IDENTITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL

APPROACH TO STUDY AND MEASUREMENT

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Abstract

Identity in American Politics: A multidimensional approach to study and measurement

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This dissertation, "Group Identity in American Politics: A Multidimensional Approach to Study and Measurement," offers novel measurement strategies and theoretic insight toward the study of group politics. My research examines how best to explain group political preferences in a society that is becoming more culturally pluralistic while at the same time experiencing an increase in within-group heterogeneity.

The first chapter frames the dissertation as an exploration group politics with both critical and positive implications. I outline the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics, addressing the tension between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, and research in political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. I argue that a full understanding of relationship between an individual's self-identification and sense of shared outcomes with the identity group requires us to understand the different ways individuals may self-categorize and link their identities to political attitudes and behavior. In chapter one I introduce the type-predictor framework, a theoretical contribution that rests on the notion that it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes and behaviors, but the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient. I argue that different types of individuals may process group consciousness in a variety of different ways when group membership becomes salient at the individual level, leading them to express different conclusions about the notion of shared fate with in-group members. The type-predictor typology consists of five "types" that describe how individuals self-categorize (non-affiliation, abstract conceptualization, non-conformist

identification, multiple identification, and strong identification) that correspond with four "predictors" of how an individual will conceptualize and respond to questions about group consciousness (disassociation, group membership, group identity, and group attachment). My typology clarifies the theoretical discussion by providing a framework that considers the subjective nature of the relationship between demographic characteristics and their political correlates, which can vary by groups.

Drawing on a series of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, the second chapter of this thesis presents support for the type-predictor framework, and demonstrates how individuals link their sense of identity to their political attitudes and behaviors when given the opportunity to explain the process in their own words. One contribution of my work has been to provide an analysis of a linked fate measure based on an open-ended question that allows interview subjects to respond in reference to the group with which they primarily self-identify rather than having subjects answer the linked fate question in reference to an ascribed social category such as race or gender. The linked fate measure is frequently cited to explain the seemingly homogenous political attitudes and behaviors of African Americans and has been used increasingly in the past two decades to argue for a sense of shared outcomes leading to political solidarity among other groups such as Hispanics and Latinos, women, and the LBGT community. The question asks, "Do you think what happens to [people in your group] will have something to do with what happens in your life?" My interviews reveal that people interpret the linked fate question quite differently, with a wide degree of variation the range of responses. These findings are consistent with existing empirical research showing consistent statistical support for linked fate, yet substantial variation between and even within groups. Moreover, the open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provide support for the type-predictor framework. I find examples of all five "types" and all four "predictors" in the typology, and the relationships between types

and predictors are consistent with the directions I expected. Thus, my analysis of the interview data emphasizes the theoretical underpinning of the type-predictor framework: it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes and behaviors, but rather the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient. In other words, among the interview sample, a sense of shared outcomes is related to the different degrees of group consciousness individuals may hold at the individual level depending on the group categories with which they do (or do not) self-identify.

The third thesis chapter further explores the multidimensionality of identity by using survey data to examine how group identity matters to individuals across policy areas, with particular attention paid to the politics of immigration and welfare policy. In the 2015 Identity Measurement Survey (IMS) (N=3,010) I introduce a point allocation system for measuring identity that allows subjects to allocate a fixed number of "identity points" to a number of socially relevant identity categories and compares this new approach with conventional survey methods by randomly assigning respondents to one of six methods of identity measurement and assessing the differences in policy-related attitudes across the six randomly assigned groups and across identity categories. Existing empirical work relies almost universally on a set of fixed, categorical measures that fail to reflect the multidimensionality many scholars associate with racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, and other forms of identity. The identity point allocation system allows survey respondents to identify with multiple group identities and to weight the strength of their association across groups. In addition to racial categories, the identity point allocation design includes class, religion and gender as categories to which respondents allocate points, and the random assignment of individuals to different measurement conditions allows us to understand how different approaches to measurement may reveal different outcomes on important identity-related questions. The design also allows us

to explore whether the attitudes observed when individuals select a primary identity are different from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures of demographic correlation.

Data from the IMS reveal that attitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differ for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional "checked box" measure of ascriptive group identity. In particular, individuals who primarily identify as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what we would observe under conventional correlation between ascriptive categorization and attitudinal outcomes. Those who ascriptively identified as Protestant, male, or as a white person are most likely to have colder feelings toward immigrants and more conservative views toward providing welfare than people who more strongly associate with other groups. These attitudinal differences were even more pronounced when the analysis considered policy views according to the primary identity offered by respondents rather than through ascriptive categorization alone. These results underscore the opportunities afforded by alternative measurement strategies to reveal additional information about the links between identity and expressed policy attitudes when we allow individuals to tell us which identities matter most to them.

Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation provide perspective on individual thresholds for self-identification, and offer a novel measurement strategy to understand how individuals subjectively relate to group identities. Continued work will shed light on the relationships between individuals, their subjective identities, and the empirical correlates of identity such as inequality, intergroup conflict and violence, coalitional politics, and descriptive representation. The implications of these, to be sure, are not limited to the study of American politics.

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For my family.

Introduction

Current politics are as ripe with examples of appeals made on the government from identity groups as they have ever been. The Black Lives Matter and Brown Lives Matter movements are not only conduits for social activism among black and Hispanic/Latino Americans, they have harnessed the ability of new media to provide timely and relevant information about policies important to their respective causes, and opportunities for allies to hold representatives accountable to those policies. Pride flags representing solidarity with the LBGT community adorned homes in the D.C. community where Mike Pence lived in advance of his relocation to the vice presidential residence, a signal of criticism from Pence's neighbors regarding his conservative views on LBGT issues. From January to June 2017 there have already been as many as 13 organized marches on Washington, D.C. including the March for Life (in dissent of the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision), the Native People's March on Washington (led by primarily indigenous people in protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline and the U.S. Government's relationship with native nations), the March for Science (in support of evidence-based policy related to science and the environment), the National Pride March (in support of LBGT rights), the Immigrants and Workers March (an appeal for members of Congress to stop funding the Trump administrations mass deportation efforts and secure rights for migrant workers), and the Women's March on Washington (to address women's rights and the related issues of immigration reform, LBGT rights, racial equality, labor issues, and

the environment), marked as the largest combined protest in the history of the United States. The magnitude of social demonstration from groups mobilized under banners of identity and interest signal the rising tide of identity politics in the United States.

But on what basis should we form our inferences about group members and their identity-related appeals? When we further interrogate how attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, can we develop a more refined picture of identity and intersectional politics in the United States?

In the following three chapters, I present work that examines the subjective nature of self-identification, and explain how our inferences about important political attitudes and outcomes depend on our understanding of how individuals choose to self-identify with relevant social groups, or not. Using both qualitative and quantitative support I demonstrate how additional theoretical conceptions and measurement strategies may add context to our understanding of identity group politics in the United States specifically, though my work may be useful for conceptualizing and measuring identity across groups in broader comparative contexts as well. In chapter one I introduce a typology of group conscious thinking called the "type-predictor framework", in chapter two I demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework for understanding self-categorization and a sense of shared political fate using data from semi-structured interviews in chapter two, and in chapter three I contribute a novel point allocation strategy for the survey measurement of identity in chapter three, demonstrating how our inferences about group attitudes change depending on whether the relevant attitudes are assessed according to a person's ascriptive group membership versus a self-selected primary identity. I conclude by discussing the contributions of my work to the field of political science and the broader academic literature, providing recommendations for social scientists and practitioners interested in the application of social science research tools, and outlining my plans for continued research.

1 Typologies of Group Conscious Thinking

Part I Introduction

Introduction

This dissertation assesses how political attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, and asks whether additional information can be gained about the links between identity and political views when we allow individuals to tell us which identities matter most to them. The present chapter sorts through the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics and addresses the tension between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, and political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. I then introduce the type-predictor framework, a theoretical contribution that represents a departure from much of the current literature by interrogating the relationship between an individual's self-identification and sense of shared outcomes with the identity group and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with group consciousness. I argue that the ways in which different types of individuals process group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level lead them to think about the politicization of their identities in importantly different ways.

For decades, scholars and political actors have noted the significance of group identity to political attitudes and behaviors (Brown 1931; Taifel et al. 1971; Conover and Feldman 1984; Conover 1984, 1988; Fazio 1990; Cross Jr 1991; Lien 1994; Sellers et al. 1997; Duckitt and Mphuthing 1998; Bobo and Johnson 2000; Lee 2008; McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez et al. 2011; Ferguson 2012). However, the nature of the relationship between demographic characteristics and their political correlates seems to vary by groups. At the same time, a wide range of theories have emerged to explain how individuals conceptualize the self in relationship to the social categories and groups that exist in social environments. Among the most prominent theories in the social psychology literature are social identity theory, social categorization theory, and social interaction theory. Different theories emphasize different aspects of one's identity and while some scholars disagree (Hogg et al., 1995), others argue that there are substantial areas of overlap between major theories of identity (Stets and Burke, 2000). I believe the different aspects of self-categorization emphasized by each of the major theories can be linked in ways that enhance our understanding of how different types of individuals politically relate to social groups. Indeed, Stets and Burke (2000) have noted the similarities between identity theories and argued for the further development of research that meaningfully synthesizes various identity theories.

Most theories of identity treat the self as reflective in that it can "take itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories" (Stets and Burke, 2000, p. 224). Social identity theory refers to this process as *self-categorization* (Turner et al., 1987; Haslam et al., 1996) while identity theory refers to this process as *identification* (Burke and Stets, 2009; Stets and Burke, 2000). I use the terms self-categorization and identification somewhat interchangeably as my work emphasizes the utility of each theory for describing an underlying process of relating self to group, although for broad purposes, self-categorization tends to refer more the placement of self in social categories (such as a racial group, religious group,

or gender identity) while identification tends to refer to self-placement according to social role (such as teacher, sorority member, or ambassador) or, at times, personality traits (such as kindness, extroversion, or tenacity). Because my work is centered on the belief that individuals may affiliate with multiple groups at varying levels of intensity at a given time, and because I find reason to believe there is overlap between the concept of social role and social category, I use the terms self-categorization and identification throughout my work to refer broadly to the process of self-placement in group context.

Why Group Politics?

While any socially relevant category may constitute a group (mothers, sports car enthusiasts, veterans, dog-lovers), a standard belief is that politicized group identities are more likely to cause an individual to believe her political interests are bound to the status of the group, leading that individual to believe collective action is the best means for the group to realize its shared interests. Social science research differentiates group membership, group identity, and group consciousness; the theoretical and operationalizational differences between each will be discussed in this chapter. While racial group identities are an accessible starting point for this discussion considering the prevalence of appeals made on behalf of racial groups throughout the history of United States politics, this chapter is also concerned with how to deal with the notion of group consciousness from an intersectional perspective. Many scholars would agree that race is related to political attitudes and behaviors, but the field must do more to account for the ways that race interacts with other social identities. Further, the interactions between an individual's set of social group memberships and identities may lead to political attitudes and behaviors that vary from person to person. For example, Chong and Kim (2006) compare the effects of economic status on support for racial group

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interests among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. They find that for all minorities, preferences toward affirmative action and government policies to ensure equality between racial groups were mediated by the socioeconomic status of individuals. Similarly, Austin, Middleton, and Yon (2012) find that while group consciousness is expressed generally among people of African descent in Miami-Dade County, Florida, group consciousness has a greater impact on political participation among African Americans while socioeconomic status more heavily influences political participation among immigrant black people and black ethnics (Africans, Afro-Caribbean Americans, Afro-Cuban Americans, and Haitians).

Indeed, scholars have continually found support for the existence and influence of group conscious political attitudes, yet substantial variation between and even within groups (Sanchez and Vargas 2016; Gay et al. 2016; Hochschild and Weaver 2015; Gay et al. 2014a; Cohen 1999). To move the field forward in an increasingly pluralistic society, social science researchers must consider the nature of a person's relationship with the social group categories to which she is ascribed in order for emerging research to more fully account for the relationship between identity and political outcomes without overextrapolating at both the individual and the group level.

To begin this important, if formidable research task, I introduce a new framework for understanding how different types of people ascribe political significance to their salient individual identities. The *type-predictor* framework presented in this chapter posits that the way a person process group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level may result in one of several different conclusions about linked fate (the belief that her individual status is tied to the status of the group). We may care about the political stakes of group consciousness especially because the relationship between identity and political choice has clear and immediate implications for both public policy and electoral politics. Race, class, gender, and religion have always been situated close to the surface and have occasionally risen as important elements of political

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dialogue, especially during times of crisis. Indeed, identity has emerged as a central force shaping the current political landscape of the United States, and the scope of categories that may influence individual political considerations are ever broadening. Claims made by social identity groups, and appeals from politicians to these groups are an explicit part of our current political discourse. An ideological tension also exists between groups and political figures who assert and respond to identity-based claims, and those who do not appeal to identity as a basis for political discourse. In short, contemporary politics are framed in the rhetoric of group identity, or the rejection thereof.

My work in this chapter, and in the dissertation more broadly, is grounded in a theoretical framework set forth by E.E. Schattschneider (1960), who argues that "what happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc. The outcome of the game of politics depends on which of a multitude of possible conflicts gains the dominant position (Schattschneider, 1960 as cited in Drutman, 2016)." Indeed, political factions, parties, and class identities should be placed alongside race, gender, religion, and the host of other social groups with which individuals may self-identify and develop a sense of shared political outcomes. And though partisanship and ideology certainly play an important role in American politics (see Converse et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Green and Palmquist, 1994; MacKuen et al., 1989; Green et al., 1998; Benjamin and Shapiro, 1992; Green and Yoon, 2002; Green et al., 2004), the active literature on partisanship and ideology illustrate that ideological thinking will always play a role in American politics, but will never have exclusive influence (see see Achen and Bartels, 2017). Other identities such as class, gender, religion and other social categories are groups with which individuals self-identify and develop a sense of shared political outcomes. If political outcomes depend on where the dividing lines of politics are drawn, and current politics are waged along the lines of identity for a substantial portion of the United States population, we may stand to see a more robust portrait of identity and its ties to the policy preferences and political behaviors of

groups, the influence of these groups in political spaces, and the effects of group influence as they relate to political outcomes.

To ultimately derive the typologies of group conscious thinking, this chapter begins by examining the literature on group membership, group identity, and group consciousness, discussing how scholars have theorized and defined each, and the designs used to measure each when used as an explanatory or dependent variable. In addition, I discuss further the theory of linked fate, a politicized form of group consciousness used throughout the literature to explain the seemingly homogenous political behavior of African Americans, and employed more recently to describe the political behavior of other groups in the United States and in comparative contexts. I also discuss the survey measure used to operationalize the linked fate theory, presenting the challenges and opportunities afforded by the conventional survey measurement of identity and its political correlates. While the majority of the section focuses on group consciousness among racial minorities, I also address literature regarding group consciousness for white Americans, women, and religious groups.

The chapter next addresses the empirical correlates of identity, and examines how researchers have related identity to political attitudes and behaviors across social groups.

Finally, I introduce a new set of typologies of group conscious thinking that incorporate existing theory to explain how different types of respondents respond to the politicization of their identities (i.e.: the concept of linked fate) in different ways. The typologies help explain the most puzzling characteristic of the linked fate literature: that researchers consistently find support for linked fate across large populations, yet substantial variation within groups.

Group Membership

Group membership refers to the "assignment of an individual into a particular group based on characteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held intersubjective definitions (McClain et al., 2009, p. 3)." In the United States, institutions such as courts, laws, and the census have codified and reified the criteria of membership in social groups, especially racial groups. As illustrated in Figure 1, officially recognized classifications have expanded and contracted over time for a number of reasons such as increased pluralism within the society, and changes in the colloquial names used to describe groups. For example, the categories "Mulatto," "Quadroon," and "Octoroon," were retired after Census 1890 and are no longer used to describe mixed race people.[1] Census 2010 allows black Americans the option to check African American as opposed to only Negro or Black in previous years. Additionally, Census 2010 allowed individuals to identify with more than one race, distinct from the use of terms like "quadroon" and "octoroon" to describe partial black ancestry.

The United States Census Bureau recently released the proposed Census 2020 Questionnaire, which will include a citizenship question (see Figure 2) alongside hispanic origin (see Figure 3) and race/ethnicity questions (see Figure 4) and requiring respondents to provide more specific information about their racial and ethnic identities. The new classifications have drawn criticism,

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[1] In 1850, enumerator instructions included the following specification: "Be particularly careful to distinguish between blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons. The word 'black' should be used to describe those persons who have three-fourths or more black blood; 'mulatto,' those persons who have from three-eighths to five-eighths black blood; 'quadroon,' those persons who have one-fourth black blood; and 'octoroon,' those persons who have one-eighth or any trace of black blood (U.S. Census Bureau 2017)." Curiously, the instructions included no further explanation of how to determine fractions of black blood.

especially the citizenship question which has not been asked of all citizens on a United States Census since Census 1950.[2] The Census Bureau claims that including a citizenship question allows the government to more effectively prevent discrimination in voting and enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Likewise, the Bureau claims that the questions about race and Hispanic origin help the government ensure equal opportunity and identify segments of the populaiton that may not be receiving public goods for which they are eligible, for example, medical services under the Public Health Service Act, or residential provisions under the Indian Housing Block program (United States Census Bureau, 2018). Critics believe the changes will discourage non-citizens from participating in the Census, causing an underreporting of segments of the population, especially immigrants and communities of color, which could have meaningful consequences for the redistribution of seats in the House of Representatives and the drawing of legislative districts, both of which are determined by census population counts.

Debates over who belonged in each category have been highly consequential. Indeed work by Nobles (2000) and Schor (2017) emphasize the idea that categories used to describe groups of people in the United States, particularly through the census, are part of a process of the creation and codification of national identity defined by inclusion, exclusion, and eligibility for full participation in the U.S. political system. The coveted position of whites at the top of the racial hierarchy meant that inclusion in the category of "white" significantly influenced a person's social standing. Other social categories affected a person's life chances as well: whether Mexican Americans should be subject to Jim Crow laws, whether Native Americans were deemed assimilable or categorized according to fractions of black and white "blood," whether Latin Americans were classified as white,

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[2]A citizenship question was asked of the total population on each decennial census from 1890 to 1950. Prior to 1890 census questionnaires included some form of a question about citizenship. Until 1920 the question was asked only of adult men (women and children assumed the same citizenship status as their husbands or fathers). The question was not included in Census 1960. Since then, only a sample of U.S. households have been asked a citizenship question, either on the long form census or the American Community Survey (Pew Research Center, 2018a).

mulatto, or as a racially distinct, and the increasing detail with which Asian Americans are clas-
sified by nationality all impacted how people characterized themselves, and how they developed
attitudes and opinions about their social communities and the politics that affected their lives. The
terms used to classify individuals into groups allowed them to be seen as potential insiders or "de-
fined them as perennially outside the status of American (Hochschild and Powell, 2008)." While
the classification of individuals can at times profoundly impact the way people and groups inter-
act with policy, it is important to note that these societal and legal definitions are distinct from
the feelings and preferences of individuals themselves, thus group membership is the subjective
assignment of people that is arbitrary, albeit flexible at times (McClain et al. 2009).

Figure 2: Census 2020 Proposed Citizenship Question

Is this person a citizen of the United States?

☐ Yes, born in the United States

☐ Yes, born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or
    Northern Marianas

☐ Yes, born abroad of U.S. citizen parent or parents

☐ Yes, U.S. citizen by naturalization – *Print year of naturalization* ↙

☐ No, not a U.S. citizen

Figure 1: Ethnoracial Classification in the Decennial Census, 1860-2010

Category	1860	1890	1970	2000 - 2010
Race	White	White	White	White
	Black	Black	Negro or Black	Black, African American, or Negro
	Mulatto	Mulatto		
		Quadroon		
		Octoroon		
		Indian	Indian (Amer.)	American Indian or Alaska Native
		Chinese	Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean	Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, some other Pacific Islander, or some other Asian.
				Some other race
Ethnicity			Other	Mexican, Mexican American,
			Mexican, Puerto Rican,	Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Other
			Cuban, Central or South American,	Spanish, Hispanic, Latino
			Other Spanish	

(Reproduced from Lee 2009)

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Figure 3: Census 2020 Proposed Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin Question

Is this person of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

☐ **No**, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

☐ Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano

☐ Yes, Puerto Rican

☐ Yes, Cuban

☐ Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin – *Print, for example, Salvadoran, Dominican, Colombian, Guatemalan, Spaniard, Ecuadorian, etc.* ↙

Figure 4: Census 2020 Proposed Race / Ethnicity Question

What is this person's race?
Mark ☒ one or more boxes **AND** print origins.

☐ White – *Print, for example, German, Irish, English, Italian, Lebanese, Egyptian, etc.* ↙

[_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _]

☐ Black or African Am. – *Print, for example, African American, Jamaican, Haitian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, Somali, etc.* ↙

[_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _]

☐ American Indian or Alaska Native – *Print name of enrolled or principal tribe(s), for example, Navajo Nation, Blackfeet Tribe, Mayan, Aztec, Native Village of Barrow Inupiat Traditional Government, Nome Eskimo Community, etc.* ↙

[_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _]

☐ Chinese   ☐ Vietnamese   ☐ Native Hawaiian
☐ Filipino   ☐ Korean   ☐ Samoan
☐ Asian Indian   ☐ Japanese   ☐ Chamorro
☐ Other Asian –   ☐ Other Pacific Islander –
Print, for example,   Print, for example,
Pakistani, Cambodian,   Tongan, Fijian,
Hmong, etc. ↙   Marshallese, etc. ↙

[_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _]

☐ Some other race – *Print race or origin.* ↙

[_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _]

Political science research that focuses on group membership often describes group-based differences in political behavior and public opinion using group categories such as race, religion, gender, and class as controls in empirical analyses. While group-based differences may account for variation in public opinion and political behavior, using ascriptive group membership as a proxy for the broader social and cultural values held by individuals may lead researchers to conflate the measurement of ascribed group membership with self-identification, and inappropriately infer causal relationships based on data lacking identification strategy.

Group Identity

Group identity refers to an individual's self-location within a particular social group, along with a psychological sense of belonging or attachment to that group (Miller et al. 1981). In psychology and sociology literature, group identity has been conceptualized within the framework of social identity theory (SIT) which posits that an individual's identity is primarily comes from the groups to which she belongs. Because individuals do not just have personal self-hood, but multiple affiliations with different social categories, a person's behavior might change depending on the social context in which she considers her identity. Relevant social identities vary from person to person, and can include a national origin, the neighborhood where a person resides, the school where a person studies, family relationships, religious affiliations, and many other possibilities. SIT addresses the notion of intergroup bias and social conflict, especially concerning interethnic relations. According to SIT, intersubjective distinctions between groups provide the basis for the comparison of a person's ingroup with members of the outgroup (for example, a fan of the New York Yankees baseball team cheering, "Go Yankees!"). Because even subtle distinctions between groups can provide the basis for intergroup bias, the tendency to view ingroup members more favorably relative to other groups can become the basis for discrimination against out-groups (for example,

the same Yankee's fan yelling, "Boo Red Sox! (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; McClain et al. 2009; Turner et al. 1979). Central to SIT is the notion that people have a need for positive social identity which "requires them to establish a positively valued distinctiveness for their own group compared to other groups (Turner and Reynolds 2001, p. 134)."

Tajfel (1974) described the extent to which a person acts as an individual or as a group member in her interpersonal relationships as the "interpersonal-intergroup continuum," an idea which explains when social identity processes are likely to operate and the social behaviors that differ between extremes on the continuum. According to Tajfel, social behavior falls on a continuum which ranges from interpersonal behavior (when a person is inclined to act primarily in terms of self) to intergroup behavior (where a person is most inclined to act in terms of the group). The interpersonal-intergroup continuum is not related to personal versus social identity, but rather focuses on differences in the cognitive processes and relationships between the personal and social; most social situations require a compromise between the two extremes.

Social categorization theory (SCT) emerged in the 1970's as a concept distinct from, but related to, SIT. Where Tajfel placed interpersonal and intergroup behavior on a continuum, SCT theorists suggested that the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behavior could be explained by a latent individual distinction between personal and social identity (Turner et al. 1987). Less concerned with ethnocentrism and bias, SCT attempts to explain the psychological motivations for group behavior.

SCT posits that self-concept varies between personal and social identity, and that as a person moves from defining self as an individual to defining self in terms of social identity, group-based behavior emerges. For example, the member of a sports team could think of herself as an individual player aspiring to improve her personal stats in the game, or think of herself as a team

player at times foregoing actions that could improve her personal stats if it meant she were pursuing a different course of action that would allow the team to advance as a whole. According to Turner et al. (2001), when a shared social identity becomes psychologically operative, a individual's self-perception depersonalizes, and the perception of mutual group interests and collective similarities are enhanced. This phenomenon of individual-level distinctions between personal and social identity led Turner et al. to hypothesize that there are different levels of self-categorization. Categorization theory suggests that when a person moves from describing herself as "I" and "me" to describing herself as part of "we" and "us," it represents a cognitive representation of the collective self. In other words, the collective self is a reflexive representation of self structured by the realities of group life in society.

SCT can be seen as a reconceptualization of the theory underlying SIT, though both theories emphasize the notion that personal identity can be distinguished from social identity, and that group behavior is the simple idea that people are acting more in terms of social than personal identity (Turner and Reynolds 2001). The distinction is that SIT is useful for understanding intergroup relations while SCT provides a way to think about group formation and the cognitive process by which a person situates herself in a collective identity.

Distinct yet from SIT and SCT is identity theory, developed by Burke and Stets (2009). Identity theory draws its intellectual heritage from the symbolic interaction theory (SI), which argues that social behavior can be best understood by identifying individuals' definitions and interpretations of themselves, others, and their social environments. By focusing on the meanings that individuals attribute to their social situations and interpersonal interactions, symbolic interaction attempts to understand how individuals construct their actions, and how actions are orchestrated with others to accomplish individual and collective goals. From this theoretical underpinning, two strands of

SI diverge, each differing in their emphasis on the social structure as a constraint on individual agency, identification, and action.

One strand, traditional SI treats social structure as fluid, flux, and in a constant state of being created and recreated through the interpretations and actions of actors in various situations. Traditional structural interactionists emphasize the notion that "Individuals are free to define situations in any way they wish with the consequence that society is always thought to be in a state of flux with outcomes determined by negotiation, but with no overarching organization or structure from the view of the individual (Stets and Burke, 2009, p. 34)."

Structural SI, on the other hand, emphasizes the influence of social structure on the actions and choices available to individuals in negotiating their identity and presentation of self. Through social interactions, individuals learn that society contains an array of groups, networks, communities and institutions that are distinct from one another, but that sometimes overlap to produce cooperation or conflict. Of structural SI Stets and Burke explain that "we navigate in and around these various crosscutting groupings depending upon our tastes, and they influence who we become (2009, p. 35)." Exposure to particular social structures over time helps shape both individual and collective goals.

Identity theory prioritizes the structural approach over the traditional approach to social interaction theory, and argues that because society is organized and patterned, the self must also be organized in a way that reflects the context of a complex, structured social environment. Identity theory features a perceptual emphasis, conceptualizing identities as hierarchically arranged, but in a system of control rather than salience or prominence hierarchy. According to Stets and Burke (2009), "identities higher in the control system hierarchy are conceptualized as more abstract such as one's moral identity, and they influence identities lower in the hierarchy such as the parent identity or friend identity. The relationship between identities at higher and lower levels in the control

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system of identities delves into the area of multiple identities (p. 54)." According to identity theory, the way an individual performs a given identity depends on how salient that identity is within one's overall hierarchy of identities – the more salient the identity, the more likely it is for an individual to invoke that identity in a given situation.

The cognitive and motivational underpinnings of SIT, SCT and identity theory are useful for understanding the substance of intergroup politics (McClain et al. 2009), and the influence of political attitudes on identity formation (Huddy 2001). Indeed, researchers have operationalized group identity in a number of ways throughout the literature. For example, Olsen (1970) compared black Americans who considered themselves to be members of a minority group with those who had not. Verba and Nie (1987) devised an index that summed the number of times black Americans referred to race in response to a series of open-ended questions. Lee (2009) employed a point allocation system in which respondents were asked to allocate a fixed number of identity "points" to a set of socially relevant categories.

To more fully understand the relationship between identity and its political correlates, a distinction must be drawn between group identity, which is concerned with how a person describes herself, and group consciousness, which extends the notion of group identity to consider the politicization of a person's identity.

Group Consciousness

Group consciousness involves identification with a group, plus a sense of political awareness about the group's relative position in society, plus the belief that collective action is the best means to realize the group's shared interests (Dawson 1994; Miller et al. 1981).

Miller et al. (1981) describe group consciousness as a multidimensional concept with four components that reflect both affective and cognitive elements:

1. Group identification: the conscious, psychological feeling of belonging or attachment to a particular social stratum.

2. Polar affect: a preference for members of one's own group (the "ingroup") and a dislike for people outside the group (the "outgroup").

3. Polar power: expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group's status, power, or material resources in relation to that of the outgroup.

4. Individual vs. system blame: the belief that the group's status in society is either attributable to individual failings or inequality in the social system.

Miller et al. argue that the four components of group consciousness form the basis for a political ideology that provides a way for subordinate groups to express their dissatisfaction with social injustices and lack of legitimacy with the social hierarchy. At the same time, the ideology of group consciousness justifies the advantage of dominant groups, giving legitimacy to their social status and providing a rationale for action aimed at securing permanence for the advantaged position (Miller et al. 1981). Members of many socially stratified groups (race, gender, class, religion) may develop a sense of group consciousness and indeed, this dissertation is concerned with the intersectional aspects of group opinions and behaviors. However, because much of the political science literature revolves around racial group consciousness, this chapter proceeds by digging deeper into the literature surrounding racial group consciousness. I argue that continued research must consider more fully the intersectional aspects of identity, taking into account the theoretical and empirical challenges and opportunities presented by a multidimensional approach to identity studies, if we are to properly appreciate the relationship between group consciousness and political attitudes and behavior in an increasingly pluralistic society.

Verba and Nie's landmark study *Participation in America* (1987) was among the first to quantify the relationship between racial group consciousness and political participation among black Americans. The authors argue that socioeconomic factors influence the rate at which individuals participate in politics.[3] While in the aggregate, data suggest that black Americans participate in conventional forms of political action less frequently than their white counterparts, once the analysis controls for socioeconomic status, black American participation outpaces that of white Americans, which the authors explain using the theory of group consciousness. Verba and Nie measure group consciousness as the number of times black respondents mention race in a series of open-ended interview questions and show that, once controlling for group consciousness and socioeconomic status, black Americans participate in politics at far greater rates than raw data suggest, and indeed, higher rates than those of white Americans.

Another important group consciousness study, Shingles' Black Consciousness and Political Participation (1981), argues that the large effect of group consciousness on African American political participation can be explained by a missing link: a sense of political mistrust which induces political involvement. Shingles explains, "the primary reason black consciousness has such a dramatic effect on political participation is that it contributes to the combination of a sense of political efficacy and political mistrust which in turn induces political involvement (p. 77)." He analyzes the same dataset used in Verba and Nie's study, and similarly operationalizes black consciousness as the number of times black respondents voluntarily refer to race in response to a series of open-ended questions related to the presence of conflict in their communities, problems in their personal lives, or issues in the community and the nation. Shingles finds that poor black respondents were

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[3] Verba and Nie define participation as action that aims at "influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel (p. 2)." Thus, participation in the Verba and Nie study includes voting, contacting elected representatives, and contributing to, or volunteering for a campaign, but does not include actions such as protest activity, community organizing, marching in parades, or similar expressions of political attitudes.

more likely to focus on political action through the policy process in contrast with poor white respondents, who were more inclined to participate through conventional forms of political action such as voting. Shingles adds that in their efforts to influence policy, black Americans in the sample were more likely to express a mistrust for government officials, though this mistrust tends to lead to community advocacy to influence policy rather than conflict with government officials.

The next part of the chapter describes a canonical element grown out of the racial group consciousness literature: linked fate. After discussing the theoretical underpinnings of linked fate and highlighting empirical examples, I turn to the final task of this chapter, the contribution of a new theory that introduces a typology of group conscious thinking that accounts for the different cognitive processes that lead people to self-identify and subsequently develop a sense of shared consciousness with in-group members, or not.

Dawson's Linked Fate

While generally acknowledged as a social construct, race as a form of identity is believed to be largely influential not only in the formation of individual and group identity, but also in the formation and explanation of political attitudes and opinions. Rooted in the study of identity in American politics is the concept of linked fate. Michael Dawson's theory of linked fate as described in his 1995 book *Behind the Mule* argues for the decisive power that identity, particularly racial identity, has on the political outlooks and choices of African Americans. Dawson develops a basis for linked fate described as a "black utility heuristic" which rests on three theoretical underpinnings:

1. Despite increasing economic status and the growth of the black middle class, the life chances of African Americans are still mainly affected by race.

2. Because their life chances are affected by race, it is rational for African Americans to view their fate as being linked to the success of the group as a whole.

3. It is therefore efficient for blacks to use group interests as a proxy for their own self-interest (Dawson, 1994).

Linked fate is not a distinct concept from group consciousness, rather we should understand Dawson's conception of linked fate as a mechanism through which group consciousness is manifest for African Americans.

Linked fate is measured using a pair of survey questions. The first asks, "Do you think what happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" Given an affirmative response, respondents are subsequently asked, "Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?"

There seems to be support for the notion of linked fate most consistently through the correlational evidence that African Americans have voted overwhelmingly as Democrats for many decades. Survey evidence cited by Dawson (1994; 2003) and others (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007; Harris 2009; Brown and Shaw 2002; Tate 2003; Gay 2004) indicates that African Americans routinely see their life chances as being tied to the status of the group as a whole. However, empirical evidence for linked fate relies almost universally on Dawson's original survey measure without much further consideration about measurement validity. Specifically, there seems to be little indication that discriminant validity exists between linked fate and other correlates of group identity. In the absence of empirical validation checks to verify the distinctiveness of linked fate, we are left to question whether it is really linked fate driving African American public opinion, or perhaps some other sort of correlate such as shared identity or shared political ideals at work.

