Rethinking Organizational Leader Identity Development:
A Social Network and Ethnographic Approach

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ABSTRACT

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I propose a nuanced theoretical approach to understanding leader identity development in organizations. Past identity work has ignored or tangentially addressed phases of development that I term ‘leader identity stagnation’ and ‘leader identity destruction’. Analysis of survey and network data examining West Point cadets’ identities and friendship, leadership, and trust networks adds insight into the leader identity development process. Ethnographic research of the institution offers further understanding and helps confirm the new theoretical model of the phases of leader identity development. A concluding chapter examines the application of new social networking technologies and mixed-media interaction to enhance organizational leader identity construction. A gap exists in management literature pertaining to the creation and use of social network technologies for this purpose.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND RESEARCH CONTEXT

> "In the past I've felt challenged in a good way by academic courses and having a leadership role in the company, but now it seems like I'm always complaining to anyone who will listen about how much we hate it here." -Cadet John Pritcher[1]

The above quote captures some of the topics addressed in this dissertation. First, I argue that leader identity development is not a continuous upward progression. At a point in time, Pritcher held a formal leadership role within the organization, and was pressed developmentally by the additional academic and physical challenges of life at West Point. But then his identification with the organization and his role as a leader changed. His developmental progression as a leader stagnated. He became pessimistic about his leadership development and college experience, and he is cynical toward all those whom he perceives to impose their will upon him.

Second, I examine network impacts on leader identity development. While not wishing to read too much into semantics, Pritcher interestingly comments in the quote above that he complains to, "anyone who will listen about how much we hate it here." The use of the word "we" indicates the influence of a peer network.

This dissertation begins by addressing the topic of leader identity development in organizations, and then proposes a nuanced developmental model in Chapter 2. DeRue and Ashford (2010: 641) advise that empirical tests of a leader identity development model should, "capture the individual, relational, and organizational factors that influence the leadership

[1] Pseudonyms are used throughout this dissertation to maintain anonymity.

identity construction process." This study attempts to do exactly that, but with a greater theoretical understanding of the leader identity development process. In Chapter 3 I examine the primary data source, a study of West Point cadet leadership, trust, and friendship networks and their impact on leader identity. I also take an ethnographic approach to uncovering vital organizational influences on identity construction. Chapter 4 addresses the use of web and mobile networking technologies for identity development, and theorizes propositions from management and sociology perspectives.

Fundamental to this research is a belief that organizational members are embedded in a social system that impacts identity development. I examine the impact of social ties (friendship, leadership, and trust) on leader identity development through a multiple methods approach (Jick, 1979). Practically, this dissertation contributes to the empirical and ethnographic works on organizational identity development.

Why is this research important? Military leaders are delegating combat power and decision making authority to increasingly lower levels. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, writes, "Small unit leadership will be at a premium in this potential environment of dispersed, decentralized operations… The complexity of this environment requires a deliberate investment in our leaders. The need to adapt to rapidly changing situations and identify underlying causes of conflict calls for mental agility and strategic vision," (Odierno, 2013: 5). The focus of my research is on a subset of these future leaders: cadets at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, who will be commissioned as second lieutenant Army officers upon graduation.

Though only 18-24 years of age and struggling with many of the same social and societal issues of their civilian college counterparts, these men and women will bear this burden of

leadership in surprisingly short order. Less than a year after graduation from West Point, second lieutenants are placed in charge of organizational units of up to 40 soldiers. Within six years of graduation, most who remain in the military are commanders of approximately 100 soldiers. The identity that these organizational members form while at the academy can have tremendous influence over the efficiency and effectiveness of the units they command.

A second reason this research is important is that it translates to organizations outside of the U.S. military and West Point, as leader identity development and its relationship to networks have broad application. Third, a network approach to understanding leader identity development is an under-researched area of study. And finally, communities of practice are growing in use. I define a community of practice as a group of people with common interest who connect informally and responsibly to promote learning, solve problems, or develop new ideas. Addressing their impact on identity development is worthy of study.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

The Progression of Modern Organizational Leadership Studies

Modern organizational leadership research has progressed significantly since Thomas Carlyle's (1841) "Great Men" studies. Early leadership research followed this model in focusing on a leader's individual characteristics. Rapid industrialism and the rise of a professional manger class in the late 1800s created the market for leadership theory that moved beyond heroic idealism, propagating rational managerial coordination. With a focus on leadership stemming from the proper administration of large bureaucracies, many studies drew upon the railroad industry, the military, and civil service organizations. In translating these studies for the private sector, a focus on rigorous process and accountability led to the scientific management school of thought, as exemplified by Frederick Taylor (1911), and often referred to as Taylorism. Under scientific management, the leader is an engineer of the organization, and directs the further division of labor and rationalization of the workplace (Barley & Kunda, 1992).

From around the time of the great depression until the mid 1940s, the rational leadership perspective would yield to the normative findings of Elton Mayo (1945) and others in the human relations school. If viewed as members of a group with individual needs, workers form identities with the organization, and are better able to work toward achieving organizational goals. While not denying many of the efficiencies advocated by scientific management, human relations does stress the necessity of leader involvement in fostering upward communication and the social needs of group members (and led to many current practices in human resources management). Concurrent with the research of the human relations school was a returned focus on charismatics and traits of the individual leader, arguably attributed to the sociocultural influences of the time

(Grint, 2011). The cultural focus on powerful political figures and the rise of mass movements influenced leadership and organizational studies; rational inquiries ceded to examinations of the leader as a central character.

A rigorous examination of leadership theory followed World War II and the related economic prosperity of the West. Analysis of America's newfound industrial prominence, combined with a cultural focus on the individual, yielded the self-actualization movement, namely Maslow's (1954, 1962) characteristics of the self-actualizer and hierarchy of needs. This transition can also be seen in McGregor's (1960) development of Theory X (heavy-handed leadership exercised through hierarchical control is the best means of motivating an inherently lazy workforce) and Theory Y (employees are motivated through the satisfaction of completed work, and will best develop when managers set conditions through communication and positive relationships). Together with the human relations school, these agendas contributed much to modern human resources practices, but fell out of favor in the 1960s.

Institutionalization of the human relations program led to criticism that organizations were damaging the independence of employees and even democratic traditions. Furthermore, negative assessment of the school's economic advantages mounted. Janis' (1972) work on groupthink is representative of both critiques, arguing that allegiance to the organization hampered creativity and individualism, thus limiting adaptability of the firm. This turn of opinion paralleled the growth of technology in the workplace and a call for added rigor in business schools. Management and leadership theory saw a return to rationalism, most notably with contingency theory. Rather than a strict set of structural characteristics being preferred above others, contingency theory held that organizations must balance differentiation and integration to best fit their environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Fiedler's (1967)

contingency theory carried this into leadership research and helped discredit trait theories, asserting that good leadership entailed rationally analyzing the environment and executing the proper response.

This more systems-oriented approach to leadership faded in favor of a return to normative, trait-focused proposals such as emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Goleman, 1998) in the 1990s. Though still popular in business press and some leadership research, little evidence has empirically secured the soundness of these ideas.

Leader Identity

Leadership studies continue to evolve, and some researchers have attacked the field for this very reason (Meindel, et al., 1985; Pfeffer, 1977). The lack of a distinct definition of the term leadership (and furthermore 'leader development'), discredits for some the nature of leadership science. Others view this as a strength of the field; Day and Harrison (2007: 360) conclude that, "The complexity and multidimensionality of the very nature of leadership mitigate the possibility of a simple or unitary definition." Leadership has more recently become viewed as a process of reciprocated influence: a social construction that relies on relationships between leaders and followers and not requiring a formal hierarchical position (Collinson, 2005; Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007). Table 1.1 identifies some of the progression in leadership studies.

DeRue and Ashford (2010) theorize that leader identity is comprised of three components, those being individual internalization, relational recognition, and collective endorsement. While this work has added significantly by providing a model of leader identity

construction through a process of claiming leadership and granting followership (see Figure 1.1), it fails to address the social network impact on member identity.

This dissertation proposes a further advancement to leader development that focuses on self-identification as a leader, and the importance of not just leader-follower relationships, but networks within the organization.

Table 1.1: Summary of Evolvement of Thinking Around Leadership, From Day and Harrison (2007)

Summary of evolvement of thinking around leadership

Level of complexity and inclusiveness	Definition of leadership	Illustrative theories of leadership	Levels-of-analysis addressed	Leadership development focus	Parallel level of self-concept and identity knowledge principle
Most basic, least complex and inclusive conceptualization of leadership	• Leadership is role-based authority	• Trait theory • Leader behaviors	• Individual level • Top-down influence of leader on followers	• Individual skills development	• Individual self-concept • Personal dominance
Mid-level conceptualization of leadership	• Leadership is an influence process between individuals • Roles are also important in shaping influence processes	• Leader–member exchange (LMX)	• Reciprocal dyadic influence • Top-down influence of leader on follower as well as bottom-up effect of follower on leader	Includes both: • Individual skill development • Relationship building	Acknowledges both: • Individual self-concept • Relational self-concept Able to draw from: • Personal dominance • Interpersonal influence
Most advanced, complex, and inclusive conceptualization of leadership	• Leadership is a shared property of a social system including interdependencies among individuals, teams, and organizations. • Can also involve roles and influence processes depending upon situation	• Shared leadership • Collective leadership • Connective leadership	Multi-level approach (includes individual, team, and organizational level). • Includes both contextual influences of organizational influences on team and leadership emergence within a team • Also acknowledges dyadic and individual levels	Includes all: • Individual skill development • Relationship building • Empowerment • Collaboration • Working across boundaries	Acknowledges all: • Individual self-concept • Relational self-concept • Collective self-concept Able to draw from: • Personal dominance • Interpersonal Influence • Relational Dialogue

Table 1.1 summarizes the progression of leadership science, to include the increasing level of complexity, changing definition of leadership itself, and level of self-concept. This dissertation addresses the individual and collective self-concept, with the further advancement of incorporating a network approach to leader identity development.

Figure 1.1: The Leadership Identity Construction Process, from DeRue and Ashford (2010)



Academic work in the field of self and self-identity largely began with the early works of William James (1890) and continues to flourish as one of the most heavily investigated aspects of social psychology (Baumeister, 1999). Experiencing a similar evolution as leadership studies, self-identity has migrated away from an exclusive focus on the individual to a more social consideration of the relational self and the collective self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).

Drawing on social psychology, I define identity as the union of an individual's values, experiences, and self-construal (Baltes & Carstensen, 1991). Identity development transpires through identification with persons of influence as well as groups (Weinreich & Saunderson, 2003). A plethora of authors have worded and reworded identity, even causing Taylor (1989: 29) to remark, "But in fact our identity is deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible

articulations of it." After surveying the literature I find the Baltes and Carstensen (1991) definition most relevant to leader identity development in the context of organizations.

In developing a theory of the leader identity construction process, DeRue and Ashford (2010) argue that a leader identity is both an internal cognition and a socially constructed cognition that builds on the interplay between leader and follower. Those who grant leadership status to others develop a follower identity. Leadership is therefore a social process which changes over time.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) define social identity as the aspects of an individual's self-image that are derived from that individual's perceived social groups. People may classify themselves or others into social categories, such as gender, race, age, and religious affiliation (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). The classification into these categories serves several functions. First, it gives individuals a clear way to define others, based on their classification. Second, classification gives the individual a sense of self in the social environment. While possessing the means to define others within a social space can help individuals deduce patterns of interaction, the associated stereotypes are not necessarily reliable, as discussed in depth in other studies (see Hamilton, 1981).

Social identification is the "perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human aggregate," (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21). Social identification literature suggests principles that are relevant to leader identity. First, to identify with a social group, an individual needs only to see herself as sharing the fate of the group (Foote, 1951). Second, socially identifying with a group means that the individual is personally affected by the successes and failures of that group (Foote, 1951; Tolman, 1943). Both of these principles indicate that if an individual identifies

with a group, that individual will have a vested interest in the functions and actions of the group. Third, social identification is clearly distinguished from internalization (Kelman, 1961).

Internalization is when an individual accepts influence because it aligns with his values, whereas identification is an individual adopting behavior that may be derived from another person or group because such behavior acts to fulfill a sense of self identity (Kelman, 1961). An individual self-identifying as a leader in an organization might positively identify with the social category "leader" within the organization.

Finally, an individual can identify with a group or with an individual, however, Ashforth and Mael (1989) find that these types of identification are complementary, meaning that although the entity that the individual is identifying with is different, the process is similar. This identification with an individual person, or the classical identification of Kelman (1961), may be the most applicable to this dissertation, as individuals emulate another person in order to appease them or gain their qualities (Ashforth & Mael, 1961).

In building a theory of leadership process focused on follower self-identity, Lord and Brown (2004: 17) define the working self-concept (WSC) as, "the highly activated, contextually sensitive portion of the self-concept that guides action and information processing on a moment-to-moment basis." Markus and Wurf (1987) first proposed the term "working self-concept," and argued that a person's self-concept was a collection of selves with particular activation dependent upon the environmental context. The WSC is the particular self-concept that predominates at a specific time. A specific self-concept is chosen, which facilitates the cueing of appropriate reactions and behaviors, thus simplifying the mental processes necessary to navigate a given situation. Self-identities operate at one of three levels: individual, interpersonal, or collective. The WSC has three components: self-views, current goals, and possible selves (Lord,

et al., 1999), as depicted in Figure 1.2. Lord and Brown (2004) expand these concepts to encompass leadership and leader identity.

Figure 1.2: Model of the Working Self-Concept, from Lord and Brown (2004)



Lord and Brown (2004) define self-views as an individual's perceived possession of prominent attributes, which can change dependent upon the particular context. Current goals are focused and short-term in nature. Possible selves hold a longer time frame and are focused on the future. Current goals and possible selves serve as comparative standards to self-views.

The three internal components of the working self concept can engage proximal motivation (meaning closer to the current situation) or more future-focused distal motivation. Organizational members differ in their time perspective, but leaders can often help subordinates form an integrated self identity by bridging their self-views and possible selves with current

goals (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1986). A simple strategy for this is demonstrating the connection between pertinent current issues or potential behaviors and a more distant desired future state.

Leaders, as defined by Hogg (2001), are individuals who have disproportionate influence (through power, prestige, or both), that allows them to guide the actions, goals, and outcomes of a group. Based on this definition, it follows that leadership is a group process, as a leader requires followers to influence. This definition highlights the connection between individuals undergoing a self-identification process (Kelman, 1961) and the presence of a prototypical leader. A prototypical group member is likely to be a leader of the group as members conform to and are influenced by that individual who resembles the prototype of the in-group (Hogg, 2001); however, Hogg goes on to say that leadership is not only being "passively prototypical," but also exhibiting a high degree of social attraction.

For leadership positions, group members are more attracted to a prototypical member than a non-prototypical member (Hogg, 1992). The prototypical leader, therefore, has influence over the followers in their group, granted that both the leaders and followers support each others' self image. DeRue and Ashford (2010) present a theory that is based on informal and formal leaders and followers claiming and granting the roles of leader and follower to one another. An important aspect of this theory is that social identification is an individual assuming a specific image and others in the group mirroring or reinforcing that image (Hatch & Schultz, 2002).

This "collective endorsement" leads to being seen in the social environment as a leader or a follower (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), which DeRue and Ashford (2010) use to support their theory that the more a leader or follower is collectively endorsed, the more those images will be reinforced and the stronger those images will become. Collective endorsement within an organization amplifies the effect of the claiming and granting process. Patterns of claiming and

granting can form "deviation-amplifying" loops (Masuch, 1985) in which a change in one variable alters a second variable.

A positive spiral occurs when the claiming and granting of leader and follower identities mutually support one another (DeRue, et al., 2009). Claiming and granting of leader and follower identities can be used to explain how a prototypical group member is found socially attractive by the group, claims a leader image, and is granted that image by the followers of the in-group. This process perpetuates and strengthens both leader and follower images. Leadership is seen as an identity construction tied to the claiming and granting process. The self image of being a leader is therefore a social construction that is based on the interaction of leaders and followers (Helgø & Karp, 2008).

As newcomers in an organization are concerned with their roles and apprehensive about their status, they undergo an organizational socialization process that builds a situational self definition (Katz, 1980). This self definition is largely based on the self identity, as studies have shown that the sense of who one is complements the sense of where one belongs and what is expected (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Applying the claiming and granting process of leader identification to organizational socialization of newcomers, the newcomer gains a sense of self definition through interactions with the in-group that resolves ambiguity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). I discuss this further in Chapters 2 and 3.

Van Maanen (1979) argues that the interpretation of these interactions with the in-group determines the conceptions of the self. This implies that socialization indirectly affects internalization through identification, that an individual can identify with or be loyal to an organization despite particular interpersonal relationships within that organization, and that

symbolic leadership helps to foster organizational loyalty and salient membership (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).

Balkundi and Kilduff (2006) propose that interpersonal relationships, or connections between actors, can identify leaders. They posit that an individual patterns her social ties with other individuals with congruent expectations, which complements Hogg's (2001) theory of prototypical leaders. A prototypical leader would be connected to the actors within the network or organization as the actors would want to associate with the prototype of the in-group. This ego network is not the sole determinate of a leader's effectiveness, as the organizational network that controls the flow of social capital and the interorganizational network that is formed by interpersonal ties are also important (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006). Network theory suggests that individuals who are able to move toward the center of these networks and bridge to other networks in their environment are likely to gain control of resources and power (Burt, 2005). I discuss Burt's (1987, 1992, 2005) work further in the Network Analysis section of Chapter 4. It is not always possible for a leader to increase her connectedness in multiple networks, as building social capital in one may endanger social capital in another (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006).

It is conceivable that the organizational leader may not be in the center of every network within his organization (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006), yet research suggests that individuals who are prototypical or conform to the ideals and values of the in-group are likely to become leaders and build social capital within their networks (Hogg, 2001). As individuals build a social identity, they tailor their image to the group they perceive themselves belonging to (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The leaders of these networks build social capital as they make claim to and are granted the leader image, strengthening their self image as a leader (Ashford & DeRue, 2010).

This leads to a further discussion of network research and its impact on the field of leader identity.

Network Research and Organizational Leader Identity

Reicher, et al. (2005) argue that modern leadership studies are attempting to recapture elements of Weber's (1947) charismatic leadership. The shift away from 'Great Man' theories discussed earlier in this review moved too far toward scripted contingency theories of leadership, leaving something missing. Researchers have broadened the focus to encompass two noteworthy features. First, leaders are able to modify collective norms and goals (Shamir, et al., 1993). Second, rather than focusing exclusively on the leader, research examines followers, as well as the leader-follower relationship (Hollander, 1995). This latter approach in particular has led to even more recent accounts of broader relationships, and a social network approach to leader scholarship (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006).

The network form of organizational structures is part of the open system approach to organizational theory, one that treats the firm boundary as being permeable, and therefore open to environmental influences. Open system researchers are generally concerned more with process than structure. Organizations are impacted by the cognitive and cultural dimensions of their social environment, from which they garner, but also contribute to, knowledge and resources. Following World War II, sociological interest in the open system emerged as a means to counter the economic-based open system theories (agency theory and transaction cost economics) and to take into account the growing academic interest in general system theory (Scott & Davis, 2007). Theories of note were institutional theory, structural contingency theory,

resource dependence theory, organizational ecology, and network theory, the latter of which will be the focus of this section.

Network theory encompasses a number of methods for analyzing structures and relationships. Many of these methods originate in the work of Harrison White and several of his students. Some of White's original research developed the basic concepts of network structures and created a base upon which later quantitative network analysis would build (White, 1965). Prior to White, the work of Georg Simmel is also cited as instrumental in the development of sociological network perspectives. Simmel wrote of affiliations creating web-like structures, and the ability of individuals to act as arbitrators, brokers, or instigators between two other people in a triad (Simmel, 1955 trans.). Some of Simmel's network essays date as early as 1908.

Granovetter's (1985) work on embeddedness contributes much to the advancement of social network theory. He proposes that behavior is embedded in a network of social relationships, and that observing action under such a premise avoids taking an under- or over-socialized view. This line of research focuses on economic action, although it can be applied elsewhere. Granovetter (1985: 506) writes, "Managers who evade audits and fight over transfer pricing are acting nonrationally in some strict economic sense, in terms of a firm's profit maximization; but when their position and ambitions in intrafirm networks and political coalitions are analyzed, the behavior is easily interpreted." These managers are concerned with factors beyond the optimization of firm profit; their behavior is dependent upon other dynamics, such as status, power, and social approval. Economic action is impacted by ties within the social network, and such ties have greater influence than abstract notions of self-interest. A wide range of behaviors can be affected by an organization's relationships with other firms, to include

performance, organizational structure, and strategies. The importance of this research in relation to leader identity research is that relationships between individuals matter.

Granovetter (1973) explores large social structures that are able to diffuse information quickly among a multitude of nodes. He faults earlier sociological theory for failing to connect "micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns in any convincing way" (Granovetter, 1973: 1360). The small-scale interactions of dyadic ties are explored, and the cohesive power of weak ties is described.

Recent work has been important to expanding network theory. Stark and Vedres (2006) propose a future for network structures, though they alter the conventional means of network analysis. They criticize conventional network analysis on three grounds. First, as other critics have agreed, they fault the theory's static nature. Second, they believe it often forces organizations to be grouped into separate communities unnecessarily. Third, they view entrepreneurism as existing not in structural voids, but in intercohesive positions. They introduce new analysis tools from contemporary physics to uncover temporal network traits, and note that sociology has a long tradition of emphasizing the strength of groups over time, but that recent network analysts have focused far more on network structure (Vedres & Stark, 2008). Of particular interest is the concept of trust. They make the effective criticism that many researchers focus on trust within their network computations, but duration of the networks are not considered. When trust is built upon repeated interactions, how can you avoid considering time? This dissertation gathers friendship, trust, and leadership (both formal and informal) networks and analyzes leader identity development from a social network perspective.

Burns (1963) offers a slightly different take on organizational design via an analysis of the flux of industrial design and his categorization of such into mechanistic systems, appropriate

during stable conditions, and organismic, appropriate in changing conditions. Referring to the rational bureaucracy of Weber (1968 [1921]) as the "social technology which made possible the second stage of industrialism," Burns (1963: 42) places mechanistic systems firmly in the outdated realm of early industrialization. Excited by his then-current research into the British electronics industry, he lauds the benefits of the highly adaptable organismic form, an approach with numerous parallels to some modern sociological research dedicated to heterarchy.

This concept is similar to the heterarchical (flat-structured) arbitrage trading room of Beunza and Stark (2004), whose analysis succinctly bridges the ideas of other performativity authors, while providing evidence of the effectiveness of multiple human-machine interactions in a heterarchical organizational structure. Galison (1999: 157) adds later, "It is the *dis*unification of science- the intercalation of *different* patterns of argument- that is responsible for its strength and coherence." His concept of the trading zone seems to support the findings within heterarchies as described by Stark (2009), which are able to take advantage of having diverse entities and a variety of network ties between organizational members. The distributed intelligence form taken by the heterarchy generates lateral accountability. The technology enables a mechanistic organization to draw from organismic structural benefits, such as "the contributive nature of special knowledge and experience," and, "knowledge may be located anywhere in the network," (Burns, 1963: 46-47). This dissertation comments on the use of such communities of practice for leader identity development, and their subsequent impact on organizations.

Theoretical Contribution

The theoretical contribution of this dissertation draws primarily on the Leader Identity portion of the Literature Review, as well as the work discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. The idea that an organizational member can lose her sense of leader identity is largely absent from the leader identity literature. My ethnographic research within an institution that exists largely for the development of young leaders confirms that the building of a member's leader identity can languish, and in some cases decline. I term these two possibilities 'leader identity stagnation' and 'leader identity destruction'. The intended organizational outcome of maturation and leader development (which is most common among members), I term 'leader identity construction'.

Explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, I propose that organizational members navigate through phases of identity development over time:

- **Leader Identity Construction**: the member serves in a leadership role (organizationally bestowed or informal) and the leadership claim is reciprocated with collective endorsement. Characterized by positive identification with the social category "leader" within the organization and a strong self-image as a current and future leader.

- **Leader Identity Stagnation**: the member fails to occupy a leadership role (or self-selects out of leadership roles) and puts leader development on hold. Characterized by cynicism, neutral identification with the social category "leader" within the organization, and an impartial attitude toward leadership and self-development.

- **Leader Identity Destruction**: the member makes no leadership claims, or makes leadership claims that are not reciprocated by other organizational members. Characterized by cynicism, negative identification with the social category "leader" within the organization, and a disparaging attitude toward leadership and self-development.

Viewed graphically, as in Figures 1.3-1.5 below, a member's leader identity development can take many paths.

