

BHUTTO, THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY  
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT  
IN PAKISTAN, 1967-1977.

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## ABSTRACT

This study analyses politics in Pakistan viewed from the perspective of Bhutto and The Pakistan People's Party in the period 1967-1977. This involves a detailed consideration of the nature and performance of the PPP, in terms of its social composition, organisational development and its role in the political system, and of leadership patterns in Pakistan with special reference to Bhutto. In the process of this inquiry we examine the origin and rise of the PPP, its electoral performance in 1970 and the repercussions of the 1971 crisis on the party. In analysing the Bhutto regime in the period 1971-1977, we look at both the internal dynamics of the PPP in terms of its development as a patrimonial-clientele type party exhibiting some 'mass party' features, and Bhutto's relations with the political opposition, the civil bureaucracy and the military.

This study attempts to apply the patrimonial model to Bhutto's political system. As a heuristic tool, this concept enables us to explain and relate a wide range of phenomena such as personalism, factionalism, patronage and corruption. The phenomena of a dominating figure as reflected in Bhutto's patrimonialism is viewed against the background of the country's colonial Viceregal tradition and related to its culture and social structure. Bhutto's patrimonial system is viewed as an adaptation of the Viceregal model. Patrimonial features such as the personalisation and concentration of power, the manipulation of clientele support from rural landed groups, and the primary reliance on bureaucratic, rather than participatory and representative instruments of rule are essentially those identified with the Viceregal pattern of governance. It is argued that Bhutto's patrimonial strategy not only resulted in a failure to develop the PPP into an institutionalised party of the type associated with 'modern' political systems, but served to inhibit political development and reinforce Pakistan's praetorian tradition.

The materials used in this thesis include official publications, political party literature, Urdu and English language newspapers and magazines as well as information derived through personal interviews with prominent personalities.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION .....	1
<u>PART I</u>	
Chapter	
I	A PROFILE OF PAKISTANI POLITICS AND SOCIETY ..... 36  Authority and the State: The Primacy of Civil-Military Bureaucracy. • Rural Structure. • Urban Structure. • Party Development in Pakistan. The Ayub Khan Era.
II	BHUTTO AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY 1967-1969 ..... 97  Bhutto: Background and Early Career. Background to the Formation of the PPP. • Foundation of the Party. • Organisational Development of the Party and Growth of its Support Base. • The Role of the PPP in the Anti-Ayub Movement.
III	THE PPP AS AN ELECTORAL MACHINE, 1970 ..... 171  PPP: The Decision to Participate and the Hala Conference. • The General Election of 1970. • The PPP and the Campaign. • Results of the Election. • Conclusion: Nature of the PPP in the Electoral Phase.
IV	BHUTTO, THE PPP AND THE CRISIS OF BANGLADESH, 1971..... 241  Bhutto and the Six Points. Towards Confrontation. The PPP and the Yahya Regime: March - December, 1971. Bhutto and the PPP: An Assessment.

PART II

Chapter		Page
V	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1971-1977: AN OVERVIEW .....	301
	o Early Priorities and Dilemmas.	
	o Economic Reconstruction.	
	Political Reconstruction: The PPP and Opposition.	
	The 1977 Election and the Fall of the PPP Government.	
<del>VI</del>	THE PPP : PARTY BUILDING AND PATRIMONIALISM....	378
	Bhutto: Beliefs and Strategy.	
	- Party Organisation and Patrimonial Power.	
	- The Challenge from the Left and the 1972 Party Convention.	
	- The Shift in the Party's Social Base.	
<del>VII</del>	THE PPP : FACTIONALISM, PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION .....	421
	- Factionalism in the Party.	
	The Nature and Consequences of Factional Conflict.	
	The Politics of Patronage and Corruption.	
VIII	THE PPP : PERSONALISM OR INSTITUTIONALISATION?..	487
	The Party, 1975-76.	
	- An Assessment of the PPP.	
IX	THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION .....	500
	The Historical and Cultural Legacy: The Limits of Tolerance.	
	Bhutto's Attitude towards Opposition.	
	PPP and Opposition: The Politics of Control and Suppression.	
	The Opposition's Challenge to the Bhutto Regime.	
X	BHUTTO AND THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY .....	587
	PPP and the Civil Service: The Background.	
	Bhutto's Attitude towards the Civil Bureaucracy.	
	Purges, Reform and Patrimonial Control.	
	From Control to Reliance.	

Chapter	Page
XI      BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY .....	634
Models of Civil-Military Relations. The Pakistani Experience upto 1971. Bhutto and the Military. The Military Coup of July 1977.	
<del>XII</del> THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT .....	682
Regime Performance and the 1977 Urban Protest Movement.	
CONCLUSION .....	753
APPENDIX A      SELECT LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED .....	775
APPENDIX B      POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN - 1968-69..	777
APPENDIX C      ASGHAR KHAN'S LETTER TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES - APRIL 1977...	779
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	781

LIST OF TABLES

Table		<u>Page</u>
I.1	Level of Urbanisation .....	56
I.2	Registered Trade Unions and Membership .....	57
I.3	Major Daily Newspapers, Ownership and Circulation (1974) .....	65
III.1	Allocation of Seats for the 1970 Election ....	188
III.2	Nominations for the National Assembly by Party and Region .....	190
III.3	Percentage Voting Turnout by Province for National and Provincial Election, 1970 .....	211
III.4	Results of the Election Held in December 1970 to National and Provincial Assemblies .....	212
III.5	Votes Cast for the PPP by Province (N.A. Election) .....	213
III.6	Voting Percentage (N.A.) .....	214
III.7	Percentage of Seats and Votes Won by the PPP in the Punjab Districts (N.A.).....	222
III.8	Selected Socio-Economic Variables and the PPP Vote - Coefficient of Rank Correlation .....	225
V.1	Industrial Investment, 1970-71 to 1976-77 ....	323
V.2	Results of the N.A. Elections, 1977 .....	356
VI.1	Social Background of the Top 50 PPP Leaders, 1975-76 .....	413
XI.1	Senior Officers Relieved from Service (during the first four months of the Bhutto government) .....	644
XI.2	GNP, Gross Revenue Receipts and Defence Expenditures .....	657
XII.1	Position of Major Industrial Families: Impact of Nationalisation .....	689
XII.2	Trend in Prices (Yearly Averages), 1971/72 to 1976/77 .....	704

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1	- PPP Organisation - 1969/70 .....	199
Figure 2	- Constitutional Organisation of the Pakistan Government, 1973 .....	340



## INTRODUCTION

This thesis has a two-fold purpose: (1) To contribute to the subdiscipline of what has been termed Stasiology by focusing on and analysing the performance of a political party - the PPP - in a particular country and (2) to explore a number of themes in nation-building and political 'modernisation' as illustrated from Pakistan's experience in the period considered - 1967-1977. In the case of the former, our aim is to enhance the empirical knowledge of Third World parties by a detailed consideration of the nature of the PPP in terms of its social composition, organisational development, leadership style, and structure, its relationship with the society at large, and its role in the political system. The personalism, factionalism and patronage practices that are identified as the dominant characteristics of the PPP lead to our depiction of the party as a patrimonial clientele type, but a party which nonetheless exhibits features of the 'mass party' type. Our concern is to examine the PPP as a patrimonial style party and the problems inherent in the combination of 'mass and 'clientele' characteristics.

The latter purpose involves an appraisal of leadership patterns in Pakistan with special reference to Bhutto. We also look at problems of political institutionalisation as illustrated from the case of the PPP and the nature of a patrimonial-clientele system as reflected in Bhutto's strategy of political consolidation.

The focus of the study is 'national' and represents a 'case study' approach, but the range of questions asked, such as the tension between a patrimonial type party and 'mass' party, the obstacles in the development of the PPP into a discrete, autonomous organisation, are typically those raised with respect to parties elsewhere in the Third World. At the same time the thesis incorporates suggestions from broad cross-national analyses. It utilises certain middle-range generalisations that have been derived from comparative studies, which act as a guide to this study.

In many countries of the Third World, the political party has become a prominent feature of political life. This has led many western scholars to direct considerable attention to studying and analysing this political phenomenon. Much of this concern arises from the widespread assumption that parties are vital mechanisms by which the 'new nations' can deal with the societal transformations implicit in the 'modernisation' process. Through the writings of many scholars of the development process runs the persistent theme: without denying the efficacy of other institutions, political parties are the most important agency in helping to cope with the problems that result from 'modernisation'.<sup>1</sup> "In the modernising world he controls the future who organises its politics", Huntington writes.<sup>2</sup> In a similar vein, David Apter notes that "in the area of political modernisation, no single role is of greater

importance than that of party politician."<sup>3</sup>

The study of political parties in the Third World however, has been problematic.<sup>4</sup> The tradition of classical European party theory handed down by scholars such as Sigmund Neuman, Maurice Duverger, Giovanni Sartori and Otto Kirchheimer, while providing a valuable source of insights, could not be applied satisfactorily to the great variety of parties in political systems markedly different from the European environment. Thus those studying parties in the Third World invented new typologies and categories to analyse the non-western parties. This is not the place for a detailed review of the large literature on political parties in the developing states. However, some of these typologies deserve to be mentioned both because they have provided some of our terms of reference and to indicate some of the problems inherent in such typologies.

Many of the typologies emerged from studies of African political parties<sup>5</sup> but can be applied elsewhere in the Third World. The starting point of most of these studies was an acceptance of the position taken by Thomas Hodgkin in his influential study of African political parties that it was neither necessary nor useful to define the term 'party' and that we should 'consider as parties all political organisations which regard themselves as parties and which are generally so regarded.'<sup>6</sup> Different writers put forward a wide variety of typological constructs. One such approach was to distinguish between 'mass' and 'patron' parties, (an adapted version of Maurice Duverger's distinction between 'mass' and 'cadre' parties), in which the way

elites related to non-elites and the ideology of elites were treated as the crucial variables.<sup>7</sup> 'Mass' parties reached out to all the citizens in the community to represent, rule and lead them, and relative to 'patron' parties had an articulated organisation and institutionalised leadership. Patron parties usually rested on limited elitist support and their goals were likewise limited.

Other typological constructs emphasised the social bases of parties and their goals as distinguishing criteria. Thus 'mass' parties were contrasted with ethnic, tribal and regional or 'clientele' parties.<sup>8</sup> The typologies constructed for the African one-party states increasingly focused on the notion of "dynamism", and there was a distinct trend toward categorisations of parties in terms of their mobilisation and integrative functions.<sup>9</sup> 'Revolutionary' - centralising parties,<sup>10</sup> 'revolutionary mass movement regimes',<sup>11</sup> 'mobilising' parties<sup>12</sup> were contrasted with 'pragmatic-pluralistic',<sup>13</sup> or 'consociational types'.<sup>14</sup> Within the mass parties, a distinction was also frequently made between 'mobilist' and 'adaptive' parties.<sup>15</sup> The former was typically concerned with effecting attitudinal and behavioural changes within society while the primary concern of the latter was its adaptation to the sentiments of the public in its quest for electoral support.

The tendency in the literature and research that utilised such typologies was to attribute characteristics to the parties studied that were often based on the images that such parties wished the world to see rather than on empirical reality.<sup>16</sup> It soon became apparent that the images

conveyed by such typologies were based on a description of those aspects of Third World parties which were most accessible to outside observers. As one scholar wrote, addressing the same point:

"Too often the politics of new states have been described as if intentions were facts, as if the word had become flesh; the characterisations of political systems in Africa are based on images conveyed to the world by party leaders." 17

When in a growing number of Afro-Asian countries supposedly 'strong' 'mass' parties were overthrown by the military with relative ease and little reaction from the party membership or general populace, it became apparent that early studies had frequently mistaken the rhetoric of the political elites for reality and posited characteristics, such as mass support and organisational coherence, that simply were not there.

The fluid nature of Third World politics not only required a set of typological constructs that were rooted in empirical reality but which could also explain a wide range of phenomena, such as personalism, factionalism, and corruption, previously considered deviant or pathological and hence excluded from any analyses, but which appeared to be pervasive in the developing nations. Many scholars claimed to have found categories that could be adapted for use in the Third World context in the initial and earlier stages of the western evolution of parties. According to this approach most parties of the Third World could be perceived and rendered in terms of the familiar 'clientele' or 'political machine' models derived from the pre-mass stage of party development.<sup>18</sup> This has led to the depiction of

the political parties in developing countries as organisations resembling the political machines - the patronage party - so widely discussed in the literature on American political parties. This approach may still appear a variety of western-centricity, but endeavours based on such an approach are not liable to be more western inspired than the Third World polity builders themselves. After all, party symbols, techniques and arrangements are largely - for the new states - adaptations of imports.

The approach in this study combines some of the terms of reference provided by the earlier typological constructs with those derived from the 'machine' model. To these are added distinctive features of Pakistani society to produce a comprehensive analysis of the PPP in the period under review. This involves, inter alia, three general questions. The first of these concerns the tension between a mass-based party and a patrimonially-led clientele one as illustrated from the case of the PPP. The second concern is with identifying the dilemma of reconciling strong, personalised leadership with developing organisational strength and viability. And third, we are concerned with the problem of institutionalisation, i.e. in examining the factors which hindered the institutionalisation of the PPP as a political party of the kind associated with 'modern' political systems. The discussion of such questions should not only reveal the specific nature of the PPP but also help to illuminate aspects of the general dilemma of party-building in a Third World country.

However, before the role of the PPP in the political development of Pakistan can be analysed, it is appropriate to outline the conceptual and methodological assumption underlying this study. Since there are several definitions of political development, an assessment of the party's role in political development and how the one relates to the other, depends in part on one's conceptualisation of the phenomenon. It would be inappropriate here to review either the extensive original or secondary literature concerning political development. It is sufficient to note that no consensus emerges from this literature on the precise definition - and measurement - of political development. A number of quite individualistic central concepts have been put forward as characterising the essence of political development. Some of these are: the restructuring of society, the acquisition of new political capabilities, increasing differentiation and specialisation of political functions, greater participation of citizenry in the political system, ontological change, improvements in organisational technology, social mobilisation and a communications revolution. However, closer inspection shows that these concepts are interrelated, and that there is considerable conceptual equivalence among the various formulations (of political development), partly hidden though it is by terminological variety. Thus these and other views about the attributes of political development have contributed to what is an increasingly accepted understanding of the general concept.

We examine now how the terms 'political development' and 'political modernisation' are generally used by political scientists. Although some scholars have used the two terms interchangeably, it is usually recognised that modernisation refers to a much broader process of change than political development as we shall see below. 'Modernisation' in general refers to a complex process of change producing significant social, economic, political and psychological transformations. The cluster of interrelated transformations labelled 'modernisation' includes changing forms of economic and social activity as production for the market and wage labour made inroads into subsistence agriculture and non-monetary exchange of goods and services, growing urbanisation, broadening application of technology, and increasing specialisation and division of labour. In the modernisation process, old social relationships, customary patterns of social and economic activity, and former attitudes and values are being gradually eroded and replaced or joined by new and different social and psychological patterns. Accompanying these changes have come wider exposure to mass communications media, new and broader identifications and loyalties, and an expansion of political awareness and participation. Modernisation is seen as the effect of the new on the old, not the eradication of the old and its substitution by the new. It is generally agreed that modernisation should not be confused with 'progress', nor should it involve teleological assumptions. That roughly similar patterns of change are occurring throughout the world is not to say that any nation is



presently at the end point of modernisation or indeed that there is a final end point at which modernisation will be complete. Such transformations are not inexorably bound to terminate in presently definable societies, economies and political systems.

These transformations in the political sphere have commonly been expressed as a syndrome of related characteristics of political modernisation. The syndrome as suggested by Lucien Pye<sup>19</sup> and others, varies somewhat, but may be said to include (1) a general attitude towards equality which allows equality of opportunity to participate in politics and compete for government office; (2) the capacity of people in a political system to formulate policies and to have them carried out; and (3) differentiation and specialisation of political functions.

These changes are often seen to give rise to what are generally called "developmental problems". These problems or crises to be met within the course of modernisation are listed differently by different writers. They include problems of legitimacy (expressed as a problem of state-building), identity (expressed as a problem of nation-building), distribution (how political and other benefits are to be shared), penetration (effective administration) and integration (of specialised governmental functions).<sup>20</sup>

Given the existence of these developmental problems arising from political modernisation, political development is then often seen as a political system's capacity to solve these problems.<sup>21</sup> Leaving aside the point of why some problems (or crises) are selected and not others, this formulation of

political development does not provide a uniform approach as writers are often at variance in stating what is part of the modernisation syndrome, and what constitutes a problem arising from the syndrome. Political development as a capability to solve problems arising from modernisation is suggested more simply but rather differently by Alfred Diament. He views political development as a process which creates an institutional framework for solving an ever-widening range of social problems.<sup>22</sup> While this formulation avoids specifying the goal or purpose of political development, it too is fraught with difficulties. By suggesting that the problems to be solved may extend beyond the bounds of the developmental set of problems, the definition ends up in a potential minefield.

If the discussion of political change is fraught with serious ambiguities and theoretical difficulties, nevertheless, the different perspectives of writers in the field have provided us with the material to assemble a conception of political development. For the purposes of this study we have sought to incorporate in our analysis some of the key dimensions of political change and modernisation which students of the new state tend to refer to when speaking of political development. The key elements of political development involve, first, with respect to the population as a whole, a change from widespread subject status to an increasing number of contributing citizens, with an accompanying spread of mass participation, a greater sensitivity to the principles of equality, and a wider acceptance of universalistic laws. Second, with respect to

governmental and general systematic performances, political development involves an increase in the capacity of the political system to manage public affairs, control controversy and cope with popular demands. Finally, with respect to the organisation of the polity, political development implies greater institutionalisation of political organisations and procedures and greater integration of all the participating institutions and organisations.

However, since this conceptualisation contains elements of western ethnocentricity and tends to imply a vision of the end-product of modernisation or political development in terms of these interrelated elements, it needs to be qualified by a number of additional assumptions, central to this study. First, we assume that societies may develop in ways not necessarily envisaged by the western model of modernisation. Second, we recognise the importance of various aspects of a society's historical continuity for shaping different contours of its development. Thirdly, we recognise that the mere destruction of traditional forms of life does not necessarily assure the development of a new and viable modern society. Finally, as our use of the term 'patrimonialism' in depicting Bhutto's political system implies, modernising societies do not necessarily travel along an inevitable path towards one type of modernity, but tend to develop their own pattern or 'logic' which can perhaps be better explained and understood in terms of different aspects of the society's tradition. In a sense, then, the 'patrimonial model' as illustrated from the Pakistani case can be viewed as a

particular method of coping with political change, suggesting its own version of modernity.

From the standpoint of political development, party roles and configuration can be viewed as the outgrowth of the development process - the culmination as it were, of processes of societal, economic and political change - indeed it is customary to view the party as a dependent variable in this sense, influenced by interacting societal variables. But parties can also be viewed as institutionalised forces affecting political change, whether it be "progressive" or "retrogressive". Parties can, and often do, have an impact on the development of the political system in which they operate. The assumption underlying our concern with the role played by parties in political development, reflects our understanding that they are not only the products of their environment but also instruments of organised human action for affecting that environment. Therefore, a meaningful research strategy must view the party as both dependent and independent variable in the modernisation process. Just as the importance of social, economic, cultural and communication factors in shaping and constraining the process of a party's development cannot be denied, neither should the important influence which may be exerted in these sectors by the party be forgotten. It is true that several scholars have treated the party as a dependent variable, suggesting that it is the modernisation process itself that produces political organisations, and that political organisation is a consequence of increased occupational differentiation which in turn results from

economic growth and technological change. The difficulty with viewing political change in such a sequential fashion is that however logical it may appear to be, in the history of political change no such sequence can be found. Indeed, political organisation often precedes and may be an important factor in whether or not there is a large scale economic change.

Pakistan both shares a number of common characteristics with other 'new nations' often described as constituting the Third World, and exhibits a number of features that are distinctive to it. Like most other post-war 'new' nation-states, Pakistan is still grappling with the problem of forging a positive national identity. Pakistani society is highly fragmented, divided, subdivided and cross-divided by horizontal cleavages based on cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, and vertical cleavages based on class, and by 'social gaps' between the westernised, urban-based modern elite and the predominantly rural, illiterate masses. An overwhelmingly rural society with dense population, cruel poverty and growing tensions between expanding hopes, wants and needs, and painfully slow economic and social advancement, are characteristics broadly shared by most Third World countries. Pakistan exhibits social patterns associated with subsistence and village life - rigid stratification and tight bonds of family and kinship groups. Relatively rapid, frequently disturbing and disorienting change is an additional characteristic Pakistan shares with other new nations. Processes of social, economic, political and psychological change have

commenced which have already produced important alterations in the patterns of life and work of vast numbers of persons in the country and bode further, far reaching transformations creating what is often described as a 'transitional' society. However, such change has affected the country in what one scholar has called a 'dysrhythmic' fashion.<sup>23</sup> That is to say, it has affected parts of society at a differential rate. We can identify regional variations - with Baluchistan virtually unaffected, the North West Frontier marginally affected, Sind more relatively affected and Punjab perhaps the most significantly transformed. Moreover, even where the incidence of change has been the greatest, old and new persist side by side and few social structures have been wholly transformed. For example, in the Punjab, the feudal chieftan may have lost some of his political authority but he retains his position in the ritual and social hierarchies. Clearly then, certain sections of Pakistan society seem relatively impervious to the transformations and some traditional customs and attitudes have proved to be astonishingly persistent. Yet if one looks at the country as a whole, such transformations have given rise to a host of problems common to traditional societies responding to the demands of the modern world. Such problems have led to the concern in this study with the processes of change and adaptation.

The distinctiveness of Pakistan lies in (1) the religious nature of the state's raison d'être; (2) the unique geographic aspects (in the pre-Bangladesh period) of

the union of East and West Pakistan; (3) the tenuous integration of the four ethnic/regional groups into what now constitutes Pakistan and (4) the Viceregal tradition.

The unique aspects of two parts of the country separated territorially was an incongruity that needs little explanation, and in the post-Bangladesh period has little relevance. But the subcultural differences in the Pakistani population based on four distinct ethnic/regional groups means that the integration of Pakistan is a largely formalistic and tentative phenomena. Each of the four major ethnic groups (the Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis and Baluchis) has its own language, culture and social customs, and is based in a clearly defined regional area. A fifth ethnic group is composed of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (refugees from India) who are dispersed throughout the Punjab and Sind. However, their largest concentration is found in Karachi and the major urban centres of Sind.

Another distinctive feature of Pakistan is its Islamic identity. Over 97% of Pakistanis are Muslim, but despite this regional homogeneity of Pakistan's population, Islam has not always proved to be unifying force for a number of reasons. To begin with, Pakistani Muslims are divided into two major sects - Shia and Sunni - which themselves are sub-divided into numerous groups and movements. The Sunnis compose the preponderant majority and contain within their fold numerous groups and movements, but these are not distinctive sects. The Shia community (which forms an estimated 20% of the population) is sub-divided into a number of sects, such as the Ismailis and the Bohras. The

Ahmeddiyas represent a separate, distinctive sect although originating within the Sunni fold.

The Shia-Sunni schism has been of relatively minor political significance in Pakistan in the past. Of greater importance has been the problem of defining the role of Islam in the state. Except for the state of Israel no other modern nation has appealed to a religious faith as the basis for its establishment. The religious basis of Pakistani nationalism raised the problem of what sort of state was appropriate for Muslims and what policies should be pursued. The Pakistani state could not be a theocracy, for the campaign for Pakistan was led by political rather than religious leaders, and political power subsequently was exercised by the former rather than the mullahs. But it could not be a secular state either, for Islam was the raison d'être of Pakistan, and Islam, unlike Christianity, did not recognise a separation between the religious and political sphere. Moreover, Pakistani leaders from Jinnah onwards believed that while other Muslim countries like Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and Tunisia could embark on a territorial and secular nationalism and forge a feeling of common identity on a unity of race, territory, history and culture, in Pakistan each of these factors tended to make for sub-national unity rather than a sense of Pakistan nationhood. Thus, in Pakistan, Islam provided the only stable basis of unity between its various provinces and sub-groups. At the same time since Pakistani leaders recognised that it was their Islamic identity that set them apart from their neighbours, the new state should



reveal its Muslim heritage. How this was to be done, however, became a highly contentious political issue at the elite level.

Conflict between the westernised, partially secularised elite and the traditional Ulema (the religious leaders) over the proper role of Islam in the state has characterised Pakistani politics throughout. It needs to be mentioned that while several elites can be identified in Pakistan (with a certain amount of overlapping between them) - the Ulema, the civil-military bureaucratic elite, the leading industrial families, the traditional landed-gentry and the emerging urban middle-class professional elite - when we abstract generally these elites can nevertheless be aggregated to enable us to differentiate broadly between the westernised, partially secularised elite and the religious elite. Even amongst the non-Ulema elite groups, the 'problem' of Islam has been a source of considerable tension and controversy. This explains the fact that even amongst the non-religious leadership, no one has ever openly pressed for secularisation of the polity. Indeed, successive Pakistani rulers have recognised the need to pursue the goals of modernisation and progress in an Islamic setting.

The fourth distinctive feature of the country is its Viceregal tradition. Before outlining this, it is important to note that the areas that comprised Pakistan (with the exception of East Bengal) inherited the tradition of what the British termed the Non-Regulation provinces (in which the district administration enjoyed enormous

discretionary powers) on the one hand, and that of political agencies and princely states on the other hand (which had been personal autocracies). The rest of India, for the most part, inherited the tradition of the Regulation Provinces, in which the local administration had enjoyed less discretionary authority and had functioned within a more rigid framework of rules and regulations.

The colonial Viceregal system, that prevailed in undivided India before partition, was in essence, an autocracy. The hallmark of this system was a powerful viceroy, who as de facto Emperor of India, possessed immense authority (subject to a distant crown) and ruled with the help of a powerful civil-military bureaucracy, free from parliamentary or popular limitations on his power. Power in India proceeded downward from the Viceroy-Emperor not upward from the people. Although ultimate power lay with the viceroy, he delegated part of his authority to his chosen representatives in the provinces and districts. A direct chain of authority descended from the viceroy to the provincial Governors to the District Officers. Each of these was an identifiable person, who enjoyed paternal power and was called Ma-baap (mother-father) by the people whose welfare he held in trust. Thus the conventions of government in British India were based on paternalistic, authoritarian rule from above. However, such paternalism in no sense reflected the notion of accountability to the Indian public; rather any benevolence exercised represented an act of grace. It is true that as time went on, the British applied a policy of gradual

extension of self-government to India, but until the very end of British rule, final power remained in the hands of the viceroy and his governors. In fact there was a steady increase in the powers and status of the viceroy's office as the territories he ruled grew larger and its responsibilities correspondingly greater. Central to the viceroy's strategy of rule (in the area that later comprised Pakistan) was a policy of quid pro quo with the zamindars (feudal landlords) and tribal chieftans. Feudal privileges, far from being challenged, were extended in exchange for their loyalty to the Crown.

Many of these elements of the Viceregal system have endured and survived, with some modification throughout Pakistan's history. Indeed, of all the successor states to the British Indian Empire, Pakistan retained most completely the institutional configuration of the British Raj. In fact behind Pakistan's constitutional instability and its experimentation with different forms of government, lies a fundamental continuity in terms of its Viceregal tradition. The explanation for this need not detain us here, as it is dealt with in the following chapter. It is necessary only to note how the structure of the new state showed substantial continuity with the old. Many essential elements of the Viceregal heritage can be discerned in the Pakistani polity: in the concentration of power in a strong leader from Jinnah through Ayub to Bhutto, in the primacy of personality over institutionalised governance, in the supremacy of the permanent executive over representative institutions, in the primary

reliance placed on the civil-military bureaucracy, and in the ultimate dependence of the entire system on a glorified 'Great Leader'. The military regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan were structurally revivals from a Viceregal past without even the feeble legislature of the earlier period.<sup>24</sup> The anti-political bias of the civilian-military bureaucracy and its suppression of political groups claiming to represent the people and demanding a parliamentary system, was partly aimed at building a state free from political division. These goals and strategy bore a close resemblance to the colonial system's aims and policy.

In many important respects, Bhutto's patrimonial system represented an adaptation of the Viceregal model. Patrimonial features such as the personalisation and concentration of power, the manipulation of clientele support from landed groups, the personalised supervision over the bureaucracy and military, are essentially those that we identified with the Viceregal pattern of rule. As in the latter case, in Bhutto's patrimonial system, power radiated from a single point in the system, and was delegated as an act of benevolence to those personally chosen by the patrimonial leader. The Viceregal disdain for the notion of popular sovereignty was reflected in Bhutto's reluctance to develop representative institutions - even his own PPP as an instrument of popular participation. The similarities can be extended and multiplied, but the brief summary above, will suffice at this stage to indicate both the historical continuity of the Viceregal system of political control, and its adaptation into a

patrimonial-clientele system.

When our research commenced, secondary material on the Bhutto period in general, and the PPP in particular was fairly limited, although subsequently more literature became available. The earlier studies, largely monographs and articles, dealt with the initial phase of the party. Some were essentially narrative accounts of the party's origin and development.<sup>25</sup> The analytical studies by K. B. Sayeed,<sup>26</sup> M. Gopinath,<sup>27</sup> S. J. Burki<sup>28</sup> and Craig Baxter,<sup>29</sup> focused on the party's ideological content and social composition, depicting the PPP as a party of change. While this was a reasonable interpretation of the party's early image and support-base in the Punjab, the PPP's anti-status quo nature seems to have been overstressed and the generalisation made on its basis, exaggerated. It is equally important to describe and analyse the party's feudal links in the Sind, which the earlier literature seems to have glossed over. Moreover, little attention was directed in the above-mentioned literature, to the party's organisational structure, to the personalities and internal schisms and leadership style. Therefore, this study in its discussion of the party's early years attempts to fill in these gaps in our knowledge of the party, and furthermore by directing attention to the party's various compromises with tradition, seeks to qualify the depiction of the PPP as a party of radical change. Robert La Porte's

study<sup>30</sup>, which also covers the Bhutto period, concludes that the PPP had emerged as a vehicle for 'middle-sector' groups, a view that we find difficult to accept in this study in the light of the evidence on the party's subsequent development. A number of articles by G. A. Heeger<sup>31</sup> and Robert La Porte<sup>32</sup> dealt with specific aspects of the early part of PPP rule.

The literature that became available while this research-study was in progress included Salmaan Taseer's biography of Bhutto<sup>33</sup> (see below), and a book of readings entitled Pakistan: The Long View,<sup>34</sup> which dealt with various aspects of the Bhutto period. The latter included Anwar Syed's article on the PPP. These works raise a number of issues germane to this thesis, which are dealt with at the appropriate places in this study. Other note-worthy articles published during the course of research included G. A. Heeger's 'Politics in the Post-Military State!'.<sup>35</sup>

A spate of literature followed the fall of the PPP government, and dealt with the 1977 election and its aftermath. The literature is too voluminous to be either mentioned here or assessed.<sup>36</sup> It is sufficient to note that each of these works provided somewhat different perspectives on the 1977 crisis. Many of these are discussed in later chapters.

Two major works on the Bhutto period by S. J. Burki<sup>37</sup> and P. E. Jones<sup>38</sup> became available when

this study was nearing completion. Jones' study is confined to analysing the party in the Punjab, and covers only the period from the party's foundation to 1971. The study's major contribution lies in the analysis of the PPP (in the Punjab) within the context of the 1970 elections, for which the author had access to polling station level data. Burki's work covers the Bhutto era up until the fall of the PPP regime in 1977. His entire analysis is built around the "group theory of politics", by which he seeks to explain Bhutto's rise as a leader, his actions in office and his eventual fall from power. But, group theory has its weaknesses when it comes to empirical application. However satisfying it may be to the analyst of theoretical systems to reduce everything political to groups, it is precisely this homogenisation of diverse political realities that makes group theory a not very adequate analytical instrument. Moreover, if all factors of politics are made out to be groups, then the term group loses its analytical value. For these reasons, the Burki study has a number of limitations.

Despite the recent growth in literature covering the PPP/Bhutto era, to date there is still no study that takes a comprehensive picture of the entire period. This research effort is an attempt at filling that vacuum in scholarship. Such originality as this study may have lies not only in the fact that it is an inquiry into

the nature and performance of the PPP in the period 1967-77, that has not been comprehensively studied to date, but also in the range of issues and questions discussed during the course of such an inquiry. This thesis explores a number of themes from the perspective of nation-building - such as the role and form of leadership, factors inhibiting the development of an institutional capability, and patrimonialism versus mobilisation as strategies of political consolidation. A major theme of the study is the nature and consequences of personalism over institutionalised politics as illustrated from the case of the PPP. The patrimonial aspects of the Bhutto regime forms a central feature of the study - a characteristic to which Gerald A. Heeger also directs attention in his article cited above. This study differs from Heeger's in that it represents a fuller elaboration of the patrimonial 'model' and its applicability to Bhutto's political system. Here, patrimonialism is viewed as a variant of political clientelism, which, because it cuts across both "traditional" and "modern" referents, has a heuristic value generally missing from the conceptual arsenal of either "modern" or traditional politics. It directs attention to and enables us to explain a wide range of behaviour such as political corruption and factionalism which have thus far received relatively little analytical treatment from observers of Pakistani politics.



An interpretation of the Bhutto/PPP era has much to do with one's assessment of Bhutto's personality. Our assessment differs fundamentally from the 'two faces of Bhutto' thesis advanced by S. Taseer in his biography of Bhutto, and echoed by others elsewhere.<sup>39</sup> Taseer interprets Bhutto's apparent paradoxes and contradictions in terms of an essentially schizophrenic personality. Thus Bhutto's actions are explained with reference to a basic tension in his personality between the modern progressive reformer and the feudal chieftan, between the democrat and the despot. The position taken here departs from Taseer in that it views Bhutto pre-eminently as a power craftsman with an overwhelming preoccupation with his personal destiny. For Bhutto politics was less a matter of principles and commitments, and more a game to be played with a Machievellian sense of manipulation. His manipulation of different interests was not the product of a schizophrenic personality, but revealed a balance-of-power strategy of a practitioner of Realpolitik, for whom politics was pre-eminently the art of attaining and retaining power. His hero was not a Gandhi, or a Lenin, but Napoleon Bonaparte from whom he claimed he had "imbibed the politics of power."<sup>40</sup> He claimed that the great failing of his predecessors was their inability to comprehend the flow of historical changes.<sup>41</sup> Holding that he possessed a "sense of history", he sought to move with the forces of change as he understood them in order not to be overtaken by them. His espousal of socialism was therefore less a matter of ideological commitment than an

opportunistic response to what he characterised as the "central theme of Asia", that of "upheaval and change" brought about by the growing demands by the masses for social justice and equality.<sup>42</sup> According to Bhutto, one of the cardinal rules of politics was "not to go against the current and the tide."<sup>43</sup> He likened political strategy to military strategy: "One must know when to move forward and when to go back, as in military work."<sup>44</sup> Such pronouncements were the product not of a schizophrenic mind, but of an astute observer of events for whom politics was a game of power play and tactics.

For its primary data, this study relied on official gazettes, government white papers, newspapers and weeklies (both English and Urdu), political party literature, records of national assembly proceedings, official documents and reports, and the speeches, statements and biographies of important political leaders as well as information acquired through personal interviews.

The published data resources increased during the course of research as a consequence of a series of white papers published by the government of General Zia ul Haq after the fall of the PPP regime, dealing with different aspects of the latter.<sup>45</sup> The lengthy annexures to these white papers consisted of correspondence between Bhutto and his political associates and bureaucratic advisers drawn largely from files kept in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. Since it was widely recognised that the release of such files was politically motivated -

forming part of the military regime's activities aimed at disparaging Bhutto's reputation,<sup>46</sup> - the information derived from them has been used cautiously. The commentaries of the Zia government contained in the various white papers were largely disregarded while information from the secret files was checked and corroborated by other sources. It is relevant to mention that few, if any, of the PPP leaders challenged the authenticity of the documents, but only the interpretation given to them. Even Bhutto accepted their authenticity - for instance with reference to the first white paper, he protested that "the 342 hand-picked documents....present a one sided picture" if they are "not read with other documents" that had not been released.<sup>47</sup> From his prison cell, Bhutto wrote an extensive reply to the charges made in the first and second white papers, which was subsequently published in the form of a book entitled "If I Am Assassinated..."<sup>48</sup> Again, the main brunt of Bhutto's reply was directed towards challenging the interpretation given to the documents, not the authenticity of the documents themselves.

It was partly due to the kind of problem presented by the nature of published information, that the interview process proved indispensable to the study. A total of 97 individuals were interviewed, including representatives of the major political parties and leading interests in the country, such as military leaders, bureaucrats, businessmen/industrialists, landlords, trade union leaders, student representatives, lawyers, teachers/educationalists. (See Appendix A). An attempt was made to contact those

who had a 'reputation' for being knowledgeable about subjects relevant to the research topic. The particular individuals interviewed were therefore not selected randomly, but purposively.<sup>49</sup> However, not all of those thus selected cooperated, with a few declining to grant an interview.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, those interviewed expressed candid opinions and assessments; much of which was provided on an "off-the-record" basis.<sup>51</sup> The majority of PPP politicians and military leaders interviewed stressed the confidentiality of the information provided by them and asked not to be quoted by name on specific points. The information solicited through the interview process was checked and corroborated wherever possible, through the published data sources and cross checked against other interviews.

This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I begins with an introductory chapter which aims at portraying briefly, the Pakistani scene prior to the emergence of the PPP. It attempts to illuminate some of the fundamental problems that have conditioned the Pakistani political tradition. It is not intended to be a comprehensive or even a radically new treatment of events prior to 1967, but represents a brief overview of factors considered necessary to mention in order to understand and put into perspective subsequent developments. The quasi-chronological survey is aimed at enabling the reader to identify historical traditions and important personalities and power groups, their inter-relationships, and significant

political events which set the dynamics for the Bhutto/PPP era. The introductory chapter also outlines the salient social and economic characteristics of the country in order to provide the environmental backdrop to its politics.

The next three chapters are organised chronologically and trace the origin of the PPP and its development in opposition. Chapter II begins by examining the circumstances which led to the emergence of the party in 1967, and its role in building up opposition in the period 1968-69. Chapter III deals with the transformation of the PPP from a 'movement' of protest to a party seeking electoral support, and examines the party as an electoral machine within the context of the 1970 general election. In the light of the secondary literature (see above) covering the early phase of the PPP (i.e. the period dealt with by these chapters, 1967-1970), the contribution of these chapters is of a qualificatory type rather than a radical critique.

The last chapter of Part I analyses the role played by Bhutto and the PPP in the events that ultimately culminated in the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. Again, this period has been covered by several accounts of the Bangladesh crisis, most notably by G. W. Choudury and R. Jahan<sup>52</sup>, but none of these accounts viewed the crisis with the PPP as the focal point of the analysis, or indeed involve a detailed appreciation of the PPP's role and position. Taseer's chapter on the 1971 crisis in his biography of Bhutto partially covers this, but a discussion of the party's internal dynamics is conspicuously absent.

Jones' study does address itself to this subject in its epilogue, but is confined to analysing the party in the Punjab. Therefore it is hoped that the material provided in chapter IV in terms of the internal developments in the party as well as the repercussions of the crisis on the internal party structure can be regarded as original.

Part II is divided into eight chapters, which deal with the party in power both in terms of its internal dynamics and its external relations with other institutions/ power groups in the country. Part II does not follow the chronological approach of Part I. Only chapter V proceeds quasi-chronologically, providing a narrative account of PPP actions during its years in power (from 1972 to 1977), for the analytical chapters that follow. The next three chapters analyse the PPP's internal dynamics in the post-1972 period. Chapter VI is concerned with analysing the building of the party, while chapter VII deals with the actual working of the party machine by examining factionalism and political corruption through the concept of political clientelism. Chapter VIII focuses on the phenomena of the primacy of personalism over institutionalism in the PPP. Chapters IX, X and XI analyse the PPP/Bhutto's relationship with the political opposition, the civilian bureaucracy and the military respectively, and assesses its implications and consequences. Chapter XI also attempts to provide insights into the military coup that toppled Bhutto. In chapter XII, the PPP is analysed in terms of its performance as a regime. In the concluding section of chapter XII, the social and economic policies of the PPP

government are examined in terms of their relationship with the urban protests of 1977 which preceded and paved the way for military intervention.

The final chapter of the thesis sets out some conclusions and perspectives about Bhutto and the PPP and their place in the political development of Pakistan. It establishes the experience of Bhutto/the PPP within the country's historical tradition. In all major respects, the Bhutto era is viewed as representing a continuation of the country's Viceregal tradition and its ultimate dependence on the 'Great Leader'. On the basis of these assessments, the prospects for Pakistan's political future are considered.

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NOTES

1. See for instance, Joseph La Polambara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1966).
2. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London : Yale University Press 1968), p.461.
3. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernisation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
4. For a discussion of these problems, see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A framework for analysis, (Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976) especially chapter eight.
5. Ibid.
6. Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, (London: Penguin African Series, 1961), pp.15,16.
7. The distinction was made by Ruth Schachter Morgenthau in Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
8. Jean Blondel, Political Parties, (London: Wildwood House, 1978).

9. See for example, the discussion in Rupert Emerson, 'Parties and National Integration in Africa', in La Polambara and Weiner, ibid.
10. J. S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley: University of California, 1965).
11. Robert Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, (New York, 1963), pp. 3-19.
12. David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Ghana, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
13. Coleman and Rosberg, ibid.
14. Apter, ibid.
15. M. Weiner and J. La Polambara, 'The Impact of Parties on Political Development', in Weiner and La Polambara, op.cit., pp. 425-426.
16. For critical appraisal of such literature, see Sartori, op.cit.
17. Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 5.
18. Henry Bienen has been the most prolific proponent of the machine model's applicability to African political parties. See ibid., and 'Political Machines in Africa' in M. Lofchie, ed., The State of Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971). Myron Weiner applies the machine concept to India in Party-Building in a New Nation, (Chicago: University Press, 1967). See also A. R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Rene Lemarchand, 'Political Clientelism and Ethnicism in Tropical Africa', American Political Science Review, (APSR) (March 1972); James Scott, 'Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change', APSR (December 1969). The rest of the literature is too vast to be mentioned here.
19. Lucien W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).
20. See, C. H. Dodd, Political Development, (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 13.
21. Gabriel A. Almond and C. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
22. Alfred Diament, 'Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy', in J. D. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin, eds., Approaches to Development, (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1966), p. 16.
23. C. S. Whitaker, Jr., 'A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change', World Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1967), pp. 190-217.



24. For an interpretation of Ayub's political system as Viceregal, see Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
25. For instance, Hasan A. Rizvi, 'PPP - The First Phase 1967-1971', (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, n.d.); and T. Hussein, Pakistan Peoples Party, 1967-1971, unpublished (Urdu), Masters dissertation (Punjab University, 1974).
26. K. B. Sayeed, 'How Radical is the Pakistan Peoples Party', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring, 1975).
27. M. Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and the Rise to Power of the PPP, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1975).
28. C. Baxter, 'The Peoples Party vs. The Punjab Feudalists', in H. Korson ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974).
29. C. Baxter and S. J. Burki, 'Socio-Economic Indicators of the PPP Vote' in W. H. Wriggins ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1975)
30. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California, 1975).
31. G. A. Heeger, 'Socialism in Pakistan', in H. Desfosses and J. Levasque eds., Socialism in the Third World, (New York: Praeger, 1975).
32. Robert La Porte, 'Regionalism and Political Opposition in Pakistan', in Asian Thought and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2, (September 1976). Robert La Porte's observations of the Bhutto regime in terms of its intolerance of regional opposition corresponds closely to our analysis of the regime's dealings with the political opposition. However, we argue that this intolerance extended to all opposition, both within and outside the party and stemmed partly from Bhutto's personality traits, partly from the historical tradition of equating opposition with treason, and to some extent from the behaviour of opposition parties themselves.
33. S. Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca, 1979).
34. L. Ziring, R. Braibanti, W. H. Wriggins eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University, 1977).
35. Published in World Politics, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, (January, 1977).
36. Robert La Porte, 'The Leadership Crisis in Pakistan', Asian Thought and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, (September 1977). Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan: The Campaign before the Storm', Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 7 (July 1977); M. G. Weinbaum, 'The March 1977 Election in Pakistan', Asian Survey, ibid; Mohsin Ali, 'Pakistan's second General Election and After', Pacific Community, Vol. 8 No. 4 (July 1977); Sir Cyril Pickard, 'Change in Pakistan', The World Today, (December 1977); Anwar H. Syed, 'Pakistan in

- 1977', Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, (February 1978); Eijaz Ahmed, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan', Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 4 (1978); Jamil Rashid, 'Economic Causes of Political Crisis in Pakistan', Journal of Developing Economies, Vol. XVI, No. 2, (June 1978) and K. B. Sayeed, 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Social Change in Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (July 1979).
37. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, (London Macmillan, 1980).
38. Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Building in an Era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979).
39. See for instance, K. B. Sayeed, 'Political Leadership and Institution-Building under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto', in Pakistan: The Long View, op.cit., p. 260.
40. Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979) p. 224.
41. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, July 1972- 30 September 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1973), pp. 219-220.
42. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 October 1972 - 31 December 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1973), p. 238.
43. Z. A. Bhutto, Interviews to the Press, 20 December 1971 - 13 August 1973, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 24.
44. Ibid.
45. These white papers are as follows: 1) White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977 (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, July 1978); 2) White Paper on Misuse of Media - 20 December 1971 - 4 July 1977, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, August 1978); 3) White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, (Islamabad: January 1979); 4) White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, Misuse of the Instruments of State Power, (Islamabad: January 1979); 5) White Paper on the Performance of The Bhutto Regime, Vol. IV, The Economy, (Islamabad, January 1979).
46. See, for instance, William L. Richter, 'Pakistan Under Zia', Current History, Vol. 76, No. 446, (April 1979), p. 169.
47. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit., p. 12.
48. Ibid. Excerpts from Bhutto's prison writings can also be found in: B. L. Kak, Z. A. Bhutto: Notes From the Death Cell, (New Delhi: Radha Krishna, 1979). Bhutto was hanged on 4 April 1979, before he had the opportunity to reply to the remaining four white papers. For Bhutto's trial and execution, see

- Victoria Schofield, Bhutto: Trial and Execution (London: Cassell, 1979) and J. C. Batra, The Trial and Execution of Bhutto, (New Delhi: King Publishing House, 1979).
49. The author was unable to interview Begum Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto who had agreed to grant an interview but were prevented from doing so by the legal restrictions imposed on them by the Zia regime.
  50. These included, most notably General Zia, and some PPP politicians.
  51. That is, some of the persons interviewed wished to remain anonymous; some did not wish the place of interview to be mentioned; many stressed that any information provided by them should not be attributed, by name, to them.
  52. G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1974); R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (London: Columbia University Press, 1972).

## PART I

## I

A PROFILE OF PAKISTAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947, a heterogeneous community brought together because its people, adherents of Islam, refused to be absorbed by a Hindu-dominated political system. Admittedly, its leadership was secular prior to partition and beyond. No doubt also, a consensus was never reached on what an 'Islamic Polity' should be. Nevertheless, Pakistan was created to satisfy the demand for statehood by a broad and deep coalescing of Muslim opinion in the Muslim-majority areas of British India. Pakistan had evolved from a threatened sense of distinct identity that would have been exaggerated by remaining part of Hindu India. Islam dictated separation but not the pattern of future development.

The tenuous unity imparted by Islam dissipated before long. For the first year or two after independence the élan and dedication of the Pakistan movement had imparted an impression of a greater unity than actually existed. Gradually, as attentions returned to more mundane problems of existence, considerations of social prestige, political or economic power, tribal or clan loyalties, sectarian or linguistic allegiances prevailed over any theoretical recognition of broader national interests. Diversity rather than unity proved to be the dominant characteristic of Pakistani politics. For Pakistan - with a low level of educational and population mobility, a

territory widely dispersed, with its two parts uniquely separated by a thousand miles of what was viewed as a hostile country, and most of its inhabitants lacking a tradition of living together - the abstract concepts of nation and state were bound to remain relatively meaningless for the overwhelming majority of its citizens. Thus, after the euphoria of independence had dissipated, the transfer of citizenship from primordial to national levels proved extremely difficult, and the quest for forging a national identity proved elusive. Consequently, the country was not able to establish a common set of values that underpinned either the polity or any specific set of institutions in the society or economy. The entire history of Pakistan can be interpreted as a series of attempts to establish a national identity and an orderly political system. The results of the failure of these attempts have been a chronic instability, a vain search for a constitution and finally a civil war leading to the dissolution of the country within twenty-four years of its creation.

The confused environment and fragility of government in the first few years of the country's existence was highlighted by an abortive military coup d'état in 1951<sup>1</sup> and the outbreak of communal violence in 1953.<sup>2</sup> Another principal legacy of the first few years of independence was a fundamental disagreement about the organisation and purposes of the Pakistani state - the controversy over Islam. The controversy over the role Islam should play in the polity left the state polarised between orthodox and

secular-oriented factions. The debate, both inside and outside the two constituent assemblies, was indicative of serious rifts. The crisis was never resolved and the Islamic identity of the state varied from one constitution to another. As the communal disturbances in Punjab in 1953 demonstrated, Islam, far from being an integrative power, could work as a divisive force. The Punjab disturbances also provided a painful reminder of the possible consequences of an open split between, for the most part, secular authorities and the orthodox Ulema. The controversial Munir Report stated bluntly that if religion was to be allowed a say in political affairs, the country would be reduced to a state of perennial civil war. Indeed, the report concluded on a rather cynical note:

"If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense." 3

Doctrinaire disputes about the religious character of the state alternated with the sordid squabbles of highly personalised politics, (which will be discussed below), while the state itself decayed.

#### AUTHORITY AND THE STATE: THE PRIMACY OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY BUREAUCRACY

The principal legacy of the early disorganisation and confusion of Pakistan's public life was the autonomy and primacy of the civil and military bureaucracy. While

emerging political forces and weak political institutions characterised the ambiguous politics of constitution - making, the civil and military bureaucracy assumed a predominant position in the political system of Pakistan. Pakistan's national life in its first years, therefore, found the praetorian elites manning the battlements while the public men disagreed on fundamentals of national life. But there were other reasons for this bureaucratic dominance. Most Pakistanis saw the first need of the country as government, not an effective political system, and for the first decade efforts were directed at building an effective army and civil administration. The British had left a useful 'Praetorian Guard' in civil and military leadership. Moreover, the imperial legacy, strong in the instruments and lessons of control and administration, was comparatively weak in the practices and institutions of popular participation. Few Muslim politicians had had parliamentary experience - the Muslim League, Pakistan's independence party, was weak and perhaps, most important, most of the able provincial politicians in the country were in parties which, prior to 1947, were in provincial opposition to the Muslim League. Another important factor was that the areas that came to Pakistan were politically inarticulate, little experienced in mass politics and themselves divided into parochial groups. Indeed, the areas comprising Pakistan, were for historical and other reasons, the most backward politically and economically. The Punjab and Sind were incorporated in the British Raj only in 1849; Sind was given the status of a province . . .

for the first time in 1937 - the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was ruled as a special area till the mid-thirties while Baluchistan had no representative government of any sort during the entire period of British rule.

Another colonial legacy, which is frequently overlooked in studies of the development of the Pakistani polity, concerns the distinction made by the British between what were called "Regulation" and "Non-Regulation" Provinces.<sup>4</sup> Historically, in no part of British India did the system of close administrative supervision and bureaucratic power at the district level strike such deep roots as it did in the provinces of the Punjab and the NWFP, which became parts of West Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> These provinces inherited the administrative system of what was called the "Non-Regulation" Provinces. The British found that the over-legalistic administrative system of Bengal, Madras and Bombay (known as Regulation Provinces), with its careful definitions of rights and obligations of the citizens and officers, had not produced an equitable system of justice. In the Regulation Provinces, the district officers could not use their discretionary authority to help the illiterate and poor peasants against the exploitation of the landlords and the moneylenders. However, the administrative system of the Regulation Provinces with its careful definition of rights of the citizenry, and the restrictions it placed on the authority of the district officer enabled the growth of political consciousness in those provinces. In the Non-Regulation



Provinces like the Punjab and the NWFP, all powers - executive, magisterial and judicial - were concentrated in the hands of the commissioner. In other words, the British in the Non-Regulation Provinces had restored the old Moghul administrative system in which enormous executive power was concentrated in the hands of the local representative of the government. The system in the Non-Regulation Provinces was clearly authoritarian and paternal rather than legal and democratic. (This partly explains why political consciousness in what was West Pakistan which inherited the system of Non-Regulation Provinces was seldom as high as that in (the former) East Pakistan, which inherited the system of Regulation Provinces).

The above-mentioned colonial heritage coupled with the conscious attempt made in the post-independence years by successive governments to pursue policies maximising the state's cohesion, further contributed to the strengthening of the 'administrative state'. This emphasis on the development of government capabilities not only meant an unbalanced growth of the political system (that is, the growth of output functions at the cost of input functions)<sup>6</sup> but also led to an imbalance in the distribution of powers among the various subnational groups. Emphasis on the output sector meant strengthening the civil-military bureaucracy - which was dominated by Punjabis (and to a lesser extent Muhajirs). The political elite itself did little to reverse this trend. Part of the reason for this was that the elite that came to power in Pakistan

after independence was a small group of people (as represented by leaders like Liaqat Ali) who generally came from regions which were not part of Pakistan, and lost their political constituents after partition. They were reluctant either to broaden their ranks by including the regional leaders from within Pakistan, or to risk an election, for fear of losing power. In their bid to stay in power this political elite found an ally in the civil-military bureaucracy. The latter came to the former's aid partly because they were trained to carry out their political superior's orders and partly because they also shared the elite's belief in the policy of centralisation and 'nationalisation'. Thus, during the first decade, a close working alliance developed between the political elite and the civil-military bureaucracy - an alliance which in later years, especially after 1954, was dominated by the latter.

The instability and uncertainty in the Pakistani polity is reflected in the fact that during the first twenty years of its existence, the country had had two constituent assemblies, one constitutional commission and three constitutions.<sup>7</sup> All this experimentation, however, still did not produce any constitutional formula or consensus. In fact constitution-making epitomised many of the problems faced by the country since independence, chiefly the problem of the proper role of Islam in the state, and the question of federalism,<sup>8</sup> which underscored the tensions created by the regional/ethnic division of the country. The political arena presented the chaotic

spectacle of political in-fighting and political profiteering. Alliances among groups of politicians were made and unmade with no direct reference to the electorate or guidance from public opinion. The object in each case was none other than occupying ministerial offices. Every new opportunity of capturing office brought with it a shifting of loyalties, fall of governments and change of prime ministers. The conduct of public affairs degenerated into a spoils system which set political life at the mercy of vested interests and removed it entirely from the comprehension as well as from the sympathy of the masses of the population.<sup>9</sup> This fierce competition for influence, wealth, power and prestige between various interests and personalities contributed to the chaos, unpredictability and instability which characterised Pakistani political life. However, while on the surface Pakistan's political experience appears to have merely been one of persistent instability - one of a struggle for power resulting not only in a succession of governments but also in new constitutional arrangements none of which survived for long, interrupted by interludes of martial law, yet a closer examination reveals something beyond this. On closer examination, in fact, there is a striking continuity in certain political traditions and in the alignment of social forces that have made up Pakistan's ruling oligarchy. It is toward these elements of continuity that we now turn, in order to provide a meaningful background perspective on subsequent political developments.

The most outstanding, and perhaps the most important pillar on which the entire political structure of Pakistan seems to have rested - with or without assemblies and parliaments - has been the Viceregal system and the supremacy of the permanent executive over representative institutions. It has, correctly been pointed out that "the strongest traditions and structures of politics that were inherited by Pakistan were autocratic and Viceregal."<sup>10</sup> It needs to be emphasised that the main components of the Viceregal system were a powerful viceroy, otherwise known as the Governor-General, an executive council, chosen by the Governor-General, a central assembly with limited powers, subordinate provincial governments, and above all, a powerful bureaucracy placed in strategic positions at the centre, in the provinces and in the districts. The army in this system provided the coercive cover and was called into action in extreme cases. All these characteristics have been in operation in Pakistan ever since its inception, with the crucial difference that unlike under the British Raj, the Governor-General in independent Pakistan was not appointed by or subject to the authority of a distant imperium. During the first three decades of its existence, Pakistan has had several constitutional systems but the basic political system, with some variation has been more or less the Viceregal system.<sup>11</sup>

The tradition of executive supremacy can be traced to Pakistan's first Governor-General, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah's preference for a Viceregal authority pattern, at

the outset of Pakistan's political existence, reinforced the trend to an increasing reliance on a quasi-colonial style of governance, and set the tone for this pattern of governance. Of course, this tradition was reinforced by personality considerations. Jinnah brought to the office his tremendous prestige and charisma as "Father of the Nation" and the Quaid-i-Azam (The Great Leader). Thus, Jinnah exercised powers unfettered by the constitutional limitations of an orthodox governor-general,<sup>12</sup> even as enlarged by the discretionary powers laid down in the 1935 Act, which was taken as the new state's temporary legal framework.<sup>13</sup> Jinnah's exercise of absolute power created a dangerous precedent, which was drawn upon by his successors. Ghulam Mohammed's frequent abuses of such powers were only the wider extensions of the practices of his predecessor. Those extraordinary powers of the governor-general were simply passed on without any fundamental change, to the hands of the chief executive of the country. Any reading of Pakistan's chequered history will show that the head of the state has remained powerful and autocratic in character. From the time of Ghulam Mohammed onwards, the Viceregal tradition, not the parliamentary experiment, proved dominant. Iskander Mirza, who succeeded Ghulam Mohammed in 1955 and Ayub Khan who followed Mirza in 1958, only perpetuated this tradition of strong, paternalistic personal rule through an elite bureaucracy. In this sense, the martial law regimes have, structurally, been revivals from the Viceregal past without even the feeble legislatures of the Nineteenth Century.

The coup of 1958, far from being a fundamental departure, in fact brought Pakistan's political realities abreast of its political theory, and threw off the veneer of 'parliamentary democracy'. When the army and the civil service decided on a take-over, they were, in fact, formalising and institutionalising a situation (the ascendancy of the civil-military coalition) which had existed almost since independence, but particularly since 1953. As Hamza Alavi has pointed out:

"In Pakistan, the army and the bureaucracy had played a dominant and decisive role....the 'seizure' of power in 1958 by General Ayub Khan in the name of the army was just a dramatic movement in that continuing domination.....In the first decade of independence the facade of parliamentary government obscured the role of the bureaucracy and did its bidding." 14

At any rate, the civil and military bureaucratic coalition had been ascendant at least since 1953 when prime minister Nazimuddin, who symbolised political elitist consensus, was summarily dismissed by the governor-general, a former civil servant, presumably with army support.<sup>15</sup> This was followed by an equally summary dismissal of an elected government in Bengal in 1954 and the dissolution of the constituent assembly-cum-legislature in the same year.<sup>16</sup> The supremacy of the civil-military bureaucratic apparatus over representative institutions proved to be a pervasive and persistent feature of the Pakistani political system. Such pre-eminence was in large part the product of the Viceregal heritage which had accorded prominence to praetorian elites thereby

resulting in the organisational superiority of the civil-military bureaucracy vis a vis political institutions. Till October 1958, however, the higher civil service was the senior partner in this military-bureaucratic coalition; after that the armed forces became the chief focus of power. A variety of reasons lay behind the military's seizure of power.<sup>17</sup> Of these the most significant were the breakdown of law and order (a symptom of civilian political failure at consensus-building), and the prospect of a general election in 1959, which the military felt would only bring more chaos and bloodshed, but more importantly, challenge the dominant position of the Viceregal institutions (military and civil service) in the political system.

Ayub continued to rely on the bureaucracy as an instrument of the Viceregal, colonial-style regime he inherited and reinforced. The hallmark of such a system, was of course, its extreme centralisation. Both formally and in practice, the tradition of a strong Centre was firmly established. The Government of India Act of 1935 together with various modifications made in the post-independence period<sup>18</sup> provided for a strong central government, and the constitution of 1956<sup>19</sup> perpetuated the essentially strong position of a Centre vis a vis the provinces. The administrative-political policies pursued during the course of time were characterised by centralisation. Also, from the very beginning, the central government intervened directly and frequently in the administration of the provinces. Chief ministers were regularly deposed,<sup>20</sup> and

provinces were frequently brought under direct central control. Such centralisation exacerbated provincial frictions and ethnic tensions - since dominance of the centre almost invariably meant domination by one province - Punjab. The pre-eminence of the civil-military bureaucracy also translated into 'Punjabi domination' since Punjabis constituted the overwhelming majority of the senior personnel in the civil service and the armed forces (70% in the case of the latter).<sup>21</sup> All this inevitably caused increasing frustration and disenchantment on the part of other provinces, particularly East Bengal.<sup>22</sup> Demands for regional autonomy have been a perennial feature of Pakistani politics, and were not merely limited to East Bengal.

#### RURAL STRUCTURE

Another persistent feature in the political system of Pakistan has been the dominant position of rural landed interests in the political and economic life of the country. In fact it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that as far as the institutional bases of power in pre-1970 Pakistan is concerned, while the civilian-military bureaucracy dominated national (and provincial) decision-making after independence, landed wealth interconnected these two institutional bases. Landowning families, have been the source of ministerial talent for all regimes in Pakistan since 1947. The Punjab, particularly has traditionally contributed heavily to the civil-military administration. The British called them the



'martial races', and a tradition of military service grew here.<sup>23</sup> One observer has rightly suggested that the "key to Pakistan politics is to be found in a little official publication for restricted circulation by the Government of India before 1914 and entitled 'The Landed Families of the Punjab'."<sup>24</sup>

West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab and Sind, possessed one of the most skewed landownership structures in Asia. We may recall that there were, in part, historical reasons for this. British Indian officialdom under the Raj regarded the Punjab (and to a lesser extent, Sind) as the key to the security of north India, since these areas were close to the frontier. This larger security interest of the empire led the British to seek the loyalty of the proprietary-agricultural tribes by preserving (even extending) the economic resources and social authority of the chiefly and gentry lineages.<sup>25</sup> In the Punjab, the salience of these concerns was evident from the founding (and operation) of the paternalistic and conservative school of administration (associated with such figures as John and Henry Lawrence).<sup>26</sup> Clearly then, the British interfered less with feudal privileges here than they did elsewhere in India. The economic and social power of the rural landed classes persisted in the post-independence period, and they remained a very influential political group.<sup>27</sup>

The extent of the concentration of ownership was such that in Punjab in 1958, more than one-fifth of the cultivable land was owned by about one-half of one percent

of the owners. The concentration indices for Sind were even higher, with a mere 3000 landlords holding 69% of the occupied land.<sup>28</sup> In the NWFP, 0.1% owners possessed nearly one-eighth of the total area.<sup>29</sup> For West Pakistan as a whole, about 0.1% of landowners, that is about 6,000 people, owned land to the extent of five hundred acres or more.<sup>30</sup> Consistent with this ownership structure was a high incidence of tenancy in which tenants-at-will cultivated the land, usually under the batai system (a rent system with rent paid in kind as a certain proportion of the produce).<sup>31</sup> Although no precise figures are available, it has been surmised that at the time of independence over 50 per cent of the cultivated land was held in such forms of tenancy in West Pakistan - in the Punjab, 56 per cent of land was cultivated by tenants-at-will, in Sind 80 per cent was cultivated by such tenants known as Haris, and in the NWFP the figure was 50 per cent.<sup>32</sup> "While taking stock of the conditions in the country", the authors of the First Five Year Plan were moved to write, "one is struck with their similarity to feudalism."<sup>33</sup>

Political leadership was drawn primarily from this feudalistic landlord class. The economic and social power of the landed aristocracy gave it a political ascendancy that neither the introduction of universal suffrage nor the rise of new political parties could snatch from it. The Punjab, for instance, had many features of a squirearchy not unsimilar to that of seventeenth or eighteenth Century England. That is, the key rural families controlled politics through elections and the holding of

appointive offices. Traditionally then, the landlords played an important role in Pakistani politics and constituted the most significant class interest in the Muslim League. The extent of their predominance is best indicated by the social composition of Pakistan's legislative assemblies. The largest single group in both the first and second constituent assemblies was that of the landlords - 27 out of 79 and 28 out of 40 respectively.<sup>34</sup> Again, in the Punjab provincial elections in 1951, about 80 per cent of the members elected were landlords. In the Sind elections in 1955, 90 per cent of the members of the Sind assembly came from large land-owning families. The key posts in the Muslim League hierarchy were held by big landlords. Even after the so-called land reforms of 1959, the representation of landlords in the assemblies remained the highest for any one group. In the 1962 national assembly for instance, 58 out of 96 members were landlords,<sup>35</sup> in the 1965 national assembly the figure was 34 out of 82.<sup>36</sup>

Given the above structure, the political process has been one in which rivaling landlords constantly feuded against each other. The governments of Sind and Punjab were perpetually riddled with intrigues and feuds between rival factions of landlords - politics came to reflect the animosity (based on biradarism, local and ancestral rivalries, etc) between rival landlord groups. As these rival groups were more or less in agreement in retaining their landed interests, politics in West Pakistan became more a cynical pursuit of sheer power. Even the One-Unit

(the scheme whereby all four provinces and areas in West Pakistan were integrated into a single province or unit in 1955) controversy<sup>37</sup> has been interpreted as factional fighting amongst the landlords of various provinces.<sup>38</sup>

Ayub's land reforms (1959) did not substantially alter the rural power structure. Although it reduced the influence and manipulative power of some of the wealthier landlords, the impact of the reform was minimal, especially since the senior personnel of the military and the bureaucracy themselves owned substantial land. Indeed, conventional village life was reinforced, not altered by Ayub's "new" system of local self-government - the Basic Democracy system.<sup>39</sup> As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out:

"The system of basic democracies has actually strengthened the position of the local landlords - first because it is easier for them to manipulate and intimidate a small electorate than a larger one and second, because the candidate must reside in the locality, thus making it impossible to provide the peasants with an alternate leadership.....The effect of the new system has been to associate the local landowners with the official machinery of government." 40

Thus, "the real levers of power" continued in the hands of the "upper class of landlords, civil servants, industrialists and professional men."<sup>41</sup> Therefore, despite land reforms, the landlord class, the zamindars, were not displaced from their power position. As one observer has written:

"Powerful landlords and a mass of captive peasantry continue to serve as the chief explanatory variables in the sociology of Pakistan's politics, past and present. Urbanisation and economic growth notwithstanding, the power of the big landlords persists both at the apex and the base." 42

Despite indications of accelerated urbanisation (discussed below), Pakistan is still very much land-oriented. Seventy-four per cent of its people<sup>43</sup> live in some 45,000 villages, ranging in size from several hundred to a thousand or so inhabitants. Agriculture is the mainstay of the country's economy. In addition to employing 54.80% of the labour force,<sup>44</sup> it has constituted the foundation on which the industrial sector rests (textiles and food processing accounting for the major share in value added), and through its exports, agriculture has earned most of the country's foreign exchange.

The predominantly rural character of Pakistani society makes it necessary to describe briefly a number of important aspects of village life.<sup>45</sup> To begin with, the villages depend on agricultural economic bases. A substantial part of agricultural cultivation contributes to a subsistence rather than a commercial market. In 1972, 67% of the landholdings were below 12.5 acres or over one-half of (owner occupied and tenanted) farms were believed to consist of 5 acres or less.<sup>46</sup> These mini-plots combined with relatively primitive methods of cultivation has meant that the commercial market contribution of the majority of agriculturalists is negligible. Elsewhere, however, the introduction of new technology has extended monetisation of the rural economy and served to undermine traditional life in the villages.

In terms of social organisation, a village is a system built around the structural relations of extended families, which translate themselves into a system of

caste-like relationships. Although the importance of caste varies from place to place and tends to be greater in the Punjab than in Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan, traditional caste differentiation and social status nonetheless underlies village structure in most of the country. Although ostensibly based on the egalitarian principles of Islam, Pakistani society functions in terms of a modification of the Hindu-based caste system prevalent throughout South Asia. Thus religious teaching has not sufficed to overcome the combined influence of the social system of pre-Islamic India and the traditions of Hinduism, from which the ancestors of most Pakistanis converted.

Caste, in the Muslim context, means an endogamous group with either a common traditional occupation or a tradition of descent from a common ancestor or both, but completely devoid of the Hindu connotations of religious (as distinct from social) hierarchy and hereditary ritual purity or pollution. Used in this sense the term caste is applicable to most of the traditional social groups in the Punjab. The three most important castes in the Punjab are the Jats, Rajputs and Arains.<sup>47</sup> In terms of social precedence, the Rajputs come first - and are by tradition warriors, rulers, landowners and cultivators.<sup>48</sup> The Jats are the largest group in the Punjab. Their social position, though lower than the Rajputs, is highly respectable, and the line between the two sometimes indistinct. A Jat is usually a landowning cultivator and he has also contributed substantially to the fighting forces of the country. The Arains also enjoy a good

social standing. Many of them moved into the canal colony districts after new land was opened by irrigation. There are four other groups of social and political significance: the Biloches, Awans, Gujars and the Lohars and Tarkhans. There are, in addition, other functional castes of a distinctly lower social position. The Chuhras and Mussallis, traditionally sweepers and scavengers, are often landless agricultural labourers and menials, and they have the lowest status.

In rural areas, the individual has social importance only as a member of a family. Groups of patrilineally related families in turn form units, called in the Punjab, biradari. The biradari as a functioning unit acts to protect the interests of its members, exercises social control through threats of ostracism, and has significance in marriage arrangements. Biradaris usually claim common descent from a known ancestor. A number of biradaris form the local caste group, extending over several villages. The major Punjabi biradaris include the Syeds, Awans, Qureishis and Sheikhs. It is difficult to estimate the precise number of biradaris in rural Pakistan. We have felt it necessary to dwell, at some length on the structure of the rural countryside, not only to provide a comprehensive background to politics, but also because, all too often these aspects of the social structure are overlooked by political observers whose gaze does not extend beyond the city, towards which we now turn our attention.

URBAN STRUCTURE

The urban component<sup>49</sup> of the country's population has increased in recent years, as is indicated by the table below.

TABLE I.1LEVEL OF URBANISATION

	1961			1972		
	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
Actual (in million)	9.7	33.2	42.9	16.6	48.4	65.0
Percentage	22.5	77.5	100.00	25.5	74.5	100.00

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1976  
(Islamabad, Statistics Division)

Although urban areas are dominated in terms of population by metropolitan centres like Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Lyallpur, Hyderabad and Multan, there are in addition, at least thirty cities with populations exceeding 100,000.

The principal groups in the urban areas are industrial labour (comprising 25.7% of the urban labour force), those engaged in commerce and trade (comprising 25.9% of the urban labour force), and college and university students.<sup>50</sup> In addition there are professional groups such as lawyers, teachers, doctors and engineers, often referred to as the 'educated middle class'. The numbers of these groups increased phenomenally over the years and particularly as a consequence of Ayub's policy of rapid industrialisation in the 1960's (discussed below). This has been accompanied by the growth of modern, associational interest-group type of organisations based on



the protection of the economic interests of these groups. Taking the case of the trade unions first, Table I.2 below indicates the growth in both the numbers of trade unions and their membership in the period 1948-1977.

TABLE I.2

REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS AND MEMBERSHIP

YEAR	NO. OF T.U.'s	MEMBERSHIP
1948	110	116,300
1950	185	128,888
1955	240	120,081
1960	466	175,313
1965	592	218,665
1971	1,997	581,219
1975	8,196	695,667
1977	9,110	760,300

Source: 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1972  
(Government of Pakistan, CSO)  
&  
Pakistan Labour Gazette, Jan-March 1977  
(Islamabad: Labour and Manpower Division)

This is not the place for a review of the history of the trade union movement in Pakistan.<sup>51</sup> It is sufficient here to note that until the mid-sixties, trade unions did not emerge as effective instruments of collective bargaining that had any appreciable impact on governmental policy. There were several reasons for this trade union weakness, some of which can be summarised below. First, membership in unions was (and is) low - in 1964 less than 10% of the urban industrial labour force had been organised into unions. Second, largely as a consequence of the former, unions have been financially poor. Third, since most unions are organised on a plant (rather than industry

group) basis, it has been difficult for them to combine with other trades in order to exercise concerted pressure on the employers or the government. A number of federations at the national level have emerged from time to time such as the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour, Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions, but none of these succeeded in affiliating a sufficient number of individual unions to create a comprehensive nation-wide organisation.

Another source of trade union weakness has been intra and inter-union leadership rivalries,<sup>52</sup> much of which was manipulated by employers to divide the labour movement.<sup>53</sup>

Perhaps the most important factor responsible for the weakness of the labour movement was the commitment of successive regimes to the support of the emerging industrial entrepreneurial class, which in their view necessitated severe restrictions on labour unions.<sup>54</sup> Industrial growth (through the private sector) was given priority, while the requirements of 'social justice' were clearly of subordinate concern. By a series of measures, successive regimes sought to place curbs on trade union activity. For instance, in 1954, the Punjab-based Pakistan Trade Union Federation was banned as 'Communist', while in 1959, the government imposed a virtual ban on strikes.<sup>55</sup> Such restrictions, together with the reasons enumerated above, combined to seriously inhibit the growth of trade unionism.

However, despite these grave disabilities, labour unions attempted to exert pressure on the government and employers on a number of occasions from 1962-63 onwards,

at times winning limited wage increases. Then, in the 1969 urban protest against Ayub Khan, (discussed below and in more detail in the following chapter) labour unions not only displayed the capacity to confront the police apparatus of the regime, but also developed an organisational capacity to conduct effective strikes, to combine with other unions in different industries, trades and professions and to formulate certain concrete demands relating to wages, living conditions and certain desired changes in the economic and political system.<sup>56</sup> Although the immediate reason for this labour militancy and unity was the decline of industrial wages<sup>57</sup> during the Ayubian period of high industrial growth (discussed below p.80 ), the power of organised labour, as demonstrated in 1969, indicated that trade unions had developed an organisational depth and power that would have to be recognised and reckoned with by any subsequent regime.

Traders, merchants and small businessmen form a sizeable proportion of the urban population. This group also includes shopkeepers and the arhtis (commission agents or middlemen) of the mandi (market) towns. Not included in this group are the big industrialists who form a separate category designated as the industrial elite, which is discussed below. The traders, merchants and shopkeepers are organised into various trade and commerce associations, numbering several hundred. The most powerful of these associations representing bigger traders/merchants are the local chambers of commerce (in the cities and large towns) all of which are affiliated into the Federation of

Chambers of Commerce, with its head office in Karachi. The latter has played an important role in advising successive governments on the formulation of economic policy especially with regard to import and tariff rules and on measures of local taxation.<sup>58</sup> In the smaller towns there is usually a separate mohalla (alley or quarter) that specialises in particular trades or businesses. Thus there are mohallas where goldsmiths, or tanners predominate, others where wheat or sugar keepers are located. Such segregation, a legacy of the old Guild system gives rise to considerable cohesiveness within each trade and has not prevented concerted action by the various trades, when the occasion has arisen, in the form of successful Hartals (a protest whereby shops and trades are shut down). In certain cities, traders and merchants predominantly belong to a particular ethnic group - Muhajirs (refugees from India) in the case of Karachi and Hyderabad and refugees from East Punjab in the case of Lahore and Multan - which reinforces their cohesiveness as an occupational category.<sup>59</sup> In some cities, these traders/merchants also belong to particular biradaris - the Sheikh and Qureishi biradari in Multan for instance - which again reinforces their sense of solidarity. The arhtis are found in towns that provide market outlets for the agricultural produce of the adjoining countryside and function as service centres for the villages.<sup>60</sup> The arhti is concerned with the movement of primarily cash crops (cotton, rice, etc.) from the village/farm level to the primary markets in the mandi towns, but often also acts as money-lender to the

small landowners. As such the arhti belongs to the rural economy and can be said to constitute the rural bourgeoisie. The arhti is often viewed as an exploitative middleman by the grower, but is nevertheless utilised for the disposal of the farmer's agricultural surplus. These arhtis are well organised by numerous arhti associations - there are an estimated 15,000 such associations in the Punjab alone.<sup>61</sup>

A relatively small, but influential and growing element of the urban population is the group of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers and journalists. Almost every profession has some form of voluntary association modelled after their western counterparts.<sup>62</sup> Lawyers appear to be the best organised, with the Bar Council linked comprehensively to the network of local bar associations throughout the cities and smaller towns. These bar associations have functioned as important units of political organisation and the various bar councils figure prominently in the political campaigning tours of politicians. Lawyers have been well represented in almost all the cabinets and legislatures of Pakistan,<sup>63</sup> although this is largely because such lawyers were drawn from landed backgrounds (in Pakistan, a degree in law was and still is considered a virtual sine qua non for entry into politics). Teachers too, have emerged as a significant force, organised in various associations.<sup>64</sup> These associations, along with associations of journalists, lawyers, doctors, and middle-level civil servants have provided the salaried middle class with considerable

organised power, demonstrated most impressively on those rare occasions, as in the anti-Ayub agitation in 1969, when they were in concert. Yet despite these broadly shared trade unionist concerns,<sup>65</sup> these associations have been afflicted by divisions arising from ethnic/linguistic, sectarian and biradari cleavages.<sup>66</sup> This has led one observer to term these professional groups as 'modern tribes' or biradaris, "whose membership is acquired through appropriate degrees but whose organisational behaviour bears close resemblance to the traditional social patterns."<sup>67</sup>

Another sizeable urban group consists of students (at the university and secondary school levels). In 1975-76, the student population was composed of 23,000 university students, 47,726 students in professional colleges, 211,600 in arts and sciences colleges, and 480,000 secondary school students.<sup>68</sup> Not only are these students important, in terms of numbers, but by virtue of their deep involvement in politics throughout Pakistani history, they constitute an influential urban group. In analysing the linkages between education and politics, one writer has used the phrase "politically over-developed youth" to describe student involvement in politics in the developing countries.<sup>69</sup> "Political over-development" is a complex concept, but it directs attention to the pivotal role played by the student generation in national politics - and South Asia is no exception. In Pakistan, student involvement in politics can be traced to the independence movement, when students were one of the major instruments utilised by Jinnah and the Muslim League in the anti-

colonial struggle.<sup>70</sup> Subsequently, as one writer has pointed out:

"Much of the dynamics of politics in Pakistan has been provided at key periods by the political activism of university students." 71

Student activism in politics is the result not simply of a distaste for authority amongst rebellious youth, but of the students' self-perception of their responsibility to the society of which they are a part. In developing countries, the students form a sizeable section of the intelligentsia in a predominantly illiterate society. Consequently, as an official commission on student problems and welfare noted in 1966, the student community

"feels by reason of its education that it has the right to take a leading part in the building up of political consciousness of the illiterate and uneducated masses....they form a very influential political element, whose support is sought for by almost all politicians, whether in power or out of power. Leaders of the opposition and ministers alike woo students and seek to be popular among them, for in political campaigns they are found to be useful and loyal workers." 72

Many political parties have organised youth branches to recruit student support in the universities and colleges.<sup>73</sup>

Thus many student organisations in the universities and colleges are youth branches of political parties, and their manifestos contain political programmes rather than demands for better amenities or educational reforms.<sup>74</sup>

There are, however, student organisations, such as the National Students Federation, which are not affiliated to political parties, but are no less politicised in their programme or actions.

The majority of students at college and university level, come from high income families, both urban and rural.<sup>75</sup> But the fact that they are drawn from socially-privileged groups, in no way diminishes their propensity towards political activism. Indeed, one study of university students found that those belonging to more educated and higher income families tended to be more politicised than those from less-well-to-do backgrounds.<sup>76</sup> Secondary school students come from a wider social background, and have often involved themselves in politics by participating in student demonstrations against successive regimes organised by their counterparts at higher levels of education. Indeed, whenever successive regimes have apprehended or been confronted with student unrest, they have proceeded to order the temporary closure of schools in addition to universities and colleges.

The media (newspapers, radio, television) is largely restricted to the urban centres, but is growing rapidly. In a country where literacy is only 21% (in 1976) it is the 'transistor revolution' which has been responsible for making news and information accessible to the large majority of the illiterate masses. But the press is the oldest and the best developed of the mass media. Partly because of the traditional Islamic credence accorded to the written word, it is also the most influential medium, even though it has operated under severe restrictions (and at most times, censorship) under successive regimes. The influence of the press is much greater than newspaper circulation - five per thousand population in the Seventies -



would indicate because single copies of newspapers and newsmagazines are often passed from person to person, and individuals who are unable to read often have the newspaper read to them. In 1976 the number of dailies was 105, while the total number of periodicals (including bi-weeklies, weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies) was 1,211. The major daily newspapers, their ownership and circulation figures are shown in Table I.3 below.

TABLE I.3

MAJOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS, OWNERSHIP AND CIRCULATION (1974)

Title	Language	City of Publication	Circulation (in thousands)	Ownership
Jang	Urdu	Karachi	190	Private
Mashriq	Urdu	Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta	145	NPT*
Nawa-I-Waqt	Urdu	Lahore & Rawalpindi	100	Private
Imroze	Urdu	Lahore & Multan	45	NPT
Musawaat	Urdu	Lahore & Karachi	30	PPP
Hurriyat	Urdu	Karachi	30	Private**
Jasaarat	Urdu	Karachi	16	Jamaat-e- Islaami
Pakistan Times	English	Lahore & Rawalpindi	63	NPT
Dawn	English	Karachi	41	Private**
The Sun	English	Karachi & Lahore	23	Private
Morning News	English	Karachi	17	NPT

\* NPT - National Press Trust (Government owned)

\*\* Owned by the Haroon Family

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

A major feature of Pakistani society, that is common to both rural and urban sectors, is the prominent position accorded to mosques and mazaars (spiritual centres)

which represent two distinct traditions in Islam. Although there is no institutional hierarchy of ordained priests in Islam, there are two groups of men in Pakistan who provide religious leadership and often function as priests. One is the body of men known collectively as the ulema, who are learned in Islamic theology and law and have traditionally provided what might be called the orthodox leadership of the community. The other is the collection of men often called pirs, who are associated with the mystical or devotional side of Islam known as Sufism. Both traditions are important in Pakistan. In the first the mosque plays a central role. Traditionally, the mosque had a maktab or madrassah (primary and secondary schools which imparted religious teaching in Arabic and Urdu) attached to it and although these have declined in number and standards with the spread of western-style education,<sup>77</sup> these are nevertheless important, particularly in the remote villages. The members of the Ulema are variously called maulanas, maulvis, imams and mullahs. The first title is accorded to those who have received special training in theology and law and represent a body of learned men. The other titles refer to those with varying degrees of knowledge of theology and who perform certain religious functions.<sup>78</sup> Members of the Ulema control some 40,000 mosques all over the country. Their influence also extends into many aspects of local community life, through solemnising marriages, reading funeral prayers, etc. Since the mosque represents the moral authority of religion, it functions as a major instrument of social control. The Friday Khutbas (sermons)

have often emerged as a powerful instrument of opinion forming, particularly in the rural areas, but are by no means restricted to village life.

Potentially, the Ulema through the mosques can wield formidable power. In practice, however, such power has been demonstrated only rarely, owing to a number of reasons. First and foremost, the predominantly Sunni Ulema are divided among themselves into several groups and movements. Several schools of thought can be discerned, such as the Ahle-Quran, Ahle-Hadith, Wahabi, Barelve, Deobandi, and so on. Thus the Sunni Ulema have not been sufficiently united to assert their power, unlike the Shia Ulema who in Pakistan and elsewhere (Iran) form a relatively closer-knit community. Second, unlike the Shias, who through the concept of Ijtihad, (independent exercise of judgement) were able to re-interpret Islam in the light of the modern world and its complexities and thus present Islam as a vibrant force relevant to the problems of the modern world, the Sunni ulema remained orthodox and rigid in their doctrine. This has meant that while the Sunni community reveres and seeks religious guidance from its Ulema, they do not necessarily seek or accept guidance on worldly matters to the extent that the Shia community perhaps does. Third, the ulema themselves have often preferred not to operate through mosques, and have attempted to exert pressure on successive governments through organising political parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan, which have met with varying degrees of success.

In general, however, as one observer has pointed out,

"The orthodox ulema.....have lacked the knowledge of the techniques of effective political action to enable them to take the offensive on behalf of a rigorous return to classical standards." 79

Nevertheless, on the rare occasions when the religious leadership has acted in concert, as for instance during the 1953 anti-Ahmeddiya disturbances, or in opposing Ayub Khan's family laws, the mosques emerged as formidable centres of political agitation.<sup>80</sup>

Pirs and Sufism represent the mystical and devotional side of Islam common throughout the Islamic world but especially prevalent in the Indian sub-continent. Sufi 'saints' preached and popularised the word of Islam, creating systems of devotion which were built into spiritual orders (silajat). Innumerable tombs of the saints function as shrines and devotional centres.<sup>81</sup> In Sind, many of the feudal landlords are also Pirs, such as the Pir of Pagaro and the Pir of Hala. Additionally, in Sind, such 'priesthood' is dynastic. The power wielded by such feudal aristocrats-cum-Pirs is considerable, a fact acknowledged by political parties like the Muslim League, which have sought the support of Pirs in order to obtain blocks of votes of their fanatical followers. Although chiefly characteristic of Sind, this phenomenon occurs throughout Pakistan. Pirs are viewed with suspicion, often derision by the orthodox ulema, but the two traditions nevertheless persist side by side throughout rural and urban Pakistan.

## PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

One of the most striking characteristics of Pakistani politics and perhaps the most important from our point of view, has been (and continues to be) the weakness and unstructured nature of its political parties. Party tradition in Pakistan is far from being well established, and has been relatively divisive. Many scholars have attributed the 'failure' of parliamentary democracy and the country's drift into military rule to the ineffectiveness of its political parties. As one scholar has written: the

"Main hindrances to the development of a parliamentary system in Pakistan were the absence of broad-based political parties and a lack of political leadership." 82

Mushtaq Ahmed writes in the same vein:

"What went wrong with Pakistani democracy was not the character of the 1956 constitution or the parliamentary system - it was the failure of the unwritten constitution, namely the political parties, without which written constitutions tend to wither away." 83

An official inquiry conducted in 1960 into the question of the failure of parliamentary democracy put the major portion of the blame on the lack of leadership of well-organised and disciplined parties.<sup>84</sup>

To some extent, the failure to establish a strong party tradition in Pakistan was due to the inability of its independence party, the Muslim League to set this tradition.<sup>85</sup> And here a comparison with the Indian experience may be instructive. To begin with, Pakistan had no political institution comparable in organisational terms

to the Indian Congress Party. The difficulties which the League faced with the creation of Pakistan were colossal as compared to those faced by India. But the inadequacies of the League to meet the tasks can be traced to the circumstances under which it developed in pre-independence India. The Muslim League entered the political arena somewhat later than the Congress, but like the Congress it entered as an interest group with limited demands rather than as a comprehensive nationalist movement. And until the mid-Thirties, the League remained a small interest group, largely supported by landlords, high officials, and Muslim princes. It was in the years between 1937 and 1940 that the League grew from a limited interest group to a mass movement. However, it was not until 1940 that the League officially adopted the demand for Pakistan, but even then its programme remained vague. The League, consequently, did not struggle for very long to win freedom. Its mass movement phase lasted only a few years and this was to exact a heavy price later. The long struggle of the Congress, (its mass movement phase spanned two decades), on the other hand, enabled it to develop as a cohesive, well-organised 'mass' party which preserved its own inner discipline reasonably well. Unlike the Congress, the League failed to develop organisational loyalties. It also did not have much experience in running provincial governments as did the Congress. Although the League became "comprehensive" enough to have a mass following, it never built an effective organisation. It did virtually no work among trade unions or peasant

associations, nor did it encourage constructive work organisations as did Congress. And provinces, where it was strongest in quality and organisation - Bombay, Bihar, the United Provinces - did not become part of Pakistan.

In the early years, the League having almost no open political enemies to fight was involved with dividing the spoils of office among its adherents. Jinnah's death in 1948, just over a year after independence, deprived the League of the only leader who could have held it together. Factional struggles imperilled the unity of the League, and soon the League organisation in the provinces virtually resolved itself into a chaotic tangle of small factions, each attached more to a person, or an interest, rather than representing a policy. The League made no attempt to appeal to a national public - it was, for example, unrepresentative of the great mass of rural poor and its organisation remained confined to the urban centres. Moreover, from the inception of the state, the League, especially in the East, wore an aristocratic label and thus lost much of its popular appeal. In the West too, it progressively became the monopoly of a class who aimed to use it for the realisation of its own political ambitions and the advancement of its economic interests. The organisation, particularly in the West, passed under the control of the landlords and the legislatures remained filled with their representatives. One illustration of the Muslim League government's concern with protecting landlord interests can be adduced from the fact that in Punjab, an Act was passed in 1950 under which 'a tenant can be ejected if

he is guilty of reading out at a public or private meeting the Punjab Muslim League Manifesto of 1944, in which land reforms have been vehemently advocated.'<sup>86</sup> The Muslim League was repudiating its own programme.

Opposition organisations emerged in reaction to a Muslim League party which could not and would not address itself to a national constituency. The Muslim League, for its part, claiming to represent the Muslim nation and identifying itself with the state, viewed its opponents as "traitors" and all forms of dissent as "anti-state" and "foreign-inspired". It was such an attitude that established the tradition of intolerance of opposition and a tendency to view all dissent as the result of foreign conspiracies attempting to undo the state. Such an attitude is best exemplified in a speech made by Liaquat Ali Khan:

"As long as I am alive no political party will be allowed here." <sup>87</sup>

Some of the Muslim Leaguers even went so far as to say that any Muslim who opposed the Muslim League had betrayed the cause of Islam itself.<sup>88</sup> This intolerance of opposition, in fact, led to the banning of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Red Shirt Organisation in NWFP in July, 1948, and may have been a factor in outlawing the Communist Party of Pakistan in 1954.<sup>89</sup> However, the strenuous techniques employed to frustrate the opposition only seemed to generate greater antagonism. Sensing a threat to its pre-eminence, the Muslim League, as usual, insisted that it ruled by divine fiat and hence could not be displaced without at the same time, throwing the South Asian homeland



into shambles. However, such protestations were less and less successful after the deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat. With no one of like stature to succeed them, regional leaders soon fell to bickering among themselves and exposed the organisation's vulnerability to opposition attacks from without and bureaucratic manipulation from within. By the end of 1954, the party had already reached its end but few of its remaining leaders had grasped the consequences.

The Muslim League decline was sharp and precipitous. Just as constitution-making foundered on the question of East Bengal's claim to representation in consonance with its larger share of population, so too did the eastern wing play the important role in judging the Muslim League as inept and soon to be defunct. The League was routed in the 1954 provincial elections in East Bengal, by the United Front, a coalition of opposition parties. This accelerated the undermining of the Muslim League in the West. The Republican Party came into being there, and when this party sought to link up with the regional parties in the East, the League was hard pressed to maintain any kind of following.

To summarise the experience of the League: once Pakistan was established, its raison d'être disappeared and before it could discover another, Jinnah's death deprived it of his great moral authority. In the absence of agreed purpose or inspired leadership, the League disintegrated and was succeeded by a constellation of parties representing small societies, appealing to more limited segments of

the national community. Although there was general agreement among party leaders that a parliamentary form of government was desirable, their diverse political commitments precluded the consensus essential to its smooth functioning.

Apart from the Muslim League, Pakistan has had a plethora of parties such as the Republican Party, Awami League, National Awami Party, and the 'Ulema' parties.<sup>90</sup> However, most of these were coteries of groups; the multiplicity of parties did not for the large part reflect difference in social and economic philosophy and policy (with the exception of the religious parties). Such organisations as the parties claimed to possess, existed largely on paper. Parties depended largely on the popularity and influence of individual leaders rather than on any effective base. They were not solid organisations - but shifting combinations of members of parliamentary assemblies, rather like the parties in Eighteenth Century England:

"Lists of members never agree and nobody knows from week to week who belongs to what. A government attracts support if it looks like forming a government." 91

To a large extent parties (we are referring here primarily to West Pakistan) were the personal following of large landowners, who marshalled their tenants to vote as they directed. This was probably one reason why a modern party system did not develop: there were too many pocket boroughs. The traditional, predominantly rural nature of Pakistani society as described above, meant that social

relations were organised by kinship; power and status were hierarchical; and political cleavages reflected customary and lineage ties to powerful landlords, pirs or tribal leaders. In this environment, political parties were little more than extensions of the influence and network of the locally dominant zamindars. Muslim League politics - and Republican in 'due course' - were built on alliances and rivalries of Legharis, Daultanas, Qizilbashes, Tiwanas and other leading feudal families in the Punjab,<sup>92</sup> of Talpurs and Khosos, Pirs and Mukhdooms in Sind, of Mazaris, Bugtis and Marris in Baluchistan, and the delicate balancing tribal interrelationships in the Frontier. Such parties resembled pre-party phenomena rather than "political parties" of the type associated with 'modern' political systems. Thus social structural characteristics served to inhibit the development of 'modern' political parties.

As a result of this, organisational loyalty remained poorly developed. Since political power was highly localised and fragmented, parties instead of building up their organisations or mass support, generally co-opted locally influential leaders with their own group of supporters. Since local leaders were co-opted into the party, and did not join because they believed in the party's programme and ideology, they felt free to alter affiliation whenever they stood to gain by doing so. And since parties were composed of local leaders with their own followers, factionalism was rife; party differences were often based on factional/personality factors rather than on

matters of policy. Since rural factions were the parties' major sources of support, and the factional bases were local, it was difficult to build national political parties. Indeed, no party succeeded in developing as a national institution. Throughout Pakistan's political history one theme is constant. Pakistan's political parties were regional and parochial in form and personal in performance. Changing party loyalties became a perennial feature of Pakistan's party system. One scholar has described parties in this way:

"The political groups of Pakistan were, strictly speaking, not parties. They may have been on their way to becoming political parties but they were at best, centres of opinion, and at worst feudal clans, or phantom groups, or religious associations." 93

Keith Callard in a frequently quoted passage, made the following observation about the nature of parties:

"The system of political parties in Pakistan bears little resemblance to that of most other democratic countries....In Pakistan politics is made up of a large number of leading persons who, with their political dependants, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make politicians less available for office." 94

Regular national general elections might have brought about a national outlook among at least some political parties, leading them to the development of more cohesive structures and programmes, and thus may have helped to lay the foundation of a modern, mass-party based tradition. But this did not happen. Pakistan has had precious few elections. In the absence of a national

legislature elected directly by popular vote (until 1970), parties did not feel the necessity of turning their attention to the primary voter. In West Pakistan each province (except Baluchistan) had an adult suffrage election to elect their respective provincial legislatures but as the Electoral Reforms Commission reported:

"It was widely and persistently complained that these elections (1951-53) were a farce, a mockery and a fraud upon the electorate." 95

The Basic Democracy 'elections' of 1959 and 1964 could hardly have been a more meaningful experience for the voters and parties than the provincial elections of dubious propriety during the 1950's. Indeed, the 1959 election took place in the absence of parties, since they were banned at the time.

In evaluating party performance, it is important to remember that often, parties in Pakistan have operated under severe restrictions. Policies of repression adopted by successive regimes played their part in preventing parties from developing into broad-based national organisations. Imprisonment and harassment of party workers, periodic banning of some parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, the National Awami Party, disqualification of politicians through such instruments as PRODA<sup>96</sup> and EBDO,<sup>97</sup> censorship of the press and other media of communication, were hardly conducive to the development of parties. The restrictions on parties began in a systematic manner in 1954. With the dissolution of the first constituent assembly, the civilian bureaucracy, backed by the military

establishment, became openly involved in the political life of the country. Thereafter, the activities of political parties were largely circumscribed, and an attempt was made to impose a consensus on them by holding out the threat of martial law or a military-backed dictatorship. With the military coup in 1958, political parties were banned altogether, along with all other forms of political activity, and it was not until 1962, that the ban was lifted; and that too, partially.

#### THE AYUB KHAN ERA

The Ayub Khan era (1958-1969) saw the rise of both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party. The main features of the era therefore, relevant to our purpose, need to be noted briefly.<sup>98</sup> Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 by ousting politicians who had lost the ability to work out stable coalitions, with the ostensible aim of replacing the immobilism and corruption of politicians with the speed and efficiency of the army.<sup>99</sup> Few voiced dissatisfaction over the liquidation of parliamentary government. The politicians were either held in contempt or were too distant from the general population to be missed. Ayub and the civil-military coalition that supported him saw the imperative need of the second decade of independence as more discipline, stability and security rather than mass mobilisation and participatory democracy. And since the relatively weak political forces of the country were incapable of resisting the army's power, its leadership could undertake the operation without worrying

about its possible high cost of uncertainty. For almost a decade, Ayub's leadership gave Pakistan relative political stability and a coherent public policy. But for all these 'successes', Pakistan at the end of Ayub's decade remained what it was at the beginning: a politically divided, economically poor, and militarily vulnerable state. What is more important is that Ayub's policies generated widespread social, economic and political discontent, unprecedented in its magnitude, and from which both Bhutto and his PPP were to benefit.

In the political field, Ayub considered the prevalent forms of democracy too complex to be operated successfully by the simple illiterate peoples of Pakistan. What was needed was a system more suited to the 'genius' of the Pakistani nation. This was presented as the system of 'Basic' Democracy, (B.D.) which was, Ayub's version of a 'guided' or 'controlled' democracy.<sup>100</sup> Through this system, Ayub sought the support of what he called "the hard core of the nation", the rural majority, and attempted to exclude from political power, the urban middle class - which was the source of opposition to him and his system. The chief motive behind the B.D. system was to build support at lower levels primarily through patronage and distribution of favours among the rural elite and the establishment of channels of communication with them. The large and middle landlords in West Pakistan and the surplus farmers, in the East, were the major beneficiaries of the B.D. scheme. It was from these categories that the majority of the B.D.'s were drawn. The underlying

assumption of such a strategy was that by mobilising support from traditionally privileged sections of rural society, the régime could entrench itself for a long time to come. The "suitable" government for Pakistanis, maintained Ayub, was one which consulted with only those localised, Ayub-designated rural elites through the Basic Democracies scheme.

Free from popular or political limitations on its powers, the civil-military elite under Ayub, set its sights on the building of a "modern" nation. Economic growth was accorded top priority - and the official Pakistani doctrine was one of functional inequality i.e. income inequality was considered a necessary evil in the drive towards rapid economic development, and growth was put before equality. During the period from October 1958 to March 1969, Pakistan experienced an economic growth that was spectacular for Asia in gross, quantitative terms, but which occurred within a context of increasing economic inequality between a minute upper class on the one hand and a small middle class and the masses on the other hand. The strategy of development followed aimed at creating an industrial entrepreneur class capable of bringing about rapid industrialisation. Ayub's approach to economic development was marked by the fostering of a private sector through state subsidies, concessions, tax-holidays and other incentives, emphasising gross economic increase without regard to income redistribution or other considerations of social justice.



By 1968, twenty families, who constituted the industrial elite, were said to control 66 percent of all industrial capital, 97 percent of insurance funds and 80 percent of banking.<sup>101</sup> These "industrial robber barons" were the logical outcome of Ayub's policies of industrial development (in the west) which was based on the philosophy of what Gustav Papanek called "the social utility of greed".<sup>102</sup> The costs of change - were squarely placed upon those who could least afford to carry it. The social impact of this kind of capitalist expansion which created (or accentuated) income inequalities between classes,<sup>103</sup> cannot be overemphasised.

It was clear that the main beneficiaries of Ayub's 'Decade of Development' were the new industrialist and business class in the urban, and the traditional elite in the rural areas. Ayub's economic policies resulted not only in depriving the rural landless (and land-poor) of the fruits of rapid economic growth, but also adversely affected industrial workers (see below). Such neglect was to have a profound political impact as this increasingly impoverished rural and urban working class was to demand greater, more equitable distribution. Ayub's policies also led to the expansion of urban and small-town professional classes, thus increasing the strength of the groups bitterly opposed to his rural-biased political system, and consolidating the politicising new social forces, ready perhaps for mobilisation by a new political party.

Another effect of Ayub's economic policies was to widen regional disparities. During the third plan period

(1965-70) economic disparity between East and West Pakistan in per capita terms rose from 46% to 60%.<sup>104</sup> Frustration with Ayub's political system and economic policies sharpened regional loyalties not only in East Pakistan, but also in Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP, where opposition to the 'one-unit' scheme intensified. The growing economic disparity between the two wings plus the continued dominance of West Pakistan power elites in the policy-making structure of Pakistan served to strengthen latent Bengali nationalism. Bengalis remained seriously underrepresented in the civil bureaucracy and the military.<sup>105</sup> The political opposition in Bengal complained bitterly that Ayub had virtually turned East Pakistan into a "colony" of West Pakistan.

Discontent with Ayub's system first became apparent during the 1965 presidential 'election', in which the Combined Opposition Party candidate, Miss Jinnah, was able to win a respectable 36% of the votes cast, despite the biased nature of Ayub's electoral system.<sup>106</sup> This discontent, however, gained momentum in the aftermath of Pakistan's disastrous war with India in September 1965. While severe recurrent droughts in the mid-sixties brought to a virtual halt the rapid advance in the agricultural sector, the 1965 war had an equally adverse impact on the urban economy. Against this background, the Tashkent agreement in which Ayub agreed to re-establish relations with India (which was interpreted by the political opposition in the West as a sell-out of the Kashmiris and a humiliating capitulation before the Indians) began a period of political

ferment which was to culminate in the challenge to the Ayubian system in 1968-69 (discussed in the following chapter).

The Ayub Khan era gave rise to widespread discontent amongst various strata of the population. The cause of disaffection varied from group to group, but the alienated groups as a whole formed a wide spectrum. They included urban dissidents (intellectuals, lawyers, teachers, journalists, lower government servants, students and the newly mobilised urban proletariat) who resented Ayub's paternalism and interpreted his rural bias - as reflected in the B.D. system - as a scheme not only to deny them access to political power but also as a means of entrenching himself; industrial workers who saw their real wages declining<sup>107</sup> and who viewed the denial of their rights to strike and better pay as a result not only of a lack of distributive capabilities of the system, but also, of the regime working hand in glove with vested interests; the Ulema, who distrusted the regime for its modernising activities (e.g. family planning, family laws); and the 'Leftists' who opposed Pakistan's continued membership in western military pacts, (SEATO, CENTO) and the regime's unabashed, unmitigated, capitalist-oriented planning. This discontent was to find expression in the anti-Ayub movement - which culminated in the collapse of the Ayub regime.

It is apparent that Ayub made economic development, without social justice, the major national goal, and the civilian bureaucracy the main instrument of governance. Emphasis on rapid growth rather than distribution created social tensions, by fostering income inequality between

classes and exacerbated the problem of East-West integration, by widening regional inequalities.

The link between landed interests and the civil-military bureaucracy was reinforced in the Ayub era by the grant of land to civilian and military officers,<sup>108</sup> who thereby became substantial landowners in their own right when they were not already.<sup>109</sup> Additionally, leading landowning groups established and maintained close family links with high ranking army officers and bureaucrats through intermarriages.<sup>110</sup> The civil-military bureaucracy was however, not only recruited from a narrow social base, but from a specific regional area - the Punjab. This helps to explain why the most powerful challenge to the dominant bureaucratic-military oligarchy has come primarily from regionally-based opposition movements, in East Bengal, Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP.

The industrial elite fostered by Ayub's policies popularly known as 'twenty-two families', but which in actual fact consists of about forty families, were for the most part, Gujarati-speaking refugees from India. belonging to Shia trading communities.<sup>111</sup> The industrial elite has been linked to the civilian and military bureaucracy (and indirectly to the landed elite) in the form of joint partnerships, which were promoted during the Ayub and Yahya regimes.<sup>112</sup> These partnerships were formed principally between retired generals or central civil service personnel and industrialists; the former provided the contacts and licenses required for business purposes, and the latter the capital and managerial talent required to make the business successful. The industrial elite is also linked to senior military officers, bureaucrats and

landlords through inter-marriages, a link which has not been documented by writers on Pakistan.<sup>113</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Few governments created since World War II have had greater problems in establishing and maintaining their authority than Pakistan. By 1971, Pakistan had experienced and experimented with various types of rule - it had undergone eleven years of civilian government (1947-58) and thirteen years of military-led regimes (1959-71). But Pakistan was not able to develop a form of government, and the necessary institutions and processes required to support it, which endured beyond the political 'life' of a dominant leader. The 'Great Leader' phenomenon appeared to have become a continuing feature of political life. The personal approach to governing, begun with Jinnah became a political tradition. It has been pointed out that Pakistan is "a country whose political culture almost guarantees the rise of a single leader."<sup>114</sup> The Pakistani political system has always been dominated by a single personality, who with the help of the civil and military bureaucratic machinery, has attempted to grapple with the basic problems of national survival. Jinnah, Liaquat, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, were such leaders, and although they came from different backgrounds and subscribed to different political and ideological positions, they neither sought nor did anything to change the country's dependence on strong one-man government. The coup of 1958 inaugurated an extended period of martial

law followed by an exceptional manifestation of bureaucratic government under Ayub Khan. Ayub's failure was written large in the policies of Yahya Khan and the resultant political weaknesses that led to the debacle of Bangladesh in 1971. The country passed through several sequences where its existence as an independent national entity was seriously questioned - and then eroded in 1971. Its primary dilemma lay within itself and essentially in its inability to develop sound representative political institutions. Bureaucratic government meant giving pre-eminence to the administered state, over the political nation. Political institutions were allowed to atrophy to the point where national political leaders - let alone national political parties, had little chance of developing. Accompanying this was political discontent and social frustration - unfulfilled promises and unsatisfied demands. This - political impotence and administrative dominance and military rule - is the background against which the emergence of the PPP must be seen. It is also all the commentary needed on Pakistan's political tradition.

#### NOTES

1. The coup attempt which came to be known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, was allegedly the work of Major-General Akbar Khan and other army officers, basically disgruntled over the conduct and outcome of the war in Kashmir, and was alleged to enjoy the support of "Communist and revolutionary elements". The 'Conspiracy' was made the pretext for a massive witchhunt of the Left and Communists. It was dismissed as a 'stunt' by the opposition. The trial was held 'in camera' and details of the case were never made public. See Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. 1, No. 2, (21 March, 1951), p. 34.
2. The communal violence arose at the instigation of religious groups (like the Ahrars) and political parties, and was directed against the Ahmeddiyya sect. See Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted

under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, popularly known as the Munir Report. (Lahore: Government of Punjab, 1954).

3. Op.cit, p. 232.
4. A notable exception is Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960).
5. Here, the agent of the central and provincial governments in the district was the deputy commissioner or district magistrate. The role of the deputy commissioner was like that of a French Prefect: he not only maintained law and order but also controlled or supervised a host of economic and social activities in the district, arbitrated in local disputes, collected land revenue - functions employing political skills. In matters like remission of land revenue, granting of agricultural loans or building of schools, the people in the countryside depended almost entirely upon the goodwill and leadership of the deputy commissioner. This seriously undermined the role of the politician for he could neither put forward vigorously the interests of his constituents, nor was much patronage available to him at the district level.
6. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York : John Wiley, 1965).
7. These were: (1) The Government of India Act 1935 as adapted under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, known as the 'Interim Constitution' and under which the country was governed from 1947 to 1956; (2) The Constitution of 1956, framed as a result of the deliberations of two constituent assemblies over nine years of effort, but which remained in operation for only two and a half years (23 March 1956 to 7 October 1958); (3) The Constitution of 1962 promulgated by President Ayub Khan supposedly in accordance with the 'mandate' that he received from the 'people' in 1960.
8. For a comparative discussion of federalism see Ursula K. Hicks, Federalism: Failure and Success, A Comparative Study, (London: Macmillan 1978).
9. For a neo-Marxist analysis of Pakistan's early political history see Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in Harry Goulbourne, Politics and State in the Third World, (London: Macmillan, 1979).
10. Wayne A. Wilcox, 'Political Change in Pakistan: Structure, Functions, Constraints and Goals', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, (Fall, 1968), p. 347.
11. The Viceregal thesis was first advocated and systematically applied to the Pakistani political system by Khalid bin Sayeed, ibid, and The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).
12. For a discussion of the powers of the Governor-General, see Pakistan: The Formative Phase, ibid.

13. The following illustrations help to demonstrate Jinnah's exercise of such powers. Jinnah dismissed the pro-Congress ministry in the NWFP which had been suspected of working for the creation of a separate Pakhtun state ("Pakhtunistan") under its chief minister, Dr. Khan Sahib, and his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier Gandhi". Baluchistan - then a chief commissioner's province - was brought under what amounted to Jinnah's direct control. He dismissed M. A. Khuhro from the chief ministership of Sind because he opposed Jinnah's order to separate Karachi from Sind. Similarly, without consulting either cabinet or the members of the Punjab assembly, he dismissed the Khan of Mamdot, chief minister of Punjab, on grounds of inefficiency.
14. Hamza Alavi, "Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan", International Socialist Journal, Vol. 3, No. 14, (March/April, 1966).
15. Keith Callard, Pakistan - A Political Study, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), pp. 135-162.
16. Ibid, pp. 140-146 and pp. 160-162.
17. See Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), and K. J. Newman, 'Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes' Pacific Affairs, Vol.32, (March 1959).
18. See Government of India Act, 1935, (London: H. M. Stationery Office); The Transitional Constitutions of India and Pakistan, (Calcutta: The Indian Law Review Office, 1947), and Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1951).
19. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, passed by Constituent Assembly on 29 February, 1956 (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1956).
20. No less than ten provincial ministers fell victim to national action in the first seven years of independence: the sequence of dismissals are as follows:
- 1947 - Khan Sahib and Rashid of the NWFP.
  - 1948 - Khuhro of Sind.
  - 1949 - Khuda Baksh of Sind and the Khan of Mamdot in Punjab.
  - 1951 - Khuhro of Sind.
  - 1953 - Mumtaz Khan Daultana of Punjab.
  - 1954 - Peerzada Abdus Sattar of Sind.  
Malik Feroze Khan Noon of Punjab.  
Fazlul Haq of East Bengal.
21. The Punjabi representation in the civil service of Pakistan is difficult to estimate since available data only provides a breakdown on a West and East Pakistani basis. In the 1950's, West Pakistani representation in the Civil Service of Pakistan (the elite corps) averaged 71%.



22. Indeed the consequent lack of sense of participation on the one hand and a grievous sense of political underweightage on the other were chiefly responsible for augmenting and crystallising East Pakistani regionalism, which in its most extreme form finally emerged in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's famous Six Point "Charter of Survival" for East Pakistan. For details see, Mujibur Rahman, Our Charter For Survival: Six Point Programme, (Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1966).
23. See Syed M. Latif, History of the Punjab from the Remotest Antiquity to the Present Time, (Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press, 1891).
24. W. H. Morris Jones, 'Experience of Independence - India and Pakistan', The Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, (July 1958).
25. For who got what and when see, Lepel H. Griffin, The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families in the Territories under the Punjab Government, (Lahore: Chronicle Press, 1865).
26. N. G. Barrier, 'The Punjab Government and Communal Politics, 1870-1908', in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVII, (March 1968).
27. For an account of how the landlords prevented any serious land reform see Nimal Sanderatne, 'Landowners and Land Reform in Pakistan', South Asian Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, (January, 1974).
28. Planning Board, Government of Pakistan, The First Five Year Plan, Vol. II, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1958), p. 117.
29. Ibid, p. 309.
30. Quoted in M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1964), p. 50.
31. Under the batai system, the gross produce is shared by landlord and tenant usually at a 50:50 rate, but with varying degrees of participation of landlords in the production costs. The lease is mostly without contract and for one year or one season only, often however with automatic prolongation for a longer period but without any security for the tenant. See A. S. Haider and F. Kuhren, 'Land Tenure and Rural Development in Pakistan', Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives, No. 4, (F.A.O. 1974).
32. Report of the Land Reforms Commission for W. Pakistan, January 1959, (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1959).
33. Ibid, p. 118.
34. Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1970), p. 89 & 106. The latter figure is for W. Pakistan only.
35. Ibid, p. 236 - Figure for W. Pakistan.
36. Ibid, p. 247 - Figure for W. Pakistan.

37. The scheme was initially put forward by Punjabi politicians but was opposed by the smaller provinces out of fear of Punjabi domination. Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali in alliance with some of the Punjabi (Gurmani, Daultana) and Sindhi landlords, forced the unit into being. The one-unit controversy dominated Pakistani politics until 1970, when the former provinces were restored and one-unit abolished by General Yahya Khan, due to popular pressure.
38. See Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'Group Interests in Pakistan Politics, 1947-1958', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, Nos. 1 & 2 (Spring/Summer 1966), which states the view that the one-unit became a pawn on the chessboard of power politics between the landlords of the Punjab on the one hand and those coming from the smaller provinces on the other.
39. The Basic Democrat System, formulated in 1959, reflected Ayub's view of a 'guided' democracy. The system stipulated a hierarchical pyramidal structure of indirect representation with four tiers of authority. Local representatives called Basic Democrats (B.D.s) were chosen by direct election roughly at the rate of one for each thousand of population - 80,000 in all, 40,000 from each wing of the country. These formed the lowest tier and were responsible for local administration. The next three tiers consisted of selected B.D.s and of an equal number of nominated civil servants. The B.D. collectively formed the electoral college that chose the President and members of the national and provincial assemblies. The first B.D. election was held in 1959-1960, the second in 1965. For studies of the B.D. system, see K. B. Sayeed, 'Pakistan's Basic Democracy', Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, (Summer 1961); H. J. Friedman, 'Pakistan's Experience in Basic Democracy', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33 (June 1960); and Douglas E. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
40. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. 1, (London: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 11.
41. Ibid, p. 324.
42. M. Shahid Alam, 'Economics of the Landed Interests', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (Spring 1974), p. 12.
43. Population Census of Pakistan, 1972, (Islamabad: Pakistan Census Organisation, January 1973), Bulletin 1.
44. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1976, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Statistical Division).
45. For studies of Punjabi village life see Zekiye Eglar, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) and Saghir Ahmed, Class and Power in a Punjabi Village, (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Mahaz, 1977). See also, Hamza Alavi, 'Kinship in West Punjab Villages', Contributions to Indian Sociology, No. VI (1972).

46. Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1972, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture).
47. There is a paucity of information on the subject of caste in Pakistan, hence it is difficult to judge the extent and stability of the Muslim caste system. One useful guide is D. Ibbetson, Punjab Castes, (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1916). See also the works referred to in note 45 above.
48. It is important to remember that in a number of functional castes, both Hindu and Muslim, the majority of the members no longer follow the traditional caste occupation, but usually that occupation gives them their name and general social status.
49. Urban areas are defined by size, by the nature of employment of the population, and by the kind of administration. They include municipalities and any collection of houses inhabited by 5,000 or more people that the provincial census director may decide to classify as urban. Places of less than 5,000 population may also be classed as urban at the option of the provincial director if they have urban characteristics such as highways, sanitation facilities, office building, schools and a substantial non-agricultural labour force.
50. By 1970-71, Pakistan had seven universities and 387 colleges, and the number of college/university students totalled 255,000.
51. For such reviews see, S. C. Sufrin and S. A. Anwar, The Status of Trade Unionism in Pakistan, (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1962); M. Shafi Malik, The Labour Movement in Pakistan, Urdu Publication, (Hyderabad, 1963).
52. Pakistan Labour Gazette, Vol. XII, No. 1, (Government of Pakistan 1964), p. 241. See also, Labour Policy of Government of Pakistan, (Ministry of Health and Labour, July 1969).
53. Talukder, op.cit, p. 94.
54. Z. Shaheed, The Role of the Government in the Development of the Labour Movement in Pakistan, mimeograph (Department of Politics, University of Leeds, 1975).
55. Ibid, p. 6.
56. For an explanation of how such trade union strength was built up despite the formidable obstacle placed by the Ayub regime, see K. B. Sayeed, 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (July 1979).
57. See A. R. Khan, 'What Has Been Happening to Real Wages in Pakistan?' Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 7, (Autumn 1967).
58. Information derived through interviews with businessmen, Rawalpindi/Lahore, August 1977.
59. There are historical reasons for this. Before partition, these professions were dominated almost exclusively by Hindus. After

independence when these Hindus migrated to India, they were replaced in their professions by (East Punjabi) Muslim muhajirs who had migrated to Pakistan.

60. In Pakistan, as in other regions of South and South-East Asia, towns have mostly grown out of villages. See S. J. Burki, 'Development of Towns: The Pakistan Experience', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 8 (August 1974).
61. The author is grateful to Khalid bin Sayeed for this information.
62. The Pakistan Bar Council, the Pakistan Medical Association, the Association of Engineers, the Pakistan Federation of Journalists' Unions, and the Institute of Architects and Town Planners, are some of the better known of such organisations.
63. See Asaf Hussein, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, (Kent: Dawson, 1979), p. 112.
64. As for instance the Punjab Teachers Union (with a membership of 95,000 local body and government school teachers in 1971), and the West Pakistan College Teachers Association (with 2,500 dues-paying members). For an analysis of the role played by teachers associations in influencing government policy, see Dawn E. Jones and Rodney W. Jones, 'Nationalising Education in Pakistan: Teachers Associations and the Peoples Party', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No.1, (Spring, 1977).
65. These associations have acted more as unions than as professional organisations concerned with improving the level of professional performance and standards.
66. M. A. Qadeer, 'Some Indigeneous Factors in the Institutionalisation of Professions in Pakistan', in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975), p. 143.
67. Ibid, pp. 150-151.
68. Figures derived from Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1976, (Karachi: Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance, 1977), p. 131.
69. Douglas E. Ashford, op.cit, p. 258.
70. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, op.cit, p. 200.
71. Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'Political Activism of University Students in Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, Vol. IX, No. 3, (November 1971), p. 234.
72. Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare (Karachi: Ministry of Education, 1966).
73. They include the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam organised by the Jamaat-e-Islaami and the Pakhtun Students Federation organised by the National Awami Party.
74. Maniruzzaman, ibid, p. 236.

75. Ibid, p. 239.
76. Ibid, p. 244.
77. Kauser Niazi, Role of the Mosque, (Lahore: Sh. Mohammed Ashraf, 1976), pp. 31-32.
78. The term imam has a number of meanings. In an informal sense it refers to the leader of the prayer ritual, and as such, anyone can be imam. In a more formal sense, it has special meaning for the Shias, but in ordinary usage it is a functional term that refers to a paid official in charge of a mosque. Maulvis have a limited knowledge of theology, and most village maulvis often know the Arabic script well enough to read and recite Quranic verses but with little comprehension of what they are reading. The term mullah may be used to refer to a maulvi or to a local imam but usually it is a rather derogatory term that connotes a semi-literate, and often bigoted village maulvi or imam.
79. Keith Callard, op.cit, p. 225.
80. The comments made by the Court of Inquiry set up to investigate the 1953 agitation are still relevant and instructive in this regard. See Munir Report, op.cit.
81. An incomplete list of the more important ones compiled in 1938 named over 500, many of which are now in Pakistan.
82. G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, (London: Longmans, 1969), p. 244.
83. Mushtaq Ahmed, op.cit.
84. See the Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1961, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1962).
85. The principal political party of Pakistan's early period has yet to be adequately studied. A. B. Rajput, Muslim League: Yesterday and Today, (Lahore: Mohammed Ashraf, 1968), is a poor substitute for the story of the Muslim League.
86. Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. G. Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan, 1947-1958, (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, n.d.), p. 114.
87. Quoted in M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, (July 1970).
88. For example, Fazl-ul-Haq in a speech to the Sind Muslim League Conference in Karachi in 1938, The Indian Annual Register, Vol. II. (Calcutta, 1938), p. 355.
89. The Communist Party was banned soon after the alleged Communist-inspired abortive coup d'etat. See note 1 above.

90. For accounts of these parties' activities in the first decade of Pakistan's existence see K. K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-58, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), and M. R. Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research 1976).
91. Sir Ivor Jennings reviewing Keith Callard's 'Pakistan: A Political Study in Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 192.
92. For an excellent but brief survey of the squirearchy that underlay Punjab's patrimonially based politics, see Craig Baxter, 'Peoples Party vs. The Punjab Feudalists', Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 8 (July/October 1973), pp. 166-89.
93. K. K. Aziz, op.cit, p. 181.
94. Keith Callard, op.cit, p. 67.
95. Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, 24 April, 1956, p. 922. Mr. Suhrawardy used even stronger language: "The elections (in the Punjab) were a farce; intimidation and coercion, fraud and manipulation of ballot papers and ballot boxes were practised on an unprecedented scale," H. S. Suhrawardy, 'Address to the Nation', (Lahore: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), delivered at Dacca, 8 May 1953, pp. 6-7.
96. The Public Order and Representative Officers (Disqualification) Act, 1949 or PRODA, permitted the government to debar from public life, for a maximum of ten years, ministers, members of the central and provincial legislatures and parliamentary secretaries found guilty of corruption, maladministration or any abuse of official position. This Act, passed at the behest of Liaqat Ali Khan, was widely used as an instrument of repression of political opponents. It was repealed in 1954.
97. The Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance or EBDO passed by Ayub Khan in 1959, authorised special tribunals to try political leaders for 'misconduct'. Only by accepting an offer of disqualification from "being a member or candidate for the membership of any elective body" could these men avoid prosecution. Approximately 7,000 persons were EBDOed or excluded from political life.
98. A perceptive study of the Ayub decade is Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).
99. Ayub condemned the politicians of Pakistan as self-seekers who had "ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal gains." Broadcast by President Ayub on Radio Pakistan, 8 October 1958, (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Information, n.d.).
100. See note 39. For Ayub Khan's views, see his 'Pakistan Perspective' in Foreign Affairs, No. 4, (July 1960).

101. This was stated by the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission in April, 1968 in a speech before the Karachi Chamber of Commerce. See The Business Recorder, 25 April 1968.
102. Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 226.
103. See A. Bergen, 'Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings in Pakistan, 1963-64', Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 7 (Summer 1967). The lower half of the country's households got about one-fourth of the total personal income while the top 5% received 20% of the income. Recently, however, S. Guisinger and Norman L. Hicks have argued that the common perception that rapid growth in the 1960's led to a deterioration in income distribution is not supported by facts. See their 'Longterm Trends in Income Distribution in Pakistan', World Development, Vol. 6, (November-December 1978). This issue remains controversial but it would not be inaccurate to suggest that peoples' reactions to economic developments is based not so much on the facts of the situation, but on how they perceive it. Evidence from the latter part of the Ayub era clearly suggests that the peoples' perception of a worsening in income distribution was widespread; this has not been contested to date.
104. Economic Survey of East Pakistan: 1969-70, (Dacca: Government of Pakistan, 1970).
105. For instance East Pakistanis constituted only 5% of the officers of the Pakistan army in 1963.
106. For an analysis of the election see Sharif Al-Mujahid, 'Pakistan's First Presidential Elections', Asian Survey, Vol. 5, (June 1965), pp. 280-294.
107. A. R. Khan, op.cit.
108. These linkages were of course not solely the product of Ayub's policies. Indeed the connections between landed wealth and the civil-military bureaucracy can be traced back to the British Raj, and crystallised over the years. But it was during Ayub's rule that such connections assumed greater political significance.
109. See Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies', op.cit.
110. See S. Alam, op.cit., pp. 18-19.
111. For detailed analysis of the social background of the industrial elite, see Hanna Papanek, 'Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship and Partial Modernisation!', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 21, No. 1 (October 1972), and Lawrence J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974).
112. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley; University of California Press 1975), pp. 94-95.

113. Ibid.

114. Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm', Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 7, (July 1977).



## II

BHUTTO AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES' PARTY  
1967-1969

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the rise of the PPP, the milieu in which it emerged, the part played by its founder, Bhutto, and the social and economic transformations related to the party's subsequent growth and development. We are concerned, then with the circumstances that led to the birth of the party in 1967 and the role played by the party and its leader in building up opposition to the Ayub regime in 1968-1969.

The impetus for the creation of the PPP came from Bhutto, who was an established public figure much before he came to found the party. In so far as the party was built around the personal popularity of a single individual, it did not represent a complete break with Pakistani political tradition, as its leaders claimed or as suggested by writers such as H. A. Rizvi.<sup>1</sup> As indicated in the preceding chapter, politics in Pakistan has been much the politics of personalities, with political parties often representing little more than the personal following of certain leaders. But while the PPP originated primarily as Bhutto's vehicle, to be utilised in his campaign to dislodge Ayub Khan from power, the emergence of the party and its subsequent growth were closely bound up with the general process of modernisation and came to reflect the socio-economic changes set in by Ayub Khan's policies of industrialisation and economic development. As we shall

see below, without the economic and social deprivations that arose during Ayubian rule, the Bhutto phenomenon and the PPP would not have become such a significant force in 1968-69 and later in 1970. Bhutto's remark at the time that "nothing that I might say or do can possibly stir the masses in any way unless the objective situation was there"<sup>2</sup>, was more than political rhetoric. As such the PPP was also a product of the changing character of West Pakistan society of the late 1960's.

Since the emergence of the PPP cannot be understood without directing attention to its founder, it is necessary to begin with a brief account of Bhutto's public career, political views and tactics in order to gain a comprehensive picture of how it was that he came to found a new party in an environment in which there were already a plethora of parties. (See Appendix B for political parties of the period 1968-1969).

#### BHUTTO: BACKGROUND AND EARLY CAREER

It is not intended to write a detailed profile of Bhutto,<sup>3</sup> but to mention the salient features of his career relevant to this thesis, and to suggest, if not to emphasise the prominence he acquired in Ayub Khan's administration.

Bhutto came from an aristocratic wadera (Sindhi feudal) family of Sind. His father, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto was an eminent political figure of his time, a leading member of a clan of wealthy zamindars, and a community leader who had acquired the reputation of being a spokesman

of Sind in British India.<sup>4</sup> He was appointed to various official positions by the British. He was a member of the old Imperial Council and minister of the Government of Bombay, besides having worked as adviser to the Governor of Sind, being chairman of the Bombay Provincial Committee and a member of the Public Service Commission for Bombay and Sind. He was a delegate to the Round Table Conference in 1931 and 1932 and member of the Bombay Provincial Simon Committee.<sup>5</sup> Many Imperial distinctions were conferred upon Bhutto's father<sup>6</sup> and in 1930, he was knighted for being "the most influential zamindar in Sind.. .. (who had) constantly and effectively exercised influence in support of the Government."<sup>7</sup> It was Shahnawaz's campaign for the separation of Sind from the old Bombay Presidency - a demand which the British conceded in 1935 - that gave the Bhutto family added prominence in Sindhi politics. Indeed, as Bhutto once claimed, his father's campaign for the separation of Sind on the basis of its Muslim identity in many essential aspects, "contained the germs of the two-nation theory propounded by Jinnah for the partition of India."<sup>8</sup> However, despite this achievement, Shahnawaz lost the election to the Sind Legislative Assembly in 1937 - a defeat which his son later attributed to betrayals and jealousy on the part of his father's feudal chieftan friends.<sup>9</sup> In 1947, Shahnawaz moved to Junagadh, a small princely state, and became the Divan (Prime Minister). Under Jinnah's direction, he advised the Muslim ruler to opt for Pakistan when the transfer of power took place. However, agitations by the

predominantly Hindu, pro-Congress population forced the ruler to abdicate in 1947, and Shahnawaz left for his ancestral home in Larkana (Sind) with his family.<sup>10</sup>

The young Bhutto was brought up in this colonial - though highly politicised milieu. Referring to this background, Bhutto once described himself thus:

"Although by birth I am an agriculturalist and by education a lawyer.... It is politics above all that inspires me and kindles in me the flame of a lasting romance....my association with politics is rooted in my environment. I come from a politically saturated district in which my family played a prominent part. Politics was the milk given to me at birth....." 11

According to Bhutto, he was raised in an atmosphere pervaded by "wadera politics", and it was "naturally assumed that I would be in politics."<sup>12</sup> The Bhutto home at Larkana was frequented by leading Sindhi feudal politicians from influential families such as the Soomros, Talpurs, Jatois of Nawabshah and Mehar, Syeds of Nawabshah, and Bijaranis.<sup>13</sup> As a boy, Bhutto was exposed to the feudal politics of alliance-making, faction-building and manoeuvre with his father schooling him in the art of developing links with members of the Sindhi squirearchy, and introducing him to the waderas and political barons of Larkana and Sind.<sup>14</sup> Such connections were to prove extremely useful, when Bhutto later sought to launch his own political party.

Bhutto received his education at the highest seats of learning in the United States and England, in Los Angeles at the University of Southern California and in Berkeley at the University of California from where he

graduated in 1950 with Honours in Political Science, and at Christ Church, Oxford, where in 1952, he received a post-graduate degree in Jurisprudence. He was called to the Bar in London at Lincolns Inn in 1953 and was then appointed Lecturer in International Law at Southampton University.

On his return to Pakistan, he taught Constitutional Law at the Sind Muslim Law College at Karachi, and at about the same time, 1954-1958, practised as a barrister at the Sind High Court in Karachi. It was at this juncture that Bhutto became involved in Sindhi politics by joining the opposition to the 'one-unit' scheme.<sup>15</sup> But Bhutto did not wish to launch his political career as a regional leader, and in this he was guided by his father who "had a broad vision, and the role he envisaged (for me) was (as a national leader)...otherwise I would have gone into the direction of regionalism, localism, provincialism, zatism (castism), and biradarism,.....since every Pakistani in order to be a politician goes in that direction."<sup>16</sup> Thus Bhutto quickly extricated himself from the politics of regionalism surrounding the 'one-unit' controversy.