Behind the Mule

Dawson begins his book by challenging the popular conjecture that political diversity is likely to follow economic diversity among black Americans, who experienced a rise in middle class status

in the 1980's when Dawson conducted much of his inaugural work on linked fate. Although his empirical support is thin (the survey used to support Dawson's claims in the book has a small sample size, and he uses linked fate as both a dependent and explanatory variable)[4], Dawson urges readers to consider two main points from his book. First, Dawson claims that black political behavior is influenced by perceptions of racial group interests, which are not associated with individual economic status. Second, Dawson claims that as blacks become more affluent, they become less likely to support redistributive policy (p. 204).

While support for linked fate in Dawson's book rests on the use of a single survey measure, the notion of linked fate in race and identity politics literature has been widely influential. The keywords "linked fate" return 2,120 separate items in Google Scholar (as of February 21, 2018) suggesting not only the breadth of influence of Dawson's work, but also the widespread use of linked fate theory as a way to explain behavioral outcomes. In the following section, I review three major themes in the literature that are particularly relevant to this present project: linked fate across the population, linked fate and political outcomes, and linked fate over time. Though not an exhaustive review of the entire set of literature available, I highlight the empirical evidence used to support the concept of linked fate and discuss how future social science research should address theoretical and empirical shortcomings in the literature by employing a mixed methodological approach, particularly through rigorous qualitative work and the use of a novel strategy for the survey measurement of identity. The following section will consider group consciousness broadly, as well as studies which operationalize group consciousness using Dawson's linked fate measure.

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[4]Empirical support for the linked fate measure in Dawson's book *Behind the Mule* comes from the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study (N=100 in the 1984 panel, N=134 in the 1988 panel).

Part II Empirical Correlates of Group Consciousness

How Have Researchers Attempted to Measure Identity?

The following sections will show that although identity is often theorized as being fluid and operating along a continuum of sorts (Taifel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Reynolds 2001; Burke and Stets 2009), it is nearly always operationalized using fixed categorical variables. There are both limitations and opportunities provided by the existing conventions of measurement in the field: while checking boxes within racial, gender, class, and religious survey categories affords little flexibility for individuals to indicate their magnitude of self-identification with each category, checked boxes are an easily recognizable task for many people. The choices made by researchers over what to do with such survey results present another set of opportunities and limitations. As social scientists have become increasingly concerned about the effects of group identities and the interconnectedness, or intersectionality of identity categories across a host of political outcomes, the amount of data and methodological innovations have increased substantially. Despite advances in data and methods, many research designs still place social categories such as race, gender, class, and religion on the right-hand side of regression equations.

Work by Gay, Hochschild, and White (2014a) complicates the notion that linked fate operates uniformly across groups. Using a national survey, they examine Americans' views on linked fate by race, ethnicity, gender, class, and religion. The authors find strong support for linked fate across groups, but little support that linked fate is associated with political views or political participation. Their conclusion offers that researchers should further the conceptual development and empirical experimentation of linked fate: the present chapter sits on that very frontier.

Empirical Support: Group Consciousness in the Literature

In general, large shares of non-white survey respondents express a sense of shared outcomes with in-group members. The proportion of respondents who share a sense of group consciousness, and linked fate in particular, is largest among African Americans. In seven surveys from 1984-2008, 60-83 percent of blacks expressed a sense of shared fate, although these figures dipped in the 2000s compared with earlier decades (Gay et al., 2014b). These surveys, which were either specific to blacks or featured oversamples of African American respondents, are consistent with findings in general population surveys such as the American National Election Study (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS).

The linked fate measure used by Dawson to operationalize group consciousness was first introduced in the National Black Politics Survey (NBPS) in 1994, and has since been regarded as the standard survey question for linked fate. Since Dawson's study, the case for linked fate has been submitted by numerous scholars of public opinion and identity politics. Linked fate has continually been associated with a sense of support for race-based coalitions and nationalist movements (Block, 2011; Brown and Shaw, 2002; Hoston, 2009), preference to live in racially diverse neighborhoods (Gay, 2004; Krysan et al., 2009), criticism of the mainstream media (Davis and Gandy, 1999; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007), and support for majority-minority Congressional districting and descriptive representation (Griffin, 2014; Manzano and Sanchez, 2010; Schildkraut, 2012; Tate, 2003). Taken together, the associations between a strong sense of shared fate and support for these political outcomes form the basis for the empirical claim that linked fate serves as a heuristic for political decisionmaking, especially among African Americans.

Block (2011) examines the effect of linked fate and "disillusionment with racial progress" on black support for nationalist ideology. According to Block, the linked fate pathway suggests that

feelings of in-group affinity are unrelated to black Americans' attitudes about white people. In contrast, when support for nationalism is driven by disillusionment, black respondents who perceive themselves to be treated unfairly by white people are more likely to express feelings of shared fate with other black people (Block, 2011). Using data from the 1993-1994 National Black Politics Survey (NBPS) and the 2004-2005 National Politics Study (NPS), Block finds conditional support for linked fate: black respondents who expresses a strong sense of shared outcomes with other blacks show corresponding strong support for nationalism, regardless of the level of disillusionment. When blacks reject the notion of linked fate, support for nationalism is high only among blacks who express high levels of disillusionment.

Block interprets these correlations as evidence of a causal relationship between linked fate, disillusionment, and nationalism. However, the NBPS data were 16 years old at the time of Block's study, and the NPS data were five years dated as well. We may expect feelings of shared fate to vary over time or across social and political contexts, a point developed further in a later section of this paper. However, even if we are to accept the data used in Block's analysis, we should be suspicious of the fact that the effect of linked fate on black nationalism weakens significantly at high levels of disillusionment.

Block is only one of several scholars who have continued the use of the linked fate question along with 1994 NBPS data.

Rather than addressing the pathways to black nationalism, Brown and Shaw (2002) use the linked fate theory to argue that not all "black nationalisms" are the same. Results from an OLS regression show that blacks with a higher sense of linked fate are more likely to favor community-based nationalism (support for black political and economic autonomy within the American institutional structure) over separatist nationalism (support for autonomous black institutions marked by a physical separateness between black and white America). The authors believe linked fate is

more strongly associated with community nationalism because linked fate is "more arguably a significant component of a group identity that blacks value as being inextricably both black/African and American (Brown and Shaw,2002)," although Brown and Shaw do not include any measures for distinctions between identity group affiliations among respondents.

Though less extreme than nationalist ideology, racial solidarity also belongs on the spectrum of group conscious politics. While nationalism calls for the institutional autonomy of black communities, black solidarity promotes an awareness of shared racial identity and the belief in collective action as a way to advance the interests of black people. Hoston (2009) argues that linked fate is positively associated with black solidarity. His data comes from the 2000 Mayoral Approval Surveys, a dataset of black and non-black registered voters in New Orleans, Detroit (cities with a majority black racial context), Chicago, and Charlotte (cities with a majority white racial context). Using OLS regression of an index of racial group solidarity on linked fate and other explanatory demographic variables, Hoston finds that blacks exert a sense of black solidarity regardless of the racial context of the city in which they live, perhaps because the measures for linked fate and measures for group solidarity are similar in the first place. Linked fate does seem to be a stronger predictor of solidarity in majority black cities in Hoston's dataset, however, the effect size is larger in majority black cities for all of Hoston's explanatory variables. It is possible that a substantial portion of adults self-select into the cities where they live, thus we may expect that an unmeasured confounding variable could influence not only the decision to reside in a city with a particular racial context, but also support for preferences such as nationalism and racial group solidarity. Indeed, racial attitudes may vary systematically with individual socioeconomic status, and the geographic concentration of socioeconomic groups may lead to distinct racial norms and behaviors (Gay 2004).

Gay (2004) posits that neighborhood quality and socioeconomic composition will influence whether black Americans see race as a defining interest in their lives. Using data from the 1992-1994 Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality and the 1990 Census, Gay finds that the quality of a neighborhood, including its socioeconomic environment, sustains the belief that race influences an individual's life chances. Neighborhoods rich in resources that facilitate future socioeconomic mobility are associated with a decline in the sense of linked fate among blacks. Living among more highly educated blacks is also associated with a weaker sense of shared outcomes with other blacks. Gay argues that her findings are suggestive of the material roots of black racial identity, and that actual exposure to material deprivation impacts the salience of race.

When should we expect to see the salience of race manifest in political choices, quite apart from ideological and neighborhood preference?

Davis and Gandy (1999) explore how racial identity affects individual responses to mass media. Their survey of black residents of Alabama, California, and Pennsylvania uses two measures of racial identity. The first is the conventional linked fate question, intended to consider self-interest as a component of racial identity. The second question referred obliquely to race and asked for agreement with the statement, "Each of us can make real progress only when our community as a whole makes progress," intended to emphasize the collective aspects of racial identity by using terms that signify "group, community, and collective (Davis and Gandy, 1999)". Respondents with a higher sense of shared identity on both dimensions were more likely to be critical of the portrayal of blacks in the media, though the authors concede that their measures for racial identity are strongly correlated. These findings are echoed by scholars such as Gandy (2001), Bobo (1997), Hecht, Collier and Ribeu (1993).

The studies just described in this section reflect the broader literature aimed at understanding the attitudes and behaviors of racial minorities in the United States, especially African Americans.

One shortcoming of this literature is that it relies on correlational evidence built almost exclusively on the use of measures that are highly associated with one another. Given the nature of this evidence, the field must advance by using new research design strategies to assess the causal relevance of group consciousness and the conditions under which a sense of shared political fate persists.

Another shortcoming of these studies is that they tend to treat minority public opinion as monolithic. As Griffin states, when studies anticipate that the size of a minority population should be linearly related to legislative behavior, greater support for a particular type of policy, or coalescing views on race-related issues, they implicitly assume that minorities share the same opinions despite growing heterogeneity in socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, neighborhood choice, and other factors among those ascriptively identified as black Americans (2014). Continued social science research should address intra-group differences in relevant political outcomes to appreciate more fully group politics in a pluralistic context.

Variation in Group Consciousness

Dawson's work has influenced scholarship on group consciousness for more than two decades. One natural extension of Dawson's work has been to examine how well linked fate accounts for diversity within black populations along the lines of gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality (Harris, 2011). As the African American population in the United States has grown increasingly heterogeneous, some scholars have attempted to address variations in linked fate among individuals who may be ascriptively identified as black, but differ in their sense of shared history, culture, and political preferences. Several authors examine linked fate among Afro-Caribbean immigrants, or black ethnics, in America. For example, Greer (2013) argues that although shared racial attitudes exist among black ethnics, ethnicity remains a "significant determinant of intraracial attitudes and policy stances for black populations," especially among new immigrants (Greer, 2013).

Findings from the ABS News Polling Unit / Columbia University's Center on African American Politics 2008 Black Politics Survey (Harris, 2011) also demonstrate the complexity of linked fate as it relates to other social identities held by black Americans. About 64 percent of blacks respondents in the ABC / Columbia University Black Politics Survey report feelings of linked fate with other African Americans. However, when asked whether blacks should stop thinking of themselves as a group and think more of themselves as individuals, nearly half of black respondents agreed that blacks should think of themselves more as individuals than as part of the group. Furthermore, 60% of black respondents reported feeling more connected with their social class than fellow black Americans (36%), indicating that although many African Americans express a sense of linked fate, a nearly equal proportion express feeling more closely connected to people of the same social class regardless of race. Harris' findings reflect the notion that while the realities of racial discrimination may link the black community together in a broad sense, many black Americans also seem to simultaneously adhere to the values of individualism that are prevalent in American society (Harris, 2011). Further work by Harris and McKenzie reveals that black Americans' views about the primacy of identities are "conditioned by experiences with discrimination, attitudes toward racial identity, social class standing, residency in black neighborhoods, and sense of financial security (Harris and McKenzie, 2015, p. 1)."

Cohen discusses the limitations of linked fate among black Americans in her influential work *Boundaries of Blackness* (1999), which investigates the relationships between power, status, and political action within black communities. Cohen argues that rather than operating under a universal linked fate political framework, a more accurate characterization of the political positioning of most black Americans is that of a "qualified linked fate," since not every black person is seen as "equally essential to the survival of the community, as an equally representative proxy of each individual's interests, and thus as equally worthy of political support by other African Americans

(p. xi)." Cohen specifically examines political activism within the African American community around the AIDS epidemic and argues that because the disease has been perceived as an issue affecting primarily black gay men, black men who have sex with men, and black injection drug users, the response was silence or delayed mobilization among black community leaders, churches, political organizations, the black press, and black elected representatives who treated AIDS-vulnerable groups as less essential to the shared fate of black Americans as a whole.

Austin, Middleton and Yon (2012) find that group consciousness has more of an impact on American blacks, whereas socioeconomic status more heavily influences the political considerations of black ethnics (Africans, Afro-Caribbean Americans, Afro-Cuban Americans, and Haitians). The authors specifically examine the relationship between group consciousness among people of African descent and political participation. The authors create an index of group consciousness which includes the standard linked fate survey measure along with measures such as support for collective action among group members, belief that the respondent's group shares similar social and economic interests with African Americans, experience with discrimination, political ideology and support for political candidates. They find support for the positive effect of racial group consciousness on black political participation that other research has suggested. However, the authors concurrently find that while racial group consciousness has a comparatively strong effect on American black political participation (a one unit increase on the consciousness index corresponds with increased political participation in the range of 3 to 16 percentage points depending on the activity[5]), the effect size weakens among Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Cuban, and Haitian American respondents for whom socioeconomic status is a stronger determinant of participation. Age,

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[5]Austin, Middleton, and Yon use a number of dependent variables to measure political participation including attending political rallies, contacting political officials, donating funds, meeting officials, signing petitions, participating in volunteer activities, and voting.

gender, generation of citizenship, partisanship, and church attendance appear to influence political participation among all groups, but to varying degrees (Austin, Middleton and Yon, 2012).

Research has increasingly taken into account the political associations of Latinos (McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2006, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010). McClain et al. find that Latinos with a higher sense of linked fate are more likely to find Blacks to be a palatable coalitional partner (McClain et al., 2009). Using data from the 1999 Kaiser/Post National Survey of Latinos, Sanchez finds Latinos are more likely to display group consciousness and a sense of linked fate in the context of political activities directly tied to Latino communities and when commonality and perceived discrimination were highest. Sanchez observes a positive relationship between group consciousness and political participation in activities specifically related to the Latino community such as attending meetings and demonstrations, and donating money and time to the political campaigns of Latino politicians rather than indirect participation through voting (Sanchez, 2006). In a corresponding study, Sanchez (2010) finds that group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino political attitudes across issues directly related to ethnicity (such as immigration and bilingual education) rather than those that are not directly tied to Latinos (such as abortion and the death penalty), moderated by nativity and the length of time lived in the United States.

The linked fate measure has been used to study other racial and ethnic groups including Asian Americans (Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Kim and Lee, 2001; Lien, 1994, 2010; Lien et al., 2004; Masuoka, 2006; Wong et al., 2011), Latinos (Burnside and Rodriguez, 2009; Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Segura, 2012), and, to a lesser extent, Arab Americans (Barreto et al., 2008).

A survey experiment by Junn and Masuoka (2008) finds that racial group attachment among Asian Americans is malleable, in contrast to African Americans, whose racial identification remains relatively stable over various contexts. The authors randomly assigned respondents in each racial group into two conditions designed to measure the effect of descriptive representation on

racial group consciousness. In the treatment condition, self-identified Asian American and African American respondents were shown photographs of U.S. presidential cabinet appointees belonging to the same racial group as the respondent, those in the control condition were not exposed to photographs. Respondents were asked five dependent variable questions related to their feelings of closeness to other people in their racial group, as well as the linked fate question. Junn and Masuoka found that African Americans showed relatively consistent support for the identity re- lated variable questions across treatment and control conditions, and while Asian Americans in the control condition reported lower levels of closeness and linked fate relative to African Americans, exposure to the "descriptive representation" treatment produced levels of support for linked fate and feelings of closeness to members of one's own racial group to a proportion nearly identical to those reported by black Americans – nearly 80 percent. In other words, black Americans appear to have an active racial identity and consistent sense of racial consciousness, while Asian Americans appear to move along the identity scale when identity is politicized (or activated by the prospect of a descriptive representative). Junn and Masuoka claim that it is a shared racial identity distinct to the context of the United States that unites Asian American political consciousness rather than claims to a universally "Asian" culture or other descriptive characteristics, since Asian Americans are a group comprised of many diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious communities.

Wong et al. use an original dataset, the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS), to demonstrate meaningful variation in the range of ways that Asian American citizens and non- citizens make their political opinions known. The authors concentrate on five acts of political par- ticipation: voting, political donations, contacting government officials, working alongside mem- bers of one's community, and protest activity Wong et al. (2011). They argue that Asian Americans with limited English-language ability will be less comfortable participating in political activities that require verbal communication such as contacting representatives, and will require stronger

mobilization efforts. Because campaign contributions require discretionary income, and voting is encouraged by partisan affiliation and party mobilization, both activities will be more likely to occur among Asian-Americans born in the United States and naturalized citizens who have lived in the country longer and likely learned the political norms. Protesting and community organizing, on the other hand, are encouraged by a sense of connectedness (or shared fate) with community members and have low barriers to entry, making participation in such activities more accessible for Asian Americans with limited English language ability or limited knowledge about United States institutions. The NAAS also includes two measures of linked fate – one asks the linked fate question with respect to Asians, the other asks the linked fate question using the respondent's ethnic group as the reference category. When asked the first question about whether respondents think what happens to Asians generally in the United States will affect what happens in their lives, 44 percent respond affirmatively to a sense of linked fate, though fewer than 10 percent feel their personal fate is strongly linked to that of other Asians in this country. When the question wording was changed to refer to people who share the same ethnic or national origin, respondents were somewhat more inclined to report feelings of linked fate: about 50 percent reported a sense of shared outcomes with people of the same ethnic group or national origin, and among those, about 12 percent believed that linked fate was strong.

The 2012 ANES reported 52 percent of Latinos and 62 percent of white Americans feeling at least some sense of shared fate, as compared with 65 percent of black Americans, that their own life chances depend at least partly on the fortunes of their racial group as a whole. Similar results hold for Latinos in the 2008 ANES with a slightly higher percentage sharing a sense of linked fate among a small sample in 2004 (The 2008 and 2004 ANES did not include whites on the linked fate question, and Asian Americans were excluded all three years).

The majority of opinion studies find, similar to the ANES, that black Americans express the strongest sense of shared fate compared with other groups. However, pan-ethnicity has become an increasingly influential component of the political considerations of Asian Americans, especially relating to views on education and employment issues (Bobo, 2000; Bobo and Johnson, 2000; Cain et al., 2000; Cho and Cain, 2001).

Within-group comparisons reveal an even greater degree of variation in responses to the linked fate question. Scholars have attempted to explore the strength of shared fate among cross sections of populations within groups including gender and sexual identity (Moore, 2010; Simien, 2005; Cohen, 1999), socioeconomic status (Chong and Kim, 2006; Gay, 2004), and religious affiliation (Reese and Brown, 1995; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014).

Moore (2010) examines the strategies used by black lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LBGT) people to assert a gay identity that is simultaneous with a black identity. Moore conducts in-depth, in-person, semi-structured interviews with 25 self-identified lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered black Americans who live or work in predominantly black or black and Latino neighborhoods in Los Angeles, and supplements his interviews with participant observation and ethnographic work in neighborhoods, churches, spiritual centers, and cultural spaces where LBGT people spend time in Los Angeles. Moore explains that black sexual minorities who see their self-interests as linked to those of other black Americans use shared culture to connect their struggles to historical efforts for black equality, using nationalist symbols and language to frame their political work.

Simien (2005) analyzes the 1996 National Black Election Study used in Dawson's work to examine the effect of gender identification on racial group consciousness. She finds that black men report a higher sense of race identification than black women, though both black men and black women report strong support for linked fate regardless of the reference group.

Cohen's book *Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics* (1999) further complicates the notion of linked fate by asking why black leaders and the black press failed to mobilize around the issue of AIDS despite the fact that the disease was threatening significant numbers of African Americans. Cohen argues that issues that cut across race, class, gender, and sexuality challenge conventional notions about who belongs in a particular community. Cohen contends that because African Americans were already a marginalized community, many of the institutions indigenous to black communities were unable or unwilling to make AIDS a major issue for African Americans and their politics.

Masuoka (2006) uses data from the 2000 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey and the 1999 National Survey on Latinos to determine the predictors of pan-ethnic consciousness among Latinos and Asian Americans. The ordered probit models confirm that for Asian Americans, high levels of income, prior participation in Asian-American politics, Democrat party identification, and experiencing racial discrimination are associated with higher levels of pan-ethnic group consciousness. For Latinos, pan-ethnic consciousness is more strongly associated with high income, gender, being foreign-born, participation in Latino politics, and perceptions of discrimination. Masuoka concludes that social contextual factors like discriminatory experiences have an important role in shaping group consciousness across pan-ethnic identity groups.

Chong and Kim (2006) use data from a 2001 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University national survey to analyze the effect of economic status on expressions of group consciousness (operationalized as preference for more/less attention paid to racial issues in the United States, preference toward affirmative action, and preference for government policies to ensure equality between minorities and whites in health care, education, jobs, and the administration of the law) among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. The authors argue

that intergroup differences in expressions of shared consciousness are driven by varying experiences and perceptions of discrimination rather than from group-specific theoretical processes. African Americans in the sample are less responsive to changes in economic circumstances (relative to Asian Americans and Latinos) because they are generally more pessimistic about their life chances and more likely to have encountered discrimination. However, broadly in the sample the authors find that for minorities who perceive equal opportunity and experience less discrimination, higher economic status is associated with a reduced emphasis on shared fate with racial group members.

Gay's (2004) work on the environmental determinants of black racial attitudes focuses on how the socioeconomic character of neighborhoods impacts whether black Americans view race as a defining interest in their lives. Using multi-city survey data and block-group-level demographic statistics from the 1990 Census, Gay finds that as the economic quality of neighborhoods improve, the salience of race (measured by the linked fate question and level of perceived discrimination) recedes. Gay also finds that the educational composition of neighborhoods impacts the salience of race: black Americans living in neighborhoods with greater numbers of highly educated black residents expressed more pessimistic attitudes about perceived discrimination, but their perceptions of linked fate were unaffected. This study demonstrates how racial attitudes are impacted by socioeconomic factors while challenging prior theorizing in black public opinion that middle class black Americans would be more racially oriented than their lower class counterparts.

Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss religious consciousness in the United States, citing survey evidence that nearly 90 percent of Americans identify with some religious group or tradition. The authors also show that service attendance, participation in "rites of passage" (such as naming ceremonies, celebrations of progress through life, and funerals) in religious organizations, and donations to religious organizations still occur at high rates, challenging the claim that religion has

become a casualty to American secularism. Religiosity, the authors argue, persists in the United States because it provides a social identity that is particularly important in American culture. As physical mobility, economic change, and immigration continue to threaten people who sense they are losing their roots, religion provides a sense of stability, supplying what science and politics fail to address. Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss three faces of religion: creed, institution, and social/cultural group, arguing that the third, religion as a social group, often produces a sense of shared status, a common culture, and a distinctive way of life. As members of the same religious community develop a similar way of looking at the world, group consciousness emerges and, at times, draws religious institutions into politics (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014).

Research by Reese and Brown (1995) explores the impact of religiosity on racial-group con-sciousness among African Americans, emphasizing both the civic message communicated and the political activism encouraged by religious organizations. Using data from the 1984 National Black Election Study, the authors find that members of faith communities that communicate messages of civic awareness (discussions about politics during religious service, encouraging members to vote, respondent's belief that the religious organization should be involved in politics) expressed higher levels of racial group consciousness, while members of faith communities that promote political activity (political meetings hosted at the place of worship, whether the religious organization col-lects money to support political candidates, whether other work for candidates occurs at the place of worship) tended to perceive more power imbalance and place greater blame on the governmental system for inequality.

More recent scholarship has begun to compare the notion of shared fate across as well as within groups. Junn and Masuoka (2008) examine the effect of shared fate among Asian Americans and black Americans. Junn and Masuoka use an embedded survey experiment to examine whether a sense of linked fate is more of a psychological predisposition or a perception that may be cued

by outside contexts. They hypothesize that black Americans, who have a strong and deeply held racial identity should show a smaller increase in group consciousness compared to Asian Americans, whose racial identity has a latent political context. Respondents from each racial group were randomly assigned into two groups. Respondents assigned to treatment were shown pictures of U.S. presidential cabinet officials (Ronald Brown and Rod Paige for the black respondents, and Norman Mineta and Elaine Chao for the Asian American respondents. Each picture was given a caption with identifying information about the cabinet official and a description of their position, and was accompanied by the text: "Both President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have included diverse Americans in their cabinets." Respondents in the control group were exposed neither to the images nor text. As dependent variables, Junn and Masuoka employ five measures of racial identification and consciousness including the "close to" question asking how close respondents feel to members of their own racial group, how important racial political identity is to the respondents, whether respondents favor a racial cultural identity (preference for children to study an African/Asian language, preference for children to marry other black/Asian people, and desire to learn black/Asian history and culture), and a variant of the linked fate question that asks respondents to rate on a likert scale their agreement with the following statement: "as things get better for [whites; blacks/African Americans; Hispanics/Latinos; Asian Americans] in general, things get better for me." In addition the authors ask black respondents whether it is more important to be black, both black and American, or American. Asian American respondents are asked whether it is most important to be a specific ethnic group (e.g., Chinese), a specific ethnic group and American (e.g. Chinese American), Asian, Asian and American, or American. For black respondents, exposure to the image of a black public official only produced a statistically significant difference in responses to the linked fate question, increasing from 56 percent who agree and strongly agree in

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the control group to 64 percent among those who received the treatment. Asian Americans demonstrated strong results from the manipulation, signifying that exposure to descriptive representation increased levels of linked fate, feelings of closeness to other Asians and Asian Americans, and feelings of political racial identity. Respondents who viewed the stimulus were also more likely to say it was most important to be a specific ethnic group and American (i.e., "Chinese American") or Asian American, meaning they favor the inclusion of "American" in their self-categorization.

Importantly, Junn and Masuoka's study provides illuminating findings when comparing black and Asian racial consciousness. When comparing feelings of closeness to members of one's own racial group, the authors report that 79 percent of black respondents in the control group respond affirmatively. While 67 percent of Asian respondents reported feelings of closeness in the control group, respondents in the treatment group reported feelings of closeness almost identical to the level of black respondents, 78 percent. Likewise, affirmative responses to linked fate among Asian respondents who view the descriptive representation treatment jump nearly to the level of black respondents who have not been primed to think about racial group representation. Junn and Masuoka's study underscores the idea that racial political consciousness should be thought of in a structural as well as constructed sense.

Lien (2004) compares rates of political participation between Asian Americans and Hispanics and finds that despite large differences in socioeconomic status, the two groups "bear similar ethnicity and participation structures." Specifically, Lien argues that a sense of shared outcomes between in-group members plays a complex and important role in the acculturation and subsequent participation process for Hispanics and Asian Americans.

Chong and Kim (2006) examine the conditions under which economic status increases support for racial group interests among African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans. Using results from a national survey, Chong and Kim suggest that African Americans are less responsive to

individual changes in economic status because they are "on the whole more pessimistic about their life prospects and more likely to encounter discrimination" than Asian Americans and Latinos. However, in general the authors find that among minorities who experience less discrimination and perceive their chances to be equal to others in society, higher economic status is associated with a reduced emphasis on race and ethnicity (Chong and Kim, 2006).

Group Consciousness Over Time

Sanchez, Moran, and Sanchez-Youngman (2011) acknowledge that an increasingly diverse electorate should prompt us to consider how considerations of linked fate may differ across racial groups and across generations. Indeed, the continued use of the linked fate question on mass opinion surveys over the past two decades suggests that scholars are still interested in the theory and its potentially wide-ranging implications. However, there is a distinct deficit in the long-term study of linked fate: there have been no large scale panel studies to date that examine the influence of linked fate within respondents over time. The American National Election Study has included linked fate as a measure in 2004, 2008 and 2012, but comparisons are only available for blacks as whites, Latinos, and women have not been included in all years, and Asian Americans are still not asked the linked fate measure with respect to their racial identity.

While the literature suggests a longstanding interest in the effects of linked fate, the variation in findings, absence of panel studies, and lack of diversity in measurement techniques points toward a clear agenda for future research to focus on developing a more precise way to link the theory of group consciousness with measures for shared fate.

Non-minority Racial Consciousness and White Nationalist Ideology

While white nationalism is neither the subject of this chapter nor this dissertation project as a whole, I do argue that the emergence of contemporary white nationalism should be understood as white racial consciousness, and indeed, white Americans who may not align with a nationalist ideology may also exhibit a sense of racial group consciousness. In a "Monkey Cage" article citing data from the American National Election Study surveys, Sides (2017) explains how in 2012, 30 percent of Republicans believed there was at least a moderate amount of discrimination against white people in America, a figure that jumped to 47 percent in the ANES study in January 2016 and at least partially accounts for the particular brand of identity politics that tapped into white racial attitudes and fueled Donald Trump's 2016 electoral victory. An October 2015 Public Religion Research Institute poll similarly found that nearly two-thirds of Republicans thought "discrimination against whites has become as big of a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities." Sides explains that support for Trump depended less on personal economic anxiety ("I'm afraid of losing my job,") and was more heavily influenced by a distinctly racialized anxiety ("I think minorities are taking jobs away from people like me"). In light of such polling data and other research documenting white racial attitudes (some of which I detail below) it should come as no surprise that the importance of "white" identity is now recognized as a substantial political influence, though latent racial attitudes have been influencing political preferences and behaviors long before the outcome of the 2016 presidential election caused political scientists and pundits to turn their attention to the identity-based appeals of white Americans.

Consequently, I argue that theory and measurement strategies in social science research that address group identity must also account for white racial group identity, its motivations, and its discontents. The attention paid to group identity and group consciousness among minorities, women, and other marginalized communities has not been extended to the study of white identity to nearly the same degree. Indeed, compared to other minority groups, white Americans are less likely to encounter discrimination, or experience systemic and institutional disadvantage because of their race. For other groups, politics are often framed in the rhetoric of identity – discussions about welfare often evoke images of the black welfare queen living lavishly off of food stamps, immigration debates evoke images of Mexicans illegally crossing the border to the U.S., and recent travel ban policies have expressly targeted and restricted passage to the U.S. from several majority-Muslim countries. For white Americans, however, dominant status in society means that white-ness is often the baseline from which other groups are compared. Unsurprisingly, "our understanding of intergroup relations with respect to white Americans is dominated by theories that focus on outgroup attitudes" (Jardina, 2014).

In this section I review research on white racial consciousness, in particular, the existence of a contemporary movement of white nationalism that differs, at least in its approach to the collective realization of its goals, from older racist right movements in the United States such as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party. I also highlight emerging research that focuses on white identity apart from white nationalism, signaling the need for future studies to further account for the role of white identity alongside other social identities to advance our understanding of intergroup politics in the United States.

In their discussion of theories of racial prejudice, Kinder and Sears (1981) contrast realistic group conflict theory, or the racial threat hypothesis (which argues that the origins of prejudice can be found in the realities of direct competition between blacks and whites for scarce resources

such as jobs, and positions in desirable schools and neighborhoods), with symbolic racism, or sociocultural prejudice (in which a solid core of prejudice is learned by children and adolescents alongside other normative values and attitudes that are prevalent in their social environments). Kinder and Sears use evidence from the outcomes of two mayoral elections in Los Angeles to argue that symbolic racism – the abstract, moralistic resentment toward black Americans for violating the values of individualism and self-reliance – is more pervasive and deterministic of the voting behavior and policy preferences of white Americans than the realistic group contact theory. In other words, the response of some white Americans to racial issues stems from moral and symbolic challenges to the racial hierarchy in society rather than direct experiences with challenges to their own personal lives. The authors' findings imply that although the politics of change to the racial status quo may be framed as issues addressing the status of minority communities, the argument can be made that white racial consciousness is activated through the politicization of minority and diversity issues as well.

Swain (2002) argues in her book *The New White Nationalism in America* that at least seven conditions have spurred the growth of white racial consciousness in the United States. These include: (1) an increase in both documented and undocumented non-white immigrants resulting in the possibility of a majority non-white United States population; (2) global economic changes that have contributed to the decline in high wage jobs for unskilled workers who now view documented and undocumented immigrants as competition for low wage employment opportunities; (3) white resentment over the perceived unfairness of race-based affirmative action policies; (4) the perceived prevalence of black-on-white violent crime; (5) the increased social acceptance of racial and ethnic pride and identity politics that emphasize a preference for multiculturalism; (6) rising expectations of social and economic equality among racial minorities; and (7) the rapid growth in

the number of people who have access to the Internet, which provides a forum for like-minded people to consolidate their strength, converge on their ideas, and mobilize their resources for political action. According to Swain, the heightened awareness of collective grievance and the existence of a target of blame for their perceived injustices have given resentful white people enough reason to mobilize around their shared racial group consciousness. Indeed, her claims seem to be bolstered by Abrajano and Hajnal's work in the book *White Backlash*, which uses panel data from national surveys to show that changes in public opinion on immigration at one point in time can predict changes in aggregate white partisanship to favor the Republican party in future periods (2015). As immigrants have increasingly impacted the country and native-born racial minorities continue to advocate for just and equal treatment to address persistent social and economic disparity, more white Americans than ever have flocked to the Republican party (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015) to seek recourse through policy for their own perceived injustices. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck also note that white American's opinions toward minority groups became more intertwined with their partisan identities and became stronger predictors of their opinions across a number of policy areas – including the economy, immigration, and attitudes toward Muslims – particularly during the Obama administration (2016).

