Violent or Nonviolent Means to Political Ends:
What Accounts for Variation in Tactics Among
Dissident Organizations Targeting Domestic Governments?

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ABSTRACT

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What determines whether organizations with maximalist demands - those calling for regime change and increased political self-determination - employ violent or nonviolent tactics to make their governments acquiesce in political demands? More specifically, why do some organizations employ strikes and demonstrations whereas others employ guerrilla warfare/conventional warfare, and others still terrorist tactics, against their governments?

I infer from bargaining theory that rational organizations should prefer to use nonviolent means of contestation to resolve conflicts of interests with target regimes because it is generally less costly than employing violent tactics. When nonviolent protest cannot be employed due to fear of lethal government repression, inability to mobilize enough participants to pose a military challenge, or inability to solve the information problem using nonviolent tactics, organizations are either deterred from using any tactic at all or they employ violent tactics.

Whether they do the former or the latter, and which type of violent tactic they employ depends on organizations' ability to mobilize supporters to participate in contention, which in turn depends on popular satisfaction with the status quo.

I argue that organizations' choice of tactics depends on two key factors: 1) Anticipated repression of nonviolent protest; and 2) Popular satisfaction with the status quo. I refer to this theory as mobilization theory.

I evaluate the empirical support for this theory as well as the predominant theory in the existing literature, opportunity structure theory, by using statistics to analyze organizational choice of tactics in nine high state capacity countries in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980-2004 and 37 low state capacity countries in Africa from 1990-2010.

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Acknowledgments

Till mamma, pappa, och Katrin

"The difference is not like the difference between prayer and dynamite.
Political violence, like political nonviolence, usually has as its purpose
making someone do something or not do something or stop doing something."

Thomas Schelling, preface to Sharp (1973, 5)

Chapter 1

Variation in Violent and Nonviolent Tactics and Why it Matters

1. Introduction and Research Question

During April 2014 the *New York Times* featured news reports on dissidents using demonstrations in

Taiwan (Ramzy 2014), Venezuela (Burnett and Newman 2014), and Ukraine (Higgins and Kramer,

2014); guerrilla/conventional warfare[1] tactics in Syria (Barnard 2014), Central African Republic

(Sengupta 2014) and South Sudan (Fortin 2014); and terrorist[2] tactics in Afghanistan (Ahmed and

Kakar 2014), Nigeria (Nossiter 2014), and Pakistan (Walsh 2014), to target their governments.

As made clear by these events, dissident organizations seeking to coerce governments have

various tactics beyond conventional politics to choose from.

Despite the stark differences between violent and nonviolent tactics, all are means to similar

ends, namely making governments give in to political demands. If nonviolent,

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[1] I do not consider guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare the same although I treat them as such in this dissertation. Doing so is unfortunate, but impossible to avoid, since I cannot differentiate between them empirically in the quantitative data I use to analyze the research question. I discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 6.

[2] Terrorism is defined as indiscriminate violence used to randomly target governments' civilian constituencies; attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant coerce governments rather than civilians. This definition is very reminiscent to Stanton's (2009) "coercion strategy." I define all tactics of interest in chapter 6.

guerrilla/conventional, and terrorist tactics are all tools that domestic dissident organizations (from hereon organizations) use strategically to make governments acquiesce in political demands, what determines which tactic they use?

Obtaining an answer to this question is a matter of urgency. Understanding what factors determine organizations' choice between these tactics is crucial to informing international policy efforts aimed at: 1) Preventing organizations from radicalizing; 2) Preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict; and 3) Formulating effective counter-terrorism policy.

Despite various explanations suggested in the literature, we have surprisingly little systematic insight into what accounts for variation in organizations' choice of violent versus nonviolent tactics.

In an effort to contribute to greater understanding of this empirical puzzle for the purposes of informing policy and addressing the lacuna in the literature, this dissertation asks the following research question: What determines whether organizations with maximalist demands - those calling for regime change and increased political self-determination - employ violent or nonviolent tactics to make governments acquiesce in political demands? More specifically, why do some organizations use nonviolent tactics, whereas others employ guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics, to do so?

2. *Why the Answer Is Not Obvious*

The argument that "nonviolent resistance is a practical mode of strife only when the government allows it to take place…[and is]... absolutely useless in repressive regimes determined to remain in power" (Merari 2007, 23) implies that organizations using nonviolent tactics in repressive regimes are not only foolhardy, but should also be few and far between. Yet, as will be shown below, organizations in repressive regimes frequently employ nonviolent tactics to obtain their objectives, even when their demands are maximalist in character.

A brief look at the currently only publicly available dataset tracking variation in tactics among organizations representing ethnic group interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) from 1980-2004, the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, suggests the answer to what determines organizations' tactical choices is not straightforward.

There are four organizations representing Azerbaijani and Kurdish interests in Iran, all whose primary political objective is secession. Only *Komala* and the *Kurdistan Democratic Party* (DPKI) - the two Kurdish organizations - used violence as their primary tactic to make their government acquiesce in political demands. Why?

That variation in tactics fell squarely along ethnic lines may suggest that the explanation be cultural: Is there something about being Kurdish that makes these organizations quicker to use violence than their Azerbaijani counterparts?

Variation in tactics among Kurdish organizations in Turkey seems to refute the notion that a shared culture determines the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics. Of four organizations with secessionist goals representing Kurdish minority interests in Turkey, only one - the *Partiya Karkari Kurdistan* (PKK) - employs violence as its primary tactic. The remaining organizations have instead chosen to work within the political system, or alternatively, use nonviolent tactics.

That three out of four Kurdish organizations in Turkey employ nonviolent tactics is perhaps not surprising given that the country is a democracy, a regime type that typically not only encourages nonviolent protest, but also offers institutional avenues through which minority groups can express their political demands. But if democracy encourages nonviolent tactics, why do so many organizations in Israel, the bastion of democracy in the Middle East, frequently employ violent tactics against the government?

Let us assume for now that Israel is an outlier – an assumption that will be relaxed later on – and that democracy influence organizations to use nonviolent tactics. Is there also a causal relationship between autocracy and organizations' propensity to employ violent tactics?

Such an argument is challenged by MAROB data. None of the eight organizations representing ethnic group interest in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Bahrain – some of the most autocratic MENA countries – used violent tactics during 1980-2004, relying instead on nonviolent tactics.

Perhaps the reason why none of these organizations use violent tactics is because highly autocratic regimes also tend to be the most repressive? State repression can be used to both deter collective action and crack down on organizations seeking to challenge the political status quo.

If organizations are deterred from using violence in repressive regimes, why are they not also deterred from using nonviolent tactics such as demonstrations, given that this tactic is often illegal and leaves organizations highly exposed in case of a violent state crackdown?

Clearly, variation in organizations' choice of tactics surveyed above is much more complex than outlined here. Nevertheless, these different accounts serve as a useful reminder that the answer to the research question is far from obvious.

3. Why Care About the Answer? Relevance to Policy and Academic Literature

Policy Relevance

Understanding what determines organizations' choice of tactics is crucial for the purposes of informing policy aimed at preventing organizations from radicalizing, preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict, and countering terrorism.

To prevent radicalization of organizations, one needs to comprehend when and why they opt for violent over nonviolent tactics. This requires analyzing why, among organizations with similar political demands, some use nonviolent and others violent tactics.

Preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict requires a better understanding of why certain conflicts of interests between organizations and governments are resolved peacefully, while others escalate to violence. Obtaining such knowledge necessitates figuring out why some organizations seek to obtain their political objectives by using nonviolent tactics, whereas others see the need to employ either guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics.

Finally, developing effective counter-terrorism strategies aimed at preventing organizations from adopting this tactic requires understanding why organizations opt for this tactic as opposed to alternatives. To do so, we need to analytically compare organizations that use terrorism to those using other tactics.

Relevance to the Literature in Political Science

Despite this research question addressing some of the most urgent issues in security studies, there are few published large-N studies explaining what accounts for variation in organizations' choice of tactics[3] (exceptions include Asal et al. 2013; Gallagher Cunningham 2013). This is not for lack of scholarly interest: There is a wealth of separate literatures devoted to the study of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and nonviolent protest. Yet, the general trend within academia has been to study violent and nonviolent organizations separately.

The majority of scholarship in security studies and civil war only addresses why some organizations use violent tactics as opposed to no tactic at all (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Walter and Kydd 2006); why they use different violent tactics (Bloom 2007; Horowitz 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Kalyvas and Balcell 2010; Pape 2005; Stanton 2009, Valentino et al. 2004); and have less to say about when

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[3] The dependent variable in Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) foundational study is the success rate of violent versus nonviolent tactics, as opposed to choice of tactic.

organizations employ nonviolent tactics versus guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics.

Although important exceptions exists (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; DeNardo 1985; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2011; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Tilly and Tarrow 2006),[4] the majority of the literature on nonviolent protest has few insights into what determines whether organizations opt for violence over nonviolence and vice versa (Ackerman and Duvall 2001; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan 2010; Erickson Nepstad 2011; Schock 1973; Zunes et al. 1999).

Despite the literatures mentioned above all addressing organizations' choice of tactics, there has been limited cross-disciplinary scholarly collaboration. Consequently, little effort has been devoted to consolidating and/or contrasting insights from each literature.

The richness of the scholarly work within each research program suggests a promising starting point from which to engage in some exploratory theory building. By doing exactly that, as well as testing subsequent hypotheses, this dissertation hopes to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of what accounts for variation in organizations' choice between nonviolent protest, guerrilla/conventional warfare and terrorist tactics.

I also seek to build on the literature applying bargaining theory to intra-state conflict by incorporating the role of nonviolent tactics into the existing theoretical framework in ways that have not previously been done. I suggest bargaining theory provides a theoretical framework better able to incorporate how organizational and governmental strategies are interactive and anticipatory, and how this influences choice of tactics, than structural arguments represented in the literature.

The majority of bargaining theory scholarship on civil war focuses on understanding how bargaining obstacles influence the ability to reach a negotiated settlement capable of ending

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[4] Only Sambanis and Zinn (2005) employ large-N analysis to address the research question. This manuscript remains unpublished.

domestic conflicts that have already turned violent. Considerably less work has analyzed, as opposed to just theorized, under what conditions conflicts turn violent versus are resolved in peacetime.[5]

A crucial exception is Walter's (2006, 2009) work. Numerous insights from these studies are relevant to understanding what explains variation in organizations' choice of tactics. By using this theoretical framework as a lens to addressing the research question, this dissertation aspires to provide insights structural arguments alone cannot, while also contributing to an understudied aspect of bargaining theory.

Doing so does not mean that I believe structural factors are irrelevant to explaining variation in organizations' choice of tactics. I merely suggest that approaching the research question through the lens of bargaining theory enables us to better understand the effect of structure and agency in organizations' tactical choices in a more holistic fashion.

4. Argument in Brief

Bargaining theory suggests a partial answer to the research question, namely why organizations use violent tactics. Following the logic of bargaining theory, organizations opt for violent tactics when bargaining obstacles make it impossible to reach a negotiated settlement in peacetime. Knowing this allows me to theorize about when, and why, organizations are more or less likely to employ violent tactics, thus providing insights into what determines organizations' choice of tactics.

I posit that organizations have a bias toward using nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics because using nonviolent tactics is generally less costly than using force (Fearon 1995), and because it allows organizations to overcome impediments to initiating bargaining in peacetime as well as ameliorates the information problem inherent in bargaining.

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[5] Exceptions include some of the mediation literature. For a review see Kydd (2010).

By using nonviolent tactics, especially demonstrations, organizations can make implicit compellent threats to use violent tactics in peacetime without the same risk of being the target of a government crackdown. In addition, implicit compellent threats using nonviolent tactics allows governments a more face saving way to initiate bargaining, and potentially acquiesce in political demands, than do explicit compellent threats.

Finally, by signaling latent military capability and resolve, and making the implicit threat to use violence credible partly through the compellent technique of brinkmanship, nonviolent tactics, and in particular demonstrations, can be used to ameliorate the information problem, thereby increasing the chances of successful conflict resolution in peacetime.

Fear of lethal government repression of nonviolent protest, failure to mobilize enough participants, or inability to solve the information problem using nonviolent protest, are reasons why organizations nevertheless opt for violent over nonviolent tactics.

When nonviolent protest cannot safely be employed due to lethal government repression, organizations are either deterred from using any tactics or they employ violent tactics. Whether they do the former or the latter, and which type of violent tactic they employ, depends on organizations' ability to mobilize supporters, which in turn depends on popular satisfaction with the status quo.

In short, I argue that organizations' choice of tactics depends on two key factors, namely the level of 1) Anticipated repression of nonviolent protest; and 2) Popular satisfaction with the status quo. I refer to this theoretical framework as mobilization theory.

This dissertation evaluates the empirical support for this theory and the predominant explanation in the existing literature, opportunity structure theory. [6]

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[6] The core thesis of opportunity structure theory is that organizations employ different tactics depending on when conditions for doing so are opportune. I discuss the logic of opportunity structure theory in more detail in Chapter 2.

5. Findings

I find that the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, and regime type, largely determine whether organizations employ nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.

Results suggest that organizations active in political environments characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Those operating in environments characterized by low repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the accompanying level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, are more prone to using nonviolent tactics.

Organizations are also more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism in democracies, and more likely to abstain from using any of these tactics in high state capacity autocracies.

These findings are, however, limited in scope to high state capacity MENA countries. The two theories are largely unable to account for what determines organizations' tactical choices in low state capacity African countries.

Three more general findings emerge from the statistical analyses: 1) Surprisingly, whereas organizations in high state capacity MENA democracies are more prone to employing nonviolent and terrorist tactics, organizations in low state capacity African democracies are not. This suggests organizations' propensity to use nonviolent and terrorist tactics differ depending on whether they are active in high state capacity MENA or low state capacity African democracies; 2) Contrary to what is implicitly assumed in the civil war literature, organizations in anocracies are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics; and 3) Perhaps counter-intuitively, organizations with small constituencies are not more prone to employing terrorist tactics. This suggests that terrorism may not actually be the default tactic of the weak, at least in terms of latent military capacity, something often suggested in the literature (Betts 2002, 20; Crenshaw 1981, 381).

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6. What This Dissertation Does and Does Not Do

The research question can be approached at different levels of analysis. For the purposes of this dissertation, I treat organizations as rational unitary actors (Crenshaw 1990).[7]

Because the unit of analysis is already established organizations, I do not address how constituencies with political grievances overcome the collective action problem inherent in organizing (Olson 1965).[8] I do consider, however, the extent to which organizations can mobilize members of their constituencies to take a more active role in using different tactics, and how anticipation of their ability to do so influences choice of tactics.

For the purposes of this project, I assume that the factors that determine organizations' initial choice of tactic also determine potential changes in tactics over time.

Finally, I do not analyze what accounts for variation in tactics among popular masses that are not formally organized, or under what circumstances the various tactics of interest succeed in obtaining political objectives.

7. Dissertation Outline

The dissertation consists of nine chapters.

Chapter 2 examines the dependent variable - organizations' choice of tactic - by documenting broad patterns in organizations' tactical choices across countries covered in the two datasets I use for my statistical analysis. The first dataset tracks variation in tactics among

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[7] This means that I do not consider psychological explanations exploring the role of individual leaders or members of the organization in deciding when to employ different tactics. These aspects are clearly relevant to our greater understanding of why certain organizations use violent versus nonviolent tactics. However, it is beyond the scope of my research to assess the validity of possible theoretical explanations at different levels of analysis along with the ones I consider here.

[8] For more on the collective action problem and more recent research on this topic see the review by Medina (2013).

organizations representing ethnic group interests in nine countries in MENA from 1980-2004, and the second dataset covers variation in tactics among organizations across 37 African countries from 1990-2010. The reason for this regional focus is that I only have quantitative data on organizations' use of tactics across time for these regions and periods.

The chapter continues by reviewing various alternative explanations and presenting testable hypotheses that can be derived from the predominant existing theoretical framework, namely opportunity structure theory. I conclude by defining important concepts, making explicit theoretical assumptions, and discussing and justifying my research design.

Chapters 3 and 4 feature two theory-generating case studies from the same regions as the datasets I employ for statistical analysis. Chapter 3 seeks to explain variation in tactical choice among Islamist organizations in Algeria from 1962-1997. Chapter 4 analyzes the same variation among organizations in the South African anti-apartheid movement from 1912-1992.

These case studies allow me to derive three insights: 1) Organizations tend to generally have a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government violence; 2) Organizations in repressive regimes employ nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a significant number of people; and 3) Organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare when they believe themselves able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal government force.

These insights, in combination with insights from bargaining theory, form the foundation of what I refer to as mobilization theory, the logic and testable hypotheses of which I present in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 discusses the empirical strategy employed for the statistical analyses, describes the datasets, explains how dependent and independent variables are conceptualized and coded, and addresses issues of selection bias, endogeneity, and multicollinearity.

The MENA dataset includes 53 organizations with maximalist political demands representing ethnic groups across nine countries - Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey - from 1980-2004.

The new contestation in Africa dataset is, at time of writing, to my knowledge the most extensive of its kind. It tracks variation in tactics among 167 organizations with maximalist political demands across 37 African countries from 1990-2010.

Chapter 7 features the first of two statistical chapters devoted to testing mobilization and opportunity structure theory. The statistical analysis proceeds in two stages. The primary MENA analysis (MENA 1) uses more precise proxies for mobilization theory's key independent variables. The secondary MENA analysis (MENA 2) uses more generalizable proxies for these explanatory variables.

Chapter 8 seeks to ascertain whether the statistical findings of the MENA 2 analysis translate to a broader set of organizations and to another region, namely Africa. I begin by discussing the Africa results, and conclude by examining how the Africa and MENA 2 findings compare to each other.

The final chapter discusses the findings, their implications to policy and theory, as well as potential limitations to the study. I conclude by proposing various future research projects suggested by the results.

Chapter 2

The Lay of the Land: Summary Statistics, Literature Review, and Research Design

1. Introduction and Chapter Outline

This chapter provides the backdrop against which I analyze the research question, and is divided

into three sections. I begin by examining the dependent variable - organizations' choice of tactics -

by documenting broad trends in tactical choice among organizations with maximalist political

objectives, as described in the datasets I use for statistical analysis.

The first dataset looks at variation in tactics among organizations with maximalist political

grievances representing ethnic groups in nine MENA countries from 1980-2004. The second dataset

tracks variation in tactics among organizations with maximalist political grievances in 37 African

countries from 1990-2010.

Second, I review and discuss four possible explanations represented in the literature and their

limitations; 1) Repression; 2) Culture; 3) Relative Deprivation; and 4) Opportunity Structure. I

conclude that opportunity structure theory is the most persuasive explanation and proceed to

present its testable hypotheses. I conclude by describing and justifying the research design adopted

for this project.

2. Empirics

Trends across Time

The following discussion of summary statistics illustrates variation in the dependent variable across region and time for the purposes of justifying that there is indeed an empirical puzzle that warrants the research effort undertaken here. It also serves to highlight differences in propensity to employ tactics among organizations across regions and with disparate maximalist political objectives.

Since the overall number of organizations changes over time, one has to be careful not to read too much into these summary statistics. Given lack of alternatives, however, they are nevertheless the best statistics capable of demonstrating trends over time.

Graph 1 shows the number of organizations representing ethnic groups using nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorist tactics, respectively, in nine MENA countries from 1980-2004.

Despite a slump from 1980-1986, there has generally been a steady increase in organizations representing ethnic groups using nonviolent tactics. The decline in organizations using nonviolent tactics during the early 1980s is surprising; I would expect organizations to be more prone to using this tactic given its successful employment in the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Following the end of the Cold War the number of organizations representing ethnic groups employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics declined significantly. This is somewhat surprising, given that the overall number of civil wars increased immediately following the Cold War.

Organizations' use of terrorist tactics appears to be more or less constant from 1980-2004, with no more than three organizations employing the tactic at any given time. Overall, only a very limited number of organizations employed this tactic during the period covered in the dataset.

Graph 1. Trends across Time: Variation in Tactics, MENA

Graph 2 depicts the number of organizations using nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional and terrorist tactics across 37 African countries from 1990-2010.

The graph shows that the majority of African organizations from 1990-2009 employed guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. No significant decline in propensity to employ this tactic followed the end of the Cold War, as was the case among organizations in the MENA dataset.

The number of organizations employing terrorist tactics has been fairly constant across time, with the number of organizations using this tactic never exceeding three in any given year in the dataset. The trend as the dataset is ending shows a decline in the number of organizations using terrorism, with no organizations doing so in 2009-2010.

The number of organizations using nonviolent tactics never exceeded five from 1994-2004. These are incredibly low numbers given that they represent organizations in 37 African countries. Although the number of organizations using nonviolent tactics increased from 2004 onwards, it remains a not very frequently employed tactic regionally among organizations with maximalist political demands.

Graph 2. Trends across Time: Variation in Tactics, Africa

Source: Africa dataset

Tactics across Time

With regards to organizations' choice of tactics across time, more than half of all African organizations use only violent tactics, 42% use only nonviolent tactics, and a mere 5% use both nonviolent and violent tactics, as shown in graph 3. Judging from graph 4, this is quite different from MENA organizations, where 23% of organizations use only violent tactics, 29% use only nonviolent tactics, 24% use both violent and nonviolent tactics, and 24% use none of these tactics.

These numbers may be somewhat misleading, however, since organizations that do not use any tactics during their presence in the dataset are included in the MENA, but not the Africa dataset. Nevertheless, it seems clear that African organizations are much more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than MENA ones.

These numbers also come with a big caveat. As the datasets reflect mere snapshots in time, they do not provide information about organizations' activity since inception, making me unable to follow organizations' use of tactics chronologically from the start.

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Graph 3. Organizational Tactics across Time, Africa

Source: Africa dataset

- Violent only
- Nonviolent only
- Both violent and nonviolent

5%
42%
53%

Graph 4. Organizational Tactics across Time, MENA

Source: MENA dataset

- Violent
- Nonviolent
- Nonviolent and violent
- None of above

24%
23%
24%
29%

Another interesting regional difference across the datasets is the percentage of organizations seeking to achieve regime change versus political self-determination.[9] Graph 5 tells us that whereas 89% of African organizations are calling for regime change and 11% for political self-determination, the MENA counterpart is 29% and 71%, as seen in graph 6.

The high number of organizations calling for self-determination in MENA is probably a function of the dataset containing only organizations representing ethnic groups, as these may be more prone to demanding political self-determination for reasons related to nationalism.

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[9] Although it is possible to view calls for political self-determination as calls for regime change, I consider them different on the basis that demands for political self-determination usually entail calls for political autonomy that does not mean replacing the current government.

Graph 5. Issue Area, Africa

Source: Africa dataset

11%

89%

- Regime change
- Self-Determination

Graph 6. Issue Area, MENA

Source: MENA dataset

29%

71%

- Regime change
- Self-Determination

Graph 7 shows that African organizations calling for regime change are about as likely to employ violent as nonviolent tactics. The pattern is similar in MENA, as seen in graph 8, although here organizations are also equally prone to abstaining from using any tactics.

Graph 7. Tactics if Demands Entail Regime Change, Africa

Source: Africa dataset

- Violent — 50%
- Nonviolent — 45%
- Both violent and nonviolent — 5%

Graph 8. Tactics if Demands Entail Regime Change, MENA

Source: MENA dataset

- Violent — 33%
- Nonviolent — 27%
- Nonviolent and violent — 7%
- None of above — 33%

African organizations calling for self-determination are especially prone to employing violent tactics (78%), as shown in graph 9. In contrast, MENA organizations use violent tactics only 19% of the time, and violent and nonviolent tactics 31% of the time, as shown in graph 10.

Graph 9. Tactics if Demands Entail Political Self-Determination, Africa

Source: Africa dataset

22%

78%

- Violent
- Nonviolent

Graph 10. Tactics if Demands Entail Political Self-Determination, MENA

Source: MENA dataset

19%   19%

31%   31%

- Violent
- Nonviolent
- Nonviolent and violent
- None of above

3. Possible Explanations Suggested in The Literature

Four overarching categories of explanations can be identified within the literatures on contentious politics/social movements, civil war, guerrilla warfare and terrorism: 1) Repression; 2) Culture; 3) Relative Deprivation; and 4) Opportunity Structure. The following section reviews and discusses the limitations of each. I conclude that opportunity structure, despite its flaws, is the most persuasive theoretical explanation, and present testable hypotheses derived from it.

Potential Explanation I: Repression

Numerous explanations in the literature refer to repression as a key explanatory variable capable of explaining variation in organizations' choice of tactics. How repression matters depends on which of two strands of the literature is referred to. Both focus on the effect of repression on organizations employing nonviolent tactics.

The first strand argues that repression of nonviolent tactics makes organizations reassess the efficacy of this tactic, causing them to substitute for violent tactics (Gurr 2000; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Pierskalla 2009; Sambanis and Zinn 2005.)

H1 (Efficacy and Substitution): *Repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to reassess the efficacy of this tactic and escalate to violent tactics.*

The second strand focuses on how repression of nonviolent protest or leadership decapitation fragments organizations, which in turn creates structural incentives for them to employ violent tactics (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2012).

These smaller factions are believed to be more predisposed to violent tactics because they; 1) No longer have to moderate their views to accommodate the majority of participants, resulting in organizations becoming more radical and more disposed to violence; 2) Due to their size are unable to employ nonviolent tactics effectively; and 3) Are more likely to engage in outbidding.

H2 (Splintering): *Repression and leader decapitation causes organizations to splinter, and splinters to use violent tactics.*

H3 (Outbidding): *Organizations are more likely to use violent than nonviolent tactics when there are many organizations competing for the same constituency.*

Limitations of Explanations Emphasizing Repression

There are four main drawbacks to these explanations.

First, neither explanation states the reason why organizations use nonviolent tactics/

Second, neither explanation explains why repression of nonviolent protest sometimes causes organizations to escalate to violent tactics, while it at other times deters organizations from engaging in contestation completely.[10] As summarized by Davenport

"There have never been any analyses of the conditions under which governments effectively eliminate or reduce dissent; there have only been empirical investigations that reveal that occasionally repression increases and/or decreases the activity of state challengers (i.e., that state coercive efforts are respectively ineffective and/or effective). Whether repression is more or less likely to reduce proto-insurgency or any other form of dissident activity, and if so under what conditions, are open empirical questions." (2007, 210):

Third, arguments emphasizing how repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to update their beliefs about the efficacy of this tactic, and escalate to violent tactics, fail to explain why organizations cannot anticipate the level of repression nonviolent tactics will meet *in advance,* and adjust accordingly, prior to becoming targets of government violence.

Third, arguments suggesting that organizational splintering cause organizations to become more prone to radical agendas and violent tactics seem to forget that all organizations start off small, yet only a minority of them adopts violent tactics.

Despite these critiques, I will nevertheless center my South African theory generating case study around testing the repression hypotheses.

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[10] Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) come close by arguing that repression both deters participants that are unresolved and makes participants who are resolved escalate to violent tactics.

Potential Explanation II: Culture

Explanations proposing that culture (Geertz 1977) and history (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) are key to explaining organizations' choice of tactics come in two flavors: monadic or dyadic. Monadic explanations argue that tactical choice is a result of ethnic group ancestry or nationality, whereas dyadic explanations posit that tactics can be predicted based on the extent to which cultural identities of organizations and governments differ.

Culture: Monadic Explanations

Monadic cultural explanations suggest that organizations' tactics are "inherited" (Tilly and Tarrow 2006, 4), and "recurrent, historically embedded characters of contentious politics ...[sic]..." that "draw[sic] on a long history of previous struggles" (Ibid., 17). They propose that organizations' choice of tactics is constrained by cultural norms embedded in either ethnic or national identities (Ibid.). This is reminiscent of the concept *strategic culture* (Johnston 1995, 1998; Snyder 1991).

Strategic culture refers to the notion that there are "beliefs, attitudes, and habits pertaining to the use of force that are distinctive, enduring and shared within a group"(Snyder 2010, 1). Early work on strategic culture considered it a national characteristic applicable to both governments and citizens of particular nation-states (Gray 1999; Johnston 1998).

Scholars arguing in this vein propose that strategic culture causes organizational choice of tactics primarily by conscribing the range of tactical options available (Johnston 1995). The primary function of strategic culture is to assist in decreasing analytical complexity by suggesting culturally appropriate "standard operating procedures" (Snyder 2010, 4). Tilly and Tarrow refer to this culturally conscribed range of tactical choices as *repertoires of contention* (2006, 11).

Arguments about strategic culture generally assume that overarching beliefs about the efficacy of tactics are constant over time and do not change depending on adversary.

Limitations of Monadic Cultural Explanations

Monadic cultural explanations fail to address why, given the dangers involved for generally much weaker organizations in challenging governments, organizations pick tactics more or less by default, without considering whether they can employ them successfully or not. This suggests that organizations lack the ability to be pragmatic.

The concept of repertoires of contention partly addresses this critique since it explains that organizations have various tactical options available to them. But it does not specify the tactics included within the repertoire, or how such repertoires vary across cultures. Nor does the concept tell us how organizations decide which tactic within their repertoire to use.

If repertoires of contention can include tactics such as demonstrations, strikes, guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorism, but does not tell us what determines when and why one can expect each tactic to be employed, it is unclear it can be helpful in answering the research question.

Although monadic cultural arguments do not provide specific predictions about organizations' use of tactics, they could potentially explain statistical findings suggesting that organizations in different regions have disparate propensities to employ diverse tactics. I return to exploring this possibility when discussing the comparative results from the MENA 2 versus Africa analysis.

Culture: Dyadic Explanations

Dyadic cultural explanations suggest that choice of tactics is better explained by differences in cultural identities between organizations and governments. Actors sharing similar cultural traits are more likely to relate to each other in ways that promote peaceful conflict resolution (Abdelal et al.

2006), whereas cultural dyadic differences makes it more likely that parties employ violent tactics to settle conflicts of interests (Huntington 1996).

The core logic behind cultural dyadic arguments resonates with that of social identity theory (Brewer 2001; Brewer et al. 2007; Tajfel 1982). Social identity theory argues people divide into groups of individuals of similar descent.[11] Intergroup behavior is determined by the extent to which these groups are culturally different. Consequently, "some relationships (those with groups socially recognized as similar) will be more cooperative than others (those with groups recognized as different) even if the same issue is at stake (such as territory, power, or status)" (Abdelal et al. 2006, 699).

Norms dictating what constitutes acceptable behavior are more likely to restrain choice of tactics when organizations target governments of similar cultural background than vice versa (Ibid.). This logic is echoed in Pape's (2005) argument that suicide terrorism is more frequently employed by organizations targeting governments of different religious affinity.

That cultural differences cause normative relativism also resonates with what we know about the evolution of laws of war. Historically, codified norms of restraint on the battlefield shared the common trait that they only applied to adversaries considered culturally similar, but not adversaries perceived as "others" (Ober 1994).

Since cultural differences are suggested to determine the intensity of conflict between organizations and governments, organizational tactics chosen will correspond to what is considered normatively appropriate given the identity of the adversary: Nonviolent tactics will be used for limited conflicts with culturally similar governments; guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics will be the tactic of choice for more serious conflicts with more culturally different governments; and

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[11] A desire to strengthen the bond within the "in-group" causes it to view itself as socially superior to groups that differ from it, the "out-groups" (Brewer et al. 2007).

terrorist tactics - the least normatively acceptable tactic– will only be employed against very culturally divergent governments.

Limitations of Dyadic Cultural Explanations

Even if we were to assume that cultural differences between organizations and governments make them more likely to have conflictual relationships, that does not explain the outbreak of violent conflict or the tactics they employ. Since cultural ancestry is a constant, interaction between actors with very different cultural affiliations should be as well. Yet, empirically, relationships between culturally different groups are almost always characterized by periods of both peaceful coexistence and violent conflict. Hence, cultural differences cannot explain the timing of different tactics being employed. This suggests that organizations have more agency over whether or when they use different tactics than dyadic cultural arguments seem to acknowledge.

Dyadic cultural explanations also do not adequately address alternative explanations for the formation and cohesion of identity. Nationalism scholarship suggests that the salience of ethnic and national identity varies depending on whether and when individuals and organizations believe they will benefit from invoking such affiliations (Hardin 2001; Posner 2004; Snyder 2000; Swindler 1986). Hence, culture serves as a "tool kit of arguments, metaphors, and operational techniques that strategic actors can draw upon creatively and selectively to accomplish their task" (Snyder 2010, 4).

In addition, a correlation between the degree of dyadic cultural differences and the intensity of conflict may not mean that the relationship is causal. What this correlation actually represents may be a governmental tendency to discriminate against particular ethnic or cultural groups as opposed to others as part of a *divide-and-rule* strategy.

