

Piety Projects: Islamic Schools for Indonesia's Urban Middle Class

Karen Bryner

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines two piety projects competing for control over popular conceptualizations of piety and what it means to be a good Muslim, as presented by Al Azhar 31 Islamic Primary School and Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School in Jogjakarta, Indonesia. Al Azhar 31 promotes an Indonesian Islam, pluralistic and inclusive of multi-tradition approaches to Islam that is flexible in regards to acceptable forms of worship. Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes a transnational Islam, inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and linked to the Indonesian Islamic political party, Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS). The school's purificationist approach pushes for the removal of local customs and traditions from mainstream Islam and promotes exacting observance of standardized practices. These two schools' disparate approaches to Islam are emblematic of the larger polarizing trends in approaching Islam in Indonesia today.

This dissertation has particular significance for understanding the intersection of Islamic movements, Islamic education, and the religious middle class. Based on 15 months of ethnographic research, this dissertation demonstrates how schooling can be a tool for shaping socio-religious and political climates of a community and country. It adds to the growing literature on the educational spaces developing alongside Islamic piety movements throughout the Muslim world. Additionally, this dissertation provides a rare example of the influence on Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologies on education, rather

than politics. It also illustrates how the schools' disparate approaches to Islam shape distinct religious subjectivities within their students. The documentation of the innovation of the extended-day Islamic school model and integrated Islam ideology employed by both schools adds to the rich history of Indonesia's Islamic schooling traditions. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates how middle class parents' classed aspirations and anxieties regarding education, wealth, morality, and corruption coalesce to create ready consumers for a particular type of Islamic school: one that provides a longer school day, strong academics, and a robust religious curriculum focused on Islamic morals and values.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

<i>Aurat</i>	Private parts of the body that are inappropriate for the opposite sex to see unless that person is a spouse or blood relative
<i>Bid'ah</i>	Innovation or practices added to Islam not found in the Qur'an
<i>Dakwah</i>	Islamic propagation
<i>Fatwah</i>	Formal legal opinion
Hadith	The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>Ibadah</i>	Rituals and acts of worship
JSIT	Network of Integrated Islamic Schools
Madrasa	Islamic school with secular curriculum
Muhammadiyah	Modernist Islamic organization
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama, traditionalist Islamic organization
Pesantren	Generally a Islamic boarding school associated with NU
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party
<i>Qur'an</i>	Holy text of Islam
Shari'ah	Islamic law
<i>Sholat</i>	5 daily required prayers
SIT	Integrated Islamic school
Wahabi	A movement influenced by Muhammad Abd al-Wahab in Saudi Arabia

Chapter 1

Introduction

Although more than 50,000 tickets had already been sold, Lady Gaga's 2012 Jakarta concert was cancelled by the national police, due to protests by various Islamic groups and threats from the fundamentalist Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) to cause "chaos" if the concert went on (Agence France-Presse 2012).¹ FPI aimed to prevent Lady Gaga, through the mobilization of 30,000 supporters, from "setting foot on our land." The FPI chairman explained, "She had better not dare spread her Satanic faith in this country...Her style is vulgar, her sexual and indecent clothes will destroy our children's sense of morality. She's very dangerous" (Marhaenjati 2012). The Minister of Religious Affairs welcomed the cancellation, believing it would "benefit the country. [As] Indonesians need entertainment and art which have moral values" (BBC News 2012).

In contrast, a politician of the Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) criticized the cancellation, believing that the concert would not have corrupted the country's sense of morality. The politician said, "Whether someone goes to hell or heaven doesn't depend on whether they watch concerts or not. It depends on their deeds and their hearts" (Al Arabiya 2012). A Christian organization, the Indonesian Council of Churches (PGI), voiced support for the concert on the basis that Indonesia's constitution supports freedom of expression (Marhaenjati 2012). Commenting on larger issues at hand, an Indonesian lawmaker criticized, "The government shouldn't discriminate when upholding the law. If they dare to

¹ The Islamic Defenders Front raised \$8,000 in order to purchase 157 Lady Gaga tickets, a large enough block to create a credible threat to security. See "When religious intolerance rules," Beth McAdams, *The Straits Times/Asia News Network*, July 10, 2012.

cancel shows that push a liberal-capitalistic ideology like Lady Gaga, then they should also take firm action against demonstrations pushing ideologies from the Middle East,” which also often run counter to Indonesian culture (Al Arabiyah 2012). Concerns with national and personal morality, freedom of expression (and very likely religious belief), and the preservation of Indonesian culture that emerged around Lady Gaga’s concert highlight major tensions in present day Indonesia regarding tolerance of others’ beliefs and behavior.

Indonesia’s reputation for longstanding religious pluralism throughout the archipelago has been challenged in recent years by acts of religious intolerance. News headlines not only report Muslim attacks on Christian churches and their members, but also on members of Ahmadiyah and Shiite communities for practicing supposedly heretical traditions of Islam. The Wahid Institute, a liberal research organization in Indonesia, reported a 16-18% increase in cases of religious intolerance, including violence, arson and discrimination, between 2010 and 2011 (Schonhardt 2012; McBeth 2012).

This recent increase reflects, and is possibly an outgrowth of, Indonesia’s engagement with the worldwide revival of Islam ignited by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. A multiplicity of revivalist efforts to Islamize Indonesia and Indonesians target political and socio-cultural reforms. Some groups focus on the country’s political and governmental structures through political activism and new legislation. Others are concerned with creating more pious Muslims, focusing on shaping individuals’ religious and moral subjectivities. These piety movements, as Mahmood (2004) has termed them, depend heavily on education. Aside from mosques, schools are a natural space of engagement.

As levels of religious intolerance rise in Indonesia, it is important to look at Islamic schools that have developed within this revivalist period and ask how they shape their students' worldviews and subjectivities through intellectual and religious education. Drawing primarily upon anthropological literatures of religion, education, class, and Indonesia, this dissertation examines educational efforts by Al Azhar 31 Islamic Primary School and Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School in the city of Jogjakarta. While the schools share similarities in clientele profiles, levels of quality in academic and religious instruction, integrated approach to 'secular' and religious knowledge, and emphasis on piety, the schools hold disparate and distinguishing conceptualizations of piety.

Based on 15 months of ethnographic research, I argue that these schools not only promote educational and classed projects, they more specifically promote piety projects that are at odds with one another. Each school's approach to piety shapes particular religious and moral subjectivities among their students. As such, the schools' opposing conceptualizations of piety, each championing flexible Indonesian pluralistic or exacting transnational purificationist approaches to Islam, are contributing to the battle for the preservation of or reformation of mainstream conceptualizations of piety and what a good Muslim looks like in Indonesia. This research demonstrates how schooling can be a tool for shaping political and socio-religious climates of a community and country.

A Cacophony of Islamic Activity in Indonesia

Indonesian Muslims, over 85% of the country's population, are predominantly Sunni. The process of the Islamization of Indonesia, as described by Geertz (1960), involved

appropriating the local, deeply-rooted Indic theories and Hindu-Buddhist Javanese culture into Islamic practices. This initial and influential understanding of Indonesia's Islamic practices led later researchers to mistakenly view the country's Islam as an "Islamic superstructure erected atop a layer of Hindu belief that rests on a foundation of animistic folk religion" (Thomas 1988:898).² Consequently, as Hefner (2000:xix) points out, referencing Marshall Hodgson's (1974) assessment, this narrow and "modernist" understanding of Islam led to identifying "many practices and beliefs of Indonesian Muslims as 'Hindu-Buddhist' rather than as subaltern streams in Southeast Asian Islam" as the practitioners considered themselves to be.

Cultural pluralism is a striking feature of Indonesian Islam today. It is far from uniform in practice. As a single group did not orchestrate the spread of Islam and religious scholars (*ulama*) did not monopolize control over the religion's implementation, regional practices have varied, and continue to vary. Participants in Indonesia's mainstream Islamic traditions recognize that there are different interpretations and variance in the balance of "divine command and local culture (*adat*)" (Hefner 2000:14).

In a simplified view of Indonesia's current religious landscape, two main variants of Sunni Islam dominate mainstream Islamic practices. Scholars often refer to these two groups as traditionalist and modernist, or more recently in less progress-laden terms,

² Prior to the arrival of Islam, people of the now Indonesian archipelago were Hindu, Buddhist, and animist. Hindu-Buddhist states, which flourished for centuries, left significant literary and artistic legacies that continued to thrive after the growth of Islam. It appears significant conversion to Islam began in the 13th century and continued with greater intensity during the 14th and 15th centuries. Some scholars attribute the spread of Islam to its egalitarian ethos, which countered the Hindu caste system. Others consider it to have been a matter of establishing strategic alliances with Muslim traders working in the region. While there were wars between kingdoms, it seems they were more for dynastic, strategic, or economic, rather than religious, motivations. Upon the arrival of Western colonizers, a large number of local kings accepted Islam as a political strategy to counter the threat posed by Christian nations (Ricklefs 2001).

classicalist and reformist (Lukens-Bull 2005). The classicalist and reformist streams' major organizational vehicles are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, respectively.³ NU's elements of Sufism (mystical Islam) contrast with Muhammadiyah's more "modern" or rational approach to religion, which included purging the mystical aspects from Islamic practices. These two streams claim just over 50% of Indonesians' loyalty⁴ (van Bruinessen 2008:219), with Muhammadiyah's urban following constituting over 30 million supporters and sympathizers (Woodward 2011). NU's predominately rural following is over 50 million strong (Al Qurtuby 2013).

The worldwide revival of Islam has not only inspired greater participation in the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations, it has also generated a greater diversity of Islamic practices, much of which is influenced by transnational Islamic movements and groups based in the Middle East. Consequently, Islamist⁵ groups have gained popularity (Collins 2003).⁶ Many Indonesian Muslims are concerned that this transnational influence is

³ The Muhammadiyah organization is more formal with its membership status. For example, it provides member ID cards. NU membership is not as formalized and is usually something one is born into. In recent years, the membership of these organizations has become less clear, or less important (see chapter 2).

⁴ In a recent national survey, 42% of respondents indicated the NU represented more or less their Islamic leanings, while 12% made the same claim about Muhammadiyah. The way the questions were framed suggests that respondents who identified as NU did not identify so much with the organization as much as with the religious attitudes associated with the organization, such as openness to local traditions, flexibility, and tolerance, as opposed to the more principled and puritan attitudes associated with Muhammadiyah (van Bruinessen 2008:219).

⁵ "Islamist" denotes a view of Islam as an ideology that provides clear guidelines for social reform, human interaction, and political organization.

⁶ Collins (2003) argues that the Islamization efforts beginning after Suharto stepped down in 1998 were not, and continue to not be, uniform, differing in *dakwah* (religious propagation) and the role of Islam in government. For a more detailed description of the streams of *dakwah* and the organizations behind each, see Collins 2003. However, Collins focuses on the *dakwah* streams that have a political purpose. Some organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, which has been around for more than 100 years, are also involved in *dakwah*, but do not seek an Islamic government (Jones 1980:318). Some groups view democracy as un-Islamic, while others see no contradiction between Islam and democracy (Collins 2003). While the neo-Salafi group rejects democracy and advocates for *Shari'ah* law, it does not believe in opposing a legitimate

challenging the “Indonesian” ways of religious and political life (Fealy 2008). Some argue that the religious scene has changed so much in the last 30 years that Muhammadiyah, the key player in the progressive Islamic reformist movement of the early 20th century, now seems more moderate and relatively aligned with NU due to new Islamist groups widening the spectrum of Islamic practices (Masaaki et al. 2010).

Engagement with the worldwide revival has generated a surge in mosque construction, attendance at Friday worship services, the availability and purchasing of Islamic literature and music, veiling among women, the opening of Islamic banking branches, pilgrimages to Mecca, alms collection (*zakat*), religious education, and the use of Arabic, rather than a local language, for common daily interactions such as greetings (Bubalo & Fealy 2005; Masaaki et al. 2010). This increase in Islamic activities and the projection of Islamic piety, though, has not directly translated to full support for wholesale Islamization of the political and judicial system as some groups had hoped and others had feared. According to a survey⁷ conducted in 2007 by the Indonesian Survey Institute, Indonesians only selectively support the implementation of *Shari’ah* law (Masaaki et al. 2010:4). For example, they may not be in favor of punishments such as cutting off the hand of a thief, but they may support the requirement for all Muslim women to veil.

government. (Although it advocates for a peaceful existence within their given context, it is interesting to note that many of the violent acts, such as the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, were committed by Salafi members [Collins 2003].) Hizbut Tahrir is another group that rejects democracy, as well as desiring to once again set up a caliphate, the original form of Islamic government and a representation of a unified *ummah*, the collective body of all Muslims throughout the world. Of all the new *dakwah* groups, the Tarbiyah Movement (*Gerakan Tarbiyah*)—also known as the Society of Tarbiyah (*Jemaah Tarbiyah*)—heavily influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has gained the largest prominence in mainstream Indonesia. It claims no incompatibility between democracy and Islam. Its current public face is the political Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Several of these groups, such as PKS and Hidayatullah, have established new private Islamic schools as part of their efforts.

⁷ The survey was called “The Trend of Support Toward the Islamic Values vs. Toward the Secular Values and Influence of Political Islam.”

Islamist parties have adapted to the lack of widespread political support by softening their platforms, and becoming more pragmatic through focusing on the local, rather than exclusively on national-level policies. This has resulted in an increase in the passing of *perda Shari'ah* (*paraturan daerah Shari'ah*) or *Shari'ah*-based bylaws at the provincial and district levels (Masaaki 2010:4). Indonesia's highly decentralized government facilitates such legislative activity. The provincial and local governments of Aceh, a strictly observant Muslim area of the island of Sumatra, have passed laws enforcing a curfew on woman after dark, requiring woman to veil, or imposing a tax for *zakat*, the Islamic practice of alms-giving (Buehler 2008). In less overtly political tactics, many radical groups have gained traction in influencing public opinion by strategically selecting events, such as the Lady Gaga concert, in which they "blur the lines between jihadism and anti-vice and anti-apostasy activities" (McBeth 2012).

The complex and often confusing cacophony of Islamizing efforts currently taking place is, Ricklefs (2008) tentatively suggests, leading to a polarization of society along the lines of religious identity. Yet Ricklefs (2008) also describes the state of contemporary Islam in Java as "one of much complexity, confused and confusing" (133) and therefore too complex to be reduced to two groupings of moderate-liberal and radical-extremist. These two sides and their multiple permutations fall into "ideal types." On one side, there is the approach to Islam that is "liberal in their interpretations [of religious texts], supportive of gender equality, supportive of multiculturalism and welcoming of other faiths, valuing local culture, accepting of mysticism, politically disinterested and peaceful in approach" (133). The other group's approach to Islam is "puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of other

cultures and faiths, rejecting local culture, opposed to mysticism, hoping to impose its version of Islam from the top down and assertive or even willing to use violence” (133).

This polarization extends to the types of Islamic schooling available for middle-class Indonesian children. Al Azhar and the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu* or JSIT), the two private extended-day Islamic school groups examined in this dissertation, are emblematic of these two opposing approaches. As schools are influential sites of socialization and forms of schooling shape forms of religious subjectivities (McLeod 2000), these schools provide useful lenses for examining the broader trends that are competing for control of the conceptualizations of piety and how to be a good Muslim in contemporary Indonesia. These two competing approaches are working to either preserve or reform Indonesia’s socio-religious and political landscape through Indonesian pluralistic or transnational purificationist approaches to Islam.

While transnational Islamic movements influence both school groups—one could not argue any Islamic practice has remained untouched—the degree to which these groups have welcomed and embraced this larger movement differs significantly. Both groups are energized by greater interest in Islam and efforts to foreground Islam in one’s life. However, Al Azhar orients itself towards Indonesia’s pluralistic mindset with regard to cultural and religious practices. JSIT, while localizing transnational Wahabi movements, more specifically inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in an Indonesian context (Machmudi 2008), is much more concerned about returning to what is viewed as purer forms of Islam by eradicating the corrupting effects of Indonesian culture on Islamic practices.

Islam, the State, and Religious Education

Writing specifically about the post-colonial Indonesian context, Ropi (2006:242) argues, “Islamic education reform movements cannot be separated from the political context of the relationship between the state and the Muslim population.” I argue that this statement is relevant to pre-Independence times as well. The political agendas are clearly seen in both formal governmental education reform as well as informal reforms initiated through independent educational organizations establishing private schools such as pesantren, madrasas, and modern Islamic schools. This section briefly reviews the historic relationship between religion, the state, and the development of Islamic schools in general, setting the stage for a detailed explanation of the recent emergence of extended-day schools.

Religion and the state

The role of religion in public life has been a continuous point of debate since the conception of Indonesia as an independent country. As Indonesians prepared for independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945, many activists wanted to require Indonesia’s Muslims to follow *Shari’ah* law.⁸ In the end this was excluded from the final version of Pancasila, the nation’s founding philosophy. The first of Pancasila’s five principles declares, however, Belief in One and Only One God.⁹ This tenet of Pancasila and

⁸ While *Shari’ah* is not implemented at the national level, some district governments have recently begun implementing *Shari’ah* for Muslims within their jurisdiction. Indonesia’s highly decentralized government allows for great governance flexibility at the local level.

⁹ As Indonesia is comprised of myriad ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, the founding principles state “Belief in one God”, but the name of that God is withheld so as to accommodate Muslims, Christians (as in Protestant groups), Catholics, and other monotheistic religions. This was an effort to claim to be a religious, monotheistic country. However, this in turn meant the country would not officially recognize the animistic

the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) demonstrated and guaranteed the prominence of religion, and particularly Islam, in the identity of the nation (Fealy 2004; Hefner 2000; Rifai 2006).

Once Pancasila was ratified, a president was democratically elected. President Sukarno stayed in office for 22 years, until 1967, when he was replaced by a coup. The Indonesian parliament appointed Suharto, an army general, as president of the country. During his 32-year authoritarian and brutal New Order regime (1965-1998), Suharto established impressive economic development and political order. Suharto sought to promote the secular ideals of Pancasila and national unity in part by managing Islam (Sidel 2006).

President Suharto's preoccupation with power at all costs prevented a consistent position on religious matters. Initially, he marginalized Islam¹⁰ and pushed for a secular society. However, by the late 1980s, he courted moderate Muslims and promoted a more Islamic image of himself (van Bruinessen 2002:132) as the general public was showing renewed, widespread interest in Islam. In the mid-1990s Suharto switched gears yet again as he sought favor with the ultra-conservative Islamists. Ultimately, general disapproval of the widespread corruption and nepotism that riddled his government and the economic blow of the Asian financial crisis weakened Suharto's regime (Hefner 2000:59, 72, 82,

religions, which had pre-Islamic presence throughout the archipelago, as well as other minority religions, and in more contemporary debates, atheists. Initially there were five officially recognized religions: Islam, Catholicism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Buddhism and Hinduism were creatively reinterpreted as monotheistic religions in order to be officially recognized (Ricklefs 1981:213). A sixth religion, Confucianism, has since been formally recognized. The other four pillars of Pancasila are more nationalistic rather than religious, namely: Just and civilized humanity; Unity of Indonesia; Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and, Social justice for all Indonesians.

¹⁰ In the 1973, Suharto forced Islamic political parties into a single collation, the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP). Eventually the party eventually came to publicly oppose Suharto.

xviii). Due to widespread protests and calls for resignation, Suharto stepped down in 1998. A new president was democratically elected in 1999. The advent of democracy opened the door for a greater religious presence in the public sphere and greater assertiveness of religious groups in shaping political and social issues (Schonhardt 2012; McBeth 2012).

To many Indonesians during the New Order, Islam became a tool for adapting to their rapidly modernizing society. For the working class, Islam provided new ways to create community in urban settings; Islam also provided a channel for protest. To the middle class, Islam provided a unifying set of values to stand in for ethnic traditions that were becoming irrelevant in the face of development (Collins 2002:158, Jones 1980:317). As the middle class began embracing more Islamic lifestyles, anxieties arose regarding morality, wealth, and corruption (Jones 2012). In addition to a general increased interest in Islam, these middle-class anxieties have contributed to a rapid growth of a new market for private religious schools.

Islamic education and the state

Prior to the 20th century, pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools, were the only formal indigenous educational institutions in Java and the majority of what is now considered Indonesia (Lukens-Bull 2005). The establishment of multiple pesantren throughout the region is said to have been in effort to counter colonial schooling (Whalley 1993). Pesantren are generally associated with the traditionalist NU organizations. After the 1975 Joint Declaration requiring madrasas to increase general education topics to be 70% of their curriculum, most pesantren, although not required by the law, also increased the amount of secular subjects they offered either by incorporating secular subjects into

their curriculum or by attaching a madrasa to their pesantren for students to attend in the mornings and then return to the pesantren to continue religious training for the rest of the day (Azra & Afrianty 2005). Pesantren leaders continue to struggle to find the best balance between general subjects and religious ones in their schools. They acknowledge the need to increase subject matters that will develop employable skills in their graduates. They are being creative in how to “modernize” while maintaining their Islamic character (Lukens-Bull 2005).

Madrasas, first established in Indonesia in the early 20th century, were originally Islamic schools with some general education courses. These schools were originally modeled after the Dutch government and Christian missionary schools, where general education classes were included with religious classes. The modern classroom with chalkboards and desks replaced pesantren’s study circles huddled on the floor gathered around the teacher. While they were initially open to only boys, girls currently constitute slightly over 50% of enrolled madrasa students (Azra et al. 2007).¹¹ Suharto viewed Indonesia’s dual education system—the general stream run by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the religious stream under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA)—a challenge to creating a “distinctive national identity, national unity and patriotism” (Porter 2002:53). Through a series of reforms beginning in the 1970s to the present, school curriculum for madrasas (Islamic schools under the aegis of the Ministry of

¹¹ Several factors contribute to the slightly higher female enrollment rate for madrasas. Observant Muslims find the religious school setting more appropriate for adolescent girls. Additionally, boys are expected to become the breadwinners of a family and are therefore sent to the general schools, which tend to provide better education. If family budgets were tight, money would be invested in the boys’ education at state schools while girls would be sent to the less expensive option, the madrasa (Azra et al. 2007). It will be interesting to see if girls enrollment changes due to the new legislation that declared state schools to be free beginning in 2010.

Religious Affairs) was aligned with general school curricula under MoNE. In March 1975, the Ministers of National Education, Religious Affairs, and Home Affairs issued a Joint Decree stipulating that the madrasas' curriculum should consist of 70% of teaching periods dedicated to secular subjects, leaving 30% of teaching time for religious subject matter. The decree also stipulated the value of a diploma from a madrasa to be equivalent to that of non-religious schools. In effect, this decree standardized madrasa education (Rifai 2006). The changes allowed for transferability of students from religious to general schools and vice versa. These changes also prepared graduates from madrasas to successfully compete for seating in higher levels of education (Thomas 1988). Subsequent policies tightened the standardization process, incorporating madrasas more deeply into the national education system. Although madrasas played a role in extending educational opportunities to poor students¹² largely in rural areas, they typically provided poorer quality education than general schools. Despite efforts to incorporate them into the national education system, they are considered second-class educational institutions.^{13 14}

In the 1920s, around the same time as the emergence of the madrasa, Muhammadiyah established the first “modern Islamic schools,” infusing Islam into the Dutch schooling system (Azra & Afrianty 2005:10). Muhammadiyah leaders feared that modernization and a concomitant rational mindset would alienate Muslim intellectuals

¹² Prior to the government's 2010 declaration that all state schools are to be tuition-free, state general schools were more expensive than madrasas, making madrasas a more affordable schooling option.

¹³ This is highlighted by the performance of junior and senior secondary pass rates on national examinations. Madrasa students' failure rates are two-and-a-half times those of general school students (Azra et al. 2008:180-82). Madrasas generally serve rural and disadvantaged populations. Over half of madrasa students are children of farmers or laborers; this is about 50% higher than in general schools (Azra et al. 2007:182).

¹⁴ Another significant factor to lower quality schooling at madrasas is funding. State subsidies per student at the primary level for state and private madrasas average only about 75% and 38% respectively of the average subsidy provided for students at state general schools (Azra et al. 2007).

from Indonesia's common Islamic practices that were steeped in mystical Sufi traditions and practices. Consequently, the leaders introduced what they considered to be a more rational approach to religion. A remodeled, modern Islam aimed to counter secular and Christian trends. Their rationalism and opposition to superstition successfully attracted Indonesian intellectuals to the organization (Rifai 2006). In contrast to the pesantren and madrasa of the day, Muhammadiyah schools devoted relatively little time to religious subjects. Arabic was not taught. Even though the reformists talked about returning to the Qur'an and Hadith, they read them regularly in Indonesian translations written almost exclusively by contemporary reformist writers (van Bruinessen 2008:223).

Muhammadiyah's Islamic schools, at the primary level in particular, generally provided better quality education than madrasas and have significantly contributed to the transformation of Islamic schooling in the 20th century (Azra & Afrianty 2005).

In a general sense of the word, pesantren and Muhammadiyah schools could be considered madrasas since they are Islamic schooling institutions; however, they are not categorized as such in Indonesian society. Curricular content and ministry affiliation distinguish educational institutions in Indonesia. Madrasas and pesantren are under the aegis of MoRA; Muhammadiyah schools are under the aegis of MoNE. While pesantren are also directed under MoRA, their general lack of a full general education curriculum categorizes them differently than madrasas. Painting in broad brushstrokes, pesantren generally educate students to become classicalist of NU *ulama* (religious leaders); madrasas educate students to become intellectual *ulama*; and Muhammadiyah schools educate students to become educated Muslims (Azra & Afrianty 2005:6). The renewed interest in Islam throughout Indonesia has generated a reform of these institutions as well

as an expansion of religious schooling options beyond traditional NU pesantren, madrasas, and Muhammadiyah schools, to other institutions such as Salafi pesantren¹⁵ and extended-day Islamic schools.

Extended-day Islamic Schools

The new educational phenomenon of extended-day Islamic schools, as I term it, has gained significant momentum in the last 15 years or so, growing from a handful to over 1,000 primary and secondary schools. The extended-day schools are an innovation in Indonesia's long history of Islamic educational institutions. They developed out of a specific set of needs, in response to a specific set of circumstances. This educational trend is part of larger efforts to develop a religious ethos to replace the secular mindsets and abstract approaches to Islam. However, for these schools, academics are still of equal importance.

Similar trends are seen in Islamic schooling throughout the world. There is both a push to focus on religious education to teach morals when the secular state has failed (Adely & Starrett 2011) as well as to merge religious knowledge with "marketable" instruction (Liomeier 2005:405). For example, in Egypt, Herrera argues that demand for private Islamic schools has increased as the public seeks Islamic instruction perceived to be missing in secular state schools. At the same time, some of the new Islamic schools cater to elite families who want an Islamic environment for their children but will also pay a premium for English language and computer skills (Herrera 2000, 2006).

¹⁵ Salafi is a newer transnational approach to Islam, taking a scripturalist approach to understanding the Qur'an and following a stricter approach to following the teachings of Islam. Salafi pesantren could be considered the concurrent educational development in pesantren schooling as JSIT schools are to the "older" modern Islamic schools.

International trends in expanding private Islamic schooling markets are facilitated by the democratization of Islam, or a broadening of legitimacy in who can produce and transmit religious knowledge (Eikelman 1985, 1992). This democratization has created new hierarchies of knowledge, perceptions of expertise, and credentials (Eikelman 1985, 1992; Messick 1993, Fischer and Abedi 1990, Mottahedeh 2008). Consequently, more individuals and groups are establishing Islamic schools with little or no formal religious training or sponsorship from formal religious organizations, thus creating diverse content and ideas of what makes a school Islamic. This introduces new forms of understanding into public and sometimes politicized arenas (Herrera 2000, 2006; Hefner & Zaman 2006; Hefner 2009a; Janson 2005).

While differing in aspirations regarding the legal implementation of *Shari'ah* law and strictness in Islamic practice, the various school groups involved in Indonesia's trend of extended-day schools are united in the ambition of producing a well-educated generation of pious, observant Muslims. As the term suggests, these schools extend the length of the school day, meeting two to four hours longer than most general and private Islamic schools, which release students at noon or 1 p.m. This feature is highly attractive for practical reasons, as it correlates more conveniently with the work schedules of middle-class parents.

This trend is made up of several groups, most significantly of the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu*, hereafter known as JSIT), the Network of Hidayatullah Integral Schools, and Al Azhar Islamic Schools, in addition to smaller groups and independent schools. While still small in number, particularly in comparison to the longer-standing Islamic education institutions, they are growing rapidly

and are teaching an influential group of students, predominately from the middle and upper-middle classes, who are likely to become social activists, politicians, academics, businesspeople, and the like. The graphic at the end of the chapter (Figure 1) maps out pre-tertiary Islamic schooling in present-day Indonesia, highlighting extended-day schools. As a survey of all extended-day Islamic school groups does not exist and such an undertaking was not part of the scope of my research, the following analysis is based upon research on Al Azhar and JSIT, two of the first extended-day school groups. As the popularity of the extended-day Islamic schools has grown, many spinoffs have sprouted up, and it is unclear how much the form and ideology of the new schools are consistent with the schools of this study.¹⁶

Al Azhar, headquartered in the affluent area of Kebayoran Baru in southern Jakarta, is a prominent, largely apolitical educational group that caters to middle- and upper-middle-class families. While all education is political, this group does not have formal or informal ideological ties or sponsorship with a religious organizations (such as Muhammadiyah or NU) or political parties (such as PKS). Al Azhar is one of the, if not the most, well-respected names in quality Islamic schooling. The group's highly centralized franchise¹⁷ management model works to ensure the high quality of the schooling. In 2010 it had 35 preschools, 35 primary schools, 30 secondary schools, and a university, mainly on the island of Java (personal communication with Al Azhar headquarters office, May 2010).

¹⁶ While ideological and structural similarities were found at two other extended-day Islamic schools I visited in Jogja, one an independent school and the other a member of a small school group, claims to representativeness cannot be made regarding all extended-day Islamic schools.

¹⁷ The term "franchise" emerged from the data when during interviews, leadership referred to their schools as franchises, complete with Memorandums of Understanding between headquarters and the local sponsoring foundations that run the schools. They also discuss these schools using terms business terms such as "brand name" and "marketing."

Al Azhar promotes a flexible Islam that accommodates various Islamic practices. In chapter 3, I provide details on this school group based on my research at the Al Azhar 31 primary school campus on Jogja.

The Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu* JSIT),¹⁸ the largest group of extended-day Islamic schools, is headquartered in Depok, abutting Jakarta on the south. According to Hefner, they are part of a “multi-stranded educational movement that, to the surprise of many, became one of the fastest growing trends in Islamic education in post-Suharto era” (Hefner 2009:73).¹⁹ In 2009, the Network had 571 preschools, 424 primary, and 130 secondary member schools throughout the archipelago (JSIT 2009).

The majority of members of the partnering foundations that run the schools are members of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, hereafter PKS). Due to laws that forbid political parties from sponsoring social institutions, such as schools or health clinics, there are no formal or fiscal ties between JSIT and PKS. However, they are ideologically unified and the Network is a strategic piece of the PKS' larger vision to Islamize the country politically and culturally. While the link is not formally promoted, it is no secret and the schools are often referred to in the general public as “PKS schools.”

¹⁸ An important clarification on the use of JSIT and the more general term of integrated Islamic schools needs to be made. Most literature refers to JSIT schools as simply integrated Islamic schools (SIT), which they certainly are, seeing as in the name of the network, all of their schools have this in their title, and they claim to have coined the phrase. However, the few authors writing about integrated Islamic schools generally do not differentiate between JSIT schools and the multiple independent schools or education groups who also use the phrase. This runs the risk of non-JSIT integrated Islamic schools being associated with the politics of PKS. Many integrated Islamic schools do not want to identify with the political party and its platforms, although they do identify with their approaches to teaching Islam in schools and implementing Islam in form and practice.

¹⁹ Hefner's reference included JSIT and Network of Hidayatullah Integral Schools. However, JSIT is the larger network of the two. See chapter 2 for more details.

While not achieving the same reputation as Al Azhar, JSIT schools are well-respected among the middle class and are known to rival top state general schools in their communities. In chapter 4, I provide details on this school group based on my research at the member school Luqman al Hakim SIT campus in Jogja.

Al Azhar and JSIT, along with other extended-day Islamic school groups, are redefining formal Islamic schooling in urban Indonesia. Like the Muhammadiyah schools, they are run under MoNE to highlight their academic emphasis. There are six main facets that distinguish these extended-day Islamic schools from Indonesia's more common Islamic schooling models (i.e. pesantren, madrasa, and Muhammadiyah schools): 1) relatively expensive tuition and fees; 2) a Qur'an-based epistemology that guides the integration of Islamic knowledge and general knowledge in all subjects; 3) an expanded religion curriculum on top of the full national curriculum; 4) focus of religious curriculum on Islamic values and ethics rather than the more traditional subjects, such as *fiqh* (jurisprudence) or *tafsir* (commentary on the Qur'an); 5) an extended school day, releasing students one to three hours later than state general schools and other private Islamic day schools; and 6) no association with formal Islamic organizations (i.e. Muhammadiyah or NU).

Extended-day schools have reimagined or re-imaged Islamic schooling to be rigorous in both academics and religion, and have integrated the two fields within the classroom by teaching the national education curriculum within an Islamic framework. Qur'anic knowledge and discussions of God's hand in history and science are not only integrated into all subject matter, but take precedence over human knowledge if the two are in conflict. I argue that the intent of this integrated Islam ideology and Qur'an-based

epistemology goes beyond educating students to know their facts according to science and the Qur'an; its aim is to engender piety among students by instilling intellectual respect for God and indebtedness to God's benevolence. Therefore, these schools, much like the piety movements across the Muslim world, aim to not only teach *about* Islam, but to motivate students to incorporate Islam into all aspects of their lives, to live with Islamic values, to develop Islamic character, and to be pious.

Both school groups consider that their independence from religious organizations²⁰ allows them to promote a universal, rather than an organization-specific, Islam.²¹ However, the schools conceptualize a universal Islam quite differently. Al Azhar views a universal Islam as inclusive. This concept of universal means "all encompassing" (Collier and Ong 2005:9-10). Universal Islam to them welcomes all forms for worship.²² Al Azhar, therefore, promotes a pluralistic Islam that allows for flexibility in how one demonstrates piety. This widens the boundaries of who is considered a pious Muslim. More in line with transnational trends, JSIT considers a universal Islam to be a normative, standardized, and "deculturalized" form of practice that is therefore applicable to all. This conceptualization

²⁰ As noted previously, JSIT is linked to the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). However, this is a political party and therefore not considered a religious organization in the same sense as the non-political community organizations or *ormas* (*organisasi masyarakat*) such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and other religious organizations. The blurring of boundaries between PKS as a political party and a religious organization will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.

²¹ In Islam, a religious organization is the closest parallel to the concept of a denomination within Christianity. Consequently, the closest equivalent to a Christian denomination in Indonesia's landscape of Islamic practices are religious organizations, such as NU or Muhammadiyah, to name the two largest. These religious organizations promote specific and distinct interpretations of holy texts and forms of rituals and acts of worship, resulting in group-specific practices, cultures and customs.

²² It is recognized that Al Azhar does have a bounded definition of Islam, and is therefore exclusive to a certain extent. For example, the Ahmadiyah group, a group that claims to be Muslim but also claims to follow a current prophet and therefore does not accept the Prophet Muhammad as the last and final prophet, is not considered to be Muslim by the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims. Al Azhar teachers on a survey I administered but is not discussed in this dissertation, did not agree with permitting this group to operate in the country.

considers the “universal,” as Collier and Ong (2005) discuss it, to be a “phenomena whose significance and validity are not dependent on the ‘props’ of a ‘culture’ or a ‘society’. They are rather...‘based on impersonal principles, which can be set out and developed without regard to context’” (Collier and Ong 2005, quoting Giddens, “Living a Post-Traditional society,” pp. 58-59).²³ In JSIT’s perspective, Muslims are beholden to a normative standard regardless of time and space. Motivated by this perspective, the JSIT promotes a more exacting approach to Islam that more narrowly defines piety. These varying conceptualizations are crucial in shaping the unique models of Islam, and therefore piety, taught to students at each school.

The school groups’ motivations for promoting their particular versions of universal Islam are as different as their conceptualizations. I argue that Al Azhar is motivated by quality of relationships between groups, maintaining mutual respect, and preserving harmony in society. This necessitates a flexible approach to practices and imposes only basic, common standards among all practicing Muslims. While welcoming, this approach runs the risk of being criticized for compromising important standards, being too unstructured in specifics, and therefore being a watered-down version of Islam. I also argue that JSIT is motivated by principle. Disciplined obedience to a high standard is prized. This exacting approach risks being perceived as exclusive and alienating individuals who do not conform.

²³ In this perspective, a universal Islam is much like the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”

Conceptual Framework: Piety Projects

This dissertation draws primarily upon anthropology's literatures of religion, class, education, and Indonesia. This research has particular significance for understanding the intersection of Islamic movements, Islamic education, and the religious middle class. The two schools' opposing versions of piety have significant ramifications for middle-class subjectivities, religious tolerance, and national politics.

Initially, reform associated with the worldwide revival of Islam was spoken of largely in terms of politics; but in recent years, focus on social and cultural reforms has greatly increased. While political reform focuses on the legal structures, social and cultural reform focuses on individuals. The development of individual piety, or the (re)formation of one's religious dispositions, has become a key means to social and cultural reform within local Islamic revival efforts (Brenner 1996; Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2009; Mahmood 2004; Rinaldo 2007; Rudnycky 2006). This dissertation offers a unique examination of the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on educational reform efforts in Indonesia. The significant emphasis al-Banna put on education is often overshadowed in the press and scholarly research by the political nature of Muslim Brotherhood groups. The importance of education and its power to effect change, however, was not lost on the Tarbiyah Movement-cum-PKS (Hasan 2009; Machmudi 2006). In accordance with Indonesian law, PKS does not directly sponsor or finance JSIT; however, PKS cadre members established and manage JSIT headquarters and most JSIT member schools. JSIT schools teach Islamic principles and promote religious subjectivities of the Tarbiyah Movement, or transnational-style Islam.

Mahmood (2004) argues the reform efforts of Egypt's piety movement, as she terms it, were not aimed at challenging political secularism, but rather social and cultural secularism. In other words, activists did not work to influence issues of the state, such as arguing for the implementation of *Shari'ah* as governing law. Rather, they opposed a secularism that formulated religion as a sphere of life (economic, legal, familial, etc.) rather than a way of life. Activists aimed to "imbue each of the various spheres of contemporary life with a regulative sensibility that takes its cue from Islamic theological corpus rather than from modern secular ethics" (Mahmood 2004:47). Religion was to be a way in which to regulate one's life and gauge one's character regardless of the public or private contexts in which one participated throughout the day—employment, education, domestic life, or social activities.

Mahmood (2004), building upon Foucault's notions of ethics to be "local and particular" rather than universal, demonstrated that while activists of Egypt's piety movement had similar goals, their forms of piety were not uniform (28). For Foucault, morals are a "set of norms, rules, values and injunctions," while ethics refers to the "practices, techniques, and discourses" through which "highly specific ethical-moral subjects come to be formed" (Mahmood 2004:28). In this process of subject formation, an individual's ethical subjectivity is an "affect of a modality of power operationalized through a set of moral codes that summon a subject to constitute herself in accord with its precepts" (Mahmood 2004:28). Various "prescriptive agencies, such as family...educational institutions or churches" promote their own similar or disparate morals and ethics (Foucault 1985:25). Mahmood (2004) argued, within one cultural and historical space,

there are various configurations of personal piety; each variation is a product of “specific discursive formation rather than of the culture at large” (120).

A key mechanism for the development of piety within piety movements is education: formal and informal, state-sponsored and private. The expansion of Islamic education activities since the encounter of the Muslim world with colonial powers has been facilitated through the objectification of Islam, or the conceptualizing of religion into a system of specific beliefs and practices that can be intellectually examined, comprehended, reformed and purified, and transmitted through schooling (Eickelman 1992). This objectification of Islam has contributed to a “democratization” of religious knowledge, redefining what can be considered legitimate religious knowledge and who can be considered a religious specialist (Deeb 2006; Eickelman 1992; Messick 1993), and how it can be transmitted (Hirschkind 2006; Eickelman & Anderson 2003). This greater access to the now portable knowledge of Islam allows for more individuals to establish new institutions of learning as legitimate locations for religious instruction. In Indonesia, this is seen in the expansion of the private religious schooling market through growing numbers of schools sponsored by individuals and groups who are not connected to formal religious groups and are led by individuals without traditional training in Islam.

To look at educational efforts within Indonesia’s Islamic schooling market, I draw upon Bartlett’s (2003) concept of educational projects. Bartlett introduces the concept of educational projects to compare two programs competing to define and influence popular concepts of adult literacy in Brazil. She argues that educational projects include “theory, pedagogy, philosophy, training, and institutions plus a variety of social actors and social practices;” they also “simultaneously work at the cultural/discursive and

political/structural levels” (Bartlett 2003:187). Educational projects “shape how we think about things as intimate as knowledge, intelligence, and personhood, even while they structure our material world” (Bartlett 2003:187).

The school groups of this study are not only educational and class projects (see chapter 7 on middle-class parents), but more specifically piety projects. Extended-day Islamic schools are conceived within the formal structure of the national education system. Unlike the religiously-themed informal educational component (generally study circles) of piety movements throughout the world that focus on religious themes, these schools address a more comprehensive education, integrating religion and academic subjects into one epistemological framework. The schools must be academically competitive to succeed in the middle-class milieu in which they operate. They distinguish themselves from other high-performing general and religious schools through the non-cognitive or non-academic curriculum they offer, namely religion and, more specifically, piety. Religion is not only a subject matter to be cognitively mastered, but also to be embodied by the students, displayed through their moral character, and identified by their piety. There are two components to piety: 1) the proper performance of religious duties and acts of worship; and, more fundamentally important, 2) Islamic character, or daily conduct in accordance with the principles of devotion and moral and virtuous behavior (Mahmood 2004).

The specific forms of schooling shape distinct forms of religious subjectivities within their students. McLeod (2000), employing Bourdieu’s notions of “habitus” and “field,” argues that schools can be seen as “paradigmatic social fields...in which practices, discourses and ethos of particular kinds of schooling shape the dispositions and ways of being of young people” (503). In the same vein as the piety movement of Egypt, the piety

projects of extended-day Islamic schools aim to instill Islamic “regulative sensibilities” in students through a new way of Islamic schooling that integrates Islam into all subject matters. In addition to introducing Islamic practices within government school structures, such as group prayer or Islamic dress codes, as documented in places like Morocco (Boyle 2006) and Egypt (Herrera 2003), the schools of this study have also reframed national curriculum within integrated Islam ideology (see chapter 6) in order to not only teach Islamic practices, but to also imbed comprehensive affinities to Islam and God at a deeper level within students. While using the same integrated Islam ideology approach to knowledge, the schools’ disparate approaches to Islam shape different religious subjectivities within students.

These piety projects compete for “hegemonic control over popular conceptualizations” (Bartlett 2003:187) of piety and being a good Muslim. They influence ideas about religion’s place in public and private spheres, male–female interactions, religious tolerance, and national politics. The schools teach their students how to accommodate, assimilate, and reject various outside influences, such as Western knowledge and transnational Islam. They teach students what a “good Muslim” and moral character look like. However, the school groups’ motivations for promoting their particular versions of Islam and their conceptualizations of piety vary in significant ways.

As previously mentioned, the two school groups are emblematic of the currently polarizing approaches to Islam in Indonesia identified by Ricklefs (2008). For the purpose of this study, I focus on a subset of Ricklefs’ (2008:123) differentiating parameters of these two groups to highlight the factors that contribute to the differences in schools’ competing forms of piety. These parameters are: “attitudes towards interpretation of theology (liberal,

flexible and contextual, or puritan, inflexible and scriptural), attitudes towards woman (favoring gender equality, or supporting separate roles and only prescribed interactions); attitude towards other religions, especially Christianity (welcoming, cooperative and tolerant, or opposed), attitudes towards mysticism (approving and embracing, or rejecting); [and] attitude towards indigenous culture (tolerant and open, or intolerant and opposed).” There are two parameters where the schools do not differ: “basic theology (Modernist or Orthodox, that is, rejecting or accepting the authority of the four Orthodox [Sunni] schools of law); and modus operandi (irenic, or assertive or indeed prepared to use violence)” (Ricklefs 2008:123). However, while both are modernist in theology, rejecting the four Orthodox schools of law, their variations in interpretations of this Modernist theology generate differences in attitudes towards women, indigenous cultures, mysticism, and other religions.

One final parameter is important to note: “political posture (detached from politics, or involved—the latter case whether publicly or clandestinely)” (Ricklefs 2008:123). The schools’ relationships to formal politics do not directly influence forms of piety; however, they do highlight great differences in the schools’ larger formal ideological goals for formal national development, as JSIT is linked to the political party PKS. However, as Mahmood (2004) points out, while piety movements generally do not directly engage with politics, their transformative powers are immense, and the ethical influence on individuals can greatly influence politics. Both school groups are extremely aware of the political influence individual citizens can have in the political arena, and both see piety as a crucial form of citizenship (see chapter 6). However, PKS-linked JSIT has a more focused and formalized political agenda in the education of students.

These piety projects are set within the context of the Islamic middle class. The relatively high tuition and fees of these schools make them unaffordable for lower classes, the traditionally typical Islamic schooling population. Many scholars argue that the rise of Islamic piety in Indonesia has been a fundamentally middle-class phenomenon (Brenner 1996, Hefner 2000, Smith-Hefner 2007, as cited by Jones 2012:159). In other words, the middle classes—more than other classes in Indonesia—are embracing a more Islamic lifestyle. The new prominence of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere since the late 1980s has assumed a “moral tone for the middle class position between the working classes and the wealthy” (Jones 2012:159). The anxieties around this relatively new phenomenon of middle-classness in Indonesia stem from, among other things, the incompatibility between wealth and morality, and in particular consumption and corruption (Jones 2012). Indonesia is well known for its high levels of corruption.²⁴ This corruption is seen both internally and internationally as a key impediment to the country’s economic development. Jones (2012) argues that the rise in public forms of Islamic piety is a partial solution to public anxieties about corruption. I argue, more specifically, that the rise in Islamic schooling among the middle classes is due to parental expectations that it will safeguard children against moral corruption. No less important, the quality of the schools’ academic programs also provided the educational foundation for future education and training students need to be successful professionals, thus maintaining middle-class status. The aspirations, dilemmas, and anxieties of the newly religious middle classes, particularly in relation to tensions between

²⁴ Indonesia is constantly at the top of lists of corrupt countries in the world. Jones (2012) provides a thorough analysis of the forms of monetary corruption that can take place, particularly in relation to the feminized work in the home.

morality, consumption, and corruption, create ready consumers for the extended-day Islamic school market.