Figure 1.3: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development, Example A



Figure 1.4: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development, Example B



Figure 1.5: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development, Example C



In the language of Spradley (1979, 1980), many researchers take it for granted that leader identity development is progressive. Further, most Americans would likely assume that tax dollars are being dedicated to continuous upward development of their future Army officers. It is surprising that this is not always the case, as in Examples A and B in the figures above. Some of the nation's brightest and most ambitious high school students matriculate to West Point to become great leaders, yet they stagnate.

Junior cadet John Pritcher fits the model of Example A above. He watched the second airplane strike the World Trade Center from a television in his 5th grade classroom near Chicago, Illinois. He wrestled in high school and volunteered for more than 100 hours of community service at a Boys and Girls Club: mostly because he enjoyed it, though he willingly admits that improving his college applications was a motivating factor. With an average grade point, he studied diligently for the SAT. A good score in his junior year helped earn him a spot at West Point's Summer Seminar, a seven-day immersive experience into life as a cadet. He remarked, "I remember vividly opening the seminar invitation, checking it out online, and deciding that night that I wanted to go. My dad knew a bit about the service academies, and I could tell he was proud I'd been invited. I know he also liked that it was free, but my parents have told me for years that they'd help pay for me to go to a good school. My mom was more hesitant the way a lot of parents are, having watched the news for so many years after 9-11."

He shares many of the attributes common among cadets. Drawn to the academy initially out of patriotism, practicality, and simple enthusiasm about the possibility of being an Army leader, it was his experiences with cadet leaders at the summer seminar that sealed his decision to attend West Point if admitted. Pritcher said, "The cadets leading us through the week were really impressive to me. Looking back, they didn't really sugar-coat the West Point experience,

but I think I had it in my mind early on that I wanted to try this, so I downplayed some of what they shared with us. There was one cadet squad leader who was pretty cynical, and I chose to ignore him. Now that I think about it, that's pretty funny, because I'm probably a lot like him now, three or four years later."

The initial shock and lifestyle change of cadet basic training was difficult for Pritcher, but he succeeded and maintained his optimism and positive attitude through his sophomore year. He invested time and energy in his own development and leadership abilities. He read professional books and sought leadership opportunities within his company and through external academic and military clubs. In the summer between his junior and senior year his motivation began to wane. A disgruntling experience with poor leadership planted the seeds of cynicism. He showed up to his new academic year company and was not given a leadership position. He withdrew from his outside activities and currently focuses on doing well in class. He commented, "I see the value in most of my courses, and I'm motivated to do well academically so doors open for me in the future. But no, I'm not interested in trying to lead now. Self-development isn't really a priority for me anymore… my friends feel the same way." This dissertation examines leader identity development in organizations, and the socially-influenced movement between phases of development.

Leader identity is both an internal cognition, per the Baltes and Carstensen (1991) definition of identity as the union of an individual's values, experiences, and self-construal, and a socially constructed cognition (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). My ethnographic research supports that the phases of leader identity development can be driven by either of these concepts, as well as the social network surrounding an individual.

RESEARCH CONTEXT

Character and leadership identity development create uncertainty for many organizations. Snook (2004: 17) argues that institutions struggle with four primary questions in this regard: "Should we develop the characters of our students, volunteers, or employees? Can we? What should we teach? And how should we teach it?" Carved into granite at the academy and memorized by every cadet, the mission of West Point is: To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the nation as an officer in the United States Army. West Point exists, in part, as an affirmative answer to the first two of Snook's questions.

The creators of West Point, namely George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox, and John Adams, sought to create an institution capable of providing a disciplined and competent officer corps that remained under civilian control. Cadets would be citizen-soldiers, hailing from across the nation and selected by elected political representatives. America had relied on the expertise of many foreign army officers during the Revolutionary War, particularly in the realms of artillery and engineering. West Point would accrue and disseminate the nation's expertise in these fields and supply the leadership necessary to command militia forces if needed, thus being an economical answer to many questions surrounding national defense (Ambrose, 1966).

West Point still serves much the same purpose, though the education and leader development process have changed significantly since the academy's founding in 1802. Entering cadets must still secure a nomination from a member of congress (with some exceptions) and acceptance from the academy's Department of Admissions. Graduates earn a

commission as a second lieutenant and a Bachelors of Science degree in any of 40 available academic majors. All cadets complete a broad liberal arts education.

Currently, the United States Corps of Cadets (USCC, or the Corps) consists of 4,494 young men and women from every U.S. state and territory. More detailed demographic data can be seen in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. West Point trains a maximum of 60 foreign exchange cadets (approximately 15 per year are admitted, with no more than three cadets from any one country allowed at a time) who complete the full four-year education period and return to the armies of their home countries. This exchange relationship exists with 39 foreign countries. The academy annually sends 35 to 45 cadets to foreign military academies for one semester of training, and an additional 65 to 75 cadets to overseas civilian universities or the other U.S. service academies (Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard). A similar number of Navy midshipmen, Air Force cadets, and Coast Guard Cadets spend a semester at West Point.

Table 1.2: Cadet Gender by Graduation Year

Grad Yr	# Cadets	# Males	# Females	% Females	% Males
2013	1080	936	144	13.33%	86.67%
2014	1107	911	196	17.71%	82.29%
2015	1152	959	193	16.75%	83.25%
2016	1155	972	183	15.84%	84.16%

Table 1.3: Cadet Race by Graduation Year[2]

Grad Yr	TOTAL	American Indian	Asian	Black	Caucasian	Hispanic	Other	Unknown
2013	1080	5	74	65	808	111	11	6
2014	1107	13	75	93	817	86	13	10
2015	1152	11	76	121	816	109	19	
2016	1155	11	84	102	825	100	28	5

[2] Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provided by USMA Institutional Research and Analysis Branch

The Corps is organized in a hierarchy for administrative and military training purposes. Figure 1.3 displays the structure of the Corps (also sometimes called a brigade), which consists of four regiments, each with nine companies. Highlighted companies are those I surveyed in the first round of the network and leader identity study described in Chapter 3.

Figure 1.3: Organization of the Corps of Cadets



Figure 1.4 below displays the organization of each cadet company. The highest ranking positions (commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and staff positions) are held by seniors.

Platoon sergeant, squad leader, and assistant staff positions are filled by juniors. Sophomores fill the role of team leaders, while freshman are 'members of squad'.

Figure 1.4: Organization of a Cadet Company



Each class has its own historical nickname and Army rank. Seniors are known as 'firsties', from being first-class cadets, and serve as cadet officers. Juniors are called 'cows', and act as cadet non-commissioned officers. Sophomores are 'yearlings', or 'yuks', and have the rank of cadet corporals. Freshmen are 'plebes', and cadet privates. Juniors and seniors are responsible for training the under two classes during summer military training, and operate in a

military hierarchy throughout the school year. A network diagram of a cadet company hierarchy reveals the split chain of authority and communication that also exists in the U.S. Army. Hierarchical levels at platoon and above have both an officer and a non-commissioned officer counterpart, resulting in this division.

Figure 1.5:. Network Visualization of a Cadet Company Hierarchy



CHAPTER 2: ADDING TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF LEADER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

> "Eat up! I need you sluggish out there today. There's no way we're winning." -Cadet Kevin Perkins

Perkins, the coach of his company intramural wrestling team, wants to lose. Though not a fervent desire to lose, in examining his attitude and that of others seated around me at lunch in the cadet mess hall (cafeteria), it is a pervasive feeling nonetheless. To this point in their athletic season they have competed effectively, and will likely earn a spot in the regimental playoffs. Winning means advancing toward the brigade championship and more afternoon competitions, while losing means an end to the season and a few additional afternoons of free time. The cadets smile and speak of losing with humor.

This attitude runs counter to the espoused values of the institution. During their first summer of military training, every cadet memorizes Douglas MacArthur's quote regarding the importance of athletics: "Upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other fields, on other days, will bear the fruits of victory." As a former Superintendent of West Point from 1919-1922, MacArthur had this quote inscribed above the entrance to the gymnasium, and today it surrounds his statue in the cadet living area (Langford, 1991). He emphasized the developmental strategy that is still practiced today, that of "every cadet an athlete," in which all cadets must participate on a Division I college athletic team, a club sport, or an intramural athletic team.

MacArthur, and subsequent academy leaders after him, sought to create officers possessing mental and physical talents to win on future battlefields. But here with Perkins and his team mates we see the attitude demonstrated by my opening quote in Chapter 1. These cadets see a disconnection between their leader development training (forced participation in intramural athletics) and their future roles as Army officers, or perhaps their overall leader identity is simply low. In the following section I will look more closely at leader development systems.

A System of Leader Development

Returning to Snook's (2004) discussion of organizational struggles with leadership and character identity development, I now address West Point's attempts to answer the latter two questions: What should we teach, and how should we teach it? In December of 2010, West Point's superintendent, Lieutenant General David Huntoon, ordered a review of the academy's leader development system. Huntoon felt that the then current system, known as the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS), merely explained the process by which the West Point 47-month experience created leaders of character. CLDS was developed and implemented by Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, superintendent from 1986-1991, and Colonel Howard Prince, head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, in order to "guide and integrate all developmental activities over the four-year cadet experience," (Betros, 2012:66).

Huntoon sought a system that could better help academy leadership make decisions about programs, curriculum, and any other developmental process that one would expect to take place in a university and military training program. The desired end state was a revised CLDS that included a larger portion of the West Point community a facilitated implementation of the cadet

development system. Huntoon hoped that the newly named West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS) could serve as a functional means of carrying out the West Point mission.

The creators of WPLDS aligned it with the Army's Leader Development Program (ALDP), which focuses on the integration of training, experience, and education through three domains: operational (an organizational position in a standard training and deploying Army unit), institutional (Army schools such as Command and General Staff College and the Army War College), and self-development.

Figure 2.1: The Army's Leader Development Model[3]



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[3] Department of the Army, 2012 Army Posture Statement. Retrieved June 5, 2013 from https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/addenda/addenda_m.aspx

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22 (formerly Field Manual 6-22), titled "Army Leadership," is a product of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL)[4]. The document describes the role of leaders and the three levels of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic), defines leader attributes (character, presence, and intellect), explains core competencies (leads, develops, and achieves), and differentiates the responsibilities of direct, organizational, and strategic leaders.

Figure 2.2: The Army's "Be, Know, Do" Leader Model



Introduced in 1983, the Army's *Be, Know, Do* system focused on the tactical level of leadership, and conveyed how individual organizational members could improve.[5] Through the 1990s, organizational leaders throughout the Army placed greater emphasis on the development

[4] Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (2012), *Army Leadership*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

[5] Field Manual 22-100 (1983), *Military Leadership*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

of training and doctrine in the operational and strategic levels of command (Purvis, 2011). Answering a call for greater scrutiny in strategic leader development following the attacks of September 11, 2001, researchers at the Army War College reviewed contemporary leadership literature and reformulated core competencies of strategic leaders. Their six metacompetencies were: identity, mentality agility, cross-cultural savviness, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness for the future Army (Wong, et al., 2003).

As an organization, the Army continues to apply these concepts, as exemplified by the June, 2013 release of "ALDS: Army Leader Development Strategy 2013." Crafted by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, ALDS highlights the *Be, Know, Do* framework as well as the Army Leader Development Model.[6] The ALDS is coordinated and driven by seven imperatives (see Figure 2.3 below).

Figure 2.3: The Seven Imperatives of the Army Leader Development Strategy 2013

- Commitment to the Army Profession, lifelong learning, and development.
- Balance the Army's commitment to the training, education, and experience components of leader development.
- Manage military and civilian talent to benefit both the institution and the individual.
- Select and develop leaders with positive leader attributes and proficiency in core leadership competencies for responsibility at higher levels.
- Prepare adaptive and creative leaders capable of operating within the complexity of the operational environment and the entire range of military operations.
- Embed Mission Command principles in leader development.
- Value a broad range of leader experiences and developmental opportunities.

With WPLDS, academy leadership sought to move further beyond the Army's leader development model and *Be, Know, Do* training structure by incorporating theoretical

[6] *ALDS: Army Leader Development Strategy 2013* (2013), Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

understandings of human learning and education models. Kegan's (1982, 1994) theories of identity development and Bloom's (1956) taxonomy of educational objectives were key among academic works in this regard.

Kegan (1982, 1994) proposes that human existence revolves around what he terms meaning-making, and that from infancy through adulthood we advance through stages of progressive changes in perspective and mental capacity. These stages impact developmental domains, including that of learning. Developmental stages build upon each other, with the individual developing increasingly complex cognitive structures when confronted by an external environment too complex for current capabilities.

Drawing primarily on the works of Maslow (1954), Kohlberg (1976), and Piaget (1972), Kegan's (1982) developmental model comprises six stages. Incorporative (stage 0) and impulsive (stage 1) are generally completed through infancy and early adolescence. Most individuals attain the imperial stage (stage 2) by around age 12, but some adults never depart this level of development. Stage 2 is characterized by self-interest; individuals can understand the perspectives of others, but focus on what others can do for the self.

Subordinate cadets in stage 2 of development will desire a leader who appears to be solely concerned with satisfying the individual needs of their sub-organizational members, even at the cost of the larger parent organization. Sophomore cadet Dan Wittaker exemplifies this attitude in saying, "[My platoon leader] is great. He doesn't volunteer us for anything, and he doesn't make us send up weekly reports. Things are just really chill, nobody bothers me, and I don't have to waste much time working with my plebe [the cadet Wittaker is assigned to lead]." Perhaps Wittaker's platoon leader is still in stage 2 as well.

The interpersonal stage of development (stage 3) is characterized by a focus on interpersonal relationships. College-age adults in stage 3 are concerned with their reputations and being recognized for their individual characteristics and skills. Stage 4 (called the institutional stage) is typified by self-authorship and strong identity development. The identity becomes focused around values and principles that can dictate action in the absence of a social group. Cadets in the institutional stage are self-motivated to achieve both their own goals and those of their embedded organization.

Figure 2.4: The West Point Leader Development Model[7]



When asked about self-development opportunities, sophomore cadet Brittany Stephens said, "I volunteered to help run the Hudson Valley Special Olympics, and most people thought that was cool, but others told me I was being a tool and they'd end up being voluntold [forced to

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[7] Huntoon, D., B. Keith, et al., Building Capacity to Lead. United States Military Academy

volunteer] to help." In speaking further with Stephens it was apparent that she had reached the institutional stage, and was seeking opportunities to enhance her identity as a leader of character. Some of her less developed peers felt threatened by her acts of self-authorship, and worried that her achievement might diminish their own reputations (typical of stage 3) or eventually create more work for them (a fear for the self-interested stage 2 individual).

Kegan (1994) proposes that few college-age adults will reach stage 4, and that many adults will never progress that far. Lewis, et al. (2005: 360) write that progression to stage 4 "is critical to the growth of autonomous professionals, professionals of the sort capable of exercising sounds judgment in the face of the complex, ambiguous, and rapidly changing situations that increasingly characterize modern work life." As an institution, West Point clearly desires to graduate officers who possess such abilities.

Ethnographic Methods

The ethnographic research for this dissertation took place over a four year period (April 2009 through May 2013), with the majority of examination coming through unstructured and semistructured interviews from September 2011 through May 2013. All interview participation was voluntary, and informants were not incentivized monetarily.

Drawing on Dohrenwend and Richardson (1965) and Gorden (1987), Bernard (2011) describes a continuum of interview situations delineated by the interviewer's desired amount of control over a subject's responses. Informal interviewing, the least structured, typically involves daily interaction with subjects and nearly continuous development of field notes. While I did not commit to executing informal interviews, since May of 2010 I have served a number of roles at the academy (instructor, athletic team officer representative, platoon mentor, etc.) that have

given me access to, and greater understanding of, cadets, faculty, and administrators. I do not claim to have undertaken three years of strict field research, but I do assert to have a sound understanding of the institution.

Some may view my formal association with West Point as problematic for conducting research, and I acknowledge the potential for a variety of biases. The most likely of these is the deference effect when interviewing cadets: subjects telling me what they think I want to hear in order to avoid offending me as an instructor and Army officer, or to avoid offending others at the academy assuming they would see my research (Bernard, 2011). I took precautions to mitigate the potential of the deference effect: assuring anonymity, interviewing cadets in informal settings such as family-style meals in the mess hall, etc. I have sought to remain objective throughout my writing.

Unstructured interviews are framed around a plan, but exert little influence over a subject's response to questions. They typically consume much time, and are designed to allow people to, "express themselves in their own terms, and at their own pace," (Bernard, 2011: 157). I conducted 98 interviews in total, the majority being unstructured. Table 2.1 details the interviews by type and subject. A semistructured interview maintains much of the informality of the unstructured interview, but is framed around a series of topics or questions. Lastly, structured interviews ask subjects a strict set of formal questions (Bernard, 2011). Interviews lasted from 10 to 150 minutes, with an average duration of approximately 25 minutes.

Table 2.1: Interviews by Subject and Type

Subject\Interview	Unstructured	Semi-Structured	Structured	Total
Freshman Cadet	8	3	2	13
Sophomore Cadet	8	4	4	16
Junior Cadet	14	6	5	25
Senior Cadet	14	9	7	30
Administrator	4	5	0	9
Faculty Member	2	3	0	5
Total	50	30	18	98

The Role of Identity in Leader Development

Though focusing on the acquisition of leadership skills, Lord and Hall (2005) take an interesting approach by addressing leader identity, and its profound impact on leader development. While traditional accounts of leadership have focused on traits (which most researchers treat as being relatively stable over time) or behaviors (implying that leader development experiences can be of short duration and focused on mimicking learned behavioral styles), more recent leadership research calls for a more intricate combination of social, psychological, and intellectual development across varying times (Day & Halpin, 2004). While much of this can potentially be provided for by an organization, it may be incumbent on an individual to take action toward leader development (Chan & Dasgrow, 2001). Hence, to maintain a concentrated pursuit of building leadership skills and ability, members may require a strong leader self-identity.

Lord and Hall (2005: 592) write that a leader's self-identity is critical because it, "(a) provides an important structure around which relevant knowledge can be organized; (b) is a source of motivational and directional forces that determine the extent to which the leader voluntarily puts himself or herself in developmental situations; and (c) may provide access to

personal material (i.e., stories, core values, etc.) that can be used to understand and motivate subordinates." Leader development models must move beyond a focus on surface skills, and consider the principles and ethics required of truly effective leaders, even if such characteristics may take months or years to develop.

West Point, like many institutions, acknowledges the roles of identity and self-development in creating leaders. The WPLDS handbook, *Building Capacity to Lead*, states, "To prepare commissioned leaders of character for our Nation, we must not only educate and train cadets in relevant professional knowledge and skills; we must also facilitate the development of their identity as mature, professional adults… Our theory of leader development incorporates the BE component into this framework—how we help cadets develop a professional identity while simultaneously acquiring professional knowledge and skills," (Huntoon, et al., 2012: 15).

Some of the leader development methodology in practice at West Point appears to fit this theoretical framework for leadership skill and expertise development, though clearly there are imperfections, as exemplified by Cadet Perkins and some of his teammates sitting with me at lunch. Lord and Hall (2005) propose that surface skills are first acquired via experience and observation. Individuals eventually develop advanced systems to direct their learning and social awareness. These form in concert with a growing leader identity that becomes crucial to the member's self-definition. This identity, while originally focused on the individual, swings toward a more collective interpretation. Leader development is similar to a maturing process where knowledge of the self and one's social surroundings merge with a strong leader identification (Munusamy, et al., 2010).

While I agree that this concept of maturing toward a stronger leader identity is largely accurate, I argue that the progression is not continually, or in many cases even consistently, upward. Senior Trevor Sikorski said, "I think a lot of times academics, extracurricular activities, and our personal lives force us to put leadership development on hold. I am not saying this is right or wrong but it does happen."

Some cadets do feel that their development at the academy has been consistently positive. Senior Wayne Cook commented, "There are always chances to use leadership styles and test your leadership development both professionally and socially. I'm trying to practice leading by example and retaining as much knowledge from officers, NCOs, cadets and other leaders I interact with and observe every day. You need to practice and test leadership styles here at the academy while using what you learn from other leaders around you: both good and bad leadership styles."

Similarly, senior Amanda Person said, "Although at times bad things happened when I was either a follower or a leader, I found that I learned something from every event after I reflected on it weeks, months, or years later. I believe there should never be an event that causes you to not want to be a leader. The challenges are out there to make stronger leaders."

Organizations vary in their processes of shaping member identity. Investiture processes draw on the existing identities of new members and reinforce them, while divestiture processes displace the entering identity with a new organizational identity (Van Maanen, 1978). A stereotypical understanding of the military's initial entry training, or basic training, is drill sergeants in round hats yelling at new recruits in a process designed to break them down and then build them back in the image of a soldier, marine, etc. Changes to initial entry training over

the past decade negate some such typecasts, though the process can still be described as one of divestiture.

Van Maanen and Schein (1979: 64) define divestiture as processes of socialization that, "seek to deny and strip away certain personal characteristics of a recruit." They focus on organizations that subject new members to harassment, separate them from prior social connections, and put them in menial positions. Such treatment limits the impact of a new member's entering identity while seeking to impart ideals and behaviors desired by the parent organization. Optimally, the rebuilding of the identity leads new members toward a greater understanding of themselves and of previously unrecognized capabilities (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979).

When voluntarily undergone, as is the case at West Point under the All Volunteer Force (AVF), such a divestiture process functions to bond the individual to the institution. The success of such a process may hinge on the recruit's desire to be accepted into the organization as a full member. Turow (1977) describes this in a study of first year students at elite schools of law. This can be seen at West Point, when following the initial six weeks of Cadet Basic Training, cadet candidates are welcomed into the Corps at Acceptance Day. During a formal parade, the new class of cadets stands before the upper three classes and marches into them, joining their respective companies. The individual is henceforth known as "Cadet," rather than the more derogatory "New Cadet." This ceremony takes place before friends and family, demonstrating their new identities to loved ones.

Figure 2.5: Freshmen Cadets March Into Their Companies on Acceptance Day[8]

Having completed their initial summer training, the freshman class is publically welcomed into the organization before friends and family. During the Acceptance Day Parade they ceremonially join the ranks of their companies by marching into the upper three classes and joining them on the parade field. The entire Corps then conducts a "Pass and Review" before the Superintendent and all those attending.

After the ceremony the new class is released to spend time with these connections to their old identity, though they must remain in uniform and close to West Point, again bridging the gap between their old and new identities. Sophomore cadet Mark Buit remarked, "Acceptance Day was the first time I'd seen my family in six weeks. I was proud to show them I had made it that far, but it was also awkward, because they didn't really understand this new world I now

[8] Photograph courtesy of westpoint.org. Retrieved May 29, 2013 from http://www.west-point.org/family/mem2011/pages/aday/index.html.

belonged to. Their questions seemed silly because they weren't familiar with all these new aspects of my life."

Buit's comments echo those of many other cadets who come to West Point from families with little or no military experience. Some cadets do have a parent or close relative familiar with the academy and the Army, and for them the transformation of identity is less extreme. Their pre-institutional identity differs less from the organizational identity, and thus the divestiture process is less traumatic. This doesn't necessarily make the experience less difficult, however. Freshman Cadet Paul Cooper, who struggles with the decision to remain at West Point or not, said, "My mom was in one of the first classes of women. She went through hell to make it through this place. It's just assumed that I'll make it: that I have it easy compared to them." The expectations of Cooper's support network are greater (both of his parents are West Point graduates and career Army officers), and he struggles to live up to these prospects.

Though now made full members of the organization, Acceptance Day does not mark the conclusion of the divestiture process for freshman cadets. Plebe year has just begun, and what lays ahead is two semesters of academics coupled with military development, social restrictions, plebe duties (memorization of newspaper articles, delivery of mail and laundry, etc.), and other measures designed to restrict free time and develop teamwork, discipline, communication, and other skills desired in military leaders. Cadet Candidates are now Cadets, but the initial socialization process is not complete.

In addition to learning the policies, procedures, and nuances of organizational life, newcomers are highly concerned with developing a self-definition through symbolic interaction (Ashforth, 1985). Here, symbolic interaction involves a member applying meaning to both verbal and nonverbal exchanges with others or elements of the organization, such as

advertisements. Van Maanen (1979) proposed that self-conceptions are created through interpretations of social interactions. Members attribute socially constructed descriptions to themselves and to those around them: motivated, career-oriented, etc. Cadets certainly do this, and have developed their own lexicon to categorize individuals: tool, slug, get-over, bro, good dude, etc. I discuss this further in Chapter 3.

The creation of these initial self-images can be critical to future leader identity development. Sophomore cadet Blake Ebbins stated, “My first chain of command was pretty terrible. I’m not just saying that because the first three weeks here are rough. Looking back at some of their actions and laziness, I really think they just didn’t put much effort into leading us and showing us how to be great. It took me a long time to get my head up and realize that I didn’t have to be like them, that I could be a great cadet, and that I should look forward to leading soldiers.”

