Special Interest Partisanship: The Transformation of American Political Parties

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ABSTRACT

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Why have group-party alliances become more common since the mid-twentieth century? This dissertation employs both qualitative and statistical tools to address the puzzle of contemporary special interest partisanship. After tracing partisanship across several measures, I develop a continuum of group-party relationships, running from fluid, unstructured interactions (akin to political pluralism) to highly institutionalized alliances (as we might see in a firm). Drawing on pluralist scholarship and theories of firm formation and evolution, I explore the costs and benefits of different arrangements, and explain why we might expect to see movement along the continuum over time. On the one hand, pluralism offers flexibility to parties and groups, and alliances have little value when parties are too weak to discipline their members in Congress. On the other, institutionalized alliances offer significant efficiency gains, which are especially valuable during periods of growth. I argue that changes in group-party relations stem from the growth of national party organizations over the second half of the twentieth century, which increased the value of group resources and intensified parties' need for efficiency. Until this period, parties were weak on the national level and strong on the state and local levels, and patronage was the primary currency of politics, leaving little room for issues in political competition. The New Deal's historic expansion of federal power disrupted this balance, temporarily strengthening local parties by offering new sources of patronage, while also sparking gradual, interconnected processes that would

ultimately undermine machine power—most notably, the growth of groups and the rise of issue politics as a site of electoral competition. Realizing the economies of scale necessary to build strong national parties required movement away from pluralism into more structured, long-term relationships. Moreover, in order for the new site of competition to help Republicans build a coalition to compete with the long-dominant New Deal Democrats, distinct issue positions were necessary. The result of this party-building process is a pattern of group-party alliances quite unlike the bipartisan relations Key, Truman, and others observed in the mid-twentieth century.

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Part I

Dissertation Chapters

Chapter 1

Introduction

Tales of polarization in contemporary American politics range from political tragedy to farce. The parties' inability to negotiate a timely solution to the debt ceiling crisis led to a historic downgrade of the nation's credit in 2011. Their more recent failure to reach a budget deal has triggered sequestration, a dramatic wave of automatic cuts—the threat of which was intended to promote compromise—and further undermined public confidence in government. In other news, Republicans and Democrats, apparently unable to share goldfish crackers and ginger ale, had separate break rooms during recent redistricting meetings in New Jersey.[1] Needless to say, the steep growth of elite polarization since the early 1970s has been one of the most remarkable trends in contemporary American politics. It is almost hard to believe that only sixty-three years ago, the American Political Science Association (APSA) published a report criticizing the parties for excessive similarity. Today, Democrats and Republicans seem to have clear and opposite stances on most issues, and political discourse has become increasingly aggressive and unyielding.

Scholars have, unsurprisingly, taken great interest in the origins of this trend. One common claim is that activists caused polarization (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006, *inter alia*).[2] The conventional wisdom here is that activists are more extreme than legislators, they have become even more extreme over time, and changes to the Democratic Party's nomination system in 1968 and 1972 opened the process and allowed activists to pull elites away from the median voter. Scholars, journalists, and citizens

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[1] Rosenthal, Alan. Interview with Justin Phillips and Alissa Stollwerk. New Brunswick, NJ. 15 November 2011.

[2] Though not everyone uses the term "activist" to mean special interest activist, ideological pressure on parties still drives this explanation. Moreover, even a vague "party activist" is likely to have off-median preferences in at least one special interest issue area. Even if they do not explicitly refer to special interest groups, then, these studies imply that special interest activists are driving polarization (Aldrich 1995; King 1997, 2003; Jacobson 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Shafer 2003; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004; Fiorina et al. 2005; Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006).

have also noticed a troubling increase in revolving doors, iron triangles, and other seemingly unscrupulous dealings between political leaders and special interest groups.

This argument makes sense. These days, it seems like both parties have armies of special interest groups lined up at their sides. In the 2012 election cycle, women's groups directed 97% of their $20.9 million in federal campaign contributions to Democrats (The Center for Responsive Politics). On the other side of the aisle, Republicans received 98% of the $3.4 million from pro-life groups and 96% of the $4.4 million from gun rights groups. This trend extends beyond ideological and single-issue organizations, as 85% of donations from the building materials and equipment industry went to Republicans, while Democrats received 70% of the contributions from lawyers and law firms. In this light, it is not difficult to envision a narrative in which groups choose partisan allies, and then pressure them to take extreme policy positions and uncompromising attitudes.

Yet, if we look back at work by V.O. Key and others on group-party relations in the mid-twentieth century, this explanation for polarization becomes more puzzling. According to these scholars, special interest groups typically avoided party alliances—with good reason (Key 1942; Truman 1951; Blaisdell 1957; Holtzman 1966; Greenstone 1969).[3] Key remarked, for example, that "often it is unwise to back either party . . . it is better to have friends in both camps, for the group must promote its objectives whatever party is in power" (Key 1942: 212). Avoiding partisan alliance was part of a broader strategy to evade bright lights in the political arena, according to Truman. While "interest groups rather generally participate in elections, they are usually timid about admitting it," he notes in the early 1950s, with "most, in fact, plac[ing] a high premium on what is known as 'keeping out of politics' "(Truman 1951: 295).

[3]Greenstone wrote about the alliance between the Democratic Party and organized labor. However, he also noted that this was an exceptional case. For the most part, he notes that groups were not closely aligned with parties at this time.

Associating with a party could alienate groups' members, who might have different party preferences.

From this perspective, what has been offered as an explanation for polarization actually sounds more like another side of the puzzle. For their own reasons, it appears neither parties nor groups wanted to "pick sides" in the middle of the twentieth century. Today, this reticence seems to have vanished, or at least eroded. Are these common impressions accurate? Have group-party relations really changed so dramatically over the post-war period? If so, why, and to what effect? And what does this mean for our understanding of polarization? These are my dissertation's central questions.

Former APSA president E.E. Schattscheider famously feared the power of special interests, believing group and party strength to be inversely related. He even goes so far as to say "pressure groups thrive on the weaknesses of the parties" (Schattschneider 1948: 18). Since parties must mobilize broad majorities, while groups guard unrepresentative minorities and "[sing] with a strong upper-class accent," group power ultimately hurts the populace (Schattschneider 1960: 34-5). Lowi (1969) echoes Schattschneider's concerns, expressing deep worry over the expansion of "interest group liberalism" in American government. As its power and responsibility swelled during the New Deal, he argues, the federal government delegated more and more authority to interest groups, perverting representation and undermining effective governance. Even in the absence of widespread party affiliations, Lowi argues groups' expanded involvement in government degrades democracy.

It is difficult to gauge whether these problems have increasingly infected contemporary American politics as group-party relations have changed without a precise picture of these changes. Political science has not paid much attention to group-party relations since the pluralism debates of the mid-twentieth century. In a

recent *Annual Review of Political Science* article, Tichenor and Harris (2005) call the dearth of scholarship on contemporary group-party relations "one of the most glaring lacunae of the discipline" (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 266). Attention to interest groups began to rise in the 1980s as "several scholars lamented that interest group research had essentially lain fallow for more than a decade and noted the irony that political scientists were looking away from organized interests precisely when they were becoming more significant in American politics."[4] Still, few scholars answered Key and Truman's calls to study groups' relationship to parties.

This is beginning to change, however. Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller (2008) recently asserted a provocative new theory of parties placing special interests in the center of political action. Razing the wall between insiders and outsiders, these authors argue that activists do not pressure political parties—they *are* political parties. That is, they fall within the traditional party umbrella and "will be permitted large roles in party decisions" (Cohen et al. 2008: 15). This has major implications for policy, as the authors argue: "Parties try, via the candidates they nominate and elect, to pull policy toward what their interest and activist groups want, even if that is not what most voters want. Thus, our claim about how parties work is also a claim about how democracy works" (Cohen et al. 2008: 6-7).

Though they never cite Frymer (1999), Cohen et al.'s argument can be placed on one end of a spectrum, opposite Frymer, representing the potential range of overlap between parties and special interests. According to Frymer, these entities are not only separate, their relationships can be unbalanced and strained—even when they are "allies." When a group commits to one party, and has also been rejected by the opposing party, that group is "captured" within its "ally" party (Frymer 1999: 8). The group

[4] Tichenor and Harris 2005: 252, citing Wilson 1981, Arnold 1982.

cannot credibly threaten to defect from the alliance because it has no alternative coalitional home. Consequently, the party lacks strong incentives to act on the group's behalf. Certainly, not all groups will have this relationship to parties; nevertheless, Frymer's argument suggests there is an opposite extreme to Cohen et al.'s characterization of group-party fusion, even for ideologically like-minded entities. Moreover, even if the group is not in the extreme position of "electoral capture," McCarty and Rothenberg (2002) have shown that groups and politicians have independent interests that may impede successful cooperation. All in all, there is a range of possible relationships between complete fusion and separation that scholars have not yet explored in depth.

My dissertation addresses this range by developing a continuum of group-party relationships, running from fluid, unstructured interactions (akin to political pluralism) to highly institutionalized alliances (as we might see in a firm). Drawing on pluralist scholarship and theories of firm formation and evolution, I explore the costs and benefits of different arrangements, and explain why we might expect to see movement along the continuum over time. On the one hand, pluralism offers flexibility to parties and groups, and alliances have little value when parties are too weak to discipline their members in Congress. On the other, institutionalized alliances offer significant efficiency gains, which are especially valuable during periods of growth. Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, I show that group-party relations have in fact moved away from pluralism over time; in other words, special interest partisanship has increased. These changes, I argue, stem from the growth of national party organizations since the New Deal. Before discussing these claims in detail, however, it is important to step back and clarify exactly what we mean by parties, special interest groups, and special interest partisanship.

1.1 Conceptualizing Group-Party Relations

A fuller understanding of group-party relations necessarily begins with precise definitions. What makes an interest special, and how are special interest groups different from other entities like pressure groups, social movements, and political parties? Schattschneider defines special interests in contrast to common interests, as the former are "shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community; they exclude others and may be adverse to them" (Schattschneider 1960: 23). Though some scholars may take issue with the terms *few* and *fraction*—indeed, James Madison fretted the prospect of majority factions in *Federalist 10*—this definition is relatively uncontroversial.

Disagreement rises when we move from a discussion of what constitutes a special interest to what constitutes a special interest group. Different scholars employ different terms, like special interest groups, pressure groups, social movements, professional associations, and political parties, to name a few. Sometimes they use different terms to describe the same concept—it seems, for example, that *special interest group* represents a modern rebranding of the more traditional *pressure group*—and sometimes they are describing different kinds of special interest organizations.

Grossman and Helpman (2002) offer a broad and useful definition that can encompass different kinds of organizations: "An interest group may be considered 'special' if its members covet policies that would not be considered desirable by the average citizen. Thus, any minority group of citizens that shares identifiable characteristics and similar concerns on some set of issues might be termed a [special interest group]" (Grossman and Helpman 2002: 75). Given the high workload faced by today's government, we might expand this definition to include groups coveting policies that the average citizen would not especially value. These policies need not be

undesirable, but the average citizen would not afford them scarce resources like agenda space. By this definition, *special interest group* can serve as an umbrella concept for social movements, professional associations, and industry groups. Diversity need not weaken the definition; indeed, all special interests are not the same, just as all democracies are not the same. It is often useful to distinguish between groups based on levels and features of organization, activity, and membership. Yet, despite their differences, they collectively constitute a distinct and important part of American political life because they are all private and extra-constitutional.

Political parties are not special interest groups because they are, in practice, only quasi-private. Despite their private financing, parties perform critical functions in American government. Should the Democratic and Republican parties spontaneously evaporate, American government would be left in a state of chaos. If an entity is so tightly integrated into government so as to render the government incapable of functioning in its absence, it cannot be considered truly private. Political parties are quasi-private organizations, occupying a gray area between government and traditional special interest groups.

Parties and groups also have different goals, according to Key and Schattschneider, as parties are primarily concerned with winning elections, while groups care more about policy. Goal divergence propels parties and groups onto different paths, in terms of strategy and organization. Electoral concerns encourage parties to mobilize majorities, aggregating many interests, which in turn leads to moderateness—parties "aim at inclusiveness, are hospitable and catholic" (Schattschneider 1948: 17). Because they are not attempting to win elections, groups lack incentives to unify large numbers of people through broad, moderate appeals. Instead, they "promote the interests of relatively narrowly defined minorities and are so closely and exclusively identified with

these minorities that they could never in the nature of things become majorities" (Schattschneider 1948: 18).

These claims may sound dated to the modern ear, as differences between parties and groups appear to have softened over time. As groups become increasingly involved in electoral politics, the distinction between party and group goals fades, or at least becomes more complex. But what does this mean? Have groups become more like parties, have parties become more like groups, or have they both changed in unexpected ways? To address these questions, we need to rethink the boundaries between parties and groups, and investigate their interaction over time.

Key provides a useful framework for this kind of analysis, enriching the standard definition of parties by breaking the monolith into three distinct, but interconnected pieces: parties in government, parties as organizations, and parties in the electorate. Parties are not one-dimensional entities whose operations we can observe on one plane; to fully understand them, we need to analyze all three dimensions. Aldrich (1995) develops this tripartite framework further in his classic study of parties, arguing that we can get very different pictures of party strength depending on which sphere we examine. Scholars' overemphasis on parties in the electorate led to mistaken conclusions about party decline, he claims. I argue we can also draw distorted inferences about special interest groups and their relationship to parties by focusing too much on one area.

Like parties, special interest groups operate as organizations, in government, and in the electorate. Studying special interest groups as organizations involves examining their infrastructures and general operations. Today, for example, most major organizations have full-time staffs and many have established political action committees (PACs) to represent their interests in the electoral arena. These are organizational choices and developments. Assessing the status of special interest groups

in the electorate involves looking at the relationship between special interest groups and the population. Do people identify with the group? Do they support its positions? This is a way of looking at special interest group strength that is distinct from its infrastructure and role in government. To analyze the last category, we would consider the behavior of elected officials on special interest issues. Breaking special interest groups into these three categories will help us measure their relationship to parties with more precision.

As a concept, *special interest partisanship* captures the relationship between parties and groups within and between these three spheres. To what extent do party and issue coalitions overlap in government? Do members of Congress vote along party lines on special interest issues? Are certain issues associated with one party or the other? By answering these two questions, we can get a sense of parties' issue positions as well as their priorities. Looking between spheres, we can analyze the relationship between special interests as organizations and parties in government, for example. To what extent do government processes involve special interest organizations?

In sum, because parties and special interest groups are multidimensional entities, there are numerous ways to measure special interest partisanship. These measures may not be consistent, even within a special interest group. The question of whether special interest partisanship has increased over time is therefore highly complex. By looking across multiple groups and measures, however, we can get a broad sense of the strength of special interest partisanship in the American political system over time. Understanding *why* changes occur requires different sets of tools, drawn from both rational choice and historical institutional traditions in political science.

1.2 A Mixed-Method Analysis of Party Nationalization and the Growth of Special Interest Partisanship

I argue that we can better understand changes in group-party relations by thinking about the party as a firm. New institutional economists have endeavored to explain how and why organizations change, and their insights can get us quite far in understanding the relationship between parties and groups over time. Firms—and I argue parties as well—arise and evolve in order to reduce transaction costs and capitalize on economies of scale. This allows them to maximize efficiency and, ultimately, profits (or in the case of parties, votes).

Significantly, and perhaps controversially, this approach encourages us to explain changes in group-party relations—including polarization, or special interest partisanship in Congress at the highest level of aggregation—without focusing on changes in ideology. In this story, group-party relations do not change because elite preferences change. Rather, their cost-benefit environment changes. This influences their incentives with respect to groups. This is not to say that there have been no changes in party ideology. We know, for example, that parties are more internally homogenous and externally differentiated in roll-call voting today than they were a few decades ago (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). We also know there are more clear differences between party platforms today than there were at the time of APSA's 1950 Report on Political Parties. Yet, neither of these changes necessarily mean that politicians' beliefs have evolved; simply that their choices—what they perceive to be the best strategic decisions—have changed.

As Mayhew (1974) and others have argued, politicians' goals are very consistent over time. The best strategy for achieving those goals can change quite dramatically in

response to changes in historical and institutional context, however. This is why Aldrich predicts the party system will continue to evolve over time. In the mid-twentieth century, presumably balanced relationships between parties and groups were thought to be the best arrangement for goal achievement. Today, the assessment appears to be different. To understand contemporary group-party relations, then, we need to ask why perceptions about the ideal group-party arrangement changed. This requires attention to the incentives facing politicians, as well as the historical and institutional forces shaping these incentives. At any one moment, incentives may be relatively fixed; over time, however, contextual changes will alter them.

A historical-behavioral approach is well suited to this kind of analysis. Combining the logic of rational choice with historical institutionalism is not a unique approach, though its application to this subject matter is new. Gamm and Shepsle argue that macro and micro-level approaches are "two sides of the same coin," serving as "complements rather than substitutes" (Gamm and Shepsle 1989: 62). Aldrich (1995) draws on both traditions for his classic work on parties, and Katznelson (1998) encourages their dual deployment in puzzles of American political development.

Using qualitative and quantitative methods, I argue that changes in group-party relations stem from the growth of national party organizations over the second half of the twentieth century, which intensified parties' need for efficiency and altered the nature of electoral competition. Until this period, parties were weak on the national level and strong on the state and local levels, and patronage was the primary currency of politics, leaving little room for issues in electoral competition (Schattschneider 1942; Mayhew 1986). The New Deal's historic expansion of federal power disrupted this balance, temporarily strengthening local parties by offering new sources of patronage, while also sparking gradual, interconnected processes that would ultimately undermine

machine power—most notably, the growth of national party organizations and the rise of issue politics as a site of electoral competition. As national issues became more salient, parties paid more attention to them; and when material incentives (i.e., patronage) finally dissolved by the late 1960s, purposive incentives (i.e., issues) gained new value as tools for appealing to voters. This encouraged party organizations to take clearer stances, just as Schattschneider suspected it could. Moreover, as the the Republican and Democratic National Committees grew stronger and more stable, they were better equipped to handle the research and intra-party negotiations necessary to develop strong issue positions.

In sum, Schattschneider was quite right about the connection between party decentralization and weak issue politics; as parties nationalized, issue competition intensified. His claim that the national committees needed stronger infrastructure to develop issue positions also proved prescient. Yet, he appears to have underestimated groups' ability to aid national party-building. Party and group strength are not inverse; groups provided invaluable assistance to national parties as they grew from the "ghost parties" (as Schattschneider termed them) of the early and mid-twentieth century, which did little and disbanded between elections, to the professionalized organizations we see today. Realizing the economies of scale necessary to build strong national parties required movement away from fluid, pluralist relations into more structured, long-term relationships. The result of this party-building process is a pattern of group-party alliances quite unlike the bipartisan relations Key, Truman, and others observed in the mid-twentieth century. This argument has implications for our understanding of group-party relations, as well as polarization.

1.3 A New Perspective on Polarization

Polarization is typically treated as an ideological phenomenon beginning in the 1970s, with roots in the previous decade's party reforms and historic civil rights extensions, which encouraged broad party realignment in the south. I aim to expand this traditional characterization of polarization and our understanding of its origins. While polarization may present ideological symptoms, I argue it is largely an organizational phenomenon. And when we examine the organizational changes leading to polarization—specifically, the nationalization of the Democratic and Republican parties—we can see that its roots lie in the New Deal era, well before the 1970s.

I cast polarization as a process of developing issue programs and positions—something parties were not doing, at least not successfully, even as late as the mid-twentieth century. This perspective is supported by a disaggregated study of polarization in chapter two. Studies of mass polarization often look issue by issue; but, curiously, elite polarization is almost always analyzed at a higher level of aggregation. For example, scholars often look at the difference between mean party NOMINATE scores in the House and Senate, which take into account members' entire voting records. While there is undoubtedly great value in analyzing elite polarization in this way, for it illuminates broad trends, I argue there is also value in disaggregation. From this, we can see that parties gradually took positions on different issues throughout this period—not all at the same time, or to the same degree. In other words, this was not simply one big trend; it developed in pieces. This perspective on polarization is also supported by evidence showing that parties developed their own issue priorities over this period. What we are seeing, essentially, is the development and maturation of issue politics.

To be clear, this analysis does not contradict all previous explanations for

polarization. Rather, by examining the trend's historical roots, this analysis broadens our view and provides a unifying narrative for several existing explanations. To clarify how my analysis fits into the large literature on polarization, I will review this literature and explain in more detail what is and is not new about my perspective. Some of the explanations offered over the past two decades, like redistricting, have been undermined by subsequent research. Indeed, it seems unlikely that redistricting caused polarization, since we see polarization in the Senate as well as the House (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). Reforms redirecting power from committees to the majority party caucus are unsatisfying for similar reasons. Since committees are much less powerful in the Senate than in the House, this explanation cannot account for the growth of polarization in the upper chamber. There are, however, a few explanations that have received significant support from scholars, namely southern realignment, income inequality and immigration, and, as discussed earlier, activist pressure.

Shortly after Key (1949) documented the Democratic Party's dominance in the south, the region began a long-term realignment. Republican seat share began to rise in Congress in the 1950s, though it did not crack thirty percent until the early 1970s, and did not reach fifty percent until the 1994 "Republican Revolution." Still, this was a monumental change in American politics. Because conservative Democrats became conservative Republicans, the parties were ideologically "sorted" more neatly, leading to greater intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity (Rohde 1991, Hood et al. 1999, Jacobson 2000, Roberts and Smith 2003, Polsby 2005). This is a compelling, though not complete, explanation for polarization. For one, we see a large increase in polarization in the last few decades of the twentieth century even if we exclude southern members of Congress (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006: 49). More specifically, southern realignment cannot account for the decline of non-southern liberal

Republicans.

After reviewing and dismissing several explanations for polarization, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) introduce two new factors into the debate. They show a striking correlation between inequality, immigration and polarization over time. After falling and then leveling out in the early to mid-twentieth century, the Gini index (measuring income inequality) began to rise dramatically in the 1970s. We see a similar pattern in immigration, with the percent of the population that is foreign born falling from the turn of the century until the early 1970s, when it starts to climb. These trends demand attention, as polarization also began its steep ascent in the early 1970s.

My dissertation does not challenge these explanations so much as it provides additional context. In fact, it suggests some critics may have been a bit too quick to reject southern realignment. Tracing the development of issue positions, we can see that what we often think of as southern realignment in response to the civil rights revolution was not just a southern phenomenon. Archival research illuminates the Republican Party's observation that civil rights issues also loosened Democratic ties amongst white, working class voters in northern cities. This offered Republicans a key opportunity to recruit a large bloc of new voters, and chip away at the New Deal Democratic leviathan. Chapters four and five will show that Republicans viewed issues like school busing, abortion, and school prayer as tools to recruit these voters, who were not satisfied with the Democratic Party's position on those issues. While there was no sweeping party realignment in the north akin to the one in the south—indeed, this would have been impossible, as the north had not been as politically homogenous—it is important to note that some of the stimuli for southern realignment also affected the north. This helps to explain polarization's universality. Instead of focusing specifically on southern realignment as a cause of polarization, we can point to the *causes* of southern

realignment, which influenced both southern and non-southern legislators.

My analysis also offers a new perspective on why immigration would encourage polarization. Over the mid-to-late twentieth century, the electorate became increasingly complex, as African-Americans gained full voting rights and immigration brought new voters into the fold. Of course, many immigrants are not citizens and cannot vote; still, as immigration rates rise, more and more immigrants do enter the electorate over time. This diversification made electioneering more difficult, since the parties did not always know how to appeal to different groups of voters. As Chapters three and five will argue, this increased the value of group resources and intensified parties' need for efficiency. Groups were very helpful in providing information about different types of voters, like what kinds of positions might induce them to support the party, and communicating parties' messages to those voters. And as the need for efficiency rose, parties had incentives to move away from fluid, pluralistic interactions into more structured relationships with groups. Through both of these channels, issue positions solidified and the parties became more distinct.

In sum, a historical-behavioral approach to polarization helps weave together different explanations for this extraordinary trend in American politics. It also undermines the common claim that activists caused polarization. My analysis shows that parties had their own reasons for wanting to encourage the rise of special interest partisanship. This is not to say that activists do not pressure parties to take more extreme positions than the median voter would prefer. Yet, activists are not responsible for systematic changes to the system. This was, I argue, an endogenous transformation of the American party system.

1.4 Chapter Outline

Following this introduction, chapter two measures special interest partisanship over time across forty groups, ranging from pro-life organizations to the pharmaceutical industry, in four arenas: legislation, agendas, money, and attitudes. While there is considerable variation across measures and groups, I show that special interest partisanship has in fact risen over the post-war period. This analysis exposes some long, gradual changes, as well as critical moments requiring explanation.

Chapter three develops a theory explaining why group-party relations evolve. I begin by analyzing individual elite-level party members' incentives to work with special interest groups, detailing the resources groups can offer politicians to help them achieve their electoral and policymaking goals, and considering how changes in political and electoral contexts might alter these incentives over time. We should expect parties to build closer relationships with groups when their need for group resources increases, and/or their existing supply of those resources declines. Subsequent chapters will argue that both circumstances arose in the post-war period. This tells us little about the *form* of group-party relations, however.

Proceeding to the organizational level, I develop a continuum of relationships between groups and parties, ranging from fluid, unstructured relations, as we would see in a purely pluralist system, to highly institutionalized, exclusive partnerships, akin to the organization of a firm. Drawing on classic pluralist scholarship and the new institutional economics literature on firm formation and evolution, I discuss the benefits and costs of different arrangements, and the circumstances under which we might expect to see movement along the continuum. In short, a federal system with weak national parties encourages pluralistic relations, as a group has little to gain from an

alliance if its partisan partner cannot discipline its members. Parties also benefit from this arrangement, under which they face less pressure to take positions that could alienate moderate voters. Moving away from pluralistic bipartisanship carries significant efficiency benefits, however. Institutionalization allows parties to achieve economies of scale in group liaison, and internalization (i.e., long-term partnerships, mimicking a business merger or acquisition) obviates the need to build a new coalition *de novo* for each election cycle or legislative effort, and aligns incentives, making groups more reliable coalition partners. Growth can intensify the need for efficiency, stimulating changes in organizational form in firms and, I argue, in parties as well.

Chapters four and five use history analytically to explain changes in special interest partisanship over time, with careful attention to the patterns discussed in chapter two, and the incentives discussed in chapter three. Chapter four traces the growth of national party organizations following the New Deal, and shows how this provided both the incentives and infrastructure necessary for parties to develop issue programs. Chapter five looks in depth at how parties drew on groups to help them build national organizations. This demonstrates how and why the growth of polarization was driven by parties' organizational concerns, rather than activists or ideological changes. It also shows how and why party and group strength are not necessarily inverse. This is not a zero-sum game. While there may be legitimate reasons for concern about the influence of special interest groups in politics, this does not erase the fact that groups were of great assistance in the critical process of national party-building. Indeed, they played a key role in the development of a more competitive two-party system.

It is crucial that we gain a better understanding of group-party relations, since groups have become such an integral part of American democracy. Just as Aldrich notes democracy is unworkable save in terms of parties, so too have parties become

unworkable save in terms of special interest groups (Aldrich 1995: 3). This project aims to begin an academic dialogue about how to measure this change, why it occurred, and what it means for American democracy.

Chapter 2

The Growth of Special Interest Partisanship

This chapter traces special interest partisanship in government, organizations, and the electorate over time with three central aims. One goal is simply to characterize group partisanship, as many scholars have explained the contours of individual- and macro-level partisanship. How strong is group partisanship? How stable? What kinds of changes, if any, do we observe at the group level? How much variation do we see between groups? Do we observe significant differences between different groups' behavior and Congressional treatment of issues relevant to different groups, for example? Of course, we may get different answers to these questions depending on which sphere we examine. To get a sense of this variation, the second task is to examine different measures for the same group. Finally, looking across multiple measures and groups over time allows me to map out the puzzle of special interest partisanship systematically, detailing what subsequent chapters will need to explain.

I find that special interest partisanship did increase over time in several important ways. The parties have become more distinct in the eyes of citizens, in their voting behavior, and in their prioritization of issues. Importantly, however, the parties did not become more distinct across the board at once; they were neither intent on broad disagreement, nor acquiescing to stronger party discipline on all issues. Rather, they developed distinct positions on different issues over time. This supports a view of polarization as the development of issue politics. This perspective is also supported by data showing that Democrats and Republicans increasingly focused on different issues over this period.

Changes in the electorate, in contrast, have been quite minor over this period. Groups in the population have generally not become more partisan. To be sure, partisanship has increased amongst some groups, but most have remained relatively stable. And, overall, their level of partisanship is relatively small. In other words, I find a

gap between special interest partisanship at the mass level (i.e., in the electorate) and the elite level (i.e., in organizations and government), consistent with the disjuncture observed by Fiorina (2005) and other scholars of polarization. The changes we see in government do not appear to have resulted from a widespread growth of special interest partisanship in the electorate.

We cannot easily attribute the growth of special interest partisanship in government to activist organizations either. Examining campaign finance patterns, we can see that groups have not distributed their money more unevenly over time. They do, however, change their behavior quite dramatically in response to changes in party control of government. In other words, it appears groups are responding to parties, not—or at least in addition to—the other way around. Moreover, a brief overview of political endorsements shows that groups began endorsing candidates *after* polarization began to rise.

2.1 Measuring Special Interest Partisanship

Before delving into specific measures, it makes sense to consider what group partisanship means. There are well-developed literatures in political science on individual partisanship and macropartisanship, but little on mid-levels of aggregation. To define partisanship at the group level, we can look to see how scholars have measured it at higher and lower levels of aggregation.

Campbell et al. (1960) view partisanship as a psychological attachment to a party, which forms in childhood and remains stable over time. Only realignment changes partisanship, according to this view. While Key (1966) agrees that some people (“standpatters”) maintain long-term party attachments, others (“switchers”) swing

between parties. These oscillations are not random, but rational responses to party behavior. Fiorina (1981) builds on Key, arguing that voters keep a “running tally” of party triumphs and foibles, and vote accordingly. The debate on partisan stability remains today, with Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (1998, 2002) arguing that macropartisanship constantly adjusts at the margins, while Green, Palmquist and Schickler (1998, 2002) claim partisanship is a long-term, psychological attachment, changes to which are extremely gradual at both individual and aggregate levels.

Despite their disagreements, all of these scholars view partisanship as a type of identification with a party. Some argue this identification is deeply rooted in one’s psyche, while others argue it is more rational. Those in the first camp also view it as a long-term attachment, while those in the second view it as a short-term attachment that may be renewed or reversed. Whether partisanship is rational or psychological, short-term or long-term—these are empirical, not definitional questions. I will treat them similarly at the group level. To study special interest partisanship is, quite simply, to study the relationship between groups and parties.

There are two main ways to measure partisanship at the individual level. First, we can look at individual self-identification. Many surveys ask people if they consider themselves strong Republicans, weak Republicans, Republican leaners, independents, Democratic leaners, weak Democrats, or strong Democrats. Second, we can look at political behavior. Who did they vote for in the last presidential election? Did they vote straight down the ticket, or did they split it? Answers to all of these questions provide insight into an individual’s party identification. We can employ similar measures at the group level, aggregating responses to the same survey questions by group to measure special interest partisanship in the electorate. We can also consider additional measures like campaign contributions to gauge the partisan leanings of special interest

organizations. Just as an individual might vote straight down the ticket, so might an organization donate all of its money to one party in a particular election cycle.

Studying alliances between parties and groups, we should consider both the strength and stability of partisanship. Groups may support the same party election after election, behaving like Key's "standpatters," or they may oscillate between parties, behaving more like "switchers." Even if a group does not switch parties, however, the strength of its partisanship may vary over time. There is a difference between a 51-49% margin and a 99-1% margin. The former is a case of weak partisanship, while the latter is a case of strong partisanship. While we might expect increases in strength and stability to occur in tandem, this need not be the case. It is possible, for example, that some groups routinely offer strong support for the incumbent party. Here, we would see strong but not stable partisanship over time.

There are additional complexities involved in measuring group partisanship that are not present in measuring individual partisanship. Reaching the highest level of group partisanship requires cooperation between groups and parties. Individuals can join one of the two major parties simply by registering. There is no application process, formal or informal—the party does not reject individuals. And because parties have such large memberships, people do not generally expect individual validation or attention from the party. This becomes more complex with groups because, as Frymer (1999) notes, parties can reject groups from their camps. They may use strict means, by making public statements against the groups or their goals, or soft means, by simply refusing support. This can lead to conflicting measures of partisanship. For example, a group may donate all of its campaign funds to the Democratic Party, but the party may refuse to add a supportive provision to its platform or even acknowledge the group as part of its coalition.

Group partisanship also differs from individual partisanship in its division between two distinct levels: the leaders and the people they claim to represent. While leaders may believe it is best for the group to affiliate with one of the parties, and may make decisions on behalf of the group to that end, group members will not necessarily change their partisanship or voting behavior. This is a second way in which we may see conflicting measures of partisanship. Parties control some measures of partisanship, special interest group leaders control others, and some are beyond the control of both parties and special interest group leaders, lying—like elections—in the hands of citizens. Both parties and special interest groups can influence special interest partisanship, but neither can control it unilaterally. In evaluating special interest partisanship, then, it is important to consider a variety of measures.

We can sort measures of partisanship into four categories. First, we can examine *attitudes* to see how much issue and party coalitions overlap in the electorate. We can also look to see how people in the electorate evaluate parties. That is, do they think the parties are taking increasingly opposite positions on issues? The second category is *legislation*. Here, we can examine the final stage of lawmaking in Congress (i.e., roll-call voting) to see how much party and issue coalitions overlap, and intermediate stages (e.g., congressional hearings) to see if and how groups shape the substance of policy. The third category involves *agendas*. Difference will not always mean opposition. If priorities diverge, we will observe uneven levels of attention to issues across the two parties. In the fourth category, *campaigns*, we can look at groups' contribution and endorsement behaviors. This gives us a clearer picture of the group side of special interest partisanship.

2.2 Data and Methods

To measure special interest partisanship in these different ways, I draw primarily on data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), Baumgartner, Jones and Wilkerson's Policy Agendas Project (PAP), the American National Election Studies (ANES), and the ProQuest Congressional hearings database. CRP organizes campaign finance records from the Federal Election Commission from 1980 to the present by group "industry." These range from traditional economic industries, like railroads, to more ideological industries, like human rights. PAP maintains data on a wide range of political topics from the late 1940s through the mid-2000s, using the same master topics coding scheme on all datasets. I use their data on roll-call votes, congressional hearings, and State of the Union Addresses to study legislative and presidential treatment of different special interest issues. ProQuest Congressional maintains a searchable database of hearings from 1824 to the present. The ANES, a major national survey, tracks demographics, public opinion, partisanship, and political behavior from 1948 to the present.

Because the universe of groups is enormous, I focus on 40 groups for which I could acquire data from at least two of my three main sources (PAP, CRP, and ANES).[1] This allows me to compare at least two measures of partisanship for all groups in my analysis. The groups are: abortion; active military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and trucks; commercial banks; computers and internet; education; electric utilities; entertainment; environment; ethnic and racial minorities; farming and ranching; food processing and sales; guns; health insurance; hospitals and nursing homes; human rights; immigrants; insurance; labor; lawyers and law firms; lesbian, gay, bisexual and

[1]Details on how I matched categories from different datasets are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.1, A.2, A.3, AND A.4).

transgendered people (LGBT); low-income people; mining; oil and gas; older people; people with disabilities; pharmaceuticals; railroads; rural; sea transport; securities and investments; small business owners; telecommunications; tobacco; tourism; urban; veterans; and women.

Some of these groups may appear incomparable. Indeed, in many ways, they may be. However, they all compete for attention from parties and government. A busy legislature cannot consider legislation in all areas in every session, so groups must contend with each other for agenda space. They also compete for political capital. Even the most liberal government can only produce so much liberal policy in one session; thus, groups compete not only with opposing groups, but also ideologically like-minded groups. The extent to which there are critical differences between different types of groups is more usefully treated as an empirical question than an *ex ante* judgment. One goal of this analysis is to uncover patterns of behavior across groups, which may or may not break on economic/social lines.

When possible, I analyze all 40 groups in my sample. However, data is not available for all groups on all measures. For example, State of the Union data is only available for 35 of the 40 groups between 1946 and 2005. Some group issues were never discussed in State of the Union Addresses over this period. Survey data is only available for 18 of the 40 groups. Some, like electric utilities, do not match easily to slices of the electorate. For other measures, like hearings and endorsements, I narrowed the selection of groups for practical reasons.[2] The remainder of this chapter will present and discuss the results of my analysis of attitudes, legislation, agendas, and campaigns.

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[2]Because endorsement data is not readily available, finding information on group endorsements requires more investigation. So, for this section, I chose a smaller handful of groups. I also chose a smaller selection for hearings, since this analysis required searching a database for individual organizations' names.