Swain argues the existence of a new white nationalist movement which differs from older forms of white radical nationalism such as the Ku Klux Klan or the America Nazi Party - or their contemporary counterparts such as the loosely organized skinhead movement. New white nationalism rejects the violence and intimidation advocated by the older racist right and instead seeks to expand its influence through policy advocacy, rational discourse, and outreach to its target audience of white Americans who have become frustrated and embittered over what they perceive to be a landscape of racial double standards and race-based grievances in the areas of policy and the economy. Because new white nationalism seeks a mainstream audience, it has abandoned the

violent and intimidationist tactics used by the Klan and Nazi movements, which is less palatable in the contemporary United States.

For Swain, the next logical step for research in the field is to develop a national survey designed to identify developing white racial consciousness and white identity politics, and to explore how much traction the arguments advanced by white nationalists have gained among mainstream white Americans.[6]Swain (2002) says such a survey would allow researchers to "systematically examine whether [white nationalist] arguments are having the desired effect of getting more people to think and act more like the members of other racially self-conscious, self-interested minority groups (pg. 12)."

Walters (2003) writes about how white nationalists have advanced their interests through conservative policymaking in the United States. He argues that because white Americans are dominant to the extent that they control the institutions of decisionmaking in the United States, they can use those institutions and the policy outcomes they produce as instruments with which to structure their racial instruments. Because white Americans have historically been dominant in the U.S. government, most policy actions appear to take on an objective quality – in other words, it becomes difficult to distinguish the objective civil interests of the state from the subjective racial interests of those who wield decisionmaking power precisely because there has been little need for the dominant majority to articulate their interests in racial terms. Like Swain, Walters claims that in the wake of increased influence from groups advocating for minority interests, affirmative action and redistributive policies aimed at advancing the interests of racial minorities became targets of blame for resentful whites who view the societal push toward pluralism as a threat to white national interests. For Walters, the interests of white nationalists are inherently political as the goals

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[6]In a different chapter I introduce a survey measurement task that, at least in part, addresses Swain's objective to identify developing white racial consciousness and white identity politics. See "Can Alternative Measurement Strategies Provide New Insights for Our Understanding of Group Political Attitudes in the United States?" for more.

of the ideology are realized by using collective action to secure and cement the dominance of white American interests in policymaking and political institutions.

Zeskind (2009) writes about the history of white nationalism in the United States and prognosticates about a future in which white Americans will no longer constitute the racial majority, and consequently will no longer be able to preserve a system of white privilege through majority-rule winner-take-all democracy. He details the historical account of white nationalism in the United States and argues that in colonial America the practices of domination came into existence before the ideas that justified them, but as time passed, the pervasiveness of white dominance in political, economic, and ideological structures became so ingrained that it was practically invisible to most white people. Because institutional privilege to white Americans goes largely unchecked, times of crisis that challenge white privilege become the targets of white nationalist movements to oppose change and preserve the status quo.

Most authors in their discussions of white nationalism also reference a related phenomenon: the articulation of a Christian conservative ideology (Barkun 1997; Swain 2002; Swain and Nieli 2003; Zeskind 2009). Although the ideologies of white nationalists and far-right conservative Christianity are distinct and should be treated as such, the two converge in many of the ideas that motivate their movements. For example, religious and cultural traditionalists both adhere to the notion that the legitimization of LBGT equality threatens the (white) nuclear family, the conviction that abortion is unlawful killing, and the belief that middle class white people, particularly men, are the victims in contemporary society (Zeskind, 2009).

Compelling work on white racial identity also comes from Jardina (2014) who argues features of contemporary U.S. politics, including a mass influx of non-European immigrants, the election of America's first African American president, and the nation's growing non-white population have signaled the end of white cultural and political dominance, which had previously allowed the

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group to take their racial identity for granted. Jardina explains that racial identity is a meaningful antecedent of political behavior among white Americans, and, using survey data, shows that when the dominant status of white Americans relative to other racial and ethnic minorities is unchallenged, white identity is likely to remain dormant. When whites perceive that the dominant status of the group is threatened, or that the group has been unfairly disadvantaged, white racial identity becomes politically salient, invoking political attitudes that reflect a desire to preserve social and political privilege and advance ingroup interests.

Studies focusing on white nationalism and identity demonstrate that the explanatory power of racial group consciousness is useful for understanding the motivations and behaviors of minority and majority groups in society. Indeed, the concept of race as constructed and perpetuated by white Americans must be understood as a social force that influences the politics of the majority as well as those on the margin.

Part III A New Typology of Group Consciousness: The Type-Predictor Framework

Group consciousness becomes activated in different ways for different kinds of people; that much is clear from existing literature, which consistently finds statistical support for the linked fate measure (understood here as the survey operationalization of group consciousness), but substantial variation between and sometimes even within groups. Indeed, Dawson states in his book *Behind the Mule* (1994) that "not all individuals possess the same degree of group consciousness or substitute group utility for individual utility (p. 63)."

To foreshadow, the following chapter of this dissertation presents the qualitative findings of a set of interview data, which shed additional light on the topic of group consciousness by allowing

participants to answer the linked fate question with an open-ended response format. First, I begin here by providing a theoretical framework – the t*ype-predictor* framework – for understanding why the differences borne out in existing research may manifest the way they do.

A separate question asks when and how any particular group membership becomes salient at the individual level. This question, though important, is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Readers may see Burke and Stets (2009) for further explanation and a review on when and why group memberships and identities become salient at the individual level. The authors write:

> "What is termed a salient identity in social identity theory is an identity that is activated in a situation. A particular identity becomes *activated* or salient as a function of the interaction between the characteristics of the perceiver (accessibility) and the situation (fit). As indicated earlier...accessibility is the readiness of a given category to be called up into awareness, and fit is the congruence between characteristics of an identity and stimuli that are present in the situation (p. 207)."

I take group membership as given throughout this dissertation and seek to understand how, given the salience of a particular group membership, individuals belonging to a particular type process group membership and, correspondingly, interpret the notion of shared political outcomes, including linked fate. I adopt the Sellers et al. understanding of salience as described in the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity[7]. For the purpose of this study, I apply to all subject identities what Sellers defines particularly for black Americans in his Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity, where salience refers to the extent to which a person's group membership is a relevant part

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[7]The Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI) developed by Sellers et al. consists of three dimensions of African American racial identity: centrality (the degree to which a person normatively defines herself with regard to race), ideology (a person's beliefs and attitudes about the way she feels members of the race should live and interact with other people in society), and regard (a person's affective judgement of her race, or the extent to which she feels positively or negatively toward her own membership and toward members of the ingroup). The authors claim that salience (the extent to which a person's race is a substantial part of her self-concept) is the mechanism by which the other three dimensions influence the way a person experiences a given situation at a particular point in time. Sellers et al. find support for the internal validity of the inventory in a 1997 survey of 474 black American college students from both predominantly African American universities and predominantly white universities.

of his or her self-concept at a particular moment in time. As explained by Sellers et al., salience is concerned with the specific event as the level of analysis (Sellers et al., 1997).

The type-predictor framework illustrated in Figure 5 represents a departure from much of the current literature by challenging the notion that group membership has a direct, causal relationship with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with linked fate. Rather, I argue that the ways in which individuals process group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level leads them to interpret the notion of linked fate in importantly different ways. In effect, my framework accommodates the multidimensional nature of identity by acknowledging the different degrees of group consciousness individuals may hold. As noted by Stets and Burke, "a complete theory of the self would consider both the role and the group bases of identity as well as identities based in the person that provide stability across groups, roles, and situations" (2000). The type-predictor framework accommodates different conceptions of self-relation to person, role, and group as a way to further understand how self-categorization relates to an individual's perception of shared outcomes with a social group. This is especially useful for understanding how people who express intersectional identities may relate to groups. People who belong to hegemonic groups may not feel the effects of group stereotype as personally, or as urgently, as members of subordinate groups. The type-predictor framework theorizes the consequences of varying concepts of group identity (including those reflective of hegemonic and subordinate identities) and provides a pathway for understanding how these different concepts of group identity may relate to variation in the ways that individuals interpret the notion of group consciousness and shared fate.

Figure 5: Type-Predictor Framework

I now begin the task of introducing a new typology of group conscious behavior and explain how each type corresponds with a particular interpretation of the linked fate question. In doing so I must first define two terms: type and predictor.

A person's *type* refers to her categorization in one (or more, in the case of multiple identifiers) of five typologies that describe how an individual thinks about group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level:

- Non-Affiliates

- Abstract Conceptualizers

- Non-Conformists

- Multiple Identifiers

- Strong Identifiers

A person's type then corresponds with the one or more types of theoretical *predictors* we would expect to produce her interpretation of the linked fate question or other measures of group consciousness, which will be discussed in the following chapter of this dissertation. The predictors, based on existing theories in the psychology, political psychology and sociology literature include:

- Disassociation

- Group Membership

- Group Identity

- Group Attachment

Figure 3 provides a brief description of each type and its corresponding predictor(s).

Figure 6: Consciousness Type Descriptions and Group Consciousness Predictors

Non-Affiliates	• Do not process group membership as being related to life chances in any way. • Predictor: disassociation
Abstract Conceptualizers	• Akin to a "fan" who relates group membership to personal identity but attaches no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at individual level. Does not affect self-concept or decision-making. • Predictors: disassociation, group membership.
Non-Conformists	• Sees self as member of a particular group, but does not adhere to common group stereotypes. Process group membership as part of identity even if they don't "fit the mold." • Predictor: group identity
Multiple Identifiers	• Rarely processes one group membership in isolation as a component of identity. • Predictors: group identity, group attachment
Strong Identifiers	• Personal identity inextricably tied to membership in salient group, like a "team player" but to a stronger degree. • Predictors: group identity, group attachment

For each type and predictor I present a description and provide theoretical motivation from previous work, drawing especially from the literatures of psychology and sociology. Rather than developing my typology from one theoretical perspective, I synthesize multiple perspectives on identity to explain how the combination of several theories more fully addresses variations in self identification as they relate to group conscious thinking. In other words, individual theories often

have a specific explanatory scope. This typology complements existing theoretical work by suggesting the scenarios in which we should expect theories of identity to have the most explanatory power concerning individuals, their relationships to social groups, and the political consequences of group identification.

Non-Affiliates

Though non-affiliates may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, they do not view group membership as being tied to their life chances. In fact, they may intentionally disassociate themselves from group affiliation instead focusing on individualistic qualities such as personality as a motivator and basis for their actions and beliefs. Non-affiliates provide negative responses to the linked fate question, even when prompted to think about identity, because non-affiliates rarely associate their sense of personal well being to the collective fate of the groups of which they are members. Rather, non-affiliates have a more individualistic sense of outcomes, especially in political matters such as policy attitudes and voting behavior. Non-affiliates are the types of people who may tick boxes for their appropriate demographic traits on a survey, but would rarely be inclined to describe themselves according to categories such as race, gender, or religion, and opt rather for descriptions that better reflect a sense of personal identity, such as being "a kind person," "an introverted book-lover," "a good friend who likes having fun," or something similar.

Non-affiliation is best explained by social interaction theory (SI), and specifically, the traditional approach to social interaction theory, which draws its intellectual heritage from the seminal work of George Herbert Mead (1934) and Charles Horton Cooley (1902). SI posits that social behavior can be best understood by focusing on individuals' definitions and interpretations of themselves. Traditional SI emphasizes the behavior of actors, and attributes a great deal of agency and autonomy to the individual in articulating his or her sense of self. Traditional social interactionists

do not view the social and cultural environment as a constraint on individual. Instead, social structure is viewed as constantly in a state of flux, created and recreated "through the interpretations, definitions, and actions of individuals in situations" (Burke and Stets, 2009, p. 34).

Non-affiliation is also explained by theories of identity that focus on the "person" as a category of identity rather than the group or role as an individual's level of of self-categorization (Stets and Burke, 2000). Deaux (1992) argues that although personal identities may be connected to particular social identities, individuals who prioritize personal identity do so because personal identity represents a general view of the self as a unique entity, distinct from other individuals. As a result, the personal identity pervades all the group membership categories to which one may otherwise belong, making it unlikely that non-affiliates should view group membership as being tied to their life chances (Stets and Burke, 2000).

Abstract Conceptualizers

Abstract conceptualizers relate group membership to their personal identities but attach no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at the individual level. Abstract conceptualizers are not only aware of their membership in a particular group, they are aware that belonging to that group may cause others to view them along with any perception of shared beliefs, feelings or interests associated with group members (McClain et al., 2009), even if the individual may not entirely share those beliefs, feelings or interests. Abstract conceptualizers are able to understand such perceptions and misperceptions but are overall unmoved in their personal belief structures by them. Consequently, membership alone in a particular group would seem to be an insufficient condition to produce the type of utility proxying behavior required of group consciousness. Group membership itself does not carry any affective value of group-belonging, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not uniformly motivate strong enough sense of collective fate.

While traditional approaches to social interaction theory help explain non-affiliate behavior, the structural approach to social interaction theory helps explain the cognitive motivations of abstract conceptualizers. Structural SI places a stronger emphasis on the role of social structure in shaping the social life and self-identification of individuals. While traditional SI treats the social environment as being in a constant state of flux, structural SI treats the social structure as stable and durable, which structural social interactionists claim is evinced through the patterned behavior within and between individuals. Because structural SI treats society as being preexistent to the person, individuals learn about social organization through the process of socialization. As individuals come to learn that society is comprised of many groups, networks, communities, and institutions, individuals begin to navigate these crosscutting groupings, the social structures influence how individuals identify and present themselves to the world. As Stets and Burke (2009, p. 35) argue, "Exposure to particular social structures helps shape individual goals." The authors further explain,

> "Social structure provides both limits and possibilities for actors' behavior... Because social actors have agency, that is, their actions are oriented to individually held goals (from proximal goals such as accomplishing a particular task in a situation to distal goals as in achieving one's moral objectives), individuals have the capacity to create social structures. Social structures emerge from individual actions as those individual actions are patterned across persons and over time. And, actors have the capacity to change social structures as well, thereby reorienting social behavior with the results that new patterns emerge. However, individual action also occurs in the context of social structures within which the individuals exist. On the one hand, social structures impose constraints on the agency of actors. For example, there is strong evidence on the intergenerational transmission of class position or the intergenerational transmission of aggression. On the other hand, social structures can provide resources and opportunity structures for actors such that they can overcome these constraints. For example, we take notice when the unexpected occurs, as when people become

upwardly mobile actors in the class structure or when their experience of a violent up-bringing becomes transformed into an adult life of nonviolence. Complexity is added to the picture when we see that although agency involves an individual accomplish-ing certain goals, if the goals are consistent with social structural arrangements, they are reinforcing not only for the person but also for the structures within which the in-teraction is embedded. If the individual's goals are in opposition to social structural arrangements, interaction may, on the one hand, become disruptive and destabilize the existing structures or, on the other hand, become squelched as the individual is prevented from obtaining his or her goals.

Considering the influence of the social structure makes us aware that individu-als' outcomes are not completely orchestrated by their own or even others' actions as traditional symbolic interactionists would maintain. Structural arrangements persist according to their own principles and intrude into interaction, and they can constrain the actions of actors. Indeed, every situation has an implicit status hierarchy, a distri-bution of resources, a set of norms that shape and guide interaction and so forth, and this may constrain what actors can accomplish. (p. 35)"

Abstract conceptualizers reflect the core of structural symbolic interactionism in that abstract con-ceptualizers spend more time than non-affiliates contemplating how social structures shape their interactions. Still, an abstract conceptualizer type person does not go so far as to believe her per-sonal success in life is tied to the groups with which she may affiliate. The role of personal agency is yet prioritized over group fate for the abstract conceptualizer.

Non-Conformists

Nonconformists see themselves as members of a particular group, but do not adhere to common group stereotypes. They tend to process group membership as part of their personal identity even if they "don't fit the mold." Non-conformist behavior is best explained by social identity theory, which assumes that when group membership becomes salient, an individual's sense of membership in a minority group would become a meaningful basis for perceiving self and others. However,

because the social identity approach presents the self as relatively malleable, we may expect to see some variation in responses to the linked fate question. Abrams and Hogg (2001, p. 9) claim,

> "The social identity approach emphasizes that categorization involves differentiation of our self and others into meaningfully distinctive categories. The process is both inductive and deductive – inferences are made on the basis of category-based stereotypes, but those stereotypes depend on the features that maximally distinguish the category from relevant other categories (Haslam et al., 1996; Oakes, 1996). The process involves both the application of stereotypes to others, and the depersonalization of self. Depersonalization means that the self-inclusive category becomes self-defining. Social identity is the perception of self in terms of stereotypical ingroup attributes. Throughout the 1980s social identity researchers (e.g., Turner & Giles, 1981) described social and personal identity broadly as consisting of category memberships and traits, respectively (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988, for a comprehensive review). The social identity/personal identity distinction was depicted as if these were two different parts of identity structure."

Thus, while abstract conceptualizers may understand the self and group through the application of stereotype, abstract conceptualizer type individuals do not confine the self (nor do they confine the presentation of self) to the stereotypes commonly used to describe the group.

Multiple Identifiers

Multiple identifiers do not process one group membership in isolation as a component of their identity. They may at times have a heightened sense of awareness of their belonging in one group over others at any given time, but their considerations and actions are overall guided by the fact that they cannot, or perhaps will not, compartmentalize their sense of personal relationship between any of the groups with which they feel a strong sense of identity. They tend to interpret the linked fate question from the lens of self categorization theory, social identity theory, or group attachment and

depending on an individual's categories of self identification, may fall under more than one type in the type-predictor typology.

Strong Identifiers

For strong identifiers, personal identity is inseparably tied to group membership, and is explained by the self-categorization theory developed by Turner and others (Turner et al., 1987, Turner et al., Haslam et al. (1996)). While social identity theory treats self categorization as a process in which individuals distinguish the self and others, the self categorization approach makes more explicitly explains the process by which individuals treat the self and the ingroup as mutually exclusive.

To the extent that an individual's behavior is inseparably tied to her need for proximity to the attachment group, self-categorization theory may suggest that linked fate is the mode of behavior through which individuals achieve proximity, thus strong identifier types will tend to answer the linked fate question affirmatively. Although Dawson sees linked fate as a means through which individuals make decisions ultimately for self-gain, strong identifiers who view the world through a self categorization framework would see linked fate as one of a variety of behaviors that facilitate closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned with the extent to which favoring the policy of the attachment group allows the individual to signal her ultimate desire to be bonded with the group.

Abrams and Hogg (2001, p. 10) explain,

"Self-categorization theory more explicitly developed the analysis of social categorization to define personal and social identifications as being functionally antagonistic. Depersonalized self categorization means that the self and ingroup are one and the same. For example, Smith and Henry (1996) have shown that when social categorizations are made salient, the ingroup becomes psychologically merged with, or linked to, the self. Depersonalization is also consistent with phenomena such as social projection, which seems to operate more strongly when people make judgments

about others who share a categorization with self than when they are categorized as outgroup members (Kreuger, 1998; Kreuger and Clement, 1994). The functional antagonism means that if self-categorization becomes salient at a particular level (e.g., European) self-categorization at the lower level (e.g., British) becomes less salient. Which level of categorization is salient is flexibly influenced by contextually bounded comparisons between potential ingroups and outgroups."

Thus, for strong identifiers, the self and the group are inextricably tied once group membership becomes salient to the individual, as explained by self-categorization theory. In this sense, we should expect strong identifiers to answer affirmatively to questions relating personal outcomes to the status of the group with which a person strongly identifies.

Predictors of Response to Group Consciousness

Disassociation

Dissociative responses are given by non-affiliate types who report feeling a stronger sense of attachment to one group relative to other groups in their identity set yet do not frequently refer to the group in relation to their political considerations. I expect to see little evidence of a sense of shared outcomes for individuals whose identity ties to a particular group are relatively weak.

Disassociative responses are characterized by individuals who express a sense of belonging to groups that would not presumably be ascriptively identifiable, such as political parties, veterans, marital or family status, or in some cases, religion. In this sense, disassociative responders may be less inclined to feel a sense of shared outcomes the groups to which they belong are often "selected into" by the individual, and perceptions of group membership from others depends almost entirely on what the individual projects. In contrast, individuals who feel a stronger sense of attachment to racial and ethnic groups, class-based groups, or other minority groups may be more subject to

differential treatment based on out-group perceptions of individual group membership and thus, whether negatively or positively, may respond differently to the linked fate question.

Group Membership

Membership alone in a particular group would seem to be an insufficient condition to produce the type of utility proxying behavior Dawson describes. Group membership itself does not carry any affective value of group-belonging, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not motivate particular feelings or behaviors other than perhaps a sense of belonging. Membership is akin to a "fan," who may occasionally cheer for his team and celebrate team successes, but is ultimately unburdened by the team's victories or losses at the individual level to the extent that his own self-concept and decision making behaviors are meaningfully affected.

Group Identity

Unlike membership alone, group identity appears to have implications for the predictions of linked fate among respondents in this sample. If group membership allows individuals to act, at most, as "fans of the team," moving along the continuum from membership to group identity would seemingly make an individual a "team player." A person's status and sense of self are more connected with the status of the group, and hence there may be a stronger relationship between group and individual well-being. Both social identity theory and self-categorization theory might assume that minority status makes minority group membership a salient category for individuals, thus minority group membership would become a meaningful basis for perceiving self and others.

It is difficult within the framework of self-categorization theory to address why, when social identity is salient, not all group members think or behave similarly (Abrams, 1990). The theory does not give a compelling account for why consistent individual differences may exist, though

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Abrams (1990) and others have suggested that while subjective stability in the self must be based to some degree on a person's ability to make stable social comparisons, individual stability may be accompanied by subtle variations that "allow people to arrive at different interpretations of the same categorization at different times (Abrams and Hogg, 2001).

Group Attachment

To the extent that an individual's behavior is inextricably tied to her need for proximity to the attachment group, attachment theory may suggest that linked fate is the mode of behavior through which individuals achieve proximity. Although Dawson sees linked fate as a means through which individuals make decisions ultimately for self-gain, individuals who view the world through a group attachment framework would see linked fate as one of a variety of behaviors which serve the function of facilitating closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned not only with self-perception, but also about the extent to which favoring the policy of the attachment group allows the individual to signal her ultimate desire to be bonded with the group.

Readers may quibble over whether the conjectures offered by the social identity theory and the group attachment framework differ at all. I contend that the distinctions lie in whether the individual is perceived by out-group members to be a member of the identity group (as in the case of group membership) or not (as in the case of group attachment), and whether identity reflects an underlying motivation for higher status among in-group members. While both theories would suggest a sense of shared outcomes at the individual level, the motivations for individuals to link their fate to the group varies by context.

Discussion

The type-predictor framework bridges theories of group consciousness by reconciling the work of political political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, with that of political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. The type-predictor framework rests on the notion that perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes/behaviors, but the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient. My typology transitions the theoretical discussion by providing a framework that considers the nature of the relationship between demographic characteristics and their political correlates, which seem to vary by groups.

In the following chapter I explore the range of support for the type-predictor framework through an analysis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014. To foreshadow, the open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provide support for the type-predictor framework. I find examples of all five "types" and all "four" predictors, and the relationships between types and predictors appear to be in the directions I expected.

Political and social psychology research is ripe with opportunities for researchers to engage in qualitative studies to develop a richer contextual understanding of identity, as well as quantitative studies to empirically demonstrate the distinctiveness of identity-related concepts, especially in relation to political preferences and related behavioral outcomes. There is an especially strong need within the identity literature to develop causally identified research designs in order to fully understand the conditions under which aspects of an individual's identity may causally motivate her preferences and behaviors. The literature must grow to incorporate new design strategies aimed at validating empirical distinctions between often-cofounded concepts. Though a formidable task, broadening the scope of available measures will, at least, be beneficial to the scholarly community

and, at best, demonstrate an improvement in measurement precision and provide a benchmark for future studies to build upon.

2 The Type-Predictor Framework in Action

Introduction

In this chapter I present support for the *type-predictor framework* by analyzing a set of 40 in-depth interviews conducted in 2014. The previous chapter explains the theoretical underpinnings of the framework as a reconciliation between the work of political political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, and political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. The type-predictor framework represents a theoretical contribution that departs from much of the current literature by challenging the notion that group membership has a directly causal relationship with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with group consciousness. Rather, I argue that the ways in which different types of individuals process group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level lead them to think about the politicization of their identities in importantly different ways.

I argue that we should interpret the relationship between ascriptive identities and attitudinal, behavioral, and political outcomes with nuance. There may be instances when we want to generalize these relationships, but our inferences may change meaningfully if we allow individuals to explain the nature of those relationships in their own words. Perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that

we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes and behaviors but the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient.

Chapter Overview

This chapter begins by providing a brief recap of the type-predictor framework, introduced in chapter one of the dissertation to provide a basis for understanding how the different ways individuals think about their membership in a relevant group may lead them to think about the politicization of their identities in importantly different ways. The remainder of the chapter provides support for the type-predictor framework through the analysis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014. After reviewing the process for selecting respondents and describing the interview population, I detail the constant comparative method used to analyze the interview responses. I then proceed with an analysis of the interview data, highlighting the questions used to examine the two elements of the theoretical framework: consciousness types and group consciousness predictors. I provide examples from the data that characterize each element of the type-predictor framework to demonstrate the usefulness of this theory for understanding the relationship between group identity and group consciousness from a more nuanced perspective, contextualized by real-world descriptions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what can be learned from this exploration of the type-predictor framework and ideas for future research.

Figure 7: Type Predictor Framework

The Type-Predictor Framework for Understanding Group Identity and Group Consciousness

Group consciousness becomes activated in different ways for different kinds of people; that much is clear from existing literature, which consistently finds statistical support for the linked fate measure (understood here as the survey operationalization of group consciousness), but substantial variation between and sometimes even within groups.

The type-predictor framework illustrated in Figure 7 represents a departure from much of the current literature by challenging the notion that group membership has a directly causal relationship with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with linked fate. Rather, I argue that the ways in which individuals process group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level leads them to interpret the notion of shared fate in importantly different ways. In effect, my framework accommodates the multidimensional nature of identity by acknowledging individual-level variation in group consciousness that may change depending on the set of groups with which an individual self identifies.

A person's *type* refers to her categorization in one (or more, in the case of multiple and conflicted identifiers) of five typologies that describe how an individual processes her consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level:

- Non-Affiliates

- Abstract Conceptualizers

- Non-Conformists

- Multiple Identifiers

- Strong Identifiers

A person's type then corresponds with the one or more theoretical predictors we would expect to produce her interpretation of group consciousness related questions such as linked fate, which will be discussed in the analysis section of this paper. The predictors, based on existing theories in the psychology, political psychology and sociology literature include:

- Disassociation

- Group Membership

- Group Identity

- Group Attachment

Figure 8 provides a brief description of each type and its corresponding predictor(s).

Figure 8: Consciousness Type Descriptions and Group Consciousness Predictors

Non-Affiliates	• Do not process group membership as being related to life chances in any way. • Predictor: disassociation
Abstract Conceptualizers	• Akin to a "fan" who relates group membership to personal identity but attaches no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at individual level. Does not affect self-concept or decision-making. • Predictors: disassociation, group membership.
Non-Conformists	• Sees self as member of a particular group, but does not adhere to common group stereotypes. Process group membership as part of identity even if they don't "fit the mold." • Predictor: group identity
Multiple Identifiers	• Rarely processes one group membership in isolation as a component of identity. • Predictors: group identity, group attachment
Strong Identifiers	• Personal identity inextricably tied to membership in salient group, like a "team player" but to a stronger degree. • Predictors: group identity, group attachment

I investigated the usefulness of my theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between subjective identities and a sense of collective fate using semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviewing is an especially appropriate method for this type of inquiry for three main reasons:

- Open-Ended Formatting. Unlike closed-form survey formats, interviews allow for a great deal of variation in responses because subjects are not confined to a set of choices in forming their answers to each question. For example, when asked, "How do you identify yourself?" respondents can answer in any way that they choose, rather than having to select from a list of pre-selected categories. This type of flexibility in response also allows respondents to answer questions from a variety of perspectives, providing a more insightful illustration of the thought process by which individuals reason through relationships of importance to

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social science research. My work builds upon the foundation laid by scholars who have used interviews, participant observations, and other qualitative techniques to investigate questions related to identity, group consciousness, and politics (Price, 2009; Simpson, 1998; Gamson, 1992; Walsh, 2004, 2008).

- Narrative Power. As noted by Cramer (2008), employing a methodology driven by active listening revealed things that I, the learner, might never have thought about prior to the interview. While interviews do not dissolve the self-reporting biases present in most opinion surveys, interviews do provide revelatory power through the narratives respondents provide. When beginning an interview, I included time to build rapport with respondents. I asked them about their daily routines, things they enjoy, their background, life experiences, friendships, jobs, and hobbies. I asked questions, but interjected as little as possible in their responses to allow respondents to tell me about their viewpoints on politics and identity in their own words. This practice of asking and listening rather than responding revealed important information about how respondents see themselves and the world around them.

- Novelty of Theory. Because the type-predictor framework is a new theoretical contribution, investigating its explanatory strength through the use of interviews is a necessary first step before further empirical analyses can be employed, which is itself an attempt to reconcile theory that treats identity as fluid and malleable, with existing empirical studies that treat identities as fixed categorical variables.

Interview Process

A purposive sample of 40 individuals were selected for semi-structured interviews in 2014. Individual interviews were conducted by the author and by two additional research assistants[8] in-person whenever possible (N=19), but interview respondents were also able to elect a telephone (N=17) or Skype interview (N=4) when it was not possible to meet in-person.

To be eligible for inclusion in this study, participants were required to be age 18 or older, and speak conversational English or Spanish. I employed a snowball sampling method that allowed for the recruitment of respondents from a variety of ages, education levels, religious affiliations, and racial and ethnic backgrounds. After being selected for, and consenting to, the study, individuals were asked to recommend an additional individual for inclusion in the study. The first subject was asked to call or email her acquaintance and if the second individual agreed to participate in the study, a member of the research team contacted the second individual to provide the consent form and arrange a time and date for an interview. To safeguard the anonymity of respondents, all names and personally identifying information have been changed in this analysis.

Forty subjects participated in the interviews, including twelve subjects recruited for a set of pilot interviews. The entire set of interviews was conducted from March through August 2014 and included 18 male and 22 female participants. Ages ranged from 20 to 84 with a mean age of 39 and a median age of 35. 3 individuals had completed no more than a high school education, 4 completed some college, 13 completed a bachelor's degree, and 20 had obtained a graduate or professional degree.

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[8]The research assistants for this project were two undergraduate researchers in the Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Summer Research Program. Information about the race and gender of each interviewer is included in the Appendix A "Interviewer Profiles."

The sample tended toward Democratic party identification with 19 participants self-identifying as Democrats, 7 self-identifying as independents, 2 self-identifying as Republicans, and the remaining 12 participants self-identifying as apolitical or declining to indicate a party identification.

Ten individuals self-identified as being white or Caucasian, 13 as black or African American[9], 8 as Asian or Pacific Islander, 5 as Hispanic or Latino, and 4 self-identified as being of mixed racial background. All are U.S. citizens or permanent residents.

Researchers conducted the interviews in a semistructured format using a standard questionnaire for all respondents, and each interview was digitally recorded. I transcribed each of the interviews myself. My choice to transcribe the interviews personally was an invaluable part of the analytic process. Although transcribing requires a tremendous amount of time and attention to detail, I combined the process of transcription with note-taking and was able to gain important information by listening not only to the content of each interview, but to the tone of respondents' voices – their pauses, their inflection, the moments when they are hesitant or eager to respond to a question, the laughs, and sighs – all elements too easily missed by reading a transcript alone.

The full questionnaire used to conduct the semistructured interviews and a descriptive information about respondents are included in Appendix A. Each part of the interview focuses on a different aspect of the relationship between identity and political attitudes and preferences, and the interview progresses from more abstract concepts to more structured questions that are common in social science survey research. To maintain a natural flow of conversation, interviewers were allowed to ask questions in any order within each part of the survey, but the parts themselves remained in sequence to maintain continuity between interviews.

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[9]One respondent identified as black, but revealed that her mother is of Native American and Dutch descent while her father, whom she never met, is Creole. Despite being raised in a predominantly white family, the respondent identifies as black, and not mixed, and is therefore counted as black for the purpose of this interview. Another individual in the sample identified as being of continental African descent.

Part 1 of the interview collected background and demographic information including each respondent's age, place of birth, parents' countries of origin, gender, education level, and party ID. Part 2 asked questions specific to identity, asking each respondent how she self identifies, whether she feels a stronger sense of identity with some groups over others, and how the respondent thinks other people identify her. Importantly in Part 2 of the interview, researchers did not initially prompt respondents about what types of identities to consider. Respondents were encouraged to draw from their own conceptions of identity in answering the questions. Part 3 of the interview asked respondents about political decisionmaking including what policy issues are the most important, how each respondent decided which policies are best, and what considerations each respondent weighs when voting in an election. In Part 4 respondents are asked a series of commonly used survey questions related to group consciousness including the linked fate question, whether the respondent feels her life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion, and whether the respondent believes her own success is tied to the success of the group. Part 5 of the survey links group identity with collective action and asks whether respondents prefer to foster in-group unity to achieve common group goals versus joining forces with other groups to achieve similar goals.

The semi-structured interviews lasted 20 minutes to 1 hour in duration, with an average interview duration of 37 minutes.

Analysis

To analyze the interview responses I employ the constant comparative method of qualitative analysis. The constant comparative method developed by Glaser (1965) combines an explicit coding procedure with theory development. According to Glaser, "the purpose of the constant comparative method of joint coding and analysis is to generate theory more systematically by using explicit coding and analytic procedures (p. 437)."

There are four stages to constant comparative analysis: (1) comparing incidents applicable to each theme of interest, (2) integrating themes and their properties, (3) delimiting a theory, and, (4) writing the theory. As one stage transforms itself into the next, previous stages remain in operation throughout the analysis and provide continual development to the following stage throughout the duration of the analysis (Glaser 1965). Here I make an effort to outline, as explicitly as possible, the process by which I identified themes in the data. Following this section, I discuss the scope of the theory supported by my data and subsequently describe how the data compellingly illustrate my proposed theory: the type-predictor framework.

