# The Cities on the Hill: Urban Politics in National Institutions

**Thomas K. Ogorzalek**

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# ABSTRACT

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# Thomas K. Ogorzalek

The contemporary "Red-Blue" political alignment is characterized by a national divide between cities and rural areas. This urbanicity divide is stronger than it has ever been in our modern history, but it began with the development of an urban political order that changed the Democratic party during the New Deal era. These cities, despite being the site of serious, multidimensional conflicts at home, have been remarkably cohesive in the way they represent themselves in national politics, forming "city delegations" whose members attend to more than their own district's concerns. These city delegations tend to cohesively represent a "city" interest that often coincides with what we think of as liberalism.

Using evidence from Congress, where cities represented themselves within the nation, and a unique dataset measuring the urbanicity of House districts over time, this dissertation evaluates the strength of this urban political order and argues that city delegation cohesion, which is a basic strategic tool if cities are to address their urgent governance needs through action at higher levels of government, is fostered by local institutions developed to provide local political order. Importantly, these integrative institutions also helped foster the development of civil rights liberalism by linking constituencies composed largely of groups that were not natural allies on such issues. This development in turn contributed to the departure of the Southern Democratic bloc, and to our contemporary political environment.

This combination—of diversity and liberalism, supported by institutions that make allies of constituencies that might easily be rivals—has significant implications for an America characterized by deep social difference and political fragmentation.

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# Acknowledgements

All dissertations are a sort of summing up, and this is no exception. In trying to bring together all of the things I am interested in—cities, history, race, geography, power—I have driven myself crazy at times over the past few years, while at others I couldn't imagine doing anything else for a living. It only makes sense when I consider the dear friends with whom I've shared the last 8 (!) years, while I found time around the edges to figure out how to turn a title into a dissertation.

I could not have begun this project without the inspiration, guidance, and material support I have received along the way from new colleagues and friends during my time at Columbia and the New School. My many colleagues at the New School, especially Victoria Hattam, David Plotke, Genaro Lozano, and Columbus Mavhunga, introduced me to the profession and the field, and in their own work and through memories of old conversations I am reminded that it isn't entirely necessary to leave one's normative perspective at the door, no matter what they say, and that research can be for something as much as it can be about something.

The many visitors to the urban politics workshop at Columbia have helped me gain intuitions about how to think about politics in cities. I am thankful for the attention and constructive comments given by those generous enough with their resources and time to invite me to present primitive versions of this project without condemning it to the dustbin. These include participants in the Saguaro/Manchester SCHMI Summer Workshop (especially Jane Green, Robert Putnam, Tom Sander, Ed Fieldhouse, Louise Kennedy Converse, and Jenny Birchall); conference discussant McGee Young; political science departments at Syracuse University (especially Tom Keck, Kristi Andersen, and Shana Gardarian), Northwestern University (especially Dan Galvin, Tony Chen, Ben Page, and Jim Farr), and the Kennedy School (especially Moshik Temkin, Jennifer Hochschild, Alberto Abadie, and Ryan Enos). Their advice and tips improved the project in many ways.

At Columbia, I have become aware of the possibilities for working deeply within a field but also of the importance of maintaining a breadth of interests that can only flourish in a welcoming, friendly community of scholars. I owe the University and the wider community there a great debt. It is impossible to overstate how lucky I feel to have had the opportunity to interact and

work closely with such a group of talented and generous colleagues and mentors, who have all influenced my work and perspective. Justin Phillips has been a constantly available resource, willing to nudge me away from flights of fancy but always encouraging of new ideas and a perfect advisor for a new student trying to gain his feet in the academy. John Huber took many chances on me, including letting me borrow his computer for three years; upon return I am afraid it will be far less useful than the theoretical, technical, and professional insights I gained from working with him during that time. Bob Shapiro, though busier than anyone else, was also the most available for a word of advice or help, even on the simplest matters, without judgment. He is the kind of colleague we should all be. Rob Lieberman, in addition to writing the essay and collecting the cities list that gave birth to the ideas I try to explore here, has been an enthusiastic and welcome presence throughout my time at Columbia, brimming with ideas himself and engaging when we discussed my own. Meredith Sadin and Kate Krimmel have always been available for an encouraging word, a conversation to work through a puzzle, or simply a therapeutic loop through the park. Paul Frymer has helped me keep a level head, but encouraged the risk-taking that comes less naturally to an aging academic like me. Dorian Warren has been an invaluable friend and colleague at Columbia, always generous with time, advice, and attention on any subject, and a perfect companion at the only fancy Manhattan dinners I've had in the last eight years. Ira Katznelson, beyond the inspiration I have always drawn from his writing and thinking, has been a wonderful advisor and mentor. His wit, insight, work ethic, and genuine care for others have been constant, and his support, in so many ways, has kept me in the game, and he will always be my model not only of professional and scholarly life, but of urbanity itself. Would that all students were so lucky.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and Quinn.

Part I

# Dissertation Chapters

# Chapter 1

# Introduction: An Even Playing Field?

In the summer of 1964, rural representatives were on the defensive. Over the previous half-decade, landmark Supreme Court cases including *Baker v. Carr* and *Reynolds v. Sims* had enshrined the principle of "one person, one vote." Throughout the 20th century, representation at the state and national level had been distorted, privileging townships or territory over population. Representative institutions did not reflect the metropolitan reality of American life. Malapportionment was particularly egregious in the South and West, and in state legislatures, but it existed in all regions and in national congressional districts as well. The principle used to defend such inequities was representation by place: the idea that each county, or township, should be represented in a legislature on a roughly equal basis (the same principle guides representation in the U.S. Senate), even though the industrial revolution had prompted population explosion in cities and away from the countryside. As a result, it was not unusual for rural voters to have about twenty times as much representation per capita as city voters.[1] In essence, a 20th century polity was being represented by 18th or 19th century legislatures. The Warren Court waded into this explicitly political "thicket" and took steps to remedy this imbalance. The result would be a significant shift in representational power away from the countryside and toward cities and suburban areas.

The ruralists did not take the mandated changes to the system of representation lying down, and presented their case against equal apportionment forcefully, even recommending a constitutional amendment. Former Representative John Vorys (R-OH) attempted to explain the justice of malapportionment favoring rural areas over the city. After a long career as a legislator in the House and in both chambers of the Ohio legislature, Vorys observed that "Those of us who have served in the state legislature know of the power that is more than numerical that goes with the organization of the big cities." To buttress this claim, he quoted at length from a 1930 treatise on "The History and Theory of Lawmaking by Representative Government" by his former House colleague Robert Luce (R-MA), who wrote that

> the great increase of effective force which comes from the election of a large number
> of representatives of one city—*representatives who represent, not, in fact, their separate*

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[1] Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008), p. 30. More broadly, the authors chronicle the historical roots of malapportionment, the political and judicial prologue to the voting equality decisions of the early 1960s, and the effects of subsequent changes in representation.

*districts, but the whole city, representatives who are responsible to the same public opinion, and, in fact represent but one combined interest of the citizens of the city*—the great accumulation of power created by that combination so far outweighed the effective power of a great number of scattered representatives of widely divided centers of population, small centers of population, that a difference in the ratio…went but a small way toward equalization.[2]

Ruralists, worried not only about the supposed corruption of the cities, but also about the potential power of cohesive city blocs, were arguing that malapportionment was an important preemptive remedy against better organized, more united urban forces. To the modern ear, the worry that cities, in August of 1964, would be too *united* to be defeated in legislative combat seems curious. If anything, this is an era famous for urban fracture and often violent conflict. Harlem, Rochester, and Jersey City had already had riots that summer; Elizabeth, Chicago, and Philadelphia would have their own later that month. This was a moment of particularly dramatic division, but cities have always been the sites of deep pluralism, where the limits of toleration and political order have been tested, and where the broader community's interests are not naturally apparent, because so many individuals' interests conflict and clash.[3] Why did places with such obvious divisions inspire such concern that, without an institutional advantage, rural interests would be unfairly overwhelmed?

Also in the room that day was someone from exactly the kind of urban organization that Vorys and his rural allies feared. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the City of Chicago was Richard J. Daley. From his positions as head of the Cook County Central Democratic Committee and Mayor of Chicago, Daley was the kind of boss that reformers and ruralists railed about. Discipline, loyalty, and unity were the fundamental principles of the Chicago organization, from the precinct to City Hall to Springfield to Capitol Hill.[4] No stranger to state politics himself

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[2]Emphasis added. "Apportionment of State Legislatures," Subcom No. 5, House Committee on Judiciary. Aug. 6, 1964, HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 504-505. Perhaps Vorys was fortunate that Luce was not there to read the quote himself, having died in 1946. The passage is clearly taken out of context, for Luce (a Boston Republican with evident affection for cities) would probably not have wanted his work to be used in service of such a cause. On the page previous to the one quoted by Vorys, Luce writes that "the most powerful motive [for the continuation of malapportionment] has been jealousy, suspicion, and fear of the cities," and later argues that the cohesive power of the cities was overrated in the case of Massachusetts. Luce (1930), pp.364-367

[3]Katznelson (2009)

[4]Snowiss (1966)

(he had previously served in the state legislature as a loyal lieutenant of Anton Cermak and the Kelly-Nash machine), Daley saw to it that "members of Cook County's uniformly Democratic delegation to the state legislature took their marching orders" from city hall on the issues of the day. As a result of this devout (or blind) loyalty, Chicago's Democrats were able to punch above their weight in a statehouse where they were typically outnumbered.[5]

Though the specific subject that day was state politics, the reapportionment revolution had similar implications for national politics as well, as the logic of the Supreme Court decisions was shortly applied to both legislative levels. Urban-rural conflict had always simmered, and sometimes bubbled over, in American politics, but the 1960s was an inflection point, in which an urban political order took positions that widened the political gap between city and countryside that had opened up decades before. A closer look at Daley's position that day, given the context of the 1960s and his role as the powerful political boss of the most important Democratic city, illuminates important themes about the place of cities in American politics in a moment of dramatic social and political change.

Citing the heightened governance demands of cities, Daley said that rural areas should not be "given special and disproportionate weight in the legislature because they have special problems. For years, the problems of cities and suburbs—metro areas—and their needs for government aid have been at least as great as those of rural areas."[6] Since the onset of industrialization and urbanization, the recurrent and urgent governance problems of American cities had not become easier to solve. Rather, the increasing vulnerability of cities within the national political economy had become apparent, and the "special problems" of rural areas paled dramatically in comparison to the continuous economic upheaval, intermittent violence, and great potential for social ills inherent in large, dense, heterogeneous communities. Increasingly, cities were themselves on the defensive, and they sought external aid to shore up finances, deliver services, and keep the social peace. Removing institutional roadblocks that kept cities from state-level success was an important priority.

Daley continued:

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[5]These marching orders were communicated via "idiot lists" of positions to be taken Biles (1995), p.61
[6]HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 473

> Legislative bodies must mirror the views of the citizens within the jurisdiction. This does not justify policy-making bodies being set up in such a way that minority interests of any type are represented in any way other than as justified by their relative numbers. They remain a minority interest until such time as they convince a majority of the people that their view is the one that should prevail.

The minority Daley was referring to here was rural populations, who despite their dwindling numbers held preponderant institutional power in legislatures. But large cities did not constitute a majority of legislative seats, either, so the urban position was also a minority one. More, their positions on important issues of the day often put them at the end of the ideological spectrum. This was especially true on issues related to the role of the state in the economy: the most interventionist perspective was formulated and led by this urban bloc.

Nonethless, despite their strategic situation of nonpivotal positioning, and even though handicapped by malapportionment, city representatives had found a way to lead a majority coalition and remake national politics. For a generation, they had at many important moments managed to persuade representatives of other kinds of places that theirs was the view that "should prevail" in many areas. Urban liberals had set many of the terms of debate since the beginning of the New Deal, forging what would turn out to be an "urban interlude," an exceptional period in American history in which city forces seem to have been unusually successful in shaping the national state and policy.[7] These urbanites, who were mainly Democrats and would find a more natural home in that party over time, combined early in the New Deal to forge an urban political order that was the driving force behind much of what we call liberalism today.[8] Never before in national politics had such a distinctively urban bloc taken shape within a single party, and never before had city issues risen to make up such a large share of the national agenda. In a tenuous alliance with the largely

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[7]Lieberman (2009), Ethington and Levitus (2009)

[8]Plotke (1996) defines a political order as "a durable mode of organizing and exercising political power at the national level, with distinct institutions, policies, and discourses." I use the term similarly, but in this text I focus on a specifically *urban* political order, which includes many of Plotke's distinctive forces (such as labor unions, whose numbers came mainly from cities) but emphasizes the conditions of city life and governance that predispose leaders to the set of political commitments known (and explicitly defined by Plotke) as progressive liberalism. This urban order is not quite as powerful an assemblage of persons and political forces as Plotke's Democratic order, which is closer conceptually to a "regime," influential enough to dominate politics for a period of time. The urban political order consisted of cities, their members, their representatives, and their advocates, which won some battles but obviously lost others all along the way. In this, my use of the urban "political order" is more akin to the "institutional orders" in Smith and King (2005), which exist concurrently with competing and opposed orders.

rural and underdeveloped South, which extracted its own share of federal largess, cities worked to create policies that would alleviate some of the pressure of continual fiscal and social crises at home, which were brought on by such massive external forces as global economic collapse, wartime austerity, immigration, state-imposed budget requirements, economic restructuring, and the automobile, among others. It is perhaps ironic, then, that in arguing for fairer apportionment in state legislatures, Daley and his urban allies had already had some (always limited and incomplete, but significant) success getting "sympathetic understanding" for "the problems of the urban citizen and community" in national politics.

By 1964, however, this sympathy seemed to be vanishing. Almost from the beginning of the New Deal, a conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had been a regular feature of national politics, throwing a roadblock in the way of urban Democrats' plans not only to advance civil rights for African Americans (an unacceptable outcome for Southerners), but also to expand national urban policies and continue the national pro-growth initiatives that had sustained industrial cities through the past three decades.[9] Daley's testimony reveals the urban Democrats' response to the reapportionment mandate in the light of their troublesome coalition dynamics. Judicial Committee Chair Emanuel Celler, a longtime Brooklyn Democrat, observed that suburbs might find common cause with the cities:

> *Celler*: [Maybe if] the suburban areas would have greater representation. . . they might be able to see because of being closer proximity to Chicago the needs of Chicago and might join up with Chicago and therefore give Chicago what it deserves?

> *Daley*: I think that would be a fair assumption. Not only that, we overlook other facts. There are metropolitan areas downstate who have the same problem. There are metropolitan areas that account for 76 percent of the population. . . Champaign, Urbana, Davenport, Rock Island, Moline, Peoria, Springfield, East St. Louis.

This exchange by two pillars of the urban political order, one a congressman and the other a mayor, touched on the new alignment that would take shape as the South drifted away. Here again, the historical moment of this hearing is important, because the 1960 census revealed that

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[9]Mollenkopf (1983), Ch. 2, Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)

the large cities that had been the heart of the liberal alliance in Congress were no longer growing. The future lay in the rapidly expanding suburbs, which have since absorbed a full majority of the nation's population. Throughout the New Deal era, the areas outside large cities had been strictly Republican territory, between largely Democratic cities and mixed rural constituencies. But it was the suburbs that had the most to gain from the apportionment revolution. Since 1964, there has been a "maturation" of national partisan conflict along the urban-rural continuum: the cities have remained Democratic (and some have become moreso), suburban constituencies became less uniformly Republican, and rural areas shifted toward the Republicans, though many smaller cities remain Democratic, as Daley had hoped. No longer do cities leapfrog their suburbs to find allies; their bedfellows are far less strange, in terms of the kinds of places they come from—the "next-most" urban instead of the least urban. The vision of politics that Daley hoped for was based on interests putatively shared by densely settled communities; today's politics, characterized by greater ideological coherence and polarization, was the result.

Finally, from his place in the Democratic Party, linking local and national organizations, a wide range of terrifically diverse social groups with a stable city political order, Daley was situated at an historic crossroads. As the urban interlude gave way to an era of suburban demographic explosion, Daley was the country's most powerful mayor and one of the most powerful Democrats in the country. He was both of these things because he was the head of a strong local party organization, in which loyalty was a primary value and in which political order was prioritized over more coherent ideological programs, often to the dismay of liberals and other reformers.

The traditional party's style of politics was becoming almost as anachronistic as the feudal system of representation he had come to attack. They had been the dominant institutional form in 19th-century city governance, but in most places they had long since passed their prime by the 1960s, and the places where they were still strong were losing people. Population shifts, institutional reforms, and social change had sapped their strength and contributed to their demise.[10] What the traditional parties had done well was integrate politics across the face of the city, assembling many fractious groups and constituencies and serving as an institution that integrated

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[10]Bridges (1984), Mayhew (1986), Erie (1988)

politics both horizontally (linking constituencies across the city) and vertically (linking actors at different levels of government). This integration provided order and authority where the possibilities for each were quite uncertain. Without such binding institutions, Vorys may have had little to worry about—the subdivisions of a city would have little in common and no more organization than any other collection of districts.

This is a study about city representation in national politics, and the development of a cohesive liberal bloc, with roots in cities that anchor one pole of our current national partisan alignment characterized by a significant and increasing urban-rural divide. Key to this story is a puzzle presented by the very conditions that make cities interesting places to study or govern: how do cities—many cities—remain unified in politics, when they are the sites of so many kinds of difference and sets of conflicting interests? Without a "natural" basis for political unity, and under conditions that are believed to *undermine* liberal policies of many kinds, how can we explain the emergence and strengthening of "Blue America," a political alignment that is "doubly liberal" on issues pertaining to the economy and culture?

This ability to consistently unite representatives of many heterogeneous constituencies, many of whom did not get along for many reasons, in support of a "city interest" (which often corresponded with the "liberal" position) was what worried Vorys and his rural allies, and is a major theme of this study. A significant part of the explanation relates to city institutions that foster political cohesion in the face of social division, and allow for political conflict to be resolved locally and for a unified representation of the city in higher levels of government.

## 1.1 City Organization and National Party

Cohesion within and across cities has been a key tool in the promotion and defense of urban prerogatives in national politics, but the organizations that often fostered this cohesion were not always obviously liberal. In fact, the traditional party organizations (and the corruption they often spawned) are sometimes thought of as *obstacles* to progressive or liberal politics, but their full

story is more complicated. Many of the most ardent programmatic liberals, including government reformers, intellectuals, union leaders, and African American activists, were indeed often at loggerheads with the traditional organizations and their leaders, especially on local issues. As the local center of power, these parties had little interest in radically changing the game, so were often reluctant to adopt institutional reforms or to consider issues of justice or equality paramount in their political calculations. Sustained by a politics of material exchange, and what their critics described as a "self-regarding" ethos, they were also notorious fonts of corruption. The strongest machines were autonomous organizations, able to play the electoral game so well that their re-election became detached from responsiveness to their constitutents.[11] On racial issues especially, many of these organizations seemed particularly unresponsive to the needs of African Americans, whose life circumstances rarely improved much under machine rule.[12] From this perspective, getting a lecture on the principles of representative democracy from a leader as notoriously autocratic as Richard J. Daley would seem a surreal experience.

While the machines were assailed from the left, they were also often attacked from the right, and here is where the complexity of the traditional party organization hits home. Because while they are notorious for their venality and for their ideological "flexibility," the urban machine tradition—its personnel and its mass base—shared much in common with more self-consciously liberal urbanites when it came to national politics. When the time came for counting votes in national politics, urban "liberals" and their more "traditional" local rivals often became indistinguishable. Both groups' shared concerns for their urban constituents and communities, and their vision for America's urban future, made them allies in a nascent urban political order, which took shape as the core political change of the New Deal.

Regional rivalries also melted away at the national level. Before the urban interlude, city leaders had been focused on local issues and wary of both outside intervention and other cities. Historians of the urban political order have noted that "united action by the nation's cities to induce the Federal Government to assist cities was still unknown in 1932," but this changed quickly as the common experiences of the Depression and hostility from rural-dominated state legislatures

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[11]Trounstine (2008)
[12]Pinderhughes (1987)

guided cities to take up a stake in national politics as allies.[13] Over the next three decades, this political order, anchored by the traditional party organizations of the major cities such as New York and Chicago, pursued policies that would help manage problems at home, including labor regulation that benefited industrial workers and unions, aid that cities needed more than other kinds of places, and relief from the foulest of racist practices for African Americans. Even as they were weakening—perhaps *because* they were weakening—these anachronistic political institutions and their leaders managed to reshape American politics, and played a key role in establishing the content and style of what we call liberalism today.[14]

These very same policies undermined the cities' national alliance with the South. From even before the beginning of the New Deal, a fraught relationship between the least compatible political forces in the country had been held together by a national-level accord. Though urban and Southern Democrats both enjoyed the benefits of majority status in the national coalition, they were in true agreement on very little. This alliance was held together in part by a pattern of policymaking that created large-scale interventions by the national government but protected many local prerogatives in policy implementation. Urbanites especially wanted these interventions, but they provided desired goods to all coalition members (in disproportionally large amounts to rural Democratic constituencies), tempered by local or partial administration of the programs, which the South relied upon to protect its white supremacist order.[15] By the 1960s, this alliance was hanging by a thread, and the South continued to respond defiantly to civil rights legislation, inching away from the party they had solidly supported since Reconstruction. While race was an issue that divided Americans in all kinds of communities, the *representatives* of large cities—whose home districts were the site of violent and destructive racial conflict throughout this era, especially in the 1960s—were not divided. They remained united on race, despite the division in their streets and city halls, despite the temptation to keep winning the dominant national majorities of the past generations, and despite the fact that very few of them had many constituents who were not white. This urban unity, especially strong among representatives of the very cities where tradi-

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[13]Gelfand (1975), p.28
[14]Buenker (1973), Ch.6
[15]Bateman and Taylor (2007), Lieberman (2001), Katznelson (2005)

tional party organizations were often seen as enemies of racial egalitarianism, would lead to our contemporary politics. The sources and demonstration of cohesive liberalism are the subject of the next four chapters; for the moment, I briefly turn to a snapshot of the "Red-Blue" divide that was its outcome.

## 1.2 City Mouse, Country Mouse: Seeing Red and Blue More Clearly

In 1964, Daley and Vorys were talking about state politics, where urban-rural conflict has often been most obvious. But the national urban-rural divide was growing as well. While today it is a clear reality, there has not always been a relationship between place-type and national partisanship. Back to Jefferson and Hamilton, and probably before, a thematic city-country rivalry has always been present, but—probably because the population was predominantly agrarian socially and decentralized politically—neither city nor country went distinctively toward one party or the other, and no major party relied much on cities for their national success. This changed early in the New Deal, as cities across the country tilted decisively toward the Democrats, playing a crucial role in Roosevelt's electoral successes and building a cohesive bloc-of-blocs in Congress. But this change was not just about shifting power away from the party of Hoover; it had important substantive implications for national policy as well. Faced with a variety of governance challenges associated with modernity—and made obvious by the hard times of the Depression—cities reached beyond their borders for the first time to reshape American politics, introducing a distinctively urban agenda, the modern American version of liberalism, to national politics.

Political scientists attentive to geography have seen a strengthening relationship between place and partisanship in the electorate, leading to the conclusion that the population has increasingly "sorted" itself along partisan lines since the 1970s.[16] These studies evaluate county-level shifts in partisanship, and do not look specifically at an urban-rural divide. Attending to place character,

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[16]Bishop (2008), Tam Cho, Gimpel and Hui (2008), but see Abrams and Fiorina (2012) for a counterpoint. Using data from lower levels of aggregation, Chen and Rodden (1992) illustrate that this partisan spatial sorting is asymmetrical, with Democrats more heavily concentrated in cities than Republicans are in outlying areas.

Nall (2010) finds that the divide between many cities and their suburbs grew after the onset of widespread highway construction, which made suburban development easier.[17] These findings are an important part of the story, but if we go back further and track the development of the urban-rural divide in national politics, there is more to the narrative.[18]

Today, the place character cleavage is more important than ever before in national politics, contributing to our current state of political polarization. More than at any time in recent history, an individual or representative's position on one important issue gives us information about their position on other, seemingly unconnected, controversies of the day.[19] This polarization is the undercurrent of the "Red and Blue America" narrative that pervades much political discussion. These issue positions and partisan identities have also become more related to place character. The urban-rural cleavage is apparent at several levels, and a significant portion of this Red-Blue polarization is related to place character and the urban-rural continuum: the more urban the unit of analysis, the more likely it is to tilt toward the Democratic Party. This is probably not a controversial idea for close observers, but the national narrative often focuses on states, as reflected in the presidential electoral-college maps of the past three cycles.[20] At that level, we can see this divide impressionistically from the series of Red-Blue maps that have been on display after the past three presidential elections.

For instance, Figure 1.1 displays the well-known map from the 2008 Presidential election, which resembles the map from the previous two electoral cycles, with some changes at the margins. The industrial Northeast and Midwest were joined by the West Coast, which also has large central-city populations. Stopping at the state level, pundits often settle on regional cultural tropes and stereotypes (think Starbucks vs. Wal-Mart, sails vs. outboard motors) in explaining the lines

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[17]By "place character," I refer to where a place falls on an urban-suburban-rural continuum, in terms of built environment, density and heterogeneity of population and use, and the size of the local polity. I alternatively use the term urbanicity, defined below and developed in the next chapter, to refer to roughly the same thing. Others have used "cityness" or "urbanity" instead, to refer to similar concepts. See Sassen (2005), and the American National Elections Study. Sassen's "cityness" is too related to an ineffable individual kind of cosmopolitanism, and the more conventional "urbanity" is also weighted with normative implications because of the putative desirability of being "urbane." Martin (1976) operationalizes "urbanicity" as a particular county-level measure of demography and development; I agree with his underlying meaning but do not apply it in the same way or to the same units.

[18]This is the subject of Chapter 3.

[19]Shapiro and Bafumi (2009), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)

[20]See, for instance, Gelman (2008), which makes claims about how relationships differ across "Red and Blue" states.

Figure 1.1: **2008 Red State, Blue State.** 2008 State-level Presidential election winners, Obama in blue, McCain in red. *Source: Mark Newman et al, University of Michigan.*

of political conflict. Region certainly plays an important role, a fact that is not at all unusual in American history, but a closer look reveals a pattern: all of the consistently Blue states are home to large cities (except some in New England). There is also a complimentary pattern within states and across regions at the county level, as in Figure 1.2, which shows the unevennesss within both Red and Blue states—within almost all states, urban areas were more strongly Democratic areas.[21] Urban counties tended to be more Democratic, rural places tended to be more Republican, and suburban places were somewhere in between: "purple." This is of course perfectly compatible with the state-level map above. After all, when we think of big cities, certainly the "Blue" states contain most of the paradigmatic examples in America: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit. But the trend was apparent *within* states as well. In Texas, Austin, Dallas, and Houston were bluer than most of that state, while in blue states like California and New York

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[21]These maps may be difficult to see in grayscale. Full color versions are available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election/2008/

Figure 1.2: **Red County, Blue County.** County-level voting in the 2008 presidential election (Blue for Obama, Red for McCain). *Source: Mark Newman et al, University of Michigan.*

the populous urban counties were bluer than the rest of *those* states.[22] It is difficult to see clearly from the county-level map, so Figure 1.3 plots county-level vote share for Obama against the natural log of county population density for twenty-five large states, with local fit lines to visualize trends. While the baseline level of support for Obama varies widely by state, in almost every case, densely populated counties voted for Obama much more than sparsely populated ones, often by 20 to 30 percent, as we can see by the fit lines sloping up, often sharply, on the right-hand side of the graphs. [23]

These aggregate data tell us about places, but not about individuals. [24] Digging beneath the

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[22]Notable exceptions include rural areas with large African American, Latino, or Native American populations in the Deep South, Southwest, and West; Vermont and Iowa, which are "unexpectedly" Democratic; and Phoenix's Maricopa County

[23]Again, this is consistent with the asymmetrical geography of **?**. In some states the relationship is noisier than in others, and the dots are not weighted by population: a few dots further to the right on this graph may carry the same weight as a cloud on the left. Note that the trend is not monotonic in several Southern states. Gastner and Newman (2004) find similar spatial relationships in other recent presidential elections elections.

[24]Trends and relationships at the aggregate level may mask individual-level processes. For instance, one of the paradoxes of the Red-Blue divide has to do with the at-odds relationship between income and partisanship at different levels of analysis. See Bartels (2006) and Gelman (2008).

Figure 1.3: **Support for Obama by population density in twenty-five states.** 2008 County-level support for Obama by population density for various states. In most cases, support for Obama is relatively high in densely populated counties. *Source: Calculated from USA Today (Election Results), U.S. Census (County demographics). States with few people or few counties excluded.*

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limits of aggregation, the urban-rural cleavage is even more vivid; it clearly operates at the individual level as well. Figure 1.4 maps the local probability of voting for a John Kerry in particular places using geocoded data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, which had a huge number of respondents and is thus more geographically representative than the typical national sample.[25] The Red Country-Blue City divide is striking here, and these maps may more accurately portray the political landscape than do the previous ones, which stopped at the aggregate level. Here, blue clusters are almost exclusively around cities, and almost all large cities are blue (meaning high levels of support for Kerry against Bush).[26]

Clearly understanding that the political geography of Red and Blue America is rooted not only in region or state but in place character, and focusing on the urban-rural cleavage changes our perspective on important political developments of the past century. While country-city tension has always been present in American politics, partisan conflict has never been as structured around place character as it is today. To an unprecedented extent, the Democrats are the party of a nationwide city political order in the electorate and in the halls of national representative institutions. At the same time, while major parties have often been dominated by rural interests, seldom has a party been as weak in cities as Republicans are today. Among individual Americans, this partisan difference is related to racial and class identities, and to attitudes toward politics and religion, but it is not reducible to these traits.[27] Urbanicity is an independent and powerful concept for helping to explain the substance and style of contemporary political conflict in the United States.

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[25] And which also included information about respondents' ZIP codes.

[26] A notable exception is Arizona, where the urbanicity pattern present virtually everywhere else is reversed—Phoenix is more Republican than its hinterland. Creating the same figure with white voters only (not pictured) reveals that support for Obama among whites was similarly patterned across space, albeit generally at a lower level—again, urbanicity is not equivalent to race, but it is mildly correlated, and race certainly remains important.

[27] For instance, if we use statistical methods to "control" for traits commonly associated with vote choice, such as race, ideology, region, income, education level, age, sex, and religiosity, the average urbanite was *ceteris paribus* still 8 to 9 percent more likely to support Obama in 2008. (Author's logit analysis of 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey)

Figure 1.4: **Red countryside, Blue city.** Local probability of voting for Bush (Light grey) or Kerry (Dark grey/black) in 2004. Almost all dark patches are cities. Measures are predicted values of a linear geographically-weighted regression with no predictors. For a clearer, full-color "Red-Blue" version, see http://www.columbia.edu/~tko2103/Bushvote2004color.htm *Source: Calculated from 2004 NAES*

## 1.3 Cities and Polarization

The increasing strength of the place character divide has proceeded at the same time that the ideologies associated with membership in the two major American parties have apparently become more coherent. For much of the 20th century, national Democrats and Republicans were among the strangest of political parties: in Congress they did not vote as cohesive blocs, and at times they seemed to include wildly disparate elements. This is no longer the case. As has been widely reported, national partisan politics has become polarized (or at least "sorted"). There are no longer many major issue areas on which the parties are internally divided, or on which they overlap, as was the case (most notably on race) during the middle of the 20th century.[28] While the conflict about the size of government used to be cross-cut by other issues—race, region, and "culture" among them—today's political elites have become consistently divided on a much wider range of substantive issues. Democrats are all "doubly liberal" on the economic and cultural issues that reach the agenda, while Republicans are all "doubly conservative."

The sources of this polarization, and the mechanisms by which it spreads and is reproduced, are a central area of inquiry for political scientists. Studies of partisan realignment help us relate the substance of contemporary polarization to the dramatic midcentury rift in the Democratic Party, which was driven by issues related to race and civil rights.[29] The substance and "teams" of today's heated partisan conflict are the modern elaboration of that split, with Republicans anchored by the South and Democrats anchored in large cities. To a great extent, the contemporary alignment simply reflects the logic of that intraparty conflict, with factions divided now as then over race, labor, and the proper shape of the state.[30] The ways that seemingly unrelated or new issues "line up," however, seems a bit arbitrary until we examine the relationship between urbanicity—the quality of being like a city—and these issues. Urban places require different things from government, and foster different predispositions on the part of citizens and leaders, in such

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[28]Though there remains significant debate on how polarized the electorate is, or how polarization spreads, or how far apart the parties are, there is consensus within this subfield on the fact that there is little overlap between contemporary Republicans and Democrats. See McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Shapiro and Bafumi (2009), Fiorina, Pope and Abrams (2004)

[29]Carmines and Stimson (1989), Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)

[30]Katznelson and Kryder (1993), Sitkoff (1978), Mollenkopf (1983),Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)

varied policy areas as market interventions for economic management, the treatment of groups in space, or adjustment to new social norms and phenomena. Just as the partisan alignments have come to reflect the place-character divide more than they used to, so too has the content and style of national politics, but the cities have been "blue" since long before there were Blue Dogs. When Daley spoke in 1964 of developing political alliances out of common interest with the suburbs and smaller cities, his vision was of a party (with big-city politicos at the reins, no doubt) which would support policies compatible with urbanicity. Today the Democrats are that party, though the alliance may not be as powerful, all-encompassing, or supportive of city-friendly policies as "the Boss" would have preferred.

## 1.4   Cities on the Hill: Motivation and Outline of the Project

To better understand a politics increasingly polarized by place character, it is helpful to contextualize city representation in national politics. What does it mean for one pole of our national alignment to be rooted in cities, the other in more sparsely populated places, and how does this relate to the content and development of our current era of polarization? An understanding of cities and their institutions can help clarify why our politics look the way they do, and how they got that way.

Proponents of American exceptionalism often refer to the United States as a metaphorical "City Upon a Hill," in describing the country's potentially exemplary place in world history. In this study, however, I turn to a relatively exceptional period in American history, the urban interlude, and examine the self-presentation of actual cities on "the Hill"—in Congress. While we often think of cities as the *object* of powerful forces—things "happen to" cities—we should also remember that cities can serve as a model for the world (and the nation), and impact politics at the national level. Cities truly "cannot be hid," and how cities present themselves, and how they deal with important political issues, can shape broader conversations and political struggles. The urban interlude,

from the early 1930s to the 1960s, was a time of unusual city strength in national politics.[31] In this study, I use evidence of how this urban vision was communicated to the nation through representative institutions on Capitol Hill, as city representatives drove the New Deal political order, characterized by a multidimensional progressive liberalism that orients one pole of American politics today. By turning an analytical spotlight on the relationship between the characteristics of cities and the distinctive way in which these communities represent themselves in national politics, we can better understand the origins of the place character divide in contemporary American politics, including changes which were based on a city alliance and which pre-date the massive migration to the suburbs.