Conversely, junior cadet Rashad Brown had strong initial entry leadership that helped him overcome future disappointments: “My basic training cadre was tough, yet really compassionate. They showed us what right looks like. To this day I think back to two of them in particular. I’ve had bad leaders since, and I can just look at these new guys and tell myself to focus on how I’ll be better. I go back to those first two leaders, and I aspire to emulate them. That motivates me to be better.”

While it does not appear to be a major impediment to leader development, many cadets seem disillusioned by a forced distribution military grading system. Junior cadet Marvin Simmons remarked, “I’ve seen many cadets just give up out of frustration. I think it happens a lot as a squad leader, when sometimes you work really hard and still end up with a C because your peers are just better and the platoon leader, commander, and tactical officer can only give

out so many As and Bs. Or worse, you work hard and get a C because the other squad leaders are buddies with the firsties. After that you just want to quit." Tactical officers are active duty captains and majors who formally command cadet companies. There are parallels here to Van Maanen and Schein's (1979) description of an organization that socializes middle managers to continually strive for ascension toward a limited number of upper management positions.

Though arguably there is no better solution, this type of culture often leads to disillusionment, discontent, and high employee turnover. The military has dealt with high turnover rates in the past, as manning cycles tend to be cyclical. Turnover is less of a concern than it was even just five years ago, as the Army is currently facing budget restrictions and congressional mandates to downsize, but failing to address organizational policies toward retention and the needs of leaders can have negative consequences in later years. In Chapter 5 I discuss leader identity and turnover at greater length.

Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development

I propose that identity development is not a continual upward progression. DeRue and Ashford (2010) hint at this through the concept of failed identity construction due to an unreinforced claim or grant on a leader or follower identity. Weinreich and Saunderson's (2003) concept of contra-identification similarly relates, but in neither instance does the group member consciously opt out of leader development. Analysis of interviews conducted through ethnographic research reveals some common themes. I propose the concept that organizational members move through phases of identity development over time, namely:

- **Leader Identity Construction**: the member serves in a leadership role (organizationally bestowed or informal) and the leadership claim is reciprocated with collective

endorsement. Characterized by positive identification with the social category "leader" within the organization and a strong self-image as a current and future leader.

- **Leader Identity Stagnation**: the member fails to occupy a leadership role (or self-selects out of leadership roles) and puts leader development on hold. Characterized by cynicism, neutral identification with the social category "leader" within the organization, and an impartial attitude toward leadership and self-development.

- **Leader Identity Destruction**: the member makes no leadership claims, or makes leadership claims that are not reciprocated by other organizational members. Characterized by cynicism, negative identification with the social category "leader" within the organization, and a disparaging attitude toward leadership and self-development.

Figure 2.6: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development



In the model that I propose, each individual's leader identity development can take a different path over varied durations. Figure 2.6 above is merely a representation of one individual's potential leader identity development progression, such as Pritcher's movement from initial motivation to be a great leader, to negative experiences which drove him toward cynicism and leader identity destruction. Figures 1.3-1.5 in Chapter 1 show other potential paths of leader identity development. In the following three sections I'll provide background and supporting ethnographic research regarding members in the three stages of leader identity development.

Leader Identity Construction

While I've found cynicism toward the parent organization to be pervasive, there are certainly members who fit the mold of what might be desired by the academy's institutional leadership. Junior Alex Harrel, a catcher on the Division I baseball team, displays behavior representative of this phase: "I am always striving to be the best person and leader I can be. I work hard in the classroom and on the baseball field. While I am not always focused on my military development, academics and sports help me become a more developed leader. These people and thinking skills will fold over on my career as an officer."

A theme that emerges among those cadets whom I'd classify as being in this construction phase is an overlap of positive identities. A key element of social identity theory, as discussed earlier, is the existence of multiple self-identities within an individual (Turner, 1987; Reicher, 1982). The selection of a particular self-identity is context dependent. Cadets undergoing leader identity construction have multiple identities as do cadets in other phases, but the identities of

those in construction tend to all involve either an affirmative attitude toward the organization or leadership in general.

When asked, "Do you view yourself differently, or do you take on a different identity, when acting in a leadership role versus taking part in other activities?" Cadet Harrel responded, "Yes, I am a different person on the baseball field than in the barracks. While I try to be a leader in both areas, I am more committed on the baseball field and I act differently. I am more blunt and intense on the baseball field." Whether he is drawing on his self-identity as a formally appointed leader within the Corps of Cadets, or as a member of the Army baseball team, Harrell views himself as a leader. Interestingly, he alters his approach to leadership, but self-identifies as a leader in either context.

The parent organization thus benefits from recruiting practices that favor leadership in high school and civilian life: Eagle Scouts, Girls State or Boys State participation, captains of athletic teams, club leadership positions, etc. Munusamy, et al. (2010: 150) find this to be true as well, stating, "For people whose social identity already comprises aspects of leading others, being a role model and being respected, the integration with a leader identity can be relatively smooth." They cite the example of high status or privileged classes in the United Kingdom often viewing leadership and service to others as part of their social identity, and therefore more easily merge this identity with a professional leadership role than do members of other classes.

The West Point admissions office weights participation in leadership activities through evaluation scales. Applicants are ranked by their Whole Candidate Score (WCS), which is based on 10% physical aptitude, 30% leadership potential, and 60% academic capacity (McDonald, 2012). Leadership potential is calculated through the Community Leadership Score (CLS). The CLS has three components: faculty appraisal by high school officials (evaluations from math,

science, and English teachers who rate characteristics on a 1 to 5 scale), athletic leadership (with All-Americans and multiple team captaincies rated at the top and no athletic participation at the bottom), and extracurricular leadership (with multiple top positions such as student body president and Eagle Scout rated at the top and no extracurricular participation a the bottom). An academy admissions officer said, “Clearly we value demonstrated leadership prior to admission, and statistics have shown that these entrants have higher graduation rates and tend to remain in the Army at higher percentages than those with minimal early leadership experiences.”

In their reformulation of social identity theory for the Academy of Management, Ashforth and Mael (1989: 35) propose that the feeling of belongingness to a group encourages organizational members to “engage in, and derive satisfaction from, activities congruent with the identity, to view himself or herself as an exemplar of the group, and to reinforce factors conventionally associated with group formation (e.g., cohesion, interaction).” This is representative of the leader identity construction stage I propose. But what of those members who only partially identify with the organization, and perhaps even reject the exemplar?

Leader Identity Stagnation

I asked senior cadet Adam Lockard to describe his state of preparedness for entering the Army as a lieutenant, which at the time of interview was nine months away. He responded in part, “I’ll be ready when it’s time to lead. I still have BOLC [the Basic Officer Leadership Course] to really learn the skills of an engineer officer. Right now I just want to get through my classes and really enjoy my time with my friends.” Lockard’s general attitude toward West Point is not negative, and he seems to enjoy most of his time during his final year, but he is not

investing in his own leader development. His attitude and actions conform to the proposed leader identity stagnation stage of development.

Some interviewed cadets who wish to succeed in an endeavor but anticipate failure (even partial) revert to a performance of cynicism in defense of their self-image. Thus, the college student who wants to earn a 4.0 but fears falling short, will project the image of not caring, and may in fact put in less effort and earn poor grades in order to maintain this image, rather than perform to his fullest potential and earn something less than perfect. These students "use this cynicism as a means of insulating their inner selves," (Goffman, 1959: 20). Such beliefs, I find, to be captured in leader identity stagnation as a stage of identity formation. This can be seen in Paul Cooper, the struggling freshman with dual-graduate parents. Rather than admit that he is giving his full effort and only marginally succeeding, he provides a list of complaints as to why "West Point just isn't for me."

Leader identity stagnation clearly runs counter to the institution's desired developmental state. The WPLDS handbook even states, "Cadets take ownership of their own and others' development to maximize growth, achieve desired outcomes and embrace their future roles as commissioned officers," (Huntoon, 2012: 11). Cadets such as Lockard are not overly cynical or negative toward the institution to the point that their leader development is reversed, but they also fail to invest in their growth and that of others.

Some interviewed cadets appear to have stagnated from moderate disappointment with the institution. Junior cadet Brett Duval said, "In my experience everyone I've interacted with around here is honorable. That's something I really love about the academy, and I think the honor code is a good thing overall, but one of my friends knew about another cadet having a fake ID, and he didn't turn the guy in, and now my friend is up for an honor board." While Duval is

not in a destructive mindset, he is disappointed with the implementation of organizational policy, and the disillusionment has spread into multiple aspects of his life. The cadet honor code, which simply states, "A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do," requires cadets to monitor each other for infractions of the code. This non-toleration clause, as it is known, makes cadets not just responsible for their own integrity, but the integrity of anyone in their cadet network.

Returning to Kegan's (1982, 1994) constructive-developmental theory of the self, cognitive development is unlikely to occur if individuals are not challenged by increasingly complex environments. A cadet in leader identity stagnation often self-selects out of such environments, and hinders her own progression toward a higher stage of understanding and capacity. Those cadets occupying Stage 2 are particularly vulnerable to stagnation, and perhaps even destruction, as their cognitive focus is self-centered and hinges on their own needs and desires.

Leader Identity Destruction

Cynicism toward the parent organization and the work required of cadets is a consistent theme in my interview notes. Junior cadet Hugh Wagner said, "I think this place is ridiculous. I came here to play lacrosse. For awhile I was excited about being a lieutenant, but I guess I don't really care about being a leader… When other cadets tell me to do something I tell them to go away. When an instructor or TAC tells me to do something I do just enough to get by." The level of distaste with the organization demonstrated by Wagner is uncommon. Most cadets express some level of negativity toward facets of the organization or the structure of their condition, but few are as cynical as Wagner.

Goffman (1959) describes the cynic and a disbelief-to-belief cycle through the example of medical students losing their initial naiveté upon facing the mental onslaught of requirements, only to be regained later in their careers. Interviews with cadets reveal a similar pattern of experience. Teenagers holding a post-September 11th, 2001, fanciful image of military service are quickly faced with the reality of unexpectedly high discipline, perceived or actual unfair treatment, and significant mental, physical, and emotional stress. Upon completion of entry training, a return to initial optimism is approached, though rarely met. This process may explain the ambivalent feelings that many veterans hold about their service, or when they watch a recruiting commercial: sincerity and cynicism. There is genuine pride for having served in a job that many consider relevant and worthy, yet cynicism in recognition that military service does not consist of constant freedom fighting, helicopter flying, and high-tech computer training, all conducted with triumphant background music.

I recognize that attributing failure purely to a display of cynicism is an oversimplification, and cadets have multiple and disparate reasons for the lack of success in areas of evaluation. In an interview with Paul Cooper I confronted him with the concept of using cynicism in protection of his self image. He remarked, "I suppose some of my attitude could be attributed to a need to project a certain image. It's true that I don't want my peers to think I'm working every waking hour to succeed, and yet still fail. But much of my cynicism is pretty genuine. I have a few terrible leaders, and because of them, I'm bitter about being here. It's just that simple."

Returning to the leadership and self-identity work of Lord and Brown (2004), the working self-concept (WSC) and its three components (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1) contribute to my understanding of leader identity development. Senior organizational leaders and subordinate

employees may differ in their present and future time distinction, particularly in a training environment such as West Point. Academy leaders see the benefit of rigorous and time-consuming behaviors designed to instill discipline, values, and the characteristics desired in Army officers. This distal motivation can conflict with the proximal motivation of cadets. Junior cadet Aaron Watkins said, "I get that my end state is to be an outstanding leader, and that to be outstanding I need to be focused, and have gone through a lot of training and undergrad coursework. But sometimes I just want a break. I want to sleep in, and have more freedom. I don't get how some things around here are supposed to make me a better leader."

From my interviews and general familiarity with cadets, I believe that the vast majority of them desire to be great officers. In the language of the WSC, they see the connection between their self-views and their possible selves. Cynicism and even leader identity destruction revolves around disagreement with current goals. In order to achieve the possible self, cadets and the West Point Leader Development System differ on the implementation of current goals for achieving proximal and distal motivation. Without these motivations the cadet languishes, self-development falters, and the leader identity withers.

When the components of the WSC are in alignment, leader identity construction can occur. Senior cadet Dan Miller remarked, "I'm on board with the lifestyle here. I like it. I thrive in it. I don't always enjoy the regimen, and sometimes I don't feel like going to an evening lecture or changing uniforms six times a day so I can get to boxing and back to class and then to dinner and what not. But I know it's making me stronger, and so I just do it with a smile. I want to succeed in the Army, and I think this lifestyle is preparing me to do that."

Becker and Carper (1956) conduct an interesting study of physiology graduate students, many of whom entered the program with the intent of moving on to medical school. Through

interaction with professors, engagement in the field, and other social experiences associated with schooling, many students developed self-identities of physiologists. My conceptions of leader identity stagnation and destruction are important additions to identity development, as I believe that the creation of self-definition is not as straightforward as Becker and Carper (1956) would propose. Simply being immersed in a professional culture is not sufficient for members to self-identify with the characteristics of that profession or organization. In the case of destruction, it can lead to disengagement with the organization and its espoused values and beliefs.

Initial Surveys and Network Approaches to Understanding Leader Identity Development

I examine leadership and identity survey results, leadership, trust, and friendship associations, as well as prescribed networks mandated by the organization's command structure (the formal chain of command). Statistical and social network analysis models help identify the impact of these associations on variables associated with leader identity development.

Pilot Studies

Statistical and network analysis is conducted using Stata 12.0 and Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) NetScenes 3.0.0.2 software. I chose ORA for conducting network analysis because of its focus on social and organizational systems.[9]

Pilot Study 1

In the pilot study, I tested two modified organizational identity scales and developed an Army Values scale. Two waves of data were collected from September to December, 2011.

[9] ORA is a free statistical package from Carnegie Mellon University's Center for the Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, available at: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/index.php

Organizational identity scales were reworded to capture cadets' attitudes towards their own company organization.

The target population for the study was 132 college students within a single cadet company. The unit received the same paper survey two separate times over the course of the semester with a participation rate of 100%. Demographic questions included gender, ethnicity, class year, and academic major. Social network items asked participants to list their friends and most respected leaders in the organization in order to map network structure for each unit. In addition, a supervisorial network was constructed using the participant's self reported level of authority within their own unit.

The age of the participants ranged from 18-26 years with 27% (n = 36) freshmen, 27% (n = 35) sophomores, 26% (n = 34) juniors, and 20% (n = 27) seniors. Factor analysis showed that there were eight factors from the organizational identity questions, three of which were relatively strong (Table 2.2). The goal of this factor analysis was to ensure that the scales were meaningful for our population. Factor 1 included five of the six items from Edwards and Peccei's (2007) scale (questions 7-12) plus one of the two newly created questions (question #14). I call this new scale Organizational Identity-Self (or OI-Self). Factor 2 included three of the six items in Mael and Ashforth's (1992) scale. Questions #3 and #5 loaded slightly more heavily on factor 1, but were still related to factor 2. Factor 3 included questions #4 and #13, and were later included in this scale. I call this new scale OI-Integration. These scales are quite distinct, and were therefore reworded so that the Mael and Ashworth's scale focused on West Point identity while the second asked about Army identity.

Table 2.2: Factor Analysis of Organizational Identification Scales

Questions	*Factor 1*	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*
Mael and Ashworth's scale (1992)			
1. When someone praises Company X, it feels like a personal compliment.	0.38	***0.60***	0.17
2. When someone criticizes Company X, it feels like a personal insult.	0.35	***0.67***	0.17
3. I am very interested in what others think about Company X.	0.51	*0.40*	0.28
4. When I talk about Company X, I usually say "we" rather than "they".	0.26	0.19	***0.63***
5. Company X's successes are my successes.	0.43	*0.39*	0.43
6. If a story in the media criticized Company X, I would feel embarrassed.	0.24	***0.49***	0.38
Edwards and Peccei's scale (2007)			
7. My membership in Company X is a big part of who I am.	*0.49*	0.51	0.17
8. I consider myself a Company X person.	***0.61***	0.30	0.21
9. What Company X stands for is important to me.	***0.79***	0.23	0.33
10. I share the goals and values of Company X.	***0.70***	0.23	0.33
11. Being a Company X is important to me.	***0.85***	0.31	0.15
12. I feel strong ties with Company X.	***0.56***	0.45	0.26
USMA identity scale			
13. I am aware that I represent Company X when I make decisions.	0.46	0.19	***0.63***
14. If I had an ethical dilemma, I would always consider the values of Company X.	***0.54***	0.19	0.38

Further analysis was conducted to explore whether the OI scales are associated with demographics, attitudes, and sociometric items. In a cross-sectional analysis at wave 1, OI-Self is associated with liking the company, having attended the West Point prepatory school (a one year program focused on mathematics and English skills for cadet-candidates hoping to gain admission to West Point), and high friend degree centrality. Looking at OI-Self longitudinally, friend degree becomes non-significant and those who attended prepatory school are more likely to have negative OI after controlling for OI at time 1. Liking the company is consistently linked with OI-Self, while degree and prepatory school history seems to be related to OI, but the relationship may change over time.

Table 2.3: Linear Regression of Organization Identification-Self on Demographics, Attitudes, and Network Indices

	Time1 OI-Self			Time2 OI-Self		
	Coef	*se*	*p-value*	*Coef*	*se*	*p-value*
OI T1				0.59	0.05	0
like company	0.62	0.12	0	0.43	0.08	0
prep school	0.30	0.13	0.017	-0.23	0.09	0.013
friend degree	8.74	3.61	0.017			
Constant	2.09	0.28	0	-0.98	0.86	0.257

OI-Integration is associated with liking the company, high betweeness centrality, and low degree centrality. After controlling for Organizational Identity at time 1, OI-Self is associated with not liking the company, being male, having no prior college, and low degree centrality. Unlike OI-Self, strong OI-Integration corresponds to low degree and high betweeness. These individuals, while not necessarily popular, hold key positions in bridging the network. Those high in betweeness centrality can be viewed in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7: Friendship Network Sized by OI-Self

In Figure 2.7, nodes are sized by OI-Self such that larger nodes indicate higher organizational identitification (OI). Friendship ties are bidirectional. Nodes are colored by class year to show the general structure of cadet companies, where freshman (dark blue) are isolated from other classes, and juniors (green) generally link sophomores (light blue) and seniors (yellow). Individuals who are bridges between groups tend to have higher OI. This makes sense, as members who identify with the company are more likely to be friends with other company members. This is not always the case, as someone such as node 118 may identify strongly with the company but have few friends. This could be a good example of a 'tool', which I discuss further in Chapter 3.

Changes over time show inconsistent effects, where those liking the company go from having higher OI to lower OI-Integration. Data collected in the primary survey (described in

Table 2.4: Linear Regression of Organization Identification-Integration on Demographics, Attitudes, and Network Indices

	Time1 OI-Integration			Time2 OI-Integration		
	Coef	*se*	*p-value*	*Coef*	*se*	*p-value*
OI-Int T1				0.80	0.08	0
like company	0.92	0.12	0	-0.32	0.13	0.012
female				-0.37	0.13	0.004
prior college				-0.26	0.12	0.03
friend betweeness	4.48	2.38	0.062			
friend degree	-18.28	4.65	0			
friend degree T2				-8.64	2.72	0.002
Constant	1.55	0.20	0	1.89	0.31	0

Chapter 3) helps clarify these relationships.

In the next scale, I attempted to capture one's beliefs in the seven Army values (Mackey, 2008):

1. Loyalty - Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers.
2. Duty - Fulfill your obligations.
3. Respect - Treat people as they should be treated.
4. Selfless Service - Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.
5. Honor - Live up to the Army Values.
6. Integrity - Do what is right, legally and morally.
7. Personal Courage - Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

The Army Values scale includes two questions per Army value. While this study focuses on West Point cadets, the seven Army values are taught to all organizational members and held in regard as essential characteristics of a soldier. In concert with social identity theory (Turner, 1987; Reicher, 1982), the extent to which a person takes ownership of and internalizes the seven Army values is hypothesized to be associated with social leadership. Followers are more likely to view someone embodying prototypical leader behaviors (such as the Army values) as an organizational leader. Items loaded consistently on three factors. Loadings at .40 and above are shown below in Table 2.5. Questions 3, 7, 12, and 13 did not load on any factors and I will remove them from the main study survey. All of the Army values are addressed by at least one question. The final scale is a 10-item scale.

The Cynicism scale captures the level of pessimism towards the West Point institution and experience. The Organization Identity scales will measure how much participants identify with West Point and the U.S. Army. The Army Values scale measures the extent to which individuals have adopted and internalized the seven Army values.

Table 2.5: Factor Analysis of Army Values Scale

Question	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. I trust in the U.S. Constitution and believe it is worth protecting.			0.65
2. What is good for the Army and other soldiers is important to me.			0.67
3. I can count on my chain of command to do their jobs well in their company positions. (ex. Team Leader, Athletics Officer)			
4. I strive to do the best job I can in my company position. (ex. Team leader, Academic NCO)	0.65		
5. I maintain a professional relationship with my chain of command above and below me.	0.59		
6. I trust the company and its members.	0.56		
7. I rather spend time for my subordinate's success, than my own.			
8. I consciously think about how I can become a better officer for my future units.	0.6		
9. I internalize not just the cadet honor code, but the spirit of the honor code, into my everyday life.		0.74	
10. I respect the Army values.		0.48	
11. You can count on me to choose the harder right than the easier wrong for all rules at West Point.		0.69	
12. Honor violations like lying or stealing, are more serious than a brigade violation like drinking underage.			
13. I challenge myself physically to take on new obstacles and workouts.			
14. I would stand up to a friend for making an unethical choice.		0.42	0.43

Pilot Study 2

I received West Point IRB approval on January 11, 2012. I delivered consent forms to cadet companies during lunch formation from January 15 through February 30, 2012. I explained the study to each company individually while a research assistant passed out informed consent forms and collected signed consents. To follow-up with non-consenting cadets, an email was sent out one week later with an option to return consents with a digital signature. I obtained access to ten cadet organizational units (n = 1321). Of 1321 targeted cadets, 59% agreed to participate in the study. Cadet companies with participation rates lower than 50% were dropped from the pilot study (two companies). The remaining eight companies include 717 cadets representing 68% of the target population of 1055 students. Of the eight

companies, two have participation rates over 80%, two with rates between 70-80%, two between 60-70%, and two around 50%.

Social network items included a roster that corresponds to the cadets in each company. A 5-item scale measured a person's perceptions of their own leadership instincts, including questions, "I believe I can contribute more to a group if I am a follower rather than a leader" and "I am definitely not a leader by nature." Response options are on a 5-point scale ranging from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'. This scale was modified from an original 9-item scale by Chan and Drasgow (2001).

Moving forward, the data for this dissertation focuses on eight companies. Approximately 78% of the cadets are still in their same companies as during the pilot studies, accounting for the departure of graduating seniors. The primary study also includes the incoming freshman class.

CHAPTER 3: NETWORK POSITION AND LEADER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

In Chapter 2, I proposed a new framework for describing organizational leader identity development. This chapter builds upon this structure and attempts to further explain the developmental stages of organizational members. From my own familiarity with West Point, and through ethnographic research and survey data, I identify and describe cadets in six different classifications dependent upon their network positions and level of leader development. Interviews and observation provide insight into the leader development of cadets occupying these classifications. Categories are determined by leader identity and network centrality. I label each category with a colloquial term as used by cadets at the military academy.

The Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey

I conducted the leader identity and network study, titled "Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey", or CLINS, in two parts. The first round (known as CLINS1) was a single survey of eight cadet companies taking place during the 2012 academic year, and the second round (CLINS2) was two surveys of seven companies taking place during the 2013 academic year. Participants received online surveys for CLINS1 on April 20th, 2012, and were given four weeks to complete them. The first CLINS2 survey was sent on January 8th, 2013 (after return from winter break) and the second survey was sent on April 15th, 2013.

The study sample was not completely random, but I believe it is an accurate representation of the population in part because cadet companies are themselves designed to be a proportionate mix of ethnicity, gender, class year, athletic team participation, grade point

average, and academic major. Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1 shows the hierarchical structure of the Corps of Cadets and the placement of the eight companies surveyed in the first round of the study: D1 (meaning D Company, 1st Regiment), H1, A2, C2, C3, E3, F3, A4. The result is quite close to a stratified random sample, in which the researcher divides a population into subframes and takes an unbiased random sample (Bernard, 2011). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the consent and response rates for both rounds of surveys.

