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Cost Effectiveness of the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Health Policy Investment Babak Mohit, MBA, DrPH

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Introduction: Lower-income Americans are suffering from declines in income, health, and longevity over time. Income and employment policies have been proposed as a potential nonmedical solution to this problem.

Methods: An interrupted time series analysis of state-level incremental supplements to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program was performed using data from 1993 to 2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System surveys and state-level life expectancy. The cost effectiveness of state EITC supplements was estimated using a microsimulation model, which was run in 2015.

Results: Supplemental EITC programs increased health-related quality of life and longevity among the poor. The program costs about \$7,786/quality-adjusted life-year gained (95% CI=\$4,100, \$13,400) for the average recipient. This ratio increases with larger family sizes, costing roughly \$14,261 (95% CI=\$8,735, \$19,716) for a family of three.

Conclusions: State supplements to EITC appear to be highly cost effective, but randomized trials are needed to confirm these findings.

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Introduction

tarting in the 1990s, lower-income Americans began to realize a gradual decline in health, followed by a decline in life expectancy.^{1–5} This trend among lower-income Americans is historically unprecedented in a nation that is not confronting a catastrophe, such as the fall of the Soviet Union or the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa of the 1990s.⁶ In parallel with this trend, skyrocketing healthcare costs and declining wages have been eroding the standard of living among low- and middle-income households in the U.S. If these confluent health and macroeconomic stressors continue, the U.S. may be faced with a future in which the tide of increasing prosperity and health throughout much of the 20th century, for lower middle class Americans, slowly recedes.

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Poverty is believed to be a major risk factor for poor health.^{8,9} Poverty is independently associated with a larger burden of disease than obesity or smoking.¹⁰ It may therefore be possible to improve the health and increase the longevity of lower-income Americans with anti-poverty programs.¹¹⁻¹³ Such programs can improve the standard of living of lower-income Americans, thereby reducing exposure to crime, stress, poor housing, and cheap processed foods. In this conceptualization, poverty is an "upstream" risk factor for an array of other risk factors that produce much of the disease and death in America. If poverty damages one's health, then antipoverty programs targeted toward younger, healthy workers might conceivably function as a primary prevention "vaccine" against a downward spiral of poverty and poor health.^{14–17}

One social welfare program, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), designed to boost both income and employment, has lifted 7 million Americans out of poverty and has received bipartisan support.¹⁸⁻²⁰ Presently, 27 states supplement the federal program with their own "supplemental" EITC.

However, the association between EITC receipt and health or longevity has not been proven, the program is

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76 expensive, and there is some evidence that it might increase the BMI of some low-income Americans.9,21 77 There are proposals presently in Congress aimed at 78 expanding EITC, particularly to childless workers, but 79 these proposals have not yet been funded despite support 80 by both parties.²² In this study, causal modeling of state 81 EITC supplementation on health was therefore con-82 ducted and these data were entered into a microsimula-83 84 tion model to determine whether supplementation is a 85 cost-effective way to improve population health.

Methods

⁸⁹ ₉₀ Overview

These analyses are described in detail in the Appendix (available
online), which includes additional introductory text, the date of
implementation, magnitude of the EITC increase by state, doseresponse analyses, analyses by each state, further details of the
methods, and additional results.²³⁻²⁵

To estimate the effect of state-level EITC supplementation on 96 health, an interrupted time series difference-in-difference analysis 97 of state-level mortality rates and health-related quality of life 98 (HRQL) scores was conducted between 1980 and 2011. With the 99 average change in HRQL and mortality rates across all states that supplemented EITC, it is possible to estimate the number of 100 quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs, or years of life lived in perfect 101 health).²⁶ Note that EITC recipients are a high-risk population for 102 premature mortality, and comprise upwards of one in ten people 103 in each state. They are therefore responsible for a disproportionate 104 share of annual mortality changes in a given state. Each outcome 105 measure (HRQL and mortality rate) was estimated as the net, 106 weighted mean effect across states that supplemented the federal EITC relative to before supplementation. The effect was also 107 estimated relative to states that did not supplement over the period 108 of interest-from 1980 to 2011. The analysis did not account for 109 the magnitude of the supplement in individual states, but rather 110 the binary effect (supplement or no supplement).