Cities have not always been politically distinctive in national politics, at least not in partisan terms, and scholarly attention has focused with intermittent intensity on cities and their relationship to the broader polity. Once, the city was perhaps *the* central object of study in American political science, but this focus has waned, at least partially in response to the American population's shift to the suburbs and the perception that the stakes of city politics are not as high as they once were.[32] When political scientists have approached the city, they have typically engaged with the internal processes of a city's power struggles for insights about those particular places or to make more general claims about politics. The vast majority of urban political studies adopt this "methodological localism," focusing on local causes and effects.[33] This approach is useful for gaining insights about how power and institutions interact within cities, but the place of American cities within a federal system—within states and within nation—means that local outcomes are not the results of hermetically sealed processes, and "cannot be adequately understood as locally generated or self-contained."[34] To the contrary, the multilayered, overlapping jurisdictions of the federal system mean that politics and policy are generated by interactions between levels, and that local outcomes both influence and are influenced by supralocal factors.

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[31]Lieberman (2009), Ethington and Levitus (2009)

[32]Dilworth (2009*a*)

[33]Brenner (2009)

[34]Brenner (2009), p.134. A recent edited volume, Dilworth (2009*b*), is a kind of collective manifesto for the reinvigoration of the study of urban politics with a specific eye toward American political development. This study draws on several of those essays for scholarly inspiration, hoping to contribute to an ongoing reinvigoration of research in this direction.

That outside forces have effects felt within cities is clear. As Bridges (1984) puts it, "politics in cities is special because cities are not self-contained arenas of political activity...The dependence and permeability of the urban polity mean that things happen not only *in* cities, but *to* cities."[35] Studies of urban politics have often identified constraints on local options in these overarching institutions, and examined the things that "happen to" cities and influence local outcomes. Structural economic factors are often identified as the most powerful outside forces, especially the city-crippling forces of de-industrialization and suburbanization. The relationship between these macroforces and the "urban crisis" of the 1960s and 1970s are well-chronicled.[36] But technology and modernization are not the only relevant forces. According to Paul Peterson (1981), federalism and easy personal and capital mobility across jurisdictional lines create limits on the kinds of policies that are sustainable at the local level, especially hamstringing local efforts at redistribution. On top of this logic of interjurisdictional competition, Hackworth (2007) heaps the power of financial institutions such as bond rating agencies, which discipline local governments bound by budgeting constraints and in need of steady credit on the municipal bond market. Even more explicit institutional limits on city policy possibilities, such as balanced budget requirements or tax and expenditure limits (TELs) are often imposed at the state level.[37] All of these factors contribute to the fragile position of cities in an age of global capitalism, where location of production is flexible, capital and residents mobile, and demand for city services often outstrips the local ability to provide them. This is the paradox of city governance: cities are "high-maintenance" places, but there are external constraints on the amount of maintenance they can do.

But if cities are affected by outside forces, they can also affect those apparently external outcomes. As homes to tens of millions of people in a democratic polity, cities can and have had significant influence in some electoral outcomes. As centers of commerce, industry, culture, and ideas, they can also influence social norms, the economy, and political conversations in ways that likely outstrip even their raw numeric strength. They are not merely buffeted by powerful forces;

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[35]Bridges (1984), p.15 An important analogous point is central to the study of international relations, where states are situated within a broader system, and outcomes frequently depend on the two-way interaction between that system and its constituent parts.

[36]See, for instance, Rae (2003), Caraley (1976), and Sugrue (1996).

[37]These rules are sometimes imposed at the local level as well. TELs place constraints on the size of government, though it is unclear how effective they ultimately are in practice. Kousser, McCubbins and Moule (2008).

cities as communities may also affect the broader polity. Cities represent themselves in state and national politics, and pursue the distinctive kinds of policies that are important for successful urban governance. By shining the spotlight elsewhere, beyond the city limits and into the halls of national policymaking, this project seeks to explore the external effects of cities' internal political processes, which have been important factors in shaping the substance and contending forces of contemporary politics.

### 1.4.1 The Urban Interlude: Nation as City

When we look to the halls of national power, we can see that a national political alliance made up largely of city representatives was a key driver of political change in twentieth century America, and that many of the policies they pursued were prompted by the paradox of city governance.[38] But the influence of cities on national politics has clearly not been constant over time.[39] The overall share of national population living in large cities grew rapidly in the early 20th century and has declined slowly since the 1950s, as suburbs have grown quickly (fewer Americans live in purely rural areas as well). Representation in Congress always lags at least slightly behind population shifts, and cities were particularly and systematically underrepresented in all states until the court cases that enshrined "one person, one vote," a principle that finally arrived at the same moment that the population of many industrial cities began to decline. Thus, in strictly numerical terms, cities were never dominant.

But the political power of cities pre-dates that moment of representational parity. The key historical moment in a narrative of city-driven political change is the "urban interlude," the period during which a city perspective was pre-eminent in national politics despite cities' relative underrepresentation. This period, from the early 1930s to the 1960s, entails a "metonymic moment when the part came to speak for the whole; when a metropolitan vision became appealing to a

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[38]Mollenkopf (1983)
[39]Lieberman (2009)

huge majority of Americans."[40] In contrast to most of our nation's history, when Jefferson's pastoral vision embodied Americanism, and cities were considered inimical to democratic-republican self-rule, the dominant political forces of this interlude were shaped by cities, and articulated a vision of American progress that was rooted in the urban experience.[41] It was also the first time that a national city alliance coalesced within one party, the Democrats. The Democratic Party was the dominant national force during this era after a long time in the political wilderness; while the Southern wing was its oldest core element and a major component, the New Deal alliance owed its national ascendancy to large cities.[42] The Democratic political order that took shape in the 1930s was thus tempered by the continuation of the Southern Democracy, but the most significant policy preoccupations of its national leadership were urban and progressive.[43]

Historians have often characterized the New Deal as eclectic and pragmatic, a "temperament" more than a coherent ideological program.[44] Compared with the more rigid political-economic worldviews of the age, the New Deal program for crisis remediation certainly seems more plastic and less systematic, but this does not mean it was without guiding principles. More recent treatments have seen elements of a consistent vision in the multifaceted suite of New Deal programs. For Plotke (1996), the ideology of the New Deal Democratic order was characterized by three guiding commitments, which together constitute a "progressive liberalism" that underpinned the sprawling suite of New Deal programs: a focus on the role of groups in political and economic life; a positive view of the state in social and economic regulation; and governmental responsiveness to the claims of the marginalized, potentially through expanding democratic political participation.[45] These principles owe much to lessons that had been learned in urban politics over the

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[40]Ethington and Levitus (2009), pp.155, 165; they refer to this period as the early "Metropolitan Era," and I will at times refer to it as the "urban interlude" to emphasize its exceptional status as a moment within national political history, and the "Long New Deal," emphasizing the strains of political and policy continuities within this era of mostly Democratic control of national institutions. Several studies take stock of national-local interaction and the urban order's political advances and setbacks during this era, including Buenker (1973), Gelfand (1975), Mollenkopf (1983), Biles (2011)

[41]Buenker (1973), Lieberman (2009)

[42]Especially in Presidential elections. See Eldersveld (1949)

[43]Mollenkopf (1983) states it thus: "The New Deal's "core programs aimed at urban public works investment, urban public employment, direct relief for the urban unemployed, and strengthening the labor market position of the urban working class." (p.60)

[44]Hofstadter (1948)

[45]p. 169. Similarly, Kennedy (2009) argues that the New Deal's coherent contribution was a set of institutions that provided security against the vagaries of markets for Americans. This is a manifestation of the second principle of

previous decades.

Hofstadter and those who characterize the New Deal as unideological are correct in the sense that it was not dogmatically derived from an complete theoretical worldview as were contemporary, programmatic versions of Marxism, Fascism, laissez-faire capitalism, or white supremacy. Instead, the New Deal order's principles were seen by progressive liberals as a more pragmatic response to the suite of challenges posed by modernity: heightened social and economic complexity, the social and economic integration of the nation, urbanization, industrialization, and rapid demographic shifts that brought diverse groups of individuals together into a shared social and political space. The New Deal's politics and policies included important elements of both "bread and butter" liberalism of welfare provision and a "politics of amelioration," in which inclusive negotiations and the pursuit of compromise between groups with deep differences of perspective (often through mutual exchange) were privileged over abstract or absolute principles.[46] The Depression exposed the urgent shortcomings of less interventionist models of political economy, especially in cities, so these commitments were posed as a solution to the basic problem of providing order and stability, an objective for which previous state institutional arrangements had proved inadequate.[47]

The political commitments of progressive liberals were as much about a style and process of governance and politics as its particular policy contents. In this, too, the new national order resembled that of the large cities that supported the New Deal. This application of an urban style at higher levels is apparent in two ways. First, for nearly a century before the urban interlude, cities had dealt with the tumult of modernity largely on their own, often by developing new institutions, or adjusting old ones, to deal with new social realities. Recurrent, urgent crisis, more common and costly in cities, made it necessary to develop sustainable routines and practices for establishing political order—we might think of them as flexible institutions for governance. From even well before the 1930s, such ideas and commitments were hallmarks of urban politics, and

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progressive liberalism identified by Plotke. Mayhew (1986) also labels the non-Southern Rooseveltian reform wing of the extended New Deal alliance "progressive-liberal." Buenker (1973) traces the development of "liberalism," finding it in the progressive politics of local urban politics, especially among new-stock immigrant parties.

[46]Buenker (1973), Ch. 1, Ch. 6.

[47]Plotke (1996), Skowronek (1982)

they came to be embraced by the largely urban non-Southern bloc of Democrats, but they were never the commitments of the mostly rural Southern wing. The struggle within the party over these principles, which was present from the start of the Long New Deal and recurred throughout the marriage of strange bedfellows, presaged the structure of virtually all political conflict within the U.S. today.

Second, the party used "urban" strategies to resolve intraparty conflict as well. Cities are the sites of deep pluralism; in such places, the "consensus and community" that seems natural in other kinds of places gives way to a "diverse and rather contentious aggregation of interests" whose only shared interest is order and political victory.[48] The same became obvious in the tenuous New Deal alliance, which included a cacophony of political voices which were incoherent on their face. Logrolling and the distribution of material goods became the party's *modus operandi*, just as traditional party organizations in cities had built their organization and dominance on reliable practices of material exchange and avoidance of unprofitably divisive issues; the maintenance of such diverse coalitions is predicated upon "making no waves."[49] Mayhew (1966) characterizes the Democratic Party of the midcentury as a party of "inclusive compromise," with multiple interested factions held together by the reciprocal distribution of material goods, especially in cities, farm areas, and the South.[50] Thus the major projects of the New Deal involved the distribution of material goods, especially relief work administered through local officials, and the conceptualization of politics as the exchange of goods and loyalty for the sake of political order. In this approach to politics, a positive view of state activity, especially in policy areas where credit can be easily taken by incumbents as a sign of a job well done (and make the case of being worthy of return to office), is more important than rigorous programmatic coherence, or the worldview-compatibility of allies. The New Deal distribution of goods was about papering over divisive factional conflict with goods and sustaining a tenuous political alliance. This ability to find a way around deep division to establish order is the heart of the traditional party, and it was the heart of the New Deal as well.

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[48] Bridges (1984), p.3, Katznelson (2009)
[49] Rakove (1975), Snowiss (1966), Wilson (1960), Mayhew (1986)
[50] Mayhew (1966), ch. 6

### 1.4.2 Sources of Evidence: Time and Place

This study seeks out the effects of cities and city organizations in national politics. As such, it is about the development of a national urban-rural cleavage, and the progressive-liberal policies pursued by the political forces from the "urban" end of that continuum. It is also about institutional effects observed in places where they "should" not be present. Cities have no formal recognition within national politics, especially in Congress, and extracameral events and actors outside of a member's district are typically not considered important in shaping representative behavior. Yet cities, and the distinctive governing institutions developed to provide internal political order in them, nonetheless make themselves felt in national politics, often in the way that John Vorys described—through unity of representation reflecting a citywide position. Subsequent empirical chapters will draw on the historical congressional record, with most attention given to the the urban interlude, when urban political commitments and style came to define a pole of national political conflict, to illustrate how the city political order in national politics has developed.

The House of Representatives, rather than the Senate, is the key source for analysis because this chamber gives us a firmer grasp of the personnel actually representing cities. House districts represent defined territories, often small enough to be located within or roughly coterminous with cities. States are invariably "noisier" constituencies; while some Senators were clearly advocates for urban progressivism on both dimensions of liberalism during this era, for reliable analysis the House is a more appropriate place to look because it is clearer who is actually representing a city (and, just as important, NOT representing other kinds of places) in the House based on district territory. We can also analyze intrastate dynamics within the House, something which is impossible in the Senate.

The urban interlude is the focus of study because this was a key moment of powerful change in American politics in several ways. Politically, the creation of a city political order within the Democratic Party during this time set in motion the processes that have led us to our current

national political division.  By bringing two distinctively urban sets of issues rooted in the city experience—statism and group pluralism—to the national agenda, this city bloc wound up setting the terms of debate for the next 80 years, and the urban-rural divide has been maturing ever since.  The major glacial change of the intervening decades, the departure of the white South to the Republican Party, was set in motion from the urban capture of the Democratic Party not in the 1960s, when the action of realignment is often spotted, but in the very creation of the New Deal alliance (or even before) and its nationally new commitments to pluralism, state activism, and new group mobilization. The white South was always opposed to these commitments, but it took them decades to finally change allegiances.[51]  The intraparty discursive conflict on these issues, and the divergence in roll call behavior, was present early in the New Deal.

Socially and culturally, the urban interlude is also a compelling place to look because it represented the peak of central cities as a proportion of the population. If ever there were a time for the urban perspective to gain traction in national politics, this was it.  On important issues, city representatives pursued an "urbanizing" strategy, convincing others that there were city issues, and that cities knew best how to resolve them, and their allies should defer to them on these issues.[52] Finally, and just as important theoretically, this was a time before the conflation of cities with other confounding factors, particularly race.  Today, "urban" is often employed as a euphemism for "not white," with a particular application toward African Americans, often because racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately likely to live in central cities. During the urban interlude cities were indeed places of heightened diversity (as they almost always are), but they were still mostly white, and their politics were firmly in the hands of white elites. The influxes of African Americans to large industrial cities over several decades did bring another group into these communities, but the Great Migrations did not by themselves utterly transform city demography. A variety of other social, economic, and political processes, stretching out over decades, contributed to the change.  Throughout the urban interlude, however, most large city districts included vir-

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[51]And for the Republicans to create organizations in the South to receive them; this change was ironically sped up by the reapportionment revolution that finally brought representational parity to more densely populated areas.  See Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008).

[52]This "urbanizing" strategy is identified by Burns et al. (2009) as one employed by city representatives on potentially controversial issues in state legislatures, and I see a similar strategy among city representatives on civil rights issues during the urban interlude.

tually no African Americans, so it is difficult to attribute the development of racial liberalism to simple responsiveness to constituents. Studying this time period helps "control" for race in some of following analyses, particularly of the role of urbanicity and local institutions in patterning representation on national civil rights issues during this period, as illustrated in Chapter 5.

### 1.4.3 Data and Method

In analyzing the development of the urban-rural divide and the development of dual liberalism within the city wing of the Democratic Party during the urban interlude, I turn primarily to the congressional record. My primary concern is the character of city representation in national politics, so the national legislature is an important place to look: it is the site in which cities contend most directly with other kinds of constituencies, and of course where decisions about the course of national policy are made. In general, I examine two pieces of this historical record. As in many political science analyses, patterns of roll call voting are central to my story. While there have been a few previous analyses of urban representatives' behavior in Congress specific, the new data developed for this project on districts' urbanicity and city of origin collected for this project makes several original analyses possible, as well as clarifying replications of and addenda to some of these previous studies.

First, as elaborated in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1, I have developed an original dataset that identifies the place character of congressional districts over the full course of American history. This dataset makes many historical analyses of the role of place character in shaping representation and partisanship possible for the first time.[53] By analyzing city delegations (as well as the whole bloc of representatives from cities) in these roll-call analyses, we can examine how the character of local institutions—not just *whether* a district is from a city, but what *kind of city*.

The second main primary source of data I draw upon comes from the other end of the legislative process, the record of congressional hearings. Unlike roll call votes, the record of these

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[53]Previous analyses in this area, such as Mayhew (1966), Wolman and Marnicki (2005), and Caraley (1976), restricted themselves to analyses of subsets of years after 1950 (See Appendix 1).

hearings includes more nuanced information than a roll call can reveal about how representatives are thinking about these issues (or at least how they want to be *perceived* as thinking about them), how they want others to think about these issues, what their priorities are, and what organized groups in society share their views. Not every issue is discussed in hearings, of course, but many major issues are.[54] And while these hearings include scripted testimony by witnesses, they also frequently include relatively frank, candid conversations between representatives and witnesses and among representatives. Conflicts that may not be apparent in roll calls—because representatives are pressured to conform to a party position or because intraparty compromise has adjusted the content of a bill to reflect a majority-party accord that all factions can live with—may be evident in these conversations, revealing the "truer" preferences of representatives. From these hearings, the subtler elements of city strategies can sometimes be gleaned: pressure to comply with the institutionalized logroll of the Democrats' inclusive exchange; arguments emphasizing the urgency of certain urban issues, or the "urbanization" of obviously controversial civil rights policies, and the direction of future alliances. From these two main sources, we can make a start at understanding how urbanicity—through city representatives on the national stage—transformed American politics during the urban interlude.[55]

### 1.4.4 Chapter Outline

In the next chapter, I theorize the relationship between urbanicity and governance, with a focus on how the distinctive attributes of cities—density, size, and heterogeneity—prompt a set of policy priorities, and foster the development of local institutions to sustain them, among those responsible for a community's well-being. Among these priorities are statism and group pluralism. These

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[54]For that matter, not every issue gets a roll call vote, either—sometimes committee agendas are *more* inclusive.

[55]In a better world, the machinations and political arrangements of the traditional party organizations where urban liberalism was incubated and drew its strongest support would also be accessible as sources for the analysis of city delegations. It is unfortunate that, as Buenker (1973) notes, "so few of the practitioners of urban liberalism left any accounts of their activities... undoubtedly mindful of the dictum of the "sage" of (Boston's) Ward 8, Martin Lomasney: "Never write anything down when you can say it, never speak when you can nod your head." (p.208) A continued search for more data from these kinds of sources is a future priority for this project.

governing commitments, especially the economic interventions, are difficult to sustain if enacted only at the local level, so cities must also seek to affect supralocal policies. To do this effectively, a collection of representatives from across a city (and across many cities), who are often rivals in other contexts, must put aside their differences and behave cohesively in support of a citywide interest at the higher level. This cohesion is fostered by institutions characteristic of city delegations but not of other collections of representatives. These institutions of horizontal integration bind heterogeneous constituencies together and play a key role in the "city delegation theory" elaborated in this chapter, which highlights the role of local institutions in allowing the cities to represent themselves as cohesive units rather than as collections of heterogeneous and separate constituencies, just as John Vorys feared.

In Chapter 3, I zoom out to broadly describe the urban bloc in Congress and introduce a new dataset developed for the purpose. The twentieth century has seen the birth of a distinct, national urban political order, and then a shift from a "bimodal" coalition of urban and rural representatives to one in which the relationship between urbanicity and partisanship is much more monotonic. Building upon previous analyses, I evaluate the strength of the city bloc over time, using measures of institutional strength within Congress. While the urban interlude of 1930-1950 was a heyday for the city's place in the national imagination, in some ways the urban political order is more powerful, though also more vulnerable, today.

In Chapter 4, some of the observable implications of city delegation theory are tested. At the national level, were the rural defenders of malapportionment correct in their concerns that cities are more organized or cohesive in representation than we might expect? Is there a difference between cities with different kinds of local institutions? The answer to each question, this chapter shows, is "yes." Institutions of horizontal integration—IHIs, political institutions spanning multiple constituencies, which are present in cities but not in other areas, and which are stronger in some cities than in others—foster cohesive representation among members of a city's congressional delegation even though its members often represent very different kinds of constituents. Cities foster agreement among representatives. This is especially true in places with local traditions of strong parties. The unit of the city delegation is vital in the maintenance of a progressive,

united urban political order, because it is a building "bloc" for such a political force. By overcoming the challenges to political order presented by heterogeneity at home, cities can present a cohesive face to the nation in pursuit of national urban policies.

Chapter 5 explores the role of urbanicity and local institutions of horizontal integration in the re-emergence of second-dimension political conflict (over race), a political development that drove the midcentury transformation of the "solid" South from a place at the heart of the Democratic Party for nearly a century to the stronghold of doubly conservative Republicanism today. More than simple sectional conflict drove the intraparty schism and rent the fabric of the Democratic national alliance. Urbanicity and the characteristics of local party organization were important factors in this partisan change. The insights of city delegation theory help explain how local party organizations linking the diverse constituencies of the largest American cities had an important role to play in fostering national racial liberalism, one that is often overlooked in studies of urban racial politics.

Finally, the conclusion takes stock of the urban political order: the maturation of the place-character divide in the contemporary "Blue" alignment, with its continually strange bedfellows, and the prospects for a regeneration of urban metonymy.

# Chapter 2

# Urbanicity and City delegations

"When [the American people] get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as Europe."

-Thomas Jefferson[1]

"But why, then, does the city exist? What line separates the inside from the outside, the rumble of wheels from the howl of wolves?"

-Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*

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[1]Quoted in Gosnell (1937), p. vii

Before exploring the role of cities in driving change in 20th century American politics, it is helpful to address what it is about cities that makes them distinctive communities within the nation. These characteristics will present us with a puzzle about cities and their role in American political development. In this chapter, I outline a theory that adds to our understanding of how cities contributed to the changing structure of political conflict in the U.S. over the course of the 20th century. This theory draws on the spatial and political characteristics of cities, and on the strategic situation of the city bloc in national politics, laying the groundwork for the empirical analyses in subsequent chapters. By turning an analytical spotlight on the relationship between the characteristics of cities and the distinctive way in which these communities represent themselves in national politics, we can better understand the origins of the place character divide in contemporary American politics, including changes which were based on a city alliance and which pre-date the massive migration to the suburbs.

## 2.1   What is a city?

Scholarly and popular interest in cities has seen a renaissance in recent years, as the world's population has shifted dramatically to the fast-growing cities of the developing world and as different approaches toward urban form have gained traction in Western cities in the ebb of massive-scale industrialization. Urbanicity—the condition of being like a city—certainly has many dimensions that contribute to cities' distinctiveness, but three characteristics seem particularly important from a sociological and political perspective: density, heterogeneity, and size. Studies of urban places tend to focus on density and heterogeneity.[2] In their essence, cities are densely populated cen-

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[2]A note on terms. "Urban" places are settlements characterized by relative density and heterogeneity. A "city" is a political construction typically consisting of the largest (usually in terms of both population and geographical extent), central jurisdiction in an urban space. Sometimes a city fills an urban space, but more often today an urban area extends beyond city boundaries. In certain contexts, this distinction between "urban" and "city" is relevant: for some purposes, the Census defines an urban space as any non-rural area (ie, a city and its suburbs, a metropolitan area). The Census includes areas not in central cities in its category of urban or urbanized, which is also closely related to a "metropolitan" area. In this study, the I employ "urban" and "city" to refer to the same kinds of communities and spaces, at one end of an urban-suburban-rural continuum.

ters of varied, relatively specialized economic and social activity.[3] In a metropolitan area, the downtown area of the central city tends to have the highest density, and density often diminishes monotonically as one moves farther from that center.[4] Density is important for economic activity: returns to scale associated with clusters of firms and labor can make production much more efficient, but they can also have powerful side effects that spur further growth.[5] Concentrations of diverse bases of human capital foster interaction, innovation, and growth; these processes generate wealth and move society forward generally. In the broad scope of history, the process of urbanization and the development of cities has been powered by commerce and industry, and broad structural economic and geopolitical forces have been determining factors in cities' ascendency, decline, or resurgence.[6]

In a city, economic density and heterogeneity are accompanied by social density and heterogeneity, and the quest to better understand and control the social dynamics of cities was itself an important motivation for the creation of modern American social science itself. This fascination was clearest in the late 19th and early 20th century, an era in which millions of people moved to American cities. These new arrivals came from many places, in the U.S. and abroad, and often had little in common in terms of shared experiences or worldview, and many arrived from rural places. Urban life, with its greater density, variety, and anonymity of human interaction, lends itself more to the thin ties, specialization of individuals' roles, and larger institutions characteristic of civil society than to the thicker patterns of social interaction, less specialized or formally codified institutions, and more rigid ties of smaller, more static communities.[7] Cities were and remain points of first contact, and heightened social density and unclear authority relations create new challenges for order and the provision of the general welfare. Density makes all sorts of interactions more frequent, and heterogeneity makes them more uncertain. Managing such a

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[3]In thinking about a city, and what is distinctive about it, it may be helpful to think of density in terms of either population (either resident or employment, or both), or some conception of "activity," as in a high rate of economic or social activity in terms of the number or volume of transactions. The two seem co-incident.

[4]Though today there are often locally dense nodes of such activity outside the center as well.

[5]Glaeser (2011)

[6]See, eg. Mumford (1961), Rae (2003), Sassen (2001)

[7]Tonnies (1887) famously names to these concepts *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, roughly understood as community and society, respectively.

society requires different strategies than smaller communities where people are better known to each other and where informal codes and norms and shared background experiences might more effectively provide social organization and control. New norms, practices, and institutions need to be developed to make life in such places manageable.

Density and heterogeneity pose distinctive challenges and opportunities that often make cities fascinating social laboratories. However, cities are also distinctive on another important—and perhaps more definitionally fundamental—dimension that is related to but analytically separable from those characteristics: size.[8] Simply put, cities are *large* political communities.[9] The size of a city is determined by the boundary that defines it. The lines on a political map can have many effects, but the key function of a city boundary as an institution is to include residents in a common local political community (or to exclude them from it). Within cities, political boundaries can serve as "trenches," reinforcing identities related to residence as important for organizing politics.[10] Municipal boundaries, alternatively, can bind or divide members of the broader polity (and their representatives) on the basis of membership in a local polity, and such divisions have consequences not only for decisions made within the city, but also for representation of that social space.[11] Membership in the large community of New York City means people in Queens Village, on the edge of New York City, may live in a neighborhood that looks much like the Long Island suburb of Elmont across the street—and much less like neighborhoods in the south Bronx, midtown Manhattan, Annadale (on Staten Island), or Park Slope (in Brooklyn), neighborhoods very different from each other in many ways—but residents of all five boroughs share membership in

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[8]Economic and sociological approaches to urban studies tend to focus on density and heterogeneity. From this perspective, the metropolitan area is often an appropriate unit of analysis: economic activity within the United States is not tightly constrained by municipal boundaries, and the central city along with its suburbs often constitute something close to a functional unit of economic activity. The Census, at times, assumes this perspective and defines "urban" areas as a metropolitan area counties, and the Brookings Institution approaches urban policy issues through the lens of a "Metropolitan Policy Program." A similar perspective is in evidence when comparing cities around the world: the New York metropolitan area, not just New York City, is often the frame of comparison for other supercities such as London, Tokyo, or Mexico City, because of variation across countries in the forms and importance of local government.

[9]In some cases, size is the necessary condition for heterogeneity as well. Where residential or economic-functional segregation is pronounced (often the case in American cities), only geographic inclusion makes these places particularly heterogeneous.

[10]Katznelson (1982)

[11]Gainsborough (2001). Perhaps the apt metaphor for the city boundary is the moat or wall (as opposed to the trench for an intracity boundary), which once more dramatically divided the city from its outlying areas, as in the Calvino epigram above.

the city, with people who came there from around the nation and world, and who do all sorts of things for a living. If we imagine a parallel world, in which New York had not expanded to incorporate the outer boroughs, but instead had fragmented even more, such that the units we now call neighborhoods had continued as self-governing municipalities all their own, the politics of those five counties would surely be quite different from those of New York City today.

Taken together, size, heterogeneity, and density constitute the core dimensions of urbanicity. These concepts have specifically political implications as well as "merely" social and economic ones. Urbanicity has had important effects on American politics in the twentieth century, as cities grew, matured, spread across the nation, and gave way to the suburb as the typical political home of most Americans. Cities have provided national and regional political leadership, they have given birth to political movements, and served as "laboratories of democracy" just like states have. The three characteristics of urbanicity have left their mark on how cities and their members have taken part in national politics, predisposing residents and elites to a suite of political commitments developed during the early twentieth century that came to be known as liberalism.

## 2.2   Urbanicity and two-dimensional liberalism

If size, density, and heterogeneity make cities distinctive communities, how might these attributes manifest themselves or shape the politics of cities? This question is a central investigatory prompt of urban political science, and many urban studies make their contributions by looking at how these variables interact to contribute to political outcomes at the local level.[12] Theoretically, the characteristics of cities might have important effects that we could observe in a number of different places, with perhaps contradictory expectations.

Most viscerally, city life may have an effect on individuals' preferences. City people may want different things out of government, and may consider a different style of political engagement

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[12]For instance, among recent canonical works, Browning (2003), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Kaufmann (2004), Trounstine (2008), Hajnal (2007), Erie (1988), all examine dynamics and outcomes at the local level, focusing in particular on intergroup relations in urban political space. Similarly, classic studies such as Dahl (1961), Banfield and Wilson (1963), and Sayre and Kaufman (1965) all looked local, sometimes to make broader external claims by analogy.

with others appropriate or desirable, compared to people not in cities. These distinctive individual preferences certainly aggregate into distinctive communities.[13] But while cities are collections of individual citizens, they are also more than that; they are communities whose situation within society fosters "organic" city-wide interests that may differ at times from those of individual city dwellers (taken separately or even in aggregate) for the sake of resolving governance crises and the maintenance of the city's continued "health."[14] City leaders, representatives in state and national government among them, are likely to be particularly sensitive to this organic interest (or at least their perception of it), because their careers and livelihood often depend on the overall health of the city; unlike the typical resident, they cannot usually decamp to another place and maintain their same status as leader, so they will take steps to perceive and defend a city interest.[15] This "city" position is related to how cities represent themselves at higher levels of politics. Rather than simply represent their districts, which are often very different from each other in important ways, city representatives present a more organized, cohesive front in supralocal politics. This cohesion reflects representation of a city interest, which is promoted by institutions that link city constituencies together. In 1964, John Vorys lamented this fact, while Richard J. Daley no doubt saw it as an important tool for defending the interests of his city and his political organization.

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[13]The relationship between context and attitudes is a contentious subject, and has been for as long as scholars have systematically investigated the study of individual behavior and preferences. Many of these studies suffer from a fairly intractable problem: people can generally choose where to live in the United States, and so in studying a potential association between preferences and residency, an analyst is faced with a difficult problem of determining the direction of causation: cities may shape people's preferences, or people may have preferences that affect their choice of residence.

[14]Peterson (1981) identifies the key organic interest of the city as the maintenance of a tax base, measurable by the retention or attraction of above-median taxpayers. The organic interest of a city may be more nebulous and harder to measure than that, but the point here is that the maintenance of community order may be derived from different principles than a simple aggregation of individuals' preferences or actions. The organic city interest is akin to Rousseau's "general will," in its essential unknowability (as opposed to the aggregate "will of all," which we might determine from elections or deliberation (Rousseau (1762), Book II, Ch. 3). Peterson's minimal operationalization can lead us toward an organic interest in some areas, but not in others—for instance, the "proper" way to handle race relations is not obvious from the pursuit of above-average taxpayers. The vast number of perspectives and interests present (or invisible but relevant, from a normative standpoint) in contentious city politics mean that no solution to any problem is likely to coincide with the preferences of all members of the community, or even a majority. Ultimately, I believe this matter is not easily resolvable, but there may be significant overlap between the abstract "organic" interest and the concrete "city position" or "accord" fostered by city institutions of horizontal integration and supported by a city delegation in representative politics. This citywide accord is likely to reflect the interests of those elites who are most reliant on the overall health of the city; in the worst case, they are purely corrupt, at the best case, they serve the cities long-term interest as well as their own. At a minimum, the order provided by IHIs can be seen as at least a partial primary good (when contrasted with the plausible alternative of open-ended disorder), even if the order and accord are not satisfactory to all parties.

[15]Such leaders will likely be attuned to the "aggregate" interests of citizens (as well as their own particular interest) as well, but city-wide concerns seem more salient at the elite level than at the mass level.

In this section, I theorize a city position on the two primary dimensions of conflict in American politics and argue that this city position (the city's "organic" interest, though not necessarily the aggregate preferences of city-dwellers, or of all subsets of a city's dwellers) informs what we call the liberal position on issues in these dimensions. Two areas of substantive disagreement seem to have structured a great deal of political conflict in American national politics in the 20th century. The first dimension related to conflict over the role of government in the economy, or statism, while the second dimension has to do with race, region, and culture.[16] Each dimension had a liberal and conservative pole, and one of the central preoccupations of American political science is how these two dimensions—once ostensibly separable—increasingly overlap or coincide, creating a situation of deepening political polarization in American politics today. Attention to place character and space can help us understand this polarization better. The liberal position on each of these dimensions is related to urbanicity and the management of urban politics and economy, though the difference between "aggregate" and "organic" interests may be important in how cities are governed and represented.

## 2.2.1   Cities and the First Dimension

The primary, typically dominant, dimension of political conflict has been about statism.[17] After all, much modern government activity at any level, at any time, even in a market society, is devoted to managing the economy; and how it should be done is a central source of contention. On this first dimension, it seems clear that the urban "position" should generally be more supportive of state intervention in the economy because of the nature of participation in a large, dense, heterogeneous market. Government interventions in the economy most often take three forms in

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[16]Poole and Rosenthal (1998). The second dimension waxed and waned in importance over the 20th century, but was particularly oblique to the first during the urban interlude, and eventually conflicts on that dimension were folded into the first, such that the two dimensions are not analytically separable as they were before.

[17]The "dimensions" are measured by Poole and Rosenthal (1998), and captured in their DW-NOMINATE scores. Current iterations of this research agenda are available in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) and at www.voteview.com, where they refer to the substance of the first dimension as "the role of the government in the economy," though the precise content of this substantive judgement is fairly subjective and inductive, and may not apply to previous eras.

the United States: regulation, public goods provision, and redistribution. Each of these types of intervention has an intuitive relationship to urbanicity.

Economic regulation, the making and enforcement of rules about behavior, is more important in a city for several reasons. First, production and commerce often generate negative externalities such as pollution or congestion, which are more serious in a city than in other built environments because they can accumulate more quickly and affect more people when they do. Regulation of externality-generating processes can mitigate their effects. For instance, if there are no rules about how one disposes of garbage in a rural space, it may be no big deal—nature will dispose of it (at least the organic component) before it can accumulate. In a city, such anarchy leads to health crises quite quickly. The same argument can be made about other kinds of pollution.