Two features of the constant comparative method should be noted. First, in contrast to other methods of analysis such as analytic induction, the constant comparative method prioritizes the development and suggestion of properties of a general phenomenon rather than the provisional testing of a hypothesis. Second, no attempt is made to ascertain "the universality of the proof of suggested causes nor other properties (Glaser 1965, pg. 438)." Because theory development is prioritized and no attempt is made to prove universalistic causal propositions, the constant comparative method does not require consideration of all available data, and many types of cases may be considered.

Comparing Incidents within Categories of Interest

The selection of themes, sometimes referred to as "categories" (Glaser and Strauss 1967), or "codes" (Miles and Huberman 1994) is partly inductive (coming from the data) and partly a priori (coming from the investigator's prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being researched) (Ryan and Bernard 2003). And while themes themselves can be somewhat abstract and subjective, the identification of themes is an important element of semistructured interview analysis. The importance of a theme is related, among other factors, to how often it appears, and how

pervasive it is across different sets of observations. For the present analysis a theme answers the question: What is this an example of? While this conceptualization of a theme may appear broad, it allows for a more encompassing scope of analysis of concepts and categories of interest within, and between relevant cases (Opler 1945).

The analysis of interview data began with transcribing the audio recordings from each interview. Transcripts were then uploaded to the qualitative data management software NVivo where the coding and classification of themes began. Prior to coding interview transcripts for themes, a base set of themes were developed based on the catalogue of questions used in the semi-structured interviews. Additional themes were developed during the constant comparison process itself by making systematic comparisons between the similarities and differences across each unit of data. For each interview, or case in the study, I employed a line-by-line analysis that involved comparing the topic of each sentence with the sentence before it – or the interview before it – asking, How is one expression similar to, or different from, another? The running list of similarities and differences within and across cases generated themes (Ryan and Bernard 2003).

A Priori Themes   A priori themes are based on the questionnaire used during the semistructured interviews, and were identified prior to the coding of interviews. The themes are broken down into 5 main categories with sub-themes later developed within each:

- Group Consciousness

- Group Success Strategies

- Perceptions of Identity

- Political Decisionmaking

- Type-Predictor Framework

Inductive Themes Inductive themes were generated as comparisons between units of analysis and revealed similarities and differences between responses within each of the five main thematic categories:

- Group Consciousness

  - Group Success (Affirmative or negative belief that the respondent's success in life is related to the success of her identity group overall).

  - Life Chances (Respondent's belief that her life chances are based on any of the following sub-themes):

    * Class

    * Gender

    * Race

    * Religion

  - Linked Fate (Affirmative, negative, or mixed support for the notion that what happens to people in the respondent's group will have something to do with what happens in her own life).

  - Group Empathy (Using group outcomes as a proxy for respondent's own well-being).

- Group Success Strategy

  - Join Other Groups (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is to join forces with other groups fighting to achieve similar goals).

  - Ingroup Unity (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is to foster unity within the group first).

- Mixed Strategy (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is through a combined strategy of fostering ingroup unity and joining forces with other groups).

- Perceptions of Identity

  - Belief that other people's perceptions don't matter

  - Belief that other people's perceptions do matter

  - Positive self-perception of the ingroup

  - Negative self-perception of the ingroup

  - Positive perception of the ingroup from others

  - Negative perception of the ingroup from others

- Political Decisionmaking

  - Most Important Issue(s)

  - Opinion Formation (Respondent refers to one or more of the following elements as affecting the way she forms her opinion on politics and public policy):
    * Candidate character and values
    * Family and upbringing
    * Feasibility of policy
    * Issue-specific voting
    * Party solidarity
    * Personal experience and values
    * Racial solidarity

* Research and reading

  * Utilitarianism (do the most good for the most people)

  * Don't really care for politics

- Type-Predictor Framework

  - Consciousness Type

    * Abstract conceptualizer

    * Multiple identifier

    * Non-affiliate

    * Non-conformist

    * Strong identifier

  - Predictors

    * Disassociation

    * Group attachment

    * Group identity

    * Group membership

Although I expected all of the typologies identified in the previous chapter to appear inductively in the interview data, I did not select them as themes a priori because I wanted to see whether they would appear organically rather than attempting to fit data into these themes.

I did not restrict the coding to one type and one predictor per interview, and instead allowed for as many types and predictors to be coded as were applicable to a given interview. As a result, the total number of entries coded as types or predictors may sum to a number greater than the

40 unique interview cases. This coding decision allowed for a greater degree of flexibility in accommodating the range of identity expressions within an individual case, especially in the case of strong identifiers and multiple identifiers, who tended to express a sense of belonging to more than one group, but may have also fallen into different predictor categories depending on the specific identity groups they were considering at any given point in the interview process. While restricting the coding to one type and one predictor per case may have resulted in a more direct mapping of types to predictors, I convey through my coding decision the fluid nature of identity, and contribute a method of categorization that accommodates such fluidity while maintaining a theoretical grounding.

Another important coding element to note is the internal validity of the coding frame itself. Resource limitations prevented me from employing a second researcher blind to the purpose of the study to code the transcripts using my code frame. Ideally, an intercoder reliability test using a second coder would reveal how consistent the coding frame is across respondents (an intercoder reliability score is computed by counting the number of unique codes per respondent by each coder as the denominator, and the number of overlapping codes as the numerator) (Walsh, 2008). In the absence of a second coder, I read through each interview transcript and its coded responses a minimum of three times to check that themes had been coded appropriately. Multiple readings (and coding) of each transcript was a time-insensitive task, but was certainly worth doing to elevate the quality of analysis.

Integrating Themes and Their Properties

As examples of a priori themes materialized, and as inductive themes emerged in the data, I began the process of integrating themes and their properties. In other words, rather than comparing from incident to incident, I began comparing each incident to an accumulated knowledge within

the theme under calculation (Glaser 1965). This stage illustrates the diverse range of properties within a theme. For example, I realized that some respondents characterized as multiple identifiers also described strong identity ties to one or more groups. This realization led me to understand that consciousness type categories, in this case multiple identifiers and strong identifiers, are not mutually exclusive as defined by my theory. Similarly, a respondent might have described the same group identity in abstract conceptualizations under one context, but when asked to consider a different scenario would talk about her identity using more concrete and exacting examples. Thus, I realized that the consciousness types I define may not be as specific to individuals as they are to the contexts individuals are asked to consider.

Delimiting Theory

Looking at the entire set of cases reveals the underlying uniformities between the original set of categories and their properties. The similarities and differences between cases and the themes they describe reveal the scope of the interview dataset. While the purposive sampling method produced a diverse population of respondents, the dataset is not representative of a broader population. Generalizations about the applicability of the type-predictor theory to a population other than the interview sample may not be an appropriate way to understand this data. Rather, the data provide examples and real-world context about how the theory is borne out among a diverse cross-section of people, providing a meaningful basis from which the theory can be understood and from which further analyses, empirical and otherwise, may be tested.

Type-Predictor Typologies Among Respondents

Type Descriptions

At the start of the survey respondents were asked a number of questions related to their self-identification used to determine whether interview subjects fell into the "type" categories described by the type-predictor typology. Without any prior prompting other than the prior collection of demographic characteristics (age, place of birth, parents' countries of origin, gender, education, party identification, and whether they are a resident or citizen of the U.S.), respondents were asked to describe their identity in the following questions:

- How do you identify yourself? Why?

- (If respondent identifies with multiple groups): Do you feel a stronger sense of identity with one group over the others (Or, what group do you feel closest to)? Why?

  - Do you think your personal identity is tied to this group?

  - How do you feel about the status of your group in society right now?

- How do you think others identify you?

  - Do you think that people in your group identify you in a different way than people who aren't in that group? Why or why not?

  - Do you think other peoples' perceptions of your identity matters? Why or why not?

I find support within the sample for each of the 5 types illustrated in Figure 9. Among the sample I observe the highest incidences of abstract conceptualizers (N=16) and similarly high incidences of strong identifiers (N=14) and multiple identifiers (N=14). Examples of non-affiliates and non-conformists were the least common among the sample, with 8 and 7 examples of each, respectively.

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Figure 9: Frequency of Types Among Sample

I describe the in further detail the range of responses for each consciousness type, with context from selected individual interviews below.

Non-Affiliates

Among the 40 interview participants, there are 8 examples of non-affiliate types (see Appendix A). Non-affiliators may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, but do not closely associate a sense of personal identity with those categories, much less a sense of shared outcomes with members of the group. In fact, they may intentionally disassociate themselves from group affiliation and instead prefer to focus on individualistic qualities such as personality as a motivator and basis for their actions and beliefs. When asked to describe themselves and their sense of identity, non-affiliate types gave responses like:

"I don't think I particularly identify myself in groups...I guess I do but, I don't know, I think of myself as separate from everything. I'm myself. I'm my own person. I don't really put myself in a category, that's not how I view myself. [Whispers to interviewer] this kind of makes me nervous these deep questions – I don't think about these." - Amy, 20, from New York City.

"I mean, there are things that people apply to being Asian American, I think there's two kinds. One that's born here, and one that comes as an immigrant. I guess it doesn't really apply to me because I don't really feel like I should really be held down by what other people think about these Asian Americans in general. I like to do things myself." - Brian, 21, from Chinatown, New York City.

"I first came to this country in 1975 I lived in North Carolina for four years while I was going to college. And you know, you had people back then at that time there was more of a stigma. But I don't need to worry about what people are saying about me." -Fausto, 58, from Nicaragua.

Other non-affiliate types referred to qualities like work ethic, having a caring personality, and being a work-in-progress when describing their senses of identity. Even when other social categories such as class, race, gender, or religion came up in conversation, non-affiliate types did not consistently refer to group-based identities when describing their political considerations, and were unlikely to express a sense of group consciousness because they are most inclined to see their identity (and consequently, their life chances) as being contingent on individual factors rather than the status of a social group.

Beth Greer, Non-Affiliate

It was a busy weekend for Beth Greer and her husband Charles, who owned a small convenience store inside a Montgomery, Alabama hotel. There were two conferences going on, one at the convention center across the street, and the other at nearby Alabama State University. Downtown Montgomery isn't exactly a tourist hotspot. Along Tallopoosa Street there are a handful of trendy

looking places: a Thai restaurant with a patio overlooking the town's historic train station, a popular Mexican-cuisine franchise, a tapas bar and lounge, and Dreamland Barbecue, which boasts its "Food Network's Best" designation on a plaque next to a shelf of brightly colored T-shirts for customers to purchase after a sit-down meal. Occasionally newcomers take the $3.00 trolly from the visitor center in Union Station around a circuit of Montgomery's historically relevant sites: the Civil Rights Museum, the former White House of the Confederacy, the spot where Rosa Parks was arrested, the Hank Williams Memorial, and the home of Martin Luther King, Jr., among others.

But besides providing a modest nightlife scene for Alabama locals, the promise of authentic Southern barbecue for passers-through, and a rich civil rights legacy for those intrigued by the city's history, downtown Montgomery does not tend to attract much activity. So Beth and her husband rely mostly on conference attendees and college visitors for business. For the past ten years they have managed the hotel convenience store. Eight months ago the couple bought the business and re-opened it two weeks ago under its new name, The Nick Knack Shop.

The walls of the store are sparse; Beth is still waiting for a shipment of Montgomery paraphernalia - novelty name keychains in the shape of the state, I "heart" Montgomery T-shirts, beanie babies and other plush toys - that should arrive later in the afternoon. There is a modest collection of snacks, toiletry items, and coloring books already, as well as a shelf of handmade bracelets woven in brightly colored hemp by Beth's eight-year-old granddaughter, Kaylee. The bracelets, sold at $2.00 a piece, are a sort of side-business Beth does to encourage her granddaughter's entrepreneurial spirit. Kaylee purchases the materials for the bracelets, handles inventory, and manages the finances while Beth oversees. It's a bonding activity that Beth speaks of warmly. From behind the cashier's desk, she brings out a photo of Kaylee from her wallet. Kaylee favors her grandmother with thin, light-colored hair, blue eyes, and slightly broad shoulders. "It's easy to

spoil someone who reminds me so much of myself," Beth says with a chuckle. Her granddaughter and the store are her two biggest sources of pride.

When Beth moved with her husband from Syracuse, New York to Montgomery in the late 1990's, the two were surprised by how quickly the acclimated to the culture of the South. Despite being raised in a white, middle class home in the Northeast, Beth now speaks with the faintest southern drawl and formed her words slowly when asked to describe herself:

> "I'm outgoing. I belong to a sorority...but I don't think [I feel a strong sense of identity with any particular group]. That's always a hard question to answer...I think other people might say I'm outgoing, a pretty even-tempered person. But other people's opinions don't matter to me."

When prompted to talk about her identity, Beth did not make any verbal indication that race, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, or education had anything to do with her concept of personal identity. In fact, her membership in those groups did not come up during any recorded portion of the interview. Although she is a sorority member (of a cultural and intellectual sorority, to be precise), a business owner (who earned her MBA in her twenties), and a proud Republican (who wishes Sarah Palin had run for president because "she has a handle on what's good for the country"), all groups in which individuals may affiliate and derive a sense of identity, Beth did not believe these group to define her in any way.

Beth's concept of identity typifies the way non-affiliates view themselves. Though non-affiliates may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, they do not view group membership as being tied to their self-concept. This is consistent with the traditionalist interpretation of social interaction theory, which forms the theoretical basis for non-affiliate typology and posits that social behavior can be best understood by focusing on individuals' definitions and interpretations of themselves. Traditional SI emphasizes the behavior of actors, and attributes a great deal of agency and autonomy to the individual in articulating his or her sense of self. Traditional

social interactionists, and thus non-affiliates, do not view the social and cultural environment as a constraint on individual, thus non-affiliates tend not to focus on group identities that are often the subject of cultural focus such as race, class, or gender. In fact, they may intentionally disassociate themselves from group affiliation instead choosing to focus on individualistic qualities such as personality as a motivator and basis for their actions and beliefs. Consequently, non-affiliates tend to provide negative responses to linked fate and other group consciousness questions because non-affiliates rarely associate their sense of personal well-being to the collective fate of the groups of which they are members.

Abstract Conceptualizers

Among the 40 interview participants, 16 examples of abstract conceptualization emerged, making abstract conceptualizers one of the two most common types, along with multiple identifiers (see Appendix A). Abstract conceptualizers relate group membership to their personal identities but attach no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at the individual level. Abstract conceptualizers are not only aware of their membership in a particular group, they are aware that belonging to that group may cause others to view them along with any perception of shared beliefs, feelings or interests associated with group members (McClain et al., 2008), even if the individual may not entirely share those beliefs, feelings or interests. Abstract conceptualizers are able to understand such perceptions and misperceptions, but are overall unmoved in their personal belief structures by them. Abstract conceptualizers self-identified with a wide range of groups, from religion, nationality, and, ethnicity to more abstract concepts like success:

> "I would say that I'm driven, I would say that people typically – especially where I'm from in Virginia – think I'm successful because I'm in New York and I work for Morgan Stanley. And I went to school on a scholarship for basketball so everybody has this perception that I'm really successful but honestly I don't see myself as that. I see

myself like there's really a long way to go. [INTERVIEWER: So a large part of your identity is success?] Yeah, which is honestly subjective. There's no one definition of success...Because at the end of the day, whether you're black, white, purple, Asian, Indian, or whether you come from a certain country, success is what matters, you know? You know, when you look at somebody you see if they're successful or not, you don't view them just by their color and I feel like success is something that doesn't have to do with gender or race." -Petra, 22, from Brooklyn, New York.

"There are a series of codes and ways to relate to another person that for me are much more familiar with let's say Mexican, Argentinian, Brazilians, or let's say Latinos in general than it's going to be with American or even European people. It's – I think the fact of the land which makes interaction much more fluid. English is not my first language of course, I think I'm kind of alright with it, but there's this little lag, sometimes I have to think a little too much of what I have to say. So I think that kind of makes a difference whenever I express myself in Spanish. But yeah, there is a sense of belongings with other Latinos...I had it naturally while I was living [in Argentina], I lived in Argentina 'til I was 22. And when I came here that got reinforced, it was a way for me to cope you know, just having moved to a different culture. But now that a long time passed, it's going to be 17 years, I moved here in '96, now I kind of feel detached of this need to cling to ethnicity. Here is really, everybody is from different backgrounds, so now background is not that important to me anymore." -Carlos, 40, from Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Jake Bianchi, Abstract Conceptualizer

Late August always comes with a sense of excitement for Jake, but the end of summer 2014 was especially full of good days for the twenty-five year old musician. He had just finished a seven-month gig playing drums for the national tour of a major Broadway musical. He formed a band with his brother and their two childhood best friends, and successfully crowd-sourced a $9,000 campaign to raise money for the production of their first studio album. And as always the season was full of outdoor festivals celebrating the final days of summer, which meant there would

be plenty of paying gigs for Jake and his band, whose sound is reminiscent of a slightly softer Mumford and Sons that fellow twenty-somethings would listen to with the windows down on a drive to the beach. In many ways Jake's music reflects his personality: positive and uplifting.

Jake is a northern New Jersey native whose love for his hometown is strong, though easily surpassed by his love for his family. He smiles often when speaking of his parents, both children of Italian immigrants, who he says, "raised him with Biblical morals as a kid," without him even realizing it. He lives with his parents in his childhood home while in-between gigs, his next tour slated to begin sometime within the coming month. He spent his college days preparing for a career as a musician at the prestigious Berkelee College of Music in Boston, Massachusetts. Berkelee in fact has a notoriously low retention rate as many of its students earn commercial success well before graduating - John Mayer, Gavin DeGraw, Quincy Jones, Maroon 5 guitarist James Valentine, and Steely Dan frontman Donald Fagen are among those who once attended but ultimately left the school for pastures made greener by money and fame. Jake was also eager to jump-start his career, but not at the expense of a college degree. He completed his dual major in music education and drumset performance by taking summer and winter classes every term, which allowed him to finish the program in four years as opposed to the usual five.

Since graduating, Jake has spent more time on tour than off, and has played around the world from Thailand to Croatia, Australia, Greece, and Israel (his personal top five tour stops). He ultimately hopes to settle, though, in New York City where he aspires to work as a drummer for Broadway musicals, because the nighttime performance schedule would give him the flexibility to work as a studio musician during the day, and be a little more present for the family he hopes to start at some point in the distant future.

In Jake's opinion, the world needs more love, and infusing the lives around him with positivity is part of his personal life mission. He is deeply influenced by his belief in Christianity, a faith his

parents raised him to embrace as a child and which he now fully accepts as an adult. Faith is the lens through which Jake sees everything else. It is no wonder, then, that Jake strongly identifies as a Christian, or as he more specifically describes himself, a believer.

When asked how he thinks other people might identify him, Jake paused and tilted his gaze upward. His brow furrowed a bit; he had never given the question much thought. Admittedly, Jake describes himself to be a non-confrontational person, preferring to listen and observe heated conversations rather than actively engage in them. So when his friends talk about identity-related topics - religion, race, sexuality - Jake is rarely inclined to ask others what their perceptions of him, or his faith might be.

"And why would they?" he adds,

> "I think sometimes because of the fact that I'm not always super loud as a speaker and stuff, and I'm always playing music, people are just like, 'Oh, you just play music, your life's easy.' But it's not at all! I think that's how some people perceive me in my life, people just don't get the musician lifestyle, that it's not easy...So I think some people identify me like that - as a musician so that's all that goes on in his head. As if it's because I'm not talking about my opinions all the time.

> "But I also think people would identify me as someone with morals. Like I've never tried smoking weed. And I was around it all the time in high school. God I mean, like, I'm a musician. But I've never even tried it because I have no intention to do it. I was in a blues band in high school with three other guys and we would rehearse - like every rehearsal they would smoke. And we would order Domino's pizzas and I wouldn't smoke but I could still eat a whole pizza by myself. And pretty soon they just stopped offering [weed] to me because they knew I wouldn't take it. They knew me as someone who didn't do that kind of stuff and didn't drink and stuff like that. Whether they're strong in their faith or not, I think they do."

> [INTERVIEWER]: How do you feel about the status of Christians in society right now?

> "I think in [my church] community, it's pretty strong."

Jake referenced his home church, a 5,000 member congregation born out of the even larger Hillsong Church of Sydney, Australia. Since its founding in 1983, Hillsong has opened more than 20 campuses in cities all over the world including, Paris, Capetown, Bali, London, Kiev, and Los Angeles, its churches brimming with young adults in their twenties and thirties, a demographic which has typically strayed away from the Pentecostal type teaching on which Hillsong was founded. Despite the appeal he sees in his church where the pastor has tattoos and is known to quote Biggie Smalls lyrics during sermons, Jake was also mindful of the perception of Christians outside his community:

> "But then you've got like the Westboro Baptists who are just giving everyone in the world a bad name. I think people are just, they're relying too much on themselves when they speak and they think that they're right...and they try to force that on everyone else and that's no way to do it. It's all about love, you know? So to say it simply, I think people aren't loving on each other enough as Christians. They're accusing and they're blaming and they're criticizing when really all they need to be saying is, 'Hey! You do you, I'll do me, and maybe you'll see the love I have for you, and maybe you'll want a little bit of that.' I think if there were more love in the Christians of - everywhere - then it would be better."

As an abstract conceptualizer, Jake relates group membership to his personal identity but attaches no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at the individual level. In the same way that his decision not to smoke weed does not diminish his self-concept as a musician, the actions of the Westboro Baptist Church and others do not diminish his identity as a Christian, although he is aware of the ways both musicians and Christians may be perceived in the society around him. For abstract conceptualizers like Jake, group membership itself does not produce any affective value, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not motivate a strong enough sense of collective fate to motivate a person's beliefs or behaviors. Abstract conceptualizers reflect the core of structural symbolic interactionism in that abstract conceptualizers are keenly aware of how

social structures shape their interactions. Still, an abstract conceptualizer type person does not go so far as to believe that personal successes are bound to group outcomes. So while abstract conceptualizers differ from non-affiliates in that they spend more time considering the role of social structure and perceptions of the group by others, abstract conceptualizers are similar to non-affiliates in that the role of personal agency in determining identity and individual status is prioritized over group fate.

Non-Conformists

7 examples of non-conformists emerged among the 40 interview participants (see Appendix A). The least common of the five types in the sample described here, non-conformists express a sense of self-identification with a particular group but do not adhere to all of the characteristics or stereo-types they believe are common to the group. In short, non-conformists believe themselves to be part of the group, but also believe they don't "fit the mold." Non-conformists mostly expressed a sense of belonging with a racial or ethnic group, and in one case with a gender category, but recognized that they did not always fit in with the group:

> "Okay. So I am Korean, but I grew up – I would say I grew up in a very West-ern family, in the sense that my parents, they are from Korea but they immigrated to Canada when they were very young, so like my mom was 8, my dad was 11, so they grew up in Canada. So I feel like they had a lot of more Western views and Western perspective, so that's the home that I grew up with. Which is different from a lot of my other friends that are Korean because their parents are very much – very strict, very like, bold, very Korean values and hold on to the Korean culture very well, whereas my family not so much. And my parents actually discouraged us from hanging out with too many Koreans and they really want us to meet other people and branch out and things like that. So I would say yeah, I'm Korean by ethnicity but culturally very Western, I think. Even when I moved to Korea and it was just for that one year, that

was my first time in Korea – so it was a definite culture shock. It was very hard to adjust because you feel like you look the part, but then people will treat you differently, they'll look at you differently, so it was a very interesting time when I was in Korea. Yeah, I would say I'm very westernized." - Patricia, 29, from Toronto, Canada.

Corbin Moreau, Non-Conformist

No one in his hometown expected Corbin to pursue an acting career. Men from Corbin's neighborhood in Schenectady, New York marry their high school sweethearts and start families by the time they are in their mid-twenties. The majority of Corbin's friends who pursued a postsecondary education did so at Schenectady Community College and later earned one of many jobs made available through the booming sustainable energy programs of General Electric Company. The city of roughly 66,000 people once boasted itself as "the city that lights and hauls the world,"[10] as it is home to energy giant General Electric's headquarters and was the site of American Locomotive Works, the company once responsible for providing the country with steam and diesel trains in the heyday of the United States locomotive industry. Schenectady was, and still is, a place whose businesses and people reflect grit and innovation. And in the small, homey corner of the city where Corbin grew up, the comfort of close community and promise of jobs were more than enough for its residents, they were preferred. But then again, Corbin had never fit the mold his peers so readily embraced.

At seventeen, Corbin started college at the Rochester Polytechnic Institute. He quickly became a star athlete at RIT, was the celebrated captain of the crew team as well as the swim team, president of the student government, and valedictorian of his class with a major in biochemistry. He was smart, athletic, and tall. By his senior year, any opportunity that couldn't be opened by his athleticism or 4.3 GPA could have at least been pried looser by Corbin's charm and chiseled

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[10]According to the official website of the City of Schenectady (www.cityofschenectady.com)

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features. He is the kind of person who gazes straight into the eyes of the person he is talking to and smiles warmly throughout a conversation, occasionally sweeping his hand through his curly blond hair when it falls out of place.

It came as a huge shock to Corbin and everyone around him when at the time of his graduation he had been rejected from every medical school program to which he had applied. His parents expected him to become a doctor. His grandparents had been telling extended family and friends in France for years that their grandson in the States was going to practice medicine. In his family's eyes Corbin was too smart, too full of promise, to do anything less.

"They urged me to reapply," Corbin recounted during a subway ride in mid-July. He had just come from the rehearsal for a local theater production he would be starring in three weeks later. It was a muggy summer evening, and Corbin wore a tank top and basketball shorts - a much different wardrobe from the pop shirt and khaki pants he wore during the day as a researcher at the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. Corbin had taken the job three years prior because it afforded him the opportunity to move to New York City after graduation, an attractive location for Corbin who interpreted his rejection from medical school as an opportunity to pursue yet another passion of his: acting. As a child, he had always enjoyed participating in school plays and often belted his favorite songs around the house. He was in a local production of Pippin in high school, but at the time the arts scene in Schenectady left much to be desired.

Now in his mid-twenties, Corbin works at Sloan Kettering during the day and spends the rest of his time building his performance resume – going on auditions, taking modeling gigs, and participating in often expensive master classes with industry professionals whose face-time can be a valuable resource in the incredibly competitive acting world.

Corbin describes himself as a "smart, creative, multicultural person." When asked how he thinks other people might identify him, Corbin glanced down at his hands, rubbing his palms together in a moment of contemplation:

> "One thing that stands out to me is the idea of masculinity, and how that changes depending on the culture around you. I'm fortunate enough to live in New York [City] now, but in other places in the United States, masculinity is this thing with guidelines. And if you don't fit in those guidelines people will call you gay or homosexual, which is unfair to gay men and straight men. Like where I lived in upstate New York, if I went to work wearing anything but Timberland boots and a flannel shirt – if I dressed the way I do now – people would say I'm gay. Whereas in French culture, it's totally normal to kiss people on both cheeks and to express who you are openly – there aren't the same boundaries on who gets to be considered masculine. There aren't the same judgments attached.

> "When I was young I got made fun of a lot. I had a faint French accent and I couldn't pronounce my 'R's.' So kids in school believed I was gay and it always sort of stuck with me. And even though I am not gay, as an actor I have a lot of friends who are. I was actually talking to one guy...who said that people told him he was gay so much growing up that he figured it must be true. And he's openly gay now, and he's very happy, and I'm glad he's happy. I just think it's sad that what other people say about who we are can affect us so deeply."

Non-conformists like Corbin see themselves as members of a particular group, but do not adhere to common group stereotypes. So while Corbin discussed masculinity as an important part of his self-identity, he acknowledged that he does not fit within the guidelines of what people in his hometown define as masculine. Still, non-conformists tend to process group membership as part of their personal identity even if they "don't fit the mold." Social identity theory posits that when group membership becomes salient, an individual's sense of membership in a group, particularly membership in a minority group, would become the meaningful basis for perceiving self and others. However, because the social identity approach presents the self as relatively malleable,

we may not expect group consciousness to activate a sense of shared fate uniformly across non-conformists. There should be some variation in responses to the linked fate question depending on how one's personal identity is perceived.

Multiple Identifiers

Among the 40 interview participants, there are 14 examples of multiple identifiers (see Appendix A). Along with abstract conceptualizers, multiple identifiers are tied as the most common type among the sample. Multiple identifiers do not process one group membership in isolation as a component of their identity. They may at times have a heightened sense of awareness of their belonging in one group over others at any given time, but their considerations and actions are overall guided by the fact that multiple identifiers cannot, or perhaps will not, compartmentalize concerning the groups with which they feel the strongest sense of identity as seen in the following examples:

> "I actually would prefer the term 'African-American,' stressing the hyphen in between. I think that there's a double-consciousness as W.E.B. DuBois would explain, where I have always sought resonance and balance in my identity as an American and as a black person born in America. And I think that I'm too American to solely consider myself African, and I am too African to solely consider myself an American. And so I think that it fits well for me because I have Negro aspects and I also have American aspects that I essentially live day-to-day in attempt to find balance between both." - Jairus, 23, from Illinois.

> "I think it depends on the context that people are asking. I know that I identify as a woman, as a white American, and then also can go into my educational levels, that I'm an educated woman. I also identify as a lesbian so I connect with that community and definitely present that in terms of who I am and what I'm about – so that's always a part of my presentation...I've also found that now that I've been working in the social services field I identify as a social worker, also as a mandate reporter – those types of things have become a part of my identity as my work has progressed...I definitely

would say that if I had to sum it up, I would say that I identify as a white – or Caucasian – lesbian from a middle class family." - Rachel, 24, from Virginia.

"It's very tricky to define myself. I feel that I have many backgrounds and identities. I feel that I'm able to relate to many different cultures because of my background. There are different ways that I identify myself. Like, I am Brazilian. I feel more Brazilian than any other country that I've lived in. But I look Korean. And I speak Korean to my parents and I've grown up in a Korean culture, that's my upbringing, is Korean...So I do feel more, very open-minded like Brazilians are. And they're a lot more friendly and less clique-y than Asians. But I still hold that – the Korean – as who I am also. And I feel like a resident of this country. Like, I am American in some ways. I'm more conservative than most Brazilians are because I've lived in this country throughout my teenage years. So yeah, it's a little tricky." - Elana, 29, from Brazil.

"I would say that it's – it might be challenging for people to understand but you are inherently – you can have two identities at the same time. I might come off as very Nigerian in certain ways here in the states but when I'm in Nigeria I definitely come off very American. And that's something that's an interesting balance. Because you're just programmed so much – you know I speak Yoruba, we speak it at home, we eat the food, we listen to the music, we dress a certain way. The Yoruba culture is definitely intellectual; they push you toward degrees, and multiple – right? One [advanced degree] is not good enough. So that's definitely a part of it. But then there's a lot of who I am and how I perceive the world and how I interact that's very American. The thing is, I'm a bit more conscious than other people are because I know when to turn it off and when to turn it on." - Ola, 32, from Florida.

David Hunt, Multiple Identifier

When asked about his identity, David Hunt quoted lyrics to the Cher song *Half Breed*, "'that's all I ever heard,' and you end up loving the hated word." David, whose mother is Filipino and whose father is African American, says that although he has a sense of identity as a biracial person, he most strongly identifies as an African American man and as a Christian:

"Because I look in the mirror every morning and society reminds me every day that I'm an African American man. And Christian? It's just who I am. I think it's because I consciously work towards it on a daily basis...And it's interesting, growing up as a biracial kid the African American side treats me as if I'm outside of the race, and the other side does, too."

David reflected on his personal experiences often throughout the interview, and often referenced the disconnect between his own sense of racial self-identity and the way he is perceived by others, which influences the way he navigates throughout the world:

"Well, they definitely wouldn't think [I'm] Filipino. I'm more mistaken for Hispanic or Latino. But I think generally non-black populations would look at my features and think black before they'd think Filipino. And they'd think Latino before they think black. And also with the black community, they don't identify me a lot of times as black, which I feel more close to because my dad's black, and I grew up around black people [laughing now], my relatives are black. So you know, that's my strongest identity. But in terms of growing up on my dad's side, going to the country where he was from – the eastern shore – you know, that family is black. But outside of that black family, with the general black community, they don't look at me as black as much. Some do, but most don't. I don't get that validation within the black community all the time."

* * *

"When I was a kid in elementary school I used to be so proud when she would wave at me from the front yard while we were outside for recess because I thought she was the prettiest mom in the world," David recalls his mother Benilda fondly. David, the third-youngest of ten siblings, sometimes felt the need to compete for the attention of his mother, but he never minded. He was a momma's boy. One who beamed at the sight of his mom pinning laundry onto a clothesline while his third grade class played in the yard of their San Francisco school. One who enjoyed showing off his mom to new friends in each new city that the family would move to every three years.

David's dad, Bernie, was in the military. During David's childhood the family lived on U.S. army bases in Aberdeen, Maryland; San Francisco, California; Stuttgart, Germany; Anchorage, Alaska; and Fort Drum, New York. It was in fact through the military that Bernie met Benilda while stationed in the Philippines. Bernie was an officer at the time, who became completely captivated by Benilda, a beautiful seventeen-year-old singer at a popular nightclub near the base. Benilda had long, dark hair and a velvety voice. She, too, fell quickly in love and married Bernie in a quiet ceremony in her home village. They had three children before Bernie returned with his bride to the United States; Benilda never returned to her home country.

