

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations frequently engages in peacekeeping activities in post-conflict societies in order to build and sustain peace. A crucial component of the durability of peace is the rule of law. While there is extensive empirical literature on the effect of UN peacekeeping on the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting, there is little literature that empirically examines whether UN peacekeeping can improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state. This study uses data to determine whether UN peacekeeping has a positive effect on the quality of rule of law in post-conflict settings. Using regression and matching analysis, this study does not find evidence that peacekeeping influences the rule of law in a post-conflict setting in either a positive or negative direction. Even so, the "non-findings" of this study have implications for policy makers who wish to have post-conflict peace building efforts in order to improve the rule of law.

[In Bosnia] we thought that democracy was the highest priority, and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize...In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, [and] public confidence in police and the courts.

Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 2002

Since its inception, the United Nations has worked to support international peace and security through various means, particularly through the use of UN peacekeeping forces. However, many have questioned whether UN interventions have empirically helped end conflict and maintain peace in the aftermath of a conflict. This paper will examine the impact that UN actions, specifically peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, have on the security and the socio-political conditions in post-conflict states.

There is extensive quantitative academic literature on the relationship between peacekeeping and the durability of peace in post-conflict settings, finding overall that UN involvement is significantly correlated with an increased durability of peace in post-conflict settings. One way in which a peacekeeping operation can affect the durability of peace is by altering the in-

centives that determine whether parties choose to go to war. Another way the operation could affect the durability of peace is by reducing uncertainty and fear between factions.¹ Peacekeeping missions can also take on peacebuilding roles beyond military tasks such as improving governance and the rule of law, monitoring elections, reforming police forces and the judiciary, human rights monitoring and training, and rebuilding state institutions. Peacekeeping missions (particularly multidimensional operations) can then sustain post-conflict peace by preventing the political abuses that originally instigated the conflict.² Overall, the academic literature posits that peacekeeping can help the durability of peace by both alleviating mistrust between formerly warring parties and by strengthening domestic political institutions to prevent misuses of power that provoke war. By strengthening them and improving their legitimacy, UN peacekeeping bolsters both the rule of law and the capacity of political institutions to respond to problems that could provoke conflict.

There is very little academic literature, however, on the specific question this paper wishes to address: how does peacekeeping influence the rule of law in post-conflict settings? Some policy-oriented work exists on the topic, which mostly takes an overwhelmingly negative outlook on the ability of the UN to im-

prove the rule of law. The UN approaches post-conflict policing and reforming the rule of law on an ad-hoc basis due to resource constraints and lack of a clear vision on how the mission should approach policing in a post-conflict setting.³ Additionally, while certain rule of law tasks by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations may be necessary, the implementation of these tasks is very dependent on the characteristics of a mission's operating environment, which the mission cannot control. Missions often have resources, but only enough to provide short-term security and stability. Because of these constraints, UN peacekeeping cannot consistently improve key rule of law institutions in post-conflict settings.⁴ Finally, this literature finds that rule of law efforts have fallen short because they tend to focus heavily on building legal institutions that are part of the formal sector. This approach can be futile, as the institutions are useless if the people do not believe in their value, efficacy, and ability to resolve disputes.⁵

There is a clear divide in the academic and policy literature. While academic literature finds that peacekeeping has a positive effect on the durability of peace (which includes the rule of law), policy and qualitatively oriented literature overall finds that peacekeeping has an unclear effect on the quality of rule of law in post-conflict settings. This paper hopes to fill the gap in the academic literature by providing a quantitative large-N analysis of the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the long-term rule of law in post-conflict societies. This paper will explore the following question: in a conflict and post-conflict setting, does, UN peacekeeping effectively improve the rule of law years after a conflict has ended? To limit the very large scope of this question, I focus on the quality of rule of law in the long-term. I want to compare the UN's effectiveness in improving the quality of a host country's main rule of law institutions. Does the presence of UN peacekeeping troops, UN police, and/or UN formed police units improve both the effectiveness of the police, justice, and corrections sectors and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict society?

DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS

Rule of Law

What exactly is the rule of law? Academics and policy-makers have historically struggled to accurately define this term, as it encompasses several issues and can be applied to different situations. In his 2004 re-

port, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defines the rule of law as, "a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."

In addition, Thomas Carothers (1998) defines the rule of law as "a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone." Specifically, the rule of law involves the following "anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding."⁶

These two definitions encompass the manner in which the term "rule of law" will be used in this paper. The rule of law is a system in which people are held accountable to the law equitably and independently, and requires the effective functioning of legal institutions including the judicial, police, and corrections sectors of a society.

Peacekeeping

Not all UN peacekeeping missions are the same. Borrowing from the conceptual definitions of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004), we can divide UN peacekeeping missions into different categories.

A monitoring or observer mission is an "interim arrangement used in violent conflicts with the consent of the host government. In these conflicts, there is no formal determination of aggression. The purpose is to monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers."⁷

These missions are not armed; their main task is to simply watch and report what they observe.

A traditional peacekeeping mission involves deploying military units and civilian expert officials to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is usually authorized with a Chapter VI mandate under the UN Charter, meaning it is deployed with the consent of the parties involved. This type of peacekeeping mission is meant to monitor compliance with an agreement, but they can also “establish and police a buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disarmament of military forces.”⁸

A multidimensional peacekeeping mission is also based on consent, but is designed to implement a more comprehensive peace agreement. It includes “a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to more multidimensional strategies for capacity expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system; elections; civil society rebuilding).”⁹ Rule of law reform activities are therefore a part of multidimensional peacekeeping missions.

Peace enforcement missions involve military intervention and operate under a Chapter VII mandate. Peacekeeping missions that operate under a Chapter VII mandate are sent into volatile conflict settings where the state is either unable or unwilling to maintain security and order. Chapter VII mandated missions involve traditional peacekeeping tasks but also include more complex tasks that may require the use of active, coercive force.¹⁰

Post-Conflict Justice

One important factor that influences the durability of peace is the form of justice that emerges in a post-conflict society. Post-conflict justice, as discussed in this paper, is separate from peacekeeping activities. Although it may be a complement to peacekeeping activities, it is distinct from peacekeeping itself. As it influences the ability of the UN to reform the rule of law, post-conflict justice must be discussed in the context of the rule of law and UN peacekeeping activities.