2.3 Attitudes

I used the ANES to identify groups in the electorate and analyze their partisanship. Of the 40 groups in my case universe, I was able to match 18 to ANES categories with more than 100 observations over the whole time period. Eight are demographic groups: ethnic and racial minorities (defined as all who do not identify as white); immigrants (defined broadly, as those with at least one parent born outside the United States); low-income people (defined as the lowest third of the income distribution); older people (defined as those aged 65 and over); people with disabilities; rural; urban; and women. Six are occupational groups, comprised of people living in union households, as well as those employed in the following industries: cars and trucks; computers and internet; education; entertainment; and farming and ranching. The remaining four represent groups defined by policy positions: environmentalists; pro-life people; pro-choice people; and people supporting LGBT rights (since the ANES does not ask about sexual orientation). These categorizations are not exclusive (i.e., one person can be in multiple groups).

Within the 18 categories listed above, I calculated the percent of people identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans in each year. To measure relative partisanship, I subtracted the percent Republican from the percent Democrat. We can examine partisan stability by looking at the standard deviation of this measure, which shows how much each group's partisanship deviates from the mean over time. A low standard deviation indicates stability. FIGURE 2.1 shows that, by this measure, the most consistent partisans are pro-choice people, women, immigrants, and low-income people, while the three most variable groups are employees of the computer and internet and cars and trucks industries, and people with disabilities.



Figure 2.1: **Standard Deviation of Partisanship.** This graph shows the standard deviation of each group's partisanship for the entire period, telling us how much each group's partisanship deviates from the mean over time. A low standard deviation indicates partisan stability. *Source: NES data*

Of course, this does not mean these groups are the most reliable partisans. A high standard deviation could result from partisan fluctuation (i.e., groups switch parties often) or intensification (i.e., groups become much more strongly partisan over time). To separate these possibilities, FIGURE 2.2 plots relative partisanship (represented by the solid line), as well as its absolute value (represented by the dotted line), over time. For most groups, these two lines overlap completely, meaning party identification did not change. Indeed, the only groups to cross the partisan threshold over this period were pro-life, cars and trucks, computers and internet, farmers and ranchers, and older people (though only slightly). This is a much smaller percentage of switchers than we will see in the money analysis (29% versus 63%). The curves in most of these graphs are quite flat, suggesting that variation in partisanship is not normally dramatic.



Figure 2.2: **Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate.** This graph plots relative partisanship (represented by the solid line), as well as its absolute value (represented by the dotted line), over time. For most groups, these two lines overlap completely, meaning party identification did not change. *Source: NES data*

Overall, partisanship in attitudes has decreased slightly over time. Bivariate OLS regressions of special interest partisanship on year indicate that three groups have become stronger partisans (statistically significant at the 90% level or greater): pro-choice people, environmentalists, and older people.[3] In contrast, we see weakened partisanship amongst 6 groups: pro-life people, farmers and ranchers, immigrants, members of union households, people with disabilities, and people living in rural areas. These effects are small—the gap between the percentage of people in each group identifying with Republicans and Democrats ($|\%D - \%R|$) has only shrunk by a fraction

[3]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.5).

of a percent per year. Nevertheless, this stands in stark contrast to the increases we will see in legislation and agendas. These results are consistent with findings in the polarization literature that—in contrast to elites—the electorate has polarized little, if at all, over the past 40 years.

Surveys indicate that people are aware of this elite-mass gap. That is, they know the parties have become more distinct. In many survey years between 1952 and 2008, the ANES asked: "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?" FIGURE 2.3 graphs the percent of respondents each year who answer this question affirmatively. A simple bivariate logistic regression indicates that, over time, people have become significantly more likely to report seeing differences between the parties. Taking midterms into account strengthens this relationship.[4]

Adding dummies for party identification shows that independents see less difference between the parties than do party identifiers, controlling for age, religion, church attendance, urbanism, education, race, gender, income, whether or not the respondent voted in the previous election, participation in politics, and basic political knowledge (measured by correct identification of House majority). Respondents with higher levels of education, political knowledge, and political participation were much more likely to report important differences between the parties. These effects are both statistically significant and substantively large.[5]

We get a similar answer if we look at where people position each party on the 7 point ideology scale, with 1 being the most liberal and 7 being the most conservative. FIGURE 2.4 shows that the mean difference between respondents' placement of the two parties has grown by approximately 1 point on the 7 point scale since 1972. We can gain

[4]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.6).

[5]See TABLE A.6 in the appendix.



Figure 2.3: **Perceived Difference Between Parties.** This graph displays the percentage of people in each survey year who answered affirmatively the following question: "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?" *Source: NES data*

more insight into this change by running separate models for each party's ideology with the same control variables used in previous models. The only difference is that these models use a 7 point scale for respondents' party identification, rather than dummy variables. The scale runs from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 (strong Republican). OLS regressions confirm that people see a greater difference in the parties' ideologies over time.[6] Interestingly, this difference comes not from a more liberal placement for Democrats and a more conservative placement for Republicans; rather, people think both parties have become more conservative. Consistent with previous models, people see

[6]The Democratic and Republican Party ideology variables are based on questions in the survey. I created the difference variable by taking the absolute value of the respondent's placement of the Democratic Party minus his or her placement of the Republican Party. Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.7).

less of a difference between the parties' ideologies during midterm years, and education, participation and knowledge are all correlated with higher perceived differences.



Figure 2.4: **Perceived Party Ideology.** This graph displays the mean assessment of Democratic and Republican Party ideology, and the mean difference between each respondent's placement of the two parties. *Source: NES data*

These models also show that, unsurprisingly, party identification influences perceptions of ideology. In comparison to more conservative voters, more liberal voters view the Democratic Party as being more liberal. And in comparison to liberal voters, more conservative voters view the Republican Party as being more conservative. In other words, people seem to see what they want to see. All in all, people see a greater difference between the two parties over time, though these differences appear smaller during midterm elections, and more conservative voters see a greater difference than more liberal voters.

Though public opinion findings often change when we examine more specific

questions, these do not. In addition to asking general questions about ideology, the survey also asks people to estimate the parties' positions on various issues using a 7 point scale. Specifically, they ask where the parties stand on government provision of health insurance, guarantees of employment and a good standard of living, aid to minorities, defense spending, general spending and service provision, and equal roles for women. For each issue, I ran separate regressions analyzing people's assessment of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the absolute difference between the two parties.[7] Overall, people report greater differences over time between the parties' positions on all issues except the traditional left-right issues of general government spending and service provision, and guarantees of employment and a good standard of living. On these two issues, they think the parties have actually grown more similar over time. This suggests that, at least in the eyes of the public, not all conflict collapses on a traditional left-right redistribution continuum.

Where are these differences coming from? On the issues of defense spending and government service provision, people think the parties have moved in opposite directions, with Republicans becoming more conservative and Democrats becoming more liberal. On all other issues, people think both parties have become more conservative, but that Republicans have outpaced Democrats in this rightward move. As in previous models, respondents with higher levels of education, political participation, and political knowledge see greater differences between the parties.

We can also look to see if these differences hold up when people are asked about candidates, rather than parties generally. In sum, OLS regression analysis indicates that people make very similar observations about presidential candidates as they do about parties, seeing a greater difference between Republican and Democratic presidential

[7]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.8, A.9, AND A.10).

candidates' general ideologies, as well as their positions on health insurance, aid to minorities, and equal roles for women, and less difference between the parties on general government spending and service provision, and guaranteed jobs and minimum standard of living.[8] The only major difference is that people do not see any significant change on defense spending. Again, this suggests that issue positions have not simply collapsed onto a left-right redistribution scale. People see differences between parties' views on redistribution and their views on other issues. Though party identification performs inconsistently, education, knowledge, and participation are positive and significant in most models.

Assessments of candidates for seats in the House of Representatives produce similar findings.[9] Over time, people see greater differences between candidates of opposing parties in terms of their general ideology, as well as their positions on aid to minorities, equal roles for women, and guaranteed jobs. As with presidential candidates, they see no increasing divide on general spending and service provision. In sum, whether they are asked general questions about the parties or specific questions about policies or opposing candidates, people report seeing greater differences between the parties over time. These differences span general ideology as well as many different issues over time. So, while group partisanship in the electorate may not have become extreme over time, people do think the parties have become more distinct. Examining special interest partisanship in legislation over time, we can see that these perceptions reflect reality.

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[8]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.11, A.12, A.13, AND A.14).

[9]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.15 AND A.16).

2.4 Legislation

At the broadest level, we know special interest partisanship has increased in Congress since the early 1970s. Polarization represents special interest partisanship at the highest level of aggregation. If parties take sides on all issues before Congress, we will see perfect polarization. However, there is only so much we can learn from this level of aggregation. Is polarization happening in all issue areas, or only some? Do we see the same long, steady pattern of change across issues? To answer the questions posed above, we will need a way to measure party voting on different issues over time. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal's (2006) industry standard measure of polarization—the difference between the parties on the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE—cannot be disaggregated by issue because DW-NOMINATE scores are calculated using a legislator's entire voting history. We might also want to know what happens before the voting stage. To what extent do groups contribute information to policy debates under different partisan regimes? We can gain insight into this question by examining group testimony in Congressional hearings.

2.4.1 Roll-Call Voting

We can begin analyzing special interest partisanship in legislation by calculating Rice likeness and cohesion scores for every vote in Congress from 1946 to 2004, using PAP data. To calculate intra-party cohesion, I take the absolute difference between the percentage of yay and nay votes cast by a party (Rice 1925, 1928). If half vote yay, while half vote nay, cohesion will be 0. If the whole party votes unanimously, cohesion will be 100. To calculate inter-party likeness, I subtract from 100 the absolute difference between

the percentage of yeas cast by Republicans and Democrats (Rice 1925, 1928).[10] High likeness scores can be driven by high chamber cohesion (i.e., unanimous or near-unanimous votes) or low party cohesion (i.e., both parties split down the middle). If all Republicans vote in favor of something, while all Democrats vote against it, we will get a likeness score of 0.

The top and bottom left-hand graphs in FIGURE 2.5 display mean cohesion and likeness in the House and Senate, respectively, for all non-private, non-commemorative bills. Likeness increased in the House and Senate before beginning its modern decline around 1970 (though in the House, it reached a nadir in the mid-1990s, and then started to rebound). Cohesion is similar across chambers, showing relative stability between 1947 and 1970, and then rising over the ensuing decades. Bivariate OLS regressions confirm that likeness has decreased, on average, by approximately one point on the 100 point scale in each session in the House; in the Senate, the decrease was slightly less (at 0.78), but still large. In both chambers, Democratic and Republican party cohesion have increased by a little more than one point, on average, in each session since 1947. Controlling for Democratic majorities, and whether or not the vote occurred in an election year, we still find significantly increased cohesion and decreased likeness over time. Substituting Democratic seat share for Democratic control of the chamber does not change these results.[11]

Of course, special interest partisanship is more than likeness or cohesion alone—high partisanship requires high cohesion and low likeness. To capture this complexity, I combined likeness and cohesion into one variable.[12] First, I rescaled

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[10] I determined the percent of each party voting yay and nay by dividing the number of Democratic (Republican) yays and nays by the total number of seats in the chamber held by Democrats (Republicans).

[11] Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.17 AND A.18).

[12] This is only necessary to analyze low levels of special interest partisanship. To identify high levels,



Figure 2.5: **Likeness, Cohesion, and Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate.** The top and bottom left-hand graphs display mean likeness and cohesion for all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the House and Senate, respectively, from 1947-2004. The two right-hand graphs display mean special interest partisanship from 1947-2004. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

cohesion and likeness to range from 0 to 1, rather than 0 to 100. Then, I subtracted the likeness score for each roll call vote from 1, and multiplied the result by the average party cohesion score for each vote. The following equation summarizes this calculation for roll call vote v:

$$SIP_v = \frac{DCoh_v + RCoh_v}{2} * (1 - Likeness_v)$$

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we can simply look at party likeness, as it is impossible to get low levels of likeness without high party cohesion. However, as explained above, high likeness can exist alongside high or low levels of party cohesion. If we want to differentiate between high chamber cohesion and bipartisan voting, the special interest partisanship metric identified here will be more useful than likeness.

The top and bottom right-hand graphs in FIGURE 2.5 show a decline in mean special interest partisanship between 1947 and 1970 in the House and Senate, followed by a long, gradual increase. To confirm the significance of this trend, I regressed mean special interest partisanship scores, calculated for each group in each session of Congress, on the Congress number and Democratic seat share in each chamber. As expected, special interest partisanship has increased by approximately 0.008 points on the 0 to 1 scale in each Congress in both chambers.[13] Overall, these results are consistent with well-known patterns of polarization.

Though strong, this trend is not universal. FIGURE 2.6 plots the coefficients from bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress, by chamber and group.[14] That is, I separated the votes in each chamber by subject matter, so we can analyze behavior on different special interest issues. In the House, partisanship has increased significantly for 29 of the 40 groups, and declined significantly for 4. In the Senate, partisanship increased significantly for 29 groups, and declined significantly for 5. Comparing significance is tricky because the number of votes is not even across issues. As FIGURE 2.7 demonstrates, there is a relationship between sample size and significance in both chambers; however, many groups with small sample sizes have statistically significant coefficients. Overall, read with caution, FIGURE 2.6 provides a general sense of change across issues.

These results confirm the presence of a broad increase in special interest partisanship in Congress over the post-war period. However, regression results and aggregate trends mask meaningful variation in patterns of change. FIGURES 2.8 and 2.9 graph changes over time in the House and Senate in two ways. The blue lines are lowess

[13]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.19).

[14]Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.20, A.21, A.22, AND A.23).



Figure 2.6: **Changes in Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate Over Time.** This graph displays the coefficients from bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on Congress session, by chamber. Solid points to the right of the reference line (located at zero) indicate a statistically significant increase in special interest partisanship over time, while solid points to the left of this line indicate a statistically significant decrease. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

curves, showing locally weighted trends. Because these curves do not assume a linear relationship between variables, they provide a more nuanced picture of special interest partisanship over time than OLS regression. Yet, their smoothing function illustrates general patterns that may be more difficult to see by looking at the more volatile means. The gray lines represent mean special interest partisanship for each session of Congress, which can expose key moments that smoothed lines may hide. While sharp change sometimes reflects noise or outlying observations, at other times, it may mark a "critical moment."



Figure 2.7: **Sample Size and Significance.** This graph is based on a series of bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress for each group, plotting the t-value against the sample size (i.e., number of roll-call votes relating to each group issue) for each regression. Each point represents one group in one chamber, so every group (except for tourism, which has no observations in the Senate) appears twice. The references lines mark the 10% significance thresholds (-1.645 and 1.645). *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

In this case, both perspectives are useful. Looking across groups, a few patterns emerge. The lowess curves show that special interest partisanship has increased a great deal over time on some issues, like health insurance. On others, like securities and investments, there has been very little change. In other words, parties have taken sides on many—but certainly not all—issues. This much we could see from the regression results. The lowess curves provide additional insight by showing differences in the *timing* of change. On some issues, like air transportation, special interest partisanship declined before it rose. On others, like oil and gas, the increase was more linear. Finally, looking at the mean, we can see fairly linear upward trends for some issues (e.g.,



Figure 2.8: **Special Interest Partisanship in the House Over Time, by Group.** Each graph plots mean special interest partisanship for each group by Congress, as well as a lowess curve. The latter represents a locally weighted regression, providing a sense of the trend over time without assuming a linear relationship. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

abortion), while other issues (e.g., health insurance) change abruptly. Indeed, for many groups, it appears the Republican Revolution of 1994 (resulting in a change of party control in the 104th Congress) was a critical moment.

Breaking down roll-call votes into these categories reveals a great deal of variation within the broad and well-known polarization trend. This suggests that the parties are not simply determined to disagree about everything. Rather, they developed clear, alternative positions on some issues, but not others. It is not especially surprising that



Figure 2.9: **Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate Over Time, by Group.** Each graph plots mean special interest partisanship for each group by Congress, as well as a lowess curve. The latter represents a locally weighted regression, providing a sense of the trend over time without assuming a linear relationship. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

parties would not diverge strongly on votes relating to commercial banking, for example, given the volume of this industry's campaign contributions. Issue polarization must be consensual; one party could attempt to stake out a distinct position, but the other party could always follow. The variation shown here, both across groups and over time, supports the notion that polarization is not just a broad trend affecting all of elite party politics. Rather, it reflects the parties' development of alternative positions on a large range of issues over this period.

2.4.2 Information

Another way to check for special interest partisanship in Congress is to track groups' participation in Congressional hearings over time, to see if party control of government influences their level of participation. Do some groups testify more often under Democratic or Republican control of government, or is their participation in hearings unaffected by changes in party control? These questions have significant implications for our understanding of information-gathering in Congress. In this context, a strong relationship between party control and testimony volume indicates strong special interest partisanship.

It is not easy to analyze these party effects, however. The Democrats' dominance over Congress in the mid-to-late twentieth century leaves us with little variation in party control. Moreover, group participation in hearings was very spotty until the mid-1960s, at least for the groups in my sample. Consistent, strong participation did not really begin until the 1970s. The most meaningful variation in terms of party control comes in 1994, when Republicans displaced the Democratic leviathan, and 2006, when Democrats regained control of Congress. While it would be difficult to gauge the effect of changes in party control of Congress over a long time period, we can look to see whether groups' participation changes before and after the 1994 Republican Revolution, and 2006 Democratic takeover. This, at the very least, will give us a sense of whether special interest partisanship extends past roll-call votes into other parts of the policy process.

Since this analysis focuses on specific organizations, I chose a few cases from the larger sample. I searched the Proquest Congressional hearings database for the names of the top three organizations in each group, in terms of the amount of money they spent on lobbying in 2012, and counted the number of times each organization testified in each Congress. This is not a comprehensive analysis of group involvement in hearings, by

any means; however, it can give us a preliminary sense of whether or not group participation changes under different party regimes.



Figure 2.10: **Testimony by Environmental Organizations.** This figure includes graphs for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional hearing in each year. *Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database*

FIGURE 2.10 graphs participation by the top three environmental lobbying groups in Congressional hearings since 1970. As the BlueGreen Alliance graph shows, not all lobbying groups participate in hearings. This is true in other issue areas as well, as subsequent figures will demonstrate. Many other lobbying organizations do participate in hearings, though their contributions vary quite significantly under different partisan majorities. The gray dotted reference lines mark the first Congress after the Republican Revolution and the year Democrats regained control of Congress. It is quite clear from this figure that the Environmental Defense Fund's involvement in the formal information gathering process depends very much on party control of Congress. Other

notable environmental organizations, like Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, demonstrate patterns very similar to the Environmental Defense Fund's. In contrast, the Nature Conservancy's participation in hearings is more consistent over this period.



Figure 2.11: **Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Choice Organizations.** This figure includes graphs for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional hearing in each year. *Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database*

In the abortion/pro-choice category, Planned Parenthood displays a pattern similar to the Environmental Defense Fund's (see FIGURE 2.11). When Republicans controlled Congress from 1995 to 2006, this organization hardly testified at all, after being quite active over the previous 25 years. While the other top lobbying organizations were never very involved in Congressional hearings, other large organizations interested in abortion rights also dropped out of Congressional hearings after the Republican takeover. The National Organization for Women, for example, testified very little after

1994; and, as with Planned Parenthood, their participation in hearings did not rebound once Democrats regained control of Congress. Curiously, we see a similar pattern for Right to Life, as shown in FIGURE 2.12. Without data on the number of organizations participating in hearings over time, it is difficult to tell whether this reflects a reduction in participation by all groups, or something specific to abortion groups.



Figure 2.12: **Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Life Organizations.** This figure includes graphs for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional hearing in each year. *Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database*

Finally, I examine health insurance organizations, since this is an area of increasingly strong special interest partisanship. As FIGURE 2.13 illustrates, we still see a dip in participation after the Republican Revolution, though it is not as dramatic as in other areas. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, for example, still contributed a significant amount of testimony to hearings between 1995 and 2006. Their participation is relatively low in the late 2000s, which is interesting given the increasing prominence of health care reform

issues under the Obama Administration.



Figure 2.13: **Testimony by Health Insurance Organizations.** This figure includes graphs for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional hearing in each year. *Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database*

All in all, this analysis provides preliminary evidence that special interest partisanship in legislation extends beyond the roll-call voting stage. It appears that, at least for some groups, participation in the formal information-gathering process depends on party control of Congress. While it may not be especially shocking that environmental groups would be more involved in lawmaking under Democratic majorities, this is nevertheless an important addition to the overall portrait of special interest partisanship. Of course, parties' differing priorities may account for some of what we see here. That is, Democrats may hold more hearings on environmental issues than Democrats. The next section will examine this possibility.

2.5 Agendas

Whereas roll-call votes demonstrate party positions, agendas illustrate priorities. Which issues do the parties think deserve attention, for substantive or political reasons? I get two perspectives on these questions by looking at congressional hearings and State of the Union Addresses.

2.5.1 Congressional Hearings

The roll-call stage does not represent the entire policy process. A lot of the action in Congress takes place in committees, especially in the House of Representatives. To get a deeper sense of special interest partisanship in government, then, we can look to see if attention to issues in Congressional hearings depends on party control. If parties take issue competition more seriously over time, we should not only see them developing more distinct positions, but also more distinct agendas. That is, each will develop its own policy program, a set of issues it would like to be associated with the party. If this is in fact the case, then standard measures of polarization—however dramatic—actually underestimate party difference.

To examine this possibility, I use data on congressional hearings from the Policy Agendas Project. They classify the 89,926 Congressional hearings held between 1946 and 2010 by topic, using the same coding scheme used to classify roll-call votes. I used this data to identify the number of hearings held in House and Senate committees on each of my 40 special interest issues in each year, and added dummy variables for Democratic control of each chamber, and an interaction between year (rescaled to run from 1 to 63) and Democratic control for each chamber. This allows me to analyze whether the effect of party control has increased over time.



Figure 2.14: **Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Abortion.** This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder's (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of Democratic control of the House of Representatives on the number of hearings held by the chamber on this issue. A negatively sloped line indicates that Republican majorities held more hearings on the issue, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as they are here. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

For each issue, I regress the number of hearings in each chamber on year, the chamber-specific party dummy, and chamber-specific interaction term. I then used code from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) to graph the marginal effect of Democratic control on attention to the issue in each chamber over time. FIGURE 2.14 is an example of this kind of graph for abortion in the House. When the solid line is above zero, that means more hearings are held under Democratic majorities; when it is below zero, as it is here, more hearings are held under Republican majorities. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. When both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as in FIGURE 2.14, the marginal effect of party is statistically significant. When they are on

opposite sides of zero, as in FIGURE 2.15 (the graph for tobacco), the effect is not significant.



Figure 2.15: **Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Tobacco Issues.** This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder's (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of Democratic control of the House of Representatives on the number of hearings held by the chamber on this issue. A positively sloped line indicates that Democratic majorities held more hearings on the issue, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when both dotted lines are on the same side of zero. Here, they are not. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

Overall, in the House, there have been more hearings under Democratic majorities on 28 issues: active military, air transportation, alcohol, cars and trucks, commercial banks, education, environment, ethnic and racial minorities, farming and ranching, food processing and sales, health insurance, hospitals and nursing homes, insurance, labor, LGBT, low-income people, mining, oil and gas, people with disabilities, pharmaceuticals, railroads, rural, sea transport, securities and investments, tourism, urban, veterans, and women. On only two issues (abortion, and computers and internet)

were there more hearings under Republican majorities. On the remaining ten issues, there was no difference between Republican and Democratic control.[15] This means that special interest partisanship has increased over time for 75% of the issues in my sample in the House.

We do not see nearly the same degree of difference in the Senate. This is not especially surprising, since committees are generally less important in the upper chamber. Whereas there are differences on 30 of 40 issues in the House, there are only differences on 7 issues in the Senate: commercial banks, environment, guns, health insurance, pharmaceuticals, small business owners, and tourism. All 7 of these issues receive more hearings under Democratic majorities, meaning that on no issue were there more hearings under Republican majorities. For the remaining 33 issues, there was no difference between parties.[16]

We can get a slightly different perspective by looking at relative attention. That is, of all hearings held in a particular year, how many are devoted to different issues? While, looking across the whole time period, party control does not affect the total number of hearings held in each session, there could be some variation year to year.[17] Examining relative attention, we still see party effects that grow over time, though for a smaller range of issues—17 in the House and 6 in the Senate (compared to 30 and 7,

[15]These issues are: electric utilities; entertainment; guns; human rights; immigrants; lawyers and law firms; older people; small business owners; telecommunications; and tobacco.

[16]These issues are: abortion; active military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and trucks; computers and internet; education; electric utilities; entertainment; ethnic and racial minorities; farming and ranching; food processing and sales; hospitals and nursing homes; human rights; immigrants; insurance; labor; lawyers and law firms; LGBT; low-income people; mining; oil and gas; older people; people with disabilities; railroads; rural; sea transport; securities and investments; telecommunications; tobacco; urban; veterans; and women.

[17]Bivariate OLS regressions for each chamber reveal no significant relationship between the number of hearings held and party control. This remains true when controlling for whether or not it was an election year.

respectively, for absolute attention). We see more of a split between the two parties in this analysis, however. Whereas 28 issues received more hearings under Democrats in the House, while only 2 received more hearings under Republican majorities, when we examine relative attention, we find that 10 received more hearings under Democratic majorities, and 7 received more hearings under Republican majorities.[18] In the Senate, it is an even split—3 issues received more relative attention under Democratic majorities, and 3 received more under Republican majorities.[19]

Whether we look at absolute or relative attention, we can see that parties are developing more distinct issue programs over the second half of the twentieth century. Differences between parties extend beyond their positions in roll-call votes to their priorities. Importantly, on no issue did the effect of party decrease over this period. We find a similar, if narrower, pattern in examining State of the Union Addresses.

2.5.2 State of the Union Addresses

To get a sense of parties' rhetorical agendas, I analyzed State of the Union Addresses from 1946 to 2005 using PAP data. While these are not official party positions, they are delivered by the party's symbolic figurehead. PAP categorizes each quasi-statement of each address by major topic and subtopic. I used their categorizations

[18]The issues receiving more hearings under Democratic majorities are: environment; ethnic and racial minorities; food processing and sales; health insurance; hospitals and nursing homes; insurance; labor; LGBT; low-income people; and people with disabilities. The following issues received more hearings under Republican majorities: abortion; computers and internet; entertainment; lawyers and law firms; sea transport; small business owners; and telecommunications. There was no difference on the following issues: active military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and trucks; commercial banks; education; electric utilities; farming and ranching; guns; human rights; immigrants; mining; oil and gas; older people; pharmaceuticals; railroads; rural; securities and investments; tobacco; tourism; urban; veterans; and women.

[19]The following issues receive more attention under Democratic majorities: commercial banks; health insurance; and pharmaceuticals. Republican majorities hold more hearings on active military; computers and internet; and LGBT.

to identify statements regarding the 40 group issues at the center of this analysis. Five issues contained no observations, leaving 35 groups.[20]

To see if attention to issues varies over time and/or by party, I regressed the percent of quasi-statements in each address devoted to each issue on the year of the address and the president's party. This produced 35 separate regressions, results of which are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.24, A.25, AND A.26). The presidential party dummy is coded 1 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats, and I rescaled year to run from 1 to 60 to ease interpretation. Over time, State of the Union Addresses have included more discussion of computers and internet, education, guns, health insurance, lawyers and law firms, LGBT, low-income people, older people, tobacco, and women, and less discussion of electric utilities, farming and ranching, labor, and veterans. Democratic presidents pay significantly more attention to computers and internet, education, food processing and sales, guns, health insurance, hospitals and nursing homes, human rights, and tobacco.

To see if the effect of party has changed over time, I ran another set of regressions with an interaction between year and party, and graphed the marginal effect of the president's party over time, using code from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). When the solid line is above zero, that means the issue gets more attention from Republican presidents; when it is below zero, it is more of a Democratic issue. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. When both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as in FIGURE 2.16, the marginal effect of party is statistically significant. When they are on opposite sides of zero, as in FIGURE 2.17, the effect is not significant. Overall, the

[20]This does not necessarily mean those five issues were never discussed in State of the Union Addresses. Because the Policy Agendas coding scheme is exclusive, quasi-statements that could potentially fall into two different categories can only be assigned to one. It is possible that those five issues were discussed in the same quasi-statements as other issues that were ultimately deemed more significant.



Figure 2.16: **Marginal Effect of President's Party on Attention to the Environment.** This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder's (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of the party of the president on attention to environmental issues over time. A negatively sloped line indicates that Democratic presidents paid more attention to the issue in State of the Union Addresses, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as they are here. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

president's party has a significant effect that has grown over time in 12 of the 35 areas examined. Four issues have become greater priorities for Republicans (lawyers and law firms; LGBT; older people; and securities and investments), and 8 have become greater priorities for Democrats (computers and internet; education; environment; ethnic and racial minorities; guns; immigrants; pharmaceuticals; and tobacco). In none of the 35 issues examined did the effect of party decrease over time.

By this measure, the change in agendas is narrower than in legislation, affecting 34% of group issues (compared to 73% and 74% in House and Senate roll-call votes). It is difficult to compare partisanship across branches, however, as there has been more



Figure 2.17: **Marginal Effect of President's Party on Attention to Commercial Banking.** This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder's (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of the party of the president on attention to commercial banking issues over time. A positively sloped line indicates that Republican presidents paid more attention to the issue in State of the Union Addresses, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when both dotted lines are on the same side of zero. Here, they are not. *Source: Policy Agendas Project data*

partisan turnover in the presidency than in the legislature. Still, this analysis demonstrates that party difference extends beyond positions. Over the same period in which we see growth in the overlap between party and issue coalitions in Congress, we also see presidents paying different degrees of attention to issues. This suggests that priorities were becoming more partisan, along with positions.

2.6 Campaigns

So far, this analysis has focused on the party side of special interest partisanship. By examining campaign donations and endorsements, we can gain more insight into the group's perspective. If activists are at the root of polarization, we should see their partisanship begin to rise before the parties', and intensify throughout this period. If activists appear to be following the parties, however, this would shed doubt on their responsibility for the growth of polarization. This analysis will show that the latter scenario more closely matches reality.

2.6.1 Campaign Donations

To examine campaign donations over time, this section uses two sources of data. Ideally, we would examine campaign finance data spanning the past century. Because contemporary reporting requirements did not arise until the 1970s, however, most of the analysis will employ data on hard money contributions from political action committees (PACs) to candidates from 1980 to 2010, sorted into industries by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). It is not impossible to analyze campaign finance before this period. Louise Overacker published a series of articles on the subject in the *American Political Science Review* during the 1930s and 40s, based on reports from Congressional investigations and documents filed by the parties. While these data do not fill out the time series, they provide a rough point of comparison.

FIGURE 2.18 lists all groups donating $1,000 or more in elections between 1932 and 1944, and the percentage of their money that went to Democrats in each cycle. The group universe in 1932 was small and relatively bipartisan. While three of the seven groups split their money roughly 80 to 20 percent between the parties (publishers and



Figure 2.18: **Partisan Breakdown of Campaign Contributions, 1932-1944.** These graphs use data from Overacker (1933, 1937, 1941, 1945) to graph the partisan breakdown of campaign contributions in the 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944 election cycles.

advertising; mining and oil; and manufacturers), four groups (bankers and brokers; retail stores; professional people; and railroads, airways, and public utilities) came close to an even split. The landscape changed quite dramatically in 1936, as more groups appeared and most gave disproportionately to one party. Several groups that contributed in both elections became much more partisan in 1936. Most significantly, bankers and brokers, who split their donations evenly in 1932, gave almost exclusively to Republicans in 1936. Over the next two election cycles, however, this spike in partisanship decayed. Still, partisanship appears to be higher in campaign finance than

in roll-call voting in the mid-twentieth century. Despite scholars' characterization of this period as an era of low special interest partisanship, it was quite common for groups to favor one party financially.

CRP data show this is still true today, though several broad changes have developed in the electoral arena over time. First, the number of PACs increased dramatically, from 608 in 1974, when the Federal Election Commission was established and first began collecting these data, to 4,234 in 2008. This mirrors a larger "advocacy explosion" in the United States since the New Deal. Baumgartner and Leech (1998) document a growth in associations from 5,843 in 1959 to 23,298 in 1995, as well as a diversification of the group universe (i.e., some groups, like those concerned with social welfare, proliferated at much higher rates than others, like trade groups and chambers of commerce). We can see this diversification in the electoral arena as well. Today, the parties receive contributions from traditional groups like bankers, as well as new economic industries like computer and internet companies, and many non-economic groups, like those concerned with human rights, abortion, and guns. In other words, many more groups choose to participate in electoral politics today.

To analyze special interest partisanship in campaign finance between 1980 and 2010, I converted all contributions in CRP's dataset to 2010 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, and added dummy variables for Democratic control of the House, Senate, and Presidency, midterm elections, and the period after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act banned parties' use of soft money. I also created a new time variable, running from 1 to 16 (i.e., 1980 cycle=1, 1982 cycle=2, etc.), as well as a squared version of this variable. This allows me to test for a statistically significant quadratic time trend, as well as a standard linear trend.

Special interest partisanship has changed in the financial arena over time, though

not nearly as neatly as in legislation and agendas. FIGURE 2.19 aggregates campaign giving by cycle, displaying mean special interest partisanship (the absolute value of the percentage of each group's money directed to Democrats minus the percentage directed to Republicans) across all industries over time. The lowess curve in this figure indicates that special interest partisanship has *not* increased broadly in campaign finance; in fact, it appears to have decreased. We see large changes in mean special interest partisanship during this period, but—unlike aggregate polarization—this trend is not gradual or linear. There is a sudden spike in 1996—the first cycle after the Republican Revolution in Congress—and a similarly-sized decrease in 2008—the first cycle after Democrats regained control.

This is not especially surprising, given Republicans' insistence on disproportionate giving. In October of 1994, when the Republican Revolution appeared likely, if not quite as large as it turned out to be, then-House minority whip Newt Gingrich famously warned PACs, "For anybody who's not on board now, it's going to be the two coldest years in Washington" (Hook 1997). The *Los Angeles Times* reports, "Word spread quickly among PAC directors and the business community: They should not only give generously to Republicans but also cut off money to Democrats or suffer political consequences" (Hook 1997). Republican fundraiser Brad O'Leary emphasized this message with a newsletter showcasing a "PAC List of Shame," identifying groups who donated unacceptable amounts to Democrats in 1992. The newsletter, distributed to PACs and Republican legislators, reiterated Gingrich's efforts in "laying down the law with certain PAC executives who have been seen consorting with the enemy" (Weisskopf 1994). The National Republican Congressional Committee later compiled a similar list for its members, labeling PACs as "friendly," "neutral," or "unfriendly," based on their contributions in the 1993-1994 election cycle (Hook 1997). If groups took



Figure 2.19: **Aggregate Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance.** The blue line shows mean special interest partisanship (absolute difference between the percent of each group's money that went to each party in each election cycle, and then averaged for the group universe for each cycle). The gray line is a lowess curve, showing a locally weighted trend. *Source: Center for Responsive Politics data*

these threats seriously, we should expect to see special interest partisanship rise when Republicans gain control of Congress.

Multivariate regression analysis confirms that the patterns observed in these graphs are statistically significant. I begin with two pooled models to evaluate broad changes in special interest partisanship over time. Model 1 in TABLE 2.1 shows no statistically significant quadratic change over time, while Model 2 shows that there has been a significant linear decrease. Special interest partisanship does, however, increase significantly when Republicans control the House of Representatives and when Democrats control the Presidency. Party control of the Senate is not significant in either

model. Special interest partisanship also does not change between midterm and presidential elections, or after the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.

The third and fourth models include industry fixed effects, which an F-test confirms are appropriate. These models show that differences across industries are not driving the overall results with respect to time and control of government. Even just looking within industries over time, we do not see a significant increase in special interest partisanship. There is a significant linear decrease over time (see the negative coefficient on time in model 4), but no significant quadratic trend (see the non-significant coefficients on time and time squared in Model 3). Again, control of the House and the Presidency significantly influence special interest partisanship—it is higher when Republicans control the House and when Democrats control the Presidency.

To highlight the differences between various permutations of partisan control of government, I used King, Tomz and Wittenberg's (2000) software, Clarify, to calculate the expected value of special interest partisanship under various scenarios, based on Model 1. When we move from Democratic unified government to a Democratic Senate and President, but Republican House, the expected value of special interest partisanship rises from .4 to .52, meaning the partisan differential in campaign giving rises from 40 to 52 percentage points. Taking Senate control away from Democrats makes almost no additional difference, raising the expected value of special interest partisanship from .52 to .53. When we move from a Republican unified government to a Republican Senate and President with a Democratic House, the expected value of special interest partisanship drops from .5 to .38. Turning the Senate Democratic has very little additional effect, dropping the expected value from .38 to .37.

Under these broad trends lies a lot of variation by group, however. As FIGURE 2.20 demonstrates, some (e.g., environment) have remained fairly constant, while others

(e.g., mining) have changed quite substantially. Even within the second category, we see different patterns of change over time. Interestingly, only one group displays a relatively linear trend similar to the classic polarization trend: abortion policy/pro-life. In contrast, many groups increased their partisanship after Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994, and then returned to a more even distribution of campaign funds after Democrats regained control in 2006. Of the 87 groups identified by the Center for Responsive Politics, 32 (37%) maintain their party affiliation over time and 55 (63%) cross the aisle (i.e., cross the 50% mark). Of these switchers, 10 change parties only once, 15 change and then change back, 17 change 3 times, and 13 change 4 or more times.