His family always joked that Bernie resembled Clark Gable with slightly darker skin. Bernie's mother was a freed slave who never spoke of Bernie's father, though other relatives claim he was the white owner of the plantation where Bernie's mother once labored. Whatever his true heritage, David sees himself as biracial, and describes himself with a keen sense of self-perception. Throghouout my conversation with David I was struck by how thoughtfully he seemed to have considered questions about identity prior to our interview, and possibly throughout his entire life. Along with his faint regional accent, I picked up from David a sense of earnestness with which he grappled with the idea of "belonging" in a society where he was never offered validation of his membership in any particular social group. Though he most strongly identifies as an African American and Christian (to "equal degrees"), he never severs from considering what it means for him to exist in his communities as a biracial person:

> "I think at times my physical appearance can be ambiguous so [people] don't know what I am, they just know I'm agreeable. Growing up as a biracial kid, the African American side of me treats me as if I'm outside the race, and the other side does, too. I identify with Cher's song "Half Breed" – that's all I ever heard, and you end up loving the hated word.
>
> "I think for the most part, when non-black people look at me, they think I'm black before they think Filipino, and they think [I'm] Hispanic before they think [I'm] black,

[David laughs], which I feel more close to because my dad's black and I grew up around black people – my relatives are black. I never really met my mom's side of the family other than a few cousins because they all stayed in the Philippines. But outside of my black family, in the general black community, I'm not thought of as black. So I think of myself as black, but I don't get that validation most of the time."

Multiple identifiers like David usually consider more than one aspect of their identities simultaneously, and importantly, they see their relationships to those identities as being interconnected. In a sense, we might think of multiple identifiers as exhibiting a sense of intersectionality. For example, while he strongly identified as Christian and referred to his faith consistently throughout the survey, David also considered himself to be a biracial person, and referred simultaneously to his dual sense of identity as a black person and as a Filipino person, even if his magnitude of identification varied between the two. Because multiple identifiers tend to interpret questions related to group consciousness from the lens of self-categorization theory and social identity theory, they are most likely to offer affirmative answers to linked fate and related questions.

Strong Identifiers

Among the 40 interview participants, 14 examples of strong identifiers emerge (see Appendix A). For strong identifiers, personal identity is inextricably tied to group membership. Strong identifiers refer to their group (or sometimes groups) consistently throughout the interview and express commitment to the group and improving its status in society. Strong identifiers tended to refer to their racial, gender, and religious backgrounds the most, and are often also doubly classified as multiple identifier types. For strong identifiers, a sense of identity is integrated in many areas of life, and strong identifiers refer to their identity groups often when discussing their self-concept and other important considerations:

"Yeah, I mean, I think people who are black women more often than not – not always -- see me as you know, kind of a sister. Even if we don't like each other [chuckles] even if there's no real, like, love, we still know what we know. And there's like a whole script you don't even have to go over. We've already been through the hair thing, we have already been called each other's names by our neighbors who confuse us, we have maybe been treated a certain way in a certain store on our main street in our town, or we may have been profiled by one of our police officers in our town; we already know what we know. Now, that doesn't bond me with everybody... not every black woman who lives here thinks she's black or identifies as black, or wants to talk to me. That's fine, but in the main, as it's been anywhere in the United States that I've ever lived, you see another black woman and there is someone who knows certain things about you. And it's an entrée – it's a possible entrée to friendship." -Marsha, 52 from Illinois.

"I view myself as an African American male. I think I have a strong community orientation. My basic view is that [Allah] put you here on the earth for a purpose, and at the end of your life you need to decide: Why was I here? Did I live a purposeful life? And so I'm community oriented, focus a lot on helping other people, I think, how much money do you really need to live? So after you get to a certain point of comfortableness, then you need to be thinking about others and sharing with others." - Tyson, 71, from Virginia.

"[I feel closest to] Latinos. I guess it's just having things in common with them and I think it's more of a cultural thing. For example, when I graduated college I went to work for a translation company. And I can say it was me and maybe me and one other Latina in the office. Everyone else was white. Or African American. And I felt that the culture was just different – they weren't as inviting, they weren't as open. I felt that my life experiences were different from what their life experiences were. So when they would talk about growing up and being on the yacht team and having swimming lessons and this and that – not that I felt like I stood out – but I did, I stood out. I couldn't really relate. And to the point where they used to tell me, "Oh, it seems like you're so shy and so quiet." And you know, I was like "Oh, that's so ironic because I'm totally not shy and I'm totally not quiet!" -Kristin, 23, from New York City.

"The only thing that I take more seriously than any other thing is my Christianity, my faith." -Ryan, 34, from Ohio.

"[I'm] Black. Because if I say that my religion is the top defining [characteristic], that opens up a whole lot of doors to some other issues. How could I be a Christian and be black, knowing the role that Christianity played in slavery? And not even just at Morehouse [College], but when I walk into the room, I'm basically defined by the way you see me. So that's why black would be the defining thing." -Shawn, 24, from New York City.

Lucy Jansen, Strong Identifier

From the front door of her Baltimore city home, Lucy yelled for her kids to keep off the street. Her five-year-old and fifteen-year-old sons were playing catch in the yard. Anytime her oldest son took the youngest outside to play was a much needed reprieve for Lucy. It gave her two boys a chance to burn some energy before coming in for dinner and settling down for the night, and gave Lucy a few moments of relative quiet to study for her upcoming GRE exam.

Lucy never met her father of Louisiana Creole descent, and was raised by her mother who was of Native American and Dutch descent, but was considered to be white. Lucy, 36, dropped out of high school in tenth grade, but later completed her G.E.D. and currently raises her two children as a single parent while working on her associate's degree in the evening. As a child raised by her single white mother and among her white relatives, Lucy strongly identified as white and even reported expressing prejudiced attitudes toward black people throughout her childhood and adolescence. Despite being disconnected from the Creole side of her family, Lucy's orientation shifted from a strong white identity to a strong black one as she reached adulthood. When asked why she most strongly identifies as a black person, Lucy replied,

"I think I do gravitate more to the black side, 'cause even though she's part Native American my mother is considered white, and actually on a lot of legal paperwork

because my mom is considered white, I'm considered white. But I think I go more to-ward the colored side than the white side. I actually check now that they have 'biracial' [on the U.S. Census] I actually check that now, but before that I checked black.

"I'd have to say it's because of the society I grew up in. Living in the suburbs, there wasn't very many white people...So even though in the household – in my home – there were all white people, on the outside all my peers and stuff they were always black. And with racism, you know when I was a child I didn't really understand it. When I was younger, I gravitated toward the white side. I want to say I was kind of racist against black people myself as a child, and it's because of the racism that was inside the home. You know, for instance, my mother used to call my stepfather a 'cotton-pickin' bastard' all the time, and I never really knew what that was. I didn't know what that meant until a few years ago it dawned on me – 'wow, that was racist.'

"And like, as a child, I remember thinking that black babies were so ugly. I used to think that white babies were so pretty. And even as far as men or boys went, I used to think that black boys were ugly. My mom tells me that when I was in kindergarten, she said I asked her why she was always kissing my stepfather, who was a black man, and she said 'because he tastes like chocolate.' So she said I went to school and kissed a little black kid and I said 'no that was disgusting, he taste like snot and peanut butter.' [Lucy laughs].

"I was always turned off by black people and even as I got older into my teenage years, I started being interested in darker skinned guys but it was more of like Puerto Ricans and very, very light skinned men, and it wasn't really until I was in my 20s that I started going out and saying ok, darker skinned men are actually ok."

[INTERVIEWER: So what triggered that switch for you when you went from having a sense of identity with white people to closely identifying with black people now?]

"When I got into my teenage years is when I started seeing a lot of the black power movement and things like that, and it really caught my eye. Especially the Malcom X biography that was the first book I read – period. So I sat down even though I watched the movie, I sat and read the book and started really getting into it. So looking into the Nation of Islam and things like that I started to relate more to black people and understanding a little more the things that were going on around me. So I think that

was the start of it, and again that was when I started getting into [black culture]. And I was in high school [when] I started getting interested in the black power movement and understanding who I am at that point, starting to do research. And as I got older I started to do research and I got to travel and see other people there, and that started building me, too."

As Lucy described her experiences learning about the civil rights movement, the Nation of Islam, and prominent figures in black American history, she also described how her own orientation shifted from an interest in black culture to a commitment to the black community around her. She began to travel, and reinterpret her own life experiences through the lens of a black American identity. Lucy cited examples of laws such as Florida's Stand Your Ground law (which authorizes the use of deadly force in self-defense) and concealed carry laws (which in many states allow a person to carry a weapon, including a handgun, in public in a concealed manner) when explaining why she is so committed to improving the status of black people in the United States:

"Now I think those two laws together are a combination for the destruction of the black man, because that right there, the stand your ground law automatically gives someone permission to kill you just because they think they might be harmed. Now you see a black man coming at you and he's got a gun on him, what sense is anyone gonna have? There's a lot of things going on now that's against us, and we don't see that. Because a lot of black people in our years do not think that racism still exists. They're thinking 'get over it,' 'move on,' but it really does still exist. And I've seen it in my own family...There's still a lot of [racism] and there's a lot of things I see that are starting to gear towards our destruction. Even in the community, they've taken away a lot of things for the kids, recreation and things like that, things that are deemed 'too expensive' but things that are hard for people in low income families to afford for their kids to do as after school activities and things like that. So it leads them to where? Juvenile detention. Prison. We don't see it, and those who do see it are not willing to stand up for it.

"And even us, just as a people, we don't stand up for each other anymore. You look at shows like Real Housewives of Atlanta and things like that, look what they're depicting! You act this way, wear all the pretty dresses and the makeup, and you go on T.V. and kids see it and think 'Oh, that's the life I want,' but they have all this drama, all this crazy being with that man and this man. And we're not even careful what we're depicting! When we get into higher places like that where we could show young kids a better place, we go on T.V. and say it's all about the ratings anyway, so instead we give the networks what they want so we can get the good ratings. And I want to do better. I want us to do better."

As someone who strongly identifies as African American, Lucy's expresses a strong sense of commitment to her group membership among other black people. To the extent that an individual behavior is tied to her need for proximity to the attachment group, attachment theory may suggest that developing a sense of shared fate with other ingroup members helps individuals achieve proximity to the group. Thus, strong identifier types like Lucy tend to answer affirmatively to questions related to group consciousness. Strong identifiers who view the world through a self-categorization framework would see shared group consciousness as one of a variety of behaviors that facilitate closeness with the group. Descriptions of strong identifier types are consistent with self-categorization theory, illustrating that when social categorizations are salient to a person, the ingroup becomes psychologically merged with, or linked to, the self. Thus, for strong identifiers, the self and the group are inextricably tied once group-ness becomes salient to the individual.

Responses and Fitting Into the Framework

The interview questionnaire for this study included a number of survey questions related to group consciousness to determine whether interview subjects fell into the "predictor" categories described by the type-predictor typology. The entire survey questionnaire is included in Appendix A.

Each of the questions related to group consciousness listed below have been used on national opinion surveys including the General Social Survey, the National Election Studies, and the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, but are asked using a closed-format. In a departure from the conventional survey format, my interviews asked the following four group consciousness questions in an open-ended format (respondents were not prompted to answer with a "yes" or "no," and the subsequent scaling questions were dropped. Respondents were asked the linked fate and group success questions in reference to the group (or groups) with which they reported feeling the strongest sense of identity.

Changing the form of the questions from closed- to open-ended provided considerable variation in responses, with some respondents answering yes or no straightforwardly, while others meandered around a response that seemed to consider many factors.

- Linked Fate: Do you think that what happens to (people in respondent's group) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

- Life Chances: Do you think your life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion?

- Group Success: Based on your experiences, does it make sense to view your own life chances as being tied to the success of other people in your group?

- Proxy: Do you ever use race as a proxy for your own self-interest?

The majority of this analysis will focus on responses to the linked fate question classified as positive, negative, or mixed responses (exhibiting some combination of positive and negative feelings toward linked fate). However, because the framework itself is not specific to linked fate and is useful for understanding group consciousness more broadly, responses from the other group consciousness questions will be used in some of the examples extracted from interviews. I find support within the sample for each of the 4 predictor categories, and describe the in further detail the range of responses for each, with context from selected individual interviews below.

Taken together, Figures 10 and 11 suggest that the type-predictor framework works among the sample in the way I theorized it would. The bar chart in Figure 10 shows the number of unique cases in each consciousness type that fall into each group consciousness predictor category. I use cases rather than individuals as the unit of analysis here because in some instances, a person classified as a multiple identifier could exemplify one predictor, say group membership, when referring to one aspect of her identity, and exemplify a different predictor, say group attachment, when referring to some other aspect of her identity. Non-affiliate types fall exclusively into the group membership and disassociation predictor categories, and provide the greatest proportion of disassociative responses among the sample. This means non-affiliate types, who derive a sense of identity more from individual traits than group affinity, do not tend to express a sense of shared fate with others. On the other hand, strong identifier types tend to fall into the group attachment and group identity predictor categories, meaning they not only express a sense of shared fate with in-group members, but may even derive a sense of personal gain from their perceived closeness with the group.

The bar chart in Figure 11 shows the distribution of positive, negative, and affirmative responses to the linked fate question within each group consciousness predictor category. Most negative responses to the linked fate question came from the disassociative predictor category. While all

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Figure 10: Distribution of Predictors among Types

predictor categories had people who expressed a positive sense of linked fate, the greatest proportions of positive responses came from the group identity and group attachment predictor categories, as expected because the strong identifiers and multiple identifier types who fell into these two predictor categories are theoretically more inclined to view themselves as part of the group and, by extension, may be more inclined to express a sense of shared fate with ingroup members.

Figure 11: Number of Positive, Negative, and Mixed Responses to Linked Fate for Each Predictor Category

Disassociation

Among the entire sample, 11 examples of disassociation emerged (see Appendix A), and as predicted by the type-predictor framework, disassociative responders provided the majority of negative responses to the linked fate question (6 of 11 cases). While I expected that disassociative respondents would be more inclined to provide negative responses to the group consciousness questions, I made no initial conjectures about what factors might motivate an individual to view her personal status as being disconnected from the status of the group. The following disassociative responses were given by non-affiliate type participants who may have reported feeling a stronger sense of identity with one group relative to other groups in their identity set, but did not frequently refer to the group during parts of the interview that were not specific to identity. Not surprisingly, there seems to be little evidence of a sense of shared outcomes for individuals in the sample whose identity ties to a particular group are relatively weak.

Carrie Parsons and Tara Williams, Disassociators

Carrie, a white female psychology graduate student in her mid-20s, hesitated for about five seconds before asking the interviewer to repeat the question, "Do you believe what happens to Christian people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" Carrie formed her answer gradually, saying she believed what happens to Christians could potentially affect her life, but that she wasn't sure whether the status of Christians would affect her life over time, or affect her kids. Tara, who attends the same graduate psychology program as Carrie, responded by asking followup questions after being asked to answer the linked fate question regarding her relationship to liberals in the United States. She was at first abrupt in her response:

> "I don't really think of that as a well-worded question. Like what happens to liberals?"

[INTERVIEWER]: Well, when policies are passed that are what liberals want, and so liberals start to feel a little better – when good things happen for liberals do you think that has something to do with your life? Do you think you'd be better off when liberals are better off?

"Yes because of my age, and yes, because of my profession, but besides that, no. Because like I said, I'm very privileged. I think that's why I don't care so much about politics in general. I think if it affected me more directly, like if I was gay, I'd probably be way more passionate about politics."

[INTERVIEWER]: I see. So you think if you were in a position where policy changes were benefitting you more directly, you would have a stronger sense of being linked with other liberals?

"Yes."

Beth Greer, Disassociator

Beth, from Rochester, New York, was similarly conflicted in her response regarding shared outcomes with other Republicans:

"I don't know. Let's say that somebody doesn't do his job and the neighborhood gets incinerated. That would have something to do with my personal life. But I don't think it would in general because in general I don't rely a lot on my community for what I do and think. So only if it's a major intrusion. (Beth is suddenly abrupt) Ok. That's my answer to that. (Beth laughs).

[INTERVIEWER]: Was this a hard question to answer?

"The thing is, it's not a question that I had ever asked myself so I had to stop and create a possible scenario in how I would react to it."

Individuals in the sample categorized as having disassociative responses tended to express a sense of belonging to groups that would not presumably be ascriptively identifiable, and are not politicized in a way that felt salient to respondents. In this sense, perhaps Carrie, Tara, and Beth felt a

sense of shared outcomes with Christians or liberals because in a sense these groups are "selected into" by the individual, and perceptions of group membership from others depends almost entirely on what the individual projects. In contrast, individuals who feel a stronger sense of attachment to racial and ethnic groups, class-based groups, or other minority groups may be more subject to differential treatment based on out-group perceptions of individual group membership and thus, whether negatively or positively, may respond differently to questions that prompt individuals to think about group consciousness.

Group Membership

Among the entire sample, 16 examples of group membership occurred, making group membership the second-most common of the four predictor categories (see Appendix A). Membership alone in a particular group appears to be an insufficient condition to produce the type of utility-proxying and collectivist attitudes and behavior associated with group conscious thinking. Group membership alone does not carry any affective value with group-belonging; it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not motivate particular feeling or behaviors other than perhaps a sense of belonging. Membership is akin to a "fan," who may occasionally cheer for her team and celebrate team successes, but is ultimately unburdened by the team's victories or losses at the individual level to the extent that her own self-concept and decisionmaking behaviors are meaningfully affected. Consequently, group membership produced equal proportions of positive and negative responses to the linked fate question, and were most likely to produce mixed responses (four of the six "mixed" responses came from people categorized in the group membership predictor).

Fausto Herrera, Group Membership

Fausto responded to the linked fate question question knowing that although he sees himself as Hispanic and that others automatically perceive him to be Hispanic "because of [his] heavy accent," he also distanced himself from the group, stating that his experience as a Hispanic person in the United States differs from the experiences of the typical Hispanic/Latino immigrant around him.

Despite distancing himself from the status of other Hispanic people, Fausto expressed a desire to see Hispanics improve their position in society during other portions of the interview. But after a long moment during which Fausto sighed heavily and murmured, "I don't know", he concluded that the status of other Hispanics would not affect him personally, primarily because of his elevated socioeconomic position and personal motivations. He also noted that the question was difficult to answer for Hispanics as a whole because so many subgroups comprise the Hispanic community:

> "If the question is whatever happens to Hispanic people, well my question is what has happened to Hispanic people? Like I said, there's different geographic location. You know, there's South American, Central American, Puerto Rican, they're the biggest bulks of immigrants and each one has had different experiences. So what happens to them has influenced what happens in my life? No, because I came to this country not for economic prosperity, I came to this country to go to school. In the course of that, there was a revolution in Nicaragua so I couldn't go back – so I ended up staying. I married an American lady from this area. So it wasn't like I came here looking for like a lot of people who have immigrated...So I don't think what happen to Hispanic people affecting me in any way. But I'm not the norm. So I'm not sure how to answer that question. It's a tricky question."

Barrett Ackerman, Group Membership

Similarly, Barrett did not believe that his membership in the Jewish community meant his life chances would be affected by the group as a whole, although he did seem to believe group status

may have had more of an impact for individuals in the past. After hesitating, Barrett asked for clarification on the linked fate question:

> "Uhh, that's interesting. Is that in the future, or is that in the past?
>
> [INTERVIEWER]: You know, when they ask on these surveys it's usually just a closed form 'yes' or 'no.'
>
> [Barrett takes a more decisive tone].
>
> "I don't think what happens to me or what happens to Jewish neighbors – not that I have many – but I don't think we're stereotyped individually anymore.
>
> [INTERVIEWER]: How about in the past? At least in your personal life did you ever feel like your own life chances were affected by the success of other Jewish people?
>
> "I think there were times with some negative difficulties. When I was up in Alaska some of my board members were very hostile toward anyone who wasn't white and Christian. The group that hired me, which had a lot of Native representatives on it, very successful Native people, that board disappeared and I got a few very conservative people on it and it was very clear that they had certain reactions toward me."

Fausto and Barrett expressed membership with their social groups, but did not believe their personal fates were determined by collective outcomes. Though Fausto self-identified as a Hispanic person, he believed the term "Hispanic" encompassed too many diverse groups that may not share common cultural or social interests in every case. And because his own experiences differed from many of the other Hispanic immigrants in his community, he empathized with fellow in-group members, but did not believe his own status was affected by the status of the group. While Barrett acknowledged that shared fate may have been an important concept for Jewish people in the past, he did not believe negative stereotypes against Jews had much individual impact in the present, and consequently answered that although he self-identified as a Jewish person, he did not believe negative perceptions of the group would affect him personally. In other words, both Fausto and

Barrett had developed a an affinity with their respective groups strong enough to produce a sense of membership, but not sufficient to produce an absolute sense of shared outcomes.

Group Identity

18 examples of the group identity predictor emerged from the sample, making group identity the most common of the four predictors in my framework (see Appendix A).

Unlike membership alone, group identity appears to have implications for the predictions of linked fate among respondents in this sample. In fact, 16 of the 19 examples of positive linked fate responses came from people in the group identity predictor. In the group identity predictor, a person's status and sense of self are more connected with the status of the group; hence we should expect a stronger relationship between group identity and individual well-being. Both social identity theory and self-categorization theory suggest that minority status makes minority group membership a salient category for individuals, thus minority group membership would become a meaningful basis for perceiving self and others. However, because the self-categorization approach presents the self as relatively malleable, we may expect under certain instances to see racial interests trumping class interests, for example. Perhaps to some degree this depends on how likely the individual is to view race and class interests as inextricably tied. For black Americans with lower socioeconomic status, the tie between race and class may be stronger than for African Americans of higher socioeconomic status. Whereas Dawson would suggest that the black upper and middle class continues to view racial interests as affecting their life chances, the self-categorization theory may not strongly support such a claim.

Patricia Lovett, Group Identifier

It is difficult within the framework of self-categorization theory to address why, when social identity is salient, not all group members think or behave similarly (Abrams, 1990). The theory does not give a compelling account for why individual differences may exist among group members, though Abrams and others have suggested that while subjective stability in the self must be based to some degree on a person's ability to make stable social comparisons, individual stability may be accompanied by subtle variations that "allow people to arrive at different interpretations of the same categorization at different times (Abrams and Hogg, 2001).

The predictions of the self-categorization approach seem to be borne out in Patricia's position on the linked fate of African Americans. Patricia is a black business owner whose government contracting organization made her a millionaire by the time she reached her mid-40s. Though she identified herself strongly and consistently as an African American, she did not believe that racial interests trumped class interests. In fact, Patricia mentioned that she specifically prohibited her organization from applying for minority-set-aside contracts from the government, even though they would have faced relatively little competition for such bids. Patricia responded to the linked fate question by saying,

> "I would say no now. In the year 2014, no. In the 1900's I would say yes, because I lived during that time. And so many things are different, so many things have changed since that time. But now? No. Because I think it's more on merit and what you bring to a specific situation, whatever the box is being checked for. I mean, we have a black President. That wasn't thought of in the 60's or 70's. So I would say that's really a 2-part answer, it depends on the era. That's initially a very black and white, yes / no question, but it's hard to make it yes or no when you've lived in both time frames."
>
> [INTERVIEWER]: Did you ever think differently?
>
> "Yes, around the 60's and 70's. Because the opportunities weren't there. For example, and African American male who for whatever reason wasn't able to finish school –

they could have excellent common sense. But back in the day they weren't viewed as 'what you can bring to the table,' they were viewed as 'you didn't finish school.' (Patricia chuckles). That was like the end. But now you can have someone who didn't finish college, but has total common sense, total ethics of brain – they could be managing something now because the opportunities are different."

Christina, Group Identifier

Social identity theory, on the other hand, posits that because individuals desire self-esteem (which itself is dependent on positive social comparisons between the in-group and the outgroup), there is a tendency to "seek positive distinctiveness for the in-group in comparison with the out-group" (Turner, 1981). Thus, individuals may invoke social comparisons which result in competitive intergroup processes and attitudinal biases. Consistent with Dawson, then, social identity theorists may expect individuals to favor policies and political candidates that benefit the ingroup, even at the expense of personal preference (if a discrepancy exists in the first place).

Christina, a recent college graduate, and the daughter of Chinese immigrant parents, said,

"When I see things that happen to women it makes me sad, but in terms of politics, like laws, I guess it would have an impact...but most of these things don't happen to me."

[INTERVIEWER]: Do you think your life chances are affected by the status of other women?

"Yes, because I'm female, even more limited because my parents are working class. And because not only am I female, but I'm a minority. Because people [are] more likely to hire men. If women are headstrong they're called bitchy or bossy, but if men are headstrong, they're called [leaders]."

[INTERVIEWER]: So would you say your life chances are tied to the success of women as a whole?

"I don't think the solution to it is having more women succeed, I think the answer is a change in the mentality of others."

Jacob, Group Identifier

Jacob revealed a sense of shared identity and outcomes with other black people throughout his interview, despite his belief that "at the foundational level [other people's perceptions of his race] shouldn't matter." He was quick to provide examples of injustices toward African Americans made on the basis of racial perceptions, citing the murder of Trayvon Martin[11] and the recent controversy over Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard Sherman being labeled a "thug" by national media outlets.[12] Jacob was quick to explain that he feels personally affected by the status of other black Americans, saying,

"What pissed me off recently was the Richard Sherman thing. We boast ourselves as a nation as having liberty and justice for all...We made a lot of inroads with civil rights and all, but then when a football player like Richard Sherman is hyped up and he says a couple things that might not be consistent, then he's a thug because he's got dreads.

"...So many people in America, they come here to get a better life. They come here to escape. But they get here and they're looked upon as second class citizens. It's the superiority that ticks me off—certain races and groups of people. I'm not mad at people in particular, I'm mad at the mindset, that ideology. With that ideology, the after effect is always injustice."

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[11]Trayvon Martin was a 17-year-old African American who was fatally shot by neighborhood watch volunteer George Zimmerman on February 26, 2012. In 2013 a jury of six women found Zimmerman not guilty of the second-degree murder for which he was charged, and in 2015 the United States Department of Justice announced that no federal civil rights charges would be brought against Zimmerman. http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html.

[12]Following a 2014 post-game interview where Sherman made negative comments about 49ers receiver Michael Crabtree, media outlets and users of social media platforms such as Twitter responded to Sherman with some praise for his honesty, but notably, with many negative and racialized comments about his behavior. http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/01/richard-sherman-seattle-seahawks-erin-andrews-super-bowl.

Group Attachment

Eight examples of the group attachment predictor emerged from the sample (see Appendix A), and though it is the least common of the four predictors, it is strongly associated with positive responses to the linked fate question (of the eight people characterized by the group attachment predictor, six responded affirmatively to linked fate).

To the extent that an individual's behavior is inextricably tied to her need for proximity to the attachment group, attachment theory suggests that individuals may achieve proximity through behaviors motivated by group consciousness. Although Dawson and others (Capers and Smith, 2016; Gay et al., 2016) describe linked fate and group consciousness as a means through which individuals make decisions for self-gain, individuals who view the world through an attachment framework may see a sense of shared outcomes as one of a variety of behaviors which serve the function of facilitating closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned with the extent to which favoring the policy of the attachment group allows the individual to signal her ultimate desire to be bonded with the group. Lucy and David both expressed feeling a sense of shared fate with African Americans, despite the fact that neither one is readily embraced as a group member by other blacks.

Lucy, Group Attachment

Lucy wholeheartedly believed the status of other African Americans would affect her life:

> ". . . Regardless of the color of my skin, it's definitely going to have an effect on me. No matter how you look at it, if something effects someone of color – it doesn't matter how much education you have or how light or how dark you are, if it affects someone of color it's going to affect us all in the same way. People might view it differently, um, our perspective may be different, but as a whole it's gong to have the same effect."

David, Group Attachment

David spoke candidly about his desire to advocate for the status of black families at his children's predominantly white upper class parochial school, particularly because his wife is African American and his children and other families at the school were experiencing differential treatment at the school in part because of what David believed to be presumptions about their racial identification. According to David,

> "It didn't matter to me that we were African American, what mattered to me was how they treated us because they perceived we were African American. So I created the Minority Parents Advisory Committee. I wanted my children to grow up not feeling the stigma and pressure of race – the little bit that I experienced, and I didn't experience a lot of it – because I truly believe that as I've navigated through life people really didn't treat me the way they treated most people that would be identified as African American. And I think that goes back to the old mindsets of the south where you were treated based on your darkness. If you were a lighter African American you were treated differently. So growing up as an African American, in the greater society I was treated better than darker African Americans," he said in an almost apologetic tone.

> "So my treatment as an African American wasn't as severe or harsh as I've seen others treated, but it bothered me to see others treated that way."

For this reason, David started the organization to advocate for families whose children were being treated unfairly sometimes by fellow students, and sometimes, more egregiously, by their educators and administrators. "It bothered me to see how my racial peers were treated...and their families."

Readers may quibble over whether the conjectures offered by the social identity theory and the group attachment framework differ at all. I offer that the distinction lies in whether the individual is perceived by out-group members to be a member of the identity group (as in the case of group membership) or not (as in the case of group attachment). While both theories would suggest a

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sense of shared outcomes at the individual level, the motivations for individuals to link their fate to the group varies by context.

Discussion

Though my work exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate multidimensionality in the study of identity, more work must be done to offer alternative measures of group consciousness that accommodate a more fluid operationalization of identity. Even from the open-ended responses, the ambiguities highlighted at the start of this paper remain unresolved. These interviews do, however, underscore at least three important ideas.

First, these interviews reveal support for the typologies of group conscious thinking introduced in the type-predictor framework. The open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provide support for the type-predictor framework. I find examples of all five types and all four predictors, and the relationships between types and predictors appear to be in the directions I expected.

Second, the interviews reveal that individuals think about their identities and group affiliations in nuanced ways. Not only do individuals claim membership in multiple groups simultaneously, but those groups may hold conflicting interests and the salience of any particular identity may ebb and flow depending on a variety of contextual factors. While the convention, at least in political science research, has been to control for categories such as race, socioeconomic status, gender, and religion in a regression framework, and to use these categories as explanatory variables for a host of political phenomena, these interview findings suggest that we should be more careful in our suppositions regarding the causal relationship between social group identities and their empirical correlates. In what ways, and under what conditions should we expect race, gender, class, or religion to be causal?

Third, this study leads us to ponder the degree of subjectivity respondents have in choosing and articulating the magnitude of their identity with a particular group. Some identities and social categories listed by respondents in this study (for example, "caring person," "musician," "student,") are roles or traits chosen by respondents that may only carry political significance and prompt shared consciousness when activated in a particular way. Other identities listed by respondents (for example, "black person," "woman," "second generation immigrant,") may be identities respondents choose for themselves, but may also importantly carry social significance or meanings that are ascribed to respondents, in a sense constraining a person's ability to determine the social significance of such identities because of the institutional and social factors that surround them.

Conclusion

The findings of this study, though illuminating, should be interpreted with caution. The sampling procedure yielded a diverse population, but not a representative one. The responses of participants can not be compared across groups within the study, nor can responses be generalized to the broader populations of the groups these individuals represent. I do not claim that my classification of this particular set of respondents into the type-predictor categories should be universally true of a larger population, and though great effort has been made to conduct this study in accordance with best practices and rigorous analysis, it is yet reasonable to consider the falsifiability of these findings. Evidence to counter my findings might look like a study in which the same set of respondents classify themselves in the framework categories and place themselves in different categories than the ones I chose for them, or a study with a larger sample where respondents fall into more (or fewer) types that map differently onto more (or fewer) predictor categories. However, even if it is possible to conceive of an observation that might prove this particular set of findings falsifiable, it is also possible to conceive of research designs that would provide additional, and potentially

stronger, evidence for the type-predictor framework. Additional work on this topic should include a nationally representative sample, and use questionnaire designs that allow respondents to list the identity or identities that matter most to them (as was done in this study). This work would also be strengthened by research design and procedural elements such as the use of a second coder, or the incorporation of additional interviewers in order to allay potential concerns about race of interviewer effects. Future work might also incorporate designs where respondents categorize themselves according to the type-predictor framework and those same respondents are categorized by a third-party researcher or observer to determine the extent to which the framework can be used consistently for self- as well as observational- categorization. Another possibility is to build on the methodological tools used to investigate group consciousness in the style of Shingles (1981) or Verba and Nie (1987). Long form interviews with open-ended questionnaires make it possible to employ the type of count analysis used by Shingles and Verba and Nie. There are ample opportunities for future studies to build upon the type-predictor framework as a tool for understanding the relationship between self-categorization and shared political consciousness.

That said, we should glean from this study a fresh take on a longstanding literature, and a range of ways forward for future research to especially examine the measurement questions that arise concerning the conceptualization and behavioral implications of group membership, group identity, and group attachment.

Political and social psychology research is ripe with opportunities for researchers to engage in both qualitative studies to develop a richer contextual understanding of identity formation, as well as quantitative studies to empirically demonstrate the distinctiveness of identity-related concepts, especially in relation to political preferences and related behavioral outcomes. There is a strong need within the linked fate literature specifically to develop research designs based on causal inference in order to fully understand the conditions under which aspects of an individual's identity may

causally motivate her preferences and behaviors. The group identity literature must grow to incorporate new design strategies aimed at validating empirical distinctions between often-cofounded concepts. Though a formidable task, broadening the scope of available measures will, at least, be beneficial to the scholarly community and, at best, demonstrate an improvement in measurement precision and provide a benchmark for future studies to build upon.

3 Can Alternative Measurement Strategies Provide New Insights for Our Understanding of Group Political Attitudes in the United States?

Introduction

The present chapter takes a closer look at one of the main findings from the interview analyses: namely that respondents view their personal identities in layers, and that the relationships between self-identities and political attitudes are complex and nuanced. I respond to the interview results by asking: what further information can be learned by introducing a new measurement strategy to the study of identity that allows respondents a greater degree of flexibility when considering the subjective relationship between their sense of group identity and the policy attitudes often considered to be empirical correlates of identity?

This chapter begins with a bit of background on the group consciousness literature. I discuss what has been learned from existing research and what information still stands at stake. Next, I discuss the specific ideas explored in this chapter and provide a description of the survey instrument and measurement strategies used. I then discuss the survey itself and provide descriptive information about the dataset. The data analysis consists of three parts: (1) an analysis of two feeling thermometer questions regarding attitudes toward immigrants, (2) analysis of a series questions about attitudes toward spending in five policy areas, and, (3) descriptive analysis of individual groups of respondents. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this project and directions for future work.