111 The effects by state and the effect by the size of the supplement 112 were estimated in a secondary analysis. These estimates are 113 associational, and therefore represent a weaker estimation 114 approach (Appendix, available online). In theory, it is possible to 115 account for these effects using an instrumental variable approach 116 (yielding an estimate that is less subject to confounding), but the 117 sample size was inadequate for such an analysis.

The cost of the EITC supplemental programs was evaluated 118 using estimates of deadweight loss associated with tax transfers.²⁷ 119 In this case, deadweight loss is an estimate of economic inefficiency 120 produced when tax dollars are used to supplement labor income. 121 The cost-effectiveness analysis followed the recommendations of the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, and 122 employed a 3% rate of discount for future costs and QALYs 123 124^{T05} gained.²⁶ The model input parameters are presented in Table 1. The model assumed that deadweight loss was correctly estimated, 125 that the interrupted time series (quasi-experimental) analyses of 126 EITC implementation by state correctly estimated their health 127 impacts, and that EITC did not impact other costs (e.g., health 128 expenditures).

Table 1. Input Values for the Microsimulation Model and the129Associated Range of Error130

Maximum return (\$)	Value	High/low (SE)
Cost inputs		
Earned income tax credit ^a		
Average	\$2,440	
0 children	\$496	_
1 child	\$3,305	_
2 children	\$5,460	_
\geq 3 children	\$6,143	_
Deadweight loss on return	30%	15%, 45%
obability inputs		
State life expectancy	Annual, age- specific	_
Annual change in QALE ^b		
Average	0.097	0.020
0 children ^c	0.069	C
1 child ^c	0.087	_c
2 children ^c	0.097	c
\geq 3 children ^c	0.126	c

^aThe cost of the EITC by family size is calculated by multiplying the average returns by the deadweight loss ratio.

^bThe annual change in QALE for recipients of EITC in states that expanded their EITC programs. The QALE is calculated using spatio-temporal differences in mapped EuroQol 5D (EQ5D) scores in states that did and did not expand EITC and is statistically significant at p < 0.0001.

^cAnnual variation in life expectancy by family size is not available at the state level. The annual QALE gained was estimated using linear interpolation of HRQL scores under the assumption that life expectancy is directly proportional to HRQL.

EITC, earned income tax credit; HRQL, health-related quality of life; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.

Mortality and Health-Related Quality of Life

169 Two data sources were used to estimate the change in quality-170 adjusted life expectancy (QALE) associated with EITC expansion: 171 (1) state-level Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 172 data from 1993 to 2011 to obtain annual state-level age-adjusted 173 HRQL and (2) the annual state-level age-adjusted mortality data from 1980 to 2011 from the Compressed Mortality File to calculate 174 annual state-specific life expectancy.^{27–29} The models were run in 175 November 2015. Responses to questions within the BRFSS were 176 mapped to the EuroQol 5D (EQ-5D) index, an HRQL-compatible 177 measure.²⁹ QALE was then estimated by first estimating that state-178 level mortality rate and mean EQ-5D index in each age group and 179 then building life tables from these data.^{30–33}

Because the BRFSS and the Compressed Mortality File cover 180 different years of observation and contain different variables, the 181

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182 Table 2. Supplemental EITC Benefit by State, Year Enacted, and Change in Slope in 183 OALE Associated With Implementation of EITC