Non-retributive post-conflict justice focuses on the victims and the human rights violations they faced during a conflict. Usually, this takes the form of reparations to victims and truth commissions. A non-retributive justice mechanism leaves many perpetrators of conflict free on the streets. This presence

of perpetrators, and their potential to commit further violence, could influence the ability of the UN and national security forces to effectively re-establish the rule of law, because it is an additional security risk UN forces must address. The literature is divided on the impact of retributive versus non-retributive post-conflict justice on the durability of peace. Retributive post-conflict justice focuses on holding perpetrators accountable for the crimes they committed during the conflict. Institutional mechanisms that pursue retributive justice include prosecution and sentencing in domestic courts and/or special tribunals, international tribunals, and joint international and domestic tribunals created to address crimes committed during the conflict.¹¹ In democratic settings, these measures are usually a part of a greater reconciliation process designed to support human rights in a post-conflict setting. In an autocratic setting, however, retributive justice is arbitrary and aims to hurt the losing side of the conflict. In this case, trials are often “show trials” where the outcome is predetermined.¹²

Post-conflict justice could also protect against a cycle of revenge attacks. If victims of war feel that crimes and wrongdoings are inadequately addressed, they may be tempted to conduct “private justice” as a substitute for insufficient legal justice. Private justice could take on the form of extra-legal killings, fragmenting a peace between forces in a post-conflict state and increasing the risk of civil war recurrence. The immunity of insurgents increases the risk of “wild justice,” which is the unpredictable revenge of one side to obtain justice that could inadvertently provoke conflict again. Consequently, by holding criminals accountable, retributive post-conflict justice may help a post-conflict government make sure that individuals do not seek revenge through private (and often violent) means.¹³ On the other hand, some argue that retributive post-conflict justice can have a negative effect on peace. Post-conflict justice, particularly retributive post-conflict justice, could provoke resentment among the losing side by opening old wounds and creating new ones in already fractious societies.¹⁴

Retributive justice is easier to carry out when the military outcome of the conflict is clear. Prosecuting war criminals is more feasible when insurgents or the former regime is clearly and severely defeated and no longer poses a threat to the present leadership. In situations where there is no clear victory or where the perpetrators are hard to identify, non-retributive post-

conflict justice may be a better option.

Amnesty measures are mechanisms that make perpetrators immune from post-conflict prosecution. Amnesty is meant to convince parties to put down arms in exchange for a guarantee of not being prosecuted.¹⁵ However, amnesty measures could limit the actual realization of justice and reduce the period of post-conflict peace, as they may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and create instability again. Additionally, amnesty measures increase the risk of private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. Combined with the fact that post-conflict societies often lack the resources to carry out fair and impartial trials without harming other aspects of peacebuilding, this makes the value of amnesty uncertain.¹⁶ Thus, it is important to look at various forms of post-conflict justice because it could impact the way in which UN peacekeeping should affect the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

Theory & Hypotheses

The UN may be able to improve the rule of law by improving the efficacy of institutions that carry out rule of law functions, and bolstering public confidence in the police and judicial institutions. The UN facilitates the reformation of rule of law in post-conflict countries by specifically working to improve each aspect of rule of law in a country: the police sector, justice institutions, and corrections facilities. By training local police and improving the quality of judicial institutions through training and programming, the UN not only improves institutional capacity to settle disputes, but also works to build trust in legal institutions. UN peacekeeping can alleviate fear and mistrust towards rule of law institutions, which is a legacy of many conflicts, by strengthening the capacity of those rule of law institutions to address wrongdoings. By alleviating this mistrust of rule of law institutions, the UN hopes people will use rule of law institutions, further increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. The UN then perpetuates a cycle of trust, legitimacy, and effectiveness in rule of law institutions in post-conflict societies. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.

Not all UN missions are the same, however. Given the various types of peacekeeping missions, some will be

better at strengthening the rule of law in a post-conflict setting, given the type of mandate and capacity they have. For instance, a simple monitoring mission, whose purview solely involves observing a truce and/or cease-fire, will not be as effective in reforming and/or developing rule of law institutions as a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, which has the capacity and strength of mandate to carry out rule of law reform tasks. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

Monica Toft, in her book *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, finds that a negotiated settlement tends to reduce the likelihood of the durability of peace unless there is comprehensive security sector reform that is aimed at restructuring rule of law institutions.¹⁷ Thus, if a peace agreement does not include provisions for security sector reform a UN peacekeeping mission will most likely not have the mandate to carry out rule of law reform (a component of security sector reform). Therefore:

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

Post-conflict justice, depending on the type, can also influence the UN's ability to successfully reform the rule of law. Particularly, amnesty measures may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and consequently remain politically intact to instigate conflict. Additionally, amnesty measures both increase the risk of private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. Thus:

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

Control Factors

There are several factors that influence the UN's ability to implement rule of law reform in a post-conflict setting. Notably, the severity and degree of hostility of the conflict could determine the success of the UN in improving the rule of law. In a post-conflict environment where deep hostility, ethnic fractionalization, and high levels of casualties exist, it may be more difficult for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law. These hostile conditions can be reinforced by the

duration of conflict as well. Longer fighting implies higher fatalities in conflict and ultimately deeper hostility. The more hostile the conflict (as indicated by the number of fatalities, level of ethnic fractionalization, and duration of conflict), the more difficult it will be for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law in the post-conflict environment. Additionally, the level of economic development can influence the level of political stability and security in a post-conflict setting. The more stable and developed a post-conflict setting is, the more feasible it is for the UN to implement rule of law reforms, as they do not have to deal with external security risks relating to economic concerns. Thus, the regression between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law controls for the number of deaths in conflict, war duration, ethnic fractionalization, and economic development (through proxies of electricity consumption per capita and real GDP per capita).

RESEARCH DESIGN

Unit of Analysis

For the empirical analysis, I use the International Peacebuilding Data Set from Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. The original data set is cross-sectional and includes 124 events of civil wars. It includes “wars that started since 1944 and terminated before 1997 and wars which were ongoing as of December 1999, but which had at least one significant settlement or truce or third-party peace operation, signaling the parties’ desire to terminate the war and start a peacebuilding process.”¹⁸ This allows for the examination of peacebuilding outcomes at least two years after the end of the war or after the start of a peace operation. Doyle and Sambanis also classify the data into four categories of peacekeeping missions: monitoring or observing missions, traditional peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. This classification is used to examine the relationship between the scope of a mission and its ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict state.

To measure the dependent variable, rule of law, I use the Rule of Law estimate from the World Bank Governance Indicators. “Rule of Law,” as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators, encompasses several indicators that “measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.” These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These indi-

cators measure the protection of property rights and the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions.

The World Bank’s estimates of the quality of rule of law are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores correspond to better outcomes/higher qualities of rule of law. This data spans from 1996 to 2012. Given this data limitation, for my first set of regressions, I only used those civil wars that ended 1986 or later in the Doyle and Sambanis data set, providing me with sixty-six events of civil war. I then coded the Rule of Law score ten years after a civil war ended. I also coded the Rule of Law scores eleven years after the conflict ended. I then coded and calculated a new dependent variable, the change in Rule of Law score by subtracting the Rule of Law score for ten years after the conflict from the score for ten years after the conflict.