Elite politics rather than popular politics was to be Bhutto's first route to public position. In September 1957, thanks to his father's friendship with President Iskander Mirza, Bhutto, then twenty-nine, was selected as a member of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations, where he delivered his first speech before an international assembly on "Defining Aggression".<sup>17</sup>

Soon after, in March 1958, he represented Pakistan at the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva.<sup>18</sup> Bhutto, who by now had shown considerable talent, energy and ambition was appointed Minister of Commerce at the age of thirty (making him one of the youngest cabinet ministers in the history of the sub-continent) in Iskander Mirza's cabinet in October 1958. Later, in the same month, when Iskander Mirza was deposed by Ayub, Bhutto was retained in the same post by the new regime. In January 1960, he was given the Ministry of Minority Affairs as well as National Construction and Information, and three months later took charge of the additional portfolio of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources.<sup>19</sup> It was at this time that he visited Moscow and negotiated an oil agreement with the Soviet Union, an event that is said to have inaugurated - largely at Bhutto's instance - the era of friendly ties with the Russians.<sup>20</sup> This and other such agreements provided Bhutto with good initial preparation for the portfolio that he coveted: foreign affairs. In January 1963, upon the death of Mohammed Ali Bogra, he became Foreign Minister. This reinforced Bhutto's belief that he was destined to play a decisive role in his country's history - a belief that he did little to disguise, then as before.<sup>21</sup>

Two broad aspects of Bhutto's association with the Ayub regime need to be noted: his relatively more publicised role as foreign minister and his somewhat less-publicised, but varied experience in domestic politics, in terms of organising a political party, learning about feudal politics and serving as Ayub's personal confidant

in domestic policy matters. It is important to note at the outset that while Bhutto's views on an appropriate foreign policy for Pakistan were clearly articulated and coherently set forth in his writings of the period - as for instance in The Quest for Peace and Myth of Independence,<sup>22</sup> his views on aspects of domestic politics, in marked contrast, appear ambivalent. Of course, in this period, Bhutto's major preoccupation was foreign policy, but despite this, and especially since, as we shall see below, he did serve the regime in various capacities related to domestic policy, his failure to enunciate his political views on the domestic political system (other than in the most general terms by defending the Ayubian system) as clearly and lucidly as his foreign policy doctrine, suggests among other things, his lack of commitment to any particular dogma or ideology, and more importantly his strategy, as his sights were set on his future political career, of keeping open the widest possible options. Certainly, there is no record of his enunciating any socialist principles, either publicly or in private,<sup>23</sup> despite his later claims that he disagreed with Ayub on domestic issues such as "the concentration of wealth, the theory of creating barons of capital" and "ignoring the working class."<sup>24</sup> Bhutto's later socialist views are discussed below; here it is sufficient to note that his claim that his commitment to socialism was an old one which found its origin in the grotesque poverty of Sind, as reported by a number of writers<sup>25</sup> appears to possess little credibility in the absence of any trace of socialist thinking either

in his early writings and speeches or performance as a member of Ayub's administration.

Bhutto's foreign policy doctrine as reflected in his writings, was, in the main, concerned with pointing out that in an era of super-power domination and neo-colonialism, smaller developing nations should be wary of trying to placate or of always supporting one of the global powers, but should constantly function within enlightened self-interest. Insofar as Bhutto spoke of the dangers of neo-colonialism and of the need to withdraw from western military pacts, his views can be said to have had a leftist orientation, but can more appropriately be termed nationalistic. Bhutto frequently declared at various public forums that he would never allow Pakistan to become subservient to any Great Power. He argued for and attempted to bring about a shift in regional relationships towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China with an attendant withering away of American influence and economic assistance. He gradually became identified as the architect of friendly relations with China and with the move away from close dependence on the United States.<sup>26</sup> This brought him a considerable measure of personal popularity, particularly amongst youth and students, who not only viewed China as a powerful friend who came down fairly and squarely on Pakistan's side (unlike the Americans) over the Kashmir question but saw it in a much broader context - as an example that Pakistan would do well to emulate; the example of a poor nation, courageously working out its own salvation without help from others and



systematically putting its own house in order by discipline, unity and hard work.<sup>27</sup>

Bhutto also became well known for his anti-Indian stance. Indeed he created a conscious image of himself as a champion of confrontation with India. His public statements and particularly his emotionally charged speeches before the Security Council and elsewhere identified him with a militant posture towards India and in favour of the liberation of Kashmir's Muslims from Indian hegemony. This again appealed particularly to the youth, who, in contrast to their elders (who by and large, having witnessed the trauma of partition, wished to avoid further acrimony and bloodshed), appeared to be more emotionally involved with the issue of Kashmir's liberation. What further helped Bhutto acquire personal popularity was the wide publicity given to his nationalist views in the official media and the fact that he was presented by the regime as a youthful, brilliant, dynamic foreign minister relentlessly campaigning against India and fighting a "Thousand year war" for justice. His impassioned speech before the Security Council in 1965, in which he had referred to the Indians as "dogs", for instance, was always recalled with great pride by chauvinistic Pakistanis and his youthful admirers.<sup>28</sup> What added to his popularity amongst students and the intelligentsia was that he himself was a representative of the educated and determined young generation. It would not be in error to suggest that he was a figure that the educated youth and the intelligentsia could identify with in a regime otherwise known for its anti-intellectualism.<sup>29</sup>

Although Bhutto achieved public prominence and popularity as foreign minister, his experience in the domestic domain provided him with the necessary grounding for the political role that he was to assume later. Such experiences were wide and varied, ranging from his membership of the cabinet sub-committee which studied the Report of the Constitutional Commission (1961),<sup>30</sup> and in which Bhutto gave his unqualified support to the principles of the 1962 constitution - despite his later condemnation of the whole exercise - to his role in advising Ayub to take over the chain of newspapers owned by Progressive Papers Limited in an effort to suppress criticism of the government.<sup>31</sup> On such occasions, the views expressed by Bhutto scarcely established him as a democrat championing the cause of political liberty or freedom of speech. Indeed, as a member of the cabinet committee, Bhutto's views corresponded closely with Ayub's<sup>32</sup> and he supported the strongly authoritarian presidential form of government based on a restricted franchise (the Basic Democrat system, discussed later) which was later operationalised in the 1962 constitution.<sup>33</sup> Further, Bhutto was reported to have been closely associated with Ayub's decision to introduce press censorship.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, he was also reported to have advised Ayub in 1961, in his capacity as member of the cabinet sub-committee which examined the Constitution Commission Report, to set up a one party state by merging the party and the civil administration in order to create a new political structure based on a mixture of coercion and persuasion.<sup>35</sup> Later when Bhutto condemned the Ayubian

political system as a "disguised form of fascism", he justified his earlier support of such an authoritarian arrangement by arguing that at the time he felt anything was worth trying that would end political chaos and instability that was humiliating Pakistan in the eyes of the world - particularly in contrast to the stability of neighbouring India.<sup>36</sup>

For the present purpose it is necessary to emphasise two aspects of Bhutto's experience with domestic politics which had an important bearing on his subsequent political career. These are his involvement in organising Ayub's Convention Muslim League and his personal rivalry with the Nawab of Kalabagh. When Ayub decided to organise his own political party in 1962 - or, to be more precise revive the dormant Muslim League, he appointed Bhutto as secretary general.<sup>37</sup> This post, which Bhutto later said he did not want,<sup>38</sup> enabled him to establish important political links and to gain a useful insight into the dynamics of Pakistani politics. Exposed to the feudal machinations and the political horse trading that were characteristic of the League, he learnt important lessons in power-broking, feudal alliance-making and patronage politics. The Convention Muslim League was a patrimonially-led, patronage party par excellence, with Ayub dominating the party, nominating the members of the key central bodies, and utilising patronage to cement the party organisation.<sup>39</sup> When Bhutto organised his own party later, it was to bear a striking resemblance in terms of these features to Ayub's party.<sup>40</sup> And Bhutto was also able to draw lessons from the failings

of the Convention Muslim League, particularly its weakness vis a vis its lack of a mass base.<sup>41</sup> But besides gaining experience in party organisation, Bhutto established personal links with several notables and attempted to create his own group of supporters. This can be adduced by the fact that on one occasion he was chided by Ayub Khan for "putting in his own cronies" in the Muslim League organisation.<sup>42</sup> Many of Bhutto's ex-Muslim League friends, such as Pir Ghulam Rasool Shah, Mustafa Khar, Jatoi, and Fazal Elahi, were to later join him when he organised his own party.

The mutual antagonism and rivalry between Bhutto and Ayub's governor of the Punjab, the Nawab of Kalabagh, also afforded Bhutto the opportunity of forging links with political notables. Kalabagh, during the course of his Governorship (1960-1966) had acquired the reputation of being a dictatorial person who disliked opposition and had no hesitation in crushing those who attempted to oppose him or who had offended him.<sup>43</sup> Although Bhutto's official position in the Ayub administration was in no sense comparable to Kalabagh's as to have given rise to rivalry between them, both competed for Ayub's favour and confidence and personally disliked one another - a dislike that was based more on a personality clash than a Sindhi-Punjabi collision.<sup>44</sup> As a consequence of this rivalry, those who had suffered at Kalabagh's hands, in one way or another, rallied around Bhutto for protection and favours.<sup>45</sup> There were three reasons for this: first, it was generally accepted that Bhutto enjoyed Ayub's trust

and confidence - indeed, there were wide speculations that Ayub was grooming Bhutto to be his successor.<sup>46</sup> Second, since the Bhutto-Kalabagh antagonism was a well-known fact, anti-Kalabagh elements knew they would find a sympathetic response from Bhutto. And third, Bhutto consciously made himself easily accessible to such individuals, and went out of his way to accommodate and help them.<sup>47</sup> Bhutto had evidently learnt that governmental office was a great client-creating resource, and he cleverly manipulated the anti-Kalabagh groups to his own political advantage. It is reported that a year before he left Ayub's cabinet he began 'sounding' people in the Muslim League and the government opposed to Kalabagh in an effort to rally personal support.<sup>48</sup>

It was on a foreign policy issue - Tashkent - that Bhutto broke with the regime that he had served for eight years.<sup>49</sup> The outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 marked the beginning of a parting of ways between Bhutto and Ayub.<sup>50</sup> In retrospect, whether Bhutto's disillusionment with Ayub rose out of the poor conduct of the war and the subsequent 'surrender' at Tashkent,<sup>51</sup> or whether Bhutto with consummate political skill wanted to disassociate himself from a regime that had become increasingly unpopular,<sup>52</sup> is a question that may never be answered. What is undoubtedly true is that the ceasefire in September 1965 and the Tashkent agreement brought him his severest disappointment as well as the highest pinnacle of popularity that he had yet achieved. The Tashkent declaration restoring the status quo in Kashmir, had been the occasion

for widespread students' riots in the towns throughout West Pakistan in January-February 1966.<sup>53</sup> This had been put down by a firm show of force for fear of its spreading to infect the armed forces who were thought to be restive over the cease-fire agreement. The demonstrations that followed the Tashkent declaration were the immediate outburst of a dazed people, who had been led by years of official propaganda to believe in the military superiority of Pakistan vis à vis India. Although every political party in the opposition tried to cash in on the general unrest the agitation remained leaderless - perhaps giving Bhutto the cue, and the nation a foretaste of the greater storm that was to be let loose two years later.

Bhutto, who was present at Tashkent, was believed to have strongly opposed the settlement and his departure from the government shortly afterwards gave currency to this view, along with the idea that his departure was the price demanded by the United States for the resumption of aid.<sup>54</sup> Bhutto deplored the Tashkent Agreement, because, as he was later to declare, he believed that what was won on the battlefield was lost at the conference table. Whether Bhutto drew a timely lesson from the manifestation of public discontent in the streets with Ayub's performance at Tashkent or not, it was obvious that Bhutto was convinced that Tashkent had sealed the fate of the Ayub government. This surely was the most opportune moment to leave the government and reap a political harvest. Bhutto, after all, professed to believe in the dictum that "when events change, men must change with the events," and that "consistency was the virtue of small minds."<sup>55</sup>

Ayub's popularity declined sharply after the 1965 war and Tashkent. When Bhutto proceeded on 'long leave' never to return to his post in the Ayub cabinet, a delicate situation had already built up. This sprang from the widely held belief that it was Bhutto who, in September 1965 and thereafter, had displayed the greater resolution. His image as the young and forceful foreign minister who, at the Security Council, had defied India, occupied a large place in the public mind. By contrast, Ayub was felt to have given away too much at Tashkent. After Tashkent, Bhutto remained in office for another six months and then finally left in June 1966, having resigned his Muslim League post earlier, in March.<sup>56</sup> After Bhutto's official exit from the Ayub cabinet, in June 1966, he proceeded by train from Rawalpindi to his ancestral home in Larkana. At intermediate stopping places throughout his journey he was given tremendous ovations and a hero's reception. The sympathy expressed for him, mostly by students and young people was intense, since his unceremonious departure together with (later) official harassment and persecution was symptomatic of the treatment that students themselves were receiving at the hands of the Ayub regime. Additionally, Bhutto capitalised on the image he enjoyed of an inflexible champion of Pakistani rights, who had been 'sacrificed' by a corrupt and weak regime in deference to American wishes. The Ayub regime itself fell into Bhutto's trap, and did much to perpetuate this image. A leading minister of Ayub's cabinet, to give but one instance, accused Bhutto

of creating "unpleasant relations with American and western countries."<sup>57</sup> In addition, the government sought to discredit him in several ways<sup>58</sup> - a factor which only served to increase his popularity by presenting him as a martyr, and did much to erase the embarrassing memory of his eight-year association with the Ayub regime.

#### BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE PPP

The period between the departure of Bhutto from the cabinet and the formation of his own party (i.e. June 1966 - November 1967) was for him one of calculated manoeuvre, to gauge the intentions of an increasingly hostile government, to understand the directions of public opinion and to test the strengths and weaknesses of the various opposition parties and leaders. It needs to be emphasised that Bhutto moved towards adopting a leftist political position and founding a 'socialist' party only after a careful reading of the country's economic and political situation, and after consultations with various political parties and groups - in the period June 1966 - June 1967. A number of factors appear to have influenced Bhutto in arriving at the decision to launch a new party and to adopt socialism as his political creed. These need to be examined in some detail.

Initially, Bhutto explored the possibility of working within existing political parties. For instance, he spoke of creating a 'Forward Bloc' within Ayub's Convention Muslim League, a move that was unequivocally rebuffed by the party stalwarts.<sup>59</sup> He was also involved in



negotiations with the National Awami Party (NAP) and Daultana's Council Muslim League.<sup>60</sup> Clearly, these parties were not willing to accept Bhutto as their leader, which was the position he envisaged for himself.<sup>61</sup> Additionally, Bhutto, himself, regarded these parties with a measure of contempt. According to him, none of them measured up to his criteria in leadership, organisation or programme.<sup>62</sup> Almost all the opposition leaders were men of parochial appeal and provincial stature, and their party organisations were riven by factionalism.

While, on the one hand Bhutto was rebuffed by and disillusioned with existing parties, on the other hand he recognised the political potential of a disparate group of leftists, who were attracted by his vehemently, anti-imperialist and nationalist stance, and were now urging him to form a new party.<sup>63</sup> This is not the place for a detailed review of the history of the Left in Pakistan,<sup>64</sup> but a few background features of these groups need to be noted here. First, leftist organisations in West Pakistan had had little continuity in terms of their existence. The Pakistan Communist Party (PCP) was banned in 1954 after a series of events involving the party.<sup>65</sup> Efforts to organise a Pakistan Socialist Party proved shortlived, with the party hampered by its secularism, by the earlier connections of its leaders to the Congress and Indian Socialist parties, and by the Hindu complexion of the party in East Pakistan.<sup>66</sup> Thereafter many members of the banned PCP and the moribund PSP joined and worked within "progressive parties" (such as the Azad Pakistan Party which

merged with similar leftist groups in 1954 to form the National Party; the National Awami Party formed by the merger of the National Party with Bhashani's peasant movement in East Pakistan) the majority of which were regional in form, while others chose to work within trade unions.<sup>67</sup> Thus the Left persisted in a fragmented form, focused around particular groups of leaders, small groups of intellectuals, peasant organisers and trade unionists, representing remnants of earlier organisational spurts. Many members of these diverse groups such as J. A. Rahim, Mubashar Hasan, Mukhtar Rana, Mairaj Mohammed Khan, K. H. Meer, Taj Mohammed Langah and Sheikh Rashid, admired Bhutto for his unrelenting anti-imperialist campaign and attempted to persuade him to launch his own party.

The urgings of such admirers coincided with Bhutto's own assessment that the changed economic and social realities of Pakistan of the mid-sixties required a new party with a message that would have a mass appeal. Such an assessment was based on a perceptive analysis of the social and political repercussions of Ayub's policy of vigorous economic development. In a society characterised by growing disenchantment with the wide gulf between the abject poverty of the have-nots and the ostentatious living of the haves, Bhutto discerned that the most powerful rallying slogan would be one which addressed itself to the issue of economic deprivation. Bhutto not only recognised the importance of directing attention to the "exploited urban and rural working class", but sensed the growing resentment amongst urban professional intelligentsia and the

student community against the Ayubian political system. Indeed, in the Punjab, (and to a lesser extent in Sind) Bhutto was sought out by a number of 'progressive' groups amongst lawyers (through various bar associations) and students (through student federations such as the Muslim Students' Federation and the National Students' Federation), who on account of Bhutto's unceremonious ouster from the Ayub cabinet following his opposition to the Tashkent declaration, viewed him as a progressive, nationalist figure, symbolising their own resentment against the Ayubian system. Thus, Bhutto could discern that an amorphous constituency was beginning to congeal around him. These developments and the underlying economic and social tensions provided Bhutto the cue for his future strategy. The support of feudals and the politically influential was important, but as a consequence of the social and economic developments of the 1960's, any aspirant for political power must also appeal as a populist politician.<sup>68</sup> Only a new party, according to Bhutto, could succeed in accommodating the emerging social groups and the new generation that had come of age in the country.<sup>69</sup>

The socialist cry of equality was part of Bhutto's strategy aimed at gaining popular support, an ideological move assisted by such leftist intellectuals as J. A. Rahim and Mubashar Hasan. Thus Bhutto's emerging socialist beliefs were the result, less of ideological commitment, than of his calculation that political success in the Pakistan of the late sixties required mass support. Or as one writer has pointed out, to Bhutto, socialism represented

an "ideology of protest" to be utilised in his attacks on the Ayub government, for he "was never really an ideologically oriented political actor."<sup>70</sup> His espousal of socialism thus represented an opportunistic response to what he saw as the "central theme of Asia", that of "upheaval and change."<sup>71</sup> Privately, and particularly to his conservative, feudal followers, he is reported to have explained that his espousal of socialism was necessary to prevent more radical leaders from capitalising on the social and economic tensions, which would only bring violence and bloodshed.<sup>72</sup>

Just as Bhutto's move towards socialism had occurred gradually, so too did his elaboration of the kind of socialism he professed to believe in. Although he adopted a socialist orientation in his attacks on the government, his vision of socialism at this stage remained vague. However, he made it clear at the outset that:

"We do not advocate the communist kind of socialism.....we stand for a socialism which is compatible with our own conditions."

In emphasising that his brand of socialism was not of a militant, atheistic variety, Bhutto was taking full cognizance of Pakistan's Islamic identity. He was cautious not to preach anything that might appear to contravene Quranic teachings. Bhutto's personal views on Islam were ambivalent - he was in no sense religious-minded, but acknowledged Pakistan's Islamic heritage and identity, and believed passionately in the two-nation theory.<sup>73</sup> It would not be wrong to suggest that Bhutto, like other Pakistani leaders such as Jinnah, Liaquat and Ayub, had an essentially

secular outlook, but one qualified by the need to find a place for Islam in the Pakistani state and society, which arose from the recognition of Pakistan's Muslim identity. Bhutto was aware that socialism would have to be tailored to the country's prevailing and dominant Islamic ethos, and he was also aware of how earlier attempts (by the traditional left) at using socialist ideology had been hampered by its open secularism. Therefore, he included Islam as an integral part of his emerging ideology. In his speeches, he stressed the compatibility between Islam and Socialism, by interpreting socialism in terms of Islamic musawaat (egalitarianism).<sup>74</sup> However, it was not until he had formed his party, that he fully elaborated his concept of the congruency between Islam and socialism.

In September 1967, Bhutto announced his decision to form a new party dedicated to "democracy, independent foreign policy and a socialist pattern of economy". Bhutto was careful to stress that his party's socialism would be reformist.<sup>75</sup> In the intervening period between this announcement and the party's inaugural convention in November 1967, Bhutto moved on several fronts simultaneously. He entrusted several intellectual leftists, notably J. A. Rahim, Mubashar Hasan and K. H. Meer, with the task of drawing up the party's programmatic and ideological documents - under of course, his personal supervision.<sup>76</sup> Others, notably his personal followers and friends such as Khar and Talpur, were given the task of 'sounding' politically notable people (zamindars for the most part), an effort which met with little success, for those who were sympathetic to

Bhutto, nevertheless feared reprisals from the government, while others wished to wait until the party had been launched to make up their minds about joining it.<sup>77</sup> At the same time, contacts were made with student and labour representatives known to be sympathetic, inviting them to the convention.<sup>78</sup> The aim was to collect the widest possible assortment of individuals and interests. But, as many of the organisers of the inaugural convention indicated in interviews with the author, the haste with which Bhutto called the conference, together with the legal restrictions imposed by the government on political activity, did not enable them to achieve this aim, and they did not expect the convention to be a success.

#### FOUNDATION OF THE PARTY

The first convention of the PPP, at which the party was founded by the unanimous decision of the delegates present, was held in Lahore on November 30 and December 1, 1967. Although, at the time, there were no occurrences that could give reasonable cause to apprehend an outbreak of disorder, the government had prohibited assembly in public places in Lahore. The convention was therefore held at the residence of Mubashar Hasan. About 300 delegates (including a handful of women) from various parts of West Pakistan participated. It is significant that no one from the eastern wing of the country was present. There were few political notables who could be identified amongst the founding members at the convention. Those who could be identified as politically notable, included the

Talpur brothers (who belonged to the pre-British ruling family of Sind), Mohammed Hayat Khan (former secretary general of the Council Muslim League), Nisar Mohammed (former MPA), Begum Abad Ahmed Khan (formerly of the Awami League), Gandapur and Sherpao (from the NWFP), and Bhutto's ex-Convention Muslim League colleagues, Khar and Mumtaz Bhutto. Significantly, no member of the Punjabi feudal aristocracy can be identified amongst the delegates.<sup>79</sup> A fair number of student representatives were present at the inaugural meeting, as were lawyers and a couple of labour union organisers. Two Ulema were present in order to ensure the Islamic credentials of the party.<sup>80</sup>

The heterogeneous composition of the party was thus evident from the beginning, as the organising conference was attended by not only leftist organisers and intellectual socialists, but also aristocratic, conservative followers of Bhutto. Taseer's contention that there was "a marked absence of feudalists"<sup>81</sup> applied only to the representation from Punjab, for a number of zamindars can be identified from Sind and the NWFP. However, it was the leftists who dominated the convention, both in terms of numbers and in terms of affecting the proceedings.<sup>82</sup> According to several founder-members, many of those attending were government agents, informers or C.I.D. men.<sup>83</sup> Indeed, it was this fear of government agents that provided Bhutto with the justification for personally nominating, (rather than electing) the members of the various committees constituted at the convention.<sup>84</sup> Thus began the tradition of nomination, which was to

characterise the party throughout its existence.

The convener of the convention, which held four sessions, was Malik Aslam Hayat (a lawyer and president of the Lahore district bar association), while Bhutto presided over all four sessions.<sup>85</sup> In his presidential address, Bhutto launched a frontal attack on the existing socio-economic system, and called for a popular struggle to overthrow it.<sup>86</sup> "Political and economic realities demanded a new party", as "the country was bending towards self-destruction. The old forms of political arrangements are not sufficient."<sup>87</sup> Bhutto explained that the economic programme of the party aimed at social justice, and the aim of the party was to bring socialism to the country. However, Bhutto declared that the party would be sufficiently adaptable to absorb and synthesise diverging viewpoints. He called for nationalisation of all key industries. His party would also struggle for the rights of the Kashmiris, since "Pakistan without Kashmir is as incomplete as is a body without a head."<sup>88</sup> The convention passed twenty-five resolutions, which dealt with a wide range of issues such as expressing solidarity with the Third World and the people of Jammu and Kashmir and condemning the Ayub regime.<sup>89</sup>

The only election held at the convention was for the chairman, and Bhutto was declared elected by a unanimous show of hands.<sup>90</sup> Four committees - all nominated and chaired by Bhutto - were declared constituted at the convention. These were the Steering Committee and the Resolution Committee, comprising ten members each, the



Constitution Commission, comprising twelve members, and the Draft Declaration Committee, composed of eleven members.<sup>91</sup> The last three committees were to be concerned with ideological work for the party and the task of framing a party constitution. Provisionally an interim constitution, prepared jointly by Bhutto and K. H. Meer (lawyer, formerly of the Azad Pakistan Party and NAP - Bhashani group) was passed.<sup>92</sup> The Steering Committee was to be concerned with organisational work and selecting the organising committee. In constituting these committees Bhutto attempted to balance intellectual leftists with feudals and moderate middle-class professional representatives, but in general zamindars did not form a preponderant majority - in marked contrast to later committees of the party which were dominated by them. For instance, out of the thirty individuals represented in the Convention Committees, eleven were zamindars (of both large and medium status), six were lawyers, two were journalists, two were teachers, four were students (two with labour connections), one was a woman, and three each were former government servants and small businessmen. The membership of these committees clearly illustrated the heterogeneous nature of the PPP from the beginning. Here was a diverse collection of individuals with widely varying social backgrounds, generational characteristics and importantly with potentially conflicting notions about the aims and purposes of their new party,

The supreme body of the party was to be its Central Committee, to be constituted by the Chairman, "in consultation

with the organisers and leaders of the party in the country".<sup>93</sup> The Central Committee, in turn, was to elect the secretary general, the vice-chairman, the treasurer and other office bearers of the party. The dominant part to be played by the party's chairman was quite apparent. In effect, he was given the authority to pick members of his choice for the party's highest authority, the Central Committee. The awareness of Bhutto's primacy existed among all the members of the party right from the beginning.<sup>94</sup> Bhutto chose not to constitute a central committee at this stage - indeed it was not until after the 1970 election that one was formally nominated. The reason he most frequently gave for the delay was that since several members of the party were suspected of being government agents, and he had yet to test the loyalty and integrity of many around him, it would not be opportune to appoint the party's supreme body.<sup>95</sup> For the same reason, there was no question of holding party elections. But many of his party leaders, in interviews with the author, suggested that a more plausible explanation for the delay was that Bhutto needed the time and the opportunity to bring in more feudals into the party before naming a central committee, to ensure their dominance over the radical and progressive elements.<sup>96</sup>

#### THE FOUNDATION DOCUMENTS

At the inaugural meeting of the PPP, ten Foundation Meeting Documents were published under the collective title, Foundation and Policy, embodying the party's

programme and policies.<sup>97</sup> The Documents, purporting to be Bhutto's covenant with the people, spelt out the party's views of Pakistan's development since independence, the rationale behind the party's formation, its version of socialism, and the party's principal aims and objectives. These were widely interpreted as an attempt to unite the country's nationalist forces irrespective of their class character.<sup>98</sup> The three main slogans of the party - Islam is our faith, Democracy is our polity, and Socialism our economy - were a safe combination of the three different trends in opposition politics. The party programme represented a curious mixture of socialism, welfare economy and an enlightened private enterprise. Socialism and the establishment of a classless society were stated as the avowed objectives of the party, but incitement of class hatred was expressly forbidden, and provision for free enterprise was securely made. It is interesting to note that the term 'Islamic Socialism' nowhere appears in the original Documents, although in some public pronouncements Bhutto is reported to have used the term without, however, elaborating conceptually upon it.<sup>99</sup> In his inaugural address to the first session of the party, Bhutto had asserted that Islam and Socialism were harmoniously compatible but the slogan of 'Islamic Socialism' was not used.

The rationale for a new party was set out in Foundation Meeting Document Number Three, entitled 'Why a New Party'. The reasons behind the formation were later echoed in two other party pamphlets - both written by Bhutto, The Political Situation in Pakistan, and

Why the People's Party.<sup>100</sup> Justifying the need for a new party, its sponsors felt that as Pakistan entered the third decade of its existence, fundamental issues involving its citizens remained in a state of "anxious uncertainty." Successive regimes had not only failed to solve national problems but their policies had led to further degeneration in the quality of Pakistani life. Crime and violence had increased, corruption and nepotism had reached new heights, labour was in a state of tumult, while the poor and the middle class found the burden of rising prices unbearable. The values of the intellectuals, the young and the students had degenerated as they had grown progressively, apathetic and alienated. According to the Document, "the political parties were split into factions and were in disarray." In such an environment "a new party is necessary to cement the unity of all the existing political parties.....It will form a bridge between the existing conflicting interests and give a lead in reconciling the historical dichotomies of the opposition." Above all, "in the existing state of affairs a new progressive party is also imperative for the task of uniting all the progressive elements." There was another important consideration according to the Document. This was that

"a growing and powerful body of people, spearheaded by the younger generation, firmly believes that the old ways and the traditional methods are not sufficient to surmount the colossal problems of Pakistan.. ....the people....are not willing to tolerate the present conditions much longer. They want a new system based on justice and attached to the essential interests of the toiling millions. Only a new party can discharge this responsibility." 101

The Foundation Documents lamented that in the Pakistan of 1967, the means of livelihood were not open to all, that the rich kept growing richer while the poor became poorer. Document Four, entitled, 'Why Socialism is Necessary for Pakistan', declared that socialism was the only answer for Pakistan's dilemma, and that the aim of the party was the transformation of the country into a socialist society. The PPP had come forward to represent the underprivileged against a regime that promoted monopoly capital (i.e. industrialist elite) and was working against the interests of the poor, students and intellectuals.<sup>102</sup> The PPP believed that all basic industries of the national economy should be nationalised - but there was room for private enterprise, so long as it did not create "monopolistic preserves." In Document Five, the party announced that its guiding principles would be the establishment of a classless society and the application of socialistic ideas to realise economic and social justice. It set forth a number of programmatic principles, which included the 'abolition of feudalism'. It is noteworthy that before the convention met, Sheikh Rashid (socialist, former associate of the Communist Muslim Leaguer, Danyal Latifi), successfully insisted that the Foundation Papers include the 'abolition of feudalism', whereas Bhutto had preferred 'the elimination of feudal practices'.

Certain sections of the Documents are vaguely worded and poorly defined - perhaps deliberately. Where the PPP was unequivocal was in its declaration of confrontation with India over Kashmir, and its opposition to the

Awami League's Six Points programme for regional autonomy. Not wishing to provoke widespread hostility when it was just getting off the ground, and to keep its appeal as wide as possible, the PPP wished to create an image of a pragmatic party, and not a rigidly doctrinaire, ideological one. Consequently, there is little revolutionary about the Documents. At the same time, there was enough radical nationalist rhetoric to appeal to the student community and progressive sections of the community. In some parts, the Foundation Documents resorted to Marxism terminology, which, perhaps, reflected the views of a number of socialist intellectuals associated with its preparation, most notably, Rahim, Mubashar, Sheikh Rashid. But, other than that, the socialism that the PPP claimed to profess was of a mild, reformative kind, rather than Marxist or Communist. Indeed, Bhutto was at pains to point out 'that his brand of socialism was not to be equated with Communism or Marxism.<sup>103</sup>

The authors of the Documents appeared to be sensitive to the attacks that might be hurled at the party from various quarters - in particular the traditional religious ulema - alleging that advocacy of socialism was un-Islamic. This concern was reflected in the importance given to Islam in the Documents. The compatibility of Islam with socialism was stressed by suggesting that the major socialist values - egalitarianism and condemnation of exploitation - were pre-eminently Islamic values. Indeed, among the documents was a curious litany based on the theme of Jehad (Muslim holy war). Its tone can be

guaged from some of the sub-titles - MAN HAS GONE ASTRAY, MAN IS ON THE BRINK OF DISEASE, SOCIETY HAS LOST ITS ANCHOR, and, WE PROMISE TO CONTINUE THE JEHAD UNTIL GOD'S EARTH IS LIT UP WITH DIVINE LIGHT.<sup>104</sup> Thus the documents invoked Islam in calling for a Jihad against the oppressive and exploitative political and economic system of Ayub, and bringing about socialism. In the Documents and elsewhere, Bhutto emphasised that the socialism he envisaged would be in strict conformity with Islam. On one occasion, for instance he declared:

"The socialism applicable to Pakistan would be in conformity with its ideology...if there can be a Scandinavian form of socialism, why cannot there be a Pakistani form of socialism suitable to our genius.....Islam and the principles of socialism are not mutually repugnant...Islam preaches equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it." 105

Despite the fact that the party's advocacy of socialism was predicated on its professed harmony with Islam, the term 'Islamic Socialism' was fastidiously avoided by party leaders. The reason for this was that Ayub had used the term,<sup>106</sup> giving it a strongly anti-socialist connotation, and it was felt that this would cause considerable confusion in the public mind.<sup>107</sup> However, the press frequently defined the party's position as Islamic socialism, and the term gradually began to be used by PPP workers; thus the phrase became associated with the party. But the party leadership did not officially adopt the slogan or elaborate upon the concept until the 1970 election campaign.

From our discussion of the party's Foundation Documents, it is clear that Bhutto's strategy was to appeal to the widest possible section of groups. According to the documents, the PPP would be essentially nationalist, the "basic guide to all problems" being "the teachings of the Quaid-e-Azam." It would appeal directly to the masses and represent a new generation. It would serve first as a polarising centre for progressive forces and then as a catalyst around which multiple interests and classes could unite to restore democracy. The extent to which the PPP actually achieved these objectives or developed along these lines will be discussed during the course of this and subsequent chapters.

#### ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY AND GROWTH OF ITS SUPPORT BASE

Having launched his party, Bhutto began to tour the countryside, holding meetings and making speeches, to build support for the PPP. Soon after its formation, the Ayubian regime showed its disdain and contempt for the party by declaring that the PPP would remain a students' party - a reference to the students attending the convention meeting and to the absence of a substantial number of politically notable people there. The party became the object of ridicule and attack by all government ministers, and the officially-controlled press gave prominent coverage to such attacks.<sup>108</sup> Amongst the opposition parties, there was growing suspicion within conservative religious circles regarding the PPP's socialism, while other parties expressed their disquiet over Bhutto's lack of commitment on the issue



of the form of democracy that he aimed for.<sup>109</sup> When Bhutto began his extensive tour of West Pakistan in the spring and summer of 1968, his meetings were often interrupted by rowdies and by threats of personal violence. On several occasions, he was the target of physical attack.<sup>110</sup> At the same time a constant barrage of propaganda emanated from the government controlled media attempting to project Bhutto as a charlatan and opportunist, reminding the public of his past association with Ayub's regime and his unqualified support to Ayub's political system and economic policies, which he now condemned as a 'socialist'.<sup>111</sup> In its formative phase, therefore, the party operated under severe restrictions, hostile propaganda, official harassment, intimidation and threats. Such official action, however, not only proved to be futile, but helped the party to gain rapid popularity.

Since the initial goal of the party was the dislodging of the Ayub regime, it set about enlisting numerous dissident groups from among Pakistani society. Amongst its early recruits were leftist leaders and groups, who were attracted to the party by Bhutto's aggressively pro-China foreign policy as well as the loudly proclaimed Marxism of some of his followers. The party itself had foreseen, in the Foundation Documents, that it had a good chance of weaning away support from NAP's pro-Peking faction.<sup>112</sup> This hope was borne out by subsequent developments, as several members of this faction (many with trade union links) in West Pakistan joined the PPP.<sup>113</sup> To these were added other small leftist groups. In the large

urban centres of Punjab, some of these groups - such as Mukhtar Rana's in Lyallpur (Punjab's second largest industrial city) - had assumed control over some of the large industrial and public utility labour unions. Thus these groups provided the PPP with an avenue for recruiting the support of the urban labour. At the same time, the PPP attracted radical labour union organisers such as Ziauddin Butt, former aide of Mirza Ibrahim in the (Lahore-based) Railway Workers Union, and Mahmud Babar who had links with trade unions in Multan. Of these leftists, many who did not believe in the socialist bona fides of Bhutto contended that it was at least possible to bring about a confrontation with the Ayub regime and the 'monopoly capitalists' in co-operation with him. Indeed, interviews conducted with some of these leftist leaders indicate that although many doubted Bhutto's socialist credentials, they wished to use the platform provided by the PPP for the time being, at any rate.<sup>114</sup>

The PPP also attracted leftist student leaders - such as Mairaj Mohammed Khan from Karachi ( a recent president of the National Students Federation), Raja Anwar from Rawalpindi and Amanullah Khan, a student activist from Lahore - who provided important manpower for early party activities in urban centres in terms of distributing party literature, propagating the party programme and acting as unpaid volunteers for party work. In general, students in West Pakistan demonstrated considerable sympathy for the PPP, as we shall see below, on account of the party's militant nationalism and its support of student demands.

It is important to note that the PPP refused to support any specific student organisation, or indeed organise its own student wing, maintaining that the student community in its entirety had Bhutto's support. Thus Bhutto preferred to keep the emerging student movement unstructured and generally united on an anti-Ayub pro-Bhutto platform, rather than risk splitting the student community by selecting a single group for direct support. This policy enabled the PPP to avoid being drawn into the highly factionalised and unstable arena of student union politics. In East Pakistan however, the situation was different. There, students as well as leftist and progressive intellectuals were already in the fold of the Awami League and Bhashani's NAP. Bhutto had undertaken a tour of East Pakistan in October 1967, prior to the PPP's formation, but it was reported that he failed to muster any support there, other than establishing an informal agreement with Bhashani over opposition to Ayub, and making arrangements for the establishment of a zonal office of the PPP at Dacca (which was however wound up within a year).

In the Punjab, the party made considerable headway in recruiting support from urban professional groups, such as lawyers, writers, journalists and teachers. Many members of the urban middle and small-town professional groups - who were becoming increasingly resentful over injustices in income distribution fostered by Ayub's economic policies and their lack of representation in his rural-based political system, were attracted to the PPP by its promise of social and political change. But it was not only

from these 'modern' sections of the population that the PPP began to draw its support. Bhutto utilised his feudal links with the landed aristocracy of Sind and the adjoining areas of Punjab, to bring in several landlords into the party. Many feudal landlords, former Convention Muslim Leaguers, joined the party - much to the chagrin of Bhutto's leftist supporters, who viewed the entry of such jagirdars with great alarm. However, it needs to be pointed out that at this stage, only members of Bhutto's landlord faction in Sind joined the party, while their traditional opponents remained with Ayub's Convention Muslim League. It was only after Ayub's fall, that Bhutto was able to wean away members of other factions. In the Punjab, it was only the smaller, lesser-known feudals who joined the party at this stage - indeed it was only after the PPP's election victory in 1970 that Punjab's feudal aristocracy joined the party in large numbers. In terms of support then, the PPP, within two years of its existence had become an amalgam of older vested interests and new social forces - a coalition of leftist groups, newly mobilised urban social groups (labour, students, professionals), and experienced politicians. Its support base contained both traditional, conservative elements and modern, progressive elements.

Bhutto's prosperous feudal friends provided much of the necessary finances for the party, and he himself used a not inconsiderable sum from his own personal funds.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, as one writer has suggested many of the leftist intellectuals and student leaders were attracted

to the party inter alia by Bhutto's financial resources.<sup>116</sup> However, at this stage, party funds were not sufficient in the view of party leaders, since it only succeeded in drawing substantial contributions from wealthy donors after the fall of Ayub, when it became evident that the party stood a good chance of assuming power.<sup>117</sup> It is reported that many party men had become "bankrupt" spending personal funds for party work.<sup>118</sup>

Organisationally, the party expanded in an extremely chaotic fashion. Although a central organising committee was constituted by Bhutto soon after the November Convention, chaired by him and dominated by leftists - notably Mubashar Hasan and Sheikh Rashid - this body did not play a central part in organisational activities in the sense of co-ordinating the various party units or maintaining a record of party branches and registered members.<sup>119</sup> Indeed, as our interviews with leading PPP members indicate, many PPP leaders were not even aware of the existence of such a body.<sup>120</sup> There were two major reasons for such disorganisation. The first concerns the rapid popularity of the party, while the second relates to Bhutto's personality. As the party gained popularity, local party offices were set up whenever and wherever a coterie of supporters existed, with or without authorisation from the central organising committee.<sup>121</sup> Three zonal organising committees were set up for Sind, Punjab/Bahawalpur and NWFP, but these too proved to be ineffective. Local party offices were often set up first and then chairmen of these zonal committees invited to officially

inaugurate these offices.<sup>122</sup> This frequently resulted in two or more offices emerging in the same locality, each claiming to represent the same or at least overlapping areas. The extent of such organisational chaos was such that district party organs often had no idea of how many offices existed in their respective areas.<sup>123</sup> Nor were records maintained systematically of registered membership of the party, which in common with other parties in the Third World, and generally, always tended to be much less than the actual supporters of the party.

The second reason for the party's weak organisational development lay in Bhutto's relative inattention to matters of party structure and organisational detail. One writer has described this in the following way:

"Attempts at organisation were half-hearted.....Bhutto's role....was ...  
 ....never organisational....His time was spent in recruiting individuals and power groups into the party." 124

Although three conventions of the party were held in 1968 - a Punjab and Baluchistan convention was held in Lahore in August 1968, a Sind convention at Hyderabad in September 1969, and a Frontier convention at Peshawar in November 1968 - no attention was directed either then or on other occasions to the need to effectively organise the provincial and local units of the party. The low priority given to party organisation can in large part be explained by the fact that given his goal of dislodging the Ayub regime, Bhutto's concept of the PPP was less that of a party with a well-structured organisation, than a broad political movement, where groups and leaders were held

together segmentally with vertical lines of authority leading to the chairman (i.e. Bhutto). This early organisational aspect of the party is crucial to understanding the PPP's later development into a patrimonial-style party (in the post 1972 period).

In the large urban centres, much of the party work was undertaken by experienced party organisers, originally either from the Muslim League or even from the Communist Party.<sup>125</sup> These active party organisers were concerned with explaining the party programme to the urban masses and establishing links with labour groups. In Lahore, for instance, under the direction of leaders such as Sheikh Rashid and Ziauddin Butt, these workers succeeded in recruiting valuable support from amongst the railway workers and workers from the government mint and WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority).<sup>126</sup> At the same time, leaders like Mubashar Hasan from Lahore, (an engineer by profession) enabled the party to forge links with the middle-class urban professional community (groups such as university and college teachers, engineers, and other members of the urban intelligentsia) and gain access to their interest group organisations. The social background of these party workers ranged from middle class (such as lawyers, doctors, teachers) to lower middle and working class (such as tea-stall owners, fruitsellers, industrial workers).<sup>127</sup>

The heterogeneous nature of the party membership indicated difficulties of sustaining such a coalition in the future. Already, there were signs of strains in the

PPP coalition.<sup>128</sup> Such strains were exacerbated by the fact that many party leaders, such as Sheikh Rashid, and other personally linked to Bhutto, (e.g. Khar) had their own factional supporters and competed for control over the local groups.<sup>129</sup> In some districts there were open clashes between rival factions. Much of the factional rivalry reflected ideological divisions. When old Convention Muslim Leaguers and landlords joined the party, there was increasing fear amongst leftist party workers that these conservative forces would distort the progressive image of the party and rob it of its leftist élan. But, these notables wielded considerable power in their areas due to their wealth and political ascendancy. By virtue of their influential positions, they were often given important posts in the party organisation which was highly resented by the leftist workers.<sup>130</sup> For the time being, however, these tensions did not assume a serious nature, as the party sought to present a united front in mobilising political support for the movement against Ayub. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the disputes that marked the early phase of the party's existence would become issues in the internal factional politics of the PPP in the post-1971 period (see below, chapter VI and VII).

#### THE ROLE OF THE PPP IN THE ANTI-AYUB MOVEMENT

The anti-Ayub movement has received considerable academic attention.<sup>131</sup> There is, however, disagreement over the importance that should be accorded to Bhutto in the anti-Ayub movement.<sup>132</sup> There is consensus that Bhutto



and the PPP did play a part in building up opposition to the regime, but disagreement over the question, 'how big a part?'. The contention of this chapter is that while Bhutto and the PPP were not solely responsible for creating the crisis that culminated in the fall of Ayub, they, nevertheless played a significant role in the anti-Ayub agitation and emerged as the principal beneficiary of the upsurge. While the anti-Ayub movement was a complex social, economic and political phenomenon, it is conceivable that without Bhutto's leadership and his party, the agitation that built up would not have been able to overturn the Ayubian system. The movement was by no means 'led' by the PPP - indeed the party was more a creature of the protests than its creator. But the PPP was an important factor that contributed to the spread of the movement of political, social and economic discontent, with Bhutto's personality becoming an important rallying point for opposition to the administration. The spreading sense of public disquiet was accentuated by Bhutto's fierce public attacks on Ayub, and by the seeming effort to victimise him through the criminal courts.<sup>133</sup>

Our purpose here is to examine the part played by the party in the upheavals of 1968 and 1969 by posing the question as to how and why the PPP, a new, hastily organised party, was successful in mobilising support in opposition to Ayub, where the older, more established and better organised parties failed. Rather than recite the continuous sequence of riots, disturbances and strikes, we are primarily interested in outlining the PPP's role in the anti-Ayub movement - and its consequences.

Discontent with the Ayubian system had been simmering for some years prior to the crisis, and had begun to gather momentum immediately after the 1965 war and the Tashkent Agreement ( see above, chapter I). Ayub's image and popularity declined rapidly, both among the people, and importantly within the armed forces. The dissatisfaction over the Tashkent Agreement, growing East-West Pakistan tensions, and economic discontent after the 1965 war,<sup>134</sup> were all working against Ayub. These rumblings, however, still had little focus and no leader or organisation.

In the summer and autumn of 1968, Bhutto swung over from relatively low-keyed to boisterous opposition and began a major assault on the Ayub government. In September, he launched a frontal attack on Ayub at Hyderabad.<sup>135</sup> In a provocative speech, Bhutto attacked Ayub over the shortcomings of the regime and spoke of the "bloodshed" and "rebellion" that was inevitable as a consequence of the cruelties perpetuated by the administration upon the students. Bhutto embarked upon a major speaking tour of West Pakistan, his articulate attacks on the regime attracting large, enthusiastic audiences wherever he went. In an already tense atmosphere, there was little doubt that Bhutto's statements and actions were complicating the situation and provoking further disaffection and encouragement for protest as doubtless Bhutto fully intended, and for which he was castigated by the Ayub government.<sup>136</sup> The fall of 1969 marked the tenth year of Ayub's rule, an era that was officially termed 'Decade of Development'.

Bhutto's attack on the Ayub government coincided with the official celebrations of Ayub's ten years in power.<sup>137</sup> When large sums of public revenue were allocated to publicise the regime's accomplishments, this provided Bhutto with an effective propaganda weapon, and it hardly came as a surprise when these official celebrations coincided with an outbreak of widespread disturbances and violence. This constituted the immediate background to the crisis.

The precipitant factor in the anti-Ayub movement was student unrest.<sup>138</sup> Such unrest originated in student issues, such as demands for the repeal of the University Ordinance (that inter alia, restricted student political activity and provided for the forfeiture of their degrees if accused of subversive activities), but rapidly spread to more generalised demands concerning broader social and political issues.<sup>139</sup> Student agitation began with sporadic strikes at Karachi University in October 1968 and became increasingly violent as it merged with Bhutto's campaign against the regime. The students' cry was taken up and generalised by Bhutto. He mounted the hustings to demand that Ayub quit and that the Basic Democracy system be replaced by full adult franchise. Responding to and in turn stimulating student agitation, Bhutto rapidly became the students' hero.

What marked the inception of the country-wide movement against Ayub was a trifling incident in Rawalpindi involving a scuffle between the students and the police over some allegedly smuggled goods. This culminated in a

bloody student-police clash (in which one student was killed) on 7 November when Bhutto was visiting Rawalpindi (and was due to address students).<sup>140</sup> Thus Bhutto became the focus for the initial outbreak of violent agitation against the government. Two days of rioting followed, accompanied by arson and looting; troops were called out and two more students were killed.<sup>141</sup> Seizing the advantage offered by the occasion, Bhutto attended the funeral of the students. The firing triggered off student demonstration in other parts of Pakistan - in cities and towns, such as Lahore, Karachi, Sialkot, Multan, Quetta, Lyallpur, Peshawar, Jehlum and even in smaller towns such as Campbellpur, Okara, Charsadda, Lalamusa, Mianwali. In further clashes between the students and police, the anti-Ayub movement found its martyrs and the resulting flames spread across the country. This marked the inception of a movement which was brought to a close only when Ayub relinquished office. From 9 November 1968 to 25 March 1969, not a day passed in Pakistan without some kind of civil disturbance, riot, strike, bloodshed or demonstration.

On 10 November, a student attempted to assassinate Ayub at a public meeting in Peshawar.<sup>142</sup> Meanwhile, Bhutto continued his attacks with redoubled vigour, and went on to address the Lahore District Bar Association on 11 November.<sup>143</sup> Here he refused to appeal to the student community for moderation, saying that the students were fighting for a just cause and that he was with them: although he did not want bloodshed he was not afraid of it. Bhutto was arrested under the Defence of Pakistan

Rules on 13 November on charges of inciting the students to violence.<sup>144</sup> Bhutto's provocative tone had left the government with little choice but to arrest him, which is precisely what Bhutto intended. The tactics of his deliberate challenge to the government were clear: a jail term (just before the 'presidential' elections due in winter 1969) would make Bhutto a martyr and at least partially lead to his atonement for previous service to Ayub. Other politicians arrested at the same time included Khan Abdul Wali Khan (president of the National Awami Party), Mumtaz Bhutto (a cousin of Bhutto and a member of the national assembly) and the president of the Lahore District Bar Association. Those arrested were said to include seven members of the PPP and five members of the National Awami Party.

These arrests only intensified the crisis, and so began nineteen weeks of the most widespread urban unrest Pakistan had ever experienced. It was not that the number of deaths was strikingly high, a matter of scores rather than hundreds, but that in every medium and large city - and later even villages - in East and West Pakistan, the government's writ ceased to run. The range of the protest began to gather momentum. What was initially a students' protest now widened into a broader movement incorporating other middle and lower middle class groups and eventually industrial labour and spread to smaller towns and rural areas. Lawyers, teachers, journalists and other urban professional groups began to march in the streets adding demands for better wages and service conditions to the universal demand for constitutional reform. As Ayub Khan

put it, "every problem of the country was being decided in the streets!"<sup>145</sup> The volume of public protest grew as the Ulema and Islamic religious groups joined forces with other groups to denounce police brutality and to demand the introduction of Islamic law.<sup>146</sup>

An analysis of the newspaper reports for the period October 1968 - March 1969, reveals that a wide variety of social groups were involved in the anti-Ayub movement. These can be identified as follows: student groups, journalists, lawyers, teachers, other members of the urban intelligentsia, such as poets and writers, religious groups and Ulema, medical workers and doctors, engineering workers, lower government functionaries, bazaar shopkeepers, industrial workers (organised through such established groups as the West Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions as well as new labour fronts and workers committees) and some kisan (peasant) groups in West Pakistan and peasants in East Bengal organised by Bhashani's NAP. It is important to note that many of such protesting groups tended to rely either on pre-existing organisations - such as student unions, Bar Associations - or on recently-created ad hoc committees (such as the labour fronts that emerged in various cities), as planning and mobilisation bodies. This signified the participation of urban social elements in the movement as discrete social groups through various voluntary interest group associations. However, there was at the same time a tendency for some social groups to enter the movement haphazardly and to participate in the more anomic forms of protest, although in some

cases they moved towards creating distinct organisations (such as the Engineers Action Committee). Newspaper reports of the period also reveal that in most cases the protesting groups were not (at least initially) organised or led by any particular political party. In other cases, the opposition parties, such as NAP, the Jamaat-e-Islami (and later, the Democratic Action Committee) and the PPP organised these groups via their interest group associations in processions and demonstrations. It would be relevant to mention here that the PPP organised several joint processions and meetings with other political parties, chiefly NAP (Mazdoor Kisan Group),<sup>147</sup> the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam, and NAP (Wali Khan Group). Earlier in April 1968, the PPP had entered into an alliance with Bhashani's pro-Peking NAP,<sup>148</sup> to work together for democracy and socialism.<sup>149</sup>

It is noteworthy that while the protesting groups were not always led by the PPP, the latter had by far the best connections with key social groups in the movement because it was itself a coalition of figures who identified with these same social groups - students: Mairaj, Raja Anwar; lawyers: Aslam Hayat and K. H. Meer; urban intelligentsia: Ramay; teachers and engineers: Mubashar Hasan; and labour: Ziauddin and Mukhtar Rana. It was at the same time under PPP banners that many of the new labour fronts participated in the movement.

With Bhutto in jail, the movement was deprived of his direct leadership, but other members of his party such as J. A. Rahim (as acting chairman) and Sheikh Rashid, and

other opposition leaders carried on the struggle and attempted to provide leadership to the amorphous movement. More significant was the role played by Begum Bhutto, who toured the entire countryside campaigning for her husband's release, addressing party workers, leading processions, issuing statements of policy and urging people to join the PPP.<sup>150</sup> A new element was introduced into the situation when ex-Air Marshal Asghar Khan announced his entry into politics on 17 November in opposition to the Ayub regime.<sup>151</sup> Asghar Khan's campaigning stimulated what Bhutto had, in a sense, begun. Indeed, Asghar Khan was "thanked" by PPP leaders for "sustaining the peoples movement after Bhutto's arrest!"<sup>152</sup> The fact that after Bhutto's arrest the focus shifted to Asghar Khan, (and Begum Bhutto), rather than to Bhutto's political party indicated both the heavy dependence of the party on Bhutto's charisma, and its consequent institutional weakness, and to a well-known feature of Pakistani society - the greater appeal of leaders rather than parties or principles. This is not to underrate the activities of the PPP in mobilising and organising opposition to Ayub in its leader's absence, but to emphasise an important and recurring feature of Pakistani political life.

Meanwhile, the agitation, hitherto confined to West Pakistan, spread to East Pakistan on 7 December 1968, with general strikes called by the opposition parties and clashes between police and demonstrators.<sup>153</sup> Students were again in the forefront, but in the East wing, the agitation began in an early stage to draw in working class



elements, and Bhashani electrified the whole province by involving the rural masses and urban workers. As the movement widened, it became evident that the mass movements in the two provinces differed in emphasis. In the West, the movement was against Ayub and his system; in the East it was against Ayub and his system as a vehicle of Pakistan's domination.<sup>154</sup> Although the demand for regional autonomy was also voiced in the smaller provinces in West Pakistan, it was more clearly and vocally articulated in the eastern wing.

The older opposition parties now attempted to capitalise on a movement that had very largely been beyond their control. Leaders of eight opposition parties joined to form the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) in January 1969.<sup>155</sup> The DAC's eight-point programme<sup>156</sup> attempted to embrace the diverse concern of its component parties, and the alliance called for a boycott of the 1969 elections. The DAC's programme however, omitted reference to the contentious question of regional autonomy and 'one-unit', and avoided matters of social and economic policy. The PPP and Bhashani's NAP decided to keep away from the DAC. Earlier J. A. Rahim, at Bhutto's direction, had announced the latter's candidacy for the presidential elections without consultation with other opposition parties, or for that matter his own party.<sup>157</sup> This was not only criticised by the opposition parties,<sup>158</sup> but was reported to have caused a split within the PPP and allegedly led to the creation of a 'Forward Bloc' within the party.<sup>159</sup> In fact Rahim had to issue an official denial of the existence of

such a bloc, and to announce that the decision had been taken after consulting the members of the party's Principle Committee and Organising Committee.<sup>160</sup> However, this was characteristic of Bhutto's approach of arriving at decisions without prior consultation with his party men. This also demonstrated Bhutto's ability to abruptly throw his political foes off balance by sudden, dramatic announcements.

With violence intensifying in the new year, the government began offering - too haltingly perhaps - concessions to its opponents' demands. In February 1969, Ayub offered to talk to "responsible" opposition leaders.<sup>161</sup> In February, the country witnessed yet another event, which was of some political significance in the anti-Ayub movement. This was the filing of Bhutto's affidavit in the West Pakistan High Court in Lahore, in support of his writ petition challenging his detention.<sup>162</sup> Bhutto's voluminous affidavit was a massive indictment of a dictator, and was read as an important and influential tract of the time. It recounted much detail of Bhutto's association with Ayub, of events immediately prior to his dismissal and of his subsequent harassment by the regime. Bhutto's polemical piece was addressed to the public rather than to the court. Except for two paragraphs concerning the Tashkent Declaration, the affidavit was published in full in most newspapers. Since the document is a good example of the rhetoric employed by Bhutto during the anti-Ayub movement, and of his political style, it would be worthwhile furnishing a couple of excerpts from it. Bhutto states,

"the popular agitation in the country is an expression of protest against a derelict system,.....The voices raised in the streets are a spontaneous verdict of the people against the excesses of the regime, its corruption, its selfish purposes, its contempt for the rights of man, its corroding of institutions, its dependence on an oppressive bureaucracy, its failure to serve the common weal, its pedantic approach to culture, its insulation from the people and its insatiable appetite for family fortunes..... Starvation has dried the milk in the mother's breast and suffering has dried many a father's tear. It is not the law of God that our people must live eternally in despair and that their children should die of disease and want.....Deny them their rights and they will find a redeemer and if none is available they will redeem themselves."

Outlining his role in the disturbances, Bhutto asserts,

"The phenomenon of change is the law of nature. It lies in the conditions of society....There must be something brittle about this system if the government feels its edifice shaky after a weeks' tour of mine. The people acclaimed me.....because I represented their feelings when I declared that corruption had permeated all levels, that the students were in chains, that the people were in agony."

In the affidavit, Bhutto explains that;

"the true reasons why I have been pursued by the government with grotesque harassment and finally arrested and thrown into prison .....(are)...(i) the fear that I might take the Tashkent affair to the people of Pakistan for their verdict and (ii) the fact that President Ayub Khan believes that I am his most powerful rival for the presidency because I enjoy the confidence of the people whereas he does not."

Simultaneously with the affidavit, Bhutto announced that he would go on hunger strike to force the government to lift the emergency. Bhutto aimed now at humiliating Ayub by forcing an unconditional release as opposed to a

release ordered by the court on mere legal grounds, should that be the view taken by the judges. Bhutto announced that if the emergency was not lifted by 14 February, he would begin a fast unto death. The implication here was that if, at any time in the near future, Ayub did withdraw the emergency it would be said that he did so under the threat of Bhutto's intended fast. Soon after, Ayub announced the release of Bhutto along with other political leaders detained including Mujib,<sup>163</sup> and called for a round table conference (RTC) between the government and the opposition, while promising to end the state of emergency. The DAC accepted Ayub's invitation to talks at Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, Bhutto emerged to a hero's triumphal welcome in Karachi,<sup>164</sup> although amidst some violence.<sup>165</sup> At Karachi Bhutto declared that he would continue to fight for 'Islam, Socialism and Democracy, and a thousand years' war to liberate Kashmir.'<sup>166</sup> Bhutto also refused to attend the forthcoming RTC - a tactic that paid off handsomely, and demonstrated how accurately he had judged the mood of the country. Despite these negotiations and the DAC leaders' satisfaction with the concessions extracted from Ayub<sup>167</sup> (including the latter's decision to drop the Agartala case), the rising tide of revolt continued unabated. This gave credence to PPP claims that the DAC politicians were merely serving their own interests and had no real public support, at least in West Pakistan.

The disintegration of both political and public authority was not halted by the result of the RTC. Indeed

the movement entered, what can be called its 'second', more violent phase of rioting and mass strikes in March. The leaders who were most closely associated with this phase of the movement were Bhutto and Bhashani. Both had put their faith in the streets. Although their weak organisations made them spokesmen rather than leaders of the popular mood, their radical socialist rhetoric certainly contributed to the mood of militancy amongst urban labour and peasants (in Bhashani's case).<sup>168</sup> March was a month of massive labour unrest throughout Pakistan, as factory workers resorted to gherao (seizure) and jalao (burning), of factories belonging to the twenty-two families.<sup>169</sup> These conditions together with strikes by lower echelon government servants brought the government bureaucracy and much of the urban economy to a virtual standstill. This phase saw the emergence of new labour fronts and organisations, such as the Joint Labour Council (representing the major established unions and federations), Muttihida Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers Front of Lahore), Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal (Workers Action Committee of Multan) and Peoples Labour Front (of Rawalpindi). Some of the new labour fronts organised processions and industrial action under the guidance of labour leaders belonging to the PPP, for instance Mahmud Babar in Multan and Ziauddin Butt in Lahore. At the same time, many NAP (Bhashani) labour union organisers in West Pakistan - such as Khalid Mahmud of the Thal Mahnatkash Mahaz (Thal Workers Front) - shifted their support to the PPP. Through such links with labour unions, the PPP became associated with several industrial stoppages and strikes.

Several radical PPP leaders with labour union links were in favour of organising a trade union federation formally allied to the PPP. But Bhutto adopted a similar policy to that adopted with regard to students. He did not want to lose broader labour support by identifying too closely with the radical left segments of the labour union organisations. Being reluctant to be drawn into the highly volatile field of labour union politics, Bhutto preferred to declare his support for the labour community in its entirety. This policy was to pay the party rich dividends later in the 1970 elections.

By the middle of March, the uprising against Ayub had turned into a violent, ugly situation, particularly in East Pakistan, where signs of peasant revolt began to appear. The villages there were in a state of near anarchy as the whole system of local government collapsed and as peasant mobs began to attack and kill Basic Democrats (often the local landlords and moneylenders), members of the Muslim League, unpopular officials, rent collectors, and "foreign intruders" from West Pakistan.<sup>170</sup>

Another aspect of the second phase of the anti-Ayub movement was the increasing ideological polarisation in the country. With Bhashani and Bhutto occupying the centres of the political stage, the air was thick with socialist slogans. The traditionalist Ulema began to "denounce socialism from the pulpit" up and down the country, while industrial and business interests reportedly moved to support conservative religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami.<sup>171</sup> We find then, that the PPP (as

the NAP) was involved in fighting on two fronts simultaneously - against the Ayub regime and against attacks from the Islamic parties and groups. The assault mounted by the Islam-Pasand parties was not a new phenomenon. The author of the history of the Jamaat-e-Islami points out that "after 1966, the main direction of the Jamaat's attack was turned against Socialism."<sup>172</sup> The Islamic groups redoubled these attacks during the anti-Ayub movement. "The Jamaat's attack was mainly directed against Bhutto's PPP and Bhashani's NAP....both....used the term 'Islamic Socialism'."<sup>173</sup> The PPP for its part, accused the Jamaat of being a tool in the hands of the "worst enemies of Muslims and other oppressed peoples - the imperialists." On the national level, the Jamaat was "serving the interests of the big landlords and the bureaucracy and exploiting the sacred name of Islam for the survival of capitalism and feudalism."<sup>174</sup> Bhutto had entered into a "gentleman's agreement" with Maulana Maudoodi, Amir of the Jamaat, in 1968, pledging to avoid mutual acrimony, as according to him extremists on both sides had created "bad blood" between the two parties.<sup>175</sup> But it is apparent that this "agreement" had fast worn thin. In the existing highly charged emotional atmosphere, both PPP and NAP supporters were involved in street fights with followers of Maudoodi's vehemently anti-socialist Jamaat.<sup>176</sup> On one occasion Maudoodi called on the "faithful", "to silence the tongue that utters the word Socialism."<sup>177</sup> The PPP was highly sensitive to such attacks by the Islamic parties, and particularly to the accusation often levelled by them

that the party was financed by the Chinese.<sup>178</sup> Bhutto, therefore, had constantly to deny such unfounded charges,<sup>179</sup> and on occasion his pro-Peking (foreign policy) stance.<sup>180</sup> At the same time, party propaganda had to take cognisance of these political realities and adjust accordingly - emphasising the 'Islamic' element in the PPP's slogan of 'Islam and Socialism', lest they be outflanked by the Jamaat. It was also under these pressures that Bhutto began to moderate his leftist leanings and the party's radical rhetoric.<sup>181</sup>

It would be instructive here to examine Bhutto's style of rhetoric, and the language he employed in his political speeches to mass audiences, in order not only to understand his success at establishing a rapport with the masses, but also the manner in which he countered the fatwas (religious decrees) issued by the Ulema against him. Sindhi-speaking, himself, Bhutto's command over Urdu was limited - but it was in Urdu that he had to address audiences in the Punjab. Bhutto did not speak Punjabi, but his use of Urdu was also aimed at conveying his identification with the idea of 'Greater Pakistan', (since Urdu is the country's national language) transcending his Sindhi origins. His limited Urdu far from being a handicap, proved to be an asset, for his Urdu with its plain, often crude idiom, was of a kind ordinary people could understand and which appealed to them. On one occasion, when his Urdu was criticised by his opponents, he aptly retorted:

"There are only two languages in Pakistan - the language of the exploited and the language of the exploiters. Today I am going to speak to you in the language of the exploited." 182



Moreover, Bhutto often tried to compensate for his weak Urdu through dramatic gestures, acting, and mimicry or ridicule of political opponents. This kind of showmanship appealed to the crowds, and became an essential part of his political style. His style of rhetoric can best be exemplified by reference to a public meeting where, he was being heckled that he drank alcohol, strictly forbidden by Islam. He retorted that yes, he did drink, but unlike his opponents, he did not drink the poor people's blood. Similarly, on other occasions, when he had to counter fatwas that his socialism was un-Islamic, he for instance, declared:

"I respect the Ulema, but those who give fatwas after receiving money have served the Kafirs (non-believers).....  
 ...Islam is not in danger. Those who are in danger are the capitalists and the landlords and their puppets....Islamic musawaat is called socialism in English...  
 ....just as peoples' rule is called democracy." 183

The idea that socialism was merely the English equivalent of the Arabic/Urdu word musawaat which means equality, was reiterated in many of Bhutto's speeches. It was through such techniques and display of rhetoric that Bhutto was able to appeal to the ordinary masses.

For his audiences amongst the intelligentsia, Bhutto produced more sophisticated arguments in his immaculate English. To give but one example, again dealing with the question of the compatibility of Islam and Socialism:

"The roots of socialism lie deep in a profoundly ethical view of life....the high ideals of Islam in relation to society can

be attained only through a socialist system abolishing the exploitation of man by man. We believe that the nature of justice in the world demanded by our religion is inherent in the conception of a classless society. In this Islam differs fundamentally from other religions. Islam recognises no castes. Capitalist society has a class structure which is opposed to the equality and brotherhood enjoined upon Muslims by Islam. When we call our economic programme Islamic socialism....we are...within the moral traditions of Islam." 184

The movement of 1968-69 finally culminated in the abdication of President Ayub and his surrender of power to the army. Ayub announced his resignation in a public broadcast on 25 March, 1969. Ayub's period in power ended as it had begun, at a time of internal crisis and with the proclamation of martial law. General Yahya Khan, the commander-in-chief of the army, assumed the Presidency on 31 March, 1969. A mass movement had succeeded in overthrowing an authoritarian regime and ending the Ayubian era. One of the objectives of the PPP had been realised - the overthrow of the Ayub regime.

### CONCLUSION

During the formative phase, the PPP became a 'movement' to overthrow the Ayubian political order on the basis of a socialist posture and utilising Bhutto's personal popularity. The success of Bhutto in the brief span of a few months was by any standard, exceptional. Indeed his party did not gain as much popularity in one year (i.e. 1967 to 1968) as it did in the few months beginning November 1968. Here, an important qualification is

in order - Bhutto did not create the vast popular upsurge in West Pakistan which erupted spectacularly during the month of November. Rather he rode on the crest of a wave, which later, he was able to manipulate. He, and the party, became the beneficiary of a popular upsurge that came into existence quite independently of them. We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that Bhutto's early open confrontation and his party's machinations probably contributed significantly to the mood of defiance and resentment that was to manifest itself later. As a member of the Ayub cabinet remarked,

"Mr. Bhutto was the first to offer open confrontation. He sensed in good time that 1968-69 was to be the period when the last trial of strength would take place. This may be because he had a keener perception of the situation or because he was better informed of the weakness of the government." 185

The PPP's programme of propaganda and sloganeering did play an important part in contributing to the sense of deprivation and awareness of exploitation felt by various social groups who came to protest against the Ayub government. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the PPP had by far the best connections with key social groups in the movement. In a sense, the PPP provided a new vocabulary to politics in Pakistan. Bhutto's populist style gave a new idiom to politics and brought about a new awareness of the importance of the politics of the people.

For these reasons the PPP emerged as the principal beneficiary of the upsurge, and not other opposition groups. And that is also why Bhutto's personality managed

to eclipse and overshadow other opposition leaders. While other opposition leaders talked about vague constitutional issues, the PPP offered a new message of socio-economic justice designed to appeal to the new social forces and other disgruntled groups, and in particular, youth. Bhutto had appealed to the post-independence generation and the PPP had sought to cultivate this important constituency. The anti-Ayub movement, can in part, be viewed, as a 'crisis of participation' brought on by new social groups that had, as a result of Pakistan's first surge of industrial and agricultural development (under Ayub) acquired political identities, associational forms of organisation and high social and economic aspirations. Bhutto, by articulating their frustrations emerged as the victor of the movement. As far as the other opposition parties were concerned, it is significant that not one of the DAC's eight points dealt with economic problems. Further, in the midst of the agitation, while the DAC chose to talk to a discredited Ayub on the future political order, Bhutto refused to participate in the RTC, choosing the mass movement as the proper vehicle for the transfer of power, and putting his faith in the streets. It was Bhutto's policy that paid off in the end. The PPP could claim with some justification, that it gave the first lessons in mass agitational politics in Pakistan.

As for the internal characteristics of the party, three major features can be identified: (1) the heterogeneous nature of its membership; (2) its weak organisational nature and (3) its heavy reliance on Bhutto's personality.

Originating essentially as a union of an established public figure with his own group of personal (feudal) followers, and a disparate group of leftist leaders and factions, the party expanded by recruiting from various dissident groups - traditional feudal landlords, students, urban professionals, industrial labour - linked primarily by a common animosity towards the Ayub regime. In building his party, Bhutto relied both on traditional ties and personal linkages with Sindhi landlords, and 'modern' appeals based on a socialist ideology to urban social groups. These disparate constituencies made the PPP a coalition of diverse interests. This, together with the fact that Bhutto chose not to develop the PPP into a clearly structured organisation meant that the PPP was, in consequence less party, than movement.

What party organisation existed was weak, at best. As mentioned earlier, the party developed rapid popularity and in a tumultuous period. Few efforts were directed at effectively organising the party or rationalising its structure. Bhutto's broad coalition strategy for challenging the Ayub regime led him to maintain the PPP as an amorphous structure that was neither rigidly defined nor clearly delineated. Moreover, Bhutto placed greater emphasis on his personalised leadership than on party organisation.

Related to this, was the heavy emphasis of the party on Bhutto's personality. One aspect of this was the weak development of secondary leadership in the party. This is apparent from the fact that while Bhutto was in jail, no

effective second-ranking leader emerged. Another aspect of this was Bhutto's supremacy over the party. Thus the dominant features that later characterised the party - Bhutto's patrimonial control over the party, its weak organisational nature, the tension between the disparate elements, and the attempt to combine 'mass party' features with traditional features - were all evident in its formative phase. Indeed, they laid the basis for the party's subsequent development.

An additional characteristic of the party was its regional support base; its strength was confined to West Pakistan, and within West Pakistan, primarily to Sind and Punjab. It made no headway in East Bengal.<sup>186</sup> In fact, the East Pakistan branch of the party was dissolved in March 1969, in view of Bhutto's failure to support the Bengali demand for full regional autonomy.<sup>187</sup>

The upheaval of 1968-69 illustrated the radicalisation and polarisation as well as the structural changes that Pakistani politics underwent in Ayub's decade. It saw not only widespread support for radical demands for social justice (articulated so effectively by the PPP) and autonomy (a demand put forward by the Awami League in the Eastern wing), but also an ideological division between the Left and the Right. Finally, the uprising showed that after ten years of Ayub's centralised, personal rule, the country was left with no national institution that could usher in a smooth transition for a successor regime or hold the two wings together.

NOTES

1. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan Peoples Party: The First Phase 1967-1971, (Lahore: Progressive Publications, n.d.).
2. Bhutto's Affidavit before the Lahore High Court - Text in Dawn, 6 February 1969, 1 & 6.
3. For such a profile see Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca, 1979).
4. Details of Sir Shahnawaz's career are to be found in Pilo Mody, Zulfi, My Friend (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books 1973) and Taseer, ibid, chapter one.
5. Ibid, p. 15.
6. Order of British Empire in 1919, the title of Khan Bahadur in 1921 and Companion of the British Empire in 1925.
7. Taseer, ibid, p. 16.
8. Information derived through taped conversations between Bhutto and his biographer, Taseer, made available to the author by the latter.
9. Ibid.
10. Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power, (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1972).
11. Z. A. Bhutto in an article entitled 'My Debut in Journalism' published in Pakistan Observer, 12 January, 1967.
12. Bhutto's taped conversations, ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Taseer, op.cit, p. 22.
15. For the one unit controversy, see above chapter I, especially note 37.
16. Bhutto's taped conversations, ibid.
17. 'Defining Aggression', Address to the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 25 October 1957 in Z. A. Bhutto, Politics of the People: Reshaping Foreign Policy, Vol. I, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), pp. 76-89.
18. See his 'Address to the First Committee of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 17 March 1958', in ibid, pp. 93-103.
19. Mody, ibid, p. 58.

20. This is what Bhutto himself claimed later with considerable justification. His claims were corroborated by Aziz Ahmed, Foreign Secretary, both under Ayub and later Bhutto, in an interview with the author, Islamabad, December 1977.
21. Taseer, op.cit, p. 35.
22. Z. A. Bhutto, Quest for Peace, (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966); Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
23. Taseer supports this view as well, ibid, p. 83.
24. Bhutto's taped conversations, ibid.
25. As for instance Kauser Niazi, Deedawar (Lahore: Ghulam Ali, 1977), p. 45 and Mody, op.cit, pp. 48-49.
26. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 87-94.
27. Such admiration for China was not only confined to youth. As Feldman reports, civil servants, businessmen, intellectuals, Muslim ulema, and officers of the armed forces visiting China, came back deeply impressed and "full of praise for the single-minded determination of the Chinese people led by Chairman Mao". Feldman adds "Nor could it be said that this admiration had been purchased for at that time China had made no contribution to Pakistan's development." Ibid, pp. 92-93.
28. "India's Aggression", Speech in the U.N. Security Council, 22 September 1965 in Reshaping Foreign Policy, op.cit, pp. 221-227.
29. For Ayub Khan's anti-intellectual views see his Friends Not Masters, 'A Political Autobiography, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
30. Carl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 216.
31. The Progressive Papers Limited owned the most influential newspapers in the country such as the Pakistan Times and Imroze (Urdu). The owner of the PPL was Mian Iftikharuddin who had been a powerful figure in Pakistani politics. Although a landlord himself, he had been associated with the left-wing intellectual movement in the Punjab and his newspaper empire was viewed as constituting the intellectual Left in West Pakistan. For a detailed discussion of the seizure of the PPL, see Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 100-104.
32. Von Vorys, op.cit, p. 217.
33. For a discussion of the authoritarian features of the 1962 constitution, see D. P. Singhal, 'The New Constitution of Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 6 (August 1962). See also G. W. Choudhury, 'Democracy on Trial in Pakistan', Middle East Journal, Vol. 17,



- (Winter-Spring 1963) and Wayne A. Wilcox, The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).
34. Tariq Ali, op.cit. See also Gavin Young, 'The Iron-Fisted Dandy', The Observer Magazine, 1 May 1977, p. 30.
  35. Outlook, 1 July 1972, p. 3.
  36. Gavin Young, ibid.
  37. For a brief, but perceptive analysis of the reasons behind Ayub's decision, and the nature of the party he established, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 127-132.
  38. Bhutto's taped conversations, op.cit.
  39. Jahan, ibid.
  40. See chapters VI, VII and VIII, below.
  41. Bhutto's taped conversations, ibid.
  42. Ibid.
  43. For a more detailed profile of Kalabagh see Feldman, op.cit., pp. 56-58.
  44. This mutual antipathy is mentioned in passing in ibid., p. 154.
  45. Interview with G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
  46. See Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 49.
  47. Interview with G. M. Khar. Khar, himself belonged to one of the anti-Kalabagh groups.
  48. Ibid.
  49. Bhutto himself made it quite clear, in his affidavit before the High Court in Lahore (1969) in connection with a habeas corpus petition against his detention, that his disagreement with Ayub came solely over the issue over the conduct of the September war with India in 1965, and the subsequent Tashkent Agreement, not over domestic policies or behaviour of the government. This was corroborated by Aziz Ahmed when the author interviewed him.
  50. Kauser Niazi, however, reports that Bhutto first clashed with President Ayub in 1962, over the Sino-Indian war, op.cit., page 65. According to Bhutto, the first time he realised the shortcomings of the regime was in June 1961, when in a letter to the President he expressed the opinion that the entire cabinet should resign voluntarily, see Dawn, 5 February 1969, 9. On different occasions, Bhutto gives different dates for the beginning of his disenchantment with the Ayub Khan regime.

51. Bhutto had, after all, initially defended the Tashkent Declaration in the National Assembly. See National Assembly of Pakistan Debates - Official Report, 15 March 1966, Vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 421-511.
52. An early indication of this came in 1962, when Bhutto went to address students at the Punjab University at Lahore on the subject of Kashmir. He was heckled and could not make himself heard amidst shouts of anti-Ayub and anti-dictatorship slogans. See Tariq Ali, op.cit, p. 106.
53. Feldman, op.cit, pp. 157-160.
54. A. H. M. Kamaruzzaman's speech in the National Assembly in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, 27 June 1966, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 1561. Indeed this was stated openly in the national assembly by one member in this manner, "Mr. Bhutto who had been taking the country towards a great path has been thrown out of power today.....Bhutto was undoubtedly taking the country out of the clutches of imperialist powers who are going to crush the liberty of the entire world....possibly the capital of Pakistan has been shifted to Washington and we are being governed from Washington."
55. Bhutto quoted in Fakhar Zaman and Akhtar Aman, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: The Political Thinker, (Lahore: Peoples Publications, 1973), p. 4.
56. Explaining why he did not leave the cabinet immediately after Tashkent, Bhutto claimed that he in fact had offered his resignation three times - once before the signing of the agreement and twice after it, but according to him, "I was told that my leaving the office would amount to desertion at a time when Pakistan was in the throes of a serious crisis and foreign troops were on our soil and that solidarity was essential in the hour of crisis." See Dawn, 26 October 1968, 8.
57. Kazi Fazlullah quoted in Dawn, 21 February 1967, 9.
58. In July 1967, for example, the government released documents purporting to show that Bhutto considered himself an Indian citizen at least up to the year 1958. This attempt backfired disastrously and the government found itself deeply embarrassed when queried as to why, in the light of this knowledge, the regime appointed him to so many ministries in the government. For other illustrations, see Feldman, op.cit, Appendix E, pp. 316-317.
59. Ziring, op.cit, pp. 94-95.
60. Interview with G. M. Khar.
61. Askari, op.cit, p. 5.
62. Ibid.
63. Interview with Khurshid Hasan Meer, founder-member and formerly Deputy secretary-General of the PPP, Islamabad, October 1979.

64. For brief reviews, see Tariq Ali, op.cit, pp. 42-46; and Gerald A. Heeger, 'Socialism in Pakistan', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesques eds., Socialism in the Third World, (New York: Praeger 1975), pp. 292-294.
65. See Marcus F. Franda, 'Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 7, (July 1970). The Pakistan Communist Party, in classic Stalinist style, was set up by a decision of the Communist Party of India in 1948, and a leadership was sent from the Indian party to "lead the movement in Pakistan". This made the PCP highly suspect in government eyes, and after a series of events involving the party, such as fomenting revolutionary armed uprisings in several parts of East Pakistan between 1947-1952 and an alleged plot to overthrow the government in 1951 in conspiracy with military officers, the PCP was banned in 1954.
66. The problem of the Pakistan Socialist Party are discussed in Saul Rose, Socialism in South Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 59-69.
67. These developments are discussed in Tariq Ali, ibid.
68. Bhutto's taped conversations, op.cit.
69. These views are expressed in Bhutto's writings of the period. See Political Situation in Pakistan, (Lahore: PPP, 1969), and Politics of the People: Awakening the People, Vol. 2, 1966-69, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).
70. Heeger, op.cit, p. 297 and 302.
71. These views can be found in Bhutto's writings cited above.
72. Interviews with PPP leaders.
73. Bhutto's taped conversations, ibid.
74. See for instance, Bhutto's speech at a public meeting on 18 February 1968, reprinted in Awakening The People, ibid, p. 60.
75. Dawn, 19 September 1967.
76. Interview with K. H. Meer, and Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
77. Interview with G. M. Khar.
78. Ibid.
79. Most of them remained aligned to either Ayub's Convention Muslim League or Daultana's Council Muslim League.
80. Namely, Mohammed Saeed and Qadrattullah.
81. Taseer, op.cit, p. 91.
82. Interview with G. M. Khar.

83. According to K. H. Meer "not less than one-third of the delegates were government agents."
84. Ibid.
85. The proceedings of the first convention are to be found in Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.)
86. Ibid, p. 5.
87. Ibid, p. 6.
88. Ibid, p. 6.
89. Ibid, pp. 14-20.
90. Interviews with founder-members of the party.
91. For the names of the members comprising these committees see Foundation and Policy, op.cit, pp. 9 and 10.
92. Ibid, pp. 89-95.
93. Ibid, p. 90.
94. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
95. Interviews with PPP leaders.
96. Ibid.
97. Foundation and Policy, ibid.
98. Far East Economic Review, 11 January 1968, p. 54.
99. At a press conference in Lahore on 7 November 1967, for instance, he had declared that he believed in Islamic Socialism which was different from socialism in other countries. Asian Recorder, 22-28 January 1968, Vol. XIV, No. 14.
100. Political Situation in Pakistan, op.cit, and 'Why The Peoples Party' (written version of speech at party meeting in Peshawar, 27 October 1968) reprinted in Awakening The People, op.cit.
101. Foundation and Policy, ibid, p. 27.
102. Ibid, p. 153.
103. See for instance, Dawn, 6 November 1967, 6 and Far East Economic Review, 26 November 1968, p. 392.
104. Document N. 7, op.cit. This section of the Documents was written by Hanif Ramay (a leftist intellectual journalist), who was later to popularise the term 'Islamic Socialism' through the Party's organ Musawaat of which he subsequently became editor.

105. Political Situation in Pakistan, op.cit.
106. See Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1964), Vol. VIII, p. 19.
107. Interview with K. H. Meer.
108. See, for example, Dawn, 13 November 1967, 5.
109. Dawn, 27 November 1967, 8,
110. Feldman, op.cit, p. 317.
111. Ziring, op.cit, p. 97.
112. Foundation Meeting Document No. 3, op.cit, p. 27. See also Far East Economic Review, 19-25 November 1967, p. 348.
113. Tariq Ali, op.cit, p. 147.
114. Interview with Mukhtar Rana, London, February 1978.
115. Interview with G. M. Khar.
116. Feroze Ahmed, 'Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan', K. Gough and M. P. Sharma, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973) p. 183.
117. Interview with PPP leaders.
118. Anwar H. Syed, 'The PPP - Phases One and Two' in Lawrence Ziring et al, eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 101.
119. Tassadaq Hussein, Pakistan Peoples Party, 1967-71, unpublished masters dissertation (South Asia Institute, Punjab University, 1974), pp. 169-170.
120. Interview with K. H. Meer.
121. Ibid.
122. Hussein, ibid, p. 169.
123. Ibid.
124. Taseer, op.cit, p. 93.
125. For a detailed analysis of the social background and political skills of party workers, see K. B. Sayeed, 'How Radical is the PPP?' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1975).
126. Interview with Mubashar Hasan.
127. Sayeed, ibid, p. 49.

128. Within months of the founding of the PPP, a rift was reported in its membership, when 42 persons claiming to be PPP members announced the founding of their own Progressive Peoples Party. Basharet Ali, their convener, accused Bhutto of being aligned with American interests while masquerading as a socialist. On its part, the PPP rejected even the claims of these people of being PPP members, and dismissed the whole episode as a clumsy attempt on the part of the government to ruin Bhutto's reputation. See Dawn, 30 August and 28 September 1968.
129. Interview with G. M. Khar.
130. Interview with K. H. Meer.
131. Feldman, op.cit; Tariq Ali, op.cit; W. M. Dobell, 'Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (Fall 1969); Wayne Wilcox, 'Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point', Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 2, (February 1970); Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Muneer Ahmed, 'The November Mass Movement in Pakistan', in Aspects of Pakistan's Politics and Administration, (Lahore: Punjab University, 1974); Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'Crisis in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime', The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 5, (January 1971); Shahid Javed Burki, 'Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation', Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, (March 1972); G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London: C. Hurst, 1974); and Louis Dupree, The Military is Dead: Long Live the Military, American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XIII, No. 3, (April 1969).
132. There is considerable divergence in the interpretation offered by scholars and observers to explain Ayub Khan's fall from power. Some like Wilcox attribute it to his illness in the spring of 1968. Other, like Dobell and Herbert Feldman give major importance to Bhutto's role in building up agitation. In Feldman's view, "if at any moment there was one single defineable factor that could be isolated from the skein of events, situations, and personalities that combined to bring down Ayub, that factor was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his visit to Rawalpindi in the early days of November 1968." Others such as Louis Dupree and Tariq Ali apportion the major responsibility for the fall of Ayub Khan to the concerted campaign of protest by student and worker demonstrators and opposition politicians. Robert La Porte, however, believes that the erosion of Ayub's support in the military was "the single most important non-personal reason" for his ouster. In a similar vein, G. W. Choudrey, attributes Ayub's fall to intrigues at army headquarters at Rawalpindi. Indeed, he asserts that Bhutto's so-called "revolutionary role" had roots in his links with the the GHQ at Rawalpindi since "political changes in Pakistan were always the product of internal intrigues and power struggles among the factions of the ruling elite composed of the top civil and military officers." Thus the mass movement Choudrey suggests, had the secret blessing of GHQ - socio-economic factors do not tell the whole story. Some political

analysts have provided a socio-economic explanation for Ayub's fall. One such writer, Maniruzzaman, attributes it to corruption which affected all sections of the powerful civil bureaucracy. Burki also gives prime importance to socio-economic reasons to explain Ayub's fall by attempting to correlate the level of violence to socio-economic factors such as modernisation, urbanisation and ethnic and cultural differences. But Burki attributes Bhutto and the PPP with transforming the socio-economic discontent into a giant political movement.

133. Before being arrested Bhutto was accused and a case registered against him for conspiracy to cheat, forgery and abuse of power - charges relating to his period in office from 1962-1966. The case, which came to be referred to as 'The Tractors Case' involved the ludicrous charge that Bhutto in conspiracy with the employees of the Agricultural Department, had wrongfully obtained subsidised tractors on hire charges for development of his lands, thereby depriving the government of Rupees 2.13 lakhs. See the Pakistan Observer, 2 November 1968.
134. A clearly identifiable source of economic discontent was the rise in prices in 1967. The inflationary pressures building up in the country since 1964, increased in 1966-67. The wholesale price index rose by 14% during the period compared with 4% in the preceding year. This co-incident with acute food scarcity forcing Ayub to officially announce a food shortage and a rise in consumer prices in early 1967. 1966 and 1967 were also two poor crop years. We need hardly emphasise the impact of successive poor harvests, in a country where nearly 87% of the population depends directly or indirectly on agriculture, and something like 46% of the GNP accrues from it. These factors all played their part in heightening social tensions.
135. Awakening of the People, op.cit, pp. 119-133.
136. The West Pakistan Law Minister A. C. Akhund, for instance, declared: "Wherever Mr. Bhutto has gone there has been students trouble" and it is "evident that Mr. Bhutto is behind the students unrest". See Dawn, 10 November 1968, 8.
137. For newspaper supplements marking the 'Decade of Development' see the issue of Dawn, 2-27 October 1968.
138. There were very few years during Ayub's tenure that did not witness student demonstrations. See Tariq Ali, op.cit.
139. Far East Economic Review, 5 December 1968.
140. Pakistan Observer, 8 November 1968.
141. Dawn, 10 November 1968.
142. Pakistan Observer, 11 November 1968.
143. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1-8 March 1969, Vol. 17, p. 23218.
144. Dawn, 14 November 1968.

145. Far East Economic Review, 24 April 1969, p. 241.
146. The Ulema were deeply opposed to the Ayub government over, for instance, the introduction of Family Laws, which in their opinion were not in conformity with the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah. They were also perturbed by the open advocacy of family planning as a means of population control.
147. In December 1968 the PPP and NAP (Mazdoor Kissan) entered into an alliance for launching a joint struggle for the restoration of peoples rights. See Dawn, 2 December 1968, 8.
148. Bhashani headed the pro-peking faction of NAP after the split of December 1967. While not a Marxist, Bhashani's ideas would bring him closest to that particular camp. A life-long agitator, he always expressed a distaste for parliamentary politics. Bhashani's support was confined to East Bengal where his party claimed to be the representatives of peasants and labour. See M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, (Fall 1970), pp. 394-407.
149. Far East Economic Review, 11 July 1968, p. 109.
150. Dawn, 12 February 1969, 6.
151. Asian Recorder, 1-7 January 1969, Vol. 15, No. 1, page 8699. One of the most respected figures in Pakistan, Asghar Khan, had commanded the Air Force from 1957 to 1965, and was widely regarded as being responsible for developing it into an effective fighting force.
152. Dawn, 21 December 1968, 9.
153. Asian Recorder, 15-21 January 1969, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 8718-7.
154. For an analysis of the anti-Ayub movement in the then East Pakistan, see Rounaq Jahan, op.cit, pp. 159-177.
155. The DAC included Mujib's 6-point Awami League, NAP (Wali Group), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, Council Muslim League, Nizam-e-Islam, National Democratic Front, and Nasrullah's Awami League. See The Pakistan Times, 9 January 1969.
156. The DAC's eight points were as follows:
- 1) a federal parliamentary system of government
  - 2) direct elections by adult franchise
  - 3) an end to the state of emergency
  - 4) repeal of "black laws", including detention laws
  - 5) release of political prisoners including Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto
  - 6) the withdrawal of preventive orders under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code



- 7) the restoration of labour of the right to strike, and  
8) the withdrawal of all press restrictions and the return of Progressive Papers Ltd., to its original owners.
157. Pakistan Observer, 31 December 1968, 4, and Dawn, 29 December 1968.
158. One opposition leader remarked at the time, "It is equally perturbing to note that a gentleman who has been trying to pose himself as a believer in democracy has not bothered to give a chance to his own party men to hold a meeting of their party to express their views before he directed his second-in-command to announce a decision of such a vital nature. This is a typical example of Mr. Bhutto's disregard for democratic principles and his contempt for his own yes-men." See also Far East Economic Review, 16 January 1969, p. 83.
159. For condemnation by a forward bloc, see Dawn 10 January 1969, 9. Malik Aslam Hayat, advocate and PPP leader held that the method adopted by J. A. Rahim for the nomination of the party's candidature was unconstitutional - the decision should have been taken at a general meeting of the party. See Dawn 9 January 1969, 12.
160. Dawn, 8 January 1969.
161. Ayub announced this in a broadcast to the nation; See Pakistan Times, 2 February 1969, p. 1.
162. Published in full in Dawn, 26 February 1969. See also Z. A. Bhutto, Commitment to History: Text of the Affidavit, (Lahore: Peoples Book Centre, 1969).
163. Mujib was in detention in connection with the Agartala Conspiracy Case. This 'conspiracy' to sever the East wing from Pakistan with 'India's help' had been 'unearthed' in February 1968. It involved a number of junior service officers and three senior civil servants, with Mujib as the organiser and ring leader. The trial itself had been going on in full publicity since June 1968.
164. For a first-hand account of the tumultuous reception accorded to Bhutto, see Mahmud Sham, Larkana: to Peking, (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1969), pp. 1-2.
165. A gun battle between government and opposition supporters occurred at one stage on his route; twenty-two people were injured. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit, p. 232214.
166. The Times, 18 February 1969.
167. At the conclusion of the talks, agreement had been reached on only two of the DAC's 8-point demands; parliamentary government and direct elections. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 17-24 May 1969, Vol. 17, p. 23353. Consequently, the DAC decided to dissolve itself on 3 March 1969, as its basic objectives (parliamentary government) had been achieved.

168. The Guardian, (London), 18 March 1969.
169. The Times, 7 March 1969.
170. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit, p. 23354.
171. The Times, 28 February 1969.
172. Kalim Bahadur, The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action, (New Delhi: Chetna Publications, 1977), p. 118.
173. Bahadur, ibid, pp. 118-122.
174. Dawn, 14 February 1969, 9.
175. Dawn, 16 February 1969, 8.
176. See, for instance, Asian Recorder, 19-25 February 1969, Vol. 15, p. 8780.
177. Pakistan Times, 15 March 1969.
178. The Jamaat-e-Islami, the JUP and JUI all accused Bhutto of receiving funds from Chinese and 'other' foreign sources. See Asian Recorder, 3-9 December 1969, Vol. 15, No. 49, p. 9272.
179. An early denial of such charges was issued soon after the formation of the party. See Asian Recorder, 22-28 January 1968, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 8142.
180. Asian Recorder, 26 March - 1 April, Vol. 15, No. 13, p. 8845.
181. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, September 1977.
182. Quoted in Taseer, op.cit, p. 84.
183. Nusrat, 12 October 1970.
184. Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit, p. 158.
185. S. M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, (Lahore: Book Centre, 1970), p. 107.
186. Bhutto's visit to East Pakistan in October 1967, prior to the founding of the PPP, was reported to have ended in failure. See Dawn, 30 October 1967, 9.
187. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit, p. 23354.

## III

THE PPP AS AN ELECTORAL MACHINE, 1970

This chapter is concerned with analysing the role played by Bhutto and his PPP in the 1970 election, focusing on the transformation of the PPP from a protest movement into a party seeking electoral support. Much has been written about the 1970 election itself.<sup>1</sup> The focus of much of this literature, however, is on analysing the party in the Punjab, with the major emphasis directed towards a discussion of the party's 'modern' characteristics which led to the depiction of the PPP as a party of change.<sup>2</sup> This chapter attempts to provide a more comprehensive picture of the party by analysing the party both in the Punjab and Sind and by emphasising its 'traditional' features along with its 'modern' characteristics to arrive at a more satisfactory assessment of the party as an electoral machine. As we shall see below, this involves a qualification of the view that the PPP was a party of radical change.

In his attempt to forge a broad electoral coalition, Bhutto relied on a mixture of appeals to traditional as well as 'modernised' social groups. In rural Sind and the adjoining parts of Punjab, his party resorted to co-opting established feudal and clan leaders, while in the Punjab for the most part the party attempted to appeal directly, over the heads of local notables, to the masses. In the urbanised parts of the country, attempts were directed at recruiting the support of the urban poor, and middle-class

professional groups. Such an electoral strategy meant that the PPP had many different faces and spoke in different languages to different provincial and socio-economic groups. Thus Bhutto's electoral strategy combined the traditional 'patron' mode of political campaigning i.e. by manipulating feudal elites (in Sind), with populist politics aimed at mobilising mass support (in the Punjab).

In several respects the pattern and nature of the coming election campaign had already been determined by the 1968-69 mass urban protests.<sup>3</sup> Four months of intermittent rioting by urban social groups, such as industrial labour and white-collar professionals, had demonstrated both the growing political importance of these newer social groups and the salience of economic grievances, which formed the basis of such social unrest. The lessons of the 1968-69 upheaval were quickly absorbed and assimilated in the PPP programme and electoral strategy. Bhutto's aim was to manipulate the 'revolution of rising frustrations' amongst such groups to his party's electoral advantage by appealing directly to these urban masses in the Punjab (for it was in urban Punjab that the anti-Ayub movement developed and gained momentum) through socio-economic slogans promising social justice and better standards of living. Thus Bhutto's electoral strategy envisaged the recruitment of these recently created and mobilised urban interest groups in addition to drawing upon traditional patron-client pyramids in the Sindhi rural countryside. The extent to which this strategy was successful is

discussed later. Here, it may be relevant to mention two additional aspects of the November mass movement that had an impact on the election campaign subsequently. These are the growing polarisation between the 'left' and the 'right' and between the two halves of the country, East and West Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> The election campaign period further strengthened these divisions that had been accentuated during the mass upsurge. The slogans of the November mass movement were repeated with ferocity during the campaign - the demand for regional autonomy (as symbolised earlier by the demand for the dissolution of "one-unit" in the West, and by the Six Points of the Awami League in the East) and the issue of Islam versus Socialism.

Before we go on to look at the 1970 election, it is necessary first to outline the nature of the Yahya regime<sup>5</sup> and the PPP's attitude towards it, and second, the manner in which the PPP arrived at the decision to participate in the election.

The political atmosphere during the Yahya period was one of heightened tensions and rising often violent, economic and political discontent. The transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya on 25 March<sup>6</sup> signified a return to military rule, undisguised by the trappings of civilian institutions. The reimposition of martial law did not put an end to the riots and strikes, which continued, albeit sporadically, in both wings of the country.<sup>7</sup> Yahya inherited the dilemmas of his predecessors, but his method of dealing with these differed markedly. Yahya demonstrated far more willingness to respond to widespread

demands for popular participation and redistribution than earlier regimes. This was reflected in a number of reforms announced by his regime in the spheres of education and labour legislation.<sup>8</sup> In deference to popular demands, a purge of the civilian bureaucracy followed.<sup>9</sup> The Yahya regime also announced that from now on social welfare and economic growth must harmonise in the country's planning policies, and this required a complete re-orientation of commercial, industrial, fiscal and foreign trade policies.<sup>10</sup> Responding to the evident social and political strains caused by the rapid economic growth of the preceding years, the martial law regime also introduced measures to increase the emphasis on the equitable distribution of wealth. All this went some way to placate various discontented social groups such as urban labour and the intelligentsia.<sup>11</sup> However, the atmosphere remained charged with tension and uncertainty. The main source of uncertainty lay in the fact that the various social and political conflicts of the country had only been frozen by martial law. Violence and rioting continued in East Pakistan, while in the West, in September 1969, there began a period of strained and turbulent labour relations which provided fertile ground for political intervention. Professional groups such as teachers, lawyers and journalists also continued to re-organise and agitate in this period. The continuing unrest among these groups demonstrated that the reform proposals of the Yahya regime only partially satisfied their central demand for redistributive justice and more specific demands

pertaining to, for instance, reform of the educational system or labour laws.

Bhutto was quick in seizing the opportunity afforded by these circumstances. In his public speeches, he articulated the grievances of these social groups and pressed for the recognition of their demands in an attempt to rally their support for the coming election.<sup>12</sup> Thus, while other political leaders waited for Yahya's official 'proclamation' permitting political campaigning, Bhutto was already on the public platform. For instance, capitalising on discontent among urban industrial workers which continued despite the regime's measures at restoring the right to strike and subsequently increasing the industrial minimum wage,<sup>13</sup> Bhutto made several public statements in support of higher wages, and restrictions on the profits of the industrial elite. Bhutto's unqualified support for the demands of industrial workers was aimed at winning their electoral support. The same applied to his championing the demands of professional groups, such as teachers and journalists. In the case of teachers, Bhutto voiced the demand for better pay and later, nationalisation of educational institutions.<sup>14</sup> The grievances of these urban social groups were carefully noted by Bhutto and incorporated in his party's slogans and manifesto.

In mid-1969, Yahya began outlining his time-table for the return to civilian government, reserving at the same time the right of the military regime to define the parameters of political activity. In November 1969, Yahya announced full freedom of action for political

parties subject to certain 'guidelines' from 1 January 1970,<sup>15</sup> and general elections on 5 October 1970.<sup>16</sup> The procedures to be followed were spelled out in greater detail in the Legal Framework Order (LFO) promulgated on 30 March 1970,<sup>17</sup> and based on those principles on which a broad consensus had emerged at the 1969 Round Table Conference. The LFO envisaged the dissolution of "one-unit" in West Pakistan and its sub-division into four provinces - Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier, i.e. the restoration of the situation prior to 1955. The LFO also resolved another ticklish issue - that of representation on a population basis. Parity between East and West Pakistan in the national assembly, a basic principle in the 1956 and 1962 constitution, was discarded, and the East wing was conceded 56% of the seats (169 out of 313 seats). The election would be direct and on universal suffrage - "one-man, one vote". Prior to assuming government and legislative function, the assembly would be given a period of 120 days to draft a constitution - with Yahya reserving the right to authenticate the constitution. The LFO also spelled out a number of fundamental principles which the constitution would have to incorporate in order to meet Yahya's approval. These included a guarantee of the inviolability of Pakistan's territorial integrity preservation of Islamic ideology, independence of the judiciary, fundamental rights, free elections, a federal system ensuring not only autonomy to the provinces, but also adequate legislative, administrative and financial powers to the federal government, and the removal of



disparities, especially economic disparity, among the various regions.

Out of the three main points of political controversy about the future constitutional set-up, Yahya took it upon himself to settle, albeit provisionally, two - namely, the issue of "one-unit", and the question of parity versus population as a principle of representation. The third issue, which related to the distribution of powers between the Centre and the provinces, was left to the N.A. to resolve.<sup>18</sup> Yahya's decision to abolish "one-unit" proved a blessing for Bhutto and the PPP. Bhutto could not openly advocate the break-up of "one-unit" for fear of alienating the major source of his party's support - the Punjab, which had traditionally supported the idea of "one-unit," at the same time he could not oppose it for fear of annoying his native Sind, a province that had for long voiced its resentment against "one-unit". By removing this issue from the arena of political controversy, Yahya indirectly defused an issue which could have been a highly divisive one in the PPP.

By and large, Bhutto publicly welcomed and supported Yahya's political policy pronouncements,<sup>19</sup> although as we noted above, he severely criticised the regime's social and economic policies. But, while Bhutto proclaimed that he did not doubt the sincerity and "bonafides" of the Yahya government,<sup>20</sup> he often complained of victimisation by the regime.<sup>21</sup> It is important to note that whatever the fluctuations in the public relationship between Yahya and Bhutto, in private, the two scarcely concealed their

mutual animosity. But despite this, Bhutto evidently decided to adopt a policy of pragmatism vis a vis the Yahya government partly in order to establish a more 'respectable' image for the party in the election period. That is one of the reasons why, for instance, when radical PPP leaders like Mukhtar Rana and Mahmud Babar were arrested by the Yahya regime, the PPP did no more than make a feeble protest.<sup>22</sup> But as the election campaign intensified, Bhutto stepped up his attacks on the regime, recounting various incidents to demonstrate that the regime, far from being neutral, was biased against the PPP. He accused the administration of attempting to unite the three Muslim Leagues to check the growing popularity of the PPP.<sup>23</sup> Bhutto's attacks were largely directed at individual ministers of the Yahya government whom he accused of directly supporting various political parties<sup>24</sup> and of encouraging the 'anti-socialist' movement that had begun in the national press.<sup>25</sup> Bhutto's allegations about the partiality of the Yahya regime were interpreted by his opponents, at the time, as part of a strategy to gain the sympathies of the people,<sup>26</sup> by putting forward the image of the mazloom. (oppressed)

The government on its part claimed that it was maintaining a policy of non-interference. The regime was certainly interested in the results that would be produced by the elections. At the same time it seemed to have convinced itself that the best way of bringing about the desired result was to display more or less total impartiality toward all political parties.<sup>27</sup> The political scene in Pakistan appeared sufficiently confused to convince the

government of Yahya that no single party would triumph.<sup>28</sup> With the seats split among a number of parties, the regime could play the role of a political broker.

#### PPP: THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE AND THE HALA CONFERENCE

Bhutto's attitude towards elections (as with his views on 'democracy' in general) had always been somewhat ambivalent. In the past, this ambivalence had manifested itself in shifting positions on the issue, with Bhutto rejecting on some occasions the very idea of elections and maintaining that his party was a 'revolutionary' one,<sup>29</sup> while at other times he had even expressed his willingness to contest elections on a restricted franchise.<sup>30</sup> With the scene set for the first ever general election in Pakistan, there seemed little doubt in Bhutto's mind that as the 'victor' of the anti-Ayub movement, he would reap a rich harvest electorally if he contested the election. But what of the party's revolutionary image, and of the die-hard leftists within the party who rejected the very idea of elections as 'bourgeois' and meaningless?<sup>31</sup>

Although Bhutto's mind was largely made up on the question of participation, he decided to call a conference of the party to debate this issue.<sup>32</sup> But he announced that till such time as the party took a final decision on the issue, it should be assumed that the party would participate in the elections.<sup>33</sup> A two-day, all Pakistan conference of the party was called at Hala (in Sind) under Bhutto's presidentship. This was the second major convention of the party since the party's founding. Although

conventions of the party had been held on a provincial basis in 1968, no all-Pakistan convention had been organised since 1967. The Hala conference, therefore, deserves some attention, as it proved to be a historic one in the annals of party history.

The Hala conference was convened on 2 July 1970 at the residence of Makhdoom Zaman, the Pir of Hala. It was ironical that a self-acclaimed 'revolutionary' party had convened its first major convention at the home of one of Sind's biggest landlords and spiritual leaders. Indeed, the Makhdoom's connection with the PPP was an explicit manifestation of the PPP's links with the waderas and spiritual leaders of Sind (as discussed later). 700 delegates attended the conference, representing various parts of the country. The delegates came from a broad social spectrum, ranging from lower middle and middle class urban professionals (lawyers, teachers) to scions of Sindhi aristocratic families, and included student leaders and labour organisers. This reflected the heterogeneous nature of the party's membership and the divergent interests represented by it.

The conference, in which there was relatively free and open debate, discussed and reviewed various aspects of the political situation in the country, focusing on whether or not the party should contest the elections. From information obtained from interviews,<sup>34</sup> a sharp division arose at the conference on this issue, between the 'rightists' (Peerzada) and 'centrist' (Mubashar, Ramay) elements who advocated participation and the 'leftist' (Mairaj, Tariq Aziz, Shamim Zainuddin, Ziauddin Butt) and 'progressive'

(Rahim) elements who opposed participation (or supported participation on certain conditions). As stated by Mairaj, the left position maintained that a radical party like the PPP could not view the elections as solving the problems of the people. Revolutions were never produced by elections - indeed elections only returned those to power who protected the status quo or their own narrow interests. Electioneering would mean that the party would have to rely, to some extent, on the support of monied interests and this would bring in all sorts of "opportunist"; conservative interests and "feudals" into the party. Thus even bourgeois democracy could not be established if the PPP was to consist of feudalists. The right groups disagreed with the left groups' interpretation of a 'revolutionary party'. The party was indeed revolutionary but it believed in peaceful methods of acquiring power, and this necessarily entailed contesting elections. As for the entry of 'feudals' in the party, this could not be opposed per se - all were welcome to join the party as long as they decided to abide by the party programme.<sup>35</sup>

Among the 'leftist' groups the Mairaj Mohammed faction argued that while ideologically it was opposed to the idea of 'bourgeois elections', boycotting the election might prove to be wrong strategy. The PPP should utilise the electoral platform to establish itself nationally and to spread 'socialist consciousness', while at the same time barring the entry of "feudal opportunists" and adopting a clear stand that elections per se were no solution to the problems of the mass populace.<sup>36</sup>

With the party so sharply divided on the issue, two days of heated discussion failed to produce any consensus. At this stage of the proceedings, the conference gave a 'mandate' to the chairman (Bhutto) to resolve the deadlock. Although it is not known who arranged the 'mandate', this method of not taking a vote, and delegating all responsibility to Bhutto to arrive at the final decision, in fact set up a tradition in the party whereby decision-making, as we shall see later, became highly personalised, with Bhutto making all major policy decisions, often against the wishes of other members of the party hierarchy. Instead of voting upon an issue and setting up a democratic tradition in the party, "mandates" were "issued" to Bhutto to resolve issues in a highly personalised manner. This was an early indication of Bhutto's Viceregal approach - in terms of the centralisation and personalisation of decision-making, and obviously inhibited the evolution of any institutionalised decision-making mechanism within the party.

On the last day of the conference, Bhutto announced his decision to participate in the election, but stated at the same time that elections by themselves would not solve the problems of the masses. The latter portion of the announcement was clearly aimed at appeasing the 'leftist' groups.<sup>37</sup> At the close of the conference, several resolutions were passed that for instance, condemned the Yahya regime's policy of "victimising" students, industrial workers and members of leftist parties, criticised the fourth Five Year Plan, and demanded a ban on the use of

mosques for political propaganda.<sup>38</sup>

Although the election issue had dominated the convention's proceedings, related issues, notably the kind of 'revolution' the PPP envisaged for the country, occupied a central role in the debates. This, like the election issue, revealed deep ideological differences within the party. As stated by Mairaj, the radical leftists maintained that in its fight against imperialism the PPP should not only take a stand against the capitalists, but also the feudal system.<sup>39</sup> Thus the leftists, led by Mairaj wanted to place primary emphasis on the liquidation of feudalism, whereas Bhutto (supported by Mubashar, Ramay and Peerzada) argued that since the links of imperialism in Pakistan were with the capitalists (and the higher bureaucracy) this class, not that of the landed notables, was the primary internal enemy. The immediate implication of Mairaj's argument was that feudalism could not be destroyed if the PPP gave tickets to this class (a reference to the Sindhi landed elite in the party) and reflected the leftists' growing doubts about their chairman's commitment to revolutionary change. Thus, the Hala Conference, despite the demonstration of unity at the end, revealed deep ideological divisions in the PPP.

Immediately after the convention, the PPP launched its own daily newspaper Musawaat from Lahore on 7 July,<sup>40</sup> under the editorship of Hanif Ramay (a member of the central organising committee of the PPP).<sup>41</sup> It is noteworthy, that although, in theory, the government-owned National Press Trust (NPT) which controlled the largest section of

the press, both English and Urdu - was free to report the campaign and to adopt a non-partisan role, in practice, this was not the case. The NPT was headed by Information Minister Sher Ali, whose antipathy for Bhutto and the PPP's socialism was well known, as were his sympathies with right-wing Islamic parties, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami. In his public speeches, Bhutto repeatedly accused Sher Ali of being responsible for biased reporting in the NPT press.<sup>42</sup> Such allegations, were in large part, justified. This factor together with the nature of the non-official press media stressed the need for the party to launch its own daily newspaper. The conservative Islamic parties either owned or had the sympathy of a large number of widely circulated Urdu newspapers and newsweeklies.<sup>43</sup> Much of the remaining press media was owned by the Haroons, one of the twenty-two families, from which the PPP could scarcely expect favourable reporting. Therefore, the launching of the party's own organ was, in Bhutto's view, a necessary step towards propagating the party's electoral programme and countering the attacks of the right-wing press.

Soon after, the PPP published its Election Manifesto, drafted by Bhutto, Mubashar Hasan and J. Rahim, setting forth the party's ideological and programmatic position.<sup>44</sup> There was some delay in the final release of the Manifesto to the public.<sup>45</sup> It was reported at the time that this delay reflected differences of opinion among the various ideological groups within the party (outlined to some extent in the preceding section above, and below); this



also helps to explain some of the seeming contradictions in the document, and its vagueness on important issues, such as ceilings on land holdings and regional autonomy.

The programmatic promises contained in the lengthy Manifesto were substantially the same as in the Foundation Documents (discussed in the preceding chapter): the commitment to socialist objectives and the promise of nationalisation of "basic and key industries". For the agricultural sector, while the Manifesto proclaimed that it stood for the elimination of feudalism, there appeared to be some dilution of even the moderate reformist programme proposed in the Foundation Documents. For instance, on the issue of land reforms no precise ceiling was set.<sup>46</sup> The vagueness on this crucial issue was a reflection of Bhutto's anxiousness not to frighten the Sindhi aristocracy, which was an important constituency of the PPP. It may be relevant to mention here that a few months earlier, in March, the issue of land ceiling had been a highly contentious one at a meeting of the Punjab provincial committee. A group of leftists comprising Sheikh Rashid, Amanullah Khan and K. H. Meer demanded that the land ceiling be fixed at 25 acres in the party's manifesto.<sup>47</sup> This was vehemently opposed by landed members led by Khar. No consensus was reached, and a proposed party meeting was postponed.<sup>48</sup> At the same time one student member of the leftist group, Amanullah was expelled from the party.<sup>49</sup>

The Manifesto avoided comment on the question of regional autonomy. Although it referred to West Pakistan's domination of the East as an "internal colonial structure",

it did not spell out any solution to this problem other than the general prescription that socialism would "abolish" such inequities and exploitation.<sup>50</sup> On constitutional issues, in general, the Manifesto said little. It envisaged a federal, parliamentary system of government and "full democracy", but these concepts were not elaborated.<sup>51</sup> In the field of foreign policy great emphasis was laid on the 'confrontation with India' theme, and solidarity was expressed with the people of Kashmir. In terms of specific commitments, the party promised withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, "for avoiding neo-colonialist dictation of policy."<sup>52</sup>

There was greater emphasis on Islam in the Manifesto than in the Foundation Documents. Indeed the Manifesto named Islam as the derivative source for all its policy proposals: "The substance and spirit of the party's programme, demands, and activities obey the teachings of Islam." However, the Manifesto did not use the term 'Islamic Socialism', which we shall see presently, became an important part of Bhutto's campaign speeches. Although the Manifesto used socialist vocabulary, and talked of class conflict, it was devoid of the militant, hard-hitting content that we otherwise find in Bhutto's speeches and public pronouncements of the time. The Manifesto was certainly radical in the range of socio-economic change that it envisaged for the future, but it was by no means a revolutionary document.

#### THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1970

Pakistan's first ever general election was scheduled

for 7 December 1970. For the first time since independence, all Pakistanis above the age of twenty-one were being called upon to elect members of a national assembly by direct vote. Ten days later, on 17 December, they were to exercise their vote again, to elect members of provincial assemblies for each of the five provinces. Even the direct election of provincial legislatures was a new experience for many voters - those who had come of age since the early and mid-fifties. These were the first elections in Baluchistan, the first direct elections in East Pakistan since 1954, first since 1951 in Punjab and the NWFP, and since 1953, in Sind. Thus previous electoral experience included only four provincial elections (on adult franchise basis) in the early fifties, and two (indirect) national 'elections' (including a presidential one) under Ayub's Basic Democracy system in the sixties.<sup>53</sup>

Under Yahya's LFO, the national assembly was to consist of 313 members of whom 300 would be elected to fill general seats while 13 seats were reserved for women.<sup>54</sup> The number of seats in the N.A. and the P.A.'s were distributed amongst the provinces and the centrally administered tribal areas (CATA's) according to the census of 1961. See Table III.1 below for the allocation of seats.

Yahya had decreed that the elections be held on the basis of single member territorial constituencies of approximately equal size and the first-past-the-post system. Delimitation and other arrangements were in the hands of the Election Commission headed by a retired Supreme Court Justice. The last census (that in 1961), was used as the

TABLE III.1

ALLOCATION OF SEATS FOR THE 1970 ELECTION

<u>National Assembly</u>		
	General	Women
East Pakistan	162	7
Punjab	82	3
Sind	27	1
Baluchistan	4	1
North-West-Frontier Province	18	-
Centrally Administered Tribal Areas	7	1
	<hr/>	
Total seats	300	13
<u>Provincial Assemblies</u>		
	General	Women
East Pakistan	300	10
Punjab	180	6
Sind	60	2
Baluchistan	20	1
North-West-Frontier Province	40	2

basis for delimitation subject to the proviso that rational administrative boundaries be used as constituency boundaries as well.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, the Commission considered tribal and biradari to be important factors in delineating constituencies. Two examples of these are Dera Ghazi Khan district (in the Punjab) where the territories of influence of the Leghari and the Mazari clans were placed in separate constituencies, and Campbellpur (Punjab), where the Khattar, Awan and Makhad areas were provided with potential "pocket boroughs."

The electoral register was based on the 1961 census, but brought up to date by including those who had come of voting age by 1970. Registered voters totalled 56.94 million

(30.5 males and 26.44 females), representing just under half the population (47%) of Pakistan - estimated at 120 million in 1970, (94 million in the 1961 census).<sup>56</sup> It can be surmised that the electoral roll was a fairly accurate representation of the population (above 21) eligible to vote, since the Pakistani population is predominantly young - 46.4% being below the age of fifteen years.<sup>57</sup>

Before we go on to look at the election campaign and the results produced by the election, it is necessary here to give a brief survey of the main parties that contested the election.

#### CONTESTANTS: THE PPP AND ITS COMPETITORS

The Pakistani electorate in 1970 was confronted by a plethora of parties, with twenty-five parties contesting the election, eleven in East Pakistan and fourteen in West Pakistan. Nominations for the national assembly by (major) party and region are shown below, in Table III.2.

We can classify the major parties contesting the election into four broad groups:

1. The various factions of the Muslim League.
2. Conservative and fundamentalist "Islam - Pasand" (Islam - loving) parties, like the JUI, JUP and JI.
3. Older, more established parties (or splinter groups of older parties), regionalist in form and ideology, such as NAP and the Awami League.<sup>58</sup>
4. Newly-established parties (not splinter groups of older ones) such as the PPP.

TABLE III.2

## NOMINATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY PARTY AND REGION

Total Seats	Balu- chistan (4)	NWFP (25)	Punjab (82)	Sind (27)	W.Pak (138)	E.Pak (162)	Pakistan (300)
Awami League (AL) .....	1	2	3	2	8	162	176
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) ....	2	15	44	19	80	71	151
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group) (QML)	4	17	35	12	68	65	133
Pakistan Muslim League Convention (PML (C) )	-	1	24	6	31	93	124
Pakistan Peoples Party... (PPP)	1	16	78	25	120	-	120
Council Muslim League (CML)	2	5	50	12	69	50	119
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)	1	2	21	3	27	78	105
Jamiatul Ulema-i-Pakistan (Hazarvi Group (JUP (H) )	4	18	46	21	89	15	104
National Awami Party..... (Wali Group) (NAP (W) )	3	16	-	6	25	39	64
Markazi Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Islam & Nizam-i-Islam (MJUI)	-	2	3	-	5	49	54
Jamiatul Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	-	1	41	8	50	-	50
National Awami Party..... (Bhashani Group) (NAP (BH) )	1	-	2	2	5	14	19
Pakistan National League (PNL)	-	-	2	-	2	14	16
Other Parties .....	1	1	6	8	16	18	36
Independents .....	6	46	105	46	213	113	326
Total .....	26	142	460	170	808	781	1589

Source: Report on General Election Pakistan 1970-1971, Vol. II, (Karachi: Manager of Publications), pp. 122-123.

We shall now take a brief look at the major parties within these broad groupings, beginning with the Muslim League factions.

## THE MUSLIM LEAGUE FACTIONS

The Muslim League, Pakistan's independence party, was split and in disarray.<sup>59</sup> In 1962, Ayub tried to seize control of the League as a vehicle for his regime and his supporters. He called a convention of the Muslim League; hence his party became known as the "Convention" Muslim League (PML(C)). Other Leaguers who did not find Ayub Khan's leadership acceptable, under the inspiration of Mian Mumtaz Mohammed Khan Daultana (a member of the Punjabi feudal aristocracy and a former chief minister) reconvened the Council of Muslim League under the presidency of former Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin. This is how the "Council" Muslim League (CML) came into existence in 1962. In February 1969, a third faction emerged under the leadership of Qayyum Khan, the Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum group or QML) and consisting of dissident members of both the PML (C) and CML.

All three factions of the League relied on the support of the West Pakistani feudal aristocracy. In a sense, the three Leagues were the vehicles of different landlord factions and were essentially 'patron' parties. The Convention Muslim League for instance, enjoyed the support of some members of the Qizilbash and Tiwana clans in the Punjab. The CML's principal source of support appeared to be the Punjab feudal aristocracy, to which both Daultana (the leader of the party) and Shaukat Hayat (the provincial president) belonged. The CML was built around a series of alliances between the leading Punjab feudal families - the Noon's, Gilanis, Qureishis, Hayats, Makhads, Mazaris,

Legharis, Syeds and Mians. In Sind, Daultana's faction was aligned with the Sindhi wadera faction of Ayub Khuhro, a former chief minister and traditional rival of the Bhutto clan. The QML was based on similar alliances between landlord factions, and enjoyed the support of the Pir of Pagaro faction of Sind, members of Qayyum's own landlord faction in the NWFP, and Punjabi landowning families like the Noons of Sargodha, Gilanis of Multan and Hasan Mahmud of Bahawalpur.

There were few programmatic differences between the three Leagues.<sup>60</sup> All subscribed to a conservative political philosophy, invoking Islam to assert their leadership claims. All three stood for a strong Centre, although the CML appeared to be more tolerant than the other two, towards demands for regional autonomy. All three advocated social justice although in the vaguest of terms. However, of the three, the QML was vociferous in its rejection of the PPP's socialism as being inconsistent with Pakistan's Islamic ideology.

### THE ISLAMIC PARTIES

Generally speaking, all these parties stood for a political, economic and social system rooted in Islam. There were sharp differences of opinion on interpretation of the meaning of an "Islamic System", especially in the economic field, and between the various Sunni Islamic sects. Therefore, the various Islamic parties represented different schools of thought in Islam. Of the Islamic parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami, led at the time by its founder, Maulana



Maudoodi, was generally regarded to be one of the best organised parties in the country, with an elaborate under-structure in both wings down to the Mohalla (precinct) level.<sup>61</sup> It had a clearly articulated orthodox Sunni philosophy based on Maudoodi's interpretation of Islam, and had consistently advocated the establishment of an Islamic state and society adhering to the tenets of the Qur'an and Sunna. During the campaign the Jamaat enlisted the support of some prominent politicians such as former Punjab Governor Nawab Gurmani and some retired military officers including General Umrao Khan.

The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) was another variant of the ulema parties, belonging to the Barelvi school of thought. The Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam (JUI) derived its inspiration from the Deoband school. In 1969 the JUI split into two factions - the more orthodox faction JUI(T) led by Maulana Thanvi and a more liberal Sunni faction, JUI(H), led by Maulana Hazarvi. The JUI(T) claimed some support in the Sind and Punjab, while the JUI(H) drew its strength from the Frontier and Baluchistan.

### THE REGIONAL PARTIES

Of the regional parties, the most vociferous advocate of greater regional autonomy was the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, which was almost exclusively East Pakistani based.<sup>62</sup> Its concept of regional autonomy was presented in the form of a Six-Point Programme.<sup>63</sup>

In the West, the National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group) which derived its support largely from tribal chiefs

of NWFP and Baluchistan advocated greater regional autonomy for these provinces.<sup>64</sup> The NAP(W) claimed its descent from the National Party of Pakistan, generally regarded as representing the 'Old Guard' Left in Pakistan.<sup>65</sup> The party supported a socialist programme, calling for nationalisation of banks and key industries and fixing a ceiling on land holdings. NAP(W) was perhaps the only party in the country that was openly secular. The Sind United Front led by G. M. Syed (a Sindhi landlord), similarly, called for greater regional autonomy, and enjoyed the support of some Sindhi landlords and members of the Sindhi intelligentsia.

#### THE PPP: ORGANISATION AND CANDIDATE SELECTION

The state of party organisation was far from satisfactory as the election date approached. A party central committee had yet to be formally constituted - up to now decisions were generally taken by Bhutto and a caucus of advisers which included J. Rahim, M. Hasan and Khar. Four provincial committees - ranging in membership from 20 to 30 - had been appointed earlier by Bhutto, but of these only the Punjab committee had met regularly.<sup>66</sup> For the purposes of candidate selection, four provincial parliamentary boards were set up, along with an 11-member central Parliamentary and Review Board.<sup>67</sup> The setting up of centrally selected provincial parliamentary boards meant that the provincial committees already in existence were shunted aside. This was to some extent motivated by the desire to avoid factional in-fighting over tickets

in the provincial committees that had already manifested itself in Punjab, for instance, in the ideological-cum-factional conflict between Sheikh Rashid (provincial president) and G. M. Khar (provincial secretary-general), and in Karachi between the president Hafeez Peerzada and secretary Mairaj Mohammed.<sup>68</sup> However, the whole business of candidate selection proved to be quite chaotic, both because of the party's disorganisation and because of factional disputes in the party.

The PPP had no coherent structure. Bhutto had yet to organise the party in a systematic manner. As we saw in the previous chapter, party units had in the past been set up haphazardly and with little regard for coordination. This pattern intensified as the election approached: provincial and national structures remained poorly delineated; local branches were set up whenever and wherever a coterie of supporters existed. Consequently, when the time came for the allocation of party tickets, local party groups in many areas made competing claims for the candidature of the same or overlapping constituencies.

The problem of organisational incoherence was compounded by a surge of factionalism at all levels between old party workers (founder members and those who joined the party prior to the Hala conference) and new ones (who had joined after the Hala conference). When the list of candidates was finalised, it became apparent that in many places, many old workers had been passed over in favour of those who had jumped on to the PPP bandwagon recently. As the party's secretary-general later pointed

out:

"Tension was inevitable in view of  
of the way last-minute arrivals....  
...were given party tickets.<sup>69</sup>

It was the type of constituency that these new entrants represented which became the source of tension. Although this is discussed in more detail below, it is necessary here to note that in its list of nominees from Sind and parts of the Punjab, a large number could be identified as feudals, pirs and former followers of Ayub. Amongst the feudals nominated from Sind, at least four remained with Ayub till the last days of his regime.<sup>70</sup> The same could be said of two of the three nominees from Gujrat, Choudrey Fazal Elahi and Choudrey Ghulam Rasool. Similarly, a Multan tehsil seat was given to Nawab Sadiq Hussein Qureishi, a wealthy member of the Qureishi landed-gentry family, with strong local influence and a significant political network, who had joined the party in August 1970. On the other hand, a dedicated worker like Amanullah Khan, was not only refused a party ticket, but expelled from the party. As mentioned earlier, Amanullah Khan had been a vociferous advocate of radical land reform. The PPP leadership obviously felt that he had become a liability for the party, when it was trying to draw in men of influence. The expulsion of Amanullah, however, brought on a chain reaction of open protests, student resignations and resolutions from various left groups in the Punjab denouncing the "undemocratic attitude of the central leadership."<sup>71</sup> This led to his reinstatement in August 1970 but not after producing a great deal of intra-party bickering.

All this led to considerable resentment within the party among the more dedicated socialist membership and the rank and file. In Sialkot, for example, the party chairman resigned in protest against what he termed Bhutto's wrong policy in awarding party tickets.<sup>72</sup> Similar discontent was voiced by the rank and file membership in Multan. Here, the chairman of the Multan PPP, Babu Feroze Din Ansari, a working class leader in the artisan tradition, (head of the West Pakistan Weavers Conference with a biradari following of 200,000 Ansaris) announced his departure from the party in protest against not being given a party ticket, whilst a gentry notable (Sadiq H. Qureishi), even though a recent convert, was awarded a ticket in a tehsil of Multan<sup>73</sup> (see above). Leftist leaders of the Multan PPP organisation, such as Taj Mohammed Langah, too expressed their resentment against Bhutto's decision to grant Qureishi a party ticket - a decision evidently taken without consulting anyone in the Multan PPP. These reactions perhaps received the greatest publicity but they were by no means isolated incidents, and they illustrated how the ticketing process became the source of serious factional infighting in the Punjab PPP, at times bringing the provincial organisation close to a breakdown. Indeed in virtually every district of the Punjab, local PPP units experienced ticketing disputes that were based on personal, biradari and ideological issues.

Of course part of the problem relating to ideological disputes over tickets arose from the fact that the

party did not adopt any selective method for admitting people into the party. The PPP had opted for a mass 'open' membership. Bhutto had set a simple test:

"Every person who is in agreement with the manifesto of the PPP is welcome to join it." 74


The question of party finances was another reason why the party now preferred to admit and nominate men of money and influence. Electioneering required funds, and Bhutto made several appeals for party funds.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, the central leadership directed the provincial parliamentary boards to give preference to candidates who were financially well off.<sup>76</sup> This advice, however, was not always followed, as in many parts of the Punjab (excluding Multan and Sargodha districts), self-appointed PPP officials defying the central provincial leadership selected less prosperous candidates generally lacking in local notable status.<sup>77</sup>

No effort was made to hold elections in the PPP which may have helped in providing the starting point for building up a solid and effective organisation. Party elections, it was felt at this stage, would merely lead to further factional in-fighting and 'petty jealousies' - a situation the PPP could ill afford, faced with an election.<sup>78</sup> Such an argument had prima facie validity, for internal elections in the case of parties in the Indian sub-continent have frequently produced severe factionalism and splintering. Technically, the party was governed by its interim constitution during what the party called the "organisational period" i.e. the period till the organisational work of the party was completed.<sup>79</sup> This interim

constitution was to remain in force until "another constitution is adopted by the National Council to be constituted after the party had been built up on the widest base and elections held democratically upwards from below." Until such time office bearers were to be nominated - the chairman appointing provincial chairmen and office-bearers at the provincial level, and the provincial chairman appointing district office-bearers and so on. Under the interim constitution, the chairman was to nominate office-bearers like the secretary and vice-chairman in consultation with the central committee of the party. But since the latter had not even been constituted, in practice, Bhutto made these appointments by himself. Second, since elections were continuously postponed, this established the tradition of nominations in the party. All this could only inhibit the development of a solid party organisation.

On the eve of the election, the party structure was as follows:

FIGURE 1  
- PPP ORGANISATION - 1969/70



\*Large Cities could have more than one city organisation

## THE PPP AND THE CAMPAIGN

The Muslim League factions and the other parties adopted the traditional mode of campaigning in the rural areas, i.e. relying on what may be termed 'intermediaries' - biradari leaders, mullahs, etc. Campaigning thus involved using the rural elites and winning over local influentials. The slogan 'Islam in danger' was often used. The lessons of the 1968/69 upheaval seem to have been lost on these parties. Bhutto, on the other hand, had carefully noted and absorbed the wider implications of the mass urban protests, and these were reflected in his party's electoral strategy.

