādins had already recognized one or more of the dhammāyatana-rūpas which

1. See Thomas, Hist. of Bud. Thought, 160; Winternitz, Hist. of Ind. Lit., II, 44; also 168

2. See Takakusu, The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins, JPTS. 1904-5

find mention in the Abhidhamma. Or else, the section referring to the three kinds of rūpa¹ may be considered as a subsequent interpolation. Either of these (alternative) suggestions explains satisfactorily the situation to which we have drawn attention.

Another connection which the Abhidhammikas seek to establish between the nikāyas and the dhammāyatana-rūpas is concerned with the two pairs of terms, namely, (a) santike and dūre, (b) oḷārīka and sukhuma. These terms are used in the Abhidhamma to distinguish the dhammāyatana-rūpas from the rest.²

As used in this context santike and dūre do not signify spatial proximity or distance. The first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are called santike (proximate) because the ghaṭṭana, the contact between them, (which results in cakkhu-viññāna or visual consciousness, etc.,) witnesses to their very presence. In other words, because of their being thus easily known (gahanassa sukarattā) they are styled santike (proximate). For this self-same reason they are also called oḷārīka, gross. The dhammāyatana-rūpas cannot be known through the medium

1. See above, 111

2. See Dhs. 148

of any of the first five sense-organs; their existence is known by a process of inference. In this sense they are not easily known (duppariññeyya). Hence they are described as dūre (far). For this self-same reason they are also called sukhuma (subtle).¹

Quite different is the sense in which the Vaibhāṣikas use antikaṃ (santike) and dūraṃ (dūre): A given rūpa could be antikaṃ or dūraṃ according to, or depending on, the time of its existence. The rūpa that exists (present) is antikaṃ; the rūpa that was (past) or the rūpa that will be (future) is dūraṃ.² On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣikas, too, use audārika (olārika) and sūkṣma (sukhuma) to distinguish the dharmāyatana-rūpa (= avijñapti-rūpa) from the rest: Audārika is applied to the latter and sūkṣma to the former. However, as an alternative explanation, it is said that the two terms are not expressive of an absolute division, but are of relative application (āpekṣikaṃ).³ That is to say, what is sūkṣma (subtle) in relation to something could be audārika (gross) in relation to something else.⁴

1. See Asl.337; ADSVT.116; Abhv.294

2. See AK.Ch.i 36; AKvy.i 44

3. See AK.Ch.i 36 and AKvy.i 43

4. Cf. apekṣayā vā audārikaṃ sūkṣmaṃ ca bhavati. tad-yathā
likṣāṃ apekṣya audāriki yukā yukāṃ apekṣya sūkṣmā
likṣeti. - AKvy.i 43

The above mentioned two pairs of terms occur in a stock formula of the Nikāyas, where rūpa is referred to in its totality: "... yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā olārikam vā sukhumam vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā, sabbam rūpaṃ...."¹

If the underlined words were interpreted according to their Abhidhammic usage, then such an interpretation would presuppose dhammāyatana-rūpas. But the general tone of the formula does not suggest that herein they are used in such a technical or, so to say, academic, sense. They could well be understood in a direct and literal sense as "whether gross or subtle" and "whether far or near". All what the formula seeks to do is to lay stress on the totality of rūpa (sabbam rūpaṃ) - first with reference to time (atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ), secondly with reference to a given individual (ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā), thirdly with reference to a characteristic of rūpa (olārikam vā sukhumam vā), fourthly with reference to the value of rūpa (hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā), and finally with reference to distance (dūre vā santike vā). With the necessary adjustment this

1. S.iv 382; see also S.iii 47; M. iii 16

same formula is applied to the other four khandhas, too, quite apparently, with a view to laying stress on the idea, "all" or "all kinds of." This is perfectly understandable, for this kind of description is often made in order to advocate a moral injunction, e.g., one should not have any craving for, or attachment to, any kind of rūpa, vedanā, etc.

The Nikāya meaning of dūre and santike is, in fact, retained in the Vibhanga as an alternative explanation.¹ It also finds expression in the interpretation attributed to Bhadanta: All rūpas that exist in a visible locality (dr̥śya-deśa) are antikaṃ; those that exist in an invisible locality (adr̥śya-deśa) are dūraṃ.² The criterion is not whether the rūpas are visible or not - for such an explanation would bring rūpāyatana under one heading and all the remaining items of rūpa under the other - but whether the locality is visible or not, i.e., near or far. This explanation tallies well with the context of the Nikāya formula, and as such does not presuppose the fact that any item of rūpa was included in the dhammāyatana.

From what has been observed so far, it should become clear that the inclusion of certain rūpa-dhammas in the

1. .yam vā pan'añnam pi atthi rūpam anāsanne anupakatṭhe dūre asantike: idam vuccati rūpam dūre.

. .yam vā pan'añnam pi atthi rūpam āsanne upakatṭhe avidūre santike: idam vuccati rūpam santike - op.cit., 2-3

2. See AK.Ch.i 36-7 and AKvy.i 44-5

dhammāyatana is of comparatively late origin. Most of these items, it may be noted here, do not properly answer to the definition of rūpa as given by the Buddhists themselves. The avijñapti-rūpa which the Vaibhāṣikas have included in the dharmāyatana is a case in point.

What is called avijñapti-rūpa is closely connected with the Vaibhāṣika theory of karma. Buddhism, as is well known, recognizes three kinds of karma, namely, mano-karma (mental action), kāya-karma (bodily action) and vākkarma (vocal action). The Theravādins and the Sautrāntikas take the view that these three types are essentially the same. Pure volition (cetanā) is mano-karma; when it is manifested by bodily motion it is called kāya-karma; when by voice it is called vākkarma. Karma, although it is spoken of as three-fold, is nothing but cetanā, volition.¹

In contrast, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that only mano-karma is cetanā (cetanā mānasam karma). What result from mano-karma or cetanā are called kāya-karma and vākkarma (tajje vākkāyakarmāni). The latter two, it is said, are quite distinct from the former. They are manifested by a peculiar disposition of the body and by way of voice. Hence

1. See Asl. 84 ff.; AK.Ch. iv 12

they receive the name vijñapti, the "manifested."¹ These two types of vijñapti "create a thing of a particular nature, semi-material (rūpa) and semi-spiritual,"² designated as avijñapti, the "unmanifested." "Once produced ... the avijñapti exists and develops of its own accord, without the agency of thought, whether a man is waking, sleeping or absorbed in contemplation."³ The avijñapti-rūpa is said to depend on the mahābhūtas (mahābhūtāny upādāya). Hence it is brought under rūpa and is recognized as a bhautika rūpa-dharma.⁴

Although the Vaibhāsikas bring avijñapti-rūpa under rūpa, they admit that it is exempt from ruppana (the fact of being "hurt", disturbed) and pratighāta (resistance, impenetrability) which are considered as two fundamental characteristics of rūpa.⁵ This seems to be the reason why Harivarman's Satyasiddhi insists that it should be assigned a place in the category of citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras, i.e., miscellaneous dharmas neither mental nor physical.⁶

1. See AK.Ch.i 20 ff.; Ch.iv 14 ff.

2. De la Vallée Poussin, The Way to Nirvāna, 71

3. Ibid.loc.cit.,

4. For more details on the subject of avijñapti, see Sōgen, Systems of Bud.Thought, 149 ff.; Mc Govern, Manual of Bud.Phi.i 128 ff; Takakusu, Essentials of Bud.Phi., 67 ff.; Stcherbatsky, Cent.Concep., 99 ff.

5. See AK.Ch.i 25 ff, Ch.iv 14 ff.; AKvy. i 35

6. See Mc Govern, Manual of Bud.Phi.i 129

The Sautrāntikas contend that since it does not quite properly answer to the definition of rūpa it should not be recognized as rūpa.¹ This is not to say that they were dissatisfied only with the position assigned to it. On the contrary, they vehemently denied its reality,² for they had been very suspicious of the wisdom of postulating new entities. Nor is it conceivable that the conception of avijñapti-rūpa was known to early Buddhism.

It is true that the Theravādins do not recognize the avijñapti-rūpa under any guise. However, a majority of the rūpa-dhammas which they have included in the dhammāyatana pose similar problems. These items will be examined in detail in the course of the next two chapters. Suffice it to note here that the list in question is a "strange miscellany" of items, some of which are nothing but certain "qualities" or characteristics, modes or aspects and phases of matter, all raised to the status of rūpa-dhamma. Side by side with the "real" rūpa-dhammas are enumerated the "nominal". The illogicality of the enumeration would not arise had not the Abhidhammikas made a special attempt to recognize such things as phases of matter by postulating dhammas corresponding to

1. See AK.Ch.i 25 ff.
2. See ibid., Ch.iv 14

them. Such a situation is not met with in the Nikāyas. What is more, some of the Buddhist schools, notably the Sautrāntikas, too, recognized certain characteristics common to both mental and material dhammas; but rather than postulating them as dhammas they relegated them to the domain of prajñaptis, mere designations.¹ As far as this situation is concerned the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is more akin to the Vaibhāṣika system. Attention may be drawn here to the fact that in recognizing the "characteristics of that which is conditioned" (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas), the Vaibhāṣikas went so far as to postulate them as entities, as real as the things which they characterize.²

If we were to follow the generally accepted meaning of dhamma, then we had to understand all the items in the Theravāda list as real and discrete entities. However, it is extremely doubtful whether such an interpretation could be justified. For the names and explanations given to some items show that all were not conceived as having equal status although they all were designated as rūpa-dhammas. It seems very likely that it was the avowed antipathy of the Buddhists towards introducing the distinction between substance and quality that impelled the Abhidhammikas to

1. See below , 221-2

2. See below , 221

take such a step. If this was the reason then it is very doubtful whether this device had its desired effect. The fact that the Pāli commentators deemed it necessary to bring about a radical change in the position of some of the dhammāyatana-rūpas - to this we shall come in the next chapter - shows that the Theravādins themselves came to realize the inadequacy of this arrangement.

The apparent want of consistency in the Theravāda list of rūpa-dhammas, as suggested by Mc Govern,¹ seems to suggest that it represents a comparatively early tradition. It seems very probable that with the gradual development of Buddhist scholasticism, some of the items in the list "which were inconsistent with a more logical, systematic and scientific view of the universe"² were either eliminated or placed under more appropriate places.

A glance at the positions assigned to some of the items of the Theravāda list by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas should show that such a possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. For instance, the three characteristics and the four phases of matter (nos.15-21) do not figure in

1. Manual of Bud.Phi.i 117

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

in the lists of rūpa-dhammas supplied by these two schools. And, we have already noticed that seven of the dhammāyatana-rūpas of the Theravādins figure in the Vaibhāṣika list as sub-divisions or combinations of other āyatanas.¹ The development of a novel category called cittaviprayukta-saṃskāras,² too, seems to have facilitated this process of systematization. Thus by assigning a place to jīvitendriya in the above category the Vaibhāṣikas eliminated the necessity of postulating - as was done by the Theravādins - two jīvitindriyas, one mental and the other material.³ Harivarman's insistence on relegating the avijñapti (which the Vaibhāṣikas have brought under rūpa) into the same category,⁴ signifies another step in this process of systematization.

1. See above , 110

2. On the origin and development of this category, see Jaini, BSOAS, Vol. XXII, Pt. 3 (1959) , 531 ff.

3. See below , 164

4. See above , 120

CHAPTER FOUR

SECONDARY ELEMENTS II: GROUP A (NIPPHANNA)

It was observed in the previous chapter that some of the upādā rūpas, the secondary elements, though elevated to the status of rūpa dhamma, are nothing but certain phases, qualities, modes, etc., of matter. It is therefore no matter for surprise that with the passage of time the Theravādins themselves realized the unsatisfactoriness of this arrangement. The authors of the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works seek to remedy the situation by classifying all the material elements, primary as well as secondary, into two groups called nipphanna and anipphanna.¹

The positive term, nipphanna, with the intensive prefix pari (=parinipphanna) occurs in three of the Kathāvatthu controversies, in a more or less technical sense.² When something is qualified as parinipphanna, the following characteristics are implied: it is impermanent (anicca), conditioned (sankhata), causally dependent (paṭicca-samuppanna), subject to decay (khaya-dhamma), subject to waning away (vaya-dhamma) capable of producing dispassion (virāga-dhamma), subject to cessation (nirodha-dhamma) and to change (viparināma-dhamma).

From this it follows that the term parinipphanna,

1. See Vism 381-2; Asl. 343 ; Abhvt 74; ADS 27; NRP 33; SS 4
 2. Op.cit., 459-62; 626-27

like sankhata, applies to all mental and material elements that make up the totality of contingent existence, for they share all the above characteristics. Narrowing down the field we may say that all rūpa-dhammas are necessarily parinipphanna. What is not so should be either asankhata (like Nibbāna) or paññatti, mere designations with no corresponding objective reality.¹

If the commentators, too, use the term nipphanna with the same implications, then it follows that only those items which they qualify by that term could be considered as true rūpa-dhammas. The fact that the Atthasālinī sometimes uses parinipphanna instead of nipphanna² suggests that the commentators made no distinction in meaning between the simple term and that with the intensive prefix, pari. And, that the term is used with the same implications is also shown by the given explanations.

Buddhagosa observes that nipphanna rūpas are so called because they can be seized in their intrinsic nature (sabhāveneva pariggahetabbato). The rest are contrary thereto (tabbiparīta).³ Sumangala says that only nipphanna rūpas are brought about by the four generative conditions of matter, namely, citta, kamma, utu and āhāra.⁴ This is another

1. See below, 181-2

2. Op.cit., 343

3. Vism 381

4. Cf. ... attano sabhāveneva kammādihi paccayehi nipphannattā nipphannarūpaṃ nāma - ADSVT 112; see also Abhv 291

way of saying that they alone are true rūpa dhammas, for no rūpa dhamma could come into existence without reference to certain conditions.

This is further shown by the use of the peculiar compound, rūpa-rūpa, to describe the same category.¹ In almost identical words, Dhammapāla and Sumangala observe that only nipphanna rūpas are called rūpa-rūpa because they alone are subject to ruppana.² *On the coinage of this compound, they say:* This term rūpa, as a matter of convention, has been used to indicate things which are devoid of the nature of rūpa (matter). Therefore the term is qualified by another rūpa.³ This is to admit that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka certain items which do not answer to the definition of rūpa are also brought under it and that thereby its meaning has become unduly "stretched". Hence arises the necessity to reduplicate the term.⁴

Anuruddha adds three more terms to distinguish the nipphanna rūpas from the rest, namely, sabhāva-rūpa, salakkhana rūpa, and sammasana-rūpa.⁵ The first is meant to show that the nipphanna rūpas alone have their own intrinsic nature (attano sabhāvena siddham).⁶ The second indicates that

1. Vism 382 ;ADS 27; VismT 459-60; ADSVT 113; Abhv 291

2. VismT 459; ADSVT 113

3. Svāyam rūpa-saddo rūlhiyā atamsabhāve pi pavattati ti aparena rūpa-saddena visesetvā vuttam rūpa-rūpan ti - VismT 459-60; also ADSVT 113

4. Cf. hetu-hetu; dukkha-dukkha; dhātu-dhātu

5. ADS 27

6. ADSVT 112

they alone are endowed with the three salient features, viz. anicca (impermanence), dukkha (the fact of being a source of suffering) and anatta (the absence of any abiding essence); alternatively that they alone are characterized by the three sankhata-lakkhaṇas, viz. uppāda (origination), thiti-jarata (subsistence-decay) and bhanga (cessation).¹ The third is indicative of the fact that, since the anipphanna rūpas have their own intrinsic nature, one could attribute to them the three salient features of anicca etc., and thus could make use of them as proper objects of meditation.²

All these different terms combine to show that only those elements, described as nipphanna, are true rūpa dhammas. Of the twenty four upādā rūpas, only fourteen are brought under this category. They are: the first five sense-organs, the first four objective fields, itthindriya, purisindriya, jīvitindriya, kabalīkāra-āhāra, and hadaya-vatthu. The four mahābhūtas - of which three constitute phoṭṭhabbāyatana and the other comes under dhammāyatana - are also brought under the same category. Thus there are in all eighteen nipphanna rūpa dhammas, four being primary and fourteen secondary. Thus it will be seen that the commentators have recognized

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1. Ibid., loc.cit., cf. also sace rūpaṃ aparinipphannaṃ na aniccādi-sabhāvaṃ siyā - KvuA 198-9
On the three sankhata-lakkhaṇas, see below, 221 ff.
2. . . . sabbhāveneva upalabbhanato lakkhanattayaropānena sammasitum arahattā sammasana-rūpaṃ - ibid., 113

only five dhammāyatana upādā rūpas as true rūpa dhammas. The fifth, hadāyayatthu, is one of their own additions. Had they drawn the line in such a way so that even these five items would have fallen under the opposite heading, i.e., anipphanna, then there would remain only the ten (rūpa) āyatanas plus one dhammāyatana rūpa, i.e., āpo-dhātu. And, at the same time, if the āpo-dhātu, too, had been included in the phoṭṭhabbāyatana, as was actually done by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, then all the true rūpa dhammas would be represented by ten āyatanas only. As far as the number of rūpa dhammas is concerned one could notice here where the Theravādins have differed from the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. It may be recalled here that while the Vaibhāṣikas have recognized one dharmāyatana rūpa the Sautrāntikas have none.

Let us now examine the fourteen elements brought under the general heading "nipphanna-upādā" and see what their more specific characteristics are.

Sense-organs

The first five sense-organs, which are conceived as five secondary material elements, are cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jivhā and kāya, i.e., the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch respectively.

On their nature as a species of matter, the Nikāyas are less informative. True, they figure oft and again in many a sutta. However, the purpose is not so much to explain their nature as a variety of matter. Sometimes they occur in stock formulae where the causality of sense perception is explained;¹ oftener than not they occur in what may be described as hortative discourses where the Buddha is exhorting the disciples not to become victims to sensual pleasures lest they should fall short of the highest ideal.²

In the Abhidhamma piṭaka, they came to be described as pasāda.³ Literally it means clearness, brightness, serenity, or faith. But as a descriptive term of the sense-organs, it had not been used in the earlier Pāli texts. "Taken causatively", observes Mrs. Rhys Davids, "it may conceivably have meant either that which makes clear - a revealer as it were - or that which gratifies or satisfies, ..."⁴ It is in fact suggestive of both meanings, for the first indicates the receptive and reacting nature of the sense-organs and the second brings into relief the part they play in the gratification of sensual pleasures.

In the Sanskrit sources, too, the sense-organs are

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1. Cf. e.g., M.i 111-2, 259-60, 190; S.iv 39-40, 67 ff.
 2. Cf. e.g., S.iv 225; M.i 92 ff., ii 220, iii 62 ff.; A ii 16 ff.
 3. Dhs. 134 ff.
 4. Bud.Psy.Ethics, 159 n.2

described as prasāda. Considering the contexts in which it occurs¹ it could also be said that in using this term the Buddhists are intent to show that the sense-organs are of a very subtle and delicate matter. This is borne out by the fact that according to the Dhammasaṅgani they cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (mano).² The Vaibhāṣikas too conceive them in a similar way. They are supra-sensible (atīndriya),³ and translucent (accha).⁴ Because of this translucence, like the luminosity of a gem (maṇiprabhāvāt), they cannot be burnt or weighed.⁵ Nor can they be cut into two. For example, when a part of the body is chopped off, thereby the body-sensibility (kāya-prasāda) does not multiply itself. For the part that is cut off is devoid of body-sensibility; this is inferred from the fact that on the basis of the part that is separated, there does not arise tactile sensation.⁶

On this point Yaśomitra makes this interesting observation:

"How then could there arise tactile sensation with reference

1. Cf. e.g., AK.Ch.i 15; AKvy.i 24

2. Op.cit., 178

3. AK.Ch.i, 15; AKvy 1.24. Here indriya is used with reference to the 1 st. 5 sense-organs only.

4. AK.Ch.1, 67

5. Ibid.loc.cit.,

6. na hindriyani dvi-dhā bhavanti chinnaśyaṅgasya kāyād apagatasya nirindriyatvāt. idam api katham gamyate. nirindriyaṃ tad aṅgaṃ yac chinnaṃ kāyād apagataṃ iti. yasmāt tat pratītya spraṣṭavy'ādikaṃ ca kāy'ādi-vijñānānupapattih. AKvy 1. 68

to the tip of the nose when it is cut but not separated from the nose? Since it is connected with the nose the body-sensibility (kāyendriya) arises again. Hence there is no contradiction. But how is it that when the tails of house lizards, etc., are chopped off, they begin to vibrate if they are devoid of body-sensibility? This is due to the alteration (vikāra) of the air element."¹

Since the sense-organs are conceived as a species of extremely subtle matter, it is explicitly stated that they should not be understood according to their popular conception. The Abhidharmakośa says that what in common parlance are known as eye, ear etc., are the adhiṣṭhāna, the support, of the real sense-organs.² The same distinction is upheld in the Theravāda, too. The Atthasālinī remarks that the very purpose of using the term paśāda is to dismiss their popular conception. Each sense-organ (i.e. in a broad and general sense) consists of two parts: the compound or peripheral organ (sasambhāra) and the sentient organ (paśāda). The first is what we ordinarily mean by eye, ear, etc. The second is the real sense-organ, and has the first as its basis (vatthu).³

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1. katham tarhi chinnena punar lagnena nāsika'grena kāya-vijñānotpattiḥ. nāsikā-mūla-sambandhena punaḥ kāyendriyotpatteḥ adosaḥ. katham iha grhagodhik'ādinam pucchāni chinnāni spandante yadi tatra kāyendriyam nāsti. vāyu-dhātor eṣa vikāro. - AKvy l.113; see also Stcherbatsky, Gen. Concep. 12
 2. Op.cit., Ch.1, 56, 65; also AKvy l. 24
 3. Op.cit., 306-7

In pursuance of this distinction, the Visuddhimagga and the Atthasālinī give, in almost identical words, a long disquisition on the nature and constitution of the sense-organs: The sasambhāra-cakkhu or the compound eye is white from the abundance of phlegm, black from that of bile, red from that of blood, rigid from that of the element of extension, fluid from that of cohesion, hot from that of heat and oscillating from that of mobility. The pāsāda-cakkhu or the sentient eye is situated in the centre of the compound eye. It permeates the ocular membranes as sprinkled oil permeates seven cotton wicks. It is served by the four elements doing the functions of sustaining, binding, maturing and vibrating, just as a princely boy is tended by four nurses doing the functions of holding, bathing dressing and fanning him. It is not bigger in size than the head of a louse. The organ of hearing is situated in the interior of the compound organ, at a spot shaped like a finger ring and fringed by tender hairs and is tended by the four primary elements. The organ of smell is in the interior of the compound organ at a spot shaped like a goat's hoof. The organ of taste is above the middle of the compound organ at a spot shaped like the upper part of a torn lotus leaf. The organ of touch is to be found everywhere in this physical

body like a liquid that soaks a layer of cotton.¹

Although the organ of touch is said to be co-extensive with the whole body, yet the possibility of confusion (sankara) between the sense-organs as to their functions, is repeatedly ruled out. The characteristic (lakkhana), function (rasa), manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna) of one sense-organ are different from those of another. For instance, the organ of sight has the characteristic of being sensitive only to the sphere of visibility, but not to sounds, tastes, etc., its function is to draw attention to its respective objective field only; and, it manifests itself as the physical basis of visual consciousness, but not as the basis of auditory or any other kind of consciousness.²

Prof. Stcherbatsky observes that the Buddhist conception of the sense-organs as composed of matter subtler than the things that become the corresponding objects, is reminiscent of the Sāṃkhya view, namely, that matter developed along two different lines, the one with predominance of the translucent intelligence-stuff (sattva), the other with predominance of dead matter (tamas), resulting in sense-objects in their subtle (tan-mātra) and gross (mahābhūta) forms. But the fundamental difference to which Prof. Stcherbatsky himself

1. Translation mainly based on Nānamoli's Path of Purification (Vism 445-6; Asl. 307 ff)

2. See Asl. 312; Vism. 444

draws attention is that, unlike in the Sāṃkhya, in Buddhism the two groups are not conceived "as modifications or appurtenances of an eternal substance."¹

Moreover the force of this parallelism tends to fade away because of the circumstance that in most of the systems of Indian thought the sense-organs are conceived in a more or less similar manner. The Jainas speak of two kinds of sense-organs: dravyendriya, the physical sense-organ, and bhāvendriya, their ^{psychical} physical correlates. The former in turn consists of two parts: nivr̥tti, the organ itself, and upakarana, the supporting environment. According to Caraka the sense-organs are distinct from their peripheral seats. The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that "the sense-organs consist in the faculty of potency (śakti) abiding in the sockets". The Śūkarite Vedānta is of the view that the organs of sight hearing, smell, taste and touch are composed of the sāttvic parts of light, ether, earth, water and air respectively.²

It is of course very likely that this somewhat common tradition is due to the influence of the Sāṃkhya on the other systems of Indian thought. It is also significant to notice that a similar view seems to have been held by Ajita Kesakambalī who, as we gather from the suttas, was contemporaneous with Buddha. In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta

1. Stcherbatsky, Cent. Concep. 12

2. See Sinha, Ind. Psy. Ch. 1

he is recorded to have told King Ajātasattu that man is composed of four mahābhūtas, viz. paṭhavī, āpo, tejo and vāyo, and that after his death while the four mahābhūtas join with their respective groups (in the external world) his indriyas join the ākāsa (ether).¹ On the basis of its general usage, if indriya is understood as referring to the sense-organs, then the fact that they are said to join the ākāsa suggests that in Ajita Kesakambali's view they are a very delicate variety of matter.

The association of such characteristics as subtlety, transparency, translucence with the sense-organs is understandable, for this is an attempt to explain the big problem as to why they are sensitive to external phenomena.

Once the sense-organs were distinguished from the other upādā rūpas by their being described as pasāda-rūpa, the next problem that required an explanation was why they were different, one from the other.

There was the well-known theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: The difference is due to the circumstance that the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are composed of light, ether, earth, water and air respectively. Each organ is sensitive to that phenomenon which is the particular

1. Cātummanhābhūtiko ayaṃ puriso, yadā kalam karoti paṭhavī paṭhavī-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, āpo āpa-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, tejo teja-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, vāyo vāya-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, ākāsaṃ indriyāni saṅkamanti. - D.i 55

quality (viśeṣa-guṇa) of the substance that enters into its composition. Colour, sound, smell, taste and touch are the respective qualities of light, ether, earth, water and air. As such they become the objects corresponding to the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch respectively. There is thus a community of interest between the sense-organ and the corresponding objective field.¹

That this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, in a modified form, was accepted by certain Buddhists is shown by some comments made by Buddhaghosa on two similar theories. According to the first, among the primary elements that support the organ of sight, heat is in excess; likewise, in the case of the organs of hearing, smell and taste air, earth and water are in excess. And, as for the organ of touch there is no difference between the supporting primary elements. According to the second, the five sense-organs (in the order they are mentioned above) have respectively heat, ether? (vivara), air, water and earth in excess.²

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1. See Bhaduri, Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 152 ff.
 2. Keci pana tejādhikānaṃ bhūtānaṃ pasādo cakkhu, vāyu-pathavi-
apādhikānaṃ bhūtānaṃ pasādo sōta-ghāna-jivhā; kāyo sabbesan
ti vadanti. Apare tejādhikānaṃ pasādo cakkhu, vivara-vāyu-
apa-pathavādhikānaṃ sōta-ghāna-jivhā-kāya ti vadanti. -
Vism. 376; see also Asl. 312-3; our interpretation of "bhūtā-
naṃ" as "among the supporting primary elements" is supported
by the rest of the passage in the Vism. and by the VismS.v
56-7

The two views are cited only to be refuted. That they were advocated by certain Buddhists is clear from Buddhaghosa's contention, namely that those who put forward them should be pressed to quote a sutta in favour of their argument - an attempt, says Buddhaghosa, in which they would be disappointed.¹ In the ṭikā to the Visuddhimagga the first is attributed to certain Mahāsaṅghikas and is said to have been advocated by one Vasudhamma.² And in the Sinhalese sannē to the same work the second is attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins, the rival sect of the Mahāvihāra.³

Buddhaghosa's argument is as follows: But some give as their reason that it is because these (several sensitivities = sense-organs) are (respectively) aided by visible data, etc., as qualities of fire and so on. They should be asked, "But who has said that visible data, etc., are qualities of fire and so on? For it is not possible to say of primary elements which remain always inseparable, that "That is a quality of this one, that is a quality of that one". Then they may say, "Just as you assume, from excess in such and such material things, the (respective) functions of upholding (sandhāraṇa) etc., for earth, etc., so from finding visibility,

1. Vism. 444; see also Asi. 312

2. Op.cit., 335

3. Op.cit., v 57

etc., (respectively) in a state of excess in material things that have fire in excess, one may assume that visible data, etc., are (respectively) qualities of these. "They should be told, "We might assume it if there were more odour in cotton which has earth in excess than in fermented liquor which has water in excess, and if the colour of cold water were weaker than the colour of hot water which has heat in excess. But since neither of these is a fact you should therefore give^{up} conjecturing the difference to be in the supporting primary elements.¹

Buddhaghosa's general refutation of the two theories is understandable. For, as represented by him, their underlying assumption is that colour, smell, etc., are the qualities of the primary elements - a view to which Buddhism in general took strong exception. His own explanation - repeated by his successors, too - as to the difference between the sense-organs is based on an earlier tradition, namely that they come into being through the action of kamma (kammāsamutṭhāna).² The difference between the sense-organs, it is said with much emphasis, is due to the difference in

1. Nānamoli, Path of Purification, 491-2 (Vism.444-5); also Asl.312-3
 2. See below, 277 ff.

the kamma of which they are the results.¹

However, as pointed out by Dr. Sarathchandra, although the Buddhists rejected the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory as regards the affinity between a given sense-organ and the corresponding sense-object, yet they seem to have been influenced by it in postulating the media in which the sensory stimuli travelled. The media for the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch were, respectively, light (āloka), space or ether (ākāsa), air (vāyo), water (āpo) and earth (paṭhavī).²

Before we end this section we need examine why the sense organs are called indriya. Buddhists interpret the term as expressive of power, dominance or suzerainty (ādhipacca, issariya).³ As the bases or supports (vatthu, nissaya) of the consciousness (viññāna) the sense-organs are said to wield a dominating influence on the former.⁴ Since consciousness cannot arise without reference to a given sense-organ and the corresponding object, the question is raised as to why the former alone is called indriya. The answer is that the intensity of the consciousness is relative to the strength of the sense-organ. If the latter is "sharp", strong (tikka), the former, too, becomes "sharp",

1. Vism.445; also Asl.313

2. Bud.Psy.of Percep.40

3. See Vism.491 ff

4. See Vism.493;

strong; likewise if the latter is weak (manda) the former too becomes weak.¹

Objective Fields

The Nikāyan descriptions of rūpa (the visible), sadda (sound), gandha (smell), rasa (taste) and phoṭṭhabba (the tangible) take a general form determined mostly by ethical and practical considerations. They are not permanent (anicca) and have no abiding essence (asāra). Attachment to them cannot therefore be made the basis of true happiness. It only nourishes and prolongs "saṣāric" existence. For the realization of the highest ideal all sensual pleasures should be eschewed. But rūpa, sadda, etc., are the five strands of sensual pleasures (pañca kāma-guṇā). Hence it is that they are sought to be described in such a way as to bring home the perils (ādinava) that result from attachment to them and thereby to emphasize the need to eschew all kinds of craving in respect of them (nissarana).²

This, in brief outline, is how the earlier texts approach the subject under consideration. In the post-Nikāyan works they have become the subject of a more detailed study. Certainly the ethical approach prevails, but the

1. See Vism. 493; see AK.Ch.ii 107-8 and Akvy.i 96 where a similar explanation is given.

2. Cf. e.g., D.i 233, M.i 503, iii 143, 233; S.i 144, iii 107, 139

emphasis is not as pronounced as in the nikāyas. Their treatment in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is very laconic; the logical implications are not discussed. However, the commentaries and the sources of Sanskrit Buddhism help us to understand the descriptions in a wider perspective.

Let us take rūpāyatana, the sphere of the visible, first. In the Dhammasaṅgani under rūpāyatana are enumerated first some examples of colour - blue, yellow, red, white, etc., - and then some examples of figure - circular, oval, square, hexagonal, etc.,¹ As far as the inclusion of both items under rūpāyatana is concerned, this explanation is fundamentally the same as that of the Vaibhāṣikas.

They too maintained that it consisted of colour (varṇa) as well as figure (saṃsthāna). The visible can be colour without being figure (saṃsthāna-nirapekṣam); e.g., blue, red yellow, white, shade, sun-light (ātāpa), light (āloka), darkness (tamas). It can be figure without being colour (varṇa-nirapekṣam); e.g., that part of long, short, etc., which constitutes the kāya-vijñapti, bodily expression.² Or else, it can be at one and the same time both colour and figure, i.e., all other varieties of the visible.³

The Sautrāntikas, in whose system of thought one could

1. Op.cit.,139

2. See below,189-90

3. See AK.Ch.i 16; AKvy.i 25-26

detect the burden of emphasis shifting from the outer to the inner, declared that colour (varṇa) alone was real, that it alone constituted the visible, and that figure (samsthāna) was only a mental construction (mānasam) with no corresponding objective reality (prajñaptisat).¹

Their thesis is sought to be established by three main arguments. One can obtain the notion of long, short, etc., by seeing or by touching something. Therefore if the figure were a real entity, then one should admit that it could be perceived by two-sense-organs - a view which goes against the canonical definition of rūpāyatana according to which it is the objective field corresponding only to one sense-organ, namely, the organ of sight.

The Vaibhāṣikas contend that when we obtain the idea of, say, long after having touched something, it is not that we actually perceive it by the organ of touch but that we are reminded of the figure (long) because it is associated with the tangible. It is just as when we see the colour (visible) of fire we are reminded of its heat (tangible); or when we smell the odour of a flower we are reminded of

1. See AK.Ch.i 16-17, Ch.iv 8 ff; KSP:MCB iv 209 ff. see also Stcherbatsky, Cen. Concep. 13; cf. Yaśomitra's comment: na hi cākṣusam etat samsthāna-grahaṇam. mānasam tv etat parikalpitam. varṇa-samniveśa-viśeṣa eva hi samsthānam. na samsthānam nāma dravyam kimcid asti. varṇagrahāṇe samsthāna-grahaṇābhāvāt - AKvy.i 26

its colour. The Sautrāntikas point out that this analogy is not of universal validity. Concerning the two examples cited: colour reminds us of the tangible and the odour reminds us of the colour because there is an invariable association (avyabhicāra) between the two things given in each example. But every tangible is not associated with a particular figure. Hence it is not correct to say that the perception of a given instance of tangible should necessarily and always remind us of its figure. If it were otherwise, runs the argument, then every time we touched something we should also know the colour associated with it.

Secondly, if figure is a real rūpa then it has to be conceded that there could be a plurality of rūpas in one and the same locus (ekadeśa). In a variegated carpet, for instance, there are a large number of figures. If figure is a real entity, then a figure that is a part of a long line cannot at the same time be a part of a short line.

Thirdly, colour is a constituent element of the smallest unit of matter¹ but the same cannot be predicated of figure.

The Vaibhāṣikas retort that if figure is nothing but a certain disposition of colour then the figure can never

1. See Ch. on Atomism.

change if the colour is the same. The Sautrāntikas meet this objection by saying that one calls something long etc., when a number of real dharmas (elements) are placed in a certain manner or disposition.¹

The Strong opposition of the Vaibhāṣikas to interpreting saṃsthāna as a mental construction with no corresponding objective reality is, in all probability, motivated by their desire to establish the reality of kāya-vijñapti. They are of the view that it is a certain figure of the body (of a living being), known as an object of visual consciousness.² Unlike the Sautrāntikas, they could not deprive kāya-vijñapti of its reality because along with vāg-vijñapti it is closely associated with avijñapti-rūpa.³

The foregoing Sautrāntika arguments against the conception of saṃsthāna as a real entity cannot be overlooked if we are to understand in a broad perspective how the commentators interpreted the Dhammasangani account of rūpāyatana. It was noted earlier⁴ that in this manual some examples of figure too are brought under rūpāyatana. But in the Atthasālini they are interpreted in such a way that it presents a close parallelism to the Sautrāntika theory.

Commenting on the examples of figure cited in the

1. See AK.Ch.iv 8-12; AKvy.ii 348 ff.; KSP: MCB iv 209 ff.
 2. See below, 189-90
 3. See above, 119-20
 4. See above, 142

Dhammasangani, the Atthasālinī says: ... the terms 'long' etc., are accomplished by mutual reference (aññam'aññam upanidhāya). The terms 'circular' etc., are accomplished by juxtaposition (sannivesena). Among them with reference to what is short 'long' is so called as being higher (uccatara) than that; 'short' is so called as being lower (nīcatara) than 'long'. With reference to what is big, a thing smaller than that is 'little,' with reference to which a great thing is 'big.'¹

Then it goes on to say: Among these expressions because it is possible to know 'long' etc., also by touch, but not 'blue-green' etc., therefore in reality 'long' is not directly (nippariyāyena) a visible object, neither is 'short' and similar terms.²

That " 'long' is not directly a visible object" clearly shows that strictly speaking figure (saṅḥāna) is not a part of rūpāyatana. Explaining why in the earlier account some examples of figure are enumerated under rūpāyatana, the Atthasālinī remarks that this has been done as a concession to popular usage (vohārato.)³ No such implication could be drawn from the original account.

1. Dīghādīni hi aññam'aññam upanidhāya siddhāni, vaṭṭādīni sannivesena. Tattha rassaṃ upanidhāya tato uccataraṃ dīghaṃ, tam upanidhāya tato nīcataraṃ rassaṃ, thūlam upanidhāya tato khuddakaraṃ anukaṃ, tam upanidhāya tato mahantataraṃ thūlam — op.cit. 317 (tr. from Expositor)

2. Tattha yasmā dīghādīni phusitvā pi sakkā jānituṃ, nīlādīni pañ'eva na sakkā tasmā na nippariyāyena dīghaṃ rūpāyatanaṃ. Tathā rassaḍīni. — ibid loc.cit. (tr. from Expositor)

3. Ibid loc.cit.

One cannot overlook the fact that among the Sautrāntikas there was a strong tendency to interpret as nominal (prajñaptisat) some of the dharmas which in the Vaibhāṣika and the Theravāda were postulated as real (dravyatas, saccikatṭha-paramatṭhena). Their advocacy of the theory of representative perception (bāhyānumeyavāda) and their nonrecognition of any of the dharmāyatana-rūpas such as the avijñapti-rūpa, are indicative of their subjectivist tendencies.¹ It is very likely, therefore, that among Buddhists it was they who first advocated the theory in question before it found expression in Theravāda scholasticism.

Whether it was an introduction from an outside source or one of their own creations the Theravādins could easily accommodate it into their system. For unlike the Vaibhāṣikas they did not interpret kāya-viññatti as a figure (saṅghāna) of the body.² Nor did they recognize avijñapti-rūpa. Hence they could conveniently relegate saṅghāna to the domain of paññattis without thereby undermining the basis of any other established doctrine.

And, it is as a logical result of this new

1. See Murti, Cen. Phi. of Buddhism 81 ff

2. See below, 187 ff.

interpretation that in the Mūlatika the older term rūpāyatana is sometimes substituted by the more specific vaṇṇāyatana, i.e., "the sphere of colour".¹

As for sadda, sound, the account given in the Dhammasaṅgani is, in the main, an enumeration of different kinds of sounds: of drums, of tabors, of conch-shells, of tom-toms, of singing, of music, etc.,² In the post canonical scholasticism we are presented with two different theories on the subject. Earlier is the one given in the (Sihala) Aṭṭhakathā. Although the work is not extant now, a reference to one of its views is made in the Atthasālinī.³

According to this reference, sound travels in an elemental series - bhūtaparamparā. Of much interest is the example given in support of this view: The bodily movements of men felling trees of washermen washing clothes are seen (quickly) although they are at a great distance. On the other hand, the sound they make is relatively slow of ascertainment (vavatthāna) because it comes in an elemental series (dhātuparamparāya) and strikes the auditory organ.⁴

1. Op.cit., 104, 106 etc.

2. Op.cit., 140

3. Op.cit., 313

4. Dūre rukkhamaṃ chindantaṇam pi rajakāṇaṃ ca vattham dhovantaṇam dūrato va kāyavikāro paṇṇāyati. Saddo pana dhātuparamparāya sotam ghattetvā saṇikam vavatthānam gacchatī ti vuttam - Asl. 313

The Atthakathā view, as noted by Dr.E.R. Sarathchandra,¹ is on a parallel with the one advanced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas concerning this subject: "Either sounds reach the ear in concentric circles of waves like the waves of water, or they shoot out in all directions like the filaments of a Kadamba."²

The Atthasālinī has alluded to the Atthakathā theory of sound only to dismiss it as unsound. The main objection raised is that such a theory cannot adequately account for our knowledge of the direction of sound: If sound comes slowly having arisen at a distance then it will be apprehended after some time. Coming in an elemental series and impinging on the sensitive portion of the ear, the direction it comes from might not be evident.³ For when one hears a sound one can (fairly accurately) say whether it is a distant sound, or a near sound, or whether it is a sound from the farther bank or from the hither bank.⁴

Following the Atthasālinī argument, Dhammapāla too observes that if sound travels towards the ear then there

1. Bud.Psy. of Percep. 34

2. Sinha, Ind.Psy. 22

3. Saddo pi sace sanikaṃ āgaccheyya dūre uppanno cirena suyeyya paramparāghaṭṭanāya ca āgantvā sotam ghaṭṭento asukadisāya nāma ti nā pannayeyya. - Asl. 314

4. Ibid., 314

cannot be the determination of its locality and direction (desādesa-vavatthāna). He further notes that when sound is apprehended it remains where it has arisen. As to how an echo arises it is said that the sound, although it remains at a distance, becomes a condition (paccaya) for the arising of an echo elsewhere even as a magnet (ayo-kanta) for the movement of iron.¹ Then there is the observation of Sumangala: the fact that one hears the sound of thunder which arises at a distance or the sound generated within the body which is covered by the skin shows that for its apprehension sound need not travel towards the ear and strike its sensitive portion.²

It is significant to notice that this theory which has been introduced in place of the earlier is similar to the one accepted by some of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, according to which sound is characterised by "apravāhavartiva", i.e., it does not exist in a series.³

1. See VismT. 446-7

2. See ADSVT. 114

3. See AK ch.i 67; AKvy i 69. The rejection, on the part of the Pāli commentators, of the earlier view is necessitated by the introduction of a new theory concerning the position of the sense-organs in relation to their respective objects. According to the (Sihala) Atthakathā (see Asl. 313) the sense-organs are "sampatta-gocara" i.e., they apprehend their objects when the latter come into actual contact with them. Buddhaghosa and his successors modified this to the effect that in the case of cakkhu and sota, they are not sampatta-gocara, i.e., they apprehend their objects at a distance; see Vism. 445; Asl. 313; ADS. 27 ; AbhvT. 67 ; AbhvK. 262. The same idea is expressed in AK. Ch. i 87 ff and

With the development of atomism,¹ an important problem cropped up concerning the production of sound. As we shall see in a later chapter,¹ the Vaibhāṣikas deny the possibility of atoms coming into immediate contact with one another. How, then, is the phenomenon of sound to be explained?

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr had the answer ready: "si les atomes se touchaient, la main en collision (abhyāhata) avec la main s'y fondrait,² la pierre en collision avec la pierre s'y fondrait, comme de la gomme se fond dans de la gomme. Et le son ne se produirait pas."³

Continuation from last page....