What Do We Think We Know From Empirical Data?

Before discussing what empirical literature has told us about group political attitudes in the United States, we should first distinguish between the terms used throughout social science literature to discuss individuals and their relationships to groups. While group membership refers to a person's ascriptive categorization in a particular group, group identity refers to a person's awareness of belonging to that group coupled with a sense of psychological attachment due to a sense of shared beliefs, interests, feelings, or ideas with fellow group members (McClain et al., 2009). Distinct from group identity, group consciousness is in-group identification politicized by a system of beliefs about the status of the group within the broader society, as well as a view that collective action is the best way for the group to improve its status and realize its shared interests (Dawson, 1994, 2003; McClain et al., 2009). The empirical goal of this chapter is to understand whether the policy attitudes we observe for individuals are different when we are looking from the perspective of group membership (observing relationships in data based on ascriptive categorization alone)

versus group identity (observing relationships in data by asking a person which group identities matter to her).

Discussions of social identities in the United States tend to center around race, class, gender, and religion. Early observations in social science literature by Tocqueville and others point out that race is not only a significant part of American politics but also that race will continue to drive social and political cleavages in the US (Tocqueville, 1945; Brown, 1931). Since Brown's seminal work *The Nature of Race Consciousness* (1931), scholars have sought to understand not only the emergence of group consciousness at the individual level, but also the effects of group consciousness as they relate to political outcomes.

Scholars who focus on race have highlighted the effects of racial identity and racial group consciousness on voting and political participation and behavior (McClain and Stewart Jr, 1995; Cho and Cain, 2001; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007; Lien, 2010; Sanchez, 2006; Segura, 2012; Lien, 1994; Miller et al., 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Kim and Lee, 2001; Tate, 2003; Gillespie and King-Meadows, 2014; Enos, 2014, 2016), candidate choice (Cho and Cain, 2001; Segura, 2012; Stokes, 2003; Chong and Rogers, 2005; Wong, 2008; Cameron et al., 1996; Schildkraut, 2012), and preference for policies that purportedly benefit minorities (Griffin, 2014; Block, 2011; Lee, 2008; Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Greer, 2013; Gillion, 2013). Many of these observational studies treat race as a fixed categorical variable in which survey respondents are asked to indicate the racial or ethnic group to which they belong, and subsequently asked a battery of outcome measures whose relationships to racial identity are determined using regression analysis. To the extent that these studies contrast the political differences between groups, the majority of studies focus on differences between white and black Americans although scholars have increasingly begun to study the effects of group consciousness among Hispanics and Latinos

(Stokes, 2003; Sanchez, 2006; Manzano and Sanchez, 2010; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Schildkraut, 2012; Gay et al., 2014a), women and individuals who identify as LBGT (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Simien, 2005; Moore, 2010), and religious communities (Harris, 1994; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007; Granqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2008; Gay et al., 2014a).

Studies focusing on class and socioeconomic difference in the U.S. face the challenge of creating empirical distinction between the influence of class and race, which are not only highly correlated but also often empirically endogenous. Still, scholars such as Gay (2004; 2006), Greer (2013) and Carnes (2012; 2013) have posited the effects of class-consciousness on policy attitudes and political preferences.

Gender and religion are among the least-frequently studied categories of social identity in relation to policy attitudes, at least in political science literature. Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014) argue that religion is more pervasive in United States politics than most people realize, and influence political attitudes, the behavior of political elites and ordinary citizens, individuals' interpretations of public policy, and the development of government programs. Using data from the 2012 American National Election Study Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner find that married white and Latina women have slightly lower levels of gender linked fate than unmarried women of the same race/ethnicity, while black women in the sample express high levels of shared consciousness with other women regardless of marital status. The authors use mediation analysis to show that differences in perceptions of shared fate explain a significant amount of the variation in political ideology and partisanship for white and Latina women, arguing that marriage alters women's perceptions of self-interest by institutionalizing their partnerships with men and ultimately leading women to feel less connected to other women. Black women, on the other hand, have more experience interpreting discriminatory events because they also experience more racial disadvantage, and are subsequently more likely to view their fates as being connected to other women in addition

to other black Americans (Stout et al., 2017). Sociologists and cultural anthropologists have also sought to understand the influence of gender and religious identity at the individual level (Glem, 2013; Frable, 1997; Moore, 2010), but still, the majority of studies in these disciplines either rely heavily on ethnographic work or feature again the fixed, categorical, observational measurement strategies characteristic of group consciousness literature more broadly.

To a large extent, studies related to group identity also study categories of identity in isolation from one another.

A Multidimensional Approach

How Might What We Think We Know Change if We Introduce a New Measurement Strategy?

Changes to the racial and ethnic classifications on the U.S. Census over the years reflect demographic changes in the country, or at the very least, are an ever-adapting reflection of the ways groups in the United States prefer to be enumerated (see Figure 9).

In the Census 2000 and Census 2010, the United States employed a new technique for measuring race which allowed respondents were given the opportunity to check more than one racial category for the first time, apart from previous Census strategies that quantified black heritage as . In 2010, 9.0 million people reported multiple races, a 2.4 percent increase from the 6.8 million people who reported multiple races in 2000 (Jones and Bullock, 2013). The growth of the population reporting more than one race on the census is probably attributed to a combination of factors. One explanation is outright population growth, the other is a shift in the thinking of people who were already multiracial but are now more inclined to report themselves as being so on censuses and other surveys. While the percentage of individuals who report belonging to two or more races

Figure 12: Ethnoracial Classification in the Decennial Census, 1860-2000

Category	1860	1890	1970	2000
Race	White	White	White	White
	Black	Black	Negro or Black	Black, African American, or Negro
	Mulatto	Mulatto		
		Quadroon		
		Octoroon		
		Indian	Indian (Amer.)	American Indian or Alaska Native
		Chinese	Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean	Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, some other Pacific Islander, or some other Asian.
				Some other race
Ethnicity			Other	
			Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, Other Spanish	Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Other Spanish, Hispanic, Latino

(Reproduced from Lee, 2009)

may seem small, the two or more races population is often reported in a single-race category, especially in subnational surveys. If these individuals were removed from the single-race category and placed in the two or more races category, "the numbers might begin to affect policy decisions and resource allocation (Renn, 2009)." In education policy, for example, racial data are used to determine funding for programs designed to promote equal opportunity, planning for schools serving Native American communities, and monitoring of school segregation and possible racial discrimination in the areas of ability grouping, discipline, financial aid, and programs designed to serve special populations (Renn, 2009).

Lee provides a useful illustration of this point (2009). Consider two types of individuals confronted with the 2000 Census questionnaire, type A and type B. Type A will check off a second racial group if and only if she identifies as strongly with it as she does to the first racial group she marks. Type B will check off a second group (or third) if she in any way identifies with it - strongly or not. Now take the example of a biracial individual who identifies more strongly as African American than as Asian American. If she is type A, she will mark only African American in Census 2000; if she is type B, she will mark both.

An alternative strategy to measuring identity allows both types A and B to identify as biracial by giving survey respondents a fixed number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across a set of social identity categories. Work done by Taeku Lee in a 2009 pilot study introduces an approach to studying ethnoracial self-identification which tests the fluidity of how race or ethnicity is expressed in social surveys. Lee proposes a measure which gives survey respondents a fixed number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across a set of racial and ethnic categories (Lee, 2009). Analogous to Loni Guinier's "cumulative voting" design (1994), which allows citizens to vote for multiple candidates and weight their votes according to preference intensity within

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the set of candidates, the identity point allocation system allows survey respondents to identify with multiple group identities and to weight the strength of their association across groups.

In addition to racial categories, the present research extends the identity point allocation design to include class, religion and gender as categories to which respondents allocate points, and uses a survey design that compares responses across six arms of varying measurement conditions. The random assignment of individuals to different measurement conditions allows us to understand how different approaches to measurement may reveal different outcomes on important identity-related questions while also allowing us to compare policy attitudes among people who are given the opportunity to select a primary identity from a comprehensive list of socially relevant categories. The design also allows us to explore whether the attitudes we observe when individuals select a primary identity are different from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures of demographic correlation. Allowing respondents to tell us what identities matter to them may provide a more robust scope of information about the subjects of social science research and the policy preferences of their subjective groups.

Why Does it Matter if Our Inferences Change?

We might think measurement strategies matter not only because of the responsibility social scientists have to accurately reflect populations through research, but also because social scientists (and those interested in the application of social scientific research tools) use such research to describe important relationships between social groups and their relationships to power, policy, and preference that have meaningful consequences in the political world.

The previous chapters of this dissertation demonstrate that individuals do not seem to perceive their identities in strictly bounded categories but rather as fluid layers which they pick and choose, as well as within typologies of identification. In addition, the striking gap between theory

and measurement evinced through social science literature points to the need for a more adaptive measurement strategy.

There are, of course, merits to conventional measures of identity. Check boxes and multiple choice formats are familiar tasks that people recognize and can easily understand. However, introducing alternative strategies for measuring identity and its nuances will help social scientists inside and outside of academia better understand the link between group identification and group preference. If all politics are group politics, our inferences about the demographic and attitudinal traits of groups have real-world consequences that are further complicated if those inferences vary as a function of how we ask individuals to self-identify.

Hypotheses

1. Policy attitudes will differ between groups of respondents by race, class, gender, and religion.

2. The policy attitudes we observe under conventional measures of group membership will differ from the attitudes we observe under methods that ask people to select a primary identity group among the set of socially relevant identity categories.

Identity Measurement Task

The Identity Measurement Study (IMS) conducted in 2015 asked identity-related questions to 3,010 respondents. The survey was distributed to a national sample online as a module of the MIT Political Experiments Research Lab 2015 Omnibus Survey. Respondents were recruited for the IMS through three survey platforms: Survey Sampling International (SSI), Research Now (RN), and Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mturk). The goal of this survey was to test whether different

Figure 13: Identity Measurement Survey Flowchart

strategies for measuring identity are related to different outcomes on identity-related questions, and whether these results vary for subgroups of respondents.

As illustrated in the Figure 10 flow chart, the survey first collected respondents' demographic information, asking subjects to self-report their race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, and religion, among other questions in a multiple choice format where they were given the option to select as many options as applicable in a given category. Of the 3,010 individuals in the sample, 76 percent (N=2,280) of respondents identified as white, 11 percent (N=335) identified as black or African American, 9 percent (N=283) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 5 percent (N=162) as Asian or Pacific Islander, 1 percent (N=44) as American Indian or Alaska Native, and less than 1 percent (N=10) identified as Middle Eastern. Around 1 percent (N=31) of respondents self-identified as belonging to some other racial group. 2.3 (N=70) percent of respondents volunteered a "multiracial" identity, defined for the purpose of this analysis as checking more than one racial category in the demographic portion of the survey.[13] 48 percent of respondents identified as male, and 52 percent identified as female.

After collecting basic demographic information, the IMS asked identity-related questions to respondents. The goal of this survey was to test whether different strategies for measuring identity produce different outcomes on identity-related questions, and whether these results vary for subgroups of respondents. Prior to exposure, respondents were randomly assigned to one of six treatment categories, each requesting subjects to complete a different identify measurement task. The survey compares a traditional method for measuring identity: a multiple choice question where respondents are asked to choose one category based on a list of options (solely racial options in Condition 1, or a combination of racial, socioeconomic, gender, and religious identity categories

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[13]In the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census the percentage of multiracial identifiers in the total U.S. population was 2.4 and 2.9 percent, respectively.

in Condition 2) with a system of point allocation where respondents are asked to designate a number of identity points to a list of racial (Condition 3 and Condition 5) or combined (Condition 4 and Condition 6) categories. Conditions 3 and 4 constrain the total number of points available for respondents to allocate. In these conditions, the number of points a respondent can allocate must sum to 10 or 100, respectively. In the unconstrained point allocation conditions, respondents can allocate up to 10 points to any given category in Condition 5, or up to 100 points to any given category in Condition 6. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six measurement conditions:

- Condition 1: choose 1 identity, race only

- Condition 2: choose 1identity, combined IDs

- Condition 3: point allocation, race only, constrained (total points must sum to 10)

- Condition 4: point allocation, combined IDs, constrained (total points must sum to 100)

- Condition 5: point allocation, race only, unconstrained (can allocate up to 10 points per group)

- Condition 6: point allocation, combined IDs, unconstrained (can allocate up to 100 points per group)

Aside from the descriptions below, a full description of the prompts and instruments used in each condition can also be found in Appendix A.

Conditions 1 and 2: Choose 1

If you had to choose only one, which racial group would you say is the biggest part of your personal identity?

White / Caucasian
Black / African-American
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian / Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander

The Combined ID variant in Condition 2 also includes gender (male or female), religion (Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist, Agnostic, or None), and class (lower class, working class, middle class, or upper class). The choices in each category are populated by previous responses and only appear if they are selected by respondents in the demographic portion of the survey.

Conditions 3 - 6: Point Allocation

The point allocation conditions begin with a prompt. Conditions 3 and 5 include only race categories, where the only difference is that condition 3 constrains the number of points to sum to 10 while condition 5 allows respondents to allocate up to 10 points per group. Conditions 4 and 6 include the same combined ID categories as described for Condition 2: gender, religion, and class

categories which appear if they are previously selected by respondents in the prior demographic portion of the survey.

Condition 3 Prompt

> In identifying a person's race and ethnicity, we often use just one racial or ethnic category. Sometimes, however, more than one racial or ethnic category is applicable. Suppose you could describe a person's race and ethnicity using 10 points to allocate as you wish to any group that you think accurately describes a person. For example, if you thought someone were half-white and half-Asian, you might allocate 5 points to each. Or if you thought someone were mostly black but had some Hispanic heritage, you might allocate 9 points for black and 1 point for Hispanic. Now suppose you were asked to describe your own racial background in this way. How would you describe your race and ethnicity using this 10 points system?

Condition 4 Prompt

> We often describe people using one or only a few parts of their identity – such as their race and gender. Sometimes, however, other aspects of our identities are also important.Suppose you could describe your identity using 100 points to allocate as you wish to any group that you think accurately describes you. Below are some group membership categories. Move the sliders to reflect how you view your personal identity, where the total number of points allocated sum to 100.For example, you might think these groups are all an equal part of your identity, and give them all the same amount of points. Or you might think of yourself most often as a member of just one group and give most of your points to that group, and give the other groups fewer points. You might even give some groups zero points. If there is another group you think is part of your identity, you can add it at the bottom of the list.How would you describe your personal identity using this 100 point system?

Condition 5 Prompt

In identifying a person's race and ethnicity, we often use just one racial or ethnic category. Sometimes, however, more than one racial or ethnic category is applicable.Suppose you could describe your identity using 10 points to allocate as you wish to any racial group that you think accurately describes you. Move the sliders to reflect how you view your personal identity, where you can allocate up to 10 points to each group.For example, if you thought of yourself as half-white and half-Asian, you might allocate 7 points to each. Or if you thought you were mostly black but had some Hispanic heritage, you might allocate 10 points for black and 3 points for Hispanic.How would you describe your personal identity using this 10 point system?

Condition 6 Prompt

We often describe people using one or only a few parts of their identity – such as their race and gender. Sometimes, however, other aspects of our identities are also important.Suppose you could describe your identity using 100 points to allocate as you wish to any group that you think accurately describes you. Below are some group membership categories. Move the sliders to reflect how you view your personal identity, where you can allocate up to 100 points to each group.For example, you might think these groups are all an equal part of your identity, and give them all the same amount of points. Or you might think of yourself most often as a member of just one group and give most of your points to that group, and give the other groups fewer points. You might even give some groups zero points. If there is another group you think is part of your identity, you can add it at the bottom of the list.How would you describe your personal identity using this 100 point system?

Point Allocation Task

Following the prompt, respondents are given the following task (illustrated here by the race only condition):

Now suppose you are asked to describe your own racial background in this way. How would you describe your race and ethnicity using this 10 points system?

Respondents move the slider to indicate the number of points they would like to allocate to a given category; the total number of points allocated between all categories is shown at the bottom of the screen. Although the system of point allocation used in this survey is an extension of work done by Lee (2009), the original contributions of this work are threefold. First, I allow respondents to allocate points to categories other than racial and ethnic identities. By including gender, socioeconomic status, religion, and an "other" box alongside race and ethnicity in three of the six treatment branches, we observe how respondents may weigh aspects of their personal identity with respect to other traits with which they self-identify. In the "other" box respondents were given the option to write in another category using an open text format. The open text option was included to give respondents the opportunity to reject traditional categories of self-categorization as well as to give respondents greater flexibility in choosing the categories with which they self-identified. In addition, for each respondent assigned to a condition including a combination of identity categories, I customize the survey to display only the unique gender, socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic categories that they selected in the demographic portion of the survey prior to treatment.

Thus, each respondent completes the point allocation task for the set of categories to which he or she self-reported membership.

Second, my design allows for comparison between a constrained "pot" of points where respondents must allocate points that sum to a specific amount, with an unconstrained version that does not force respondents to sum their points to a specific amount but rather allows them to give any amount of points to their categories of choice (constrained only in the sense that the sliding bar on the survey itself must have a limit, and so the number of points available for any selection is limited, but not the amount of points respondents can spend in total).

Third, I employ experimental design to understand whether sets of respondents differ in their responses to outcome questions across treatment groups, conditional on their earlier responses. Because the conditional branching used in my approach leads to different sets of respondents answering the outcome questions, this design does not allow us to compare outcomes for equivalent randomly assigned groups. However, we are able to observe how outcomes differ based on the type of measurement strategy used for respondents to self-identify. Additionally, the conditional branching yields a wealth of observational data about how individuals self-identify and contributes valuable data about the behavioral and attitudinal considerations of people who identify in more nuanced ways that are not captured in ways that can be observed through conventional survey methods.

As noted by Lee (2009), the operationalizaion of this point allocation approach rests on a few seemingly arbitrary decisions. First, the number of identity points given to respondents is set at 10 in the third and fifth branches, and 100 in the fourth and sixth branches. Lee explains that 10 is a reasonable number of points that is likely "to minimize the cognitive task at hand, given the ubiquity of the base-10 system and 10 point systems generally to rate a range of phenomena." The 100 point system is equal in familiarity for respondents as it is used for tasks such as rating

performance on an exam, and is directly analogous to a percentage point system. Thus, the 10-point and 100-point systems are expedient, familiar scales appropriate for the IMS point allocation task.

The second seemingly arbitrary decision is over the slate of racial and ethnic categories that individuals can choose from when allocating points (Lee, 2009). The group categories used in the IMS are the group names and categorizations used annually in the MIT Political Experiments Research Lab Omnibus Survey and are similar to the categories used on other familiar surveys such as the General Social Survey, the American National Election Study and the United States Census. The six categories of white/Caucasian, Black/African-American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian/Alaska Native and Middle Eastern are frequently encountered by respondents on official forms and other documents, and correspond closely with common conceptions of race. In addition, the IMS offers an "other" category where respondents are given the option to fill in a text box with an unlisted identity group. This helps address concerns over the arbitrariness of the conventional categories offered and provides an opportunity for respondents to add any category she deems necessary to describe her identity more fully.

Analysis

All respondents were assigned to an identity measurement task and were asked a number of questions related to their attitudes on undocumented immigrants, foreigners with work visas, government jobs, and spending on welfare, aid to the poor, education, defense, and climate change. Because policy attitudes are widely regarded as political expressions of group identities, the relationships between group identities and policy attitudes are analyzed along two dimensions: 1). The difference in mean attitudes between groups themselves, and, 2). The difference in mean attitudes observed under descriptive categorization versus primary group membership.

This analysis reveals that outcomes related to policy attitudes vary between subsets of respondents. Specifically, those who most strongly identify as Protestant, male, or as a white person are most likely to have colder feelings toward immigrants and more conservative views on welfare than people who more strongly associate with other groups. Class also emerges as a relevant identity on welfare related issues. We see these attitudinal differences more strongly when looking at policy views according to the primary identity offered by respondents rather than by descriptive categorization alone.

First, to get a better sense of whether the survey measures themselves had an impact on subject responses to outcome questions, I assess the difference in means across treatment categories for a given outcome variable. Figure 11 shows that across treatment categories, there is no significant difference in means for a commonly used "feeling thermometer" outcome variable which asks respondents to rate their feelings toward illegal immigrants on a scale from 0 (unfavorable) to 100 (very favorable).

Figure 14: Response Means to "Illegal Immigrants" Question For All Respondents by Treatment Category

The bars surrounding each mean plot represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 11 implies that the identity measurement tasks randomly assigned to respondents do not produce significantly different responses on outcome questions. Plots of the differences in means for all outcome measures used in the analysis of this paper can be found in Appendix B. In the remainder of this analysis, I will pool those respondents in Conditions 2, 4, and 6 who were assigned an identity measurement task in which they were able to select a primary identity from a list of racial, socioeconomic, religious, class, and gender categories rather than race alone.

Part I

Attitudes Toward Immigrants

Respondents were asked two feeling thermometer questions with a scale ranging from 0 to 100 to gauge their attitudes toward immigrants in the United States. The prompt reads as follows:

> "We'd like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. Below we list several groups, and we'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group."

Respondents were then asked to rate their feelings toward two groups: illegal immigrants, and foreigners with work visas.

Among the entire survey population, the mean response to the feeling thermometer regarding foreigners with work visas was 56.94. The mean response to the feeling thermometer regarding illegal immigrants was 37.19. When comparing the means across Tables 1 and 2, we see that respondents expressed warmer feelings toward foreigners with work visas than those who had entered the country without legal documentation; this pattern persists when we look more closely at the responses across the groups respondents selected as their primary identities in Tables 3 and 4.

Tables 3 and 4 reflect responses from people randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, and 6, who were exposed to the full set of social categories from which to select a primary identity.

While most respondents have generally warmer feelings toward immigrants with work visas than undocumented immigrants, Table 3 reveals that respondents who selected white, male, or

Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Foreigners with Work Visas Feeling Thermometer

Thermometer Rating	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100	NA
Frequency	215	110	161	232	396	541	376	376	271	310	22
%	7	4	5	8	13	18	13	12	9	10	1

N= 3,010. Mean= 56.94

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Illegal Immigration Feeling Thermometer

Thermometer Rating	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100	NA
Frequency	844	245	254	272	348	344	228	171	132	146	26
%	28	8	8	9	12	11	8	6	4	5	1

N= 3,010. Mean= 37.19

Table 3: Attitudes Toward Foreigners with Work Visas by Primary Identity

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
0-9	0	1	4	0	22	30	30	1	1	2	0	0
Col. %	0.0	0.056	0.078	0.0	0.12	0.063	0.08	0.077	0.014	0.032	0.0	0.0
10-19	0	0	4	0	8	13	13	0	5	2	0	1
	0.0	0.0	0.078	0.0	0.044	0.027	0.035	0.0	0.068	0.032	0.0	0.024
20-29	0	0	3	0	8	33	30	0	5	0	0	1
	0.0	0.0	0.059	0.0	0.044	0.069	0.08	0.0	0.068	0.0	0.0	0.024
30-39	0	0	2	2	22	33	39	2	3	4	0	2
	0.0	0.0	0.039	0.083	0.12	0.069	0.104	0.154	0.041	0.065	0.0	0.048
40-49	0	2	6	1	17	73	54	1	12	5	0	4
	0.0	0.111	0.118	0.042	0.093	0.152	0.144	0.077	0.162	0.081	0.0	0.095
50-59	0	8	10	3	28	87	62	4	14	15	1	11
	0.0	0.444	0.196	0.125	0.153	0.182	0.165	0.308	0.189	0.242	0.5	0.262
60-69	0	2	4	2	28	37	49	0	8	5	0	7
	0.0	0.111	0.078	0.083	0.153	0.077	0.13	0.0	0.108	0.081	0.0	0.167
70-79	1	3	8	2	19	66	38	3	11	18	1	6
	1.0	0.167	0.157	0.083	0.104	0.138	0.101	0.231	0.149	0.29	0.5	0.143
80-89	0	2	7	4	17	41	29	1	6	7	0	4
	0.0	0.111	0.137	0.167	0.093	0.086	0.077	0.077	0.081	0.113	0.0	0.095
90-100	0	0	3	10	14	66	32	1	9	4	0	6
	0.0	0.0	0.059	0.417	0.077	0.138	0.085	0.077	0.122	0.065	0.0	0.143
N	1	18	51	24	183	479	376	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	79	60.28	54.82	77.96	51.9	58.51	53.83	57.46	59.01	63.5	67	64.93

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Table 4: Attitudes Toward Illegal Immigration by Primary Identity

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
0-9	0	2	8	2	67	127	135	3	17	11	0	12
Col. %	0.0	0.111	0.157	0.08	0.366	0.267	0.359	0.231	0.230	0.177	0.0	0.286
10-19	0	1	4	0	19	48	33	0	4	4	0	5
	0.0	0.056	0.078	0.0	0.104	0.101	0.088	0.0	0.054	0.065	0.0	0.119
20-29	0	2	2	0	11	40	36	0	6	4	0	2
	0.0	0.111	0.039	0.0	0.06	0.084	0.096	0.0	0.081	0.065	0.0	0.048
30-39	0	2	2	1	12	29	34	0	10	6	1	4
	0.0	0.111	0.039	0.04	0.066	0.061	0.09	0.0	0.135	0.097	0.5	0.095
40-49	0	7	7	4	15	64	38	3	9	8	0	8
	0.0	0.389	0.137	0.16	0.082	0.134	0.101	0.231	0.122	0.129	0.0	0.19
50-59	1	2	9	2	24	50	35	2	11	14	1	2
	1.0	0.111	0.176	0.08	0.131	0.105	0.093	0.154	0.149	0.226	0.5	0.048
60-69	0	1	4	4	15	35	18	2	4	4	0	4
	0.0	0.056	0.078	0.16	0.082	0.074	0.048	0.154	0.054	0.065	0.0	0.095
70-79	0	1	4	2	11	27	21	1	6	7	0	3
	0.0	0.056	0.078	0.08	0.06	0.057	0.056	0.077	0.081	0.113	0.0	0.071
80-89	0	0	7	6	5	23	9	2	3	2	0	2
	0.0	0.0	0.137	0.24	0.027	0.048	0.024	0.154	0.041	0.032	0.0	0.048
90-100	0	0	4	4	4	33	17	0	4	2	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.078	0.16	0.022	0.069	0.045	0.0	0.054	0.032	0.0	0.0
N	1	18	51	25	183	476	376	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	53	39.4	50.3	66.2	31.7	38.6	31.7	49.1	40.7	44.0	41.0	35.5

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Protestant as their primary identity category reported especially cold feelings toward undocumented immigrants (means 31.7, 31.7, and 35.5 respectively). 36 percent of people who most strongly identified as white or male, and 28 percent of those who most strongly identified as Protestant rated their feelings toward undocumented immigrants between 0 and 10 points, with the majority of feeling thermometer points from all three groups clustering around 0 to 40. People who strongly identified as females expressed somewhat cold feelings as well, though not as strongly. Tables 20 and 21 in Appendix C reveal that individuals who primarily identify as white and male have an average feeling thermometer rating towards undocumented immigrants that is statistically significant from the sample mean. Further, primary male identity reveals a statistically significant difference from ascriptive male identity concerning attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, underscoring the notion that primary identity reveals potentially different information than what we observe under the ascriptive "checked box" categories for some respondents.

Because immigration has been a highly contested policy issue cutting across racial lines and especially affecting communities with high rates of immigration to the United States such as Hispanic, Latino, and Asian communities, we might think immigration matters for particular subsets of respondents, perhaps especially for those who strongly identify with a racial or ethnic group (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Gest, 2016; Lee, 2008; Sanchez, 2006).

Table 5: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigration Question by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	2,263	33.8	29.0	0.6
	1,300	32.7	28.4	0.8
	183	31.7	28.3	2.1
Black / African American	333	47.7	28.3	1.6
	222	47.4	28.8	1.9
	51	50.3	30.3	4.2
Asian American / Pacific Islander	158	43.5	27.0	2.2
	105	45.7	29.2	2.9
	18	39.4	19.5	4.6
Hispanic / Latino	278	52.0	28.9	1.8
	127	57.0	25.8	2.3
	25	66.2	28.5	5.7
Native American / Alaska Native	44	42.1	30.3	4.6
	13	43.8	31.9	8.8
	1	53.0	NA	NA
Middle Eastern	10	43.7	21.9	6.9
	5	49.2	24.3	10.8
	0	–	–	–
Other	31	39.5	37.8	6.8
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Survey Population Mean	2,984	37.2	29.4	0.5

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

In each column of Table 5, the top set of numbers represent responses to the illegal immigration feeling thermometer question among all respondents using the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers reflect responses from all the individuals who selected a racial or ethnic category as their primary identity group. The bottom set of numbers represent responses among

only those individuals randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of social categories from which to select a primary identity.

Among the entire survey population population, the mean feeling thermometer rating toward undocumented immigrants is 37.2. When using the conventional survey measure of race, we observe a mean response to the illegal immigration feeling thermometer question of 33.8 among white respondents (N=2,263), 47.7 among black respondents (N= 333), 43.5 among Asian and Pacific Islander respondents (N=158), 52.0 among Hispanic and Latino respondents (N=278), 42.1 among Native American respondents (N=44), and 43.7 among Middle Eastern respondents (N=10), as reflected in Table 5. Comparing these groups with one another, all groups but white respondents have a warmer than average mean rating toward undocumented immigrants. Demographically Black and Hispanic respondents reported the warmest feelings, more than 10 points above the survey population mean.

When we look at feelings by race and ethnicity according to the primary identities offered by respondents in the bottom row for each group, we see that those who offered the Hispanic/Latino group as their primary identity reported warmer feelings toward undocumented immigrants than those who were merely descriptively categorized as Hispanic/Latino. Primary Hispanic/Latino respondents gave an average of 66.2 points on the feeling thermometer, more than 14 points higher than what we would have observed through descriptive categorization alone, and nearly 30 points higher than the survey population mean. Table 21 in Appendix C confirms that these differences are statistically significant from the sample mean. Similarly, Table 21 reveals that black respondents, both primary and ascriptive, have statistically warmer means than the broader sample.

Attitudes Toward the Government's Role in Guaranteeing Each Citizen a Job

Respondents were asked the following question regarding their attitudes toward jobs provided by the government:

> "Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Government Jobs Question

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Frequency	310	302	507	626	545	397	323
%	10	10	17	21	18	13	11

N= 3,010. Mean= 4.1

The survey mean response to the government jobs question was 4.089. Table 6 displays the frequency distribution of responses to the welfare question among all respondents in the survey.

Mean responses to the jobs question were the highest among males, Protestants, white, and Asian Americans, signifying that they are the most likely among the subpopulations included in Table 7 to believe individuals are responsible for their own fate rather than advocating for policies that make the government responsible for public job creation.

We might also expect class identities to be related to the attitudes reflected in this government jobs question. Work by Carnes (2013) and Gest (2016) suggest that class consciousness influences a number of politically relevant attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, researchers spanning the past several decades have noted the role of class as a powerful predictor of voting behavior and political attitudes (Carnes, 2012; Ferguson, 2012; Frable, 1997; Gay, 2004, 2006; Converse et al., 1960;

Table 7: Crosstab: Responses to Government Jobs Question by Primary Identity

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1	0	0	10	6	14	61	30	3	8	5	0	0
Col. %	0.0	0.0	0.192	0.231	0.075	0.127	0.079	0.231	0.108	0.081	0.0	0.0
2	0	0	5	1	9	48	31	6	10	7	1	4
	0.0	0.0	0.096	0.038	0.048	0.1	0.082	0.462	0.135	0.113	0.5	0.095
3	1	3	5	4	24	86	42	1	16	16	0	5
	1.0	0.167	0.096	0.154	0.129	0.179	0.106	0.077	0.216	0.258	0.0	0.119
4	0	5	13	4	39	115	86	1	14	13	0	6
	0.0	0.278	0.25	0.154	0.21	0.24	0.228	0.077	0.189	0.129	0.0	0.143
5	0	4	12	3	42	87	64	0	10	8	0	10
	0.0	0.222	0.231	0.115	0.226	0.181	0.169	0.0	0.135	0.129	0.0	0.238
6	0	5	5	3	29	45	71	1	9	8	1	14
	0.0	0.278	0.096	0.115	0.156	0.094	0.188	0.077	0.122	0.129	0.5	0.333
7	0	1	2	5	29	38	56	1	7	5	0	3
	0.0	0.056	0.038	0.192	0.156	0.079	0.148	0.077	0.095	0.081	0.0	0.071
N	1	18	52	26	186	480	378	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	3.0	4.8	3.7	4.0	4.6	3.9	4.5	2.7	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.8

Fiorina, 1981). Table 8 takes a closer look at how views on government jobs may differ among those who express a class category as their primary identity compared with what we might see under a cross tabulation of attitudes using the conventional descriptive measure of class.