In sum, looking at money, special interest partisanship is quite high for most years in this analysis. While some groups split their donations evenly between parties, rarely does the group universe, on average, demonstrate this kind of bipartisanship. Importantly, though, this is not new. Looking at the available data from the 1930s and 1940s, it appears campaign finance was always partisan, even in an era of special interest bipartisanship. Of course, more groups participate in electoral politics today than in the 1930s and 40s. We might consider this a rise in special interest partisanship, since campaign finance is an inherently partisan arena. If a group wants to focus on specific issues, rather than party politics, it could spend money on lobbying instead of contributing to campaigns. Indeed, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (2002) find that groups more involved in lobbying tend to be more bipartisan in their campaign donations.

Still, based on this analysis, it would be difficult to argue that activists caused the increase in special interest partisanship we observe in government. Evidence from campaign finance suggests that groups are responding to parties just as much, if not more than parties are responding to them. Endorsement patterns tell a similar story.



Figure 2.20: **Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance by Group, 1980-2010.** The blue lines in these graphs show mean special interest partisanship over time for each group. The gray lines are lowess curves. *Source: Center for Responsive Politics data*

2.6.2 Endorsements

Unfortunately, comprehensive data on political endorsements by special interest groups are not available. Building a database of this nature will be an important next step in this project and broader research agenda. In the meantime, we can look at the timing of prominent groups' entrance into the endorsement arena. If groups started endorsing candidates before the rise of elite polarization on issues, that would support the argument that activists have caused polarization. If group endorsement generally

lags the rise of polarization, however, that would not support this conventional wisdom. My preliminary analysis indicates that many of the most prominent membership-based organizations did not begin endorsing candidates until the 1980s, well after polarization started to rise in the early 1970s.

The National Rifle Association (NRA) offered its first presidential endorsement in 1980 for Ronald Reagan.[21] This came *after* the parties began to differentiate their positions in Congress (see FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9). The trends in these figures are consistent with work by Karol (2009), who, examining Democratic and Republican lawmakers' support for gun control between 1967 and 2000, finds growing party divisions beginning in the 1960s. The NRA's endorsement also came after Ford and Carter took different positions on gun registration in the 1976 election cycle (though Carter would back off of his position) (Karol 2009). Reagan, who "seemed more eager than Nixon to have the [NRA's] backing," was quite active on gun rights issues during his tenure, attempting to dismantle the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and supporting the successful Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986 (Karol 2009: 88).

The National Organization for Women, the nation's largest feminist organization, gave its first presidential endorsement in 1972 to Shirley Chisholm, the first African-American woman to run for the nation's highest office. This cannot be considered the organization's true entrance into endorsement politics, however, since Chisholm was a member of NOW, and the organization did not endorse another candidate until Walter Mondale in 1984.[22] This came after the Republican Party backed

[21] "100 Years: Remembering President Ronald Reagan." *National Rifle Association* 17 March 2011. Last visited 18 February 2013 <http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2011/100-years-remembering-president-ronald.aspx>.

[22] "Highlights from NOW's Forty Fearless Years." *National Organization for Women*. Last visited 25 February 2013 <http://www.now.org/history/timeline.html>.

off its previous endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment, removing support from its 1980 platform. The parties had also begun differentiating themselves on women's issues in the House in the late 1960s, well before NOW's endorsement (see FIGURE 2.8). The Sierra Club, the oldest and largest environmental organization in the country, also supported Walter Mondale in its first ever presidential endorsement.[23] FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9 show that the parties began to diverge in Congress before this date, suggesting that the Sierra Club was responding to a party-driven trend that was already in motion.

The Human Rights Campaign, the nation's largest advocacy organization for LGBT rights, did not enter the game for almost another decade, offering its first presidential endorsement to Bill Clinton in 1992.[24] This followed Bill Clinton's pathbreaking support for the LGBT movement. On October 28, 1991, when a student at a presidential forum at Harvard University asked the candidate if he would issue an executive order to overturn the ban on military service for LGBT individuals, Clinton responded simply: "Yes. I think people who are gay should be expected to work, and should be given the opportunity to serve the country" (Rimmerman 1996: 113). With this remark, Clinton became the first presidential candidate ever to support the LGBT movement. However, party divisions had already begun to grow on LGBT issues in Congress in the late 1980s (see FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9).

While this is by no means a comprehensive list of American special interest organizations, it does represent the most prominent organizations in some of the most partisan industries. Interestingly, even these organizations, so strongly associated with

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[23]"'Taking the Initiative." *Sierra Club*. 23 June 2008. Last visited 18 February 2013 <http://sierraclub.typepad.com/carlpope/2008/06/airtime-in-cl-1.html>; "About Sierra Club." *Sierra Club*. Last visited 25 February 2013 <http://action.sierraclub.org/site/PageServer?pagename=AboutWildPlaces>.

[24]"Working for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equal Rights." *Human Rights Campaign*. Last visited 25 February 2013 <http://www.hrc.org/the-hrc-story/our-victories>.

party politics today, did not begin endorsing candidates until more than a decade after polarization began its modern rise. Examining them one at a time, we can see that their entrance into endorsement politics also followed the growth of party divisions on issues specifically relevant to the organizations. This supports the notion that activists were, at most, cooperating with parties in the rise of special interest partisanship. They do not appear to have been driving the trend all by themselves.

2.7 Contours of the Puzzle

Based on these measures, what can we conclude about special interest partisanship? First and foremost, there is, in fact, a puzzle to be explained. Special interest partisanship has increased significantly over time in legislation and agendas. This analysis also reveals an elite-mass gap similar to the one we see in studies of political polarization. The decline of special interest partisanship in attitudes suggests that group identification is playing a less important role in people's political identities over time. This is not surprising, given Putnam's (2000) observations regarding the erosion of associational ties over this period.

Systematic analysis of group-party relations suggests that the puzzle of special interest partisanship is more complex than we might expect, however. First, there is significant variation between groups. Some groups are clearly more partisan than others throughout this period, and some experience more change than others. This variation appears to be more complex than a simple divide between economic and social groups. A few groups, like abortion and labor, stand out from the crowd. Are they contradictory outliers, going against a general trend, or extreme cases revealing important lessons about group-party alliances? The answer to this question hinges largely on whether or

not there is a theoretical explanation for their exceptionalism.

Even if we isolate those experiencing change, we see two distinct patterns of increase across groups and measures. For some groups, we see a long, gradual trend (mirroring the aggregate trend) beginning around 1970, while others exhibit more abrupt changes. Some of these sharp changes are part of larger patterns of volatility, and may simply demonstrate unstable partisan preferences. Looking across groups, however, we can identify moments that seem to be important for many groups. These are signals of "critical moments" that group idiosyncrasies cannot fully explain. Rather, they indicate contextual changes. A good example is the 1994 Republican Revolution in Congress, at which point we see an abrupt increase in partisanship for many groups—even some exhibiting a gradual trend up to that point. A thorough analysis of group-party relations will need to address both types of change.

There is a striking difference in patterns of change across legislation and money. While there is a mix of gradual and sharp change in voting patterns in Congress, the latter predominates in campaign finance. Only among pro-life groups does partisanship increase steadily over time; others experiencing an increase tend to spike in the first cycle after the 1994 Republican Revolution, and plummet after Democrats regain control in 2006. Campaign finance records indicate that groups see different incentives operating under Democratic versus Republican controlled Congresses.

Groups' strong reaction to changes in control of the House of Representatives sheds doubt on the increasingly common argument that activists caused polarization. This is, at best, an oversimplification—activists appear to be responding to parties at least as strongly as parties are responding to them. Both groups and parties have contributed to changing group-party relations, though groups' role has received more scrutiny. In examining special interest partisanship, then, it makes sense to pay

particularly close attention to the party side of this puzzle. Why would parties change their relationships with groups? The next chapter develops a theory of group-party relations to examine this question.

	(1) pooled	(2) pooled	(3) industry fe	(4) industry fe
time	-0.005	-0.008**	-0.007	-0.008***
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
$time^2$	-2.06e-04		-7.51e-05	
	(0.001)		(3.72e-04)	
Democratic Senate	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Democratic House	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.121***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Democratic President	0.031*	0.029*	0.031***	0.030***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Midterm	-0.002	-0.003	-3.93e-04	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.001)
After BCRA	0.025	0.013	0.023	0.019
	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.019)
Constant	0.499***	0.508***	0.507***	0.510***
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Observations	1,336	1,336	1,336	1,336
R-squared	0.049	0.048	0.135	0.135
# of industries			87	87
			F test that all u_i=0: F(86, 1242) = 30.57 Prob > F = 0.0000	F test that all u_i=0: F(86, 1243) = 30.60 Prob > F = 0.0000

Table 2.1: **Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance.** Models 1-4 are OLS regressions. The first two are pooled models, while the third and fourth include industry fixed effects. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001. *Source: Center for Responsive Politics data*

Chapter 3

The Efficiencies and Pathologies of Special Interest Partisanship

In his classic 1969 book, *Labor in American Politics*, J. David Greenstone argues that "the emergence of organized labor as a major, nationwide electoral organization of the national Democratic party represents the most important change in the *structure* of the American party system during the last quarter century" (Greenstone 1969: xxxi-ii). Labor was exceptional in this way, he notes—most groups did not even affiliate with parties, let alone become part of their machinery. Today, in contrast, labor is far from unique in its party alliance, as a wide range of groups offer campaign funds disproportionately to one party or the other, and parties have taken strong and opposite positions on many special interest issues. Two puzzles emerge from these observations. First, why would organized labor ally with a party in the mid-twentieth century, while other groups remained bipartisan? And second, why would we see a broader pattern of change in group-party relations from bipartisanship to alliance?

To address these questions, this chapter examines group-party relations through an organizational lens. Scholars and pundits often discuss polarization in substantive terms. Changes in the nature of politics, like increased acrimony between parties, have received a great deal of attention. People increasingly socialize only with members of their own party, and express distaste for those across the aisle (Gelman et. al 2008). Republican and Democratic legislators not only vote differently, but seem unable to cooperate on anything. Talk of a "culture war" peppers American political discourse. While these substantive changes are undoubtedly important, they have overshadowed a related and equally important evolution in party organization. These institutional changes can provide new insight into the striking substantive developments we have seen over the past few decades.

The strong version of this argument is that *the substance of politics has changed because party organization has changed*. The weaker version is that *mutually reinforcing*

substantive and organizational evolutions occurred simultaneously. Either way, it begs the question: why did party organizations change? This chapter develops a theory to address this question, explaining the rise of group involvement in party politics, and the pattern of movement from bipartisanship to party alliance.

To understand why groups, like labor, would become more involved in party politics, we will need to address the prior question of why they would become involved at all. We could, of course, answer this question from the parties' or groups' perspective. This chapter will focus primarily on the parties' perspective. What can groups offer parties? The first section will explain groups' contributions to parties from a micro-perspective. What motivates individual politicians to work with groups? What do they need, and what do groups offer? This will help us to understand why parties would ever bother having relationships with groups.

Party-group relations can take different forms, however; the incentives described in the first section do not necessarily lead to one common relationship. The second section of this chapter will map out the range of possible group-party relations, from fluid, short-term interactions—similar to those described by scholars of pluralism—to long-term, institutionalized alliances, as we would see in a firm. Borrowing theory from the new institutional economics literature on firm formation and expansion can help to explain what parties gain from institutionalizing relations with groups, and the conditions under which we might expect movement in this direction. Some of the costs and benefits of institutionalization vary by group, however, so we should not necessarily expect parties to have the same kind of relationship with all groups. The theory of the firm can provide insight into why parties might be more likely to build alliances with particular groups.

This is only the first step in understanding why group-party relations might shift

over time, as incentives, costs, and benefits depend, in large part, on context. While many institutional studies of politics "take the interests and aims of political actors as given," Lieberman (2002) notes, "actors' understanding of their own interests is apt to evolve as the ideological setting of politics changes" (Lieberman 2002: 698). A benefit in one political context might become a liability in another. To understand changes in group-party relations over time, then, we need to consider how context might influence politicians' incentives to work with groups, and the costs and benefits of pluralism versus institutionalization. This combination of micro- and macro-level analyses is key to understanding changes in group-party relations over time. Chapters four and five will use the incentives and cost-benefit considerations identified in this chapter to guide a deeper analytical history of group-party relations.

3.1 Group-Party Relations at the Individual Level

To understand why parties would turn to special interest groups, we need to consider politicians' goals, and how groups can contribute resources needed to achieve them. It is well known that politicians care about winning elections. Mayhew believes this so strongly that his classic 1974 book begins with the assumption that Congressmen are motivated solely by reelection. Even if they also care about policymaking, he claims, electoral success is a proximate goal. Aldrich (1995) echoes this sentiment, arguing that in order to understand parties we must consider the reelection goals of their members.

Though few works in political science challenge this conventional wisdom, it remains important to avoid overemphasizing individual elections. As Galvin (2010) demonstrates, minority party presidents tend to care about the party's electoral prospects generally—not just their own races. Throughout the second half of the

twentieth century, Republican presidents endeavored to build a new electoral majority to destabilize the Democratic leviathan in Congress, dating back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidency. Reelection is both an individual and group prospect, given the value of majority status in Congress.

Mayhew identifies three general methods by which members of Congress attempt to achieve their reelection goals: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming. Advertising includes "any effort to disseminate one's name among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content" (Mayhew 1974: 49). Attending community events and appearing on television constitute advertising. By bolstering name recognition, these kinds of activities can make people more likely to support the officeholder on election day. The second and third methods, position-taking and credit-claiming, are more substantive. Position-taking involves "public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors" (Mayhew 1974: 61). Politicians can accomplish this in many ways, from speech-making to roll-call voting. Credit-claiming is fairly self-explanatory—legislators want to take credit for "particularized benefits" given to their constituents (Mayhew 1974).

While these strategies may seem simple, they are not costless. Credit-claiming requires politicians to know what their constituents want, pass legislation or secure appropriations to gain these benefits, and communicate their successes to constituents. While legislative success is unnecessary for position-taking, this strategy still requires politicians to identify the "correct" position, and communicate it to constituents. Communication is crucial for successful advertising as well. While these activities are fairly constant throughout a politician's term, leading up to an election, direct mobilization efforts become increasingly important as well. By helping politicians raise

money and get out the vote on election day, mobilization efforts reinforce earlier work in advertising, position-taking and credit claiming.

In sum, then, politicians need resources for information gathering, coalition-building, communication, and mobilization. Legislators can draw upon many sources of these resources, and different sources have different strengths. Congressional committees are classic tools for information gathering and coalition-building. By gathering information about policies and reporting their findings back to the floor, committees provide an efficient system of specialization allowing Congress to make informed decisions about a wide range of policies (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel 1991). The committee system also facilitates coalition-building by allowing legislators to trade influence over different policy areas, instead of simply trading votes (Weingast and Marshall 1988).

Yet, committees face a much larger agenda today than they did at the time of their creation. Polsby (1968) and Gamm and Shepsle (1989) argue that increasing workloads motivated members of Congress to institutionalize because they needed a more efficient system by which to make decisions. As society has become even more complex and workload has increased even further, committees have become less sufficient, incentivizing officeholders to seek additional ways to reach their reelection and policy goals. Just as the floor needed to delegate to committees, so do committees need to delegate some of their work to groups in the modern era. The floor can also access information through groups directly, which they may compare to information they receive from committees. This allows lawmakers to triangulate, and make more informed policy decisions.

Special interest groups' informational contributions to parties might not be obvious, but they are important nonetheless. As Grossman and Helpman (2001) note,

"Many special interest groups are well placed to deal in information because their members gain knowledge about issues of concern to the group in the course of conducting their everyday business, and because groups frequently collect information that bears on their members' interests" (Grossman and Helpman 2001: 22). Legislators cannot always completely trust the information they receive from special interest groups, just as they cannot always completely trust the information they receive from congressional committees. This does not render the information useless, however. As long as legislators can estimate the size and direction of the group's bias, they can still use the information to make policy decisions. If, as Krehbeil argues, they are able to do this with respect to congressional committees, then they ought to be able to do this with special interest groups as well. Since they cannot become experts in every field and they cannot research the implications of every bill before Congress, this informational assistance has great value.

Special interest groups can also assist coalition-building efforts in government through two mechanisms: communication and selective incentive provision. The value of communication is vastly underappreciated in the Congress literature. When the president or a member of Congress wants to pass a bill, he often needs to court legislative votes. This can be an arduous process, and special interest groups can help lessen the burden by contacting members of Congress to persuade them to support the bill, and mobilizing their members to do the same. This kind of behavior is often termed *lobbying*, but it is by no means restricted to traditional K Street outfits. Even membership-based social movement organizations perform this service. Special interest groups can also help legislators build coalitions in government by offering selective incentives like campaign resources, rewarding those who join and honor coalitions and withholding resources from those who do not. This is especially valuable in recruiting

the last few key votes to push a bill over the edge. These two mechanisms can also help lawmakers block unfavorable legislation.

Special interest groups' contributions to elections are well-known. Their most obvious offerings, campaign funds, have increased dramatically since the mid-twentieth century. Political action committees are major sources of campaign support, and it is difficult to imagine contemporary electoral politics without them. Special interest groups also provide information about candidates and issues to their members through preexisting communication networks. A feminist organization might profile candidates in its newsletter, or a religious organization might encourage ministers to discuss important political issues in their sermons. This kind of communication can be used to promote candidates or rally people around certain legislative programs. Churches have been particularly successful networks for political mobilization, as we have seen in the civil rights movement (Morris 1981) and the modern religious right (Oldfield 1996).

Communication networks deserve special emphasis for a few reasons. First, communication plays a key role in advertising, position-taking, and credit claiming. In other words, it is important for almost everything politicians do. Second, communication networks are a relatively unique resource for special interest groups. While congressional committees can provide information and coalition-building assistance, they cannot reach the electorate—their job is to communicate with the floor, not the citizenry. Communication is also a precursor to mobilization, which is obviously important for politicians. To win elections, they need their supporters to go to the polls.

There are several advantages to communicating with the electorate through groups. First, communication is expensive, and groups are often willing to share this cost. Second, special interest leaders typically have more credibility than parties with their members. Messages coming from special interest leaders can therefore be more

persuasive than those coming from parties. Third, and most important, groups have access to proprietary communication networks, which can be much larger than the party's own network.

In sum, special interest groups provide many resources and services to parties, which helps to explain why parties would want to build closer relationships with them. But why would groups come to play a greater role in party politics over time? The simplest answer is that *we should expect parties to draw on groups more when (1) they develop a greater need for the resources groups are best positioned to supply; and/or (2) their current supply of these resources declines*.

Chapters four and five will argue that both circumstances arose in the post-war period. In his 1942 classic, *Party Government*, Schattschneider laments the bullish strength of parties' "private faces" and the relative feebleness of their "public faces". Patronage, rather than policy, was the primary political currency at this time—and patronage ultimately served the machines, not the public. The roots of this woeful arrangement lay in party decentralization, according to Schattschneider. Stronger national party leadership could resist the machines' demand for patronage, and more extensive infrastructure would liberate national parties from their dependence on machines for mobilization. I will argue that as national parties grew stronger, and politics became more about issues than patronage in the decades following the publication of *Party Government*, the importance of information and communication increased. The value of information also rose over this period as the electorate grew larger and more complex. Parties increasingly needed groups to help them appeal to new voters. The process of party decentralization also compromised a key mobilization resource: political machines. While the power of bosses declined dramatically by the late 1960s, the importance of mobilization did not; thus, parties needed new ways to activate

the electorate. In sum, party centralization contributed to groups' increased involvement in party politics over the second half of the twentieth century by raising the value of resources provided by groups, and depressing parties' supply of these resources.

This tells us little about the *form* of group-party relations, however. What is the range of possible relationships between groups and parties, and under what circumstances might we expect different arrangements? Answering the latter question will require attention to both *preferences* and *capabilities*. As McCarty and Rothenberg (2002) note, we cannot assume alliances will form just because both sides desire them. Various challenges in the political arena (e.g., non-contemporaneous exchange) can impede cooperation. While party organizations can theoretically facilitate alliances by enforcing agreements between individual politicians and groups, albeit without legal standing, McCarty and Rothenberg argue that their ability to do this depends on their capacity to discipline their members and ally groups.

3.2 The Range of Group-Party Relations

There is a wide range of possible relationships between groups and parties, from the fluid interactions described by Key, Truman, and others, to the kind of highly institutionalized partnership we have seen between labor and the Democratic Party. What are the advantages and pitfalls of different locations on this continuum? To define and explore the less structured end, I will draw on pluralism—the quintessential system of fluid interactions between parties and groups. The theory of the firm can guide us through the opposite extreme of rigid institutionalized alliances. We simply need to replace the primary goal of business, profit, with the primary goal of politics, winning elections.

The continuum between pluralism and institutionalization can apply to more than one level of analysis. We could evaluate each group's position on the continuum at any historical moment, or mark its average position over time, as some groups are traditionally more partisan than others. We could also aggregate the groups, and place the entire pressure system on the continuum at any historical moment, or separate them by party to see if Republican-leaning groups are more institutionalized than Democratic-leaning groups. All of these options would provide valuable information about the party system, the pressure system, and American politics more broadly.

3.2.1 Pluralism: A Free Market of Group-Party Relations

At one end of the continuum is a free market of exchange between parties and groups. This is akin to political pluralism, in which groups compete for attention and policy in a political marketplace without a central power structure. This process of interaction, made famous by Dahl, "normally has many units, [and] many interrelationships that shift over time" (McFarland 2007: 48). While groups and parties may work together, coalitions are typically "time bounded" (Polsby 1960: 481). We might see a particular group influencing a policy area, but this does not mean they will align with a party. Indeed, the alignment of many groups with a party would create a central power structure, the lack of which is a defining feature of pluralism. Polsby (1960) explains, "If there exist high degrees of overlap among issue-areas in decision-making personnel, or of institutionalization in the bases of power in specified issue-areas, or of regularity in the procedures of decision-making, then the empirical conclusion is justified that some sort of a 'power structure' exists" (Polsby 1960: 483).

Under what conditions might we expect parties and groups to operate in a free market? What are the costs and benefits of this system? According to Greenstone (1969),

it was an auspicious arrangement for both sides. “Because these groups’ political demands are relatively limited,” he argues, “the major parties try to build alliances on particular issues with as many interests as possible, rather than make broad programmatic commitments that might alienate possible supporters” (Greenstone 1969: 5). This system also offers flexibility to groups, who “tend to move between the parties, bargaining for the best arrangement” (Greenstone 1969: 5). With a tone of concern, Greenstone notes that labor’s alliance with the Democratic Party during the New Deal “has taken from the labor movement much of its freedom to bargain with each of the major parties” (Greenstone 1969: 6). In sum, free market negotiation allows groups to get the best deal possible, and helps parties appeal widely to the electorate.

Truman (1951) offers a more extensive explanation for special interest bipartisanship, grounded partly in the structure of American government, partly in the party system, and partly within groups themselves. At the broadest level, he argues, the American federal system encourages pluralism. When groups must appeal not only to different party regimes at the national level, but also different state and local governments, they need to be able to work with both parties. One party will almost certainly never control the entire system at once. Since there are often links between parties at different levels, Truman remarks, “open and continuing identification with one of these forces may easily cost more than it gains” (Truman 1951: 296).

Weak national parties also encourage this arrangement. Conventional wisdom suggested that parties were in a state of “disorganization, if not of unrelieved chaos” in the mid-twentieth century (Truman 1951: 282). Though this perception might be a bit overblown, Truman notes, “it is apparent that the national party at any given time is fluid and unstable, consisting more of temporary personal alliances than of continuing institutionalized relationships” (Truman 1951: 282). Consequently, he argues, “It follows

that relations between political parties and other political interest groups will be similarly protean" (Truman 1951: 282). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine strong external relationships existing alongside weak internal infrastructure.

Low party discipline, resulting from weak national party leadership, also makes special interest bipartisanship attractive. When national parties are "essentially devices for electing the president, rather than instruments for operating the government," as they were in the mid-twentieth century, groups know that bipartisan support is critical (Truman 1951: 285). Even under unified government, Truman notes, "discipline is normally so weak that the group identified with the majority party may enjoy no special advantages from being so" (Truman 1951: 297). Key (1942) takes this argument a step further, claiming that "friendly legislators of whatever party are thus the principal concern of most interest groups; they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by consistent partisanship" (Truman 1951: 296-7). In sum, when party discipline is so low that successful lawmaking requires bipartisan support, alignment can be costly.

Additional reasons for bipartisanship may be found within groups themselves. Cohesion is one important consideration. Key argues that intra-group variation encourages bipartisanship, since it is difficult to mobilize a heterogenous group behind one party. Moreover, Truman notes, it could be discrediting for leaders to make alliances at the national level if significant variation exists in the partisan preferences of state and local affiliates. Group norms may also render political involvement taboo. Partisan activity may be inconsistent with founding principals or the scope of the group's work. Even if a group is cohesive, it might not be considered "'right' for group leadership to tell the members to back a particular party or, for that matter, a particular candidate" (Truman 1951: 297-8).

Partisanship also carries a "very real threat" of isolation, according to Truman.

When the group's ally party is not in power, it will most likely lose access to government. Under these circumstances, Truman argues, "some measure of bipartisanship...becomes a sort of insurance" (Truman 1951: 302). Since party discipline in Congress was weak at the time, Truman noted that this danger was only relevant for presidential elections. Still, it was "usually great enough so that a group will hesitate to take sides unless it is fairly certain that access to one of the candidates is likely to be denied anyhow and nothing is to be lost by backing his opponent" (Truman 1951: 302).

Choosing sides could also make it more difficult for groups to cooperate with other groups. To pass legislation, it is often important for groups to be able to make alliances with other groups. Sometimes they will want to work with groups very different from themselves—successful coalitions can "involve some exceedingly strange combinations" (Truman 1951: 304). However, groups may hesitate to cooperate with other groups that have strong party attachments, for fear of isolating themselves. Such cooperation could "threaten to produce cleavages within one of the participating groups or to reduce its chances of independent access to political leaders" (Truman 1951: 304).

In sum, a federal system with weak national parties facilitates fluid group-party relations. Under these circumstances, alliances seem to carry few benefits and many costs. Since group-level factors also influence special interest partisanship, we should expect to see some variation between groups, however. Still, pluralist scholarship explains why the pressure system as a whole might tend toward bipartisanship. To understand why the system might move away from a free market system, we can examine the costs and benefits of institutionalization.

3.2.2 Institutionalization of Group-Party Relations

On the other end of the group-party continuum, we have rigid, routinized relationships between parties and groups. Here, parties and groups are *not* free to negotiate on a policy-by-policy or election-by-election basis. Rather, they maintain long-term relationships. At the most extreme point on this continuum, the party internalizes the group, as a manufacturer might acquire a distributor. To understand the benefits and costs of this arrangement, we can look to the classic theory of the firm, which aims to explain why some exchanges do not take place on open markets (Coase 1937).

Why establish a firm instead of operating through short-term contracts? If someone wanted to build and sell furniture, for example, he could negotiate contracts with leather and cloth dealers, carpenters, salespeople, and others whose goods or services he needed to run his business. By bargaining with all of these actors, he could always be confident that he was getting competitive prices. Over the long term, however, this is a costly way to conduct business. Some costs, like contract negotiation and creation, arise before the exchange, while others, like implementation, surveillance, and problem resolution, appear afterwards. Coase argues that certain organizational forms and contractual patterns can reduce or even eliminate these transaction costs. Instead of negotiating with carpenters over each product, for example, the manufacturer could hire them to build all of his furniture in house. Rather than bargaining with dealers, he could establish his own sales department.

We can think of the firm as "a web or nexus of contracts" providing centralized leadership to manage exchange, so as to avoid transaction costs associated with making all deals on an open market through the traditional price mechanism (Eggertsson 1990: 48; Coase 1937). Centralized leadership can also allow the firm to capitalize on potential

economies of scale (Coase 1937: 390, 392). All firms will not necessarily look the same; as Weingast and Marshall (1988) note, we should see "production and exchange take place through institutions (contractual patterns, organizational forms) that reflect the specific pattern of transaction costs found in trade" (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 134).

Application of this literature to political science has important and widely accepted precedent. Though Aldrich (1995) does not use the language of new institutional economics, his argument about party origins is consistent with Coase's theory on firm formation. Ceding power to a central authority (i.e., party leadership) dramatically reduced the number of formal and informal contracts needed in daily political life, thereby reducing transaction costs. Weingast and Marshall (1988) explicitly employ the theory of the firm to explain why legislators (i.e., elite members of parties in Congress) built the committee system, and Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) draw upon this literature to study Congressional delegation.

I argue we can apply this intuition to political science in a new way, to understand how and why parties evolve. The group-party arrangement that Key, Truman, and others describe in the middle of the twentieth century looks like a market dominated by the price mechanism. Parties and groups have some interaction, but it is generally fluid and short-term. They work together to accomplish discrete tasks, but do not maintain long-term relationships. Groups work with both parties, and parties work with a wide variety of groups. Overall, there is very little structure in this arrangement. Today, in contrast, there appears to be a cabal of liberal groups on one side of the aisle facing a similar band of conservative groups on the other, implying long-term, institutionalized relationships between groups and parties. This suggests not that a firm has been created—the party already existed—but that it has expanded, and perhaps changed in organizational form. To understand special interest partisanship, then, we can look to

the literature on firm expansion and evolution.

3.2.2.1 Changes in Organizational Form

Classic studies of American business, like Chandler's (1962) *Strategy and Structure*, offer clues to the types of changes we might expect to see in political parties. American companies undertook major organizational changes during the twentieth century, transitioning from unidivisional ("U-Form") to multidivisional ("M-Form") structures. Du Pont and General Motors pioneered this transformation shortly after World War I, and American businesses began adopting M-Form structures en mass between 1945 and 1960. Growth and increasing economic complexity taxed the U-Form system, producing problems of coordination, communication and opportunism (Williamson 1981). The M-Form corporation alleviated these problems in several ways.

Whereas traditional U-Forms were organized by function (e.g., production, marketing, etc.), M-Forms were organized by product or region. This transition dramatically decentralized authority, and separated operational and administrative functions (Chandler 1962). No longer did executives manage day-to-day operations. At the top of the M-Form hierarchy lies a general office, which "makes the broad strategic or entrepreneurial decisions as to policy and procedures and can do so largely because it has the final say in the allocation of the firm's resources—men, money, materials—necessary to carry out these administrative decisions and actions" (Chandler 1962: 11). Under the general office are several quasi-autonomous divisions, each responsible for a particular product or region of the country. While divisions can make some strategic decisions concerning their product or region, they do not control firm-level strategy regarding that product or region. Within each division, there are several departments responsible for different functions (e.g., sales, research,

manufacturing, etc.), and under these department lie field units. Only at this last level do managers directly oversee day-to-day operations.

Decentralization and separation of administrative and operational duties relieved overburdened executives and smoothed coordination within rapidly growing companies. Separating administrative functions like resource allocation and policy creation from operational functions also helped to control opportunism. Those working on particular products had incentives to maximize productivity within their divisions, but could not allocate firm resources to those products. Instead, firm executives could look across divisions in an M-Form corporation, and distribute their resources in a manner most efficient and profitable for the company as a whole.

To what extent should we expect to see similar changes in parties? As the electorate grows larger and more diverse, we might see more specialization by group, with specific people in government responsible for maintaining relationships with specific groups. This would be the party equivalent of organizing by "product" (here, special interests in the electorate). It would also make sense to see a separation of operational and administrative duties. The party should want a centralized figure to control allocation of resources to different group liaisons to control opportunism. These resources could range from time with the party in government (e.g., the president, agency representatives, etc.) to acknowledgment in a State of the Union Address to agenda space in Congress. Hence, while we might expect to see the development of specialists in group liaison, we should not expect these specialists to control resources. Instead, they should need to persuade a more central figure to allocate resources to their groups. Analyzing the evolution of group-party relations in government, chapter five will show that these kinds of changes do in fact occur in the last few decades of the twentieth century.

This creates a system of internal as well as external competition for groups. Pro-choice groups, for example, are not only competing with pro-life groups for outcomes on abortion policy, they are also competing with other liberal groups for attention from the Democratic Party. Thus, thinking about the party as a firm helps us to better understand groups' relationships to parties, as well as to each other.

3.2.2.2 Changes in Size

In addition to changes in organizational form, we may also see changes in firm size. Just as forming a firm can reduce transaction costs, expanding through consolidation, integration, and geographic dispersion can help the firm increase production, take advantage of economies of scale, direct resources efficiently, protect the quality of its products, safeguard its technological investments, and ultimately lower the market price of its products.

Growth outside the firm may stimulate expansion. Studying changes in American business, Chandler (1962) argues that "strategic growth resulted from an awareness of the opportunities and needs—created by changing population, income and technology—to employ existing or expanding resources more profitably" (Chandler 1962: 15). Technological innovation can change the firm's ability to communicate externally to consumers and internally to other parts of the firm or industry. In one sense, this may relieve stress by making communication easier; in another, however, it may pressure the firm by quickly and vastly expanding the potential market for goods and services. Both positive and negative stimuli are powerful, as Chandler argues, "the prospect of a new market or the threatened loss of a current one stimulated geographical expansion, vertical integration, and product diversification" (Chandler 1962: 15).

Different kinds of expansion provide different benefits. One option is to expand

horizontally through consolidation with similar organizations. Firms are willing to relinquish some autonomy in forming a consolidated organization because this enables "economies of scale through standardization of processes and standardization in the procurement of materials" and—even more importantly—a "concentration of production in a few large favorably located factories" (Chandler 1962: 31). In other words, the central office ensures efficient direction of resources, and produces goods at a lower cost. Firms may also integrate horizontally with other firms in order to expand their business into new geographic areas.

Horizontal expansion can lead to vertical expansion for a few reasons (Chandler 1962). Enhanced production capacity heightens distributional needs; the more goods the firm can produce, the more it needs to sell. Under these circumstances, Chandler argues businesses were no longer comfortable contracting product distribution out to wholesalers, since they also sold competitors' products. Their interests do not necessarily conflict, but neither do they align (Chandler 1962: 31). By engaging in forward integration, internalizing post-production functions like distribution, firms gain more confidence that they are selling as much as possible.

Williamson (1981) argues that forward integration also protects product quality. In a market system, producers rely on wholesalers and retailers to maintain the quality of their products. Because these entities bear only part of the cost of quality deterioration, their incentives to maintain product quality are lower than the producer's. The problem could be managed with proper supervision, but this, of course, is not free. Since metering and enforcement are cheaper to carry out internally than externally, firms have incentives to internalize distribution to protect the quality of their product. Thus, Williamson argues, firms will be more likely to substitute administrative mechanisms for market mechanisms—effectively increasing the size of the firm—when the quality of

their particular products could deteriorate in the hands of distributors outside the firm.

They will also be more likely to internalize functions through integration when developing highly specific assets. Williamson argues, “as assets become more fully specialized to a single use or user, hence are less transferable to other uses and users, economies of scale can be as fully realized when a firm operates the asset under its own internal direction as when its services are obtained externally by contract” (Williamson 1981: 1548). When assets are non-transferable, at least not without a substantial loss in value, internalization provides substantial security over contracting.

Even in the absence of incentive and security problems, coordination between different levels can become difficult. This encourages companies to engage in forward integration, internalizing post-production functions like distribution so the firm’s administration can manage the flow of goods through different levels. In addition to smoothing coordination, this also “provided a more certain cash flow and more rapid payment for services rendered” (Chandler 1977: 7). Internalization brings informational advantages as well. Chandler notes, “by linking the administration of producing units with buying and distributing units, costs for information on markets and sources of supply were reduced” (Chandler 1977: 7).

These insights help to explain why parties and groups might be willing to institutionalize their relationships, despite the many benefits of fluid relations identified by Key, Truman, and Greenstone. Some of the problems described by Chandler and Williamson, like coordination and incentive misalignment, arise in politics as well as in business. Like businesses, parties face population expansion and technological advancements, and, as Chandler argues, “growth without structural adjustment can only lead to economic inefficiency” (Chandler 1962: 16). Consequently, *when the universe of political consumers (i.e., voters) changes, we should expect structural changes to follow.* As

the population diversifies, party coalitions become less clear, and both individual legislators and party leaders have growing incentives to gather more information about the electorate. Who are their constituents, what do they want from their government, what are their ideological leanings, and how can the party appeal to them?

Groups are well positioned to help parties answer these types of questions. They tend to know a lot about their members, and how to communicate effectively with them. Special interest groups can help parties understand how to appeal to new voters, and parties can, in turn, give special interest groups new access to government. In this context, groups may also be willing to share the costs of building relationships with new constituents and adapting to technological advancements.

Structural changes will look different for parties than for businesses. Parties are unlikely to integrate formally with other organizations, the way two companies might agree to merge or one might pursue a hostile takeover of another. By creating long-term alliances with certain groups, however, parties can simulate internalization. This can increase efficiency in both the legislative and electoral arenas. Relatively stable alliances obviate the need to build a coalition *de novo* every time the party wants to pass an important piece of legislation. The same is true for electioneering. When special interest partisanship is high, parties know they can count on certain groups for support. This may have certain costs for special interest groups, as Frymer (1999) has shown, and it may leave parties vulnerable to charges of extremism. However, it also streamlines the coalition-building process in both the electoral and legislative arenas, lowering coordination and negotiation costs.