The reason for my decision to evaluate the Rule of Law score between the tenth and eleventh years is three-fold. First, this study is designed to measure the effect of UN peacekeeping measures on the long-term rule of law, rather than the short term. As a result, a sizeable gap of ten years between the end of a conflict and the measurement of the Rule of Law ensures that the long-term, rather than the short-term, rule of law is the subject of this analysis. Second, a ten-year gap enables this study to use a greater set of post-conflict states in its analysis, given the limitations of both the World Bank and the Doyle and Sambanis data set, as described above. Lastly, ten years is not so long a period of time that one would expect for the impact of a peacekeeping operation to have faded regardless of the results on the long-term rule of law. This technique of measuring years out after the conflict has ended is not unique. Fortna, in a quantitative study on peacekeeping and democratization, follows a similar technique in which she measures her dependent variable of democratization one, two, and five years after the end of a conflict in order to measure movement from autocracy to democracy.¹⁹

I ultimately decided to use this difference in scores as the measure of improvement of each country’s rule of law, as it would give me a sense if each country’s rule of law improves. If I were to just look at only the level of rule of law ten years after a conflict

Table 1: Variables in Analysis

Independent Variables	Controls	Dependent Variable
un2int: Was there a UN peace operation? 0 = no; 1 = yes (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Log of deaths during conflict (logcost): The log of the total number of dead, including civilians and battle deaths (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	World Bank Rule of Law score 10 years after a conflict ended (wbgi.rle 10 years after): World Bank Governance Indicator Rule of Law score 10 years after a civil war has ended (World Bank Governance Indicators).
untype 2: UN peace operation involving deployment of neutral military and/or civilian observers (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Real GDP per capita (rgdpcaps): Real GDP per capita in US\$ (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Difference between World Bank Rule of Law scores 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.wbgi.rle): Change in Rule of Law score; the difference between the ROL score 11 years after the conflict and 10 years after the conflict (calculated from World Bank Governance Indicators).
untype 3: UN peace operation involving traditional peacekeeping operation (military and civilian personnel) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Development levels (develop): measured by a proxy of electricity consumption per capita (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Difference in CIM values 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.cim): the change in Contract-Intensive Money 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. CIM is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply (IMF International Financial Statistics)
untype 4: UN multidimensional peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf): Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index; The index ranges from 0-100 and higher values correspond to higher degrees of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the country (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
untype 5: Peace enforcement, either multilateral through the United Nations or by a third party or coalition of parties, acting under a multilateral, UN-sanctioned mandate. Also includes executive authority and supervising authority (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	War duration (wardur): Duration of the war measured in months (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	Presence of a treaty signed to end a conflict (treaty): coded 1 = treaty signed by the parties with intent to end the war; 0 = no major treaty was signed (although cease-fires were possibly agreed upon at various times) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	Presence of amnesty measures (pcj.amnesty): Records whether or not an amnesty was given in the post-conflict peace period. Coded 0 - No Amnesty: There were no amnesties after the conflict; Coded 1 - Amnesty: At least one amnesty was initiated after the conflict (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster 2012).	
	Presence of Security Sector Reform (SSRI): Security sector reform; a dummy variable that is a combination of 2 factors: 1) whether or not the combatants will form a new army after the war based on quotas from each side and 2) indicates the extent to which a settlement is implemented. The combination SSRI variable only includes those cases in which a successfully implemented settlement was present. If the settlement was well-executed, the variable was coded "1." Unsuccessful implementations were "0" (Toft 2010).	

has ended, there would be no way to control for baseline (pre-existing levels of rule of law). It would not be possible to know if the treatment (peacekeeping or no peacekeeping) actually improves the rule of law. By looking at the change in rule of law, I can directly observe if there is any improvement from peacekeeping. Looking ten years after a conflict has ended, and calculating this difference helps reduce endogeneity concerns and reverse causality concerns that arise from the fact that peacekeepers go to the places where the rule of law is weakest initially.

Another variable I use to measure the rule of law (as a proxy) is Contract Intensive Money. Contract Intensive Money (CIM) is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply, or $(M2-C)/M2$, where M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and C is currency held outside banks. I calculate CIM in this analysis using the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics data on currency outside of banks, money supply, and quasi-money supply.²⁰ CIM is supposed to act as a proxy for the rule of law because if contract enforcement and property rights are strong, actors will be more willing to hold money in a form other than currency. This is because the value of non-currency money depends on the ability of depositors to enforce claims against banks and the ability of banks to enforce claims against borrowers. Therefore, a higher CIM (the higher amount of non-currency money that people hold) suggests a better quality of legal institutions. Essentially, a higher CIM value correlates with stronger rule of law.²¹

Similarly to my calculations for the World Bank rule of law variable, I calculate the difference between the CIM value a country has ten years after the conflict and eleven years after the conflict. This is done to isolate the measure of the improvement in rule of law, rather than the level of rule of law itself. As the data on CIM spans a longer time frame, I am able to use 119 cases from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set for a second round of regressions with this dependent variable.

The data for the controls come from a variety of sources. The controls of deaths from conflict, real GDP per capita, development, ethnic fractionalization, and the presence of a treaty signed all come from the data set constructed by Doyle and Sambanis. The data for the amnesty measures come from Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster and the data for security sector reform comes from Toft. These data sets

do not match up with Doyle and Sambanis. Thus I had to merge these data sets by matching each conflict in Doyle and Sambanis data set to their corresponding data in the post-conflict justice and the SSR data sets.

Table 1 lists the independent variables, controls, and dependent variables that are used in the analysis.

Regression Models

To first test my hypotheses, I conducted several ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law, while controlling for factors that detail the hostility of conflict, presence of security sector reform, and the presence of amnesty measures as post-conflict justice mechanisms. I run two major sets of regressions, each using a different dependent variable. The first set uses the rule of law measure from the World Bank, and the second uses the Contract Intensive Money variable as a proxy for the quality of rule of law.

I first test the hypotheses by carrying out a variety of regressions with the dependent variable as the difference in rule of law/CIM scores ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. In order to test all facets of hypotheses 1 and 2 on the independent variable of peacekeeping, I create five models with different variations of the general independent variable "UN peacekeeping" to test on the dependent variable. By testing each mandate type by itself, I can examine if different mandate types have varying influences on the quality of rule of law (what Hypothesis 2 is questioning). Below is a table that describes the independent variable(s) that each model contains.

Table 2: Independent Variable Models²²

Model	Independent Variables/Mission type
Model A	All mandate types (untype 2, 3, 4, 5)
Model B	Presence of UN peacekeeping (un2int)
Model C	Monitoring/observer mission (untype 2)
Model D	Traditional peacekeeping mission (untype 3)
Model E	Multidimensional peacekeeping mission (untype 4)
Model F	Peace enforcement mission (untype 5)

Additionally, I also interact the amnesty measures and security sector reform variables with the UN peacekeeping presence variable (*un2int*) to further test Hypotheses 3 and 4. I wish to test if the effectiveness of peacekeeping will vary depending on what values the amnesty and security sector reform variables take. The interactive terms are the products of the basic peacekeeping variable (*un2int*) and the SSRI and amnesty variables.