AKvy.i 83. Consult Bud.Psy.of Percep.32 ff. & Cpd.160,n.2.for details. Although Asl.denies that cakkhu and sota are sampatta gochara, sometimes it uses the term sampatta in respect of the corresponding objects, e.g., vanno...cakkhu sampatto (314) It seems that sampatta is used not only as referring to the physical contact between the organ and the object, but sometimes as referring to the apprehension of the object by the sense-organ. See AK., Ch.1, 87 n.1 where de la Vallée Poussin cites a Vibhāṣā passage, according to which prāpta which in this context corresponds to Pāli sampatta occurs in the same two senses.

1. See below, ch.viii
2. Because, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the atom is partless and hence non-resisting (apratigha), see below, 356, 363 ff.
3. AK.Ch.i 89

Thus it is the very fact that atoms do not touch one another that makes possible the production of sound. The fact that sound arises is itself taken as proof in support of the theory of atomic non-contact.

With the development of the theory of rūpa-kalāpas, the Theravādins, too, had to answer a similar question. For in their view, too, the rūpa-kalāpas, the ultimate units of matter, do not come into immediate contact.¹ If this thesis was to be maintained, the production of sound could not be attributed to an actual concussion of the rūpa-kalāpas. Hence it is that the ṭīka to the Visuddhimagga, having observed that sound results from the ghaṭṭana, striking together, of the rūpa-kalāpas, goes on to define what this ghaṭṭana is: "it is the arising of rūpa-kalāpas in proximity to one another due to conditions."² The words: "arising ... in proximity" are meant to rule out their actual contact as well as their movement. For the theory that motion is an illusion created by the genesis of momentary elements in adjacent locations (deśantarotpatti), is put forward in the late works of the Theravādins, too.³

1. See below, 366 ff.

2. Op.cit. 452

3. see above, 75-6

On the subject of gandha, odour, and rasa, savour, the treatment is mainly a matter of classifications.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī does not commit itself to a definite number as regards the types of odour.¹ The Atthasālinī makes a classification of all varieties into two broad groups: (a) sugandha or iṭṭhagandha, i.e., agreeable odour; (b) duggandha or aniṭṭhagandha, i.e., disagreeable odour.² In the Vaibhāṣika each group is again considered as utkaṭa, excessive or anutkaṭa, non-excessive.³ Some Buddhists recognize a variety called sama-gandha, odour which is neither agreeable nor disagreeable.⁴

As to rasa, savour, the Theravāda sources do not lay down a definite number of types. The Dhammasaṅgaṇī description is an enumeration of different types, e.g., bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent, followed by the words: "or whatever other savour there is".⁵ The Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, recognize six fundamental varieties (san-mūla-jāti), viz, sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent, and admit that their mixtures could give rise to a wide variety.⁶

1. Op.cit., 141

2. Op.cit., 320

3. See AK.Ch.i 18

4. AKvy.i 27

5. Op.cit., 142

6. AKvy.i 27

As for the tangible, the objective field corresponding to the organ of touch, it was already observed that, according to the Theravāda, it consists of three of the four primary elements. This subject was discussed in the course of our chapter on the primary elements.¹

Faculties of sex

By faculties of sex we mean itthindriya (faculty of femininity) and purisindriya (faculty of masculinity). According to the Dhammasaṅgani definition, the former means the physical appearance, marks, traits and deportment peculiar to a female or the state or condition of femininity - itthatta, itthibhāva. Likewise, the latter means physical appearance, etc., peculiar to a male, or the state or condition of masculinity - purisatta, purisabhāva.²

Two passages in the Anguttaranikāya show that the earlier texts too have understood them in the same sense.³ But nowhere in the Nikāyas are they brought under rūpa, let alone their being postulated as two rūpa-dhammas. The commentators seem to have been rightly aware that ⁱⁿ the abstract sense of femininity and masculinity the two items could not be included in the category of nipphanna-rūpa. Apparently, the one and only alternative is to bring them under the

1. See above, 88-9, 94-5

2. Op.cit., 142; see also Vbh. 122-3

3. Op.cit., iv 57

opposite heading, i.e., anipphanna-rūpa. But instead of doing this they modified their earlier definition so as to justify their inclusion in the present category.

Hence it is that according to the Atthasālinī, the physical appearance and other features which are peculiar to a female are not expressed by itthindriya. They are what arise because of it. Just as, because of a seed a tree grows replete with twigs and branches, even so because of itthindriya there come into being such physical features, etc., as are peculiar to a female. With the necessary adjustments, the same observation applies to purisindriya, too.¹

Thus the "that" (yaṃ)² of the Dhammasaṅgani is in the Commentary understood as "that through which" (yena).³ This commentarial explanation falls in line with the one given by the Vaibhāṣikas. For, in their opinion, too, the two faculties of sex determine those differences between the male and the female as regards their physical form (saṃsthāna), tone of voice (svara), dispositions (abhiprāya), manner of being (ācāra), demeanour (ceṣṭā), etc.⁴

There is however this fundamental difference: The

1....itthilingādi pana na itthindriyam, ... yathā bīje sati bījam paṭicca rukkho vadḍhitvā sakhāvitāpasampanno akāsam pūretvā tiṭṭhati. Evam eva itthibhāvasaṅkhāte itthindriye sati itthilingādāni honti. Bījam viya hi itthindriyam. - op.cit., 321

2. Ibid. 321 (...yan ti kāraṇavacanam. Yena kāraṇena...)

3. See Dhs. 143

4. See AK.Ch.ii 104, 108; AKvy.ii 94, 97

Theravādins believe that itthindriya/purisindriya is spread all over the body (sakala-sarīra-byāpaka) as kāyendriya (the organ of touch) is.¹ On their relative position Buddhaghosa observes that it is not correct to say that itthindriya/purisindriya is either "located in the space where the organ of touch is located" or "located in the space where that is not located".² What is attempted to show is that, although both are spread all over the body, yet the one is not an aspect or a part of the other. Those primary elements which support the organ of touch are different from those that support the faculty of sex. (bhinna-nissayata).³

On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that strīndriya/purusendriya is not distinct from kāyendriya. "A part dans l'organe appelé kāyendriya, organe du tact, les deux organes sexuels. Ces deux organes ne sont pas distincts du kāyendriya".⁴ This is precisely why the Vaibhāṣikas do not count them as two separate rūpa dharmas.⁵

Buddhaghosa's commentator seems to have had the Vaibhāṣika theory in mind when he says that some entertain

1. See Vism. 378; Abhv. 269; ADSVT. 111

2. na ca kayappasadena thitokase thitan ti va atthitokase thitan ti va vattabbātam āpajjāti. - Vism. 378;

3. See Vism. 448; cf. na ca tassa kayappasadena sankaro lakkhanabhedato nissayabhedato vā. - Abhv. 269

4. AK.Ch. ii 108; see also AKVy. i 97

5. See above, 110

the wrong belief that the faculty of sex is only a part of the body (sarīrekadesavutti). And he goes on to remark that it is partly with a view to refuting this belief that in the Visuddhimagga it is described as pervading the whole body.¹

In consonance with their view, namely that the two faculties of sex "ne sont pas distincts du kāyendriya," the Vaibhāṣikas also maintain that "ils connaissent le tangible."² That the Theravādins do not subscribe to such a view is shown from the fact that the two items are not included in the category of "rūpam sappatigham."³

Since indriya is understood as that which exercises a dominant influence, in which sense and over what do they wield their influence? The Vaibhāṣikas explain this in two ways: Firstly, they are the determinant factor of the distribution of living beings into two groups as male and female (sattva-bheda). Secondly, they determine the differentiation of living beings (sattva-vikalpa-bheda); it is because of them that there are differences between the two sexes as regards the physical features, etc.

From what has been observed so far, it should become clear that the Theravāda answer to the question amounts to

1. VismT.448

2. AK.Ch.ii 108

3. See above, 58, 112

to the same.¹

We might note in passing some interesting comments made in the Atthasālinī on some differences between the two sexes:

The shape of a woman's hands, feet, neck, breast, etc., is not like that of a man's. The female lower body is broad, the upper body is less broad. The hands and feet are small, the mouth is small. The female breast is prominent. The face is without beard or moustache. The dressing of the hair, the weaving of clothes are also unlike those of a man's. The masculine features are just the opposite. For the shape of the hands, feet, neck, breast, etc., of a man is unlike the shape of those of a woman. For a man's upper body is broad, the lower body is less broad, his hands and feet are large, the face is large, the breast flesh is less full; beard and moustache grow.

Then there are differences as to habits and deportment: Thus in youth women play with tiny shallow baskets, pestles and mortars, variegated dolls, and weave string with clay-fibre. There is a want of assertion in women's walking, standing, lying down, sitting, eating, swallowing. Indeed

1. Cf. ... itthindriyañ ca purisindriyañ ca sattapaññaya
padaṭṭhānaṃ. - Pet.101

when a man of that description is seen, folk say: He walks stands, etc., like a woman. In the case of men there is a marked difference. In youth they play with chariots and ploughs etc., make sand-banks and dig ponds. There is assertion in their walking, etc.. When a woman is seen taking long strides etc., folk say, "she walks like a man".¹

Coming closer to our subject, we may note here a problem that has been created by the Atthasālinī account of the two faculties of sex. The view that they are the determinant factor of the differences between the male and the female as regards their physical features, etc., does not accord with the definition of indriya-paccaya as given in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In this work with the sole exception of itthindriya and purisindriya all the indriyas are postulated as indriya-paccaya, "condition by way of faculty".² The obvious implication seems to be that the two items are not interpreted as indriyas although they are so designated. The situation is perfectly understandable for, as we have seen,³ according to the earlier texts they mean femininity (itthatta) and masculinity (purisatta) and not, as interpreted in the Atthasālinī, what are responsible

1. Tr. from Expositor ii 419 ff.; arrangement is changed
(Asl. 321-2)

2. see below, 331 ff.

3. see above, 154

for them.¹

In all probability, it was this situation that prompted the authors of the later works to modify the Atthasālinī view on the subject. It is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, feminine features, etc., are due to the past kamma. But, since they arise mostly in a continuity endowed with the itthindriya, itthindriya is to be recognized as their kārana, "reason", i.e., a sort of supplementary cause. The same is true of purisindriya.²

1. According to the Vibhāsa, an ācārya named Saṅghavasu contended that only the 1st. 5 sense-organs & the faculty of life (see 162 ff) were indriyas in the real sense of the term - AK (Introduction), XLIII. In the opinion of some ācāryas, only the 6 sense-organs (the 6th is manas = the mental organ) form what is called "mūlasattvadravya," i.e., the fundamental constituents of a living being - AK.Ch.ii, lll, n.1 & 2; AKvy.i 98. As far as the position of the two indriyas in question is concerned, both these traditions accord well with the above situation which obtains in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

2. See VismT 448; VismS. v 62 ; cf. Kiñcāpi itthilingādini yathasakam kammādina paccayena samuttahanti yebhuyyena pana itthindriyasahite yeva santane tam-tadākara hutva sambhavanti, itarattha na bhavanti ti tesam tabbhāvabhāvitam upādāya indriyam paṭicca jāyanti ti vuttāni. Abhv. 266

That the two faculties of sex come into being through the action of kamma (kamma-samuṭṭhāna), is a view referred to both in the earlier and the later works.¹ When this view and the above modification are taken into consideration, the following situation results:

Kamma is the cause, not only of the two faculties of sex, but also of those differences which the two sexes exhibit as regards their physical appearances, etc.

This reduces the fundamental difference between the two faculties of sex on the one hand and feminine and masculine features, etc., on the other. The recognition of the former as a kāraṇa of the latter, seems to be only a flimsy device to save the situation. It will also be seen that, in these circumstances, the position of itthindriya and purisindriya comes very close to that assigned to them in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It seems more proper that the two items were excluded from the category of nipphanna-rūpa. Such a step does not necessitate a modification of the Dhammasaṅgani definition; nor does it give rise to the particular situation to which we have drawn attention.

Before we close this section we may refer here to the fact that in the view of the Atthasālini purisindriya is

1. see below ,277 ff.

superior to itthindriya: The former is brought about by higher morality (mahantena kusalena) and the latter by weak morality (mandena kusalena).¹ Mrs. Rhys Davids observes that in assigning a superior position to the former, the author of the Atthasālinī is mindful "to appreciate the sex to which he belongs."² This is not unlikely. However, there has been an earlier tradition according to which manhood is superior to womanhood.

The Vibhaṅga, for instance, says that there is no possibility of a female being the Sakka, the Māra or the Brahmā.³ An interesting view recorded in the Abhidharmakośa is that, although the two faculties of sex do not obtain in the Rūpa-loka, yet the living beings there are males for this reason: "Ils possèdent cette autre masculinité (puruṣabhāva) qu'on voit chez les mâles du Kāmadhātu, forme du corps, son de la voix, etc."⁴ Here too one cannot fail to notice the attempt to boost up masculinity.

Faculty of life

It is fairly certain that the recognition of two jīvitindriyas, faculties of life, is a doctrinal development confined only to the Theravāda.

1. Op.cit., 322; see also abhvt. 68; Abhvk. 267-8

2. Bud.Psy.Ethics 175, n.1

3. Op.cit., 336

4. Op.cit., Ch.ii 130

The first, called arūpa-jīvitindriya (mental) is one of the fifty two cetasikas (consciousness-concomitants), and as such is included in the sankhārakkhandha.¹ It is the factor that stabilizes and sustains every type of citta (consciousness) as well as those cetasikas which are co-nascent and co-terminous with it.² It is therefore counted as one of the seven "universal concomitants of consciousness" (sabba-citta-sādhārna cetasika).³

The second, called rūpa-jīvitindriya (material) is an upādā rūpa and as such is included in the rūpakkhandha. It is the factor that stabilizes and sustains the kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa (matter that comes into being as a result of kamma),⁴ namely, the first five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex, the physical basis of mind,⁵ and all other material elements inseparably associated with them.⁶ Hence it is that according to the theory of rūpa-kalāpa, it enters into the composition of all kamma-samuṭṭhāna rūpa-kalāpas,⁷ just as arūpa-jīvitindriya is concomitant

1. See Dhs.24,34 etc.,

2. See Asl.123-4; Vism.464,493; Abhk.120

3. See ADS.6

4. In Vism.378 the kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa is referred to as that rūpa which is "sahaja" with jīvitindriya, because they come into being simultaneously - see below,211; see also Abhk.270; ADSVP.112

5. i.e., hadaya-vatthu, the latest addition - see below,171 ff.

6. Discussed in 277 ff; rūpa-jīvitindriya too is kamma-samuṭṭhāna - see below,167-8

7. see below,387

with every kind of citta.

The Vaibhāṣikas, for instance, took an entirely different position: There is only one jīvitendriya. It is certainly not of the nature of rūpa. Nor is it exclusively a caitsika (mental) dharma, although it resembles the latter. For unlike the caittas (consciousness-concomitants) it is not associated (samprayukta) with citta. Hence it is assigned a place in the category of citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras.¹ This is to show that it applies, not only to nāma-dharmas (mental) but also to rūpa-dharmas (material). In this respect, it is like the four saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas² which, because they apply to both groups, are included in the same category.

Dr.P.S.Jaini has shown that the reason for the development of two such traditions (Theravāda and Vaibhāṣika) is traceable to the account of āyu given in the Mahāvedalla Sutta of the Majjhimanikāya and to the problems arising from the recognition, on the part of Buddhists, of the two planes of existence, viz. asaṅṅabhava and arūpaloka.

According to the sutta in question, what stabilizes the five sense-organs is āyu. Āyu depends on usmā (heat), and usmā in turn on āyu. Their interdependence is compared to that between the flame and the light of the lamp. Just

1. See AK.Ch.ii 178-9,214 ff.; AKvy.i 105, 168 ff.
2. See below,221

as the light is visible because of the flame, even so the flame is visible because of the light.

Āyu is not identical with vedanā (feelings) because if it were, then a person experiencing the trance called sañña-vedayita-nirodha (the cessation of perceptions and feelings) would not be able to rise again from that trance. Since the four nāmakkhandhas - vedanā (feelings), sañña (perception,) sankhāra (formations) and viññāna (consciousness) - are necessarily co-existent, sañña-vedayita-nirodha is the nirodha (cessation) of all the four. Hence for the self-same reason āyu could not be identified with any of these four khandhas.

Nor could it be included in the rūpakkhandha. Rūpa does not obtain in the arūpaloka. Consequently to include it in the rūpakkhandha is to exclude it from the arūpaloka. But the principle of life should be recognized in this plane of existence too.

Hence it is that the Theravādins have recognized two jīvitindriyas each having its province well demarcated; whereas the Vaibhāṣikas have recognized only one, which, although common to both nāma and rūpa, is not identical with either of them.¹

1. Jaini, The development of the theory of the viprayukta-samskāras, BSOAS, 1959 Vol.xxii Pt.3; see also, Buddha's prolongation of life, ibid., 1958 Vol.xxi Pt.2

That this was the reason that led to these two parallel developments, is further confirmed by a Kathāvatthu controversy where the point at issue is whether there are two jīvitindriyas or not. The Theravādin's (Sakavādin's) claim to the desirability of recognizing two jīvitindriyas is based on two main grounds: The first is that it explains the fact that the attainment of nirodha-samāpatti is not identical with death. The second is that the denial of nāma in asaṅṅabhava does not amount to the denial of jīvitindriya, for therein there is rūpa-jīvitindriya.

The objections of the opponent (the Pubbaseliyas and the ^āSammitīyas, according to the Commentary)¹ are strongly reminiscent of the Vaibhāṣika position. The opponent contends that there is only one jīvitindriya, that it is common to both nāma and rūpa, and that it is arūpa. Its description as arūpa suggests only its exclusion from rūpakkhandha and not its identity with any of the cetasikas. For, although he admits its inclusion in the sankhāra-kkhandha (sankhāra-kkhandha-pariyāpannā), yet he denies that sankhāras obtain in the nirodha-samāpatti.² The opponent's view, therefore, seems to be that although jīvitindriya could be assigned a place in the sankhāra-kkhandha, it is certainly not a pure cetasika-dhamma. It may be recalled

1. Kvua.112
2. Kvu.394 ff.

here that the Vaibhāṣikas include it in the category of citta-viprayukta-samākāras, but make it distinct from the caitasikas. In point of fact the Commentary observes that in the opinion of the opponent, jīvitindriya is a citta-vippayutta-arūpa-dhamma.¹

There is thus a close parallelism between the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas and that which the Kathāvatthu proposes to refute. And, the controversy could therefore be taken as representative of a conflict between two different solutions to a common problem - the problem of explaining the position of jīvitindriya in relation to asaññabhava and arūpaloka.

However, when the function assigned to rūpa-jīvitindriya is taken into consideration, the case for its recognition appears to be weak. Its characteristic function, it is said, is to stabilize and sustain the kammaja-rūpa, i.e., the material elements which arise as a result of kamma.² It is argued that, although what are called kammaja-rūpas are the result of kamma, their stability and uninterrupted continuity cannot be accounted for without the rūpa-jīvitindriya.³ But rūpa-jīvitindriya is itself kammaja.⁴

1. KvuA.112

2. See Vism.447; ADSVT.112; AbhvK.270

3. Ibid., loc.cit., cf. Na hi kammajānaṃ kammaṃ'eva tthitihetu bhavitum sakkoti. - AbhvK.270

4. Asl.342

Thus here we have a situation where one kammaja-rūpa is stabilizing and sustaining the other kammaja-rūpas. Adopting a Sautrāntika argument¹ one may contend that if the stability and uninterrupted continuity of the kammaja-rūpas cannot be accounted for without a rūpa-jīvitindriya, then this rūpa-jīvitindriya which is also a kammaja-rūpa should require another rūpa-jīvitindriya in order to account for its own stability and uninterrupted continuity. And this would result in what the Buddhists (and other Indian schools) call "anavasthā", the fallacy of infinite regress.

The situation becomes all the more clear when one considers how the Sautrāntikas reacted against the recognition, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas, of jīvitendriya as a real entity (dravyatas). Their argument is that karma alone is sufficient and efficient enough to sustain what arises as a result of karma. The so-called jīvitendriya, they contend, is a prajñapti (designation) with no objective reality.²

"Just as the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination are determined at the moment of its shooting, similarly the karma of an individual, at the moment of rebirth, fixes the destiny (nikāya-sabhāga) and the duration of the santāna of the five skandhas."³

1. See AK.Ch.ii 45 ff.

2. See AK.Ch.ii 214 ff.

3. Jaini, BSOAS, 1959 Vol.xxii Pt.3

The postulation of jīvitendriya is not only superfluous, but gives rise to, and leaves unexplained, the question of accounting for its own stability and continuity.¹

Viewed in the light of this Sautrāntika argument, the reasons adduced by the Theravādins for recognizing the rūpa jīvitindriya are rather far-fetched. As they have often done, had the Theravādins followed the Sautrāntika line of reasoning, they would have readily excluded it from the category of nipphana-rūpa.

Nutrient

Kabaḷikāra-āhāra, literally, means "food made into a ball" or "morsel-made-food". In the Nikāyan terminology, it means solid material food as against citta (consciousness), cetanā (volition), and phassa (sensory and mental impression) which are also called food (āhāra), for they all nourish, sustain and keep going the empiric individuality² - a process of alimentation.

While the earlier texts understood kabaḷikāra-āhāra in the general sense of food which all living beings take for their sustenance and growth, the Abhidhamma interpreted it in a more abstract sense to mean the nutritive aspect of matter, the "quality" of nutrition. It is of course true

1. See AK.Ch.ii 45 ff.

2. Cf.e.g., D.iii 228; 276; M.i 48; S.ii 11; 98

that the Dhammasaṅgani defines it by citing some examples of food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, flour, fish, flesh, milk, curds, butter, cheese, etc.,¹ But as the Commentator observes this is a definition given in terms of its embodiment - vatthu-vasena.² The commentarial observation is admissible for it is supported by the fact that kabalīkāra-āhāra is one of the dhammāyatana rūpas. It cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (mano),³ i.e., it is known by a process of inference. Nevertheless this definition by way of "vatthu" is reminiscent of its earlier meaning.

Quite in contrast is the Vaibhāṣika definition of kavaḍḍīkāra-āhāra: It consists of three āyatanas, viz. gandhāyatana (odour), rasāyatana (savour) and spraṣṭavyāyatana (the tangible). Rūpāyatana (the visible) is excluded on the ground that it does not contribute to the function of alimentionation.⁴

For the moment if we overlook the exclusion of rūpāyatana then this interpretation does not amount to a radical departure from the earlier conception. For, it may be noted here, the three āyatanas which make up

1. Op.cit., 144

2. Asl. 330

3. See above, 108-9

4. Cf. kavaḍḍīkārahārasya trīṣu gandhārasaspraṣṭavyāyataneṣu saṃgrahaḥ/ kasmād rūpāyatane na saṃgrahaḥ/ yasmāccakṣur-darśanāhārena sattvanikāyasya mahābhūtānam nopacayas-tasmāt// - Abhm. 40; see also AK Ch.iii 120 ff.

kavaḍḍikāraāhāra along with rūpāyatana represent those material elements which are qualified as avinirbhāga (inseparable) and which are said to enter into the composition of all material things.¹ Hence, if what in the Nikāyas was considered as kabaḷīkāra-āhāra (food in its general sense) was sought to be explained as composed of these four āyatanas, then this really amounts to a case of approaching the subject from the stand-point of āyatana.

As regards this subject the fundamental difference between the two schools is this: For the Theravādins kabaḷīkāra-āhāra is a separate rūpa-dhamma whereas for the Vaibhāṣikas it is a compound of rūpa-dharmas.

The physical basis of mental activity

The enumeration of hadaya-vatthu (the heart-basis) as a secondary material element and its recognition as the physical basis of mano-dhātu (mind) and mano-viññāna-dhātu (mind-consciousness) is a post-canonical development which finds mention in the Theravāda works compiled during and after the time Buddhaghosa. The Nikāyas are silent on the subject. Even in the Dhammasaṅgani, where we get the most exhaustive analysis of matter as far as the Pāli Canon is concerned, no allusion is made to such a theory. The

1. See above, 103-4; below, 372 ff.

first canonical reference to a physical basis of mental activity is met with in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, but strangely enough the manual does not specify what it is.¹

With their acceptance of the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity, one question the commentators had to answer was why hadaya-vatthu was omitted in the Dhammasaṅgani. In their opinion the omission was not accidental, but was due to the necessity of maintaining consistency in the method of exposition. The explanation is as follows:

In the Vatthu-duka section fo the Dhammasaṅgani, the exposition is made with reference to the basis of the first five kinds of viññāna, e.g., "There is rūpa that is the basis of cakkhu-viññāna; there is rūpa that is not the basis of cakkhu-viññāna."² If the dyads were stated with reference to mano-viññāna too, as "There is rūpa that is the basis of mano-viññāna; there is rūpa that is not the basis of mano-viññāna", then the Vatthu-duka section would not fall in line with the Ārammaṇa-duka section (where the dyads are stated with reference to the objects of the first five kinds of viññāna).³ For it is not possible to establish a dyad like "There is rūpa that is the object of mano-viññāna;

1. see below, 174

2. Dhs. 125, 149

3. ibid.; 126, 149 ff.

there is rūpa that is not the object of mano-viññāna" (because all the rūpa-dhammas become the objects of mano-viññāna).¹ If there were to be inconsistency between the two sections in question, then there would not be uniformity in the method of exposition. Herein the Teacher's intention was to develop the exposition in a form that has unity (eka-rasa). Hence the omission of hadaya-vatthu which is the basis of mano and mano-viññāna was unavoidable.²

That this is a highly ingenious explanation, is quite obvious. It is of course true that much of the subject-matter of the Dhammasaṅgani is cast in a symmetrical form. But it is extremely unlikely that the authors of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka should deliberately avoid mentioning an important element of rūpa just for the sake of retaining symmetry in the method of exposition.

Dr. S.Z.Aung too suggests, but for entirely different reasons, that the omission of hadaya-vatthu in the Dhammasaṅgani is not accidental: "In view of the popular idea, i.e., of the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity prevailing in his time, the Buddha preferred to be silent on the point. He did not accept the theory, but if he had expounded his own theory it would not have

1. See ibid., 178

2. See VismT 449-50; see also AbhvK.271, ADSS 154-5 & VismS vi 64-5, where the same explanation is repeated.

been acceptable to his hearers."¹

This explanation too is equally unsatisfactory and equally far-fetched. To suggest that Buddhism withheld certain ideas for the simple reason that they would not "go down" with the age is to overlook the element of radicalism in Buddhist thought.

Why hadaya-vatthu is not mentioned in the Dhammasaṅgani although it finds mention in the commentaries and in the kindred literature, does not seem to be a very relevant question; for what we encounter in the later texts need not necessarily find expression in the earlier. If there is a difference between the earlier and the later works as regards doctrinal tenets, this difference can be put down to a historical process at work.

Of much significance, however, is the passage in the Paṭṭhāna which alludes to a physical basis of mental activity without specifying what it is. The interesting thing to note is the way it makes this allusion. First it specifically states that cakkhu is a condition by way of basis (nissaya-paccaya) for cakkhu-viññāna (visual consciousness). Likewise, sota, ghāna, jivhā, and kāya are instanced as basis-conditions for sota-viññāna (auditory consciousness), ghāna-viññāna (olfactory consciousness), jivhā-viññāna

1. Cpd. 277-8

(gustatory consciousness) and kāya-viññāna (tactile consciousness) respectively.

But when it comes to refer to that which forms a basis-condition for mano and mano-viññāna, the language becomes less specific: "Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññānadhātu ca vattanti, taṃ rūpaṃ manodhātuyā ca manoviññānadhātuyā ca taṃ sampayuttakānaṃ ca dhammānaṃ nissayapaccayena paccayo".¹ (= "That material thing, based on which the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element occur — that material thing is a condition by way of basis for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element and what are associated therewith.")²

It will be seen that in the quoted sentence, the physical basis of mano and mano-viññāna is not specified. It is referred to in a circuitous way as "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ." Mrs. Rhys Davids' observation, namely that the term is "guarded" and that "the evasion is quite marked,"³ is certainly to the point. And as already observed by Aung, if it was thought that heart was the physical basis of mental activity, then the Paṭṭhāna would have used the word, "hadaya-(vatthu)" instead of "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ." However, we cannot agree with the suggestion made, namely,

1. Tkp.4

2. "What are associated therewith" means those cetasikas which arise along with mano-viññāna.

3. Bud.Psy.71

that this non-specification was due to the fact that, although Buddhism gave some sort of concession to the popular belief (see p.173), yet it was not prepared to go so far as to commit itself to the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity.¹

In view of the "marked evasion", it seems more probable that the author or authors of the Paṭṭhāna was/were not quite certain as to what exactly constituted the seat of mental activity; hence he or they preferred to observe what may be called a noble silence on the question. This is only a tentative suggestion, for the nature of the situation is such that no categorical statement could be made.

The commentators' interpretation of "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ" as hadaya-vatthu could neither be supported nor refuted with reference to the Paṭṭhāna passage. For it is an answer to a question left unanswered.

An interesting argument in support of their interpretation is found in the sub-commentaries. The first part of this argument is an attempt to find out whether it is possible to identify the "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ" of the Paṭṭhāna with any of the twenty seven rūpa-dhammas mentioned in the Dhammasaṅgani.

Attention is first drawn to the fact that cakkhu, sota, etc., which are the physical bases of the five kinds

of viññānas named after them are a variety of nipphanna-upādā-rūpa. Therefore - so runs the argument - the physical basis of mano and mano-viññāna too should be a rūpa-dhamma which is nipphanna as well as upādā. This eliminates the four primary elements because, although nipphanna, they are not upādā. It also eliminates the ten items which we shall examine in the next chapter because, although upādā, they are not nipphanna. Consequently the field is narrowed down to the ^{thirteen} ~~fourteen~~ nipphanna-upādā-rūpas which we have examined in this chapter.

Among them, none of the first five sense-organs can be selected because they are the physical bases of the five kinds of viññānas named after them. The four objective fields and the element of nutrition (kabalīkāra-āhāra) exist not only in the body of a living being but also outside of it; hence they too have to be eliminated. Since mano and mano-viññāna obtain even in those living beings who do not possess the faculty of sex, the two faculties of sex, too, have to be eliminated. The faculty of life has its own function to perform; to attribute another is not quite right; hence it should also be eliminated.¹

So far it has been a case of elimination. And, so

1. See VismI 449-50; VismS.v-vi 64-65; Abhv.270-271;

far two things have been established; the first is that what is referred to as "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ" should be a nipphanna-upādā-rūpa; the second is that it cannot be identified with, and should therefore be distinct from, any of the (already known) thirteen nipphanna-upādā-rūpas. The main purpose is to show that the postulation of a separate rūpa-dhamma as the physical basis of mental activity is justifiable.

The next problem is to find out where it is located. It is said that when someone thinks of anything bringing it to mind intently and directing his whole mind to it, he experiences exhaustion (khijjana) in his heart. Therefore it is to be inferred that the location of the seat of mental activity is inside the heart (hadayabbhantare).¹

What is called hadaya-vatthu is not absolutely identical with heart as such. Like the sense-organs, it is a very subtle and delicate species of matter, and is located inside the heart. Like the sense-organs, it also comes into being through the action of kamma.² But unlike the former,³ it is not an indriya. Because of this reason

1. ... atthikatvā manasikatvā sabbam cetasā samannāharitvā kiñci cintentassa hadayappadesassa khijjanato tatthedaṃ tiṭṭhati ti vinnāyati. - Abhv. 271

2. See Vism. 450

3. See above, 140

although *mano* and *mano-viññāna* have *hadaya-vatthu* as their basis, they are not controlled by it in the sense that the relative strength or weakness of the latter does not influence the former.¹ Since mental culture is a central theme in Buddhism, the scholiasts seem to have taken the view that it is not proper to conceive *mano* and *mano-viññāna* as controlled by the *hadaya-vatthu* although the latter is recognized as the physical basis of the former.

In recognizing *hadaya-vatthu* as the seat of mental activity the Theravādins have followed an old Indian tradition. In a prayer in the Atharva-veda one reads: "O Mitra and Varuna take away the thinking power (*citta*) from the heart (*hr̥d*) of this woman....."² Caraka and Suśruta, too, have recognized the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity.³ The question is not raised in the Nikāyas. However, as Mrs. Rhys Davids notes, the term *hadaya* "finds a place in Buddhist popular psychology, but in the sense of 'inmost', 'inwardness' and also of 'thorough'"⁴ Thus we have "*hadaya-sukhaṃ*" (inward pleasure), "*hadayaṅgama*" (going deep into the bosom of the heart). It also occurs in poetic diction as in "*dhammassa hadayaṃ*" (the heart of the

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1. See Vismī.450 ; Abhv.271
 2. Das Gupta, Hist. Ind. Phi. ii 292
 3. See Sinha, Ind. Psy. 1
 4. Bud. Psy. 34

doctrine). Attention has been drawn to a Jātaka where a man's thinking is referred to his heart's flesh (hadayamaṃsa).¹ In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the term hadaya is sometimes used as synonymous with mano and mano-viññāna.² References as these, too, may have encouraged the commentators in arriving at their conclusion.

1. Ibid., 278

2. See Vbh. 87, 88, 144

CHAPTER FIVE

SECONDARY ELEMENTS, 111 : GROUP B (ANIPPHANNA)

We have already shown¹ that only those items, qualified by the positive term, (pari)nipphanna, are true rūpa-dhammas: They are real and discrete entities having their own nature (sabhāva). Although real they are not eternal; not only are they dependent on conditions (paccaya), but are also characterised by the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas, that is to say, they come into being (uppāda), exist for some time (ṭhiti) and perish completely (bhaṅga).² They are therefore saṅkhata-dhammas. What then are the (pari)nipphanna rūpas?

According to the Kathāvatthu, what is not parinipphanna is also not saṅkhata.³ Since the commentators too, as we have shown,⁴ use the term with the same implications, it follows that what are called anipphanna-rūpa cannot be saṅkhata. But as is recognized in the commentaries themselves, what is not saṅkhata need not necessarily be asaṅkhata, i.e., something that exists permanently transcending all laws of "conditioned" (saṅkhata) existence.⁵ It could

1. see above, 128

2. i.e., according to the late interpretation of saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas; on various interpretations on the subject, see below, 215 ff.

3. Op.cit., 626-7

4. see above, 126

5. Cf. Kvua.92

as well be a nominal dhamma, a paññatti. Under which of these categories do anipphanna-rūpas fall?

The authors of the Atthasālinī and the Abhidhammāvatāra seem to have been perfectly aware of these implications. For, immediately after having stated that certain items are anipphanna, in almost identical words, they raise the question "If they were anipphanna, would not they become asaṅkhata?"¹

The question is raised only to answer it in the negative. The answer, when its implications are developed, amounts to this: What are called anipphanna-rūpas signify certain positions, phases, characteristics, etc., of the nipphanna-rūpa. As such they should not be interpreted as real and eternal entities transcending all laws of "conditioned" existence. In other words, they are certainly not asaṅkhata.²

The denial, namely, that they are not asaṅkhata does not mean that they are saṅkhata either. For, as we have already seen,³ one of the two purposes of describing the nipphanna-rūpa as salakkhaṇa-rūpa is to show that the three

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1. Yadi honti anipphannā bhavēyyuṃ te asaṅkhata? - Abhv.74
see also Asl.343
 2. Ibid.loc.cit., cf. Sumangala's comment in Abhvk.291
 3. see above, 127-8

saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas apply only to them.

The resulting conclusion is clear. The anipphanna-rūpas do not represent a set of rūpa-dhammas which are distinct from, and as real as, the nipphanna-rūpas. For the former merely signify certain facts (positions, phases, characteristics) connected with the latter. Apart from the nipphanna-rūpas, there are no distinct and separate material elements called anipphanna-rūpas. In other words, the anipphanna-rūpas are nominal dhammas with no autonomous objective counterparts. As such, once it is recognized that the nipphanna-rūpas are saṅkhata, the question as to whether the anipphanna-rūpas are saṅkhata or asaṅkhata does not arise. Then why were they postulated as rūpa-dhammas (material elements)?

Dhammapāla answers: They stand for the fact of limitation, certain positions, and characteristics of the nipphanna-rūpa; in this sense they "follow with the latter" (taggatika). Hence (as a matter of convention) they are also designated as rūpa-(dhammas).¹ That is to say, since they have a close and intimate connection with what really amounts to rūpa, they are also given the same designation. But this designation does not carry with it the implication

1. Nipphannarūpassa paricchedavikāralakkhanabhāvato taggatikamevā ti rūpantveva vuccati. - Vism. 459-60

that they are rūpa-dhammas in the same sense as the nipphanna-rūpas are. For, it may be recalled here, when Dhammapāla and Sumangala observe that the term rūpa has, as a matter of convention, been extended to denote things which do not satisfy its definition, they mean the anipphanna-rūpas.¹

Why the four generative conditions of rūpa (rūpa-samuṭṭhāna-paccaya), viz. citta, kamma, utu and āhāra are said to apply only to the nipphanna-rūpas² should become clearer now. Since they are saṅkhata, and since no saṅkhata-dhamma can arise without reference to certain conditions (paccaya), it is necessary that their coming into existence should be accounted for by the assignment of conditions. But, because of what has so far been observed, similarly cannot be treated the anipphanna-rūpas. If they, too, were assigned conditions separately, then this would amount to saying that they were something distinct from the nipphanna-rūpas - which is not the case.

There is however this situation to be noted. Although we are told that the four factors in question do not apply to the anipphanna-rūpas, yet they are often described as citta-samuṭṭhāna, kamma-samuṭṭhāna and so on.³

1. see above, 127

2. see above, 126

3. see e.g., Asl.340; Vism 451-2;

This does not mean that the scholiasts have overlooked the implications of what they have explicitly stated. That that was done from a conventional point of view, is clearly shown from what the Atthasālinī observes in respect of the two viññatti-rūpas. Although it describes them as citta-samuṭṭhāna, when it comes to define them it specifically states that in an absolute sense (paramatthato) this is not so.¹ This is because the viññatti-rūpa (as we shall see in detail later)² represents, not a separate material element, but a number of citta-samuṭṭhāna nipphanna-rūpas when they are in a particular position. Hence, once these nipphanna-rūpas are described as citta-samuṭṭhāna, it is not necessary to make the same description in respect of the viññatti-rūpa, too, because the latter is a name given to the former when they are in a particular position. And if the latter, too, is described as citta-samuṭṭhāna - this, as is recognized by the scholiasts themselves, is a description made according to the "indirect method" (pariyāyena) and as such is not valid in an absolute sense (paramatthato.)³

This needs much emphasis, for here one can see one

1. Op.cit., 337

2. see below

3. Cf. Lahutādīnam picittajādibhāvassa pariyāyeneva icchittā nippariyāyena attharaseva nipphannarūpani kammādi-samuṭṭhānāni ti - Abhv. 290

of the main points on which the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works differ from the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. The Dhammasaṅgani,¹ for instance, brings under the headings citta-samuṭṭhāna and "kamma-samuṭṭhāna,"² many of the items which, in the later works are brought under the heading, anipphanna. Because of this situation those items seem to appear as separate (and real) entities. By maintaining that this situation is not true in an absolute sense, the authors of the later works have done away with the flimsy claim those items had to stand as real rūpa-dhammas.

With these general observations in mind, let us now examine the ten upādā-rūpas which in the later Abhidhammic works came to be interpreted as anipphanna.

Modes of self-expression

The two viññatti-rūpas, namely, kāyaviññatti and vacīviññatti, signify bodily movements (gesture) and articulate vocal sound (speech) as two modes of self-expression or as two media for the communication of one's thought to another. This, be it noted, is only a general statement of the Buddhist conception of the two viññattis. Although it tends to coincide with the interpretation

1. Op.cit., 147

given by the Sāmmittīya and the Vātsīputrīya,¹ it does not do full justice to the exact position taken by the other schools including the Theravāda itself. The two viññattis are one of those subjects on which the scholiasts have advanced a wide variety of opinions. The initial statement should therefore be understood in a general sense.

The definition given in the Dhammasaṅgani, though it is the most exhaustive as far as the earlier texts are concerned, is not very clear. For, although it gives some fundamental facts on the subject, it does not give a clear indication of their mutual relation.

The first, i.e., kāyaviññatti, is defined as the state of bodily tension or excitement (kāyassa thambhanā santhambhanā santhambhitattam), "on the part of a person who advances or recedes or fixes the gaze or glances around or retracts an arm or stretches it forth."² It is said to result in response to a thought whether wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala), or morally indeterminate (avyākata.)³ For this reason it is also described as invariably citta-samuṭṭhāna, i.e., set up or given rise to by consciousness.⁴

It is called kāyaviññatti because it is the bodily

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1. see below , 188
 2. Bud.Psy.Ethics,176
 3. Dhs.143
 4. Ibid., 147

expression or the bodily intimation of that morally qualifiable thought in response to which it arises. It makes that thought known - viññāpanā; it is the state of having made that thought known - viññāpitatta.¹

What is quite clear from this brief account is that kāyaviññatti is not identical with the movements of the body. It means the bodily tension, the bodily excitement, on the part of a person who moves his body or limbs.

The Sāmmittīyas and the Vātsīputrīyas adopt a more direct approach: "L'infomration corporelle (kāyavijñapti) est un mouvement (gati) issue d'une pensée ... qui veut ce mouvement (tadviṣayāḷambakacittāder utpannā)."² The movement is that of the body (kāya). And, it is this movement that is recognized here as the vijñapti, because it makes manifest or expresses that thought in response to which it arises. It is included in the rūpāyatana, the sphere of the visible, because it is the movement of the body, of matter that is visible. Hence, it is the opinion of the Sāmmittīyas and the Vātsīputrīyas that kāyavijñapti is apprehended by the organ of sight.³

1. Dhs.143

2. KSP: MCB iv.212-13; see also 212,n.21. In the AK.Ch.iv,4 the theory that kāyavijñapti = movement, is attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas; whereas in La Siddhi,48 it is attributed to the Sāmmittīyas

3. See KSP: MCB iv,213, n.22

The Vaibhāṣikas object to this interpretation on the ground that there is no movement in an ultimate sense. All elements of existence are momentary (kṣanika).¹ Whenever they come into existence, there itself they cease to exist.² Motion is not something that exists in reality (dravyatas), but is a name given to the appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations (deśāntarotpatti).³ If somebody retracted his arm or stretched it forth, in an ultimate sense, it is incorrect to say that his arm had moved. What actually happened was that the series of momentary elements that constituted what was called the arm arose in adjacent locations in a certain direction. Only the place of the arising of elements had changed, not a single element had moved.

Hence to identify kāyavijñapti with bodily movements is to deprive it of its position as a real dharma. To deprive it of its position as a real dharma is to undermine the very foundation of the avijñapti-rūpa,⁴ in defence of which the Vaibhāṣikas, time and again, joined issue with the Sautrāntikas.

Hence it is that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, kāyavijñapti is not the movements of the body, but is such

1. See below, 221

2. yatraivotpattiḥ tatraiva vināsaḥ. - AKvy.i 33

3. See AK.Ch.iv 4-8

4. see above, 119 ff.

and such figure or disposition - samsthāna - of the body, given rise to, or conditioned, by a volitional thought (cetanā). This kāyaviññapti-samsthāna is something that is visible.¹ It can be apprehended independently of the colour (of the body): "kāyaviññapti-grahanam tu varṇa-nirapekṣam."²

Thus, although the Vātsīputriya-Sāmmittīyas and the Vaibhāṣikas differ in answering what exactly constitutes kāyaviññapti, both agree on this point: kāyaviññapti comes under rūpāyatana, it can be apprehended by the organ of sight.