Second, because cities are more fluid and anonymous environments, with thinner ties between members, regulation can also provide valuable information for economic actors, reassuring them that the other participants in the marketplace have cleared at least some minimal bar for entry and continued membership. The recent clear, obvious posting of health inspection grades in the windows of New York City restaurants is an example of this; in a place with only a few restaurants, where potential customers would know quickly which ones tended to make their patrons sick, large letters would be less necessary. In a city with over 23,000 restaurants and rapid turnover, neither word of mouth nor personal experience can suffice.[18] Effective regulation thus ameliorates information problems that are more severe in cities. City residents, even those who are themselves regulated, may be more accepting of heightened regulation than their counterparts in less dense places. For city leaders and policymakers who are concerned with creating and enforcing such measures, regulation can also be done more efficiently in large communities than elsewhere, because the size of the community may allow for more specialization and professionalization of regulatory functions, and therefore more expertise among local city regulators.

The second major form of governmental intervention in the market is the provision of public

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[18]In this case, regulation essentially serves to enhance the probability for cooperation in a "prisoner's dilemma" in which the diner and restaurant are the participants. The state takes steps to ensure the quality of the meal, and promises to punish the diner if he defects by not paying the bill. This system can also benefit restaurants that *would have been* conscientious in any case, as well as diners: an "A" in the window can serve as expert testimony that at the very least, this establishment is not dangerous or negligent. Thus all restaurants have an incentive to be conscientious, and are rewarded for it.

goods.[19] While some goods, like public safety, are obviously (and about equally) valuable across all spatial contexts, some are more valuable in a city than in another setting.[20] Goods that must be located in a particular location and the use of which is related to proximity to that good are more valuable in a densely populated area than in more sparsely populated place.[21] For instance, to the extent that people prefer to walk to a park in order to use it, having a park within walking distance of lots of residences increases the value of that park. In a city like New York, where many thousands of people can walk to Central Park in a few minutes, this is particularly clear. In a less densely populated area, fewer people would live within walking distance, by definition, and the use-value of the park would be less.[22] Similar arguments can be made about museums or other cultural institutions, and public transit infrastructure: these goods can be valued more, by more people, in densely populated areas. This logic seems to play out in practice: large and dense communities do tend to provide more public goods than other kinds of localities.[23]

Finally, government often actively adjusts economic outcomes through redistribution, often among individual citizens directly. Among individuals, attitudes toward redistribution are likely to be related to the character of redistribution (we usually think of redistribution as moving resources from above the median to below, but other patterns are certainly possible and have different implications) and one's place in the income distribution. For instance, a person at the less affluent end of the income distribution might favor a progressive redistribution regime, as they would likely gain a net benefit from it. A rich person would be more likely to oppose such a regime, because they would experience a net cost from it. From this basic claim, Meltzer and

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[19]Here, I am conceiving of public goods as both goods with broad benefits that are very hard to exclude non-paying users from, like public safety or fire protection, but also goods like infrastructure, for which it would be easier but more inefficient to limit use to paying users, like parks or highways; and also those goods which are technically private but open to use by all and often constructed or subsidized by the state, such as public transportation.

[20]Though for some goods likely to be valued everywhere, it may be more *important* that the good be effectively provided by the state in certain contexts. For instance, in a sparsely populated area, a murder is unlikely to cause a costly riot. In a city, such reactions have often been the case, because of the much higher accumulation of value and density of potential witnesses and property-destroyers.

[21]Bateman and Taylor (2007)

[22]Individuals, even those who do live within walking distance to the park, may also value the public good of the park less because in a less-dense residential environment there are often many "private parks" directly behind people's homes. In such a context, people may quite reasonably be even less inclined to support or pursue provision of further public parks.

[23]Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)

Richard (1981) predict that aggregate preferences for redistribution will be stronger in unequal electorates. Cities—as a consequence of one kind of heterogeneity—tend to be more unequal than other political communities, so on average demand for redistribution might be higher in cities than in more economically homogeneous communities to the extent that preferences for redistribution are based on local information.[24]

Density and heterogeneity heighten the demands for interventions to maintain important status quos and for managing social conflict—to meet the demands of governing such "high maintenance" places.[25] Thus for each of these important types of state intervention in the economy, we expect the preferences of urbanites and their representatives to be to the "left" of people from other kinds of communities, favoring statism more because of the characteristics of their communities.[26] An impressionistic survey of the historical record seems to bear this out. Conflict over statism came early to cities, and the interventionists tended to win. In New York City, for instance, the Democrats came to represent "a kind of primitive social welfare state" against proponents of "small, efficient government; individualism; and laissez-faire" by the 1850s, and that argument would be "at the heart of local politics for the rest of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth," and other cities' experiences were similar.[27] Primitive social welfare policies, regulation, and public goods provision were hallmarks of nineteenth century city parties and governments.[28] The Progressive movement of the early 20th century, especially its urban component, promoted many forms of economic regulation and reforms, including the redistributive income tax, and today large communities do tend to provide more public goods than other kinds

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[24]Assessing preferences for redistribution across levels of government makes the story more complicated. Preferences about "redistribution" may be formed at the local level if individuals' information about their place in the income distribution is local, but to the extent that income distributions differ across space, there may be counter-intuitive results, such as a rich person in a very poor locality wanting less redistribution than a poor person in a wealthy place, even though the latter may actually have more wealth or income. In practice, redistributive policies may not be in the "organic" interest of the city if enacted locally; they may be unsustainable at the local level due to external constraints described by Peterson (1981) and Hackworth (2007), among others. In this view, redistribution is more functionally suited to higher levels of government. So we may not see heightened redistribution manifest at the local level, despite local demand for it, but rather in the form of stronger support for redistributive policies at higher levels.

[25]To continue the metaphor of an organic city interest, we can think of cities as requiring greater inputs to maintain homeostasis.

[26]This is not to imply that being urban and supporting statist interventions are equivalent; this is not the case, as there are certainly many conservatives in cities and many liberals outside of them. But cities foster a predisposition toward these interventions, especially among those tasked with maintaining the health of the city.

[27]Bridges (1984), p.20

[28]Erie (1988)

of places.[29]

Cities face many constraints that make significant market interventions very difficult at the local level, however. These constraints have intensified as social conditions have changed to effectively expand the geographic scope of many markets well beyond city boundaries. The logic of interjurisdictional competition (and other constraints) predicts that significant interventions may be unsustainable if applied only at the local level. Peterson (1981) makes this argument about redistribution specifically, but it applies to other kinds of market-intervention policies as well. High levels of public-goods provision (at least those that are not self-financing, or the benefits of which may not be apparent to the above-median taxpayer) should be similarly difficult to sustain. And businesses may seek to relocate, if feasible, to laxer regulatory environments. Thus city leaders are often faced with a dilemma: the conditions of urbanicity make market interventions important for the maintenance of their economic and social communities, and perhaps for their political careers, because the citizens may demand such interventions or at least the social conditions such interventions sustain; but such interventions, if adopted unilaterally, may deter investment and undermine the city's resource base and the overall "health" of the city. This is a key area in which the aggregate and organic interests of a city may be in subtle tension, if not in outright conflict, as the dynamics of urbanicity may operate differently at the mass and elite levels—and at cross purposes—in ways that are unlikely in other contexts.[30] Even the most active and well-meaning local government may be overwhelmed by governance challenges presented by powerful forces well beyond local control.[31]

Those who seek such interventions may therefore do better to pursue supralocal policies—to shape outcomes at higher levels. By pursuing policies that impose interventionist policies that

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[29]Buenker (1973), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)

[30]For instance, we might expect very unequal cities to have high aggregate demand for redistribution, according to Meltzer and Richard (1981). Their representatives, elected by the median voter(s), may agree in principle. But if city hall unilaterally imposes a progressive income tax, while other nearby jurisdictions do not, high earners—who would provide most of the revenue for the tax—can leave, dodging the tax, but still enjoying the other benefits of city life, and the city will lose whatever other revenue they might have gained from those high taxpayers in other ways. This is against the city's organic interest. If the progressive tax is imposed at a higher level of government, such that it would be very difficult or costly for the high taxpayers to move away, then the preferences of the voters (and officials) can be met without undermining the organic health of the city. This is the heart of Peterson (1981)'s logic, and a site of tension between aggregate and organic city interests.

[31]Rae (2003), p. xii

support "high maintenance" places across all local polities (or that at least reduce the marginal benefit of individuals' relocation to non-city places), proponents of such interventions can soften the effects of interjurisdictional competition. But cities do not exist in a vacuum, and they must often contend with other kinds of communities where demand for statism is not as high in higher-level jurisdictions, where cities seldom constitute a majority. Thus the city must pursue some strategy at those higher levels. The most obvious strategy (and a baseline complement to other, more sophisticated strategies) is to present a common, cohesive position in support of a city's organic interest, and to seek common cause with other cities faced with similar governance dilemmas. In national politics, this has meant cohesive city delegations and the creation of an urban political order composed of many cities facing similar problems and seeking similar aid and policy uniformity from the national government. This political order took shape within the Democratic Party over the course of the Long New Deal, as detailed in chapter 3. The portfolio of New Deal policies (and a series of Supreme Court decisions ultimately ratifying them) transformed the relationship between the United States government and markets, and also provided much of the substance of political conflict ever since.

### 2.2.2   Cities and the Second Dimension

There is a clear logical connection between urbanicity and statism, with the main challenge being *how* to provide the demanded interventions, in order to balance mass preferences with organic interests in light of institutional constraints. The story gets more complicated, however, when we consider the second major "dimension" of political conflict frequently identified in American politics, that having to with racial and cultural issues. On these issues, the implications of urbanicity are less obvious at the individual level; rather, they are the subject of a half-century's scholarly controversy. More, because race is often so divisive, the aggregate and organic interests of the city may be more directly in tension than on economic issues.

There is no consensus on the relationship between group diversity and intergroup relations,

but two main theories have been in tension over the years. The first is contact theory, which holds that exposure to (especially intimate contact with, in terms of getting to know individuals) persons from groups different from one's own will erode stereotypes and intergroup hostility based on those stereotypes. Evidence supporting this school of thought has typically come from psychology, and operates at the individual level.[32] In political science, on the other hand, the bulk of the evidence has supported the racial threat hypothesis, which holds that intergroup relations are likely to get worse when levels of diversity are high or increasing. This more pessimistic theory predicts that competition over material resources, status, or culture leads to heightened tension or conflicts between groups, and negatively affects individuals' affect toward those other groups.[33]

Each of these hypotheses have observable implications at the individual and aggregate levels that can be tested empirically. Most basically, if individuals feel better about members of other groups in diverse contexts, that would support the contact hypothesis. If they found group identities to be more salient, and harbor feelings of hostility or rivalry toward the other group, that would support the threat hypothesis. At the aggregate level, we can imagine analogous implications, though we would have to be careful about traps related to ecological inference.[34] For instance, if we saw relatively strong support for anti-discrimination legislation in areas with relatively high minority populations, that could be because such policies were getting moderate support from every group equally, or maybe only very strong support from the minorities themselves and very weak support from local whites. Taking that closer look to see how the aggregate support was constituted would have important implications for how we judge the effects of diversity.

To the extent the racial threat hypothesis holds, we would expect American cities—the sites of tremendous diversity, and frequent inflows of potentially threatening groups—to be hotbeds of intergroup conflict. Historically, there are many important examples of just this expected outcome, especially between whites and African Americans. Race riots and smaller scale racial violence

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[32]Allport (1954) originates this perspective, but for a review of the literature, see Oliver (2010).

[33]Key (1949), Blalock (1967), Oliver (2010). A key methodological challenge in such studies is the problem of residential mobility and endogeneity: environments may change persons, or persons may relocate into environments that that suit their preferences for diversity. This is mainly a challenge for those who find the racial contact hypothesis at work, as it seems less likely that persons are moving in order to be closer to groups they do not like. Observational studies that find evidence for threat, as in Oliver (2010), are less vulnerable to this fundamental inferential problem.

[34]Ecological inference is the often inapt practice of making individual-level judgements from aggregate-level data.

were chronic realities in many cities over the entire 20th century, often sparked by personal violence across group lines.[35] And most evidence from opinion surveys and mass behavior tends to support the racial threat hypothesis that familiarity breeds contempt across group lines.[36] One corollary finding related to the threat hypothesis is the finding that diverse communities have lower levels of social capital; even when people from different groups are not fighting outright, they are not getting along and cooperating very well, either.[37] At the individual and neighborhood level, then, it seems that diversity makes people *less* likely to get along, and *less* likely to forge the institutions that might provide a framework for strong civil society.

The implications for diversity may be different for elected officials and other elites than for individuals, however. Circumstances in which high levels of diversity lead to heightened intergroup conflict among citizens tend to conflict with the organic interest of maintaining social peace. Whatever one feels about racial harmony or members of other groups, as long as physical entry into a community is relatively easy (and as long as overt Apartheid-style repression by force is ruled out), then finding a way for groups to get along—rather than "explode"—must be a priority in governing a heterogeneous community. From the perspective of a city's "health," deep group division will tend to be a negative.[38] But how can the individual and aggregate tendency toward conflict be overcome in the name of the organic interest in peace?

### 2.2.3 Diversity, Institutions, and Political Order

In an analysis of how group-based diversity affects political outcomes, we must examine how institutions process inputs from civil society (such as individuals' opinions, claims made by groups, and the interests of local associations) into outputs in the formal political system, a process which

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[35]Sugrue (1996), Joyce (2003)

[36]Or at least more enmity than amity, though our understanding of these intergroup conflicts has become more nuanced as scholars have explored the role of broader context of the particular contact or threat. See Oliver (2010), Enos (2010), Hopkins (2010), Varshney (2002)

[37]Putnam (2007)

[38]There are many reasons social peace is preferable to heated division: humanitarian "preferences" that persons not be injured or killed; desire for a feeling of mutual affection or respect with co-members of one's community; respect for private property; the promotion of commerce or other practices that are strengthened in circumstances of physical security; aesthetic affection for particular historic buildings or districts, and so on.

at the end of the day must distill infinitely plural interests into policies or representatives' decisions. When scholars have approached the relationship between diversity and liberalism at this level, they have generated different accounts of how institutions "process" diversity or the arrival of new groups. Because cities are typically more diverse than the nation or states in the U.S., many of these studies have used evidence from the local level. The rosiest picture is of a politics of smooth group incorporation through electoral politics, in which new groups arrive in a polity and are invited to join political organizations competing for an election-winning coalition.[39] In certain circumstances, this has been an important path to political inclusion and social incorporation.[40]

Such pluralist accounts of even-footed incorporation are undermined, however, by broad evidence of non-responsiveness to new or minority groups for a variety of reasons.[41] Group-based electoral competition is almost a given in urban politics, and examples of particularly contentious politics are easy to find in studies of urban politics.[42] If politics is about racial "teams" competing for scarce status or goods, then a majority group might control all of those goods because it includes the median voter; they may also change institutions to limit the participation or effectiveness of minority groups.[43] In places where no single group entails a majority, shifting coalitions may join to share the goods, excluding those left out. Of course, it is rare that racial or ethnic group-based conflict entails the entirety of politics in the U.S.; ideology, class, and other factors are always important as well, so politicians may make appeals to minority groups in order to break some stalemate on another dimension. To the extent that the implications of "racial threat" holds in the electorate, however, appeals to minority groups may not result in net gains: if the "threat" is sharp enough, appealing to one group may push members of rival groups out of an existing coalition.[44] Overall, diversity is typically conceived as a challenge rather than an asset.

Importantly, studies of political or policy outcomes (distinct from studies of "pre-political"

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[39]Dahl (1961)

[40]The classic group is the Irish, as in Erie (1988), but see also Italian-American incorporation in Dahl (1961). Keiser (1997) theorizes conditions under which African Americans were successful in being meaningful/powerful members of local coalitions.

[41]Erie (1988), Pinderhughes (1987), Hajnal and Trounstine (2010)

[42]Kaufmann (2004), Sonenshein (1994), Browning (2003)

[43]Bridges (1997), Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008)

[44]Frymer (1998)

phenomena such as individuals' preferences or affect toward other groups) have also tended to support racial threat theory. Indeed, Key's (1949) landmark study of southern politics in the nation, often cited as an early recognition of racial threat, employs data from congressional behavior by Southerners to find that "black belt" representatives, whose constituencies included higher proportions of African America were more conservative on race than their regional allies from whiter districts. Even though they were barred from voting, the black citizens in these districts were seen as influencing representatives' behavior by posing a deep threat to the white supremacist racial order. Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) find that local voters are apt to fundamentally alter their local institutions of government to dodge rule by other groups when faced with demographic change; a rising tide of diversity causes whites to erect protective barriers around their current privileged status, rather than incorporate the growing groups of newcomers. Thus it is commonly believed that higher levels of diversity leads to higher levels of conflict between groups—meaning less "liberal" outcomes on the second dimension of political conflict.

Diversity is also thought to have a dampening effect on first-dimensional liberalism. Studies in this vein suggest that there is reason to expect racial and ethnic heterogeneity to undermine *statism* (not only intergroup comity), even as density promotes it, prompting us to think twice about how we might expect cities to represent themselves on "first dimension" issues like regulation, redistribution, and public goods provision. In one oft-cited study, local jurisdictions provided fewer public goods when levels of diversity were high, indicating that it may be difficult for groups to overcome their ethnic or racial differences and govern at the local level.[45] These key findings of how politics distill diversity into representation and policy have tended to support the idea that diversity makes things "worse" for proponents of both dimensions of liberalism.

But when we look closely at how cities represent themselves in national politics, the expectations that diversity engenders racial division and fiscal conservatism—that diversity contributes to two-dimensional conservatism—has not been borne out. Rather, while cities were often the site of internal racial hostility and domination, they were also the modern home of racial liberalism, incorporating racial minorities into a broader coalitional politics. Previously, the last

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[45]Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), see also Habyarimana et al. (2009) for experimental evidence in a different context.

round of immigration-driven American diversity (from roughly 1890-1920) eventually gave rise to the initial articulation and promotion of both dimensions of liberalism at the national level, a two-dimensional liberalism that was resilient to the challenges posed by diversity and intergroup strife.[46]

How, then, are we to understand the complex relationship between liberalism, diversity, and urbanicity? These liberal policies and ideals are famously urban—they were generated by and drew their staunchest support from the most diverse sections of the nation, the large cities of the New Deal coalition. City political commitments, rooted in diversity, pluralism, and state activism, would ultimately undermine white supremacy as an assumption of American politics. It would also undermine the Democratic Party's midcentury dominance, which relied in part on arrangements maintaining that white supremacy itself. This process of developing, defending, and sustaining racial liberalism by cities that were themselves deeply divided along racial lines and on racial issues at home, is the focus of Chapter 5, which will assess the role of city delegations in sustaining unity in a potentially fragile anti-racist liberal coalition. First, however, I will outline a theory of city representation, the City Delegation theory, which proposes a mechanism by which one element of urbanicity (size) can help mitigate the challenges of another (heterogeneity).

## 2.3 Representing a city interest: City Delegations

An answer may lie in the pattern of city representation that John Vorys worried about in 1964, according to which city representatives are responsive not only to their particular constituencies, but to a broader city interest as well. The conditions of urbanicity generate pressures for governance, and for amelioration of conflicts between groups. Particularly urgent and clear are the "citywide" implications of urbanicity for statism outlined above, which are complicated by institutional pressures about where interventions should come from. As articulated by Peterson (1981) and others, the powerful logic of interjurisdictional competition supports a division of labor among levels of

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[46]Buenker (1973), Ch. 6

government for specific sorts of policies: developmental policies at lower levels, redistributive at higher levels where the threat of exit by high-end taxpayers is less.[47] A similar logic holds for other market interventions that may prompt the exit of wealthy taxpayers from the local polity. Those who hold the reins of local government feel the pinch of this logic quite acutely; to meet the demand for such policies, they should pursue them at higher levels of government, rather than at the local level.

This presents yet another strategic problem, however, because at those higher levels, even though the geographic basis of representation results in some legislators having city constituencies, cities themselves are not formally represented. There is no representative of "Chicago" or "New York City" in either the statehouse or the Capitol, and the shorthand "D-LA" would be interpreted as "Democrat from Louisiana," not "Democrat from Los Angeles." Instead, these large, heterogeneous communities are represented by a collection of representatives, each with his or her own separate geographically-based constituency, which may include a subsection of the city as well as some part of the surrounding area.[48] These collections of representatives, which together make up a city's delegation to a legislature, often represent very different kinds of constituencies: neighborhoods with different class or ethnic compositions, with different business interests, and so forth. They are often not much alike in terms of important aggregate demography, and their residents may see themselves as cross-town rivals, not natural allies. As I will illustrate in Chapter 4, they are often *particularly* heterogeneous collections of districts, especially when it comes to race. Beyond proximity, they often share very little, according to the formal logic of the legislature or the demographic building blocks of politics.

One characteristic that members of a city delegation *do* share by definition is membership in a common local political community, their city. Given the often dire circumstances of cities, those concerned with the fate of the broader city—and many elites may count themselves among

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[47]Peterson (1981)

[48]The exception, of course, is is when a city's population hits a sweet spot equal to the size of a legislative district at a particular historical moment (such that the district would encompass the city as a whole, rather than a subdivision of the city, or the city and its surrounding areas, which may have very different interests). This is fairly rare, but such a district would be the closest we can often get to identity between a city and a member in a legislature.

this group—must strategize to pursue organic citywide interests.[49] For such a bloc, any successful strategy must begin with the forging of unity in the city bloc. Even though cities and their districts are often very different, they must overcome these differences in a legislative alliance to pursue citywide goals. They must also find or recruit allies to support "city" positions. In state legislatures where large cities contend with rural forces, political scientists have seen city delegations pursue such strategies to some success. Burns et al. (2009) find that city unity will increase the success of the urban delegation on urban issues by sending information about a citywide accord to the rest of the legislature, who then defer to the city delegation on that vote. This is an "urbanizing" strategy. Weir and Wolman (2005) argue that city unity and alliances with inner-ring suburbs (who may face similar governance problems) help cities achieve legislative victory. Because this strategy relies on the attraction of the "next-most urban" constituencies, and on the development of shared interests, this is an "affinity" strategy. Each of these strategies has been employed at different moments by national city representatives, but the premise of each is a unified city bloc.[50] Given the diversity of city districts, however, rivalries from the local level might be transmitted to higher levels as well, so the city delegation unity presupposed by each of these strategies (and by Rep. Vorys in 1964) should not be automatically assumed.

### 2.3.1 Unity despite diversity

Statism and and group pluralism are important for city governance, and these ideas have combined to define "dual liberalism" in contemporary politics. Even in local politics, however, these ideas are not settled matters; they have been the subject of contentious debate and deep division in city politics for over a century, and cities, like other places only more so, are home to a multiplicity of voices and political perspectives. They are often deeply divided. Given such divisions, how

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[49]In the context of an urban-rural divide, a common feature of politics even if it is not along partisan lines, strategic action is particularly crucial because city representatives rarely constitute a majority in a legislature, and their preferences on important issues (like statism) are likely to be at one end of the continuum (rather than centrist and potentially pivotal), and may be strongly opposed by some set of non-city legislators.

[50]In his exchange with Rep. Celler in Chapter 1, Daley seems to be articulating an affinity strategy. In Chapter 5, I will argue that city representatives pursued an urbanizing strategy on civil rights.

can a city represent itself cohesively in higher levels of government, in pursuit of the strategies above, which might help foster policies that make city governance easier?

Given the high levels of demographic heterogeneity and plurality of interest within and across cities, these communities do not seem like particularly fertile ground in which to base a national political alignment. Within cities, social division and resource scarcity constantly threaten, as repeated episodes of urban violence have illustrated. Between cities, competition for taxpayers and finite intergovernmental aid could undermine alliances. Sustaining political alliances in such circumstances requires constant attention and significant skill. Nonetheless, a national urban political order has been resilient and growing on city issues since the beginning of the New Deal. Given their vulnerable position within the federal political economy, the continuing incentives for cities to compete with one another, and the great potential for internal division within cities, it is remarkable that this political force formed and endured. Understanding how cities maintain internal order may help us understand how the national urban order sustained itself through most of the 20th century.

Because of their high levels of social conflict and vulnerability within the federal order, cities are prone to political chaos and sometimes appear to be "ungovernable."[51] Capital flight, crime, congestion, labor and social unrest, pollution, and even weather all present recurrent, powerful governance challenges to American cities typically faced with severe resource constraints. Overlaid on top of these chronic governance problems is the high level of ethnoracial diversity present in many cities, which can intensify or create conflict in its own right. The uneven patterings of race and class across space within cities, fostered by local practice and policies at all levels in every American city, mean that these conflicts may take place within the city but across legislative districts, meaning that local political conflict can be transmitted or intensified in representative institutions, which are based on that same segregated territory. The result of these many cleavages and constrained resources can often resemble irresolvable "hyperpluralism," resulting in fragility, chaos, and the constant danger of civic crisis.[52] These governance challenges have at times made cities fairly unpleasant places to live or do business for those with other options, prompting exit

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[51]Cannato (2002)
[52]DeLeon (1992)

by many and further compounding these problems.

For political *elites* within the city, however, exit is *not* an option. For this group, the establishment of political order and the pursuit of some approximation of an organic city interest is a priority as they attempt to manage the city and solve governance problems in the context of deep pluralism.[53] Several important institutional arrangements, distinctive in cities, foster civic political order. These institutions foster political integration horizontally, across the breadth of the city, by including different constituencies and their representatives in common forums. They foster common interests and perspectives among their participants, and serve to "smooth" (even if only a little) the rough edges of city politics. By integrating local politics, they also help to foster "vertical" integration, up the political food chain to higher levels, and allow for a more cohesive representation of a city interest in higher levels of government.

There are two main categories of institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs): jurisdictional and organizational. The chief jurisdictional institution is simply the city boundary and the central city government that oversees governance of the territory within. This kind of horizontal integration is common to all cities, and is what makes size an important characteristic of urbanicity. We often take the city boundary for granted, but this invisible line is an important political institution. The larger the city, the more likely that different kinds of areas will be included within the same jurisdiction. As American political communities get "fenced off" into smaller and often more homogeneous units (often suburbs), this shapes politics in a way that undermines the possibility for two-dimensional liberalism. Gainsborough (2001) finds that the "suburbanization" of American politics leads to a strengthening of political localism and increasing support for small-government policies, while Oliver (2001) finds that homogeneity leads to diminished political participation and civic capacity. Shrinking the political community seems to shrink the public sphere and tighten the public purse strings.

When heterogeneous collections of residents, constituencies, and representatives are forced to come together in a central place for municipal matters, they may conflict, but they will at least interact. More, they will have a shared stake in the organic health of the city, and a chance to take

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[53]Katznelson (2009)

part in the citywide accord. This process is at the heart of the ideal-type pluralism described by Dahl (1961) and others. It is not obvious that power is as dispersed as the pluralists believed, but it does seem clear that the most legitimate participants in government are persons and groups from within the political community, and the processes they engage in are the sources of binding legislative or administrative decisions. Persons and representatives from outside the border do not have a seat at that table, nor typically a vested interest in what happens there. The citywide accord is likely to entail decisions about the allocation of goods and services over space within the city; these decisions are most often made centrally, so access to and participation in these centralized city decision-making processes is important—for residents who want access to city services and public goods, and for elites who want to take credit for their provision or direct them in particular ways for some reason or other. Membership in this common community itself makes representatives more cohesive in national politics, even though the districts themselves are not formally associated with citywide governance.[54]

Overlapping with jurisdictional institutions, *organizational* institutions of horizontal integration include the many more visible institutions that have been created to help provide political order in cities, from parties and machines to informal regimes. Made up of groups of persons, often elites, concerned with promoting some version or vision of a city's organic interest, the study of these institutions constitutes much of the field of urban political science.[55] Unlike jurisdictional horizontal integration, the strength of organizations vary across cities: some cities have strong citywide institutions of horizontal integration, while these kinds of organizations are virtually absent in others. In places where these institutions are strong, ties between the center and periphery within a city, or between far-flung and very different parts of a city, may be particularly strong. Where a single boss or small group controls access to office and resources, as in the strongest ma-

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[54]Advocates of metropolitan governance schemes are implicitly emphasizing the importance of jurisdictional IHIs in the articulation and implementation of policies reflecting a broad "organic" interest; much to the dismay of such advocates, these institutions are usually fairly weak or restricted in their substantive purview.

[55]For instances or conceptual outlines of strong local parties in cities, see Banfield and Wilson (1963), Bridges (1984) and Mayhew (1986). For classic accounts of machine politics, see Gosnell (1937) and Erie (1988). Bridges (1997) outlines instances and characteristics of Reform regimes, and Trounstine (2008) draws an important connection between these institutional arrangements and partisan-style machines, conceptualizing each kind of political order as a subset of the broader category "monopoly." Stone (1989) conceptualizes the elite urban regime and describes some of its characteristics in action in Atlanta.

chines, that boss has many resources with which to enforce political discipline and order across the city; elected officials dependent on that central decisionmaker for (re-) nomination and material delivery of goods and services to their constituencies are more likely to attend to the will of the center. And the strong demands of some part of the city are more relevant to representatives from other parts of the city, if they can reach the citywide agenda and become part of the citywide accord.

Each of these institutional configurations, formally or informally, has the important effect of channelling or limiting the potentially infinitely varied content of public participation in policy-making to some ultimate decision, enacted and enforced by an established authority. While each has been often, and often fairly, criticized as undemocratic, these criticisms are oblique to the deepest crisis of the 20th century American city, beset as it was on all sides by both demands for action and constraints on resources and authority. In such a context, representation and responsiveness to public opinion on particular issues are important, but must coexist with, and at times accede to, the primary goods of political order and a city's organic interests.[56] Political order can be established through these institutions of horizontal integration, forging a citywide accord.[57] Crucially, these institutions of horizontal integration, which force plural interests into resolution, have been developed in cities but not in other social spaces of comparable size, as described below.

City delegation theory, which I articulate and investigate in this study, argues that local institutional factors influence the way that cities represent themselves in higher levels of political decisionmaking, especially making them more cohesive in representing a putative city interest. Institutions of horizontal integration do not only function at the local level, providing political order in the context of resource constraint and governance challenges; they can also serve to coordinate action by the representatives of cities. These representatives, who come from and retain links to local institutions that integrate politics across the city, tend to be particularly cohesive

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[56] Huntington (1968)

[57] Again, this citywide "accord" may be undemocratic, and may reflect neither the "will of all" the city's residents nor the abstract "general will" of the city as a corporate body (though ideally it will include elements of those), but it is an enforceable policy or position that results from the deliberation and workings of the institutions of horizontal integration. I choose the language of "accord," as opposed to "city interest" or "consensus" to reflect this idea—that there may be winners and losers, and that it is certainly possible that the accord reflects neither consensus nor the city's organic interest.

units, especially when we account for the high levels of heterogeneity among city constituencies. I will demonstrate this in greater depth in Chapter 3, but the next section includes a fuller explanation of the logic of this theory.

### 2.3.2   Cities and representation

Many factors influence legislative decision making, and the composition of a constituency is frequently employed to explain legislator behavior.[58] In the ideal abstract, a legislature is something of a microcosm of broader society, with the views and preferences of its constituent parts brought to bear on political questions for deliberation and action. In reality, along the way to final legislative decisions, unavoidable collective action and social choice problems give rise to legislative institutions that shape the way constituencies' preferences are aggregated into policy. Much of the study of Congress and lawmaking is devoted to determining how much these institutions matter—the relative influence of legislative parties and precameral "preferences" (of constituencies or legislators themselves) in shaping legislative behavior.[59] When cities turn to higher levels of government to pursue solutions to their local governance problems, both constituency and party should therefore be taken into account.

When scholars have considered the role of cities in the national legislature, the typical approach has been to identify "urban" districts, aggregate them, and study how representatives from urban districts behave in congress: how numerous or powerful they are, their partisan distribution, and their potentially distinctive behavior on urban issues.[60] The model underpinning this typical approach to the role of urbanicity in national politics assumes that districts from large, central cities, wherever they are, have similar interests and will pursue these interests in concert

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[58]Mayhew (1966), Mayhew (1974) Fenno (1973). This mix of factors is in itself something fairly distinctive about American legislative politics, where relatively decentralized party institutions make strict party-line voting something less than a given, as it is in most other Western democracies.

[59]They are both important. Aldrich (1995), Krehbiel (1998), Cox and McCubbins (2004). For a review of this literature, see Aldrich (2011), Ch. 7.

[60]Mayhew (1966), Wolman and Marnicki (2005), Caraley (1976).

in national politics.[61] For some analyses, this is a good framework and can inform our understanding of the development of 20th century American politics.[62] However, this assumption is not straightforward for two important reasons. First, while cities may resemble each other as urban agglomerations, and often face similar challenges, particularly in the wake of the industrial age, it is also true that cities, states, and regions can and do organize as rivals rather than allies. According to Gelfand (1975), "rivalry, not cooperation, marked most inter-city relations" for most of American history.[63] Particular development strategies may favor one region or group of cities over another. In the early days of the Republic, New York and Philadelphia vied for supremacy. As California grew, rivalries between Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego often made the cities rivals rather than allies.[64] At a regional level, Republican urban policy in the middle of the 20th century tended to favor the rapidly growing Sun Belt cities, while Democratic eras have tended to be more beneficial for the older cities of the Northeast and Midwest.[65] Thus the creation and construction of an urban bloc and partisan-place character divide was not inevitable or natural; it was a political project that involved interactions between national elites, urban constituencies, and city elites.[66]

Second, the belief that each urban district will identify an urban interest, line up, and coalesce into an urban coalition underestimates not only the plurality of interests among cities, but also *within* cities. Perhaps the central insight (or premise) of the study of urban politics since the field's birth is that cities are the site of heterogeneous constituencies, diverse and plural interests, and deeply contested politics. Not only should we not assume that all cities will get along as allies, we should not even assume that a "Los Angeles" or "Chicago" position on contentious issues will naturally arise from unorganized social activity, because local politics is as likely to be conflictual as it is to be consensual, and there are likely to be winners and losers within cities even

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[61]Mayhew (1966), Caraley (1976), Wolman and Marnicki (2005)

[62]Indeed, I implicitly adopt it myself, above in the discussion of the relationship between urbanicity and liberalism and in Chapter 3's analysis of the development of the urban bloc and its ability to pursue an "urban agenda" over time.

[63]p. 28

[64]Erie (1992)

[65]Mollenkopf (1983), Ethington and Levitus (2009)

[66]Many authors highlight different aspects of this project and its importance for the New Deal, including Dorsett (1977), Mayhew (1986), Andersen (1979), Mollenkopf (1983), Buenker (1973)

on issues of supralocal importance. Urbanicity may foster some predispositions, but a city's organic interest (or citywide accord) may not "naturally" coincide with the aggregate positions of its several districts, especially because those with different interests and perspectives are likely to be separated into different constituencies. Thus the key attribute of the contemporary urban political order—increasing unity and cohesion in representation as the base of a major party—is remarkable precisely because rivalries both among and within cities have been overcome to create such a stable alignment in national politics. The basic building block of this alignment, where cities' propensity for insoluble conflict is first overcome in the name of national-politics unity, is the cohesive city delegation.