Table 3.1: Consent and Response Rates for CLINS Round 1 (Academic Year 2012)

Company	# Consented	% Consented	# Responses	Response Rate	% of Total Target Population
A2	87	67%	87	100%	66.92%
A4	71	55%	68	96%	52.71%
B3	92	73%	88	96%	69.84%
E3	110	81%	109	99%	80.74%
F2	73	55%	73	100%	54.89%
F3	91	79%	91	100%	79.13%
H1	78	61%	78	100%	61.42%
I1	99	74%	98	99%	73.13%
Total	701	68.13%	692	98.75%	67.25%

Table 3.2: Consent and Response Rates for CLINS Round 2 (Academic Year 2013)

Company	# Consented	% Consented	# Responses	Response Rate	% of Total Target Population
A2	78	63.41%	77	98.72%	59.23%
A4	59	51.75%	55	93.22%	44.72%
C2	81	69.23%	63	77.78%	50.00%
D1	81	67.50%	71	87.65%	59.17%
E3	73	60.33%	68	93.15%	54.40%
F3	97	84.35%	81	83.51%	64.29%
H1	111	92.50%	84	75.68%	66.14%
Total	580	69.86%	499	87.10%	56.85%

The majority of the data I obtained in the survey is from Likert scales (Likert, 1932), and is therefore ordinal. In most cases it is coded 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree. Being ordinal means that a response of 5 is stronger than a response of 4, but I cannot say that a subject responding with a 5 is 25% more likely to "trust in the U.S. Constitution and believe it is worth protecting" (for example) than a subject responding with a 4 on the same question. The responses may only be treated as being ordered, and thus a linear regression model may not be the best statistical approach to analyzing the survey results (Baum, 2006). Consequently I use an ordered logistic (ologit) estimation when modeling an ordinal dependent variable with more than two categories as a function of a set of explanatory factors.

It is important to note that the construct of leader identity is more complex than I am able to capture in this more quantitative portion of the dissertation. While my literature review, ethnographic research, and subsequent discussion of leader identity explore the concept more thoroughly, the CLINS surveys limit its form to questions pertaining to motivation to lead. These survey questions draw upon the applied psychology work of Chan and Drasgow (2001) and my pilot studies. Readers of this section of the dissertation should understand that the CLINS data treats leader identity (or my variable *leader*) as an organizational member's self-described motivation to lead. I recognize this as a limitation, and intend to collect a more robust interpretation of leader identity in future work. In the network portion of the survey, I ask participants to think of the qualities of an effective leader and then name up to five members whom they believe have the most potential to become good leaders. While this offers an interesting network perspective on leadership and future leader ability, it also has its limitations.

Table 3.3 below shows the codebook, while Appendix 1 displays each question asked in the CLINS surveys. The ten item personality inventory (TIPI) is a hasty method of determining measures of the big five personality measures (Gosling, et. al, 2003).

Table 3.3: Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey Codebook

Variable Name	Variable Description	Values	Length
id	Subject Identification Number	11001-91134	5
age	Current Age	18-26	2
usma_grad_yr	Graduation Year (class)	2012-2016	4
gender	Gender	M=Male F=Female	1
gpa	Cumulative Academic Quality Point Average (i.e. grade point average on a 4.0 scale)	0.000- 4.333	4
usma_stat_cd	USMA Status Code	A=Admin Leave C=Active Cadet G=Graduated S=Separated	1
company	Cadet Company	A2, B3, etc.	2
milgrade1	Military Grade 1st Semester	1 = A, 2 = B, 3 = C	1
milgrade2	Military Grade 2nd Semester	1 = A, 2 = B, 3 = C	1
redcat	Racial Ethnic Descent Category	B=African American C=Caucasian, M=Asian R=American Indian S=Hispanic, X=Other	1
value1- value10	10 variables from the Army values scale	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
values	Average of value1-value10 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating a stronger embodiment of the seven Army values	7
motive1- motive5	5 variables from the motivation to lead scale	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
leader	Average of motive1-motive5 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating a stronger motivation to lead	7

auth1- auth16	16 variables from the authentic leadership scale	1= Never, to 5= Always	1
auth	Average of auth1-auth16 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating a stronger embodiment of authentic leadership principles	7
monitor1- monitor17	17 variables from the self-monitoring scale	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
selfmon	Average of monitor1-monitor17 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating a stronger ability to self-monitor behavior	7
tipi1- tipi10	10 variables from the ten item personality inventory (TIPI)	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
cohes1- cohes8	8 variables from the group cohesion scale	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
cohesion	Average of cohes1-cohes8 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating stronger group cohesion	7
likeco	Answer to "I like my company".	1= Yes 2= Neutral 3= No	1
oi1- 0i7	7 variables measuring organizational identity with West Point	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
orgid_wp	Average of oi1-oi8 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating stronger organizational identity with West Point	7
oi8- oi14	7 variables measuring organizational identity with the Army	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
orgid_army	Average of oi8-oi14 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating stronger organizational identity with the Army	7
cyn1- cyn7	7 variables measuring organizational cynicism	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
cynic	Average of cyn1-cyn7 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating stronger organizational cynicism toward West Point	7

share1-share10	10 variables measuring shared leadership within the company	1= Strongly Agree, to 5= Strongly Disagree	1
shared	Average of share1-share10 (accounting for reverse coding)	1-5, with higher averages indicating that leadership and decision making are shared in the company	7

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below display summary statistics for key variables collected in the CLINS surveys.

Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Key Variables, CLINS 1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	754	21.25729	1.406007	18.573	27
gpa	754	3.049286	.5382713	1.191	4.273
leader	757	3.78362	.6355817	1	5
values	734	4.226839	.4298883	1	5
auth	704	3.949929	.3454303	2.875	5
selfmon	711	3.080996	.4514273	1.470	4.529
cohesion	713	3.654804	.7144161	1	5
likeco	723	1.344398	.5922454	1	3
orgid_wp	714	2.343337	.7772827	1	5
orgid_army	712	4.051565	.7747233	1	5
cynic	712	3.443018	.7135966	1	5
shared	710	3.33831	.7430334	1	5

Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Key Variables, CLINS 2

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	538	20.832	1.4122	18	26
gpa	538	3.056	.561752	1.333	4.198
leader	539	3.707	.5971459	1.6	5
values	533	4.108	.4359049	1.571	5
auth	509	2.051	.3411806	1.062	4
selfmon	515	3.077	.422308	1.941	4.176
cohesion	525	3.788	.7067696	1	5
likeco	526	1.399	.6534301	1	3
orgid_wp	528	3.750	.7082559	1	5
orgid_army	517	4.141	.6457408	1	5
cynic	520	3.528	.7483903	1	5
shared	522	3.560	.7301395	1	5

Table 3.6: Tabular Statistics of Gender and Racial Ethnic Descent Category (redcat), CLINS 1

gender	B	C	M	R	S	X	Total
	redcat						
F	13	82	13	0	6	0	114
M	45	473	44	7	61	10	640
Total	58	555	57	7	67	10	754

In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, B = African American, C = Caucasian, M = Asian, R = American Indian, S = Hispanic, X = Other

Table 3.7: Tabular Statistics of Gender and Racial Ethnic Descent Category (redcat), CLINS 2

gender	B	C	M	R	S	X	Total
	redcat						
F	14	59	7	1	11	3	95
M	29	330	32	6	40	6	443
Total	43	389	39	7	51	9	538

The ordinal nature of the variables also impacts correlation calculations. Pearson's correlation (*r*, the linear association of two interval variables), commonly used in the social sciences, is not applicable. I therefore use Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (*rho*). This non-parametric statistic is calculated on ranks, as opposed to means, and therefore useful when studying ordered variables (Prevalin & Robson, 2009).

Table 3.8: Spearman Correlations of Key Variables, CLINS 1

	leader	values	cynic	orgid_wp	orgid_a	cohesion	shared	gpa	age	trust_in	leader_in	friend_in
leader	1.0000											
values	0.3087*	1.0000										
	0.0000											
cynic	0.1377*	0.3987*	1.0000									
	0.0009	0.0000										
orgid_wp	-0.2129*	-0.2689*	-0.4679*	1.0000								
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000									
orgid_army	0.3337*	0.4215*	0.3133*	-0.2998*	1.0000							
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000								
cohesion	0.0335	0.3186*	0.3839*	-0.1868*	0.2152*	1.0000						
	0.4206	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000							
shared	0.0636	0.2524*	0.3701*	-0.1179*	0.2125*	0.6895*	1.0000					
	0.1266	0.0000	0.0000	0.0045	0.0000	0.0000						
gpa	0.0549	0.0473	0.1770*	-0.0907	-0.0127	-0.0021	-0.0384	1.0000				
	0.1868	0.2556	0.0000	0.0291	0.7599	0.9600	0.3561					
age	0.1000	0.0038	-0.1000	0.0533	0.0465	-0.0206	-0.0380	-0.1771*	1.0000			
	0.0160	0.9282	0.0161	0.2005	0.2642	0.6212	0.3611	0.0000				
trust_in	0.1162*	0.1566*	0.0038	0.0059	0.1220*	0.1004	0.0800	0.1660*	0.2087*	1.0000		
	0.0051	0.0002	0.9268	0.8873	0.0033	0.0157	0.0543	0.0001	0.0000			
leader_in	0.2123*	0.1321*	-0.0025	-0.0380	0.0986	0.0228	0.0152	0.1929*	0.2915*	0.6908*	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0014	0.9514	0.3615	0.0177	0.5833	0.7155	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
friend_in	0.1787*	0.0979	-0.0292	0.0423	0.0578	0.0398	0.0326	0.0299	-0.0482	0.5086*	0.3488*	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0184	0.4838	0.3095	0.1649	0.3386	0.4336	0.4723	0.2473	0.0000	0.0000	

Tables 3.8 and 3.9: shows Spearman correlations (*rho*) for key variables and level of significance (*p value*). Starred correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 3.9: Spearman Correlations of Key Variables, CLINS 2

	leader	values	cynic	orgid_wp	orgid_a	cohesion	shared	gpa	age	trust_in	leader_in	friend_in
leader	1.0000											
values	0.2367*	1.0000										
	0.0000											
cynic	0.0850	0.3985*	1.0000									
	0.0623	0.0000										
orgid_wp	0.2088*	0.3464*	0.5527*	1.0000								
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000									
orgid_army	0.2630*	0.4392*	0.4496*	0.4445*	1.0000							
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000								
cohesion	0.0969	0.2709*	0.3278*	0.2289*	0.3159*	1.0000						
	0.0334	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000							
shared	0.0907	0.2977*	0.4190*	0.3177*	0.3328*	0.6291*	1.0000					
	0.0465	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000						
gpa	0.0567	0.0603	0.1129	0.1026	-0.0239	0.0597	-0.0605	1.0000				
	0.2141	0.1860	0.0131	0.0242	0.6007	0.1906	0.1851					
age	0.0229	-0.0698	-0.2057*	-0.0626	0.0609	-0.0207	-0.0055	-0.1042	1.0000			
	0.6158	0.1262	0.0000	0.1700	0.1816	0.6505	0.9039	0.0222				
trust_in	0.1271*	0.2001*	0.0110	-0.0153	0.0821	0.0813	0.0711	0.2211*	0.2131*	1.0000		
	0.0044	0.0001	0.1341	0.2555	0.0073	0.0259	0.0449	0.0002	0.0001			
leader_in	0.2247*	0.0990*	0.0144	-0.0441	0.1439*	0.2251	0.4385	0.1844*	0.3989*	0.4798*	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0022	0.2419	0.2866	0.0002	0.1398	0.6409	0.0000	0.0002	0.0000		
friend_in	0.2014*	0.1218	-0.0188	0.1183	0.1188*	0.1473	0.0987	0.4497	0.0115	0.3577*	0.1471*	1.0000
	0.0002	0.0098	0.0611	0.4402	0.0009	0.0355	0.5767	0.3298	0.0938	0.0000	0.0000	

Network Measures, Analysis, and Categorization

The CLINS surveys asked three network questions using a fixed choice roster method (Wasserman & Faust, 2009):

1. Name up to 5 people you consider to be a friend (*someone you choose to spend your time with and go on pass with*).
2. Think of the qualities of an *effective leader*. Name up to 5 cadets you think have the most potential to become the best leaders (consider all four classes).
3. Name up to 5 cadets you trust (*not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem trustworthy*).

After each question the subjects were given a pull-down roster of every cadet in their company, from which they selected a maximum of five cadets. Within each cadet company of approximately 120 cadets, roughly eight individuals serve out of company, meaning their academic year position has them living outside the geographical setting of the majority of the company in order to work on a higher level staff. For example, three cadets from Company B3 worked on battalion staff, three worked on regimental staff, one worked on the brigade honor staff, and one cadet was spending a semester at a foreign university. I chose to leave these cadets in the pull-down menu to be selected as friends, effective leaders, or trustworthy individuals because in most cases they had established relationships with the more permanent members of the company, and typically continued interaction with their company peers despite physical separation.

Initially developed by Bavelas (1948), the concept of centrality is a measure of the connectedness of an actor. Knoke and Burt (1983) argue that the importance of an actor in a network is tied to what they term prominence, a combination of centrality and prestige. Central actors have many ties to others. A prestigious actor is the receiver of many directional ties (has a

high indegree). Sociology and management scholars have also treated prestige as a measure of status (e.g. Zeleny, 1940a; Harary, 1959c).

Network centrality is commonly measured in terms of degree, closeness, and betweenness. Degree is the number of nodes that a node is connected to; therefore, the degree is also a measure of the involvement of the focal node in the network (Opsahl, et al., 2010). Degree does not measure the ease of flow between nodes, meaning that a node of high degree may not easily reach others to access resources or information. It simply relates the connectedness of an actor, or how many other actors are adjacent to it. Closeness centrality addresses this issue, as closeness is defined as the number of connections between nodes, or the inverse sum of connections to all other nodes from a focal node. Central actors can reach all other nodes in the network with a minimum number of steps (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). A node with high closeness likely encounters less resistance trying to access resources or spread information throughout the network. Betweenness is a measure of how the node may influence information being passed through the network. To be precise, across all node pairs with a shortest path containing node v, the betweenness centrality of v is the percentage of these pairs that pass through v (Freeman, 1979).

By laying along the shortest route of information or resource flow, a node can exert control or influence on the flow, and is therefore a key player in the network. These three measurements of network centrality help to evaluate a node's influence and position within the network and allow comparison of nodes within a network. In cases of ambiguity, degree is often better than closeness and betweeness. Two key limitation of the CLINS surveys are use of the fixed roster (subjects are limited to selecting five names from a pull-down menu) and a participation rate under 70 percent.

The choice of which network measure to use also has a theoretical motivation. For one kind of theoretical issue, it may be that betweeness matters for one and closeness for another. Rarely would a researcher want to use all three. For example, betweenness matters most in power and brokerage relationships, where information can change as it passes through nodes. In the case of a cadet company, cadets are interacting regularly (in person and through electronic mediums) and a member is unlikely to miss information because someone withholds it. Closeness is about efficiency of information flow. Someone can more easily reach others; it is less strained than betweenness but still requires assumption that a zero (lack of nomination by a subject) means there's no possibility of a connection.

Degree centrality is just the number of people who nominate a member, thus it is most directly interpretable (I do not need to make assumptions about where information can flow). Additionally, it is important to note that the CLINS network variables are directional, and I therefore focus on indegree measurements of centrality across the friendship, trustworthiness, and effective leadership networks. An actor with a high trustworthiness indegree (*trust_indeg*), is one whom many other cadets nominated as being trustworthy.

Table 3.10: Summary Statistics of Key Network Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
leader_indeg	671	.0770179	.118612	0	1
trust_indeg	671	.1480419	.1528304	0	1
friend_indeg	671	.2574948	.1967895	0	1

Being primarily concerned with leader identity development, I treat *leader* as a dependent variable. The *leader* variable is constructed from Likert scale questions pertaining to motivation

to lead and self-identification as a leader (e.g. “I am the type of person who likes to be in charge of others,” and reverse-coded: “I am definitely not a leader by nature,”). Tables 3.11 and 3.12 indicate that *leader* is surprisingly consistent across cadet year groups.

Table 3.11: Summary of *leader* by Year Group, CLINS 1

Grad Year	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2012	153	3.839	.6593	1.8	5
2013	174	3.797	.5982	1.6	5
2014	199	3.789	.6165	1	5
2015	227	3.735	.6570	1.2	5

Table 3.12: Summary of *leader* by Year Group, CLINS 2

Grad Year	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2013	93	3.696	.5638	2.4	5
2014	116	3.737	.5982	1.8	5
2015	155	3.749	.6215	1.6	5
2016	174	3.652	.5935	2	5

Leader identity is also consistent along cadet age, race, gender, and grade point average. I now focus statistical analysis on the CLINS 1 data to avoid repetition. An ordered logistic regression accounts for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, as discussed earlier. The *cohesion* and *shared* variables proved inconsequential.

Table 3.13: Ordered Logistic Regression of CLINS Data

Number of obs = 598
LR chi2(7) = 102.37
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -606.20657 Pseudo R2 = 0.0779

leader	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
cynic	-.8752419	.654011	-1.34	0.181	-2.15708	.4065962
values	4.764177	1.082244	4.40	0.000	2.643018	6.885337
orgid_wp	-1.987479	.5818388	-3.42	0.001	-3.127862	-.8470961
orgid_army	2.417634	.5795122	4.17	0.000	1.281811	3.553457
leader_indeg	3.258547	1.070408	3.04	0.002	1.160587	5.356508
trust_indeg	-1.562259	.8834695	-1.77	0.077	-3.293828	.1693092
friend_indeg	1.652088	.4570979	3.61	0.000	.7561925	2.547983
/cut1	-1.136234	1.193245			-3.474951	1.202482
/cut2	1.107919	.9903424			-.8331166	3.048954
/cut3	4.010083	.9853383			2.078855	5.94131
/cut4	6.830754	1.014654			4.842068	8.819439

Ordered logistic coefficients are in log-odds units and cannot be interpreted as regular ordinary least squared coefficients. Post-estimation is necessary through looking at marginal fixed effects. A z-value greater than 1.96 (for a 95% confidence) indicates that a variable has significant influence on leader identity. The higher the z-value (positive or negative), the greater the impact on *leader*. Two-tail p-values, or P > |z|, are testing the hypothesis that each independent variable's coefficient is different from zero. A p-value less than 0.05 (given the large sample size, I choose to use an alpha of 0.05) indicates that the variable is statistically different from zero and therefore has significant influence on *leader*. In Table 3.13, *cynic* and *trust_indeg* do not appear to be significant. Examining marginal effects through post estimation yields a better understanding of the independent variable coefficients.

Table 3.14: Marginal Fixed Effects After Ordered Logistic Regression of CLINS Data

variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% C.I.	]	X
cynic	-.0986869	.0741	-1.33	0.183	-.243919	.046545	.689775
values	.5371795	.1267	4.24	0.000	.288842	.785517	.84796
orgid_wp	-.224096	.0666	-3.37	0.001	-.35462	-.093572	.468514
orgid_army	.2725977	.0664	4.10	0.000	.142421	.402774	.813808
leader_indeg	.3674139	.1222	3.01	0.003	.127809	.607018	.080254
trust_indeg	-.1761508	.1001	-1.76	0.079	-.372386	.020084	.150818
friend_indeg	.1862793	.0524	3.55	0.000	.083482	.289077	.258656

The marginal fixed effects allow calculation of probabilities of change in the dependent variable based on changes in independent variables.

Table 3.15: Probabilities of Leader Identity (*leader*) Scores Based on Values (*values*) Scores (all other independent variables held constant at mean)

	values=1	values=2	values=3	values=4	values=5
Pr(leader=1|x):	0.0486	0.0307	0.0075	0.0029	0.0011
Pr(leader=2|x):	0.2765	0.1995	0.0593	0.0240	0.0094
Pr(leader=3|x):	0.5726	0.6147	0.4992	0.3078	0.1519
Pr(leader=4|x):	0.0956	0.1443	0.3903	0.5594	0.6026
Pr(leader=5|x):	0.0067	0.0108	0.0437	0.1059	0.2349

Table 3.15 above provides a more meaningful understanding of the impact of an independent variable on leader identity. The variable *values*, which has the greatest impact of any independent variable in the model, clearly has a positive relationship with *leader*. With a high *values* score of 5, for example, it is likely that a cadet will self identify as a leader (60.26% chance of *leader* = 4 and 23.49% chance of *leader* = 5 when all other independent variables are held constant at their means). Lower *values* scores show an increasing likelihood of lower leader identity scores. Academy leaders (and anyone interested in West Point creating leaders of character, such as U.S. taxpayers) would likely be heartened to see the positive relationship

between *values* and *leader*. Based on the CLINS questions regarding *values*, those with a high *values* score have internalized the honor code, respect the Army values, will stand up against unethical behavior, etc.

Table 3.16: Probabilities of Leader Identity (*leader*) Scores Based on Leadership Indegree (*leader_indeg*) Scores (all other independent variables held constant at mean)

	indeg=0	indeg=.2	indeg=.4	indeg=.6	indeg=.8	indeg=1
Pr(leader=1|x):	0.0030	0.0016	0.0008	0.0004	0.0002	0.0001
Pr(leader=2|x):	0.0247	0.0131	0.0069	0.0036	0.0019	0.0010
Pr(leader=3|x):	0.3143	0.1985	0.1160	0.0645	0.0348	0.0185
Pr(leader=4|x):	0.5551	0.6066	0.5796	0.4841	0.3547	0.2317
Pr(leader=5|x):	0.1028	0.1802	0.2967	0.4473	0.6083	0.7487

Table 3.16 is a similar method, here looking at the impact of leader indegree. A higher *leader_indeg* value (shortened to *indeg* along the top axis of the table) means that a large number of peers identified the cadet as one of their five company members when asked: “Think of the qualities of an effective leader. Name up to five cadet you think have the most potential to become the best leaders (consider all four classes).” The ordered logistic regression shows that cadets with higher leader indegree are more likely to have stronger leader identity, and Table 3.16 is a useful means of making sense of the output. For example, in moving from leader indegree of 0.6 to 0.8, a cadet is 16.1% more likely to have a *leader* score of 5 (60.83% - 44.73% = 16.1%). While the ordered logistic results are more statistically rigorous, a standard regression can still be informative.