Viewed against this background, the kāyaviññatti of the Dhammasaṅgani raises one important problem. We saw that it could not be identified with bodily movements. Nor can it be taken as something that is apprehended by the organ of sight. For its inclusion under the heading, "dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna"³ shows that it cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (mano). It is known through a process of inference. In which way, then, does it act as a mode of self-expression? Or, to be more precise, how does it express or make known that morally qualifiable thought in response to which it arises?

1. See AK.Ch.iv 4-12; KSP: MCB iv 207-209

2. AKvy.i 26

3. Dhs.179

On the solution of this question, depends our understanding of the whole subject. But strangely enough, this is the point on which the Dhammasaṅgāṇī is practically silent.

It may be noted here that in the Dhammasaṅgāṇī account, reference is made not only to the state of bodily tension or excitement (which is kāyaviññatti) but also to bodily movements such as retracting an arm or stretching it forth. This seems to be an indication of the fact that, although bodily movements are not kāyaviññatti, yet they have a close connection with it. That is to say they, too, have a part to play in the expression of thought.

What this close connection is, would be clear if a correspondence could be established between the kāyaviññatti of the Dhammasaṅgāṇī and that of the Dārṣṭāntikas given in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: "D'après les Dārṣṭāntikas, il existe un certain Rūpa qui n'est ni couleur (varṇa) ni figure (samsthāna) qui est produit par la pensée. Ce Rūpa met en mouvement la main et les autres membres".¹

What this "certain Rūpa" is, is not explained here in more positive terms. In the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu, an almost identical, if not the same, theory is attributed to the Sauryodayikas. According to this

1. La Siddhi 48

theory, bodily movements are due to the air-element (vāyu-dhātu), given rise to by a certain variety of consciousness (citta-viśeṣād utpannaḥ). And, it is this air-element that is recognized as the kāyavijñapti.¹

What interests us here is the fact that according to both accounts (Dārṣṭāntika-Sauryodayika) kāyavijñapti is the cause (hetu) of bodily movements. From this it may be concluded that the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sauryodayikas do not seem to have overlooked the contention of the Vātsīputrīyas, namely, that kāyavijñapti occurs only when there is some kind of movement (iñjita?) of the body and not otherwise.²

It may then be asked why the designation, kāyavijñapti, (that which makes known)³ is given to the cause of bodily movements, but not to the bodily movements themselves. For according to this explanation the significance of kāyavijñapti as a mode of self-expression is rather indirect. This is certainly so. But like the Vaibhāṣikas they, too, were committed to the theory of the denial of motion. For, although they speak of movements, they do not recognize them in an absolute sense. Strictly speaking, there is no "deśāntarasamkrānti," i.e., movement of a thing from one

1. See KSP: MCB iv 219 ff.

2. See AK.Ch.iv 4

3. See ibid., 3 n.2

locus in space to another, but only "deśāntarotpatti," i.e., the appearance of (momentary elements) in adjacent locations.¹ It seems very probable, therefore, that it was with a view to retaining its reality that kāyaviññatti was sought to be identified with the cause of bodily movements.

That there is some parallelism between the kāyaviññatti of the Dhammasaṅgani and that of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sauryodayikas is clear. The former, too, is neither colour (vanna) nor figure (saṅkhāna). For its exclusion from the rūpāyatana and its inclusion in the dhammāyatana precludes its being identified with either.

Its parallelism with that of the Sauryodayikas goes still further. As we have already noted, it is defined as "kāyassa thambhanā santhambhanā santhambhitattam". It may also be noted here that thambhitattam (tension, distension) is one of the terms used in the Dhammasaṅgani in defining the air element.² Does this mean that the kāyaviññatti of the Dhammasaṅgani, like that of the Sauryodayikas, is the air element?

In the Dhammasaṅgani seventeen rūpa-dhammas are listed under the heading citta-samuṭṭhāna, i.e., arising

1. See KSP: MCB iv 219-20

2. Op.cit., 177

in response to, or conditioned by, consciousness. Two of them are the air element and the kāyaviññatti.¹ If the latter were the same as the former, then they would not be mentioned separately and counted as two items. On the other hand, if the kāyaviññatti were different from, or if it had no connection with, the air element, then it would not be explained as (kāyassa san) thambhitattam. The relation between them seems to be one of identity as well as difference.

The whole situation becomes clear when it is understood in the light of certain observations made by the commentators. Except for one significant fact their interpretation tallies well with the main points brought into relief so far.

According to the commentators what is called kāyaviññatti is an "ākāra-vikāra" or "vikāra" of the citta-samuṭṭhāna air element. "ākāra-vikāra" (lit. alteration of the mode) or "vikāra" (alteration), as understood in the commentaries and in the kindred works, means a particular position, situation or condition (of the air element).² Since the air element cannot arise or exist

1. Op.cit., 147

2. See Asl. 83, 343; Vism. 448; Abhv. 273 ff.

independently of the other three primary elements,¹ it is further observed that, in reality, it is the ākāra-vikāra of all the four (and of any other secondary element that arises and exists with them).² But it is called ākāra-vikāra of the air element for this reason: Among the primary elements (and any other secondary element that arises and exists with them) of which it is an ākāra-vikāra, the air element is characterised by more intensity (ussada) or capability (sāmatthiya).³ In the Abhidhammatthavikāsinī this ākāra-vikāra is said to resemble the state of effort-making (ussahana-vikāra) which appears in the body of a person when, with full effort, he is lifting a huge stone.⁴

We have already observed that in the Dhammasaṅgani reference is made to a list of citta-samuṭṭhāna rūpa-dhammas of which two are the air element and the kāya-viññatti. We have also drawn attention to the close affinity between two of the words used in defining the two items in question. When these two facts are taken into

1. See above, 78

2. Cf. the theory of avinibhoga-rūpa; see above, 103

3. See Vism. 450; Abhv. 273-274

4. ...mahantaṃ paṣaṇaṃ ukkhipantaṃ sabbatthāmena gahaṇa-kāle sarīraṃ ussahanavikāro viya ... labbhamāno eko akāravikāro kāyaviññatti nama ti vuttaṃ hoti - op.cit., 274-275; repeated in ADSVT. 113

consideration the interpretation of kāyaviññatti as an ākāra-vikāra of the citta-samuṭṭhāna air element (and its concomitants) seems to be quite in accord with the earlier account. It could be understood as a re-statement, made in terms of elemental analysis, of the earlier general definition.

The position of kāyaviññatti as a mode of self-expression is explained as follows: kāyaviññatti is a condition (paccaya) for the occurrence of bodily movements (pariphandana, calana). It is through the bodily movements which are conditioned by kāyaviññatti that the particular thought is expressed or intimated. The thought is known (inferred)¹ after the apprehension of the colour (vaṇṇagahaṇāntaram) of the body which is in movement.²

In recognizing kāyaviññatti as a condition (paccaya) for the occurrence of bodily movements, the Theravādins are in general agreement with the Dārṣṭāntikas and the

1....ñāpetabham ... anumānato siddham - Abhv.275

2. See Abhv.273-275; Vism. 451 ; ADSVT.113-113

N.B. In the previous chapters, we took notice of the fact that in the late works (the tikas for instance) of the Theravādins, too, motion was interpreted as "desantarup-patti", i.e, appearance of dhammas in adjacent locations. From their point of view, therefore, all references to (bodily) movement should be understood accordingly - a point explicitly stated in ADSVT.114

Sauryodayikas. However, there is this significant difference to be noted: According to the Sauryodayikas kāya-vijñapti is the air element, whereas according to the Theravādins kāyaviññatti is an ākāra-vikāra of the air element (and its concomitants.) Why The Theravādins took this position needs explanation.

It seems that kāyaviññatti is called so because of two reasons: The first is that it makes manifest or expresses that particular thought in response to which it arises. This manifestation or expression, as we have seen, is a certain tension or excitement of the body (kāyassa thambhitatta). It is not something that is visible,¹ but it is the physical representation of a mental event. In this sense it is bodily expression, i.e., kāyaviññatti.

The second is that it conditions or helps the occurrence of bodily movements through which that thought is communicated. In this sense it is that which makes known - viññāpanā.

Now, elsewhere in the Dhammasaṅgani it is stated that the kāyaviññatti is citta-sahabhū, i.e., co-existent with the thought (in response to which it arises), and cittānuparivatti, i.e., follows the pattern of the thought

1. See Abhv.275; Mvn.65

(in response to which ^{it} arises).¹ The implied reason is that since it is the physical manifestation or representation of a thought, its duration, too, should be equal to the duration of that particular thought. Secondly, since it is brought about by being conditioned by that thought (which it makes manifest or represents), it too follows the pattern of that particular thought.

In this connection, it should be noted here that in the view of the Theravādins the duration of a material element is longer than that of a mental element.²

Accordingly, although the citta-samuṭṭhāna air element and its concomitants arise simultaneously with a thought-moment,³ yet they do not cease to exist together with that thought-moment. In view of this circumstance, the air element and its concomitants cannot be described as citta-sahabhū, because to describe them so is to admit that their duration is equal to that of the thought-moment. But the kāya-viññatti has to be citta-sahabhū. This explains why the designation, kāyaviññatti, is given, not to the air element and its concomitants, but to their ākāra-vikāra. Is there

1. Dhs.148

2. See below, 215-17; 223; 224,n.1; 323

3. Cf. Mkp.3 where citta and cetasikas are postulated as a condition by way of co-nascece (sahajāta-paccaya, in relation to citta-samuṭṭhāna rūpa.

then no contradiction is recognizing kāyaviññatti as a rūpa-dhamma while describing it as citta-sahabhū?

What we should not overlook here is that what is called kāyaviññatti is not a rūpa-dhamma in its usual sense. It is not something which is distinct and separate from the air element and its concomitants. It signifies only a particular situation or position - ākāra-vikāra - of the latter. It is a name given to the latter when they are in a particular position. Apart from the air element and its concomitants, of which it is an ākāra-vikāra, there is no separate rūpa-dhamma called kāyaviññatti, just as much as there is nothing called table apart from a collection of rūpa-dhammas (material elements) organized and arranged in a particular order.

In other words, kāyaviññatti is a name given to the air element and its concomitants when they function as bodily expression or manifestation of a thought, just as table is a name given to a collection of rūpa-dhammas when they function as that what we conventionally call "table". Stated otherwise: the air element and its concomitants are called kāyaviññatti as long as that particular thought in response to which they arise, exists, because it is during this time that they make manifest or represent that thought (= viññatti) and function as a condition for the

occurrence of bodily movements and thereby make known that thought (= viññāpanā).

However, the air element and its concomitants do not cease to exist concurrently with the cessation of that particular thought in response to which they arise, but their position and function as kāyaviññatti do. The sun is called mid-sun when it is overhead; but it does not set immediately after its position and function as mid-sun is over. A similar situation obtains here, too.

Thus it is clear that kāyaviññatti is not a rūpa-dhamma, distinct and separate from the air element and its concomitants, signifying as it does only an ākāra-vikāra of the latter. However, in the Dhammasaṅgani not only the air element and its concomitants but also kāyaviññatti are described as citta-samuṭṭhāna¹ - a situation which gives the impression that the latter has an arising separate from that of the former. Nevertheless, the fact that kāya-viññatti is described as citta-sahabhū although no rūpa-dhamma can be so described, suggests that thereby the Dhammasaṅgani does not mean that ^{it} is a (separate) rūpa-dhamma. The logic that seems to have guided it in taking such a step could be that since the air element and its concomitants are citta-samuṭṭhāna, their "ākāra-vikāra" (= kāyaviññatti), too, is citta-samuṭṭhāna.

1. Op.cit., 147

The Commentators clarify the whole situation when they observe that, strictly speaking, only the air element and its concomitants are citta-samuṭṭhāna.¹ This is quite understandable. For, as we have already seen, kāyaviññatti signifies the selfsame number of rūpa-dhammas when they are in ^α particular position or situation, and not something that is distinct from them. In other words, it is an anipphanna-rūpa.

As for the interpretation of vāgvijñapti (Pāli: vacīviññatti) there is general agreement among most of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. Voice (vāc) or vocal sound (vāgdhvani) as a mode of self-expression or as a medium for the communication of one's thought to another is vāgvijñapti. It is defined as sound which is discourse by its nature, i.e., articulate (varṇātmaka) sound; as the pronunciation of sounds (ghoṣoccarana); or as the distinct pronunciation of syllables (vyaktavarṇoccarana). Since vāgvijñapti means vocal sound it is brought under śabdāyatana, the sphere of the audible.² It is presumably because of this general agreement on the subject that the accounts of vāgvijñapti occupy comparatively ^{little} ~~less~~ space in the sources of Sanskrit Buddhism.

1. See Asl. 337

2. See AK.Ch. iv 14; KSP: MGB iv 156, 260; Mdhy.Vrt. 307; AKvy. ii 351

On the other hand, the Theravāda account of the subject takes quite a different form. The one given in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka does not present a complete picture. First, vācā (voice) is described as girā (utterance), vyappatho (speech, speaking), udīrana (vocal emission), ghosa (noise), ghosa-kamma (act of making noise), or vacībheda (broken or articulate voice) - which arises in response to a thought wholesome, unwholesome, or morally indeterminate. Then it is said that the manifestation (viññatti), the making known (viññāpanā) or the state of having made known (viññāpitatta) (of that thought) through vācā is vacīviññatti.¹

At first sight it might appear from this statement that vacīviññatti means vocal sound as a medium of thought expression. But its exclusion from saddāyatana shows that it is not conceived as a variety of sound as such. However, the fact that vocal sound is referred to, suggests that it is closely connected with vacīviññatti, even as bodily movements are with kāyaviññatti. Thirdly, the fact that it is also described as citta-sahabhū,² shows that like kāyaviññatti it is not a discrete rūpa-dhamma.

The commentators' interpretation falls within the

1. Dhs. 143-144

2. Ibid., 148

framework of these three fundamental facts. We may therefore take it as an explicit statement of what has been implicitly recognized in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

That the thought is communicated through vocal sound is admitted. But the vacīviññatti is not the same as vocal sound, but is causally related to it in the same way as kāyaviññatti is to bodily movements.¹

Vacīviññatti, it is said, is an ākāra-vikāra of the citta-samuṭṭhāna earth element.² Although it is called so, in reality, like the kāyaviññatti, it is an ākāra-vikāra of all the four primary elements (and of whatever secondary element that arises and exists with them). In this case it is the earth element that is characterised by more intensity and capability; hence it is called the ākāra-vikāra of the earth element.³

This so-called ākāra-vikāra of the earth element (= vacīviññatti) strikes against the vocal apparatus (upādinnaka, akkharuppattiṭṭhāna) and produces (vocal) sound through which the thought is communicated.⁴

Why an ākāra-vikāra of the earth element and its concomitants is recognized as vacīviññatti is because of

1. Vism.379

2. Ibid.loc.cit.,

3. Vism.452

4. Abhv.277; see also Mvn.65

the fact that, like kāya~~i~~ññatti, it too has to be citta-sahabhū. And, the position of vacīviññatti in relation to the earth element and its concomitants should be understood in the same way as that of the kāyaviññatti in relation to the air element and its concomitants. That is to say, apart from those elements of which it is an ākāra-vikāra there is no distinct and separate rūpa-dhamma called vacīviññatti - hence its inclusion in the category of anipphanna-rūpa.

Characteristics of matter

By characteristics of matter we mean the three items, namely, rūpassa lahutā, rūpassa mudutā and rūpassa kammanñatā. The first means lightness (lahutā) of matter, its light transformability (lahupariṇāmatā), its lack of heaviness (adandhatā) or non-rigidity (avithatātā); the second, plasticity of matter (mudutā), its softness (maddavatā) or its absence of hardness (akakkhālatā); and the third, wieldiness or pliability of matter (kammanñatā, kammanñattam, kammanñabhāva).

According to these definitions, which we have taken from the Dhammasaṅgani¹, the three items seem to indicate some characteristics or qualities of matter in general. However, in the later works we are told that they signify

1. 144

certain characteristics of the matter of the body of a living being: They are not found apart from each other (na aññam'aññam vijahanti); the triad represents a certain position of the body when it is healthy, efficient or when it is amenable to work.¹

This gives an indication of why the Abhidhamma has recognized the items in question. In the Nikāyas much emphasis is laid on the desirability of bodily health or efficiency for the purposes of mental culture. A healthy body is usually described as lahu and kammañña, i.e., pliable and wieldy.² Over-eating renders the body garu (heavy) and akammañña (unserviceable); it is like a load of soaked beans. Such a state of the body is not conducive to putting forth energy in the right direction. Hence the monks are advised to have a body that is lahu and kammañña.³ Thus it is that Khitaka of the Theragāthā exults in the thought that his body is lahu and that it "floats" like a piece of cotton in the air.⁴ The term muḍu occurs mostly in the references to bodily beauty.

Nevertheless the fact that lahu and kammañña occur

1. See Abhv. 281

2. Cf. e.g., M. i, 437

3. Cf. the description of eight kusīta-vatthus, bases of indolence in A. iv, 332 ff.

4. Thag. 15

often in the Nikāyan allusions to the bodily health and efficiency and the fact that Buddhism attaches much importance to it, seem to confirm the statement, namely, that the three items are meant to recognize certain characteristics, not of matter in general, but of the body of a living being (when it is healthy and efficient).

However, nowhere in the Nikāyas are they recognized as rūpa-dhammas although they are so recognized in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Whether this means that they are understood as three discrete material elements is the question that arises here.

The way they are named (note the term rūpassa added before each item) and the way they are defined suggest clearly that they could well be interpreted as qualities of matter (body). Their elevation to the status of rūpa-dhamma seems to have been done with a view to forestalling their being interpreted as such. But the commentators appear to have realized that by this device alone their true nature cannot be concealed. This explains why in the later works they are explained in such a way as to deprive them of their apparent position as discrete entities.

What they really amount to, is stated clearly: When the body is not efficient, i.e., when it is not light (lahu), pliable (muḍu), and wieldy (kammañña), it is said to be

characterised by "dhātukkhobha", elemental disturbance.¹

What is called dhātukkhobha is either the disharmony between wind (vāta), bile (pitta) and phlegm (semha), or that of chyme? etc., (rasādīdhātu).² In either case, in the ultimate analysis, it means the same thing: it is a certain position or situation (vikāra) of the primary elements and of whatever other secondary element concomitant with them.³

Likewise, when the body is not characterised by dhātukkhobha, in the ultimate analysis, it also signifies a certain position or situation of the primary elements and their concomitants. It is this position or situation that is represented by the triad, lahutā-mudutā-kammaññatā. Hence it is called vikāra-rūpa.⁴ And, since they represent a vikāra of the primary elements and their concomitants, apart from them there do not exist three rūpa-dhammas called lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā. Stated otherwise: they are anipphanna-rūpa.

1. See Asl. 326-7; Vism. 448-9

2. Dhātukkhobho: vāta-pitta-semhappakopō; rasādīdhātūnaṃ vā vikāravatthā - Vism. 453

3. Dvidhā vutto pi atthato paṭhavī ādīdhātūnaṃ yeva vikāro datṭhabbo - ibid. loc. cit.,

4. See Abhv. 280 ff.

Phases of matter

The next four items, namely, rūpassa upacaya, rūpassa santati, rūpassa jaratā and rūpassa aniccatā are a *representation* ~~formularization~~ of four phases, not of matter in general, but of the physical body of a living being. It is of course true that this limitation in their scope is not explicitly stated in the Abhidhamma. But the way they are described, both in the earlier and the later works, makes it clear that this was the underlying assumption. And, it is only when this fact is taken into consideration that their significance as well as their mutual relation become increasingly clear.

Let us take the first two, first. Rūpassa upacaya is defined as: "yo āyatanānaṃ ācayo, so rūpassa upacayo", and rūpassa santati as "yo rūpassa upacayo, sā rūpassa santati".¹ Thus, while the first is explained as "āyatanānaṃ ācayo", the second is identified with the first.

One immediate conclusion that can be drawn from this is that both are expressive of the same thing. On the other hand, one cannot overlook the fact that they are counted as two items and that they convey two different meanings: the first means growth or integration of matter and the second its continuity or subsistence. When

1. Dhs.153

both points are taken into consideration, their relation turns out to be one of identity as well as difference. In which sense are they identical and in which different?

From the (Vibhāvinī) ṭīkā to the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha one gathers that the first refers to the growth of the body (embryo) from the moment of conception till the sense-mechanism is complete.¹ Although in the later works the subject under consideration has undergone much change, yet this particular statement could be supported by the data confined to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

We saw that rūpassa upacaya = āyatanānaṃ ācayo. We need first clarify what the term āyatana signifies here. It is a well known fact that there are twelve āyatanas, of which six (cakkhu, sota, etc.,) are qualified as ajjhattika and the other six (rūpa, sadda, etc.,) as bāhira. But usually the simple term āyatana is used to mean only the ajjhattika group. Sal-āyatana (Skr.ṣaḍ-āyatana) is a case in point. In the phrase in question, too, the term appears to have been used with this restricted denotation. Further proof of the supposition is the fact that it tallies well with the rest of the data on the subject. Since āyatanānaṃ ācayo = rūpassa upacayo, we could still narrow down the

1. Cf. Tattha paṭisandhito patthāya yāva cakkhādidasakānaṃ uppatti, etthantare rūpuppādo upacāyo nāma. - ADSVT.114

field to include only the first five ajjhattika āyatanas, i.e., the first five sense-organs, which alone come under rūpa.¹

Since ācaya means "heaping up" or "accumulation", āyatanānaṃ ācayo implies that the coming into being of the five sense-organs is a graduated process. This is further confirmed by a Kathāvatthu controversy concerning the genesis of the sense-mechanism. According to some schools (the Pubbaseliya and the Aparaseliya)² the six-fold sense sphere comes into being all at once (apubbaṃ acarimaṃ). The Theravādins reject this view on the ground that it is neither logical nor supported by the Scripture. Their view is that only (maṇāyatana) and kāyāyatana come into being at the moment of conception. The other four, namely, cakkhāyatana, sotāyatana, ghāṇāyatana and jivhāyatana arise subsequently in the order they are mentioned here.³

With this theory in mind when one approaches the formula: āyatanānaṃ ācayo = rūpassa upacayo, its significance becomes clear. The accumulation, i.e., the coming into being one after the other, of the first five sense-organs

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1. This is not to suggest that the sense-organs could arise independently of other rūpa-dhammas, because they are a variety of upādā-rūpa;
 2. i.e., according to KvuA.148
 3. Kvu.493 ff.

is, in other words, the growth or intergration of the body (rūpassa upacaya). It is like saying: the gathering of people is the growth of the crowd. Or to adopt a simile from the commentaries: the welling up of water is the brimming up of the well.¹

From this it should not be concluded that the sense-organs could arise independently of some other material elements. Since they are upādā-rūpas it is implied that the four mahābhūtas and the four upādā-rūpas which necessarily arise with them² are also present. Again, since they are kamma-samuṭṭhāna rūpa, and since the stability of the kamma-samuṭṭhāna rūpa is dependent on the rūpa-jīvitindriya,³ the presence of the rūpa-jīvitindriya, too, is implied.⁴

1. See Vism.380; Asl.327

2. See above, 103-4

3. See above, 167

4. To this group the later works add hadaya-matthu and the faculty of sex, both of which are said to arise together with (manāyatana) and kāyātana - see Vbha.22; ADS.30; ADSS.199. The addition of the former is necessitated by its being recognized as the physical basis of mind. Cf. Ukp.3 where it is stated that at the moment of conception the relation between mind and matter is one of reciprocal co-nascence (añnam'anna saha-jāta). The addition of the latter is necessitated by the new interpretation given to it

Thus rūpassa upacaya means the growth of the embryo with the gradual accumulation of the sense-organs. It covers that interval from the moment of conception to the moment when the sense mechanism is complete.

With the completion of the sense mechanism, in other words, with the accumulation of the last sense-organ, ends what is called rūpassa upacaya, the growth of the body. This does not mean that there is no growth thereafter. It all means that the body is not deficient in any of the sense-organs. From the point of view of the sense-organs it is complete. Moreover, if rūpassa upacaya means the accumulation of the sense-organs, it follows that with the accumulation of the last sense-organ there ends the phase called rūpassa upacaya.

Thereafter begins rūpassa santati, the continuity of the body complete with all the sense-organs. It is not continuity in a static sense. For certainly the body grows even during this phase. It is therefore continuity (santati) by way of growth (upacaya). This explains why rūpassa santati is defined as rūpassa upacaya: yo rūpassa upacayo sã rūpassa santati.

Thus, both rūpassa upacaya and rūpassa santati mean the growth of the body (= rūpassa upacaya). In this sense they are identical. But they represent two phases of growth. In this sense they are different.¹

1. See above, 209

The third is rūpassa jaratā: "The decay (jarā) or the state of decaying (jīranatā) of the body (rūpa), brokenness of teeth (khaṇḍicca), greyness of hair (pālicca), the state of having wrinkles (valittacatā), shrinkage in the length of days (āyuno saṃhāni), hyper-maturity of the faculties (indriyānaṃ paripāko)".¹

One question that arises here is whether rūpassa jaratā ~~formularizes~~ ^{represents} a stage in the history of the body or whether it refers to the fact of decay itself. Since brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, etc., are symbolic of old age, it seems more appropriate if it is understood as a stage which sets in with the passage of time, when the body shows signs of decay, old age. The use of the words, "shrinkage in the length of days" does also encourage this conclusion.

Once it is understood as a stage, the next question that arises here is whether it overlaps with rūpassa santati. What we should not overlook here is that, although rūpassa santati means continuity of the body, yet it is defined as rūpassa upacaya, growth of the body (after the completion of the sense mechanism.) Generally speaking, when decay sets in growth ceases. And, since rūpassa

1. Dhs.144; this same description occurs as a stock formula in D.ii 305, M.i 49, S.ii 2

santati is defined as the growth of the body, it seems unlikely that it was understood as covering the jaratā-phase, too. This is not to suggest that jaratā as a phenomenon could not take place during santati - (or upacaya-) phase. But when life is young the tendency is towards growth. With the passage of time there is a plus tendency towards decay. Gradually the faculties get matured. The body begins to show signs of maturity and decay. It is these two phases that rūpassa santati and rūpassa jaratā represent. During the first the main characteristic is growth (upacaya); during the second it is decay (jaratā).

Finally, we come to the final phase, or rather the moment - rūpassa aniccata. This signifies the break-up of the body at the time of death.¹ It is that moment when the body becomes a (lifeless) corpse.²

These four upādā-rūpas which amount to a formulation of four phases of the history of the body appear to have been based on the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas referred to in the Āṅguttaranikāya. In this Nikāya it is stated

1. See Dhs.144

2. This should be the moment when the rūpa-jīvitindriya ceases to function. Cf. KvuA.113 where it is stated that at the moment of death both rūpa and arūpa jīvitindriyas cease to function simultaneously (Cutikkhaṇasmim dve pi jīvitāni sah'eva bhijjanti)

that that which is saṅkhata has three fundamental characteristics (lakkhaṇa) namely, uppāda, vayo, and ṭhitassa aññathatta.¹

Now, uppāda, i.e., birth or origination, corresponds to the beginning of the first phase, rūpassa upacaya. Vayo, i.e., waning away or cessation corresponds to rūpassa aniccatā. Before one could find out what corresponds to ṭhitassa aññathatta one has to find out what it really means.

As we shall soon see different schools of Buddhism interpret ṭhitassa aññathatta, literally, "otherwiseness of that which is existing", in different ways, as if to justify the very meaning conveyed by the phrase. But what is common to these later-day interpretations is that they are based on the theory of moments. This theory does not find expression in the earlier texts. True, the doctrine of impermanence is constantly alluded to. But the logical implications of this doctrine were not developed on the basis of a theory of moments. And, as Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly observes, "it was inevitable that later exegesis would so develop the theme."²

The second point to be noted here is that although

1. Op.cit., i 152
2. Bud.Psy. 14

The Nikāyas recognize the rapidity of change in mental events, they assign a relative permanence to the body.

"Better were it, bhikkhus, that the uneducated many-folk should conceive this four-element-made body, rather than citta, to be soul. And why? The body is seen to persist for a year, for two, three, four, five, ten or twenty years, for a generation ... even for a hundred years or even longer, while that which is called consciousness, that is mind, that is intelligence, arises as one thing, ceases as another both by night and by day."¹

This difference between mind and matter as regards their duration is recognized and upheld in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, too. A number of controversies in the Kathāvatthu suggest clearly that the Theravādins had no hesitation in recognizing the momentariness of mental elements.² On the other hand, they do not deny the relative permanence of the body or matter in general. In point of fact the thesis (of the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas)³ namely, that the duration of material things is equal to

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1. S.ii 94 (translation from Bud.Psy.13-14); cf. also N'āham bhikkhave annam ekadhammam pi samanupassāmi evam lahuparivattam yathāyidam bhikkhave cittaṃ - A.i 10
 2. See op.cit., 204-8, 458-9, 620-1
 3. according to Kvua.196

the duration of a thought-moment (eka-cittakṣaṇika) is rejected as untenable.¹

It was not the Theravādins alone who upheld this tradition. Vasumitra records that in the view of the Mahāsaṅghikas the material sense-organs and the primary elements "evolve" (pariṇamati) whereas consciousness and consciousness-concomitants do not "evolve". This has been interpreted to mean that while material elements endure for a longer time, mental elements are "naissant-périssant en un instant" (kṣaṇabhangura).² Yaśomitra notes that in the opinion of the Ārya-Sāṃmitīyas matter is of longer duration whereas consciousness and consciousness-concomitants are characterized by instantaneous being.³ A similar view is attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas, too: Some saṃskāras exist for some time while others perish at every moment.⁴

On the other hand, many other schools notably the Sarvāstivāda, the Mahīśāsaka, the Pūrvaśāila, and the

1. See Kvu.620 ff.

2. Documents d'Abh.: MCB v 136; Masuda 34, n.1,2; Bureau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques Du Petit Véhicule 73-74

3. Cf. yo py aha nikayaṃtariya iti aṛya-Sāṃmitīyah. sa ghaṭ'āder mudgar'ādi-kṛto viṇāśa iti maṇyate kālāṃtar-āvasthāyī hi tasya rūpaṃ. citta-caittānaṃ tu kṣaṇika-tvaṃ - AKvy.i 179

4. Masuda, AM.ii 54

Aparaśaila disapproved of this distinction. In their view not only mental but also material elements are of instantaneous being.¹


It seems fairly clear that over the interpretation of the early doctrine of impermanence the Buddhist schools fell into two general groups. Some recognized the momentary duration of mental elements but assigned a relative permanence to material elements. Others objected to introducing any such distinction. As we have seen the Theravādins of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka belong to the former group. As yet they were not prepared to admit that material elements were of momentary duration.

In view of this circumstance, as far as material elements are concerned, they seem to have understood *ṭhitassa aññathatta* in a very general sense. That is to say, material things become otherwise while they are existing. Looked at in this way, how it is represented

1. Masuda. AM.ii, 54, n.2; Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques Du Petit Véhicule 103,105,144,186; see Documents d'Abh.: MCB.v 137-140 where Sanghabhadra criticizes severely the thesis that matter is not of momentary duration. For a compact but comprehensive discussion on this subject, consult Silburn, Instant et Cause 227-274

among the four upādā-rūpas is easily recognizable. We have already shown that rūpassa upacaya and santati signify the gradual growth of the body and rūpassa jaratā the gradual process of maturing and decay that sets in with the march of years. Since they point to the fact that the body becomes "otherwise" (aññathatta) while it is "existing" (ṭhitassa) they could be understood as representative of ṭhitassa aññathatta.

The position of the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas vis-à-vis the four upādā-rūpas could then be graphically illustrated, as follows:



When the Āṅguttaranikāya refers to the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas, the purpose is to show that all mental and material things are impermanent. The fact that in the earlier texts the impermanence of both groups is not explained in equal terms, is a different question. The Abhidhamma Piṭaka has not deviated from this fundamental principle. It may then be asked why it has made a special

attempt to show the "sankhata-ness" of the body.

Moral edification seems to be the reason behind this device. True, to the body some relative permanence could be assigned. Yet it is not something that is everlasting. It has a beginning all right, but it has an end too. It has a phase of growth all right, but it has a phase of decay too. "This corporeal frame of mine is made up of the four elements, starts from parents, is sustained by rice and other foods, is impermanent and subject to attrition, abraision, erosion, dissolution and disruption and this consciousness of mine is tied and bound up therewith".¹ This is how one is expected to approach one's own body so that one's own attachment to it, let alone to any other instance of matter, should cease thereby. When one remembers that the scope as well as the approach of the Buddhist analysis of matter are mainly determined by ethical factors, one need not be surprised why the Abhidhamma Piṭaka has deemed it necessary to enumerate the four items which we have so far discussed.

When the doctrine of impermanence which in the earlier texts was described in simple and general terms came to be explained more systematically and with greater

1. D. i, 76

precision, attempts were also made to reinterpret the saṅkhata-lakṣaṇas.

The Vaibhāṣikas interpreted sthityanyathātva (ṭhitassa aññathatta) as jaratā, postulated another item, sthiti,¹ and thus increased the number to four: (i) jāti, origination; (ii) sthiti, existence; (iii) jaratā, decay; and (iv) anityatā, extinction. All dharmas, elements of existence, mental as well as material, characterized by them are saṃskṛta. Only ākāśa and the two kinds of nirodha escape from their inexorable sway.² At every kṣaṇa, moment, all (saṃskṛta) dharmas are affected by them. A kṣaṇa is the time during which the four saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas accomplish their operation. The Vaibhāṣikas also maintained that they were not only distinct from, but also as real as, the dharmas they characterize - showing thereby a strong predilection to naive realism. And, in consonance with this thesis, it was also claimed that they were in turn characterized by anulakṣaṇas, secondary characteristics.

The Sautrāntikas made a prolonged polemic against this Vaibhāṣika interpretation. They pointed out that the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas were mere characteristics, mere

1. According to some ācāryas both sthiti and jaratā are represented by sthityanyathātva; see AK.Ch.ii 223

2. See below, 245

designations, with no objective reality and argued that the recognition of anulakṣaṇas would lead to the problem of infinite regress (anavasthā). In their view, they apply not to one but to a series of momentary elements. "The series or stream itself is called subsistence, (stṛiti), its origin is called jāti, its cessation is vyaya, and the difference in its preceding and succeeding moments is called stṛityanyathātvā".¹ A momentary element, so they argued, cannot have^a a phase called stṛiti or jaratā, for whatever that originates has no time to subsist or decay but to perish.²

How the Theravādins of the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works developed the doctrine of impermanence and how they interpreted the saṅkhatalakṣaṇas can be understood clearly when the subject is unfolded against this background. We have already shown that although the Abhidhamma Piṭaka recognizes the

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1. Jaini, The development of the theory of the viprayukta saṃskāras, BSOAS Vol.xxii Pt.3
 2. This brief sketch is based on: Jaini, op.cit., De La Vallée Poussin, Documents d'Abh.: MCB.v 134 ff.; Stcherbatsky, Central Concep. 39 ff, Bud.Logic i 79-118; Silburn, Cause et Instant, 254-262. See also AK.Ch.ii 222-238; AKvy.i, 174 ff.; CP. Mdhv.Vrt. 108 ff.; La Siddhi, 64-68

momentariness of mental elements, it does not extend the same principle to material elements. What is more, even this "limited" momentariness is not explained systematically. The new development is to be seen in the formulation of a theory of moments, replacing the early doctrine of momentariness. It applies to both groups of elements equally, but for one significant difference: The earlier tradition that matter is of longer duration is recognized, but of course not in the same form.¹ On some technical points the Theravāda theory differs from those of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. However, in the *ṭīkā*s where the subject is dealt with in more detail, it has come very close to that of the Sautrāntikas.

The most striking thing about the Theravāda theory is that the fact of momentariness is explained in quite a different way: Each dhamma has three moments, namely, *uppādakkhana*, the moment of origination; *ṭhitikkhāna*, the moment of existence; *bhaṅgakkhāna*, the moment of cessation. The three moments do not correspond to three different dhammas. On the contrary, they represent three phases (*avatthā*) - the nascent, the static and the cessant - of one "momentary" dhamma. Hence the statement, namely, that dhammas are momentary, means that a given dhamma

1. see below , 323

has three momentary phases or stages. It arises in the first moment, subsists in the second moment and perishes in the third moment.¹

Commenting on the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas of the Āṅguttaranikāya,² the Commentator says that uppāda is jāti (birth, origination), vaya is bheda (destruction), and thitassa aññathatta is jaratā (decay). And he goes on to say that these three are represented by uppāda-kkhaṇa, bhaṅgakkhaṇa and thitikkhana respectively.³ The fact that jāti and bheda are said to be represented by uppādakkhana and bhaṅgakkhana respectively does not pose a very significant problem. But the fact that jaratā is said to be represented by thitikkhana shows that the so-called moment of subsistence is also the moment of decay.

In contrast, the Vaibhāṣikas take jaratā as distinct from sthiti, and accordingly count them as two separate saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas. Since the Theravādins explain thiti (kkhana) as jaratā, it may be concluded that there is some kind of change or modification in a given dhamma

1. See VbhA.7-8, 25-29; Vism.291-292, 613-614. The thitikkhana of rūpa is of longer duration than that of the mental elements; see below,³²³ On how the theory of perception is explained on the basis of the theory of moments, see Sarathchandra, Bud.Psy.of Percep. 42 ff.

2. See above, 214-15

3. AA.ii 252

during the moment of its subsistence.

That this is so, is shown by two comments made by Buddhaghosa and Buddhaddatta. In almost identical words, they observe that jaratā is manifested as the loss of navabhāva, newness, of a dhamma (navabhāvāpagama), and not as the loss of its sabhāva, intrinsic nature (sabhāvāpagama). It is like (new) paddy becoming old (vīhipurāṇabhāvo viya).¹ Since jaratā = ṭhiti (kkhaṇa) this means that a dhamma is new and fresh at the moment of its origination, but is old, matured, changed or modified at the moment of its subsistence - though its intrinsic nature remains the same.

Of much significance is the fact that both commentators took special care to point out that jaratā does not signify the loss of sabhāva, but only the loss of navabhāva. Thereby they were intent to show that during the jaratā-phase the identity of a dhamma is not completely lost. If it were otherwise then it would mean that the dhamma that subsists^s is not the same as the dhamma that originates.^λ There would be two dhammas corresponding to the two moments, uppādakkhana and ṭhittikkhāna - a situation which would undermine the very foundation of the theory of moments.

1. See Vism.449; Abhv.71

Although this explanation does not lead to the collapse of the theory of moments, yet it raises one significant problem which seems to have escaped the attention of its authors. If a dhamma becomes different without, however, losing its intrinsic nature, then this situation approaches the doctrine of pariṇāṃavāda according to which the essence, the substance, remains the same while its modes undergo change. Change, as it came to be finally interpreted in the schools of Buddhist logic, is not the transformation of one and the same dharma from one stage to another, but the replacement of one momentary dharma by another.¹ The following polemic in the Abhidharmakośa, directed against the Vaibhāṣikas who admitted jaratā of one momentary dharma, applies equally to the explanation given by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta.

"Mais comment attribuer à dharma la vieillesse? La vieillesse, c'est la transformation, la dissimilitude entre deux états. Or, peut-on dire d'un dharma qu'il devient différent de lui-même?

S'il reste celui-ci, il n'est pas celui-là; s'il est transformé, il n'est plus celui-ci. Donc la transformation d'un dharma est impossible".²

1. See Stcherbatsky, Bud.Logic i 96 ff.

2. Op.cit., Ch.ii, 233

The authors of the ṭikās, notably Sumangala, seem to have taken notice of the whole problem stemming from the recognition and definition of jaratā. This explains why an attempt has been made to foist a new interpretation into jaratā - an interpretation which really amounts to its denial.¹

It may be recalled here that according to the earlier account jaratā is manifested as the loss of navabhāva of a dhamma, and not as its complete loss of identity. According to Sumangala's interpretation, navabhāva is only a figurative expression for uppādakkhaṇa, the moment of origination - so called because of its chronological priority in relation to ṭhitikkhaṇa, the moment of subsistence. That is to say, since uppādakkhaṇa of a dhamma precedes its ṭhitikkhaṇa, in this sense the former is its navabhāva. Understood in this way, the loss

1. It is very likely that they were inspired by the arguments of the AK. The Theravādins of Ceylon show much acquaintance with this (and other notable works of Skr.Buddhism) Cf. e.g. VismS. v 51 ff. where quotations from it are cited not, as might be expected, with a view to refuting them, but in support of its own statements. On Theravādins, acquaintance with Skr.Bud.works, see Godakumbara, Sinhalese Literature, 41-46; his art.References to Skr.Bud.writers in Sinhalese literature, CUR Vol.1 Pt.1; see also Paranavitana, Mahāyānism in Ceylon, CJS Vol.1. No.1

of navabhāva is nothing but the lapse of uppādakkhana, and the (immediate) lapse of uppādakkhana means the succession of t̥hitikkhāna. Now, just as uppādakkhana is called navabhāva, "newness", because it comes before t̥hitikkhāna even so t̥hitikkhāna is called jaratā, "oldness", because it comes after uppādakkhana.¹

There is another reason - this of course is only implied - ^{why} t̥hitikkhāna could be designated as jaratā. Sometimes t̥hitikkhāna is defined as "nirodhābhimukhāvattā" or "bhaṅgassa abhimukhāvattā", i.e., that phase (moment) when a dhamma is facing its destruction.² The obvious implication is that since bhaṅgakkhāna is the immediate and unavoidable successor ^{to} t̥hitikkhāna, during its moment of subsistence a dhamma can only face its own destruction, its own death. Generally speaking, death is preceded by old age (jaratā). And, since bhaṅgakkhāna is always (immediately) preceded by t̥hitikkhāna, on the above analogy but as a figure of speech, the latter could well be designated as "old age" (jaratā).

1. Cf. t̥hitikkhāne hi jarā nāma; na ca tadā dhammo sabhāvaṃ vijāhati. Navabhāvo uppādavattā, tassā apagamabhāvena gayhati ti āha navabhāvāpagamapaccupaṭṭhāna ti -
Abhyk. 284

2. See Abhyk. 305; ADSVT. 115

Sumaṅgala is rightly aware that in the context of this new interpretation the "oldness-of-the-paddy-sūmile" (vīhipurāṇabhāvo viya)¹ is not relevant, if not misleading. Accordingly he observes that when paddy becomes old there is at least a change in its savour, etc. On the other hand, when a dhamma becomes old, i.e., when it comes to the moment of subsistence it abandons nothing else but its own moment of origination!²

To sum up the difference: according to Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta, ṭhitikkhaṇa is also called jaratā because at this moment a dhamma has undergone a change although it has not lost its complete identity. According to Sumangala, although ṭhitikkhaṇa is called jaratā the latter term is not to be understood as decay or as implying any idea of change, modification or transformation of a dhamma. In other words, there is no jaratā when it is understood in its usual sense. According to the former ṭhiti(kkhaṇa) is really jaratā; according to the latter ṭhiti(kkhaṇa) is really ṭhiti in the true sense of the term.

This new interpretation, though it has successfully

1. See above, 225

2. Vīhipurāṇabhāvo tāva rasādim apaneti, ayampana kevalam uppādāvattameva apaneti - Abhv.284

eliminated the problem stemming from the earlier definition of jaratā, upsets the correspondence between the three khaṇas (moments) and the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas. We saw¹ that according to the earlier account *ṭhitikkhaṇa* represented the third saṅkhata-lakkhaṇa, i.e., *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. However, since *ṭhiti(kkhaṇa)* was explained as jaratā, one cannot say that some justice was not done to the idea of "change" or "becoming otherwise" conveyed by the phrase, *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. But in the later account *ṭhiti(kkhaṇa)* is not understood as jaratā, although it is (figuratively) called so. As such, has it any claim to represent *ṭhitassa aññathatta*?