The PPP's campaign strategy was based on an appeal to traditional feudal forces in rural Sind and the adjoining areas of the Punjab but complemented by - and this is what differentiated the PPP strategy from that of other parties - an appeal to the 'modern', newer social groups in urban Punjab and Sind. Such a strategy reflected Bhutto's assessment firstly that each province had its peculiar characteristics, and secondly that in general it was necessary to differentiate between the rural and urban areas. The need to rally the support of the urban social groups followed from Bhutto's interpretation of the events of 1968/69. Bhutto had had the double advantage of witnessing from both inside and outside the government how the development programme initiated by Ayub had generated certain forces of discontent. As an astute politician, Bhutto no doubt discerned that electoral success in urban areas could be ensured by articulating the frustrations of the newer social groups - such as industrial labour, and



middle class professional groups. Bhutto was convinced that politics in urban Pakistan, at any rate, must now be mass-oriented and mass-based in order to succeed. Thus, in the campaign, Bhutto and the PPP leaders addressed themselves directly to the grievances and aspirations of the urban masses. Bhutto declared:

"Our politics is the politics of the masses.....now the politics of the people will decide the future of the country." 80

To gain the support of industrial labour and the under-privileged urban masses, Bhutto put forward the image of the PPP as a revolutionary socialist party that was bent upon "tumbling the thrones and tossing the crowns."<sup>81</sup> They were told that every trace of feudalism and capitalism would be eliminated, that the lands would belong to the tillers and the factories to the workers, and that every exploiter would have to be answerable to the people's court;<sup>82</sup> 'Roti, Kapara, Makan' (Food, Clothing, Shelter), promising a better life for the underprivileged, became the key slogan of the party to win the support of these groups. The success of this strategy became evident when several trade unions announced their support for the PPP in the election. In October 1970, Bashir Bakhtiar announced that his Pakistan Labour Party (effectively the West Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions) would support the PPP in all but a few constituencies where it was committed to JUI candidates.<sup>83</sup> Other unions backing the PPP included the Pakistan Press Workers Union, The Pakistan Mint Workers Union and the Tonga and Taxi Drivers Union.

At the same time, the party sought to win the support of urban and small town professional groups by its promise of social change in general and better pay and working conditions in particular. To give one illustration the PPP incorporated the demands and grievances of teachers in its campaign strategy, and succeeded in winning the support of various college and school teachers' associations.<sup>84</sup> At the lower levels, such numerical support was impressive. The Punjab Private School Teachers Federation, for example, embraced eleven member associations and had an aggregate individual membership of about 16,500 teachers.<sup>85</sup> Similar associations in Sind added an equal number. Dispersed in every urban neighbourhood, the teachers constituted measurably to PPP urban electoral victories, especially in Punjab. The same could be said of lawyers. Bhutto and other PPP leaders, many of whom were lawyers, (Hafiz Peerzada, K. H. Meer) addressed the various bar associations throughout the country, promising benefits to the legal community.<sup>86</sup> During the early part of the campaign, Bhutto persuaded an eminent Punjabi lawyer, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, known for his passionate advocacy of civil liberties, to leave NAP(W) and join the PPP.<sup>87</sup> A former secretary-general of NAP(W), Kasuri was immediately appointed as one of the PPP's vice-chairmen by Bhutto.<sup>88</sup> After Kasuri's exit from NAP(W), several former NAP(W) office-holders in the Punjab, many of them lawyers, joined the PPP.<sup>89</sup> The PPP also succeeded in mobilising support from the journalist community through winning the backing of the Pakistan Federated Union of Journalists.

It was, however, not only from these 'modern' elements that the PPP sought support. In its drive to build up an effective electoral coalition, it also focused ~~its attention on traditional groups~~. In Sind, other than the urban centres of Karachi and Hyderabad, Bhutto utilised ~~the traditional mode of campaigning~~ by enlisting the support of feudal waderas and pirs. Bhutto's major campaign victory came when the Pir of Hala (feudal aristocrat and spiritual leader of over a million followers) joined the party. After his entry many politically influential aristocratic landlord families joined the party such as Pir Rasool Shah of Tharparkar, Darya Khoso of Jacobabad, Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi and Hakim Zardari from Nawabshah. Immediately before the election, Bhutto managed to wean away a leading member of the Pir of Pagaro faction, Jam Sadiq Ali from Sanghar. Bhutto had skillfully utilised his former links with the Convention Muslim League to win these allies since almost all of those mentioned above were former Convention Muslim Leaguers. Thus by mid-1970, the Sind PPP had become the preserve of Sindhi landed notables - Bhuttos, Talpurs, Jatois, Peerzadas and the Hala Makhdums, ~~with a junior partnership accorded to Ji'ay Sind~~ ('Long Live Sind) provincial elements. (See below).

Ostensibly a leftist party, the PPP had to explain its apparent willingness to admit landed notables and so-called ~~'reactionaries'~~ to its ranks. Bhutto's defence was ~~that there was not a single party, including the NAP, which was without capitalists and feudalists in its ranks~~. He explained:

"It was a fact that some capitalists and feudal lords have joined my party, but it does not at all mean that the PPP has been converted into a party of jagirdars to suck the blood of poor people. The capitalists and feudal lords who have joined the party have already taken an oath before me to abide by all the conditions laid down in the Manifesto." 90

Privately, however, Bhutto is reported to have assured these landlords that their interests would be protected once he was in power.<sup>91</sup> At the same time, leaders like Mubashar Hasan, argued that these feudals were indispensable if the party was to win seats.<sup>92</sup> However, the discomfort amongst the radical leftist leaders in the PPP (such as Mukhtar Rana, Mairaj) was scarcely assuaged by such arguments; these leaders were not so naive as to believe that the landed notables of Sind (and Multan) had entered the party to preside over their destruction as a class.

In rural Punjab for the large part, the situation was different. Here, as we saw earlier, the leading feudal families were aligned to one or other of three Muslim League factions. Consequently, despite Bhutto's courting of the Punjabi zamindari, the PPP was only able to attract a limited number of feudal landlords. These included members of the Qureishi, Khakwani and Gilani families of Multan and a branch of the Noon family in Sargodha. These feudal elements sensing the growing popularity of the PPP by mid-1970 joined the party during the last phase of the campaign. Much as their forefathers they quickly learned to accommodate themselves to a new political phenomenon by embracing it. But other than these bandwagoners, the PPP had little support from the Punjab

feudal aristocracy. Therefore, Bhutto's campaign strategy here differed from that in rural Sind. Here Bhutto sought to appeal to the less-privileged rural forces, through promises of "zamin kashtkaron ko" (land to the tiller), tenancy reform and the elimination of feudalism. Whether this strategy was the result of Bhutto's failure to mobilise the support of the Punjabi feudal aristocracy or whether it emerged from a shrewd assessment of the impact of socio-economic changes that had to some extent begun to erode traditional patterns of power and authority in the Punjabi countryside,<sup>93</sup> or both, is a question that may never be answered satisfactorily. But whatever the reason, Bhutto's campaign strategy involved mobilising the support of smaller zamindars, non-gentry landlords and the rural under-privileged (tenants and landless peasants) through its promise of 'change' and a better deal for the agricultural sector.

An important element of Bhutto's campaign was the heavy emphasis on the slogan of 'Islamic Socialism'.<sup>94</sup> Sensitive to attacks made upon his party by the Islamic parties and other right-wing parties, Bhutto sought to blunt their attack by making Islam an important plank in his campaign.<sup>95</sup> As noted earlier, the term 'Islamic Socialism' was not used either in the party's Foundation Documents or the Manifesto for a number of reasons discussed previously but now it appeared both in Bhutto's speeches and in the public pronouncements of other party leaders.<sup>96</sup> This move appeared to have been assisted by a new entrant in the party, Maulana Kauser Niazi.<sup>97</sup> Formerly

an important leader in the Jamaat-e-Islami, Niazi formally joined the PPP in August 1970.<sup>98</sup> That Bhutto immediately appointed Niazi, information/publicity secretary of the party against the protests of secular-minded party leaders, such as Rahim, indicated the importance he attached to giving his party an 'Islamic' face. This need was an especially pressing one in view of the fact that 113 maulvis in both parts of Pakistan had issued fatwas (religious decrees) holding socialism to be un-Islamic and Bhutto a kafir (non-believer) for espousing it.<sup>99</sup> With Niazi's help Bhutto sought to counter these attacks by holding that Islamic Socialism meant only Musawaat (egalitarianism).

While the Islamic parties attempted to conduct a debate in terms of Islam versus Socialism, asking people to choose between secularism and religion, Bhutto rejected this, and asked the people to choose between two interpretations of Islam, i.e. between his egalitarian variety and the 'capitalist version' of his opponents. When the religious parties raised the cry 'Islam in danger', he countered by saying that it was not Islam that was in danger - that was a contradiction in terms in a predominantly Muslim country - but "it is the rich people who are in danger".<sup>100</sup> In order to placate the fears of those who were suspicious of the term socialism, Bhutto pointed out that his party did not believe in the socialism of the Soviet Union or Peoples' China. It had firm faith in the tenets of Islam to resolve all problems.<sup>101</sup> It should be noted that the term 'Islamic Socialism' has been current

in Muslim political discourse in parts of the Arab world (Egypt, Syria) for decades, particularly after Nasser's promulgation of 'Arab Socialism'.<sup>102</sup> Judging by their writings and public speeches, the "Islamic Socialists" of Pakistan (Bhutto included) were apparently quite unaware of this rich literature and did not exploit it. Or perhaps Bhutto preferred to put forward a Pakistani version, drawing on the quotations of Jinnah or Liaquat to demonstrate that these two nationally revered leaders had also advocated 'Islamic Socialism'.<sup>103</sup>

Surprisingly, the Islamic parties (all Sunni) did not attack Bhutto on the basis that he was a Shia and thus belonged to a minority sect in a predominantly Sunni country. Part of the reason for this may have been that Yahya too was Shia. Bhutto, however, utilised his Shia background to gain the support of the three major Shia bodies in the country, Pakistan Shia Tanzeem, Idara-e-Tahafaz-e-Haqooq-e-Shia and the Shia Demands Committee.<sup>104</sup> At the same time, the PPP's image as the least orthodox of the various parties attracted the support of the Ahmeddiya community.<sup>105</sup>

Another aspect of the PPP campaign that deserves attention was the heavy reliance on Bhutto's personal campaigning. Bhutto travelled extensively throughout the country, explaining his party's programme in the context of local conditions, exposing the inconsistencies of his opponents' arguments, and expounding his views on the situation as it developed from day to day. Bhutto's personal appearances always drew large audiences, although for

many, no doubt, his jalsas (public meetings) had an entertainment value owing to his often theatrical performances.<sup>106</sup> At times, he addressed up to a dozen meetings in a day. A brilliant speaker, Bhutto would use simple language and invoke popular symbols to establish a rapport with his audiences. On the public platform he was a performer, utilising rhetoric, mimicry, ridicule, insinuations and irony, which all went to create a characteristically 'Bhutto style' of political artistry and drama. He excelled in holding up his opponents to ridicule, often nicknaming them with derogatory terms. As one of his political opponents remarked, "not a day passes when Bhutto does not make a personal attack on his political opponent or indulge in imitating them just to please the crowds...."<sup>107</sup>

Bhutto often tailored the party's slogans to suit the requirements of the region he happened to be campaigning in, thus appealing to the peculiar prejudices of a given region or province. For instance in the Punjab, which is known to be the most chauvinist of all the provinces, and which is also the major recruiting area of the army, much emphasis was laid on the theme of confrontation with India.<sup>108</sup> In Sind, on the other hand, Bhutto would talk about the rights of Sindhis, and of giving the Sindhi language its 'rightful' place in the country, in an obvious attempt to woo the Sindhi regionalists away from the Sind United Front.

In his campaign speeches, then, Bhutto attempted to aggregate diverse interests, promising something or another to every one. As one observer has written:



"He promised an economic nirvanā to peasants, workers and the underprivileged through socialism, while adopting landlords (and) monied people.....as candidates for the most part. He exploited the lack of leadership among leftists in the West after the NAP's fragmentation to win their support by calling for a socialist revolution; but at the same time he dispelled the Islam-pasands' misgivings by interpreting his Islamic Socialism in terms of Islamic musawaat,.....and by attaching an Islamic connotation to the PPP election symbol; the sword, which was presented as the Zulfiqar-i-Ali, the famous sword of Ali (the fourth Caliph of Islam)'.109

But apart from the central role played by Bhutto's personal campaigning, the PPP campaign rested also on the activities of party workers, both paid and voluntary. Paid party activists (some of whom were experienced party organisers formerly from the Muslim League), together with student supporters who acted as unpaid workers for the party, were involved in door-to-door canvassing in the large urban cities and small towns, and often made sweeping promises to urban groups such as industrial labour and the katchi-abadi ( mud huts and slums) dwellers. In some parts of rural Punjab adjoining the cities, it was also reported that PPP workers had distributed promissory notes promising twelve and a half acres for each landless tenant.<sup>110</sup> In the urban areas of Punjab, these party workers were fairly successful in establishing contacts with the urban masses and were instrumental in mobilising them to cast their votes.

During the campaign the PPP concentrated all its energy in Punjab and Sind. It did not attempt to rally support or even put up a single candidate in East Pakistan

where the campaign had turned into a referendum on regional autonomy, as symbolised in Mujib's Six Points. Bhutto did not expend much energy campaigning in Baluchistan, where politics remained the close preserve of tribal leaders and sardars. An attempt was made, instead, to win over tribal leaders, with the party eventually enjoying the support of the nawabs of Kheran and Mekran. In the NWFP, 'progressive' sections had already been mobilised by a well-established party, Wali Khan's NAP while tribal leaders were split between NAP and Qayyum's Muslim League. In Sind and Punjab, as we have seen, the PPP distinguished between urban and rural areas for the purposes of its campaign, and in rural Punjab it followed, with a few exceptions, a different strategy than that in the rural Sind. Thus we find the PPP enlisting the support of different socio-economic strata in different provinces.

To conclude then, the party's electoral strategy was based on a mixture of appeals to 'traditional' forces and 'modern' elements. Its strategy combined 'direct' appeals to urban masses as well as to Punjabi rural masses with the manipulation of rural elites in Sind. At the same time Bhutto was careful not to alienate any important power centre in the country, with the exception of the industrial elite. This applied particularly to the military, whom he referred to as the third major force in the country - the other two being the PPP and the Awami League. Indeed, Bhutto's strong nationalistic stand won him support among the jawans as well as among officers.<sup>111</sup>

## RESULTS OF THE ELECTION

58% of registered voters cast their vote in the national poll. Voting turnout by province for both the national and provincial poll is indicated in Table III.3 below:

TABLE III.3

### PERCENTAGE VOTING TURNOUT BY PROVINCE FOR NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTION, 1970

PROVINCE	N. A. PERCENTAGE TURNOUT	P. A. PERCENTAGE TURNOUT
Sind	58.44	59.66
Baluchistan	39.04	43.53
Punjab	66.48	61.56
N.W.F.P.	46.83	47.34
West Pakistan	52.07	52.35
East Pakistan	55.09	48.28

Source: Ibid, pp. 24-33.

The Awami League won a landslide victory in East Pakistan and an absolute majority in the N.A. This was both a protest vote against West Pakistan domination and a demand for greater provincial autonomy for Bengal. The AL captured all but two seats in the East and about 75% of the vote, while the PPP with 81 seats (out of 138) became the majority party in the West. (See table III.4).

Although the PPP emerged as the majority party in West Pakistan, its victory was by no means as decisive as the Awami League's in East Pakistan. In terms of votes polled, the PPP's competitors had together received more votes than the PPP in West Pakistan. The PPP polled 38% of the total votes cast in the West.<sup>112</sup> Although much less than half, its voting percentage was still the highest among

TABLE III.4

## RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS HELD IN DECEMBER 1970 TO NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

Parties	East Pakistan		Punjab		Sind		NWFP		Baluchistan		Provincial Total 600	National Total 300
	Provincial	National	Provincial	National	Provincial	National	Provincial	National	Provincial	National		
PPP	-	-	113	62	32	18	3	1	-	-	148	81
Awami League	268	151	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	268	151
Independents	6	1	28	5	10	3	6	7	5	-	55	16
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	-	-	6	1	5	1	10	7	3	-	24	9
NAP (Wali)	1	-	-	-	-	-	13	3	8	3	22	6
Council Muslim League	-	-	15	7	4	-	1	-	-	-	20	7
JUP	-	-	4	4	7	3	-	-	-	-	11	7
Pakistan Muslim League (Conversion)	-	-	6	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	8	2
JUI (Hazarvi)	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	6	2	1	8	7
PDP	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1
Jamaat-e-Islami	1	-	1	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	4	4
Jamiat (Hadith)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
NAP (Pakhtoon)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Baluchistan United Front	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-
Sind United Pathan Panjabi Front	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

all parties, the second highest being 10% for the CML.<sup>113</sup>  
The votes cast for the PPP, province-wise, are shown in Table III.5.

TABLE III.5

VOTES CAST FOR THE PPP BY PROVINCE  
(National Assembly Election)

WEST PAKISTAN	VALID VOTES CAST (TOTAL)	VOTES POLLED BY THE PPP	PERCENTAGE
Punjab	1,08,79,416	45,32,759	41.66%
Sind	31,18,338	14,01,660	44.95%
N.W.F.P.	14,39,720	2,05,599	14.28%
Baluchistan	3,73,240	8,869	2.38%

Source: Ibid, p.68

Table III.6 gives some indication of PPP's lead over the parties in terms of percentage of votes received in Sind and Punjab. It also demonstrates that if the PPP's opponents had combined against it, their combined vote would have been higher (49.69% - excluding independents) than the PPP's in the Punjab (41.66%), and only slightly lower (43.34% - against the PPP's 44.95%) in Sind.

The Provincial Assembly election followed the N.A. poll by ten days, well after the results of the first elections were known. During the intervening period, a number of candidates retired from the contest. In many cases, this was the result of inter-party bargaining as efforts were made to confront the PPP with a single opponent. The 'merger' of opposition candidates was more successful in the urban than in the rural areas. Wherever such a merger occurred in the rural areas, it tended to

TABLE III.6

VOTING PERCENTAGE (N.A.)

PARTY	PUNJAB	SIND	NWFP	BALUCHISTAN
PPP	41.66	44.95	14.25	2.38
CML	12.66	6.84	4.06	10.99
PML (CONVENTION)	5.11	1.79	0.57	-
PML (QAYYUM)	5.42	10.70	22.64	10.94
JAMAAT-E-ISLAAMI	4.74	10.31	7.22	1.16
JUP	9.96	6.94	0.02	-
JUI (H)	5.19	4.85	25.45	20.0
NAP (W)	-	0.37	18.40	45.23
PDP	2.26	0.08	0.32	0.37
OTHER PARTIES	1.35	2.16	0.93	2.12
INDEPENDENTS	11.65	11.71	6.01	6.81

further consolidate biradari hold over the votes. The opposition to the PPP particularly sought to field the 'right' biradari candidate. We should also bear in mind the fact that for the provincial elections, the size of the constituencies was considerably smaller. In the rural areas, consideration of biradari membership had a greater impact on votes in more compact constituencies.

It was for these reasons together with the much higher candidate/seat ratio that in the provincial poll, the share of the vote received by the PPP dropped. In the Punjab, for instance, it obtained 39.07% of the vote, as against 41.66% polled in the N.A. election, in Sind it received 39.11% of the vote compared to 44.95% in the national poll, in Baluchistan 1.88% as against 2.38% in the national poll. In NWFP, however, there was no

change, with the party receiving 14.29% of the vote in the provincial poll against 14.28% in the national assembly election.<sup>114</sup> Despite this the party was able to gain a majority in the Sind and Punjab legislatures, with 28 out of 60 seats and 113 out of 180 seats respectively.

There were two striking features of the N.A. election in Punjab and Sind. Firstly, the poor performance of the three Leagues in terms of seats received. The other important outcome was the serious setback to parties fighting on a purely religious programme. The debacle of the rightists and centrists may be attributed to the proliferation of parties among them and to their consequent in-fighting. The PPP benefitted immensely from the fact that the votes cast against it were split between various parties. The votes received by the PPP's opponents, which (as indicated above), when combined constituted a sizeable proportion of the total votes cast, were not translated into seats under the first-past-the post electoral system in use. At least four organisations claimed votes in the name of Islam, and four centrist parties (the three Leagues and the PDP) stood on almost identical platforms. For example, in Punjab's 82 constituencies, some 260 rightists and centrists plus 114 (conservative) independents divided their common following. As a result, many top-ranking leaders of the three Leagues lost the election, including such personalities as Ayub Khuhro and Kazi Fazlullah from Sind, Hasan Mahmud from Bahawalpur, Kirmani, Abid Hussain, Yasin Wattoo from the Punjab, and Sardar Bahadur Khan and Yusuf Khattak from the NWFP.<sup>115</sup> Perhaps the only survivors among the League

stalwarts were Daultana, Shaukat Hayat and Qayyum Khan.

Since the election result showed distinct regional patterns, and different elements were responsible for the PPP victory in Sind and Punjab, it would be more useful to analyse it on a provincial basis.

#### NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN

Both these provinces, regarded as the most backward socio-economically, in Pakistan, where tribal and sardari influences predominate, seemed to have followed stronger traditional voting patterns. This produced a fragmented result, with no party emerging with a clear majority at either the national or provincial level.

The PPP did poorly in both provinces winning only one seat to the N.A. in the NWFP (out of 18) and none in Baluchistan. It was in Mardan (a relatively industrialised part of the Frontier) that the party met its single success. In the D.I. Khan district, Bhutto suffered his only defeat amongst the six seats that he contested personally.<sup>116</sup>

Tribal factors influenced the electoral outcome in the NWFP.<sup>117</sup> The majority of the inhabitants of the NWFP belong either to the Yusufzais or the Kirlani tribes.<sup>118</sup> The Yusufzais have traditionally supported NAP, while the Kirlanis have, by and large, supported the main opponents of NAP (the Muslim League and the JUI). The contest in the NWFP was dominated by a triangular struggle between NAP, the Qayyum Muslim League and the JUI. Wali Khan appealed to the Pathans of the Peshawar plain, the



majority of whom are Yusufzais and who supported his father Ghaffar Khan and uncle, Dr. Khan Sahib in the elections of 1937 and 1946, and to those Pathan nationalists who looked for greater provincial autonomy for the Frontier. NAP, however, won only three seats, in predominantly Yusufzai areas. Qayyum's Muslim League, accusing NAP of being anti-national and playing on the Congressite background of the party, tried to rally those who believed in a strong central government.<sup>119</sup> Qayyum's support came largely from Hazara district and the formerly princely states to the north, in regions which had an ethnically mixed population, i.e. Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun.<sup>120</sup> JUI secured the largest number of votes in the NWFP, and the second largest number of seats from the province for the N.A. Its support came from traditionally anti-NAP areas (Bannu, D. I. Khan), where the population is non-Yusufzai, and predominantly Sunni.

Independents won all seven seats reserved for the Tribal Areas of the NWFP. Among the 76 candidates for the 7 seats, only one was sponsored by a party, the JUI(H). Political parties have yet to make any inroads into these tribal areas, where tribal loyalties are at a premium.

In Baluchistan, PPP's efforts to woo leading tribal leaders and Sardars did not meet with much success. NAP won 3 out of the 4 N.A. seats and 8 out of 20 provincial seats. Its success here can be attributed to its close links with influential tribal sardars. It had the support of the major Baluchi tribes such as the Marris, Bizenjos and Mengals.<sup>121</sup>

SIND

The PPP won two-thirds of the seats from Sind. Only the city of Karachi stood aloof from the PPP tide, but in the provincial election the party fared better in the city. The pattern of voting differed from that of Punjab. Sindhi politics remained feudal, while long-standing family rivalries seemed to determine power-alignments in the province. As mentioned earlier, the traditional rivalry of the two major Pirs - the Pir of Pagaro and the Pir of Hala surfaced into new electoral alliances, with the latter supporting Bhutto and the former, the Qayyum Muslim League. Bhutto was able to weaken the unity of the Pir of Pagaro's faction, by enlisting the support of the Raisani pirs and Jam Sadiq Ali, who traditionally supported Pagaro. Thus we find that in Sind, the PPP operated largely within the traditional framework of feudal politics by enlisting many of the waderas and pir type of traditional leaders. In some cases, it was the younger members of influential families who supported the party, but they were nonetheless able to draw on the traditional voting influences of the past. That is, the greater proportion of the PPP vote came as a result of feudal influence, and its victory in a number of constituencies, as in Khairpur district, was due simply to support of influential families whose close preserve the constituency was. These rural notables used their voting banks to run up majorities in constituencies which are little more than bailiwicks controlled by the squirearchy. Additionally, as in the case of the Pir of Hala, the

landed-gentry had religious roles as Pirs, and could therefore reinforce their feudal position with their spiritual status. Although it has been suggested that the more conservative of the Sindhi rural elite was aligned to one or the other Muslim League factions,<sup>122</sup> and by implication that those aligned with the PPP represented less conservative landlords, such a distinction is not justified for the large part. Nine of the PPP's eighteen candidates elected to the N.A. from Sind were former Convention Muslim Leaguers who cannot be considered any less conservative than the Muslim Leaguers. Adopting the PPP ticket is not a sufficient indicator of their less conservative position.

There is no disputing the fact that the PPP owed its success in Sind to primarily feudal power, even though the virtual eclipse of the Sind United Front suggested that the party had picked up the Sindhi regionalist vote from the small Sindhi intelligentsia. It is important to note that as the first Sindhi leader to achieve a national status, Bhutto attracted the support of Sindhi regionalists, who probably felt that he would have greater leverage, than say, a provincial leader like G. M. Syed, at the central government level to press for Sindhi rights.

If we look at the 'independents' who won seats - a total of three were returned - we find, again, that voting followed traditional patterns. In one of the Sukker constituencies, voting was purely on a clan basis, returning the head of the Soomro biradari. In Sukkur II, Mangi (through the support of the Soomro clan and Bhutto's

tacit support) was able to defeat his rivals, A. K. Brohi and the Jamiat candidate.

In Karachi, however, the situation was different. Although a part of Sind, it is a cosmopolitan, non-Sindhi city, where the majority of the population are the Urdu-speaking refugees or muhajirs.<sup>123</sup> This makes Karachi different not only from Sind, but by virtue of the social and economic characteristics of the Muhajir community, different from the rest of urban Pakistan. The muhajirs constitute a closely knit community, have a higher rate of literacy than any other ethnic group in the country, tend to be engaged in 'modern' professions, but are in general deeply religious, and have traditionally supported Islamic parties like the JUP and Jamaat.<sup>124</sup> Voting in Karachi thus reflected the continuing appeal of Islamic parties to the muhajir community. All of the five seats in the heart of the city were won by refugee candidates of religious parties. The PPP won two seats - victories that were ensured by the support of industrial labour (both Sindhi and refugee).<sup>125</sup> In Hyderabad, again a predominantly Muhajir city, a JUI refugee candidate won the national seat while the two provincial seats were also won by Islamic parties. The pattern of refugee or non-Sindhi victories was continued in the provincial election, although the PPP won eight out of fifteen seats in Karachi. Only four of the PPP winners were Sindhi, all the six from the other parties were muhajirs. It is clear from this that voting patterns in rural up-country Sind differed considerably from those in the Karachi and

Hyderabad city complex, with feudal factors pre-dominating in the case of the former, and refugee support for Islam-Pasand Muhajir candidates influencing voting behaviour in the latter.

### PUNJAB

The Punjab emerged as a major bastion of PPP power. The PPP won three-quarters of the seats to the N.A. by polling 41.66% of the vote, and almost two-thirds of the seats to the P.A. by polling 39.07% of the vote. The Punjabi feudal aristocracy suffered a serious setback. As Craig Baxter put it,

"no member of the rural elite can find much pleasure in the results of the 1970 elections. Perhaps individuals - Daultana, Shaukat, those who jumped on to the PPP, might find their own picture not clouded, but as a group, the rural elite was badly beaten and this by a group largely comprising unknowns." 126

At least twenty-three candidates from the rural aristocracy could be identified in the N.A. contests. The CML accounted for eight of these and four won seats. Each of the three accepting the PPP label were winners (Anwar Ali Noon, Sadiq Hussain Qureishi and Hussein Gardezi from Multan). The other two winners were independents.

The traditional means of campaigning in the Punjab was to rely on established leadership drawn generally from landed families. The Muslim Leagues operating as essentially 'patron' parties depended on their linkages with rural notables to deliver the votes. The election results indicated that such a method of campaigning was not as successful as it had been in the past. As we saw

earlier, the PPP did not utilise this method of campaigning in the Punjab, with a few exceptions. Instead, the PPP directed its appeal to the newly-emerged urban social groups and to non-privileged rural groups such as smaller landlords and tenants through its promise of social and economic change. The election results indicated that this strategy had been a successful one in the relatively 'modernised' areas of the province. The pattern of the PPP showed distinct regional patterns. They did much better in the relatively prosperous and 'modernised' areas of Lahore, Sheikhpura, Lyallpur, Eastern Multan district and all along the Grand Trunk Road as far as Rawalpindi - areas where industrial development has taken place, and which are relatively more urbanised. Table III.7 below shows the seats won by the PPP and the percentage votes received by it districtwise.

TABLE III.7

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS AND VOTES WON BY THE PPP IN PUNJAB DISTRICTS (N.A.)

DISTRICT	TOTAL SEATS	PPP:NO. OF SEATS	PERCENT OF SEATS WON	VOTE PERCENTAGE
Rawalpindi	4	4	100	49.76
Campbellpur	2	0	0	23.78
Jhelum	3	3	100	39.89
Gujrat	4	3	75	30.14
Sargodha	5	3	60	35.52
Mianwali	2	0	0	5.70
Jhang	3	0	0	16.93
Lahore	8	8	100	53.38
Sheikhpura	4	4	100	53.01
Gujranwala	4	4	100	49.67
Sialkot	5	5	100	52.67
Multan	9	7	87	46.15
D.G. Khan	2	0	0	20.51
Muzaffergarh	3	2	66	27.26
Sahiwal	7	7	100	54.86
Bahawalpur	2	0	0	8.73
Bahawalnagar	3	2	66	37.12
Rahimyar Khan	3	1	33	41.66
Lyallpur	9	9	100	56.72

Districts where the PPP won 100% seats - such as Lahore, Lyallpur, Sheikhpura, constitute what can be called 'modern' Punjab, where groups like industrial labour form a sizeable proportion of the population. The PPP's success in the rural constituencies of what is generally referred to as the 'Punjab heartland' (i.e. the rural areas of Lahore, Gujranwala, Wagha, Gujrat, Kasur and Sialkot) indicated that the party was able to break through parochial biradari structures and traditional loyalties and galvanise the non-privileged rural groups. As Jones' study has also shown, the PPP's success in such constituencies could be attributed to support from small landholders and non-landholding groups (such as tenants, field labourers, menials).<sup>127</sup> Similarly, in the rural canal colony areas (Lyallpur, Sahiwal), many of the PPP's victories rested on the support of small and middle landholders, tenants and field labourers. In some instances, the PPP won because biradari rivalries between gentry landlords split the non-PPP vote, allowing the PPP candidates to win pluralities. However, it is clear that in the relatively modernised parts of the Punjab, the crucial factor in the PPP's success was largely the support from 'mass' sectors of the populace (both urban and rural). Along the Indus Valley, in less prosperous districts such as Jhang and Mianwali, traditional biradari factors continued to predominate as representatives of the Islam-Pasand groups of parties and the Muslim Leaguers won many national and provincial seats.

There have been three studies on the 1970 elections in the Punjab. In the first, Craig Baxter analysed the

effects of the election on the Punjabi feudalists by relating socio-economic factors to the election result at the district level.<sup>128</sup> In the second, Burki and Baxter correlated voting returns at the tehsil level with various indices of modernisation.<sup>129</sup> They found that the PPP "polled strongest in those urban and rural tehsils which have been undergoing recent change as measured by (the following) socio-economic indices": the level and rate of increase of urbanisation, literacy, industrial labour force, electrified villages, and agricultural land under tubewells. In the third, most recent study, Philip E. Jones used polling station level data for a very detailed analysis of social group response in the election in Punjab.<sup>130</sup> Although the three studies utilised different methodologies (the first two using quantitative methods), all three arrived at broadly similar conclusions regarding the PPP's electoral performance. All three found that the PPP vote was highest in the more developed areas of the Punjab indicating that the PPP was able to overcome biradari and customary authority influences; in the relatively backward regions, traditional support patterns (such as biradari, pirship) were evident as candidates belonging to parties that represented traditional elite or religious interests (CML, JI, PML(C) ) were returned. We are in broad agreement with these assessments, although the Baxter study (see below) perhaps exaggerated the negative impact of the election on the landed notables.

To supplement Burki's findings, we selected a limited number of socio-economic variables and attempted



to correlate these to the level of the PPP vote at the district level in the Punjab. Our findings are given below:

TABLE III.8

SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE PPP VOTE -  
COEFFICIENT OF RANK CORRELATION

1. Percentage of industrial Value Added (1969-70)	0.626
2. All weather Road Mileage per 1,000 square miles	0.533
3. Industrial workers as a percentage of district population	0.465
4. Literacy (per cent)	0.453
5. Electrification (KWH per person)	0.398

The data used in the sample covered all nineteen districts of the Punjab and each variable was correlated with the percentage of PPP votes cast in the district. These variables were chosen as they denote the level of modernisation in a district. The first four variables showed a significant correlation with the percentage of votes cast for the PPP in the district. On the basis of this evidence it can be hypothesized that the PPP owed its victory in Punjab to its successful mobilisation of newly-emergent groups, both urban and rural. The PPP's appeal in the Punjab was directed towards those who were already caught up in the process of change - by promising to extend and accelerate socio-economic change within the framework of an egalitarian society, the PPP was able to win mass support in the relatively modernised areas of the Punjab.

What implications can be derived from the

'modernisation' thesis as put forward by others and developed above, for both the PPP and Punjabi politics in general? As far as assessing the PPP in the Punjab is concerned, a number of reservations are called for to qualify the statements made above. Bhutto's candidates in the Punjab, were by no means all drawn from a non-feudal background. In several constituencies, the PPP drew on landlords, both members of the landed aristocracy (Sadiq H. Qureishi) and others of medium status (such as Khar). Bhutto's charismatic appeal and the PPP programme were often not always sufficient to overcome traditional leadership. For example, it took a Noon on the PPP ticket to defeat the "official" Noon-Tiwana clan candidate in the Sargodha seat, while a scion of the Qureishi clan was given a PPP ticket in a Multan constituency. This policy of adopting feudal candidates had not pleased left-wing factions in the party and led to much disillusionment amongst both party activists and student supporters.<sup>131</sup>

The adoption of landlord candidates and the appointment of Maulana Kauser Niazi to an important party post, also led to an open rift between Bhutto and the party secretary-general, J. A. Rahim on the eve of the election.<sup>132</sup>

Rahim accused Bhutto of changing the character of the PPP to suit landlords, and of totally ignoring socialistic principles. It also needs to be pointed out that Bhutto won his own seat (out of the six he contested) in one of the Multan constituencies with the help of the dominant Qureishi and Gilani families.

Similarly, caution is also required in assessing what the election result signified for Punjabi politics in general. On the basis of the election result, newspapers both in Pakistan and abroad at the time commented that the results had produced a 'Revolution Through the Polls.'<sup>133</sup> In similar vein, many writers concluded that "the day of the rural elite control of government in the Punjab has ended",<sup>134</sup> or that "the influence of the landed gentry....and the biradari of caste and clan connections had broken down."<sup>135</sup> Such conclusions tend to exaggerate the extent of change that had occurred. As we saw earlier, in Punjab the PPP's victory was not a decisive one in terms of the percentage of votes received by the party. In thirteen out of nineteen districts in the Punjab (see Table III.7) the PPP polled less votes than the combined votes of its opponents. The PPP won by fifty per cent of the vote in only thirty-four N.A. seats in the Punjab. Additionally many of its feudal opponents had won seats. For instance, the seven candidates elected on the CML ticket were all either landed notables or men of wealth and influence. The feudal influence seemed to have worked equally effectively in the case of the independents elected to the N.A. In a Mianwali constituency, one of the five independents returned was the son of the late Nawab of Kalabagh, while the other four independents (in Multan, D. G. Khan and Bahawalpur) were also landlords. This scarcely suggests the 'end of feudalism'. Therefore it is untenable to hold that the political structure of Punjab had been totally transformed. It would perhaps be more

accurate to suggest that while feudal influence worked effectively in some areas, in others, the PPP by mobilising the newer social groups (in the urbanised and industrialised parts of the province) and 'mass' sectors in the rural countryside had made a major dent in the traditional feudal political structure of the province.

CONCLUSION: NATURE OF THE PPP IN THE ELECTORAL PHASE

Four major features relating to the nature of the party in the electoral phase need to be noted. These are: (1) its heterogeneous support base which had both a 'mass' and 'patron' component; (2) Bhutto's dominance; (3) its organisational weakness and (4) its regional nature.

(1) The heterogeneous nature of the PPP was evident from ~~the beginning but in the electoral phase its membership and support base became even more heterogeneous.~~ There has been a tendency in the literature on the PPP to emphasise the party's mass 'modern' features.<sup>136</sup> This has resulted in part from the fact that most studies have focused on the party's image and performance in the Punjab, where, as we saw above, such features are indeed evident.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless, it is obvious that any satisfactory assessment of the PPP must rest on an equal emphasis on its nature in Sind (and the adjoining areas of Punjab), where its 'traditional' features are most evident. There is clearly a danger in generalising about the PPP's nature on the basis of its 'Punjabi face' alone, which is for instance what a study by Gopinath appears to have done. Our analysis of the election results

suggests that the PPP in terms of its support base, had become an amalgam of newer social groups (the 'mass' component) and traditional (albeit largely Sindhi) rural elite groups (the 'patron' component). Thus as an electoral machine, the PPP was able to draw upon modern mass sectors (urban labour and professionals and the rural underprivileged in Punjab) as well as traditional patron-client pyramids. The party sought and won support from both 'modern' and 'traditional' elements. Clearly, then, the PPP exhibited characteristics of both a 'mass' type party and a 'patron' party. As we shall see in later chapters, the tension between these two types was to characterise the PPP's development in later years.

(2) The second feature of the PPP was Bhutto's dominance over the party. The PPP relied heavily on Bhutto's personality to keep the disparate interests in the party together. This loyalty to the leader may well have indicated a transitional stage in which it would eventually be transferred to the party, but past political tradition, as for example in the case of the Muslim League, did not suggest that such a course was inevitable. In the case of the latter, the party relied heavily on Jinnah's leadership, so that with his death the party disintegrated rapidly. Indeed, Bhutto's domination of the party perhaps exceeded even that of Jinnah over the Muslim League. Bhutto's position in the party was virtually unchallengeable, and those who found Bhutto's predominance unacceptable could do little else but to either leave the party or make a mild protest and then accept the situation. For

instance, when the secretary-general of the Rawalpindi branch condemned the dictatorial attitude of Bhutto towards party workers, he was promptly expelled from the party.<sup>138</sup> J. A. Rahim accused Bhutto of "yearning for a personal following" to the detriment of party democracy, and said that the office of party secretary-generalship held by him was just "Naam ke Wastey" (in name only), since even he was not consulted on important issues.<sup>139</sup>

This raises the question as to why Bhutto's supremacy went unchallenged, when there were undoubtedly party members who objected to such a scheme. Two explanations seem to emerge from the answers given to the author by party leaders who were interviewed. First, there was a strong sense of dependence amongst the party leaders on Bhutto, based on the assessment that without him the party could never have achieved the kind of success that it enjoyed, and also that he was the only person who could hold the party together. Organisational loyalties had not had the time to develop, and before they could, the party could only be united by Bhutto's personality. Second, there was a strong sense of personal loyalty towards Bhutto which does not lend itself to easy explanation. This personal loyalty was based on a combination of factors which included admiration, personal self interest, and above all, his charismatic appeal.

(3) The third feature of the party concerns its organisational weakness. The PPP achieved its electoral victory without proper organisation. It enjoyed mass support in the Punjab but this was not adequately organised

in any systematic manner. Party organisation remained chaotic, and was characterised by ad-hocism. The important work of grass-roots organisation still needed to be done. This problem was only compounded by the huge rush after the PPP's electoral victory to join the party. Indeed Bhutto had to make a public announcement asking those who wished to join the party to contact party offices in their respective areas, and not merely to make declarations of both support and membership in the press and on the public platform.<sup>140</sup> In making such an appeal Bhutto probably lost sight of the fact that often there were no recognisable party offices locally for these people to contact.

(4) Finally, the regional nature of the party's support base needs to be noted. Its appeal was confined by and large, to the Sind and Punjab. This failure to make any headway in the other provinces, particularly in East Pakistan, was to have disastrous consequences for Pakistan as we shall see in the next chapter. Bhutto cannot, however, be blamed entirely for this failure. While there was a lack of interest in eastern Bengal, this was nonetheless based on a realistic assessment of the political situation there. Mujib's hold over the Bengalis was almost impregnable. With limited resources, men and money, the PPP could ill afford to expend its energies in a region that had already demonstrated its unflinching loyalty to Bengali leaders like Mujib and Bhashani. Bhutto adopted a similar stance towards building support in Baluchistan and NWFP.

NOTES

1. There are several works on the subject, which include: Craig Baxter, 'Pakistan Votes - 1970', Asian Survey, Vol. II, (March, 1971); Sharif al-Mujahid, 'Pakistan: First General Elections', Asian Survey, Vol. II, (February 1971); Iftikhar Ahmed, Pakistan General Elections 1970, (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1976); Craig Baxter and Shahid Javed Burki, 'Socio-Economic Indicators of the PPP Vote in the Punjab: a study at the Tehsil Level', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 36, (August 1975); Craig Baxter, 'The PPP vs The Punjab Feudalists', in J. H. Korson, ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); Mushtaq Ahmed, Politics without Social Change, (Karachi, Space Publishers, 1971). The most detailed study (though restricted to the Punjab) is Philip E. Jones, Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis (Fletcher School of Law, 1979), chapters X and XI. Official publications include 2 volumes published by the Election Commission, Report on General Elections, Pakistan 1970-71, Volume I contains the narrative report and some statistical tables, while Volume II contains the statistics.
2. See Baxter and Burki, ibid.
3. The best analysis of the anti-Ayub movement remains, Muneer Ahmed, 'The November Mass Movement', in Aspects of Pakistan's Politics and Administration, (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974).
4. See chapter II.
5. For accounts of the Yahya Khan period, see: Lawrence Ziring, 'Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment - Pakistan under General Yahya Khan, 1969-71', W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1975); Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976); M. A. Akhyar, 'Pakistan: The Way Ahead from Martial Law', South Asian Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1969).
6. For an account of the mechanics of succession see Robert La Porte, 'Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State', Asian Survey, (November 1969), pp. 842-861.
7. Press reports of the period from March 1969 to December 1969 give a good idea of these riots and disturbances in which labour strife played a key role. One of the worst outbreaks of labour violence commenced with the strike of textile workers in E. Pakistan on 15 October 1969. This was followed in November in West Pakistan by thousands of workers striking in Karachi, Lahore and Multan.
8. For the 'new' education policy see Pakistan Times, 27 March 1970. See Pakistan Times, 5 May 1969, and 4 November 1969, for the order restoring labour's right to strike.
9. 303 senior officials were charged with corruption, misuse of office and misconduct, and sacked in December 1969.
10. Pakistan Times, 6 September 1970.



11. For a brief review of the 'reformist' nature of the Yahya regime see, Ziring, ibid. For a more detailed analysis, see Feldman, ibid.
12. For Bhutto's public speeches of the period, see his Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy, Vol. III, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).
13. See Rashid Amjad, Pakistan's Growth Experience: 1947-77, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1978).
14. For a more detailed analysis see, Dawn E. Jones and Rodney E. Jones, 'Nationalising Education in Pakistan: Teachers Associations and the Peoples Party', Pacific Affairs, Volume 50, No. 1, (Spring 1977).
15. See text of President Yahya's broadcast to the Nation in Dawn, 29 November 1969.
16. Owing to the flood disaster that struck East Pakistan in August 1970 and the cyclones that followed, the elections were subsequently postponed and held on 7 December 1970, while the provincial elections were held on 17 December.
17. The text of the Legal Framework Order is given in Dawn, 30 November 1970.
18. On this count, Yahya has been severely criticised. By postponing the issue of regional autonomy Yahya is accused of having directly precipitated the crisis of 1971, which led to the creation of Bangladesh. In Yahya's defence it can be argued that since he believed that with so many parties contesting the election, no single organisation was likely to emerge with dominant support, he envisaged that in the coalition-building that would follow, the victorious parties would be constrained to find a consensus on the question of regional autonomy. More specifically he hoped that the election results would force Mujibur Rahman to yield on his Six-Point Programme, for coalition-building would necessarily require individual parties to modify their programmes.
19. Bhutto did, however, call for a sovereign N.A. and criticised the clause in the LFO which gave Yahya the right to veto the constitution. See Pakistan Times, 7 July 1970, 10.
20. See for instance his speech reported in Pakistan Times, 4 March 1970, 9.
21. See 'The Incident at Sanghar', in Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit., pp. 44-49.
22. Interview with Mukhtar Rana, London, October 1978.
23. Pakistan Times, 24 September 1970, 12.
24. The three ministers who were singled out were Qizilbash, Sher Ali and Mahmud Haroon, who were accused of supporting the Qayyum Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Awami League respectively. See Pakistan Times, 26 August 1970, 16.

25. Kauser Niazi, 'Deedawar' (Urdu), (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1977), p. 218.
26. See Asghar Khan's attack on Bhutto in Pakistan Times, 7 October, 1970, 12.
27. There is unanimous consensus amongst scholars over the question of the impartiality of elections. See for instance, Baxter and Burki, op.cit., Mujahid, op.cit. There is disagreement only over Yahya's precise motive in ensuring a free and fair poll.
28. Burki and Baxter, ibid., p. 160.
29. Z. A. Bhutto, Awami Adalat Mein (Lahore: Pakistan Peoples Party, 1969), p. 28.
30. In January 1969 he had declared his candidature for the presidential elections under the Ayubian system while in prison and without consulting his party. This had caused considerable resentment within the PPP. See chapter II, p.
31. Information about the 'leftists' within the PPP is based largely on interviews with Mukhtar Rana and Amanullah Khan, student leader, (Lahore, November 1977).
32. Information based on interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
33. Dawn, 16 May 1970, 10.
34. Interviews with Mukhtar Rana, Mubashar Hasan and K. H. Meer.
35. This was the argument advanced by Mubashar Hasan.
36. This faction of the leftist groups is mentioned in an editorial in Al-Fatah, 7-14 July 1970.
37. See Bhutto's resume of the Hala conference, in Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit., p. 131.
38. For the text of the press release of the party resolutions see Dawn, 8 July 1970, 5.
39. Interview in Al-Fatah, 6-13 September 1973, p. 20.
40. Pakistan Times, 7 July 1970.
41. A former journalist and M.N.A., Ramay was regarded in the party as representing the urban intellectual Left. In 1967, he launched a bi-monthly, Nusrat, making it the only mouthpiece of the party upto 1970.
42. See for instance, Bhutto's speech at a public meeting at Lahore on 14 October 1970, in Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit., p. 138.
43. For major newspapers and their circulation see Table I.3, p. 65

44. Election Manifesto of the PPP, 1970, Third Edition, (Karachi: Vision Publications, 1971).
45. See editorial in Nusrat, 19 July 1970, entitled 'Bhutto! The People Demand a Manifesto'.
46. The Manifesto did however declare that "the norm" would be "a maximum of 50 to 150 acres of irrigated land."
47. Interview with K. H. Meer.
48. S. Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca, 1979), p. 92.
49. Dawn, 7 May 1970, 9.
50. Manifesto, ibid, p. 9-11.
51. Ibid, p. 51.
52. Ibid, p. 14.
53. For a brief resume of Pakistan's earlier electoral experience, see Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1975), pp. 175-202.
54. Women were eligible for general seats. After the general election of the members of the N.A., the members from a province had to elect women for seats reserved for them from that province. The same applied to seats reserved for women in the provincial legislatures.
55. The Gazette of Pakistan, Islamabad, 16 December, 1970, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1970).
56. Report on the General Elections, op.cit, Volume Two, pp. 128-131.
57. Figure for West Pakistan. See S. J. Burki, Pakistan: A Demographic Report, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, (Washington, Population Reference Bureau, 1973).
58. Of course all parties were regionally based - indeed the most striking characteristic of the election was that there was not even one genuine national political party contesting.
59. For a detailed account of the process of such factionalism and splintering, see Safdar Mahmud, Muslim League Ka Daur-e-Hakumat, (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1973).
60. For their programmes see Political Parties: Their Policies and Programmes, (Lahore: Ferozesons, 1971).
61. For a study of the Jamaat-e-Islami, see Kalim Bahadur, The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action, (New Delhi: Chetna Publications, 1977).

62. The origin and programme of the Awami League is discussed in M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan', Asian Survey, (July 1970), pp. 574-587.
63. This is discussed in more detail in chapter IV, pp. 246-248.
64. For a study of the NAP, see M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, (1970), 394-409.
65. Gerald A. Heeger, 'Socialism in Pakistan', in Helen Desfosses and Jacque Levesque, eds., Socialism in the Third World, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 293-294.
66. Tassadaq Hussein, Pakistan Peoples Party, 1967-71, (Urdu), unpublished masters dissertation (South Asian Institute, University of the Punjab, 1976), p. 174.
67. These were announced immediately after the Hala conference. See Pakistan Times, 29 July 1970.
68. Interview with G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
69. J. A. Rahim, quoted in Pakistan Times, 9 October 1972.
70. Mir Darya Khan Khoso, G. Mustapha Jatoi, Mir Eijaz Ali Talpur and Abdul Hamid Jatoi.
71. Nawa-i-Waqt, 14 May 1970. For Amanullah's reinstatement, see Musawaat, 26 August 1970.
72. Pakistan Times, 18 October 1970, 13.
73. The Ansari biradari (belonging to the weaving community) accused the PPP of betraying the interests of the poor by issuing tickets to nawabs, feudalists and capitalists. See Pakistan Times 24 September 1970, and Hurriyat, 26 September 1970.
74. Pakistan Times, 24 September 1970.
75. See, for instance, Dawn, 10 July 1970, 12.
76. Tassadaq Hussein, op.cit, p. 100.
77. Interview with G. M. Khar.
78. These were the reasons given by most of the PPP leaders that the author interviewed - in particular Mukhtar Rana and Mubashar Hasan.
79. The interim constitution was prepared by a constitution commission set up by the party at its Foundation Convention in 1967. See Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.) p. 89.
80. Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit, p. 3.
81. Musawaat, 5 December 1970.

82. Musawaat, 7 December 1970.
83. Kohistan, 26 October 1970.
84. Dawn E. Jones and Rodney W. Jones, op.cit, p. 595.
85. Ibid, p. 595.
86. Interview with K. H. Meer.
87. It was Kasuri who had filed the habeas corpus petition on Bhutto's behalf when he was arrested by Ayub in 1969.
88. Pakistan Times, 29 July 1970, 7.
89. Pakistan Times, 3 August 1970, 10.
90. Pakistan Times, 24 September 1970, 12.
91. Interview with Mubashar Hasan.
92. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
93. For different perspectives on such changes in the Punjabi countryside, see S. J. Burki, 'The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture' and Hamza Alavi 'The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan' in R. D. Stevens, H. Alavi and P. J. Bertocci, eds., Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976).
94. For an analysis of the Islamic theme in Bhutto's campaign see K. B. Sayeed, 'How Radical is the Peoples Party', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Spring 1975), pp. 52-54.
95. Bhutto's socialism was criticised not only by the 'Islam-Pasand' parties, but also by ostensibly secular-minded, parties like the CML and non-religious leaders like Asghar Khan and Nur Khan. See Pakistan Times, 24 August 1970, 10.
96. See for instance, Pakistan Times, 12 January 1970.
97. Interview with Maulana Kauser Niazi, Islamabad, October 1979.
98. Niazi was a member of the Jamaat's central body, the Majlis-i-Shura, and Amir of the Lahore branch, and had long disagreed with Maudoodi's interpretation of Islam. Details of these differences are to be found in his Jamaat-e-Islami 'Awami' Adalat Mein, (Lahore: Qomi Qitab Khana, 1974).
99. Forum, 7 March 1970, Vol. I, No. 16.
100. Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit, p. 19.
101. Dawn, 2 May 1970, 9.
102. For a short survey of the development of Islamic socialism in the Middle East see Fazlur Rahman, 'Sources and Meaning of Islamic Socialism', Donald Smith, ed., Religion and Political Modernisation,

- (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); see also Abdul M. Said, Arab Socialism, (London: Blandford, 1972).
103. Dawn, 16 May 1970, p. 10.
  104. Pakistan Times, 11 November 1970, 7.
  105. In addition large sections of Christian community were reported to have supported the PPP as the most secular alternative.
  106. His opponents often suggested this, to which he once replied: "I ask you am I some kind of Dilip Kumar' (an Indian film star) that people come to see me?" See Nusrat, 15 March 1970, p. 16.
  107. Nur Khan quoted in Pakistan Times, 26 September 1970, 6.
  108. Asian Recorder, Vol. XVI, No. 19, 7-13 May 1970, p. 9533.
  109. Sharif Al-Mujahid, op.cit, p. 168.
  110. Kohistan, 5 August 1970.
  111. One senior officer told the author that the general feeling within the army was that Bhutto was one leader who could unite the nation. This along with his pro-China and anti-India stance made him extremely popular among younger army officers. He also suggested that many senior officers were at the time not only reconciled with seeing a return to civilian rule but actually desired it, as it would, in their perception, strengthen not only the country, but the armed forces as well. According to him, two decades of army intervention in politics had diverted the attention of the army from its major task, i.e. defending the country's borders and developing into a modern and effective fighting force.
  112. Report on General Elections, Vol. I, op.cit.
  113. Ibid.
  114. Ibid.
  115. Pakistan Times, 21 December 1970, 3.
  116. Bhutto contested six seats, two from the Punjab (Multan and Lahore), three from Sind (including his home town Larkana) and the sixth in the D. I. Khan district of the NWFP. He won large majorities in all save the latter, where he was defeated by the general secretary of JUI(H), Mufti Mahmud. The aim behind contesting so many seats was to establish Bhutto's credentials as a 'national' leader, representing all provinces.
  117. For an analysis of the elections in NWFP see Javed Kamran Bashir, NWFP Elections of 1970 - An Analysis, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973).

118. Kirlanis include such tribes as the Waziri, Masood, Afridi, Khattak, Bangash, Merwat, Niazi and Ghalzai tribes. They differ from the Yusufzais in claiming their descent not from Afghans, but from Alexander the Great. These Pathans tend to be anti-Afghan and consequently anti-NAP. The Yusufzais, on the other hand, are Afghans, i.e. descendents of the Bannu Afghana tribe, which was a Jewish tribe that centuries ago migrated from the Middle-East and settled in Afghanistan.
119. Qayyum Khan is not a Pakhtun, but comes originally from Kashmir. He is domiciled, however, in Hazara, and considers himself a Hazarite.
120. Bashir, ibid, p. 10.
121. There are about 400 tribes, sub-tribes and clans in Baluchistan. The racial and ethnic composition of the province comprises Baluchs, Pathans, Hazaras, Mekranis and Punjabi/Sindhi settlers. The three main linguistic groups are Baluchi, Pushto and Brohi. In the 1970 election, the Pushto-speaking group supported Abdus Samad Achakzai's Pakhtun Khwa NAP (a splinter group of NAP). Among the Baluchi and Brohi tribes, some supported NAP (Marri, Bizenjo, Mengal), some were split between NAP and the PPP (Mazaris), whilst others supported independents (Jamalis, Magsi, Mazaris).
122. Baxter, 'Pakistan Votes', op.cit, p. 214.
123. The demographic changes compelled by the partition of India in 1947, shattered the linguistic homogeneity of Sind, through the influx of Urdu-speaking muhajirs from Uttar Pradesh in India. Muhajirs are not only linguistically separated from the Sindhis, but tend to be relatively better educated and engaged in 'modern' professions. According to the census of 1951 (subsequent censuses have had no muhajir category) - literacy among the muhajirs in Sind was 23.4% while the percentage of literates in Sind was only 13.3%. Although at that time the muhajir population was only 11.17% of the total Sindhi population, they accounted for more than 51% of the educated personnel. See Gul Hasan, and M. I. Abbasi, eds, Census of Pakistan, 1951: Sind and Khairpur State, (Karachi: Government Publications, Vol. VI, p. 88. It has been estimated that by 1970, muhajirs constituted 80% of Karachi's population. See Hafeez Malik, 'Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan', in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (University of Islamabad Press, 1975), pp. 84-85.
124. Theodore P. Wright, 'Immigrant Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XII, No. 2, (July 1974).
125. Aziz Ahmed, 'Pakistan Faces Democracy', in Round Table, Vol. 242, (1971), p. 234.
126. 'The PPP versus the Punjab Feudalists', op.cit, p. 28.
127. Philip E. Jones, op.cit, chapter XI.
128. Baxter, op.cit.

129. Baxter and Burki, op.cit.
130. Jones, ibid.
131. The PPP organising committee of Punjab, with Sheikh Rashid as its president, had warned Bhutto against adopting such a policy in March 1970. A resolution passed at the joint Punjab/Bahawalpur Organising Committee meeting had declared that persons whose class interests were in conflict with the party programme should not even be admitted into the party. Where such individuals were admitted for exceptional reasons (such as their past career), it was deemed that "such persons should not be allowed to hold any important position in the party for a period of at least one year." Pakistan Times, 31 March 1970, 8.
132. This rift came to light when letters exchanged between the two, were published in the press in September/October 1970. The authenticity of the letters were confirmed by Bhutto, who admitted to a 'difference of opinion' over organisational matters with Rahim. See Pakistan Times, 3 October 1970, 10.
133. See, for instance, Pakistan Times, 9 December 1970 and The Daily Telegraph, (London), 10 December 1970.
134. Baxter, op.cit., p. 28.
135. M. Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of the Pakistan Peoples Party (New Delhi: Manohar 1975), p. 99.
136. For examples of such literature, see Baxter and Burki, op.cit.; Gopinath, op.cit.; Sayeed, op.cit.; and Baxter (1974), op.cit.
137. Baxter and Burki, op.cit.; Sayeed, op.cit.; and Baxter (1974), op.cit.
138. Syed Zafar Ali Shah, chief of the Rawalpindi branch, also accused Bhutto of thwarting democracy within the party. See Dawn, 1 May 1970, 8.
139. See his statement in Pakistan Times, 29 September 1970, 3.
140. Such declarations, according to Bhutto, had no legal status as far as the party was concerned. See Pakistan Times, 13 December 1970, 12.



IV

BHUTTO, THE PPP AND THE CRISIS OF BANGLADESH, 1971

Politics in Pakistan went from a peak of optimism in 1970 to the depths of despair in 1971. The general election had held out the prospect of a return to civilian democracy after more than a decade of military rule, but within three months the country was plunged into the worst crisis in its history with its very survival as one state in jeopardy. This chapter examines the role played by Bhutto and the PPP during this year of national crisis. It is not intended here to provide a comprehensive review of the events of 1971 that led to the break-up of Pakistan and of the development of the movement for Bangladesh, which are well documented.<sup>1</sup> We are interested primarily in Bhutto and his PPP, their strategy and responses in this period, and in analysing the impact of the crisis on the man and the party. Most studies of the PPP have generally neglected this phase in the PPP's history and development.<sup>2</sup> Our contention is that the 1971 crisis had a number of repercussions on the PPP that need to be highlighted in order to understand subsequent political developments in post-Bangladesh Pakistan with respect both to Bhutto's approach to various national issues as well as the PPP's internal dynamics.

By the end of 1970, Pakistan had completed successfully the critical first step in the restoration of electorally based civilian government. But the process of transfer of power from the military to civilian leadership

had to await the emergence of a consensus on the future constitutional order between the military regime of Yahya and the two major victors of the election, Mujib representing the Eastern wing of the country and Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in the West (even though the PPP was not in as commanding a position in the West as the Awami League (AL) in the East, since the former had not won as decisive a victory as the latter). What made such a consensus difficult was that the three principal figures, Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto perceived themselves as representing constituencies whose interests were mutually exclusive. In addition, mutual mistrust and misperceptions between the military and civilian leaders on the one hand, and between the civilian leaders on the other hand, made the reconciliation of such interests difficult. When Mujib demanded regional autonomy on the basis of the Six Points (discussed below), this was opposed by both Yahya, who viewed it as threatening both the unity of the state as well as the interests of the Punjabi-dominated military, and Bhutto for whom Mujib's scheme signified a challenge to the interests of his power-base in West Pakistan as well as to his claim for a dominant position at the Centre. This led to a deadlock in the negotiations, while all three protagonists hardened in their postures. As the three set on a collision course, each protagonist set about playing off one against the other. As these manoeuvrings continued, the AL's demands became more strident and it launched a non-cooperation movement which gave Mujib de facto control of East Bengal. Unwilling to

concede to Mujib's unusual scheme for a federation, and under enormous pressure from Bhutto and his own constituency in the military, Yahya decided to use military force to resolve the crisis. This military action culminated in the secession of East Pakistan, although final disintegration of the state did not come about until nine months later after a successful national liberation movement and Indian military intervention.

From the standpoint of Bhutto and the PPP, the year of national crisis had a number of effects. While these are dealt with in detail later, they can be summarised below. First, the events of 1971 exhibited and highlighted Bhutto's ability to manoeuvre at various levels of politics, amongst difficult groups simultaneously - amongst the mass populace, his party, the upper echelons of the military and the dominant feudal and industrialist families. Second, the Bangladesh episode influenced Bhutto's perceptions and approach towards opposition parties in general and those advocating regional autonomy in particular. His experience with the Awami League crystallised his views on regional autonomy and undoubtedly conditioned his responses and actions with regard to similar demands later in West Pakistan.

As for the effect of the crisis on the internal party structure, a number of points can be made. First, with PPP leaders' attention directed to resolving the problem of regional autonomy in negotiations with Yahya and Mujib, little time or effort could be devoted to matters of party organisation. As indicated in the preceding

chapter, there was an urgent need to strengthen the PPP's weak organisational base. But the PPP leadership's preoccupation with the national crisis meant that the organisational problem was ignored and the institutional chaos continued. This had an important bearing on Bhutto's strategy of rule when he assumed power.<sup>3</sup> Another important effect of the crisis was the assertion of Bhutto's personal dominance over the party. The 1971 crisis created both the need and the justification for Bhutto to strengthen his control over the party. The manner of decision-making in the party through the course of the year demonstrated Bhutto's primacy over the PPP. At the same time, the nature of Bhutto's consultations with his party revealed his preference for a Viceregal style, in terms of consulting with the party's central committee when he saw fit, and then too as a legitimising device rather than as an exercise in democratic consensus-building. Finally, the 1971 crisis urged Bhutto to attempt to portray himself as the representative of all West Pakistan interests in order to bolster his negotiating position vis à vis the military and Mujib. This involved an endeavour to tone down the party's socialist rhetoric and to bring the party's left wing radicals under greater control. Thus another effect of the crisis was a deradicalisation of the PPP's ideology and stance.

We now turn to a more detailed consideration of the 1971 crisis, beginning with an assessment of the three major figures engaged in the constitutional controversy, their respective constituencies<sup>4</sup> and the nature of the

problem they faced. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's emergence as an unchallengeable leader of East Pakistan has to be viewed against a background of Bengali dissatisfaction with the Punjabi-controlled West's economic and political domination over the country. The long history of such dominance is well-documented and need not detain us here.<sup>5</sup> It is sufficient to note that the most formidable problem of nation-building in Pakistan since independence was the integration of the Bengali subnation. The urgency of this problem was underscored by the fact that the Bengalis were not merely the largest ethno-cultural subgroup in the country and actually constituted a majority (54 per cent) of the total population, but resided in an area that was geographically discontinuous from the rest of Pakistan. However, successive regimes pursued policies that continued and strengthened the dominance of the West through favoured treatment for West Pakistani industry and the Punjabi-dominated military, and failed to accommodate the Bengali demand for effective participation in the political system. This fuelled growing resentment in East Pakistan, and from 1965 onwards the earlier Bengali demand for participation was transformed into a more radical demand for regional autonomy that called for a fundamental restructuring of the political system.<sup>6</sup> It was Mujib who was responsible for this transformation. Mujib had begun his political career as a student leader and spent his early years with the AL organisation (becoming its first assistant general secretary when it was formed in 1949, and its general secretary three years later) which emerged as

the vehicle for the rising Bengali vernacular elite. In 1966 Mujib assumed the presidency of the AL and formulated Bengali discontent in the famous Six Point programme for autonomy.<sup>7</sup>

Originally put forward in 1966, the Six Points were amended in 1970 and incorporated in the Election Manifesto of the AL. As one observer put it,

"The Six Points formula in fact represented an attempt on the part of its protagonists to aggregate all the regional demands which were articulated by individual political leaders from East Pakistan from time to time during 1947-66." 8

But the Six Points represented more than this. Unlike previous Bengali demands, they did not call upon the central government to do more for East Pakistan, but asked the central government to let East Pakistan do more for itself. As announced in the AL manifesto, the Six Points were:

1. The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary.
2. The federal government shall be responsible for only defence and foreign affairs.
3. There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing.
4. Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units.
5. Separate accounts shall be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units.
6. Federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or parliamentary force.

For all political purposes, the Six Points envisaged a confederate rather than a federal structure. When Mujib

launched the Six Points movement in 1966, his demands were branded by the Ayub regime as 'secessionist' and 'a demand for greater Bengal'.<sup>9</sup> However, even though at this stage Mujib hinted that the demands were negotiable, the Ayub regime instead of attempting to arrive at a settlement with him, tried to suppress the movement, and arrested Mujib charging him with sedition in the Agartala conspiracy case.<sup>10</sup> His arrest and imprisonment gave him the halo of martyrdom and instead of destroying his support helped to increase it by magnifying his role as the champion of Bengali rights. By the time he was freed from prison in 1969, he enjoyed unprecedented popularity in Bengal.

Under Mujib the AL became an exclusively East Pakistani party<sup>11</sup> seeking to mobilise support on the basis of a programme that promised to end the economic and political exploitation of the eastern province. Such a promise appealed to groups such as middle-class professionals and (to a lesser extent) the rising Bengali business class, (fostered ironically by Ayubian policies) because (for the latter) it meant the elimination of big-business competition from West Pakistan. Labour and rural peasant support was gained by the promise that an end to the exploitation of East Pakistan would lead to a better standard of living for the common man. It was, however, the middle class professionals and students who formed the AL's major constituencies.<sup>12</sup> These constituencies were opposed to the ruling military junta for perpetuating the domination of the west and viewed their counterparts in the Punjab

(largely recruited by the PPP) not as national allies with whom they shared common social and educational characteristics, but as adversaries making their own claims on national resources. If we bear in mind his constituency support and the fact that Mujib's rise to public prominence was so closely interwoven with his Six Points, it will enable us to understand his difficulties in withdrawing or amending them when called upon to do so by Bhutto and Yahya.

If Mujib's constituency support imposed certain constraints on his ability to manoeuvre, the same could be said of Bhutto, although the latter's constituency was in no way as homogeneous as Mujib's. While the PPP's heterogeneous support-base made Bhutto's general position difficult in terms of the need to reconcile different interests, he nevertheless had a degree of freedom, not perhaps available to either Mujib or Yahya, on the specific issue of regional autonomy because he had not taken a firm stand on the issue, nor had he fought the election campaign, unlike Mujib, on the issue. This together with the fact that he enjoyed unchallengeable primacy over his party gave Bhutto a relatively better bargaining position. However, they were limits to his flexibility. In claiming to represent West Pakistani (although in reality he could legitimately claim to speak only for Sind and Punjab) interests, any scheme that envisaged a transfer of power from the West to the East was perceived by Bhutto as compromising the interests of his power base in the Punjab. Additionally since much of Bhutto's appeal, particularly in



the Punjab, rested on his image as a nationalist - as demonstrated by his anti-Tashkent and anti-Indian stance - any substantive concession to Mujib's Six Points demand was perceived by him as likely to erode this appeal.

Yahya's constituency was obviously the military, but also the other element of the old ruling elite (i.e. the bureaucracy). The second Martial Law of March 1969 was very much a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the civil-military oligarchy to maintain its position which had been challenged by the November 1968-69 mass movement. The task of the Yahya regime was to seek a new political order which could placate the demands of the more vocal groups in the mass movement while maintaining the status quo. Thus the regime adopted a number of policies (see chapter III above) specifically designed to placate the protesting groups (such as urban labour, teachers) and the politicians. But Yahya, as representative of the civil-military oligarchy, was concerned with preventing any fundamental restructuring of power, and even when permitting political activity, defining the rules of the game and maintaining the initiative in his hands. Central to Yahya's scheme was to play the role of mediator and power broker. Such a role was envisaged on the basis of Yahya's expectation prior to 1970, that the election would result in a multiplicity of parties (in both East and West Pakistan) and that in the ensuing coalition-making, the military would be able to assume the role of arbiter.<sup>13</sup>

When the election result turned out to be different from the one the regime expected, Yahya was faced with a

dilemma. The interests of the regime ran counter to those of Bhutto and Mujib. The military was especially apprehensive of Mujib and his Six Points. The military perceiving their role as safeguarding the unity of Pakistan (translated as a strong Centre) found the Six Point programme unacceptable since in its view it spelt the end of a strong and united state. Additionally, the military's institutional interests were potentially threatened, for if applied, the Six Points would have effectively meant a loss of financial support for the army. Mujib had been explicit on this score in the past, complaining repeatedly that two-thirds of Bengal's revenues were being spent on the armed forces in which the Bengalis had little or no representation.<sup>14</sup> The closing comments made by Ayub in his farewell speech seemed to reflect the general feeling within the military:

"It is being proposed that.....the Centre be made a weak and helpless organ, the defence forces be paralysed completely.....I cannot preside over the destruction of my country." 15

Thus the three leaders had different constituencies with potentially conflicting interests. Against this background, we can now look at the specific position adopted by Bhutto and the PPP and then go on to deal with the crisis at length.

#### BHUTTO AND THE SIX POINTS

Although, both in (as Ayub's minister) and out of office, Bhutto had acquired the reputation of being an advocate of a strong central government his stand on the

Six Points had, at least in public, been somewhat ambivalent. Privately, however, he had consistently expressed serious reservations about the programme.<sup>16</sup> As a member of Ayub's cabinet, he had described the Six Points as secessionist in 1966 and advised Ayub to allow him to challenge Mujib to a public debate on the issue.<sup>17</sup> Ayub, however, had rejected this proposal and had, according to Bhutto, turned from the "weapon of language" to the "language of weapons."<sup>18</sup> Ayub, as mentioned above, threw Mujib in jail, charging him and several other Bengalis with sedition. By this time, Bhutto had left Ayub's cabinet, and he now called for Mujib's release.

At the foundation convention of the PPP, an attempt was made to come to grips with the problem posed by Mujib's Six Points.<sup>19</sup> Foundation Document Number Ten, entitled 'The Six Points Answered', while maintaining that Mujib had "a just grievance with regard to the condition to which East Pakistan has been degraded", strongly criticised the Six Points.<sup>20</sup> It accepted only the first and sixth point, while expressing serious reservations with regard to the rest. But while rejecting the Six Points, the PPP did not outline its own proposal for resolving the problem of regional autonomy, other than the vague declaration that the remedy of national problems lay in socialism. In subsequent policy pronouncements too, the party did not spell out its stand on the issue of regional autonomy and dealt with this and related constitutional issues perhaps purposively in the vaguest of terms. In one of a series of pamphlets issued by the party

in 1968-69, the party secretary-general, J. A. Rahim outlined his party's views on the future constitutional order for Pakistan. Rahim declared that "East Pakistan has indeed all the characteristic of a colony (of West Pakistan)",<sup>21</sup> but his solution for the key issue of provincial autonomy was vague to the point of completely avoiding the main issue. It is relevant to note that when the East Pakistan branch of the PPP was wound up in March 1969, it was reported that it was the Dacca branch itself that had severed its connections with the party because of Bhutto's failure to support the Bengali demand for regional autonomy.<sup>22</sup> Certainly Bhutto's uncertain public stand on the Six Points was one factor in the party's failure to muster support in the eastern wing. By the time the PPP released its election Manifesto, it seemed that the party was still not ready to spell out a clear policy regarding this issue. The Manifesto was all but silent on matters pertaining to regional autonomy, although one could perceive a clear preference for a strong Centre. Bhutto evidently wished to keep the question of provincial autonomy open for discussion.

During the election campaign the PPP avoided comment upon the Six Points - as indeed any constitutional issue. Since the PPP's major political base was the Punjab, Bhutto was unwilling to take a stand on the Six Points thereby possibly prejudicing his position there. Even during Mujib's campaign tour of West Pakistan in July 1970, when he was proclaiming that the Six Points were not negotiable,<sup>23</sup> the PPP chose, by and large to

remain silent. On one occasion however, Bhutto did point out that the Six Points contradicted the fourth fundamental principle of Yahya's Legal Framework Order (LFO) - the one pertaining to the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity.<sup>24</sup> Bhutto appeared to take the position that the demand for provincial autonomy was a negotiable subject and suggested that since the interpretation given to provincial autonomy differed from one political party to another, the precise quantum would have to be determined through negotiations later. In his campaign speeches we find Bhutto arguing for a strong Centre with adequate powers, but he rarely spelt out what this would imply in terms of the autonomy to be granted to the provinces.<sup>25</sup>

Bhutto's reluctance to articulate a clear stand can be attributed, in part, to four factors of pragmatic importance. First, Bhutto did not wish to open debate on a potentially divisive issue within the party, and second, by not adopting a clearly-defined stand, he would have a relatively freer hand vis a vis any further negotiations with Mujib. Third, he perceived that even a hint of compromise with the Six Points at this stage might erode his support base in the Punjab.<sup>26</sup> And fourth, acceptance or accommodation with the Six Point programme naturally had implications for the West Pakistani provinces as well, and he had no wish to begin a controversy over the extent of regional autonomy to be given to the West Pakistani units. In contrast, the other West Pakistani parties with the notable exception of NAP (Wali Group) and small regional groups fiercely attacked the Awami League leadership and

its programme, the most vociferous being the Qayyum faction of the Muslim League. The military regime of Yahya for its part maintained a tolerant silence. Even when, as it claimed later, Mujib was "inciting" the people of East Pakistan against West Pakistanis, the government did not deem it fit to intervene lest this was interpreted as official interference in the campaign.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, as both Bhutto and Yahya argued later, they did not feel the need to confront Mujib publicly as the latter had to a large extent "skillfully manoeuvred" them into "believing that he would become.....more susceptible to compromise on Six Points after an election victory."<sup>28</sup>

#### TOWARDS CONFRONTATION

The results of the election posed the demand for provincial autonomy more starkly than ever, since the two majority parties enjoyed no support in each other's provinces. Bhutto now began to define his party's stand on the regional issue. Initially his tone alternated between being conciliatory and threatening. While offering to enter into detailed discussions with Mujib on the future constitutional order, he warned that any attempt to bypass the PPP would lead to dire consequences. "Hamlet", Bhutto declared dramatically, "could not be played without the Prince of Denmark."<sup>29</sup> Bhutto took the position that "majority alone doesn't count in national politics",<sup>30</sup> that since the PPP had won in Punjab and Sind - where the real power of the Centre lay - no government at the Centre could be run without his cooperation.<sup>31</sup> He also

declared bluntly that his party was not prepared to occupy the opposition benches in the National Assembly (N.A.).

Bhutto's statements were greeted with derision by the AL Leaders.<sup>32</sup> Mujib pointed out that under normal parliamentary conventions the PPP would lead the opposition in the N.A. and that Bhutto would have to be content with that and the PPP's control of the provincial governments of Sind and Punjab. In his first major post-election policy speech, on 3 January 1971, Mujib announced at a huge public rally that his was the majority party in all of Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> His party would try to frame a constitution in cooperation with the elected representatives of West Pakistan, but there would be no compromise on the question of principle. The future constitution would be based on the Six Point programme and the Eleven Points of the Bengali student community. As the Bhutto-Mujib polemics crystallised into East-West confrontation, the exchanges were reminiscent of earlier debates between Bengali leaders and West Pakistani politicians. The two, without meeting each other - their last meeting was in 1969 - demonstrated their mutual suspicion of one another's intentions, and the gulf between them continued to widen. Each and every action of the other appeared suspect, and likely to be misperceived. While previously Bengali leaders had always gone to West Pakistan for negotiations, Mujib deliberately chose to stay in Dacca. His refusal to visit West Pakistan despite urgings from Bhutto and Yahya, was deliberate and meant to symbolise the transfer of power from the Centre (West) to the East. This was

viewed by Bhutto and Yahya as a sign of Mujib's secessionist tendencies and was perhaps just one of the many misperceptions that led to the slow building up of the crisis.

By now (if not before), Bhutto appeared to be convinced that Mujib's designs were those of a secessionist and that the Six Points were "a concealed formula for secession" - an opinion (that constituted the basis of PPP's subsequent policy towards the Awami League) formed without consulting his party colleagues.<sup>34</sup> It has been argued by various observers and by Bhutto himself in his personal account of the crisis that Mujib's position on Six Points hardened considerably after his election victory.<sup>35</sup> This may have been true and we find some support for such a contention in Mujib's own statements of the time. However, what is probably more relevant is that this was interpreted by Bhutto not as a negotiating stance but as a veiled threat of secession.<sup>36</sup> As Bhutto later recounted: "a few months before the general elections" he had a discussion with Lieutenant General Peerzada, Principal Staff Officer of Yahya, who asked him outright what he thought of Mujib's true intentions. Without hesitation, Bhutto replied, "Separation!"<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless Bhutto claimed he decided to make "every effort to arrive at a political settlement....knowing as I did that the alternative would be bloodshed and slaughter."<sup>38</sup>

Against this background, Bhutto turned his attention to his party and called a meeting of the party's Central Executive Committee to discuss future strategy. It is significant that Bhutto sought to 'consult' his



party officially after so much had already transpired - albeit in the form of public exchanges in speeches - between Mujib and him. This demonstrated the Viceregal nature of Bhutto's approach towards decision-making. Just as the viceroy consulted his Executive Council to gain endorsement of policy, Bhutto looked toward his party's Central Executive Committee for legitimisation rather than policy formulation. A number of other interesting features regarding the PPP also need to be noted. First, an eighteen-member central executive committee was nominated by Bhutto just a few days before the meeting; the party's highest organ was thus constituted more than three years after the party came into existence.<sup>39</sup> This body was a nominated rather than an elected one, thus continuing the tradition of nominations in the party, and giving Bhutto effective supremacy over it. Once again a 'crisis situation' was used as the official justification for not holding elections to this body. The central committee met for the first time on 23 January to discuss the East Pakistan situation and to formally endorse party appointments made over the last three years by Bhutto, which again demonstrated its role as a rubber-stamping authority. The meeting revealed a number of other interesting features about the party. Since there is no formal record of the proceedings, information about the historic first meeting is based on press reports and personal interviews.<sup>40</sup>

Several influential individuals who were not even members of the party had been invited to participate in the

deliberations of what was theoretically, the highest organ of the party. These included big Punjabi landlords like Nawab Muzaffer (of Kalabagh) and leading industrialists like Habibullah. This caused considerable alarm amongst the left-wing factions within the party; Taj Mohammed Langah and Begum Nasim Jahan declined to participate in the meeting, while the Sheikh Rashid group staged an official walk-out. Such internal stresses were the natural result of Bhutto's strategy of making his constituency a more broad-based one in West Pakistan to strengthen his bargaining position vis à vis both Mujib and Yahya. This was particularly necessary since Bhutto feared that other West Pakistani parties especially the regional ones might line up with Mujib, thus preventing him from having a dominant position at the Centre. Bhutto explained that the nature of the crisis in East Pakistan necessitated involving individuals - even those representing "vested interests" that he had earlier attacked - who, although not members of the party, had an influential voice in Pakistan politics and could not be ignored. Thus one consequence of the crisis for Bhutto was the need to take steps to convince both the military and Mujib that he was a leader representing all-West Pakistan interests (although no such formal unit existed any longer).

As for the discontent amongst the left factions within his party, this could always be contained as it had been in the past through private reassurance, and failing that, threats, as we shall see below. The central committee proceedings were taken up largely by Bhutto's

address as chairman giving his views on Mujib's position, with little time allotted to eliciting the opinions of others on this issue, since the rest of the time was given to matters of party organisation. What little discussion followed revealed a divided view over the Six Points. Some of his party men took the 'extreme' position that the party should oppose the Six Points in its entirety, while a very small number took the position that the AL programme should be accepted. The majority, however, are reported to have supported Bhutto's view that negotiations should be conducted with Mujib to bring about a compromise.<sup>41</sup> What is clear is that Bhutto was not interested in developing the central committee as a body for collective decision-making but regarded it as a legitimising instrument for decisions made on his own.

An incident involving the PPP is worthy of mention at this stage since Bhutto utilised this to deliver a clear warning to those of his party men who did not fall in line with party policy as defined by him. In the first week of January, several workers of the state-controlled Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) went on strike over the dismissal of some pro-PPP journalists and press workers.<sup>42</sup> Four MNAs-elect of the PPP, namely Mukhtar Rana, Ahmed Raza Kasuri, A. H. Kardar and Mian Hamid Yasin joined the hunger-striking workers, promising that in accordance with the party manifesto they would assist the workers in 'taking over' PPL. At this stage Bhutto intervened, directing Mukhtar Rana to call off the strike, with which the latter grudgingly complied.<sup>43</sup> Bhutto publicly rebuked

these PPP leaders who according to him had started agitation on their own without a call from the party. Bhutto followed this by issuing a severe warning to anyone of his party men who were attempting to "whistle the leadership into action",<sup>44</sup> and warned against "left adventurism" and "rank opportunism".<sup>45</sup> Clearly, Bhutto concerned as he was with portraying himself as the leader of all West Pakistan interests evidently felt it necessary to tone down his party's radical image. His action in forcing an end to the hunger strike was a manifestation both of his efforts to deradicalise the party's image and to bring the party under greater control.

At a public rally soon after, Bhutto, in his typically dramatic manner, threatened to resign from the party.<sup>46</sup> Amidst shouts of "no", "no" from the crowd, Bhutto said that he would bow down before the wishes of the people, but would set a condition for his continuance in office: that he should face no internal rifts in the party ranks. He could tolerate opposition from outside, but not from within the party. It was widely felt at the time, that Bhutto's warning was meant not only for those involved in the PPL dispute but also those members of the PPP hierarchy who had expressed misgivings about Bhutto's attitude towards Mujib and his Six Points.<sup>47</sup> Thus Bhutto utilised the PPL episode to call for strict discipline in the party. This incident helps to illustrate the manner in which Bhutto maintained discipline in the PPP and demonstrates Bhutto's unwillingness to tolerate any voices of dissent against party policy, as formulated and dictated by him.

Bhutto's methods of dealing with the PPL dispute also enabled him to make good the promises given privately to leading industrialists and important members of the ruling military junta that if they strengthened his hands vis à vis negotiations with Mujib he would tone down his socialist stance and control his party radicals.<sup>48</sup> The entire PPL episode is a good illustration of what can be called a characteristically 'Bhutto art' of being able to manoeuvre at different levels of politics simultaneously - amongst the party, the mass populace and the ruling elite. This revealed a political style that seemed to combine elite manipulation with populist politics.

While Bhutto was engaged in attempts to establish himself as the sole representative of West Pakistan interests as a counterweight to Mujib's undisputed claim as the sole representative of East Pakistani interests, Yahya proceeded to Dacca in mid-January to hold consultations with Mujib. While Yahya officially expressed satisfaction over the talks, even referring to Mujib as "the next prime minister" of the country,<sup>49</sup> he returned disappointed with what he regarded as Mujib's unwillingness to accommodate the "West Pakistani point of view" (in terms of preserving a strong union).<sup>50</sup> On their return, Yahya and his aides visited Bhutto at his home town, Larkana. It was here, according to G. W. Choudhury and others, that "a new and sinister alliance.....between the military junta and Bhutto" was formed.<sup>51</sup> While it is difficult to substantiate the nature and extent of such an alliance, there is sufficient evidence (see below) to indicate that Bhutto

and the military 'hawks'<sup>52</sup> (a group that did not include Yahya) developed close links during subsequent weeks over the "threat" posed by Mujib's Six Points to Pakistan's integrity. Significantly, it was in this period that the main emphasis in Bhutto's public statements shifted from socialist to nationalist themes and it was only a day before he met Yahya that he forced an end to the PPL strike. These were signs that Bhutto was acting to make himself 'acceptable' to the junta by de-emphasising his socialist rhetoric and demonstrating that he could control the radicals in his party.

On 27 January Bhutto led a fifteen member PPP delegation to Dacca for talks with Mujib - his first meeting with Mujib in over two years. In the three rounds of talks the two sides failed to forge even the beginning of an informal consensus on the Six Points. While Mujib maintained that he had received a mandate from the people on the Six Points and was not in a position to deviate from them, Bhutto was equally adamant in declaring that since West Pakistani public opinion was against such a programme he could not accept them in an unamended form.<sup>53</sup> Thus both justified their inability to compromise by reference to the constraints imposed on them by their respective constituencies. Perceptions of conflicting constituency interests played an important part in the failure to arrive at a settlement. Additionally, the personal antipathy between the two probably also played a part. Bhutto's later remarks about Mujib are instructive in this regard. His personal contempt for Mujib is evident in his

description of him as "incapable, conceited, lacking in culture, common sense.....there was no depth in him.... the only idea he's ever had in his head is the idea of secession."<sup>54</sup> This kind of contempt had been demonstrated by Bhutto in the past towards his political opponents in the West as well,<sup>55</sup> and indeed was to characterise his dealings with opposition leaders after his assumption of power.

On Bhutto's return to West Pakistan, a series of party meetings were organised.<sup>56</sup> These meetings were called, according to Bhutto to ascertain members' views "on how far we could go for a consensus" (with Mujib).<sup>57</sup> But this was not the only purpose served by these so-called intensive party consultations. Bhutto utilised these to demonstrate to both Yahya and Mujib the legitimacy of his leadership claims, and also to give credibility to his request of being allowed more time before the N.A. met in order to sound public opinion in West Pakistan. At one stroke, Bhutto appeared to derive several benefits from these series of party meetings - he gained valuable time; he satisfied those within the party who complained that they had not been consulted on the key issues; he used these meetings to demonstrate his political base to Yahya and Mujib; and finally to explain and gain his party's endorsement of his own decision arrived at after his talks with both Yahya and Mujib that no useful purpose would be served by attending the N.A. session in the absence of a prior arrangement worked out outside the Assembly. Another outcome of these meetings was to reinforce Bhutto's

unchallenged leadership within the party. At the same time Bhutto also met with other political leaders such as Qayyum Khan and Wali Khan.<sup>58</sup> And he met Yahya on several occasions. In meetings with Yahya, Bhutto counselled him to delay calling the N.A. so as to give him more time to bargain with Mujib<sup>59</sup> as well as to sound public opinion in West Pakistan on the Six Points which he hoped would pressure Mujib into amending his programme.<sup>60</sup> Two factors, however, worked against this strategy. First, Yahya went ahead and announced that the Assembly would meet at Dacca (a symbolic gesture to Bengali demands) on 3 March.<sup>61</sup> And second, Mujib succeeded in winning the support of the minority parties in the West, with a few exceptions.

Outmanoeuvred, Bhutto immediately, and without consulting his party, announced that the PPP would boycott the N.A. session.<sup>62</sup> At a press conference on 15 February Bhutto declared that his party could not attend the assembly session "simply to endorse a dictated constitution."<sup>63</sup> Prone to using strong language under stress, Bhutto described his party's presence in Dacca as being "in a position of double hostage" and alluding to some fatal fist fights on the floor of the Dacca legislatures before 1958, he called the N.A. a "slaughter house". He explained that his party had already accepted the first and last point of Mujib's Six Points. On the other points, "something could be worked out." Only on the point of taxation was he completely unable to compromise. Since it was this clause on which the military was expected to be



most apprehensive (since it threatened financial support for the army), this part of Bhutto's speech was clearly aimed at gaining the support of the military, particularly the "hawks" who felt that Yahya had gone too far in his appeasement policy vis a vis Bengal.<sup>64</sup> Bhutto's boycott decision was supported only by the Qayyum Muslim League and JUP at this stage, while the other minority parties of West Pakistan indicated their willingness to attend the assembly.

Bhutto now moved quickly and simultaneously on various fronts - in holding private, secret meetings with important members of the military junta, in calling a parliamentary convention of his party on 20 February and addressing a mass rally at Lahore to consult the people 'directly'. This again demonstrated his remarkable ability to manoeuvre at different levels simultaneously with maximum effect. The precise nature of his meetings with army "hawks" such as Peerzada, Omar, Hameed and Gul Hasan are still clouded in secrecy, but it is generally believed that Bhutto's links with these army "hawks" proved crucial and that he played upon their fears of the 'Bengali threat' and their alarm at Mujib's threatening posture against the army, to make his views prevail upon these influential members of the junta.<sup>65</sup> In meetings with military hardliners, and Yahya, Bhutto argued that the Six Points demand was more than a plan that would emasculate the central government and cut the economic ground from under the military but was in reality a "concealed formula for secession."<sup>66</sup> As these private parleys continued it became

increasingly obvious that, so far from clearing a way for the successful outcome of the assembly's session, these conversations between Yahya and Bhutto or the rumours of secret meetings between Bhutto and other generals were prompting confusion and sowing the seeds of further mistrust between Bhutto and Mujib. Indeed, at one point Bhutto had to publicly deny rumours of complicity with the Yahya regime. At any rate, in East Pakistan at least, the military - Bhutto parleys looked like a West Pakistani 'conspiracy' to thwart the legitimate demands of the Bengali majority.<sup>67</sup> Some disquiet was expressed in PPP circles as well over the nature of these meetings and the rumours they were generating.<sup>68</sup>

Bhutto called a convention of the PPP at Karachi on 20 and 21 February in order to obtain his party's formal endorsement of his boycott decision. It is significant that the meeting was called after he had publicly announced his decision not to participate in the assembly session, so that the convention was left with the task of rubber-stamping the chairman's decision.<sup>69</sup> The two-day convention was attended by over six hundred delegates including members of the party's central committee, MNAs and MPAs-elect.<sup>70</sup> Despite the fact that the convention was presented with a fait accompli, some voices of dissent could be discerned during the proceedings. The Mairaj faction opposed Bhutto's decision and argued that no purpose would be served by a boycott - the party should instead go to Dacca and strive to pressurise Mujib both inside and outside the assembly. Mukhtar Rana, Abdul

Khaliq and Abdul Hameed Jatoi also implored Bhutto to reverse his decision, but their pleas were unheeded, and they found themselves not only outnumbered by those supporting Bhutto, but completely outmanoeuvred by Bhutto's tactics. Bhutto not only got the convention's endorsement of his decision but also obtained what amounted to a blank cheque from the party to follow any course of action that he deemed fit.<sup>71</sup> He asked the convention to 'mandate' him with the power to decide all issues relating to East Pakistan. The convention ended with almost all the members taking an oath on the Quran to resign en bloc if the N.A. met without them. In addition, at Kauser Niazi's initiative party members took another oath pledging their loyalty to Bhutto and giving him full authority to outline the future course of action for the party.<sup>72</sup> Thus one important effect of the crisis was to reinforce Bhutto's personal dominance over the party.

Bhutto now turned his attention to the mass public. Some demonstration of public support was necessary in Bhutto's scheme of things to further buttress his bargaining strength vis à vis the military and Mujib. Accordingly, Bhutto declared that he would adopt the "direct method" of consulting the people through a public rally to be addressed at Iqbal Park in Lahore on 28 February. At the rally in his characteristically dramatic style, Bhutto employed all the demagoguery and oratory at his command to have the crowds chant that they endorsed their Quaid-e-Awam's decision not to attend the assembly session. It was here that Bhutto demanded that the N.A. be postponed to a

later date or alternatively that the 120 day limit (imposed by Yahya under the LFO) for the completion of the new constitution be extended so as to give the two parties more time for negotiations.<sup>73</sup> Bhutto threatened to launch a mass agitation from Peshawar to Karachi if the assembly went ahead as scheduled.<sup>74</sup> He threatened non-PPP parliamentarians with "dire consequences" if they chose to go to Dacca. For his own party members he held out an even stronger threat: Those who decided to go would be "liquidated" by party workers and their "legs would be broken."<sup>75</sup> It may be mentioned here that out of the West Pakistani parties, the QML, the JUP and CML (except Nur Khan who disassociated himself from his party's decision) decided to keep away from the N.A. session, while the rest of the parties had already despatched their members to Dacca. Within the PPP, Ahmed Reza Kasuri was the sole member who revolted against the party decision and proceeded to Dacca. Later in May 1971, when Kasuri was suspended from party membership for flouting party discipline (see below) he organised his own "Reza Progressive Group" within the party and proceeded to expel Bhutto instead.<sup>76</sup>

On 1 March, Yahya announced his decision to postpone the assembly session sine die, citing Bhutto's boycott as a primary cause for his action.<sup>77</sup> This announcement was made without consulting Mujib and according to Bhutto, without even consulting him.<sup>78</sup> A minister in Yahya's cabinet, G. W. Choudhury, however, later alleged that Yahya not only did this at Bhutto's behest since he was "by now the junta's most influential adviser" but that

209

he along with General Peerzada probably even drafted Yahya's statement.<sup>79</sup> Choudhury's thesis that Yahya was merely a helpless pawn in Bhutto's hands is not borne out by the evidence.<sup>80</sup> As indicated earlier, Yahya had his own constituency interests to protect against both Mujib and Bhutto. Consequently in this game of three-way political chess, Yahya obviously had his own pieces to manoeuvre. Recognition of the fact that Yahya's "hawkish" colleagues such as Generals Hameed, Omar and Peerzada, who shared Bhutto's views, were pressurising Yahya to take a stronger stand against Mujib<sup>81</sup> does not necessarily mean that Yahya was acting on Bhutto's behalf. A number of other actions taken by Yahya at the same time do not easily fit into the latter argument. Even before his postponement announcement, for instance, he had begun to tighten the military's grip over the country by dissolving his civilian council of ministers on 22 February, and even earlier Choudhury reports the preparation of an army contingency plan in case Mujib persisted in his uncompromising attitude.<sup>82</sup> Little notice seems to have been taken in those accounts of the crisis of 1971 that view Yahya as a pawn in Bhutto's hands, of two additional factors.<sup>83</sup> First, Yahya decided to exercise one rather than the other option presented by Bhutto. After all, the 120 day limit could also have been waived - unless of course Yahya was already convinced of Mujib's secessionist aims and felt that to allow more time would take the initiative out of the hands of the army. Second, while postponing the assembly session, Yahya did not announce a fresh date simultaneously.

For Mujib and his supporters, of whom the more radical members were already growing restive, this was a further indication of the army's untrustworthiness. It was not until five days had passed that Yahya fixed 25 March as the new date for the N.A. session - by which time it was probably too late to control Bengali passions. Had a fresh date been announced simultaneously, perhaps the reaction in East Pakistan would not have been as violent as it was.<sup>84</sup> But whatever Yahya's exact motives at this juncture, his actions do not suggest that he was merely acting on Bhutto's behalf, although it certainly appeared that way in terms of the sequence of events. And from Mujib's vantage position in Dacca it looked like a West Pakistani conspiracy led by Yahya in which Bhutto willingly participated as a collaborator. This was yet another illustration of misperceptions accentuating the East-West confrontation.

The reaction to the postponement in East Pakistan has to be viewed against the background of the suspicion in the Bengali public mind, nurtured over the years, that the West Pakistani elite would never voluntarily give up its paramount position in the country. The Awami League was now certain that the PPP and the junta had combined to deny the majority party its right to rule. The postponement sparked off violent demonstrations, and in the next few weeks, Mujib came under tremendous pressure from other political parties like NAP (Bhashani group), which indeed called for independence, and from the radicals within his own party to declare independence.<sup>85</sup> Military pressure also became visible as troops were flown in from the West

in increasingly large numbers. Mujib called for a general strike, accusing Yahya of postponing the assembly session solely in response to the machinations of a single party (PPP), against the wishes of the AL and several West Pakistani parties.<sup>86</sup>

With the situation in East Pakistan deteriorating, Yahya on 3 March invited all the leaders of the parties and groups represented in the N.A. - twelve in all - to meet him at a Round Table Conference at Dacca on 10 March. While Bhutto accepted the President's invitation, Mujib rejected the offer alleging that the army was shooting down unarmed Bengalis in the streets of Dacca. Mujib also argued that constitutional issues were best resolved within the forum of the N.A. rather than by secret negotiations and Round Table Conferences.<sup>87</sup> On 6 March, Yahya announced a new date for the inaugural session of the N.A. as 25 March.<sup>88</sup>

In West Pakistan Bhutto's political opponents with the exception of the QML, seeing a fine opportunity to discredit him as being the main contributor to the crisis, heaped criticism on him.<sup>89</sup> This served to reinforce Bhutto's fear that the minority parties in West Pakistan by lending their support to Mujib would further strengthen the latter's position. Meanwhile, Mujib, addressing half a million demonstrators in Dacca on 7 March, put forward four conditions for the AL's participation in the assembly session: (1) withdrawal of martial law, (2) return of troops to the barracks, (3) an inquiry into the alleged killings of civilians by the army and (4) transfer of power to the

elected representatives of the people.<sup>90</sup> It was widely expected that Mujib would declare independence at this meeting but he decided instead to launch a non-cooperation movement, which was to place him in complete control of East Pakistan. The civil disobedience movement that followed made him the de facto political authority in East Pakistan in the name of Bangladesh whose flags flew on all the governmental buildings by 23 March.

All the West Pakistani leaders, with the exception of Qayyum, castigated Bhutto, holding his intransigence responsible for the crisis, and the majority of them counselled Yahya to accept Mujib's four-point demand.<sup>91</sup> This development undoubtedly influenced Bhutto's perception of his political opponents and conditioned his attitude toward them once he was in power. Although his later intolerance of opposition cannot be attributed to this factor alone, the antagonism that developed during the 1971 crisis did play a part in his distrust of opposition later.<sup>92</sup> After he assumed power Bhutto frequently referred to the support given by these parties to Mujib's demands to equate such opposition with treason and to justify its suppression. Thus this aspect of the 1971 crisis had important repercussions on Bhutto's subsequent attitude and tactics towards other political parties. Clearly apprehensive of the possibility of an alliance developing between Mujib and the West Pakistani minority parties, Bhutto told Yahya in a meeting on 14 March that he agreed in principle to Mujib's demands, but any settlement had to be made with the PPP's consent.<sup>93</sup> And further, if power was to be transferred



before the N.A. met it should be done in both wings to the two majority parties.<sup>94</sup> Bhutto's proposal was widely interpreted as implying the creation of "Two Pakistans", and was criticised as such by minority parties in West Pakistan.<sup>95</sup>

It was against this alarming and rapidly deteriorating background that Yahya rushed to Dacca on 15 March. The minority party leaders of West Pakistan also went to Dacca, and advised Yahya to devise an interim arrangement under which power could be transferred to the AL.<sup>96</sup> The Yahya-Mujib parleys were held in utmost secrecy but from the various published versions of the talks it appears that by 20 March Yahya had agreed in principle to Mujib's four pre-conditions.<sup>97</sup> Martial Law was to be lifted and power transferred in the five provinces without effecting a similar transfer in the central government. It was also proposed by the AL that the N.A. be divided ab initio into two committees, one comprising the West Pakistan MNAs, the other all those from East Pakistan, which would prepare separate reports within a stipulated period and submit their proposals to the N.A.<sup>98</sup> It would then be left to the N.A. to discuss and debate the proposals of both the committees and find out ways and means of living together. Under an interim arrangement which was to be an amended form of the 1962 constitution, East Pakistan would be given autonomy on the basis of the Six Points and the provinces of the Western wing would have powers as provided in the 1962 constitution, but would be free to work out their quantum of autonomy according to a mutually

agreeable procedure, subject to the President's approval. AL leaders later claimed that the provisions for two N.A. committees and different levels of autonomy were incorporated to accommodate Bhutto in response to his stand that there were two majority parties in "two Pakistans."<sup>99</sup>

These proposals were placed in a draft proclamation for the president's signature, prepared by the AL team. An examination of this document shows that Yahya had made a number of important concessions on the Six Points.<sup>100</sup> But he made his agreement contingent on that of other politicians, principally Bhutto.

Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 21 March amidst a hostile reception, since he was associated in the Bengali public mind with being responsible for obstructing the transfer of power. From 21 to 25 March discussions were held at Dacca in which Yahya, the AL, the PPP, and other west wing political parties participated. Bhutto refused to accept the Yahya-Mujib agreement<sup>101</sup> (as did the military "hawks" and the QML politicians). Bhutto's principal objections centred around the provisions for the two committees and the differential quantum of autonomy for East and West Pakistan, which he argued would inevitably result in the separation of the two wings.<sup>102</sup> Ironically Bhutto thus rejected that part of the scheme that was specifically included to accommodate him. Bhutto's alternative proposals were to call the N.A. first or to allow him more time to negotiate directly with Mujib.<sup>103</sup> The latter plea met with no response from the AL. By that time the pressure on Mujib to either get a quick settlement or to

declare independence had nearly reached breaking point.

The AL's detailed draft proclamation presented in an aides' meeting on 23 March differed from that agreed upon earlier by Yahya in many significant respects.<sup>104</sup> For instance the committees were now called conventions, and the term 'confederation' was used. It thus appeared to the Yahya regime that the Awami League had gone somewhat beyond the demand for regional autonomy to one which approximated the constitutional break up of Pakistan.<sup>105</sup> Yahya raised several objections to the AL draft proclamation, which centred on these provisions that were viewed as threatening both the Centre's powers and the institutional interests of the military. By that time the pressure on Yahya from those within the military establishment such as Generals Peerzada, Tikka, Hameed and Omar who felt that already Yahya had gone far enough to accommodate Mujib, had a perceptible impact.<sup>106</sup> But there were other factors operating simultaneously which were also contributing to disquiet among military circles. On 23 March, 'Pakistan Day' (the day the Pakistan Resolution was passed in 1940), the AL declared 'Resistance Day', and ordered the Bangladesh flag to be hoisted on all public buildings.<sup>107</sup> Clashes between the army and demonstrators cost ten lives, while Mujib called for a general strike for 27 March.

The situation in West Pakistan was also far from satisfactory not only from the military's point of view, but also from Bhutto's. Leftist radicals of the PPP demanded the immediate transfer of power to a Mazdur-Kisan Raj (Worker-Peasant Rule), and in the Punjab there were

increasing incidents of factory takeovers and gheraos in several cities. Under the leadership of Mukhtar Rana, pro-PPP labour unions began to take over industrial units in Lyallpur, Multan and Sargodha. These efforts culminated in bloody riots in Lyallpur on 25 March.<sup>108</sup> Bhutto severely reprimanded Rana for such "adventurism" in an effort to bring the PPP left-wing under greater control. From the point of view of the military authorities, the situation in both the wings was clearly getting out of hand.

On the night of 25 March, while Awami Leaguers were reportedly awaiting the presidential proclamation, Yahya without formally breaking the talks, launched a policy of military action against the Bengalis.<sup>109</sup> The AL was banned and Mujib was arrested and flown to West Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> The exact circumstances leading up to the military action are still clouded in secrecy, and there are different interpretations of both the motives and the source behind the decision to resort to a military solution of the crisis.<sup>111</sup> According to Yahya's version the military action was taken to pre-empt an armed insurrection planned by the Awami League for the night of 25/26 March.<sup>112</sup> Bhutto supported Yahya's justification of a pre-emptive strike in his account of the crisis.<sup>113</sup> Both Bhutto's and Yahya's versions put the onus of the failure of the talks upon Mujib, who is accused of having been determined to achieve secession since as far back as the 1960's with Indian complicity. These allegations, however, have not been amply substantiated. An alternative view, advanced

largely by Indian and Bengali writers of the crisis is that Yahya (and Bhutto) were negotiating in bad faith simply to buy time until the troop buildup was completed.<sup>114</sup>

While this thesis cannot be ruled out, it seems simplistic and obscures the complex interplay of forces which led to the final outcome.<sup>115</sup> The 'single-minded conspiracy theory' does not adequately explain why Yahya had to carry the game so far as to have even agreed to the principles of the transfer of power. A more plausible explanation may be that Yahya had prepared his coercive potential in case it was necessary, while he continued talking in the hope of finding a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution.

According to Yahya his hand was forced by Bhutto who goaded him into taking military action against the AL.<sup>116</sup> Bhutto's precise role at this juncture remains shrouded in mystery, although he strongly supported the initial military action. This is indicated by the speeches he made on his return to West Pakistan. His first reaction to the news of the military offensive in the East was: "Thank God, Pakistan has been saved."<sup>117</sup> In a speech on 27 March, Bhutto expressed his support for Yahya's order to crush the independence movement for Bangladesh.<sup>118</sup> In another speech Bhutto described the Six Points as a "sugar-coated pill for secession" and alleged that the AL objective was to secede from Pakistan step by step.<sup>119</sup> At the same time he alleged that Mujib was supported in his aims by the regional leaders in Pakistan, who together prepared a "London Plan" to undo Pakistan in October 1969,

when all these leaders had met in London.<sup>120</sup> In Yahya's speech of 26 March, he announced as mentioned earlier, a ban on the AL, and a total ban on all political activities and complete press censorship. Bhutto not only supported the ban, but publicly urged Yahya to ban all other political parties that had opposed the Pakistan movement - an obvious reference to NAP (Wali Group) and those parties that had cooperated with Mujib in the preceding months.<sup>121</sup>

#### THE PPP AND THE YAHYA REGIME: MARCH - DECEMBER 1971

The military action initiated by the ruling junta on 25 March marked the end of the negotiating phase of Pakistani politics and also spelt, as we shall see below, the beginning of the end of a united Pakistan. The months March to December 1971 saw the army engaged in a full scale military offensive in East Pakistan, and proscribing political activity in the West. Bhutto and the PPP's attitude towards the military regime alternated between conciliation and confrontation in these intervening months. As military action intensified in the East and civilian casualties mounted, rumours circulated widely of military atrocities upon the Bengali population. Bhutto could not openly criticise the army as some of his party members such as Mairaj were urging him to do, but he could criticise the way the junta was handling the situation. At the same time he continued his efforts to cultivate friendship with members of the junta in order to bring pressure to bear upon Yahya, who by now seemed in no hurry to

transfer power to a civilian government. This was indicated by Yahya's speech of 28 June 1971, when, departing from the LFO, he put forward a new plan for the restoration of democracy. By-elections were to take place in East Pakistan to fill the seats rendered vacant by the ban on the AL while a new constitution was to be prepared by a committee of presidential advisers.<sup>122</sup> After this the N.A. was to meet, followed by the formation of a new government in the Centre and some time later, in the provinces. Within the PPP this announcement was interpreted not only as a calculated measure designed to delay the transfer of power, but as the first step of part of a larger plan to nullify the entire result of the 1970 election.<sup>123</sup> Consequently, Bhutto, unlike other West Pakistani leaders who appeared to have acquiesced in Yahya's plan, announced his rejection of it and demanded an immediate transfer of power to his party.

Bhutto now also faced problems from within his own party. While the confrontation with Mujib - the "crisis situation" - had enabled Bhutto to impose discipline in the party earlier, now with the crisis temporarily frozen, the party exhibited growing signs of factionalism and intra-party conflict. In April, for instance, the Punjabi PPP was riven by the factional struggle between Sheikh Rashid (President of Punjab PPP) and Mustapha Khar (secretary general of Punjab PPP, who appeared to have Bhutto's support) over the issue of who would be chief minister of the province in the event of a transfer of power.<sup>124</sup> In Sind a similar conflict between Mumtaz Bhutto and Jatoi

was evident over the chief ministership. Elsewhere too various leadership groups were involved in a flurry of manoeuvres aimed at securing ministerial appointments. These were other sources of internal stress in the party. There was, for instance, tension between the party's left-wing groups and the central leadership over the entry into the party of several traditional landed notables,<sup>125</sup> which included Nawab Muzaffer of Kalabagh, the Gilani clan of Multan and the Pir of Zakori Sharif. Bhutto however, against the protests of the party left, continued to welcome into the PPP any prominent leader who gave him verbal declarations of adherence to the party manifesto.

The issue of party elections emerged as another source of intra-party tension. Several leaders (Kasuri, Mairaj, Rana, Kardar) who had earlier accepted Bhutto's justification that the intensity of the national crisis necessitated continuing the tradition of nominations now strongly advocated elections to give the party a democratic character.<sup>126</sup> The demand for elections came primarily from the leftist factions within the party who felt that this was the only way to purge the party of the feudals, capitalists, and self-seekers. Mukhtar Rana appealed to Bhutto to come out of the cordon thrown around him by jagirdars, calling the PPP central committee a "feudal-capitalist committee of a socialist party."<sup>127</sup> Bhutto did not publicly criticise Rana, but Musawaat launched a campaign against him, labelling him the "Lyallpur PPP's Liu Shao-ch'i."<sup>128</sup> Thereafter, Rana announced his resignation from the chairmanship of the Lyallpur PPP.



Rana's was not an isolated case of dissent within the party. Ahmed Reza Kasuri declared publicly that the "era of nominations" must end in the party and elections be held, but Kasuri was first removed from his post as president of the Kasur tehsil PPP and then expelled from the party by Bhutto.<sup>129</sup> Kasuri branded Bhutto 'a fascist' and declared that as far as he was concerned Bhutto was no longer chairman of the party because he had "violated the basic principles of the party." In a similar vein, Anwar Aleemi, secretary general of the Sheikhupura branch called upon Bhutto to announce elections within the party, failing which the PPP workers would form their own forward bloc to free the party from the clutches of capitalists and jagirdars.<sup>130</sup> He accused Bhutto of being a dictator within the party and alleged that the party leadership, now in the hands of the waderas of Sind and the capitalists of the Punjab, had completely gone back on the manifesto. This agitation for party democracy was denounced by Bhutto, who called those demanding elections "anarchists".<sup>131</sup> Elections, Bhutto argued, could not be held until the national crisis was resolved.<sup>132</sup>

Bhutto's response to the growing disunity in the PPP ranks was to divert the party's attention towards continuing the struggle against the military regime and arguing more forcefully for an immediate transfer of power.<sup>133</sup> In September, he demanded that "the rule of the generals must end and the people must take their destiny in their own hands."<sup>134</sup> Although this pressure led Yahya to announce a number of concessions (as for example lifting

the ban on political activity), there were other signs that suggested that the junta was attempting to entrench itself more firmly in power. The Yahya regime produced a draft constitution, (known as the Cornelius Committee's constitutional draft), which, on the Turkish pattern, provided the military with a permanent role in the country's political system, and also gave East Pakistan autonomy, but "within limits".<sup>135</sup> The draft was reported to be even more restrictive than the 1962 constitution.<sup>136</sup> As we shall see below, subsequent events in East Pakistan never gave Yahya the opportunity to enforce this constitution.

The Yahya-Bhutto manoeuvrings in West Pakistan had no impact in the East where the situation except for a brief lull continued to deteriorate. Guerilla warfare organised by armed Bengali freedom fighters, the Mukti Bahini, gathered momentum by October. A provisional government of 'Bangladesh' had already been set up in April by AL exiles in Calcutta. The exodus of East Pakistani refugees into western Bengal gave an international dimension to the internal conflict.<sup>137</sup> As the refugees poured into India, the latter began to openly and actively support guerilla activities.<sup>138</sup> But what alarmed the Yahya government even more was the signing on 9 August of a Treaty of Mutual Friendship between India and the Soviet Union, committing the latter under Article nine to India's defence.<sup>139</sup> Yahya's natural response was to look towards China to provide Pakistan with similar support. Accordingly, in November Yahya despatched an eight-member official delegation

to China led by the man who, more than any other leader in the past was identified as the architect of closer relations with China - Bhutto. The delegation also included two key figures of the military bureaucracy with whom Bhutto reportedly had developed close links - General Gul Hasan and the Air Chief, Rahim Khan. Although the mission brought no tangible help,<sup>140</sup> for Bhutto the visit was of tremendous personal importance for two reasons. First, it brought him prominently into the public eye and earned for him a great deal of renewed public approbation. Second, and more importantly, it enabled Bhutto to renew his friendship with Gul Hasan and Rahim, who were later instrumental in bringing him to power. This is borne out by the disclosure made later by Yahya that it was during this trip that Bhutto prevailed upon these key figures to effect what was a de facto coup that finally removed Yahya from power.<sup>141</sup>

Soon after the China mission, a series of incidents (beginning on 17 November) along the Indian-East Pakistan border culminated in December in full scale hostilities between India and Pakistan.<sup>142</sup> The logistics of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and its conduct lie beyond the scope of this study. Here, it would suffice to note that Pakistani forces were on every front and by land, sea and air, seriously out-weaponed, out-numbered and out-manoeuvred. In the midst of a losing war, Yahya, under pressure from key figures in the junta - in particular Generals Peerzada and Gul Hasan - announced the formation of a coalition government at the Centre, with Nural Amin,

a veteran East Pakistani political leader, as premier and Bhutto as vice-premier.<sup>143</sup> Bhutto agreed temporarily to accept second position in a civilian government on the understanding that wars do not last forever.<sup>144</sup> Bhutto was immediately despatched to New York to argue Pakistan's case at the United Nations. At the Security Council, Bhutto delivered an impassioned speech accusing India and the Soviet Union of attempting to dismember Pakistan.<sup>145</sup> Bhutto castigated the Security Council for "legalising aggression" and in the face of repeated Soviet vetos on resolutions for cease-fire, stormed tearfully out of the chamber. Ironically, Bhutto's statement to the Security Council that "I will not be party to your ignominious surrender" was being made at a time when Dacca had fallen, and the 90,000 strong West Pakistani forces in Bengal had surrendered to the invading Indian troops, and when the terms for surrender were being discussed by a defeated General Niazi at Dacca. Whether Bhutto was aware of the surrender at this stage or not, it is clear that his dramatic performance won him much acclaim at home.<sup>146</sup> The traumatic outcome of this disastrous war was the partition of Pakistan and the formation of a new nation, Bangladesh.

The most immediate effect of these events was the occurrence of violent demonstrations in the West against the military government. Effigies of the ruling junta were burnt throughout the country.<sup>147</sup> The unconditional surrender of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan was viewed as a national humiliation brought about by an inept and morally depraved military junta (since Yahya's fondness

for women and drink was no secret). The shock caused by the military <sup>de</sup>ba<sup>^</sup>cle and the unconditional surrender was all the greater because official statements on the progress of the war had completely concealed the true situation there. Angry mobs took to the streets, while demonstrations demanding an end to military rule continued in the main towns until 20 December, when these threatened to degenerate into riots.<sup>148</sup> The outcry was joined by junior officers in the army who were reported to be on the verge of revolt.<sup>149</sup> A delegation of angry young officers led by Colonel Aleem Afridi called upon Gul Hasan demanding Yahya's removal. These feelings of anger were also expressed at a meeting called at General Head Quarters of all army officers above the rank of colonel. When the army chief, General Hameed rose to address the officers, he was abusively shouted down.<sup>150</sup> The lesson of a defeated army turning on its leaders was not lost on the senior officers in the army. Bhutto's links with important generals appeared to have had an important impact on the situation. Yahya later claimed that the eleven generals who were most vocal and persistent in their demands for Yahya's resignation all had close links with Bhutto.<sup>151</sup>

Against this background, the top military commanders met on the night of 17 December, holding what has been described as a "military election."<sup>152</sup> The decisive voices seem to have been those of Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim, who asked Yahya to resign and hand over power to the only legitimate source of authority - Bhutto. Bhutto's efforts to create a constituency in the upper echelons of

the military evidently paid off. Yahya considered annulling the result of the 1970 election in a bid to stay in power, but this proposal was shot down.<sup>153</sup> Yahya's alternative proposal that the military remain in power but with General Hameed replacing him was also clearly not acceptable to Gul Hasan and Rahim, who pointed out Hameed's unpopularity within GHQ itself. The two leaders decided that not only should Yahya go but that the armed forces itself had no choice but to return to its professional duties, handing over power to the elected civilian leader. The decision to remove Yahya was in essence a de facto coup led by General Gul Hasan, who by all accounts, was the only person exercising real authority within the army.<sup>154</sup> When Bhutto returned from New York on 20 December he was met by Gul Hasan and Rahim and with them he drove straight to the President's House where he was sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The manner in which Bhutto was brought to power may leave the impression that he was merely a military nominee, but this would do him less than justice. Bhutto's claim to leadership rested after all on a sound and legitimate foundation - electoral success, even if he needed the army's sanction to finally achieve power. And for the army it was a case of Hobson's Choice. Faced with a popular uprising in the streets and the prospect of a mutiny in the army ranks, and given the additional factor that there was nobody in the army who could have taken over, they could no longer delay putting into effect the peoples verdict as expressed in the 1970 polls.

## BHUTTO AND THE PPP: AN ASSESSMENT

Our analysis of the traumatic events of 1971 indicates that the crisis had a number of important repercussions with respect to both Bhutto and the PPP. First, as far as Bhutto is concerned, the crisis influenced his later approach to various issues such as regional autonomy within West Pakistan, and his dealings with the political opposition, particularly the regional parties. The secession of Bangladesh accentuated his fears of the Balkanisation of West Pakistan and conditioned his perceptions of regional opponents. His experience with the AL reinforced his suspicions of regional autonomists and the secession of the eastern province with the help of Indian intervention indicated to him the possibility that regional opponents in the West under the guise of political opposition were also actively plotting secession with 'foreign help.' For Bhutto the AL's bid for independence was less a demonstration of what happens when demands for regional autonomy are denied than proof of the actual intentions of regional autonomists. In this sense, Bhutto too succumbed to the tendency that has characterised the approach of all central governments to date, of being suspicious about the loyalty of regional opponents to the very integrity of the State of Pakistan. No less important in this phase were the relations between Bhutto and other political opponents in West Pakistan. Since all the West Pakistani parties - with the exception of the QML - had sided with Mujib against Bhutto at some stage or the other and had held Bhutto primarily responsible for the crisis, this

undoubtedly affected Bhutto's subsequent attitude towards them. This not only deepened his antagonism towards them but contributed to his later tendency to view all political rivals as "enemies of the State".

As for the effect of the crisis on the party's internal dynamics, this period saw the further growth of Bhutto's dominance over the party. As we saw earlier, the crisis gave Bhutto the justification for increasing his personal hold over the party. This was demonstrated firstly, by the continuation of the practice of nominations within the party. And secondly, by the nature of debates and the manner of Bhutto's consultations with the party. Bhutto's preference for a Viceregal style was evident in his relationship with his party in this period. The manner in which Bhutto consulted his party's central committee closely resembled the viceroy's consultation with the Executive Council; the party's highest organ was treated as a rubber-stamping authority rather than one effectively participating in decision-making. Important policy decisions with respect to the East Pakistan situation were made first by Bhutto and then taken to the party forum for endorsement. Within the party, Bhutto - much like Jinnah before him - demanded lieutenants who wished to serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In this sense, he expected to be treated not as a colleague by the other members of the party hierarchy, not even as *primus inter pares*, but as the supreme 'Great Leader'. He could and did ride roughshod over the views of other party members, as we saw earlier in the case of



Ahmed Reza Kasuri, Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj. Indeed he threatened the party with resignation if there was any attempt to challenge his personal authority. If there was any hint of insubordination or if any attempt was made to diminish his self-image, the particular office-holder had to face severe consequences, as was evidenced in the case of A. R. Kasuri.<sup>155</sup> Bhutto's demand that his will be law within the party also set up the unhealthy tradition of leaving everything in the party to him. In fact Bhutto once rather ironically complained that the entire burden of the party fell on him. Given Bhutto's expectation of complete obedience from his lieutenants, this could not have been otherwise. Bhutto's centralised and personalised control over the party naturally inhibited the emergence of secondary leadership within the party. However despite these efforts there were increasing signs of tension within the PPP coalition once it became evident that the party would soon assume governmental power. Factionalism within the party was a reminder of the fact that the PPP was composed of divergent interests and that it was not always easy to reconcile such interests, and maintain party discipline. These intra-party tensions were to assume greater intensity after the PPP assumed power.

Another effect of the crisis on the PPP was a deradicalisation of the party's image. Given Bhutto's aim of portraying himself as the sole representative of West Pakistani interests and of making himself more palatable to elements in the junta he took several steps, as discussed above, to tone down his socialist rhetoric and

bring his party radicals under greater control. This marked an early phase in the PPP's progressive deradicalisation - a process that as we shall see later (chapter VI) intensified in the post-1971 period and eventually involved a decisive shift in the party's social base and the balance of its internal factions.

Another feature of the PPP in this period was that its organisation continued to languish. Organisational problems were pushed into the background as the party concentrated its attention upon the autonomy issue. Thus one effect of the 1971 crisis was to inhibit the organisational development of the party. Factionalism within the party only exacerbated problems of organisational weakness. Such institutional chaos, as we shall see later, had an important bearing on Bhutto's choice of patrimonialism as a strategy of rule.

An early indication of such a strategy was evident in the manner in which Bhutto finally achieved power. Bhutto's lobbying of influential members of the military hierarchy demonstrated a "personalist" approach to political power. For Bhutto his party structure alone was not a sufficient resource with which to acquire power. Other resources were essential, and of these, the military was in his view the single most important means by which he could assume governmental power. Bhutto had been in Pakistani politics long enough to realise that important members of the country's praetorian guard had to be won over or placated before the military could be persuaded to transfer power. It is in the light of this assessment

that Bhutto attempted to establish links within the military. His reliance on non-representative actors to consolidate his political position was born of what he considered a realistic appraisal of the Pakistani political situation, but nonetheless reflected his belief that the road to power lay not merely in political party organisation but the manipulation of other interests as well. Such an assessment and reliance on non-representative actors was, as we shall see later, to exert an important influence both on the subsequent development of the PPP and the manner of Bhutto's rule.

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#### NOTES

1. There are several books and articles dealing with this topic, and considerable divergence amongst them both in the interpretation given to events as well as the responsibility they assign to different political actors concerned with those events. For a work stating the East Pakistani view see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (London: Columbia University Press, 1972). For books representing the West Pakistani view see G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974); Safdar Mahmud, The Deliberate Debacle, (Lahore: Sheikh Mohammed Ashraf, 1976); Major-General Fazal Mugeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973); Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan, (London: Macmillan, 1972); Rushbrook Williams, The East Pakistani Tragedy, (London: Faber 1972). See also Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973) and Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976). Articles include: David Dunbar, 'Pakistan: The failure of Political Negotiations', Asian Survey, XII: 5, (May 1972); W. H. Morris Jones 'Pakistan: Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh', Political Quarterly, vol. 43, (April/June 1972); G. W. Choudhury, 'The Last Days of the United Pakistan', International Affairs, 49, (April 1973) and 'Bangladesh: Why it Happened', International Affairs, 48, (April 1972), Official documents include: -Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and National Affairs, 5 August, 1971) and Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1971). This list of writings is by no means exhaustive, and a more extensive bibliography can be found in 'Political Science and Pakistan, 1947-1971', in W. Eric Gustavson, ed., Pakistan and Bangladesh: Bibliographic Essays in Social Science, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975) in the section on the 'Politics of Tragedy', pages 106-110. Despite the vast literature

on the subject, a serious gap in information remains owing to the fact that the Report of the Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission, an enquiry commission set up by Bhutto on 1972 to look into the East Pakistan crisis, has still not been made public.

2. This applies to studies such as Anwar Syed, 'The Pakistan Peoples Party: Phase One and Two' in Lawrence Ziring et al, eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press 1977); K. B. Sayeed, 'How Radical is the Peoples Party?' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Spring 1975). A notable exception, however, is Philip E. Jones, Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979).
3. See chapter VI.
4. For another assessment of the three principal figures and their constituencies, see Rounaq Jahan, 'Elite in Crisis', Orbis, Vol. XVII, No. 2, (Summer 1973).
5. The best work remains, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, ibid. See also K. U. Ahmed, Break-up of Pakistan, (London: Social Science Publishers, 1972).
6. Jahan, ibid, p. 160.
7. The Six Point programme was advanced by the Awami League as early as February 1966. See Dawn, 12 February 1966, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Our Charter for Survival: Six Point Programme (Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1966).
8. Syed Hamayun, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's 6-Point Formula, unpublished masters dissertation, (Political Science Department, Karachi University, 1973), p. 59.
9. The Pakistan Observer, 15, 19, 20 March 1966.
10. The Agartala Conspiracy, in brief, charged thirty-three East Pakistani politicians, civil and military personnel with conspiring to bring about East Pakistan's secession in collusion with India. The list of alleged conspirators include Mujib. The case was widely viewed by the Bengali community as a plot against Bengali nationalists. Even in West Pakistan leading politicians expressed grave doubts about the credibility of the case. The case was finally dropped and Mujib released during the last days of the Ayub regime.
11. Upto 1966 the Awami League also enjoyed some support in West Pakistan. But when Mujib made the Six-Points programme public, the West Pakistani branch led by Nasrullah Khan strongly criticised it. The party split into pro-and anti Six Pointers, the latter being generally from West Pakistan. See M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, (July 1970).
12. See M. Rashiduzzaman, 'Leadership, Organisation, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement', Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3, (March 1972).

13. There is a near-unanimous consensus on this motive of the Yahya regime amongst writers on Pakistan. See for instance, Lawrence Ziring, 'Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum', in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975); H. Feldman, op.cit; R. Jahan, op.cit. This contention has recently been supported by Henry Kissinger in his memoirs, in which he reports a conversation between Yahya and him before the election. See his The White House Years, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 850. Indeed it was perhaps this motive which lay behind the two major concessions made by Yahya: that is the dissolution of one-unit in West Pakistan and representation in the national assembly apportioned on the basis of population rather than parity (thus giving the Bengalis a majority in the assembly).
14. See, for instance, Mujib's speech on 23 March 1966, reprinted in The Bangladesh Papers, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, n.d.), p. 27.
15. Quoted in The New York Times, 26 March 1969.
16. Interviews with senior PPP leaders.
17. This was disclosed by Bhutto in an address to the national assembly in April 1972. For the text of his speech see Pakistan Times, 16 April 1972, 6.
18. Ibid.
19. Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, Foundation Document Ten, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.), pp. 80-88.
20. Ibid, p. 84.
21. J. A. Rahim, Outline of a Federal Constitution for Pakistan, (Karachi: PPP, 1969), Political Series (4), p. 36.
22. Tapan Das, Pakistan Politics, (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1969), p. 48.
23. Pakistan Times, 4 July 1970.
24. Pakistan Times, 29 July 1970..
25. See for instance, Pakistan Times, 13 April, 1970.
26. Interview with G. M. Khar, London, March 1978.
27. The Yahya government gave its own version of the events leading up to the civil war in East Pakistan in a White Paper, op.cit, published in August 1971, in which it alleged that the crisis was the result of "collusion" between the Indian government and the Awami League going back to 1964.
28. Bhutto's version of the crucial events of 1971 are to be found in his, The Great Tragedy, (Karachi: Vision Publications, 1976).
29. Pakistan Times, 20 February 1971.

30. Pakistan Times, 21 December 1970.
31. Pakistan Times, 21 December 1970.
32. See for instance Tajuddin's statement as reported in The Times, (London), 28 December 1970, 4.
33. Dawn, 4 January 1971. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 January 1971, p. 6.
34. Interview with PPP leaders.
35. Safdar Mahmud, op.cit, for example puts forward this argument. For Bhutto's view, see The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 17.
36. Ibid, p. 27.
37. Ibid, p. 75.
38. Ibid.
39. Dawn, 10 January 1971. The members of the committee were Bhutto, Rahim, Mubashar Hasan, Sherpao, Sheikh Rashid, Rasool Buksh Talpur, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Hanif Ramay, Makhdoom Zaman of Hala, Taj Mohammed Langah, Naseem Jahan, Peerzada, General (Retd) Akbar Khan, Kauser Niazi, Mairaj Mohammed Khan, Khar, Safiur Rahman Kiyani, and Tahir Mohammed Khan. The number was later increased to 24 by the end of January to include Khurshid Hasan Meer, Afzal Wattoo, Mustafa Nawaz Awan, Sher Mohammed Khan, Sardar Mohammed Aslam, Suleiman Samejo.
40. Interviews with Mubashar Hasan, Mustapha Khar, Taj Mohammed Langah, (Lahore, December 1977), Maulana Kauser Niazi (Islamabad, October 1979) and K. H. Meer (Rawalpindi, October 1979).
41. Interview with Mukhtar Rana, London, October 1978.
42. The entire account of the PPL dispute is to be found in A. H. Kardar, Peoples Commitment: Politics in Pakistan, 1970-1971, (Lahore : National Book Service, 1971), pp<sup>s</sup> 31-52.
43. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
44. Pakistan Times, 22 January 1971, 6.
45. Musawaat, 16 January 1971.
46. Pakistan Times, 27 January 1971, 16.
47. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
48. Interview with leading Karachi industrialists.
49. Pakistan Observer, 15 January 1971.
50. Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 34.

51. G. W. Choudhury, op.cit, p. 156.
52. The "hawks" were reported to include: General Abdul Hamid (Chief of Staff); Lt. General S. M. G. Peerzada (Principal Staff Officer); General M. Akbar Khan (Director, Military Intelligence); Major-General Omar (Director, Military Security); Lt.-General A. K. Niazi (GOC, Eastern Command); and Lt.-General Tikka Khan (the last West Pakistani Governor of East Pakistan).
53. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 21.
54. Z. A. Bhutto's interview with Oriana Fallaci, 1972, reprinted in The Bangladesh Papers, op.cit, pp. 292-293.
55. See chapter III.
56. A meeting of PPP leaders of central and northern Punjab was held in Lahore on 2 February, which gave Bhutto the "mandate" to "seek adjustments in the AL Six Points to make them serve the ends of national unity." Curiously enough this meeting was held at the residence of a non-PPP political personality, Mian Arif Iktikhar, and its proceedings conducted "in camera". Meetings followed in Karachi on 4 February, Multan on 10 February and at Larkana and Bahawalpur. See Pakistan Times, 3 February 1971, 1 and 11.
57. Pakistan Times, 3 February 1971, 1 and 11.
58. Pakistan Times, 14 February 1971, 14.
59. Mujib had asked Yahya to convene the N.A. on 15 February.
60. The Great Tragedy, ibid, p. 22.
61. Bangladesh Papers, op.cit, pp. 150-151.
62. Dawn, 16 February 1971.
63. Ibid.
64. Interviews with senior army officers, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, October 1979.
65. Interviews with Major-General Shah Rafi Alam (Rawalpindi, December 1977), Lt. General Mohammed Iqbal (Rawalpindi, October 1979) and Air Chief Marshall Z. A. Khan (London, March 1978).
66. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 27.
67. M. Rashiduzzaman (1972), op.cit, p. 193.
68. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
69. Some members, notably Mairaj and Ahmed Reza Kasuri, had the courage to say so at the convention.
70. Pakistan Times, 22 February 1971, 1, 7 and 10.