State	Year enacted	Intervention size (% addition to Federal EITC)	Increas QALE
California	2015	85	_a
Colorado	1999, 2013	10	_b,c
Connecticut	2011	27.5	_b
Delaware	2005	20	-0.01
District of Columbia	2000	40	-0.05
Illinois	2000	10	0.262
Indiana	1999	9	0.045
Iowa	1989	15	0.117
Kansas	1998	17	0.054
Louisiana	2007	3.5	0.049
Maine	2000	5	-0.01
Maryland	1987	25.5	0.029
Massachusetts	1997	23	0.070
Michigan	2006	6	0.398
Minnesota	1991	35	0.114
Nebraska	2006	10	0.24
New Jersey	2000	30	0.008
New Mexico	2007	10	0.150
New York	1994	30	0.227
Ohio	2013	10	b
Oklahoma	2002	5	0.807
Oregon	1997	8	-0.09
Rhode Island	1986	12.5	0.062
Vermont	1988	32	0.090
Virginia	2004	20	b
Washington	2000	10	0.06
Wisconsin	1989	11	0.074

^aThe EITC program was enacted too recently to capture meaningful health outcomes.

²²⁵ ^bThe Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data set that was used to estimate HRQL gains
 ²²⁴ changed the sampling frame within the period of interest, so these states were only used in the analysis
 ²²⁵ of mortality rates. Overall QALE was generated using mean HRQL effects from 22 states and mean
 ²²⁶ mortality rate effects from 26 states.

226 "The state EITC program existed for only 2 years (between 1999 and 2001) before being re-enacted in
 227 2013. We attempted to capture the 2 years of program effects on mortality between 1999 and 2001.

EITC, earned income tax credit; HRQL, health-related quality of life; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.

two analyses (HRQL and mortality rates) are not strictly comparable. Twenty-seven states have implemented a supplemental EITC policy, with states implementing these policy changes at 233r10 different points in time (Table 2). Usable mortality data were available for 26 states and usable HRQL data for 22 states.

Mortality data were excluded for Cal-235 ifornia because its EITC program was 236 implemented in 2015, resulting in 237 inadequate follow-up time. HRQL 238 data were excluded for Colorado, 239 Connecticut, Ohio, and Virginia 240 because the survey design and sampling frame of the BRFSS were 241 changed within the period of interest, 242 potentially explaining any observed 243 change in HRQL. Colorado's mortal-244 ity rates are also potentially attenuated 245 because EITC was enacted in 1999 but 246 withdrawn in 2001. It was re-enacted 247 in 2013, but this date was out of the **04 от** 248 range of this analysis Table 3.

Statistical Analysis

An interrupted time series analysis was conducted using SAS, version 9.4. There were 51 states from 1993 to 2008, yielding $51 \times 16 = 816$ data points, or 51 series of data, one for each state. The slope in the annual change in QALE was observed for each of the 51 states, and the annual change in QALE was observed before and after EITC implementation for 22 states for HRQL and 26 states for mortality. Thus, data were collapsed across different numbers of states, depending on the outcome measure, to compute the mean effects for each outcome measure. The mean effect of EITC implementation was estimated separately for HRQL and for mortality as follows:

Let $y_{i,t}$ be the health outcome measure for state *i* at year *t*. Suppose binary variable *I* is an indicator for the implementation of EITC and variable t_2 is the number of years since the implementation of EITC and $t_2 = 0$ for years before the implementation. The following model was applied:

$$E(y_{i,t}) = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1it} + \beta_{2iI} + \beta_{3it2} + \beta_4 X,$$

where *X* is a set of possible confounding variables (used only in sensitivity analyses) and βji (j=0, 1, 2, 3) are the state-specific random coefficients to incorporate differences across states. To examine the impact of EITC, β_{2i}

and β_{3i} were estimated for the changes on level and slope, respectively. In sum, the slope was computed for each state prior to and after implementation of EITC by examining the interaction term of EITC on each of the outcome measures of interest.