I. Regressions with the World Bank measure as dependent variable

This set of tests has $N = 66$. Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran three different sets of tests. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 excluding the Security Sector Reform variable (Table 3: PCJ Amnesty, included in Appendix B). The second set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, excluding the amnesty dummy variable (Table 4: SSRI, included in Appendix B). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and security sector reform variables (Table 5: Neither, included in Appendix B). The results in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable.

II. Regressions with CIM measure as dependent variable

This set of tests has an $N = 119$. Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran four different sets of tests with the CIM measure as the dependent variable. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, including both the Security Sector Reform and PCJ amnesty variable (Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time), included in Appendix C). The second set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, including the amnesty variable and excluding the SSRI dummy variable (Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (No SSRI), included in Appendix C). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, in addition to the SSRI variable, and excludes the amnesty variables (Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty), included in Appendix C). The fourth set of tests

includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and SSRI variables (Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSRI, included in Appendix C). The results in the tables are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable. Additionally, I tried to interact the SSRI and amnesty variables with the presence of peacekeeping variable (*un2int*) and did not find any significant relationships. The results of these tests are indicated in the tables under the IV/Controls column (“Interactive term on UN Presence and [amnesty or SSRI]”).

Matching analysis

UN peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned. UN peacekeeping and peace building missions intentionally go to the most difficult locations, the places where the intensity of conflict was high, and in the case of this study, where rule of law is poor or practically non-existent. Cases in which the UN intervenes for improving the rule of law are very different from cases in which the UN does not intervene. Thus, linear regressions may not effectively estimate the effect that UN peacekeeping has on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state, because a linear regression model can lead to effects that are more of a result of the model rather than the data itself.

I hope to resolve this selection issue by carrying out a matching analysis. This would involve choosing two countries that are very similar on multiple dimensions. Then one mission would be “treated” with a UN mission, whereas the other one does not get the treatment. This sort of analysis is used by Gilligan and Sergenti (2007), in which they determine whether or not UN interventions cause peace. Gilligan and Sergenti, noticing that previous literature did not randomly assign UN missions in studying the relationship between UN interventions and sustainable peace, correct for this flaw with matching techniques, using a sample of UN interventions in post-Cold War conflicts. They ultimately find, similar to the previous studies, that UN interventions are effective in sustaining peace in post-conflict environments, but have no causal effect on peace while civil wars are still ongoing. By using non-random assignment of UN missions using matching techniques, they find that previous studies have underestimated the positive impact that UN interventions have on sustainable peace in a post-conflict setting. The results suggest both that the UN

does have a strong ability to extend periods of peace and that the effect is larger than previously estimated by previous studies because of the correction for the nonrandom assignment of UN missions.²³

Matching finds an overlap in cases of conflict that vary solely on whether or not UN peacekeeping was present. These cases are all matched based on a variety of controls. By finding the overlap between non-UN intervention and UN intervention cases based on the similarity of controls, matching allows for the comparison of similar cases. The controls used in this matching analysis are the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and the duration of war. Matching thus assesses whether or not UN intervention makes a difference in cases that had the same level of conflict. Matching helps give an average assessment of the effect of peacekeeping on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state.

To start the matching analysis, I temporarily coarsen exact match (CEM) the data by creating “bins.” The CEM command sorts the data into the various bins. The CEM command creates one “stratum” per observation of X, and then places each observation in a stratum. Then, the CEM command assigns each stratum to the original data and drops observations that do not contain at least one treated and one control unit. Then CEM creates a weight measure that I use in a regression with the uncoarsened data. The results of the “weighted” regression are the results of the matching analysis.²⁴

REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

A. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for World Bank measure

The empirical evidence does not support my theoretical hypotheses. There is not significant evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) positively improves the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country’s rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank rule of law measure do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen each set of tests, the coefficients of the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law.

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN’s ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve the rule of law, thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, the lack of presence of security sector reform in a negotiated settlement (as indicated by 0 in the dummy variable) is not significantly correlated with a lower quality of rule of law. The coefficient for this variable, while positive (indicating that the direction the hypothesis put forward is correct), is not statistically significant. The results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism will weaken UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law, and again I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Amnesty measures, (controlling for several variables, including UN peacekeeping) however, are negatively correlated with the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states. Let us turn, for example, to Model A in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, in a post-conflict environment, controlling for all UN mandate types, the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty.

The results show for Model A that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.123 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, the regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With twenty-two degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.123 \pm 0.06846(1.72)$ from -0.241 to -0.005.

We can also examine Model C in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, controlling for UN peacekeeping missions with a mandate to deploy of neutral military and/or civilian observers (untype 2), the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty. The results for Model C show that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.09863 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Just like the results from Model A detailed above, given the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, this regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With twenty-five degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.09863 \pm 0.0561(1.71)$ from -0.195 to -0.003.

Given the correlation coefficients of the regression equations for Models A and C for the amnesty variable are negative numbers, the multiple regression models demonstrate a negative relationship between post-conflict amnesty measures and the rule of law. While it is not possible to conclude that post-conflict amnesty measures distort/influence the UN's ability to improve the rule of law (as Hypothesis 4 intended to test), the data is consistent with the theoretical explanation that the presence of amnesty measures can result in an overall poorer quality of rule of law.

B. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for CIM measure

The empirical evidence does not support the theoretical hypotheses. There is not ample enough evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) is significant in positively improving the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen in each set of tests, the coefficients of the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the change in the quality of rule of law after a conflict has ended.

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN's ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with the ability of UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law. The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the change in the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism (pcj.amnesty) will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of amnesty as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law; I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Controls

While none of the hypotheses were accepted, this particular analysis shows that the log of deaths during a conflict has a negative correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests with Models A, B, and D, controlling for all UN mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, security sector reform, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Additionally, in the second set of tests with Models A, B, C, D, E, and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electric-

ity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is also negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after the conflict.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the log number of deaths during conflict (logcost) will cause a -0.02451 unit change in the difference between CIM value ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is negative, the regression model results in a negative relationship between log of deaths during conflict and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With thirty-three degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.02451 \pm 0.01246(1.6924)$ from -0.0456 to -0.00342.

This particular analysis also shows that ethnic fractionalization has a positive correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after the conflict. Additionally, in the second set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F show a positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the difference in CIM values.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the level of ethnic fractionalization will cause a 0.002193 unit change in the difference between CIM values ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is a positive number, the regression model results in a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With thirty-three degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 95-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $0.002193 \pm 0.001012(1.6924)$ from 0.0005 to 0.0039.