From a passing comment² made by Sumaṅgala one gathers that he did not, because he could not, take *ṭhitikkhaṇa* as corresponding to *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. In view of this

1. See above, 224

2. We mean the question: *Kasmā pāliyam ṭhitikkhaṇo na vutto ti?* (*Abhv.305*). This shows that *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is not taken as representative of *ṭhitassa aññathatta*, for the latter is referred to in the pāli, i.e., the Canon (see *A.i 152*). We are told that it is because of a purely practical reason, i.e., in the interests of the instructed (*vineyya-jjhāsayānurodhena*, cf. *upāya-kaṣṭhāya* of *Mahāyāna*) that the *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is not referred to in the Canon. Perhaps this may mean the same as what certain *Vaibhāṣikas* say: With a view to creating complete detachment, in the minds of the disciples, from *samskrta-dharmas*, it was deemed proper that the static phase (*sthiti*) of the *samskrta-dharmas* should be overlooked. - see *AK.Ch.ii 223*

circumstances, the third sankhata-lakkhaṇa, *ṭhitassa aññathatta*, remains unrepresented by any of the three khaṇas. We are not told how we should understand it. Nevertheless the denial, namely, that it does not apply to a momentary dhamma, carries the implication that it applies to a series of momentary dhammas.

This brings the position of the Theravādins another step closer to that of the Sautrāntikas.¹ However there is this fundamental difference to be noted: Unlike the Sautrāntikas, Sumaṅgala (and others) do not deny the *ṭhiti* phase of a momentary dhamma. If this too could be denied, then the difference would become almost negligible. In point of fact, among some Theravādins there was a movement towards such a direction.

For Sumaṅgala himself refers to one *vācariya*, named *Ānanda*, who objected to the recognition of the *ṭhitikkhaṇa* under any guise, whether it was interpreted as *jaratā* or not. According to the latter, a dhamma has only two phases, one of origination and another of cessation. *ṭhiti* is recognized, but as applying only to a series. This is called *pabandha-ṭhiti*, the series itself as subsistence. *ṭhitassa aññathatta* is interpreted as *pubbāpara-visesa*,

1. See above, 221-22

the difference between the preceding and the succeeding dhammas that constitute a series (pabandha).¹

It hardly needs mention, the above interpretation is an attempt to introduce wholesale the Sautrāntika theory into the Theravāda. From what we can gather from the *ṭīkā*s, it does not seem to have had a great following among the Theravāda scholiasts. The counter-argument of Sumaṅgala and others amounts to this:

True, a dhamma that originates should also cease to exist. But before it could cease to exist, there should be at least a moment when it turns towards its own cessation (nirodhābhimukhāvatthā). It is this moment when a dhamma is facing its own cessation that we call the moment of subsistence (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*). The underlying assumption of this counter-argument seems to be that a dhamma that arises cannot cease to exist at one and the same time, for other-

1. *Abhv.* 304-305; see also *ADSVT.* 116

The argument attributed to *Ananda* - *Api ca yathābhūto dhammo uppajjati, kim tathābhūto va bhijjati, udāhu annathābhūto? Yadi tathābhūto va bhijjati na jaratāya sambhavo; annathābhūto anno eva so ti sabbathā pi ṭhitikkhaṇassa abhavo yevā (Abhv. 305)* - is reminiscent of: *yadi sa eva nāsav athanyatha na sa eva (hi/ tasmād ekasya dharmasya nānyathātvam prasidhyati//)*

- *AK.Ch.ii* 233, n.1

-wise existence and non-existence would become co-existent - an extremely difficult situation even to imagine.

This brings us to an end of our survey of how the Abhidhammic commentaries and *ṭīkā*s have explained the early doctrine of impermanence on the basis of a formulated theory of moments. Our purpose in giving this account is to show how and why they differ from the Abhidhamma Piṭaka in interpreting the four upādā-rūpas, namely, rūpassa upacaya, rūpassa santati, rūpassa jaratā and rūpassa anniccata with which we are concerned in this section.

How they are defined in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka has already been examined. We have shown that these four items, which amount ^{to} ~~as~~ a formulation of some phases in the history of the body, are based on the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas. We have also shown that in explaining how the body is saṅkhata the Abhidhamma Piṭaka does not go so far as to say that the rūpa-dhammas that constitute it are of momentary duration.¹ Therefore, and quite understandably, the later scholiasts could not retain the earlier account of the subject in the same form. For in their view the three saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas represent three momentary phases - the nascent, the static (decay) and the cessant - of a "momentary" dhamma. It is to be

1. see above, 216 ff.

expected therefore that their interpretation of the subject should fall in line with this development.

That rūpassa upacaya and rūpassa santati are expressive of the same phenomenon is recognized by the later scholiasts, too. (That there is some kind of difference between them is not denied; but this can be overlooked for the moment). But in their view it is jāti, or uppāda of rūpa, i.e., genesis or origination of matter.¹ With the recognition of this fact the four upādā-rūpas get reduced to three, namely, (i) rūpassa jāti (= upacaya and santati), (ii) rūpassa jaratā and (iii) rūpassa aniccata. These three items, it may be noted here, correspond to the three khaṇas (moments) namely, (i) uppādakkhaṇa, (ii) ṭhiti-kkhaṇa (jaratā) and (iii) bhaṅgakkhaṇa. Once this correspondence is established it is easy to approach the subject from the point of view of the theory of moments.

According to a post-canonical theory of the Theravāda,² body consists of an enormous number of rūpa-kalāpas, i.e., the ultimate or the smallest groups of rūpa-dhammas. The rūpa-dhammas of each rūpa-kalāpa are not separable, one from the other. They form a unity having a common

1. Ubhayam p'etaṃ jātirūpass' evādhivacaṇaṃ - Vism.380;
see also Asl.326

2. see below, ch.viii

origin, a common existence and a common cessation. Hence the three momentary phases of one rūpa-kalāpa mean the three momentary phases of all those rūpa-dhammas that make up that particular rūpa-kalāpa. The continuity of the body-series is due to the circumstance that when some rūpa-kalāpas perish they are immediately succeeded by others. It is a process of continual succession, projecting a picture of static existence.

The nascent phase, in other words, the uppādakkhana of all those rūpa-dhammas that enter into the composition of the body-series is rūpassa jāti (= upacaya and santati); their static phase, in other words, the thitikkhāna which is also called jaratā, is rūpassa jaratā; their cessant phase, in other words, the bhaṅgakkhāna, is rūpassa aniccata.

Although both rūpassa upacaya and rūpassa santati are said to signify rūpassa jāti, yet this difference between them is recognized: The nascent phase of those rūpa-dhammas which constitute the body-series from the moment of conception till the sense-mechanism is complete is rūpassa upacaya. The nascent phase of those that constitute it thereafter, i.e., upto the time of death (cuti-pariyosānaṃ) is rūpassa santati.¹

1. What has been stated so far is based on the accounts given in the commentaries as well as in the tikās; cf. Vism. 449-50; Asl. 327 ff.; Vismṭ. 454 ff.; Abhk. 282-284, 287-289; ADSVT. 114 ff.

The latter statement needs some explanation. We have already shown¹ that according to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka rūpassa santati signifies that phase of the body (growth) which comes before rūpassa jaratā. But according to the new interpretation rūpassa jāti (= upacaya and santati), rūpassa jaratā and rūpassa aniccata signify three momentary phases of a rūpa-dhamma/rūpa-kalāpa that enters into the composition of the body series. As such, strictly speaking, rūpassa jaratā as understood by the Abhidhamma Piṭaka has no place in the context of the new interpretation. This explains why rūpassa santati (= rūpassa jāti) is said to continue up to the moment of death.

Nevertheless, jaratā as understood by the earlier texts is also recognized, but is given a different interpretation. It is called pākāṭa-jarā,² "evident decay" and is distinguished from jarā or jaratā as a momentary phase.³ The latter is called avici-jarā, because it takes place incessantly, without interruption.⁴

1. See above, 213-14

2. Asl.328; Vism.449

3. i.e., ṭhitikkhāṇa; see above, 229: according to Buddhaghosa and others jaratā implies some kind of change, according to Sumaṅgala and others it is only a figurative expression.

4. Asl.328; Vism.449; Abhv.283

Brokenness of teeth (khandicca) is an instance of pākāṭa-jarā. In terms of elemental analysis pākāṭa-jarā is only a vikāra.¹ That is to say, it merely signifies a peculiarity of the position, situation or arrangement of the momentary² rūpa-dhammas/rūpa-kalāpas that constitute the body-series.

In the course of our discussion on the theory of moments we noticed³ that Ānanda (as represented by Sumaṅgala) objected to the recognition of the ṭhitikkhaṇa under any guise. When approached from this point of view, the four items would get reduced to two: rūpassa jāti (= upacaya and santati) and rūpassa aniccata.

Why the items under consideration are brought under the heading, anipphanna may now be considered. These items signify certain phases or, as the scholiasts say, certain characteristics (lakkhaṇa) of the nipphanna rūpa. As such they are not real rūpa-dhammas. When a rūpa-dhamma originates it is called rūpassa jāti; when it subsists (decay)⁴ it is called rūpassa jaratā; when it perishes it is called rūpassa aniccata. In

1. See Abhv. 283

2. Momentary means having three momentary phases: see above, 223-24

3. See above, 231-32

4. See above, 229

addition to the rūpa-dhamma which originates, subsists (decay) and perishes, there are no rūpa-dhammas answering to the names rūpassa jāti, rūpassa jaratā and rūpassa aniccatā.

If these characteristics, too, were postulated as real entities, then it would be necessary to postulate another set of (secondary) characteristics to account for their own origination, subsistence and cessation. And these (secondary) characteristics would in turn require another set of (secondary-secondary) characteristics to account for their origination, etc. In this way it would lead to a process ad infinitum. And it is in order to avoid this problem of infinite regress that the characteristics are not recognized as entities distinct from, and as real as, the dhammas which they characterize. This is the significance of the statement made in the Mohavicchedanī: "It is not correct to assume that origination originates, decay decays and cessation ceases because such an assumption leads to the (fallacy) of infinite regress (anavatthāna)".¹

1. Na hi jāti jāyati, jarā jīrati, maraṇam miyatīti voharitam yuttam, anavatthānato. - op.cit., 67-68. See also Abhk. 288; AK.Ch. ii 223 ; AKvy. i 175 ; CP.Mdhy.Vrt. 110, n.273, n.274, 126-7

Element of space

We have drawn attention to the fact that although in the Nikāyas ākāsa is sometimes enumerated immediately after pāṭhavī, āpo, tejo and vāyo, it is not recognized as a mahābhūta.¹ As far as its exclusion from the category of mahābhūtas is concerned, the post-Nikāyan works agree with the Nikāyas. However, when we come to the Dhammasaṅgani and the Vibhaṅga we find an item called ākāsa-dhātu, element of space, recognized as one of the upādā-rūpas.² Its recognition as an upādā-rūpa carries the implication that ^{it} is dependent on the mahābhūtas.

As pointed out by Prof. Keith and Mrs. Rhys Davids, it is difficult to imagine that it was recognized so because it was a pure form of intuition or a mental construction.³ This suggestion gathers support from a Kathāvatthu controversy on the nature of ākāsa, to which we shall refer in the course of this discussion.⁴ There is no evidence to suggest that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is acquainted with the comparatively late Sautrāntika theory, namely that ākāsa is nothing but the mere absence of

1. See above, 63

2. Dhs. 144; Vbh. 84

3. Keith, Bud. Phi. 189; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Bud. Psy. Ethics, Introduction, lxvi

4. See below, 247 ff.

resistant matter (sapratighadravyābhāvamātra), with no corresponding objective reality.¹

In explaining why in the Dhammasaṅgani ākāsa-dhātu is recognized as an upādā-rūpa, Prof.Keith observes that it is intimately connected with matter. It is pointed out that since it is necessary for the movement of matter it can well be placed under secondary matter.²

That ākāsa-dhātu is that which affords room for the movement of material things is of course one of the ways in which it is described in the Vibhaṅga.³ But it is very doubtful whether this was the sole or rather the main factor that was taken into consideration in placing it under matter. For if it were the reason, then it ought to have been given a position at least on a par with the four mahābhūtas, rather than being recognized as dependent on, and therefore secondary to, them.

The whole situation becomes clear when it is understood in the light of the Vaibhāsika conception of ākāsa. Two kinds of ākāsa are distinguished:

1. See AK.Ch.i 50 n.1; AKvy.i 57

2. Bud.Phi.189

3. Cf. ... yena ca asitapītakhāyitam ajjoharati, yattha ca asitapītakhāyitam santitthati, yena ca asitapītakhāyitam adhobhāga nikkhamati (= ākāsa-dhātu) - op.cit., 84

One is elevated to the status of an asaṃskṛta-dharma, and is referred to by the simple term, ākāśa. The other is brought under rūpa, and is referred to by the compound, ākāśa-dhātu.¹

Dr. Mc.Govern tells us that in the Chinese sources the former is rendered as hsu'k'ung and the latter as k'ung. K'ung, he says, "agrees more or less with the Sthaviravādin (= Theravādin) conception of Ākāśa".² To this correspondence, Prof. De la Vallée Poussin too has drawn attention.³ The fact that both are included in rūpa does certainly show that there is a close parallelism between them. Of equal significance is the fact that both are referred to, not by the simple term, ākāśa, but by the compound, ākāśa-dhātu.

This is only part of the story. There is much evidence to show that the Theravādins, too, have recognized another kind of ākāśa. This they have never included in rūpa; and except for one significant fact it corresponds to the asaṃskṛta-ākāśa of the Vaibhāṣikas.⁴

First let us consider what the Buddhists mean by

1. See AK.Ch.i7-8 and 49-50; AKvy.i 15,57

2. A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, i 110-111

3. AK.Ch.i 49 n.4

4. See below, 245 ff.

ākāsa-dhātu and examine why it is brought under rūpa. In the Abhidharmakośa the Vaibhāṣika ākāsa-dhātu is defined as follows: "La cavité ou vide de la porte, de la fenêtre, etc., c'est l'élément espace (ākāśadhātu) externe (bāhya); la cavité de la bouche, du nez, etc., c'est l'élément espace interne (ādhyātmika)".¹ The Theravāda definition is more or less the same; the distinction between internal (ajjhattika) and external (bāhira) is also recognized: The cavities of the ear (kaṇṇacchidda), of the nose (nāsacchidda), the mouth-door (mukhadvāra), that through which what is eaten, drunk, chewed are swallowed, that where they are deposited, and that through which they are evacuated^a are ajjhattika ākāsa-dhātu. Likewise the cavities and interstices that obtain outside the body - (the cavities in the wall, of the door-space, etc.,)² - are bāhira ākāsa-dhātu.³

It will thus be seen that according to both schools ākāsa-dhātu means cavities, holes, apertures, interstices, etc. It could therefore be understood as bounded or delimited space. The Chinese rendering, k'ung is said to mean "lack of rūpa, or interstices between rūpa".⁴

1. Op.cit., Ch.i 49

2. VbhA.72

3. Vbh.84-85

4. Mc.Govern, op.cit., 111

The later works of the Theravāda, too, recognize this meaning when they refer to ākāsa-dhātu by the technical term pariccheda-rūpa.¹ Pariccheda signifies not only that which delimits (paricchindati) but also that which is delimited (paricchijjati).² The implication is that since ākāsa-dhātu means cavities, interstices, etc., it sets limits to, and is itself limited by, the surrounding matter.

Once ākāsa-dhātu is understood as bounded or delimited space why it is recognized as dependent on the mahābhūtas is not far to seek. Holes, cavities, etc., have an intimate connection with matter in the sense that they obtain owing to the peculiar position or situation of the latter. In this sense they can well be conceived as dependent on matter. And since the four mahābhūtas should necessarily enter into the composition of all material things, on further analysis, they are dependent on the mahābhūtas.

This explanation is further confirmed by Buddhaghosa's statement, namely that ākāsa-dhātu is manifested as the confines of matter (rūpa-mariyāda-paccupaṭṭhānā) and that it has its proximate cause in matter delimited

1. See Vism. 451

2. Rūpaṇi paricchindati, sayam vā tehi paricchijjati - Abhv. 279

by it (paricchinnarūpa-padaṭṭhānā).¹ The same idea is implied in Yaśomitra's comment, namely that it is established (vyavasthāpitaṃ) with reference to (apekṣya) walls, etc.²

In so far as the Vaibhāṣikas are concerned one cannot, however, say that this was the only factor that was taken into consideration. In their view ākāśa-dhātu is either light (āloka) or darkness (tamas) and as such is visible (sanidarśana). For this reason it is considered as a part of rūpāyatana.³ That the Theravādins do not admit the visibility of ākāśa-dhātu is shown not only by its inclusion in the dhammāyatana but also by a Kathāvatthu controversy. Some Buddhists argue that it is visible on the ground that one can see the interval between two trees or two posts, the space in a key-hole or in a window. The Theravāda reply is that in the case of an interval between two trees, for instance, one sees with his eye only the colour of the two trees and that the interval as such is known only by the mind.⁴

The Vaibhāṣikas, as stated above, distinguish ākāśa

1. Vism. 448

2. AKvy. i 57

3. AK.Ch. i 49-50; AKvy. i 57

4. See Kvu. 330-1 and KvuA. 93

dhātu from ākāśa. The latter, like pratisaṅkhyā - and apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, is an asaṃskṛta-dharma. As such, the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas¹ do not apply to it. It is omni-present (sarvagata) and eternal (nitya). Its nature is non-obstruction (anāvaraṇa-svabhāva). That is to say, it does not obstruct (āvṛṇoti) matter which freely exists therein; nor is it obstructed (āvriyate) by matter for it cannot be dislodged by the latter. However it is not the mere absence of obstruction (anāvaraṇabhāvamātra), but is something positively real.² Thus what is called asaṃskṛta-ākāśa may be understood as space, considered as absolutely real and as constituting a receptacle for the existence and movement of matter.

This is a brief statement giving the fundamental characteristics of the asaṃskṛta-ākāśa, made for the purpose of showing that it has its counterpart in the Theravāda, too.

In the Milindapañha we are introduced to an ākāśa which is quite different from the ākāśa-dhātu of the Dhammasaṅgī. Its fundamental characteristics are as

1. See above, 221

2. See AK.Ch.8; AKvy.i 15

follows: In no way can it be grasped (sabbaso agayho); it inspires terror (santāsaniyo); it is infinite (ananto), boundless (appamāno) and immeasurable (aparimeyyo); it does not cling to anything (alāggo), is not attached to anything (asatto), rests on nothing (appatiṭṭhito) and is not obstructed by anything (apalibuddho).¹

Elsewhere in the same work we are told that two things in this world are not born of kamma (akammajā) or of causes (ahetujā) or of season (anutujā), namely, Nibbāna and ākāsa.²

With reference to this ākāsa of the Milindapañha Prof. Keith observes that "it is certainly a more philosophic view than is found in the Dhammasaṅgani of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka where it is classified as a material derivate".³

According to this observation the ākāsa-dhātu of the Dhammasaṅgani and the ākāsa of the Milindapañha represent the two different views on the same subject and that the latter is a more refined version of the former.

It is of course true that the Milindapañha is later than the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. However, as we shall see fairly soon, the type of ākāsa referred to therein is known to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Moreover,

1. op.cit., 387-388
 2. Ibid., 268
 3. Bud.Phi.169

when one considers the fundamental characteristics of the Milindapañha ākāsa one cannot fail to notice its strong similarity with the asaṃskṛta-ākāśa of the Vaibhāṣikas. Of much significance is the statement that only Nibbāna and ākāsa are not born of kamma (akammajā) or of causes (ahetujā) or of season (anutujā). This is a clear attempt to bring ākāsa on a par with Nibbāna. The Vaibhāṣikas too elevate ākāśa to such a position by recognizing ākāśa and the two kinds of nirodha as asaṃskṛta. And we have already shown how the ākāsa-dhātu of the Dhammasaṅgani (and the Vibhaṅga) corresponds to the ākāśa-dhātu of the Vaibhāṣikas. In view of these circumstances we could quite justifiably assume that, as the Vaibhāṣikas do, the Theravādins too distinguish between two kinds of ākāsa. As such the type of ākāsa referred to in the Milindapañha should be understood, not as a different (later) version of the same kind of ākāsa (- dhātu) of the Dhammasaṅgani; (and the Vibhaṅga), but as the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣika asaṃskṛta-ākāśa.

It is not in the Milindapañha alone that we get reference to the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣika asaṃskṛta-ākāśa. One of the controversies in the Kathāvatthu of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka concerns the

question whether ākāsa is asaṅkhata. In one of his answers the Theravādin admits that ākāsa is not saṅkhata.¹

This admission shows that the ākāsa at issue here is not the same as the ākāsa dhātu of the Dhammasaṅgānī because the latter is saṅkhata. On the other hand it points to the close correspondence between the ākāsa of the Kathāvatthu controversy and that of the Milindapañha. It may be recalled here that according to the latter work both Nibbāna and ākāsa are not born of kamma or of causes or of season. This is another way of saying that both are not saṅkhata.² For all saṅkhata-dhammas arise and exist because of causes. Since the ākāsa of the Kathāvatthu and that of the Milindapañha are not saṅkhata, it is fairly certain that both works refer to the same kind of ākāsa.

There is, however, this significant problem to be considered: Although the Theravādin of the Kathāvatthu controversy denies that ākāsa is saṅkhata, he does not

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1. Kvu.330: To the opponent's question, "Akāso saṅkhato ti" the Theravādin's answer is "Na h'evam vattabbe".
 2. Further confirmed by: Yathā mahārāja ākāso na jāyati na miyati na cavati na uppajjati ... evam'eva kho mahārāja nibbānam na jāyati na jīyati na miyati na cavati na uppajjati ... - Mil.320-21

admit that it is asaṅkhata! Thus in his view, it cannot be described either as saṅkhata or as asaṅkhata.

The commentator says that this is because ākāsa is a mere paññatti (paññatti-mattam),² i.e., a nominal dhamma. As far as the data are concerned this conclusion is certainly correct. For that which is neither saṅkhata nor asaṅkhata should be a paññatti.³

There is however the following situation to be considered. The definition of ākāsa in the Milindapañha does not give any indication of its being recognized as a paññatti. On the other hand, as already stated it bears a strong resemblance to the ākāśa of the Vaibhāṣikas, which is an asaṃskṛta-dharma. It has also been noted that according to this work both Nibbāna and ākāsa are not saṅkhata. Now, if ākāsa is not a paññatti and if it is not saṅkhata, it should be an asaṅkhata-dhamma. But what is significant to note here is that although the Milindapañha applies the term asaṅkhata to Nibbāna,⁴ it (carefully) avoids applying the same term to ākāsa. On this point, as we have seen, the Kathāvatthu is more positive, for it categorically says that ākāsa should

1. See Kvu. 328 ff.

2. KvUA. 92

3. See above, 181-2

4. Op.cit., 270

not be described as asaṅkhata (although of course it denies that it is saṅkhata).

When the above situation is taken into consideration it is difficult to follow the commentator. As we have already observed it is of course true that his conclusion is supported by the data in the Kathāvatthu. But there are some good reasons to believe that the problem at issue here is on quite a different level. As such the commentator's conclusion does not seem to represent the actual situation that obtains in the Kathāvatthu.

The Theravādins, it should be noted here, never object to Nibbāna being qualified as asaṅkhata. What is more, they seem to have deemed it improper to extend the term to something else even if it is not saṅkhata lest this should give the impression that it is as exalted and as noble as Nibbāna - the highest ideal of Buddhism. This seems to be the reason why the Milindapañha and the Kathāvatthu do not apply the term asaṅkhata to ākāsa, although according to both it is not saṅkhata. In other words, ākāsa as conceived in these two works is not a paññatti; it is a real dhamma which is not saṅkhata, but which is not designated as asaṅkhata.

On the one hand, this suggestion explains the

peculiar situation that obtains in the Milindapañha. On the other, it gets more positive support from the nature of the Theravāda arguments as represented in the Kathāvatthu controversy.

To the statement of the opponent, namely that ākāsa is asaṅkhata, the immediate reaction of the Theravādin is: "Does this mean to say that ākāsa is Nibbāna, the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial".¹ When the opponent denies this the Theravādin retorts in that case one has to recognize two Nibbānas. Even his other arguments are mainly based on the assumption that the extension of the term asaṅkhata to ākāsa would necessarily amount to a confusion, if not identity, between Nibbāna and ākāsa. The main argument of the opponent follows what may be called the logic of language: "If you deny that ākāsa is saṅkhata, you should admit that it is asaṅkhata".²

The assumption of the Theravādin is certainly far-fetched. To admit that Nibbāna and ākāsa are asaṅkhata does not necessarily mean that they are identical in all respects, just as much as nāma-dhammas and rūpa-dhammas are not identical in all respects although both groups are

1. Kvu.328 (tr. from Points of Controversy)

2. Ibid., 330

qualified as saṅkhata.

In point of fact similar controversies arising from the restriction of the use of technical terms do occur in the Kathāvatthu. A typical example is the one concerning the question: Could rūpa be a hetu? The Theravādin answers it in the negative and the opponent in the affirmative. At first sight it appears that the former has rejected a fundamental tenet of Buddhist philosophy by not admitting that rūpa could constitute a cause (hetu). But in actual fact this is not so. There is no disagreement between the two parties. The Theravādin (rather arbitrarily) restricted the meaning of "hetu" to indicate only the "moral causes", namely, alobha, adosa, amoha, etc.,¹ Accordingly and understandably he denied the proposition that rūpa could constitute a hetu. Whereas his opponent understood the term in the general sense of cause and accordingly he affirmed it.² A similar situation seems to obtain in the controversy over the question: Is ākāsa asaṅkhata?

From what we have observed so far it should become clear that the Theravādins, too, distinguish between

1. On this subject see also Dhs.124,188; Tkp.11

2. Kvu. 532-3

two kinds of ākāśa and that, except for some minor details, they correspond to the two kinds of ākāśa recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas. One sometimes reads that while the Vaibhāṣikas elevated ākāśa to the status of an asaṃskṛta-dharma the Theravādins brought it under rūpa.¹ Such a contrast is not justified. It overlooks the fact that both schools have recognized two kinds of ākāśa, one of which (= ākāśa-dhātu) is included in, and the other (= ākāśa) excluded from, rūpa.

We might also note in passing that parallel situations are met with in other systems of Indian thought, too. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga, for instance, distinguishes between two kinds of ākāśa, namely, kāryākāśa and kāraṇ-ākāśa. The former is derivative because it is produced from śabda-tanmātra, the sound-potential; the latter is original because it is associated with prakṛti, the uncaused first cause of the world of not-self.² Similarly certain Jaina works, too, recognize two varieties of ākāśa. One is logāgāśa, the space that gives room for the

1. See e.g. Mishara, Hist. of Ind. Phi. i 403

2. See Jhaveri, The concept of ākāśa in Indian Philosophy, ABORI Vol. xxxvi 1956, where attention is drawn to the fact that in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga works earlier than Vijnānabhikṣu's only derivative ākāśa is mentioned. Cf. also Seal, Positive Sciences of the Hindus, 27-28

existence of all extended substances (astikāya). The other is alogāgāsa, the infinite space beyond the cosmos, where the two conditions of motion (dharmastikāya) and rest (adharmastikāya) do not have their influence.¹

Of course, the correspondence between these theories does not go very far, because each of them has been formulated according to the metaphysical assumptions of the particular system of thought to which it belongs. But what is striking is the similarity in the pattern of development.

What made the Buddhists draw such a distinction could be traced to the Nikāyas themselves. Therein sometimes ākāsa is described particularly with reference to holes, cavities, apertures, etc.² Such descriptions suggest the beginning of ākāśadhātu which is brought under rūpa.

Sometimes it is described as the ultimate basis, a sort of fulcrum or receptacle, of the whole physical world. Thus in the Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta Buddha is represented as saying: "This great earth, O Ananda, rests on water, water on air, and air on ākāsa".³ And in the

1. See Davva-saṅgaha 56-57; Pañcastikāya Samayasāra, 99 Niyamasāra, 16 ff.

2. Cf. e.g. M.i 431, iii 31

3. D.ii 107

Rāhulovāda Sutta it is said that ākāsa for its part does not rest on anything (ākāso na kattha ci patiṭṭhito).¹ In point of fact, Nāgasena (Milindapañha) cites this same canonical statement after enumerating the fundamental characteristics of ākāsa,² implying thereby that it is such statements in the earlier texts that paved the way to the conception of ākāsa which we find in the Milindapañha and the Kathāvatthu. Equally significant is ~~is~~ an observation made by Yaśomitra: When the Vaibhāṣikas argue that ākāsa is real they base this argument on a (Sūtra) passage where Buddha declares to a brāhmin that the earth rests on the circle of water, the circle of water on air, air on ākāsa, and that ākāsa for its part does not rest on anything, does not cling to anything.³

When we come to the commentaries and the subsequent works the whole subject has undergone a notable change.

1. M.i 424

2. Mil. 388

3. Akvy.i 15; (Sūtra) passage: prthivī bho Gautama kutra pratiṣṭhita. prthivī brāhmaṇa ap-maṇḍale pratiṣṭhita. ap-maṇḍalam bho Gautama kva pratiṣṭhitam. vāyau pratiṣṭhitam. vāyur bho Gautama kva pratiṣṭhitam. ākāse pratiṣṭhitam. ākāsam bho Gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam. atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇāṭisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa. ākāsam brāhmaṇapratīṣṭhitam anālambanam. ibid.loc.cit.,

The ākāsa of the Kathāvatthu and the Milindapañha, which as we have seen, is the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣikas' asaṃskṛta-ākāśa, came to be designated as anantākāsa, infinite space, or ajaṭākāsa, unbounded space.¹ Although the two terms are reminiscent of its earlier realistic conception, the use of another term, tucchākāsa,² false or empty space, indicates an attempt to deprive it of its reality. As a matter of fact, it is clearly stated that it is only a paññatti,³ a nominal dhamma with no corresponding objective reality.

Understandably the same fate fell on the ākāsa-dhātu, too. The logic that guided the Vibhaṅga and the Dhammasaṅgani in bringing it under rūpa is certainly far-fetched. Its conception as real is a different question. The later scholiasts were not satisfied with either of these situations. They eliminated both by bringing it under the heading, anipphanna-rūpa. For this is another way of saying that ^{it} is neither rūpa nor a dhamma in the true sense of the terms. As such its description as that which delimits (paricchindati) or that which is delimited (paricchijjati)⁴ should not be understood in a

1. See KvuA. 92, 93; AbhvK. 279

2. KvuA. 92

3. Ibid. loc. cit.,

4. See above, 243

realistic sense. For it is nothing but the mere
limitation of matter - rūpa-pariccheda-mattam.¹

1. Abhv. 279

CHAPTER SIX

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS.

Section A.

In the course of our discussion of the twenty eight rūpa-dhammas¹ we saw how they were subjected to certain classifications such as the one into primary and secondary. In addition to those, an earlier discussion of which was necessitated for a better understanding of the subject so far covered, there are others no less important. And it is these remaining classifications that we propose to examine in this chapter.

Divisions and classifications play a significant part in the Abhidhammic systematization. They are the stock-in-trade of its methodology, the fundamental means whereby the import and implications of the terms representing the various elements of existence (dhammā) are sought to be unfolded. In the seven Pakaraṇas of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka it is very rarely indeed that one finds a direct enumeration of all the rūpa-dhammas; oftener than not they are presented under various classifications. Hence it is that the Rūpavibhatti² of the Dhammasaṅgani consists, to a

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1. = 4 mahābhūtas + 14 nipphanna-upādā + 10 anipphanna-upādā.
 2. i.e., the section (8th Bhānavara) where the subject of rūpa is explained. As far as the Pāli Canon is concerned it is the most exhaustive.

great extent, of an enormous number of classifications, arranged into ten sections in an ascending numerical order.

The first¹ section consists of one hundred and four classifications,² each being an arrangement of rūpa-dhammas into two groups. The last ninety are developed in a rather "mechanical" way. In each the distribution of rūpa-dhammas into two groups is made in such a way that only one rūpa-dhamma constitutes the first "group" whereas all the others the second group. The first is described by a positive term and the second by its negative formed with the addition of the negative particle "na". The last ninety should therefore be understood as a (monotonous) device to show the characteristics peculiar to a given rūpa-dhamma. In each such arrangement the contrast between a given rūpa-dhamma on the one hand and

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1. Our reckoning as 1st, 2nd etc., starts from the 2nd section of Dhs. from were onward we get the classifications. In its 1st section "all rūpa" is considered under single uncorrelated characteristics. See Bud.Psy.Ethics, 154
 2. We use the term classification to mean every arrangement of rūpa-dhammas under two or more headings. Very often only one item falls under one of the two or more headings; in such cases the purpose is to show how a given rūpa-dhamma can be distinguished from the rest.

the rest on the other is brought into relief. Two methods are adopted for this purpose.

(a) Sometimes a characteristic or a function peculiar to a given rūpa-dhamma is taken as the basis of the arrangement; e.g., "There is rūpa which is the basis of visual consciousness (= cakkhu, the organ of sight) and there is rūpa which is not the basis of visual consciousness (= all the remaining rūpa-dhammas)".¹ What results from such an approach is obvious: That rūpa-dhamma the peculiar characteristic or function of which is taken as the basis of the arrangement comes under the positive category and all the rest under the negative. This is a method with wide ~~wide~~ scope for what is recognized as peculiar to one rūpa-dhamma cannot be predicated of another. However only the five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields are subjected to such a treatment. And this results in as many as forty arrangements. For all its tedious length and apparent complexity it is only a different way of describing the oft-recurrent thesis that cakkhu, sota, etc., are the bases (vatthu, nissaya) and that rūpa, sadda, etc., are the objects of the first five kinds of consciousness (viññana)

1. Atthi rūpaṃ cakkhuvinnānassa vatthu, atthi rūpaṃ cakkhuvinnānassa na vatthu - Dhs.125

and their concomitants (cetasikas).¹

(b) Sometimes a given rūpa-dhamma itself is taken as the basis of the arrangement; e.g., "There is rūpa which is kabalīnkāra-āhāra and there is rūpa which is not the kabalīnkāra-āhāra (= the remaining rūpa-dhammas)".² According to this method rūpa in its totality can be differentiated in as many ways as there are rūpa-dhammas. However the actual number of the arrangements exceeds the number of rūpa-dhammas because of this reason: Some items such as the sense-organs are repeated under dhātu, āyatana and indriya. There are in all forty such arrangements: Each sense-organ as dhātu, āyatana and indriya is distinguished thrice from the rest of the rūpa-dhammas (15); each objective field as dhātu and āyatana is distinguished twice (10); the remaining fifteen are each distinguished only once (15).³

The fourteen classifications that occur at the beginning of the first section are more important in the sense that they form the nucleus of a great majority that

1. See below, 315, 321

2. Atthi rūpaṃ kabalīnkāro āhāro, atthi rūpaṃ na kabalīnkāro āhāro - Dhs. 127

3. Three mahābhūtas are collectively referred to by the 5th objective field; hadaya-vatthu is not known to Dhs.; hence in all 27 items are involved here.

come in the next nine sections. They are the arrangement of rūpa-dhammas into two groups as (1) upādā and anupādā, (2) upādiṇṇa and anupādiṇṇa, (3) upādiṇṇupādānīya and anupādiṇṇupādānīya, (4) sanidassana and anidassana, (5) sappatigha and appatigha, (6) indriya and na indriya, (7) mahābhūta and na mahābhūta, (8) viññatti and na viññatti, (9) cittasamuṭṭhāna and na cittasamuṭṭhāna, (10) cittasahabhū and na cittasahabhū, (11) cittānuparivatti and na cittānuparivatti, (12) ajjhattika and bāhira, (13) oḷārika and sukhumā, and (14) dūre and santike.

The implications of a great majority of these fourteen classifications have already been examined. No.1 refers to the distinction between primary and secondary matter, and No.7 indicates the type of material elements that constitute each group. No. 4 points to a characteristic peculiar to rūpāyatana. Since rūpāyatana represents the visible it alone comes under the positive heading, sanidassana (visible).¹ As far as the contents are concerned, there is no difference between Nos.5, 13 and 14: the sense-organs and the objective fields are sappatigha, oḷārika and santike; the remaining rūpa-dhammas are appatigha, sukhumā and dūre. We have discussed their significance and shown how they testify to a veiled

1. See above, 111-12

recognition, on the part of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, of the difference between what early Buddhism and what most of the Buddhist schools in common recognize as rūpa on the one hand and the later accretions on the other.¹

No.6 is an attempt to classify all the rūpa-dhammas into two groups as indriya and "non-indriya". The five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex and the faculty of life constitute the first group² and the rest the second. No.8 draws attention to the fact that two rūpa-dhammas, namely kāya- and vacī-viññatti, are viññattis³ and that the rest are not viññattis. Nos. 10 and 11 are based on two characteristics (= cittasahabhū and cittānuparivatti)⁴ peculiar to the two viññattis. As such these two items alone come under the positive terms and all the rest under the negative.

The classification into upādiṇṇ'upādānīya and anupādiṇṇ'upādānīya (No.3) is the same as that into upādiṇṇa and anupādiṇṇa (No.2) except for this difference: In the former the term upādānīya is added to qualify both the positive and the negative sub-classes of the latter. Thus upādānīya signifies a characteristic common to all

1. See above, 112, 115-18

2. See above, 140-41, 157-58, 163

3. See above, 186 ff.


4. See above, 197-98, 202

the rūpa-dhammas. No.3 cannot therefore be taken as a separate classification. Most probably it was made in order to avoid any possible confusion between the apparently similar upādānīya¹ and upādiṇṇa. As the former qualifies all the rūpa-dhammas and the latter only some, the distinction in their meaning is not to be overlooked.

We are thus left with only three classifications, i.e., those into (a) upādiṇṇa and anupādiṇṇa, (b) citta-samuṭṭhāna and na cittasamuṭṭhāna, and (c) ajjhattika and bāhira. Before we come to a discussion of them let us survey the other nine sections which contain more complex classifications.

The second section consists of one hundred and three classifications, each being an arrangement of rūpa-dhammas into three groups. Each such arrangement has the classification into ajjhattika and bāhira of the first section as its invariable basis. It is transformed into one with three classes by clasifying either the ajjhattika-rūpas or the bāhira-rūpas (but not both concurrently) into two groups.

E.g.



1. See below, 396

The next seven sections containing seven classifications in order into five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven groups are more repetitive and therefore less informative.

That into five groups is the same as that into upādā and anupādā but for this difference: Since anupādā consists of the four primary elements it is accordingly arranged into four "groups".

In the case of the next three classifications into six, seven and eight groups, the ascending numerical order is obtained by classifying into two a selected group of the immediately preceding classification - a process whereby the first two classifications are rendered superfluous^u in the sense that both get absorbed into, and thus represented by, the third. Their purpose is to show how the rūpa-dhammas can be classified according to the way they become objects of consciousness. Colour (rūpa) for instance differs from sound (sadda) in that while the former is known by visual consciousness (cakkhu-viññeyya) the latter is known by auditory consciousness (sotaviññeyya).¹

The classification into nine groups is the same as that into indriya and na indriya except for this difference:

1. See below, 315

Since indriya-rūpa counts eight rūpa-dhammas, the positive group is accordingly arranged under eight headings.

This same classification is next made into one with ten groups by classifying the items that come under the negative heading, i.e., na indriya, into two groups as sappatigha and appatigha.

The last with eleven headings show how the rūpa-dhammas are distributed in the older list of the twelve āyatanas: The first five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields constitute the ten āyatanas called after their names as cakkhāyatana, rūpāyatana, etc., and the remaining fifteen rūpa-dhammas form a part of the dhammāyatana.¹

This brings us to an end of our survey of the two hundred and thirty classifications given in the Dhammasaṅgani. From what we have observed in its course it should appear that it is not necessary to go into each and every one of them separately.. We noticed that all the classifications given in the second and third sections and three of the seven given in the next seven sections are all traceable to the first section which consists of classifications into two groups. The few exceptions were noted, and we have indicated in the relevant places that

1. See above, 107-109

any data they yielded were discussed in more appropriate contexts. In the course of this brief survey if we have stressed what is obvious and repeated what was said elsewhere it is because our aim is not only ^{to} elicit some important classifications for discussion but also to give a conspectus of the Abhidhammic methodology as revealed from the exposition of rūpa.¹

The ensuing discussion will therefore be confined to an examination of those classifications of the first section which came under our final selection.

Section B.

First let us examine the implications of the classification into upādiṇṇa and anupādiṇṇa.² The positive term, upādiṇṇa literally means that which has been appropriated or laid hold of, but in order to understand what it exactly connotes in the Abhidhammic terminology we have to get at the agency behind this act of appropriation or laying hold of.

Prof. De la Vallée Poussin is of the opinion that the pair of terms, upādiṇṇa and anupādiṇṇa of the Pāli Abhidhamma conveys the same sense as upātta and anupātta as explained

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1. The appended charts will help to understand the relative positions of the various groups involved in the classifications, see below, 299 ff.
 2. See above, 264

in the Abhidharmakośa.¹

The Kośa (= Abhidharmakośa) defines upātta as "ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent (upagr̥hīta) et s'approprient (svīkr̥ta) en qualité de support (adhiṣṭhāna)".² The five sense-organs (with the exception of those that were and those that will be) and those other rūpas which are inseparable from, or intergrated with, the sense-organs (indriyābhinna, indriyāvīnirbhāga), namely, rūpa, gandha, rasa and spraṣṭavya are called upātta. The relation between this kind of matter and mind is one of close connection: "en cas de bien-être ou de malaise, il y a réaction réciproque entre la pensée et cette matière". It is this rūpa, observes the Kośa, that the "langue vulgaire" calls "sacetana" or "sajīva".³

It should also be noted here that, as explicitly stated in the Kośa⁴ and also as is clearly implied by the very definition given to the term in question, the mental elements are not upātta.

With this background in mind, if we proceed to

1. AK.Ch.i 63, n.1

2. Ibid., Ch.i 63; cf. also La Siddhi 193 ff.

3. AK.Ch.i 63

4. Cf. Les sept dhātus de pensée, le dharmadhātu et l'audible (śabdadhātu) ne sont jamais appropriés. - ibid., Ch.i 62

examine the meaning assigned to upādiṇṇa in the Dhammasaṅgani and also the meaning revealed from its usage in different contexts, its identification with upāṭṭa presents some difficulties.

The Dhammasaṅgani makes it abundantly clear that what is called upādiṇṇa rūpa comes into being through the action of kamma (kammassa katattā).¹ However, this statement does not in itself constitute a serious difficulty in identifying it with upāṭṭa rūpa. For the Kośa, too, refers to a category of rūpas said to be the result of karma (vipākaja), the contents of which are the same as those enumerated under upāṭṭa.² It could therefore be argued that when the Dhammasaṅgani says that upādiṇṇa rūpa comes into being through the action of kamma, this has to be understood, not as a definition of upādiṇṇa as such, but as an explanation on the origin of the rūpa so designated.

There is however some positive evidence which suggests that upādiṇṇa is not used in the same sense as upāṭṭa. The evidence comes from another passage of the Dhammasaṅgani purporting to give the complete denotation of the term upādiṇṇa. To the question: "what dhammas are upādiṇṇa",

1. See Dhs.146

2. See AK.Ch.i 68-70

it provides the following answer:

"Sāsavā kusalākusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ vipākā kāmāvacarā rūpāvacarā arūpāvacarā vedanakkhandho saññakkhandho saṅkhārakkhandho viññānakkhandho - yañ ca rūpaṃ kammaṣṣa katattā - ime dhammā upādiṇṇā."¹

This statement makes it abundantly clear that not only rūpa but also the other four khandhas that come into being through the action of kamma (vipāka, kammaṣṣa katattā) are considered as upādiṇṇā. On the other hand, as stated in the Kośa, mental elements (vedanā, sañña, etc.,) are not called upātta - a fact implied by the very definition given to it: "ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent ... en qualité de support".