This strategy was often employed by colonial powers as a means to prevent anti-colonial revolt. To prevent the formation of cross-ethnic alliances capable of challenging colonial rule,

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colonial powers gave preferential treatment to one ethnic group, most often a minority, while

discriminating against others. By doing so, colonial powers created loyal allies in the ethnic group

that received preferential treatment, while breeding animosity between the preferred group and

those discriminated against.

Since this system stayed largely in place following de-colonization, it is possible that the

relationship between cultural differences and organizations' use of tactics is more accurately related

to the extent to which ethnic groups represented by organizations are economically and politically

discriminated against. If so, it may be the level of discrimination that explains organizations' tactical

choices, rather than dyadic cultural differences.

Potential Explanation III: Relative Depravation

Relative deprivation arguments suggest that organizations' propensity to using violent tactics is

determined by the level of relative deprivation suffered by its constituents. Organizations whose

constituents feel targeted by governmental discriminatory practices are more likely to use violent

tactics (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 2001; Petersen 2002).

Limitations of Relative Deprivation Explanations

The main problem with relative deprivation arguments is that they fail to explain why, given the

multitude of groups that are victims of severe governmental discrimination, only a select few use

violent tactics (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This is probably because government discrimination and

repression go hand in hand, making collective action among discriminated groups difficult.

Indeed, even relative deprivation explanations suggesting that emotions such as jealousy or

hatred are driving factors in explaining ethnic violence note that the timing of organizations

employing violent tactics is likely to coincide with whether structural conditions to do so appear

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opportune or not (Horowitz 2001; Petersen 2002).

Potential Explanation IV: Opportunity Structure

Explanations emphasizing opportunity structure persuasively argue that although political grievances may be a necessary condition for organizations using violence against governments, it is not a sufficient one. Pragmatic organizations will only challenge governments using violent tactics when conditions to do so are opportune (Fearon and Laitin 2003).[12] More generally, the theory suggests organizations employ different tactics when conditions for doing so are favorable.

Factors Influencing Opportunity Structure

Regime type and *state capacity* are the independent variables most commonly referred to as explaining organizations' choice of tactics, according to opportunity structure theory.

Some scholars suggest that organizations' choice of tactics is partly determined by the openness of the political system. Democracies are generally believed to encourage organizations to either work within existing political institutions or use nonviolent tactics to bring about political change (Tilly and Tarrow 2006, 161). Conversely, when the political system is closed, organizations are driven towards using violent tactics (Ibid.).

Whether organizations employ violent tactics against governments in closed regimes depends on state strength. High state capacity autocracies often divert substantial funds and institutional capacity towards maintaining a repressive state apparatus, allowing them to prevent and deter

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[12] Most opportunity structure arguments focus more on making predictions about the general character of political contestation in a country or what types of states are especially at risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis 2004) than predicting whether individual organizations will employ violent versus nonviolent tactics. Yet, much of the logic behind these types of arguments is relevant to informing hypotheses about organizational behavior as well.

collective action. High state capacity autocracies are therefore not only highly capable of deterring collective action, but also adept at cracking down on organizations that despite odds succeed in organizing and challenging the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006).

Organizations are unlikely to use violent tactics in both high state capacity democracies and autocracies, but for different reasons. In high state capacity democracies, using violent tactics is less cost-effective than working within the political system or using nonviolent protest (Amenta 2010; Andrews 2000). In high state capacity autocracies, government repression makes collective action hard, and the odds of organizations successfully employing violent tactics low.

H1: *Organizations are more likely to abstain from using any tactic in high state capacity autocracies*

Low state capacity democracies and autocracies are less able to provide public goods and otherwise rule effectively, something that is likely to translate into higher levels of popular dissent. An increase in popular grievances combined with a decrease in governments' ability to repress makes organizational mobilization easier.

Organizations in low state capacity democracies are unlikely to use violent tactics for the same reasons as high state capacity democracies. Indeed, the prediction that organizations in democracies seldom rely on violent tactics resonates with there being a "democratic domestic peace" (Davenport 2009, 10).

H2: *Organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics in both high and low state capacity democracies*

Having said that, organizations in democracies should also be more prone to employing terrorist tactics. This is because terrorism is more likely to succeed in democracies, on account of democratic governments being more sensitive to both civilian fatalities and popular calls for giving in to organizations to avoid further terrorist attacks (Pape 2005; Reiter and Stam 2002).[13]

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[13] For more on the relationship between terrorism and democracy see Chenoweth's (2013) review.

H3: *Organizations are more likely to employ terrorism in both high and low state capacity democracies*

Low state capacity autocracies provide optimal conditions for organizations to challenge the government by force. Weak autocracies are less able to repress and deter collective action, thereby making mobilization and organization possible, while also having a decreased ability to withstand violent insurgent assaults (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006).[14]

Anocracies and rentier states are special types of regimes believed to have inherently weak bureaucracies, something that translates into low levels of state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003).[15] Organizations in these types of regimes can also be expected to opt for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

H4: *Organizations are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in low state capacity autocracies, and in both low and high state capacity anocracies*

H5: *Organizations are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in rentier states*

Financial resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977) are likely to influence ability to pay for weapons needed to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Hence, organizations receiving *foreign state financial support* should be more likely to employ this tactic.[16]

H6: *Organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics*

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[14] Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that regime type is irrelevant to whether organizations employ insurgency, and that what really matters is state strength and whether conditions are conducive to using guerrilla tactics.

[15] Organizations are also believed to be more likely to employ violent tactics against politically unstable target governments (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Newly formed states and states undergoing regime change (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and/or whose political elite are realigning (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) are examples of states that are politically unstable.

[16] Mountainous terrain is frequently referred to in the literature as a condition conducive to guerrilla warfare. The measure is not included in the analysis because the variable as constructed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) is problematic. The original article does not define what level of elevation should be considered enough to be referred to as mountainous. In an email conversation with James Fearon on April 3, 2013, he told me he was unsure there had ever been a definite cut-off. Without knowing what the definition of mountainous terrain is, it is impossible to measure the extent of it.

The *percentage of rural population* is a factor that should influence organizations' ability to mobilize participants for both violent and nonviolent tactics. Whereas guerrilla /conventional warfare tactics should benefit from higher levels of rural population (by making recruitment of farmers easier (Zedong 1961)), the opposite should be true of nonviolent tactics and terrorism.

Demonstrations contesting governments usually take place in cities, suggesting recruitment occurs there as well. Inflow of urban populations was relevant for mobilization purposes both for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa during the latter part of the apartheid regime (Price 1991) and for mobilization leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution of (Kurzman 2004).

Targeting civilians using terrorist tactics should be easier in cities, since the population density there is higher than in rural areas.

H7: *Organizations are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics at higher levels of rural population, and more likely to employ nonviolent tactics or terrorism at lower levels of rural population*

Table 1 summarizes the core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory.

Table 1. Core Hypotheses Opportunity Structure	High State Capacity	Low State Capacity
Autocracy	None of the tactics used (H1)	Guerrilla/Conventional (H4)
Anocracy	Guerrilla/Conventional (H4)	Guerrilla/Conventional (H4)
Democracy	Nonviolent (H2) Terrorism (H3)	Nonviolent (H2) Terrorism (H3)

Limitations of Opportunity Structure Theory

Although I believe opportunity structure theory to be the most persuasive explanation in the literature, it is not without some theoretical weaknesses.

The very factors that suggest to organizations that conditions are conducive to using violent tactics should also translate into increased organizational bargaining leverage (Walter 2009). In these situations, the chances of successful bargaining *prior* to organizations employing violent tactics should be especially high. In other words, opportune conditions for using coercive tactics should result in organizations being more able to resolve conflicts of interests diplomatically, without the need to use violent tactics.

Having said that, bargaining theory also explains why, despite seemingly favorable bargaining conditions, organizations nevertheless may see the need to employing violent tactics (Fearon 1995).

4. Research Design

I combine both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Lieberman 2005) and implement my research in three steps.

I begin by conducting two theory-generating case studies. The first features variation in tactics among Islamist organizations in Algeria from independence to 1997. The second features variation in tactics among anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa from 1912 -1992. To structure these case studies, I center them around testing existing theoretical explanations, namely opportunity structure (Algeria) and repression (South Africa).

These case studies are methodologically appropriate for the purposes of generating theory for two reasons. First, both feature variation in tactics among several organizations within the same country and with the same political agenda. By holding constant both political demands and country I am better able to isolate the causal processes behind organizations' choice of tactics (George and

Bennett 2005). Second, because the case studies correspond to the regions for which I have large-N quantitative data I can be more confident that the findings are generalizable to these regions.

I draw on key insights from the case studies, as well as bargaining theory, to inform what I refer to as mobilization theory.

I proceed to test the hypotheses of mobilization and opportunity structure theory using statistical methods. Large-N analysis is a powerful research tool allowing me to deal with informational complexity. Although this research method alone cannot prove causation (King et al. 2001), it is effective at dismissing explanations that are not supported statistically as well as identifying potential explanations that, because they are statistically supported, may be causally valid as well. As such, it is a suitable tool for initial theory testing.

Two separate datasets are used for testing. The MENA dataset is a time-series cross-sectional dataset that tracks tactical choice among 53 organizations with maximalist political grievances representing ethnic group interests in nine high state capacity MENA countries from 1980-2004. The Africa dataset is a new time-series cross-sectional dataset featuring 167 organizations with maximalist political grievances across 37 low state capacity African countries from 1990-2010.

Differences in the dataset allow me to draw on the comparative advantage of each.

Since I have more information about organizational characteristics for the MENA dataset, I can test hypotheses related to such variables to a greater extent than I can with the Africa dataset.

Because opportunity structure theory argues that organizational choice in tactics partly depends on the level of state capacity, I can only test hypotheses about high state capacity with the MENA dataset and those about low state capacity with the Africa dataset.

I conduct two versions of the statistical analysis using the MENA dataset. The primary MENA analysis (MENA 1) features more precise proxies for the key independent variables of mobilization theory, whereas the secondary MENA analysis (MENA 2) uses somewhat cruder, but

more generalizable, proxies. To be able to compare the findings of the MENA 2 and Africa analyses, I make the MENA 2 dataset as similar as possible to the Africa dataset. This entails excluding organizations that do not employ any tactic during their presence in the dataset.

  I then employ essentially the same regression model I used to analyze MENA 2 to explore the Africa data, using the same proxies for mobilization theory's key explanatory variables. I conclude by comparing the findings of MENA 2 and Africa, in an effort to assess whether findings from the former is generalizable to another region and broader set of organizations.

Chapter 3

Theory Generating Case Study I:

Violence, Nonviolence and Islamic Political Dissent in Algeria 1962-1997

1. Introduction and Main Analytical Findings

The 1992 Algerian civil war resulted in more than 100,000 people dead. This figure and the insight

that civil wars are intrinsically hard to resolve once started (Walter 2009), begs the more general

question: Why do some organizations use violence to achieve their political objectives, whereas

others employ nonviolent tactics for the same purposes?

This exploratory case study of the evolution of organized political dissent in post-

independence Algeria seeks to answer this question by analyzing what precipitated choice in tactics

amongst eight Islamic organizations, namely *Al Qiyam, Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), Takfir wa-*

Hijra, Mouvement pour d'Etat Islamique (MEI), Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), Front Islamique du Salut

(FIS)/Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), Al Nahda, and *Hamas.*

I draw three general conclusions from this study that I later use to inform theory building.

First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent

tactics, even when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met by government violence. Second,

organizations in repressive regimes employ nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a

significant number of people. Third, organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare when they

believe they can mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal government force.

2. Guiding Theoretical Framework: Opportunity Structure Theory

Although the main purpose of this case study is for theory generation, I structure the chapter around predictions made by opportunity structure theory.

Opportunity structure theory can be tested using a one-country study with variation in tactics among organizations partly because Algeria experienced regime change during the period studied. It was a low state capacity[17] autocracy[18] from 1962-1990, upon which it became a low state capacity anocracy, only to return to becoming a low state capacity autocracy again in 1991.

The theory predicts that organizations in low state capacity autocracies and anocracies are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. As will be seen below, these predictions are largely unable to explain organizations' choice of tactics in Algeria from 1962-1997.

3. Chapter Outline

The chapter consists of five parts. I begin with four sections describing contestation and government-organization interaction chronologically, and corresponding to the following time periods: 1)1962-1978; 2)1979-1987; 3)1988-1991; and 4)1992-1997. I discuss contention among organizations active during each period, focusing in particular on explaining the rationale for tactical choices. Upon assessing whether opportunity structure theory can explain variation in tactics among

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[17] A low state capacity state is one that has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita that is less than $4,086. I return to discussing why I use this cut-off in more detail in chapter 5.

[18] I obtain information about regime type over time for Algeria from the PolityIV project [http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/alg2.html], using the cut-offs for autocracy and anocracy that are standard in the literature. I return to discussing how I code different regime types in more detail in chapter 6.

these organizations, I conclude by discussing what general insights capable of informing theory building can be drawn from the analysis.

4.Contestation 1962-1978: Al-Qyiam, Dawa wa Tabligh, Ansar Allah and Takfir wa Hijra

Co-optation and Repression

The first Algerian post-independence constitution of 1963 established a single-party regime with a strong presidency. The national assembly was composed exclusively of members of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), and was a consultatory and largely powerless body. Composed of various factions from the civil war's winning coalition, FNL was far from a coherent party. President Ahmed Ben Bella was able to exploit the post-independence honeymoon period of popular support for the first two years, during which he ruled without largely any contestation from civil society (Willis 1998, 101, 72).

The exception was Al Qyiam.[19] Founded in 1964, it was the first Islamic organization to emerge in post-independence Algeria (Ibid., 41). Opposing the government's socialist agenda and seeking to pressure it into taking Islamic values more into account (Ibid., 161), the organization soon became an important nexus for popular protest (Ibid., 41).

Although Al Qiyam's publications featured calls for the establishment of an Islamic state using rhetoric echoing the radical Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Salim Qutb, - known for believing that an Islamic state could only be created using revolutionary measures (Ibid., 42) - the organization never challenged the government directly (Ibid., 43). Despite Al-Qiyam not using violent tactics, "the association [could] be seen as a precursor of the later radical Islamist movements in that they believed that all political parties, leaders and regimes that are not based on Islam are dangerous and illegal" (Roberts 1988, 563).

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[19] Jamiyyat al Qiyam/The Association of Values

Since independence, Ben Bella had made his utmost mission to neutralize and remove his enemies from within FLN. Seeking to remove the army chief of staff, he eventually went to far, and inadvertently created the impetus for a coup, which took place on 19 June, 1965 (Willis 2012, 56-57).

Al Qiyam enjoyed benign neglect until 1965, largely as a result of political infighting within the government (Ibid.). But the new president, Houari Boumedienne, felt that Al Qiyam threatened the government implicitly by questioning its religious legitimacy, and for its capacity to mobilize popular protests (Roberts 1988, 563; Willis 1998, 41, 43). The latter was especially significant since the Algerian government, like other rentier states,[20] sought to take advantage of the current influx of petro-dollars to acquiesce the masses (Entelis in Martinez 2000, xi). Consequently, the government tried to undermine the organization by employing a "twin-pronged strategy of repression and incorporation" (Willis 1998, 47).

First, the government adopted the organizations' Islamic rhetoric, in addition to some more peripherally Islamist features, to appeal to Al Qiyam's constituency. It then proceeded to ban its activities in 1966 and eventually the entire organization in 1970 (Shahin 1997, 116-117). By offering them positions within the government, Boumedienne co-opted Al-Qiyam members into staying quiescent about the banning.

Remaining parts of the organization split into two new organizations: Dawa wa Tabligh and Ansar Allah. Both came to have little political influence due to Ansar Allah being outlawed and Dawa wa Tabligh being largely apolitical (Willis 1998, 56). Although Takfir wa Hijra emerged in 1974-1976 (Ibid.), it was largely dormant, resulting in their being little to no significant organized dissent in Algeria until the early 1980s (Ibid., 161).

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[20] For more on the rentier state thesis see Beblawi and Luciani (1987) and Beblawi (1990). For a critique, see Ross (2001).

Despite Dawa wa Tabligh publicly seeking the "abolition of the socialist regime in all Muslim countries" (Ibid., 161) and the treaties of Takfir wa Hijra calling for the overthrow of the government (Ibid., 65), neither organization adopted violent tactics. Hence, no Islamist organization used violent tactics during this period (Willis 1998, 65.)

Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights

Contrary to predictions by opportunity structure theory that organizations in low state capacity autocracies and rentier states are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, Islamist organizations during this period used exclusively nonviolent tactics, or abstained from using any tactics at all. They did this despite at least one of them, Takfir wa Hijra, calling for the violent overthrow of the government.

The government appears to have relied more upon co-optation than violent repression to handle organizational challenges to the status quo during this period. Algerian contestation during 1962-78 hence suggests that organizations have a bias towards using nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics as long as repression of nonviolent tactics is not too severe.

5. Contestation 1979-1987: MIA

The end of the decade saw an increase in Islamic activism throughout the Muslim world. Although religion had increasingly taken over the role of Arab nationalism following the loss of the Six Days War with Israel in 1967 (Roberts 1988, 562), it was the latter part of the decade that spurred the resurgence of the Islamic movement. Many Muslims volunteered to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 demonstrated the possibility of creating an Islamic state (Ibid., 89, 92).

Although these events were relevant in Algeria as well, the sudden death of President Boumedienne and his being replaced by Chadli Benjedid were more important to explaining the upsurge of Islamic activism (Ibid., 94). The combination of these regional developments and the ascendance of an initially weak president provided the political space needed for the Islamist movement to reemerge (Ibid., 578).

Islamist organizations began developing among the student population. These were allowed to function, and indeed encouraged to do so, by the president. The reason was not only because Benjedid had yet to assert himself politically (Ibid., 578), it also had a strategic rationale: Islamist organizations were seen as balancing the radical leftist and Berber student groups, which at the time were considered more dangerous (Willis 2012, 97).

Although Islamism spread within civil society, most of these groups were followings gathered around a leader, rather than formal organizations with a name. The exception to this rule was an organization formed in 1979 by Moustapha Boyali. The organization initially called itself the *Group for the Defense of the Illicit*, and would later become the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA). Its political goal was the creation of an Islamic state (Willis 1998, 71).

The organization initially sought to coerce the government through nonviolent means. In 1981, MIA unsuccessfully called on the Islamic movement to join it in a protest march calling for the creation of an Islamist state. Having failed to mobilize the broader Islamist community for the purpose of using nonviolent tactics, MIA escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead (Ibid., 72).

Despite MIA having similar goals as the greater Islamic movement, there was little to no support for its violent, or apparently nonviolent, methods (Burgat and Dowell 1993, 267). Upon hearing that MIA was going to use violent tactics, "several senior figures" within the movement used their mosque prayers to deter people from joining the organization (Willis 1998, 80). As noted by

one scholar, this suggests "Boyali's belief in the necessity and efficacy of armed struggle to install an Islamic state was not shared by most of the wider Islamic movement" (Willis 1988, 88).

Unrest among Islamist student groups prompted the government to crack down on MIA, despite the organization having yet to conduct any major armed operation. A substantial number of MIA members were arrested on charges that the organization was planning to target official structures and high-ranking personnel (Willis 1998, 73). Boyali escaped capture and hid abroad.

He returned in 1984, when 92 jailed MIA members were released, to reconstitute the organization. MIA fought domestic security forces in the Algerian mountains from 1985 until 1987, when Boyali was killed. Nevertheless, the organization was to take on an increased importance when resurrected in 1992.

Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights

Why did MIA resort to violence? Some scholars argue the turn to violence was due to the "lack of any democratic channels to express frustrations and disenchantments with economic and social policies and cultural trends" (Ait-Hamadouce and Zoubir 2007, 106). This argument resonates with opportunity structure theory, which also correctly predicts that MIA use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Although opportunity structure theory is technically correct in predicting MIA's choice of tactics, the timing of the organization's decision to use force suggests an alternative rationale: It was made following the failure to mobilize Islamic groups for the purposes of nonviolent contestation. This suggests MIA gave up on using nonviolent tactics because it could not recruit enough participants to use this tactic effectively. Lacking the numbers needed to successfully employ nonviolent tactics, the organization instead opted for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, a tactic

requiring fewer active participants. Had MIA been more successful at organizing nonviolent events, perhaps it would not have resorted to violence.

Having said that, it is important to note that the majority of Islamic organizations were clearly not in favor of using violent tactics, preferring instead to stay inactive.

This discussion suggests two insights. First, organizations tend to have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by violence. Second, organizations in repressive regimes only employ nonviolent tactics if they can mobilize enough people.

6. Contestation 1988-1991: FIS, Al-Nahda, and Hamas

The Algerian rentier state social contract started to crumble due to declining oil prices in the mid-1980s, resulting in countrywide demonstrations and riots in October 1988 (Shahin 1997, 127).[21] The government reacted harshly to the protests, declaring a state of emergency and calling in the army. Protests were violently suppressed and at least 500 civilians killed (Ibid., 128).

Although the protest was not formally organized, the government blamed the Islamic movement and proceeded to crack down on it. The spontaneous mobilization and the military crackdown of October 1988 became the backdrop against which the next phase of Islamic organized dissent in Algeria developed.

Realizing he had alienated the populace by allowing the army to use excessive force against protesters, Benjedid sought to redeem himself by liberalizing the political system. Political reforms set forth in the Constitution of 1989 hence allowed for the "formation of associations of political character" and multi-party elections (Willis 2012, 113). This was a radical break from the single-party

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[21] For an analysis of how the rentier state strategy of controlling contestation failed in preventing the Iranian Revolution, see Skopcol (1982).

rule that had characterized post-independence Algerian politics. Over fifty political parties applied for recognition, among them Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Ibid.).

FIS, under the leadership of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, was formed in February 1989 for the purpose of becoming a political party. Focused primarily on criticizing the existing regime to appeal to as many voters as possible, FIS' overarching goal was nevertheless creating an Islamic state.

Since Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt all prohibited Islamist parties from obtaining legal recognition and the right to compete in multiparty elections (Willis 1998, 389), it was uncertain whether FIS would be allowed to become a political party (Willis 2012, 117). It was hence somewhat surprising when the government approved FIS' application on 16 September 1989 (Ibid.,117).

Benjedid's reform and accepting FIS as a political party was not only a reaction to the riots, it also had a strategic rationale: Giving FIS the right to compete in elections was part of a divide-and-rule strategy, with regards to both FLN and the larger Islamist movement.

By allowing multi-party elections, Benjedid sought to undermine FLN, thereby strengthening the presidency. Doing so allowed him to distance himself from popular critique of the ruling party, something he believed would be crucial to winning a third term (Willis 2012, 129, 135).

Benjedid realized FIS would become a popular party, and envisioned this playing into his scheme of breaking up FLN's political power. A strong electoral outcome for FIS would make it less likely that FLN won a majority of votes. Ideally, the two parties would tie, giving the president the chance to play kingmaker in the new National Assembly (Ibid., 121). In addition, by allowing FIS to work within the political system, Benjedid sought to isolate the radical fringes of the Islamic movement, while also keeping mainstream organizations under close surveillance (Ibid.,120).

High popular support for FIS soon became apparent through its ability to mobilize the masses for nonviolent protest. By employing the mosque network, FIS was able to organize

demonstrations with over 100,000 participants as early as 1989. In April 1990, it mobilized 600-800,000 supporters for a rally in Algiers (Ibid., 122).

The new constitution called for local and regional elections to be held in June 1990, followed by national elections in December 1991. FIS won overwhelmingly in the local and regional election, beating FLN with a wide margin (Ibid.,133).

Upon realizing that FIS was becoming more successful than was strategically in the president's interest, Benjedid legalized two additional Islamist parties - Al Nahda[22] and Hamas[23] - in an effort to splinter FIS' support (Ibid., 165). These new parties represented the more mainstream Islamist movement, which up until then had been uncertain about the correctness of engaging in politics for the purposes of establishing an Islamic state.[24]

Governmental attempts at gerrymandering by imposing new election laws sought to further minimize FIS' turnout in the national election (Ibid., 135). On May 25, 1991, FIS called for a general strike and marched in protest over the new electoral laws. Security forces shot into the crowd during the demonstration, killing seven FIS members (Shahin 1997, 142). The demonstration turned violent and the army intervened.

The government used the situation as an excuse to start cracking down on FIS, arresting its leaders in June 1991 on charges of "rebellion, the setting up of unauthorized armed forces, the obstruction of the economy and incitement of citizens to take up arms against the state" (Willis 1998, 171).

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[22] Al-Irchad wal Isla/Islamic Society Movement.

[23] Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique/ MNI/Renaissance.

[24] There had been doubts within the larger Islamist movement - as represented by the apolitical umbrella organization Rabitat Dawa - about whether pursuing the political path was the correct way to establish an Islamic state, instead viewing proselytizing and education as the correct way of creating an Islamic state.

Government repression and gerrymandering appeared to have the desired effect: Polls suggested that FIS would be unable to win more than 30% of the national votes (Ibid., 218). Nevertheless, participation in a November 1991 FIS rally exceeded 300,000 participants (Ibid., 221), an indication that support for the party still remained high. Indeed, FIS won 47% of all votes in the first ballot of the national election in December 1991, close to twice as many as FLN.

Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights

Contestation during this period was exclusively nonviolent. Opportunity structure still erroneously predicts that organizations during this period should be more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, since Algeria was a low state capacity anocracy.

This suggests organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government violence.

7.Contestation 1992-1997: FIS, Al Nahda, Hamas, Takfir wa Hijra, MIA, MEI, GIA

The electoral outcome in the first ballot of the national elections in December 1991 suggested FIS would win an absolute majority of votes in the second ballot (Ibid., 225, 232). This scenario was of great concern not only to Benjedid, but the army as well. It feared that a FIS government would generate domestic unrest and seek to take away power from the military (Ibid., 245).

When Benjedid expressed willingness to rule with a FIS government, the army saw the need to step in. Under pressure from the military, Benjedid resigned and power was transferred to a High Council for Security in January 1992 (Ibid., 247). The military cancelled the second round of voting and annulled the results from the first round of the national election.

FIS had suspected a military intervention and reacted cautiously to the coup d'état, being highly aware that the new regime would seek any excuse to crack down on the organization (Ibid.,

252, 253). The current FIS leader, Abdelhakader Hachani, cautioned members against engaging the police and made a public statement saying that FIS "would pursue the application of its programme in a peaceful manner and rejects the use of violence" (quoted in Willis 1998, 253)

Despite FIS' attempt at keeping a low profile, the military junta started arresting its members starting in January 1992 (Ibid., 256). It was not until the military tried to remove *imams* from FIS controlled mosques that violent clashes broke out. In light of escalating violence, the military called for a state of emergency on February 9, 1992 (Ibid., 256).

The new president, Mohammad Boudiaf, announced that FIS was banned starting March 4, 1992, on account of the organization "wanti[ing] to use democracy to destroy it"(quoted in Willis 1998, 256). While FIS would not be allowed to compete in any subsequent elections (Ibid., 261), the other two Islamist parties, Al Nadhah and Hamas retained their legal prerogative to do so.

The FIS reacted to the news with the following statement:

"The dissolution of the FIS is a return to rule by the sword and domination by a self-interested elite which opens up the state to unpredictable consequences and dangerous developments, as long as the country remains in the control of a gang who has no respect for sharia or the constitution."
(Quoted in Willis 1998, 267)

The party's banning resulted in little popular protest, largely as a result of the military making it abundantly clear that any nonviolent protest would be met by lethal force. FIS cancelled plans for a rally on February 14, 1992, for fear of a massacre (Ibid., 257).

The decision to cancel the rally may have been a costly strategic mistake by FIS. With over three million votes (Ibid., 258), FIS knew it enjoyed substantial popular support. Some of this could arguably have been mobilized for the purposes of nonviolent protest. According to a senior officer in the Algerian military, "[i]f [FIS] had brought 500,000 of their supporters onto the streets [sic], the army would never have been able to open fire" (Ibid., 377).

Armed organizations started to emerge following the banning of FIS and the suspension of elections. Perhaps surprisingly, none were directly created or immediately sanctioned by FIS. Takfir wa Hijra , which had remained largely inactive since the 1970s (Ibid., 268) united with a revived version of Bouyali's original MIA, featuring some of his recently released lieutenants (Willis 2012, 173; Hafez 2000, 574).

Both organizations used rhetoric suggesting that obtaining their political goal - the establishment of an Islamic state - could only come through armed struggle. Nevertheless, they had lain dormant during FIS' electoral campaign (Willis 1998, 268). Indeed, Takfir Wa Hijra had even participated in FIS organized demonstrations and marches (Hafez 2000, 574).

According to one scholar, it is "not clear that the MIA has ever seriously envisaged a revolutionary seizure of power. It has never attempted to mobilize popular support on a large scale, or to provoke a collapse of the state by targeting senior power holders" (Roberts 1994, 24). Instead, its political goal was focused solely on exerting coercive pressure on the military regime to recognize FIS and its electoral victories (Martinez 2000, 198; Roberts 1994, 25).

Another militant group, the Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique (MEI), had kept a very low profile since its creation in the late 1980s. An organization with the belief in the necessity of a people's war to establish an Islamic state, its main strategic goal from 1991-1993 centered on mobilizing people for nonviolent protest (Martinez 2000, 206).

A MEI pamphlet dated January 1991 states:

"Injustice is arising and persisting mainly because of the docility and silence of the majority. The government in power has no authority outside that which society willingly gives it through its silence, submission, and cooperation. Without our consent and silence, the regime cannot control more than twenty million people with four hundred thousand soldiers and police...So it is a question of struggling against the unjust and corrupt government by withdrawing confidence from it in order to change it. If the people shows its determination and remains united, the regime in power will fall, despite all means at its disposal." (MEI leader Said Makloufi quoted in Martinez 2000, 206)

When calls to mobilize the masses for nonviolent protest failed, the organization concluded that the Algerian people were too afraid to defy the regime, and decided to target them in order to "shake civilians out of their indifference and force them to change sides." (Ibid.).

The initial phase of armed combat was somewhat unorganized, due to FIS not having formally sanctioned the resort to arms (Willis 1998, 268). This changed in January 1993, when the jailed original leader of FIS, Ali Belhadj, smuggled out a letter from his cell stating that "[i]f I was outside the walls of this prison I would be a fighter in the ranks of army brother Abdelkader Chebouti [the leader of the MIA]" (Qtd in Willis 1998, 277). Belhadj's statement was timed to detract media attention away from a more radical and recent organization that had been monopolizing the media spotlight to the detriment of MIA: Groupe Islamique du Armée (GIA)[25].

Established in January 1993, GIA took a more fundamentalist approach to the military struggle. Not only did it see armed combat as the only means toward creating an Islamic state, it was also fiercely anti-democratic. GIA's communiques "hardly referred to the cancellation of elections [sic] to justify its violence" (Hafez 2000, 591). Its political goal appeared revolutionary to the core: The overthrow of the government and the creation of an Islamic state. The organization's hard line approach was clear from its motto "No dialogue, no reconciliation, no truce" (Kepel 2006, 266).

GIA saw civilians that supported the military regime as apostate, making them legitimate targets. Targeting civilians, first through individual assassinations starting in March 1993, and later, in 1996 onwards, through mass killings, resulted in GIA dominating the Algerian media. The early phase of GIA's soft targeting in September 1993 included killings of government officials, journalists, and foreign tourists (Willis 1998, 283). The later phase starting in 1997 entailed assassinating regular Algerian civilians believed to either support the regime or not be GIA-friendly enough (Kalyvas 1999, 113).

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[25] Jammat Ilamiyya Mousalaha

While GIA accrued notoriety, FIS faded further into the background. Despite endorsing armed struggle, and MIA in particular, and there being many minor organizations fighting on its behalf, FIS did not control any of them. To regain the momentum and provide a more pragmatic alternative to GIA (Kepel 2006, 265), FIS, MIA and MEI, in addition to smaller associated groups, created the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) in 1993 (Willis 2012, 174).

The formation of AIS was important because it was the military wing of FIS (Martinez 2000, 198), and because it unified several of the organizations that had been fighting on behalf of FIS all along. AIS rejected GIA's absolutist stance of not negotiating with the regime and its targeting of civilians. Nevertheless, prior to the creation of AIS, FIS felt compelled to condone killings of intellectuals and journalists by organizations supporting their political cause for fear of appearing weak and less militarily ruthless than GIA (Willis 1998, 288) The majority of AIS' deadly force was nevertheless projected against Algerian security services (Hafez 2000, 580).

Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights

What caused so many organizations to use violent tactics following 1992? The literature suggests two possible explanations: 1) Ideology; and 2) The political system being closed.