Table 3: Regression Results with CEM weight (using algorithm)

Dependent variable (difference.wbgrle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.1495865	.1261033	0.301	-.4997054	.2005324
Wardur	.0007444	.0007952	0.402	-.0014633	.0029521
Elf	-.000358	.0021241	0.874	-.0062555	.0055395
Logcost	-.0782816	.0527691	0.212	-.2247922	.068229
Constant	1.050172	.6103211	0.160	-.6443509	2.744695

RESULTS FOR MATCHING ANALYSIS

A. Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank measure as dependent variable

I. Using CEM algorithm

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: 0

Interpretation with algorithm CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .51111111

Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Table 4: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)

Dependent variable (difference.wbgrle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.0618187	.0535736	0.260	-.172644	.0490067
Wardur	-.0000715	.000202	0.727	-.0004893	.0003463
Elf	-.0003919	.0008771	0.659	-.0022063	.0014226
Logcost	-.0066913	.0140664	0.639	-.0357899	.0224072
Constant	.1495394	.1915143	0.443	-.2466381	.5457169

Table 5: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight

Dependent variable (CIM difference)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	.001116	.0089213	0.901	-.0169951	.0192271
wardur	-.0000529	.0000782	0.503	-.0002116	.0001058
elf	-.0000333	.000155	0.831	-.000348	.0002815
logcost	.0021292	.0020669	0.310	-.0020668	.0063251
constant	-.0156197	.0228245	0.498	-.0619559	.0307166

B. Results for Matching Analysis using CIM measure as dependent variable

I. Using CEM algorithm

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .18965517

Interpretation with algorithm CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice

Algorithm used in STATA:

cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .50222575

Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The results of the regression and matching tests were on the whole inconclusive in finding any specific directional relationship between peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict state. The limitations of existing measures and data on the rule of law ultimately reduce the number of data points that can be analyzed in such a study. Given the limited data and quality of data on the rule of law there is a limited amount that can be said, using empirical large-N analysis as evidence, on whether or not UN peacekeeping improves the rule of law.

That being said, there is still much to be learned given the finding that peacekeeping had neither a significantly positive or negative effect on the rule of law in both the regression and matching analyses. For

Table 6: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)

Dependent variable (CIM difference)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	.0155614	.0192143	0.420	-.022669	.0537918
wardur	.0000436	.000082	0.597	-.0001195	.0002066
elf	.0003126	.0003133	0.321	-.0003108	.0009361
logcost	-.004761	.0047257	0.317	-.0141636	.0046416
constant	.0280284	.0560619	0.618	-.0835172	.1395741

both the World Bank Rule of Law measure and the Contract Intensive Money measure, there was no significant relationship between UN peacekeeping in all iterations of the independent variable and hypotheses 1 and 2, regardless of whether or not the rule of law improved after a conflict had ended.

This has important implications for UN peacekeeping rule of law activity. Even though UN peacekeeping makes a concerted effort in promoting the rule of law in post-conflict states, its impact is undetectable in the long-term. The fact that UN peacekeeping is not making an obvious improvement in the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states despite massive amounts of time and resources dedicated towards improving the rule of law means that there are most likely other factors/issues at hand (whether it be UN-based or host-country based) that impede the UN's ability to decisively and comprehensively improve the rule of law.

Another interesting conclusion that can be pulled from this analysis is the finding that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism are negatively correlated with the difference in rule of law quality after a conflict has ended. While I was not able to find evidence that amnesty measures act as a conditional/interactive factor between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law, there is much to be said about this finding about the relationship between amnesty measures and the rule of law. As discussed in the literature review, post-conflict amnesty measures can protect perpetrators of conflict and leave them politically and physically intact to launch into conflict again, thus harming efforts to improve the rule of law. This particular finding supports findings in the literature that amnesty measures can harm the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting.

CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH

Does UN peacekeeping improve the rule of law in a post-conflict society? I proposed that UN peacekeeping helps improve the long-term rule of law by both physically improving the rule of law institutions themselves and building up public confidence in various rule of law institutions (such as the police and justice sectors). The empirical results, however, do not provide ample enough evidence to confirm that UN peacekeeping improves or harms the rule of law after the end of a conflict. It does not appear that UN peacekeeping has a substantive effect on improving rule of law institutions in the long-term. While the findings

are inconclusive regarding the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict settings in the long-term, they still have important applications for the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Even though UN peacekeeping spends significant effort and time rebuilding the rule of law in post-conflict states, their impact is difficult to determine.

Although the empirical results do not provide significant evidence for the research question, there is evidence that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism can harm the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state. This particular finding serves as support for the findings of Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates, who find that amnesty measures negatively affect the overall durability of peace in a post-conflict environment. It also has implications for policy makers deciding what post-conflict justice mechanisms will most benefit a society in the short-term and long-term: Amnesty measures could convince armed groups to put down their arms in the immediate end of a conflict, but may have negative implications for the quality of rule of law in the post-conflict environment.

The “non-findings” of this empirical analysis complement the findings of the qualitative studies carried out by the Stimson Center that evaluate the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in reforming and supporting the rule of law. UN peacekeeping theoretically has the capability and necessary mandate to improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state, but it is difficult for them to make a decisive positive impact because of several practical realities. The physical environments in which missions deploy most obviously pose difficult challenges to logistics, but also to the efficient use of resources. Resources may be poured into a mission's efforts to improve the rule of law, but if the mission's tasks are not finely tuned to the regional and domestic challenges and frameworks that guide society, those resources could end up going to waste. Ultimately, this could reduce the positive impact UN peacekeeping on the rule of law.

The main policy implication of this study is that smarter peacekeeping operations are needed, not just an increase in resources or stronger mandates. It is clear that throwing any amount of resources at a problem will not automatically rebuild the rule of law. Using resources effectively is crucial to long-term success in rebuilding and restoring the rule of law. One such way in which UN peacekeeping missions can improve their effectiveness in reforming the rule of law is by

effectively using donor funds to reach both short-term and long-term goals. UN peacekeeping missions should continue to focus on short-term goals, but they should also organize partnerships to help reach longer-term goals. There needs to be a strategic plan if any of the UN's quick impact projects on improving the rule of law are to actually make a difference in substantively improving the rule of law. Short-term achievements are inherently undermined by the fact that progress is needed in longer-term goals for the short-term achievements to mean anything in long run.

Secondly, right now the UN is focusing on the individual capacity of rule of law officials—police, corrections officers, and justice sector personnel like judges and lawyers—and the institutional capacity of rule of law institutions. More focus should be placed on institutional integrity if the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical portion of this paper are to actually work. Simply put, focusing on improving the institutional integrity and reliability of rule of law institutions will alleviate distrust of these institutions and lead to their more frequent use by the public. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping components should consider a policy approach to customary justice mechanisms at the start of a mission as a crucial element that can promote accessibility to justice.