71. The Convention passed a resolution "endorsing whole heartedly the decision of the party chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto not to attend the coming session of the N.A. until such time as it is assured that both parts of the country will frame an agreed constitution". For the other resolutions passed at the convention, see Pakistan Times, 22 February 1971, 1, 7, & 10.
72. See Kardar's account in Peoples Commitment, op.cit, p. 80.
73. Dawn, 1 March 1971.
74. Far East Economic Review, 6-13 March 1971, p. 12.
75. Lahore High Court Judgement in Murder Trial, State vs. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Others, (Lahore: Pakistan Times Press, 1978), p. 6.
76. This was on 3 May 1971. Kasuri was formally expelled from the party in October 1973. Ibid, p. 7. See also, Pakistan Times, 3 May 1971.
77. Dawn, 2 March 1971.
78. Dawn, 15 March 1971.
79. The Last Days of United Pakistan, op.cit, p. 236.
80. Choudhury's entire account of the 1971 crisis has been challenged by A. Gauhar, 'Last Days of United Pakistan: Review Article', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. One, No. 1, (January 1979), pp. 91-104. Gauhar's article suggests that Choudhury's account is not reliable as it suffers from serious inconsistencies and deliberate mis-statements.
81. Wayne Wilcox, op.cit, p. 21.
82. Choudhury, op.cit, p. 237.
83. In addition to Choudhury's study, this is also applicable to David Loshak, Pakistan Crisis, (London: Heiniman, 1971).
84. This was Mujib's own assessment. See Salik, op.cit, p. 43.
85. Rounaq Jahan, op.cit, p. 194.
86. Dawn, 8 March 1971.
87. Dawn, 8 March 1971.
88. Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, op.cit, pp. 90-93. For a selection of Yahya's strongly-worded speeches of the period see 'Documents' in Pakistan Horizon, The East Pakistan Crisis, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (1971) pp. 102-111.
89. 'Bhutto's Intransigence Held Responsible for Crisis', Pakistan Times, 8 March 1971, 12.
90. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh, My Bangladesh, selected Speeches and Statements, 28 October 1970 to 26 March 1971, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 97-103.



91. 'Many leaders support Mujib's Four Demands', Dawn, 8 March 1971, 12.
92. See chapter XI below.
93. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 36.
94. Dawn, 15 March 1971.
95. See for instance, Hamid Sarfaz's statement in Dawn, 17 March 1971, 10.
96. The Bangladesh Papers, op.cit, pp. 246-247.
97. The published accounts are: White Paper, op.cit, which gives Yahya's version; The Great Tragedy, op.cit, which gives Bhutto's version of the negotiations; and Rahman Sobhan 'Negotiating for Bangladesh: A Participant's View', South Asian Review, (July 1971), which (though much briefer than the first two) gives the Awami League side of the story; and press reports.
98. For details of the proposals see White Paper, op.cit:
99. Ibid, p. 20. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 40. Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, op.cit, p. 102.
100. White Paper, op.cit, pp. 47-59.
101. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, p. 41.
102. The Great Tragedy, op.cit, pp. 45-46. For a discussion of Bhutto's other objections see David Dunbar, op.cit, pp. 458-459.
103. Ibid, pp. 45-46.
104. Ibid, pp. 61-75.
105. Salik, op.cit, p. 68.
106. Interviews with senior military officers.
107. Asian Recorder, 30 April - 6 May, Vol. XVII, p. 10133.
108. Ten mills were taken over in Lyallpur as workers came out into the streets under Mukhtar Rana's instructions. See Dawn, 25 March, 1971.
109. Troop movements in the East had intensified throughout the month of March. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1-8 May 1971, Vol. 18, p. 24567.
110. See Yahya's speech in Dawn, 25 March 1971.
111. See for instance, Jahan, op.cit, Salik, op.cit, and Anthony Mascarenas, Rape of Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971).

112. For Yahya's version see, White Paper, ibid.
113. Ibid, p. 51.
114. As for instance argued by Subrata Roy Chowdhrey in Genésis of Bangladesh, (Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1972) and Mascarenas, op.cit.
115. For a critique of such a view see Hamza Alavi, 'Bangladesh: Background and Prospects; a Review Article, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. XI, (1973).
116. This 'disclosure' has been made only recently by Yahya in an interview with a Pakistani monthly. See Jang, (London), 29 December 1978, 1.
117. Dawn, 27 March 1971.
118. Dawn, 28 March 1971.
119. Dawn, 4 April 1971.
120. Dawn, 6 April 1971, 5.
121. Pakistan Times, 15 April 1971, 1.
122. For his speech see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 18, 20-27 November 1971, p. 24953.
123. See Bhutto's speech of 17 July in Asian Recorder, Vol. XVII, 3-9 September 1971, p. 10346.
124. Pakistan Times, 27 April 1971, 1.
125. See Azad, 5 and 18 January 1971.
126. Dawn, 12 August 1971, 31.
127. Pakistan Times, 2 October 1971, 6.
128. Musawaat, 24 September 1971.
129. Pakistan Times, 4 May 1971, 8.
130. Pakistan Times, 29 August 1971, 16.
131. Pakistan Times, 24 September 1971, 7.
132. Pakistan Times, 5 May 1971.
133. Pakistan Times, 5 May 1971.
134. Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit, p. 217.
135. Choudhury, op.cit, pp. 196-197.
136. Ibid. This has never been made public.

137. As of 11 June 1971, an estimated 5.5 million refugees had reached India. See The Washington Post, 11 June 1971, 1.
138. For a detailed discussion of the military planning, actual preparations and course of the Indian campaign, see Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 1973). See also International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1971, (London: IISS, 1972), pp. 46-54.
139. Space does not permit us to go into the international aspects of the 1971 war. This has been dealt with in G. W. Choudhury, The Major Powers and the Sub-Continent, (New York: Free Press 1975).
140. There is some controversy over this point. Yahya, seven years later, 'disclosed' that Bhutto deliberately "lied" to him about the extent of support that the Chinese had promised Pakistan. Whereas the Chinese committed only moral help, Bhutto allegedly conveyed the impression to Yahya that the Chinese would intervene militarily in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. According to Yahya, this deliberate misperception created by Bhutto had an important bearing on the conduct of the war in East Pakistan, as the Pakistani forces kept waiting for 'Red help' from the North that never materialised. See Yahya's interview in Urdu Digest, (January 1979).
141. Urdu Digest, ibid.
142. Pakistan formally declared war on India on 4 December 1971. Yahya imposed a state of emergency and banned the National Awami Party. This was apparently done to preempt any bids for secession in the NWFP and Baluchistan by NAP that had always advocated greater regional autonomy, and supported Mujib's Six Points. Fears of Balkanisation of the western wing had always been expressed within the army. Bhutto, himself, had frequently warned of this, and Yahya later attributed his action of banning NAP to pressure from Bhutto. See Urdu Digest, op.cit.
143. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 18, 5-12 February 1972, p. 25090.
144. New York Times, 4 December 1971, 10.
145. See 'The Invasion and the Veto', Speech at the Security Council, New York, 12 December 1971, in Marching Towards Democracy, op.cit., pp. 231-260.
146. Later, the film clip of Bhutto's performance at the U.N. was shown over and over again on Pakistani television after Bhutto was sworn in as President.
147. New York Times, 24 December 1971, 4.
148. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 18, 5-12 February, 1972, p. 25090.
149. Interview with Air Chief Marshall Z. A. Khan, London, March 1979.

150. Ibid.
151. Urdu Digest, op.cit.
152. New York Times, 24 December 1971, 4.
153. Urdu Digest, op.cit.
154. Herbert Feldman, op.cit, p. 189.
155. Other than being thrown out of the party, Kasuri and his followers were physically attacked by a rival PPP faction in Kasur led by Yaqub Maan allegedly at Bhutto and Khar's behest. The physical assault by the Yaqub faction is an established fact, but whether Yaqub acted on his own initiative or was directed by Bhutto personally, remains an unresolved issue. See Pakistan Times, 3 May 1971.

PART II

## V

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1971-1977: AN OVERVIEW

This chapter is concerned with the narration of the major events and policies during the PPP's five and a half years in office. The intention here is to provide the essential introductory background for the analytical work that follows. Such a narrative backdrop is considered necessary in the absence of any readily available published record of the entire PPP era to which we can refer.<sup>1</sup> Burki's book does cover the period considered here, but the narrative material he provides is related primarily to his thesis of the applicability of the group theory of politics to Pakistan under Bhutto.<sup>2</sup> Taseer's work also deals with this period, but since his is a biographical approach, he provides insufficient information about the Bhutto government's policies and actions for our purposes.<sup>3</sup> An account of internal developments in the PPP, however, is, for the most part, reserved for the following three chapters.

THE PERIOD 1971-77 IN OUTLINE

When the Bhutto government assumed power in December 1971, it was confronted with a formidable array of problems. Some of these problems were a consequence of the 1971 war and the secession of Bangladesh, while others were related to heightened expectations that accompanied the establishment of the first popularly elected civilian government in Pakistani history. The Bhutto

government made vigorous efforts to reconstruct the country both politically and economically. It announced a series of reforms in the economic and social sphere. At the same time, the regime took a number of steps to consolidate its power by neutralising power centres such as the military, the civil service and the industrial elite.

However, the problems of the new regime were compounded in the early years by increasing incidents of public disorder. This took several forms - labour strikes, tenant unrest, student agitation and linguistic riots.(in Sind) - and the government had to direct considerable attention towards dealing with these in order to preserve public order.

The task of political reconstruction depended in large part on the evolution of a consensus on the new political structure between the PPP regime and the opposition parties. Constitution-making in 1972 and 1973 highlighted the difficulties of evolving such a consensus over issues such as regional autonomy, the role of Islam in the state, and executive power. Through a series of manoeuvres and timely concessions, Bhutto was able to elicit support from the opposition for the interim Constitution of 1972, and then the Permanent Constitution of 1973. However, this achievement proved to be short-lived, and government-opposition relations became increasingly strained over the provincial autonomy question, the issue of Islamisation of Pakistani society and what the opposition regarded as Bhutto's assumption of dictatorial powers. This eventually led Bhutto to ban the major opposition party NAP (National Army Party) in February 1975, establishing a virtual one-

party system under a parliamentary facade. Bhutto resorted to ruling with the help of emergency powers and other authoritarian laws, and used military action to crush a regional autonomy movement in Baluchistan. By 1976, this insurgency in Baluchistan appeared to have been sufficiently restrained, while the opposition parties stood divided and in disarray. This convinced Bhutto that the opposition could no longer mount any significant challenge to his authority. When this coincided with a temporary upturn in the economy after years of stagnation and rising prices, Bhutto viewed this as the most opportune moment to renew his party's electoral mandate. Therefore, he decided to call a general election in March 1977.

Prior to the March election, the PPP regime took a number of steps aimed at improving its populist credentials. However, despite this, the nine opposition parties - now combined in the Pakistan National Alliance - succeeded in mobilising a massive wave of anti-government sentiment unleashed by the relaxation of curbs on political activity. But the election resulted in a huge victory for the PPP. The opposition denounced this as fraudulent and launched an agitation movement to dislodge Bhutto from power. Within a month, the Bhutto government found it difficult to maintain its authority in the face of the urban protest and was compelled to seek military assistance to quell the agitation. This ultimately culminated in the military's seizure of power. We turn now to a more detailed account of these developments.

## EARLY PRIORITIES AND DILEMMAS

Bhutto came to office in circumstances tragic for Pakistan, in the wake of a shattering military defeat which led to the break-up of the country and to over 90,000 Pakistani troops and civilians taken prisoners of war by India. Coming to power after what has been referred to as the 'second partition' of Pakistan, the PPP government had a formidable array of problems with which to deal. Some of these problems were the result of the 1971 war with India and the loss of Bangladesh, while others were a consequence of the 'crisis of expectations' caused by the PPP's radical rhetoric, the nature of its constituency support - amongst the new social groups that demanded participation in the political system - and the restoration of a civilian government after years of military rule.

Some historians have compared the 1971 situation to that obtaining at the time of independence, in 1947.<sup>4</sup> The analogy is attractive for the legacy and the problems appear almost identical. Like the first post-independence nationalist government, the PPP regime had to deal with the legacy of war and economic dislocation, as well as problems of nation and state-building in an atmosphere of heightened expectations. In essence, Bhutto and his government were given the task of building a 'New Pakistan' - a Pakistan different both geographically and psychologically.

Bhutto addressed himself quickly to dealing with these problems establishing as his first priority what W. H. Wriggins has called "the ruler's imperative," i.e. the need to stay in power.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, his initial moves



were directed towards curtailing the influence of the major power groups on the one hand, and dealing with sources of public disorder on the other hand. Contemporaneously retaining martial law under which he became Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, Bhutto appointed a twelve-member cabinet consisting mainly of members of his own party, while keeping the portfolios of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Inter-Provincial Co-ordination for himself.<sup>6</sup> At the same time he appointed PPP men as governors to the four provinces.<sup>7</sup> He announced the release of Mujibur Rahman after 'consulting' with the 'people' at a mass rally,<sup>8</sup> permitting him to return to Dacca, and lifted the ban on NAP imposed by the Yahya regime.

Simultaneously with these actions, Bhutto through a series of executive decrees attempted to consolidate his power by neutralising potentially hostile power centres, such as the military, the civil service, the big industrialists and the media. Dealing with the military first, Bhutto "retired" twenty of the top military leaders, including Yahya Khan, who was placed under house arrest, and appointed a commission of inquiry into the military débâcle of 1971. Bhutto's attempt to establish civilian control over the military went a step further in March 1972 with the removal of Lt. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim along with six other military leaders.<sup>9</sup> These purges were followed by structural changes - for instance the post of Commander-in-Chief, which Bhutto described as an 'anachronistic and colonialist' title, was abolished and replaced by Chief-of-Staff. The head of state now became the effective 'commander-in-chief'.<sup>10</sup>

The civil service was dealt with in a similar way as the military - with purges followed by structural reforms. On 12 March 1972, 1,300 civil servants were dismissed under a Martial Law Order passed to "tone up" the administration and to "correct serious lapses and failings" in the civil service.<sup>11</sup> The purge of the bureaucracy was followed by the withdrawal of constitutional safeguards, traditionally enjoyed by the civil service, in the new constitution of 1973.<sup>12</sup> Then, on 20 August 1973, sweeping structural changes were announced in the civil service.<sup>13</sup> The existing civil service structure (that consisted of classes 1 to 10) - including the elitist CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan)-was abolished and replaced by a simple unified grading structure. Condemning the CSP-dominated colonial structure in the most derogatory terms, Bhutto declared:

"No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national life as what is called 'naukershahi'.....It has created a class of brahmins or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery and arrogance, insulated from the life of the people, and incapable of identifying itself with them." 14

At the same time, Bhutto announced that the new system would

"remove barriers in the way of the movement of individuals both upwards to the posts of higher responsibility and sideways between different kinds of related jobs."

A system of "lateral entry" was announced to recruit qualified specialists from professions outside the service.

Other than the military and civilian bureaucracy, Bhutto also moved against another power group, the industrial elite, in order to establish his political ascendancy. On

the very day he assumed power, he impounded the passports of the 22 families.<sup>15</sup> Action was threatened against 19 industrialists and three of the richest, Dawood, Valika and Habibullah were arrested.<sup>16</sup> In January 1972, several private firms were nationalised to reduce the political and economic power that had been accumulated by a small number of industrial and financial houses. (The nationalisation programme is described below under Economic Reconstruction.) The capitalists were asked to surrender capital taken abroad, and Habibullah was even paraded on television in handcuffs as a warning.<sup>17</sup> Simultaneously important changes were made in high civilian posts - the editor of the Pakistan Times, the chairman of the Press Trust of Pakistan, the governor of the State Bank, the managing director of the National Shipping Corporation, and the managing director of the Progressive Papers Limited, were dismissed.<sup>18</sup> Most of these posts were either held by members of the 22 families or their friends.

But after this initial show of strength, Bhutto and his finance minister, Dr. Mubashar Hasan, addressed about 200 leading Karachi businessmen on 23 January 1972, adopting a more conciliatory tone and asking for their cooperation.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, Bhutto announced the lifting of travel restrictions and the release of Dawood and Valika.<sup>20</sup> In early May 1972, this policy went a step further when Bhutto appointed Rafique Saigol (one of the "22") as managing director of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA).<sup>21</sup> This appointment was intended as a symbolic gesture to Big Business.<sup>22</sup> However, the big business community remained

hostile and unreconciled by the new PPP regime, despite repeated assurances by the latter. The nationalisation measures together with Bhutto's initial actions against the industrialists created an atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty. While Bhutto gave assurances, in several meetings with businessmen and industrialists that "private enterprise had a distinct part to play" in the kind of "mixed economy" envisaged by the PPP government,<sup>23</sup> the business community was unwilling to accept the government's right to lay down conditions and rules for the role to be played by the private sector and remained suspicious about the government's intentions. This uneasy and often hostile relationship was to continue throughout the PPP's five and a half years in office, and was to have economic repercussions as we shall see below.

Another power bloc that the Bhutto government dealt with upon assuming power, was the media. The influence of this power bloc although in no sense comparable to the power of the military, civil service or the industrial elite, was nevertheless viewed as significant enough to justify government attention and action.<sup>24</sup> In the first few days of the PPP government, controls over the press and the media were temporarily suspended. However, when media professionals began to exercise the freedom granted them, the PPP regime reinstated controls upon the media. In February 1972, Altaf Gauhar, the editor of Dawn who wrote critical articles about the new regime was arrested and jailed under Martial Law for "acting in a seditious manner."<sup>25</sup> The regime's subsequent justification that Gauhar

had been arrested not in his capacity as a journalist, but for his "previous role as a senior civil servant" did not appear very convincing.<sup>26</sup> While journalists throughout the country campaigned for his release, the PPP government appointed "new management" for the newspaper, that was now careful not to offend the ruling party.<sup>27</sup> The Punjab Punch of Lahore was banned in February, while the Sun had its operations suspended until the government was satisfied that the news would conform to government "standards".<sup>28</sup> Two periodicals of Lahore, Zindagi and Urdu Digest were banned and their editors jailed under Martial Law - an action that led to strong protest from the Punjab Union of Journalists.<sup>29</sup> Contrary to what the PPP had promised during the 1970 election, the National Press Trust (a government body used to censor newspapers) was not abolished, but merely reconstituted. Further, a Press Consultative Committee was set up in March 1972 under the Minister of Information, Kauser Niazi, which was merely a euphemism for a censorship body composed of 'loyal' journalists. Thus safe for a brief period, the PPP government imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of expression.<sup>30</sup>

Several methods were used to establish controls and check dissent.<sup>31</sup> Legal methods included the use of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance (a remnant of the Ayub Khan era). A special cell was created in the Ministry of Law to make speedy use of the legal provisions.<sup>32</sup> Non-legal methods included the use of newsprint (over which the government had a monopoly) and advertisements both to 'control' the

dissenting papers and to patronise People's Party organs and other pro-PPP papers.<sup>33</sup> The PPP newspaper Musawaat was given official sanction to write some critical stories in order to give some semblance of 'press freedom' and Bhutto was asked in November 1972 by his press officials to name the 'holy cows' whom the papers could not attack or criticise.<sup>34</sup> Bhutto's answer was simple: "I am the only holy cow."<sup>35</sup>

Other than the neutralisation of important power blocs in the country, Bhutto's initial priorities were also concerned with what we earlier called the civil order problem that was partially a consequence of the events of 1971 and in part resulted from the heightened expectations amongst the new social groups that formed part of the PPP constituency. There were various sources of public disorder that posed a challenge to the PPP government's authority in the early years. These can be identified as industrial action by urban labour, tenant unrest, linguistic riots and student agitation. We will deal with labour unrest first.

Labour unrest was a legacy of the Ayubian model of economic development which stressed industrialization but put growth before equity and was partially responsible for creating an increasingly impoverished industrial working class, and of the economic dislocation under Yahya, occasioned by the Bangladesh crisis and the war with India, which resulted in a fall in industrial output and the consequent deterioration in living standards. Such unrest was also the result of PPP's own radical rhetoric, and its

election promise of creating a more equitable social order. Believing that the PPP government would now implement their slogans of 'worker's government' and Awami Raj' (People's Rule), industrial workers in many parts of the country occupied factories.<sup>36</sup> Awami Adalats (People's Court) in the Punjab and Sind 'tried' individuals for being pro-capitalist or anti-labour and passed sentences.<sup>37</sup> Gheraos (seizure) and Jaloas (burning) of factories became frequent.<sup>38</sup> The PPP government was faced at this juncture not only by industrial action, but also by agrarian unrest, as pitched battles raged between landlords and tenants in many parts of Sind, Punjab and NWFP. Tenant unrest was to some extent defused by the announcement of tenancy reform (see below under 'Economic Reconstruction' for details) but labour hartals (stoppages or strikes) assumed far more dangerous proportions.

Initially, the PPP government adopted a cautious policy. Some action was taken to stop retrenchments and to reinstate workers dismissed for striking by employers, largely under the guidance of Mairaj Mohammed Khan, the left-wing member of the PPP Central Committee, and now a minister of state for Public Affairs. But when labour unrest continued despite severe warnings from Bhutto, the PPP government decided to reorient its strategy. Bhutto now warned that if Gheraos and Jaloas did not stop "the strength of the street will be met by the strength of the state."<sup>39</sup> At the same time a 'New Labour Policy' was announced on 10 February 1972, followed by the passage of a large volume of labour legislation over the next several months.<sup>40</sup>

The labour reforms mandated large increases in both monetary and non-monetary benefits for workers. These benefits included compulsory payment of bonus, an increase in profit-sharing from 2% to 4%, contributions by the employers to pension, medical and welfare funds, as well as 20% worker's participation in management to be worked out in gradual stages.<sup>41</sup> Another set of provisions in the new labour laws set up a compulsory system of shop stewards, with a grievance procedure to go along with it, with appeal to a Labour Court. Thus the workers while retaining their right to strike were now provided with the option of immediate adjudication by the court. At the same time, reasons for dismissal now had to be given in writing by the employer. The 'New Labour Policy' (its economic aspects are discussed below), however, fell far short of labour's expectations, and the strikes continued unabated.<sup>42</sup> Faced with such a situation, Bhutto used the police, and later the army, to break up strikes in Karachi and Hyderabad in February 1972. The worst outbreak of violence occurred on 8 June when eleven workers were killed according to official figures in a worker-police clash in SITE, Karachi.<sup>43</sup>

To add to the lawlessness, the police went on strike in February in several cities to press for their demands for better pay.<sup>44</sup> Troops were called out to deal with striking policemen in Hyderabad, while in Lahore, following the then Commander-in-Chief of the army's refusal to supply troops,<sup>45</sup> Governor Khar used armed "supporters" of the PPP - mostly hired goondas (goons) to break up the strike on 24 February.<sup>46</sup> 1972 however, continued to be a



year of industrial unrest with the ruling party rather unconvincingly presenting this as a 'capitalist conspiracy' to embarrass a 'socialist government' and to topple "peoples" rule. In October-November 1972, eighteen days of labour riots and hartals led by the eleven biggest trade unions of Karachi resulted in pitched battles between police and workers and ended in the calling out of troops to control the situation. Hundreds of labour leaders were arrested and several workers were killed.<sup>47</sup>

The adoption of tougher measures<sup>48</sup> and ultimately force to bring about industrial discipline created serious strains within the ruling party between the Leftist factions and the party leadership. The first to part company with the PPP over this issue was Mukhtar Rana, MNA, who enjoyed substantial labour union support in the Lyallpur district of the Punjab. Accusing the party of having gone back on its manifesto, of closing the party's door on the meknat kash (the toiling people) and of seeking to perpetuate a "feudal Martial Law" regime,<sup>49</sup> Rana called for an open awami adalat (people's court) to "try" Bhutto.<sup>50</sup> Rana was arrested on 23 March 1972, under a Martial Law Regulation for making an 'objectionable speech'.<sup>51</sup> He was subsequently sentenced under Martial Law, to five years rigorous imprisonment, and disqualified from membership of the National Assembly.<sup>52</sup> In the official press, Rana was portrayed as an "eccentric", "anarchist" and "adventurist".<sup>53</sup> Rana contended that his jailing was intended as a severe warning to labour union organisers to desist from opposing the ruling party and marked the victory of the right-wing forces

right vs  
left

in the party (such as Khar, Peerzada and Kauser Niazi) who had repeatedly pointed out to Bhutto the dangers of allowing the Left to take over the party.<sup>54</sup> Mukhtar Rana was formally expelled from the party on 19 May 1972.

Another PPP leader who expressed his disenchantment with the PPP government's labour policies - as well as its attitude towards the 'toiling people' in general - was Mairaj Mohammed Khan. A cabinet minister since May 1972, he found it increasingly difficult to justify the PPP's strong-arm methods against labour, as well as what he felt were the PPP's half-hearted attempts at industrial and land reform. Mairaj's patience was clearly exhausted when Kauser Niazi had made a thinly veiled threat against 'Communists' in the party who instigated workers during the labour trouble in Karachi in October/November 1972.<sup>55</sup> In protest against the government's repressive policies he resigned from the government on 17 October 1972.<sup>56</sup> He finally left the party on 13 November 1973 accusing the PPP, among other things, of trying "to preserve the old, dying feudal and capitalist system."<sup>57</sup> Mairaj continued to criticise the PPP government for its 'anti-labour' and reactionary policies until he was arrested on 28 May 1974 for interceding on behalf of striking women teachers in Karachi during a scuffle with the police.<sup>58</sup> He was later tried and sentenced to four years imprisonment by a special tribunal under emergency laws for making an "objectionable speech".<sup>59</sup> Similar treatment was meted out to militant union leaders; in some cases criminal suits were instituted against recalcitrant union leaders, or they were detained under

emergency laws such as Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR).<sup>60</sup>

But Bhutto's problems were not only limited to the 'crisis of expectations' among labour described above. Another source of public disorder during the early years was language riots in Sind in July 1972. Since this coincided with the labour unrest in Karachi, this led Bhutto to speak of the '3 L' conspiracy in Sind - i.e. labour, language and lawlessness.<sup>61</sup> The linguistic trouble originated as a consequence of a bill passed by the PPP-dominated Sind provincial assembly on 7 July 1972, making Sindhi the provincial language of Sind.<sup>62</sup> In Sind, where an estimated 45% of the inhabitants are Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, such a bill was bound to generate controversy.<sup>63</sup> Predictably, the Muhajirs reacted violently and bloody riots broke out between the 'old' and 'new' Sindhis.<sup>64</sup> Faced with this explosive situation when he had just taken the first step towards normalising relations with India by signing the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972, which had generated its own problems (some of which are discussed below), Bhutto was constrained to move quickly to defuse the issue. Intervening personally, Bhutto negotiated a settlement - The Language Accord - mutually agreeable to representatives of the 'old' and 'new' Sindhis. This provided the Muhajirs with several concessions such as making the learning of Urdu compulsory for Sindhis, and exempting non-Sindhi government employees from having to learn Sindhi for twelve years.<sup>65</sup> The original bill was revised to declare both Urdu and Sindhi as official languages of the province.<sup>66</sup> Even with the question settled, relations between old and new

Sindhis remained precarious and outbreaks of violence continued well into August. On 9 August, sixty active proponents of Sindhi regionalism, including G. M. Syed of the Sind United Front and Sindhi PPP leaders like Qazi Mohammed Bux were arrested under DPR. The crisis was past; but the violence and magnitude of these disturbances illustrated the continuing intensity of the longstanding language issue as a divisive factor both in the country and within the ruling party.<sup>67</sup>

Another source of public disorder that the PPP government had to deal with during its initial years of rule was student turbulence. Although Sindhi students had been involved in the language riots in Sind, described above, it was only in December 1972 that widespread student agitation developed throughout the country. There were earlier signs of student unrest which, like the labour troubles, resulted in part from the heightened expectations associated with the PPP's rhetoric and its assumption of power.<sup>68</sup> However, widespread student unrest manifested itself over the issue of recognition of Bangladesh.

It would be inappropriate at this stage to detail the Bhutto government's endeavours in international diplomacy, which is beyond the scope of this study. Here it is sufficient to note that at Simla in July 1972, Bhutto had taken the first step toward an accommodation with India which resulted in the partial normalisation of relations (short of resumption of diplomatic relations) and the eventual withdrawal of troops behind the international boundaries along the border and to mutually agreed cease-fire

positions in Kashmir.<sup>69</sup> The question of recognition of Bangladesh was, however, postponed, partly because public opinion in Pakistan and the Punjab in particular was strongly against it, but partly also because it gave Bhutto a negotiating lever vis à vis the question of the repatriation of the Prisoners of War and the issue of 'war crime' trials threatened by the Bangladesh government. Although Bhutto was known to be personally in favour of recognition he seemed equally conscious of the dangers, both domestic and international, of according a hasty recognition.<sup>70</sup> In November 1972, Bhutto, who had often declared that he would take the issue of recognition to the public, addressed rallies in Peshawar and Rawalpindi arguing in favour of recognition.<sup>71</sup> The opposition parties in the Punjab, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Tehriq-e-Istaqlal and the Muslim League, were quick to seize upon this issue and began organising demonstrations against recognition in the Punjab in December 1972.

Against this background, a Punjab students convention, dominated by the Jamiat-e-Tuleba (the student wing of the Jamaat), met at Lahore on 10 December and passed a resolution against recognition.<sup>72</sup> The next day the students organised a demonstration which was put down under Khar's orders with the most ruthless show of force.<sup>73</sup> What basically began as a right-wing inspired students demonstration now spread, as the entire student community came out in protest against police brutality. The liberal and left-leaning students organisations, generally thought to be sympathetic to the PPP, also joined the protest rallies - the National Students

Federation, National Students Organisation and the Pakistan Students Federation.<sup>74</sup> The Khar administration used the occasion to arrest students belonging to the right and left in a bid to crush extremists from both wings for once and for all.<sup>75</sup> When lawyers of Lahore and other cities of the Punjab also came out into the streets in protest, Khar once again used armed PPP men to break up the rally resulting in violence and bloodshed.<sup>76</sup> The students 'Bangladesh Na Manzoor' movement (Bangladesh not acceptable) was crushed with force but at great cost to the ruling party, as we shall see later (see chapter XII).

#### ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The economic history of the period 1971-77 consists of the Bhutto regime's endeavours to firstly, rehabilitate the economy after the loss of East Pakistan, and secondly to restructure it in accordance with the regime's economic and political objectives (discussed in chapter XII below).

During the first two years of rule, the Bhutto regime was confronted with severe economic problems caused by the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the secession of Bangladesh. The year long counter insurgency operations in East Pakistan and the subsequent war with India had drained the state's financial resources and disrupted industrial production and trade. Since the costs of war had been met by heavy deficit financing during July-December 1971 by the Yahya government, this resulted in severe inflationary pressures on the economy.<sup>77</sup> However, the economic decline could be traced back even further, to the economic

and political uncertainties following the collapse of the Ayub government. In particular, the private sector - a sector that had demonstrated considerable dynamism in the 1960's - seemed to lose confidence in the country's economic future. This was reflected in the sharp decline in savings and investment. Savings as a percentage of GDP declined from 13.1% in 1964-65 to 9% in 1969-70.<sup>78</sup> Investment by private entrepreneurs declined from 8.5% in 1969-70 to 5.4% in 1971-72. Overall investment declined from 22% in 1964-65 to only 13% of GNP in 1969-79.<sup>79</sup> This had important repercussions on the country's rate of economic growth. During the 1960's GDP (gross domestic product) had increased at a rate of 7% annually, but from 1969-70 to 1971-72 it grew at the rate of only 0.5% annually.<sup>80</sup> Since the population growth rate was an estimated 3.5% per year,<sup>81</sup> the declining rate of GDP growth meant a drop in per capita incomes. For the period 1969-70 to 1971-72 per capita (gross) income fell by 21%.<sup>82</sup> Thus when the Bhutto government took office, it was not only confronted by this legacy but by consequences of the Bangladesh separation - the crisis of foreign exchange and commodity markets and disruption of inter-wing trade. In the past jute and tea had been an important source of foreign exchange; now alternative export commodities had to be developed. Similarly, East Pakistan had previously absorbed 40% of West Pakistan's manufactures; now alternative markets had to be found. Many of these manufactures could not be exported because of their inherently uncompetitive character; by 1965 for example 84% of Pakistani manufacturing relied heavily on

protection and on an average their products were sold in the domestic market at prices 150% higher than the prevailing market prices.

Faced with these problems, the Bhutto regime took a series of measures aimed at rehabilitating the economy. Perhaps the most important of these were the exchange reforms announced in May 1972, which devalued the Rupee by 130% from a parity rate of Rs. 4.76 to one U.S. Dollar to Rs. 11.00.<sup>83</sup> The reform of a multiple exchange rate system (with seven rates) and an overvalued currency was long overdue. The pernicious effects of such a system, as the Finance Minister correctly pointed out, reached into every corner of the economic life of the country:<sup>84</sup> encouraging imports, discouraging exports, encouraging foreign-made capital goods, discouraging domestic, encouraging the flight of capital, restricting private freedom. The devaluation aimed at making Pakistani exports more competitive in world markets..(It had a number of other objectives, some of which are discussed below). At the new rate, the exporters had little difficulty in switching from markets in East Pakistan to those in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and U.S.A. The rise in export earnings was also facilitated by buoyant foreign demand and favourable world prices for Pakistani cotton, textiles and rice (the country's major exports).<sup>85</sup> Export figures for 1972 and 1973 indicated considerable success both in diverting products formerly sent to East Pakistan and the boost given to exports by devaluation. Pakistan's export earnings in 1972 (upto 15 December) amounted to \$ 640 million compared to \$ 660 million for both East



and West Pakistan together and \$ 461 million for West Pakistan in 1971.<sup>86</sup> In FY 1972-73, Pakistan had a trade account surplus for the first time since the 'Korean War Boom' of 1950-51.<sup>87</sup> The export boom also reflected a sharp jump in the size of the cotton crop due to favourable weather conditions. Thus the balance of payments crisis expected to follow the loss of East Pakistan was much less severe than had been widely predicted earlier,<sup>88</sup> owing to both governmental policy and a combination of fortuitous circumstances.

The success of the export effort enabled the Bhutto regime to direct its attention towards attempting to restructure the economy in line with its political objectives and in consonance with the economic interests represented by the PPP. This restructuring envisaged a shift from private to public sector domination of the economy in the industrial sphere, and a change in emphasis from industry to agriculture. The first policy objective was achieved by a nationalisation programme, while the latter involved a series of measures, described below. The reduction in the economic and political power of the industrial elite was an important motivation behind the decision to enlarge the public sector. This was done through a series of nationalisation measures that began with the government take-over of ten 'basic' industries (in the capital and intermediate goods category) under the Economic Reforms Order of 1 January 1972.<sup>89</sup> Almost all of these belonged to the 22 families. The rhetoric that accompanied the measure in no way reflected the importance of these enterprises or of the

industrial sector in the country's economy.<sup>90</sup> In a country where a consumer-good led industrial growth had taken place, this measure meant that less than 20% of value added of large scale manufacturing was taken over.<sup>91</sup> In 1972, the large-scale industrial sector accounted for 12.8% of GDP and employed only 3.4% of the total labour force. Its contribution to exports was only 8.3% of the total.<sup>92</sup> The government also nationalised insurance companies and banks, owned for the large part by the 22 families, in March 1972 and January 1974 respectively. As with the earlier nationalisation, foreign-owned establishments were exempted. Later, the government also assumed control over the rice and cotton export trades, (June 1973), shipping (January 1974) and the marketing and distribution of petroleum products. It nationalised twenty-six mills in the vanaspati ghee (vegetable oil) industry, thus assuming control over a number of small-scale enterprises producing an item of everyday consumption.<sup>93</sup> In July 1976 the government also nationalised 3,000 units in the wheat flour, rice husking and cotton ginning industries.<sup>94</sup>

The nationalisation measures were accompanied in the industrial sphere by the introduction of labour reforms, whose major provisions were described earlier. A government report surmised that the total cost for employers of implementing these reforms would be in the region of Rs. 250 million or 12.5% of the share of wages in the value of industrial output, and assumed that "this amount would be transferred from industrial profits and would not be passed on to the consumer."<sup>95</sup> The new labour legislation also enlarged the scope of its applicability, by changing

the definition of 'registered' enterprises from 'that employing ten or more persons and/or using power' (as defined in the 1964 Labour Laws Ordinance) to five persons, thus bringing an additional 1.2 million workers within the purview of the law.<sup>96</sup> This meant that over a half of the 2.2 million persons employed in manufacturing were eligible for benefits under the new labour laws compared to the previous figure of 25%.

An important effect of the nationalisation and labour policies was a sharp decline in private investment as shown in the table below:

TABLE V.1

INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT, 1970-71 TO 1976-77  
(Million Rupees, constant 1969-70 prices)

YEAR	PRIVATE SECTOR	PUBLIC SECTOR	TOTAL
1970-71	1,358	65	1,423
1971-72	1,065	85	1,150
1972-73	625	68	693
1973-74	492	188	680
1974-75	601	446	1,047
1975-76	700	1,224	1,924
1976-77	650	1,563	2,213

Source: Statistical Division, Ministry of Finance

Thus in the period 1972-1977 total private sector industrial investment dropped to less than half of its level in 1971. As is evident from the table above, public sector investment increased sharply - the public sector's share in total industrial investment rose from less than 10% in 1973 to 70% in 1977. Such investment was, by design, in capital-intensive, intermediate and capital goods industries with long periods of gestation.<sup>97</sup> Since public sector savings

were insufficient (they were negative in 1972 and 1973) much of public investment was financed by domestic and foreign borrowing.<sup>98</sup> This subjected the economy to severe strains. International factors, such as the 1973 oil price rise and the world recession in 1974 also played a substantial role in contributing to Pakistan's economic problems.

The Bhutto government's objective of shifting the emphasis of the economy from industry to agriculture was to be achieved firstly, through devaluation which removed the subsidy and protection received by the industrialists because of the overvalued exchange rate, and through a series of measures such as high support prices for agricultural commodities, the combined effect of which was foreseen as shifting the terms of trade in favour of agriculture. Procurement prices more than doubled in the period 1972-76 for major crops like wheat, cotton, rice and sugar cane. The government also heavily subsidised agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, seeds and provided subsidised credits for tubewells and tractors. This, together with the expansion of rural credit through the nationalised banks and the Agricultural Development Bank, led to a significant transfer of resources to the agricultural sector.<sup>99</sup> A land reform programme was introduced in March 1972, which reduced the permitted landholdings from a ceiling of 500 (irrigated) acres to 150 acres.<sup>100</sup> However, the economic impact of the reform both in terms of redistribution of land and the improvement of agricultural efficiency was limited owing to a number of reasons discussed in chapter XII.<sup>101</sup>

Its political impact is discussed in chapter VII. The Land Reform of 1972 also sought to bring about changes in the landlord-tenant relationship. Tenants were given legal protection from eviction and begar (forced labour). At the same time the burden of bearing the costs of inputs was shifted from the tenant to the landlord. The new law required landlords to pay all taxes and water rents and half the costs of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs.<sup>102</sup> Further agrarian measures were announced on 1 July 1972 with the launching of the Integrated Development Programme with the objective of transferring technology to the rural sector, to introduce modern programming methods to agriculture and to generally bring urban amenities to rural areas. An ambitious system of "agrovilles" was an integral part of this programme.<sup>103</sup> The IRDP was much like the former Village Aid Programme, envisaging the mobilisation of farmers in local units to help bring adequate credit, inputs, know-how and marketing opportunities to all farmers. At the same time, a People's Works Programme was launched similar to the old Rural Works Programme but including urban areas as well.

A major problem faced by the PPP regime was that of rising prices. This resulted in part from the government's efforts at rehabilitation and restructuring the economy, partly from its policy of monetary expansion - money supply rose by 26% in the first year of the PPP government, while the annual compound rate of growth in money supply was 18.2%<sup>104</sup> - and to some extent from international factors. In 1973 and 1974, a series of events, both domestic and

international further strengthened inflationary pressures on the economy on the one hand and harmed the country's trade position on the other hand. In August 1973, severe floods in the country caused extensive damage to standing rice and cotton crops, stored wheat and other commodities.<sup>105</sup> As a result the government was constrained to temporarily ban the export of a number of commodities, including cotton, the major foreign exchange earner. This was done to prevent domestic prices from rising even further, and to ensure domestic availability of essential commodities earlier earmarked for export (such as beef, poultry, vegetables). Then in October 1973, the OPEC price rise exacerbated Pakistan's balance of payments crisis (by absorbing one-third of the country's foreign exchange earnings) and contributed further to inflation. Pakistan's domestic production of crude oil scarcely meets 15% of its total requirement. Higher petroleum prices added a further \$150 million to the trade deficit in 1974.<sup>106</sup> Another exogenous source of strain on the economy in 1974 was the world recession in cotton textiles which resulted in a drastic curtailment of cotton exports and led to serious strains in the cotton textile industry - an industry which employs about half of the total industrial labour force. Thus a series of reverses in 1974-75 - natural disasters and price convulsions in the international market - created serious problems for the Pakistani economy.

However, not all such problems were the result of events beyond the government's control. The unbridled growth of non-developmental public expenditure was an important

source of financial problems. Of this, defence allocations formed the largest single category - 49% of current non-developmental expenditure.<sup>107</sup> After the 1971 war, the Bhutto regime raised defence allocations substantially. In 1970-71 defence expenditure amounted to Rs. 3,202 million, in 1973-74 to Rs. 4,949 million, in 1974-75 to Rs. 6,914 million and in 1976-77 to Rs. 8,121 million.<sup>108</sup> This led not only to the erosion of resources that would otherwise have been available for development purposes, but also contributed to annual budget deficits and the consequent increases in money supply. Government subsidies for food constituted another part of the non-developmental expenditure.<sup>109</sup> The government attempted in April 1974 to reduce the food subsidy, by announcing price increases in three basic commodities of everyday consumption, atta (wheat), sugar and ghee.<sup>110</sup> This led to mass urban protest demonstrations beginning with the railway workers strike in Lahore.<sup>111</sup> In the event the government did not withdraw the price increases, but attempted to soften the blow on the consumers by announcing wage increases for industrial labour and low-income government employees.<sup>112</sup> Thus the entire exercise had little impact on the general inflationary situation.

Inflation was a world-wide phenomenon at the time, but in Pakistan it assumed threatening proportions during the Bhutto years. While prices were rising no more than 3 to 4% a year in the late 1960's, between January 1972 and December 1973, prices rose about 20% annually. The rate of inflation touched the highest point of 30% in 1973-74

and was 27% in 1974-75.<sup>113</sup> Thereafter, partially as a consequence of the government's anti-inflationary measures, the rate of inflation declined to 6% in 1975-76 and subsequently rose only moderately.

Other than the issue of prices the Bhutto regime was also faced with a situation of a steady deterioration in the balance of payments position of the country after two relatively successful years, 1972 and 1973. The deficit rose from \$ 481 million in 1973-74 to \$ 1,039 million in 1974-75. Although it declined to an estimated \$ 880 million in 1975-76, the deficit remained high. A part of this deficit was met by a transfer of funds from abroad in the form of remittances home of Pakistani nationals living and working abroad.<sup>114</sup> However this was not sufficient to meet the large deficit, thus necessitating reliance on foreign borrowing. Dependence on foreign aid increased markedly in the 1970's.<sup>115</sup> An increasing amount of this aid has come from OPEC countries - about a third of the total aid disbursed during 1974-76.<sup>116</sup> The substantial foreign borrowing over this period resulted in a major increase in debt service payments. These amounted to \$ 107 million in 1973-74, \$ 264 million in 1974-75 and \$ 295 million in 1975-76, which accounted for 17% of foreign exchange earnings in spite of the substantial debt relief granted to Pakistan by its creditors.<sup>117</sup>

Despite this bleak background, by the end of 1976, the Pakistani economy showed some signs of recovery - although in retrospect this proved to be a transitory phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, the rate of inflation



declined significantly. GNP stood at a respectable 4.3% as compared to 2.1% in the preceding year.<sup>118</sup> This reflected an improvement in the performance of the agricultural sector, which registered a 4% increase in 1974-75, after several years of negative growth rates in agriculture. Favourable weather conditions ensured that wheat harvests in the spring of 1976 established a new record of 8.6 million tons.<sup>119</sup> This temporary respite from shortages and soaring prices, and the expectation that the economy was not likely to maintain this performance in 1977<sup>120</sup> evidently persuaded the ruling party that this was the most opportune moment to call a general election. (Other political considerations are described below).

#### POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION: THE PPP AND OPPOSITION

The whole question of building a new political structure for Pakistan was tied up with relations between the PPP government and the opposition parties and the evolution of a consensus on issues related to constitution-making and governmental form, in particular regional autonomy and the role of Islam in the state. What follows is a narrative account of these inter-linked issues.

The political history of the Bhutto period, at least from 1972-1975, was dominated by a struggle for power between the PPP government and Wali Khan's National Awami Party (NAP). Early moves seemed to suggest that Bhutto was anxious to evolve a consensus over the future constitutional order with the opposition parties. In December 1971, he met with Wali Khan and Mufti Mahmud of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-

e-Islam (JUI), who together commanded the majority of the seats in the provincial assemblies of NWFP and Baluchistan.<sup>121</sup> Bhutto also kept vacant two ministerial portfolios and was reported to have offered these to NAP.<sup>122</sup> The tentative understanding reached, however, did not last long. Relations between the two became strained largely on two issues: the withdrawal of martial law and the appointment of governors to the NWFP and Baluchistan. Bhutto proposed a phased return to democracy, arguing that the special powers of martial law were necessary to give effect to urgent reforms - an argument that was rejected by all opposition parties, particularly NAP, who demanded the immediate lifting of martial law and convening of the National Assembly (N.A.).<sup>123</sup> At the same time NAP staged protest rallies in Quetta in opposition to the PPP's appointment of its own governors without NAP's consent, in NWFP and Baluchistan.<sup>124</sup> Such demonstrations were forcefully put down by the PPP administration.<sup>125</sup> In order to undercut the influence and popularity of NAP, the PPP government encouraged the Mazdoor-Kissan Party (MKP) in the NWFP to mobilise landless tenants against landowners in the NWFP, many of whom belonged to NAP.<sup>126</sup>

It was against this rapidly deteriorating situation that the three parties, the PPP, NAP and JUI met again in March 1972 to resolve their differences. An agreement was finally reached on 6 March when a Tri-partite Accord was signed between the three.<sup>127</sup> The PPP conceded the NAP-JUI alliance the right to govern NWFP and Baluchistan in exchange for their support for the continuation of martial

law up to 14 August.<sup>128</sup> The N.A. was to be convened on 14 April for three days to endorse an interim constitution, the main principles of which were agreed upon by the three parties. The provincial assemblies were to meet on 21 April. A constitutional committee of the House was to be set up to draft the permanent constitution.<sup>129</sup> No sooner had the Accord been signed than differences again arose over the PPP's decision to enter into an alliance with the Qayyum Muslim League (QML) under which Qayyum was sworn in as Minister of the Interior in exchange for his party's pledge of support to the PPP in the NWFP assembly.<sup>130</sup> NAP interpreted this as yet another attempt by Bhutto - the other being the PPP's tacit alliance with the MKP - to circumvent NAP by winning over its enemies.<sup>131</sup> By the middle of April then, on the eve of the first N.A. meeting, the Accord stood shattered.<sup>132</sup>

When the N.A. met for the first time on 14 April, angry exchanges, scuffles and a walkout by the opposition marked its first day's proceedings.<sup>133</sup> However, in a surprise announcement, Bhutto declared that martial law would be lifted on 21 April.<sup>134</sup> This unexpected show of tactical flexibility on Bhutto's part clearly took the wind out of the opposition's sails.<sup>135</sup> In exchange, Bhutto demanded the immediate adoption of the Interim Constitution. The opposition proposed several amendments, but in principle agreed to Bhutto's demand for an 'instant constitution', so that on 17 April, the Interim Constitution<sup>136</sup> was adopted by a large majority, with forty opposition members abstaining and only one dissenting voice - from the PPP itself,

Rao Kurshid Ali.<sup>137</sup> At the same time Bhutto was given a massive vote of confidence by the House, and elected as President by 104 votes to 38.<sup>138</sup> A 25 member Committee was set up by the House which included nine opposition MNA's, and with Mahmud Kasuri as Chairman.

A new Tripartite Agreement was concluded between the PPP, NAP, JUI on 27 April 1972, under which the PPP recognised NAP-JUI as the majority parties in NWFP and Baluchistan, and on that basis allowed them to form their own provincial governments and name their own governors.<sup>139</sup> Consequently, NAP leaders Ghaus Buksh Bizenjo and Arbab Sikander were sworn in as Governors of Baluchistan and NWFP respectively on 29 April, while Khar and Talpur were made governors of Punjab and Sind.<sup>140</sup> NAP-JUI coalition ministers were installed in NWFP and Baluchistan on 1 May 1972. Bhutto's offer of two central ministries to the NAP and JUI was, however, declined.<sup>141</sup> Mufti Mahmud, Ataullah Mengal, Mumtaz Bhutto and Meraj Khalid were appointed Chief Ministers of NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind and Punjab respectively.

No sooner had the new ministries in NWFP and Baluchistan started functioning than relations between these two provinces and the federal government became strained. The NAP-JUI coalition accused the federal government of interfering in their administrations by continuing to aid the MKP in inciting landlord-tenant clashes in the NWFP,<sup>142</sup> by inciting tribes opposed to the NAP against the Baluchistan government's authority and by mounting a propaganda offensive, largely under Qayyum's direction,

insinuating that the NAP was "plotting" against Pakistan.<sup>143</sup> Wali Khan further accused Bhutto of attempting to 'rule by the rod' and warned that his policy of using 'gold and guns' to intimidate the smaller provinces would be opposed forcefully.<sup>144</sup> The PPP, for its part accused the NAP-JUI government of failing to implement the land reforms, of distributing arms to its supporters to terrorise the population and carrying out tribal vendettas in Baluchistan.<sup>145</sup>

However, the confrontation did not reach alarming proportions until after July 1972. This was largely because the PPP government was facing problems in Sind, where language riots had erupted at the time. And secondly, Bhutto was concerned with maintaining a measure of national unity and consensus in view of the forthcoming negotiations with India at Simla. Indeed, Wali Khan had warned in no uncertain terms that if Bhutto went to the Summit without consulting Baluchistan and NWFP, he would be representing only "half of Pakistan" at the negotiating table.<sup>146</sup> Thus Bhutto was constrained at this stage from adopting an even harsher stance against the NAP-JUI governments which, by all indications, had clearly become a source of annoyance to him.<sup>147</sup> The Simla Accord was generally welcomed by the NAP-JUI leadership, even though a number of other opposition parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami accused the government of a "sell-out".<sup>148</sup> In a special session on 14 July, the N.A. ratified the Accord, with NAP-JUI voting with the government.<sup>149</sup>

After this, however, the confrontation between NAP-JUI and the PPP government took on a greater intensity with

the 'discovery' in September of a second 'London Plot'.<sup>150</sup> According to stories of this plot, which were circulated in all the government-owned newspapers, Wali Khan and Ataullah Mengal who were in London at the time met Mujibur Rahman, also in London, to plan the further dismemberment of Pakistan.<sup>151</sup> The well-orchestrated publicity of the 'London Plan' in the context of growing confrontation between Islamabad and Peshawar/Quetta was interpreted by independent observers to be a calculated move to stem the tide of opposition in general and NAP in particular.<sup>152</sup> It was also viewed as being aimed at tarnishing the image of Wali Khan in the Punjab and Sind where after the language riots in Sind he was beginning to emerge as an alternate leader.<sup>153</sup> Although Bhutto denied any responsibility for the 'London Plan' episode,<sup>154</sup> the confrontation continued on other issues. Several MKP leaders were arrested by the Mufti government in August.<sup>155</sup> In early October, tribal warfare broke out in Baluchistan between the Zehri, Bugti and the Mengal tribes. The chiefs of the Zehri tribes (who were also important members of the QML) and Salim Bugti (related by marriage to the Zehris) alleged that the Mengal government had sent tribal 'lashkars' to suppress them.<sup>156</sup> Bizenjo on the other hand accused these tribes of setting up a parallel government and of attempting to circumvent the government's plan to nationalise the marble and coal mines, owned by the Zehris and Bugtis respectively.<sup>157</sup> Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai, Nabi Buksh Zehri and Salim Bugti fled to Karachi to escape arrest, while requests for their extradition were turned down by the Sind government.

Bhutto now called for all-party talks on 15 October to agree upon the principles for the Permanent Constitution.<sup>158</sup> As a result of these deliberations - in which all parties participated, NAP, JUI, QML, Council Muslim League (CML), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and a group of independent parliamentarians - an All-Party Constitutional Accord was signed on 20 October. Bizenjo and Arbab signed on behalf of NAP, as Wali Khan was still in London. The draft constitution agreed upon, provided a federal parliamentary system, a substantial concession on the part of Bhutto who favoured an American-style federal, presidential system.<sup>159</sup> Once again Bhutto achieved a 'viable' centre, with a Prime Minister as the Chief Executive answerable to the National Assembly. A bicameral legislature was provided (N.A. and Senate), empowered to elect a titular President.

Bhutto's achievement in settling constitutional controversies, however, appeared to be short-lived. Wali Khan declared that as Bizenjo and Arbab had signed the Accord as individuals, his party was not bound by it.<sup>160</sup> In a meeting of the General Council of the NAP in Peshawar on 18 November 1972, the party refused to ratify the agreement, expressing great dissatisfaction over many constitutional provisions.<sup>161</sup> Earlier, on 4 October, on the constitutional issue Bhutto also lost the allegiance of his Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and Chairman of the Constitution Commission.<sup>162</sup> Kasuri's resignation came after a long period of disagreement with Bhutto over various constitutional matters - civil liberties, provincial autonomy and the powers of the P.M. Kasuri was unwilling to go along with a plan

that to his mind resembled a 'constitutional dictatorship'.<sup>163</sup> Kasuri was later expelled from the party. On 29 October, another PPP dissident, Ahmed Reza Kasuri was also expelled from the party in fairly similar circumstances.<sup>164</sup>

Meanwhile, the situation in Baluchistan deteriorated further in November/December.<sup>165</sup> In protest against Central interference, the Mengal government "repatriated" 5,500 (mainly Punjabi) civil employees from Baluchistan, of which 2,880 belonged to the police force.<sup>166</sup> At the same time it refused to allow federal coastguards to patrol the Mekran Coast. In the Pat Feeder area of Baluchistan, armed Marri and Mengal tribesmen attacked Punjabi settlers,<sup>167</sup> while armed Bugti tribesmen marched to the provincial secretariat and encircled it demanding the resignation of Ahmed Nawaz Bugti (a minister of the Mengal cabinet).<sup>168</sup> The worst outbreak of violence, however, erupted on 26 December when lashkars of Mengal, Bizenjo and nine other tribes attacked the Jamotes of Lasbella, forty-two of whom were killed.<sup>169</sup> Tribal warfare continued until the Federal government intervened by sending contingents of the army to restore order. The decision was reportedly taken when Bizenjo himself had requested federal help. Bizenjo, however, denied having asked for army units and said he had requested help from federally controlled civil armed forces.<sup>170</sup> Bizenjo accused Qayyum Khan of inciting the armed rebellion under the leadership of the Jam of Lasbella,<sup>171</sup> while the NAP executive claimed that at the root of the rebellion lay the opposition of the Jamote tribes to reform measures introduced by the provincial government to put an end to the Sardari system



there.<sup>172</sup> Wali Khan himself described the despatch of troops as "naked interference in the internal affairs of Baluchistan."<sup>173</sup> Wali was joined in the condemnation of Bhutto by Asghar who accused Bhutto of turning Pakistan into a "fascist" police state.<sup>174</sup>

Against this background, the N.A. meeting on 30 December, was stormy. The opposition parties led by Wali Khan (who was also Leader of the Opposition in the Assembly) staged a walkout.<sup>175</sup> Bhutto threatened that in the opposition's absence the PPP would prepare its own constitution.<sup>176</sup> An opposition Co-ordination Committee set up under the chairmanship of Wali, announced their boycott of the N.A. sitting as a legislature but agreed to attend the N.A. sitting as a constituent assembly.<sup>177</sup> Meanwhile, talks outside the assembly continued in January/February 1973, while a barrage of official anti-NAP propaganda continued reaching a peak with the 'sensational disclosure' made by Akbar Bugti, one-time NAP sympathiser, that the Baluch government was receiving arms from abroad to help it achieve its goal for an 'Independent Baluchistan'.<sup>178</sup> On 10 February, the authorities raided the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad unearthing a cache of Russian-made arms, allegedly en route for use in Baluchistan.<sup>179</sup> Bhutto utilised this incident to dismiss the NAP governors and the Mengal ministry. The NWFP ministry resigned in protest. Several NAP leaders were arrested in the Punjab by Khar.<sup>180</sup> Bhutto lost no time in appointing Sardar Akbar Bugti and Aslam Khattak as governors of Baluchistan and NWFP respectively. Bugti hastily set up a cabinet headed by the Jam of Lasbella, while Khattak


appointed Gandapur as his chief minister. Many Baluchi tribes rose in protest over the dismissal of the NAP-JUI government, and a major rebellion developed over the next three years which pitted army contingents against the insurgent tribes.

Other opposition leaders also met with strong government action. The Punjab chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami was arrested for calling upon the army to take over the country.<sup>181</sup> Zahur Elahi of the CML was also arrested and criminal charges instituted against him.<sup>182</sup> Meanwhile the NAP forged an alliance with religious and right-wing parties in the Punjab and Sind. These elements committed their support to NAP's demand for the restoration of its provincial governments. On 2 March 1973, opposition parties (NAP, JUI, JUP, JI, the two factions of the Muslim League, PDP and the Khaksar Tehriq) united to form a United Democratic Front, (UDF), under the leadership of the Pir of Pagaro.<sup>183</sup> Asghar Khan's party, however, stayed out of the alliance. During March the UDF held several rounds of talks with Bhutto on various issues, particularly the framing of the permanent constitution. While they continued to boycott the legislature, the UDF put forward 11 non-negotiable points to be included in the constitution.<sup>184</sup> Many of the proposed amendments related to Islamic provisions (as NAP in quid pro quo supported the demands of the Islamic parties) and to the concentration of power in the executive. The UDF also decided to demonstrate its strength to the PPP at a mass rally called on 23 March at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. The rally turned into a bloody clash between the opposition and PPP supporters

resulting in twenty deaths.<sup>185</sup> In protest against 'official hooliganism', the UDF declared its boycott of the N.A., calling for the lifting of Emergency Rule. Rejecting pleas to lift the Emergency, Bhutto pointed to plots at home and abroad. Claiming that he had already accommodated most of the opposition's proposals in its draft constitution, Bhutto announced his decision to go it alone in the N.A.<sup>186</sup> Consequently, the N.A. began a clause-by-clause adoption of the new constitution. Initially the UDF stayed away, but at the last minute, after extensive back-stage manoeuvrings in which the Jamaat played a major role, opposition parliamentarians returned to the Assembly on 10 April half an hour before the constitution was passed.<sup>187</sup> The last minute change in the opposition's attitude took place partly as a consequence of timely concessions made by the ruling party and partly out of pragmatic consideration, in particular the fear that in their absence from the Assembly, there would be no restraining influence on Bhutto.<sup>188</sup> The opposition voted for the constitution to make the adoption near-unanimous, but only after the PPP agreed to several changes.<sup>189</sup> The only three MNAs who abstained from voting were the two rebel PPP MNAs, (both the Kasuris), and Noorani, chief of the JUP.<sup>190</sup>

The new constitution which came into force on 14 August 1973, established Pakistan as a federal republic with a parliamentary system.<sup>191</sup> The Constitution set up the following political structure for the country's governance:-

FIGURE 2

CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, 1973

On 12 August, Bhutto was voted Prime Minister by 108 votes to 28, and two days later he was sworn in, while Fazal Elahi Choudrey became the titular President.

Before this, however, several developments occurred in quick succession which need to be noted. In March/April 1973 came the discovery of a coup attempt by junior officers of the army "who planned to seize power between 11 and 21 April, before the constitution was passed."<sup>192</sup> The group involved in the attempt included twenty-one officers of the Army, two of whom were brigadiers and fourteen Air Force officers. Convinced that Bhutto was responsible for the debacle of 1971 and that he was out to dismember the rest of Pakistan through his undemocratic activities, and that the leadership of the Army was just as corrupt, these officers and generals planned to capture power by arresting all top government officers and generals.<sup>193</sup> The officers were promptly arrested and tried in two separate Courts Martial.<sup>194</sup>

Meanwhile, relations between the government and opposition worsened. The NAP's claim to the governments of Baluchistan and NWFP, and the issue of the continued suspension of fundamental rights under the proclamation of emergency remained the major source of conflict. The new Bhutto-appointed cabinet in Baluchistan stayed in power only by contriving the defection of two JUI members and jailing four - Bizenjo, Mengal and Khan Buksh Marri were arrested on 16 August on an interesting spectrum of criminal charges.<sup>195</sup> This enabled the Bugti government to enjoy the support of ten members in the 21 member provincial legislature. Khattak used similar tactics in NWFP, obtaining, unlike Bugti, a majority in the provincial legislature by freely distributing cabinet posts in July 1973.<sup>196</sup> In July 1973, a coup in Afghanistan brought to power Sardar Daud Khan, a protagonist of the 'Greater Pakhtunistan' movement. Mentioning the Pakhtunistan issue in his very first broadcast, Daud later referred to the strife in Baluchistan and expressed concern over the conflict between the NAP and the federal government. This was sufficient to further strengthen Bhutto's resolve not to let NAP regain control of these two provinces while at the same time vindicating in his mind the official propaganda that predated the Bhutto period, that the NAP had always acted in collusion with Afghanistan.

Relations between government opposition in the N.A. were continuously strained as the government sought to pass legislation strongly opposed by the UDF components. In May 1973, an ordinance was passed setting up a new paramilitary force to be called the Federal Security Force (FSF).<sup>197</sup>

When the FSF Bill was presented to the N.A., the opposition protested at the setting up of what it called personal "storm troopers" of the PPP regime, the whole purpose of which could only be to terrorise and subjugate the opposition.<sup>198</sup> The bill was nevertheless passed, and the opposition's fears seemed justified in view of what occurred subsequently. In June a UDF rally was broken up by FSF contingents in Lahore - setting up a pattern of intimidation that continued throughout the PPP's rule.<sup>199</sup> Stationing the FSF outside the N.A. from time to time emerged as another source of contention.<sup>200</sup> The adoption of the High Treason Act, the Private Military Organisations' (Abolition and Prohibition) Act and the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Ordinance gave further cause for concern to the opposition.

Elections to the Senate in July/August 1973 further strengthened the position of the PPP government. The four provincial assemblies returned eight PPP nominees from Sind, nine from Punjab, six from NWFP and five from Baluchistan. The PPP also won the two Federal Area seats, while independents elected from the Federal Administered Tribal Area aligned themselves with the ruling party. Thus, the opposition secured only twelve of the forty-five senate seats. The PPP also succeeded in having its candidates elected to the offices of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate, and Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the N.A.

On 7 September, a joint sitting of parliament approved a presidential ordinance issued the day before suspending fundamental rights, and extended the Emergency to 13 March 1974.<sup>201</sup> The UDF boycotted the N.A. and continued

with their civil disobedience movement launched on 24 August, defying the restrictions imposed on holding public meetings and processions.<sup>202</sup> The Jamaat disassociated itself from the movement in view of the devastating floods that struck the Punjab and Sind at the time. The Jamaat's strategy proved correct as the situation created by the floods led to poor public response to the movement. As a result the movement petered out by September. The temporary tranquillity that prevailed was shattered only by two political assassinations in the period September-December 1973 - that of a PPP leader in Sanghar, Ali Junejo on 6 October, and the leader of the Pakhtunkhwa NAP, Abdus Samad Achakzai on 2 December (a PPP sympathiser).<sup>203</sup>

Enforcement of the constitution necessitated administrative changes in all provinces which Bhutto made in December 1973 - January 1974. Khar became Chief Minister of Punjab while Sadiq Hussain Qureishi was sworn in as Governor. Jatoi replaced Mumtaz Bhutto in Sind as Chief Minister. Akbar Bugti on the other hand, submitted his resignation over differences with the chief minister Jam Qadir of Lasbella on 31 October.<sup>204</sup> In a remarkable about face Bugti expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of using the army to deal with what was essentially a political problem in Baluchistan.<sup>205</sup> Bugti was replaced by the Khan of Kalat, an appointment which was regarded as a politically astute move by Bhutto since the Khan was a widely respected figure of his province, often referred to as the 'Khan of Khans'.<sup>206</sup>

The PPP government had other reasons as well for believing that their position was beginning to be secure. In early

1974 it won the by-election of a N.A. seat in Quetta, and a P.A. seat in NWFP, while all MNAs belonging to the three factions of the Muslim League in the N.A. (except three) pledged their support to the PPP. A three-day Islamic Summit held in Lahore beginning 22 February, in which Bhutto acted as the host to leaders from all over the Islamic world, helped to enhance Bhutto's personal prestige.<sup>207</sup> It also enabled him to recognise Bangladesh, defusing what threatened to become a potentially divisive issue which the opposition could exploit.<sup>208</sup> Thereafter, he confidently announced the further extension of the Emergency on 4 March 1974.<sup>209</sup> Only another political assassination- of Maulvi Shamsuddin of the JUI, who was also the deputy leader of the Baluchistan Assembly on 13 March, shattered the euphoria that prevailed in the ruling circles in the immediate post-Summit Pakistan.<sup>210</sup> The sense of complacency that prevailed in the first quarter of 1974 is best indicated by the lack of enthusiasm evidenced in the N.A. which an exasperated newsman described in the following manner:

"It seems that we are here to report on the ringing of quorum bells and nothing more." 211

However, the N.A. debate on Baluchistan, which the NAP boycotted in February, ended on an ominous note when Sher Baz Mazari, an independent, warned that if a military solution was imposed on Baluchistan, the events of East Pakistan would be repeated, and he accused the Army of rape, arson and murder.<sup>212</sup> Nevertheless, the PPP government continued in its confident stance and proceeded to dissolve the Pakhtun Zalme (the para-military wing of NAP).<sup>213</sup> The only



serious independent newsweekly, 'Outlook' was banned in July 1974 for publishing an interview with Wali Khan.<sup>214</sup> In what appeared as an even more ominous move, the PPP government passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill on 23 April which limited the freedom of association as laid down in Article 17.<sup>215</sup> It empowered the government to dissolve parties and associations whose object was deemed to be against the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.

Bhutto's attention during the second half of the year was diverted to resolving intra-party disputes (discussed in chapter VII) and a serious outbreak of violence in the Punjab over the Qadiani issue. The Qadianis or Ahmeddiyas are a small Sunni Muslim sect who have been traditionally viewed by the more orthodox Muslims (both Shia and Sunni) as heretics because of some of their beliefs.<sup>216</sup> Consequently, there have been periodic demands from orthodox sections for the state to declare the Qadianis non-Muslims.<sup>217</sup> The agitation over the Qadiani issue began on 29 May, when a group of students passing through Rabwah - the headquarters of the sect - shouted insulting slogans against the Qadianis.<sup>218</sup> The students were beaten up. When the news of the incident spread, anti-Qadiani demonstrations broke out chiefly in the Punjab.<sup>219</sup> Two weeks of rioting led to seventy deaths. Hoping to capitalise upon this situation, the UDF - particularly its religious components, demanded that the Qadianis be declared outside the pale of Islam, and be sacked from government jobs. The Army was called in to help control the riots and by mid-June, succeeded in doing so; the political controversy however,

continued. Bhutto referred the resolution of the problem to the N. A.<sup>220</sup> After two months of secret deliberations and hearings, the N. A. unanimously declared the Qadianis a non-Muslim minority on 7 September.<sup>221</sup> Bhutto declared, however, that there would be no "witch-hunt" to force Ahmeddiyas out of government jobs as he did not believe in religious persecution. The PPP regime credited itself with resolving a hundred year old religious controversy. Thereafter, eighteen opposition members of the Punjab Provincial Assembly (belonging to JUI, JUP and the Muslim League) crossed the floor to join the PPP and the opposition was reduced to 16 in a House of 186.<sup>222</sup>

Clearly out-maneuvred, in October a desperate UDF demanded an immediate solution of the Baluchistan problem, contacting foreign envoys to "appraise them of the situation" and despatching telegrams to the military commanders asking them to disobey government orders.<sup>223</sup> Bhutto responded with even harsher measures. An ordinance was promulgated to set up special courts for speedy trial of offences of sabotage, subversion and terrorism.<sup>224</sup> Another wave of official propaganda, led this time by Bhutto himself, accused the NAP of wanting "to present half of Pakistan to Afghanistan on a silver platter."<sup>225</sup> In November, Ahmed Reza Kasuri, a dissident PPP MNA who supported the opposition's demand for the restoration of democracy narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in which his father died.<sup>226</sup>

The year 1975 opened with yet another boycott of the N. A. by the opposition parties, this time in protest over the expulsion from the House of Ahmed Reza Kasuri.<sup>227</sup> The

opposition also refused to attend Senate proceedings. In February, while Bhutto was on a state visit to the United States, a bomb exploded at Peshawar University killing a senior PPP minister of the NWFP, Hayat Mohammed Sherpao, who was officiating at a student function there.<sup>228</sup> Coming after a series of bomb explosions in the NWFP and Islamabad over the past few months, this incident was too serious not to be taken notice of. Bhutto cut short his tour and flew back to Pakistan, ordering the arrest of Wali Khan, Arbab Sikander, Gardezi (leader of the opposition in the Senate) and Ahmed Nawaz Bugti among other NAP members. On 10 February NAP was banned and its property and funds seized by the authorities.<sup>229</sup> Addressing an emergency session of the N.A. the same day Bhutto declared that

"all necessary steps have to be taken to save Pakistan for all times to come from the politics of violence and the scourge of secession." 230

Some of the "necessary steps" were outlined the same day when the N.A. passed two amending bills withdrawing the immunity of legislators from arrest. Other steps followed rapidly. The Third Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed on 12 February at which the opposition walked out of the Assembly.<sup>231</sup> This amendment provided for indefinite detention without trial for persons deemed to be "acting or attempting to act in a way prejudicial to the security of the state." The same amendment also removed the requirement for approval for the extension of the period of proclamation of emergency every six months, thus limiting the amount of legislative control over executive action. Police raided university campuses all over the country 'uncovering' caches

of arms of 'foreign' manufacture.<sup>232</sup> Ultimately, a son of Wali Khan and two other students were convicted by a special tribunal of complicity in the Sherpao murder and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.<sup>233</sup> As required by law, the case of the dissolution of NAP was referred by the government to the Supreme Court in April.<sup>234</sup> Wali Khan refused to participate in the proceedings of the Court.<sup>235</sup> The ban on NAP was upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court in its judgement pronounced on 30 October 1975 'for operating in a manner prejudicial to the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan.'<sup>236</sup>

Following the ban on NAP in February Bhutto had dismissed the PPP-QML-UF coalition in NWFP and imposed federal rule.<sup>237</sup> This was withdrawn on 3 May and Nasrullah Khan Khattak was elected as the new chief minister with the opposition boycotting.<sup>238</sup> Khattak immediately set about engineering defections from the NAP, JUI and PPP's own ally QML.<sup>239</sup> By the end of the year he had raised the PPP's strength in the Assembly to 22 and dismissed his senior colleague, Inayatullah Gandpur.

In the national legislature, the hurried passage of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment on 14 November caused an uproar both inside and outside the House.<sup>240</sup> Under this Amendment the high courts were deprived of their rights to grant bail to any person detained under preventive detention laws. Fist fights broke out on the floor of the House during the passage of the Bill, while three opposition MNAs, Zahur Elahi, Ahmed Kasuri and Malik Suleman were removed bodily by FSF men and debarred for the rest of the

session.<sup>241</sup> Outside the Assembly, lawyers and journalists demonstrated against the Fourth Amendment.<sup>242</sup>

The arrest of the NAP leaders, left the official opposition in a state of collapse. At the same time, divisions developed within the UDF between JI and JUP, with the latter walking out of the alliance over the issue of contesting a by-election in Karachi.<sup>243</sup> Attention now shifted to Asghar Khan's Tehriq-e-Istaqlal<sup>244</sup> and the newly-formed National Democratic Party. The NDP was the successor of NAP and was formed by Sherbaz Mazari, formerly an independent MNA, on 6 November 1975.<sup>245</sup> In an obvious attempt to deprive the NDP of parliamentary strength, the government issued an ordinance in December 1975, barring NAP members from membership of legislatures for the next five years.<sup>246</sup>

Bhutto's own administration in Baluchistan, however, became a source of trouble towards the end of 1975 mainly due to personal differences between the Governor and the Chief Minister.<sup>247</sup> This led Bhutto to dismiss the chief minister and his cabinet, dissolve the Assembly and impose federal rule on 31 December 1975.<sup>248</sup> The cabinet was dismissed on charges of corruption and inefficiency and all executive authority was handed over to the governor. All the provincial ministers including the chief minister, were however, retained as advisers to the governor, in what was regarded as a remarkably contradictory move.<sup>249</sup> Touring the province in April 1976, Bhutto abolished the Sardari system of administration through tribal chiefs, and extended normal laws to the entire province, where tribal and customary laws had prevailed for centuries.<sup>250</sup> The relative tranquillity

that prevailed in the province as a consequence of continued army action led Bhutto to express satisfaction over the political situation in Baluchistan.<sup>251</sup> However, he conceded that while the back of the rebellion had been broken, the germs of the rebellion would have to be fought much longer.<sup>252</sup>

In the rest of the country 1976 saw the imposition of even harsher measures on an emasculated and demoralised opposition coupled with an even more half-hearted attempt by the government to maintain a parliamentary facade. This led Ghafoor Ahmed of the Jamaat to remark:

"To-day in early 1976, the country does not even have those democratic freedoms which it enjoyed in early 1972, when Bhutto was Chief Martial Law Administrator." <sup>253</sup>

Two Muslim Leaguers, Hanif Ramay and Zahur Elahi were arrested for making 'objectionable speeches' and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment under DPR.<sup>254</sup> More NAP leaders, including the leader of the opposition in the Senate, Hashim Ghilzai were arrested in April 1976.<sup>255</sup> Meanwhile, the UDF could still not evolve a common strategy with which to fight back. While the UDF had officially decided to resign their seats in all the legislatures, the mass resignations did not materialise. Faced with fissures in its ranks, the opposition called off its long boycott of the legislatures in February, in spite of the absence of a single concession by the ruling party.<sup>256</sup> The opposition fell back on the tactics of staging walk-outs. The opposition's demoralisation was so complete that it convened only two meetings throughout the whole year, and these too amidst internal rifts and bickerings.<sup>257</sup> A mass exodus of its members began in March,

with almost all deserters joining the PPP. What probably came as the severest blow was when a veteran Muslim Leaguer and deputy leader of the opposition in the N.A. Sardar Shaukat Hayat, left his party to join the PPP. A vice president of the Muslim League, Yasin Wattoo also joined the PPP. Several ex-NAP members also joined the PPP, including Barozai, ex-Speaker of the Baluchistan Assembly, Ghulam Faruque, ex-finance minister in the NWFP government, and Arbab Jehangir Khan (MPA).<sup>258</sup> Several PPP deserters also returned to the fold. Prominent among these were Ahmed Reza Kasuri, who had joined the Tehriq-e-Istaqlal, and Khurshid Hasan Meer. Many of these people joined the PPP in anticipation of the general elections scheduled for August 1977.

By the end of 1976 then, the demoralised state of the opposition parties (resulting from the jailing of NAP's leaders and the increasingly severe restrictions placed on political activity), together with the temporary recovery in the economic situation (described above), appeared to assure Bhutto that he would have little problem in renewing his party's electoral mandate.

#### THE 1977 ELECTION AND THE FALL OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT

In early January 1977, Bhutto announced national and provincial elections for 7 and 10 March respectively. Bhutto had begun preparing systematically for the election much earlier,<sup>259</sup> for he claimed to have "learnt a cardinal lesson from ...(history)...and that was to leave nothing to chance and never to be overconfident."<sup>260</sup> Accordingly, during

1976, in the P. M.'s Secretariat, "evaluations were made and instructions given in order to anticipate issues which the opposition might raise.....Strenuous election tours were planned and undertaken, provincial cells were created and the party was reorganised."<sup>261</sup> In May 1976, Bhutto asked his bureaucratic advisers in the P.M.'s Secretariat to prepare a report on the PPP's election prospects in the Punjab.<sup>262</sup> The report assured Bhutto that the party would sweep the Punjab, although perhaps not in the urban areas.<sup>263</sup> A note of caution was however sounded by Bhutto who was not very happy with his party's position in the urban areas of Sind and in NWFP in general. This is evident from two letters that he wrote to the chief ministers of the two provinces on 13 June 1976, in which he asked them to make special efforts to strengthen the party in their respective provinces.<sup>264</sup>

From 1 October 1976, the PPP government launched a massive campaign in the official media to highlight its accomplishments in office.<sup>265</sup> In connection with this publicity exercise, the Ministry of Information published a lengthy document entitled 'Promises and Performance', cataloguing the party's fulfilment of the various promises made in the election manifesto of 1970.<sup>266</sup> At the same time, administrative mobilisation for celebration of successive Minorities, Women's Services, Labour, Students, Peasants' and Armed Forces' Weeks began during October 1976. A national charter for peasants was announced during 'Peasants' Week'.<sup>267</sup> This promised the distribution of state land to landless peasants, and was followed by the announcement of a 'second instalment'



of agricultural reforms which further reduced the land ceiling to 8,000 PIUs.<sup>268</sup> Accompanying this reform was the decision to replace the traditional land tax with a tax on agricultural income for all large farms. Substantial increases in the pensions of military and civil employees of the government were also announced.

Restrictions on political activity, however, continued - the emergency was not lifted, NAP leaders and other political prisoners were not released (although some were allowed to contest the election from jail), curbs on the press continued,<sup>269</sup> and troops were not recalled from Baluchistan, which the opposition had demanded as a precondition for participating in the election in that province. These factors together with the ruling party's control of governmental resources led most observers to believe that the election would largely be a one-sided affair. However, the formation of an opposition alliance, PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), consisting of nine parties, changed the earlier assessment.<sup>270</sup> A disparate group which included three Islam-Pasand parties and an avowedly secular party (NAP), the PNA was united only by its hatred for the Bhutto regime.<sup>271</sup>

The campaign period saw the two major electoral forces locked in intense political debate and bitter attacks on one another, much of which revolved around the personality of Bhutto. While the PNA concentrated its attack on Bhutto's dictatorial, corrupt personalised system of governing, PPP propaganda depicted him as the saviour of the nation, a statesman, a leader of the Third World, and one who had

brought the country both stability and change from the old oppressive order. Both parties accused each other of being anti-Pakistan - the PNA held Bhutto responsible for the breakup of the country in 1971 while Bhutto accused the PNA of being "a band of secessionists."<sup>272</sup>

Although the various party manifestos were largely obscured by the nature of the political debates and personality clashes that ensued, the PPP and PNA manifestos revealed few programmatic differences. What the PNA did was to use Islamic rhetoric to promise much the same things as the PPP had promised in 1970 and 1977.<sup>273</sup> The PPP manifesto<sup>274</sup> was a dull one (compared to the 1970 one) and its emphasis on "production goals" made it read much like a state five year plan, reflecting perhaps the advice of economists and financial experts in the government bureaucracy that Bhutto had reportedly sought for the formulation of the party document.<sup>275</sup> What was significant was the weak emphasis placed on the goal of 'socialism' both in the manifesto and the party's policy pronouncements. In its public campaigning the word 'socialism' was replaced by the more neutral term, Musawaat (egalitarianism) reflecting the party's sensitivity to attacks by the PNA's Islamic fundamentalists. The PNA's major election slogan was the demand for Nizam-e-Mustapha (Order of the Prophet) but it appeared to gain the campaign offensive when it articulated specific grievances against the ruling party such as rising prices, corruption and suppression of civil liberties, all highly emotive issues in urban areas. Forced on the defensive Bhutto pledged to launch a crusade against high prices, corruption and mal-administration.<sup>276</sup>

The two-month campaign period unleashed a massive wave of discontent and disillusionment with the ruling party.<sup>277</sup> Encouraged by the large turnout at opposition rallies, the PNA declared that the people had already given their verdict and that the election was now a formality.<sup>278</sup> But apart from the challenge that the PPP faced from without, there was considerable resentment within the party over the award of tickets. For the most part, old party workers were passed over in favour of members of the feudal elite and other local notables, such as biradari leaders. This was in accordance with the decision taken by Bhutto in May 1976, when it was pointed out to him by an official of the P.M.'s Secretariat that the 'magic' of the party programme had been 'considerably diluted' and that reliance had to be placed on prosperous traditional notables and biradari leaders.<sup>279</sup> About half of the PPP nominees in the Punjab had joined the party after it came to power and had contested against the PPP in the 1970 election.<sup>280</sup> Leading Punjab feudal families like the Legharis, Qureishis, Noons, Gilanis, Hayats and Mazaris were all given party tickets. Consequently, in several constituencies those refused party tickets either rebelled and contested as independents, or worked (either overtly or covertly) for opposition candidates.

On the eve of the election PNA came out with a long catalogue of methods that it accused the regime of planning to use to 'rig' the result.<sup>281</sup> Doubts about the regime's intention to hold a fair poll were further fed when fifteen PPP members, including Bhutto and the four chief ministers, were elected unopposed to the national assembly. PPP nominees

elected unopposed to the four provincial assemblies totalled fifty-five giving the PPP a majority in the legislatures of Baluchistan and Sind. These uncontested elections were accompanied by PNA allegations that their candidates were kidnapped and forcibly prevented from filing nomination papers, including the nominees in Bhutto's own constituency.<sup>282</sup> The result of the election are set out in the table below.

TABLE V.2

RESULTS OF THE N.A. ELECTIONS 1977\*

PROVINCE	TOTAL SEATS	PPP		PNA	
		SEATS WON	% OF VOTES WON	SEATS WON	% OF VOTES WON
Punjab	116**	108	60	8	35
Sind	43	32	63	11	30
Baluchistan	7	7	50	-	-
NWFP	34	8	37	17	48

\* This does not include independents, since none of them won any seats in the four provinces - the eight independents elected were in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where no political party exists.

\*\*Includes the Federal Capital seat.

Source: Dawn, (Karachi), 20 March 1977.

The PPP won 155 of the 200 seats, polling 58% of the popular vote, while the PNA won 36 seats with 38% of the popular vote. The few victories of the PNA came in areas recognised as opposition strongholds - the NWFP and the urban areas of Sind.

No sooner had the results been announced than the PNA accused the PPP of rigging the election, particularly in the Punjab through such devices as bogus votes and the use of the FSF to intimidate voters with the connivance of the

election staff and the local administration.<sup>283</sup> Bhutto denied the charges, arguing that if irregularities had occurred they were restricted to isolated cases and were the work of overzealous officials.<sup>284</sup> To placate the opposition, however, the Election Commission declined (pending inquiry) to validate the election results in 24 constituencies and annulled the results in another six.<sup>285</sup> In a newspaper interview, the Chief Election Commissioner, (CEC), expressed his shock at learning of irregularities in more than half the seats.<sup>286</sup> But when the records of another 85 constituencies were called for by the CEC, the special powers of judicial enquiry vested in the commission were suddenly withdrawn by the Bhutto government.<sup>287</sup> But whatever the precise scale of the rigging and the number of constituencies actually affected, the net result was to rob Bhutto of that important intangible commodity, political legitimacy.<sup>288</sup>

The PNA boycotted the provincial assembly poll and launched an agitation movement which led to almost four months of domestic violence.<sup>289</sup> The nationwide, largely urban, campaign to oust Bhutto saw hartals, demonstrations, and street violence become the order of the day. Journalists, orthodox mullahs, lawyers, petty shopkeepers and traders, pro-Jamaat students, women and a section of urban labour banded together to protest against what they regarded as an authoritarian and corrupt regime.<sup>290</sup> Bhutto charged that the agitation against him was not a desi (indigenous) conspiracy, but a massive international conspiracy masterminded and financed by the U.S.A., (which he referred to obliquely as the power which waged "a cruel and savage war in Vietnam").<sup>291</sup>

Bhutto's response to the crisis alternated precariously between offering concessions on the one hand and outright suppression on the other. The PNA rejected Bhutto's compromise proposal - referred to as the 'Bakhtiar Formula', since it was conceived by the Attorney-General - to hold fresh provincial elections, and if the opposition gained an overall majority in them to hold a new general election.<sup>292</sup> Bhutto attempted to defuse the conflict with timely give-ways - a ban on alcohol, gambling and night clubs was announced accompanied by a promise to enforce Islamic laws within six months. This device to steal the thunder of the orthodox mullahs in the opposition camp failed to make any impact. Increases in the pay of the army, police and civil service, the grant of property rights to urban squatters, and the offer to hold a referendum also failed to defuse the crisis. On the other hand, the arrest of all PNA leaders and the use of strong arm tactics on the part of the law enforcing agencies, the police and the FSF only served to escalate the movement. Unable to control the rising tide of violence, Bhutto called in the army, imposing martial law in the country's three largest cities.<sup>293</sup> The opposition regarded this as a tactical victory as they hoped that the army would now oust Bhutto.

While the army initially stood divided on the question of resuming political power,<sup>294</sup> it became the key factor in the crisis and was instrumental in bringing the two parties to the negotiating table and pressurising Bhutto to agree to hold fresh elections as a pre-condition to a dialogue with the PNA.<sup>295</sup> The dialogue which began on 3 June

and lasted four weeks, finally resulted in an accord providing for fresh elections under the supervision of the army and judiciary. But the central council of the PNA refused to ratify the accord making their endorsement conditional upon the prior settlement of nine points.<sup>296</sup> Hours after Bhutto addressed a press conference in which he accused the PNA of going back on the agreement, he was deposed in a bloodless army coup on 5 July. The Chief of Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, one of Bhutto's own appointees, proclaimed martial law, put the constitution into abeyance, banned all political activity and dissolved the assemblies.

A contingency plan for a possible military takeover - known as 'Operation Fair Play' - was prepared by Zia and his corps commanders early in the nation's four months of turmoil.<sup>297</sup> But what precipitated the coup was the use of the army to quell the anti-Bhutto opposition. Throughout the eleven weeks that the army administered key cities under Bhutto's limited declaration of martial law, it came under serious pressure from within its ranks for allowing itself to be 'misused' for political ends. When a number of brigadiers resigned in protest in Lahore, the threat to the unity of the army could no longer be ignored by the army High Command. Thus the army intervened to 'save the nation' from chaos and bloodshed and to preserve unity within its own ranks. Since the talks between Bhutto and the PNA had not actually broken off when the Army intervened, the justification for military action rested on the argument that even with an agreement, there was every chance

of further fighting and bloody clashes, with the army caught in the middle.

The military coup brought to an end the PPP's five and a half years in government and placed the country, for the third time in its history, under military rule.

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#### NOTES

1. The only exception is Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), but published in India, this book is not readily available elsewhere.
2. S. J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77, (London: Macmillan 1980).
3. Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca, 1979). Taseer's biography is strong in background information about Bhutto's social origins and early career, but poor in the description and analysis of Bhutto's years in power. For instance, while ten chapters are devoted to describing Bhutto's childhood and early political career, only one chapter really deals with his years in office.
4. For example, see L. F. R. Williams, Pakistan Under Challenge, (London: Stacy International, 1975), pp. 29-32 and David Dunbar, 'Bhutto - two years on', The World Today, (January 1974), p. 16.
5. W. Howard Wriggins, The Rulers' Imperative, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 4.
6. The two non-PPP members of Bhutto's cabinet were both Bengalis, Nurul Amin and Raja Tridev Roy, who were elected to the national assembly from East Pakistan in 1970. Their inclusion in the cabinet was intended to emphasise Bhutto's refusal to recognise the secession of East Pakistan. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 5-12 February 1972, Vol. 18, p. 25091.
7. Ghulam Mustapha Khar, Hayat Mohammed Sherpao, Rasul Baksh Talpur and Ghaus Baksh Raisani were appointed governors of Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan respectively.
8. Outlook, 29 April 1972, p. 7.
9. See Dawn, 4 March 1972. The reason behind this shake up are discussed in more detail in chapter XI.
10. Far East Economic Review, 11 March 1972, p. 3.
11. Dawn, 13 March 1972.
12. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1973).



13. Dawn, 21 August 1973.
14. Quoted in Administrative Reforms: Before and After', in Pakistan Times, 24 November 1976.
15. Pakistan Times, 23 December 1971.
16. Pakistan Times, 27 December 1971.
17. Warnings to the 22 families to bring back the nation's wealth were issued frequently during the first few months of the PPP's assumption of power.
18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit.
19. Ibid, p. 25092.
20. Ibid.
21. The Sun, 7 May 1972.
22. Outlook, 27 May 1972, p. 7.
23. Dawn, 6 March 1972.
24. For a brief account of the nature and role of the media in Pakistani society, see chapter I, pp. 64-65.
25. Morning News, 9 February 1972. For an elaboration of allegations of sedition against Gauhar, see Al-Fatah, 10-17 February, 1972. The actual grounds for Gauhar's detention however were extremely vague. See Morning News, 19 February 1972.
26. It is interesting to note that as Ayub Khan's secretary of information and close confidante, Gauhar (a former CSP), was widely regarded to be the most influential of Ayub's advisers. Ironically, it was Gauhar who was reported to have been one of the chief architects of the policy of imposing strict controls over the media. During Yahya's rule, Gauhar was among the 303 class 1 officers who were dismissed from the civil service. The Bhutto government claimed that Gauhar's arrest was related "to his removal from government service during the 1969 round of screening and his activities thereafter". See Morning News, 6 February 1972 and 9 February 1972.
27. Dawn, 7 February 1972, 1 & 3.
28. Dawn, 18 July 1972.
29. Pakistan Times, 11 April 1972, 3.
30. The most important source of information on relations between the PPP government and the media comes from a White Paper published by the Zia government after Bhutto's fall. The White Paper on Misuse of Media, December 1971 - July 4, 1977, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1978), provides documentary evidence in

its annexure (covering 41 pages) of the methods utilised by the PPP regime to both silence criticism and to publicise the activities of Bhutto and the PPP. The White Paper publishes selected documents from the P.M.'s secretariat and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, which largely speak for themselves.

31. See chapters I & II in White Paper on the Misuse of Media, ibid.
32. Ibid, pp. 78-79.
33. Ibid, p. 85. Newspapers "rewarded" in this manner included Musawaat, Hilal-e-Pakistan, Nusrat, Baluchistan Times, Zamana, while those "punished" included Nawa-e-Waqt, New Times, among others and several newsweeklies such as Outlook, Pakistan Economist, Urdu Digest, Al-Fatah.
34. Letter submitted by Nasim Ahmed, (secretary, information and broadcasting) to Bhutto, Annexure 13, ibid.
35. Noting by Bhutto on Nasim's letter, ibid.
36. Dawn, 7 February 1972.
37. Interview with Mukhtar Rana, (London, November 1978), ex-PPP MNA for Lyallpur, who himself presided over many of these 'courts'.
38. Dawn, 8 January 1972, 6.
39. Dawn, 11 February 1972.
40. See Anwar Ahmed Qadri, 'Development of Labour Laws of Pakistan', in Zahid Malik, ed., Pakistan after 1971, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan National Centre, 1974), pp. 175-188; and New Labour Laws, (Karachi: Mansoor Book House, n.d.).
41. 'New Deal for Labour', Pakistan Times, 20 December 1972.
42. Far East Economic Review, 24 June 1972.
43. Dawn, 9 June 1972.
44. The police strikes led to the announcement of Police Reforms on 12 April 1972, promising better pay and conditions. See Pakistan Times, 13 April 1972.
45. Indeed this was one of the reasons that led to Gul Hasan's dismissal from the army in March 1972, mentioned earlier. See H. K. Burki, 'Picking Up the Pieces' in 'First Year of Peoples Government', special supplement of The Pakistan Times, 20 December 1972.
46. Dawn, 25 February 1972.
47. The labour riots began on 18 October and ended on 3 November 1972 - For a detailed description of the riots see Al-Fatah of the period above. See also 'Labour's Increasing Militancy' in Outlook, 4 November 1972, p. 46.

48. The Mumtaz Bhutto government in Sind, for instance gave factory owners the permission to dismiss striking workers. See Dawn, 1 November 1972.
49. See Dawn, 5 March 1972 and 9 March 1972.
50. Interviews with Mukhtar Rana.
51. Dawn, 25 March 1972.
52. 'Mukhtar Rana: Rebel with a Cause' in Outlook, 20 March 1972. Rana was later also charged with murdering a textile factory owner in Lyallpur. The murder case, according to what Rana told the writer, was absolutely concocted and was an attempt by the right-wing members of the PPP such as Khar, Peerzada and Niazi to destroy his image.
53. See, for instance, the Pakistan Times editorial of 9 May 1972, 3.
54. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
55. Pakistan Times, 20 May 1972, 7.
56. Pakistan Times, 18 October 1972.
57. Dawn, 14 November 1973, 8. Mairaj subsequently wrote a lengthy critique of the PPP in an 'open letter to the people' explaining why he left the party. This document was banned by the PPP government and was published only after the fall of Bhutto in 1977. For Mairaj's letter see Al-Fatah issues of 12, 19, 26 August, 2, 9, 16 September, 1977.
58. Outlook, 15 June 1974, p. 5.
59. As with Mukhtar Rana, Mairaj's case was taken up by Amnesty International and he too was adopted as a 'prisoner of conscience'. See Amnesty International Report: Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1976, (London, 1977).
60. Two notable labour leaders of Karachi belonging to the powerful Mutihida Mazdoor Federation, Bawar Khan and Abdullah Baluch were detained under DPR, while 175 workers belonging to this union were made to undergo criminal trials as a consequence of their opposition to the PPP government. See Outlook, 2 June 1973, pp. 4-5
61. Far East Economic Review, 5 August 1972.
62. Dawn, 8 July 1972.
63. Census figures are not available as the last census to enumerate 'muhajirs' as a separate category in the population of Sind was in 1951. The 1951 figure does not accurately represent the proportion of muhajirs in the Sindhi population as the influx of 'refugees' from India into Pakistan was continuing when the census information was collected. An independent estimate made

by Hafeez Malik, 'Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan' in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1975) showed the following strength of Muhajirs in the eight main cities and towns of Sind in 1971:

<u>City &amp; Town</u>	<u>Muhajir %</u>
Karachi	80 - 85
Hyderabad	60 - 65
Sukkur	50 - 60
Larkhana	50 - 50
Mirpurkhas	50 - 55
Nawabshah	45 - 50
Dadu	45 - 40
Shikarpur	35 - 40
Thatta	35 - 40

64. Far East Economic Review, 1 July 1972. Nearly a hundred people died during July and August, and damage to property was extensive.
65. For the 'Language Accord', see Dawn, 16 July 1972, 1.
66. S. Kumar, op.cit, p. 19.
67. Fissures within the PPP over the language issue had arisen before the Bill was moved in the Sind Assembly. At the PPP Central Committee meeting in Murree on 12 June 1972 one group led by Mumtaz Bhutto demanded the adoption of Sindhi as the official language, while another group led by Mairaj urged that while Sindhi be given its 'rightful' place, sufficient safeguards should be provided for the Urdu-speaking populace after extensive consultations with representatives of both groups. While the Central Committee decided in favour of the latter view, in practice the Sind government of Mumtaz Bhutto flouted this decision, with or without Bhutto's concurrence, and went ahead with a bill without any safeguards for the Muhajirs. This flouting of a decision taken by the PPP's central body by the party's Sind branch resulted in considerable tension within the party.
68. Interview with Dr. Khaliq - who was education minister of the Punjab government between 1972 and 1976; Rawalpindi, December 1977.
69. For a critical analysis of the Simla Summit stating the Indian viewpoint and the text of the agreement signed between India and Pakistan, see G. S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender: The Simla Summit, (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1972). For a Pakistani view, see Taseer, op.cit, chapter 12.
70. Interview with Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1972-1977; Islamabad, December 1977.
71. Pakistan Times, 25 November 1972.
72. Pakistan Times, 11 December 1972.

73. 'A Taste of the Mailed Fist', Outlook, 23 December 1972, pp. 6-7.
74. Pakistan Times, 25 December 1972, 9.
75. Outlook, ibid, p. 7.
76. Pakistan Times, 14 December 1972, 1.
77. Economic Review, (January 1973), p. 7.
78. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. I, (7 April 1978), Document of the World Bank, Restricted Circulation, p. 10.
79. Ibid, p. 6.
80. 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics: 1947-1972, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1973).
81. Population Census of Pakistan, 1972, (Islamabad: Pakistan Census Organisation, 1973).
82. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-77, (Islamabad: Finance Division, 1977), Statistical Section, p. 11.
83. Pakistan Times, 13 May 1972, 1 & 5.
84. Ibid, 5.
85. Gilbert T. Brown, 'Pakistan's Economic Development after 1971', in Lawrence Ziring et al, eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), pp. 177-178.
86. Z. A. Bhutto, 'Pakistan Builds Anew', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, (April 1973).
87. Pakistan Economic Survey, op.cit, p. 85.
88. Brown, ibid.
89. For the text of the Economic Reforms Order, see Pakistan Times, 3 January 1972.
90. Bhutto, for instance, declared that this move was meant to 'eliminate, once and for all, poverty and discrimination in Pakistan". See his Speeches and Statements - 20 December 1971 - 31 March 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 33.
91. Rashid Amjad, Pakistan's Growth Experience, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1978), p. 11.
92. Burki, op.cit, p. 114.
93. Shakila Zaheer, Vegetable Ghee Industry in the Punjab, (Lahore: Board of Economic Inquiry, 1975).

94. The government, however, maintained that this should not be viewed as nationalisation as these were not industrial units but an integral part of the agricultural economy. See Dawn, 18 July 1976, 1. See also Prime Minister's Address to the Nation, 17 July 1976, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976).
95. Labour Reforms of 1972, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Labour Division, 1972), p. 34.
96. Ibid, p. 18.
97. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, op.cit, p. 12.
98. Pakistan Economic Survey, op.cit, p. 138.
99. Rashid Amjad, ibid, p. 13.
100. Dawn, 2 March 1972, 1.
101. See also 'Land Reforms: The Lacunae and the Remedies' in Pakistan Times, 6 March 1972, p. 5.
102. It was estimated that at 1970 prices the net annual transfer of incomes from landlords to tenants due to changes in the sharing of cash input costs would amount to Rs. 264 million. Although this is slightly less than 2% of the GDP originating in agriculture (in crop year 1973), for typical tenants this could amount to Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 per year.
103. The "Agroville" and PWP were reportedly inspired by Mubashar Hasan and Sheikh Rashid, the two 'ideologues' of the party. In an interview, Mubashar told the author that the Agroville scheme remained on paper only. The PWP was abandoned soon after it was launched as the provincial governments made a "mess" of it; the funds allocated under the programme began to be distributed through MPAs as a source of patronage, and corruption was rampant. Interview with Mubashar Hasan ex-Minister of finance in the PPP government 1972-1974, and secretary-general of the PPP 1974-1977; Lahore, August, 1977.
104. State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report, 1977-1978, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1978), Statistical Annexure, Table 5:1.
105. Quarterly Economic Review, Annual Supplement 1974, p. 2.
106. Brown, op.cit, p. 179.
107. Ibid, p. 67.
108. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1978-79, (Islamabad: Finance Division, 1979). See also Table XI.2.
109. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, op.cit, pp. 60-67.
110. Pakistan Times, 8 April 1974.

111. Far East Economic Review, 25 April 1975.
112. S. Kumar, op.cit, p. 150.
113. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-1977, op.cit, p. 101.
114. Based on a survey carried out by the government in 1977 there are an estimated 700,000 Pakistanis abroad, of whom 280,000 are in OPEC countries, 250,000 in the U.K., and the remainder scattered throughout the world. Remittances from OPEC countries have grown phenomenally while those from Britain have stagnated. From OPEC sources remittances grew from \$ 134 million or a quarter of total remittances at the time of the major oil increase in 1973, to \$ 434 million or three-quarters of the total in 1977. Earnings of that magnitude make manpower export Pakistan's fourth largest foreign exchange earner.
115. For a detailed analysis of this dependency on foreign aid see B. M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development, 1948-78: The Failure of a Strategy, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1979), chapter seven. The amount of aid disbursed during the period 1973-74 to 1975-76 amounted to: \$ 497 million in 1973-74, \$ 1,135 million in 1974-75 and \$ 1,242 million in 1975-76.
116. M. L. Qureishi, 'An Economic Survey' in Pakistan: Past and Present, (London: Stacy International, 1977), pp. 191-192.
117. Ibid, p. 192.
118. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-1977, ibid, p. viii.
119. Ibid, p. 18.
120. The main indices of economic performance as released in the Economic Survey, ibid, only a few days before the military's assumption of power bore out the accuracy of this expectation.
121. Pakistan Times, 23 December 1971. NAP and JUI had established alliances in Baluchistan and the NWFP. NAP had to pay a heavy price for this alliance with a religious party, having to forego its secularism and diluting its socialism to the point of luring Pakistani industrialists and capitalists to the two provinces. In return, NAP received firm support from the JUI on the question of provincial autonomy and the general relationship between the Federal government and the provinces.
122. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 5-12 February, Vol. 18, p. 25091.
123. Dawn, 25 January 1972.
124. New York Times, 30 December 1971, 2.
125. Pakistan Times, 29 December 1971.
126. The Mazdoor-Kissan Party (Workers-Peasants Party) is an offshoot of the NAP itself. When the NAP split in 1968 into the pro-Moscow Wali group and the pro-Peking Bhashani group, a West

Pakistani group allied itself with the latter, but called itself NAP (Mazdoor-Kissan group). In May 1970, it formed itself into the Mazdoor-Kissan Party under the leadership of Afzal Bangash. The MKP distinguishes itself from other 'bourgeois' parties - it does not believe in elections and has long organised and assisted the peasants of the NWFP against the sardars and Khans. It enjoys some support among sections of the students and urban workers in the Punjab, but remains largely an NWFP-based party - despite the fact that its two main leaders came from the Punjab. For an account of the MKP see Outlook, 6 May 1972, pp. 8-10.

127. Dawn, 7 March 1972.
128. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 8-15 July 1972, Vol. 18, p. 25359.
129. 'The Accord and After', Dawn, 12 April 1972, 4.
130. Outlook, 15 April 1972, p. 4.
131. Qayyum was Wali's most implacable political foe. Indeed, the entire history of the NWFP since partition and before has been dominated by the struggle of power between Qayyum's Muslim League (that supported Jinnah in the movement for independence from India) and NAP and its predecessor, the Congressite Khudai Khidmatgars under the leadership of Wali's father, Ghaffar Khan, who opposed Jinnah and the Pakistan movement.
132. Pakistan Times, 9 April 1972.
133. Far East Economic Review, 22 April 1972, pp. 18-19.
134. Outlook, 22 April 1972, p. 3. It was generally believed that at least 39 of the PPP's 88 MNAs were opposed to any continuation of martial law.
135. Ibid, p. 4.
136. The Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1972, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972).
137. Pakistan Times, 18 April 1972.
138. Pakistan Times, 15 April 1972.
139. Attorney General's Opening Address in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 19, 20, & 23 June 1975, (Islamabad: Directorate of Research, Reference and Publications, 1976), p. 23.
140. Pakistan Times, 30 April 1972.
141. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 8-15 July 1972, Vol. 18 p. 25360.
142. Outlook, 6 May 1972, p. 6.
143. For Qayyum Khan's statements see Pakistan Times, 30 May 1972, 6.



144. Pakistan Times, 22 June 1972, 8. Wali Khan was referring to the PPP efforts in the two provinces to 'buy' support by promise of public office - and failing which, to use force against 'non-purchasable' people.
145. Dawn, 6 August 1972, 6. One of the first acts of the Mufti Mahmud government was to lift the ban on the Khudai Khidmatgar organisation in May 1972. This also meant the rehabilitation of its para-military wing, the Pakhtun Zalme.
146. Pakistan Times, 23 June 1972, 10.
147. Interview with Nasrullah Khan Khattak, Islamabad, October 1978.
148. The reaction of the Jamaat was much like the Jan Sangh in India. Both accused their governments of a "sell-out", and insinuated that there was a "secret clause" in the Agreement that compromised their respective country's interests.
149. Dawn, 15 July 1972.
150. The first 'London Plan' had the same 'conspirators', i.e. the regional leaders from East Bengal and NWFP.
151. Pakistan Times, 10 September 1972.
152. Outlook, 16 September 1972, p. 3.
153. Interview with Khan Abdul Wali Khan, President NAP, September 1979.
154. Dawn, 16 September 1972.
155. Dawn, 28 August 1972.
156. Outlook, 14 October 1972, p. 5.
157. Pakistan Times, 4 October 1972, 8.
158. Pakistan Times, 8 October 1972, 4.
159. Hafeez Malik, 'The Emergence of the Federal Pattern in Pakistan', in W. J. Korson, ed., Contemporary Problems in Pakistan, (Lieden: J. Brill, 1974), p. 52.
160. Dawn, 19 January 1973.
161. Akhtar Aman, 'Pakistan and the Challenge of History', (Lahore: Universal Books, 1974), p. 70.
162. Pakistan Times, 5 October 1972.
163. Outlook, 7 October 1972, pp. 3 & 4.
164. Ahmed Reza Kasuri was one of (5) signatories in Mahmud Kasuri's letter of resignation, thereby stating his opposition to 'Bhutto's strong executive proposals'. Pakistan Times, 30 October 1972.

165. Most of the events between 1972 and 1974 in Baluchistan are described in the PPP government's White Paper on Baluchistan, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 19 October 1974).
166. Outlook, 11 November 1972, p. 5.
167. Far East Economic Review, 8 January 1973.
168. What prompted this rather bizarre incident when armed horsemen descended on to Quetta and encircled the provincial secretariat was the promulgation of the Mine's Ordinance by the provincial government cancelling leases of the coal mines belonging to the Zehri and Bugti tribes. See Outlook, 9 December 1972, p. 5.
169. White Paper on Baluchistan, op.cit, p. 20.
170. Ibid, p. 21.
171. Dawn, 27 January 1973.
172. Dawn, 28 January 1973.
173. Dawn, 10 February 1973.
174. Dawn, 22 January 1973.
175. Dawn, 2 January 1973.
176. Dawn, 6 January 1973.
177. Dawn, 23 January 1973.
178. Aman, op.cit, p. 70.
179. Dawn, 11 February 1973.
180. Dawn, 13 February 1973.
181. Dawn, 20 February 1973.
182. Dawn, 17 February 1973.
183. Dawn, 3 March 1973.
184. For the text of the UDF's 11 point demands see Dawn, 25 March 1973, 1 & 5.
185. 'Language of Bullets', Outlook, 31 March 1973, pp. 4 & 5.
186. Bhutto offered twelve major adjustments in the constitution in accordance with the wishes of the opposition, but made these conditional upon UDF's declaring an end to their boycott. See Pakistan Times, 5 April 1973, 1 & 8.
187. Interview with Maulana Maudoodi, Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami, Lahore, August 1977.

188. Interview with Wali Khan.
189. None of the amendments concerned the issue of the distribution of power between the provinces and the centre, indicating that the issue of autonomy (at least in the constitutional sense) had been settled several weeks ago between the PPP and the opposition.
190. Pakistan Times, 11 April 1973.
191. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1973). For analyses and critiques of the constitution see: G. W. Choudhury, '"New" Pakistan's Constitution, 1973', Middle East Journal, Vol. 28 (Winter, 1974); Fazlur Rahman, 'Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan', in J. Henry Korson, ed., op.cit.; and Craig Baxter, 'Constitution-Making', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, (December 1974).
192. Pakistan Times, 12 May 1973.
193. For proceedings of the army officers trial in which the general background, causes and aims of the aborted coup attempt are set out, see Dawn, 26 July 1973, 2.
194. Some of the officers were acquitted while others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Pakistan Times, 2 February 1974.
195. Far East Economic Review, 3 September 1973, p. 11.
196. Interview with Ghaus Baksh Raisani, former PPP governor of Baluchistan, Islamabad, October 1979.
197. For a description of the FSF's functions and organisations see 'Federal Security Force - Friends of the People' in Pakistan Times, 5 October 1976 - special two-page supplement.
198. Pakistan Times, 2 June 1973.
199. 'Stately Hooliganism' in Outlook, pp. 4-6.
200. Dawn, 6 July 1973.
201. Dawn, 8 September 1973.
202. Outlook, 1 September 1973, p. 4.
203. Dawn, 7 October 1973, 3 December 1973.
204. Far East Economic Review, 19 November 1973, p. 20.
205. Far East Economic Review, 28 January 1974, p. 21.
206. The Khans of Kalat have been the traditional heads of the confederacy of Brohi tribes which outnumber the Baluchi-speaking tribes in the province.

207. Outlook, 2 March 1974, p. 11.
208. Outlook, 9 March 1974, p. 4.
209. Ibid, p. 3.
210. Dawn, 14 March 1974.
211. Quoted in Anis Mirza's 'From the Press Gallery', Dawn, 6 February 1974, 6.
212. Dawn, 16 February 1974, 8.
213. Dawn, 18 February 1974.
214. The article in question was, 'Wali Khan Interviewed', Outlook, 6 July 1974, pp. 5-8.
215. Pakistan Times, 24 April, 1974.
216. The Qadianis or Ahmeddiyas sect was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed in the late 1880's in Qadian (India). Claiming that he had received a series of revelations from God, an Ahmeddiya society was set up by Mirza in 1901. The revelations claimed by him was in direct contradiction to the message in the Quran that Muhammed was the last of the prophets. Thus the tenets of this new sect came to be regarded as heretical by most orthodox Muslims. In 1947, the Ahmeddiyas moved their headquarters from Qadian to Rabwah, near Lahore. In 1953, anti-Qadiani riots resulted in bloodshed and the imposition of the first martial law. Total numbers of Ahmeddiyas are not known. Estimates in mid-1974 ranged from several hundred thousand to between 3 and 5 million. Their influence, however, is far greater than their small proportion in the total population would suggest. Adherents reportedly occupied many of the key positions in the armed forces, banking, the judiciary and the civil service.
217. Amongst the Muslim states, Saudi Arabia has been vocal in this demand, and has banned Qadianis from performing the Haj (the annual pilgrimage to Mecca).
218. Pakistan Times, 30 May 1974.
219. On 1 June, the Punjab government under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (1960) banned any news or comment on the sectarian situation.
220. Pakistan Times, 15 June 1974.
221. Dawn, 8 September 1974.
222. Dawn, 18 September 1974.
223. Far East Economic Review, 1 November 1974.
224. For the text of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Ordinance, see Dawn, 6 October 1974.

225. Dawn, 5 November 1974.
226. Kasuri claimed this was the fourth assassination attempt upon him. See Dawn, 12 November 1974. Later Kasuri appeared in the N.A. with the blood stained clothes of his father and held Bhutto directly responsible for his death. See Dawn, 5 December 1974.
227. Dawn, 1 February 1975.
228. Dawn, 9 February 1975.
229. Dawn, 11 February 1975.
230. Ibid.
231. Dawn, 13 February 1975.
232. Pakistan Times, 22 May 1975.
233. Richard S. Wheeler, 'Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of Opposition', Asian Survey, Vol. XVii, (February 1976), pp. 113-114.
234. For the arguments put forward by the government see Attorney General's Address to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, op.cit.
235. Wali did, however, state his case in Written Statement of Khan Abdul Wali Khan in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, (Peshawar: Frontier Press, 1975).
236. For the text of the verdict, see Pakistan Times, 2 November, 1975, pages I to VIII. The government also issued five booklets summarising the Supreme Court verdict entitled NAP's Role Against Integrity of Pakistan; Historical Background of NAP; NAP's Collusion with Afghanistan; NAP's Concept of Nationalities; Genesis of Pakhtoonistan Movement, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.).
237. Dawn, 17 February 1975.
238. Pakistan Times, 4 May 1975.
239. Interview with Nasrullah Khan Khattak.
240. ViewPoint, 21 November 1975.
241. 'The Battle of the Bill', ViewPoint, op.cit, pp. 7 & 8.
242. Pakistan Times, 11 December 1975.
243. 'Pakistan in 1975', op.cit, p. 114.
244. In May 1975, the regime insituted a case against him under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. See Pakistan Times, 9 May, 1975, 5.
245. Dawn, 7 November 1975.

246. This however applied only to NAP office-bearers.
247. ViewPoint, 9 January 1976, p. 7.
248. Dawn, 1 January 1976.
249. ViewPoint, ibid.
250. Dawn, 9 April 1976. It is interesting to note that when the JUI-NAP government had sent a resolution in 1972 to Bhutto suggesting implementation of the abolition of the Sardari System, (at the time, under the Interim Constitution, provincial governments did not have the authority to take such decisions by themselves), it was ignored by the central government and opposed by the PPP in the assembly.
251. Z. A. Bhutto's Speech in the Parliament (on) Situation in Baluchistan, 26 April, 1976, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.).
252. Interview reported in Far East Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1977, p. 262.
253. ViewPoint, 13 February 1976, p. 10.
254. Zahur Elahi was convicted on 6 August while Ramay was convicted on 21 September.
255. Dawn, 14 April 1976.
256. Dawn, 28 February 1976.
257. These were held on 25 July and 31 October 1976. For disunity amongst the UDF components, see ViewPoint, 6 August 1976, p. 11.
258. Bhutto justified the entrance of ex-NAP members to his party on the rather weak ground that NAP had always had two types of members: those who were secessionists and those who were not aware of the party's real designs. The latter were welcome to join the PPP. See Dawn, 15 February 1976.
259. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), pp. 22-31. According to the White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, op.cit., published by the Zia regime, Bhutto had in fact started preparations for rigging the election as early as April 1976. A blueprint for rigging, entitled 'The Larkana Plan' was allegedly prepared by Bhutto, envisaging the mobilisation of the district administration as an electoral instrument of the PPP. The White Paper also accuses Bhutto of gerrymandering constituencies by interfering in the activities of the Election Commission. The White Paper relies on two sources to prove its allegations: (1) documents signed and circulated by Bhutto, Rafi Raza, Tamman, officials of the P.M.'s secretariat, intelligence executives, and chief ministers, chief secretaries and officials handling the election operations, and (2) the findings of a committee of enquiry appointed on 1 November 1977 by General Zia to investigate the conduct of the elections. Bhutto's extensive reply to the allegations of rigging is to be found in his "If I Am Assassinated", written in jail after he was arrested by Zia's regime in September 1977.

260. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, p. 23.
261. Ibid.
262. Annexure 166, White Paper, op.cit, p. A 469.
263. Ibid, p. A 470.
264. Annexures 167 and 168, ibid, p. A 475, 476.
265. ViewPoint, 1 October 1976, pp. 15, 25.
266. Promises and Performance: Implementation of the 1970 Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1977).
267. National Charter for the Peasants of Pakistan, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1976).
268. The new reform, however, promised those whose land was resumed would receive compensation at above market prices, in the form of 10 year interest bearing bonds. For text of the Land Reform Order, see Pakistan Times, 6 January, 1977, 1, 5, 6.
269. A demonstration of the ruling party's control over media activities was provided during the course of the election campaign. When a Lahore High Court Order called for apportioning equal time and coverage in the media to opposition campaigning, this was superseded by an executive order declaring the order void.
270. The Muslim League, the PDP, the Khaksar Tehriq, JUI and JI were already united within the UDF. After the election date was announced the UDF joined hands with the Tehriq-i-Istaqlal, the JUP and Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.
271. According to Bhutto, "the unity of the PNA was not a desi (indigenous) conspiracy", but part of an 'American' conspiracy to destabilise him, because of his determination to go ahead with acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant. See "If I Am Assassinated" op.cit, pp. 106-107.
272. Pakistan Times, 21 February 1977.
273. A. T. Chaudhri, 'The Battle of Manifestos' -I, Dawn, 14 February 1977.
274. Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, 1977, (Rawalpindi: PPP Central Secretariat, 1977).
275. 'PPP Manifesto: Who's Writing What', ViewPoint, 30 January 1976, p.7.
276. Dawn, 17 February 1977.
277. For a detailed analysis of the election campaign see Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan: The Campaign before the Storm', Asian Survey, (July 1977), pp. 581-589.

278. Bhutto later alleged that the PNA's confidence was based on a conspiracy that it had hatched in February 1977 with the military commander, General Zia to overthrow the Bhutto government. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, p. 165.
279. Annexure 166. White Paper, op.cit, pp. A 471-72.
280. For example, all seven PPP candidates from the Sargodha district were members of the traditional rural elite, and the majority of PPP candidates from Sahiwal, Mianwali, Bahawalpur, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh were either big landowners or biradari leaders, who had jumped on to the PPP bandwagon recently.
281. Hurriyat 2 March 1977, 5 Marcy 1977.
282. Appeals made to the Election Commission were all dismissed except in the case of one provincial assembly seat, where a ruling was given in favour of an opposition candidate. The petition filed against the unopposed election of Bhutto was dismissed for lack of evidence. See Pakistan Times, 13 February 1977.
283. ViewPoint, 25 March 1977, p. 12. According to a White Paper issued by the PNA, there was not a single constituency in the Punjab and in Sind outside Karachi and Hyderabad, where certificates of count for all polling stations was given.
284. Bhutto stated in his oath-taking speech before the N.A. on 28 March that it was not his government's policy to rig the election, but "there might have been irregularities in some places.....it happened even in civilised countries like the U.S.A." In a later interview Bhutto conceded that "when it came down to it, there may have been fifteen seats won honestly". Newsweek, 23 April 1977, p. 21.
285. A detailed judgement was given only in the case of N.A. 57, Sargodha V, involving the ex-minister of railways, H. Cheema. The Commission found that false ballot papers had been stuffed wholesale in ballot boxes, opposition votes had been over-stamped to invalidate them, and Cheema's supporters had brandished weapons to intimidate voters.
286. Millat (Gujrati), 6 May 1977.
287. Ibid.
288. Two major theories have since been propounded regarding the rigging. Both accept that rigging took place but disagree on the extent and on who they held responsible. According to the 'Central Rigging Plan' theory, there was a pre-planned conspiracy to 'rig' the result wholesale, which was conceived, directed and implemented by Bhutto himself and his close associates. This is the view advanced in the 'White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections', op.cit. The 'over-zealous officials' or 'wicked advisers' theory rejects this holding Bhutto personally innocent and places responsibility upon anxious-to-please officials for what it believes was limited rigging. This theory was advanced by Bhutto in his "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit.



289. The following figures give some idea of the scale of the movement. Over 250 people were killed and 1,763 injured after 7 March and no less than 16, 863 were arrested. Members of the general public took part in 4,290 processions of which 262 were organised by women, 94 by lawyers, 19 by Ulema and 283 by students. These figures were quoted in the statement filed by the States' Counsel in the Supreme Court hearing of Mrs. Bhutto's petition challenging Martial Law Regulation No. 12. See Pakistan Times, 12 October 1977, 7.
290. That Bhutto was deeply perturbed at the participation of labour in the agitation was indicated by his comments on a note written to him by Rao Rashid on 26 April informing him that "the first to throw their weight behind the PNA were the pro-west trade unions....now even the leftists have adopted an anti-government stance." Bhutto said that this was "a very serious development." See Annexure 336, White Paper, op.cit, p. A, 1008.
291. Bhutto alleged that the U.S.A. had poured in millions of Dollars to help the PNA campaign. The USA which gave Bhutto's government £200 million in aid and sold it \$150 million worth of arms in 1976, denied any interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs. See Bhutto's Address at the Joint Session of the National Assembly and the Senate, (Government of Pakistan, Islamabad), 28 April, 1977.
292. Dawn, 10 April 1977.
293. On 21 April martial law was imposed in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore.
294. While several Corp Commanders were in favour of an immediate coup to remove Bhutto whom they regarded as having provoked bloodshed, the army's chief of staff, General Zia initially refused to intervene against what he, at least up to April, regarded as a legally-constituted government. Interview with General Rafi Alam, Divisional Commander, Armoured Corps, Rawalpindi, December 1977.
295. Another important source of pressure were the Arab states of U.A.E., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The emissaries of these states, particularly the Saudi ambassador, assumed a mediatory role in an effort to find a way out of the impasse.
296. These points centred on such issues as the constitutional character and powers of the independent 'implementation council that would supervise the election, the date of dissolution of the N.A. and the date for the withdrawal of troops from Baluchistan'. The hardliner among the opposition leadership, generally regarded to be responsible for the talks deadlock was Air Marshall Asghar Khan, the leader of the Tehriq-e-Istaqlal.
297. 'Fairplay: The Military Initiative', 111, Defence Journal, (Karachi, 1977), Nos. 7/8, pp. 5-6.

## VI

THE PPP: PARTY BUILDING AND PATRIMONIALISM

The following three chapters are concerned with analysing the PPP's internal dynamics in the post-1972 period. This chapter begins with a discussion of Bhutto's beliefs and strategy that are considered relevant to the development of the PPP and then examines how Bhutto's patrimonial strategy was operationalised. Thus, we are concerned here with analysing the building of the party in order to assess the PPP's nature, social base and organisational development. Chapter VII deals with the actual working of the party machine through an examination of the nature and consequences of factionalism, patronage and corruption. Chapter VIII discusses Bhutto's response in the period 1975-76 to various developments in the party enumerated in the preceding chapters in order to ascertain whether these last-minute 're-organisational' efforts signified a reversal of the past dominant trend of personalism in the party by moving towards institutionalisation, or merely the continuation of previous trends. This is followed by an assessment of the PPP which, by bringing together the perspectives of the preceding two chapters, focuses on the phenomena of the primacy of personalism over institutionalisation in the PPP and its consequences for regime stability and for the broader issue of political development.

Although the question of the extent to which Bhutto succeeded in transforming the PPP from a movement into a political party, in the sense of an institutionalised group

possessing organisational viability and cohesion, is raised specifically in chapter VIII, this broad theoretical issue is of central concern in chapters VI and VII as well. An examination of the factors that inhibited the development of an effective organisation would help to illuminate aspects of the general problem of party building in the Third World countries. It is suggested in this chapter that the dominance of a strong personality over the party and the requirements of the patrimonial strategy followed by Bhutto strongly inhibited the institutionalisation of the PPP as a political party of the kind associated with 'modern' political systems. It is further argued in chapter VII that factionalism, which to some extent was inevitable given the heterogeneous membership of the party, but which was enhanced by Bhutto's strategy of factional manipulation and intra-party competition for patronage, was an important factor responsible for the PPP's organisational weakness. It is also argued in chapter VII that patronage as a tool of party building had only limited efficacy in the case of the PPP. The personalism, factionalism and patronage practices that are identified as the dominant characteristics of the PPP in the following three chapters lead to our depiction of the party in power as a patrimonial-clientele type, but which nonetheless exhibits features of the 'mass party' type. In this sense the PPP can be viewed as reflecting both the 'traditional' and 'modern' aspects of Pakistan's 'transitional' society.

Much of the literature concerned with the PPP has focussed on the party in the pre-1972 period with an emphasis

on analysing the party in the Punjab.<sup>1</sup> A recent study by Philip E. Jones also falls into this category, but is nonetheless an important contribution to the subject of party building in the Punjab.<sup>2</sup> We share much of Jones' analysis of the party in the Punjab, and are in complete agreement with his main conclusion that as "Bhutto consistently rejected a party organisational strategy in preference for charismatic appeals and highly personalised forms of leadership" this prevented the PPP from developing into an "institution."<sup>3</sup> At the same time, there are a few areas where we do not agree with Jones, which we will deal with during the course of this chapter. Anwar Syed's article is the only study which examines the PPP as a governing party and addresses itself to the question of party building in the post-1972 period, although it is limited to what he calls the 'second phase' of the party's development, from 1972 to 1974.<sup>4</sup> This phase according to Syed is characterised by organisational debility resulting from intra-party factionalism, corruption and repressive limitations on participation. We share Syed's general view for the large part, but attempt to analyse such phenomena through the concept of political clientelism, and relate this to Bhutto's patrimonial strategy for consolidating power. Moreover, while Syed views factionalism as the product of Punjab's traditional web of local rivalries that have also afflicted the Muslim League, Republicans and Conventionalists in the past, we argue that the factionalism within the PPP was distinctive owing to its interplay with Bhutto's patrimonial authority. Syed hints at this at one point, but does not

follow it through to its logical conclusion.

Party building is not a mysterious process which proceeds independently of human volition; often, the particular manner in which a party develops is governed by the perception, beliefs and strategies of its leaders. Pointing to the importance of the human element in party building W. N. Chambers writes:

"Party as such is a product of human ingenuity and not simply a natural growth. It must be built by the efforts of skilled political craftsmen....." 5

The impact of leadership characteristics on party development assumes an even greater importance when a party is closely linked with the fortunes of its founder and leader.

As Lucien Pye explains:

"When a party is largely the personal projection of an individual leader, it is usually not just his explicitly political views but all facets of his personality which are significant in determining the character of the movement." 6

Similarly, the development of the PPP cannot be analysed without reference to Bhutto's personality and his personal predilections, for the party was primarily his creation - a phenomenon which he quite aptly described in the following manner:

"I am the Peoples Party and they are all my creatures." 7

Thus the starting point for any discussion of the PPP must begin with Bhutto himself.

In the literature, two views have generally been advanced about Bhutto's personality. One view, as represented by Taseer, depicts him as a schizophrenic personality and refers to the tension within him between the modernizer and

traditional wadera, between the socialist and the feudal chieftan, and this is used to explain Bhutto's apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes.<sup>8</sup> This view is shared by Pilloo Mody,<sup>9</sup> Hugh Trevor-Roper<sup>10</sup> and to some extent Burki, who points to the "sharp conflict of interests between the social class in which he (Bhutto) was born and the class to which he belonged intellectually."<sup>11</sup> In contrast, the other view, as advanced by Syed and Jones,<sup>12</sup> and advocated here, depicts Bhutto as pre-eminently a power craftsman and a practitioner of Realpolitik, interested in power and moving according to the conception of what was most advantageous in the gaining and maintaining of it.

#### BHUTTO: BELIEFS AND STRATEGY

From the standpoint of this study, four aspects of Bhutto's personal beliefs that had a bearing on the PPP's development need to be examined.<sup>13</sup> These are (i) Bhutto's approach to the mechanics of governance in general and institution-building in particular, (ii) his attitude to the general question of mass mobilisation, (iii) his concept of socialism and 'change', and (iv) the kind of political base that he envisaged as providing the essential underpinnings for regime stability.

(i) In a political system of weak institutions, shifting alliances, and unpredictability, political survival became the most important pre-occupation for Bhutto. Political survival for Bhutto meant the consolidation of his control over the political system through personalist - as opposed to organisational means - a strategy that has been

termed patrimonialism, in the literature on comparative politics.<sup>14</sup> Bhutto's preference for personalised leadership was evident throughout the period of his struggle for power. Although he founded the PPP, he never attempted to organise it into a discrete structure. As has been repeatedly emphasised (in chapters II, III and IV, above) Bhutto placed greater reliance on personal appeals and his genius for political manœuvre than on party organisation. For Bhutto, the PPP was primarily an instrument with which to challenge the Ayub regime and to win the 1970 election, and it remained from the beginning very much a party of personal loyalty to Bhutto. Personalised leadership suited Bhutto's distinct political skills, and freed him to operate simultaneously at different levels - at the level of the mass populace, at the elite level, within the party - a phenomenon that we described in some detail in chapter IV above. Bhutto's preference for a personalist approach over an organisational one has also been noted by other writers. Taseer, for instance, asserts that from the earliest days of the PPP's existence "attempts at organisation were half-hearted and there was no support for this from the upper echelons of the party.....Bhutto's role.....was never organisational."<sup>15</sup> In similar vein, Jones notes that "party organisation was not a priority of the chairman," and that Bhutto "consistently rejected a party organisational strategy in preference for.....highly personalised forms of leadership."<sup>16</sup>

This preference for a personalised approach was reflected after Bhutto came to power in his patrimonial

strategy of rule.<sup>17</sup> Bhutto was acutely conscious of the need to link subordinates, both in the government and party apparatus to himself through personal ties of loyalty. As a political realist Bhutto also realised that such ties of loyalty would not only be based on emotional bonds arising from a charismatic claim to leadership, but would have to be supplemented by patrimonial ties based on personal dependency.<sup>18</sup> What he envisaged was a combination of the two in which the latter predominated since in his mind an altogether more tangible and secure footing would be provided by a system of rewards and material incentives. This suggested then, that Bhutto favoured creating and utilising patrimonial linkages rather than taking institutional paths as a means of political consolidation. In other words, Bhutto envisaged underscoring his supremacy within the system by constantly spawning new relations of dependency between himself and various sectors of society. Such dependency was to be maintained by manipulating access to various kinds of patronage and prebends. Bhutto's confidence that such a strategy would work rested on a remarkably perceptive understanding of the kind of society in which he had to function. This needs to be noted briefly as this environmental variable is central to understanding the choice of Bhutto's strategy.