To sum up the difference: while the Dhammasaṅgani uses upādiṇṇā to denote all resultant states of kamma, mental as well as material, the Kośa uses upātta to designate those rūpa-dhammas which the mind and the mind-factors take as their support.

It could however be said that the original meaning of upādiṇṇā is the same as that of upātta and that when the Dhammasaṅgani uses it to include mental elements as

1. Op.cit., 211; see also 255

* N.B. As to why the term vipāka is not used in respect of rūpa which arises as a result of kamma, see below, 283-4

well, it has illegitimately extended the meaning of the term. Herein we are concerned with the meaning of upādiṇṇa as used in the Dhammasaṅgani. Whether it represents a subsequent development or not, is another question.

Such a view could however be maintained if there were evidence in the earlier texts - the Suttas for instance - which would lend support to the meaning assigned to upātta in the Koṣa. An examination of some passages in the Suttas shows that neither the Dhammasaṅgani nor the Koṣa^{is} representing the original meaning.

In a number of Suttas the term upādiṇṇa occurs in a stock formula where the four mahābhūtas are described. Each mahābhūta is said to exist either internally (ajjhataṃ paccattaṃ), i.e., as part of the complex that makes the individual or externally (bāhira), i.e., in the nonsentient world. The distinction in question is sought to be established by designating the former as upādiṇṇa. Such bodily constituents as teeth, hair, nails, bones, blood, etc., are cited as upādiṇṇa.¹ Although the negative term, anupādiṇṇa does not occur, yet we may say that the rūpa which enters into the composition of trees, hills, rocks, etc., is "anupādiṇṇa".

In the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta where this distinction

1. Cf.e.g., M.i, 185 ff.; 421 ff.

is extended to the ākāsa-dhātu as well, upādiṇṇa is explained as that which is appropriated by craving - tanhūpādiṇṇa.¹

Thus in the Suttas upādiṇṇa is used to distinguish the rūpa that enters into the composition of living beings from other instances of rūpa. Since upādiṇṇa is further explained as "tanhūpādiṇṇa", it may be asked why only the matter of the body is so designated. The answer is provided in the same passage where the term is explained: One appropriates one's own body with craving (tanhā) which manifests itself in such thoughts as "This am I" (ahan ti), "This^{is} mine" (maman ti) and "I am (this)" (asmī ti).² Accompanied by craving such thoughts can be directed to other things, too. But, in the main, it is one's own body that one appropriates with craving, with it one identifies oneself. It is upādiṇṇa par excellence. And in this sense the term is used to qualify only the body (so as to distinguish it from other instances of matter).

Buddhaghosa's remarks in this connection are quite significant. Commenting on upādiṇṇa as used in the Suttas he observes that it means: "dalham ādinnaṃ ahaṃ maman ti evaṃ dalham ādinnaṃ gahitaṃ parāmatṭham".³ In point of

1. M.i, 185

2. Ibid.loc.cit.,

3. Vism.349

fact, the commentators were quite aware that in the earlier texts upādiṇṇa was used in a sense different from the sense in which it came to be used in the Abhidhamma. For instance, the commentator of the Majjhimanikāya observes that upādiṇṇa (as used in the Majjhimanikāya) refers to all rūpa, irrespective of the distinction as to whether it is kamma-caused or not, that enters into the composition of the body (sarīratthaka-rūpa).¹

That the earlier meaning of upādiṇṇa is different from either of the meanings given to it by the Dhammasaṅgani and the Kośa is further confirmed by the difference in the items brought under the term. Since the Suttas understand upādiṇṇa as referring to the rūpa that constitutes the body, they bring under it such things as hair, bones, blood, urine, excreta etc.,² For the Dhammasaṅgani, since upādiṇṇa-rūpa means the rūpa that arises by way of kammic fruition, it eliminates from the category so designated such rūpa-dhammas as the triad of lahutā etc., because they are cittasamutthāna.³ For the Kośa

1. Cf. Upādiṇṇam ti na kammāsamutthānam eva, avisesena pana sarīratthakassa etam gahaṇam. Sarīratthakam hi upādiṇṇam vā hotu anupādiṇṇam vā ādiṇṇa-gahita-paramatthavasena sabbam upādiṇṇam eva nāma. - op.cit., ii 222

2. See e.g. M.i 185 ff.; 421 ff.

3. See Dhs. 146

since upāṭṭa means "ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent ... en qualité de support (adhiṣṭhāna)", it eliminates from the category so designated such things as the head-hair, bodily hair, nails and teeth - "en exceptant la racine, laquelle est liée au corps ou organe du tact" - and excreta, urine, saliva, mucus, blood etc.¹

Prof. De la Vallée Poussin has drawn attention to the fact that the "Majjhima iii 240, reproduit dans Pitāputrasamāgama, donne les cheveux ... les excréments comme ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ kakkhalaṃ upādiṇṇaṃ". Since "les cheveux ne sont pas upādiṇṇa",² he is inclined to believe that one has confused the ajjhattika-rūpa with upāṭṭa-rūpa.³ It appears to us that it is not necessary to explain away the anomaly in question by putting it down to a confusion between upādiṇṇa and ajjhatta. The anomaly persists because it is concerned with a term which has two meanings, the earlier and the later. If in the Suttas a term occurs in a sense different from what it has assumed subsequently, this is understandable. For when a term acquired a different meaning subsequently, attempts were not always made to change the contexts in which the self-same

1. AK.Ch.i 63

2. i.e., from the point of view of the Kośa definition.

3. AK.Ch.i 63, n.1

term had been used in the original sense, so as to bring all in line with the later meaning. Sometimes even in the same work both meanings do occur. In the Vibhaṅga,¹ for instance, upādiṇṇa is used in the Nīkāyan sense as well as in the sense in which it is used in the Dhammasaṅgani.

Since the meaning of upādiṇṇa of the Dhammasaṅgani is different from that of upātta of the Kośa and both from that suggested by its usage in the Suttas, we may reasonably assume that the first two cases are two separate developments of the original idea. It may however be noted here that since the Kośa does not bring mental elements under upātta, to that extent it is more faithful to the earlier. The term is explained in a similar way in the Abhidharmāmṛta of Ghosaka, where also all the mental elements are excluded from the category of upātta.²

Even the Pāli commentaries and the tīkās do not lend any support to the interpretation of the upādiṇṇa of the Dhammasaṅgani in the light of the upātta of the Kośa. They all agree in maintaining that the rūpa so designated is kammaja or kammasaṃuṭṭhāna.³ The Visuddhimagga observes that it is called so because it is grasped by kamma - "taṃ

1. Op.cit., 2 and 13

2. Cf. Astadāsasu katyupattāḥ / kati niranupattāḥ // nava (upāttānupattābhedaṇa dviḍḍhāḥ) / indriyena saha pratyutpannā upāttāḥ / cittacaitasikadharmanāmasahabhāvat // - op.cit., 58

3. See Asl. 336-7; ADS. 28; ADSS. 121;

kammaṇa upādiṇṇattā upādiṇṇaṃ".¹ The explanation given in the Vibhāvini Tīkā, although almost the same, seems to combine the two meanings given to it in the Suttas and in the Dhammasaṅgani: "taṇhā-ditṭhīhi upetena kammaṇā attano phalabhāvena ādinnattā"² = "(so termed) because it has been grasped at by the karma that is closely attended with craving and erroneous opinion, by way of its own fruit".³ However it should not be overlooked here that in the commentarial works the Nikāyan explanation of upādiṇṇa is also recognized.

The items brought under upādiṇṇa may be considered now. On the basis of upādiṇṇa and its negative anupādiṇṇa, the Dhammasaṅgani arranges the rūpa-dhammas into three groups.⁴

The first group is invariably upādiṇṇa. It consists of the eight indriya-rūpas, namely, the five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex and the faculty of life.

The second group is sometimes upādiṇṇa and sometimes anupādiṇṇa. It consists of eleven items, namely, the four mahābhūtas, rūpa, gandha, rasa, āhāra, ākāsa-dhātu, upacaya and santati. These items represent the type of rūpa with which

1. Op.cit., 451

2. Op.cit., 116

3. Cpd. 159 n.6

4. Dhs. 146

the indriya-rūpas are associated. Since the indriya-rūpas are a variety of upādā-rūpa, they cannot exist without being supported by the mahābhūtas. And the mahābhūtas cannot exist independently of four of the upādā-rūpas, namely, rūpa, gandha, rasa and āhāra.¹ This explains the presence of the first eight items in the second group. The inclusion of ākāsa-dhātu seems to have been necessitated by the need to account for any cavities or holes involved in the constitution of the sense-organs. The inclusion of upacaya and santati appears rather strange. We have seen that both signify the growth of the matter of the body. Their inclusion in this group shows that according to the logic of the Dhammasaṅgani the growth of the upādiṇṇa rūpa is itself upādiṇṇa. In other words the growth of the kamma-caused rūpa is also considered as kamma-caused.

Why the items included in this (second) group are not recognized as invariably upādiṇṇa is not far to seek. When they exist in association with the indriya-rūpas they are upādiṇṇa and when they exist otherwise they are anupādiṇṇa.

It will be seen that in this (second) group there are some items which in the commentaries are brought under the heading, anipphanna. We have already noted that in the view of the commentators, strictly speaking, none of the

1. See above, 103-4; below, 353, 372-3

anipphanna-rūpas can be described as kammāsamuttāna (= upādiṇṇa) although they can be so described in an indirect way (pariyāyato) or in a conventional sense.¹ Hence from their point of view, strictly speaking, ākāsa-dhātu, upacaya and santati are not upādiṇṇa.

The third group is invariably anupādiṇṇa. It consists of eight items, namely the two viññattis, the triad of lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā, jaratā and aniccatā, and sadda. Elsewhere in the Dhammasaṅgani the first five items are brought under the heading, cittāsamuttāna.² This explains why they are completely excluded from the category of upādiṇṇa which is "kammāsamuttāna". The Kathāvatthu shows that, although the authors of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka had no objection to assigning causes to jāti (genesis) and upacaya-santati, (growth), they were not prepared to treat jaratā and aniccatā in the same way.³ It is in keeping with this tradition that jaratā and aniccatā are included in this group. For to have included them in either of the first two groups is to recognize that they are brought about by kamma.

The recognition of sadda (sound) as invariably anupādiṇṇa shows that, as the Vaibhāṣikas do, the Theravādins,

1. See above, 184-5

2. See above, 187, 200

3. See Kvu. 460-462; 353-355

too, do not consider that sound could ever result from kamma. However there were other schools which maintained the opposite view, namely that sound, too, could be conditioned by karma. From the Kathāvatthu and its Commentary one gathers that the Mahāsaṅghikas were of this opinion.¹

In support of their theory they adduce evidence from a passage in the Dīghanikāya,² which runs as follows: "He through having wrought, having accumulated, having piled up, having increased such karma becomes reborn with the voice of Brahmā God, like that of the karavīka bird"³ Hence the Mahāsaṅghikas maintain that sound could certainly be a result of karma. The Theravādin, on his part does not adduce a convincing counter-argument. He merely says that sound is not vipāka; but, as we shall soon see,⁴ in the terminology of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka vipāka is given a restricted denotation to include only those results of kamma which belong exclusively to the realm of mental phenomena. Hence the Theravādin's argument, based as it is on the definition of vipāka - a definition which the non-Theravādin does not accept - takes the whole controversy to a different level without providing a direct answer

1. See Kvu.466-7 and KvuA.113

2. Op.cit., iii,173

3. Translation from Points of Controversy,267

4. See below, 283

to the opposite view as embodied in the cited sentence. The commentator, too, evades the issue by observing that the Mahāsaṅghikas have come to this conclusion by a careless interpretation of the quotation.

While the Theravāda view is shared by the Vaibhāṣikas the opposite view is shared by the Vātsīputrīyas and the Vibhajyavādins.¹ The Vaibhāṣikas, too, were confronted with a somewhat similar passage occurring in the Prajñaptisāstra: "This mark of the mahāpuruṣa which one calls 'voice of Brahmā' (brahmasvaratā) results from the perfect practice of abstinence from injurious language".² How is this to be reconciled with the thesis that sound is never a karmic result? Two slightly different answers are given. The following view is common to both: It is true that vocal sound is produced by the concussion of the mahābhūtas which have resulted from karma; yet, since the sound itself does not result directly from karma, it is not to be regarded as karma-caused.³ However, according to the quotation the Brahma-voice has its cause in the good karma accumulated previously. As such it recognizes the fact that the nature of the sound is determined by the previous karma.

1. See AK.Ch.i 69, n.4

2. AK.Ch.i 69-70

3. Ibid., Ch.i 70; see also AKvy.i 70

What one can gather from all this is that the early Buddhist texts - where the mechanism of karmic fruition was not explained in detail - took the general view that as a result of good kamma one could possess in the next birth a good voice. This idea is clearly implied in the two quotations referred to. During the period of the Abhidhamma systematization, when the mechanism of kammic fruition came to be explained in more detail, some schools notably the Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas changed the earlier view. This change seems to have been necessitated by this reason: Of the many rūpa-dhammas only the indriya rūpas are recognized as invariably kamma-caused. However, rūpa, gandha etc., too, must be included in the group of dhammas which are sometimes kamma-caused because being avinibhoga rūpas¹ they are necessarily and inseparably integrated with the indriya-rūpas. Sadda (sound), on the other hand, is not an avinibhoga rūpa. As such it is not necessarily co-existent with every rūpa-dhamma. Hence its complete exclusion from the category of kamma-caused rūpa could be effected without violating the principle that the sense-organs and the other indriya rūpas are brought into being through the action of kamma.

Closely connected with the theory that the sense-organs

1. See above, 103-4

are kammāsamutṭhāna is the problem arising from the definition of vipāka. In four of the Kathāvatthu controversies the Theravādins deny that rūpa can ever be vipāka.¹ Since vipāka as it is generally understood means the results of kamma, this denial at first sight seems to contradict what we have been saying so far, namely that some rūpa-dhammas come into being through the action of kamma.

The Theravāda arguments, however, point to a different conclusion. Against the assertion of the Mahāsaṅghikas² namely that the sense-organs are vipāka, the following objection is raised: "The vipāka is a matter of feeling, pleasant, painful or neutral; it is conjoined with feeling of these three kinds; it is conjoined with mental contact, feeling, perception and volition and thought; it goes with a mental object; with it go adverting, attention, volition, anticipation and aiming. Are the five sense-organs anything of this kind?"³ This counter-argument is meant to show that in the view of the Theravādins the term is applicable only to the mental states resulting from kamma. In other words, for the Theravādins vipāka is essentially a subjective experience.

1. See KvV.536-7; also 349-52; 466-469

2. i.e., according to KvU.A.136

3. Points of Controversy, 267; (KvU.467 ff.)

But this does not mean that they object to the recognition of the sense-organs as the results of kamma. It only means that in the terminology of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the term vipāka is given a restricted denotation. The controversy concerns a question relating to the use of terms. In actual fact both parties agree with the view that the sense-organs are kamma-results. In point of fact, the commentator observes that the Theravāda argument is meant to show that the usage (vohāra) of vipāka does not apply to the rūpa-dhammas resulting from kammic fruition.¹ This explains why no objection is raised against the Mahāsaṅghikas' assertion that the maṇāyatana could be vipāka.² It is also in keeping with this circumstance that in the Dhammasaṅgani passage which ^{we} have quoted above,³ while the four khandhas which represent the mental elements are described as vipāka, the rūpa-dhammas are separately mentioned with the qualification: kammaṣṣa katattā. Most probably it is this phrase that later gave rise to katattā-rūpa which, in the Paṭṭhāna⁴ became the standard term for kammaṣṣamuṭṭhāna rūpa.

1. Cf. Rūpadhammesu paṇāyam vohāro va natthī ti dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa. - KvuA.136

2. See Kvu.467 ff.

3. See above, 271

4. Cf. e.g., Tkp.5; Dkp.16, 17

Whether the sense-organs are the result of one kamma or of a multiplicity of kammās is another question that drew the attention of the Buddhists. Nāgasena confirms the latter alternative. Just as - so runs the illustration - five different seeds sown in a field later yield five different kinds of fruits, even so the five sense-organs result from diverse kammās and not from one kamma.¹

Buddhaghosa, too, seems to have had the same theory in mind when he says that the difference between the sense-organs is due to kamma-visesa, the difference in the kammās of which they are the results.²

However, his commentator interprets "kamma-visesa" not as referring to a multiplicity of kammās, but as referring to a single kamma having the potentiality of differentiating the sense-organs. In explanation it is said that, although the kamma is one, arising as it is from the desire for a mode of existence (attabhāva) complete with five-sense-bases, yet, since it is the cause of the differentiation of the sense-organs, it is described as "kamma-visesa."³ It is further observed that the difference

1. Mil.65

2. Vism.445

3. Cf. Ekam pi kammaṃ pañcāyatānikattabhāyabhāyapatthanā nipphannaṃ cakkhādivisese hetutāya aññamaññassa asādhāranan ti ca kammaviseso ti ca vuttam ti daṭṭhabbāṃ - Vism.444

of this kamma by which it is a condition (paccaya) for the organ of sight by that same difference it is not a condition for the organ of hearing and so on, for otherwise there will not be difference between the sense-organs.¹

It is very unlikely that Buddhaghosa had used "kamma-visesa" in the same sense as his commentator interpreted it. The probability is rather that he meant a multiplicity of kammās, as was recognised by Nāgasena. Since "bhūta-visesa" which occurs in the same sentence² means the difference between the primary elements (plural) it seems more proper that kamma-visesa too should be similarly interpreted.

What interests us more here is the fact that both explanations attempt to show that the difference between the sense-organs is due to the kamma or kammās of which they are the results. The reason for this is not far to seek. We saw how certain Buddhists, adopting a Vaiśiṣṭika theory, maintained that the difference between the sense-organs was due to the difference in their supporting

1. Na hi tam yena vivesena cakkhussa paccayo teneva sotassa paccayo hoti, indriyaṅtarābhāvappattito. - VismT.444

2 = Kiṃ pana tam yaṃ aṇṇamaññassa asādhāraṇaṃ, kammaṃ eva neṣaṃ vivesakāraṇaṃ, tasmā kammavivesato etesaṃ viveso na bhūtavivesato. - Vism.445

primary elements. We also noticed what prevented the Theravādins from accepting that theory.¹ This clarifies why both explanations insist on the fact that the difference between the sense-organs is due to the kamma or kammās of which they are the results.

Finally, a fact which has been implicit in the foregoing account of kammāsamuṭṭhāna rūpa should be made explicit here: The rūpa that comes into being through the action of kamma does not obtain outside of the body of a living being. This is only an implication arising from the fact that only the indriya-rūpas, the hadaya-vatthu² and what is inseparably associated with them are recognized as kammāsamuṭṭhāna.

However, there had been a tendency on the part of certain Buddhists to extend the sphere of kammic influence on rūpa. Since human action is sometimes directed to gain domination and sovereignty over the earth some Buddhists are recorded to have concluded that the earth itself is the result of kamma.³ This view which the Theravādins attribute

1. See above, 137 ff.

2. i.e., according to the commentaries, see above, 178

3. Cf. Hañci atthi issariya-samvattanikam kammaṃ adhipacca-samvattanikam kammaṃ, tena vata re vattabbe paṭhavi kammavipāko ti - Kvu. 352

to the Andhakas is rejected by the former as completely untenable. Their counter-argument, in brief, is as follows:

If the earth were the result of kamma then either one living being or all the living beings in common should be responsible for the kamma in question. The first hypothesis is not tenable because in that case many will enjoy the fruit of kamma for which only one is responsible. The second is equally untenable because all beings do not share the use of the earth: there are those who utterly pass away (parinibbāyanti) without enjoying the use of it. But it is impossible - so the argument runs - for one to pass away utterly without exhausting the result of kamma for which he or she is responsible.¹

The objection of the Theravādins is significant in that it shows that they did not want to modify the view, namely that one is responsible for all the consequences arising from one's own kamma. This view is said to be

1. See Kvu.349 ff; Cf. also the following passage from Divy. 54: Pūrṇena karmāni kṛtāny upacitāni ko'nyah pratyānu-bhaviṣyati/ na bhikṣavaḥ karmāni kṛtyāny upacitāni vāhye pṛthivīdhātau vipacyante nābdhātau na tejodhātau na vāyudhātau api tūpātesv eva skandhātvaṣyataneṣu karmāni kṛtyāny upacitāni vipacyante śubhānyāśubhāni ca/

supported by a stanza in the Khuddakapāṭha¹ where it is stated that kammic fruition is not commonly enjoyed by all (asādhāraṇaṃ aññesaṃ).² Equally significant is the opposite view in that it seems to show the beginning of an attempt to relate the results of kamma to a wider basis or if we may say so to "socialize" the fruition of kamma.

The arrangement of rūpa-dhammas on the basis of cittasamuṭṭhāna and its negative may be considered now.

The term cittasamuṭṭhāna, as observed by Mrs. Rhys Davids, does not imply creation of rūpa by mind.³ In our account of the two viññattis it was stated that some rūpa-dhammas arise in response to a thought, wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala) or neutral (avyākata).⁴ The implication is not that they are created but set up or prompted by mind. It is precisely for this reason that in the Paṭṭhāna consciousness (citta) and its concomitants (cetasika) are instanced as a saha-jāta-paccaya (condition by way of co-nascence) in relation to all rūpa-dhammas qualified by cittasamuṭṭhāna.⁵

As in the case of upādiṇṇa and its negative, on the basis of cittasamuṭṭhāna and its negative all rūpa-dhammas

1. Op.cit., 7

2. Kvu.351

3. Bud.Psy.Ethics, 188, n.3

4. see above, 187, 202

5. Tkp.3, see below, 320

are classified into three groups.¹ The first is recognized as invariably cittasamuṭṭhāna and it consists of the two viññattis. We have already shown that these two items are not two discrete rūpa-dhammas in the sense that each signifies an ākāra-vikāra (a particular position or situation) of a set of (other) rūpa-dhammas.² We have also drawn attention to the fact that since the set of rūpa-dhammas in question is cittasamuṭṭhāna, the Dhammasaṅgani has thought it proper to extend the same description to the two viññattis, too.³ And once the two viññattis are described as cittasamuṭṭhāna it is but proper that this description should be further qualified as "invariably". For each of them represents an ākāra-vikāra of only those rūpa-dhammas which are cittasamuṭṭhāna.

The second group comes under both headings, i.e., cittasamuṭṭhāna and its negative. It includes the four mahābhūtas, rūpa, gandha, rasa, āhāra, sadda, ākāsa-dhātu, the triad of lahutā, etc., upacaya and santati. Their inclusion under the negative heading is because of the simple reason that they do not always arise in response to, or conditioned by consciousness (citta). Their inclusion under the positive heading is because of the fact that they are

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1. See Dhs.147-8
 2. See above, 199-200, 204
 3. See above, 200

the kind of rūpa-dhammas the ākāra-vikāras of which are represented by the two viññattis. In this case they are cittasamuṭṭhāna. As to the selection of the items included in this group, the following facts may be noted here. The first eight items are the basic elements present in every instance of rūpa. The ninth, i.e., sadda refers to vocal sound associated with vacīviññatti. Akāsa-dhātu, which, in this case, represents the cavities and holes in the body, is also connected with the viññattis. In the production of vocal sound the cavity in the mouth, for instance, has its part to play. The triad of lahutā, etc., which represents bodily efficiency could facilitate bodily movements involved in kāyaviññatti. These, it seems to us, are the reasons for recognizing the first thirteen items as (sometimes) cittasamuṭṭhāna. The inclusion of upacaya and santati need not deter us here. What we have said about their inclusion under upādāna applies here, too.

In the above (second) group we find certain items which in the commentaries are recognized as anipphanna. Hence from their point of view, strictly speaking, all such items are not cittasamuṭṭhāna.

The third group is never cittasamuṭṭhāna. It consists of the eight indriya-rūpas and jaratā and aniccata. The first eight, as we have seen, are invariably upādāna, i.e.,

kammasamuṭṭhāna. Hence they must be included in this group. The inclusion of the next two items is because no cause or condition is assigned to them.¹

The two headings, upādiṇṇa (kammasamuṭṭhāna) and cittasamuṭṭhāna, which we have considered so far imply two generative conditions (samuṭṭhāna-paccaya) of rūpa, namely kamma and citta. To this the commentators add utu and āhāra.

Utu (temperature or season) is another name for tejo dhātu which is one of the mahābhūtas, and which represents the phenomenon of heat and cold. Ahāra is the same as kabalīnkāra-āhāra which is one of the upādā-rūpas, and which represents the nutritive aspect of matter, the "quality" of nutrition. Both are recognized as two generative conditions of rūpa. The kinds of rūpa conditioned by utu and āhāra are called utusamuṭṭhāna and āhārasamuṭṭhāna respectively.² While āhārasamuṭṭhāna rūpa is confined to the body of a living being, utusamuṭṭhāna rūpa obtains both internally and externally, i.e., as part of the rūpa that constitutes the body and also outside of it.³

1. See above, 279

2. See Vism. 366, 451-2; Asl. 340 ff.

3. See ADS. 29; NRP. 39

Finally there remains to be considered the classification of the rūpa-dhammas into two groups as ajjhattika and bāhira.¹ While the five sense-organs are brought under ajjhattika-rūpa the remaining items are brought under bāhira.² This arrangement is not an Abhidhammic innovation for it is implied in the classical list of twelve āyatanas arranged in the same way into two groups.

With reference to what are some items ajjhattika (internal) and the others bāhira (external)? Buddhist exegesis gives more than one explanation and they all purport to show that no implication of ātmavāda should be associated with the term ajjhattika, "belonging to the self".

According to one explanation - frequently repeated - ajjhattika means that which belongs to the atta. And the term atta is interpreted not as referring to soul but as synonymous with attabhāva, i.e., the empiric individuality as composed of mental and physical factors. Since the sense-organs such as cakku, sota, etc., exist only as a part of the complex that makes the living being they are called ajjhattika, "belonging to the attabhāva".³

There are however other rūpa-dhammas which also go

1. See above, 264

2. Dhs. 148

3. See Vism. 450 and ADSV 115

to make the living being. Therefore one may ask why they are not brought under the heading, ajjhattika-rūpa. The exclusion of such items as the four mahābhūtas is understandable^a for unlike the sense-organs they do not exist exclusively as a part of the complex that makes the living being. But the same is not true of itthindriya, purisindriya, rūpa-jīvitindriya and hadaya-vatthu. Along with the sense-organs they, too, are recognized as invariably kammāsamutṭhāna. Because of this very fact¹ - not to mention any other - they never exist outside of the body of a living being.

Sumaṅgala, the author of the Vibhāvinī Tika, seems to have taken notice of this situation when he observes that, as a matter of fact, rūpa-dhammas other than the sense-organs also go to make up what is called attabhāva, but, as a matter of convention, the latter alone are designated as ajjhattika-rūpa.² As an alternative explanation it is said that the sense-organs alone are ajjhattika par excellence (visesato) because they are so helpful to the attabhāva that they seem to say: "If it were not for us you would be like unto a log of wood!"³

1. See above, 287-9

2. Kāmaṇaṃ pi hi ajjhattasambhūtā atthi, rūpāhi vasena pana cakkhādikaṃ yeva ajjhattikaṃ - ADSVT.115

3. Aha vā yadi mayā na homa tvam katthalīṅgarūpamo bhavissasi ti vadanta viya attabhāvassa sātisayam upakāratta cakkhādineva visesato ajjhattikāni nama. - ibid.loc.cit.

The Abhidharmakośa, on the other hand, takes ātman as a synonymous term for citta, consciousness. Consciousness is the object of the notion of self (ātman); it is that which the people falsely take to be their self. Hence, by way of metaphor, it receives the name, ātman. Then it observes that the sense-organs (including the mano-dhātu) are proximate (pratyāsanna, abhyāsanna) to consciousness, because they are, in fact, its "point d'appui" (āśraya). For this reason the sense-organs are described as ādhyātmika whereas rūpa, rasa, etc., which become the objects of consciousness are described as bāhya, external (to consciousness).¹

What all these explanations attempt to show is that the ^{difference} ~~dichotomy~~ between ajjhattika (ādhyātmika) and bāhira (bāhya) has no reference to a self (atta, ātman). Since the Buddhist attitude to ātmavāda is one of emphatic denial, as far as this fact is concerned, they are all correct.

However, in understanding why in the Dhammasaṅgani only the sense-organs are brought under the heading ajjhattika-rūpa, the explanation given in the Abhidharmakośa is more helpful than any other. If, as is suggested by the other explanations, attabhāva is the centre with reference

1. AK.Ch.i 74; cf. ...ātmanam vā cittam adhiḥkṛtya ye dharmāḥ pratyāsanna-bhāvāt āśraya-bhāvena vartante. te adhyātmikāḥ.
- AKVy.i 74

to which the distinction between "internal" (ajjhattika) and "external" (Bāhira) is established, then this raises the question as to why such items as the two faculties of sex are excluded from the category of ajjhattika-rūpa. The question does not arise if, as is suggested by the Abhidharmakośa, citta is taken as the point of reference. That is to say, the bases of supports (vatthu, nissaya) of citta are internal to it whereas the things that become its objects are external to it.

It is true that no citta can arise without reference to an object, too. However, since the sense-organs are the very bases of citta in this sense they are more proximate to it. This idea seems to be implied by the fact that the Consciousnesses are named after their bases as cakkhu-viññāna, sota-viññāna, etc. The statement made in the Commentary to the Paṭṭhāna, namely that when consciousness arises, it seems to spring forth from within the sense-organs,¹ is based on the same idea.

Sumaṅgala's statement, namely that the use of the term ajjhattika to qualify only the sense-organs is mostly a matter of convention,² becomes more meaningful if it is understood in the context of an observation made by

1. Cf. Arūpino hi khandhā cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnaṃ; abbhantarato nikkhantā viya uppajjanti. - Tkp. 53-54
 2. See above, ²⁹⁴

Sthavira (= Śrīlāta), a celebrity of the Dārṣṭāntika School. The latter rightly points out that the distinction between ādhyātmika and bāhya is not a hard and fast one (pāryāyikaṃ): As bases of consciousness the sense-organs alone are ādhyātmika, but since the sense-organs, too, can become the objects of consciousness they become bāhya as well.¹

Sthavira's observation could be confirmed from another point of view. From a Vibhāsa passage, cited by Prof. De la Vallée Poussin, one gathers that the difference between the two terms is established from two other points of view: (a) les dharmas qui se trouvent dans la personne propre (svātmabhāva) sont personnels; ceux qui se trouvent chez autrui et aussi ceux ne sont pas intégrés aux êtres vivants (aṣṣattvākhyā) sont externes; (b) les dharmas intégrés aux êtres vivants peuvent être personnels; les autres sont externes.²

A similar situation obtains in the Vibhaṅga and the Dhammasaṅgani: The two terms in question are used in the adverbial as ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā to signify another distinction. "Rupaṃ ajjhattaṃ" denotes the rūpa that makes up one's own person and "rūpaṃ bahiddhā" that which makes

1. Sthavira āha. pāryāyikaṃ eṣāṃ ādhyātmika-bāhyatvaṃ. vijñānānāṃ āśrayās te cākṣur-ādāya ity ādhyātmikāṃ. mano vijñāna-viṣayatvāt tu bāhyā iti. - AKvy.i 40
 2. AK.Ch.i 73; n.1

up all other living beings.¹ The point of reference differs from person to person. To A his own body is *ajjhataṃ* but to B it is *bahiddhā*. Curiously enough, this does not take into account the *rūpa* that does not enter into the composition of living beings. As such it cannot be identified with either (a) or (b) of the *Vibhāṣā*. Nor does it fall in line with the *Nikāyas* where the two terms are often used to establish the dichotomy between the *rūpa* that constitutes the body of the living being and the *rūpa* that obtains outside of it. In the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dhammasaṅgani* the same pair of terms is applied to the other four *khandhas*, too.² Perhaps for the sake of uniformity a stock formula is used in respect of *rūpa* as well as the other *khandhas*. This explains why "*rūpaṃ ajjhataṃ*" and "*rūpaṃ bahiddhā*", as understood by these two works, do not represent *rūpa* in its totality.

1. See *Vbh.*2 ; *Dhs.*187-8
 2. *Vbh.*1 ff; *Dhs.*187-8

Abbreviations

Classification-headings

A = upādā	a = anupādā
B = upādinna	b = anupādinna
C = upādin̄nupādānīya	c = anupādin̄nupādānīya
D = sanidassana	d = anidassana
E = sappatigha	e = appatigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = viññatti	h = na viññatti
I = cittasamutthāna	i = na cittasamutthāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhātika	l = bāhira
M = olārika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dūre

Material elements

1 = pathavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammañātā
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacayā
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccata
9 = kāya	18 = vacīviññatti	27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-catthu is not known to the Dhammasangani)

* = The items indicated by this mark comes under upādinna as well as under anupādinna (see above, 277) or under cittasamutthāna as well as under na cittasamutthāna (see above, 290)

Classifications of the 1st Section

I	A 5-27	a 1-4
II	B 5-9,14-16,(1-4,10,12,13, 19,23,24,27)*	b 11,17,18,20-22,25,26 (1-4,10,12,13,19,23,24,27)*
III	C 5-9,14-16,(1-4,10,12,13, 19,23,24,27)*	c 11,17,18,20-22,25,26, (1-4,10,12,13,19,23,24,27)*
IV	D 10	d 1-9,11-27
V	E 1-3,5-13	e 4,14-27
VI	F 5-9,14-16	f 1-4,10-13,17-27
VII	G 1-4	g 5-27
VIII	H 17,18	h 1-6,19-27
IX	I 17,18,(1-4,10-13,19-24, 27)*	i 5-9,14-16,25,26,(1-4, 10-13,19-24,27)*
X	J 17,18	j 1-16,19-27
XI	K 17,18	k 1-16,19-27
XII	L 5-9	l 1-4,10-27
XIII	M 1-3,5-13	m 4,14-27
XIV	N 1-3,5-13	n 4,14-27

Abbreviations.

Classification-headings

A = upāda	a = anupāda
B = upādinna	b = anupādinna
C = upādiṇṇupādāniya	c = anupādiṇṇupādāniya
D = sanidassana	d = anidassana
E = sappatigha	e = appatigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = vinnatti	h = na vinnatti
I = cittasamutthāna	i = na cittasamutthāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika	l = bahira
M = olarika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dūre.

Material elements

1 = pathavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammanāta
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyavinnatti	26 = aniccata
9 = kāya	18 = vacīvinnatti	27 = ahāra

(Hadaya-catthu is not known to the Dhammasangani)

* = The items indicated by this mark comes under upādinna as well as under anupādinna (see above, 277) or under cittasamutthāna as well as under na cittasamutthāna (see above, 290)

Classifications of the 2nd Section

i	5-9	LA	1A 10-27	1a 1-4
ii	5-9	LB	1B 14-16, (1-4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	1b 11, 17, 18, 20-22, 25, 26, (1-4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
iii	5-9	LC	1C 14-16, (1-4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	1c 11, 17, 18, 20-22 25, 26, (1-4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
iv	5-9	Ld	1D 10	1d 1-4, 11-27
v	5-9	LE	1E 1-3, 10-13	1e 4, 14-27
vi	5-9	LF	1F 14-16	1f 1-4, 10-13, 17-27
vii	5-9	Lg	1G 1-4	1g 10-27
viii	5-9	Lh	1H 17, 18	1h 1-4, 10-16, 19-27
ix	5-9	Li	1I 17, 18, (1-4, 10-13, 19-24, 27)*	1i 14-16, 25, 26, (1-4, 10-13, 19-24, 27)*
x	5-9	Lj	1J 17, 18	1j 1-4, 10-16, 19-27
xi	5-9	Lk	1K 17, 18	1k 1-4, 10-16, 19-27
xii	5-9	LM	1M 1-3, 10-13	1m 4, 14-27
xiii	5-9	LN	1n 4, 14-27	1N 1-3, 10-13

Abbreviations

Classification-headings

A = upāda	a = anupāda
B = upādinna	b = anupādinna
C = upādin̄nupādāniya	c = anupādīn̄nupādāniya
D = sanidāssana	d = anidassana
E = sappatigha	e = appatigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = vinnatti	h = na vinnatti
I = cittasamutthāna	i = na cittasamutthāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika	l = bāhira
M = olārika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dāre

Material elements

1 = pathavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammaṇātā
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jīvā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccata
9 = kāya	18 = vacīviññatti	27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-catthu is not known to the Dhammasangani)

* = The items indicated by this mark comes under upādinna as well as under anupādinna (see above, 277) or under cittasamutthāna as well as under na cittasamutthāna (see above, 290)

Classifications of the 3rd Section

i	AB 5-9,14-16 (10,12,13, 19,23,24,27)*	Ab 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*	aB (1-4)*	ab (1-4)*
ii	AC 5-9,14-16, (10,12,13, 19,23,24,27)*	Ac 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*	aC (1-4)*	ac (1-4)*
iii	AE 5-13	Ae 14-27	aE 1-3	ae 4
iv	AM 5-13	Am 14-27	aM 1-3	am 4
v	AN 5-13	An 14-27	aN 1-3	an 4
vi	BD 10 *	Bd 5-9,14-16, (1-4,12, 13,19,23,24, 27)*	bD 10 *	bd 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (1-4,12,13, 19,23,24,27)*
vii	BE 5-9,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	Be 14-16,(4,19, 23,24,27)*	bE 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	be 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*
viii	BG 1-4)*	Bg 5-9,14-16, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*	bG (1-4)*	bg 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*
ix	BM 5-9,(1-4,10, 12,13)*	Bm 14-16,(4-19, 23,24,27)*	bM 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	bm 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*
x	BN 5-9,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	Bn 14-16,(4,19, 23,24,27)*	bN 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	bn 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*

Cont'd.....

Abbreviations.

Classification-headings

A = upāda	a = anupāda
B = upādinna	b = anupādinna
C = upādiṇṇupādāniya	c = anupādiṇṇupādāniya
D = sanidassana	d = anidassana
E = sappatigha	e = appatigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = viññatti	h = na viññatti
I = cittasamutthāna	i = na cittasamutthāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika	l = bāhira
M = olārika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dūre

Material elements

1 = paṭhavi	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammanāta
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccata
9 = kāya	18 = vacīvinatti	27 = ahāra

(Haḍaya-catthu is not know to the Dhammasaṅgānī)

* = The items indicated by this mark comes under upādinna as well as under anupādinna (see above, 277) or under cittasamutthāna as well as under na cittasamutthāna (see above, 290)

Classifications of the 3rd Section

xi	CD 10 *	Cd 5-9,14-16, (1-4,10,12, 13,19,23,24, 27)*	cd 10 *	cd 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (1-4,10,12,13 19,23,24,27)*
xii	CE 5-9,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	Ce 14-16,(4,19, 23,24,27)*	cE 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	ce 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*
xiii	CG (1-4)*	Cg 5-9,14-16, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*	cG (1-4)*	cg 11,17,18, 20-22,25,26, (10,12,13,19, 23,24,27)*
xiv	CM 5-9,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	Cm 14-16,(4,19, 23,24,27)*	cM 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	cm 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*
xv	CN 5-9,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	Cn 14-16,(4,19, 23,24,27)*	cN 11,(1-3,10, 12,13)*	cn 17,18,20-22, 25,26,(4,19, 23,24,27)*
xvi	EF 5-9	Ef 1-3,10-13	eF 14-16	ef 4,17-27
xvii	EG 1-3	Eg 5-13	eG 4	eg 14-27
xviii	FM 5-9	Fm 14-16	fM 1-3,10-13	fm 4,17-27
ixx	FN 5-9	Fn 14-16	fN 1-3,10-13	fn 4,17-27
xx	GM 1-3	Gm 4	gM 5-13	gm 14-27
xxi	GN 1-3	Gn 4	gN 5-13	gn 14-27

CHAPTER SEVEN

MATTER AND THE SYSTEM OF CORRELATION

One of the fundamental postulates of Buddhist philosophy is that a plurality of conditions is necessary for the origination of every element of existence, mental as well as material. In the tradition of the Theravādins this principle is summed up in the phrase: "ekadhammassa aneka-paccaya-bhāva".¹ The same idea finds expression in what the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism call "pratyaaya-sāmāgrī".² Accordingly, it is with reference to a concurrence of relations that the occurrence of an event is sought to be explained.

The Theravāda Abhidhamma seeks to explain the interdependence and the conditionality of all dhammas with reference to what is called "paccayākāra-naya", the system of correlation. It is said to provide an explanation as to the causal relation of all dhammas, not only in their temporal sequence but also in their spatial concomitance. In regard to this subject there are two things which should be noted at the very outset, namely, (a) paccaya, the condition or the relating thing and (b) paccayuppanna-dhamma, the conditioned or the related thing. In a given relation between two dhammas if one constitutes a necessary ground

1. Tkp. 59

2. AKvy. i 235

for the existence of the other, then it is designated as paccaya and the other, i.e., what is conditioned thereby paccayuppanna-dhamma. In the words of Buddhaghosa, whatever dhamma which is a support for the persistence or origination of another is to be taken as the paccaya of the latter.¹ It is to be understood, he says, in the sense of assisting in the arising or coming to be of the (paccayuppanna) dhamma.²

In all there are twenty four paccayas, i.e., twenty four ways in which one dhamma is a condition for another, namely, hetu (moral root), ārammaṇa (object), adhipati (dominance), anantara (contiguity), samanantara (immediate contiguity), saha-jāta (co-nascence), aññamañña (reciprocity), nissaya (basis), upanissaya (inducement), purejāta (prenascence), pacchājāta (post-nascence), āsevana (habitual recurrence), kamma (volitional action), vipāka (retribution), āhāra (nutriment), indriya (faculty), jhāna, magga (Path), sampayutta (association), vippayutta (dissociation) atthi (presence), natthi (absence), vigata (disappearance) and avigata (non-disappearance).³

The schools of Sanskrit Buddhism postulate six kinds of hetu and four kinds of pratyaya as factors responsible for the origination of all dharmas. Karaṇa-hetu (the raison

1. So hi dhammo yassa dhammassa t̄hitiyā vā uppattiyā vā upakāraṅko hoti, so tassa paccayo ti vucceti. - Tkp.11

2. See ibid.loc.cit.,

3. Ibid.,1

d'etre), sahabhū-hetu (co-existent cause), sabhāga-hetu (identical cause), samprayukta-hetu (associated cause), sarvatraga-hetu (universal cause), and vipāka-hetu (cause of retribution) are the six kinds of hetu. Hetu-pratyaya (cause-condition), samanantara-pratyaya (immediate-contiguity-condition), ālambāna-pratyaya (object-condition) and adhipati-pratyaya (dominance-condition) are the four kinds of pratyaya.¹

Yaśomitra says that no distinction is drawn between hetu and pratyaya and that both are synonymous.² We may then ask why some items are brought under hetu and the others under pratyaya. The answer given is that ^{the} exposition of hetus is based on an examination of causes by way of non-obstacle (avighna-bhāva), co-existence (sahabhūtvā) identity (sadr̥ṣatva), etc., whereas that of the pratyayas is based on an examination of causes by way of immediate contiguity (samanantara), etc.³ That there is, however, an element of redundancy involved here is shown by the explanation given as to the relation between the two groups.