Thirdly, it is also important that UN peacekeeping work on improving coordination between police, justice, and corrections sectors of rule of law institutions. It is clear that one sector affects the other, and one challenge that a sector faces will ultimately influence how effective another sector is in carrying out its essential functions. By improving information sharing, each sector could potentially improve coordination of activities and prevent issues such as overcrowding of prisons or overloading of court dockets.

There is much room for future research on the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law. As mentioned in the discussion, a major limitation of this study was the relatively small sample size. Future research on this topic should obtain more data for analysis by, for example, looking at lower levels of conflict. This would entail extending the data set from only civil wars to include cases of internal strife that maintained a lower level of hostility than a civil war. Another way in which future research could expand upon this study is by exploring alternative measures of the dependent variable of rule of law. A major limitation of the World Bank measure was its time frame. It only started releasing the rule of law scores starting in

1996. This time frame limited the number of cases I could use from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set.



While the CIM measure, calculated from IMF data, had a much larger time frame than the World Bank data (I was able to get data dating back to 1946), the CIM measure does have downfalls as a proxy for the rule of law. The creators of the CIM value describe CIM as a measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Although property rights and the enforceability of contracts are important aspects of the rule of law, they do not completely align with the definition of rule of law presented at the start of this paper. Importantly, CIM functions as a measure that combines both legal institutional and non-legal institutional factors. It can be difficult to tell whether or not societies with high CIM values have faith in legal methods that enable more business transactions or if they have faith in legal methods that hold all persons, institutions and entities, including the government itself, accountable to laws that are equitably enforced and consistent with international human rights norms. Thus a future avenue of research on this relationship would have to look into finding a measure of the rule of law that has a larger time frame for conflicts, in addition to content validity. This means that the data should have a higher degree of correspondence with the concept of rule of law and the measurement technique should include all aspects of the rule of law, as defined by the researcher.

Even though there is uncertainty in the results of the empirical findings, the end result of UN peacekeeping not having any obvious effect on the rule of law in a post-conflict setting is disconcerting. There is an expectation in the international community that UN peacekeeping, given all the time and resources it employs, has at least some positive effect on the rule of law. Ultimately, there is no detectable positive impact is a cause for concern. More importantly, it provides grounds for the UN and international peacebuilding community to evaluate how UN peacekeeping missions can better effectively utilize resources to rebuild the rule of law and make sure that post-conflict societies are safe and secure. The rule of law is necessary for the stability of societies, especially those emerging from conflict. Thus it will be a challenge not just for UN peacekeepers, but also for the peacebuilding community, to focus not just on the short-term capacity needs, but also on building effective institutions that can prevent infractions and breakdowns of the rule of law that lead to conflict in the first place.

APPENDIX

Description of Matching Methodology

With Coarsened Exact Matching, there are two ways to coarsen the data. One way is to run the automatic binning algorithm, while the other way involves self-defining cut points and bins for each control. The automatic binning results in more bins, but fewer bins will actually have matched cases. Using fewer cases allows for a better comparison of exact matches, as there are fewer cases. Thus, using the automatic algorithm provides matching analysis with better internal validity. Using pre-determined cut points allows for more observations to have matches and for a larger set of cases to be analyzed in a weighted regression. Using the pre-determined cut points, however, can result in more coarsening of the data, and involve more cases in the weighted regression analysis that are not an exact match. Thus, using the pre-determined cut points method will result in a higher external validity, but lower internal validity of the weighted regression. In this study, I run the matching analysis with both the automatic binning algorithm and the pre-determined user defined cut points method.



Results from regression with difference in World Bank rule of law scores

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Significant results are colored yellow

Table 7: PCJ Amnesty

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.20E-02 (1.285e-02)	-6.067E-03 (3.512e-05)	-1.09E-02 (1.183e-02)	-9.04E-03 (1.199e-02)	-8.46E-03 (1.222e-02)	-6.96E-03 (1.233e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	2.35E-05 (2.342e-05)	1.500E-05 (2.281e-05)	3.05E-05 (2.083e-05)	1.25E-05 (2.081e-05)	1.64E-05 (2.161e-05)	2.01E-05 (2.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.89E-05 (4.054e-05)	-2.365E-05 (3.512e-05)	-4.38E-05 (3.375e-05)	-2.36E-05 (3.258e-05)	-2.15E-05 (3.657e-05)	-2.12E-05 (3.480e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-8.68E-04 (9.652e-04)	-3.827E-04 (8.216e-04)	-6.64E-04 (8.163e-04)	-6.21E-04 (8.489e-04)	-3.01E-04 (8.580e-04)	-2.97E-04 (8.405e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.15E-04 (3.054e-04)	6.793E-05 (2.939e-04)	1.85E-04 (2.548e-04)	4.77E-05 (2.641e-04)	9.52E-05 (2.655e-04)	5.60E-05 (2.851e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	8.47E-02 (7.155e-02)	3.509E-02 (5.287e-02)	6.31E-02 (5.356e-02)	6.45E-02 (5.838e-02)	3.00E-02 (5.931e-02)	3.96E-02 (5.301e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	-0.123. (6.846e-02)	-7.915E-02 (1.196e-01)	-9.863E-02. (5.610e-02)	-8.46E-02 (5.674e-02)	-6.09E-02 (5.180e-02)	-5.26E-02 (5.347e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.271E-02 (7.106e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.07E-01 (7.860e-02)	NA	1.07E-01 (7.190e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-9.74E-02 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	-1.02E-01 (1.028e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	9.91E-03 (8.802e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.66E-02 (8.220e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-3.28E-03 (1.745e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-7.87E-02 (1.651e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	3.029e-02 (1.285e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 8: SSRI