### 2.3.3 Smoothing preferences

City delegations function by smoothing out diverse preferences into a more cohesive bloc, just as institutions of horizontal integration can create political order in a fractious local political and social environment. The city delegation theory offered by this analysis complicates traditional models of representation by adding an extracameral intermediary between constituency and legislative behavior. Consider the abstract model of representation in Figure 2.1. At left, there are four hypothetical districts to be represented in a legislature. District-level characteristics, abstracted as different colors or patterns at left, are reflected unmediated in representation at right.[67]

   In such a model, the atomistic districts are unlinked, and representation is largely determined by district-level characteristics. When districts share district-level characteristics, they are likely to "agree" on a particular policy in question, and this agreement should be reflected in their representatives' behavior. When they are very different on demographic or other fundamentals, however, it may be harder to coordinate action, even when the districts are part of the same legislative party. This is a relevant consideration in the historically relatively weak congressional party system in the U.S., and a big part of the meaning behind Tip O'Neill's famous aphorism that "all politics is

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[67]These differences may be softened by chamber party, a truism in the study of legislatures. But such studies rarely examine subdelegations, or patterns among them, which is the explicit focus of city delegation theory.

Figure 2.1: A model of atomistic representation: Diverse preferences and interests at left are mirrored by representatives at right.

local."

In city delegations, however, district-level characteristics pass through mediating institutions of horizontal integration, affecting representation among members of the delegation. This model is depicted informally in Figure 2.2. Here, the abstracted districts are just as different from each other as in the previous figure, but they are no longer atomistic; they are part of a broader city-wide "molecule," as indicated by the boundary around the districts. TInclusion within this group means that the constituencies and representatives share some common political identity, and their diverse preferences are at least somewhat filtered through the intermediate city institutions. The result is that even when districts are very different from each other, they may still be very cohesive in the legislature because they are linked to the other districts in their city.

What links city districts to each other? *Institutions of horizontal integration* (IHIs) connect city districts in a way that other districts, even those that are geographically adjacent, are not usually connected. First, members of a city delegation are linked by *jurisdictional* IHIs, reflected in a city border and formal city governing institutions. Sets of districts that are not from within the same

Figure 2.2: Model of a City Delegation: Diverse preferences and interests, at left, are smoothed into a more cohesive bloc, at right, as they are filtered through the intermediate institutions of the city.

city are not connected by jurisdictional institutions at the local level. [68] To the extent that policies affect the city as a whole, rather than particular districts within a city, there will be an impulse toward unity among these representatives. For instance, many supralocal programs distribute funds not to particular neighborhoods, but to municipalities or other political subdivisions for final expenditure.[69] In a city with several congressional districts, a mayor, city council, or central office would likely have a great discretion over how those funds were spent across districts.[70]

Members of a city delegation to a legislature are often members of more obvious and human institutions of citywide horizontal integration as well, which may articulate city policy "accords" and enforce cohesion. These are *organizational* institutions of horizontal integration, frequent objects of study in the field of urban politics. Examples of these include strong parties, machines,

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[68]Districts from the same state are within the same jurisdiction, but the greater geographic extent of states and the immediacy of local ties will make local jurisdictional institutions relatively more powerful integrators. Empirically, state delegations of any significant size are not usually very cohesive.

[69]By "supralocal," I refer to levels of government above the local, primarily state and national.

[70]The politically-motivated distribution of such goods is almost a truism of urban politics and has been rigorously observed in several studies, eg. Trounstine (2008), Hajnal and Trounstine (2010), and Phillips and Brooks (2010).

monopolies, and urban regimes.[71] As well as making decisions about local governance, these city-wide institutions often also play a role in selecting the personnel that represent the city at higher levels. A strong local party is the best example of this phenomenon, because it is purposefully designed as an institution of both horizontal and vertical integration, connecting electorates and elites at all levels and across constituencies. A strong local organization can centralize nomination decisions and create a more cohesive city delegation, either by selecting agents it is confident will be reliably and loyal, or by threatening to remove a rogue from the ballot at the next election. They can also serve powerful agenda-setting functions, shaping the realm of the "possible" or acceptable in politics. Even without formal parties, other IHIs, such as the elite coalitions known as "regimes," still rely on longstanding relationships that develop norms of loyalty and reciprocity to maintain partnerships in city governance.[72] Thus a representative from a city with strong institutions of horizontal integration, especially of the organizational type, must attend not only to the preferences of his or her own constituents, but also to the citywide accord manifest in the integrative institutions—the stronger these institutions, the greater cohesive effect the city can have on the representative's primary goal as a Mayhewian "single-minded seeker of re-election." A city without such strong institutions of horizontal integration will be less effective at this, and its city delegation will be less cohesive.

### 2.3.4 *Cohesive* liberalism

The following empirical chapters analyze aspects of city power and behavior in national politics. In each analysis, the tendency toward cohesion and liberalism among city representatives will be a salient theme. A key IHI that enhanced this cohesion during the urban interlude was the traditional party organization. Together, these local institutions and their response to governing helped define and defend liberalism as we know it in American politics today.

The broad suite of policies and political praxis of progressive liberalism was built largely upon

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[71]See, eg., Erie (1988),Trounstine (2008),Stone (1989)
[72]Stone (1989), p.180

urban policy and institutional experiences over the first three decades of the twentieth century. Given the waves of "refreshed" diversity in these cities, the development and maintenance of this suite of political commitments is important and continues to be worthy of examination, especially because many studies of city politics during this time focus on some very undemocratic or conservative (even illiberal) aspects of city politics, and this debate often focused on the arrangements of local political institutions.

The most famous clash of this era of urban politics was between the "machines" and the "reformers." It is unclear which of these groups was more "progressive" or "liberal," (however those terms are understood) and each has come in for its share of criticism on anti-democratic grounds during this time. While the machines are sometimes seen as non-ideological parties run amok, awash in corruption and incompetent governance, the assault on parties led by the urban Reform waves of the early 20th century (part and parcel with the broader Progressive movement) has itself been variously characterized as exclusionary, classist, xenophobic, and racist.[73] From the advantaged perspective that comes with time, and from a national-politics perspective, however, the divide between "progressives" and "urban parties" was perhaps not so vast. Normatively, Trounstine's (2008) synthesis makes the fundamental observation that, taken to venal extremes, both parties and reform-style institutions lead to too much electoral insulation for elites and not enough responsive policy for the poor.[74]

This important finding about machine/reform domination at home, however, as with most studies of urban politics, focuses on the local scene. As I emphasize in this study, under conditions of modern capitalism and federalism, the city is not a hermetically-sealed polity. And it is at the national level that the battle between Reformers and Partisans in the great industrial cen-

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[73]An argument about the Machine-Reform dichotomy is perhaps the most long-standing argument in urban politics. Early political science was sharply critical of the machines, and Reformers were among the first in the profession. Gosnell (1937), among others, was critical of some elements of machine politics, but strived for neutrality in his catalogue of the machine's operations. Banfield and Wilson (1963) seem to admire machine politicos' professionalism, perhaps because these hard-nosed operators they were not motivated by liberal ideology. **?** unabashedly endorses the machine, or at least the traditional party of the immigrants, and is skeptical that "self-styled reformers" were much different from traditional parties, apart from their xenophobic WASPism. More recently, Erie (1988) affectionately examines the role of urban machines played in welfare provision and the causes of their general extinction as a form, and Bridges (1997) focuses on the anti-democratic impulses of Reformers, especially those designing institutions of a whole cloth in the younger cities of the Southwest. Trounstine (2008) argues that both machines and reform regimes were often inattentive to the concerns of those at the social margins.

[74]See also Hajnal and Trounstine (2010).

ters really begins to lose its coherence. What is remarkable in the cast of characters who appear to represent cities on the Hill and to lead the progressive liberal movement is how blithely they leap (or ignore) this supposedly stark divide between machine and reform, even as they exploit the institutional, political, and rhetorical advantages of each form.[75] If we look again at the local level, however, this should not be surprising, for city politicians, especially those of this era, were particularly deft institutional players. As Dorsett (1977) would have it, this dichotomy is wholly "artificial and oversimplified."[76]

While machines and traditional parties were criticized by their contemporaries (and later political scientists as well) as conservative and inadequate to deal with the complexity and rapid change of modern society, the real lesson from this era seems to be their resilience in the places where they were in place when the reformers got going, and their ability to incorporate new ideas and reforms while still retaining (or even growing) their organizational strength.[77] The end result of progressive reform in the cities where it first appeared to fight the parties was not reform government but "a hybrid system" in which traditional party organizations continued to operate while taking on some elements of reform.[78]

The most effective "reformers," in the long term, were those who grew out of the city organizations and could marshal their political style and might to some positive end. In Congress, as Buenker (1973) repeatedly observes, "foreign-stock" urban representatives were often prime examples of progressive urban leaders who had one foot with the reformers and one foot with the party: for instance, Robert Wagner Sr. from New York, Adolph Sabath from Chicago, and David Walsh from Boston. And while Roosevelt gained national prominence as an anti-machine reformer and won his first nomination in a heated confrontation with the Democratic machines (most of whom were again behind Smith), he did not hesitate after his election to engage these local leaders in their own idiom, using the resources and discretion of national New Deal programs to establish what amounted to a "quick understanding with the local Democratic organizations on the terms of support downward in federal money and jobs in exchange for loyalty upward in

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[75]See Mayhew (1986), Chapter 11, for a discussion.
[76]p.4
[77]Erie (1988)
[78]Mayhew (1986), p.308

elections, national conventions, and Congress."[79] It worked; the Democratic organizations gained fuel for their machines from the New Deal, and Roosevelt (and future Democratic candidates) would rely on them for his continued incumbency.[80]

That this mutual exchange became the glue holding together the entire Democratic coalition was an extension of the city system: this was how city parties work, holding diverse coalitions without much obvious interest or ideology in common together with material benefits meted out through elite negotiation. Thus a great blurring of the lines between party hack and reformer, between "professional" and "amateur," and in some cases even between Republican and Democrat, became apparent as an urban perspective came to color the national agenda of the New Deal. As we shall see in the ensuing chapters, however, there were differences between cities with strong parties and those without them in terms of their *cohesion* in representation. Cities do foster liberalism, but city organizations also foster cohesion, an important independent fact when those divisive "second dimension" issues like race appear on the agenda, or when demographic change threatens "natural" affinity between constituencies across a city, and when very different elements of a city delegation need to coordinate action.

Finally, a key characteristic of the traditional party was its intense local focus, which bound it to the local grassroots across a city. While "amateurs" were concerned with national or world affairs, or values, those who studied traditional parties up close emphasize the priority of local over national concerns in the way these parties thought of themselves and how they considered strategic action or the city interest. As one participant-observer in the Chicago organization described it, "The machine is willing to...subordinate the interests of the [national] Democratic Party to the interests of the Democratic organization in the City of Chicago."[81] This local focus can help us understand that national power for at least some of these local politicians was an instrumental means to local success—where the real access to patronage, material benefits and final spending was. Hence the push to leverage national power to help navigate local governance challenges, and the need to pursue reliable allies and power within the Democratic caucus.

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[79]Mayhew (1986), p.321
[80]Eldersveld (1949)
[81]Rakove (1975), p.141

## 2.4 Cities in Nation: Strategic concerns

At the broadest level, cohesive city delegations are important because cities need to be united to advance many of their urgent priorities in higher-level politics, and attending to a citywide accord will help contribute to this unity. Some observable implications of city delegation theory will be tested in Chapter 4, where I show that, consistent with this theory, city delegations are more cohesive than similarly contiguous sets of representatives not bound by a common jurisdiction, and that cities with strong local parties, the classic institution of horizontal integration, are more cohesive than cities without such parties. Looking more closely, I also demonstrate that, at the individual level, representatives from the same city are more likely to agree on a congressional roll call vote than representatives *not* from the same city, even when we account for other important factors such as congressional party and district-level demography. Being from the same city fosters cohesion.

But internal cohesion alone is not enough to create a national urban political order. Regional or intercity rivalries must also be overcome to create a cohesive national urban political alliance. As political scientists have noted, uniting and maintaining the loyalty of these large cities was the major political project of the New Deal, and the key to Democratic control over the urban interlude.[82] The creation of the national urban bloc-of-blocs required the articulation and development of a national agenda that could address the urgent governance requirements common to all cities and regions. The articulation of this agenda by supporters, and the obstacles it faced within cities and from the conservative coalition, has been chronicled in several notable studies,[83] but the actual consolidation of city representatives in one party, and the maturation of the urbanicity divide over the course of the 20th century has not been rigorously described. This is the subject of the next chapter, where I analyze increasingly partisan character of the city-country divide in repre-

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[82]Mollenkopf (1983), Dorsett (1977),Eldersveld (1949)

[83]Biles (2011), Mollenkopf (1983), Gelfand (1975)

sentative institutions, and chronicle the power of the city bloc over time.

### 2.4.1 Marginal Urgency

Even cross-city cohesion, however, is *still* not enough for city success at higher levels. Bloc unity is a crucial strategy for collective action among voters with shared interests or preferences, but it is most effective when the bloc can realistically claim to hold the balance of power. This claim is most credible when a bloc is near the center of the preference distribution, making it more likely to include the pivotal vote (in the House, the median voter). This is the situation of "pivotal cohesion." During the long New Deal, this strategy of bloc unity was used quite effectively by Southerners in Congress to defend their regional racial order.[84] Southerners frequently and increasingly "defected" from their copartisans on many issues, forming the conservative coalition with Republicans that would be a recurrent feature of national politics for decades. Because they actually defected, and because the positions they took did not seem incompatible with their "true" preferences, their victories did not appear to be pyrrhic, and they gained significant leverage as the pivotal bloc in the legislature.[85] Concurrently, a similar strategy was employed in electoral politics by the fast-growing African American population in some large Northern cities to advance their civil rights agenda and gain meaningful incorporation into local and national party organizations.[86] Previously loyal to the Republican "Party of Lincoln" in national and local elections, the black vote was still in play during the 1930s and 40s, and black power brokers sought to extract concessions from their suitors in each party. This strategy would lose its power over time, however, as return to the Republican fold began to seem less likely or self-defeating for African Americans.[87] Each of these groups was able to leverage pivotal cohesion into meaningful results.

For the urban political order, however, the strategic situation was typically different. Once a city-country divide has emerged, and the agenda includes many potentially controversial issues

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[84]Katznelson and Farhang (2005)

[85]Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), Sitkoff (1978)

[86]Sitkoff (1978) pp.88-92, Keiser (1997) pp.7-9, 26-33.

[87]The Democrats' approach to race and retaining the black vote are discussed in Chapter 5.

on which positions are structured by urbanicity, cities' claims to being pivotal are quite weak. Because of their high demands for statist "maintenance," cities—even if united—may frequently find themselves at the margins (as opposed to the pivot), while still facing urgent needs that require an adjustment of the status quo. In such a context, city representatives have relatively extreme preferences and thus little real leverage based on cohesion alone—even the most cohesive minority will lose every time without allies. But the changing conditions of urbanicity mean that adjusting the policy status quo is often urgent to meet concrete governance challenges and maintain social order. This "marginal urgency" means that further steps are needed to achieve policy success; a strategy more sophisticated than simple unity and the threat of defection from a coalition would be required to pursue policy success at higher levels.[88]

### 2.4.2 Unity and Agenda Control

Several strategic tools seem important for advancing the non-pivotal city agenda, and each is important for the subsequent empirical chapters in this study. The first strategy is to consolidate the urban political order, building the bloc-of-blocs by uniting city delegations within one national party. This has happened over time, as Democrats have claimed the mantle of the "party of the cities" since the 1930s.[89] The growth of the urban bloc in the Democratic Party is chronicled in Chapter 3.

Second, the city bloc can pursue majority status and leadership positions. In both chambers, but especially in the House, majority status confers special power to advancing or defending a policy agenda.[90] Control of committees and the floor agenda allows the majority to dictate much of the action of the legislature. Thus membership in the majority coalition is vital for a bloc, such as the urban political order, that seeks to create national policies to meet important local governance

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[88]During the New Deal, moreover, the newly consolidated city bloc was closely identified with the administration and proposed many initiatives the adoption of which, they argued, was urgent for their constituencies; they could not very convincingly threaten to walk away from them.

[89]Mayhew (1966)

[90]Cox and McCubbins (1993)

needs. Additionally, membership in the party's chamber leadership (or "cartel", consisting of the Speaker, floor leadership, committee chairs, and membership on "prestige" committees such as Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations) is especially desirable for shaping the agenda.[91] Given that these leadership positions are largely a function of seniority, city representatives should take steps to enhance their own prospects for return to office, in both absolute terms (this is a primary goal of all ambitious politicians, and of course easier said than done) and *relative to other members of their party*. This requires a difficult balancing act, potentially trading off between bloc policy priorities with party success, in order to hit the sweet spot of leadership-in-majority. If there is another firmly entrenched (and therefore electorally "safe") bloc within the party that is a threat or obstacle to the urban bloc's policy goals (Southern Democrats in this case), then majority status alone may not be enough to satisfy a bloc that cares about more than retaining office, so alternative strategies or coalitional shake-ups may be strategic imperatives. City Democrats have had some success in achieving leadership positions, but this has also left them in the minority for most of the last two decades.

In pursuit of long-run majorities in support of their desire policies, the national urban political order has pursued partisan allies using several strategies that are also apparent among city delegations in other contexts: mutual exchange,[92] urbanizing,[93] and affinity.[94] Each of these strategies were apparent at different moments or in different areas of policy during the urban interlude, and I describe them briefly here.

### 2.4.3  Mutual inclusive exchange

In the search for elusive majorities, a non-pivotal minority like the urban political order can pursue a strategy of inclusive exchange, or logrolling, in which they may be able to institutionalize

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[91]Cox and McCubbins (2004), Wolman and Marnicki (2005)
[92]Mayhew (1966)
[93]Burns et al. (2009)
[94]Weir and Wolman (2005)

legislative success with allies with which they share little in common.[95] This is a useful strategy when some groups of legislators have intense preferences about some issues, but are relatively indifferent about others, and they can exchange support to meet their intense desires. Throughout the Long New Deal, city representatives were never a majority of the Democratic Party (see Chapter 3, Figure 6b), and most of their copartisans were from rural areas and may have been rather unconcerned with the distinctive pressures of city governance that could be relieved through national policy. In many cases, these rural allies, especially Southerners, were actually quite wary of statism by the national government. To get the state interventions they needed, the New Deal city bloc constructed a coalition and held it together with the distribution of material benefits.[96] In keeping with the urban politics tradition of material exchange and distributive politics, city representatives were the most avid and consistent logrollers in Congress during this period on distributive issues; that is, they were just as supportive of many rural projects and programs (from which their constituents gained little) as they were of programs targeted at the cities. The same was not true of rural representatives, even Democrats, who increasingly defected from this intraparty arrangement, in part on ideological grounds.[97] Intense ideological conflict that cannot be resolved with the sharing of material goods, such as those about race and culture, are particularly dangerous for political alliances. This city-Southern partnership was fraught from the beginning, though city representatives worked hard to establish and maintain it from early in the 1930s, as we will see in Chapter 4.[98]

Over time, however, the urban bloc's main partners in this distributive politics (the South) became increasingly unreliable on a range of issues of critical importance to cities.[99] This was especially true on nationalized urban issues, in which policies were being pursued that would apply

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[95] Mayhew (1966), Aldrich (2011) p.23-24

[96] Fleck (2008), Bateman and Taylor (2007)

[97] Mayhew (1966)

[98] The "uneven" logroll that was the heart of the Democratic coalition also fits with an understanding of how urbanicity and Peterson (1981)'s logic fit together as an example of collective action on statism. Cities, which were had relatively more resources, and could ostensibly provide some of these goods/interventions on their own, but they are constrained from doing so. In turning to the national level, they were forced in effect to provide certain goods to other constituencies (where such interventions are less important, because the conditions of urbanicity did not obtain, and where they would not be far less likely to be provided even if there were no constraints), in order to ensure that such interventions were made in cities. This helps explain why less densely populated areas actually received more federal largesse during this time, according to Bateman and Taylor (2007).

[99] Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)

to all cities, including those in the South, such as public housing and fair employment, as opposed to more decentralized and locally-administered. City representatives turned to alternative or complementary strategies to pursue their city agenda. Political scientists have only occasionally investigated how city blocs deal with the strategic challenge of marginal urgency, and they look most often at the state level. While the urban-rural divide is more complicated at the national level (because there are also important racial, regional, and sectional divides), it has long been clearer and more enduring as the dominant cleavage structuring politics within many states with large cities. In some states (such as Illinois, New York, and Michigan), a major city (eg. Chicago, New York City, and Detroit) is often pitted against suburban and rural constituencies in partisan and ideological struggle. In some cases, the main thing that non-city constituencies holds in common is its antipathy toward (or at least mistrust of) the major city. On many issues, these outstate constituencies do not share much natural affinity. Regardless, the city is faced with the marginal urgency problem: city representatives constitute a non-pivotal minority bloc—forged by of geographic proximity, some demographic similarity, and institutions of horizontal integration—that must attract allies for their urban agenda, which usually demands adjustment of the status quo.[100]

### 2.4.4 Urbanizing

The third and fourth strategic "tools" have been identified as effective for pursuing "urban" interests at the state level, and each has been apparent at different moments in national politics. "Urbanizing" is a potentially powerful strategy cities employ in state legislatures to address their urgent needs in the face of potentially hostile outstate forces is to "urbanize" a policy issue.[101] This consists of a two-step process. First, a city bloc defines a problem as distinctively urban and articulates an urban consensus position on the issue (and demonstrates that consensus by voting

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[100]Again, the conditions of urbanicity mean that the status quo does not usually work for very long; social and economic flux mean that policies must change to address new realities and associated governance challenges. Thus city representatives must typically forge coalitions for positive action, not merely block policy changes that would harm their cities (though they must do that as well).

[101]Though they do not use the term "urbanize," this model is drawn from Burns et al. (2009)

cohesively). Second, having established and demonstrated an urban consensus on the issue, city members urge outstate copartisans, who should have weak prior commitments on such urban issues, to defer to the wisdom of the city delegation and support the urban position.[102] This strategy is attractive because, if successful, it leads to the adoption of the city bloc's preferred position. However, it is also entails significant risk if relied upon as a primary strategy. First, it is premised on city cohesion. As Burns et al. (2009) note, when the city bloc is divided, the non-city representatives do not have a powerful cue to defer to, and may make up their own minds. Thus developing a cohesive city delegation (or nationally, a cohesive urban political order) is a necessary condition for this strategy. Second, it relies on the persuasive power of the city bloc to bring the non-city votes along. Those non-city voters may not be persuadable, depending on the strength of the urban-rural divide. They may, on a range of issues, choose not to defer to the city bloc's position precisely *because* they find "urban" positions anathema, leaving the urbanites without sufficient support for their policy. This urbanizing strategy was employed as city Democrats were increasingly the congressional force behind civil rights issues over the course of the urban interlude, the subject of Chapter 5.

### 2.4.5 Affinity

Even more straightforward than urbanizing is an affinity strategy, in which a city bloc forges an alliance with the next-most-urban constituencies, essentially emphasizing the urban-rural continuum. This is what Daley seems to have wanted, based on his exchange with Rep. Celler in 1964. Many years later, Weir and Wolman (2005) do identify such an emerging alliance between city constituencies and inner-ring suburbs in Illinois. In this strategy, affinity between blocs is almost natural, and based on common interests or preferences; the premise is that the interventions vital for big-city governance are only a little less important for the next-most urban environments. To pursue this strategy at the state level, the big-city bloc would pursue allies among suburban con-

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[102]Burns et al. (2009)

stituencies, especially those with important links to cities (the first-ring of suburban communities in a metropolitan area, which are often older and increasingly face some of the same governance challenges as central cities).[103] On a national scale, the city bloc can build alliances with these older suburbs, as well as with districts that are not in large metropolitan areas but which may include one or more smaller cities, which may also be facing similar governance challenges and consist of at least some urban built environments. In many cases, these smaller cities contain large minority populations, another potential source of affinity (related to, but not identical with, urbanicity affinity) as political affiliations and identities are increasingly related to race and racial issues.[104] Surveying the contemporary political landscape, this is very much the composition of "Blue" America today.

Pursuing an affinity strategy may reduce the material costs of maintaining a more diverse coalition with logrolls, because the preferences of marginal members of the alliance (suburbs or small cities, in this case) are closer to the preferences of the city bloc. In circumstances in which ideology makes exchange or compromise very difficult, logrolls may be impossible in any case. An alliance based on affinity also makes it more likely that city representatives hold important leadership positions, and thus agenda power, because as the urban-rural divide is emphasized, the least safe (ie, suburban or small-city, near the median of the urbanicity distribution) members may face the most competition from the opposition, and therefore be junior members of the coalition. This may contribute to polarization, as relatively extreme coalition members will be safest. On the other hand, the affinity strategy also gives some leverage to the marginal additions to the city bloc, because this is essentially a median-voter, minimum-winning coalition strategy, and important policy outcomes may reflect their preferences more than those of the "core" members of the city bloc. This leverage may restrict the range of policies the city bloc may successfully pursue, or simply shape the content of what policies may ultimately succeed, because of the character of suburban politics.[105]

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[103]Weir and Wolman (2005)
[104]Sears and Tesler (2010)
[105]Gainsborough (2001)

## 2.5 Urban Politics in National Institutions

Beginning with the partisan consolidation of the nation's large cities in the New Deal, urbanites in Congress pursued each of these strategies, sometimes in combination, and instances of this are observed in the following empirical chapters. A fundamental dysfunction ran through the Democratic Party of this era, which had as its key elements a rural remnant bloc from the "Solid South" that was deeply conservative on both fiscal and (especially) racial issues, and a city bloc that was driven by the logic of federalism to pursue a suite of progressive liberal, especially statist, policies at the national level in order to prevent catastrophe at home. The strategies pursued by city representatives and the character of their behavior in Congress, were mimetic of the character and values of the city representatives and the political traditions from which they emerged.

Many came from the "traditional party organizations," common in Northern cities but rare elsewhere, that emphasized a politics of party discipline, unity, local orientation, a preference for materially distributive politics for core members, and largely symbolic recognition of peripheral members.[106] Mutual exchange is the primary currency in exchange for loyalty is the stock and trade of such politics, and some efforts of city representatives to pursue this exchange are noted in Chapter 3.

Along with these well-known qualities, however, the importance of these traditional organizations' inclusive traditions of cultural pluralism (values shared by the more "programmatic" liberals with whom they were increasingly allied in national affairs) should not be underestimated; this meant that white supremacy was not a necessary condition for politics they would support, as it was for Southerners. While the pursuit of electoral success, for Southern Democrats, was related to (or secondary to) the maintenance of white supremacy, city organizations had incorporated other "suspect" groups in the past and often actively sought black support at home when it suited their political needs (these new constituencies were urbanites, after all) These efforts permanently alienated their national Southern allies over such issues. To bring a liberal position on race to the national agenda, city representatives pursued an urbanizing strategy. Their role in this

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[106]Mayhew (1986), Erie (1988)

signal political change, which fulfilled the deep logic of the changes of a generation earlier, is the subject of Chapter 5. For now, we turn to a description of the urbanicity cleavage and city power in the national legislature.

# Chapter 3

# The Cities on the Hill: Urban Power in Congress

Reece: It happens that I come from a small city. Now, we do not look upon our sanitation problem there as a federal problem.

Moses: If you lived here (in New York City), and you had New Jersey just across an arbitrary line, you would feel differently about it.

—Exchange between Rep. Brazilla Reece
(of Johnson City, TN) and Robert Moses,
Hearing of Subcommittee on Public Works and Construction,
July 28, 1944

## 3.1  The Urban Bloc(s) in Congress

In the introduction, we saw that the urban-rural partisan cleavage in the electorate today is stronger than ever before, and closer analysis reveals that it is not solely a function of the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of urban areas over that time period.[1]  While these individual-level preferences and behavior are important, they do not contribute decisively to policymaking. Ultimately, the system of representation distills the preferences of individuals-in-communities into seats in the legislature; thus this urban-rural divide may be re-presented within national political institutions. Formally, however, representation is based on residence: legislators represent geographic constituencies, not sectors of the economy or age cohorts or other possible cross-sections of society.[2] A representative will represent a particular built environment and the persons that dwell within it—and to the extent that urbanites, suburbanites, and ruralists are affiliated and represented differently, this may create or intensify political conflict along this dimension. A 55-45 victory (in percentage of the vote) is quickly exaggerated to 1-0 (in terms of seats) in a winner-take-all constituency, so even seemingly small place-character effects can be magnified in the process of representation. The increasing identification of one place-type with a particular political alliance or ideology, moreover, may feed back into the system, prompting further geographic sorting, heightening polarization, and deepening division.[3]

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[1]The average urbanite was *ceteris paribus* about 9 percent more likely to support Obama in 2008, even when we account for other important factors known to be related to vote choice, such as ideology, race, income, religiosity, education, age, and sex. Such a "small" place-character advantage may not only shift a district's baseline disposition from one party to another, but also make a district practically uncompetitive, though this effect would be smaller in the many "mixed" districts that combine more than one character of place and in suburban districts, where voters are less distinctive in their partisan choices. Such safe districts may give representatives electoral slack and allow them to deviate from the preferences of the district median voter, even without any insidious or overly partisan gerrymandering.

[2]Under the Voting Rights Act, some racial and ethnic minorities are identified as communities of interest that are not strictly spatial, though the solution to their historic political marginalization has still been rooted in territory. The controversy over the odd shapes of some of these districts reflects the dominant view of spatial proximity as the most "natural" basis for representation in the U.S.

[3]It is very difficult to convincingly identify the causal relationship between residential location and geographic political polarization. Gainsborough (2001) speculates that the processes are mutually reinforcing, at least in the suburbs—that suburbs attract conservatives, who then become more conservative among like-minded neighbors. Bishop (2008) makes a similar argument about the role of political homophily in residential sorting, though this claim is not uncontroversial. It is probably not only conservatives who are moving to suburbs, of course, as these areas have become *less* Republican, in aggregate, since the 1960s. It is unclear whether analogous processes are at play in other kinds of places—for instance, whether mostly liberals move to cities or conservatives are the most likely residents to remain in rural areas. See Fiorina et al (2012) and Gimpel et al (2011).

This study focuses on the relationships between local place-character, local political institutions, and national representative institutions. Looking for the effects of local institutions in national politics is a fairly unusual path to take for a study of local politics, but it should not be. The logic of federalism and the disciplining power of financial institutions do not determine the character of every local outcome, but they do constrain cities seeking to promote progressive politics locally—particularly on questions of statism and public goods provision.[4] As an alternative or complement to at-home policies, urban political forces can organize at higher levels to shape the broader contexts in which their communities govern themselves. From the earliest days of the New Deal, such intergovernmental links were important in solidifying the nascent urban national political order.[5] Redistribution, labor law, regulatory policy, public works projects, and a host of other market interventions are perhaps better planned and paid for at a national scale, where interjurisdictional competition—between cities and between cities and their suburbs—is less of an undermining force. Urbanicity predisposed city elites toward what we call a liberal position on each of these interventions, and that position, when advanced, has typically been given voice in national politics by the Democratic Party since at least the New Deal.

As a useful first empirical step, the focus of this chapter is to show how the growing urban-rural political cleavage has manifested itself in Congressional power and how city issues have appeared on the agenda over the long-durée. While previous studies have described urban power in the House over a couple of decades, there has been no analysis of the power of city interests over the century and a half since the consolidation of the national two-party system.[6] While today it is something of a truism that the Democratic Party is the "urban" party, the parties have not always been organized along this continuum. Sectional conflicts, or long periods of fairly one-sided national politics, have been more typical with no place-character divide.[7] Theoretically and

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[4]Peterson (1981), Hackworth (2007)

[5]Dorsett (1977), Biles (2011), Mayhew (1986)

[6]Mayhew (1966), Caraley (1976) (1976), Caraley (1992), and Wolman and Marckini (1998) examine different facets of city representation over some parts of the postwar period. Lieberman (2009) takes a first step at quantifying city representation over the longer scope of U.S. history, but does not account for within-state variation in place-character. There does not seem to have been a study of city power in the Senate, perhaps because it is so difficult to tell whether a Senator is "urban." I take a first step toward such description in Appendix 3.

[7]Mayhew (1966) and Caraley (1976) each identify the Democrats as the party of the cities over different periods over 1940-1970, in analyses of the partisan breakdown on issues identified as especially important to cities.

in practice, even if some political conflict is urban-rural, its partisan split need not be national; in some places we could have the "typical" contemporary configuration, while in others Republican cities could be surrounded by a Democratic outlying areas.

During the New Deal era, however, "local and national political entrepreneurs used federal programs to introduce and solidify a new system of alignments in American politics."[8] Ever since, the nationalization of the urbanicity-partisanship identity has spread, so now cities in all parts of the country and of all ages tend to be more Democratic than their outlying areas, in the electorate and in Congress. Given our present demographics (with an ever-increasing proportion of Americans living in metropolitan areas, but also ever-increasingly in the growing suburban fringes), an elite partisan politics with opponents arranged according to constituency place-character is likely to be contentious and close-fought, as we have seen in the past few electoral cycles.

Analyses of city representation in Congress, and of the place of cities generally in the development of national politics, have been too rare in political science.[9] Previous studies focusing explicitly on city representation in Congress have examined the influence of cities on legislators or the power of city legislators in the chamber to pursue a distinctive urban agenda. In what may be the first scholarly indication of the Congressional ideological-partisan sorting to come, Mayhew (1966) finds that city Republicans were cross-pressured by constituency and party. On housing roll calls from the 1950s, city Republicans voted against their party, ostensibly on behalf of their constituents. Conversely, city Democrats found the same vote on those bills compatible with both their urban constituencies *and* their national party—probably because they had formulated the party position on such issues themselves. Among Democrats, however, there were high levels of defection by non-city representatives, especially from the South, an important instance of the conservative coalition. Though the urban-rural partisan divide had not yet matured in Congress at this point, its seeds were clearly there. Wolman and Marckini (1998) systematically explore the developing character and strategic position of the urban bloc over the three decades in which suburban pre-eminence took hold, finding that city influence in Congress did not wane as much as might be popularly believed, but that the growth of suburban constituencies (at the expense

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[8]Mollenkopf 1980,p. 17
[9]Lieberman (2009)

of "non-metropolitan" areas) has left Congress "thoroughly dominated by suburban representatives."[10] This chapter updates and expands each of these endeavors, focusing on two strategic "tools" available to the putative urban political order, cohesion and chamber leadership. Urban cohesion has been strengthened by the cities' continuing shift to the Democratic Party, and chamber leadership among city representatives has been strengthened—but made brittle—by the outflow from the Democratic Party of non-city constitencies.

### 3.1.1   Measuring district urbanicity

To study city representation in Congress, we need some standard of what constitutes a "city" district. Unlike states and persons, however, cities are accorded no formal representation in the national legislature. Congressional district boundaries often blithely cross municipal boundaries, so identifying an "urban" or "city" district may not be straightforward. Worthy approaches typically rely on the availability of Census data listing the districts' proportion of rural, suburban, and urban residents. Mayhew (1966) used this approach, combined with an accounting of percentage in the district who rented their homes. Wolman and Marckini (1998) identify a district's character with its largest population group: central city, suburban in-metro, out of metro, or a mixture. These studies represent the best examples of attempts to identify and track urban representatives in the House using Census data.