In his Systems of Buddhist Thought which is mainly

1. See AK.Ch.ii 245 and 299 ff.

2. hetūnām pratyayanām ca kaḥ prativīśeṣaḥ. na kaścid ity āha. ... hetuḥ pratyayo nidānam kāraṇam nimittam liṅgam upaniṣad iti paryāyāḥ; - AKvy.i 188

3. AKvy.i 188

based on the Chinese sources, Yamakami Sōgen gives the following diagram to illustrate the relation between hetu, pratyaya and phala (effect) as understood by the Sarvāstivādins.¹




As is shown here, hetu-pratyaya corresponds to five of the hetus while kāraṇa-hetu corresponds to three of the pratyayas - a fact which clearly shows that the two classifications in question are not mutually exclusive but that they completely coalesce, one into the other. The five varieties of phala which are posited against the hetus should be understood as related to the pratyayas, too, because the four pratyayas do correspond to the six hetus. That is to say, while hetu-pratyaya refers to five of the hetus, the remaining three pratyayas are referred to by the last of the hetus. This explanation as to the relation between hetu and pratyaya is identical with the one which, according to De la Vallée Poussin, was advanced by the "premières maitres" of the Vibhāṣā.²

1. Op.cit., 315


2. See AK.Ch.ii 299, n.1

The Abhidmarmakośa and its Vyākhyā give a slightly different explanation.¹ The difference lies in the fact that according to them kāraṇa-hetu corresponds only to adhipati-pratyaya. This explanation is identical with the one attributed to the "seconds maitres" of the Vibhāṣā and also with the one adopted by the Prakarāṇa.² The masters of the Mahāyāna explain the relation in question in a still different way: "Le sabhāga-hetu est à la fois hetupratyaya et adhipati-pratyaya, les autres cinq hetus sont adhipatipratyaya."³ We may illustrate these two kinds of relation between the hetus and the pratyayas as follows:

The "seconds maitres" of the Vibhāṣā, AK., AKvy. & Prakarāṇa



Masters of the Mahāyāna



In the first hetu-pratyaya stands as a general designation

1. AK.Ch.ii 244 ff; AKvy. i 188 ff.

2. AK.Ch.ii 299, n.1

3. Ibid.loc.cit.

for all the hetus except kāraṇa-hetu which corresponds to adhipati-pratyaya. In the second it is the adhipati-pratyaya that stands as a general designation for all the hetus, the first of which corresponds to hetu-pratyaya, too. In both, ālambana- and samanantara-pratyayas have not been related to any of the hetus.

What one can gather from the three different explanations as to the relation between the six hetus and the four pratyayas is that the two groups have not been considered as completely exclusive of each other. In other words, the two terms in question are understood as more or less convertible. This is in keeping with the terminology of the Nikāyas where hetu and paccaya are used in apposition¹ but is quite in contrast to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka where the use of hetu is restricted to denote only those factors (lobha, dosa, moha, etc.,) which determine the ethical quality of volitional acts.²

This is a brief resume of the Theravādins' paccay-ākāra-naya and of the hetus and pratyayas of the schools

1. Cf. e.g., D.iii 284; S.ii 224, iv 68, 151; A.i 66
 2. See above, 252; below, 333-4

of Sanskrit Buddhism.¹ We are interested in the subject only in so far as it bears some relevance to the analysis of rūpa. Hence all abstruse and hair-splitting details have been omitted. In regard to this subject, too, there are many points of contact between the Theravāda and the other schools of Buddhist thought. In this connection there are three things to be noted.

It is true that the Theravādins have postulated comparatively a large number of paccayas. However, an examination of the list should show that it is unduly inflated: sometimes an item is repeated under different names; sometime a group of (already mentioned) items are brought under a new heading. That the scholiasts were not unaware of this element of redundancy is shown by Anuruddha's observation, namely that the twenty four paccayas are reducible to six.² Secondly, as we have already observed, in the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism the two terms hetu and

1. For more details on the subject, see Mrs. Rhys Davids' article on relations (Buddhist) in ERE; Ledi Sadaḥ, Paṭṭhanuddesadīpanī, his article, The philosophy of relations, JPTS.1915-16; Nyanatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, 62 ff; Tatia, article on Paṭṭhāsamuppāda, Nava-Nālanda-Mahāvihāra Research Publication, Vol.1; W.S.Karu naratana, Development of the Theory of Causality in early Theravada Buddhism.

2. See ADS.39

pratyaya are recognized as more or less convertible. Therefore, in finding out what corresponds to (Pāli) paccayas one need not confine oneself to (Sanskrit) pratyayas but may take into account the hetus, too. Thirdly, as De la Vallée Poussin remarks, certain differences concern the nomenclature but not the interpretation.¹ For example, the aññamañña-sahajāta-paccaya of the Theravādins is the same as the sahabhū-hetu of the Sarvāstivādins.² To this should be added: sometimes the nomenclature remains the same but the interpretation differs. For example, the hetu-paccaya of Pāli Buddhism has practically no correspondence with the hetu-pratyaya of the Sanskrit schools.³

Taking all these points into consideration we may examine how rūpa enters into the system of correlation of the Theravādins. Wherever possible we may also observe the parallel cases as found in the other systems of Buddhist thought. In the main, we are interested in those relations where rūpa constitutes either a paccaya or a paccayuppanna-dhamma. In other words, the following discussion is an

1. AK.Ch.ii 299,n.1
 2. See below, 318-19
 3. See below, 333

attempt to unfold the implications of the phrase, "rūpaṃ sappaccayaṃ", which occurs in the Dhammasaṅgani.¹

Ārammaṇa-paccaya:

Ārammaṇa-paccaya (= ālambana-pratyaya) can mean anything which, as object, constitutes a condition for the arising of consciousness (citta) and its concomitants (cetasika).² We have already indicated how all rūpa-dhammas fall under six different headings according to the way they become the objects of consciousness.³ Rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa and phoṭṭhabba are known as objects of the five kinds of viññāna named after the corresponding sense-organs (= cakkhu-viññāna, sota-viññāna, etc.), and the remaining rūpa-dhammas as the objects of mano-viññāna. Hence while the first five items are instanced as ārammaṇa-paccayas in relation to the first five kinds of viññāna the others are instanced as ārammaṇa-paccayas in relation to the sixth.

Adhipati-paccaya:

Adhipati-paccaya, the condition by way of dominance, is of two varieties: ārammaṇādhipati and sahajātādhipati.

The former is the same as ārammaṇa-paccaya but for this difference: only those objects which exert a dominant influence on the consciousness and its concomitants are recognized as ārammaṇādhipati.⁴

1. Op. cit. 124-5

2. See Tkp. 2, 12 ff.

3. See above, 266

4. See Tkp. 13, 31

The latter applies only to the four kinds of iddhipāda, namely, chanda-samādhi (concentration of intention), viriya-samādhi (concentration of energy), citta-samādhi (concentration of consciousness) and vīmaṃsa-samādhi (concentration of investigation).¹ These four factors alone are recognized as saha-jātādhipati because they exert an overwhelming influence on the mental states which arise simultaneously with them. They are so powerful that at a given moment only one of them can arise.² If a particular consciousness and its concomitants which are influenced by one of these iddhipādas give rise to cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa, then this cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa is also recognized as influenced by that iddhipāda.³ This is the position of rūpa in relation to saha-jātādhipati paccaya. In this particular relation the position of rūpa is only that of the paccayuppanna-dhamma (conditioned).

The adhipati-paccaya of the Theravādins should not be confused with the adhipati-pratyaya of the Abhidharmakośa.

According to the latter work, it is the same as kāraṇahetu. As such its scope is greater than that of any other pratyaya. For what is called kāraṇa-hetu applies to all saṃskṛta-dharmas but for one exception: a dharma is not kāraṇa-hetu of itself. The function of kāraṇa-hetu is to be

1. Ibid., 13. 31 ff.

2. Cf. Na ekakkhane bahū jettḥakā nāma honti — Tkp. 31

3. See Tkp. 2

understood, not in a positive sense, i.e., as a kāraka, but in a negative sense, i.e., as offering no obstacle.¹

Its universal application is based on the contention that no dharma constitutes an obstacle (avighnabhāvāvasthā) to the origination of those other dharmas which are destined to be originated (uppattimant).² The implication is that "it does not directly make any disturbance in the causal nexus".³

It is because of two reasons that kāraṇa-hetu is also called adhipati-pratyaya: The first is that it applies to the largest number of dharmas (adhikaḥ pratyayaḥ). The second is that it constitutes a condition in relation to the largest number of dharmas (adhikasya pratyayaḥ).⁴

That there is a big difference between the adhipati-pratyaya of the Abhidharmakośa and that of the Theravādins is obvious. Stated briefly: for the Abhidharmakośa adhipati signifies dominance mainly by way of quantity, whereas for the Theravādins adhipati signifies dominance solely by way of quality.⁵

In view of the fact that kāraṇa-hetu (= adhipati-pratyaya) applies to all dharmas, it goes without saying that each and every rūpa-dharma constitutes a kāraṇa-hetu,

1. AK.Ch.ii 307

2. AK.Ch.ii 248; see also AKvy.i 189 ff.

3. Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, 3/2

4. AK.Ch.ii 308

5. Cf. Jetṭhakatṭhena upakārako dhammo adhipatipaccayo - Tkp.13

not only in relation to the other rūpa-dharmas but also in relation to all arūpa-dharmas.

Sahajāta-paccaya:

In the case of two dhammas, if one cannot arise unless simultaneously with the arising of the other, then the latter is recognized as a sahajāta-paccaya (co-nascece-condition) in relation to the former. If the relation between A and B is such that B always arises simultaneously with A, then A is the paccaya and B the paccayuppanna-dhamma. This does not necessarily mean that A cannot arise independently of B. It only means that under no circumstances can B arise independently of A. The two are not on a par.¹

When they are on a par, the relation between them is described as aññamañña, reciprocal. It is one of mutual support. In this case, while A is a sahajāta-paccaya in relation to B, B too is a sahajāta-paccaya in relation to A. What is true of one is equally true of the other.² Accordingly in such a relation each becomes at one and the same time the paccaya as well as the paccayuppanna-dhamma.³

The latter variety of sahajāta-paccaya which is distinguished from the former by being qualified as aññamañña,

1. See Tkp. 14, 36

2. Ibid.loc.cit.

3. Imina va etesam dhammanam ekakkhane paccayabhavan c'eva paccayuppannabhavan ca dipeti. - Tkp.36

is the same as the sahabhū-hetu of the Sarvāstivādins. For in the case of sahabhū-hetu, too, the related things are considered not only as causes but also as effects in relation to each other.¹

The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to this principle of reciprocal conditionality or causation. They concede, however, that between two co-existent things one could become the cause of the other, and cite the relation between the visual organ and the visual consciousness as a case in point. But they refuse to believe that two co-existent things could be related in such a way that one becomes at one and the same time the cause as well as the effect of the other.² The counter-argument of the Sarvāstivādins amounts to this: There are certain things which always arise simultaneously; when one is present the others are also present, and when one is absent the others are also absent. Therefore it is to be concluded that the relation between such things is one of reciprocal causation.³

The well-known example cited in this connection is that of three sticks set upright, all leaning against one another at their upper ends.⁴ The Sautrāntikas contend that

1. See AK.Ch.ii 248 ff.; AKvy.i 191 ff.

2. See AK.Ch.ii 253 ff.

3. Ibid.loc.cit.

4. Ibid., 254; see also Tkp.14

there is a complex of anterior causes which is responsible for this peculiar position of the sticks (because of which position the three sticks do not fall to the ground).¹

The objection of the Sautrāntikas to recognizing the sahabhū^hhetu is not without significance for it shows that their general policy of reducing the lists² was applied to the list of hetus and pratyayas as well.

How the two kinds of sahajāta-paccaya apply to rūpa may be considered now. Two cases were noted in two previous chapters: (a) The four mahābhūtas are a sahajāta-paccaya (non-reciprocal) in relation to the upādā-rūpas.³ (b) Each of the mahābhūtas is a sahajāta-paccaya (aññamañña = reciprocal) in relation to the other.⁴ The first establishes the necessary depend^ence of the upādā-rūpas on the mahābhūtas and the second, the co-ordinate position of the mahābhūtas.

There are two more cases to be noted: (a) Citta and cetasikas are a sahajāta-paccaya (non-reciprocal) in relation to cittasamu^httāna-rūpa.⁵ Here the conditionality is not recognized as reciprocal because of the simple reason that a consciousness and its concomitants can arise without necessarily giving rise to cittasamu^httāna-rūpa. (b) The

1. AKh.ii 255

2. See above, 110, 121, 122, 168-9, 221-2

3. See above, 98-99

4. See above, 78-79

5. See Tkp.3, 14, 37 ff.

other refers to the relation between nāma (mind) and rūpa (matter) at the moment of conception (paṭisandhi). Here the conditionality is recognized as reciprocal with a view to showing that both come into being simultaneously and that the one cannot come into being independently of the other.¹

Nissaya-paccaya:

This refers to something which aids something else in the manner of a base or foundation. Consequently all the examples given with reference to sahajāta-paccaya are repeated as nissaya-paccayas, too. Again, since the first five sense-organs are the physical bases of the five kinds of viññāna named after them, the former are instanced as nissaya-paccayas in relation to the latter. Similarly as explained the position of hadaya-vatthu (i.e., "yaṃ rūpaṃ ... taṃ rūpaṃ" of the Paṭṭhāna)² in its relation to mano and mano-viññāna.³

Purejāta- and Pacchājāta-paccaya:

Purejāta-paccaya (pre-nascent-condition) refers to something which, having arisen first, becomes a support for something else which arises later; and pacchājāta-paccaya (post-nascent-condition) to something which, having arisen later, becomes a support to something else which has arisen earlier.⁴ In the first as well as in the second, that which

1. Tkp.3, 14,

2. See above, 175

3. See Tkp.3-4,

4. See ibid., 17, 42 ff.

becomes the paccaya (condition) and that which becomes the paccayappaṇṇa (conditioned) are not co-nascent. The first is like the father who supports his son. The second is like the son who supports his father.

The first five sense-organs (cakkhu, sota, etc.,) and the corresponding sense-objects (rūpa, sadda, etc.,) are recognized as purejāta-paccayas in relation to the first five kinds of consciousness (cakkhu-viññāna, sota-viññāna, etc.,).¹ Their recognition as such is because of the circumstance that by the time, say, cakkhu-viññāna arises cakkhu and rūpa have been existing. Cakkhu and rūpa do not come into existence simultaneously with the cakkhu-viññāna in relation to which they become paccayas. This statement is true enough from the point of view of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the earlier works where the relative duration of matter is recognized.² But as we have already seen, the early doctrine of impermanence later gave rise to a formulated theory of moments.³

It may be recalled here that according to the theory in question each dhamma, mental or material, has three momentary phases, namely, the nascent (uppāda), the static

1. Tkp.17, 42 ff.

2. See above, 215 ff.

3. See above, 222 ff.

(ṭhiti) and the cessant (bhanga). There is however this difference to be noted: the static phase (ṭhiti) of a material dhamma is longer than that of a mental dhamma.¹ Therefore, if a material dhamma and a mental dhamma come into existence simultaneously, they will not cease to exist simultaneously. The former will continue to exist (for some time) even after the cessation of the latter. Thus the principle, namely that matter is of longer duration than mind, is not abandoned even after the development of the theory of moments.

From this it follows that a material dhamma which arises earlier can become a condition in relation to a mental dhamma which arises later. In other words, the former can become a purejāta-paccaya in relation to the latter. We have already noted that the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are purejāta-paccayas for the first five kinds of consciousness. The time-difference involved here is explained by the commentators as follows: When consciousness arises, say with cakkhu as its basis and rūpa (the visible) as its object, then both cakkhu and rūpa are in their static phase (ṭhiti).² That is to

1. See VbhA. 25 ff.; Vism. 613

2. See Tkp. 42.

say, at this time both cakkhu and rūpa have passed their nascent phase (uppāda). It is because of this chronological priority that cakkhu and rūpa are described as purejāta, and it is because they become the basis and the object respectively of visual consciousness that they are considered as paccayas.

The other item that is considered as purejāta-paccaya is the hadaya-vatthu, i.e., in relation to mano and mano-viññāna.¹ At the moment of conception, however, the relation is not of this kind. For, as we have already indicated,² at this moment hadaya-vatthu and manāyatana come into being simultaneously.

In the case of the relation by way of pacchājāta, the paccaya is always mental: Consciousness (citta) and its concomitants (cetasika) constitute a pacchājāta-paccaya for (the preservation of) the body.³ This, too, is based on the principle that matter is of longer duration than mind. Since the static phase (ṭhiti) of a material dhamma is longer than that of a mental dhamma, there is the possibility of the matter of the body being conditioned by post-nascent (pacchājāta) consciousness and its concomitants.

1. Tkp. 43

2. See above, 211 n.4

3. Tkp. 5, 43 ff.

It will be seen that purejāta- and pacchājāta-paccaya do not apply to those relations where both paccaya (condition) and paccayuppanna (conditioned) are mental. This is because of the following reason: Mental elements arise either simultaneously or in immediate contiguity. If they arise simultaneously, they must perish simultaneously. If they arise in immediate contiguity, then the immediately preceding one has to perish before the immediately succeeding one could appear. Hence a mental element cannot become either a purejāta- or a pacchājāta-paccaya in relation to another mental element.¹

Kamma-paccaya:

As a paccaya in the system of correlation, kamma is of two kinds: If what is conditioned thereby arises simultaneously with it, it is known as saha-jāta. If what is conditioned thereby is asynchronous, it is known as nānākhaṇika. In both cases the reference is to cetanā, volition.

Concerning the first, it is said that the cetanā, whether wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala), forms a paccaya for those mental states which arise together with it. If these mental states give rise to (cittasamuṭṭhāna)

1. Based on the implications of the relation between citta and cetasikas and the definition of samanantara-paccaya, see below, 338 ff.

rūpa, then the latter, too, is considered as conditioned by that cetanā. The implication is that the mental states and the rūpa in question are determined, fashioned and impelled by the force of cetanā.¹

Cetanā (volition), it may be noted here, is one of those cetasikas which arise with every kind of consciousness. Hence it is described as sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa.² From this it follows that cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa is always conditioned by cetanā. And, if kamma is another name for cetanā, it may be asked why cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa is not described as "kammāsamuṭṭhāna-rūpa". This calls for a consideration of the Buddhist theory concerning the fruition of kamma.

The Buddhists maintain that the effect of kamma never takes place concurrently with the kamma.³ It is argued that if kamma fructifies at the very moment of its occurrence then a person who performs a kamma which is conducive to birth in heaven will be born a deva at that very moment.⁴ This view, namely that the effect of kamma is not synchronous with the kamma itself, is maintained in

1. See Tkp.45 ff.

2. See NDS.6

3. See Tkp.45 ff.

4. Kusalākusalam hi kammam attano pavattikkhane phalam na deti. Yadi dadeyya, yam manusso devalokūpagakusalakammam karoti; tass' anubhāvena tasmim yeva khane devo bhavēyya. - Tkp.46

the Abhidharmakośa, too: "La rétribution n'est pas simultanée à l'acte qui la produit, car le fruit de rétribution n'est pas dégusté au moment où l'acte est accompli".¹ This work goes on to say that the fruition of karma does not take place even immediately after (anantara) the occurrence of the karma.²

In view of the fact that kamma and kammic fruition do not take place simultaneously, the cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa which arises together with, and conditioned by, cetanā cannot be understood as the fruition of that cetanā (kamma). In other words, the relation between cetanā and cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa is not the same as that between kamma (cetanā) and its fruit (phala). This does not mean that cetanā is not partly responsible for the arising of the rūpa in question. For otherwise the former would not have been recognized as a paccaya in relation to the latter.

Consequently the second variety of kamma-paccaya which is described as nānākhanika is the kamma-paccaya par excellence. The relation involved here is that between kamma (cetanā) and its phala (fruit, effect) because the qualification, nānākhanika signifies a difference in time in their occurrence. It is in order to account for all those mental and material dhammas which come into being

1. Op.cit., Ch.ii 275

2. AK.Ch.ii 275

as the result (phala) of kamma that this variety of paccaya is established. As for rūpa, we have already stated that the first five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex, ^{the faculty of life,} the physical basis of mental activity and all other rūpa-dhammas which are inseparably associated with them are results of kamma (kammāsamuttāna).¹ Suffice it to note here that it is in relation to the above kinds of rūpa that kamma (nānākhanika) constitutes a paccaya.

Vipāka-paccaya:

In the previous chapter we drew attention to the fact that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the use of the term vipāka is restricted to denote only those results of kamma that are mental.² It is in keeping with this tradition that only mental dhammas are instanced as examples of vipāka-paccaya. This does not mean that rūpa cannot become the paccayuppanna (the conditioned) in relation to vipāka-paccaya.

Vipāka (results of kamma which are mental) is considered to be of a very delicate and tranquil nature (santabhāva). For it comes into being as if it were not impelled by any effort (nirussāha). Hence, in the capacity of a paccaya, vipāka exerts a tranquillizing influence on its paccayuppanna-dhamma.³

1. See above, 277-8, 287

2. See above, 283-4

3. See Tkp.18

At the time of conception (okkantikkhane) all the mental dhammas are vipāka. As such, at this time they all form a paccaya by way of vipāka for the rūpa that comes into being simultaneously with them.¹ Again, the (cittasamutṭhāna) rūpa which arises in response to a consciousness and its concomitants which are vipāka, is also recognized as conditioned by vipāka-paccaya.² These are the two occasions when rūpa comes under the influence of vipāka.

The vipāka-paccaya of Pāli Buddhism does not correspond to the vipāka-hetu of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

In the case of the former, as we have seen, vipāka itself is the paccaya. As such, vipāka-paccaya does not mean condition in relation to vipāka. It means condition by way of vipāka. The kind of relation involved here applies to things which arise simultaneously.

In contrast, the latter refers to the cause (hetu) of vipāka: "vipākasya phalasya hetur vipāka-hetuḥ".³ The cause (hetu) of vipāka is karma. Therefore the vipāka-hetu of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism corresponds to the kamma-paccaya (i.e., nānākhanika) of Pāli Buddhism. The kind of relation involved here is between the antecedent karma and the subsequently arising karma-result (phala).

1. Tkp.47-8

2. Ibid.loc.cit.

3. AKvy.i203

Ahāra-paccaya:

In its technical sense āhāra (food, nutriment) means not only kabalīkāra-āhāra which is one of the rūpa-dhammas but also phassa (sensory or mental impression), cetanā (volition) and citta (consciousness), for they all nourish, sustain, and keep going the empiric individuality as composed of mental and material factors. Each of them is cited as an āhāra-paccaya. In their capacity as paccayas they nourish their related things so as to enable them to endure long, to develop, to flourish and to thrive.¹

Of the last three items phassa and cetanā are two of the cetasikas which arise with every kind of consciousness.² And the other, i.e., citta, means consciousness itself. As such, whenever cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa arises, it is always conditioned by these three āhāra-paccayas. And, as stated above³, at the moment of conception all the mental dhammas are a condition in relation to all the rūpa-dhammas. Therefore rūpa at the time of conception is also similarly conditioned.⁴

The last, i.e., kabalīkāra-āhāra which stands for the material "quality" of nutrition nourishes and sustains the

1. See Tkp.48 ff.

2. See ADS.6

3. See above, 321

4. Tkp.48

body. Hence the former is postulated as an āhāra-paccaya in relation to the latter.¹

Indriya-paccaya:

Indriya-paccaya is like adhipati-paccaya: It exercises a dominating influence over the things related to it.²

In all there are twenty two indriyas. Of them fourteen are arūpino, mental (one is mano and the other thirteen are cetasikas). They become indriya-paccayas in relation to cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa.³

The remaining eight indriyas are rūpino, material: the first five sense-organs, rūpa-jīvitindriya, itthindriya and purisindriya. The last two, though designated as indriya, are not postulated as indriya-paccayas.⁴

Over what and what things the first six items wield a dominating influence has already been indicated: The sense-organs are indriya-paccayas in relation to the five kinds of consciousness named after them in the sense that, if the former are weak the latter, too, become weak and if the former are strong the latter, too, become strong.⁵ The uninterrupted continuity of the kammamuṭṭhāna-rūpas depends

1. Tkp.5,15

2. Tkp.18

3. Tkp.6,19

4. Ibid.loc.cit.

5. See above, 140-41

on the presence of the rūpa-gīvitindriya.¹ It is in this sense that the latter wield's a dominating influence on the former.

As to the non-recognition of itthindriya and purisindriya as indriya-paccayas, the commentators give the following explanation: At the initial stages of the embryonic development, although itthindriya and purisindriya are present, they do not perform their respective functions, that is to say, they do not bring about the manifestation of sex distinctions. Since they remain dormant and inactive at this stage, it is to be concluded that they are not indriya-paccayas. This conclusion is based on the contention that at no time does a dhamma which can rightly be called an indriya-paccaya remain inactive or dormant.²

From the point of view of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the above explanation has no relevance. For, as we have seen,³ according to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka itthindriya and purisindriya mean feminity and masculinity respectively and not their *raison d'être* as interpreted by the commentators.

Jhāna-and Magga-paccayas:

The seven jhāna-factors (e.g., vitakka, vicāra, etc.,)

1. See above, 167

2. See Tkp. 50

3. See above, 154-55

and the twelve Path-factors (e.g. paññā, viriya, etc.,) influence those mental states which arise in association with them. And, if such mental states give rise to (cittasamuṭṭhāna) rūpa, the latter, too, is considered as influenced accordingly.¹

Hetu-paccaya:

We have already indicated how hetu-pratyaya is explained in the Abhidharmakośa: Every dharma is a hetu-pratyaya in relation to all other dharmas. The implication is that no dharma constitutes an obstacle (avighnabhāvāvasthā) to the origination of those other dharmas which are destined to be originated. Hence hetu-pratyaya is not a kāraṇa, i.e., it is not something that helps something positively. Its function is negative, i.e., non-obstruction.²

According to the Theravādins, on the other hand, hetu-paccaya signifies those factors which determine the ethical quality of volitional acts. The factors in question are lobha (covetousness), dosa (hatred), moha (delusion) and their opposites. It is on the basis of these factors that a particular thought is judged as wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala).³

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1. See Tkp. 5, 41 ff.
 2. See above, 316-17
 3. See Tkp. 11-12, 23 ff.

They form paccayas by way of hetu, "moral root" in relation to those mental states which arise together with them. And if such mental states give rise to (cittasamuṭṭhāna) rūpa, the latter, too, is considered as conditioned thereby.¹

This does not mean that rūpa, too, becomes morally qualifiable as wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala). For it is a well established thesis that no ethical quality can be predicated of rūpa.² In this connection, it should be noted that the function of lobha, dosa, etc., is not limited to determining the ethical quality of mental states. Those mental states which are conditioned by them are said to be firm and well fixed like firmly rooted trees.³ Consequently the (cittasamuṭṭhāna) rūpa which arises in response to such mental states does also become firm and well fixed. It is in this sense that lobha, dosa, etc., are instanced as hetu-paccayas in relation to cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpas.

Atthi- and Avigata-paccayas:

As two paccayas, atthi and avigata are completely identical. They need not deter us here, for they are two

1. Tkp. 1, 23 ff.

2. Cf. rūpaṃ avyākataṃ - Dhs. 125; see also Vbh. 12; Kvu. 532 ff.

3. See Tkp. 12

names given to a combination of four paccayas, namely, sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya and purejāta.¹ We have already examined their implications with reference to rūpa.²

Upanissaya-paccaya:

The Paṭṭhāna does not include rūpa in the relation based on the upanissaya-paccaya. In the commentaries, however, the sense-objects are cited as constituting ārammaṇa-upanissaya-paccayas in relation to consciousness and its concomitants. What is called ārammaṇa-upanissaya need not be examined here for it corresponds to ārammaṇādhipati.³

So far we have been considering those relations with reference to which rūpa becomes either a paccaya or a paccayuppanna-dhamma. There are certain varieties of relation into which rūpa does not enter. They are based on the following paccayas: āsevana, sampayutta, anantara, samanantara, natthi and vigata. We may consider, as briefly as possible, why such relations are not obtainable in the domain of rūpa.

The function of āsevana-paccaya, the condition by way of habitual recurrence, is that of causing its paccayuppanna-dhammas to accept its inspiration for them to gain greater and greater proficiency. It is just as in learning

1. See Tkp.55 ff.
 2. See above, 320-35
 3. See Tkp.15-17, 39 ff.

by heart: through constant repetition the later recitation becomes gradually easier and easier.¹ Now, this so-called energy or proficiency which each succeeding event comes to acquire is interpreted and evaluated entirely in ethical terms.² But, as stated earlier, no ethical quality can be predicated of rūpa - hence its exclusion from this kind of relation.

Consciousness (citta) and its concomitants (cetasika) are said to be related by way of sampayutta, association, when they have the following four characteristics; the same sense-organ as their basis (ekavatthu); the same object (ekārammaṇa); simultaneous origination (ekuppāda); and simultaneous cessation (ekanirodha).³ Rūpa-dhammas cannot be so related because of the simple reason that they cannot share the above-mentioned four characteristics in toto. For although the last two characteristics apply to them, e.g., the four mahābhūtas which come into being simultaneously and cease to exist simultaneously, the first two do not. Nor can nāma (mind) and rūpa (matter) be so related. For a mental dhamma and a material dhamma can

1. See Ledi Sadaw, Paṭṭhānuddesaṇā, 32 ; cf. Āsevanatṭhena anantarānam gunabalavabhāvaya upakārako dhammo asevanapaccayo ganthādisu purima-purimābhiyogo viya. - Tkp.17

2. See Tkp.17-18, 44 ff.

3. See ADS.6

have in common only one of the above four characteristics, i.e., either simultaneous origination (ekuppāda) or simultaneous cessation (ekanirodha): If they arise simultaneously, e.g., at the moment of conception, then they do not cease to exist simultaneously. If they cease to exist simultaneously, then they could not have arisen simultaneously. This is based on the theory that the duration of a material dhamma is longer than that of a mental dhamma.¹

It is for these reasons that the relation between nāma and rūpa is described as one of vippayutta, dissociation, and not sampayutta. All mental dhammas are vippayutta in relation to all material dhammas and vice versa.² However, only the physical bases of consciousness, viz. the first five sense-organs and the hadaya-vatthu, are considered as vippayutta-paccayas.³ It is said that when consciousness springs up, it springs up as if it were "issuing forth" (nikkhaṅṭā viya) from within its physical basis. Thus there is some kind of close association between the consciousness and the physical basis - an association not observable between the consciousness and the sense-object. Hence the physical basis alone is said to constitute a

1. See above , 323

2. See Tkp.53

3. Ibid.loc.cit.

vippayutta-paccaya in relation to the consciousness.¹ This conclusion seems to be based on the idea that when something is related to something else by way of vippayutta-paccaya there should exist a close connection between them - an idea which appears rather paradoxical, and which reminds one, of the definition given to citta-viprayukta-samskāras in the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.²

Anantara and samanantara are but two names given to the same kind of paccaya. All classes of consciousness (citta) and their concomitants (cetasika) which have just ceased to exist are anantara- or samanantara-paccayas in relation to all classes of consciousness and their concomitants which arise in the immediately succeeding moment.³ The schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, too, understand samanantara-pratyaya in a similar way and, like the Theravāda, they, too, apply it only to mental dharmas.⁴

What concerns us here is why samanantara-paccaya is excluded from the domain of rūpa. It is stated that only those phenomena which are capable of giving rise to other

1. See Tkp. 53-4

2. Cf. citta-viprayuktā iti citta-grahaṇam citta-samāna-jāṭīya-pradarśanārtham. cittam iva cittaena ca viprayuktā ity arthah. - AKvy. i 142

3. See Tkp. 13-14, 33 ff.

4. See AK.Ch. ii 300 ff.; AKvy. i 232 ff.

phenomena, immediately after their cessation, are considered as samanantara-paccayas, conditions by way of immediate contiguity.¹ Since samanantara-paccaya is applied only to mental dhammas, it is implied that the succession of elements in a regular order is not always true of material dhammas.

The following argument, attributed to Vasumitra, elucidates the above situation: "Dans un même corps, sans que la série d'un rūpa d'accroissement (aupacayika) soit rompue, peut naître un second rūpa d'accroissement; donc le rūpa n'est pas samanantarapratyaya".² Here, "rūpa d'accroissement (aupacayika)" refers to that variety of rūpa which evolves in the body as a result of food, sleep or trance.³ Yaśomitra adds that when a person having eaten food were to sleep or enter into a trance (dhyāna), then concurrently there would be aupacayika or accumulation born of food as well as that born of sleep or trance.⁴

The underlying assumption is that in the case of

1. See Tkp. 13

2. AK.Ch.ii 301

3. See AK.Ch.ii 301, n.2

4. yadā hi bhuktvā svapiti dhyānam vā samāpadyate. tad'āhāra-
ja aupacayikah svapna-ja ca samādhi-jo vā aupacayika
udpadyate. - AKvy.i 232

samanantara the antecedent dharma should cease to exist at the moment when the subsequent dharma arises. As shown in Vasumitra's example, the aupacayika born of food and the aupacayika born of sleep or of trance co-exist. If the principle of samanantara, immediate contiguity, applies to the domain of rūpa, then the aupacayika born of food should cease to exist the moment when the aupacayika born of sleep or of trance arises.

As two paccayas there is no difference between natthi (absence) and vigata (abeyance).¹ The definitions and the examples given in respect of them show that they are identical with samanantara-paccaya. The Paṭṭhāna says: "Samanantara-vigatā citta-cetasikā dhammā paccuppannānaṃ citta-cetasikānaṃ vigata-paccayena paccayo".² This is the same as samanantara paccaya stated differently. The immediately preceding dhamma is a condition for the immediately succeeding dhamma in the sense that the disappearance of the former affords an opportunity for the origination of the latter. Since these two paccayas represent only a restatement of the samanantara-paccaya, what has been observed as to the exclusion of rūpa from the relation by way of samanantara, applies equally to these two cases, too.

1. See Ukp. 59

2. Ibid., 7

CHAPTER EIGHT

ATOMISM

One of the Theravāda theories, without, apparently any antecedent history in the Pāli Canon itself, is the theory of rūpakalāpas. A post-canonical development in all its essentials, it makes its first appearance in the Visuddhimagga and in the Abhidhammic commentaries. In its fully developed form, however, it occurs in the manuals and commentaries of the twelfth century and later, notably the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddha, its Sinhalese sannē by Sāriputta, its Pali ṭīkā by Sumaṅgala and such Abhidhammic compendiums as the Nāmarūpasamāsa and the Saccasaṅkhepa.

An examination of the fundamental principles of the theory of rūpakalāpas would show that it is nothing but the Theravāda counterpart of the atomic theory of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. Much has been done by modern scholarship to critically examine the atomism of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.¹ Very little, however,

1. See De la Vallée Poussin, AK.Ch.ii.143 ff., La Siddhi 39.; Sōgen, Systems of Bud.Thought, 121 ff.; Mc Govern, Bud.Cosmology 125 ff.; Sylvain Levi, Materiaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra 51 ff.; Stcherbatsky, Cent.Concep. 13 ff.; Murti, Cent.Phi.of Buddhism, 200; Rosenberg, Probleme der buddhistischen philosophie, 151 ff.

is known about the close analogy which the theory of rūpakalāpas presents to the atomic theory of Sanskrit Buddhism.

There are valid reasons to believe that in the formulation of the theory in question the Theravādins were much influenced by the Sanskrit Buddhist scholasticism. De la Vallée Poussin and Mc Govern have drawn attention to the fact that atomism as a subject is discussed in the Mahāvibhāṣā.¹ The allusion therein to the opinions of Vasumitra, Bhadanta and Buddhadeva on the question whether the atoms come into contact or not,² shows clearly that in its time the atomic theory had become a well established tenet of Sanskrit Buddhism.³

It is true that the (earlier) Pāli commentaries, where we meet with the theory of rūpakalāpas in a very undeveloped form, are based on the Sīhaḷa Aṭṭhakathās, which are not extant now. It is also true that, in view of this circumstance, it is not easy to ascertain how much of

1. See AK.Ch.i 90, n.1; Manual of Bud.Phi.1, 126

2. See AK.Ch.i 89 ff.; also AKvy.i 85

3. On the various theories of Indian atomism and on the question of its origin and development, see Jacobi, Atomic Theory (Indian), ERE; Keith, Indian logic and atomism; Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ajivakas, 262 ff.; Bhaduri, Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 54 ff.

the Abhidhamma was developed in the latter before the compilation of the former. However, since the Theravāda scholasticism developed in comparative isolation in Ceylon, it is very unlikely that it influenced the Buddhist schools which flourished in the mainland. Therefore, and in view of the close parallelism that exists between the Theravādins' theory of rūpakalāpas and the atomic theory of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, it seems very probable that the former was formulated on the basis of the latter. In the manuals and the commentaries of the twelfth century and later, where the theory under consideration is presented in its fully developed form, the signs of external influence are more marked and therefore more unmistakable.

This is not to suggest that the theory of rūpakalāpas is a complete replica of the atomic theory of Sanskrit Buddhism. As we shall soon see there are certainly some differences. But most of them are unavoidable, stemming as they are from the fundamental differences as to the way the Theravādins and the non-Theravādins have conceived the various elements of matter. For instance, since the Theravādins have postulated comparatively a large number of material elements, it is but natural that this numerical discrepancy should reflect itself in the theory of rūpakalāpas, too. It is also worth noting here that between

the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas there had been some differences of opinion concerning certain aspects of the theory. A close examination of the theory of rūpakalāpas will show that in regard to some aspects the Theravādins preferred to follow the Vaibhāṣikas and in regard to others, the Sautrāntikas.

The Vaibhāṣikas have postulated two kinds of paramāṇu (atom), viz, the dravya-paramāṇu (the unitary atom) and the saṅghāta-paramāṇu (the aggregate-atom, i.e., the molecule).

The former is the smallest unit of matter: it is the most subtle (sarva-śūksma),¹ it is partless (niravayavat) and therefore no spatial dimensions (dig-bhāga-bhedatva) can be predicated of it.² Saṅghabhadra, one of the celebrities of the neo-Vaibhāṣika school, defines it as follows: "Parmi les rūpas 'susceptibles de résistance' (sapratigha), la partie la plus subtile, qui n'est pas susceptible d'être scindée a nouveau, s'appelle paramāṇu; c'est-à-dire: le paramāṇu n'est pas susceptible d'être divisé en plusieurs par un autre rūpa, par la pensée. C'est ce qu'on dit être

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1. See AK.Ch.ii 144 and AKvy.i 34,123; cf. sarvasūksmaḥ khalu rūpaṣaṃskāropadānaśaṃcayabhedaparyantaḥ paramāṇur iti prajñāpyate. - Abhd. 65
 2. Cf. tad etad dig-bhāga-bhedattvam necchanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. dig-bhāga-bhedo hi saṅghāta-rūpaṇāmeva kalpayate. - AKvy.i 85, see also La Siddhi 39 ff.; Vimś. 7

le plus petit rūpa; comme il n'a pas de parties, on lui donne le nom de 'plus petit'. De meme un kṣaṇa¹ est nommé le plus petit temps et ne peut être divisé en demi-kṣaṇas".²

A dravya-paramāṇu never arises or exists in isolation. It always arises and exists in combination with other dravya-paramāṇus. A collection of them, forming a unity and having a simultaneous origination and a simultaneous cessation, is called saṅghāta-paramāṇu, "aggregate-atom", i.e., molecule.³ The smallest saṅghāta-paramāṇu is an octad consisting of the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, namely, rūpa, gandha, rasa and bhautika-spraṣṭavya.⁴ That the four primary elements always arise simultaneously and that the secondary elements cannot arise independently of the primary, are the two fundamental principles involved in the conception of saṅghāta-paramāṇu.

This is a brief statement of the two kinds of paramāṇu

1. See above, 221

2. AK.Ch.ii 114,n.3

3. See AK.Ch.ii 144 ff. and AKvy.23 ff.(na vai paramāṇu-rūpam ekam prthagbhūtam asti - AKvy.i 34)

4. Ibid.loc.cit., Cf. saryasūksmah khalu rūpasamskāropadāna-samcaya-bheda-paryantaḥ paramāṇur iti prajñapyate. sa tu sapta-dravyāvinirbhāgī catubhir bhūtais tribhiḥ copādāya-rūpais tribhis tribhir vā bhūtais caturbhūḥ copādāya rūpāir avinirbhāgavarty asāv aṣṭama iti. - Abhd.65

postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas. We have given it in brief outline with a view to finding out whether the two varieties are represented in the atomic theory of the Theravādins.

At the outset it should be noted that as far as the medieval manuals and the commentaries, wherein the theory of rūpakalāpas appears in its developed form, are concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that the Theravādins have incorporated the Vaibhāṣika conception of the dravya-paramāṇu. However, two intriguing passages in the Visuddhimagga seem to contain an allusion to such a conception.

In the first passage it is stated that the bodily constituents such as head-hair, bodily-hair, etc., should be understood by way of kalāpas: What in common parlance is called head-hair is only a collection of eight material elements, namely, the four mahābhūtas and four of the upādā-rūpas: rūpa, rasa, gandha, and āhāra. Therefore, the passage goes on to say, from the point of view of ultimate analysis head-hair is an "attha-dhamma-kalāpa-matta", i.e., merely a collection of eight elements.¹

1. Kalāpato ti yā ayam kesā lomā ti ādinā nayena vīsatiyā akārehi pathavīdhātu, pittaṃ semhan ti ādinā neyena dvādasakārehi apōdhātu niddhitthā. Tattha yasmā: Vanno gandho raso oja, cātasso cāpi dhātuyo atthadhammasamodhāna hoti kesā ti sammuti tesam yeva vinibbhoga natthi kesā ti sammuti ti, tasmā kesā pi atthadhammakalāpamattaṃ eva; ... op.cit., 364

The second passage enjoins another way of looking at the rūpa that enters into the composition of the body, i.e., by way of cunṇa, particles: "In this body the paṭhavī-dhātu taken as reduced to fine dust and pounded to the size of paramāṇu might amount to an average doṇa-measure full, and that is held together by the āpo-dhātu measuring half as much".¹

In the medieval works of the Theravādins the term kalāpa is used in a technical sense, i.e., as referring to the smallest unit of matter which is a collection of material elements.² In this technical sense kalāpa corresponds to the saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Vaibhāṣikas. If one were to understand the kalāpa of the first passage (see atṭhadhamma-kalāpa) in this technical sense, then one could suggest that atṭha-dhamma-kalāpa corresponds to the saṅghāta-paramāṇu and that cunṇa or paramāṇu of the second passage corresponds to the dravya-paramāṇu. However, a close examination of the implications of the two passages along with a consideration of the contexts in which they occur

1. ... imaṣmim hi sarīre majjhimena pamānena parigayhamānā paramāṇuḥedasaṅcunṇā sukhumarajabhūta paṭhaviḍhātu doṇa-mattā siyā, sa tato upadḍhappamānāya āpodhātuyā saṅghāhitā.
- op.cit., 365

2. Cf. e.g., ADS.29 ADSS.156; ADSVI.58; SS.4; NRS.19

would lead to a different interpretation.