Table 3.17: Standard Regression of CLINS Data

```
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     598
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   590) =   14.63
       Model |  47.7782331     7  6.82546187           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  275.245178   590  .466517251           R-squared     =  0.1479
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1378
       Total |  323.023411   597  .541077741           Root MSE      =  .68302
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      leader |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       cynic |  -.3406807   .2247108    -1.52   0.130    -.7820112    .1006498
      values |   1.616916   .3617102     4.47   0.000     .9065197    2.327312
    orgid_wp |  -.6907041   .1963476    -3.52   0.000    -1.076329   -.3050787
  orgid_army |   .7332687   .1918519     3.82   0.000     .3564729    1.110065
leader_indeg |   1.157763      .3708     3.12   0.002     .4295147    1.886012
 trust_indeg |  -.5703812   .3102885    -1.84   0.067    -1.179786    .0390231
friend_indeg |   .5764532    .159987     3.60   0.000     .2622398    .8906666
       _cons |   2.247493   .3307645     6.79   0.000     1.597873    2.897112
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

The regression in Table 3.17 shows similar results as the ordered logistic regression. *Values* is highly significant and has the greatest impact of all independent variables. Cadets who are highly identified as having leadership potential also self-identify as leaders. Organizational identity with West Point has a negative effect on leadership identity, while organizational identity with the Army has a positive effect. This result is interesting, but also fitting with my ethnographic research. As previously mentioned, the majority of cadets are optimistic about their futures as Army officers.

Even those harboring great cynicism for the academy can be eager for the relative freedom and responsibility of being a lieutenant. Sophomore cadet Sebastian Marks said, “I’ve been here less than two years, and I’m already feeling pretty bitter about the whole experience. Yuk year isn’t much better than plebe year like I thought it would be. I like my friends, and I know I’m getting a good education and all, but I just don’t enjoy my life or really feel connected to this place like. I just want to be an officer and lead, and the sooner I can get there the better.” I find this quote representative of several other cadets I interviewed, and I believe it helps

explain the opposite effect of *orgid_wp* and *orgid_army* on leader identity. Marks clearly has high leader identity and occupies the leader identity development phase (he views himself as a leader and continues self-development), yet his organizational identity with the academy is low.

The *cynic* and *trust_indegree* coefficients are both interestingly negative, but not statistically different from zero. The trustworthiness variable is still of interest, however, and also significant if using an alpha of 0.1. From the CLINS survey, subjects are asked, "Name up to five cadets you trust (not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem trustworthy)." Why would trust indegree have a negative relationship with leader identity? I will return to this question after describing a categorization of organizational members.

There was some asymmetry in the reporting of friends, trustworthiness, and good leaders. A reported connection, such as selecting someone as a friend, could be induced by a triad (e.g. a cadet spends time with cadet X because he wants to be with cadet Y. 58% of cadets selected as a friend returned the selection. When you have imperfect measures (binary) it does not mean members cannot be friends. This makes it difficult to motivate betweeness centrality. If friendship could conceivably exist along a path that I fail to measure then it is invalid. Centrality is predicated on the assumption that if a connection is not identified then information cannot flow through that path. This is invalid if information could flow, and I simply fail to capture the connection. This is further reasoning for my focus on indegree centrality. As a robustness check I assume there is a non-response. There may be missing data (I missed the return report from the named friend) because subjects are limited to five names and did not have a free name to respond, or the target noted did not take the survey. With symmetrized ties (assuming that whenever i chooses j, j also chooses i) I get the same story. As an additional robustness check, I found that roster position (the order of names on the pull-down menu in the CLINS survey) does

not impact indegree. Thus, names at the top of the pull-down menu are not selected more often than names further down the list.

I categorize cadets in the network by their levels of leader identity and network centrality. I use three levels of leader identity (low, moderate, and high) and two levels of network centrality (low or high). The first group exhibits low leader identity and low network centrality. These cadets have generally not had the experience or development necessary to identify themselves as leaders, or they have not been inspired to view themselves as leaders. Low network centrality means they either do not have many connections within the network, they are on the periphery of the network, or they cannot exert control over information flow in the network. The cause of low network centrality may be their lack of formal leader positions within the network, an inability or lack of desire to obtain an informal leadership position in the network, or simply being socially reclusive or unliked.

Table 3.18: Colloquial Terms Defined by Network Centrality and Leader Identity

	Low Leader Identity	Moderate Leader Identity	High Leader Identity
Low Network Centrality	Ghost	Slug	Tool
High Network Centrality	Bro	Likable	Good Dude

A colloquial term at the military academy for cadets that fall into this category is a 'ghost'. Ghosts at West Point, according to the organization's culture, are rarely seen by other

members of their companies, implying that they have few network connections. Underclassmen will struggle to recognize the ghost as a member of their company. When asked about such a cadet in his own company, freshman cadet Christopher Lee responded, "[the ghost] even goes to West Point?" Two other cadets in the company failed to recognize the ghost despite having lived on the same floor of the same building for nearly four months.

The next category of cadets exhibit low leader identity, but have high network centrality. Cadets in this group do not identify themselves as leaders. However, having high network centrality would suggest that they hold an informal leadership position, as they can influence information within the network. Alternatively, they could simply be liked socially, and are not necessarily viewed as good leaders. These cadets are often referred to as 'bros'. A bro, as the slang implies, would be seen as a less developed leader, but still a likable person. Cadets typically see bros as good people, but they recognize their low leader identity by saying that they do not enforce or abide by the regulations and standards of the organization. Bros may have unique leadership potential through leveraging of network position.

A third group is those with moderate leader identity and low network centrality. Cadets in this group typically have had some development as a leader, but do not strongly self-identify as leaders. Low network centrality suggests that they share some of the same social habits as ghosts, as they have little network capital that they can leverage to influence information or resources in the network. I assign the term 'slug' to this group. Slug is a commonly used term at West Point that can have an abundance of meanings, being both derogatory and complimentary, as slang terms often depend on context. For the purposes of this study, the definition of slug is based on interviews with cadets. The consensus of cadets from all four classes is that a slug is "a cadet that participates in minimal physical activities, company events, and duties," as explained

by one senior cadet. From this definition, the moderate leader identity is evident, as slugs participate in mandatory leader development events such as company intramural athletics, but they do not exhibit high leader identity.

The most highly populated group is that with moderate leader identity and high network centrality. Cadets in this group would say they are nearly ready to take on the responsibility of leading a larger group of cadets such as a platoon or company, but not ready to become an officer and lead a platoon in the Army. They typically identify themselves with multiple different groups, whether those groups are military organizations such as their company, or athletic teams and clubs. High network centrality often follows from their identity with these groups. These 'likable' cadets are often easy to get along with and well respected, but not necessarily the cadets that others want to see occupy a leadership position.

The final two classifications of cadets exhibit high leader identity. These cadets identify themselves strongly as leaders and are often granted leadership positions in their network, whether it be a formal or an informal position. The first group, the 'tools', are self-interested and patronizing. They have low network centrality, as their self-interest and "brown-nosing" character makes them unattractive to peers. Tools are particularly harmful to networks in spite of their low centrality. When tools are placed in formal leadership positions, which often occurs due to their high leader identity, their attitude impacts other cadets that are obligated to interact with them.

Table 3.19: Percentage of Surveyed Cadets in Each Colloquial Category

	Low Leader Identity	Moderate Leader Identity	High Leader Identity
Low Network Centrality	Ghost = 7.8%	Slug = 18.6%	Tool = 8.0%
High Network Centrality	Bro = 14.1%	Likable = 38.2%	Good Dude = 13.3%

Table 3.20: Percentage of Interviewed Cadets in Each Colloquial Category

	Low Leader Identity	Moderate Leader Identity	High Leader Identity
Low Network Centrality	Ghost = 3.6%	Slug = 8.3%	Tool = 7.1%
High Network Centrality	Bro = 21.4%	Likable = 42.9%	Good Dude = 16.7%

The Cadet Leader Identity and Networks Survey asks respondents to select five cadets whom they view as being effective leaders, trustworthy, and friends. The nature of these questions may therefore cause a tool to score very low in centrality measures, but still have a large impact based on a formal leadership position. For example, a tool may be a cadet company commander, and therefore integral to the information flow and operation of a 120-person

organization, but still not be trusted, regarded as a good leader, or thought of as a friend. For this reason I collected the formal chain of command structure for each of the companies surveyed during both rounds of the CLINS study.

As mentioned above, 58% of the nodes selected as a friend returned the friendship connection. Members occupying the colloquial categories tend to establish friendships with similar others, with the tool friendship connection being stronger than any other group (tools befriend other tools at a higher rate than do members of other categories). Having only 67.25% (CLINS1) and 56.85% (CLINS2) of the cadet companies as participants makes it difficult to propose concrete claims about friendship, trust, and leadership networks within my chosen categories, and this represents another limitation of the current study.

Leaders described as tools cause frustration in other cadets when they see through the façade and recognize that the tools are at the top, not because they are competent or have good character, but because they have been able to showcase particular abilities to other leaders within the network, most often the tactical officers (TACs). TACs have significant power in deciding which cadets will occupy chain of command positions. Sophomore cadet Paul Shepherd remarked, “My platoon leader is a total tool. All his leadership bravado is about looking good to the cadet commander and the TAC. He doesn’t care about really developing us at all.” Frustration evolves into feelings of cynicism and builds until cadets have stated that they feel discouraged from developing as a leader. This group is responsible for much of the diffusion of cynicism at the academy.

While tools are a prime contributor to the spread of cynicism, the ‘good dude’ is actively influencing positive attitudes and perhaps increases leader identity across cadets within their networks. A good dude is a cadet with high leader identity and high network centrality. These

cadets have conformed to the in-group and identify strongly with it. They have been reinforced as a leader through a claiming and granting process and exert considerable influence over their network. Other cadets view them as capable leaders and trustworthy friends. Good dudes establish the prototype that most other cadets belonging to the in-group will strive to achieve, and they typically are in leader identity construction. When placed in formal leadership positions, the morale of other cadets in the network increases, and their will to develop themselves as a leader increases. The healthy environment created in the network around a good dude fosters development and efficient flow of information and resources.

How a cadet self identifies alters how they react to others. For example, a cadet with a low or moderate leader identity will typically classify themselves as discouraged or frustrated when they encounter a tool. Conversely, those same cadets consider themselves to have a greater ability to develop their leader identity when led by a good dude. The implication of West Point's mission statement and the West Point Leader Development System is that every cadet is consistently placed in situations where development as a leader of character is possible.

Upon encountering a tool or a poor leader, cadets are encouraged to use the situation as a challenge to become better leaders. Some cadets will use their interactions with a tool as a learning experience, while others that have not identified with or established loyalty toward the organization will associate the negative experience with the organization. This negative association can breed frustration and cynicism, as cadets feel discouraged to participate in leadership development opportunities.

Categorized Members in the Network

Figure 3.1 shows cadet company A2's friendship network. The circled node is the cadet with the largest number of others claiming him or her as a friend. In total, 12 people claimed this cadet as a friend. Cadet X, as she will be referred to, had the highest indegree centrality in the friendship network (the greatest number of A2 cadets selecting her as a friend). In this network, Cadet X has the highest friend indegree centrality of 0.094, with the second highest being 0.079.

Figure 3.1: Company A2 Friendship Network.



While Figure 3.1 shows the friendship network of the company, to accurately classify Cadet X into one of the previous mentioned six categories, I look at her leadership identity. Figure 3.2 is the leadership network map for the same cadet company. Again, Cadet X is the circled node. The leadership network is more centralized around a small number of nodes, unlike the friendship network that was somewhat separated by class year. The highest leadership network indegree centrality was 0.205 (selected by 26 other cadets as being an effective leader), but Cadet X has a value of 0.024. Her CLINS *leader* score is well below the mean at 2.25.

Figure 3.2: Company A2 Leadership Network



Applying this data to the claiming and granting process that leaders in an organization experience while building their leader identity, it can be seen that a relative minority within the company grant Cadet X a leadership role, whether formal or informal. In turn, she has a relatively low ability to claim an informal leadership role, yet she may be able to claim a formal leadership position in the organization based on class year and rank. Cadet X falls into the classification of a 'bro', or a cadet with high network centrality and low leader identity (as confirmed by her *leader* score of 2.25).

I now return to the question raised by the negative relationship between *trust_indeg* and *leader*. The ordered logistic and linear regression analysis shows that cadets with lower leader identity are more likely to be selected as being trustworthy. The answer to this conundrum may be the 'bro'. These cadets are deemed trustworthy by peers despite surprisingly low leader identity. For some, the complete lack of interest in leader development is a character hallmark. Senior cadet Steve Campbell remarked, "Yes, I know some people consider me a bro. It has to do with not really caring about everything stressful around there. You just focus on having a good time whenever you can, and taking care of people." Despite a lack of interest in institutional requirements, I can see why Campbell is trusted. Cadets may view trustworthiness from a more personal perspective than leadership; a 'bro' is someone they are more likely to trust with moral conflict or private issues.

This explanation of the negative relationship between trustworthiness and leadership identity also holds when looking at the opposite end of the categorization: the 'tool'. In speaking about a tool classmate, junior cadet Clarence Holdings said, "I avoid that guy at all costs. I know

he's so fired up about looking like such a great commander, and he'll sell anyone out to keep that image." The tool cadet will score high on leader identity yet low on trustworthiness.

What can happen when a 'bro' cadet, such as Cadet X, is put into a formal leadership position within the company hierarchy? Based on the survey data from her company, few other cadets think of Cadet X as a leader, yet many view her as a friend. It is therefore likely that if Cadet X was placed into a formal leadership position where she had the opportunity to claim a leader role in the organization, her support network of friends would help her grow and develop a stronger leader identity, accelerating her towards the 'good dude' category of high network centrality and high leader identity. When asked about the potential of this situation, senior cadet Kyle Pressley said, "Yes, I've dealt with that before. My old roommate was first sergeant last semester. He hated it and didn't want the job, but the TAC said he was the man… Most of us got behind him and helped get the under classes on board even when he messed something up." This may not be the case for other cadets placed in a formal leadership position.

To examine the phenomenon of a 'ghost' (a cadet with low leader identity and low network centrality) being placed into a leadership position, I look to a second cadet, Cadet Y. Figure 3.3 is the same friendship and leadership network shown prior, however Cadet Y is now circled. Cadet Y has a friendship indegree centrality value of 0.008 and leadership indegree centrality value of 0.016. Indegree centrality in the company's trust network (not shown) is 0.000. Cadet Y likely does not identify with the in-group's culture or values (additionally, *orgid_wp* = 1.85 and *orgid_army* = 2.65). He is not the prototypical group member that would attract others and lead them to conform more to the prototype of the in-group.

Figure 3.3: Company A2 Friendship Network (left) and Leadership Network (right).



Academy leaders are concerned about organizational members like Cadet Y. Ideally, every cadet in the Corps of Cadets would have high leader identity by the time of their graduation. In order to encourage development of a strong leader identity, West Point requires that all cadets are given formal leadership positions within the Corps at some point during their cadet careers. If leader identity is low, cadets with high network centrality, like Cadet X, are able to rely on their friends for support and to help them work through the challenges of holding a formal position. Their claim to leadership is likely to be reciprocated despite having low leader identity. Sophomore cadet May Booker said, “If I respect someone, like if they’re my friend or I know they care about me and are trying their hardest, I’ll work for them even if they’re screwing things up.” Cadet Y does not have that support network of friends, and appears to lack the trust

of his company peers. Few may be willing to grant him a leader role, even if West Point officers place him in a formal hierarchical leadership position.

Ghosts such as Cadet Y are often still placed into a developmental position, where they are forced to claim a formal leader role, such as a platoon leader. Tactical officer Gregory Johnson remarked, "Obviously you'd love to put your super stars in the leadership positions and just let the company operate smoothly, but then you're doing a disservice to future soldiers by allowing weaker leaders to skate by and still graduate. We have to challenge even those who would rather hide in the back of formation, even if it causes growing pains for a squad or platoon." Officers and non-commissioned officers tend to identify members such as Cadet Y and focus their attention and mentorship efforts on assisting them through the challenges of formal leader roles. I view this as an effort to intervene during the relational recognition cycle of leadership claiming and leadership granting (DeRue & Ashford, 2010) (see also Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1), and push the cadet toward a phase of leader identity construction.

In his formal leader role, Cadet Y's performance and development would likely suffer without a relatively large change to his identity and network centrality. Platoon leaders are responsible for a large portion of their platoon member's daily lives. Therefore, if Cadet Y is performing poorly and not improving, the cadets in his platoon will feel a negative impact from his actions. Van Maanen's (1979) work would suggest that the cadets who identify with the values of and are loyal to the organization would not have their organizational loyalty or identity affected by this negative interpersonal relationship. The majority of the cadets in Cadet Y's platoon are members of the lower two classes who have spent anywhere from three to twenty months at the academy.

In this amount of time, some will have identified with West Point and the Army. The effect of Cadet Y's leadership, according to Van Maanen's (1979) argument, would be seen most greatly on the ones who do not identify with the parent organization, and who have low leader identity themselves. These cadets would see their single interpersonal relationship with Cadet Y as typical of the academy and the Army and become unmotivated to develop and internalize the values of the organization. I saw this clearly in Paul Cooper, the freshman cadet grappling with the decision to stay or quit. Six months into his time at West Point he said, "I'm just shocked at how terrible a few of my cadet leaders are. My squad leader and platoon leader don't understand me, and I would never follow them in combat. I can't believe they're going to be lieutenants in about a year and a half. It makes me want to quit because I don't want to be around them." Despite having several great cadet and officer leader examples in his life, he associates a few weak leaders with the parent organization, and this significantly impacts his occupation of the leader identity destruction phase of development and his eventual decision to leave the academy.

The cadets negatively affected by Cadet Y's leadership are of concern to the organization. When a member becomes unmotivated to develop and internalize the values of the organization, they begin to become part of the out-group and have less centrality in their network. As these members progress in rank and responsibility, they eventually gain leadership roles of their own. Suddenly, they are in the same position as Cadet Y with low network centrality and possibly low leader identity. These cadets in turn influence others and perpetuate a cycle of poor leadership. I see this as a root cause of cynicism at the academy. Cadets develop negative and pessimistic notions with regards to the Army and West Point because of a few weak leaders. Until they internalize the values of their organization, their interpersonal relationships affect their view of the organization as a whole, leading to feelings of cynicism and pessimism.

One cadet stated that when he encounters a bad leader, he felt, “discouraged with the system as a whole.”

The third interesting cadet I examine is Cadet Z, the ‘good dude’. As previously defined, a good dude has high network centrality and high leader identity. Cadet Z has high indegree centrality values in the friendship, leadership, and trust networks. As seen in Figure 3.4, Cadet Z appears to have a high degree of friendship network centrality. His total indegree centrality values are 0.063 for the friendship network, 0.056 for the trustworthiness network, and 0.165 for the effective leader network.

Figure 3.4: Company F3 Friendship Network



To be a good dude, Cadet Z must also have high leader identity. Using DeRue and Ashford's (1985) theory of claiming and granting and the deviation amplifying loops that result from the process (Masuch, 1985), a node in the leadership network that is identified by many followers as a leader is likely to self identify as a leader. While not as high in leadership network indegree centrality as some cadets, Cadet Z fits this category based on CLINS scores (*leader* = 4.45).

Figure 3.5: Company F3 Leadership Network



Network analysis shows that Cadet Z is well liked within his company, and that he is seen as a strong leader. Cadet Y's low leader identity and lack of friends may lead some cadets around him to grow unmotivated to develop as leaders. Cadet Z more likely inspires cadets to grow and develop as leaders and he fosters a healthy, trusting environment (indegree centrality value of 0.056 in the company trust network). Sophomore cadet Dan Wittaker said that when he encounters a cadet that is well liked and seen as a strong leader, "I use his example to make my own leadership style and I go to him for help with problems. There's a firstie in my company right now like that. He's not a PL or anything, but I seek him out because he seems to have given really good advice in the past, and he's just a good dude. He's pretty inspiring." Good dudes as leaders, either formally or informally, possess the networks to give advice and help others, and perhaps push organizational members into leader identity construction.

Organizational members with low leader identity and network centrality are likely to struggle and negatively impact other's motivation, development, and attitude when placed in leadership positions. The ensuing cycle of failed leadership claiming and granting breeds cynicism and stunts leader development throughout sub-organizations. Countering that phenomenon is the effect that cadets with high leader identity and network centrality have on their network when placed in a formal leader position. Their leader identity and network centrality make them valuable assets for the organization as they help develop others within the organization.

CHAPTER 4: LEADER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the development of a social networking technology that ties together multiple communities of practice (CoP) to shape organizational leader identity. Through the creation and distribution of knowledge, the MilSpace technology creates value for its parent organization, the U.S. Army. Founded as a grassroots movement to enhance communication among junior military officers, the technology has retained many of its original qualities despite institutionalization within the military bureaucracy and recognition as a Harvard Business Review Top 20 Business Idea of 2006.

A gap exists in management literature pertaining to the creation and use of social network technologies for identity development in organizations. This line of research shows promise for bringing individual agency into network analysis and for explaining institutionally-embedded learning and identity development networks.

The community of practice (CoP) is a social technology that facilitates knowledge creation and learning. Powell, et al. (1996: 142), who find that innovation in fields of rapid technological change occurs more frequently in learning networks rather than individual firms, note, "Learning occurs within the context of membership in a community and may require different kinds of organizations and organizational practices to access that community." Brown and Duguid (2001: 203) write of CoPs, "Mediating as they do between individuals and large formal and informal social structures, and between organizations and their environment, they are

where a good deal of the work involved in knowledge creation and organizational learning gets done."

Brown and Duguid (1991) propose that the CoP is able to create tacit knowledge that resides in a social distribution among members, tools, and practices. The CoP is therefore more than a learning tool, but a means of member identification. They write, "Sociocultural accounts of knowledge and the firm generally turn on the relationship between individual learning and social identity. Learning is inevitably implicated in the acquisition of knowledge, but it is also implicated in the acquisition of identity," (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 200). Wenger (1998) proposes that learning is integral to member identity, and that CoP participants benefit from learning and knowledge transfer while continuously building a shared identity.

Though MilSpace provides some of the services found in popular social network sites, it is important to distinguish a CoP from the more prevalent social platforms. Boyd and Ellison (2007) define social network sites as internet-based products that allow members to, "(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system."

Though knowledge is exchanged and learning certainly occurs, the context of such sites is generally limited to interpersonal relationships. Communities of practice, however, are depicted as a group of people with common interest who connect informally and responsibly to promote learning, solve problems, or develop new ideas. Membership in the CoP implies, "participation in an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their communities," (Lave & Wenger, 1991: 98).

Figure 4.1: A Snapshot of Potential Audience Population and Typical Organizational Position[10]

Active Officer Corps, 2013

Rank	#
2nd Lt.	6,912
1st Lt.	13,260
Captain	29,958
Major	17,151
Lt. Colonel	10,255
Colonel	4,415
1 Star	134
2 Star	119
3 Star	51
4 Star	10
Total	82,265



Wellman, et al. (1996) describe similar community characteristics under the term computer supported social networks (CSSNs), but CoP better describes the focus of this chapter on a population that often shares face-to-face communication, though most information flow is computer mediated. In reviewing much of the organization knowledge literature, Brown and Duguid (2001: 202) conclude that, "For a variety of reasons, then, communities of practice seem a useful organizational subset for examining organizational knowledge as well as identity."

The term community of practice may encroach on the sociological concept of a boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) in that the community represents a variety of meanings for

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[10] Active Officer Corps population data is from Department of Defense Personnel and Procurement Reports and Data Files. Retrieved June 10, 2013 from http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm.

multiple organizational members. The concept aligns closely with what is often termed a trading zone, or "boundary-spanning coordination work in conditions of high speed, uncertainty, and rapid change," (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006: 22; Galison, 1999). Drawing on Knorr-Cetina's (1999) work, the CoP represents a specific organizational structure that composes an epistemic setting.

Social technologies are becoming increasingly pervasive (or invasive, depending on your perspective on the technology). Four of the most popular social networking websites, Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, and Twitter, have over 1,966,000,000 active users alone.[11] Younger segments of the current workforce are generally familiar with networking technology, yet business organizations have rarely capitalized on this potential source of knowledge creation and technical proficiency. As a CoP, MilSpace serves a more knowledge-based purpose than social network sites, yet its position in the middle ground of computer-based networks allows it to draw on the increasing prevalence of web-based and mobile social technology in the lives and identity creation of organizational members.

[11] Business Insider (2013, May). Retrieved June 01, 2013, from http://www.businessinsider.com/google-plus-is-outpacing-twitter-2013-5.

Figure 4.2: The Landscape of Online/Mobile Social and Knowledge Networks



Figure 4.2 depicts the variation in function of several prevalent online and mobile networks. Technologies range in purpose from the predominantly social (Facebook and Twitter) to the purely informational (online libraries), with CoPs defining a space in between. There is often some variation in purpose, such as LinkedIn's professional information purposes, or a social element to creating knowledge through repeated interchange on Wikipedia's encyclopedic entries.

In looking critically at the case of networking technology in the U.S. Army through inside access to documents and the people who created and currently manage the CoP, I am able to comment on the impact of such communities on leader identity development.

Research Setting

In March of 2000, four Army captains working as professors at West Point used their spare time to launch the website www.CompanyCommand.com, "as a means of connecting past, present, and future company commanders in an ongoing conversation about leading Soldiers and building combat-ready units," (Dixon, et al., 2005). Use of the website by junior military officers (lieutenants and captains) grew rapidly, and the team started www.PlatoonLeader.org to cover topics focused on lieutenants. After two years of expansion, military leaders recognized the value of these websites and reassigned the founding members to earn their doctoral degrees and return to West Point in order to run the newly created Center for Company-level Leaders (CCL), now renamed the Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational Learning (CALDOL).

Figure 4.3: A Screen Shot from Company Command on MilSpace



Having grown beyond the capacity of their personal resources, and requiring institutional support to continue, the founding team donated their websites to the Army in 2003, after which they were shifted to military servers and given ".army.mil" internet addresses. After on-line content was directly quoted in the media, the websites were restricted to military use only and membership reached approximately 26,000. Access was restricted not only for security concerns, but because members would be less likely to share their stories and knowledge if they thought it was going to be published in print, and not merely shared by the community. In May of 2006, use was restricted to officers and cadets, and membership stands at approximately 8,000 for PlatoonLeader and 10,000 for CompanyCommand. In their third major platform change, both websites were updated with Web 2.0 technology and incorporated into a single virtual environment known as MilSpace. The fourth (and most recent) upgrade consolidated all MilSpace applications under an Army-wide technology suite known as MilBook.