Long-term coalitions also align incentives, increasing the reliability of information and decreasing opportunism. This is especially powerful in an age of political polarization. When the group's legislative agenda is linked to the party's electoral fate,

the party can be more confident in its delegation to groups. We can think of communication with the electorate as the "distributional" phase of party operations. As discussed earlier, advertising, position-taking and credit-claiming all require communication with the electorate in order to be effective, and groups can be very valuable in this arena. When group and party incentives are aligned, the party can be more confident that the group is sending favorable messages, and working hard to mobilize voters behind the party.

Incentive alignment can also initiate a positive feedback loop, making long-term coalitions easier to achieve. McCarty and Rothenberg (2002) note that parties are better able to facilitate cooperation between legislators and groups when groups care which party controls Congress. They find, "If the group cares about majority status . . . it may value a member's election—even if she is not ideologically preferable relative to her opponent or if access to her is given no value—because access to the other member favored by the group becomes more valuable" (McCarty and Rothenberg 2002: 32). Under these circumstances, groups may be more willing to compromise with the party on key decisions, like the allocation of electoral resources between different party members. The party "can attempt to make majority status as valuable as possible to the group and, by extension, to the incumbent by, for example, treating the minority party especially harshly" (McCarty and Rothenberg 2002: 35-6). On the softer side, the incentive alignment provided by internalization can have a similar effect.

This is not something we should necessarily expect to see with all groups. Given the specific benefits of internalization, we might be especially likely to see parties build long term coalitions with groups that have strong distributional capabilities—that is, membership-based groups with strong grassroots communication networks. This helps to explain why labor would be an especially good candidate for party alliance, even in

an age of special interest bipartisanship. It would also make sense to see long coalitions when a certain group and party are working together to develop an asset they could not easily convert to another purpose.

Having examined the two extremes of pluralism and internalization, we can now consider the full continuum of group-party relations. What occupies the space between pluralism and internalization?

3.2.3 The Full Continuum of Group-Party Relations

We can think of group-party relations on a continuum running from left to right. At the left-most point, we have the least amount of structure in group-party relationships, and at the right-most point, we have the most amount of structure. For simplicity's sake, I have divided the continuum into four zones: pluralism, routinization, cooperation, and internalization. To determine the level of structure, we can look to certain features of group-party relations for clues. As structure increases, we are likely to see changes in the degree of centralized authority, the stability of relationships, and the overlap between group and party infrastructure and goals. These categories are ideal types, which are unlikely to match reality in full. However, they can serve as a guide for evaluating group-party relations.

The left-most zone, *pluralism*, is characterized by fluid, informal relationships. At the most extreme point in this zone, there is no centralized structure or authority, and no overlap between party and group infrastructure. In other words, there are no shared resources. Parties and groups may work together, but only on a short-term basis, and only to the extent that it suits their immediate goals. This is a zone of low special interest partisanship.

To the right of pluralism is *routinization*. In this zone, we will see more repetition—the same kinds of interactions will happen over and over. Some structure will be necessary to design and maintain the routines, but there will be no strong authority. There is more stability, but no more obligation than under pluralism. Groups and parties are still free to change the routines and negotiate on the open market, but they do so less often in this zone than under pluralism. Also, there is a clear separation between group and party goals and activities.

Next in line is *cooperation*, marked most notably by a partial fusion of group and party objectives. In this zone, parties and groups are working together toward at least one common goal. This requires more structure and authority, and will produce greater stability in group-party relations. For efficiency's sake, we may see some resource pooling; however, most of their resources will remain separate.

The right-most zone is *internalization*. At the most extreme point in this zone, the group becomes part of the party's apparatus. Though both are responsible to the same centralized authority, their goals need not be completely identical; even within a corporation, different divisions might have conflicting desires and objectives. However, we have significantly more goal alignment than in the cooperation zone. Relationships in this zone are very stable, dislodged only by serious conflict. They are also exclusive—in other words, groups can only be internalized by one party at a time. Hence, this is a zone of high special interest partisanship.

Placing party-group relations on this continuum provides an alternative view of political polarization. If parties internalize all groups, they will end up with very different platforms. In this situation, we are likely to see little overlap between parties in roll-call votes. Compromise will be difficult, because the parties have stronger policy commitments than they would under pluralism. Understanding movement along the

group-party continuum can therefore shed light on the origins of polarization.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter argues that parties had their own internal reasons for encouraging the growth of special interest partisanship. They did not need activists to push them away from pluralism. Because the costs and benefits of different group-party arrangements can change over time, explaining the evolution of group-party relations requires careful attention to historical context. Chapters four and five will argue that changes in group-party relations are part of a larger transformation of parties since the New Deal. Substantively, the parties have become more distinct, and organizationally, the national parties have become much stronger. I will argue that these two changes are related. The substance and organization of party politics are inextricably linked.

Chapter 4

Party Nationalization and Polarization: The Structural Roots of Ideological Change

As chapter two illustrates, the Democratic and Republican parties became more distinct in a number of different ways over the second half of the twentieth century. Not only did they develop alternative positions on many issues, but they also began prioritizing issues differently. The question now is, why?

There is no immaculate conception for issue positions. Echoing Schattschneider, I argue that position development requires significant work and compromise, which in turn require organization and infrastructure. Put more starkly, in order for parties to polarize on a range of issues, they needed stronger organizations than they had in the early to mid-twentieth century. They also needed compelling reasons to abandon their "Tweedledee and Tweedledum" arrangement, which had allowed both sides to avoid alienating moderate voters, and adopt alternative positions on issues. Though parties may be well-known for their espoused ideologies today, I argue that major changes are not likely to be caused by ideology. Assuming parties care deeply about elections, if we see radical changes, it is most likely because the nature of political competition has evolved.

Party organization has not played a major role in the literature on elite political polarization. The existing explanation that comes closest to invoking organization is the increasingly common argument that changes to the Democratic Party's nomination processes in the late 1960s and early 1970s opened the process and allowed increasingly extreme activists to pull elites away from the median voter. While these developments were certainly not immaterial, I argue that critical changes in party organization began well before changes to the party nomination process in the late 1960s. The roots of modern polarization lie in the New Deal era. I challenge the conventional wisdom further by arguing that activists did not cause polarization. Rather, as the previous chapter argued, parties had compelling reasons to evolve as the nature of political

competition changed.

I begin with an explanation of my theory, which draws heavily on Schattschneider's work on party similarity in the mid-twentieth century. This brings me to my central hypothesis, that elite party polarization stems from the nationalization of the party system since the New Deal. The spectacular growth of federal power during the New Deal spurred the centralization—albeit gradual and sometimes rocky—of party power. As patronage politics declined with the dissipation of local machines by the late 1960s, issues became more important in political competition, encouraging parties to take them more seriously. And as national party committees grew stronger and more professional over this period, they were better equipped to develop issue positions.

This is not an easy hypothesis to test, for reasons of data availability as well as complexity. I will address it in a few stages, marshaling different kinds of evidence. First, I exploit state-level variation in polarization and patronage history to test the link between these phenomena. This analysis suggests that patronage politics do in fact depress party differences, just as Schattschneider argued. I will then review changes in the primary independent variable in this analysis: party nationalization. This amounts to a history of the American party system, particularly how and why the balance of power between national and state/local parties changed, and how this affected political competition. Then, I will show how these changes influenced parties' incentives and capabilities with respect to issues. I will begin by zooming in on one issue, abortion, using archival data to illustrate how changes in political competition, rather than ideology, drove the Republican Party to adopt a strong, distinct position. This is an ideal test case, as it has become one of the most intensely ideological issues in contemporary American politics. If the Republican Party's decision to adopt a strong pro-life position, in contrast to its opponent, was motivated by strategic electoral considerations rather

than ideological change, I have strong evidence in favor of my argument. Finally, I will show how stronger national party infrastructure supported the development of party positions.

4.1 Decentralized Parties and Issue Position Convergence

Though Franklin Delano Roosevelt may be remembered as one of the strongest Democratic politicians in American history, his party was weak at the national level. State and local party bosses were the "locus of power" at this time; above them were "ghost parties," national committees technically sitting atop the party hierarchy, but actually having very little power or responsibility. These organizations met infrequently, did little, and disbanded between elections.

Patronage was the primary currency (Lowi uses the word "technique") in this decentralized system (Lowi 1990: 194; Schattschneider 1942). To gain support from voters, state and local parties used "material incentives" like jobs and contracts, rather than "purposive incentives" (Mayhew 1986). In exchange for federal patronage, state and local parties would mobilize their constituents in national elections as well, since the feeble national parties were ill-equipped to do this themselves.

This arrangement had important consequences for issue politics. Since candidates "have not counted very much on workers or supporters inspired to activity by issues, principles, causes, or ideologies," issues played a negligible role in electoral competition (Mayhew 1986: 20; Schattschneider 1942). This environment gave parties little incentive to address issues, let alone take strong alternative positions (Schattschneider 1942; APSA Report 1950). Charles Merriam, political science scholar and advisor to President Roosevelt, observed that "many fundamental questions of public policy are not party

questions at all," and "only in exceptional cases is the party bugle sounded to rally the party members to their party standard, and even then they do not always respond" (Merriam and Gosnell 1940: 41).

Merriam's observation alludes to the second reason Schattschneider offers for issue convergence under weak national parties. Even if they wanted to take strong, alternative positions, Schattschneider argued, the national parties lacked the necessary resources and infrastructure to do so. Taking positions is not so easy—it requires research, experts, and knowledge of constituencies. Moreover, to enforce positions, the party must have the capacity to discipline its members.

An important hypothesis emerging from this argument is that *if the balance of power between national and state/local parties changes, we should eventually see changes in parties' willingness and ability to take distinct issue positions*. If true, this suggests that what ultimately appear to be ideological changes—parties taking stronger, more opposite positions on a range of issues—actually stem from structural changes to the party system, which alter the nature of electoral competition. This insight would offer an important contribution to our understanding of political polarization, which is most often treated as an ideological phenomenon.

4.2 Testing the Link Between Patronage and Polarization

It is simple enough to see that political polarization began rising dramatically in the early 1970s, soon after the end of what Mayhew has called political machines' "golden age" (Mayhew 1986: 330). This is consistent with the hypothesis articulated above, but could, of course, be a coincidence. To test the link between patronage and polarization more explicitly, we can exploit state-level variation on these variables.

States differ widely in their history of patronage organization, as well as legislative polarization (Mayhew 1986; Shor and McCarty 2011). This approach has limitations, since polarization scores are only available at the state level from the mid-1990s on, well after machines' decline. Still, if Schattschneider's theory is correct, we might expect states with a strong history of patronage organization in the 1960s to lag behind states without such legacies in the development of distinct party positions. Presumably, in states without strong patronage organizations, parties always needed to rely on purposive incentives to appeal to voters. Hence, parties in these states would have been working to develop strong, alternative issue positions for a relatively long time. While parties in former machine states eventually needed to transition from material to purposive incentives, they would have started this process later. With less time for parties develop strong, alternative positions, we should see them on a narrower range of issues. In sum, *states with stronger patronage organizations in the 1960s should be less polarized today than states with weaker (or nonexistent) patronage organizations*.

To measure patronage, I use Mayhew's "traditional party organization" (TPO) scores. In a sweeping history of American parties, Mayhew assigns each state a score between 1 and 5, indicating the level of traditional party organization present in that state in the late 1960s.[1] States with a score of 1 (e.g., Minnesota, North Carolina) had no TPOs at this time, while states with a score of 5 (e.g., Illinois, Pennsylvania) had strong TPOs. To measure state polarization, I use Shor and McCarty's (2011) data. They estimate ideal points for state legislators that are comparable across chambers, states, levels of government, and time, using roll-call data (the traditional source for ideal point estimation at the national level) and surveys of state and federal legislators. To calculate polarization for each chamber in each state, they measure the distance between the ideal

[1] For more detail on the process of assigning TPO scores, see Mayhew 1986: 21-22.

points of the median member of each party. In 2008, this measure ranges from 0.56 to 3.0 in state lower chambers, and 0.6 to 2.7 in upper chambers.

Of course, it is important to consider other known determinants of national-level polarization in a state-level analysis as well. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) show clear, positive correlations between immigration, inequality, and polarization. To control for these factors, I include variables indicating each state's Gini index coefficient in 2008 (an accepted measure of inequality, also used by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal at the national level), and the percent of each state's population that was foreign born in 2008.[2]

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the effect of TPO scores on state polarization, controlling for state-level inequality and immigration levels. TABLE 4.1 summarizes the results. As expected, there is a statistically significant, negative relationship between patronage legacy and polarization. That is, states that had strong patronage organizations in the 1960s still lag behind states without such organizations in polarization in 2008. For every additional point on the 1 to 5 TPO scale, polarization decreases by 0.12 in both chambers. This is both statistically and substantively significant, since polarization ranges from approximately 0.5 to 3.

While these findings certainly cannot confirm the whole theory outlined above, they support the hypothesized link between party organization and issue positions. In states that had strong patronage-based organizations in the 1960s, parties in state legislatures have not yet become as polarized. For a more textured analysis of this relationship, we can analyze changes in party structure—specifically, the increasing strength of national party organizations in relation to state and local party organizations—and examine the extent to which changes in parties' attention to issues

[2]Gini index data came from an American Community Survey Brief released by the U.S. Census Bureau, entitled "Household Income for States: 2008 and 2009." Immigration data came from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2006-2008 American Community Survey.

	Model 1 State Houses	Model 2 State Senates
TPO Score	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.12** (0.04)
% Foreign Born	0.04** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)
Gini Coefficient	1.14 (5.87)	-4.54 (4.21)
Constant	0.83 (2.56)	3.38 (1.82)
Observations	31	32
R-squared	0.33	0.46

Table 4.1: **Traditional Party Organization and State-Level Polarization.** Models 1 and 2 are OLS regressions. There are fewer than 50 observations because polarization data are not available for all states in all years. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001. *Source: Data from Mayhew 1986, Shor and McCarty 2011, and U.S. Census Bureau*

follow.

4.3 Measuring Party Centralization

What does it mean for parties to centralize? In short, either national parties need to become stronger, state and local parties need to become weaker, or both trends need to occur. I will focus primarily on demonstrating how national parties became stronger, though state and local parties are also important parts of the story. They did not necessarily weaken as national committees developed—they simply changed in a few key ways. Most notably, party machines waned, and state and local parties became more

integrated with national parties, particularly on the Republican side.

Of course, this raises the follow-up question: what does it mean for parties to become stronger? How can we measure party strength systematically? While there has been little recent work on party organization, with important exceptions by Klinkner (1994) and Galvin (2010), organizational changes during the mid-twentieth century inspired a surge of scholarship on party strength in the 1980s, mostly by Bibby, Cotter, Gibson, and Huckshorn (in different combinations). These scholars thought in depth about organizational measurement, and conducted a survey of national party leaders from 1979 to 1980, as well as larger-scale surveys of state party leaders between 1960 and 1980. The metrics discussed below, and the observations discussed in the next section, draw heavily from their work.

First and foremost, to evaluate a party's strength, we can determine if and when it established a permanent headquarters. A strong, active party requires a stable home base for its operations. It also needs professional staff. In this realm, we can look at the number of people working for the party and the degree to which they are compensated. Is the party chairmanship a full-time, paid position? How many paid staff members does the chair have? We can also examine the size of the party's budget, since activities and infrastructure require money, and the manner by which party leaders raise funds. Do they have systems in place for regular fundraising, or are they constantly scrambling to raise money in various ways from various sources? We can also look at their organization. To what extent is the party bureaucratized? The degree of bureaucratization will be related to staff size, since specialization will be difficult if not impossible for a small staff. This matters because specialization facilitates strength by raising efficiency. Finally, we can look at the party's operations and activities. Most simply, does it operate continuously or does it fade between elections? Strong parties

need a reasonable degree of stability in their operations. More specifically, we can evaluate the party's programmatic activity. As Gibson, Cotter, Bibby and Huckshorn (1983) summarize, in addition to bureaucratization, "Strong organizations must also have programatic capacity—that is, they must be capable of sustaining a high level of programatic activity. Through such activity the party organization develops a constituency; firm expectations and support are created and the organization becomes resilient in the face of disintegrative forces" (Gibson et al. 1983: 198).

Tracing party centralization is considerably more difficult than documenting the centralization of government power. In the words of Kenneth Janda, "party organizations rarely tell about themselves."[3] To do so, I rely on a few key sources. For the period from 1933 to 1945, I use a series of contemporaneous articles on party finance published in the *American Political Science Review* by Louise Overacker. These articles draw on multiple primary sources, most notably a series of reports published by Congressional committees tasked with investigating the parties over this period. For the few years leading up to 1950, I use the report published by the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*. For the period from 1959 to the present, I use the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, which contains data on the national committees and affiliated organizations, including membership, budget, staff size, and publications. Not all of these data are available in every year, but they allow for a rough estimate of national party organization and activity over time. I also rely heavily on key secondary sources, most notably Cotter and Bibby (1980), Klinker (1994), and Galvin's (2010) work on party organization.

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[3]Janda 1983: 319, cited by Appleton and Ward 1995.

4.4 The Process of Party Nationalization

The 1968 and 1972 Democratic Party reforms have received a lot of attention in the literature on polarization. However, critical changes in party organization began well before this time. As Cotter and Bibby note, "[party] nationalization is a long-term trend with antecedents dating to the 1940s. The nationalization of party organization in the United States thus is not an abrupt result of the turbulent 1968 Democratic National Convention" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 12). In this chapter, I argue that the impetus for nationalization arose even earlier than the 1940s.

While woeful, according to Schattschneider, the decentralization of party power was not especially surprising, as it mirrored the balance of power in government for most of the nation's history. From approximately 1800 to 1933, the federal government's main functions involved administrative matters, subsidies, tariffs, public lands, patents, and currency (Lowi 1990: 193). Overall, the federal government had relatively few responsibilities, while "the states did most of the fundamental governing, and the states were in particular responsible for those aspects of government that require directly coercive techniques," like regulation (Lowi 1990: 194).

It would be an overstatement to say the Great Depression and New Deal began the shift toward party centralization. Industrialization, urbanization, and advancements in transportation and communication technology had been gradually raising the salience of national issues prior to the 1930s (APSA Report: 33). However, the Depression and ensuing expansion of federal power under the New Deal engendered more sudden and dramatic changes to the status of national power and policy. The economic crisis "brought to light the incompetence of the spoils machines to handle the problems of unemployment and relief," and people looked to the national government to solve the

increasingly important issues of the day (Merriam and Gosnell 1940: 441). The New Deal responded to this crisis by fundamentally transforming American federalism, granting the national government tremendous, unprecedented regulatory power and responsibility for citizens' welfare.

4.4.1 National Parties

While the party system did not go through such a rapid transformation, important changes were beginning to occur in the national parties. Traditionally, national party organizations were relatively dormant between elections. The APSA Report quotes a DNC member's remarks to this effect in 1919: "It was the custom of this body immediately after the Presidential election had passed . . . of going out of business in a week or two, just as soon as we could pay up the bills, and indeed sometimes we went out of business before we did that."[4] Cotter and Bibby report that DNC Chairman James Farley distributed termination notices at the 1932 Convention in Chicago, and "his staff members had to find their own transportation home" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 5). Yet, even by this time, some important changes were already brewing.

First, the parties established permanent headquarters. The RNC made this move around 1918, though its operations still declined significantly between elections (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 3-4). The DNC lacked adequate resources to maintain their activities between elections until 1929, when chairman John J. Raskob announced that the party would establish a permanent headquarters in Washington D.C. with a permanent executive committee and a full-time director of publicity to facilitate continuous operations between elections (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 4). While the DNC was still

[4] APSA Report: 48, quoting Proceedings of the DNC, 1919.

running a deficit, it was substantially smaller than it had been, and the party could afford to make what he viewed as a critical change. "After many conferences with members of the executive and advisory committees," he announced, "I have reached the conclusion that the party's interests can be advanced best by the opening of permanent and adequate headquarters in Washington, and the conducting of active organization work 365 days in the year."[5] In addition to providing a place for Democrats to hold meetings, the office was also to have publicity and research capabilities.[6]

The chairmanship position also changed significantly. After the 1936 election, the RNC made its chairmanship a full-time, salaried position (Overacker 1941; APSA Report 1950: 49). The DNC followed 8 years later, in 1944. However, the "full-time" chairmen could still hold other positions. Notably, several DNC and RNC chairman held federal executive positions during their tenure with the party committees. DNC Chairman Robert Hannegan, for example, served as United States Postmaster General under Harry Truman from 1945 to 1947 during his DNC Chairman appointment from 1944 to 1948. It is particularly worth noting, for this analysis, that the Postmaster General controlled a great deal of patronage. Before Hannegan, James Farley and Frank C. Walker both served this particular dual-role, from 1933 to 1940 and 1943 to 1944, respectively. Dwight Eisenhower would eventually stop this trend during his presidency, as Cotter and Bibby note he was "adamant that neither the party chairman nor any member of the national committee would simultaneously hold a federal executive position" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 7).

Over this period, the party committees also became more independent of the chair—they were "no longer a mere extension of the chairman's personality" (Cotter and

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[5] "Raskob Appoints Shouse to Lead Revival of Party." *The New York Times* 1 May 1929.

[6] "Democrats Will Open Headquarters in City." *The Washington Post* 1 May 1929.

Bibby 1980: 6). This autonomy was also financial, as chairmen no longer bankrolled the committees.[7] The chairman's independence from the president also increased over the middle of the twentieth century. Writing in 1980, Cotter and Bibby note, "A few decades ago it was understood that the chairman and his cronies might legitimately benefit from exerting the influence associated with that position. It is still a job that involves personal loyalty to an incumbent president, but within the changing framework of law, there are now some things that a president is unlikely to ask of a chairman, and there are some requests to which a chairman will say no" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 6).

Permanent headquarters and professional, autonomous chairmen did not immediate translate to continuous organizational work, however. Operations remained relatively unstable, due largely to the parties' financial difficulties. Still, both parties attempted to increase their between-election activities over this period. In spite of their post-election debt, the DNC maintained a "vigorous organization" following the 1932 contest, with $300,000 in operating expenses in 1934 and $385,000 in 1935. Overacker (1937) notes, "Apparently Mr. Farley operates upon the theory that the party should function continuously and that between campaign activity is an important factor in winning elections. This may be one of the secrets of his success" (Overacker 1937: 475). The RNC, in contrast, was "practically dormant between the campaigns," with operating expenses of $60,500 in 1933, $216,676 in 1934, and $159,977 in 1935 (Overacker 1937: 475). After the 1936 election, both national committees maintained operations, despite their post-election indebtedness. This surge in activity fizzled after the 1940 election, however. According to Overacker, this was largely a consequence of the Hatch Act, which limited parties' expenditures per year, spurring a decentralization of party spending. All in all,

[7]Chairmen did not always finance committee activity before this time. However, Cotter and Bibby note that previously, "A wealthy chairman could play angel to the national committee. John J. Raskob, Al Smith's DNC chairman, for example, ran up a party debt of $1,550,000, much of which he personally financed" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 6).

over the decade following the first New Deal, the concept of continuous operations gained some favor; however, parties were unable to achieve it consistently.

By 1950, when APSA published *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, the RNC and DNC still did not meet regularly (APSA Report: 29). The National Committee "is seldom a generally influential and much less a working body," they noted (APSA Report: 29). Since the committees still focused mainly on presidential elections, it is not especially surprising that their activities consistently dwindled thereafter (APSA Report: 38). In a comparative analysis of American and British parties, Casey (1944) observed, "The usual American practice is a feverish construction of a party headquarters staff capable of real organization and propaganda service a few months before a presidential campaign. The skeleton gets flesh and bones on the eve of a national convention or soon after a nominee is chosen. After an election, the major part of a headquarters staff melts away."[8] This left parties with meager research capabilities, to APSA's dismay. Instead of the "frail organs" in existence at that time, APSA argued the parties needed "stronger, full-time research organization, adequately financed and working on a year-in, year-out basis" (APSA Report: 81).

Over time, parties did make this transition, if not at APSA's preferred pace. FIGURE 4.1 illustrates a significant increase in between-election staffing levels, for example. Data on party staffing are difficult to come by, though they are available for certain years. Most of the data used to create FIGURE 4.1 come from Cotter and Bibby, who in turn relied on work by Hugh Bone (1958, 1971). I supplemented this with data from Klinkner (1994) and the Encyclopedia of Associations (EA). Raw numbers and sources for each year can be found in the appendix (see TABLE A.27). EA does not always get new data from organizations every year. In this situation, they typically use

[8]Casey 1944, quoted in APSA Report: 48-49.



Figure 4.1: **DNC and RNC Paid Staff, 1935-2000.** The data used to make these graphs come from Klinkner (1994), the Encyclopedia of Associations, and Cotter and Bibby (1980), who in turn relied largely on work by Hugh Bone (1958, 1971). Raw numbers and sources for each year can be found in the appendix (see TABLE A.27). Blank spaces indicate missing data, not necessarily zero staff. The vertical dotted reference lines mark presidential election years.

data received previously. This means that EA data will exaggerate stability, but it can provide a rough estimate of party staff size in the contemporary era. Blank spaces indicate missing data, not necessarily zero staff, and the vertical dotted reference lines mark presidential election years. In 1935, the RNC had only 11 paid staff members. This is consistent with scholars' observations of organizational decline between elections. By the mid-1950s, however, parties are maintaining more robust organizations in non-election years. Staffing levels do continue to drop after presidential elections. Between 1952 and 1953, for example, both parties cut their staff by approximately three-quarters (DNC from 251 to 59, RNC from 386 to 98). However, the between-election staff gets significantly larger over time, especially on the Republican side.

There was also a rise in party-affiliated organizations. EA collects data on national party and party-related organizations, which I used to create a timeline of their proliferation. TABLES 4.2 AND 4.3, displayed at the end of this chapter, list these

organizations alongside their founding year and membership as of 1997. While core organizations like the DNC, RNC, and national party congressional committees were established in the 19th century, the vast majority of national party-affiliated organizations arose after the Great Depression. FIGURE 4.2 shows the density of organizational establishment over time. Not only were the RNC and DNC growing over the post-war period, there was also a steep rise in auxiliary organizations like the National Federation of Republican Women, the Log Cabin Republicans, and the National Rainbow Coalition, providing an additional centripetal force in American party politics.



Figure 4.2: **The Growth of National Party-Related Organizations.** This graph shows the number of party-related national organizations established per year. A list of these organizations is available at the end of this chapter. *Source: data from the Encyclopedia of Associations, 1997*

As they grew larger, the party committees also became more complex and bureaucratic. We can measure this by looking at the number of divisions in the

organization, which increased greatly over time (Cotter and Bibby 1980). Woodburn (1906) reported that the national parties had five subdivisions as of 1906. By the late 1950s, the RNC had 18 subdivisions, 12 of which were established after 1935 (Cotter and Bibby 1980).

With greater staff, infrastructure, and bureaucratization came more institutionalized fundraising operations, at least for the RNC. In the mid 1930s, under Chairman John Hamilton, the RNC created the National Republican Finance Committee (NRFC), which established a new system of centralization for national committee and Congressional campaign committee fundraising. The Hamilton regime also spearheaded a new membership program, in which people pledged donations to the party each year, as members of a congregation might promise annual donations to a church. In 1962, Chairman William Miller moved the RNC toward a direct mail program, which went from raising $700,000 in 1962 to $5.1 million in 1964. This program would account for a substantial percentage of the RNFC's overall receipts over Miller's tenure (21% in 1962, 40% in 1963, and 47% in 1964) (Klinkner 1994: 62). The party's direct mail operation grew even more under Bill Brock's guidance in the 1970s. During his tenure, the RNC went from raising $12.7 million from 250,000 contributors in 1976 to $26.5 million from 1.2 million contributors in 1980 (Klinkner 1994: 140-1).

The direct mail program's success altered the balance of power between national and state parties (Klinkner 1994: 63, 141). Heard (1960) argued that money was the primary source of state and local parties' power over the RNC. "The national leadership has on occasion rejected the demands of important state and local party leaders," he observed, "but the paucity of its independent financial resources, along with other factors, circumscribes its freedom and denies it a potential source of stability," which "pushes the center of gravity further down in the party structure than it need otherwise

be."[9] By creating a large network of small donors, the direct-mail program gave the national party more independence. It also changed the balance of party power geographically. Large northeastern donors saw their share of the party's receipts decline, as the party received a larger number of small donations from around the country. Donations over $500 from mid-atlantic states made up 43% of total contributions in 1960, but only 25% four years later (Klinkner 1994: 63).

The DNC lagged behind its opponent in the development of systematic fundraising by more than two decades. The party did not have a permanent, operational finance committee until 1960. And even then, it was relatively unstable, collapsing in 1964 after a dispute between the presidential and congressional wings of the party, and then reemerging in 1974. Following a failed attempt to institute a direct-mail program similar to the RNC's in 1969 under Chairman Fred Harris, the party had some success raising money through telethons under Chairman Bob Strauss in the mid-1970s (Klinkner 1994: 94, 126-7). Though the telethons were relatively isolated events, they contributed to a more stable fundraising infrastructure by helping the party gather names for future direct-mail efforts. By 1974, they had collected over a million names from various sources, and receipts from their direct mail efforts accounted for approximately half of the DNC's total receipts under Chairman Strauss.

Even then, however, the DNC's direct-mail operation was smaller and less technologically advanced than the RNC's. Considering the RNC developed much more stable, institutionalized, and centralized fundraising capabilities than the DNC, it is unsurprising that the RNC raised more money than the DNC over this period. Importantly, the RNC received a relatively large percentage of overall contributions from Republican donors; Democrats, in contrast, donated more often to candidate

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[9] Heard 1960, cited in Klinkner 1994: 62

organizations (Freeman 1986; Jacobson 1985).

All in all, major changes to national party organizations occurred between the Great Depression and the early 1970s, when elite polarization began its steep rise. They established permanent headquarters, began keeping sizable staffs between elections, developed systematic fundraising capabilities, and maintained more continuous operations. This resulted in larger, more stable, and professional organizations with far greater programmatic capacities than the "ghost parties" of Schattschneider's narrative.

4.4.2 State and Local Parties

So far, this analysis has focused almost exclusively on national parties. What happened to state and local party organizations over this period? If they grew more than national parties, we would not have a net centralization of the party system. The answer to this question differs substantially for state and local parties. At the state level, we also see different patterns for Republicans and Democrats. Overall, however, the national parties grew more powerful relative to their state and local counterparts. While this was not a quick process, it had broad and important consequences.

Though the balance of power between federal and state/local government changed dramatically in the 1930s by virtue of the former's ascension, the latter did not decline right away. In fact, the New Deal fortified machines in the short-term. Programs like the Works Progress Administration expanded the supply of federal patronage, which aided existing machines and even helped to build new ones (Mayhew 1986: 324). Roosevelt's attitude toward machines also played a role, as Mayhew notes that he "approached the still-flourishing stratum of organizations at lower levels not as obstacles that needed to be removed but as possible allies to be mobilized" (Mayhew

1986: 318). This represented a change in orientation toward machines after the reform efforts of the Progressive Era. Democratic presidents maintained the attitude that "traditional party organizations could agreeably supply strength to, as well as draw benefits from, politicians who built and tended coalitions at the national level" through this "golden age" of machine politics, which lasted through the late 1960s (Mayhew 1986: 318, 330). Even after this period, however, local party organizations did not fizzle; rather, they changed in nature, moving away from patronage-dominated machine politics (Gibson et al.1985).

State parties did not decline either (Gibson at al. 1983; Cotter et al. 1984). By the early 1970s, almost all state parties had established headquarters outside the chair's home (80% in the state's capitol), their budgets grew, and, on the whole, they became much more professionalized and bureaucratized between 1960 and 1980 (Gibson et al. 1983). There were important differences by party, however. Republican state parties grew stronger between 1960 and 1980, while Democratic state parties ascended in the 1960s, before dipping slightly over the following decade. Overall, state Republican parties were stronger than their Democratic counterparts. This makes sense, considering the different levels of attention given to state parties by the RNC and DNC.

While state parties may not have declined in the mid to late twentieth century, they did become more strongly integrated with national parties, albeit in different ways. The RNC focused on providing more services and resources to candidates (Freeman 1986). Following the party's defeat in 1964, RNC Chairman Raymond Bliss enacted a program to strengthen state and local organizations. The RNC helped state parties with recruitment, and offered extensive training services during the 1960s. These included live events like conferences and seminars as well as printed materials like manuals. After the 1976 election, Chairman Bill Brock undertook an even more aggressive

program, deploying personnel, technological resources, and other assistance for state party development. For example, the RNC spent $1 million per year to provide each state headquarters with an organizational director, and offered access to the party's data processing network (Cotter and Bibby 1980; Klinkner 1994).

An important part of the RNC's state-level program was Operation Dixie. This historic effort, beginning in 1957 under Chairman Meade Alcorn, aimed to build Republican party infrastructure in the south, a region so dominated by Democrats that Key (1949) deemed it a non-competitive one-party stronghold. Building party organizations from scratch was not easy; indeed, even recruiting staff and candidates was no small task, since running on the Republican ticket was not especially attractive at this time. These new activists, much like the "amateurs" rising in the Democratic party, were younger, more educated, and professional than the older, business elite establishment Republicans. They also turned out to be much more conservative than Chairman Alcorn and President Eisenhower hoped (Klinkner 1994).

Research on state organizations suggests these party-building efforts were quite successful. Huckshorn, Gibson, Cotter, and Bibby (1986) use surveys of state party leaders conducted between 1960 and 1980 to demonstrate, among other things, the level of national party involvement in state parties. FIGURE 4.3 shows the percentage of state parties receiving different kinds of assistance from the RNC and DNC. A few patterns stand out in this graph. The level of assistance from the RNC to state Republican parties is quite significant, with nearly half receiving aid with polls and research, over 60% receiving staff assistance, and over 90% receiving campaign seminars from the national committee. This stands in stark contrast to state Democratic parties, which enjoyed almost no staff assistance and significantly less aid in other areas, compared to Republican state parties. Only in rule enforcement did state Democratic parties receive



Figure 4.3: **Party Integration.** This graph was created from a chart in Huckshorn et al. 1986, which used data from surveys of state party chairmen conducted between 1960 and 1980.

more assistance from the DNC than their Republican counterparts received from their national committee, reflecting substantial DNC efforts in this area.

In contrast to their opposition, the DNC tended to use rules and regulations to assert control over state parties. According to Cotter and Bibby (1980), these efforts were initially motivated by problems of defection by a number of southern states from the DNC's presidential ticket leading up to the 1948 election. In the short-term, the DNC decided in 1949 to remove six members from Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina from the committee. But, they also realized they would need a longer-term solution to the problem of disloyalty. This need became more urgent after a

conflict-ridden 1952 convention, in which Chairman Rayburn declared the Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana delegations ineligible to participate in the nomination for failure to adhere to the loyalty rules adopted at the 1948 convention, only to be overturned "in two prolonged and turbulent votes" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 15). While the DNC decided not to require a loyalty oath in 1956, it increased its authority over state parties through new requirements regarding the listing of presidential and vice presidential candidates' names on state ballots. Before the 1960 convention, Chairman Paul Butler reinforced this new authority by "formally advis[ing] state leaders that any policy or device that sought to relieve Democratic electors of their obligation to cast their ballots for the Democratic nominees would result in a challenge before the 1960 Credentials Committee" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 16).

Conflict intensified in 1964 when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party sent its own delegation to the convention as an alternative to the planned delegation, decried as racist. Democratic Party leaders managed to accommodate both delegations, diffusing the situation in the short-term. The DNC also established a Special Equal Rights Committee in 1964, which would recommend specific delegate selection procedures in 1968 to make the process more democratic for the party's many constituencies. Among these recommendations, adopted in January 1968, were "open and publicized party meetings, nondiscrimination, broad registration drives, publication of selection procedures, and publication of qualifications for party officeholding" (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 17). The McGovern-Fraser Commission, whose reforms are more well-known to contemporary scholars, would build on these principles.

Though the DNC and RNC asserted control over state parties in different ways, both grew stronger relative to state and local parties over the post-war period. On the whole, there was a significant nationalization of the American party system, just as

Shattschneider hoped there would be. As this processes unfolded, the nature of political competition slowly changed, with purposive incentives like issue positions becoming more important. And as the parties grew stronger, they were much better equipped to develop comprehensive policy programs.

4.5 The Development of Issue Positions

Examining national party platforms in FIGURE 4.4, we can see parties paying more attention to issues over time. The party platforms gradually lengthen toward the end of the nineteenth century, before the imperatives of the Great Depression temporarily focus politics on the most critical issues of the day. By the end of the New Deal period, however, we begin to see a dramatic increase in platform length. National parties clearly change their orientation toward issues, viewing them as more worthy of attention than they were in the past.

Of course, this analysis is not just about attention to issues, but the development of alternative positions thereon. Schattschneider named two mechanisms by which party decentralization encouraged issue position convergence: incentives and organizational capacity. This section will analyze changes in each mechanism, and how they contributed to the development of strong, opposite issue positions.