That in the Visuddhimagga passage the term kalāpa is not used in the same sense as it came to be used in the medieval works, is easily seen. What the Visuddhimagga says is that the head-hair, for instance, is an aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa, a collection or group of eight elements. If it had used the term kalāpa in the technical sense, then it should say that the head-hair is a collection of kalāpas (each consisting of eight elements). The term should be put in the plural and not in the singular. For, in its technical sense, kalāpa means the smallest unit of matter and as such the head-hair should consist of a large number of kalāpas. It is clear therefore that when the Visuddhimagga says that the head-hair is an aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa, it is referring to the eight kinds of material elements that enter into its composition.¹

As yet, there is no implication here that, in the "ultimate" analysis, material things consist of atoms. Nor

1. This conclusion is also confirmed by the VismS.iv,136, where it is stated that aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa refers to the eight kinds of rūpa which in their combination make up what is called head-hair: (aṭṭhadhammakalāpamattam eva) yanudu keśa-prajñaptiyāta kāraṇa vū varṇādīn ekatvayen genā kīha. ovun aṣṭadharmamātra noveyi data yutu.

is there any contradiction between the two usages of the term, for a given material thing can be described in either sense of the term. From the Buddhist point of view, I can say that the hair on my head is a kalāpa of eight material elements, because it consists of the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, viz, rūpa, gandha, rasa and āhāra.¹ I can also say that the hair on ^{my} head consists of an enormous number of kalāpas, each consisting of the above-mentioned eight material elements.² It is in the former sense that Buddhaghosa, the author of the Visuddhimagga, uses the term kalāpa. Anuruddha, the author of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, for whom kalāpa means the smallest unit of matter, would have used the second statement. For the former, it means a group (the general sense); for the latter the smallest group (the technical sense).

On the other hand, it can be shown that what the medieval works call kalāpa (i.e., in the technical sense) corresponds to what the Visuddhimagga in the second passage calls cunṇa or paramāṇu.

We have already shown that in the Buddhist works the names of the four primary elements are used in two distinct senses: one in the sense of lakkhana (characteristic)

1. See above, 103-4

2. See below, 372-3

and the other in the sense of *ussada* (intensity). In the first sense, *paṭhavī* is *kakkhalatta*. In the second, what is *kakkhala* is *paṭhavī*, for whatever material thing wherein the characteristic of *kakkhalatta* is most intense (*ussada*, *sāmatthiya*) is also called *paṭhavī*, although in fact it consists of all the four primary elements and their concomitants.¹

When the Visuddhimagga refers to the atomization of ^{paṭhavī-dhātu,} \wedge it uses *paṭhavī-dhātu* in this second sense. In point of fact, at the beginning of the passage concerned, it is said that head-hair, bodily-hair, etc., are *paṭhavī* and that blood, mucus, etc., are *āpo*. It is also said that they are called so on account of the respective prominence of each primary element - *ussada-vasena pana paṭhavī-dhātu āpo-d hātū ti saṅgahaṃ gato*.² Thus, in the statement, namely that the *paṭhavī-dhātu* of the human body is reducible to *paramāṇu* (atoms), the term *paṭhavī-dhātu* refers to the head-hair, bodily-hair, etc.,

Next, it may be noted here that according to the theory of *avinibhoga-rūpa*,³ the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, namely, *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*

1. See above, 92-3

2. Vism.365

3. See above, 103-4

and āhāra are necessarily co-existent (niyata-sahajāta) and positionally inseparable (padesato avinibhoga). From this it follows that those parts of the human body, which, on account of the intensity of the paṭhavī-dhātu, are conventionally called paṭhavī-dhātu, consist of the above-mentioned eight material elements. And, since these eight elements are positionally inseparable (padesato avinibhoga), even when the head-hair, bodily-hair, etc., are reduced to paramāṇus, each of the paramāṇu should in turn consist of the same number of elements. Thus what the Visuddhimagga calls cunṇa or paramāṇu turns out to be an aggregate of eight material elements. It is the same as kalāpa in its technical sense and does correspond to the saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Our interpretation of cunṇa or paramāṇu, in this way, is also confirmed by the statement, namely that the paṭhavī-dhātu, when reduced to the size of paramāṇus, might amount to an average doṇa-measure and that the āpo-dhātu to half as much. In a given instance of matter there is no quantitative difference between the primary elements that enter into its composition; the only difference is one of intensity (ussada).¹ If the Visuddhimagga had used paṭhavī and āpo in the philosophical sense (in the sense of lakkhana only) then it would

1. See above, 86 ff.

not say that, when reduced to the size of paramāṇu, the former amounts to a doṇa-measure and the latter to half as much.

From the fore-going observations it should appear that in the two passages of the Visuddhimagga there is no allusion to the dravya-paramāṇu. Even in the subsequent Abhidhammic compendiums and the commentaries, the situation remains unchanged. For the Theravādins, the ultimate unit of matter is an aggregate - a collection of material elements forming a unity and having a simultaneous origination (ekuppāda) and a simultaneous cessation (ekanirodha).¹

In the Visuddhimagga, where the theory in question is introduced for the first time, this ultimate unit is called paramāṇu or cunṇa. In the subsequent works kalāpa became the standard term. While the first two terms are indicative of the fact that what is indicated thereby is the smallest unit of matter, the other brings into relief that, although it is the smallest, yet, in the ultimate analysis, it is but a plurality of different material elements. The preference shown by the medieval works for the use of kalāpa instead of paramāṇu and cunṇa - the two earlier terms - is itself indicative of their desire to emphasize this fact. The use of the term piṇḍa in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and its

1. Ekuppādā ekanirodhā ... rūpakalāpā nāma. - ADS. 29

paraphrase as rūpa-samudāya in the Sinhalese sannē of Sāriputta are also suggestive of the same fact.¹

The fundamental principle underlying this theory is not far to seek. What are called upādā-rūpas are always dependent on the mahābhūtas, for they cannot arise independently of the latter. Nor can a single mahābhūta arise independently of the other three and, at least, four of the upādā-rūpas.² Thus there is no material element, whether it is primary or secondary, that can have an independent existence. Hence material elements always arise by way of groups (piṇḍa-vasena).³ Consequently, when a given instance of matter, say, a piece of stone, is reduced to smaller pieces - whatever be the number of pieces or whatever be the size of each piece - the fact remains that each of them is a group or plurality of material elements. The smallest unit of matter, whether we call it cunṇa, paramāṇu, piṇḍa, kalāpa or rūpa-samudāya, is no exception to this universal law.

The nearest Theravāda term to the dravya-paramāṇu of the Vaibhāṣikas is kalāpaṅga, literally, "the limb of the

1. ADS.28 ; ADSS.166

2. See above, 103-4

3. See ADSS.166; cf. ... etāni rūpāni kammāditto uppajjamānāni pi ekekaṃ va na samutthahanti, atha kho piṇḍato va samutthahanti. - ADSVI.58

group", i.e., a constituent of a kalāpa.¹ The very term aṅga (kalāpa + aṅga) suggests that it has no independent existence and implies a whole. But is not the part smaller than the whole? Therefore is it not more logical to postulate the kalāpaṅga as the smallest (sabba-pariyantima) unit of matter?

The Vaibhāṣikas would answer this question in the affirmative. For, in their view, the constituent, i.e., the so-called dravya-paramāṇu, though it cannot exist independently - it always arises in combination with seven others - is the most subtle (sarva-sūkṣma).² They seem to have argued that since the saṅghāta-paramāṇu is an aggregate of dravya-paramāṇus, it admits divisibility. To describe as sarva-sūkṣma what admits divisibility is a contradiction.

The Theravādins, on the other hand, seem to have followed a different line of argument. It is true that, since the kalāpa is an aggregate, each of the constituents (kalāpaṅga) that make up this aggregation, is smaller (subtler) than the aggregate itself. But this is only logically so. In reality, the kalāpaṅga does not exist in itself; it is in inseparable association with other kalāpaṅgas. With this view, the Vaibhāṣikas, too, agree. The Atthasālini observes

1. See ADS., 29

2. See above, 344-5

that, although it is possible, for the sake of defining the characteristics (lakṣhaṇato), to speak of rūpa, rasa, etc., as separate elements, yet positionally (padesato) they are not separable, one from another. Rūpa, rasa, etc., - so runs the argument - cannot be dissected and separated like particles of sand.¹ The colour (rūpa) of the mango, for instance, cannot be separated from its hardness (paṭhavi) or from its taste (rasa). This situation is true of the kalāpaṅgas of a kalāpa, too. Hence there is no necessity, other than merely logical, to postulate the kalāpaṅga as the sabba-pariyantima, for in actual fact it is not positionally (padesato) separable from the other kalāpaṅgas of the same kalāpa.

This, it appears to us, is the line of argument that led the Theravādins to observe silence on the question of the dravya-paramāṇu, and to define the rūpakalāpa as the sabba-pariyantima. In taking up this position, they seem to have been influenced by the Sautrāntikas.

For, it may be noted here, the Vaibhāṣika conception of the dravya-paramāṇu came in for severe criticism on the part of the Sautrāntikas. As a matter of fact, it was the most significant issue that divided the two schools over the theory of atomism.

1. See Asl.311

What made the Sautrāntikas join issue with the Vaibhāṣika conception of the dravya-paramāṇu was that it was sought to be defined as devoid of parts (niravayavat) and exempt from pratighāta or resistance which is the fundamental characteristic of rūpa.¹ The Vaibhāṣikas did not want to define the dravya-paramāṇu as possessing parts, because this implied the divisibility of the atom. Its exemption from pratighāta, according to Yaśomitra, is a corollary arising from the first thesis: when there are no parts there cannot be pratighāta.² To the objection that, if the dravya-paramāṇu is of this nature it escapes the definition of rūpa, the Vaibhāṣikas reply: "Sans doute, la monade est exempt de rūpana; mais un rūpa de monade n'existe jamais à l'état isolé; en l'état d'agglomere, étant dans un agglomeré (saṃghātastha, saṃcita) il est susceptible de détérioration et de resistance".³

But this way of defining led to further complications. The Abhidharmakośa and the Vyākhyā rightly point out that, if the dravya-paramāṇu is devoid of parts and exempt from pratighāta, then even the aggregate will be devoid of parts and exempt from pratighāta because the aggregate is ultimately constituted of the atoms. What is lacking in the

1. See AK.Ch.ii 89 ff; AKvy.i 85

2. See AKvy.i 34, ii 355

3. AK.Ch.i 25

latter cannot be predicated of the former.¹

In this connection one cannot also forget the severe diatribes launched by the Buddhist Idealists (vijñānavādins) against the definition of the atom as devoid of spatial division. In order to have a basis for their polemics they provisionally agreed with the objection of the Sautrāntikas that the aggregates are ultimately constituted of, and therefore not different from, the atoms, the difference between one atom and an aggregate being only one of quantity.

It was the failure, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr, to take notice of this fact that gave rise to the fallacy of their assumption that, although the atoms do not touch, the same situation is not true of the aggregates.² Once this oneness (ekatva) is overlooked, it leads to many mutually incompatible conclusions and fails to give a rational explanation to many a phenomenon of day to day experience: It is a matter of common experience, for

1. See AK.Ch.ii 143 ff.; AKvy.i 34 ff.

2. Cf. naiva hi paramānavah samyujyante niravayavatvāt/ mā bhūd esa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ/ samhatāstu parasparam samyujyanta iti kāśmiravaibhāṣikāsta idam praṣṭhavyaḥ/ yaḥ paramānūnam samghāto na sa tebhyo'rthāntaram iti/ - Viṃśatikā, 7; see also La Siddhi, 39 ff.

instance, that when the sun rises a given aggregate is found to be illuminated at its eastern direction and dark at its western direction, or when one sees or touches, say, a wall one does not see or touch its opposite side - two situations which unmistakably point to the conclusion that the aggregates have spatial divisions. This characteristic cannot be predicated of them if the atoms which constitute them do not severally possess it.¹

It is supposed (by the neo-Sarvāstivādins) that the combination of atoms takes place in such a way that six different atoms occupy six points of space - east, west, north, south, above and below - of another atom. This law of atomic aggregation carries with it the implication that the atom has at least six sides. On the other hand, if it be contended that the locus occupied by one atom is common to all the six, then the atom being devoid of parts and exempt from resistance (pratighāta), all the six would coalesce into one; the difference between the magnitude of

1. See La Siddhi, 40; cf. also: chāyāvati katham vā yady ekai-
kasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityodaye katham
any-atra chāya bhavaty anyatrātapaḥ/ na hi tasyānyah
pradeśo' sti yatrātapo na syāt/ āvaranam ca katham bhavati
paramāṇoḥ paramānvantarena yadi digbhāgabhedo neśyate/
na hi kaścīdapi paramāṇoḥ parabhāgo' sti yatrāgamānād
anyenānyasya pratighātaḥ syāt/ - Vimś.7

one atom and that of six would vanish.¹

These objections and counter-objections between the Buddhist schools show that when it came to the question of defining the atom, the atomists were caught in the horns of a big dilemma. On the one hand, to admit the spatial dimensions (dig-bhāga-bhedatva) of the atom is to admit its divisibility - a contradiction in terms if the atom is defined as the smallest and not amenable to further division. On the other hand, to deny the spatial dimensions of the atom is to deny the spatial dimensions of the aggregates - a situation contradicted by common experience. The Vaibhāṣikas followed the first line of argument and the Sautrāntikas the second, each party tenaciously clinging to its own view without attempting to solve the resulting paradox.

This gave a good opportunity for the Buddhist Idealists to refute both alternatives and to establish their theory that matter is "logiquement inadmissible": If, as the

1. Cf. satkena yugapadyogātparamāṇoḥ sadamśatā/ sadbhyo digbhyah sadbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ sadamśatam prāpnoti/ ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyasambhavāt/ sannān samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ/ atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva sannām/ tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sargaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātrah syāt/

- Vims. 7

the Sautrāntikas say, the atoms "sont étendus (ont dig-
deśabhāga) ... ils peuvent être divisés et par conséquent
ne sont pas réels". If, as the Vaibhāṣikas say, the atoms
"ne sont pas étendus ... ils ne pourront pas constituer un
Rūpa massif (sthūla)". If anything, the atom should be
"étendu", but what is "étendu" is divisible, and what is
divisible cannot be "entité réel" (dravyasat). The inescapable
conclusion, they contended, is that matter is "logiquement
inadmissible".¹ Thus the paradox was solved, but the
solution offered was not in favour of either of the
contending parties. The intervention of the umpire, in this
case, is not to judge who is right but to show that both are
equally wrong!

In this big controversy over the definition of the
smallest, the Theravādins² appear to have been the spectators.
They were therefore in a better position to judge the
whole situation. They had before them three alternatives.
However, there was no possibility of accepting the conclusion
of the Vijñānavādins, because being realists the Theravādins
were not prepared to subscribe to the idealistic metaphysics
underlying that conclusion. They were therefore left with
two alternatives, the two interpretations given by the

1. See La Siddhi.40-41

2. i.e., of the medieval manuals and the commentaries.

Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. They opted to follow that of the Sautrāntikas for, on the whole, it was more satisfactory and less riddled with complications.

This is only a tentative suggestion as to why the Theravādins deemed it proper to recognize an aggregate as sabba-pariyantima; while observing a (deliberate) silence on such questions as whether the constituents of this aggregate have spatial dimensions or not.

On the other hand, that spatial dimensions can be predicated of the kalāpa is clearly suggested by an isolated reference in the Viśuddhimārgasannaya which says that ākāsa, the intervening space between two kalāpas, "has the function of delimiting the kalāpa as: this is the lower side (yaṭa) of the kalāpa and that is the upper side (uda) of the kalāpa".¹

This is further confirmed by a theory advanced as to the size of the kalāpa in relation to a (cubic) inch (aṅgula). It occurs in the Vibhaṅgattakathā.² The term used is paramāṇu. We propose to interpret the paramāṇu of the Theravādins as identical with the rūpakalāpa on the strength

1. ākāsadhātu ... mē udaya mē yaṭayayi kalāpayangē paryantaya pahāḷa kirīma kṛtya koṭa eṭṭīyi - VismS.v, 68

2. Op.cit., 343; see also Abhidhanappadīpikā - sūci, ed. Subhūti (colombo, 1938), 126

of the observations made in the course of this chapter.

The table runs as follows:

36 paramāṇus	= 1 aṇu
36 aṇus	= 1 tajjāri
36 tajjāris	= 1 rathareṇu
36 rathareṇus	= 1 līkhā
7 līkhās	= 1 ūkā
7 ūkās	= 1 dhaññamāsa
7 dhaññamāsas	= 1 angula, "finger-breadth", i.e., (cubic) inch.

Thus the size of the paramāṇu in relation to the cubic inch will be: $\frac{1}{36 \times 36 \times 36 \times 36 \times 7 \times 7 \times 7} = 1/581,147,136$

That this table which gives the size of the paramāṇu in relation to the cubic inch is one that is arbitrarily assumed goes without saying. For there were no physical data for a mathematical calculation of infinitesimal units. A somewhat similar table - perhaps the original source of the above - is given by Varāhamihira.¹ Yamakami Sōgen² and Takakusu³ have referred to similar tables adopted

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1. See Seal, Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 82 ff.; Ray, Indian Chemistry, 248 ff.
 2. Systems of Bud.Thought, 122
 3. Essentials of Bud.Phi. 64

by the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. At best, they all may be described as attempts to emphasize how infinitesimally small the paramāṇu, the ultimate unit of matter, is.

For the paramāṇu is so small that in the Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā it is (figuratively) described as a particle of space (ākāsa-koṭṭhāsa).¹ The Visuddhimagga-tīkā observes that it comes only within the province of the divine eye (dibba-cakkhu).² This is similar to the view expressed in some Jaina works, namely that the paramāṇu can be known only by those who have realized kaivalya-jñāna.³

Another problem that was hotly debated by the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism that adopted atomism was whether the atoms came into contact with one another.

Since the Vaibhāṣikas believed that the dravya-paramāṇu was devoid of parts, any conclusion in respect of this problem should in no way contradict this belief. In point of fact, the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmir take the niravayavatva, partlessness, of the atom as the very premise of the expected conclusion. They grant the possibility of two alternatives both of which, they say, are inadmissible: (1) si les

1. Tattha paramāṇu nāma ākāsakoṭṭhāsiko ... - op.cit., 343

2. ... mamsacakkhussa āpaṭham n'agacchati, dibbacakkhuss'eva āgacchati. - op.cit., 362.

3. See e.g., Pāncastikayasāra, 84

atomes se touchaient dans leur totalité, les choses (dravya) c'est-à-dire les différents atomes, se 'mêleraient', c'est-à-dire, n'occuperaient qu'un lieu; (2) si les atomes se touchaient par un endroit, c'est donc qu'ils auraient des parties (avayava): or les atomes n'ont pas de parties".¹

Another argument, the one attributed to Vasumitra, is based on the theory of momentariness (kṣāṇikatā): "Si les atomes se touchaient, c'est donc qu'ils dureraient deux moments".²

That is to say an atom should arise first (1st moment) in order to touch (2nd moment) - a view which, if accepted, would go against the doctrine that an element of existence endures but for one moment (kṣaṇa).

On the strength of these arguments the Vaibhāṣikas conclude that atoms do not come into contact with one another and that between two atoms there is always an intervening space (antara). In this intervening space there is no āloka (light) and it is so small that another atom cannot occupy it.³ The presence of āloka has to be ruled out because āloka being included in the category of rūpa, to affirm its existence is to deny the ^cvaūity between the two atoms. To the possible objection that if there is

1. AK.Ch.i 89

2. Ibid., Ch.i 91

3. AK.Ch.i 89 ff; AKvy.i 85: yan madhye nāsti kiṃcid iti bruvānā Vaibhāṣikā madhye ālok'ādi necchanti. anya-paramānu-praveśanavakāṣaṃ tu na bruvate.

"antara" between atoms how is it that the aggregates which are ultimately composed of these atoms do not fall into pieces when struck, the reply is that vāyu-dhātu, the air-element keeps them together.¹

It is to be expected that the Sautrāntikas should challenge this conclusion for it is mainly based on the premise that the atom is niravayavat - a dogma to which they did not want to subscribe. Hence it is that the author of the Abhidharmakośa whose sympathies are more with the Sautrāntikas and his commentator launch severe diatribes against this theory. In their opinion the interpretation given by Bhadanta, namely that contact is another expression for "nirantaratva", is the best. They propose to interpret nirantaratva in this context as indicating absence of interval.² For otherwise, the argument runs, what would prevent the atoms from moving within the interval.³ In putting forth this objection, they seem to have overlooked the fact that in the case of momentary elements, as reminded by Vasumitra, there is no motion: wherever an element arises

1. See AK.Ch.89ff; AKvy.i 84 ff

2. Ibid.loc.cit., cf. nirantare tu spr̥ṣṭa-samjñe ti Bhadantaḥ Bhadanta-matam caistavyam iti. Vaiḥāṣikamatam kasman naistavyam. nanu Vaiḥāṣikair apy evam uktaṃ. tad evaiṣaṃ nirantaratvam yan madhye nāsti kimcid iti. asty evam. sāvakāśam tu tad vacanam. - AKvy.i 85

3. anyathā hi sāntaraṇām paramānūnam śūnyesv antaresu gatih kena pratibadhyeta gatimata iti vākya-śeṣaḥ. - AKvy.i 85

there itself it perishes. On the other hand, Saṅghabhadra, a celebrity of the Vaibhāṣika school, interprets nirantaratva of Bhadanta as lending support to the theory that there is antara, interval between atoms.¹ The main objection directed against the Vaibhāṣika theory is that it is but absurd to deny contact between the atoms while recognizing contact between the aggregates.²

Since the theory of rūpakalāpas, as suggested earlier, is modelled on the atomic theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, it may be interesting to consider what position the Theravādins took ~~up~~ in respect of this problem. According to the Theravādins, since the kalāpaṅgas that constitute a kalāpa are positionally inseparable, the possibility of their being separated by an interval does not arise. Hence the problem boils down to this: Can two kalāpas come into (physical) contact?

The question is not raised, let alone being answered, in the earlier commentaries where we meet with the theory in its rudimentary form. The authors of the later works took up the matter and provided the answer: rūpakalāpas do

1. See AK.Ch.i 91, n.3.

2. See AK.Ch.i 92; Vims. 7; cf. na ca paramāṇubhyo'nye saṅghātaḥ gathā Vaibhāṣikā kalpayanti. ta eva te saṅghātaḥ. paramāṇavaḥ sprśyante yathā rūpyanta iti. - AKvy.i 85

not come into contact; between them there is space.

Every rūpakalāpa is delimited (paricchindate) by the environing ākāsa, space.¹ This ākāsa is so small that the fact of delimitation is described as "as if delimiting" (paricchindantī viya).² However, the kalāpas are not touching one another for the ākāsa is qualified as "not touched" (asamphuṭṭha) by the kalāpas separated from it.³ The implication is that the vacuity is a fact, although it is infinitesimally small. Hence the ākāsa is said to manifest itself as "untouchedness" (asamphuṭṭha-paccupaṭṭhānā).⁴

In maintaining this view the Theravādins were anxious to stress the separateness of each kalāpa. Sāriputta and Sumaṅgala take special care to emphasize that each kalāpa is in itself an entity, physically separated from the others. This separation is not possible if there is contact. And it is the ākāsa, the so-called pariccheda-kāsa, that is

1. See VismT.453; ADSVT.98; Abhv.279; VismS.v 67;

Cf. (ākāśadhātu), karmādi eki ekī pratyayen samurthita vū cakṣurdasakādi kalāpayan kalāpantaraya hā saṅkara novana heyin pirisindinā svabhāva vū ākāśadhātu tomō; (paricchedarūpaṃ nāma) paricchedarūpa nam vē. - ADSS.156

2. VismT. 453

3. Ibid.loc.cit.,

4. (rūpa-mariyada-paccupaṭṭhānā) ti yasmim kalāpe bhūtānaṃ paricchedo teh'eva asamphuṭṭhabhāva-paccupaṭṭhānā.

- VismT.453

responsible for their being separated and being prevented from mixing (asaṅkara-bhāva).¹

The admission, on the part of the Theravādins, of ākāsa between kalāpas suggests Vaibhāṣika influence. However, the reasons given for accepting this view are quite different. This is inevitable, because the Vaibhāṣika theory of non-contact between the dravya-paramāṇus is mainly based on the denial of spatial dimensions (and the denial of motion), whereas for the Theravādins the question as to the possibility or otherwise of physical contact is a question relating to the kalāpas, the spatial dimensions of which are not denied.

Hence it is that King Parākramabāhu II, the author of the Sinhalese sannē to the Viśuddhimagga, attempts to show how the non-contact of the Kalāpas is only a logical corollary arising from the fact that the kalāpaṅgas of a kalāpa are positionally inseparable (padesato avinibhoga). It is argued that if the kalāpas are not separated by ākāsa, then this leads to the acceptance of one of two alternatives,

1. Abhk.279; ADSS.156: ... ekeka-kalāpa-gata-rūpānaṃ kalāpantarehi asaṅkiṇṇābhāvāpādāna-vasena paricchedakaṃ rūpaṃ pariccheda-rūpaṃ.
Dhammapāla takes the fact of separateness as synonymous with untouchedness: abyāpitaṃ hi asamphuṭṭhatā. - Vism.453

both of which are not compatible with the above-mentioned principle.

The first alternative is to deny that there is ākāsa between the two kalāpas.¹ The kalāpaṅgas of a kalāpa, be it repeated here, are positionally inseparable. Now, if there is no actual separation between two kalāpas, then the characteristic of positional inseparability which applies only to the kalāpaṅgas of a kalāpa has to be extended to the two kalāpas as well.² That is to say, the separateness of each of the kalāpas vanishes and both combine to form a bigger kalāpa. If the principle could be extended to two kalāpas, then it could also be extended to three or more, and so the process could be indefinitely extended. If a given piece of stone is composed, let us say hypothetically, of one million kalāpas, then this million kalāpas would become one big kalāpa, precisely as big as the stone. This would undermine the very foundation of the theory of kalāpas.

In the first place, it goes against the established thesis that the kalāpaṅgas of a kalāpa are not separable, one from another. For, if the stone in question is a (big)

1. Cf. ... paricchedākāsaya temē rū piriṣiṇḍa rūpakalāpa hēma ekkota piriṣiṇḍiyeti yi. - VismS.v 68

2. Cf. Esē hōt nan kalābūyehi rū da ekakalābūyehi rū seyinma avinirbhogabavata pēminena heyin hē no mēnevē. ibid.loc. cit.

kalāpa, then it should be of such a nature that no part of it can be separated. The moment I break the stone we are speaking of, into pieces, then the theory, namely that the constituents of a kalāpa are not separable, one from another, too, so to say, breaks into pieces.¹

In the second place, it would also go against the view of a plurality of kalāpas. For, according to this alternative under consideration, the Mount Himālaya would be one big kalāpa. But the Mount Himālaya is not completely separated from the rest of the physical world. If the physical world is characterized by unbroken continuity in the sense that no part of it is completely separated from the rest, then one will be forced to the conclusion that the whole physical world is one mighty kalāpa.

In this connection it is interesting to note that one of the arguments advanced by the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr to deny physical contact of the atoms is that if two of them touch in their totality, then the atom being non-resisting (apratigha) and partless (niravayavat), all the atoms would coalesce into one, the whole universe would

1. Ledi Sadaw, the Burmese thera, argues that it is solely because there is ākāśa around kalāpas that "lumps of stone and iron can be broken up, or cut into pieces, or pounded into dust, or melted" - Buddhism in England, 1930, Vol.V, No.4

coalesce into one atom, so small that no spatial dimensions can be predicated of it.¹ The objection of the Theravādins, when its implications are fully developed, is that if kalāpas are not separated by ākāsa, then the whole physical world would become ^{one} enormous kalāpa. The Vaibhāṣika objection is that the world will be reduced to a partless atom; the Theravāda objection is that the atom will be inflated to the size of the world - two situations literally with a world of difference.

The other alternative is to affirm that the kalāpaṅgas, not the kalāpas, are separated by ākāsa. This, too, would lead to many difficulties somewhat similar to the ones that stem from denying the separateness of the kalāpas. If it were assumed that in a given kalāpa the kalāpaṅgas are separated by ākāsa, then the separateness and independence of the kalāpas would fade away establishing the separateness and independence of the kalāpaṅgas.² The ultimate unit of matter, then, would be the constituent (kalāpaṅga) and not the aggregate (kalāpa). For the reasons we have given above,³ the Theravādins were not prepared to accept such

1. See AK.Ch.i 89

2. Cf. Ēkkalāpayakama ē rū ven ven koṭa piriṣiṇḍiyen. Mē esē vuvahot ek kalabuyehi rū da nānā kalāpayehi rū seyin ma vinirbhogabavaṭa pēminena bēvin hē da no mēnāvā. - VismS.v 68

3. See above, 354-5

such a conclusion. Although it is logically true that the kalāpaṅga should be smaller (subtler) than the kalāpa, yet in a given kalāpa the kalāpaṅgas are not separable one from another. They arise, exist and perish as one unit. There is therefore no point in postulating the kalāpaṅga as the ultimate unit of matter. The refutation of the second alternative, although it is not explicitly stated, does amount to a criticism of the Vaibhāṣika stand-point.

In all there are seventeen kinds of kalāpa. The smallest is an octad consisting of the four mahābhūtas and four of the upādā-rūpas, namely, rūpa, rasa, gandha and āhāra. This collection of eight material elements, called suddha-
tṭhaka,¹ the bare octad corresponds to the smallest saṅghāta-
paramāṇu of the Vaibhāṣikas, but for two differences:

Firstly, in place of āhāra the Vaibhāṣika list contains spraṣṭavya.² The difference is unavoidable. According to the Theravādins, phoṭṭhabba includes only the mahābhūtas with the exception of one, i.e., āpo-dhātu.³ Hence from the point of view of the Theravādins, it is not necessary to repeat phoṭṭhabba because it is already represented by the enumeration of the mahābhūtas. According to the Vaibhāṣikas,

1. See ADS. 29; SS.5; NRP.39

2. See AK.ch.ii 145

3. See above, 94-5.

spraṣṭavya includes the four mahābhūtas, i.e., bhūta-spraṣṭavya, and eleven bhautikas (secondary rūpa), i.e., bhautika-spraṣṭavya.¹ It is in order to represent the latter, the so-called bhautika-spraṣṭavya that sprāṣṭavya is repeated, although one aspect of it is represented by the mahābhūtas. A similar situation is responsible for the inclusion of āhāra in the Theravāda list. While the Theravādins have postulated āhāra as a separate rūpa-dhamma, the Vaibhāṣikas have conceived it as a combination of rasa, gandha and sprāṣṭavya, which three items occur in their list.²

The two lists are thus representative of the same items except for the fact that bhautika-spraṣṭavya is not represented in the list of the Theravādins. This is unavoidable because the latter do not admit that any of the upādā-rūpas come under the object of touch.

The other difference is more significant. It is a Vaibhāṣika principle, with which the Sautrāntikas do not seem to have had any sympathy, that each bhautika is dependent on a tetrad of the mahābhūtas. The mahābhūtas which serve as a support (āśraya) for a given bhautika, say, colour, do not at the same time serve as a support for another

1. See AK.Ch.i 18 ff.

2. See above, 170-1

bhautika, say smell.¹ Hence as the Abhidharmakośa rightly points out the smallest saṅghāta-paramāṇu should consist of, not eight, but twenty elements, for, since each bhautika is dependent on a separate tetrad of mahābhūtas, the four bhautikas of the saṅghāta-paramāṇu should have sixteen mahābhūtas.² The Vaibhāṣika reply is quite reasonable. They say that the "nature (jāti) de la téttrade des grands éléments reste la même, que ceux-ci supportent la matière dérivée odeur ou les matières dérivées visible, saveur, tangible" and that therefore there is no anomaly in counting the mahābhūtas as four, although there are four of each type.³ In contrast, the Theravādins believe that the four mahābhūtas in the suddhaṭṭhaka are the common support (ekanissaya) of the four upādā-rūpas.⁴

These, then, are the two significant differences between the suddhaṭṭhaka of the Theravādins and the octuple saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Vaibhāṣikas.

1. Cf. yad bhūta-catuṣkam āśraya ekasyopādāya-rūpasya nīlasya pītasya vā. na tad evānyasyopādāya-rūpasya gandhasya rasasya v'āśrayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. anyad eva bhūta-catuṣkam tasy'āśraya iti Vaibhāṣika-siddhāntaḥ. -AKvy.i 123

2. AK.Ch.ii 148

3. Ibid.Ch.ii 149

4. See ADDS.166; cf. Suddhaṭṭhakan ti cattāri mahābhūtāni tannissitā vanna-gandha-rāsa-ojā ti idaṃ ... - Abhv.k.297

The conception of the octuple saṅghāta-~~ḥ~~paramāṇu, on which the suddhaṭṭhaka is modelled, reminds one of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the four elemental substances and their respective qualities. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that odour (gandha), taste (rasa), colour (rūpa), and touch (sparṣa) are respectively the special qualities (viśeṣa-guṇa) of earth, water, fire and air.¹ It will be seen that it is the same items that constitute the octuple saṅghāta-paramāṇu. The special qualities, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain, are invariably associated and co-existent with their respective elemental substances.² The eight items of the saṅghāta-paramāṇu, as the Vaibhāṣikas maintain, are necessarily co-existent (niyata-sahotpanna). It should of course be conceded that in the Buddhist schools the secondary rūpas are not recognized as the qualities of the primary. However, by recognizing four items of the octad as secondary to the other four, rather than assigning equal status to all the eight, the resulting picture appears to be a veiled recognition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. It should be more logical and more in keeping with the Buddhists' denial of the duality between substance and quality to have given equal status to the eight items in

1. See Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, 52 ff.

2. Ibid., 52 ff.

question. In point of fact, a suggestion in this direction was given by the Sautrāntikas, which the Vaibhāṣikas, with their usual dogmatism, did not want to accept.¹ Perhaps it was the desire to escape from this seeming similarity with the Vaiśeṣika view that impelled the Vaibhāṣikas to declare that each bhautika is dependent on a separate tetrad of the mahābhūtas.

The remaining sixteen kalāpas are formed according to the same principle as adopted by the Vaibhāṣikas in forming the saṅghāta-paramāṇus other than the octad. The eight items of the octad are the basic material elements: they are present in every instance of matter. Therefore, in all other kalāpas these eight material elements are present as their basis. The other kalāpas are formed by adding one or more, as the situation demands, of the remaining material elements (= those other than the eight in question) to the basic octad.

Since we have already examined all the material elements,² we shall confine ourselves to the way they enter into the composition of kalāpas.

Next to the basic octad comes sadda-navaka, the sound-nonad which, according to both schools, is formed by

1. Cf. the Sautrāntika criticism of the theory of reciprocal causation (sahabhūta-hetu) in AK.Ch.ii 254
 2. See above, Chs.V, VII

adding one element of sound to the basic octad.¹

As to the formation of the five sense-organ kalāpas or saṅghātas, the two schools follow two slightly different methods.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, of the sense-organs, the kāyendriya (the organ of touch) consists of the minimum number of dravya-paramāṇus. It is a nonad consisting of the basic octad and one dravya-paramāṇu of kāyendriya added to it. Each of the other four sense-organ saṅghātas is formed by adding one dravya-paramāṇu of each of them to the kāyendriya-nonad. Thus while the kāyendriya saṅghāta is a nonad the other sense-organ saṅghātas are decads.²

For the Theravādins every sense-organ kalāpa is a decad (dasaka). First one kalāpaṅga of rūpa-jīvitindriya is added to the basic octad to make it organic. The resulting nonad is called jīvita-navaka, the vital nonad. The five sense-organ kalāpas are then formed by adding each of the sense-organ kalāpaṅgas to the jīvita-navaka. Thus there are cakku-dasaka, sota-dasaka, ghāna-dasaka, jivhā-dasaka and kāya-dasaka.³

1. See AK.Ch.ii 144; AKvy,i 123; ADS.29; SS.5

2. Cf. kameṣṭadravyakośabdhāḥ paramāṇur anidindriyah/
kāyendriyo navadravyo dasadravyo'parendriyah//
 - AK.Ch.ii 22

3. See ADS.29; SS.4; NRP.38

The Vaibhāṣikas have added one dravya-paramāṇu of kāyendriya to the other four sense-organ saṅghātas because the other four sense-organs are said to be associated with kāyendriya (tat-pratibaddha-vṛttitvāt).¹ They seem to have taken the view that the organs of sight, hearing, taste and smell are certain modifications of the organ of touch - a view accepted by some Nyāya-Vaiśeḍikas, too.² It is rather strange that the Theravādins do not add one kalāpaṅga of kāyendriya to the other four sense-organ kalāpas. For, in the commentaries we are told that the organ of touch is present in every part of the body (sabba-sarīra-byāpaka), existing as it were like oil soaked in cotton.³ Why the Vaibhāṣikas, unlike the Theravādins, do not include jīvitendriya in the sense-organ saṅghātas, is understandable. For, as stated earlier,⁴ they have recognized only one variety of jīvitendriya which is included in the category of (rūpa)-citta-viprayukta-samskāras.

Since the Theravādins have defined the two faculties of sex as separate elements of rūpa rather than conceiving

1. Cf. yatra hi cakṣuḥ śrotr'ādi vā tatra kāyendriyena bhavitavyam tat-pratibaddha-vṛttitvāc cakṣur'ādīnām - AKvy.i 123

2. See Bhaduri, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, Ch. III

3. See As1.311; Vism.446 ; see above, 133-34

4. See above, 164

them as part of the organ of touch,¹ and since they have postulated the heart-basis as the seat of mental activity,² these three items, too, are explained by way of kalāpas, to which corresponding saṅghāta-paramāṇus are not found in Sanskrit Buddhism. The method of their formation is like that of the sense-organs. That is to say, one kalāpaṅga of itthindriya, purisindriya and hadaya-vatthu is added to the jīvita-navaka; the resulting three decads are called itthibhāva-dasaka, pumbhāva-dasaka and vatthu-dasaka respectively.³

The kalāpaṅgas or the constituents of the kalāpas which we have considered so far are all nipphanna-rūpa. Of the ten anipphanna-rūpas only five are recognized as kalāpaṅgas.

The five which are not recognized as kalāpaṅgas are ākāsa-dhātu, upacaya, santati, jaratā and aniccata. Why they are excluded needs hardly any explanation. Ākāsa-dhātu (delimited space) is not something that enters into the composition of the kalāpas; it is that which intervenes between the kalāpas. That is to say, it sets bounds to, and is itself bounded by, the kalāpas. The other four items are merely indicative of certain phases of

1. See above, 156-7
 2. See above, 171 ff.
 3. ADS.29

matter.¹ As such they are not material constituents of the kalāpas.²

The five anipphanna-rūpas which are recognized as kalāpaṅgas are the two viññattis and the triad of lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā. We have already shown that, although the anipphanna-rūpas are called rūpa-dhammas, they do not stand for something distinct from the nipphanna-rūpas.³ Accordingly, although some anipphanna-rūpas are recognized as kalāpaṅgas, they do not stand for something distinct from the nipphanna kalāpaṅgas. Let us take one example to clarify the situation.

Kāyaviññatti, it may be recalled here, signifies an ākāra-vikāra (a particular position or situation) of a set of cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpas which are nipphanna.⁴ According to the theory under consideration, kāyaviññatti signifies an ākāra-vikāra of the cittasamuṭṭhāna kalāpas (for the cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpas, too, exist by way of kalāpas). Now, each of these kalāpas, an ākāra-vikāra of which is called kāyaviññatti, is indicated by the addition of kāyaviññatti as one of its

1. See above, 237-8

2. Kalāpānam pariccheda lakkhaṇattā vicakkhaṇā/
na kalāp'āṅgam'icc'āhu ākāsaṃ lakkhaṇāni ca// - ADS.29

3. See above, 181 ff.

4. See above, 199 ff.

kalāpaṅgas. Thus the recognition of kāyaviññatti as a kalāpaṅga does not carry the implication that it is something distinct from the nipphanna kalāpaṅgas. Its purpose is to indicate the type of kalāpas an ākāra-vikāra of which is represented by the kāyaviññatti. It is in this manner that we should understand the significance of the five kalāpaṅgas which are anipphanna.

Let us now consider those kalāpas some of the kalāpaṅgas of which are anipphanna-rūpa.

The first, called kāyaviññatti-navaka (bodily-expression-nonad), is formed by the addition of one kalāpaṅga of kāyaviññatti to the basic octad. It represents the citta-samuṭṭhāna kalāpa an ākāra-vikāra of which is called kāyaviññatti. Next comes vacīviññatti-dasaka (vocal-expression-decad) which is formed by the addition of two kalāpaṅgas of sound and vacīviññatti to the basic octad. This represents the cittasamuṭṭhāna kalāpa an ākāra-vikāra of which is called vacīviññatti.¹ The addition of sound is necessary because vacīviññatti is intimately connected with vocal sound.² Since the Vaibhāṣikas treat kāyaviññatti as a part of rūpāyatana³, they do not recognize a separate

1. See above, 203-4

2. See above, 203

3. See above, 190

saṅghāta-paramāṇu corresponding to it. But the same is not true of vāgvijñapti. Although it is treated as a part of the śabdāyatana,¹ its composition as a saṅghāta is more complex than that of ordinary sound. For "le son (śabdāyatana) qui est produit par les grandes éléments qui font partie de l'organisme (upātta) n'existe pas indépendamment des organes".² Hence in the case of a saṅghāta-paramāṇu of vāgvijñapti sound, the usual sound-nonad becomes an undecad by the addition of two dravya-paramāṇus of kāyendriya and jihvendriya.³

The last four kalāpas, to which, except perhaps to one, no corresponding saṅghāta-paramāṇus can be traced in Sanskrit Buddhism, have as their kalāpaṅgas the usual eight inseparables of the basic octad, the triad of lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā and the two viññattis.⁴

The first, called lahutādekādasaka (undecad of plasticity, etc.), consists of the basic octad plus three kalāpaṅgas of lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā. It may be recalled here that the last three items which represent the body when it is healthy and efficient, arise always together (na aññam' aññam vijahanti).⁵ This explains why the three items are

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1. See above, 201
 2. AK.Ch.ii 145
 3. Ibid.loc.cit.,
 4. See ADS.29 ff.
 5. See above, 205

included in the same kalāpa rather than establishing three separate kalāpas.

The second and the third, called kāyaviññatti-lahutādi-dvādasaka (dodecad of bodily-expression and plasticity, etc.) and vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka (tredecad of vocal-expression, sound, plasticity, etc.), are formed by adding lahutā, mudutā and kammanñatā to the previously mentioned kāyaviññatti-navaka and vacīviññatti-dasaka respectively. The occurrence of the two viññattis could be accompanied (facilitated) by the triad of lahutā, etc.,¹ It seems that it is in order to explain such situations that these two kalāpas have been postulated.

The last kalāpa is sadda-lahutādi-dvādasaka (dodecad of sound, plasticity, etc.). It is the same as the previously mentioned vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka except for the absence of one constituent, namely, vacīviññatti. Since the triad of lahutā, etc., is included here, it certainly concerns itself with a phenomenon associated with the physical body of a living being.² And since vacīviññatti is lacking we may interpret it as representative of vocal sound unaccompanied by vacīññatti as well as sound produced by the other parts of the body. In the Abhidharmakośa there

1. See above, 204 ff.

2. See above, 206

is reference to a saṅghāta-paramāṇu, called the sound-deçad, which consists of the basic octad and two dravya-paramāṇus of sound and kāyendriya. It represents the phenomenon of upātta-mahābhūtika sound, i.e., sound produced, say, by the clapping of hands, etc.,¹ Cases like these, it may be observed here, are represented by the kalāpa in question. The non-inclusion of kāyendriya as a constituent of this kalāpa is understandable, for we have already seen that unlike the Vaibhāṣikas the Theravādins do not add kāyendriya either to the kalāpas of the first four sense-organs or to the kalāpa of vacīviññatti sound.