Research Setting and Methodology

The bulk of my research took place in Yogyakarta (hereafter referred to as Jogja), Central Java. The city and the surrounding areas are home to 3.5 million people. Jogja, the cultural capital of Indonesia and a university town with six major universities, is also the headquarters of Muhammadiyah, the country's second largest Islamic organization. In 2009, Muhammadiyah schools accounted for 86% of all primary Islamic schools in the Yogyakarta province (author's calculation from MoNE 2009 data). As such, Jogja provided an interesting setting to look at the development of newcomers to the Muhammadiyah-dominated modern Islamic schooling market. I made several trips to Jakarta for interviews with leadership at headquarters of both school groups.

The two school groups of focus for this study are arguably the two most influential extended-day Islamic school groups in the country: Al Azhar and the JSIT, the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT). Azhar is one of the, if not the most, well-respected names in modern Islamic schooling in Indonesia. Al Azhar has 65 primary and secondary schools throughout the country, the majority of which are in the Jakarta area. It is also the largest foundation not associated with an Islamic organization (such as Muhammadiyah) managing Islamic schools promoting the Indonesian approach to Islam. JSIT has a significantly greater presence throughout the archipelago, with over 550 primary and secondary member schools. It is the largest organized network of modern Islamic schools promoting a transnational approach to Islam in the country.

As my objective for this research project was to understand the new trend in extended-day Islamic schools in urban areas, I located myself in Jogja, a burgeoning urban center where there is a growing number of extended-day Islamic schools. In Jogja, at the time of my research, there was only one operating Al Azhar campus, Al Azhar 31 in the Sleman district. That same year there were 16 JSIT primary schools in operation. I selected Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School (Luqman al Hakim SIT) as my JSIT research site for its historical role in the city, as well as its reputation throughout the network. Luqman al Hakim SIT is the longest-running JSIT school in the Jogja area, as well as one of the first in the country. Additionally, as the school was touted as an exemplary JSIT school by national and regional-level leadership, I selected it for its representation of JSIT ideals in school performance. I also chose this school for the rich institutional history available through two original founders still on the school board.

The bulk of my data comes from interviews and some observations. I conducted over 120 semi-structured interviews with an array of stakeholders involved with the two school groups, namely leadership at the two organizations' headquarters in Jakarta (n=13), founders and board members (n=18), school administration (n=15), teachers (n=27), and parents (n=14) from the two schools in Jogja. I also conducted 18 structured group interviews with students in grades four and six from both schools. I conducted observations in classrooms as well as common areas for teachers, and attended school events. Outside of the two school groups, I conducted 37 semi-structured interviews with Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs officers (n=4), religious activists, and leaders and scholars from the larger Islamic community (n=29) and other

extended-day Islamic schools (n=4) to understand their perceptions of these two extended-day Islamic school groups.

Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and then analyzed using Atlas.ti software. I created a content-driven coding system structured around general themes that emerged during the data collection process. Upon coding transcripts, new themes and sub-themes emerged and were added to the codebook. After coding a subset of transcripts, I revised the coding system and began recoding again from the beginning, making small adjustments as I worked through the entire data set. After coding was completed, I culled quotes based on themes to explore relationships between and within the school groups and the larger public.

To supplement parent interview data, I conducted a survey of parents from both schools through self-administered questionnaires. The questionnaires were distributed through the classroom teachers, via students, to all parents. Complete questionnaires were then returned to the teachers through the students and collected at the main office. A total of 229 Al Azhar 31 and 708 Luqman al Hakim SIT parent surveys were collected, achieving 83% and 88% return rates respectively. The data was analyzed using Stata statistical software.

Organization of Dissertation

In order to provide a context for the arguments of this dissertation, chapter 2 maps out two points of difference between the Indonesian and transnational camps' approaches to politics and Qur'anic interpretations regarding innovation in Islamic practices. The mainstream Islamic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah represent Indonesian Islam.

The PKS Islamic political party, inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, represents transnational Islam. The two sides disagree on the role of Islamic law in national politics and the role of pre-Islamic Indonesian culture in Islamic practices. As a challenger to the status quo, PKS has an uphill battle as it exerts influence to reconfigure what the public views as mainstream.

The flexible Islam promoted by the Al Azhar school group is emblematic of Indonesian Islam. Chapter 2 describes Al Azhar in general and the Jogja campus of Al Azhar specifically to illustrate the attitudes and practices that contribute to the formation of the flexible Islam they promote. Drawing on interviews with leadership and teachers at the national and local levels, I show that Al Azhar's flexible Islam is comprised of three interrelated components: Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism. This set of parameters facilitates an easy compatibility with mainstream Indonesian culture. While Islamic values, such as honesty, respect for elders, hard work, and service to others, are standardized, various forms of Islamic practices are honored as legitimate forms of worship. As such, piety can be expressed in multiple ways, the focus being on the participation in Islamic practices, making form secondary to observance.

The exacting Islam championed by the JSIT school group is characteristic of transnational Islam. Chapter Four reviews JSIT in general and Luqman al Hakim SIT in Jogja specifically to demonstrate the approaches and practices that combine to create the exacting Islam they promote. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Tarbiyah Movement is institutionally represented by the Islamic political party PKS and ideologically drives JSIT. Based on interviews with leadership and teachers at the national and local levels, I illustrate the three interrelated components of JSIT's exacting Islam to be: Qur'an-

and Hadith-based beliefs, standardized practices, and exacting adherence. While the general public highly values the Islamic morals and values promoted at the school, observers frequently criticize the standardized, mono-traditional approach to Islamic practices as exclusive and rigid. This school promotes a specific, explicitly defined form of piety, requiring disciplined adherence regardless of time or space.

Specific forms of schooling promote specific forms of religious subjectivities. Based on group interviews with students, chapter 5 investigates the correlation between the type of Islam taught at each school and the respective schools' students' religious subjectivities. Students' religious inclinations from both schools were fairly similar in regards to the prominence of religion in future educational and professional aspirations. However, differences between students' conceptualizations of a "good Muslim" and moral subjectivities generally mirrored the schools' unique approaches to Islam. Al Azhar 31 students' diversified conceptualization of a good Muslim offered greater moral flexibility in accepting and interpreting deviant moral behavior. The majority of Luqman al Hakim SIT students' focused conceptualizations of a good Muslim aligned with a less flexible moral subjectivity that left little room for situational considerations for deviant moral conduct.


Both school groups view piety as a crucial form of national citizenship. Although Al Azhar and JSIT conceptualizations of piety differ, they both agree on the importance of piety for both the individual and the nation. Based on interviews with leadership and teachers from the national and local levels, chapter 6 lays out the schools' employment of what I term integrated Islam ideology to instill piety in students while teaching the national curriculum. The components of integrated Islam ideology are intended to create an intellectual respect for and emotional indebtedness to God, which in turn is meant to

engender pious and devout sensibilities within students. The integrated Islam ideology is also a blueprint for a nationwide piety project, formalized in PKS' education platform.

Middle classed sensitivities regarding education, morality, wealth, and corruption contribute to the popularity of extended-day Islamic schooling. Chapter 7 draws mainly upon parent survey data and parent interviews from both schools to discuss parents' practical and ideological motivations for enrolling their children in Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT. Middle-class parents use extended-day Islamic schools as a tool to mitigate their parental anxieties to care for their children intellectually and spiritually. The marriage between high quality academic training and extensive religious curriculum, combined with the resultant extended school day, makes for a convenient solution to busy middle-class parents concerned with the intellectual and moral development of their children and the maintenance of middle-class status.

The final chapter returns to the various issues discussed in this dissertation. It points out how piety projects are being managed at institutional and familial levels, expecting benefits to society and the individual. Discussions demonstrate this research's significance for understanding the intersections of Islamic movements, Islamic school groups, and the religious middle class.

Figure 1. Map of Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia, Primary and Secondary School



Data Sources:

Pesantren and Madrasa: EMIS of Directorate General of Islamic Education, 2008.

www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=data2008 retrieved January 20, 2011. Data for 2008.

Muhammadiyah: Personal communication with Secretary of Central Board Muhammadiyah, Oct. 31, 2011.

Network of Integrated Islamic Schools: JSIT website, JSIT Membership, retrieved October 20, 2010. Data for 2010.

Al-Azhar: Personal communication with Al-Azhar, October 25, 2010. Data is for the year 2010.

Hidayatullah: Hefner, Robert (2009). *Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia*. In *Making Modern Muslims: The politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia*. Robert Hefner (ed.) Pp. 55-105. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. Data for the year 2007.

*This number is for boarding facilities only; while the majority of pesantren are boarding facilities, some are not. Also, this number it is not specific to primary and secondary facilities. College students also attend and board at pesantren in order to continue their religious education while attending university. It is unclear and thus must be assumed that this number also includes facilities for tertiary level students.

**This number includes pre-primary schools.

***This is an estimation, as there is not way to calculate a more exact number.

Note: While madrasas and pesantren are Islamic schools, they differ from the "Islamic school" category as they fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Affairs rather than the Ministry of National Education. While it is debated to have been earlier, many scholars agree that the first pesantren were established in the 16th century while the first madrasas were established in the early 20th century.

Under the aegis of the Ministry of National Education, schools have greater freedom with curriculum. The Al-Azhar and Network of Integrated Islamic Schools are considered elite since their school fees are generally expensive and thus exclusive. The Muhammadiyah (MUH) schools were first established in 1920s; while the first al-Azhar school was established in the 1960s, al-Azhar's expansion of campuses and the establishment of most other integrated Islamic schools took place in the 1990s.

Chapter 2

The Politics of Religion: Indonesian Versus Transnational Islam



Battles over politics, over Muslim identities, and over what a Muslim modernity should look like are to be fought on the field of education. Whatever one wants Muslim society to become, it seems, the principle instrument of coercion, influence, and change is to be the schools; education has become the leading edge in various efforts to transform Islam and the Muslim world.

Berkey 2007:41

Islamic schools, more than ever, are in the market to fuel or stymie particular transformations of religion, society, and politics in Indonesia. These battles within schooling reflect the larger differences between religious groups and religious political parties. The following chapter examines the intergroup politics between Indonesia's two largest mainstream religious institutions, namely Muhammadiyah (a modernist Islamic group in urban areas that sponsors Muhammadiyah schools) and NU (a mystic, traditionalist Islamic group mainly in rural areas whose followers run pesantren), and the transnationally influenced Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, an Islamic political party whose cadre members run JSIT; see chapter 4 for more details on JSIT). (See Table 1.)



As mentioned in the previous chapter, the surge in the observance of Islam in Indonesia has not been monopolized by one form of piety. While there are permutations and variations, the multiple voices loosely fall into one of two types of Islam: Indonesian and transnational, or what some informants refer to as "not Indonesian." Al Azhar and JSIT represent educational institutions that promote these two types of approaches. (See Table 2.) In order to better understand the motivation behind each school's piety project, this chapter reviews the dynamics between religious entities that find themselves in competing camps in the battle over retaining or gaining relevance in mainstream Indonesian society.

Table 1. Selected Islamic Institutions in Indonesia

	<p>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest religious organization, was established in 1926 and is known for its Sufism (mystical Islam) and accommodation of local traditions within Islamic practices.</p> <p>Model of Islamic reform: Accommodationist/Traditionalist</p>
	<p>Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest religious organization, was established in 1912 to modernize Islam in Indonesia by purifying local traditions from Islamic practice. However, it allows more flexibility within social and political spheres than revivalist groups.</p> <p>Model of Islamic reform: Purificationist/Modernist</p>
	<p>The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Indonesia's largest Islamic political party, is the institutional manifestation of the Tarbiyah Movement, an underground Islamic dakwah (religious propagation) movement established during the 1980s and influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The party was originally established in 1998 as the Prosperous Party (PK) but reconstituted itself as PKS in 2002. The party aims for a comprehensive Islamic reform of Indonesian society, touching on personal religious practices as well as the country's political, social and cultural spheres.</p> <p>Model of Islamic reform: Purificationist/Revivalist</p>

See Machmudi (2008: 53-61) for discussions on models of Islamic reform in Indonesia.

Table 2. Extended-day Islamic School Groups

	<p>The Al Azhar Islamic Pesantren Foundation (Al Azhar), established in 1952, expanded its informal religious instructions programs (namely Qur'anic study circles at the foundation's mosque) in 1962 by building formal Islamic schools. The schools were meant to address the general public malaise toward Islam.</p> <p>Approach to Islam: Flexible</p>
	<p>The Network for Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT) was established in 2003 to formally coordinate and facilitate the operations of loosely associated integrated Islamic schools. The first integrated Islamic schools were established in 1994 out of individual initiatives of Tarbiyah Movement activists-cum-PKS cadre. JSIT is a social organization used for PKS's effort to culturally Islamize the country.</p> <p>Approach to Islam: Exactng</p>

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the dynamics of the Indonesian versus transnational debates regarding the attributes of piety and religious life. Using the country's two mainstream religious organizations—NU and Muhammadiyah—to represent the Indonesian camp and PKS to represent the transnational camp, I first explain two major ideological differences between the two groups: the role of Islam in politics and the approach to Qur'anic interpretation. The transnational approach has been criticized for disrupting the “Indonesian way(s)” of conducting politics and being Muslim. In turn, the Indonesian approach has been criticized for contaminating true Islam through the accommodation of local cultural practices. I briefly review some factors contributing to the tensions between these two camps. Although two religious school groups are discussed in detail in this dissertation, I end the chapter with a review of other Islamic schools and groups in Jogja to demonstrate the variety of schools promoting variations of Indonesian and transnational Islam and contributing to battles over relevance in mainstream Indonesia.

Points of Difference Between NU, Muhammadiyah, and PKS

NU and Muhammadiyah are the two dominant religious organizations on Java with significant influence over mainstream schools of thought regarding how to conduct a pious life in Indonesia. Their influence on believers is similar to that of different denominations in Christianity. NU practices are infused with Javanese and mystical Sufi traditions. Muhammadiyah and, more intensely, the PKS, are considered purificationist in approach, as they advocate the removal of local customs and traditions from their practices of Islam. As part of an early 20th-century transnational reformist movement, Muhammadiyah was

established in 1912 in reaction to the syncretic, mystic approach to Islam—which was later institutionalized by the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, in 1926. The arrival of new transnational approaches to religious observance in the 1980s generated strong competition for Muhammadiyah and NU membership. PKS is one of the more visible and high profile groups within this new wave of Islamization.

Although Muhammadiyah's roots are from an earlier transnational movement at the beginning of the 20th century, the organization has localized its practices, and has become one of Indonesia's mainstream approaches to Islam. Additionally, Muhammadiyah's purification efforts focused on religious practices, rather than the social and political spheres that PKS's transnational vision also aims to reform (Machmudi 2008:53-61). Some argue that the religious scene has changed so much in the last 30 years that Muhammadiyah, the key player in the progressive Islamic reformist movement of the early 20th century, now seems more moderate and compatible with NU relative to new transnational Islamist groups, which have widened the spectrum of Islamic practices (Masaaki et al. 2010). According to a national-level Muhammadiyah education officer in Jakarta, ideological differences between NU and Muhammadiyah and PKS are two-pronged: "The way they approach politics and the way they understand the Qur'an" (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010). These two differences are explained below.

Politics and secularism

Since Indonesia's independence, the nature of the country's government—Islamic or secular—has been debated. During the construction of Pancasila, the country's founding philosophy, one draft included the requirement that all Muslims be required to adhere to

Shari'ah. In the end, however, this clause was withdrawn. The first of five founding principles is "Belief in one God," ultimately leaving the government religious but without a specific religion. Debates regarding religion's formal role in government continue today, with reformers hoping that *Shari'ah* will play a role in national governance.

Muhammadiyah and NU individuals have played significant roles throughout Indonesia's nearly 70-year national history. The National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, or PKB) and The National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, or PAN) are associated with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively. Although members of these religious groups head the parties, the parties do not promote Islamist platforms.

PKS is a relatively new political party, established immediately after the fall of Suharto in 1998, originally as the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, PK) and then reformulated as the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*) in 2002. PKS is an Islamic political party and initially campaigned for the application of *Shari'ah* within government structures. However, PKS has since reined in its Islamic aspirations in order to garner wider political support. Using campaigns for social justice and public welfare, the party aims to educate the population on *Shari'ah*, and thus bring about the application of *Shari'ah* through grassroots-level calls for change (Machmudi 2008:217-218).

In contrast, the "Indonesian" form of politics is a Pancasila government, one that promotes religion, but doesn't require *Shari'ah* law, or any religion's law, to be imposed upon its citizens. As a Muhammadiyah officer, explained:

Muhammadiyah does not have an agenda to set up a new Islamic state. Muhammadiyah wants to strengthen a Pancasila state, but of course implementing Islam not as a formal political ideology but the substance of Islamic morality. (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010)

NU, like Muhammadiyah, supports a Pancasila state. While they do not want Islam or

Shari'ah law to determine the laws of the land, they are keen to have individuals employ *Shari'ah* as a code for personal conduct, believing that as individuals live by Islamic morals, they build a moral society and government. My informant continued, pointing out that in the beginning, PK (before it became PKS)

definitely said that they wanted to be a party that set up an Islamic state or *Shari'ah* state. Later on, after so many critiques on that, they said, [they wanted a] Medina state²⁵...If they follow the Medina state, it is like a Pancasila state actually, but the word Medina also brings a connotation, "Oh, that is something related to Islam," rather than saying "Pancasila" (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010).

As mentioned earlier, PKS changed its original goals in response to public criticism.

However, the call for a Medina state, although similar to a Pancasila state, emphasizes a hope for the state to reflect an explicitly Islamic character.

Currently within PKS, there is internal conflict between the purist and pragmatic, or what Woodward et al. (2011 and 2012) refer to as the "Justice" and "Prosperity," factions of the party. The Prosperity faction, in an effort to expand the party's voter appeal beyond its Islamist base, advocates for a softening of Islamist ideology, while the Justice faction insists on maintaining their strict, core Wahabi²⁶ Islamic values. This shift mirrors findings of Elman and Warner (2008), who argue that, globally, religious political parties are shifting to more moderate platforms in order to stay politically relevant. In Indonesia, there are some who consider the shift within PKS to be sincere, and there are others who are skeptical (Wahid 2009; Woodward 2012).

²⁵ Medina, Muhammad's hometown, was the seat of the first Islamic State.

²⁶ Wahabism is a purificationist movement of strict observance that originated in and is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.

Tensions between the groups could also be due in part to jealousy over PKS' political success. In less than 14 years, PKS has become the largest and most influential Islamic party in Indonesia and the fourth-largest political party overall, the other three being secular (Woodward et al. 2012). In the 2009 presidential election, the party joined the incumbent, and now re-elected, president's coalition. The party's reputation for running a clean campaign and working on social issues through Islamic values has increased the popularity of the party, even if those supporting it are not as observant of Islam as the party cadre. Two Christian friends of mine once commented that if they were Muslim, they would vote for PKS because of their clean reputation. This was unexpected praise, as it came on the heels of their expressions of concern over their perception of PKS' exclusive attitudes toward non-Muslims.

While a moderated Islamic political platform may increase PKS' popularity among voters, the party's strong Islamic values have been a main attraction for parents to JSIT schools from the beginning. One mother who was not a PKS member commented that while Luqman al Hakim SIT was a "PKS school," she liked the Islamic education her children received there. She later, in a formal interview, said that after a prayerful search for a school "that was right for me, right for this world and the next," Allah guided her to Luqman al Hakim SIT. Consequently, she has enrolled her three daughters there (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, April 30, 2010).

Qur'anic interpretation and bid'ah

NU and Muhammadiyah have differences in how they approach Islam, with Muhammadiyah's being more similar to PKS in some ways. However, according once again

to a national-level Muhammadiyah education officer in Jakarta, “Muhammadiyah understands the Qur’an and Hadith in very, very rational ways and sometime we are liberal while they [PKS] want to understand the text in a more scripturalist way” (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010). While it is unclear what he is referring to specifically as “very rational” or “liberal,” he presents Muhammadiyah as being more contextual, rather than textual or scripturalist, in interpreting the Qur’an. A contextual approach allows for contextualizing or adapting Qur’anic teachings to contemporary times, while a textual or scripturalist approach focuses on the teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith and promotes principles and practices that disregard the context (social, historical, cultural) in which the religion is implemented (Woodward et al. 2012). Consequently, this textual, rather than contextual, understanding of principles expects the purer form of practice to be free from the accommodation of local traditions. Both Muhammadiyah and PKS are similar in that they strive to purify Islamic ritual and understanding from the more mystic Javanese practices of NU. PKS, however, is considered to have taken purification efforts further than Muhammadiyah, applying them to social and political spheres as well.

Regardless, NU feels under attack from both Muhammadiyah and PKS. Two professors with NU backgrounds at the State Islamic University in Jogja (UIN-Jogja) boiled down the distinctions between the three groups to difference in Qur’anic interpretation of the permissibility of *bid’ah*. *Bid’ah* is an innovation, or a practice that was not mentioned in the Qur’an but is incorporated into the rituals and practices of Islam. Muhammadiyah and PKS, as two interviewees explained, consider the presence of *bid’ah* in NU’s rituals and practices to be heretical:

Informant 1: Both Muhammadiyah and PKS consider NU as a supporter of TBC...TBC stands for *tahayul*, *bid’ah*, and *churafat*. Actually TBC is a term in the

medical field that stands for tuberculosis. But they changed it to TBC to stand for: T *tahayul*—*tahayul* means superstition; B is for *bid'ah* or religious innovation—*bid'ah* means practicing something that is not literally mentioned in the Qur'an and Hadith; and C is for *churafat* that has very close meaning with superstition...They regard NU as practicing TBC, and therefore their Islam is not pure and therefore they will go to hell.

Informant 2: There is a prophet's saying, "*kullu bid'atin dlolalatin*." *Kullu* for NU means "some." But for Muhammadiyah *kullu* means "all." So Muhammadiyah translates the prophet's saying as "all *bid'ah* is going astray." And going astray is going to hell...NU people translate the prophet's saying "*kullu bid'atin dlolalatin*" as "some *bid'ah* is going astray." (Interview with UIN-Jogja professors, October 14, 2009)

According to these men, the difference in the interpretation of one word in the Qur'an as "all" or "some" creates significant difference among groups in attitudes towards practices, and the permissibility of incorporating local culture into practices. The first informant went on to give an example of an NU *bid'ah*:

The Qur'an, for example, does not encourage us to pray together in a group after somebody dies. NU says if we have to pray, we do it in a group...Instead of praying individually, we do it in a group. We can see the advantages of being together. But according [to] them, PKS and Muhammadiyah, it is *bid'ah* because the Qur'an and the prophets do not mention that [group prayer after a person's death]. According to their understanding, we NU people created a new religion. As a result, Muhammadiyah and in particular PKS always not only criticize us, but also attack us. So this is the tension between the three groups...Muhammadiyah tends to be less [critical]. PKS fights the hardest in attacking NU...in the terms of religious practice. (Interview with UIN-Jogja professors, October 14, 2009)

It is easy to see how NU members could feel animosity towards Muhammadiyah and PKS for being judged as going to hell for what they consider to be sincere and conscientious practice of Islam. *Bid'ah*, or innovation, being likened to tuberculosis is a strongly critical perspective that views NU practices as a corrupting disease weakening the living vitality of Islam. Following this stream of logic, then, to restore the health of Islam, it must be cleansed from its infection of local culture.

As a Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, referring to mainstream Islam in general, and not solely NU practices, explained,

We know that Islam in Indonesia is contaminated by the culture or local customs (*adat*) that exist in Indonesia. So it seems some of Islam has become ambiguous or Islamic identity has become unclear among Muslims because the Islam of the Qur'an and Islam of local culture (*budaya lokal*) have been intermixed...Maybe we want to say we want to standardize (*menstandarisasikan*) a common and modern Islam, that's not too contaminated (*yang kontaminasinya tidak terlalu banyak*)...if there are adjustments, they should be the peripheral (*cabang-cabang*), not the core (*utama*) of it. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, April 19, 2010)

The "infection" and "contamination" of local practices, in other words, compromise the purity of true Islam.

Are you Indonesian enough?

NU and Muhammadiyah are united in their objection to PKS' overall aim to reform current mainstream Indonesian practices. While there is no singular "Indonesian way," there is a multi-voiced Indonesian mainstream that is being challenged. Although the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are Sunni, they express their religion through three major inclinations: traditionalist, modernist, and revivalist (Machmudi 2008). As Sikand (2008) warns, while such categories are useful for heuristic purposes, it is important not to exaggerate their differences. A modernist may have traditionalist leanings on particular aspects, or a revivalist may on something else. The difference in interpretation of a single Hadith has led to distinct differences in religious practices.

As noted, both Muhammadiyah and PKS oppose NU innovations, which include praying over dead bodies, visiting gravesites to honor the dead, and inserting *qunut* as part of *sholat*; yet Muhammadiyah is less intense in its criticisms. Even though Muhammadiyah aimed to rationalize and modernize Islam in the beginning of the 20th century by doing

away with NU's mystic practices, Bahtiar Effendy, a political science analyst and Muhammadiyah activist known from his frequent op-ed pieces in *The Jakarta Post* to be an opponent of the PKS, saw a difference between Muhammadiyah and PKS.

Muhammadiyah has been able to adjust [their] standards within the Indonesian cultural tradition, and that's what actually also happened with Nahdlatul Ulama [NU]. Even though they have different religious points of view, they try to contextualize it within their own traditional ways of thinking and ways of understanding religion. (Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, December 10, 2010)

While there are differences in religious practices and ideas of appropriate forms of worship, both groups have localized their practices to their Indonesian communities.

However, he indicated that this is somehow different from PKS:

PKS is puritan in nature but many perceive PKS as theologically representing a non-Indonesian Islam rather than Indonesian Islam, and more specifically Saudi Arabian Islam with the idea of, well, not as strong as Wahabism developing in Saudi Arabia, but that kind of perception exists. Of course if you try to talk to PKS people, then they will deny it wholeheartedly: "No, we are trying to build and develop the so-called Indonesian Islam." (Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, December 10, 2010)

While all groups practice Islam, mainstream groups feel an "Indonesian-ness" in PKS practices is missing. These mainstream organizations criticize what they perceive to be a Wahabi influence on PKS' strict observance of Islam. Although there has been a history of tension between NU and Muhammadiyah, they both oppose PKS' "non-Indonesian" Islam.

The tensions between the three organizations rose to the point that Hidayat Nur Wahid, the then-Chairman of PKS, invited Hasyim Muzadi and Din Syamsyuddin, the chairmen of NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, to a meeting in an effort to seek mediation from the leader of Gontor, a prestigious pesantren all three men had attended as youth. Apparently, Hidayat Nur Wahid felt that PKS was unjustly being singled out as, among other things, an organization that was co-opting NU and Muhammadiyah assets for

party expansion purposes. (This will be detailed in the following section of this chapter.)

Bahtiar recounted the meeting to me as told to him by Hasyim Muzadi of NU.

So Pak Hasyim told me, “The first thing I asked Hidayat Nur Wahid is, ‘Do you represent Indonesian Islam?’” He was not complaining about the mosques and the assets or infrastructure of NU. The first question Pak Hasyim asked Hidayat was whether Hidayat represented Indonesian Islam. And according to Pak Hasyim, Hidayat couldn’t answer it, or he did not answer it. He said, “Myself and Pak Din represent Indonesian Islam. Does PKS represent Indonesian Islam?” This was a very straightforward question. This is the suspicion that both NU and Muhammadiyah have of PKS. (Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, December 10, 2010)

In fairness, Bahtiar suggested that the opposition to PKS was not just the principle of unwelcomed reformation of religious practices, but also a sense of being threatened by PKS’s success as a political organization. PKS has become the largest Islamic party in the country. He suggested,

Of course there is always the possibility that these two organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, are jealous of PKS. They were able to sort of maneuver themselves into a positive social mobility. And this kind of question was used to justify that they [NU and Muhammadiyah] are legitimately able to be in conflict with the PKS. That is always a possibility because you know in 2004 PKS was really the rising political party. (Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, December 10, 2009)

PKS’ Islamic practices greatly concern NU and Muhammadiyah activists. PKS has localized the inspiration they took from the Wahabi-influenced Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for its religious and political practices (Machmudi 2008). This process, however, resulted in the creation of new models of political and religious practices that challenge the “Indonesian” ways of doing things. Islamist hopes for government replace those of a Pancasila State. Their purificationist, de-culturalized—possibly even Saudi Arabian, but definitely less “Indonesian”—Islam challenges the authenticity of Islamic

practices that have been developing since the 13th century in what is now Indonesia.²⁷ Historically, Muhammadiyah and NU's educational institutions have been key in institutionalizing their organizations' practices. Consequently, Muhammadiyah and NU activists view PKS-linked schools as a threat, believing that they are undermining common Islamic practices of mainstream Indonesians.

Friction Points between NU, Muhammadiyah, and PKS

Since in Indonesia political parties are not allowed to sponsor social institutions or vice versa, NU²⁸ and Muhammadiyah are religious social institutions rather than political parties. As religious social organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah own mosques, schools, hospitals or other social institutions as part of their *dakwah* (religious propagation) efforts. Although the connections are not legally formalized, the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, or PKB) and the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, or PAN) are parties associated with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively. Members from the organizations traditionally hold key leadership positions in the parties. Although these parties represent the ideology of these religious organizations, neither party's platform is Islamist.

²⁷ As Anderson (1990:68) says, "the penetration of Islam [into Indonesia] was more assimilative than revolutionary...Islam came to Java on the heels not of conquest but of trade." It necessarily accommodated many of the customs and traditions of centuries-old religions of the area, losing much of its doctrinal strength and "pristine" content.

²⁸ The NU made this change in the early 1980s, withdrawing from being a political party and becoming a religious organization. Muhammadiyah has never been formally involved in politics.

In contrast, PKS is an Islamic political party with cadre members who sponsor and manage social institutions. In the case of JSIT schools, Fahmi Alaydrus,²⁹ PKS' Education Department Chairman, explained the relationship between JSIT schools and PKS:

Political parties in Indonesia are not allowed to own schools. So in a formal legal sense, it [PKS] doesn't. But the majority of the people who are in [JSIT] integrated Islamic schools are affiliated with or become PKS cadres. No problem. So people that have the perception that the schools Luqman al Hakim and Nurul Fikri are part of PKS aren't wrong; it's correct, but the school is not owned by PKS. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010)

JSIT schools are not owned by PKS; however, they are ideologically driven by them and are therefore strategic in promoting the group's ideologies, just as NU and Muhammadiyah promote their ideologies through their schools.

Although PKS is a political party, it acts much like a religious organization, to the concern of NU and Muhammadiyah. PKS is the only Islamic party to issue *fatwas*,³⁰ such as the prohibition of shaking hands between genders (Rinaldo 2007). In 2007, PKS declared the official date of the advent of Idul Fitri (the end of Ramadan)—an act generally left to Islamic leaders rather than politicians.³¹ Additionally, party members are expected to adhere to specific Islamic practices and standards, such as maintaining appropriate male–female interactions (Machmudi 2008). In many conversations, professional and casual alike, during my time in Indonesia, people talked about NU, Muhammadiyah, and

²⁹ In addition to being PKS' Education Department Chairman, Fahmi Alaydrus also serves as Chairman of Yayasan Nurul Fikri, the foundation sponsoring the original JSIT schools.

³⁰ A fatwa is "formal advice from an authority on a point of Islamic law or dogma" as defined by M.B. Hooker in *Indonesian Islam: Social Change Through Contemporary Fatawa*. Honolulu Press: University of Hawai'i Press (2003, viii; cf p. 1).

³¹ The NU and Muhammadiyah leadership reacted to this declaration, saying the party had acted outside of its jurisdiction. In subsequent years, the PKS has refrained from announcing this date.

PKS as if they were equivalent categories, each with their own distinct way of practicing Islam.

Given that NU and Muhammadiyah memberships cover nearly 50% of all Muslims in Indonesia, it is not surprising that many members of PKS leadership are actually from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds (Machmudi 2008). JSIT leaders are always quick to point out their schools' families and leaders have NU and Muhammadiyah backgrounds. Background and involvement in the organizations, however, are two different things. Background is generally dependent on where an individual is from (rural areas are dominated by the NU and urban areas by Muhammadiyah), and involvement is a deliberate choice. Given some overlap between Muhammadiyah and PKS in reformist ideas about Islam and urban location, several Muhammadiyah members became involved with PKS. Initially, participation of Muhammadiyah members in PKS was not a concern to Muhammadiyah leadership.

As the nascent political party began defining itself, creating its own culture and Islamic identity and growing its numbers, Muhammadiyah and NU began to view PKS as predatory to their own infrastructures and memberships. This concern was the seed of the contentions that led to the abovementioned mediation. According to a Muhammadiyah leader, during this initial growth, the PKS looked to gain support by co-opting public spaces as well as NU and Muhammadiyah mosques and schools. For example, PKS "provided services in the mosques available in [Jakarta's] shopping malls. Because shopping centers sometimes have their own small mosques called *musholla*, a small place to worship, and also parking spaces that are transformed into mosques on Friday" (Interview Bahtiar Effendy, December 10, 2009). These areas were built by commercial entities to

accommodate the needs of their observant costumers. It was a good business strategy to keep costumers in the malls rather than forcing them to leave the building to find a place to perform *sholat* at the appropriate times of the day. These areas of worship, however, were not intended for affiliation with any religious organization. PKS was savvy enough to take advantage of these unsupervised areas of worship by having members become prayer leaders, leading prayers and offering Friday sermons.

More disconcerting, however, were what NU and Muhammadiyah saw as predatory practices on their own mosques³² and Muhammadiyah schools. A female Muhammadiyah activist, and former JSIT parent, explained the process PKS used to co-opt Muhammadiyah schools. This was also a common process for mosques.

Initially it was usually like this: before PKS came, a school belonged to Muhammadiyah. But then people splintered from Muhammadiyah, one joined PKS and the one remained Muhammadiyah. And maybe there was a kindergarten around the houses where the Muhammadiyah people joined PKS; [so] they converted [reoriented the ideology of] the school [to PKS/JSIT]. Or, the school did not have a notary even though the school belonged to Aisyiyah [Muhammadiyah's female organization] but it was not legalized by a notary. So they, the PKS people, they went to a notary and tried to legalize it under a different name. (Interview with former Luqman al Hakim SIT parent and Muhammadiyah activist, February 9, 2010)

Shifting loyalties within a community are not unheard of. It is common for a mosque to be seen as belonging to the community in which it is located, and therefore Muhammadiyah-turned-PKS communities may have felt some claim on their community mosques. However, Muhammadiyah considered the buildings as belonging to the organization, regardless of the community affiliations. There are no reliable numbers, but this female activist

³² The NU tells stories of Muhammadiyah having done similar things with their mosques as well. But there is a sense that they were not as predatory as the joke goes that they Muhammadiyah only stole the gong out of the mosque, not the entire mosque.

commented that “many” preschools and schools were converted from Muhammadiyah to JSIT schools.³³

Muhammadiyah membership provided opportunities for Muhammadiyah-turned-PKS members in leadership positions of mosques and schools to realign the institutions’ ideological orientation with that of PKS. A high-level Muhammadiyah official recounted to me a popular story. On a visit to a Muhammadiyah school, the Muhammadiyah Chairman, Din Syamsyuddin, asked the students what the organization’s mission was. To his displeasure, student responses did not reflect Muhammadiyah’s mission, but rather that of PKS. A few informants went so far as to accuse PKS of specifically assigning cadre members to take teaching posts at Muhammadiyah schools, and then teach according to PKS ideology.

In 2006, Muhammadiyah issued Central Board Muhammadiyah Decree Number 149/KEP/I.0/B2006, in an attempt to prevent any more such instances, and to protest rigid forms or puritanism (Ricklefs 2008). The decree pointedly states:

All Muhammadiyah members and those involved in the organization’s management, must be free from the influence, mission, infiltration and agenda of political parties...Every Muhammadiyah member needs to be aware, understand and adopt a critical attitude towards all political parties in this nation, including those which claim to be engaged in religious proselytization, or develop proselytization auxiliaries/activities, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), recognizing that they are in fact political parties. Every political party is focused on the acquisition of political power. For that reason, in dealing with any political party, we must always remain committed to the true Path of Muhammadiyah and must free ourselves, and never engage ourselves with the mission, interests, activities or goals of the above mentioned political parties (Muhammadiyah 2006, Points 2 and 3).

³³ Although it is presumed that many of the transfers took place before JSIT was established, the term JSIT is used to indicate that the schools were transferred into the PKS-linked school network, which in 2001 was formalized as JSIT.

The statement, according to a national-level Muhammadiyah education leader, was intended to emphasize “the importance of being Muhammadiyah and not having a double membership with PKS, because this organization [PKS] was not mainly a political party but also a religious movement that had a certain ideology [different than Muhammadiyah]” (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010).

PKS seems to have employed more machinations to co-opt NU mosques, possibly due to fewer NU members being involved with PKS. For example, an NU mosque would be in need of repairs or financial help for upkeep. PKS cadres would offer financial contributions to fix up the mosque. An MOU, declaring control of the mosque be transferred to the benefactors, would be signed by unsuspecting NU people inexperienced in the legality involved with an MOU. Although pesantren³⁴ were never mentioned as being targeted by PKS, after-school community study groups for children in NU mosques were. In these situations, PKS members would teach the after-school community classes from a PKS ideology. Additionally, Friday services, during which men of the community gathered for group prayer and sermon, would be conducted by PKS members, thus spreading PKS ideology to the larger NU community (Interview with UIN-Jogja professors, October 14, 2009).

While losing infrastructure and membership was a concern, the teachings that take place in schools and mosques pose the greatest threat to the preservation of Indonesian Islam. The following section demonstrates the various efforts of educators in Jogja to retain or gain relevance in mainstream Islamic practices through the establishment of Islamic

³⁴ Although there are no stories of NU schools being infiltrated, new JSIT schools are attracting middle-class NU parents since NU does not generally provide academically rigorous schools, like many Muhammadiyah schools, as discussed in the next section.

schools. This section focuses on Islamic groups outside of Al Azhar and JSIT, to demonstrate the diversity in and provide a snapshot of Jogja's educational landscape in which they are functioning.

A Glimpse into Jogja's Educational Battlefield

Schools representing permutations of the Indonesian and transnational camps populate the educational landscape of Jogja. In the 2008–2009 school year, Muhammadiyah schools accounted for 86% of all private Islamic schools in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (see Table 3). In some ways, JSIT schools have become a strong catalyst for diversification of the small but growing extended-day Islamic schooling market. Many educators who more closely align with the transnational Islamic movement seek to emulate JSIT schools' quality academics and significant religious training. However, their disinterest in political activities or specific teaching approaches expected of JSIT school personnel motivates them to create their own institutions. Consequently, several different extended-day Islamic school groups of the transnational ilk have emerged, tailored to their organization-specific goals.

Other school groups, in particular those sponsored by NU activists who feel threatened by JSIT ideology, are creating Indonesian Islam-friendly schooling options for middle class families. These schools appear to be in direct response to the competition JSIT and other transnational Islam groups are creating for the newly middle-class Muslims. As will be demonstrated, parents often seek religious schooling for their children but

Table 3. Private Primary Schools in the Jogja Region, 2008-09

Islamic	266	69%
MUH	230	86%
Integrated Islam (SIT)	23	9%
Other	13	5%
Christian	105	27%
Protestant	28	27%
Catholic	77	73%
Non-Religious	12	3%
Total	383	

Source: Ministry of National Ed., 2009

Note: Not all Integrated Islam schools (SIT) are members of the Network for Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT).

demonstrate little discernment towards the type of Islam and religious subjectivities that schools promote. It seems these newer schools from both camps are more a response to JSIT than to Al Azhar schools. A possible explanation is that Al Azhar is more expensive and more elitist, leaving several organizations looking to a JSIT model that has proven to be more accessible to a greater portion of the middle class. The review of various providers of Islamic schools in Jogja demonstrates this diversification.

Muhammadiyah

Historically, Muhammadiyah started what most people consider to be the first modern Islamic schools in Indonesia, promoting strong academics in addition to religious instruction. Consequently, the new extended-day Islamic schools could easily be considered serious competition for them. The number of JSIT schools is growing and the potential for large-scale competition may be a concern to Muhammadiyah. However, there are currently over 240 Muhammadiyah schools in the Jogja region³⁵ and only 19 JSIT schools,³⁶ thus limiting the actual scale of competition. Muhammadiyah is also working to improve the quality of their extensive network of 14,000 day schools³⁷ throughout the country rather than creating new institutions.

Islamic schools linked to Muhammadiyah's religious ideology, aside from possibly Al Azhar 31, are curiously absent from Jogja's new educational market of extended-day Islamic schools. It is possible that the organization's sponsorship of schools does not

³⁵ Calculated by author from data received from Ministry of National Education office in Jogja.

³⁶ JSIT Website, accessed June 20, 2011.

³⁷ This number includes kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools. Number obtained from personal communication with the Secretary of Central Board Muhammadiyah, November 2, 2011.

encourage individual members to create their own schools. In the northern area of Jogja, however, there is one small school group, Budi Mulia Dua, sponsored by Amien Rais, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah. Although community members assume the religious aspects of the school are guided by Muhammadiyah ideology, Budi Mulia Dua is not an Islamic school, but rather an elite private general school. Aside from this school, it seems individual Muhammadiyah members are not establishing private schools of their own.

Nahdlatul Ulama

While Muhammadiyah is known for its day schools that focus on the national curriculum plus additional religion classes, NU is known for its boarding schools whose specialty is religion, rather than academic training, although the national curriculum is often taught. There is a trend to improve the NU pesantren's academic training and include modern technologies such as computers, but it is still a work in progress. This academic weakness provides JSIT with an untapped market for such schools in NU communities. Two members of an NU think tank and publication house in Jogja voiced concern over the influence of PKS-linked schools in East Java, an NU stronghold.

I have heard many complaints from the surrounding schools in East Java. Many [PKS-linked] integrated Islamic schools have already started to appear, even in the villages. People feel uneasy because the ideology is different; it's disrupting the ideology that's already been established there...That is troubling. (Interview with NU activists, October 21, 2009)

Community members, both NU and otherwise, are attracted to PKS-linked schools due to the quality of the schooling, the modern facilities and technology, and the longer school day; as such, JSIT school enrollment is increasing. The "different ideological issues" between "the NU (*aswaja*) ideology and Wahabi ideology" are said to be causing unrest.

Certainly NU leadership is concerned. It is not clear, though, how much unrest is being created among the parents and the general NU community.

The informant believed many of the parents to be unaware of the JSIT schools' affiliation with PKS. Like Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT parents, they may simply be less concerned about organizational affiliation than they are with quality schooling options and a general education in Islamic values (see chapter 7). This same man speculated that unless a local *kyai*,³⁸ or NU religious leader, made a formal statement against the JSIT schools, the schools would continue to grow in popularity and number. Considering the respect community members have for their *kyai*, it is possible that a formal statement by the *kyai* could influence the general population to reconsider their choices and view the schools as a threat in the same way active NU members would.

When asked how dangerous he considered JSIT ideology to be for NU people, this same man responded:

Very dangerous. Ideologically dangerous. The Islam that we have built will be destroyed (*hancur*). Islam that collaborates with this culture will be destroyed (*hancur*) because their platform is Arab Islam, exclusive Islam. Honestly, as an NU person, I am a bit anxious with Muhammadiyah, let alone PKS. Initially, my son was in a Muhammadiyah elementary school [in Jogja]. When I was looking for primary schools, an NU school did not exist. In the end, I put him in a state madrasa. I pulled him out of the Muhammadiyah school because I think that even the ideology of Muhammadiyah is different than my ideology. Later on my son would be different. Later he would not *qunut* (a short prayer at the end of morning *sholat*) during morning *sholat*. This is within the context of Muhammadiyah on NU ideology. Especially when it's more extreme than that, to me it's very dangerous. (Interview with NU activists, Jogja, October 21, 2009)

The greatest concern for this man would be that:

³⁸ In the NU tradition, local religious leadership is highly respected and considered to be the guide for the community.

later the [PKS] ideology will have become deeply embedded in the kids and the children will have a negative view of NU traditions. That's the real concern. The person who was originally NU, then goes there [a JSIT school] and when the ideology is firmly embedded, that person will actually be hostile towards the NU community from which they originated. (Interview with NU activists, Jogja, October 21, 2009)

This exchange suggests concern both for religious practices changing and for the social fabric of the NU community being disrupted. NU communities are generally in more rural areas where the community activities and relationships are intertwined with the social lives of community members; for example, the NU *bid'ah*, or innovation, to pray together as a community over a dead body. Consequently, the JSIT ideology has great potential to disrupt the social fabric of NU communities if neighbors become critical of such practices and refuse to participate, or worse, “become hostile towards the community from which they originated.” For Muhammadiyah in the urban areas, where life tends to be more segregated between work, home, and mosque, disruptions in Muhammadiyah ideology may not be felt in such extensive social ways as an NU community might experience.

To thwart the encroachment of JSIT schools on NU communities, NU activists are establishing their own version of the JSIT integrated Islamic schools.³⁹ My informants speculated that if NU people did not create NU schools to rival the JSIT schools for their middle-class members, the latter's presence would only grow stronger. In Jogja, an NU *kyai* who also serves as Dean of the Department of Islamic Law at Jogja's State Islamic University (UIN-Jogja) established the city's first NU integrated Islamic school in 2010. Acknowledging that the education obtained at standard NU-associated schools was no competition for JSIT schools, he strategically planned to include “integrated Islamic school”

³⁹ There is no estimation of how many have been established.

as well as “NU” in the school’s name. Some of his NU friends objected to the use of “integrated Islam,” but he had two reasons for its inclusion.

First, because when we say this is an SIT [integrated Islamic school], everybody will take it for granted that it’s a good school...The second is the more important reason. Because they [PKS] have stolen our mosques, I want to steal their name...I use the term integrated Islamic school, but let’s say in my words, I NU-ize integrated Islamic schools...It’s a different kind of interpretation. I don’t want that when you say the term “integrated Islamic school,” you come to the conclusion that this belongs to PKS. No. I want to say that there is another interpretation that is very NU. (Interview with UIN-Jogja professors, October 14, 2009)

His school opened for the 2010–2011 year, with “integrated Islamic school” as part of its title, but sans “NU.” Yet the school name connotes the NU tradition, which would be readily recognizable to NU members. Perhaps the exclusion of NU from the title was strategic. An affiliation-free school could be more likely to draw in non-NU families. The school’s curriculum included English and Arabic and the school day extended until 4 p.m., just like JSIT schools. Yet it is unclear if this NU integrated school included the JSIT (and Al Azhar) integrated Islam ideology and approach to secular and religious curricula in the classrooms (as discussed in chapter 6). Regardless, it is notable that JSIT schools are established to transform Indonesian Islam while the NU integrated Islamic schools, just like the Al Azhar schools, are working in the name of preservation.