4.5.1 Incentives

As patronage politics declined, a culture of political "professionals" gave way to the rise of "amateurs." Klinkner summarizes, "For many years the strength of the Democratic party lay in its control of party machines in the urban centers of the north



Figure 4.4: **Party Platform Length, 1840-2008.** This graph shows the number of words in the Republican and Democratic Party Platforms over time. *Source: text of party platforms gathered from the American Presidency Project (Woolley and Peters)*

and in the traditional Democratic loyalties of the rural South. But by the 1950s, a new breed of amateur Democrats begun to gain ascendance in the party. These Democrats were more educated and affluent and were motivated less by patronage or the benefits of local one-party dominance or the need to exclude blacks, than by issues and programs" (Klinkner 1994: 15). Studying members of the 85th Congress (1957-58), Miller and Stokes find support for this contention. In their survey, only 25% of "party recruits" characterized issues as "of equal or greater importance than other factors" in their election, compared to 61% of "self-starters".[10]

[10]Miller and Stokes, unpublished manuscript, cited in Mayhew 1986: 245. The exact question, with parenthetical clarification provided by Mayhew, was: "In seeking renomination [this evidently means in 1958], how would you compare the importance of your stands on issues with the importance of other factors—such as services to your constituents, your standing in the party, and so forth?"

Direct-mail also heightened purposive incentives in politics. This new fundraising method widened parties' support networks, and changed the tools they would need to gather supporters. In addition to reducing the influence of large contributors in the northeast, the direct mail system also made ideological appeals more important. Observing George McGovern's attention to issue politics, Klinkner notes, "Like Barry Goldwater and George Wallace, the first presidential candidates to use direct-mail successfully, McGovern took ideological positions that a great many people believed strongly in and were willing to support with their money. Such contributors, however, were less willing to support the more general purposes of the DNC" (Klinkner 1994: 127). As issues became more important in political competition, strong positions gained value.

This was not only true from a financial standpoint; strong issue positions could also win votes. We can see this clearly by looking at the development of alternative party positions on abortion. While abortion might be one of the most intensely ideological issues in contemporary American politics, archival documents collected at the presidential libraries of Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan show that the Republican Party's decision to take a strong pro-life position in opposition to their opponent's was not motivated by ideology. In other words, it is not that members of the Republican Party suddenly became more conservative on social issues. Rather, this was a strategic choice, meant to boost the party's competitive position. Abortion was deliberately used as a purposive incentive to attract new voters to the party.

While abortion politics were very salient following the Supreme Court's 1973 landmark decision in *Roe v. Wade*, the Republican Party's position on abortion was not yet clear.[11] Even the President and the First Lady were not completely in sync, as she

[11]Memo; Ray Waldmann to Mike Duval; 24 June 1976; folder Democratic Party Platform [3]; Box 26;

was generally more supportive than he of *Roe v. Wade*. Drafting the 1976 platform, party leaders tried to figure out what position would be most advantageous over the short- and long-term. Many people did a lot of research in this area, reflecting the party's inchoate position at this time.

Interoffice memoranda demonstrate clearly that Ford did not want to involve himself in abortion politics. The issue was not very important to him, and he was reluctant to take a strong position on such a controversial topic. When he did express a position on abortion, it was generally moderate.[12] While the administration wanted to open communication with Catholic leaders, they did not want to focus on abortion, nor did they want the press to emphasize this issue when reporting coverage of meetings with Catholic leaders.[13] Understanding the issue's sensitivity, even the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) criticized the media's over-coverage of abortion, directing their attention to other issues of importance to the NCCB, like international food security, refugees, and nonpublic education.[14] Though they strongly opposed

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Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[12]Memo; Ken Cole to President Ford; 6 September 1974; folder Abortion [2]; Box 1; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Article; "Catholics Hold Talk With Ford"; 19 June 1975; folder National Conference of Catholic Bishops [3]; Box 50; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[13]Letter; James L. Robinson to Theodore C. Marrs; 10 July 1975; folder National Conference of Catholic Bishops [2]; Box 50; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[14]Letter; Reverand James S. Rausch to Editor of the Washington Star-News; 28 January 1975; folder 1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S. Catholic Conference [2]; Box 64; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; Reverand James S. Rausch to Editorial Page Editor of The Washington Post; folder 1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S. Catholic Conference [2]; Box 64; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; James L. Robinson to Theodore Marrs; 29 January 1975; folder 1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S. Catholic Conference [2]; Box 64; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Press release; "Bishops Discuss Issues with President at White House Meeting"; folder Religious Groups; Box 25; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; James L. Robinson to Theodore Marrs, enclosing editorial, "The Wronging of Bishop Rausch," *The Washington Post*; 13 February 1975; folder United States Catholic Conference; Box 55; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

abortion, they also cared deeply about other issues.

Still, many party members saw strategic advantages in taking a position against abortion. Noting Catholic Bishops' dissatisfaction with the Democratic platform's support for abortion, Republicans thought taking a different stance could "give us a real opportunity to exploit the Democrats' weakness on this issue."[15] Special Counsel to the President Michael Raoul Duval assured Ford that "the proposed Republican Platform will help us defeat the Carter-Mondale ticket by drawing clear distinctions between our principles and programs and theirs."[16] Abortion was an important part of this strategy, as party advisor Henry Cashen told Raoul Duval that "even a modestly anti-abortion position [by Ford] could win millions of votes."[17]

These party elites saw an opportunity to bring traditionally Democratic northern urban Catholics into the Republican Party. These voters were a "soft spot in Carter's support."[18] This kind of stance would appeal to Catholics in the electorate directly, and also help to reach them indirectly through their leaders. Reemphasizing the value of communication, Cashen reminds Raoul Duval that the Catholic hierarchy is opposed to abortion and "they set the policy which is directed for sermons to the various dioceses throughout the United States."[19] Ultimately, they did not take a stance against abortion

[15]Letter; Thomas Patrick Melady to William J. Baroody, Jr.; folder Republican Party Platform: Catholic Issues; Box 27; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[16]Notes; Meeting with Selected Members of Executive Committee of the Committee on Resolutions (Platform); 15 August 1976; folder Republican Platform—1976: Platform Committee Negotiations [2]; Box 23; Michael Raoul-Duval Papers; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[17]Letter; Henry C. Cashen II to Michael Duval; 14 July 1976; folder Republican Party Platform: Catholic Issues; Box 27; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[18]Letter; Thomas Patrick Melady to William Baroody, enclosing memo to Dr. Myron B. Kuropas; 25 June 1976; folder Republican Party Platform: Issue Papers [1]; Box 28; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[19]Letter from Cashen to Duval, 14 July 1976.

because they became more ideologically extreme, but because they saw an opportunity to gain support for the party.

The Reagan administration agreed with this assessment, believing it was important to have clear differences between the parties on issues. Though members of the religious right were focusing their energies on Republican candidates by this time, they were more likely to become deeply involved in elections when candidates took different positions on abortion. A post-campaign memo notes, "We believe that pro-life campaign projects provided the winning increment in at least six 1980 Senate races in which pro-life Republicans faced pro-abortion Democrats."[20] This logic extended to special interests in the electorate. Abortion had the potential to bring Democratic identifiers across party lines, but this would only work if the parties took different positions on the issue.[21]

In sum, the incentives underlying politics changed substantially after the New Deal. As material incentives declined, the importance of purposive incentives rose. As we can see from looking at the Republican Party's orientation toward abortion, by the 1980s, elite members of the party in government are self-consciously using purposive incentives to bolster the party's competitive position. In a system of patronage, this would be much less likely. However, incentives alone cannot cause widespread polarization on issues. In addition to wanting to take positions, the parties need the ability to develop coherent policy programs. To this, we now turn.

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[20]Memo; To Robert J. Thompson; 11 July 1982; folder Pro-Life II [5]; Box OA9081 (13); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[21]Memo; Gary J. Bauer to Edwin L. Harper; 18 June 1982; folder Pro-Life—Continued—#2 [7]; Box OA9081, 9082 (14); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo; Gary L. Bauer to Edwin L. Harper; 18 May 1982; folder Pro-Life—Continued—#2 [7]; Box OA9081, 9082 (14); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo to Thompson, 11 July 1982.

4.5.2 Programmatic Capacity

Since members will not always agree on issues, parties must have mechanisms for managing internal conflict in order to take positions. Stronger party infrastructure was essential for the development of clear issue programs, according to major scholars of parties, like E.E. Schattschneider and Charles Merriam. The latter, writing in 1921, lamented that "on the side of organization for the consideration of party policies and party techniques [the party] is singularly defective."[22] Party leaders lacked, among other things, "the interchange of ideas regarding national or party politics."[23] APSA argued that the parties also needed greater research capabilities in order to move away from what they deemed a troubling degree of programmatic similarity between parties.

In a comprehensive history of American parties' responses to defeat in presidential elections from 1956 to 1993, Klinkner (1994) explains how both parties increased their programmatic capacity over this period. I will review a few of the institutions he discusses, and how they contributed to the development of party policy. Importantly, it seems quite unlikely that Schattschneider's "ghost parties" could have supported this kind of activity.

The Democratic Party. Paul Butler, DNC chairman from 1954 to 1960, took the APSA report very seriously, and endeavored to increase the party's attention to policy positions. His "initial effort to locate policy development within the DNC" arose in 1955, with the establishment of the Democratic Advisory Committee on Agriculture (Klinkner 1994: 20-1). The next year, he added three more committees for labor, small business, and natural resources. The most important fruit of this effort to increase the national

[22] APSA Report: 40, citing Merriam 1921, Merriam and Gosnell 1949.

[23] APSA Report: 40, citing Merriam 1921, Merriam and Gosnell 1949.

committee's responsibility for policy came after the 1956 election, with the creation of the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) "to coordinate and advance efforts in behalf of Democratic programs and principles."[24] This was novel, as Klinkner notes, "Though the party conventions have always played an important role in drafting party platforms, the national party organizations, whether in or out of power, have made little effort and have had even less success in developing party policy" (Klinkner 1994: 12). Instead, the party committees were typically focused on securing patronage for state parties (Klinkner 1994: 13). Policy development normally happened in the White House for the presidential in-party, and in Congress for the presidential out-party.

Butler asked twenty people to join the DAC. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, almost none of the invitees had machine ties. Four had already achieved national-level prominence (Harry Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and presidential candidates Adlai Stevenson and Averell Harriman). Of the 15 members of Congress invited, all but one (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee chairman Michael Kirwan) represented states or districts in states with low TPO scores (either 1 or 2). The final invitee was Saint Louis mayor Raymond Tucker. While this certainly does not prove that patronage depresses issue politics, it is worth noting that 18 of the 20 people asked to join the DNC's first major policy initiative were *not* associated with machine politics, and one of the two remaining invitees held a leadership position in the national party.

The DAC was controversial—not everyone who was invited agreed to join. Some were concerned that Republicans, whose votes were necessary to pass bills in a Congress with low party discipline, would be reluctant to support policies originating in a DNC body (Klinkner 1994: 23). Others worried about upsetting members of Congress, whose authority could be undermined by an external policy body like the DAC. This was a

[24] Quoted in Klinkner 1994: 22.

major reason why Congressional leaders declined participation. Despite these qualms, the Council held its first meeting on January 4, 1957. The DNC stressed the importance of a year-round operation, stating in a resolution, "The recent election proves the virtual impossibility to have party policy formulated and generally accepted in the brief period from the opening of the Democratic National Convention to the General Election. We can win in 1960 only if we begin now to hammer out a forceful, coherent policy and to keep communicating it to the public."[25] By May 1957, they established eight committees for different issue areas: foreign policy, economic policy, civil rights, urban and suburban policy, labor, farm policy, health policy, Social Security, natural resources, and science and technology (Klinker 1994: 25). In its last year of operation, the DAC's budget of $123,400 represented 15% of the DNC's total budget (Klinkner 1994: 26). James Sundquist described the Council as part of an "activist triangle," along with the two chambers of Congress.[26]

While opposition from Republican President Dwight Eisenhower and conservative Democrats in Congress squelched many of the DAC's policy proposals, it still contributed greatly to the party's legislative program. Klinkner (1994) notes, "Despite the lack of short-term success, the DAC did help to make many of these proposals a part of the Democratic agenda and to help ensure their passage during the New Frontier-Great Society Era" (Klinkner 1994: 38). There were some important shorter-term triumphs too. For example, the Democratic Advisory Committee on Agriculture's proposed policy on raising farm price supports was included in the party's 1956 platform. The Council also provided a forum for discussion of economic policy, a site of considerable intra-party disagreement (Klinkner 1994: 29-33). Perhaps most

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[25]Quoted in Klinkner 1994: 25.

[26]Sundquist 1968: 411, cited by Klinkner 1994: 38.

notably, the DAC played an important role in the development of the party's more aggressive and liberal stance on civil rights. The Council spoke out during the Little Rock school crisis in 1957, earning significant media attention for criticizing Eisenhower's response. This kind of action was notable, as DNC press secretary Samuel Brightman remarked: "At the time of the Little Rock school crisis, there was nobody in Congress who was getting any headlines or anybody saying that the Democratic Party was in favor of integration, which was going to be pretty important in the '58 election, until the Democratic Advisory Council put out a statement" (Klinkner 1994: 36-7). This was not the end of the story, however; the Council's actions and influence extended beyond the immediate crisis. Klinkner argues, "Later statements by the council also helped to move the party away from moderation on racial issues. Though the 1960 Democratic platform, as James Sundquist points out, went further on civil rights than the DAC had advocated, the council still played an important role in making such a stand acceptable, even required, by the party. It therefore seems accurate to agree with one historian's assessment that the civil rights plank of 1960 'was a remarkable tribute to the DAC' " (Klinkner 1994: 37).

Klinkner argues that the DAC was possible because the presidential and congressional wings of the party lined up with the party's ideological schism, with liberals controlling the DNC and conservatives in Congressional leadership positions. These factions supported different party strategies following Eisenhower's re-election in 1956, so it might have been more difficult for the DNC to take a strong lead on issue politics if they had to accommodate both factions. While this may be true, it is also important to note that a group like the DAC requires a degree of organizational maturity that was not present earlier in the 20th century. A national committee without a permanent headquarters or staff could not have support this type of council. And an ad

hoc group of party members who got together once or twice a year would have difficulty asserting the kind of influence that the DAC did.

The Republican Party. The RNC's policy program-building efforts began a bit later than the DNC's. The Republican Coordinating Committee (RCC) was established in 1965, following a landslide defeat of the party's prickly presidential aspirant, Barry Goldwater. Over the previous few years, Goldwater's supporters had largely taken control of the RNC, to the distress of more moderate Republicans. Led by the chairman of the RNC, a group of Republican governors, other party leaders, and RNC members hoped to bring the party back toward the center. Its initial statement of purpose read: "The Republican Coordinating Committee was created (1) to broaden the advisory base on national party policy; (2) to set up task forces to study and make recommendations for dealing with the problems that confront the people of our nation; and (3) to stimulate communication among members of the party and others in developing a common approach to the nation's problems" (quoted in Klinkner 1994: 84). To this end, the RCC established a number of task forces on different issues, ranging from foreign relations to fiscal and monetary policy to senior citizens. This was quite novel for the RNC, which had been focusing primarily on purely organizational developments.

The RCC differed from the DAC in a few key ways. First, congressional leadership played a meaningful role in the RCC. This was not the case for the DAC, which represented the liberal wing of the party, and typically opposed the more conservative congressional wing. More broadly, Klinkner notes that the RCC "strove to achieve unity within the party rather than to advance the programmatic goals of one faction of the party" (Klinkner 1994: 85). Consequently, the RCC was not as "hard hitting" or provocative (Klinkner 1994: 85).

Despite this, and the fact that it only lasted until 1968, the RCC contributed significantly to the formation of party policy. Klinkner argues, "The RCC . . . provided an internal forum for discussion between party factions and thereby helped to unify a badly divided party" (Klinkner 1994: 85). Its research efforts were also valuable, as it "produced a steady flow of reports and statements spelling out constructive, if not exciting, Republican positions on issues and criticisms of the Johnson administration" (Klinkner 1994: 85). During this time, the RNC also bolstered its own research division, producing 116 major reports on various topics between 1965 and 1968—over 100 more than the number produced over the previous three years (Klinkner 1994: 85-86).

Chairman Bill Brock resumed and intensified these kinds of efforts during the Ford administration through the Republican Advisory Councils (RACs). Ford, a "key architect" of the RCC, wanted a new iteration of that organization (Klinkner 1994: 147). He was not alone—others in the party also thought it was time for the RNC to take a more active role in policy development. Klinkner reports, "According to Roger Semerad, an associate of Brock's who later became director of the RNC's policy councils, both he and Brock discussed the need for a 'serious and substantive vehicle' for policy discussion within the party. Such a policy group would bring various points of view into a 'common working environment' with the intention of providing the party with a coherent policy statement for the 1980 campaign" (Klinkner 1994: 148). They began by establishing advisory councils for five issue areas in 1977 with a total budget of $100,000, a small staff, and four hundred members.

As planned, these meetings had major consequences for party policy. Many members of the RACs also served on the 1980 platform committee, most notably Roger Semerad, who was director of the former and executive director of the latter. The council's contributions were not simply rhetorical, however; they also extended into the

policymaking process. The concept of "supply-side economics," perhaps Ronald Reagan's most notable legacy, was introduced to a broad range of party members through the Advisory Council on Economic Affairs. Through interviews and archival research, Klinkner finds that supply-side economics was "perhaps the most important idea to gain acceptance in the Republican Party through the advisory councils" (Klinkner 1994: 149).

Like the DAC, the RCC and RACs were products of stronger party infrastructure. It would have been very difficult for a non-continuous party organization to support these kinds of long-term efforts at issue development. They needed money, staff, and other resources that the paltry national organizations of the early twentieth century could not have provided. The history of these councils also shows that major issue positions do not simply appear—they require work and compromise, which a strong national party organization can facilitate.

4.6 Conclusion

The nationalization of the party system since the New Deal has had major consequences for political competition, specifically the status of issue politics. This has, in turn, given the parties both the desire and capacity to develop alternative issue programs. In sum, as Schattschneider argued, it appears that decentralized, patronage-driven parties were in fact depressing issue competition. Once this began to change, the parties slowly moved away from "issueless" politics. What Schattschneider did not anticipate, however, was the degree to which activists aided this process of national party-building. This is the subject of my final empirical chapter.

Party	Organization	Founded	Members
D	National Democratic Club	1834	1,200
D	Democratic National Committee	1848	390
R	Republican National Committee	1856	165
R	National Republican Congressional Committee	1866	50
D	Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee	1882	51
R	College Republican National Committee	1892	100,000
D	Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee	1916	0
R	National Republican Senatorial Committee	1916	
R	Women's National Republican Club	1921	900
D	Women's National Democratic Club	1922	1,500
R	Young Republican National Federation	1931	50,000
D	College Democrats of America	1932	80,000
D	Young Democrats of America	1932	100,000
D	Young Democratic Clubs of America	1932	60,000
R	National Federation of Republican Women	1938	115,000
R	Bull Elephants	1951	200
R	National Republican Club	1951	4,000
D	Democratic Study Group	1959	
R	Ripon Society	1962	10,000
R	House Wednesday Group	1963	39
D	Democrats Abroad	1964	
R	National Teen Age Republican Headquarters	1965	100,000
R	National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council	1968	60

Table 4.2: **List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 1).** This table lists party-related organizations in order of their founding. The far right-hand column shows each organization's membership as of 1997. *Source: data from the Encyclopedia of Associations, 1997*

Party	Organization	Founded	Members
D	Association of State Democratic Chairs	1969	114
D	National Federation of Democratic Women	1972	300,000
R	National Black Republican Council	1972	25,000
R	National Congressional Club	1972	200,000
R	Republican Presidential Task Force	1974	7,000
R	New Leadership Fund	1976	
R	Republicans Abroad International	1977	1,000,000
R	Log Cabin Republicans	1978	10,000
D	Conservative Democratic Forum	1980	55
R	Republican Congressional Leadership Council	1980	300
R	Republicans Abroad	1980	
D	Business Leadership Forum	1981	850
D	Fund for a Democratic Majority	1981	200,000
D	New Democratic Dimensions	1981	2,000
D	American Democratic Political Action Committee	1982	
R	National Federation of Cuban American Republican Women	1982	350
D	National Rainbow Coalition	1984	13,000
R	Republican Mainstream Committee	1984	
D	Democratic Leadership Council	1985	400
R	National Jewish Coalition	1985	5,000
D	Presidential and Democratic Party Victory Fund	1987	
R	Republican Liberty Caucus	1987	600
D	Arab American Leadership Council	1989	250

Table 4.3: **List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 2).** This table lists party-related organizations in order of their founding. The far right-hand column shows each organization's membership as of 1997. *Source: data from the Encyclopedia of Associations, 1997*

Chapter 5

Reviving Republicans: Party-Building Through Groups

Changes in electoral competition will not necessarily affect both parties equally. In the mid to late twentieth century, the parties were in very different competitive positions. While there were several Republican presidents over this period, the party struggled in Congressional elections. As Galvin (2010) has demonstrated, even Republican presidents—electorally victorious in their own right—viewed their party as the minority party in the mid to late twentieth century. This motivated Republican presidents to use the stature and resources of their position to bolster their party's infrastructure and, consequently, its long-term competitiveness, while Democrats ignored (and sometimes "preyed" upon) their party until Bill Clinton's second term, when Republicans gained control of Congress (Galvin 2010). In this chapter, I build on Galvin's narrative by showing groups' utility in the party-building process. Despite Schattschneider's concerns that groups would feed on party weaknesses, I find they were instrumental in Republican party-building, and, by extension, the development of a more competitive two-party system.

To show how and why group-party relations evolved, this chapter examines the party in government's orientation toward groups from the Nixon administration through the Reagan administration. I begin with Nixon because group-party relations in government began to change during his tenure. This essentially amounts to a history of the Office of Public Liaison, an executive institution established formally in 1974 to manage relationships with groups. I consult archival documents gathered at the Presidential libraries of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan to gain insight into what parties were hoping to gain by drawing on groups, what they feared, and what benefits they ultimately received.

Evaluating differences between parties is tricky, since Jimmy Carter is the only Democratic president to serve during this period.[1] Nevertheless, we can see that group-party relations looked quite different—specifically, more pluralistic—under Carter than under his Republican counterparts. While the Carter administration was primarily interested in using groups to build coalitions around specific pieces of legislation, Republican administrations endeavored to build a broad new coalition to compete with the long-dominant New Deal Democrats. In this pursuit, movement away from pluralistic relations carried significant efficiency benefits.

Strategic concerns about electoral competitiveness—not ideology—drove these changes in group-party relations. Of course, the increase in special interest partisanship resulting from the evolution of group-party relations may have ideological consequences. It may have resulted in more divergent party platforms, and attracted more ideological extremists to party politics. Yet, the origins of these changes were distinctly non-ideological. Changes in special interest partisanship, I argue, were reasoned adaptations to an evolving electoral environment.

They were also driven largely by agents within the parties, not activists. This chapter shows members of the party in government, sometimes in conjunction with the party as organization, making self-conscious choices to change their relationship with groups in order to increase efficiency and bolster electoral competitiveness. While it might be too much to say that parties drove the growth of special interest partisanship unilaterally, they were, at the very least, active participants in this process. Polarization—like other changes in special interest partisanship—did not happen *to* parties. This was, I argue, an endogenous transformation of the American party system.

[1] I visited the Clinton Presidential Library, but was not able to collect many materials because very little has been processed for research so far.

5.1 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974

The Nixon administration represents a transitional period for the relationship between groups and parties in government, which Pika notes "had been unsystematically scattered among staff members during the presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt through Lyndon B. Johnson" (Pika 2008: 2). Until the Nixon administration, "staff members assumed liaison responsibilities as the White House figured out who might have enough personal knowledge to deal with issues as they arose" (Pika 2008: 3). White House aide Bryce Harlow suggested formalizing group-party relations in the later years of the Eisenhower administration, but it was not until he served as an assistant for legislative affairs and counselor to Richard Nixon that his advice led to action. Gerald Ford, then-minority leader, also recommended establishing an office in charge of group liaison (Pika 2008).

While Nixon did not establish a formal, dedicated office, he agreed to intensify White House interaction with groups. He granted most of this responsibility to Charles Colson, a boisterous and controversial Special Counsel to the President who would later serve a prison sentence for his role in the Watergate scandal. Though more significant than preceding liaison, Colson's operation was still relatively small and informal. He had a staff of ten to twelve assistants, but the operation was much more of a one-man show than its successors. Moreover, group liaison was not Colson's only responsibility—he was also involved with the Committee to Re-elect the President, and performed many miscellaneous tasks for Nixon.[2] Still, Colson's operation represented a significant centralization of group liaison, which mirrored proposed changes in the

[2] Charles Colson, Video Oral History Interview, 17 August 2007, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

Republican National Committee.[3]

In a November 1969 memo to Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, Colson describes the proposed purpose of his new project. The starting mission was "to understand, organize and draw upon the resources of the domestic political substructure and to further the President's objectives and policies through direct contact and interchange with specific groups of all kinds."[4] A "primary function" of his office would be to "identify and record information about all major domestic groups and organizations which have specific definable concerns." In particular, he wanted to catalogue their "aims and policies," their "political strengths and resources," and their relationship with executive agencies and previous administrations. The fact that this was a primary function illustrates just how little they knew about the group universe at this time. His office would also keep track of how the Nixon administration was faring with respect to these groups.

In addition to gathering information, Colson also planned to build relationships with groups. This process would begin with "develop[ing] contacts and 'friends' in various special interest groups." Acting as a "sounding board" for their concerns would help the White House anticipate problems, and involving them in policy discussions would make them feel included even if they did not actually affect the decision-making process. These relationships could then become "resources" that the White House could "activate" (an earlier handwritten draft uses the term "exploit") "in support of the

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[3]Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General and H.R. Haldeman; 21 January 1971; folder Republican National Committee [7 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection: Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[4]Memo; C.W. Colson to H.R. Haldeman; 6 November 1969; folder HRH Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [2 of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

President's positions."[5] This was not a reaction to pressure from groups; it was, as Colson summarized in a 2007 oral history, a proactive effort "to mobilize constituencies around the country—all kinds, every kind—in order to build public support for the President's policies."[6]

Some parts of Colson's plan developed as designed. A March 3, 1970 memo from Colson and Ken Cole, Director of the White House Domestic Council, to H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, notes, "We have taken great pains in the last few months to establish an organization through which the President could achieve better coordination and faster action on domestic issues."[7] Over the course of Nixon's first term, however, they focused more on electoral coalition building than legislative coalition building. As we will see, this is not true of some of his successors. The Ford and Carter administrations, for example, dedicated a lot of time and resources to building support for the President's policy agenda.

This is not especially surprising, as the late 1960s and early 1970s represented a time of great electoral change in American politics. Following the civil rights struggles and victories of the fifties and sixties, the South transitioned from a one-party Democratic stronghold to a two-party region of Republican dominance. Moreover, African-Americans were included in elections in a meaningful sense for the first time in history, women were emerging as a more unified, independent voting bloc whose partisan position was not yet clear, and traditionally Democratic white Irish-, Polish- and

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[5] Handwritten notes; folder HRH Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [1 of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[6] Video Oral History Interview with Charles Colson, 17 August 2007.

[7] Memo; Ken Cole and Chuck Colson to Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman; 6 March 1970; folder HRH Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [1 of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

Italian-Americans appeared to be reconsidering their partisan loyalties. As traditional party bases loosened, the Nixon administration endeavored to figure out what a 1972 winning coalition—and a longer-term Republican coalition—might look like.

While they communicated with organized groups to some degree, they also worked to build relationships with special interests in the electorate themselves. They wanted to appeal to specific voting blocs, but worried about depending too much on organized groups whose reliability they questioned. A good example of this strategy was the "voter blocs" effort, a joint project of the White House and the Committee to Re-elect the President leading up to the 1972 election.[8] The Committee believed they could win a potentially tight election by "focusing attention on important blocs with common characteristics." At the national level, the Committee identified nine groups to which they could make "specific appeals," and planned "a concerted effort . . . to appeal to individuals on the basis of their membership in the group." Each group had its own Washington-based staff to "represent the interests of their constituency in overall campaign strategy." The director of each constituency staff team would also "represent the campaign's interests with White House and Executive Branch units that affect his constituency." CRP encouraged State Chairmen to adopt similar efforts "to generate volunteers for . . . the fundamental campaign activities of registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote."

The Women's Surrogate Program is another example.[9] Eight teams of three

[8]Draft presentation with notes; Notes on Voter Blocs and Voter Bloc Presentation; folder Voter Bloc Presentation; Box 30; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[9]This program was implemented. Memo; Barbara Franklin to Clark MacGregor through Fred Malek and Jeb Magruder; 12 October 1972; folder Women's Surrogate Program [2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection: Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

women—generally wives of White House staffers, Cabinet members, Governors, Senators or Congressmen—would travel to key states to "persuade women to vote for Richard Nixon" and "demonstrate the visible, active involvement of women in the Nixon Administration and campaign."[10] Organized groups were not involved with this plan; as in the "voter blocs" effort, the party in government was attempting to communicate directly with women in the electorate.

This strategy had limitations, however. Despite their reservations about group liaison, the administration valued organizations' publicity capabilities. Parties in government need to advertise themselves, their positions, and their accomplishments. A March 1971 RNC memo notes, "Since we cannot depend upon the news media to convey our story accurately and fully, we must communicate with the voters in a variety of ways, including direct mail; television, radio and newspaper advertising; speakers; and the like."[11] Groups could assist these efforts by sharing some of the costs and offering access to their networks, which were often larger than the party's.

Cost was a significant issue for Republicans during Nixon's first term, as the RNC found itself in "serious financial difficulty" leading up to the 1972 election.[12] In December 1971, Jeb Magruder of CRP reported to the Attorney General that, "After the 1968 Campaign, the Finance Chairman announced that the campaign was financially

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[10]Memo; Barbara Franklin to The Honorable Clark MacGregor through Jeb Magruder and Fred Malek; 18 August 1972; folder Women Surrogate Program (PP) [1 of 2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Draft proposal; Proposal for Women's Surrogate Program; 18 August 1972; folder Women Surrogate Program (PP) [1 of 2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[11]Memo; Thomas B. Evans, Jr. to Jeb S. Magruder; 17 March 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [5 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[12]Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General; 16 December 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [1 of 10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

solvent. However, what he thought to be a handsome surplus, turned out to be a large deficit which we are still trying to liquidate."[13] They sold the RNC airplane, reduced their staff, froze salaries of all employees making over $10,000, and postponed payment on many bills as they paid off debt accumulated in the 1968 and 1970 campaign cycles.[14] By the end of 1971, their debt was expected to reach $2.4 million, and $1.2 million of their $6.9 million budget for that year was earmarked for debt payment.[15] Though the situation improved significantly by the end of 1972, it was still a period of significant cost consciousness.

Because communication expenditures were "the major cost item in the [RNC] budget," a November 1971 memo argued they needed to "develop some controlls [sic] and budgetary objectives in this area."[16] A line item budget for June 1971 shows their monthly postage expenses ($43,000) were more than their rent ($18,000), airline ($4,000), employee benefits ($5,700) and professional fees ($7,770) expenses combined—second only to salaries ($166,000) as their highest single expense.[17] Overall, 19% of the 1971 RNC budget was slated for communications, and $193,000 of the $983,404 budgeted for Nixon's re-election was allocated for television, radio and promotional video.[18] The

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[13]Memo; Barry Mountain to Tom Evans; 10 June 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [4 of 10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[14]Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.

[15]Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to Attorney General; 22 June 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [6 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.

[16]Memo; Jon M. Huntsman to Gordon Strachan; 19 November 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [3 of 10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[17]Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.

[18]Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.

communications division of the RNC was responsible for direct mailing (both the mailing itself and the maintenance of distribution lists) as well as RNC publications like its weekly *Monday*, monthly *First Monday*, and miscellaneous promotional materials. The communications division was also responsible for "develop[ing] new programs to bring members of American ethnic and minority groups and senior citizens into the Republican party" and "advis[ing] Chairman Dole on the interests and problems of American ethnics, senior citizens, blacks, agriculture and labor."[19] These duties overlapped Colson's, and there was frequent communication—if not always cooperation—between the two offices.

Building relationships with groups could help them control costs in this area. Taking out a single page ad in three Catholic newspapers in New Jersey with a combined circulation of 173,700 was estimated in March 1972 to cost $2,590.[20] If the President met with Catholic leaders, however, Catholic newspapers across the country would cover the meeting for free. In scheduling such meetings, Colson's office made sure to "be alert to groups the President can receive, who have the will to publicize their reception."[21]

In addition to sharing costs, groups could also offer access to their networks, some of which were larger than the party's. While the RNC's weekly publication, *Monday*, went out to 45,000 people, the National Council of Senior Citizens' publication, *Senior Citizen News*, boasted a circulation over 2.5 million people.[22] *Modern Maturity*, a

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[19]Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.

[20]Budget Recommendations to Nelson Gross for the Catholic Campaign; folder Citizens—Catholic Vote [1 of 2]; Box 27; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers: Series III: Citizen Groups; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[21]Memo; George T. Bell to Charles W. Colson; 19 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[22]Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971. Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Chuck Colson; 28 February 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject

magazine published jointly by the American Association of Retired People (AARP) and the National Retired Teachers Association (NRTA), circulated to 1.8 million people.[23] Another source puts AARP's publication circulation at 3.5 million.[24] Even these were modest compared to the Catholic press, which was estimated to reach 50 million people.[25] These numbers were extraordinary not only in comparison to *Monday's* circulation, but also the RNC financial base. In 1977, for example, the RNC had approximately 300,000 contributors—a significant achievement, but still a small network in comparison to those available to other groups (Klinkner 1994: 139).

The nature of groups' reach also had value. A goal of the 1972 campaign was to make communication with the electorate more selective—a "rifle shot approach" as opposed to a "shotgun approach."[26] While the RNC was developing its own ability to do this, special interest publications allowed the party to communicate easily with specific parts of the electorate at little to no cost. They provided, in many ways, a major shortcut for party-building.

Knowing their value, group leaders could use their communications capabilities as currency with the administration. For example, in exchange for a public statement supporting a social security increase and "urging the states not to ignore the very real

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Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[23]Letter; Cyril F. Brickfield to Charles W. Colson; 23 January 1970; folder American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association; Box 31; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[24]Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Fred Malek; 24 May 1972; folder Citizens—Older Americans [6 of 8] II; Box 33; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers: Series III: Citizen Groups; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[25]Handwritten Notes; 17 March 1972; folder Citizens—Catholic Vote [1 of 2]; Box 27; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers: Series III: Citizens Groups; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[26]Memo from Evans to Magruder, 17 March 1971.

problems just because Congress did," National League of Senior Citizens leader Bill Forst promised to "give the positive aspects of the President's 'aging program' front page coverage from now until the election, include special articles which various departments write concerning their programs benefiting the elderly," and put a picture of himself with the President on the front page of the League's publication, which had a circulation of 150,000. This offer was especially significant for Nixon, since the group was traditionally "Democratically-oriented."[27]

Communication was not groups' only value. They contributed information to the party in government as well. For example, the National Women's Political Caucus gathered information on candidates (both Democratic and Republican) running in the 1972 elections, and Colson's operation turned to groups—often grudgingly—for information on special interests in the electorate. Groups also helped them find people, particularly women, to appoint for positions within the administration.[28]

As with communication, they often tried to perform these tasks on their own. They did not want to rely too much on organizations whose credibility they could not assure. At Colson's request, in early 1972, the White House planned to conduct its own public opinion survey of older Americans. The aim was clear, as an interoffice memo from Bud Evans, liaison to groups concerned with aging issues, to the Committee to Re-elect the President's Deputy Director Fred Malek notes, "Hopefully, this survey will allow us to get away from relying on what organized older Americans' organizations

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[27]Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Charles W. Colson; 7 August 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[28]Memo; George T. Bell to Charles W. Colson; 18 August 1970; folder General Federation of Womens' Clubs; Box 67; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Memo; Fred Malek to Chuck Colson; 10 June 1971; folder [Barbara] Franklin—Memos; Box 29; Barbara Franklin Reference File—Office File; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

claim to be the opinion of the majority of older Americans, and will allow us to understand how the silent older people list their priorities. It may be that the results will agree with what organized groups have represented the opinions of older persons to be; or they may be substantially different. This has been a point that Colson has constantly brought up, and is one for which it is time we established an answer." Handwritten notes next to this section of the memo remark "good point" and "this is what prompted Bud and I to push for this poll."[29]

Their wariness of organized groups becomes especially apparent in their plans to create their own membership-based organization for older Americans. A January 1972 memo from Evans to Colson argues, "It is probable, but not absolutely certain, that a mass membership organization of older persons—properly controlled—should be created to provide an alternative to persons now joining existing associations."[30] Again reinforcing the importance of communication, Evans notes "a primary purpose of such a new organization would be control of comprehensive communications lines with those who call themselves 'older Americans.' " They also talked about creating other organizations to help recruit volunteers, build "effective and continuous Republican communication lines" with older Americans in the electorate, and "develop organized 'voices' in the field of aging which will reflect Republican points of view after the election." This was not a reaction to pressure from groups, or even older Americans in the electorate; rather, it was a proactive attempt to build the party.

Even in this effort, however, the Nixon administration recognized that they would not be able to completely avoid organized groups. Because their "most immediate need

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[29] Memo from Evans to Malek, 24 May 1972.