This brings us to an end of our survey of the seventeen kinds of kalāpa. They all are again classified into four groups on the basis of the four generative conditions of matter (rūpa-samuṭṭhāna-paccaya), namely, kamma, citta, utu and āhāra. Since we have discussed them elsewhere,² herein we shall confine ourselves to indicating how the kalāpas are classified accordingly. It should also be noted here that if a kalāpa is conditioned by more than one of these four factors, say by three (ti-samuṭṭhāna) then that particular kalāpa is counted thrice. In this way, although there are seventeen distinct kalāpas the number is brought

1. See AK.Ch.ii 145 and Ch.i 17

2. See above, 292

up to twenty one.

Since the eight rūpa indriyas and the hadaya-vatthu are recognized as coming into being through the action of kamma,¹ the five sense-organ dasakas, the two sex dasakas, the jīvita-navaka and the vatthu-dasaka are brought under kammāsamuṭṭhāna. Since the two viññattis represent ākāra-vikāras of cittāsamuṭṭhāna-rūpa,² the four kalāpas - kāya-viññatti-navaka, vacīviññatti-dasaka, kāyaviññatti-lahutādi-dvādasaka and vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka - are brought under cittāsamuṭṭhāna. The two kalāpas, sadda-navaka and sadda-lahutādi-dvādasaka, are utusamuṭṭhāna. These two kalāpas refer to two varieties of sound, the first to sound produced in the body of a living being and the second, to sound produced in the insentient (aviññānika) world. It should be noted here that, although sound arises owing to the concussion (ghaṭṭana) of the mahābhūtas, utu (heat) is considered as a special condition for its continuity.³

On the other hand, the two kalāpas, lahutādekādasaka and suddhaṭṭhaka are ti-samuṭṭhāna in the sense that they are alternatively conditioned by citta, utu and āhāra.

The first which refers to the triad of lahutā, etc., is

1. See above, 287

2. See above, 201, 204

3. Cf. ADSS. 167-168

ti-samuṭṭhāna because bodily efficiency which is implied by the triad could be brought about by a wholesome state of mind (citta), or by agreeable nutrition (āhāra) or by good temperature (utu).¹

When the suddhaṭṭhaka, which consists of the four mahābhūtas and the four upādā-rūpas inseparably associated with them, is brought into relation with citta, as in the case of bodily movements arising in response to a thought, it is called cittasamuṭṭhāna. When it arises conditioned by nutrition or by temperature of cold and heat, it is called āhārasamuṭṭhāna and utusamuṭṭhāna respectively. All rūpa, other than that which enters into the composition of living beings, is ultimately constituted of suddhaṭṭhakas and sadda-navakas, both conditioned only by utu.² For the temperature of cold and heat, according to the Theravādins, is an essential factor for the arising, continuity and all changes of all such rūpa.³

Why the suddhaṭṭhaka is not kammāsamuṭṭhāna needs

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1. Cf. Laghutādi-traya; (utucittāhārehi) satprāya rtuya prasanna cittaya satprāya āhāraya yana meyin (sambhoti) vannēyi. - ADSS.165
 2. Cf. Tattha suddhaṭṭhakam saddanavakañ ceti utusamuṭṭhānakalāpā bahiddhā pi labbhanti, āvasesā pana sabbē pi ājjhattamevā ti - ADS.29
 3. Asl.342 ff.

explanation. It is true that the (eight) constituents of this octad enter into the composition of all kalāpas including those that are kamma-conditioned. It should, however, be recalled here that, although some rūpa-dhammas come into being being conditioned by kamma, yet their uninterrupted continuity is said to depend on the rūpa-jīvitindriya.¹ Therefore a kammasamuṭṭhāna kalāpa should at least be a nonad (navaka), consisting of the eight inseparables (basic octad) and one kalāpaṅga of rūpa-jīvitindriya. An octad in itself can never be kammasamuṭṭhāna.

Before we conclude this chapter a few comments are called for on the position of kalāpas in relation to Rūpa-loka, the second ^{plane} ~~plane~~ of existence according to Buddhist cosmology.

The Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas share the view that all elements of rūpa exist in the Kāma-loka and none in the Arūpa-loka. Therefore the same situation is true of the kalāpas/saṅghāta-paramāṇus in relation to these two planes of existence.²

That some rūpa-dhammas exist in the Rūpa-loka is admitted by both schools, but opinion differs as to what they are.

1. See above , 167

2. See ADSS.172; NRP.40

The Vaibhāṣika view is that gandha, rasa, and the two faculties of sex which are a part of kāyendriya, do not obtain in the Rūpa-loka.¹ The first two are eliminated because along with spraṣṭavya they form what is called kavaḍīkārahāra.² Since "personne ne naît dans le Rūpadhātu qui ne soit détaché de cet aliment",³ it has to be excluded. But spraṣṭavya which is also a part of kavaḍīkārahāra is retained, partly because in itself it cannot constitute kavaḍīkārahāra, and partly because - this is the more important reason - the four primary elements are included in the spraṣṭavya.⁴ Since the primary elements are the support (āśraya) of the secondary elements (bhautika), their presence must be admitted. The reason given for the elimination of the two faculties of sex is that they arise as a result of the desire for tactile consciousness associated with sexual union, from which desire the beings who are destined to be born in the Rūpa-loka are completely free.⁵

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1. See AK.Ch.i 55 ff; cf. na sto rūpa-dhātau: gandha-rasau. nihprayojanatvāt. strī-puruṣendriya-viṣayavad iti. - AKVy. i 61
 2. See above, 170
 3. AK.Ch.i 55
 4. See above, 94
 5. See AK.Ch.i 55; cf. maithuna-sparśa-vitarāgaś ca rūpāva-carāḥ sattvāḥ. tasmāt tatra na trṣṇā-pūrvakam karma bhavati. tasmād ahetukatvāt. - AKVy. i 63

Since the two faculties of sex are conceived not as independent rūpa-dharmas but as a part of the kāyendriya, the elimination of the former does not affect the principle of atomic aggregation. On the other hand, since rasa and gandha are conceived not only as two separate rūpa-dharmas but also as two of the constituents of the basic octad, their elimination necessitates the reduction of every saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Rūpa-loka by two dravya-paramāṇus. Consequently, the smallest saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Rūpa-loka becomes an aggregate of six constituents; and this quantitative deficiency is reflected in the composition of the other saṅghāta-paramāṇus, too.¹

The Theravādins agree with the Vaibhāṣikas in eliminating the two faculties of sex,² presumably for the same reason. However, they disagree with the latter over the other elements of rūpa to be eliminated. Instead of rasa and gandha they have excluded the two sense-organs corresponding to them and also the organ of touch. Consequent on this reduction, the two bhāva-dasakas (sex-decads), the

1. See AK.Ch.ii 147 ff; cf. ya ihāṣṭa-dravyaka ukto nirindriyo'śabdah. sa tatra ṣad-dravyakah. yo nava-dravyakah kāyendriyā. sa sapta-dravyakah. yo dasa-dravyako'parendriyah. so'sṭa-dravyakah. sa-śabdakah punar ete saptāṣṭa-nava-dravyakā ity avagantavyam. - AKvy.i 125

2. See ADS.30

jivhā-dasaka, the ghāna-dasaka and the kāya-dasaka get eliminated from the Rūpa-loka.¹

A comparison between the two lists of rūpas eliminated by the two schools should show that the differences are of a considerable nature, the Vaibhāṣikas eliminating the sense-objects and the Theravādins the sense-organs. Although it might appear that the two schools have completely parted ways, yet on closer examination it will be seen that they are following two different methods for a common purpose.

Both schools agree on the view that jivhā-viññāna (gustatory consciousness) and ghāna-viññāna (olfactory consciousness) are absent in the Rūpa-loka; the Theravāda eliminates, in addition, kāya-viññāna (tactile consciousness).² If this latter fact is overlooked for the moment, then there is complete agreement between the two schools. Since viññāna requires for its arising the conjunction between the sense-organ and the sense-object, its absence can be indicated in one of two ways: either by the exclusion of the sense-organ or by the exclusion of the sense-object. The Theravādins have followed the first alternative, and the Vaibhāṣikas the second.

1. See ADS.30

2. See ibid.loc.cit.,

Although the two methods brought the two schools to a common conclusion, yet they separated them over one vital issue, an issue concerning the composition of the saṅghāta-paramāṇus/kalāpas: In pursuance of the second alternative the Vaibhāṣikas had to eliminate gandha and rasa from each and every saṅghāta-paramāṇu of the Rūpa-loka. Thereby the theory of avinirbhāga-rūpa according to which the four mahabhūtas and rūpa, rasa, gandha and (bhautika) spraṣṭavya are necessarily co-existent (niyata-sahotpanna) could not be retained in the same form both in the Kāma-loka and in the Rūpa-loka. On the other hand, the adoption, on the part of the Theravādins, of the first alternative did not necessitate such a course: What required reduction was not the number of constituents of each kalāpa but the number of kalāpas.

The concern of the Theravādins to retain the theory of avinibhoga-rūpa unmodified is also shown by the way they solved the problem of āhāra-rūpa. They, too, were of the opinion that the beings in the Rūpa-loka were completely detached from kabalīkārāhāra.¹ But, since āhāra is one of the avinibhoga-rūpas it could not be eliminated from the kalāpas. The desired effect was realized by eliminating all the

1. See ADS 30

āhārasamuṭṭhāna-kalāpas.¹ Thereby they admitted that there was āhāra-rūpa in the Rūpa-loka, but denied that the beings therein were nourished by it.

1. Ibid.loc.cit.

Abbreviations

- 1 = pathavī-dhātu (earth-element)
- 2 = āpo-dhātu (water-element)
- 3 = tejo-dhātu (fire-element)
4. = vāyo-dhātu (air-element)
- 5 = rūpa (colour)
- 6 = sadda (sound)
- 7 = gandha (smell)
- 8 = rasa (taste)
- 9 = āhāra (nutriment)
- 10 = cakkhu (organ of sight)
- 11 = sota (organ of hearing)
- 12 = ghāna (organ of smell)
- 13 = jivhā (organ of taste)
- 14 = kāya (organ of touch)
- 15 = jīvitindriya (faculty of life)
- 16 = itthindriya (faculty of femininity)
- 17 = purisindriya (faculty of masculinity)
- 18 = hadaya-vatthu (heart-basis)
- 19 = kāyaviññatti (bodily expression)
- 20 = vacīviññatti (vocal expression)
- 21 = rūpassa lahutā (lightness of matter)
- 22 = rūpassa mudutā (pliancy of matter)
- 23 = rūpassa kammaññatā (wieldiness of matter)

COMPOSITION OF THE RŪPAKALĀPAS

Rūpakalāpas	Kalāpaṅgas
Suddhatṭhaka (basic octad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9
Sadda-navaka (Sound-nonad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6
Jīviṭṭa-navaka (Vital nonad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15
Cakkhu-dasaka (Eye-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+10
Sota-dasaka (Ear-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+11
Ghāṇa-dasaka (Nose-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+12
Jivhā-dasaka (Tongue-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+13
Kāya-dasaka (Body-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+14
Itthibhāva-dasaka (Decad of femininity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+16
Pumbhāva-dasaka (decad of masculinity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+17
Vatthu-dasaka (Decad of heart-basis)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+18
Kāyaviññatti-navaka (Nonad of bodily expression)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+19
Vacīviññatti-dasaka (Decad of vocal expression)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6+20
Lahut'ād'ekādasaka (Undecad of plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+21+22+23
Kāyaviññatti-lahut'ādi- dvādasaka (Dodecad of bodily expression & plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+19+21+22+23
Vacīviññatti-sadda-lahut'ādi- terasaḥ (Tredcad of vocal expression, sound & plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+20+6+21+22+ 23
Sadda-lahut'ādi-dvādasaka (Dodecad of sound & plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6+21+22+23

CHAPTER NINE

THE ETHICO-PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE BUDDHIST
(THERAVĀDA) ANALYSIS OF MATTER

The exact nature of the earliest form of Buddhism is still a matter of controversy.¹ However, on the basis of the Pāli Nikāyas as they exist in their present form it may be said that Buddhism is, in the main, a doctrine of salvation. Deliverance from the "saṃsāric" plane of existence, in other words, the realization of Nibbāna, is its final goal. Its analysis of the world of experience is undertaken, not for

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1. On various theories on the nature of the earliest form of Buddhism and the connected problems see specially A. Keith, Bud. Phi. 1-74, 'The Doctrine of the Buddha', BSO(A)S., Vol. VI, 393-404, 'Pre-canonical Buddhism', IHQ., Vol. XI, 1-20; J.C.H. Kern, Manual of Ind. Bud., 46 ff. ; Maryla Falk, Nāmarūpa and Dharmarūpa; T.R.V. Murti, Cent. Phi. of Bud., 14 ff. ; J. Przyluski, Origin & Development of Buddhism, Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXV, 337 ff. S. Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phi. Vol. 1, 341-476, 676-94; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Sakya or the Bud. Origins; O.K.J. Rosenberg, Die probleme ..., 47 ff.; St. Schayer, 'Precanonical Buddhism', AO., Vol. VII, 121-32, 'New contributions to the problem of pre-Hīnayanistic Buddhism', PBO., Vol. 1, 8-17; Th. Stcherbatsky, Cent. Concep. of Bud., Bud. Logic, Vol. 1, 3-7, 'The Doctrine of the Buddha', BSO(A)S., Vol. VI, 867-96, 'The "Dharmas" of the Buddhists and the "Gunas" of the Sāṃkhyas', IHQ., Vol. X, 737-60; E.R. Sarathchandra, Bud. Psy. of Percep. 1-22, 97-105; L.A. Waddel, Bud. of Tibet, 76-122; A.K. Warder, 'On the relationships between early Buddhism and other contemporary systems', BSOAS., Vol. XVII, 43-63, 'Matika', Mv. XIX ff.; M. Winternitz, 'Problems of Buddhism', VBQ (New Series), Vol. 11, 41-56. Further references can be obtained from the works cited here.

its own sake, but for evolving a rationale for its practical doctrine and discipline. Attention is not concentrated on the empirical world in and for itself. The Buddhist inquiry into the nature and constitution of matter and its relevance to Buddhism as a spiritual discipline cannot be properly understood if the subject is divorced from this religious context.

The close connection between the Buddhist analysis of matter and Buddhist ethics is indicated by the oft-recurrent statement, namely, "rūpaṃ saññojanīyo dhammo",¹ i.e., matter is something that is favourable to, or productive of, fetters (saññojana) - the fetters that bind the living being to "saṃsāric" existence. The description of rūpa as saññojanīya favourable to the creation of fetters, does not mean that it is a saññojana, a fetter (in itself). It is the upādāna, "the laying hold of", i.e., the craving for or attachment to rūpa that constitutes the saññojana. One is said to be bound by Māra when ^{one} "graps at" rūpa - Rūpaṃ ... upādiyamāno baddho Mārassa.² Since rūpa is favourable or leading to upādāna, it is called upādānīya;³ since upādāna is a gantha, a tie,

1. See e.g., S. iii 166

2. S.iii., 74

3. S.iii., 167; also Dhs. 125, 133

fetter, it is also called ganthanīya;¹ and since gantha prolongs ogha, the flood (of saṃsāric existence), it is also called oghanīya.²

That rūpa in itself is neither a saṃyojana nor a gantha is very well illustrated by a conversation between Sāriputta and Mahākoṭṭhita.³ When the latter asks whether the eye (cakkhu) is a bond in relation to the visible (rūpa) or vice versa, the former denies both alternatives and goes on to say that what constitutes the bond is the chandarāga - any desire or passion that might arise as a result of their contact. If two oxen, one white and one black, are tied by a yoke or a yoke-tie, it is not correct to say that the black ox is a bond for the white ox or vice versa. It is the yoke or the yoke-tie that constitutes the bond, it is that which unites them both. So it is in the case of the eye and the visible. The saṃyojana lies in the chanda-rāga.⁴ This situation is true of the relation between

1. Dhs.125, 133

2. Ibid.loc.cit.,

3. S.iv 162-5

4. Na kho āvuso Koṭṭhita cakkhu rūpānaṃ saṃyojanaṃ na rūpā cakkhussa. Yaṅ ca tattha taḍ ubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati chandarāgo taṃ tattha saṃyojanaṃ ... Na kho āvuso kālo balivaddo odātassa balivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ nāpi odāto balivaddo kālassa balivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ. Yena ca kho ekena damena vāyuttēna vā saṃyuttā taṃ tattha saṃyojanaṃ. Evam eva kho āvuso na cakkhu ... - S.iv, 163

the whole cognitive apparatus on the one hand ^{and} the external sense-objects on the other. If it were otherwise, then one had to rule out the very basis of the practice of higher life (brahmacariyavāso) which has as its goal the elimination of all suffering (sammā-dukkhakkhaya).¹ More or less the same idea is reflected in the Indriyabhāvanā Sutta² where Buddha questions a disciple of Pārāsariya how his master teaches the culture of the senses. In reply the latter says that the senses are to be trained to the extent when they fail to fulfill their respective functions: The eye does not see forms; the ear does not hear sounds. Buddha rejoins that this kind of sense-culture would lead to the conclusion that the blind and the deaf have their senses best cultivated. The implication is that mental culture is not to be associated with the suppression of the senses; they should be cultivated to see the truth, to see things as they really are (yathābhūtam).

Because rūpa in itself is not a saṃyojana - therefore freedom from rūpa (rūpassa nissaranam) means, not the

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1. Cakkhu vā āvuso rūpā^h saṃyojanam abhavissa rūpā vā cakkhussa saṃyojanam^h na yidam brahmacariyavāso paññayetha sammādukkhakkhaya - S.iv.163
 2. See M.iii 298 ff.

abandonment and elimination of rūpa, but the abandonment and elimination of chanda-rāga towards rūpa.¹ One is said to be freed from the Evil One when one ceases to grasp at rūpa - rūpaṃ anupādiyamāno mutto pāpimato.² It is with the complete waning away (khayā), cessation (nirodhā), letting go (cāgā), or abandonment (paṭinissaggā) of whatever desire (chanda), passion (rāga), attachment (nandi), craving (taṇhā), graspings (upādāna) and all kinds of mental prejudices and biases (cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayā) towards (in relation to) rūpa that the mind is said to be "suvimutta", well-freed, from rūpa.³ Hence it is that the monks are constantly advised to eschew all kinds of desire and passion in respect of rūpa - yo bhikkhave rūpasmiṃ chandarāgo taṃ pajahatha.⁴

But this chanda-rāga cannot be properly disciplined or eliminated without a proper knowledge about the nature of rūpa. In other words, because rūpa is saṃyojanīya - therefore it should be pariññeyya⁵ (understood, comprehended.).

1. Cf. Yo bhikkhave rūpesu chandarāgavinayo chandarāgappahānaṃ idaṃ rūpassa nissaranaṃ

2. S.iii 74

3. M.ii 151

4. S.iii 159

5. Cf. Rūpaṃ bhikkhave pariññeyyo dhammo ... - S.ii 159

Ignorance breeds attachment which in turn impedes spiritual progress. For it is by not knowing, not seeing things as they truly are that one gets attached to them - *ajānaṃ apassaṃ sārājjaṭi*.¹ Hence if one wants to free oneself from *rūpa*, i.e., to free from the attachment to *rūpa*, one should know its true nature. One who is wanting in such knowledge cannot be expected to make an end of suffering (*dukkha*) - *Rūpaṃ bhikkhave anabhijānaṃ aparijānaṃ ... abhabbo dukkhakkhaya*.² Hence it is that the monks are advised to be "*rūpaññū*", "knowers of matter". One who is not *rūpaññū* cannot be expected to reach the higher stages of spiritual progress (*vuddhi*, *virūhi*).³

Here then is the relevance of the analysis of matter to the practical doctrine and discipline of Buddhism. Buddhism recognizes that *rūpa* is *saṃyojanīya* and concludes that it should (therefore) be *pariññeyya*. The analysis of matter is thus necessitated by an ethical need and is therefore elaborated mainly in the interests of ethics. This is also true of the Buddhist analysis of mind (*nāma*). Both mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*) are analysed and described with a practical end in view.

1. M.iii 287

2. S.iii 27; See specially S.iii 260-3

3. See M.i 220, 222-3

In the earlier texts where rūpa is explained in simple and general terms the ethical approach to the subject is much more pronounced. That rūpa is impermanent and that therefore it cannot be made the basis of true happiness is the main theme that runs throughout all such discussions.

Whatever form it assumes rūpa is certainly not permanent (nicca, dhuva).¹ Its origination is manifested (uppādo paññāyati); so is its dissolution (vayo'pi paññāyati).² It arises owing to a complex of causes (paṭicca-samuppanna), is conditioned (saṅkhata), is subject to change or becoming otherwise (aññathābhāvī), to waning away (khayaḍhamma), to passing away (vayaḍhamma), to cessation (nirodhadhamma).³ This is true of all rūpa whether it exists as a part of the complex that makes the living being (ajjhattaṃ, ajjhattika) or whether it exists externally (bahiddhā, bāhira). "There comes a time when the external water-element is wroth and the external earth-element disappears before it. Then will this external earth-element, ancient though it be, reveal how transient is its nature, how subject to dissolution and decay, how mutable! And what of this short-lived body bred of cravings?"⁴ Since all rūpa in which one participates is

1. S.iii 139

2. M.iii 282

3. See S.iii 24, 43, 123

4. SBB., Vol.V, 134 (M.i, 185)

characterized by impermanence it cannot be made the basis of true happiness. It may give rise to some kind of pleasure - for otherwise the living beings would not get attached to it¹ - but certainly not permanent happiness. The things one gets attached to are constantly changing. Hence attachment to them would inevitably lead to unrest and sorrow.² One who follows them with avid greed and passion will have his mind scattered and dissipated (vikkhitta, visaṭa).³ For they give rise to ideas of attachment and repugnance and hence to a desire to satisfy the feelings so excited.

Accordingly rūpa is often described in such a way as to bring into relief the dangers (ādinava) that arise from attachment to it and the happiness that results from detachment from it. Hence it is that rūpa is often described as, or compared to, Māra, a slayer (māretā), a disease (roga), a pestering wound (gaṇḍa), an arrow (salla), pain (agha), a slaughterer (vadhaka), fire (āditta).⁴ These are descriptions made for the purpose of religious edification, and as such

1. No cedam bhikkhave rūpānam assādo abhavissa na yidam sattā rūpesu sārājjeyyam. Yasmā ca kho bhikkhave atthi rūpānam assādo tasmā sattā rūpesu sārājjanti. - S.iv 15

2. Cf. S.iii, 107

3. See M.iii 225

4. See S.iii 32, 33, 114; iv 189; Cf. Mh.Nd.ii 277 where 43 ways of approaching rūpa are given.

should be understood in a profoundly religious context. They testify not only to the reality of rūpa but also to its provocative influence.

With this same purpose in view, sometimes rūpa is sought to be described in quite a different way - in a way which seems to suggest its unreality. Rūpa, it is said, should be approached as suñña (void), tuccha (false), ritta (empty) and asāra (essenceless).¹ Similar statements are extended to the other four khandhas, too. In the Samyuttanikāya, for instance, rūpa is compared to a drop of froth (phenapiṇḍa), vedanā to a bubble of water, (bubbula) sañña to a mirage (marīci), saṅkhāra to a plantain-trunk (kadali) and viññāna to an illusion (māyā).² In the Suttanipāta, Moghārāja is bidden to consider the world as suñña - suññato lokam avekkhassu.³ Then we have: "ajjhattañ ca bahiddhā ca natthi kiñcīti passato"⁴ (There is nothing internal or external to one who thinks: Is there anything); "natthī ti nissāya tarassu ogham"⁵ (Cross the flood basing on the thought: There is nothing).

1. See Mh.Nd.ii, 277

2. Phenapindūpamam rūpam vedanā bubbulūpamā
marīcīkūpamā sañña saṅkhārā kadalūpamā
māyūpaman ca viññānam dīpitādiccabandhunā - op.cit.,iii 142

3. Op.cit.,217 (verse 1119)

4. Ibid., 215 (verse, 1113)

5. Ibid.,205 (verse, 1070)

Statements such as these seem to give the impression that Buddhism (as represented in the Nikāyas) does not believe in the reality of rūpa or any other khandhas and that it is or, at least tends to be, nihilistic. In point of fact Prof. Kern who confirms Prof. Waddell's suggestion, namely that early Buddhism is an "idealistic nihilism",¹ refers to the last two statements as an instance where "nihilism is tersely expressed".²

These statements, it seems to us, are made in a profoundly religious context. And once they are understood in this context they do not lend themselves to such an interpretation.

Suññatā, as explained in the Nikāyas, does not really mean Void (although we have translated it so) but devoid - devoid of atta (self, substance) or of anything pertaining to atta (attaniyena).³ Ritta, tuccha, asāra carry more or less the same meaning. To deny a persistent or ever-perduring

1. See Waddell, Buddhism of Tibet, 121; also JRAS (London, 1894), 367 ff.

2. See Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, 50, n.6

3. Cf. Suñño loko suñño ti bhante vuccati. Kittāvata nu kho bhante suñño loko ti vuccati? Yasmā ca kho Ananda sunnā attena vā attaniyena vā tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati. - S.iv 54; see also Coomaraswamy, HJOS., Vol. iv (1939), 189

substance, mental or material, does not mean that the world of experience is unreal. It amounts to a different interpretation of the world. The Nikāyas make it abundantly clear that the cosmos or the world (loka) is lacking (ūna) in any persistent and permanent substance and that consequently it cannot be held to be permanent (dhuva). In view of this fact it is not possible to regard it as one's own (saka) or as a haven of security (tāna).¹ Hence the description of the world as suñña, tuccha, ritta is not without significance even within a realistic context.

Stated otherwise, those statements which seem to suggest a nihilistic metaphysic are really indicative of the fact of dukkha which characterizes all forms of "samsāric" existence. The term dukkha, as pointed out by Prof. Stcherbatsky,² should not always be translated as "pain", "misery" or "suffering". As a philosophical term it means much more in the sense that it includes such ideas as "imperfection", "absence of an abiding substance", "conflict", "unrest". This explains why the characterization, dukkha is extended even to matter. It also explains why the states of jhāna resulting from the practice of higher meditation and

1. See e.g., M.ii 68 ff.

2. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, 54 ff.; see also W.Rāhula, IHQ.Vol.XXXI, 249 ff.

free from suffering as ordinarily understood are also included in dukkha. For they, too, are conditioned and subject to change. The later scholiasts recognize the wider implications of the term when they explain it as three-fold, namely dukkha-dukkha (dukkha as suffering), viparināṃa-dukkha (dukkha as change) and saṅkhāra-dukkha (dukkha as conditioned state).¹

It is, in fact, these wider implications of the term dukkha that are brought into relief in the few quotations we have cited above. Moreover, if the texts sometimes describe "saṃsāric" existence in such a way as to suggest its ^uunreality this is understandable, particularly in a religious context. That is to say, for the purpose of religious edification it was necessary to show what a worthless thing "saṃsāric" existence is when compared to the eternal bliss of Nibbāna. What is involved here is a question of valuation. Since Nibbāna represents the highest goal, from the point of view of Nibbāna saṃsāra is, in a way, a "non-entity". For it does not afford a permanent basis on which permanent happiness can be established. In this sense it is unreal. This seems to be the reason why the Suttanipāta says that

1. See Vism. 499

one should cross the "flood" thinking that there is nothing here.

Statements which, at first sight, seem to countenance an idealistic interpretation of the world are also not wanting: "The world is led by the mind and is activated by the mind".¹ "Verily I declare to you my friend that within this very body, mortal as it is and only a fathom high but conscious and endowed with mind, is the world and the waxing thereof and the waning thereof and the way that leads to the passing away thereof."²

Here too we should guard ourselves against relying on isolated passages and that too taken out of their context. For on the basis of such statements as these one may be tempted to conclude that Buddhism as revealed from the earlier texts is or, at least tends to be, idealistic. The presence of such statements should become clear if we constantly keep in mind the obvious fact that Buddhism is a religion and that mental culture plays an important part in it.

Since the whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline which has attainment of Nibbāna as its final goal

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1. Cittena niyyatī loko cittena parikissati - S.i 39
 2. Apī khvāham āvuso imasmim yeva vyāmatte kaḷevare saññimhi saṃānake lokaṃ ca paññāpemi lokasaṃudayaṃ ca lokanirodhaṃ ca lokanirodhagāminim paṭipadaṃ ca - S.i 62; see also A.ii 48 (Tr. from Dialogues of the Buddha, i 273)

is based on a course of mental culture, it is but natural if Buddhism gives a pre-eminent position to mind. But from this circumstance the conclusion does not necessarily follow that matter exists by virtue of mind. Rūpa is not "manomaya" "mind-made" but manorāma,¹ "pleasing the mind", provoking the mind. Consciousness (viññāna) is said to be "externally agitated and dissipated" (bahiddhā vikkhittam visatam) when one with avid greed and passion follows the sense-objects.² To one who is not free from passion, craving, desire and thirst towards rūpa, with the change and dissolution of rūpa there arise all kinds of frustration.³ But when one knows things as they truly are, i.e., as anicca, dukkha and anatta, one ceases to get agitated by them, one ceases to seek refuge in them.⁴ On one's understanding of things depends one's reaction to them. Just as attachment to things is to get fettered by them even so detachment from them is

1. M. iii, 216

2. Cf. Katham c'āvuso bhiddhā viññānam vikkhittam visatan ti vuccati? Idh'āvuso bhikkhuno cakkhuna rūpam disvā rūpa-nimittānusāri viññānam hoti rūpanimittassādagathitam rūpa-nimittassādaviniḍḍham ... (applied to the other sense-organs, too) - M.iii 225

3. Cf. ... rūpe avigatarāgassa avigatachandassa avigatapemassa avigatapipāsassa avigatatanhassa tassa rūpassa viparināma-nnathābhāvā uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā - S.iii 107

4. See D.i 239; S.iii 123

to get freed from them. Thus both the malady and the remedy lie within. In this context we could conveniently understand the significance of those statements which give a prominent place to mind.

The latter quotation, as pointed out by Prof.Keith,¹ need not be understood as a metaphysical deliverance. It points to the fact that salvation is within oneself and that one must work out one's own salvation - a theme on which the Nikāyas constantly dwell upon.² It is more in the nature of a counsel on self-reliance, and it is scarcely possible to draw idealistic implications from it.

A somewhat similar idea seems to be reflected in another oft-recurrent statement, namely, "Where there is eye where there is visible (rūpa), where there is visual consciousness ... there lies the world ...". The same formula is extended to the other sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects.³ This has sometimes been understood as countenancing a phenomenalist interpretation

1. Bud.Phi.56

2. Cf. Atta hi attano nātho - Dhp.24; Attadīpā bhikkhave viharatha -

3. Yattha ... atthi cakkhum atthi rūpā atthi cakkhuviññanam ... atthi tattha loko ... - S.iv 39

of the external world: The external world has no independent reality, but is dependent on the activities of the senses.¹ Taken in itself the quotation does point to such a conclusion. However, it seems doubtful whether it was meant to be an exhaustive definition on the nature of the external world. It seems more proper if we understand it as an attempt, made in the interests of the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, to show what "world" (loka) means for each individual. As far as each individual is concerned, his knowledge of things, mental as well as material, is gained through the activities of his six sense-spheres (saḥ-āyatana). And all his ideas of attachment and repugnance and the desire to satisfy the feelings so excited function within this (his) "world". Since the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline advocates the elimination of all ideas of attachment and repugnance, it is understandable if the texts say that as far as each individual is concerned the "world" is synonymous with the activities of his six sense-spheres. This, it seems to us, is the context in which the above and similar statements² should be understood. The severely practical approach of Buddhism seems to be responsible for their presence.

1. See E.R.Sarathchandra, Bud.Psy.of Percep., 11

2. See S.iv 87, 95

It is not without significance that the above-mentioned definition of the world is often accompanied by the words, "ariyassa vinaye"¹, i.e., in (according to) the noble discipline. That it was made in a harrower context is therefore fairly obvious.

If we base ourselves on the Pāli Nikāyas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.² The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline which has the attainment of Nibbāna as its final goal is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.

As soon as an individual is born the outside world plays upon that individual. Sensations are stirred up within. They give rise to ideas of attachment and repugnance. There

1. See S.iv, 95; A.iv, 430
 2. See Keith, Bud.Phi. Ch.iii

arise desires to satisfy the excited feelings. This is the problem in *which* Buddhism is mainly interested. What matters is the given. It is seen that the individual is constantly played upon by the outside world. It is also seen that it is this contact between within and without that signifies the beginning of all kinds of unrest and attendant miseries.¹ It is this situation which Buddhism seeks to explain, not for its own sake but for making an end of all suffering. As a philosophy Buddhism begins where necessity sets in.

The *Simsapā Sutta*,² as Prof. Oldenberg observes, states briefly what Buddhism is and what it is not. "It does not purport to be a philosophy which inquires into the ultimate grounds of things, unfold to thought the breadths and depths of the universe".³ For it is little interested in metaphysical questions and in constructive speculations of the universe which have no immediate relevance and reference to the

1. Cf. *Cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānaṃ tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso phassapaccayaṃ vedanā vedanāpaccayaṃ tanhā tanhāpaccayaṃ upādānaṃ upādānapaccayaṃ bhavo bhava-paccayaṃ jāti jātipaccayaṃ ṭāramāraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupāyasaṃ sambhavanti* (applied to the other sense organs and the sense-objects) - S.i 73

2. See S.v 437-8

3. Oldenberg, Buddha ... , 205

problem of salvation. Hence questions concerning the first and final causes or the original germ of all things are set aside. Speculative questions on the infinity and duration of the world are among those brought under the heading "avyākata"¹ (not explained). The reason for this attitude is that a knowledge of such questions - whether they can be known or not is another question - is not essential for one to work out one's own salvation.

It is in the problem of dukkha and its elimination that Buddhism is primarily interested. "As the vast ocean, O disciples, is impregnated with one taste, the taste of salt even so this doctrine and discipline is impregnated with one taste, the taste of deliverance."² But in order to fashion out a way of deliverance from saṃsāra it was necessary to study the nature of "saṃsāric" existence. The individual should be shown exactly where he stands in relation to the universe around and within him, the obstacles with which he is besetted and the potentialities with which he is endowed. It is for this reason that Buddhism seeks to explain the empiric individuality in relation to the external world.

1. See M.i 426 ff.; S.v 438

2. Seyyathā pi bhikkhave mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso, evam eva kho bhikkhave ayaṃ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttirasō.

- Vin.ii 239

The earlier attempts to explain this situation are represented by the analyses into khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. They are the component factors into which existence is analysed. They purport to show that there does not exist a "unity", "substance" "atta" or "jīva". Unity is really a complex of factors, "one" is really "many". This applies to both mind (nāma) and matter (rūpa). Both exist as complexes. In the case of living beings there is no self (atta) which is immortal while in the case of things in general there is no essence which is ever-perduring. That existence does not consist of a primary substance, mental or material, but is composed of a variety of factors is the conclusion that could be drawn from the analyses into khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. "The Tathāgata sees in its true perspective the world which consists of a plurality of elements, a variety of elements" - "Tathāgato ... aneka-dhātu-nānā-dhātu-lokaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti".¹ Since existence, both mental and material, is sought to be explained with reference to a plurality of basic factors, we may, following Prof. Stcherbatsky,² call Buddhism (as represented in the Nikāyas) pluralistic.

Prof. Murti is inclined to believe that the doctrine

1. M.i 70

2. See Bud. Logic, i, 3-7;

of elements (khandha-dhātu-āyatana) was not meant to be taken as an ultimate standpoint: "On our interpretation, the doctrine of elements was necessary as a preliminary step. If there had been only the substance-view (ātmavāda) in the field, Buddha could not have been led to the dialectical consciousness. A model view too was necessary. A thesis had to be opposed by a counter-thesis before there could emerge the dialectical consciousness. Then alone could there be a Conflict in Reason and the attempt to transcend it. As a matter of dialectical necessity then did Buddha formulate, or at least suggest, a theory of elements".¹

There are certain trends in the canonical works which seem to support such a conclusion.² If we take into consideration the immense emphasis with which Buddhism advocates the eradication of all kinds of attachment to, or craving for, any kind of thing, mental or material, we could, however, understand them in a different way. Here we may do well to draw a sharp distinction between Buddhist analysis of existence and the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline. Although existence is reduced to a multiplicity of basic factors this certainly does not mean that one should

1. Cent. Phi. of Buddhism, 49-50

2. Cf. for instance the Mūlapariyāya Sutta in M.i 1 ff.; see also Warder, BSOAS., Vol. xviii, 50

lean on them, that one should have any attachment to them. They are as impermanent as the compounds they produce. They too belong to the level of "saṃsāric" existence. Hence they too should be transcended in the sense that one should free oneself from any kind of desire towards them. "Dhātukusalatā"¹, the ability in the analysis of existence into different elements, is in itself not sufficient. In the context of the practical doctrine and discipline, it is only a preliminary step to "manasikāra-kusalatā"², the ability to reflect on their true nature, i.e., as impermanent (anicca), as devoid of any persistent substance (anatta) and as characterized by unrest or as a source of suffering (dukkha). It is only then that the yogin begins to turn away from them and ceases to have^{any} kind of attachment to them.³ Thus within the context of the Buddhist ethical discipline dhātu-kusalatā is only a preliminary step to manasikāra-kusalatā and manasikāra-kusalatā is only a preliminary step to the elimination of all desires which in turn has the realisation of Nibbāna as its goal. But the advocacy of non-attachment (even) to the basic factors

1. See A.i 83

2. See Ibid.loc.cit.,

3. Cf. Puna ca param .āvuso bhikkhuno rūpaṃ manasikaroto rūpesu cittaṃ na pakkhandati nappasīdati na santiṭṭhati ... - D.i 239

does not necessarily mean that they are considered as ultimately unreal. It seems that it is the immense emphasis with which Buddhism advocates its doctrine of non-attachment (virāga) that is responsible for the presence, in the texts, of certain trends which seem to suggest that the doctrine of elements (khandha-dhātu-āyatana) is not meant as an ultimate standpoint.

The fundamental character of Buddhist philosophy (as represented in the Nikāyas) is well illustrated by the Buddhist refutation of the four theses, namely, sabbam atthi, sabbam natthi, sabbam ekattam and sabbam puthuttam.¹

Avoiding the two extremes (anta) of sabbam atthi (everything is) and sabbam natthi (everything is not), it steers a middle course: "This world, O Kaccāna, generally proceeds on a duality, of the 'it is' and the 'it is not'. But, O Kaccāna, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no 'it is not' in this world. Whoever, Kaccāna, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no 'it is'".² Thus neither Being nor non-Being is

1. See S.ii 77

2. Dvayanissito khvāyam Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañ ca natthitañ ca.

Lokasamudayam kho kaccāyana yathābhūtam sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti// lokanirodham kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtam sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti. - S.ii 17

the truth. There is only Becoming, happening by way of cause, continuity without identity, persistence without a persisting substance. "He who discerns origin by way of cause he discerns the Dhamma; he who discerns the Dhamma he discerns origin by way of cause".¹ No permanence is associated with the basic factors of existence or the compounds they produce. They are conditioned (saṅkhata), brought about by certain causes (paṭiccasamuppanna) and are subject to dissolution (nirodhadhamma). Anicca (impermanence), aññathatta (otherwiseness), viparināma (fluctuation), khaya (waning away), vaya (passing away), udayabbaya (rise and fall) - these words, more or less synonymous and occurring in the texts with more or less equal frequency, indicate the great emphasis with which Buddhism advocated its doctrine of change.²

Buddhism also steers a middle course between sabbam ekattam and sabbam puthuttam.³ Ekattam implies a unity, a whole with fractions. The component parts of the universe,

1. D. iii, 275 ; M. i, 191

2. Two things should, however, be noted: One is that in the earlier texts the doctrine of change is not explained on the basis of a theory of moments as is done in the later texts. The other is that the relative permanence of matter is not denied. - see above, 215-19

3. See S. ii 77

according to the Buddhist analysis, are not fractions of a whole indicating an absolute unity (ekatta), but a number of co-ordinate ultimates. This seems to be the reason why Buddhism refuses to subscribe to the view of existence implied by the thesis, sabbam ekattam. Puthutta, on the other hand, implies a theory of "absolute separateness" and suggests that the world is a concatenation of separate and discrete factors with no inter-connection, with no inter-dependence. A theory of this kind is, in fact, advocated by one of the six paribbājakas mentioned in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta.¹ The Buddhist view of existence does not amount to such an extreme (anta). For according to Buddhism the factors of existence are inter-connected by laws of causality. Although the factors are not the fractions of a whole, yet they are inter-connected and inter-dependent. Thus causality emphasizes some kind of unity, but not an extreme form of unity as implied by sabbam ekattam.

In the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the realistic and pluralistic view of existence is retained and is developed further. That existence does not consist of a primary substance is the main theme that is sought to be explained here. Although the analyses into khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus are retained, the general pattern of the analysis

1. Cf. the doctrine attributed to Pakudha Kaccāyana in D.i,56

has undergone some notable change. Nāma (mind, the mental) is divided into two broad groups as citta (consciousness) and cetasika (consciousness-concomitants). Rūpa (matter) is divided (analysed) into twenty seven items. These mental and material factors of existence are introduced by the technical term, dhammā.

The definition of these mental and material dhammas and the explanation of their inter-connection form the primary function of the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. One cardinal principle that is implicitly accepted is that to understand properly any given item is to know it in all relations, under all the aspects recognized in the philosophy and the practical doctrine and discipline of Buddhism. Therefore the same material is sought to be classified in different ways and from different points of view. This explains why in the Dhammasaṅgani and other Abhidhamma pakaraṇas one encounters interminable lists of classifications. Although they may appear as repetitive and therefore monotonous, yet they serve a useful purpose. For they bring into relief, not only the individual characteristics of each dhamma, but also its position in relation to other dhammas.

In the list of rūpa-dhammas given in the works of the

Abhidhamma Piṭaka, some of the items - particularly those which, in the post-canonical Abhidhammic works, are brought under the heading, anipphanna - may appear as artificial constructions. However, if we try to understand the list in the context of the Buddhist (Theravāda) philosophy and its practical doctrine and discipline, the selection of the items becomes meaningful.

Of the twenty seven ¹rūpa-dhammas the four mahābhūtas, and rūpa, gandha, rasa and āhāra explain the constitution of matter in general. For they are the basic elements (= the avinibhoga-rūpa of the commentators) present in all instances of matter, whether they exist as a part of the complex that makes the living being or otherwise. Sadda stands for sound, and ākāsa-dhātu for delimited space, the space delimited by matter. All the remaining seventeen items pertain exclusively to the body of a living being. This fact, at least indirectly, suggests that it was the physical aspects of a personality more than matter in general that drew the special attention of the Ābhidhammikas. When we remember the nature and scope of the Buddhist analysis of existence, such a situation becomes quite understandable. Of the seventeen items in question five, namely, cakku,

1. i.e., according to the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

sota, ghāna, jivhā and kāya are the first five sense-organs, the physical bases of the five kinds of consciousness named after them, or the material constituents of the cognitive apparatus. Itthindriya and purisindriya signify the sex distinctions, and rūpa-jīvitindriya accounts for the life-principle of kamma-caused rūpa. The two viññattis, namely, kāyaviññatti and vacīviññatti, explain how a personality expresses itself. They are really connected with the Buddhist theory of kamma. For they represent the physical manifestation of karmically qualifiable thoughts. The triad of lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā shows the special importance attached to bodily health or efficiency (which is necessary for mental culture). The last four items, namely, upacaya, santati, jaratā and aniccata represent four phases of the history of the body, from the moment of conception to the moment of death. It will thus be seen that the list of rūpa-dhammas is an attempt to explain and account for all the physical aspects as well as certain facts connected with these physical aspects of a personality and its physical environment.