While it is not conclusive (as discussed in chapter 3), some NU community members in Jogja speculated about Al Azhar 31 and its connection to NU. A well-known NU leader heads the school. Several of the founders are from NU. Some NU community members find it curious that NU people would establish an Al Azhar school since the Al Azhar foundation was born out of a Muhammadiyah mosque. It is possible that local NU and Muhammadiyah activists on a city council established the first Al Azhar campus in Jogja as one way to

diversify the Islamic school market, or possibly even more strategically to provide a non-PKS-linked Islamic schooling option for the city's elite.

It is interesting to note that during interviews with religious leaders and other community members about extended-day schools, concerns regarding Al Azhar schools did not surface. All concerns went immediately to JSIT schools. This could be explained in a variety of different ways. First, Al Azhar is likely not seen as a threat but rather an ally to Indonesian Islam. Secondly, Al Azhar has not expanded like JSIT schools have. Although Al Azhar established its first school nearly 30 years before the first SIT, in the 2010-11 school year, Al Azhar had 35 preschools and 65 primary and secondary schools throughout the country while JSIT had 571 preschools and 554 primary and secondary member schools. Thus, Al Azhar's presence is likely not viewed as competition for the general student population in the same way as JSIT schools.

Non-JSIT integrated Islamic schools

As mentioned in chapter 5, while JSIT schools appear to be the first to use the term "integrated Islamic school," they have not held exclusive rights to it. Due to the popularity of JSIT schools, many schools also use the term "integrated Islamic schools" to take advantage of the reputation, regardless of their commitment to JSIT's educational, and political, goals. There is no observable way to identify JSIT affiliation; it is often only discernible upon inquiring at schools in regards to their membership. The two following integrated Islamic schools have JSIT roots, but are currently independent of the network.

The Institute of Integrated Islamic Education for the Development of Pious Children (*Lembaga Pendidikan Islam Terpadu Bina Anak Sholeh, LPIT BIAS*), more commonly know

as BIAS, was established in Jogja and now runs several schools in other cities. The founder is the wife of one of the original founders of the preschool, whose children became the first students of the primary school Luqman al Hakim SIT. Due to inconsistency in educational visions for the preschool, she and her husband eventually parted ways with the group to start their own integrated Islamic preschool and then primary school. There are conflicting reports from both groups as to who actually coined the phrase “integrated Islamic schools.” Regardless, BIAS leadership left to start a new school with greater focus on student character through moral development. Additionally, they did not want to be connected “with politics,” but rather just “pure Islam” (Interview with BIAS representative, Interview May 6, 2010). This group has also developed a school in the Jogja area specifically for students with learning disabilities.

Jabal Nur SIT is a small independent primary school located in a more rural area outside of Jogja. This non-JSIT school tends toward the transnational dress codes and more regulated male–female interactions; however, they make it clear they are not interested in politics or an exclusive approach to Islam. Funders, leadership, and some teachers of this school were initially part of Nurul Islam SIT during its first two years of operation.⁴⁰ In 2001, some of the school’s foundation members and several of the teachers split off to form Jabal Nur SIT. One of the school’s administrators explained the purpose of their school in the context of a discussion about the split from the JSIT school.

We seek to restore Islamic learning as a whole (*menyeluruh*) in the sense that we give children the understanding that in Islam there is a variety of groups (*aliran*) that maybe have somewhat different understandings. Our children are given such insights, but the important thing is that our kids know not to degrade other groups

⁴⁰ Although JSIT was not yet established, this school was associated with PKS cadre and became a member school when JSIT was formed in 2003.

(menjelek-jelekkan kelompok). [We let them know] there are some differences between the NU and Muhammadiyah, and they should not let that cause strife. We all respect each other. As for the background of our teachers, we are also from various [Islamic groups]. There is NU, Muhammadiyah, and there is also Tarbiyah [Movement members]. But, thank God, here we can eliminate differences. There's a pre-existing agreement that each person doesn't carry a specific religious label [into the school]. (Interview with Jabal Nur SIT leadership, April 21, 2010)

The educators who split off did so in order to be a part of a school that was more inclusive and respectful of various religious practices and political affiliation. Two of the teachers I talked with in independent conversation said they left due to disagreement with the original school's policies, which required teachers to be involved "in politics"—a lightly masked way for them to say that they did not want to be involved with PK, which is now PKS. However, in a separate conversation, local JSIT leadership attributed the secession to disagreements over the management of funds. It is likely that as the partners implemented and refined their visions for the school, differences emerged, eventually leading to a separation. While JSIT, BIAS, and Jabal Nur SIT leadership's visions of Islamic education overlap in many ways, specific differences interfere with full collaboration. Each group offers the larger Jogja community a variation of a transnational approach to Islamic schooling.

While both of these schools attribute their separation from JSIT affiliation in part to differences in politics, it is important to note that Hefner (2009) reported that some educators from JSIT schools across Java did not feel their schools were politically oriented or maintained political agendas. Additionally, during my time at Luqman al Hakim, I saw very little overt connection to the party. This will be discussed in chapter Four.

Hidayatullah

The Network of Integral Hidayatullah Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Integral Hidayatullah*) supports member schools across the country, including one in Jogja. In 2007, they were operating 133 schools (Hefner 2009:78). Hidayatullah is a populist group that caters to the poor and lower middle class. Originally an educational foundation, Hidayatullah transformed itself in 2000 into a political movement supporting an Islamic state. In addition to schools, it runs several other types of social institutions and programs, such as businesses and husbandry and forestry projects. The group views education as a tool for transforming society; they would like to see Islamic law integrated into all aspects of individuals' lives. Their schools also offer extended-day school hours and integrate Islam into all aspects of the curriculum. They oppose the "Western" values of secularism, pluralism (the idea of all religions being equal), and liberalism (Hefner 2009:81).

Unfortunately, I was not able to visit a Hidayatullah school. Although my contact to the Hidayatullah school, a faculty member at the State Islamic University in Jogja who had a son enrolled at the school, strategically requested an interview for me—as opposed to directly contacting the school myself—I was not granted the opportunity. As this was the only interview denied me in all of my time in Indonesia, I could not help but wonder if their excuse of being in the middle of renovations for the rest of my remaining time (four months) in the country was a thinly veiled excuse for disinterest in speaking with an American researcher.

Conclusion

Although NU and Muhammadiyah have their differences regarding appropriate Islamic practices and how to be a good Muslim, the differences do not seem as stark as they once did in comparison to the new ideas introduced by transnational approaches, as exemplified by PKS, which have begun to take root in Indonesia. PKS, inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, aims to purify Islamic practices by ridding them of local traditions, and to establish a greater presence of *Shari'ah* in government. Their ideas of a pious life and Islamic society include an Islamic government. This opposes the mainstream Indonesian tradition of "Islamic-but-pluralistic nationalism" (Hefner 2009:73) that supports a religious country but with no specific religion or religious laws governing the citizens. These newer, transnational approaches challenge the "Indonesian" ways of political and religious life in mainstream Indonesia. Islamic schools are playing a significant role in promulgating variations on these two different approaches. As a challenger to the status quo, PKS has an uphill battle as it exerts its efforts to reconfigure what the public views as "mainstream."

In this dissertation, Indonesian and transnational approaches to Islam are represented respectively by Al Azhar and JSIT school groups. Each school group highly values Islamic piety, but each one promotes its own form of piety. In essence, the piety projects of these groups are contributing to either preserving or reforming Indonesian society and Indonesian ways of being Muslim in urban Indonesia. Al Azhar's flexible Islam (see chapter 3) contributes to preservation of Indonesian pluralism, while JSIT's exacting Islam (see chapter 4) is promoting a transnational purificationist Islam that cleanses local traditions from Islamic practices. The next two chapters are dedicated to a detailed

discussion of each school group and the approaches to Islam that distinguish them as opposing piety projects.

Chapter 3

A Flexible Islam, the Glue of the Nation: Al Azhar 31 Islamic Primary School

What we want is an Islam that's accepted everywhere, that's not exclusive, extreme right, or extreme left.

Al Azhar 31 foundation secretary, March 14, 2010

Muhammadiyah and NU are groups (masuk golongan). Our [Al Azhar 31] guidelines...are the Qur'an and the sunnah (teachings of Prophet). Maybe NU and Muhammadiyah are also...guided by the two of these things, the Qur'an and the sunnah, but maybe there are still things or beliefs they include that perhaps not everyone can agree with. Islam brings peace and blessings...Islam is not meant to divide.

Al Azhar 31 headmaster, February 18, 2010

Extended-day Islamic schooling for the middle class in Indonesia is marked by two competing piety projects. In this chapter, I discuss one of those: specifically, the one codified within the Al Azhar network. The schools affiliated with Al Azhar pride themselves on the notion that they promote an inclusive Islam. The universality of Islam in Al Azhar's institutional approach is found in its inclusiveness. Acceptance of individuals as Muslims, without focus on a particular membership in Islamic organizations or distinguishing forms of practice as right or wrong, is meant to create unity among Islamic groups and Muslims. Al Azhar leaders view the tendencies to focus on differences between various groups and to consider one as infinitely better than another as divisive. The secretary of the Al Azhar 31 Foundation said:

I'm so tired of hearing Muhammadiyah mock NU and NU ridicule Muhammadiyah. That's not helpful; those who benefit are the anti-Muslims. If we continue like this...the brotherhood of Islam, the unity of Islam will be destroyed. We must figure out how to unite everyone...When one's asked, one should be able to answer, "I'm Muslim," not "Muhammadiyah," not "NU," but, "I'm Muslim." Then when people are hit by disasters, they aren't asked if they're Muhammadiyah and if they are they're told Muhammadiyah people aren't going to be helped. That's dangerous. That's what happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 foundation secretary, April 14, 2010)

This Al Azhar 31 officer, an active NU member, is not expecting Islamic organizations to disband; however, he wants the feelings of differences to be replaced with a focus on their universal membership in the brotherhood of Muslims, the *ummah*, or the worldwide community of Muslims, which is not determined by specific religious ideologies or national boundaries. He sees societal danger in exclusionist approaches.

Al Azhar attempts to build a unified Indonesia by offering a version of Islam that accommodates a variety of opinions on how to be Muslim. Through a moderate, open approach to Islam, differences in practices are nearly irrelevant in light of a unified commitment to the Islam as found in the Qur'an and Hadith before interpretation-mediated practice. This type of focus on a common religious identity, Muslim rather than Muhammadiyah or NU, is expected to provide a shared culture and mutual respect for each other's interpretations of holy texts and execution of ritual and practice. To instill this culture of acceptance, I argue, Al Azhar conceptualizes a universal Islam as one that is adaptable, and thus accommodating. This flexible Islam is comprised of three interrelated components: Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism.

I begin this chapter with a brief historical overview of Al Azhar Islamic Pesantren Foundation (*Yayasan Pesantren Islam Al Azhar, or YPI Al Azhar*, henceforth known as Al Azhar) and compare its franchise business model to a neo-liberal, post-Fordist model. I also review the history of Al Azhar 31 Islamic Primary School (hereafter referred to as Al Azhar 31), the Al Azhar campus at which I conducted my research to create a context for outlining the three interrelated components of Al Azhar's⁴¹ conceptualization of a universal Islam:

⁴¹ Throughout this chapter, and the entire dissertation, I often refer to Al Azhar, the foundation headquartered in Jakarta, and Al Azhar 31, the school in Jogja, interchangeably. Although the majority of the

Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism. I argue that these three components combine to form a flexible Islam, which is intended to promote peaceful co-existence in the religiously diverse society. Finally, I argue that Al Azhar's flexible Islam, aimed at unifying all Muslims and creating social stability, parallels the nationalist pluralist rhetoric of Sukarno and Suharto that worked to unify the diverse ethnic populations within Indonesia.

The Al Azhar Franchise

At the center of the Al Azhar Islamic Pesantren Foundation's massive headquarters complex in Kebayoran Baru, an affluent area of southern Jakarta, is a large mosque built in the mid-1950s. The foundation's roots can be traced to this mosque, originally Agung Kebayoran Mosque, which was established by a Muhammadiyah activist⁴² and supported by the Minister of Social Affairs and the mayor of Jakarta (YPI Al Azhar 2012). In Islamic tradition, the mosque hosted Qur'anic study circles for adults in the morning and for children in the afternoon. During a visit in 1960, the *Sheikh* from Cairo's world-renowned Al Azhar⁴³ University renamed the mosque *Al Azhar*. In response to troubling socio-

data was collected at the school, the centralized nature of the foundation and management of schools generates great consistency in ideology and practices between the two, and therefore allows for this interchangeability. Additionally, the headmaster has been headmaster at two other Al Azhar campuses and was assigned by headquarters to open Al Azhar 31. Any site-specific characteristics will be specifically mentioned as such.

⁴² A national-level Muhammadiyah education official in Jakarta explained the relationship between Al Azhar and Muhammadiyah as follows: "Al Azhar is actually quite close to Muhammadiyah. The foundation of Al Azhar is under the family of Professor Hamka and Professor Hamka was the former leader of Muhammadiyah. His father, H. Rosul, was the person who brought Muhammadiyah to Sumatra. So Al Azhar is a 'brand' of Muhammadiyah, but it's family-owned. But the system is very close to Muhammadiyah because the owner was a Muhammadiyah activist" (Interview with Muhammadiyah officer, March 24, 2010).

⁴³ Al Azhar University of Cairo is the premier university for Islamic learning in the Muslim world.

religious conditions of the day,⁴⁴ and to live up to its venerable namesake, the foundation began expanding its educational activities to formal Islamic schooling.

Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectual who advocated for tolerance, pluralism, and democracy, was involved in the efforts to establish the schools.⁴⁵ He often taught that according to the Qur'an, God created all things in pairs consisting of two contradictory parts; therefore, it was only right that Muhammadiyah and NU both existed in Indonesian society, as two wings of one eagle. He believed it to be God's will that both existed. Consequently, rather than emphasizing differences, he advocated for the two organizations to collaborate in actualizing the ideals of Islam (Saleh 2001:91). This concept of collaboration and mutual respect has persisted through the subsequent decades and continues to influence multiple Islamic groups.

The educational mission of Al Azhar is to "Become a leading, modern *dakwah* (religious propagation) and Islamic education institution for the purpose of enlightening and educating people of the nation to form an Indonesian community of faith, knowledge, good works, devotion to the glory of Muslims (*wal Izzul Muslims*)" (YPI Al Azhar 2012). The phrase of "*wal Izzul Muslims*," or "the glory of Muslims," harkens back to the intellectual Golden Age of Islam. This emphasizes its intellectual focus, and also highlights a lack of focus on political issues. The foundation hopes Al Azhar students will become "pious

⁴⁴ The first school was built in the early 1960s to counter the permeation of Communism in all sectors of government, which occurred largely during Sukarno's reign, and the oppressive nature of Suharto's rule. Sensing the Muslim population to be "like young chicks who'd lost their mother hen" (Busyairi 2002:90), manifested by empty mosques and prayer rooms and idle *dakwah* efforts, Al Azhar leadership set out to not only revive the mosque, but to go beyond afternoon study groups and established Islamic schools. This new vision included eventual establishment of a university "to equal Al Azhar University in Cairo," the mosque's namesake (Busyairi 2002:91).

⁴⁵ Abdullah Hakim directed the efforts with the assistance of Nurcholish Madjid, Mahfudh Makmun, A. Wachid Zaini, and others.

upstanding Muslim intellectuals, physically and mentally healthy, intelligent, capable and skilled, who believe in themselves, have strong personalities (*kepribadian yang kuat*), are champions for good (*berwatak pejuang*) and also have the ability to improve themselves and their families, and be responsible for the development of the people and the nation” (YPI Al Azhar 2012).

Al Azhar is run like a franchise, with campus branches throughout the archipelago. This business model suggests that foundation leaders show great concern in monitoring the quality of their institutions. A conversation with senior officers at Al Azhar’s Jakarta headquarters demonstrated the level of attention and pride given to preserving the high reputation of the schools.

Officer 1: Al Azhar is the most powerful brand name for Islamic education in Indonesia.

Officer 2: You know, there are a lot of schools or foundations, so be careful. If you see Al Azhar 1, Al Azhar 2 or Al Azhar 3, it belongs to us. But once you get to Kemang [an affluent area of Jakarta], there is Al Azhar Kemang. That’s different; that Al Azhar belongs to a personal foundation... So now Al Azhar University has patent rights to the name [Al Azhar] because of that kind of practice, because a lot of people would like to steal the name of Al Azhar for their own use.

Officer 1: Not because they do not agree with the curriculum or content, but they...seek personal gain, for personal financial benefit.

Karen: Like for profit?

Officer 1: Yes.

Officer 2: Yes, because indeed Al Azhar is a very powerful brand. (Interview with Al Azhar headquarters officers, April 12, 2009)

While Al Azhar is a non-profit organization, it is very protective of its brand name and reputation. In order to protect the reputation and guarantee a particular product, Al Azhar is highly centralized. As the headmaster of Al Azhar 31 put it, “We here are a franchise, like

McDonalds. So we coordinate with Al Azhar Jakarta” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 headmaster, March 17, 2009).⁴⁶ Numbering the campuses, rather than personalizing the names to the location, reinforces the image of a franchise. In effort to protect their brand name, the foundation has copyrighted the use of the “Al Azhar.” This means that any other organization, educational or otherwise, must petition Al Azhar headquarters, and upon approval, follow particular rules in order to use the name. Considering that the name Al Azhar symbolizes the epitome of religious education throughout the Muslim world, it is surprising that a single organization could gain legal control over the use of the name in a predominantly Muslim country. It also suggests some kind of favor with the government to have been able to obtain the legal possession of the name.

Initial efforts to establish schools focused on Jakarta, but they then expanded across the archipelago. Starting with a preschool in 1964, Al Azhar had expanded to 35 preschools and kindergartens, 65 primary and secondary schools, and a university by 2010. Nearly 80% of Al Azhar’s primary and secondary school growth occurred in the 1990s and 2000s in concert with the swelling of popular interest in Islam and Islamic activism.

Al Azhar’s franchise management approach mirrors a neo-liberal business model with post-Fordist adaptability to meet the needs of a specific niche of clientele. Al Azhar has been selective in its expansion, careful to guard reputation as a network of high quality schools. It is not apologetic for being one of the most expensive private Islamic schools in the country. The schools are built around a balance of teaching a flexible Islam that accommodates religious understanding of parents who are relatively new in exploring

⁴⁶ A memorandum of understanding is signed between headquarters and the sponsoring foundation of a new school.

their own personal religious journeys. Their clientele are generally upper-middle class parents who are religious-minded, but living their religion in less regimented and overtly Islamic ways.

Al Azhar 31

Al Azhar 31 sits along North Ring Road, the busy double-lane thoroughfare that wraps around the city of Jogjakarta. Pulling into the campus, one immediately sees the MTQ National Monument XVI, which looks less like a monument and more like a small, high-ceilinged, enclosed gazebo. (The importance of this building will be explained below.) The monument is connected by a covered walkway to a larger rectangular two-story building, which houses the school's administrative offices on the ground level and a small library and computer room on the second level. Upon rounding these buildings, the grounds open up to the fenced-in, colorful preschool complex and then, behind that, the larger elementary school complex. The open fields to one side and the small Code River tucked in a ravine on the other side of the campus offer a refreshing change from the crowded residential complexes and busy city streets on the inner side of Ring Road. The ample greenery throughout the campus provides a welcome calming atmosphere.



Al Azhar 31 teachers on the first day of school

The elementary school's cement-tiled courtyard doubles as the workout area during gym class and meeting grounds for morning assemblies and school events. To one side is a small grassy area with a compact jungle gym complete with swings, monkey bars, and slides. The clean, spacious, air-conditioned classrooms are full of natural light. They are furnished with area rugs and colorful tables, with chairs for the younger grades and individual desks and chairs for the upper grades. While the medium of instruction is Indonesian, classroom walls are decorated with student work and attractive teaching materials in Indonesian, Arabic, and English.

The school grounds were once government property, owned by the Sultan.⁴⁷ In 1991, Jogjakarta hosted the Department of Religion's national bi-annual *Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an* (MTQ), a multi-day event involving competitions related to the Qur'an. To memorialize the city's honor of hosting the competition, the small single-room National Monument XVI was constructed on an otherwise empty lot next to the busy ring road. In 1999, after several years of ineffective use of the building, the Mataram Development of Islam Center Foundation⁴⁸ (*Yayasan Pusat Pengembangan Islam Mataram - YPPIM*) was established with the "aim to develop the greatness of Islam by providing various amenities in the MTQ National Monument XVI complex" (YPPIM 2007:21).

In 2003, after another period of inefficient use of the space, Hafidz, a foundation board member, proposed the area become a "living" and "dynamic" monument through the establishment of a private Islamic school on the monument grounds. In an unusual move,

⁴⁷ Jogja is a special region with the attributes of a kingdom of the Republic of Indonesia. The Sultan is governor of the region by virtue of him being Sultan.

⁴⁸ Mataram is the former name of Yogyakarta when it was the Kingdom of Mataram, under the Sultan.

the Sultan donated the land to the foundation, making it private real estate. Just as in the establishment of the original Al Azhar mosque in Jakarta, government figures were involved in the conceptualization and support of the school in Jogja, signaling that a role of these schools is to be supportive of the local government.

Keen to be successful in their endeavor and aware of the multiple private Islamic schools operating in Jogja, as well as the growing trend in elite⁴⁹ Islamic schools, the foundation strategically decided to establish a branch of Al Azhar. The secretary of the foundation explained:

We initiated the establishment of an Al Azhar preschool and kindergarten in collaboration with the foundation of Al Azhar Islamic Education Center in Jakarta. It's a franchise. Our use of the name of Al Azhar was not random; you must have permission. So by using the name Al Azhar, thank God, [in Jogja] if I can make a business analogy, [Al Azhar] it is a marketable brand (*dagangannya laku*). (Interview with Al Azhar 31 foundation secretary, June 17, 2009)

The well-known reputation of the Al Azhar schools was expected to facilitate entrance into Jogja's burgeoning market for quality private Islamic schools. Upon establishing a Memorandum of Understanding⁵⁰ between Al Azhar headquarters in Jakarta and the local sponsoring foundation, the Al Azhar 31 Yogyakarta branch was established.

It is not lost on local NU activists that Hafidz, a prominent NU activist and the mastermind of the plan, founded a non-partisan Islamic school that delivered the full national curriculum, rather than an NU pesantren, which tends to focus more heavily on religious studies and promote the NU tradition. During interviews, a few NU activists

⁴⁹ "Elite" is defined by high tuition fees not affordable by those earning the average wage in the city. See the end of the section for details.

⁵⁰ There are three types of MOUs: one in which all teachers and the headmaster are provided by Al Azhar headquarters; another in which the headmaster is sent by headquarters to lead the school, but the rest of the staff are local; and another in which all staff and administrators are from headquarters. In this school, the headmaster was transferred from other Al Azhar school, but teachers were all local hires.

wondered aloud, as if repeating a question they had considered among themselves before, “why would an NU man establish a ‘Muhammadiyah school’?” Al Azhar’s roots are in Muhammadiyah, as a Muhammadiyah activist started the original mosque, but the suggestion that Muhammadiyah ideology influences the current foundation is dismissed by the leadership and is not immediately observed in practice.

A few NU informants playfully speculated that Hafidz was trying to insert some NU teachings into the school culture and thus inculcate NU leanings among students. While headquarters centrally regulates the religion curriculum through in-house religion textbooks, it is possible that some NU attitudes filter, intentionally or not, into the classroom through the main religion teacher. He is a humorous, charismatic man, the son of a *kyai* (NU religious leader) who aspires to becoming a *kyai* himself. Additionally, Hafidz had organized at least one NU-specific activity for the faculty. During a special faculty meeting, those in attendance were led in prayer intended to clean the school of spirits. According to NU belief, spirits occupy empty uninhabited spaces, such as the rice fields that surround much of the school, making the school susceptible to visits from spirits. Indeed, earlier that school year a female student had seen a spirit in the bathroom.

In an interview with the school’s foundation secretary, I repeated outside curiosities about an NU man starting a school generally associated with Muhammadiyah. I commented that some thought perhaps NU teachings were being inserted into the school, and then asked what he thought of these speculations. He, an NU activist himself, smiled, looking slightly amused, raised his eyebrows, and shrugged his shoulders to suggest it might be the case, before asking who had suggested such things to me.

Another perplexing question is why Hafidz chose to run an elite Islamic school rather than a school for economically disadvantaged students, another NU tradition. Perhaps the government was not interested in donating land to a specific group's school. Or, perhaps Hafidz strategically wanted to diversify the large private Islamic schooling market dominated by Muhammadiyah schools and being quickly populated by JSIT schools linked to PKS—a party troubling to both Muhammadiyah and NU leaders. Regardless of motive, by establishing a branch of Al Azhar, the foundation provided middle-class parents with a “moderate,” as Al Azhar leadership often described their institution, Islamic schooling option.

The eclectic backgrounds of board members symbolize the inclusiveness of religious practices the school attempts to instill in its students. The sponsoring foundation board members come from various religious and professional backgrounds. For example, board members include a high-level administration official at the Muhammadiyah University, Jogjakarta campus; a former Ministry of Religious Affairs district office head in charge of religious education; a well-known *kyai* (NU leader and religious scholar); and a current regional legislator, as well as a former member of the Tarbiyah Movement who refused to become politically active when the Movement's cadre members were required to become members of the Islamic Partai Keadilan (PK), which is now the PKS. Many of the board members are well established in their careers and have extensive professional experience related to either religion or education.

The presence of the monument and donated land serves as a subtle message that Al Azhar 31 is connected to the Sultan and government of Jogja and the government's patronage to Islam. It also speaks to the nationalist loyalty Al Azhar demonstrates towards

the state. Al Azhar does not officially have a political agenda, but one Al Azhar leader in Jakarta explained that Al Azhar schools are expected to promote an Islam that will support a Pancasila state.

Beginning in 2005 with preschool and kindergarten classes, the school grew with the advancement of the original cohort. As such, in the 2009–2010 school year, four grades were in operation in addition to the preschool and kindergarten. Grades three and four had two classes, while grades one and two had three classes, each averaging 27 students. The popularity of the school grew to the point that for the 2010–2011 school year, the grade-one class enrollment reached maximum target enrollment numbers, creating four full classrooms of students per grade. For incoming students, schooling costs⁵¹ included a one-time facilities fee of US\$685 (Rp 7,000,000), a yearly activities fee of US\$206 (Rp 2,100,00), and monthly tuition of US\$33 (Rp 335,000). This works out to cost US\$1,254 for initial enrollment and the first academic year, and US\$569 for the subsequent academic years, plus any fees for after-school clubs or special activities. As the average monthly income in Jogja in 2009 was US\$119 (PBS Statistics Indonesia 2011: 31), this school is only viable for the middle and upper classes.

⁵¹ The July 1, 2009 exchange rate was used to calculate the U.S. dollar amounts. July is the month in which the 2009–10 school year began. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest whole amount. The activities fee is Rp. 60,000 per month, but is presented as an annual fee to be comparable to the Al Azhar school fee, which is charged one time each year. The school year is 11 months.

The Universal in Flexible Islam

Unlike the mainstream Islamic schools that have dominated the Islamic schooling market for the last 100 years, Al Azhar schools⁵² are not affiliated with or owned by a specific religious organization such as Muhammadiyah or NU.⁵³ Their organization-free status creates an open invitation to people of all political and religious backgrounds, preempting possible organizational loyalties from hindering enrollment. An the Al Azhar 31 secretary stated:

Islam here is complete (*kaffah*), perfect (*sempurna*) Islam. So it means, we do not follow Muhammadiyah's school of thought or any other school of thought. People here are taught that Islam is a universal view. Islam is universal, not fragmented into certain sects. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 foundation secretary, June 17, 2009)

Unhindered by organization-specific traditions, interpretations, and histories, this founder believes the school is positioned to teach students a pure, *kaffah* (complete) Islam; a universal or non-discriminatory Islam. The three interrelated components of Al Azhar's conceptualization of a universal Islam are Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism; they combine to create a flexible Islam.

Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs

A crucial aspect to Al Azhar's universal Islam is the exclusion of the historical, group-specific interpretations that build upon the Qur'an and Hadith. The Qur'an is

⁵² The locus of this discussion is Al Azhar 31 Islamic Primary School in Jogja. However, conversations with administration at Al Azhar headquarters in Jakarta and leadership from the Al Azhar 3 Islamic High School located at the headquarters complex are also included. Due to the franchise business model employed by Al Azhar, consistency in attitudes and opinions across the network of Al Azhar institutions are expected to be greater than any variations that might occur within individual schools.

⁵³ While both Al Azhar, and JSIT schools which will be discussed in the next chapter, are technically religious organizations as they run or oversee religious schools, they are not what Indonesians consider religious organizations (*organisasi keagamaan*) like Muhammadiyah or NU. These two organizations are comparable to what in Christianity would be considered a denomination as they have distinct beliefs and practices and separate religious leaders, yet hold the same core beliefs of most Muslims.

considered to be God's final revelation to humanity, the literal word of God as dictated to Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. Hadith are records of the Prophet Muhammad's statements and acts as recorded by eyewitnesses. They are considered a source of religious law, second only to the Qur'an. Hadith are also considered the source for understanding *sunnah*. *Sunnah* are social practices set for believers by the prophet and sometimes his close companions that are found in the Hadith (Woodward 2011:6). Group-specific attitudes towards the Hadith influence perceptions of the *sunnah*, generating differences in Islamic practices (van Bruinessen 1996:3). Traditionally, memorizing the Qur'an was part of the oral tradition of Islamic societies for preserving knowledge. Although printing and information technology have dramatically facilitated storing and accessing knowledge, memorization holds a special place in Islam beyond its use for preservation. To memorize, and recite, the Qur'an is considered an act of purifying oneself.

While it is acknowledged that NU and Muhammadiyah organizations use the Qur'an and Hadiths as sources, they also add to them. As part of their curricula, students at NU-affiliated schools study classical religious commentaries known as *kitab kuning*. The *kitab kuning* are texts that contain interpretations on *fiqh* (law), morality, and other commentary on the Qur'an. Muhammadiyah provides organization-specific content, such as its history. Al Azhar school educators find these interpretations, commentaries, and histories to be a distraction from the essence of Islam. All groups, however, accept and value the Qur'an and Hadith, making them universal in use and acceptance. By focusing solely on the Qur'an and Hadith, there is no loyalty to one group over the other. However, this then necessitates that the schools focus more on Islamic morals and basic practices rather than doctrine, making interpretations and exegesis less important. The Al Azhar 31 headmaster explained:

Perhaps in some schools, like at Muhammadiyah schools, elements of Muhammadiyah are also discussed. At Al Azhar it's not like that. We're neutral. There are two things that guide our lives, namely the Qur'an and Hadith. Hadith are all the things done by the prophet Muhammad. We don't have any other additions. But at Muhammadiyah schools, there's additional Muhammadiyah-related materials [*keMuhammadiyah*] taught. We're not like that. We do not bring in other streams and we have a neutral stance. We also don't adhere to political parties or groups [like the PKS]. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 headmaster, February 18, 2010)

Additionally, a grade four teacher explained:

There are several streams (*aliran-aliran*) in Islam. Essentially it is only one, that being Islam. But there are several teachings and those teaching are *sunnah*, things that can be done and things that can't be done. These differences are in fact only about the teachings of the *sunnah*, but these differences are what ultimately lead to clashes between factions. At Al Azhar, we are open to all of them, so we're not NU, Muhammadiyah, Salafi or any other, because the prophet Muhammad told us in the Hadith that Islam will be divided into various streams, but the point or the focus is only Islam. The bottom line is that Islam is correct as it is implemented by Muhammad, so we just follow that. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, March 18, 2010)

It is commonly accepted that the prophet spoke of Islam dividing into many different groups or streams, as this teacher said. Al Azhar understands that each stream is still a form of Islam and therefore must be respected at the school. By avoiding the interpretations and focusing only on the Qur'an and Hadith, Al Azhar considers itself to be promoting the core or essence of Islam, rather than various groups' specific canonical traditions and histories.

The importance of the Qur'an as part of a child's Islamic schooling is highlighted in several ways at school. Depending on the grade, students spend between 12 and 15% of their study hours each week in religion-related classes (religion of Islam, reciting and memorizing the Qur'an, and, starting in grade four, Arabic⁵⁴). In addition to regular religion

⁵⁴ Since Arabic is the language in which the Qur'an is written, the purpose of studying Arabic is to become fluent in the language of the Qur'an. Arabic is generally considered part of the religious curriculum.

class, students have a weekly 70-minute class on Qur'anic reading and 35 minutes a week of memorization of the Qur'an. Additionally, each student is pulled out of regular classes once a week for a 10-minute one-on-one session with a Qur'anic reading teacher. This offers individualized help on reading and pronunciation of the Qur'anic verses in Arabic. Overall, this means that over half of the religious curriculum is devoted to learning to recite and memorizing the Qur'an. Grades one and two spend 9%, and grades three and four spend 7%, of their weekly class time memorizing and learning to recite the Qur'an. Additionally, memorization of a chapter of the Qur'an⁵⁵ is a graduation requirement.



Al Azhar 31 grade-four student during weekly individual Qur'anic reading lesson

Knowledge of the Qur'an is so important that it is part of requirements for hiring full-time teachers, regardless of their specialized subject matter. The teachers at Al Azhar schools are expected to recite memorized parts of the Qur'an as part of the application process. At Jakarta headquarters, if a teacher memorizes the entire Qur'an, the school rewards the teacher with a *haji* trip. While this is currently not offered at Al Azhar 31, the administration hopes to reward their teachers in this way sometime in the future.

⁵⁵ Given the difficulty of memorizing the Qur'an, the shortest chapter, which is the last chapter, is the chapter required for graduation. Memorization of the last chapter is common practice for Qur'anic students in Indonesia's Islamic institutions.

Inclusivity

Being organization-free allows the schools to be non-partisan. As one high school administration official in Jakarta explained, Al Azhar schools are:

Islamic schools, but in our own terms, we're called Islamic private general schools (*sekolah umum swasta Islam*). We aren't classified as an NU school; we're also not classified as a Muhammadiyah school. We're in between them. Our Islam, in Indonesian people's terms, is moderate (*moderat*) Islam. (Interview with Al Azhar 3 administration, March 21, 2010)

Al Azhar sees this organization-free approach to Islam as "moderate," a term that frequently surfaced in interviews. While terms such as "radical," "moderate," or "conservative" are hard to define and are often unhelpful in accurately describing a particular approach to Islam,⁵⁶ the repeated use of this term seemed to be a marketing phrase, as it connotes a safe and welcoming kind of Islam. In the above quote, this man defined "moderate" as covering the middle ground, having a sense of being non-partisan.

Al Azhar's non-partisan, moderate Islam aims to avoid contention that can arise over specifics in standardized Islamic practices. Even in the most basic rituals, Muhammadiyah and NU have different practices. For example, during Ramadan, NU will pray 22 times during the night and Muhammadiyah 11. Ways of prayer also differ slightly. The NU pray facing west, reflecting pre-modern geographic orientation, while Muhammadiyah face northwest, reflecting modern understanding of the location of Mecca

⁵⁶ During my fieldwork, several times I attempted to understand how individuals understood terms such as "radical," "conservative," "liberal," and "moderate" by conducting pile sorts with cards. These sorts were confusing for people, largely because they did not understand Islam in those terms. One man refused to do the task, as he thought the terms were Western labels that did not hold any meaning for him. During my fieldwork in separate conversations with Mark Woodward, a longtime Indonesianist and anthropologist, and Farish Noor, a prominent political scientist who focuses on South and Southeast Asia, both men commented the inaccuracy and impracticality of categorizing Islamic practices in Southeast Asia, and even more so in Indonesia, as one group's practices could have shades of several terms depending on the aspects on which one focuses.

(Woodward 2011:220). In reference specifically to the way in which students are taught to pray at school, the Al Azhar 31 headmaster said:

We are always neutral (*netral*). The important thing is not to go outside of the guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith. If we make problems out of small things, disputes, arguments, and debates will arise and ultimately each person will go his own way. That's not good. Instead we should be united. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 headmaster, February 18, 2010)

At her school, the teachers are given specific guidelines from Jakarta headquarters not to value one religious group over another in the classroom. By not favoring one group over another, but staying with the specific guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith, they seek to avoid offending or favoring any single group.

Al Azhar 31 foundation's secretary explained, "What we want is an Islam that is accepted everywhere, not exclusive, not extreme right or extreme left" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 foundation secretary, June 17, 2009). Realistically, acceptance everywhere is not possible. By definition, extreme right or extreme left removes one from being central, lowering the probability of consensus or large-scale acceptance. Conversely, a middle ground would not be acceptable to those in "exclusive extremes." While "acceptance everywhere" may not be realistic, mainstream approval seems to be the realistic goal.

Al Azhar does not envision opening Islam to only Muslims of any type, but to non-Muslims as well. At Al Azhar 3 High School in Jakarta, an administrator commented on how the school tried to demonstrate that Islam is not in opposition to those outside of Islam. It is universally welcoming. In reference to a short study-abroad trip for high school students to New Zealand, he said,

We show that Islam is not closed to...the world outside of Islam, because Islam is for all, not just for the Islamic world. We are friends and friendly with everyone... We want to show that Islam is not extreme and not exclusive. Islam is universal. We

want to build cooperation with everyone. (Interview with Al Azhar 3 administration, March 21, 2010).

In other words, they want to present a moderate (not extreme) and inclusive (not exclusive) Islam to the entire world. The middle ground they walk is a common ground where they hope all people should be able to peaceably co-exist with Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Pluralism

Pluralism involves having flexible standards and focusing on the essence of Islam, rather than the form of its implementation. The Al Azhar 31 headmaster recognizes that teachers at her school may have organizational affiliations that engender affinity for one style of practice over another. Outside of school grounds, teachers may do as they wish. However, at the school, the teachers are to check their affiliations at the door, and teach only according to the schools guidelines. The headmaster said,

The important thing is we worship God. Our intention is to seek reward from Allah. So we all can return back again [to Allah]. Later it is God who will judge our devotion and what we did. For example, in the *sholat subuh* [required prayer before sunrise], there are people who recite *Qunut* prayers but some do not. In our opinion, prayer is good and it depends on individual beliefs [on how to perform them]. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 headmaster, February 18, 2010).

In her opinion, flexibility in how to worship does not devalue that act of worship itself. She views preferences for how to pray as personal beliefs, which each individual is free to choose.

At school children learn to pray; the school curriculum on how to pray is highly scripted for the teachers so as to avoid teaching one organization's practice over another. Students are taught it is their duty as a Muslim to perform *sholat*, the daily five required prayers. Students *sholat* together in the classrooms with their teachers each day. The

expectation of performing *sholat* five times a day is reinforced through the students' completion of daily logs in which they report their performance of the previous day's required prayers that take place outside of school hours. Students, however, are not asked to report on the style of *sholat* but simply the completion of the activity. In addition to required *sholat*, students also pray over their food at lunchtime, before lessons, and before going home.

An Al Azhar 31 religion teacher believed that the forms of performance were customs or habits rather than the essence of the practice. As an example, he mentioned the dress and grooming standards of a more prescriptive approach to Islam taught at Luqman al Hakim SIT (which will be discussed in depth in the following chapter). This teacher worked for a year at an SIT run by one of the founders of Luqman al Hakim SIT and therefore felt confident that his experience was similar to that of Luqman al Hakim.⁵⁷ While teaching there, he was uncomfortable with the standards the school imposed on teachers, and eventually left the school to teach at Al Azhar 31. He explained:

The purity of Islam is one, not because of acts (*perbuatan*) but because of *tawhid* (unity), namely of the Qur'an and Hadith. That's the purity of Islam. Islam isn't traditions or customs. So long as the traditions and customs don't interfere with Islam, they're fine. In Luqman al Hakim SIT, the custom of a large *hijab*, or men wearing a beard and short pants—that's custom. It's not like that in the Qur'an. (Interview Al Azhar 31 religion teacher, February 12, 2010)

The teacher did not believe that the SITs' implementation of dress standards was prescribed in the Qur'an, and therefore felt there could be flexibility in how one dresses appropriately. Since the Qur'an did not mandate specifics, the way in which the SITs had come to establish their standards were, in his mind, a custom or tradition. He considered

⁵⁷ The observations he makes as far as dress and attitudes are in line with those that I observed during my time at Luqman al Hakim SIT.

these traditions to be personal or group-specific, rather than universally binding.

As we continued this conversation, we talked more about the differences between Al Azhar 31 and Integrated Islamic Schools (SITs) in general. The topic again turned to the idea of pluralism or flexible standards. The term “moderate Islam” surfaced, and the religion teacher used the term in a similar manner as previously in this chapter, referring to a middle-of-the-road, inclusive Islam. The following quote is lengthy, but it provides insight into debates among groups regarding the regulation of standards for behavior. It also highlights, through the interjection of a question from a teacher who had been listening, that teachers might be unclear at times in regards to the distinction between form of practice and essence.

Karen: If there’s moderate Islam here [Al Azhar 31], what kind of Islam is there at SITs?

Al Azhar 31 religion teacher: It’s not moderate Islam. They justify their own group, “My group is right.” But we aren’t like that. They’re exclusive, “My group is right.” So if there are teachers who go there, they have to be like that. But here, we are not regulated on what to do. There are those that wear the *peci* [tight-fitting brimless cap]; there are those that don’t. Everyone’s different and free. That’s moderate (*moderat*). We don’t require a large *hijab*. At SITs, the *hijab* has to be wide and cover the chest because in the Qur’an the *hijab* should cover the chest. And [women] can’t wear pants but must wear skirts.

Al Azhar 31 teacher: How do you think it should be, *Pak*?

Al Azhar 31 religion teacher: If it covers the *aurat*,⁵⁸ you’re fine. If the pants aren’t tight or anything, that’s also fine. The important thing is to cover the *aurat* and not be too tight. At SITs, a teacher can’t dress like that. She’d definitely get thrown out. If you don’t want to follow their rules, you’d be

⁵⁸ The *aurat* is the private parts of the body not to be seen by those of the opposite sex who are not blood relatives or spouse. For men, this are is from the waist to the knees. The female *aurat* is contested among groups, but in general the *aurat* is the hair and the entire body excluding the face and the hands, and often the feet.

told to leave. But here, you're free. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 religion teacher, February 12, 2010)

Within this perspective that specific standards are not *Islam*, but rather traditions and customs, one understands how a less prescriptive way to veil for example, does not indicate a less pious sensibility. According to this religion teacher, the principle is to cover the *aurat*, and that can be accomplished in several equally acceptable ways. There is no need to create distinctions between ways in which a moral principle is implemented.

However, while the school may teach that women should veil, woman who do not veil are not banned from attending the school.⁵⁹ As far as I could tell, the women who did not veil were not treated differently while on campus and did not look to be uncomfortable. The acceptance or tolerance of unveiled Muslim women was also demonstrated by the public display of students' family photos outside of the grade-two classrooms along a main corridor. While most mothers and daughters in the photos were veiled, some were not. The equally prominent display of photos, regardless of veiling practice, spoke of acceptance of both practices. Finally, while administration did say it would be appreciated if I dressed in long sleeves and long pants or skirts, I was not requested to veil. A couple of times the headmaster did suggest I veil, but only because I "would look prettier" if I did. I didn't feel this suggestion was a passive-aggressive way to encourage me to veil while on campus for the sake of modesty. Her encouragement spoke more to how the veil has become a fashionable item.

⁵⁹ One mother commented, however, that woman must veil in order to attend the weekly, voluntary mothers' Qur'an study group on campus held during school hours (Interview with Al Azhar 31 mother, April 29, 2010). The class is often lead by one of the religion teachers.

It is apparent that Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism are heavily interconnected. Throughout the entire discussion above, the recurring motivation for having a flexible Islam is the great desire to avoid contention, eliminate potential points of disagreement between groups, and to thus generate a society that is united and peaceful. Al Azhar is highly motivated by community and relationships within the community. A flexible Islam accommodates multiple traditions and practices, and conversely expects individuals to do the same towards those who participate in traditions different than their own.

Flexible Islam and the Middle Class: An Easy Fit

While a flexible Islam welcomes a variety of Islamic practices, it also facilitates a compatible relationship between an active religious life and mainstream middle-class Indonesian culture. The following vignette from Al Azhar 31's open house for potential new parents and students demonstrates this.



Al Azhar 31 Open House fashion show participants

Shaded under a large, open, outdoor tent, a camera-happy crowd of parents surrounding a red carpeted catwalk watched sets of young girls as they took turns traversing the runway and striking poses to the beat of modern

Islamic music. The audience was treated to a variety of outfits, ranging from chic kid to glamour model to Javanese royalty fusion, all Muslim-style. While the girls wore makeup and oversized, high-heeled boots that accentuated their unnatural looking hip thrusts, struts, and arm positions, their hair was completely covered and their clothing exposed only their hands. Their *hijabs* were all shapes and sizes; some flowed over the shoulders, while others looked more like a head wrap accessorized with bands or flowers, leaving the neck exposed. The models looked like they'd just stepped out of advertisements for Katerina, one of the city's trendy Islamic clothing stores.

This fashion show was one of several performances at Al Azhar 31's 2010 Open House, an event to entice new parents to enroll their children for the coming school year. Other performances included numbers from the school drum band and the singing club, traditional Indonesian dances by groups of upper-grade students, and Qur'anic recitations by individual students. SpongeBob SquarePants even made an appearance. Current and prospective school parents mingled as they watched performances, visited food stations, and perused vendor stalls hawking wares such as women's tunics, religious story books, household items, and children's games. A woman handed out free bags filled with individual-sized bags of various chips and snacks. The scene looked like the busy street of Malioboro, Jogja's popular downtown shopping district, with a mix of men and veiled and unveiled women browsing the goods.

I was caught off guard by the fashion show, even though fashion shows and modeling contests are common in Indonesia. Malls and large department stores frequently sponsor modeling contests and fashion shows for babies and young children. One afternoon I stumbled upon a fashion show at a Kentucky Fried Chicken. The young

participants all wore KFC T-shirts that many mothers had creatively stylized by adding ribbon trim, cutting out the ribbed neck, or tying at a knot at the waist. The contestants mostly wore jean miniskirts and the same oversized high-heeled boots. The scene perplexed me as I watched veiled, fully covered mothers prep their young daughters, applying makeup, fixing their hair (not one girl was veiled), and coaching them on their sexualized poses and struts.

I knew high fashion and Islam were not closed worlds. Islamic fashion is a bustling industry in Indonesia, as many middle class women have come to express their modern and pious selves through contemporary Islamic clothing (Brenner 1996, Jones 2007). My puzzlement at KFC was at the inconsistency of mothers who veil—and thus would likely have a particular commitment to modesty and non-sexualized public behavior—and also encourage their young daughters to engage in seemingly un-Islamic behaviors that the veil typically discourages, both literally and symbolically. At Al Azhar 31, the same sexualized poses seemed to be in even greater contradiction with the Islamic attire the students were modeling. Al Azhar 31's fashion show was also in sharp contrast to the simple and plain-clothes approach to fashion and more rigid concepts of modesty that I observed at Luqman al Hakim SIT campus, as discussed in the next chapter.