Two of the founding members, Pete Kilner and Tony Burgess, now manage MilSpace as part of their responsibility as directors of CALDOL. Despite its humble origins as a basic website technology with no operational funding and minimal institutional support, the MilSpace community of practice has become a fundamental component of the Army's organizational structure that incorporates multiple innovative technologies such as social tagging, i-Link, wiki, RSS feeds, and dynamic content rating. Within two years of its launch, the technology was recognized by national newspapers and was presented the Army's Knowledge Management Award. The Harvard Business Review recognized the website as one of the top 20 business ideas of 2006. In addition to running the online networks, Kilner and Burgess have a number of other responsibilities, including the development of material for Army Magazine, a monthly hardcopy publication with a distribution of over 120,000. The MilSpace directors select a

pertinent discussion, collaborate with online members to improve their writing, and then submit a collection of postings to the magazine.

Figure 4.4: A Screen Shot from Company Command on the Most Recent Upgrade, Known as MilBook



Figure 4.5: CompanyCommand.com's March 2012 contribution to Army Magazine

To: Company Commanders
From: Company Commanders

Lessons from Task Force Duke in Afghanistan

Company commanders from the nine battalions that composed Task Force Duke (3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division) in the summer of 2011 have shared their hard-earned knowledge and experiences in a new *Afghan Commander AAR Book*. Task Force Duke waged a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Khost, Paktya and Ghazni from January to December 2011. Despite their high operational tempo, 43 commanders made time during their deployment to share what they were learning with the company commanders who would follow in their footsteps. This month, we share excerpts from some of the contributors.

CPT Bernard Gardner
C/1-26 Infantry
COP Bowri Tanah, Khost Province

Defining Unit Experience

The toughest situation for the company occurred on 2 September 2011 when two platoons and my TAC faced a complex attack when conducting a joint raid to capture a high-value individual in a congested urban area. A group of children and teenagers had moved close to our inner cordon, and one teenager threw a grenade that exploded 10 feet from me and some of the Soldiers. Five seconds later, another local-national kid ran near one of the vehicles on the outer cordon and threw a grenade into one of the gunner's turrets, and then we received small-arms fire from a cornfield 300 meters away. Six U.S. personnel were wounded, including me, as well as two Afghan border police. My body immediately went into shock after 10 pieces of shrapnel tore into

This event was a perfect scenario where a unit had to execute succession of command under fire with multiple platoons. It is important for all Soldiers to understand that they are literally a heartbeat away from taking over their supervisors' duties and responsibilities. Thankfully, there were no KIA and our succession of command was anticipated, understood and rehearsed prior to conducting the mission. The leaders executed flawlessly and maintained our battle rhythm until I resumed command several days later.

CPT Jerry Wood
B/6-4 Cavalry
COP Wilderness, Paktya Province

Building the U.S.-Afghan Team

In everything that you do, you will have an Afghan counterpart (if you want to be successful). Focus your first month or so on building the team. Drink the chai and eat

Figure 4.5 shows the opening portion of the end product of a monthly iterative process. A topic of interest begins in the online forum. Organizational members with popular submissions (those voted most helpful by the community of practice) are contacted by CALDOL and asked to refine their writing for publication in Army Magazine.

Participation

Why do organizational members participate in the community of practice? Kilner and Burgess attribute some of the success of CompanyCommand and PlatoonLeader to the attention given to their members by CALDOL leadership. Kilner says, "I agree that giving attention to a new contributor can help bring them quickly toward the center of the community." Social networking technologies tend to facilitate an early 'honeymoon' period where new adopters constantly check the site as they rapidly build connections, are tagged in photos, have multiple wall comments ("so glad you're finally on here!"), etc. that generally build a sense of self-worth. Kilner has found that it helps to comment visibly on a post, and follow up with a personal note encouraging new members to post pictures, find valued members, and continue their posting. Even after the period of high-volume contribution fades, the member has a base of involvement and a large enough profile to warrant subsequent involvement.

Participation in a CoP takes time, and thus competes with work and recreation outlets. CALDOL has found anecdotally that MilSpace is often viewed either when a member has a specific Army-related question or when the employee needs to be in the office but does not have pressing work to complete. It is atypical to access the site outside of work hours during leisure periods. Kilner states, "I think with the new technology you have the opportunity to interest members in building a larger profile that taps into status, friendships, etc. An obvious concern may be the direction that this takes the community." The fear is that including more social technologies may detract from the professional purpose of the community.

Some cadets and junior officers, particularly those who would contribute to MilSpace, are proud of their profession and would welcome an opportunity to broadcast their status and organizational identity without being socially sanctioned. Publically displaying the signs of a

strong military identity is viewed as norm-breaking by many organizational members, particularly among younger populations of the Army. Cadet Mark Workman, interviewed during ethnographic research, made this point when recounting a situation in which he displayed his Facebook profile picture wearing combat equipment and holding a rifle. He was hassled for days, both on Facebook and in person, despite removing the picture within 24 hours. The strongest sanctioning came from his West Point peers.

It is not socially acceptable to project an image in certain public venues that says a member defines herself as an Army officer (even though many do, at least partially), but on MilSpace it is the norm. On MilSpace, members are expected to fill out a profile and include military education, completed training, feelings on leading troops, and pictures while serving in the military. This holds great value in encouraging membership and participation, and in strengthening leader identity.

Learning, Knowledge, and Identity

The MilSpace community provides an interesting application of a learning and knowledge transfer community to identity development. Argote and Ingram (2000) build a theoretical framework for understanding knowledge transfer through the movement and modification of knowledge reservoirs and networks. They additionally contribute through the summary of multiple important factors influencing knowledge transfer, and write, “Although adapting to differences in people across contexts poses challenges to knowledge transfer, people’s ability to adapt knowledge they possess facilitates transfer,” (Argote & Ingram, 2000: 164). Organizations develop subnetworks of elements (members, tasks, and tools) that adapt to current conditions, yet may not perform optimally when circumstances change.

In a similar approach to knowledge adaptation, Barnett and Pontikes (2008) (following March, 1991) articulate the two forms of change generally found in organizational theory, exploration (moving into new areas) and exploitation (adaptation in an existing environment). In line with ecological theories, exploitation evolves out of competitive dynamics. Competition drives organizational constraint and resource scarcity, reducing performance and encouraging management to seek alternate means of enhancement. Once performance is restored, competing firms are now lagging, and the competition continues in a cycle. Argote and Ingram (2000: 164) write, "The knowledge reservoirs or subnetworks imported from one context must be compatible with or fit the new context." Barnett and Pontikes (2008) are focused on learning within a single firm while Argote and Ingram (2000) are concerned with the broader topic of knowledge transfer both within a firm and between firms, but the findings certainly support each other.

Hansen (1999) focuses on organization subunits, and points to the benefit of weak ties in transferring knowledge that can be codified, while strong ties appear more necessary for non-codified knowledge to spread through a firm. This important theoretical and empirical application of social network theory to the organizational learning literature helps further delineate the process of knowledge transfer within an organization, and concludes, in part, that, "Weak and strong inter-unit ties have their respective strengths and weaknesses in facilitating search for and transfer of useful knowledge across organization subunits," (Hansen, 1999: 105).

The community of practice is a social technology that facilitates knowledge creation and learning. Powell, et al. (1996: 142), who find that innovation in fields of rapid technological change occurs more frequently in learning networks rather than individual firms, note, "Learning occurs within the context of membership in a community and may require different kinds of organizations and organizational practices to access that community." Brown and Duguid (2001:

203) write of CoPs, “Mediating as they do between individuals and large formal and informal social structures, and between organizations and their environment, they are where a good deal of the work involved in knowledge creation and organizational learning gets done.” Brown and Duguid (1991), propose that the CoP is able to create tacit knowledge that resides in a social distribution among members, tools, and practices.

The CoP is therefore more than a learning tool, but a means of member identification: “Sociocultural accounts of knowledge and the firm generally turn on the relationship between individual learning and social identity. Learning is inevitably implicated in the acquisition of knowledge, but it is also implicated in the acquisition of identity,” (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 200). Wenger (1998) proposes that learning is integral to member identity, and that CoP participants benefit from learning and knowledge transfer while continuously building a shared identity. Based upon this understanding of organizational learning and identity I propose:

Proposition 1: Members of a community of practice experience a greater sense of identity with the larger parent organization than non-members.

Proposition 2: Community of practice participation encourages members to enter identity construction, rather than stagnation or destruction.

Proposition 3: Communities of practice enhance identity development with the larger parent organization by attracting members seeking knowledge transfer and learning opportunities.

Network Analysis

Continuing the discussion of network research begun in Chapter 1, I turn to network research relevant to MilSpace and identity development. Burt (1987) raises the importance of social capital in an economic environment, which may not directly relate to identity, but provides

insight into the continuation of MilSpace. Through network relationships come opportunities to create economic profits from human and financial capital. Within certain ranges of ability, many organizations possess comparable amounts of human and financial capital, thus social capital is often the discriminating factor for determining economic superiority. Burt (1987) goes on to detail networks as a conduit to specific resources. Social networks exist as capital in their own right, with size being the predominant measure. Networks offer information on and access to opportunities, referrals, and resources. Larger networks are more likely to offer more information and resources, but the density of the network is important as well. Dense networks are inefficient, but a sparse network with non-redundant contacts will often prove more fruitful.

Burt's (2005) concept of structural holes, which separate nonredundant information sources, offers a fascinating bridge between the worlds of economics and sociology in describing aspects of competitive capitalism. When someone is connected to two other nodes that are not connected to each other, that person has the ability to act as a broker and share information between the two nodes. This is built upon Granovetter's weak ties, though Burt clarifies that, "the causal agent in the phenomenon is not the weakness of the tie but the structural hole it spans. Tie weakness is a correlate, not a cause," (Burt, 2005: 73). Control is negotiated as players in a competitive environment alter their social structures to garner resources. Social capital is vital for gaining access to resources. He also develops the concept of legitimacy in regard to becoming a trusted source of information.

The MilSpace managers recognize the importance of developing trust between themselves and the junior officers they serve. They build rapport with individual contributors by thanking them for sharing insights or being an active member of the CoP. Particularly dedicated members of the network may be asked to serve as topic leads and take on the responsibility of

recruiting contacts, sending newsletters, conducting surveys, facilitating conversations, sending welcome letters, etc. These are all means of continually reconnecting to community members. Kilner commented, "Someone with the internal drive and dedication to craft a thoughtful response on a topic is generally someone who also wants to play a more active role in the community." These members are typically engaged in leader identity construction, and can encourage others through their example. In addition to fostering the growth of the network size and its knowledge generation, topic leads are well positioned within the network to direct resources to members in need of information or leader identity development.

Some of Burt's proposals are supported by Padgett and Ansell's (1993) analysis of political parties and network elites in Renaissance Florence. The Medici network remained sparse through calculation. By tying his family through marriage to elite, geographically separated patriarchs, and via economics to lower-status 'new men' within the neighborhood, Cosimo de Medici became "an awesomely centralized patrimonial machine" and "the only bridge holding this contradictory agglomeration together," (Padgett & Ansell, 1993: 1285). Through the establishment of few elite network ties, particularly in comparison to other high-status families, the Medici family was able to leverage its position as a broker between many disparate groups from all economic and social status levels. This matches well with Burt's thoughts on structural holes and their ability to generate rates of return.

The MilSpace directors have similarly placed themselves in a position to connect a variety of organizations and community members. Kilner and Burgess in particular are able to act as brokers of information as they connect those with information needs with those who possess the knowledge to handle a specific situation. In 2008 Kilner was asked by the Army's Chief Information Officer to spend three days in Boston conducting field tests on new software

known as Cognitive Edge. The new technology may be used to analyze the After Action Reviews (reports from military units detailing mission successes and failures) that can be examined to more quickly change doctrine. Kilner's position within the military's academic community, as an active duty officer and a professor in the department of philosophy, allows him to move beyond the CCL and bring his assets to bear in multiple environments.

The MilSpace founders provide another vivid example of this in a book they published in 2005 titled *Company Command: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession*. By highlighting the ability of the network to connect people and distribute knowledge, the authors relate the story of a personnel officer in Iraq whose Army unit has lost its first soldier. Recognizing that she lacks the information to carry out a litany of casualty-related tasks, she connects to CompanyCommand. Within hours, she is connected to leaders with experience in this situation and she has a toolkit for handling casualty affairs, an article and a community discussion on coping with a soldier's death, and links to information from the Adjutant General school on Army reporting requirements. Additionally, she was in contact with two experienced chaplains and a former battalion commander who provided first-hand experience about dealing with the situation and a copy of a bereavement letter that she could use as a model. These connections and informal mentors provide not only useful knowledge and information, but also opportunities for leader identity development and encouragement for maintaining leader identity construction.

Because Kilner and Burgess have interviewed hundreds of lieutenants and captains in Iraq and Afghanistan, monitored and led professional discussions for over 15 years, and been deeply embedded in the epistemic culture of the organization, they are profoundly well-connected and capable of bridging important structural holes.

Proposition 4a: A community of practice director's structural position drastically shortens the average path length of the network, facilitating knowledge transfer.

Proposition 4b: The structural positions of key discussion facilitators shorten the average path length of the network, facilitating knowledge transfer.

MacKenzie and Millo's (2003) investigation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange demonstrates that the organization did not succeed because of neo-classical economic market theory. They write, "The very agents who performed option theory were not and did not become atomistic, amoral *homines economici*: if they had, they could not have constructed the market," (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003: 109). The authors go on to expand the theory of performativity, but profess a reliance on network theories to describe the organization, particularly Granovetter's embeddedness. The research additionally addresses the social pressures of making fair options trades, as the community of traders is capable of rejecting an individual if his behavior is deemed deviant. This concept is echoed in Greif's (1991) analysis of the Maghribi traders' coalition of the 11th century, thus indicating that network structures are not merely a contemporary development in social organizational structure. Like many social networking technologies, the members of MilSpace have been known to police themselves and make corrections on group members who share false information or deviate too far from standard practices.

Proposition 5: Deviation from norms face sanctioning by community members.

Recent work has been important to expanding network theory. Stark and Vedres (2006) propose a future for network structures, though they alter the conventional means of network analysis. They criticize conventional network analysis on three grounds. First, as other critics

have agreed, they fault the theory's static nature. Second, they believe it often forces organizations to be grouped into separate communities unnecessarily. Third, they view entrepreneurism as existing not in structural voids, but in intercohesive positions. They introduce new analysis tools from contemporary physics to uncover temporal network traits, and note that sociology has a long tradition of emphasizing the strength of groups over time, but that recent network analysts have focused far more on network structure (Vedres & Stark, 2008). Of particular interest is the concept of trust. They make the effective criticism that many researchers focus on trust within their network computations, but duration of the networks are not considered. When trust is built upon repeated interactions, how can you avoid considering time?

> Proposition 6: By allowing repeated interaction among geographically dispersed organizational members, communities of practice facilitate trust creation and knowledge transfer.

Burns (1963) offers a slightly different take on organizational design via an analysis of the flux of industrial design and his categorization of such into mechanistic systems, appropriate during stable conditions, and organismic, appropriate in changing conditions. Referring to the rational bureaucracy of Weber (1968 [1921]) as the "social technology which made possible the second stage of industrialism," Burns (1963: 42) places mechanistic systems firmly in the outdated realm of early industrialization. Excited by his then-current research into the UK electronics industry, he lauds the benefits of the highly adaptable organismic form, an approach with numerous parallels to some modern sociological research dedicated to heterarchy.

Galison (1999) provides research of a similar nature in discussing the war-time integration of scientists from varying backgrounds who were forced to work together at places such as MIT's Radiation Laboratory. He writes, "Under the gun, the various subcultures coordinated their actions and representations in a way that had seemed impossible in peacetime; thrown together they began to get on with the job of building radar," and, "one can see the visible manifestations of the new modes of exchange. Rooms are established with movable walls… the laboratory with its 'model shop' had delivered $25 million worth of equipment," (Galison 1999: 152). The effect of this new distributed interaction within the community impacts the building of future organizations, and construction of a large physics laboratory is undertaken with the radiation lab in mind, to include avoiding paneled offices for senior members.

Much of this echoes the heterarchy work of Beunza and Stark (2004) discussed in the literature review on network research. The social network platforms of MilSpace serve as a means for flattening structures and supporting lateral communication between heterogeneous actors. Given this examination of heterarchical network structures in the context of the U.S. Army's hierarchy, I propose the following:

Proposition 7a: Communities of practice facilitate the flattening of hierarchical structures within organizations.

Proposition 7b: Communities of practice increase lateral communication within organizations.

Boundaries, Identity, and the Production of Knowledge

New technologies pertaining to the community of practice may broaden our understanding of organization theory literature pertaining to boundaries, identity, and the production of techno-scientific knowledge. Star and Griesemer's (1989) analysis of boundary objects at the Berkeley Museum of Vertebrate Zoology effectively expands work on actor network theory. Rather than a single translation, they see the possibility for multiple translations through boundary objects.

Multiple network entities make connections to create interest. Individuals make an input through the process of enrollment, and a language is created that can reach certain audiences. Museum managers are able to control diverse populations and coordinate efforts through the analytic concept of boundary objects, or scientific objects that exist in multiple overlapping social networks and fulfill information requirements for all of them. They hold different meanings depending upon the user, and can adapt to the particular needs of various network entities.

MilSpace represents a highly versatile boundary object that effectively coordinates the efforts of multiple heterogeneous actors, and its continuous management by the Center for Company-Level Leaders directors is essential to its success. As Star and Griesemer (1989: 393) write, "The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds." In order to expand the museum's collections, the curators are reliant upon amateur collectors who are "often on the front line, making contact with a host of other social worlds," (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 402). Similarly, the MilSpace staff depend upon junior officers to engage the outside world and then donate their experiences to the community. Just as many amateur collectors desired legitimacy for their

efforts, the MilSpace managers recognize that many officers respond positively to signs of legitimacy, such as appreciative email responses or token gifts of appreciation like a hat or baseball bat bearing the Company Command logo.

As a final point of comparison, the museum's most pivotal director was able to establish order and accuracy by propagating methods of collection and subtly disciplining members of the collection network. Without overly influencing content, the MilSpace creators are similarly successful at directing the method by which information is shared, thus increasing its impact across the community. In many ways, the MilSpace technology mirrors Galison's (1999: 138, 146) concept of the trading zone as the site "where the local coordination between beliefs and action takes place," and which serves as the "social and intellectual mortar binding together" segments of a culture. The networking technology serves to highlight the heterogeneity of practice that exists within the military's sub-culture of junior officers.

Knorr-Cetina (1999) makes an important extension of sociology to study the epistemic machinery of science, rather than just the creation of scientific knowledge itself. She lauds the sociological perspectives of Giddens (1990), but faults his approach of being concerned with only the output of expert systems. Giddens (1990) treats the producers of knowledge as black boxes, and fails to consider their development and inner workings. The exploration of MilSpace contributes to the existing literature by examining a specific case in which network technology is created, grows, and is integrated into a large organization. Knowledge is typically viewed as scientific belief, but Knorr-Cetina (1999: 8) writes, "The definition I advocate switches the emphasis to knowledge as practiced- within structures, processes, and environments that make up *specific* epistemic settings." The Army's CoPs thrive on the very concept of knowledge as practiced. The Army's contemporary operating environment is the epistemic setting, and the

junior officers on deployments and in training exercises can sit down at a computer and share their knowledge in real time based on exposure to changing threats and evolving best practices.

Drawing parallels to much of the work on new institutional theory, Knorr-Cetina (1999: 10) also addresses the concept of culture and symbols, and writes, "Symbolic structuring will come into view through the definition of entities, through systems of classification, through the ways in which epistemic strategy, empirical procedure, and social collaboration are understood." This view can be strongly seen in MilSpace's repeated representation of three officers conversing on the hood of the military's general multi-purpose vehicle, typically called the 'Humvee'. This location holds value in Army culture, and MilSpace employs its image as a means for encouraging community members to gather, share knowledge with each other, and build a shared identity. Another example can be seen in the very name MilSpace. Though thought of by David Axe, a reporter from *Wired* magazine who was writing a story on the CCL, Kilner and Burgess decided that it made sense to try and link their community to the popularity of the MySpace social networking site.

Proposition 8: Communities of practice offer information for a variety of purposes for multiple types of community members.

Figure 4.6: The Cover of a CCL Publication and the Culturally-Significant Image of the Humvee Hood as a Place to Gather, Share Knowledge, and Build Identity



Bowker and Star (1999) observe studies showing that college students have a propensity to cite only information that is available online. Current and rising generations of young officers are accustomed to conducting information search with computers. The military leaders responsible for the support of MilSpace perhaps understood this when they latched onto the CompanyCommand model for creating and distributing knowledge. The use of internet technologies to conduct search goes beyond the simple availability of conventional knowledge online, as demonstrated by the relatively low use of the Army's Reimer Digital Library (https://rdl.train.army.mil/), a source of Army field manuals and training manuals.

Lieutenants and captains, the youngest cohorts of Army officers, would rather access the information and advice of members in a CoP than attempt to meet their information needs in dense manuals. Bowker and Star (1999) also address the issues of classification and the overwhelming abundance of information available on-line. Part of MilSpace's success can be linked to its ability to categorize data in a meaningful way that enables users to search for accurate information quickly. Echoing this categorization work, Kahl (2008) advocates the re-conceptualization of categorization as a dynamic system that members use epistemically to create knowledge. With some of the newer Web 2.0 technologies now incorporated into the site, members are shown potentially useful information without conducting a search, thus offering knowledge without user input.

Proposition 9: For some purposes, a community of practice is able to meet information requirements more efficiently than conventional learning resources.

Organization theory research also addresses the impact of social influence on firm boundary and identity. Porac, et al. (1995) frame their paper within the competition literature, arguing that they fill a void left by population ecologists (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) and transactionalists (Burt, 1992) by addressing the ability of individual firms to shape competitive relationships. By taking into account the "social reality of rivalry," Porac, et al. (1995: 204) include "the constitutive role of the managerial mind in making markets." Industry borders are socially constructed through a rivalry process in which managers conduct constant comparison with competing firms.

Being cognitively incapable of comparing all firms along multiple aspects, managers "define market boundaries using the summary features of organizational types as reference

points around which market structure evolves." Socially constructed categories, created by necessity to simplify the organizational comparison process, evolve to define industry boundaries and shape how managers perceive their own firms.

Following the work of new institutional theorists, Zuckerman (1999) shows how borders are at least partially defined by the constraints placed on managers to conform to recognized organizational forms: a mechanism termed the categorical imperative. This concept is echoed by Polos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002: 90, 112), who write, "An identity constrains what an entity would/could be and what is expected and not expected of it… violations of the default assumptions have the price of lowered valuation." While the argument to conform in order to gain legitimacy follows closely the new institutional theory work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zuckerman (1999) makes an important contribution to the literature by concretely identifying both the penalty placed on those who fail to conform and the source of the social judgment that implements said penalty. Polos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002) expand on this concept when describing how core features determine an organization's membership, while peripheral features can be altered to differentiate without risking exclusion from the larger social form. Agreed-upon classifications link the social form to an organization's identity.

Market candidates are faced with the challenge of conforming enough to be within a zone of legitimacy in the eyes of the audience, yet must differentiate themselves enough to be selected over competitors. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) strengthen the theoretical framework for this process, provide scope conditions, and support their ideas through empirical analysis of securities analysts and Silicon Valley law firms. They conclude with the theoretical implication of ascription with achievement: "Whereas the notion of conformity would seem to imply a static

social order, we have pointed out that there must be some prospect of (at least, downward) mobility for an actor to feel pressure to conform," Phillips and Zuckerman (2001: 422). Movement within the status hierarchy is also dependent upon an actor's prior identity. This explains the variation within approaches to conformity.

Kilner supports this first point in saying, "I feel we are highly regarded by the leadership around here [West Point] and in the Pentagon, but we've always had to sing for our supper. If we're not providing quality services and linking officers to the information they need then we'll lose our funding." In order to continue linking young officers, MilSpace has to attract them and keep their interest. They accomplish this in part by being a source of innovation and a platform for important discussions, but they also attract members through conformity with other popular social media outlets. Phillips and Zuckerman's (2001) second closing point regarding ascription with achievement reveals itself in MilSpace's rejection of certain conforming technologies, such as the ability to upload and tag multiple photographs, when considering its past identity and fundamental purpose.

The directors of MilSpace are compelled by market forces to conform to certain norms in presenting their technology to the audience: future, current, and past company-level leaders. The means of communication and interaction within the CoP must fit established customs to such a degree that members of the broader organization (the U.S. Army) identify MilSpace as a valid potential outlet for social and professional relations. Once the technology falls within this zone of legitimacy, it must differentiate itself enough to be selected over alternative outlets.

Proposition 10a: A community of practice will adapt its technology to incorporate capabilities offered by competing social and professional outlets.

Proposition 10b: Once basic technologies have matched that of competing outlets, differentiating capabilities will arise to distinguish the community of practice from competitors within its zone of legitimacy.

Innovation Diffusion and New Institutional Theory

Rogers (1995: 6) defines diffusion as "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system." It is a change in the social structure of a system, and can occur spontaneously or under external control. Communication is the development of common perceptions as members interact and share information. Rogers (1995: 11) further identifies the four main elements present in diffusions research: innovation, communication channels, a social system, and time. Adoption (the decision that employing an innovation in full is the best course of action) or rejection takes place through the innovation-decision process: knowledge (learning of an innovation and understanding its purpose), persuasion (forming a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the innovation), decision (taking action that leads to a decision of adoption or rejection), implementation (employing the innovation), and confirmation (pursuing verification that the correct decision was made).