Pakistan like other developing societies, is characterised by material scarcity, both real and perceived, so that the asymmetry in relations between the powerful and less powerful is particularly pronounced. Scarce resources are relatively more scarce, and the power derived from controlling



them is more extensive and inescapable. The few resources at the disposal of the powerless can be easily lost or destroyed, and awareness of this fact heightens a general sense of vulnerability and potential disaster, and sets in motion myriads of clients in search of patrons. There is no real escape from the quest until and unless this contextual scarcity is overcome. Networks of dependency are continually regenerated. At the same time, the scope for patronage can be expanded with the expansion of state activities, for it increases the competition for privileged access to state services or relief from impositions. Bhutto realised that with the expansion of the state sector, the need for intercessors, protectors and patrons would only increase.

Publicly, Bhutto repeatedly urged his countrymen to build and respect institutions and place less emphasis on individuals and personal leadership.<sup>19</sup> But at other times, he publicly expressed cynicism about whether institutions could take root in the current Pakistani environment permeated as it was by the politics of faction, manoeuvre and personalism. On one occasion he made the following observation:

"Personal politics would continue to predominate until politics had had the time to mature in Pakistan. These troubles would continue....until people stopped thinking in 'personal' terms." 20

On another occasion he explained that institutions in Pakistan were always subject to 'collapse', because

"There are explosions that take place and Asia is going through a period of explosions and upheavals.....Institutions, they come into being and before they take root they become obsolete because things are moving so fast.....Institutions will begin

to work and they can settle down generally only when we have overcome fundamentally the economic challenge." 21

Thus Bhutto's attitude towards institution-building in general was strongly conditioned by doubts about whether - given the existing Pakistani state of economic and political 'under-development' - attempts at strengthening and extending the institution-building process would ever meet with success.

But perhaps, more importantly, Bhutto's personal predilection for centralising power in his own hands, suggested that his commitment to institution-building would at best be limited. Indeed, Bhutto made no secret of the fact that he perceived himself as personifying the political system in Pakistan, and that the country's stability correlated with his longevity in office.<sup>22</sup> This perception together with his concern with enhancing his manoeuvrability in and control over the political system indicated that he would not be inclined towards building institutions that would impose constraints on his scope for manoeuvre or limit his power. As Huntington has noted,

"The institutionalisation of power means the limitation of power which the charismatic leader might otherwise wield personally and arbitrarily. The would-be institution builder needs personal power to create institutions, but he cannot create institutions without relinquishing personal power." 23

Institutional authority is the opposite of patrimonial authority, and patrimonial leaders defeat themselves if they attempt to create stable institutions.

Bhutto's attitude towards specific state institutions - namely the bureaucracy and the military - was governed by his patrimonial conception of authority. While in

opposition, he had singled out the bureaucracy for virulent attack and criticised the military's dominance in politics (albeit guardedly), leading some of his radical followers to believe that Bhutto intended to significantly alter their role in the decision-making arena - even to eliminate them (with the ostensible purpose of replacing them with a well-organised party).<sup>24</sup> In power, however, Bhutto's strategy appeared more limited. His intention - far from eliminating their influence - was to establish his personal control over them thereby reducing their independent discretion and then to utilise them as subordinate allies in the process of governance. In other words, Bhutto was expected to continue an important aspect of the Viceregal pattern of governance, by relying primarily on the bureaucratic - military apparatus, albeit under political tutelage, to govern.<sup>25</sup> Bhutto's choice to continue this aspect of the Viceregal tradition in effect meant undermining his own party, and keeping it away from meaningful participation in policy formulation. The PPP's organisational frailty - which was of course in large part of Bhutto's own making - urged Bhutto in this direction and away from establishing a genuine party government. Bhutto recognised that the PPP had come to power too quickly and had to make the change from a movement in opposition to a party in power with much of its machinery of organisation untested by any long period of trial. As such, the party needed considerable time (and governmental help) before it could emerge as an organised disciplined entity to be utilised as an essential part of the machinery of government.

However, as we shall see below, Bhutto's policies towards the PPP seriously inhibited such a development, thus serving to increase his regime's dependency on the bureaucracy and military. Another clue to what appeared as a self-contradictory disposition on the part of Bhutto to accord a somewhat low priority to his party (vis a vis the government apparatus), is provided by the fact that the administrative and police machinery of the government is so strong that a political leader often succumbs to a tendency to dispense with the party machinery. Such a development had emerged under Jinnah, and since had become a recurring feature in the Pakistani political system.<sup>26</sup>

(ii) The response of parties to the 'development problem' of mass participation/mobilisation has been a central concern in comparative studies in political development.<sup>27</sup> As we saw in an earlier chapter, while in opposition, the PPP and Bhutto had spoken a great deal about fostering mass mobilisation and involving the previously passive masses in political participation. In power, however, while continuing to talk about 'mobilising the people'<sup>28</sup> Bhutto wished to de-emphasise participation and mobilisation. Indeed, even before he came to power, Bhutto had, at the party's 1970 convention separated himself completely from the militant, mass-oriented faction of the party that had argued in favour of a campaign of mass mobilisation as an alternative to contesting the elections.<sup>29</sup> The anarchic situation in which Bhutto assumed power made him more resolute in his general reluctance to foster large scale mobilisation. This was the time for 'healing and reconstruction', not extending

participation.<sup>30</sup> To engage in the latter course at this juncture would either lead to chaos inviting military intervention<sup>31</sup> or to adventurism, from which only extreme Leftists would benefit.<sup>32</sup> As it was, Bhutto felt that the kind of mass mobilisation that the country had undergone in the period 1968-1970, in which he himself had played a part, had gone too far - leading to heightened expectations that no government had the capacity to satisfy. Moreover, the economic dislocation in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war necessitated in Bhutto's mind a cautious and limited approach in order to restrict, not extend or accommodate, people's participatory urges. The need of the hour was "to consolidate political unity and take strides in the economic field," not to allow divisive tendencies to come forth which inevitably a campaign to mobilise the masses would do.<sup>33</sup>

To some extent the decision to de-emphasise mobilisation was a recognition of the underlying weakness of the PPP structure, for the pre-1970 mobilisation had demonstrated quite clearly that Bhutto, as yet, had not developed an organisational base in the PPP strong enough to direct or sustain it.<sup>34</sup>

However, that Bhutto chose not to build on what after 1970 emerged as a potential mass base (at least in the Punjab) for the party, was less a comment on organisational frailty than on leadership value. It reflected Bhutto's deep-seated belief that mass-mobilisation, once initiated, would be difficult to control and direct, raising mass expectations beyond any government's control. The net result of such a policy would be highly destabilising for his regime. This also indicated that the role he envisaged for his party

was not a 'mobilist' one, as some of his radical party colleagues desired, but an essentially 'adaptive' one.<sup>35</sup>

(iii) Bhutto always claimed that he was a socialist and that his party was a 'revolutionary' one. He often maintained that in the South Asian context, with its overwhelming poverty and inequality, one could not but be a socialist. He once wrote:

"On my twenty-first birthday on 5 January 1948, I received in Los Angeles two birthday gifts from Larkana. One was an expensive set of five volumes of Sloane's biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. The other was an inexpensive pamphlet (Marx's Communist Party Manifesto). From Napoleon I imbibed the politics of power. From the pamphlet I absorbed the politics of poverty." 36

But socialism according to Bhutto had to be adapted "to our conditions keeping our framework of values."<sup>37</sup> It had to be Islamicised, as a pragmatic response to Pakistan's Islamic identity and dominant ethos.<sup>38</sup> Bhutto presented himself as a socialist but was aware that socialism as a doctrine might not be able to withstand the charge of his opponents that it was foreign and unIslamic. Therefore he constantly emphasised the fact that the Socialism that he espoused was Islamic Socialism and that this was exactly the same as Musawaat-i-Muhammedi. He held out the vision of economic equality as the ultimate goal arguing that this was neither inconsistent with Islam nor the political integrity of Pakistan. But Bhutto's socialism did not go beyond these vague formulations. His attitude towards spelling out the precise form of socialism he claimed to believe in displayed the same kind of unwillingness to become tied to specific positions that was evident in his public approach to other major

issues. In the past, pressure from the party's Left for a clearer definition from the Chairman on what he meant by socialism had seldom produced a specific response from Bhutto. He continued to talk in general terms about a welfare state on the "Willy Brandt model" or the Scandinavian model.<sup>39</sup> And against those within his party who wished to give socialism a more radical interpretation, he argued that to do this would mean going against the tenets of Islam, for Islam recognised private property and its responsibilities.<sup>40</sup> Certainly prior to 1970, Bhutto at times had given a radical interpretation (but again in the most general terms) of his socialist principles, sometimes couched in Marxist vocabulary in order to enlist the support of radical leftist groups in the country, including the communist elements.<sup>41</sup> Such support, as we saw earlier (in chapters II and III) was important in organising the PPP against the older politicians and the right-wing parties. Indeed the enthusiasm of the Left had played an important part in the PPP's electoral mobilisation programme in urban Pakistan in 1970. However, such radical pronouncements clearly had a tactical purpose in the agitational and electoral policies of that period and did not in any way form part of a systematic philosophy advocated by Bhutto that could guide later party and governmental policy.

After Bhutto's assumption of power, he began to view his radical supporters as a liability although he did attempt to some extent to satisfy the constituency (see chapter IX) they represented. The radical PPP leaders' demands for systemic change was unacceptable to Bhutto and he probably

felt he could dispense with them on the assumption that their radicalism exceeded that of their constituencies. Indications of Bhutto's desire to shift away from the radical left within the party came even earlier, in 1970, immediately after his election victory, when he remarked to a foreign correspondent that the people most unhappy with his victory were the communists:

"I have stopped the tide of communism by introducing socialism in this country." 42

In power, Bhutto argued that the ultimate egalitarian society he claimed to believe in was one which was to be achieved through gradual change. Referring to his party's manifesto and its programme of socialism, he asserted that it could not be implemented in a day:

"It had to take some time for its implementation and this was a phased process." 43

One had to proceed cautiously as "we can't do anything insensible and upset the whole equilibrium-"<sup>44</sup> "no-one can sweep the boards clean in one go."<sup>45</sup> Speedy implementation would invite the wrath of conservative interests leading to instability which could pave the way for either external intervention or a military takeover.<sup>46</sup> Referring to the impatience expressed by left-wing circles within the party, Bhutto warned:

"I won't be dictated like that by any elements. I will, in my good judgement, consider what is right for the country and proceed on that basis." 47

He maintained that since he knew conditions in Pakistan better than anybody else, the speed and manner of implementation of socialism had to be left to him.<sup>48</sup> Existing conditions demanded cooperation between classes, not enmity:



"In our egalitarian society, there is, of course a place for everyone - the worker and the enlightened industrialist and businessman, the peasant and the fair-minded owner. All can contribute to the challenging process of national reconstruction and national reconciliation." 49

Referring to those in the party who desired rapid change and wished to mobilise political support through the accentuation of class conflict, Bhutto said:

"If they want me to be a communist, they have to join some other party and I will be able to deal with them." 50

Clearly, Bhutto's conception of gradual change together with his vision of an egalitarian society based on collaboration between classes working within a mixed economy, suggested that Bhutto's aims were not to eliminate or displace property-owning power groups such as the industrialists and the landowners, but to establish his control over them.<sup>51</sup> On one occasion he explained that his intention was merely to break up the 'monopoly power' of these groups, but other than that he wanted 'landlords and industrialists' to flourish.<sup>52</sup> The implications of such a strategy for the development of the PPP involved a deradicalisation of both party rhetoric and structure as we shall see below, and indicated that the party in power would take on an increasingly conservative, status quo oriented nature.

(iv) The above discussion already provides some clue to the kind of political base Bhutto considered necessary for the survival of his regime. Central to his scheme for regime-stability was to rely upon landlords as the major support base for his party.<sup>53</sup> Bhutto saw no contradiction between this and his oft-proclaimed socialist beliefs. For

he placed primary emphasis on fighting capitalism, since it was the capitalists who exploited the resources of the country in a monopolistic fashion and it was capitalism that was the ally of imperialism, and not feudalism. These beliefs were reflected in the early party documents, one of which stated:

"In the rural areas, in relation to agriculture, the cultivator may suffer under a feudal system of land tenure and be exploited through the process by which his produce is brought to the market or the consumer. It is, however, in the industrial sector of production, which is principally urban, that the problem of capitalist exploitation presents itself in its typical form." 54.

In the several hundreds of statements published in the years 1967-1970, the PPP Chairman was never reported to have taken a public position on the land ceiling question. This was so despite pressure from the party's left for whom a stand on land ceilings was a crucial test of the real intentions of a big landholder like Bhutto. The latter's standard response was that the fixation of land ceilings was a minor issue and that the agrarian problem was more complex.<sup>55</sup> In the period upto 1970, Bhutto, on balance, scarcely mentioned 'feudalism' as a national problem and concentrated his attacks on the bureaucracy and capitalists. It was only in 1970, after Bhutto's attempts to court the major Punjabi landed aristocratic families met with failure that he began to make radical statements on the land problem, particularly in the Punjab in order to recruit the support of non-gentry rural elements there. This indicated that his anti-feudal rhetoric in the Punjab was more a tactical response than a reflection of his commitment to transforming

the rural power structure. Bhutto's social origins, as a scion of the landed class played no small part in his general reluctance to pursue a radical course of action - vis à vis the landed aristocracy. Indeed, Bhutto went further and after assuming power, according to one of his cabinet ministers, made no secret of his conviction that the feudal class alone possessed the competence to rule the country.<sup>56</sup> In his view the landed class alone had a positive interest in stability and possessed intimate knowledge about the mechanics of local administration. On the other hand, Bhutto showed little confidence in the ability of the sophisticated, urbanised, western-educated middle class to provide leadership for a number of reasons. Firstly, in his view, this class had few tangible resources other than their idealism.<sup>57</sup> Secondly, he realised that they would be less amenable to his control. Their disillusionment with the pace of change outlined by Bhutto had already become noticeable when he took over power, and in the event it was from them that he perceived that a challenge to his authority would come. Landlords on the other hand, traditionally deferential to whom so ever was in power, provided a far more dependable reservoir of support. Such considerations urged Bhutto to place primary reliance on the landlord groups, although as we shall see below, he did attempt to woo other constituencies.

However, in Bhutto's patrimonial strategy, what he foresaw was not the recruitment of the landlord group as an equal ally, but as one subordinated to his personal control through a patronage system of rewards and punishments.

Thus, those who have viewed Bhutto as merely the representative of the landlord class miss the point altogether.<sup>58</sup>

Bhutto wished to establish a pattern of dependency between him, standing at the apex of the government, and the landlords, with the latter looking towards him for protection (from land reform measures), and favours, in a typically asymmetrical patron-client relationship. The landlords themselves with their networks of patron-client relationships would pledge their support to Bhutto and it is this that would provide the building blocs for the PPP in the countryside.<sup>59</sup> This was clearly reflected in Bhutto's election strategy for the 1977 election, as we shall see below.

Having said this, however, it is important to note that Bhutto's reliance on the feudal support base did not preclude efforts at cultivating other constituencies in urban Pakistan, amongst what we, in an earlier chapter, called the newer social groups, such as labour, urban professionals, and amongst the urban poor in general. That these efforts met with marginal success will be discussed below, and later in chapter XII. It is sufficient here to note that while Bhutto wished to make landlords the major support base for his regime, he did nevertheless want to maintain his progressive image as a populist politician by charismatic appeals addressed to the masses through such devices as the mass rally.

Against this background, we can now undertake an analysis of the PPP and examine how Bhutto's strategy was actually operationalised.

## PARTY ORGANISATION AND PATRIMONIAL POWER

The main features that characterised the PPP in power were: (1) the failure to take steps to develop an effective organisation, (2) Bhutto's patrimonial control over the party, (3) the gradual disillusionment of the Leftist groups within the party and their eventual displacement by conservative, landlord-dominated groups, (4) the growth of factionalism and the utilisation of patronage as a tool for party-building. The first three features are discussed below, while the two latter characteristics are examined in chapter VII.

The need for reorganisation and restructuring of the PPP was evident as soon as the party came to power. The hard work of local organisation still needed to be done. But as party leaders assumed governmental roles, organisational matters of the party were largely ignored in the initial period. As in the past, the problem of party organisation was not given top priority by Bhutto. As we saw in earlier chapters (II and III) in the past Bhutto's broad coalitional strategy for challenging the Ayub government and then contesting the 1970 election had led him to maintain the PPP as a loose structure, dominated by him. This meant that the PPP was more a 'movement' than a 'party' with a well structured organisation. Demands for a more discrete party framework had in the past been voiced largely by left wing groups in the PPP. But these were consistently rejected by Bhutto because they would have meant a lessening of the PPP's dependence on him and also because of the problems a rigid organisation would have posed for a party

and  
Bhutto  
didn't  
refuse

that consisted of disparate and potentially clashing interests. In power, too these considerations lay behind Bhutto's reluctance to strengthen his party organisation. It is not as if Bhutto failed to appreciate the critical matter of party organisation - although undoubtedly initially there were more pressing problems that needed to be dealt with (see 'Early Priorities and Dilemmas', chapter V). In our interviews with PPP leaders we heard the repeated assertion that Bhutto "deliberately ignored the question of party organisation" for this would inevitably have limited his own scope for political manoeuvre both in the party and in the wider political arena.<sup>60</sup>

In May 1972 the secretary general of the party, J. A. Rahim admitted that there had been an "organisational breakdown" since the PPP took over power.<sup>61</sup> Rahim listed the following reasons for such a breakdown: (i) many leaders had joined the government and thus could not devote time to party work; (ii) there had been an enormous growth in the party (membership) since it came to power; (iii) the inability of the central secretariat to coordinate party activities. The latter problem arose due to the fact that while the central secretariat could only work through the provincial set-ups, in Sind the provincial committee had not even been formed.<sup>62</sup> For many members of the party, including Rahim and particularly the leftist groups, holding elections within the party was considered as the first, necessary step towards restructuring the party and laying down the basis for institutionalising the party. However, despite the fact that successive central committee meetings

in 1972 promised elections, such pledges never materialised and the party continued to function under the ad hoc, nominated bodies created in early 1971. In fact, Bhutto deliberately discouraged elections within the party, giving different reasons at different times to justify such a policy.<sup>63</sup> Instead, he made the system of nominations the central organising principle of the party. Indeed this provided Bhutto with the means for establishing his patrimonial control over the party.

Bhutto's control over the allocation of party posts enabled him to enhance his personal authority within the PPP. To have allowed the rationalisation of the party structure through the impersonal mechanism of elections would have cut off options, destroying the random, personal quality that was at the core of Bhutto's power. Through the allocation of party posts, strategic 'delays' in the reorganisation which when it occurred often proceeded in a piece-meal fashion, Bhutto maintained the initiative by the systematic inculcation of an atmosphere of unpredictability and contingency among party office-bearers. With the latter's political fortunes always in doubt, he was in a position to exert and maintain asymmetrical lines of dependency and protection - the features of patrimonial authority. Whenever party posts were allocated the impression conveyed to the nominated was that this represented a personal act of generosity on Bhutto's part, thus calling forth a sense of personal obligation to bind his subordinates to him.<sup>64</sup> A note circulated by one of Bhutto's political advisers (in his personal secretariat) to top members of the PPP

hierarchy, is illustrative of this phenomenon. Referring to the selection of party candidates for the forthcoming general elections, the note set out the following principle:

"Everyone who gets (a) ticket feels directly beholden to the Leader of the party." 65

A similar note circulated by another member of Bhutto's personal staff stated the following:

"It is extremely essential....that each candidate who gets the party ticket either for National Assembly or the Provincial Assembly is beholden to the Prime Minister personally and considers it as a favour from him rather than from any intermediary." 66

In the nomination of office-bearers or the selection of party candidates for by-elections or general elections, Bhutto appeared to act as a patron, in as much as the jobs/tickets he gave out were meant as personal gifts from the store of scarce values he controlled and were intended to create a feeling of personal debt and obligation among recipients. At the same time those given ministerial posts or high-ranking party posts were never made to believe that they had earned their position; they were often reminded that were it not for Bhutto's favour, they might never have made it.<sup>67</sup> Conversely, they were always made aware that they may rapidly fall from grace no matter what office they held.

In successfully nurturing this disposition, Bhutto maintained the initiative. Rapid and unexplained demotions - as for instance, in the case of Mubashar Hasan, (one of the senior-most PPP leaders), who was deprived of the ministerial portfolio of Finance in 1974 unexpectedly and the arbitrary manner in which the party secretary general,



Rahim was dismissed (discussed below) - left party leaders fearful for their future. Bhutto constantly reminded his party colleagues that none of them was indispensable.<sup>68</sup>

It follows from this that Bhutto's authority increasingly derived from his skill as manipulator of party patronage rather than from his charisma. If party members made constant protestations of loyalty in the form of admiration for the Quaid-e-Awam (Leader of the People) this was because such eulogies had become established as a standard way of showing one's sympathies.<sup>69</sup> The observation Hans Gerth makes about Hitler and the members of the 'inner circle' of the National Socialist party can equally well be applied to Bhutto and the top members of his party:

"Every suspicious and ever watchful, they felt compelled continually to demonstrate their unswerving belief in the leader's charisma. Even though they might not actually believe in Hitler's abilities, this necessity makes for the exuberant praise and eulogy of the leader's actual or imputed virtues and qualities.....As such each member of the inner circle can only legitimise his power by invoking the favour of the leader; his exclusion from the inner circle can only be interpreted by the party at large as a consequence of disobedience and unfaithfulness. The weaker his position actually becomes, the more ardently will he emphasise his belief in the righteousness of the leader." 70

In his study of the PPP in the Punjab, Jones suggests that a "structural dualism" existed in the PPP organisation, and he differentiates between what he calls a "central cell" composed of PPP leaders who had direct access to Bhutto, and whose membership was contingent on his good will, and a "party cell" of those who had no ready access to Bhutto, tended to be ideologically oriented to the left and who

depended more on party organisation for their influence, and were generally gathered around Sheikh Rashid (Chairman of the Punjab Provincial Committee).<sup>71</sup> In our opinion this formulation tends to attribute a degree of cohesion to party groupings that perhaps did not exist. There are also other problems in such a formulation. Many members of what Jones calls the "party cell" did not have access to Bhutto, most notably Rashid himself. Additionally the elements Jones identifies in the "party cell" did not all gather around Rashid. As Jones himself points out "the left wing of the Punjab PPP was itself a collection of groups of varying size, organisational integrity, (and) ideological emphasis."<sup>72</sup> Moreover, Rashid was never, despite Jones' claim, "regarded by many as the second most powerful leader in the People's Party."<sup>73</sup> Thus, there are several problems inherent in the criteria and assumptions that Jones makes to differentiate between the "central cell" and the "party cell". It would be more appropriate in our opinion to analyse the tensions Jones subsumes under "central cell-party cell cleavage" in terms of intra-party ideological conflict between groups rather than fit them into neat organisational categories which do not accurately reflect reality (or do so only at a very high level of generality). These tensions are discussed below.

#### THE CHALLENGE FROM THE LEFT AND THE 1972 PARTY CONVENTION

The main challenge to Bhutto's authority within the party - as well as to his approach to Pakistan's problems in general - came from the radical leftist groups within the

PPP. As we saw in earlier chapters (II, III, IV), the Left had from time to time, expressed dissatisfaction with many of Bhutto's policies in the past. This had manifested itself in the ticketing arrangements for the 1970 election, over the issue of electoral participation at the Hala Conference (July 1970), over the presence of feudals in the party and over Bhutto's attitude towards 'feudalism'. However, the Left within the party was always an amorphous entity. It was by no means a united bloc and consisted of several groups that had allied themselves to the PPP at different stages independently of one another. The Mairaj group had close ties with radical labour and student unions (Mairaj was a former student leader of the National Students Federation) in Karachi, and called for radical change, by violence if necessary, to abolish feudalism and capitalism. The Mukhtar Rana group enjoyed radical labour union support in Lyallpur (Punjab) and can best be described as an indigenous version of Anarcho-Syndicalism.<sup>74</sup> Both these groups were committed to fundamental systemic reform. They agreed on the need to break up the industrial conglomerates, on establishing a Mazdoor-Kissan Raj (worker-peasant rule) in drastic reform of the Viceregal institutions (the military and the civil service), as well as a fundamental land reform. The Sheikh Rashid group consisted of old communist party workers associated with the former Kissan Committee, that had some experience of organising peasants in the Lahore district. Rashid believed in evolutionary transformation, with a major emphasis on developing new types of rural, social and economic structures ("agrovilles").

Mubashar, J. A. Rahim, Ramay and K. H. Meer (although not in one group) represented the urban intellectual social-democratic left. They were more moderate than the above two groups, but nevertheless believed in major reforms of the industrial and agrarian economic and social system to create a more equitable society.

Out of these groups, the first three began, immediately after Bhutto's assumption of power, to question both Bhutto's promise to implement his party's manifesto as well as his clear intention to concentrate power in his hands. The discomfiture of these groups was enhanced by the new wave of entrants into the PPP. More than at any other time, the period after the transfer of power saw the entry of several notables into the party. This trend was strongest in the rural areas where notable and gentry landlords began to flock to the PPP. While this is discussed in some detail below, the entry in such large numbers of rural notables particularly in the Punjab, was a source of considerable tension between Bhutto and the leftist groups, and led to renewed doubts amongst the latter about the genuineness of Bhutto's commitment to even a minimal enactment of the party's manifesto.<sup>75</sup> The various reforms announced by Bhutto were regarded by these groups as only a start towards the implementation of the manifesto. Moreover, many of the reforms - the land reform in particular - fell far short of the expectations of these groups.

The Mukhtar Rana group was the first to part company with the PPP.<sup>76</sup> Condemning Bhutto for betraying the cause of the mehnat kash (toiling people), Rana called an

K. J. Singh  
1972

Awami Adalat (people's court) in Lyallpur to 'try' Bhutto. At the mass rally, Rana accused Bhutto of perpetuating a 'feudal martial law regime' and called upon him to come out of the cordon thrown around him by waderas, while insisting that PPP reforms ought to be legislated into law by the N.A. and not issued as martial law regulations.<sup>77</sup> Rana was arrested and subsequently sentenced (in April 1972) to five years of rigorous imprisonment for making an "objectionable speech".<sup>78</sup> This sentence handed down under a martial law regime headed by Bhutto, was intended as a severe warning to the radical left, that Bhutto was not hesitant in using martial law against those who dared to oppose him. Subsequent to his arrest, Rana was stripped of his party membership and his seat in the N.A.<sup>79</sup>

The Mairaj group was the second leftist faction to sever its links with the PPP. A minister in Bhutto's central cabinet since May 1972, Mairaj found his position increasingly untenable in view of what he felt were half-hearted attempts at industrial and land reform. The Bhutto regime's use of force against striking workers at Karachi in June and October 1972 (see chapter V) precipitated Mairaj's break with the PPP. In protest against the government's repressive policies, Mairaj resigned from the government in October 1972.<sup>80</sup> The fact that Mairaj's ouster came after a public slanging match in the press between him and Kauser Niazi who represented the Islamic, Right wing in the party, demonstrated that the party leadership concurred with Niazi's campaign to purge the party of "troublesome Communists".<sup>81</sup> Mairaj finally left the party in November 1973,

describing it as a "degenerated form of Ayub's Convention League."<sup>82</sup> Mairaj subsequently met the same fate as Rana. In 1974 he was arrested, and subsequently tried and sentenced to four years imprisonment by a special tribunal for making an "objectionable speech."<sup>83</sup>

The exit of these two men from the party, along with their respective followings deprived the regime of important labour (and in the case of Mairaj, student support as well) support - at any rate in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lyallpur. Other leftist leaders (see below) were to follow suit after the Party Convention at Rawalpindi where the left was officially disowned.

The proceedings of the 1972 Convention,<sup>84</sup> held on 30 November and 1 December 1972 (the third since the party was formed) deserves some attention as it was here that the party, under Bhutto's guidance, sought to formally disassociate itself from the radical left. In his address to the convention as chairman of the party, Bhutto bitterly attacked the Leftists in the party, declaring that "most of our troubles come from the Left."<sup>85</sup> To the 3,000 delegates who attended the convention Bhutto explained that his party's programme stood for socialism and not for communism.<sup>86</sup> So far as socialist ideas were concerned, he claimed that his government's nationalisation of insurance, the takeover of twenty basic industries and the resumption of the land without compensation and its distribution among farmers were all steps designed to establish socialism in the country. In this manner, Bhutto separated himself completely from the militant factions in the party and put forward a concept

of socialism that would be gradual.<sup>87</sup> Individuals like Mairaj, Rashid and M. Kasuri - the latter had recently resigned his ministership (see below, chapter VII) in protest at Bhutto's attempt to bring in a presidential structure disguised in parliamentary clothing - were specifically criticised.

While Bhutto's address indicated deradicalisation of party ideology, the social composition of the convention delegates itself suggested the growing importance of landlord groups and conservative members within the party. The majority of the delegates came not from the older, doctrinaire elements but consisted of local notables, recent 'converts' and feudal groups in the Punjab and Sind. Indeed, the process of delegate selection before the convention met, had led to cleavages between the "bandwagoners" and the "original socialists", with intense rivalry and competition between the two to gain a greater number of seats.<sup>88</sup> While local committees were given the task of selecting delegates, in practice this was controlled by Governor Khar in the Punjab and Chief Minister Mumtaz Bhutto in Sind, both close confidants of Bhutto.<sup>89</sup> Both represented landlord groups and were obviously partial to their constituency. It was in protest against this bias that Mairaj refused to attend the convention,<sup>90</sup> while others, Taj Mohammed Langah and Mahmud Kasuri criticised this at a public meeting just before the convention met.<sup>91</sup> It was also largely in protest against this that the secretary general, Rahim tendered his resignation to Bhutto at the end of the first session of the convention.<sup>92</sup> Bhutto, however, tore up Rahim's

resignation during his address to the convention,<sup>93</sup> while privately reassuring him that the PPP's commitment to socialism and democracy had not waned.<sup>94</sup>

The convention's proceedings, despite all the precautions taken to exclude 'dangerous theorists' still revealed differences, and many voices of dissent demanding 'genuine implementation of the party manifesto' were heard.<sup>95</sup> Little was achieved from the debates at the convention in the sense of providing policy guidelines for governmental implementation. Nor was it intended to, for the convention was primarily a "speech-making convention".<sup>96</sup> The twelve resolutions that were passed were vague and general expressions of support for issues ranging from Kashmir and Third World Unity, to ending corruption in the administration.<sup>97</sup> One resolution expressed confidence in Bhutto's leadership, "vision and determination".<sup>98</sup> No committees were set up by the convention and no organisational plans outlined indicating Bhutto's unwillingness to dilute his own power of appointments and to keep matters of organisation firmly within his own hands. The only significant decision taken was to make it incumbent upon those who had accepted governmental offices to give up their posts in the party. Predictably, Bhutto was exempted from this rule, enabling him to retain the chairmanship of the party. The convention while recognising the problem of factionalism within the party, (discussed in chapter VII below) made no effort to resolve it or even address itself to it.<sup>99</sup> This could not but be otherwise given Bhutto's desire to retain his personal initiative in the resolution of factional disputes. To have allowed the



emergence of some kind of institutional mechanism for conflict resolution within the party would have meant undermining his patrimonial position as the Great Arbiter.

### THE SHIFT IN THE PARTY'S SOCIAL BASE

From the point of view of the PPP's left wing, the convention was a clear indication of the party's shift to the right, and a confirmation of their earlier apprehensions about Bhutto's intentions. Many leftist cadres departed from the PPP at this time, some going back into their former pursuits (e.g. journalism), while others like Zia-uddin Butt (former member of the PPP Punjab Organising Committee) joined leftist labour organisations like the Mazdur Majlis-e-Amal (Workers' Action Committee) of Multan, and the Muttahida Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers' Front) of Lahore, or political groups like the Young People's Front and the Mazdoor-Kissan Party. Those who stayed on in the PPP joined factional groupings around Sheikh Rashid, K. H. Meer, and Taj Mohammed Langah (a radical left leader from Multan). This indicated that ideological conflicts within the party would continue (as we shall see in chapter VII below) even if the exodus of many leftists from the PPP meant that such conflicts would no longer dominate the party.

The exodus of several leftist groups from the party had other repercussions for the PPP. First, it meant an erosion in the party's support amongst the constituencies represented by them, i.e. part of the 'new' urban social groups that we earlier spoke about. Admittedly, this applied to the more radical sections of say unionised industrial

labour, but it was nevertheless an important constituency in urban Sind and Punjab (see below, chapter XII). Secondly it deprived the party of many of its most active party organisers. And thirdly, it signalled a change in the character of the party's social base, which ultimately resulted in the domination of traditional feudal groups in the PPP. We turn now to a discussion of this transformation in the social composition of the PPP after its advent to power.

As has been repeatedly emphasised throughout this study, the PPP had emerged as a coalition of diverse social groups, such as landlords, middle class professionals, urban socialists, Marxist radicals and industrial labour. Thus, it contained both 'modern' and 'traditional' elements.

Even before the party came to power, larger numbers of 'traditionals' (landlords and local notables) began to enter the party. In an examination of ward level PPP units in the Lahore district, Jones for example, found that "traditional type entrants" outnumbered "modern" entrants in the period between the Hala Convention and the 1970 election<sup>100</sup> - i.e. before the PPP won the election. Naturally, this trend became more pronounced after the PPP had won the election, and even more so once it assumed power.<sup>101</sup> This phenomenon

was particularly marked in the Punjab, where previously as we saw in chapter III, the PPP, by and large, represented the thrust of the newly-politicised mass sector and did not (with a few exceptions) enjoy support amongst the Punjabi landed aristocracy. Now, leading Punjabi notables and gentry landlords flocked to the party. By 1975, these included the Pirs of Makhad, Manki Sharif and Taunsa Sharif,

the Legharis and Khosas of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Daultanas, Khakwanis and Gilanis of Multan, the Pirachas, Tiwanas, Bandials and Qureishis of Sarghoda, the Tammans and Jodhras of Cambellpur, the Hayats of Wah, Kalabaghs of Mianwali, and the Pirs of Shah Jiwana of Sarghoda. In Baluchistan and the NWFP too, many traditional power-holders, tribal chieftans, sardars, and Khans joined the party, giving it a foothold in provinces where prior to 1972, it enjoyed little support.

In one sense the change in the PPP's social composition was a reflection of its new resources. Like most other new ruling parties, the PPP was faced with the task of accommodating a host of new adherents who were attracted by its control over governmental resources. Many landlord families, for instance, joined the PPP to both protect themselves against land reform legislation/implementation and to gain access to decision-makers within the administration who made license, permit, quota, and loan decisions. Thus the entry of notables was undoubtedly a protective reaction, for access to the power system has always been crucial to the gaining and holding of land and wealth in the countryside. A natural bandwagon effect changed the social base of the party particularly in the Punjab (since the Sind PPP was already landlord dominated) as local leaders, landlords and many others who saw the potential advantage of political influence flocked to its banner. The importance of access grew steadily as the public sector of the economy expanded and as administrative decisions were increasingly politicised. On the one hand, the new adherents were welcomed

by the party leadership—as additions to the party's support base; in return for lipservice to the PPP manifesto and an expression of loyalty to Bhutto, they found easy entry into the party. On the other hand, these new allies represented a more opportunistic clientele; they were tied to the party largely by the flow of material benefits. Compared to many of the pre-1970 leaders and followers, the newcomers were conspicuous for their indifference to broad ideological issues but intensely moved by the distribution of loaves and fishes. New adherents, far from being moved by a grandiose vision of an egalitarian society, viewed the party as a means of obtaining jobs for friends and relatives and of gaining access to the many services and material benefits which government at all levels can bestow. This indicated that the party would gradually be transformed into a vehicle for the material advancement of notables. When leaders like Mubashar protested that 'waderas, jagirdars, and capitalists were flooding the party', it led to a personal intercession on Bhutto's part, who pointed out that he himself was a landowner.<sup>102</sup> Bhutto declared that political parties were not hujras (private cubicles) where paucity of space would occur, and compared his party to a great flowing river which was being joined by small torrents.<sup>103</sup>

The extent to which landlord and other traditional groups came to dominate the party can be demonstrated in a number of ways. An inquiry into the social origins of the top fifty leaders of the party (in 1975-76)—such a selection is based on the importance of the office (party or government)

held by them as well as characterisations of these figures as 'politically influential' by PPP leaders and workers in personal interviews conducted with the latter - reveals the following picture:

TABLE VI.1

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE TOP 50 PPP LEADERS - 1975-76

<u>Social Background</u>	<u>Number</u>
Landlord	27
Tribal Chief	6
Businessman-cum-Contractor	5
Middle Class Professional (Lawyer, Engineer, Teacher, etc.)	7
Former Ruler of Princely State	2
Retired Civil Servant/Armed Force Personnel	2
Trade Union Leader	1

An alternative way of demonstrating the same phenomenon is to examine the extent to which the party became aligned with members of the traditional landed aristocracy in the Punjab. In an article on the Punjab squirearchy, Craig Baxter lists 33 leading families which have played a dominant role in Punjabi politics since the beginning of the 20th Century.<sup>104</sup> Taking this compilation of Punjab chiefs as our reference point, we find that 28 out of the 33 families had one or more member represented in the PPP by 1976.<sup>105</sup> The growing importance of landlord groups within the party was also reflected in the party's representatives in the national legislature. In the Senate, for instance, out of the 31 PPP members elected (in July/August 1973), more than half belonged to the landed aristocracy, while the rest were either lawyers cum small landlords, or retired civil servants.<sup>106</sup>

In the Punjab, by 1976, the rural elite held the posts of the secretary-generalship of the (Punjab) PPP (Sayed Nasir Ali Rizvi), the Chief Ministership (Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi) and the Governorship (Amir of Bahawalpur). In the country, of the fifty-two district PPP organisations set up in 1975, the chairmanship of thirty-two was in the hands of landlords or other notables. However, nowhere was this landlord domination of the party more evident than in the PPP's list of nominees for the 1977 election. As one observer has remarked with reference to the Punjab:

"The list of PPP candidates reads like a 'Who's Who' of the families that dominated electoral politics in Punjab from 1920 to 1958." 107

A survey of the PPP nominees from the Punjab reveals that about half of them had joined the party after it came to power, and had contested against the PPP in the 1970 election.<sup>108</sup> Thus, in 1977, the social base of the party in the Punjab was markedly different from that in 1970, when it was, by and large, the newer social groups that formed the PPP's main pillars of support. The growing dominance of the traditional landlord groups led to a concomitant decline in the importance of the newer social groups, within the PPP. This social transformation of the PPP meant that the party's 'traditional' features came to predominate over its 'modern' features, indicating that the party would increasingly assume the nature of a 'patron party' rather than a 'mass party'.

NOTES

1. Craig Baxter, 'The Peoples Party vs. The Punjab "Feudalists"', in J. H. Korson, ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); S. Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, 'Socio-Economic Indicators of the Peoples Party Vote in the Punjab', in W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1975); and Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'How Radical is the Pakistan Peoples Party?' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Spring 1975).
2. Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis, (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979).
3. Ibid, p. iv.
4. Anwar Syed, 'The Pakistan Peoples Party: Phases One and Two', in Lawrence Ziring et al, eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977).
5. W. N. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 49.
6. Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
7. Quoted in Outlook, 13 July 1974, pp. 7-8.
8. Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca Press, 1979).
9. Pilo Mody, Zulfi, My Friend, (New Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1973).
10. See Hugh Trevor-Roper's Introduction in Z. A. Bhutto, New Directions, (London: Namara Publications, 1980).
11. S. Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 36.
12. Syed, ibid; Jones, ibid.
13. Our major source material for this section comes from interviews conducted with Bhutto's close political associates, both within the party and outside. Needless to say, since political leaders' public pronouncements often differ markedly from what they privately believe, we cannot place too much reliance on Bhutto's publicly stated beliefs.
14. The term of course comes from Max Weber who viewed it as a variant of the 'traditional' source of authority. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, (New York, Macmillan, 1966), pp. 341-358. For applications of the concept to modern regimes see Guenther Roth, 'Personal Rulership, Patri-minialism and Empire-building in the New States', World Politics,

- Vol. XX, No. 2, (January, 1968); A. R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-patrimonialism, (California: Sage Publications, 1973).
15. Taseer, ibid, p. 93.
  16. Jones, ibid, p. 389 and p. iv.
  17. This aspect of the Bhutto regime has also been noted by Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistan Experience', World Politics. Vol. XXIX, No. 2, (January 1977).
  18. While Weber isolated charismatic authority from the traditional-patrimonial, one finds that in the real world these two do not operate as mutually exclusive categories. See for instance, Edward Shils, 'The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries', World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 1, (October 1958), p. 3.
  19. See, for instance, Morning News, 21 December 1974.
  20. Pakistan Times, 28 May, 1974, 9.
  21. Z. A. Bhutto, Interviews to the Press, 20 December 1971 to 13 August 1973, (Karachi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1973), p. 25.
  22. The most explicit exposition of these beliefs is found in Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979).
  23. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 238-239.
  24. Interview with Mukhtar Rana, London, November 1978.
  25. For a brief discussion of the Viceregal tradition in Pakistani politics see chapter I.
  26. See Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'Political Leadership and Institution-Building Under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto', in Pakistan: The Long View, op.cit, pp. 241-270.
  27. See Joseph La Polambara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
  28. See, for instance, Dawn, 17 February 1976, 1 & 4.
  29. See above, chapter III.
  30. President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, Islamabad, 14 April 1972, (Islamabad: Department of Films and Publications 1972), p. 34.



31. That Bhutto was always acutely sensitive to threats of a military take-over is indicated in his early public statements. See for instance, President Bhutto's Interviews to Foreign Correspondents, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972).
32. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.
33. Interviews to the Press, op.cit. p. 73.
34. See above, chapter II.
35. For a distinction between a 'mobilist' and 'adaptive' party, see Political Parties and Political Development, op.cit., pp. 424-426.
36. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit., p. 223-224.
37. Interviews to the Press, op.cit., p. 22-23.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 183.
40. Z. A. Bhutto, Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy, Vol. 3, (Rawalpindi, Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 70.
41. See above, chapter II.
42. The Times, (London), 12 December 1970, 4.
43. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 October, 1972 - 31 December 1972, (Islamabad: Department of Films and Publications, 1973), p. 24.
44. Interviews to Foreign Correspondents, op.cit., p. 165.
45. Ibid., p. 166.
46. Interview with central PPP leaders.
47. Interviews to the Press, op.cit., p. 166.
48. Interviews with Dr. Khaliq, Rawalpindi, December 1977 and G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
49. President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, op.cit., p. 43.
50. Interviews to the Press, op.cit., p. 183.
51. Dawn, 10 November 1974, 5.
52. Dawn, 6 November 1974, 8.
53. Data for this section comes almost entirely from interviews conducted with top PPP leaders.

54. Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy (Lahore: PPP, n.d.), pp. 34-35.
55. Musawaat, 28 July 1970.
56. Interview with Dr. Khaliq.
57. This is a factor noted by Lawrence Ziring in 'Pakistan Political Perspective', Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 7, (July 1975), p. 631.
58. As for instance, Jamil Rashid, 'Economic Causes of Political Crisis in Pakistan: The Landlord vs. The Industrialists', in Journal of Developing Economies, Vol XVI, No. 2, (June 1978).
59. For an analysis of the rural bases of power and its patterns of dependency, see Hazma Alavi, 'Rural Bases of Political Power in South Asia', Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1974), pp. 413-422. See also, Saghir Ahmed, Class and Power in a Punjabi Village, (Lahore: Punjabi Adabi Mahaz, 1977).
60. Interviews with K. H. Meer, Mubashar Hasan, G. M. Khar, Dr. Khaliq, Taj Mohammed Langah.
61. Pakistan Times, 23 May 1970, 1 & 5.
62. Ibid.
63. These reasons ranged from arguments designed to show that since the country was in the midst of an economic and political crisis important issues of state demanded the party's attention, to arguments purporting to demonstrate that elections would be 'divisive' at this stage and would merely bring to the fore petty rivalries and jealousies.
64. Data gathered in interviews with PPP figures, conducted by the author at the national, provincial and district levels between July 1977 and December 1977, and October 1979.
65. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1978), Annexure 11, P, A26.
66. Ibid, Annexure 31, A 102.
67. Interview with G. M. Khar.
68. Ibid.
69. Even a superficial glance at the newspapers and press reports of the period 1972-77 would reveal a constant spate of public eulogies and tributes paid to Bhutto's extraordinary powers by his party leaders.
70. Hans Gerth, 'The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition', The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XIV, No. 4, (January 1940), p. 521-522.

71. Jones, op.cit, p. 396 & 399.

72. Ibid, p. 411.

73. Ibid, p. 410.

74. These broad categorisations are based on assessments of these figures in interviews conducted with leaders and workers of the party.

75. Interviews with PPP leaders.

76. This was not the first occasion for a serious clash between Mukhtar Rana and Bhutto. See chapter IV, pp. 276, 280. In 1971 Rana resigned his position as Lyallpur PPP president to devote more time to trade unionism. But he remained a vocal and harsh critic of what he called "fascist tendencies" in the PPP.

77. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.

78. Dawn, 25 March 1972, 1.

79. Outlook, 20 May 1972. Rana served three years of his sentence.

80. Pakistan Times, 18 October 1972, 1.

81. For an example of Kauser Niazi's campaign against Mairaj, see Shahab, 7 September 1972.

82. Mairaj Mohammed Khan's Letter of Resignation, sent to J. A. Rahim, dated 13 November, 1973. (Mimeographed).

83. See Amnesty International Report: Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1976, (London, 1977).

84. 'The Stately PPP Convention', Outlook, 2 December, 1972.

85. Outlook, 9 December 1972, p. 4.

86. Pakistan Times, 30 November 1972, 6.

87. Ibid.

88. Pakistan Times, 30 November 1972, 6.

89. Outlook, op.cit.

90. Pakistan Times, 30 November 1972, 10.

91. Outlook, op.cit.

92. Rahim was also angered by Bhutto's intention to offer positions in the government to non-PPP members, and by the growth of Bhutto's personal power over the party and government. See Outlook, 13 July 1974, pp. 7, 8.

93. Pakistan Times, 1 December 1972, 7.

94. Interview with K. H. Meer, deputy secretary-general of the PPP, Islamabad, October 1979.
95. The debates at the convention were held behind closed doors. The Press and observers were only allowed to be present during the Chairman's address, the secretary-general and the deputy secretary-general's speeches. Hence, for the former, we have relied upon information provided in interviews with those who attended the convention.
96. Interview with Dr. Khaliq.
97. For the text of the twelve resolutions adopted at the convention, see Pakistan Times, 3 December 1972, 7.
98. Resolution No. 5, ibid.
99. See Deputy Secretary-General's address to the convention in Pakistan Times, 1 December 1972, 7.
100. Jones, op.cit., p. 482.
101. Outlook, 7 July 1973, p. 13.
102. Dawn, 31 January 1976, p. 8.
103. Dawn, 13 February 1976, p. 1.
104. Craig Baxter, op.cit., pp. 6-29.
105. The 28 families/clans that aligned themselves with the PPP included the following: the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura; the Mokul and Qizilbash family of Lahore district; Janjuas of Darapur, Pirs of Jalalpur, Khokhars of Jhelum, Pirs of Makhad, and Hayats of Wah, Shamsabad Awans of Attock; Noons, Tiwanas, Qureishis and Pirachas of Sargodha, the Wanbachian and Kalabagh families of Mianwali; Pirs of Rajoa and of Shah Jiwana and Sials of Jhang; the Daultanas, Gilanis, Dahas, Qureishis, Gardezis and Khaggas of Multan; Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh, and Legharis, Dreshaks, Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan. The remaining five, which allied themselves with different factions of the Muslim League, included the Kot Ghebas family of Wah, Pirs of Jahanian Shah of Sargodha, Dastis of Muzaffargarh, Chatthas of Gujranwala, and Pirs of Taunsa Sharif in Dera Ghazi Khan.
106. Outlook, 4 August 1973, p. 12.
107. Jones, ibid., p. 661.
108. To give but a few examples, all seven PPP candidates from the Sargodha district were members of the traditional rural elite, and the majority of the PPP candidates from Sahiwal, Mianwali, Bahawalnagar, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh were all big landlords or biradari leaders, who had jumped on to the PPP bandwagon recently. Leading Punjab feudal families like the Legharis, Daultanas, Qureishis, Gilanis, Noons, Hayats and Mazaris were all given party tickets.

## VII

THE PPP: FACTIONALISM, PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTIONFACTIONALISM IN THE PARTY

One of the most striking features of the PPP in the period 1972-77 was the growth of factionalism in the party, ~~which seriously damaged its effectiveness as a governing~~ party and led to an erosion of its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Factionalism came to dominate the PPP to an extent that distinguished it from the factionalism that afflicts perhaps all political parties. Indeed, the entire history of the PPP in this period is one of intense intra-party factionalism, with Bhutto following a policy of factional manipulation, producing deleterious consequences for the party organisation.

To some extent, the tendency towards factionalism was inherent in the heterogenous character of the party membership. Bhutto's movement strategy in the pre-1972 period had brought into the party a wide assortment of disparate elements with potentially clashing interests. We have analysed several cases of intra-party tensions in previous chapters (see chapters II, III and IV) and indicated that Bhutto responded to the conflicting claims of the diverse groups that he had recruited into the PPP, through a policy of balance and manipulation. This suggested that these tensions far from being resolved, were likely to re-surface from time to time.

After the PPP assumed power, the tendency towards factionalism increased as a consequence of the party's

social transformation outlined above in chapter VI. The influx of "bandwagoners" (traditional power-holders for the most part) into the party intensified the heterogenous nature of the party's social composition, laying the foundation for two types of factional conflict in the party. One related to the tension between the older, more doctrinaire, socialist-oriented, urban middle class elements (representative of the 'newer' social groups) and the traditional, feudal-dominated groups; while the other related to conflicts amongst the latter, as they now sought to battle with each other over power, influence and the spoils of office. The two types correspond closely to the distinction made by Giovanni Sartori between "factions of principle" (those motivated by ideology or ideas) and "factions of interest" (those motivated by immediate and tangible rewards such as power or/and spoils).<sup>1</sup> Some cases of factionalism in the PPP, as we shall see below, combined elements of both types. As a result of the change in the PPP's social base, it was the latter type of factionalism that became increasingly frequent, marked by the intensely personalistic character of factional conflict. Even in cases of what appeared on the surface as ideological disputes between factional groups, on closer examination these often revealed personal enmities deceptively obscured by the ideological language in which such disputes were carried out.

In whatever form in which it manifested itself, what Madison two centuries ago called the 'violence of faction'<sup>2</sup> afflicted the PPP at all levels. Disruptive strains were inherent not only because of the original make-up of the

party, but also by virtue of it being the dominant party in the country. As Chambers has suggested,

"the greater the success a party has in winning power and achieving a position of dominance, the greater the effect of this disruptive force is likely to be, as more and more disparate elements find their way into the party's structure and power base." 3

A second divisive force lay in the tendency, as the party encompassed a wider variety of loosely attached elements, towards lessened intensity of unifying distinctly partisan loyalty among leaders and workers. Moreover, in the absence of an external threat (either from another party or as in the case of the party in opposition, from administrative reprisals), as the party was no longer under pressure to distinguish itself sharply from a threatening rival, the tendency was for firm, emotional attachments to the party to decline and these were often replaced by factional or personal attachments among its crucial leaders and workers, who no longer placed party welfare so high on the scale of values as against other claims. The further a party has progressed with the passage of time toward status as an institution and toward organisation, the less likely it is that such a unifying party spirit will occur or create severe damage, but the PPP had hardly reached this stage of development. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Bhutto's earlier movement strategy and his personalist approach had in large-part precluded any real effort to forge a 'party identity'. Disparate elements, often with pre-existing loyalties to other groups or individuals, were welcomed into the PPP with less regard to the extent to which they

identified with the PPP or its programme in any meaningful sense, than to their demonstration of loyalty to Bhutto.

Given this background, our concern, below, however, is not merely to show that factionalism existed in the party or that such factionalism had a highly personalist nature. Of themselves, such characteristics have been common in Pakistani party politics as well as in the politics of other societies at similar stages of development. What was peculiarly distinctive about factionalism within the PPP and set it off from, say the factionalism that afflicted Muslim League politics in the '40s and '50s,<sup>4</sup> was the interplay between factionalism and Bhutto's patrimonial authority.<sup>5</sup> Thus, what requires emphasis is the manner in which Bhutto sought to manipulate factionalism in order to assert his personal control over the party, playing a game of balancing factions, while paradoxically, calling for strict party discipline and attempting to check divisive strains within the party.<sup>6</sup> As we shall see below, by means of constant flux and/or shifting of actors from one arena to another, Bhutto sought to avoid open contentions for power in order to eliminate situations in which any faction or factional leader might weaken his own power. By shifting political lieutenants, disgracing those who seemed to be gaining popularity, and often bringing them back as chastened men, he gave little opportunity for factions to become consolidated. An examination of factionalism in the Sind and Punjab would illustrate this pattern of interplay between factionalism and patrimonialism.



Rashid vs Khar

A good illustration of the 'factionalism of principle' is provided by the ideological conflict in the Punjab between Sheikh Rashid and Mustafa Khar, who were president and secretary-general of the Punjab PPP respectively. The factional feud reflected ideological differences with Sheikh Rashid representing a section of the Punjab left wing in the provincial party and Khar closely aligned with the Punjabi zamindars. This factional feud had surfaced several times in the past, as for instance in the ticketing arrangements for the 1970 elections, when Khar strongly opposed Rashid's (who was President of the Punjab parliamentary board) policy of "keeping out the feudals" and was able, through his membership of the PPP Central Parliamentary Review Board, to manoeuvre many of the reversals of the decisions made by Rashid. This, importantly, enabled Khar to build up a body of loyal supporters among future PPP MNAs and MPAs.<sup>7</sup> This factional feud had also manifested itself in a struggle for the chief ministership of the Punjab in 1971 when the transfer of power to the PPP became imminent.<sup>8</sup>

After the transfer of power to the PPP Khar was appointed governor of the Punjab (by Bhutto), and was allowed to retain his post as secretary-general. Khar now set up his own Punjab PPP headquarters in an apparent act of challenge to the Rashid group. This marked the beginning of a parallel provincial organisation that gradually replaced the original Rashid-dominated organisation. Rashid's appointment as minister of health in the central cabinet meant that he had none of the resources that Khar

had as governor, for the latter office controlled not only patronage in the province, but also the police machinery. With these resources, his support in the Punjab PPP legislature, as well as his growing reputation as Bhutto's chief lieutenant and close confidant, Khar moved quickly to assert control over the Punjab PPP.<sup>9</sup> During 1972 and the first half of 1973, many pro-Rashid elements were harassed, intimidated and purged from the party at various levels throughout the province.<sup>10</sup> In order to eliminate his factional rivals Khar undoubtedly enjoyed Bhutto's support, as Bhutto welcomed the opportunity as a means of controlling radicals in the party. Bhutto followed a balance of power strategy which for the moment demanded tilting the balance in favour of the Khar faction. At this stage, Bhutto needed Khar to establish a strong and effective PPP government in a province which the former had alluded to as the "bastion of power" in Pakistan. Under Bhutto's direction, Khar established what was often referred to at the time, as a Danda regime (rule by the rod) characterised by an authoritarianism that was more reminiscent of the Kalabagh days than that envisaged in the PPP's promises of Awami Raj (People's Rule).<sup>11</sup>

In his activities to purge the party of 'undesirables' Khar utilised the services of two of his cabinet colleagues and personal friends, Choudrey Irshad and Iftikhar Ahmed Tari, both of whom were reported to have underworld connections.<sup>12</sup> A central committee meeting in July 1973, decided to "reorganise" the party (in Punjab and Sind) by forming new provincial committees and naming

new office-bearers. While elections were promised, for the time being, the new bodies would continue to be nominated in effect by Bhutto.<sup>13</sup> In accordance with the decision of the 1972 convention, both Khar and Sheikh Rashid had to give up their party posts. Khar now prevailed upon Bhutto to have his close supporter, Afzal Wattoo nominated as President of the Punjab PPP, while ensuring that the majority of the 60-member provincial committee was also filled with his nominees.<sup>14</sup> This ensured Khar's total control over the Punjab party, a situation created, for the most part, by Bhutto's patrimonial designation rather than one reflecting the Khar faction's initial numerical superiority or support. Such control was all the more pervasive since according to the party constitution, the provincial committees had the task of nominating the party tiers at the district level. In this manner, the Khar faction could ensure their supremacy at the lower tiers throughout the province. As far as Sheikh Rashid was concerned, it was reported that he had been completely bypassed in matters regarding the provincial reorganisation.<sup>15</sup>

That Wattoo was chosen (a defeated candidate in the 1970 election), despite numerous allegations of corruption against him, while he served as provincial labour minister, by a group of Bahawalpur MPA's, promised that factional in-fighting in the Punjab would no longer be confined to the Khar-Rashid struggle.<sup>16</sup> Predictably factional warfare broke out between supporters of Wattoo and Manzoor Mohal, chairman Bahawalpur district PPP. Their personal animosity was based partly on biradari rivalries, but for

the most part, reflected a personal struggle over the distribution of the 'goods' of office. Wattoo, enjoying Khar's backing, was able to assert factional supremacy which culminated in the arrest of Mohal in July 1973 on charges of corruption.<sup>17</sup> That both factions accused each other of corruption publicly could only tarnish the image of the party in the Punjab. At Khar's insistence, Wattoo also moved against other opponents ordering 'inquiries' whenever an opponent proved recalcitrant.<sup>18</sup> Such actions brought Wattoo into open conflict with Sheikh Rashid, with the latter refusing to attend meetings of the provincial committee in protest.<sup>19</sup> A reconciliation was brought about by Bhutto after Sheikh Rashid was assured that some of the old purged officials would be reinstated.<sup>20</sup> Wattoo, however, largely on Khar's instructions, continued to suspend members in various parts of the Punjab on charges of either corruption or indiscipline.<sup>21</sup> The state of factionalism was serious enough to merit a severe warning by Bhutto to party leaders to refrain from criticising one another and creating rifts in the party ranks, in February 1974.<sup>22</sup> Bhutto realised that while factionalism could be manipulated to an extent to consolidate his own power position, an excess of intra-party conflict could only weaken the party and erode its legitimacy. The paradox inherent in Bhutto's policy manifested itself repeatedly in factional politics in Punjab as we shall see below. However, as far as the Rashid-Khar/Wattoo factional struggle was concerned, it is apparent that the former suffered a decisive defeat. Although the Rashid group would later attempt to regain

their influence in the Muhasaba (accountability) committees that emerged as a consequence of factional shifts and Khar's growing unpopularity in the Punjab, as we shall see below, it was never able to recover its original strength.


Another illustration of 'factionalism of principle' is provided by the activities of the Manshoor or 'Manifesto Group'. This group emerged within the PPP national parliamentary party on the eve of the passage of the Permanent Constitution in March 1973, and reflected differences between Bhutto and several party leaders over the former's constitutional proposals.<sup>23</sup> Formed on 28 March, the Manshoor group which was also known as the 'Democratic Group' consisted of eight dissident MNAs.<sup>24</sup> A socially diverse group, containing both young landlords (Noon) and urban middle class elements (Kasuri, Rao), the members were united by their opposition to Bhutto's "one man rule" both in the party and the country. The main figure behind the group was Mahmud Ali Kasuri, one of the vice-chairmen of the PPP and an eminent jurist both in the country and abroad. In April 1972, Kasuri resigned as Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs as well as gave up his post as chairman of the constitution committee (an all-party N.A. committee set up to frame the new constitution) in protest against Bhutto's proposals for a strong executive.<sup>25</sup> Thereafter Kasuri had repeatedly been harassed by the Khar regime through involving him in "false income tax cases."<sup>26</sup> Under Kasuri's direction, the 'Manshoor Group' aimed to function as a pressure group to force the party to adhere to its

manifesto and promised to "fight against Bhutto's attempt to establish a fascist state in the country". The members of the group, however, were subjected to official harassment, legal persecution and threats of violence.<sup>27</sup> Such harsh treatment illustrated the manner in which Bhutto sought to punish those who dared to challenge his authority in the party. In protest against such tactics, two members of the Group (the two Kasuris) severed their connections with the PPP and joined Asghar Khan's Tehriq-e-Istaqlal party.<sup>28</sup> Their exodus weakened the group considerably, although the two Kasuris often aligned with the group in the national legislature, and emerged as the most vocal critics of the Bhutto regime. The Manshoor group attempted to exert pressure on the government to withdraw some of its severe proposals designed to curtail civil liberties, and was a considerable source of embarrassment to the party. At the same time, it often pushed the opposition parties in the N.A. into adopting a harder stance against governmental proposals.

From within the parliamentary PPP, other voices of dissent, too, were heard from time to time, from Sheikh Rashid and other old, left-leaning members. For instance, in August 1973 when the parliamentary PPP nominated Choudrey Fazal Elahi and Sahibzada Farooq Ali for the office of President and Speaker respectively, the leftists expressed strong disapproval, pointing out that it was embarrassing for them to explain to their constituencies why an ostensibly socialist party had nominated a landlord (Fazal Elahi) and a landlord-cum-industrialist (Farooq) to

*Rahim vs Bhutto*

two of the highest offices in the country.<sup>29</sup> In protest against these nominations, Rahim had even refused to attend parliamentary party meetings in August 1973.<sup>30</sup> Similar protests were made by J. A. Rahim during the Senate elections in July 1973 when Bhutto nominated over fifty per cent landlords as the party's candidates.<sup>31</sup> Outside the legislature Rahim protested publicly against the entrance to the party of Aziz Ahmed,<sup>32</sup> an old bureaucrat, against his election as senator, and his subsequent appointment as minister of state for defence and foreign affairs.<sup>33</sup> To Rahim, Aziz Ahmed personified everything that needed changing in Pakistan and he also intimated that Bhutto had gone back on almost all his promises, seeking to build a cult around himself.<sup>34</sup>

 The Rahim-Bhutto conflict deserves some attention since it reflected important policy disagreements between the two.<sup>35</sup> A former career official of the foreign service, Rahim had played a major role in the conception and founding of the PPP. His evident integrity and his seniority made him one of the most respected figures in the party. In the past Rahim had been a constant spokesman in the PPP for maintaining the ideological and organisational integrity of the party, hoping that it would be able to play a major role in governmental policy-making. Also, he was one of the few central leaders close to Bhutto, who had repeatedly indicated concern about the latter's attempts to build a personal following in the party, and had been critical of the dominant trend in the PPP of putting loyalty to Bhutto above that of the party. This was clearly reflected in the

Rahim-Bhutto correspondence of 1970, mentioned earlier (see chapter III, note 132). Rahim had also been severely critical of the entry in the party after 1972 of elements (such as feudals) whose commitment to socialist principles was to say the least, highly suspect.<sup>36</sup> In December 1972, Rahim reasserted the need for elections in the party, and emphasised the importance of forming "a hard core party cadre" while "weeding out undesirable elements of the party."<sup>37</sup> Clearly, Rahim's outspoken views on such issues, together with his opposition to specific actions taken by Bhutto (such as the appointment of Aziz Ahmed), became a source of annoyance to Bhutto. The treatment meted out to Rahim subsequently amply illustrates the manner in which Bhutto dealt with those in the party who held independent views. On 2 July 1974, during a dinner party at Bhutto's residence, when the guests including Rahim, were made to wait for several hours before the host appeared, Rahim complained that Bhutto treated his party men like personal fiefs and ruled Pakistan like a personal 'Rajwadah' (principality).<sup>38</sup> Learning of these remarks, Bhutto without consulting with anyone, dismissed Rahim from the government and the secretary-generalship of the party on the spot. Like many other party members, Rahim was thrown out of the PPP without the 'consultation' required by Article Ten of the party's interim constitution.<sup>39</sup> In the early hours of the following day, a contingent of the FSF descended upon Rahim's residence with the express purpose of serving him with a letter of dismissal. Thereafter, Rahim and his son were beaten up and driven to the police station.<sup>40</sup>



Afterwards, when Rahim was released he was continuously harassed, tortured on one occasion, while a 'case' was registered against him for possessing 'objectionable material'.<sup>41</sup> The Rahim affair amply demonstrated that Bhutto was not reluctant to use force to silence intra-party criticism, since he viewed such criticism as a challenge to his authority.

The arbitrary manner in which Bhutto dismissed Rahim did not constitute an exceptional case. Another critic, Mubashar Hasan whose views on economic policy did not always correspond with Bhutto's was ousted from the cabinet in October 1974 in as arbitrary a manner as Rahim.<sup>42</sup> Unlike Rahim, Mubashar was placated by his appointment as the party's new secretary-general (in January 1975). However, the exit of both Rahim and Mubashar from the cabinet in 1974, both founder-members of the party known for their progressive, social-democratic views, was received with undisguised satisfaction in the party's right-wing circles (Peerzada, Niazi, etc.), and marked the latter's ascendancy over the 'socialist' component. This constituted one aspect of the process that was described earlier as the gradual deradicalisation of the party, involving a shift to the right in terms of ideology and a decisive change in the social make-up of its central leadership.

Before we go on to look at 'factionalism of interest' it is appropriate to mention another source of intra-party discord that was a hybrid type, i.e. in part ideological and in part personal. This relates to the factional struggle between Khurshid Hasan Meer and Kauser Niazi, both members

of the central cabinet. The conflict was couched in ideological jargon with the latter representing the 'Islamic Socialists' and the former propounding the 'Scientific Socialist' case, but the conflict also reflected an intense personal rivalry for power.<sup>43</sup> One indication of the latter was that factional followers of both leaders did not always fall into the neat Left-Right categories that Niazi/Meer claimed. Thus while the factional conflict had an ideological basis, it contained elements of what Sartori calls 'power groups' i.e, factions motivated by power for power's sake.<sup>44</sup> In other words, it combined elements of what we earlier described as factions of interest and factions of principle. Both factions sought to discredit one another, with the Rawalpindi branch of the party split between the rival factions. Both factions appealed to Bhutto to dismiss the minister opposed, each suggesting that the other was actually conspiring against the Quaid-e-Awam (i.e. Bhutto).<sup>45</sup> This underscored an important aspect of factional conflict within the PPP, suggesting that factional supremacy depended less on the numerical superiority attained by a faction than on gaining Bhutto's favour. The crucial factor for each faction was the attainment of Bhutto's patrimonial support and correspondingly, the discrediting of opposing factions in Bhutto's eyes - hence the accusations accompanying most factional conflicts that a rival faction represented a conspiracy against Bhutto himself. When a member of the Niazi faction levelled charges of corruption against Meer, the latter offered to resign and invited an open inquiry into such charges.<sup>46</sup> That Bhutto promptly

accepted both the offers was indicative that his sympathies at the time lay with the Niazi group.<sup>47</sup> With Meer's loss of office, several members of his faction shifted their support to Niazi, declaring that they would shun 'groupism' as demanded by Bhutto.<sup>48</sup> Meer resigned his post in the party as well and proceeded to join the 'Manifesto Group' in the national assembly (N.A.) in 1975. By 1975 Niazi appeared to have consolidated his position considerably, enabling him to emerge as a major figure at the centre. Bhutto now proceeded to shift power once again, this time away from Niazi. Towards the end of 1975, a 'reconciliation' was reached with Meer, and he was brought again into the central cabinet in an effort to countervail Niazi's growing influence.<sup>49</sup> Such a balancing strategy ensured that neither faction would acquire any significant degree of stability, while at the same time creating that atmosphere of insecurity and unpredictability which we earlier suggested was an essential condition for the assertion of patrimonial authority.

As suggested earlier, many of the internal conflicts of the party were not related to ideological disputes or, for that matter, to disputes over major questions of public policy, but represented 'factions of interest'. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Sind where factionalism centred around the tussle for power between Jatoi and Mumtaz Bhutto on the one hand, and the Talpurs and Jam Sadiq Ali on the other. Factional affiliations in both cases related to the need for status and prestige. In the case of the former, the factional feud was based not on social cleavages

nor biradari rivalries, but reflected personal differences.<sup>50</sup> For a time, the Mumtaz Bhutto faction gained dominance (1972-73) but only as long as Mumtaz enjoyed the support of his cousin at the centre. By the end of 1973, Mumtaz had gained the reputation of the 'strong man of Sind' backed by a growing body of personal followers whose allegiance to him was based on personal friendships, biradari loyalties, status aspirations and desire for access to the wide variety of rewards/favours that he had the power to dispense. Bhutto's response to what, in one sense, can be described as the emergence of Mumtaz's 'personal machine' within the party (i.e. the consolidation of personal support through patronage) was predictably that which any patrimonial leader would follow.<sup>51</sup> In December 1973, he replaced Mumtaz by Jatoi as chief minister in order to check the former from entrenching himself and establishing his own personal following. Since Mumtaz's power to attract factional followers was dependent, for the most part, on his continued access to patronage and government largesse, a new realignment of forces followed in Sind leading to some defections from the Mumtaz camp. The factional struggle, however, continued with Mumtaz criticising the Jatoi government's policies, and the latter retaliating by threatening to "raise the curtain from his misdeeds when he was chief minister".<sup>52</sup> Mumtaz's influence in Sind was neutralised through party "reorganisations" which put Jatoi's supporters in important posts, and by instituting 'inquiries' into cases of corruption involving Mumtaz's closest supporters.<sup>53</sup> At the same time Bhutto intervened to placate Mumtaz by appointing him a minister in the central cabinet.<sup>54</sup>

Jam Sadiq Ali's factional feud with Rasul Baksh Talpur - both of whom belonged to the wadera class - was in part based on family rivalries that predated the party. In this case, factional affiliations were based upon personal friendship, kinship ties and biradari loyalties. Jam Sadiq was also able to attract factional followers from amongst those who viewed his close association with Mumtaz Bhutto and later, with Jatoi, as a means of gaining access to administrative favours and protection. In July 1972, Sadiq, through Mumtaz's tacit support, sought to discredit Talpur by suggesting that the Talpur family sympathised with the Baluchi regionalists and were helping them surreptitiously.<sup>55</sup> Coming at the end of what Talpur regarded as a campaign of vilification against him, and after his prior protests had been ignored by Bhutto, Talpur announced his resignation from the governship of Sind. and left the party. As with other party deserters, the official PPP press in Sind heaped abuse on him, calling him 'corrupt', a 'dope addict', and suggesting that the Talpur family's ambitions were insatiable.<sup>56</sup>

Factional conflict in the party increasingly came to reflect the 'power' and 'spoils' motivation rather than ideology or policy differences, This can be illustrated from the case of the Punjab.

In 1974, with the Khar-Rashid conflict receding into the background factional struggles now began between Khar and opponent factions consisting largely of landlord groups. The rivalry had its basis not in differences over policy, but in the competition for the spoils of office (and to a

lesser extent, biradari rivalries). Khar maintained that opposing groups consisted of those who felt deprived of an adequate share in the spoils of office.<sup>57</sup> Khar's main opponents were landed notables (belonging largely to the Multani landed gentry), such as M. K. Khakwani, Khalid Malik, Yaqub Maan and Syeda Abida Hussain, who resented the centralisation of all patronage in his hands. Khar sought to deal with such opponents under the guise of an anti-corruption drive in the party, registering cases against opposing factions led by Yaqub Maan, Raja Munnawar, Khakwani and Khalid Malik (all landlords).<sup>58</sup> For instance, one case against Khalid Malik alleged that he had accepted a bribe for interceding with the police administration in Lyallpur to free a suspected murderer. The Maan-Khakwani groups found sympathetic support amongst urban-based PPP politicians like Hanif Ramay, Mubashar Hasan and K. H. Meer who were strictly opposed to Khar's brand of authoritarianism and goonda gardi (goonism), which had increasingly degenerated into acts of terror. Such acts included cases, abductions, threats and alleged political murders, and were directed against opponents both in the party and outside, all of which undoubtedly brought the PPP much unpopularity in the Punjab, especially when this occurred in an economic situation of severe inflation and shortages of essential goods. Many PPP leaders at the centre, such as Hafeez Peerzada, also felt the need to make common cause with the anti-Khar elements because of their own personal animosities towards Khar. In Peerzada's (a Sindhi) case such an animosity had elements of inter-regional rivalry,

for the two had often clashed in meetings of the inter-provincial co-ordination committee over issues such as the allocation of development funds and division of the Indus waters between the provinces of Sind and Punjab.<sup>59</sup>

Bhutto himself became increasingly concerned over what he saw as Khar's efforts to establish his own political fiefdom in the Punjab. His discomfiture was not assuaged when he saw Khar assuming the title of Quaid-e-Punjab and Sher-e-Punjab (Leader and Lion of Punjab respectively). At one stage, Bhutto prevailed on Khar to exclude Iftikhar Tari (a staunch Khar loyalist) from his cabinet (in November 1973), at the request of Ramay.<sup>60</sup> Now, when some of his central ministers, notably Peerzada, pointed out to him that Khar, through a combination of terror and patronage was building a personal following in the Punjab which could eventually be used to threaten Bhutto, this only confirmed the latter's own fears about Khar's ambitions.<sup>61</sup> That Bhutto was deeply concerned about the situation in the Punjab is indicated by his instructions to his personal staff in the P.M.'s Secretariat to look into these factional squabbles and suggest ways of dealing with Khar.<sup>62</sup> The advice of these bureaucrats further reinforced Bhutto's belief that the time had come to check Khar's growing strength and deprive his faction of his patrimonial favour. Accordingly, Bhutto encouraged the Maan-Khakhwani group in preparing a memorandum against Khar which was signed by 14 MPAs, and submitted to him towards the end of January 1974.<sup>63</sup> The memorandum alleged several cases of corruption and nepotism on Khar's part, as for instance, granting

permits to set up mills to his friends and jobs for families of his close political associates.<sup>64</sup> This coincided with the establishment on an ad hoc basis of several Muhasaba committees in the district and city PPP units, which denounced the repressive nature of the Khar regime and "exposed" widespread corruption among Khar-appointed office-bearers of the party. The impetus behind the creation of these committees came from members of the Sheikh Rashid faction as well as the anti-Khar coalition of PPP landlords and urban politicians.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the Rashid faction, although it was only one element in the situation, was nonetheless a contributory factor in the pressures that finally ousted Khar from office.

Khar resigned his position as chief executive of the Punjab in March 1974, declaring, however his full faith in Bhutto's leadership, and stating that he would choose death rather than betray Bhutto. Khar explained:

"Bhutto was the general and we are all his soldiers and he has every right to assign us soldiers to any post and I am there to obey his commands." 66

Bhutto replaced Khar with Hanif Ramay in order to neutralise Khar's influence in Punjabi politics, for the latter was amongst Khar's chief political opponents. While much was written in the government controlled press<sup>67</sup> about how the balance had tilted in favour of the urban, middle class in view of Ramay's social background, this change was more apparent than real, for Ramay was strongly supported by the Maan-Khakwani-Khalid Malik faction. Besides, the overwhelming majority of his cabinet consisted of landlords. However, that the new chief minister accommodated two Khar supporters -



Abdul Khaliq and Afzal Wattoo - indicated that Khar was by no means a dead force in Punjabi politics.<sup>68</sup> This was also demonstrated at a Punjabi provincial committee soon after when Khar's opponents led by Meraj Khalid (a Ramay supporter) tabled a resolution to expel Khar from the party; in the event only four members voted for the move, while 56 members voted against it.<sup>69</sup> This in fact underlined to Bhutto the necessity for purging the party bodies of Khar supporters, a move that the former undertook by the announcement on 21 May that the Punjab committee stood dissolved.<sup>70</sup> Bhutto replaced Wattoo with Meraj Khalid as president, and sought to balance the Left (factions) with the Right by nominating a landlord, Syed Nasir Rizvi as general secretary and Taj Mohammed Langah, a radical socialist, as deputy secretary general of the Punjab PPP. Once again, those who found themselves wielding power through Bhutto's patrimonial designation utilised party 'reorganisation' to settle factional scores, despite Meraj Khalid's assurance that there would be no "witch-hunting".<sup>71</sup> Such purges of Khar's supporters obviously enjoyed Bhutto's blessings. However, his calls for party unity indicated his desire to check the violent extremities to which settling such factional scores were often taken.<sup>72</sup> At the same time he seemed to have accepted that disruptions in the party ranks were to some extent inevitable when he made the philosophic observation that differences within the ruling party had been a feature of Punjabi and Sindhi politics since the 1940's and that it would take time for such (personal) politics to change.<sup>73</sup>

Khar and Bhutto continued to meet throughout this period with the latter privately reassuring the former that he still enjoyed his confidence.<sup>74</sup> However, Khar saw his friends and supporters losing more and more offices at the district and provincial level as a consequence of the party's "reorganisations".<sup>75</sup> At the same time, the Ramay government began to harass and institute cases against Khar's closest friends and supporters like Kahloan and Choudrey Irshad. This was accompanied by a campaign in the official press aimed at discrediting Khar's image.<sup>76</sup> Khar retaliated by criticising the Ramay government, alleging victimisation and letting it be known that it was he, not Ramay, who commanded the support of the majority of MPAs.<sup>77</sup> This was followed by a campaign of innuendos designed to create the impression that he had sacrificed public office for the sake of Punjab's interests and that the whole campaign against him was in fact a sinister Sindhi (Bhutto) conspiracy against Punjab.<sup>78</sup> The justification of loss of office (through losing Bhutto's confidence) on the basis of policy considerations, was perhaps too belated to sound convincing.

That factionalism remained a persistent feature of PPP politics was indicated by repeated warnings issued by Bhutto against "dragging personal feuds into politics",<sup>79</sup> as well as the growing tendency among party office-bearers, MNAs and MPAs to criticise one another publicly.<sup>80</sup> On one occasion Bhutto reminded his party members that factionalism was fatal to democracy and recalled how democratic institutions in Pakistan had atrophied due to factionalism.<sup>81</sup>

Bhutto was referring here not only to the Khar-Ramay factional struggle, but also to the local conflicts in many districts of the Punjab between rival groups on the basis of biradarism, personal rivalries and competition for the spoils of office, e.g. licences, permits, jobs, funds. Bhutto attempted to deal with both in much the same manner - through a policy of balancing, and the constant shuttling of power between factional leaders. This is illustrated by the manner in which he dealt with the Khar-Ramay struggle.

The Khar-Ramay tussle which ultimately culminated in Khar's open challenge to Bhutto's authority needs to be outlined briefly, for this episode helps to reveal all the major features characterising factionalism in the PPP and the manner in which Bhutto sought to deal with it. It demonstrates the intensely personal character of factional conflict, Bhutto's constant shuffling of power between different factions, his attempt to prevent any faction from acquiring any degree of stability and his use of force to weaken or eliminate factional support when other methods failed. Such characteristics are to be found - perhaps with various degrees of intensity - in several other cases of factionalism that occurred within the party.

In March 1975, following a period of bestowing favour upon the Ramay group, Bhutto suddenly brought back Khar, appointing him, to what under the 1973 constitution was a largely ceremonial post of governor of Punjab.<sup>82</sup> Contrary to what Bhutto had privately led Khar to believe, Ramay remained chief minister.<sup>83</sup> This action can only be

interpreted as part of a conscious policy followed by Bhutto to engineer and renew the factional conflict between Khar and Ramay, possibly with a view to neutralise the influence of both protagonists. Predictably, the two, once again, engaged in bitter dispute, with Ramay accusing Khar of attempting to run a parallel administration. Ramay retaliated with the now familiar method of instituting corruption cases against Khar supporters, Kahloan and Tari.<sup>84</sup> Ramay tried to give what had increasingly become a personal struggle with Khar an ideological slant by suggesting that this was a conflict between a progressive socialist and a reactionary representative of landlord interests - an attempt that met with little success. At this point, Bhutto intervened, removing both from their respective offices - the removal of Ramay on 14 July was followed by Khar's departure by the end of the month. Ramay was replaced by Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, a member of the Punjabi traditional aristocracy, who had earlier given up the governorship to Khar in March, while the former ruler of the princely state of Bahawalpur was appointed governor. More than at any other time, the new Punjab PPP government reflected the dominance of the traditional rural elite.

While Khar was not promised a new post, Ramay was assured that he would have a seat in the central cabinet. In July he was elected to the Senate in its mid-term elections, but the promise of ministership had not materialised by October. Meanwhile, the new chief minister who was widely described in the official press as a 'neutral' figure, who had "stayed clear of factional fights",<sup>85</sup> began

a campaign on Bhutto's behest, to root out "goondas, exploiters and corrupt elements from the party."<sup>86</sup> Such a campaign was designed to neutralise the influence of both the Khar and Ramay factions. In several districts of the Punjab, rallies were organised against pro-Khar factions.<sup>87</sup>

This formed the background to Khar's eventual decision to challenge Bhutto's authority. This deserves some attention, as it was perhaps the most serious confrontation that Bhutto faced from within his party, throughout the years that he was in power. In order to regain his influence in the Punjab, Khar asked for the PPP's nomination in the by-election to the Punjab assembly seat vacated by Ramay in Lahore. This request was turned down by the party's central executive (i.e. Bhutto), which decided instead to nominate a minor party worker from Lahore. At this humiliation Khar resigned from the party on 24 September 1975, declaring his intention to contest the election as an independent. At the same time he launched a campaign against the Bhutto government accusing it of betraying the interests of the Punjab - a vaguely worded charge designed to whip up emotional chauvinist sentiment, but one which promised to have some potency given the declining economic situation in the province. This open challenge to Bhutto's authority - a situation that Bhutto had always meticulously tried to avoid - was viewed with the utmost seriousness by the party high command. The government unleashed a vigorous campaign in which all central and provincial ministers participated, to discredit Khar by issuing a long

catalogue of charges against him ranging from murder, rape and abduction to corruption.<sup>88</sup> Sheikh Rashid's statements that Khar's ouster was "not the exit of an individual but of a feudal class" seemed unconvincing in view of those Bhutto had picked to succeed him.<sup>89</sup> PPP newspapers, like Musawaat, published old pictures showing students and lawyers being beaten up by police during what was described as Khar's dictatorial rule.<sup>90</sup> Publishing long lists of Khar's 'misdeeds', newspapers conveniently forgot that Khar had, after all, run a PPP government. Khar and his supporters were meted out the same treatment that they themselves had once dealt to their opponents. When Khar addressed an election rally in Tajpura in Lahore, Federal Security Forces (FSF) broke up the meeting and several people died in the violence that followed.<sup>91</sup> Shortly before polling, Ramay in an amazing political somersault, declared his support for his long time rival, Khar; their newfound unity reportedly resting upon the protection of Punjab's interests against what they described as the Sindhi-dominated Bhutto regime.<sup>92</sup>

Khar lost the Lahore by-election held on 19 October, but amidst widespread reports that the election had been rigged with the help of the district administration and at the behest of Malik Hayat Tamman who headed the political wing in the P.M.'s Secretariat.<sup>93</sup> The mysterious 'disappearance' of Khar's close confidants, Tari and Choudrey Irshad on 6 October and their eventual transportation to a secret detention camp in Dulai by the FSF, was intended as a warning to other dissidents to abstain from supporting

Khar.<sup>94</sup> For a while, Khar and Ramay entertained the idea of forming a new party and for this purpose sought the support of Bugti, Maudoodi and others opposed to Bhutto.<sup>95</sup> But eventually both joined the Muslim League.<sup>96</sup> Ramay was later arrested (in March 1976) and charged with making an "objectionable speech" under the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR).<sup>97</sup> He was convicted by a special tribunal and sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment. Khar was dealt with somewhat differently. According to Khar, he was prevented from remaining active in Punjabi politics through intimidation, threats of violence, and blackmail by the authorities.<sup>98</sup> The latter tactic involved the refusal by Bhutto to release his associates, Tari and Irshad, if Khar persisted in his campaign of opposition to Bhutto. Thus force remained the ultimate weapon in Bhutto's hands to deal with any challenge to his authority.

#### THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT

What emerges from the discussion of the various types of factionalism above, is Bhutto's overriding concern with establishing his personal control over the party and his attempt to prevent any of his personal retainers from entrenching themselves and establishing their own political fiefdoms. Our evidence also shows that intra-party groupings increasingly - as a consequence of the exodus of many of the leftist and urban middle-class elements from the party - reflected personal rivalries for power, status and patronage. As ideological conflicts receded into the background, it was conflicts of 'interests' and 'power'

that predominantly characterised factionalism in the PPP. Although the language of conflict was often phrased in terms of important principles and a policy issue was sometimes seized upon as a pretext for factional struggle, factions and factional conflict was organised largely around personalities and around personal enmities among party leaders. Thus, these factions were characterised by a greater concern with power and spoils than with ideology and policy. Factional affiliations relating to the need for status and prestige or to the desire for material rewards became the crucial factor in intra-party conflict. Withdrawal from the party was often justified on the basis of ideological or policy considerations (e.g. Khar, Ramay) but this seldom reflected reality. The major organising principle of factional conflict was enmity between party leaders. PPP politics became personal politics characterised by the personal nature of political loyalties. For many factional followers, there was no internal conflict involved in following leaders whose view-points on important issues differed from their own or in switching allegiances from one leader to another, regardless of their personal ideologies (e.g. Ramay in declaring his support for Khar). Many factions reflected not social cleavages, for they often cut across biradari lines, but merely the personal political ambitions of a particular personality. Paul Brass' comment that "factional politics in traditional societies is personal politics and status politics" seems to apply equally well to PPP politics.<sup>99</sup> To weaken rivals, factions attempted to discredit opposition faction members,



dislodge them from their posts, and 'buy' away their allies. This led to a politics of personality in which rumour, character assassination, bribery and deception were rife. Passions of jealousy and revenge were aroused, opportunism fostered, while urgent short-term goals often required the compromise of principles (e. g. Ramay). These, in short, comprised what one scholar terms the "comic opera" politics or "pure politics" so characteristic of factional systems.<sup>100</sup>

What gave factionalism within the PPP a distinctive character was not merely its personalist nature - for this is a common feature in the political systems of other 'developing' nations<sup>101</sup> - but its interaction with Bhutto's patrimonial authority.<sup>102</sup> For the strength and cohesiveness of a faction within the PPP depended ultimately upon the proximity of a factional leader to Bhutto. Power derived less from attaining any numerical strength in factional competition, than from acquiring Bhutto's support and patrimonial designation. Factions tended to be characterised by unstable membership and uncertain duration - in short, by their fluidity - as Bhutto systematically shifted his favour from one faction to another. Maintenance of control by a patrimonial leader like Bhutto required the constant movement of lieutenants, the continuous shuttling of power between different factional leaders, and rapid changes of support for different factions. Such a strategy was designed to check the rise of any factional leader who could pose a threat to Bhutto's authority, and obviously had the effect of preventing factions from acquiring any

degree of stability. Factions attained temporary stability only as long as the particular factional leader enjoyed Bhutto's support. The moment such support was withdrawn, factions dissipated as new alliances were formed. Moreover, since in the case of 'factions of interest' factional affiliations were, for the most part based on instrumental ties, for a factional leader to be deprived of his office (by Bhutto) meant being cut off from the major resource through which factional followers could be rallied - i.e. governmental patronage.

The personal dependence on Bhutto on the part of factional leaders together with force as Bhutto's ultimate weapon to deal with recalcitrant leaders, resulted in a kind of politics that can only be interpreted as one in which participation and recruitment was severely limited. Since PPP leaders were concerned largely with gaining Bhutto's favour for assuming leadership positions, they did not always perceive the need to demonstrate majority support for themselves to the same extent as their counterparts would in other factional systems. Also, once a factional leader had fallen out with Bhutto, he was acutely aware that he would face serious consequences if he attempted to build support at lower levels of the party. Thus the threat of the use of force also prevented factional leaders from engaging in political activity at the grass-root level. Thus one of the major 'benefits' that, according to some writers accrue from factionalism, in the sense that it extends participation and widens recruitment to a party by requiring factional leaders to rally supporters

and followers, was largely absent in the case of the PPP.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, in some cases factional leaders often considered it more important to acquire the support of other notables than to rally support at lower levels. For instance, when Khar found his position weakening, he made it a point to be 'seen' with Bugti, Maudoodi, Talpur, Meraj, etc. in order to demonstrate his importance to Bhutto, rather than to garner factional support at lower tiers of the party. This kind of factional activity resembled pre-party politics rather than modern political activity. This is because competing factions tended to function within what was largely a closed system - an endless round of intermediate manoeuvrings in which actors continuously shifted partners and antagonists without really enlarging the number of participants. At least, as far as the top tier of party leadership was concerned, political power was perceived by them as radiating from a single point in the political system, i.e. Bhutto. Thus there was little incentive for factional leaders at this level to engage in political activity at lower levels of the party.

Bhutto's oft-stated desire to curtail factionalism and groupism in the party appeared to be little more than political rhetoric. As an astute politician, it is unlikely that he failed to appreciate that his frequent personnel changes, as well as his policy of balance and manoeuvre of factionalism in order to prevent a challenge to his authority, could only perpetuate this kind of conflict. In an interview with the author, one PPP leader suggested that as far as the Punjab was concerned, "Bhutto deliberately

created and encouraged factional conflict in order to keep the Punjab PPP divided."<sup>104</sup> While this view might be somewhat exaggerated it points to the disintegrative effect inherent in Bhutto's strategy. The constant balancing of factions, and playing off one factional leader against another produced a disruptive effect from the point of view of party cohesiveness and unity. This not only resulted in serious dislocations in the party organisations but also reduced party effectiveness, in the sense of being able to meaningfully participate in policy-formulation and oversee the functions of government. As we shall see in chapters VIII and X, this only made the Bhutto regime more dependent on the Viceregal institutions - the military and the civil service.

The intensity of factional conflict also led to an erosion of the party's legitimacy in the eyes of the public in general, and the urban intelligentsia and the military in particular.<sup>105</sup> The spectacle of a party ridden with warring factions and a leader who showed no confidence in any of his lieutenants for any length of time, could not have helped the party's image. The acts of factional violence and the open charges of corruption and other allegations made by PPP leaders against one another, brought about as Bhutto recognised himself, public cynicism, and even contempt.<sup>106</sup> This recognition was shared by other members of the party high command. On one occasion Meraj Khalid remarked:

"Internal conflicts, mutual wranglings and petty disputes had discredited the party in the eyes of the general public." 107

On another occasion, Bhutto himself pointed out the dangers and its implication for national stability if "petty party quarrels" assumed a larger proportion, remarking at the same time that it was no use "trying to garb personal ambition and aggrandisement in high sounding....(principles)...or in terms of picking up a cause."<sup>108</sup> Conscious that the party's links with its rank and file and grass roots support were increasingly becoming tenuous because of party leaders' preoccupation with factional wranglings, Bhutto declared emphatically that "the PPP must not turn into a cabal."<sup>109</sup>

#### THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION

Patronage practices and corruption emerged as major features characterising the party in power. Governmental patronage was utilised as a means to reward the faithful, recruit the hopeful and punish the unfaithful. As we shall see below, this did not in the case of the PPP, prove to be an efficacious method of party building for a number of reasons. Moreover, the frequent abuse of public office for personal profit on the part of party men, led to a serious erosion of the party's legitimacy amongst the general urban public as well as amongst strategic power groups (e.g. the military). This was also reflected in Bhutto's evident concern, particularly when complaints against corruption were voiced during the 1975-76 party conventions, with the deleterious repercussions of patronage and graft for the PPP's public image. However, that Bhutto repeatedly chose not to take effective action against such

practices indicated that he viewed them as politically useful, even if he did at times, albeit largely on the eve of the 1977 election, express a desire to keep them within publicly accepted bounds.

The use of governmental power and patronage for party-building has been a common feature in many 'new' nations,<sup>110</sup> a phenomenon which some scholars have termed 'machine politics' and which they view as closely resembling the manner in which political machines were built in American cities in the early part of this century.<sup>111</sup> Whether termed 'machine politics, 'political clientism' or patronage - as it is here designated - this type of politics is characterised by patron-client relationships (that is more or less personalised relationships characterised by unequal wealth/status/influence based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial transactions),<sup>112</sup> and refers to "the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support.....(and)....seek to turn public institutions and public resources to their own ends."<sup>113</sup> Viewed from this perspective, the 'patronage' or 'clientelist' concept possesses a heuristic value for understanding a wide range of political behaviour often regarded as pathological or deviant, mostly aspects of political corruption.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, the recent growth of studies using patron-client relations as a framework for analysis attests to its vitality as an explanatory vehicle.<sup>115</sup>

It has been rightly suggested that patronage and corruption are not unique to the new states but are a

generic feature of political systems regardless of their stages of development.<sup>116</sup> However, it is generally agreed that patronage, "spoils", and corruption seem to be more prominent and pervasive in some societies rather than others, because of a variety of conditions which seem to foster patron-client relations. What we are interested in is identifying and examining briefly some of these conditions in Pakistani society as a first step towards understanding the operation of PPP as a patronage party.

Pakistan can be viewed as offering a social context which in many respects gives rise to patron-client relationships. Some of the features that foster relations of personal dependency were outlined in chapter VI above. Here it is important to note three important characteristics of Pakistani society. First, the persistence of marked inequalities in the distribution of wealth, status and power. The connection between this and the patron-client ties is more or less self-evident. If inequities in access to vital goods were alone sufficient to promote the expansion of patron-client ties, such structures would predominate almost everywhere. Therefore, a second, and more significant condition supportive of patron-client ties is the relative absence of institutional guarantees for an individual's security, status or position. Where a society's impersonal, legal guarantees of physical security, status and wealth are relatively weak, individuals often seek personal substitutes by attaching themselves to "big men" capable of providing protection and even advancement. In the words of one writer, a patron-client relationship is

a "personal security mechanism".<sup>117</sup> In this context, direct personal ties based on reciprocity substitute for law, shared values and strong institutions. Thirdly, since Pakistani society is characterised by scarcity and insecurity, political office is viewed as a major means of gaining access to status/security/wealth.<sup>118</sup> Also, where the patrimonial view of office is strong, a public post becomes a great client-creating resource. The client-creating function of public office has taken on a greater importance in Pakistan as state power has expanded throughout society. The expanding economic and social role of the state can be seen to underline the spread of patronage. The government's discretionary powers over employment, promotion, assistance, welfare, licensing, permits and other scarce values can, in such a context, serve as the basis of a network of personally obligated followers. Additionally, a wide variety of economic measures often serve patronage functions. In this respect, programmes of nationalisation, while they may answer economic and patriotic needs too, can be tailored to maximise the number of patronage posts available to the ruling party. Often rural development programmes are designed - as was the case under Ayub Khan in 1960 - with this duality of function in mind.

Given this sort of social context, along with the potential for creating political followings through governmental action, it is easy to understand why short-run material incentives and patronage came to be viewed as the major adhesive agent by the PPP in power, as it aimed to create political bonds through the political distribution of



patronage. The bandwagon effect experienced by the party after 1972 was largely due to the popular recognition that the party would control the disposal of tangible rewards for some time to come. An overwhelming concern with the particularistic distribution of rewards to supporters and the decline of broader policy goals became the hallmarks of this transformation in the party's development. The necessity of generating broad political support on continuing basis meant that the PPP wielded patronage on a scale that was distinctive.

Nowhere were patronage practices more evident than in Bhutto's relationship with the country's landlord groups. Bhutto's long-term strategy appeared to be one of establishing a stable clientelist system in the rural countryside by making landlords an important (and perhaps the most dominant) element in his regime's support base. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy depended not in a straightforward representation of landlord interests, but in first curbing the independent power of the landlord class and then protecting or advancing their interests. The feudal aristocracy, for its part was wedded to an older system of spoils that was sustained by aristocratic patronage and social heredity. Bhutto, on the other hand, hoped to replace this system with one founded on centralised personal patronage and discretionary favours. With landlords made dependent on Bhutto's favour, they could all the more be easily controlled. Only by creating such personal dependency and by reducing the independent power of notables could Bhutto place himself effectively at the helm of affairs.

The major instrument Bhutto and his party utilised in pursuing such a strategy was the land reform legislation of 1972. The land reform announcement together with the radical rhetoric that accompanied it, had given sufficient cause for concern amongst the landed groups. In addition, before the reform was announced, the PPP's leftist cadres had gone about issuing promissory notes to peasants indicating that they would acquire, free of cost, a certain amount of land.<sup>119</sup> Such actions only served to increase the general insecurity amongst landed interests. Indeed, as we noted above, this environment of insecurity had triggered off a bandwagon effect, bringing into the party many landlords and tribal chiefs, anxious to protect themselves from any proposed land reform legislation. After the land reform was instituted,<sup>120</sup> landlords, found that the only way to 'save' their lands (above the prescribed ceiling), was through Bhutto's personal intercession. Files relating to numerous cases where the land reform applied, were called for (from the Federal Land Commission set up for implementation), and kept by Bhutto in his personal secretariat at Rawalpindi.<sup>121</sup> This enabled Bhutto to establish himself as the "Grand Patron" and "Ultimate Arbiter" of land reform cases using his discretionary power both to reward loyals and to coerce when necessary. "Rewarding" those who had demonstrated loyalty to him and his party manifested itself in a variety of ways. One method was not to take action against those individuals who had concealed parts of their holdings.<sup>122</sup> Referring to the widespread practice of the concealment of lands, one writer suggested:

"The success of landlords in so concealing lands....can be construed..as... ..the impotence of administrative authority in the face of feudal power... However, it is more likely that the landlords are enjoying official patronage in their efforts at concealment." 123

Another device used to reward loyal supporters was to first resume the excess land and then re-allot it in the names of the favoured landlord's friends or relations 'misrepresenting' them as tenants.<sup>124</sup> Yet another device was to 'lease' out land 'resumed' to former owners at ridiculously low rents.<sup>125</sup>

These were only some of the methods utilised to reward loyal supporters of the regime. However, what is important is not so much the procedural aspects of the distribution of such favours, but its net result, which was to tie individual landlords personally to Bhutto (and his party) in a typically clientelist manner. If the land reform could be used to reward loyals, it could also serve to punish those, who, for one reason or another, chose to oppose the regime.<sup>126</sup> It was no coincidence, for instance, that punitive action under the land reform legislation was taken against Bizenjo, Mengal, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti and Khan Buksh Marri, all leading members of the major opposition party NAP (National Awami Party).<sup>127</sup> A case relating to Syeda Abida Hussain serves as a good illustration of the use of the land reform to both reward and punish. Abida had gifted excess land to a charitable trust. In 1973, an amendment in the law made such gifts unlawful, but as Abida had since joined the party, the gift made by her was not touched. Later, however, when she joined a demonstration against

police atrocities in Lahore in 1977; the Punjab administration ordered the gift to be void and the land involved to be resumed.<sup>128</sup> Actions against such people were, as we have seen, almost always politically motivated. However, the official media often characterised these actions as a 'socialist' government's attack on feudal interests in efforts to rally support of peasants and landless labour.<sup>129</sup> Indeed in areas where local power-holders (tribal chiefs or landlords) proved recalcitrant, it became official policy to encourage and provoke landlord-tenant confrontations. This was particularly evident in the NWFP, where tenants and sharecroppers were actively aided by the PPP administration in disputes/clashes with land-owning sardars who had failed to support the Bhutto regime.<sup>130</sup> Even in the Punjab and Sind, the threat to implement the legislation relating to the protection of tenants rights<sup>131</sup> was utilised to bring into political submission those landlords opposed to the regime, while at the same time demonstrating to tenants/peasants that the PPP regime was concerned with advancing the interests of the poor.<sup>132</sup> In addition, the settlement of many landlord-tenant disputes was a function performed not by the local administration impersonally but reserved for Bhutto and his personal lieutenants.<sup>133</sup> This enabled Bhutto to enhance his personal ascendancy vis a vis landlord groups, and by appearing as the 'Great Benefactor' in so far as the landless were concerned, create the image that he alone was responsive to their grievances. This art was perfected in Bhutto's open 'kutchery' system (open courts), where he personally

decided such cases in what often appeared an arbitrary manner.<sup>134</sup> Another instrument utilised was to order "on the spot enquiries" into cases of landlord-tenant conflict. For instance, on one occasion, when in response to a wave of arbitrary ejections in the Punjab - a matter which should have been settled by the local administration - Bhutto ordered the Punjab Governor to ask a special Inspection Team to make on-the-spot enquiries into such cases.<sup>135</sup>

In addition to the use of land reform and tenant legislation outlined above, several other means were utilised to set up a system of rewards and material incentives to build political support for Bhutto and his party. Policy pronouncements such as high subsidies for inputs, cheap credit for modern equipment, higher procurement prices - were designed to benefit rich landowners.<sup>136</sup> While such policies provided inducements for landed groups as a whole, Bhutto and his party additionally, sought to distribute favours/rewards individually (amongst landed groups) both to maintain and extend their political support. The nationalisation measures affecting industry and financial institutions expanded the resource base of the regime considerably. This was now used to maximise political support; landlords who demonstrated their loyalty were rewarded with cheap credit by the nationalised banks, while large loans were disbursed to (landlord) leaders of the party;<sup>137</sup> fertilizer distribution followed similar lines.<sup>138</sup> The significant aspect of such patronage practices lay in the establishment of reward networks linking selected individuals/families personally to Bhutto. Bhutto did favours individually

rather than collectively because he wished to create a personal obligation of clientship.<sup>139</sup> Access to the 'spoils system' was always subject to Bhutto's arbitrary manipulation and hence, was supportive of patrimonial ties.<sup>140</sup>

The use of material rewards to build and cement a political following was reflected not only in Bhutto's dealings with landlord groups, described above. Through a wide variety of ways, the PPP distributed governmental patronage and 'spoils' amongst other groups and amongst its own personnel to both extend its support and to furnish organisational cement for the party. For this purpose a major resource at the party's disposal was that of public office/jobs. The nationalisation of various sectors of the economy served to expand the structural framework through which this type of patronage could be exercised. Consequently, jobs in the nationalised public sector ranging from managerial posts to clerical positions were distributed according to political criteria - often leading to over-staffing in many establishments.<sup>141</sup> Lawyers within the party were accommodated by the creation of legal posts in all industrial establishments. Further, a law was specially enacted making it obligatory for all industrial units over a certain productive capacity to appoint a legal adviser.<sup>142</sup> Predictably, those seeking such posts had to demonstrate their loyalty to the party before they could qualify for these jobs. In a letter to Bhutto, one of his advisers explained how this strategy was to work:

"It is suggested that a committee be set up in the provinces....to review the

distribution of legal advisers to the industrial units and recommend names of such other advocates who are prepared to toe the line of the government and will also be prepared to join the PPP.....By adopting equitable distribution of legal advisers, district-wise, pro-government lobby amongst the lawyers in the country, can be built up." 143

Similarly, jobs in the official media-press, radio, television— came to be filled by party loyalists.<sup>144</sup>

Other than public jobs, an additional source of party patronage derived from the government's discretionary powers over promotions and the allocation of development funds, licenses, and permits. Party leaders distributed permits for ration depots and various categories of licenses to reward supporters and to bring into the party elements such as contractors who saw the party as principally an avenue for material advancement. That this was a policy sanctioned by the party high-command is borne out by Mubashar's admission, on one occasion, that some ration depots had indeed been allotted to PPP supporters and his remark that in other instances the allotment of permits had been followed by hoisting of PPP flags on depots.<sup>145</sup> Such 'buying' of political support assumed an even greater importance in the NWFP, where the PPP had a relatively weak support base. Here, behind (provincial chief minister) Nasrullah Khan Khattak's attempts at engineering defections from the opposition parties and enlisting the support of local notables, lay promises of ministries / public offices and material incentives of permits and licenses.<sup>146</sup> In the Punjab and Sind, during the membership campaign launched by the party in 1975-76 (see below, chapter VIII) many

biradari leaders, contractors, village 'choudries' and other notables joined the party en masse in the hope of gaining access to the spoils system.<sup>147</sup> There seemed little doubt that the type of people entering the party were attracted principally by its promise of material rewards and incentives. Such persons were all too willingly drawn into what had become the PPP's dominant ethos - of self-seeking careerism and what can only be called corruption. At local levels the PPP required party membership of practically everyone who sought dealings with the government; for example membership in the PPP was required for transporters wishing to qualify for road licenses,<sup>148</sup> or for contractors hoping to acquire government contracts.<sup>149</sup>

Clearly, politicians and party leaders who exploited their office in the manner described above to reward clients were violating the legal norms of public conduct and their activity can only be termed as corruption.<sup>150</sup> Corruption, in the sense of "the abuse of public power and influence for private ends",<sup>151</sup> assumed a variety of forms, and consisted of such activity by party leaders as designed to either reward supporters/would-be-supporters or aimed at direct self-enrichment.<sup>152</sup> Some illustrations of the former have been given above; a few more would help to further illuminate such behaviour. As Minister for Housing, Jam Sadiq Ali allocated residential and commercial plots at officially reserved rates to reward party supporters,<sup>153</sup> while also making several appointments in a government organisation at a time when it did not have a single vacancy.<sup>154</sup> Another prominent PPP leader, Mumtaz Bhutto, as



chairman of the National Shipping Corporation, awarded contracts to friends and supporters.<sup>155</sup> Another case relates to Nasrullah Khattak, who issued car permits to influential families to obtain their political support.<sup>156</sup> This sort of activity was not restricted to ministers and MNAs, but even petty party officials "used the names of persons in prominent positions to provide jobs, permits and inams (prizes)" to their relatives and friends.<sup>157</sup>

Indeed, local party workers too expected tacit approval of their extra-legal manoeuvres as their price for supporting the party's leadership.<sup>158</sup> The 'buying' of political support and manipulation of favours by party leaders at almost all levels was of course viewed by the party high command as an inevitable and necessary part of the process of extending and consolidating political support.<sup>159</sup> This is borne out by the correspondence between party leaders and Bhutto in which the former frequently asked the latter to sanction favours, jobs, promotions, and grants of money to either reward loyalists in their areas or win over the undecided.<sup>160</sup> For instance, on one occasion the Punjab chief minister, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, made the following request to Bhutto:

"One of the sardars of Machka tribe has been paid...by Hasan Mahmood (an opposition leader)...to secure their votes... This man is among other leaders of the tribe. If permitted I intend to buy off the whole tribe (as they are only persuadable with money) and for this purpose I may request for one to one and a half lakhs of rupees." 161

But perhaps the most striking illustration of the use of cash grants from state coffers for party purposes, was the

regular, monthly payments made by Bhutto to major office-bearers of the party from state secret funds.<sup>162</sup> In his five and a half years in office, Bhutto is reported to have handed over the equivalent of nearly £2 million by way of monthly payments.<sup>163</sup>

Instances of the use of public power by party leaders and officials to enrich themselves are as numerous and varied as those designed to reward clients. Only a few can be mentioned here to demonstrate such a phenomenon. Interestingly, some of these cases were widely publicised by the party itself, either when it sought to discredit leaders such as Khar, who had fallen from official favour, or when one faction sought to discredit another. For instance, in the case of Khar it was alleged by the authorities that he had acquired agricultural land at subsidised rates, had a road constructed out of public funds to his ancestral village, and misappropriated public funds for personal enrichment,<sup>164</sup> (although it can be argued that the construction of a road would benefit not only him personally, but also his biradari followers and others in his constituency). Another prominent party leader, Kauser Niazi derived substantial monetary returns from contriving the bulk purchase by the government, of various books written by him.<sup>165</sup> Abdul Waheed Katpur, a senior minister in the Sind cabinet, secured the allotment of several plots of land.<sup>166</sup> Nasrullah Khattak as chief minister of the NWFP awarded government construction contracts to family members.<sup>167</sup> A minister of the Sind cabinet accepted a substantial bribe in awarding a contract to a

private commercial firm.<sup>168</sup> Jhang district PPP officials obtained loans from a state body ostensibly for flood relief purposes, which they misappropriated rather than disbursing among flood-affected people.<sup>169</sup> More generally, public development funds earmarked under the People's Works Programme for particular areas were utilised by local MPAs and MNAs who were expected to oversee such projects, for personal benefit.<sup>170</sup> In some instances, funds were misappropriated while in others they were misused, e.g. building a road to the MNA's/MPA's own village.<sup>171</sup>

The incidence of such abuse of power for personal profit had reached wide enough proportions to elicit severe warnings from Bhutto<sup>172</sup> and successive provincial committee meetings.<sup>173</sup> However, that such warnings and public admonishments were never backed by any concrete action demonstrated the unwillingness of those at the top to actually do something about the situation. There is little doubt that Bhutto regarded a certain amount of political graft and corruption as useful, but there is indication that an excess of such practices, and particularly the blatant manner in which they were carried out was a source of some concern to him. As a way out of this dilemma, one of his advisers suggested the following course of action:

"There is.....need to take drastic action in certain cases of flagrant corruption by the politicians in each province....Prime Minister might like to.....select a few cases and take immediate....action." 174

However, that Bhutto did not even take such selective action suggested that even his concern over "cases of flagrant corruption" was more apparent than real.

As the PPP prepared to go to the polls, complaints of corruption in the party appeared to be a major source of anxiety for the central leadership. Indeed, the complaint Bhutto most frequently heard during the pre-election party convention of 1975-76, related to corruption.<sup>175</sup> It was in response to these complaints that Bhutto declared that "the corrupt will not be given party tickets in the next elections".<sup>176</sup> While on another occasion he remarked that if his party did not meet with success at the polls, it would be on account of some of his colleagues, and not owing to the opposition's strength.<sup>177</sup> Files kept in the Prime Minister's secretariat show that corruption in the party and its repercussions for the party's public image, occupied a central place in the correspondence between Bhutto and his political and bureaucratic advisers in 1976 on the eve of the election.<sup>178</sup> It would be useful to cite parts of such correspondence for not only would this help to describe the general pattern of such corruption but indicate the recognition, albeit a belated one, on the part of the policy makers that this had led to considerable erosion of the party's legitimacy.

In July 1976, a member of Bhutto's personal staff, Rao Abdur Rashid submitted a report to Bhutto describing "factors that contribute to corruption in the PPP".<sup>179</sup> Rashid mentioned "allotment of ration depots, grant of car permits, plots and arms licences, special quotas given to the MNAs for admissions to schools and colleges."<sup>180</sup> In addition, he pointed out that "government servants are demoralised because a lot of transfers take place on the

recommendation of the PPP workers, MNAs and MPAs when the government servants do not listen to their unreasonable demands."<sup>181</sup> In a similar note written to Bhutto, Rashid explained that "malpractices committed by its (the party's) second and third liners, members of the assemblies and local office-bearers has earned a bad name for the party and tarnished its image considerably....As the pinch of petty favours like the allotment of a ration depot or a route permit is felt at the mohallah level, its adverse effects are fairly widely spread....Many of these leaders were nonentities before associating themselves with the ruling party, their present financial well-being is in sharp contrast to their previous not very enviable state of affairs."<sup>182</sup> Significantly, Rashid pointed out that "Much as one would like the situation to be otherwise, the fact remains that this 'reaping of the spoils' by partymen had done more harm to its cause than any other single factor." In May 1976, Pir Rashidi, Bhutto's information adviser wrote to him of "corruption....by swarms of 'party workers'....Many of these worthies have already become widely 'badnam' (notorious)....and are more despised than even corrupt officials."<sup>183</sup> In early 1977, an opinion poll conducted by the research cell of the P.M. secretariat showed that 95% of the people interviewed mentioned corruption as their second major criticism of the party (the first being rising prices).<sup>184</sup> Explaining this finding, an official of the research cell wrote:

"The issue which seems paramount in the common mind is the prevalent corruption... people's representatives have made this deep-rooted evil a widespread phenomena

in every walk of life. The role of MNAs and MPAs has come under sharp criticism. Their political favouritism, bribery and malpractices have created general discontent." 185

Any assessment of the impact on the party of the politics of patronage and corruption must begin with the recognition that such practices cannot merely be dismissed as deviant or morally reprehensible and left at that. As several studies of political parties in other societies have attempted to show, patronage and corruption can be a useful instrument of party building.<sup>186</sup> According to one writer this is because "Few, if any, durable political bonds except that of material self interest are available to build a large political party among poor, heterogenous, transitional populations....Self-interest thus provides the necessary political cement when neither a traditional governing elite nor a ruling group based on ideological or class interest is available."<sup>187</sup> Another writer has argued that "a smattering of corruption may help keep the masses politically satisfied" and aid development efforts.<sup>188</sup> Others have sought to demonstrate how parties sustain themselves and win electoral support primarily through the distribution of patronage and spoils.<sup>189</sup>

While recognising the potential of patronage for party-building and its success in many 'new' nations, our contention is that in the case of the PPP, the politics of reward appeared to be dysfunctional for party development. This contention rests on a number of factors. The first and most obvious factor was the relative scarcity of patronage and spoils to distribute. Undoubtedly the expansion of government activities under the PPP regime enlarged the

party's resource base, but it was nevertheless subject to what Zolberg terms "an inflationary process of demand-formation".<sup>190</sup> One favour may have made a friend, but alienated all those who hoped to get it and were passed over. There were often more disgruntled lieutenants than those who received rewards.<sup>191</sup> Since the supply of material rewards was limited, competition within the party was intense and manifested itself in factional warfare. That factionalism in the PPP was increasingly based on rivalries for the 'spoils' of office has already been noted. What needs emphasis here is that behind the intense factional warfare lay the basic problem that demands were greater than could be met. As one PPP leader, G. M. Khar, explained:

"There just weren't enough jobs to go around.....the disappointed took to challenging my authority and getting together with others whom I had at some time or other refused favours." 192

Businesses could be nationalised, new franchises and licences could be let, older civil servants replaced by loyal workers, but the supply of such material incentives was soon exhausted in the context of growing demands. The inflationary nature of these demands was a natural consequence of the PPP's mode of operation - its promise of material benefits meant that almost all who joined the party expected favours as a perfectly normal price for supporting the party. Those who were disappointed or not adequately rewarded either began to engage in disruptive factional activity or to rally behind the opposition. Thus the benefit one writer ascribes to rewards/corruption, in that "it tends to make the elite more cohesive"<sup>193</sup> does not appear to apply

to the PPP's experience. The shortage of disposable rewards, far from leading to party cohesiveness, resulted in serious splits within the party, as epitomised in the Khar episode described earlier.

Another factor that reduced the effectiveness of patronage as an instrument of party building was the tendency of PPP leaders, most notably of Bhutto himself, to develop their own personal followings. With patronage and spoils frequently delivered through personal connections to augment personal power, the loyalty that was called forth was loyalty not to the party but to individuals. As Bhutto's dealings with landlords demonstrate, what ultimately emerged was a personal network linked to Bhutto as well as a party organisation. As far as other party leaders were concerned, many (e.g. Khar, Mumtaz Bhutto) dispensed rewards to build up their personal support, rewards which aimed at the creating of clienteles who owed their allegiance first to the particular leader who had showered them with material rewards, and then to the party. The allocation of political goods was in such cases dictated not by what was good for the party as a whole, but what would benefit a particular leader. Such a phenomenon has been characterised thus by G. A. Heeger:

"The system is not to be likened to a machine so much to a multitude of machines frequently competing against one another." 194

The distribution of rewards through personal machines yielded a political process that was hostile to party institutionalisation. Building up individual personal support as opposed to developing organisational loyalty through patronage



could not but lead to weak institutional development.

Another aspect of the personalism permeating the party was the use of public office by some party leaders to reward themselves, i.e. self-enrichment. This phenomenon which one writer terms "non-machine corruption" and which we discussed earlier, could not by its nature, aid party development. Such corruption was, as is obvious, not finely articulated and organised to maximise party support, but reflected random greed. To the extent that such personal greed and appropriation constituted a fairly widespread phenomenon, it led to a channelling of resources that the party could otherwise have utilised to meet the demands of a broader stratum. For example, the case cited above of the pocketing of funds by PPP leaders which were really intended for "party work" amongst those affected by floods in the Punjab meant depriving the party of already scarce resources.

Finally, it can be argued that the benefits accruing to the party from patronage and corrupt practices were far outweighed by the costs in terms of the erosion of party legitimacy. Writers who have pointed out the beneficial effects of patronage vis a vis party development, typically base their argument on examples drawn from early twentieth century American history. Wielding patronage in the 'new' nations, however, occurs in a markedly different legal and social context than it did in much of urban U.S.A. Saddled with the "very latest" in terms of public office regulations, politicians in Pakistan find themselves denied by law many of the spoils that aided the building

of strong parties in the U.S.A. At the same time, while it is true that the patrimonial view of office still survives to predispose most Pakistanis to tolerate a certain amount of corruption, politicians have to reckon with "modern" groups such as students, army officers and the small but strategically placed middle class of civil servants and professionals (who have profited from achievement and universalism) in whose eyes such activity can be highly objectionable. Additionally, the serious scarcity of resources in developing countries like Pakistan also means that patronage practices occur in an economic environment markedly different from that of early twentieth century urban America. In a growing and prospering economy patronage can perhaps be "accepted" to a greater extent by a public, which is suffering no great economic hardship. However, in a deteriorating economic situation, as was the case in general in the Bhutto years, (see above, chapter V) such practices acquire a more sinister meaning than they would perhaps do otherwise. Indeed in such situations, people are not unlikely to perceive a connection between their own declining economic position and corruption.

The fact that the Bhutto regime evinced much concern, albeit at the time of election, about the problem of corruption shows that they themselves perceived limits to the public's tolerance. Indeed, towards the end of the regime's years in power, party leaders, Bhutto included, recognised the fact that corruption within the party was one of the major reasons for its decline in public esteem. The party admitted that the loss of legitimacy among middle

class groups was reflected in the erosion of its support throughout urban Pakistan.<sup>195</sup> Any loss of legitimacy is perilous - but if a party loses legitimacy in the eyes of a politically important group, such as the Army, the consequences can be disastrous. As Nye argued, in so far as corruption destroys the legitimacy of political structures in the eyes of those who have power to do something about the situation, it contributes to instability.<sup>196</sup> In the case of the PPP, there are no empirical indices to establish a reliable measure of the relationship between corruption and the 1977 coup d'état. Although corruption figured prominently in post-coup rationalisations, the degree to which corruption was itself a major cause of the military take over is, however, open to question.<sup>197</sup> It may be that for army officers, the perception of a rigged election in March 1977, constituted the ultimate corrupt act on behalf of a party that they had seen engaging in the most blatant forms of corruption over the years.<sup>198</sup> It can, nevertheless, be argued that corruption contributed to the aura of disillusionment that preceded the coup of 1977, and made it difficult for the PPP to find popular (or elite) support when the chips were down.<sup>199</sup>

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NOTES

1. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 1, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 76-77.
2. Quoted in W. N. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 192.
3. Ibid, p. 202.

4. For a study of Muslim League factional politics see Safdar Mahmood, Muslim League Ka Daura-e-Hakumat ("The Period of Muslim League Rule"), (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1973). For briefer references see K. K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-58, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976) and M. R. Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-58, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976).
5. This aspect of the PPP has also been noted by Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan Peoples Party, unpublished doctoral thesis, (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979).
6. For an example of Bhutto's fears about the disruptive effects of factionalism see his speech reported in Pakistan Times, 11 June, 1975, 1.
7. Interview with G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
8. See Pakistan Times, 25 April 1971, 5, and 27 April, 1971, 1.
9. The Khar-Rashid tussle also finds mention in Anwar Syed, 'The Pakistan Peoples Party: Phases One and Two', in Lawrence Ziring et al eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 94-95.
10. In an interview with the author, Khar admitted ordering these purges, but explained that these were the prerogative of whoever wielded power in the Punjab. Only those 'extremists', according to him, who maintained a policy of confrontation were thrown out while others were accommodated.
11. For critiques of the Khar regime see for example, Outlook, 8 December 1973, p. 3 and Outlook, 16 March 1974, p. 3.
12. Anwar Syed, op.cit, p. 95.
13. Dawn, 12 July 1973, 4.
14. Outlook, 4 August 1973, p. 12.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Dawn, 31 July 1973, 4.
18. Pakistan Times, 1 January 1974, 3.
19. Pakistan Times, 13 January 1974, 12.
20. Pakistan Times, 15 January 1974, 7.
21. Dawn, 18 January 1974, 8.
22. Dawn, 3 February 1974, 1.
23. Dawn, 28 March 1973, 1.
24. These were Mahmud Kasuri, Ahmed Reza Kasuri, Abdul Hameed Jatoi,

Abdul Khaliq, Rao Khurshid Ali, Manzoor Dhodra, Anwar Ali Noon, and Ali Ahmed Talpur.

25. Interview with Mahmud Ali Kasuri, in Outlook, 25 November 1972, Vol. 1, No. 34, pp. 8-11.
26. White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), p. 16-17.
27. Ibid.
28. Dawn, 28 March 1973, 3.
29. Dawn, 29 July 1973, 8.
30. Pakistan Times, 17 June 1973, 10.
31. Dawn, 8 August 1973, 3.
32. Interview with Aziz Ahmed, ex-minister of state for defence and foreign affairs, 1972-1977, Islamabad, December 1977.
33. Outlook, 4 August 1973, p. 12.
34. Rahim pointed out that Aziz Ahmed was Ayub's first deputy chief martial law administrator and that the appointment of a man with such a background would only alienate the rank and file of the party. See Outlook, 14 July 1973, Vol. 2, No. 15, p. 10.
35. The Rahim-Bhutto conflict is dealt with briefly in Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan Political Perspective', Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 7, (July 1975).
36. Pakistan Times, 23 May, 1972.
37. Pakistan Times, 11 December 1972.
38. Interview with (Retd) Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, February 1979. Zulfiqar was one of the invitees to the dinner.
39. See Interim Constitution in Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.).
40. See J. A. Rahim's statement at a press conference on 9 August, 1977, cited in White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Government, Vol. III, Misuse of the Instruments of State Power, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 88-97.
41. Ibid, pp. 94-98.
42. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
43. For the debate see Musawaat, 5 August 1974, 1.
44. Sartori, op. cit, p. 77.

45. Dawn, 22 August 1974, 4.
46. Dawn, 16 December 1974, 1.
47. Dawn, 22 December 1974, 7.
48. Dawn, 23 December 1974, 5.
49. ViewPoint, 26 December 1975, p. 8.
50. Interview with G. Mustapha Jatoi, PPP chief minister (Sind), Islamabad, December 1977.
51. The term personal machine is used by Gerald A. Heeger, in his The Politics of Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan, 1974), to denote the attempts of elite members to consolidate their own personal support through the manipulation of patronage and government largesse.
52. Dawn, 27 August 1974, 8.
53. Dawn, 8 February 1974, 5.
54. Dawn, 22 October 1974, 1.
55. Dawn, 14 February 1973 and 16 February 1973, 8.
56. Hilal-e-Pakistan, 28 September 1975.
57. Khar told the author that the Maan-Khakwani group began to oppose him only because he refused to share his power of patronage with them, remarking that "there were only so many jobs to go around".
58. Dawn, 13 February 1974, 8.
59. The Peerzada-Khar tussle is briefly mentioned in Outlook, 20 April 1974, p. 5.
60. Outlook, 1 December 1973, p. 4.
61. Interview with G. M. Khar.
62. Note from the P.M. to Afzal Said Khan, dated 22 November, 1973, White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, op.cit, P, A-5.
63. Khar mentioned that the Maan-Khakwani group could not have undertaken the risk of submitting such a memorandum without the assurance of Bhutto's backing, and that the memorandum itself was wholly 'inspired' by Bhutto and Peerzada. Interview with Khar.
64. For the text of the memorandum, see Pakistan Times, 14 April 1974, 1, 10.
65. Interview with G. M. Khar.

66. Dawn, 14 March 1974, 1.
67. See for instance, Dawn, 16 March 1974, 5.
68. Dawn, 26 March 1974, 6.
69. Pakistan Times, 7 May 1974, 1.
70. Pakistan Times, 22 May 1974, 8.
71. Pakistan Times, 29 May 1974, 4.
72. Pakistan Times, 29 May 1974, 4.
73. Ibid.
74. Outlook, 1 June 1974.
75. Interview with G. M. Khar.
76. Outlook, 18 May 1974, pp. 6-8.
77. Pakistan Times, 16 April 1974, 3.
78. Khar told the author that he had fallen foul of Bhutto and Peerzada during meetings of the Inter-provincial co-ordination committee where he opposed measures designed to provide benefits to Sind at the cost of the Punjab - mentioning in this connection the issues of allocation of development funds and division of the Indus waters between the two provinces.
79. Pakistan Times, 29 May 1975.
80. Pakistan Times, 13 June 1975.
81. Pakistan Times, 11 June 1975.
82. Khar accepted the post because, as he explained to the author this would exonerate him from all quarters. For Bhutto to reappoint him in full knowledge of all the allegations against him could only vindicate Khar's assertion that all charges of corruption and nepotism were politically motivated.
83. Interview with G. M. Khar.
84. Pakistan Times, 19 May 1975, 1.
85. Pakistan Times, 20 July 1975, 6.
86. Pakistan Times, 28 August 1975, 1.
87. Pakistan Times, 2 July 1975, 5.
88. See for instance, Pakistan Times, 9 October 1975, 8, and 30 September 1975, 8.
89. Pakistan Times, 27 September 1975, 5.

90. Far East Economic Review, 7 November 1975, p. 7.
91. 'The Tajpura Incident', White Paper, Vol III, op.cit, pp. 114-115.
92. Pakistan Times, 16 October 1975, 8.
93. White Paper, ibid, p. 35. According to this, "rigging filled the gap between the 12,000 votes polled by Khar and the 9,000 cast for his opponent.
94. See 'Dulai Camp', in ibid, pp. 49-58.
95. Pakistan Times, 11 October 1975, 4.
96. ViewPoint, 7 November 1975, p. 9.
97. Amnesty International Report: Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1976, (London: 1977), p. 72.
98. Interview with G. M. Khar. Khar remained publicly inactive. In May 1977, he returned to the Peoples Party as Bhutto's Special Adviser on Political Affairs.
99. Paul R. Brass, 'Factional Politics and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh', Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 9, (September 1964), pp. 1045.
100. James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Columbia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 3-24. Payne attempts to explain factionalism in Columbian politics on the basis of the prevalence of "status" rather than "programme" incentives among Columbian politicians, similar in many ways to our discussion of factional politics within the PPP.
101. One study of factionalism that stresses the personalist aspect is Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
102. See also Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State, op.cit.
103. See for instance, Paul R. Brass, 'Factional Politics' op.cit, pp. 1045-1047.
104. Interview with Dr. Khaliq.
105. In interviews conducted with senior officers of the armed forces in 1977 and 1979 condemnation of such factional violence seemed unanimous. Many of those interviewed expressed the opinion that the party that was constantly divided was not "fit to govern the counrty."
106. See for instance, Pakistan Times, 3 May 1974, 7. Pakistan Times, 29 May 1975, 1.
107. Pakistan Times, 30 May 1974.



108. Pakistan Times, 16 June 1975.
109. Pakistan Times, 16 July 1975.
110. The literature on this is vast; for theoretical expositions of this phenomenon, see Gerald A. Heeger, 'Bureaucracy, Parties and Development' in World Politics, Vol. XXV, No. 4, (July 1973), pp. 600-607; Gerald A. Heeger, The Politics of Under Development, op.cit; For case studies see Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Henry Beinen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa, (Chicago: Rand-McNally & Co., 1966).
111. On the American political machine, see C. E. Merriani and H. F. Gosnele, The American Party System, (New York: Macmillan, 1949); Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Free Press, 1961); W. N. Chambers, op.cit; Henry Beinen has been the most prolific proponent of the machine model's applicability to Africal political parties. See his Tanzania, op.cit; See also his 'Political Machines in Africa', in Michael Lofchie ed., The State of Nationa: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). See also Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Henry L. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah, (New York: Praeger, 1966). James C. Scott, 'Corruption Machine Politics and Political Change', American Political Science Review, (December 1969), is a valuable discussion of the nature of machine politics and its applicability to the new states of Asia and Africa.
112. This definition is put forward by Rene Le Marchand and Keith Legg in 'Political Clientelism and Development', Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4, (January 1972), p. 151.
113. Alex Weingrod, 'Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. X, (July 1968) p. 379.
114. The heuristic value of the concept is noted by John Duncan Powell, in 'Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, (June 1970). A useful book of readings which brings together most of the leading research efforts on the topic of political clientelism (both sociological and political) is S. W. Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Lande, Laura Guasti, eds., Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
115. Several interesting general explorations of the subject include: Robert Kaufman, 'The Patron-Client Concept and Macro Politics: Prospects and Problems', paper delivered at the 1972 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association; James C. Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South-East Asia', American Political Science Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, (March 1972); and Rene Le Marchand and Keith Legg, op.cit.

116. Richard Sandbrook, 'Patrons, Clients and Factions,' Canadian Journal of Political Science, No. 1, (March 1972), p. 109; Rene LeMarchand and Keith Legg, op.cit, p. 149; J. S. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis', American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, (June 1969), p. 418.
117. Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South East Asia', op.cit, p. 19.
118. William J. Siffin emphasises this process with regard to Thailand; see his 'Personnel and Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy', in Heady and Stokes, eds., Papers in Comparative Administration, (Ann Arbor 1962), pp. 207-228.
119. Bruce J. Espito, 'The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Pakistan', Asian Survey, (April 1974), p. 430.
120. For the land reform measure see Government of Pakistan Martial Law Regulation No. 115 in Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 11. March 1972.
121. Documentary evidence of such cases became available as part of the material submitted by the Federation's Counsel in the Supreme Court hearing of the petition filed by Mrs. Bhutto challenging the detention of Bhutto under a Martial Law Regulation in 1977. See Pakistan Times, 12 October 1977.
122. See White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. IV, The Economy, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1979), p. 13-14.
123. A. Alam, 'Economics of Landed Interests: A Case Study of Pakistan', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (Spring 1974), p. 22.
124. White Paper, Vol IV, ibid, p. 20-21.
125. Ibid, p. 15-16.
126. For a discussion of the political motives of the land reform see Ronald J. Herring, Redistributive Agrarian Policy: Land and Credit in South Asia, unpublished doctoral thesis, (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), chapter six, pp. 225-234.
127. Pakistan Times, 11 October 1975, 4.
128. Cited in White Paper, Vol IV, ibid, p. 19.
129. See for instance, the news report on the Federal Land Commission Chairman's announcement, in Pakistan Times, 30 April 1974.
130. See above, chapter V, the section on the PPP and the political opposition.
131. For details of such legislation, see below, chapter XII.
132. Interview with Ghaus Buksh Raisani, former PPP chief minister of Baluchistan, Islamabad, October 1979.