An Islamic fashion show strategically presented prospective parents with the message that the school was both Islamic and well centered in mainstream middle and upper-middle class Indonesia. Although students did recite the Qur'an, most of the performances were not religious in nature. School drum bands are quite popular and a sign of school pride throughout the nation. The part-time music teacher is a well-respected local musician who teaches students popular songs that, while asserting general morals, are not

necessarily Islamic. The traditional dances honored ethnic groups. The reputation of the school's high academic standards is widely known in the community; therefore the school's culture and facilities were under scrutiny that day by parents at the Open House. The range of events at the Open House demonstrated an easy mix of popular middle class culture and religious life.

Conclusion

The three interrelated components, Qur'an- and Hadith-based beliefs, inclusivity, and pluralism, of Al Azhar's conceptualization of a universal Islam combine to create a flexible Islam. Beliefs limited to the Qur'an and Hadith eliminate debates and difference on interpretations, allowing the school to focus on the basics to which all Muslims agree. Focusing on the Qur'an and Hadith as the common denominator, Islamic groups are expected to find common ground from which to live in peaceful coexistence. Inclusivity in the terms of mainstream Indonesian practices means they strive to hold the middle ground between the different NU and Muhammadiyah practices. They consider themselves to be neutral, not favoring one form of worship over another while staying within the guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith. This inclusivity promotes a pluralism that involves having flexible standards and focusing on the essence of Islamic practices, rather than the form of its implementation. This flexible approach to Islam is expected to be the "glue of the nation" by maintaining and facilitating religious tolerance, and thus a peaceful society.

While Al Azhar 31's flexible Islam aims to be religiously inclusive, the institution itself is economically exclusive given the high tuition (one of the most expensive in the city) and its selective franchise business model. Although a non-profit institution, the school

image and reputation are extremely important and carefully groomed. The neo-liberal, post-Fordian flexibility of the business side of Al Azhar has facilitated Al Azhar's development of a very specific niche market within the burgeoning elite Islamic schooling market. Within Jogja, Al Azhar 31's popularity has increased and community confidence in the institution has grown to the point that by the fifth year of the elementary school's operations, it reached maximum enrollment capacity for the incoming grade-one class. Additionally, Al Azhar has not only expanded to establish a junior secondary school in 2012, but in 2011 Al Azhar 38, another preschool and elementary school, opened in Bantul, a town on the southern edge of Jogja. While this growth lags behind the JSITs in Jogja and the country in scale (there are over 19 JSIT primary schools in Jogja), Al Azhar does not seem to be concerned; they are aware that their Al Azhar clientele within the middle class is a different subgroup than those interested in JSIT schools.

This school is well aware of who its customers are: middle- and upper-class parents who are largely just beginning their own exploration and experience with religion on a personal, daily basis. A flexible, inclusive, middle-way approach to Islam for these parents may seem the most attractive and safe. The headmaster explained:

At Al Azhar, perhaps those that educate their children here are people whose Islamic understanding is of those who are just learning, so we have to adjust to it. And we must also remember that it is inside of us that we insert the values of Islam. We cannot be authoritarian, but should be loving, attentive, slowly and gradually. It's all a necessary process. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 headmaster, February 18, 2010)

She believes the most effective way of teaching Islam—the values rather than the doctrines, interpretations and histories—is through attentiveness and patience. A pluralistic environment would certainly appear to be a safe environment for the exploration and development of religious sensibilities. This particular approach to Islam, as the headmaster

alluded to, contrasts with more standardized and exacting approach found in JSIT schools, as discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to the idea of accommodating their clientele, JSIT schools aim to have parents and students “adjust” to their approach to religion. Al Azhar’s commitment in accommodating their clientele also speaks to the organization’s awareness of and sensitivity to their customers’ needs, highlighting that it is not only an institution of learning, but also a business.

Echoes of national concern with relatively new puritanical groups of Muslims challenging the longstanding pluralism and religious tolerance in Indonesia can be heard in local and national Al Azhar leadership’s promotion of a flexible Islam that accommodates multiple approaches to the religion. A flexible Islam is expected to unite the Muslim community, and therefore Indonesia, rather than create divisions and intolerance. The high school headmaster at Al Azhar 3 in Jakarta demonstrated his belief in the unifying effect of flexibility when he claimed, “Moderate Islam is Islam that returns to the Qur’an and *sunnah*. We have become the glue for our people and nation and it has become a unified people and nation” (Interview with Al Azhar 3 administration, March 21, 2010).

Al Azhar 31’s pluralistic perspective that acts as “a glue” to unify the country is summed up by an Al Azhar 31 founder and board member, and former member of the Tarbiyah Movement who refused to become politically active when the Movement’s cadre members were required to become members of the Islamist Partai Keadilan (PK), which is now the PKS:

I personally think Islam is good and everything [all forms of Islam] are fine. If you want to join a particular organization, go right ahead. As long as it doesn’t conflict with the *sunnah*, it doesn’t matter because it’s just an organization. Mr. Hafiz’s [chairman of Al Azhar 31] own background is NU, but he doesn’t want to be defined (*diklaim*) as NU because he has many friends in Muhammadiyah and other organizations. I prefer to be neutral and not be pigeonholed by the label of an

organization. We're complementary, you know? If there are friends of NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis and so on, it's great if you can complement one another. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 board member, April 29, 2010)

This founder believes multiple types of Islamic practices are not in opposition to each other but can actually complement each other, as long as they stay within the Qur'an and Hadith. Such a synergetic relationship is expected to benefit the country.

Al Azhar's encouragement of Islamic pluralism echoes the nationalist pluralism rhetoric of the New Order. "Unity in diversity" (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) was a national motto employed by Indonesia's first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, after gaining independence from the Dutch. Their efforts were meant to unite the country whose almost 100 million citizens spanned over approximately 300 ethnic groups and spoke over 650 local languages. Pluralism was promoted through *Pancasila*, the country's founding doctrine of Indonesian nationalism.⁶⁰ During the New Order, pluralist nationalism was a key theme in engendering unity and peace. Rudnyckyj (2011) argues that Suharto's carefully managed authoritarian nationalism is giving way to democratic exclusion as religious identity is being substituted for nationalist identity in what he calls a post-Pancasila Indonesia. In a post-Pancasila Indonesia, he sees the emphasis on the five officially recognized religions of Indonesia is shifting to Islam as a "common denominator of belonging" (191). Al Azhar's emphasis on the role of Islam in unifying not only the Muslim *ummah*, but also the country, is an example of Rudnyckyj's observation.

⁶⁰ Pancasila is the textual definition of Indonesia the nation-state and the principles of belonging in the imagined community of Indonesians. The five principles are: Belief in one God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia as a territorial unit, democracy guided by wisdom through representative deliberation, and social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people (Darmodiharjo, Dekker, Pringgogigodo et al. 1970:31 as cited by Rudnyckyj 2010:190-1).

Al Azhar promotes an Islamic sensibility that honors multiple traditions and is not focused on form of execution, but the act of implementation. However, a flexible Islam still holds a codified, however loosely, set of beliefs and standards. This was demonstrated in the above discussion with the religion teacher who, when talking about veiling practices, stated that as long as the headscarf covers the *aurat*, it doesn't matter what the size or style is as long as it covers the *aurat*. But what if the *aurat* is not covered? Is it possible to be a pious Muslim woman if you do not veil? The religion teacher implied that veiling, no matter how it is accomplished, is better than not veiling. If one interprets the Qur'an or Hadith to require women to veil, then even a flexible Islam based on that interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith will have some kind of standards, although ambiguous, on how to best live a pious life.

This ambiguity creates challenges in promoting a flexible Islam, as differences of opinion, and confusion, can arise regarding the definition and shape of a pious life. This is illustrated by an interaction with a seasoned teacher from Al Azhar headquarters campus in Jakarta and from a teacher at Al Azhar 31. In Jakarta, one afternoon during the course of our conversation as we drove back to the city from a social visit to retired Al Azhar teacher, I asked if it were permissible for a Muslim to say "*assalamu alaikum*" (a common Arabic greeting among Muslims that has gained popularity in mainstream Indonesia and has begun to replace greetings spoken in Indonesian) to a non-Muslim. She immediately said, "Yes, of course it is." When I relayed to her that her colleague, an officer in the headquarters office, did not agree with that practice, she responded, a little exasperated, "I wish they would make a handbook and let us know what's appropriate and what's not." Perhaps she did not challenge his opinion given his position in the administrative offices and seeing him

as more knowledgeable of the institution's culture or unwritten rules. Although I did not ask her to confirm this, it seemed the wish for a handbook was due to other similar instances when her personal opinion, or others', did not align with the practices of the institution and she felt in the wrong, or at least that she needed clarification or some type of standardized protocols.

At the end of the Open House as I helped teachers and staff return chairs to classrooms and potted plants to their regular spots around the school courtyard, I made a general comment about the fashion show to one of the young vice-headmasters. She voiced discomfort with the event. She felt it was unfitting and inappropriate for the students' Islamic character. It was unclear exactly what she objected to: the worldliness of a fashion show itself, the presenting of young girls to the audience in a sexualized way even though they had not yet passed through puberty, or perhaps some other reason all together. Regardless, her discomfort with the school's sponsorship of the fashion show demonstrated how differences in standards could cause disagreement and possibly tension between those of differing values. If there are only minimal institutionally standardized practices and protocols, certainly personal standards exist and may come in conflict with each other. This raises the issues of tolerance and acceptance, which must be managed on an individual basis when a standard has not been institutionally prescribed. These issues will be further explored in chapter 6 when I discuss students' religious sensibilities, and in particular students' moral subjectivity. In contrast to the flexible Islam of Al Azhar that aims to promote national unity through religious plurality, the following chapter examines the nature of JSIT's exacting Islam intended to transform individuals and the country into a

pious, and therefore individually beneficial, society through strict obedience to a single, “purer” form of Islam.

Chapter 4

Exacting Islam, Benefiting Humanity as a Whole: Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School

I asked Ery Masruri,⁶¹ a founder of the Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School (*Luqman al Hakim Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu*, henceforth known as Luqman al Hakim SIT)⁶² and Chairman of the Mulia Foundation Consortium,⁶³ to describe the type of Islam taught at the school. Was it liberal, fundamentalist, moderate? His understandably lengthy response to a complex question included an explanation of how such terms inadequately encapsulate the entirety of his school's approach to Islam. While, due to the intentional wording of my question, our conversation was framed by these problematic descriptors, the following excerpt provides first the motivation for and then an explanation of the school's "strict" approach to Islam:⁶⁴

We really wanted to give birth to, to practicing Islam that's part of *rahmatan lil alamin* [blessings for the universe], the Islam that created grace (*rahmatan*). Mercy (*rahmat*) is a positive value for the life of the world. We wanted to give birth to an institution to educate this generation that could become positive, giving birth to the virtues of Islam. The more a person adheres to Islam, the more he is of great worth

⁶¹ Given the number of times in this dissertation that I refer to conversations with Ery Masruri, I mention his name. Aside from being a founder of the Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School and Chairman of the Mulia Foundation Consortium, he is also one of the founders of the integrated Islam concept within JSIT, a member of JSIT's Research and Development Department, and founder of three additional JSIT schools in Jogja.

⁶² This school will be referred to as Luqman al Hakim SIT throughout the rest of the dissertation. "SIT" is the abbreviation used in Indonesia for the Integrated Islamic School (*Sekolah Islam Terpadu*). JSIT is the abbreviation of the Network for Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu*).

⁶³ The Mulia Foundation Consortium is a small consortium of daycare facilities, preschools, and primary and secondary JSIT schools that includes Luqman al Hakim SIT.

⁶⁴ I recognize that just as terms such as "fundamental" or "moderate" have become loaded terms and have multiple meanings, using any single word such as "flexible" or "exacting" to distinguish between comprehensive forms of practice is problematic. However, these terms are used, as they are heuristically relevant for the discussion.

(*bernilai tinggi*), beneficial (*bermanfaat*), liked (*disenangi*) by everyone...The issues that are a part of our fundamental bond with God, they become non-negotiable (*harga mati*). And maybe that's what's considered strict (*ketat*). Perhaps one could say Luqman al-Hakim is fundamentalist⁶⁵ (*fundamentalis*) in terms of bonds with God, very fundamentalist...[For example,] the obligation provided by Islam that a woman (*seorang wanita*) should cover her *aurat* by wearing the *hijab*, that's a non-negotiable, with a variety of examinable benefits... Where are we going with this [fundamentalist approach]? It makes devout Muslims who are of great worth (*bernilai tinggi*), extremely obedient (*ketaatan tinggi*) to God, and are highly valuable (*bernilai guna tinggi*) to humanity as a whole. (Interview with Ery Masruri, October 21, 2009)

The repeated imagery of “giving birth” to a very principled way of practicing Islam and an institution that educates students in this “strict” and selectively “fundamentalist” religion suggests the school’s founders believed this kind of Islam and Islamic school were not yet alive in Indonesia, or at least not thriving. In their minds, while Islam had been practiced for centuries in Indonesia, *rahmatan lil alamin*, an Islam that brings blessings to the entire world, was not widely practiced at the time.

As he explained, this form of Islam expects individuals to bind themselves to God through the transformative process of performing specific sets of practices. Personal worth and one’s level of benefit to society are directly linked to one’s obedience to God. The greater the extent to which one is bound to God, or the greater the obedience to God, the greater the yield of blessings. The benefits of these blessings are twofold. The devout gain personal benefits (for example, a woman who veils appropriately will receive greater honor in society), and “humanity as a whole” benefits from these devout individuals. Personal obedience is considered to universally bless humanity.

⁶⁵ Fundamentalism is a concept that has emerged within the context of this modern era. While Islamic fundamentalism generally rejects Western influence, it, along with fundamentalism found in Christianity and Judaism, incorporates the distinctive features of modernity such as “technologies, science, communications, bureaucratizations, and rationalization” (Ewing 2010:52).

The birth of a moral institution, which brings to life a new kind of Muslim that in turn benefits society, recalls Maududi's teachings that the family is the foundation of a moral society. Maududi, a great 20th-century Islamist thinker from Pakistan, worked to create a new *ummah*, a collective Muslim community, in South Asia by expunging colonial influences from the region. In his framing, the family, and in particular women, is an Islamic society's base unit. Maududi's social and political teachings have influenced Islamist groups and movements in Southeast Asia and across the globe, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution (Jenkins 2008).

Similarly, the JSIT schools are working, through what they believe to be the transformative powers of Islam on individuals and in turn on society, to bring about a pious Indonesia. These schools work on the assumption that the appropriate development of Muslims, and a Muslim nation, requires the implementation of specific religious practices and principles aligned with the original practices of Islam, thus making them universally applicable. The schools teach children to reject the Western, or neo-colonial, influences of secularism and materialism, which are enemies to the expansion of *rahmatan lil alamin* Islam, while harnessing useful scientific knowledge and technology from the West for the development of a modern society. Students are expected to become observant and pious Muslims, the prerequisite to creating a just and peaceful nation. Similar to Maududi's envisioned features of family, with very specific gendered roles and forms of modesty (Maududi n.d), many JSIT practices promote specific, gendered ideas regarding male–female interactions, the proper roles men and women play in society, and female dress codes. Ery's vision of growing a school system echoes Maududi's vision of growing an Islamic nation.

In this chapter, I argue that Luqman al Hakim SIT's conceptualization of a universal Islam is comprised of three interrelated components, namely, Qur'an and hadith-based beliefs, standardized practices, and exacting adherence, which combine to create an exacting Islam. I then explore the paradox of being "universal" while simultaneously requiring specific practices and rituals. This paradox will be discussed within the context of perceptions and practices of exclusivity. Before these discussions, I map out the history of the ideological and institutional roots of Luqman al Hakim SIT in relation to the larger political history and socio-political agenda of the Tarbiyah Movement and PKS to set the context for my arguments.

JSIT's Roots in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Politics

The Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu*, henceforth JSIT) is one of the largest, if not the largest, association of Indonesian Islamic schools without a religious organization affiliation. As of 2010, the network's membership included 570 daycare, pre-school and kindergarten facilities and 550 primary and secondary schools (JSIT 2010). Unlike the Al Azhar schools that expanded under the direction of the governing board at headquarters, the initial growth of the now JSIT schools was organic and uncoordinated. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the first Integrated Islamic schools were established by independent *dakwah* activists from the Tarbiyah Movement in several different cities.

The creation of the Tarbiyah Movement was heavily influenced by ideals from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Economic growth during the New Order allowed students to travel abroad for university training. Many of these students returned from international

study with new ideals concerning the establishment of a more pious and Islamic society. These activists localized the Islamic Brotherhood ideals to the Indonesian context, and eventually formed the Tarbiyah Movement in the mid-1980s (Machmudi 2008:134). For the sake of survival during Suharto's secular New Order regime, it operated underground and was most successful on university campuses. The movement's model of Islamization involves a system of Islam *kaffah*, or "comprehensive Islam." It calls for Muslims to incorporate Islam into all aspects of their lives, to see Islam as the complete and only source for the fulfillment of all spiritual and worldly needs. From the Tarbiyah Movement activists' perspective, there is no single matter that is not subject to the rules of Islam (Machmudi 2008:66). The movement's specific notions of how Islam is to be implemented require discipline and education in order to understand its many rules (Rinaldo 2008). The disciplined individual is key to an alternative vision of national development that challenges secular, corrupt governments. A critical mass of such disciplined individuals influences political, economic, social, familial, and cultural aspects of society; they are then expected to create a new society based on Islamic principles. This vision of disciplined individuals is codified in school procedures and their expectation that students will become pious Muslims.

The Tarbiyah Movement seeks to Islamize Indonesia through political and cultural avenues (Machmudi 2008:51,66). When Suharto stepped down in 1998, the movement became public and within months established the Prosperous Party (PK), which later became the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, henceforth PKS) in 2002. Establishing a political party was key in these efforts to Islamize Indonesia's national structures. While not immediately accepted by all Tarbiyah activists, an internal

referendum in 1998 by the movement's core cadre transformed the Tarbiyah Movement into a political institution.⁶⁶ As there was to be no distinction between the party and the movement, all religious training and activities were taken over by the party. The PKS continues to be the formal political arm of the Tarbiyah Movement (Machmudi 2008:72). PKS has become well known, gaining more public support than any other Islamic political party in the country.

The cultural strategy for Islamizing Indonesia targets the development of Islamic social institutions such as schools, health clinics, and financial institutions governed by *Shari'ah*.⁶⁷ Al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, was a schoolteacher and imam. He viewed education as not simply a way to teach knowledge, religious or secular, but as a way to bring about moral edification and the development of fully Islamic individuals. The belief is that, by working to implement *Shari'ah* in all aspects of one's life, the sincere believer transforms the community around him. In time, a collective of believers transforms the nation as a whole.

Viewing education to have transformative powers for individuals and society, al-Banna believed a new society required a new system of formal and informal education to nurture a new generation of Muslims committed to the cause. Once this was achieved, al-Banna believed the Muslim nation (*ummah*) would be restored to its lost power and glory (Rosen 2008). The significant emphasis al-Banna put on education is often overshadowed

⁶⁶ Although some activists had been channeling their *dakwah* efforts through non-political institutions, all movement members automatically became party members. Members who were not in agreement with the party as a manifestation of the movement, but rather the political wing of it, were excluded from the movement's membership (Machmudi 2006:73).

⁶⁷ While non-Muslims often associate *Shari'ah*, or Islamic law, with criminal laws and punishments, it encompasses laws regarding politics, economics, family life (marriage, divorce, adoption), human rights, sexuality, hygiene, and much more.

in the press and scholarly research by the political nature of Muslim Brotherhood groups. The importance of education and its power to effect change, however, is not lost on the Tarbiyah Movement (Machmudi 2008). *Tarbiyah* is Arabic for education.⁶⁸ From its conception, the Tarbiyah Movement has been involved in various activities related to its namesake. This can be observed in PKS' various formal and informal educational efforts, the most publicly visible and widespread being JSIT and its member schools.⁶⁹ Through its investigation of the JSIT school group, this dissertation provides a significant contribution to the body of research on the Muslim Brotherhood's transnational influence on Islamic schooling, of which there is currently a scarcity.

PKS views the Islamization of the country as a gradual process that will culminate in a call for the implementation of *Shari'ah* from the grassroots. There are, however, several groups in Indonesia who consider PKS to have a hidden agenda, believing that they will advance to political power through the democratic process but then unilaterally legislate *Shari'ah* on all citizens (Wahid 2009; Woodward et al. 2011; Woodward et al. 2012). While PKS has denied these allegations, it has also openly declared its commitment to the struggle of Islam, including applying *Shari'ah*. Yet, because it is a sensitive topic, the PKS has never clearly described what *Shari'ah* would look like in a democratic state. In addition to advocating for *Shari'ah* to be enforceable by law, the movement believes that Islamic laws must become part of the internal character and power of the individual cadre members.

⁶⁸ There are three Arabic words for "education." *Tarbiyah* refers to the idea of "development of individual potential and to the process of nurturing and guiding a child to a state of completeness or maturity" (Halstead 2004:522).

⁶⁹ In addition to integrated Islamic schools other educational efforts include: 1) Nurul Fikri college prep courses, which are used as recruitment purposes for Tarbiyah Movement campus groups; 2) after-school classes at mosques for children, and Friday sermons given during Friday prayer gatherings; and, 3) workshops, seminars, and frequent small and large private study circles for PKS cadre members.

Strong Islamic character is expected of all Muslims. This translates into highly popular anti-corruption and clean-government campaigning. The movement wishes to popularize *Shari'ah* by stressing its role in achieving the goals of prosperity and justice for all Indonesians (Machmudi 2008:191).

The party, fifteen years after its establishment, is at a crossroads. While it has done better than other Islamist parties, disappointing election results in 2009 signaled the party's need to change tactics to stay relevant and influential in politics. One group of cadre members is calling for the party to temper its original Islamist agenda in order to continue to be an active participant in the current political milieu. The other group favors remaining committed to the original platform (Woodward 2011b). Regardless of this internal conflict, though, the social institutions run by cadre members are not likely to be significantly affected by this political problem. While the party may ultimately need to change its party line for political participation, the social institutions run by PKS cadre members are likely to remain unaffected by the party's national levels of popularity, as there is sufficient local community support for the services that the institutions provide. This demonstrates how social institutions such as schools are able to promote the Muslim Brotherhood at the local level, affecting cultural and social aspects of society independently of formal political structures.

Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT)

As the Tarbiyah Movement did not initially have a coordinating leadership body, the first integrated Islamic schools (*Sekolah Islam Terpadu*, or SIT) developed organically through the individual initiatives of activists. Education graduates of Indonesian

universities who had joined the movement as students established many of the initial schools, beginning in 1994 (Chudleigh 2011). As parents dissatisfied with the schooling options in their communities, the activists often established integrated schools for their own children. As one founder, who now works at the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Jakarta, said, “We set up our own, made our own school...[and] our children became the guinea pigs” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, March 22, 2010). Proving themselves capable of providing a solid academic and religious education, the SITs gradually gained respect and popularity among their respective local communities; non-Tarbiyah Movement members also began to enroll their children. Eventually regional associations of SITs were created as support networks. In 2003, founders of initial schools, many of whom were involved in the establishment of PKS, formed the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (*Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu*, henceforth JSIT) to coordinate and facilitate the operation of the schools (Hasan 2009:10). This brought all PKS-linked SITs under one umbrella organization. Currently, all network member schools are expected to adhere to JSIT guidelines for integrating religious and secular knowledge and to follow the JSIT religion curriculum guidelines and competencies. There are, however, no standard textbooks for member schools to use. The schools are given latitude to be creative in how programs are run, but religious ideology is held constant.

Given the rigid and tightly centralized organization of PKS, the JSIT’s looser management of schools is a surprising feature of the network.⁷⁰ Not all schools are politically oriented, nor are all school leaders connected to PKS (Hefner 2009). However,

⁷⁰ While JSIT is a network and has less oversight of its members (*anggota*) than the Al Azhar franchise does with its branches (*cabang*), there is a consistent school ethos among members.



Luqman al Hakim SIT students during school-wide noon *sholat*

PKS leadership told me that most school leadership was connected to the party cadre. Network members uninterested in PKS politics are likely attracted to the network for the curricular guidance and general positive reputation of the name. It is possible that the looser network

allows a greater number of schools to be involved, thus strategically expanding the ethos and Islamic culture consistently promoted at JSIT schools.

The general public often refers to JSIT schools as “PKS schools.” It is illegal, however, for political parties to own businesses or social institutions. Therefore there are no structural or financial ties between SITs and PKS. While individuals may be working on boards of both PKS and integrated Islamic schools, the institutions are formally distinct and independent of each other. Ideologically, however, they are intrinsically intertwined, as they are both institutions run by Tarbiyah Movement activists-cum-PKS cadre, and both share a united vision of the role of, and approach to, Islamic education required for the Islamization of Indonesia.

The secretary of JSIT explained the formal relationship between the schools and the party:

A party may not have schools, but members who are in the party may have a school. So we [PKS members] do *dakwah* (religious propagation) of Islam, not the party’s propaganda, but preach Islam...We make a social institution based on private individuals, not the party. We build clinics, schools, foundations. (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009)

PKS cadre members feel a personal responsibility to conduct *dakwah* among the community through various social institutions. These social institutions are built around religious cultural frames that parallel the Tarbiyah Movement and, consequently, the PKS, thus creating a web of social and political institutions guided by a unified vision of an Islamized Indonesia.

It is important to note, however, that while the school has clear links through JSIT to PKS, during interviews with Luqman al Hakim SIT personnel, they were vague or dismissive about their relationships with the party. In interviews, when I asked administrators and teachers about a school's reputation as a "PKS school," personnel claimed no affiliation. When pushed, a respondent would comment that perhaps the reputation came from having so many parents who were PKS members, leaving untouched any reference to the teachers, administrators, or JSIT. The most direct comment came from a Luqman al-Hakim board member, also an active Muhammadiyah member, who explained, "We are actually not the PKS, although there may be similar tendencies in our methods of Islamic thinking" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, May 5, 2009).

Interestingly, parents and students freely volunteered information that the school or the teachers "were PKS."

In the first and only American publication on JSIT schools, Hefner (2009) reported that not all JSIT schools consider themselves to be politically motivated and are uncomfortable with explicitly mixing politics and education. On campus, I observed very little in the day-to-day activities that linked the school to PKS or promoted activism with the party, but it appears there was a more direct connection between the party and the school years earlier. While looking through the school's old photo albums, I found photos of

some schoolteachers I recognized participating in a PKS rally off campus. Judging by the quality of the photos, the rally had taken place several years prior. I marked these photos to be scanned by the school librarian—I was not allowed to remove the albums from the campus, but I was offered use of the library’s scanner. The librarian and I worked through the photo albums, scanning marked photos. Upon encountering the PKS rally photos, the librarian paused and then without explanation excused herself for a moment, disappearing out of the library with the photo album. When she returned, the photos had been removed from the album, and she informed me that they were not available. At some point, it seems the school had been open about and proud of their PKS affiliation; indeed, why else would photos of teachers participating at a rally be placed in a school photo album? The album was old enough that it had likely not been looked at for quite a while. The librarian did not seem surprised to see the photos, but she sensed an inappropriateness with them that required consultation. It was clear that the current school administration did not want any linkage to the party.

In the school personnel’s non-school lives, connections did exist. The house of a teacher I visited, for example, had a few PKS logo stickers on the front windows. When asking two women on the street for help in locating Ery’s house for our first interview, I mentioned his name and showed them the directions he had dictated to me over the phone. Looking at the directions, one said to the other, “Oh, the PKS guy,” when they realized who I was looking for. They then proceeded to give me directions to his house, which also sported a faded PKS sticker on one of the windows. Additionally, one of the other school founders was serving as the Chairman of the PKS Regional Leadership Council (*Dean Pen gurus Wilayah*) for Jogja at the time of my research.

I was perplexed by the hesitancy, or near refusal, of the Luqman al Hakim SIT personnel to acknowledge personal or institutional PKS affiliation particularly since at JSIT headquarters in Depok, leaders talked about it freely. I voiced my puzzlement to a JSIT headquarters official. He surmised:

It's related to the social and cultural factors in Jogja. In Jogjakarta, Muhammadiyah is very strong and they are jealous of the integrated Islamic schools [JSIT schools]...The chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsyuddin, said so directly...He said because of integrated Islamic schools, Muhammadiyah schools are short of students. Their number of pupils has reduced because people prefer integrated Islamic schools. So in Jogjakarta maybe you have to be careful. It deals with the market. I think this is a marketing strategy because once branded PKS, people will stay away. They like the PKS, but maybe they do not want to see a school that only belongs to a party. Schools must belong to everyone. Maybe that's why. (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009).

This comment confirms that, at least at JSIT headquarters, they consider the school to be linked to the party. It is possible, but unlikely given the close connection between headquarters and the schools, that headquarters was unaware of the school's disinterest in or lack of connection to PKS. Downplaying affiliation seems to not only be a marketing strategy as suggested, but also one of reputation management in a town dominated by Muhammadiyah. As mentioned previously, Muhammadiyah issued a decree in 2007 that, among other things, condemned Muhammadiyah member involvement with PKS. It also warned against supporting *dakwah* efforts (of which schools are easily included) by political parties, "such as Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)" (Muhammadiyah Central Board, Decree Number 149/KEP/I.0/B2006:Points 2 and 3). It is possible that previously open acknowledgement was reined in around the time tensions came to a head between Muhammadiyah and PKS.

Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School

Luqman al Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School can be considered representative of the political and religious ideals of JSIT, as it has a long history of collaborating with the founders of the network in the early years before the network was established. Additionally, Luqman al Hakim SIT is considered one of the network's model schools. The Luqman al Hakim SIT campus complex is an impressive compilation of two large three-story buildings, a mosque, and a few other smaller buildings nestled in a calm residential neighborhood of spacious modern homes in southern Jogjakarta. Although the founders started out with great hopes, they did not envision the school growing to its current size when they acquired land and began construction of the current facilities. This is evident in the cramped classrooms and the lack of open space for student recreational activities. The school compound centers around an open rectangular, concrete-tiled courtyard where morning ceremonies are held and children play during recess. The buildings around the perimeter of the courtyard consist of, starting at one end, a one-story building containing the front office, a small counseling room, an office for a vice headmaster, and three classrooms, perpendicular to a long three-story L-shaped building, and then a two-classroom long, three-story building. Next to this is the two-story mosque with a high-pitched roof, bringing the buildings full circle, as it is adjacent to the front office.

The entrance to the courtyard is accessed by passing between the mosque and the front office. The thick, white- and dark-green-painted buildings house classrooms, teachers' rooms, a library and multimedia room, a computer lab with 19 computers, an indoor gym, and a covered, open-air area directly below the gym on the ground floor. One of the large

pillars supporting the structure doubles as a newly-installed climbing wall. To one side of the courtyard is a washing station for students to prepare for *sholat* (daily required prayer); another washing station is located to one side of the mosque. As the mosque is not big enough to hold all 800-plus students and 70 teachers for group *sholat*, the upper-grade boys and male teachers pray in the mosque. Female teachers oversee the upper-grade girls, who pray in the gym, while the lower-grade boys and girls pray in the covered open area on the ground level. Each group conducts their *sholat* independent of each other. While the buildings are not air-conditioned, most rooms have a fan attached up high on one wall. The dim rooms are cramped with well-worn, dark brown wooden tables for either one or two students, and individual wooden chairs. The lower-grade classrooms each have an area rug for students to gather on in addition to desks similar to those in the upper-grade classrooms. The limited wall space displays student work.

Directly accessed from the street along the eastern perimeter of the property is another set of buildings. To one side of the compound entrance is a *Shari'ah* co-op bank operated by the Consortium. Teachers' salaries are deposited to their compulsory accounts, and parents are able to make school fee payments at the bank, as well as at the school's front office. To the south of the entrance is a store, owned by the foundation's Consortium, that sells snacks and basic school supplies to the students. Next to this is a simple daycare for teachers' infants and toddlers, a small office for the consortium's administrative needs, and a nurse's office for students and teachers.

School leadership consists of a headmaster and three vice-headmasters elected from among the teaching staff, by the staff, for three-year terms.⁷¹ Once their terms are over, the administrators return to teaching positions within the school if they are not re-elected for a second term. Men dominate leadership positions. At the time of this research, the school's first female vice-headmaster was serving her first term. While there are no official rules banning women from the position of headmaster, neither of the two female faculty members I asked, in different interviews, foresaw a woman becoming headmaster. The female vice-headmaster clarified that, given that the amount of additional time the position required outside of regular school hours would infringe upon the woman's time at home taking care of her children, women were not assigned to that role. In other words, a woman's priority was to grow the nation through the home as a mother, rather than through a high-level professional position at the school.

The school is managed by the Mulia Foundation Consortium (*Konsorsium Yayasan Mulia*), which oversees three daycare and preschool facilities, two of which also have kindergarten programs, the Luqman al Hakim elementary school, a junior high school, and a senior high school. Many of the Consortium's board members are mid-career individuals who were also part of the initial five activists that started Luqman al Hakim SIT. One is a business owner, another a psychology professor at a small state university as well as an

⁷¹ Leadership assignment is semi-democratic. Every three years, elections are held among the teachers and staff of the school for leadership positions. The Consortium provides a list of teachers from the school who meet specific requirements, such as being senior or a high-performing teacher. Teachers vote for five people from the approved list to become headmaster candidates. The top five then make presentations about their visions for their tenure. After a second vote by the teachers, the Consortium then selects the headmaster from the top three candidates. Once the headmaster has been selected, the Consortium presents a set of lists of candidates for the three vice-headmaster positions on which the school staff votes. The individuals who receive the most votes are then assigned one of three vice-headmaster positions.

active Muhammadiyah member, while another is the Chairman of the PKS Regional Leadership Council (*Dewan Pengurus Wilayah*) for the Jogja region.

Due to dissatisfaction with the schooling options in the community, the founders took matters into their own hands. From very humble beginnings in 1995 with only eight students and seven teachers, enrollment 14 years later in 2009 had grown to



Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six students at the computer lab

809 students with 70 teachers. Due to the outside community's incremental interest and confidence in the school, beginning in the 2003/04 school year, enrollment applications outnumbered available space and some applicants were declined admittance. In 2009, more than 80 students were turned away. The school is large, with six grades, and each grade comprised of four classes; previously, there had been 40 students in each class. However, a recent policy initiated for the 2006–07 school year reduced the maximum number of students to 32 per class. For the 2009–10 academic year's incoming students, costs⁷² included a monthly tuition fee of US\$29 (Rp 300,000), a one-time facilities fee of US\$392 (Rp 4,000,000), and a yearly activities fee of US\$65 (Rp 660,000).⁷³ This totals

⁷² The July 1, 2009 exchange rate was used to calculate the U.S. dollar amounts. July is the month in which the 2009–10 school year began. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest whole amount. The activities fee is Rp 60,000 per month, but is presented as an annual fee so to be comparable to the Al Azhar 31 school fee, which is charged one time each year. The school year is 11 months.

⁷³ In 2009, the average monthly income in the Yogyakarta Region was US\$118.85 (Rp 1,209,054) (PBS Statistics Indonesia 2011:31).

US\$776 for the first school year and US\$384 for the following school year.⁷⁴ While this annual tuition and fees is a third less expensive than Al Azhar 31, it is still prohibitively expensive for the majority of the population, given that the average monthly income in Jogja in 2009 was US\$119 (PBS Statistics Indonesia 2011:31).

Luqman al Hakim SIT lacks the professional polish of Al Azhar 31. The Al Azhar 31 complex is newer, with larger classrooms and more natural lighting as well as open outdoor space. Higher tuition and other fees certainly contribute to this difference in facilities. However, a marked difference can also be felt in the school leadership. At JSIT, the headmaster is a teacher, elected for a limited term. At Al Azhar, headmaster is a career position. Al Azhar 31's headmaster was a headmaster at two other campuses prior to starting her post in Jogjakarta when the school was founded. Her years of experience show in interactions with parents during meetings and events.

However, as at Luqman, Al Azhar 31's two vice headmasters were selected from among the school's teachers. These two women also carry a full load of teaching along with their administrative duties. The Luqman al Hakim headmaster lacks the public persona of a leader that comes with years of experience. Before becoming a religion teacher at Luqman al Hakim in 2001, and then vice-headmaster and finally headmaster in 2004 and 2007, he worked office jobs at a research center and an Islamic community finance center (*Baitul Maal wa Tamil*). At both schools, the headmasters were well respected by parents, staff, and teachers, and both administrations demonstrated high levels of dedication and attention towards their administrative responsibilities and students.

⁷⁴ As Luqman al Hakim SIT is the oldest, largest, and most well-known JSIT school in Jogja, its tuition is higher than any other JSIT school in the city.

The Universal in Exacting Islam

Like Al Azhar, JSIT schools are free from association with formal religious institutions, such as Muhammadiyah or NU, emboldening them to also claim that they teach a comprehensive, or universal, Islam.⁷⁵ JSIT leadership considers Islam to be larger than any religious organization. A Luqman al Hakim SIT founder and board member explained:

If we honestly look deeper into Islam, it's not about the issues of groups (*kelompok-kelompok*)... Islam shouldn't be trapped in something like that [debates about differences in rituals and practices] because [NU and Muhammadiyah] are merely organizations (*organisasi*)...It's unfortunate if we let ourselves become stuck there [in debates]. That's what we teach the children. Islam is complete (*utuh*), so comprehensive (*menyeluruh*). (Interview with Ery Masruri, April 8, 2009)

In classic Javanese reluctance and apology for any potentially critical comments, JSIT's regional director for the Jogjakarta region continued along the same lines when he reasoned:

Why can't schools that use the label of Islam [NU and Muhammadiyah schools]...demonstrate how to become a Muslim?... Because perhaps religious matters at Muhammadiyah or even NU, forgive me if I am mistaken, are limited to the organizations' specific views (*keMuhammadiyah dan keNUan*).... We don't think it's necessary to put forward an Islamic organization. We only put forward the values of Islam, the higher ones. (Interview with Jogja regional JSIT director, April 1, 2009)

The JSIT schools, apparently, view differences in group practices as a source of contention, as does Al Azhar.

Individuals not involved with JSIT schools independently suggested to me that the organization-free/universal Islam approach was a marketing strategy more than anything else. Given that in urban areas the population is more fluid, with people from different

⁷⁵ Although the JSIT is ideologically affiliated with the PKS and is run by PKS cadre members, the PKS is not a formal religious organization. However, their organization-specific practices and philosophies regarding religious life make it similar to a religious organization rather than a political party.

areas of the country moving in and out, a school can open up its consumer base by not claiming association with any particular religious group. These schools have become popular enough that, while it would be hard to prove, there may be truth to speculations that some non-JSIT Islamic schools were only in it for the business. These schools were, as the accusations go, calling themselves integrated Islamic schools and charging expensive tuition fees, but were not really teaching the students how to be true Muslims. Money, not the Islamic character of the students, was the management's priority.

While being organization-free may not have originally been a marketing strategy, it does have its advantages. One parent, a religion professor at the Islamic State University (UIN) in Jogja, admitted that he enrolled his son in an integrated Islamic school to prevent conflict with his rural, NU family members and friends:

I prefer to send my son to an integrated Islamic school because I don't have a choice. There is no NU school that has a good quality standard like I want...For me I prefer to send my children to an SIT rather than to Muhammadiyah because when I go to my village and my family there knew that my children were in a Muhammadiyah school, they would be very disappointed. But if I say that my children are in an integrated Islamic school, they don't know what an integrated school is because they [the schools] are only in cities. (Interview with UIN professor, February 2, 2010)

This parent's enrollment choice was strategic in two ways. It provided his son a quality education (secular and religious) and avoided the disappointment of his NU family members. His stated reason for not sending his son to a Muhammadiyah school did not include a concern over his son learning Muhammadiyah rather than NU traditions. In fact, the man's wife comes from a mixed background of both Muhammadiyah and NU traditions. Additionally, while he considers himself NU, he has quite pluralistic ideas about religion. He attributes these flexible attitudes towards Islam to having been exposed to multiple interpretations of the religion and forms of devotion through his academic studies as well

as international travel to Canada, where he received a PhD in religious studies at McGill University. An NU friend aware of the PKS connection to JSIT schools warned this father that he was going to have to expunge his son of the “exclusive attitudes” taught at the SITs once his child graduated. The motivations for, and risks parents take in, enrolling their children in schools that don’t completely match their own religious perspectives will be discussed in chapter 7.⁷⁶ Although his pluralistic attitudes regarding Islam are more in line with those of Al Azhar than JSIT schools, Al Azhar 31 was both too expensive and too far from this man’s home to be a viable schooling option.

Unhindered by organization-specific traditions, interpretations, and histories, JSIT views itself as positioned to teach students a purer form of Islam, the universally applicable Islam. The three interrelated components of JSIT’s conceptualization of a universal Islam are Qur’an and Hadith-based beliefs, standardized practices, and exacting adherence combine to create an exacting Islam.

Qur’an- and Hadith-based beliefs

Parallel to Al Azhar, JSIT validates itself as a non-partisan Islamic institution by confining their guiding religious texts to the Qur’an and Hadith, thus excluding historical and group specific texts and traditions. One of Luqman al Hakim’s three vice- headmasters explained:

So exactly why is there NU, Muhammadiyah? It’s actually just interpretation. It’s like this—the actual original source [of Islam] is one thing, the Qur’an and the Hadith. Then beneath that sometimes there are ways of understanding different concepts

⁷⁶ For a thorough discussion on the competing religious, educational, and political agendas of parents and SITs, see the unpublished 2011 master’s thesis by Benita K. Chudleigh (2011). *Educating for an Islamised Indonesia? Sekolah Islam Terpadu*, Asia-Pacific Studies, The Australian National University.

and they are followed by many people. We do not want to distinguish between NU and Muhammadiyah. We just focus on Islam according to Qur'an and Hadith. (Interview with a Luqman al Hakim vice-headmaster, October 5, 2009)

Rather than looking to an organization's historical interpretations of particular issues or practices, Luqman al Hakim simplifies its focus to these most sacred texts of Islam. This prevents confusion and corruption of principles and rituals.

That a significant amount of Luqman al Hakim SIT's weekly instruction time is devoted to the Qur'an demonstrates the school's commitment to it. Depending on the grade, students spend between 27–30% of their study hours each week on religious coursework (religion of Islam, reading and memorizing the Qur'an, and Arabic⁷⁷). Two-thirds of the religious curriculum centers on the Qur'an. Students spent four hours a week reading and memorizing the Qur'an. Grades one through three spent 21% of their weekly class time memorizing and learning to recite the Qur'an; grades four and five spent 17%, and grade six spent 15%. For grades one through five, more time was spent each week on the Qur'an than on any other single subject. In grade six, mathematics becomes the only class that students study for an equal number of hours as the Qur'an. Graduation requirements at JSIT schools include the memorization of two chapters of the Qur'an, as opposed to one chapter at Al Azhar schools.⁷⁸

This significant amount of time spent on the Qur'an is the one of the largest contributing factors to the length of JSIT school day, next to time spent performing *sholat*. General state schools in Indonesia release students at noon. Muhammadiyah schools go

⁷⁷ Since Arabic is the language in which the Qur'an is written, the purpose of studying Arabic is to become fluent in the language of the Qur'an. Arabic is generally considered part of the religious curriculum.

⁷⁸ Both schools require the 31st chapter of the Qur'an, and SITs require the 30th chapter. The selection of these chapters is strategic and pragmatic—these are the shortest chapters in the Qur'an.

until 1 p.m., due to their religious curriculum. Al Azhar extends the school-day hours until two in the afternoon.⁷⁹ SITs extend the school day until 4:00 in the afternoon, offering what they describe, in English, as “full-day schools.” Classes end at 3:30, and then students perform the afternoon *sholat* before starting after-school clubs and activities or returning home.

While Al Azhar and JSIT schools both highlight their use of the Qur’an and Hadith as part of their universal Islam, their use of it is different. Al Azhar focuses on the Qur’an and Hadith, the common denominator among all traditions, so as not to promote one variation or form of practice over another at the schools, thus honoring other practices, or at least refraining from claiming one set of practice to be better than another. In contrast, Luqman al Hakim claims loyalty to the Qur’an and Hadith in order to both discredit practices they see as having added to these foundational sources and to champion one standardized form of practices they claim comes directly from these sources.

Standardized practices

In line with the current transnational Islam trend, JSIT schools promote what Roy (2004) refers to as a “deculturalized” Islam. Transnational Islam is revivalist as well as purificationist, seeking to establish social and religious practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his close companions (Roy 2004). Consequently, the focus on the Qur’an and Hadith is intended to replace localized Islam with the original form of Islamic practices.

⁷⁹ Throughout Indonesia’s primary schools, the younger grades end the school day earlier than the upper grades. For the sake of simplicity during the discussion, the lower grades are not included. Consequently, these hours are for the upper grades.

A founder and board member of Luqman al Hakim SIT expounded upon the situation in Indonesia:

We know that Islam in Indonesia is contaminated by the culture or local customs (*adat*) that exist in Indonesia. So it seems some of Islam has become ambiguous or Islamic identity has become unclear among Muslims because the Islam of the Qur'an and Islam of local culture (*budaya lokal*) have been intermixed...Maybe we want to say we want to standardize (*menstandarisasikan*) a common and modern Islam, that's not too contaminated (*yang kontaminsasinya tidak terlalu banyak*)...if there are adjustments, they should be the peripheral (*cabang-cabang*), not the core (*utama*) of it. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, April 19, 2010)

In contrast to the pluralism of Al Azhar, which allows for local influence on forms of practice, JSIT schools' universal Islam aims to be free of context or custom. It strives to be the original form of Islam shedding layers of interpretations and regional contextualization. While this founder acknowledged that "contamination" of religion with the local culture is unavoidable, he argued that these schools aim to teach a purer form of Islam. A standardized Islam is an Islam that is uniform in core practice regardless of time, place, or organization. A "modern" Islam therefore indicates some kind of adaptation to the current era and location. Rather than a standardized, deculturalized approach, Al Azhar promotes a multi-tradition form of practice. In contrast, JSIT expects consistency in their specific forms of practice and standards regardless of context.