[30] Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Chuck Colson; 24 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

[was] defensive," they argued that "use of 'neutral' organizations—even when not totally reliable—should be considered, i.e., AARP, NARFE, others."[31] Though they hoped to "reestablish" the "Republican orientation" of AARP-NRTA, they were uncertain about whether or not this would be possible.

Sometimes they employed a mixture of approaches, working through groups and also attempting to appeal directly to special interests in the electorate. They used this "dichotomous" approach for labor, with different strategies for leaders and rank-and-file workers. Convinced that inroads were possible in the labor movement, the Nixon administration made significant efforts to improve their relationship with labor leaders. They attended an AFL-CIO convention, included labor on a list of groups receiving priority from the White House Office of Spokesmen Resources, and maintained frequent contact with them through Colson's operation.[32] Knowing this would be a difficult, long-term project, however, they engaged in simultaneous efforts to attract union members. Plans in this arena ranged from meeting with union members who won recognition to showing interest in baseball, football, "patriotic rallies" and other "hard hat type activities" that would help Nixon "[appeal] to them as 'gutsy, and a hard worker.' "

There were good reasons to believe Republicans could make progress with this traditionally Democratic constituency. At the rank-and-file level, there were large overlaps between labor and other special interest groups like Catholics and white

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[31] Memo from Evans to Colson, 24 January 1972.

[32] Memo; Stephen Bull to H.R. Haldeman via Dwight L. Chapin; 16 December 1971; folder Scheduling Objectives Quarterly Reports: Presidential Scheduling [1971-72]; Box 4; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Stephen B. Bull; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Memo; Patrick E. O'Donnell to Charles W. Colson; 9 February 1972; folder Peter Flanigan; Box 7; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Memoranda File; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

immigrants who seemed to be loosening their traditional identification with the Democratic Party. Democratic machine bosses were "becoming less important," and many whites were unhappy about changing race relations, and particularly outraged over the prospect of busing to facilitate school desegregation.[33]

Overall, Colson's work was significant because it centralized liaison for the first time. The Nixon administration was thinking about the electorate in terms of groups, which makes sense given the diversification of the electorate during this era. Though they had reservations about depending too much on organized groups, the administration did see some value in drawing upon them for help. Colson's operation, though relatively small, provided an important building block for the expansion of group-party relations under Ford. The administration's discussions also reveal concerns about incentive alignment and information reliability—two problems that can be addressed by changes in organizational structure (i.e., expanding the firm). Nixon's successor increased the level of structure in group-party relations, moving into the zones of routinization and cooperation.

5.2 The Ford Administration, 1974-1977

When Gerald Ford assumed the presidency after Nixon's resignation in 1974, he institutionalized and widened relations with groups by establishing the Office of Public Liaison (OPL). William Baroody, who assumed Colson's duties after his resignation during the Nixon administration, would direct this new office. Baroody's appointment tells us something about the office's purpose and place in the broader development of

[33]Memo; Charles Colson to Ken Cole; 17 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.

conservative infrastructure, as he had strong ties to a prominent conservative think tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI was one of the initial institutions established during Republicans' long-term effort to build conservative intellectual infrastructure to rival the Brookings Institution and the university system, which they believed were dominated by Democrats (Phillips-Fein 2009).[34] Baroody's father founded AEI, and the younger Baroody returned there after his tenure at OPL.

From the outset, Ford's OPL was more ambitious than Colson's operation under Nixon, joining the Congressional Office, the Domestic Council, and the Press Office as one of the four "Major White House Links to America." FIGURE 5.1, taken from background materials on OPL, provides a good image of the office's intended place and function. The White House connected to the media through the Press Office, to state and local governments through the Domestic Council, to Congress through the Congressional Office, and now to the public through OPL. Certain business sectors already had regular communication with agencies, and OPL would offer the wider public similar opportunities. They identified 12,628 major organizations in the United States, and 1,326 with "special OPL emphasis." The latter category broke down as follows: consumer/environmental (243 organizations), Hispanic (163 organizations), minorities (100 organizations), youth (250 organizations), and women (295 organizations).

Communication between OPL and these organizations occurred in a few different ways. OPL provided a centralized "point of contact," serving "as a clearing house for communication directed to the White House on virtually every conceivable subject."[35]

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[34] Article; "White House Link to Outside: Baroody Builds an Empire," *Washington Star*; 23 February 1975; folder Office of Public Liaison [3]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[35] Notes; Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office; undated; folder Public Liaison Office—General [1]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.



Figure 5.1: **The Office of Public Liaison's Purpose.** This figure was part of the initial planning materials for OPL under William Baroody. *Source: Miscellaneous Planning Materials; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.*

Although this was not a small task—they received approximately 2,500 such contacts per week—it was not their main focus. Baroody did not want to be an ombudsman.[36] Internal correspondence suggests OPL was less concerned with listening and more concerned with persuading groups to support the president's programs. Ultimately, they hoped OPL would "establish for the President and his departments a 'floating coalition' in relationship to his governmental priorities and programs."[37] These benefits

[36]Interview; An Interview with William J. Baroody, Jr. Assistant to the President; November 1974; folder Public Liaison Office—General [2]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[37]Background material on the Office of Public Liaison; undated; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts;

could extend to the party as well. Special Counsel to the President Michael Raoul Duval's notes for a meeting with Ford and the Republican Platform Committee encourage the President to "indicate that the people back here will have the capability to turn on a lobby effort, if necessary, with special interest groups, Cabinet who are back here, etc." He proceeds to note, "This is a major resource that we should be prepared to take advantage of." This part of Baroody's operation is similar to Colson's before and Carter's afterward.

Ford's OPL was much more active than Colson's operation, however. The office was not simply reactive—they spent most of their time actively reaching out to groups.[38] Communicating with the public through groups provided significant efficiency gains. In a November 7, 1974 interview, Baroody defended Ford's group strategy. In a country with 214 million people, he argued, "a President attempting to use his time and the resources at his disposal to reach the broadest cross-section . . . it strikes us the best way is to do it this way: working through the organizations."[39] When asked if working through groups disadvantaged individuals, Baroody—in Tocquevillian spirit—noted that most people belong to at least one group. Working through groups provided a "systematic" way to reach the American people.

This was no easy task, however. To communicate effectively, the office first needed to know with whom they should be speaking. Part of OPL's job was to map out the special interest universe. An early memo to Ford promises that "within a relatively short time frame, we will be able to identify leaders of any segment of society in any

Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[38]Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.

[39]Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr.; 7 November 1974; folder Public Liaison Office—General [2]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.



Figure 5.2: **The Office of Public Liaison's Functions.** This figure, taken from initial planning materials, illustrates OPL's proposed functions. *Source: Miscellaneous Planning Materials; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.*

geographical area of the country within a few hours."[40] They then communicated with these groups during a series of routine meetings, which took four primary forms: Tuesday meetings with citizen groups ("Tuesdays at the White House"); Wednesday meetings with business groups ("Wednesdays at the White House"), White House Conferences on Domestic and Economic Affairs ("field conferences"), and miscellaneous meetings like State of the Union briefings. They supplemented these face-to-face interactions with other communications like mailings and periodic telephone and written correspondence. FIGURE 5.2 illustrates how they foresaw the value of these

[40]Memo; William J. Baroody to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

interactions.

"Tuesdays at the White House" were the most frequent, occurring weekly and lasting for two to three hours with an average of 70 people representing 35 organizations and 100 government actors representing 25 agencies or divisions at each meeting. These meetings were geared toward citizen groups, like veterans, minority groups, religious groups, women's groups, and volunteer organizations—what they called the "human resources segment of society."[41] OPL would bring together special interest representatives and government officials to encourage two-way communication about various issues like bilingual education, the 1976 defense budget, and housing. As Baroody noted in his presentation to the Cabinet, "The best decisions are those made with input and advise [sic] with those most familiar with the subject and those most affected by the decision that is made. Where strong feeling about a pending decision exists we feel that it is especially appropriate that the Public Liaison Office become involved."[42]

Gathering a diverse cross-section of groups interested in a particular policy facilitated not only party-group communications, but also group-group communications. Baroody believed that encouraging inter-group discussion could help them manage heterogeneous views. In a November 7, 1974 press conference, he argued "by putting labor, consumers and environmentalists in the same room talking about issues, you are also creating better dialogue and understanding among the various groups about the problems the other groups really face, and hopefully, if that process is carried on routinely, it is going to maximize the ability of making a major contribution to

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[41]Background material on the Office of Public Liaison; undated. Background material on 'Tuesday Meetings'; undated; folder Public Liaison Office—General [1]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[42]Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.

the public policy process."[43] This makes the government more of a moderator than an arbitrator, relieving some pressure stemming from increased heterogeneity in the population and growing societal and economic complexity.

Bi-monthly "Wednesdays at the White House" focused more on business-oriented groups like labor organizations, food processors, grocery manufacturers, heavy manufacturers, and business women. These meetings typically lasted for half a day and included an average of 20 people representing 20 organizations, and 41 government participants representing 30 agencies or divisions.[44] They tried to keep both Tuesday and Wednesday meetings small to facilitate communication. In contrast to Tuesday meetings, which focused on specific issues, Wednesday meetings were more general discussions of groups' interests. A government representative would usually start the meeting with a brief presentation on the administration's position on a particular issue, and the rest of the time was reserved for discussion.[45]

Field conferences were held across the country approximately twice a month, co-sponsored by OPL, regional, state and local organizations. These were different from Tuesday and Wednesday Meetings at the White House in many ways, beyond their location outside Washington. While Wednesday meetings focused on particular groups, and Tuesday meetings focused even more narrowly on particular issues, the White House Conferences included many different organizations like labor, community, business, and ethnic groups. The group to government personnel ratio was far larger than for Tuesday and Wednesday meetings, at around 700:9. These meetings were also open to the media, which took full advantage of the opportunity—an average of 400

[43]Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.

[44]Background material on the Office of Public Liaison, undated.

[45]Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.

media representatives in addition to the White House press corps requested credentials for each conference.

White House Conferences helped the administration communicate with special interests at a relatively low cost. Though Baroody's operation was more formal and ambitious than Colson's, it still operated with modest resources. They began with a staff of only six people, including Baroody and an administrative assistant, and a "very limited budget."[46] This was not a problem, Baroody argued in an interview, because groups shared many of their operating costs and did a lot of the work. Field conferences essentially belonged to these organizational co-sponsors, Baroody explained, "So, in terms of getting the hotel and putting the meeting itself on and the cost of that kind of thing, they are absorbed by the organizations."[47]

In addition to routine meetings and conferences, OPL also organized interactions with groups at important times. For example, they would hold briefings before and/or after major presidential addresses like State of the Union messages. There were also special meetings to discuss issues, as well as special commissions and public hearings.[48] After all meetings, Baroody wrote a detailed report for the administration, offering "an early-warning system—a key to what people are thinking at the grass roots. This is valuable in shaping executive actions and decisions and in determining the form and substance of our legislative proposals."[49] This report would go to the President and his advisors as well as people in the department or agency relevant to the issue at hand.

Reactions to OPL were mixed. To many, the office signaled a new responsiveness,

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[46]Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.

[47]Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.

[48]Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.

[49]Interview with William Baroody, November 1974.

or at least a new willingness to listen. The value of transparency was especially high after the Watergate and Pentagon Papers scandals, and many people lauded what appeared to be a more open door under Ford.[50] Some groups, like Catholic organizations, were pleased to gain access to the White House that they had not enjoyed for many years. Others were more skeptical of what *The New York Times* called a "public relations campaign that is unsurpassed by any in previous Administrations."[51] Echoing this sentiment, *The New Republic* referred to OPL as "Ford's Image Machine."[52] To these critics, OPL looked like a shameless attempt by an unelected incumbent to build a base leading up to the 1976 election. There was at least some truth to this—even Baroody referred to field conferences as "road shows."[53] Party infrastructure was thin, and Watergate had severely damaged public trust. Ford had only two years to rehabilitate his party's image and build himself a base before the general election. And before getting to that stage, he would have to face the formidable Ronald Reagan in a primary election. This gave him even less time; essentially, he needed to build a base immediately. In this light, it is not surprising that creating OPL was one of his first actions as President.

OPL's efforts appear to have been politically effective. They built new relationships with many groups, which brought some political benefits. Polls taken

[50] *See, e.g.,* Newspaper article; "Ford Tries to Run an 'Open' Shop," *The Denver Post*; 1 March 1975; folder Scrapbook Materials [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Newspaper article; "Mr. Clean in the White House," *The Miami Herald*; 23 February 1975; folder Scrapbook Material [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[51] Newspaper Article; "Selling of a President: Publicity Expands Under Ford," *The New York Times*; 17 March 1975; folder Scrapbook Material [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Newspaper article; "Selling Ford as right for job," *The Houston Post*; 18 May 1975; folder Public Liaison Office—General [4]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[52] Article; "Ford's Image Machine," *The New Republic*; folder Scrapbook Material [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[53] Memo; William J. Baroody, Jr. to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

before and after field conferences found that support for the administration increased by five to nine percent. Importantly, these increases did not only come from expected allies. Baroody notes, "These White House Conferences have been received favorably by not only our traditional supporters but especially by those who have had a past record of opposition to the Administration and to its policies. The [sic] have been a very successful tool in garnering confidence and therefore support."[54]

Whether OPL represented a base-building effort, a pure desire to regain people's trust in government and the Republican Party after Watergate, or something in between, it was a proactive attempt to build relations with groups—not a reaction to group pressure—and the motivation behind it was strategic, not ideological. Though OPL had many critics, few, if any, alleged that it was a response to pressure from groups. Many argued, as a *New York Times* headline did, that "Bill Baroody's Job is to Sell Ford's Policies to Leaders of Special Interest Groups," not that Ford was acquiescing to arm-twisting.[55] OPL was a party-building institution, consistent with other efforts to strengthen the party during this time.

Like other Republican presidents, who viewed their party as the minority, Ford was not only concerned about his own re-election, but also party fortunes over the long term (Galvin 2010). Many believed the party was in danger of extinction. Indeed, in a speech before the National Federation of Republican Women in September 1975, Ford warned that "America is truly on the road to one-party rule."[56] This is, of course,

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[54]Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.

[55]Article; "Question for Today: Is the Nation Ready to be 'Baroodied'?," *The Wall Street Journal*; 25 February 1975; folder Office of Public Liaison [3]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[56]Speech; Remarks of the President at the 18th Biennial National Federation of Republican Women's Convention; 13 September 1975; folder District of Columbia 9/17/76 National Federation of Republican Women Reception; Box 4; Gwen Anderson Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

rhetoric; but, it is very different rhetoric than we typically hear today. Highlighting the depth to which the party had fallen, Klinkner notes, "At the January 1977 meeting of the RNC, John East, then national committeeman and later senator from North Carolina . . . suggested that the Republican label had become an albatross and that the committee should consider changing the party's name" (Klinkner 1994: 134). East was not alone in these sentiments; prominent Senator Jesse Helms and even Ronald Reagan also discussed a potential name change (Klinkner 1994).

Saving the party would require building infrastructure, a project dating back to Eisenhower (Galvin 2010). In addition to gathering support for the President, one of OPL's other central objectives was to "improve communication between national and local leadership."[57] This is significant, as national parties were still in the process of building themselves into the strong, complex organizations we see today. Field conferences helped the party link national and local resources to benefit both. Local organizations were responsible for inviting people, allowing them to grant political access to people and groups of their choosing. This also helped the party, which would not necessarily know where to direct messages in different areas.

Just because Ford did not win the 1976 election does not mean institutionalized liaison was an unsuccessful party-building effort—the Republican Party survived a tumultuous period, despite Ford's loss to Carter. In fact, many of the seeds of the Republican ascendancy in the eighties and nineties were planted during this time. That OPL was a party-building entity does not make it insidious. As Schattschneider and other scholars have noted, parties are meant to serve the majority. Strengthening the party can enhance its ability to serve the population, as well as candidates. OPL met with a wide variety of groups throughout Ford's short presidency. Though some have

[57]Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.

questioned his motivations for engaging these groups, it is difficult to argue this was not a step forward in openness.

Regardless of Ford's intentions, OPL's creation marks an important moment in the history of group-party relations. In a May 1974 memo to Ford, Baroody argues that OPL "must be systematic enough to run smoothly [and] institutionalized enough to be recognized as essential."[58] Baroody is alluding to what we now call institutional stickiness. Even if the reasons for their creation fade, institutions tend to endure. As Schickler (2001) argues, it is common to build institutions on top of each other, but uncommon to eliminate them. This has certainly been the case for OPL. Presidents have used the office differently, and even changed the name; but, the institutionalization of group-party relations endured.

5.3 The Carter Administration, 1977-1981

When control of the presidency shifted from Ford to Carter, the Democratic Party was in a very different position than its adversary. Not only were Democrats less encumbered by the legacies of Watergate, but they had also enjoyed a long-standing majority in Congress. Consequently, long-term party-building was less of a concern for the Carter administration. While he maintained OPL, Carter used it very differently than his Republican predecessor and successor.

From the beginning, Carter's OPL was tied less closely to party politics than its predecessors. An early interoffice memorandum notes that "The Office of Public Liaison in the past served as a political arm of the President working closely with the Republican

[58] Memo; William J. Baroody to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

National Committee and—in the case of the Nixon years—with the Committee to Reelect the President."[59] This would no longer be the case under Carter. Rather, "In keeping with the President's directives and Margaret Costanza's personal approach to the office, the work of the Office of Public Liaison has become more substantive and the activities of the staff less partisan."[60]

While the office maintained its distance from the Democratic National Committee throughout Carter's tenure, it assumed quite different personalities under its two directors. There were essentially two OPLs under Carter. Under the direction of Midge Costanza, the first aimed to provide representation for groups in government. This often involved "symbolic interactions with groups, some of which, such as gay rights activists, had no previous White House access."[61] By communicating with "organized America," OPL would serve as the administration's "stethoscope on the nation's heartbeat."[62] As under Ford, they met with a wide range of groups, though they were particularly interested in less resourced organizations.[63] Costanza believed OPL could help open government to the underrepresented, offering access these groups would not normally have. Meetings would include OPL representatives as well as staff members from other parts of the White House and relevant agencies.[64]

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[59]Memo; 31 March 1977; folder [Public Liaison and Reorganization] 3/77-4/77 [O/A 4455]; Box 14; Costanza Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[60]Memo, 31 March 1977.

[61]Peterson 1992: 615, citing Kumar and Grossman 1984: 300, Pika 1985: 20.

[62]Memo; Ed [last name not specified] to Seymour [last name not specified]; 20 November 1977; folder Office of Public Liaison—Year-End Report to the President 11/77 [O/A 5772]; Box 7; Costanza Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[63]Brief Description; Margaret Costanza; folder Memos, 2/77-6/77 [0/A 4455]; Box 14; Costanza Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[64]Memo from Ed to Seymour, 20 November 1977.

This only lasted for fifteen months before the administration changed the office's direction, however. Costanza's replacement, Anne Wexler, was a political expert with significant campaign experience whose main objective was to use OPL to gather support for the President's legislative program. In a memo to Hamilton Jordan, Carter's Chief of Staff, Wexler emphasizes "the need for an *aggressive* and *sustained* program of constituency group contact."[65] The purpose of these efforts was not, as under Costanza, to offer access to groups. Rather, she argued, "Such a program is essential to the separate functions of policy development; the enlistment of public support for Presidential initiatives; and the ultimate expansion of our political base."[66] Over the next few years, OPL worked hard in pursuit of the first two goals. The third did not receive priority, and would in fact turn out to be a casualty of OPL's efforts in other areas.

Wexler's OPL did not completely abandon what she called "case work." As under Ford, there were still individuals responsible for maintaining relationships with different constituencies. The office had special assistants for blacks, Hispanics, women, senior citizens, consumers, environmental groups, and others. This was necessary, she argued, because special interest groups had an increasingly significant presence in Washington. It was important to be aware and "responsive."[67]

The administration thought it was important to separate operational and administrative functions in this area. The special assistants were responsible for handling routine communications and "day-to-day problems." Wexler and Jordan informed the assistants that they would "be expected to develop lists of organizations

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[65]Underline emphasis in original changed to italics. Memo; Anne Wexler to Hamilton Jordan; 13 July 1978; folder Public Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[66]Memo from Wexler to Jordan, 13 July 1978.

[67]Anne Wexler Interview, Exit Interview Project, 12 December 1980 <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/oralhist.phtml> ("Wexler Exit Interview").

and their leaders; maintain regular contact with the groups; and have intimate and up-to-date knowledge of their leadership and concerns."[68] They would also be responsible for conducting briefings on specific projects and general administration goals, and should "be in a position to periodically contact the groups to ascertain their positions on major policy pieces."[69] Like a manager in an M-Form corporation, Wexler then used the information she got from the special assistants to come up with broader strategies to build support for the President's agenda.[70]

Developing experts in group liaison was very useful in coalition-building. If, for example, Wexler thought women's groups could have a stake in a particular bill of interest to the President, she would go to Sarah Weddington, the special assistant to women, "and say 'Listen, I need help with women's groups' and she would provide me with the list and often organize the meetings. I would need to have these women get to work on whatever it was I needed them to work out."[71] Having special assistants in charge of different groups was, essentially, the political equivalent of organizing a firm by product. Just as companies facing rapidly growing markets felt it was more efficient to manage their businesses this way, the party in government felt it was easier and more productive to manage the proliferation of groups in Washington through an M-Form organization.

This arrangement also helped to control opportunism. While special assistants could be influential, in that the information and services they provided could be

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[68] Memo; Anne Wexler and Hamilton Jordan to White House Distribution List; 27 July 1978; folder Public Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[69] Memo from Wexler and Jordan to White House Distribution List, 27 July 1978.

[70] Anne Wexler Interview, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Carter Presidency Project, 12-13 February 1981 <http://millercenter.org/president/carter/oralhistory/anne-wexler> ("Wexler Oral History").

[71] Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

valuable, they had limited decision making power. Above these specialists was a "coordinator" whose job it was to "monitor contact, assess group needs in terms of the President's priorities, seek ways to make optimal use of established relationships, and insure maximum linkages to policy development, developing public support for issues and political action"[72] The coordinator would also screen requests for Presidential appearances at group events, help the Personnel and Political Coordination group with appointments, and "monitor such prizes as political appointments, invitations to White House functions and prenotification of Administration action."[73] In sum, the people who were responsible for developing relationships with groups were not the same people who controlled resources allocated to those groups. The coordinator, along with other higher level members of the President's staff, could look at the information provided by all of the special assistants and allocate resources in a manner deemed most beneficial for the administration as a whole.

Whether or not something was deemed beneficial depended largely on its potential to advance the President's legislative agenda. Wexler summed up OPL's job as building "campaigns on issues" and her job as "lobbying the lobbyists."[74] When faced with a new issue, they would begin by thinking through every group that could have a stake in it ("it is a far bigger group than you might think at the start"), and talk to many groups to figure out who would support the effort and who would oppose it.[75] This strategy would often result in a coalition of groups that would not normally work together. Yet, because they all had an interest in the issue and a part in its development,

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[72]Memo; Jane Wales to Anne Wexler; 6 July 1978; folder Public Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

[73]Memo from Wales to Wexler, 6 July 1978.

[74]Wexler Oral History, 1981. Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

[75]Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

she noted "when it came time for the vote they were fighting like the dickens for us. And that's when we were successful."[76]

This is not an entirely pluralistic group-party arrangement, since OPL was providing a certain degree of central power structure. However, it was a step back in the direction of pluralism. The office's relationships were broad, bipartisan, and constantly in flux. Indeed, Wexler reinforced the notion that allies and opponents were fluid, changing continually from one issue to the next. They tried to keep groups that opposed particular bills in the negotiations "and talk with them and reason and negotiate."[77] This did not always work, but it was still worthwhile in the long run, as it allowed OPL to go back to those groups for support on other issues.

Party weakness had a lot to do with this strategy. The DNC was not helpful in coalition building, according to Wexler. She recalled, "In the early days when we were having East Room briefings the political operation in the White House would insist that we call the desk people at the Democratic National Committee to get some names from them. And we did that a few times. But the desk person would call up some local person and say exactly what...they should not have said: 'Who do you know that would like to come to the White House?' They had absolutely no relation to the issue involved and we were constantly getting all these yo-yos would wouldn't help us at all! So, we quit doing it."[78]

Moreover, weak party discipline made constructing broad, bipartisan coalitions important and often essential. It was not easy for the President to get widespread support from Congress, even from members of his own party. Legislators were not

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[76]Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

[77]Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

[78]Wexler Oral History, 1981.

motivated by party, she recalled, but by what was in the bill for them.[79] Something that was important to Carter might not affect many Congressional districts. Wexler recalls, "The Congress was saying to the President, 'Show me that you have got enough support out there to earn my vote for this issue.' . . . They wanted it proven to them so that they could feel safe and secure in supporting him. That's what happens when you don't have any strong political system. Congress had no particular vested interest in doing that because it wasn't going to help them at home."[80]

As discussed in chapter three, groups can help the executive bargain with Congress. OPL staff was "putting together what would become a working coalition on the Hill to get legislation passed and at the same time a grass roots effort to support that working coalition on the Hill."[81] Through liaison efforts, Wexler stated, "We were then able, when necessary, to target grassroots efforts in particular Congressional districts or states or to call up 25 to go to the Hill because we needed their help with a subcommittee or full committee. Quite often we needed to do things like that."[82] They had a close, if not always smooth, relationship with the Congressional Liaison's office. Wexler describes the division of labor as follows: "They would be visiting Senators, counting votes, and bringing the vote counts back to us. In response, we would be deploying the interest groups to go back to Senator X or Senator Y to try to change their mind on a vote or shift them on an amendment. Literally, it was like a general moving an army around. Congressional Liaison would be moving out and finding out where concentrations

[79] Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[80] Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[81] Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.

[82] Wexler Oral History, 1981.

needed to be made, and then we would be moving the people to the designated areas."[83]

While Carter's pluralistic OPL may have been able to compensate for party weakness, at least in part, it did not help to correct this problem in the long-term. "It is not useful for political organizing and for building support around issues to have the ad hoc situation we had," Wexler stated, "In fact it is destructive, but I don't know how else you can do it." Building coalitions around issues "does not in any sense create a political base." Indeed, it can erode the party. By "pandering to interest groups," this strategy "makes them stronger and encourages them to divorce themselves a bit from their philosophical political party and say, in effect, 'My issue first, my party second.' "[84] She regretted "the destruction I wrought on the political parties for the last three years in order to try to get a job done for my President," and noted that "it's an issue that all of us in our leisure now are going to have to address in terms of the future of the political system as we know it in this country."[85] This is consistent with a wider pattern, discussed by Galvin (2010), of majority party presidents putting their own political goals ahead of party-building. With long-standing majorities in Congress, Democratic presidents tended to be much more concerned about policy, viewing success in this arena as key to their electoral success. Republican Presidents, in contrast, used their position to help build their party. Nowhere is this more clear than in OPL's transition from Carter to Reagan.

Even in the short-term, OPL's ad hoc strategy had some major drawbacks, most notably in terms of efficiency. The problem with creating coalitions by issue is that "you have to start from scratch on every single issue," Wexler noted, "You have to start all

[83]Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[84]Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[85]Wexler Oral History, 1981.

over again and reinvent the wheel every single time."[86] It also has implications for the nature of the president's legislative program. Some issues cannot easily be tied to clear constituencies, making them difficult to push under this kind of system. As Donald Kettl remarked during Wexler's oral history interview, "there are no chips to cash in from the past." OPL's "matchmaker role . . . tends to exclude some kinds of policies and makes other kinds of policies more costly, but in any case it is not neutral with respect to the outcome."[87] He also notes that the costliness of this process limits the scope of the President's agenda. In the absence of economies of scale, there is only so much the administration can reasonably take on. In the next administration, moving away from pluralistic relations with groups brought significant efficiency gains for Reagan.

5.4 The Reagan Administration, 1981-1989

Though many view him as the father of the modern conservative coalition, Reagan did not build it alone. His achievements added to the significant liaison foundation built by Nixon and Ford. Like Nixon, Reagan wanted to build a long-term winning coalition to compete with the Democratic leviathan forged during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidency. Watergate interrupted Nixon's efforts, which may explain why the modern conservative coalition is often dated back to Reagan. Looking back, Colson remarks regretfully, "but for Watergate I've always felt that what became known as the Reagan Democrats would have been the Nixon Democrats."[88]

Reagan's OPL was larger than Ford's and Carter's, with a staff of 18 (Pika 2009).

[86] Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[87] Wexler Oral History, 1981.

[88] Video Oral History Interview with Charles Colson, 17 August 2007.

Reagan maintained his predecessors' focus on group liaison, but the nature of liaison changed. Compared to Ford and Carter, Reagan's OPL held fewer meetings with large groups both inside and outside Washington. Whereas Ford established loose liaison with a wide range of groups, Reagan engaged in strong liaison with a relatively small number of groups. Based on responses to 1980 and 1985 surveys of organizations, Peterson finds the Reagan administration "had regular, ongoing interactions with a rather limited number of groups in the sample of membership organizations" (Peterson 1992: 617). He also finds that more conservative groups were more likely to enjoy access. Twenty-eight percent of very conservative groups enjoyed "frequent" access, compared to four percent of very liberal groups, and two-thirds of very conservative groups enjoyed "at least occasional access," compared to less than one-quarter of very liberal groups. This includes interaction with any part of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., OPL, the Office of Management and Budget, etc.).[89]

Under Reagan, the Republican Party partially internalized conservative Christian groups. In other words, instead of merely cooperating, they built these groups into the party's infrastructure. This represents an important moment in the history of group-party relations, as it marks the beginning of a long coalition that still exists today. While religious conservatives may be at the forefront of contemporary "culture wars," Republicans' decision to ally with them was not driven by ideological change. It was, in fact, a strategic party-building maneuver. This organizational innovation brought important efficiency gains in coalition-building. Reagan needed broad-based support for his economic program, the administration's chief concern, addressing social issues only when necessary to keep religious conservatives in the party's nascent coalition.

The administration was trying to build the party's infrastructure, creating a robust

[89]To measure ideology, Peterson uses responses to questions about federal service provision.

national network by strengthening links between national, state and local levels. Their vision of a strong party as a strong network distinguishes them from the Democratic Party at this time, whose thinking was more short-term (Galvin 2010). We can see the desire for network building in Reagan's decision to recruit Amway cofounder Richard DeVos as the party's finance chairman. The company became a multibillion-dollar enterprise by encouraging people to sell common household products to people they knew, and then encouraging those people to do the same. Reagan wanted DeVos to apply this business model to the Republican Party. Between January 1981 and August 1982, DeVos "fundamentally restructured the party's fund-raising apparatus and redoubled his commitment to nurturing small donors" (Galvin 2010: 123). This was not all about money, as DeVos's "main goal was to turn small donors into grassroots party activists on a mission for the Republican party" (Galvin 2010: 123). Reagan was correct about the value of this model, as the party raised over $30 million in 1981 and over $40 million in 1982—extraordinary numbers, considering the party's entire budget in 1971 was $6.9 million.

Special interest groups, particularly religious groups, had great value in this pursuit. Special Assistant and Deputy Chief of Staff Richard S. Williamson told Reagan that the National Right to Life Committee "is actually—like a major political party—a coalition of autonomous organizations."[90] In an interview with scholar Philip Klinkner, Ben Cotton, associate of RNC Chairman Bill Brock's, explained groups' value in the language of new institutional economics. Klinkner summarizes, "According to Ben Cotton, Brock and others on the RNC saw the evangelical churches as a 'distribution system' for disseminating Republican information and as an institution for mobilizing voters" (Klinkner 1994: 147).

[90]Memo; Richard Williamson to President Reagan; 21 January 1981; folder Right to Life; Box F026, F027; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

With strong infrastructure and communications capabilities, religious conservatives provided for Republicans what unions had long provided for Democrats: a solid grassroots network and coalition anchor. Business could provide money, but not volunteers or communication networks. Though their missions are clearly distinct, *structurally*, labor and religious conservatives are very similar. Both have large networks and frequent, regularized contact with their members. They also have a degree of power over their members not seen in many other groups.

Communication networks were often discussed in letters between members of Congress and the President, as well as inter-office memoranda.[91] In scheduling meetings with the President, OPL staff took special note of groups with a "strong national network" who were "adept at generating news."[92] Communicating with special interest organizations was more efficient than attempting to communicate with special interests in the electorate, as Ford had previously noted. In a letter to Reagan, Rep. Robert Livingston emphasized the "ability of these groups to marshall [sic] public opinion in support of [the President's] programs unaided by public media."[93]

This communication network's value was not just in its reach, but also its position outside mainstream media. As Trent Lott reminded Reagan in a letter urging him to meet with pro-family leaders, "these individuals have their own means of communication which bypass the usual media outlets," which Republicans viewed as

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[91]Letter; Trent Lott to The President; 21 May 1981; folder Pro-Family—1982; Box F008(11); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter; Stan Parris to President Reagan; 19 May 1981; folder Pro-Family—1982; Box F008 (11); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Suggested Invitees to Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political Clout; folder Conservatives—General; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[92]Suggested Invitees to Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political Clout.

[93]Letter; Robert L. Livingston to President Reagan; 8 June 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [2]; Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

left-leaning.[94] Senators Orrin Hatch and John East expressed similar sentiments, the latter with particular urgency. "Given the barrage of media criticism of your spending cuts, tax reduction and block grant proposals," he warned Reagan, "I am convinced that we need to reply with all of the forces we can muster."[95]

OPL agreed, noting that groups "provide an important multiplier effect through their communications networks at the state and local levels."[96] Pro-family activists "each have effective networks at their disposal" and "they are not only supporters of the President, they each feel it is their duty to educate and activate more people in the political process," notes Morton Blackwell, OPL liaison to religious groups.[97] Expressing a similar sentiment in a May 19, 1981 letter to Reagan, Rep. Stan Parris remarks, "I need not outline to you the communications capacity and demonstrated record of responsible activism that many of these [pro-family] individuals have developed over the years, nor the impact their support could have on the positions of the administration we are all trying so desperately to promote.[98]

The communications capabilities of gun rights groups and religious and pro-family groups were tremendous. Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell maintained a mailing list of more than five million names, and his Old Time Gospel Hour program aired to audiences between sixteen and thirty million on over 500 television stations

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[94]Letter from Lott to the President, 21 May 1981.

[95]Letter; Orrin Hatch to President Reagan; 28 May 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [1]; Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter; John P. East to President Reagan; 28 May 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [2]; Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter from Lott to the President, 21 May 1981.

[96]Proposal; 28 January 1982; folder Equal Rights Amendment [2]; Box F002, F003; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[97]Schedule Proposal; Meeting with "Pro-Family" Activists; 22 April 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [1]; Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[98]Letter from Stan Parris to President Reagan, 19 May 1981.

every Sunday, and daily programs on over 500 radio stations.[99] The Moral Majority's annual budget exceeded $60 million—two times the amount the Republican Party was able to raise in 1981, even after successfully adopting the Amway model. These audiences were not only large, they were also growing. In 1983, the Moral Majority's membership was increasing at a pace of 11,000 every month.[100] They were not alone, as notes in preparation for a 1983 meeting with Falwell state, "Virtually every group is in a period of rapid growth in terms of numbers, funding, and political expertise. All of these leaders have already decided that part of their role in life is to activate others in political processes." Clearly, special interest networks were able to contribute a significant volume of communication efforts.

Sometimes special interest group action could substitute for party action in beneficial ways. Because they are technically outside the party, groups can say and do things that the president or other party members could not without damaging their reputations. For example, in June of 1982, the administration was trying to decide what, if anything, they should say publicly about the expected fall of the Equal Rights Amendment. An interoffice memo by staffer Michael Ulmann suggests allowing their pro-family allies to handle this messaging for them. "With Phyllis Schlafly [leader of the conservative group the Eagle Forum] preparing to celebrate the end with victory parties and the like, and the specter of the fasting women, there will be media thrills a minute," he notes,"and I see nothing but disaster in having the President become the third ring in the circus."[101] Schlafly, who the administration recognized had "arguably the best

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[99]Memo; Morton Blackwell to Red Cavaney; 27 January 1983; folder Conservatives—General—1982 [6]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry Falwell; 14 March 1983; folder Moral Majority [3 of 9]; Box 9; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[100]Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry Falwell, 14 March 1983.

[101]Memo; Michael M. Uhlmann to Edwin L. Harper; 11 June 1982; folder Women's Strategy—January

national network of any conservative movement leader," would rally against the ERA and publicize its demise under Reagan, which would advertise the party's accomplishment in a way the party could not.[102] This spectacle could be associated with the party, gaining attention, without being attributed to the party, arousing criticism.

The party also drew on groups to help mount campaigns. While campaign donations are important, groups provide many other critical resources like volunteers and communication with the electorate. Support from business groups helped the party raise money, but corporations could not provide campaign labor. Organized labor provided these services to the Democratic Party beginning in the 1930s; however, for most of the twentieth century, the Republican Party had no similar support system. Part of Reagan's coalition-building involved constructing a corollary to organized labor within the Republican Party. This was especially important following changes to campaign finance laws, which increased the importance of small donors.