Ideology

The majority of organizations using violent tactics were arguably of the belief that using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the only means by which to create an Islamic state. Although this outlook no doubt plays some role in their decisions of what tactics to employ, I suggest the significance of ideology on organizations' choice of tactic was actually limited.

First, Takfir wa Hijra, MIA and MEI's political goal may not have been revolutionary. According to Willis, "[f]or the vast majority of those in the armed groups, the ultimate goal of an

"Islamic State" is really only an icon representing more basic desires - the overthrow of the regime and the end of official repression and economic and social deprivation" (1998, 387). This view is echoed by Roberts, who states: " While the rhetoric of the rebellion has suggested that its aim is to overthrow the present state and establish an Islamic Republic in its state, there are grounds for thinking that the aim of the mainstream of the rebellion has been to force the regime to revoke its ban on FIS and resurrect the possibility of a negotiated transfer of power within a measure of constitutional continuity" (1995, 240).

The overall goal for the majority of the armed groups not being revolutionary is significant, because it suggests that violent tactics is a means to a political end, namely obtaining a bargaining leverage, rather than an end in itself. It implies organizations think strategically when deciding whether to use violent tactics, and are not driven purely by an ideology espousing violence.

Second, since ideology is a constant it cannot account for variation in tactics. We know that Takfir wa Hijra, MEI, and MIA all lay dormant during the period FIS was successfully exploring the electoral path. Had they believed that guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the only means of obtaining an Islamic state they would have used violence prior to 1992. In other words, ideology cannot account for these organizations' choice of tactics.

What about GIA? Since its inception in 1993, GIA was publicly always absolutist in its belief in the necessity of armed *jihad*. It was against working within the political system and adamant about not negotiating with an apostate government. Since violent tactics is a constant in the case of GIA, is it not possible that ideology explains the organization's resort to arms? Ideology may arguably have influenced GIA in two ways: 1) By making it use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics; and 2) By making it target civilians. I begin by discussing the latter option.

One scholar argues that GIA's more fundamentalist ideology explains why the organization was more open than AIS to targeting civilians and conducting mass killings (Hafez 2000, 583-584).

But since ideology is a constant it cannot explain the timing of the organization's targeting civilians (Kalyvas 1999, 251). "The GIA did not alter its ideology between 1994 and 1997, yet it committed massacres in 1997 but not 1994" (Kalyvas 1999, 251). Kalyvas argues that the timing of massacres is better predicted by developments on the battlefield. He claims that "[m]assacres are likely to be committed by insurgents in the context of a particular strategic conjecture characterized by a) fragmented and unstable rule over civilian population, b) mass civilian defections toward incumbents, and c) escalation of violence" (2000, 245). This suggests that ideology cannot explain why GIA targeted civilians versus used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

But since GIA consistently used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and never had a period where it lay dormant or used nonviolent tactics, is it not possible that ideology can explain the organization's choice of this tactic?

I suggest that although it is feasible that the overall outlook of GIS was different from the majority of armed organizations, this does not mean that ideology explains why the organization used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Instead, I suggest that one can infer more about the organization's decision to go violent by looking at the timing of the formation of the organization. I expand on this alternative explanation in more detail below, after addressing whether organizations' embraced guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics due to the closed political system.

Closed Political System

Some scholars suggest the reason why organizations employed violent tactics after 1992 is due to the political system being closed. Willis argues "the manifest failure of the FIS legalist strategy, following the January coup, strengthened the conviction of those radical Islamic elements that had remained outside the party, that only force of arms could achieve an Islamic state" (1998, 268). Hence, he argues, it was "the blocking of the constitutionalist path by the regime in January 1992 [that] caused

most of these [organizations] to break their tactical alliance with the party and join those seeking armed confrontation with the government" (Ibid., 278). Roberts agrees, stating that "violence of the mainstream of the armed rebellion has been primarily a reaction to the state's decision to deprive it of a constitutionalist avenue rather than the expression of a doctrinaire preference for violent over nonviolent activity" (1995, 239-240). This reading is largely in accordance with the logic and predictions of opportunity structure theory, which suggests that organizations oscillate to violent tactics when the political system is closed.

I take issue with this explanation. First, I suggest that the timing of organizations' use of guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is highly relevant to understanding their motivation for choosing this tactic. Despite existing prior to the Constitution of 1989 (which allowed for the formation of political parties and multiparty elections), violent tactics was not Takfir wa Hijra, MIA and MEI's primary choice. Takfir wa Hijra and MEI had been largely inactive during the early 1980s, and MIA and MEI had both, unsuccessfully, sought to use nonviolent tactics before escalating to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Hence, these organizations did not use this tactic because constitutionalist avenues of contestation were blocked.

General Insights

I argue that organizations employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics only did so upon realizing not only that using nonviolent tactics would be met by lethal repression, but also that they had enough popular support to employ this violent tactic.

The results from the first ballot of the national election in 1991 served to convey information to these organizations about the size of their potential recruitment pool. When the election was cancelled and nonviolent protest lethally repressed, organizations realized that the conditions for recruiting militants for the cause were especially favorable. Indeed, according to one

scholar, Takfir wa-l Hijra and MIA "saw in the dissolution of [FIS] and the imprisonment, exile or murder of its officials an exceptional opportunity to represent the Islamist electorate. They found in the communes recently supporting the FIS a fund of sympathy, which made it possible to launch guerrilla operations against the security forces in 1992 and 1993" (Martinez 2000, 21).

Of all the organizations following 1992 discussed, only MEI believed massive adherence to civil disobedience could bring about a nonviolent revolution capable of overthrowing the government. Ironically, failure to mobilize people to use nonviolent tactics led MEI to start targeting civilians, in an effort to force them to take active sides in the conflict. MEI's decision to escalate to violent tactics following failing to mobilize people for nonviolent contestation is very similar to that of Boyali and the original MIA.

What about GIA? Many of the leading members of the organization had previously been active in FIS and MIA, yet the organization was only created January 1993. The timing of GIA's creation suggests that the rationale for GIA using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the same as for other militant organizations: It saw the opportunity to draw on massive popular discontent and support for an Islamist state made apparent by the electoral results.

Finally, what accounts for FIS' escalation from nonviolent to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics through the creation of AIS? One possible argument is that the endorsement of MIA and the later formation of AIS were done in reaction to GIA taking over FIS' struggle. FIS was beginning to lose the momentum and ability to affect developments in both the military and political realm. This explanation suggests an outbidding logic at play.

Although there is no doubt that FIS worried about the ascendance of GIA, I argue that outbidding provides only a very partial rationale for the organization's decision to escalate to violent tactics. More important, I suggest, was that FIS not only knew that it had a significant following, as made clear by the election results and because so many organizations claimed to be fighting on its

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behalf, but also that it could no longer safely employ nonviolent tactics due to the threat of lethal government repression. The combination of nonviolent tactics being too dangerous to employ and the knowledge that it nevertheless had enough of a following to potentially succeed in using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, is what I suggest finally drew it to take to arms.

The delay in FIS escalating to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is most likely due to it waiting to see if the military would reverse its decision to annul the election results. If this were to happen, FIS wanted to make sure that it was in a not going to be prevented from forming a government because it had gone violent. As time passed such a scenario became less and less likely, eventually causing FIS to conclude in 1993 they had nothing to lose from endorsing MIA and literally joining the fight.

If a formerly nonviolent political party such as FIS went violent, why did the other two Islamic parties, Hamas and Al Nahda, not do so as well? Despite ideological differences between FIS versus Hamas and Al Nahda (Roberts 1995, 239), I posit that ideology is unlikely to have influenced these organizations' decision to remain inactive.

Instead, I suggest the reason for these two organizations not going violent is due to two factors. First, Al Nahda and Hamas jointly received only 15% of the votes in the election. Hence, the majority of voters gave their support to FIS rather than the general Islamic movement, as epitomized by these two other Islamist organizations. Second, as opposed to FIS, Hamas and Al Nahda maintained their status as legal political parties eligible to participate in future multiparty elections. The prospect of doing so, without having to compete against FIS, their biggest challenger, created a strategic incentive for them to stay largely inactive rather than use violent tactics.

8. Conclusion: Opportunity Structure Theory Application and General Insights

My analysis suggests that opportunity structure has limited ability to explain what accounts for variation in tactics among Islamic organizations during this period in Algeria.

There was little to no violent contestation - with the exception of the early MIA - during the period in which the political system was completely closed, i.e. prior to the constitution of 1989, that allowed for political parties and multiparty election. This suggests that a closed political system does not necessarily make organizations more likely to use violent tactics. Instead, organizations active in political environments such as these appear more likely to use nonviolent tactics. I found that the original MIA (and partially MEI) only employed violent tactics after failing to mobilize enough people for nonviolent protest.

Furthermore, I argue that FIS, MIA, MEI and GIA all opted to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics because the election made clear the extent of their constituency, allowing them to deduce that they could mobilize enough popular support to employ this tactics, and because nonviolent tactics was seen as a non-starter due to the likelihood of a lethal government crackdown.

What about insights into what determine organizations' use of terrorism? Although MEI and GIA targeted civilians, they did not do it in a way that is in accordance with my definition of terrorism. I define terrorism as indiscriminate violence used to randomly target governments' civilian constituencies; attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant coerce governments rather than civilians. MEI and GIA's targeting of civilians were largely meant to coercing them into cooperating, which is an inherent part of guerrilla tactics (Galula 1964; Huntington 1968) that I consider separate from terrorist tactics

To what extent does this analysis suggest new theoretical insights? I derive three general conclusions from this study that I draw on to inform theory building.

First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics over violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government violence.

Second, organizations in repressive regimes only employ nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a significant number of people.

Third, organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal repression.

Chapter 4

Theory Generating Case Study II:

Choice of Tactics among South African Anti-Apartheid Organizations

1. Introduction

What accounts for variation in organizations' choice of tactics? Under what circumstances are

organizations more inclined to employ nonviolent tactics than guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics

and vice versa?

This exploratory case study seeks to answer this research question for the purposes of

informing theory generation, by analyzing what factors influenced variation in tactics among

organizations within the national anti-apartheid movement in South Africa from 1912-1992.

Studies of South African contestation usually limit their analysis to explaining the *African*

National Congress' (ANC) decision to escalate to from nonviolent to guerrilla/conventional warfare

tactics (Seidman 2000). Fewer studies have analyzed variation in tactics among domestic anti-

apartheid organizations beyond ANC (exceptions include Sommer 1996), more specifically *Black*

Consciousness (BC) and *United Democratic Front* (UDF).

2. Main Analytical Findings

I find that repression hypotheses are generally unable to explain ANC, BC, and UDF's choice of tactic.

I argue that ANC escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics due to a combination of lethal repression of nonviolent protest and popular pressure to use violent tactics. The latter allowed the organization to conclude that it would be able to mobilize enough people to take up arms.

Despite ANC deeming nonviolent tactic ineffective in countering the apartheid regime, BC and UDF both opted for nonviolence as their initial tactic. They did so knowing that they could largely avoid repression by maintaining a non-confrontational stance.

Neither BC nor UDF escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics upon later becoming targets of severe government repression. The reason for not doing so, I argue, was because they assumed the cohort of black South Africans willing to use force had joined, or were in the process of joining, the already militant ANC.

I derive two general insights relevant to theory generation from this analysis.

First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met by government violence.

Second, organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal repression.

3. Chapter Outline

The case study is organized in five sections.

I begin by presenting testable hypotheses derived from the literature on repression. Second, I describe organized contestation in South Africa from 1912 - when ANC was founded - until 1961,

the year *South African Communist Party* (SACP), *Pan African Congress* (PAC) and ANC all escalated

from nonviolent to violent tactics. My main focus here is explaining what accounted for ANC's

decision to escalate. I then discuss BC's trajectory of contestation, focusing in particular on its

choice of initial tactics and the reason why it did not escalate to guerrilla/conventional warfare

tactics despite being the target of significant state repression. Fourth, I discuss the same factors as

they apply to UDF. I conclude by summarizing whether the case study finds support for repression

arguments, and more generally, what additional testable hypotheses are suggested by the analysis.

4. Guiding Theoretical Framework: Repression

This case study features variation in tactics among organizations with the same political demand,

representing the same constituency, and active within the same country. Explanations focusing on

culture and relative depravation cannot explain such variation. Opportunity structure theory would

assume that given that South Africa was a low state capacity anocracy[26] during the period studied,

organizations are more prone to engaging in guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Nevertheless, the

theoretical explanation I center this case study around is repression.

> The repression literature suggests the following hypotheses:

H1 (Efficacy and Substitution): *Repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to escalate to violent tactics because they deem nonviolent protest ineffective.*

H2 (Splintering): *Repression and leader decapitation causes organizations to splinter, and splinters to use violent tactics.*

H3 (Outbidding): *Organizations are more likely to use violent than nonviolent tactics when there are many organizations competing for the same constituency.*

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[26] I obtain information about state capacity from the World Bank's World Development Indictator. Low state capacity is coded the same way as in the Algeria case study. I obtain data on regime type from the Polity IV dataset. [http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/SouthAfrica2010.pdf] I discuss the coding of regime type and state capacity in more detail in chapter 6.

5. Contestation 1948-1961: ANC, SACP and PAC

ANC was founded in 1912. Despite the modest stated nature of its political goal at this time, namely the creation of a "national union for the purposes of creating national unity and defending [black] rights and privileges" (Younis 2000, 42), the prime impetus of the organization was to protest the discriminatory policies of the white minority regime. Black people being deprived of their right to vote to affect politics directly, ANC's main means of contestation from its inception until the early 1950s included writing petitions and lobbying.

Escalation in Nonviolent Tactics in Response to Expansion of Apartheid Regime

Although apartheid had informally been the *modus operandi* for the supremacist South African government for decades, it was not until 1948, when the *National Party* came to power, that the framework for apartheid was implemented more forcefully. The main ideological core of apartheid ideology is that whites and blacks should be both politically and geographically separate. In an effort to achieve such separation, the government envisioned the creation of ten separate *bantustans* in which black South Africans would be forced to live (Schock 2005, 56). Access to the urban and white controlled areas of the country were allowed for the purposes of employment only, and exclusively by those displaying mandatory passes (Price 1991, 19-20).

The development of these pass laws led ANC to revise its formerly non-confrontational political goal. The Program of Action, adopted in 1949, called for "freedom from White domination and political independence consistent with the African people's right of self-determination", the "right of direct representation in all the governing bodies of the country" and the "abolition of all differential institutions or bodies specially created for Africans" (Younis 2000, 83).

The installment of the National Party government clearly demonstrated that ANC's current nonviolent tactics had failed in obtaining the political objective sought, and was inadequate means

by which to contest the expansion of the apartheid regime. The Programme of Action of 1949

therefore outlined the introduction of more radical tactics to be employed, including "immediate and

active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other means" (Ibid.). ANC had

formally made its shift to a strategy of nonviolent mass mobilization.

The impetus for this initial escalation was the increased influence of members of the newly

formed (1943) ANC Youth League (Zunes 1999, 204) and the more radical SACP. Founded in 1921,

SACP had increasingly shifted towards representing black workers. Consequently, the membership

of it and ANC overlapped significantly, resulting in an informal alliance. This informal alliance

deepened further with the banning of the SACP in 1950 (Barrell 1990, 6).

The first serious manifestation of ANC's more confrontational approach to nonviolent

tactics was the Defiance Campaign of 1952, led by Youth League leader Nelson Mandela. The

nationwide campaign called on South Africans to disobey rules demanding that public places be

segregated (Schock 2005, 58). When rioting broke out, the government intervened forcefully, quickly

succeeding in bringing the campaign to a halt by detaining thousands of participants. In the

aftermath of the Defiance Campaign the government passed numerous laws aimed at making

collective action more difficult (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the campaign had served to get the message out

and ANC's membership swelled to 100,000 (Mandela 2008, 120).

The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the Banning of ANC and PAC

Objecting to the inclusion of whites within the ANC membership, a faction in 1959 splintered off to

create its own organization, PAC (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, 29). PAC employed the same type of

nonviolent tactics as ANC and soon somewhat of a rivalry developed. In an effort to preempt an

ANC organized demonstration against pass laws, PAC organized a rally to be held prior, on March

28, 1960. Participants in this rally in Sharpeville were met by a brutal government crackdown leaving 69 dead and 178 wounded. The event became known as the Sharpeville Massacre.

In memory of the people killed, ANC called a general strike. The strike lasted three weeks and caused a severe government crackdown. A state of emergency was declared during which the police detained more than 10,000 people. ANC and PAC were both banned in 1961.

Abandoning Nonviolent Tactics for Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics

The decision by SACP, ANC, and PAC to escalate to violent tactics was taken in the aftermath of the state of emergency following the Sharpeville massacre. ANC and SACP jointly formed their military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), and PAC theirs, Poqo (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, 33). Initially conceived of as an autonomous movement from ANC, MK was formally adopted as the organizations' military wing in October 1962 (Adams 2001, 54).

Despite much discord within ANC about whether escalation was legitimate given how long ANC had used nonviolent tactics, a compromise solution was reached that allowed organizational cohesion to remain intact. In congruence with the political objective of attaining nonracial democracy and avoiding a race war, it was decided that MK would abstain from using lethal violence against white South Africans and initially merely engage in sabotage (Mandela 1994, 246).

The MK, led by Nelson Mandela, launched its initial sabotage operations in December 1961. The primary purpose of adopting sabotage was as a warning to the government that the conflict could easily escalate out of control (Ibid., 4). Sabotage was not only morally more acceptable than all-out guerrilla warfare, it also had the added benefit of being easier to recruit for (Ibid., 7) and requiring fewer active participant (Ibid., 246).

ANC did not believe the conflict would remain limited. According to Mandela, "if sabotage did not produce the results we wanted, we were prepared to move on to the next stage: guerrilla

warfare and terrorism" (1994, 247). It was clear that the government's violent response to sabotage would justify ANC's escalation to full on guerrilla warfare (Ibid., 247). Hence, sabotage was merely the stepping-stone between nonviolent and violent conflict and laid the groundwork for the creation of a revolutionary army (Barrel 1990, 7).

ANC felt that "[i]f war was inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favorable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparation for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare " (Ibid.)

Given that conditions in South Africa are particularly poorly suited to guerrilla warfare, it is somewhat perplexing that ANC decided to employ this tactic. South Africa has little mountainous terrain or forests for rebels to use for cover and concealment, the peasant class was small and highly controlled by white farm owners, and there were no friendly neighboring countries in which to set up external bases (Adams 2001, 57; Davis 1987, 4; Marx 1992, 157; McKinley 1997, 28; Price: 1991, 39; Zunes 1999, 207). The organization chose to ignore these facts, focusing instead on the recent successes of insurgency in Algeria and Cuba (Barrell 1990, 7; McKinley 1997, 28), and later on the de-colonization of Mozambique and Angola, as reasons to be optimistic about the potential for armed conflict (Zunes 1999, 205).

As suspected, the initial sabotage campaign failed to bring the regime to the bargaining table or withdraw white support from the National Party. Consequently, ANC and SACP escalated to guerrilla warfare. Given the lack of friendly neighboring countries from which to launch attacks, the majority of MK action centered round creating such conditions by helping ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) to power (Ellis and Sechaba 1991, 43). This resulted in ANC in exile becoming even less visible domestically to black South Africans than it already was.

ANC's Rationale for Escalating to Violent Tactics: Repression, Efficacy, and Popular Pressure

Why did ANC escalate to violent tactics? The literature suggests three possible motives: 1) Nonviolent tactics had been unsuccessful in obtaining political objectives; 2) Lethal repression had made nonviolent tactics a prohibitively dangerous tactic to employ; and 3) To respond to popular calls to use start using violent tactics.

First, after more than 40 years of using nonviolent tactics, there was an increasing sense within ANC and blacks in society at large that the tactic had accomplished little. According to Mandela "nonviolence was not a moral principle, but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon" (Mandela 1994, 137). Mandela believed that "nonviolence has failed, for it had done nothing to stem the violence of the state nor change the heart of our oppressors" (Ibid., 23). Because "[n]onviolence was a tactic that should be abandoned when it no longer worked"(Ibid., 137), ANC "had no alternative to armed and violent resistance" (Ibid., 236), according to Mandela.

Second, nonviolent tactics were becoming a prohibitively dangerous tactic to employ, even prior to the organization being made illegal. "Over and over again [ANC] had used nonviolent weapons in our arsenal - speeches, deputations, threats, marches, strikes, stay-aways, voluntary imprisonment - all to no avail, for whatever [it] did was met by an iron hand," stated Mandela (Ibid., 236-237).

Police repression against nonviolent protest was becoming increasingly ferocious (Davis 1987, 14), and the government had started to call on the army to do protest policing (Meli 1988, 148). Oliver Tambo, a central ANC figure, directly attributes government escalation to the organization's decision to take to arms: "Once the army was involved we could not take it any further than that. The police were no longer sufficient. It was a new situation. We decided then to embrace violence as a method of struggle" (quoted in Meli, 1988, 148).

According to Mandela, repression had made nonviolent tactics "suicidal" (Mandela 1994, 141), meaning "it was wrong and immoral to subject [the] people to armed attacks by the state without not offering them some kind of alternative" (Ibid., 137).

A final factor influencing ANC's decision to use force was popular pressure. The black populace was growing increasingly tired of nonviolence and there were signs suggesting they were about to take up arms independently. Urban and rural revolts suggested that ANC needed to get on the bandwagon or risk becoming obsolete (Adams 2001, 54; Davis 1987, 14; Ellis 1991, 32; McKinley 1997, 28-29).

While debating Moses Kotane, the SACP Secretary, about the decision of whether to abandon nonviolent tactics for violent ones, Mandela pointed out that "[p]eople were already forming military units on their own, and the only organization that had the muscle to lead them was the ANC" (Mandela 1994, 237). In Mandela's view, "[v]iolence would begin whether we initiated it or not"(Ibid., 237). Hence, concluded Mandela, if ANC "did not take the lead now, [sic] we would be latecomers and followers to a movement we did not control" (Ibid.).

Explaining ANC's Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses & General Insights

Repression Hypotheses

How does ANC's rationale for escalating to violent tactics resonate with repression hypotheses?

ANC's discussion of how repression of nonviolent tactics undermines the efficacy of the strategy, in turn suggesting an escalation to violent modes of contestation, seems like evidence in favor of the efficacy and substitution hypothesis.

The prediction that repression and leader decapitation cause organizations to splinter, and that splinters use violent tactics is unsupported. Not only did ANC not splinter due to repression,

but the decision to escalate to violent tactics was also made prior to the incarceration of Nelson Mandela.

The outbidding hypothesis is only partially supported. There was clearly concern within ANC that unless it escalated to violent tactics it would be "left behind." Yet, the immediate worry was less about other organizations using violence to recruit participants from a joint pool of recruits, than about failing to represent unorganized popular pressure to employ violent tactics following the Sharpeville massacre.

General Insights

Of the three reasons for why ANC escalated to violent tactics - ineffectiveness of nonviolent tactics, repression of nonviolent tactics, and popular pressure to employ violent tactics - I suggest the two latter ones were most important.

Although ANC had used nonviolent tactics with largely no results for the last 40 years, it was only when the government called in the army to repress nonviolent protesters that the organization concluded that it was time to escalate to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Since people had already started to call for a more militant approach to apartheid, the organization knew it would be able to mobilize a substantial number of participants for the purposes of armed conflict.

Combined, these insights suggest that organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they can mobilize enough participants and when nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by lethal government repression.

6. Contestation 1969-1977: BC

The Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the main South African opposition parties resulted in an increasingly repressive political environment with largely no organized popular contestation. The repression of dissent gave the illusion of a "domestic peace" (Price 1991, 24), a security situation that lasted for the majority of the 1960s.

It was not until 1969 that organized anti-apartheid activity was once again initiated. Founded in 1969, BC originated among black university students, and was closely associated with the South African Students Organization (SASO) under the leadership of Steve Biko. Highly influenced by the writing of Franz Fanon (1965), the mission of this umbrella organization was to improve black self-esteem and assertiveness, the means to achieving regime change.

Although Fanon provided the ideological foundation for numerous violent independence movements, this was not an aspect adopted by BC. Anthony Marx notes that "[f]or BC, the use of force to undermine the regime's will or capacity to rule was simply unnecessary, because ""the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress"" (1992, 47). For the same reason, it was considered unnecessary to try to persuade whites to give up power. Although BC did not elaborate on exactly how black assertiveness would bring about political change, it was clear that its overall approach was fundamentally nonviolent (Hirshmann 1990, 10; Marx 1992, 47).

Given the repressive climate, keeping an initially low profile was pragmatic: The vagueness of BC's political objectives and its passive approach to organizing nonviolent protest made the apartheid government view it as non-threatening. Consequently, it allowed BC and its two core affiliates – SASO and the Black People's Convention - to grow somewhat unrestrained in the early 1970s (Marx 1992, 47; Price 1991, 50). Hence, BC was able to avert government repression during its nascent phase, thereby allowing the organization to recruit members and affiliates among a constituency still fearful of mobilizing due to memories of the harsh repression of the early 1960s

(Marx 1992, 47). Indeed, given the radical alternative inherent in ANC, the government was somewhat encouraging of the development of a much more moderate black organization (Marx 1992,49).

Nevertheless, since it was the only active anti-apartheid organization in the country, the government soon started viewing BC as threatening. Consequently, as the influence of the organization grew within the black community, so did government repression: 1971-1973 saw individual BC leaders being either banned or jailed. SASO was made illegal in 1975. Yet, the harshest forms of repression were to take place following the events in Soweto on June 16, 1976.

The Soweto uprising began as a spontaneous demonstration protesting that secondary school would be taught exclusively in Afrikaans. Police violence against protesters resulted in two fatalities, which in turn set off a spree of protests and riots that spread throughout the country. The first week of the uprising resulted in at least 130 people killed (Ibid., 68).

Despite the revolt lasting 5 months, neither did an organization emerge nor were political demands explicitly made (Price 1991, 58). The uproar appears to have been largely a manifestation of popular anger over a deteriorating economy and a general decline in living standard (Ibid., 56).

Although the people revolting had clearly been influenced by BC rhetoric, the organization had no role in organizing the violent uprising (Ibid., 70). It nevertheless became the target of state repression, just as ANC and PAC had been targeted after the Sharpeville massacre. BC's de facto leader, Steve Biko, was arrested and died while incarcerated, probably at the hands of his guards. Five weeks later, on October 17, 1977, the government banned BC and 17 of its most important affiliates (Ibid., 84) in order to prevent the organization from uniting with the exiled ANC/SACP and PAC. BC dissolved following the banning, and the organization emerging in its wake, AZAPO, adopted nonviolent tactics (Ibid., 86).

Government violence during the uprising made many black South Africans conclude that taking up arms was the only viable option. This resulted in numerous former BC members fleeing the country to join ANC. As a result, ANC's membership rose to 9,000 in 1980, nine times as high as in 1975 (Ibid.,93).

Explaining BC's Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses and General Insights

Despite ANC's conclusion that nonviolent tactics were ineffective and due to anticipated repression even being referred to as "suicidal", BC nevertheless chose to employ nonviolent tactics

BC's experience is remarkably similar to that of ANC and PAC following the Sharpeville massacre. ANC, PAC, and BC all initially espoused nonviolent tactics, all were repressed and eventually banned in the aftermath of violent spontaneous rioting that they had no role in organizing. All organizations were witness to an increasingly militant populace, which clearly indicated that the black populace was ready and willing to use violence to confront the regime. Finally, historical developments during both uprisings suggested that violent tactics could be productive in bringing about political change, with Angola and Mozambique gaining independence in 1974 and developments in Zimbabwe suggesting that the transition to majority rule was soon in the making. Yet, whereas ANC and PAC escalated to violent tactics, BC did not. Why?

I begin with discussing to what extent repression hypotheses correctly predict BC's choice of tactics, and then consider more general insights.

Repression Hypotheses

Repression hypotheses have little to say about BC's initial choice of nonviolent tactics. But once BC became the target of severe government repression following the Soweto riots, while also losing its

leader at the hand of the regime, repression hypotheses would have predicted that it adopt violent tactics. Yet, it did not.

Upon being banned, BC instead dismantled, and the splinter group emerging in its wake, AZAPO, used exclusively nonviolent tactics. This goes against both the efficacy and substitution, and the splintering hypotheses.

Finally, despite ANC drawing on BC support in the aftermath of the Soweto riots due to an increase in youth wanting to employ violent tactics, thus fleeing the country to join ANC, BC did not feel compelled to escalate as predicted by the outbidding hypothesis.

None of the repression hypotheses predicting violent tactics are hence supported.

General Insights

BC organized and sought to further its political cause largely by functioning as a cultural and educational organization, only occasionally employing nonviolent tactics, and when doing so, making sure it did not confront the regime. This suggests organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by government violence.

Why did the organization not escalate to violent tactics in face of heavy repression following the Soweto riots? According to Biko, BC was "not going to get into armed struggle" (quoted in Davis 1987, 25), something he believed that the organization could "leave [sic] to the PAC and the ANC" (Ibid.) Despite this statement making it sound as if BC was ideologically committed to nonviolence, I suggest that BC may not have remained wedded to nonviolent tactics in face of severe repression had ANC not already begun using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

The onslaught of refugees escaping South Africa to join the ANC following the Soweto riots resulted in a dramatic membership rise for ANC (Price 1991, 61). I suggest had this more militant

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cohort of BC's constituency not left the country for ANC, it is possible that popular pressure for a more militant approach could have made the organization escalate to violent tactics.

The more militant black cohort leaving to join ANC meant that BC might not have enough participants to mobilize for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, were it to escalate. Hence, despite nonviolent tactics becoming prohibitively dangerous to employ, in contrast to ANC, BC did not escalate to violent tactics because it did not have enough participants to employ violent tactics.

This argument reinforces the earlier insight derived about ANC escalation, namely that organizations employ violent tactics when they know they can mobilize enough participants and nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by lethal government repression.

7. Contestation 1983-1991: UDF

The years following the Soweto riots and banning of BC saw the South African economy improving. Recovering from the recession, the apartheid regime decided to try to buy black quiescence by co-optation rather than use of force. One way in which the government hoped to do so was through partial liberalization in the form of constitutional reform.

But the 1982 proposal offering select groups of blacks and Indians voting rights in three "ethnically separated houses of parliament" was met by disdain by the black community, who recognized it as a cheap attempt of "divide and rule," given that the proposal would effectively leave more than half of all South Africans without the right to vote (Marx 1992, 106, 111).

UDF formed in reaction to this proposal in 1983. It was an umbrella organization with the purpose of coordinating collective action among its initially 300 local affiliates. Although the nature of affiliates varied markedly (Seekings 2000, 15), they all shared the common denominator of being anti-apartheid (Marx 1992, 130). Affiliates were autonomous and independent of UDF, who largely functioned as a nexus for the coordination of collective action.

Despite the goals of UDF being essentially those laid out in ANC's Freedom Charter, the organization initially maintained its non-alignment (Ibid., 130), and abstained from inflammatory rhetoric against the government. UDF and its affiliates initially only made claims against individual businesses and local regional government by using nonviolent tactics (Ibid., 111). Because nonviolent protest was initially not aimed directly at the apartheid regime, UDF largely averted government attention and repression during its formative years (Schock 2005, 59).

Given that ANC had stepped up its attacks in the aftermath of Soweto, the government was hopeful that the formation of an alternative, less militant organization, would redirect popular contestation towards UDF instead (Marx 1992, 144-145). The government was trying to be strategic in its use of violent repression in the hopes that this would make UDF maintain its non-confrontational approach to the regime.

UDF's first national campaign directly targeting the government was precipitated by the proposal for a revised constitution. The Anti-Election Campaign, launched in August 1984, called for boycotting the reform referendum (Schock 2005, 60). The campaign made clear to the apartheid regime that UDF might be more of a status quo challenger than initially thought.

Upon hearing the news that the white electorate had approved the new constitution, non-UDF related local protests in the Vaal triangle turned violent. Acting on the mistaken belief that UDF was behind the violence in Vaal, the government responded with repressing the organization (Marx 1992, 148, 155, 159). In reality, UDF sought to make its affiliates abstain from using violence (Ibid., 159).

Targeted repression against UDF precipitated popular anger, and subsequently more violence and protests in the bantustans. Reacting to the deteriorating security situation, the government called for a partial state of emergency in July 21, 1985, followed by a complete state of

emergency on June 12, 1986. Unrestrained in its repressive capacity, the government detained more than 26,000 people without a trial, 80% of which were UDF affiliate members (Ibid., 159-160).