Ironically, as JSIT leaders decry the negative aspects of religious organizations, JSIT is institutionalizing their own specific form of worship through their schools. Indonesians often view JSIT-cum-PKS' very specific approach to Islam as if it is a distinct religious approach. In many professional and casual conversations alike, people discussed NU, Muhammadiyah, and the PKS as if they were equivalent categories, each with their own distinct way of practicing Islam. It seems that a main difference in JSIT leadership's minds is that they consider themselves to be implementing the higher, universal standards of

Islam, rather than locally contextualized, and thus contaminated, forms of Islam found in Indonesia's mainstream religious organizations. This paradox will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Exacting adherence

The plurality of practices honored in the flexible Islam of Al Azhar is replaced in JSIT by the conviction that a specific approach to Islam leads to the most devout development of believers and Muslim society. Devotional practices are taught and expected to be performed in a very particular manner. Turning to additional excerpts of the conversation presented at the beginning of the chapter, Ery, the school founder and Consortium Chairman, described this exacting approach. He used the phrase "integrated Islam" to refer to JSIT's approach to teaching Islam as well as their specific practice of religion:

So issues that are part of our fundamental bond with God, they become non-negotiable (*harga mati*). And maybe that's what's considered strict (*ketat*). Perhaps one could say Luqman al Hakim is fundamentalist (*fundamentalis*) in terms of bonds with God, very fundamentalist. For example, the issue of covering *aurat*, clothing. Later you can see it in our schools. For our students, because of the obligation provided by Islam that a woman (*seorang wanita*) should cover her *aurat* by wearing the *hijab*, that's a non-negotiable, with a variety of examinable benefits, social benefits, benefits of security (*keamanan*) for women, the glory of women, protection (*penjagaannya*), honor. The more women wear the *hijab*, the more they will be honored, free from the abuses of negative attitudes. It [veiling] is set in stone (*harga mati*). Maybe people will say integrated Islam is orthodox (*ortodoks*), integrated Islam is fundamental (*fundamental*). Because why? Because if there is a female student wearing clothing and then it reveals this (*dibuka ininya*) [pointing to his lower forearm], well, she'll get reprimanded. The small *hijab* is not allowed (*nggak boleh*). The *hijab* should cover this [indicating the chest]. (Interview with Ery Masruri, October 21, 2009)

According to Ery, not only is veiling required, but a very specific form of veiling, which includes a certain dress code for women and girls. He explicitly rejects the small *hijab* and long-sleeved tops that could accidentally expose the forearm. As he sees it, the ways in which one binds oneself to God cannot be negotiated; they are set in stone. This straightforward approach is connected to highly specific methods of performance and implementation. Those who regulate their behavior within these parameters become the recipients of particular desirable benefits, such as personal safety, as well as social honor from the larger society.

As Rinaldo (2008) purports, the PKS women's style of the *hijab* (Muslim dress) is not meant to express individual identities, but rather a particular pious habitus, and is stylistically different than that worn by most Indonesian women. The female PKS dress code is a loose *hijab* that drapes over the shoulder and down the front and back with loose tunics, long skirts, and heavy socks; they adorn themselves with little jewelry and or makeup, as they believe Islam prohibits too much

display. While there is a wide continuum of Islamic dress in Indonesia, the mainstream veiling practices and *busana Muslim* (mainstream Indonesian style of Islamic dress) include what Ery would consider a "small hijab"—a *hijab* that generally covers the hair, but does not always drape over the shoulders, nor does it fully extend below the chest. It is often



Luqman al Hakim SIT teachers outside main office with signs behind them directing visitors to dress appropriately and refrain from smoking

tucked in to the collar of the woman's blouse or tied and styled in such a way as to show the shape of the neck. Most Muslim women wearing the "small *hijab*" also wear a mix of Western and Islamic clothing, including pants, rather than only skirts. The PKS woman's distinct clothing practices mark the women as pious, but a different kind of piety than the "more interpretive versions of Islam, which allow for more flexibility in clothing practices" (Rinaldo 2008:32). Rinaldo continues to note that these clothing practices represent an orientation toward something new and different in Indonesia; they hearken to the Middle East, but do not fully imitate it.

School uniforms of female JSIT personnel fall in line with this PKS dress style. Among students, pants are not allowed except during gym class; however, the student *hijab* is not as long. Again, according to Rinaldo (2008), PKS dress codes for men are less distinguishable from other Indonesian men. However, at Luqman al Hakim and other SITs, unlike most Indonesian men, males often wear collarless shirts, pants hemmed above the ankle, a *peci*, or brimless, tight-fitting cap, and sport facial hair. This style is considered to be more in line with how the Prophet Mohammed dressed.

Ery did not consider all aspects of Islam taught at SITs to be so "strict" or "fundamental" as the dress code. Ery, in continuation of the opening conversation of this chapter, mentioned the school's open interactions with Westerners and non-Muslims as an example:

In other aspects we aren't [fundamental]—in terms of violence, in conjunction with non-Muslims. We are determined that our community service—such as once a year if there are disaster victims, we don't distinguish between Muslims, Christians. For example, Karen, as a non-Muslim woman, we welcomed you. Our children, I think, were not negative...They didn't reflect anti-non-Muslim attitudes. That's not fundamental, anti-Western, right? In fact, they're very open. But the things that are very principled, such as prayer, the basic forms of human devotion to God, that's

when we are very strict. But in terms of relationships with human beings, we're open. (Interview with Ery Masruri, October 21, 2009)

Ery distinguishes acts of devotion and social interactions as two distinct aspects of one's religious life that are regulated differently. Acts that demonstrate one's level of devotion to God, such as the performance of prayer or style of dress, are not open to variation. One's relationship with God requires strict observance to highly regulated activities they have determined to be Islamic, which often eliminate practices that other Muslims think of as Islamic, but that the JSIT perspective considers to be Indonesian. However, he believes interaction with others to not be so restricting. Individuals are free to interact with believers and non-believers. This openness was fortuitous for me, as a non-Muslim researcher.

However, *how* one interacts with others, in particular with the opposite sex, regardless of religious affiliation, is highly regimented at the schools. While both genders work together within the same school, social interaction is regulated and physical contact between men and women is restricted to blood relatives. Men and woman are not to be alone in the same room together. This became quite evident to me, as school protocol on my second visit required a male office assistant to join my interview with one of the male vice-headmasters, since the only available space was not in an open public space. While most teacher interviews took place in the small library where other staff members were perennially present, on one rainy afternoon several months into my research at the school, I interviewed a male teacher alone. We sat on the floor of a small second-floor office with the door intentionally left wide open, as if inviting public view to be the third participant. For students, male–female interactions are taught through both curricular content

discussed within the classrooms as well as through school policy. Male and female students are segregated into their own classrooms beginning at grade four, the grade during which some children enter puberty. However, when classes are small, such as Saturday morning study sessions or some classes at Abu Bakar Junior High, practicality calls for gender mixed classes.

In day-to-day interactions of faculty and staff, men and women do not shake hands or make any kind of physical contact. Eye contact between men and women is often avoided or infrequent. As a woman conducting my research with male informants at the school, communication was often strained, as these men distanced themselves from me physically, made inconsistent eye contact, and were reluctant to socialize with me. If standing while talking, men would often stand to my side with a gap between us, rather than standing directly in front of me. Female teachers, though, were generally quite friendly with me.

In many conversations I observed among the Luqman al Hakim SIT staff, there was little eye contact between the two genders. While male and female teachers did show warmth towards each other, I never observed physical contact between the genders. During meetings, men and women grouped themselves and sat with a distance between the groups, even if it was a small gathering around a single table. Being consistent with this standard, the Minister of Information, Communications and Technology, a PKS member, has been quite vocal regarding appropriate male–female interactions—so much so that he was heavily mocked, via posts on social networking sites, when he was unintentionally filmed clasping Michelle Obama’s hand as she and President Obama were visiting dignitaries during their visit to Indonesia in 2010 (Jakarta Post 2010). Although he tweeted

that Mrs. Obama had thrust her hand in his and he had had no choice but to shake her hand, a simple viewing of the short clip suggests otherwise.

Modern technologies seem to be acceptable tools to mediate this physical restriction on male–female interactions. Dating, or men and women spending time together alone before marriage, is considered inappropriate. Generally, a couple is to have chaperoned visits, and if there seems to be a connection, a wedding is arranged, often within a few months. One of the female office staff had told me about the matchmaking agency she had signed up with to facilitate this process of not only finding a possible match, but also providing chaperoning services. While physical interactions are restricted, texting each other, at least as a sixth-grade male teacher explained it to me, was completely acceptable. Texting is the most common form of cell phone communication in Indonesia, as calling is extremely expensive.

Social networking sites are also in use. In the above-mentioned interview during which an additional staff member was asked to join us in the secluded room, for example, the vice-headmaster casually commented on looking at my Facebook profile. He inquired if the location of a particular hiking trip of which I had posted photos had been in the United States. In another instance, a male teacher who wished to give me a book of compiled talks, one of which discussed SIT's teaching philosophies, offered to pass it along to me at a local mall, as he did not teach at the school on a daily basis. We arranged the meeting via text messages. To my surprise and initial confusion, after greeting me at the mall, he congratulated me on having won a BMW. Apparently, from what I understood, he had googled my name and found an announcement about a Karen Bryner winning a car for

having the highest sales at her company.⁸⁰ These men's unabashed use of the Internet to gather personal information on me felt inconsistent with their rigid maintenance of physical distance and interaction as we talked. The use of technology, it seems, is an appropriate way to communicate with, and find information about, the opposite sex.

In contrast, at the Al Azhar 31, ways of wearing the veil and male–female interactions are not restricted. The children are not separated into classes, and mixed-gender groups are a part of in-class activities. While some male teachers did not opt to shake my hand, it was due to personal choice rather than school-wide practice. One-on-one interviews with male teachers were not considered objectionable, and male and female teachers alike were social and friendly with me. During meetings, men and women often grouped themselves, but it seemed to be not out of a sense of propriety as much as simply common practice.

The Paradox of Universal and Exacting Islam

The universal Islam Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes is expected to have the potential to bless all of humanity and requires an exacting and disciplined practice. The public often perceives this exacting and mono-traditional practice of Islam to be exclusive,⁸¹ a label that JSIT leadership does not welcome. This exclusivity is often discussed in terms of attitudes of superiority towards other Islamic traditions and well as other religions. In our final interview, I asked Ery about the school's reputation for being exclusive. He responded:

⁸⁰ After our conversation, I returned home and googled my name. I found a Karen Bryner in Missouri who had managed a BMW Championship Gold Tournament in 2008.

⁸¹ Al Azhar 31 is also often labeled as exclusive, but in the economic rather than ideological sense, to which the leadership does not object.

When an institution has strong character, certainly people on the outside will see the institution as exclusive. But when they enter it, they will see that it is not exclusive. I think Miss Karen could confirm this. Miss Karen, how did you find us? Would you assess us as exclusive? (Interview with Ery Masruri, May 5, 2010)

After agreeing that people had been open with me, I hesitantly and with a bit of trepidation also replied that, in all honesty, at times I had felt alien, and while teachers and staff had perhaps not been suspicious of me (which I actually felt many had been, but in following Javanese custom did not say it directly), several had been hesitant to talk with me. He responded that it was only natural, given I was a foreigner and a researcher, that I should receive a lot of attention and that people be curious as to why I was there. But he then assured me that after the novelty of a foreigner had worn off, certainly their hesitations had subsided and interactions were not strained. I however, did not feel that way.

To clarify, the many female teachers (most male teachers avoided informal conversation out propriety) were warm and welcoming towards me. I was invited by a few different teachers to participate in social activities. I spent an enjoyable Saturday afternoon with a married couple, both of whom taught at the school, and their children. My research assistant and I were invited several times to the home of a teacher who lived near the beach; unfortunately, timing prevented us from accepting the invitations. The male English teacher shared with me a magazine geared towards introducing children to English that he was in the last stages of finalizing before releasing the first edition. He invited me to be a guest in the correspondence section. Additionally, Ery and all but one foundation board member were unguarded and open with me, a couple accommodated several interviews, and always did what they could to facilitate my research. However, interactions with the school administration were often vaguely strained and many teachers kept their distance.

Although the administration cooperated with me, there was often a sense of wariness. Certainly as a researcher, I was an imposition, requiring their time for interviews as well as time to schedule interviews with teachers and classroom observations. At the school, I felt restricted in my contact with teachers and my movement throughout the school. In contrast to Al Azhar 31 where I was allowed to approach the teachers for interviews and classroom observations, the Luqman al Hakim SIT administration managed the logistics. Additionally, during structured group interviews with grade-four and -six students, the administration, after approving a revised list of interview questions, required a teacher to be present during interviews. These may have been standard protocol procedures for researchers; however, I often felt an underlying sense of caution towards me as well.

The presence of a researcher at Luqman al Hakim SIT was common. I was once shown the guestbook cataloging previous researchers and their projects. Numerous Indonesian university students (nationwide, a senior thesis often based on original research is an undergraduate graduation requirement) and a few other foreigners (for example, a master's student from Japan looking at child health) had come before me. However, these research projects were most commonly conducting one-time parent surveys, faculty interviews, or a few weeks of observations. I, in contrast, given my anthropological research methods for an extensive doctoral study, was the first researcher to stay over a five-month period. I had hoped that over time my relationships with the administration would become less formal. Once in a while there would be a casual conversation, but most interactions were administrative in nature.

In fairness, aside from being an imposition on the time of the administration, the ambiguity towards me that I sensed from them could have been in part due to their lack of information regarding my research. Not until the last month of my time at the school did it come to my attention that the vice-headmasters had never seen the research project description and plan I had submitted to the headmaster when I first came to the school. The headmaster was regularly busy with duties outside of the school. Consequently, the vice-headmasters, who were not present in my first meeting with the headmaster, were asked to work with me and accommodate my requests without, it seems, a full explanation of my research or timeframe. After presenting the vice-headmasters with my proposal, we created a plan for my remaining time for the completion of my data collection. Once the plan was approved and in place, the strain with the administration lessened. When I started concentrated interviews with teachers in the last month of my time, I was not required to submit my interview questions for approval, as was common procedure.

However, as much as I wished I could have interpreted the general sense of wariness from the administration and some teachers as shyness or curiosity, I hesitantly conveyed to Ery that my initial feelings had not fully dissipated during my time there. Additionally, those feelings were not isolated to just me, a foreigner. I relayed the experience of my research assistant, a Muslim woman from East Java working on her master's degree, whom Ery had met previously. During her first visit to the school, she had also felt a bit alien and perceived school personnel to not been as polite (a huge Javanese offense) as she had expected. I also mentioned to Ery that she had thought this treatment

was possibly due to her wearing of a smaller headscarf.⁸² In response, he forthrightly asserted that:

When we enter into a community or society that should be equal to ours but it turns out to hold to a higher ethical standard (*standar etika yang lebih tinggi*), we feel guilty (*bersalah*) there. Automatically, we feel like we are being watched, whereas as the people in the community are not watching us, even though we feel like they are. (Interview with Ery Masruri, May 5, 2010)

Ery argued that an individual's sense of acceptance is negatively affected when one encounters a community with "higher ethical standards" or that is morally superior to her own. This reasoning assumes that an individual entering the community would automatically recognize the community's value system, or piety, as "better," not simply different. In other words, Ery viewed the standards at Luqman al Hakim SIT to be normative, rather than relative. There was no consideration that the individual may feel completely comfortable with her standards, yet simultaneously uncomfortable with simply encountering something unfamiliar or different. Holding people to a higher standard runs the risk of appearing exclusive to others. The above incident highlights the complex relationship between maintaining "higher ethical standards" and providing a welcoming atmosphere to people who do not appear to adhere to or share those standards.

Ery outlined how Luqman al Hakim SIT is not exclusive:

If there are people who feel the school is exclusive, it's because they don't know it [the school] yet. From the aspect of politics or political background, we have nearly all the leading parties here... So from the aspect of political parties, we are not exclusive. From the aspect of individual character, we are also not exclusive because it can be seen that there are those [parents] that probably only perform 20% of Islamic laws (*hukum Islam*). There are others that do 10%, 50%, 70%; everybody

⁸² Her experience was so uncomfortable that she did not want to return to the school. So when I requested that she pick up some data a few months after her initial visit, she brought along a friend—another young, similarly veiled Muslim woman with an NU background. This second woman relayed to me that although she had been skeptical of the reality of her friend's discomfort and perceived treatment by the school staff, she too had felt judged and uncomfortable during her brief stop at the school.

comes here. There are those who wear the *hijab*; there are those that don't. (Interview with Ery Masruri, May 5, 2010)

Regarding school membership, Luqman al Hakim SIT does welcome Muslims from all political and religious affiliations and levels of devotion. This argument echoes Ery's previous line of reasoning that the school is not fundamental in that it does not forbid interactions with non-Muslims.

There is an unacknowledged difference, however, between accepting enrollment of individuals who hold to different religious and political backgrounds (and granting permission to a non-Muslim to conduct research) and teaching a higher standard that does not equally value those various forms of practices and beliefs. Although parents may "only perform 20% of Islamic law," students are taught and expected to perform 100%. Although Ery assured me I could observe women at school picking up students or attending events who did not veil, during my five months of regular visits to the school, I never once observed an unveiled woman. I myself was requested to veil and dress appropriately after my first visit.⁸³ There is a sign at the entrance of the Luqman al Hakim school courtyard which reminds visitors to "Please dress appropriately (*Harp sesuaikan pakaian Anda*)." It is implied that dressing appropriately for women is veiling and fully covering their arms and legs. Below this sign is another reminding guests that the area is a "non-smoking area (*kawasan bebas rokok*)." JSIT leadership teaches students not to smoke and forbids faculty from smoking, and expects the same of its guests.

⁸³ On my first visit, I was not asked to veil. But once I was approved to conduct my research at the school, I was requested to veil and dress appropriately as I was going to be seen on the campus regularly and visiting classrooms.

From the perspective of some parents, it can easily be argued that there is institutional pressure on students and parents to conform to these “higher standards.” One mother, a Muhammadiyah female activist who had enrolled her son in the school upon her return with her family after completing a master’s degree in Australia, was unaware of the school’s approach to Islam at the time of enrollment. She eventually became concerned with the influence of the school on her son due to comments he began making at home. She disapproved of, among other things, the school’s “exclusive manner”, which she described through the following comment.

For example the way they...take clothing. [They say,] “Islamic dress can’t be like this. The most Islamic way to dress isn’t like that.” I mean, you can’t say *this* is the most Islamic way [to dress], [meaning] the way they dress. (Interview with former Luqman al Hakim SIT mother and Muhammadiyah activist, February 9, 2010).

This mother disagreed with teachings on distinguishing between Islamic and un-Islamic practices. An interesting discussion arises as to why, if parents disagree with some of the school’s teaching, they do not enroll their children in other schools. This will be explored in chapter 7.

Another mother’s experience with the school’s influence on her personal journey with veiling illustrates how some mothers perceived the school’s expectations to be less flexible than Ery explained. While this experience appears to have been much less common among mothers, it does demonstrate the pressure one can feel to conform to school standards. A mother of three relayed that she only began veiling because:

It’s obligatory to veil if you want to meet with the teacher, to get the report cards and so on. Or if I met the teacher on the street, I’d be uncomfortable not wearing the *hijab*... so when at school I would veil, but outside of the school I wouldn’t. Then I thought, why bother?... So finally, I just started wearing it all of the time. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 23, 2009)

This mother admitted, after confirming I would not share the information with the school, that her primary interest in the school had not been religion, but rather the individualized attention her children would receive from the teachers. Her oldest child's negative experience with teachers in state general schools motivated her to find a different schooling option for her two younger children. Although she did not feel more religious after veiling daily for two years, she did, in accordance with Ery's claim of personal benefits to veiling for women, feel safer on the streets because men did not bother her like they had when she did not veil. At first her husband, who lives in another city, objected to her veiling, but seeing the benefits had since accepted her practice. However, he expressly told her he did not want her to wear a large *hijab*.

While the school expects women to veil, and PKS activists and JSIT teachers veil in a very specific style (Rinaldo 2008), the school does not attempt to enforce this specific style on the mothers and female visitors. Although I never observed a mother unveiled, the majority of the veils were "small," and in general, mothers wore pants rather than skirts. There were actually very few mothers who veiled in the same style as the teachers. I never detected a sense of discomfort among the mothers for veiling differently than the female staff. Perhaps, as Ery said in reference to my research assistant's uncomfortable experience, this woman had come to know the school and did not feel uncomfortable or consider it to be an exclusive place even though they implemented what Ery perceived to be a lower standard of veiling.

Concerns of exclusivity regarding JSIT schools from non-JSIT communities also extended to attitudes towards other religions. In a few conversations I had with different Indonesian scholars, I was asked about anti-Christian attitudes. They wondered, since they

perceived PKS to be exclusive and anti-Christian, if I had seen any of such sentiments at the PKS-linked school. I never experienced or witnessed any anti-Christian activities or attitudes. However, on a smaller scale, I did observe and experience two forms of exclusive thought towards Christianity and other religions through “superiority discourse” (Niyozov & Memon 2011), which favored Muslims over followers of other religions.

During student interviews, I witnessed one instance and was told of another where teachers made direct hierarchical distinctions between Muslims and Christians and Islam and other religions. In a structured interview with grade-four students, I had asked the question, “In your opinion, can a non-Muslim be a good person?” As other students were answering, the chaperoning teacher, sitting one student away from me, spoke into the ear of the student next to him, saying, “But Muslims are better.” The boy slightly uncomfortably replied when it was his turn to respond, “But the best are Muslims (*Tapi yang terbaik yang Muslim*)” (Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boys, December 3, 2009). In another interview with grade-six girls, a student expressed why she wanted to attend a state junior secondary school upon graduating from Luqman al Hakim SIT. In her opinion, the school was “way too Islamic; other [religions] are less important. Other religions are, like, looked down on (*terlalu Islam sekali jadi yang lain agak di bawah. Agama yang lain itu kayak direndahkan*)” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009). While these types of attitudes were not regularly expressed in my presence, they do indicate a presence at some level.

This section demonstrates how encouraging observance of higher standards runs the risk of appearing exclusive or promoting superiority discourses towards “others”, be it other forms within a religion or other religions. The vision of Luqman al Hakim SIT and

JSIT leaders to “give birth” to a new kind of school that promotes a more “strict” Islam challenges the status quo. Consequently, resistance and accusations of exclusivity are to be expected. As those unfamiliar with the schools come to know them, as Ery suggests, they will be able to make more informed assessments.

Conclusion

As opposed to Al Azhar’s vision of managing a peaceful society through respect of various forms of Islam, JSIT intends to create a new type of believer that will in turn bring about a more pious society and great blessings to the country. Echoing Maududi’s argument that the pious family units in society create a Muslim *ummah* in the midst of colonial powers, the JSIT intends to contribute to PKS’ plan to comprehensively transform corrupt and secular Indonesia into a pious Muslim nation by giving birth to a new educational institution teaching universal Islamic practices. JSIT’s conceptualization of universal Islam is comprised of three components, namely Qur’an and Hadith-based beliefs, standardized practices, and exacting adherence. These interrelated components come together to create an exacting Islam. Qur’an and Hadith-based beliefs allow the schools to stay free of local religious organizations’ practices. This also enables the promotion of the original form of Islam as explained in the Qur’an and Hadith, shedding layers of interpretation and regional contextualization. Based on the Qur’an and Hadith, Islam can be standardized, uniform in core practice, regardless of time, place, or organization. These standardized devotional practices are taught and expected to be performed in a very particular manner. The ways in which one binds oneself to God cannot be negotiated. The promotion of exacting adherence comes from the leadership’s conviction that a specific

approach to Islam leads to the highest levels of personal development of believers and of society.

While the schools welcome all types of individuals from various political and religious backgrounds, they simultaneously expect personnel, students, and ideally community members to live the “higher standards” they promote. These higher standards (specific ways to dress, regulated ways of interaction with the opposite sex, or memorizing significant portions of the Qur’an, for example) are ways to bind individuals to God. JSIT, as demonstrated through Luqman al Hakim SIT, hopes Muslims will strive to become a particular brand of believers who demonstrate devotion through disciplined observance of Islam.

While both Al Azhar and JSIT make similar claims to promote universal Islam, they promote different kinds of universal Islam for different purposes and with different aims. Both claim to be organization-free and focus solely on the Qur’an and Hadith as sources of doctrine. At Al Azhar, that serves to create a common base and sponsors an attitude that honors multiple traditions, showing no preference of one group’s forms of ritual and practice over another. The school group teaches a foundation in general Islamic values and basic duties and practices that can be adapted to a variety of contexts and accommodate multi-tradition practices. For JSIT, being universal and organization-free means they intend to be free of specific local cultural practices, and expect consistency in their standardized mono-traditional practices and standards regardless time or space. Ironically, by being so specific in how Islam is to be practiced, JSIT schools are institutionalizing a form of practice. This form of practice is in line with PKS ideology and therefore, the JSIT schools are part of the ongoing process of institutionalizing PKS’s Islamic practices.

I argue that the Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT piety projects offer disparate versions of universal Islam, particularly in their varying approaches to interpretation of theology and attitudes towards women, local culture, mysticism and possibly other religions. These opposing versions have significant ramifications for middle class subjectivities, gender relations, religious tolerance, and national politics. In the next chapter I demonstrate how each school's approach to Islam influences particular religious subjectivities among its students, particularly in conceptualizations of piety and what a good Muslim looks like.

Chapter 5

Students' Trajectories in Religious Subjectivities

I first learned of Michael Jackson's death as I perused *The Jakarta Post* while waiting to be ushered in for an interview. I do not know how his death affected elementary school children in the United States, but those at Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT seemed to have Michael Jackson on the brain. Many of the students were far more familiar with his music than I was—and I was in grade five when *Thriller* was released. One morning at Al Azhar 31, when fielding questions in a grade-three class, I was asked about Michael Jackson and somehow ended up demonstrating the moonwalk. At Luqman al Hakim, a large group of grade-three boys spontaneously pulled me into singing “Heal the World” in the middle of the crowded courtyard during recess. A grade-six girl was easily encouraged by her friends to sing her repertoire of Michael Jackson songs as we rode in a rented bus through rural dirt roads to a village where the students would witness the donation and slaughter of two cows and three sheep, provided by parents from the school, to poor villagers as part of Eid al-Adha.⁸⁴ One day after the daily school-wide *sholat*, as teachers and students were putting away their prayer shawls and heading to back to classrooms to eat lunch, two younger girls shyly approached me and asked, “Miss, what does ‘Just beat it’ mean?” I remain perplexed at the familiarity these students had with the “King of Pop.” However, the seamless movement between participating in religious and mundane activities demonstrates how religion is as common in their lives as pop culture, and neither are mutually exclusive.

⁸⁴ Eid al-Adha is a holiday that celebrates the obedience of Abraham for his willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael, before an angel intervened and provided a sheep for the sacrifice. It is customary for those who have the resources to donate animals to poor communities who ceremonially slaughter the animals and then distribute the meat among the community.

Students from both schools were fully immersed in the mainstream urban Indonesian pop culture and lifestyle. They played video games after school, went to the mall with their families and to the movies if they could afford it. Many had cell phones—a few had BlackBerries—and Facebook accounts. Several students' Facebook profile pictures were of American pop stars, Disney cartoon princesses, or Japanese anime characters. Some students were verging on the childhood obesity that comes with the more sedentary lives and diets of urban consumerism. While versed in pop culture, the schooling experiences of the extended-day Islamic school students varied greatly from their state-schooled peers, as well as other Islamic school students, due to the unique integrated Islam ideology of the schools (see chapter 6). While I did not observe or detect differences between Al Azhar and Luqman al Hakim SIT students' engagement with pop culture, there were some noticeable differences in their religious subjectivities. These findings supports Mahmood's (2004) argument that within a particular movement, variation in personal piety develop out of "specific discursive formation" (120).

This chapter explores the relationships between forms of schooling and forms of religious subjectivity. McLeod (2000), employing Bourdieu's notions of "habitus" and "field," argues that schools can be seen as "paradigmatic social fields...in which practices, discourses and ethos of particular kinds of schooling shape the dispositions and ways of being of young people" (503). Bourdieu viewed learned dispositions, which he calls *habitus*, to be "a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks" (quoted in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:18). Habitus is not simply an understanding of the rules, but a

dynamic sense of how to play the game (Erickson 2011:30). Consequently, dispositions learned in school are applied to an array of settings outside of the institution. In application to this chapter, the varied forms of schooling seen at Al Azhar 31 (a more flexible Islam, focusing on the essence of the religion balanced with some basic principles so as to accommodate multi-tradition practices of Islam) and Luqman al Hakim SIT (an exacting Islam that values mono-tradition practices, focusing on specific and more “correct” forms of practice that are not negotiable regardless of time or space) begin to shape varied forms of student subjectivities and set them in disparate trajectories for their full development. However, the process of developing subjectivity is not only acceptance of, but also reaction to, a school’s “practices, discourses and ethos” (McLeod 2000:503).

Acknowledging that subjectivity and habitus are formed and solidified over time (McLeod 2000), this chapter does not offer an in-depth discussion of the students’ habitus, but rather a synchronic gaze into the religious inclinations these schools are shaping within their students. To explore students’ religious subjectivities, I look at the prominence of religion in considerations of future education and career aspirations, as well as students’ conceptualizations of a “good Muslim” and their moral subjectivity. I argue that these religious subjectivities of the students correlate with their schools’ unique approaches to Islam.

Methods

The data used to explore how the schools shape student subjectivities comes from structured small-group interviews with students. Interviews were conducted at each school by gender and grade. Thirty-three Al Azhar 31 students (18 male and 15 female

grade-four students) and 46 Luqman al Hakim SIT students (20 male—8 grade-four and 12 grade-six boys—and 26 female—13 grade-four and 13 grade-six girls) participated. At the time of this research, grade four was the most senior grade at Al Azhar 31; therefore, there were no grade-six students to be interviewed. Within the analysis, age-related differences in responses that emerged are discussed when appropriate. Some students did not respond to every question; therefore, in the following sections the total numbers of respondents to each of the questions are not equivalent.

I interviewed Al-Azhar students, pulled out of their computer class in groups of three to five, in an open, quiet, sunlit workspace outside of the computer lab. No school personnel were present during the interviews. The students may have conformed to a dominant personality in the group, but given the multiple group interviews (five for girls and six for boys), there was opportunity for different opinions to surface across groups.

The Luqman al Hakim SIT interviews were conducted during recess in the small, poorly-lit school counselor's office, the office wall providing little barrier to the loud sounds of children taking advantage of their time to move around and socialize. For the majority of the interviews, a teacher or administrator was present, per the request of the school administration. These interviews were conducted in groups of six to eight students. I recognize that students may have felt pressure to conform to the opinions of their peers, or felt shy about expressing their own opinions due to the size of the group. Additionally, the presence of the teacher could have influenced the response of the students. However, if this is the case, it contributes to the observation that the Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes heavy emphasis on conformity.

This chapter begins with a review of student responses to the following four questions:

- Where do you want to attend junior high school?
- What do you want to be when you grow up?
- What is a good Muslim like?
- Do you agree (*setuju*) with a woman (*prempuan*) leaving the house unveiled?

A review of student responses to these questions provides material for discussing the correlation between the type of Islam taught at each school and the religious inclinations of their respective students. Students' responses to questions regarding future education and professions indicate that while some students from both schools desire a continued religious education, none of them aspire to religion-oriented careers for themselves. Greater difference between schools was demonstrated by students' conceptualizations of piety, or what being a good Muslim looks like, and student tolerance and acceptance of a deviant religious behavior, as exemplified through a woman not veiling when in public.

Secondary school preference


To understand the prominence of religion in future schooling selection, I asked students where they planned to attend junior high school. In Jogja, the options for Islamic schools included Muhammadiyah secondary schools, vocational track madrasas, various pesantren, and Abu Bakar Integrated Islamic Junior and Senior Secondary School (known hereafter as Abu Bakar SIT). Luqman al Hakim SIT founders established Abu Bakar SIT Junior High School in 2001 for Luqman al Hakim SIT students matriculating to the junior secondary school level. At the time of the research, Al Azhar 31 administration was talking of establishing a junior secondary school in 2012 for the first class of Al Azhar 31 students

matriculating to the junior high school level.⁸⁵ The provision of solid academics in an Islamic school, as offered at Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT, is less common at the secondary level. The dual attraction for parents (see chapter 7) to these two primary schools was that they provided students with a strong foundation in the rituals and values of Islam as well as a solid academic background for the rest of their schooling trajectory, ending in, ideally, acceptance to top public or private universities. Islamic secondary schools, in general, do not rival state secondary schools in the way they do at the primary level. Therefore, parents and students are brought to a crossroads and must decide between high academic quality and continued religious schooling. The following discussion focuses first on grade-six students at Luqman al Hakim SIT, as their attendance in junior high was imminent, and then focuses on the grade-four student responses from both schools. (See Figures 2, 3, and 4 for school preference by grade and school.)

Somewhat unexpectedly, only about a third of grade-six Luqman al Hakim SIT students (nine out of 26, six of whom were boys) wanted to continue their education at an Islamic school. Six of those nine students wanted to continue on to Abu Bakar SIT. The others wanted to go to a

pesantren, or an Islamic boarding school, mostly to join an older sibling already in attendance there. There was a large gender difference in where students wanted to go: 50% of boys wanted to attend a religious school while only 21% of girls wanted the same. The boys were interested in an Islamic junior secondary school so as to “deepen their

Figure 2. Luqman SIT 6th-Graders' Junior High School Preference, by Type



Note: N=26

⁸⁵ In 2012, Al Azhar 26, a junior secondary school, opened in Jogjakarta.

religion” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, December 4, 2009). One of two girls who wanted to attend Abu Bakar commented, “I want to go to [Abu Bakar]. If my score is good enough, I could go to a state school. [But] at Abu Bakar I could continue to improve my Arabic and religion could become clearer...later if I meet Arab foreigners, I’d be able to speak Arabic with them” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009).


Nearly two-thirds of the grade-six students interviewed indicated that they hoped to transfer to a state general secondary school. These students were ready to forgo their Islamic schooling experience for continued academic development and new social experiences. More girls (79%) than boys (42%) were interested in state schools (11 girls and five boys). One student remained undecided.

Reasons for choosing a state school clustered by gender. Boys focused on academic excellence while girls placed more of an emphasis on the social experience. Many of the boys mentioned specific schools by name, stating they were “better” and “the best (*favorit*) in the city.” As one group of girls struggled to find the right way to express their motivations, a student finally explained their general sentiment, “Education at the state schools is more social (*lebih mengarah ke sosial*). At [Luqman al Hakim SIT] it’s way too Islamic, so others are less important. Other religions are, like, looked down on (*terlalu Islam sekali jadi yang lain agak di bawah, agama yang lain itu kayak direndahkan*). So we want to go to a state junior secondary school because we want to see what it’s like socially (*ingin melihat sosialnya bagaimana*)” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009).

This group of girls was looking for a less Islam-centric approach to schooling as well as the social life they consider state schooling afforded. While it is unclear exactly what they meant by “more social,” co-ed classrooms and less restricted association with the opposite sex are a likely a part of it. However, continuing on to Abu Bakar may be a reality for some despite their preference. As one girl put it, “The thing is that I’ve become bored at SIT. But it depends on my score. If my score is low, well, I’ll be at another SIT” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009). While not her first choice, Abu Bakar was her backup plan.


Grade-six students showed a less varied interest in junior secondary school selection and less loyalty to their current schooling institutions than grade-four students at both schools. Over a third of Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four students expressed interest in continuing to Abu Bakar SIT or a pesantren while slightly more Al Azhar 31 students were interested in attending an Islamic school, preferably an Al Azhar junior secondary school if one were to be built. Fewer Al Azhar 31 students (15%) were interested in attending state schools than their grade-four Luqman al Hakim SIT peers (30%). Nearly double the percentage of Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six students (59%) wanted to shift to a state school compared to the school’s grade-four students (30%).

Figure 3. Luqman SIT 4th-Graders’ Junior High School Preference, by Type



Note: N=20

Figure 4. Al Azhar 31 4th-Graders’ Junior High School Preference, by Type



Note: N=33

This large difference could indicate that older students may be more focused on academic excellence than younger students, and therefore focus on state schools. It could also be that the grade-six students are more drawn to social settings or a learning environment different than those found at Luqman al Hakim SIT or Abu Bakar SIT. Over a third of the grade-four students from both schools were undecided. The academic reputation of Al Azhar junior secondary schools in Jakarta as some of the capital's top schools may give confidence to Al Azhar students and parents in regards to attending the proposed Al Azhar junior high in Jogja. In contrast, Abu Bakar SIT does not compete with the state schools in Jogja for top ranking; this may explain Luqman la Hakim SIT students' greater interest in transferring to the state school system.

As explained in the previous chapters, the Islamic training of these students is the value-added aspect of these schools for most parents, not necessarily the primary attraction of the school. Most parents (see chapter 7) expected a religious education at the primary level to form a solid moral foundation that would serve their children through their lives. Satisfied with their children's religious education at the primary level, parents aspired to have their children attend top academic schools, even if it meant moving to a non-religious school. As long-term academic training is necessary for productive participation in the work force, academic training is not to be sacrificed for Islamic training. Most parents opt for top state schools when comparable Islamic schools are not available, such as the case in Jogja. However, for those students who do not qualify for the top state schools, the private Islamic system may be the backup plan.

While one might expect secondary school choice to be primarily a parent's decision, students seemed to be quite involved. Several of the Al Azhar girls were unsure and said

they would defer to their parents. In general, however, the students voiced their opinions, with only a few from each school stating that their parents had already told them where they would be going. Indeed, during parent interviews, parents from both schools often commented on how the decision on where their children would attend junior secondary school would be up to the students.

Professional goals

To understand the prominence of religion in students' career aspirations, I asked, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" The student responses demonstrated middle-class preferences for careers that had no apparent connection to religion. Of the 76 students who responded (37 boys and 39 girls), the most popular careers were medical professionals⁸⁶ (n=20), businesspersons and entrepreneurs (n=11), and professors (n=11). Over 80% of those wanting to be in the medical profession were female, and two-thirds of those females were Luqman al Hakim SIT students. Only two Al Azhar 31 girls chose a traditional female occupation of midwife, while the rest wanted to be doctors of various sorts, dentists, and for one, to be "a pediatrician or a veterinarian. If a vet, I just want to help God's creations" (Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, February 19, 2010, group 1). There were more than four times the students at Al Azhar 31 who wanted to go into business than at Luqman al Hakim SIT (six boys and three girls from Al Azhar 31 compared to two boys from Luqman al Hakim SIT). A nearly equal interest was shown at both schools in becoming professors. However, at Luqman al Hakim SIT, twice as many boys (five boys and two girls) were interested, and at Al Azhar 31, four girls and no boys were interested in becoming professors. Outside of these three professions, writer, architect, pilot, and the

⁸⁶ Mostly doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and a couple of midwives.

armed forces were also popular. Two boys at Luqman al Hakim SIT mentioned the unexpected combination of professions of fashion designer and restaurant (*rumah makan*) owner. It would seem that they had talked about this previously, since the boys were in separate groups.

Female student aspirations were generally not the “traditional” female careers. The majority of girls, 35 from both schools, hoped to be doctors, writers, professors, and, in a few cases, athletes and astronauts. One Al Azhar 31 student wanted to be a “doctor, scientist, a political expert, and minister” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 11, 2010) citing by name Sri Mulyani, the female finance minister, as an example. At Luqman al Hakim SIT, only one girl wanted to be a primary school teacher and another wished to be a secretary. At Al Azhar 31, as mentioned earlier, two girls wanted to be midwives.

Three Al Azhar 31 students (two boys and a girl) also aspired to be rich, one of whom added “famous” to his aspirations as a rich racecar driver. One Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girl hoped to be famous for designing buildings in other countries.

While students did not mention aspirations for religious-minded professions, such as religious leaders or scholars, a few students connected the idea of their future to where they wanted to be in the next stage of life: heaven. An Azhar 31 girl said, “I want to be a professor. I want to be a good person, rich, and go to heaven. The important thing is to go to heaven. And to be liked by a lot of people” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, February 19, 2010). Following this comment, the next girl responded, possibly attempting to show more piety, “For me, the important thing more than anything else is to go to heaven” (Interview with Al Azhar 41 grade-four girls, February 19, 2010). The first girl’s

response highlights the common idea within these families that being pious and being rich are not incompatible, as will be discussed in chapter 7.

At Luqman al Hakim, among one group of grade-six boys, the theme of honorable religious duty surfaced. Two boys nearly simultaneously responded to my question, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" with, "A martyr (*mati syahid*)." Instantly a couple of other boys laughed, either at the coincidence of their friends' responses or the actual response. However, the other four boys in the group immediately replied that they too wanted to be martyrs as well, one adding, "So I can enter heaven." Unfamiliar with the Indonesian phrase "*mati syahid*," I asked for an explanation. The first boy explained, "A martyr is someone who dies a martyr's death in battle," while another continued, "Dies rescuing people," and another, "Defending the faith" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, November 30, 2009). Still confused with the explanations, I asked again what they wanted to be when they were older, to which they then responded with career-oriented responses: doctor, architect, air traffic controller, scientist, and archeologist. It is possible that the first two boys set the standard high in terms of a noble achievement, so the others followed suit.

As exemplified by one humorous response, students and administration were aware of the global controversies over Islam. In immediate response to my question of what they wanted to be when they grew up, a Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boy lightheartedly called out, "Terrorist!" eliciting laughter from his friends. He then continued, "Not really. But military, and then president" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boys, December 3, 2009). Indonesians are well aware of the popular idea promoted by much of Western media that Islamic schools generate terrorists. Adults who are generally less

inclined to joke about terrorism, at least with an American researcher, one JSIT leader from headquarters during our first meeting made the point of clearing up any possible misconceptions I may have had regarding their involvement with terrorism, emphasizing the students from their schools were trained to be obedient (*taat*) to their religion as well as skilled in technology (*technokrat*). He stressed that the students from their schools were “not extreme (*ekstrem*) [Muslims] like is alleged by the United States as, what’s that called, a terrorist.” He explained that Islam at their school was “modern” and “fully compatible with development (*perkembangan*),...it’s democratic, and respectful of others” (Interview with JSIT headquarters officer, March 18, 2009).

Conceptualization of a good Muslim


To understand students’ conceptualization of what piety might look like in action, I asked, “What is a good Muslim like?” Students’ responses fell into four main interconnected elements: 1) participation in *ibadah*, or rituals (such as *sholat*, fasting, and reading the Qur’an) and acts of worship (such as veiling); 2) obedience to God (*taat kepada Allah*) or following God’s commandments; 3) moral and virtuous behavior such as being honest, treating others kindly, and respecting parents; and 4) believing (*percaya*) in God. *Ibadah* was “made incumbent upon Muslims by God” (Mahmood 2004:123), and these acts of worship and ritual are considered the basics of piety. Obedience is how one keeps oneself clean and worthy of God’s blessing. Morals refer to facets of one’s character. Belief refers to one’s personal convictions about God’s existence. One could argue that performing rituals is an act of obedience, but student responses made distinctions and categorized *ibadah* and

obedience differently. Therefore, the above elements follow the lead of the students' responses.

These four elements fall into two larger components of piety: outward performances or acts (*ibadah*); and inner character (obedience, moral behavior and belief in God) that drives actions. Mahmood (2004) argues that among women in the piety movement in Egypt, ritual performances are “disciplinary practices through which pious dispositions are formed,” when approached with proper understanding of their power to assist in the realization of piety (128). However, these women in Mahmood’s study considered inner character or “their daily conduct in accord with principles of Islamic piety and virtuous behavior” to be of even greater importance in their journey to developing piety (4).


In analyzing student responses, I found three main differences between schools. First, Luqman al Hakim SIT children showed a more focused conceptualization of being a good Muslim, and Al Azhar 31 students showed a more diversified one. See Figures 5, 6, and 7. Second, Al Azhar 31 students’ answers predominantly focused on inner character, while Luqman al Hakim SIT student responses focused more on outward performances. Third, Luqman al Hakim students focused more heavily on enumerated practices than on general concepts, while Al Azhar 31 students balanced the two more evenly.

Figure 5. Distribution of Student Responses Regarding of Categories of Conceptualizations of a Good Muslim, by School




**Ibadah*: rituals and acts of worship

Figure 6. Al Azhar 31 Student Response Distribution of Categories of Conceptualizations of a Good Muslim



**Ibadah*: rituals and acts of worship

Figure 7. Luqman al Hakim SIT Student Response Distribution of Categories of Conceptualizations of a Good Muslim



**Ibadah*: rituals and acts of worship

Note: Belief in God category was not represented in Luqman al Hakim SIT data.

Al Azhar 31 students' answers referenced nearly equally the three themes of *ibadah*, obedience, and morals, with some mention of belief and faith. Their responses included both specific actions and general or abstract concepts to describe a good Muslim. One boy said, "*Sholat* often and carry out the commandments well" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, March 11, 2010), and another, "Do what's required of you, honest, moral" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, March 12, 2010). A girl said, "Be diligent in doing rituals (*rajin beribadah*) and be a good person (*baik hati*)" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, February 18, 2010). A few students also mentioned, "believe in God (*percaya kepada Allah*)" or "faith in God (*beriman kepada Allah*)."
Ibadah, obedience, and moral behavior are equally present in students' understanding of a good Muslim, with belief in God playing a minor role. Consequently, Al Azhar 31 students' composite conceptualization is one-quarter outward performance, two-and-a-half quarters inner character, and one slice miscellaneous items. See Figure 8.

Nearly two-thirds of responses from Luqman al Hakim SIT students focused on *ibadah*. Common responses included: "One who is obedient to God, performs *sholat*, and

reads the Qur'an," (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boys, December 4, 2009) and "Be diligent in reading the Qur'an and cover the *aurat*" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, November 30, 2009). References to obedience and morals were each nearly a fifth of the responses. While concepts of belief or faith in God did not surface, a couple of students mentioned larger abstract concepts such as piety or *takwal* (having an submissive attitude to God's way). Overall, for these students, *ibadah's* rituals and acts of worship are complemented by obedience and moral behavior. Luqman al Hakim SIT's composite conceptualization is three-fifths outward performance, two-fifths inner character, and a fraction miscellaneous. See Figure 9.

Figure 8. Al Azhar 31 Student Response Distribution as Outward Performance and Inner Character





Figure 9. Luqman al Hakim SIT Student Response Distribution as Outward Performance and Inner Character



Lastly, student responses included specified actions and abstract concepts when describing a good Muslim. In contrast with Al Azhar 31 students, most Luqman al Hakim SIT students' answers focused on specific practices. For example, students stated, "read the Qur'an," "give offerings," "fast diligently," "don't kill," "don't disobey your parents," and "honesty." In addition to itemized actions, Al Azhar 31 students also mentioned larger concepts such as "being moral" or being a "good person (*baik hati*)," and "believe in God." These abstract items diversified Al Azhar 31 students' responses by providing a second, conceptual dimension to the profile of a good Muslim.

Luqman al Hakim SIT students' focus on specific rituals and activities allows students greater certainty in the appropriateness of their actions and those of others. Al Azhar 31 students' inclusion of abstract concepts as components of piety can lead to ambiguity in assessing moral behavior. As will be discussed in the next section, it seems this ambiguity creates a need for moral flexibility.