The innovation-decision process is conducted by a social system in one of three primary methods: 1) optional innovation-decisions are conducted by individuals who make independent judgments, though norms often influence the process; 2) collective innovation-decisions occur with consensus from system members; and 3) authority innovation-decisions reject or adopt based on the resolve of few individuals with decision-making power. Following previous decisions, a contingent innovation-decision can be made through a combination of the previous three mechanisms. The decision to adopt CoPs within organizations is often a contingent

decision, as individuals within a community must choose to participate, while authority figures approve the institutional support necessary for technological support.

> Proposition 11: Organization-specific communities of practice require both institutional support from authorities and grass-roots support from members in order to survive.

Homophily (individuals who share common interests, reside or work close-by, or participate in similar groups) provides the basis for enhanced communication and innovation diffusion. Rogers (1995: 19) writes, "When they share common meanings, a mutual subcultural language, and are alike in personal and social characteristics, the communication of new ideas is likely to have greater effects in terms of knowledge gain, attitude formation and change, and over behavior change." The barrier of heterophilous participants is significantly reduced, particularly in communities of employees who work for the same organization or within the same job field.

In reviewing past research Rogers (1995) finds that varying rates of adoption are explained predominantly through the characteristics of innovations: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. The greater the advantage perceived by individuals along each of these dimensions, the faster the adoption. Familiarity of organizational members with social networking technologies may translate directly into increased perceived advantage. For example, the technology of an organization-specific CoP will likely be deemed more compatible (consistent with current norms, member experience, and member requirements) and less complex (degree of difficulty to perceive and implement) as social network technology is used more often and by larger proportions of organizational members.

> Proposition 12a: The more familiar and comfortable an organizational member is with social networking technology, the more likely he or she is to join an associated community of practice.

Propositon 12b: The more familiar and comfortable an organizational member is with social networking technology, the more likely he or she is to participate in an associated community of practice.

New institutional theory, which finds it origins primarily in the works of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is predominantly a sociological model that relates organizations to the environments which surround them. Institutionalization, which Berger and Luckmann (1966) developed in great detail, "involves the process by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social thought and action," (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341). These rules, or myths, provide a cognitive framework for decision making, and supply actors with the means for interpreting the behavior of other members.

New institutional theory extends this definition to organizations. Within this context, organizations are heavily influenced by rationalized institutional rules that can differ significantly from efficient economic pressure. Adhering to the rules and integrating the myths into organizational structure provides legitimacy, which Suchman (1995: 574) defines as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions."

Kilner notes that many senior leaders, when evaluating the MilSpace technology, place great emphasis on awards such as the Harvard Business Review's Top 20 Business Ideas of 2006. Lacking the means to evaluate the benefits of distributed community, these leaders rely on an external source of legitimacy. Interestingly, the CCL makes an effort to not publicize such accolades to their users, as the junior officer community does not view such awards as sources of

legitimacy, but rather as indications that the community may not be as grassroots as they would prefer.

DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) framing of isomorphic change within new institutional theory applies directly to the technology of MilSpace. Institutional isomorphism (meaning identical or similar in form or structure) is achieved via three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. New institutional theory is effective at explaining the long-standing survival of organizations which are deeply embedded in societal structure, such as schools, hospitals, and firms that rely heavily on government contracts. These organizations are highly resistant because the institutional environment protects them with rules and legal regulations.

Thus, even if the changing environment dictates that a defense company's product is no longer necessary, it can survive because of existing guaranteed contracts, or it may provide ineffective services and still endure because it was awarded on a cost-plus contract. By maximizing legitimacy through adoption of rationalized elements, an organization achieves stability and increased access to resources which allow it to endure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Because they are not as institutionalized as other such organizations, the CCL must consistently maintain its legitimacy through the services it provides the organization and the connections its directors make throughout the community.

Fligstein (2001) describes the importance of social skill in the alteration of institutional environments. The new institutional concept of local orders is linked to an actor's ability to interact with symbols and myths to induce cooperation. Fligstein (2001: 108) writes, "The process of institution building takes place in the context of powerful actors attempting to produce

rules of interaction to stabilize their situation." Fligstein (2001) is criticizing the more traditional new institutional theorists for treating actors as passive executors of institutional norms.

A skilled actor will adapt to the environment and engage in bricolage: gathering the surrounding elements and changing the institutional environment through brokerage and negotiation. Skilled social actors become the means of establishing a new institutional environment, just as the creators of Company Command have created a new means for creating knowledge and sharing ideas in the military.

In a series of three experiments, Zucker (1977) shows that (1) transmission of culture from one generation to another occurs, (2) maintenance of the culture takes place, and (3) the persistence of culture is dependent upon resistance to change. When institutionalization is high, culture is more effectively transmitted, maintained, and defended against alteration. Swidler (1986: 284) expands upon the impact of culture, which provides "resources for constructing strategies of action." The MilSpace technology may witness further growth and expansion throughout the military as generations of junior officers rise within the military hierarchy and extol the advantages of taking part in the community.

It is also possible that MilSpace has succeeded in part because it serves as a source of legitimacy for its larger parent organizations. Recognizing that younger generations desire social networking technologies, West Point and the larger Army may benefit from MilSpace as a means of becoming better aligned with the institutional environment. Many who view the military as a domineering, hierarchical bureaucracy are surprised to learn that the Army has not only permitted, but promotes use of a fairly unrestricted CoP. As social network sites become more prevalent, particularly among younger generations of employees, I predict:

Proposition 13: The increased use and legitimization of social networking technology will lead to the increased presence of communities of practice within organizations.

The Costs of Connectivity

While much research has demonstrated the benefits of CoPs to organizations, it is vital to note the potential costs of such network structures. In her discussion of the role of organizations in the production of workplace techno-scientific knowledge, Vaughan (1999) highlights a paradox in that the very structures designed to coordinate action often create uncertainty. Social networking technology can increase horizontal and vertical information flows and unite disparate meanings systems. Through sharing the organization's dedicated language and culture, barriers can be taken down. But is this only a best-case scenario? Can the opposite occur, such as individuals communicating within a closed space and thus further reinforcing uniformity of thought and structural secrecy? Potential downsides such as these deserve more attention and research.

Kogut (2000: 408) writes, "If benefits of identity are to lower the costs of communication and coordination, they come at a cost. For identities represent a norm which indicates avenues of exploration; by implication, they also prohibit certain path." Is it possible the MilSpace facilitates path dependence? Discussion areas and the categorization of topics provides a framework for organizing information, yet it may also inhibit the generation of new knowledge boundaries. Following this argument I propose:

Proposition 14: An organizational community of practice can contribute to path dependence in member thought patterns and originality.

Perhaps the incorporation of CoPs into organizational structures is but a management fad, destined to fade as social network sites either fade in popularity or become fully take-for-granted (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999). Abrahamson (1996: 261) considers short-lived management fashions and numerous other concerns posed by Rogers (1995) via the pro-innovation bias, and turns the focus of innovation diffusion to the dynamic processing of management fashion and rational management techniques, which are "labels that denote for organizational stakeholders both certain managerial goals that effective managers should pursue, as well as the means to pursue these goals efficiently." For example, he writes, "Alternatively, the belief that a management technique is either innovative or an improvement may be inaccurate," (Abrahamson 1996: 265).

Benders and Van Veen (2001) contend that Abrahamson's supposed focus on beliefs in specific management fashion definitions is a dilemma. They propose that management fashion be redefined in order to incorporate the flexibility exercised by management practitioners when employing new techniques. They write, "Interpretive viability increases the size of the potential market because different buyers may recognize their own situation in the description," (Benders & Van Veen, 2001: 37). The creators of management fashion maintain ambiguity in order to broaden the appeal of their work.

Does MilSpace have the negative effect of transmitting faulty information, or of creating excessively homogenous sub-units within the military? While few would argue against the benefit of transmitting proven best practices throughout an organization, others may point to the value of heterogeneity among a conglomerate's sub-organizations. The sharing of knowledge does not mandate that transmissions be best practices.

CHAPTER 5: FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS

My research revolves around the development of leader identity in organizations. Through this dissertation I have proposed a nuanced understanding of how organizational members move in and out of phases of leader identity development. The following sections address my other research interests related to the topic of organizational leadership identity. The most fundamental, interesting, and important question I wish to answer with my future work is "Does leader identity spread through social networks?"

I further conjecture that mentorship plays a crucial role in guiding organizational members into and through the leader identity development stage. I make some final comments regarding communities of practice, and in the final section of future work I spend some length applying leader identity to an earlier research interest of mine: employee turnover. I conclude with some final comments regarding this dissertation and the direction of leader identity research.

FUTURE WORK

Leader Identity Contagion

An early draft of my dissertation proposal centered around the research question, "Does leader identity spread through social networks?" Applying the proposed stages of the development framework, I sought to ask, "If an individual is surrounded by organizational members engaged in leader identity construction (or leader identity stagnation or leader identity destruction), is she more likely to also enter this stage?" Research surrounding this question could lead to a better understanding of propositions such as:

Proposition A: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity construction are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity construction.

Proposition B: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity stagnation are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity stagnation.

Proposition C: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity destruction are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity destruction.

The primary network data collected during my study has only two solid points of time. I believe that with additional time and data collection this research question could be addressed, and deserves examination.

Mentorship and Leader Identity Construction

Mentor programs at the U.S. Military Academy force cadets with particular deficiencies (rules infraction, honor violation, academic/physical/military shortcoming) into a phase of leader identity construction; the individual sees himself as a future officer and is actively guided

through leader identity construction. Many deviations from expected leader norms result in cadets with poorly developed leader identity. Mentors can be effective for altering an organizational member's referent other (Adams, 1963), or the target of his self-comparison. Rather than comparing himself to a peer in a civilian college, a cadet will compare himself to a recently graduated lieutenant, and alter his self perception and identity. As a private sector point of comparison, an organization may similarly desire leaders who identify with the parent company, and those leaders may be more inclined to do so if paired with a mentor who has internalized organizational values.

Communities of Practice and Professional Identity

During an interview with Pete Kilner, one of the founders of CompanyCommand, he remarked, "I believe that the evolution of community members could be the most interesting concept." Kilner and the MilSpace administrators have noticed a pattern of behavior among many members. Cadets and junior officers wishing to join MilSpace must apply through the CALDOL. Part of the application asks, "Why do you want to join MilSpace?" Many join for the purpose of connecting with peers in the larger organization (i.e. reasons related to making connections or having social interaction). MilSpace is not designed like social media, however, as described in Chapter 4. Some members change their patterns of interaction from social to more professional participation.

I propose identifying a group of officers who state social reasons for joining MilSpace and then trace their online behavior and categorize it, potentially showing an increase in "professional" activities. This would require defining different types of interaction: e.g.

uploading or downloading of important files and active participation in professional discussion would be classified differently than other interactions that deal less with being an Army officer.

I think the management field is interested in these concepts because it can show how organizations can exploit the potentially lucrative employee skill sets of online social networking and use of virtual communities of practice as a way of influencing professional identity development. I have found little academic research on this topic, and I see that more can be done to investigate distributed communities of practice and their impact on professional identity.

Community of Practice Administration and Participation

In Chapter 4, I described how MilSpace directors select a prominent discussion from within the CoP and collaborate with the authors of noteworthy posts to enhance their submissions. These are then published in Army Magazine, a hardcopy publication with a monthly distribution to over 120,000 people. In 2010 I began a study that focused on the authors of these published submissions.

The MilSpace directors worked together to create a monthly discussion, known as the CC Jam (Company Command Jam, or discussion). Examples of past topics include: the platoon leader – platoon sergeant relationship, working with JIIM (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) partners, developing military expertise, handling a crime scene during combat conditions, and company-level innovation in Afghanistan. My original approach to this study was to examine one calendar year of these discussions and parse two populations: 1) prominent contributors (with prominence being determined by length of postings and number of 'likes' by other members) who were selected for publication in Army Magazine, and 2) prominent contributors who were not selected for publication. I could then compare the pre- and post-

publication behavior of those selected for recognition in the print magazine, as well as compare their behavior to those not featured.

Based on my understanding of communities of practice and member behavior I proposed:

Proposition D: Featured organizational members within the CoP experience a greater sense of identity with the parent organization.

Proposition E: Featured organizational members within the larger external organization experience a greater sense of identity with the parent organization.

Propositions F: Featured organizational members, either within the CoP or the larger external organization, increase their participation.

Proposition G: Featured organizational members bring their social group with them to the CoP.

Proposition H: CoP participation enhances member professionalism.

Leader Identity and Turnover

A vital component of the U.S. Army's organizational structure is its base of captains. At this rank, officers have completed several years of training and have served successfully for three to eight years. Sometimes referred to as the private sector's equivalent of middle managers, captains are also eligible to leave the military at the expiration of their terms of service. Officers are commissioned from one of three sources: Reserve Officers' Training Corps (conducted at civilian colleges), West Point, or Officers' Candidate School (where enlisted soldiers are trained to become officers). Completing each of these training opportunities confers a commission as a second lieutenant and incurs a commitment to the Army, typically three to eight years in length.

As an all-volunteer force, officers have the option of leaving the Army at the completion of these commitments. As was the subject of many media stories around 2007, unprecedented percentages of officers were selecting to leave the military, and the Army was in desperate need

of more middle managers to fill voids within its structure. The problem of officer shortages was exasperated by Congress' call to expand the Army by 65,000 soldiers. This added six combat brigades to the already existing 42, and brought the active duty organization to over 540,000 people.

Loss rates from USMA classes at the time showed an increasing trend. In 2005, 35% of the West Point Class of 2000 left the Army. In 2006, 46% of the Class of 2001 left, and an unprecedented 58% of the Class of 2002 exited in 2007 at the end of their obligation. These percentages were actually reduced artificially as officers who intended to leave the organization were unable due to stop-loss (being held in place for deployment or because of special needs), being deployed, or from completing extended commitments (such as an eight year commitment in return for pilot training).

Officers cannot simply be hired from outside with no specialized training, as a private sector corporation may do if growing appreciably. The only way to add senior officers where none were planned for several years ago (when they would have been commissioned as lieutenants based on projections for X number of majors, lieutenant colonels, etc.) is to promote at higher rates and reduce promotion timelines. The Army has done this; for example, the amount of time until new lieutenants reached the rank of captain was reduced from 48 months (in 1999) to 36 months (in 2007), and promotion rates to captain in 2007 exceeded 98%. A well-known joke, which also held at least some truth, was, "Don't get a DUI or kill anyone and you'll make major."

While there are a number of explanations for the shortage of young officers, the primary reason is that officers are leaving the Army at a higher rate than expected. What caused this increase in voluntary turnover? The majority of officers who leave the Army prior to retirement

do so at the end of their first term of commitment. For officers commissioned out of the Reserve Officer Training Corps, this is generally after four years of service, while United States Military Academy graduates owe the Army five years of active duty service. The military extended some of these commitments through mandatory stop-loss, in which selected military units or occupational specialties were not permitted to leave or retire.

Others were forced into staying due to deployment windows: periods of time either slightly before or during deployment rotations in which soldiers were not allowed to transfer between units or exit the Army. These were only temporary measures, however, and those committed to leaving were generally able to within a year of their desired departure date.

Numerous factors affect an officer's decision to remain in the military, but fundamental in the decision making process is the perceived ability to quickly attain a job of equal or near-equal responsibility and compensation, or to gain entry into a graduate program of choice. Tied to this is the concept that officers are induced to remain in the military because the value of their work experiences is significantly greater in the service than in the civilian sector. An officer who spends three years in Iraq and Afghanistan knows that her evaluators, and the Army as a whole, place tremendous value in the experience she gained while deployed. A civilian company, however, will give such experiences a lower value, particularly in comparison to the officer's peers in the civilian sector who spent those three years working successfully in their career fields. This makes it less likely that an officer can transition from the military into a comparable job elsewhere.

It is a general perception that deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan provides intangible skills and leadership experience that may be valued by corporate institutions or graduate programs, but that deploying more than once does not add significantly to one’s resume or acceptance packet.

By the fourth year of service, most officers have spent six months to a year in military schools, approximately two years training at a home base, and at least one year deployed overseas. They are approaching the end of their commitment, they have the experience that is valued by external agencies, and they foresee that future military service will not add significantly to their competitive statistics. Thus, at approximately the four year point in their military service, officers decide that their uniformed service has reached its maximum value to private sector business and graduate school programs.

In order to add to this discussion, I interviewed two associate directors for MBA admissions from Columbia Business School, Robert Shea and David Keefe. They confirmed that the majority of MBA applicants with military backgrounds are generally high performers, and that extensive deployments are not necessarily more valuable than a single combat experience. Shea said, “Historically we’ve had really good experience with military people. Their competitive and collaborative nature are not at odds, similar to varsity athletes. They are almost universally incredibly impressive.” Keefe stated that when the admissions committee meets to review applications, the “leadership element is just checked off.” Those with military backgrounds have “performed under pressure and a great amount of responsibility at a young age.” Both interviewees agreed that corporate recruiters love military backgrounds as well.

A not uncommon point of discussion among young officers, particularly those on deployment, is “What would a civilian corporation have to pay a middle manager to live in a foreign country for 14 months, carry out enormously stressful workloads, work every weekend, suffer through harsh living conditions, brave life-threatening scenarios daily or weekly, and be separated from family with limited phone and internet access?” The obvious counter to those in the military who have such heartache with deployment conditions as this question captures is,

"Sorry buddy, you signed up for this." This is a valid point, and I hypothesize that many officers bid adieu to the military for exactly this reason. At the end of their commitment, they do not have to be "signed up" anymore, and so they leave. The construction (or stagnation or destruction) of a leader identity clearly impacts these turnover decisions.

The U.S. Department of Defense service academies maintain an online business networking resource for service academy alumni, known as SABRD, for the Service Academy Business Resource Directory. A basic analysis of the data entries reveals that the preponderance of officers leaving the Army are entering the corporate community or attending graduate school, particularly business, engineering, and law programs.

In 2007, the Army emplaced organizational policies to stem the flow of captains out of the service. Approximately 16,000 captains were offered their choice of a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (a cash payment of $25,000 to $35,000), relocation to a different Army post, reassignment to a new job function, or possible participation in military schooling or a two-year graduate degree (Wardynski, et al., 2010). Officers who accepted these incentives incurred an additional service commitment. While several thousand captains accepted one of these offers, many captains who were "on the fence" claim that the choices were not good enough to significantly impact retention, and that most accepters were already planning to remain in the Army for 20+ years (military retirement is offered beginning at service year 20). As one former captain stated in an interview, "I'm being offered $30,000, which after taxes maybe amounts to $25,000, and in return I'll owe three years and probably end up staying through 20. It's simply not enough money. Down the road I could make that up in one year in the business world."

How can organization theory help address these issues? The work of Mitchell, et al. (2001) and Lee, et al. (2004) has added to traditional work on employee turnover through the

development of a construct termed job embeddedness. Fit (employees perceive themselves to be compatible with the organization and the community in which they reside), links (employees have strong ties to others in the organization and the community), and sacrifice (employees thing that quitting the organization would carry high costs, such as professional ties and a meaningful social life) are the three main components.

In addition to finding support in the private sector, job embeddedness is appealing in a military context because it accounts for multiple dimensions outside of the workplace. The military lifestyle is often viewed as "all consuming," and more traditional predictors of job turnover, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, often fail to consider several important factors in a military setting. Job embeddedness, which draws clearly on the work of Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1996, 1997), captures some of the network effects that influence Army turnover.

A bulk of the voluntary turnover literature stems from March and Simon's (1958) landmark book *Organizations*. Key factors to their turnover model were an employee's perceived ease of transferring jobs and the desire to do so, which have generally been modeled through job alternatives and job satisfaction.

Equity theory predicts that an employee compares the ratio of his inputs to outcomes to the ratio of someone else, termed a referent other or a target of comparison (Adams, 1963, 1965). The referent can be anyone, but is most often someone of comparable status: a co-worker of equal education and experience, for example. If the referent has a higher ratio of inputs to outcomes (e.g. their work to compensation ratio is greater than one's own) then the person making the comparison feels guilt. If the ratio is lower, the feeling is one of anger. Equity theory predicts that the individual will then change his behavior or alter his perception of inputs

and outcomes to even the ratio by a number of different means, thus removing the source of cognitive dissonance. For example, an employee may lower inputs by skipping work more often in the case of negative inequity, or increase inputs by staying late at the office in the case of positive inequity. An employee may also rationalize that his skills are more valuable than he previously gave himself credit for, etc.

Organizational research has typically focused on inequality in salaries, and the resultant effects on employee performance and loyalty (Greenberg, 1990). Limited research has been conducted on voluntary employee turnover as a result of perceived inequity, despite the fact that Adams (1963, 1965) predicted it to be a potential means for eliminating employee discontent. Goodman (1974) also focused on pay issues, but expanded the equity framework by answering the following questions, "What kinds of referents do people use in evaluating their pay? How do these referents relate to pay satisfaction? How does one explain the differential selection of these referents?" He examines three classes of comparison targets (other, system, and self), and an individual will experience pay dissatisfaction if input/outcome inequity is sensed in any of the three (Goodman, 1974).

Recent research has shown the varied effects of equity related to internal versus external referent choice. Selection of an internal referent is often a better predictor of perceived organizational support and motivation in the workplace, while choosing an external referent is a better indicator of turnover intention (Shore, et al., 2006). Prior to this, Ronen (1986) showed that external referents are more important than internal referents when predicting job attitudes and behavioral propensities. This suggests that the abundance or lack of external job opportunities plays a mediating role on the effect of equity on turnover. This seems logical; an

officer with dim hopes for a good civilian job is likely to stay, even if dissatisfied with deployment schedules, pay, etc.

Equity theory is a special case of Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory. When a referent's input/outcome ratio does not match one's own, the subsequent discomfort can be alleviated by altering inputs and outcomes or changing the target of comparison (Festinger, 1957; Adams, 1963). In the 1970s, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) added to the discussion by introducing the concept of psychological equity, in which individuals change their mental perceptions of inputs and outcomes, as opposed to altering actual behavior.

Past studies have indicated that pay inequity with external referents is more predictive of turnover intention than is pay inequity with internal referents (Shore, et al., 2006), as the sense of inequity when comparing self to external referents is greater than when comparing to internal referents. I predict that this effect will carry over to comparisons of factors other than pay. Based on these expectations, I propose the following:

> Proposition I: External pay and lifestyle comparisons by organizational members will be more strongly related to turnover intentions than will internal pay and lifestyle comparisons.

Relating this further to my dissertation research, I see the importance of organizational identity in reducing turnover intention. If a member has a strong leader identity (in the case of Army officers), he is more likely to compare himself to others within the organization, and is therefore perhaps less likely to leave.

> Proposition J: The stronger the organizational identity, the more likely a member is to select an internal versus external target of comparison.

A hole exists in the literature in regard to applying the dynamics discussed above to the military. While this is certainly understandable given the narrowness of scope, turnover in the military has recently become a topic of national interest, primarily due to the increased attrition rates from the Army's junior officer corps at a critical point in time. In one of the earliest studies of military turnover, Norman (1971) concludes that an officer's decision to stay or go is "based not so much on what his actual situation is as on what he thinks it is." Norman (1971) does not delve into organization theory, and the research is primarily an analysis of survey data, but the above statement is applicable to the retention issue; even if an officer imagines a carefree civilian lifestyle where he swims in cash and hardly works, if he believes it to be valid then it will factor into his stay/leave analysis.

Research related to the Army's conversion to an All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 relates to officer loss due to sudden competition with the civilian job market, and indicates that minority and female officer retention in the Army was higher than for white males due to equal pay among ranks (Stewart & Firestone, 1992). Gotz and McCall (1983) developed a model to research what they termed "the stay/leave decisions" of Air Force officers. Unfortunately, much of their work is inapplicable to junior officers in the current Army force structure. Two of the model's fundamental factors are promotion probability and mandatory separation and retirement probabilities, neither of which can compare to the Army at present because promotion rates are exceptionally high and forced retirement is not a concern for captains.

In the 1960s, Butler and Bridges (1978) developed a scale for measuring intent to remain in or leave the Army, based on research that intention to stay or leave an organization is strongly related to turnover. Known as the Military Career Commitment Gradient (MCCOG), the scale was a single question given to newly commissioned officers with four-year mandatory

commitments to the Army. Seven years later, the authors analyzed the pool of participants and showed that their intent to stay as new second lieutenants was highly predictive of their actual stay or leave decision (Butler & Bridges, 1978).