133. This is a factor easily adduced from gleaning through the newspapers of the period 1972-1977, since the official media often gave the widest publicity to the fact that Bhutto took a personal interest in the problems of the rural poor.
134. Bhutto held open Kutcheries frequently largely in rural areas and sometimes in the most far flung villages. For a critical account of Bhutto's 'kutchery' system, see Outlook, 2 February 1974, p. 3.
135. A. Alam, op.cit, p. 23.
136. Procurement prices more than doubled in the period 1971-76 for major crops like wheat, cotton, rice and sugar cane. High procurement prices obviously benefit those farmers who produce a marketable surplus (i.e. large and middle landowners). The largest share in the value of the marketed output from these crops come from the large and middle landlords of the Punjab, who formed important elements in the PPP's support base.
137. See White Paper, Vol. IV, op.cit, p. 67. PPP leaders advanced large loans under the Agricultural Credit Scheme for small farmers included Jam Sadiq Ali, Makdum Talibul Maula and Mir Aijaz Ali Talpur, all large Sindhi zamindars.
138. Ibid, pp. 26-27.
139. This appears as a common form of patronage in many other societies. See, for example, David Winfel, 'The Phillipines, Comparative Studies in Political Finance: A Symposium', Journal of Politics, Vol. 25, (November 1963), pp. 757-773.
140. For illustration of the varied nature of such personal favours, see the annexures (in particular 33-35) in White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Government, Vol. II, op.cit.
141. White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, p. 41.
142. That patronage formed the underlying motive for enacting this provision can be evidenced from the correspondence between Bhutto and his advisers in the P. M.'s secretariat in Annexure 23, White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, P, A-67.
143. Ibid.
144. See Annexure 139, in White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, op.cit, PP, A-422-423.
145. Dawn, 16 February 1976, 5.
146. See ViewPoint, 14 August 1975. For Khattak's denials see Dawn, 8 August 1976, p. 18.
147. ViewPoint, 13 August 1976, pp. 7-9.
148. See ViewPoint, 4 June 1976, p. 9.

149. The most notorious case was that of Pir Humayun, a man of modest means, who turned into a millionaire through the award of government contracts by the Trading Corporation and the Food Department with the help of Kauser Niazi after joining the party. See ViewPoint, 9 July 1976, pp. 7-8.
150. Corruption, as John Waterbury points out, may be defined in a legal or a normative sense, and in some societies the two definitions may be coincident. In the legal sense, corruption is self-regarding behaviour on the part of public functionaries: that directly violates legal restrictions on such behaviour. Normatively, a public functionary may be considered corrupt whether or not a law is being violated in the process. A legally corrupt person may arouse no normative reprobation; a person judged corrupt by normative standards may be legally clean. What is common to both definitions is the notion of the abuse of public power and influence for private ends. From our examples of patronage practices, it can be safely assumed that the PPP's activity manifested both these forms of corruption. For Waterbury's definition see his 'Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime', World Politics, Vol. 25, (1972-1973).
151. Ibid.
152. Corruption within the PPP is also discussed in Anwar Syed, op.cit., pp. 100-106.
153. White Paper, Vol. I, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, His Family and Associates, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 78.
154. Ibid.
155. Interview with officials of the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, Karachi, August 1977.
156. White Paper, Vol. I, op.cit., p. 75.
157. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
158. Ibid.
159. While party leaders interviewed by the author did not always agree on the extent of such practices, almost all conceded that a certain amount constitutes a necessary part of politicking, some even pointing out that in a society like Pakistan's, what everybody understands is the 'politics of personal benefits and and money'.
160. Such correspondence has been published in the form of annexures in the White Papers cited above.
161. Annexure 224, White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections, op.cit. P, A-669.
162. This disclosure was made after the ouster of the PPP regime, by the state's counsel in the Supreme Court Hearing cited in note 121 above. Among those who received such payments were

the party's secretaries, deputy secretary-general, the four provincial presidents, Punjab secretary-general, the Chief ministers of the NWFP and Sind. See White Paper, Vol. I, op.cit, pp. 24-27. Bhutto did not deny the payments but only questioned the motive attributed to him.

163. Ibid, p. 25.
164. See Pakistan Times, 12 October 1975, 10.
165. White Paper, Vol. I, op.cit, pp. 50-52.
166. Ibid, p. 76-77.
167. Ibid, p. 76.
168. Pakistan Times, 22 April 1974, 5.
169. These factors came to light during the hearings of the Punjab Flood Commission Inquiries in 1974. See Pakistan Times, 29 April 1974, 8, and 30 April 1974, 5.
170. Interview with Mubashar Hasan.
171. Interview with Dr. Khaliq who in addition to being a provincial minister, was also chairman, Peoples Works Council of Gujarat district in 1974.
172. See for instance, Dawn, 11 January 1975, 3, and 8 July 1974, 1.
173. See for example, the warning issued by the Sind Provincial Committee in Dawn, 12 November 1973, 1.
174. Annexure 12, White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections, op.cit, P, A-31.
175. ViewPoint, 20 February 1976, p. 8.
176. Pakistan Times, 17 July 1975, 1.
177. Pakistan Times, 22 December 1975, 10.
178. Much of this correspondence is to be found as annexures in the voluminous White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections, op.cit.
179. Annexure 65, ibid, P, A-214.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid, p, A-215.
182. Annexure 63, ibid, p, A 203.
183. Annexure 11, ibid, p, A 25.
184. Annexure 64, ibid, p, A 207.

185. Ibid, p, A 210.
186. The most celebrated case relates to the development of American political parties in this manner. See W. M. Chambers, op.cit, and James C. Scott, 'Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,' op.cit.
187. Scott, ibid, p. 1151.
188. A. J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
189. Myron Weiner, Party-Building in a New Nation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
190. A. R. Zolberg, op.cit, p. 149.
191. This point was most candidly made by G. M. Khar in an interview with the author.
192. Ibid.
193. Joseph S. Nye, op.cit, p. 240.
194. The Politics of Underdevelopment, op.cit, p. 137.
195. See Annexures 9,31,166, in White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections, op.cit, PP, A-18, A-470.
196. J. S. Nye, op.cit, p. 422.
197. Corruption figured prominently amongst the justifications given by the Zia regime during the State's Counsel's submissions in the Supreme Court hearing of a petition filed by Mrs. Bhutto challenging martial law. For an account of these proceedings, see, for instance, Pakistan Times, 11 October 1977, pp. 1-7. See also Zia's interview in Urdu Digest, (November 1977).
198. That this view was widely held both within senior and junior ranks of the army was indicated by Major-General Shah Rafi Alam in an interview with the author, in Rawalpindi, December 1977.
199. We refer here to the period between the March 1977 election and the July coup, a time when the PPP needed desperately to demonstrate such support to forestall a possible coup. During the opposition agitation, the PPP failed to demonstrate any counter support, relying on the use of force to (temporarily) establish its supremacy.

## VIII

THE PPP: PERSONALISM OR INSTITUTIONALISATION?THE PARTY 1975-76

Partly as a response to the serious dislocations caused in the party organisation by the factionalism described in the preceding chapter, Bhutto took several steps in 1975-76 aimed at a major overhaul of the PPP organisation. This indicated that Bhutto appreciated how critical the matter of party organisation was, especially with the general election approaching in 1977. But how far can the efforts made by Bhutto to improve the party machinery be regarded as encouraging the development of the PPP as an institution, thus reversing what has been characterised as the dominant trend of personalism in the PPP? As we shall see below, Bhutto's last-minute efforts, as it were, only confirmed the trends in the party that have been analysed above in the preceding two chapters and reinforced Bhutto's personal dominance over the party. Thus these efforts did not constitute a significant move towards institutionalisation of the party. Nonetheless, these organisational developments need to be noted as they were obviously taken with an eye to the coming general election, and hence they determined the kind of structure Bhutto had in the PPP to contest the 1977 election. That such steps were taken on the eve of the election perhaps also indicated that Bhutto had come to regard the PPP as little more than an instrument to win elections.

First, in keeping with past tradition, Bhutto decided to postpone party elections until after the general elections.<sup>1</sup> This, together with the fact that the promised party constitution to replace the 1967 interim constitution (that had been rendered obsolete by subsequent events) never materialised,<sup>2</sup> in effect meant that Bhutto could re-fashion the party in accordance with his own personal dictates. This signified a continuation of personalism in the party. In early 1975, Bhutto ordered the "reorganisation" of the Punjab PPP, and new working committees were set up under his personalised direction at the provincial, district, town and municipal levels.<sup>3</sup> The membership of the new committees reflected the recent shifts in factional permutations at the cabinet level in Punjab and showed the dominance of landed groups, again representing a continuation of past trends in the party.

Preparatory work for a major reorganisation of the party throughout the country was, however, only undertaken between November 1975-July 1976. "Reorganisation tours" were undertaken by Bhutto beginning with the Punjab districts in November 1975, followed by Sind in January 1976, the NWFP and Baluchistan in February-April 1976. Sixteen party conventions were held throughout the country on a divisional basis. The aim of these conventions was officially described as enabling Bhutto "to listen to the complaints and suggestions of party workers" with a view to helping him re-organise the party.<sup>4</sup> Clearly then, the purpose of these conventions was 'consultative' at best, a continuation of past tradition in the party. It is significant that no



national convention was held. Perhaps the state of factionalism in the party urged Bhutto not to hold one; 'divisional' conventions were more manageable and gave him greater scope for manoeuvre.

Significantly the responsibility for organising these tours and conventions lay not with the party branches but with the respective district administrations, while Bhutto's bureaucrat advisers from the Prime Minister's Secretariat travelled with him.<sup>5</sup> This reflected Bhutto's increasing dependency on the bureaucracy, and left the party leaders responsible only for amassing large crowds - even that function was shared with the administration. At the same time it was reported that preparatory work for the formulation of the PPP's 1977 election manifesto was entrusted to Bhutto's bureaucratic advisers, rather than his party men.<sup>6</sup> There were also growing signs that bureaucrats - cynically called "Bhuttocrats" - from his P.M. Secretariat were involved in backstage manoeuvrings and in the mediation of factional disputes and bargaining. While this phenomenon is also examined in chapter X, it is necessary to note here the growing role played by these bureaucrats in party affairs, a sign perhaps that the bureaucracy under Bhutto's direction had begun to penetrate the party.

The party tours were accompanied by a mass membership drive which saw many notables entering the party. In August 1976, a nationwide membership drive was launched.<sup>7</sup> The membership fee was fixed at 50 paisa and the doors of the party were open to all who had faith in 'Islam, Socialism and Democracy'.<sup>8</sup> A Central Enrolment Committee was set

up under Sheikh Rashid, while the basic enrolment was to be carried out by primary enrolment committees (PEC), each having five members. Members of the PECs were to be nominated by Tehsil Enrolment Committees, which were chosen by the District Enrolment Committees, which in turn were the creation of the provincial bodies. In addition, Bhutto directed provincial office-holders to authorise any party office-bearer to enrol new members.<sup>9</sup> As a result of the membership campaign which ended on 20 December 1976, the party claimed that its membership stood at 10 million.<sup>10</sup> The membership drive saw a wide variety of individuals and groups entering the party, including landlords, tribal sardars, film stars, sports personalities, shopkeepers and contractors. Many of those who joined the party did so in the hope of sharing in the 'spoils of office', and in this sense represented a somewhat opportunistic clientele. No day passed without the announcement of this tribe or that biradari joining the party. PPP committees vied with one another to demonstrate to the central leadership that they had brought in the largest number of supporters. That figures were often inflated in the competitive struggle was indicated by Meraj Khalid's sarcastic comment that if these figures were to be believed, the population of the country had suddenly registered a rapid increase.<sup>11</sup> View Point, a weekly generally sympathetic to the PPP, implored the Chairman to "save the party" from "self seekers" and pointed out that the growing membership figures through the influx of such people was actually weakening the party.<sup>12</sup> That the PPP committees were openly enrolling members by appeals

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to biradarism intensified the emergence of particularistic cleavages.<sup>13</sup> Meraj Khalid, pointing to the "emergence of clannish trends" in the party issued a strong warning to party workers operating on biradari lines.<sup>14</sup> But the influx of feudal oligarchs, biradari leaders and tribal chiefs continued leading to a resurgence of factionalism at all levels of the party in the country. No district of the Punjab was free from factional conflict based on biradari or personal enmities. In the NWFP where the party, as in Baluchistan, was essentially a creation of the federal government and was built from the top downwards, factional infighting was everywhere. In D. I. Khan the tussle was between Gandapur and Makhdoom Rahman, in Bannu it was between Humayun Saifullah and Habibullah Khan, in Mardan between Abdul Samad Khan and Abdul Razik Khan, and in Kohat between Gilani and Moshin Ali. Examples can be multiplied ad nauseam to show that while the PPP was increasing in numbers, factionalism was becoming equally widespread. Thus problems of organisational weakness, far from being resolved, were in fact exacerbated by these developments.

On 7 December 1976, Bhutto announced a comprehensive reorganisation of the party at the provincial, district, tehsil, town and city level, to give "a new impetus and vitality" to the party.<sup>15</sup> While Bhutto himself selected the office-bearers at the provincial level, the district office-bearers and lower tiers were selected by the political wing of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, headed by Tamman. The composition of the new structures gave due recognition to new entrants, with clan and biradari leaders, feudals

tribal chiefs and village chaudaris being predominant at all levels.<sup>16</sup> This reflected the culmination of the gradual shift in the party's social base, towards a greater dependence on 'traditional' power holders.

The structure itself, was a multi-tiered one consisting of provincial, district, tehsil city/town and village/mohalla (urban precincts) units.<sup>17</sup> A national executive committee was set up to coordinate the activities of the various units. The village and mohalla units were put under the control of district units, while district units were placed under the control of provincial units. This structure was not unlike that of the Ayubian Basic Democracy (BD) system. Like the BD system, the PPP was given a multi-tiered and pyramidal shape. The important difference was that the lowest tiers of the PPP had far less autonomy than the union councils (the lowest tier of the BD system).

To sum up, then, these organisational endeavours did little to reverse past trends in the party, indeed, they signified a continuation of the tradition of the primacy of personalism over institutionalisation in the PPP. Thus even Bhutto's belated efforts at improving party machinery did not significantly aid the PPP's development as an "institution".

#### AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PPP

Two major inter-related conclusions emerge from the discussion of the PPP in chapters VI, and VII above. Both are related to and were a consequence of Bhutto's preference

for a patrimonial - as opposed to an organisational - strategy for consolidating political power. The first concerns Bhutto's failure to develop the PPP into an institution, while the second conclusion relates to the character of the party's social base. We turn now towards considering these and their consequences both in terms of regime-stability and from the broader perspective of political development.

Clearly, Bhutto's patrimonial approach resulted in a failure (or unwillingness) to develop the PPP into an institutionalised political group possessing a degree of organisational viability and autonomy. Bhutto attempted to enhance his personal authority over the party through the manipulation of patronage and the calculated use of unpredictability - the hallmarks of a patrimonial strategy. He tried to fashion the PPP into his personalised instrument through creating and utilising patrimonial linkages based on personal dependency. This resulted in a political party in which its chairman became the source of all authority, and who expected unquestioning obedience and subservience from other party leaders and members. Those who tried to question Bhutto's authority faced serious consequences, as the numerous illustrations above show. In terms of party building, the kind of loyalty Bhutto expected - which placed the individual above that of party - clearly prevented the PPP from developing any measure of organisational viability and autonomy. Additionally, Bhutto's unwillingness to take effective steps to strengthen the party organisation and give it a more discrete structure strongly inhibited

the PPP's institutional development. This paradox of a leader downgrading his own party can be explained in terms of Bhutto's overriding concern - common to patrimonial rulers - to prevent the emergence of an organisation that could serve to limit his power and his scope for political manoeuvre both inside the party and outside in the wider political arena.

Bhutto's patrimonial policy of factional manipulation contributed further to the PPP's organisational weakness. Of course intra-party factionalism to some extent afflicts most political parties, and in the PPP's case was to some extent inherent, given the heterogeneous composition of the party. Indeed, intra-party factionalism based on ideological differences, biradari rivalries, personal enmities and competition for patronage threatened to cause serious disruptions in the PPP's organisation. However, instead of evolving a formula or mechanism to resolve such conflicts, or to contain it within reasonable bounds, Bhutto's patrimonial policies served to exacerbate such factionalism. Bhutto's policy of factional manipulation which was one of balancing factions and of constantly shuttling power between different factional leaders perpetuated this kind of conflict, with deleterious consequences for party cohesiveness and unity. At the same time, Bhutto's use of government patronage as a cement for party organisation had only limited efficacy for a number of reasons discussed above. In the PPP's case, patronage intensified factional conflict and led in some instances to the emergence of "personal machines" in the party. Additionally, the scale of

"non-machine" corruption in the party seriously damaged the PPP's legitimacy in the eyes of the public and strategic power groups in the country (e.g. the military and the urban intelligentsia).

The second major conclusion that emerges from our analysis of the PPP concerns the character of the party's social base. This, again, was a consequence of Bhutto's patrimonial strategy. According to the evidence presented in chapter VII and above, there was a decisive shift in the party's social make-up while it was in power. Bhutto chose not to build on what after 1970 had emerged as a potential mass base - at least in the Punjab - preferring instead to adopt a patrimonial policy of cooption of traditional power holders in all four provinces. In the Punjab specifically, this meant a decisive shift away from the party's original mass constituency of 'modernised' newer social groups towards a greater reliance on 'traditional' rural notables. Under Bhutto's direction, the PPP, instead of developing the organisational and institutional framework for organising mass support (a development precluded by Bhutto's patrimonial strategy) resorted to coopting locally influential leaders with their own groups of supporters. This policy of recruitment brought into the PPP all types of locally notable people whose loyalty to the party was based not on programmatic principle but on the personal gain they could derive from such an alignment. With party leaders becoming increasingly aligned with traditional local power holders, the party lost much of its 'popular' 'mass' character. Bhutto's patrimonial policy of



creating a clientelist base of support amongst rural power holders meant that the PPP increasingly became a party of notables. In this way, the PPP's "patron party" features gradually came to predominate over its "mass party" characteristics.

This change in the party's social base obviously had an important impact on the party's goals, as indeed on the party's role as a governing party. While the question of the extent to which the PPP acted as a 'modernising' party is examined in chapter XII, it is necessary to note here that the domination of traditional power holders in the party inevitably inhibited its espoused 'modernising' aims and robbed it of its 'populist' appeal. Far from acting as a 'mobilist' party, the PPP increasingly became an avenue for the material advancement of notables.

The PPP's organisational weakness also seriously affected its role as a governing party in the sense of acting as a two-way channel of communication between the rulers and the ruled. The party failed to develop the organisational capabilities or the institutional mechanism necessary to accommodate and aggregate political demands emanating from the citizenry and to project these upwards into the process of governmental policy formulation. Indeed, the PPP acted more as the legitimising instrument of an autocrat than as an aggregative party functional to a party system. Certainly individual party leaders in their capacities as ministers did participate in policy making, but this is quite different from a party as an organised entity, responding to pressures from below and influencing governmental

policy formulation and implementation. A party that does this can become a crucial element in the political system and perform a wide range of functions such as integrating the citizen body with the ruling elite in a common policy process, accommodating the demands of rising social groups, aggregating diverse interests, and asserting control over the formulation of governmental policy. But the PPP did not come anywhere near acquiring such a pivotal role in the Pakistani political system under Bhutto. Indeed, the policies followed by Bhutto with regard to the party did not enhance the likelihood of the PPP's even approaching such a position. This meant that the crucial function of communicating political demands in the political system through the party as a middle level organisation linking government and citizenry, was, in the case of the PPP, weakly performed, at best. This had important repercussions, for it resulted in a greater dependency of the Bhutto regime on the bureaucratic instruments of rule. This signified a continuity with the Viceregal pattern of governance, in the sense of relying primarily on bureaucratic instruments rather than representative institutions.

Viewed from a broader perspective, Bhutto's failure at middle-range institutionalisation had far reaching consequences for both regime stability and the development of the Pakistani polity. That the emergence of stable middle range institutions, such as political parties, have an important bearing on the establishment of a stable political equilibrium has been the subject of many studies of political development and decay.<sup>18</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, for instance,

suggests that instability and political decay in transitional societies often results from an absence of strong political institutions.<sup>19</sup> Thus if a leader fails to understand the 'organisational imperative' or as in Bhutto's case, fails to act on it, the consequences can be disastrous. The crisis of 1977 and the subsequent military coup that toppled Bhutto amply attests, in our opinion, to the validity of this hypothesis. As Huntington has pointed out a situation of high politicisation and low institutionalisation provides fertile ground for military intervention. The crisis of 1977 represented this kind of situation. Thus "when Chairman Bhutto needed a party, he found to his dismay that there was practically none."<sup>20</sup> The Bhutto regime's inability to deal with the situation produced by the aftermath of the March election was in large part, due to Bhutto's failure or unwillingness to develop the PPP into an effective institution. In this sense, the 1977 crisis which culminated in the coup d'état of July can be viewed as largely reaffirming Huntington's thesis that the "causes which produce military intervention....lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society."<sup>21</sup> Viewed from this perspective Bhutto's failure to develop the PPP into an effective political institution was an important factor which paved the way for military intervention and contributed to the demise of his regime.

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NOTES

1. Pakistan Times; 23 November 1975, 1.
2. At the Sind PPP Convention in December 1973, it had been promised that a new constitution would be ready by March 1974. See Dawn, 31 December 1971.

3. Dawn, 20 January 1975, 3.
4. Dawn, 2 January 1976, 6.
5. Interviews with PPP leaders, October 1979.
6. 'PPP Manifesto: Who's Writing What', View Point, 30 January 1976, p. 7.
7. Dawn, 3 August 1976, 1,5.
8. Dawn, 5 August 1976, 7.
9. Pakistan Times, 5 October 1976, 8.
10. Far East Economic Review, 14 January 1977, p. 27.
11. ViewPoint, 4 June 1976, p. 5.
12. "Mr. Chairman Sir, Save the PPP", ViewPoint, 13 August 1976, pp. 7,8,9.
13. Pakistan Times, 5 November 1976, 8.
14. 'Back to the Biradari System', ViewPoint, 12 November, 1976, pp. 1,2.
15. Pakistan Times, 8 December 1976, 8.
16. One has only to go through the lists of the new office-bearers published in several issues of Pakistan Times in December 1976 - January 1977, to estimate the dominance of 'notables'.
17. Pakistan Times, 13 December 1976, 1,7.
18. The best amongst these remain, J. La Polambara and M. Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), and S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
19. Ibid, pp. 192-263.
20. ViewPoint, 5 August 1977, p. 12.
21. Ibid, p. 196.

## IX

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of government-opposition, inter-party relations under the Bhutto regime, with a view to assessing the kind of political structure that emerged in Bhutto's 'New Pakistan'. An important theme of this chapter is the nature of the political opposition in Pakistan under Bhutto and how it was perceived by the party in power. The main conclusion reached here is not a surprising one in view of Pakistan's past political experience (see chapter I, and below). We find that the Bhutto regime while espousing principles of open, democratic and competitive politics, instituted policies that crippled the freedom of political expression through narrowing and then eliminating the scope for opposition activity. Such policies, whether termed 'authoritarian' or designated as tendencies towards setting up a one-party state, involved a concentration of executive power and disregard for parliamentary institutions on the one hand, and the suppression of opposition activity on the other hand. Inasmuch as the PPP regime placed severe restrictions on political participation<sup>1</sup> and gave precedence<sup>1</sup> to executive instruments of rule over representative institutions (parliament), it can be viewed as continuing an important element of the Viceregal tradition. The PPP regime sought to monopolise power through suppressing the opposition parties, which it viewed as disruptive of national

stability and often, also as inimical to national integrity. This perception of the political opposition, as we shall see below, was not always justified by the facts. Nevertheless, the PPP regime's policy of suppression, produced a desperate opposition, which, deprived of all channels of legitimate political action resorted in the wake of a disputed general election, to bringing about the downfall of the Bhutto government through the only method that was likely to succeed - a military coup d'etat.

The plan of this chapter is as follows: we will consider first, the notion of 'opposition', and then examine this in the context of Pakistan's cultural and historical tradition. Such a background is considered necessary for understanding PPP/opposition relations, not only because, as we shall see below, government/opposition conflicts centred on issues (e.g. provincial autonomy, religion ) that have plagued all successive governments since the country's inception, but also because elements in the Pakistani political culture and structure have produced a tradition of intolerance of opposition. Thus we will give a brief resume of the country's historical tradition relating to these inter-provincial rivalries and religious controversies that in the past, made inter-elite consensus-building difficult.

Bhutto's personal beliefs and attitude towards 'opposition' are equally important in order to understand his policies of centralisation and restrictions on the opposition; hence some space will be devoted to this

within the context of the situation he faced on assuming power before undertaking an analysis of how the PPP dealt with political opposition and its consequences for regime-stability.

#### THE NOTION OF 'OPPOSITION'

The process of opposition may be regarded as a universal one, characteristic of all political systems, but its importance and the forms which it takes vary widely from country to country and from period to period. The notion of an institutionalised, recognised and 'loyal opposition' has become an integral part of western liberal democracies. However, as Robert Dahl has shown in his study of political opposition in the leading liberal democracies, this notion is a relatively recent and rare phenomenon in historical experience.<sup>2</sup> The studies edited by Dahl also show that even where opposition is an integral and legitimate part of the political system, the patterns differ fundamentally. The nature of opposition and the forms of its expression in communist states are markedly different. The crucial difference between communist and western regimes is that in the former, rival political parties are not permitted either by law or custom.<sup>3</sup> This does not make such regimes "oppositionless", but as Leonard Schapiro has demonstrated in his study of political opposition in communist one-party states,<sup>4</sup> 'opposition' takes other forms and expresses itself in a variety of ways, such as 'power struggles' within the higher echelons of party and/or government, or 'pragmatic

dissent' constantly exercised as a means of pressure by scientists and professional experts.<sup>5</sup>

The new states of Asia and Africa present a variegated picture with respect to the nature and forms of opposition. Many of these states began their independent political career with their political structures modelled on the pattern of the political system of the departing colonial power, i.e. on the pattern of the western parliamentary liberal democracies. Indeed, the colonial rulers themselves introduced some form of parliamentary government. However, as has been noted by numerous studies of post-independence political developments in new states, the great majority of these states soon departed from the western parliamentary pattern and chose for themselves different modes of government, which varied from country to country in the nature and degree of competitiveness permitted, and in their tolerance of opposition.<sup>6</sup> In very few of these states, was 'opposition' accepted as an integral and legitimate part of the political system.<sup>7</sup> This did not always mean that authority was exercised without a sense of responsibility or without channels of communication between the governor and governed; it did mean that the leaders of these states regarded the notion of institutionalised opposition as practised in western democracies as somewhat alien to their way of conducting the business of government. In some of these states politics was still competitive, but dissent was no longer expressed through the channel of public opposition parties.<sup>8</sup> In some of the African one-party



states, as for instance Tanzania, it was found that 'opposition' was expressed within the 'open' structure of a single party.<sup>9</sup> In some instances, the federal structure was seen as providing an important outlet for the expression of 'opposition', thus contributing, even though rival competing parties were outlawed, to the process of consensual and competitive politics.

Amongst the few states in Asia that permitted opposition to exist in a public and institutional form, but where one party dominated the political system, such as India (until the Emergency in 1975), the nature and function of opposition was quite different from that in western parliamentary democracies. In the 'Congress system' that prevailed in India in the first three decades of its existence,<sup>10</sup> 'opposition' was expressed in the competition for power and status within the dominant party, as well as in the attempts by the opposition parties to influence sections within the Congress.<sup>11</sup> Thus, as Morris-Jones has pointed out:

"the opposition parties neither alternate with the Congress in the exercise of power, nor do they share power in any coalition form; rather they operate by conversing with sections of Congress itself." 12

Although the 'Congress system' no longer exists in India in this form as a consequence of the defeat of the Congress in the 1977 election, a continuing feature of the Indian political system (notwithstanding the brief period of Indira Gandhi's Emergency Rule) is its competitive nature and its acceptance of political opposition as a legitimate activity. Many characteristics of India's history and

culture have informed this tolerance of dissent and opposition, and enabled it to develop what has been called 'a consensual style' in dealing with problems and issues.<sup>13</sup>

Within South Asia, Sri Lanka, like India, has adapted and operated the parliamentary model of competitive politics reasonably well. The habit of toleration as well as a measure of agreement over a fairly wide range of fundamentals have helped to establish the notion of opposition as a legitimate form of activity.<sup>14</sup> In marked contrast, no such tradition has developed in Pakistan. Indeed, intolerance of opposition has been a feature of all governments - civilian and military - in Pakistan from the time of independence. Several elements in Pakistan's history and culture help to explain this tradition. We turn therefore towards a consideration of these structural and cultural characteristics.

#### THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL LEGACY: THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE

Since 1947 the concept of public tranquillity in the country has been understood by those in power to include suppression of political adversaries who were often designated as 'trouble makers'. Successive governments frequently equated opposition with treason. This habit of intolerance of opposition can, to a large extent, be explained by a number of factors. Of these, the first relates to Pakistan's colonial heritage. The British colonial system in India had many facets, but it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the imperial legacy was

strong in the instruments and lessons of control and administration and comparatively weak in the practices and institutions of representative government. This seemed to apply even more to the areas that came to constitute Pakistan. As one writer has correctly suggested:

"The strongest traditions and structures of politics that were inherited by Pakistan were autocratic and Viceregal."<sup>15</sup>

The areas comprising Pakistan were those which had little experience in even the limited self-rule introduced by the British in India. For instance, the North West Frontier Province was ruled as a special area till the mid-Thirties, while Baluchistan had no representative government of any sort during the entire period of British rule. As we saw earlier (see chapter I) the provinces that constituted Pakistan were ruled (with the exception of Bengal) as 'non-Regulation' provinces, a system that was authoritarian and barely conducive to the development of a democratic participatory culture. Thus the areas that constituted Pakistan were little accustomed to representative institutions.

Another aspect of Pakistan's pre-partition history that helps to explain the tradition of intolerance relates to the particular manner in which the Muslim nationalist struggle under the Muslim League developed in the sub-continent. The Muslim League claimed to be the sole representative of Muslims - in contrast the Congress party considered itself the sole representative of all Indians, regardless of community. Congress accepted any groups which favoured independence, no matter what methods they

wanted to use or what kind of society they envisaged after independence; it even permitted them to maintain their identity. The League tolerated only those groups or individuals who supported the idea of Pakistan. Nationalist Muslims who were anti-British but who advocated independence but not a Pakistani state, were not only excluded from the League, but viewed as 'traitors' to the cause of the Muslim Community. The attitude thus formed towards the opposition continued in the post-independence period and was reflected in the League's exclusivist claim to rule. Undoubtedly the position of the League, a minority group uncertain as to whether it would obtain its demands for a separate state from the British had a profound effect upon its attitude towards diversity.

The League's position as a minority group also conditioned its attitude towards parliamentary institutions. While in India and Ceylon the struggle of the nationalist movements centred on demands for greater participation by Indians and Ceylonese in representative institutions, i.e. the struggle for parliamentary government was part of the struggle for independence - the Muslim leaders were long wary of what would happen if India gained a democratic government. Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan argued in the late nineteenth century that the application of the principles of representative and parliamentary government in Indian society would mean the permanent subordination of the Muslim minority to the Hindu majority. Therefore, unless the special position

of the Muslims was secured, and ultimately unless the British granted a separate state to the Muslims, the strengthening of parliamentary institutions meant a weakening of the Muslim position vis à vis the Hindu. The Muslim League, consequently, was perhaps less enthusiastic about parliamentary institutions as either the Indian National Congress or the Ceylonese nationalist leaders. In addition, the Muslim League did not have as much experience in running provincial governments as did the Congress Party, which ran seven provincial governments from 1937 to 1939. or the Ceylon National Congress, many of whose members had been in the Assembly for twenty years. Muslim leaders who did have some experience in running provincial governments - as for instance Sir Sikander Hayat Khan in Punjab - were in parties which, prior to 1947, were in provincial opposition to the League. All these factors, undoubtedly affected the character of the Pakistan political system and the place of opposition within that emerged after independence.

If there was little in Pakistan's colonial heritage that can be seen as aiding the growth of representative institutions, there was equally little in the Pakistani culture to have encouraged a habit of tolerance of opposition. Two aspects of political culture that have a bearing on the tradition of intolerance need to be noted briefly. Firstly, the predominantly rural feudal nature of Pakistani society gives rise to a political culture in which the notion of opposition as a

legitimate activity, is not readily accepted. In Pakistan's rural-dominated political culture, the accepted norms of resolving disputes do not exclude violence. Indeed, physical violence against rivals/opponents is part of the landlords' customary conduct, enabling him to maintain his prestige and honour among peers and clients who would lose faith in him if they were to know that he was weaker than his rivals. Thus it is not difficult to see why such a cultural environment has not encouraged the development of habits of tolerance of opposition and dissent.

Another aspect of political culture that can to some extent explain the tradition of intolerance relates to its Islamic ethos. Although in general Quranic doctrine preaches tolerance, aspects of Islamic teaching and tradition have produced a tendency towards authoritarianism. The controversy within the Islamic world as to whether western constitutional/representative government is compatible with Islam need not detain us here.<sup>16</sup> It is sufficient to note that Islam emphasises the essential unity of all Muslims, which results in a unitary rather than a pluralist conception of politics. Thus when leaders like Ayub and General Zia have proclaimed the incompatibility of Islam with multi-party politics, they have (whatever their political motives) stressed albeit in exaggerated form a central tenet of the Islamic faith - the notion of unity of the Islamic community or umma. One writer in contrasting the differing experiences of India and Pakistan explains thus:

"The integrative capacity of Congress first as a national movement, and since independence as a political party, is analogous to the integrative capacity of Hinduism and its notion of many paths to truth; the League's incapacity to integrate diversity and its history of destroying competition are analogous to the schismatic tradition of Islam which acknowledges only one path to truth, the truth given by Allah, and the need for submission." 17

In addition, as the history of Islamic states amply demonstrates, the weight of Islamic tradition (as distinct from teachings of the Quran and Sunnah) is on the side of concentration of authority in the hands of one man. These elements in Islamic teaching and tradition have undoubtedly influenced and conditioned Pakistani political culture, contributing to the tendency to authoritarianism and intolerance of opposition.

As is evident from the discussion above, conditions that may have encouraged the development of representative institutions along with an acceptance of the notion of opposition as a legitimate activity, were not present in Pakistani history and culture. However, as Morris-Jones has suggested

"no 'objective' variable has an importance comparable to one of a more subjective kind: the degree of serious commitment to liberal democracy on the part of those in charge in the formative stage of a new state." 18

When one looks at the record of Pakistan's founding fathers, it appears to be a poor one from the point of view of encouraging representative institutions and establishing a tradition of tolerance of opposition. However, as we shall see below, this was due to a number of factors, of

which the "degree of serious commitment" was undoubtedly an important one. Of these factors, one related to the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's birth. A nation born out of the fear of Hindu domination found that its psychological insecurity did not disappear with partition. Indeed the widespread disruption which accompanied partition only heightened its sense of insecurity and had an immediate and permanent impact on the perceptions of Pakistan's rulers. It encouraged a 'seige' mentality, mutual suspicion, an intolerance of opposition and a tendency to interpret all dissent as disruptive, the result of a conspiracy and foreign inspired. Irri-dentist claims by Afghanistan based on the ethnic similarity of tribes on both sides of the border and calling for a 'Pakhtunistan', homeland of the Pathans (discussed below), only served to confirm the fears of Pakistani leaders that "Pakistan was surrounded on all sides by forces which were out to destroy her."<sup>19</sup> Jinnah, himself, in his speeches, repeatedly identified all opposition activity with an external enemy, i.e. India.<sup>20</sup> Thus when General Yahya called the Awami League leadership in East Pakistan 'traitors' and 'agents of India',<sup>21</sup> he was following a tradition set by none other than Jinnah himself.

Another factor that conditioned the response of Pakistan's founding fathers towards representative institutions was the belief - given the economic and administrative dislocations caused by the partition - that the first need of the country was 'strong' government, not an effective political system. Pragmatic considerations of



political survival also lay behind such a belief, since many of the leaders of Pakistan in the formative stage came from areas that did not form part of Pakistan. Leaders, who, like Liaqat Ali Khan, found themselves without constituencies in Pakistan, were hardly likely to press urgently for a system of representative government that could have challenged their leadership positions.

Attitudes of intolerance can also be traced to Jinnah's practice of identifying the party of independence, the Muslim League, with the state.<sup>22</sup> Anyone who stood against the League was called a traitor or a quisling by Jinnah.<sup>23</sup> Since the Muslim League perceived itself as representing the entire Muslim nation, opposition was ruled out as anti-national. Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, even went to the extent of denigrating parliament by pronouncing that the council of the Muslim League carried

"more weight than the Parliament .....  
its (Muslim League's) strength is equal  
to the existence and strength of Pakistan!"<sup>24</sup>

The League's exclusivist claim to rule was conditioned by the belief both Jinnah and Liaqat shared, that western-style, competitive politics was a luxury Pakistan could not afford.<sup>25</sup> The seeds of an authoritarian tendency were quietly but firmly set by none other than Pakistan's founding fathers. Jinnah and Liaqat centralised all power in the executive and used this against political opponents.<sup>26</sup> The elimination of dissent was exemplified by such legislation as the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA) 1949, the Security of Pakistan

Act of 1952, the frequent interventions of the central government in provincial affairs, the banning of the opposition party in the NWFP, the Khuda-i-Khidmatgar (popularly known as the 'Red Shirts') and the Communist party.

Clearly then, Pakistan's colonial and cultural heritage together with the practices of its founding fathers, helped to establish a tradition of intolerance of opposition. Subsequent regimes followed in this tradition and reinforced the authoritarian tendency. But what lay behind the attempts of successive regimes, from Jinnah onwards, to curb and restrain opposition activity, was their repeated failure to resolve the two major problems that have beset the country since its inception. These are the provincial autonomy issue which centred around the need to establish amicable mutually satisfying working relationships between the centre and the provinces (how much provincial autonomy against how much centralisation) and the religious issue, i.e. the role of Islam in the state. The settlement of these two issues was closely related to the larger problem of creating a national identity which could transcend provincialism and become rooted in positive rather than negative concepts (such as the fear of Hindu domination that had formed the motive force of the demand for Pakistan). The provincial autonomy issue reflected Pakistan's ethnic diversity and brought to the fore difficulties associated with the assimilation of the six major linguistic groups (Bengalis, Punjabis, Baluchis, Pathans, Muhajirs and Sindhis) into

a single national identity. On the other hand the 'Islamic' issue reflected the clash of two value systems, the 'modern' secular and the traditional, Ulema-dominated Islamist, and manifested itself as a struggle between ulema and secular oriented politicians on the role of Islam in a state that had come into being on the basis of religious nationalism.<sup>27</sup> Successive political and constitutional crises since 1947 arose from a continued lack of consensus over these issues.<sup>28</sup> Successive regimes were characterised by their tendency to provoke but not control sub-national, ethnic, and religious group controversy. Since these two issues formed the major source of conflict between successive governments and opposition, they need to be outlined briefly prior to a consideration of PPP/opposition relations. This is not to suggest that personal rivalries and struggles within elites did not play any part in engendering conflicts between governments and oppositions. Indeed the cleavages that gave rise to opposition were often personal ones among the elites. Here, however, we are concerned with focussing upon the more 'stable' opposition groups, that have been a continuing feature in Pakistan's history - i.e. those that have been generated by social or cultural groups - regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious.

One of the continuing tragedies of Pakistani politics was the failure to establish a permanent, mutually satisfying working relationship between the Centre and the provinces. The 'provincial problem' involved the demands for greater autonomy by the four linguistic regions of

Bengal, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan from what the regional leadership of these provinces saw as a Punjabi-Muhajir dominated centre.<sup>29</sup> Provincial leaders from these regions blamed their economic and cultural troubles on the Punjab and tried to nurture anti-Punjabi sentiments in their regions. The response of successive central governments from that led by Jinnah through Bogra's upto Yahya Khan's regime was to view such demands as running counter to the ethos of Muslim nationalism, i.e. that the Muslims composed a single nation. This is best exemplified in a speech made by Jinnah:

"(Provincialism) was a disease and a curse.....I want the Muslims to rid themselves of the disease of provincialism. A nation can never make progress unless it marches in one formation." 30

It is relevant to point out that central leaders, even when they were non-Punjabi (Liaquat, Ayub, Yahya, and later Bhutto) recognised that maxim of Pakistani politics: "He who controls Punjab, controls Pakistan", and attempted to represent Punjabi interests. The Sindhi, Bengali, Baluchi and Pathan elites' attempt at self-assertion was met with greater centralisation of power by successive Punjabi-dominated central governments. Thus regional and provincial dissatisfaction with central government policies and the attempts of the central government to control political opposition based upon regional movements have been central to the history of Pakistan.<sup>31</sup>

The major challenge to central authorities came from regionally-based opposition parties in East Pakistan

(the Awami League) and from protagonists of 'Pakhtunistan' in the west. The demands for provincial autonomy from Bengali regionalists has been dealt with in some detail in Chapter IV.<sup>32</sup> In West Pakistan inter-provincial tensions arose between central authorities and Pakhtun leaders of Baluchistan and the NWFP, and focused around the 'Pakhtunistan' issue. Pakhtunistan was at once an irri-dentist as well as a regional movement. Both aspects deserve to be noted briefly. Before partition, the demand for Pakhtunistan, i.e. an independent homeland for the Pathans,<sup>33</sup> was raised by Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars (popularly known as the Red Shirts) and the Wrore Pashtoon movement in the Pushto speaking areas of Baluchistan led by Abdul Samad Achakzai.<sup>34</sup> As a leading Congressite of the Frontier, Ghaffar Khan had opposed the partition of Pakistan.<sup>35</sup> After boycotting the referendum held in the NWFP in 1947 to decide its political affiliation (which gave a verdict in favour of Pakistan) Ghaffar Khan modified his position on Pakhtunistan saying that it meant autonomy for the Pakhtuns within the framework of Pakistan. Autonomy was felt to be indispensable for the Pakhtuns in order to escape Punjabi domination. From Jinnah onwards, successive regimes in Pakistan viewed Ghaffar Khan's activities with suspicion, which were only accentuated by his ambivalent stance towards Pakistan.<sup>36</sup> Successive governments dealt harshly with him, keeping him in jail intermittently for 15 years, and finally forcing him to seek political asylum in Afghanistan in December 1964. His party was banned in 1948 while attempts were made to neutralise his influence in frontier politics by utilising the

services of Ghaffar's premier political foe in the Frontier, Qayyum Khan, who headed the Frontier Muslim League and became chief minister of the NWFP after the dismissal of Ghaffar Khan's ministry by Jinnah in 1947.<sup>37</sup> The issue of Pakhtun autonomy was consequently never seriously faced in Pakistan's first two decades. Successive governments tried to handle it by suppressing its advocates and by integrating the NWFP into the unified province of West Pakistan in 1955 ('one-unit'<sup>38</sup>). Neither approach achieved its desired end. Indeed, 'one-unit' merely stirred the embers of anti-Punjabi sentiment in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan and led directly to the formation of the National Party of Pakistan in which the Red Shirts coalesced with five other regional parties from Sind and Baluchistan in opposition to 'one-unit'.<sup>39</sup>

After several transformations, Ghaffar's party was reconstituted in 1967 as the National Awami Party led by his son, Wali Khan.<sup>40</sup> The suspicion with which central authorities viewed Ghaffar were now transferred to his son, as his organisation was regarded as the direct lineal descendent of the Red Shirts. Harsh central government action continued to characterise relations between successive regimes and the regional opposition in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Pointing to the tribal nature of both the NWFP and Baluchistan, and the fact that historically Pakhtun and Baluch tribes had always tried to resist conquest or integration within a larger nation,<sup>41</sup> central leaders from Jinnah to Ayub maintained that the demand for provincial autonomy did not reflect progressive nationalism but

rather medieval particularism.<sup>42</sup> It was this equation of Pakhtun/Baluch demands with tribal resistance to central authority that led Ayub Khan (and later Bhutto) to justify the despatch of troops to Baluchistan in 1958.<sup>43</sup>

The irridentist aspect of 'Pakhtunistan' became evident at the time of partition when Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's entry to the United Nations and declared its support for Pakhtunistan,<sup>44</sup> although Afghan interests in the area go back into the nineteenth century.<sup>45</sup> The transnational dispersion of the Baluchis and particularly the Pakhtuns across the Afghan border encouraged the Afghanistan government to press irridentist claims against Pakistan, as exemplified in the Afghan demand for the creation of a 'Pakhtunistan'.<sup>46</sup> The Pakhtunistan issue became even more complex in 1955 when the Soviet Union expressed support of Afghan claims.<sup>47</sup> A further complicating factor was Pakistan's contention that India was giving both moral and financial support to Afghan efforts regarding 'Pakhtunistan'.<sup>48</sup> The attitude of the Afghan government itself has varied from time to time and from one regime to another. At times it has given loud and vocal support to the conception of Pakhtunistan and eulogised Ghaffar Khan as its main champion, while occasionally the official attitude toward 'Pakhtunistan' seemed to cool.<sup>49</sup> Details of such developments need not detain us here. It is sufficient to note that the irridentist aspect of the issue made regional parties like the NAP doubly suspect. The perceptions of central leaders of the 'regional threat' always appeared to be closely associated with the

international dimension of the problem accentuating the above-mentioned fears of dismemberment of the country. It was these perceptions that, for instance, lay behind Yahya Khan's banning of the NAP in 1971.

The other issue, apart from regionalism, that successive regimes faced, was that of Islam. The debate over the role of Islam in the state was perhaps conducted with less intensity than that over 'provincial autonomy', but nevertheless the continuing, occasionally violent contention between the modernists and traditionalists was a critical factor in relations between successive governments and oppositions in Pakistani political history. The struggle for Pakistan was led by 'modernist' lawyer-politicians rather than 'traditionalist' ulema. Indeed some sections of the latter had opposed the creation of Pakistan on the doctrinal ground that true Islam had no territorial bounds and hence secular nationalism was incompatible with Islam. The leaders of the Pakistan movement had advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an axiom, but exactly what this implied in terms of 'Islamic statehood' was not stressed at the time. After the achievement of a state that was predicated on the basis of its Islamic identity, political leaders in Pakistan were faced with the problem of defining the role of Islam in the structures of the new state. The leading personalities who dominated national decision-making from Jinnah onwards were for the most part westernised and secular, seeking to reinterpret Islam in terms of contemporary conditions rather than to fit society to the



doctrines of religion. Thus Jinnah declared that he wanted a democratic constitution, incorporating "the essential principles of Islam" but Pakistan would not be a "theocracy or anything like it",<sup>50</sup> "to be ruled by priests with a divine mission."<sup>51</sup> As one scholar has stated,

"after the creation of Pakistan, its ruling elite was content to see that Pakistan had an external Islamic personality, but that government was run on lines as close to British Indian secular principles as possible." 52

In contrast stood the traditionalist religious leaders (the ulema) and the non-ulema Islamic reformers (like Maudoodi) who demanded the establishment of an Islamic state, and the restructuring of society in accordance with Islamic precepts. Although there was often little agreement amongst them on the nature of the Islamic state they wished to establish or in their approach towards problems like secular democracy and the rights of property, there was a measure of consensus on the need to establish a regime similar to what used to obtain in the early days of Islam - a demand, therefore, for a rigorous return to classical standards. Such religious fundamentalism thus formed a major source of opposition to successive regimes in Pakistan. Through political organisations such as the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the Ulema sought to exert pressure on the ruling elites. The latter on their part, aware of the dangers of being denounced as un-Islamic and yet unable to concede to fundamentalist demands continually wavered between

accommodation and repression of such groups.

The nature of such opposition is best exemplified in the religious fundamentalism of the most well-organised of the Islamic parties, the Jamaat.<sup>53</sup> Under Maudoodi's leadership, the Jamaat has advocated a fundamental transformation of Pakistani society in accordance with classical Islamic doctrine (as interpreted by Maudoodi). In particular, the Jamaat has expressed its distrust of both western parliamentary methods and western-educated political elites in effecting such a transformation. Maudoodi, for instance, believed that only men with intensely religious personal lives could be trusted to rule the country.<sup>54</sup> Otherwise, he questioned

vi "who will build the required Islamic atmosphere? Can an irreligious state with westernised persons at the helm do the job? Will the architects who are all versed only in building bars and cinémas spend their energies in erecting a mosque? If the answer is affirmative, it will indeed be a unique experiment in human history. Godlessness fostering Godliness to dethrone itself." 55

Inasmuch as the Jamaat is committed to a fundamental alteration of the Pakistani political system, its opposition closely resembles what has been referred to elsewhere as 'integral'<sup>56</sup> or 'structural' opposition.<sup>57</sup> It was such opposition which brought the Jamaat into conflict with successive regimes. In 1953, Maudoodi was sentenced to death for inciting religious disturbances, although the sentence was later commuted.<sup>58</sup> In 1964, the Ayub regime banned the party and imprisoned Maudoodi on charges of 'subversive activities against the state.'

What emerges from our discussion of political opposition above is a clear and unbroken tradition of intolerance of opposition on the part of both civilian and military regimes and the accompanying suppression of it throughout Pakistani political history. Thus, when Bhutto achieved political power, Pakistan's twenty-five year heritage was one of varying degrees of authoritarianism. Clearly, it was difficult to see that these trends could be reversed.

#### BHUTTO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OPPOSITION

Bhutto's attitude towards opposition and democracy did not suggest that he would seek to reverse the trends outlined above. Indeed many aspects of his personal beliefs/perceptions establish him firmly within the historical tradition described above. Since many of Bhutto's personal beliefs have been discussed earlier (see chapters II and VI) it is necessary here only to briefly recall some of these.

Bhutto's preference for a centralised and authoritarian political system became evident when he was a member of the Ayub regime, and particularly in the advice that he had given in his capacity as a member of the cabinet sub-committee set up in 1962 to examine the report of the constitution commission.<sup>59</sup> Bhutto had argued for an authoritarian one-party system in which the roles of the judicial and legislative branches of government were to be completely subservient to an all-powerful central authority. As Burki points out in his study, a

number of Bhutto's close party followers, aware of his advice to Ayub, nevertheless expected that the 1968-69 political movement would have converted him into a democrat who, when placed in power would bring about the return of representative democratic institutions to Pakistan.<sup>60</sup> Certainly Bhutto encouraged this belief, and in his campaign against the Ayub regime and during the elections of 1970, he often spoke of the need for open, democratic and competitive politics. In 1969, challenging his own imprisonment under a preventive detention law, he presented a glowing defence of democratic rights before the Lahore High Court in the following manner:

"Yes, my Lords, democracy is certainly, ... like a breath of fresh air, like the fragrance of a spring flower.....But more than a feeling, democracy is fundamental rights, it is adult franchise, the secrecy of the ballot, free press, free association, independence of the judiciary, supremacy of the legislature, controls on the executive and other related conditions which are conspicuously absent in the (present) regime's system."<sup>61</sup>

The Foundation Documents and later the Election Manifesto of the PPP promised democratic politics. "Democracy is our polity" formed the second avowed principle of the party.

But such assertions of commitment to representative institutions remained largely on the level of rhetoric. And they appeared to be inconsistent with Bhutto's other statements in which he strongly expressed his distaste for western-style democracy, holding that this was not "suited to our genius."<sup>62</sup> Indeed Bhutto frequently spoke of a 'disciplined' democracy<sup>63</sup> which he felt was more appropriate to the 'peculiar conditions of a backward

country'<sup>64</sup> - an idea strongly reminiscent of Iskander Mirza's 'controlled democracy' and Ayub's 'guided democracy'. Bhutto was informed by his learning and experience to hold the view that the country could only be governed by a determined and, if need be, ruthless leader.<sup>65</sup> According to him, Pakistan had historically five of the most "difficult provinces" to govern: "the peoples of these provinces were more individualistic, society was more tribal, every individual wanted to exercise a veto."<sup>66</sup> Such a country needed "firmness", not unfettered democracy.<sup>67</sup> Thus, Bhutto, like his predecessors, saw the first need of the country as 'strong government' rather than representative institutions. For Bhutto, the 'peculiar conditions' of the country compelled the use of forceful measures.

Thus he declared:

"If they (i.e. the opposition) expect that I am sitting in Westminster, well I am not sitting in Westminster, I am sitting in Pakistan, and I know how our politics go... .;;to expect in our conditions a kind of politics of lavender and lace, it is being unrealistic.....if ruthless measures are required, I have no hesitation in taking them....I am not a half-measure man." 68

The need for discipline was reinforced in Bhutto's mind by the events of 1971. Given Pakistan's ethnic diversity, to allow unfettered democracy would only bring to fore, divisive provincial sentiments.<sup>69</sup> Such, Bhutto believed, had been Yahya's mistake in allowing unrestricted political activity during the election campaign period in 1970.<sup>70</sup> "The result" according to Bhutto, "was the division of the country."<sup>71</sup> Pakistan was not yet sufficiently 'politically mature' to permit undisciplined

democracy,<sup>72</sup> for this would only "let loose....all the emotional questions, all the hatred, all the wild allegations" intrinsic in a backward country.<sup>73</sup> It would take time for "the democratic set-up to take root"; until then stability has to be ensured through 'controls' and 'firmness'.<sup>74</sup>

Bhutto's preference for strong centre, so dramatically illustrated during the East Pakistan crisis (see chapter IVa), indicated that his approach towards the question of provincial autonomy would not be significantly different from that of previous regimes. Indeed, the secession of Bangladesh gave further impetus to Bhutto's fears regarding the further disintegration of the country through the secession of the NWFP and Baluchistan. But more importantly, it perhaps reinforced Bhutto's perception that political opponents who represented regional interests were actually involved in treasonable conspiracies. This is borne out by the following statement made by him in 1975:

"When I talk about these intrigues I am not dramatising the situation.....Only four years ago our country was dismembered and that dismemberment was due to internal and external conspiracies.....These conspiracies and those involved in them are still active....against this background our vigilance has to continue unabated and we shall not allow it to be eroded by accepting a concept of political permissiveness which would allow anti-state elements to work for the disintegration of Pakistan." 75

Bhutto's attitude towards his political opponents was one that scarcely revealed a tolerant approach. Prior to assuming power, Bhutto characterised his opponents as

hypocrites, intriguers, cowards, and above all, as traitors.<sup>76</sup> While it may be suggested that such characterisations of his opponents as traitors to the country may not have reflected any deep-seated belief on the part of Bhutto but merely political tactics to discredit and defame rivals, nevertheless such characterisations reveal an attitude that was essentially antagonistic rather than tolerant. Bhutto scarcely disguised what he himself described as an "intellectual contempt" for the opposition.<sup>77</sup> He found bargaining and negotiations tiresome with members of the opposition whom he found 'mentally inferior', "senile and completely decrepit."<sup>78</sup> His contempt for opposition leaders was frequently reiterated in his speeches; he often referred to them as "hollow men,"<sup>79</sup> "devoid of imagination", and "bankrupt of principles".<sup>80</sup> In the past, there was little evidence of any cooperative activity between Bhutto and opponent parties. Bhutto had resolutely refused to cooperate with any party (except for a limited period with Bhashani's NAP) during the anti-Ayub agitation<sup>81</sup> and subsequently. Indeed during the events leading up to the Bangladesh crisis, his party had stood alone, while his West Pakistani opponents, at some time or the other, extended their support to Mujib's Awami League.<sup>82</sup> This fact was not lost on Bhutto. Later he frequently and bitterly recalled how "The rejected parties of the West wing, smarting with defeat, inveighed bitterly against the People's Party" and had supported the Awami League.<sup>83</sup> Thus, not only was there a complete absence of any record of cooperative activity between Bhutto

and other parties/leaders, but a schism had developed which only widened with time. Such a background - characterised by bitterness and mistrust - was bound to have an impact on government-opposition relations once Bhutto was in power.

A number of writers have attempted to explain Bhutto's proclivities for authoritarianism in terms of an "intense personal insecurity" which resulted from the fact that he was born into an aristocratic Muslim family from a woman of low social origins who had been converted to Islam from Hinduism.<sup>84</sup> Writers like Burki and Taseer have also suggested that Bhutto inherited his autocratic nature from the social class that he belonged to - the Sindh wadera - a class that remained authoritarian in outlook. The position taken in this study is somewhat different. Our contention is that Bhutto's preference for an authoritarian political system is to be understood not in terms of contradiction in his character, but as an expression of his beliefs, outlined above, as well as his political strategy in the face of constraints imposed by the political environment, discussed below.

#### PPP AND OPPOSITION: THE POLITICS OF CONTROL AND SUPPRESSION

Despite its emergence as the pre-eminent political organisation in the election of 1970, the PPP assumed governmental power very much limited by its political environment. The party had achieved electoral success in only two of the four provinces of Pakistan - Baluchistan and NWFP having rejected the PPP for the NAP and JUI.



On an all-Pakistan basis, the PPP had received only 38% of the popular vote with the rest going to the opposition parties. Even in the Punjab, which Bhutto frequently described as the "bastion of power" in the country, the PPP's support base in terms of actual vote percentages was not as secure as was perhaps indicated by the percentage of seats gained (see above, Table III.6). Indeed, although the PPP emerged as the majority party in both Sind and Punjab, yet the combined vote of the opposition parties was higher than the PPP's in Punjab and only slightly lower in Sind. This suggested the extent of opposition strength and the constraints that this situation was perceived as imposing on the Bhutto regime's ability to govern. In addition, the circumstances in which Bhutto assumed power were marked by economic and political chaos. (see chapter V ) which imposed its own imperatives, aptly summed up by Bhutto as the task "of picking up the pieces". Relations between the PPP regime and the opposition can thus partly be viewed in terms of the Bhutto regime's increasing concern over the constraints on its ability to rule and its attempt at enhancing its control over a restrictive political environment. Such attempts were increasingly marked by the use of coercion against parties perceived as hampering Bhutto's exercise of power. The PPP regime's perceived need to enhance its capacity to govern became a major reason for its shift to an authoritarian pattern.<sup>85</sup> The PPP regime attempted to narrow and then eliminate the scope for opposition activity, establishing a steady trend towards, what many

observers characterised as a de-facto one-party state within a parliamentary framework.<sup>86</sup>

When Bhutto came to power, ethnic and religious problems posed serious questions about Pakistan's unity. Much depended on arriving at a consensus and establishing amicable relations between Bhutto and opposition parties representing regional/ethnic, religious and other interests. The attitude of the opposition towards the Bhutto government varied from one party to another. Some opposition leaders, like Asghar Khan were sceptical about Bhutto's promise of wanting to "break away from the past and lay the foundation of a just and democratic order in Pakistan."<sup>87</sup> Others, like the Jamaat leaders viewed the new regime with grave apprehension on account of the latter's espoused 'socialist' beliefs.<sup>88</sup> However, it would not be inaccurate to suggest that in general the opposition attitude was one of qualified acceptance of the Bhutto government, i.e. the majority of opposition spokesmen were anxious and willing to cooperate with the new regime on the proviso that the latter would take immediate steps to demonstrate its 'sincerity' for returning the country to a democratic and parliamentary system of government. On the part of some opposition leaders, like Wali Khan, a conciliatory approach was clearly evident initially which was predicated on the belief that after the trauma of Bangla Desh a demonstration of national unity rather than partisan loyalty was the need of the hour.<sup>89</sup>

Drawing on the lessons of past failures at consensus-building, Bhutto was acutely aware of the need to

arrive at some sort of an understanding, especially vis à vis framing a new constitution, with opposition parties.<sup>90</sup> The need for consensus was also urged by his fear of possible military intervention.<sup>91</sup> Bhutto believed that the military would be reluctant to overthrow a political structure that had the support of most political parties. This concern for consensus on the future constitutional order, however, was accompanied by the equally pressing but conflicting need to establish control over the political system in order to enhance his capacity to govern. The compulsion of seeking control was manifested in Bhutto's reluctance either to share power or to allow any dilution of his personal authority. The need for a powerful central figure can to some extent also be attributed to Bhutto's concern with curbing the power of the military, for he believed that only through a strong personalised executive could the military be subjected to civilian control (see chapter X).

The regime's initial steps, thus, reflected this dichotomy between seeking control and consensus, revealing a curious mixture of freedom and control. For instance, the ban on NAP imposed by Yahya Khan was lifted, but legal steps were taken that placed restriction on political activity. Bhutto kept in force the state of emergency with all its preventive detention provisions, and continued martial law for four months using it to silence dissent within his own party.<sup>92</sup> Indeed in the eyes of the opposition Bhutto's initial moves, his lifting of the ban on NAP notwithstanding, were a clear demonstration of his desire

to monopolise power and his insincerity about introducing democracy in the country. Bhutto's appointment of his party men as governors in NWFP and Baluchistan, his reliance on martial law to enact his reforms, his proposal for a 'phased' return to democracy built up opposition suspicion about his intentions in an environment already characterised by an absence of mutual trust. Thus, as early as January 1972, Asghar Khan, a leading member of the opposition announced his resolve to remove Bhutto from power, since the latter had "no intention of restoring democracy."<sup>93</sup> Asghar Khan declared that

"suppression and intolerance has hastened the journey towards a fascist society which Mr. Bhutto ironically appears to have fixed as the ultimate goal for a people who had voted for democracy....."<sup>94</sup>

In similar vein, Wali Khan threatened to withdraw the support he had offered Bhutto,<sup>95</sup> accusing the latter of trying to impose a dictatorship in the country.<sup>96</sup>

The lack of mutual trust was amply demonstrated during negotiations between the PPP and opposition parties over the future constitutional set up throughout 1972. Three 'Accords' between the government and opposition were swiftly broken, with each side accusing the other of broken promises.<sup>97</sup> Given this initial lack of mutual respect and trust and Bhutto's desire for control, government/opposition relations were bound to be stormy, characterised by a lack of restraint on both sides. The PPP regime moved within a small orbit of toleration and repression: as tolerance began to set free the forces of opposition, the regime became fearful and clamped down. In such an

atmosphere it made little difference whether such fears were real or imaginary; because toleration was perceived as sowing the seeds of the regime's destruction, it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The regime in other words, created a self-fulfilling need for repression. In this vicious circle, fear of challenges to its authority to govern led the regime to adopt repressive action, which in turn (as we shall see below) left opposition little choice but to become violent, thus apparently justifying repression after all.<sup>98</sup>

Initially however, Bhutto was able to achieve a measure of consensus, however temporary, with opposition parties which led, first to the adoption of an Interim Constitution in April 1972, and then the Permanent Constitution, which came into effect on Independence Day, 14 August 1973.<sup>99</sup> The Interim Constitution represented a mixture of the Government of India Act (1935) and the Independence Act with some amendments. It offered a peculiar combination of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, with provisions for a strong centre. The President was the central figure in the Interim Constitution, not answerable to the legislature, and possessing sweeping powers - of appointment of governors and other high offices, the right to dismiss or summon the N.A. and the right to assent to all legislation.<sup>100</sup> The political structure under the Interim Constitution was essentially Viceregal. As Burki has also pointed out,

"Bhutto, as President of the republic was vested with the powers that the British viceroys had enjoyed under the crown rule." 101

Governors in the provinces were to be appointed by the President and were responsible to him. The provincial

ministries were made responsible not to the legislatures but to the governors. As in the Ayubian constitution of 1962, the President was given emergency powers whereby he could suspend fundamental rights and legislate on matters reserved for the provinces. It may appear difficult to understand how Bhutto was able to get opposition support for a system that was clearly Viceregal in its essentials. The answer to this lies partly, as Burki has suggested, in Bhutto's promise that this was an interim measure necessitated by the grave crisis that the country was passing through at the time.<sup>102</sup> Another explanation is Bhutto's display of tactical flexibility for he made opposition acceptance of the Interim Constitution a condition for the withdrawal of martial law. For the opposition it appeared that even the strong, centralised government provided by the Interim Constitution was preferable to the continuance of martial law which they felt enabled Bhutto to wield power arbitrarily.<sup>103</sup>

To produce the 1973 Constitution,<sup>104</sup> which was widely described as a 'document of national unity', Bhutto conceded to some of the demands of the parliamentary opposition, which consisted of NAP, JUP, JUI, JI and the Muslim League. The PPP had the parliamentary majority to go it alone, but Bhutto realised that such a constitution would lack the legitimacy which he deemed indispensable for his authority to govern as well as acting as a check upon possible military intervention. Through a combination of adroitly-timed manoeuvres aimed at detaching the Jamaat from the opposition (so that hardliners

like Wali Khan could only follow the majority),<sup>105</sup> intimidation and harassment of opposition members outside the assembly,<sup>106</sup> and selective concessions that he was certain a frustrated opposition would accept, Bhutto achieved the near unanimous confirmation of the constitution. Concessions to opposition demands related to the issue of provincial autonomy and Islamic provisions - the two issues on which there had been heated debates, negotiations and much last-minute haggling. The Constitution attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of the central government and of the provinces by demarcating two formal areas of legislation in the Federal Legislature List and the Concurrent Legislature List.<sup>107</sup> Residual powers rested exclusively with the provinces. Undoubtedly the federal list went somewhat beyond the narrow confines of "defence, foreign affairs and currency" desired by the NAP, giving the Centre adequate financial and administrative power that Bhutto sought. Nevertheless, in the reservation of a wide range of powers to the provinces, a symbolic move towards provincial autonomy was made.<sup>108</sup> Despite this enumeration of legislative jurisdiction, the central government, in accordance with Bhutto's desire, possessed ultimate authority over the provinces through its powers to take over the executive and legislative functions of provincial governments and to suspend their administrations in times of emergency, and also by virtue of the Centre's financial functions (e.g. disbursement of development funds). Partly mitigating this situation, was the provision that income

from certain natural resources, for example electricity in the NWFP and natural gas in Baluchistan, must revert to the provinces in which exploitation has taken place.

Concessions to the religious Right were reflected in the Islamic provisions in the Constitution.<sup>109</sup> For the first time in its history, Islam was made the state religion of Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> In order to appease the religious opposition, Bhutto dropped the word 'socialism' or 'Islamic socialism'. The Constitution enshrined the principle that all laws would be brought into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah, and that no law shall be enacted which was repugnant to Islam.<sup>111</sup> A Council of Islamic Ideology would be set up to advise the national and provincial legislatures as to the adherence of a law proposed or already enacted to the injunctions of Islam. But the advice of the council would not be binding, and would be sought only if 40% of the members of the legislature so desired. Although the Constitution received heavy doses of formal, emotional Islam, (as was the case in 1956 and 1962) such 'Islamic' provisions only served to bring the state into external conformity with Islam. For instance, the "Repugnancy Clause" (Article 227) is productive of secular law, not of Islamic law, since in order for a law to be Islamic it is obviously not sufficient that it not be "repugnant to Islam" but that it be derived from Islamic principles.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, many of the Islamic provisions remained statements of goals rather than programmes of action. As with the constitutional language defining the relationship between the Centre and



provinces, much depended on interpretation and implementation.

Bhutto's real victory, however, was reflected in the special powers given to the prime minister by the Constitution. Bhutto's oft-stated preference for a presidential system had led to a controversy involving not only the opposition but also leading members of his own party who demanded the parliamentary form of government. Indeed, Bhutto's desire to concentrate wide-ranging powers in the chief executive led to the resignation of his law minister, and chairman of the constitution committee Mahmud Ali Kasuri in October 1972.<sup>113</sup> In the face of such pressure, Bhutto backed down from his proposal for a presidential system, but nevertheless sought special powers and protection for a prime minister (P.M.), which the opposition maintained would establish the P.M. as a 'constitutional dictator'.<sup>114</sup> After acrimonious debate, the formula which emerged indicated that Bhutto's view had prevailed. While the Constitution provided a parliamentary system of government, with the executive responsible for the legislature, a number of unique provisions established the P.M.'s supremacy to compensate for what Bhutto saw as the weakness of the parliamentary system (in terms of the frequent toppling of P.M.s). These were contained in the clauses relating to no-confidence motions. According to these, a no-confidence motion could not be moved during a budget session and had to include within the text the name of a successor.<sup>115</sup> If unsuccessful, another motion could not be moved for six months. Further, for a period

of ten years or from the holding of the second general election to the national assembly, which ever occurred later, a vote of no-confidence cast by a party member elected to the national assembly had to be disregarded if the majority of that member's political party in the N.A. cast their votes against the adoption of the resolution. The P.M. was thus provided with security against minor dissidence within his own party and against motions by the opposition who had to agree firmly on a successor before moving a resolution. In sum, the P.M.'s hold on office was made so unusually strong for a parliamentary form of government as to constitute a contradiction in terms. With the president given minimal powers, and the advice of the P.M. binding on him in the performance of all functions, the clear intent of the Constitution was to make the P.M. the focus of all power. Wide-ranging emergency and preventive detention powers (Articles 232-236 and Article 10 respectively) provided the P.M. with ample constitutional means to control and restrict political opposition. The vagueness of such clauses permitted the government a great deal of latitude in the exercise of its power to curb dissent and political expression.<sup>116</sup> The emergency provisions together with the P.M.'s unassailable position (as a consequence of the no-confidence motion clauses) placed substantial constitutional powers at the disposal of the central executive to use against political opponents and to make its exercise of power almost unrestricted. Thus, the political structure established under the 1973 constitution had many features of the

Viceregal system, and was not too different from the authoritarian structure built by Ayub in his 1962 constitution. How Bhutto sought to operationalise this system and dealt with political opponents, and the consequences that ensued, forms the concern of the remainder of this section.

The major opposition to the PPP regime came from: (1) the forces of Pakhtun and Baluch regionalism as represented by NAP (2) the forces of religious traditionalism as represented by Islam-Pasand parties such as the JI, the JUI and JUP and (3) parties representing feudal factions in the Sind and Punjab such as the Muslim League (Pagaro group) and (4) smaller parties, that were largely built around personalities, such as Asghar Khan's Tehriq-e-Istaqlal (TI).<sup>117</sup> The Bhutto regime's response to the various sources of opposition followed an identical pattern and was characterised by intolerance which manifested itself in the use of coercion and repression. The underlying motives of adopting such a policy towards the four kinds of opposition outlined above also appear to be the same: a general reluctance to share power coupled with fears of the 'divisive' effects of opposition activity. Tactics, too were identical - the regular characterisations of opponents as "enemies of the state" or "secessionists" followed by harassments, prosecution, imprisonment and on occasion torture.<sup>118</sup> In some instances, repression followed when earlier attempts at winning support through the 'carrot' technique (rewards, ministries, etc.) failed. Since the various kinds of opposition raised somewhat

different questions it would be more appropriate to deal with them separately, despite the similarity in the treatment meted out to them. More attention needs to be devoted to the regional and religious opposition, for it was from these two sources that Bhutto perceived that the major challenge to his authority came. The constitutional 'settlement' of the 'regional' and 'Islam' issue was one thing, but the practical working out of these issues was entirely a different matter, and it is to the latter aspect that we now turn our attention.

#### THE REGIONAL OPPOSITION

The practical problem of evolving a mutually satisfactory relationship between the ruling party and NAP turned, naturally, on the extent of provincial autonomy and decentralisation that Bhutto was willing to permit in practice, and NAP to accept. Bhutto's approach to the problem of 'provincialism' was quite different from that of 'autonomists' like the NAP. Although Bhutto had frequently reiterated his support for a genuine federalist scheme as best suited for Pakistan given its ethnic and linguistic diversity, this was always qualified by his insistence on a 'viable' and 'strong' centre.<sup>119</sup> NAP, on the other hand, advocated substantive devolution of power to the provinces as the only way to protect the rights of the smaller units. Indeed, at the time of the 1970 election, NAP's views on the degree of provincial autonomy to be provided to the units in a federal system were close to those of the Awami League. However, after the

secession of Bangladesh, NAP moderated its stance. According to Wali Khan, in view of the grave crisis facing the country after 1971, his party "compromised part of (its) own party manifesto" in demonstrating its willingness to accept a quantum of provincial autonomy that was considerably less than what his party had previously advocated.<sup>120</sup> There is some validity in such a claim. NAP's assent to the 1972 and 1973 constitution, both of which as we saw above, provided for a strong centre, was one indication of the change in NAP's stance. Nevertheless, Wali Khan still demanded considerable de-centralisation involving a broad sharing of power between the federal government and the federating units. This seemed to be incompatible with Bhutto's emphasis on the need for a strong Centre.

Given the choice between control and sharing of power that decentralisation inevitably involved, Bhutto preferred the first, following in the tradition of his predecessors. But where he departed from the tradition of the past was in his attempts, as we shall see later, to create a sense of 'distributive justice' amongst the federating units in order to allay the fears of the smaller units of being dominated by the Punjab. The latter was part of a long-term political strategy. In the short term, Bhutto's concern was to maintain the provinces within the Pakistani union without having to share his authority or power, that is to avoid a shift of power from the centre to the provinces. Such a strategy clearly meant that political opponents such as NAP, could, at best, exercise limited power and authority even though they possessed an

electoral mandate in their respective provinces. That combination of fear of Balkanisation of the country and a reluctance to share power that had characterised Bhutto's attitude towards the Awami League during the East Pakistan crisis now exhibited itself in his dealings with NAP.

NAP on its part, by advocating the concept of "four nationalities", i.e. that Pakistan is a coalition of four linguistic 'nations', claimed for itself a position of parity with the PPP, the former being the majority party in Baluchistan and NWFP and the latter being the dominant representative organisation of the Punjab and Sind.<sup>121</sup> The PPP regime by maintaining that such a concept "is nothing but the sowing of the seeds of secession" which denied "the very basis of Pakistan" questioned both NAP's claims and the reasoning behind them.<sup>122</sup> Further, Bhutto regarded Wali Khan's demand for central non-interference in provincial affairs as the first step of part of a calculated strategy aimed at establishing an independent Pakhtun state.<sup>123</sup> In pursuing this goal, Bhutto asserted that the NAP was operating simultaneously on two planes - as an opposition party within the parliamentary framework and as an underground group "serving... as the front-line organisation for Afghan territorial designs on Pakistan."<sup>124</sup> NAP viewed such allegations as part of "a bogey raised by the centre to tarnish their image and deprive them of their rights as the chosen representatives of the people."<sup>125</sup>

It is important to note here that the PPP's allegations of NAP's "treasonous activities" and particularly of "collusion with Afghanistan" have never been adequately and conclusively substantiated despite the Supreme Court verdict of 1975 (see below). Although NAP's historical antecedents (e.g. the pre-partition role played by Ghaffar Khan) have made the party suspect in the eyes of successive regimes, the allegation of NAP's 'secessionist aims' is far from being proven.<sup>126</sup> Indeed, Wali Khan's beliefs and actions do not easily establish him as a 'secessionist'.<sup>127</sup> While, as we indicated earlier, his father remained quite equivocal about whether 'Pakhtunistan' meant a separate state or greater autonomy within Pakistan, Wali Khan's approach was significantly different. While still espousing the cause of Pakhtun autonomy and advancing the theory of "four nationalities", Wali Khan was always at pains to point out that the regional autonomy demanded was within the context of united Pakistan.<sup>128</sup> In March 1972 Wali even went as far as to say that 'Pakhtunistan' was not an issue with his party.<sup>129</sup> Such statements as well as Wali's efforts to cultivate support in the Punjab and Sind after 1971 were perhaps evidence of his desire to disassociate himself from a narrow provincial identity and pursue a national political role. Indeed Wali and others, both inside his party and outside, believed that it was because such efforts were beginning to bear fruit - with Wali emerging as a potential alternative national leader to Bhutto - that finally became a source of uneasiness for Bhutto and accounted for his subsequent harsh treatment of Wali.<sup>130</sup>

Bhutto initially permitted NAP to form governments (in coalition with JUI) in the NWFP and Baluchistan in 1972. This had been a tactical ploy to gain NAP's assent for the Interim Constitution. But at the outset it was clear that Bhutto's strategy was to circumscribe NAP's ability to govern with the goal of replacing these governments with those of his own party. The PPP entered into an alliance with Qayyum's Muslim League, NAP's traditional political foe in the Frontier - an action which the NAP claimed demonstrated that Bhutto was not anxious for its cooperation for he had made cause with the main factor, (i.e. QML) that had historically been responsible for giving NAP its 'secessionist' image in the rest of Pakistan.<sup>131</sup> For Bhutto the alliance with Qayyum was aimed at enabling his own party to gain a foothold in the Frontier as a counterweight to NAP. Several other actions taken by Bhutto also indicated that his primary aim was to engineer the downfall of the NAP-JUI governments. A concerted campaign in the official press accused Wali Khan of "plotting" against Pakistan (the so-called 'London Plan'), and insinuated that NAP envisaged the creation of two autonomous states.<sup>132</sup> This was accompanied by frequent "tours" of the two provinces by PPP ministers,<sup>133</sup> instigation of the Mazdoor Kissan party militants against the NAP government's authority, and a 'divide and rule' strategy aimed at eliciting the support of tribal leaders (particularly in Baluchistan) traditionally opposed to NAP.<sup>134</sup> Following a variety of Centre-provincial conflicts and a general deterioration of law and order in



both provinces (discussed above, chapter V ) Bhutto used emergency powers to remove NAP leadership in both provinces and replace them with his own nominees.

Clearly, Bhutto had found intolerable the bargaining process in which his government and the two provincial governments had engaged, perceiving this as a dilution of central government authority. His response followed the pattern of predecessor regimes: suppression of regional opposition amidst charges that such opposition was actively plotting the dismemberment of Pakistan in collusion with 'foreign powers'. When such suppression led to violent resistance in Baluchistan (on the part of tribes loyal to NAP) Bhutto's answer was to send in the Army to crush the insurgency, again resorting to a method frequently utilised by his predecessors. Bhutto's short-term objective of establishing political control, it appeared, took precedence over the risks inherent in a policy that involved bringing the army back into the political arena.<sup>135</sup> Bhutto's attempt to impose a military solution to what was essentially a political problem was reminiscent, as the NAP repeatedly pointed out, of Yahya Khan's action in East Pakistan.

In spite of the anxieties of the PPP leadership about the dangers of disintegration because of NAP's espousal of ethnic nationalism, the suppression of NAP in order to avoid such disintegration was not justified in the result. Indeed, the removal of NAP governments led directly to open rebellion in Baluchistan in 1973 and 1974, constituting a self-fulfilling prophesy on the part of the

Bhutto regime that we mentioned earlier. In the violence that followed, both sides showed an equal lack of restraint. With Sherpao's assassination, Bhutto felt justified in imposing a ban on NAP in 1975.<sup>136</sup> Bhutto further justified this action by alleging that NAP was working in collusion with Afghanistan in its aim to set up a 'Pakhtunistan' - an allegation that previous regimes had also made while seeking to contain NAP's predecessors.<sup>137</sup> As required by the law, the case of the dissolution of NAP was referred by the government to the Supreme Court. The ban on NAP was upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court in its judgement given in October 1975 for "operating in a manner prejudicial to the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan."<sup>138</sup> This action of the Supreme Court was, again, reminiscent of the country's political past when all available legal resources were employed by the central authorities to control regional opposition. The observations made by an Amnesty International report are worthy of note:

"we believe that the (Supreme) court reached conclusions on evidence that did not inevitably point to the NAP acting in a manner contrary to the security and integrity of Pakistan." 139

Bhutto jailed all leading NAP figures, including Wali Khan. The 'Hyderabad Conspiracy trial' that followed became the latest in a series of political trials that, as we saw earlier, began soon after independence.<sup>140</sup> Sustained official propaganda, as reflected for instance in the White Paper on Baluchistan, emphasising NAP's links with Afghanistan, attempted to detach NAP from other opposition

parties in the rest of the country - a policy that, as we shall see below, met with failure. Indeed, NAP's successor group, the National Democratic Party (NDP) found sympathetic support amongst opposition groups in other provinces who were united in their resolve to oust the Bhutto regime.

Bhutto followed the methods and tactics of his predecessors in seeking to contain regionally-based opposition but where he departed from the practice of the past was to recognise that such containment had to be followed through by attempts to create a sense of 'distributive justice' for the smaller provinces on the one hand and to build up his own party in these provinces as an alternative to the banned NAP, on the other hand. Thus force was accompanied by a long-range strategy of incentives and patrimonial manipulation of the traditional sardari (tribal leader) system. In a sense, Bhutto followed a policy much like the British in manipulating the sardari system with a view to allowing Baluchistan's traditional rulers to neutralise one another. By playing off one sardar/tribal leader against another through judicious shifts in favouritism (reflected in part, in the frequent change of governors/chief ministers in Baluchistan), Bhutto attempted, in patrimonial style, to keep tribal leaders from mounting a united challenge to central authority. For instance, Bhutto capitalised on traditional rivalries between the Bugti and Mengal tribes in Baluchistan and between Pakhtun (Afridi tribes) speaking tribes and Hindko-speaking tribes in the Frontier.

And while the sardars were engaged in protracted conflict with each other, the PPP regime attempted to promote economic development in these areas, long neglected by previous regimes, in the hope that this would weaken the tribal structure of society which formed the basis of support for NAP.<sup>141</sup> Bhutto increased development funds to the two provinces substantially.<sup>142</sup> In addition to programmes for developing roads, electrification and new water supplies, the PPP aimed at weakening tribal institutions. The "Sardari system" - under which tribal chiefs operated their own laws, courts and jails and exacted a variety of levies and taxes - was abolished by official proclamation in 1976.<sup>143</sup> Meanwhile, immediate financial incentives were employed to 'win' political support for the party in both provinces. This was reflected in the several defections that were engineered from amongst members of NAP, JUI and QML by the ruling party. Such tactics enabled the Bhutto-appointed provincial government to obtain a majority in the NWFP provincial assembly (see above, chapter 'V'). But in Baluchistan, such tactics were less successful. (A notable defection was that of Barozai once NAP speaker of the Baluchistan Assembly who became PPP chief minister in 1976). There, the Bhutto-appointed cabinet had to resort to force (by jailing NAP assembly members), but even this did not give the cabinet majority support in the provincial assembly. This led Bhutto to dissolve the assembly and impose federal rule in 1975. It was only in 1976, on the eve of the general election that the Baluchistan provincial

assembly was revived, with the PPP enjoying a majority in the legislature - a majority achieved through the use of force (jailing opposition members and dispossessing them of their assembly seats that in subsequent by-elections, which the opposition boycotted, were won by PPP men) rather than persuasion.

The success of Bhutto's long-term strategy of financial incentives rested on a number of factors of which perhaps the most important was the immediate establishment of public tranquillity in these provinces. For the present, the central government's display of economic generosity was not adequate to quell the tribal unrest which followed in the wake of NAP's ouster and ban. Moreover, the PPP regime's attack on sardari privileges obviously met with resistance. This tactic represented a significant departure from the Viceregal tradition. The British and predecessor regimes had sought to maintain political tranquillity in the usually turbulent tribal areas of the Frontier and Baluchistan by leaving undisturbed the domination of the traditional interests. Bhutto sought to challenge the traditional interests through measures such as abolition of the sardari system. This was met by stiff resistance from the tribal leaders and produced much bitterness, especially since many of the tribal leaders believed that Bhutto's attack on feudal privileges in the Sind and Punjab was far from being as thorough-going as that in the other two provinces.<sup>144</sup> It came as little surprise then that violence increasingly characterised the tone of politics in both provinces. To

meet this dilemma, Bhutto placed final reliance upon the military (in Baluchistan), an action that only exacerbated the problem. The use of force to bring about ethnic integration, as we saw earlier, never met with success at any point in Pakistan's history.

### THE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION

The second major source of opposition to the Bhutto regime came from the religious parties, the JUP, JUI and in particular the Jamaat. Although all these parties represent the forces of religious traditionalism, the Jamaat distinguishes itself from other Islamic parties by calling itself a non-ulema organisation. Such a distinction is meant to emphasise the 'reformist' nature of Jamaat, since ulema are to be found in all three organisations. For the orthodox ulema, Islam is a perfect and eternal religion from which laws can be derived for all time to come. For the Jamaat the orthodox ulema's call of 'back to the Quran' is not enough, because there are wide areas of modern life for which the Quran does not legislate. Thus, as one writer has suggested the orthodox ulema are essentially "reiterators", while the Jamaat leaders like Maudoodi are "rethinkers" for they are trying "to rethink Islam in modern terms."<sup>145</sup> However, despite this difference, the Jamaat's views "shorn of their modern trappings and the jargon of social sciences" were "similar to those of ulemas he (i.e. Maudoodi) criticised for being out of date and reactionary."<sup>146</sup> Relations between the Jamaat and the two ulema organisations have varied from time to time, but the latter have often

willingly allowed Maudoodi to be their spokesman. Since the Jamaat is by far the most well organised of the religious parties, which also explains why successive regimes have taken it more seriously than other parties, we will focus on the Jamaat to illustrate the nature of religious opposition.<sup>147</sup>

The activities of the Jamaat cannot be understood without addressing attention to its founder and leader, Maulana Abul al Maudoodi. Maudoodi was not a professional man of religion, but a profoundly religious man, who founded the Jamaat in 1941 with the aim of establishing an Islamic system. During the period preceding partition, Maudoodi opposed the Pakistan movement, for he regarded territorial nationalism as contrary to the tenets of Islam, although he emphasised the separate identity of Muslims as a nation and thus provided ideological sustenance to the Two-Nation theory. After partition the Jamaat in Pakistan constituted itself into a separate organisation with Maudoodi as Amir (leader). Maudoodi reconciled himself to the creation of Pakistan and began to assume an active political role to pressurise successive regimes to frame a constitution and build a political system in accordance with Maudoodi's concept of an Islamic system. One difficulty in explaining Maudoodi's ideas is that they have changed quite rapidly from time to time (he has written over a hundred and twenty books and pamphlets) - changes that are not unconnected with the imperatives and vicissitudes of Pakistani politics.<sup>148</sup> However, Maudoodi has consistently opposed westernization

and secularism and has advocated an Islamic state that is "universal and all-embracing", an ideological state to be run only by those who believe in the ideology, and based on the Divine law.<sup>149</sup> However, Maudoodi has argued that such an Islamic state is not theocratic, because it is not ruled by a priestly class, but by the umma (the community of Muslims). At the same time it is not democratic in the western sense, because the people in an Islamic state are not completely sovereign, their sovereignty being limited by the divine law of Islam. He suggests, therefore, that an Islamic state is a "theo-democracy" or a divine democratic government.<sup>150</sup> Despite the fact that his doctrines have appealed only to a particular section of the urban community (see below), Maudoodi has been highly respected even amongst his political opponents, for his integrity and intelligence.

Maudoodi built the Jamaat into a well-knit, tightly-organised party, on the lines of the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood), with all power vested in the Amir. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat has always given precedence to organisational efficiency and loyalty over strength in numbers. Its small membership - 35,000 in 1978<sup>151</sup> - is due to a high measure of selectivity, granted only after a long period of probation. This has led many observers to suggest that the Jamaat has modelled its organisational structure on the pattern of Leninist communist parties.<sup>152</sup> The Jamaat's associate members are believed to number close to half a million.<sup>153</sup> The Jamaat's discrete and wide-ranging organisational network and its highly trained and disciplined cadres give it a depth of



power that is reflected in the common assertion made by Pakistanis that the Jamaat is the most well-organised party in the country. The Jamaat has always placed great emphasis on penetrating - some say in a semi-conspiratorial fashion (aspects borrowed perhaps from the Brotherhood) - strategic power groups in the country, such as the military and the civilian bureaucracy.<sup>154</sup> At the same time, pro-Jamaat groups are to be found amongst lawyers, teachers and other professional groups. It has also sought to organise parallel unions within the labour movement - a policy that, as we shall see below, played an important part in ensuring the success of the Piya-Jam (wheel-jam) strikes (in Karachi) in the 1977 anti-Bhutto agitation. The Jamaat has also built considerable support amongst the student community through its student auxiliary, the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam, which has branches in colleges and universities throughout the country.

Against this background, we can now turn our attention towards analysing relations between the Bhutto regime and the religious opposition. As we saw earlier (see chapter IIc and IIIc), the hostility between the PPP and the religious leadership had originated in the Ayub period and had manifested itself in several violent clashes between PPP and Jamaat workers. After Bhutto assumed power, the religious parties, in particular the Jamaat, condemned the regime, regarding it to be socialist and therefore inconsistent with Islam.<sup>155</sup> Maudoodi, who by now had given up leadership of the Jamaat to Mian Tufail Ahmed, but who continued to dominate the party's

activities, expressed strong disapproval of Bhutto's 'socialist policies' for he saw these as leading to an increasing secularisation of the state.<sup>156</sup> Initially, Bhutto sought to placate the religious opposition, and is reported to have assured Maudoodi - in a series of Bhutto-Maudoodi meetings in late 1972 - that he would take necessary action to 'control' radicals and communists within his party.<sup>157</sup> These meetings took place in the period in which Bhutto officially disowned the radical left within the PPP (see above, chapter VI). Indeed, such Bhutto-Maudoodi contacts played an important part in finalising a constitutional settlement in 1972 and 1973. However, the temporary truce did not last very long, The Jamaat did not believe that the Bhutto regime would implement many of the Islamic provisions in the constitution that had been conceded by the regime, which we discussed above. Indeed, the religious opposition viewed with increasing alarm what they regarded as a steady trend towards secularism and godless socialism under the auspices of the Bhutto government. In 1973, the Amir of the Jamaat declared that the Bhutto regime was illegitimate and called upon the military to seize power.<sup>158</sup> Bhutto's response followed predictable lines: the arrest of Jamaat's leader and harassment of other Jamaat leaders and workers. At the same time Bhutto tried to placate the religious opposition through a number of actions. He lifted restrictions - imposed by the previous regime because of a shortage of foreign exchange - on pilgrims going for the Haj. He founded various government organisations for

propagating Islamic teaching and encouraging the learning of Arabic, and introduced the Quran into school curricula. In 1974, following violent anti-Ahmeddiya agitation in the Punjab (see chapter V above) he deferred to orthodox Muslim sentiment by declaring the Ahmeddiyas a non-Muslim minority. This action was taken despite the fact that the Ahmeddiyas as a community had voted for the PPP in the 1970 election. However, such concessions were viewed by the religious parties as "cheap gimmicks" and an "exploitation of the name of Islam", and as hypocritical window dressing, rather than a demonstration of sincerity to Islamic principles.<sup>159</sup>

What intensified the opposition of religious parties to the Bhutto regime was the fact that a number of reforms and actions taken by the latter appeared to seriously threaten the social and economic interests of the constituencies represented by the former. Thus the social base of the religious parties is crucial for understanding the intense hatred exhibited by these parties against the PPP regime. As indicated in an earlier chapter (see above, chapter IIIc) in Sind, support for religious parties (Jamaat and JUP) comes predominantly from the Urdu-speaking muhajirs who are concentrated in the urban centres of Karachi and Hyderabad. Jones' analysis of ward-level constituency returns of the 1970 elections in the Punjab provides us with a useful insight into the social base of religious parties in that province.<sup>160</sup> Jones' data shows that support for the religious parties came primarily from urban middle and lower middle class groups

engaged in trade and commerce such as merchants, traders, shop-keepers and arhtis (in the mandi towns). These groups are predominantly East Punjabi Muslim muhajirs from India who replaced the Punjabi Hindu trading and money lending castes and took over commercial and arhti establishments and other ventures in many cities and towns in the Punjab after partition. Within certain cities and towns, the East Punjabi muhajirs also belonged to certain biradaris, such as the Sheikhs, Ansaris and Qureishis- with a strong internal discipline (which was indeed an important factor in their business success). In many of these Punjabi towns then, the religious parties like the Jamaat, can, as Jones has suggested, be viewed as representing a coincidence of biradari (Sheikh), sub-ethnic group (muhajir), class (trading) and ideological (Islam) interests.<sup>161</sup>

Having identified the support-groups of the religious parties, it remains to be explained how the PPP regime's policies harmed the social and economic interests of such groups. While the PPP's economic and social policies and their impact is discussed in greater detail below (see chapter XIIe), it is necessary here to briefly mention two sets of policies that appeared to threaten the interests of the constituencies represented by the religious parties. The first of these relates to the government's decision in 1972 to make Sindhi the official language of Sind. As the violent reaction of the muhajir community in Karachi and Hyderabad (see chapter VI. a) demonstrated, this move was viewed by the refugee settlers

as a grave threat to their interests and as part of a broader strategy of a Sindhi-led government to deprive them of their dominating position in the economic and commercial life of urban Sind. The Jamaat and the JUP, representing the muhajir community, organised several pro-Urdu demonstrations. Although a political settlement was quickly reached, this only partially alleviated the fears of the muhajirs and the entire episode only seemed to antagonise the muhajir group. Another action of the PPP government which hurt the interests represented by the religious parties relates to its nationalisation measures.

In particular, the nationalisation in 1976 of the agro-based industries (and earlier of rice and cotton trading) affected the economic interests and in some instances the livelihood of small merchants, traders and arhtis (see below, chapter XIe). As we shall see below, it was these groups, as a number of other observers have also pointed out, that provided much of the sustenance for the opposition's anti-Bhutto agitation in 1977.<sup>162</sup>

As is clear from the illustrations above, economic and social factors reinforced the religious factor in arousing the intense animosity of the religious parties towards the Bhutto government. Bhutto responded by recalling that those who opposed him were the same people who had opposed Jinnah and his struggle for Pakistan. "They did not want Pakistan then and.....they are still opposed to Pakistan and want to weaken it."<sup>163</sup> In addition to labelling such opposition as "reactionary" and "anti-Pakistan," he also resorted to banning

newspapers sympathetic to the Jamaat,<sup>164</sup> arresting political workers and student leaders belonging to Islam-pasand parties,<sup>165</sup> and a general tightening up of restrictions on political activity. Such repressive measures only led to further intransigence and drove the religious parties into seeking cooperation with other parties including the self-avowedly secular NAP, with whom they shared little other than the common desire to destroy Bhutto and the PPP. Although poles apart in philosophy and national outlook, NAP and Jamaat came together within the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1973 and later the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), their unity resting on a common resolve to oust Bhutto's government.

#### OTHER SOURCES OF OPPOSITION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUPPRESSION

Bhutto's dealings with other opposition parties - the Muslim League and TI - were characterised by the same features that had increasingly marked PPP/NAP, PPP/Jamaat relations - the use of government intimidation and often violence. Of these parties, the TI, led by Asghar Khan was evidently the source of much concern for the Bhutto regime. Asghar Khan, a retired Air Marshall, who is generally credited with building the Pakistani Air Force into an effective and modern fighting force, entered politics in opposition to the Ayub regime and had played some part (see above, chapter IIc) in the anti-Ayub movement. Then and subsequently, Asghar Khan has advocated

the establishment of a genuine parliamentary democracy and a true federal system combined with an attack on the repressive policies of successive regimes.<sup>166</sup> His political and economic philosophy places him at the right of centre on an ideological spectrum in Pakistani politics. A Kashmiri, domiciled in Hazara, Asghar Khan has the advantage of not being identified with any of the major ethnic groups in the country and hence can transcend the provincial antipathies that make a Pakhtun - like Wali Khan - unacceptable in other provinces. However, his party has had limited appeal - enjoying some support amongst urban middle-class professionals and traders, and sections of the military and civilian bureaucracy. Nevertheless, its appeal does appear to cut across ethnic boundaries. The Bhutto regime's attitude towards Asghar Khan was essentially repressive - police harassment, denying access to the media and preventing public meetings, and at times forcibly disrupting these, were some of the methods utilised against the Tehriq.

Apart from Asghar Khan, other critics of the regime, such as those belonging to the Muslim League were dealt with in much the same way as Asghar Khan. Many faced official charges ranging from sanguinary ones such as murder to farcical ones such as stealing a buffalo.<sup>167</sup> In one instance, opposition leader and MP, Zahur Elahi of the Muslim League was tried for murdering a man who later appeared in court and disclosed that he had been abducted by the police.<sup>168</sup> Charging political opponents with ordinary criminal offences, such as complicity in murder

and theft became a prime weapon for dealing with dissent both within the PPP and outside.<sup>169</sup> Referring to this phenomenon, a leading newsweekly made the following observation:

"It is a trifle bit bizarre to discover that members of the national legislature are subjected to . . . . detention on such elevated charges as cattle pilferage, murder, forgery of property transfer documents . . . . there seems to be (a) link between petty crime and political intransigence." 170

In addition, the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) was often utilised to detain political opponents, who were then tried before special courts and tribunals set up under special and emergency legislation.<sup>171</sup> Several constitutional amendments and a host of legislative measures such as the High Treason Act (1973), Prevention of Anti-national Activities Ordinance (1973), the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act (1975), increased substantially the legal powers at the disposal of the regime to deal with political opponents and establish its dominance.<sup>172</sup> The manner in which the regime dealt with opposition protest over such constitutional and legal measures designed to give the former immense powers to contain dissent, is best exemplified by recalling the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment.<sup>173</sup> When the PPP sought to rush the controversial amendment through parliament, opposition members were not only prevented from speaking but three of them, Zahur Elahi, Ahmed Reza Kasuri and Malik Suleiman were bodily removed from the assembly by Federal Security Force (FSF) officials in the



midst of fist fights.<sup>174</sup> The disregard, not only for opposition views, but for the sanctity of parliament, demonstrated in this incident was characteristic of the regime's methods.

In addition to the use of legal and constitutional powers, derisively referred to as "black laws" against political opponents, the regime also resorted to extra-legal methods to contain opposition. The FSF was often used to break up opposition rallies,<sup>175</sup> (when they were allowed to be held) on the justification that "the people did not want to hear the rejected leaders of 1970."<sup>176</sup> Opposition leaders alleged that their party offices were often burnt by PPP thugs.<sup>177</sup> Police harassment extended not only to opposition leaders but also to their families.<sup>178</sup> At times, dissident politicians "disappeared" - the opposition alleged that such politicians were in fact abducted by police authorities.<sup>179</sup> The use of such repressive tactics led to an increase in political violence to which both the PPP and the opposition contributed. There were several assassination attempts on Wali Khan, Asghar Khan and Ahmed Reza Kasuri. In one incident the latter escaped an assassin's bullet, which however, killed his father.<sup>180</sup> Political assassinations of both leading opposition figures (e.g. Maulvi Shamsuddin, Khwaja Rafique) and PPP leaders (Sherpao) or sympathisers (Abdus Samad Achakzai) made the government/opposition confrontation an increasingly violent and bloody one.<sup>181</sup>

Coercive measures against political opponents also included preventing public meetings through the imposition

of section 144 (barring public assembly) denying access to the media and even (by intimidation of press owners) preventing the publication of opposition party literature. Through a combination of legal and extra-legal methods, the ruling party sought to prevent opposition views from reaching a wider public, and opposition leaders from mobilising support. Despair and discouragement about their prospects for growth drove the opposition into making wild accusations, walkouts, boycotts of parliamentary sessions, obstructive actions and often, triviality.<sup>182</sup> Such behaviour not only doomed the opposition to ineffectiveness, but the aggressiveness of opposition rhetoric, which such conditions prompted, also laid them open to charges of subversive intent. This, the PPP was ready to exploit at every opportunity. A few examples showing the opposition's aggressive language and behaviour would suffice. At a press conference in April 1973, Asghar Khan, describing Bhutto as a 'sick man', 'thoroughly evil' and 'insane' warned that if the ruling party adopted the 'language of bullets' it should remember that a bullet could also turn towards Bhutto.<sup>183</sup> Predictably, Asghar Khan's statements were followed by reprisals and further repressive measures by the ruling party. Similarly when Tufail Mohammed of the Jamaat warned that the PPP government's un-Islamic measures would not be obeyed but resisted by force,<sup>184</sup> PPP leaders accused the Jamaat of preaching violence and characterised them as 'traitors' seeking to bring about national discord and disunity.<sup>185</sup> The opposition's aggressive behaviour was reflected in its

frequent resort to agitational activity and acts of deliberate provocation of the government. A good example of the latter phenomenon was the repeated practice after 1975 of opposition leaders in addressing letters to the three chiefs of the armed forces asking them to "save the country from Bhutto's fascist dictatorship."<sup>186</sup> Another example was the attempt by opposition leaders to establish liaison with foreign embassies in Islamabad and abroad, "to appraise the outside world of the regime's true nature."<sup>187</sup> Such activity only led to more repressive measures by the regime which the latter found completely justifiable.

#### THE OPPOSITION'S CHALLENGE TO THE BHUTTO REGIME

It was against this background of suppression of opposition that Bhutto, evidently convinced that he had little to fear from a divided and demoralised opposition, decided to seek a fresh mandate from the people. But when he called a general election in March 1977, a desperate opposition quickly forged an alliance - the PNA - to pose a united challenge to his regime. However, there was little doubt amongst opposition politicians that there was only one way in which Bhutto's regime could be brought to an end short of his demise - through a military coup d'état. The opposition was convinced that the election was merely a re-legitimising device for the Bhutto government to enable it to reinforce its control over the country, and could not, by virtue of the regime's control over the administrative (civil-police) machinery, be a fair one.

Citing the futility in opposing the PPP at the polls, an opposition leader argued the following:

"....taking an over-all view, the elections are more a part of the internal re-organisation of the People's Party than an open reference to the people for a renewal of the mandate ..... However fair the elections are made to be, the people have nothing to choose from ....." 188

Although the opposition decided to contest the election, it stated in no uncertain terms that the result would inevitably be 'rigged'.<sup>189</sup> Thus even before the election, a desperate opposition (united in the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance, PNA, which represented the regional, religious as well as other sources of opposition) had decided that the election would be rigged, but envisaged the possibility of utilising the opportunity provided by the election to dislodge the Bhutto government by contriving a situation in which the military would have no option but to intervene.

The opposition's new found confidence rested not only on their ability to forge a united front against Bhutto, bringing together parties as divergent in outlook as the secular, National Democratic Party (NAP's successor), the Jamaat and TI, but also on the fact that the campaign period had unleashed a massive wave of anti-government discontent and disillusionment, albeit largely urban, that the opposition was able to capitalise and direct. In its campaign to oust Bhutto, the opposition alliance adopted the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustapha (the demand for an Islamic system or Order of the Prophet), in the belief that an appeal to Islam would not only stir the public, but find

a receptive ear within those segments of the army who were known to be Islam-Pasand (i.e. the Army Chief of Staff himself). Clearly, for the regional opposition (NDP) and the secular parties in the PNA (Tehriq, Muslim League) the issue of Nizam-e-Mustapha was less an ideological commitment than a tactical means of challenging the Bhutto regime. The demand for Nizam-e-Mustapha and an attack on Bhutto's one-man, authoritarian rule constituted the two main planks of the PNA's election campaign.

No sooner had the results been announced that the PNA accused the ruling party of having rigged the election. The election was undoubtedly rigged, and whether the PPP majority "was more padded than stolen"<sup>190</sup> mattered little in the public furore that followed the announcement of the result.<sup>191</sup> Whatever the precise scale of the rigging, the net result was to bring into doubt the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise. The PNA sought to capitalise on the initially spontaneous urban protest that developed, calling for a nationwide agitation movement to bring down the government. The issue of election rigging was seized upon by the opposition as a catalyst to oust Bhutto. Bhutto's later allegation that the PNA embarked on a "pre-planned conspiracy" to oust him has, therefore, some validity, although the accompanying charge that the PNA movement was part of a "massive international (U.S.) conspiracy" in which the military acted as an accomplice is more difficult to substantiate.<sup>192</sup> The PNA's four month campaign of hartals, riots,

demonstrations, street violence, piya-jam (wheel jam) strikes was aimed at creating national dislocation and disorder, which would destroy the legitimacy of the Bhutto government in the eyes of the military, forcing the latter to intervene. Given this strategy, Bhutto's offer of concessions (judicial inquiry into electoral malpractices, new provincial elections, a ban on alcohol, gambling and night clubs) were repeatedly spurned by the opposition. Having come this far, the opposition was not likely to be satisfied with anything short of Bhutto's removal.

The volume of protest manifested in the predominantly urban anti-Bhutto movement was larger than what the heterogeneous collection of opposition parties could command through their constituencies. This indicated that a wide range of economic and social grievances lay behind the revolt. Since this aspect of the movement is discussed in detail in chapter XII, it would suffice to note here that the PNA movement reflected the social and economic frustrations of broad sections of urban society. The use of a volatile religious issue (Nizam-e-Mustapha) as a carrier for economic and social frustration is part of a political tradition in Pakistan that reaches back through the religious agitations of the 1930's and the Khilafat movement to the Great Rebellion of 1857.

The key to understanding the organisational strength of the PNA movement and Bhutto's inability to contain this, lies in the nature of the support groups of the PNA and PPP. As we explained earlier, amongst the constituent

elements of the PNA, the religious parties like the Jamaat and JUP drew much of their support from Urdu-speaking muhajirs concentrated in urban centres of Sind and from urban middle and lower-middle class groups consisting of small merchants, traders, shopkeepers and arhtis which in many Punjabi cities and towns tended to belong to a particular ethnic group (East Punjabi muhajirs) and to particular biradaris (Sheikhs, Qureishis and Ansaris) within this. As Sayeed has rightly suggested, it was these groups that provided much of the sustenance for the PNA movement in the Punjab.<sup>193</sup> The PNA's support amongst such groups (principally through the Jamaat and JUP) enabled it to gain access to arhti associations and other commercial associations giving it a depth of organisational power that was difficult to match in the cities and mandi towns. The local organising capabilities of parties like the Jamaat and JUP was thus a key factor in sustaining the anti-Bhutto movement in urban centres. The support of traders associations meant that the PNA "could have..... shops closed within a few hours".<sup>194</sup> This ensured the success of the numerous hartals organised by the PNA. In addition, the Jamaat through its 'front' organisations amongst for instance lawyers and students was able to ensure the participation of these groups in the movement. There were 94 demonstrations by lawyers and 283 by students in the anti-Bhutto movement.<sup>195</sup> The PNA's links with some trade unions (in cities like Karachi and Hyderabad) also ensured the participation of sections of urban labour. The pro-Jamaat Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions which had 264 trade unions affiliated to

it organised a successful piya-jam strike in Karachi. Above all, the religious parties' links with mosques up and down the country put at the PNA's disposal a powerful instrument for organised political action. Since the mosque was the one place where meetings were not banned,<sup>196</sup> it emerged as a formidable centre for political agitation and the starting point for the protest marches.

Clearly the PNA with the kind of organisational strength described above, had enormous 'street power' in the urban centres that could and was used to bring widescale disruption and disorder. In contrast, the PPP's major support groups were predominantly rural. The assessments we made earlier (chapters VI and VII) regarding the party's weak organisational nature and the character of its social base are crucial in explaining why the PPP's power could not be mobilised to counter the PNA movement.

Political arithmetic gave Bhutto majority support, but it was the PNA which had urban 'street power'. The importance of the latter phenomenon derives from the fact that in the Pakistani environment, as in Third World countries in general, urban unrest of objectively small dimensions often has an excessive political influence.<sup>197</sup> In the recent past, it was a predominantly urban agitation that had toppled the Ayub regime. This and the anti-Bhutto agitation clearly demonstrated the importance of urban 'street power' in dislodging an incumbent regime. As one writer has noted:



"On a head count a party may have millions of rural voters but a scream-mob of five thousand on the streets of Karachi can bring down a government." 198

Although this statement is somewhat exaggerated, it nevertheless serves to underline the phenomenon of the disproportionate influence of the urban milieu in Third World societies.

The PNA with its forces concentrated in the urban centres was able to mount and sustain an agitation movement that seriously challenged the legitimacy of the PPP government. Bhutto, on the other hand, had few resources with which to contain this movement, other than the instruments of state power (police and FSF). The desperate resort to repressive measures not only served to escalate the agitation, but involved calling in the military into the political arena. Bhutto was forced to impose martial law in three major cities to contain the violence. For the PNA this was a partial victory for it marked the beginning of the dilution of Bhutto's authority. The PNA hoped that the army would oust Bhutto and call new elections - having been asked by Bhutto to rescue the country from a state of bloody disorder they were not likely to hand it back to the man whose regime provoked the bloodshed. The opposition's strategy was to continue to stage strikes and demonstrations in defiance of martial law, thereby demonstrating to the military that Bhutto had lost all credibility as a leader and pressurising it into withdrawing its support from the regime. The PNA played its dangerous hand to the utmost - in effect provoking armed

troops into firing on unarmed civilians in street demonstrations. This was accompanied by direct appeals to the military to take over power (see Appendix C) as evidenced in Asghar Khan's letter addressed to the three chiefs of staff. That the PNA was not, at this stage, anxious to reach an understanding with the PPP regime was indicated by the fact that even when a final accord had been negotiated in PNA/PPP talks, the PNA council refused to ratify the accord.<sup>199</sup> In the light of existing information, it is difficult to substantiate Bhutto's allegation of prior complicity between the army leadership and the PNA in contriving a situation which would justify military intervention. However, there seems little doubt, that a desperate opposition, given the opportunity provided by the controversial election, did its utmost to engineer a situation in which the military would have no option but to remove Bhutto. The PNA attempted to destroy the legitimacy of the PPP government in the eyes of the army, and embarked on a collision course aimed at creating public disorder, chaos and bloodshed - circumstances within which the military would be pressurised to exercise its 'saviour' role. Such a strategy culminated in the military coup of 5 July 1977. In this sense Bhutto's alienation of the opposition through his authoritarian and repressive tactics, led indirectly to his eventual fall.

### CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, intolerance of opposition has been a continuing characteristic of Pakistani politics.

Regional dissatisfaction with the concentration of power at the Centre and the demands of fundamentalist Islamic groups, coupled with the tendency of previous regimes to suppress such opposition and equate it with treason, gave a special character to political opposition in Pakistan. The Bhutto regime did not significantly depart from established government practices in dealing with regional, religious and other opponents. Bhutto's preference for a Viceregal system, together with a fundamental distrust of all opposition activity led his regime to continue many of the Viceregal features of previous regimes in terms of the restrictions on political participation and concentration of executive power and its use against political opponents. In so far as opposition was felt to be akin to treason, PPP leaders saw no harm in destroying the opposition. Certainly drawing on the lessons of earlier failure, the government showed signs of being more responsive to regional sentiment in the use of development funds (in Baluchistan and NWFP) to create a sense of justice and to quell the fears of the smaller provinces of Punjabi domination. As a long-term strategy this may have worked well in bringing together ethnically disparate groups into a common national framework. However, Bhutto's short-term strategy - partly dictated by a personal reluctance to share power and partly by his constituency support (i.e. the Punjab - as in the case of all previous regimes) - of preventing the elected leaders of Baluchistan and NWFP from participation and using the army to crush the resistance that subsequently developed, created serious strains, making the goal of national integration more elusive. Bhutto's

resort to using the army to bring about ethnic assimilation firmly established him within the historical tradition of his predecessors who too had utilised force as the ultimate tool of nation-building.

Bhutto's policy of suppression did not eliminate opposition, but only made it more intransigent and its actions and activities more questionable. The PPP regime, in fact, created a self-fulfilling prophecy; repression produced a desperate and violent opposition whose "no holds barred" approach only justified the need for greater repression. The necessity of contending with an incumbent elite, so distrustful of opposition, rendered the situation of opposition parties difficult. Where the regime believes that those who oppose it in particular matters are their enemies in all that counts in life, a corresponding attitude is bred in the opposition. If enmity is cultivated enmity is harvested. Such was the case under the Bhutto regime. Bhutto's policy of suppression had a two-fold effect: it led the opposition to adopt an intransigent and extreme political position, and by excluding the opposition from participation it created a dangerous void in the political communication of the system. Thus an alienated opposition felt that it was not transgressing any political norms - for there were no agreed fundamental rules of political competition - in its appeal to the military to oust Bhutto. Had not Bhutto himself used the army to crush political opposition? That both protagonists sought to involve the army in politics underscored the failure to evolve any accepted rules of the

political game - a failure that has been one of the continuing tragedies of Pakistani politics.

It is important to note that the PPP's policy of suppressing political opponents, with all that this involved in terms of curtailment of civil liberties, and violation of democratic values, had little impact on Bhutto's major constituency in the rural countryside of Punjab and Sind. As indicated earlier, in Pakistan's rural culture, the accepted norms of dealing with opponents do not exclude violence and other illegal measures. Indeed physical violence against rivals/opponents is part of the landlords' customary conduct.<sup>200</sup> In this environment, Bhutto's harsh treatment of political rivals was not only acceptable but perhaps not illegitimate. It was the urban middle class and the intelligentsia who became agitated over the infringement of democratic norms. It is unlikely that Bhutto's banning or disrupting of opposition meetings and other violations of democratic values offend in any great degree his supporters within the rural landed-gentry and peasants. Indeed, the opposition parties repeatedly failed to arouse any sympathy from these groups - its drawing power remained limited to regional groups in Baluchistan and NWFP on the one hand (which had its liabilities since Bhutto could raise the bogey of 'secession' to justify repression before his Punjabi supporters) and to urban groups in the Punjab and Sind such as the disenchanting professional intelligentsia, the maulanas, industrialists, merchants and traders, and sections of the labour and student community. In this setting,

Bhutto probably had the numerical majority, but the opposition had the urban power which could be used to cause widespread disruption and dislocation. But the crucial factor in this dynamic, as far as the opposition was concerned, was winning the military's support, for an urban agitation movement could not itself topple the Bhutto government. It was the politics of desperation par excellence - for the same parties that had cried themselves hoarse protesting about the army's 'presence' in Baluchistan, were calling upon the same army to remove Bhutto.

The political crisis of 1977 and the trials and tribulations of evolving democratic politics that preceded it merely highlight what appears to be a persistent feature of Pakistani politics - the seeming impossibility of escape from a recurring cycle of limited politicisation, oppression, divisiveness, turmoil, military intervention and depoliticisation. The Bhutto regime displayed a continuity with the Viceregal tradition in its centralisation of power and in the severe restrictions imposed on political participation. Bhutto continued the tradition of executive supremacy over representative institutions. The political system he built was Viceregal in its essentials - with a powerful and autocratic central figure, a disregard for the practices and institutions of representative politics and the use of executive power to curtail political participation. There was a strong irony in the fact that as the only leader in Pakistani history who can be credited by virtue of his populist role in the period

1968-1970, with involving the masses in national politics, he should have sought, once in power, to revert to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors. As one observer has also noted:

"Certainly it was a tragedy for Pakistan that the one politician who did involve people in democratic dialogue should have had such a cavalier approach to democracy."201

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NOTES

1. By political participation, we mean here access to the various lawful and customary processes of influencing governmental decision-making, including the freedom to oppose the government of the day through the exercise of voting rights, and freedoms of speech, assembly and organisation. Thus when a ruling party, for instance, jails its opponents, disrupts their public meetings or bans their organisation, this can be regarded as curbing political participation.
2. Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), especially pp. xi-xii, viv, 332.
3. See H. Gordon Skilling, 'Opposition in Communist East Europe', in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Regimes and Opposition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973).
4. Leonard Schapiro, ed., Political Opposition in One-Party States, (London: Macmillan, 1972).
5. Five 'forms' of 'opposition' activity have been delineated in the literature concerned with Russia and other Communist states of Europe, always subject to the overall proviso that the boundaries between the different categories are not necessarily permanent or clearly distinct. Other than the two mentioned above, the remaining three are (i) 'integral' opposition based on an all-out rejection of the whole communist system of rule; (ii) 'dissent' - in Russian conditions, a political dissent; and (iii) the form of political activity which by analogy (even if inaccurate analogy) with liberal democratic politics is called 'interest group' or 'pressure group' activity.
6. See, for instance, James S. Coleman's concluding chapter in G. Almond and J. C. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially pp. 532-44.
7. Edward Shils, 'Opposition in the New States of Asia and Africa', Rodney Barker, ed., Studies in Opposition, (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 45.

8. For a study that analyses the reasons for the decline of this kind of competitive politics in the new states, see Hans Daalder, 'Government and Opposition in the New States', in Government and Opposition, Vol. 1, No. 2, (January 1966).
9. See Henry Beinen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
10. The term is Rajni Kothari's, see his 'The Congress System' in Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 2, (December 1964).
11. W. H. Morris, Dominance and Dissent in Rodney Barker, ed., op.cit, pp. 288-289.
12. Ibid, p. 289.
13. Rajni Kothari, 'India: Oppositions in a Consensual Polity', in Regime and Oppositions, op.cit, p. 309.
14. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 'Oppositional Politics in Ceylon: 1947-68', in Rodney Barker, ed., op.cit, pp. 267-283.
15. Wayne A. Wilcox, 'Political Change in Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3, (Fall 1968), p. 347.
16. For a brief discussion of this controversy see Elie Kedourie, Islamic Revolution, Salisbury Papers 6, (London:Contemprint Limited, 1979).
17. Myron Weiner, 'The Politics of South Asia', in G. A. Almond and T. S. Coleman, eds., op.cit, p. 196.
18. W. H. Morris-Jones, 'The West and the Third World: Whose Democracy, Whose Development?' in B. K. Nehru and W. H. Morris-Jones, Western Democracy and the Third World, (London: Third World Foundation, 1980), p. 26.
19. Liaqat Ali Khan's speech quoted in The Times, (London), 15 September, 1947.
20. See for instance, Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. II, (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960), p. 492-493.
21. See chapter IV.
22. Ahmed, ibid.
23. See for example his speech quoted in Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 15 November 1952, Vol. 2 No. 4, p. 242.
24. For Liaqat Ali's statement see Dawn, 9 October 1950.
25. See Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1975), p. 53.



26. The best account of what has been called the Viceregal period in Pakistan's political history is K. B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
27. See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).
28. G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, (London: Longman, 1959).
29. The problem of provincial autonomy is dealt with in greater detail in Hafiz Malik, 'Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan', in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), pp. 60-132.
30. M. Rafique Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-e-Azam, Vol. II, (Lahore, 1966), p. 455.
31. Robert La Porte, 'Regionalism and Political Opposition in Pakistan: Some observations of the Bhutto Period,' Asian Thought and Society, Vol. I, No. 11, (September 1976), p. 215.
32. See also, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
33. The territorial boundaries of the projected state have always been rather vaguely defined and have varied from one protagonist to another. Some advocates including Ghaffar Khan have claimed the area from the Amu (Oxus River) to the west as far as Herat and to the south as far as Jhelum River. See L. F. Rushbrook Williams, Pakistan Under Challenge, (London: Stacey International, 1975), p. 71.
34. Feroz Ahmed, ed., Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question, (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975), p. 88.
35. The history of Ghaffar Khan's struggle is to be found in My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan, as narrated to K. B. Narang, (Delhi: Mind Pocket Books, 1969); D. G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, (Bombay: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967); Pyarelal, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Thrown to the Wolves, (Calcutta: Eastlight Book House, 1966); Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (New York: Longmans, 1969).
36. Feroz Ahmed, ibid, pp. 88,89.
37. It was Qayyum Khan's government that banned the Red Shirts. During Qayyum Khan's tenure there were several violent clashes between police/troops and Red Shirt supporters, of which the 'Charsadda massacre' of 12 August, 1948 referred to as the Babra incident, is the most famous.
38. Discussed above, chapter one.
39. See Historical Background of NAP, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.).

40. The details of these transformations can be found in M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, (Fall 1970), pp. 394-407.
41. The best work which sets out to explore this tradition of resistance to conquest or integration into a larger nation is A. T. Embree, ed., Pakistan's Western Border Lands, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977).
42. For a study that attempts to look into the validity of such assertions, see Feroz Ahmed, op.cit.
43. Troops were despatched when the Khan of Kalat sought to separate his state from Pakistan. The Pakistan army quickly subdued the Khan's troops and sent him into temporary exile, but by 1962 he was restored to his former status and power. See Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, (London; Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 42.
44. Pushtoonistan: Prime Minister's Statement in the Constituent Assembly on 9 January, 1950, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1950).
45. The genesis of the problem pre-dates the Durand Line, but the drawing of this line in 1893 made the problem acute and projected it into the 20th Century because of its arbitrary division of the Pakhtun tribes between Afghanistan and what was then British India. See Leon B. Poullada, 'Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan', in Pakistan's Western Borderlands op.cit., pp. 126-151.
46. From 1947-50 Afghan demands for Pakhtunistan involved the following: (1) Pakhtunistan should be the name of the NWFP, and of certain areas of Baluchistan; (2) The tribal areas on Pakistan's side of the international boundary (The Durand Line) should be declared a sovereign state of Pakhtunistan, and the NWFP and Baluchistan should be incorporated into this new state. See "Prime Ministers' Statement in the Constituent Assembly", ibid, p. 6.
47. Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Pakistan, Fourth Edition, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 256.
48. Ibid. See also Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan' Foreign Policy, No. 32, (Fall, 1978).
49. These developments are traced in some detail in F. L. Rushbrook Williams, op.cit.
50. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-1948, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 58.
51. Ibid, p. 65.
52. Aziz Ahmed, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

53. For literature tracing the history of the Jamaat and its ideology see Kalim Bahadur, 'Survey of Source Material: The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan: Ideology and Political Action', International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 14, No. 1, (Jan/March, 1975), pp. 69-84. See also Freeland Abbot, 'The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan', Middle East Journal, Vol. II, (Winter, 1957) and K. B. Sayeed, 'Jamaat-e-Islami Movement in Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, (March, 1957), pp. 59-69. The most comprehensive recent work on the Jamaat is S. R. Ahmed, Maulana Maudoodi and the Islamic State, (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1976).
54. Interview with Maulana Maudoodi, Lahore, August 1977.
55. Sayeed, 'The Jamaat-e-Islami Movement', op.cit, p. 61.
56. Skilling, op.cit, p. 75.
57. Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies, op.cit, p. 342.
58. For the official view of Jamaat's role in the religious riots see Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act III of 1954 to inquire into Punjab Disturbances of 1953, (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954).
59. See S. Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca, 1979), p. 44. See also the discussion above, chapter II)
60. S. J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, (London: Macmillan 1980), p. 81.
61. Z. A. Bhutto, Politics of the People: Awakening The People, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 205.
62. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 October 1972 - 31 December 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan 1973), p. 51.
63. Bhutto's concept of a 'disciplined' democracy can be found in many of his speeches and statements. See for instance, Outlook, 18 August 1978, p. 3; and interview to the Guardian reported in Dawn, 3 March, 1972, 1.
64. Outlook, 7 October 1972.
65. Interview with Aziz Ahmed, (minister of state for foreign affairs in the Bhutto government), Islamabad, December 1977. Ahmed also worked closely with Bhutto prior to 1966, when both served as ministers in the Ayub Khan government.
66. Z. A. Bhutto, Interviews to the Press, 20 December 1971 - 13 August 1973, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 224.
67. Interview with Aziz Ahmed.
68. Interviews to the Press, ibid, p. 186.
69. Ibid, p. 173.

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Newsweek, 28 February 1977.
73. Interviews to the Press, ibid, p. 173.
74. Ibid, p. 173, See also Gavin Young, 'The Iron-Fisted Dandy', Sunday Observer, (London), 1 May 1977, p. 28.
75. Z. A. Bhutto, Interview to Asia Observer, 24 December 1975, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1975), p. 6-7.
76. See Anwar H. Syed, 'Z. A. Bhutto's Self-Characterisations and Pakistani Political Culture', Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12, (December, 1978), p. 1263.
77. Interviews with Bhutto's close political colleague, G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
78. 'Interviews to the Press', op.cit. p. 200.
79. Ibid.
80. Speeches and Statements, op.cit., p. 239.
81. See above, chapter II.
82. See above, chapter IV.
83. Z. A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, (Karachi: Vision Publications, 1971), p. 26, 34-35.
84. Burki, op.cit., p. 87-89; Taseer, op.cit., p. 151; Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979), p. 228.
85. For a study that views the 'capacity problem as a major reason for the shift to an authoritarian pattern' in 'new nations', see Gabriel Almond and P. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Development Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 212.
86. See, for example, 'Outlook's' prognosis of a one-party state as early as 1972 in 'Elective Despotism', Outlook, 22 July 1972, p. 3.
87. See Outlook, 5 August 1972, p. 7.
88. Interview with Maulana Maudoodi, Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami, Lahore, August 1977.
89. Interview with Wali Khan, President, NAP, London, September 1979. See also Wali Khan's interview in The Herald, (Karachi), January 1978, pp. 27-30.

90. Z. A. Bhutto, 'Pakistan Builds Anew', Foreign Affairs, (April 1973), p. 542.
91. These fears are clearly reflected in Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978).
92. For instance, Mukhtar Rana was arrested, tried and imprisoned under a martial law regulation in March, 1972. See above, chapter V.
93. Dawn, 12 January, 1972, 1.
94. Outlook, 5 August 1972, p. 7.
95. Dawn, 7 February 1972, 1.
96. Pakistan Times, 23 June 1972, 8.
97. See above, chapter V.
98. For a view that regards this as characteristic of regimes in the new states see Hans Daalder, op.cit, p. 223-224.
99. The Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972) and The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1973).
100. 'All Power to the President', Outlook, 12 August, 1972, pp. 10-11.
101. Burki, op.cit, p. 91.
102. Ibid, pp. 43-44.
103. Interview with Wali Khan.
104. For an assessment of the 1973 constitution see G. W. Choudhury, '"New" Pakistan's Constitution', The Middle East Journal, Vol. 28, (Winter 1974). For a comparison of the 1973 constitution with earlier constitutions, see Y. V. Gankovsky and U. N. Moskalenko, The Three Constitution of Pakistan, (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1978).
105. For the role played by the Jamaat-e-Islami in making the last-minute accord between the government and the opposition possible, see Outlook, 21 April 1973, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 4-7.
106. The two major instances of governmental "intimidation" prior to the constitutional vote involved the dismissal of the NAP-JUI ministry in Baluchistan in February 1973 and the use of police violence against an opposition rally in April, 1973. For details of these incidents, see above, chapter V.
107. For details see, Craig Baxter, 'Constitution-Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 12, (December 1974), pp. 1074-1085.

108. Ibid, p. 1080.
109. The specifically described Islamic provisions are contained in Part IX of The Constitution.
110. For a fuller discussion of the Islamic provisions, see Fazlur Rahman, 'Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan', in J. Henry Korson, ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), pp. 30-44.
111. Article 227 of the Constitution provided the repugnancy clause.
112. Fazlur Rahman, ibid.
113. See Outlook, 25 November 1972, pp. 8-11.
114. Outlook, 31 March 1973, p. 5.
115. The no-confidence motions are governed by the provisions of Article 96 of the constitution.
116. For a discussion of some of the provisions specifically related to the control of opposition and dissent, see Robert La Porte, 'Regionalism and Political Opposition in Pakistan', op.cit, pp. 219-223.
117. A fifth source of opposition to the regime - that from within the party itself - and how Bhutto dealt with it has already been discussed in chapter VII above.
118. For details of political prisoners and cases of torture, see, Amnesty International Report: Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1976, (London, 1977) which covers the period from the time a state of emergency was declared in 1971 to January 1977.
119. These views can be found in The Great Tragedy, op.cit.
120. Herald, op.cit.
121. Dawn, 17 July 1974, 1, and New Times 24 January, 1972, 1.
122. See NAP's Concept of Nationalities, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), pp. 3-4.
123. These view are clearly reflected in the submissions of the state counsel to the Supreme Court during the hearings of the dissolution of NAP. See Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar's Opening Address in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 19,20,23, June, 1975, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1975).
124. Ibid, p. 30.
125. Outlook, 20 July 1974.
126. For a view that argues otherwise, see L. F. R. Rushbrook Williams, op.cit.

127. For Wali Khan's ideology see for instance Anwar Muzdakiy, Wali Khan key Sujasat (Urdu), (Lahore: Tariq Publishers, 1972).
128. Interview with Wali Khan.
129. Dawn, 30 March 1972, 1.
130. Interview with Begum Nasim Wali Khan, London, September 1979.
131. Outlook, 17 June 1972,
132. See above, chapter V.
133. Robert La Porte, 'Power and Privilege', op.cit, pp. 104-105.
134. See above, chapter V.
135. That Bhutto was aware of the long run implications of such a policy is evident from the correspondence between him and senior officials in the P.M.'s secretariat (in 1976); See White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1978), Annexures 69-71.
136. For details, see above, chapter five, 'Political Reconstruction'.
137. Such allegations were made by the Bhutto government even prior to the banning of NAP. See White Paper on Baluchistan, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1974).
138. Amnesty International Report, op.cit, p. 53.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid, pp. 50-60.
141. For Bhutto's resolve to destroy the Sardari system see Prime Minister's Speech in Parliament: Situation in Baluchistan, 26 April 1976, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1976).
142. For example, the total development expenditure in Baluchistan for ten years (from 1960-61 to 1969-70) amounted to Rs. 300 million. Under Bhutto Rs. 300 million became the budgeted figure for development expenditure in one year alone (1976-1977). Similarly, development funds for NWFP were more than doubled.
143. For a view of the 'sardari system' from a neo-Marxist perspective, see Aijaz Ahmed, The National Question in Baluchistan', in Feroze Ahmed, op.cit, pp. 6-44.
144. Interview with Ghaus Baksh Raisani, former PPP governor of Baluchistan, Islamabad, October 1979.
145. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (London: Pan Books, 1979), pp. 134.
146. 'The Jamaat-e-Islaami Movement in Pakistan,' op.cit, p. 64.

147. See note 53 above. See also Kalim Bahadur, The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977).
148. For Maudoodi's ideology see the bibliography in Bahadur, ibid. Many of the Maudoodi publications referred to in this have been translated and published in English. See also C. Adams, 'The Ideology of Maudoodi', in D. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
149. A. A. Maudoodi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969), p. 140.
150. A. A. Maudoodi, Political Theory of Islam, (Pathankot, n.d.), pp. 31-32.
151. Figure quoted in Asaf Hussein, Elite Politics in an Ideological State (Kent: Dawson, 1979), p. 80.
152. See for instance, E. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 247.
153. Hussein, ibid, p. 81.
154. Aijaz Ahmed, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan', Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 4, (1978), pp. 500-505.
155. Interview with Maulana Maudoodi.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Speech made by the Amir of the Jamaat quoted in Pakistan Times, 23 February 1973, p. 1.
159. Interview with Mian Tufail Ahmed, Lahore, August 1977.
160. P. E. Jones, op.cit, chapter XI.
161. Ibid, p. 546.
162. As for instance, K. B. Sayeed, 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political change in Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 2, (July 1979).
163. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, op.cit, pp. 240-242.
164. The best known example was the ban imposed on Urdu Digest. The editor and publisher, Altaf and Ijaz Qureishi, were arrested in Lahore on 20 March, 1976. Both were sentenced to two years imprisonment by a special tribunal of Punjab. Interview with Dr. Ijaz Qureishi, London, July 1979.
165. Amnesty International Report, op.cit, pp. 14-15.
166. Interview with Asghar Khan, Rawalpindi, October 1979.