In some ways, this is simply an application of communications capabilities to campaigning. Private communication networks were especially valuable after changes to campaign finance laws, as groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) were allowed to undertake independent expenditures to communicate with their own members (as well as non-members).[103] Leading up to the 1980 election, the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action "sponsored a multi-media campaign for Reagan which included direct mail, magazines, tabloids, newspaper advertisements, radio spots, and

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1982-June 1982 [3]; Box F014; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[102] Suggested Invitees to a Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political Clout.

[103] Memo; Morton Blackwell to Elizabeth Dole thru Diana Lozano; 23 March 1982; folder Conservatives—General—1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

literature distribution at firearms exhibits and gun club gatherings."[104] The volume of campaign communication was substantial. They direct-mailed 629,377 letters "praising Gov. Reagan and castigating Pres. Carter" to members in Texas, California, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, as well as Life Members in other states. Another direct mail campaign distributed a chart on Reagan's positions to 1.6 million members. They also included two full-page ads, one endorsing Reagan and the other criticizing Carter, in *American Rifleman* and *American Hunter* magazines, which had a combined circulation of 1.8 million members.[105] The week before the election, they distributed 800,000 get-out-the-vote postcards in eighteen states where the election was expected to be tight.[106] These were not only communications—they were targeted communications. The people who received them were, for the most part, more likely to support Reagan than Carter.

Internalization enhanced the value of group networks by aligning group and party incentives, making groups more reliable coalition partners. When the fate of the group's agenda becomes linked to the party's electoral fate, the party needs to worry less about the group's dependability, as the Nixon administration often did. Just as increased production can lead a firm to expand vertically instead of simply outsourcing tasks, as they are no longer comfortable contracting out product distribution to wholesalers who also sell their competitors' products, so did the Republican Party want to assure that, as they expanded, they could rely on key communication networks to spread favorable messages. A network is also a specific asset, intended to activate a select group of people. When assets are non-transferable, at least not without a substantial loss in value,

[104]Memo from Blackwell to Dole, 23 March 1982.

[105]Memo from Blackwell to Dole, 23 March 1982.

[106]Miscellaneous; Administration Position on McClure-Volkmer Bill; folder Conservatives—General—1982; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

internalization provides security. In this light, the party's internalization of groups with significant networking capacities is unsurprising.

Internalizing groups carries many important advantages for the party. First, it keeps the campaign infrastructure in abeyance between elections. When the party needs to gear up for another election, it does not need to build a new coalition from scratch. Second, it makes groups more likely to support all party candidates, not just the most prominent ones. This is valuable even to the President, who needs Congressional support to push his agenda. Third, once their interests are aligned, groups are more likely to support the party on issues outside their own area. This is valuable not only because it helps to move the party's agenda forward, giving them support they might not otherwise have, but also because it increases legislative efficiency. With a long coalition in place, the party does not need to go out and build a new coalition every time it wants to pass the budget or push a piece of legislation, as Carter's OPL did.

We can see this efficiency in action throughout Reagan's tenure. Religious and gun rights groups provided a vital support system for Reagan's economic program.[107] Right before Reagan's economic package went to Congress, OPL Director Elizabeth Dole reinforced the importance of mobilizing the conservative coalition—gun rights groups, pro-life groups, right-to-work groups, etc. They "are his most avid supporters and have the most clout in terms of grassroots support, political organization and structure, ability to mobilize citizenry and influence members of Congress."[108] This support extended to other issues as well. In March of 1983, Jerry Falwell "announced Moral Majority's main

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[107]Notes on various groups; folder Conservative Groups [1 of 4]; Box 7; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[108]Schedule Proposal; Meeting with Conservative Coalition Groups; 11 February 1981; folder Conservative Coalition Group Meeting; Box F026, F027 (31); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

goal for 1983 is to combat the nuclear freeze movement."[109] This brings to mind Greenstone's (1969) observation that allying with the Democratic Party broadened labor's support for the party. Whereas before the alliance, they worked to mobilize their own constituency, after their informal integration into the party, they worked to mobilize the party's entire base. Republicans received similar benefits from the party's internalization of gun rights, religious and right-to-work groups.

This partnership was not motivated by ideology. Reagan did not bring them into his coalition because he was primarily concerned about abortion or other highly ideological issues. The partnership provided an efficient, effective way to push the administration's economic program and build a long-term coalition to compete with the New Deal Democrats. While the administration periodically raised social issues, these issues did not receive high priority on its agenda.

On some issues, like tuition tax credits to aid parochial schools, the administration was simply not as supportive as it claimed to be. While the administration rhetorically advocated for this issue of great importance to Catholics, an OPL memo notes that tuition credits did not make the President's first tax cut proposal because they were expected to cause a $4 billion loss in tax revenue.[110] On other issues—most social issues, in fact—the administration was not unsupportive, but not especially committed either. Though the administration endorsed constitutional amendments prohibiting abortion and allowing school prayer, their support for these measures was tepid. Interoffice communications indicate that the Human Life Amendment was unlikely to pass, but that "it is important for this Administration for there to be votes on this issue, preferably

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[109]Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry Falwell; 14 March 1983; folder Moral Majority [3 of 9]; Box 9; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[110]Memo; Jack Burgess to Elizabeth H. Dole via Red Cavaney; 6 August 1981; folder Tuition Tax Credits 1981; Box F010 (16); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

repeated votes, in both Houses." Even the appointment of anti-abortion activist Dr. Everett Koop as Surgeon General was qualified, as "he is instructed to make no public statements regarding abortion."[111] Support for school prayer was similarly weak. In a July 23, 1982 memo to Elizabeth Dole, Blackwell notes that, "To date neither the President nor any Administration figures have given the Congress any reason to believe that we are prepared to take vigorous action on this amendment this year."[112] Symbolic support through the State of the Union Address could offer "balm on the wounds" to these groups whose initiatives the administration was "to put it gently, not far advanced in proposing." Since the 1980 election, Blackwell argues, "we have indulged in unilateral moral disarmament." Emphasizing their lack of commitment to conservative social positions, he notes, "the Reagan Administration behaves as if these issues were skunks at our garden party."[113]

Economic issues were the centerpiece of their 1984 campaign and the top priority on their legislative agenda.[114] Social issues were raised cautiously and grudgingly. As the President's Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Gary Bauer, wrote in a March 3, 1982 memo, "Rather than be forced to deal with social issues on an ad hoc basis and/or on someone else's timetable, I recommend we undertake an analysis of key components of the social agenda with an eye towards deciding which ones we are willing to support and under what terms and conditions."[115] In this category, he includes school prayer,

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[111]Miscellaneous; Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives; 17 January 1983; folder Revising the Winning Coalition—Morton Blackwell [1]; Box 14; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[112]Memo; Morton C. Blackwell to Elizabeth H. Dole thru Diana Lozano; 23 July 1982; folder School Prayer July 1982—December 1982; Box F008 (11); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[113]Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives, 17 January 1983.

[114]Miscellaneous; OPL Issues Travel Book; folder Travel—OPL Issues Travel Book [1]; Box F010 (16); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[115]Memo; Gary Bauer to Edwin Harper and Roger Porter; 3 March 1982; folder Conservatives—General—

busing, the Family Protection Act, and similar issues. Emphasizing the administration's strategic, instrumental attention to these issues, Bauer says, "By moving to the forefront on one or two of these issues, the President's social link can be reforged, and the conservative grassroots can be rejuvenated for the upcoming legislative battles. To do little or nothing will lead to greater conservative dissatisfaction and diminished active support for the economic battles." Next to this section of the memo, Chief of Staff James Baker handwrote a note stating "Please tell [Elizabeth Dole] we're doing this via tuition tax credits and school prayer."

These groups were not entirely unaware of the administration's questionable commitment to their cause. At one point, Blackwell warned Dole that some groups "indicated their intention to attempt to convince members of the House and Senate to oppose the Reagan tax cut package feeling that only a defeat of the tax package will force the Administration to take social issues seriously."[116] This threat came shortly after the nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court, a surprising disappointment to many who expected a more conservative nomination. Knowing the value of their communication networks, groups would warn the administration that inaction on social issues would make it difficult for them to rally their troops for the next election. Elizabeth Dole informed Reagan after a meeting with groups about the Family Protection Act that "the point was repeatedly made that without some meaningful signs of encouragement from the Administration, much of the grass-roots enthusiasm which produced startling changes in the 1980 elections in both Houses will not be available for

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1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo; Elizabeth H. Dole to Edwin Meese III, James A. Baker, III, and Ed Harper; 9 March 1982; folder Conservatives— General—1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

[116]Memo; Morton Blackwell to Elizabeth H. Dole; 8 July 1981; folder Conservatives—General; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

candidates who support your policies in 1982."[117]

Though relations were not always smooth, the alliance between religious conservatives and the Republican Party marked another shift away from pluralism. The party did not internalize all groups, of course. But, they did have a core group of supporters who traveled across different issues, demonstrating considerably more structure in group-party relations than we saw earlier in the twentieth century. These party-building efforts were successful in the short-term, as they helped Reagan enact sweeping economic reforms, as well as the long-term, as Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994 after a generation of Democratic dominance. This revolution gave the party new leverage over special interest groups, which they used to demand stronger group partisanship, as discussed in chapter two.

5.5 Conclusion

Over the course of Nixon, Ford and Reagan's presidencies, liaison with special interest groups became more centralized, institutionalized, and eventually partially internalized. This narrative challenges the increasingly common argument in political science that activists caused political polarization. Parties and special interest groups did indeed become closer over the second half of the twentieth century, but they built this relationship together in response to a changing historical context. Parties were active, willing participants in this endogenous transformation of the American party system. This narrative also challenges the notion that group and party strength are inverse, as Schattschneider argued. Though special interest partisanship may have some negative

[117]Memo; Elizabeth H. Dole to President Reagan; 19 October 1981; folder Family Protection Act—1982 [1]; Box F003, F004 (3); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

manifestations, it is not inherently detrimental to parties. Since groups can assist parties with many important tasks, relationships with groups can fortify, rather than sap party strength.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: For Better or for Worse?

When APSA called for “a more responsible two-party system,” the current climate of intense party conflict is most likely not what they had in mind. While many scholars have examined the roots of polarization, there has been little attention to the relationship between special interest groups and political parties since the pluralism debates of the mid-twentieth century—to the detriment of our understanding of polarization. In examining the relationship between political parties and special interest groups and group issues over time, my dissertation aims to make four interventions in the political science literatures on parties, groups, and polarization.

First, I have argued that the timeline of polarization is quite a bit longer than is currently appreciated in the literature. While it may not have begun its dramatic rise until the early 1970s, its origins actually lie in the Great Depression and the New Deal, which spurred a broad nationalization of the party system. If we think of polarization as growing out of the Democratic Party reforms of 1968 and 1972, or even the civil rights revolution earlier in the 1960s, we miss its organizational foundation.

This leads to my second main point. Although we might associate polarization with a “culture war” in contemporary American politics—with zealots on both sides of the spectrum roaring polemics on increasingly partisan news programs—its origins were not entirely or even primarily ideological. Polarization cannot be understood simply as a process of ideological “sorting,” in which all liberals become Democrats and all conservatives become Republicans, though this does occur. Nor can it be understood simply as a process of elite party member preferences drifting away from the political center. If we look only for factors that could have caused changes in beliefs, we miss changes in the structure of the American party system. Polarization, I argue, is just as much an organizational phenomenon as it is an ideological phenomenon—perhaps even more so.

As Schattschneider aptly noted, the nation's strongly decentralized, patronage-driven party system depressed the importance of issues in electoral competition, as well as national parties' ability to devise and promote clear policy positions. This led to a high level of programmatic similarity in the mid-twentieth century. National party weakness also facilitated fluid group-party relations. When Key, Truman and others observed widespread special interest bipartisanship in the mid-twentieth century, national parties were not strong enough to facilitate alliances between elite party members and groups. By transforming the balance of power between national and state and local governments, the New Deal disrupted this equilibrium. While machines received a temporary boost from the surge in patronage provided by programs like the Works Progress Administration, the New Deal also sparked long-term processes that would eventually undermine patronage politics. The most important of these was the growth of national party organizations. While this process was slow and sometimes fragmented, party nationalization had major consequences for American politics.

As material incentives declined, purposive incentives grew more important, and issue politics became a key site of electoral competition. Parties began vying for voters' affections through issues. In order to appeal to voters in this way, however, a party needed to claim to offer something different than its opponent. This encouraged the development of alternative issue programs, both rhetorically (i.e., in party platforms) and behaviorally (i.e., on the floor of Congress). In other words, a strong, centralized party system based on issues rather than patronage facilitates opposing positions. In the aggregate, we observe this as a broad polarization of American politics at the elite level.

As national parties matured, with permanent headquarters, sizeable staffs, and increased programmatic capacities, they were also much better equipped to "pick sides"

on issues—and, for that matter, to pick which issues to pick sides on! Developing a policy program is not easy. The parties need to know what issues will attract certain voters, and what positions will be most likely to boost their competitive position. These things were not obvious, especially as the electorate grew more diverse and complex. Constructing issue programs required research, as well as the capacity to resolve disputes between different members.

All in all, Schattschneider's argument about the relationship between party decentralization and issueless politics was quite right. As parties centralized, issue politics intensified. What Schattschneider did *not* anticipate was the degree to which groups could aid in the process of party nationalization. This is my third intervention in the existing literature. Group and party strength are *not* inherently inverse, as he often argued (Schattschneider 1942, 1948, 1960). Indeed, they can—and did—develop symbiotic relationships. Groups played a critical role in twentieth century party-building. As national parties strengthened and machines weakened, groups took over some of the key tasks machines once performed, like electoral mobilization.

The process of national party-building also intensified parties' need for efficiency, motivating movement away from fluid, pluralistic relations on the group-party continuum. Thinking about the party as a firm helps to explain its incentives to evolve structurally over time. The rise of special interest partisanship involved fundamental changes to parties' organizational form. Relationships between groups and parties grew more structured, which brought efficiency gains for national parties as they developed from the "ghost parties" of the early to mid-twentieth century to the strong, professionalized organizations we see today.

This analysis complements some existing explanations for polarization, and brings others into question. On the one hand, it supplements McCarty, Poole and

Rosenthal's (2006) argument about the role of immigration. Needing more efficient ways to reach an increasingly diverse and complex electorate, parties drew on groups for assistance with information gathering, coalition building, communication, and mobilization. As groups became more strongly linked to the party apparatus, party-group relations became more clearly defined and the parties grew more distinct. On the other hand, my analysis undermines the increasingly popular argument that activists caused polarization. The transformation of American parties was, at the very least, a joint effort between parties and groups. Taking a step further, I argue that the rise of special interest partisanship was an endogenous transformation of the American party system. This is my fourth intervention in the existing literature.

These distinctions matter not only for our understanding of American history, but also for research outside the United States. Patronage politics still operate in many countries, to the dismay of many who consider them corrupt. While "spoils systems" raise obvious and grave concerns about representation, my argument suggests that dismantling these regimes could have unintended consequences. Indeed, special interest partisanship also raises serious questions about representation.

Yet, the growth of special interest partisanship is not all bad. Today, as chapter two demonstrates, people see clearer differences between the parties than they saw a few decades ago. While people may harbor negative feelings toward politicians in general—especially members of Congress, whose already low public esteem has fallen to a historic nadir—it would be difficult to argue that people do not have a choice today between distinct policy programs. What Democrats and Republicans "stand for" has become more apparent over the past few decades, as special interest partisanship has increased. The parties' issue positions and interest group affiliations have become quite clear—even if people do not like them.

While I would not necessarily go so far as to say this has given American voters *more* choice, it has not given them less either. I would argue that voters today simply have different kinds of choices. As groups come to play a more prominent role in American politics, we need to broaden our view of political behavior. Voting is not the only, or even necessarily the most important way in which people participate in politics today. They can participate in party politics, group politics, or both. And this, I argue, is not necessarily bad, because parties are not always better equipped to represent people's interests in the modern era.

Our nation's formal system of representation is based on geography. That is, people are represented as a citizens of particular districts and states. At the nation's founding, this may have been an adequate basis for high quality republican democracy. As the nation's economy and population became more complex and diverse, however, people's interests and preferences no longer broke along state or district lines. Over time, then, geography became a less sufficient basis for political representation. Key noted in 1942 that this dilemma encouraged the rise of special interest groups. This had democratic merit, as he described:

> In one respect pressure organizations perform an important representative function in our politics. Their representative function arose partially because of the inadequacy of geographical representation in a more and more diversified society. So long as the people of a particular congressional district, for example, are engaged in one type of farming and in occupations tributary to agriculture, the representative from the district can speak for their interests, but when the interests within his district become highly diversified he must tread warily lest he antagonize an important segment of his constituency. The result may be that important elements within his district do not have a voice in Congress or the state legislature. The constant increase in specialization in our society has made more and more difficult the task of the representative selected from a geographical area. Special interests came to be organized so that, in part, the cheese makers, the laborers, the drys, or others of like views and interest might have representatives who could state their attitudes

authoritatively before the government and the public (Key 1964: 202).

Over the past several decades, the special interest sector has developed into a secondary system of representation based on substantive issue preferences, operating alongside the primary system of representation based on geographic location. Today, people can choose to become members of political parties and also choose to become members of issue-specific organizations. They can donate to the Democratic Party in order to support its electoral fortunes and also donate to the Sierra Club in order to bolster its position within the party. Or they can donate to the Republican Party because they like its fiscal positions, and also donate to the Human Rights Campaign because they support the legalization of same-sex marriage. Hence, this second tier of representation can help voters reconcile political preferences that do not align cleanly with party platforms. A reasonable person could argue this is actually *more*, not less democratic than the previous system. And while it might contribute to polarization, it also helps mitigate some of its negative effects.

At the same time, recent work suggests that polarization may depress responsiveness to public opinion. For example, over the past twenty years, public support for LGBT rights has grown significantly—even in states and districts represented by Republicans. Today, there are public majorities favoring a range of legal protections for LGBT individuals; yet, this has not translated into a commensurate host of policy gains. Matching the voting records of members of Congress to policy-specific opinion in their state or district around the time of each vote reveals a striking amount of incongruence between members and their constituents (Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips 2013). There is an important partisan dimension to this story. Since 1992, the parties have staked out increasingly distinct positions on LGBT rights, with the DNC becoming more supportive and the RNC more opposed. Over this same period, Democratic members of

Congress have voted in favor of LGBT rights more and more often, as their constituents have become more supportive. Republicans, however, appear to be following their party's conservative position rather than their constituents' increasingly liberal preferences on these issues. This is striking, considering the high salience of LGBT issues, and concerning, given the implications for civil rights gains.

In the end, whether the rise of special interest partisanship is good or bad for democracy is an open question. APSA's 1950 Report lamented excessive party similarity; today, polarization evokes scorn. More research is needed to determine whether or not there is an ideal level of party difference, or a superior zone on the group-party continuum. What is certain, however, is that a useful normative evaluation will compare the contemporary arrangement not only to a hypothetical democratic ideal, but also to the patronage-based system it replaced.

Part II

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Part III

Appendix

	Center for Responsive Politics	Policy Agendas Project	American National Election Studies
Abortion	Abortion Policy/Pro-Choice; Abortion Policy/Pro-Life	Right to Privacy and Access to Government Information (includes abortion) (abortion coded by hand from this category)	See VCF0837 and VCF0838 (N=13,022 - pro-life) (N=14,903 - pro-choice)
Active military	Defense	Manpower, Military Personnel and Dependents (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines), Military Courts	Occupation (category: current member of the armed forces) (VCF0154a) (N=90)
Air Transportation	Air Transport	Airports, Airlines, Air Traffic Control and Safety	
Alcohol	Beer, Wine & Liquor	Alcohol Abuse and Treatment; Drug and Alcohol or Substance Abust Treatment	
Cars & Trucks	Automotive; Trucking	Truck and Automobile Transportation and Safety	Occupation (categories: mechanics and repair supervisors, mechanics and repairers, vehicle and mobile equipment; motor vehicle operators) (VCF0154a) (N=716)
Commercial Banks	Commercial Banks	U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation	
Computers & Internet	Computers/Internet	Computer Industry, Computer Security, & General Issues Related to the Internet	Occupation (categories: mathematical and computer scientists; computer equipment operators) (VCF0154a) (N=213)
Education	Education	Education	Occupation (categories: teachers, postsecondary; teachers, except postsecondary) (VCF0154a) (N=946)
Electric Utilities	Electric Utilities	Electricity and Hydroelectricity	
Entertainment	TV/Movies/Music	Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV, Cable, Radio)	Occupation (category: writers, artists, entertainers, and athletes) (VCF0154a) (N=346)

Table A.1: **Case Selection (Part 1).** This chart shows how I matched categories from the Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled from each data set for each group.

	Center for Responsive Politics	Policy Agendas Project	American National Election Studies
Environment	Environment	Environment	See and VCF0842 and VCF9047 (N=9,451)
Ethnic & Racial Minorities		Ethnic Minority and Racial Group Discrimination	Respondent race (VCF0106a) (N=8,323)
Farming & Ranching	Crop Production & Basic Processing; Livestock	Government Subsidies to Farmers and Ranchers, Agricultural Disaster Insurance; Animal and Crop Disease and Pest Control	Occupation (categories: farm operators and managers; farm occupations, except managerial; related agricultural occupations) (VCF0154a) (N=459)
Food Processing & Sales	Food Processing & Sales	Food Inspection and Safety (including seafood)	
Guns	Gun Control; Gun Rights	Police, Fire, and Weapons Control	
Health Insurance	Health Services/ HMOs	Insurance reform, availability, and cost; Provider and Insurer payment and regulation	
Hospitals & Nursing Homes	Hospitals/Nursing Homes	Facilities construction, regulation, and payments; Long-term care, home health, terminally ill, and rehabilitation services	
Human Rights	Human Rights	Human Rights	
Immigrants		Immigration and Refugee Issues; Migrant and Seasonal workers, Farm Labor Issues	Were both your parents born in this country?) (VCF0143) (N=6,831)
Insurance	Insurance	Insurance regulation	

Table A.2: **Case Selection (Part 2).** This chart shows how I matched categories from the Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled from each data set for each group.

	Center for Responsive Politics	Policy Agendas Project	American National Election Studies
Labor	Building Trade Unions; Industrial Unions; Transportation Unions; Public Sector Unions; Misc Unions	Employee Relations and Labor Unions	Household union membership (VCF0127) (N=10,004)
Lawyers & Law Firms	Lawyers/Law Firms	Executive Branch Agencies Dealing with Law and Crime; Court Administration; Juvenile Crime and the Juvenile Justice System; Criminal and Civil Code	Occupation (category: lawyers and judges) (VCF0154a) (N=74)
LGBT	Human Rights (includes subtopic Gay & Lesbian Rights & Issues)	Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination (LGBT coded by hand from this category)	See VCF0876a and VCF0877a (N=3,892)
Low-Income People		Education of Underprivileged Students; Food Stamps, Food Assistance, and Nutrition Monitoring Programs	Income percentile (category: bottom 1/3) (VCF0114) (N=14,286)
Mining	Mining	Coal	
Oil & Gas	Oil & Gas	Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)	
Older People	Retired	Age Discrimination; Elderly Issues and Elderly Assistance Programs (Including Social Security Administration); Elderly and Handicapped Housing	Age Group (categories: 65+) (VCF0102) (N=8,034)
People with Disabilities		Handicap or Disease Discrimination; Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped; Elderly and Handicapped Housing	Respondent Work Status 16-category (categories: working now and permanently disabled—20 or more hours; permanently disabled, no current occupation; permanently disabled and working now—less than 20 hours/week) (VCF0150) (N=720)
Pharmaceuticals	Pharmaceuticals/ Health Products	Regulation of drug industry, medical devices, and clinical labs; Prescription drug coverage and costs	
Railroads	Railroads	Railroad Transportation and Safety	

Table A.3: **Case Selection (Part 3).** This chart shows how I matched categories from the Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled from each data set for each group.

	Center for Responsive Politics	Policy Agendas Project	American National Election Studies
Rural		Rural Housing and FMHA Housing Assistance Programs; Rural Economic Development	Urbanism (category: rural, small towns, outlying and adjacent areas) (VCF0111) (N=16,187)
Sea Transport	Sea Transport	Maritime Issues	
Securities & Investment	Securities & Investment	Securities and Commodities Regulation	
Small Business Owners		Small Business Issues and the Small Business Administration	
Telecommunications	Telecom Services & Equipment; Telephone Utilities	Telephone and Telecommunication Regulation	
Tobacco	Tobacco	Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, and Education	
Tourism	Lodging/Tourism	Tourism	
Urban		Urban Economic Development and General Urban Issues	Urbanism (category: central cities) (VCF0111) (N=11,479)
Veterans	Defense	Veterans Housing Assistance and Military Housing Programs; VA Issues	
Women	Women's Issues	Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination	Respondent gender (VCF0104) (N=26,317)

Table A.4: **Case Selection (Part 4).** This chart shows how I matched categories from the Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled from each data set for each group.

	Model 1 abortion-pc	Model 2 abortion-pl	Model 3 cars & trucks	Model 4 computers & internet	Model 5 education
Year	0.003* (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.005)
Constant	-6.052* (2.935)	16.11*** (4.414)	-14.95 (12.67)	14.85 (15.99)	7.315 (9.041)
Observations	15	15	10	10	10
R-squared	0.259	0.502	0.152	0.095	0.072

	Model 6 entertainment	Model 7 environment	Model 8 ethnic & racial minorities	Model 9 farming & ranching	Model 10 immigrants
Year	0.006 (0.006)	0.009** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.002** (0.001)
Constant	-11.27 (12.60)	-17.94** (6.680)	4.094 (3.487)	14.84** (6.129)	4.793** (2.156)
Observations	10	10	27	10	21
R-squared	0.096	0.482	0.038	0.419	0.188

	Model 11 LGBT	Model 12 labor	Model 13 low-income people	Model 14 older people	Model 15 people with disabilities
Year	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.016* (0.007)
Constant	3.930 (19.53)	6.912*** (1.867)	-1.294 (1.944)	-3.659* (1.888)	32.56* (14.62)
Observations	5	26	26	27	12
R-squared	0.011	0.336	0.028	0.140	0.325

	Model 16 rural	Model 17 urban	Model 18 women
Year	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-4.64e-04 (0.001)
Constant	7.074*** (1.763)	-1.707 (2.097)	1.138 (1.636)
Observations	25	25	27
R-squared	0.400	0.041	0.012

Table A.5: **Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate, by Group.** This table displays results from 18 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship in the electorate on year. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
year	0.0178***	0.0437***	0.0429***	0.0429***	0.0429***
	(0.000781)	(0.00457)	(0.00464)	(0.00464)	(0.00464)
dem			0.0474		1.056***
			(0.0529)		(0.0788)
ind			-1.009***	-1.056***	
			(0.0819)	(0.0788)	
midterm		-0.272***	-0.299***	-0.299***	-0.299***
		(0.0752)	(0.0764)	(0.0764)	(0.0764)
age			-0.000674	-0.000674	-0.000674
			(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00147)
religion			0.00357	0.00357	0.00357
			(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)
church_att			0.0147	0.0147	0.0147
			(0.0145)	(0.0145)	(0.0145)
urbanism			-0.232***	-0.232***	-0.232***
			(0.0317)	(0.0317)	(0.0317)
education			0.221***	0.221***	0.221***
			(0.0298)	(0.0298)	(0.0298)
race			0.0615**	0.0615**	0.0615**
			(0.0277)	(0.0277)	(0.0277)
female			-0.186***	-0.186***	-0.186***
			(0.0504)	(0.0504)	(0.0504)
income_pct			-0.00492	-0.00492	-0.00492
			(0.0198)	(0.0198)	(0.0198)
partic_camp			0.412***	0.412***	0.412***
			(0.0412)	(0.0412)	(0.0412)
voted			0.416***	0.416***	0.416***
			(0.0579)	(0.0579)	(0.0579)
know_hormaj			0.486***	0.486***	0.486***
			(0.0543)	(0.0543)	(0.0543)
rep				-0.0474	1.009***
				(0.0529)	(0.0819)
Constant	-0.381***	-2.618***	-2.337***	-2.290***	-3.346***
	(0.0306)	(0.225)	(0.234)	(0.228)	(0.235)
Observations	27,282	8,224	8,171	8,171	8,171

Table A.6: **Basic Party Differences.** These models are logit regressions. The dependent variable measures people's responses to the question: "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?"

	Model 1 Democrats	Model 2 Republicans	Model 3 Difference
year1	0.0154***	0.00878***	0.0362***
	(0.00292)	(0.00301)	(0.00320)
midterm	-0.0131	-0.00167	-0.121***
	(0.0285)	(0.0295)	(0.0313)
age	-0.0102***	0.00165*	0.00373***
	(0.000867)	(0.000895)	(0.000951)
religion	-0.00824	0.0315***	-0.00621
	(0.00838)	(0.00866)	(0.00917)
church_att	-0.000113	0.0297***	0.00790
	(0.00813)	(0.00841)	(0.00890)
urbanism	0.0487***	-0.106***	-0.123***
	(0.0182)	(0.0188)	(0.0200)
education	-0.178***	0.181***	0.111***
	(0.0162)	(0.0167)	(0.0177)
race	0.0295*	0.0307*	-0.0131
	(0.0163)	(0.0169)	(0.0179)
female	-0.0125	0.0570**	0.127***
	(0.0279)	(0.0289)	(0.0306)
income_pct	-0.0199*	0.00230	0.00576
	(0.0108)	(0.0112)	(0.0118)
partic_camp	-0.0745***	0.118***	0.153***
	(0.0195)	(0.0201)	(0.0213)
voted	-0.160***	0.133***	0.232***
	(0.0336)	(0.0347)	(0.0368)
know_horma	-0.319***	0.309***	0.347***
	(0.0311)	(0.0321)	(0.0341)
pid_7pt	-0.140***	0.0158**	0.0252***
	(0.00670)	(0.00691)	(0.00734)
Constant	4.533***	3.536***	0.298**
	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.152)
Observations	9,624	9,607	9,499
R-squared	0.123	0.056	0.066

Table A.7: **Perceived Party Ideologies.** These models are OLS regressions. The dependent variable for Model 1 is perceived Democratic Party ideology, and the dependent variable for Model 2 is perceived Republican Party ideology. For Model 3, the dependent variable is the absolute difference between each respondent's placement of the two parties. Two-tailed tests are used: * $<$ .10, ** $<$ .05, *** $<$ .001.

	Model 1 Health-D	Model 2 Health-R	Model 3 Health-Diff	Model 4 Jobs-D	Model 5 Jobs-R	Model 6 Jobs-Diff
year1	0.0186*** (0.00387)	0.0357*** (0.00384)	0.0205*** (0.00439)	0.0377*** (0.00338)	0.0396*** (0.00342)	-0.0140*** (0.00393)
midterm	0.0899* (0.0481)	-0.0404 (0.0486)	-0.238*** (0.0552)	0.112*** (0.0343)	0.0655* (0.0351)	-0.0583 (0.0400)
age	-0.0110*** (0.00137)	-0.00268* (0.00138)	0.00727*** (0.00157)	-0.00481*** (0.000980)	0.000717 (0.000997)	0.00670*** (0.00114)
religion	-0.0319** (0.0136)	0.0210 (0.0136)	0.0200 (0.0155)	-0.00708 (0.00966)	0.0126 (0.00986)	0.00991 (0.0112)
church_att	0.0239* (0.0129)	0.0275** (0.0129)	0.00120 (0.0147)	0.0192** (0.00931)	0.0398*** (0.00950)	0.0151 (0.0108)
urbanism	0.0419 (0.0279)	-0.146*** (0.0280)	-0.150*** (0.0318)	0.0579*** (0.0205)	-0.122*** (0.0209)	-0.171*** (0.0239)
education	-0.129*** (0.0257)	0.132*** (0.0258)	0.150*** (0.0294)	-0.190*** (0.0188)	0.118*** (0.0192)	0.152*** (0.0218)
race	-0.0353 (0.0269)	0.0727*** (0.0270)	0.171*** (0.0306)	-0.0134 (0.0189)	0.0274 (0.0192)	0.0897*** (0.0220)
female	0.0625 (0.0440)	0.0695 (0.0442)	0.0855* (0.0503)	0.0111 (0.0320)	0.0506 (0.0326)	0.0519 (0.0372)
income_pct	0.00313 (0.0178)	0.00142 (0.0179)	-0.0323 (0.0204)	0.0199 (0.0123)	0.0145 (0.0126)	-0.0441*** (0.0143)
partic_camp	-0.0880*** (0.0297)	0.128*** (0.0299)	0.214*** (0.0338)	-0.0762*** (0.0222)	0.107*** (0.0226)	0.223*** (0.0257)
voted	-0.107** (0.0522)	0.172*** (0.0526)	0.239*** (0.0598)	-0.153*** (0.0387)	0.191*** (0.0394)	0.261*** (0.0451)
know_hormaj	-0.282*** (0.0506)	0.256*** (0.0509)	0.335*** (0.0580)	-0.140*** (0.0358)	0.154*** (0.0365)	0.235*** (0.0418)
pid_7pt	-0.0752*** (0.0106)	-0.0660*** (0.0106)	-0.0130 (0.0121)	-0.0670*** (0.00769)	-0.101*** (0.00781)	-0.0326*** (0.00893)
Constant	3.931*** (0.195)	3.235*** (0.195)	0.197 (0.222)	2.916*** (0.155)	3.052*** (0.158)	1.541*** (0.180)
Observations	5,123	5,041	4,928	8,245	8,222	8,076
R-squared	0.059	0.078	0.080	0.061	0.065	0.058

Table A.8: **Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 1).** Models 1-18 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 7 Aidmin-D	Model 8 Aidmin-R	Model 9 Aidmin-Diff	Model 10 Women-D	Model 11 Women-R	Model 12 Women-Diff
year1	0.0185*** (0.00284)	0.0355*** (0.00290)	0.0147*** (0.00318)	0.00304 (0.00361)	0.0241*** (0.00392)	0.0379*** (0.00364)
midterm	-0.0617* (0.0326)	0.00326 (0.0335)	-0.0533 (0.0365)	-0.0717** (0.0361)	-0.0326 (0.0399)	0.00783 (0.0368)
age	0.000681 (0.000918)	0.00323*** (0.000943)	0.00480*** (0.00103)	0.000882 (0.00109)	0.000554 (0.00120)	0.000816 (0.00111)
religion	0.00505 (0.00902)	0.0219** (0.00925)	0.0112 (0.0101)	0.00263 (0.0106)	0.0386*** (0.0117)	0.0240** (0.0108)
church_att	-0.00476 (0.00862)	0.0322*** (0.00885)	0.0261*** (0.00965)	0.00550 (0.0103)	0.0327*** (0.0114)	0.0197* (0.0105)
urbanism	0.0889*** (0.0190)	-0.133*** (0.0195)	-0.167*** (0.0213)	0.0483** (0.0227)	-0.0469* (0.0251)	-0.118*** (0.0231)
education	-0.165*** (0.0176)	0.113*** (0.0180)	0.150*** (0.0197)	-0.138*** (0.0208)	0.0798*** (0.0228)	0.100*** (0.0211)
race	-0.0466*** (0.0173)	0.113*** (0.0179)	0.126*** (0.0195)	0.0213 (0.0214)	0.0539** (0.0237)	0.0536** (0.0219)
female	-0.00360 (0.0297)	0.103*** (0.0305)	0.0999*** (0.0333)	0.0946*** (0.0355)	0.0679* (0.0391)	0.0521 (0.0361)
income_pct	-0.00110 (0.0117)	-0.0267** (0.0120)	-0.0483*** (0.0131)	0.0285** (0.0138)	-0.0208 (0.0153)	-0.0829*** (0.0141)
partic_camp	-0.0614*** (0.0207)	0.110*** (0.0212)	0.214*** (0.0231)	-0.0835*** (0.0245)	0.0695*** (0.0269)	0.166*** (0.0249)
voted	-0.110*** (0.0353)	0.156*** (0.0364)	0.189*** (0.0397)	-0.133*** (0.0421)	0.0123 (0.0465)	0.0433 (0.0429)
know_hormaj	-0.241*** (0.0329)	0.0812** (0.0338)	0.156*** (0.0370)	-0.242*** (0.0399)	-0.00684 (0.0440)	0.111*** (0.0407)
pid_7pt	-0.0892*** (0.00719)	-0.0723*** (0.00735)	-0.0357*** (0.00804)	-0.0141 (0.00863)	-0.135*** (0.00943)	-0.0893*** (0.00875)
Constant	3.462*** (0.138)	2.788*** (0.142)	0.504*** (0.155)	3.409*** (0.166)	2.990*** (0.182)	-0.195 (0.168)
Observations	9,656	9,574	9,429	6,503	6,407	6,293
R-squared	0.057	0.064	0.057	0.034	0.052	0.066