Thanks to its cell-like structure, UDF was initially able to withstand government repression, and by 1985 the organization had more than 2 million affiliated members (Ibid., 167). Yet, eventually repression made it impossible for the organization to serve the role of a moderating coordinator among its affiliates. When the government banned UDF and numerous affiliates in February 1988, the momentum and optimism characterizing the early years of protest had already faded (Ibid., 176).

UDF's moderation was considered partly to blame for the revolts' inability to obtain concrete political objectives by taking advantage of the momentum and challenge the regime (Ibid., 178-179). The organization continued its work clandestinely under the name the *Mass Democratic Movement* until February 1990, when some of its rights were restored. It formally dissolved in August 1991, after the de-legalization of PAC, ANC, and SACP among others (Seekings 2000, 698).

Explaining UDF's Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses and General Insights

Repression Hypotheses

UDF employed nonviolent tactics and did not escalate to violent tactics despite increased government repression during the state of emergency. This goes contrary to repression hypotheses, which would have predicted UDF use violent tactics following the government crackdown, potentially splintering, and splinters employing violent tactics. Hence, repression arguments are unable to explain UDF's choice in tactics.

UDF went to great lengths to appear non-confrontational, initially only directing claims against state officials and local businesses. It was only upon having organized substantially that it took on the central government directly using nonviolent tactics.

Just as was the case with BC, this suggests that organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when this form of contestation is likely to be met by government violence.

Upon becoming the target of severe repression following the Vaal uprisings and later banned, UDF continued its nonviolent work under another name instead of escalating to violent tactics. Given the intense repression and the organization's close alliance with ANC, why did UDF not escalate to violence? The decision seems even more perplexing given that UDF affiliates saw "themselves as being under ANC discipline and carrying out its strategies" (Suttner 2004, 699).

The answer may, counter-intuitively, lie partly in UDF's close relationship to ANC. According to one scholar, UDF saw "itself as a curtain raiser before the main team arrived on the field" (Ibid.). Given UDF's deferential stance towards ANC, as exemplified by the organization's decision to disband following the legalization of ANC (Ibid.), it is perhaps not surprising that UDF, just as BC before it, saw violent tactics as something to be left to this earlier organization.

I suggest that UDF did not escalate to violent tactics, because the cohort within its constituency that were willing to use force already had the option of joining ANC. Hence, the reason why UDF did not escalate to violence was the same as BC: Although nonviolent tactics were no longer a feasible option given the intensity of state repression, the organization did not think it had enough participants within the organization willing to use violent tactics were it to escalate.

8. Conclusion and Theoretical Insights Suggested by Analysis

I find that repression hypotheses are generally unable to explain what accounts for anti-apartheid organizations' tactical choices during the period studied.

I suggest that ANC escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics because nonviolent tactics were likely to be met with lethal government repression, and because of popular pressure to escalate to violent tactics. The extent of calls for escalation meant that ANC knew it would be able to mobilize enough participants to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Hence, a more encompassing general hypothesis suggested by the analysis is that organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they know they can mobilize enough participants, and nonviolent tactics is too dangerous to employ due to lethal government repression.

Neither BC nor the later UDF opted for violent over nonviolent tactics. Instead, both organizations initiated their activity with exceedingly non-confrontational stances towards the government and did not escalate to violent tactics when faced with violent state repression.

That both organizations used nonviolent tactics as their initial tactic suggests the following general hypothesis: Organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government repression.

I suggest that the reason why neither of them escalated to violent tactics was because they did not believe themselves capable of mobilizing enough participants to use violent tactics, since the militant cohort of their constituency had joined, or were in the process of joining, ANC.

This conclusion reinforces the earlier insight that organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal repression.

Chapter 5

A Mobilization Theory of Contestation

1. Introduction:

Insights from Case Studies and Bargaining Theory Informing Mobilization Theory

Insights from the case studies and bargaining theory provide important clues to what determines

organizations' choice of tactics. In this chapter, I draw on these combined insights to construct a

supplemental theory to opportunity structure theory, which I refer to as mobilization theory.

Insights from Case Studies

The exploratory case studies seeking to explain organizations' tactical choices in Algeria and South

Africa suggest three general insights relevant to theory generation: 1) Organizations tend to generally

have a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is

likely to be met by government repression; 2) Organizations in repressive environments only employ

nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a significant number of people; and 3)

Organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to

mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal

repression.

Insight from Bargaining Theory

I derive two key insights from bargaining theory that, I argue, are crucial to understanding what accounts for variation in organizations' choice of tactics: 1) All rational organizations should prefer to solve their conflict of interests without using violent tactics, since doing so is costly; 2) Organizations willing to use violent tactics only do so when bargaining obstacles make it impossible to solve conflict of interests through negotiations in peacetime (Fearon 1995).

2. Chapter Outline

The chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by stating important assumptions and defining key variables. Second, I review and discuss how bargaining theory applies to intra-state conflicts of interests. Third, I lay out the tenets of mobilization theory, paying particular attention to how nonviolent protest, under certain conditions, can serve as a signaling device allowing organizations to overcome not only what I refer to as the *peacetime bargaining dilemma,* but also ameliorate the information problem inherent in bargaining. I close by presenting testable hypotheses.

3. Key Assumptions and Definitions

Key Assumptions

For the purposes of this analysis, I make five theoretical assumptions that should be made explicit.

First, I assume that organizations and governments are rational unitary actors that seek to maximize utility and make their decisions by weighing the costs and benefits of using various tactics.

Second, I assume that organizations know whether they are willing to employ violent tactics.

Third, I assume that organizations seek to use whatever tactic is most likely to work given their resource endowment and the structural context. This, however, does not mean that the tactics chosen will always be successful, merely that they constitute the best option available at the time.

Fourth, I assume that factors determining organizations' initial choice of tactic also determine potential changes in tactics over time.

Fifth, I assume that violent tactics that do not constitute terrorism are always guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Definitions

A *dissident organization* is a political organization whose objectives entail "seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations" and who makes political demands on the government "by mobilizing civilians for sustained political action"(Amenta 2010, 288).[27]

Maximalist political demands are those requiring governments to "make concessions that fundamentally alter the political order or the nature of the state"(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 69). These include calls for increased political self-determination and regime change. The former includes calls for federalism or secession and the latter calls for democratization, creation of an Islamic or socialist state, changes in the constitution, or the removal of the current government.

Strategy is a "plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim."[28]

Tactics are the means through which strategies are put in action and/or implemented.[29]

A *nonviolent tactic* does not entail the use of force. Nonviolent tactics include strikes, demonstrations, petitions, and sit-ins.

A *demonstration* fulfills the following four criteria, namely being: "(1) a voluntary [public] gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against

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[27] This definition draws heavily on Amenta et al.'s definition of a social movement (2010, 288).

[28] New Oxford American Dictionary.

[29] Technically, there is an intermediate step between strategy and tactics, namely operations. For the purposes of this analysis I will merely be referring to strategy and tactics.

public policies; (2) bounded by space and time (that is, it occurred in a specific location during a limited time period); (3) the number of participants was not restricted by the organizers of the event (that is, it was not a conference, convention, or other restricted organized meeting); and (4) did not have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that is, it was not a mass violent event)" (Beissinger 2002, 462).

A *strike* is an organized work stoppage for the purposes of achieving political demands.

A *violent tactic* relies on the use of lethal force. Violent tactics include guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics.

Guerrilla warfare is a technique of armed combat that employs "small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible" while "seek[ing] to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population" (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 70).

Conventional warfare occurs when organizations "militarily confront states using heavy weaponry such as field artillery and armor" (Kalyvas and Balcell 2010, 419). "[M]ilitary confrontation is direct, either across well-defined front lines or between armed columns; clashes often take the form of set battles, trench warfare, and town sieges" (Ibid.).

Terrorism is indiscriminate violence used to target governments' civilian constituencies at random; attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant to coerce governments rather than civilians.[30] Targeting civilians for the purposes of coercing them to cooperate is an inherent part of guerrilla tactics and is considered separate from terrorist tactics (Galula 1964; Huntington 1968). Hence, MEI and GIA targeting of civilians do not constitute what I define as terrorism.

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[30] Author's definition. This definition is very similar to what Stanton (2009) refers to as coercion strategy.

Repression is "the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions...Repression involves applications of state power that violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security"(Davenport 2007, 2).

4. Reasons for Bargaining Failure also Reasons for Organizations Employing Violent Tactics

A central tenet of bargaining theory is that if organizations and governments could anticipate the outcome of a military clash between them in advance, they would be better off reaching an agreement, the terms of which represented the outcome of such armed combat, instead of only doing so after paying the costs entailed in fighting as well (Fearon 1995).[31]

Understanding when and why bargaining in peacetime, if initiated, fails, allows one to ascertain why organizations sometimes employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics and other times do not.

The reason reaching a mutually acceptable agreement in peacetime sometimes fails is due to three bargaining obstacles: 1) Private information about capability and resolve and efforts to misrepresent them; 2) Issue-indivisibility; and 3) Commitment problems.

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[31] Given the immense influence of Fearon's (1995) article to the scholarship on interstate war onset, it is easy to forget that the original theory developed by Hicks (1963) sought to explain why certain labor negotiations resulted in deals whereas others failed, resulting in strikes. For more on bargaining theory as it applies to international conflict see Powell (2002).

Of these three bargaining obstacles, I focus on private information about capability and resolve.[32] Because I consider issue-indivisibility a kind of information problem,[33] I suggest the latter is the most common bargaining obstacle.

Private Information about Capability and Resolve and Incentives to Misrepresent

Bargaining theory posits that for successful bargaining in peacetime to be possible, organizations must first find a way to credibly convey information about their latent military capability and resolve to fight to governments (Fearon 1995). Sometimes the only way of sending such a costly, and therefore credible, signal, is to start using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics (Wagner 2000).

Fighting allows adversaries to transfer information about their respective military capability and resolve. Once enough information has been transferred for parties to update their beliefs and agree on the likely outcome of fighting, they can also reach a mutually acceptable solution ending the conflict (Blainey 1988; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Iklé 2005; Pillar 1983; Powell 2002; Slantchev 2003; Walter 2006, 2009).

Peacetime information problems are especially challenging in intrastate conflicts for two reasons: 1) Assessing organizations' latent military capabilities is hard for governments as well as for organizations; and 2) Even if both parties have perfect information about the relative balance of military power, they may nevertheless not agree about the likely outcome of armed combat due to private information about resolve (Walter 2009).

Information about government military capability is easier for organizations to obtain than vice versa (Ibid.). Whereas states can engage in public military drills to showcase their military

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[32] I do not discuss commitment problems because mobilization theory does not depend on it and I consider information problems more common and central to negotiations in peacetime failing.

[33] For an argument proposing the issue-indivisibility problem is a form of commitment problem, see Powell (2006).

prowess (Fearon 1995), organizations may be reluctant to convey information about their military capabilities for fear of a preemptive strike (Walter 2009). Since organizations know that demonstrating their latent military power and willingness to use these capabilities to obtain their political objectives is likely to make them appear threatening to the state, they may do just the opposite, namely seek to appear less militarily potent than they are.[34]

Another complicating factor is that organizations have imperfect information about their own strength (Walter 2009). The main function of guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is for compellent purposes, but when initially employed they also serve an important mobilizing function (Huntington 1968, Galula 1963, Zedong 1961).[35] Although organizations may be able to roughly estimate the extent of their popular support, they do not know exactly how much of it will translate into support capable of being mobilized for armed combat until *after* the organization starts using violent tactic (Walter 2009).

Issue-Indivisibility Really an Information Problem

Conflicts of interests about who have the right to strategically (Fearon 1995), culturally and/or religiously important territory (Goddard 2006; Hassner 2003; Toft 2001), or who rules (Betts 1994), are often perceived as indivisible or zero-sum by the parties involved. This makes these conflicts of interests especially hard to solve through peacetime negotiation, and hence more likely to escalate to violent conflict (Fearon 1995).

Theoretically, negotiated settlements featuring side-payments should be able to solve this type of bargaining obstacle (Ibid.). Yet, empirically, overcoming the issue-indivisibility problem

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[34] Misrepresenting yourself as weaker than you actually are is likely to be harder if you have conventional warfare capabilities.

[35] This is arguably the case with terrorism used as "propaganda by the deed" as well (Crenshaw 1978).

appears harder than implied by the side payment solution: Armed conflicts characterized as zero-sum tend to last longer than other types of conflicts (Walter 2009).

I argue that indivisibility on its own is unlikely to pose an obstacle to peaceful conflict resolution. What makes it a hard issue to find a compromise solution to is that both parties are highly resolved to obtain the entire "prize" rather than settling for a side-payment (Fearon 1995). Conflicts of interests over an object perceived as indivisible should be easier to solve when the parties do not care deeply about the issue. Hence, it is the salience of the object at stake - i.e. the *relative balance of resolve* (Betts 1987) - that determines whether these conflicts are amenable to a peaceful solution or not.

Assuming perfect information about military capabilities, issue indivisibility only poses a problem to conflict resolution in peacetime when both parties are highly resolved, but there is incomplete information about who cares most about the issue, making it unclear who should accept a side-payment and who should obtain the "prize" involved. Since the real problem inherent in issue-indivisibility is imperfect information about resolve, this bargaining obstacle is a kind of information problem.

Inability to Initiate Bargaining in Peacetime Due to the Peacetime Bargaining Dilemma
Although private information poses a serious hurdle to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement in peacetime once negotiations started, I argue a more permissive reason for bargaining failure is negotiations never being initiated in peacetime.

In order for bargaining in peacetime to start, organizations must make a compellent threat *before* they start administering the punishment, i.e. start using violent tactics (Schelling 1966). Despite governments' and organizations' mutual incentives to avoid the costs of warfare by solving conflicts of interests before they turn violent, what I call the peacetime bargaining dilemma creates strategic

incentives for each party to act in ways that makes initiating bargaining in peacetime difficult. The peacetime bargaining dilemma consists of two parts: 1) The *identification problem;* and 2) The *saving face/reputation for resolve problem.*

The Identification Problem

The information problem is only a problem to negotiations succeeding provided they are actually initiated in peacetime. Walter (2009) assumes that a key problem facing governments is to identify which, among a plethora of organizations making compellent threats in peacetime, are bluffing and which ones should be taken seriously. Empirically, I argue, organizations are unlikely to identify themselves by making explicit and public compellent threats in peacetime. This is since doing so automatically brands organizations national security threats, and is more likely to result in a military crackdown than an invitation to negotiate.

Organizations being reluctant to identifying themselves as willing to use force by stating an explicit compellent threat in peacetime means governments may only find out which organizations are willing to do so upon their starting to use violent tactics. Indeed, none of the organizations surveyed in the theory-generating case studies made compellent threats to use violence prior to actually engaging in armed conflict. The identification problem is the first part of the peacetime bargaining dilemma.

The Saving Face/Reputation for Resolve Problem

Even if organizations were able to state their political demands in the form of a public explicit compellent threat without risking a preemptive government crackdown, peactime bargaining is unlikely to follow because of the saving face/reputation for resolve problem.

Compellent threats are more difficult to succeed than deterrent threats, because acquiescing in compellence requires actively doing something, whereas giving into deterrence can be accomplished through inaction (Schelling 2008, 124, 128). This means governments acquiescing in compellence are more easily observable to third parties, something the former would like to avoid since they worry about losing face and their reputation for resolve (Ibid.).

Governments care about their reputation for resolve because it is likely to influence whether other organizations will try to challenge it using compellence (Walter 2006). Seeing organizations using compellence to succeed in making governments acquiesce may influence other organizations to pose explicit compellent threats to obtain their political objectives, something governments would like to avoid (Walter 2006).

This means that governments may be more comfortable giving in to compellent demands after armed combat has started, since this demonstrates not only their resolve, but also the military capabilities of the organization, more clearly, thus allowing governments to save face if acquiescing in demands. Other organizations may not emulate guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics if it is clear that they are militarily much weaker than the organization that received concessions.[36]

Implications of the Peacetime Bargaining Dilemma

The peacetime bargaining dilemma means that organizations may conclude that the prospect of initiating bargaining in peacetime is low. Those willing to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics to obtain their objectives may instead jumpstart the bargaining process by making their compellent demands at the same time as starting to employ violent tactics. In this scenario, organizations skip

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[36] I suggest that the reason why terrorism is unlikely to succeed in attaining political goals is because this tactic requires so few resources to employ. Giving in to organizations using a tactic that can be employed by a majority of organizations largely regardless of their resource endowments would set a dangerous precedent, likely to influence a multitude of copycat organizations into using the same tactic.

formal, explicit bargaining in peacetime, resulting in the government not being aware of their existence, political demands and willingness to use force until after they do so.

Doing so allows organizations to make compellent threats backed up by military force while being less exposed to governments' repressive response than they would have if they made the threat in peacetime. The benefits of making compellents threat simultaneously as using force is that organizations, now mobilized and in hiding, are better able to withstand governments' military response than they would be in peacetime. Counter-intuitively, this means that organizations may view a compellence strategy that initiates the bargaining process in wartime, rather than in peacetime, as the safer option. Fighting also allows organizations to overcome the most serious bargaining problem had negotiations started, namely the information problem.

4. Mobilization Theory:

Nonviolent Tactics as Solution to Peacetime Bargaining Dilemma and Information Problem

Given the peacetime bargaining dilemma and the information problem, do organizations resolved enough to use violent tactics always end up doing so? Not necessarily.

I argue that there are ways organizations can reveal enough information about their political demands, latent military capability, and resolve to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, to allow governments to identify them as suitable bargaining partners in peacetime in a way that does not put them at the same risk of a preemptive attack, while also allowing governments to initiate bargaining and even acquiesce in political demands without jeopardizing their reputation for resolve.

Doing so entails organizations using nonviolent tactics as a signaling device capable of transferring credible information about capability and resolve. The ability for nonviolent tactics to serve this function means that since all rational resolved organizations prefer solving conflicts of interest peacefully, they are likely to adopt nonviolent tactics whenever they have the necessary

number of participants and it is permissible from a security standpoint. These were also two key

insights derived from the Algeria and South Africa theory generating case studies.

Nonviolent Protest as an Implicit Compellent Threat and Signaling Device

Under certain conditions organizations can overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma and

ameliorate the information problem by using nonviolent protest to communicate implicit compellent

threats.[37]

 If compellent threats are implicit rather than explicit, organizations can communicate their

political demands with less of a risk of a government crackdown. In addition, when faced with an

implicit, rather than explicit, compellent threat, governments are less worried that negotiating with

organizations or even acquiescing to political demands will be interpreted as giving in to

compellence with the potential of creating a domino effect of copycat organizations.[38]

Signaling Capability and Resolve

Nonviolent protest can serve as a credible means of signaling organizational capability and resolve,

thus ameliorating the information problem inherent in bargaining.

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[37] Organizations may prefer to make implicit rather than explicit compellent threats to maintain some flexibility in their response if the compellent threat ends up not working. They too are likely to have a reputation for resolve that they care to uphold in the eyes of domestic audiences as well as with the government. Like autocracies, even organizations with no prior history of making compellent threats have reason to care about their reputation for resolve to ensure they are taken seriously in interactions with the government in the future. Therefore, they would prefer to not position themselves into a situation were they have no choice but to start using violent tactics were the government to not yield to compellent threats.

[38] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that one of the benefits of using nonviolent tactics is that governments are more willing to negotiate with organizations employing nonviolent protest for largely moral reasons. My discussion suggests the same, but for different reasons. Here, it is demonstrations ability to function as implicit compellent threats that make it easier for governments to acquiesce in political demands, not morality per se.

The number of protesters participating in demonstrations is information allowing organizations to signal their latent military power. A crucial part of guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics entails logistics and maintaining of bases, something rebels rely on civilian supporters to do. Hence, the total number of demonstrators provides the government with information that can be used as a rough proxy for organizations' latent military power.

The size of demonstrations only matters if organizations can also credibly signal how much they care about obtaining their political demands. For demonstrations to credibly signal resolve to use violent tactics, using nonviolent tactics has to be costly. Holding demonstrations despite their being illegal, and therefore likely to be met by violent government repression, sends a much stronger signal of resolve than using them in a setting where they are sanctioned.

The extent to which an organization can credibly signal resolve to use violent tactics by holding demonstrations is hence positively correlated with the danger entailed in doing so. Yet, the ability to send a strong signal of resolve by using demonstrations is counterproductive if the price of doing so means the event will be met by lethal government repression. When governments' willingness and ability to use lethal repression suggest that making implicit compellent threats by holding demonstrations is too dangerous, organizations willing to use force are likely to forego employing nonviolent tactic for violent ones, thereby going directly to the wartime bargaining phase.

This logic resonates with the finding that both South African anti-apartheid organizations and Algerian Islamist organizations preferred using nonviolent tactics to violent tactics despite a repressive climate as long as it was not deemed too dangerous, and as long as they could mobilize enough people. It also explains FIS' decision to forego holding a rally after the coup d'état due to fear of lethal government repression.

It also explains why latently militant organizations like MIA and Takfir wa Hijra only started using violent tactics after it became clear that FIS had a substantial number of supporters they could

recruit, and using nonviolent protest was no longer a viable option due to lethal government repression. Likewise, ANC only escalated to violent tactics upon concluding that they had enough popular support, but lethal government repression had made nonviolent tactics "suicidal."

Demonstrations as Implicit Compellent Threats Made Credibly by Brinkmanship

The ability to credibly signal both resolve and capability through nonviolent tactics should give governments a sense of the latent military threat posed by organizations. Yet, why should one assume that such a implicit military threat would not just remain latent? Why should caring for the issue at hand enough to risk a violent government crackdown be interpreted as the organizations' willingness to use violence to obtain their political objective?

For demonstrations to pose an implicit compellent threat of organizations' willingness to escalate to violent tactics, governments have to believe that their latent military power could be effectively mobilized for armed conflict with the potential of posing a considerable military challenge. Guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics require trained fighters and a highly organized command and control structure. The organizational skills needed to employ these tactics are far beyond what it is required for organizations to organize a demonstration (Tilly and Tarrow 2006).[39] In addition, demonstrations are public events open for anyone to join, regardless if they are formally affiliated with the organizations arranging the protest event or not. If organizations do not even know the individuals participating in their events, how can they be expected to mobilize and coordinate them for the purposes of armed struggle?

I suggest organizations' inability to fully control the action of participants in protest events is the reason why demonstrations under certain conditions can serve the function of credible, albeit

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[39] For an argument claiming that the organizational capacity needed for employing nonviolent protest is greater than for employing violent tactics, see Pearlman (2011). This may be true for terrorism, but is unlikely to hold for guerrilla warfare tactics. Pearlman does not differentiate between violent tactics.

implicit, compellent threat of violence. It does so through the compellent technique of brinkmanship (Schelling 2008, 91).

Rather than threatening to impose punishment because of political demands not being met, brinkmanship entails "setting afoot an activity that may get out of hand, initiating a process that carries some risk of unintended disaster" (Ibid., 91). The risk inherent in demonstrations is that they will somehow turn violent. As noted by Gurr, "demonstrations and general strikes have always had the potential for escalating into violent confrontations" (2000, 156). The way that demonstrations can turn violent is less important than that there is a risk that they can result in violent conflict, with the potential of escalating into more serious sustained armed conflict.[40]

This risk is something that organizations can use to their advantage by "encourag[ing] observers to fear that if nonviolent claims [sic] go unmet, violence will follow" (Ibid., 155). Were the events to turn violent, organizations may have little to no ability to call for cessation of hostilities. This is a reason why organizations that forswear violence can still be able to use demonstrations as implicit compellent threats to use force.

Tipping point models of collective action suggest that civilians' decision of whether to participate in protest is determined by how many people are already engaged in the activity. Civilians join in waves with the potential of setting off a cascade of mobilization once a certain threshold is reached (Granovetter 1978; Lohman 1994). The size of demonstrations can therefore provide crucial information to civilians who support the cause and are trying to decide whether the time to join is right. As the size of demonstration increases, political demands may escalate as well.

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[40] One danger with organizations not being able to control the evolution of demonstrations is that they also may be perceived as unable to effectively bargain for the masses. This may cause problems if governments want to negotiate, since organizations may be seen as unsuitable bargaining parties due to their being unable end demonstrations.

The prospect of a growing crowd with escalating demands is another reason why governments may feel the need to crack down on illegal demonstrations, despite being aware of the risk of an escalation of violence. If giving in to political demands is considered potentially less costly, governments may consider acquiescing instead. As noted by Schelling "[i]f the clash of a squad with a division can lead to unintended war, or of a protest marcher with an armed police officer to an unwanted riot, their potencies are equal in respect to threats that count" (2008, 103).

Necessary Conditions for Nonviolent Protest to Serve as Effective Compellent Threat

For demonstrations to serve as implicit compellent threats made credible through brinkmanship, two conditions must hold.

First, demonstrations must be large enough to pose a challenge to riot police were events to turn violent. Only by appearing to carry a risk of escalating into something much more serious, that the government would very much like to avoid, are demonstrations capable of serving the purpose of an implicit compellent threat (DeNardo 1985).

Small demonstrations may carry a risk of becoming violent as well, but because riot police are likely to be able to contain them, they have less risk than larger demonstrations of escalating beyond government control.

Smaller demonstrations are also unlikely to get the same media attention as their larger counterparts. Without media covering the event, governments willing to use force indiscriminately can do so without having to worry about it being brought to the attention of domestic and international audiences, something that may result in the type of moral backlash that could cause previously inactive domestic audiences to take up arms.

Second, governments are unlikely to interpret demonstrations as implicit compellent threats unless they are also convinced that organizations care enough about the issue to potentially be

willing to employ violence to obtain their objectives. Holding a large demonstration without the potential of signaling resolve because there is little risk of a violent government crackdown is unlikely to have a compellent effect.

Theoretically, such large demonstrations can still compel through brinkmanship. But since the government has no reason to assume that the majority of participants care enough about the issue to be willing to use violence, brinkmanship is also less likely to work.

Hence, in order for demonstrations to be a safe enough option for organizations to employ as part of a compellence strategy, yet still capable of signaling resolve in a credible way, they have to be large, while also carrying some risk of eliciting a violent government crackdown.

When government repression is anticipated to be lethal, organizations willing to use force to obtain their objectives will prefer employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead.

Consequently, demonstrations are most likely to be employed as part of a compellence strategy by latent militant organizations targeting regimes that have outlawed demonstrations, but where governments' repressive reaction to nonviolent protest is unlikely to be lethal.

The above discussion explains why ANC only opted for guerrilla tactics after concluding not only that nonviolent protest had become too dangerous to employ because of anticipated government lethal repression, but also that its membership base was large enough to employ guerrilla tactics. It also explains why FIS used nonviolent tactics despite of government repression, but escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics once the nonviolent option was no longer viable due to lethal government repression.

6. Demonstrations as Protest for Persuasion

Demonstrations are frequently employed by organizations with maximalist political demands that are unwilling to resort to violence, and where the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest is low. In these circumstances, the causal mechanism by which demonstrations seek to obtain political objectives is through persuasion.

In contrast to compellence, persuasion strategy seeks to make governments give in to political demands by appealing to international (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999) or domestic political elites to either adopt the cause, or if more closely associated with the government, reconsider their loyalty and defect (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Beissinger 2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005; Sharp 1963). To gain the attention of these instrumental third parties, political organizations send in petitions, and/or organize demonstrations and sit-ins.

In democracies, "protest for persuasion" (Andrews 2001) seeks to gain enough media attention to create sympathetic allies among the public as well as political elites, who then argue in favor of organizations in front of the government. In this political setting, the immediate goal of demonstrations and petitions is to influence agenda setting (Amenta 2008; Andrews 2001). Whether political demand will be met or not depends on whether there is political and public support for the issue. It is assumed that the greater the number of participants employing nonviolent tactics for the purposes of persuasion, the greater the chances of success (Guigni 2004).

In less than democratic regimes, strategies of persuasion can target numerous types of third parties depending on organizations' political demands. When political demands resonate with Western ideals, such as those related to human rights, civil liberties, and democracy, domestic political organizations will seek to capture the attention of foreign and international NGOs, as well as domestic political elites and security forces (Risse and Sikkink 1999).

As theorized by Keck and Sikkink (1998), reaching out to international actors is a crucial part

of the logic behind the so-called "boomerang effect" (Keck and Sikkink 1998). NGOs persuaded to take on the cause of domestic political organizations serve as force multipliers to organizations on the ground, as well as internationally. International NGOs lobby their governments to pressure the target government, which, if successful, can result in diplomatic denunciations and even economic sanction. Pressure from "above" is complemented by pressure from "below" (Ackerman and Duvall 1995; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). Domestic campaigns of "naming and shaming" works as a kind of persuasion (Keck and Sikkink 1998) by making political elites question the legitimacy of current policies or political institutions (Beissinger 2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

When working according to plan, persuasion strategy is capable of making political leaders defect or re-brand themselves as supporters, something that was common among political elites during the height of *glasnost* (Beissinger 2007).

7. Core Tenets of Mobilization Theory

Insights from the discussion above constitute the core tenets of mobilization theory. They suggest that organizations should have a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, and only employ violent tactics when nonviolent protest is deemed out of the question for either security reasons or because organizations cannot mobilize enough participants for a large demonstration, but enough for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Drawing on this logic, I propose that organizations' choice of tactic depends largely on two factors: 1) The level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, and 2) Anticipated repression of nonviolent protest. Both factors are closely linked to organizations' ability to mobilize participants, and influence whether they employ nonviolent tactics, guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, or if they abstain from using tactics.

Level of Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo and Ability to Mobilize

The level of popular satisfaction with the status quo determines the size of the constituency organizations can draw on for mobilization purposes. All else equal, the greater the fraction of the population that is unhappy with the current status quo the easier it should be for organizations to mobilize participants.

The number of people organizations are able to mobilize in turn determines the ability to employ different tactics effectively. Nonviolent protest (Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 2001) and guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics are both likely to be more effective the more people can be mobilized to use the tactic. All else equal, the bias towards nonviolent tactics should however make it more likely that organizations capable of mobilizing many people will employ nonviolent tactics rather than guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

This explains why South African anti-apartheid movements all opted for nonviolent tactics as their initial tactic, and why the Algerian organizations Al-Qiyam, Dawa wa Tabligh, Takfir wa Hijra and FIS did the same.

ANC only escalated to guerrilla tactics tactics upon realizing that it had a large enough member base, and that using non-violent tactics would jeopardize the existence of the organization and its members.

MIA, MEI, and Takfir wa Hijra all escalated to guerrilla tactics after laying dormant prior and during FIS electoral campaign. They opted for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics only when government lethal repression made clear that nonviolent tactics was too dangerous to employ, but elections had conveyed information about the extent of FIS' support, which they believed they could draw on for mobilization purposes.

BC and UDF did not escalate to violent tactics even in face of severe repression, because they were unsure they could mobilize enough participants for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics

given that the majority of South Africans willing to use violence had already joined, or was in the process of joining, the already militant ANC.

Terrorism, on the other hand, can arguably be employed effectively even with a small number of active participants.[41] Hence, I assume that organizations that employ terrorism are those with a limited constituency, since had they more popular support they would opt for either guerrilla/conventional warfare or nonviolent tactics. Despite the permissive logistical demands of terrorism, the strategy behind using it for the purposes of coercion requires targeting civilians that can influence their governments, conditions most commonly found in democracies (Pape 2005).[42]

Organizations that are less capable of mobilizing people are also less likely to employ nonviolent tactics for the purposes of making compellent threats. This is since if organizations can only muster small demonstrations they are unlikely to be perceived as serious latent military threats by governments. The original MIA and MEI in Algeria gave up using nonviolent tactics and instead turned to violent tactics partly because they couldn't generate enough support for nonviolent tactics.

Governments in rentier states are especially ardent about seeking to keep popular satisfaction with the status quo high in order to keep dissent about the lack of democracy and civil liberties low. They seek to do so by providing ample amount of public goods and rents (Beblawi 1990). If they are able to do so successfully, one should expect organizations to be especially inactive in rentier states. This explains why there was little to no Islamic contestation in Algeria until after the decline in oil-prices in the mid-1980s.

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[41] More participants should make it harder for organizations to stay covert to the extent needed for the effective employment of terrorism.

[42] For more on the relationship between terrorism and democracy, see Chenoweth (2013).