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-8.56E-03 (2.487e-02)	-6.721e-03 (1.961e-02)	-1.46E-02 (2.092e-02)	-1.29E-02 (2.142e-02)	-1.61E-02 (2.237e-02)	-2.00E-02 (2.036e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	4.36E-05 (3.524e-05)	3.181e-05 (3.726e-05)	4.85E-05 (3.118e-05)	3.69E-05 (3.297e-05)	4.52E-05 (3.103e-05)	4.92E-05 (3.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-2.98E-05 (5.027e-05)	-2.257e-05 (4.481e-05)	-4.56E-05 (4.240e-05)	-3.34E-05 (4.192e-05)	-4.08E-05 (4.526e-05)	-2.30E-05 (4.286e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-7.03E-04 (1.562e-03)	8.711e-06 (1.091e-03)	-3.08E-04 (1.199e-03)	-4.61E-04 (1.299e-03)	4.08E-06 (1.119e-03)	2.22E-04 (1.053e-03)
War duration in months (wardur)	-7.60E-05 (3.680e-04)	1.598e-05 (3.503e-04)	1.74E-04 (2.880e-04)	7.90E-05 (3.016e-04)	1.51E-04 (2.926e-04)	-1.81E-05 (3.166e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	6.34E-02 (9.434e-02)	1.807e-02 (8.352e-02)	3.50E-02 (8.577e-02)	6.08E-02 (8.824e-02)	4.33E-02 (8.567e-02)	5.09E-02 (8.299e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	3.87E-02 (1.433e-01)	-1.77E-02 (1.821e-01)	6.637e-02 (9.376e-02)	-5.48E-02 (9.366e-02)	-3.79E-02 (1.259e-01)	-2.56E-02 (9.259e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.111e-02 (9.750e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.99E-02 (9.441e-02)	NA	5.29E-02 (8.649e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-1.18E-01 (1.652e-01)	NA	NA	-1.00E-01 (1.527e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	-1.10E-01 (1.597e-01)	NA	NA	NA	-1.23E-02 (1.365e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-2.42E-01 (2.239e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-2.00E-01 (1.838e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	-9.723e-02 (1.999e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 9: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
logcost (log of deaths during conflict)	-3.07E-03 (1.241e-02)	-2.81E-03 (1.165e-02)	-4.07E-03 (1.161e-02)	-3.75E-03 (1.171e-02)	-4.21E-03 (1.175e-02)	-3.02E-03 (1.166e-02)
rgdpcaps (rGDP per capita)	2.20E-05 (2.451e-05)	9.68E-06 (2.248e-05)	2.33E-05 (2.123e-05)	1.62E-05 (2.115e-05)	1.66E-05 (2.177e-05)	2.03E-05 (2.023e-05)
Develop (electricity consumption per capita)	-1.65E-05 (4.040e-05)	-1.55E-05 (3.315e-05)	-2.71E-05 (3.366e-05)	-1.93E-05 (3.321e-05)	-1.74E-05 (3.667e-05)	-1.37E-05 (3.393e-05)
elf (ethnic fractionalization)	-4.60E-04 (9.825e-04)	-4.79E-04 (8.231e-04)	-5.66E-04 (8.465e-04)	-5.09E-04 (8.652e-04)	-3.72E-04 (8.621e-04)	-2.91E-04 (8.399e-04)
wardur (war duration in months)	2.65E-05 (3.157e-04)	-8.27E-07 (2.864e-04)	1.32E-04 (2.631e-04)	8.02E-05 (2.693e-04)	9.08E-05 (2.674e-04)	1.72E-05 (2.821e-04)
treaty (Was there a peace treaty?)	2.78E-02 (6.719e-02)	3.63E-02 (5.436e-02)	2.21E-02 (5.014e-02)	2.29E-02 (5.249e-02)	1.11E-02 (5.750e-02)	2.28E-02 (5.014e-02)
un2int (UN presence)	NA	-5.34E-02 (6.317e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
untype 2 (UN observer missions)	3.93E-02 (7.213e-02)	NA	4.80E-02 (6.603e-02)	NA	NA	NA
untype 3 (traditional UN PKO missions)	-2.43E-02 (1.078e-01)	NA	NA	-3.32E-02 (9.405e-02)	NA	NA
untype 4 (multidimensional PKOs)	7.18E-03 (9.217e-02)	NA	NA	NA	1.84E-02 (8.250e-02)	NA
untype 5 (peace enforcement UN missions)	-1.14E-01 (1.709e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.22E-01 (1.589e-01)

Results from regression with difference in CIM VALUES

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Standard errors are in parentheses Significant results are colored yellow