Table A.9: **Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 2).** Models 1-18 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 13 Defense-D	Model 14 Defense-R	Model 15 Defense-Diff	Model 16 Services-D	Model 17 Services-R	Model 18 Services-Diff
year1	-0.0378***	0.0117**	0.0172**	-0.0305***	0.0902***	-0.0875***
	(0.00620)	(0.00579)	(0.00686)	(0.00903)	(0.00935)	(0.01060)
midterm	-0.166***	0.113***	0.186***	0.126***	0.0257	0.0424
	(0.0358)	(0.0331)	(0.0394)	(0.03930)	(0.04060)	(0.04610)
age	0.00375***	-0.00138	-0.00263**	0.00238**	0.00179	0.00145
	(0.00107)	(0.000989)	(0.00118)	(0.00115)	(0.00119)	(0.00135)
religion	-0.00785	0.0243**	0.00846	0.00301	-0.0089	-0.00248
	(0.0102)	(0.00950)	(0.0112)	(0.01110)	(0.01140)	(0.01300)
church_att	0.00872	0.0168*	0.00985	-0.0208*	-0.0333***	0.0118
	(0.00999)	(0.00929)	(0.0110)	(0.01080)	(0.01110)	(0.01260)
urbanism	0.105***	-0.0891***	-0.185***	-0.0855***	0.134***	-0.197***
	(0.0225)	(0.0209)	(0.0248)	(0.02400)	(0.02490)	(0.02820)
education	-0.103***	0.0651***	0.0140	0.139***	-0.208***	0.151***
	(0.0200)	(0.0185)	(0.0220)	(0.02140)	(0.02200)	(0.02500)
race	0.0509***	0.0174	0.0168	0.0256	0.00296	0.0790***
	(0.0180)	(0.0167)	(0.0198)	(0.01880)	(0.01940)	(0.02200)
female	0.103***	0.0436	-0.0104	-0.0616*	-0.0792**	0.0798*
	(0.0340)	(0.0316)	(0.0375)	(0.03660)	(0.03780)	(0.04290)
income_pct	-0.0324**	0.0102	-0.0139	0.0265*	-0.000413	-0.0242
	(0.0133)	(0.0124)	(0.0147)	(0.01430)	(0.01480)	(0.01680)
partic_camp	-0.0973***	0.104***	0.158***	0.0795***	-0.135***	0.232***
	(0.0248)	(0.0231)	(0.0273)	(0.02680)	(0.02770)	(0.03140)
voted	-0.121***	0.0692*	0.183***	0.189***	-0.108**	0.239***
	(0.0407)	(0.0377)	(0.0449)	(0.04330)	(0.04470)	(0.05080)
know_hormaj	-0.182***	0.200***	0.196***	0.328***	-0.275***	0.424***
	(0.0378)	(0.0350)	(0.0417)	(0.03990)	(0.04120)	(0.04670)
pid_7pt	-0.140***	-0.0541***	0.0354***	0.0538***	0.116***	-0.0290***
	(0.00811)	(0.00750)	(0.00892)	(0.00862)	(0.00890)	(0.01010)
Constant	5.777***	4.568***	1.277***	5.190***	0.155	4.840***
	(0.260)	(0.243)	(0.288)	(0.37500)	(0.38800)	(0.44000)
Observations	6,585	6,701	6,494	5569	5623	5511
R-squared	0.093	0.033	0.031	0.069	0.1	0.085

Table A.10: **Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 3).** Models 1-18 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 Ideology-D	Model 2 Ideology-R	Model 3 Ideology-Diff	Model 4 Health-D	Model 5 Health-R	Model 6 Health-Diff
year	0.0306***	0.0152***	0.0173***	0.0182***	0.0367***	0.0185***
	(0.00355)	(0.00345)	(0.00361)	(0.00453)	(0.00444)	(0.00524)
age	-0.00907***	-0.00121	0.00378***	-0.00872***	-0.00496***	0.00441*
	(0.00120)	(0.00117)	(0.00123)	(0.00194)	(0.00189)	(0.00226)
religion	-0.0140	0.0439***	0.0193	-0.0485**	0.0194	0.0466**
	(0.0119)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0196)	(0.0192)	(0.0227)
church_att	0.00483	0.0382***	0.00482	0.0140	0.0168	0.0107
	(0.0114)	(0.0112)	(0.0117)	(0.0183)	(0.0179)	(0.0213)
urbanism	-0.00626	-0.154***	-0.0929***	0.0633	-0.111***	-0.133***
	(0.0255)	(0.0249)	(0.0261)	(0.0397)	(0.0389)	(0.0461)
education	-0.124***	0.165***	0.0691***	-0.126***	0.0836**	0.114***
	(0.0227)	(0.0221)	(0.0231)	(0.0358)	(0.0349)	(0.0414)
race	0.0261	0.0195	0.00727	0.00742	0.0203	0.0560
	(0.0223)	(0.0218)	(0.0230)	(0.0344)	(0.0340)	(0.0397)
female	0.111***	-0.00967	-0.00686	0.0745	-0.0122	0.0370
	(0.0392)	(0.0383)	(0.0400)	(0.0625)	(0.0614)	(0.0725)
income_pct	-0.00310	-0.00369	-0.0256	0.0138	0.0345	-0.0384
	(0.0157)	(0.0154)	(0.0160)	(0.0262)	(0.0257)	(0.0305)
partic_camp	-0.127***	0.125***	0.192***	-0.174***	0.131***	0.232***
	(0.0280)	(0.0274)	(0.0285)	(0.0442)	(0.0435)	(0.0510)
voted	-0.213***	0.334***	0.260***	-0.140*	0.166**	0.300***
	(0.0506)	(0.0492)	(0.0518)	(0.0800)	(0.0782)	(0.0930)
know_hormaj	-0.262***	0.296***	0.367***	-0.389***	0.286***	0.447***
	(0.0454)	(0.0442)	(0.0465)	(0.0741)	(0.0725)	(0.0862)
pid_7pt	-0.153***	0.0137	0.0547***	-0.0893***	-0.0869***	-0.0119
	(0.00938)	(0.00915)	(0.00956)	(0.0149)	(0.0146)	(0.0173)
Constant	3.990***	3.507***	0.885***	3.894***	3.369***	0.497*
	(0.180)	(0.176)	(0.184)	(0.256)	(0.253)	(0.297)
Observations	5,651	5,779	5,517	2,746	2,887	2,616
R-squared	0.116	0.074	0.060	0.079	0.067	0.061

Table A.11: **Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1).** Models 1-21 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 7 Jobs-D	Model 8 Jobs-R	Model 9 Jobs-Diff	Model 10 Aidmin-D	Model 11 Aidmin-R	Model 12 Aidmin-D
year	0.0535***	0.0508***	-0.0218***	0.0321***	0.0541***	0.0192***
	(0.00355)	(0.00363)	(0.00402)	(0.00359)	(0.00357)	(0.00391)
age	-0.00412***	0.00332***	0.00701***	0.000833	0.00435***	0.00549***
	(0.00120)	(0.00123)	(0.00136)	(0.00120)	(0.00121)	(0.00133)
religion	-0.0161	0.0295**	0.0246*	-0.00528	0.0332***	0.0385***
	(0.0120)	(0.0125)	(0.0137)	(0.0119)	(0.0122)	(0.0131)
church_att	0.000271	0.0453***	0.0222*	-0.0167	0.0307***	0.0261**
	(0.0116)	(0.0119)	(0.0132)	(0.0115)	(0.0116)	(0.0126)
urbanism	0.0344	-0.126***	-0.132***	0.0629**	-0.130***	-0.139***
	(0.0251)	(0.0259)	(0.0284)	(0.0253)	(0.0256)	(0.0279)
education	-0.134***	0.111***	0.0782***	-0.0906***	0.0475**	0.0230
	(0.0231)	(0.0236)	(0.0260)	(0.0232)	(0.0233)	(0.0253)
race	-0.0607***	-0.0159	0.0691***	-0.0259	0.0877***	0.0947***
	(0.0218)	(0.0223)	(0.0244)	(0.0216)	(0.0215)	(0.0236)
female	0.00998	-0.0146	-0.00411	0.0213	0.0641	0.0419
	(0.0393)	(0.0404)	(0.0445)	(0.0395)	(0.0398)	(0.0434)
income_pct	0.0228	0.0177	-0.0396**	-0.0158	-0.0400**	-0.0562***
	(0.0157)	(0.0162)	(0.0178)	(0.0158)	(0.0159)	(0.0173)
partic_camp	-0.125***	0.161***	0.299***	-0.120***	0.155***	0.239***
	(0.0283)	(0.0292)	(0.0320)	(0.0283)	(0.0287)	(0.0310)
voted	-0.150***	0.251***	0.238***	-0.0999**	0.144***	0.180***
	(0.0493)	(0.0506)	(0.0559)	(0.0495)	(0.0500)	(0.0547)
know_hormaj	-0.194***	0.160***	0.266***	-0.185***	0.177***	0.304***
	(0.0450)	(0.0462)	(0.0511)	(0.0451)	(0.0454)	(0.0497)
pid_7pt	-0.0828***	-0.101***	-0.0131	-0.0892***	-0.0761***	-0.0366***
	(0.00945)	(0.00970)	(0.0107)	(0.00952)	(0.00956)	(0.0104)
Constant	2.528***	2.495***	1.852***	2.942***	2.221***	0.564***
	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.200)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.193)
Observations	5,958	6,075	5,736	5,870	6,007	5,643
R-squared	0.075	0.085	0.057	0.051	0.080	0.051

Table A.12: **Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2).** Models 1-21 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 13 Women-D	Model 14 Women-R	Model 15 Women-Diff	Model 16 Defense-D	Model 17 Defense-R	Model 18 Defense-Diff
year	-0.0143***	0.0243***	0.0332***	-0.0530***	-0.0272***	-5.13e-05
	(0.00404)	(0.00416)	(0.00401)	(0.00696)	(0.00673)	(0.00776)
age	0.000517	0.00270*	0.00102	0.00147	-0.00321**	-0.00267*
	(0.00145)	(0.00151)	(0.00146)	(0.00138)	(0.00130)	(0.00153)
religion	-0.00807	0.0377**	0.0434***	-0.00245	0.0217*	0.0162
	(0.0144)	(0.0153)	(0.0145)	(0.0133)	(0.0127)	(0.0147)
church_att	-0.00700	0.0396***	0.0449***	0.00204	0.0393***	0.0230
	(0.0139)	(0.0146)	(0.0139)	(0.0132)	(0.0125)	(0.0145)
urbanism	0.0138	-0.0663**	-0.0865***	0.00783	-0.0302	-0.0769**
	(0.0301)	(0.0319)	(0.0302)	(0.0296)	(0.0282)	(0.0327)
education	-0.125***	-0.00240	0.0127	-0.0439*	0.0747***	0.00937
	(0.0275)	(0.0289)	(0.0275)	(0.0262)	(0.0247)	(0.0287)
race	0.00784	0.0168	0.0370	0.0800***	0.0134	-0.00908
	(0.0269)	(0.0288)	(0.0269)	(0.0231)	(0.0215)	(0.0252)
female	0.0877*	0.0774	0.153***	0.175***	0.0229	-0.121**
	(0.0475)	(0.0501)	(0.0475)	(0.0445)	(0.0422)	(0.0491)
income_pct	0.0108	-0.0432**	-0.0740***	-0.0445**	0.0116	-0.0103
	(0.0193)	(0.0203)	(0.0194)	(0.0175)	(0.0166)	(0.0193)
partic_camp	-0.151***	0.0740**	0.213***	-0.107***	0.156***	0.199***
	(0.0342)	(0.0360)	(0.0341)	(0.0326)	(0.0311)	(0.0359)
voted	-0.158***	-0.0929	-0.0205	-0.0973*	0.130**	0.221***
	(0.0591)	(0.0626)	(0.0596)	(0.0565)	(0.0536)	(0.0627)
know_hormaj	-0.208***	0.0926	0.146***	-0.245***	0.227***	0.278***
	(0.0550)	(0.0583)	(0.0554)	(0.0508)	(0.0479)	(0.0563)
pid_7pt	-0.0125	-0.154***	-0.0755***	-0.162***	-0.0430***	0.0845***
	(0.0115)	(0.0120)	(0.0116)	(0.0107)	(0.0101)	(0.0118)
Constant	4.175***	3.251***	-0.0237	6.381***	5.960***	1.767***
	(0.203)	(0.212)	(0.202)	(0.296)	(0.287)	(0.331)
Observations	4,159	4,348	3,972	3,897	4,025	3,781
R-squared	0.035	0.061	0.061	0.116	0.044	0.050

Table A.13: **Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 3).** Models 1-21 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 19 Services-D	Model 20 Services-R	Model 21 Services-Diff
year	0.00658	0.178***	-0.122***
	(0.0132)	(0.0137)	(0.0147)
age	0.00207	-0.000500	0.00391**
	(0.00172)	(0.00176)	(0.00191)
religion	-0.00265	0.0146	-0.0146
	(0.0168)	(0.0175)	(0.0187)
church_att	-0.0150	-0.0654***	0.0377**
	(0.0165)	(0.0171)	(0.0184)
urbanism	-0.00252	0.113***	-0.143***
	(0.0366)	(0.0380)	(0.0408)
education	0.0645**	-0.214***	0.0745**
	(0.0319)	(0.0331)	(0.0355)
race	0.0128	0.0250	0.0704**
	(0.0257)	(0.0264)	(0.0284)
female	-0.121**	-0.113**	0.0433
	(0.0546)	(0.0565)	(0.0606)
income_pct	0.0253	0.00110	-0.0598**
	(0.0216)	(0.0223)	(0.0240)
partic_camp	0.0765*	-0.196***	0.222***
	(0.0397)	(0.0413)	(0.0441)
voted	0.348***	-0.0559	0.304***
	(0.0697)	(0.0716)	(0.0775)
know_hormaj	0.350***	-0.422***	0.393***
	(0.0609)	(0.0627)	(0.0676)
pid_7pt	0.0766***	0.119***	0.0142
	(0.0128)	(0.0132)	(0.0142)
Constant	3.663***	-3.042***	6.287***
	(0.541)	(0.558)	(0.601)
Observations	2,695	2,821	2,656
R-squared	0.073	0.137	0.078

Table A.14: **Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 4).** Models 1-21 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 Ideology-D	Model 2 Ideology-R	Model 3 Ideology-Diff	Model 4 Jobs-D	Model 5 Jobs-R	Model 6 Jobs-Diff	Model 7 Aidmin-D	Model 8 Aidmin-R
year	-0.00377 (0.00800)	0.0245*** (0.00844)	0.0745*** (0.0120)	-0.0279* (0.0164)	0.0324* (0.0173)	0.0536** (0.0227)	-0.0294 (0.0208)	0.0985*** (0.0223)
midterm	-0.143** (0.0653)	-0.129** (0.0645)	0.165* (0.0894)	0.0382 (0.0743)	0.0916 (0.0790)	0.340*** (0.104)	-0.222*** (0.0747)	-0.116 (0.0781)
age	-0.00224 (0.00156)	0.00101 (0.00165)	0.00386* (0.00233)	0.000301 (0.00193)	0.00323 (0.00206)	0.00628** (0.00277)	0.00419** (0.00208)	0.00575*** (0.00222)
religion	-0.0258* (0.0149)	0.0235 (0.0151)	-0.00472 (0.0206)	0.0135 (0.0196)	-0.00711 (0.0199)	-0.00286 (0.0265)	0.0198 (0.0204)	0.00193 (0.0210)
church_att	-0.0135 (0.0144)	-0.0321** (0.0149)	-0.0110 (0.0210)	0.0137 (0.0187)	0.0387** (0.0197)	-0.00870 (0.0268)	-0.00661 (0.0197)	0.0123 (0.0208)
urbanism	0.192*** (0.0318)	-0.0260 (0.0347)	-0.163*** (0.0469)	0.198*** (0.0401)	0.00681 (0.0438)	-0.114** (0.0575)	0.209*** (0.0421)	-0.0275 (0.0462)
education	-0.179*** (0.0287)	0.140*** (0.0300)	0.251*** (0.0415)	-0.0458 (0.0381)	0.182*** (0.0395)	0.169*** (0.0533)	-0.0891** (0.0399)	0.108** (0.0425)
race	0.0326 (0.0306)	-0.0471 (0.0357)	-0.0334 (0.0451)	-0.0568 (0.0402)	-0.0193 (0.0462)	0.158*** (0.0572)	-0.0961** (0.0434)	0.0188 (0.0503)
female	-0.0853* (0.0499)	-0.0186 (0.0514)	0.0333 (0.0722)	-0.0397 (0.0647)	-0.114* (0.0673)	-0.0270 (0.0909)	-0.131* (0.0675)	-0.0464 (0.0713)
income_pct	-0.00424 (0.0188)	-0.000272 (0.0195)	-0.0468* (0.0277)	0.00794 (0.0239)	0.0241 (0.0249)	-0.0578* (0.0337)	-0.00190 (0.0247)	0.0278 (0.0264)
partic_camp	-0.0810** (0.0323)	0.113*** (0.0325)	0.139*** (0.0446)	-0.0696* (0.0410)	0.140*** (0.0417)	0.188*** (0.0555)	-0.109** (0.0428)	0.107** (0.0439)
voted	-0.154*** (0.0593)	0.0869 (0.0617)	0.135 (0.0886)	-0.229*** (0.0781)	0.276*** (0.0835)	0.453*** (0.115)	-0.162** (0.0809)	0.250*** (0.0853)
know_hormaj	-0.311*** (0.0561)	0.275*** (0.0582)	0.404*** (0.0823)	-0.00606 (0.0734)	0.101 (0.0785)	0.186* (0.104)	-0.183** (0.0783)	0.0178 (0.0840)
pid_7pt	-0.0732*** (0.0121)	0.0389*** (0.0122)	0.0163 (0.0170)	-0.0149 (0.0156)	-0.00255 (0.0159)	-0.00144 (0.0212)	-0.0316* (0.0166)	-0.0185 (0.0170)
Constant	4.995*** (0.323)	3.131*** (0.335)	-1.951*** (0.467)	4.536*** (0.608)	2.028*** (0.647)	-1.865** (0.847)	4.979*** (0.717)	0.208 (0.769)
Observations	2,835	2,217	1,335	2,193	1,720	1,064	1,871	1,429
R-squared	0.083	0.061	0.122	0.030	0.058	0.097	0.047	0.059

Table A.15: **Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1).** Models 1-15 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 9 Aidmin-Diff	Model 10 Women-D	Model 11 Women-R	Model 12 Women-Diff	Model 13 Services-D	Model 14 Services-R	Model 15 Services-Diff
year	0.124***	-0.0157	0.0762***	0.0736**	0.0123	0.0700***	-0.0337
	(0.0277)	(0.0222)	(0.0264)	(0.0294)	(0.0179)	(0.0202)	(0.0294)
midterm	0.0658	-0.315***	-0.0980	0.184	-0.0169	-0.125	0.235**
	(0.100)	(0.0839)	(0.0960)	(0.113)	(0.0735)	(0.0782)	(0.111)
age	0.00773***	-0.00136	-0.00105	0.00738**	0.00381*	0.00375*	-0.000867
	(0.00286)	(0.00226)	(0.00267)	(0.00311)	(0.00198)	(0.00215)	(0.00323)
religion	-0.00276	0.0375*	0.0607**	0.0185	0.0314	0.0279	0.00585
	(0.0266)	(0.0222)	(0.0249)	(0.0285)	(0.0194)	(0.0208)	(0.0302)
church_att	0.0126	-0.0354	-0.0390	-0.0326	-0.0111	-0.0208	0.00406
	(0.0269)	(0.0219)	(0.0252)	(0.0297)	(0.0182)	(0.0202)	(0.0297)
urbanism	-0.224***	0.186***	0.0230	-0.0829	-0.0937**	-0.00729	-0.111*
	(0.0584)	(0.0462)	(0.0559)	(0.0643)	(0.0392)	(0.0458)	(0.0642)
education	0.154***	-0.0956**	0.0398	0.203***	0.134***	-0.212***	0.213***
	(0.0540)	(0.0441)	(0.0524)	(0.0599)	(0.0365)	(0.0406)	(0.0589)
race	0.0738	0.0142	-0.0103	0.0681	0.0404	0.0816*	0.0226
	(0.0579)	(0.0489)	(0.0612)	(0.0638)	(0.0337)	(0.0442)	(0.0621)
female	0.119	-0.0246	0.0944	0.176*	0.0417	0.0733	-0.0733
	(0.0906)	(0.0741)	(0.0867)	(0.100)	(0.0625)	(0.0692)	(0.102)
income_pct	-0.0307	-0.0254	-0.0155	-0.0420	-0.0132	0.0306	-0.0733*
	(0.0333)	(0.0273)	(0.0325)	(0.0375)	(0.0246)	(0.0272)	(0.0403)
partic_camp	0.206***	-0.0183	0.0318	0.0319	0.127***	-0.0969**	0.152**
	(0.0557)	(0.0473)	(0.0538)	(0.0614)	(0.0416)	(0.0443)	(0.0639)
voted	0.180	-0.299***	0.160	0.0481	0.00477	-0.212**	0.433***
	(0.111)	(0.0868)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.0748)	(0.0848)	(0.127)
know_hormaj	0.258**	-0.212**	0.0459	0.189*	0.157**	-0.188**	0.472***
	(0.107)	(0.0856)	(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.0657)	(0.0742)	(0.107)
pid_7pt	0.00224	-0.0130	-0.0532***	-0.0717***	0.0386***	0.0219	-0.0103
	(0.0216)	(0.0181)	(0.0206)	(0.0238)	(0.0149)	(0.0159)	(0.0231)
Constant	-3.863***	4.242***	0.978	-2.094**	3.371***	1.663**	1.824
	(0.949)	(0.773)	(0.912)	(1.017)	(0.703)	(0.791)	(1.149)
Observations	888	1,764	1,323	851	1,800	1,297	826
R-squared	0.118	0.044	0.026	0.064	0.037	0.079	0.115

Table A.16: **Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2).** Models 1-15 are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 Likeness	Model 2 Likeness	Model 3 Likeness	Model 4 Cohesion-D	Model 5 Cohesion-D
Congress	-0.950*** (0.030)	-0.746*** (0.038)	-0.766*** (0.035)	1.064*** (0.026)	1.027*** (0.034)
Democratic House		5.109*** (0.565)			1.031** (0.515)
Election Year		4.534*** (0.405)	4.510*** (0.404)		0.066 (0.369)
Demoratic Seat Share			0.087*** (0.008)		
Constant	157.8*** (2.944)	131.9*** (3.943)	115.7*** (4.563)	-40.11*** (2.603)	-37.58*** (3.598)
Observations R-squared	21,216 0.045	19,997 0.054	19,997 0.056	21,216 0.071	19,997 0.057

	Model 6 Cohesion-D	Model 7 Cohesion-R	Model 8 Cohesion-R	Model 9 Cohesion-R
Congress	0.972*** (-0.032)	1.169*** (-0.028)	0.479*** (-0.036)	0.754*** (-0.033)
Democratic House			-15.500*** (-0.537)	
Election Year	0.115 (-0.369)		-1.577*** (-0.385)	-1.734*** (-0.388)
Demoratic Seat Share	-0.008 (-0.007)			-0.155*** (-0.007)
Constant	-29.43*** (-4.168)	-49.06*** (-2.752)	30.33*** (-3.751)	30.84*** (-4.387)
Observations R-squared	19,997 0.057	21,216 0.076	19,997 0.097	19,997 0.08

Table A.17: **Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the House.** Models 1-9 are OLS regressions for votes on all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the House. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 Likeness	Model 2 Likeness	Model 3 Likeness	Model 4 Cohesion-D	Model 5 Cohesion-D
Congress	-0.785*** (0.028)	-0.482*** (0.030)	-0.471*** (0.031)	1.111*** (0.029)	1.066*** (0.033)
Democratic Senate		8.062*** (0.470)			-0.367 (0.510)
Election Year		3.572*** (0.394)	3.650*** (0.395)		-2.504*** (0.428)
Democratic Seat Share			0.519*** (0.032)		
Constant	141.0*** (2.654)	104.9*** (3.058)	81.30*** (3.964)	-45.99*** (2.787)	-40.31*** (3.317)
Observations R-squared	19,158 0.040	18,483 0.049	18,483 0.048	19,158 0.071	18,483 0.064

	Model 6 Cohesion-D	Model 7 Cohesion-R	Model 8 Cohesion-R	Model 9 Cohesion-R
Congress	0.978*** (0.033)	1.132*** (0.030)	0.759*** (0.033)	0.756*** (0.034)
Democratic Senate			-10.740*** (0.517)	
Election Year	-2.481*** (0.427)		-2.628*** (0.433)	-2.736*** (0.434)
Democratic Seat Share	-0.257*** (0.034)			-0.658*** (0.035)
Constant	-18.16*** (4.291)	-48.09*** (2.857)	-3.861 (3.358)	24.60*** (4.359)
Observations R-squared	18,483 0.067	19,158 0.070	18,483 0.076	18,483 0.073

Table A.18: **Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the Senate.** Models 1-9 are OLS regressions for votes on all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the Senate. Two-tailed tests are used: * $<$ .10, ** $<$ .05, *** $<$ .001.

	Model 1 House	Model 2 Senate
Congress	0.008***	0.008***
	(9.45e-05)	(9.53e-05)
Democratic Seat Share	-0.001***	-0.005***
	(2.10e-05)	(1.02e-04)
Constant	-0.314***	-0.243***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	21,225	19,159
R-squared	0.458	0.432

Table A.19: **Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate.** The dependent variable in these regressions is a combination of likeness and cohesion. First, I rescaled likeness and cohesion to range from 0 to 1, rather than 0 to 100. Then, I subtracted the likeness score for each roll call vote from 1, and multiplied the result by the average party cohesion score for each vote. Two-tailed tests are used: * $<$ .10, ** $<$ .05, *** $<$ .001.

	Model 1 abortion	Model 2 active military	Model 3 air transport	Model 4 alcohol	Model 5 cars/trucks
Congress	0.027*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.023** (0.009)	0.010*** (0.002)
Constant	-2.440*** (0.063)	-0.625*** (0.048)	-0.869*** (0.134)	-2.170** (0.882)	-0.850*** (0.179)
Observations	136	204	182	18	44
R-squared	0.933	0.563	0.264	0.310	0.431

	Model 6 comm banks	Model 7 computers/int	Model 8 education	Model 9 electric util	Model 10 entertain
Congress	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.012)	0.013*** (4.42e-04)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.210** (0.091)	0.078 (1.267)	-1.063*** (0.044)	1.276*** (0.302)	-0.506*** (0.171)
Observations	151	25	610	51	83
R-squared	0.115	0.001	0.597	0.190	0.178

	Model 11 environment	Model 12 eth/rac minorities	Model 13 farm/ranch	Model 14 food proc/sales	Model 15 guns
Congress	0.013*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.001)
Constant	-1.063*** (0.053)	-1.624*** (0.312)	0.931*** (0.087)	-1.164*** (0.265)	-1.159*** (0.130)
Observations	631	69	255	42	119
R-squared	0.470	0.328	0.239	0.400	0.471

	Model 16 health ins	Model 17 hospitals/nurs homes	Model 18 human rights	Model 19 immigrants	Model 20 insurance
Congress	0.034*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.010*** (4.78e-04)	0.023 (0.014)
Constant	-2.992*** (0.280)	0.069 (0.302)	0.316*** (0.110)	-0.800*** (0.047)	-2.073 (1.453)
Observations	104	62	73	225	9
R-squared	0.609	0.002	0.054	0.666	0.267

Table A.20: **Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 1).** This table displays results from 40 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 21 labor	Model 22 lawyers/firms	Model 23 LGBT	Model 24 low-income	Model 25 mining
Congress	0.016*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.004)
Constant	-1.236*** (0.146)	-1.108*** (0.073)	-3.555*** (0.423)	-0.627*** (0.067)	-1.803*** (0.418)
Observations	152	400	10	377	33
R-squared	0.429	0.481	0.910	0.331	0.410

	Model 26 oil/gas	Model 27 older	Model 28 ppl w/ disabilities	Model 29 pharmaceuticals	Model 30 railroads
Congress	0.009*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.612*** (0.097)	-0.985*** (0.135)	-0.635** (0.281)	-0.429* (0.235)	-1.452*** (0.156)
Observations	219	161	75	40	123
R-squared	0.249	0.333	0.104	0.144	0.464

	Model 31 rural	Model 32 sea transport	Model 33 securities/invest	Model 34 small business own	Model 35 telecomm
Congress	0.001 (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Constant	0.195 (0.193)	-0.063 (0.113)	-0.217 (0.259)	-1.243*** (0.267)	0.841*** (0.292)
Observations	82	158	77	108	42
R-squared	0.002	0.018	0.032	0.232	0.109

	Model 36 tobacco	Model 37 tourism	Model 38 urban	Model 39 veterans	Model 40 women
Congress	0.013*** (0.003)	4.67e-04 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)
Constant	-1.167*** (0.248)	0.044 (0.266)	-0.479* (0.273)	-0.015 (0.083)	-1.110*** (0.153)
Observations	7	12	37	168	20
R-squared	0.848	0.003	0.154	0.009	0.787

Table A.21: **Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 2).** This table displays results from 40 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 abortion	Model 2 active military	Model 3 air transport	Model 4 alcohol	Model 5 cars/trucks
Congress	0.038*** (0.001)	2.26e-04 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.049* (0.017)	0.005** (0.003)
Constant	-3.588*** (0.106)	0.111* (0.060)	-0.342*** (0.119)	-4.623 (1.699)	-0.361 (0.243)
Observations	114	196	162	4	43
R-squared	0.920	0.001	0.112	0.815	0.100

	Model 6 comm banks	Model 7 computers/int	Model 8 education	Model 9 electric util	Model 10 entertain
Congress	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.118*** (0.021)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.015*** (0.001)
Constant	-0.165* (0.097)	12.910*** (2.223)	-1.768*** (0.061)	0.168 (0.241)	-1.339*** (0.112)
Observations	117	23	554	35	80
R-squared	0.095	0.602	0.683	0.003	0.703

	Model 11 environment	Model 12 eth/rac minorities	Model 13 farm/ranch	Model 14 food proc/sales	Model 15 guns
Congress	0.010*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.001)
Constant	-0.799*** (0.091)	0.289* (0.150)	0.381*** (0.053)	-1.210*** (0.249)	-2.260*** (0.126)
Observations	390	192	437	45	138
R-squared	0.237	0.008	0.028	0.422	0.751

	Model 16 health ins	Model 17 hospitals/nurs homes	Model 18 human rights	Model 19 immigrants	Model 20 insurance
Congress	0.026*** (0.002)	0.024** (0.010)	0.005* (0.003)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.249*** (0.245)	-1.980* (0.942)	-0.422 (0.319)	-0.689*** (0.067)	-0.664*** (0.131)
Observations	124	18	46	217	26
R-squared	0.488	0.261	0.063	0.432	0.596

Table A.22: **Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 1).** This table displays results from 39 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress (tourism dropped due to lack of observations). Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 21 labor	Model 22 lawyers/firms	Model 23 LGBT	Model 24 low-income	Model 25 mining
Congress	0.010***	0.022***	0.026***	0.011***	-0.018***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.700***	-1.941***	-2.375***	-0.787***	1.862***
	(0.103)	(0.080)	(0.484)	(0.084)	(0.538)
Observations	214	289	23	468	18
R-squared	0.283	0.711	0.594	0.247	0.389

	Model 26 oil/gas	Model 27 older	Model 28 ppl w/ disabilities	Model 29 pharmaceuticals	Model 30 railroads
Congress	0.010***	0.022***	0.008***	0.018***	0.020***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.793***	-1.823***	-0.580**	-1.522***	-1.765***
	(0.050)	(0.136)	(0.253)	(0.403)	(0.196)
Observations	475	227	55	21	91
R-squared	0.445	0.514	0.143	0.505	0.520

	Model 31 rural	Model 32 sea transport	Model 33 securities/invest	Model 34 small business own	Model 35 telecomm
Congress	-0.008***	0.003***	0.009***	0.005**	0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.986***	-0.159	-0.641**	-0.256	-1.061***
	(0.232)	(0.105)	(0.283)	(0.206)	(0.198)
Observations	60	115	53	95	28
R-squared	0.140	0.064	0.162	0.060	0.597

	Model 36 tobacco	Model 37 urban	Model 38 veterans	Model 39 women
Congress	0.019***	-0.006***	0.008***	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Constant	-1.636***	0.649***	-0.548***	-0.161
	(0.289)	(0.179)	(0.192)	(0.576)
Observations	27	57	119	24
R-squared	0.653	0.141	0.126	0.015

Table A.23: **Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 2).** This table displays results from 39 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress (tourism dropped due to lack of observations). Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 1 active military	Model 2 air transport	Model 3 cars/trucks	Model 4 comm banks	Model 5 computers/int
Year	-9.85e-05 (8.48e-05)	8.46e-07 (9.82e-06)	-8.43e-07 (7.80e-06)	4.39e-05 (4.01e-05)	9.50e-05*** (2.84e-05)
Republican	0.003 (0.003)	-3.27e-04 (3.41e-04)	8.67e-05 (2.71e-04)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	0.011*** (0.003)	0.001 (3.59e-04)	2.35e-04 (2.85e-04)	-0.001 (0.001)	-3.45e-04 (0.001)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.031	0.016	0.002	0.031	0.218

	Model 6 education	Model 7 electric util	Model 8 entertain	Model 9 environment	Model 10 eth/rac minorities
Year	0.001*** (2.50e-04)	-8.72e-05*** (2.69e-05)	-1.55e-06 (5.54e-06)	-2.38e-05 (1.96e-04)	2.23e-05 (1.20e-04)
Republican	-0.015* (0.009)	-2.88e-04 (0.001)	-1.89e-04 (1.92e-04)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)
Constant	0.012 (0.009)	0.004*** (0.001)	2.42e-04 (2.02e-04)	0.013* (0.007)	0.010** (0.004)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.202	0.168	0.021	0.012	0.019

	Model 11 farm/ranch	Model 12 food proc/sales	Model 13 guns	Model 14 health ins	Model 15 hospitals/nurs homes
Year	-3.13e-04*** (7.12e-05)	-2.95e-06 (9.97e-06)	3.76e-04*** (7.73e-05)	4.06e-04*** (1.42e-04)	-7.33e-06 (3.86e-05)
Republican	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001** (3.46e-04)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.003* (0.001)
Constant	0.018*** (0.003)	0.001** (3.64e-04)	4.98e-04 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003** (0.001)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.296	0.087	0.378	0.154	0.064

Table A.24: **Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 1).** These tables display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue in each address) on the year of the address and the president's party. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 16 human rights	Model 17 immigrants	Model 18 labor	Model 19 lawyers/firms	Model 20 LGBT
Year	2.31e-05	2.77e-05	-0.001***	2.71e-04***	4.69e-05**
	(3.38e-05)	(5.81e-05)	(2.28e-04)	(7.63e-05)	(2.16e-05)
Republican	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.006	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.002*	0.005**	0.033***	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.105	0.025	0.160	0.195	0.096

	Model 21 low-income	Model 22 mining	Model 23 oil/gas	Model 24 older	Model 25 ppl w/ disabilities
Year	4.02e-04***	7.59e-06	2.26e-05	0.001**	-1.47e-06
	(1.47e-04)	(2.62e-05)	(1.83e-04)	(2.73e-04)	(1.85e-05)
Republican	-0.006	0.001	0.002	0.005	3.53e-04
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.001)
Constant	0.010*	2.49e-04	0.005	-0.008	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.001)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.123	0.010	0.002	0.090	0.005

	Model 26 pharmaceuticals	Model 27 railroads	Model 28 rural	Model 29 sea transport	Model 30 securities/invest
Year	6.61e-06	5.68e-06	-2.36e-05	-2.13e-05	2.14e-06
	(5.16e-06)	(1.36e-05)	(2.10e-05)	(2.39e-05)	(8.42e-06)
Republican	-2.13e-04	-4.74e-04	-0.001	-4.37e-05	-1.35e-06
	(1.79e-04)	(4.72e-04)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.92e-04)
Constant	5.35e-05	0.001	0.002**	0.002*	1.35e-04
	(1.89e-04)	(4.97e-04)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(3.07e-04)
	60	60	60	60	60
	0.043	0.018	0.037	0.015	0.001

Table A.25: **Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 2)**. These tables display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue in each address) on the year of the address and the president's party. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

	Model 31 small business own	Model 32 tobacco	Model 33 urban	Model 34 veterans	Model 35 women
Year	9.23e-06	6.19e-05***	-2.28e-05	-1.76e-04**	7.05e-05**
	(3.33e-05)	(1.98e-05)	(6.84e-05)	(6.63e-05)	(2.96e-05)
Republican	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.003	-0.003	-4.88e-04
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.003**	-1.85e-04	0.007***	0.010***	-2.93e-04
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.015	0.204	0.027	0.161	0.091

Table A.26: **Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 3)**. These tables display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue in each address) on the year of the address and the president's party. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.

Year	DNC Paid Staff	RNC Paid Staff	Source
1935		11	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1952	251	386	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1953	59	98	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1954	77	107	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1955	59	108	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1956	201	250	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1957	74	85	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1958	100	80	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1959	75		Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 2
1960	375	352	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1961	75	89	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1962	107	100	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1963	70	124	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1964	302	618	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1965	85	117	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1966	92	116	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1967	85	138	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1968	317	484	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1969	87	191	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1970	75	100	Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 6
1972	50		Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1976		200	Klinkner 1994: 144
1977	40	220	Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1980		350	Klinkner 1994: 144
1982	90		Klinkner 1994: 165 (staff cut from 90 to 75 this year)
1997	80	250	Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 32
1998	80	250	Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 33
1999	80	250	Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 34

Table A.27: **RNC and DNC Staff Size**. This table uses data from various sources to track RNC and DNC staff size over time.