Moral subjectivity

Students' moral subjectivity was explored through assessment of a familiar scenario in which a person's actions deviate from an explicit religious standard taught at schools. Woman's dress, and in particular the wearing of a headscarf, has become one of the most visible components of public piety in Indonesia (Jones 2010). While the practice of veiling has grown since the 1980s, there are still significant portions of the female Muslim population that do not cover their hair in public. Although students at both schools are taught that Muslim women are required by God to veil, students observe women on a daily basis in the larger community, and often their own families, who do not. The request to judge another's actions as appropriate or not generated a variety of reactions and, therefore, more analysis of responses than in other sections. I first report the students' responses, examine the types of arguments students employ to explain their position, and then look at the techniques to manage the tension generated by the request to assess another's actions, or level of piety.

Students were asked, "Would you approve if you saw a female Muslim (*Muslim prempuan*) going out in public without veiling?" Responses clustered around students' gender as well as school. Nearly three-quarters of boys (70%) from both schools

disapproved, while just fewer than half (48%) of girls disapproved. By schools, less than half (40%) of Al Azhar 31 students disapproved, while the great majority (80%) of Luqman al Hakim SIT students disapproved. It is possible that an even lower percentage of Al Azhar 31 students would have objected had a more equal number of boys and girls been interviewed—20 male and 13 female students at Al Azhar 31 responded, while 14 male and 16 female Luqman al Hakim SIT students responded. (See Figures 10 and 11.)

Figure 10. Percentage of Students who Disagreed With a Woman Leaving Her House Unveiled, by Gender and School





Figure 11. Percentage of Students who Disagreed With a Woman Leaving Her House Unveiled, by Gender Within School



The various arguments students employed to defend their assessment of the situation provides a glimpse into students' developing moral subjectivities and levels of tolerance for deviant behavior. By "tolerance," I mean the demonstration of allowance for the behavior, but not necessarily acceptance. In essence, the question asks the students to pass judgment on the woman based on their personal standards. Answers ranged from full disapproval to personal tolerance, to a few sentiments of pluralism. Disapproval, or intolerance, was demonstrated through responses such as, "I disagree because a woman's *aurat* has to be covered" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four girls, December 3, 2009). Tolerance for the behavior was displayed in a variety of ways by basically saying,

“It’s not a problem.” A few students demonstrated pluralistic tendencies by claiming no one had a right to tell another what to do and asserted there must be equal respect for whatever the person did, basing their argument on the more philosophical consideration of “the most important thing is her heart” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four girls, December 2, 2009).

Arguments the students employed to explain their judgment illustrated varying techniques for managing the tensions (Simon 2007:xii, 270) between a moral standard the schools taught and deviant behaviors observed in society. Some students, to justify and support their disagreement, conceded to a standard found in the Qur’an, given by God, or taught by a teacher that they considered to be universally applicable all Muslims. Students who showed some level of tolerance managed the tension with varying types of moral flexibility. Some showed tolerance for the activity but clarified their personal beliefs that woman should veil. Others found it difficult to judge the person and used social norms or situation-specific contexts to excuse the woman’s deviant behavior. A couple of students disregarded the idea that judgment even belonged to the scenario. They felt they had no right to pass judgment on how another lived her life. The responses demonstrate multiple combinations of (in)tolerance and acceptance, clustering around schools as well as gender. Due to variations among those who did not fully disagree with the behavior, the following analysis is grouped by type of response rather than by school.

Employing rule-abiding tendencies (Johnson 2010:52), many students, predominantly boys, from both schools unequivocally disapproved of a woman leaving the house unveiled. Those who fully objected justified their assessment by citing external standards and sources of law in Islam, namely God or the Qur’an. All of the boys and nearly

two-thirds of girls at Luqman al Hakim SIT fully disapproved, while nearly half of Al Azhar 31's boys and only one girl also offered unqualified objections of a woman leaving the house without veiling. Reasons for their disapproval included "It's required," (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, December 4, 2009), "It's a commandment of God contained in the Qur'an," (Interview with Al Azhar grade-four boys, March 12, 2010), "It's impolite," (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, December 4, 2009), "The hair is the *aurat* of women," (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boys, December 1, 2009), or "Like my teacher said, Muslims have to cover the private parts of their bodies" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, March 18, 2010). These rule-oriented reasons elevated the standard above personal considerations or contextual factors that could influence an individual's actions.

Possible consequences of not veiling were also employed to justify the practice of veiling. A grade-six Luqman al Hakim SIT boy described the protection a woman receives from veiling when he explained that women had to veil "in order to not invite trouble (*celaka*). So that you don't invite temptation⁸⁷ (*nafsu*)" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, December 4, 2009). This comment also implicitly touches on the benefits for men, who are tempted by and cause "trouble" for an unveiled woman. A grade-four girl from Luqman al Hakim focused on the potential negative experiences of the woman who does not veil when she commented, "You should be ashamed (*malu*) if your *aurat* is visible. It's shameful (*malu*) to leave the house and not veil, especially if you go to

⁸⁷ It is common Islamic belief that the form of the female body after it has passed through puberty is a temptation to men and therefore it is incumbent upon the woman dress in clothing that fully covers their bodies, leaving only the hands and feet and face exposed. The hair is often considered to be provocative as well, thus woman also cover their hair by veiling.

school” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four girls, December 3, 2009). These students supported veiling by not only referring to the law, but also citing the unwanted consequences for woman—and indirectly for men—when woman do not veil. Avoidance of such consequences is expected to motivate one to follow the practice to veil.

Tolerance was shown in several different ways, revealing some instances of intense moral gymnastics described below in detail. Some disapproval was qualified, while others who felt it “wasn’t a problem,” followed up with the counsel that the woman should veil. Still others invented scenarios that would excuse the deviant behavior and exempt the woman in question from disapproval. Others conceded to social practice rather than a normative standard to assess the situation.

Many students spoke of the dissonance between personal belief and others’ actions, but they would not outright condemn the woman of wrongdoing. Aside from the single Al Azhar 31 female student who completely disapproved, the small handful (fewer than a fifth) of other disapproving girls qualified their disapproval. For example, one Al Azhar 31 girl explained, “I disagree, but other people think differently. So, just let it be; but I hope they’ll realize [that they should veil]” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 11, 2010). One of the few female Luqman al Hakim SIT students assented to not veiling when she said, “Not all Muslim [women] wear *hijabs*, so naturally there will be those who don’t wear *hijabs* in public. The thing is there are those who wear headscarves and those that don’t.” Her classmate followed up with, “But they should wear a *hijab*” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four girls, December 3, 2009), after which the first girl immediately added that yes, woman should veil. By concluding with the personal belief that one should veil, they asserted their own beliefs and felt there was a higher standard that

should be respected. One said, “We can never force others to veil. We can only suggest” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 3, 2009), tacitly suggesting that it would be better to veil, but each woman had a right to choose. It is unclear, however, if this student felt critical or not of the women who would choose not to veil.

In a more diplomatic response, a few Al Azhar 31 students chose to agree and disagree with the scenario. One boy said, “I’m fifty-fifty. It’s okay, but one should wear the *hijab*” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, February 11, 2010). These students acknowledged a dissonance with what they felt to be right, but did not feel it necessary to create conflict by objecting outright to it. Making it an issue of fashion rather than morals, one student argued, “You’re prettier if you wear a headscarf and so you cover your *aurat*” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009), leaving her justification, or softening her criticism, to focus on the benefits of veiling.

In what seems an effort to exempt the woman from judgment, Al Azhar 31 students often provided various hypothetical situations as justification for the woman’s behavior. These included situational reasons such as “maybe she’s not used to it. Or it’s hot so she doesn’t wear it” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, March 12, 2010) or “if it’s hot or her *hijab* is being washed, it’s okay” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 12, 2010), or, it’s okay “as long as she is fully covered [modestly dressed] otherwise” (Interviews with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 11, 2010). Other students suggested a cognitive rather than material explanation: “Maybe she doesn’t know she has to wear the *hijab*” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, February 18, 2010) or even more simply, “Maybe the woman has a reason for not wearing the *hijab*” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, February 18, 2010). Here, situational factors such as being in the

process of “getting used to it,” the weather, other clothing considerations, or one’s personal reasoning or lack thereof, exempt the woman from disapproval. It’s easy to imagine a mother providing these sorts of explanations to an inquiring child as to why women, possibly including she herself, do not veil.

A common justification for excusing the deviant behavior was age. Several Al Azhar 31 students excused the lack of veiling if the female in question was “still a kid” or “not grown up.” The word *prempuan* used to mean “woman” in the question does not directly carry connotations of an adult female, but is generally used in reference to adults rather than children. The use of the word left unintentional ambiguity, and some students took advantage of the ambiguity to excuse the female in question for her deviant practices. Either the suggestion of age arose among Al Azhar 31 students because they were searching to find a justification for the deviant behavior, or it did not surface among Luqman al Hakim SIT students because they felt that veiling, regardless of age, was necessary in public. It is more common for Luqman al Hakim SIT than Al Azhar 31 parents to require their daughters to continue to veil upon returning home and removing their school uniforms (which include the *hijab*). According to a parent survey (discussed in detail in Chapter 7), 13% and 47% of parent respondents from Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT respectively said they required their daughters to veil once they had returned from school. It is possible the difference between schools was influenced by parent attitudes.

A girl from Al Azhar 31 felt the social etiquette was the overriding factor for determining veiling choice: “If you want to meet a friend, and you don’t veil, well, it’s not a problem. But if you want to meet your boss or are going to an event, yeah, you have to veil” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 12, 2010). This reasoning could be

related to protocols for gendered interactions as much as fashion considerations. If a woman meets with a female friend in a private setting, the woman would not need to veil. A boss could be male and an event would likely be mixed company, thus making it appropriate to cover her *aurat*. Either way, stepping out into public unveiled isn't necessarily the problem, but more the woman's destination and possibly the mix of company.

For others, the touchstone for appropriateness was common social practice. One Al Azhar 31 boy said, "I approve of it, but there are those that disagree, too...because Muslims should wear veils when out in public but many do not, so just let it be. It's fine" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four boys, March 11, 2010). This boy conceded to social practice rather than the standard set at school. Another Al Azhar 31 girl said, "I agree and disagree. I agree because certainly a portion of Muslim people, most of them (*kebanyakan*), don't veil. I disagree because usually (*biasanya*) woman veil" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 12, 2010). Her statement is full of contradictions. If the majority of woman don't veil, then it cannot be that woman usually do veil. These contradictory statements highlight the cognitive dissonance many students encountered as they worked through the scenario. The students "know" from observation within their community that many Muslim women do not veil. They also "know" from their lessons at school that Muslim women should veil. This student took into consideration what others were doing and attributed to it some kind of value that led her to "agree." She took the observations that women usually veil, particularly in her school environment and larger social environment, and therefore disagreed with the action of the woman in the proposed scenario.

Another Al Azhar 31 girl, while personally objecting to a woman not wearing the

hijab, felt it was a personal decision rather than one that should be forced upon individuals when she said, “Actually I don’t agree, but people have no right to prohibit it. So it’s just up to the person if she wants to veil or not” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 grade-four girls, March 12, 2010). Here, it becomes a human right to make the choice rather than a religious injunction that one must follow. This student demonstrates the greatest flexibility between personal commitment to the religious practice and another person’s right to make her own choices. She, and her personal values, are not a part of another woman’s process to choose if she will veil or not. It is a private or individual issue, not an issue of universal commandment or universal rights. She demonstrates tolerance for others’ individual standards.

The greatest moral flexibility, looking much like attitudes of pluralism, came from a Luqman al Hakim grade-six girl when she stated, “The important thing is the heart” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six girls, December 2, 2009). This comment echoes a common saying in Indonesia, “One should cover her heart first before her head.” This dictum represents the idea that a person’s character is more reflective of one’s relationship to God than the wearing of the *hijab*. In this line of reasoning, veiling is not a requirement to be a pious Muslim woman. The student’s answer also promotes the idea that one ought not judge another’s piety based on veiling practices, as one would not know a woman’s heart, the true indicator of one’s piety, simply by the covering of her hair. In this case, the student completely disregarded the school’s instruction and challenged the idea that women are required to veil. She herself may choose to veil, but she does not see that as a necessary choice for all women.

The explanations for their assessments of the hypothetical situation illuminate students' techniques to "manage the tensions" (Simon 2007) created in a situation that challenges a moral standard promoted by their schools. Although the schools promote different attitudes regarding the type of veil that is acceptable or most appropriate, the school standard is that woman should veil. However, Al Azhar 31 as a school shows greater tolerance from women who do not veil, as demonstrated in not requiring women to veil while on campus. Those who fully objected cited the Qur'an or official sources, making the act an infraction against a fixed standard outside of anyone's negotiation. Other students showed varying forms of tolerance by simultaneously understanding the normative standard and generally showing commitment to the practice of veiling by saying women "should veil," while allowing others to disregard the practice. Others allowed the deviant behavior due to social practice, thus allowing societal norms to compromise an institutional regulation. Some took a more philosophical approach and focused on the virtue rather than a specific "expressive repertoire" (Mahmood 2004:23) of it.

In their management of tensions, Al Azhar 31 students demonstrated various forms of tolerance and more readily withheld judgment. Al Azhar 31 students seemed to be most comfortable with excusing the deviant behavior under considerations such as age, conditional factors (i.e. weather, etc.), social etiquette, or personal preference, rather than directly accusing the woman of wrongdoing. The use of contextualization in the process of discerning the appropriateness of a woman's possibly deviant behavior is facilitated by more abstract and principle-based ideas of piety promoted at Al Azhar 31. Additionally, it is possible that the diversified conceptualization of piety, as discussed in the previous section, facilitates greater tolerance and in some cases acceptance of deviant behavior.

The majority of Luqman al Hakim students fully objected and referenced the laws of God to validate the objections. The school's more delineated approach to standards with a focus on specifics and particular observable acts seems to offer a clear way to monitor the appropriateness of one's own actions as well as any other person's. As such, the students could talk with greater confidence about the inappropriateness of a woman leaving the house unveiled.

Responses demonstrate that the boys more immediately disapproved of a woman not veiling because they believed it was a religious obligation to do so. The heavily gendered response could be due largely to one of the most common explanations for why women should veil—so as not to arouse sexual desire in men—which is a directly relevant benefit, leading boys to support it. Additionally, the practice does not require any kind of action on the part of men, but is expected to greatly benefit his efforts to be pious. Girls, on the other hand, tended to have a more nuanced response to the situation. While several girls disagreed for the same reasons as the boys, many other girls found reasons to excuse the woman from the offense of not veiling or at least recognized that there were many reasons why one would not. Perhaps unlike boys, girls who actually have to choose to veil have empathy even at a young age towards those who make choices not to. Additionally, since it is their gender that wears them, it is also likely that girls have had more discussions regarding the practice that have produced a more developed, varied and nuanced thinking around the practice.

While home life may influence attitudes about veiling, almost two-thirds (59%) of Al-Azhar mothers and just over three-fourths (77%) of the Luqman al Hakim SIT mothers reported on a self-administered parent survey (see chapter 7) that they veil on a daily

basis. This would indicate that at each school similar proportions of children objecting to a woman not veiling correlate with the proportion of mothers who veil daily, and presumably would consistently veil when going out in public. It is possible that student attitudes correlate with the practice of their mothers. However, as discussed in chapter 7, mothers are often influenced by their children's encouragement to veil. Several mothers mentioned the influence of their children and school environment as factors in their decisions to begin veiling. Consequently, some mothers' current veiling practices were preceded by students' opinions in regards to veiling. As such, it is unclear how much mothers' practices influenced student attitudes or vice versa.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how forms of schooling correlate with the development of students' religious inclinations. The prominence of religion in future education and professional aspirations are similar among students at both schools, while differences between students' conceptualizations of a good Muslim and moral flexibility are influenced by the schools' unique approaches to Islam. Concepts of what it is to be a good Muslim mirror levels of tolerance for deviant veiling practices.

The schools' emphasis on quality academic schooling delivered within the Islamic framework of integrated Islam ideology does not appear to create adverse feelings towards state general schools for continued secondary schooling. There was mixed interest among students at both schools in continued schooling at an Islamic institution. More Al Azhar 31 students were interested in continuing at Al Azhar if an Al Azhar junior high were to be opened, while Luqman al Hakim SIT students were more interested in state schools. It is

possible that the stricter environment of Luqman al Hakim SIT generated student interest in a less rigid and more mainstream environment of state schools. However, it is also possible that interest in quality academic schooling was more important than religious schooling and, therefore, Abu Bakar SIT, the secondary school for Luqman al Hakim SIT students which was not on par with top state schools, was not a first choice. Along this same vein of reasoning, it is possible that many Al Azhar 31 students mentioned interest in continuing at Al Azhar junior secondary school not necessarily only because they valued the school's Islamic atmosphere and teachings, but also assumed Al Azhar's high quality academics would be found at their proposed junior secondary school in Jogja.

Regardless of differences in junior secondary school preference, students from both schools showed similar professional aspirations that aligned with common middle-class occupations. References to overtly religious occupations were absent. Students seem to consider religion to be more a way of living one's life than a professional field. Even those boys and girls who wanted to deepen their religious understanding by continuing their education at an Islamic junior secondary school expressed similar career objectives, with no difference in professional aspirations than their peers wanting to attend a state junior secondary school. The students who mentioned aspirations of "getting to heaven" or being martyrs did not view their careers as a vehicle for earning that reward. Religion does not seem to play an influential role in decisions regarding professional aspirations. This aligns with both schools' goals of training intelligent and pious Muslims rather than Islamic scholars.

Al Azhar 31 students had a more diversified conception of a good Muslim, combining the outward performance of ritual acts of worships with inner character. Much

of what was mentioned, aside from specific rituals to be performed, was more conceptual than activity-specific. In contrast, Luqman al Hakim SIT students demonstrated a more focused conceptualizations of a good Muslim, with a greater emphasis on ritual performance and task-specific understandings of the more abstract ideas of piety such as morality. Specific actions appear to be the focus of their conceptualizations of a good Muslim among Luqman al Hakim SIT students.

Students' moral subjectivities demonstrated two main attitudes, namely disapproval and tolerance, with a few students demonstrating pluralist perspectives by showing acceptance. They employed various techniques to manage the tensions they encountered in the scenario of a woman not veiling when in public. Two-fifths of Al Azhar 31 students and more than three-quarters of Luqman al Hakim SIT students were intolerant of deviant veiling practices. To justify their assessment, they conceded to a normative standard that stood outside of contextualizing a situation within particular material or emotional conditions or personal interpretations. Over half of Al Azhar 31 students were tolerant of the woman's action to not veil, but showed variance in personal acceptance of the behavior. The students' techniques for dealing with the tensions included allowing the practice but not approving by insisting that the woman "should" veil. This also indicated that the students believed the standard applied to all Muslim women. A few others did not object but held a personal standard to veil, thus making the practice individual choice rather than universal edict. Others, in avoidance of passing judgment, excused the deviant behavior by creating conditional and contextual situations that would justify the woman's actions. Still others validated the practice to not veil based on societal norms rather than a universal standard. Two students who called for the focus on individuals' basic social rights rather

than deity-imposed requirement demonstrated the greatest moral flexibility.

Students' conceptualizations of a good Muslim, moral subjectivity, and techniques for managing tensions around behavior that is socially deemed deviant correlate to the types of Islam promoted at their respective schools. Al Azhar 31 does not promote organization-specific ways to conduct one's religious life. Unlike the organization-specific practices that can be generalized into NU, Muhammadiyah, and PKS, Al Azhar disassociates itself from these and promotes a more basic multi-traditional approach to Islam that honors various forms of practice. Al Azhar is more accepting of multiple practices and therefore not so prescriptive in form. This was reflected in students' understanding of a good Muslim as not solely focused on standard expectations such as rituals, but also allowed for various interpretations that fostered tolerance for various forms of Islamic practices. However, this greater tolerance is accompanied by greater moral ambivalence.

Al Azhar 31 students' conceptualization of a good Muslim offers greater flexibility in interpreting the deviant behavior of a woman not veiling. While some students viewed veiling to be of such importance that a woman should wear the *hijab*, associating it with following what is commanded, some students focused on other concepts, such as being a good person or believing in God. Also, valuing various interpretations of a single practice likely facilitated the moral gymnastics necessary to be tolerant of others' choices that were not congruent with standards promoted at school. This flexible approach to Islam could easily translate into more flexible interpretations of moral conduct and respect of those who carry out their religion differently than they themselves do.

This more flexible approach that honors multiple traditions is seen in Al Azhar 31's school practices of veiling. While all teachers were devout Muslims with required levels of

knowledge of the Qur'an, Al Azhar 31 faculty was fairly heterogeneous in outward appearance and practices of Islam. They personalized their religion in different ways. While at first glance a non-Muslim may assume that there was no variance among faculty since all teachers conducted themselves within the general principles and values of Islam. However, as previously explained, variations within practices have cultural meaning that often, especially in the case of Luqman al Hakim SIT, translate into perceived levels of piety and preference for one Islamic organization's tradition over another. The female teachers veiled in a variety of fashions. Some wore fancier headscarves with lace and beading on sheer material, tied snugly around the neck or tucked into the collar of their uniforms. Others wore large, plainer and simple headscarves, frequently offering some contour of the neck and often falling over the chest and down to the navel. The Al Azhar 31 part-time teachers who worked one-on-one with students for Qur'anic reading were generally dressed in simple, loose clothing that looked much like those of Luqman al Hakim SIT teachers.

Additionally, an implicit acceptance of those who do not veil was demonstrated with the attendance of a few bare-headed mothers at school events. More prominently and perhaps more officially sanctified, however, was the public display of students' family photos outside of the grade-two classrooms along a main corridor. While most mothers and daughters in the photos were veiled, some were not. However, the equally prominent display of photos, regardless of veiling practice, indicated a tolerance for, if not an acceptance of, both practices. It also spoke to the idea that the *hijab* students wore at school

was part of a uniform, rather than a part of their religious practices while in public spaces.⁸⁸

In contrast, Luqman al Hakim SIT's exacting approach to Islam coincided with a homogeneous demonstration of Islamic practices among the faculty and thus a more uniform example of piety throughout the school. Teachers more uniformly veiled in oversized tunics falling far below the buttocks, long loose skirts, and veils of thick and largely unadorned material hanging loosely over the shoulders and midway down the arms. As a regular female visitor, although not Muslim, I was asked to veil as well. However, my style of veiling, like the majority of the mothers who came on campus, did not mirror that of the teachers, and an issue was never made of it. While Luqman al Hakim SIT did not challenge the variations in styles of veiling among the visitors on campus, the official representatives of the institution were fairly homogeneous in style.

Additionally, the majority of Luqman al Hakim SIT students' conceptualizations of a good Muslim aligned with an approach to Islam that leaves little if any room for situational considerations for deviant moral conduct. This was demonstrated in chapter 4 regarding the firing of a teacher for smoking while off duty. Initially, he was put on probation for smoking in front of students while on a hike. While he had not before smoked on campus, smoking regardless of location was prohibited, as the school taught that smoking, a very popular activity in Indonesia to which many people are addicted, was *haram* (a forbidden activity). The teacher was unable to quit smoking, and even though he did not smoke at school, smoking in his private life was still seen as inconsistent practice of the school's

⁸⁸ The attitude that the *hijab* is only part of a uniform was more readily obvious to me when I observed high school students at the Al Azhar High School in Jakarta removing their veils as they exited the school at the end of the day.

standards, he was fired. Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes what is considered an authentic concept of self, which views an individual as a person who does not change regardless of the context in which one might find oneself.

Consistency is of the utmost importance at Luqman al Hakim SIT. Consequently, one must understand the standards so as to know how to behave appropriately. Under this approach, an individual can more confidently monitor moral behavior regardless of time or place, and avoid ambiguity and dissonance regarding standards and practices inherent in a more flexible approach. This emphasis on consistency, manifested in part through an emphasis on exacting ways for performing one's religion, is consistent with the Luqman al Hakim SIT students' quantifiable, list-oriented, and rule-abiding conceptualizations of a "good Muslim" and their disposition towards obedience and intolerance towards the situation of a woman not veiling in public. The high correlation between students' conceptualizations of a good Muslim and levels of tolerance and acceptance of deviant behavior and the schools flexible and exacting approaches to Islam suggest the schools are effectively shaping students' religious subjectivities. While subjectivities develop over time (McLeod 2000) and the students' present dispositions are not indelible, the schools are setting the students on particular trajectories in subjectivity development that look quite different from each other.

As an important final point is that students' development of religious subjectivity is not only acceptance of, but also reaction to, a school's "practices, discourses and ethos" (McLeod 2000:503). While many of the students interviewed seemed to have incorporated their school's approach to Islam into their own, some had not. One group of grade-six girls at Luqman al Hakim SIT most vividly exemplifies this. Aside from one of the eight girls in

the group, the girls interested in attending a state junior high to try something new were also the ones most tolerant of the woman not veiling in the proposed scenario. These girls were ready for a less Islamic-centric approach to schooling and were interested to socialize with others in a new way. The one girl in the same interview group that was interested in attending Abu Bakar was the only one that objected to the woman leaving the house unveiled.

Chapter 6

Intelligence, Piety, and Citizenship

The Prophet Muhammad once said that people who only have general knowledge (ilmu) are very dangerous if they do not have morals (akhlak), and people who only have morals will not be able to change the world if they have no general knowledge (ilmu). So both are highly correlated and both should go hand-in-hand. People who are knowledgeable (berilmu) but are immoral (tidak berakhlak) or have bad character (tidak berkepribadian baik), they'll produce a more devastated (lebih hancur) Indonesia.

Interview with an Al Azhar 31 teacher, March 18, 2010

A large vertical banner in Al Azhar 31's spacious main office displayed a lifelike drawing of the impressive, yet-to-be-completed four-story school building with the English words "Integrated Islamic School," followed in Indonesian by "Educating a generation of intelligent, creative, skilled and pious Muslims." These characteristics the school intends to develop in their students are not subjects to be taught, but qualities to be cultivated through guiding ideology, pedagogy, practices and school ethos. In interviews, teachers and founders of Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT repeatedly emphasized the importance of coupling of piety and intelligence, or educating "hearts and minds," to students' comprehensive development. In the United States there are multiple educational programs that promote this idea that non-cognitive characteristics are equally important to students' success in society as cognitive skills. Moral education, character education, leadership education, and multicultural education programs, for example, have been touted as crucial to full development of students and the nation (Tough 2012). To promote piety, these extended-day Islamic schools have integrated religion into all aspects of their curricula and school cultures.

While Al Azhar and JSIT, as discussed in the previous three chapters, have different visions of what piety looks like and how a good Muslim behaves, the two school groups are in full agreement on the importance of piety and both use what I term integrated Islam ideology⁸⁹ as a tool to engender piety within their students. Certainly leadership at any Islamic school would want their students to be intelligent and pious. However, unlike most Islamic schools, Al Azhar and JSIT are framing the education of their students' hearts and minds within integrated Islam ideology. Most other Islamic schools keep religion and other curriculum materials separated by class periods. Al Azhar and JSIT schools, as will be explained in detail, abolish the secular–religious dichotomy perpetuated in most other Islamic schools by integrating religious concepts and teachings of the Qur'an into class discussions on any relevant subject and established a hierarchy of knowledge between the mundane and divine. Additionally, they focus on Islamic duties and morals, rather than subjects such as Islamic history or classical religious commentaries (*kitab kuning*). This approach is expected to transform students into pious observant Muslims rather than to inform students about Islam.

⁸⁹ For Al Azhar, this integration (*memadukan*) of religious and general knowledge as an approach to teaching came about “gradually” since the first Al Azhar school was founded in 1964 (Busyairi 2002:110). In contrast, integrated Islam was the signature ideology of JSIT schools from their inception in the early 1990s. Tarbiyah movement activists conceived JSIT institutions of education to disseminate a new religious sensibility intended to set aright the perceived misdirection of the secular-minded population. Al Azhar is less vocal on reshaping the misguided Islamic practices of the country, but both schools hope to influence the population to be more pious. The use of the term “integrated Islam” is potentially confusing and my use of it requires justification. It is taken from the name of the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT) and the phrase “integrated Islam” (*Islam terpadu*, or IT) has become an informal trademark for JSIT schools. However, Al Azhar, along with other Islamic school groups not mentioned in this research, prefers to be free of politics and to be recognized for their organization's uniqueness and therefore does not like to be associated with JSIT and its linkage to PKS. Yet, as mentioned above, Al Azhar 31 in Jogja has used the phrase in English to describe the school's ideology on a banner. The phrase is likely used in English not only to distance Al Azhar from the JSIT schools' fundamentally different implementation of Islam but also as a way to advertise the integrated approach to knowledge that both schools share. “Integrated Islam” succinctly describes the distinguishing characteristic of this new wave of modern Islamic schools—an integration of religious and secular knowledge in the classroom. Therefore, I use the term to describe the guiding ideology of these two types of extended-day Islamic schools.

The development of this integrated Islam ideology is motivated by the perception that Indonesian students need an Islamic context in which to be properly educated. One Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, who received a PhD abroad in engineering, explained,

I know the Western concept [of education] is based on agnostic concepts or maybe disbelief [sic.] concepts, secularism, and materialism. I know Darwinism. Of course...in practical matters there are a lot of Western concepts that we agree on...But you know, we are in an Islamic country, so we teach them [our students] to understand about God, about the understanding that this world was created by God, about how we are to behave properly to all humankind, about humanity. We try to take the good things from Western education, and then we add to it Islamic philosophy. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, October 10, 2009).

This founder suggested that an Islamic country's education (not merely an Islamic school's education) should look different from a secular Western country's education. It is a common concern among a large range of religious educators in Indonesia that Western modernity and globalization have deteriorated Indonesia's traditional values, which these educators believe to be Qur'an-based (Lukens-Bull 2000:32). These perceptions echo the above informant's views that Indonesian-ness is often thought of in terms of religion. Additionally, imbedded in his criticisms of Western schools is the assumption that one cannot learn "to behave properly" through "agnostic concepts," "secularism, and materialism," but only through learning "about God."

To extended-day school educators, moral character is crucial to being a good citizen and religion is the best vehicle for character education. This idea extends to their view of what is right for the public at large, as will be addressed later on in this chapter. Certainly it behooves any government to advocate for a moral population as criminal, anti-social activity is a drain on national resources. However, these educators consider moral character to be synonymous with piety. In interviews, educators emphasized the dire social consequences of educated individuals who were not also pious. An Al Azhar 31 teacher

reasoned, “We have to integrate faith and piety (*taqwa*) with science (*ilmu pengetahuan*) and technology because if someone was just smart, but didn’t believe in God, it means he will not love his fellowmen. Then later, his knowledge will actually mess up (*mengacaukan*) the world” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, February 9, 2010).

Along these same lines, a Ery described the products of a secular education system as “individuals who are individualistic, exploitative, and lean towards, well, are highly motivated to control the universe for the interests of themselves and their small communities” (Interview with Ery Masruri, April 8, 2009). He went on to say that such individualistic tendencies have no sense of accountability and, he intimated, only result in corrupt leadership, rather than a *kholifah*, or a benevolent steward of God’s world who governs for the prosperity of the entire human race. Ultimately, these educators believed that only moral character-cum-piety, which comes through religious education, can thoughtfully guide the application of scientific knowledge and technology so that it can be beneficial to society. In other words, piety protects against nefarious uses of knowledge.

I argue that Al Azhar and JSIT view piety as a crucial aspect of not only personal development, but also citizenship. In this chapter, I demonstrate how extended-day Islamic school personnel conceptualize character development through solely religious terms and employ an integrated Islam ideology to promote piety among students. As the educators see universal benefits of a pious citizenry, they have hopes of an “integrated religion ideology” to be implemented in the general state schools. The religious aspects of Indonesia’s government policies facilitate and provide justification for extended-day school leadership’s arguments for visions of a nationally implemented piety project.

In this chapter, I first discuss extended-day school educators' views of religion's role in character development, how they conceptualize moral character to be synonymous with piety, and how they view piety as a crucial form of citizenship. I then demonstrate how the implementation of integrated Islam ideology is intended to engender piety in their students. I lay out the three components of integrated Islam ideology: 1) desegregation of secular and religious knowledge by presenting all class content in an Islamic framework; 2) a Qur'an-based epistemology; and 3) a strong consciousness of God. These components of integrated Islam ideology combine to create an intellectual respect for and emotional indebtedness to God, which in turn is meant to engender pious and devout sensibilities within students. In other words, the integrated Islam ideology promotes piety as it approaches academic studies by highlighting God's own intelligence and benevolence. I conclude the chapter by discussing the school leaderships' vision of introducing an "integrated religion ideology" into the national education system in order to develop a more pious and upright Indonesian citizenry. I highlight the JSIT-cum-PKS activists' proposed education platform as the material for discussion of a hoped-for nationwide piety project.

Moral Character as Piety

Through the eyes of these Islamic educators, moral character is synonymous with piety, and it can only be taught through religion. If one is not pious, one cannot be moral. An Al Azhar official at Jakarta headquarters explained,

Moral education is the way of building character of the young people...[Character building means] to build a moral life. A moral life should be based on the teachings of religion. Because the basic philosophy of our nation is Pancasila, with the first pillar of the philosophy related to the teaching of religion. There are more than six

religions that are practiced by the population of Indonesia. We agree that moral education should be built on the teaching of religion. This is how we understand it [moral education] in Indonesia. (Interview with Al Azhar headquarters official, August 13, 2012).

Relating that the state general schools only studied morals “a little bit”, but Islamic schools taught morals and general knowledge, an Al Azhar teacher explained that “the pre-eminence of Islamic schools” results from a strong moral education. He went on to say, “I’m certain that any Christian school is like that too. They don’t only want them [students] to be superb intellectually but and also superb in character (*kepribadian*)” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, March 18, 2010). This Al Azhar teacher felt only religious schools promote morals and a “superb” personality. Al Azhar and JSIT leadership are clear that they advocate for a religiously filtered morality. Like most religious—and not just Islamic—organizations and groups, they feel that religion has the monopoly on ethics and morals (Niyozov & Memon 2011:19).

While both intelligence and piety are meant to be the two equal crowning characteristics of Al Azhar and JSIT students, when extended-day schools are compared to the top state schools, student piety is the value-added commodity that makes these schools stand out. Intelligence is a cognitive skill achieved through quality instruction, and at these schools it is filtered through an Islamic framework so students avoid misinformation from a secular perspective. Piety is more a matter of affinities of the heart. There are two components to piety. First, it is the proper performance of religious duties and acts of worship. Second, and more fundamentally important, it is Islamic character, or daily conduct in accordance with the principles of devotion and virtuous behavior (Mahmood

2004).⁹⁰ Religious duties and acts of worship are taught and practiced at school through both the curriculum and daily routine to ensure proper performance. Islamic morals such as honesty, respect for elders, care for the environment, modesty, and service to others are the product of devotion to God. Teachers and administration I spoke with always assumed that Islamic instruction engendered moral children. They asserted that religion was the vehicle through which morals are taught and given meaning. Al Azhar and JSIT employ an integrated Islam ideology to teach Islamic values and motivate students to be pious.

Integrated Islam ideology promotes the idea that the coupling of intelligence and piety is crucial to personal development and the development of one's community and country. There are social benefits to be reaped from a holistic, religion-filtered understanding of the world. Correct principles lead to moral individuals and good governance, which then translates into individual and civic peace in this world and happiness in the world to come. Extended-day school education is more than human capital development for national economic prosperity. These schools are to "make Indonesian society in possession of good ethics (*berakhlakul karimah*), so that the next generation of Indonesians becomes a great people and upholds things of Islam (*keIslaman*)" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, March 18, 2010). Strong personal character, or good morals, is expected to manage negative impulses and wield knowledge for societal benefit. In the increasingly religious public sphere of Indonesia, the idea that a religion-based morality or piety is the strongest form of morality is gaining traction.

⁹⁰ See *Politics of Piety* by Saba Mahmood (2004) for similar discussion on the development of the Piety Movement in Egypt in the informal educational setting of mosque study groups for women.

The idea that individual piety benefits the nation is a growing phenomenon and is being applied to various sectors of Indonesian society. For example, an Al Azhar teacher was certain that a moral governing body would be conscientious of the environment. He theorized that if Indonesia was to advance as a nation under the guidance of pious Muslims, the development would not be accompanied by environmental disasters and environmental pollution as have occurred in the secular United States (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, March 18, 2010). In formalized practice, public and private businesses are implementing three-day Emotional and Spiritual Quotient training programs to increase company productivity levels. Rudnyckyj's (2010) fascinating ethnography, based in the national company Krakatau Steel, demonstrates how economic development is being recast in Indonesia as an ethical, rather than technical, problem. Paralleling Weber's concept of the Protestant Work Ethic, the steel company has turned to a program of Islamic "spiritual reform" that merges Islamic ethics with Western management knowledge to increase productivity. Through spiritual development, employees become better Muslims, workers and citizens who in turn positively impact the economic development of the company, society, and nation. The Spiritual Quotient trainings are meant to be universally applicable to all employees, Muslims of any kind as well as non-Muslim. However, Rudnyckyj reported that many non-Muslim participants did feel uncomfortable with the heavily Islamic approach to spiritual development.

The perceived social benefits of piety are particularly relevant to PKS's political goal of creating a more religious country. Unlike Al Azhar, PKS is actively and explicitly participating in efforts to develop a religious sensibility to replace the secular mindsets, abstract approaches to religion, or adulterated Islamic practices of previous decades

through political and cultural means. JSIT schools are a significant part of the cultural Islamization efforts of the party. In effect, the SITs are a laboratory for developing educational practices that the party would, in a modified form, expand to the national level if given the opportunity. On the other hand, Al Azhar has similar hopes of a more religious citizenry, but does not hold the same vision of what that piety would look like. As will be discussed in a later section, leadership from both organizations have similar visions of reforming the national education system to generate pious citizens, regardless of religion. As visions of this national reform are based on the extended-day schools' unique approach to instilling piety, this ideology will first be explained as implemented in Al Azhar and JSIT schools, before moving to ideas of its national application.

The Ideology of Integrated Islam

Since their conception, Islamic schools have been adapting to their social and political milieu. However, one of the most significant shifts came at the post-colonial (Niyozov & Memon 2011), or the modern (Kadi 2006, Berkey 2007), era. The Muslim response to Western modernity and Western science has been diverse, ranging from rejection, to adaptation, to adoption. Some, such as Ataturk in Turkey, marginalized Islamic schooling and embraced the Western sciences and Western schooling, seeing them as the key to Europe's superiority in technology and warfare, and therefore the key to Turkey's modernization. Others, such as Maududi in the subcontinent, called upon Muslims to distance themselves from Western modernity and Western sciences, because in Maududi's view, Western immorality and secularism, among other things, were corrupting Islam's message of obedience to God's servants (Niyozov & Memon 2011:13-14).

In post-colonial Indonesia, successive policy shifts progressively incorporated non-boarding Islamic schools (mainly madrasas and Muhammadiyah schools) into the state education system⁹¹ through standardized curriculum requirements regarding the inclusion of general sciences. Although Islamic schooling has been largely the work of private institutions rather than the government, with an estimated 96%⁹² of madrasa and Islamic schools being private, madrasas and Islamic schools account for the education of 13% of all primary- and secondary-level students in Indonesia (Azra et al. 2006:179, 180). Currently, these schools are required to provide a curriculum comprised of about 70% general and 30% religious subjects. This policy was intended to guarantee the successful continuation of religious school students' education at public institutions at the postsecondary level. Pesantren, Islamic boarding schools that traditionally only provide Islamic training, have not been and are not beholden to government certification, and are thus free from state curricula requirements. However, to address the challenges of a changing, modernizing society, pesantren leaders have and continue to adjust their curriculum by adding general-studies content (see Lukens-Bull 2000; Lukens-Bull 2005; Pohl 2006).

Al Azhar and JSIT schools see the learning of the sciences not only as a way to survive in the modern era, but also as a commandment of God and an act of worship. A Luqman al Hakim SIT Qur'an teacher explained, "Islam encourages Muslims to seek knowledge (*ilmu*) about everything... The studying of any knowledge (*ilmu*) constitutes worship" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT Qur'an teacher, November 30, 2009). This

⁹¹ Upon independence in 1945, the colonial Dutch education system was nationalized, becoming the basic pattern for the national education system.

⁹² This data is from 1989.

perspective that the Qur'an insists that the sciences and other general subject matter be studied not only validates the study of scientific subjects, but also justifies the inclusion of the entire national curriculum in an Islamic school's program of study.



Al Azhar 31 grade-two students during class work

Although Al Azhar and JSIT educators do not oppose Western sciences,⁹³ they do oppose Western society's ostensibly secular⁹⁴ approach to that knowledge. During the Enlightenment, religion and its revealed knowledge was considered limiting to scientific knowledge and reason-based understanding. The desacralization of knowledge and public life ensued, creating "secular" and "religious" types of knowledge. Consequently, state schooling systems in the West generally reflect a more

secular approach to and understanding of the sciences and information in general. Various contemporary religious movements, however—most famously among Christians, the Creationists in the United States, and among Muslims, the Gülen Movement in Turkey—have challenged this desacralized approach to knowledge and are working to reintegrate

⁹³ Teachers' tertiary training is from all different fields, rather than religion departments, and they are eager to provide an education for children that is both academically sound and religiously rigorous. Mirroring the "common man" persona of the current revival of Islam through out the world, where lay individuals fill leadership roles in social institutions with religious missions, these two school groups are no different.

⁹⁴ The concept of "secular" can be attributed to two primary distinctions: the separation of religion from issues of the state, and the differentiation of various sectors of society such as economic, legal, educational, familial, and religious (Berger 1973, Casanova 1994; Durkheim 1965; Martin 1978).

religion and the sciences. While making similar efforts, Al Azhar and JSIT schools have no connection to the Gülen Movement.

While most other Islamic schools in Indonesia incorporate both religion and general classes into their school curricula, religious and scientific knowledge are discussed in separate classes. Al Azhar and JSIT schools consider the categorization of religious and secular knowledge, or religion and the sciences, to be a misguided dichotomy. This inaccurate dichotomy is reflected in the curriculum of both general schools and other Islamic schools. As one Luqman al Hakim SIT founder put it,

In our idealism as Muslims, Islam is a holistic or comprehensive set of world affairs and the affairs of the hereafter. Cognitive, emotional, and psychomotor aspects must coalesce...Other Islamic schools indeed already had religious studies and general studies but they are not yet integrated. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, March 22, 2010)

Like many of the Islamization projects currently going on throughout the world, these schools view Islam as comprehensive and relevant to all public (political, economic, social, etc.) and private aspects of life (Roy 2004). In this paradigm, an integration of the religious and general knowledge is viewed as a more accurate portrayal of the comprehensiveness of Islam,⁹⁵ and thus a more comprehensive and accurate worldview. Since Islam is from God and God created all things, Islam contains all knowledge necessary for being successful in this life and the next. Therefore, a division of secular and religious is artificial.

Integrated Islam ideology combines some aspects of Western schooling (i.e. academic focus, the use of technology, and critical thinking pedagogy) with Islamic

⁹⁵ If Islam is comprehensive, isn't the term "integrated Islam" misleading? JSIT founders initially felt a conflict when deciding what to call their new schools. As one explained, they hesitated at first to use the term "integrated" since Islam, by its nature, is complete or integrated into all aspects of life. Ultimately, however, they chose to use the term to signify to the larger community that they approached Islamic schooling differently than other Islamic schools, namely keeping "secular" and "religious" subjects segregated.

concepts and narratives, therefore providing a “morally meaningful context” to the material (Milligan 2006:419). These schools’ integration of Islam and Western sciences has similarities with the concept of the Islamization of knowledge. In 1977 in Mecca, at the First World Congress on Muslim Education, al-Attas from Malaysia made first mention of the idea of Islamization of knowledge, or ridding Western knowledge of its secular values by reframing it in its right and proper place within an Islamic vision of truth and reality (Wan Daud 1998:309, Halstead 2004:523). However, debates among scholars have arisen regarding the appropriateness of accepting Western classifications of knowledge versus giving more attention to “sources of knowledge established in Islam or to the methodology followed by eminent Muslim thinkers” (Halstead 2004:522). The extended-day educators do not consider themselves to be engaged in these debates, though they seem to have been influenced by these concepts and approaches to knowledge.

In order to approach the study of the sciences and general knowledge appropriate for an Islamic society, the schools employ an Islamic framework that is guided by what I have termed an integrated Islam ideology. This integrated Islam ideology is marked by three key features: 1) desegregation of secular and religious knowledge by presenting all class content in an Islamic framework; 2) a Qur’an-based epistemology; and 3) development of a strong consciousness of God. These three interrelated features are intended to engender piety among students by instilling intellectual respect for God and indebtedness to God’s benevolence.

Desegregation of secular and religious knowledge in the classroom

Integrated Islam ideology seeks to reinsert God into the history, explanation, and understanding of the workings of this world (Niyozov & Memon 2011). This is done through the use of religious text, namely the Qur'an, alongside textbooks as sources of information in the sciences and all other classes. As an Al-Azhar 31 religion teacher understood it, the combination of religion and sciences "is pure knowledge, it [knowledge] becomes perfect (*kaffah*). We shouldn't distinguish Islamic knowledge and general knowledge. Knowledge is one" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 religion teacher, February 16, 2010). He argues that one without the other is incomplete. Their combination works together for a complete, perfect understanding of this world, and the next.

In integrated Islam ideology, there are no categorical divisions of "secular" and "religious" knowledge. All knowledge is from God. A JSIT founder explained:

What is learned at school must be viewed as a single unit, which in Islam is called *tumid* [unity and interconnectedness of truth]. What are the implications? When we learn about flowers, about the stones, rain, sky, earth, and so on it should not just be looked at as only science...We believe that science on the earth comes from the one that is God, the owner of knowledge. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010)

He continued with an example, claiming that it would be inaccurate to describe the law of gravity as a

so-called law of nature. Secular people call it a law of nature. Nature has willed it that way. Newton thought that there was gravity because the earth had gravitational pull. But we consider the earth to have gravity because God created it. So we integrate. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010)

From his perspective, referring to the workings of the world as the "laws of nature" is an attempt to sidestep recognition of God's hand in creating the world. In his mind, to discuss the "laws of nature" without attributing their existence to God's power is to deprive the principle of an Islamic narrative and "morally meaningful context" (Milligan 2006:419).

Additionally, Islamic principles are discussed and integrated into lessons so as to “deepen the students’ understanding of Islam” (Al Azhar headquarters official, August 11, 2012). For example, in a mathematics class on division, students use the context of the act of alms giving, one of the five pillars of Islam, for calculating an amount to be given. This situation provides direct application of the skill as well as a discussion on the practice of alms giving.

Qur’an-based epistemology

In this ideology, the Qur’an is the ultimate source of knowledge. As a grade-four teacher at Al Azhar 31 succinctly explained, “All I know is that all knowledge is from God and Islam is from God, so all the knowledge that’s out there has an explanation here [in the Qur’an], even though it’s not very detailed” (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, February 9, 2010). In other words, God is the source of all knowledge and he has revealed it in the Qur’an. As such, “When learning science it’s not secular. We associate it with revelations [from the Qur’an]” (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010). In other words, while the schools implement the ostensibly secular national curriculum in its entirety, it is taught within a religious framework that provides the students with a morally meaningful context for the information.