These techniques are straightforward, but they share two shortcomings. First, comparing across long timespans is not easy, as readily available census data for congressional districts only go back a few censuses, so getting a long-term picture of city power or the urban-rural divide may be impossible using this approach. To study the New Deal, for instance, another tack must be taken. Second, the "central city" of a Census Bureau Metropolitan Area may not conform to our idea of what a city is in national terms. Sioux City, Iowa, is the center of a small metropolitan area, but it does not really conform to our intuitive understanding of a city because it is still very

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[10]Wolman and Marnicki (2005) p.310

small—we would not think of it when listing urban places, so should we consider a congressional district anchored by such a place urban? Mayhew (1966) attempts a fix to this issue, by applying threshold of percentage in the district who rent their homes. This approach appeals to a certain dimension of what urban residential patterns are like, but it is too exclusive: it jettisons some districts within large cities if they have too few renters, even if those residents are part of the large political communities we call cities.

The alternative approach employed here is to identify *a priori* the locations of large cities at a given time and then identify the districts that comprise these places. Lieberman (2009) defines a standard of "city" that allows for consistent, intuitively satisfactory comparisons over time. A place is considered a big city if its population constituted .1 percent of the total national population in the most recent Census. This is a nice round number, and the actual list of cities it produces fits well with what one would intuitively expect from such a list, but it is also theoretically compelling: each modern congressional district (if they were exactly equal in size) makes up 1/435 of the nation, or .22 percent. Thus the .1 percent threshold is just shy of a majority of a district. For a city to have its "own" district in Congress, it should at least be close to a majority of a Congressional district.[11] In this approach, size is the key definitional element in defining cities over time: without a large population, a city cannot make a strong claim for representation in the legislature, especially in the context of partisan conflict along an urbanity cleavage, where city is pitted against hinterland.

Urbanicity scores for districts are created as follows. For each Census, Lieberman (2009) identified the cities that constituted at least .1 percent of the national population. Using this list and congressional district atlases, I assign each congressional district a set of qualitative codes about its composition and shape to create what I call "USR" data.[12] Districts completely within a city are given a qualitative code of "U" and a numeric score of 7 on a 1-7 "USR" scale. A mixed district

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[11]Employing a more rigorous "big-city" standard of .11 percent yields an identical list of cities for the 20th century, though the two lists do differ slightly during the 19th century.

[12]ie, "Urban-Suburban-Rural." Fuller description of the Lieberman city list is in Lieberman (2009). To code districts, I used maps from various sources. For current Congresses, very useful maps are available online through the Census Bureau's TIGER GIS collection. For recent pre-Internet congresses, the *Congressional District Atlas of the United States* (Bureau of the Census, series begins 1960) is useful; for older congresses, Martis (1982) is an invaluable resource. Each congressional district was given several qualitative scores by the author for this study, as detailed above and in the USR scoring Appendix.

split between central city and suburban areas would get a code of "U/S" or "S/U" and a score of 5 or 6 depending on the apparent balance between place characters.

As cities join or drop out of the Lieberman city set due to population changes, their districts' USR scores change accordingly. I assume that cities that used to be large enough for inclusion retain some urban character, so such districts are not immediately recoded as rural when their central cities are downsized. For instance, Albany, NY, was once large enough to be a central city, but it is not any longer, so its district's code has changed from U/S to S/R/U over the years. Conversely, Fresno, CA, joined the dataset after the 1990 Census, and the districts geographic extent shrank to reflect major population growth in the region, so its code has changed from R to U/S/R (actually, two "U/S/R" districts and two "S/R" districts make up the Fresno metropolitan area). Districts in states that have never had cities large enough to join the dataset, such as South Dakota or Wyoming all receive codes of "R," even though they do include some metropolitan areas.

The result is a dataset spanning American history that can allow us to see the character of place-type representation in the national legislature, and to see the partisan distribution of these different kinds of districts over a wider swathe of history than was possible before.[13] In some analyses below, the 7-category USR score is simplified to 3 categories (City/Urban, Suburban, and Rural) for the sake of visual clarity; in regression analyses in subsequent chapters, the refined 7-category variable is used unless otherwise noted. Figure 3.1 shows which cities made the list in a few selected Censuses, as the American population spread from the East and North to greater regional parity. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to some descriptive analyses of Congressional history made possible by this dataset (referred to here as the Urban-Suburban-Rural, or USR, data) follow.

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[13]There is likely a high degree of overlap in the sets of districts identified as "city" districts by each of the the selection mechanisms. For instance, using demographics, Mayhew (1966) identified 140 city districts for his time period of study, 1947-1962. Using maps and the .1 percent population threshold, USR data classify an average of 143 as city districts for Congresses during that time. The different selection rules mean that Mayhew would have more renter-heavy districts from small cities, while the USR would have more districts with many homeowners in large cities. Wolman and Marckini's technique would code as "mixed" districts that include small central cities, while these would most often be coded as rural in the USR data, because those cities do not reach the .1 percent threshold. Some of these are captured in subsequent analyses with the USR data that attend to cities formerly, but no longer, large enough to meet the threshold. The differences are at the margins, so broader claims about the size of the "city" bloc in Congress are likely robust to different selection methods. The chief advantage of the USR data is its consistency over time where more precise quantitative demographic data are unavailable or inconsistent.

Figure 3.1: Cities with more than .1 percent of national population, at fifty year intervals. Circles are proportional to national population for that year. *Source: Lieberman (2009)*

Figure 3.2: **Place-type representation over time.** Congressional District urbanity distribution, 1865-2009. The graph at left depicts the distribution of place-types in the House. At right is the same graph, with partisanship information. *Source: USR data*

### 3.1.2 City representation over time: the House of Representatives

Using the historical USR data, we can see how representation in Congress has shifted over time. The story is not particularly counterintuitive, but for illustrative purposes it is worth re-telling here. First, from the graph at left in Figure 3.2, we can see how the number of urban districts rose in the early 20th century and levelled off just as the New Deal solidified. City representation in Congress has not declined much in terms of overall numbers (though a closer look below reveals that these city representatives are more diverse in their origins than they used to be). Since the 1930s, the real change has been in the growth in the number of suburban districts, from about ten percent of seats to about one-third, while the share of rural districts diminished.[14] The graph at right in Figure 3.2 displays the partisan distribution of the different kinds of districts: dark blue Democrats on the bottom of each category, red GOP seats above within each category. From this

[14]Judgement about the number of suburban districts is the biggest difference between USR data and Wolman and Marnicki (2005); they put the figure at over fifty percent. See Appendix 1 for a discussion.

figure, we can see the historical development of the urbanicity cleavage in Congress: from 1865 to 1929, city and rural districts were each alike in how they split between the parties (there were very few suburban districts during this time, but they were all Republican), and both city and rural districts were fairly responsive to national shifts: when one rose or fell a lot, so would the other, as in the rapid sequence of partisan rotation in the 1890s.

After 1931, however, there was a large jump in the Democratic share of city districts, as the New Deal assembled its city-based coalition of labor, newly mobilized "ethnic" whites, and eventually African Americans. Republicans regained some of these urban seats intermittently in the 40s and 50s, but as Mayhew (1966) notes, these urban Republicans had to "do violence to party principles" when choosing to support many city-friendly policies.[15] On the substance of urban policy Democrats were better positioned to reconcile party programs and constituency pressure. Thus, except for that dip in the 1940s, Democrats have held a large majority of urban districts since the 1930s; since the 1960, that urban edge has been remarkably consistent even as the overall strength of the parties nationwide has fluctuated. At the same time, the share of rural districts held by Democrats fell, fairly gradually, until a big drop in the 1990s with the 1994 takeover of the chamber by Republicans, in which many rural Southern districts were converted to the GOP column. Until the 1960s the suburban middle zone of the graph was exclusively GOP territory, but the Democrats have made some gains in this area since. By this time there were fewer total rural districts in any case, as the suburbs grew, and large cities became more evenly spaced across the country. The main observation from these graphs is that the development of the urbanicity cleavage in the national legislature over the 20th century has left us with Red Country and Blue Cities in Congress as well as in the electorate: before the New Deal (and intermittently in the 1940s and 1950s) the two parties each featured sizeable city and rural factions, but this is far less true today. The bottom half of the graph has gotten bluer, and the top half has gotten redder: this is a core development in American politics in the past 80 years (not just recent cycles), and the institutional corollary of the growth of the urban-rural divide in the electorate.

Within the set of city districts, two further observations are notable. First, we can see the par-

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[15]Mayhew (1966), p.78

tisan differential along the urbanicity dimension even within the set of city districts. City districts come in many shapes, but there are four basic recurrent patterns (described more fully in the Appendix).

"Core" districts are part of a city (or in a few cases the entire city) and not very mixed with the suburbs or rural areas. A city must be fairly large (roughly 4.5 percent of the national population, or about a million people, today) to have more than one core district. "Metropolitan" districts encompass the entire metropolitan area and some outlying area, a common form for smaller cities. "Sliced" and "Spillover" districts entail a mix of city, suburban, and/or rural contexts within a metropolitan area with more than one district. Especially as America's population has shifted to the suburbs, and as redrawing district boundaries has become a more complicated affair, it is less common for a district to be purely city, suburban, or rural, and core districts have diminished in favor of slices and spillovers. Breaking urban districts into these four broad categories, an even starker partisan picture emerges. Among core districts, only one was Republican as of 2011, and Democrats have long predominated among representatives from these districts. The other kinds of city districts are more evenly distributed between the two parties, though in each category Democrats hold a majority.

The second broad observation is the increasing regional diversity of the city districts. We can get a glimpse of this in Figure 3.1; the U.S. population has shifted dramatically from the North and East to the South and West over the course of the twentieth century (as well as from the cities and countryside to the suburbs), and this is reflected in the geographic dispersion of the set of cities large enough to merit "their own" congressional representation. Figure 3.4 depicts the share of total city districts coming from each of the four main regions of the country. For nearly a century, more than half of all city representatives came from the Northeast, and another quarter from the Midwest. Very few came from the West, and those from the South typically represented districts that were grossly malapportioned, so even the larger Southern cities did not have core districts.[16] By the late twentieth century, however, city representation in Congress had reached a point of virtual regional parity: a city representative was as likely to come from the West or South as from

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[16]For figures and trends in unequal district representation before the one-person, one-vote court cases of the early 1960s, see Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008).

Figure 3.3: **City districts by type and partisanship.**Core city districts are now almost exclusively Democratic, while mixed districts are split between the parties. *Source: USR data*

**City seats by region**          **Trad. Party City Reps (# Seats)**



Figure 3.4: **Proportion of all city districts by region.** While city representatives came overwhelmingly from the Northeast and Midwest until midcentury, today city districts are evenly spread across the country. On a related note, while the number of total city representatives has not diminished, there are far fewer representatives from cities with a history of strong traditional party organizations. *Source: USR data*

the Northeast or Midwest—even slightly *more* likely to come from these faster-growing regions. This regional shift surely colors the content of any urban agenda, but what is most notable about this change is that despite increasing geographic diversity the urban bloc has become more cohesive, in partisan terms as we can see from Figure 3.2, and in terms of finer-grained measures of congressional behavior such as roll call votes, as we shall see below. The urban political order is more national than ever before.

As a byproduct of the dispersion of city districts to the south and west, there has been an institutional change as well. One of the key institutions of horizontal integration, fostering greater city delegation unity, is the traditional party, as we shall see in the next two chapters. These organizations are found mainly in cities, and mainly in the Northeast and Midwest. The subfigure at right in 3.4 shows that the number of city representatives coming from places with traditional party organizations (for this figure, TPO greater than 3 on Mayhew's measure) has been in decline since midcentury. Though the intracity power of most of these local parties has been diminished

significantly since the early 20th century, important elements of their style of politics and integrative potential remain in the cities where they continue to exist. Because of this qualitative and numerical decline in TPO power, analyses (in Chapters 4 and 5) of the role of these institutions in binding together the city delegations that are at the heart of the urban order will focus mainly on the Long New Deal era, when the effects of traditional parties were of peak importance in national politics.

The growing identity of the Democratic Party with its city constituency can also be seen by simply depicting Democrats as a share of city representatives—and, vice versa, city representatives as a share of Democrats in Congress. The two subfigures in Figure 3.5 tell the story again, with closer attention to different outcomes of interest: most city representatives are Democrats, and an increasing share of Democrats are from cities, nearly a majority of the party since the final departure of the South in the 1990s. After the 2010 losses, city representatives actually constituting a narrow majority of the Democratic caucus. At no time in our history has there been a more urban party—a party more identified with cities, their citizens, and all that entails—than the contemporary Democratic Party. This trend contributes to the strength of city power in the chamber, as we will see in the analysis of House cartel members below: as city representatives become a larger share of a major party, they become potentially more powerful when that party is in the majority, but more power*less* when they are not.

The sequence of the growth of the urbanicity divide is important: according to the model argued in this study, urban constituencies became distinctive first, advanced their policy goals in a manner shaped by the conditions of urbanicity and institutions of horizontal integration, and more conservative, rural areas reacted away from them. We can see this sequence, and measure the cleavage more clearly than in Figure 3.2 by tracking Group Seats Fractionalization (GSF), a summary measure akin to weighte disproportionality that clarify the differences between groups.[17]

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[17]GSF is equivalent to GVF or Group Voting Fractionalization, an adaptation of Gallagher disproportionality, clarified to refer to seats instead of votes. GVF is a method of comparing the voting behavior of different groups by measuring the extent to which group identity is associated with vote choice. It is a quick, intuitive way of studying cleavages in an electorate. GVF is developed in Huber (2010) as an approach to studying ethnic voting. The formula for GVF is

$$GVF = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{G-1}{2G}}} \sum_{g=1}^{G} (GVFg * s_g) \qquad \text{where} \qquad GVFg = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{p=1}^{P} (V_{g,p} - V_p)^2}$$

**Proportion of City Representatives in Democratic Party**

**Proportion of Dem. Representatives from City Districts**

Figure 3.5: **Partisanship and place-type over time.** Democrats are a stable majority of urban seats, and urban representatives are for the first time a very slight majority of Democrats. *Source: USR data*

Using city, suburban, and rural district characters as groups, Figure 3.6 illustrates that the urban-rural cleavage has grown in the House, spiking first in the New Deal, again in the 1960s, and again the 1990s until it is as high as ever in our contemporary congress. At right are the unweighted elements of GSF for each place-type are plotted over time. This measure, Seats Disproportionality (SD), is the the difference between each group and the overall chamber. Urban districts first became distinctive in the 1930s; over time, the suburbs have become much less distinctive in their partisan representation as they have grown in number and become less homogeneously Republican. Rural districts, however, have become increasingly distinctive—in favor of the G.O.P.—since

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where $V$ is the share of votes from each of $G$ groups $g$ for each of $P$ parties/candidates $p$, weighted by $s$, the proportion of each group $g$ in the electorate. In essence, it is the divergence of each group from the overall electorate, weighted by group's proportion in the electorate. Essentially, as groups become more different in their voting choice, the measure rises. The minimum possible value is 0 and the maximum possible is 1. The original Gallagher Index is from Gallagher (1991). Here the groups are based on place-character (Urban, suburban, rural), not ethnicity. The intuition of the measure is the association between district place character and party, or "how likely would you be to guess the place character of a representative's constituency if all you knew about him or her was party membership?"

in the 1960s.

**Weighted Disproportionality in House Seats** **Distinctiveness in House Seats by Place–character**



Figure 3.6: **Group-fractionalization by district place-character.** Congressional partisanship has become more organized around the urbanity dimension over time, indicated by the general rise in GSF (using place-character-types as groups) in the plot at left. At right, the general increase in place-character disproportionality is disaggregated. The increase in the overall measure is driven by the sharp and then gradual increase in distinctiveness in urban representatives beginning in the 1930s and the recent drift of rural representatives to the GOP. Suburban representatives have become much less distinctive. *Source: USR data*

The absolute magnitudes of GSF measures are not easily interpreted, but we can see that urbanicity is important by contrasting that cleavage with the other variable commonly seen at the heart of the Red-Blue divide. The typical narrative about political polarization today usually involves the "Red" and "Blue" states, which are usually grouped on a roughly regional basis. In Congress, at least, regional division has fallen since a peak around midcentury, though it has indeed seen a resurgence over the last decade. We can see this in Figure 3.7, which shows changes in GSF since 1865 at left and in SD at right.[18]

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[18]In this plot, I employ the Census "Region" definition, which has four regions. Using the "Division" definition, which divides the country into ten groups of states that are closer to pieces of the "Red-Blue" map (and which are themselves nested in the Regions) yields very similar aggregate results, and also reveals that the increasing distinctiveness of the Northeast is attributable mostly to changes in New England. The simpler regional results are shown here for clarity's sake.

**Weighted Disproportionality in House Seats**

**Distinctiveness in House Seats by Region**



Figure 3.7: **Group-fractionalization by district region.** Congressional partisanship was more divided along regional lines, especially in the "Solid" South, for the century following the Civil War. After a decrease to almost zero, division along regional lines has risen over the last decade, driven mostly by changes in New England and the South. *Source: USR data*

The foregoing description of city representatives in the House of Representatives over time leaves us with two important new observations: first, the urbanicity cleavage has matured in two main steps since 1933. Initially, city districts became disproportionately Democratic in 1933, forging a national urban political order and initiating a trend that continues to the present. Then, beginning in the mid-1960s, suburban districts became less distinctively Republican (while continuing to become more numerous) while rural districts became more distinctively Republican (and less numerous). Before the New Deal, place character was not an important dimension of partisanship at the national legislative level; since then, the cleavage has grown in importance and become more monotonic—the more "city-like" a district is, the more likely to be Democratic.

The second observation is related to the first, and will be more fully elaborated on in the next section, on actual legislative behavior by these city representatives. City legislators have become more Democratic even as they have become more diverse geographically. At the beginning of

the New Deal, 80 percent of city representatives came from what would become the Rust Belt of the Northeast and the Midwest (see Figure 3.4). With its fairly similar patterns of settlement, industrial relations, civil war legacies, such a bloc might seem easier to hold together than a bloc representing city constituencies evenly spread across the four major regions of the country. Yet we do see greater partisan similarity among cities even as the list of cities becomes more diverse. City representatives are more stably Democratic than they were at mid-century, and they are more cohesive as a voting bloc. The maintenance and development of this geographically diverse coalition is rooted in the common city experiences that are shared across cities from diverse regions. These include the city-killing forces of deindustrialization and suburbanization, but also the basic characteristics of urbanicity, which fostered common responses to such challenges, and common national goals, even among cities that shared little politically before the construction of the urban political order.

## 3.2   Urban Power in the House

Cities across the country have become more identified with the Democratic Party over the past 80 years. The governance demands associated with urbanicity in the wane of the Fordist industrial era, and the intensifying constraints cities face, have prompted the growth of a substantive city agenda in national politics since the New Deal. This growing urban agenda marked a departure from the past in large part because many of its policies dealt directly with the uncertainties and challenges of modern urban life, and the work by city representatives to articulate and advance such measures from the New Deal on have been described in detail elsewhere.[19]

However, even if a national urban agenda has become more important for cities, city districts have not become more numerous. Given that city districts make up at most a third of the legislature, pursuing an urban agenda requires strategy and institutional leverage. In this section, I explore key elements that might foster legislative success for cities in the legislature, given the

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[19]Gelfand (1975), Biles (2011)

obstacles presented by an urban-rural partisan divide. Three strategic imperatives present themselves in pursuit of any such non-majority bloc's goals: attain leadership positions to influence the agenda; be cohesive, especially when cities and other kinds of places do not agree; and gain reliable allies with either common interests or with a propensity to logroll or compromise, providing extra votes for the city bloc. The remainder of this chapter analyzes different aspects of these strategic concerns.

### 3.2.1 Chamber power positions

Within Congress, the increasing identification of the parties with different kinds of places has led to the potential for institutional exaggeration of the smaller urbanity cleavage in the electorate. This place character divide may be further exaggerated if the *leadership* of the two parties are also sorted by place character. In the House of Representatives, the majority party has significant control over the legislative agenda.[20] This agenda power allows significant control over what kinds of policies are considered for change: according to the cartel agenda model, the leadership group allows a bill to the floor only when the majority party median prefers the bill to the status quo. Though this agenda power is mostly *negative* agenda power, membership in the leadership group of the House majority is quite valuable, especially for a subpartisan group like the city bloc that may struggle to achieve chamber majorities.[21] In particular, the majority median, committee chairs, majority party members of important committees, and party floor leadership have outsize influence on substantive agendas and the precise content of legislation. For all these reasons, an analysis of the power of the urban bloc in congress should attend to the personnel in these structural positions. Here, I explore how successful city representatives were in securing leadership positions, becoming members of the cartel that could control action in the House.

For over fifty years, beginning with the New Deal, the diverse Democratic Party alliance held

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[20]Cox and McCubbins (2004)
[21]Wolman and Marnicki (2005), Mayhew (1966), Mollenkopf (1983)

almost uninterrupted majority status in the House of Representatives. Many of the key legislative battles that took place during this time were as much between different factions of the Democratic Party as between Democrats and Republicans.[22] The most famous struggle was between (mostly rural) Southerners, who had been the core of the party since Reconstruction, and (mostly urban) Northerners, many but not all of whom were relative "newcomers" to the Democratic team. Thus, while the city wing often enjoyed greater numbers and closer links to Democratic Presidents, the moderate/conservative southern wing had advantages in ideological centrality and seniority.

City power within the House cartel has not tracked broad city representation in the chamber. The overall number of city representatives in the House grew for roughly the first third of the century, and then plateaued between 135 and 145 seats to the present day, accounting for about one-third of House members, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Within the leadership, however, the pattern was more uneven but also potentially more promising for the city institutional order.[23] The first subfigure in Figure 3.8 estimates the agenda-setting power of representatives from different place-types over time, plotting the proportion of members of the legislative cartel—members of the majority party leadership and committee chairs—who represent city constituencies. As in Figure 3.2, the dark grey shaded area at the foot of the figure represents city representatives, the light grey is suburban, and the white area on top is representatives from outside major cities' metropolitan areas. The endpoint of the urban series in the 112th congress is indicated with a small circle for visibility. Overlaid on the shaded series from each type of place are vertical lines indicating Congresses when the chamber's leadership changed hands (there was Republican control before 1931, for one congress in the 1940s, and from 1995-2007), a horizontal line at .5, and a black line showing the proportion of overall seats in the House held by city representatives (as in Figure 3.2).

This subfigure tells a dramatic tale. While city representation in the legislature has been fairly steady, as indicated by the black line hovering around .3, city inclusion in the leadership has been volatile: the dark grey shaded area careens up and down over the black line representing city

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[22]Lieberman (2001), Katznelson (2012)

[23]Another way in which the trajectory of city power has not tracked the overall plateaued representation of cities is a result of the continued partisan sorting by place-character. In addition to the leadership, another important player in the cartel model is the majority party median, to whom the leadership is responsive. Over time, as the share of Democrats representing cities has grown (See Figure 3.5) the median Democrat is likely a city representative, though the median voter surely is not.

share in the legislature. By the late 1930s, city representatives made up nearly half of all leadership positions, peaking in the 77th Congress, including John McCormack (Boston) as Majority Leader, Adolph Sabath (Chicago) as chairman of the Rules Committee, and Mary Norton (Jersey City) as chair of Labor. New York City alone had six committee chairmen in its delegation in the 77th Congress, though none had particularly important portfolios. The city's place within the Democratic chamber leadership dropped precipitously during the postwar era, despite mostly Democratic chamber control. This was an era in which some northern city districts were closely contested, and a wave of quick reversals—seats shifting Democrat-Republican-Democrat over a very few congresses—erased city seniority among Democrats in some cases, and there were also some notable retirements among old-guard city Democrats during this time. Beginning in the 1950s, however, city power in the Democratic leadership grew until they achieved a numerical majority during the 1980s. In the 101st congress, half of the chamber's key roles were filled by city representatives including: Speaker; Majority Leader; Majority Whip, and the chairs of Rules;[24] Ways and Means; Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Education and Labor; and Public Works and Transportation. After a half-century of contending with the powerful conservative Southern wing of the party, city representatives had established control over important areas of city legislation. While the urban interlude is often seen as the peak of city power, a strong case for the 1980s can be made as well, at least in this important representative institution.

Of course, this moment of city rule was short-lived. The loss of the House by Democrats in the 1990s was not evenly experienced across different kinds of places: there were few Republicans to represent cities in the legislature, and the city presence in the House leadership dropped quickly, replaced by a largely suburban, but increasingly rural, Republican leadership. By 2005, only 2 of the 27 House cartel members were from cities, the lowest level of city power on this measure since the 83rd Congress.[25] This was also a half-century high tide for *rural* membership in the cartel. With the frequent changes in House leadership in recent years, city representation in leadership has become even more extreme. After the Democratic gains of 2006 and 2008, city representatives

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[24]Claude Pepper's district included Miami

[25]Before that, we need to go back to before the Civil War to find comparably weak representation of cities in the leadership.

made up a greater share of the cartel than ever before, including the Speakership, and chairs of Ways and Means, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Veterans Affairs, and Judiciary; after 2010, they were back to near-historic lows.

City representatives' ties to the Democrats, their increasing seniority, and the wane of secure non-city Democrats has meant that city representatives have often been over-represented in the leadership when Democrats have been in control of the House, and under-represented when Republicans have controlled the chamber.[26] Wolman and Marnicki (2005) attribute much of this tie between Democratic majority and city power to the increasing seniority of many city Democrats. Their findings, which end in 1995-6, have been amplified by the broad swings in city power in the prior and ensuing decades. As the city-country divide has grown in the chamber as a whole, and in the electorate as well, the institutional implications for cities in the nation have become something of a feast or famine: when Democrats control the House, city representatives make up more of the leadership than ever; when the GOP controls the agenda, city representatives are not included in the leadership.

The other subfigures in Figure 3.8 reinforce the narrative of chamber power for city representatives. In each figure, the partisan place-character divide is illustrated within sets of representatives with particular power over city issues. The central panel includes the proportion from each kind of place on the "prestige" committees: Rules, Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Budget.[27] These committees have broad jurisdictions that impact virtually all significant policy, so members of these committees may be particularly powerful. City and suburban representation on these committees have grown, and rural representation diminished, roughly parallel with the proportions in the chamber as a whole. Even more than in Figure 3.2, the partisan place-character divide is amplified on these powerful committees. This changes somewhat with shifts in chamber control—the membership proportions of these committees somewhat exaggerate chamber proportions as a whole, and a couple more city Republicans are assigned when their party is in the majority—but generally holds true. Finally, the subfigure at right shows membership by place

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[26]This analysis builds on Wolman and Marnicki (2005), filling in gaps, including more votes, extending the series forward and back, and refining the set of majority party leaders based on Cox and McCubbins (2004).

[27]This list of prestige committees is from Wolman and Marnicki (2005), who adopt it from Smith and Deering (1990).

**Proportion of House cartel members, by urbanicity**

**Proportion of members of prestige committees, by urbanicity**

**Proportion of members of banking committee, by urbanity**

Figure 3.8: **City representation in House leadership over time.** At left, members of House leadership cartel, by urbanicity. Middle, membership in House prestige committees by urbanicity and party. Right, membership on House Finance (Banking/Urban Affairs) Committee by urbanicity and party. Vertical dashed lines indicate change in House majority control. *Source: USR data, Charles Stewart Committee Roster Data*

character and party on the most important House committee for city issues, Financial Services.[28]

On this committee, cities have always been overrepresented, especially around the middle of the

last century, when city representatives made up over half of the committee (vs. a third of the

chamber), because of the committee's important role in oversight of large housing and urban

development programs. Suburban Republicans have since become more numerous, while rural

representation on this committee has greatly diminished. On issues controlled by this committee,

which include urban and regional development, and many of the specific programs established to

help cities manage the paradox of urban governance, the dividing lines between city Democrats

and non-city Republicans are particularly clear.[29]

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[28]This committee was formerly known as the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, but the urban affairs were dropped in 1995 when Republicans assumed the majority, a title change that in itself reflects the parties' attitudes toward city issues. The correspondent committee in the Senate remains Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

[29]Caraley (1976)

Taken together, these analyses of place character in leadership and on important committees reinforces two observations. The clearest long-run historical trend here is the diminution of rural power on committees and in leadership. Rural interests were once dominant in the most important institutions within the House, but city and suburban representatives, and ostensibly their perspectives, now predominate. The exception to this trend is that when Republicans are in control, rural representatives do have an outsize share of power positions, though still less than they once did. The other important observation is the volatility in city power that results from the place-character partisan divide. Before the GOP takeover of the 1990s, just under a half of House committee chairs were from urban districts, and the proportion of committee chairs from different kinds of places had held fairly steady for two decades (though there was a gradual increase in the share that went to suburban representatives). Since the mid-90s takeover, however, when Republicans have had a majority of House seats, less than five committees have been headed by urbanites; when Democrats have held a majority, more than half of House committees chairs have come from city districts. This may be due to aging-out or defeat of partisans who did not fit the place-character dimension; representatives more naturally compatible with their districts (ie, those whose party affiliation and district character match the partisan character of the urbanicity cleavage) can more easily accrue seniority as the place-type sorting of Congress continues.[30] As in the electorate and in the legislature as a whole, the place-character cleavage has matured within legislative party leadership. Even at the very top of the parties' leadership the divide is clearly present. The contrast in style and self-presentation between Barack Obama and, say, Sarah Palin or George W. Bush is obvious. But within Congress the urbanicity divide is manifest as well. Among the past four Speakers of the House—Newt Gingrich, Dennis Hastert, Nancy Pelosi, and John Boehner—each represent constituencies in synch with their party's placement on the urbanicity spectrum.

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[30]Wolman and Marckini (1998)

### 3.2.2   The Urban Agenda

What were some effects of the consolidation of city representatives within the Democratic Party? During the urban interlude, one obvious change was the ascent of important urban issues to the national agenda. Many of the major New Deal programs dealt with individuals—social security and the large welfare state programs, changes in labor regulation, and so on—but there were also major changes in the way the national government related to cities. One place this is evident is in the agenda of House hearings, which reflect salient concerns of the day that at least some members believe merit national attention.[31]

Representatives from cities that were (now more obviously) vulnerable to sudden collapse under conditions of capitalism and federalism began to support a program of national economic regulation, but a bigger change was in the relationship between the nation and municipalities would be, channeling aid of all sorts to urban centers. Over the course of the 1930s, city representatives made federal aid to cities a major element of national policy, and as time went by it would become an increasingly important source of overall revenue for cities themselves.[32]

Before 1930, when the federal government considered aid to local government, it was almost exclusively for rural areas in response to natural accidents. After 1930, aid was increasingly thought of as a response to market conditions, to help cities weather economic storms and structural adjustment.[33] We can see this from Table 3.1, which is a list of all hearings that relate to federal aid to local governments from 1900-1940.[34] In this table, the gray rows indicate those that are primarily about city or urban issues. This was determined by the substance of the hearings and the witnesses who appeared before the committee: on topics that were possibly urban, witness lists that were primarily persons from or representing cities were taken as signs that this was

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[31]Much of the story of the rise of urban issues to the national agenda has been told well elsewhere, eg. Gelfand (1975). Here, I add observations specifically germane to the urbanicity paradox (high demand, constrained resources for governance) and to the strategies city representatives pursued to overcome their situation of marginal urgency.

[32]Caraley (1976)

[33]Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004), ch. 4

[34]This list was assembled from a search of the LexiNexis Congressional Hearings database using the search terms "federal aid to local governments" and "federal aid to municipalities," two standard subjects for hearings, and searched between 1900 and 1940 for this table. Extending the search back in time produces only a few more hearings in the results; extending it forward toward the present produces hundreds more. 1930-33 is clearly an inflection point where the substance and frequency of these hearings changed dramatically.

a "city" issue. Topics that were obviously not urban, such as "Forestry," were coded as non-urban. Early in the century, federal aid was considered for many particular agricultural and hydrological purposes. Flood control was a primary concern—indeed, before 1930, the only hearing that was primarily relevant to a city was about flood control in Pittsburgh.