The logic of mobilization theory is represented by the following path-diagram (Van Evera 1997):

Level of popular satisfaction with status quo
↓
Size of constituency   **Anticipated repression of nonviolent protest**
↓   ↓
Organizational ability to employ   Ability to mobilize constituency
different tactics   for nonviolent protest
↳   **Organizations' use of tactic**   ↲

This discussion suggests the following testable hypotheses:

H1: *Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent protest is <u>low</u>, and popular satisfaction with the status quo is <u>low</u>, are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.*

H2: *Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent protest is <u>high</u>, and popular satisfaction with the status quo is <u>low</u>, are more likely to use guerrilla warfare/conventional warfare.*

H3: *Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent protest is <u>low</u>, and where popular satisfaction with the status quo is <u>high</u>, are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.*

H4: *Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent protest is <u>high</u>, and popular support of the status quo is <u>high</u>, are more likely to abstain from using nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.*

H5: *Organizations with a <u>small constituency</u> in relation to the size of the overall populace are more likely to employ terrorism, and those with a <u>large constituency</u> in relation to the size of the overall populace are more likely to employ nonviolent tactics.*

H6: *Organizations in <u>rentier states</u> are more likely to abstain from using tactics.*

Table 1 summarizes the core hypotheses of mobilization theory:

Table 1. Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional (H2)**	**Nonviolent (H1)**
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used (H4)**	**Nonviolent (H3)**

Chapter 6

Data Sources, Empirical Strategy, and Conceptualization and Coding of Variables

1. Introduction and Outline of Chapter

Having laid out the logic of mobilization and opportunity structure theory and presented their testable hypotheses I now turn to the statistical analysis. Prior to commencing hypotheses testing, however, I need to describe the data sources used for the analyses, discuss the empirical strategy employed, and how I conceptualize and code the dependent and independent variables. This is the purpose of this chapter, which is divided into four sections.

I begin by reviewing the data sources, unit of analysis and empirical strategy employed. Second, I explain how the MENA and Africa datasets are composed and how I conceptualize and code the dependent variable. Third, I discuss the conceptualization and coding of independent and control variables. I conclude by addressing issues of scope condition, selection effects, endogeneity and multicollinearity.

2. Data Sources

I employ two datasets for empirical testing of mobilization and opportunity structure theory hypotheses, the differences of which allows me to draw on the comparative advantage of each.

The MENA dataset is a time-series cross-sectional dataset that tracks tactical choice among 53 organizations in high state capacity countries with maximalist political grievances representing ethnic minority interests in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey from 1980-2004. It is based on the publicly available Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset (Asal et al. 2008).

The Africa dataset is a time-series cross-sectional dataset featuring 167 organizations with maximalist political grievances across 37 African low state capacity countries from 1990-2010. It is a new dataset assembled for the purposes of this project. As far as the author knows, as of May 2014, there are no other datasets featuring information about organizations' chouce of tactics among as many organizations and countries as the Africa dataset. It covers eight years more than the Africa Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED),[43] and close to 25 more countries than MAROB.

The Africa dataset draws on event count data made publicly available through three sources; 1) Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Hendrix and Saleyhan et al. 2012); 2) Uppsala Conflict Geo-Referenced Event Dataset Point (UCDP) (Sundberg et al. 2010); and 3) Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD) (LaFree and Dugan 2007).

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[43] To the author's knowledge, there are currently three datasets that feature information about use of <u>both</u> violent and nonviolent tactics: 1) Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1.) (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); African Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2011); and Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) (Asal et al 2008). NAVCO and ACLED are unsuitable dataset candidates for me to employ for the purposes of this dissertation, making MAROB the best option. The NAVCO dataset is not ideal for me to use for two reasons. First, NAVCO's unit of analysis is the country year in which a nonviolent or violent *campaign* peaked. It does not track organizations' choice of tactics across time. Second, violent campaigns included are an unrepresentative sample of the larger universe of cases. Only violent campaigns coded as having reached the limit of a civil war according to the Correlates of War dataset (COW, Sarkees et al. 2000) - requiring "1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict" – were included in NAVCO. This subset of violent conflicts is likely to represent the tail end of the distribution of violent campaigns, excluding the likely much broader subset of violent conflicts of lesser intensity. ACLED would have been an ideal dataset to use, was it not for the way they code protest events: The decision to code protests that turn violent as "riots" makes it impossible to differentiate between riots that started as such and those that were originally demonstrations.

Because I am interested in predicting organizations' use of tactics across time, rather than the exact date tactics were used, I convert the original format for the unit of analysis in the datasets from event-date to organization-year.

3. Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable

My research question addresses choice of tactics among organizations with maximalist political demands across space as well as over time. The unit of analysis of interest is therefore the tactic used by an organization in a given year.

The dependent variable consists of four categorical variables; 1) None of the tactics used; 2)Nonviolent tactics; 3) Guerrilla/Conventional warfare tactics; and 4) Terrorism.

4. Empirical Strategy: The Model and Steps of the Statistical Analysis

Statistical Model: Multinomial Logit

Since the dependent variable is polychotomous, categorical, and choice-dependent I use a multinomial logit model with robust standard errors. I fit a model featuring country clusters in order to take into account that organizations within the same country may not be independent of each other.[44]

Although it is generally recommended to include a lagged dependent variable to control for temporal dependency when analyzing time-series data (Beck, Katz et al., 1998), I do not because it is not warranted for theoretical reasons - I assume that factors that determine organizations' initial

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[44] For more on clustering see Long 2007, 85-87.

choice of tactic also determine potential changes in tactics over time - and because it dramatically changes the specification of the model.[45]

Including a lagged dependent variable entails assuming that whatever causes organizations to employ a particular tactic one year is the same reason they used that tactic the previous year, which in turn is caused by the same reasons that caused them to pick the tactic the previous year, etc. If so, including a lagged dependent variable makes it hard to ascertain the effect of the key independent variables in the current year, assuming they are the same as they were the previous year and actually what is driving organizations' use of tactics, since they will be represented within the lagged dependent variable.[46]

Because I use a statistical model that requires values of the dependent variable to be independent from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) I run Small-Hsiao and Hausman tests on the MENA and Africa models.[47] About half of the test statistics for each model reports support for the null hypothesis that odds of different outcome categories are independent of other alternatives. For the full results of these tests see, the Appendix.

Because the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests can report contradictory findings, some scholars recommend instead looking at your theory to assess whether choices "can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighted independently..."(McFadden (1973) quoted in Long 2007, 243). Despite including a combined guerilla and conventional warfare tactics category together, I believe there is theoretical support for the notion that the tactics represented in the dependent variable are

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[45] The findings generally stay robust when I run the models with a lagged dependent variable, although differences are more marked in the MENA 1 and 2 analyses.

[46] I am grateful to Page Fortna for pointing this out.

[47] For more on these tests see Long 2007, 243-246.

distinct, as represented by the large literature devoted to each in the political science literature. I therefore proceed to assume that I am not in violation of the IIA rule and that using a multinomial logit model is statistically appropriate.

Steps of the Statistical Analysis

My statistical analysis is divided into three steps. I begin by analyzing the MENA dataset using fairly precise proxy independent variables related to mobilization theory's key hypotheses. The primary MENA analysis is referred to as MENA 1.

I want to be able to compare the generalizability of the MENA findings to another region and a broader set of organizations, but cannot use the more fine-grained proxy measurements I use in MENA 1 when analyzing the Africa dataset. Therefore, I conduct a second MENA analysis using cruder proxies for key hypotheses of mobilization theory that can also be used in the Africa analysis. The secondary MENA analysis, the findings of which I then compare to those of the Africa analysis, is referred to as MENA 2.

In contrast to MENA 1, MENA 2 also excludes organizations that do not use any tactics of interest during the time they are present in the dataset. This is done to make the inclusion rules in the MENA 2 dataset better replicate the Africa dataset, which does not include such organizations for the only reason that it cannot identify them.

Despite my efforts to make the MENA 2 and Africa statistical analysis as comparable as possible, I am unable to do so comprehensively. Although the MENA 2 and Africa analysis use the same proxies to evaluate mobilization theory's key hypotheses, and exclude organizations that abstain from using tactics during their presence in the datasets, the datasets differ in two, arguably significant, ways: 1) The MENA dataset only includes organizations in high state capacity countries,

while the Africa dataset includes only organizations in low state capacity states; and 2) Organizations

in the MENA datasets have been active for at least three years and represent ethnic groups, whereas

the Africa dataset includes a broader set of organizations using a tactic at least once during a year.

Upon concluding the MENA 1, MENA 2, and Africa analyses, I compare the Africa

findings with those of MENA 2 in order to assess to what extent the results are comparable.

Similar findings across datasets indicate that the MENA 2 findings may be generalizable to

another region and broader set of organizations beyond those representing ethnic groups.

Disparate findings between MENA 2 and Africa, on the other hand, may indicate that

culture and/or level of state capacity influence organizations' tactical choice.

5. Composition of Datasets: Inclusion Criteria for Organizations in Datasets

General Inclusion Rules

Three general conditions must apply for organizations to be included in the datasets:

Organizations…1) Must call themselves by a specific name and be of domestic origin; 2) Cannot

have been created by the government, or be represented or running for office; and 3) Must have

maximalist political demands aimed at their domestic government.

MENA 1 and 2

Inclusion in the original dataset (MAROB) used to compose the MENA 1 and 2 datasets requires an

organization to fulfill five criteria. These entail that the organization 1)"makes explicit claims to

represent the interests of one or more ethnic groups and/or the organization's members are

primarily members of a specific ethnic minority"; 2)"is political in its goals and activities"; 3)"is

active at a regional and/or national level"; 4)"not [be] created by a government"; and 5) "is active

for at least three consecutive years between 1980 and 2006" (Asal et al. 2008).

The MAROB dataset is unique in that it allows me to identify "dogs that don't bark" (Doyle 1892), namely organizations that do not use any of the tactics of interest, but still technically fulfill my inclusion criteria for organizations.

Various organizations representing Palestinian interests have *bases in more than one country* in the dataset. The main political objectives of the majority of these are usually directed towards the Israeli government. Hence, I only include entries of these organizations' domestic activity in Israel.[48]

Several organizations representing Palestinian interests seek to make Israel acquiesce in political demands *are in exile and/or located in neighboring countries* but not in Israel. Since I want organizations' structural constraints to be as similar as possible I do not include such organizations.

Finally, organizations must have maximalist political demands to be included in the dataset. To make sure this is the case, I rely on MAROB's coding of political grievances. I only include those with issue areas that entail requests for political self-determination and territorial autonomy, since these are maximalist political demands. I incorporate the majority of cases of political grievances coded as "other" into existing categories, or a new maximalist category, namely "regime change."

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[48] I do not include entries that have organizations coded vis-a-vis their host country governments (typically Lebanon or Jordan) unless organizations' political demands are also directed towards those.

In addition to the general inclusion rules, inclusion in the Africa dataset requires organizations[49] to employ strikes, demonstrations, guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.

Data on organizations' use of nonviolent tactics for the Africa dataset is obtained from SCAD, while information on organizations' use of violent tactics come from UCDP and GTD.

UCDP only includes events involving non-state actors whose use of violent tactics in fighting governments killed at least 25 people during any one year. Once organizations qualify for inclusion in UCDP, all violent events from 1990-2010 involving this actor are included in the dataset as long as they incurred at least one death. UCDP does not specify the type of violent tactic employed, resulting in my assuming that it is either guerrilla or conventional warfare tactics. This means that I refer to these two military tactics jointly as "guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics."

Although UCDP inclusion rule should allow me to identify most organizations using violent tactics against governments, it is nevertheless possible that I am failing to include those whose armed engagement did not reach the 25 fatalities cut-off specified. In an effort to include organizations not reaching this inclusion threshold, I also employ GTD.[50]

GTD includes information on violent events that for the purposes of this project can be considered either guerrilla/conventional or terrorist tactics. I discuss the coding of these separate

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[49] Qualified organizations can be political as well as unions and professional associations. Professional associations and unions often take on the function of political parties and/or organizations in less than democratic countries where rules of associations and civil liberties are severely constrained. For a discussion of this phenomena as applied to the Middle East see Carapico, Ch.4, Angrist Ed. (2010).

[50] Because the original coding material for 1993 went missing, the GTD dataset only include an estimated 15% of all attacks in 1993. Consequently, the entire year's entry was excluded from the dataset since it was unrepresentative of the real number of incidents.

tactics in more detail below. For now, suffice to say that I only include entries from GTD that fulfill my criteria of either guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics or terrorism.

I only include domestic organizations fighting their domestic government within the territory of their country of origin.[51]

Finally, organizations are only included in my dataset if they have maximalist political demands. For the Africa dataset, I obtain information about political demands from SCAD and UCDP. The political demands of organizations only featured in GTD are obtained by conducting Nexis searches of news wires.

Organizations in Each Dataset

Once the inclusion rules have been enforced, the MENA 1 dataset includes 53 and the MENA 2 dataset 40 organizations[52] with maximalist political grievances across nine MENA countries and the Africa dataset includes 167 organizations with maximalist political grievances across 37 African countries.

As is evident from graph 1 and 2, organizations are unevenly distributed across countries. In the MENA 1 dataset, Iraq and Israel have the most number of organizations. The counterparts in

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[51] For example, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) originated in Uganda, but has perpetrated violent acts in neighboring countries. Subsequently, I only include events that involved the LRA in Uganda. It also means I exclude attacks by multinational organizations, such as for example Al Qaeda, which is active in Africa but originated in Saudi Arabia. It also means I exclude events where organizations fight domestic governments outside of their borders. For example, the government of Uganda has fought the LRA outside of Uganda.

[52] The organizations excluded from the MENA 2 analysis include Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (Algeria); National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan (Iran); Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi and Democratic Mass Party (Turkey); Kurdish Islamic Group, Islamic Labor Organization, Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraqi National Alliance, Iraqi Homeland Party, and Democratic Centrist Tendency (Iraq); Islamic Unity Movement and Al- Jama'a al-Islamiyia (Lebanon), and Progressive List for Peace (Israel).

the Africa dataset are Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo. For a complete list of

organizations and their tactical choices across time, see the Appendix.

Graph 1: Organizations across MENA Countries

Graph 2: Organizations Across African Countries

Country	Value
Zimbabwe	4
Zambia	4
Uganda	6
Togo	1
Swaziland	2
Sudan	10
South Africa	11
Somalia	8
Sierra Leone	3
Senegal	1
Rwanda	3
Nigeria	9
Niger	6
Mozambique	2
Morocco	2
Mauritania	2
Mali	1
Malawi	3
Madagasca	2
Lesotho	4
Kenya	5
Guinea	2
Ghana	1
Gabon	1
Ethiopia	7
Eritrea	1
Egypt	4
Cote d'Ivoire	6
Congo, Rep.	4
Congo, Democratic Rep.	13
Chad	15
Central African Republic	4
Cameroon	4
Burundi	5
Burkina Faso	1
Angola	4
Algeria	5

6. Coding the Dependent Variable

If MAROB indicates that organizations use nonviolent tactics in a given year I code the dependent variable "1". Nonviolent tactics include strikes, demonstrations, petitions and sit-ins.[53] I code the dependent variable "2" if MAROB reports that organizations uses guerrilla warfare tactics, and "3" if it says organizations used terrorism. Since MAROB does not define terrorism beyond stating that it entails targeting civilians, I impose two additional constraints: 1) Civilian targeting that constitutes ethnic cleansing is not considered terrorism; and 2) Terrorism entails attacks on civilians conducted using either a bomb or suicide bomber. I obtain this information from MAROB.

I consult SCAD to code the nonviolent tactics part of the dependent variable in the Africa dataset. The dependent variable is coded "1" if the tactic used is either demonstrations[54] or strikes.[55]

The inclusion rules for nonviolent tactics are broader in the MENA dataset than in the Africa dataset: The MENA dataset includes sit-ins and petitions as well. This is because I have more information about nonviolent tactics for the MENA dataset. Rather than truncating the dependent variable in a way that is unrepresentative of the empirical reality and discarding information (King et al. 1994, 130), I code the nonviolent part of the dependent variable differently across datasets.

I consult GTD and UCDP to code whether organizations used guerrilla/conventional warfare or if they used terrorism in the year being coded. I code all events from UCDP that involve

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[53] MAROB codes demonstrations, rallies and riots as "demonstrations" without giving the user an ability to ascertain which of these were used. I assume riots started off as demonstrations and turned violent, not that they were premeditated violent events.

[54] SCAD defines an *"organized demonstration"* as an event where [d]istinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action [is] directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities [and where a] clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified." (Codebook V. 3.0, Saleyhan et al. 2012, 2). SCAD's definition of an organized demonstration is rather broad, resulting in my going through all entries to make sure that I only include the types of nonviolent events that qualify as mass protest events. I exclude entries where hunger strikes by individuals were coded as demonstrations.

[55] SCAD differentiates between general and limited strikes; I code both as "1" on the dependent variable.

battles between organizations and governments within the borders of the state they are associated with as "2" for guerrilla/conventional warfare. I continue coding the guerrilla/conventional warfare part of the dependent variable using GTD. GTD features a wide variety of events, some of which do not fulfill my criteria for terrorism but are suitable candidates for the guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics category. I code GTD events characterized as "armed attacks" that are targeting either police and/or military as guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

The dependent variable is coded "3" for terrorism if events in GTD include explosive devices and target the general public, restaurants, shops or public transportation.

Dealing with Use of Multiple Tactics in the Same Year

Sometimes organizations employ more than one tactic in the same year.

There are 28 observations in the MENA[56] dataset and five observations in the Africa[57] dataset of organizations employing violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year.

There are 17 observations in MENA[58] dataset and 27 observations in the Africa[59] dataset of organizations using terrorism and guerrilla warfare/conventional warfare in the same year.

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[56] These organizations include Polisario (Morocco), Organization of Revolutionary Toilers in Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran (Iran), the Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) (Turkey), the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Islamic Action Organization (Iraq), and Hamas (Israel).

[57] These organizations include UNITA (Angola), the Islamic Party of Kenya (Kenya) and the African National Congress (South Africa).

[58] These organizations are the PKK (Turkey), Ansar al-Islam and Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Iraq) and Hamas (Israel).

[59] These observations represents the MIA and Al Queda in Mesopotamia (the latter is included because it originated as a domestic group) (Algeria), UNITA (Angola), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Egypt), AIAI and OLF (Ethiopia), FPR (Rwanda), MDFC (Senegal), ANC and Pan African Congress (PAC) (South Africa), SPLM/A (Sudan), ADF and LRA (Uganda).

The multinominal logit model requires that values of the dependent variable are categorically distinct. Hence, I cannot include a mixed category in my model without theoretically being in violation of the IIA rule.

Rather than excluding these entries, I assign them across different categories of the dependent variable. Year entries where organizations used both violent and nonviolent tactics are assigned to the nonviolent category and year entries where organizations employed both terrorism and guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in the same year is coded as guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.[60]

For an overview of the dependent variables for MENA 1, MENA 2 and Africa see graph 3, 4 and 5, respectively. As is evident from comparing the graphs, it is much more common for MENA organizations to abstain from using tactics. This is partly due to my including organizations that do not employ any of the tactics of interest in the MENA 1 dataset, whereas this is not possible in the Africa dataset. As can be seen in graph 4, representing MENA 2, the propensity to abstain from using tactics is still high when I exclude these organizations.

Another difference is the frequency by which guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is used in the Africa dataset, as seen in graph 5. Indeed, this tactic is used more than twice as often in Africa than it is in MENA. Terrorism is about twice as frequent in MENA compared to Africa. Nonviolent tactics are employed with close to the same frequency, although more often in MENA.

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[60] I initially assigned these observations across two dependent variables, with the second being coded the opposite way as the one referred to in the text. I decided which dependent variable to include based on comparing the respective AIC/BIC values. AIC/BIC values are a better estimator of model fit than pseudo R-squared for multinomial logit models. Since the AIC/BIC value for dependent variable two is lowest for the first dependent variable I conclude that this model is a better fit for the data and opt to use this model.

Graph 3: Values of the Dependent Variable, MENA 1

Source: MENA 1 dataset

- None of the tactics used — 56%
- Nonviolent — 20%
- Guerrilla/Conventional — 18%
- Terrorism — 6%

Graph 4: Values of the Dependent Variable, MENA 2

Source: MENA 2 dataset

- None of the tactics used — 52%
- Nonviolent — 22%
- Guerrilla/Conventional — 20%
- Terrorism — 6%

Graph 5: Values of the Dependent Variable, Africa

- None of the tactics used — 29%
- Nonviolent — 16%
- Guerrilla/Conventional — 52%
- Terrorism — 3%

7. Operationalization and Coding of Key Independent Variables

Mobilization Theory

The key explanatory variables for mobilization theory are: 1) Level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest; and 2) Level of popular satisfaction with the status quo. Because I have more detailed information on organizational characteristics for the MENA dataset, I operationalize and code these variables differently for the MENA 1 versus the MENA 2 and Africa analyses. Each way has certain strengths and weaknesses.

For the MENA 1 analysis I use *lethal repression by the state against the organization* as a proxy for anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics. Organizations that have been targeted with lethal force in the previous year are likely to believe that they will be targeted with lethal force if using nonviolent protest in the current year. I obtain this information from MAROB.

Lacking such information for the Africa dataset, I use *respect for human rights* as a crude proxy for anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics for the MENA 2 and Africa analysis. Data on the level of human rights within the country is obtained from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2008), which codes the level of human rights in ascending scale from 1 to 5 using reports from Amnesty and the State Department.[61]

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[61] An alternative measurement of human rights is the CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights Dataset. Although this dataset is somewhat superior to the Political Terror Scale because it has a public codebook, it does not code many Middle Eastern countries. The Political Terror Scale codes the Middle East as well as Africa. For a somewhat biased discussion of how the two datasets compare to each other see Gibney and Wood (2010).

The positive aspects of operationalizing anticipated lethal repression of nonviolent protest as I do for MENA 1 is that it is likely to be a more accurate predictor. The drawback of using this measure is that it can only be coded for organizations that employed a tactic the previous year.

The MENA 2 and Africa operationalization, on the other hand, is a more general assessment of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest that can be applied to all organizations. But it may be an imperfect proxy because it assumes that governments treat all organizations using nonviolent protest the same way, something they may not (Lust-Okar 2004). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this project it is the best proxy available.

Political discrimination suffered by the ethnic groups represented by the organization serves as a proxy for popular satisfaction with the status quo for the MENA 1 dataset. I code this variable using data from the Minorities at Risk (2009) data project.[62] Low values of political discrimination are believed to correlate with high levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo and vice versa. The discrimination proxy implicitly assumes that organizations' constituency does not extend beyond the ethnic group represented by them.

I use *annual growth in GDP* as a crude proxy for popular satisfaction with the status quo for the MENA 2 and Africa dataset. I obtain data on this variable from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Needless to say, this is a very crude measure of popular satisfaction with the status quo.[63] It also suffers from the same type of drawbacks as the human rights measure:

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[62] For a discussion about methodologically appropriate and inappropriate ways to employ the Minorities at Risk dataset, see Hug (2013).

[63] Ideally, I want a measure that captures some of the discontent among different factions inherent within the population.

Using it makes the assumption that the populace is a monolith from which organizations can recruit. Nevertheless, due to a lack of better alternatives, this measure will have to suffice.

Because I have theoretical reasons to believe that anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics and level of popular satisfaction with the status quo have a joint effect on organizations' choice of tactics that is different from the effect of each individual variable, I construct them as interaction terms. Seeking to simplify an otherwise complicated model, I construct these as dummies in order to make the statistical results somewhat easier to interpret substantively.

For MENA 1 I create a dummy variable named *High Repression* indicating whether organizations were targets of lethal government violence in the previous year. An organization targeted by lethal government violence in the previous year is coded "1", and if it was not, "0."

I code values higher than the mean as high discrimination, i.e. *Low Satisfaction With the Status Quo*. If satisfaction with the status quo is low it is coded as "1," and "0" otherwise.

For MENA 2 and Africa, I average the score between the two human rights reports and create a dummy variable for low human rights, i.e. *High Repression*, coded "1" if the score is equal or greater than four, and "0" otherwise. Countries are coded as four in the Political Terror Scale if "[c]ivil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas; and five when "[t]error has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals" [64]

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[64] [http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/faq.php. Accessed Sept. 16 2013.]

Since I have theoretical reasons to believe that negative and positive GDP growth are likely to have different effects, I create a dummy variable for negative GDP growth. This dummy takes on the value of "1" when GDP growth is negative, i.e. low popular satisfaction with the status quo, and "0" otherwise.

Having coded these variables, I proceed to create one set of interaction terms for each dataset: *High Repression and Low Satisfaction with the Status Quo.*[65] The omitted base category is *Low Repression and High Satisfaction with the Status Quo.*

I lag all explanatory variables a year in an effort to deal with endogeneity problems.

Opportunity Structure Theory

The key independent variables of opportunity structure theory are: 1) Government regime type; and 2) State capacity.

I code target government regime type using the Polity2 version of PolityIV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). I do so even though Polity IV's political participation measures are problematic. These measures are less than ideal because they incorporate violent conflict as part of the definitions of political participation (Vreeland 2008),[66] something that causes problems when analyzing dependent variables related to armed conflict. Because many organizations included in the datasets are active during civil war, and only the Polity2 version of Polity IV codes regime type during these circumstances, I use Polity2 rather than the less problematic XPolity (Vreeland 2008).

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[65] For a discussion about the correct and incorrect way to interpret interaction terms, see Braumoeller (2004).

[66] For other problematic aspects of Polity IV's political participation coding see Gates et al. (2006, 897).

The manner that the Polity2 version of Polity IV codes regime type during "interregnum" periods – which most often take place during civil war – however, is also problematic. During periods of civil war all regimes are given the regime coding "0", hence effectively coding them as anocracies (Vreeland 2008). Since guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics are very likely to be used during periods of civil war, I need to code regime type during these periods so as not to truncate the dependent variable in a way that is unrepresentative of the empirical reality (King et al. 2001). Yet, accepting Polity2's coding of regime type during civil war is too misleading.

To address this problem, I begin by recoding all entries in which Polity2 codes regime type as anocracies because the country is in an interregnum period/civil war, as missing. I then recode these entries using two rules. First, I code missing entries that are either preceded or followed by a regime type coding the same way. In cases where I have a missing value that is both preceded and followed by a regime type coding, I opt to code the missing entry according to the preceding year. This coding rule allows me to code several, but not all, of the missing regime type entries.

Polity2 ranges from -10 to 10. I create two regime type dummy variables: anocracy and autocracy. Following convention in the literature, regimes are coded as anocracies if Polity2 ranges from -5 to 5, and autocracy if Polity2 is less than -5. The omitted base category is democracy, which ranges from 6 to 10.

Recoding Polity2 allows me to fill some, but not all of the missing entries in the regime type coding. For remaining missing entries, I use Vanhanen's (2000) Polyarchy dataset. It focuses on political participation and competition, the two key components of *polyarchy* (Dahl 1971).

I translate Vanhanen's regime type entries as regime type dummy variables. Vanhanen notes that entries over 5 should be considered democracies. Based on this, I make the explicit assumption that anocracies range from 2.5-5, and autocracies range from less than 2.5.

Because Vanhanen's dataset is only coded until 2000 and has its own missing data entries, I am unable to code missing entries taking place during civil wars after that.

Following the norm in the literature, I use GDP per capita as a proxy for government state capacity.[67] Drawing on the World Bank's classification of economies, I code economies classified as low to lower middle income as low state capacity and those classified as upper middle income or higher as high state capacity. [68]

The majority of countries in the MENA dataset qualify as high state capacity states and those in the Africa dataset as low state capacity states. Because I have little meaningful variation in state-capacity in MENA and Africa countries, respectively, I only include organization-year entries in which MENA countries are coded as high state capacity states, and vice versa for African countries. Doing so precludes the need to generate an interaction term for government regime type and state capacity. Hence, I only test opportunity structure hypotheses about the effect of high state capacity using the MENA 1 and MENA 2 datasets, and low state capacity using the Africa dataset.

I include a variable measuring the size of the ethnic group represented by the organization in proportion to the overall population, and a variable measuring whether the organization received

[67] For an argument critiquing the use of GDP/capita as a proxy for state capacity see Hendrix (2010).

[68] Economies are classified according to 2012 GNI per capita, using the World Bank's Atlas method of calculating Gross National Income (GNI). Economies that have GNI/capita of $1,035 or less are classified as low income, those with a GNI/capita of $1,036 - $4,085 as lower middle income; those with GNI/capita of $4,086 - $12,615 as upper middle income and those exceeding $12,616 as high income. [http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications Accessed Nov. 15, 2013].

foreign state financial support in the previous year. Finally, I include a variable measuring the proportion of rural population relative to the overall population.

I get data on ethnic group proportion from the Minorities at Risk dataset, information about foreign state financial support from MAROB, and data on rural population from WDI. Hypotheses about foreign state financial support and ethnic group proportion can only be analyzed using the MENA dataset due to lack of data for the Africa dataset.

I am statistically only able to test the rentier state hypothesis in the Africa dataset. The rentier state dummy variable is coded using information from WDI data on natural resources rents.[69] Following convention in the literature, states whose combined rent income exceeds 30% of GDP are coded as rentier states.

I lag all variables a year to minimize endogeity problems.

Control Variables

A Cold War dummy variable is included in the MENA 1 and 2 analyses. I assume that the Cold War was over by 1990.

8. Issues of Selection Effects, Endogeneity, Multicollinearity, and Scope Conditions

Selection Effects

The existence of the unit of analysis - organizations - is highly related to government regime type. It is easier for organizations to emerge in democracies than in autocracies, given that the latter tend to

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[69] Natural gas, mineral, and oil rents are included in this category.

impose harsh restraints on collective action, right to assembly and organizing. Although this presents a selection bias (Geddes 1990), it is possible that this bias is balanced out by a selection bias in the other direction: Organizations that have maximalist grievances, especially those calling for regime change[70] are likely to be more common among less than democratic regimes.[71]

As is clear from graph 6, showing MENA organizations with all types of political demands, and graph 7, showing only those with maximalist political demands, the general pattern of their being most organizations in democracies, followed by autocracies and then anocracies, is similar in the two graphs. This suggests no major selection effect is at work.

Graph 6: Organizations across Regime Type, All issue Areas, MENA

Graph 7: Organizations Across Regime Type, Maximalist Issue Areas Only, MENA

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
[70] This is potentially less so for organizations calling for political self-determination, since organizations in democracies are known to call for secession and increased political autonomy as well.

[71] Other factors influencing number of organizations in a country are likely to include population size.

Graphs 8 and 9 show that most African organizations are located in anocracies, both when looking at all issue areas and maximalist issue areas only. There are more organizations in democracies than autocracies, but only when looking at all issue areas, as seen in graph 8. Graph 9 tells us that the number of organizations with maximalist issue areas in democracies and autocracies are close to the same, with somewhat more organizations in autocracies. Hence, there may be a partial selection effect at work here.

Graph 8: Organizations across Regime Type, All Issue Areas, Africa

Graph 9: Organizations across Regime Type, Maximalist Issues Only, Africa

Endogeneity

It is possible that some of the explanatory variables are caused by organizations' use of tactics.

The level of political discrimination and repression against an organization representing ethnic groups may be precipitated by organizations using violent or nonviolent tactics.

Likewise, it is possible that domestic instability resulting from organizations using violent tactics is causing the government to become more repressive or authoritarian, or alternatively, affect GDP growth, the MENA 2 and Africa proxy for popular satisfaction with the status quo. Domestic instability in the form of organizations employing violent tactics is also likely to influence popular satisfaction with the status quo at large.

In order to control for these many potential sources of endogeneity, I lag the explanatory variables mentioned a year. Albeit imperfect, it is the best remedy available.

Multicollinearity

To what extent is regime type correlated with proxies for popular satisfaction with the status quo in the MENA 1, MENA 2, and Africa analyses?

My proxy for *Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo* in the MENA 1 analysis - total level of discrimination suffered by the ethnic group represented by the organizations – and *Regime Type* is 68.8%. This is high and can be problematic in models with a lot of variables. Yet, because neither of the two disaggregated measures -economic and political discrimination - can be turned into dummies that are not so collinear with other variables that the statistical package drops them, this measure must nevertheless be used.

The correlation between my proxy for *Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo* for the MENA 2 analysis and *Regime Type* is significantly lower, at 14.8%. The corresponding value for the Africa analysis is even lower, 6.64%, suggesting multicollinearity will not be a problem.

The correlation between *Repression* as measured in MENA 1 and *Regime Type* is -8.2%. The correlation between repression and regime type as measured in the MENA 2 analysis and regime type is pretty high at -45.3%. The corresponding Africa correlation is 17.69%.

To what extent is my proxy for *Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo* in the MENA 1 analysis - level of total discrimination- and level of *Repression* correlated with each other and to what extent are they exogenous and independent of each other? The correlation between political discrimination suffered by the ethnic group represented by the organization and the extent to which the organization is a target of government repression is about 22.4%. The corresponding value for the MENA 2 analysis is -15.08%, and 14.15% for Africa.