While there is no secular–religious dichotomy in the classroom, there is a distinct hierarchy to knowledge. These schools both readily acknowledge the importance of religious and general knowledge for productive participation in society. Yet, if there are conflicts between an Islamic perspective and a non-Islamic one on a social, political or scientific topic, the revealed knowledge eclipses any other. While all knowledge is one,

man's knowledge is subject to God and His prophets' teachings. Science comes from God; therefore God's word in holy texts take precedence over scientists' explanations if the two sources do not correlate. The integration occurs at the level of discussing all perspectives together, but it does not mean that the perspectives are considered to be equal. The word of God, and therefore the concepts, perspectives, and ideals found within the Qur'an and Hadith, are the correct truths and cannot be altered or negotiated. The perspective is that scholars do not invent knowledge, but rather scientists discover God's knowledge (Niyozov & Memon 2011:17).

Classroom instruction on evolution offers the most vivid example of how this hierarchy is implemented through Islamic narratives of scientific principles. As the theory of evolution is part of the national high school curriculum, which Al Azhar and JSIT schools teach in full, the science teacher would teach the theory of evolution and then cite the Qur'anic account of the creation of Adam and Eve and present it as the accurate account of man's coming into existence. The proof for discounting scientific theories is found in the Qur'an, the spoken word of God. Teachers do not withhold the generally accepted theories of science from the students, but provide what they consider a complete education by correcting theories when needed with the teachings of the Qur'an. Rather than saving the theological discussion about the origins of man for religion class led by a religion teacher, as would happen in general and other religious schools, the science teacher subordinates man's "incorrect" theories to the revealed truths of the Qur'an in science class. Thus, all teachers are considered to be both religion and subject-specific teachers.

Such a practice is expected to prevent contradictions in the various learning environments students experience in a given day. In "a very extreme example" provided by

Ery, one of the founders of Luqman al Hakim SIT, students in “elementary school to college” are taught

that our ancestors are apes... In the afternoon when children return to the mosques, to their homes, it is believed that in the book of Islam that the first human was Adam, the second Eve, and so forth. So in the morning our ancestors are apes; our ancestor in the afternoon is Adam, a glorious human being. That’s something that’s contradictory. That’s...an example of a problem in the world of education in Indonesia—its [curricular content] doesn’t start from the basic religious communities themselves... We are passionate about correcting this. (Interview with Ery Masruri, October 21, 2009)

Thus, by addressing both the worldly and religious understandings of the same issues and establishing a hierarchy of knowledge, subordinating man’s scientific theories to explanations from the Qur’an, students avoid confusion from contradictory information. They categorize the information into God’s revealed knowledge, which is right, and scientists’ knowledge, which is faulty.

On a practical level, students need to know the national curriculum in order to excel on the national exams and eventually gain access to top universities. Student performance on these exams greatly impacts students’ future educational prospects (and the reputation of the institutions as quality schools). Consequently, teachers and parents alike expect students to know and understand the national curriculum well. As a science teacher from Luqman al Hakim SIT pragmatically commented, “The exam is more academically oriented which is the overall goal of education. The overall aim is inevitably to pursue good academics” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT science teacher, November 14, 2009). The schools understand that a solid foundation in not only religion, but also sciences, technology, and employable skills, is necessary to function in society as a productive citizen. Students are not being trained to become religious leaders so much as God-fearing citizens, religious politicians, pious businesspersons, Muslim academics and devout

activists. In their eyes, for Indonesia to become a stronger country, it must have not only an intelligent but also a faithful population. Integrated schools are determined to do their part in educating students to become smart and pious Muslims.

It is interesting to note that while it is crucial that students are instructed in Qur'anic content relevant to the sciences and other general subjects, students are not tested on this information. Obviously national exams would only cover national curricula, but school exams did not cover the supplementary Qur'anic material either. Such an examination seemed like an odd idea to the teachers. One teacher suggested it would be too much for students to learn the general textbook information and memorize Qur'anic references to the correlating material. It seems neither teacher nor student viewed general subject exams as the place to display their Qur'anic knowledge. Given the emphasis on of integrating Islamic understanding into all subject matters, it was surprising to me as an educator that the schools and teachers did not consider this information relevant for assessment. Perhaps this indicates a pressure the schools feel to keep the exams in their schools as equivalent as possible with the general schools. Or, it may indicate a culturally different approach to and understanding of the use of exams in schools. On the other hand, it is possible that most subject content is not contrary to the Qur'an as much as it is simply missing the moral context or appropriate attribution of its existence to God's grace, as will be discussed in the next section.

Consciousness of God

A consciousness of God's intellectual prowess and benevolent character round out this ideology. The "core" to integrated Islam, in the words of a JSIT secretary at

headquarters in Jakarta, is for students to “feel the greatness of God and the existence of God” (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009). His use of the word “feel” connotes not an intellectual understanding that can be stored in the mind, but a consciousness centered in the heart. A student’s sense of God is expected to emerge from subtle messages in the more epistemological lessons. Phrases such as “We believe that science on the earth comes from the one that is God, the owner of knowledge” implies a particular kind of benefactor–beneficiary relationship between God and humans, thus promoting a sense of intellectual indebtedness to God for knowledge.

Not only are humans intellectually indebted to God for all knowledge in this ideology, but their lives are also blessed by God’s mercy and generosity. In another example from the science classroom, students are taught God’s benevolence to humans. As an Al Azhar 31 teacher explained to me, she teaches her fourth-grade students the scientific concepts of the water cycle, such as evaporation, condensation, and precipitation. She then reads from the Qur’an to teach that rain is a gift from God (Interview with Al Azhar 31 teacher, February 9, 2010). This additional revealed knowledge from the Qur’an does not change the understanding of the scientific process; rather, it highlights the compassion of God for gifting the world with rain. By emphasizing that rain or other aspects of life are gifts from God, the teachers engender a sense of God’s compassion for humanity.

Additionally, the systematic insertion of Islamic values and codes of conduct in the schools’ daily routine interweaves God into the mundane tasks of the day (Hasan 2009). For example, the school day, and often lessons, are begun with prayer; students are instructed to write “*Basmallah*”—a shorthand phrase to mean “In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful” generally uttered at the initiation of any activity—on their school

work. The culminating effect of these activities attempts to imbue an awareness of God's presence in all aspects of life.

The epistemological components of integrated Islam ideology are coupled with an affective one to accomplish Al Azhar and JSIT's goals of shaping intelligent and pious students. The first two components—desegregation of secular and religious knowledge and a Qur'an-based epistemology—engender a particular intellectual perspective that honors God's revealed knowledge over scientists' reason-based understandings. The third component—consciousness of God—creates a more affective relationship to God. Thus, embedding the divine in all aspects of learning, attributing God to be “the owner” and therefore the source of knowledge, and ascribing the presence of scientific phenomena as gifts from God, teaches students both an intellectual respect for and sense of indebtedness to God. This is intended to create a bond with or allegiance to God with both the mind and heart. Such an allegiance is expected to inspire and drive the performance of Islamic values and expressions of piety.

Visions of a National Piety Project

In October 2012, the Ministry of National Education announced a proposed overhaul of the national curriculum to be implemented in July 2013;⁹⁶ although the reform is in part an effort to de-clutter the curriculum, it proposes to increase religion classes as part of a focus on character development (Schonhardt 2013). There has been strong opposition, not all of which is directed toward the increased religion courses. Regardless, the proposed

⁹⁶ The rush to implement the reform is likely related to fear of a shift in political support after upcoming legislative elections. (Personal communication with Sara Schonhardt, *New York Times* freelance journalist, January 28, 2013).

changes demonstrate that the conceptualization of religion and moral character development as intrinsically connected extends beyond Islamic school educators.

If Al Azhar and JSIT leadership were able to propose their own national curriculum reforms, they would go beyond increased religion classes as the ministry has proposed, and seek for an overall infusion of religion into all subjects through an “integrated religion” approach. Leadership from both organizations have similar visions of a robust national piety project that would prompt piety and moral behavior in all students, regardless of religious affiliation. The proposed method for accomplishing this would be much like integrated Islam, but generalized to a basic belief in “God.” Although their visions are similar, PKS has a more formalized reform plan.

As a member of the winning political coalition for the 2009 presidential elections, PKS, the Islamic party associated with JSIT, requested the cabinet position of Minister of Education. The request was denied.⁹⁷ Undaunted, however, the party remains active in developing a national education platform. In addition to standard policy issues such as the expansion of schooling quality, modernization of the curriculum with real-life relevance, and improved facilities, the PKS education platform includes objectives to rectify the secular orientation of the national curriculum.

⁹⁷ During the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, PKS was part of the nationalist coalition lead by the Democratic Party’s founder, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who won both elections. After the president’s 2009 re-election, PKS members obtained four cabinet seats in the new government. They currently serve as Ministers of Communication and Information Technology (Minister Tifatul Sembiring), Agriculture (Minister Suswono), Social Affairs (Minister Salim Segaf Al Jufri) and Research and Technology (Minister Suharna Surapranata).

The following description of a national piety project is predominantly based on interviews with the secretary of JSIT, and also with Fahmi Alaydrus,⁹⁸ one of JSIT's founders and current PKS Chairman of the Education Department. Given that JSIT is an unofficial but undeniable extension of PKS as they work together to develop educational policy for the network and the political party, much of the following discussion representing JSIT is discussed in terms of PKS' national educational platform.



Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four students studying the Qur'an

national education system. However, as this vision is not widely distributed (given PKS are not in a political position to propose it), Murni was not familiar with it when we talked. He was familiar with JSIT schooling. After my brief explanation, he was in general agreement with its goals and expressed similar opinions and vision. Despite the fact that Al Azhar, as

Information from two short interviews with Murni Djamal⁹⁹ also inform the following discussion. I spoke with Murni Jamal, the Dean of Faculty of Literature at Al Azhar University, in part to discuss his thoughts regarding the PKS vision of a reformed

⁹⁸ A founder and former Chairman of JSIT and current Chairman of Nurul Fikri Foundation, one of the most established and influential foundations providing and promoting integrated Islamic schooling in Indonesia. He is also the Chairman of the Education Department for PKS.

⁹⁹ When I asked my Al Azhar headquarter contacts to speak with someone who was familiar with the development of the organization's integrated approach, I was put in contact with Murni Djamal. As such, I view his perspectives to be representative of the organization's leadership.

far as I am aware, does not have a mapped out vision for reforming the national education system, it is to be expected that the organization's invested educators would have ideas they believe would strengthen the national system. However, the JSIT-cum-PKS vision is much more formalized than any Al Azhar-based ideas. Therefore, the discussion below is predominantly based on PKS' vision, with some additional input from Al Azhar when appropriate.

Starting from the integrated Islam ideology that a complete education promotes intelligence and piety and that religion is the best vehicle for moral development and piety, PKS would seek to set the state education curriculum within a religious framework. Emphasizing the myopic nature of a secular perspective that reduces this life to a material level (Niyozov & Memon 2011), Fahmi, the chairman of the PKS education department, explained,

We do not want there to be a secular curriculum. We consider that what is on the face of this earth was created by God, including ourselves...so we do not separate [secular and religious knowledge]. We live in this world, a stage before our life after we die. It's our first stage (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010).

From their perspective, all true knowledge is from God and true knowledge transcends time and space. Consequently, the concept that God created the world and "ourselves" (a subtle reminder that God, and not the process of evolution, created man) transcends the context of the students' and teachers' specific religious beliefs. Additionally, the party believes that a national education system ought to equip students for both this life and the next. A secular curriculum is then an incomplete curriculum, as it only deals with the present material world.

As the JSIT secretary explained, "There is no difference between Islam and Christianity in divinity and matters of creation." Therefore students would continue to have

religion classes specific to their religious traditions, but the generic or “non-denominational” concept of God would be integrated into general subjects. He continued, “The important thing is that students are able to feel the greatness of God and the existence of God. That’s the essence of integrated Islam” and therefore would be the emphasis of an integrated religion approach (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009). In the classroom, Fahmi explained,

when in a public school, if [the teacher] is not Muslim but Christian, he can explain to the students the greatness of God (*Tuhan*) because Christians and Muslims believe in God. Each believes in God. So a Christian is able to explain the greatness of God to the students though he doesn’t know the Qur’an but knows the Gospel. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, Interview May 1, 2010)

The particulars of God could be discussed in segregated religion classes, but in general subject classes where teachers and students of various religions participate together, teachers would instill a consciousness of God’s greatness without mention of a specific God.

As for matters of creation that would surface in science classes, Fahmi also explained, “The Gospel talks about God and that God created the universe. It’s the same with Islam...All religions teach it, including Judaism” (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, Interview May 1, 2010). According to the Qur’an, Christians and Jews are considered *ahl-al-kitab*, or “people of the book”—those who recognize the God of Abraham as the one and only God and adhere to religions based on revealed scripture.

While it is true that Muslims and Christians share a common creation story and have, relatively speaking, fairly similar beliefs about the nature of God, not all Indonesians are from these religions. In addition to Islam and Christianity (divided into Catholicism and Protestantism in Indonesia), which an estimated 95% (CIA 2012) of the population identifies as their religious tradition, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are also

constitutionally recognized religions.¹⁰⁰ As a lead-in question to understanding how different religious traditions would be honored within this integrated religion ideology, I asked how Buddhist and Hindu understandings of man's creation compared with Christian and Muslim beliefs. Both the PKS and JSIT officials openly admitted to knowing little about the religions. However, both men assumed that by the mere fact that Hinduism and Buddhism were religions, they would hold concepts of God compatible with Islam and Christianity. In the words of Fahmi:

I don't understand Buddhism, but I do understand that Buddhism cares a lot about the environment, the earth, and the sky. Hinduism too. I see there is a kind of intersection between these many religions. They teach things that are definitely commonly accepted. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, Interview May 1, 2010)

In other words, he believed that these religions promoted values that were universally accepted and assumed that these values were equivalent to those promoted within Islam and Christianity.

In addition, these JSIT and PKS activists assumed that Hindu and Buddhist concepts of God¹⁰¹ and the Earth's creation intersected in a meaningful and compatible way with Islam and Christianity. I suggested that the Muslim or Christian concepts of God were different than Hindu concepts and thus possibly incompatible. Fahmi replied, "They [Hindus] have gods (*dewa*). Similarly, they are super-natural as well, but their forms are not Allah or Jesus, but there is Brahma, Shiva, Vishnu. They call them gods. It's the same" (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, Interview May 1, 2010). Similarly, the JSIT secretariat

¹⁰⁰ Other religious groups exist in Indonesia, such as Baha'i and Judaism, but they are not officially recognized.

¹⁰¹ Technically speaking, Buddhas are not considered Gods. However, Pyysiäinen (2003) argues that Buddhas fulfill the criteria of "counter-intuitive agents," thus allowing for Buddhism to fit into a global concept of religion. See "Buddhism, Religion, and the Concept of 'God'" by Ilkka Pyysiäinen, *Numen*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2003) pp. 147–171 for full discussion.

said, “I’m not Hindu, but I don’t think there’s a difference between Islam and [Hinduism]. Perhaps the rituals are different but the beliefs are the same. They believe in *dewa* [Hindu word for God] but we say ‘Allah.’ I don’t think it’s different” (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009). In other words, they see the fact that believing in a god,¹⁰² regardless of theological tenets, creates sufficient commonalities for a guiding integrated religion ideology for the national education system.

Although one must register oneself on official government documents (birth certificates, school registration forms, state-issued identification, marriage certificates, etc.) as belonging of one of the six constitutionally recognized religious traditions, it is well known that there are additional religious traditions as well as non-believers in Indonesia. To my question of how an integrated religion ideology would affect non-believers in the education system, Fahmi, speaking from sustained determination and vision, stated,

That is the task of education. To those who do not believe, yes we have to educate them because they have arguments as to why they...position themselves as atheists. Well, actually this is the main work of the prophets, educators, *ulama*, and people who have knowledge to explain to them—in ways that are wise and good and step-by-step...We must always be optimistic and think that every person has the opportunity to change his mind. So we just inform them: “This is religion. This is the system. Synch your brain and your heart.” At first they may reject it, but like a hard stone if we use drops of water, it will slowly erode. So you have to be patient. That is the task of Jesus, Muhammad, Noah, Abraham, everyone like them. So, it’s not a problem. It’s our job to communicate and educate. (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, Interview May 1, 2010)

¹⁰² As Indonesia is comprised of myriad ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, this founding principle states “Belief in one God,” but the name of that God is withheld so as to accommodate Muslims, Christians, Catholics, and other monotheistic religions. This was an effort to claim to be a religious, monotheistic country, which in turn would not officially recognize the animistic religions, which had pre-Islamic presence throughout the archipelago, as well as other minority religions, and in more contemporary debates, atheists. Initially there were five officially recognized religions: Islam, Catholicism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Hinduism and Buddhism were creatively reinterpreted as monotheistic religions in order to be officially recognized (Ricklefs 1981:213). A sixth religion, Confucianism, has since been formally recognized. The other four pillars of Pancasila are more nationalistic rather than religious, namely: Just and civilized humanity; Unity of Indonesia; Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and, Social justice for all Indonesians.

In Fahmi's mind, the proposed education system's legal obligations to educate parallel that of the callings of prophets, Jesus, Muhammad and current religious leaders, or *ulama*, to teach and instruct the population to become believers. In essence, the party's integrated religion ideology would act as a form of *dakwah* for religion—rather than Islam specifically—to both Muslim and non-Muslim students in both public and private general and religious schools.

Acknowledging that not all unbelievers are likely to convert to a religious life, Fahmi concluded, "Whether they will want to join or not is none of our business." However, he went onto explain that

What is often the problem is that they don't get full and complete information, or they are often misinformed and biased about things. What's the result? Ultimately, their process of thinking is wrong. Why? Because the data and information was inaccurate." (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010)

Fahmi seems convinced that the right kind of education, "full and complete information," rather than a secular perspective, would turn an individual to God. Therefore, the national education system is an obvious forum for disseminating correct information and generating an awareness of God in all aspects of life, facilitating the conversion of both students' minds and hearts to God. His belief that "inaccurate information" is the only viable explanation for why individuals would not believe in God highlights a widespread bias among PKS and other religious educators, towards those that are religious.

The integrated religion approach is meant to convert individuals to a deeper, more pious practice of their own religious heritages, putting a premium on piety. As the JSIT secretariat reasoned, "Being religious is better than being irreligious or agnostic...We think

that religious people are better than non-religious people. People who believe in God are better than people who don't believe in God." He went on to clarify,

We encourage everyone to adhere to a religion. A Muslim should be a good Muslim and a Christian a good Christian. This is our vision of diversity and plurality. They are religious within their religion and we are religious within our religion; they don't interfere with each other. All goes well and everyone is happy. A Christian is welcome to worship as a Christian ought, and Islamic people also worship as well as possible (Interview with JSIT secretary, December 9, 2009)

This vision of peaceful diversity and plurality within the community is dependent on being actively religious; not just a nominal Muslim or Christian, but a "good Muslim" and a "good Christian" "worshiping as best they can." This broadens the party's inclusion of those who can contribute to the country's development and who would be considered good citizens to any religious person. However, it seems a bit optimistic to believe that "good Muslims" and "good Christians" living within their religions as best they can will not "interfere with each other." Current trends, including an uptake in religious intolerance and violence between religious groups in Indonesia, suggest that increased religiosity does not immediately translate to religious respect or tolerance for others' religious practices.

This perspective that religious traditions' values will not differ in fundamental ways assumes compatible social, moral, and political ideals between religious groups. While morals such as honesty, respect, and social responsibility may be universal, beliefs in the nature of God and God's role in the creation of the world and daily happenings are more tradition-specific. Reactions to the pornography bill, heavily legislated by PKS members, passed into law in 2008 demonstrated differences between religious traditions on issues as simple as modesty. Under its vague language, naked or partially clothed statues of Hindu gods could easily be considered arousing and therefore pornographic and in violation of the law. The governor of Bali, a predominantly Hindu island, disagreed with the law and

stated that Bali officials would not enforce it (Setiawati 2008). Unless one's sense of piety extends to respect for diverse conceptualizations of piety, there is great potential for clashes between religious groups.

Justification for this vision of a national piety project is based in Ministry of Education policy and the founding principles of Indonesia. Fahmi argued, "Indonesia's national education objective rests on two pillars (*substansi*), namely intelligence (*cerdas*) and piety (*taqwa*). These two things become a necessity for building character" (Interview with Fahmi Alaydrus, May 1, 2010). Murni from Al Azhar drew upon a more fundamental piece of national policy, claiming the integration of religion into everyday life, and therefore all subjects, is part of Indonesia's founding principles, namely the first tenet of Pancasila, "Belief in one God." He stated, "The main goal of our school system nationally is to make our young generation base their lives, their knowledge on the teachings of religion...This is what we call the first pillar of Pancasila...[The national school system is] to make people pious, to make people religious but at the same time to make important people within national life, based on the moral teachings of religion...So knowledge and religion should go hand in hand to make one complete personality of young Indonesian people" (Interview with Murni Djamal, August 11, 2012). Murni references government policy and refers to students as Indonesians, implying that developing one's religion, intellect, and morality is as much a civic duty as it is a personal pursuit.

The National Education Act of 2003,¹⁰³ chapter 2, article 3, states, "The function of national education is to develop skills and form the character and civilization of a dignified

¹⁰³ Since independence in 1945, the Indonesian Government has released two education policies regarding the framework of the education system: National Education Act Number 2 in 1998 and National Education Act Number 20 in 2003. A comparison of the 1998 and 2003 acts reveals a greater number of references to

nation, to educate the nation by developing the potential of students to be faithful and pious toward God Almighty (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), upstanding (*berakhlak mulia*), healthy, knowledgeable, skilled, creative, and independent individuals and democratic and accountable citizens” (MoNE 2003). From its conception, Indonesia has constitutionally been a religious country, without a named religion. As just stated, the first pillar of Pancasila (the Five Principles of the nation) is “Belief in One God.” Religion, and more specifically Islam, has always been a very public matter in Indonesia (Gade 2004, Hefner 2000). As religion must be declared on one’s Indonesian identity card, publicly acknowledged religion is linked to citizenship (Bowen 2003). Religious instruction¹⁰⁴ has been compulsory in general schools since the late 1960s, with a tightening of regulations in 1989 (Azra et al. 2007:187). While Fahmi’s claim that current national education objectives rest solely on the pillars of intelligence and piety is debatable, an “integrated religion” reform would work to move religion to the forefront.

The current national compulsory curriculum for general schools only requires a minimum of religious instruction, generally meeting once a week—the same frequency as compulsory arts and culture and physical education classes. While it is clear that belief in God is one of the country’s founding principles, and piety among students is a stated goal of the education policy, the attention religion has been given in the national curriculum makes one question the government’s historical level of commitment to this ideal relative to other

God and piety in the 2003 document. This shift is yet another indication that religion is becoming more prominent in Indonesian politics and policies.

¹⁰⁴ Religion classes are segregated by religion; students learn only about the religion to which they belong and teachers teach only classes on the religion to which they belong.

objectives. Proposed changes announced in October 2012 signal efforts underway to give greater priority to religious education.

In the future, PKS may have the political position and wider political support to implement further reform, or Al Azhar may be able to influence ministry policy through consultations. However, implementation would be fraught with complications such as teacher training, ascertaining teacher commitment to the approach, and possible opposition from minority religions and the non-religious public.¹⁰⁵ Other Indonesians will be uncomfortable with such an explicit infusion of a particular religious perspective into the public education system. However, religion is becoming more dominant in Indonesia's public sphere, and this kind of policy may get more traction at a later date. In the interim, the proposed curriculum reform, if implemented, will increase students' instruction on religion.

Conclusion

Extended-day Islamic school educators consider moral character to be synonymous with piety. Pervasive in the thinking of these educators is the belief that piety is not only an essential personal characteristic of a good Muslim (or believer of any religion), but also a crucial component of Indonesian citizenship. The study of both religion and general subjects is an act of worship; further, in the eyes of these educators, it is a commandment and moral obligation. While an intelligent population is necessary for national progress,

¹⁰⁵ PKS' vision of national education, as explained to me, would not increase the number of credits for religious instruction, but would infuse religious instruction into other subjects. Although explanations to me were not exhaustive and implementation strategies were not discussed, it seems implementation would require curriculum development and an expansive overhaul of teacher training, with teacher buy-in being a key component. Teachers from across the archipelago come from a vast array of backgrounds and may have different views on the place of religion in typical non-religion classes.

particularly in modern times, piety is necessary to ensure knowledge is applied in beneficial ways that prevent selfishness and corruption and contribute to a healthy nation. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, although leadership and educators within Al Azhar and JSIT visualize the particulars of piety and what a good Muslim looks like differently, they both agree on the importance of pairing piety with intelligence in order to achieve the full development of their students and the nation.

In a break from the common Islamic schools, Al Azhar and JSIT schools employ an innovative integrated Islam ideology, as I term it, in order to shape students who are both intelligent and pious. The integrated Islam ideology is comprised of three interrelated components: 1) desegregation of secular and religious knowledge by presenting all class content in an Islamic framework; 2) a Qur'an-based epistemology; and, 3) a strong consciousness of God. The ostensibly secular national curriculum is taught within an Islamic framework, integrating revealed knowledge into classroom discussions on all subjects. The innovation of the integrated Islam ideology is that it creates a hierarchy of knowledge, prioritizing divine knowledge over that of the mundane.

This integration has both intellectual and affective functions. While all true knowledge is good, students must understand that God is the source. A hierarchy of knowledge is established in which humans' reason-based knowledge is subordinate to God's revealed knowledge, as found in the Qur'an, when there is conflict between the two. Refuting the theory of evolution with the Qur'an teaches students that God is more intelligent than humans.

However, not all references to the Qur'an in class are meant to disprove the theories of humans. They often provide a morally meaningful context for scientific phenomena. For

example, students learn about precipitation, but ultimately learn to view rain as a gift from God rather than as a mere scientific process. Teaching such Qur'anic verses contributes to a consciousness of and indebtedness to God for his benevolence. These functions are intended to generate an intellectual respect for and affective indebtedness to God that will motivate pious and devout sensibilities among students.

The current integrated Islam ideology component of these schools' piety projects serves as a blueprint for extended-day Islamic school leaders' envisioned national piety projects. While ideas espoused by Al Azhar leadership are not formalized in any real sense, JSIT-cum-PKS' vision for development of a PKS education platform is. Both groups justify a national piety project through national policy and founding principles of the country that call for "belief in one God" and for students to be "faithful and pious toward God Almighty." They believe the universality of values and concepts in religions allows for any religion to be the vehicle for teaching piety and thus comprehensive character development. The mechanism for teaching would be a modification of integrated Islam ideology to a more general integrated religion ideology.

However, this ideology assumes that the similarity of values between Indonesia's various religions to be greater than theological differences. While integrated religion would intend to be inclusive of all religions through the inclusion of universal values and stripped-down concepts of God, in all likelihood it would promote a specific understanding of God that would not and could not be universal. The determination to integrate religion into the national education system appears to overshadow the theological tenets of the minority religions of the country and to ignore how those tenets may or may not fit with the dominant religion's learning objectives and worldview.

While an integrated religion ideology is far from being implemented at the national level, using religion as the vehicle for teaching moral character is gaining traction in Indonesia, as demonstrated by the popularity of extended-day schools and the proposed national curriculum changes for the 2013 school year. PKS' long-term political goal to create a pious population would be greatly facilitated if all students, not just the ones attending Islamic or other religious schools, were taught a religiously-framed understanding of the world. In this platform, the national schools would become the vehicles to teach not only the believers, but also the unbelievers, "correct" principles and encourage piety. Consequently, the national education system would be incorporated into the larger PKS political project of an Islamized and religious society.

Chapter 7

Middle Class Morality: Parents and School Selection

I saw that the method of instruction at state schools was too harsh for my daughter so I preferred to send her to Al Azhar. Additionally, she can study religion here (Al Azhar 31) and in the afternoon she can participate in other extra activities, like swimming and other things.
Al Azhar 31 mother, housewife, April 26, 2010

The 2008 instant blockbuster film *Laskar Pelangi (The Rainbow Troops)*, based on the bestselling autobiography of the same title, details the challenges of a dilapidated private Muhammadiyah school in the 1970s on the small mining island of Belitung, Indonesia. Shunned by the majority of the community and the Ministry of National Education for its poor facilities, lack of supplies, and low quality academic education, this school survives on the goodwill and determination of its unpaid teachers and the commitment of its 10 students, one of whom bikes 80 kilometers round trip each day from his remote fishing village to attend. Even though the school's fees were significantly less expensive than the local state school, the financial sacrifice of the parents to enroll their children came with the expectation that even a poor education would improve their children's future prospects. The film highlights the role Islamic schools have historically played in providing educational opportunities to poor families who could not afford public schools, which charged fees until 2009, when all public schools were declared free.

This common scenario, seen across the globe, of impoverished parents sacrificing a great deal in order to enroll their children in school with hopes for improving their future life situations, gets a middle-class makeover. In contrast to the film's marginalized Muhammadiyah school of the 1970s, the new and innovative extended-day Islamic schools are the first choice schools of many urban middle-class families in the post-Suharto era.

Unlike the parents in Belitong, who would have opted for the state school had it been affordable, the middle-class parents of this study opted for a more expensive extended-day Islamic school. These parents have redefined an education for a brighter future to include not only strong academics, but also a robust religious curriculum, and they are willing to pay expensive tuition fees for it.

In contrast to the schools' focus on the collective transformative effects of Islamic schooling on society, parents tend to focus on the benefits for themselves and their children. In this chapter, I argue that the aspirations, dilemmas, and anxieties of the newly religious middle classes, particularly in relation to tensions between morality, consumption, and corruption, create ready consumers for the extended-day Islamic school market. Busy schedules and commitment to their children's intellectual and moral development draw parents to Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT. In contrast to piety projects at the institutional level, where the schools focus on the collective transformative effects of Islamic schooling on society, parents engage in their own piety projects on the individual level, looking to Islamic schooling to individually influence their children's religiosity.

To explore this phenomenon, I first lay out the concepts of class and discuss middle class-specific privileges and anxieties in Indonesia. Secondly, to locate Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT parents in the middle class and as practicing Muslims, I create a profile of the parents using data such as education levels, religious practices, and income. I then discuss parents' ideological and practical motivations for enrolling their children in an extended-day Islamic school; parent motivations were quite similar between the two schools. Finally I explore the welcomed and unwelcomed attitudes and understandings

students bring from school into the home, how parents accommodate or contest these teachings, and the potential complications of these unwelcomed teachings. It remains to be seen whether or not the students have developed Islamic character that aligns with the parents' visions of a good Muslim.

Middle Class Anxiety with Wealth and Morality

Weber framed class formation within social processes such as piety and anxiety (Jones 2012:149). While the middle classes were of little interest to Marx, Weber focused nearly completely on them (Bottomore 1983:75; Liechty 2002). According to Weber, the emergence of middle classes was largely based not upon the "means of production" (such as factories or plantations), but upon access to other forms of "property." Due to growth in new occupations in bureaucratic, service, and professional labor sectors and a new consumer economy, social identity was constructed around the property individuals owned rather than the kind of work they did (Halle 1984 as cited by Liechty 2002:14-15). Weber argues that the middle class' position is constructed around its ability to consume, or its place in the capitalist economy. In contrast to workers who earn "wages," and capitalists who earn "dividends," members of the middle class earn "salaries," a term that implies a certain moral distance from laboring and wealth. For Weber, the middle class "stakes its identity on its accomplishments and refinement, moral discourses that it pursues largely through its privileged access to goods and services (from education to fashion) in the 'free' market" (Liechty 2002:17). In other words, Weber views middle-class morality as a way to naturalize and defend middle-class privilege.

Anthropology's nascent investigations of class have largely focused on the working classes, with some studies on social elites (Liechty 2002). Early anthropological studies in

Indonesia focused more on symbolic analysis and Javanese ideologies of status, which cut across social classes but never focused on class (Jones 2012). In his well-known analysis of Islam and various forms of worship in Java, Clifford Geertz's (1960) observations of religious practices broke down along class lines, more or less. According to Geertz's employment of ideal types, Indonesia's socio-religious groupings of the *abangan*, *santri*, and *prijaji* were, respectively, comprised of peasants with an animist emphasis, traders with Islamic leanings, and bureaucratic aristocracy with Hindu-Buddhist affinities. This seminal work has since been refuted for its conflation of religious complexes with class differences and for the simplification of Indonesian society into ideal types (see for example Hefner 1990; Koentjaraningrat 1975; van Niel 1992).

The diversity of Indonesian society and the significant growth of a middle class since the 1980s, which Hefner calls the "new Muslim middle class" (Hefner 2000), demands nuanced attention from researchers who recognize the diversity within this category. Heryanto (2003) calls for the recognition of middle classes, rather than the singular middle class, particularly when examining Indonesia. He argues that middle classes consist of different and often contradictory elements such as progressive and conservative, opportunistic and apathetic. Each segment may respond in distinct ways to political and social events based on factors such as ethnic or religious differences. Henk Schulte Nordholt (2004) argues that while the middle classes—from the lower to the upper middle class—"form the backbone of Indonesian culture," they have been under-studied by both Indonesian and foreign scholars, making them appear to be a "people without a history" (16). Their histories, he claims, are essential to "decolonizing Indonesian historiography," as the middle classes suddenly appeared in the late-1980s literature when groups no

longer fit into older colonial categories such as aristocracy, officials, peasants, laborers. Jones (2012) argues that in post-Suharto Indonesia, it is more fruitful to ask questions about middle-class subjectivities regarding middle-class consumption patterns than to investigate the middle class as a singular group. This dissertation supports the idea of inconsistent perspectives and preferences within the middle classes through its demonstration of the discordant approaches to Islam that Al Azhar and JSIT put forth to their students.

Political and cultural historical factors have limited the presence of the concept of class within the Indonesian psyche. In the early 1960s, Indonesia's communist party was the largest communist party outside of the socialist bloc. Due to the anti-communist sentiments around which Suharto framed his regime, Marxists ideas of class were banned from political discourse. After multiple anti-communist mass killings in Indonesia in the late 1960s, the term "class" came to have strong leftist overtones (Jones 2012). Additionally, Indonesian nationalism during revolutionary days promoted concepts of "a nation composed of kin," supplanting other forms of collective consciousness, especially among the middle class. As the middle class was founded upon state employment, the middle class formed a strong loyalty towards leadership who knew what was best for the "family." (Siegel 2002:222). Unlike in Europe, where class conflict has shaped class identity, in Indonesia "attitudes towards wealth are a central point of differentiation" among the classes (Siegel 1998:83).

Due to ambivalence regarding the relationship between wealth and their identity (Jones 2012:149), middle-class Indonesians have been slow to identify themselves as middle-class. Heryanto (2003) purports that the middle classes of Indonesia define

themselves not as members of a class, but rather as “educated” or “developed,” eschewing the pursuit of “wealth and power” for “truth, justice, ethics or beauty.” Thus there is a constant need to “deny their privileged status, self-interest, or desire for recognition” (Heryanto 2003:29). However, as economist Howard Dick (1985:75) argues, in addition to income and expenditure levels, social behaviors regarding the privatization of consumption are the most striking features of Indonesia’s middle class. In contrast to the communal attitudes toward open access to property and assets among rural communities, urban middle-class families have a greater sense of individual ownership of property and their private lives. Consequently, religious middle-class parents whose identification is connected to personal morality and refinement can assuage their angst concerning individualized habits of consumption through providing expensive schooling for their children if it provides religious training as well.

The new prominence of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere since the late 1980s has assumed a “moral tone for the middle class position between the working classes and the wealthy” (Jones 2012:159). Many scholars argue that the rise of Islamic piety in Indonesia has been a fundamentally middle-class phenomenon (Brenner 1996, Hefner 2000, Smith-Hefner 2007, as cited by Jones 2012:159). In other words, the middle classes—more than other classes in Indonesia—are embracing a more Islamic lifestyle. Religion has become a platform from which to critique Indonesia’s political and economic conditions, seen to result from a national moral crisis. Consequently, Islam is posited as the solution to the county’s economic and social ills.

Class has recently become a lens through which to understand contemporary political and religious aspects of Indonesian life. Heryanto (2003) discusses middle-class

influences on authoritarian rule and the process of democratization in Indonesia. Rinaldo (2007) discusses the relationship between the middle class, Islam, political activism, and women. She argues that Islam is used among middle-class women to justify their participation in the public sphere, and in politics more specifically. Jones (2012) discusses middle-class women, femininity, consumption, and morality. There has yet been little, if any, discussion of how the middle classes influence Islamic schooling in urban Indonesia; this chapter initiates the discussion.

The anxieties around this relatively new phenomenon of middle class-ness in Indonesia stem from, among other things, the perceived incompatibility between wealth and morality, and in particular consumption and corruption (Jones 2012). Indonesia is well known for its high levels of corruption.¹⁰⁶ This corruption is seen both internally and internationally as a key impediment to the country's economic development. Jones argues that the rise in public forms of Islamic piety is a partial solution to public anxieties about corruption. I argue, more specifically, that the rise in Islamic schooling among the middle classes is due to parental expectations that it will safeguard children against moral corruption.

Significant research has been conducted regarding the intersection of class and schooling, but little has looked at class and private religious schooling. Researchers have analyzed, and criticized, the use of state schooling in order to maintain class structures in Western (see Apple 1979, 1986, 1991, 2006; Bourdieu 1984; Foley et al. 2010; Gramsci 1971; Willis 1981) and non-Western countries (see Freire 1970; Levinson 2001; Luykx

¹⁰⁶ Indonesia is constantly at the top of lists of corrupt countries in the world. Jones (2012) provides a thorough analysis of the forms of monetary corruption that can take place, particularly in relation to the feminized work in the home.

1999). Others have looked at non-state actors, such as middle-class parents, and the strategies they employ to ensure social and economic advantages for their children through schooling (see Ball 2003, Brantlinger 2003; Demerath 2009; Park & Abelmann 2004; Water 2005; Weenink 2008). This chapter largely focuses on the school choice motivations of religious middle-class parents to obtain a hybrid rigorous academic and religious education for their children through private extended-day Islamic schools.

According to school choice literature, parent motivations are generally based on three considerations: academic; social/school environment; and religious/moral (Badawi 2005). Research indicates that in the United States, parents generally base public or private and sectarian or non-sectarian school selection decisions first and foremost on academic considerations (Dee 1981, Gratiot 1980, Greene et al. 1998, Vanourek et al. 1998). Parents may choose religious schooling for their children not necessarily for religious instruction, but for a perceived higher quality of services, with an emphasis on discipline, attendance, and homework (Coleman et al. 1982) and increased academic achievement (Evans & Schwab 1995). Indeed, prior to the recent development of quality Islamic schools in Indonesia, many elite Muslim families sent their children to Catholic schools, as they provided better academic quality programs than Islamic or state schools.

This is not to say, however, that all American parents who enroll children in religious schools are not interested in religious education of their children. Gratiot (1980) distinguished two types of parents interested in religious schooling: parents who were dissatisfied with public schooling options, and religiously-oriented parents who placed high premium on religious education. However, as Khan (2012:12) points out from his study in Pakistan, for religiously-minded parents to consider religious schooling, two

fundamental preconditions must be present: first, the religious school must offer a quality education; and secondly, the type of education and credentials offered must be similar to those of the public schools. As Al Azhar and JSIT provide these two preconditions, it becomes the parents' classed aspirations, anxieties, and dilemmas that draw them to extended-day Islamic schools.

I argue that Indonesia's newly religious middle-class parents ameliorate their anxieties about privilege, consumption, and corrupted morality in part through enrolling their children in extended-day Islamic schools. As stated in sections to follow, these parents want their children to become better than themselves in terms of education, economic and social achievement, and piety. The high quality of these schools allows students to pursue university education and assists them in becoming respectable professionals and citizens of the middle class. Religious training is expected to instill a sense of modesty to monitor and downplay privileges afforded by their wealth. Additionally, parents expect children's susceptibility to moral corruption as young individuals growing up in a rapidly changing society to be countered by an Islamic education that teaches children specific guidelines for identifying and avoiding immorality. Finally, in a more direct form of protection, the longer school day keeps children off the street and out of other spaces that could introduce them to corrupting influences.

The Profile of Middle-class Parents of Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT

Parents enrolling their children in Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT are better educated than the general population, regularly participate in daily *sholat* (prayer), and have a reported income above the majority of the city's inhabitants. To gather this

information, I conducted a survey of parents through self-administered questionnaires distributed to all Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT parents. A total of 937 parent surveys were collected, reaching an 83% to 88% response rate. The questionnaires were distributed to parents via students through the classroom teachers. They were then returned to the teachers through the students and collected at the main office.

Questionnaires were returned in envelopes provided with the questionnaire to create as high a level of anonymity as possible. The data was analyzed using Microsoft Excel and Stata software. (See Table 4 below for reference to the number of questionnaires received from each school.)

Table 4. Student and Parent Totals and Number of Questionnaires Collected

	Students	Parents	
	Student enrollment	Parent Responses	Responses as % of enrollment
Luqman SIT	809*	708	
Male	N/A	283	
Female	N/A	345	88%
Not reported		80	
Al Azhar 31	277	229	
Male	148	88	
Female	129	103	83%
Not reported		38	

Note: A questionnaire was distributed to each student at each school. A search for duplicate surveys due to parents returning a completed survey for each sibling at the school was conducted, and duplicates were deleted from the total surveys received and used in analysis.

*While the number of male and female students is not available, there was general gender parity.

Overall, the parents are highly educated, especially in comparison to their contemporaries throughout the rest of Indonesia. Over 98% of all parents from both schools completed secondary education, and 82% or more completed a postsecondary

degree. National gross enrollment rates for secondary and tertiary schooling in 1986, the year the average father would have graduated from senior high school, were 43% and 8%, respectively (World Bank 2012). Even in 2010, only 67% of the senior secondary school- and 23% of the tertiary-aged populations were enrolled (World Bank 2012). In other words, in comparison to their age group and the current school-aged population across the nation, these mothers and fathers are educationally privileged and highly educated.

Most of these parents, raised during the heyday of Suharto's secular New Order policies, had attended state schools and had become interested in Islam only as adults. In the primary grades, more than 92% of Al Azhar's parents and 84% of those at Luqman al Hakim SIT had attended state general schools. Therefore, the majority of extended-day Islamic school parents are providing their children a primary education significantly different than their own. It is no surprise that over three-fourths of these extended-day parents considered their children to be more religious than they considered themselves to have been during their own childhoods.

While income can be hard to determine, Al Azhar 31 parents reported having the greatest levels of income per family. More than two thirds of Al Azhar respondents reported monthly incomes of over US\$436, while just over a third of Luqman al Hakim SIT parents reported the same monthly income. However, this income is still well above the average monthly income in Jogja in 2009 of US\$119 (PBS Statistics Indonesia 2011:31). Luqman al Hakim SIT families also scored lower on other wealth measurements, such as employing domestic help, owning a home, and owning a motorized vehicle.

Even though JSIT schools promote more restrictive and regulated gendered attitudes, more Luqman al Hakim SIT mothers work outside of the home than those from Al

Azhar 31. On the survey, 29% of Luqman al Hakim SIT mothers were reported as “housewife” as their occupation. Of the mothers at Al Azhar 31, 45% were reported as housewives. In other words, Luqman al Hakim SIT reported a higher number of dual income households (71% in contrast to 55%). Given that the mothers’ education levels are fairly similar between the two schools, it can be safely assumed that there would be equal opportunities for employment for both sets of mothers. It is therefore possible that Luqman al Hakim SIT mothers work more out of necessity, while the Al Azhar 31 mothers have more choice in whether to work or not. This suggests that for many parents, a large draw to Luqman al Hakim SIT may be in part due to the need for after-school care for students. This will be supported below in interview data.

Although the general upbringing of the majority of the extended-day school parents was not overtly religious, parents reported to now regularly participate in daily *sholat* (prayer). Performing five daily prayers is one of the five pillars of Islam and is considered a way to remember Allah. The great majority of parents, 91% of Al Azhar 31 and 98% of those at Luqman al Hakim SIT, reported performing the required five *sholat* or more each day. Going beyond the required amount, 40% of Al Azhar 31 and 32% of Luqman parents performed additional *sholat* each day.

Being raised without formal religious activity translated into most parents holding no strong cultural or doctrinal allegiances to NU, Muhammadiyah, or other specific religious traditions or those organizations’ Islamic schools. The parents’ religious interests tended to be in Islam itself, rather than religious organizations. A Luqman al Hakim SIT mother explained,

I just want my child to follow the religion in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet. I don’t require him to be Muhammadiyah or NU. The PKS is a political

organization, and the NU and Muhammadiyah are community (*masyarakat*) organizations...The important thing is that my child practices religion in accordance with the guidance of the disciples [*rosulloh*]. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim mother, April 30, 2010)

Most parents, like this one, see the essence of Islam as standing outside of organizations, religious or political. This lack of allegiance allows for the organization-free, or universal, Islamic schools to thrive.

As one Muhammadiyah activist perceived it, extended-day Islamic school parents are interested in Islam in the personal, individual sense rather than the collective sense that comes with organizations. Parents are not interested in their children becoming Islamic activists or being involved in Islamic political parties. Consequently, the parents are not particularly selective of the organizations behind the schools (Interview with Muhammadiyah Activist, December 16, 2009). Fealy (2008:16) argues that the rise of Islamic consumption in Indonesia has led to strengthened individualized forms of Islam that shift away from the prominence of established organizations or figures. The few parents I spoke with who identified connection to an organization as important were willing to send their children to a high quality religious school outside of their affiliation, assuming they would teach the specifics to their children at home. This will be discussed later on in this chapter.

Reasons or School Selection

Parents' reasons for enrolling their children in both extended-day Islamic schools fall in line with middle-class parents' aspirations, anxieties, and dilemmas. Parents want their children to gain intellectual capabilities and a moral compass necessary for successfully navigating their futures. As one of the original Luqman al Hakim SIT founders

who has since moved to Jakarta to work at the Ministry of Youth and Sports observed, “I think...integrated Islamic schools have become a trend because there’s parental anxiety about the future of their children. The future is not only intellectual, but it’s also moral” (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT founder, April 22, 2010). In other words, he believes that today’s Muslim parents are concerned with their children’s moral and intellectual development. On a more practical level, parents seek help in taking care of their children as their busy schedules reduce the amount of time they have, particularly in the afternoons, to personally attend to their children. Although Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT differ in expectations for individual implementation of Islam, one being more flexible and the other more exacting, and though parents personal religious practices vary somewhat, parents from both schools held similar ideological and practical motivations for enrolling their children. The few disparities suggest a financial, rather than an ideological, difference. For many parents, Al Azhar 31 was economically unfeasible. The following section presents parents’ explanations of their motivations for enrolling their children in these two schools.