By contrast, after 1930 (and especially after 1932), as the Depression set in and hit the industrial cities of the North particularly hard, federal aid was considered for a much larger portfolio of policies, most of them primarily targeting urban areas. Unemployment relief, road building, and public works were frequently considered for federal aid, and funds were ultimately appropriated for these purposes. This marked a shift in the target and scope of federal aid to local governments. As Fiorello LaGuardia put it in a 1937 hearing on housing, "If anyone had suggested... 10 years ago that mayors would come to Washington to talk about housing with the congress it would seem so extreme and so far-fetched as to receive no serious consideration."[35] Aid in these areas was conceived of or adjusted to help cities more than it had before; while these kinds of policies could ostensibly benefit all kinds of communities, city leaders and representatives staunchly supported these programs, and cities certainly gained great benefits from them.[36]

**Hearings about federal aid to local governments, 1900-1940.**

| Hearing title | Year |
|---|---|
| Agricultural Education and ... the Oleomargarine Law | 1908 |
| Sites and Plans for Public Buildings | 1910 |
| Compensation for Use of Highways | 1912 |
| Good Roads. | 1913 |
| Urgent Deficiency Bill, 1915 | 1914 |
| Donation of Land, Malden, Mass. | 1914 |
| Flood Control at Pittsburgh, Pa. | 1918 |
| Farm Organizations | 1921 |
| Umpqua River, Bar, and Entrance, Oregon | 1922 |
| Forestry | 1922 |
| Aswell Agricultural Extension Bill | 1924 |
| County Agents in Flood-Stricken Areas ... for South Carolina | |
| Continued on next page | |

[35]"To Create a U.S. Housing Authority," Senate Committee on Education and Labor. April 14, 1937. HRG-1937-EDS-0013. p.100

[36]Unemployment in large industrial cities was higher than the national average, and the potential for unrest there made increased or extended relief particularly valuable. Though massive roadbuilding projects were already contributing to city-killing suburbanization by the 1920s, city officials supported them from the start because of the massive local stimulus they provide.**?**

**Table 3.1 – continued from previous page**

| Hearing title | Year |
|---|---|
| Flood Control. Part 1: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries | 1927 |
| Flood Control. Part 3: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries | 1927 |
| Cooperative Agricultural Extension Work | 1927 |
| Flood Control. Part 4: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries | 1928 |
| Flood Control. Part 5: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries | 1928 |
| Loans for Relief of Drainage Districts | 1930 |
| River and Harbor Bill | 1930 |
| Unemployment Relief | 1931 |
| Nontaxable Indian Lands | 1931 |
| Emergency Appropriation…in Rural Sanitation, etc. | 1931 |
| Flood Control, Drainage, Levee Districts | 1931 |
| Unemployment Relief | 1932 |
| Roads | 1932 |
| Rehabilitation of Storm-Stricken Areas | 1932 |
| Establishment of Administration of Public Works | 1932 |
| Roads | 1932 |
| Boston Harbor, Mass. | 1932 |
| Federal Aid Highway Legislation | 1932 |
| Drainage, Levee, Irrigation and Similar Districts | 1932 |
| Loans for Relief of Drainage Districts | 1932 |
| Relief to Municipalities | 1933 |
| National Industrial Recovery | 1933 |
| To Amend the Emergency and Construction Act of 1932 | 1933 |
| Surplus Navy Coal for Distribution to Needy at Nominal Prices | 1933 |
| Hearing on H.R. 13026, To Amend Section 546, Title 34, of the U.S. Code | 1933 |
| Further Unemployment Relief Through the RFC | 1933 |
| Loans by the RFC To Aid Public Schools | 1933 |
| Additional Public Works Appropriations | 1934 |
| Roads | 1934 |
| To Provide Loans Through RFC | 1934 |
| Revision of Laws Concerning Bankruptcy of Drainage Districts | 1935 |
| Revision of Municipal Districts Bankruptcy Filing Procedures | 1935 |
| Revision of Municipal Districts Bankruptcy Filing Procedures | 1935 |
| Payments in Lieu of Taxes on Resettlement Projects | 1936 |
| RFC Aid To Refinance Indebtedness …in Conservation Areas | 1936 |
| Service Charges on Federal Slum Clearance Projects | 1936 |
| R.F.C. and Federal Housing Loans for Municipal and Flood Relief | 1936 |
| U.S. Housing Act of 1936 | 1936 |
| Stream Pollution | 1936 |
| To Create a U.S. Housing Authority | 1937 |
| Comprehensive Flood Control Plan for Ohio and Lower Mississippi Rivers | 1937 |
| River and Harbor Bill. | 1937 |
| Amendments to U.S. Housing Act of 1937 | 1938 |
| Continued on next page | |

**Table 3.1 – continued from previous page**

| Hearing title | Year |
|---|---|
| Loans to Public Agencies and Business Enterprises by RFC | 1938 |
| Public Buildings and Grounds | 1938 |
| Rehabilitation of Drainage Works, . . . Ottawa National Forest | 1939 |
| To Amend the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 | 1939 |
| Federal Cooperation in Development of Airports | 1940 |
| Construction of Hospitals | 1940 |

Table 3.1: Hearings about federal aid to local governments, 1900-1940. Hearings primarily about aid to cities highlighted in gray. *Source: LexisNExis Congressional Hearings database*

Urban issues, especially programs that would help cities *qua* cities, were brought to the national agenda in earnest in the urban interlude. The constraints faced by cities, and the urgency with which they sought federal help for relief, were severe, but the use of the federal government for such purposes was not uncontroversial. From even before Roosevelt's election in 1932, a difference in attitude toward federal aid to cash-strapped local polities was apparent even among Democrats from different kinds of districts. In 1932, for instance, several bills for unemployment relief were considered in a Senate hearing. The bills were written by senators from the urban industrial states (Wagner from New York, Bulkley from Ohio, Barbour from New Jersey, and Davis from Pennsylvania. Barbour and Davis were in the Republican majority, Wagner and Bulkley were Democrats). At this hearing, the three perspectives on government activity that would persist throughout the Long New Deal were already in evidence. Wagner, who was already the face of urban liberalism in the Senate, advocated for large-scale unemployment relief in the form of public-works construction financed by a combination of grants, loans, and bonds by the national government to the states through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.[37] He was supported

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[37]"Unemployment Relief." Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Hearing, June 2-13, 1932. (HRG-1932-BCS-0008)

by a bipartisan group of senators with close ties to industrial cities: Bulkley had formerly repre-

sented Cleveland in the House; James Couzens (R-MI) was a former mayor of Detroit; and James

Davis (R-PA) was a former union official and civic organizer from Pittsburgh.

Wagner and his allies met with resistance from Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills, who

voiced the administration's chief concerns of maintaining a balanced budget (the bond issue

would constitute deficit spending) and the efficiency of government-financed public works as

a means for relieving unemployment. Mills's

> fundamental objection is that it unbalances the budget; that it resorts to the unsound
> device of an extraordinary budget, that it breaks down a sound financial policy pur-
> sued since the beginning of the government... These figures prove beyond question
> that this method of attack is wholly ineffective in solving the unemployment prob-
> lem... It becomes all the more necessary when you consider that an unbalanced budget
> and the abandonment of sound financial practices will cause a further shock to public
> confidence, tend to retard business recover, and so not only prevent re-employment on
> a large scale, but very possibly add to the number of those already unemployed.[38]

While Mills supported emergency grants to states and small loans to businesses in an effort to

jump-start production, he voiced concerns that the program as designed would allocated funds to

all states, including large, relatively wealthy ones, which he argued should be able to fund these

projects themselves:

> I know of no conceivable reason why great, rich states like New York and Pennsylvania
> should receive a grant from the federal treasury or be invited to accept one. They are
> well able to take care of their own. The bill should be so drafted as to provide for an
> emergency fund for the states that need it; not for a gratuitous distribution to all states
> on a per capita basis irrespective of need or resources.[39]

This perspective ignores the intrastate urban-rural divides that cities like New York faced, which

made it difficult for New York City to get much help from Albany. It also ignores the broader

constraints inherent in the logic of federalism, which provides a "conceivable reason" why even

relatively wealthy states would be smart to pursue such essentially redistributive interventions

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[38]HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 14-15

[39]HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 17

through national policy.

In the hearing, Mills came under attack from the city senators (from both parties) for his con-
tention that public works were not effective or efficient means of providing unemployment relief
and of spurring other industries, but their main contention was that under the urgent conditions
of the Depression, massive action must be taken by the national government.  He mainly found
support, however, from a pair of conservative Southern Democrats on the committee, Carter Glass
of Virginia and Thomas Gore of Oklahoma.  These two represented the older strain of the Demo-
cratic Party, having been in the chamber for over a decade each (of the aforementioned "urban"
Senators, only Couzens had arrived in the chamber before the late 1920s). While Mills was chiefly
concerned with keeping a balanced budget, and generally supportive of emergency aid to states
in principle, Glass and Gore went further, emphasizing the principle of state self-reliance.  Glass
stated plainly that he was "opposed to the whole business. I don't think a state has a right to exist
that can not take care of its own interests."[40]

Wagner responded that his bill had a purpose of "giving relief to the destitute where the facts
justify it…and that is where we are working toward opposite objectives."  For him, action by
the national government was the appropriate response to the nationwide economic crisis.[41]  With
New Yorkers Roosevelt and Smith again preparing bids for the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion, Mills argued that the appropriate source of funds for relief of unemployment in New York
was the State of New York:

> The question is, whether they are going to get those funds from their own people,
> or are going to the federal government for them. New York …need[s] funds for relief
> work today. But the question is whether the governor of the State of New York is going
> to call the state legislature into session and ask additional income taxes let us say, for
> relief purposes; whether he would call upon the great wealth of New York to meet the
> situation, or whether he will avoid that responsibility and come to Washington to get
> it.[42]

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[40]HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 17

[41]At this point, Wagner, Roosevelt and other leading progressives such as Republicans LaFollette and LaGuardia
were avowedly opposed to deficit spending on principle (Leuchtenburg (1963), p.37), but the inclusion of bond issuance
for these loan programs presages the later adoption of Keynesian countercyclical budgeting.

[42]ibid, p.17

Glass agreed, calling

> "so-called federal aid the biggest humbug on earth. You get money from the states and bring it on here and land it in the treasury, and then you dole it back to them."[43]

The conservative Southern position voiced by Glass was roughly in agreement with the administration, and emphatically not with the bipartisan city position. Later in the hearing, Gore also took this position, arguing that increased aid to states would lead to a state "ceas(ing) to be a body sovereign and becom(ing) a department like the departments of France."[44]

But the Southerners did not agree with Mills on everything. Glass and Gore also criticized government intervention on behalf of businesses, which was the core of Mills's position. Glass lamented that "Ordinarily when private industry no longer has any credit it closes up, and it ought to close up...I am old fashioned. I do not understand these modern devices,"[45] while Gore wondered

> What is the difference between government ownership and government wet-nursing?...The contention is that there should not be government ownership. A large group of people look upon it with bitter criticism and horror and yet it is proposed that the government shall set up a wet-nursing establishment—the RFC—and collect taxes from the people and loan money to public utilities and everything else that comes along...[46]

Gore also saw some hypocrisy on the part of businesses calling for state intervention in crises:

> In normal times whenever mention is made of the government engaging in private business, a chorus is raised against it, but in hard times they raise a chorus in favor of it. "Come over and help us", they cry.[47]

On distributive matters, Glass and Gore agreed that "the government ought not to go into your pocket to furnish me funds," and that schemes to "tax the people of Oklahoma to fix a roof in

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[43]ibid, p. 18
[44]ibid, p. 29
[45]ibid p. 41
[46]ibid p.166
[47]ibid, p.178

New York" were unacceptable (even as they agreed that relatively wealthy New York paid more in taxes than Virginia or Oklahoma, both overall and per capita). They were joined by Duncan Fletcher (D-FL), who wondered if "the people who pay taxes are now beginning to realize that in order to decrease taxes they must decrease this demand for appropriations?"[48] In this hearing, at least, the rhetoric of these (non-city) Southern Democrats was even more conservative than the Republicans, and was deeply skeptical of any national plan to manage the economy or deal with the current economic crisis.

After the landslide elections of 1932, the conflict within the Democratic Party over aid to local governments did not disappear, but the terrain on which it was fought had changed; city advocates of robust, national intervention were clearly on the higher ground. This was apparent during a 1933 appearance by Boston Mayor James Curley before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. Curley gave the city perspective on another Wagner bill that would allow cities to borrow against anticipated tax receipts to cover current shortfalls; the immediate recipients of the proposed aid had shifted from the state to the local level since the previous year's RFC proposal. In a hearing entitled "Relief to Municipalities," Gore sought to pre-emptively admonish cities for seeking aid from the national government:

> If [witnesses] are here to make a statement concerning the state of the union or matters of interest to the public generally, of course, we greet them with courtesy and are glad to hear the suggestions. If they have come here to seek money out of the Treasury of the United States and out of the pockets of the taxpayers of the United States, I want to enter a protest against hearing them.[49]

Speaking as "Ambassador from the American cities to the Congress," Curley quickly replied that he could not imagine

> anything that would be more in the nature of an innovation than some representative of any of the various units that go to make up the government of the United States or the states of the union appearing in Washington *for any other purpose than endeavoring to seek some money out of the Treasury*. So far as I have been able to ascertain, following

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[48]ibid, p.189

[49]"Relief to Municipalities," Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, May 3, 1933. (HRG-1933-BCS-0021) p. 5.

the press, that has been about the purpose of the visit of every one that has come to Washington.[50]

Gore, in response, urged local fiscal self-reliance:

I feel that when they come here, these towns and cities, to ask money at the hands of the federal government it is just a deadly blow to the system. Not only that—it is an admission that they are dead, and they will never rise, and I am going to bid you good day.[51]

Gore's frustrated, rather stormy exit from this exchange marked a moment when the coalescing urban political order, represented by Curley, confronted the previous heart of the Democratic Party, and forced it into a both symbolic and literal retreat.

The new norm of a distributive politics that would benefit a wide range of constituencies was established, allowing for the "inclusive exchange" of goods throughout the New Deal era.[52] But city representatives needed to continually remind their partners in this exchange of the deal, and had to make concessions to keep it alive. In 1933, for instance, the NIRA formula for allocating road construction and maintenance funding was adjusted to increase the importance of population (and the importance of a state's geographic area diminished). When When Rep. Fuller (D-AR) objected to this change, John McCormack (D-MA) testily rebuked the Arkansan for not being "big-hearted" enough to keep quiet about the shift of funds to states with large populations.[53]

While transportation and infrastructure policies could be subtly adjusted, housing policy was a new realm of massive activity for the national government in the 1930s. Early housing and slum clearance programs were clearly designed with cities in mind, because of the relative scarcity of city land and high costs of construction. In keeping with the party's principle of inclusive exchange, however, benefits were also extended to rural areas. The urban liberals (mainly Democrats in Congress and the administration) were careful to characterize the nascent housing programs as unbiased and inclusive with regards to urbanicity; thus in addition to support for programs that

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[50]ibid, emphasis added
[51]ibid
[52]Mayhew (1966), Fleck (2008)
[53]"National Industrial Recovery." House Committee on Ways and Means. May 18-20, 1933. (HRG-1933-WAM-0006), p. 299

benefited rural areas, city representatives also included benefits for rural areas in urban legisla-

tion, sweetening the deal all along the way. In the hearing on the USHA's initial approval, when

Sen. Franklin Hancock (D-NC) expressed skepticism that the program would actually make an

impact outside the cities, Fiorello LaGuardia (appearing on behalf of the USCM and New York

City), was barely able to disagree:

> *Hancock*: Why was the word "rural" inserted [into the bill describing slum condi-
> tions]?...I am in favor of aiding slum people whenever they exist and naturally some
> of the advocates want to leave that word in, but I do not want to fool my people. You
> must know why it was put there. You know the practical philosophy of this bill makes
> it unsuited to rural communities as well as I do...
>
> *LaGuardia*: Don't you think that the American farmer would like to have a nice cheer-
> ful place to live in, just as much as the unskilled laborer of a city would?
>
> *Hancock*: Of course, but who would buy it for him? He couldn't participate under
> this bill.
>
> *LaGuardia*: Some sort of arrangement could be made, the same as in the city.
>
> *Hancock*: Does this bill contemplate the purchase of farm lands?... Why make a gesture
> in this bill in that direction? Let us make this an urban bill and work out a companion
> measure for the rural communities.
>
> *LaGuardia*: Will you vote for it?

Later, USHA administrator Nathan Straus insisted that his agency did not subscribe to

> the principle that slum conditions and the ill-housed poor are phenomena existing only
> in large metropolitan areas. Our assistance in attacking the low-rent housing problem
> is based, not on the population, not on the urban or rural character of the applicant,
> but on the demonstrated need for slum clearance and rehousing.[54]

This insistence that housing policy (and other city-centric New Deal policies) would also benefit

rural communities was no doubt attractive for non-city legislators who might not have supported

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[54]HRG-1939-EDS-0007 p29

such expensive programs.  Rep.  James Meeks, a downstate Democrat from Illinois, inquired of

Straus how he could gain benefits for his district, which included no large population centers:

> I see that you earmarked nothing under 100,000 population there (in Illinois). I would
> like to get what the local difficulty is in Illinois, because if we are going to pass a nice
> fat pie around, I want our State to get some of it. [55]

Illinois did indeed, get some, though maybe less than it "should have."[56] While the housing pro-

gram was mostly targeted at larger cities, as seems intended by the authors and proponents, the

partisan distribution of the program's early funds is apparent.  The 1937 Congress was the most

lopsided in postbellum history: Democrats held 75 of 96 seats in the Senate and 333 of 435 seats in

the House.  Even so, the initial allocations of the USHA grants were somehow even *more* dispro-

portionately sent to districts represented by Democrats.  Ninety-two percent of over $600 million

in first-wave USHA funding for housing went to localities (mainly cities, but also small towns and

counties) represented by Democrats in the House.  Most of the money went to major Democratic

cities: New York City received $53 million, Chicago $16 million (Illinois got a late start in the pro-

gram), Philadelphia $32 million.[57]  None of the members of these large cities' delegations were

Republicans.  Smaller Republican cities in some of these states did receive grants as well: Syra-

cuse, Peoria, and Worcester all sent Republicans to the House, but they were also real industrial

cities with demonstrable need of redevelopment.  It is the smaller allocations that reveals partisan

allocation of funds.  Such poetically small towns as Paducah (KY), Muncie (IN), Norwalk (CT),

and Laurel (MS) also were among the recipients of these initial grants.  The sums they received

were fairly trivial in the grand scope of the program—typically less than $1 million.  But of the

40 "small-town" allocations made by the USHA, 38 (95 percent) were to places represented by

Democrats. Most of these small-town grants were made in the South, despite the very low costs of

labor, construction, and land in that region (the high costs of these factors in cities are what makes

government intervention in the housing market necessary).  It seems unlikely that 95 percent of

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[55]"Amendments to U.S. Housing Act of 1937," Hearing of House Committee on Banking and Currency, April 28, 1938. (HRG-1938-BCU-0004) p16

[56]And Meeks's *district* did not get any of the fat pie, either.

[57]Author's analysis of first-generation USHA grant figures given by USHA administrator Nathan Straus before Senate Subcommittee on S. 591, Committee on Education and Labor HRG-1939-EDS-0007, p. 27-28

the low-income housing needs outside of the cities happened to be in these particular districts; this was distributive politics to woo rural representatives even within the city-centric housing program.

All of this is consistent with the cities' primary strategy of addressing marginal urgency by inclusive exchange. The large cities in the Democratic fold (as well as some, like San Francisco, that were not in the Democratic fold) received much-needed funds to implement low-income housing and slum clearance programs, but the cost of the urban program was that a small allocation (about five percent of the program) went to small-town Democratic constituencies where the demand for such subsidies could not have been as strong.

Nonetheless, this urban-rural mutual exchange program had begun to fray by the end of the decade. While rural areas and states with small populations received higher per capita largesse from New Deal programs, these same places joined a conservative coalition less than enthusiastic about supporting programs (notably housing) that primarily benefited cities.[58] Frustrated with the perceived disloyalty or defection from the inclusive bargain, city representatives Raymond McKeough (D-Chicago) and Henry Ellenbogen (D-Pittsburgh) engaged in the following pedagogical exchange for the benefit of their rural colleagues in 1937:

> *McKeough*: Do you think that the requirements of this (housing) bill are to cover a parochial problem, or a national problem?
>
> *Ellenbogen*: National.
>
> *McKeough*: Is there any more reason why the municipalities that have got to cure this condition should be penalized, as against the farmer that receives his soil-erosion contribution from the federal government?
>
> *Ellenbogen*: I agree...[cities] contribute millions and millions of dollars more in Federal taxes than the Federal government pays in servicing that area. The money goes somewhere else.
>
> *McKeough*. May I ask if any of those dollars that Pittsburgh paid in were earmarked so that none of them might reach the rural settlements in the payment of gratuities to the

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[58]Gelfand (1975) and Biles (2011) chronicle the growth of the conservative coalition and resistance by non-city Democracts to a cabinet-level "urban" department beginning in the 1930s. Mayhew (1966) quantifies the relatively frequent defection by non-city Democrats from the party's practice of inclusive exchange over the 1940s.

farmers?[59]

Of course, city representatives were successful in getting city issues onto the permanent national agenda. At the final stages of representation, at roll call voting, this achievement has been lasting. Figure 3.9 shows the over-time trend in the number of roll call votes having to do with explicitly urban issues during the 20th century. To identify urban roll calls for this time series, I use data from the American Institutions Project (AIP) dataset, which assigns substantive issue codes to all roll calls in congressional history.[60] I identify votes from 3 categories as particularly important for cities, and the kind of interventions considered here and promoted by city representatives during the urban interlude: Urban and Regional Development, Public Works Employment, and Housing.

These issue areas increased in salience over the urban interlude. As we can see from Figure 3.9, in which the solid/red line indicates the number of votes on city issues, while the dashed/navy line indicates the proportion of all votes in these four city categories, the urban interlude saw an increase in the salience of the urban agenda in roll call voting.The general trend in overall urban votes is an increase since about the early 1930s, with an outlying peak during the urban fiscal crises of the mid-1970s. As a proportion of the overall House voting agenda, urban issues rise with the new Democratic majority in 1931, are at their highest levels over the 1930s-1950s, and peak in 1959 (though the *extremity* of that peak is due to a series of bills with several quick procedural votes). Of course, simply counting roll calls on a topic does not tell provide very much detail about political outcomes (and these city issues did not *dominate* agenda in any case, making up at most one percent of roll calls). But reaching the final agenda is an important first step, and these figures also reconfirm the historical treatments of urban policy and coincide with the content of the hearing agenda above.[61] In the next chapter, we shall see that city delegations were particularly cohesive on these votes, helping to promote a united urban agenda. For the remainder of this chapter, I turn to an analysis of urban voting behavior and strength in the House.

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[59]"To Create a U.S. Housing Authority", hearing of House Committee on Banking and Currency. Aug 3, 1937. HRG-1937-BCU-0002 p.101

[60]Up to the 100th Congress. See Katznelson and Lapinski (2007) for a detailed description of the dataset. AIP data is also used in the next two chapters to identify certain kinds of votes.

[61]Gelfand (1975)

Figure 3.9: **Total urban roll call votes, and urban votes as proportion of all roll call votes, 45th-100th Congresses.** The number of votes about urban issues has increased since the beginning of the urban interlude. The proportion of the overall agenda taken up by urban issues was generally high throughout the period, and peaked in the 88th congress (1959-1961).

### 3.2.3 City voting in the House

The overall number of city representatives has held fairly steady over the past eight decades, but relative to other groups they have seen changes. Suburban representatives have become a larger group overall, and city representatives have become a steadily larger share of the Democratic caucus. In this section, I will investigate the pattern of city power in roll call voting on the House floor. Has the political character of the city bloc changed accordingly? Has the frequency of city victories changed as the bloc has diversified geographically but consolidated politically? Have its internal characteristics changed, as different kinds of cities have displaced some of the industrial New Deal core as representatives of cities?

The most immediate thing we can see is that city representatives are typically the most liberal members in congress in their voting behavior, and a gap opened between them and other representatives around the beginning of the New Deal, as we would expect from Figure 3.2. This is not surprising, but has not generally been shown clearly, as even most close analyses stop at the tripartite level of non-Southern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. City representatives were the most assertive forces behind various important policies of the New Deal, including relief employment programs, public works construction projects, housing subsidies, and new labor regulation. Support for this suite of market interventions came to define liberalism, and what it meant to be a "Democrat," in national politics. We can see this in an analysis of a common measure of congressional behavior/ideology, DW-NOMINATE scores. Figure 3.10 illustrates that urbanicity is indeed associated with liberal voting on the primary dimension of conflict: city representatives have long been more liberal than rural or suburban representatives on the first dimension, and the right-hand panel shows that this is true within each party as well.

The left-hand panel in Figure 3.10 illustrates that there was little place-character divide before the 1920s: the lines for each kind of district track each other, and the chamber mean, fairly closely. After 1933, however, the city average is consistently (with a brief exception in postwar

**Mean 1st–Dimension DW scores**

**Mean 1st–Dimension DW scores**



Figure 3.10: **At left:** Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by urbanity group over time. Beginning in the 1930s, city representatives became distinctively liberal on this dimension of congressional behavior. **At right:** Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by party and subgroup. Within each major party, non-southern urbanites were more liberal on statism than non-southern, non-city representatives. The shift by non-southern city Democrats begins before the New Deal.

congresses, when Republicans briefly held a number of city districts) well below the other kinds of places and the chamber mean. Rural districts are generally slightly above average, and above the other groups, on this dimension, while suburban districts are in between, closely tracking the chamber mean. This is what we would expect, given the theorized relationship between urbanicity and preferences about statism, as well as the party-place character divide illustrated in Figure 3.2. Central city districts are to the left on this dimension (ie, have lower scores on average), while rural districts are the furthest to the right. Of course, the first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores also capture party affiliation, so this explains much of the gap in place-types on this dimension. The right-hand panel in Figure 3.10 shows that when we "control" for party (and region, among Democrats), the gap between representatives of different kinds of places is still clear. The top pair of (dashed) lines are the mean first-dimension scores among urban and non-urban non-Southern Republicans. The grey line in the middle is the chamber mean. The morse-dashed red line that arcs up and down across the graph is the mean for all Southern Democrats.[62] The solid lines running slightly downward across the bottom are the means for non-Southern non-urban Democrats and non-Southern urban Democrats, respectively. In each party, city representatives are, on average, almost invariably more liberal on this measure than their non-urban sectional copartisans. For Republicans, this gap was largest during the urban interlude, when a sizeable gap opened up between urban and non-urban members of that party—but it has diminished and even become slightly inverted over the last two decades (though there are now few city Republicans in any case, and all of them represent mixed urban-suburban constituencies). Still, during the urban interlude, there seem to have been important defections among city Republicans on statism.[63]

Among Democrats outside the South, urbanites have been consistently more liberal on this dimension than those from outside cities. Though both groups have moved slightly to the left over the past decades, the gap between them has remained relatively constant. One important obser-

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[62]Disaggregating Southern Democrats by place character reveals a slight gap (in the expected direction) between urban and non-urban representatives, but makes the figure less legible. Population-based maldistricting was particularly bad in the South, so even many "city" districts in this region contained very large rural components, as noted by Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008) and Martis and et al. (1982). The gap within the Southern Democrats is smaller than for the GOP and non-Southern Democrats, and disappears after the 1980s, when most conservative Southern Democrats faded away.

[63]This is what Mayhew (1966) finds in his analysis of housing votes among postwar city Republicans, who supported housing legislation despite their party's opposition.

vation from this figure is the "switch" that occurs between Southern Democrats and urban non-Southern Democrats in the early 1920s, well before even the surge in non-Southern Democrats in the New Deal. This dimension measures partisan conflict, typically over the economy; but something changed in the 1920s, wherein the urban Democrats became the furthest "left" on this dimension, and the most likely to disagree with Republicans, while Southern Democrats became more "centrist." Southerners remain slightly to the left of center on this dimension for the entire period of the Long New Deal, before eventually moving back toward the rest of their party.[64]

That switch in the 1920s represents a significant development, in which the city Democrats became the most consistent opponents of Congressional Republicans, and Southerners were became relatively less staunch in their opposition to the GOP. This marks the beginning of the conservative coalition and of the partisan place character divide, as the collection of progressive liberals, especially those Democrats Buenker (1973) identifies as the "new stock" immigrants, began to take the reins of the national Democratic Party. While city representatives did not constitute a majority of the party's national delegation in Congress until the 1930s, they did seem to be asserting their muscle in intraparty politics, notably in the contentious nomination of Al Smith for President in 1928 (and the failed re-attempt in 1932). Smith lost to Hoover, of course, but between him, Roosevelt and Truman, Democratic nominees were closely linked to large cities for the next quarter century, reflecting and reinforcing the pre-eminence of urban forces within the party.[65]

With the Democratic takeover of the 1930s, which saw the largest congressional majorities in history, the ascendant urban Democrats transformed their party and national politics. Bringing the active, pragmatic approach of city politics to national issues, they expanded the agenda and created the famously large catalogue of New Deal programs, including those most relevant to cities, as illustrated in the previous section. The most important of these made the market interventions prompted by the conditions of urbanicity: public goods provision (for example, the PWA, WPA, and TVA,), regulation (NLRA, AAA, SEC), and redistribution (Social Security Act,

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[64]Though they are still more moderate on average. The recent leftward drift of the Southern Democrats' average is most likely the result of the creation of relatively safe, liberal majority-minority districts and the conversion of many Southern districts to the GOP during this era, lowering the overall average for the remaining Democrats.

[65]Before Smith, Grover Cleveland, former mayor of Buffalo, had been the last Democratic nominee with significant political ties to or background in a major city.

CCC and other relief employment). Each of these modes of economic governance had become hallmarks of city politics over the previous decades as city leaders sought to grapple with the challenges of modern, complex society. Only when the economic catastrophe of the Depression revealed the shortcomings of laissez-faire to an increasingly urban electorate did these kinds of policies receive significant agenda attention from national elites.

City representatives thus came to be the most partisan Democrats, ostensibly redefining the main content of what that partisan identity meant. Given this relative marginality on the primary dimension of political conflict (ie, city Democrats were the most extreme group, and mostly not situated near the median voter), it is worthwhile to analyze trends in other strategic considerations. The potential influence of a voting bloc is related to is size, cohesion, and other factors exogenous to the bloc itself, such as the preference/ideological distribution of other voters.[66] To the extent that a bloc is large and cohesive, and the rest of the voters are not united against that bloc, the bloc can be said to have influence. Of course, the usual example of a powerful bloc in Congress is that of the congressional party, an institution designed to be a bloc large and cohesive enough that it does not matter much what the other voters do.[67] In the case of the city bloc, this group has never constituted a chamber majority in the House, nor has it been entirely from one political party (though city representatives have long leaned toward the Democrats as a bloc). Thus bloc influence will be contingent on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Figure 3.11 illustrates trends over 20th century congressional history.[68] In each of these measures, the "city position" is defined as the position taken by a majority of city representatives casting a vote on a given issue, unless specifically clarified otherwise.

The first subfigure shows the proportion of roll call votes on which the city bloc "won," where winning means the majority of city legislators agreed with the chamber majority. The grey dashed line in the same subfigure shows the percentage of *contested* votes on which the city bloc won;

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[66]For instance, a small bloc situated in the middle of the distribution—near the "pivot"—may be much more influential than an enormous but relatively extreme bloc. Wolman and Marnicki (2005) engage in a similar analysis of roll call voting by urban representatives to the one that follows, though their study is limited to voting on a small set of votes in a small number of congresses. The present analysis includes all roll calls from all post-Civil War congresses, refines the measures of leverage, and looks more closely at votes on which city representatives were distinctive.

[67]Though American legislative parties have often notably *not* cohesive by comparative standards.

[68]These roll call analyses combine USR place-character data with roll call data from Voteview.

contested votes are those with the support of less than 3/4 of the chamber. The morse-dashed line shows the proportion of "urbanicity cleavage" votes on which the city side won. Urbanicity cleavage votes are those on which the majority of city representatives disagreed with the majority of non-city representatives. Again, the thin vertical lines mark important changes in chamber control. As in Figure 3.8, city success in the legislature has become much more volatile and contingent on chamber control. This is especially on votes on which the city position differs from the non-city position, an increasingly common state of affairs. On such votes, when Democrats are in power, the city position wins. When Republicans are in power, the non-city position wins. This was not the case during the long period of mostly Democratic control, from 1933-1995. Especially early in that era, despite Democratic control and the Democrats being the party of the cities, when city and non-city representatives disagreed (which happened on about a fifth of all votes, as opposed to about half of all votes during the recent era of GOP control) the city position generally *lost*, or only won about half the time in the 1960s and 1970s, but the percentage of urbanity-cleavage votes on which the city position won from one congress to the next was fairly steady. The new, volatile arrangement leads to more feast-or-famine prospects for both legislative success and legislative leadership.

The second subfigure in 3.11 illustrates measures of congressional leverage for the city bloc, following Wolman and Marnicki (2005). The grey dashed line is the proportion of contested votes on which city representatives had potential leverage. These are votes on which the total number of city representatives was greater than the difference between non-urban voters, so if the city bloc was perfectly cohesive, it would be in a position to decide the vote one way or the other. This has been true of a large and slowly increasing proportion of votes for over a century. Given that that size of the city bloc has not been growing as steadily as that, this is an indication that non-city representatives have become more evenly divided, leaving more potential opportunities for a cohesive city bloc to cast decisive votes. Of course, city representatives are usually not perfectly cohesive, so a more realistic and useful measure is the black line, which traces the percentage of contested votes by congress for which the city bloc had "positive leverage." Wolman and Marnicki (2005) define positive leverage votes as votes on which "the majority of city representatives cast

**City bloc win rates**

**City Leverage**

Figure 3.11: **The City bloc and roll call voting.** At left, the percentage of votes in each category in which the city position won. At right, percentage of contested votes on which the city bloc was had potential and positive leverage, respectively. Vertical dashed lines indicate change in House majority control. *Source: Analysis of USR and Voteview data*

the decisive winning votes."[69] This means that the votes from non-city representatives would not have been sufficient to carry the vote without city allies, and that most city representatives voted to pass the ultimately successful measure. As with overall win rates and leadership positions, the leverage of the city bloc is increasingly sensitive to partisan control. The previous trough, in the 1930s, is a reflection of large Democratic majorities and a sometimes-divided city bloc: on many votes, city votes were not necessary for passage, even though a majority of city representatives supported most of these measures, and on others the closer partisan split among city representatives themselves made them less cohesive. The trough beginning in the 1990s, however, reflects the fact that the city position was defeated on a large proportion of votes, followed by the peak in the 110th and 11th congress, when city votes were, more often than not, necessary for passage

[69]p. 304

and enough to put the proposal over the top. [70]

## 3.3   Discussion: City Representation in the House

In this chapter, I have illustrated the secular development of an urban-rural cleavage in the House of Representatives over the past eighty years. The electorate increasingly makes choices that reflect the continuum of this cleavage. These choices are filtered into the system of representation, and the composition of the national legislature and its leadership reflects this dimension of division to an even greater extent. The manner and cause of the divide, however, are less clear. Authors focusing on spatial polarization have often focused on the city-suburb divide, with special attention paid to the 1970s or the 1950s as key moments for the development of this cleavage.[71]. This kind of conflict is real, and has been important since the New Deal, but among voters and in the halls of Congress, cities and suburbs are becoming more alike, not less, while partisan sorting matures along the full urbanicity continuum.

In Congress, the parties began to sort themselves along urbanicity lines beginning with the New Deal Democrats' urban gains and accelerating with delayed rural shifts away from the Democrats about thirty and sixty years later. Republicans were reduced to a primarily suburban redoubt in the 1930s, and made gains in the South first in presidential politics and later converted that largely rural (but increasingly suburban) "solid" region into their stronghold. In the North, the disappearance of urban Republicans starting in the 1930s led to cohesive Democratic urban blocs in many industrial cities. Though some urban liberal "Rockefeller" Republicans lingered, they were on borrowed time well before Rockefeller's 1964 defeat at the hands of conservatives.[72]

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[70]Of course, "leverage" should be understood with an important caveat. The broader argument of this study is that there is a partisan-ideological continuum that has been developing for eighty years, with city representatives at one doubly liberal pole. With city representatives more likely to be doing the proposing from a position of chamber leadership, and to theoretically have relatively extreme (ie, not near the median/swing vote) preferences on these issues, it is not clear how perfectly the concept of "leverage" applies to these votes: some more centrist group likely has more. But following Wolman and Marnicki (2005), I present these trends forward and backward to more fully describe how the position of the city bloc in the legislature has evolved.

[71]Gainsborough (2001), Nall (2010)

[72]Mayhew (1966)

Most scholarly focus has been on the conversion of the South, understanding its drift away from the New Deal coalition, and the resilient causal force and effects of racial conservatism in regional and national politics. Carmines and Stimson (1989) emphasize the effects of choices by Republican national elites in the 1960s, who seized upon an opportunity to use race as a wedge issue to appeal to Southerners and other white voters and eventually escape their seemingly permanent minority status, and how that issue evolved into a cross-partisan, rather than intrapartisan, conflict. Katznelson and several co-authors have identified the divide coming earlier. These studies identify "defections" by Southern members on core New Deal issues related to race, especially on labor, in the 1940s and 1950s as precursors of the eventual break over national civil rights legislation.[73] These are of course crucial developments, but they partly naturalize the main change during this time, which was the growth and consolidation of the urban political order within the Democratic Party, which substantively changed what it meant to be a "Democrat" and brought a host of state interventions to the agenda fairly abruptly. Southerners, from their seat as the long-established core of the party, did not change much on size-of-government preferences, or on white supremacy. They only changed parties, and it took them decades to do it. Needing an active state to alleviate their governance challenges at home, however, city Democrats pursued a program of mutual exchange with their Southern colleagues, but were met with much resistance on a range of issues, and eventually began to pursue other strategies, and other alliances, incompatible with the South's chief priorities. That will be the subject of Chapter 5, when we see the role of city representatives in promoting civil rights legislation over the urban interlude. Over time, as the South departed from the party and the urbanicity cleavage matured, city representatives have created a party in which they are perhaps more powerful in advancing their agenda in the chamber—but also more vulnerable to being left in the minority.