167. Amnesty International Report, op.cit, p. 38.
168. Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay), 26 February 1977, Vo. XII, No. 9, p. 398.
169. Dissident PPP members who faced such charges included Mukhtar Rana, Abdul Hamid Jatoi, Mahmud Kasuri, Mustapha Khan and Saeed Hasan to name but a few. See Outlook, 21 October 1972, p. 3. Opposition leaders against whom 'cases' were registered are too numerous to be mentioned here.
170. Outlook, 3 March, 1973, p. 3.
171. Amnesty International Report, ibid, pp. 41-49.
172. The Constitution (First Amendment) Bill of April 1974, empowered the government to dissolve parties and associations working against the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. This provision was used to ban NAP. The Third Constitutional Amendment of February 1975, widened the constitutional provisions for preventive detention and also removed the requirement that parliament has to give approval for the extension of emergency every six months, thus limiting the amount of legislative control over the executive. The Fourth Constitutional Amendment, of November 1975, seriously limited the power of the High Courts to grant bail. The Fifth Constitutional Amendment, of September 1976, withdrew all powers from the High Courts to give orders for interim relief including bail.
173. See above, chapter V.
174. White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 10-13.
175. The most well-known incident took place at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, on 23 March 1973, where a UDF rally was fired upon and led to six deaths. See: 'Liaquat Bagh Tragedy' in White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 107-114.
176. Outlook, 4 August 1973, p. 3.
177. For instance, Ahmed Reza Kasuri claimed that the Karachi office of the Tehriq-e-Istaqlal was burned by goondas of the PPP in July 1973. Economic and Political Weekly, op.cit, p. 398.
178. Amnesty International Report, op.cit, pp. 64-66.
179. Ibid, pp. 66-67.
180. After his fall from power, Bhutto was tried, convicted and hanged to death for his complicity in this murder. See Lahore High Court Judgement in Murder Trial: State vs. Z. A. Bhutto and Others, (Lahore: Pakistan Times Press, 1978).

181. In 1975, Asghar Khan claimed that there had been 24 political murders in the country since the PPP took power, but that the government did not act in a single case.
182. For a view that treats this mode of action as characteristic of opposition parties in new states, see Edward Shils, op.cit.
183. Pakistan Times, 29 April, 1973, 1.
184. Nawa-i-Waqt, 7 November 1976, 1.
185. Pakistan Times, 8 November 1976, 1.
186. Interview with (Retd) Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, London, March 1979.
187. See Dawn, 6 October 1974, p. 1.
188. Quoted in Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm', Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 7, (July 1977), p. 586.
189. This is indicated by the publication by the opposition alliance of a long catalogue of methods that the ruling party had allegedly planned to use in order to rig the result. See Hurriyat, 2 March 1977, 1., and The Leader, 5 March 1977, 1.
190. M. G. Weinbaum, 'The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost', Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 7, (July 1977), p. 614.
191. There is universal agreement among writers on Pakistan that the election was rigged. There is disagreement only on the extent of the rigging. Bhutto, himself, admitted that there was rigging but not to the tune of materially affecting the result, and that he was not personally responsible for the malpractices that did occur. See Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated" (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1979).
192. "If I Am Assassinated", ibid.
193. 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan', op.cit., p. 128.
194. Quoted in ibid., p. 131.
195. Figures quoted in Statement filed by the Federations' Counsel in the Supreme Court hearing of Mrs. Bhutto's petition challenging Martial Law Regulation No. 12. See Pakistan Times, 12 October 1977, 7.
196. Section 144, which bars the public assembly of more than four people, was imposed by Bhutto immediately after the polling.
197. This characteristic of 'new' states finds mention in many studies of comparative politics. See for instance, Hans Daalder, op.cit., p. 218, and Lucien Pye, 'The Non-Western Political Process', in H. Eckstein, David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader, (London: Free Press, 1963), p. 660.

198. Taseer, op.cit, p. 160.
199. The PNA Council made its endorsement contingent upon the prior settlement of nine points, all of which related to procedural matters, such as date of withdrawal of the army from Baluchistan, the date of dissolution of the N.A. etc. The hardliner among the opposition leadership who was generally regarded to be responsible for the talks deadlock was Asghar Khan. For details see the author's 'Pakistan in Crisis', The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1, (March 1978), pp. 60-78.
200. This is also noted by Anwar H. Syed, op.cit, p. 1266.
201. Hugh Tinker, 'Considering Their Verdict', Review Article, Times Literary Supplement, 8 February 1980, p. 139.

## X

BHUTTO AND THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACYINTRODUCTION

The most outstanding feature of Pakistan's political system from the time of independence was the dominant and decisive role played by the civilian bureaucracy and the military in national decision making.<sup>1</sup> Whether such pre-eminence was a logical concomitant of the asymmetry of institutions inherited from the colonial past (i.e. the organisational superiority of the civilian and military bureaucracy vis a vis political institutions),<sup>2</sup> or resulted from the "pre-emption and monopolisation of key governmental offices in the political system by bureaucratic elites" in the immediate post-independence period, need not concern us here.<sup>3</sup> It is sufficient to note the primacy and autonomy of the civilian and military bureaucracy,<sup>4</sup> a phenomenon which led observers to characterise Pakistan as an "administrative state",<sup>5</sup> or one in which the Viceregal pattern of authority prevailed.<sup>6</sup>

When Bhutto assumed power in 1971, he recognised that both the military and civilian bureaucracy could seriously limit his capacity to govern and his freedom to manoeuvre. This indicated that given Bhutto's concern to widen and ensure his control over the political system, the legacy of bureaucratic and military dominance could not survive intact. The sheer survival of the new regime depended, in the perception of Bhutto and his party leaders, on taking prompt and effective action to curb the autonomous power of the military and bureaucracy.<sup>7</sup>

In his endeavours to establish political control over what were viewed as rival centres of power, Bhutto's task was eased by the circumstances surrounding his accession to power. Bhutto had come to power at an extraordinary juncture in Pakistan's history, when the separation of Bangladesh had brought about a national crisis characterised by a power vacuum, in which the two traditional bases of power, the army and the bureaucracy had suffered an immense loss in public prestige. The PPP, on the other hand possessed considerable legitimacy. The 1971 war had not only exploded the myth of military invincibility, but had adversely affected the civilian bureaucracy. Indeed, some observers pointed out that the civil bureaucracy (especially its elite corps, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) ) had suffered an even greater loss of prestige and status than the military.<sup>8</sup> The close identification of CSP bureaucrats with the policies followed by the previous regimes made the bureaucracy the target of vehement public criticism. In the case of the military, such criticism was to some extent moderated by the traditional reverence for the military as an institution, and public attacks were directed largely at a coterie of generals identified with the Yahya regime. But in the case of the civil service, the past record as we shall see below, was less one of public respect than of disillusionment and discontent.

Disarray in the army and bureaucracy gave Bhutto unparalleled leverage.<sup>9</sup> The weakness and despair that gripped these institutions thus set the scene for Bhutto to consolidate his personal authority. Bhutto was anxious to

exploit this relatively favourable position to re-fashion these Viceregal institutions, and to re-define their role in the political system. The manner in which Bhutto sought to establish political control over the civilian and military bureaucracy forms the major concern of this and the following chapter.<sup>10</sup> To what extent did the Bhutto regime alter these institutions, and to what effect? Our analysis of such questions shows that Bhutto followed a paradoxical policy by attempting to curtail the power, prestige and status of the civil-military bureaucratic apparatus, while placing considerable reliance on such machinery for the process of governance (which only served to strengthen such machinery). Those who envisaged Bhutto as radically altering the traditional configuration of power and introducing a new style of governing by, for instance, replacing the bureaucracy with the PPP in the national decision-making arena were disappointed.<sup>11</sup> In dealing with the military and the bureaucracy, Bhutto relied on patrimonialism as a means of establishing control but having established this personal control, Bhutto attempted to make the bureaucracy (albeit a 'reformed' and politicised one) and especially the expanded police component, and the military, important pillars of his regime. Bhutto's attempts to curb the autonomy and primacy of the military-bureaucratic apparatus represented a significant departure from one aspect of the Viceregal tradition, i.e, the independent power exercised by the military and bureaucracy. But his dependence on such machinery, especially the bureaucracy, for governance, represented a

reversion to Viceregal practice in the sense of relying on bureaucratic rather than representative institutions for operational activity and daily control. Thus while Bhutto probably went further than anyone else in Pakistani history in seeking to curb the independent power of the military and bureaucracy, his goal was not to eliminate their influence altogether, but to reduce their powers and to compel their obedience to his personal authority. In pursuing this goal, while Bhutto was decidedly more cautious in his dealings with the military, he appears to have followed a common strategy (of patrimonial control) with respect to both power groups. This was coupled with structural reforms that further enhanced his personal control over these institutions. We turn now to a more detailed discussion of these efforts with the case of the civilian bureaucracy being examined in this chapter, and the military in chapter eleven.

#### PPP AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: THE BACKGROUND

In order to understand the implications of the policies followed by the Bhutto regime with regard to the civil service, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the nature of the public bureaucracy from independence upto 1971.<sup>12</sup> Two features stand out in sharp relief in this period: firstly, the unchallenged dominance of the elite cadre (CSP) within the administration; and secondly, the need for administrative reform as expressed in numerous 'reform commissions' (set up under successive regimes) and in public criticism (public refers both to the general

public and to political leaders) of the bureaucracy.<sup>13</sup> The system of administration inherited from the colonial era underwent little fundamental change after 1947, despite the need expressed by successive regimes to bring the administrative structure more in line "with the demands of an independent society."<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the first five year plan claimed that the inadequacy of Pakistan's administrative apparatus was the most serious single impediment to development."<sup>15</sup> The need for reform was clear from the establishment of several reform commissions - from 1947 to 1962, twenty-eight such commissions were set up for the purpose of reforming, reorganising and improving different aspects of the administrative system.<sup>16</sup> However, despite such reform efforts (predictably resisted by the higher bureaucracy),<sup>17</sup> the essence of the system was not touched but often warmly defended.<sup>18</sup>

The system of administration - so resistant to reform-was a highly complicated and cumbersome one. A major organisational feature was the fractionalisation of the public services.<sup>19</sup> There were class divisions of rank (I,II,III,IV), with each class recruited separately,<sup>20</sup> and spatial divisions (central and provincial). The public services were further divided into some twenty-six central services ranging in prestige from the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) to the Central Engineering Service, Class II. Beneath these superior services were Class III and IV services, the latter comprising menial help. Each of the provinces had a comparable service structure assigned within the province (discharging roughly comparable



functions, but in terms of status, not comparable). In each province the provincial service roughly comparable to the CSP was known as the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). Recruitment to the central services was a function of the Central Public Service Commission.<sup>21</sup> Each of the provinces had a comparable commission for recruitment to the provincial services. There was no unified public service unit in control of all aspects of employment, discipline, salaries, and structure - these functions were shared by the Federal Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the Establishment Division.<sup>22</sup> It is important to note that there was virtually no interchange of personnel between the various (functional) cadres of the central services on the one hand, and between the central and provincial services on the other hand. On an overall basis then, the public services revealed no less than 600 different scales of pay and grades, and fifty separate cadres, each 'closed' and compartmentalised with separate rules and regulations.<sup>23</sup>

Capping the entire public service structure in bureaucratic power and prestige, was the elitist cadre, CSP, lineal descendant of the Indian Civil Service - a group of 300 - 500 "generalists", representing no more than 0.07 per cent of the entire bureaucracy.<sup>24</sup> Members of the CSP were recruited by means of a competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), the examination itself based on Macaulay's famous assertion that "the persons who excel over others in academic learning also excel over them in other walks of life."<sup>25</sup>

The CSP was a distinctive, cohesive entity with a high degree of elan, and was characterised as "unique among the systems inheriting the imperial tradition of the ICS in the sense that its sense of exclusiveness and imperiousness have been only slightly affected since independence."<sup>26</sup> Basic to the CSP ethos was the classical-literary-generalist educational bias presumed to impart the virtues of Platonic guardianship, which, indeed, was the distinguishing feature of the imperial Indian Civil Service.<sup>27</sup> Further, the now classic formulation of Macaulay, calling for a class of administrators "Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" could appropriately be applied to the CSP.<sup>28</sup>

Members of the CSP were posted to assignments both in the central secretariat and in local administration in the provinces.<sup>29</sup> Indeed all members of the CSP started their careers as district officers, as did ICS officers before partition. CSP officers usually headed divisions and districts and held posts on the staff of divisional commissioners and in the departments of the provincial secretariat<sup>30</sup> thus setting the tone of local and provincial administration.<sup>31</sup> The CSP certainly constituted the "pivotal service around which the entire administrative edifice at the centre and province was organised."<sup>32</sup> Through a system of "reservations" the CSP monopolised the top administrative jobs at the centre, and strategic positions in the provinces. Two-thirds of all posts of secretaries, joint secretaries, and deputy secretaries, (of the central secretariat) and three-fourths of the

'cadre posts' in the provinces (such as chief secretary, divisional commissioners, etc) were reserved for the CSP.<sup>33</sup> In a study of the power of the higher bureaucracy of Pakistan, Ralph Braibanti found that in 1964, 89 per cent of (central) secretaries, 66 per cent of provincial secretaries, 75 per cent of divisional commissioners and 51 per cent of district officers were members of the CSP.<sup>34</sup> A natural corollary of this phenomenon was that technical experts and other "specialists" found that key policy posts were closed to them.

The CSP's hold over the administrative system was so firm that it was able successfully to resist any attempt at reform perceived as harming its elite nature or interests.<sup>35</sup> It prevailed on successive governments to shelve reports which were adverse in their comments on its role and efficiency. It was for demonstrating such power that the CSP was derisively termed the Central Sultans of Pakistan by critics.<sup>36</sup> The CSP's power was confined not only to the administration but extended also to the country's political system. The role of the CSP in the political arena has been dealt with in considerable detail elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> It is sufficient to note here that after the death of both Jinnah and Liaquat, the CSP - as the bureaucracy in general - in filling the power vacuum which was created by the turbulence of the parliamentary period (the disintegration of the Muslim League, factional in-fighting, etc) actively participated in political affairs. This role earned for it the title of the "best organised political party of Pakistan".<sup>38</sup> The CSP was often described as the

hotbed of political intrigue and manipulation.<sup>39</sup> The powerful position of the CSP in national decision-making was little affected by the military takeover in 1958. There was no overt supercession of civil authority by the military; on the contrary, the civil bureaucracy, rid of political harassment, became stronger than ever.<sup>40</sup> The Ayubian regime essentially represented a partnership between the army and the CSP.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, Ayub's reliance on the bureaucracy as the major tool for 'nation-building' activities only served to enhance the power and prestige of the CSP.<sup>42</sup>

The performance of the bureaucracy in general and the status of the CSP in particular met with severe criticism from different sources on several grounds, from independence onwards. For instance, criticism has been voiced about the CSP's exclusivity and its alleged arrogance, and debates of the Constituent and National Assemblies are replete with such references against the cadre. The following remarks of one member of the Constituent Assembly exemplify such sentiments:

"Our civil service has been formed and drawn up by the best talent in the country, yet what is the training that is imparted?....They are being taught the same tradition as in the 'British day... ..They are inaccessible people....Is it that you are going to train your own people to hate your own system, to hate your own civilisation and culture?" 43

The same sentiments were expressed by another politician who declared that:

"All the hatred in the hearts of the people against any government is due mainly to the self-conceited and haughty behaviour of the functionaries." 44

Civil servants in general were frequently criticised in the press and in parliament for being arrogant and aloof from the common people.<sup>45</sup> Officials were accused of behaving like "brown Englishmen" and treating the ordinary man in the street with contempt.<sup>46</sup> A different kind of criticism was that the CSP placed the generalist executive in positions of power above the technical experts, even in agencies where technical matters were dominant.<sup>47</sup> Members of the rival PCS frequently expressed the need for altering the monopolistic hold of the CSP. Thus criticism of the administrative system came from both within and outside the service.<sup>48</sup>

Much of this criticism, particularly that pertaining to the exclusivity, aloofness and arrogance of the higher bureaucracy, was justified by the facts. The elite nature of the civil service and its reverence for its colonial antecedents and practices has not been disputed or denied even by defenders of the civil bureaucracy. Indeed, CSP representatives have conceded that the bureaucracy has been arrogant, and non-responsive to the public.<sup>49</sup> However, they have argued that these features are not limited to the public bureaucracy but are in fact transmitted to the latter by the political system. In other words, public officials become non-responsive and arrogant when the political government is non-responsive and arrogant. As a senior member of the CSP stated:

"The administrative system partakes of the qualities of the political system. . . .the bureaucracy is not designed to be a check against the political head." 50

Thus although the CSP accepted much of the public criticisms directed against it, by holding that "the corrective has to be found at the political level",<sup>51</sup> it blocked any significant effort to reform the administrative system. At the same time, the higher bureaucrats' determination to cling to their historic privileges and to resist any diminution in their status obviated any endeavour that could redress public grievances as reflected in the criticism of the bureaucracy noted above.

Public criticism of the bureaucracy reached a peak towards the end of Ayub's regime.<sup>52</sup> Indeed popular resentment against the civil service was a significant element in the anti-Ayub agitation of 1968-69.<sup>53</sup> Two slogans of the 1968-69 mass movement were directed specifically against the bureaucracy - 'Nauker Shahi Murdabad' (death to the servant-kings) criticised the concentration of political power in the hands of the bureaucrats, while 'Rishwat-sitani Khatum Karo' (end corruption) criticised widespread administrative corruption.<sup>54</sup> A government announcement in November 1969 (under the military regime headed by Yahya) recognising the role played by anti-bureaucracy sentiments, stated that:

"among the causes of public resentment which led to country-wide demonstrations during the period preceding the imposition of martial law on 25 March 1969, resentment against the structure of administration figured prominently." 55

The announcement further stated that the condemnation of the administrative structure had been based on complaints that:

"it was a relic of the colonial past in which the relationship between government functionaries and the people was that of the ruler and the ruled",.....

that it had contributed

"to sustain and even strengthen the ruling elite within the service cadres which had sacrificed administrative neutrality for political partnership"

and that it had

"helped to promote corruption, inefficiency and selfishness."

The announcement also noted the discontent within the civil service itself, an obvious reference to the resentment amongst non-CSP groups and "professionals" (engineers, college teachers and doctors) against the generalist CSP's. For instance, in 1969, the Rawalpindi-Islamabad PCS Association declared that the CSP's "colonialist mentality" had contributed to the current political unrest and that its hegemony had demoralised the other services.<sup>56</sup> These views were echoed in a meeting of the representatives of the five 'financial services' in March 1969 where a resolution was passed which stated the following:

"At present, the CSPs are more equal than others, not due to any intrinsic merit but owing to an outdated colonialistic system of imperial preference." <sup>57</sup>

Yahya responded to this upsurge of condemnation of the bureaucratic structure by dismissing 303 class I officers, including 38 CSP members on grounds of corruption, misuse of office and misconduct.<sup>58</sup> Yahya also set up a Services Reorganisation Committee (SRC) under the chairmanship of Justice Cornelius.<sup>59</sup> The choice of Cornelius was

significant, for it was his vocal criticism of the CSP as contained in the (1962) Cornelius Report that had earlier led to the Report's suppression. Yahya's pre-occupation with the crisis in East Pakistan, however, did not give him the opportunity of implementing the proposals of the SRC. It was left to the new regime to grapple with the problem of administrative reorganisation.

#### BHUTTO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

It was against this background that the PPP assumed power. Before undertaking an analysis of the PPP's dealings with the civil bureaucracy, we will first refer briefly to the views held by Bhutto and his party as regards the civil service. It is important to note at the outset that Bhutto, as a minister in the Ayub cabinet for eight years (serving in a variety of portfolios - Commerce, Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Kashmir, National Reconstruction and Information, Tourism, Minority Affairs and Foreign Affairs) - had had the occasion to observe closely the inner workings of the administrative system. His personal observations probably conditioned his later responses and strategy, and had a significant impact on the evolution of his party's programmatic position on administrative 'reform'.

Bhutto had both noted the CSP's powerful position and what he saw as their exercise of unrestricted power as well as their proclivity for political intrigue.<sup>60</sup> From 1959 he had closely watched how the CSP (as represented by men like Altaf Gauhar and Fida Hussain) had first supported Ayub and then withdrawn their support as they saw his



regime weakening. He identified the CSP's formidable power as the major obstruction to any regime's ability to govern effectively. As a result, he was determined "to break the back of the CSP".<sup>61</sup> Bhutto was also keenly aware of inter-service rivalries and jealousies, particularly the tension between CSP's and non-CSP's and between the central and provincial bureaucracy (PCS); he had noted in particular, the frustration of technical experts and 'professionals' vis à vis the generalist administrators. More importantly, Bhutto held the concept of administrative neutrality in contempt. He explained the rationale behind the 'myth' of administrative neutrality thus:

"The myth of the segregated, neutral civil servant was needed by colonialism... The imperial power had created a cast iron framework of civil servants to be unavailable, and hence faceless, to the natives; to be neutral in the feuds of the natives and in dealing with the communal and political problems of the natives.... Even this neutrality was tilted from time to time, in favour of one faction or another, to serve the ends of the Raj." 62

For Bhutto, the neutrality of civil servants was a myth, perpetuated by them into the post-colonial era, to protect their own interests at the expense of those whom they claimed to serve. In many of his public speeches Bhutto attempted to show that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan had in fact worked hand in glove with "capitalists" and "big business" to preserve the status quo.<sup>63</sup> On other occasions, he warned the "bureaucracy of this country to change its behaviour."<sup>64</sup> Some of these statements have to be taken at face value, since they were made with an eye

for public consumption. After all, as we shall see below, Bhutto was to put the civil bureaucracy to his own purposes.

Many of Bhutto's stated beliefs were reflected in party documents. The PPP's Foundation Papers severely criticised the administrative structure,<sup>65</sup> while another document reiterated the belief that the higher bureaucracy "have a big stake in the maintenance of the status quo, which is to say free field for predatory capitalists."<sup>66</sup> The PPP's election manifesto (1970) underlined the need for reform of the administrative system by declaring that

"The present system of administration is a legacy of colonial rule...whatever modifications have been introduced...have been done to meet the needs of the rising indigenous capitalist class and to promote the interest of the groups that were acquiring wealth by holding the levers of power within government and administration....The administration then became its own master." 67

The manifesto further stated that "the socialist regime will need a different structure of administration", a reflection of the belief that unless 'modified' the bureaucracy would obstruct the PPP's 'socialist reforms.'<sup>68</sup> In calling for public accountability of official actions, the manifesto declared that "the present rule of anonymity will have to be drastically modified."<sup>69</sup>

#### PURGES, REFORM AND PATRIMONIAL CONTROL

In his first address to the nation, on his assumption of power, Bhutto emphasised the need for administrative reform to put the colonial legacy to rest.<sup>70</sup> Subsequent

actions reflected Bhutto's concern with establishing his personal control over the bureaucracy through a variety of methods, including structural reforms. The following section is concerned with analysing the mechanics of such control, and the relations that ensued between politicians and administrators as a consequence of this control. As we shall see below, in order to establish control over the civilian bureaucracy, Bhutto relied on "personalist" - as opposed to organisational means - a strategy that was earlier termed as 'patrimonialism', and one we earlier suggested he utilised to establish his personal control over the PPP. (See chapter VI). As we shall see presently, both the "purges" and structural reforms enhanced Bhutto's personal control over the bureaucracy.

One of Bhutto's first actions after assuming power was the purge under a martial law regulation in March 1972, of 1,300 (later the list was increased by another 700, but this also included those who were demoted rather than dismissed) public servants on grounds of corruption or inefficiency.<sup>71</sup> The list of dismissed civil servants included several CSP's (a breakdown by service is not available.) While it is difficult to estimate whether those dismissed were in fact corrupt or inefficient or both, since the announcement did not substantiate such charges in individual cases,<sup>72</sup> there is little dispute over the fact that this move was meant to convey to the public servants the need to fall in line with the wishes of the new regime. Part of the reason behind the move was the need to respond to public criticism of the bureaucracy as discussed

earlier. But the strongest motive appeared to have been Bhutto's desire to establish his personal supremacy over the bureaucratic structure. By inculcating a sense of insecurity and vulnerability amongst the officials, Bhutto was in a position to exert the asymmetrical lines of dependency which forms a necessary condition of any system of "personal rulership" or "patrimonial" control.<sup>73</sup> The purge had the desired effect of leaving high-ranking bureaucrats fearful of the future, and the fact that one hundred and fifty of the dismissed were later reinstated (through recommendations from influential PPP sources)<sup>74</sup> was a clear enough reminder to the bureaucrats of both the desirability of following the regime's dictates if they wished to remain secure, and on gaining either Bhutto's favour or those close to him, if they were to survive in office. It may be relevant to mention that the dismissed public servants were given no legal recourse (i.e. there was no provision for a show-cause notice) - a factor which only served to highlight the officials' dependence on Bhutto for 'justice'.<sup>75</sup> The lack of due process afforded to the dismissed bureaucrats not only initiated a wave of fear and insecurity within the (higher ranks) of the bureaucracy, but alarmed even members of the PPP, like Mahmud Ali Kasuri (Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs until October 1972) who, ironically was known for his disdain for the civil servants, and in particular the CSP.<sup>76</sup>

Two further purges were conducted in August 1973 and October 1976. The former affected fifteen senior officers of whom ten were CSP's and included the president

of the CSP Association, Qamar ul Islam (whom Bhutto had himself appointed as head of the Planning Commission in 1972). The action of October 1976 affected 63 officers who were compulsorily retired and 95 officers who were served with show cause notices.<sup>77</sup> It is difficult to determine the number of CSP's amongst these officers since breakdown by service was not given. Other than these bulk retirements a number of officers were also individually retired on different occasions. These included notable CSP officers such as Zafar Iqbal (see below), Afzal Agha, and Aslam Bajwa, with the official reason for their dismissal varying from case to case.

The combined effect of such purges and dismissals was to enhance the sense of vulnerability amongst the civil servants.<sup>78</sup> This sense of insecurity was intensified by frequent threats by Bhutto and his ministers of further "screenings" of "the corrupt",<sup>79</sup> as well as by reports that "lists" were being prepared of government officials "who had acquired land by dubious means."<sup>80</sup> Thus were created the ideal conditions for Bhutto to bring into play his patrimonial strategy. The message was effectively communicated and comprehended: rewards/punishments, promotions/demotions within the administrative sphere were dependent upon the will of Bhutto. As one civil servant put it "total submission (to Bhutto) was indicated as a requirement to survive in office."<sup>81</sup> The situation was succinctly summed up by an opposition leader, who noted that the government servants

"have learnt to their utter confusion, like Pavlov's dogs that there is no knowing when the hands that brings to them the sweets and the meats can also

deliver a stinging smack on the cheek or a box on the ear....Bewildered and confounded, they have surrendered themselves to the whims of the one who feeds them, and to accept the blows as part of the game, in the hope that next time, or the next, it will be sweets....." 82

The use of the 'stick' approach indicated above, was accompanied by the 'carrot' technique, to consolidate Bhutto's personal control over the bureaucracy. This involved rewarding those loyal to his regime - often promoting them over the heads of their superiors to ensure their personal indebtedness.<sup>83</sup> Patrimonial control was thus assured through the placement of officials in strategic positions within the administration. In making such appointments, Bhutto, initially, was often careful to exclude CSP members as indicated for example, by his selection of Vaqar Ahmed (of the Audit and Accounts Service) as Cabinet and Establishment Secretary, Afzal Saeed, secretary to the P.M. (who also headed the P.M.'s secretariat), Rao Abdur Rashid, special secretary (cabinet division) and Saeed Ahmed Khan, chief security adviser, who emerged as the more powerful of Bhutto's bureaucratic advisers, were all non-CSP officials who received rapid promotions through demonstrating their personal loyalty to Bhutto. When a senior CSP official, Zafar Iqbal wrote a letter of protest to the establishment secretary, asking for the grounds on which he had been superceded by a junior officer, (Afzal Saeed) he was summarily dismissed on Bhutto's instructions.<sup>84</sup> The Zafar Iqbal Case, as this incident came to be called, was clearly intended as a warning to those who dared to question Bhutto's personnel procedures. "I will not",

Bhutto is reported to have declared on this occasion, "tolerate impertinent individuals like this malapert civil servant."<sup>85</sup>

In his efforts to curtail the power of the CSP Bhutto withdrew the constitutional security of tenure previously enjoyed by the service and guaranteed by all previous constitutions.<sup>86</sup> When the opposition parties protested, pointing out that constitutional guarantees were necessary as a protection against arbitrary dismissal, Bhutto condemned this as "a legacy of the past", holding that "as in all countries this has been left to ordinary legislation."<sup>87</sup> Within his own party, Kasuri too registered a strong note of protest stating that "servants of the state, who are dismissable at the pleasure of their superiors, will tend to lose their independence and will become obliging instruments in the hands of their ..... political superiors."<sup>88</sup> The Civil Servants Act, 1973, provided a simplified disciplinary procedure, under which civil servants above the rank of additional secretary could be retired at any time without assigning any reason, while officers in grade 20 (see below, for grading system) and below could be retired at any time after completing twenty-five years of service.<sup>89</sup> Indeed the purge of August 1973 discussed earlier was intended to let the senior officers know the cutting power of the teeth put in the new 'simplified' disciplinary procedure - to remind them of their precarious tenure under the PPP regime.

The promised administrative reforms, announced on 20 August 1973 paved the way for the politicisation of the

civil service, and provided Bhutto with further means of establishing his personal control over the bureaucracy.<sup>90</sup> The principal target of Bhutto's reforms was the CSP. The CSP which consisted of 320 members in 1972, was disbanded along with all the other services, in order to be integrated into the new All-Pakistan Unified Grades. The CSP's protected status was terminated, and new functional categories were introduced.<sup>91</sup> Over 660 different scales of pay were replaced by a simplified and unified 22-grade national pay scale structure.<sup>92</sup> Equivalent grades were developed so that no officers in the pre-reform era would lose position or pay which indicated that the government fully intended to retain the great majority of officers associated with the now defunct services (e.g. CSP). Corresponding grades for the classes were as follows:<sup>93</sup>

<u>Gazetted</u>		<u>Non-Gazetted</u>	
Class I	Grades 17 to 23	Class II	Grades 11 to 15
Class II	Grade 16	Class III	Grades 3 to 10
		Class IV	Grades 1 and 2

Grades 16 and above were to be appointed by the prime minister; grades 3 to 15 by Grade 20 officers or above; and grades 1 and 2 by deputy secretaries, heads of departments or heads of offices. Provision was made for horizontal movement between cadres, and thus for technical personnel to take up senior management positions that in the past were reserved for generalists. This also made it possible for entry into the government service through lateral appointment.<sup>94</sup> Introduced with the ostensible purpose of bringing in talent at all levels from the private



sector and the professions, the scheme clearly had the potential to develop into a major instrument of political patronage. That Bhutto wished to monopolise the power of lateral appointments was suggested by the fact that the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) was given no control or say in such appointments. Indeed, the powers of the Public Service Commissioners were considerably trimmed, so that they "were reduced, in effect, to mere shadows of their former selves."<sup>95</sup> For instance, under the Federal Public Commission Act, 1973, the President was empowered to terminate the appointment of a member (of the FPSC) before the expiry of his term. In addition, the FPSC's consultative functions did not extend to disciplinary matters. Indeed, the FPSC's functions were largely limited to conducting tests and examinations for recruitment to the unified grades.

It should be noted that the administrative reform, besides providing Bhutto with the instrument (indeed the legal provisions) of consolidating his patrimonial control over the bureaucracy, served a number of other functions. It enabled Bhutto to demonstrate to his left-wing supporters within the party, that, as promised he had humbled what he termed Pakistan's 'Brahmins' and 'Mandarins'. It enabled him to meet the demand for change in the administrative machinery voiced from within the civil service and from without. Above all, it helped enlist popular support from people in practically all walks of life who had grown weary of administrative inaction, indifference and corruption. The language in which Bhutto's speech announcing the

reform was couched, the deliberate use of slogans such as putting an end to 'Naukershahi' (rule by civil servants), was clearly aimed at reinforcing his popular standing. "No" Bhutto declared in the course of his speech, "we cannot retain such Barra Sahibs in a people's government.. . . .(we) cannot but liquidate the casteism and snobbery bred by Pakistan's present structure."<sup>96</sup> Press reports indicated that "Bhutto's announcement evoked glee among large numbers of people who were thrilled by the spectacular downfall of the CSP."<sup>97</sup> This was especially true among segments of the intelligentsia who sensed new opportunities when Bhutto noted that

"the country could no longer condone a system which elevated the generalist above the scientist, technician, professional expert, artist or the teacher."

Press reports, however, did not indicate the demoralisation and sense of insecurity amongst the senior bureaucrats about the intentions of the regime.<sup>98</sup>

The nature of the 'new structure' soon became apparent. The influence of the (former) CSP initially declined appreciably, while strategic positions in the bureaucracy came to be occupied by Bhutto's personal appointees. Bhutto's power over appointments, dismissals, promotions, and transfers became the prime instrument through which control over the bureaucracy was established. The new flexible rules of promotion - now rid of the seniority principle, enabled Bhutto both to punish and to reward. Files in the P.M.'s secretariat show Bhutto's personal supervision over transfers even at relatively

lower levels of the district administration.<sup>99</sup> Even the selection of persons for routine assignments (within the central secretariat) was referred to him for final approval. Additionally, his personal appointee, Vaqar Ahmed who occupied the crucial post of Establishment and Cabinet secretary, was used as a channel for the exercise of this patrimonial strategy.<sup>100</sup> Vaqar both put up the cases of appointments/dismissals, promotions/demotions to Bhutto (in accordance with the political criteria outlined by him), and in many instances, used his own discretion to reward those loyal to the regime (through appointments and promotions) and punish the 'unreliables'.<sup>101</sup> An incident concerning Dr. Tariq Siddiqui, education secretary (Punjab Government) helps to illustrate the latter phenomena. In a departmental meeting, Dr. Siddiqui was reported to have expressed doubts about implementing a particular aspect of the regime's educational policy by the date specified. Within hours, these comments were reported to Vaqar, who proceeded to dismiss Siddiqui immediately.<sup>102</sup> However, as Vaqar himself later pointed out, Bhutto "did not believe in working through one man.....such a person could become very powerful and embarrassing to him....He believed in working through a number of persons."<sup>103</sup> Accordingly, Bhutto kept in constant and direct touch with various (central) secretaries and provincial chief secretaries.<sup>104</sup> "He would go down even to I.G.s (Inspector General) and commissioners."<sup>105</sup> In addition, he selected key individuals such as Afzal Saeed Khan, Rao Abdur Rashid, (Retd) Major-General Jilani (director-general military

intelligence) and Saeed Ahmed Khan to keep a close watch over the activities of bureaucrats in various government departments. The point to be emphasised here is that Bhutto sought personal as opposed to institutional party or parliamentary supervision over the civil bureaucracy. Certainly ministerial control was exercised over individual departments, but the main lever of control and supervision was through the personalised process described above,

As a consequence of the phenomenon described above, parliamentary supervision of the administration was virtually non-existent. The concept of public accountability of civil servants that emerged could only be interpreted as accountability/loyalty to Bhutto. While the office of a prime minister's ombudsman was created in 1972,<sup>106</sup> it scarcely emerged as a significant force.<sup>107</sup> Instead, in utilising the kutchery system, ('open courts') Bhutto sought to operationalise a personalised device of dealing with public grievances with the administration. The kutchery system, which originated in Moghul days but which was also utilised by the British under the Raj, has traditionally been a method by which the monarch/ruler has sought to redress public grievances by holding 'open courts', where people brought their complaints. Bhutto frequently held kutcheries, often in far-flung rural areas.<sup>108</sup> Since public complaints at such kutcheries typically related to (local) administrative inaction or inefficiency (at times corruption), Bhutto utilised these occasions to dispense 'administrative justice'.<sup>109</sup> For instance, in response to public representations, he would on some occasions direct local officials to expedite land settlement claims, or to look into, for

instance, property disputes that had allegedly been decided unfairly by the district magistrate.<sup>110</sup> On other occasions, he would direct a local official to be transferred elsewhere in response to public complaints about him.<sup>111</sup> Obviously, Bhutto could only deal with a limited number of such complaints at any given time, but the point to be emphasised is that he utilised these occasions to institute the idea of accountability of officials to his personal authority. At many of the kutcheries held in rural Sind for instance, Bhutto directed the chief secretary (Sind), the local I.G. (Police) Commissioner and Deputy commissioner to be present so that these officials could answer complaints and he could direct them in public view to take remedial action.<sup>112</sup> In dispensing 'administrative justice' in this manner, Bhutto reduced the whole idea of public accountability of administrators to a personalised venture.<sup>113</sup> This was the supreme, symbolic manifestation of the idea of bureaucrats' 'accountability' to Bhutto. The kutchery system brought other benefits as well. It helped reinforce Bhutto's personal popularity in the rural countryside (where, typically such 'kutcheries' were held) by communicating the idea that he took a personal interest in the problems and grievances of ordinary folk vis a vis the administration.

The politicisation of the bureaucracy was undertaken through the system of lateral entry. This measure promised certain advantages for the growing body of technocrats over the traditional bureaucracy (and was one reason why it was strongly opposed by the latter), but the main

purpose was to expand the loyalist base in the bureaucratic structure. The first two hundred appointments suggested that political affiliation rather than merit was the major criterion.<sup>114</sup> Subsequent appointments - a total of 5,476 were made in grade-16 and above between August 1973 and July 1977 - followed a similar pattern.<sup>115</sup> The scheme turned the bureaucracy into a fertile field for political patronage. It enabled Bhutto to staff the bureaucracy with those personally loyal to him. Such appointments were made at all levels of the civil service, including strategic, senior posts, as exemplified by Bhutto's appointment of Nasim Ahmed as secretary, ministry of information (grade 22) and Shahzad Sadiq as secretary, ministry of natural resources (grade 22) - appointments which caused considerable resentment amongst career bureaucrats. As the (former) Establishment secretary explained,

"In matters of appointments he (Bhutto) was the competent authority. He could appoint on his own initiative and he did. He could overrule the Selection Board and even the Federal Public Service Commission." 116

The lateral entry scheme was also used as an instrument of party patronage, to reward party faithfuls or their friends and relatives. Party MNA's and other party leaders forwarded their own lists of candidates to Bhutto who then dispensed offices and posts.<sup>117</sup> Special posts were often created - 'advisers' and 'officers on special duty' (O.S.D.) - to accommodate the new entrants.<sup>118</sup> A critical monthly identified more than a hundred senior-level lateral appointees as close relatives and associates of the ministers in the central cabinet.<sup>119</sup>

The above factors conditioned the relations that developed in general between politicians and administrators at different levels. In relations between ministers and higher civil servants, who were career officials, several patterns can be discerned. In some instances relations remained uneasy in view of the frequent public declarations made by some ministers and Bhutto himself expressing hostility and distrust towards bureaucrats, and a determination to clip their wings.<sup>120</sup> Mubashar Hasan, as finance minister, for instance, did not disguise his antipathy towards the traditional bureaucrats, whom he considered were reactionary and had to be bullied into executing 'progressive policies'.<sup>121</sup> Strong and determined ministers like Mubashar were often able to limit the officials' policy-making role. In general, however, the lack of experience of the majority of ministers, both at the central and provincial level, made them considerably dependent on officials.<sup>122</sup> On the other hand, the sense of insecurity that pervaded career officials made some of them over-adjust to the new regime - to the extent of being willing to do and say all that would please and nothing that would displease their political masters.<sup>123</sup> Many an official turned 'courtier' in an effort to consolidate his own personal position.<sup>124</sup> Vaqar Ahmed was perhaps the best example of a courtier official - others included Rauf Sheikh (secretary, finance), and Munir Hussein (chief secretary, NWFP). Non-courtier officials who offered outspoken, independent advice were transferred elsewhere from their departments (e.g. Qamarul Islam and M. Imtiaz), and

in some cases dismissed (e.g. B. A. Qureishi, secretary Punjab Planning and Development). The courtier phenomenon produced immediate harmony between ministers and officials but did not necessarily provide the official with any reason to be complacent about the future. This was particularly the case when the ministers' own fortunes remained in doubt at the hands of Bhutto. Senior officials thus often sought protection at the highest levels (Bhutto, Vaqar, Afzal Saeed) rather than risk aligning themselves too closely with ministers whose position seemed precarious.<sup>125</sup>

At the district level, the administrative machinery was subjected to particular strain. It was at the district level that a large part of party patronage was dispensed. Party men received benefits - on the recommendations of the deputy commissioners - in the form of loans, fertiliser facilities, permits, jobs, licenses, public roads, etc.<sup>126</sup> District officials had to respond to such demands made by local PPP men for they knew that behind the pressures of local politicians was the support of higher level politicians like MNA's and ministers. As one deputy commissioner described the situation:

"ministers and party workers....used to visit various (district) offices with several demands.....they were generally concerning ration depots, plots, permits for sugar, etc." 127

The demands of local party leaders also related to instituting 'cases' against political opponents and other forms of harassment and intimidation. District officials found it difficult to resist such political interference from local MNAs, MPAs and other party leaders, except in those cases



where such officials had direct access to Bhutto or the P.M.'s secretariat. (as in the case of the Rawalpindi district commissioner) and could therefore assert their own authority.<sup>128</sup> The frequency and intensity of such interference had an adverse impact on the normal and effective functioning of the district administration. That Bhutto exhibited some concern over this phenomena was indicative of the fact that he wished the district administrators to preserve some measure of autonomy that would facilitate the smooth functioning of the local administration.<sup>129</sup> An opposition leader summed up the problem:

"Interference of party workers had reduced.....the effectiveness of the administrative machinery, without disciplined party cadres, indiscriminate interference with the normal functioning of the administrative machinery is creating.....confusion." 130

With district party organisations often ridden with factions, each advancing its own demands (at the expense of the opposing faction) local officials were clearly faced with a dilemma. While some district commissioners were able to manipulate such PPP disorganisation to their personal or official advantage, others were inevitably drawn into these factional quarrels.<sup>131</sup>

#### FROM CONTROL TO RELIANCE

It has been argued above that Bhutto sought, through a variety of methods, to curb the independent power of the civil bureaucracy. Such actions which curtailed the autonomous discretion of the bureaucracy represented a fundamental departure from one aspect of the Viceregal heritage i.e.

of bureaucratic independence. However having done this, he made the 'reformed' and politicised bureaucracy a major pillar of his regime. This signified a continuity with another aspect of the Viceregal tradition, i.e. the primary reliance on bureaucratic rather than representative institutions. Thus the Bhutto regime's relationship with the civil bureaucracy demonstrated both continuities and discontinuities with the practices of predecessor regimes. This section is concerned with highlighting the essential continuity with past tradition as reflected in the Bhutto regime's dependence on bureaucratic instruments of rule.

It was the civil bureaucracy (rather than representative institutions like the party) that emerged as the Bhutto regime's instrument for dealing with the problems of governance - whether it was the implementation of the regime's reforms, or dealing with domestic unrest and political opposition, or providing information and options for policy making or even for advancing the interests of the party. While it is true that "the final decision.... (was)...made by a political rather than administrative ruler",<sup>132</sup> the political ruler was nevertheless primarily dependent on the administrative machinery for the management of state affairs. This was reflected in a variety of ways. To begin with, the professional civil bureaucracy was given the task of implementing various reform measures of the government. The only attempt to involve the party bureaucracy with the implementation - in the People's Works Programme, was as we noted in an earlier chapter, abandoned, when it led to mismanagement, misappropriation, corruption

and graft.<sup>133</sup> Vesting responsibility for implementing the regime's reforms upon the civil service inevitably meant providing the latter with some leverage. Referring to this development 'Outlook' pointed out that

"like the previous revolutions, when the dust of rhetoric settled down, one found another quantum increase in the powers of bureaucrats....for example, the deputy commissioners now have powers and responsibilities of supervising housing programmes, acquiring land with uncontested powers to determine compensation, and managing rural works programmes. These responsibilities are in addition to those which have cumulated in their hands over the past twenty-five years. There has been no concern with reviewing what deputy commissioners have done so far.....Yet the peoples government has, once again, put its faith in them to implement its revolution." 134

Bhutto relied on the bureaucracy not only to implement his regime's reform proposals, but also to deal with political opposition and intra-party dissent. It was suggested by one scholar that Bhutto's stated hope for Pakistan rested "not on the use of state power but on the efficacy of politics, of an open political process to rescue the country from its colonial and neo-colonial heritage."<sup>135</sup> Such a hope was evidently not translated into practice, for Bhutto increasingly relied primarily on traditional enforcers of public tranquillity i.e. administrative agencies like the police, FSF, etc. for solving his problems with the political opposition. As one observer remarked,

"The response of the PPP government to its political opponents both at the centre and in the provinces has been bureaucratic and reminiscent of the era of Ayub Khan and Kalabagh." 136

The use of bureaucratic machinery to deal with opposition and dissent has been analysed in considerable detail in chapter IX. It is sufficient to point out that Bhutto expanded and strengthened the existing police and intelligence machinery (e.g. Intelligence Bureau) and established new bureaucratic devices (the FSF and the Federal Investigation Agency) both to consolidate his power and to strike out against the regime's real or imagined enemies.<sup>137</sup> It was reliance on such coercive instruments of state power which led a dissident PPP leader to proclaim in 1975 that "today the source of the government's power is the FSF and the police."<sup>138</sup>

Bhutto came to rely on the bureaucracy in a more fundamental way than that discussed above. Selected bureaucrats, notably those in the prime minister's secretariat who had daily and direct access to Bhutto, became, increasingly involved in policy-making and influencing party affairs.<sup>139</sup> Although Bhutto after his fall from power emphatically denied such involvement,<sup>140</sup> the evidence at hand does not support Bhutto's claim. There were during the middle and latter years of Bhutto's rule, many indications of the regime's dependency on the bureaucracy. This was a natural consequence of Bhutto's inability or unwillingness to develop the PPP into an organised and well-structured entity that could occupy a crucial position in the policy-making process. Certainly individual party leaders in their capacities as ministers did participate in policy making but this is quite different from a party as an organised, institutionalised entity, responding to

pressures from below and influencing governmental policy formulation and implementation. As a result of Bhutto's policies towards the PPP discussed earlier (see chapters VI and VIII) the party's role in decision-making remained marginal at best. Thus policy making increasingly devolved on bureaucrats occupying strategic positions, as for example those in the P.M.'s secretariat and in the important economic ministries (such as finance, planning and development). This represented a reversion to the practices of predecessor regimes. Our contention finds support in Jones' analysis of the PPP in the Punjab.<sup>141</sup> Jones writes:

"The shift to a greater dependency on the bureaucracy was everywhere evident...the bureaucracy had taken over the crucial functions of formulating policy and drafting legislation - if, indeed, it had ever relinquished these functions." 142

Important policy decisions, such as the nationalisation of the agro-processing industries (see chapter V, 'Economic Reconstruction') in 1976, were reportedly formulated by the bureaucracy.<sup>143</sup>

Significantly, Bhutto brought back many (perhaps now chastened) CSPs into important bureaucratic positions. In the central secretariat, the important economic ministries were headed in the latter years of the Bhutto government by former CSPs. For example, Ejaz Naik as commerce secretary, Wasim Jafri as secretary, planning division, A.G.N. Kazi as head of finance, planning and economic development, all had a CSP background. In addition, the secretaryships of foreign affairs and defence were also held by former CSP's - Agha Shahi and Ghulam Ishaq respectively. In the district administration, the preponderant majority

of commissioners and deputy commissioners (D.C.s) were (as in the past) all CSPs. This phenomena reflected the growing rapprochement between the traditional bureaucracy and the Bhutto regime, as well as the increasing dependency of the latter on the former.

In addition to these developments, there were increasing signs that the bureaucracy had begun to penetrate the party itself - in particular bureaucrats in the P.M.'s secretariat - (many of them lateral entrants called officers on Special Duty) - cynically referred to as 'Bhuttocrats' - were increasingly involved with influencing party affairs. In a letter addressed to Afzal Saeed (who headed the P.M.'s secretariat) Bhutto himself referred to the secretariat as "a machinery" set up to deal with "party matters."<sup>144</sup> Not surprisingly then, important decisions concerning the party (matters of party re-organisation, selection of party office-bearers, nominations of candidates for parliamentary seats) were taken here rather than in the party's central committee.<sup>145</sup>

Bhutto did not deny the association of bureaucrats in for instance the 1976 re-organisation of the party, but argued that this was done only to get "impartial and disinterested advice."<sup>146</sup> 'Bhuttocrats' such as Rao Abdur Rashid and Afzal Saeed Khan also began to mediate factional disputes in the party and to control the channels of communication and patronage between various party groups and Bhutto.<sup>147</sup>

In addition, under the direction of bureaucrats in the P.M.'s secretariat, intelligence agencies (Intelligence Bureau, FSF) and the district administration were involved in the

party's candidate selection for the 1977 election.<sup>148</sup> At the local level, the reliance on the administrative machinery was clearly evident even in relatively routine matters, as for example on occasions when a political meeting had to be organised. Typically police and other officials rather than party officials were given the task of assembling the required crowd.<sup>149</sup> The Party conventions of 1976 similarly, were organised by district state rather than party officials.<sup>150</sup> Responsibility for organising Bhutto's district tours also lay with the local administration rather than the local party units.

The reverse side of Bhutto's policy of reliance on the bureaucratic machinery was obviously a downgrading of his own party, a fact that demoralised and disillusioned his party men.<sup>151</sup> Indeed, one PPP leader suggested that by surrounding himself by bureaucratic sycophants Bhutto increasingly became isolated from his real power base i.e. party, and this spelt the beginning of his regime's decline.<sup>152</sup> It was suggested earlier that reliance on traditional instruments of rule was in large part the result of Bhutto's failure to develop the PPP into an effective institution. But this dependence served to further inhibit the PPP's growth as an organisation that could in future be utilised as an essential part of the machinery of government. Viewed from this perspective, Bhutto's increasing reliance on essentially bureaucratic instruments resulted in the postponement and prevention of building a political organisation capable of functioning as an alternative to the bureaucracy. The temptation to dispense with party machinery and rely

on the administrative and police machinery has been a persistent and recurring phenomenon not only in Pakistan but in other new states as well.<sup>153</sup> One writer has suggested that

"The Pakistani political scene has always been dominated by a single personality who has governed with the help of the civil-police and military bureaucracies." 154

Bhutto seems to have been no exception to this characterisation.

#### NOTES

1. For a description of the tradition of bureaucratic-military predominance, see chapter I.
2. For an appreciation of this view, see Joseph La Polambara, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, Dilemmas'; S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development'; and Fred W. Riggs, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development'; all in Joseph La Polambara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
3. Gerald A. Heeger, 'Bureaucracy, Political Parties and Political Development', World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1973). Heeger argues, on the basis of the Pakistani case, that in the dichotomy between bureaucracy and political parties, the critical variable is not organisation or the lack of it, rather it is the dominance of key governmental offices and the choices made by the occupants of those offices. Thus "the expansion of the bureaucracy in Pakistan seems to have been less a flow into institutional vacuum than a preemption of the offices through which political party institutions could be built." (p. 606).
4. For an analysis of the dominant role played by the military-bureaucratic apparatus from a neo-Marxist perspective, see Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies', in K. Gough and H. P. Sharma, ed., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 145-173. See also his, 'Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan', in International Socialist Journal, (March-April, 1966).
5. Ralph Braibanti, 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', in his Asian Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 350.
6. See K. B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 62-63.
7. This is borne out by the fact that the first set of actions taken by the new regime were directed against these two institutions. See chapter V, pp. 305-306.



8. Robert La Porte, 'Civil Bureaucracy: Twenty-Five Years of Power and Influence', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 12, (December 1974), p. 1098.
9. Assessments relating to the disarray and demoralisation that set in within the military is based on interviews conducted with senior military leaders.
10. The dearth of scholarly literature on the subject is best exemplified by referring to a major work, R. Braibanti, L. Ziring and W. H. Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977). This collection of fifteen essays by eminent scholars, while claiming "to provide a comprehensive analysis of a country", considers the military and the civil service only in passing. S. J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, (London: Macmillan, 1980), deals at some length with the civil-military bureaucracy.
11. This disappointment was expressed within the PPP by both left wing elements and certain sections of landlord groups, as for instance those represented by Khar.
12. The literature on the public bureaucracy - especially the CSP - is vast. See for example, H. F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); G. S. Birkhead, ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966); R. Braibanti, 'The Civil Service of Pakistan - A Theoretical Analysis', South Atlantic Quarterly (Spring 1959), and Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, (Durham: Duke University Press 1966); Muneer Ahmed, The Civil Servant in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964); M. A. Choudhuri, The Civil Service of Pakistan, (Dacca, NIPA, 1963); Inayatullah, ed., Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan, (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962); Irfanur Rahman, Administration: Its Theory, History and Practice with Special Reference to Pakistan, (Lahore: Catapult Publishers, 1976); K. B. Sayeed, 'The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, (June 1958); S. J. Burki, 'Twenty Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol. IX, (April 1969).
13. For these reform efforts see R. Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit., and Robert La Porte, 'Civil Bureaucracy', op.cit.
14. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1962), Vol. III, pp. 72-73.
15. Government of Pakistan Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, (Karachi, 1956), Vol. I, p. 236.
16. The reports of these commissions are listed in Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit., p. 214. For a study of these reform efforts see A. S. Haque, Administrative Reform in Pakistan, (Dacca: NIPA, 1970), and M. Anisuzzaman, Bureaucratic Reforms in Pakistan, unpublished doctoral thesis (Syracuse University, 1975).

17. For the role of the higher bureaucracy in blocking reform, see Albert Govine, 'Administrative Reform', in Birkhead, ed., op.cit, pp. 185-211.
18. This is best reflected by a statement made by Iskander Mirza in 1954: "You cannot have the old British system of administration (and) at the same time allow politicians to meddle with the civil service.....In the British system the District Magistrate was the king-pin of administration. His authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that." Quoted in Dawn, 31 October 1954, 1.
19. Details of structural organisation can be found in Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit, and M. A. Choudhuri, 'The Organisation and Composition of the Central Civil Services in Pakistan', International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1960).
20. The members of these classes were further divided into two groups, namely gazetted and non-gazetted officers. The members of all class I services and most class II services were gazetted officers, invested with higher powers and responsibilities and consequently enjoying higher pay and other privileges. Members of class III and IV consisted of petty clerical workers, peons, bearers, orderlies, etc.
21. Public Service Commissions were autonomous bodies. The Commission's functions, structures, etc. are discussed in Braibanti, Research, op.cit, especially pp. 119-131.
22. Braibanti, 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', op.cit, p. 244.
23. Nazim, 'Administrative Reforms: Before and After', Pakistan Times, 24 November 1976, 4.
24. Except under very exceptional circumstances, the officers of class II services or other class I services were not promoted to the CSP. Members of this service were always recruited directly. Immediately after partition, a few officers of the PCS were promoted to this service and after the declaration of the first martial law in 1958, a handful of army officers were appointed to the CSP.
25. Muneer Ahmed, op.cit, p. 216.
26. Braibanti, 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', op.cit, p. 245.
27. Sir Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India, (London: MacDonald, 1952); Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, II: The Guardians, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954); Bernard Cohn, 'Recruitment and Training of the East India Company's Civil Service in India, 1600-1860', in Asian Bureaucratic Systems, op.cit. For further literature on the philosophy of education of ICS and CSP officers, see Braibanti, Research, op.cit, especially pp. 97-101.

28. Quoted in D. E. Ashford, National Development and Social Reform, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). For an analysis of the ethos of the CSP-dominated bureaucracy, see Anwar H. Syed, Issues of Bureaucratic Ethic: Two Essays, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974).
29. For the structure of local government in Pakistan see Najmul Abedin, Local Administration and Politics in Modernising Societies: Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Dacca, NIPA, 1973).
30. The total number of CSP officers authorised to fill posts in provincial governments, divisions and districts was 160. See Braibanti, 'The CSP', op.cit, p. 203.
31. In this respect, the CSP clearly had a centralising role to play. Central control of provincial administration seemed to negate the principle of federalism. Indeed many provincial politicians including Mujibur Rahman argued that such centralisation had made a mockery of provincial autonomy. For Mujib's criticism, see Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I, No. 68, 9 February 1956, pp. 2777-2778.
32. M. A. Chaudhuri, op.cit, p. 283.
33. These reservations were governed by the CSP (Composition and Cadre) Rules 1954, issued in June 1954 and amended in June 1966. See Notification No. 525/13/51 SEI, 1 June 1954, para 6, 6(2), Gazette of Pakistan, 18 June 1954, pp. 163-166.
34. 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', op.cit, pp. 302-303.
35. On the one hand CSP influence was predominant in the evolution of reform doctrine, on the other hand CSP members prevented both the publication and implementation of 'independent' inquiries, such as Egger and Gladreux Reports (of 1953 and 1955). The Cornelius Report (1962) which called for a drastic re-organisation of the civil service structure, recommending a unified seven-tier administrative structure, and severely criticising the role of the CSP, was not made public until 1969 - and then too, released after widespread public demand and a change of government.
36. Interview with Anis Mirza, senior correspondent, Dawn, (Karachi), London, September 1979.
37. For an analysis of why the bureaucracy in general and the CSP in particular, became so influential and powerful, see S. J. Burki, 'Twenty Years of the Civil Service,' op.cit, and K. B. Sayeed, 'The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service', op.cit.
38. Quoted in Nazim, Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats, (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1973), p. 20.
39. This found mention in the Report of the Pay and Services Commission (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1962), often referred to as the Cornelius Report.

40. See Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971). See also, Anwar H. Syed, 'Issues of Bureaucratic Ethic', op.cit, especially pp. 22-25.
41. For an analysis of how the partnership developed, see S. J. Burki, 'Twenty Years of the Civil Service', op.cit.
42. For a clear and lucid exposition of this idea, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), chapter five.
43. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 15 February 1957, pp. 434-435.
44. Quoted in Braibanti, 'The Higher Bureaucracy', op.cit, p. 305.
45. See for instance, 'Snobbery in the Services', in Pakistan Times, 11 March 1962.
46. Pakistan Times, 14 March 1957.
47. This aspect of the CSP was criticised by Rowland Egger and Bernard Gladreux, who were among the first of American public administration tradition experts to survey administration in Pakistan. Such criticism was echoed by the technical experts and specialists themselves within the Pakistani bureaucracy.
48. As an example of criticism from within the bureaucracy see, Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats, op.cit, written by "Nazim", a pseudonym for Hassan Habib, principal of The Pakistan Administrative Staff College and the Academy for Administrative Training.
49. See the CSP Association, Memorandum Submitted to the Services Reorganisation Committee, 15 December 1969, (Rawalpindi: Ferozsons, 1969).
50. Ibid, pp. 1-2.
51. Ibid, p. 2.
52. For a survey of villagers' attitudes towards administrators in the 1960s, see Aquila Kiani, 'Peoples Image of Bureaucracy', in Inayatullah, op.cit, pp. 385-86.
53. Muneer Ahmed, 'The Political Context of Civil Service Reorganisation in Pakistan', in Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol. II, No. 2, (Summer 1973), p. 167.
54. Ibid.
55. Pakistan Times, 4 November 1969, 1.
56. Nawa-i-Waqt, 25 January 1969.
57. Pakistan Times, 7 March 1969.
58. Muneer Ahmed, op.cit, p. 168.

59. Ibid.
60. Information derived from interviews conducted with PPP leaders in 1977 and 1979.
61. Quoted in White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), Annexure 11, p. A11.
62. Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p. 54.
63. See for instance, Z. A. Bhutto, Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy, Vol. 3, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 185.
64. Outlook, 14 July 1973, p. 8.
65. Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.), p. 23.
66. Z. A. Bhutto, Political Situation in Pakistan, (Lahore: New Kamran Printers, 1968), p. 45.
67. Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, 1970, Third Edition (Karachi: Vision Publications, 1971), p. 38.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 20 December 1971 - 31 March 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 8.
71. The purge was announced by PPP minister for political affairs, Mustafar Jatoi. See White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, p. 120-124.
72. Interestingly enough, in a large number of cases (of those dismissed) there were serious errors with regard to names, places of posting, and departments in the relevant Gazette Notification (No. 2/2/72/DA, issued on 13 March 1972). The most bizarre mistake was made in the case of the dismissal of three officers of the Police Department and one officer of the PCS, who had long been dead. Another example is the case of four officers of the Customs Department who did not exist at all. Another eight officers dismissed had long since retired from the service. These mistakes hardly reflected "painstaking and detailed scrutiny of service records" that the minister announcing the dismissals claimed. Indeed such cases appeared to cast doubts on the credibility of the entire exercise. For details, see White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, pp. 120-127.
73. A useful study of these conditions with reference to patrimonial rule in Morocco is John Waterbury, 'Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime', World Politics, Vol. 25, (1972-73).
74. White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, pp. 128-131.

75. The Law Division was directed by Bhutto not to include any such provisions, as he "did not believe in the Anglo-Saxon sense of justice", ibid, annexure 11, p. A8.
76. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 118-119.
77. White Paper, Vol. II, ibid, p. 142.
78. Ibid, pp. 138-139.
79. See, for example, Punjab Chief Minister, Sadiq Hussain Qureishi's statement in Pakistan Times, 16 July 1975, 1.
80. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 18, 5-12 February 1972, p. 25091.
81. Statement of S. S. Hussain, Deputy Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Rural Development, Punjab Government, in White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1978), Annexure 283, p. A785.
82. Quoted in Lawrence Ziring, 'The Pakistan Campaign', Asian Survey Vol. XVII, No. 7, (July 1977), p. 584.
83. A good example is that of a section officer, Mazhar Ali who was promoted to joint secretary in the ministry of finance. Several such examples were quoted in the conversations the author had with central civil servants in Islamabad in the summer of 1977.
84. White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, p. 153-154.
85. Ibid, p. 153.
86. Far East Economic Review, 17 September 1973, p. 28.
87. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 April - 13 April 1973, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1973), p. 27.
88. Note of Dissent by Mr. Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Annexure 37 in White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, p. A93.
89. Annexure 38, ibid, p. A94.
90. Earlier, in April 1972, Bhutto had appointed an administrative Reforms Committee under the chairmanship of party leader K. H. Meer, and consisting of Jatoi, Vaqar Ahmed and (Retd) Chief Justice Kundi as members. The two officials chosen for the committee were, significantly, non-CSP. The reform measures emerged from the deliberations of this committee. In making its recommendations the committee seemed to have been considerably influenced by the Fulton Committee Report, (1968) e.g. its proposal for a unified grading structure, grading to be determined by job evaluation, proposals for horizontal mobility between cadres, etc. For a discussion of the reforms, see Robert La Porte and Lawrence Ziring, 'The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two Views', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 12, (December 1974).

91. Text of Address to the Nation by Bhutto on 20 August 1973 and reprinted in Administrative Reforms in Pakistan: Two Historical Documents, (Lahore: Pakistan Administrative Staff College, August 1973).
92. Press conference addressed by K. H. Meer on 21 August 1973, and reprinted in ibid.
93. Robert La Porte, 'Civil Bureaucracy - Twenty Five Years of Power and Influence', in Asian Survey, op.cit., p. 1101.
94. The former secretary of the Establishment division acknowledged that the idea "was taken from Lord Fulton's report on administrative reforms in U.K." See statement, Annexure 2, White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit., p. A3.
95. Ibid, p. 137.
96. For the text of Bhutto's speech see Administrative Reforms, op.cit.
97. Far East Economic Review, 17 September 1973, p. 28.
98. It was left to opposition leaders and critical journals to point this out. See for instance, Outlook, 25 August 1973, p. 3 and 22 September 1973, pp. 11-12.
99. White Paper on the General Elections, op.cit., p. 271.
100. Information derived from interviews with senior bureaucrats, Islamabad, 1977.
101. As an example, see Vaqar's recommendations in this regard in a letter addressed to the prime minister, dated 24 October 1975, Annexure 61, White Paper on the General Election, op.cit., pp. 4,5. See also Annexure 70, p. A274.
102. Interview with a senior bureaucrat in the Establishment Division, Islamabad, 1978.
103. Statement of Vaqar Ahmed in White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit., p. A4.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Hassan Habib, Public Policy, (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1976), pp. 16-17.
107. 'The Sleeping Ombudsman', Outlook, 25 November 1972, pp. 4-5.
108. For reports of Bhutto's kutcheries see for instance, Dawn, 6 October 1973 and 20 July 1974.
109. Outlook, 2 February 1974, p. 3.
110. Interview with the Rawalpindi district commissioner, August 1977, Rawalpindi.

111. Ibid.
112. Statements of Mr. M. K. Junejo, ex-Home secretary Sind, Annexure 11, White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, Misuse of the Instruments of State Power, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), p. A39.
113. Outlook, 2 February 1974, p. 3.
114. As Outlook pointed out "The list of new appointees is studied with the relatives, friends and private secretaries of the ministers and governors." See the issue of 25 August 1973, p. 3.
115. White Paper on General Elections, op.cit, p. 61.
116. White Paper, Vol. II, op.cit, p. A10. In 1976, the Establishment division recommended that lateral entry appointments should be made the responsibility of the FPSC. Bhutto accepted the proposal and a requisition was formally sent to the FPSC. However, Bhutto continued to make political appointments.
117. Ibid, p. A-9, A-10.
118. Outlook, 22 September 1973.
119. Zindagi, (Lahore), July 1974.
120. See for instance, Bhutto's address to senior officials in Karachi on 22 July 1972, and reprinted in Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 July - 30 September 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 87.
121. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, Lahore, August 1977.
122. This was a factor mentioned by many of the PPP leaders interviewed.
123. This is best reflected in a statement made by a former home secretary, who pointed out the need to please political superiors thus: "The position of government servants.....was worse than domestic servants." See White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, p. A43.
124. The term 'courtier' is borrowed from W. H. Morris Jones, and follows his usage, as in Government and Politics in India, (London: Hutchinson, 1975), p. 142.
125. Information derived from interviews with senior bureaucrats in Islamabad, 1977 and 1978.
126. See above, chapter VII.
127. Statement of Mr. Naveed Asif, ex-D.C. Lyallpur in White Paper on the General Elections, op.cit, Annexure 313, p. A916.
128. Interview with Dr. A. Khaliq, PPP leader and chairman, Peoples Works Programme, District Council Gujarat, (Rawalpindi, April 1978)
129. White Paper on the General Elections, ibid, Annexure 65, p. A214.



130. Asghar Khan, quoted in Outlook, 5 August 1972, p. 7.
131. Interview with D. C. (Rawalpindi) and other district officials, Rawalpindi, August 1977.
132. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege, op.cit, p. 120.
133. See above, chapter VII.
134. Outlook, 14 April 1973, p. 7.
135. Elliot L. Tepper, 'The New Pakistan: Problems and Prospects', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1, (Spring 1974), p. 62.
136. Outlook, 2 June 1973, p. 6.
137. For a brief review of the activities of the Intelligence Bureau and the FSF, see White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, pp. 17-24.
138. G. M. Khar quoted in ViewPoint, 24 October 1975, p. 8.
139. This is amply borne out by the correspondence between Bhutto and his bureaucratic advisers (such as Rao Abdur Rashid) published as annexures in White Papers, Vol. I, II and III, op.cit.
140. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, particularly pp. 64-66.
141. Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan Peoples Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an era of Mass Participation, unpublished doctoral thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979).
142. Ibid, p. 663.
143. Interview with senior bureaucrats.
144. White Paper on the General Elections, op.cit, pp. 172-174.
145. See note 139 above.
146. "If I Am Assassinated", ibid, p. 55.
147. Interviews with PPP leaders.
148. See for instance Rao A. Rashid's note in White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, Annexure 21, p. A63.
149. This is also noted by K. B. Sayeed, 'Political Leadership and Institution-building under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto', in Pakistan: The Long View, op.cit, p. 266.
150. See above, chapter VIII, p. 489
151. Interview with G. M. Khar, London, March 1979.
152. Ibid.

153. For discussions of this phenomenon in Africa, Latin America and Asia, see Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Decline of the Party in Single Party African States'; Robert E. Scott, 'Political Parties and Policy-making in Latin America'; Lucien W. Pye, 'Party Systems and National Development in Asia', all in Joseph La Polambara and M. Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
154. 'The Pakistan Campaign', op.cit, p. 597.

## XI

BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY

The single most outstanding feature of Pakistan's political system has been its praetorian nature, both in the narrow sense of military political involvement and rule, and in the broader sense of the lack of effective political institutions capable of mediating group conflict.<sup>1</sup> This chapter examines civil-military relations under the Bhutto regime against the background of this praetorian tradition and offers an explanation for the military coup in 1977 which toppled the Bhutto government. It is argued here that while Bhutto sought to curb the power of the military, the patrimonial method of control that he devised to ensure civilian supremacy proved to be fragile, and was for that reason, inadequate. At the same time, a number of actions taken by Bhutto, such as relying on the military to deal with domestic discord, did not serve to erode the military's position as the "core group" in the Pakistani polity. Bhutto's failure to create viable political institutions as "countervailing" forces to the military meant that he was also unable to modify the praetorian tradition in the broader sense of the term. Before undertaking a detailed analysis of these developments, we will briefly examine the various models of civil-military relations and the Pakistani experience upto 1971, to highlight the praetorian legacy inherited by Bhutto.

## MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Amongst the industrialised nation-states it is possible to identify two major models of civilian-military relations - the democratic and what has been called the totalitarian model.<sup>2</sup> Under the democratic model the civilian and military elites are sharply differentiated. Civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a formal set of rules which specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power. In particular these rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic partisan politics. Military leaders obey the government because they accept the basic national and political goals of a democracy. Professional ethics, as well as democratic parliamentary institutions guarantee civilian political supremacy. Elements of this model have been achieved only in certain western industrialised countries since it requires viable parliamentary institutions and broad social consensus about the ends of government. The totalitarian model, as it developed in Nazi Germany, in Soviet Russia, and, to a lesser extent in Mussolini's Italy, rests on political control of the military by a centralised and authoritarian one-party political system. Political control here, is enforced by the secret police, by infiltration of party members into the military hierarchy, by the party's arming its own military units, and by control of the system of officer selection.

Neither the democratic nor the totalitarian model adequately serves to describe civil-military relations in

the countries of the Third World. These models are not applicable because the military has wider involvement in domestic, economic, social and political change. Fundamentally this derives from the weakness of civilian political institutions as described by Samuel Huntington,<sup>3</sup> Edward Shils<sup>4</sup> and others. Morris Janowitz has identified five types of civil-military relations amongst new nations: (1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass party, (3) democratic competitive systems, (4) civil-military coalition and (5) military oligarchy.<sup>5</sup> Although the first three differ markedly in the form of internal political control, they have the common feature that the military's involvement in domestic politics is at the minimal level; thus Janowitz describes the military's activities as "limited to the mark of sovereignty".<sup>6</sup> In other words, the military is not involved in domestic partisan politics but functions as an institution symbolising the independent and legitimate sovereignty of the new nation, both at home and abroad. The mark of sovereignty includes the military's contribution to internal law and order and to the policing of the nation's borders. Amongst these three types, the methods of control by which the military is limited to the role of a mark of sovereignty, vary. In the first case, control is exercised by an authoritarian regime which is based on traditional and/or personal power, as in Saudi Arabia. This type of control is likely to be found in countries just beginning the process of modernisation. In the second type, labelled authoritarian-mass party, the military is excluded from domestic politics by

the power of the civilian authoritarian political system which rests on a one-party state, under strong personal leadership without parliamentary institutions. This is the case in countries like Guinea and Tanzania. In democratic-competitive systems, which includes semi-competitive states, civilian control of the military rests on the strength of competitive democratic institutions, and in some cases on a mass political party as well, which dominates domestic politics but permits a measure of political competition. India, Malaysia and Israel exhibit this type of civil-military relations.

In the fourth and fifth model of civil-military relations, the military becomes a political actor. In the case of the civil-military coalition, the military does not directly assume governmental power, but serves as an active bloc in its support of civilian parties and other power groups. The civilian elite remains in power only because of the military's passive assent or active assistance. This has been the case for instance, in Turkey. The military oligarchy represents a direct take over of governmental power, with the military becoming the ruling group.

#### THE PAKISTANI EXPERIENCE UP TO 1971

Having identified the various models of civil-military relations in the Third World, it would be appropriate to see which of these models adequately describes the Pakistani experience in the pre-Bhutto period. Clearly, the first three models in which the military is excluded

from domestic politics, are not applicable. With the exception of the first few years of Pakistan's existence, the country has had a clear and unbroken tradition of military involvement in politics. As discussed in an earlier chapter (see above, chapter I), after the deaths of Pakistan's founding fathers, Jinnah and Liaqat, the military had increasingly expanded its political role so that from 1953 to 1958, the pattern of civil-military relations can be described as a civil-military coalition. Indeed, as one writer has pointed out, even in the preceding period - the so-called parliamentary period - Pakistan's armed forces were never completely subjected to strong political or governmental control.<sup>7</sup> From 1953 onwards, the expansion in the military's political role was in large part the result of the efforts of civilian elites to enlist the military's support in factional conflict.<sup>8</sup> In 1958, the military assumed direct governmental power thus formalising a situation that had existed since at least 1953. For the next thirteen years, until 1971, the political system of Pakistan clearly fell into the category of a military oligarchy.

A detailed examination of the reasons behind Pakistan's praetorian tradition is beyond the scope of this study.<sup>9</sup> However, we can briefly summarise some of the arguments advanced by scholars to explain the phenomena of military intervention in politics, that are particularly germane to the Pakistani experience up to 1971. Many inquiries into the phenomena of military intervention - as for instance reflected in the works of Huntington,<sup>10</sup> and

Amos Perlmutter<sup>11</sup> - stress the importance of evaluating the military's potential political role in developing countries in relation to salient features of the political system, rather than in relation to the military's own intrinsic characteristics. Thus attention is directed to the social (lack of community) and political conditions (lack of effective political institutions) that contribute to praetorianism. In other words, the fundamental weakness of civilian political institutions and the inability of civilian elites to legitimise their rule provokes military intervention. However, despite the utility and applicability of the position which finds the reason for military intervention in the pull effect of systematic weakness and the interrelated push effect of military organisation (the military being a "heavy" institution on account of its organisational superiority vis à vis all other social and political organisations), this view is not without its critics. Samuel Decalo, for example, writing on the African experience has argued that:

"It is both simplistic and empirically erroneous to relegate coups in Africa to the status of a dependent variable, a function of the political weakness and structural fragility of African states and the failings of African civilian elites."<sup>12</sup>

There is certainly a case to be made, on the basis of this argument, to be careful not to "overhomogenise" the Third World states. As a way out of this dilemma, it is useful to refer to the distinction made by Janowitz, between "reactive militarism" and "designed militarism".<sup>13</sup>

The former refers to the premeditated search for political power by the military, while the latter refers to the



expansion of military power that results from the weakness of civilian institutions and the pressure of civilians to expand the military role. Although, Janowitz argues that "reactive" rather than "designed" militarism is the usual case in new nations, by suggesting that many seizures of power are in reality a mixture of both types,<sup>14</sup> he underlines the need to combine the two perspectives in order to arrive at a more comprehensive and satisfactory explanation for military intervention.

With respect to the Pakistani experience, we can attribute the military's role expansion in large part to the inadequacy of civilian political institutions. In this sense, the "reactive" dimension in the military's political role was clear enough. But we can also discern a "designed" dimension in the military takeover of 1958 as reflected in Ayub's view that the politicians had brought the country to the brink of disaster and that only the military could bring stability and progress to Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

But whatever the reasons for the military's pre-eminence in Pakistani politics, there is little dispute over the fact that the long history of military involvement in politics posed a serious problem for any civilian successor. Such a legacy was described by Bhutto in the following manner:

"The army was in politics up to its neck... it was an unpleasant and disconcerting reality, but pleasant or unpleasant, it was a reality." 16

We turn now to an examination of how Bhutto, faced with such a legacy, attempted to deal with the military and to the kind of control he devised to ensure the military's subordination to civilian authority.

### BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY

Bhutto was determined to end what he called "Bonapartism" in the armed forces<sup>17</sup> and to curtail their influence, but he was also acutely aware of the constraints imposed by the legacy of military pre-eminence. Given the political tradition of the military's "right" to intervene in civilian affairs, any drastic alteration in the power and status of the military establishment could well have invited another coup.<sup>18</sup> The conflicting imperatives of curbing the power of the military on the one hand and of avoiding antagonising the armed forces on the other, produced what appeared on the surface as an erratic pattern of civil-military relations, with Bhutto attempting both to neutralise and to appease the military establishment. As we shall see below, Bhutto attempted to use both the carrot and stick techniques with the military.

Although Bhutto rightly acknowledged that it was "not a simple task to end Bonapartism after fifteen years of Bonapartism,"<sup>19</sup> initially this task was made considerably easier as a consequence of the military debacle in Bangladesh. The 1971 war with India and the resulting loss of East Pakistan severely tarnished the image and prestige of the army.<sup>20</sup> Our interviews with senior military officers indicate that respect - both public and

self-respect - declined rapidly.<sup>21</sup> Referring to this phenomenon, one writer has gone so far as to suggest that the "most outstanding" political consequence of the 1971 war was "the total eclipse of the army" as a political force.<sup>22</sup> Demoralised and discredited, the military was certainly in no position to reassert its supremacy over a people demanding vengeance for the shame and humiliation that had been inflicted upon them.<sup>23</sup> The public outcry against the military was accompanied by a growing body of opinion at senior levels within the army<sup>24</sup> that argued that its professional competence as a fighting force had suffered as a consequence of its long involvement in politics.<sup>25</sup> Such a view argued against the military's becoming embroiled in domestic politics.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, these were important factors behind the military's decision to remove itself from politics and hand over power to Bhutto.

These factors together with the fact that Bhutto's claim to power rested on an election victory, and not on support from the civil-military bureaucracy (as in the case of previous civilian regimes from 1951-1958), initially gave Bhutto a relatively free hand in re-fashioning civil-military relations. Bhutto exploited this favourable situation by conducting two purges of the military in quick succession and by introducing structural changes in the military command structure. The combined effect of these actions, as we shall see below, was to enhance Bhutto's personal ascendancy over the military.

The first purge in December 1971 was aimed at removing those senior military officers who had been part

of Yahya Khan's caucus. Since many of the officers sacked were implicated in the humiliating military defeat in Bangladesh, Bhutto's action against those he described as "fat and flabby generals" appeared to be a popular one amongst the general public.<sup>27</sup> The second purge in March 1972 led to the ouster of Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan, commanders-in chief of the army and air force respectively, who had been instrumental in the transfer of power to Bhutto himself and had been appointed to their posts only recently.<sup>28</sup> That Bhutto was able to get rid of opponents and benefactors alike indicated that top military leadership was not as strong, organised or confident as it once was. The personnel changes represented reforms in the sense of re-asserting civilian control over the military, but they functioned primarily to render the military more vulnerable to Bhutto's personal influence and power. Few of the retirements and replacements followed existing personnel procedures. Rather, Bhutto repeatedly emphasised the importance of filling these posts with nominees who demonstrated their personal loyalty to him.<sup>29</sup> The reliance on patrimonialism which was an integral part of Bhutto's strategy in establishing control over the military will be discussed in more detail below. Here what needs to be noted is that what was perhaps more important than the actual number of senior officers (see Table XI.1 below) sacked was the manner in which this was done.

The two purges were utilised as occasions to criticise publicly the role of the armed forces in politics and to deliver strongly-worded warnings. In his address to

TABLE XI.1

SENIOR OFFICERS RELIEVED FROM SERVICE

(during the first four months of the Bhutto government)

	No. of Officers Dismissed or Retired *	Total No. of Senior Officers **
<u>ARMY</u>		
General	2	2
Lieutenant-General	11	12
Major General	10	32
Brigadier	6	136
<u>NAVY</u>		
Vice Admiral	1	1
Rear Admiral	4	4
Commodore	2	12
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
Air Marshall	1	1
Air Vice-Marshall	2	2
Air Commodore	3	7
Group Captain	1	70
Total	43	279

\*Source: H. A. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974).

\*\*Estimated Figures.

the nation on 4 March, 1972 announcing the dismissal of military commanders Bhutto declared.....

"What has happened in Pakistan since

1958 is that some professional generals turned to politics not as a profession but as a plunder and as a result the influences that crept into Pakistan's socio-political life destroyed its fabric." 30

On other occasions, Bhutto and other PPP leaders publicly criticised the role of a coterie of generals, who in collaboration with "vested interests" had brought the country to its present malaise.<sup>31</sup> As one observer noted, such public admonishments were partly "aimed at a diminution in the almost sacrosanct status of the armed forces before the public", and in part "designed to warn other military leaders who might entertain political ambitions."<sup>32</sup> Although Bhutto and his ministers were careful not to criticise the military as an institution, the widespread publicity given in the government-controlled media to the dismissal of senior military officers and to their public censure by civilian leaders caused some disquiet in army circles.<sup>33</sup> For a significant section of senior army officers, subjecting their former commanders to public ridicule was tantamount to humiliating the armed forces in the eyes of the public.<sup>34</sup> Army resentment was aroused further when a documentary on the military surrender at Dacca was telecast, which was viewed as another attempt on the part of civilian authorities to malign and demoralise the military.<sup>35</sup> That the film was hastily withdrawn was indicative of the fact that Bhutto recognised that there was a limit to which he could risk antagonising the military.

In addition to the purges, Bhutto took several steps to erect further barriers against the return of the generals to Pakistan's political stage. Structural changes were announced in 1972 with a view to strengthening civilian control over the military. The post of commander-in-chief was abolished and replaced with chief-of-staff.<sup>36</sup> Henceforth, the president was vested with "the supreme command of the defence forces" - a ceremonial supercession that symbolised civilian control.<sup>37</sup> Later, the command of the armed forces was divided functionally between the chief of staff who was responsible for strategy and coordination between the army, navy and air force; the defence adviser (to the prime minister) who was responsible for internal security; and the defence secretary, responsible for military administration. Under previous regimes, all three functions had been vested in the commander-in-chief. Thus this reorganisation was aimed at the dispersion of power and responsibility which would serve to limit the power of any single individual. However, as we shall see later, the army chief of staff still wielded enough authority to enable him to execute a coup, without the active concurrence of either the defence adviser or the defence secretary, both of which were essentially bureaucratic offices somewhat removed from the army's effective command structure. A new joint chiefs of staff structure was also created, with a new office, that of the chairman, to head it. This was again an effort to disperse power and authority as the chairmanship was given to a senior army officer, but not the army chief of staff. This

reorganisation was also aimed - at least symbolically - to bring the air force and navy to par with the army, which can again be interpreted as an effort to reduce the power of the army chief of staff. Such administrative changes did not please the senior army leadership, but they were in no position to challenge these because of the severe demoralisation and disarray within the army in the wake of the military defeat of 1971.<sup>38</sup>

These structural reforms were accompanied by the enactment of provisions in the 1973 constitution to check military involvement in politics. Article 244 provided for an obligatory oath to be taken by members of the armed forces to "uphold the constitution" and "not to engage in any political activities whatsoever."<sup>39</sup> Article 6 in the constitution held that any attempt to abrogate or subvert the constitution by use of force or by other unconstitutional means "shall be guilty of high treason".<sup>40</sup> Article 6 (3) stated that "parliament shall by law provide for the punishment of persons found guilty of high treason."<sup>41</sup> A powerful source of (legal) support at this juncture for Bhutto's efforts at preventing military transgressions into politics, was the Supreme Court judgement in the 1972 Asma Jilani Case.<sup>42</sup> This unanimously reversed an earlier decision (in the Dosso Case)<sup>43</sup> justifying military intervention, and held that the martial law regime of General Yahya had been an unconstitutional usurpation of power.<sup>44</sup> The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ended his judgement with a stern warning to any would-be coup-makers:

"Let it be laid down firmly that the



order which the usurper imposes will remain illegal and the Courts will not recognise its rule and act upon them as de jure. As soon as the first opportunity arises, when the coercive apparatus falls from the hands of the usurper, he would be tried for high treason and suitably punished. This alone will serve as a deterrent to would-be adventurers." 45

Despite these warnings and Bhutto's efforts described above, the PPP regime was faced with an abortive conspiracy of junior military officers to overthrow the civilian government in March 1973.<sup>46</sup> The group involved in the conspiracy included twenty-one officers of the army, two of whom were brigadiers, and fourteen air force officers, one of whom was a group captain. The conspirators appeared to have been motivated by a spirit of revanchism against India and held that Bhutto alongwith senior military officers had been responsible not only for the humiliating surrender at Dacca, but for subsequently discrediting the military.<sup>47</sup> In interviews conducted with some of the alleged conspirators, it was claimed that the attempt was aimed as much against senior military, especially army officers, as against Bhutto.<sup>48</sup> However, it was said that the conspiracy did not seem to have gone beyond a rather rudimentary planning stage before the authorities were "tipped off" presumably by an "informer" amongst the group itself. According to senior military officers interviewed, the views expressed by the conspiring officers did not reflect the general opinion in the armed forces.<sup>49</sup> We might add that the conspiring officers could hardly have expected support or sympathy from amongst senior generals

since the conspiracy in part represented an abortive mutiny against the latter. Lack of support from upper echelons of the military reduced the likelihood of the attempted coup succeeding. But the event undoubtedly had a significant impact on Bhutto insofar as it accentuated his fear of a military coup. The attempt, whatever its chances for success, at least held out the possibility of a reversion to the praetorian tradition. Bhutto described his reaction to the attempted coup thus:

"I was struck by the personal and selfish factor that aroused the conspirators ... ..what made it more melancholy was that it came so soon after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. This meant that the historical tragedies arising out of military rule meant nothing to power blind individuals. The flow of blood was like water down a duck's back. The blunder of military regimes, both internal and external were not eye openers. The pollution of the armed forces by its involvement in politics had not conveyed any message. The catastrophe of East Pakistan and the surrender of 90,000 prisoners of war did not teach a single elementary lesson." 50

The conspiring officers were tried in two separate courts martial - one for the army officers and the other for air force personnel. The Attock Conspiracy Case - as the trial of army officers came to be called - took place in an army court presided over by Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq. It culminated in the conspiring officers being sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment. For Bhutto, the coup attempt underlined the need for being more cautious in his dealings with the armed forces. At the same time, the fact that one of the conspirators (Alim Afridi) had family connections with leading members of the opposition (Asghar Khan)

made Bhutto overly sensitive to civilian attempts to incite the armed forces.<sup>51</sup> But above all, it reinforced in Bhutto's mind, the need to devise an effective method of civilian control over the military. The nature of control that Bhutto operationalised forms the concern of the next section.

#### THE PATRIMONIAL METHOD OF CONTROL

The method that Bhutto utilised in establishing control over the military was a patrimonial rather than an institutional one. The emphasis on this kind of control meant that of the various models of civil-military relations that were discussed earlier, the pattern of civilian control of military under Bhutto outwardly resembled that designated as the 'authoritarian-personal' type. However, since this type is generally to be found in traditional/monarchical type regimes, the model is not strictly applicable to the Bhutto regime. This suggests the need to create a new model or category, which can be termed 'patrimonial'.

Gerald A. Heeger has also noted the patrimonial aspects of the Bhutto regime, but he does not elaborate on the phenomena in any detail.<sup>52</sup> We also differ from Heeger in the emphasis given to Bhutto's personality to explain Bhutto's preference for a patrimonial strategy. Heeger has argued that Bhutto's patrimonial strategy was less a function of personality than of circumstance, since the "(preceding) periods of military or quasi-military rule are 'de-developmental', functioning to undermine the basis of future institutionalisation."<sup>53</sup> We, on the other hand,

while recognising that institutionalising authority in the "post-military state" is a problematic and difficult endeavour for the same reason as that given by Heeger above, have argued that Bhutto's choice of a patrimonial strategy was in large part the result of his desire for maximum freedom of manoeuvre. As has been repeatedly emphasised throughout this study, Bhutto's approach to political power was never organisational or institutional, but personalised. Even when he had the opportunity, he consistently refused to follow the institutional path (e.g. strengthening his party or parliamentary institutions). In other words, we lay more emphasis than Heeger does, on Bhutto's personality to explain his choice of a patrimonial strategy for political consolidation. The implications of Bhutto's strategy are discussed later. Here it is necessary to direct attention to how Bhutto attempted to ensure civilian domination through patrimonial control.

To begin with, the combined effect of the purges as well as the structural reforms discussed above, was to enhance Bhutto's personal ascendancy over the military. This is because both the dismissal of military officers and the personnel changes necessitated by the administrative/functional reorganisation gave Bhutto the opportunity of filling the new appointments with his personal nominees. The policy Bhutto followed in making appointments showed little regard for existing promotional and seniority procedures. He often passed over senior officers in making appointments in order to ensure the personal loyalty of the promotees. For instance, in appointing General Gul Hasan,

Air Marshals Zafar Choudray and Zulfiqar Ali Khan, several senior officers were passed over. Tikka Khan, at first passed over for his next promotion, in spite of his service seniority, was retrieved from the shelf and appointed army chief of staff.<sup>54</sup> In 1976, upon his retirement, Tikka Khan was appointed as defence adviser (later in 1977, Tikka Khan was to join the PPP) as a reward for his intense loyalty to Bhutto. Tikka Khan was replaced as army chief of staff by Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto promoted over the heads of several other generals as a reward for his services during the Attock conspiracy trial. Bhutto's selective promotions policy was aimed at placing apparently loyal officers in strategic positions. He often chose pliant and unambitious individuals for rapid promotions.<sup>55</sup> For instance Zia was reportedly appointed because of his reputation as a 'simple soldier' who was uninterested in politics.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, General Mohammed Sharif, not an obviously distinguished military officer, was appointed as chairman, joint chiefs of staff. The emphasis was on personal loyalty to ensure military subordination, rather than on any institutional checks.

In pursuing a patrimonial strategy, - promoting officers because of their personal and political loyalties to him - Bhutto was injecting politics into the military and flouting the accepted promotional criteria of competence and seniority. This bred insecurity in the upper echelons of the military. The consequences of this kind of civilian interference in the internal affairs of the military have been summed up by one scholar thus:

"Such actions generally lower the professional competence and self-image of the officer corps by substituting political for achievement criteria, call into doubt the soldiers' identities as independent and respected officers, factionalise an otherwise cohesive officer corp, warp the heirarchical structure and weaken the officers' power to defend their other corporate interests." 57

By interfering in military affairs and interjecting political considerations into the armed forces, Bhutto was flouting one of the cardinal rules of a harmonious civil-military relationship: no trespassing on the military reservation.<sup>58</sup>

Bhutto's reliance on personalist rather than institutional means of political consolidation over the military as indeed over his party and the civilian bureaucracy (and the Pakistan political system in general) had important implications. With regard to the military, the precariousness of such a strategy was underlined by a military officer we interviewed in the following manner: Such civilian supremacy was "likely to be temporary and personal affair - a superficial gimmick to win over key officers through promotions and favours, and not a permanent arrangement that could govern civil-military relations."<sup>59</sup>

Viewed from a broader perspective, the personalised nature of Bhutto's rule inevitably meant weak institutional development. The failure to develop viable civilian political structures meant that there were no institutional checks on the power of the military. If the susceptibility of a political system to military intervention varies inversely with the strength of its political institutions,

as has been argued by many scholars, then the Bhutto regime remained potentially open to the threat of praetorianism. Making civilian supremacy dependent in large measure on a highly personalist, and therefore transcendent sense of loyalty on the part of senior military officers to Bhutto, was a fragile and tentative arrangement. That the military remained potential interveners in politics if domestic discord prevented Bhutto's efforts at governing effectively, was a fact recognised by observers as well as Bhutto himself. One observer noted that

"in a situation marked by a lack of political and constitutional consensus (there is) the danger of military intervening." 60

Another noted that

"the only possible alternative to Bhutto, recognised by the Pakistanis and Americans alike, appears to be some form of military leadership." 61

Bhutto recognised this too; on one occasion he stated;

"Looking into the future, if we messed it up, if we didn't make the parliamentary system work, if our constitution breaks down, then there's a possibility of the army stepping in again." 62

#### BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY'S POSITION AS A "CORE GROUP" IN THE POLITY

If the fragility of the patrimonial method of control indicated that the military remained potential interveners in Pakistani politics, Bhutto's inability significantly to erode the military's position as a "core group" also pointed towards the possibility of a reversion to the

praetorian tradition. The fact that Bhutto perceived the need to obtain military acquiescence in his rule was indicative of the military's continuing importance in the Pakistani polity. But why, notwithstanding the initial brandishing of the stick, was Bhutto unable significantly to erode the military's position as a formidable institution? The answer is to be found in two sets of factors: (1) foreign policy needs, which urged Bhutto to accord the armed forces an important role in terms of priority, for instance, with regard to public expenditure, (2) domestic needs, in particular the need to rely on the army to contain domestic turmoil.

Beginning with the first factor, that Bhutto continued to accord prime importance to the military's status, needs and interest was a function primarily of his perception of the security needs of the country. Since independence, fear of India and the aim of "liberating" Kashmir have been the main explanations for the growth of the military and for giving defence matters top national priority. Among the civilian leaders, none had advocated the military's case more forcefully than Bhutto himself. During the 1965 war he had implored the people to continue fighting India for a thousand years and to "eat grass" in order to continue arming the military. In his book, The Myth of Independence, he wrote:

"Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development. Although such development and self-reliance contribute to the strengthening of the nation's defence capability, the defence requirements of her sovereignty have to be met first." 63



Bhutto had also advocated establishing an "industrial war base",<sup>64</sup> and the development of a "nuclear deterrent" against India.<sup>65</sup> The Foundation Documents of the PPP stated plainly that

"the only answer to an armed India is an armed Pakistan", 66

and called for an increase in the strength of the armed forces.<sup>67</sup> Despite steps taken by Bhutto after coming to power to normalise relations with India,<sup>68</sup> his perception of Pakistan's 'security problem' i.e. military vulnerability vis a vis India,<sup>69</sup> led him to rebuild and rearm the military.<sup>70</sup> The task of rehabilitating the military was considered no less important than that of rebuilding the war-ravaged economy. So long as the perception of the Indian 'threat' remained there was little likelihood of a cut in defence expenditure. The domestic impact of the national security problem inevitably involved giving prominence to military opinion and leadership. Except for occasional remarks that in the event of Indo-Pakistan disputes being resolved amicably "we may not have to spend so much on defence,"<sup>71</sup> Bhutto repeatedly emphasised the need to give priority to defence matters. In a speech in 1972, he declared his intention to raise "the finest fighting-machine in Asia."<sup>72</sup> On another occasion, he pointed out that "the present government is spending much more on military preparations for defence than the regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan."<sup>73</sup> That the Bhutto government continued the tradition of making large budgetary allocations for defence is evident from the figures given below (Table XI.2) -

Defence Expenditures continued to form the largest single

item in the government's budget.

TABLE XI.2

GNP, GROSS REVENUE RECEIPTS AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

(Rs. in millions)

YEAR	GNP	TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS	AMOUNTS	REVENUE EXPENDITURE	
				AS % OF GNP	AS % OF REVENUE RECEIPTS
1968-69	37955	5774	2427	6.4	42.0
1969-70	43348	6665	2739	6.3	41.3
1970-71	45620	6021	3202	7.0	53.2
1971-72	49268	6065	3726	7.6	61.4
1972-73	61258	7533	4440	7.3	58.9
1973-74	81058	11048	4949	6.1	44.8
1974-75	105787	12980	6914	6.5	53.3
1975-76	124415	15204	8103	6.5	53.3
1976-77	141166	17787	8121	5.8	45.7

Source: Computed from Pakistan Economic Survey 1978-79,  
(Islamabad: Finance Division)

On account of the 1971 war, defence spending rose considerably in the first few years of the Bhutto government. But even after making good the losses incurred in the Bangladesh war, military expenditure remained high. Such a policy obviously strengthened the military's position.

The dilemma in reconciling the need to re-equip and strengthen the military and to keep it under civilian control was brought out clearly in an interview given by Bhutto in 1972, which is worth quoting at some length:

Interviewer: How can a humiliated army be made the finest fighting machine in Asia and also be made to stay as a dumb servant of the nation?

Bhutto: It is a question of necessity because our problems and our disputes have not yet been resolved.....Once problems which have led us into conflict (are resolved), then the people would not feel the need of maintaining a large army.....If the people are satisfied, if the government is discharging its duties and fulfilling its responsibilities then....the army....(has) to remain in line and under a democratic discipline." 74

Thus, Bhutto faced an important dilemma in reconciling domestic and foreign policy pressures. The allocation of scarce national resources to defence inevitably meant that less was available for economic development and to implement many of the PPP's social and economic reform proposals.<sup>75</sup> There seemed to be no easy way out of this dilemma, given Bhutto's perception of Pakistan's security problem.

Domestic needs, in particular what Bhutto referred to as his "lingering fear"<sup>76</sup> of a coup if he antagonised the military, also urged him towards adopting policies that had the effect of reinforcing rather than eroding the military's position as a "core group" in Pakistani society. That Bhutto felt the need to accommodate the military's views and needs can be demonstrated in a number of ways. Economic incentives included generous pay and service benefits. Military personnel were given two pay increases during the PPP rule.<sup>77</sup> Another aspect of the same policy involved the promise of meeting the military's requirements for modern and sophisticated weapons. Bhutto's efforts at getting the United States to lift the arms embargo (imposed in 1965)

in 1975 was an important step toward fulfilling this promise.<sup>78</sup> The PPP government spent over a billion and a half dollars on armaments.<sup>79</sup> At the same time, efforts were directed toward developing a nuclear capability<sup>80</sup> and in March 1976 Bhutto negotiated an agreement with France to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.<sup>81</sup>

The attempt to appease the military was not only reflected in economic incentives such as those described above, but was also demonstrated in the psychological assurance to military status given by Bhutto in many of his speeches. He frequently paid glowing tributes to the "valour and professional competence of the armed forces", and expressed his "full faith" in them.<sup>82</sup> Whether in his public speeches or when addressing army officers and jawans, Bhutto repeatedly expressed his respect and support for the armed forces, often in the following language:

"(Since)...you are the custodians of our frontiers...to us - to me and to the government of Pakistan, you are not ordinary individuals." 83

"I took pains," Bhutto later declared, "to uphold the prestige and reputation of the armed forces."<sup>84</sup> However, Bhutto, at times, utilised such occasions to define the role of the military and to reiterate the elected nature of his government in order to emphasise the norm of civilian supremacy.<sup>85</sup>

Several instances can be cited to demonstrate that Bhutto accorded considerable weight to military opinion. Bhutto deferred to the wishes of the military when he decided not to publish the Hamoodur Rahman Report.<sup>86</sup> The

report, which dealt with the causes of the military debacle in East Pakistan, was according to Bhutto "a story of rape, plunder and loot" and would have irreparably damaged the name of the armed forces.<sup>87</sup> All the senior military officers who had access to the Report were of unanimous view that it should not be published.<sup>88</sup> Bhutto later explained:

"In deference to their wishes and out of respect for the army, I did not release the Report despite the enormous pressure from the public and the opposition parties." <sup>89</sup>

Another illustration of Bhutto's desire not to antagonise the military is provided by the cautious manner in which he approached the whole question of normalising relations with India. To begin with, he delayed the recognition of Bangladesh until he secured the release of the prisoners of war from India.<sup>90</sup> Secondly, before the summit meeting at Simla with Indira Gandhi, Bhutto not only went out of his way to sound and prepare public opinion for peace with India,<sup>91</sup> but assured senior military officers that he would never accept Indian hegemony.<sup>92</sup> Bhutto was anxious to avoid another Tashkent.<sup>93</sup> Although negotiating from a position of weakness, Bhutto refused to give in to the Indian demand for a no-war pledge and a formal treaty of "non'aggression".<sup>94</sup> Bhutto was aware that such a treaty would be unacceptable to the armed forces.<sup>95</sup> He had the lesson of 1950 - when the last no-war pact was signed - before him. This had led to an abortive coup (known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case) against the then prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan.<sup>96</sup> The Accord reached

at Simla in July 1972 was sufficiently nebulous to allow both sides to interpret its clauses to suit their individual position,<sup>97</sup> but the two sides nevertheless agreed to settle all differences amicably through a step-by-step approach.<sup>98</sup> On his return, Bhutto made strenuous efforts to reassure the military, as the public in general, that he had not compromised on the vital question of Kashmir, and further, that he had outwitted the Indians at the Conference table.<sup>99</sup> The National Asssembly met to ratify the agreement, legitimising the actions of Bhutto.<sup>100</sup> The official media, on the other hand, publicised the idea that while Pakistan had gone to Simla a defeated country, she had come away with an agreement that involved no further compromise.<sup>101</sup> As one observer wrote,

"This time, unlike after the Tashkent Declaration, the people of Pakistan did not imagine they had won a war which was later compromised on the negotiating table. They had this time lost a war, but were regaining their pride at the peace table.... The Simla Accord, unlike Tashkent, had been properly packaged and properly sold." 102

Another illustration of Bhutto's caution in threatening the interests of the military was the exemption of military officers' holdings from his land reform programme.<sup>103</sup> While Bhutto was prepared to risk alienating the left-wing within his party, as represented by men like Sheikh Rashid who opposed such a move, he did not wish to antagonise the senior military leadership.<sup>104</sup> Such appeasement policies clearly served to reinforce the military's power and status.

Another policy that also served to strengthen the military's position as a core group was Bhutto's frequent

use of the army to contain domestic turbulence. During the first two years of PPP rule, troops were called out on five occasions to deal with various kinds of public disorders - language riots, an industrial strike, and tribal unrest.<sup>105</sup> Thus while civilian leaders decried military intervention in civilian affairs, the fact that they relied on the military for purposes of internal control inevitably meant drawing the army back into the political arena, albeit 'in aid of the civilian authority.'<sup>106</sup> The consequences of the use of the army for police functions has been noted by many scholars.<sup>107</sup> The consensus of opinion is that such action tends to enhance the role of the military,<sup>108</sup> politicises it,<sup>109</sup> and breaks down the boundaries between the civilian and military spheres.<sup>110</sup> As one scholar has stated:

"When a shift from power to force occurs, it is accompanied by a shift in the relative 'market value' of existing structures: in the case of the new African states, the value of political parties and of civil administration has undergone a sort of deflation, while the value of the police and of the military has been vastly increased." 111

Additionally, when the military is repeatedly called upon to put down strikes or to deal with disorder in a dissident region, officers and men at all levels become acquainted more intimately with the seamy side of political life in their country.<sup>112</sup> This can lead to an erosion of respect for the civilian rulers, and more generally toward politicians as a class. Our interviews with senior military officers indicate that the PPP government's reliance on the army for internal control not only enhanced the problem

of legitimacy (of the rulers in the eyes of the military) but reinforced the self-image of the military as the 'saviour' of the nation.

That Bhutto was sensitive to the dangers of excessive reliance on the military is demonstrated by his decision in 1972 to set up a para-military force, the Federal Security Force (FSF) to deal with domestic unrest.<sup>113</sup> In fact it was the then army chief of staff, Gul Hasan's refusal to supply troops to break up a police strike in early 1972<sup>114</sup> which necessitated (and was probably also a factor in his dismissal) the creation of a special civil task force, in order 'to reduce the reliance of the civil government on the military in a law and order situation.'<sup>115</sup> However the attempt to balance one instrument of force which was thought to be unreliable by means of the creation of another, the FSF, only exacerbated the problem for Bhutto vis à vis the military.<sup>116</sup> The creation of a force (18,500 strong by the end of 1976) outside the command structure of the regular army<sup>117</sup> was viewed with alarm not only by the regime's political opponents, but also by members of the armed forces.<sup>118</sup> Critics claimed that the FSF was modelled upon Hitler's SS.<sup>119</sup> Military officers resented the establishment of a parallel force, but were further incensed when the force was provided with modern and sophisticated arms and equipment.<sup>120</sup> As a mark of protest, FSF recruits were refused training in army units as desired by Bhutto.<sup>121</sup> The activities of the FSF<sup>122</sup> - such as the illegal abduction of dissident politicians and intimidation of political opponents - further reinforced



the view held by military officers that it was a personal, Gestapo-style instrument of the prime minister.<sup>123</sup> Thus the creation of the FSF emerged as a major source of grievance within military circles against the Bhutto regime.<sup>124</sup> This is borne out by the fact that one of the first actions of the military regime that replaced the PPP government was to disband the FSF entirely.<sup>125</sup>

Despite Bhutto's stated desire to reduce reliance on the military,<sup>126</sup> he nevertheless utilised them in containing tribal turbulence in Dir in 1976 and in Baluchistan from 1973-1977.<sup>127</sup> In sending 70,000 troops to Baluchistan to deal with a guerilla insurrection of Baluchi autonomists,<sup>128</sup> Bhutto was in effect enlisting the military to settle a political conflict with his opponents in that province.<sup>129</sup> (See above, chapter IX). This again meant drawing the military back into politics. Bhutto's attention was drawn to the 'adverse repercussions' of 'the army's prolonged stay' in Baluchistan, by one of his advisers in 1976.<sup>130</sup> In a comprehensive note on the civil-military problem in Baluchistan, Bhutto's adviser informed him that increasingly the army had begun to act as an independent force in the province; army officers had developed a taste for power and relished it in the form of arrests, searches and interrogation which gave them a feeling of authority.<sup>131</sup> This was accompanied by their contempt for the ways of the politicians and by the general impression that civil administrators and politicians were corrupt and incompetent and that only the military could deliver the goods.<sup>132</sup> The author of the note added that it was this feeling which had

ushered in the first martial law in the country.<sup>133</sup>

The note stated starkly and clearly the danger posed to civilian authority by the military's long involvement in Baluchistan. Despite these warnings, the PPP government did not follow a policy of gradual withdrawal of the army from Baluchistan.<sup>134</sup> This could only result in giving the military additional leverage and added pre-eminence in the national arena. The lack of concern shown by Bhutto at this juncture was perhaps a reflection of his confidence in the methods he had devised to control the military.

#### THE MILITARY COUP OF JULY 1977

There were several factors behind the military takeover of 5 July that toppled the Bhutto government. As is evident from the discussion above, the inadequacy or fragility of Bhutto's patrimonial method of control together with policies that served to strengthen the military's position as a "core group" meant that the military remained potential interveners in civilian affairs. In this sense the military's seizure of power in 1977 was in many ways related to various developments during the preceding five and a half years of PPP rule: Bhutto's failure to create viable political institutions; his inability, notwithstanding his early actions significantly to erode the military's power and status; and his reliance on the military to deal with domestic unrest; a policy that can be viewed as leading to "role expansion" on the part of the military. Against this background, a number of additional factors, including those arising from the exigencies of

the crisis situation in 1977 need to be examined to arrive at a comprehensive explanation for the July coup.

The four months of domestic turmoil that followed the opposition's charge of election rigging (see above, chapter IX), presented a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the PPP government and put the loyalty of the armed forces to the civilian authorities under a severe test.<sup>135</sup> Significantly, both protagonists in the political conflict-- the opposition alliance (PNA) and the PPP government - viewed the military as the key variable in resolving the crisis. On the one hand, Bhutto needed the support of the army if he was to retain his position in the face of really determined opposition agitation. On the other hand, the opposition recognised that the only way to remove Bhutto was through a military coup.<sup>136</sup> Capitalising on a massive wave of anti-government sentiment in the urban centres the PNA's four month campaign of hartals, riots, demonstrations, street violence, piya-jam (wheel jam) strikes was aimed at creating national disorder and turmoil in order to destroy the legitimacy of the Bhutto government in the eyes of the military. Bhutto's repressive measures only served to escalate the movement while his offers of concessions (spurned by the PNA) did not enable him to gain his lost authority and credibility. Unable to control the rising tide of violence, Bhutto played his last card in a desperate situation by calling in the army and declaring martial law in the country's three largest cities.<sup>137</sup> This action was flagrantly in violation of the terms of his own constitution that made no allowance for martial law at all.

For many military officers, this action demonstrated Bhutto's duplicity - while decrying military involvement in politics in the strongest of terms, Bhutto evidently had no qualms about inviting the military to act in a political role in order to save him.<sup>138</sup> As one military leader later explained to us in an interview:

"We (i.e. the military) were expected to become an arm of the PPP....we are a national institution..... we cannot take sides." 139

The use of the army to quell the anti-Bhutto movement was an important factor that precipitated the coup. The Bhutto regime's shift away from political power as a technique of rule to a reliance on force produced a typical situation, described earlier, in which a "deflation" of civilian political structures vis à vis coercive (police and military) structures occurs. Paradoxically then Bhutto resorted to force when power and legitimacy failed, but the use of force to implement authority only enhanced the problem of legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of the military to whom the implementation had necessarily to be entrusted. Military officers are generally averse to being forced to act as policemen.<sup>140</sup> Moreover, this time what is predominantly a Punjabi army was being asked to undertake the unsavoury action of shooting their own Punjabi brethren.<sup>141</sup> If Bhutto retained the loyalty of key senior officers at this juncture, this was not necessarily true of the junior officers many of whom were reported to have disobeyed orders to shoot at unarmed civilians.<sup>142</sup> In Lahore, a number of brigadiers resigned in protest

against the government's policy of repression, while the military commander in Lahore expressed serious misgivings at the tasks the civilian authorities expected the army to perform.<sup>143</sup> The threat of disunity in the army ranks was therefore a significant interventionist motive.<sup>144</sup> Additional pressure was brought to bear upon the military high command by a group of senior retired officers including Gul Hasan, Rahim Khan (who, as we saw earlier had been dismissed by Bhutto in 1972)<sup>145</sup> and Asghar Khan, who appealed to the army to desert Bhutto.<sup>146</sup>

An important additional factor that helps to explain the military's decision to intervene, was the appeal of the PNA's slogan of Nizam-e-Mustapha (the demand for an Islamic system) to important segments within the armed forces.<sup>147</sup> In order to understand this it is important to look at the changing social background of the officer corps. Firstly, the generational shift in the high command from the British-trained, secular-minded officers to the more traditional officers drawn largely from either the migrants from East Punjab (for example, the leaders of the July coup, Generals Zia, Chisti and Arif) or the unirrigated Potwar region appears to have given rise to a group of generals who are socially conservative and susceptible to a puritanical ideology of the type which the Jamaat-e-Islami (major element in the PNA) professes.<sup>148</sup> Similarly, patterns of general recruitment have also undergone some change whereby not only the jawans but even the junior officers tend to come increasingly not from relatively affluent rural families of Central Punjab, but

from among farmers of the backward northern districts, subscribing to a fundamentalist religious ethos. Consequently, the PNA's emotional appeal to religion to overthrow a corrupt and un-Islamic government could not fail to attract sympathy within the armed forces. It is difficult to imagine that Zia's religious conservatism did not prejudice him to viewing the opposition's appeals with some degree of sympathy. This is not to suggest PNA/army complicity - as Bhutto later alleged<sup>149</sup> - for which we found no evidence, but that sympathy with the religious fundamentalism espoused by the PNA may have been a factor in the army's decision to withdraw its support from the Bhutto regime.

Initially, the military pressurised Bhutto and the PNA to negotiate a political agreement. The deadlock in the talks that followed in June clearly exasperated the patience of the military. Hours after Bhutto had addressed a press conference in which he accused the PNA of going back on the agreement, he was deposed in a bloodless army coup. For the third time in Pakistan's history, the military intervened to 'save the nation' from chaos and bloodshed.<sup>150</sup> The fact that Zia and his corpscommanders were able to execute a successful coup without the participation of the defence adviser (Tikka Khan) and the chairman joint chiefs of staff (Mohammed Sharif), both intensely loyal to Bhutto, was indicative of the fact, that despite the reorganisation in the military described earlier, the army chief of staff wielded crucial power. From a broader perspective, the fact that the military took power so

easily, without any resistance, was a reflection of the widespread disillusionment with the record of the PPP government that made it difficult for it to find either popular or elite support. It was only when the military were convinced that the PPP government had lost its legitimising mantle that it decided to intervene. Just as civilian political failure had largely paved the way for the army's involvement in politics in the 1950's, so the PPP government's performance failure (e.g. the inability to preserve public order in March-June) resulted in the military intervention of 5 July. In this sense, the 'reactive' dimension in the coup of July 1977 was clearly evident.

#### CONCLUSION

To sum up, it is evident that a number of factors lay behind the military takeover that toppled the Bhutto government. In his five and a half years of rule, Bhutto failed to develop alternative political structures, at times threatened the corporate interests of the military and yet relied on it to contain domestic discord, and was unable to erode significantly the military's position as a core group in the Pakistani polity. The method of control he devised to ensure civilian supremacy was not institutional but personal, and for that reason fragile and transient. Against this background, the mobilisation of large numbers of people in the March 1977 election and the serious damage to government legitimacy and prestige which resulted from the rigging charges and the ensuing civil turmoil

encouraged the opposition parties to invite military intervention. That both the PPP and the PNA sought military support to eliminate the other was both indicative of the absence of a fundamental consensus on the rules and norms of a civilian democratic polity, and a tacit recognition of the military's role as the final arbiter of Pakistani politics. In the absence of any institutional restraints, and given the grievances and critical attitudes of many of its officers, the military finally removed the Bhutto government.

As discussed earlier, political activity by the men on horseback within the Third World is often explained in terms of the societal crises of legitimacy and stability. From this broad perspective it is both the fundamental weakness of the civilian institutions of state and their inability to legitimise their rule which promote action on the part of the military. Given the failure or, if one prefers, the instability of civilian regimes, the men on horseback act to fill the void.<sup>151</sup> Underlying this position is the view that "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political, and reflect not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society."<sup>152</sup> While our examination of the coup in Pakistan, in general reaffirms this thesis, it also directs attention to variables - such as the threat to the corporate interests of the military, the religious outlook of military officers - that are related to what can be called the military's



disposition to intervene. This indicates as S. E. Finer has suggested that the reasons for military intervention are found in two sets of forces: the capacity and disposition of the military to intervene, and the structure of society in which the military operates.<sup>153</sup> In the literature on comparative studies of military intervention, the two perspectives have often been viewed dichotomously.<sup>154</sup> While the focal point of each perspective is different, our analysis suggests that the two views can be combined to complement one another. Therefore, in looking for the reasons behind military intervention in politics, it is of the greatest importance to examine the position and motivation of the armed forces, the nature of the total societal context and the linkages that exist between society and the men on horseback.

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#### NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 195-198.
2. For a detailed exposition of these models see, Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977), pp. 187-190. A third model, the garrison-state model refers to the weakening of civil supremacy that can arise even in an effective democratic structure. The garrison-state, however, is not a throwback to a military dictatorship, but is the end result of the ascent to power of the military elite under conditions of prolonged international tension. Since the garrison state requires a highly developed industrial base the concept is not directly applicable to Third World countries. See Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', American Journal of Sociology, (January, 1941), pp. 455-68.
3. Huntington, ibid.
4. Edward A. Shils, Political Development in the New States, (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962).
5. Janowitz, ibid., pp. 81-83.
6. Ibid., p. 81.

7. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. 79.
8. For a detailed history of this period see K. B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), chapter four.
9. The literature that deals with this includes: Rizvi, op.cit; K. B. Sayeed, 'Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan', The Middle East Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 4, (Autumn 1959); K. J. Newman, 'Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and It's Causes', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 32, (March 1959); Hans Daalder, The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries, (Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, (New York: Praeger, 1965); W. A. Wilcox, 'Political Role of the Army in Pakistan', South Asian Studies, Vol. 7, (January 1972); Hugh Tinker, Ballot Box and Bayonet, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Robert La Porte, 'Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State', Asian Survey, Vol. 9, (November, 1969); Hamza Alavi, 'The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistani Politics', International Socialist Journal, (March-April, 1966).
10. Huntington, ibid.
11. Amos Perlmutter, 'The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities', Comparative Politics, Vol. I, (April 1969).
12. Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 13.
13. Janowitz, ibid, pp. 92, 161-162.
14. Ibid, p. 162.
15. For Ayub's views see his autobiography Friends Not Masters (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967).
16. Z. A. Bhutto, "If I Am Assassinated", (New Delhi: Vikas 1979), p. 116.
17. Speech in the National Assembly on 14 July, 1972, in Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 July - 30 September 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 25.
18. This fear was expressed by Bhutto both privately and in public. Bhutto talks about his fear at length in "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit.
19. Speeches and Statements, ibid, p. 25.
20. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege, Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 114-115.
21. Interviews with senior military officers, Rawalpindi - Islamabad, December 1977 and October 1979.

22. Khurshid Hyder, 'Pakistan Under Bhutto', in Current History, (November 1972), p. 202.
23. As noted above (chapter four, p.285 ), the unconditional surrender of the army in Dacca was not only followed by a wave of angry demonstrations throughout West Pakistan demanding an end to military rule but also held out the possibility of a mutiny in the junior ranks of the army.
24. Interviews with senior army officers.
25. This has been an important factor in explaining the army's voluntary withdrawal from politics in other states as well. See Claude E. Welch, 'Cincinnatus in Africa : The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics', in M. Lofchie, ed., The State of Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
26. Interviews with senior army officers, Rawalpindi, October 1979.
27. Ibid.
28. For Gul Hasan and Rahim's role in forcing Yahya Khan to hand over power to Bhutto, see above, chapter IV. See also S. Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), pp. 149-150.
29. Interviews with senior military officers, Rawalpindi, December 1977 and October 1979.
30. For the text of Bhutto's address to the nation, see Pakistan Times, 5 March 1972, 1.
31. See for instance, J. A. Rahim's statement in Pakistan Times, 27 December 1971.
32. D. Shah Khan, 'Mr. Bhutto and the Armed Forces', in Defence Journal, (Karachi), Vol. III, No. 11, (1977), p. 17.
33. Interview with Lt. General F. A. Chishti, senior corp commander and Lt. General Iqbal, deputy chief of army staff, Rawalpindi, October 1979.
34. This resentment was communicated through the new army chief-of-staff Tikka Khan to Bhutto and subsequent retirements did not follow the same pattern.
35. Defence Journal, Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2, (1978), p. 2.
36. In India the designation of the service chiefs was changed from commander-in-chief to chiefs-of-staff in 1955. See P. R. Chari, 'Civil-Military Relations in India', in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Fall, 1977), pp. 12-13.
37. De facto control however rested with the prime minister, for under the 1973 constitution, the president could only act in accordance with the prime minister's wishes.

38. Interviews with Lt. General F. A. Chishti and Major-General S. Rafi Alam, Rawalpindi, December 1977.
39. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1973), pp. 135, 184.
40. Ibid, pp. 18-19.
41. Ibid, p. 19.
42. See Pakistan Legal Decisions (1972), SC 139. For extracts from judgements in cases involving martial law since 1953, see 'Martial Law and Constitutional Jurisprudence' in Defence Journal, (1977), op.cit, pp. 44-54.
43. For the Dosso Case judgement see Pakistan Legal Decisions, (1958), SC, 533.
44. For a discussion of "judicial response to constitutional breakdown in countries of the Third World", see L. Wolf-Phillips, Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity, (London: Third World Foundation, 1980).
45. Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman quoted in ibid, p. 20.
46. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXI, 17-23 March 1975, p. 27017.
47. See chapter V, p. 340.
48. Interview with Air Commodore Sajjad Haider, Islamabad, October 1979. The other interviewees prefer to remain anonymous.
49. This seems to have been the consensus of opinion among the senior military officers interviewed by the author.
50. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, p. 124.
51. This was reflected in the harsh treatment meted out to opposition politicians who were allegedly inciting the armed forces. For instance, on 21 September 1976, a Special Tribunal awarded four year rigorous imprisonment to Hanif Ramay, (former chief minister of Punjab) for "attempting to cause disaffection among members of the armed forces."
52. Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience', World Politics, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, (January 1977).
53. Ibid, p. 261.
54. Defence Journal, (1978), op.cit, p. 2.
55. Interviews with senior military officers.
56. Victoria Schofield, Bhutto: Trial and Execution, (London: Cassell, 1979), p. 16.

57. E. A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 71.
58. Civilian impingement upon the military's autonomy invariably give rise to powerful praetorian motivations. See ibid, pp. 13, 49.
59. Interview with Colonel Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer to the Chief Martial Law Administrator (Zia), Rawalpindi, October 1979.
60. M. Ayooob, 'Pakistan's New Political Structure: Change and Continuity', International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, (April-June 1973), p.
61. Power and Privilege, op.cit, p. 117-
62. Z. A. Bhutto, Interviews to the Press, 20 December 1971 - 13 August 1973, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 80.
63. Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 152.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid, p. 153.
66. Pakistan Peoples Party: Foundation and Policy, (Lahore: PPP, n.d.) p. 70.
67. Ibid, p. 15.
68. For Pakistan's relations with India under Bhutto see Lawrence Ziring, 'Bhutto's Foreign Policy, 1972-73' in J. H. Korson ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); Ziring, et al, eds., Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 301-429; K. P. Misra, 'Trilateralism in South Asia', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 7, (July 1974).
69. Anwar H. Syed, 'Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints' in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1975), pp. 246-275.
70. Bhutto lists his efforts in rebuilding the military in "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, pp. 116-117.
71. Dawn, 26 October 1972.
72. Hindustan Times, 4 March 1972.
73. Indian Express, 18 December 1972.
74. Interviews to the Press, op.cit, p. 108.
75. See above, chapter V, p. 327.
76. "If I Am Assassinated" op.cit, p. 83.

77. Defence Journal, (1977), op.cit, p. 25.
78. William J. Barnds, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting Opportunities and Constraints' in Pakistan: The Long View, op.cit.
79. The United States was not the sole supplier of arms to Pakistan. Indeed, Washington's opposition to Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France led to its threat to refuse the sale of conventional arms in 1976.
80. Bhutto lists his own achievements in Pakistan's nuclear programme in "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, pp. 135-138.
81. Subsequently, under U.S. pressure, France went back on the treaty, asking for modifications ('safeguards') of the original agreement. Bhutto later held the U.S. Government responsible for his fall from power, as part of a conspiracy to prevent Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear capability, ibid, p. 138.
82. See for instance, Bhutto's message of thanks to the Pakistan army chief of staff on 14 April 1973, in Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 April - 13 August 1973, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 38.
83. Address at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, 21 April, 1973, ibid, pp. 48-50.
84. "If I Am Assassinated", ibid, p. 139.
85. Defence Journal, op.cit, p. 24.
86. "If I Am Assassinated", ibid, p. 139. The Report has not been made public to date.
87. Ibid.
88. Interview with (Retd.) Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, London, February, 1979.
89. "If I Am Assassinated", ibid, p. 139.
90. The military was not the only constraint on Bhutto's decision not to recognise Bangladesh. Large-scale demonstrations in the Punjab engineered by right-wing parties against the proposed recognition was an additional constraining factor. See Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), pp. 257-260.
91. Bhutto met several delegations of national and provincial political leaders, students, lawyers, ulema, labour leaders and members of the intelligentsia. See ibid, p. 233.
92. Interviews with senior military officers, Rawalpindi - Islamabad, October 1979.
93. Taseer, op.cit, pp. 145-146.

94. For an appraisal of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Indian and Pakistani positions, see William J. Barnds, op.cit, pp. 376-378.
95. Ziring, 'Bhutto's Foreign Policy', op.cit, p. 69.
96. Ibid; see also note 1 in chapter I above.
97. The essence of the Simla Accord is explained in this manner by Taseer, ibid, pp. 141-142.
98. For the text of the Simla Accord, see Pakistan Horizon, XXV, No. 3, (1972), pp. 117-118.
99. Taseer, ibid, pp. 144-145.
100. Dawn, 15 July 1972, 1.
101. See for instance the issues of the Pakistan Times, 3-15 July, 1972.
102. Taseer, ibid, p. 145-146.
103. The army traditionally recruited their senior officers from wealthy rural families. Although this pattern has undergone some change in the last two decades with more officers being recruited from less prosperous rural back-grounds, these officers nevertheless obtain substantial tracts of land (through state grants) after recruitment and become landowners in their own right when they were not already. There is little published information on this phenomenon, but see Hamza Alavi, 'The State' in Post-Colonial Societies', in K. Gough and H. P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), which touches on the subject.
104. Interview with (Retd.) Air Chief Marshal Z. A. Khan.
105. H. A. Rizvi, op.cit, p. 263.
106. Under Article 245 of the 1973 Constitution, the armed forces are obliged, under the direction of the federal government, 'to act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so'.
107. See for instance, E. A. Nordlinger, op.cit, pp. 54-56; H. Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes, (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 79-82; Claude Welch, ed., Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, (Albany: State University of New York, 1976), p. 247; Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, (Illinois, Peacock Publishers, 1973), pp. 149-150; G. A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 96-98.
108. Heeger, ibid, p. 96.
109. Welch, ibid, p. 247.

110. Palmer, ibid, p. 150.
111. A. Zolberg, 'Military Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa', in Henry Bienen, op.cit, p. 80.
112. Ibid, p. 81.
113. See above, chapter V, pp. 341-42. The nucleus of the Force was created in October 1972 with an ad hoc grant from the ministry of the interior. In May 1973 an Ordinance was passed to create the Force and in June 1973 it was given legal shape by an act of Parliament.
114. This was one of the reasons behind Gul Hasan's dismissal in March 1972. See Tariq Ali, 'Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects' in Robin Balckburn, ed., Explosion in a Sub-continent, (London: Penguin Books, 1975).
115. See 'Federal Security Force - Friends of the People', special supplement in Pakistan Times, 5 October 1976.
116. It is interesting to note that in many African countries, resort to this technique has led to pre-emptive military coups. This seems to have been the case most clearly in Ghana, where Nkrumah's creation of a special presidential guard was one of the reasons behind the 1960 coup. The same holds for the 1966 coup in the Central African Republic as well as the abortive 1966 coup in Congo-Brazzaville. For a detailed examination of paramilitary forces in the developing nations, see Morris Janowitz, op.cit, chapter one, pp. 3-70.
117. While administrative control of the forces lay with the ministry of the interior, in actual fact the Director-General of the FSF reported directly to the prime minister. Recruitment was restricted to those who were or had been members of the armed forces, the civil armed forces or the police. For its functions, organisation and recruitment see the Federal Security Force Act, 1973 in The Gazette of Pakistan Extra, 29 June 1973.
118. See Ikram Azam, Pakistan's Security and National Integration, (Rawalpindi: London Book Co., 1974), pp. 116-117.
119. W. L. Richter, 'Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2, (Fall 1978), p. 419.
120. Interviews with senior military officers. For details of the arms and equipment supplied to the FSF, see White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, Misuse of Instruments of State Power, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), p. 26 and Annexures 28, 29, 30, 31.
121. Interview with Lt. General M. Iqbal.
122. Some of these activities are described in chapter V. See also White Paper, ibid, pp. 26-34.



123. Interviews with senior military officers.
124. This grievance was communicated to Bhutto, but according to army officers, not emphatically enough by the then army chief, Tikka Khan.
125. On 30 November 1977 President Zia issued an ordinance repealing the FSF Act of 1973. See Pakistan Times, 1 December 1977, 1.
126. Bhutto's reservations about relying on the army to control law and order situations are clearly set out in a letter addressed to his chief security adviser in August 1972. See White Paper, Vol. III, op.cit, Annexure 24, p. A 68.
127. For the events leading up to the military action in Baluchistan, see chapter V, pp. 332-338.
128. Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', Foreign Policy, No. 32, (Fall, 1978), p. 138.
129. See also chapter V, p. 329-338.
130. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1978), p. 72.
131. For the full text of the note sent by Rao A. Rashid, special secretary, see ibid, p. A 269 - A 273.
132. Ibid, p. A 271.
133. Ibid.
134. After his fall Bhutto alleged that it was the army that refused to withdraw from Baluchistan, despite his repeated efforts to press for a withdrawal plan. See "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, p. 19.
135. For a detailed analysis of the events of 1977, see the author's 'Pakistan in Crisis', in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1, (March 1978), pp. 60-78.
136. See above, chapter IX, p. 562.
137. Ibid, p. 568.
138. Interview with Lt. General M. Iqbal.
139. Ibid.
140. E. A. Nordlinger, op.cit, pp. 54-55.
141. Nearly 70 per cent of military officers come from the Punjab, while 15% come from the Frontier, 10% are muhajirs and 5% come from Sind and Baluchistan. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, (Kent: Dawson, 1979), p. 129.

142. 'Pakistan in Crisis', ibid, p. 73. See also Cyril Pickard, The World Today, (December 1977), p. 449.
143. Interview with Lt. General Iqbal, who was military commander of Lahore during the 1977 crisis.
144. An indication that this factor weighed heavily on the decision to intervene was provided by the following statement made by General Zia shortly after the coup: "I, in fact warned the former Prime Minister of this. I told him that, although I was positive all units would obey orders and do their duty, this situation would be difficult to wash away. In Pakistan the only real stability in the nation is (provided by) the armed forces. At the slightest hint of disintegration in the armed forces, the country is in very grave danger indeed." Quoted in Newsweek, 18 July 1977, p. 6.
145. See also Taseer, op.cit, p. 173 and Ritcher, op.cit, p. 409.
146. See Appendix C.
147. See chapter IX, p. 563-564.
148. For the Jamaat's proselytising campaign among the armed forces see Aijaz Ahmed, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan' in Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 4, (1978), p. 503.
149. "If I Am Assassinated", op.cit, p. 165.
150. For the text of Zia's address to the nation in which he explained the reasons for his seizure of power see Pakistan Times, 6 July 1977, p. 8.
151. See for instance, Claude Welch, 'The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention' in Welch, ed., Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) Claude Welch and Arthur Smith eds., Military Role and Rule, (Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974); Janowitz, op.cit, Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World, (New York: Charles Scribner, 1974). See also the studies referred to in notes 4 and 11 above.
152. Huntington, op.cit, p. 194.
153. S. E. Finer, op.cit.
154. Norman W. Provezor, ed., Analysing the Third World, (Boston: Schenkman, 1978), p. 296-297.