Academic quality

First and foremost, the academic quality of the schools was non-negotiable. At first glance, only a few parents cited overall quality or the schools’ positive reputations in the community as a reason for their children’s enrollment. The overall quality of the national education system is poor. Consequently, middle-class parents frequently seek out the “favorite” general schools, private schools, or international schools in the country. In some cases, elite parents send their children to schools in Singapore or even the United States and Western Europe. For religious education, parents who send their children to general

schools often hire private religion tutors or send their children to lessons at the neighborhood mosque.

By marrying quality academics and robust religious education, the extended-day Islamic school provides a new schooling option for religious-minded middle-class parents. These highly educated parents are not interested in religious education alone, but also in academic training that allows their children to attend respectable high schools and then universities. Starting from a pool of the city's high-performing schools,¹⁰⁷ parents then differentiated characteristics that eventually lead them to the schools of their choice.¹⁰⁸ Hasan (2009) argues that enrolling children in reputable schools bolsters and confirms parents' social status, even more so if the school is a quality Islamic school.

A solid moral foundation

Just as with most parents around the world, extended-day Islamic school parents expressed desires for their children to have a better life than their own, to be better than they are. "Better," in this case, largely entailed being more educated in both academics and religion. A Luqman al Hakim SIT father, a graduate student in the social sciences at the prestigious Gajah Made University, explained:

¹⁰⁷ Generally, student rankings on national and regional exams published in the local newspapers are the basic indicators of the schools' academic quality.

¹⁰⁸ Options included the top state general schools, top Muhammadiyah schools, top SIT schools, Al Azhar 31, and a few other private religious and non-religious schools, such as BIAS and Budi Mulia Dua. BIAS is a small network of the Development of Pious Children (Bina Anak Sholeh-BIAS) schools belonging to the Institution of Integrated Islamic Schools (Lembaga Pendidikan Islam Terpadu). This organization is separate from the JSIT. Budi Mulia Dua is a private school run founded by Amien Rais, a prominent Indonesian politician and Muhammadiyah figure. While it is run by a prominent Muhammadiyah figure and all female teachers veil, the school does not advertise itself as an Islamic school. See chapter 2 for more details.

[In the current] culture of Indonesia, mainly Muslims, one of the wishes is that children be better than their parents in terms of education, prosperity (*kesejahteraan*), and religious education in particular...Islam has become so important in life that we want it applied well to our children. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT father, April 9, 2010)

Additionally, an Al Azhar 31 father, a professor at the State Islamic University campus in Jogja, stated:

I believe that religion can direct my kids to a better life. I believe that religion is the foundation of life. I want my children to have a strong foundation regarding religion that will lead in the way that is good and right. Perhaps the way that is good and right doesn't have to be through religion, but it is one way...and I want my kids to stick to that one. (Interview with Al Azhar 31 father, Jogjakarta, February 1, 2010).

These parents see religion as not just the foundation for life, but the key to a better life. It is interesting to note the non-exclusive attitude of the Al Azhar 31 father regarding the idea that non-religious value systems could also lead to a good life. Although he feels this way, he has chosen Islam as his guiding value system and wants his children to do the same.

Parents expect a substantial religious education at an early age to promote understanding of Islam and, possibly more importantly, of religious devotion. They believe that if their children become good Muslims, they will have better lives. Parents do not aspire to have their children become religious leaders or scholars, but rather pious businesspersons, religious academics, and upstanding professionals in all fields. They look to extended-day Islamic schooling to provide a religious foundation that is expected to set the children on the right path for a moral, upright life. The previously quoted Luqman al Hakim SIT father above reasoned:

If we inculcate Islamic education from an early age, they'll be strong from childhood...Our hope is just that our child lives according to religion and doesn't become a troublemaker. If he becomes a politician or statesman, that's fine...What's important...is to not get involved in promiscuity, drug abuse, and so forth. For Muslims, promiscuity and drugs are very defacing (*mencoreng*). Whatever they want

to be, or aspire to, as long as the desire comes from a good source, it doesn't matter. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT father, April 9, 2010)

This parent wants his child to be a respectable Muslim, first and foremost. The profession of his child is less of a concern than his religious identity and moral character.

Much like school leadership, parents view being religious as intrinsically connected to having a strong moral code. Parents expect this moral code to guide their children and protect them from the perceived growing current of increasing immorality and shifts in societal values. Parents are concerned with the loosening of traditional social values as Indonesia enters the 21st century. Religion is seen as a shield against inappropriate behavior and poor choices. Parents frequently mentioned disrespect for adults (a significant offense in Javanese culture), drug use, pornography, and "free sex" as signs of decaying morals among today's youth. A Luqman al Hakim SIT mother expressed her reasons for wanting her children to be more religious than she was as in the following statement.

I think the current social problems of children and youth are very widespread. In that sense there are many cases, like youth who become pregnant out of wedlock, drugs, and so on. That's usually from religious factors being less embedded [in the lives of the youth]...My husband and I do not quite understand religion and only know that Islam should be like this and this. But as for the Hadith and the relevant Qur'anic verses, we do not know them exactly...So if we cultivate it from childhood, and hope he [our son] understands, he can think if you want to do something like this because according to religion...We were told in earlier times, "You cannot, it's a sin." Then we would not ask again. But the children now say, "Sin? According to what? Where is the sin?" and so on. So there is a barrage of questions...that we must explain. In my day, if we were told, "Don't do it, it's a sin," we wouldn't dare to do it. But children today... (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 21, 2009)

This parent sees the youth of today as less obedient, more challenging of authority, and more widely involved in negative social activities than the youth in her adolescence. Rather than wishing to return to the era of her own childhood, where children may not have

understood religion but didn't "dare" to go against its teachings, she looks to religious schooling as the best way to keep her child from being brazen and participating in risky social behaviors. She and her husband feel insufficiently familiar with Islam's doctrinal sources to find answers to children's questions that challenge an adult's admonitions to not act in a certain way. Consequently, she hopes an Islamic school will provide her child with the needed religious knowledge and instruction to intellectually or doctrinally support the admonitions against sinful behavior. The mother assumes knowing the holy texts will be sufficient for students to make good choices and be obedient.

Integrated schools are most popular for preschool and primary-level students. There are more preschools and primary schools than junior and senior high extended-day schools.¹⁰⁹ In part, this is because the educational movement is still young, and students have not "grown" the system into a robust secondary sector yet. However, many parents also feel it is most important for their children to gain a solid religious foundation at a young age. Parents had little objection to their students attending general secondary schools.¹¹⁰ Many parents see the early years of the children's lives as the most crucial for the development of religious character and the setting of a moral compass. They assume that if their children learn at a young age to be religious, they would be more likely to

¹⁰⁹ In 2010, Al Azhar had 35 preschools and kindergartens, 35 primary schools, 24 junior high schools and six senior high schools, and one university. In that same year, JSIT membership included 571 preschools and kindergartens, 424 primary schools, 109 junior high schools, and 21 senior high schools.

¹¹⁰ Possibly a remnant of other Islamic schooling systems, secondary Islamic schools are often of even poorer quality than the primary-level schools. There are also fewer of them. Frequently, children who matriculate to secondary school from a primary Islamic school go to general schools. The majority of students interviewed at two different schools were eager to attend general schools rather than continue their secondary education at an Islamic school.

become upstanding adult Muslims. A Luqman al Hakim SIT parent, a mother who works as a teacher at a different SIT, explained:

The primary school is important for them [students] for when they grow, when they get old...What they experience in their primary schooling will stick in their minds and become habit and attitude...Some parents send their children to the best public schools but they [miss out on] good habits, religious practices. That's not enough for us. We need it all [religious and academic understanding]. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 22, 2009)

In her opinion, public schools provide an incomplete education. Similarly, another mother enrolled her children at Luqman al Hakim SIT, attracted to SITs after seeing her neighbor's preschool child reciting Qur'anic verses and "teach[ing] us, 'Oh, you must not dress like this.'" She continued,

We want our children to be religious, even though we're all from the state general schools where the cultivation (*penanaman*) of religion is less. We want our children from childhood to understand the true principles of Islam. We expect it will in be a little easier in the future as adolescents if they have been implanted (*tertanam*) [with religion] from the beginning. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 21, 2009)

While the majority of extended day Islamic school parents themselves did not have the kind of religious education they are providing for their children, in retrospect, they seem to feel they had something missing in their own lives as they were growing up. Or, due to new social trends, they feel a stronger moral and religious guide is much more necessary now than it was in their own youth.

Parents reasoned that, not only would a moral compass help students navigate the ills of society when they are older, but it would also benefit the wider society. Again, the same mother who teaches at another SIT explained:

I think if they are good in religion they will be good to people around them. They will have a good connection...People who rule this country and who are corrupt are not good in religion, any religion. If a person isn't good in their religion (*tidak bagus agamanya*), their actions aren't good (*nggak bagus*). I want my children to be a

benefit to people. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 22, 2009)

This mother considers being religious or being “good in religion” to be a protection against personal corruption. Additionally, this mother, just like school leadership, believes that when one is free of personal corruption, one can be a benefit to society at large.

Teaching methods and teachers

Parents valued these schools for their teaching methods and most frequently mentioned the teachers. Rather than discussing the depth of understanding the teachers have of their subject matter, the parents’ comments focused on the teachers’ treatment of students, particularly in contrast with state general schoolteachers. One Luqman al Hakim mother, a stay-at-home mother whose husband worked on another island, said she enrolled her younger children at Luqman al Hakim SIT after her oldest son had negative experiences in the public schools.

Most of the teachers in the public schools just educate children, but not in a polite way. Sometimes they call the students stupid...In my opinion, children don’t deserve to be punished; so don’t be harsh with them, not too much. In public schools a student must get a 10 or nine if the teacher’s going to be good to him. I think teachers should think, “These kids aren’t clever, so I have to teach them to be clever.” But they don’t do that. The just teach. And if the kids don’t get good scores, the teachers get mad. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 23, 2009)

This mother went on to echo sentiments from parents at both schools that teachers patiently and lovingly teach and re-teach concepts, using multiple teaching methods when necessary. The parents believe the teachers at these schools are attentive to their children and work hard to help them understand the material.

The teachers themselves often commented to me about cultivating warm and caring

relationships with the students. A male Luqman al Hakim SIT teacher claimed that the students felt such a close bond with the teachers at the school, they would confide in them rather than their own parents. One Saturday afternoon, I ran into an Al Azhar 31 grade-four teacher near one of two upscale movie theaters in town. He was treating a student, whom he told me later was having difficulties at home, to an afternoon at the movies. I consistently observed the teachers showing patience and affection to the students through their communication in and out of the classroom. As a Luqman al Hakim SIT mother described it, "They provide education to their students with love, genuinely. They love them like their own children" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, April 30, 2010). While male–female interactions are highly regulated at Luqman al Hakim SIT, male and female teachers warmly interacted with students of both genders equally.

This is not to say that students were not disciplined. During classroom observations at Al Azhar 31, students were typically well-behaved. One day at Al Azhar 31 as I walked into the a grade-four classroom to conduct an observation, the teacher promptly approached me at the back of the room and quietly asked me to leave the classroom so she could talk with the students privately. Apparently there had been some inappropriate behavior, but I was not given any details. Standing outside of the room, I did not hear the teacher's voice rise. After a few minutes of waiting, I was invited back in and sensed a feeling of remorse among the students, who were also ready to get back to their classwork.

While Luqman al Hakim SIT is strict on observance of standards, I regularly observed less disciplined classroom behavior by students. During class, students often talked with each other during lessons, leaving my voice recording of class lectures indiscernible. Outside noise from other classes also drifted into the classroom, adding to

the commotion. One Luqman al Hakim SIT subject teacher who moved to different classrooms during the day pointed out that a short prayer before beginning her lesson was not only an act of devotion, but also served as a strategic way to quiet down students so she could begin her lesson. The difference in student behaviors between schools could be in part due to the larger class sizes at Luqman al Hakim SIT.

Extended-day schools as “one-stop shopping”

Inevitable social changes have accompanied Indonesia’s economic development and concomitant creation of a Muslim middle class. Among other things, urbanization has changed family dynamics. Extended families are not living together and women are taking on more professional work, leaving the house to take office jobs. Consequently, these schools are playing new roles that educational institutions had not before done. As a Luqman al Hakim SIT religion teacher saw it:

Most young families do not live together with parents like in earlier times. Today’s young families usually have their own home and a little son. Both [parents] work and are relatively busy until 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. So when we introduced the full-day school, parents could...work and children could be safe at school. That’s different than in times past in the village (*di kampung*) when only the husband worked while the wife was at home so that children would have some home care. If the mother wasn’t around, there was usually the grandmother, but not now. The child at home doesn’t have a companion except the maid. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT religion teacher, November 10, 2009)

With this shift in the family dynamics of both parents working or busy with non-household activities, and not living with extended family members, the family turns to the school as partial guardian of their children. Extended-day Islamic schools are one of few, if not the only, non-boarding educational institutions in the country that hold regular classes into mid- and late afternoon. Public schools and more common private religious non-boarding

schools continue to release students by noon or 1 p.m. National policy on public teacher hours does not allow for extended school day schedules. Consequently, national policies are *de facto* creating a niche market for private schools with longer hours.

One morning at the Luqman al Hakim SIT library, I met a parent hoping to transfer in his daughter, who was currently attending a Muhammadiyah school. During the child's required entrance exam, the father very simply laid out his situation. Both he and his wife worked; Luqman al Hakim SIT had longer school hours than his daughter's Muhammadiyah school; a longer school day would ease the burden of after-school care, even though it meant paying higher tuition fees. In this situation, the convenience of a longer school day eclipsed any interest in or allegiance to a specific type of religious education.

A father from one of Jogja's many JSIT schools explained the complex issues and multiple reasons for enrolling his son at an SIT. As it was a younger, less well-known SIT than Luqman al Hakim, it was less expensive.

I bring my son to an SIT although my background is NU. My wife's background is not NU or Muhammadiyah but mixed...For my family and me we have practical reasons for sending my child there. The school is a full-day school, until 3 p.m. But it's flexible. You can also pick up your kids until 4 p.m., for example, and you don't need to pay for it...I work all day. Maybe like all the professionals, we work until 4 or 5 p.m. and we don't have any maids at home... And the ideological reason is because there my son can learn Islamic knowledge and practice Islamic teachings as well as...learn general knowledge like math, science, etc. If I take him to a madrasa that's closer to my house and is cheaper but not full-day...the quality of the general education is not good. Although the cost is much higher, because we have to pay for lunch and some other things, for us it is affordable. In [the SIT] we have to pay about Rp 250,000 or Rp 220,000 (US\$24 – \$21 a month) while in a madrasa maybe we would have to pay less than Rp 100,000 (US\$10 a month). (Interview with UIN-Jogja professor, February 2, 2010)

This father's experience highlights several of the motivational factors for sending children to an integrated school: the neutral background of the school accommodating, or at least not challenging, either of the parent's religious backgrounds; instilling religious knowledge

and teaching religious rituals; the convenience of the “full-day” schedule; and the quality education in general subjects. Additionally, paying the extra tuition was likely less than wages for domestic help at home to watch the child during the afternoon.

An SIT father in Jakarta suggested SITs are akin to “one-stop shopping.” As he viewed it, an extended school day provided his child with wholesome activities throughout the afternoon. It eliminated his need to arrange classes and transportation, as is done by many middle-class parents of state general school students.¹¹¹ Additionally, an afternoon at school was also more desirable than his child simply passing the time in front of the television or hanging out with domestic help at home. Similarly, the focus on religion at school removes the need for religion classes at the mosque or private lessons at home. (Personal conversation, December 2008)

Extended-day Islamic school leadership fully understands the time demands of a middle class lifestyle. Extended-day school administrators capitalize on the conveniences the length of their school days offer their clientele. When asking founders of both Al Azhar and JSIT schools why parents were interested in their schools, or why their schools had become popular, inevitably, the extended school day schedule was given as a top reason. An item on Al Azhar’s mission statement explicitly states: “Helping children's education beyond the ‘traditional school hours’ to carry out education from morning until evening. The objective of this activity is for the children of parents who are busy and [find it] difficult to take the time to educate their children outside of traditional school hours” (YPI

¹¹¹ Sulaiman Mappiasse, a PhD student in the Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa, is conducting research on class and education in Indonesia, part of which focuses on the after-school activities in which middle class families from state schools are enrolling their children. At the time of our communication, he had not yet published on this topic.

Al Azhar 2012). General schools release students at noon or 1 p.m. Al Azhar 31's schedule extends an extra hour or two into the afternoon, with children being released from school at 2:00 p.m. and after-school classes and clubs keep the students until 3 p.m. Luqman al Hakim SIT advertises itself on flyers as a "full day" school, releasing students at 3 p.m., plus possible after-school classes and clubs keep the children at school until 4 or 5 p.m. in the afternoon. It is possible that the larger number of dual-income families at Luqman al Hakim SIT directly correlates with the longer school day, as neither parent is likely to be at home from work until late afternoon. Given that a greater number of Luqman al Hakim SIT households have a dual income but are still overall less wealthy than those of Al Azhar 31, it is possible that some parents are not specifically attracted to Luqman al Hakim SIT over Al Azhar 31 as much as they are limited by cost to the school with lower tuition fees.

In conclusion, what do parents expect religious education to do for their children? Most parents do not talk from personal experience about growing up religious. Rather, as adults they have come to consider religion something valuable, and hope for various reasons to provide a religious foundation for their children early on. Parent comments demonstrated a repeated certainty that religious training in the early years would sustain a religious life in adolescence and into adulthood. Parents are hopeful that if their children are taught about Islam, adopt Islamic values, and become accustomed to performing Islamic rituals such as daily prayer, Qur'anic recitation, and fasting, they will not stray from them as they grow older. Additionally, such knowledge and habits will prevent them from participating in immoral behaviors, such as drugs and "free sex," seen to be more commonplace in society.

What do parents expect extended-day Islamic schools to do for them? These schools teach their children a deeper understanding of Islam that most parents do not have themselves. In turn, the students' piety influences their own parents' religious lives. Additionally important, these schools keep the children in school longer than other non-boarding schools, religious or non-religious, thus simplifying parents' lives by creating a complete—religious and academic—educational experience.

Although these schools are relatively costly, particularly in light of the recent 2010 policy making all government schools free, parents are willing to pay. Even parents with lower incomes, as one Luqman al Hakim mother explained, see the cost as an investment in having well-educated children.

[My] husband is also aware that in terms of religion we are lacking. We want our children to also get a better religious education than we did, even though maybe the fees for kindergarten (*TKIT*) and primary (*SDIT*) integrated Islamic schools are expensive. Many say so, but we don't think about it. We want our children to be better than we are...Sometimes others will say it's not worth what our children will get [from the school]. And if you're from an economic class that's just scraping by, you have to think about it because it's not an easy decision to make...We think that investing in children is most valuable for later in life. (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 21, 2009)

The tuition compensates for what the parents are not able to provide their children through their own personal understanding of religion. It also buys the possibility of a brighter future for their children. In other words, an acceptable or moral use of their money is investing in their children's intellectual and moral development. Such an investment is expected to have fruitful future returns.

On a sensible, money-conscious line of argument, a few Luqman al Hakim SIT parents calculated that the high tuition included the price of lunch, noting that state-schooled children usually ate at home. Additionally, even though the extended school hours

increased tuition, parents would otherwise have spent large amounts of money on after school lessons, shopping trips with the children during the afternoon, or pocket money given to the children for afternoon activities. In their minds, the cost of the school was not an extravagant, as one might initially assume, but a thoughtful use of money.

Parental Learning, Re-teaching, and Risks

The democratization of religious knowledge has the potential to disrupt generational and familial hierarchies, as the younger generation becomes systematically educated in religious knowledge to which their parents and elders did not have access (Abu-Lughod 1993, Adely 2012, Adely & Starrett 2011; Eickelman 1992). Enrolling children in Islamic schools invites religious influence into the home. It is hard to predict exactly how that influence will affect child–parent interactions. Some of the new ideas are welcomed, and parents become secondary students. Some ideas cause concern, and parents re-teach their children on the specific issues. This second scenario presents a precarious situation, as there is no guarantee that students will agree with their parents (who generally in the beginning stages of their personal religious development) rather than side with their teachers (who by the nature of their positions can be considered authorities on religion). This section demonstrates the ways in which students' religious educations create learning experiences in the home—with students teaching parents, or parents instructing students—and pose the risk of parents and students not seeing eye-to-eye.

Parents often comment with amusement that their children know more about religion than they do as adults. They enjoy the fact that their children have memorized verses of Qur'an or know specific prayers, such as for entering the bathroom, which they

have never learned themselves. School founders repeatedly commented on an increase in parents' religious practices due to their children's attendance at the school. This secondary influence on the larger community works to fulfill a larger goal of JSIT schools, the Islamization of society.

Parents frequently take example from their children's piety, becoming more religious-minded and observant themselves. In the words of an Al Azhar 31 housewife, "May my child be better [than me] and hopefully that [goodness and religiosity] can be transmitted to her parents" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 mother, April 29, 2010). This mother related to me that, while it was a three-year process, she began veiling regularly after her daughter's enrollment at Al Azhar 31. She started veiling, although inconsistently, at the encouragement of her preschool daughter, who, while in the car on the way to school, would say, "Mama, you're prettier if you veil. Tomorrow when you take me to school, why don't you just wear a *hijab*?" The mother "finally gave in," reasoning, "Okay, anything for my kids. I don't mind. Moreover, in this case, my child showed (*menunjukkan*) me something good. We actually also knew that it was good" (Interview with Al Azhar 31 mother, April 29, 2010). Initially, she only veiled when dropping off or picking up her daughter at school. Eventually, however, she felt conflicted about veiling only when at school, or at voluntary woman's religious study group (*pengajian*), where veiling was required. If she bumped into a friend from the study group without the veil, she would feel embarrassed. Her life as a performer complicated her decision to veil full-time. She played guitar and sang backup vocals in a local rock band. She feared a veil would look out of place onstage, and she was uncomfortable with the idea of removing it for performances. In this

process, she talked with friends who veiled and others who did not. Finally, a few months before our interview, with her child then in grade three, she began veiling the entire day.

Although the mother was veiling, she admitted that she did not understand the arguments (*dalil*) for requiring woman to veil, but she observed it anyway. She reasoned, “It’s better, so why not? What’s so hard in veiling anyway?” While still new to the practice and unsure exactly how she felt about it, she planned to continue veiling and “find out” the reasons for the practice. As for the stage, she decided she could look hip during performances by wearing a hooded sweatshirt, pulling the hood up over her *hijab* (*kerudung*). Certainly her daughter’s enrollment at Al Azhar 31 was not the singular and decisive factor in this mother’s decision to veil regularly; yet it was the impetus. Although she “knew it was a good thing,” she did not experiment with the actual practice until her daughter encouraged her to.

While some parents welcomed the influence of their children, some parents objected to the religious practices or perspectives their children brought home from school. Few parents felt the need to withdraw their students from the schools,¹¹² but several made efforts to correct their children’s understanding to bring them in line with practices at home. A Luqman al Hakim SIT mother became concerned with her son’s education as several school practices and teachers’ comments as relayed by her son were inconsistent with her beliefs. For example, she disagreed with the segregation of students at grade four and the heavy emphasis on memorizing the Qur’an, as well as a comment from a teacher about the heavenly rewards of suicide in the name of Islam. [*Jaman nabi*

¹¹² Due to obvious challenges of tracking down disaffected parents, as they are no longer connected to the schools and schools find it in their best interest not to provide contact information for such parents, little data was gathered on this subset of parents.

*Muhammad dulu, katanya begitu, ada orang yang bunuh diri untuk membela agama itu bisa masuk surga]*¹¹³ Not wanting to take a financial hit by withdrawing her child from the school, losing the costly one-time building and enrollment fee only to pay out similar fees at a new school, or to disrupt her son's social life as he settled into Indonesia after the family's return from living abroad, she kept the child enrolled with his friends and decided to "neutralize him at home" regarding issues such as "gender roles," their "ideology," and "exclusivity" (Interview with former Luqman al Hakim SIT mother and Muhammadiyah activist, February 9, 2010). Additionally, she felt she could wait out their time until they moved to Australia for her PhD program.

Another Luqman al Hakim SIT mother who worked as a lecturer at a midwifery academy recounted her fifth-grade son's disagreement with her perspective that dating was acceptable. The son, citing his teacher, said that dating is not allowed (*tidak boleh*). While she agreed that "the religion says you can't do it," she explained to her son that if dating was done within particular guidelines, it was acceptable. As she reasoned with her son,

Mom and Dad know that according to the religion, it's like that, but we don't always have to go there. As long as we are on the right path and don't disobey (*menyalahi*) the religion excessively (*berlebihan*). We have to be neutral towards our

¹¹³ This mother was the only parent to mention this topic to me. The mother pointed out that she did not find any material on this topic in her son's textbooks, but she could not be certain what was discussed in class. While one can imagine several scenarios where the discussion of suicide in the name of God could surface, it is not possible to know what the context of the discussion was or the full meaning of the comment. It is clear, however, that the student was curious enough about the discussion to make a comment to his mother. During my time at the school, I did not observe or have a sense of any kind of promotion of violence at the school. However, a similar idea did arise during a group interview with sixth-grade boys at Luqman al Hakim SIT. In response to the question, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" the first boy said, "a martyr (*mati syahid*)" and then all the other boys responded the same, one adding, "So I can enter heaven" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-six boys, November 30, 2009). In another instance, a grade-four boy, in response to the same question, joked, "Terrorist!" eliciting laughter from his friends, he then continued, "Not really, but military, and to be the president" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT grade-four boys, December 3, 2009). These interviews are detailed and analyzed in chapter 5.

surroundings. We also have to adjust to the local culture here (*melihat budaya yang ada*). That's what we've taught our son. We really aren't fanatic (*fanatik*). (Interview with Luqman al Hakim mother, December 21, 2009)

This same student also objected, multiple times, to his mother's removal of the headscarf and the wearing of "open" (*terbuka*) clothing—clothing that does not completely cover everything but the face and hands—while at home in the company of her family.¹¹⁴ On another occasion, he informed his mother that women were not allowed (*tidak boleh*) to wear trousers, which his mother frequently donned. Unwilling to accept these admonitions, she explained that veiling was not necessary in the privacy of her own home. She also pointed out the impracticality of women wearing skirts when riding scooters or motorbikes, the main form of transportation for most Indonesians. Again, she told her son, "If we do what the religion teaches us and we keep in line with our local customs, then we aren't sinning" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 21, 2009). In other words, the appropriateness of long skirts as opposed to pants is not part of "what religion teaches" but rather a cultural way of doing things. In this mother's opinion, women wearing pants are part of the Indonesian Muslim tradition. Her concern about maintaining a social order, or being "neutral towards our surroundings" rather than a "fanatic," is a classed attitude. As the maintenance of middle-class position is dependent upon social order, she sees following a common moral order as key to maintaining social order.

This mother's contextualization of standards for dating and dress within the "local culture" so as to be "neutral towards her surroundings," as well as the idea that one need not be "fanatic" or exacting in one's approach to Islam, counters the approach of the school in which she enrolled her son. She valued a less strict adherence than Luqman al Hakim's

¹¹⁴ The most common veiling practices require veiling while in public, but not while with husband and children, or with blood relatives that could not be potential suitors if the women were single.

exacting approach and expectations on implementation of higher standards. As such, she expected her son to adopt her perspective and disregard the teacher's instructions. However, earlier in the interview this same mother commented with gratitude about how her child monitored his behavior and made smart choices, such as determining the appropriateness of television shows according to what he learned at school. She said, "It turns out it's easier if the child is told by his teachers than his own parents. That's what has happened with my son. They're more receptive to the words that the teachers say than their parents" (Interview with Luqman al Hakim SIT mother, December 21, 2009). She does not seem to be aware of, or at least concerned with, the potential for her son choosing to follow the teacher's instructions rather than her own when their perspectives do not match.

Parents seem to be pleased with students being more religiously minded, participating in devotional acts such as prayer and fasting, but the observance of "higher" standards of JSIT schools sometimes caused tension. The disconnect between the principles taught at the school and the standards upheld at home may not always be predictable. The organization-free Islamic school that welcomes all types of Muslims does not provide a readily identifiable set of beliefs and standards for parents to anticipate before enrollment. Many parents, due to their lack of religious upbringing themselves, are likely in the process of solidifying and defining their own set of beliefs and practices. Practices that challenge the familiar and mainstream, especially if those practices seem to be cultural rather than religious, may be resisted. On the other hand, parents who have a religious background may not have thoroughly considered the implications of one school's teachings over another. Yet some parents may feel their family constraints confine their schooling options,

and practicality drives the selection of school, as in the situation of the father transferring his daughter from Muhammadiyah to Luqman al Hakim SIT. Although there was an occasional mismatch of beliefs or practices between the parents and schools, particularly with JSIT, there was enough overlap in educational and religious agendas to sustain parental patronage (Chudleigh 2011).

What happens when the school's perspective and the parents' perspectives differ? Will the re-teaching at home hold sway over teacher instruction? These questions cannot be answered here. However, it seems to be a gamble many parents are willing to take. A discussion with Fuad, an Islamic history professor at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, provided some possible insight into what parents are assuming. Fuad's 15-year-old son was enrolled in a Salafi pesantren (boarding school), which could be considered the concurrent educational development in pesantren schooling as JSIT schools are to the "older" modern Islamic schools. Fuad relayed the story of a trip to the mall with his son and cousins during the son's visit at home. As they headed out of the mall they bought ice cream cones, then continued walking to the car. His son did not eat his ice cream, even though it was melting quickly in the Indonesian heat. Finally, the son stopped, squatted down, began eating his treat, and thus fell behind the group. When Fuad inquired about this behavior, his son explained that it was only appropriate to eat when sitting; the Prophet Muhammad had clearly explained standing and walking were not appropriate activities while eating. While Fuad was familiar with this teaching, he did not practice it himself, nor did he feel it was necessary to comply with when in the mall or in a crowd. His son felt the location made no difference and insisted on eating only when sitting. Fuad respected his son's stance and nothing more was said about it.

After relaying this story, Fuad commented on how it did not bother him that his son was so committed to following the prophet. He felt his son would grow out of this literal obedience to the prophet's words and become less exact in his commitments. For Fuad, the important thing was for the child to learn "to commit to something. And then when the commitment is there, you can change the way you express your commitment" (Interview with UIN-Jakarta professor, March 24, 2009). He went on to explain that even though parents may enroll their children in schools that do not align completely with their own perspectives, as he did, they are most interested in their children learning the process of commitment.

While there is no guarantee that children will continue in the way they were taught when young, there is no guarantee that they will not. Fuad, though, seems to have thought through the possibility of his son remaining more literal in his commitments, and he has a strategy to prevent it.

I believe...that my kid is my kid, not somebody else's. And it does not mean that I have every right to shape him or to create him...But I have more room to negotiate with him because he is my son. He will come to my home [after living at the boarding school] and I have a lot of books and I will motivate him to read different books, to go to different Muslim groups, and so on. (Interview with UIN-Jakarta professor, March 24, 2009)

Fuad felt he would still have significant influence over his child. He believed he would be able to extend his child's understanding about religion and religious observance. Although Fuad had not enrolled his son in an extended-day Islamic school, his situation and hopes for his son's religious development are similar to parents who do.

A father from a small JSIT school in southern Jogja felt similarly. In relaying how a friend of his had withdrawn his son from a JSIT school in the city, he postulated that it

could have been due to the Islam they practice being “more rigid and exclusive, and more observant.” For him and his wife, however, who were not PKS,

It is good [to be rigid and observant in religion]...And Islam should be like that, for me. But for political thinking or if you regard other people as bad, if you regard non-Muslims or even Islam outside your group as a competitor...[pause] My son is just a kid. He will grow. We can handle it. We can discuss that later on when he can think about what Islam is. And we don't need to worry because they (JSIT schools) don't teach terrorism or radicalism. It's just a matter of observance and it is good for his discipline. As Muslims we have to practice Islam every day and all the time.
(Interview with UIN-Jogja professor, October 14, 2009)

Potential doctrinal conflicts between these fathers and their sons are quite real, but these men are confident these potential conflicts will not be problematic.

A hierarchy of values could explain the reasons for the risks parents take with enrolling their children in schools that teach values and practices that conflict with their own. Parents value a solid academic education, want to provide their children with a religious foundation to protect them from moral corruption, and find the extended school day useful in accommodating their urban middle-class lives. Given the advantages these schools offer, parents appear to be willing to overlook the conflicting differences in specific religious perspectives and practices promoted at home and school.

Conclusion

Being newly middle-class in contemporary Indonesia, as in other countries, provokes both privilege and anxiety (Jones 2012, Liechty 2002). Middle-class parents are keenly aware of their position between the poor and the wealthy segments of society. The supposed incompatibility between wealth and morality generates middle-class parent anxieties about the corrupting power of consumption. Middle-class Indonesians, who are more comfortable defining themselves as “educated” or “developed” rather than “middle-

class” (Heryanto 2003; Jones 2012), can assuage concerns over paying high tuition fees for elite schools by knowing that they are “investing” in not just a good education, but in high quality Islamic instruction for their children. Additionally, concerned with the immorality of the day, religion is seen as a solution to the corruption of social morals.

As all parents do, Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT parents aspire to provide their children with “a better life,” which includes a religious education. These religiously-minded middle-class parents have redefined the type of education required to produce a “better life” in Indonesia; in addition to academic training, they have elevated rigorous religious education to be an integral component. In order for their children to maintain middle-class status, students must be well educated so as to competitively enter the labor market as professional, white-collar workers. In order to avoid moral corruption associated with wealth, as well as Western values that are filtering into society, parents rely on Islamic values to guide students. However, in contrast to most other Islamic schooling, extended-day schooling does not focus on extensive doctrines, Islamic history, or other material that would prepare students to become religious leader. Rather, it focuses on basic Islamic rituals and Islamic character, ostensibly with no loyalty to any particular religious organization. This type of religious education is not meant to train students to be Islamic specialists or religious preachers, but moral businesspeople, educators, political activists, or any other respectable profession. Through this type of education, parents expect their children to gain a moral compass at a young age that will guide them through the challenges of the modern day and unpredictable future.

The marriage of high quality academic training and extensive religious curriculum, combined with the resultant extended school day, makes for a convenient solution to busy

middle-class parents concerned with the intellectual and moral development of their children and the maintenance of middle-class status. The middle-class parents use extended-day Islamic schools as a tool to mitigate their parental anxieties, to care for and provide comprehensive—intellectual and religious—education and development of their children. Al Azhar and JSIT schools become partner institutions in middle-class parenting responsibilities. Most obviously, the schools provide religious understanding in which many parents feel they are personally deficient.

Additionally, the extended school day provides students with supervised activities in a productive learning environment during the afternoons when parents may be working or otherwise involved in activities outside of the home. It is also possible that the warmth and kindness teachers exhibit towards their children eases any sense of abandonment for leaving their children in school longer than the students in the general schools. And finally, as a parent's wisdom and protection have limited reach, parents hope and expect religious understanding, "good habits," and Islamic character taught at the schools to protect their children from immorality and negative social activities, such as drugs, "free sex," pornography, and forms of moral corruption throughout their lives. In other words, the schools fortify students with the intellectual skills and Islamic character needed to navigate the modern world, equipping them to participate successfully in the global economy while sidestepping the pitfalls of Western culture.

The religious influence of the schools that parents invite into their homes through enrollment of their children in religious private schools is, however, received with mixed reviews. Although many parents self-identify as lacking in religious knowledge, they do have opinions and preferences in appropriate religious behaviors or standards. While

enrolling their children in an Islamic school instills in their children Islamic values and introduces them to “good habits” such as prayer and fasting, parents run the risk that their children will acquire religious perspectives, practices, and standards that conflict with their own. Some differences are welcomed and parents modify their behaviors and standards accordingly. Several parents contributed their own religious growth in part to the example and encouragement of their children.

On the other hand, predominantly in homes of Luqman al Hakim SIT students, some parents disagree with new attitudes and understandings children are taught at school. In these instances, parents re-teach their children according to practices the parents follow. Most disagreements appear to center around concepts of male–female interactions, such as dating and female dress codes. Although there are disagreements, few parents fail to voice concern over the dissonance. With the home and the school presenting different religious practices, the students then must decide to which standard they will align themselves. Certainly it cannot be predicted whether loyalty for religious practices will align with the Islamic teachers or the parents. As JSIT students become adults themselves, it will be interesting to see how they resolve the dissonance in religious values between school and home.

If students side with the ideology of their teachers—who by the nature of their positions are established as trained in religion—rather than that of their parents—who generally feel inadequate in their personal religious development—the previous generation’s approach to Islam could be overshadowed by a newer approach. Given the middle- and upper-middle class clientele of Al Azhar and JSIT, their graduates are very likely to become some of Indonesia’s future political leaders, social activists, academics and

businesspeople. Such positions have the potential to influence Indonesia's religious, political, and social realms in significant ways.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

At the intersection of Islamic movements, Islamic education, and the religious middle class, this dissertation examines two piety projects competing for control over popular conceptualizations of piety and what it means to be a good Muslim in Indonesia. Through focused research at two primary school campuses of Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT in Jogja, this dissertation provides comparative examples of how these two schools accommodate, assimilate and reject various outside influences, such as Western science and transnational Islam, on the intellectual and religious development of their students. With parallel approaches to and emphasis on knowledge and piety, the schools aim for the development of both the heart and mind of their students. However, the schools' disparate conceptualizations of piety, which are representative of the larger polarizing trends in Islam, set the students on different trajectories in their development of religious and moral subjectivities. As such, this research shows how schooling can be a tool for shaping the socio-religious, and political, climate of a community and country.

In contrast to Egypt (Herrera 2000, 2006; Starrett 1998) and Malaysia (Kraince 2009) where governments have attempted to marginalize private religious schools in efforts to manage the dissemination of religious education, Indonesia is experiencing growth and innovation in private Islamic schooling within the supportive structures of the government. As Islamization efforts in the current world-wide revival of Islam shift from reformation of political structures to (re)formation of individuals' personal piety, new educational spaces have emerged (Adely & Starrett 2011). New forms of formal and

informal study groups, schools, and professional trainings have developed (Brenner 1996; Deeb 2006; Hefner 2009; Hirschkind 2009; Mahmood 2005; Rudnycky 2009). The emergence and rapid growth of Indonesia's extended-day Islamic school market is a prime example.

Al Azhar and JSIT school groups have developed what I call an extended-day Islamic schooling model. I argue that there are six main facets that distinguish these schools from Indonesia's more common Islamic schooling models (i.e. pesantren, madrasas, and Muhammadiyah schools): 1) relatively expensive tuition and fees; 2) a Qur'an-based epistemology that guides the integration of Islamic knowledge and general knowledge in all subjects; 3) an expanded religion curriculum on top of the full national curriculum; 4) the focus of religious curriculum on Islamic values and ethics rather than the more traditional subjects, such as *fiqh* (jurisprudence) or organization-specific histories; 5) an extended school day, releasing students one to three hours later than state general schools and other private Islamic day schools; and 6) no association with a formal Islamic organizations (i.e. Muhammadiyah or NU).

The schools' integrated Islam approach to knowledge combines some aspects of Western schooling (i.e. academic focus, the use of technology, sciences) with Islamic concepts and narratives, providing a "morally meaningful context" (Milligan 2006:419) to the material. In addition to introducing Islamic practices within government school structures, such as group prayer or Islamic dress codes, as documented in places like Morocco (Boyle 2004) and Egypt (Herrera 2003) and Indonesia's own Muhammadiyah schools, the Al Azhar and JSIT schools have also reframed national curriculum within an Islamic framework to create a hierarchy of knowledge between the divine and mundane.

The key features (desegregation of secular and religious knowledge by presenting all class content in an Islamic framework, a Qur'an-based epistemology, and development of a strong consciousness of God) of this ideology are intended to engender piety among students by instilling intellectual respect for God and indebtedness to God's benevolence. These schools view piety as a crucial form of citizenship.

Their divergent conceptualizations of piety are reflected in their students' religious and moral subjectivities. Al Azhar 31 promotes an Indonesian Islam, pluralistic and inclusive of multi-tradition approaches to Islam that is flexible in regards to acceptable forms of worship. Al Azhar 31 students' conceptualizations of piety referenced nearly equally three themes, namely *ibadah* (rituals and acts of worship), obedience, and morals, and also included some mention of belief and faith. Their responses included both specific actions and abstract concepts to describe a good Muslim. Categorized differently, the answers were one-quarter outward performance, two-and-a-half quarters inner character, and one slice miscellaneous items. Al Azhar 31 students' inclusion of abstract concepts in what constitutes a good Muslim correlated with greater moral flexibility, but also ambiguity in defining what is acceptable moral behavior. Students demonstrated greater tolerance towards deviant Islamic behavior, specifically of a woman not veiling in public.

Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes a transnational Islam that pushes for the removal of local customs and traditions from mainstream Islam and advocates for disciplined, exacting observance of standardized practices. This purificationist approach is inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and linked to the Islamic political party the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS). Luqman al Hakim SIT students' conceptualizations of piety were dominated by two-thirds of answers focused on *ibadah*,

with obedience and moral behavior each nearly a fifth of the responses. In other words, the answers were three-fifths outward performance, two-fifths inner character, and a fraction miscellaneous items. Students showed greater certainty in defining acceptable moral behavior and less tolerance for deviant Islamic behavior, specifically of a woman not veiling in public.

The inclusion of Luqman al Hakim SIT in this dissertation provides a rare investigation of the transnational influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on Islamic schooling through the Tarbiyah Movement, institutionalized in the form of the Islamic political party PKS. The significant emphasis al-Banna put on education is usually overshadowed in the press and scholarly research by the political nature of Muslim Brotherhood groups. The importance of education and its power to effect social, and ultimately political, change was not lost on the Tarbiyah Movement-cum-PKS leadership (Hasan 2009, Machmudi 2006). In accordance with Indonesian law, PKS does not directly sponsor or finance JSIT and its member schools; however, PKS cadre members established and manage JSIT headquarters and most JSIT member schools. JSIT schools teach principles and promote religious subjectivities of the Tarbiyah Movement.

As the political party addresses legal structures, the JSIT schools focus on cultural and social aspects of society. In some ways, the schools are better able to promote a truer form of the Tarbiyah Movement's vision of Islam than PKS, as the schools are not beholden to the ever-shifting political milieu. Since the schools are popular for both ideological and practical reasons among parents, some differences in approaches to Islam between school and home rarely outweigh the academic and logistical benefits the schools provide parents (Chudleigh 2011). The potential political influence of JSIT schools is significant. Although I

did not observe direct promotion of the party, the schools teach affinities for and religious subjectivities that align with PKS values. This could be very advantageous in the future when students are of voting age. The students' conviction in, or at least affinity for, the party's Islamic culture and values could engender support for PKS during elections.

While the school groups are engaged in piety projects at the institutional level, another set of mini piety projects are being waged at the familial level. Parents enroll their children in Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT to facilitate their own piety projects aimed at their children. Middle class parents' classed aspirations and anxieties regarding education, wealth, morality, and corruption create demand for a particular type of Islamic school: one that provides a longer school day, strong academics, and a robust religious curriculum focused on Islamic morals and values.

Adding to the paucity of literature on middle class, religion, and education in Indonesia, this research initiates discussions on how classed subjectivities influence Islamic schooling in urban Indonesia. The relatively high tuition and fees of these schools make them unaffordable for lower classes, the populations typically served by Islamic schools. Many scholars argue that the rise of Islamic piety in Indonesia has been a fundamentally middle-class phenomenon (Brenner 1996; Hefner 2000; Smith-Hefner 2007; as cited by Jones 2012:159). Jones (2012) argues that the rise in public forms of Islamic piety is a partial solution to public anxieties about corruption. I have shown, more specifically, that the rise in Islamic schooling among the middle classes is due in part to parental expectations that Islamic schooling will safeguard children against moral corruption. No less important, however, is that Al Azhar 31 and Luqman al Hakim SIT meet two fundamental preconditions: first, the schools offer quality education; and secondly, the

type of education and credentials offered are similar to those of the public schools (Khan 2012). The quality of the schools' academic programs provides the educational foundation for future education and training that students need in order to be successful professionals, and thus maintain middle-class status.

Through their patronage, parents are the (at times unsuspecting) accomplices in the institutional battle between the competing piety projects. As many parents did not grow up religious, they have no allegiance to a particular group, such as NU or Muhammadiyah, and are therefore open to schools independent to those organizations. Additionally, many parents are in the process of solidifying and defining their own set of beliefs and practices, and therefore less concerned about specific practices than general development of Islamic character. More pragmatically, family constraints often limit schooling options and drive school selection. Although mismatches of beliefs between the schools and the parents surfaced, particularly with JSIT families, there was enough overlap in educational and religious agendas to sustain parental patronage, and therefore to continue the shaping of student subjectivities around a particular approach to piety.

It remains to be seen whether or not the students will develop Islamic character that aligns with the schools' and/or parents' visions of a good Muslim. As McLeod (2000) argues, habitus and subjectivities develop over time. Parents who were keen on robust religious training of their children during the early years to in order to establish solid Islamic character tended to be less interested in similar religious training at the secondary schooling level if academic training had to be compromised. Many students, particularly from Luqman al Hakim SIT, expected and looked forward to leaving the extended-day Islamic school to enter state secondary schools. Although Adely (2012) demonstrates that

in Jordan religious subjectivities are developed in non-religious state schools, it is unpredictable what shape student subjectivities will take as students move from an overtly Islamic schooling experience to a schooling environment where religion is curricularly segregated from academic studies.

While there is obviously no such thing as *the* Indonesian way, there are Indonesian ways of doing things; or rather, the familiar ways of doing politics, approaching religion, and living amongst a plurality of religious traditions. It is well known in the field of anthropology that culture is not stagnant, but rather always shifting and changing. Brenner (1996) demonstrates this in the increased practice of veiling among Indonesian women. In the 1980s, at the beginning of the most recent revival of Islam, very few Muslim women veiled. Veiling was not considered an Indonesian custom, but rather an Arab one. Fast forward 20-plus years, and one sees a large portion of Muslim women veiling throughout the archipelago. Within veiling practices, there are Indonesian and non-Indonesian approaches. Interestingly, the veiling habits of female PKS activists are considered non-Indonesian. One of my NU-educated research assistants exclaimed, in partial objection, one day after returning from the Luqman al Hakim SIT campus, "That is not Indonesian!" She was referencing the wearing of long pants underneath long skirts and tight sleeves down to the wrist underneath loose tunics to prevent accidental exposure of the ankles and calves or wrists and forearms. Although my research assistant may not have felt it was Indonesian, the headscarf she was wearing, although small and colorful, would not have been considered Indonesian a few decades earlier. The current piety projects are at battle; it is too early yet to tell which if either will retain or gain hegemonic control over how Indonesians will conceptualize piety and what a good Muslim will look like.

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