When we measure class in the conventional sense as a demographic variable answered by the entire survey population, the mean response to the government jobs question for lower class individuals is 3.5 (N=360), 4.0 for the working class (N=1,208), 4.3 for the middle class (N=1,366) and 4.8 among individuals in the upper class category (N=75). The IMS allows us to compare the cross tabulation of welfare attitudes and the conventional class variable with welfare attitudes among the subset of respondents who were given the opportunity to select a class category as their identity object – individuals assigned to view the full set of identity groups in Conditions 2, 4, or 6. Among people who selected a class category as their identity object, approximately 10 percent of the individuals in Conditions 2, 4, and 6, the mean response to the government jobs question for lower class individuals was 2.7 (N= 13), 3.9 for working class (N=74), 3.9 for middle class (N= 62), and 2.8 among people who identified as belonging to the upper class (N=2). When we observe individuals who selected one of the four class categories as their identity object, we see that people who strongly identify as belonging to the lower class have a lower mean response to the government jobs question that what is reflected in the conventional measure of class. In other words, people who subjectively see themselves as lower class believe more strongly that the government has a responsibility to ensure jobs and a good standard of living than what we would observe under conventional survey observation methods by almost a full point on the 7 point scale. Tables 24 and 25 in Appendix C show that lower class respondents have a statistically significant difference in mean attitudes from the sample mean on the government jobs question. Tables 24 and 25 further reveal that primary identifying white (mean 4.5), male (mean 4.5), and Protestant (mean 4.8) respondents also have statistically significant differences in means from broader sample –

Table 8: Crosstab: Responses to Government Jobs Question by Class Identity

Attitude Rating	Low. Class	Low. Class All	Work. Class	Work. Class All	Mid. Class	Mid. Class All	Upp. Class	Upp. Class All
1	3	71	8	127	5	107	0	4
Col. %	0.231	0.197	0.108	0.105	0.081	0.078	0.000	0.053
2	6	47	10	132	7	119	1	4
	0.462	0.131	0.135	0.109	0.113	0.087	0.5	0.053
3	1	57	16	209	16	233	0	8
	0.077	0.158	0.216	0.173	0.258	0.171	0.000	0.107
4	1	77	14	260	13	277	0	12
	0.077	0.214	0.189	0.215	0.129	0.203	0.000	0.160
5	0	49	10	205	8	273	0	18
	0.000	0.136	0.135	0.170	0.129	0.2	0.000	0.24
6	1	27	9	151	8	205	1	14
	0.077	0.075	0.122	0.125	0.129	0.15	0.5	0.187
7	1	32	7	124	5	152	0	15
	0.077	0.089	0.095	0.103	0.081	0.111	0.000	0.2
N	13	360	74	1,208	62	1,366	2	75
Column Mean	2.7	3.5	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.8

significance that (in the case of white and male respondents) would not be observed if the analysis considered only ascriptive categorization for these individuals.

Part II

For the following set of questions, survey subjects were asked to respond to the following prompt:

> We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. Some of these problems are listed below, and for each one indicate whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.

	Too much (1)	About right (2)	Too Little (3)
Welfare (1)	○	○	○
Assistance to the poor (2)	○	○	○
Education (3)	○	○	○
Defense (4)	○	○	○
Climate change (5)	○	○	○

Half of respondents were assigned to answer the first welfare question (N=1,494) while the other half were assigned to answer the second question regarding assistance to the poor (N=1,511).[14] All respondents answered the final three questions regarding spending on education, defense, and climate change. All the crosstabs in Part II reflect attitudes among people in Conditions 2, 4, or 6 who were exposed to the full set of identities and who selected one of the racial, class, gender, or Protestant groups as their main identity group.

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[14]Respondents were not forced to answer every single question on the survey, so although the assignments to the first or second question were random and equal, the final N in each group reflects some missing responses).

Welfare

Table 9 is a crosstab of attitudes on welfare spending. In general, people who offered a lower class primary identity believe too little money is spent on welfare, while those who offered an Asian, male, white, or working class identity tended to believe too much money is spent on welfare.

Table 9: Attitudes Toward Welfare Spending

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1 Too Much	0	4	6	4	39	77	85	0	13	11	0	8
Col. %	0.0	0.222	0.115	0.154	0.21	0.16	0.225	0.0	0.176	0.177	0.0	0.19
2 About Right	1	2	11	10	37	90	65	2	6	8	0	7
	1.0	0.111	0.212	0.385	0.199	0.188	0.172	0.154	0.081	0.129	0.0	0.167
3 Too Little	0	1	8	4	17	68	37	3	5	7	2	5
	0.0	0.056	0.154	0.154	0.091	0.142	0.098	0.231	0.068	0.113	1.0	0.119
N	1	7	25	18	93	235	187	5	24	26	2	20
Column Mean	2.0	1.6	2.1	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.7	2.6	1.7	1.9	3.0	1.9
No Resp.	0	11	27	8	93	245	191	8	50	36	0	22
	0.0	0.611	0.519	0.308	0.5	0.51	0.505	0.615	0.676	0.581	0.0	0.524

Among all respondents, the mean response to (WELFARE 1) was 1.9 (SD 0.8, SE 0.02). N=1,494.

Table 10: Mean Responses to Welfare Question by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	1,137	1.8	0.8	0.0
	670	1.9	0.8	0.0
	93	1.8	0.7	0.1
Black / African American	179	2.2	0.7	0.1
	113	2.2	0.7	0.1
	25	2.1	0.8	0.2
Asian American / Pacific Islander	77	2.1	0.7	0.1
	56	2.0	0.7	0.1
	7	1.6	0.8	0.3
Hispanic / Latino	124	1.9	0.8	0.1
	61	1.9	0.7	0.1
	18	2.0	0.7	0.2
Native American / Alaska Native	21	2.2	0.8	0.2
	10	1.7	0.7	0.2
	1	2.0	NA	NA
Middle Eastern	8	2.0	0.9	0.3
	3	1.0	0	0
	0	NA	NA	NA
Other	15	2.1	0.9	0.2
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Male	716	1.9	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	187	1.7	0.8	0.1
Female	778	1.9	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	235	2.0	0.8	0.1
Protestant	388	1.7	0.7	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	20	1.9	0.8	0.2
Survey Population Mean	1,494	1.9	0.8	0.0

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

In Table 10 we can observe some differences between mean responses to the welfare question based on the conventional demographic variable (the top line in each group), and mean responses among those who offered a racial, gender, or Protestant primary identity (bottom line in each group).

Although people who primarily identified as black or African American had a mean response 0.13 points lower than descriptively black respondents, people who chose an African American primary identity still had a mean response of 2.1, fully .2 points higher than the survey population mean of 1.9.

On the other end of the spectrum, people who offered a white or male primary identity had lower means compared to the survey population average (.14 and .16 points below the survey population mean, respectively), reflecting the attitude that they believe too much is being spent on welfare, and to a somewhat stronger degree than what we would observe using the conventional measures of race and gender.

Tables 26 and 27 in Appendix C report the statistically significant differences in means for responses to the welfare spending question. The significance table reveals that among lower class respondents (which are not shown in Tables 9 and 10), both primary and ascriptive lower class individuals have significantly stronger attitudes toward welfare spending. Because the question uses only a three point scale, it is difficult to observe variation which may explain why the differences for other groups fail to achieve statistical significance from the sample mean. Further, the entire sample was randomly assigned to receive only one of either the welfare question or the "assistance to the poor" question, which follows in this analysis. Because only half of all respondents were exposed to the welfare question, the statistical power may have been diluted for this portion of the analysis.

Assistance to the Poor

In general, most respondents tended to believe too little spending is being given toward aid to the poor, as seen in Table 11.

Table 11: Attitudes Toward Assistance to the Poor

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1 Too Much	0	1	1	0	16	30	48	1	9	5	0	8
Col. %	0.0	0.091	0.019	0.0	0.086	0.062	0.127	0.077	0.122	0.081	0.0	0.19
2 About Right	0	7	10	2	34	87	81	0	10	12	0	8
	0.0	0.091	0.192	0.077	0.183	0.181	0.214	0.0	0.135	0.194	0.0	0.19
3 Too Little	0	3	16	4	42	128	62	7	31	19	0	6
	0.0	0.273	0.308	0.154	0.226	0.267	0.164	0.538	0.419	0.306	0.0	0.143
N	0	11	27	6	92	235	191	8	50	36	0	22
Column Mean	0.0	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.8	2.4	2.4	0.0	1.9
No Resp.	1	7	25	20	94	235	187	5	24	26	2	20
	1.0	0.545	0.481	0.769	0.505	0.49	0.495	0.385	0.324	0.419	1.0	0.476

Among all respondents, the mean response to (WELFARE 2) was 2.3 (SD 0.7, SE 0.02). (Only half respondents saw this question N=1,511)

Table 12: Mean Responses to Assistance to the Poor by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	1,142	2.3	0.8	0.0
	640	2.3	0.7	0.0
	92	2.3	0.6	0.1
Black / African American	155	2.6	0.6	0.1
	110	2.5	0.7	0.1
	27	2.6	0.6	0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander	84	2.2	0.7	0.1
	50	2.2	0.7	0.1
	11	2.2	0.6	0.2
Hispanic / Latino	157	2.4	0.7	0.1
	66	2.3	0.7	0.1
	6	2.7	0.5	0.2
Native American / Alaska Native	23	2.7	0.6	0.1
	3	3.0	0	0
	0	–	–	–
Middle Eastern	2	1.5	0.7	0.5
	2	2.0	0	0
	0	–	–	–
Other	16	2.0	0.9	0.2
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Male	730	2.2	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	191	2.1	0.8	0.1
Female	781	2.4	0.7	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	245	2.4	0.7	0.0
Protestant	393	2.1	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	22	1.9	0.8	0.1
Survey Population Mean	1,511	2.3	0.7	0.02

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

In Table 12 we see that means across groups are higher when asked to rate spending on aid to the poor rather than welfare. Recall that while the survey population mean for views on welfare spending was 1.9, the survey population mean regarding aid to the poor was 2.3 – fully 0.4 points higher on the three point scale.

Still, people who offered a white or Protestant primary identity were likely to give lower mean responses regarding their views on aid to the poor (2.1 and 2.0, respectively). People who primarily identified as women also had a mean response lower than the population average, and lower for all three groups than what would be observed using the conventional demographic identity measures. Table 28 in Appendix C reports the statistical significance of the difference in means for all groups used in this analysis, and shows that no groups means are statistically significant from the sample mean on the "assistance to the poor" question. Again, because only half of all respondents were exposed to the question, and because of the limitations of a three point scale, the statistical power may have been diluted for this portion of the analysis.

Education

Table 13 shows that in general, individuals across group conditions believe that education spending should either increase or stay at its current level.

Table 13: Attitudes Toward Education Spending

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1 Too Much	0	1	3	0	23	27	55	2	7	4	0	6
Col. %	0.0	0.056	0.058	0.081	0.124	0.056	0.146	0.054	0.095	0.065	0.0	0.143
2 About Right	0	6	11	12	61	135	122	3	8	15	1	18
	0.0	0.333	0.212	0.462	0.328	0.281	0.323	0.231	0.108	0.242	1.0	0.429
3 Too Little	1	11	38	12	100	318	201	8	59	43	1	18
	1.0	0.611	0.731	0.462	0.538	0.662	0.532	0.615	0.797	0.694	0.0	0.429
N	1	18	52	24	184	480	378	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	3	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.3
No Resp.	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.077	0.011	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Among all respondents, the mean response to (WELFARE 3) was 2.5 (SD 0.7, SE 0.01).

Table 14: Mean Responses to Education Question by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	2,277	2.5	0.7	0.0
	1,309	2.5	0.7	0.0
	184	2.4	0.7	0.1
Black / African American	334	2.7	0.6	0.0
	223	2.7	0.6	0.0
	52	2.7	0.6	0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander	161	2.5	0.6	0.1
	106	2.4	0.7	0.1
	18	2.6	0.6	0.2
Hispanic / Latino	281	2.5	0.6	0.0
	127	2.5	0.6	0.1
	24	2.5	0.5	0.1
Native American / Alaska Native	44	2.8	0.6	0.1
	13	2.5	0.8	0.2
	1	3.0	NA	NA
Middle Eastern	10	2.5	0.7	0.2
	5	1.6	0.9	0.4
	0	–	–	–
Other	31	2.45	0.9	0.2
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Male	1,444	2.4	0.7	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	378	2.39	0.7	0.0
Female	1,559	2.6	0.6	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	480	2.6	0.6	0.0
Protestant	781	2.4	0.7	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	42	2.3	0.7	0.1
Survey Population Mean	3,003	2.5	0.7	0.0

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

When it comes to views on education spending, Protestants again stick out as the group distinguishing themselves from the population mean. Table 14 shows that across most groups, mean responses regarding education spending do not differ much between the conventional and subjective measures of identity. People who offer a primary Protestant identity however, have views .15 points lower than what we would observe under the conventional categorization, and .24 lower than the sample mean on the three point scale. Table 29 in Appendix C reports the statistical significance of the difference in means for all groups used in this analysis, and shows that no groups means are statistically significant from the sample mean on the education spending question.

Defense

Table 15 shows that among the primary identity groups listed, Protestants again seem to express distinctive views, this time as the group with the highest share of respondents indicating that not enough money is being spent on defense. Those who offered primary middle and lower class identities however had higher shares of respondents expressing that too much is being spent on defense although, as noted in Tables 30 and 31 (Appendix C) this difference is only statistically significant for primary identifying middle class respondents. Again, in the case of middle class respondents on defense spending, we see on Table 31 that primary identity as a middle class person reveals stronger attitudes than we would observe if the analysis used only ascriptive data.

Table 15: Attitudes Toward Defense Spending

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1 Too Much	0	5	18	11	58	183	115	8	27	31	1	9
Col. %	0.0	0.278	0.346	0.423	0.312	0.381	0.304	0.615	0.365	0.5	0.5	0.214
2 About Right	1	11	22	10	67	164	130	2	29	23	0	14
	1.0	0.611	0.423	0.385	0.36	0.342	0.344	0.154	0.392	0.371	0.0	0.333
3 Too Little	0	2	12	3	60	133	133	3	18	8	1	19
	0.0	0.111	0.231	0.115	0.323	0.277	0.352	0.231	0.243	0.129	0.5	0.452
N	1	18	52	24	185	480	378	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.6	1.9	1.6	2.0	2.2
No Resp.	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.077	0.005	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Among all respondents, the mean response to (WELFARE 4) was 1.9 (SD 0.8, SE 0.01).

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Table 16: Mean Responses to Defense Question by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	2,278	2.0	0.8	0.0
	1,309	2.0	0.8	0.0
	185	2.0	0.8	0.1
Black / African American	334	1.8	0.8	0.0
	223	1.9	0.8	0.1
	52	1.9	0.8	0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander	161	1.5	0.6	0.1
	106	1.5	0.6	0.1
	18	1.8	0.6	0.2
Hispanic / Latino	281	1.8	0.7	0.1
	127	1.8	0.8	0.1
	24	1.7	0.7	0.1
Native American / Alaska Native	44	1.8	0.8	0.1
	13	2.0	0.8	0.2
	1	2.0	NA	NA
Middle Eastern	10	1.8	0.9	0.3
	5	1.6	0.6	0.2
	0	–	–	–
Other	31	1.8	0.9	0.2
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Male	1,445	1.9	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	378	1.9	0.9	0.2
Female	1,559	1.9	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	480	1.9	0.8	0.0
Protestant	718	2.2	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	42	2.2	0.8	0.1
Survey Population Mean	3,004	1.9	0.8	0.0

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

In Table 16 we do not observe much difference between mean group attitudes toward defense spending. Table 30 in Appendix C complements this result, showing that none of the race, gender, or religious categories of primary identity produce statistically significant means from that of the broader sample.

Climate Change

The identity group we might expect to matter on attitudes toward climate change spending is the Protestant group, given the long history and sometimes contentions relationship between religious and scientific thinkers. The Pew Research Center reports that views about climate change vary by religious affiliation and level of religious observance. In a 2015 study, white Protestants were the least likely of the religious groups surveyed to believe that climate change was primarily due to human activity at 41%, compared with 56% of black Protestants, 77% of Hispanic Catholics, and 64% of the religiously unaffiliated. The report also notes that other social identities (such as political party identification) are stronger predictors of beliefs about climate change than religion, however, the report does not specify the exact question used to determine racial and religious group affiliation ().

The IMS survey does reveal that Protestant identity may be relevant on the climate change spending question. On Table 17 we see that a large share of people who primarily identify as Protestant (50 percent) give a rating of 1, indicating that they believe too much money is being spent on climate change. Hispanics and those offering a lower class or middle class primary identity tended to have a larger share of respondents indicate that not enough money is being spent on climate change issues. Tables 32 and 33 in Appendix C confirm that for people who primarily identify as lower class, middle class, and Protestant, attitudes toward climate spending are statistically stronger than those observed among the broader sample. For lower class and middle

Table 17: Attitudes Toward Climate Change Spending

Rating	Am. Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Female	Male	Low. Class	Work. Class	Mid. Class	Upp. Class	Protestant
1 Too Much	0	1	10	3	48	105	130	1	16	9	0	21
Col. %	0.0	0.056	0.192	0.115	0.258	0.219	0.344	0.077	0.216	0.145	0.0	0.5
2 About Right	0	8	19	6	67	158	109	3	23	14	1	11
	0.0	0.444	0.365	0.231	0.36	0.329	0.288	0.231	0.311	0.226	0.5	0.262
3 Too Little	1	9	23	15	70	217	139	9	35	39	1	10
	1.0	0.5	0.442	0.577	0.376	0.452	0.368	0.692	0.473	0.629	0.5	0.238
N	1	18	52	24	185	480	378	13	74	62	2	42
Column Mean	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.6	2.3	2.5	2.5	1.7
No Resp.	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.077	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Among all respondents, the mean response to (WELFARE 5) was 2.2 (SD 0.8, SE 0.01).

class primary identifiers, these attitudes are stronger than what we would observe under ascriptive categorization alone, revealing again that primary identity affords more nuance in the analysis and provides a deeper picture of the relationship between identity and attitudes.

Table 18: Mean Responses to Climate Change Question by Race and Ethnicity

	N	Mean	SD	SE
White / Caucasian	2,279	2.2	0.8	0.0
	1,310	2.2	0.8	0.0
	185	2.1	0.8	0.1
Black / African American	334	2.3	0.7	0.0
	223	2.3	0.7	0.1
	52	2.3	0.8	0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander	161	2.4	0.7	0.1
	106	2.4	0.8	0.1
	18	2.4	0.6	0.2
Hispanic / Latino	281	2.3	0.8	0.1
	127	2.3	0.7	0.1
	24	2.5	0.7	0.2
Native American / Alaska Native	44	2.6	0.7	0.1
	13	2.6	0.7	0.2
	1	3.0	NA	NA
Middle Eastern	10	2.2	0.9	0.3
	5	1.6	0.8	0.4
	0	NA	NA	NA
Other	31	2.1	0.9	0.2
	NA	–	–	–
	NA	–	–	–
Male	1,446	2.1	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	378	2.0	0.8	0.0
Female	1,559	2.2	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	480	2.2	0.8	0.0
Protestant	781	1.9	0.8	0.0
	–	–	–	–
	42	1.7	0.8	0.1
Survey Population Mean	3,005	2.2	0.8	0.0

For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.

Table 18 shows that Protestants in the sample are already on average more inclined to believe too much is being spent on climate change than the rest of the survey population. But those who offer a primary Protestant identity give an average rating of 1.7 on the climate spending scale, .2 points lower than the conventional categorization would suggest and 1.6 points lower than the survey population average on the three point scale. The differences in means for both primary and ascriptive Protestant respondents are statistically significant from the broader population mean (see Appendix C, Tables 32 and 33).

In the opposite direction, people who offer a Hispanic/Latino primary identity have a mean view on climate change spending .2 points higher than what we observe under the conventional measure, and .3 points higher than the survey population average on the three point scale, though again, these differences are only statistically significant for individuals who self-categorize, either ascriptively or primarily, as Protestant.

The finding that primary identification leads to stronger opinion for some groups may lead one to wonder whether group identity is related to particular political ideologies. However, for most groups in this sample, primary self-identification only leads to stronger opinion on *some,* not all issues. Still, throughout this analysis of IMS data, we find that people who offer a primary white, male, or Protestant identity seem to have stronger attitudes than what we would observe under conventional categorizations. Part III below presents demographic profiles of these groups and discusses the distinctive characteristics of respondents who primarily self-identified as white, male, or Protestant.

Part III

So Who Are The People Who Primarily Identify as White, Male, and Protestant?

Table 19 reflects responses from people randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, and 6, who were exposed to the full set of social categories from which to select a primary identity, and displays demographic traits of people who offered a primary white, male, or Protestant identity.

People who primarily identified as Protestant (N=42) were overwhelmingly white (88%), and were mostly conservative (64%). Primary Protestant identifiers were also more highly educated than other groups, with about 30% of respondents having attended some college, 30% possessing a 4-year degree, and 12% possessing a post-graduate degree such as a law degree or Ph.D. Primary Protestant identifiers were also more likely to be women (64%) and from the middle class (57%).

Those who offered a primary white identity (N=186) were mostly male (59%), and mostly middle (50%) or working class (35%). People who primarily identified as white were fairly evenly dispersed in self-reported ideology with a slight conservative leaning (31%).

Respondents who offered a primary male identity (N=378) were mostly white (76%) although some people who primarily identified as male also self-reported being African American (7%) or Asian American/Pacific Islander (9%), with fewer primary male respondents identifying as members of other racial and ethnic groups. Primary male identifiers were also most likely to belong to the middle class (45%) or working class (39%) and were fairly evenly dispersed in ideology and region.

To reiterate, white and male respondents do not seem to be particularly distinctive in their expressed ideology. In fact, the relatively even ideological distribution of white and male respondents

Table 19: White, Male, Protestant Identifier Demographics

	White	Male	Protestant
Gender			
Male	110	378	15
%	0.59	1.0	0.36
Female	76		27
	0.41		0.64
Education			
Did not graduate high school	11	14	0
	0.06	0.04	0.0
High school graduate	66	118	8
	0.35	0.31	0.19
Some college, no degree	30	67	12
	0.16	0.18	0.29
2-year college degree	17	36	5
	0.09	0.1	0.12
4-year college degree	47	112	12
	0.25	0.3	0.29
Postgraduate degree	15	31	5
	0.08	0.08	0.12
Class			
Lower class	22	48	1
	0.12	0.13	0.02
Working class	66	148	16
	0.35	0.39	0.38
Middle class	93	171	24
	0.5	0.45	0.57
Upper class	5	10	1
	0.03	0.03	0.02
Ideology			
Liberal	47	87	7
	0.25	0.23	0.17
Conservative	57	130	27
	0.31	0.34	0.64
Moderate	51	117	8
	0.27	0.31	0.19
Haven't thought about it	31	44	0
	0.17	0.12	0.0
Race			
White / Caucasian	183	289	37
	0.98	0.76	0.88
Black / African American	0	28	3
	0.0	0.07	0.07
Hispanic / Latino	0	15	1
	0.0	0.04	0.02
Asian / Pacific Islander	2	33	1
	0.01	0.09	0.02
American Indian / Alaska Native	0	4	0
	0.0	0.01	0.0
Middle Eastern	1	0	0
	0.01	0.0	0.0
Other	0	8	0
	0.0	0.02	0.0

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may gesture that identification is drawing out something more than ideology. A question for further research emerges: how should we explain the shared political attitudes of white and male respondents apart from ideology? There may something distinctive about the choice to identify as white or male in the first place, given that respondents were given a host of socially relevant categories from which to choose, and given that primary identification with a group does not appear to be related to consistently different attitudes for most other groups (although for some issues, primary group identification seems to matter, such as immigration for Hispanics and Latinos, and welfare for Black Americans).

Discussion

The findings of the IMS complement the findings of previous theoretical and qualitative work showing that individual perceptions of identity are more subjective than researchers have assumed using conventional strategies for the measurement of identity. Specifically, we see that attitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differ for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional "checked box" measure of group identity. Individuals who primarily identify as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what we would observe under conventional correlation between ascriptive categorization and attitudinal outcomes, especially on welfare and immigration issues.

Protestants held the most consistently conservative attitudes among the sample represented in this paper. Having a distinct Protestant self-identity is associated with colder feelings toward immigrants whether undocumented or in the country with a work visa, the belief that people should advance their social standing without the assistance of guaranteed jobs from the government, preference for less spending on welfare, aid to the poor, education, and climate change, and more

spending on defense. These attitudes were even more strongly in the conservative direction for people who offered Protestantism as their primary identity. When being Protestant is more than a descriptive category and is part of a person's self-concept, we observe differences in policy-related attitudes. In other words, being Protestant is one thing, the belief that being Protestant matters is, substantively, another.

Protestants, males, and white Americans are not the only categories where primary identification with the group relates to distinctive policy attitudes. However, for groups such as Black Americans or Hispanic and Latino Americans, it seems the identity to attitude relationship only peaks for certain policy areas. Concerning immigration, those who offered the Hispanic or Latino group as their primary identity reported warmer feelings toward undocumented immigrants than those who were merely descriptively categorized as Hispanic or Latino. Primary Hispanic and Latino respondents gave an average of 66.24 points on the feeling thermometer, more than 14 points higher than what we would have observed through descriptive categorization alone, and nearly 30 points higher than the survey population mean. Similarly, black self-identity is associated with the view that more money should be spent on aid to the poor and welfare programs, and though black respondents expressed numeric differences that bear substantively my interpretation, this finding does not appear to be statistically significant. Class likewise surfaced as a relevant identity related to preferences for increased welfare spending and the belief that the government should provide jobs for citizens. Lower class and middle class respondents also tended to believe too little money is being spent on climate issues.

Perhaps equally as interesting are the places where primary identity does not appear to coincide with stronger policy attitudes. While I certainly do not intend to undercut the relevance of identity in American politics, I do take these results to mean that identity may not be of paramount influence on every policy area that a person considers. The IMS provides an especially specific

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measure of self-identification, and if we don't see social identities cropping up on our measures of policy attitudes when individuals select those identities themselves, I believe it is an even stronger test of when identity does matter. On the other hand, when we do see primary identities emerge through distinct political attitudes, we have a more direct indication that identity with a particular group matters for the policy considerations of individuals in that group. This is especially true when the policy preferences observed for primary identifiers are statistically different from those observed using ascriptive measures because it indicates that primary identity tells us more specific information about respondents' attitudes than we would have otherwise observed. In other words, the measurement strategy used in the IMS provides a useful way for future scholars to determine the policy areas for which identity (rather than ascription) plays an especially important role.

Conclusion

In February 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) added male supremacy groups to its list of hate groups for the first time since SPLC began tracking hate organizations in 1999 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2018b). The addition of male supremacy groups comes at a time of increased political visibility among women, people of color, immigrants, and even children. The perception of dispossession among some men, especially some white men, plays an increasingly important role in the political considerations of white America, and in many cases is underscored by other elements such as religious conservatism and socioeconomic status. Indeed, when the politics of equality for marginalized communities are perceived as dispossession for white people, we see the politics of white identity rise to the surface. Though the politics of white identity are not new to American politics, the particular social and political climate in the United States mean this is something worth paying attention to and analyzing with nuance. There is important variation to understand, and social scientists need to refine the discussion about what white identity means

apart from white nationalism and white supremacy. In an increasingly pluralistic society, social scientists stand to gain information about the degree of variation displayed in self-identification, especially for people who most strongly identify as white, male, or Protestant. In a time when the dividing lines of politics are increasingly drawn along racial boundaries, understanding how identity relates to political choice has clear and immediate implications for both public policy and electoral politics. As research and measurement strategies are further refined, we may stand to see a more robust portrait of identity and its ties to the policy preferences and political behaviors of groups.

While the measure proposed in this paper provides a promising alternative conceptual framework for understanding how individuals may be thinking about group identity at the individual level, identity remains a broad topic with several spaces of nuance left to consider. First, we may question how much individuals are really picking and choosing their level of personal proximity to groups. For instance, individuals with certain class, gender, or racial and ethnic attributes may be reminded of their group membership status by societal forces such as socioeconomic inequality, gender disparity or racial and ethnic animus from other groups. Regardless of whether they wish to be closely associated with certain groups, individuals whose mere membership places them in group categories heavily affected by societal factors may conceive of their group membership as a heavily influential part of their personal identity and group consciousness may play a major role in their political attitudes and behavior. One feature of the point allocation measure used in this paper is that it allows us to gauge an individual's strength of association with a particular group by counting how many points were allocated to one group in relation to another. While assessing strength of association was beyond the scope of this paper, the data does allow for continued research that may help us understand the role of proximity operationalized as relative point distributions in the point allocation task. Future work can use point distributions to understand whether

stronger identity is related to stronger policy preference, and whether there are thresholds at which point allocation begins or ceases to correspond with political attitudes.

Second, the context in which individuals consider their personal fate to be connected to group status matters. Some individuals may exhibit a consistent sense of attachment between groups regardless of environment and allocate the same number of points to each group whether at home, work, or elsewhere. Other individuals may feel their status as a woman, for example, matters less at home where familial roles may be established within the household than at work where gender norms tend to dominate certain office settings and can affect the likelihood of receiving certain types of work assignments, equal pay, promotions and the like. Further research should attempt to distinguish whether individuals who differ in their primary self-identity based on environment also change their policy attitudes with those environmental considerations.

Third, we may question at what age individuals begin to discover identities they did not previously know they had. Identities are fluid, but they are also largely reinforced by social surroundings. As individuals age, exposure over time to different social environments may serve to reinforce or challenge a person's concept of self. The measure as used in this paper does not allow us to understand how individual attachments to groups may change over time, and future research should use the point allocation measure on panel studies to assess identity and political attitudes as they manifest within individuals, across social categories, and over time. A panel study over time, or questions adapted to measure attachment retrospectively may allow researchers to begin understanding how group identity is formed, maintained, and adapted throughout an individual's lifespan.

As research expands to consider more nuance in the relationship between self-identity and political outcomes, social scientists will gain better sense of how individuals subjectively relate to group identities. Continued work will shed light on the relationships between individuals, their

subjective identities, and the empirical correlates of identity such as inequality, intergroup conflict and violence, coalitional politics, and descriptive representation, the implications for which are useful for the study of group preference comparatively and across scholarly disciplines.

Conclusion

Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate how additional theoretical conceptions and measurement strategies may add context to our understanding of identity group politics. Here I discuss the contributions of my thesis, summarize the main arguments and findings of each chapter, present recommendations for further consideration among scholars and practitioners of social science, and detail my plans for future research.

Chapter Summaries

1 Typologies of Group Conscious Thinking

This chapter outlined the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics, addressing the tension between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, and political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. By introducing the type-predictor framework, I placed my work on an expanding frontier of the identity politics literature that commonly links ascriptive group membership to political attitudes and behavior, but has increasingly developed to consider intersectionality. The framework rests on the notion that perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular

trends in attitudes and behaviors, but the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient.

2 The Type-Predictor Framework in Action

In this chapter I presented support for the type-predictor framework using data through the analysis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The interviews demonstrated that when we further interrogate how attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, we may develop a more refined picture of identity and intersectional politics in the United States. The open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provided support for the type-predictor framework. I found examples of all five "types" and all four "predictors" in the typology, and the relationships between types and predictors appeared to be in the directions I expected. Among the interview sample, a sense of shared outcomes was related to the different degrees of group consciousness individuals may hold at the individual level depending on the group categories with which they did (or did not) self-identify. While the convention, at least in political science research, has been to control for categories such as race, socioeconomic status, gender, and religion in a regression framework, and to use these categories as explanatory variables for a host of political phenomena, these interview findings suggest that we should be more careful in our suppositions regarding the associations between social group identities and their empirical correlates.

3 Can Alternative Measurement Strategies Provide New Insights for Our Understanding of Group Political Attitudes in the United States?

In this chapter I developed a new measurement strategy for the study of identity that allows respondents a greater degree of flexibility when considering the subjective relationship between their sense of group identity and the policy attitudes often considered to be empirical correlates

of identity. In the 2015 Identity Measurement Study (IMS) I introduced a point allocation strategy for measuring identity that allows survey respondents a fixed number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across a set of social identity categories. The design also allows us to explore whether the attitudes we observe when individuals select a primary identity are different from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures of demographic correlation. The findings of the IMS complement the findings of previous theoretical and qualitative work showing that individual perceptions of identity are more subjective than researchers have assumed using conventional strategies for the measurement of identity. Specifically, the findings showed that attitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differed for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional "checked box" measure of ascriptive group identity. Individuals who primarily identified as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what we would have observed under conventional correlation between ascriptive categorization and attitudinal outcomes. Specifically, those who most strongly identified as Protestant, male, or as a white person were most likely to have colder feelings toward immigrants and more conservative views on welfare than people who more strongly associated with other groups. These attitudinal differences were even more pronounced when the analysis considered policy views according to the primary identity offered by respondents rather than by ascriptive categorization alone.

Contributions

My work is situated at the intersection of political psychology and race and ethnic studies, drawing from, and contributing to, the literatures of political science, psychology, and sociology. I use both

qualitative and quantitative methods as research tools, bringing disciplinary perspectives into dialogue with one another as a way of engaging with the literatures mentioned above. In particular, this dissertation exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate multidimensionality in the study of identity, and is part of a growing scholarly literature offering alternative measures of group consciousness that accommodate a more intersectional operationalization of identity. I offer the following contributions through my dissertation research:

- A typology for conceptualizing group consciousness. My type-predictor framework addresses the variation in inter-group expressions of shared political fate and posits that it is they way a person self-categorizes, rather than her ascriptive categorization alone, that influences whether she perceives her personal fate to be tied to the status of other group members or not. At the same time, the theoretical underpinnings of the type-predictor framework incorporate intersectionality, making the typology specific enough to describe the relationship between self-identification and expressions of shared fate yet flexible enough to encompass the range of identity expressions that may be expressed either within a single person or across groups.

- An analysis of open-ended responses to the linked fate question and other measures of group consciousness. My dissertation analyzes open-ended responses to the linked fate question across a large cross-section of interview respondents. In addition, my work is one of a handful of studies to allow respondents to answer the linked fate question in reference to the group with which they primarily self-identify rather than having respondents answer the linked fate question in reference to an ascribed social category such as race or gender. By asking respondents how they self-identify before asking them to relate their sense of shared outcomes to the primary group, I am able to analyze linked fate according to a person's primary identification rather than by group membership alone, providing an additional dimension of context

to the linked fate literature. In addition, the open-ended response format allows me to under-stand how individuals are interpreting the linked fate question. Some respondents take the question literally (if a specific event happens to my neighbor who shares my identity, will it impact me personally?) while others interpret the question more conceptually (if people in my group are better/worse off in society, will I be better/worse off by extension?). The variation in interpretations of linked fate, quite apart from the variation in negative versus affirmative responses, lead me to believe more work can be done to develop more precise measures of shared consciousness, which will be discussed in my recommendation section. The variation in responses to linked fate do not affect my type-predictor framework, which should be applied to understand group consciousness more broadly, as linked fate is but one operationalization of group consciousness. Overall, the open-ended format of the questions used in my interview work reveal that new information and contextual development can be gained when respondents are allowed to describe the important relationships between polit-ical, psychological, and social factors in their own words.