Cities, more than other kinds of places, have a particular incentive to forge a united bloc in the national legislature. They often face common challenges associated with urban life and urban society that could be addressed with similar policies. More importantly, the conditions of urbanicity create higher demand and/or need for significant market interventions, but economic and insti-

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[73]See, eg. Katznelson and Kryder (1993), Katznelson and Farhang (2005), Katznelson and Mulroy (2012).

tutional constraints leave them ill-situated to deal with many of these challenges on their own. In this context, cities have actively turned to state and national levels to ameliorate some of their governance challenges. Before the New Deal, there was nothing distinctive about city representatives in partisan terms; as a group, city representatives mirrored the national partisan split. The New Deal changed that, and made urbanicity an important cleavage in national politics. From the beginning of the New Deal, city representatives, practicing a style of politics distinctive to the the traditional party organization, recognized the increasing peril cities faced under conditions of late industrial capitalism, and sought to use national resources and national political alliances to alleviate their governance problems. Since the New Deal, not only has national unity among cities grown, through the vehicle of the Democratic Party, but rural constituencies have become more associated with the Republicans, strengthening the place-character divide at the highest levels of national representation. This change was not initiated by migration to the suburbs (the shift predates the migration), though it was surely accelerated by it. It was also not merely a function of white flight and race: all but two congressional districts had overwhelmingly white electorates in the early 1930s, when the urbanicity rift opened up.[74] The progressive liberalism of the New Deal brought city issues to the fore in national politics, and city representatives pursued these policies from their position as an important, if not pivotal, bloc.

Casually, we often think of the middle of the 20th century, the middle of the "Metropolitan Era," as the height of city power in national politics, a sort of golden age for American cities. More Americans lived in large central cities at that moment than at any other time in our history, and it embodied a kind of "metonymic moment" for cities in the nation.[75] As illustrated above, it also marked a time when important city issues (especially aid to cities) first reached the national agenda, and city issues took up their greatest share of the national agenda during this time as well. The relative social decline and recurrent problems faced by cities since the 1960s make the urban interlude seem like a golden age for city power in national politics; it was the key moment when political change began, with cities becoming identified with a then-overwhelmingly successful

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[74]Though Americans' understanding of who counted as fully "white" may be a relevant consideration here, a factor that will be relevant in the discussion of racial issues in Chapter 6.

[75]Ethington and Levitus (2009)

Democratic Party. Institutionally, however, cities have actually gotten stronger in some important ways since then, though this strength has become more closely linked to national partisan struggle, which has itself become more uncertain. As cities become more closely identified with the Democratic Party, the median congressional Democrat and the Democratic leadership are more likely than ever before to represent city constituencies; this is a new reality for an American political party. These leaders, in committee and chamber alike, may be particularly attentive to and protective of "urban" perspectives and interests on many issues.

However, given that a large majority of representatives are **not** from cities, and that when Republicans hold majority status cities go virtually unrepresented in the leadership group and are very unsuccessful in roll call voting, city power in Congress is also more brittle and vulnerable than it was during the Long New Deal, when Democratic majorities were less urban but more safely entrenched. City power on the Hill thus faces a deep, fundamental uncertainty in terms of chamber power and intraparty power.

The next two chapters will focus on the the role of local institutions in shaping the behavior of city representatives on important issues during the urban interlude, as this urban bloc-of-blocs was taking shape within the Democratic Party. First, in chapter 4, I will test general implications of city delegation theory, finding that local institutions foster cohesive representation, even though cities are most notable for their deep social *divisions*. Then, in chapter 5, I explore the role of this urban political order, and of local city institutions, in the reappearance, assertion, and development of "second-dimensional" liberalism, on issues related to race and civil rights, a dimension of conflict that would ultimately fracture the national Democratic alliance but also strengthen the association between Democrats and cities, and further heighten the urbanicity cleavage in national politics.

# Chapter 4

# Ties That Bind: City Delegations and Cohesive Representation in Congress

"In order for anything to be done under public auspices, the elaborate decentralization of authority... must be overcome or set aside."

-Edward Banfield and James Wilson, *City Politics*[1]

"Local experience has taught them that in unity there is power."

Leo Snowiss,
"Congressional Recruitment and Representation"[2]

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[1]Banfield and Wilson (1963), p. 101
[2]Snowiss (1966), p.630

## 4.1 Political Order

Before there can be a meaningful urban political order in the nation, there must be political order within the cities. To effectively pursue policy goals at the national level, cities must reach an internal accord about what policies best address governance challenges associated with urbanicity. But urbanicity also presents *political* challenges as well: heterogeneity of all kinds make cities famously fractious polities, and these divisions can themselves undermine civic unity as well as support for the statist interventions in the market discussed in the previous chapter. At times, the most salient social characteristic of city politics is the presence of deep *divisions*, not unity. This was most obvious in the 1960s, as racial and class tensions met the urban fiscal crisis, bubbling over into an "urban crisis" that left an indelible mark on the face of many cities' geography, politics, and residents.[3] But even in less extraordinary times, social conflict seems sewn into the very fabric of city life. Groups and individuals compete for scarce resources, workers and bosses clash, business leaders and neighborhoods fight over development patterns, and so on. Because of residential segregation by class and race, representational institutions may strengthen rivalries and identities by linking them to the distribution of benefits, further deepening the potential for divisions along group lines.[4] Given the wide range of complex issues cities face, fragmented politics and their simultaneous, conflicting demands can lead to "hyperpluralism" and make a city "ungovernable."[5] Such deep pluralism means that articulating a "city interest" may be impossible or a contradition in terms—the interests of a city's residents and groups are too varied and numerous, and too much in conflict, to be easily aggregated into a single, articulated position. How, then, can a city pursue its interests at higher levels of government?

The answer to this question is not always made easier by the formal constellation of local governmental institutions. Social heterogeneity provides a basis for political conflict, and the formal lines of authority in many cities do not make it obvious how political conflicts will be resolved. In most cases, Banfield and Wilson (1963) remain correct in their assertion that "the American

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[3]Rae (2003),Sugrue (1996)
[4]Massey and Denton (1993), Katznelson (1982)
[5]DeLeon (1992), Cannato (2002)

city is not governed by a single hierarchy of authority...On the contrary, from a purely formal standpoint, one can hardly say that there is such a thing as a local government" because of the many institutions with legitimate, sometimes conflicting, claims to governing authority in a given geographical space.[6] The conditions of city life create a need for governance solutions that are greater than in other kinds of built environments—those that are less dense, less heterogeneous, and smaller, where the demands for and obstacles to "getting things done" are less imposing. Thus some political accommodation must be reached to overcome the division in cities to perform the basic work of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, cities are typically constrained, by law or logic, in their ability to provide at least some of these solutions in a purely local way, so turning to a higher level of the federal order, especially the national order, presents itself as a vital strategy for meeting local needs. To effectively pursue *any* position—any "city interest"—at a higher level, however, the vast plurality of voices must be narrowed.

The distillation of many different voices into one city position for representation or policymaking is the creation of political order. In rapidly changing societies (like cities, which are continually refreshed with new populations and buffeted by powerful economic forces), order, especially political order, is a primary good.[7] The deep divisions present in cities have in many cases provided an impetus for city elites to forge institutions that promote order across the extent of the city and make governance more manageable. These are the institutions of horizontal integration discussed in Chapter 2, which bind city constituencies and their representatives in ways that other collections of districts are not linked. The study of the development and effects of such institutions is a major subfield of urban political science. In this chapter, I use evidence from congressional roll calls to argue that institutions of horizontal integration developed at the local level do indeed foster cohesion among the representatives of cities. Consistent with city delegation theory, I find that city delegations are more cohesive than other collections of representatives from similarly proximate districts, and city delegations from places with strong institutions of horizontal integration are more cohesive than those from places with weak integrative institutions. Looking

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[6]Banfield and Wilson (1963), p. 76. If anything, the lines of authority have probably become harder to parse in the past half century with the accelerated creation of new governments, especially special districts.

[7]Huntington (1968)

more closely, I find that members of a city delegation are more likely to agree on a roll call votes than representatives *not* from the same city, even when we account for other measures of plausible legislative affinity, such as congressional party, geographical proximity, and district-level characteristics (including urbanicity). These results support the claim that cities, and their local institutions, contribute to greater unity in legislative behavior, helping to make the city delegation the building block of the larger urban political order in national politics.

### 4.1.1 City Institutions of Horizontal Integration

As argued in Chapter 2, institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs) foster cohesion between representatives of different constituencies across a city, and they are generally not present among other collections of representatives. The two main IHIs analyzed here are the jurisdictional IHI of the city boundary, which includes or excludes constituencies and representatives from a local political community, and the organizational IHI of the traditional party, which moves an important locus of political influence outside of particular districts and into a citywide party or party committee, centralizing politics within a city and providing an institutional link between particular constituencies and the city as a whole.

The city border fosters some common interests among those included within it. For instance, many urban programs are administered through grants to city governments that are then allocated across the city's districts. A close relationship with the city government may increase a representative's share of any discretionary allocation. The overall well-being of a district may also depend to a great deal on the well-being of the wider city; externalities of city life do not typically stop at congressional district borders, so working as a city delegation to maintain or improve the "health" of the city is likely to be a project that benefits all participants. The same cannot really be said of suburban or rural districts, each of which may contain many local governments without much overlap in day-to-day governance. The sparser populations of such districts are also less likely to interact with or affect outcomes in other districts, so there is less impetus for coordination

across constituencies. If these ideas are true, then we would expect representatives from the same city to coordinate their behavior on policies that affect the city they share.

The most important organizational institution of horizontal integration has been the local traditional party.[8] A traditional party is defined as an autonomous organization that can successfully control access to nominations to office, a very important institutional site for shaping outcomes, and these organizations served broad integrative functions in local politics.[9] Urban machines are particularly powerful species of this kind of organization—they not only control nominations, but are very successful at winning office as well. In these organizations, "unity and hierarchy" make "organization decision-making relatively impervious to the influences of rival non-party groups, associations, and elites in the primary electorate."[10] This power to effectively choose candidates, and most officeholders, extends not just to local or state office, but often to congressional office as well.[11] In New York and Chicago, the most important Democratic cities and the homes of effective traditional party organizations, access to nominations was controlled by the local parties throughout the Long New Deal; similar local political conditions obtained in many of the other, smaller cities of the New Deal coalition.[12] Wilson (1962), in his close study of intraparty dynamics in three large cities, observed that the Chicago organization was "virtually unbeatable" in primaries even when the offices were statewide, and that in the (then) thirty years since the establishment of a citywide Democratic organization, "only one Democrat...has won nomination to an important office without regular organization backing."[13] In New York, organization dominance was more effectively challenged within the party, but even as late as 1960 almost all New York City Democrats in Congress "owed at least their initial victories to organization slating."[14]

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[8]Mayhew (1986) shows that strong parties were powerful shapers of local outcomes. Bridges (1984) calls the political machine (the strongest species of party) the "characteristic form of city government" in the 19th century, and though these institutions were weakened by reform and other factors, their structures and legacies are still evident in the cities they once dominated, and were certainly the most powerful political forces in many cities during the urban interlude. Erie (1988), Mayhew (1986).

[9]Mayhew (1986). This is the definitive, almost encyclopedic, text on such organizations in the mid-20th century U.S.

[10]Snowiss (1966), p.629

[11]Mayhew (1986), Wilson (1962), Snowiss (1966), Rakove (1975)

[12]Though they each had their own particular histories. See Mayhew (1986) for state-by-state narratives of party strength and development. See Dorsett (1977) for closer case studies of several machines' relations with the national Democratic leadership under FDR.

[13]An incumbent governor defeated a Chicago-backed insurgent. p. 67

[14]Mayhew (1986),p. 45

In each of these cities, party leaders from inside the city but outside the individual districts had significant influence in slating and supporting candidates for office, and in each place the city nominees, even after electoral success, were vulnerable to attack from within, and faced the danger of purge if perceived as disloyal to the organization.[15] Beyond conventional incentives such as career advancement and renomination for office, the traditional organizations were often able to rely on their agents in Congress because they were creatures of habit. These were men (almost invariably men) who had

> risen through the disciplined and unified local party organization [and were] well aware of the virtues of party unity…Chicago Democratic congressmen…value party cohesion as a positive good in need of little or no justification.[16]

Unity and cohesion were themselves valued goods for such politicians, the product of socialization and habit as much as of continuous monitoring or oversight. On domestic issues in particular, such representatives—members from traditional parties with localist backgrounds and orientations—were extremely cohesive, and loyal as a bloc to the city position. This loyalty was given to both the local and national parties (the positions of the two typically overlapped), but if forced to choose, the local organization seems to have been the primary home for many of these representatives.[17]

In Los Angeles, by contrast, a large city with no traditional party organization, party-like activity during this era was limited to clubs that were both weaker and more local than the city-wide organizations present in Chicago and New York.[18] Without a citywide political "umbrella," political integration was much weaker. This is not to say that the Los Angeles congressional delegation was wholly disorganized or in disagreement all the time. After all, the city boundary still serves

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[15]For instance, New York Democratic boss Carmine DeSapio successfully purged a rogue Democrat from the city's congressional caucus in 1949 (though the party was not omnipotent; DeSapio was unsuccessful in an effort to replace Adam Clayton Powell with someone more loyal to the organization in 1958, and the organization's pre-eminence was ultimately shattered by Mayor Wagner's defection in 1961). See Wilson (1962), p.47. In Chicago, the head of the Cook County Democratic organization (Mayor Kelly's mentor Patrick Nash, and then Mayor Daley himself) routinely slated loyal longtime party stalwarts for congressional seats, and manipulated statewide tickets to provide maximum benefits for the county organization. See Snowiss (1966) and Rakove (1975)

[16]Snowiss (1966) p. 630

[17]Rakove (1975)

[18]Wilson (1962) ch. 4

as a jurisdictional institution of horizontal integration. But without the added, potentially more powerful integration that comes from a city-wide organization, Los Angeles was less apt to represent itself cohesively in Congress. The traits and interests of the particular districts were more evident at the higher levels.

## 4.2   Cohesion from Diversity

In this chapter, I test several of the observable implications of the city delegation theory outlined in Chapter 2. The basic logic of the theory is that city institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs)—developed to provide political order at home—foster cohesive representation in national politics, even though cities are more heterogeneous than comparable collections of representatives.[19] Before testing these claims, I will define a few terms that will be used in the analysis.

First, in this analysis and others in subsequent chapters, a *city district* is a congressional district that is entirely or almost entirely within a large, central city as identified by the USR dataset developed for this project.[20] A *city delegation* is a collection of city representatives in the House of Representatives from the same city. Thus the Chicago city delegation, for instance, is the set of representatives from Chicago at any given time. Over the course of the 20th century, the Chicago city delegation ranged in size from 6 to 12 representatives. A *suburban district* is a district wholly or mostly within the developed area surrounding a large city,[21] and a *suburban delegation* is a collection of representatives from such districts from the same city's metropolitan area. A *metropolitan delegation* encompasses both the city delegation and suburban delegation from a given metropolitan area. By cohesion, I mean the tendency to agree on roll call voting; the more likely the members of some pair or set of representatives is to agree, the more cohesive they are.

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[19]While such cohesion could theoretically be marshalled for indeterminate ends, in practice these blocs have supported the "doubly liberal" program of the urban political order.

[20]And described in fuller detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1.

[21]"Metropolitan, non-central city" in Census terms.

## 4.3 Tests of City Delegation Theory

Empirically, the main implication of city delegation theory is that collections of representatives that are bound by common local institutions of horizontal integration will be more cohesive than we might otherwise expect—and that delegation cohesion is a function of the presence and strength of such institutions.[22] A demonstration of this phenomenon can be observed by examining the relationship between diversity and cohesion among different groups of legislators in the House of Representatives. Two basic hypotheses about city delegations should be true if local institutions play a role in fostering cohesion in representation. First, city delegations should be more cohesive than other comparable collections of districts that do not share a common local political community. This is the effect of the city boundary (the primary jurisdictional institution of horizontal integration) on legislative cohesion. To evaluate this hypothesis, we can compare the cohesion of city delegations with like delegations-of-interest, of their suburban rings and their metropolitan area (that is, the city and the suburban ring). Formally, this hypothesis is

$$H_{Jurisdictional} : C_{City} > C_{Metro,Suburbs} \tag{4.1}$$

where $C$ is Cohesion of the subscripted delegations. Second, we can compare across cities, because cities vary in the strength of their IHIs. Cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration should be more cohesive that cities with weak IHIs. Formally, this hypothesis is

$$H_{Organizational} : C_{StrongIHI} > C_{WeakIHI} \tag{4.2}$$

I will test these hypotheses on representatives' behavior at the group and individual levels.

First, we can compare city delegations to suburban and metro delegations, with the expecta-

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[22]As in many other models of legislative behavior, the underlying theory is that representatives will tend to vote alike to the extent that they share characteristics and/or interests in common. Most of the time, this means they are members of the same congressional party, or their districts have similar characteristics (like including many farmers or African Americans), or they share some common personal experience (like being veterans). Here, the characteristic that the districts share is membership in a common local polity and/or political organization, and I am testing this model at the group level now and later at the dyad level.

tion, drawn from the jurisdictional hypothesis, that cities will be more cohesive.[23] Comparing cities to their suburban rings is useful because they often have comparable numbers of representatives, because state and local politics are often characterized by a strong city-suburb rivalry (an indication that suburban districts do share some political affinity in common, just as city districts do), and because using these groups allows us to automatically "control" for factors related to region, geographical proximity, and urbanicity.[24]

### 4.3.1 Heterogeneity, not just diversity

It is important at this point to bear in mind that city delegations are typically more heterogeneous than other collections of districts, and this is different that saying a city is more diverse than its suburbs (though this statement is also usually true). A short diversion may clarify this concept. We think of diversity as "not uniformity" in the sense that persons are less likely to be similar on observable traits in cities. For instance, New York City is considered to be very diverse, because it has lots of different kinds of people on dimensions of difference considered to be important: several large racial groups, roughly at numerical parity; many immigrants but also many native-born persons; many millionaires and many poor persons; thousands of Ivy-league graduates and many more without a college degree; economic specialization is greater, so people have different occupational and class identities; and so on. This is less true in the smaller, less diverse communities that are common in the suburbs or rural places. If you were to pick two New Yorkers at random, it is more likely that they would be "different" on whatever important dimensions you chose than if you picked two persons from a less diverse place; this is what we typically mean by diversity. This diversity is a necessary precondition for delegation heterogeneity, but one other thing must be true for districts to be sufficiently different from each other: the different sorts of people that

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[23]Later, using smaller units of analysis, I will control for more factors that might foster cohesion.

[24]All members of both delegations (city and suburb) from each metro area are from the same region, and most are from the same state. High cohesion in a city delegation may be attributable to the fact that their districts abut one another. The same is true of suburban districts, however. All members within each delegation have similar scores on an urbanicity measure described in Appendix 1. Of course, city delegations and suburban delegations differ in their urbanicity. The point here is that within-delegation variation on this measure is minimal, and similar across delegations.

make a place diverse must also be unevenly grouped in the political space of the city. Richer people must be separated from the poorer ones, instead of sprinkled in evenly; whites separated from other racial groups; immigrants from natives; and so on. For various historical and economic reasons, many of them lamentable, this is usually the case in American cities. It is also true in the suburbs, but this phenomenon is more recent and in most cases not as pronounced. Because the diversity within a city is often "lumpy," with concentrations of different groups, rather than even spacing across the city, city districts (not just city *residents*) tend to be quite different from each other, on average. The underlying implication is that with different kinds of constituencies, the pressures on representatives will be different; in a city delegation, therefore, agreement between representatives of such different districts might not occur "naturally."

To illustrate this point, consider the following. Two important dimensions of difference in American politics (and in other societies) have always been class and race. Thus we might expect representatives of districts that differ from each other on measures of class and race to disagree with each other more than those from districts that are more alike—they would have higher levels of "latent" conflict derived from demography.[25]

We can measure these dimensions of latent conflict using census data to evaluate this idea of how different groupings of districts cohere using cities and their suburbs; we would expect more heterogeneous blocs to be less cohesive, because they are more different on average. Thus if a city delegation was both more heterogeneous *and* more cohesive, city delegation theory can provide a possible explanation for this cohesion. For this and subsequent analyses, I use the four cities that have been, in general, the largest in the U.S. over the 20th century: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. These cities not only represent the largest cases of city delegations (helpful for studying a city delegation), but (again helpful for analysis) they also had very different patterns of local institutional strength. Philadelphia and Chicago were generally run by strong-party, machine-style organizations for the period in question (though each had its own idiosyncratic departures from machine domination). New York had a strong but not hegemonic

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[25]Region is another dimension that we would expect to contribute to latent conflict,among others. It surely does, but in following analysis all the groups I am comparing are blocs from within the same region, so this is not a factor here. It is taken into account in the subsequent individual-level tests of predictors of agreement later in this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 6.

party system, and was also split organizationally across the larger boroughs. Los Angeles, as with most of the West, is formally nonpartisan locally with very weak institutions of horizontal integration. The first analyses will use information from these cities and their metro areas to evaluate the jurisdictional and organizational hypotheses above.

First, to show that city delegations are made up of districts that are different from each other, and thus lack the basis for "natural" cohesion, we can examine how different from each other the constituencies within city districts are. For each of these cities, I develop a city delegation cross-district two-dimensional heterogeneity score that measures how different from each other (as opposed to how internally diverse) the districts of the city delegation are. The same scores are developed for their suburban ring.[26] If city delegations are more cohesive *despite* being more heterogeneous, this is may be due to the influence of institutions of horizontal integration, and make the alternative explanation of cohesion based in "natural," prepolitical similarity less persuasive.

The heterogeneity scores are generated as follows. First, I identify the city and suburban area delegations using the USR dataset (developed for this project and more fully described in Chapter 4 and Appendix 1). The two dimensions of heterogeneity measured are class and race, two demographic identities of obvious relevance for both local and national politics. For each district, I use the median family income as the measure of class. Representatives have compelling reasons to be responsive to the median voter on many economic issues, so this seems an apt measure of a district's central tendency on this dimension. As a measure of district-level racial diversity, I use the percent identified or identifying as "not white" in the district. This measure is imperfect, but changes in the way race and ethnicity have been measured make it difficult to find a better one over time. In any case, this measure is fairly highly correlated with the available alternatives,[27] and the largest racial divide and conflict in the U.S. is most often characterized as between whites and non-whites, usually African Americans, and this is certainly true in the two-party system, where all non-white groups tilt disproportionately toward the Democratic Party, so the white-nonwhite

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[26]As in subsequent analyses, a given delegation must include at least 3 representatives in Congress to be included. This is why some of the lines in Figure 4.2 do not begin until 1930.

[27]Such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or percent black plus percent Hispanic after 1970. The data for each of these measures used in this diversity analysis are drawn from Lublin (1997), and therefore cover the 86th to 105th congresses.

dividing line is not a bad measure of latent group conflict. Using all congressional districts, I standardize these variables to put them on a common scale within each Congress, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Thus districts that are poorer, or more white, than average have negative values, while those that are richer or less white have positive values. Standardizing these values weights the two dimensions equally for the ultimate additive index of diversity.

Ultimately, we are interested not in each district's level of these important variables, but in the extent to which the member districts of a given delegation are similar to or different from each other. Using these standardized measures of each dimension, the mean absolute deviation for each bloc is calculated (that is, the mean of the deviations from the bloc mean). This mean absolute deviation is employed as the bloc-level standardized measure of cross-group heterogeneity on that dimension. Then the two dimensions are simply added together to make the two-dimensional measure of heterogeneity. This gives us a sense of how different the raw district-based pressures on legislators are likely to be within a bloc. For instance, consider the example of Philadelphia during the 94th Congress (1975-1977), when there were four city districts (PA 1 through PA 4) and four suburban districts (PA 5,7,8, and 13). Table 4.1 shows the important values from these districts. For Philadelphia in the 94th Congress, districts in the city delegation were more different from each other on both class and race than were districts in the suburban delegation, as indicated by the values in the grey "Mean dev." columns. The same is almost always true for for Philadelphia, as well as for the other three major cities analyzed here. These measures were used to create a two-dimensional diversity score for these four large cities and their suburban delegations, listed in the last column at right ("2-D Het. Index").[28]

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[28]This particular comparison example is not exceptional; in fact, it is is from a time when Philadelphia's city and suburbs were unusually close on this two-dimensional measure, as is evident from Figure 4.1.

**Demographic Differences and Heterogeneity Index,**
**Philadelphia Metro Congressional Districts, 94th Congress (1995-1997)**

| CD | Type* | Median Fam Inc | Std (Nation) | Del Mean | Dev. from del. mean | Mean dev. | Pct Nonwhite | Std (Nation) | Del Mean | Dev. from del. mean | Mean dev. | 2-D Het. Index |
|----|-------|----------------|--------------|----------|---------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|----------|---------------------|-----------|----------------|
| 1 | City | 8690 | -.46 | -.21 | .24 | .327 | .40 | 2.7 | 2.31 | .39 | 1.42 | 1.75 |
| 2 | City | 8670 | -.47 | -.21 | .25 | .327 | .66 | 4.7 | 2.31 | 2.46 | 1.42 | 1.75 |
| 3 | City | 8368 | -.61 | -.21 | .40 | .327 | .293 | 1.84 | 2.31 | .464 | 1.42 | 1.75 |
| 4 | City | 11069 | .68 | -.21 | .90 | .327 | .056 | -.074 | 2.31 | 2.38 | 1.43 | 1.75 |
| 5 | Suburbs | 12148 | 1.20 | 1.2 | 0.0 | .265 | .046 | -.149 | -.115 | .034 | .135 | .40 |
| 7 | Suburbs | 11383 | .83 | 1.2 | .37 | .265 | .09 | .188 | -.11 | .30 | .135 | .40 |
| 8 | Suburbs | 11807 | 1.04 | 1.2 | .16 | .265 | .021 | -.35 | -.11 | .233 | .135 | .40 |
| 13 | Suburbs | 13251 | 1.73 | 1.2 | .53 | .265 | .045 | -.151 | .11 | .036 | .135 | .40 |

Table 4.1: **Construction of Demography Index for Philadelphia City and Suburban Districts, 94th Congress.** District-level measures of income and diversity are standardized (based on the national distribution) and then compared to the other districts within their own local place-character delegation. The mean deviations on each dimension are summed to create the cross-district heterogeneity index. As in most instances, here the city delegation is more heterogeneous (on each dimension, as well as in the overall index) than the suburban delegation. Values for four city and suburban delegations over time are plotted in Figure 4.1 *Source: USR Data,* Lublin (1997)

While city delegations are not uniformly more diverse than their suburban ring delegations (for some cities, in some decades, the two blocs are actually comparably heterogeneous, especially on the economic dimension), this measure does confirm that there is almost always more heterogeneity among city delegations than among suburban delegations, and that this was especially true in the mid-20th century urban interlude. Figure 4.1 shows the two-dimensional heterogeneity scores for each city and its suburban ring over time; in each case, the city delegation shows more cross-district heterogeneity. On these two important dimensions, at least, the rawest social building blocks for political coordination and similarity are weaker in cities than they are in the suburbs.

### 4.3.2 City delegation cohesion

Because city districts are so often quite different from each other on politically relevant measures, we might not expect city delegations to be very cohesive in how they represent themselves in national politics. On the other hand, there seems to be a general impression, articulated for instance by John Vorys and other observers of city delegations, that city representatives were more "organized" than other sets of constituencies. We can test this impression more rigorously with Rice cohesion scores, which measure the extent to which a group of voters agree.[29] If city delegations foster cohesion, we would expect the cohesion scores of city delegations to be higher than those of suburban rings, even though the constituencies of those other places are similarly contiguous and have more in common in terms of their demography. Over time, this has indeed been the case. Figure 4.2 shows the average cohesion scores on all roll call votes for the four largest cities' city delegation (in solid/blue), suburban delegation (in dashed/red) and metropolitan area delegation

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[29]Rice cohesion scores are one of the oldest and most intuitive measures in all of political science. Drawn from Rice (1928), they range from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning a bloc of voters is unanimous and 0 meaning they are perfectly split. Because Rice's measures were designed for large numbers of voters, and are not appropriate for comparing among small blocs of different sizes, I use the adjustment recommended in Desposato (2005) to correct for the small size of the delegations being investigated as well as the differences across such small delegation sizes. The interpretation of these scores is quite intuitive: if a bloc has a cohesion score of .93, there is a 93 percent chance that any two randomly chosen members of that bloc agree.

Figure 4.1: **Cross-District Heterogeneity Among Congressional Delegations (1960-2000)**: City delegations are almost always more internally heterogeneous than suburban delegations
*Source:USR data, Lublin (1997)*

Figure 4.2: **Average Cohesion Scores for City, Suburban, and Metro Delegations in Four Major Cities**: City delegations more cohesive than suburban delegations, despite being more heterogeneous. *Source:USR data, Voteview*

(in dotted/green). As a benchmark of "high" cohesion, the horizontal grey dashed line represents the global mean of the two Congressional parties on this measure over time, y=.77.[30]

In each case, the city delegation is generally more cohesive than its suburban hinterland and the metropolitan area that encompasses both blocs, despite the higher levels of cross-district heterogeneity that exist within the city delegations. The only time the suburban delegation's cohesion exceeds that of the city is for New York during a brief time in the 1940s. These city delegations are particularly cohesive (as evaluated against the standard of a national party), while the other blocs

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[30]Republicans have generally been a little more cohesive than Democrats. The parties' average cohesion scores are .73 and .81, respectively.

are not particularly cohesive, much closer to or even below the average for a congressional party, even though they share important baseline affinities such as geographic proximity. This provides support for the power of jurisdictional institutions of horizontal integration in contributing to representational cohesion.

There is also variation among cities, however. If the effects of local political organizations matter for the character of city representation at higher levels, we would expect to see the cohesiveness of city delegations vary with the strength of local institutions of horizontal integration. While all cities have jurisdictional boundaries that serve a centripetal function, not all cities have had the same intensity of organizational political centralization over the course of the 20th Century. Among the four large cities included in this analysis, there was great variation in the strength of these organizational institutions, as described in many studies. Philadelphia and Chicago (especially after Richard J. Daley's tenure as mayor began in 1955) had very strong organizations that unified local politics. For Banfield and Wilson (1963), Chicago was characterized by an "extreme centralization of power" in the machine leadership, especially under Kelly and Daley.[31] Philadelphia had a similarly powerful machine organization, though the mayor was typically not a part of it.[32] New York's local pattern of influence was "halfway" centralized; its Democratic organization was strong but far from hegemonic. County divisions within the city, and struggles between party factions made New York City's local politics less integrated.[33] Los Angeles's local nonpartisan rules made it virtually impossible to integrate politics citywide; power there was decentralized and no significant citywide organizations existed.[34]

Figure 4.3 takes the cohesion scores from the city delegations presented in Figure 4.2 and superimposes them on the same graph for ease of comparison. In keeping with the expectations of city delegation theory, city delegation cohesion is correlated with local institutional strength. Cities with traditions of powerful parties that largely control a city's politics should have more cohesive delegations than cities without such strong organizations. From this graph, we can add

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[31]p. 104

[32]Mayhew (1986), p. 58-59

[33]Banfield and Wilson (1963),Wilson (1962)

[34]Mayhew (1986), Banfield and Wilson (1963). Wilson (1962) reports on many of these dynamics in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles at midcentury.Mayhew (1986) provides summaries of party strength over time in these cities.

Figure 4.3: **Average Cohesion Scores for Four Major City Delegations**: City delegations with stronger organizational institutions of horizontal integration were more cohesive than those with weaker ones. *Source:USR data, Voteview*

to the observation that city delegations are more cohesive than suburban delegations the further observation that some city delegations tend to be more cohesive than others.

A similar observation can be made about the frequency with which the cities were perfectly cohesive—that is, unanimous on a roll call vote. Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between local institutions and city delegation unanimity is present for all roll calls, for all domestic roll calls, and for substantive issues most obviously relevant to cities: housing, insfrastructure and public works, transportation, and urban/regional development.[35] In each of these categories, the cities

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[35]The American Institutions Project (AIP) dataset assigns substantive codes to all roll calls from the 45th to 104th Congress. I use the project's substantive codes to identify the roll calls in each category here. City votes are those in the AIP categories of Public Works and Infrastructure, Public Works Employment, Urban and Regional Development, and Housing. For details, see Katznelson and Lapinski (2007).

**Unanimity Among City Delegations**

| City | IHI strength | All votes | Domestic Votes | City Votes | IR votes |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| PHI | Strong | 0.76 | 0.59 | 0.77 | 0.59 |
| CHI | Strong | 0.67 | 0.53 | 0.64 | 0.72 |
| NYC | Halfway | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.47 | 0.38 |
| LAX | Weak | 0.46 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.45 |
| Dem | | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| GOP | | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.14 |
| Total votes | | 13962 | 10185 | 1099 | 2814 |

Table 4.2: **Proportion of votes on which city delegations were unanimous, Congresses 70-100:** Cities with strong IHIs are unanimous more often than cities with weaker IHIs. *Source: USR Data, AIP*

with strong IHIs were much more likely to be unanimous in representation than were the cities with weaker IHIs. Again, the figures for the congressional parties are presented, though they are not very informative because American congressional parties are so infrequently unanimous on roll calls.

The relationship between IHIs and voting unanimity holds particularly well for domestic votes and votes that are directly related to cities. The size of a delegation is more relevant here, as smaller delegations seem more likely to be unanimous.[36] This probably helps to explain why New York is as infrequently unanimous as Los Angeles, but it cannot explain the difference between Los Angeles and Chicago or Philadelphia; for most of the time period, LA is about as large as either of those cities (or both), but it is perfectly cohesive far less often. Interestingly, the pattern is not as strong in the fourth category, International Relations votes. The demands and influence of the IHIs may not exert the same pressures on votes that are not as obviously relevant to cities themselves. This is an area for further investigation.