## XII

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT

This chapter is concerned with analysing the economic and social policies of the PPP government, for which the narrative detail was provided in chapter V. In assessing the performance of the PPP, we address ourselves to two sets of questions: the extent to which the PPP regime acted as a vehicle for transforming the socio-economic order and secondly, how far its policies helped or hindered its efforts to establish legitimacy. In answering these questions it is important to recall that the PPP emerged and developed as a vehicle not only for the modernists and idealists, but also for the traditional and self-seeking.<sup>1</sup> In as much as the PPP represented a coalition of landlords, sharecroppers, urban middle-class professionals, students and industrial labour, it enjoyed the support both of traditional and modern elements. The PPP was originally advertised as a revolutionary party that would abolish the existing system and build a new one along the lines of democracy, Islam and socialism. But it was difficult to see how a party, whose major support - especially in the post-1970 period - increasingly came from a conservative social group (landlords),<sup>2</sup> would take any measures which would reduce the power of its prime constituency. The heterogenous membership of the PPP not only indicated that the modernising aims of the party could be seriously inhibited, but underlined the dilemma of reconciling the divergent interests represented by the party in order to sustain the uneasy coalition.

Before analysing the PPP's social and economic activities, two background factors which had an important impact on the Bhutto government's general policy direction need to be mentioned. These are the 'development strategy' followed in the 1960's and its consequences, and the social and economic environment in which the PPP assumed power. During the 1960's, Pakistan followed a strategy of economic development based on what Angus Madison has described as the doctrine of 'functional inequality', because of the alleged conflict between equity and growth.<sup>3</sup> Such a strategy was marked by the fostering of a private industrial sector through state subsidies and other encouragements, emphasising gross economic increase without regard to income redistribution or other considerations of social justice.<sup>4</sup> This had, according to one commentator, the following result:

"In Pakistan, which experienced a healthy growth rate in the 1960's, unemployment increased, real wages in the industrial sector declined by one-third, per capita income disparity between East and West Pakistan nearly doubled, and concentration of industrial wealth became an explosive economic and political issue." 5

Public disenchantment with the unbalanced economic growth in the sixties, became, as we saw earlier, a major factor in the political unrest of 1968-69, which culminated in the fall of the Ayub regime.<sup>6</sup> Ayub's development strategy stood discredited not only in the eyes of those who took to the streets in 1968-69, but even amongst the very authors of the policy who admitted its failings as a model for development<sup>7</sup> not only in its neglect of equitable

distribution but also on its own terms of economic efficiency.<sup>8</sup>

The disenchantment with the unbalanced growth in the sixties indicated that any new government would have to pay heed to questions of social justice. The economic thinking of the PPP followed directly from the emphasis on growth and neglect of distributional questions during Ayub's 'development decade'. Indeed, as we suggested in an earlier chapter in many respects the party itself was a product of the social and economic tensions generated by Ayub's economic strategy.<sup>9</sup> It was swept into power largely on the support of those groups that had suffered during Ayub's development decade - industrial labour, urban professionals and landlords (because of the pro-industrial sector bias of Ayub's economic policies). Bhutto, recognising that dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the Ayub regime was one of the major reasons for his party's election victory in 1970, repeatedly stressed the need to rectify the imbalances created by the Ayubian strategy of putting growth before equity.<sup>10</sup> The change in economic thinking was reflected in the party's manifesto which emphasised distribution and sharing the fruits of development, albeit in the most general terms.<sup>11</sup> PPP thinking further indicated that the orientation of development policy would shift from private to public sector domination of industry, from income growth per se to income growth in tandem with redistribution and that emphasis would shift from industry to agriculture and basic (industrial) infrastructure. According to Bhutto,

"these (principles) spring not from any abstract doctrine or ideological dogma but from the imperatives of progress....Our target in our socio-economic programme is not only a gratifying increase in the GNP but an improvement in the lot of the common man, in the living standards of workers and peasants and a radical change in the social milieu." 12

The immediate circumstances surrounding the PPP's accession to power also had a perceptible impact on the party's policies and actions in office. When the PPP assumed power, the country was gripped by widespread industrial strikes and (though less intense) tenant/peasant unrest.<sup>13</sup> Such militancy was partly the result of post-war economic conditions and partly the result of heightened expectations associated with the PPP's ascent to power. Significantly, however, this unrest did not cease with the establishment of the PPP government. To give but one example, between July and December 1972, it is estimated that 1.25 million man days were lost as a result of strikes and other disruptions.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, PPP leaders' protestations that "there was no need for labourers to indulge in gheraos and jalaos because the country was being ruled by their government"<sup>15</sup> seemed to meet with little response. The widespread urban and rural land seizures were perceived by PPP leaders as the top of a massive iceberg of growing economic and political pressures that could engulf and overwhelm the PPP government.<sup>16</sup> This anarchic environment imposed its own imperatives. The government had to move towards reforms to preserve its legitimacy. As Bhutto explained, "the political and social fabric would explode unless certain basic reforms were undertaken."<sup>17</sup> The need for

reforms aimed at removing some of the grievances of the protesting groups was apparent. But so also was the need to curtail the high level of mobilisation sustained by groups such as the trade unions. For example Bhutto argued that the announcement of a new labour policy warranted an end to militant union activity:

".....Activities like gherao and jalao would have to terminate.....(otherwise) the full weight of the law will be visited upon such forms of illegal demonstration." 18

The threat of the use of force was aimed at discouraging participation, for Bhutto saw in this the unravelling of his own authority.<sup>19</sup> In other words, the environment impelled the PPP government to emphasise rule rather than reform, order rather than change, and indicated that the regime would assume an "anti-mobilist" character. Bhutto was particularly interested in stabilising the agrarian scene and putting an end to peasant seizures of landlord's holdings.

The preoccupation with stability was in large measure necessitated by the economic collapse that followed in the wake of the secession of Bangladesh. The need to rebuild a war-ravaged economy, and to adjust to the economic consequences of the loss of East Pakistan (e.g. as a market for W. Pakistan exports) imposed its own imperatives. With the economy in considerable disrepair, the election promises of the PPP had justifiably to be considered by Bhutto and his party leaders in a somewhat different light. The regime argued that the situation when it acceded to power had altered drastically from the time the party

manifesto was drafted.<sup>20</sup> The war and its effects on the economy had created a different set of circumstances in which it would not be possible to proceed too rapidly with the party's programme of social and economic change.<sup>21</sup>

The net outcome of the above developments was a de-radicalisation of the PPP's aims and objectives, a factor that was examined in some detail in chapter VI above. As we noted earlier, the radical leftist groups in the party immediately expressed their disenchantment with the slow pace of change outlined by the government and severed their links with the party in 1972.<sup>22</sup> The PPP government maintained that its ultimate aim was the establishment of an egalitarian society, but while its manifesto had stated that the principal aims of the party "are unattainable by petty adjustments",<sup>23</sup> it now favoured a cautious, reformist approach. It was repeatedly emphasised that the government was committed to a mixed economy rather than total socialisation.<sup>24</sup> The regime would attempt to break the monopoly power of vested interests, but otherwise it wanted "landlords and industrialists to flourish and contribute to the national economy."<sup>25</sup> This was a far cry from the vision of a 'classless society' held out by the manifesto. It appeared that socialism, which had served well as an ideology of protest when the party was in opposition, seemed to lose its programmatic quality once the party assumed power.<sup>26</sup> Certainly the regime continued to use socialist vocabulary to legitimise its actions, and moved in the direction of implementing some of the programmes promised in the manifesto. However, as we shall see below, the regime's actions



and policies were increasingly directed less by ideology than by consideration of the preservation of political power and pragmatic adjustments to the demands of its constituency support. Indeed, the PPP's record in office was increasingly characterised by a reluctance to reconcile socialist pronouncements with practical performance. This marked the PPP's transformation from a movement ostensibly seeking radical change to a pragmatic, 'umbrella' party attempting to allay discontent through limited reform and seeking to satisfy the demands of the divergent elements that constituted its support-base. We turn now to a detailed discussion of the PPP's strategy of rule.

In the industrial sphere, the PPP's reform measures were aimed at implementing some of the promises made in the manifesto to enlist popular support as well as to widen the regime's control over the economy. In the nationalisation measures<sup>27</sup> Bhutto combined his concern with reducing the economic and political power of the industrialist elite with the pursuit of social legitimacy amongst the broad masses. In this sense the nationalisations resulted as much from Bhutto's determination to enlarge his government's control over societal interactions and to curtail the power of the industrial elite, as from any ideological commitment. After a political campaign that had stressed the unjust concentration of industrial wealth by the twenty-two families, it was not surprising that the first wave of reform in 1972 was aimed at nationalising those sectors associated with such monopolisation. This was intended to demonstrate the regime's commitment to the

goal of equity. The following table shows the assets lost by the major twenty-six industrial families as a consequence of nationalisation.

TABLE XII.1

POSITION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL FAMILIES: IMPACT OF NATIONALISATION

(Rupees in millions)

FAMILY	Pre Nationalisation		Post Nationalisation	
	Position	Net Assets*	Net Assets	Position
Saigol	1	529.8	165.3	3
Habib	2	228.0	68.8	11
Dawood	3	210.8	767.5‡	1
Crescent	4	201.7	201.7	2
Adamjee	5	201.3	146.3	5
Colony (N)	6	189.7	95.8	6
Valika	7	183.5	62.2	12
Hoti	8	148.6	148.6	4
Amins	9	137.9	137.9	-
Wazir Ali	10	102.6	87.6	-
Fancy	11	102.4	-	-
Beco	12	101.4	-	-
Hussain	13	81.7	81.7	9
Colony (F)	14	89.9	19.8	-
Ghandara	15	79.9	25.8	-
Hyesons	16	79.4	83.5‡	8
Zafar-ul-Ahsan	17	77.2	22.1	-
Bawany	18	69.3	69.3	10
Premier	19	56.1	56.1	13
Nishat	20	54.3	54.3	14
Gul Ahmed	21	52.3	52.3	15
Arag	22	50.1	50.1	16
Rahimtoola	23	49.9	49.9	17
Noon	24	48.8	48.8	18
Shahnawaz	25	46.0	46.0	19
Monnoo	26	45.0	45.0	20

Notes: \* Includes Non-Manufacturing, Banking and Insurance.  
 † Includes Dawood-Hercules (1971)  
 ‡ Includes Hyesons Sugar Mills (1974)

Source: Rashid Amjad, 'Industrial Concentration and Economic Power', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 - 4 (1976), p. 254.

The attack on the industrial elite reflected both the regime's desire to enlist popular support as well as the need to establish its control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy. The former was visible in Bhutto's seizure of passports belonging to the twenty-two families and the handcuffing of one of the big industrialists for television display. This was intended as a symbolic demonstration of the regime's contempt towards such forms of wealth and was meant primarily to impress the public, especially its leftist supporters. The actual reform measures the Economic Reforms Order, on the other hand nationalised the firms in the area of 'heavy industry' (capital and intermediate goods), giving the government control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy (one-third of fixed assets in large-scale manufacturing industry now belonged to the public sector). The subsequent nationalisation of banks and insurance companies (again both largely the private preserves of the economically powerful families) served to break the link between industrial and financial capital which had helped foster the concentration of economic power in a few families.

The second wave of nationalisation - of rice and cotton export, vegetable ghee, rice husking, cotton ginning and flour mills - extended beyond the emphasis on the major industrial families. The second wave seemed impelled by the exigencies of the situation rather than prior design or ideological considerations. For example, rising prices and unavailability in the domestic market prompted the government's move to nationalise the ghee industry.<sup>28</sup>

Similarly, the nationalisation of agro-processing units

was necessitated by alleged hoarding and profiteering on the one hand and failure to give the (rural) producer a fair price on the other hand.<sup>29</sup>

What was the impact of the nationalisation measures, both in the economic and political sense? Economically, the reform reduced the concentration of ownership in the manufacturing sector. However, the reform fell short of the basic transformation of the economic structure envisaged by the PPP manifesto. It certainly enlarged the public sector, but over 75 per cent of the industrial sector remained in private hands, including the important textile sector.<sup>30</sup> The assault on the industrial elite left much of their economic power untouched, mainly because of their dominating position in cotton textiles and the sugar industry (with the former contributing almost a third of the total value added in the large scale manufacturing sector and being the largest single employer of industrial labour).<sup>31</sup> Thus the act had a limited impact in terms of bringing about a more equitable distribution of industrial wealth. The nationalisation measure (since it exempted textiles) was clearly aimed at reducing the economic power of the industrial elite and not at eliminating it. The nationalisation of banks and insurance companies represented a more fundamental change since it severed the link between industrial and financial capital which had been built up over the last twenty years and which fostered the concentration of economic power in a few families.<sup>32</sup>

The psychological impact of the nationalisation was greater than its economic impact (in terms of restructuring

of the economy). In a country which had a past history of industrial plant being built at state expense and then being sold to private investors, the idea of nationalisation, however limited and bureaucratic, was explosive, sending a wave of fear amongst the industrial propertied class. When the government wished to operationalise its concept of a mixed economy by calling for cooperation from the industrialists, this was not forthcoming.<sup>33</sup> Despite promises of compensation for the take-over of industries, private industrial initiative was paralysed by the fear of further nationalisation.<sup>34</sup> The government's subsequent nationalisations, despite assurances given by the regime that there would be no further nationalisation, (see above, chapter V) accentuated the suspicions of the business community.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, the uncertainty created by the government's actions would probably have been less and its psychological impact of shorter duration if the nationalisations had been carried out all at once.

The business community had other sources of grievances against the PPP government. On the one hand, they felt that the PPP leaders had singled them out for public abuse,<sup>36</sup> while on the other hand they held the government responsible for encouraging labour indiscipline.<sup>37</sup> The latter factor was viewed by the business community as having an adverse effect on industrial productivity. For instance, a government survey conducted on forty-three manufacturing enterprises in ten major industries (including textiles, edible oils, cement) in Karachi showed that inter alia, management viewed 'labour indiscipline' as the single most

important factor hindering productivity.<sup>38</sup> In addition, the government's labour policies (see below) were viewed by the business community as eroding profit margins in those industries left in private hands.<sup>39</sup>

Despite assurances given to industrialists by Bhutto that "private enterprise had a distinct part to play" in the kind of 'mixed' economy envisaged by his regime, the industrialists' uncertainties and anxieties were not allayed.<sup>40</sup> Conciliatory measures taken by the government, including the decision to remove Mubashar Hasan as minister of finance (in 1974) who was known for his antipathy towards the private sector, also failed to assuage the doubts of the business community.<sup>41</sup> The lack of business confidence in the government was reflected in the decline in private sector industrial investment. Total private sector industrial investment dropped to less than half of its level in 1971. (See chapter V, Table V.1). Total private investment in 1974-75 was only Rs. 601 million compared to Rs. 1,358 in 1970-71.<sup>42</sup> The adverse consequences of this for economic progress in general and employment opportunities in particular can hardly be overstated. Although public sector investment increased substantially<sup>43</sup> from less than 10% of total industrial investment in FY 1973 to 70% in FY 1977, this was, by design, in capital-intensive, long gestation 'infrastructure' projects (e.g. steel), thus severely reducing for instance, the employment-creating impact of public investment (see below). At the same time the insufficiency of public sector savings meant that the increase in public sector investment had to be met

in large part by domestic and foreign borrowing,<sup>44</sup> thus subjecting the economy to severe strains, at a time when the country was facing adverse international conditions (see below).

It is important to note that the government's actions not only alienated the big industrialists, but the merchant and trading community in general which included small manufacturers, shopkeepers and arhtis (middle men). The second wave of nationalisation affected these groups in particular. The nationalisation of the vanaspati ghee (vegetable oil) industry affected small and medium sized entrepreneurs.<sup>45</sup> The nationalisation of the agro-based industries also hurt small and middle-class entrepreneurs in the towns and mandi (market) towns.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, state control of the rice and cotton trade significantly reduced the role played by traders and middle men. The cumulative impact of the nationalisation measures, the fall in private investment, government intervention to ensure minimum prices to the grower (farmer), and the fixation of wages and quantitative targets was to curtail the commercial activities of the arhtis and merchants on the one hand, and affected the monetary interests of the shopkeepers on the other hand.<sup>47</sup> A household survey conducted in Rawalpindi by a government-backed research institution in 1975 for instance, showed a sharp deterioration in the real incomes of shopkeepers in the 1970's.<sup>48</sup> In addition, the trading and merchant community found that they often had to pay fines, bribes and payments to local PPP men in order to get things done.<sup>49</sup> The importance of these groups - both in terms

of numbers and organisation - in the urban areas can be demonstrated by the fact that commercial trade comprises 25.9 per cent of the urban labour force (as compared to manufacturing which constitutes 25.7 per cent of the urban labour force) and that in Punjab alone there are several thousand arhti associations.<sup>50</sup> This suggested the kind of danger Bhutto and the PPP faced by alienating this middle and lower-middle class group.

If we add to these groups the small and medium industrial entrepreneurs mentioned above, it is clear that a sizeable section of the urban middle class suffered as a consequence of the PPP regime's economic policies. Although some of the small industrial owners had been affected by the nationalisations, many more - one writer has calculated the owners of 155,000 small enterprises<sup>51</sup> - were affected by the regime's labour legislation (see above, chapter V, and below). The PPP's labour laws extended not only to larger enterprises (as under previous labour laws) but to smaller units as well. The owners of small industrial units (concentrated for the large part in the Punjab) argued that the costs of implementing the new labour regulations would be much higher for them than for owners of large enterprises.<sup>52</sup> Thus one effect of the government's labour and nationalisation policies was the alienation of these middle class entrepreneurs.

If the government found that its nationalisation policies created animosity amongst the above mentioned groups, it nevertheless hoped that it would be able to mobilise alternative bases of support amongst those groups



which would benefit from the efficient functioning of the nationalised industries. This hope was not always borne out. For instance the government take-over of the vegetable ghee industry was justified on the grounds that the private sector had failed to hold the price line and to provide an efficient distribution system. However, public sector managers soon discerned that it was equally difficult for them to hold down prices of vegetable oil.<sup>53</sup> Henceforth, price increases and shortages of this essential commodity - whatever the difficulties - could lead only to fingers pointed directly at the PPP administration. In this sense, the government succeeded only in eroding its credibility (indeed its legitimacy) with the industrialists, middle and low-income urban consumers (the latter forming an important part of the PPP constituency).

The vegetable oil industry, however, was an exception amongst the nationalised enterprises, in that it produced an item of everyday consumption. The rest of the industries taken over were those concerned with the production of capital and intermediate goods. Such industries, by definition, could not have had a direct, short-run impact in terms of providing visible benefits to the populace. Thus the nature of these industries did not entirely justify the rhetoric that accompanied their nationalisation. For instance, Bhutto had proclaimed that the nationalisation of these industries was meant "to eliminate, once and for all, poverty and discrimination in Pakistan."<sup>54</sup> Clearly since these industries could not have performed these functions, the regime's rhetoric only served to raise public expectations.

It can be argued that even if the nature of the industries nationalised precluded any short-run benefits to the people, the government could generate public support by demonstrating that these industries were run more efficiently under the public sector than they were in private hands. However, this did not prove to be an easy task, for three major reasons. Firstly, most of the industries nationalised were amongst the most inefficient in the industrial sector. In making itself the owner of such units the government unwittingly assumed responsibility for all past wrongs. Secondly, adverse international conditions, such as the 1973 oil price hike and the subsequent world recession seriously aggravated the problems in the nationalised sector. Thirdly, the nationalised sector was given a number of conflicting tasks and objectives.<sup>55</sup> Dividend payments were to be maintained. Taxes and duties were to be paid in full. Workers were to be given a "fair deal", and wages and benefits increased rapidly. Prices were to be reduced or held down despite inflation. As a result of these factors, the government faced serious problems with regard to improving the economic efficiency of the nationalised industries. But the impression which gained currency amongst the general urban public was that of government mismanagement and inefficiency.<sup>56</sup> Thus the regime drew animosity rather than the praise and support expected. At the same time, declining profits in the nationalised units proved a heavy burden on the Exchequer.<sup>57</sup> It is self-evident that for public sector industries, financial profitability cannot simply be taken as an

indicator of economic efficiency or social profitability, but it is nevertheless important if only because it has a direct bearing on the public sector's ability to finance its investment expenditure. Such an ability is of major concern in view of the resource limitations of the government. The public sector's own contributions towards financing its investment expenditure out of internally generated funds was extremely low in the 1970's - on average only 7%.<sup>58</sup> Their investment expenditure was therefore dependent on government budgetary allocations (financed through a combination of foreign aid and deficit financing - the latter adding to inflationary pressures in the economy).

It is important to note that the major proportion of public sector investment was in capital-intensive projects with long periods of gestation - the Karachi steel mill, fertilizer and cement projects accounted for more than 70% of total public sector investment. This meant that the government committed a large proportion of its resources to projects which would not yield economic results in the near future. But more importantly, the decision to commit the economy to the building up of a heavy industry base was made at a time when the economy was being subjected to the adverse conditions created by international factors, in particular the oil price hike of 1973. Thus, however, laudable the government's long-term objective in laying the foundation of a capital goods industry, the immediate impact of such an objective was to create serious strains on the economy. Combined with the decline in real private sector industrial investment, the nature of

public sector investment was one of the major reasons for the slow rate of industrial growth in the Bhutto years. In the period 1971/71 - 1976/77, the rate of industrial growth averaged 1.9% per annum compared with 8.7% (for West Pakistan) in the second half of the 1960's.<sup>59</sup> Although it is difficult to relate such aggregate economic indices to economic and political discontent, it can be suggested that poor economic performances as reflected in such indices limits a regime's capability in establishing its legitimacy on the basis of economic performance. Having said this, it is nonetheless important to recognise that the PPP regime laid less emphasis (than the Ayub regime) on claims to be judged in terms of purely quantitative indicators (such as growth indices) than in terms of aspects of welfare indices (the equity dimension), to which attention is directed below. However, the large outlay on long-term projects did mean that less was available to finance welfare sectors (such as education and health) that needed urgent attention and that could perhaps have yielded quicker benefits, politically.

In the industrial sphere, the nationalisation measures were accompanied by the introduction of labour reforms. These formed part of the regime's efforts (other attempts such as the subsidy programme and land reform legislation are discussed below) to establish its legitimacy on the basis of attempting to bring about greater equity. Labour reforms represented an attempt by the PPP government to fulfil the promise, made in the party manifesto and repeatedly in campaign speeches, of improving the

pay and conditions of industrial workers. Much of the PPP's urban support came from industrial labour, and as we noted above, growing labour militancy impelled government action to mollify their grievances. The "new deal for labour" involved pay increases through raising the minimum wage and a series of benefits such as a broadened profit sharing programme, pension plans and educational allowances for workers' children.<sup>60</sup> The new labour legislation also enlarged the scope of its applicability (see above, chapter V); this meant that over a half of industrial workers in the manufacturing sector were eligible for the benefits under the new labour laws compared to the previous figures of 25% (under the Ayub and Yahya regimes). The government used its leadership in the public sector to increase the real wages of workers; four pay increases were given during the first three years of the PPP government.<sup>61</sup> At the same time legal steps were taken, guaranteeing the right to strike and aimed at strengthening trade unions. The number of registered trade unions went up from 1,997 in 1971 to 9,110 in 1977 while registered membership went up from 581,219 (in 1971) to 760,300 (1977).<sup>62</sup>

The new measures, however, fell short of labour's expectations, which was reflected in continuing labour strikes and unrest.<sup>63</sup> Further concessions involving improvements in procedural matters (such as no dismissals without prior approval of a labour court) also failed to reduce the general state of industrial unrest. Much of labour's heightened expectations was a product of extravagant promises made by PPP leaders in opposition, which in

power they neither had the resources nor the will to implement. Having used slogans such as awami raj and 'factories for the workers' as rallying points for his populist appeal, Bhutto could hardly be surprised at labour's new intransigent and aggressive stance. Militant trade union leaders argued that the PPP had not carried out its promises of the 1970-71 period and that the reforms represented only a partial fulfilment of some of the promises made.<sup>64</sup>

Initially the government sided with the increasingly restless labour movement in their disputes with management, at times pressurising the latter into paying wages for periods of illegal strikes.<sup>65</sup> While this may have been a politically rewarding move, it did not boost confidence in the economy nor increase industrial productivity - matters which became of pressing concern for the PPP government. Thus the earlier unqualified support for labour gave way to a tougher government line which included the threat to ban strikes and a "no work, no wages" policy.<sup>66</sup> The new, tougher line was demonstrated in the use of force against striking workers in Karachi in June and November 1972 which resulted in several deaths,<sup>67</sup> and arrests of militant union leaders.<sup>68</sup> The use of strong arm tactics to bring about industrial peace invited the following cynical comment from a critical new journal:

"The first avowedly socialist party in Pakistan has killed the largest number of protesting labourers in the shortest span of time." 69

Such tactics together with the harassments and arrests of

union leaders on criminal charges alienated the leftist leaders in the PPP such as Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj Mohammed who announced their departure from the party.<sup>70</sup> The exodus of these men from the party, along with their respective followings deprived the government of important trade union (and in the case of Mairaj, student support as well) support, both in urban Sind (Karachi) and Punjab (Lyallpur, Multan and Sargodha).

The police firings on workers together with the arrest of militant union leaders in Karachi and the Punjab also led to the exodus of other PPP labour organisers such as Mahmud Babar (who was later jailed by the PPP regime), Abdur Rahman (who was mysteriously assassinated in 1974), Tariq Latif and Ziauddin Butt. This ended the PPP's links with militant trade unions in the Punjab such as the Muttihida Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers Front of Lahore), the Taraqqi Pasand Mazdur Mahaz (Progressive Workers Front of Lyallpur) and Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal (Workers Action Committee of Multan) and Sind, such as the Pakistan Workers Federation of Karachi. Many former PPP trade union radicals attempted to organise a country wide network of militant unions in opposition to the regime. Mahmud Babar and Abdur Rahman (until his assassination) for instance organised workers committees in Multan and Lahore respectively.<sup>71</sup> These committees were coordinated by a central (Punjab-based) Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal which was largely led by another former PPP figure, Ziauddin Butt. The erosion of the PPP's support amongst these militant union leaders was an important reason behind the regime's inability to rally organised

labour behind it during the 1977 crisis (see below).

However, despite the PPP's loss of support amongst militant union leaders, the regime nevertheless continued to make efforts toward cultivating the constituency of urban labour. Such efforts had both symbolic/psychological and real elements. The former consisted of repeated government pronouncements demonstrating its esteem for the workers and its solidarity with their cause.<sup>72</sup> These verbal assurances aimed at enhancing the psychological status of workers, while perhaps raising expectations on the one hand, did nevertheless give them a feeling of importance and a sense of dignity. This is best characterised by the widespread sentiment amongst labour that the Bhutto government had given them izzat (respect) and had appealed directly to them, reiterating that they were the 'fountain of power.'<sup>73</sup> The government also made real efforts to improve the lot of urban labour through wage increases on the one hand and direct subsidies on essential household items like wheat, vegetable oil, sugar and rice.<sup>74</sup> Money wages of industrial workers in the manufacturing sector increased by 15.1% at an annual compound rate during the period 1971/72 - 1975/76.<sup>75</sup> However, as we shall see below these wage increases were more than offset by the rise in the cost of living. The subsidised food products on the other hand, were made available through government ration-depots, thus also providing the PPP with an immense source of patronage as licences for depots were used to reward supporters.<sup>76</sup> But, in assuming the responsibility for making essential food available through ration depots, it was the



government which was now blamed directly for periodic shortages of individual items, price increases, or for abuses amongst depot holders, such as under-weighting or adulteration of atta (wheat).<sup>77</sup> Thus even this programme of helping the urban poor carried liabilities for the PPP.

The food subsidy programme represented another effort by the PPP regime to make good its declared aim of pursuing the goal of equity. The programme was designed to insulate low-income urban groups (labour and lower-grade government employees) from rising inflation which was a product of both domestic (e.g. the devaluation of 1972 and deficit financing) and international (the oil price hike of 1973) factors.<sup>78</sup> These efforts however seemed minimal in the face of the phenomenal price increases since the PPP came to power. Prices rose rapidly between 1972 and 1975 and the cost of living increased by 100%. (See Table XII.2 below).

TABLE XII.2

TREND IN PRICES (YEARLY AVERAGES) 1971-72 to 1976-77

	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77
Consumer Prices* (1969-70 = 100)	110.6	121.4	157.8	200	223.2	228.2
Wholesale Prices (1959-60 = 100)	150.3	179.7	229.1	288.8	321.8	342.6
Sensitive Price Indicator (28 Essential Items)	-	-	160.0	197.3	218.9	214.8

\*Combined for three groups - industrial, government and commercial employees.

Source: PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 1976-77

The inflationary situation was seriously aggravated by setbacks beyond the government's control - natural disasters such as the Indus floods (1973) and drought (1974),<sup>79</sup> and price convulsions in the international community.<sup>80</sup> But rising prices nevertheless posed a major challenge to the popularity and stability of the PPP regime, leading one adviser to remark to the finance minister that "your only opposition party is prices."<sup>81</sup> The apparently uncontrollable burden of rising prices emerged as a principal source of public discontent leading ultimately to widespread urban disillusionment. Corruption and political repression certainly had their influence on the urban mind, but the effect of rising prices hurt most. It wiped out much of the benefits received by way of wage increases by low-income groups like industrial labour and low-grade government employees, and seriously hindered the regime's efforts to establish legitimacy on the basis of its economic performance in terms of its welfare/equity dimension. As indicated earlier, money wages of industrial workers rose by 15.1% at an annual compound rate under the Bhutto government; the cost of living index, however, rose by 16.1% at an annual compound rate in the same period.<sup>82</sup> This meant that real wages, in fact, declined. Similarly for government employees who form an important part of the urban population, real wages and salaries declined.<sup>83</sup> Bhutto himself conceded that prices had "eaten up many of our achievements,"<sup>84</sup> while his advisers warned him that it was this issue, more than any other, that the opposition would capitalise upon in the forthcoming election.<sup>85</sup>

The PPP administration attempted to deal with the effect that rising prices were having on the income of urban groups by decreeing wage increases to those who were organised and thus a potential source of trouble, e.g. government servants and industrial workers of large-scale enterprises.<sup>86</sup> Thus an undetermined but large portion of the urban labour force was not covered at all by the increases. At the same time having defused the threat from major protestors, the government, no doubt pressed by its resource limitations, in each instance raised the price of major subsidised commodities. At the third round, some of these raises were so drastic (for instance the price of atta went up from Rs. 21.00 to Rs. 32.00 per maund) that the action sparked off violent demonstrations in the urban areas.<sup>87</sup> The protesters were led by railway workers who were later joined by other industrial workers and students. In contrast to the resentment caused by the price increases in the urban areas the farmer was pleased with the principle of the government decision.<sup>88</sup> This underlined the dilemma faced by the PPP in reconciling the demands of the urban consumer and rural producer - both formed part of the PPP's support base. The 1975 decision to lower consumer subsidies also indicated that the regime realised that in view of financial limitations it was difficult to do much for the urban poor in the short run. As one PPP minister explained:

"The curse of subsidy must come to an end.....the question was where all the money would come from." 89

It was evident from the discussion above - and as the 1975 food riots demonstrated so dramatically - that the issue of prices considerably weakened the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the urban population. It was not only the low-income urban groups that suffered as a consequence of inflation, but middle class salaried groups as well. These groups formed an important part of the PPP's initial support base. For the urban intellectuals and professional groups, rising prices was only one of the several issues which led to their estrangement from the PPP government.

In an earlier chapter, it was suggested that these groups became increasingly disenchanted with the regime's record of infringement of democratic norms.<sup>90</sup> The use of repressive measures and periodic terror against political opponents of the regime was one source of resentment. The content and pace of the government's reforms was another factor in the growing disillusionment of the educated middle class. To these factors were added economic grievances such as shrinking job opportunities caused by a decline in private investment and of course the effects of inflation. Although the rate of inflation dropped by late 1975 (See Table XII.2 above) since there is obviously a time-lag phenomena involved in the effect of such a decrease on incomes, most middle class salaried groups did not perceive an improvement in their economic situation. Additionally, the middle-class professional groups saw their influence dwindle as their representatives (such as J. A. Rahim and Mubashar Hasan) were steadily edged out from

both the party and the cabinet. Thus the view expressed by one political commentator that the "regime has become the vehicle for the emergence of these middle sector groups in Pakistani politics"<sup>91</sup> does not seem to be borne out in practice. In fact, the PPP's governing strategy seemed to indicate that while these groups may have been considered important in helping to bring the party to power, their support was not actively sought while in power. Indeed, the regime's increasing reliance and alignment with traditional feudal groups in the rural countryside suggested that the regime probably felt that the middle class groups were dispensable.<sup>92</sup>

In formulating its economic programme for the rural sector the PPP was guided by the pragmatic belief that support from this sector was indispensable for regime stability.<sup>93</sup> Its land reform and agricultural policies were aimed at satisfying the party's rural constituency - which included both landowning groups and tenants/share croppers. Through the land reform measure the PPP sought to consolidate and extend its control over both these groups. The land reform was officially proclaimed as a major effort on the part of the regime to promote equity. In its election manifesto and in campaign speeches, the party had promised to break the "shackles of feudalism" and to "destroy the power of the feudal landowner."<sup>94</sup> But, the actual reform, announced in March 1972, which reduced the permitted landholdings from a ceiling of 500 acres to 150 (irrigated) acres and introduced legal provisions purporting to strengthen the position of tenants (for details see

above, chapter V), showed that no basic transformation of the rural social stratification system was envisaged, and that the declared goal of equity remained a rhetorical statement. Clearly, the PPP's constituency support amongst landlord groups limited its capacity to effect a significant societal transformation.

What then was the purpose of the land reform and what impact did it have? The reform served two major purposes for the regime. Firstly, as indicated in chapter VII, it became an instrument by which Bhutto sought to curtail the independent power of the large feudal landlords and to make them dependent on his regime. Given Bhutto's desire to establish his personal ascendancy over the landlord groups and then to make them an important element in his regime's support base, land reform appeared as an essential part of implementing this strategy.<sup>95</sup> The alacrity with which landlords joined the party after 1972 was ample testimony to the success of this strategy. Secondly, the reform was aimed at putting an end to rural unrest amongst tenants, share croppers and peasants by the promise of redistribution of land and measures to improve the conditions of these groups. Indeed even a partially implemented land reform would help the regime in enlisting support amongst these groups. As long as expectant tenants did not become secure in the new status of owners they would continue to feel dependent on the ruling party for the fulfilment of their dreams. Thus it was assumed that by mobilising support from both the privileged and non-privileged sections of rural society, the regime would be assured of power for a long time to come.

Given these aims, it is not surprising that the economic impact of the reform was limited. There was considerable justification in the charges levelled by radical PPP members and other left-wing parties that the reforms were a mere "eyewash" and "a betrayal of the toiling peasants."<sup>96</sup> As one PPP dissident leader alleged, land reform under the auspices of the PPP could not but be a 'fraud' given the fact that "PPP feudalists" owned the major portion of the resumable land.<sup>97</sup> The PPP's claim to have ushered in a new era by ending feudalism and breaking up inequitable concentrations of landed wealth was not borne out in reality.<sup>98</sup> Even though the PPP's reform reduced the ceiling on permitted landholding considerably; from 500 acres to 150 acres of irrigated land, and from 1,000 to 300 acres of unirrigated land - its impact was limited for several reasons.<sup>99</sup> Firstly, landholding was tied to the individual rather than the family, enabling landlords to divide their land among family members; the law made such transfers to heirs legitimate. Secondly, exemptions were given to landowners employing modern techniques of cultivation, which indicated that the regime wished to encourage commercialised farming. Such exemptions also demonstrated that the PPP regime was willing to allow concentration of wealth in land, provided the owners were enterprising and contributed to agricultural progress.<sup>100</sup> Thirdly, permitting the landlord to choose the land he surrendered increased the likelihood that the resumed land would be 'waste' (or uncultivable) thus reducing the amount of cultivable land available for redistribution.<sup>101</sup> This was a

significant loophole in view of the well-known fact that very large holdings often consist of much 'waste' land. Fourthly, since the unit used in determining the ceiling of land was not the acreage, but the produce index unit (P.I.U.), the de facto ceilings were much higher. Produce index is a measurement for determining the gross product of various classes of land. The existing PIU calculations were made at the time of the last land settlement during the mid-Thirties - a period of great depression. The existing PIUs thus reflected the cultivation pattern, yield and prices of the 1930's. Moreover, during that period most of southern Punjab and Bahawalpur and almost all of Sind had not come under canal irrigation. Thus, according to one estimate, the calculation of ceilings from PIUs resulted in an average operative ceiling (including the PIU bonus allowed for possessing a tubewell or tractor) of 318 acres in the Punjab, 519 acres in Sind, 500 acres in Baluchistan and 350 acres in the NWFP.<sup>102</sup>

It is evident from the above discussion of the land reform that the measure would, at best, have a marginal effect on the pattern of landownership. Additionally since implementation was entrusted to the land revenue administration which was known to be corrupt (especially at lower levels),<sup>103</sup> this further lessened the impact of the reform. Concealment of land by owners emerged as a widescale practice<sup>104</sup> such concealment obviously involved the complicity of local revenue officials since they are responsible for maintaining land records. Referring to the practice of concealment of lands, one writer suggested:



"The success of landlords in so concealing lands.....can be construed... ..as the impotence of administrative authority in the face of feudal power.. ..However, it is more likely that the landlords are enjoying official patronage in their efforts at concealment." 105

The PPP government claimed that as a result of the land reforms, 3.3 million acres of land were resumed, of which 1.43 million acres were distributed to 131,000 tenants.<sup>106</sup> But a committee of inquiry set up by the military regime after the fall of the PPP government to look into the effects of the land reform, held that only 1.25 million acres had been resumed, constituting 3.06% of the total cultivated area.<sup>107</sup> Additionally, the committee claimed that the land distributed to tenants formed 1.69% of the total cultivated area and that the 71,249 tenants who received land formed 0.83% of the total small farmers in the country.<sup>108</sup> An independent study put the amount of land resumed at 1.8 million acres.<sup>109</sup> But even if the PPP government's figures are accepted as accurate, the amount of land resumed and redistributed did not amount to a fundamental alteration of the rural structure,<sup>110</sup> nor did it measure up to the PPP's pre-election promise of twelve acres for each peasant. Indeed, the consensus of informed agrarian opinion is that a fraction of the rural underprivileged benefited in any way from the reform.<sup>111</sup> Clearly then, on the basis of the land reform measure, the PPP regime's claim of promoting equity, was, in large part, not justified by the facts.

If the redistributive impact of the reform was minimal, it nevertheless served a number of non-redistributive

objectives related to the regime's need to maintain and consolidate its power.<sup>112</sup> In this sense, the land reform performed both real and symbolic functions. By symbolic is meant that the reform stands for something which it does not really do. A great deal of the relation between governing elites and governed masses involves the manipulation of symbols.<sup>113</sup> In the case of the PPP, the land reform was utilised to authenticate its claims of being "socialist" and dedicated to the common man. The reform itself stood as a symbol of commitment and sincerity. Newspaper headlines such as 'A Jagirdar abolishes jagirdari in the country' were designed to demonstrate Bhutto's (and the elite's) commitment to the dispossessed.<sup>114</sup> Such symbolic functions were aimed at establishing legitimacy for the regime amongst the rural poor as well as among urban groups (such as the intelligentsia). In order to impress the latter it was emphasised that the reform stood for modernity and progress, for the abolition of grotesque feudal exploitation and backwardness. As a real political resource, the reform was used to set up a patronage system of rewards and punishments.<sup>115</sup> It became the instrument through which Bhutto could bring into political submission those feudal landlords who were opposed to his regime, while at the same time increasing the dependency of the landlords as a class on his regime to protect their interests. For a number of landlords the only way to save their land was through Bhutto's own intercession.<sup>116</sup> In this sense, the land reform was an essential part of Bhutto's patrimonial strategy in establishing a stable clientelist base of support in the rural countryside. With

the reforms hanging over the heads of landowners, the latter rushed to join the ranks of the PPP.

The reform also fulfilled what one writer has termed a "preemptive" function.<sup>117</sup> As mentioned earlier, on assuming power Bhutto was interested in stabilising the agrarian scene by putting an end to the seizure of land by peasants. In this sense, the land reform was utilised to put an end to rural dissatisfaction which was viewed as constituting a threat to the existence of the regime. In this context the legal provisions in the land reform aimed at improving the status of tenants was viewed as crucial to re-establishing rural peace, and as the only alternative to chaos and bloodshed. The 1972 regulation attempted to bring about changes in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship. Begar (forced labour) was abolished, while the eviction of tenants was prohibited except under the decision of a judicial court. However, the regulations did not place any limit on the percentage of the total crop that could be charged as rent. Without rent control, the prohibition against evictions was meaningless, as rents could be raised to ruinous levels should the owner wish to evict the tenant.<sup>118</sup> At the same time the burden of bearing the costs of inputs was shifted from the tenant to the landlord. While this measure aimed at transferring income from landlords to tenants, it is evident that this needed constant policing of landlord-tenant affairs - a taxing and virtually impossible task. Indeed, there is some evidence that one consequence of making input costs the responsibility of the landlord was an increase in tenant

evictions.<sup>119</sup> However, despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the new regulations did give a sense of psychological security to tenants and contributed to the development of a new consciousness and spirit amongst them in demanding their rights.<sup>120</sup> Even if there were loopholes in the law which landlords could exploit to their advantage, the law had for the first time recognised certain rights for tenants.

The PPP's economic policies in the agricultural sector were aimed at satisfying important elements of its rural constituency - the large landowners and the middle farmers (landholders owning between 50 and 100 acres) of the Punjab. Within its overall declared policy objective of promoting agricultural production, the regime handed out a series of benefits and incentives to the agrarian elite.<sup>121</sup> To begin with, the regime sought to reverse the pro-industry, anti-agriculture bias of the growth strategy of the Ayubian era.<sup>122</sup> The May 1972 devaluation of the Rupee was a major step in the direction of altering the terms of trade between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The devaluation removed at one stroke the subsidy and protection received by the industrialists because of the overvalued exchange rate.<sup>123</sup> As a result, 1973/74 marked a high point in the 'parity ratio', the ratio between agricultural and non-agricultural prices.<sup>124</sup> This meant that terms of trade were more favourable for agriculture in 1973/74 than they were in any previous year in the history of the country.<sup>125</sup> The improvement in agricultural terms of trade benefited the landed aristocracy and rich farmers. At the same time,

one of the first acts of the Bhutto government was to raise support for agricultural commodities.<sup>126</sup> Procurement prices more than doubled in the period 1972-76 for major crops like wheat, cotton, rice and sugar cane.<sup>127</sup> High procurement prices obviously benefit those farmers who produce a marketable surplus (i.e. large and middle landowners). In some cases, procurement prices for agricultural commodities were increased in the face of falling world prices. For instance, sugar prices on the world market were well below the procurement price. This policy was in sharp contrast to the policies pursued by the Ayub regime, when agricultural support prices were often lower than equivalent world prices. The implied subsidy was in effect borne by (urban) consumers. That high farm support prices would add to the general inflationary situation in the country was a calculated risk that the government sought to undertake for three objectives: (a) encourage greater production, (b) redress earlier imbalances created by the Ayubian policies and importantly, (c) to keep the growers happy.

High support prices for agricultural commodities translates into an incentive for the grower only when farm input costs do not rise proportionately. Therefore, the PPP government also directed efforts towards heavily subsidising agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and insecticides and provided subsidised credits for tubewells and tractors. The findings of various field studies in Pakistan as in Asia in general, indicate that access to the required inputs have tended to favour large and rich farm

owners.<sup>128</sup> Once again, the major beneficiaries of subsidies on inputs were the large and middle landowners. However, there is some evidence to indicate that even in the face of resource constraints, small farmers benefited from the subsidies.<sup>129</sup> The extension of credit facilities to small farmers probably played an important part in this.<sup>130</sup>

The expansion of rural credit was another aspect of the PPP's efforts to respond to demands from its rural constituency. In addition to the tremendous increase in loan grants from the Agricultural Development Bank, (from Rs. 80 million in 1971/72 to Rs. 533 million in 1975/76), the nationalised commercial banks also advanced loans to farmers.<sup>131</sup> The beneficiaries of the rapid rate of expansion in rural credit were the large and middle landowners.<sup>132</sup> From the overall perspective of the national economy the increase in rural credit constituted a transfer of resources to the agricultural sector. In addition to this, the government also increased budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector - from Rs. 390 million in 1972-73 to Rs. 1225 million in 1975-76.<sup>133</sup>

The PPP regime's efforts to satisfy its rural constituency of landed interests was also reflected in the nationalisation in 1976, of some 4000 agro-processing units. As noted above, the nationalisation of these agro-processing industries was largely aimed at protecting the farmer from alleged exploitation by the agrarian commercial bourgeoisie (who owned such units) and the arhtis. As Burki pointed out:

"The real political and economic significance of this measure was that it resulted in the vertical integration of the agricultural sector in the sense that the landed aristocracy now had a share not only in producing a sizeable part of the output traded in the market, but also in the marketing, processing and distribution of this output." 134

By this measure, the government dislodged the medium-sized industrial entrepreneurs, merchants and arhtis and brought in the landed interests and their representatives to manage the nationalised agro-processing industrial units. Of the 4000 new managers nearly three-quarters are reported to have had close links with the large landlords who belonged to the PPP.<sup>135</sup> Thus this measure clearly demonstrated the regime's efforts to consolidate its support among the landed interests at the cost of alienating the agrarian commercial bourgeoisie.

The PPP regime's efforts to promote the economic interests of the landed groups was also reflected in the low rates of taxation for the agricultural sector. The principal direct taxes on agriculture until 1977, were the land tax and water rates. Both taxes were kept extremely low in the 1970's despite rises in agricultural income and inflation.<sup>136</sup> The regime's unwillingness to raise these taxes in line with agricultural income growth and inflation was a reflection of the extent to which the PPP was dominated by landed interests. When the Punjab government announced an upward revision of water rates in June 1975 in order to improve revenues, this was immediately withdrawn because of protests by landlords and the unwillingness of other provinces to make similar increases.<sup>137</sup> In 1977, when an

agricultural income tax was belatedly announced by Bhutto on the eve of the elections in an obvious effort to refurbish his regime's populist credentials, critics were quick to point out that the effective implementation of this measure, unlikely in any event because of administrative problems, carried generous exemptions (e.g. for capital inputs) and benefits not allowed under the old land revenue system.<sup>138</sup> In November 1975, however, Bhutto did make a gesture in the direction of increased taxation of large farmers. Land revenue (and related taxes) was abolished on small farmers holding up to 12 acres of irrigated land or 25 acres of unirrigated land.<sup>139</sup> The relief provided to small farmers was barely tangible in economic terms since land revenue rates have remained static in most areas for almost fifty years. The change was largely symbolic as Bhutto himself later pointed out:

"The monetary index of this reform does not reflect its value in social and psychological terms....By undertaking it, the state has identified itself with the interest of the small landowner who is the under-privileged." 140

The importance to the small farmer of liberating him from the exactions of petty revenue officials, was perhaps more significant than the monetary value, as Bhutto explained.<sup>141</sup>

What emerges from the above discussion of the PPP's agricultural policies is that while directing efforts, largely symbolic, at improving the conditions of the rural poor, i.e. promoting equity, the government tried strenuously to promote the economic welfare of the rural rich in order to consolidate its rural constituency. High procurement prices, state subsidies on farm inputs, the



unspectacular progress of land reform and even in elimination of 'feudal' practices (begar), the failure to tax agricultural incomes, all represented regime solicitude for the economic interests of the rural elite, which included both large and middle landlords. In his study of the Bhutto period, S. J. Burki has also contended that the PPP regime's policies towards the agricultural sector were aimed at benefitting the rural elite.<sup>142</sup>

However, Burki argues that within the rural elite, the incentive structure adopted by the Bhutto government was aimed at favouring only the large landlords. Thus according to Burki the middle sized farmers were deliberately neglected by the regime's agricultural policies. This position is at variance with the argument we put forward above that both large and middle-size landowners benefitted from the PPP's agricultural policies. Central to Burki's analysis is the assumption that the two groups of landowners have conflicting interests and by implication constitute separate classes. As Hamza Alavi has convincingly demonstrated, the interests of the large landowners and middle farmers are fundamentally the same.<sup>143</sup> Their goals on all essential issues of public policy are identical, whether it be a question of prices of agricultural commodities, taxation of agricultural incomes or of provision of subsidised inputs. Similarly they share an identical position on issues of class relationship in the rural society vis à vis sharecroppers and landless labourers.<sup>144</sup>

It may be true that large landowners benefitted more from the PPP's agricultural policies than middle-sized landowners,

but this is not, as Burki suggests, the result of a deliberate discriminatory bias in the regime's agricultural policies but because any incentive scheme designed to promote the agricultural sector is likely to reflect the existing pattern of social and economic stratification in the rural countryside. In other words, since large landowners have better access to subsidised inputs and produce a larger surplus they are likely to gain the most from policies designed to favour the agricultural sector. But this does not mean that middle landowners do not gain any benefits at all from say, high support prices of subsidised inputs. The extent to which large landowners derived greater benefits than the medium landowners would have to await the availability of more information and data. Burki's conclusion that middle-class farmers suffered as a consequence of the PPP's agricultural policies rests on assumptions that have been questioned by other writers notably Hamza Alavi. Moreover, Burki's contention is supported by insufficient evidence; he does not, for instance indicate the data on which he rests the central argument that large landlords specialise in the production of certain commodities while middle-sized farmers specialise in the production of other commodities.

There is little dispute over the fact that the PPP's land reform measure and its agricultural policies did not bring about any real or substantial improvement in living conditions for the large majority of the rural underprivileged i.e. landless peasants and tenants. But despite this, these groups in the rural countryside remained

relatively placid as compared to the urban underprivileged, (e.g. the unionised industrial labour). The contrast in the response of the rural and urban workers to the regime's actions can be explained by two factors. Firstly, urban industrial workers are much better organised and have, through strikes or hartals, the effective means of expressing their demands. The rural underprivileged in Pakistan on the other hand do not have any comparable organisational power. Secondly, the 'peasant mentality' in the rural countryside predisposes the rural poor, to some extent, to resign themselves to a fatalistic acceptance of their inferior social and economic position. Urban labour on the other hand is relatively more sophisticated politically and has learnt - particularly in the post-1960's - the efficacy of political action in seeking to improve their socio-economic condition.

The PPP regime showed greater concern for the social sector than the Ayub regime did. In the realm of social policy, the government announced a series of reforms designed to establish its progressive credentials and aimed at rewarding important elements of its constituency. An ambitious education programme was launched which promised to bring about a wholesale restructuring of values, equal access to education and eradication of illiteracy. Nationalisation of private educational institutions in Punjab and Sind, undertaken in 1972, formed the most important practical part of the reform. While this was utilised to convey the resolve of the government to demolish the system of social privileges<sup>145</sup> there seem to have

been more pragmatic, political reasons behind the move.<sup>146</sup> The demand for nationalisation was voiced by teachers in the private sector in the sixties<sup>147</sup> and gained momentum with the activation of teachers' associations in the 1968-69 movement to overthrow Ayub.<sup>148</sup> It was at this stage that Bhutto, realising the potential in the organised power of the teachers, adopted their slogan in an effort to woo this urban constituency. In the 1970 campaign, the PPP won the support of leading teachers' associations,<sup>149</sup> with the result that teachers were second only to urban labour in contributing to the PPP's urban electoral victories.<sup>150</sup> Once in power, Bhutto viewed nationalisation as a convenient way to pacify and cultivate the aroused urban constituency of teachers. The nationalisation was indeed greeted with euphoria by private teachers on the assumption that higher pay, job security and the coveted status of government servants were now within their grasp. These benefits did accrue to them but not after a prolonged period of concerted action by them, including strikes over for instance their displeasure with the initial pay scales assigned to them and the slow pace of nationalisation. This made the overall outcome less gratifying than expected.

By nationalising education, the PPP rewarded an important constituency. Needless to say, private management (middle class entrepreneurs for the most part) dispossessed by nationalisation without compensation, harboured bitter grievances against the PPP regime. The immediate losers and gainers are easy enough to identify - but what of other costs and benefits, particularly in the light of the

PPP's claim that nationalisation would benefit the under-privileged? Since nationalised institutions were nearly all urban, the beneficiaries of low or abolished fees were the urban consumers of education - most of whom come from the upper and middle classes and are least in need of subsidy. Nationalisation did nothing for the rural majority and little for the urban poor while from the middle class, the general complaint voiced most frequently was concerned with a lowering of the quality of education after nationalisation.<sup>151</sup> It was perhaps a recognition of such criticism that government enthusiasm for nationalisation diminished during implementation. Two hundred and twenty-one elite English-medium schools were exempted in 1974 as an obvious concession to middle and upper middle class families.

The regime was not able to go very far in accomplishing the laudable objectives set out in its reform package. For instance the government had promised to achieve universal enrolment of boys (aged 5-9) in primary school by 1979 (later changed to 1983) and of girls by 1984 (later changed to 1987). By 1975/76, 63.7% boys and 24.6% girls were enrolled in schools, which was only a marginal improvement over the figures for 1971/72 which were 62.8% and 22.4% for boys and girls respectively.<sup>152</sup> Similarly, the other targets far exceeded the government's resources.<sup>153</sup> Although the public outlay on education increased under the Bhutto government, the amount, 1.69% of GNP seemed insignificant in view of the targets set<sup>154</sup> and compared poorly with other Asian countries.<sup>155</sup> In the light of our discussion above of the type of public sector

investment undertaken by the Bhutto regime, as well as large outlays for defence (see chapter XI, Table XI.2), it was hardly surprising that there was little left for the social sector. It appears that both a lack of political will and financial resources were responsible for the wide gap between promise and performance.

It would be appropriate here to mention briefly the PPP's relationship with students, who formed the original support-base of the party when it was first launched. After assuming power, the PPP directed few efforts at consolidating its support amongst students. Other than withdrawing the hated Ayubian university ordinance of 1968 which placed severe restrictions on student activity, PPP leaders made little direct effort to cultivate this constituency. In power, the PPP was concerned with curtailing the political activism of students. Student groups, however, felt that since they had played a major role in bringing Bhutto to power, they would now be given the opportunity of exercising some influence over national decision-making in general and the formulation of educational policy in particular.<sup>156</sup> Such expectations were not met as the PPP regime sought to discourage student involvement in politics.<sup>157</sup> The appointment of a former student leader of Rawalpindi, Raja Anwar (a founder member of the PPP), as Adviser to Bhutto on student affairs was considered sufficient to give students a 'sense of participation'.<sup>158</sup> A Pakistan Peoples Youth Organisation was set up in 1972. This was primarily a Sindhi-based organisation, and even this remained a "paper" organisation.<sup>159</sup> It was not only because the PPP regime

failed to fulfil its election promise of giving students a voice in national affairs that led to student disillusionment with the regime. Student disenchantment mirrored a number of complex issues that seemed to centre around the government's inability to provide for distributive justice. Their disappointment lay in the actual direction of the PPP's 'new Pakistan', with its emergency regulations, restrictions on political activities, corruption, and the regime's apparent divergence from its socialist goals. Talk of Bhutto's "betraying" students who supported him became a common topic of conversation as early as 1972.<sup>160</sup> Moreover, the government's use of repression against the students during the 'Bangladesh na manzoor' movement in December 1972 further estranged the student community.<sup>161</sup> Other sources of discontent also emerged in the regime's failure to expand job opportunities to absorb the growing number of educated unemployed.<sup>162</sup>

A combination of these factors led to a significant erosion of support for the regime amongst the student community. Disappointed with the PPP, a large section of the students turned towards the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam, the well-organised student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose millennial goals held an emotionally powerful appeal, and which appeared to provide the only avenue available for meaningful political activism. This explained the fact that by 1974, virtually all the student unions in the country's universities were controlled by the Jamaat.<sup>163</sup> The PPP reacted by attempting to foist 'nominated' leaders on the student community through electoral manipulation,

throwing out genuine student leaders.<sup>164</sup> Recalcitrant student leaders were arrested and some even found themselves transported to the infamous Dulai camp in Azad Kashmir where political prisoners were kept (since Azad Kashmir was outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan's courts of law).<sup>165</sup> PPP sponsored "dummies" were set up in various colleges, which further divided the already divided left-leaning student group and failed to provide the ruling party with any real support.<sup>166</sup>

The PPP's programme of social reform was not only confined to the educational sector. The regime announced an equally ambitious national health policy aimed at providing adequate health facilities to all citizens by 1980.<sup>167</sup> As with the educational proposals, the new health scheme was infused with ambitious egalitarian rhetoric designed to win popular support. But, as with education, the plans fell short of targets due to a lack of firm commitment on the part of the government to implement proposed plans and to the lack of financial resources.<sup>168</sup> However laudable, the government's objectives remained largely rhetorical statements of intent.

But there was one practical measure - that of the Generic names scheme - that the regime felt could be enacted promptly to convey its egalitarian resolve.<sup>169</sup> The object of the Generic scheme that banned the import, distribution, sale and prescription of drugs under brand or patent names was primarily to make drugs available to the public at cheap prices.<sup>170</sup> As the scheme involved the breaking up of the monopoly of large pharmaceutical companies it was



utilised to demonstrate the regime's concern to protect the consumer from profiteering monopolists.<sup>171</sup> Predictably, the scheme encountered stiff resistance from the pharmaceutical companies, the overwhelming majority of which were foreign owned.<sup>172</sup> What complicated the issue was that the government had given constitutional guarantees to protect foreign investment.<sup>173</sup> Government enthusiasm for the scheme waned in the face of active lobbying by foreign interests and was reflected initially in the dilution of the scheme through increasing the list of exempted drugs.<sup>174</sup> The government also found that the abolition of the patent system led to a mushrooming of local drug manufacturing companies producing sub-standard drugs.<sup>175</sup> In the absence of a quality control system, which the government had neither the financial nor the technical resources to set up, such a development was wrought with serious danger. The generic scheme was also strongly opposed by (retail) chemists and doctors since it affected these groups financially.<sup>176</sup> For chemists, (allowed to dispense drugs without prescription), the sale of drugs that were marketed under brand names yielded a larger profit than those sold under the generic names, since the large multi-national pharmaceutical companies allowed the retailer larger profit margins for promoting their products. The doctors, too benefitted from economic incentives offered by the pharmaceutical companies for prescribing drugs produced by them. The new scheme took away the financial benefits doctors and chemists derived by dispensing or prescribing drugs under patent names. Resentful of this outcome, these groups

protested strongly to the government.<sup>177</sup> As a result of these various factors the generic scheme was finally abandoned, earning for itself the title of the "biggest exercise in reformist futility."<sup>178</sup>

The regime's other social 'reforms' followed a now familiar pattern of loudly trumpeted progressive policies leading to little substantive change. A declaration on womens' rights was adopted by parliament in 1976 with a view to improving the social, legal and economic status of women.<sup>179</sup> An Act of Parliament limited 'dowry' and placed restrictions on wedding expenses.<sup>180</sup> Only to the extent that symbolic endorsement of new principles contributes to their implementation can a case be made for social change having occurred in this area. Since such progressive policies remained confined to the level of rhetoric and manipulation of symbols, they can scarcely be said to have brought about any social change.

While the PPP regime sought to establish its legitimacy primarily on the basis of its economic and social programme, it also utilised issues of nation-building for regime consolidation and legitimacy. The Sindhi regional issue and the use of Islamic symbols represented different aspects of these nation-building efforts. With respect to the first aspect, a social policy that backfired badly on the government was the decision in 1972 to make Sindhi the official language of Sind.<sup>181</sup> This was in contrast to the other three provinces of the country which had adopted Urdu as their provincial (official) language. The move was directed at rallying the Sindhi regionalists behind the

regime, who formed an important element in the party's support base in Sind.<sup>182</sup> What the regime seemed to have under-estimated was the reaction of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (refugees from India), who constitute 45% of the population of Sind, concentrated largely in the urban centres.<sup>183</sup> The refugee settlers reacted violently to the government's decision, viewing it as part of a broader strategy to deprive them of their dominating position in the economic and commercial life of urban areas like Karachi and Hyderabad.<sup>184</sup> Bloody riots followed between 'old' and 'new' Sindhis. Opposition parties, like the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan which traditionally enjoyed muhajir support (see chapter IX, above) capitalised on such grievances, to lead pro-Urdu, anti-government demonstrations. Bhutto intervened personally to resolve the crisis by offering linguistic concessions to non-Sindhis.<sup>185</sup> Peace was restored, but at substantial cost for the ruling party - the PPP regime had aroused the intense animosity of the muhajirs, who henceforth resolved to support the right-wing religious parties with renewed vigour.

With respect to the second aspect of nation-building, the PPP regime attempted to utilise religious symbols and issues for establishing regime-legitimacy. The PPP had succeeded in defeating the religious parties in the 1970 polls largely on the basis of a secular programme, but one sufficiently infused with Islamic content and ideology to make it acceptable to a people viewed as having firm emotional attachment to Islam. Bhutto clearly understood that the

voter's verdict amounted to a rejection of the clergy but not religion. Indeed, it must have been apparent to Bhutto that even this rejection of the ulema was by no means decisive in terms of the votes cast. Although the PPP won the majority of seats in the Sind and Punjab, yet if the religious (and other conservative) parties had combined against it, their total vote would have been higher than that of the PPP in the Punjab and only slightly lower in Sind.<sup>186</sup> As K. B. Sayeed has also suggested, the religious parties "had been defeated but by no means eliminated."<sup>187</sup> Thus the PPP regime felt constrained to direct much of its attention to placating religious sentiment in the country in order to defuse the threat from the religious and conservative opposition.<sup>188</sup>

Within a few months of coming into power, Bhutto allowed a record number of persons to go for 'Haj' - the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>189</sup> Subsequently in the 1973 constitution, the PPP government provided that Islam would be the state religion, and the head of state a Muslim. Friday was declared a national holiday, various government organisations were established to propagate Islamic teaching, and Koranic studies were included into school curricula. In addition, the teaching of Arabic was encouraged and a separate ministry of religious affairs was established. In February 1974 Bhutto organised the historic Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore holding out this achievement as "the most significant service rendered by the PPP government to the cause of Islam and solidarity of Islamic brotherhood."<sup>190</sup> This was followed by the

convening of an International Seerat Congress in March 1976. Earlier in 1974, in deference to conservative Muslim opinion, the PPP government declared the Ahmeddiya sect a non-Muslim minority.<sup>191</sup> This action was taken despite the fact that the Ahmeddiya community had supported the PPP in the 1970 election<sup>192</sup> and that Bhutto himself was averse to religious orthodoxy of the kind that regarded Ahmeddiya beliefs as contrary to Islam.<sup>193</sup> On the basis of such policies, the PPP claimed that the services it had rendered for Islam had no parallel in the history of Pakistan.<sup>194</sup> The government-controlled media repeatedly outlined the regime's services to Islam.<sup>195</sup> Even the government's economic reforms were justified by reference to religious symbols. For instance, the first sentence of the 1972 land reform reads thus:

"Whereas Islam enjoins equitable distribution of wealth and economic powers and abhors their concentration in a few hands....." 196

Indeed, the regime went so far as to claim that

"the goal of an Islamic renaissance (had) burst forth.....under a great leader....  
....., Zulfikar....the namesake of the victor of Kaibar's sword." 197

This catering to Islamic sentiment to establish the regime's legitimacy, however failed to generate support or goodwill amongst the Islamist opposition on the one hand and only alienated the regime's secular and socialist supporters on the other hand. The latter interpreted such endeavours as indicative of a move towards the Right, marking the victory of the conservative Islamist (as represented by men like Kauser Niazi) element over the socialists within

the party.<sup>198</sup> A disillusioned, former PPP minister described the same phenomenon in the following manner:

the regime "helped by its lackeys in the official information media took it upon themselves to out-mullah the mullah..... they administered massive doses of conservatism, obscurantism, (and) traditionalism." 199

What the PPP's secular-minded supporters described as Bhutto's "Right-wing opportunism" was viewed as a "retreat before the mullahs" which would eventually spell the demise of the regime since once it began "fighting the mullahs on their (i.e. the religious elements) grounds, the PPP was bound to lose."<sup>200</sup> The religious opposition, on the other hand, as represented by parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, viewed the PPP's religious policies as political gimmicks which did not alter in any way the regime's major thrust towards ushering in what they regarded as socialism and secularism.<sup>201</sup> The religious elite condemned Bhutto's policies as secular and viewed with alarm his party's efforts to introduce an alien ideology to replace what was regarded as the fundamental pillar of Pakistan - Islam.<sup>202</sup>

Although this chapter has been concerned with the PPP regime's domestic performances and its impact on legitimacy, it is necessary to mention briefly the regime's foreign policy endeavours in terms of their domestic impact on the regime's legitimacy. Bhutto's foreign policy successes were utilised by his regime to enlist domestic public support. The Simla Agreement, the Islamic Summit and the Nuclear Reprocessing deal with France (which Bhutto referred to as the 'Islamic bomb'), undoubtedly

major foreign policy achievements, were publicised as Bhutto's greatest success in order to project his image as a great statesman. The government controlled media was utilised to build up his image first as an "undisputed, peerless and supreme leader" of his own country, and then as leader of Asia and of the Third World.<sup>203</sup> Bhutto himself instructed the official information media to project "an image of a man associated with the people, a man of the people, a man devoted to the people, product of the revolutionary Third World."<sup>204</sup> Accordingly, in the official press, radio and television, Bhutto's domestic and foreign policy achievements were extensively and regularly projected. Although Bhutto was aware of the danger of over-projection,<sup>205</sup> the official media nevertheless unleashed a barrage of propaganda which to some extent produced an air of public cynicism, particularly amongst the urban intelligentsia similar to one that followed Ayub Khan's publicity efforts celebrating his achievements.<sup>206</sup>

#### REGIME PERFORMANCE AND THE 1977 URBAN PROTEST MOVEMENT

Clearly, the performance of the PPP government was closely related to the urban protest movement which followed the rigging of the March 1977 election and paved the way for military intervention.<sup>207</sup> As it was pointed out in an earlier chapter (see chapter IX) a determined political opposition - united for the first time by their hatred for the Bhutto regime - stood resolved to oust the PPP government. While the issue of election rigging provided the opposition with an explosive instrument with which to

challenge the legitimacy of the Bhutto government the ensuing protest was too big to be explained by the rigging of a single election. The volume of protest seemed more than the heterogenous collection of opposition parties could command merely because of their disappointment over the outcome of the election.<sup>208</sup> While the issue of the election rigging undoubtedly became the catalyst of the crisis, there was sufficient indication of widespread disaffection with the regime before the election to suggest that the seeds of the crisis were sown much earlier. Indeed, the roots of the rebellion lay in a wide array of grievances arising from the performance of the PPP regime in the preceding five and half years. The PPP's economic and social policies gave rise to considerable social and economic discontent in urban areas which manifested itself both in the campaign period before the election and in the protest movement that followed subsequently. Such discontent suggested that many aspects of the PPP regime's policies hindered its efforts to establish its legitimacy.

Much of the discontent can be traced to the nature of the PPP's economic and social policies. As mentioned earlier, the PPP faced severe policy dilemmas in seeking to reconcile the demands of its divergent constituent elements. It had to respond to demands for both change and preservation of the status quo. On the other hand, it had somehow to reconcile the conflicting demands of its rural and urban constituencies. In the event, the uneasy balance that the regime achieved failed to produce economic



and social equilibrium and hampered the regime's efforts to establish legitimacy. The explanation for this lies in a number of factors. Of these the major factor was the content of its economic reforms. Its nationalisation measures termed socialistic, however limited, frightened and alienated the industrialist, merchant and trading community. However, had the PPP regime tried subsequently to reassure those affected that it favoured a mixed economy and not complete socialisation, its use of socialist rhetoric suggested otherwise to them. At the same time the nationalisation measures clearly fell short of the expectations of the PPP's leftist leaders and supporters. Thus the nationalisation measures not only alienated the industrialists and those dispossessed and affected by the measures (which as we saw earlier included large sections of the urban middle class, medium and small industrial entrepreneurs, merchants, traders and the arhtis of the mandi towns) but its socialist supporters as well. The same applied to other 'reforms'. The labour reforms for instance provoked hostile reactions both from those who argued that the reforms went too far (the industrialists and trading community) and from those who felt they did not go far enough (e.g. militant union leaders, the party's left-wing). Thus the nature of the regime's reforms, paradoxically, alienated both right-wing, conservative, propertied elements and disillusioned those whom the reforms were ostensibly designed to benefit, and served to erode the regime's legitimacy amongst such groups.

Another factor behind economic discontent was the

kind of selectivity the regime showed in approaching the demands of social groups. As noted earlier, while the regime sought strenuously to reward its rural constituency of landed interests, the demands of its urban constituency (groups like the low-income urban consumer, labour, students) were only partially fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. In the context of disastrous inflation fed by the oil crisis of 1973 and a succession of natural disasters, a growing sense of discomfort was evident among urban groups - the lower middle class of minor clerks and officials, salaried professionals, students, and urban labour that had supported Bhutto and the PPP in 1970. Rising prices, unemployment and corruption served to replace the euphoria of the PPP's accession to power with disillusionment amongst such urban groups and seriously eroded the PPP's legitimacy amongst them. In this dynamic, by keeping rural groups relatively satisfied, the regime of course commanded the numerical majority. But both the regime's strength and vulnerability are suggested by that maxim of Pakistani politics:

"The cities may break governments but it is the countryside that makes them."

By trading the cities for the countryside in its economic policies, the regime handed its opponents a chance to mobilise urban unrest against it.<sup>209</sup>

To the economic factor were added other factors which were also important in turning some of the urban classes against the Bhutto regime. The educated middle class resented the dictatorial tendencies of the regime and its brutal suppression of political opponents. Different

groups harboured specific grievances against the PPP regime. Lawyers were concerned with the suppression of civil liberties; journalists with the curbs imposed on the press, students with the lack of job opportunities and the failure of the government to live up to its other promises. To such grievances was added the religious factor, with the Islamic fundamentalists opposed to the regime on account of its secular and socialist activities. In some instances, religious fervour combined with ethnic discontent - as in the case of the muhajirs to produce a strong anti-PPP sentiment. In other instances, religious sentiment combined with ethnic identity and economic discontent - as in the case of the predominantly East Punjabi muhajir trading community in Punjabi cities like Multan, Lahore and Faisalabad - to produce antagonism towards the PPP government.

In the urban protest movement of March-June 1977, different urban groups for different reasons, banded together to express their opposition to the Bhutto regime. Journalists, orthodox mullahs, lawyers, petty shopkeepers, merchants, traders, arhtis, students, women, a section of industrial labour (the pro-Jamaat trade unionists) and the urban unemployed, participated in a two-and-a-half month campaign challenging the legitimacy of the Bhutto regime. Leadership of the movement was assumed by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of religious/conservative and regional parties. This had led some observers to characterise the challenge posed to the Bhutto government as a conservative backlash against a

moderately reformist, progressive government.<sup>210</sup> This view has some validity for the campaign of street agitation against the Bhutto regime drew much of its sustenance from the merchant and trading community and religious and conservative political groups. (See chapter IX, above). The PNA's promises of denationalisation undoubtedly pleased disaffected industrialists and the business community.<sup>211</sup> But it is equally important to recognise that the 1977 crisis of legitimacy for the Bhutto regime also reflected the disillusionment amongst those who had looked towards the PPP to bring about substantive social change, to redeem its promise of 'Roti, Kapara aur Makaan' (food, clothing and shelter). Any interpretation of the fall of the Bhutto regime must also take into account the widespread disillusionment amongst groups such as industrial labour and urban professionals with the pace of change under the Bhutto government. In his account of the 1977 urban protest movement, K. B. Sayeed mentions the fact that labour did not play a significant role in the anti-Bhutto campaign.<sup>212</sup> But he fails to mention that if as a group labour did not participate against Bhutto, neither did it rally its support in favour of the regime. In other words, if organised labour (like the katchi-abadi (slum) dwellers) remained for the most part quiescent spectators during the urban protests, this equally well demonstrated their sense of disappointment with the regime.<sup>213</sup> Secondly, the fact that the movement encompassed (secular) regional groups (from the Frontier and Baluchistan) also suggests that the protest cannot be viewed as merely a conservative

backlash. The protest seemed to have had a broader nature than that suggested by those who have viewed it as merely a revival of Islamic fundamentalism,<sup>214</sup> or as an act of self-preservation on the part of the propertied classes under the garb of Islam,<sup>215</sup> or as a challenge posed by a powerful middle class using Islamic symbols.<sup>216</sup> Our analysis suggests that a variety of grievances lay behind the urban protest, many of which stemmed from the PPP: government's own contradictory policies, its failures and its omissions.

To conclude, it is evident that several aspects of the PPP regime's economic and social policies hindered its efforts to establish legitimacy amongst a wide variety of urban social groups. This happened because in some instances the regime failed to meet the expectations of certain groups (e.g. middle-class professionals, unionised labour), while in other instances because its policies threatened or damaged the economic (e.g. industrialist, trading and merchant community), social (e.g. muhajir) or religious interests (e.g. sections of the ulema) of other groups. This in fact meant that the PPP regime's legitimacy was seriously eroded amongst wide sections of the urban public during its five and half years of rule. Thus, the urban protest movement of 1977 can be viewed and explained against this background of the regime's inability to establish its legitimacy.

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NOTES

1. See above, chapters I, II and VI.
2. The dominance of landed groups in the party is examined in detail in chapter VI above.

3. Angus Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), pp. 136-163.
4. For a detailed examination of this strategy see Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). See also, Moin Baqai and Irving Brecher, eds., Development Planning and Policy in Pakistan, 1950-70, (Karachi: National Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1973).
5. Mahbub-ul-Haq, 'Employment and Income Distribution in the 1970's: A New Perspective', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (June - December 1971), p. 4.
6. See above, chapters I and II.
7. For instance, the chief architect of economic policy under Ayub, Mahbub-ul-Haq did a complete volte-face by condemning the strategy he had earlier advocated. For a statement of his early views, see his The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963). For his revised view see ibid, and The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
8. For instance, increasing inequalities of income failed to generate high rates of domestic saving. See T. E. Nulty, Income Distribution and Saving in Pakistan: An Appraisal of Development Strategies, unpublished doctoral thesis, (Cambridge University, 1972).
9. See above, chapter II.
10. See above, chapters II and III.
11. Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, 1970, (Karachi: Vision Publications, 1971).
12. Z. A. Bhutto, 'Pakistan Builds Anew', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, III - IV (April 1973), p. 543.
13. For details see chapter V, p. 310-313.
14. Quarterly Economic Review, (Economist Intelligence Unit), No. 3, (1973), p. 4.
15. Kauser Niazi's statement in Pakistan Times, 24 May 1972, 1.
16. Interview with PPP leaders.
17. Outlook, 10 June 1972, p. 5.
18. Dawn, 11 February 1972, 1.
19. Bhutto's attitude towards participation in general is discussed in chapter VI.
20. Outlook, 19 August 1972, p. 15.

21. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 1 October 1972 - 31 December 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1973), p. 218.
22. See chapter VI, pp. 402-406.
23. Manifesto, 1970, ibid, p. 12.
24. See for instance, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division).
25. Bhutto's speech quoted in Dawn, 6 November 1974, 8.
26. Gerald A. Heeger, 'Socialism in Pakistan', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque eds., Socialism in the Third World, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 299.
27. For details of the nationalisation measures, see chapter V, pp. 321-322.
28. Pervez Tahir, Pakistan: An Economic Spectrum, (Lahore: Arslan Publications, 1974), p. 105.
29. Anwar Iqbal Qureishi, The Economy of Pakistan, January 1972 - June 1977, (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd, n.d.), p. 95.
30. Rashid Amjad, Pakistan's Growth Experience, 1947-77, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1978), p. 11.
31. Rashid Amjad, 'Industrial Concentration and Economic Power', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-4, (1976), pp. 245-247.
32. Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974), pp. 32-41, and 57.
33. Outlook, 10 June 1972, p. 5.
34. Quarterly Economic Review, No. 3, (1976), p. 5.
35. Ibid.
36. Outlook, 6 October 1973, p. 6.
37. See also K. B. Sayeed, 'Mass Urban Protest as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan', Journal of Commonwealth Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 2, (June 1979), p. 127.
38. Meekal Ahmed, Factors which Hinder or Help Productivity: Country Paper for Pakistan, forthcoming publication (Tokyo: Asian Productivity Organisation).
39. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. 1, (1 April 1978), Document of the World Bank. (Restricted circulation), p. 9.
40. Dawn, 6 March 1972, 1.

41. Quarterly Economic Review, No. 4, (1974), p. 2.
42. See above, Table V.1, p. 323.
43. Ibid.
44. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-77, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division), p. 138.
45. See Shakila Zaheer, Vegetable Ghee Industry in the Punjab, (Lahore: Board of Economic Inquiry, 1975).
46. Indeed the government seemed to realise its mistake, albeit belatedly, and decided in May 1977 to return the small units to their owners, retaining only the bigger ones in the public sector. See Qureishi, op.cit, pp. 95-96.
47. See Mubashar Hasan's analysis in his United Front for Peoples Democracy, (Lahore: n.d.), p. 3-6.
48. 1975 Rawalpindi Survey, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1975) referred to in Stephen Guisinger, Wages, Capital Rental Values and Relative Factor Prices in Pakistan, (Washington: The World Bank, 1978), p. 8.
49. Mentioned in Sayeed, op.cit, p. 128.
50. The author is indebted for this point to Khalid bin Sayeed.
51. S. J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 121.
52. Ibid.
53. S. J. Burki, 'Economic Decision-Making in Pakistan', in L. Ziring, R. Braibanti, H. Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 164.
54. Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, 20 December 1971 - 31 March 1972, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 33.
55. For an assessment of the performance and problems of the nationalised sector, see Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. 1, op.cit, pp. 109-129.
56. Pakistan's Growth Experience, op.cit, p. 28, fn. 18.
57. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. 1, ibid, p. 109.
58. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. II: Public Sector Resource Mobilisation (7 April 1978), Document of the World Bank (Restricted Circulation), pp. 25 and 26.
59. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. 1, ibid, pp. 6 and 9.



60. A New Beginning - Reforms Introduced by the Peoples Government in Pakistan, 20 December 1971 - 20 April 1972, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1972), pp. 11-13; New Labour Laws, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, n.d.).
61. Pakistan's Growth Experience, op.cit, p. 21.
62. Pakistan Labour Gazette, January/March 1977, (Islamabad: Labour and Manpower Division, 1977).
63. This was frequently admitted by the government. See for instance Achievements of the Peoples Government, 1972-1976: Sind, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), pp. 35-36.
64. 'Why Put The Blame on Labour Alone', ViewPoint, 5 November 1976, pp. 7 and 8.
65. Quarterly Economic Review, No. 3, (1973), p.4. Illegal strikes are those that do not meet certain conditions as specified in the labour laws, (specifically the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act No. XXIX of 1973), as for instance giving the employer the stipulated notice for strike action. Strikes are deemed unlawful in a number of industries officially described as performing "essential services; however, the precise number of establishments in this category has varied from time to time and from one regime to another.
66. Ibid.
67. For details see above, chapter V, p. 312.
68. Outlook, 2 June 1973, p. 4.
69. Outlook, 4 November 1972, p. 3.
70. See Mairaj Mohammed Khan, 'Mein ne Peoples Party Kyun Chhori' ("Why I Left The Peoples Party"), in Al-Fatah, 12-19 August 1977, pp. 14-24.
71. For Abdur Rahman's activities see the editorials (published after his assassination) in Pakistan Times, 14-15 May 1974.
72. One illustration of this symbolic demonstration of solidarity with the worker's cause was Bhutto's declaration of 1 May as a public holiday.
73. Interviews with trade union leaders and workers, Rawalpindi, Summer 1977.
74. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. II, op.cit, p. 18.
75. Computed from Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1970-1971 and 1975-76, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division).
76. See above, chapter VII.
77. For a description of how the system works, see R. Turvey and E. Cook, 'Government Procurement and Price Support of Agricultural

Commodities: A Case Study of Pakistan', Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, (March 1976), pp. 102-104.

78. The government attributed inflation to three main causes - (1) Devaluation, which significantly raised prices especially those of agricultural commodities. (2) Increased deficit financing. (3) World-wide inflation which resulted in costly imports. A fourth reason was the increased labour costs which were passed on to the consumer rather than being absorbed in profits.
79. The damage from the floods in August/September 1973 alone was valued at 600 million Dollars. See Quarterly Economic Review, Annual Supplement, (1974), p. 2.
80. The 1973 oil price rise absorbed one-third of the country's export earnings.
81. Quoted in W. Eric Gustafson, 'Economic Problems of Pakistan Under Bhutto', Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No. 4, (April 1976), p. 375.
82. The author is grateful to Meekal Ahmed of the Pakistan Planning Commission for computing this data.
83. The decline was however much more severe at the upper end of the government salary structure. For the effects of inflation on government employees see M. L. Qureishi and F. Bilquees, 'A Note on Changes in Real Wages of Government Servants', Pakistan Development Review, Vol. XVI, No. 3, (Autumn 1977), pp. 323-326.
84. Quoted in Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, (New Delhi: Vikas 1978), p. 137.
85. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Rāwalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1978), Annexure 63, p. A 199-200.
86. This happened on three occasions, in August 1973, June 1974 and April 1975.
87. Far East Economic Review, 25 April 1975.
88. Ibid.
89. Dawn, 20 June 1974).
90. See above, chapter VII.
91. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 113.
92. Privately Bhutto is said to have repeatedly indicated that the middle class intelligentsia's sense of disillusionment and frustration did not unduly worry him, for he could always count on the support of landlords and farmers for winning the next

election. The voting strength of the rural countryside would anyday outweigh the power of the middle class. Interview with Dr. A. Khaliq, Rawalpindi, September 1977.

93. Interview with Dr. Mubashar Hasan, PPP finance minister (1972-74) and secretary general of the PPP (1975-77), Lahore, August 1977.
94. Manifesto, op.cit, p. 28.
95. This strategy has been discussed in some detail in chapter VI and VII.
96. See Outlook, 6 May 1972, p. 16.
97. Mukhtar Rana quoted in Outlook, 20 May 1972, p. 5.
98. See 'Sweeping Land Reforms' in A New Beginning, op.cit, pp. 15-25.
99. For a comparison of Bhutto's land reform with those in Sri Lanka and India, see Ronald J. Herring, Redistributive Agrarian Policy: Land and Credit in South Asia, unpublished doctoral thesis, (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976).
100. Ibid, p. 154-155.
101. Ronald Herring and M. G. Choudhury, 'The 1972 Land Reforms in Pakistan and their Economic Implications: A Preliminary Analysis', Pakistan Development Review, Vol. XIII, No. 3, (Autumn 1974), p. 255.
102. Ibid, p. 250 and 276.
103. Ibid, p. 271-272.
104. White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. IV The Economy, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 13-15.
105. A. Alam, 'Economics of Landed Interests: A Case Study of Pakistan', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (Spring 1974), p. 22.
106. See statement showing progress of implementation of 1972 Land Reforms up to 15-11-1976 in, Promises and Performance: Implementation of the 1970 Election Manifesto of the PPP, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1977), p. 98.
107. White Paper, Vol. IV, op.cit, p. 13.
108. Ibid, pp. 23-24.
109. Pakistan's Growth Experience, op.cit, p. 27, fn. 13.
110. Pakistan covers approximately 200 million acres of which the total cultivated area is 48 million acres.
111. Bruce J. Espito, 'The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Pakistan', Asian Survey (April 1974), p. 435.

112. See also R. J. Herring, op.cit, p. 226.
113. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, (Chicago: University Illinois, 1976).
114. Jang, 2 March 1972.
115. See above, chapter VI. See Also White Paper, Vol. IV, op.cit, pp. 15-22.
116. For instance, files relating to numerous cases were called for and kept with Bhutto. In the case of certain persons, although land had been resumed, it was illegally allotted to the former owners on lease. Documentary evidence of such cases became available as part of the material submitted by the Federations' Counsel in the Supreme Court hearing of the petition filed by Mrs. Bhutto challenging the detention of her husband under martial law. See Pakistan Times, 12 October 1977.
117. Ronald J. Herring, op.cit, p. 231.
118. A. S. Haider and F. Kuhren, 'Land Tenure and Rural Development in Pakistan', Land Reform: Land Settlement Cooperatives, F.A.O. No. 4, (1974), p. 60.
119. See N. Ahmed, 'The Contradictions of Capitalism and Marginal Solutions' in R. Ahmed, S. Naseen, A. Ghouse, eds., Economic Reconstruction in Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Economic Association, (1973), p. 143.
120. This was claimed by the government in Report of the Agricultural Enquiry Committee, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1975).
121. Interview with Mubashar Hasan.
122. Ibid.
123. Dr. Moinuddin Baqai, 'Economy On Way to Recovery', Economic Review, (Karachi), (January 1973), p. 9.
124. See Pakistan's Growth Experience, op.cit, Table 1-A in Appendix, p. 25.
125. Subsequently, the terms of trade for agriculture declined. This deterioration can be explained by the fact that the industrial manufacturing sector by virtue of its superior market organisation or power can always offset any increase in agricultural prices by an inflation in the price of manufactured products.
126. Quarterly Economic Review, Vol. 4, (1974), p. 1.
127. Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, 1971/72, (Islamabad: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Underdeveloped Areas), and Pakistan Economic Survey, op.cit. See also M. Afzal, 'Party Pricing As An Approach to Price Support Programmes', Pakistan Development Review, Vol. XVI, No. 3, (Autumn 1977), Appendix 11, p. 293.

128. See for instance, V. K. R. Rao, Growth with Justice in Asian Agriculture, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1974).
129. Herring and Choudhury, op.cit, p. 262; Promises and Performance, op.cit, pp. 81-82.
130. Ibid, p. 85.
131. Ibid, p. 85.
132. See also Aijaz Ahmed, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan', Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 4, (1974), p. 493.
133. Pakistan: The Economic Profile, op.cit, p. 43.
134. Pakistan Under Bhutto, op.cit, p. 159.
135. Nawa-i-Waqt, 27 February 1977.
136. Pakistan: Development Issues and Policies, Vol. II, op.cit, p. 24.
137. Ibid.
138. See Jamil Rashid, 'Economic Causes of Political Crisis in Pakistan: The Landlords vs. The Industrialists', Journal of Developing Economies, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June 1978), pp. 178-179.
139. Z. A. Bhutto, Address to the Nation, 20 December 1975, (Islamabad: Information and Broadcasting Division, n.d.), p. 10.
140. Ibid, p. 11.
141. Ibid.
142. Pakistan Under Bhutto, op.cit, pp. 154-162.
143. Hamza Alavi, 'The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan, in R. D. Stevens, H. Alavi and P. J. Bertocci, eds., Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 337-341.
144. Ibid, p. 341.
145. Private education was almost exclusively urban and higher education in the cities predominantly private. The private sector share diminishes in aggregate statistics as one moves down from the college apex to the primary school base and from urban to rural areas. In 1966-67 for example, the private share of colleges was 52%, of high schools 40% and of primary schools only 4%. See Statistical Profile of Education in West Pakistan, (Islamabad: Institute of Education and Research, 1971) chapters I and II.
146. For a detailed analysis of the politics of the nationalisation policy, see Dawn E. Jones and Rodney W. Jones, 'Nationalising Education in Pakistan: Teachers Association and the Peoples Party', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, (Spring 1977).

147. The impetus for the demand derived from the lack of job security, poor pay and conditions and other forms of management abuse in the commercialised private sector of education. Since the public sector offered some protection against management abuse, privately employed teachers increasingly viewed the haven of government services via nationalisation.
148. For a detailed history of the teachers' demand see ibid, pp. 583-596.
149. Ibid, p. 595.
150. See above, chapter III.
151. Information based on interviews conducted in Rawalpindi and Lahore, 1977 and 1979.
152. Enrolment figures supplied by the Government of Pakistan's Planning Commission, July 1977. Population figures based on 1961 census and 1972 census.
153. Pakistan: Population Planning and Social Services, Report No. 2018, (April 7, 1978), World Bank Document, p. 50.
154. Ibid, p. 48.
155. The average outlay on education as percentage of GNP in Asian countries is 3.04%.
156. For the role played by students in the formation of the PPP and early party organisation and activities, see chapter II. See chapter III for the contribution of students to Bhutto's electoral victory.
157. See above, chapter V, p. 316-318.
158. Interview with Raja Anwar, former student leader, Adviser (student affairs), P. M.'s Secretariat, August 1977.
159. Dawn, 20 June 1976, 17 and 18.
160. Robert La Porte, op.cit, p. 132.
161. See above, chapter V, pp. 317-318.
162. In 1973, 2.5 million persons or 12.8% of the labour force were unemployed, over 803,000 or one out of every three unemployed had primary education. Over 319,000 of the unemployed had matric certificates or better. More than 42,000 had university degrees. See Pakistan: Population Planning and Social Services, op.cit, pp. 60-61.
163. Manzur-ul-Hasan, 'Mullah Power: An Analysis', Tempo, (January-February, 1975), p. 17.
164. Interview with Dr. A. Khaliq, former PPP provincial and central education minister.:

165. White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, Misuse of the Instruments of State Power, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 117-121.
166. A case in point is the establishment in 1974 of the National Students Federation in the Punjab University to 'replace' the influential National Students Federation (Rashid Group), a leftist body that had once supported the PPP, but had now grown disenchanted with it. See Outlook, 9 March 1974, p. 6.
167. Dawn, 16 March 1972, 1.
168. Pakistan: Population Planning and Social Services, op.cit, pp. 5-9.
169. 'Drugged Blessings', Outlook, 13 May 1972, p. 4.
170. See Outlook, 3 February 1973, p. 10.
171. Ibid.
172. As is the pattern in most developing countries, this industry in Pakistan is dominated either by firms with direct investments by multi-national corporations or locally-owned firms with contractual agreements with foreign enterprises. See Khalid Sharwani, A Note on the Pharmaceutical Industry in Pakistan, (mimeograph).
173. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1973), Sixth Schedule, Article 268(2) - Number 21.
174. Outlook, 5 May 1973, p. 8.
175. Sharwani, ibid, p. 3.
176. See Khaliq Khan, Generic Drugs in Pakistan: Their Introduction and Consequences, (Lahore: Model Publishing House, 1976).
177. Ibid.
178. Herbert Feldman, 'Pakistan in 1973', Asian Survey, (February 1974), Vol. 14, p. 139.
179. Promises and Performance, op.cit, p. 213.
180. 'The Role of Women', in Pakistan: Past and Present, (London: Stacey International 1977), p. 212.
181. For details see above, chapter V, pp. 315-316.
182. See above, chapter III.
183. See chapter V, note 80.
184. For an analysis of the linguistic riots see Sayeed, op.cit, pp. 124-125.

185. See above, chapter V, p. 315.
186. See Table III.6, p. 214.
187. Sayeed, op.cit, p. 124.
188. This has partly been discussed in chapter XI which dealt with the nature and role of the political opposition.
189. Promises and Performance; op.cit, p. 167.
190. Ibid, p. 168.
191. See above, chapter V, p. 345-346.
192. See above, chapter III, p. 207.
193. Sayeed, op.cit, p. 126.
194. Promises and Performance; ibid, p. 166.
195. See for instance, Dawn, 6 November 1974, 8.
196. Ch. Mohammed Akram, Manual of Land Reforms, (Lahore: 1973), p. 5.
197. Achievements of The Peoples Government, 1972-1976: Punjab, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 7.
198. See Z. U. Poshni, 'At The Crossroads', in ViewPoint, 12 August 1979, pp. 9-10.
199. Mubashar Hasan, op.cit, p. 7.
200. Outlook, 3 March 1973, p. 6, and Poshni, ibid, p. 10.
201. Interview with Maulana Maudoodi, Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami, Lahore, August 1977.
202. This has been discussed earlier, in chapter XI.
203. For a detailed account of these media projection efforts see White Paper on Misuse of Media, 20 December 1971- 4 July 1977, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1978).
204. Ibid, p. 185.
205. Ibid.
206. Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, (London: Ithaca 1979), p. 194.
207. There are several accounts of the movement that challenged the legitimacy of the Bhutto government: Sayeed, op.cit; Mohsin Ali, 'Pakistan's Second General Election and After', Pacific Community, Vol. 8, No. 4, (July 1977); Jamil Rashid, op.cit; Eijaz Ahmed, op.cit; Robert La Porte, 'The Leadership Crisis in Pakistan', Asian Thought and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, (September 1977);



Maliha Lodhi, 'Pakistan in Crisis', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1, (March 1978); S. Taseer, op.cit, chapter fourteen; and S. J. Burki, op.cit, chapters eight and nine.

208. See above, chapters V and XI.
209. For an analysis of how the opposition derived the organisational power to sustain the urban street agitation against Bhutto, see above, chapter XI.
210. Sayeed, op.cit, and Aijaz Ahmed, op.cit.
211. Mohsin Ali, op.cit, p. 687.
212. Sayeed, op.cit, p. 128.
213. An earlier indication of the extent of organised industrial labour's estrangement from the regime was provided during the official celebrations of 'Labour Week' in October 1976, when the majority of labour federations and organisations refused to participate in the celebrations. See ViewPoint, 8 October 1976, p. 10.
214. Aijaz Ahmed, op.cit.
215. Mubashar Hasan, op.cit.
216. Pakistan Under Bhutto, op.cit.

## CONCLUSION

This final chapter of the study sets out some conclusions and perspectives about Bhutto and the PPP and their place in the political development of Pakistan. The purpose here is not to summarise all the assessments made in the preceding chapters, but to emphasise the major themes of the study with a view to providing some comparative perspectives on political development as illustrated from Pakistan's experience in the Bhutto period. As Ralph Braibanti has pointed out there is in the literature on political development, a failure to relate the experience of Pakistan not only to concept-building but even to text-book or casebook exegesis (in the sense of using Pakistan's experience to either corroborate or disprove generalisations in text books concerned with political development theory), whereas the recent history of the country affords rich opportunities for understanding the processes of political development.<sup>1</sup> The assessments made below can therefore be regarded as an attempt to fill this vacuum in scholarship on Pakistan in the field of political development.

Structuring authority in the new states elicited a variety of responses throughout the Third World. The general tendency in the early literature studying such phenomena was to emphasise ideology, charisma and political parties (usually the nationalist-movement parties of independence) as the means for achieving political consolidation.<sup>2</sup> Such emphasis followed not only from the fact that the

leaders of these states were themselves emphasising ideology, political parties, and their own personal qualities, but also because such phenomena were in a sense, the most visible to the western eye.

Recent events, however, demonstrated the limited utility of these conceptualisations in communicating the problems involved in achieving political consolidation. Charisma, where it existed, in several instances proved short-lived, and its effectiveness in securing any degree of solidarity, as David Apter has noted in his revised study of Ghana, was highly questionable,<sup>3</sup> Moreover there was a growing recognition in the literature on new states that the emphasis often placed on charismatic leadership in earlier studies, may, in fact be singling out patrimonial leaders instead.<sup>4</sup> Ideology was similarly limited in its conceptual ability to encompass the problem of political consolidation in its full scope. As Henry Bienen, for instance, has stated:

"It is false to assume that explicit ideologies...have any general relevance; they may be espoused by only a select few who themselves may be removed from the centre of power within the party. The aspiration of certain elites to transform their societies...may or may not be significant." 5

Nor has the study of political parties in new states been too successful in clarifying the process of political consolidation. Early studies of political parties in the new states tended to over-emphasise the role of the party in the consolidation and modernisation process, by frequently mistaking the organisational aspirations of the political elites for reality and positing a cohesion that simply was not there.<sup>6</sup>

Such conceptual inadequacies led to a growing tendency in the recent literature on developing societies to describe the political regimes of a large part of these societies in terms which were usually used to describe various traditional political systems. G. Roth and A. Zolberg were amongst the first scholars to use the term 'patrimonial' in the context - Zolberg applying it to many of the African states while G. Roth advocated a wider connotation to the term.<sup>7</sup> They were followed in this by others, most notably, S. N. Eisenstadt and G. Heeger.<sup>8</sup> The use of the term 'patrimonial' was not merely descriptive, but constituted a critical attitude to some of the basic assumptions of the early studies of modernisation and political development. It emphasised the inadequacy of these assumptions by indicating (1) that many of these societies and states did not develop in the direction of some modern nation-states (either of the western liberal variety or communist type regimes); (2) that these regimes did not necessarily constitute a 'transitory' passing phase towards an inevitable path to one type of modernity; (3) by indicating that there was nonetheless some internal 'logic' in their development and (4) by emphasising that part at least of this logic or pattern could be derived from some aspects of the traditions of these societies and understood in terms of these aspects (i.e. in terms of their unique configurations).

This study has attempted to apply the patrimonial model to Bhutto's political system. As a heuristic tool, the concept has enabled us to explain and relate a wide

range of phenomena, such as personalism, factionalism and patronage practices, which have thus far received relatively little attention from writers on Pakistani politics. Bhutto's patrimonialism has to be viewed against the background of the country's historical tradition and related to its culture and social structure.

One dominant leader and the personal approach to governance has been the country's political tradition ever since its inception. This phenomenon of a dominating figure, however, is not necessarily synonymous with charismatic authority. Many of Pakistan's leaders (such as Liaqat and Ayub) did not have the magic of personal charisma for many groups in society, nor did any of the leaders have the kind of impersonal, institutional charisma that Edward Shils has stressed as a basic requirement for organisational stability.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the political situation in Pakistan has been fluid because leadership has largely been merely personal and lacking in both charismatic qualities, i.e. personal as well as office charisma. While the other outstanding and recurring feature of Pakistani politics - its praetorian tradition - is considered later, it is important here to note the relationship between this tradition and the tradition of a dominating personality. Both derive, in part from the colonial Viceregal legacy as we shall see presently, and appear to have strengthened and reinforced the other. For example, as the personal approach to governance has fostered neither national community nor institutionalisation of political forms or procedure, it has served to make the country vulnerable to praetorianism,

both in the narrow sense of military intervention in politics, and in the broader sense of the lack of effective political institutions capable of mediating group conflict.

The "Great Leader" syndrome can be related to aspects of Pakistan's historical and cultural legacy and its social structure. With respect to the historical legacy, it can be traced to the Viceregal pattern of authority that has been the most persistent aspect of the country's colonial heritage. Many essential elements of the Viceregal heritage can be discerned in the Pakistani polity; in the concentration of power in a strong leader (from Jinnah through to Bhutto and Zia), in the primacy of personality over institutionalised governance - indeed in the ultimate dependence of the political system on a glorified leader. Clearly, then, the Viceregal legacy is an important factor in giving rise to the 'Great Leader' phenomena. Aspects of the Viceregal tradition, specifically the prominence accorded to "steel frame" institutions, the military and the civil service, has also given rise to the country's tendency towards praetorianism.

Aspects of the country's culture can also be related to the 'Great Leader' phenomenon. The Islamic ethos in the country's culture to some extent reinforces the tendency towards the concentration of power in one dominant leader. Although Quranic doctrine explicitly prohibits glorification of leaders, from the beginning, Islam, as a political system has placed one man at the head of the state organisation. In the early history of Islam, he was

elevated by a form of election, but since the Caliph was virtually irremovable, it constituted elective monarchy rather than democracy. Soon, the element of election was superseded by hereditary succession. Thus the weight of Islamic tradition is on the side of the concentration of authority in the hands of one man.

The Pakistani traditional social structure also reinforces the tendency towards strong, personalised leadership. While the social structure obviously differs from province to province, in general, the Pakistani social order is for the large part a paternalistic one resting on various forms of customary leadership such as tribal chiefs, powerful landlords, biradari notables, heads of gentry lineages, and pirs (spiritual guides). Political leadership, then partakes of such feudal and tribal paternalism. It is important to note the differing impact of British colonial rule on the social structure in areas that comprised Pakistan as compared to those that formed part of independent India. In the areas that comprised Pakistan, the British interfered less with traditional -tribal or feudal - privileges than elsewhere in India. Indeed, in the case of Punjab, the conservative British administrators of the "Punjab school" with an eye to maintaining the prestige of British authority in what was regarded as a strategic zone, operated by co-opting the "natural leaders" of the people.<sup>10</sup> This not only meant the strengthening of traditional, feudal and tribal entities, but also retarded the development of those nascent social classes (e.g. urban middle class) which in parts of India (e.g. Bombay, Madras,

United Provinces) were to demand representative institutions. This in fact helps, to some extent, to explain the striking differences in the political experiences between post-independence India and Pakistan.

These aspects of Pakistan's historical and cultural legacy and social structure have combined to make the phenomenon of a dominating personality a recurring one in the country's political history. Viewed from this perspective, Bhutto's patrimonial strategy for consolidating political power was in keeping with several aspects of the country's historical tradition. Indeed, in many important respects, Bhutto's patrimonial system can be viewed as an adaptation of the Viceregal model. Patrimonial features such as the personalisation and concentration of power, the manipulation of clientele support from rural landed groups, the personalised supervision over the bureaucracy and military are essentially those that we identified with the Viceregal pattern of rule. The Viceregal disdain for the notion of popular sovereignty was reflected in Bhutto's reluctance to develop representative institutions - even his own PPP as an instrument of popular participation (see below).

Our depiction of Bhutto's patrimonial system as an adaptation of the Viceregal approach to governing highlights one important element in the country's historical tradition in shaping the contours of political development. This suggests that modernising societies (as illustrated from Pakistan's experience in the Bhutto period) do not necessarily travel towards an inevitable path to one type of



modernity, but tend to develop patterns which can better be explained by reference to aspects of the society's historical tradition.

If the patrimonial model is viewed as a particular method of coping with political change, this raises the question of the effectiveness of such a method, and in particular whether this method aids or retards the political development process, the key elements of which are defined as involving a greater participation of the citizenry in the political system, greater institutionalisation of political procedures and organisations and an increase in the capacity of the political system to cope with popular demands and a changing environment. While taking cognizance of the various problems inherent in such a conceptualisation (particularly the implication of unilinear political growth ethnocentrically premised on western models) we nonetheless regard this to have a heuristic value to aid our understanding of Pakistan's experience under Bhutto. We will deal first with the problem of stability, a problem of what can be viewed as "predevelopment", the precondition, as it were, of political development.

The evidence from other studies of modern patrimonial systems shows that the limited durability of party-building and the continued dearth of material incentive aggravates the problem of political instability in such systems.<sup>11</sup> A common theme in this literature is the precariousness of the patrimonial method for the purpose of ensuring regime stability.<sup>12</sup> Our assessments of Pakistan's experience under Bhutto's patrimonially dominated

system appear to confirm this hypothesis, by depicting the serious difficulties as well as the limited durability of patrimony building for regime stability. The precariousness and the transient sense of loyalty that is called forth in such a system, was clearly evident in the relative ease with which the military toppled Bhutto in 1977.

Other than the problem of stability, it is important to emphasise that the patrimonial strategy followed by Bhutto militated against the establishment of a durable set of political procedures and behaviour - a process referred to as institutionalisation that is widely regarded as an essential attribute of political development.<sup>13</sup> If we accept that institutionalisation, understood in the sense that Samuel Huntington has characterised the process<sup>14</sup> as stable, valued recurring patterns of behaviour, is a key indicator of political development, then Bhutto's strategy can be viewed as deleterious for the process of political development. The requisites for effective patrimonial rule work against the requisites for institutionalisation. Patrimonial authority is the antithesis of institutional authority, and patrimonial leaders defeat themselves if they attempt to create stable institutions. Maintenance of control by a patrimonial leader requires the systematic inculcation of unpredictability in the political system, the constant shuffling of lieutenants and the support of the supremacy of different role occupants over time - tactics which hinder the development of stabilised procedures and organisation. In this sense, the personalism

that permeated Bhutto's political system yielded a political process that was not simply uninstitutionalised but in fact hostile to institutionalisation.

These perspectives help to explain why Bhutto failed (or was unwilling) to develop the PPP into an institutionalised party of the type associated with 'modern' political systems. Although Bhutto founded the PPP as an instrument to help him gain power, he never attempted to organise it into a discrete structure. Indeed, he placed greater reliance on personalised leadership and his genius for political manoeuvre than on party organisation.

Bhutto's personalised and centralised control over the party became more visible after the assumption of power, but from the very beginning the PPP was always a party of personal loyalty to Bhutto. Bhutto's broad coalition strategy for challenging the Ayub regime and then contesting the 1970 elections led him to maintain the PPP as a loose structure, dominated by him. This meant that in its early years, the PPP was more a movement than a 'party' with a well-structured organisation. In terms of its support base, the party from the beginning encompassed both 'traditional' and 'modern' groups. Thus the features that later dominated the PPP in power, were evident in the formative phase - Bhutto's dominance, the consequent weak organisational nature, the tension between disparate elements and the attempt to combine traditional 'patron' party type features with those of the modern 'mass' party type. The party's 'patron' features were reflected in Bhutto's links with landed notables (initially in Sind) operating

through customary sources of authority. But the PPP also came to represent the thrust of the newly politicised mass sectors in urban Pakistan and rural Punjab. This was evident in the composition of the social groups that formed an important element of the party's support base (e.g. urban labour, middle class professionals, and the non-privileged rural groups in the Punjabi countryside), and in the party's demand for a radical restructuring of Pakistani society. It was evident too in the "mass" character of the PPP vote in urban Pakistan and rural Punjab (where the PPP made a major dent in the traditional feudal structure of the province). Indeed, by virtue of Bhutto and the PPP's role as representatives of these newer social groups in the events of 1968/69-70, he and his party can be credited with ushering in the mass public (at least in the Punjab) into the political arena, a development referred to by P. E. Jones as leading to the emergence of a "participant society."<sup>15</sup> This can be viewed as representing a structural change in Pakistani politics in so far as the Punjab was concerned, holding out the prospect of building a mass-based political party and implanting the beginnings of a tradition of party government.

The "mass", "populist" aspect of Bhutto and PPP's rule in the period 1968/69-70 opened up the possibility of a major systemic change in Pakistan. At the same time, the events of 1971 - resulting in the ultimate break up of the country - placed Bhutto and his party at a relatively advantageous position vis a vis the two power groups that wielded effective political authority in the pre-1971

period, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. This gave Bhutto a leverage to refashion a political system, denied in general to his predecessors, an opportunity to break away from one aspect of the Viceregal tradition, i.e. the dominance of the military-civilian bureaucratic complex in the process of governance. Here, then, was the possibility of surmounting at least one important element of the colonial heritage.

Bhutto's choice of a patrimonial strategy for political consolidation had a number of repercussions for the development of the PPP. The dominance of a strong leader clearly inhibited the development of the PPP into an institutionalised group possessing organisational viability and autonomy. The requirements of a patrimonial strategy - as reflected in Bhutto's policy of manipulation of factional conflict - produced deleterious consequences for the PPP in terms of party cohesiveness and unity. At the same time, Bhutto chose not to build on what emerged as a potential mass base in the Punjab, preferring instead to adopt a policy of patrimonial cooption of traditional power holders in all four provinces. This was in part, because the sources of his party's strength were different in different provinces, with the PPP having a 'mass' base largely only in the Punjab. But more importantly, this was a function of Bhutto's personality, since he was not inclined towards organising the kind of mass base that could impose constraints on his personal authority, or even threaten his dominant position. In the Punjab specifically, this meant a decisive shift away from the party's "mass"

constituency towards a greater reliance on traditional rural notables. As the PPP increasingly became a party of notables, its 'patron' features came to predominate over its 'mass' party characteristics. The PPP in power emerged as a patrimonial-clientele party, with Bhutto dispensing patronage to cement the party organisation. In such a party, the loyalty that was called forth was loyalty to the leader rather than organisational loyalty. This factor together with the high incidence of non-machine patronage (i.e. the use of patronage for self-enrichment) in the PPP, meant that such patronage did not aid the organisational development of the party.

The PPP's weak organisational nature seriously affected its role as a governing party in the sense of acting as a two-way channel of communication between the rulers and the ruled. The PPP's organisational debility as a consequence of Bhutto's patrimonial strategy, meant that the party, as a middle level organisation linking government and citizenry, was unable to perform the crucial functions of communicating political demands in the political system and meaningfully participating in the process of governmental policy formulation. This urged Bhutto into greater reliance on the bureaucracy, constituting a reversion to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors. Thus Bhutto's policies were an important factor in the PPP's failure to emerge as an integral and essential part of the political system.

It is evident from the discussion above that Bhutto made little attempt to develop the PPP into a

participatory instrument. Indeed, the Bhutto regime was increasingly characterised by the severe restrictions it placed on political participation. This was reflected in the use of coercion against opposition parties, as indeed against dissidents within the PPP itself. It was reflected also in the attempts to curtail the high degree of mobilisation achieved in the period 1968/69-71 by various (mass sector) groups, such as urban labour and students. These policies aimed at discouraging participation were related to Bhutto's patrimonial strategy. And they meant that Bhutto continued the Viceregal tradition of giving supremacy to the executive over representative institutions. The political system built by Bhutto continued many aspects of the Viceregal tradition: characterised by a powerful and autocratic central figure, a disregard for the practices and institutions of representative politics and the use of executive power to curtail political participation. It appeared paradoxical that Bhutto, as the only leader in Pakistani history who can in large part be credited with involving (sections of) the mass populace in national politics whilst in opposition, should have reverted to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors once he assumed power. This paradox, however, can easily be explained if we view Bhutto as preeminently a power craftsman, moving according to his own conception of what was most advantageous for winning and maintaining power. Thus just as it was in his interest when he was in quest for power to mobilise the mass sectors, when he attained power, he perceived that it was in his interest to seek to control and limit participation.

Participation, understood as the involvement of the mass populace (as contributory citizens rather than subjects) in political life, is widely regarded as an important characteristic of political development. In the literature this attribute has been variously referred to as participant society,<sup>16</sup> politicisation,<sup>17</sup> power sharing,<sup>18</sup> participation explosion,<sup>19</sup> power diffusion,<sup>20</sup> and channelment of mass society.<sup>21</sup> If we regard participation as an important attribute of political development, then clearly the Bhutto regime's repressive limitations on participation can be viewed as de-developmental. The consequences of such a policy were dramatically illustrated in the events that emerged in the aftermath of the 1977 election, when political demands emanating from different sections of the (urban) citizenry were expressed violently in the streets of Pakistan. The intensity and manner of the protest can in part be related to the Bhutto regime's unwillingness to provide participatory channels for political expression.

Closely related to the regime's use of suppression to curb political activity was its inability to resolve the two contentious issues that have dogged successive regimes since the inception of Pakistan: the issue of regionalism and the role of Islam in the state and society. Both these issues can be viewed as different dimensions of a single problem: Pakistan's continued search for a positive national identity. The quest for forging a national identity proved as elusive during the Bhutto period as it had under previous regimes. With respect to the provincial/ethnic problem, the Bhutto regime, while displaying greater



sensitivity to the problem than previous regimes, increasingly sought to contain rather than resolve it. This was, at best, a temporary answer but fraught with serious consequences, as the regime itself discovered when it had ultimately to resort to force (the military) to control ethnic discontent in Baluchistan in the style of predecessor regimes. With respect to the issue of the role Islam should play in the state and society, the Bhutto regime similarly proffered temporary answers through manipulation of Islamic symbols aimed at allying religious sentiment rather than coming to terms with the problem itself. The Bhutto regime failed to avail itself of the possibility of harnessing Islam in a systematic way to a programme of social change - a potentiality inherent in the PPP's slogan of Islamic socialism. But Islamic socialism remained more a slogan, rather than a systematic philosophy that could have provided a positive, constructive and unifying concept for forging a national identity. Thus the Bhutto regime contributed little that can be deemed as significant towards the evolution of a national consensus on the nature and purpose of the Pakistani polity.

In the face of these assessments, what are the prospects for Pakistan's political future? Pakistan's primary dilemma lies in the lack of community and of effective political institutions to support such a community - a condition that was earlier referred to as praetorian. Military rule is but one manifestation of this general phenomenon. The fact that the military assumed power so easily in 1977 and has maintained it since is not so much a reflection of its use of naked force, but rather of

Pakistan's praetorian tradition in the wider sense of the term. As indicated earlier, such praetorianism is closely related to the colonial Viceregal heritage. Before independence the bureaucracy and the military were the chief instruments of colonial power. Therefore Pakistan inherited powerfully organised bureaucratic and military structures, and relatively weak political institutions. Thus the sources of Pakistan's praetorianism lie, in large part, in its colonial legacy. At the same time, this praetorian tradition was strengthened and reinforced by the country's tendency towards dependence on a single, strong leader which itself too was, in part, a product of the Viceregal tradition.

As Pakistan's history shows the praetorian tradition has produced what appears to be a recurring cycle of oppression, divisiveness and turmoil. This conveys a somewhat pessimistic view of the future: the probable continuation of this tragic tradition making instability a chronic rather than a transitory ailment. There are no simple answers to the question of how Pakistan can overcome its proneness to praetorianism. The tradition is certainly formidable, but it is not insurmountable. As Morris-Jones has suggested, "no 'objective' variable has an importance comparable to one of a more subjective kind"<sup>22</sup>; the degree of serious commitment on the part of the leadership towards, we may add, creating the common interests and the integrating institutions necessary to transform a praetorian society into a civic polity. To make this transformation certainly requires the scarcest commodity

in the Third World (as indeed the rest of the world for that matter): a truly extraordinary act of political will on the part of leadership. But while scarce, this quality is never absent in any society.

In the light of recent events in Pakistan as elsewhere in the Third World two very different outcomes can be suggested as far as Pakistan's political future is concerned. First, as the resurgence of Islam throughout the Muslim world, particularly in neighbouring Iran, indicates, Pakistan may seek its national identity as well as an institutional infrastructure through a reassertion of Islamic values. This is not merely to say that Islam will continue to play an important role in the search for national community, but that it is possible that the country's Islamic roots will be viewed as the sole remedy for the disorder, insecurity and corruption that seem to have become endemic in the country, regardless of the type of regime (whether military or civilian) in power. This may lead to an Islamic radicalism, of a substantially different variety than that espoused by the traditionalist ulema, (since this has largely been directed towards the support of conservative social issues or interests) with a pronounced emphasis on egalitarianism, producing an explosive substance that opens up to its audience prospects of material prosperity and earthly happiness. Such Islamic radicalism may reject western constitutionalism and representative government, or may involve efforts to establish that this form of rule is not only consonant with Islam, but that Islam actually requires this kind of

political organisation.

The other possible outcome could be a more genuine experimentation with western-adapted (perhaps Islamicised) forms of democracy and party politics for which there are many advocates amongst the growing middle class in Pakistan. Social conditions - greater urbanisation, industrialisation, spread of media sources, the diffusion of technology, higher literacy - are more conducive now than ever before, for the functioning of representative institutions. Such social mobilisation, it should be remembered, continues regardless of the political nature of any regime at one point in time (whether more or less democratic or authoritarian).

Another possibility - that of a revolutionary communist uprising - has not been predicated here, since in the light of presently available evidence on the contemporary political situation in Pakistan, this does not appear as a likely outcome in the immediate or near future. A communist seizure of power requires, at the least, a strong Marxist-Leninist party; but while there are revolutionary groups in the country (for example the Mazdoor-Kissan Party and fragments of the former Communist Party of Pakistan), there is little evidence to indicate the presence of an organised revolutionary party that could undertake to mobilise either the industrial proletariat or the peasantry. In neighbouring Muslim Afghanistan, a Marxist regime did seize power in April 1978, but such a takeover was led by a revolutionary party, the Democratic Party of the Masses known as the Khalq, that had existed since 1965 (supported and later replaced in 1980 by the Parcham

Party with Soviet armed help). Pakistan has no comparable organisation. In addition the Marxist regime in Afghanistan assumed power through staging a military coup d'état, a development made possible by the systematic infiltration of the armed forces over a period of time and of course, Soviet backing. Again the evidence from Pakistan indicates little to suggest a comparable development. In other words there is little indication of infiltration of the Pakistan army by revolutionary Marxist cadres. Neither is there any evidence of an attempt to organise a Chinese-style Red Army capable of challenging the conventional army and seizing state power. Therefore, while we do not seek to take issue with writers who have attributed the Pakistani masses with revolutionary potential,<sup>23</sup> for reasons given above, such a potential is not likely to be realised in the near future.

The threat to Pakistan's future lies in the continuation of its praetorian tradition with all that this involves for political stability and the danger of regional disintegration in a country where centrifugal pressures and regional animosities have in the past been endemic. This means that the experiment in an alternative model, whatever its precise form, and even if imperfect, is worthy of urgent effort by the leaders of Pakistan.

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#### NOTES

1. Ralph Braibanti, 'The Research Potential of Pakistan's Development', Ziring, R. Braibanti and W. H. Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: the Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977).
2. See for example, Aristide Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) and David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernisation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967)

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10. For a recent assessment of the 'Punjab School' of administration, see P. H. M. Van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972).
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12. See for instance, ibid; G. Ross, ibid, p. 205; and Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4, (January 1972), p. 166.
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APPENDIX ASELECT LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Of those interviewed, thirty-five individuals did not wish their names to be mentioned. These included eight senior military personnel, three industrialists, three student leaders, ten civil servants, three politicians, and eight trade union leaders.

- Aziz Ahmed - Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, 1972-77.  
 Ahmed Waheed Akhtar - PPP Senator.  
 Major General Rafi Alam - Divisional Commander, Armoured Corps.  
 Raja Anwar - Student Leader, Rawalpindi. Later, Bhutto's Adviser (OSD) for student affairs in the P.M. Secretariat.  
 Mahmud Babur - Trade Unionist, PPP activist in the Multan party organisation.  
 Gulzar Bano - Senior Civil Servant.  
 Iqbal Butt - Office-holder, Peoples Guards (Lahore).  
 Ziauddin Butt - Trade Unionist, PPP activist; later a leader of the Lahore Mutahidda Mazdur Majlis-e-Amal.  
 Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti - Corp Commander, Pakistan Army. One of the ring leaders of the 1977 coup.  
 Mian Muhammed Din - President, Pattoki PPP.  
 Chaudhury Zahur Elahi - Council Muslim League MNA from Gujarat.  
 Altaf Gauhar - Former CSP. Editor Dawn (1972); later jailed by Bhutto.  
 (Retd) General Habibullah Khan - Industrialist, one of the '22 families'.  
 M. Habibullah Khan - Pro-PPP student leader from Peshawar.  
 Air. Cmdr. Sajjad Haider - One of the accused in the alleged abortive coup of 1973. Later acquitted.  
 Mehdi Hasan - Secretary General, Gujranwala District PPP.  
 Mubashar Hasan - Founder-member PPP. Finance Minister 1972-74, Secretary General PPP, 1975-77.  
 Pervez Hasan - Lahore barrister, member of Tehriq-e-Istaqlal.  
 Imtizuddin - PPP activist, Rawalpindi.  
 Lt. General Iqbal - Deputy Chief, Pakistan Army, (at the time of the 1977 coup).  
 Begum Naseem Jahan - Member PPP central committee, PPP MNA (elected on the quota of seats reserved for women).  
 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi - PPP chief minister, Sind.  
 Dr. Abdul Khaliq - PPP MNA. Minister in successive Punjab provincial cabinets and central cabinet.  
 Afzal Khan - Chairman FILEC, Board of Industrial Management.  
 Ahmed Khan - Pro-PPP student leader, Peshawar.  
 Amanullah Khan - Early PPP student activist, member PPP Punjab provincial committee.  
 Asghar Khan - Leader, Tehriq-e-Istaqlal.  
 Malik Muzaffer Khan - Pro-PPP zamindar, former MPA.  
 Raja Mubariz Khan - PPP MNA (elected 1975).  
 Ghulam Mustafa Khar - Zamindar. Elected to the NA in 1962 and 1965. Early follower of Bhutto. First Secretary General of Punjab PPP. Governor of Punjab 1972-73, 1975, and Chief Minister of Punjab 1973-74.  
 Nasrullah Khan Khattak - PPP Chief Minister, NWFP.  
 Yusuf Khattak - QML leader. Member of Bhutto's central cabinet 1973-76.  
 Nasira Khokhar - Activist in women's PPP organisation, Rawalpindi.  
 Rao Khurshid Ali - PPP MNA from Sahiwal.

- Taj Mohammed Langah - Vice President Multan PPP.
- T. A. Tausif Lodhi - Corporate Executive in the private sector, member Economic Advisory Council 1973-77.
- Ali Mahmud - PPP leader, Karachi.
- Fariduddin Masud - PPP campaign (1977) organiser, Bahawalpur.
- Maulana A.A. Maudoodi - Founder and Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami. Died in 1978.
- Khurshid Hasan Meer - Founder-member Rawalpindi PPP. Deputy Secretary General, Minister in Bhutto's central cabinet.
- Aniz Mirza - Journalist, columnist for Dawn.
- Malik Fateh Muhammed - Press secretary to Hanif Ramay, PPP chief minister (Punjab).
- Major General Mujeeb - Minister of Information in the Zia government.
- Maulana Kauser Niazi - Formerly of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Joined PPP in 1970, appointed PPP central secretary for information. Elected to the NA from Sialkot, served as Minister for Information and Broadcasting and Religious Affairs in the central cabinet.
- M. Jahangir Pervez - Early PPP activist, later PPP MNA (elected in 1974).
- Dr. Altaf H. Qureishi - Journalist with Zindagi.
- Mukhtar Rana - Radical leftist PPP labour organiser. MNA from Lyallpur. Later jailed by Bhutto.
- Ghaus Baksh Raisani - PPP chief minister, Baluchistan.
- Mir Rehmatullah - PPP activist, Lahore.
- Sheikh M. Riaz - PPP MNA from Sahiwal.
- Col. Siddiq Salik - Writer, Public Relations Officer to the CMLA (Zia).
- Ras Abdus Sattar - Secretary General of Sahiwal district PPP.
- Malik Suleiman - PPP MNA from Sialkot. Later expelled from the party.
- A.R. Tahir - PPP student activist.
- Salmaan Taseer - Writer of Bhutto's biography. Presently PPP activist in Lahore.
- Mian Tufail Mohammed - Leader, Jamaat-e-Islami.
- Khan Abdul Wali Khan - President, National Awami Party. Leader of the Opposition in the NA until his jailing by the Bhutto regime in 1975.
- Begum Nasim Wali Khan - Leader of the National Democratic Party, one of the constituent elements of the Pakistan National Alliance.
- Brig. Zafar - Military Secretary to Zia ul Haq. Died in 1980.
- S. M. Zafar - Law Minister in Ayub Khan's government. Later joined the Muslim League.
- Mian Javed Zeeshan - Student leader in Muslim Students Federation. Pro-Bhutto.
- (Retd) Air Marshall Zulfikar Ali - Former Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force. Later a member of the Military Command Council under Zia.

APPENDIX BPOLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN - 1968/69

1. PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (CONVENTION) - Ayub's Ruling Party
2. PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (PDM): Opposition Coalition formed in Dacca on 1 May 1967, which consisted of:
  - (a) Council Muslim League - President: Mian Mumtaz Daultana. A faction of the Muslim League that had gone into opposition after the revival of political parties in 1962. Punjabi, feudal support.
  - (b) Jamaat-e-Islami - Amir: Maulana Maudoodi. Religious, conservative vehemently anti-socialist. Largely urban support.
  - (c) Nizam-e-Islam - President: Chaudhri Mohammed Ali (Former Prime Minister) Small, primarily urban party. Liberal, Islamic.
  - (d) National Democratic Front - President: Nurul Amin. The party grew out of the Awami League split and the old Krishak Saramik. East Pakistani party.
  - (e) Awami League (Nasrullah Group) - President: Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Support confined to Punjab in West Pakistan. Liberal, moderate party.

The PDM Programme was based on Eight Points:

- (i) Federal, parliamentary form of government, based on direct adult franchise..
- (ii) Federal subjects to include defence, foreign affairs, currency and trade.
- (iii) Full regional autonomy.
- (iv) Removal of economic disparity between the two wings within ten years.
- (v) Currency, foreign exchange, foreign trade and inter-wing communication to be managed by a Board composed of equal members from both wings.
- (vi) Parity in all central services.
- (vii) Parity in the military services.
- (viii) Parliamentary N.A. after election should incorporate clauses 2-7 of the 1956 constitution.

## DEMOCRATIC ACTION COMMITTEE (DAC)

Opposition coalition formed in Dacca on 8 January 1969. Its constituent elements included the five parties of the Pakistan Democratic Movement, and in addition, the following three parties:

- (a) Awami League - President: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Secular, East Pakistani, nationalist party, subscribed to the famous '6 Points'. These were (i) a federal parliamentary government for the country; (ii) transfer of all subjects except defence and foreign affairs to the provinces; (iii) separate but convertible currencies for each wing; (iv) all taxing power in the provinces which would make grants to the central government to fund its operations; (v) separate accounting of foreign exchange earnings for each wing and (vi) a separate militia for East Bengal.
- (b) National Awami Party - (Wali Group) President - Abdul Wali Khan. Pro-Moscow faction of NAP that had split from the pro-Peking group in October 1967. Secular, socialist party, incorporating the 'old guard' Left in West Pakistan. Its support was mainly confined to the NWFP and Baluchistan, where it was also a champion of provincial autonomy.
- (c) Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam - President: Maulana Mufti Mahmud. Islamic party that traces its roots to the Deoband School and the Majlis-i-Ahrar. "Progressive", Ulema party, enjoying support primarily in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

DAC adopted the PDM's 8 Point programme.

### 3. NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (BHASHANI GROUP)

President: Maulana Bhashani. Pro-Peking faction of NAP. Largely East Pakistani party, enjoying worker and peasant support. Some support among 'leftist' groups in the Western wing. Revolutionary, socialist party of the Far Left.

### 4. PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY

Chairman: Bhutto.

### 5. MAZDOOR-KISAN PARTY

Chairman: Afzal Bangash. Formerly called NAP (Mazdoor-Kisan Group). Small, progressive, radical socialist party, enjoying trade union links in Karachi, and peasant support in the NWFP. Some student support in the Punjab.

### 6. JAMIAT-E-ULEMA-E-PAKISTAN

President: Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani. Sunni, conservative Ulema party; support base mainly in southern part of West Pakistan - some following in the Punjab.

APPENDIX CASGHAR KHAN'S LETTER TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES -  
APRIL, 1977

I am addressing this message to the Chiefs of Staff and the Officers of the Defence Services of Pakistan.

It is your duty to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan and to obey all lawful commands of superior officers placed over you. To differentiate between a 'lawful' and an 'unlawful' command is the duty of every officer. Every one of you must ask yourself whether what the army is doing today is 'lawful' activity and if your conscience tells you that it is not and you still carry it out, you would appear to lack moral fibre and would be guilty of a grave crime against your country and your people.

You should by now have realised that military action in East Pakistan was a conspiracy in which the present Prime Minister played a Machievillian role. You know the circumstances in which military action in Baluchistan was engineered and how completely unnecessary this action has been. You are also probably aware of the utterly unnecessary military action taken last year in DIR in the North West Frontier Province. If you have any interest in national affairs, you must also be aware that during the election campaign the nation expressed its powerful disapproval of the present regime. Following the people's rejection of the Government, you should have been surprised at the election results in which the 'Pakistan National Alliance' which could muster such overwhelming popular support, could only get 8 out of 116 seats in the Punjab. You must surely know that many people were not even allowed to file their nomination papers. Was it not too much of a co-incidence that no papers could be filed against the Prime Minister and all the Chief Ministers of the four provinces? That those who dared to try, ended up in spending a few nights in Police custody? One of them has still not been traced.

Those of you who were even remotely connected with duties in connection with 7th March election would also know of the blatant manner in which rigging took place; Of the hundreds of thousands of ballot papers of P. N. A. candidates that had been taken out of ballot boxes and were found in the streets and fields of Pakistan following the election on 7th March. You would also have seen the deserted polling stations on 10th March, the day of the Provincial polls, following the call for boycott of Provincial elections by the P. N. A. Nevertheless Government media announced that an unprecedented number of votes had also been polled at the provincial election and the percentage was said to be more than sixty. Then surely you must have followed the movement which called for Bhutto's resignation and re-elections in the country.

The coming out of women in thousands on the streets in every city and town with babies in their arms was a scene that no one will forget. These were the women who Bhutto claimed had voted for him. The movement proved within a few days that he and his government had been completely rejected by the people. The death of hundreds of our youth and the beating of our mothers and sisters was a scene that may well have stirred you to shame and sorrow. Have you ever thought why the people put themselves to so much trouble? Why must mothers come out to face bullets with babies in their arms? Why do parents allow their children to face police lathis and bullets? Surely it is only because they feel that they have been wronged - that they have been cheated. That their basic right to 'LIFE and FIRE' their rulers has been denied them. They understood, when we told them the truth that the Constitution which you as officers of the Defence Services are sworn to defend had been violated. Article 218(3) of the Constitution of the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' says: 'It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and

conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against."

This, my friend, was not a just and fair election. Bhutto has violated the Constitution and is guilty of a grave crime against the people. It is not your duty to support his illegal regime nor can you be called upon to kill your own people so that he can continue a little longer in office. Let it not be said that the Pakistan armed forces are a degenerate Police Force fit only for killing unarmed civilians. How else can you explain the shooting of a spirited lad whose only fault was to show the 'V' sign to the army in Lahore the other day. The spirit of adventure; of defiance rather than servility needs to be encouraged in our youth and this unfortunate incident is a blot on the name of the army which would be difficult to wipe out. Similarly, shooting by the army in Karachi on an unarmed crowd is unpardonable. Didn't you realise that the poor and hungry people of Pakistan, throughout the 30 troubled years of our history, had shown only love and affection for our armed forces. That they wept when you laid down arms in East Pakistan; that they have always prayed for your glory and have literally starved themselves and their children so that you are well fed and our Generals and Senior Officers can live a life that even their British and American counter-parts would not dream of. It pains me to say that, that love is now gone. Pray do not let it turn to hate. For should that happen, a tragedy would have occurred in the history of this nation which we in our life-time may not be able to undo.

As men of honour it is your responsibility to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not the blind obedience of unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan. God be with you.

  
M. ASGHAR KHAN  
(Air-Marshal-Rtd.)

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