After an exhaustive review of organization theory and the concepts of job embeddedness, retention, and status, I developed two surveys for distribution to several hundred current and former Army captains. The content of the surveys was adjusted based upon the responses to two rounds of initial surveys. The final surveys were created using computer software on the Qualtrics website (www.qualtrics.com) and were distributed via email to members of the West Point graduating class of 2001. The email distribution list was obtained from the USMA Association of Graduates, and was incomplete. Of the 985 graduating members of the class, it is unclear how many individuals received the message. The email message read:

> I'm doing some work related to Army retention, and it would be very helpful if you could fill out a survey for me within the next few days. It does not take long to complete.
>
> -If you are still in the Army, please take the survey located at:
> http://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE?SID=SV_6QICtvGBVkvlqzq&SVID=Prod
>
> - If you are no longer in the Army, please take the survey located at:
> http://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE?SID=SV_4YKP53fhsNlX2zG&SVID=Prod

293 subjects successfully completed a survey (164 still in the Army, 129 no longer in service). The sample is not a random selection of Army captains, but it does offer many insights into current organization policies and the thought processes of many who remain in service, plan to leave shortly, or who have already left.

In using this sample to represent the group of Army captains, additional bias in the survey may stem from the following: I identified myself via email address and signature block; officers

currently deployed are less likely to receive the email, and therefore may be under-represented in the sample; those with strong feelings about Army retention and organizational policies are more likely to respond. I gathered additional data by conducting six in-person interviews and 12 telephone interviews with current and former Army captains, and two in-person interviews with MBA admissions directors at Columbia Business School.

Research in the area of family size generally attempts to relate social and environmental factors to the decision to procreate and may influence someone's decision to join or leave an organization. Common variables throughout past work include parental age, education level, and income (individual, household, or net assets). Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) raise the concepts of opportunity costs of children when they write, "Higher wage rates, due perhaps to greater human or physical capital per worker, induce a substitution effect away from fertility by raising the cost of children." The authors conclude that investments in human capital strongly affect economic growth, noting education appears to be a major contributing factor. They disregard age as a primary factor, however, by using a simplified model that assumes everyone lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood. Mathematics eventually predicts values for the marginal utility of producing children, which are based upon fixed time and goods spent investing in them.

Similar research was conducted by Moffitt (1986), who agrees that the cost of a child is the foregone earnings, and is therefore based on a wage rate. Some variables used in the paper include level of permanent initial wage and level of exogenous wealth (consisting of the husband's income stream plus household assets). This generates some difficulty when applied to the unemployed, who have no income.

Conger and Campbell (1978), in attempting to "capture the dynamic nature of household decision-making," found that "certain variables, however, especially education and income, proved to have greater explanatory power than anticipated." The authors employed a Female Participation Rate Equation because of the generally accepted logic that salaried work has a negative impact on birth rates. They include information on private medical expenditures during delivery and throughout the lifetime of a child to measure maintenance costs of bearing and raising children.

In addition to incorporating macroeconomic and generation variables, Becker and Barro (1998) refer to altruism and utility in regard to children. There is an equilibrium between child utility and consumption of a given set of household goods. They write, "The marginal benefit of an additional child… must balance the marginal cost." If this finding holds true, then decreased marginal costs for military children should lead to larger families.

Military compensation augments families in ways that reduce the costs of children. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is dependent upon local housing costs, rank, and whether or not the member has a dependent (usually a wife or child). Although BAH does not increase for additional family members beyond the first, it may have an effect on family size by inducing early marriage. Service members receive higher BAH rates when they have a dependent, thus there is an incentive to marry at an early age. BAH is also not considered taxable income. Officers living on military installations do not receive BAH, but are provided housing that is determined by rank and number of dependents. Larger homes are provided to members with larger families. The following was copied from the USMA family housing website[12]:

[12] Available at: http://www.usma.edu/dhpw/Housing/housing2.htm

> Married Officers in the grade of Colonel will be assigned a minimum of four bedrooms. Soldiers in the grades of Lieutenant Colonel… will be assigned a minimum of three bedrooms. All other personnel will be assigned to quarters by number of family members, based on their gender and age. When an inbound sponsor or spouse is pregnant as confirmed by medical authority and is accompanied by other family members, the baby will be considered in the bedroom count.

Another element of the Army compensation package is a cost of living adjustment (COLA). This is additional pay that service members receive to offset the increases to costs of living based on geographical area. For example, captains with over six years of service with a spouse or child who are stationed within zip code 10027 (part of Manhattan) receive an additional $407 per month, while those without dependents receive $308. One other example of compensation being driven by family dynamics is Family Separation Pay, a separate payment of $250 a month given to military members with dependents who are deployed from home for more than a month.

Discounted food and goods are available to organization members at the Commissary (grocery store) and Post Exchange (discount retail similar to Wal Mart), which sell at approximately 20% less than commercial markets and are tax free. These institutions are recognized as important and legitimate sources of compensation, and are subsidized by the federal government. The use of such establishments lowers the costs of living and child raising for military families.

The Department of Defense's Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are designed to bolster military readiness by providing soldier and family support services. Some of its subordinate organizations include Army Emergency Relief (providing immediate-need loans), Child Development Services, Autocraft Shop, Armed Forces Community Service, education centers, fitness and recreation facilities, and youth services. MWR improves the quality of life

for members and their families and reduces the costs associated with raising a child. A military couple is able to take advantage of free or inexpensive services that help in the care, education, and overall well-being of their children.

The armed forces have a long history of providing health care for its members. Most dependent family members do not make co-payments for medical services, and have low-cost pharmacies and a catastrophic cap that cannot exceed $1,000. The dental program provides affordable and extensive coverage for families that includes general dentistry, orthodontics, and anesthesia. As a family grows, it becomes increasingly economical for it to remain in the Army under military healthcare.

Although difficult to quantify, many service members appreciate the environment their career affords them. Military communities are quite safe (most have controlled entry at guarded gates and patrols by military police). A couple may be more likely to increase family size if they know their home will be in a secure area with good neighbors, and their children will go to a safe school with friends from other military families. Although service members generally have to move frequently, there is often a good support network of both old friends and members of the gaining organization that reach out to new arrivals. Knowing this can help families feel more comfortable about facing the future challenges of child rearing. Thus, the Army provides a range of organizational programs and incentives that reduce the costs of having children and encourage family growth. How do these factor into a junior leader's turnover decision.

The Army is struggling to retain its captains, and the captains are struggling to maintain stable, present relationships. Organization policies are encouraging them to get married and have children, yet they are then asked to train and deploy continuously away from their families. When asked why he left the service, one former officer wrote:

> It comes down to one word: family. I was married right before I got out of the military and couldn't see putting my family (wife and future kids) through the trauma of possibly not having a father/husband figure in their lives. I was an infantry officer that lost many good friends in Iraq/Afghanistan and realized that I didn't want to gamble my life when I had completed my service to the nation. I felt I owed it to my family to be there for them through everything. They are my number one priority, not my Army career.

From the survey responses below, current and former officers clearly feel that having a family hinders retention:

From Survey of Former Officers

Question	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
Being married encourages officers to remain in the Army.	3	19	27	51	29	129	3.65
Having children encourages officers to remain in the Army.	3	27	22	36	40	128	3.65

From Survey of Current Officers

Question	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
Being married encourages officers to remain in the Army.	5	32	34	63	29	163	3.48
Having children encourages officers to remain in the Army.	4	37	28	62	32	163	3.5

Note that when interpreting the Mean, "1" corresponds to "Strongly Agree" and "5" corresponds to "Strongly Disagree." Thus, for example, a mean of 3.65 indicates an average response between "Neutral" and "Disagree."

Another respondent offered a particularly applicable comment:

> I thought I wanted to have a family and I knew as long as I was in the Army the way things are right now, I could never accomplish that. I've come to find out that I don't want a family anymore. I thought about going back in to the Army, but the Army of the past 3 years isn't the Army I knew and loved for the 12 years I served.

Here seems to be an officer who perfectly models the conflict described in this paper. While in the organization, he was influenced by policies and social pressure to want a family, yet the demands of the job forced him out based on this mental construct. The normative influence of military life is pressuring members to have families, yet the realities of Army life discourage it.

Former and current officers were/are generally satisfied with their military compensation:

From Survey of Former Officers

How satisfied were you with the following:	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Responses	Mean
Your military pay	23	75	17	13	1	129	2.18
Your military healthcare	32	53	21	20	3	129	2.29
Commissary, PX, MWR, and other money-saving opportunities	31	54	33	10	1	129	2.19

From Survey of Current Officers

How satisfied you are with the following	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Responses	Mean
Your military pay	13	112	22	13	3	163	2.27
Your military healthcare	26	85	21	22	7	161	2.37
Commissary, PX, MWR, and other money-saving opportunities	17	69	44	23	9	162	2.62

What is most interesting about the above statistics is that those who left the Army were more satisfied with their military incentives than those still serving (mean is less in all three categories for former officers, or closer to Satisfied).

How have the events of September 11th, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the organization? The following questions attempt to answer that question from the perspective of junior officers and their families:

From Survey of Former Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
It is more difficult for an officer to find a potential spouse now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	52	43	21	10	3	129	1.98
It is more difficult for an officer to maintain a marriage now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	80	36	6	4	2	128	1.53
It is more difficult for an officer to have children now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	73	39	10	7	0	129	1.62
It is more difficult to be a dual-military couple now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	89	18	17	3	1	128	1.51
Senior military leaders understand the strains on junior officer social relationships and families.	4	21	24	41	39	129	3.7

From Survey of Current Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
It is more difficult to find a potential spouse now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	90	46	17	8	2	163	1.69
It is more difficult to maintain a marriage now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	122	29	6	4	2	163	1.37
It is more difficult to have children now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	99	41	16	4	3	163	1.6
It is more difficult to be a dual-military couple now than prior to the Global War on Terror.	101	20	36	3	2	162	1.67
Senior military leaders understand the strains on junior officer social relationships and families.	4	29	23	50	57	163	3.78

Both groups show strong support of the concept that the Army's operational tempo makes it difficult to start a relationship and begin a family. The last question in this group relates to a general perception that senior Army officers are "out of touch" with junior leaders, and do not understand the impact of strained family relationships. One former officer wrote:

> I was burned out on back-to-back deployment cycles and disappointed with Battalion and Brigade level leadership. Senior leaders have a 1990's mindset (from when the Army was getting smaller and the nation was not at war) that is not conducive to maintaining troop strength.

Another added:

> I wanted to start a family and did not want to see my children grow up in pictures. My wife has a professional career and I did not want to have her shoulder all the responsibility of raising a family while I was deployed or training.

Many of the problems currently faced by the Army stem from the number and duration of deployments, and little can be done by the organization to limit the demands placed on it by civilian leadership. The Army must fight where it is called, and in doing so it must call upon its young leaders to serve multiple times, sometimes with dire consequences for the families involved. One officer, still serving, wrote:

> Who ever came up with the idea of 15-month deployments is a complete heartless <expletive>. My girls will be five when I return from this deployment and I will have been gone for over 3.5 years of their lives; a massive cause of my marital problems which are now culminating in my divorce. Other than that, the current leadership is spot on when it come to taking care of its troops (extreme sarcasm). I will have tons of experience with two company commands, multiple combat deployments and operations in different theaters across the globe, but no family to come home to. What more can a man ask for?

Deployments are likely to slow following the projected exit from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. There is still something to be said about Army policies, culture, and pay plans that influence its members to have families. From interviews with fellow officers, they clearly value personal relationships with superior officers who show care and concern for the subordinate and his family. One powerful role model can strongly influence a large group of junior officers. Some of the most disheartened captains in the survey have served in Army units where their senior leadership has repeatedly failed them, or simply did not act ethically or morally.

From Survey of Former Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
I had a positive Army mentor who encouraged me to remain in the Army.	9	42	15	40	23	129	3.2

From Survey of Current Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
I have a positive Army mentor who has encouraged me to remain in the Army.	18	54	29	43	19	163	2.94

The survey responses above indicate that this could be a factor, as those who remain in service tend to agree that they have a mentor, while those who left indicate that on average they did not have a positive mentor. The Army may face problems of inexperience and incompetence as it decreases promotion timelines and increases promotion rates. This could also lead to the same feelings of frustration found among surveyed subjects in the Stouffer, et al. (1949) study, in which members of a group with high promotion rates felt undervalued relative to those in a group with less advancement.

Army policies and the military lifestyle have obvious implications for the spouses of officers. I surveyed for this using the following questions:

From Survey of Former Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
It is difficult for Army spouses to have their own careers.	55	52	12	9	1	129	1.83
The Army does a good job of supporting spouses' careers.	2	5	36	48	37	128	3.88
The Army does a good job of supporting spouses.	3	45	39	29	12	128	3.02
(If applicable): My spouse is satisfied with his/her career.	17	28	55	3	0	103	2.43

From Survey of Current Officers

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Responses	Mean
It is difficult for Army spouses to have their own careers.	70	64	13	11	5	163	1.88
The Army does a good job of supporting spouses' careers.	0	9	31	74	48	162	3.99
The Army does a good job of supporting spouses.	4	42	57	44	16	163	3.16
(If applicable): My spouse is satisfied with his/her career.	10	34	60	24	12	140	2.96

The Army may be able to impact retention through programs that aim to enhance spouse employment options and satisfaction with the military lifestyle, which may in turn impact organizational leader identity. Some of my other survey responses and interviews focused on the Army's inability to adapt policies and procedures for those officers in atypical situations. As one former officer wrote: "I had a son, and did not want to deploy and leave him behind. At the time I was also a single parent and the Army has little to no consideration for single parents."

This sentiment was echoed throughout the open-ended survey response portions, particularly among dual-military couples. When both spouses are Army officers, it is exceptionally difficult to have a family because the Army has no organizational policies for addressing when both parents need to be deployed, other than forcing the parents to find child care while they are gone for up to 15 months. This is unacceptable to many officers, and one or both parents opt to leave the service as a result. A female former officer wrote:

> The upper leadership was incompetent. All they seemed to care about was their career. Plus, a mother cannot deploy every two years for a year and still feel positive about her relationship with her children. It's too much.

The costs and benefits of altering Army policies to accommodate single parents, dual-military couples, and female officers in general deserve further study. This section helps illuminate the struggle that many officers are dealing with as they wrestle with conflicting identities. Organizational policies and social norms dictate that officers get married and have families, yet the lifestyle of an officer at war is hardly conducive to building and maintaining relationships with loved ones. Should it adapt, the Army could potentially improve organizational performance.

CONCLUSIONS

The research contained in this dissertation spans three fields of great interest to me: organizational leadership, identity development, and networks. In Chapter 2, I explore systems of leader development, with a focus on those of the Army and West Point. I then turn to the role of identity in leader development. In examining cadet development I propose that the formation and growth of self-identity as a leader is neither sequential nor continually upward. Rather, it can vary significantly over time, and passes through phases of leader identity development which I term leader identity construction, stagnation, and destruction.

Chapter 3 builds upon this structure and highlights statistical analysis of my Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey to reveal insights into leader identity development. Some independent variables (namely those capturing values and organizational identity with West Point and the Army) represent components of an individual's leader identity, while network variables capture the perceptions of others. I further examine the institution in classifying cadets by network position and level of leader identity development. Interviews and observation add to the understanding of leader identity development in cadets occupying these classifications.

Chapter 4 opens with an investigation into the origin and continued success of an organizational community of practice. I then apply management and sociology theories to deepen our understanding of these organizations and develop propositions related to identity development, knowledge and information transfer, trust, communication, and organizational survival.

In Chapter 5, I present my thoughts on future research pertaining to leader identity contagion, mentorship, professional identity development through communities of practice, and

employee turnover. Organizational leadership, being a social interaction between individuals in a network, can benefit from further social network analysis and the study of networking technologies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Cadet Leader Identity and Network Electronic Survey

This survey will take approxiamtely 20 minutes of your time. Your participation will help us gather perceptions about leadership and performance.

(I. Values)

Indicate how strongly you agree with the statements below.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. I trust in the U.S. Constitution and believe it is worth protecting.	1	2	3	4	5
2. What is good for the Army and other soldiers is important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I strive to do the best job I can in my company position. (ex. Team leader, Academic NCO)	1	2	3	4	5
4. I maintain a professional relationship with my chain of command above and below me.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I don't really trust the company and its members.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Thinking about how I can become a better officer for my future units is not a top priority for me.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I internalize not just the cadet honor code, but the spirit of the honor code, into my everyday life.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I respect the Army values.	1	2	3	4	5

9. You can count on me to choose the harder right over the easier wrong for rules at West Point.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I would stand up to a friend for making an unethical choice.	1	2	3	4	5

(II. Leadership Identity)

Indicate how strongly you agree with the statements below.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Most of the time, I prefer being a leader rather than a follower when working in a group.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I am definitely not a leader by nature.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I am the type of person who likes to be in charge of others.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I believe I can contribute more to a group if I am a follower rather than a leader.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I have a tendency to take charge in most groups or teams that I work in.	1	2	3	4	5

(III. Leadership Style, Authentic Leadership)

Instructions: The following sentences refer to **your leadership style**.

Leadership Actions/Behaviors	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
1. I say exactly what I mean.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I admit mistakes when they are made.	1	2	3	4	5

3. I encourage everyone to speak their mind.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I prefer not telling the hard truth.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I display emotions exactly in line with my feelings.	1	2	3	4	5
6. My beliefs are not always consistent with my actions.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I make decisions based on my core values.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I ask followers to take positions that support their core values.	1	2	3	4	5
9. I make difficult decisions based on high standards of ethical conduct.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I tend to stay away from views that challenge my deeply held positions.	1	2	3	4	5
11. I analyze relevant data before coming to decisions.	1	2	3	4	5
12. I listen carefully to different points of view before coming to conclusions.	1	2	3	4	5
13. I seek feedback to improve interactions with others.	1	2	3	4	5
14. I accurately describe how others view my capabilities.	1	2	3	4	5
15. I don’t feel it is necessary to ever reevaluate my positions on important issues.	1	2	3	4	5
16. I show my understanding of how specific actions impact others.	1	2	3	4	5

(IV. Self, Self-Monitoring)

Indicate how strongly you agree with the statements below.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.	1	2	3	4	5
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I would probably make a good actor.	1	2	3	4	5
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.	1	2	3	4	5
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.	1	2	3	4	5
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.	1	2	3	4	5
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.	1	2	3	4	5
12. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.	1	2	3	4	5
13. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.	1	2	3	4	5

14. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.	1	2	3	4	5
15. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not present myself quite as well as I should.	1	2	3	4	5
16. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face if it brings about a right end.	1	2	3	4	5
17. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.	1	2	3	4	5

(V. Core Self, Five Factor Personality Scale: TIPI)

Indicate how strongly you feel about the statements below.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I see myself as critical, quarrelsome.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I see myself as anxious, easily upset.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I see myself as open to new experiences, complex.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I see myself as reserved, quiet.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I see myself as sympathetic, warm.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I see myself as disorganized, careless.	1	2	3	4	5

9. I see myself as calm, emotionally stable.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I see myself as conventional, uncreative.	1	2	3	4	5

(VI. Cohesion, Group Cohesion)

Indicate the degree to which you agree with following questions about **your company**.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Members of my company pull together as a team.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The members of my company work together to get the job done.	1	2	3	4	5
3. My company's members are about each other.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Members of my company trust each other.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Leaders of my company pull together as a team.	1	2	3	4	5
6. My company's leaders work together to get the job done.	1	2	3	4	5
7. The leaders of my company care about each other.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Leaders of my company trust each other.	1	2	3	4	5

(VII. Social Network)

Successful training depends on your communication with others in your unit. The next few questions ask about your relationships within your Company.

Friend

4. Name up to 5 people you consider to be a friend (*someone you choose to spend your time with and go on pass with*).

   *list of cadets per company

Leader

5. Think of the qualities of an *effective leader*. Name up to 5 cadets you think have the most potential to become the best leaders (consider all four classes).

   *list of cadets per company

Trust

6. Name up to 5 cadets you trust (*not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem trustworthy*).

   *list of cadets per company

4. I like my company:

☐ Yes ☐ Neutral ☐ No

(VIII. Identity, Organizational Identity: West Point)

1. Indicate how strongly you agree with the statements below.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. When someone praises West Point, it feels like a personal compliment.	1	2	3	4	5
2. When someone criticizes West Point, it feels like a personal insult.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I am very interested in what others think about West Point.	1	2	3	4	5
4. When I talk about West Point, I usually say "we" rather than "they".	1	2	3	4	5
5. West Point's successes are my successes.	1	2	3	4	5
6. If a story in the media criticized West Point, I would feel embarrassed.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I am aware that I represent West Point when I make decisions.	1	2	3	4	5

(Organizational Identity: Army)

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Becoming an Army officer is a big part of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I consider myself an Army person.	1	2	3	4	5
3. What the Army stands for is important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I share the goals and values of the Army.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Being an Army officer is important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I feel strong ties with Army officers.	1	2	3	4	5
7. If I had an ethical dilemma, I would always consider the values of the Army.	1	2	3	4	5

(Organizational Identity: Cynicism)

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. The criteria for success at West Point are consistent with what's important in the Army.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The punishments at West Point are proportional to the misbehavior and offenses they are meant to correct.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Ten years after graduation I expect to be proud that I am a member of the Long Gray Line.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Succeeding at West Point directly corresponds to future successes as an officer in the Army.	1	2	3	4	5
5. West Point provides me with the military training I need to be future Army officer.	1	2	3	4	5
6. The West Point experience is successfully molding me into a future Army Officer.	1	2	3	4	5

7. I would recommend West Point to a High School student considering the West Point experience.	1	2	3	4	5

(IX. Purpose, Shared Leadership)

Indicate the degree to which you agree with following questions about **your company**.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Members of my company spent time discussing our team's purpose, goals and expectations.	1	2	3	4	5
2. My company discusses our main tasks and objectives to ensure that we have a fair understanding.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Members of my company devise action plans and time schedules that allow for meeting our company's goals.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The members of my company talk enthusiastically about our progress.	1	2	3	4	5
5. My company's members recognize each other's accomplishments and hard work.	1	2	3	4	5
6. In my company, members give encouragement to other members who seem frustrated.	1	2	3	4	5
7. People in my company are encouraged to speak up to test assumptions and issues under discussion.	1	2	3	4	5
8. As a member of this company, I have a real say in how this company carries out work.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Everyone in this company has a chance to participate and provide input.	1	2	3	4	5
10. My company supports everyone actively participating in decision making.	1	2	3	4	5

This concludes the survey. Thank you for your participation.

Appendix 2: Demographic Data of Army Retention Survey Population

CURRENT OFFICERS

Age		
26 - 30	144	88%
31 - 35	19	12%

Gender		
Female	19	12%
Male	143	88%

Race		
African American	4	2%
Asian	8	5%
Caucasian	140	86%
Hispanic	4	2%
Mixed	2	1%
Native American	1	1%
Other	4	2%

Highest level of education completed		
Some College	0	0%
College Graduate (4 year)	135	83%
Master's Degree	19	12%
Professional or Doctoral Degree	9	6%

Current marital status		
Rather not say	0	0%
Divorced	4	2%
Living with another	1	1%
Married	114	70%
Separated	2	1%
Single	42	26%
Widowed	0	0%

How many dependents do you have?		
0	70	43%
1	38	23%
2	29	18%
3	24	15%
4 or more	2	1%

FORMER OFFICERS

Age		
26 - 30	121	94%
31 - 35	8	6%

Gender		
Female	28	22%
Male	101	78%

Race		
African American	5	4%
Asian	3	2%
Caucasian	113	88%
Hispanic	3	2%
Mixed	5	4%
Native American	0	0%
Other	0	0%

Highest level of education completed		
Some College	0	0%
College Graduate (4 year)	93	72%
Master's Degree	34	26%
Professional or Doctoral Degree	2	2%

Current marital status		
Rather not say	0	0%
Divorced	6	5%
Living with another	4	3%
Married	86	67%
Separated	1	1%
Single	32	25%
Widowed	0	0%

How many dependents do you have?		
0	62	48%
1	33	26%
2	18	14%
3	12	9%
4 or more	4	3%

Appendix 3: Other Factors That Influence Military Retention Rates and Their Expected Effect (in parenthesis)

Number of dependents (positive: a soldier with a large family to support is less likely to transition to a new job and give up a guaranteed pay check and medical benefits; or negative: a soldier with a family will not want a lifestyle of constant deployments), ability to adapt to a military lifestyle (positive), fellow soldiers reenlisting (positive), presence of a mentor (positive), presence of good leaders (positive), bonus/incentives being offered (positive), number of years served (positive: it is logical that as someone approaches military retirement of 20 years, the less likely they are to leave; it also may become more difficult to obtain a comparable civilian job the longer one remains in service), perceived status of being in the military (positive), patriotism (positive), support of current or foreseeable future missions (positive), spouse has a military-related or easily transferable job (positive: a spouse with a career in nursing or teaching, for example, will more likely support the transient military lifestyle versus a spouse with a career that requires remaining in one geographical location), personal or family affluence (negative: having savings to draw on reduces the anxiety of going a month or longer without pay to find a civilian job), education (negative: the perception of not being able to find a comparable civilian job is amplified when a soldier lacks a college degree, for example), civilian job opportunities (negative: if someone has a civilian job lined up, or a family business to go into, it reduces the likelihood of reenlistment), deployed status (questionable), number of months deployed (questionable), casualties in the platoon/company (questionable), and spouse being in the military (questionable).