Finally, it is possible that *foreign state financial support* is correlated with the *Cold War*. The correlation between the level of foreign state financial support and the Cold War is only 2%.

None of these correlations are high enough to be considered too multicollinear.[72]

Scope Conditions

The MAROB dataset is unique in being the only publicly available dataset that allows me to track variation in organizations' use of tactics across both time and country. Despite being the best publicly available dataset available, there are two drawbacks to using this data.

First, MENA is one of the most conflict-prone, and undemocratic regions in the world. Authoritarian governments' efforts to stifle civil society activism through legal means and the heavy punishments levied on individuals seeking to organize for political purposes have made collective

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[72] According to Kennedy (2003, 209) correlations have to be .8 to .9 for multicollinearity to be a cause for statistical concern. I do not believe Achen's (2005) criticism about garbage-can regressions apply in this case, since I do not control for a wide variety of variables. It is true that the model includes many variables, but they are needed for theoretical purposes to test the hypotheses.

action organizing incredibly difficult.[73] Organizations active in such extreme settings may be qualitatively different from organizations active elsewhere.

For the purposes of initial analysis and theory testing, however, some level of homogeneity among the organizations analyzed may be preferable. Indeed, one of the strengths of the MENA dataset is that it holds organization type and region constant.

Second, the particular sample of organizations included in the dataset may or may not be comparable to the overall universe of organizations and is likely to limit the generalizability of my findings. Hence, any conclusions about what explains variation in organizations' choice of tactics reached in the MENA 1 and MENA 2 analyses can only confidently be said to hold for this particular subset of organizations.

It may be possible to ascertain to what extent MENA findings translate to a different region and broader universe of cases. This is primarily what is attempted in the section that compares the MENA 2 findings with those of Africa. The Africa dataset has greater breadth in terms of country spread and includes a larger number of organizations, making it appropriate for such purposes.

Another important drawback influencing scope conditions is that the Africa dataset includes only low state capacity states and the MENA dataset the opposite. Since opportunity structure theory considers the level of state capacity an explanatory variable, I have to look at results from both the MENA 2 and Africa analyses to assess the overall explanatory power of opportunity structure theory. Hence, I can only test mobilization theory equally across both datasets.

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[73] Restrictions on political organizing have resulted in organizations such as labor unions, professional associations, and sometimes even sports clubs taking on the role traditionally served by political parties. For more on limitations to civil society organizing in the Middle East and the coping mechanisms employed by citizens see Bayat (1997) and Lust-Okar (2004).

Chapter 7

Variation in Tactics in the Middle East and North Africa: A Statistical Analysis

1. Introduction and Chapter Outline

This chapter assesses the extent to which mobilization and opportunity structure theory receive

statistical support for predicting tactical choice among organizations in nine MENA countries:

Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey.

     The chapter consists of four parts. I begin by presenting the findings of the MENA 1

analysis. Second, I discuss findings of the MENA 2 analysis. Third, I talk about the results from

MENA 1 and 2 analyses from a comparative perspective. I conclude by discussing the reasons why

MENA 1 and 2 results differ.

2. Statistical Findings, MENA 1 Analysis

Statistical Findings Presented as Changes in Predicted Probabilities

Given the difficulties involved in interpreting the results using the normal output for multinomial

logit, I present and discuss the results exclusively as changes in predicted probabilities.[74] For the full

results of the multinomial logit model, see the Appendix.

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[74] Changes in predicted probabilities are calculated using Long's (2005) *prvalue* command.

While the pseudo R-squared is an imperfect measure of model fit, it does nevertheless tell us something about how much of the variation in the dependent variable is being explained. The pseudo R-squared of the regular multinomial logit results is .3639, which is relatively high given that I am trying to ascertain four different outcomes; Whether organizations are using nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional, terrorist tactics, or none of these tactics.

I only calculate changes in predicted probabilities for independent variables that are statistically significant in the regular multinomial logit results. All explanatory variables of interest, except *Rural Population*, are statistically significant.

I calculate changes in predicted probabilities with a 90% confidence interval while holding all variables, except the variable of interest, at their median.

Merely because an explanatory variable is statistically significant in the multinomial logit output does not mean that I will be successful in calculating changes in predicted probabilities in a way that is statistically significant, as will be seen below.[75]

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, MENA 1

Core Hypotheses

I use an interaction term to analyze the core hyptheses of mobilization theory. To ameliorate ease of interpretation, I identify four different "profiles," each representing a political condition corresponding to a core mobilization theory hypothesis. By comparing the predicted probabilities of these four profiles I can ascertain whether the core hypotheses made by mobilization theory are supported. Table 1 shows how each profile correspond to a specific condition and hypothesis.

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[75] The changes in predicted probabilities are calculated in a way that allows me to see the overall changes in predicted probabilities of each tactic being used, as opposed to calculating the changes in predicted probabilities differently depending on what base category is omitted in either of the various multinomial logit models. In other words, it does not matter what base category is omitted in the regular model; the results are the same regardless.

Table 1. Profiles and Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** Profile 4	**Nonviolent** Profile 2
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** Profile 3	**Nonviolent** Profile 1

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 1:

High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → *Nonviolent Tactics*

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 2:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → *Nonviolent Tactics*

When political conditions are permissible, organizations can overcome the identification and saving face problem inherent in the peacetime bargaining dilemma by using nonviolent tactics, which also ameliorates the information problem. The theory posits that organizations active under Profile 1 and Profile 2 conditions should be more likely to employ nonviolent tactics. Since the hypotheses associated with Profile 1 and 2 conditions predict the same outcome, there is no need to compare their predicted probabilities to each other.

Graph 1 shows that contrary to the theory's expectations, organizations employ nonviolent tactics more often (0.11%) when active in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression (Profile 3 conditions), as well as those characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression (8.18%) (Profile 4 conditions), than they do under Profile 1 conditions.

Graph 1. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 1, MENA 1

Graph 2 shows that compared to organizations active under Profile 2 conditions, nonviolent tactics are employed more frequently (6.74%) under Profile 4 conditions, but slightly less frequently (-1.33%) under Profile 3 conditions. Both results are statistically insignificant.

Based on this, I conclude that the hypothesis for Profile 1 is unsupported, while the one for Profile 2 receives weak support.

Graph 2. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 2, MENA 1

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 3:

High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Abstain from Using Any Tactic

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 4:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare

When anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics is high, organizations cannot safely employ this tactic to overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma. This means they either abstain from using tactics, or they anticipate the saving face problem and the low likelihood that governments will bargain with organizations making compellent threats in peacetime, and employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics to jumpstart the bargaining process. Their ability to mobilize participants determines which of these options they employ.

When anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high and popular satisfaction with the status quo is high (Profile 3 conditions), organizations will, despite being willing to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, be unable to mobilize enough people to effectively employ this tactic. Consequently, the will abstain from using any tactic at all.

This hypothesis is not supported. Graph 3 shows that organizations under both Profile 1 (44.01%), 2 (48.12%), and 4 (5.7%) conditions are more prone to abstaining from using any tactic than they are under Profile 3 conditions.

Graph 3. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 3, MENA 1

The theory predicts that when anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high and popular satisfaction with the status quo is low (Profile 4 conditions), organizations are unable to employ nonviolent tactics safely, but capable of mobilizing enough participants to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, resulting in their doing so.

Graph 4 tells me that organizations are more prone (32.48%) to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 than Profile 1 conditions. The finding is in the right direction but not statistically significant, meaning it is only weakly supported.

A comparison of the propensity to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 2 versus Profile 4 conditions shows that organizations are more likely (35.68%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions, as seen in the same graph. This finding is statistically significant, implying it is strongly supported.

The same graph also demonstrates that contrary to theoretical predictions, organizations are more prone (12.97%) to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 3 conditions than under Profile 4 conditions.

Since the hypothesis receives strong support in one case, weak support in another, and is unsupported in a third, I conclude that it is weakly supported overall.

Graph 4. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 4, MENA 1

Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, MENA 1

Mobilization theory is a fairly poor predictor of organizations' use of tactics in the primary MENA analysis, as can be seen in summary table 2. Only two of four core hypotheses receives support, albeit weakly so. Organizations active under political conditions characterized by high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low popular satisfaction with the status quo are indeed more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare, and organizations active under political conditions characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low popular satisfaction with the status quo are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.

Table 2. MENA 1 Results Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	Guerrilla/Conventional √ Weakly supported	Nonviolent √ Weakly supported
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	None of the tactics used x Not supported	Nonviolent x Not supported

Hypothesis Associated with Group Proportion:

Group Proportion ↑ → Nonviolent

Group Proportion ↓ → Terrorism

Beyond the core hypotheses, mobilization theory also suggests that the larger the size of organizations' constituency – measured here as ethnic group proportion – the more likely organizations representing them are to employ nonviolent tactics. Conversely, the smaller the size of the constituency, the more likely organizations representing them are to employ terrorism.

Whereas graphs 5 shows that the hypothesis about nonviolent tactics is weakly supported, graph 6 demonstrates that the hypothesis predicting terrorism is unsupported.[76]

Graph 5: Effect of Ethnic Group Proportion on Use of Nonviolent Tactics, MENA 1

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
[76] The predicted probabilities of organizations' using terrorism are zero no matter the level of ethnic group proportion.

Graph 6: Effect of Ethnic Group Proportion on Use of Terrorism, MENA 1

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1

Core Hypotheses

The overall thesis of opportunity structure theory predicts that organizations will only employ tactics when conditions for doing so are strategically opportune. Opportunity structure theory's core hypotheses, representing this overall thesis, are represented in table 3.

Since the MENA dataset includes high state capacity countries exclusively, I only test the hypotheses related to high state capacity here. I test the remaining hypotheses about the effect of low state capacity with the Africa dataset, since it only includes countries of such state capacity.

Table 3. Core Hypotheses Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA	High State Capacity
Autocracy	None of the tactics used
Anocracy	Guerrilla/Conventional
Democracy	Nonviolent Terrorism

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Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Autocracy → None of the Tactics Used*

The theory posits that organizations in high state capacity autocracies are more likely to be deterred from using any tactic, since these regimes have a strong domestic security apparatus that monitors and represses status quo challengers.

This prediction bears out: Graph 7 shows that organizations are much more likely (24.02%) to abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies than other high state capacity regimes. Because the finding is statistically significant, the hypothesis is strongly supported.

Graph 7. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Autocracy, MENA 1

Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Anocracy → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

The hypothesis stating that guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics should be more commonly employed by organizations in high state capacity anocracies than in other types of high state capacity regimes because anocracies have inherently weak bureaucracies, does not receive support.

Contrary to what is predicted by the theory, organizations are in fact less likely (-8.81%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in high state capacity anocracies, as seen in graph 8.

Graph 8. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Anocracy, MENA 1

Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Democracy → Nonviolent Tactics & Terrorism*

The open political system in both low and high state capacity democracies is believed to encourage

organizations to employ nonviolent tactics. Yet, because such democratic governments are also

more averse to civilian fatalities and sensitive to public opinion, conditions to employ terrorism are

also opportune, thus influencing organizations to employ this tactic.

Just as theorized and shown in graph 9, organizations are indeed more prone (31.61%) to

employing nonviolent tactics in high state capacity democracies. The finding is statistically

significant, causing me to conclude the hypothesis is strongly supported.

Graph 9 also tells me that organizations in high state capacity democracies are more

(6.96%) likely to employ terrorist tactics. This finding is in the right theoretical direction, but not

statistically significant, meaning the hypothesis is only weakly supported.

Graph 9. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Democracy, MENA 1

Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1

Three of four opportunity structure core hypotheses receive some level of support, as seen in table 4. This suggests the theoretical framework was largely successful in predicting tactical choices among organizations in high state capacity regimes. The only hypothesis not receiving support predicts that organizations in high state capacity anocracies are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Table 4. MENA 1 Results Core Hypotheses Opportunity Structure Theory	High State Capacity
Autocracy	None of the tactics used √ Strongly supported
Anocracy	Guerrilla/Conventional x Not supported
Democracy	Nonviolent √ Strongly supported Terrorism √ Weakly supported

Hypothesis: *Foreign State Financial Support* → *Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

Contrary to opportunity structure theoretical predictions, organizations in high state capacity

regimes receiving foreign state financial support are less prone (-5.9%) to employing

guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, as seen in graph 10.

Graph 10. Changes in Predicted Probability, Foreign State Financial Support, MENA 1

3. Statistical Findings, MENA 2 Analysis

Despite using somewhat cruder proxies for the key explanatory variables of mobilization theory in

the MENA 2 analysis, the pseudo R-squared remains relatively high (.3255) and only slightly lower

than that of the MENA 1 analysis. For full multinomial logit results, see the Appendix.

Because the statistical program is unable to calculate the output for all base categories,[77] I

infer what variables are statistically significant from the multinomial logit output using the

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[77] This is due to due to the matrix being highly singular or non-symmetric. When this occurs, the regression results display coefficient estimates but no standard errors. According to the STATA list-serve this usually happens because a variable is "sparse", meaning that is coded as greater than 1 for a very small number of the observations. Source: [http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2008-01/msg00980.html] accessed April 19, 2014.

nonviolent base category only. Calculating changes in predicted probabilities is not a problem, since the statistical command calculates the results the same way regardless of what base category is chosen. The variables *Ethnic Group Proportion* and *Rural Population* are not statistically significant, resulting in my omitting to calculate changes in predicted probabilities for these variables.

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, MENA 2

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 1:

High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 2:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics

Mobilization theory predicts that organizations active under Profile 1 and Profile 2 conditions should be more prone to using nonviolent tactics.

As expected, graph 11 demonstrates that organizations are less likely (-6.08%) to employ nonviolent tactics under Profile 3 conditions than under Profile 1 conditions. This finding is statistically significant.

Likewise, the propensity for organizations to employ nonviolent tactics is lower (-4.75%) under Profile 4 conditions than Profile 1 conditions. This finding is not statistically significant, causing me to conclude that it is only weakly supported.

With one finding strongly supported and the second weakly supported, I conclude that the hypothesis for Profile 1 is strongly supported overall.

Graph 11. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 1, MENA 2

According to graph 12, organizations are less likely (-17.83%) to employ nonviolent tactics under Profile 3 conditions than they are under Profile 2 conditions.

Likewise, organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are less likely (16.51%) to employ nonviolent tactics compared to Profile 2.

Since both findings are in the right direction, but not statistically significant, I conclude that the hypothesis receives weak support, overall.

Graph 12. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 2, MENA 2

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 3:

High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Abstain from Using Tactics

The hypothesis predicting that organizations should to be more prone to abstaining when active in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high repression (Profile 3 conditions) is unsupported.

According to graph 13, organizations are less likely (-22.92%) to abstain from using tactics under Profile 3 conditions than they are under Profile 1 conditions. The same graph also shows that compared to organizations active under Profile 2 conditions, organizations active under Profile 3 conditions are less likely (-13.55%) to abstain from using tactics. Finally, it looks as if organizations are more (17.61%) prone to abstaining from using tactics under Profile 4 conditions than under Profile 3 conditions.

Graph 13. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 3, MENA 2

Hypothesis Associated with Profile 4:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare

A final core hypothesis of mobilization theory suggests that organizations should be especially prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions.

According to graph 14, organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are more likely (10.47%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than under both Profile 1 and Profile 2 conditions. These findings are statistically significant.

Contrary to what is expected by opportunity structure theory, the same graph shows that organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are actually less prone (-19.25%) to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations active under Profile 3 conditions.

Since the hypothesis receives strong support in two out of three cases, I conclude that it is strongly supported overall.

Graph 14. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 4, MENA 2

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
Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, MENA 2

Results for mobilization theory's core hypotheses are summarized in table 5. The theory does relatively well in the MENA 2 analysis, receiving support for three out of four of its core hypotheses. The only unsupported hypothesis predicts that organizations active under conditions of high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest should be more prone to abstaining from using tactics.

Table 5. MENA 2 Results Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	Guerrilla/Conventional √ Strongly supported	Nonviolent √ Weakly supported
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	None of the tactics used x Not supported	Nonviolent √ Strongly supported

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 2

Core Hypotheses

Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Autocracy → Abstain from Using Tactics*

Opportunity structure theory predicts that organizations in high state capacity autocracies should be especially deterred from employing any tactics.

Judging from graph 15, this appears to be the case. Organizations are more likely (21.37%) to abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies than other high state capacity regimes. Since the findings is in the right direction, but not statistically significant, I conclude that the hypothesis is only weakly supported.

Graph 15. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Autocracy, MENA 2

Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Anocracy → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

Contrary to what is predicted by opportunity structure theory, organizations in high state capacity anocracies are less likely (- 1.93%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, according to graph 16. This hypothesis is thus unsupported.

Graph 16. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Anocracy, MENA 2

Hypothesis: *High State Capacity Democracy → Nonviolent Tactics & Terrorism*

According to graph 17, organizations in high state capacity democracies are more likely (45.62%) to employ nonviolent tactics than organizations in other high state capacity regimes. This finding is statistically significant and in accordance with opportunity structure theory.

In the same graph, and also in line with the theory's predictions, is the finding that organizations in high state capacity democracies are more likely (10.13%) to employ terrorism than organizations in other high state capacity regimes. This finding is not statistically significant, meaning that the hypothesis is only weakly supported.

Based on these results, I conclude that the hypothesis on nonviolent tactics is strongly supported and the hypothesis on terrorism is weakly supported.

Graph 17. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Democracy, MENA 2

Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 2

The MENA 2 statistical testing of the core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory show the theory receiving fairly good support, as seen in table 6. Only the hypothesis predicting that organizations in high state capacity anocracies are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is found unsupported.

Table 6. MENA 2 Results Core Hypotheses Opportunity Structure Theory	High State Capacity
Autocracy	**None of the tactics used**: √ Weakly supported
Anocracy	**Guerrilla/Conventional:** x Not supported
Democracy	**Nonviolent:** √ Strongly supported **Terrorism:** √ Weakly supported

Hypothesis: *Foreign State Financial Support → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

Judging from graph 18, contrary to what is expected by opportunity structure theory, organizations in high state capacity regimes receiving foreign state financial support are less likely (22.17%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations in high state capacity regimes that than do not receive such support.

Graph 18. Changes in Predicted Probability, MENA 2

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
5. Summary of Statistical Findings from a Comparative Perspective, MENA 1 and 2

How do the statistical findings from the MENA 1 and 2 analyses compare? I discuss the results for each analyses and theory, starting with opportunity structure theory.

Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1 and 2 Analyses

Opportunity structure theory receives relatively strong statistical overall support in both the MENA 1 and 2 analyses, as can be seen in summary table 7.

The hypothesis predicting that organizations in high state capacity autocracies are more inclined to abstain from using tactics is supported, albeit the two analyses disagreed on the extent to which this was the case: The MENA 1 analysis finds strong support for this hypothesis, whereas the MENA 2 analysis finds only weak support for it.

Contrary to what is expected by the theory, organizations in high state capacity anocracies are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations elsewhere.

Both analyses concur on finding support for the hypotheses arguing that organizations in high state capacity democracies are more likely to employ both nonviolent tactics (strongly supported) and terrorism (weakly supported).

Finally, neither analysis finds statistical support for the hypothesis predicting that organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Table 7. Results MENA 1 & 2 Opportunity Structure Theory	High State Capacity
Autocracy	**None of the tactics used** MENA 1: √ Strongly supported MENA 2: √ Weakly supported
Anocracy	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA 2: x Not supported
Democracy	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: √ Strongly supported MENA 2: √ Strongly supported **Terrorism** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA 2: √ Weakly supported
Foreign State Financial Support	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA 2: x Not supported

Mobilization Theory, MENA 1 and 2 Analyses

Mobilization theory receives more divergent statistical support, as can be seen in summary table 8. The theoretical framework is better able to explain variation in tactics among organizations in the MENA 2 analysis than in the MENA 1 analysis. I return to discussing what may account for these disparate results across analyses further below.

Both analyses find support for the hypothesis that organizations in political environments characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest rule out nonviolent tactics, and, because they are able to mobilize enough people, employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics rather than abstain from using any tactics.

Mobilization theory argues that organizations that cannot employ nonviolent protest for fear of repression and that cannot mobilize enough people to make guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics viable, abstain from using any tactic.

Contrary to this prediction, both analyses find that organizations active in environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high repression are not more

prone to abstaining from using tactics.

Central to mobilization theory is the prediction that organizations should have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, assuming that the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics is not too high. The two analyses disagree slightly on the hypotheses predicting that organizations should employ nonviolent tactics.

The MENA 1 analysis only finds weak support for the hypotheses predicting that organization active in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low popular satisfaction with the status quo are more prone to employ nonviolent tactics receives weak support. But no support is found for the notion that organizations active in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and high popular satisfaction with the status quo are more prone to employing nonviolent tactics

The hypothesis predicting that organizations employ nonviolent tactics when active in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and low anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics is strongly supported in the MENA 2 analysis, and the hypothesis predicting that organizations are more prone to using nonviolent protest in political environments characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and low anticipated repression receives weak support.

The MENA 1 analysis finds no support for the hypothesis predicting that the smaller the ethnic group constituency, the more likely organizations are to employ terrorist tactics. It does, however, find weak support for the notion that organizations become more prone to employing nonviolent tactics the larger the size of the ethnic group constituency.

Since the MENA 2 analysis found *Ethnic Group Proportion* statistically insignificant, the corresponding hypotheses do not receive support.

Table 8. Results MENA 1 & 2 Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA 2: √ Strongly supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA 2: √ Weakly supported
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA 2: x Not supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA 2: √ Strongly supported
Group Proportion	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA 2: x Not supported**:**	**Terrorism** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA 2: x Not supported

Conclusion

What should one make of the disparate statistical results of the two MENA analyses, especially with regards to the mobilization theory results?

There are two potential reasons why divergent findings across analyses are not surprising; 1) Different proxies were used to conceptualize mobilization theory's key independent variable; and 2) The same set of organizations was not included in both datasets.

In contrast to MENA 1, MENA 2 uses more generalizable proxies for the key independent variables of mobilization theory, and excludes organizations that do not use any tactic during their presence in the dataset. This is done in order to make the MENA 2 analysis as similar as possible to the analysis of the Africa dataset (undertaken in the following chapter), thereby making it possible to compare those findings against each other.

To ascertain which of these two factors is most likely to account for differences in findings across the datasets, I perform two additional statistical tests. The first model (MENA A) uses the more fine-grained MENA 1 proxies but excludes organizations that do not use any tactics at all during their presence in the dataset. The second model (MENA B) uses the more crude MENA 2 proxies, but includes organizations that do not use any tactics during their presence in the dataset. I

then compare the results to see when the findings start diverging from MENA 1 and oscillate towards MENA 2 findings.

The highlighted result in the lower right quadrant in table 9 suggests that MENA B is the step in the analysis where results between MENA 1 and 2 start diverging. This implies different proxies for the key independent variable of mobilization theory are likely to account for MENA 1 and 2 differences in findings.

Table 9. Results Check MENA 1 & MENA 2 Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA A: x Not supported MENA B: √ Strongly supported MENA 2: √ Strongly supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: √ Weakly supported MENA A: x Not supported MENA B: x Not supported MENA 2: √ Weakly supported
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA A: x Not supported MENA B: x Not supported MENA 2: x Not supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 1: x Not supported MENA A: x Not supported **MENA B: √ Strongly supported** MENA 2: Strongly supported

The conclusion that different proxies account for differences in findings is further supported by the results I obtain when correlating the proxies used in each dataset to each other. The two repression proxies are only correlated 12.26%, whereas the satisfaction with the status quo proxies are correlated a mere 2.81%.

I suggest that the MENA 2 proxies may be better suitable to represent the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and popular satisfaction with the status quo for organizations in general, and less suitable as proxies for organizations representing ethnic groups. Nevertheless, since I do not have better proxies to employ for the MENA 2 and Africa analysis, the cruder proxies for mobilization theory will have to suffice.

Chapter 8

Variation in Tactics in Africa: A Statistical and Comparative Analysis

1. Introduction and Chapter Outline

This final statistical chapter addresses four questions, each discussed in consecutive sections of the chapter; 1) To what extent do mobilization and opportunity structure theories predict organizations' use of tactics in 37 low state capacity African countries from 1990-2010?; 2) How do the Africa findings compare to those of the MENA 2 analysis?; 3) What can be concluded from these comparative findings?; and 4) What accounts for different results across datasets?

2. Statistical Findings, Africa Analysis

As in the previous chapter, presentation of the statistical findings focuses on changes in predicted probabilities. In contrast to the MENA analyses, the pseudo R-squared for the Africa analysis in the regular multinomial logit results is very low (.0783). This means the Africa data fits the model much more poorly than the MENA data. For full multinomial logit results, see the Appendix.

The independent variables *Autocracy, Anocracy, Democracy* and *High Repression* are statistically insignificant. I will discuss what this implies in more detail, below.

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, Africa

Core Hypotheses

Mobilization theory predicts that organizations will seek to overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma by using nonviolent tactics whenever possible from a safety perspective. Hence, the theory predicts that organizations active in political environments characterized by low anticipated levels of repression of nonviolent protest and either high or low levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo will employ nonviolent tactics.

Although organizations have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, they will adopt guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when anticipated levels of repression of nonviolent protest are high, provided that they are able to mobilize enough participants to employ this tactic. This is possible when the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo is low.

In contrast, when anticipated levels of repression of nonviolent tactics are high, and levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo are high, organizations will be deterred from using any of the tactics.

The core hypotheses and corresponding profiles of mobilization theory are represented in table 1.

Because the variable *High Repression* is found statistically insignificant, I know that there is no statistically significant relationship between the key interaction variable *High Repression and High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo* and organizations' choice of tactics. Hence, the hypothesis associated with Profile 3 conditions is not only unsupported, I should also abstain from calculating changes in predicted probabilities of Profile 3 with those of Profile 1, 2, and 4.

Table 1. Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** Profile 4	**Nonviolent** Profile 2
High Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** Profile 3	**Nonviolent** Profile 1

Hypothesis Profile 1*:*

High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics

Hypothesis Profile 2:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression→ Nonviolent Tactics

Mobilization theory predicts that organizations will prefer employing nonviolent tactics when the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is low, regardless of whether the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo is high (Profile 1) or low (Profile 2), since this allows them to overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma and potentially the information problem as well.

As is evident from graph 1, organizations under Profile 4 conditions are more likely (4.61%) to employ nonviolent tactics than they are under Profile 1 conditions. This is contrary to theoretical expectations.

Graph 1. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Profile 1, Africa

In contrast to predictions by mobilization theory, graph 2 tells me that organizations under Profile 4 conditions employ nonviolent tactics more often (2.98%) than organizations under Profile 2 conditions.

This means both hypotheses predicting nonviolent tactics are unsupported.

Graph 2. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Profile 2, Africa

Hypothesis Prediction Profile 4:

Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare

In accordance with mobilization theory, organizations under Profile 4 conditions are more prone (5.99%) to using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than they are under Profile 1 conditions, as seen in graph 3. This finding is weakly supported.

The same graph also tells me that organizations are much more (28.02%) likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions than are organizations under Profile 2 conditions. This finding is strongly supported.

Given that the positive findings received weak to strong statistical support, I conclude that the hypothesis is strongly supported, overall.

Graph 3. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Profile 4, Africa

Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory, Africa

Mobilization theory has limited ability to predict organizations' choice of tactics in African low state

capacity countries. The only hypothesis receiving statistical support predicts that organizations active

in political environments characterized by high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low

popular support with the status quo are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare.

The results of the statistical testing of mobilization theory employing the Africa dataset are

summarized in table 8.

Table 2. Africa Results Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** √ Strongly supported	**Nonviolent** x Not supported
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** x Not supported	**Nonviolent** x Not supported

Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, Africa

Core Hypotheses

Since opportunity structure theory assumes that organizations will employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when political conditions are opportune, it predicts that organizations will do so in low state capacity autocracies and anocracies.

Conditions to employ nonviolent tactics are more opportune in democracies, since this regime type encourages this mode of contestation. Nevertheless, because democracy also provides optimal conditions for employing terrorist tactics, organizations in low state capacity democracies will be more prone to employing both nonviolent and terrorist tactics.

The core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory are represented in table 3, below.

Since the key independent variables of opportunity structure theory - anocracy, autocracy and democracy - are statistically insignificant, I conclude that none of the theory's core hypotheses are supported in the Africa dataset. Table 3 thus features results as well.

Table 3. Africa Results Core Hypotheses Opportunity Structure Theory	Low State Capacity
Autocracy	**Guerrilla/Conventional:** x Not supported
Anocracy	**Guerrilla/Conventional**: x Not supported
Democracy	**Nonviolent**: x Not supported **Terrorism:** x Not supported

Hypotheses Rentier State:

Opportunity Structure Theory: Rentier State → *Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

Mobilization Theory: Rentier State → *Abstain from Using Any of the Tactics*

The two theories have different predictions about what determines organizations' choice of tactics in rentier states.

Opportunity structure theory hypothesizes that because rentier states have inherently low state capacity on account of their weak bureaucracies, conditions to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics there are favorable and should encourage organizations to use this tactic.

Not so, argues mobilization theory. Because rentier state governments pay off the populace through generous welfare plans etc. in an effort to buy dissident quiescence, organizations in such states should be more likely to abstain from using any tactics.

Whereas I find weak support for the opportunity structure theory hypothesis, I find no support for the mobilization theory counterpart. As can be seen in graph 4, organizations are more likely (14.26%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, but less likely (-6.11%) to abstain from using tactics in rentier states than non-rentier states. Neither of the findings is statistically significant.

Graph 4. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Rentier State, Africa

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
Hypotheses Rural Population:

Rural Population ↑→ *Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics*

Rural Population ↓ *(Urban Population* ↑*)* → *Nonviolent Tactics and Terrorist*

Finally, opportunity structure theory posits that the level of rural population in relation to the overall populace should influence organizations' choice in tactics.

The propensity to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics will increase in relation to the proportion of rural population, because a large rural population should make it easier for organizations to mobilize participants to use this tactic.

Since nonviolent protest is easier to organize at higher levels of urban population – civilian population is denser and demonstrations are most likely to have an effect in cities - organizations active under such conditions should be more prone to using nonviolent tactics.

But higher proportions of urban population should also make conditions to employ terrorist tactics more opportune, since targeting civilians in urban areas should be less difficult.

Graph 5 shows us that there is indeed support for the hypothesis that organizations become more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics the higher the percentage of rural population.

Graph 5. Effect of Proportion of Rural Population on Use of Guerrilla/Conventional, Africa

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
As theorized, graph 6 demonstrates that organizations are more likely to employ nonviolent tactics the lower the percentage of rural population.

Graph 6: Effect of Rural Population on Use of Nonviolent Tactics, Africa

Contrary to theoretical predictions, there is no linear relationship between organizations' tendency to employ terrorist tactics and the level of rural population, as can be seen in graph 7.

Graph 7: Effect of Rural Population on Terrorist Tactics, Africa

3. Summary of Comparative Statistical Findings, Africa and MENA 2

This section summarizes the statistical findings from a comparative perspective and then discusses what accounts for different results across the Africa and MENA 2 analyses.

Opportunity Structure Theory: Africa and MENA 2

Since the Africa dataset only includes low state capacity countries, while the MENA 2 dataset only includes high state capacity countries, I need to combine the findings from each analysis to ascertain to what extent empirical support is found for opportunity structure theory as a whole.

Overall, the theory receives mixed support, as can be seen in summary table 4. Opportunity structure theory gets no support for its core hypotheses in the Africa analysis. In contrast, three of four core hypotheses receive support in the MENA 2 analysis.

Both analyses concur that, contrary to theoretical expectations, organizations in anocracies are *not* more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

But they disagree on the effect of democracy: whereas the MENA 2 analysis finds that organizations in democracies are more prone to using nonviolent tactics and terrorism, the Africa analysis dismisses both hypotheses.

The findings suggest that the theories' overall logic apply better to MENA high state capacity countries than African low state capacity ones. I return to addressing what may account for these disparate findings in more detail below.

Table 4. Results Opportunity Structure Theory	High State Capacity	Low State Capacity
Autocracy	**None of the Tactics Used** MENA 2: √ Weakly supported	**Guerrilla/Conventional** Africa: x Not supported
Anocracy	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 2: x Not supported	**Guerrilla/Conventional** Africa: x Not supported
Democracy	**Nonviolent** MENA 2: √ Strongly supported **Terrorism** MENA 2: √ Weakly supported	**Nonviolent** Africa: x Not supported **Terrorism:** Africa: x Not supported
Foreign State Financial Support	**Guerrilla/Conventional:** MENA 2: x Not supported	
Rentier State	**Guerrilla/Conventional:** Africa: √Weakly supported	
Rural Population	MENA 2: **Nonviolent:** x Not supported **Guerrilla/Conventional**: x Not supported **Terrorism:** x Not supported Africa: **Nonviolent:** √ Strongly supported **Guerrilla/Conventional:** √ Strongly supported **Terrorism:** x Not supported	

With regards to auxiliary hypotheses, no support is found for the hypothesis predicting the organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more prone to employing guerilla/conventional warfare tactics. This hypothesis is not tested with the Africa data.