The statistical approach was validated in a number of ways. First, each of the 51 states was visually inspected for annual

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 Table 3. Incremental Cost-Effectiveness (95% CI) of State Earned Income Tax Credit Supplements and Sensitivity Analyses^a
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Analyses	Mean cost, \$ (95% Cl)	Mean effectiveness (QALY gained)	Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (\$/QALY gained)	
Microsimulations				
Average recipient (95% CI)	16371 (10058, 22765)	2.2 (1.4, 3.1)	7686 (4053, 13392)	
Family size (95% CI)				
No children	3298 (2001, 4579)	1.6	2107 (1279, 2925)	
1 child	21963 (13401, 30574)	2.0	11054 (6745, 15389)	
2 children	36182 (22206, 50363)	2.2	16404 (10068, 22834)	
3 children	40865 (25031, 56496)	2.9	14261 (8735, 19716)	
One-way sensitivity analyses ^b				
Deadweight loss				
15%	16189	2.2	7666	
45%	24311	2.2	11530	
Discount rate				
0%	27388	3.7	7732	
5%	12187	1.6	7675	

^aThe incremental cost-effectiveness ratio represents the change in costs divided by the change in QALYs gained among states that supplemented the EITC relative to states that did not supplement the EITC. All analyses are discounted at 3% unless otherwise indicated. By convention, all effectiveness values are rounded to the nearest 0.1 decimal place.

^bBased on the average micro-simulation model.

EITC, earned income tax credit; QALYs, quality-adjusted life-years.

changes in QALE between 1980 and 2011 (Appendix [available online] shows a complete list of states.) Table 2 in this paper shows changes in QALE by state prior to and after implementation of the EITC (by the year enacted) for those states that adopted EITC. In this table, the change in slope of QALE after enactment of EITC was positive in the vast majority of states that adopted supplemental EITC. Adopting states that had negative slopes tended to have relatively small supplements to EITC. The marginal QALE values presented in Table 2 represent the marginal gain in QALE by state computed by obtaining the simple, undiscounted product of marginal HRQL and marginal life expectancy changes. The primary analysis estimates these values over the remaining life span of the average EITC recipient at a 3% rate of discount.

Second, dose-response effects were estimated by ordinary least
squares analysis to ensure that higher state-level supplements were
associated with the outcomes of interest. Similarly, an analysis of
the association between family size and health effects was modeled.
This analysis not only provides policymakers with information on
the differential impacts of EITC supplementation by family size,
but also serves to validate the model because larger families receive
disproportionately large EITC supplements.

35 Markov Model

A simple microsimulation model was built using 10,000 random walk trials (model finalized November 11, 2015). In the control arm, the status quo (baseline receipt of federal EITC) was estimated by exposing each hypothetical participant to their agespecific probability of death during each 1-year cycle in the model as derived from an unabridged U.S. life table.³⁴ Participants who "died," exited the model and participants who "survived" exposure to this probability of death remained in the model. This approach was validated using the life table approach.³⁵

In the supplemental EITC arm, the model also accounted for annual losses associated with transfers of cash from better-off groups to the poor (deadweight loss)²⁷ and annual incremental changes in QALE associated with EITC supplementation. Changes in healthcare utilization were not estimated. The inclusion of healthcare system costs may alter the social costs of EITC (either increasing them or decreasing them).

Even after accounting for years in which recipients are ineligible,
recipients who do not file for EITC, and discounting, the very small
annual increases in QALE among states that implement EITC can
become substantial. This is because these effects are calculated
from the time of EITC receipt until death for the average recipient.378
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Payments to EITC recipients are known with relative precision and accuracy (as they are based on Internal Revenue Service claims), as are age-specific probabilities of mortality from age 25 years (the age at which EITC starts for most recipients) through age 65 years (as they are based on all deaths in the U.S.). Therefore, the most likely sources of significant error in the model are estimates of deadweight loss (non-random) and QALE (based upon sampling error in the BRFSS and state-to-state variability for EITC expansion states). To test the sensitivity of the assumptions presented here, deadweight loss error was modeled using a triangular distribution with a mean of 30% and endpoints at 15% and 45% to ensure a wide range of plausible values. The observed random error associated with or state-level analyses for