- A point allocation system for the survey measurement of identity. By using a point allocation task to measure identity, I am able to understand how respondents weigh certain aspects of their identity in relation to others. While a handful of surveys allow respondents to select a primary identity group (the American National Election Study began asking respondents to select a primary identity in 2016), this study is the first to use the point allocation de-sign to measure identity across a range of relevant social categories alongside one another, and assess whether differences in primary versus ascriptive group membership affects our interpretation of policy attitudes within and between groups. The advantage of point al-location compared with other methods of identity measurement is that the point allocation design allows for the recognition of a primary identity (the group with the highest number

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of points) group and provides a measure of a person's magnitude of identity with each group (the distribution of points across categories). Point allocation has the potential to provide more information about how individuals self-identify relative to other measures, yet is flexible enough to be analyzed in ways that are analogous to more conventional measures of self-identification.

- Finally, by making the subjectivity of self-identification the fulcrum of my research, I engage with the increasing number of scholars who bring multi-faceted considerations of identity into greater focus within the academic literature. I especially emphasize the need to expand our scholarly understanding of marginalized communities that often believe many aspects of their identities are important to their political selves, and advocate for the further development of theory and measurement strategies aimed at encompassing more fully the range of expressions of self-identification present in a pluralistic society. Refining the techniques for examining the important, if complex, relationships between social identities and their political correlates will have impactful consequences for scholarship (because of the responsibility social scientists have to accurately reflect populations) as well as policy (because better measures can lead to more precise matching of policy to citizen preference).

Reflections and Recommendations

Though my work exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate multidimensionality in the study of identity, more work must be done to offer alternative measures of group consciousness that accommodate a more fluid operationalization of identity. I offer the following reflections and recommendations for the consideration of social scientists and practitioners interested in the application of social scientific research tools:

- As more and more communities amplify their collective voices, social scientists should respond by placing those voices at the center of theory development and the adaptation of empirical design strategies. This means doing more to allow research subjects to describe their identities and political considerations in their own words, and placing academic value on the experiences they describe alongside our social scientific interpretations of those experiences in both qualitative and quantitative research contexts. Such adaptations will be especially useful for understanding the political attitudes and experiences of communities at the margins of power, understudied populations, and groups of people who consider intersectionality to be an important part of their self-concept.

- Empirical measures of group consciousness should be more precisely developed and tested for measurement validity. Specifically, studies should test whether discriminant validity exists between linked fate and other correlates of group identity, given that several different interpretations of the linked fate question were expressed throughout my open-ended interviews. I also recommend the development of a group consciousness index that encompasses literal and conceptual dimensions of shared fate, an individual's magnitude of self-identification with the primary group, her perception of the status of the group within the broader society, whether she believes her identity to be politicized, and the degree to which she believes collective action is the best way to improve group status. Such an index would contain each element that defines group consciousness, address the notion that individuals may conceive of the relationship between group and self status along multiple dimensions, and allow researchers to conduct analyses using the index as a whole measure, or by comparing intergroup differences across its parts.

- The empirical design strategies presented in this dissertation provide new opportunities to study identity and its political correlates in other institutional and comparative contexts.

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Including the point allocation design in frequently occurring surveys could allow researchers to better understand how different events can affect the salience of particular identities and influence how people allocate points within the same set of social categories over time, especially in the presence of open (or subdued) political conflict, or in the wake of political stimuli that raise (or lower) the salience of particular identities. The point allocation design can also be adapted to look at how people identify with other socially relevant categories such as caste, ethnic groups, and linguistic groups.

- As further research uses the point allocation strategy and compares analyses of point allocation designs to those of conventional measures of identity, a guide should be developed to focus on the merits and implications of each type of design for survey researchers. The guide should summarize when the point allocation strategy adds analytic value and should be used over conventional methods such as checked boxes and multiple choice format questions.

Future Research

This dissertation provides fertile ground for the research community to continue examining multiple dimensions of identity in relation to political outcomes. Here I identify three examples of future work that would build upon the findings and empirical contributions of this dissertation:

- An empirical analysis of the type-predictor framework. Future work should test for quantitative evidence of the type-predictor framework among a national sample with an oversample of racial and ethnic minorities to compliment the qualitative findings described in this dissertation. Continued work should also develop survey measures for each of the consciousness types and predictors in the typology and develop an index of group consciousness as an outcome measure that separately measures each of the comprising parts of group consciousness:

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politicized in-group identification, a shared system of beliefs about the status of the in-group within the broader society, and a view that collective action is the best means for the group to improve its status and realize its shared interests. Developing survey measures for the consciousness types and predictors and refining the survey measurement of group consciousness will bring empirical precision to the literature which has not yet adopted a standard survey instrument for measuring the different ways a person may exhibit group consciousness (this is what a type-predictor survey measure would contribute), nor has the literature adopted a standard index for separately measuring the components of group consciousness (prior measures capture each element separately, and individual measures such as "linked fate," the "close to" question and the "life chances" question do not adequately measure the extent to which a person believes her identity to be politicized, or the role a person believes collective action will play in improving the status of her identity group).

- Additional analyses of point allocation data. The Identity Measurement Study (IMS) point allocation survey experiment yielded a rich dataset ripe for further analysis. This dissertation used only the primary identity group recorded for each respondent in the analysis, that is, the group to which a respondent allocated the greatest number of points. Continued research on the IMS data and other surveys using the point allocation design should examine other patterns in point allocation that will provide a more complete descriptive picture of the way individuals allocate points to groups. How many respondents allocate all of their points to a single group? What types of respondents distribute their points evenly across groups? Are some people more likely to skew their points in favor of one group while distributing the rest of their points evenly? Are patterns in point distribution observable across social categories? Specific work on the IMS data should take a closer look at how to explain the shared political attitudes of white and male respondents apart from ideology. To reiterate,

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white and male respondents in my sample do not seem to be particularly distinctive in their expressed ideological identification. In fact, the relatively even ideological distribution of white and male respondents may gesture that identification is drawing out something more than ideology. There may something distinctive about the choice to identify as white or male in the first place, given that respondents were given a host of socially relevant categories from which to choose, and given that primary identification with a group does not appear to be related to consistently different attitudes for most other groups (although for some issues, primary group identification seems to matter, such as immigration for Hispanics and Latinos, and welfare for Black Americans).

- Additional tests of the point allocation task to larger national samples and over time. Continued experiments should explicitly test whether assignment to the point allocation task yields different responses to an index of group consciousness questions and policy attitude measures than assignment to a task that solely asks respondents to check a box indicating primary group membership. Such experiments will add to the descriptive data about how individuals subjectively allocate points to relevant social categories while at the same time testing the causal effect of assignment to the point allocation task versus the conventional method of checking a box to indicate group identity.

My own long-term research trajectory will continue to focus on the theoretical conceptualization and measurement strategies useful for understanding how political attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, the applications for which are not limited to the United States. By developing theory and measurement designs that are applicable to local and comparative contexts I situate my work in a space that is accessible to scholars from multiple disciplines, and offer a touchpoint for continued scholarship to addresses changing political and social environments comparatively and in the United States.

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Appendix A

2014 Interview Questionnaire

Background and Demographics

This section provides basic demographic information about your background characteristics.

1. Age (if respondent is younger than 18, the interview will not proceed):

2. Place and date of birth:

3. Parents' countries of origin:

4. Gender:

5. Education (years of education, if they went to College, name of the institution):

6. Party ID:

7. Resident/Citizen:

Identity

Now I'm going to ask a few questions about your identity, how you view yourself and how you believe other people view you in a broad sense.

1. How do you identify yourself? Why?

2. 2. (If respondent identifies with multiple groups)- Do you feel a stronger sense of identity with one group over the others (Or, what group do you feel closest to)? Why?

   (a) Do you think your personal identity is tied to this group?

   (b) How do you feel about the status of your group in society right now?

3. How do you think others identify you?

   (a) a. Do you think that people in your group identify you in a different way than people who aren't in that group? Why or why not?

   (b) b. Do you think other people's perceptions of your identity matters? Why or why not?

Political Decisionmaking

Now I'm going to ask a few questions about how you form your opinions and attitudes about important issues in your life and in society more generally.

1. When you think about politics and public policy, what sorts of issues matter most to you? Why?

2. When you're forming your opinion about these policies, how do you figure out what's best?

3. Think back to the last Presidential election in 2008 between Barack Obama and John McCain. You don't have to tell me who you voted for, what I'm interested to know is how

you decided which candidate to support? What were the most important factors for you during that election? Or if you didn't vote, what things do you think would have been most important to you at the time?

   (a) How about in general? What are the most important things when you're figuring out who to vote for?

Linked Fate

1. Do you think what happens to (people in respondent's group) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

   (a) A lot, some, or not very much?

   (b) Why?

2. Do you think your life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion?

3. Based on your experiences, does it make sense to view your own life chances as being tied to the success of other people in your group?

4. Do you ever use race as a proxy for your own self-interest?

Group Solidarity

1. Do you think it is more important to foster unity within your group to achieve common goals (such as better education, health) or is it more important to join forces with other groups that are fighting to achieve similar goals such as better education, licenses, health, and immigration?

Additional Background Characteristics of Interviewers and Interview Respondents

Interviewer Profiles

	Gender	Race
Interviewer 1	M	African American
Interviewer 2	F	Chinese American
Interviewer 3	F	African American

Respondent Profiles

Names and identifying information (including date of birth) are omitted to protect the anonymity of respondents.

Respondent SU2014_01   Date: 6/25/14 Duration: 44:09 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 23

2. Place and date of birth: Illinois

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: M.A., Columbia University. B.A., Moorehouse College

6. Party ID: No affiliation

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, resident of New York City.

Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_03 Date: 6/24/14 Duration: 20:45 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 20

2. Place and date of birth: Albuquerque, NM

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines. Father - United States.

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Morehouse College (current student).

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, resident of Virginia.

Type: Multiple Identifier, Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_04 Date: 6/25/14 Duration: 23:55 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 20

2. Place and date of birth: New York City

3. Parents country of origin: China, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education (years of education, if they went to College, name of the institution): B.A., Bing-hamton University.

6. Party ID: I don't know.

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_05 Date: 6/27/14 Duration: 18:53 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 21

2. Place and date of birth: Manhattan, NY

3. Parents country of origin: China, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Baruch College (current student).

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation

File Name: SU2014_06 Date: 6/29/14 Duration: 33:45 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 83

2. Place and date of birth: Peakesville, NY

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education : Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_07   Date: 6/29/14 Duration: 60:30 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 52

2. Place and date of birth: Chicago, IL

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., Pratt Institute

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, New Jersey resident

Type: Non-Conformist, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_08   Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 34:00 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 71

2. Place and date of birth: Virginia (also lived in DE, NC, MD, KA, CA, MI).

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: Ph.D., Harvard, also University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Washington University in St. Louis.

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Non-Conformist, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_09   Date: 6/30/14 Duration: 29:28 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone

   Notes: Now works in consulting for a tech firm. Young African American male, cited many prominent figures in Black political thought throughout interview. Graduated from Morehouse College in 2013.

1. Age: 22

2. Place and date of birth: Aumsbach, Germany

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Morehouse College

6. Party ID: Republican

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, New York City resident.

Type: Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_10   Date: 7/1/14 Duration: 49:50 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Skype

1. Age: 24

2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY. Grew up in Bedstuy

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (Brooklyn)

4. Gender: Male

5. Education M.Div., Union Theological Seminary(current student). B.A., Morehouse College.

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_11   Date: 7/2/14 Duration: 31:06 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person
    Notes: fast talker, tends to mumble for lack of diction because she talks so fast. Works for Morgan Stanley.

1. Age: 22

2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY

3. Parents country of origin: Father - Dutch (Netherlands), Mother - Nigeria

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Stonybrook University

6. Party ID: Independent

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_12   Date: 7/1/2014 Duration: 22:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 21

2. Place and date of birth: Flushing, Queens, NY

3. Parents country of origin: South Korea, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Carleton College

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_13   Date: 7/1/14 Duration: 33:35 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 63

2. Place and date of birth: San Francisco, CA

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: Ph.D., UCLA

6. Party ID: None, Independent

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_14   Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 55:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone

  Notes: Older man, gentle voice, Southern. Slow talker.

1. Age: 83

2. Place and date of birth: Birmingham, AL (repeated address of first home, which is still in his family).

3. Parents country of origin: United states, both. Mother schoolteacher, father small entrepreneur.

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: Ph.D. Nova Southeastern University.

6. Party ID: Democrat, sometimes Independent

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_15   Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 48:19 Interviewer: Eileen Lam Interview Style: Phone

Notes: Southern drawl in his speech, doesn't always go straight to the point of what he's talking about, speaks with many "um's and uhh's." Kind way about his demeanor, seemed happy to provide his insights for this interview.

1. Age: 75

2. Place and date of birth: Washington, D.C.

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: 4 year college, North Carolina Central University

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. 7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_16   Date: 7/6/14 Duration: 31:08 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 21

2. Place and date of birth: New York City

3. Parents country of origin: China, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Boston University

6. Party ID: Democrat, but doesn't strongly identify

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_17   Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 40:37 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 29

2. Place and date of birth: "Born in Toronto and when I was about 8 years old our family moved to Birmingham, England, and I lived there for 3 years, and then we moved back to Canada but we moved to like a smaller town outside of Toronto. And then I lived there for like 7 years, and then I moved to Korea, and I did my last year of high school in Korea, and then I moved back to Toronto where I did college, and now I'm here [in NYC]."

3. Parents country of origin: Korea, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., Columbia University.

6. Party ID: No affiliation.

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Permanent Resident

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_18   Date: 7/8/14 Duration: 28:33 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person
 Notes: Upbeat attitude, lots of rapport with interviewer.

1. Age: 23

2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY

3. Parents country of origin: Father - Puerto Rico, Mother - United States

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., SUNY Stonybrook

6. Party ID: Democrat (hesitant)

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_19   Date: 7/11/14 Duration: 40:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 29

2. Place and date of birth: "Brazil until I was 13, then I moved to Miami. I'm in New York now."

3. Parents country of origin: South Korea, both.

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., Columbia University.

6. Party ID: No party affiliation.

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Permanent Resident.

Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation

File Name: SU2014_20 Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 26:49 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

Notes: Upbeat, warm, positive personality. Thought the interview was so cool, and really liked the questions because these are things people don't really get to talk about much. Identified as a gay woman during the interview.

1. Age: 24

2. Place and date of birth: Woodbridge, VA. But lived in Maryland briefly.

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., Columbia in Social Work

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier, Abstract Conceptualizer, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_22   Date: 7/16/14 Duration: 28:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype

 Notes: Skype interview. Some technical difficulties - connection interrupted once.

1. Age: 25

2. Place and date of birth: Schenectady, NY.

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - France, Father - United States

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Rochester Institute of Technology

6. Party ID: Independent

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_24   Date: 8/8/14 Duration: 49:50 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 36

2. Place and date of birth: South Bend, IN, grew up in Baltimore MD, then moved to NYC.

3. Parents country of origin: "Taiwan and China. My mom was born in Taiwan, my dad was born in China but then fled to Taiwan during the revolution so his roots are in China but he's not Taiwanese, so there's that whole divide on who's Taiwanese, who's Chinese. Huge political debate."

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., University of Virginia (Architecture).

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_25   Date: 7/16/14 Duration: 35:30 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 27

2. Place and date of birth: Spanish Harlem (New York)

3. Parents country of origin: Nicaragua, both.

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Fordham University.

6. Party ID: "I'm more independent nowadays. By independent I mean I kind of don't get involved in politics as much as I used to."

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, lifelong New York City resident.

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_26   Date: 7/12/14 Duration: 51:20 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 29

2. Place and date of birth: New York City – Harlem. But has also lived in Cleveland, TN for Bible College.

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both - but doesn't know anything about her father's background

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., New Life Bible College (Theology)

6. Party ID: "I usually say Independent because I never really am swayed by weather an issue is Republican or Democrat. I kind of just go according to what I'm feeling in terms of if I agree with the party or not. Because I don't always agree with one or the other, because I am a Christian so it's like, of course because I'm black, African American, I'm gonna lean more to the Democratic side for the minorities, things like that. But being a Christian I don't always agree with certain things that society says we're supposed to in a sense. So it's like that's when I lean more on the Republican side when they want everything to be in such a uniformed way. So I'm not in-between, so therefore instead of saying I'm one or the other I kind of lean more toward Independent. That doesn't mean I go for the independent candidate."

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_27 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 1:00:13 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 32

2. Place and date of birth: Cookville, TN. "It's outside of Nashville. I grew up in Gainsville, FL. I've lived in New York for quite some time. I lived in London for a while when I was getting my Master's, and then I spent some summers in Nigeria."

3. Parents country of origin: Nigeria, both. "And they've lived for the last twenty-some years in Gainsville. There's a lot of trees. It's mainly a college town, there's not much going on. But you know, it's an ok area for Florida. It provides a nice balance because it's a college town, so it's not too Southern or closed-minded. Both my parents are from Nigeria, and both my parents are Yoruba."

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., Holt International Business School in London.

6. Party ID: "I say that I'm independent, I have consistently voted recently Democratic, especially when it comes to presidential elections. I do consider myself probably – I mean, I don't know. I think in some environments I would come across as conservative, and then in others I would be liberal. So it just depends on what group of people we're talking about. But I probably in the next democratic election will vote democrat as well. So my voting behavior says democratic but I think my ideology is more independent. But I don't think we'll ever have an independent president, so we're stuck with this two party system. So despite what I may think, that's how I'm voting."

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, but dual citizen with a Nigerian passport.

Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_28   Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 22:17 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone

Notes: Brief answers, not very talkative, but happy to give his insights. Overall a pleasant-seeming person if somewhat reserved in his responses.

1. Age: 21

2. Place and date of birth: China until I was 8, and after that in New York City in Chinatown.

3. Parents country of origin: China, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., SUNY Buffalo

6. Party ID: No affiliation

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_29 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 20:37 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person

Notes: Strong New York/Bronx accent. Interview at a Starbucks with upbeat oldies Motown era music playing in the background. Interview starts with the song "It Takes Two" playing in the background.

1. Age: 23

2. Place and date of birth: Bronx. "I practically lived in the Bronx my whole life, I moved to Yonkers 5 years ago."

3. Parents country of origin: Dominican Republic, both.

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Stonybrook University (Sociology). "I'm going for nursing school next."

6. Party ID: "I'm not really into politics but I guess I'm a Democrat. That's what I put."

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_30   Date: 8/25/14 Duration: 51:53 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 34

2. Place and date of birth: Akron, Ohio

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Lehman College

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Non-Conformist., Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_31   Date: 8/25/14 Duration: 39:51 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype

   Notes: Full time musician, interviewed over Skype while sitting in his apartment recording studio. Had been thinking about identity because he's moving back to Argentina after living over half his life in the U.S. Moving back to be with his girlfriend who is a dancer, been together 5 years, and they want to start a life together because it'll be more affordable in Argentina.

1. Age: 40

2. Place and date of birth: Buenos Aires, Argentina

3. Parents country of origin: Argentina, both.

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: M.A. in musical composition, CUNY. B.A., Berkelee College of Music

6. Party ID: No party ID, leaning more toward left independent views.

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Resident

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU_2014_32   Date: 4/8/14 Duration: 50:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 26

2. Place and date of birth: Washington, D.C.

3. Parents country of origin: Nigeria, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: M.A.

6. Party ID: Independent

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment

File Name: SU2014_33   Date: 4/9/14 Duration: 40:41 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 25

2. Place and date of birth: Annapolis, MD

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both.

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: M.A., University of Maryland, College Park (current student). B.A., University of Maryland, College Park.

6. Party ID: Democrat, but has not always been voting D lately.

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_34   Date: 4/22/14 Duration: 39:39 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-person

1. Age: 52

2. Place and date of birth: "I'm originally from North Carolina, even before that I come from a military family, so we traveled extensively. Probably saw every state twice – at least twice, and overseas, and we had the opportunity to learn a lot about different cultures, it helped us out a lot. And then from that point I was stationed, I was in the military, my dad was in the air force for 28 years, and then I was in the army for 7, I have a brother in the air force, another brother in army, and then my sister is retired air force. The whole family is military."

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (both from North Carolina).

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: B.A., Mt. Olive Christian College and Atlanta Christian College (now Barton College).

6. Party ID: No response

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Non-Affiliate, Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Disassociation

File Name: SU2014_35   Date: 4/24/14 Duration: 37:18 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In Person

1. Age: 55

2. Place and date of birth: Fort Meade, MD. "I grew up all over the continental US, my dad was in the military."

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines, Father - United States

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: High School diploma, and an Associate's degree in art.

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment

File Name: SU2014_36   Date: 4/24/14 Duration: 26:32 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

   Notes: "I like to go running, I like to spend a lot of time with my family, so I'll go home. I like going to happy hour with my group of friends, I don't party very much – I'm not a big partier, but I do like drinking with my friends, so we do a lot of wine nights. I enjoy reading, definitely a lot of things that involve being outside so like hikes, things like that."

   1. Age: 21

   2. Place and date of birth: Virginia

   3. Parents country of origin: United States, both. (Parents are both from West Virginia).

   4. Gender: Female

   5. Education: B.A., working on M.A. in Counseling Psychology

   6. Party ID: No response

   7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_37   Date: 4/25/14 Duration: 18:45 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-person

   Notes: "I do a lot of craft things, like crochet, I do crafts. I read some, my family, like my grandchildren – I have 5. One lives in Tennessee and the other four live about a mile from my house. The nine year old, she's a pain. She wants to hang out with me this weekend, so we're gonna get together tomorrow she's gonna spend the night. I don't know, I told her since we got the store – she has a rubber band loom, the little bracelets, so I told her I said bring it over and we'll make some bracelets and I'll put 'em in the store and we can sell 'em under "Zoe's Creations." So

she's – I think if we do it together, I've told her this before. It's entrepreneurship, yeah. She hasn't been real busy at it, but I think if we do it together. The other thing, we have tea parties, too."

1. Age: 65

2. Place and date of birth: Syracuse, NY

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (Syracuse, NY)

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: "I went to business school after I finished college, at Policy Business Institute in Syracuse – I went for a year and got a certificate in bookkeeping and accounting."

6. Party ID: Republican

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_38   Date: 4/25/14 Duration: 26:51 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype
 Notes: [First section of interview recording may be absent - transcript still available].

1. Age: 25

2. Place and date of birth: New Jersey

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: B.A., Berkelee College of Music

6. Party ID: Republican

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity

File Name: SU2014_39   Date: 8/8/14 Duration: 37:43 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

Notes: "Let's see, I like social media [laughs]. I do like arts and crafts. Mostly like scrapbooking and cross stitch."

1. Age: 51

2. Place and date of birth: Aberdeen proving grounds, but also grew up in Germany, California, Alaska, and MD.

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines, Father - United States

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: High School

6. Party ID: No response

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment

File Name: SU2014_40   Date: 5/7/14 Duration: 40:15 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

Notes: Very easygoing, gave thorough responses. Mother of 2 kids who were playing outside during the interview - she was keeping an eye on them and had to check on them a couple of times.

1. Age: 36

2. Place and date of birth: Maryland

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - U.S. (Native American and Dutch), Father - Louisiana (Creole)

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: GED, taking classes at Community College

6. Party ID: No response

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment

File Name: SU2014_41   Date: 5/5/14 Duration: 29:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

1. Age: 83

2. Place and date of birth: Rochester, NY

3. Parents country of origin: United States, both

4. Gender: Female

5. Education: College

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation.

File Name: SU2014_42   Date: 5/6/14 Duration: 23:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

  Notes:

1. Age: 77

2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY

3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Poland, Father - Russia

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: College

6. Party ID: Democrat

7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen

Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership

File Name: SU2014_43   Date: 5/8/14 Duration: 39:15 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone

  Notes: Strong accent. Kind demeanor, thoughtful in responses.

1. Age: 58

2. Place and date of birth: "I'm from Nicaragua. I came to the United States [in] 1975."

3. Parents country of origin: Nicaragua, both.

4. Gender: Male

5. Education: M.A.

6. Party ID: No response

7. Resident/Citizen: No response

Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Group Membership

Appendix B

Difference In Means Graphs for All 2015 Omnibus Survey Respondents

Differences in means to response questions across all six identity measurement task conditions.

"Foreigners with Work Visas" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Government Jobs Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Government Jobs Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Welfare Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

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"Aid to Poor Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Education Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Defense Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

"Climate Change Question" Response Means
For All Respondents by Treatment Category

Appendix C

Difference In Means Graphs for Policy Outcomes by Primary Identity and Ascriptive Categorization

Differences in means to response questions for respondents in Conditions 2, 4, and 6 of the Identity Measurement Study (IMS) who were exposed to the full set of social categories from which to select a primary identity. The first difference in means table for each survey question below displays the survey mean along with the 10 groups most frequently selected as a respondent's primary identity. For some survey questions I also include a second table which compares the difference in means for the survey mean and any primary identity categories that are statistically different from the survey mean, along with the mean responses for individuals ascriptively categorized in that group (i.e.: individuals who checked the category box during the demographic portion of the IMS.

Attitudes toward Immigrants

Question wording: "Weld like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. Below we list several groups, and we'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable

toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group."

- "Illegal immigrants"

- "Foreigners with Work Visas"

Scale: 0 to 100

Illegal Immigrants

Table 20: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigrants Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	37.5	0.7	39.0	36.0
White	31.6*	2.1	35.8	27.6
Black/African American	50.3*	4.2	58.6	42.0
Asian / Pacific Islander	39.4	4.6	48.4	30.4
Hispanic / Latino	66.2*	5.7	77.4	55.1
Male	31.7*	1.5	34.6	28.7
Female	38.6	1.4	41.4	35.9
Lower Class	49.1	8.3	65.4	32.7
Working Class	40.7	3.3	47.2	34.1
Middle Class	44.0	3.4	50.6	37.3
Protestant	35.5	4.1	43.7	27.4

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 21: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigrants Question for White, Black, Hispanic, and Male Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	37.5	0.7	39.0	36.0
White (Ascriptive)	34.2*	0.8	35.9	32.5
White (Primary)	31.6*	2.1	35.8	27.6
Black (Ascriptive)	49.1*	2.2	53.5	44.8
Black (Primary)	50.3*	4.2	58.6	42.0
Hispanic / Latino (Ascriptive)	52.6*	2.8	58.0	47.1
Hispanic / Latino (Primary)	66.2*	5.7	77.4	55.1
Male (Ascriptive)	35.9	1.1	38.1	33.8
Male (Primary)	31.7*	1.5	34.6	28.7

"All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Foreigners with Work Visas

Table 22: Mean Responses to Foreigners with Work Visas Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	57.4	0.7	58.7	56.0
White	51.89*	2.1	55.9	47.9
Black/African American	54.8	3.9	62.4	47.3
Asian / Pacific Islander	60.3	4.2	68.5	52.1
Hispanic / Latino	78.0*	4.4	86.6	69.4
Male	53.8	1.3	56.4	51.2
Female	58.5	1.2	60.9	56.2
Lower Class	57.5	7.1	71.4	43.6
Working Class	59.0	2.8	64.6	53.5
Middle Class	63.5	2.7	68.9	58.1
Protestant	64.9	3.2	71.1	58.7

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 23: Mean Responses to Foreigners with Work Visas Question for White and Hispanic Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	57.4	0.7	58.7	56.0
White (Ascriptive)	55.9	0.8	57.4	54.4
White (Primary)	51.89*	2.1	55.9	47.9
Hispanic / Latino (Ascriptive)	65.1*	2.3	69.6	60.6
Hispanic / Latino (Primary)	78.0*	4.4	86.6	69.4

"All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Government Jobs

Question wording: "Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Scale: 1 to 7

Table 24: Mean Responses to Government Jobs Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	4.1	0.04	4.2	4.0
White	4.5*	0.1	4.8	4.3
Black/African American	3.6	0.2	4.2	3.2
Asian / Pacific Islander	4.8	0.2	5.3	4.2
Hispanic / Latino	4.0	0.4	4.8	3.2
Male	4.5*	0.1	4.7	4.3
Female	3.8	0.1	4.0	4.7
Lower Class	2.7*	0.5	3.7	1.7
Working Class	3.9	0.2	4.3	3.4
Middle Class	3.9	0.2	4.3	3.5
Protestant	4.8*	0.2	5.2	4.4

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 25: Mean Responses to Government Jobs Question for White, Male, Lower Class, and Protestant Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	4.1	0.04	4.2	4.0
White (Ascriptive)	4.2	0.1	4.3	4.1
White (Primary)	4.5*	0.1	4.8	4.3
Male (Ascriptive)	4.3	0.1	4.5	4.2
Male (Primary)	4.5*	0.1	4.7	4.3
Lower Class (Ascriptive)	3.6*	0.1	3.9	3.4
Lower Class (Primary)	2.7*	0.5	3.7	1.7
Protestant (Ascriptive)	4.7*	0.1	4.8	4.5
Protestant (Primary)	4.8*	0.2	5.2	4.4

"All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Spending Attitudes

Question wording: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. Some of these problems are listed below, and for each one indicate whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount."

- Welfare

- Assistance to the Poor

- Education

- Defense

- Climate Change

Scale: 1 (too much spending) to 3 (too little spending).

Welfare

Table 26: Mean Responses to Welfare Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	1.9	0.02	1.9	1.8
White	1.8	0.1	1.9	1.6
Black/African American	2.1	0.2	2.4	1.8
Asian / Pacific Islander	1.5	0.3	2.2	1.0
Hispanic / Latino	2.0	0.2	2.3	1.7
Male	1.7	0.1	1.9	1.6
Female	2.0	0.1	2.1	1.9
Lower Class	2.6*	0.2	3.1	2.1
Working Class	1.7	0.2	2.0	1.3
Middle Class	1.8	0.2	3.1	2.1
Protestant	1.9	0.2	2.2	1.5

N= 652. The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the "welfare" or "assistance to the poor" question. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 27: Mean Responses to Welfare Question for Lower Class Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	1.9	0.02	1.9	1.8
Lower Class (Ascriptive)	2.2*	0.1	2.4	2.0
Lower Class (Primary)	2.6*	0.2	3.1	2.1

The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the "welfare" or "assistance to the poor" question. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Aid to the Poor

Table 28: Mean Responses to Aid to Poor Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	2.23	0.03	2.3	2.2
White	2.3	0.1	2.4	2.1
Black/African American	2.6	0.1	2.8	2.3
Asian / Pacific Islander	2.2	0.2	2.5	1.8
Hispanic / Latino	2.7	0.2	3.1	2.3
Male	2.1	0.1	2.2	2.0
Female	2.4	0.04	2.5	2.3
Lower Class	2.8	0.3	3.2	2.3
Working Class	2.4	0.1	2.7	2.2
Middle Class	2.4	0.1	2.6	2.2
Protestant	1.9	0.2	2.2	1.6

N= 698. The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the "welfare" or "assistance to the poor" question. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Education

Table 29: Mean Responses to Education Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	2.5	0.01	2.6	2.4
White	2.4	0.1	2.5	2.3
Black/African American	2.7	0.1	2.8	2.5
Asian / Pacific Islander	2.6	0.1	2.8	2.3
Hispanic / Latino	2.5	0.1	2.7	2.3
Male	2.4	0.03	2.5	2.3
Female	2.6	0.02	2.7	2.6
Lower Class	2.5	0.2	2.9	2.0
Working Class	2.7	0.1	2.8	2.6
Middle Class	2.6	0.1	2.8	2.4
Protestant	2.3	0.1	2.5	2.1

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Defense

Table 30: Mean Responses to Defense Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	1.9	0.02	2.0	1.9
White	2.0	0.1	2.1	1.9
Black/African American	1.9	0.1	2.1	1.7
Asian / Pacific Islander	1.8	0.1	2.1	1.5
Hispanic / Latino	1.7	0.1	1.9	1.4
Male	2.0	0.04	2.1	2.0
Female	1.9	0.03	2.0	1.8
Lower Class	1.6	0.2	2.1	1.1
Working Class	1.9	0.1	2.1	1.7
Middle Class	1.6*	0.1	1.8	1.5
Protestant	2.2	0.1	2.5	2.0

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 31: Mean Responses to Defense Question for Lower Class Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	1.9	0.02	2.0	1.9
Middle Class Class (Ascriptive)	1.9	0.03	2.0	1.9
Middle Class (Primary)	1.6*	0.1	1.8	1.5

N=1, 331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Climate Change

Table 32: Mean Responses to Climate Change Question by Primary ID

Group	Mean	SE	UI	LI
All	2.2	0.02	2.2	2.1
White	2.1	0.1	2.2	2.0
Black/African American	2.3	0.1	2.5	2.0
Asian / Pacific Islander	2.4	0.1	2.7	2.2
Hispanic / Latino	2.5	0.1	2.8	2.2
Male	2.0	004	2.1	1.9
Female	2.2	0.03	2.3	2.2
Lower Class	2.6*	0.2	3.0	2.3
Working Class	2.3	0.1	2.4	2.1
Middle Class	2.4*	0.1	2.7	2.3
Protestant	1.7*	0.1	2.0	1.5

N=1,331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.

Table 33: Mean Responses to Defense Question for Lower Class, Middle Class, and Protestant Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity

Group	Means	SE	UI	LI
All	2.2	0.02	2.2	2.1
Lower Class (Ascriptive)	2.1	0.1	2.2	2.0
Lower Class (Primary)	2.6*	0.2	3.0	2.3
Middle Class (Ascriptive)	2.2	0.03	2.3	2.1
Middle Class (Primary)	2.4*	0.1	2.7	2.3
Protestant (Ascriptive)	1.9*	0.04	2.0	1.9
Protestant (Primary)	1.7*	0.1	2.0	1.5

N=1, 331. "All" refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. "Ascriptive" denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. "Primary" denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.