Table 10: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-2.451e-02. (1.246e-02)	-2.325e-02. (1.214e-02)	-1.838e-02 (1.161e-02)	-1.994e-02. (1.135e-02)	-1.806e-02 (1.133e-02)	-1.712e-02 (1.121e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.172e-05 (2.006e-05)	-7.066e-06 (1.964e-05)	-1.161e-05 (1.896e-05)	-9.624e-06 (1.866e-05)	-1.504e-05 (1.902e-05)	-1.304e-05 (1.867e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	2.508e-05 (4.494e-05)	1.004e-06 (3.559e-05)	4.679e-06 (3.451e-05)	1.670e-06 (3.419e-05)	1.824e-05 (4.268e-05)	6.812e-06 (3.658e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	2.193e-03* (1.012e-03)	1.529e-03. (8.831e-04)	1.609e-03. (8.839e-04)	1.746e-03. (8.825e-04)	1.733e-03. (9.372e-04)	1.588e-03. (9.059e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.168e-04 (2.999e-04)	2.389e-04 (2.713e-04)	1.051e-04 (2.507e-04)	1.757e-04 (2.574e-04)	2.596e-05 (2.772e-04)	7.928e-05 (2.654e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.421e-02 (6.752e-02)	6.682e-02 (6.313e-02)	7.826e-02 (5.971e-02)	6.280e-02 (5.765e-02)	6.615e-02 (5.888e-02)	7.279e-02 (5.827e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	3.773e-02 (6.172e-02)	5.721e-02 (7.494e-02)	1.083e-02 (5.636e-02)	1.963e-02 (5.227e-02)	8.247e-04 (4.951e-02)	3.217e-04 (4.980e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-1.122e-01 (1.189e-01)	-4.795e-02 (1.558e-01)	-3.550e-03 (7.309e-02)	-9.539e-03 (7.006e-02)	-3.016e-02 (9.951e-02)	6.264e-03 (6.997e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	1.049e-01 (7.141e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-1.788e-02 (8.280e-02)	NA	-3.092e-02 (7.621e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.610e-01 (1.135e-01)	NA	NA	1.031e-01 (9.672e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	1.595e-01 (1.631e-01)	NA	NA	NA	6.598e-02 (1.315e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.228e-02 (1.858e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.706e-02 (1.667e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.345e-01 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.408e-02 (1.771e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 11: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.860e-02* (8.753e-03)	-2.011e-02* (8.584e-03)	-1.590e-02. (8.294e-03)	-1.810e-02* 8.410e-03	-1.597e-02. (8.292e-03)	-1.587e-02. (8.333e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-9.044e-06 (1.529e-05)	-5.784e-06 (1.376e-05)	-7.860e-06 (1.392e-05)	-6.461e-06 (1.378e-05)	-9.742e-06 (1.491e-05)	-7.791e-06 (1.393e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.176e-06 (3.228e-05)	-8.838e-06 (2.812e-05)	-3.944e-06 (2.785e-05)	-6.995e-06 (2.759e-05)	7.786e-07 (3.023e-05)	-4.013e-06 (2.918e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	1.460e-03* (7.105e-04)	1.302e-03. (6.580e-04)	1.299e-03. (6.695e-04)	1.457e-03* (6.717e-04)	1.328e-03. (6.699e-04)	1.301e-03. (6.862e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.879e-04 (2.495e-04)	2.442e-04 (2.234e-04)	1.328e-04 (2.144e-04)	2.010e-04 (2.198e-04)	1.026e-04 (2.235e-04)	1.310e-04 (2.257e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.333e-02 (4.889e-02)	5.899e-02 (4.608e-02)	6.057e-02 (4.334e-02)	5.136e-02 (4.315e-02)	5.410e-02 (4.562e-02)	5.937e-02 (4.330e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	1.706e-02 (4.557e-02)	4.434e-02 (5.443e-02)	1.072e-02 (4.115e-02)	1.875e-02 (3.802e-02)	4.184e-03 (3.728e-02)	5.856e-03 (3.732e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	9.143e-02 (5.736e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-3.367e-03 (6.067e-02)	NA	-1.393e-02 (5.512e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.017e-01 (8.629e-02)	NA	NA	9.602e-02 (8.272e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.763e-02 (8.584e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.842e-02 (7.801e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	2.642e-02 (1.478e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	7.336e-03 (1.424e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.156e-01 (8.376e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 12: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-7.612e-03 (7.135e-03)	-7.114e-03 (6.880e-03)	-5.938e-03 (6.916e-03)	-6.998e-03 (6.961e-03)	-6.355e-03 (6.875e-03)	-5.922e-03 (6.882e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-2.023e-05 (1.400e-05)	-1.870e-05 (1.392e-05)	-1.721e-05 (1.327e-05)	-1.673e-05 (1.320e-05)	-2.004e-05 (1.373e-05)	-1.726e-05 (1.327e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.486e-05 (2.871e-05)	1.366e-05 (2.450e-05)	1.546e-05 (2.459e-05)	1.015e-05 (2.520e-05)	2.359e-05 (2.674e-05)	1.443e-05 (2.564e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	6.884e-04 (5.557e-04)	5.172e-04 (5.154e-04)	6.313e-04 (5.348e-04)	6.893e-04 (5.158e-04)	6.871e-04 (5.173e-04)	6.141e-04 (5.224e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.114e-05 (1.961e-04)	3.864e-05 (1.706e-04)	-4.375e-06 (1.672e-04)	4.224e-05 (1.746e-04)	-4.061e-05 (1.730e-04)	3.885e-06 (1.769e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	1.150e-02 (4.280e-02)	7.976e-03 (4.023e-02)	2.484e-02 (4.065e-02)	2.193e-02 (3.815e-02)	2.128e-02 (3.831e-02)	2.379e-02 (3.856e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-2.823e-02 (5.553e-02)	-2.501e-02 (6.486e-02)	-3.682e-03 (4.713e-02)	-2.979e-03 (4.520e-02)	-2.380e-02 (5.275e-02)	-4.203e-03 (4.591e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.650e-02 (3.469e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.067e-02 (4.444e-02)	NA	-1.205e-03 (4.281e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	5.576e-02 (5.710e-02)	NA	NA	4.577e-02 (5.402e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	6.889e-02 (7.797e-02)	NA	NA	NA	5.627e-02 (7.456e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.872e-02 (1.398e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.774e-02 (1.315e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.286e-02 (8.270e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 13: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-6.272e-03 (5.461e-03)	-6.333e-03 (5.278e-03)	-5.675e-03 (5.298e-03)	-6.063e-03 (5.338e-03)	-5.599e-03 (5.284e-03)	-5.731e-03 (5.303e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.527e-05 (1.106e-05)	-1.286e-05 (1.016e-05)	-1.312e-05 (1.032e-05)	-1.287e-05 (1.024e-05)	-1.516e-05 (1.082e-05)	-1.328e-05 (1.028e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.048e-05 (2.109e-05)	9.620e-06 (1.860e-05)	9.613e-06 (1.877e-05)	7.706e-06 (1.909e-05)	1.368e-05 (2.001e-05)	8.861e-06 (1.926e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	5.225e-04 (4.339e-04)	4.672e-04 (4.127e-04)	5.109e-04 (4.180e-04)	5.278e-04 (4.150e-04)	5.366e-04 (4.160e-04)	4.975e-04 (4.221e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.380e-05 (1.630e-04)	5.271e-05 (1.447e-04)	2.146e-05 (1.436e-04)	4.371e-05 (1.496e-04)	2.338e-06 (1.469e-04)	2.874e-05 (1.496e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	5.075e-03 (3.144e-02)	4.692e-03 (2.881e-02)	1.821e-02 (2.701e-02)	1.620e-02 (2.682e-02)	1.216e-02 (2.855e-02)	1.744e-02 (2.698e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.003e-02 (2.583e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	9.343e-03 (3.573e-02)	NA	2.655e-04 (3.374e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	3.008e-02 (4.651e-02)	NA	NA	2.271e-02 (4.405e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.667e-02 (5.397e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.953e-02 (5.140e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	3.880e-02 (1.191e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.983e-02 (1.148e-01)

Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law dataset

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
develop	691.2512	1076.5450407	14.000000	5387.00000	65
difference.wbgi.rle	0.02015772	0.1538614	-0.454220	0.4546193	43
elf	51.20690	29.9764578	0	93.00000	58
logcost	12.46568	2.2113066	6.907755	15.6718100	65
pcj.amnesty	0.3846154	0.4902903	0	1	65
rgdpcaps	1624.0	1408.5310353	130.000000	5827.00000	63
SSRI	0.1666667	0.3761774	0	1	54
treaty	0.4153846	0.4966232	0	1	65
un2int	0.5230769	0.5033541	0	1	65
untype2	0.1846154	0.3910046	0	1	65
untype3	0.07692308	0.2685431	0	1	65
untype4	0.1076923	0.3124038	0	1	65
untype5	0.03076923	0.1740358	0	1	65
wardur	107.8154	108.4184446	1	600.00000	65

Summary Statistics for CIM values dataset

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
CIM.difference.11.10	-0.01169318	0.09989931	-0.8950195	.09367647	94
develop	549.41978529	863.4991	10	5387.000	119
elf	47.79464286	30.45633	0	93.0000	112
logcost	12.04126899	2.357759	6.9077550	15.67181	118
pcj.amnesty	0.37179487	0.4864121	0	1	119
rgdpcaps	1424.68141593	1321.930	65	5832.000	78
SSRI	0.11764706	0.3237808	0	1	113
treaty	0.29411765	0.4575717	0	1	102
un2int	0.36974790	0.4847775	0	1	119
untype2	0.14285714	0.3514067	0	1	119
untype3	0.06722689	0.2514734	0	1	119
untype4	0.05882353	0.2362890	0	1	119
untype5	0.02521008	0.1574255	0	1	119
wardur	81.00840336	94.08322	1	600.0000	119

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