The notion that organizations in rentier states are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics receives weak support. This hypothesis is only tested in the Africa analysis.

Interestingly, the set of hypotheses suggesting that level of rural population influences organizations' choice of tactics receive divergent results across analyses.

Whereas results from the MENA 2 analysis dismiss all three hypotheses, strong support is found for two out of three hypotheses in the Africa analysis. African organizations in low state

capacity organizations become more prone to using nonviolent tactics with lower levels of rural

population, and more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics with higher levels of

rural population.

The hypothesis that organizations are more prone to employing terrorism the higher the

level of urban population is dismissed in both the MENA 2 and Africa analysis.

Mobilization Theory: Africa and MENA 2

Mobilization theory is the only theory whose core hypotheses are tested equally across both datasets.

Judging from summary table 5, the theory is clearly better at explaining variation in tactics among

organizations in MENA high state capacity countries than African low state capacity countries. I

begin by discussing concurring results, and proceed to examine divergent findings.

Table 5. Results Mobilization Theory	High Repression	Low Repression
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo	**Guerrilla/Conventional** MENA 2: √ Strongly supported Africa: √ Strongly supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 2: √ Weakly supported Africa: x Not supported
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo	**None of the tactics used** MENA 2: x Not supported Africa: x Not supported	**Nonviolent** MENA 2: √ Strongly supported Africa: x Not supported
Group Proportion	**Nonviolent** MENA 2: √ Weakly supported	**Terrorism** MENA 2: x Not supported
Rentier State	**None of the Tactics Used** Africa: x Not supported	

Concurring Result, Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory, Africa and MENA 2

Findings from both analyses confirm the hypothesis suggesting that organizations resort to

guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when political conditions for employing nonviolent tactics are

prohibitively dangerous (i.e. high anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest) and when

they are able to mobilize enough participants (i.e. popular satisfaction with the status quo is low).

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Contrary to mobilization theory, neither analysis finds support for the hypothesis that organizations active in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest are more prone to abstaining from employing tactics.

Divergent Results, Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, Africa and MENA 2

A main assumption of mobilization theory is that organizations will have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, and will use the former when it is considered safe enough to do so. Nonviolent tactics can, if employed under optimal conditions, solve the peacetime bargaining dilemma and as well as ameliorate the information problem, thus making bargaining and potentially conflict resolution in peacetime more likely. This causes mobilization theory to predict that organizations active under political conditions characterized by low repression and either high or low levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo should be more prone to employing nonviolent tactics.

Yet, whereas the two hypotheses predicting nonviolent tactics receive support in the MENA 2 analysis, they are dismissed in the Africa analysis.

Results Auxiliary Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory

According to mobilization theory, the greater the size of organizations' constituency, the higher the propensity of their employing nonviolent tactics. Conversely, the smaller the size of organizations' constituency, the higher the propensity of their employing terrorism. These hypotheses are only tested with the MENA dataset.

Overall, the hypotheses predicting that organizations' choice of tactics is influenced by ethnic group proportion – the proxy for constituency given that organizations in the MENA dataset

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represent ethnic groups - receive mixed support. Whereas the MENA 2 analysis finds that organizations representing ethnic groups are indeed more prone to employing nonviolent tactics the larger the ethnic group, it does not find that organizations with smaller constituencies are more likely to opt for terrorism.

Finally, mobilization theory argues that since rentier states seek to buy off popular dissent with payoffs in the form of social welfare programs etc., organizations active in such states should be especially prone to abstaining from using any tactic. However, results from the Africa analysis show no support for this hypothesis.

4. Conclusion

When discussing the comparative statistical findings with regards to more general conclusions, I seek to address two overarching questions: 1) To what extent does these theories succeed in explaining variation in organizational use of tactics?; 2) What accounts for differences in findings across the datasets?

How Much Do the Theories Explain?

Overall, I find that mobilization and opportunity structure theory are better able to explain variation in tactics in high state capacity MENA countries than low state capacity African countries.

I begin by discussing positive findings as applied to high state capacity MENA countries, and end with talking about negative results of each theory as applied to low state capacity African countries. Each section also mentions some caveats to these conclusions.

Explaining Tactical Choice in High State Capacity MENA Countries: Positive Findings and Caveats

Mobilization and opportunity structure theories are generally successful in predicting choice in tactics among organizations.

As predicted by mobilization theory, organizations' use of tactics in high state capacity MENA countries appears largely driven by the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest and popular satisfaction with the status quo.

Low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high repression of nonviolent protest make organizations more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and low repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, makes organizations more prone to employing nonviolent tactics.

In addition, the level of rural population appears to have an effect on organizations' propensity to use nonviolent protest, with lower levels of rural population correlating with higher organizational propensity of employing nonviolent tactics. The prediction that organizations with smaller constituencies are more likely to employ terrorist tactics is dismissed, however.

The theory fails to explain when organizations in high state capacity MENA countries abstain from using tactics.

Opportunity structure theory is largely correct in predicting that organizations' use of tactics in high state capacity MENA countries is partly explained by regime type. Findings suggest organizations in high state capacity MENA countries are more prone to abstaining from using any tactics in autocracies, and that organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism in democracies.

The prediction that organizations are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in high state capacity anocracies does not bear out, however. Nor do hypotheses suggesting

that foreign financial support, rentier states, or rural population influence organizations' choice of tactics.

Explaining Tactical Choice in Low State Capacity African Countries: Negative Findings and Caveats
Mobilization and opportunity structure theory do not apply well to low state capacity countries in Africa.

Contrary to predictions by mobilization theory, organizations are not more prone to abstaining from using any tactics in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest. Nor are organizations in low state capacity African countries more prone to using nonviolent tactics when the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is low, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo.

But mobilization theory is correct in predicting that organizations are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in environments characterized by high anticipated repression and low popular satisfaction with the status quo in low state capacity African countries.

Finally, there appears to be no support for the prediction that organizations in rentier states have an increased propensity to abstain from using tactics.

The Africa results dismiss opportunity structure theory's core hypotheses; Organizations in low state capacity African countries are not more prone to using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in autocracies or anocracies, nor are they more likely to using nonviolent tactics or terrorism in democracies.

But the theory correctly predicts that organizations' choice to use guerrilla/conventional warfare and nonviolent tactics are related to the level of rural population: High levels of rural populations appear to make organizations more prone to using guerrilla/conventional warfare

tactics, and low levels of rural population to make organizations more likely to employ nonviolent tactics.

What Accounts for Different Finding Across Africa and MENA 2 Analyses?

Divergent findings for the Africa and MENA 2 analyses are likely due to differences in the datasets. Despite trying to make the two analyses as similar as possible, the datasets differ in two key regards: 1) One dataset includes only MENA countries, whereas the other includes only African ones; 2) The MENA dataset includes only high state capacity countries, while the Africa dataset includes only low state capacity countries.

The latter difference implies that the factors influencing organizations' choice in tactics in high versus low state capacity countries may be fundamentally dissimilar, whereas the first suggests that organizational propensity to employ different tactics varies across regions, and potentially cultures. I address each possible explanation in turn, starting with the cultural argument.

Culture as Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics

I may observe divergent findings because there may be something fundamentally different about the way in which organizations employ tactics in Africa versus MENA. Organizations of disparate cultural background may have varied propensities to employ tactics given similar stimuli because of cultural parameters about what is considered normatively acceptable behavior differing. This logic resonates with monadic cultural arguments emphasizing culturally unique repertoires of contention.

If culture is indeed what explains variation in findings across regions, failure to predict what accounts for variation in tactics may be due to mobilization and opportunity structure theory applying better to MENA than African cultures. It is possible that the South African case study, suggesting largely the same theoretical insights as the Algeria case study, is the exception to the

general rule of what determines organizations' tactical choices in Africa. If so, we may need a new, separate theory of African contestation, as well as additional ones covering organizations' use of tactics in other regions. Such theory building efforts will require scholars to be regional experts, focusing on contestation. Since I do not have African regional expertise, I am unfortunately ill suited to suggest a new theory here.

State Capacity as Explaining Organizations' Choice of Tactics

Although there is no reason to dismiss culture as a potential explanation, I recommend that scholars, before engaging in new ambitious theory-building projects, first consider whether differences in findings may be due to variance in state capacity.

It is possible that bargaining with low state capacity governments may be very different from doing so with high state capacity ones. Low state capacity governments are likely to be not only more fragile, but may also go about interacting with organizations in profoundly different ways than their high state capacity counterparts.

Although mobilization and opportunity structure theories were largely unable to provide us with good answers as to what determines organizations' choice of tactics in Africa - the exception being mobilization theory's prediction of when organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics – they do provide insights into *what does not* make organizations more likely to employ various tactics. I suggest one can draw on these negative findings in trying to understand how organized contention may be different in low state capacity countries than high state capacity ones.

The results tell me that organizations are not more prone to employing nonviolent tactics in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, no matter if popular satisfaction with the status quo is low or high, and that organizations in low state capacity democracies are not more likely to use nonviolent or terrorist tactics.

What is it about low state capacity countries that make organizations active under the conditions specified above less prone to employing nonviolent tactics? It is possible that the peacetime bargaining dilemma applies differently to high and low state capacity states, and that this may explain divergent findings across datasets: Whereas organizations can employ nonviolent protest to successfully overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma, and especially the saving face problem, in high state capacity countries, doing so in low state capacity countries may be harder.

Weak governments may fear that giving in to political demands, even when communicated through implicit compellent threats in the form of nonviolent tactics, are going to make other domestic organizations view them as push-overs. Such a perception may risk setting off a domino effect of contention among organizations, something a low state capacity government may be unable to deal with.

High state capacity regimes may be less worried about this scenario because they, due to their obvious power advantage over organizations, are better capable of making it look like initiating bargaining and potentially acquiescing to political demands to organizations using nonviolent tactics is done by benevolence rather than compellence. Hence, whereas nonviolent tactics provide a face-saving way by which to give in to demands for high state capacity regimes, they may be less capable of doing so for low state capacity regimes.

If organizations in low state capacity regimes that are active under political circumstances characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest can anticipate this government reaction to nonviolent protest they will react accordingly: Organizations that would otherwise use nonviolent tactics for the purposes of protest for persuasion will abstain from using tactics; and those planning to use nonviolent protest for the purposes of compellence will instead jump-start the bargaining process and employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead, provided popular satisfaction with the status quo is low.

This explanation may also account for why organizations are more prone to employing nonviolent tactics in high state capacity democracies but not in low state capacity democracies. Although democratic institutions promote nonviolent contestation, very weak democratic governments may be worried that acquiescing to organizations employing nonviolent tactics will set off a cascade of copycat challengers. Anticipating that low state capacity democratic governments will not give in to demands communicated through nonviolent tactics, organizations may instead opt to engage in conventional politics in seeking to change the political status quo.

Although this explanation may suggest a plausible answer to why organizations do not employ nonviolent tactics more often in low state capacity African states, it does not provide a good answer to why organizations in low state capacity democracies do not employ terrorism more frequently when they do so in high state capacity ones. I leave that puzzle for other scholars to theorize about further.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

1. Introduction and Chapter Outline

Why do some organizations with maximalist political demands employ nonviolent tactics such as demonstrations and strikes, whereas others employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and others still, terrorism? This project has sought to be a systematic exercise in addressing this question, the answer to which is central not only to policy makers seeking to prevent the outbreak of domestic armed conflict and radicalization of organizations, but also to the wide array of political science literature devoted to analyzing interstate conflict and contestation.

This final chapter is divided into five sections. I begin by summarizing the findings of the statistical analysis. I then elaborate on how the results have implications for policy. I proceed to talk about whether the findings confirm or challenge existing literature. Fourth, I discuss some of the limitations of the dissertation and its subsequent findings. I conclude by suggesting future research projects building on the insights of this study.

2. Findings

Findings, High State Capacity MENA Countries

I find that the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, the level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, and regime type largely determine whether organizations employ nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.

Results suggest that low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest make organizations more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. The finding resonates with the notion that organizations that cannot overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, as predicted by mobilization theory.

Low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the accompanying level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, however, makes organizations more likely to use nonviolent tactics. This suggests that organizations do indeed have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, and, since it will help solve the peacetime bargaining dilemma and ameliorate the information problem, will choose nonviolent tactics if permissible from a security standpoint. This is all in accordance with mobilization theory.

As predicted by opportunity structure theory, organizations' use of tactics is partly driven by regime type. Organizations are more prone to abstaining from using any tactics in high state capacity autocracies, and more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism in democracies.

With the exclusion of the finding about guerrilla/conventional warfare, however, these findings are limited in scope, only applying to high state capacity MENA countries. Whereas both mobilization and opportunity structure theory are largely able to explain variation in organizations' tactical choices in high state capacity MENA countries, they are much less able to do so in low state capacity African states.

Findings, Low State Capacity African Countries

Contrary to mobilization theory predictions, organizations in low state capacity African countries are not more likely to use nonviolent tactics when active in political environments characterized by low levels of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo.

Nor are organizations more prone to abstaining from using tactics when popular satisfaction with the status quo is high and anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high. This is true in high state capacity MENA countries as well.

However, just as in high state capacity MENA countries, organizations in low state capacity African countries are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high and popular satisfaction with the status quo is low.

Opportunity structure theory's core hypotheses fail to receive any support among organizations in low state capacity African countries.

Additional Observations

In addition to these overall findings, three additional observations are worth emphasizing.

First, although terrorism is often referred to as a weapon of the weak (Betts 2002, 20; Crenshaw 1981, 387), no theoretical support is found for the mobilization theory hypothesis suggesting that organizations become more prone to employing this tactic the smaller their constituency.

Second, organizations appear to select their tactics differently depending on whether they are active in low or high state capacity democracies. Whereas organizations in high state capacity MENA democracies appear to favor nonviolent and terrorist tactics, this tendency is not present among organizations in low state capacity African democracies.

Finally, despite the finding that anocracies are more likely to experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003), organizations in anocracies are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

3. Implications for Policy

How can these findings help inform policy? The introductory chapter mentions how understanding what accounts for variation in organizations' choice of tactics is relevant to three issues in particular: 1) Preventing radicalization of organizations; 2) Preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict; and 3) Developing effective counter-terrorism policy.

In order to prevent radicalization of organizations, one needs to understand why some organizations escalate from using nonviolent to violent tactics. To prevent the outbreak of domestic armed conflict one needs to comprehend what factors make organizations more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead of using nonviolent tactics, or alternatively, abstaining from using tactics. Finally, formulating policies aimed at deterring organizations from adopting terrorism require insights into what makes organizations more prone to employing this tactic rather than alternatives.

Findings in this dissertation suggest that organizations are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when active in political environments where there is low popular satisfaction with the status quo and where anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high. Results also suggest that organizations are more prone to using terrorism in high state capacity democracies.

There are two ways in which to prevent organizations from employing violent tactics: 1)By inducing organizations to use nonviolent tactics instead; or 2)By making them more prone to abstain from using tactics altogether.

To make sure that organizations do not escalate to using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, governments must be careful not to use lethal repression against nonviolent protest. If they succeed in doing so, they can be fairly sure that organizations will use nonviolent protest instead, even if overall popular satisfaction with the status quo is low. Since preventing the radicalization of organizations should be in every government's interest, even highly repressive governments should be amenable to restraining their lethal use of force against nonviolent protest.

In terms of policy recommendations, this suggests that what is most needed is information. Informing governments of the link between lethal government repression of nonviolent protest and organizations' propensity to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics may help in making sure governments do not act in ways that encourage organizations to using this tactic.

Governments restraining themselves in this manner may be easier said than done, however. As noted in the theory chapter, nonviolent protest, and especially large, illegal demonstrations can appear very threatening to governments due to their ability to take on a life of their own.

To minimize the occurrence of lethal encounters between protesters and security forces, governments can do their utmost to make sure that riot policing is as organized, disciplined, and professional as possible. Training riot police in how to best control masses without escalating to use of lethal force could be something countries could assist each other with. Hence, expanding programs in which countries with highly professional and adept riot policing practices help other states with less well-trained forces to raise their standards, would be highly recommended.

Another way of encouraging organizations to use nonviolent tactics rather than guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is for governments to take active steps towards becoming a high state capacity democracy, since organizations are more prone to using nonviolent tactics in such regimes. This may entail not only the need to democratize, but also accruing wealth, given that this tendency among organizations is exclusive to high state capacity democracies. A considerable

drawback in becoming a high state capacity democracy, however, is that organizations are also more likely to employ terrorist tactics against this type of regime.

Low state capacity African governments could potentially dissuade organizations from using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics and steer them towards using nonviolent tactics by speeding up the process of urbanization: Findings suggests that organizations in this region are more prone to using nonviolent protest at higher levels of urban population and more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics at higher levels of rural population. This relationship is not present in high state capacity MENA countries.

Governments that would like to prevent organizations from using violent tactics, but that are less enthusiastic about encouraging nonviolent protest, could instead seek to become a high state capacity autocratic regime, since organizations active in such regimes are more likely to abstain from using any of the tactics of interest. This may require governments to become both wealthier and more authoritarian. Accomplishing the latter may be easier than the former, especially since the international community may be less willing to do business with states that are actively trying to become less democratic.

The international community, as well as governments, would also like to prevent organizations from adopting terrorist tactics. Organizations are more prone to employing terrorism in high state capacity democracies. But high state capacity democracies are also more prone to see organizations employing nonviolent tactics, something the international community is generally supportive of.

Technically, to prevent terrorism, high state capacity democracies could become more authoritarian, since being a high state capacity authoritarian regime appears to make organizations more likely to abstain from using tactics.

Although it is unlikely that any government would voluntarily seek to become poorer, high state capacity democracies undergoing a recession may inadvertently decrease the odds that organizations employ terrorist tactics, since organizations are not more prone to using terrorism in low state capacity democracies.

The findings reached in this dissertation may therefore not be helpful in recommending counter-terrorism policy that is viable and/or in accord with international norms promoting democracy and the right to assemble and protest.

4. Implications for Theory

To what extent do the findings of this dissertation confirm or challenge existing literature?

Up until now, very few studies have sought to address the research question posed in this dissertation. None of the existing large-N studies analyzing what makes organizations opt between violent and nonviolent tactics (Asal et al. 2013, Cunningham-Gallagher 2013) breaks down tactics into nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorist tactics, which is what is done here. This study is also the only one examining what determines organizations' choice of tactics beyond those representing ethnic and/or secessionist groups.

Although one can discern loose contours of opportunity structure theory within the literature, this is the first time someone has derived hypotheses that seek to explain variation in tactics in the way I have from it, and proceeded to test them.[78]

Another contribution of this dissertation is that it constitutes a first effort to incorporate nonviolent tactics within the larger logic of bargaining theory.

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[78] Sambanis (2008) conducts an analysis using essentially what I refer to as opportunity structure theory, but is only interested in understanding what accounts for overall propensity of a country experiencing either civil war or terrorism.

In short, by testing not only opportunity structure theory, but also the new, supplementary, mobilization theory, this dissertation constitutes an arguably important first step to analyzing tactical choice among organizations in a holistic fashion.

The findings of the dissertation challenge some theoretical insights about what makes organizations more or less prone to using either nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics, while confirming others.

Results from this study suggest that low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest make organizations more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. This is true in both high and low state capacity countries. These results suggest that the relative deprivation argument and the repression argument emphasizing efficacy and substitution are partly right, but only when both of these factors are taken into account jointly, as specified by mobilization theory. These findings suggest that organizations that cannot overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma by using nonviolent tactics turn to violent tactics instead, as theorized by mobilization theory.

Despite the well-established finding that anocracies are more likely to experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003), I find that organizations in anocracies are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.

Another result that clashes with what is often considered a truism in the civil war literature regards the effect of foreign state financial support. Whereas the civil war literature, and indeed opportunity structure theory, predicts that organizations that receive foreign state financial support should be more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, I find this not to be the case.

The results also suggest that low repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the accompanying level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, makes organizations more prone to

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using nonviolent tactics. This suggests that organizations tend to have a bias towards nonviolent tactics as long as the security situation in which to use this tactic is not too dire.

These findings only apply to organizations active in high state capacity MENA countries, and not low state capacity African countries. The divergent findings across dataset are due to two crucial differences in the datasets: 1) Each dataset contains countries from separate regions; and 2) Each dataset only include high versus low state capacity countries, respectively.

The social movements/contentious politics literature can potentially explain these regionally diverse findings by referring to culturally distinct repertoires of contention.

But to the author's knowledge, there are currently no rationalist arguments in the existing literature equipped to address why we are more likely to see organizations employ nonviolent tactics in high state capacity countries where the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest is low, but not in low state capacity countries characterized by the same level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest.

I find support for the opportunity structure theory hypothesis predicting organizations will be deterred from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies because these regimes are likely to have a well developed repressive capacity that deters as well as allows governments to quickly crack down on organizations challenging the status quo. But since I control for repression in my analysis, the rationale for organizations not using tactics in high state capacity autocracies becomes less clear.

If the reasons why organizations abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies are not related to repression, what accounts for the propensity of doing so? One possible answer is that high state capacity governments, despite technically not being rentier states, may nevertheless successfully be using their wealth to buy off popular dissent.

Also in accordance with opportunity structure theory is the finding that organizations are more prone to using terrorism and nonviolent protest in democracies. Interestingly, this finding is

limited in scope to high state capacity MENA democracies, and does not apply to low state capacity African democracies.

Again, whereas the social movements/contentious politics literature may be able to address this discrepancy by referring to culturally distinct repertoires of contention, the literature on terrorism does currently not have any answers for why we should be more likely to see organizations using this tactics in high state capacity, but not low state capacity democracies.

The literature on terrorism stressing the importance of democracy as crucial to its strategic logic pays little heed to culture and state capacity. The key reason cited as to why terrorism is more effective when directed towards democracies is due to this regime type being more sensitive to civilian fatalities and public opinion (Pape 2005, Reiter and Stam 2002). Yet, these factors should be equally important in high and low state capacity democracies. Hence, additional theorizing about what may account for why organizations are more prone to employing terrorism in high state capacity, but not low state capacity democracies, is warranted.

Whereas opportunity structure theory provides a good argument why we should expect to see organizations using nonviolent tactics as well as terrorism in democracies, it is less capable of explaining what determines whether organizations use one or the other. Unfortunately, beside suggesting that the propensity to employ nonviolent protest and terrorism is higher in high state capacity democracies, the findings reached here do little to illuminate this puzzle.

Finally, although terrorism is frequently referred to as a weapon of the weak (Betts 2002, 20; Crenshaw 1981, 387), no theoretical support is found for the mobilization theory prediction that organizations are more prone to employing this tactic the smaller their constituency. This conclusion, in addition to findings by Fortna (forthcoming 2014), suggests that we may need to reconsider this conventional wisdom.

5. Limitations of Findings

As is the case with all projects, this dissertation suffers from some theoretical and methodological limitations that may cast some doubt on the validity of the findings. This section discusses five of the most serious ones.

First, neither theory tested in this project takes into account that governments, especially those that are less than democratic, are strategic in how they react to individual organizations using nonviolent tactics, choosing to co-opt some and repress others.

The problem of this study ignoring that governments are strategic and selective in the way they respond to nonviolent organizations may be less of a problem than it seems. Since I only include organizations that have maximalist political demands in my datasets, this is likely to streamline the type of organizations governments are likely to interact with, potentially making a governmental habit of employing a divide-and-rule strategy less common among this subset of organizations.

Second, neither of the theoretical explanations considers the effect of there existing other organizations with similar political demands on organizations' choice of tactics.

It is highly probable that the existence of other organizations with similar maximalist grievances is a factor capable of influencing organizations' decision of which tactic to employ. Although this is a fascinating aspect worth exploring further, there is a case to be made here for parsimony: Incorporating this aspect into mobilization theory would make an already complicated theory even more so.

Third, neither theory takes differences in organizational characteristics enough into account. By largely ignoring organizational differences, the theories assume that all organizations targeting the same government have the same propensity of employing different tactics.

I absolutely agree with this critique. Unfortunately, I am unable to take organizational characteristics more into consideration due to lack of data: Although the MENA 1 analysis uses explanatory variables that are specific to each organization, such information is not available for organizations in the Africa dataset.

Fourth, findings may be unreliable because the proxies used for the MENA 2 and Africa analyses are too crude, something suggested by MENA 2 proxies not correlating well with their MENA 1 counterparts.

This critique stands un-refuted: The only excuse I can offer here is that I used the best proxies available for the study in order to test the generalizability of the findings across disparate regions and datasets.

Fifth, because the statistical analysis was not followed up by process-tracing case studies, one cannot be sure that the causal mechanisms arguably at work in the two theories actually are what is driving organizations' choice of tactics.

I am fully aware that correlation does not mean causation. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this project to conduct further case studies in addition to the two theory-generating ones. What statistical analysis does well is disprove some hypotheses, while also suggesting that there may be more to those receiving support. I argue that this function is especially valuable when testing a new theory, and leave additional enquiry using process tracing case studies for other scholars to pursue.

6. Future Research Suggested by Findings

Several avenues of future research are suggested by these findings. Here, I suggest six such possible research projects.

The first project to consider is to theorize and analyze whether contestation in high and low state capacity countries is fundamentally different. Doing so may include testing the plausibility of

the argument presented in the previous chapter, which suggests that there may be something about the face-saving problem that makes it apply differently across high and low state capacity states, thereby accounting for the divergent findings presented here.

A second way to build on these findings would be to seek to obtain better generalizable proxies for mobilization theory's key explanatory variables and proceed to conduct additional statistical tests using the same data sets.

A third follow-up project could test the two theories against a new, expanded dataset of contestation. Such a dataset would preferably feature contestation in a region beyond MENA and Africa that includes countries with varying state capacity, since this would potentially allow us to test whether different findings across datasets are driven by state capacity or culture.

Another potential research project could address the puzzle why organizations are more likely to employ nonviolent tactics in high state capacity, but not low state capacity, democracies.

A related project would be to study what accounts for organizations' choice between nonviolent tactics and terrorism in high state capacity democracies.

Since the results tells us that democracy in itself does not make organizations more prone to employing terrorism, the causal story behind why organizations employ this tactic gets blurry. Hence, explaining why organizations are more prone to employing terrorism in high state capacity democracies than in low state capacity democracies requires a theoretical logic that does not rely as heavily on regime type as does Pape's (2005). This could constitute another future project.

All these research projects would benefit from considering the cultural argument as an alternative explanation to more structural, rationalist accounts.

Given the importance of this research question to policy and theory, and considering the disparate findings of this dissertation, further study and insights are much needed.

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Appendix

None=None of the tactics used
NV=Nonviolent tactics
G/C=Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare
T=Terrorism

Table 1. Tactical Choice over Time: MENA Organizations

Country	Organization	Year	Tactic
Algeria	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie	2001	None
Algeria	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie	2002	None
Algeria	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie	2003	None
Algeria	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie	2004	None
Algeria	Rally for Culture and Democracy	2003	NV
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	1998	None
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2001	None
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2002	None
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2003	None
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2004	None
Iran	National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2002	NV
Iran	National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2003	NV
Iran	National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	2004	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1980	NV/G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1981	NV/G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1982	NV/G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1983	NV/G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1984	NV/G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1985	G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1986	G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1987	G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1988	G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1989	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1990	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1991	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1992	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1993	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1994	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1995	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1996	G/C
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1997	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1998	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	1999	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	2000	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	2001	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	2002	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	2003	None
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	2004	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1980	NV/G/C

Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1981	NV/G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1982	NV/G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1983	NV/G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1984	NV/G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1985	G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1986	G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1987	G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1988	G/C
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1989	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1990	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1991	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1992	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1993	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1994	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1995	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1996	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1997	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1998	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	1999	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	2000	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	2001	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	2002	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	2003	None
Iran	The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran	2004	None
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	2001	None
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	2002	T
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	2003	T
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	2004	G/C
Iraq	Conservative Party	1995	NV
Iraq	Conservative Party	1996	NV
Iraq	Conservative Party	1997	None
Iraq	Conservative Party	1998	None
Iraq	Conservative Party	1999	None
Iraq	Democratic Centrist Tendency	2003	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1980	T
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1981	T
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1982	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1983	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1984	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1985	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1986	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1987	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1988	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1989	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1990	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1991	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1992	G/C

Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1993	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1994	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1995	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1996	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1997	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1998	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	1999	G/C
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	2000	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	2001	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	2002	None
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	2003	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1980	NV
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1981	NV
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1982	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1983	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1984	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1985	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1986	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1987	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1988	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1989	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1990	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1991	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1992	G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1993	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1994	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1995	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1996	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1997	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1998	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	1999	NV
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	2000	NV
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	2001	NV/G/C
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	2002	None
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	2003	NV
Iraq	Iraqi Homeland Party	2003	None
Iraq	Iraqi Islamic Party	2001	None
Iraq	Iraqi Islamic Party	2002	None
Iraq	Iraqi Islamic Party	2003	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1991	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1992	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1993	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1994	T
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1995	T
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1996	T
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1997	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1998	None

Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	1999	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	2000	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	2001	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	2002	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	2003	None
Iraq	Iraqi National Alliance	2002	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1982	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1983	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1984	T
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1985	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1986	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1987	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1988	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1989	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1990	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1991	NV/G/C
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1992	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1993	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1994	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1995	T
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1996	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1997	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1998	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	1999	T
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	2000	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	2001	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	2002	None
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	2003	None
Iraq	Islamic Labor Organization	2003	None
Iraq	Islamic Labor Organization	2004	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1988	G/C
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1989	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1990	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1991	G/C
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1993	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1994	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1995	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1996	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1997	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1998	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	1999	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	2000	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	2001	None
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	2002	None
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	2001	None
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	2002	None
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	2003	None

Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1985	G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1986	G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1987	G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1988	NV/G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1989	G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1990	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1991	G/C
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1992	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1993	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1994	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1995	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1996	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1997	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1998	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	1999	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	2000	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	2001	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	2002	None
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah	2003	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1980	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1981	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1982	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1983	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1984	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1985	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1986	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1987	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1988	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1989	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1990	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	1991	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1994	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1995	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1996	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1997	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1998	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	1999	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	2000	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	2001	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	2002	NV
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1980	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1981	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1982	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1983	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1984	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1985	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1986	G/C

Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1987	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1988	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1989	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1990	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	1991	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1986	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1987	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1988	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1989	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1990	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1991	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1993	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1994	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1995	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1996	G/C
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1997	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1998	None
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	1999	None
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1980	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1981	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1982	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1983	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1984	None
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1985	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1986	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1987	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1988	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1989	G/C
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1990	G/C
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	1998	None
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	1999	None
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	2001	None
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	2002	None
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	2003	NV
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	2004	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1984	T
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1985	T
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1986	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1987	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1988	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1989	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1990	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1991	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1992	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1993	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1994	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1995	NV

Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1996	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1997	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1998	None
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1999	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2000	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2001	NV/T
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2002	NV
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2003	NV/T
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2004	NV
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	2000	T
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	2001	None
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	2002	None
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	2003	None
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	2004	None
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1980	T
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1981	None
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1982	T
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1983	T
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1984	None
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1985	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1986	T
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1987	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1988	NV/T
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1989	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1990	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1991	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1993	NV
Israel	Fatah/PLO	1994	NV
Israel	Hamas	1987	None
Israel	Hamas	1988	NV
Israel	Hamas	1990	NV
Israel	Hamas	1997	NV/G/C/T
Israel	Hamas	1998	NV/G/C/T
Israel	Hamas	1999	NV/T
Israel	Hamas	2000	NV/T
Israel	Hamas	2001	NV/T
Israel	Hamas	2002	NV/T
Israel	Hamas	2003	NV/T
Israel	National Movement for Change	1995	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	1997	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	1998	NV
Israel	National Movement for Change	1999	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	2000	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	2001	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	2002	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	2003	None
Israel	National Movement for Change	2004	None

Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	1997	None
Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	1991	None
Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	1992	None
Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	1993	NV
Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	1994	NV
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	2000	None
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	2001	T
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	2002	None
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	2003	None
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	2004	None
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1986	None
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1987	None
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1988	None
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1989	NV
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1990	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1991	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1992	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1993	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1994	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1995	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1996	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1997	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1998	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1999	NV
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	2000	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	2001	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	2002	NV/T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	2003	T
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	2004	T
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	1996	None
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	1998	NV
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	1999	None
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	2000	None
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	2001	NV
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	2002	NV
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	2003	NV
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	2004	NV
Israel	Palestinian National Initiative	2002	NV
Israel	Palestinian National Initiative	2003	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1982	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1983	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1984	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1985	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1986	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1987	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1988	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1989	NV

Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1990	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1991	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1992	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1993	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1994	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1997	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1998	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	1999	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	2000	NV
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	2001	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	2002	None
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	2003	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	1994	NV
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	1996	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	1997	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	1998	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	1999	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	2000	NV
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	2001	NV
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	2002	None
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	2003	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1984	T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1986	None
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1987	None
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1988	None
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1989	None
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1990	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1991	NV/T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1992	NV/T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1993	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1994	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1995	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1996	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1997	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1998	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1999	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2000	NV
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2001	NV/T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2002	NV/T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2003	NV/T
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	2004	NV/T
Israel	Progressive List for Peace	1995	None
Israel	Progressive List for Peace	1997	None
Israel	Progressive List for Peace	1998	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	1987	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	1988	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	1989	NV

Israel	Sons of the Village	1994	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	2000	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	2001	NV
Israel	Sons of the Village	2002	None
Israel	Sons of the Village	2004	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1994	NV
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1995	NV
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1996	NV
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1997	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1998	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1999	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	2000	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	2001	NV
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	2002	None
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	2004	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1980	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1981	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1982	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1983	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1997	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1998	None
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	1999	NV
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	2000	NV
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	2001	NV
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	2002	NV
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1980	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1981	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1982	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1983	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1984	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1985	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1986	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1987	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1988	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1989	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1990	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	1991	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	2002	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	2003	None
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia	2004	None
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	2000	G/C
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	2001	None
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	2002	None
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	2003	None
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	2004	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1985	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1986	None

Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1987	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1988	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1989	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1990	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1991	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1992	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1993	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1994	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1995	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1996	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1997	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1998	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	1999	G/C
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	2000	G/C
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	2001	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	2002	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	2003	None
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	2004	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1982	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1983	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1984	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1985	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1986	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1987	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1988	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1989	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1990	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	1991	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	2002	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	2003	None
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	2004	None
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1984	NV
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1985	G/C
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1986	G/C
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1987	None
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1988	None
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	1989	None
Morocco	Polisario	1980	NV/G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1981	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1982	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1983	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1984	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1985	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1986	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1987	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1988	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1989	G/C

Morocco	Polisario	1990	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1991	G/C
Morocco	Polisario	1992	None
Morocco	Polisario	1993	None
Morocco	Polisario	1994	None
Morocco	Polisario	1995	None
Morocco	Polisario	1996	None
Morocco	Polisario	1997	None
Morocco	Polisario	1998	None
Morocco	Polisario	1999	None
Morocco	Polisario	2000	None
Morocco	Polisario	2001	None
Morocco	Polisario	2002	NV
Morocco	Polisario	2003	None
Morocco	Polisario	2004	None
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party	2001	None
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party	2002	None
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party	2003	None
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party	2004	NV
Turkey	Democratic Mass Party	1997	None
Turkey	Democratic Mass Party	1998	None
Turkey	Democratic Mass Party	1999	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1980	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1981	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1982	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1983	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1984	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1985	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1986	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1987	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari(KUK)	1988	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1989	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1990	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1991	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1992	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1993	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1994	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1995	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK)	1996	None
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1980	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1981	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1982	NV/G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1983	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1984	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1985	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1986	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1987	G/C

Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1988	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1989	NV/G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1990	NV/G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1991	NV/G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1992	NV/G/C/T
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1993	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1994	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1995	NV/G/C/T
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1996	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1997	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1998	NV/G/C/T
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1999	NV/G/C/T
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	2000	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	2001	NV/G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	2002	G/C
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	2003	NV/G/C/T
Turkey	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	2004	NV/G/C/T

Table 2. Tactical Choice across Time: African Organizations

Country	Organization	Year	Tactic
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	1998	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	1999	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2000	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2001	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2002	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2003	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2004	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2005	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2006	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2007	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2008	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2009	G/C
Algeria	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)	2010	G/C
Algeria	Front du Force Socialist (FFS)	1998	NV
Algeria	Front du Force Socialist (FFS)	1999	None
Algeria	Front du Force Socialist (FFS)	2000	None
Algeria	Front du Force Socialist (FFS)	2001	NV
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	1998	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	1999	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	2000	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	2001	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	2002	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	2003	G/C
Algeria	Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)	2004	G/C
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	1998	T
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	1999	G/C
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2000	T

Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2001	None
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2002	T
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2003	None
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2004	None
Algeria	Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA)	2005	T
Algeria	Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)	1998	None
Algeria	Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)	1999	None
Algeria	Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)	2000	None
Angola	Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	1992	G/C
Angola	Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	1993	None
Angola	Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	1994	T
Angola	Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	1995	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1994	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1995	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1996	None
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1997	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1998	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1999	None
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2000	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2001	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2002	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2003	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2004	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2005	None
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2006	None
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2007	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2008	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2009	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	2010	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1994	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1995	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1996	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1997	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1998	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	1999	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2000	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2001	G/C
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2002	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2003	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2004	None
Angola	FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R)	2005	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1990	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	1991	T
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	1992	None
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	1993	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	1994	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1995	G/C

Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1996	NV/G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1997	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1998	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	1999	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA)	2000	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	2001	G/C
Angola	União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA)	2002	G/C
Burkina Faso	Coordination of Democratic Forces	1991	NV
Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD)	1994	G/C
Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD)	1995	G/C
Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD)	1996	G/C
Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD)	1997	G/C
Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD)	1998	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	1998	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	1999	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	2000	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	2001	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	2002	G/C
Burundi	CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD)	2003	G/C
Burundi	Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina)	1995	G/C
Burundi	Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina)	1996	None
Burundi	Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina)	1997	G/C
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1991	G/C
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1992	G/C
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1993	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1994	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1995	G/C
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1996	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1997	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1998	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	1999	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2000	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2001	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2002	T
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2003	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2004	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2005	T
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2006	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2007	None
Burundi	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu)	2008	T
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	1997	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	1998	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	1999	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2000	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2001	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2002	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2003	G/C

Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2004	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2005	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2006	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2007	None
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2008	G/C
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2009	None
Burundi	Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL)	2010	NV
Cameroon	Allied Front for Change	1995	NV
Cameroon	Coalition for Nat. Reconciliation and Reconstruction	2004	NV
Cameroon	Patriotic and People's Youth Council	2008	NV
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1991	NV
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1992	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1993	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1994	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1995	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1996	NV
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1997	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1998	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	1999	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2000	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2001	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2002	NV
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2003	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2004	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2005	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2006	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2007	None
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	2008	NV
Central African Rep.	Alliance for Democracy	1992	NV
Central African Rep.	Central African Flame	2000	NV
Central African Rep.	Coord. Com. for the Convocation of a Nat. Conference	1991	NV
Central African Rep.	Movement for Social Evolution in Black Africa	1991	NV
Chad	Alliance National (AN)	2008	G/C
Chad	Comité national de redressement (CNR)	1992	G/C
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1992	G/C
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1993	G/C
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1994	G/C
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1995	None
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1996	None
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1997	None
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1998	None
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	1999	None
Chad	Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD)	2000	G/C
Chad	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)	1994	G/C
Chad	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)	1995	None
Chad	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)	1996	None
Chad	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)	1997	G/C

Chad	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)	1998	G/C
Chad	Front National Tchadien (FNT)	1992	G/C
Chad	Front Unique pour le Changement Dém. (FUCD)	2005	G/C
Chad	Front Unique pour le Changement Dém.(FUCD)	2006	G/C
Chad	Front Unique pour le Changement Dém.(FUCD)	2007	G/C
Chad	Islamic Legion	1990	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1991	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1992	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1993	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1994	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1995	G/C
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1996	None
Chad	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD)	1997	G/C
Chad	Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)	1999	G/C
Chad	Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)	2000	G/C
Chad	Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)	2001	G/C
Chad	Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)	2002	G/C
Chad	Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)	2003	G/C
Chad	Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS)	1990	G/C
Chad	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR)	2007	G/C
Chad	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR)	2008	None
Chad	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR)	2009	None
Chad	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR)	2010	G/C
Chad	Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RAFD)	2006	G/C
Chad	Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RAFD)	2007	G/C
Chad	Union des Forces pour la Dém. et le Dévelop.(UFDD)	2006	G/C
Chad	Union des Forces pour la Dém. et le Dévelop.(UFDD)	2007	G/C
Chad	Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR)	2009	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Alliance des Forces Dém. pour la Libération (AFDL)	1996	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Alliance des Forces Dém. pour la Libération (AFDL)	1997	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	1998	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	1999	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2000	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2001	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2002	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2003	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2004	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2005	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2006	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2007	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2008	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)	2006	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)	2007	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)	2008	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congolese Patriots Movement	2006	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Front pour la Restaur. de L'unité et de la Dém. (FRUD)	1991	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Front pour la Restaur. de L'unité et de la Dém. (FRUD)	1992	G/C

Congo, Dem. Rep.	Front pour la Restaur. de L'unité et de la Dém. (FRUD)	1993	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Front pour la Restaur. de L'unité et de la Dém. (FRUD)	1994	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Front pour la Restaur. de L'unité et de la Dém. (FRUD)	1995	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD)	1997	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD)	1998	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD)	1999	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Holy Alliance	1993	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC)	1998	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC)	1999	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC)	2000	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC)	2001	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Nationalist Integrationist Front	2005	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	New Forces of Union and Solidarity	2006	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD)	1998	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD)	1999	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD)	2000	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD)	2001	G/C
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Unified Lumumbist Party	1997	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1990	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1991	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1992	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1993	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1994	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1995	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1996	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1997	NV
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1998	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	1999	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	2000	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	2001	None
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Union for Democracy and Social Progress	2006	NV
Congo, Rep.	Cobras	1997	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	1999	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2000	None
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2001	None
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2002	None
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2003	None
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2004	None
Congo, Rep.	Cocoyes	2005	None
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1993	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1994	None
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1995	None
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1996	None
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1997	None
Congo, Rep.	Ninjas	1998	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	1998	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	1999	G/C

Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	2000	None
Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	2001	None
Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	2002	G/C
Congo, Rep.	Ntsiloulous	2003	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI)	2004	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP)	2002	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP)	2003	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI)	2002	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Mouvement Pop. Ivorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO)	2002	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	Mouvement Pop. Ivorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO)	2003	G/C
Cote d'Ivoire	People's Front	1991	NV
Cote d'Ivoire	Republican Front	1995	NV
Egypt	Muslim Brotherhood	2009	NV
Egypt	Muslim Brotherhood	2010	NV
Egypt	Al Jihad	1991	G/C
Egypt	Al Jihad	1992	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1992	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1993	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1994	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1995	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1996	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1997	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1998	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1999	G/C
Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	2000	G/C
Egypt	Kefaya	2004	NV
Egypt	Kefaya	2005	NV
Egypt	Kefaya	2006	NV
Egypt	Kefaya	2007	NV
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1993	G/C
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1994	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1995	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1996	G/C
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1997	G/C
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1998	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	1999	G/C
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	2000	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	2001	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	2002	None
Eritrea	Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail (EIJM-AS)	2003	G/C
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1993	G/C
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1994	G/C
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1995	None
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1996	G/C
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1997	None
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1998	None
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI)	1999	G/C

Ethiopia	Coalition for Unity and Democracy	2005	NV
Ethiopia	Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)	1990	G/C
Ethiopia	Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)	1991	G/C
Ethiopia	Ethiopian People's Rev. Dem. Front (EPRDF)	1990	G/C
Ethiopia	Ethiopian People's Rev. Dem. Front (EPRDF)	1991	G/C
Ethiopia	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF)	1991	G/C
Ethiopia	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF)	1992	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1990	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1991	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1992	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1993	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1994	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1995	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1996	None
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1997	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1998	None
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1999	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2000	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2001	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2002	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2003	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2004	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2005	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2006	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2007	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2008	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2009	G/C
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	2010	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1994	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1995	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1996	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1997	None
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1998	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1999	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2000	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2001	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2002	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2003	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2004	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2005	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2006	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2007	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2008	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2009	G/C
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	2010	G/C
Gabon	Bongo Must Go	2009	NV
Ghana	National Union of Ghana Students	1991	NV

Ghana	National Union of Ghana Students	1992	None
Ghana	National Union of Ghana Students	1993	None
Ghana	National Union of Ghana Students	1994	None
Guinea	Dadis Must Go Movement	2009	NV
Guinea	Rassemblement des Forces dém. de Guinée (RFDG)	2000	G/C
Kenya	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy	1992	NV
Kenya	Islamic Party of Kenya	1992	NV/G/C
Kenya	Islamic Party of Kenya	1993	NV
Kenya	Law Society of Kenya	2002	NV
Kenya	Mungiki Sect	2007	G/C
Kenya	National Convention Assembly	1997	NV
Lesotho	All Basotho Convention	2008	NV
Lesotho	LCD	1998	NV
Lesotho	Marematlou Freedom Party	1998	NV
Lesotho	Youthful Lesotho	1997	NV
Madagascar	3FN	2005	NV
Madagascar	Lifeblood Committee	1991	NV
Malawi	Forum for the Defence of the Constitution	2002	NV
Malawi	National Democratic Alliance	2001	NV
Malawi	Public Affairs Committee	2003	NV
Mali	ATNMC	2008	G/C
Mauritania	National Front for the Defense of Democracy	2008	NV
Mauritania	National Front for the Defense of Democracy	2009	NV
Mauritania	Rally for Democratic Forces	2009	NV
Morocco	Polisario	2009	NV
Morocco	Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	1993	NV
Mozambique	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	1992	G/C
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1990	T
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1991	T
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1992	T
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1993	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1994	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1995	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1996	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1997	NV
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1998	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	1999	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	2000	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	2001	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	2002	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	2003	None
Mozambique	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)	2004	None
Niger	Air and Azawak Liberation Front	1991	G/C
Niger	Air and Azawak Liberation Front	1992	T
Niger	Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic	2009	NV
Niger	Democratic and Social Convention	1992	NV
Niger	Front for the Defence of Democracy	2009	NV

Niger	Party for Democracy and Socialism	2009	NV
Nigeria	Campaign for Democracy	1993	NV
Nigeria	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights	1993	NV
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2000	NV
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2001	None
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2002	None
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2003	None
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2004	None
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2005	NV
Nigeria	Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra	2007	None
Nigeria	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta	2006	T
Nigeria	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta	2008	T
Nigeria	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People	2001	NV
Nigeria	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force	2005	NV
Nigeria	Nigeria Labour Congress	2009	NV
Nigeria	United Action for Democracy	1998	NV
Nigeria	Youth Alliance for Good Governance	2006	NV
Rwanda	Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR)	1996	G/C
Rwanda	Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR)	1997	G/C
Rwanda	Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR)	1998	G/C
Rwanda	Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)	2001	G/C
Rwanda	Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)	2002	None
Rwanda	Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)	2003	None
Rwanda	Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)	2004	G/C
Rwanda	Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)	1991	G/C
Rwanda	Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)	1992	G/C
Rwanda	Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)	1993	G/C
Rwanda	Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)	1994	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1990	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1991	None
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1992	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1993	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1994	None
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1995	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1996	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1997	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1998	None
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	1999	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2000	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2001	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2002	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2003	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2004	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2005	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2006	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2007	None
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2008	G/C

Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2009	G/C
Senegal	Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC)	2010	G/C
Sierra Leone	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	1998	G/C
Sierra Leone	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	1999	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1991	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1992	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1993	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1994	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1995	T
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1996	None
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1997	None
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1998	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1999	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	2000	G/C
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	2001	G/C
Sierra Leone	West Side Boys (WSB)	2000	G/C
Somalia	Al-Shabaab	2008	G/C
Somalia	Al-Shabaab	2009	G/C
Somalia	Al-Shabaab	2010	G/C
Somalia	Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC)	2006	G/C
Somalia	Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC)	2007	G/C
Somalia	Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC)	2008	G/C
Somalia	Hizbul Islam	2009	G/C
Somalia	Hizbul Islam	2010	G/C
Somalia	Somali National Movement (SNM)	1990	G/C
Somalia	Somali National Movement (SNM)	1991	G/C
Somalia	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)	1990	G/C
Somalia	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)	1991	G/C
Somalia	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)	2001	G/C
Somalia	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)	2002	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1991	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1992	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1993	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1994	None
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1995	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1996	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1990	G/C
Somalia	United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA)	1991	G/C
South Africa	Afrikaner Resistance Movement	1994	T
South Africa	Afrikaner Volksfront	1993	NV
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)	1990	NV/G/C/T
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)	1991	NV
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)	1992	NV/G/C
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)	1993	NV/G/C
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)	1994	NV
South Africa	Azania People's Organization	1990	G/C
South Africa	Azania People's Organization	1991	G/C

South Africa	Azania People's Organization	1992	T
South Africa	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	1991	NV
South Africa	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	1992	NV
South Africa	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	1993	NV
South Africa	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	1996	NV
South Africa	Inkatha Freedom Party	1991	G/C
South Africa	Pan African Congress (PAC)	1992	G/C
South Africa	Pan African Congress (PAC)	1994	NV
South Africa	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs	1997	None
South Africa	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs	1998	None
South Africa	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs	1999	NV/T
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1991	NV
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1992	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1993	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1994	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1995	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1996	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1997	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1998	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	1999	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2000	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2001	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2002	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2003	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2004	None
South Africa	South African Communist Party (SACP)	2005	None
South Africa	Treatment Action Campaign	2006	NV
South Africa	United Democratic Front (UDF)	1990	NV
Sudan	Democratic Unionist Party	2000	NV
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2003	G/C
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2004	G/C
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2005	None
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2006	None
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2007	G/C
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2008	G/C
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2009	G/C
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2010	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	1996	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	1997	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	1998	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	1999	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2000	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2001	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2002	G/C
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2003	None
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2004	None
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	2005	None

Sudan	National Redemption Front (NRF)	2006	G/C
Sudan	Popular National Congress	2000	NV
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2003	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2004	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2005	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2006	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2007	None
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2008	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2009	G/C
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2010	G/C
Sudan	SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM)	2006	G/C
Sudan	SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM)	2007	G/C
Sudan	SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM)	2008	None
Sudan	SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM)	2009	None
Sudan	SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM)	2010	G/C
Sudan	SLM/A-Unity	2007	G/C
Sudan	SLM/A-Unity	2008	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1990	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1991	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1992	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1993	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1994	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1995	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1996	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1997	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1998	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	1999	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2000	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2001	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2002	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2003	None
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2004	G/C
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2005	None
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2006	None
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2007	None
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2008	None
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2009	NV
Sudan	Sudanese People's Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A)	2010	G/C
Sudan	Ummah Party	2009	NV
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2002	NV
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2003	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2004	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2005	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2006	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2007	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2008	None
Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2009	None

Swaziland	People's United Democratic Movement	2010	NV
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	1996	NV
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	1997	None
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	1998	None
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	1999	None
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	2000	None
Swaziland	Swaziland Democratic Alliance	2001	None
Togo	Union for the Forces of Change	2009	NV
Togo	Union for the Forces of Change	2010	NV
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	1996	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	1997	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	1998	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	1999	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2000	T
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2001	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2002	None
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2003	None
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2004	None
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2005	None
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2006	G/C
Uganda	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	2007	G/C
Uganda	Holy Spirit Movement	1990	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1990	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1991	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1992	None
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1993	None
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1994	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1995	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1996	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1997	None
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1998	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1999	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2000	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2001	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2002	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2003	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2004	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2005	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2006	G/C
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2007	G/C
Uganda	Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II)	1996	G/C
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1990	G/C
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1991	G/C
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1992	G/C
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1993	None
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1994	G/C
Uganda	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	1995	G/C

Uganda	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	1996	G/C
Uganda	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	1997	None
Uganda	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	1998	G/C
Zambia	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy	1991	NV
Zambia	National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy	1990	NV
Zambia	Oasis Forum	2005	NV
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1990	NV
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1991	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1992	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1993	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1994	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1995	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1996	None
Zambia	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1997	None
Zimbabwe	Combined Harare Residents Association	2006	NV
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2001	NV
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2005	NV
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2006	NV
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2006	NV
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2007	None
Zimbabwe	National Constitutional Assembly	2008	NV
Zimbabwe	Save Zimbabwe Campaign	2007	NV
Zimbabwe	Women of Zimbabwe Arise	2007	NV

Tests of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Tests conducted on models without country clusters

MENA 1:

**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=294)

 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.

 Omitted | chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence

---------+----------------------------------

      1 | 0.000   2   1.000   for Ho

      2 | 0.000   2   1.000   for Ho

      3 | 0.000   2   1.000   for Ho

```
**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=294)

 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)   chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence

---------+-----------------------------------------------------------

      1 |    -44.216    -36.828  14.775   20    0.789   for Ho

      2 |    -95.692    -74.308  42.769   20    0.002   against Ho

      3 |    -88.843    -68.018  41.650   20    0.003   against Ho

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MENA 2:

**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=287)

 Omitted |    chi2    df    P>chi2    evidence

---------+----------------------------------------

      1 |    0.000    2    1.000    for Ho

      2 |    0.000    2    1.000    for Ho

      3 |   -0.000    4     ---      ---

------------------------------------------------

 Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of
the test.

**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=287)

 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)   chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence

---------+-----------------------------------------------------------

      1 |    -64.609    -54.821  19.576   20    0.485   for Ho

      2 |    -69.572    -64.193  10.758   20    0.952   for Ho

      3 |   -101.903    -92.318  19.170   20    0.511   for Ho

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
```

```
AFRICA:

**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=495)

 Omitted |      chi2    df    P>chi2    evidence
---------+-----------------------------------
       1 |     0.051     4     1.000    for Ho
       2 |    -1.751    11      ---       ---
       3 |     0.641    16     1.000    for Ho
-----------------------------------------------
 Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of
the test.

**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=495)
 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)    chi2    df    P>chi2    evidence
---------+-----------------------------------------------------------
       1 |  -182.506   -174.310   16.393    16    0.426    for Ho
       2 |   -68.333    -65.150    6.365    16    0.984    for Ho
       3 |  -220.807   -212.073   17.468    16    0.356    for Ho
-------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table 3. Organizations' Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: None of the Tactics Used Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 MENA 1		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
Nonviolent	Low Popular Satisfaction	.224 (.83)
	High Repression	.807*** (.08)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	.634** (.25)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-1.989*** (.45)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-15.272*** (1.17)
	Rural Population	-.037 (.02)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	.593 (.94)
	Cold War	-.515 (.61)
	Group Proportion	2.765* (1.38)
	Constant	-.575 (1.26)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low Popular Satisfaction	-.359 (1.81)
	High Repression	2.349*** (.09)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-.040 (.81)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	3.073 (8.08)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-11.734 (7.70)
	Rural Population	-.044 (.28)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-1.121** (.33)
	Cold War	1.864** (.63)
	Group Proportion	-1.510** (.45)
	Constant	-3.163 (2.04)
Terrorism	Low Popular Satisfaction	-13.665*** (2.50)
	High Repression	-.295*** (.03)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	1.282*** (.21)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-15.034*** (1.88)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-27.697*** (3.45)
	Rural Population	.0353 (.07)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	2.335 (2.22)
	Cold War	.284 (1.27)
	Group Proportion	4.140 (5.59)
	Constant	9.164 (5.45)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.3936**
	Observations	**294**

Table 4. Organizations' Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004		
Results after Multinomial Logit		
Base category=Nonviolent tactics		
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p*<0.001**		
MENA 1		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
None of the tactics used	Low Popular Satisfaction	-.224 (.83)
	High Repression	-.807*** (.08)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-.634** (.25)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	1.989*** (.45)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	15.272*** (1.17)
	Rural Population	.037 (.02)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-.593 (.94)
	Cold War	.515 (.61)
	Group Proportion	-2.765* (1.38)
	Constant	.575 (1.26)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low Popular Satisfaction	-.583 (1.68)
	High Repression	1.542*** (.10)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-.6730 (.60)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	5.062 (8.11)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	3.538 (8.09)
	Rural Population	-.0074 (.28)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-1.714* (.67)
	Cold War	2.379* (.93)
	Group Proportion	-4.275** (1.43)
	Constant	-2.589** (.93)
Terrorism	Low Popular Satisfaction	-13.889*** (2.36)
	High Repression	-1.101*** (.10)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	.648 (.34)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-13.045*** (1.86)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-12.424*** (2.64)
	Rural Population	.072 (.07)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	1.741 (1.28)
	Cold War	.799 (.68)
	Group Proportion	1.375 (4.21)
	Constant	9.739* (4.70)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.3936**
	Observations	**294**

Table 5. Organizations' Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 MENA 1		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
None of the tactics used	Low Popular Satisfaction	.359 (1.81)
	High Repression	-2.349*** (.09)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	.040 (.81)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-3.073 (8.08)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	11.734 (7.70)
	Rural Population	.044 (.28)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	1.120** (.33)
	Cold War	-1.864** (.63)
	Group Proportion	1.510** (.45)
	Constant	3.163 (2.04)
Nonviolent	Low Popular Satisfaction	.583 (1.68)
	High Repression	-1.542*** (.10)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	.673 (.61)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-5.062 (8.11)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-3.538 (8.09)
	Rural Population	.007 (.28)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	1.714* (.67)
	Cold War	-2.379* (.93)
	Group Proportion	4.275** (1.43)
	Constant	2.589** (.93)
Terrorism	Low Popular Satisfaction	-13.306*** (3.73)
	High Repression	-2.643*** (.07)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	1.321 (.85)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	-18.107 (9.57)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-15.963 (10.08)
	Rural Population	.080 (.31)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	3.455 (1.93)
	Cold War	-1.580 (1.55)
	Group Proportion	5.650 (5.61)
	Constant	12.327** (4.47)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.3936**
	Observations	**294**

Table 6. Organizations' Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004		
Results after Multinomial Logit		
Base category:Terrorism		
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001		
MENA 1		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
None of the tactics used	Low Popular Satisfaction	13.665*** (2.50)
	High Repression	.295*** (.03)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-1.282*** (.21)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	15.034*** (1.88)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	27.697*** (3.45)
	Rural Population	-.035 (.07)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-2.335 (2.22)
	Cold War	-.284 (1.27)
	Group Proportion	-4.140 (5.59)
	Constant	-9.164 (5.45)
Nonviolent	Low Popular Satisfaction	13.889*** (2.36)
	High Repression	1.101*** (.10)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-.648 (.34)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	13.045*** (1.86)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	12.424*** (2.64)
	Rural Population	-.072 (.07)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-1.741 (1.28)
	Cold War	-.799 (.68)
	Group Proportion	-1.375 (4.21)
	Constant	-9.739* (4.70)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low Popular Satisfaction	13.306*** (3.73)
	High Repression	2.643*** (.07)
	Low Popular Satisfaction * High Repression	-1.321 (.85)
	High State Capacity Autocracy	18.107 (9.57)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	15.963 (10.08)
	Rural Population	-.080 (.31)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-3.455 (1.93)
	Cold War	1.580 (1.55)
	Group Proportion	-5.650 (5.61)
	Constant	-12.327** (4.47)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.3936**
	Observations	**294**

Table 7. Organizations' Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: None of The Tactics Used Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 MENA 2		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
Nonviolent	High State Capacity Autocracy	-2.792*** (.50)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-17.925*** (.82)
	Low Popular Support	.877 (.90)
	High Repression	-.593*** (.01)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-.843 (1.54)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	.883 (1.14)
	Group Proportion	2.923 (1.65)
	Rural Population	.002 (.02)
	Cold War	-.969 (1.07)
	Constant	-.284 (.66)
Guerrilla/Conventional	High State Capacity Autocracy	2.824 (6.56)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-.181 (4.96)
	Low Popular Support	-1.44*** (.12)
	High Repression	14.34*** (1.37)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	.159 (1.08)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	-1.36* (.54)
	Group Proportion	-1.92 (1.29)
	Rural Population	-.03 (.23)
	Cold War	2.11*** (.19)
	Constant	-16.32*** (3.10)
Terrorism	High State Capacity Autocracy	-2.21 (1.77)
	High State Capacity Anocracy	-17.13*** (1.46)
	Low Popular Support	-15.10*** (.79)
	High Repression	-.06 (.14)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	15.03*** (1.18)
	Foreign State Fin. Support	2.42 (2.09)
	Group Proportion	4.55 (4.76)
	Rural Population	.06 (.08)
	Cold War	-.05 (1.14)
	Constant	-4.58 (2.81)
	Pseudo R-squared	**.3255**
	Observations	**287**

Table 8. Organizations' Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: None of the Tactics Used Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
Nonviolent	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.407 (.48)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.710 (.56)
	Low Popular Support	-.253 (1.22)
	High Repression	-.021 (.59)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	.899 (1.07)
	Rentier State	-2.400** (.71)
	Rural Population	-.046** (.01)
	Constant	1.328 (.89)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low State Capacity Anocracy	-.122 (.73)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	.365 (.84)
	Low Popular Support	-1.249* (.56)
	High Repression	.678 (.43)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	1.023 (.55)
	Rentier State	.429 (.51)
	Rural Population	.025 (.02)
	Constant	-1.838 (1.51)
Terrorism	Low State Capacity Anocracy	-.265 (.64)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	.2661 (.94)
	Low Popular Support	-13.210*** (.84)
	High Repression	.797 (.90)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	13.489*** (1.33)
	Rentier State	.136 (.65)
	Rural Population	-.005 (.03)
	Constant	-2.744* (1.40)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.0783**
	Observations	**495**

Table 9. Organizations' Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: Nonviolent Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
Nonviolent	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.407 (.48)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.710 (.56)
	Low Popular Support	-.253 (1.22)
	High Repression	-.021 (.59)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	.899 (1.07)
	Rentier State	-2.400** (.71)
	Rural Population	-.046** (.01)
	Constant	1.328 (.89)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low State Capacity Anocracy	-.122 (.73)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	.365 (.84)
	Low Popular Support	-1.249* (.56)
	High Repression	.678 (.43)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	1.023 (.55)
	Rentier State	.429 (.51)
	Rural Population	.025 (.02)
	Constant	-1.838 (1.51)
Terrorism	Low State Capacity Anocracy	-.265 (.64)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	.2661 (.94)
	Low Popular Support	-13.210*** (.84)
	High Repression	.797 (.90)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	13.489*** (1.33)
	Rentier State	.136 (.65)
	Rural Population	-.005 (.03)
	Constant	-2.744* (1.40)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.0783**
	Observations	**495**

Table 10. Organizations' Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: Guerrilla/Conventional Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
None of the tactics used	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.122 (.73)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.365 (.84)
	Low Popular Support	1.249* (.56)
	High Repression	-.678 (.43)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-1.023 (.55)
	Rentier State	-.429 (.51)
	Rural Population	-.025 (.02)
	Constant	1.838 (1.51)
Nonviolent	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.529 (.82)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-1.074 (.90)
	Low Popular Support	.996 (1.15)
	High Repression	-.699 (.70)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-.124 (.94)
	Rentier State	-2.828*** (.70)
	Rural Population	-.071** (.02)
	Constant	3.166* (1.52)
Terrorism	Low State Capacity Anocracy	-.144 (.77)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.098 (1.19)
	Low Popular Support	-11.961*** (.86)
	High Repression	.119 (1.02)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	12.466*** (1.28)
	Rentier State	-.293 (.68)
	Rural Population	-.030 (.03)
	Constant	-.906 (1.90)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.0783**
	Observations	**495**

Table 11. Organizations' Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 Results after Multinomial Logit Base category: Terrorism Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001		
Tactic	**Independent Variable**	**Coefficient**
None of the tactics used	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.265 (.64)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.266 (.94)
	Low Popular Support	13.210*** (.84)
	High Repression	-.797 (.90)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-13.489*** (1.33)
	Rentier State	-.136 (.65)
	Rural Population	.005 (.03)
	Constant	2.744* (1.40)
Nonviolent	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.672 (.77)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	-.976 (1.15)
	Low Popular Support	12.957*** (1.36)
	High Repression	-.818 (1.13)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-12.590*** (1.59)
	Rentier State	-2.536** (.79)
	Rural Population	-.041 (.04)
	Constant	4.072* (1.90)
Guerrilla/Conventional	Low State Capacity Anocracy	.144 (.77)
	Low State Capacity Autocracy	.098 (1.19)
	Low Popular Support	11.961*** (.86)
	High Repression	-.119 (1.02)
	Low Popular Support* High Repression	-12.466*** (1.29)
	Rentier State	.293 (.68)
	Rural Population	.030 (.03)
	Constant	.906 (1.90)
	Pseudo R-squared	**0.0783**
	Observations	**495**