Of course, because congressional voting is closely related to a member's party, much of a city's cohesion can certainly be attributed to the partisan makeup of a city's delegation—or more plainly the results of elections, when districts select their representatives. Winning seats in elections is a primary function of a traditional party, and this is reflected in the partisan homogeneity of the strong-party cities. The most cohesive city delegations, Chicago and Philadelphia, have often had very unified partisan delegations, while New York and Los Angeles have had more partisan divi-

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[36]This is a relevant concern here, but not in the previous analysis, which made a mathematical adjustment for delegation size.

sion; this fact itself related to the strength of local institutions of horizontal integration. Chicago's citywide Democratic machine was consolidated in the early 1930s and matured as a local hegemon in the mid-1950s when Daley assumed office, linking the formal heads of the local government and local party in the same person.[37] In Philadelphia, local party chiefs, who held grassroots mobilization power, converted *en masse* to the Democratic Party in the 1930s.[38] These cities were unified in their partisan mobilization, and their organizations were strong enough to elect a predictably cohesive bloc. Struggles within the Democratic Party in New York (between reformers and regulars in Manhattan, and between Manhattan and the other boroughs) left that city more open to Republican inroads at the Congressional level. Los Angeles had basically no local organization that included the entire city,[39] so the personnel of the city delegation seems more closely related to district-level characteristics, rather than a city-wide political order. LA's city delegation wound up far less cohesive than the other cities, despite having generally lower levels of cross-district heterogeneity.

## 4.4 Cohesion and two-stage representation

With a closer analysis, the relationship between city, local party, national party, and ultimately roll call behavior can be more precisely delineated. In this section, I turn to a smaller unit of analysis, the legislative dyad, to see more detailed patterns in the relationship between city institutions and representation. Figure 4.4 illustrates the theorized causal (and temporal) flow in the shaping of roll call votes in Congress, beginning with "pre-political" district characteristics at left and ending with particular votes by representatives at right. This model entails the basic logic of the city delegation theory. At its base, the model contains the (sometimes competing, sometimes integrated) theories of congressional behavior that suggest that the preferences of electoral constituencies and

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[37]Keiser (1997)

[38]Though the mayorship was slower to change, and slower still to be openly associated with the regular party organization.Mayhew (1986)

[39]Wilson (1962), Mayhew (1986)

congressional parties influence representatives' behavior in Congress.[40] This conventional model, focusing on district/constituency preference and/or congressional parties, is captured by influence pathways A1, A2, and C.[41]

City delegation theory complicates that model by hypothesizing effects from an extracameral institution from outside the district—the institution of horizontal integration(IHI)—as a factor that influences both party affiliation *and* roll call behavior. [42] Strong local institutions of horizontal integration foster unity among representatives through the vehicle of local parties that tend to create city delegations that are more homogeneously of one party, but they also influence roll call voting even beyond that, by sending particularly loyal partisans (if they are Democrats) to the chamber, but sometimes prompting agreement within a city delegation across national party lines (typically, city Republicans "defecting" from their party to agree with the Democrats). And because these institutions are present in cities, but not really elsewhere, the conditions of urbanicity push these cohesive blocs in the progressive liberal direction on policy questions. Chapter 5 will engage the particularly divisive issue of civil rights as it related to city institutions during the urban interlude. In this section, I will dig into the analysis of city delegation cohesion above with a statistical model of agreement among individual legislators.

The "cohesion gap" described above—the fact that city delegations, despite their relatively high levels of heterogeneity, are much more cohesive in national politics than their suburban rings, and usually more cohesive even than congressional parties—is partly a product of the partisan homogeneity of the delegations these cities send to congress. That is, Chicago and Philadelphia's congressional delegations are so cohesive in part because they are so heavily Democratic.[43] Sub-

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[40]Krehbiel (1998), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Aldrich (2011)

[41]The classic "parties v. preferences" debate in the political science literature on legislative behavior is largely over the independent relative import of "C."

[42]This model also complicates Figure 2 in Chapter 2 by breaking "representation" into two main components: national partisan affiliation (selected by voters) and voting behavior (as finally occurs on the floor of Congress). These are the two components of congressional studies, and to the extent that they *differ*, studying roll call behavior is theoretically compelling; if congressional party and voting behavior were perfectly correlated (ie, if American parties were perfectly disciplined), it would become far less interesting to study the latter.

[43]The cohesion scores for these cities are very close to what we would expect if representatives voted along party lines. To test this, we can generate "expected" cohesion scores based solely on partisan identification (ie, what would the cohesion score be if members of city delegation voted according to their partisan affiliation. When we compare these "expected" cohesion scores to the actual scores, there is no difference over 70 percent of the time. Observed cohesion is less than expected on 20 percent of votes (almost always when expected cohesion is 1 in Chicago or Philadelphia),

Figure 4.4: **City Delegation Theory:** Local city IHIs complicate the traditional model of Congressional representation (denoted by the relationships of $A1$, $A2$, and $C$). Cities with strong IHIs will have more homogeneous congressional delegations ($B2$), and their delegates will be more loyal partisans in roll call voting ($B1$ and $B3$).

urban delegations, and those from the other cities, are more split. This observation goes only halfway to explaining two things. First, geographic proximity is surely a dimension of affinity, so it seems somewhat "natural" that that city delegations would be made of members of the same party. But given the heterogeneous demographic building blocks, and political conflict in cities, this shared partisanship should not be taken for granted. Second, partisan affiliation cannot explain all of the cohesion we observe in city delegations, because city delegations are typically more cohesive than the congressional parties, as we can see from the grey lines in Figures 4.2 and 4.3; and if we break city delegations down into city *partisan* delegations (ie, New York Democrats and New York Republicans), they are almost unanimous almost all of the time. Congressional parties are much more rarely unanimous, despite the fact that coordinating legislative behavior is perhaps their main purpose. Nevertheless, party certainly matters quite a bit. We can get a glimpse of how much of city cohesion works through partisanship, and how local institutions still matter even when we account for party, with a closer analysis of congressional cohesion in a regression framework.

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and cohesion is higher than expected for about ten percent of roll calls. New York, with its notably liberal Manhattan Republicans, is exceptional, and is more often more cohesive than partisan affiliation would predict.

## 4.5   Pairwise cohesion

To evaluate the independent role of cities, city institutions, and congressional parties in shaping representation, we can use a statistical model of similarity in representation among congressional dyads to test which factors are associated with two representatives sharing party affiliation, or voting alike on a given proposal. To the extent that two individuals agree, this is akin to dyad-level "cohesion," and the basis for larger cohesive blocs. The underlying logic is that two representatives are more likely to belong to the same party when they come from similar districts, and to agree on voting in the chamber when they share relevant characteristics such as party affiliation and constituency pressures.

If cities and their institutions foster cohesion, then city institutions—membership in the same city delegation, traditional party organization at home—should be independently associated with a greater tendency to be from the same party and to agree in Congress, even when we account for other important factors. In each case, the "informal" institutions of city horizontal integration, which are external to both the chamber and the district that elects the representative, should be associated with cohesion.

In Figure 4.4, "representation" is disaggregated into two phases: one in which representatives are selected for membership in the legislature and affiliate with national parties, and one in which representatives actually vote. Institutions of horizontal integration may be associated with fostering cohesion at each stage: by making it more likely that representatives from a city are in the same party, and by making it more likely that representatives from a city will vote alike, even when we account for party affiliation. I will take each of these phases in turn, testing dyad-level models that estimate the relationships between similarity and agreement at each of these phases of representation. In each of the analyses, the unit of analysis is a congressional dyad, first a pair of congress members, and then a pair of votes by those members. We can see what factors are associated with "agreement" between representatives. I test similar models first in agreement in members' partisan identities and then agreement in roll call votes.

### 4.5.1   Selecting city delegations

First, I consider the makeup of the city delegation. Sending members from the same party, despite heterogeneous building blocks that are often oriented as rivals in local politics, is a key way to foster cohesion in a city delegation. The model of this phase of representation has several observable implications, which I evaluate below. The basic model to test the jurisdictional IHI hypothesis (Hypothesis 4.1) at the dyad level is

$$Pr(Party) = City + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \qquad (4.3)$$

where each variable is a measure of similarity between the members of the dyad on the measure indicated. The underlying logic is that precameral similarities are likely to be associated with membership in the same national party. On all variables, high values indicate similarity, so a positive coefficient means that similarity on that measure is associated with similarity in the dependent variable of membership in the same congressional party.

For instance, "City" equals 1 if members are members of the same congressional party, 0 otherwise; if, city delegation theory predicts, membership in the same city is associated with agreement on roll calls, we expect the coefficient on this term to be greater than zero. This would provide support for Hypothesis 4.1 above.

Because many factors may be relevant in determining congressional agreement, I include several other explanatory variables in the model. First, there are several measures of geographical proximity. These categorical spatial variables are dichotomous indicators of agreement: 1 if from the same city, region, section, or state, and 0 otherwise.

Urbanicity measures are available from the USR dataset developed for this project for all of those congresses. In the regression, the difference between the dyads members' scores on the seven-category ordinal USR measure (ranging from a rural 0 to a core city 6) is subtracted from six to give a measure of similarity on this dimension of demography and district character.[44] Thus a pair of core city districts would have a score of 6, a pair of rural districts a 6, but a pair made up of

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[44]See Appendix 1 for further details on USR variables.

a city district and a suburban district might have a 2, 3, or 4, depending on the particular character of the districts in question.[45]

The demographic measures for dyadic similarity along ethnoracial diversity and class lines are only available for later congresses (congresses 78 to 105 in most of the columns in the table below), but were developed using a procedure as follows. "Race" is an estimate of similarity of the proportion of the electorate identified or identifying as "native white" in each congressional district. From the 73rd through 89th congresses, this is the total population, minus the proportion of the voting-eligible population that is black (as estimated using the spatial techniques described in Appendix 2) minus percent foreign born given by Adler (2012).[46] For later years, data on racial identities including Hispanic and Asian are available from a combination of Lublin (1999) and Adler (2012). Once each district's percent white has been estimated, I calculate the difference between the dyad members' white populations, and subtract *that* value from one for use as a measure of ethnoracial similarity. For class similarity, I use the same procedure, using percent blue-collar from Adler (2012) as the initial measure. Union membership is an important element of partisan competition as well, and I include it in Model 3 in the table; however, in Adler (2012) this variable is measured at the state level and therefore not quite appropriate for a district-level analysis.

In all, there are four measures of spatial-geographic similarity (the primary explanatory variable of interest, City, and three secondary explanatory variables, State, Region, and Section), and three measures of district-level similarity on urbanicity, ethnoracial identity, and class dimensions. I estimate a the probit model with congress-level fixed effects to account for shifts in the overall partisan balance of the chamber (which would affect the baseline probability of two members being from the same party), with robust standard errors clustered by dyad (to account for continuities among districts and/or members). The broadest analysis here covers dyads from the 40th through 105th Congresses (from 1865 through 1997, respectively), while the models that include the class and race variables are limited to congresses where data is available, after the 78th

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[45]This measure of difference on the USR continuum also ranges from 0 to 6, the same as the variable it is constructed from.

[46]For estimates of the foreign born population as for African Americans, Adler's estimates still do suffer from the issues described in regard to percent black in Appendix 2 and Chapter 6. The "new immigrants" of this era were not as rigorously separated from native-born population as blacks were from whites, mitigating the problem significantly. Refining these estimates is an ongoing piece of this project.

congress.

These models test a few of the observable implications of city delegation theory. First, city institutions should be related to the partisan composition of city delegations. At the dyad level, this means that a pair of legislators from the same city is more likely to be from the same party than an otherwise similar pair that is not from the same city, even when we account for other factors on which representatives' districts may be similar. If this is true, the coefficient on "City", the indicator that representatives represent the same local political community, should be greater than zero, even when all of these other known contributors to partisan conflict are taken into account.

Further, in keeping with the Organizational Hypothesis above, strong local IHIs should foster partisan cohesion among representatives from the same city even more. Cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration, like Chicago and Philadelphia, should have more homogeneous city delegations, because they are better able to resolve local conflict and pursue a city accord at a higher level with a delegation that shares a national partisan affiliation. Cities with weak institutions will be relatively disorganized across the city, and their districts will be less likely to cohere within one party because district-level forces will be more powerful, relative to citywide factors, in determining the representative from that place. This would be supported if we observe that the relationship between membership in the same city and same national party was stronger in cities with strong IHIs than cities with weak IHIs. To test this conditional hypothesis, I add a term interacting the indicator for a dyad sharing a city with a measure of local party strength David Mayhew's Traditional Party Organization (TPO) scores, to Equation 4.3:[47]

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[47] As in other empirical analyses in this study, TPO scores (which Mayhew assigns at the state level) here are adjusted to account for Mayhew's observation that such organizations tend to be most common and strongest in cities. I adjust the scores based on the accounts available in his text. For ease of interpretation, in this analysis I then recode Mayhew's TPO scores (adjusted to account for within-state variation as described in his text) into dichtomous "strong party" and "weak party" categories, and the variable used in the interaction and accompanying term is an indicator scored 1 if both members of the dyad were from places with traditional party organizations and 0 otherwise. TPO scores of 4 and 5 were counted as strong, 3 and less counted as weak. Louisiana is the only state that receives a 3 on Mayhew's scores; alternative treatments of this state, such as exclusion, coding as either strong or weak, or introducing a third category, do not affect the substantive results of the analysis.

$$Pr(Party) = City * TPO + City + TPO + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon$$

(4.4)

In addition to estimating this interaction model on the full set of congressional dyads, I also test it on the subset of dyads that consist of two city representatives (from any city), and on the further subset of dyads made up of two representatives from the *same* city. In each case, according to city delegation theory, the strength of city-wide party organizations should be positively associated with representatives' membership in the same party in national politics.

The results for all of these models of congressional representation are included in Table 4.3. Table 4.4 lists marginal effects of interest, which have a more direct substantive interpretation. The results and substantive interpretations are broadly consistent across the models and subsets. We can see here that the coefficients of primary interest, those having to do with the IHIs of city co-membership and local institutions, are positively associated with membership in the same congressional party, even when we account for other likely factors such as geography and demography. In the first three columns, which test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis, the positive, significant coefficient on City is consistent with the theory that membership in the same local community is associated with sharing a national political party as well. From Table 4.4, columns 1 and 2 we can see that membership in the same city is associated with a 17-20 percent increased chance in being in the same party, depending on the subset of Congresses and whether race and class are included in the model.

The city boundary itself is not doing all of the work, however. Looking closer, columns 4-6 include tests of the organizational hypothesis, which holds that cities with stronger IHIs will have more cohesive delegations than cities with weak IHIs. The interactive term City*TPO is the key variable of interest in columns 4 and 5; in the regression framework, it evaluates the conditional hypothesis that the relationship between co-membership in a city and co-membership in a congressional party will be stronger in strong-party cities than in weak-party cities. It is positive and precisely measured in both models, providing support for the idea that strong organizational IHIs

are associated with citywide agreement.

A clearer interpretation of this conditional hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 4.5, which depicts the conditional relationship for the subset of dyads consisting only of pairs of legislators from large cities.[48] The vertical axis is the probability of two representatives belonging to the same party, all else equal. Along the horizontal axis there are two categories, being from the same city and not being from the same city. The top line is the probability of being in the same party for dyads whose members are both from high-TPO cities, the bottom line the probability of being in the same party for dyads whose members are *not both* from high-TPO cities (ie, one or neither of them might be). The important thing to note is that the slope of the top line is much greater than the slope of the bottom line: while being from the same city makes two representatives more likely to be in the same congressional party no matter what, the effect is greater for strong-city dyads. In this group, two strong-party city representatives are about 30 percent likely to be in the same party if they are not from the same city, but about 51 percent likely to be if they *are* from the same city, an increase of about 17 percent. Conversely, two members not both from strong parties are only about 8 percent more likely to be in the same party if they come from the same city. Thus in this pool having a strong organizational IHI appears to be about an 8 percent increase in the effect of being from the same city, a substantively significant increase in "cohesion."[49]

In the fifth column, which splits the sample to include only dyads from the *same city*, the apparent relationship is even stronger: members of a dyad from a strong party city are 13 percent more likely to have the same national party affiliation than if they are from a weak party city. These results, incorporating data over most of the 20th century, provide support for the importance of both jurisdictional and organizational institutions of horizontal integration in fostering unity within a city delegation through common congressional affiliation—that is, by having one party win the city's several elections for congress.[50]

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[48]Estimates for this Figure were created using Clarify for Stata.

[49]And statistically significant, though the standard errors on these estimates are not presented graphically here.

[50]Running the same tests on only congresses from the urban interlude actually increases the magnitude of the coefficients of interest, indicating that the relationship between IHIs and partisan affinity were particularly strong during that time, though the coefficients are positive and significant in all eras.

Tests of City IHI Association with Congressional Party Affinity

| Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pool (Dyads) | All | All | All | All | City Only | Same City Only |
| Congresses | (45+) | (77+) | (77+) | (77+) | (77+) | (77+) |
| **City*TPO** | | | | 0.28* | 0.29* | |
| | | | | (0.039) | (0.039) | |
| **SameCity** | .44* | 0.51* | .52* | 0.31* | 0.39* | |
| | (.011) | (0.015) | (.016) | (0.035) | (0.036) | |
| **High TPO** | | | | -0.068* | -.08* | 0.37* |
| | | | | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.047) |
| **SameState** | -.088* | -0.12* | -.11* | -0.11* | -0.24* | |
| | (.003) | (0.004) | (.004) | (0.004) | (0.007) | |
| **SameSection** | .25* | 0.09* | .12* | 0.11* | -.14* | |
| | (.0012) | (0.001) | (.002) | (0.0019) | (0.003) | |
| **SameRegion** | .17* | 0.17* | .17* | 0.18* | .12* | |
| | (.001) | (0.002) | (.002) | (0.0022) | (0.004) | |
| **Urbanicity** | .0097* | 0.013* | 0.12* | 0.012* | 0.077* | .026 |
| | (.0038) | (0.0062) | (.001) | (0.001) | (0.0011) | (0.11) |
| **Race** | | -0.12* | -.12* | -0.14* | -.39* | -1.63* |
| | | (0.012) | (.012 | (0.012) | (0.019) | (0.23) |
| **Class** | | -0.006 | | -0.11 | -1.14* | 13.83* |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.0659) | (.12) | (1.81) |
| **Union** | | | -.005* | | | |
| | | | (.0002) | | | |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | .02 | 0.007 | .007 | 0.0067 | 0.013 | .0727 |
| N | 5,880,127 | 2,625,712 | 2,625,712 | 2,625,712 | 736,162 | 7,735 |

Table 4.3: **Probit Regression Results:** CCity Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Congress fixed effects not listed here. *$p < .05$

Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables
on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress

| Model | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dyads | All | All | All | City Only | Same City Only |
| | | (Post-78) | (Post-78) | (Post-78) | (Post-78) |
| City*TPO | | | (Fig. 4.5) | 0.11* | |
| City | .17* | 0.20* | 0.12* | 0.15* | |
| TPO | | | -0.027* | -.032* | .13* |
| State | -.034* | -0.050* | -0.042* | -0.10* | |
| Section | .10* | 0.040* | 0.043* | 0.056* | |
| Region | .069* | 0.070* | 0.070* | -0.049* | |
| Urbanicity | .0039* | 0.0050* | 0.0046* | 0.031* | -0.008 |
| RaceSim | | -0.052* | -0.055* | -.16 | -0.52* |
| ClassSim | | -0.002 | -0.0045 | -.45* | 4.35* |

Table 4.4: **Marginal Effects:** City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels. *$p < .05$
Note Model 3, which included a state-level measure of union membership, not included in this table.

Figure 4.5: **Strength of Same-city effect on large-city dyads by organization-type.** Congressional dyads, 1939-1999. Each line represents the modeled probability of two members being in the same party, depending on whether they are in the same city. The top line represents pairs from strong-party cities, the bottom line pairs not both from strong-party cities. The slope of the line for strong-party cities is greater than the slope for non-strong party cities. Difference in slope significant at $p < .05$, verified using method described in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) (not presented here). *Sources: USR data, Voteview, Adler (2012),Lublin (1999). Estimated using Clarify in Stata.*

### 4.5.2 Discussion: Homogeneous delegations from heterogeneous constituencies

The results above provide support for the key hypotheses that local IHIs foster unity in the first phase of congressional representation, the selection of partisan representatives. Other results of the models are worth noting: being from the same region and section is positively associated with membership in the same party, but dyads from the same state are *less* likely to represent the same party, all else equal. This may reflect intrastate rivalries of various sorts. District-level character-istics include some surprises: while being similar in place character makes districts more likely to come from the same party (this reflects the broader urban-rural divide), class and race seem far less important, and similarity on these dimensions is actually associated with being represented by members of *different* parties—though note that when the sample includes only districts from the same city, the variables take on greater substantive significance, and the sign on the class vari-able switches, indicating that *within* cities, class and copartisanship are more closely associated. Finally, the extremely low pseudo-R-squared measure on the largest pools of dyads indicates that even these measures of "prepolitical" geographic and demographic similarity do not account for very much of the variation in the outcome variable. Politics is obviously complex, and simple similarity between districts tells us less than one percent of the story of who wins office in any given dyad.

### 4.5.3 Cohesive voting

The results of the previous analysis indicate that local IHIs are associated with representation by members of the same national party. This is obviously important, as congressional party is a strong predictor of how a member will ultimately vote in the halls of congress. But it is not the whole story. In addition to contributing to city delegations with unified party membership, institutions of horizontal integration should prompt cohesion in final voting. The step-by-step model of rep-resentation in Figure 4.4 includes a second site where IHIs can foster cohesion in representation, at the moment of roll call voting. In Figure 4.4, this is informally indicated by arrows $B1$ and $B3$.

Some of the effects of IHIs work indirectly through congressional party (ie, via pathways $B2$ and $C$), but because national American congressional parties are not strong or disciplined themselves, we may be able to observe a direct relationship between IHIs and legislative agreement.

In this section, I build on the previous analysis to consider whether membership in common IHIs fosters representational agreement even beyond membership in the same national party. In this dyadic analysis, membership in the same city delegation should be associated with agreement on final roll call votes, and this tendency should be strongest in cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration, all else equal. These effects should be manifest even when we control for congressional party, though some of the city's effects flow *through* congressional party and into roll call voting behavior. I test this hypothesis with additional regression analyses of roll call votes, analogous to those in the previous section. In the previous comparisons of congresspersons' identities, there was just one observation per dyad per congress, and the dependent variable measured whether the seats were held by members of the same party. To analyze agreement on roll call votes, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the two representatives in the dyad agree in their vote.

In these analyses, there is one observation per "complete" dyad on a vote—a dyad is considered complete if both members voted on that particular roll call. The dyad is coded 1 if the two members of the dyad cast the same vote, zero if they disagreed.[51] I then regress this agreement indicator on several covariates of similarity between the dyad elements. As in the analysis of party affinity, the explanatory variables are all measures of similarity, and values are the same for all roll calls in a given Congress: members' similarity in party, and districts' similarity in urbanicity, traditional party organization, racial (percent native white) and class composition (blue collar and union) where available, region, section, and state.

To assemble data for this analysis, I used the set of roll call votes identified as pertaining to domestic policy by the American Institutions Project from the 73rd through 89th Congress, the range approximating the urban interlude. There are 1711 of these votes. Because the dyadic analysis creates very large datasets (about 90,000 dyads per vote), including all of these votes makes

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[51]Missing votes were dropped from the pool from which dyads were constructed. Representatives taking a clear position in absentia with a "paired" vote as recorded in the *Congressional Record* are included in complete dyads.

the following analysis computationally unwieldy. I randomly selected 150 contested votes from this larger set of 1711.[52] Thus for the subsequent dyadic analysis of roll-call votes, I employ the following model to test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis:

$$Pr(AgreeVote) = City + Party + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \quad (4.5)$$

where with the expectation that if membership in the same local polity fosters cohesion, the coefficient on $City$ will be positive.

Testing the Organizational Hypothesis is a bit more complicated, because simply interacting traditional party organization with same-city origins is not enough; if local organizations matter, being from different parties in a strong-party city might make a dyad *less* likely to agree than an opposite-party dyad with no local basis for rivalry. I thus test this hypothesis on a much smaller subset of the data: those dyads composed of two representatives from the same city *and* the same congressional party. If the organizational hypothesis is correct, then those dyads that come from cities with strong local IHIs, as indicated by their TPO scores, should be more likely to agree than dyads that come from cities with weak IHIs. Formally, this model is

$$Pr(AgreeVote) = TPO + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \quad (4.6)$$

estimated using only dyads where city and party are the same, with the theoretical expectation that the coefficient on TPO will be greater than zero. In essence, this test "controls" for the effects of jurisdictional IHIs (by including only dyads whose elements come from the same city) and congressional party. An observed difference between dyads from cities cities with different

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[52]A contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 75 percent of the total votes cast, except in the 73rd, 74th, 75th, and 86th congress, where a contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 85 percent of the total votes cast (several of these congresses were very one-sided in favor of the Democrats, so even party-line votes were likely to have 75 percent on one side). I repeated the analysis several times with different samples of 150 from the pool of 1711, and using different samples does not seem to change the inferential substance of the analysis. With more computing power and/or time, I can formally increase confidence in these results, but it seems unlikely that they will change much.

strength of local parties would support the theory that the shape of local institutions matter for national representation.

The following analyses test these hypotheses associated with city delegation theory using roll calls from the 73rd through 90th congresses (roughly spanning the urban interlude). Multiple results are presented here to illustrate both robustness across slightly different subsamples of the data (given limited availability of class variables) and because the different models illustrate slightly different aspects of the patterns in the data. First, for models 1 through 3, I test a sample of all roll calls identified by the American Institutions Project dataset as having to do with domestic policy from the urban interlude.[53] There are over 1,700 such votes, and there about 90,000 voting dyads associated with each of them; this number made analysis computationally unwieldy. For the results presented here, I sampled ten percent of those votes, and dropped uncontested votes from that sample.[54] After sampling, the dataset for analysis included 6,411,206 total observations on 72 roll calls.[55] In Table 4.5, these analyses are indicated by the label "All" in the top row. Second, I run the analysis using a set of votes that should be of particular interest to city delegations. These are the votes having to do with Housing, Public Works and Infrastructure, Urban and Regional Development, and Public Works Employment, again as identified by the AIP classification system.[56] The relationships predicted by the city delegation theory should be particularly strong on these votes, which have to do with a city's interest.

Finally, I test the Organizational hypothesis with the same sample of votes from models 1 through 3 (a subset of all contested domestic affairs votes), but include only dyads from the same city and same party in the analysis. In this model, the key variable of interest is the indicator for local party strength, which is scored 1 if the dyad comes from a high-TPO city, and 0 if it comes from a low-TPO city. Measures of regional, sectional, and state similarity are dropped here (because all

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[53]The AIP Top-Tier category "Domestic Affairs."

[54]Contested votes are those on which neither side won more than 80 percent of the vote; I employ this somewhat unusually high level because of some particularly one-sided congresses during the era under investigation.

[55]Alternative trials and samples, which included different votes, yielded results that were substantively the same as those presented here.

[56]These are all third-tier substance categories in the AIP, subsets of the broader Domestic Affairs category used in models 1-3.

representatives from the same city are necessarily share those higher levels of geographic affinity).

Again, in each of these models, the dependent variable is agreement between two members casting votes on a roll call. All models presented were estimated with congress- and vote-level fixed effects to account for dynamics that might make agreement more or less likely during a congress or on a particular vote (though note that because uncontested votes were dropped, the votes in the analysis received between 50 and 80 percent support from the winning side in any case, so there is not a huge amount of variation there). Model 5, which includes only pairs from the same city and party, includes city-level fixed effects as well to account for unobserved features of particular cities that may make agreement more likely.[57] Table 4.5 lists the results of these five models evaluating the relationships predicted by city delegation theory and IHIs. Cells of primary interest for tests of city delegation theory are highlighted in grey.

In this table, we can see that the hypotheses related to the primary coefficients of interest are supported by the data. Being from the same city is positively associated with legislative agreement, even when we account for a host of other factors that might be important in determining voting position, particularly legislative party. Among dyads whose members both come from the same city and party, those from strong local-party cities are also more likely to agree. Taking these results a step further for ease of interpretation, Table 4.6 lists the marginal effects associated with the coefficients above, calculated while holding the other variables constant at appropriate values.[58]

These estimated marginal relationships provide support for the idea that being from the same city does indeed foster cohesion among representatives in roll call behavior. Even when we account for other obvious factors like party affiliation, demography, and geographical proximity,

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[57]Each of these models was also run without each set of fixed effects, and without any fixed effects at all, as a robustness check in case these many indicators were biasing results (especially in case they were prompting false positives). In all cases, the key substantive interpretations of the coefficients of interest (ie, sign of coefficient and precision of estimation) were not affected by the inclusion of these indicators. In models without the indicators, the magnitude of the key relationships were actually larger, so the results presented here are relatively conservative, when compared to models that exclude the indicators for congress, vote, and city.

[58]The geographic variables are all binary indicators of similarity, so marginal effects were estimated holding these constant at zero, which was both mode and median in each case, and therefore "typical." The demographic measures of similarity (on urbanicity, race, and class variables) were held at their median. This is the same procedure used to create the estimates in Table 4.4.

Tests of City IHI Influence on Roll Call Voting

| Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pool | All | All | All | City Votes | Same City, Party |
| (Congresses) | (73-89) | (78+) | (78+) | (78+) | (78+) |
| City | .18* (.01) | .24* (0.013) | .24* (.012) | .37* (0.014) | |
| Party | .65* (.001) | .72* (0.001) | .71* (.001) | .74* (0.0016) | |
| High TPO | | | | | .86* (.27) |
| State | .065* (.003) | 0.050* (0.004) | .03* (.004) | 0.034* (0.004) | |
| Section | .045* (.001) | .05* (0.002) | -.02* (.002) | -.068* (0.002) | |
| Region | .01* (.002) | -.004* (0.002) | .0002 (.002) | -.035* (0.002) | |
| Urbanicity | .023* (.0016) | 0.030* (0.0005) | .032* (.0005) | 0.050* (0.0006) | |
| Race | -0.3* (0.016) | -0.20* (0.018) | -.24* (.018) | .37* (0.019) | -.28 (.17) |
| Class | | 0.015* (0.00030) | | .014* (0.0005) | -.59* (.35) |
| Union | | | .007* (.0002) | | .15* (.024) |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | .06 | 0.06 | .07 | 0.119 | .16 |
| N | 6,407,860 | 4,621,162 | 4,621,162 | 8,272,388 | 11671 |

Table 4.5: **Probit Regression Results:** City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Shaded rows are coefficients of interest. All models include (unlisted) congress- and vote-specific fixed effects, and model 5 also includes city fixed effects.
$*p < .05$

Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables
on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress

| Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dyads | All | All | All | "City" Votes | Same City, Party |
| Congresses | (73-89) | (78-89) | (78-89) | (78-89) | (78-89) |
| City | .06* | .09* | .09* | 0.12* | |
| Party | .25* | .27 | .27* | .28* | |
| TPO | | | | | 0.21* |
| State | .02* | .02* | -.011* | .009 | |
| Section | .017* | .002* | -.009* | -.03 | |
| Region | .005* | -.001* | -.000 | -0.009* | |
| Urbanicity | .009* | .0050* | .012* | 0.031* | -0.04 |
| Race | -.11 | -0.07* | -.055* | .17 | -.09* |
| Class | | .057 | | .0051* | .012* |
| Union | | | .002 | | |

Table 4.6: **Marginal Effects:** City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels. *$p < .05$

representatives from the same city were, on average, about six to nine percent more likely to agree on domestic policy than members not from the same city. This relationship was particularly strong on the issues that city governments mobilized around during the New Deal, including housing and public works. On these issues, the marginal increase in probability of members of the same city delegation agreeing rose to 12 percent. Sharing a city matters more on issues that matter more for cities.

Finally, the test of the organizational hypothesis on the subset of dyads whose members were from the same city and party also provides support for city delegation theory. Local copartisans who were from places with strong local parties, which provide stronger links between representatives from different parts of a city, were about 21 percent more likely to agree than local copartisans from places with weak local institutions. This is an almost unbelievably strong relationship, given the common sense believe that two representatives from the same city and in the same party might almost always agree in any case. But not only are pairs from cities with strong organizational IHIs more likely to share party affiliation, they are also more likely to be more cohesive partisan delegations when it comes time to vote. These local party organizations provide a strong glue holding representatives of heterogeneous constituencies together in the final phase of representation.

Again, the results of these dyad-level regressions support the main hypothesis of city dele-

gation theory: that sharing common local institutional and political roots makes representatives more cohesive. Pairs of representatives that come from the same city are more likely to agree on roll call votes than pairs that do not, and this is especially true for those pairs that both come from cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration. Moreover, pairs of representatives from cities with such institutions (the most important of which are the traditional party organizations tested here) are more likely to come from the same party than those pairs who do not. Since partisan affiliation is an especially strong force for congressional behavioral agreement (that's what these parties are *for*, more than anything else), creating a city delegation that is monolithic in its partisan identity is an important means by which local parties operate.

## 4.6 Discussion

The analyses in this chapter provide evidence of the association between extracameral institutions of horizontal integration and legislative cohesion predicted by city delegation theory. Cities are more cohesive in their legislative behavior than are other collections of legislators, and cities with strong IHIs are more cohesive than cities with weak IHIs. This cohesion is partly attributable to the election of representatives that tend to be from the same party. Dyads from the same city are more likely to be affiliated with the same party, and this relationship is even stronger in cities with strong traditional parties. But even beyond party membership, city delegations foster cohesion in roll call voting on domestic policy issues. Representatives from the same city are more likely to agree with each other than those not from the same city, even across party lines, an indication that something like a city interest is being represented; representatives from the same city but from different parties may be cooperating or competing for the same median voter (or each at different times), but they are ultimately agreeing on policies relevant to the cities they represent.

Finally, among city representatives, those from the same local party are extremely cohesive. Chicago *Democrats* were unanimous on 85 percent of votes during the urban interlude; New York Democrats on 75 percent. These percentages increase to 90 percent (for each city) on "key" votes

on which the parties were disagreed.[59] Despite the fact that their constituencies were often quite different on important dimensions like race and class, these blocs of legislative voters consistently spoke with one voice for a city position, and were particularly cohesive when their votes were most valuable. Whether this pattern of relationships holds for all substantive policy areas, or only those most relevant to cities (like "city" or domestic roll calls) is an area for further investigation.

Even when we account for many other geographic, demographic, and political factors that foster similar representation, city institutions are related to representation on domestic issues, particularly those of most obvious relevance to a city's ability to manage the governance challenges of urbanicity. Institutions that link city constituencies make them more cohesive in their partisan affiliation and more likely to agree on policy. Of course, there is still much work that remains to more fully understand the precise mechanism for cohesion. For one, even with the inclusion of many likely explanatory factors, the model in this chapter still does not account for very much of the overall variation in whether or not dyads ultimately agree. But this is not an issue unique to the questions at hand—after all, I include what is thought to be the main determinant of vote behavior (national party) as an explanation in the model.

Second, a quantitative analysis like this cannot quite get into the *why* or *how* of city delegation cohesion. Electoral processes may lead to the selection of representatives that are more alike than their districts, or at least more mindful of citywide issues, and inclined to cohere based on something akin to true "preferences." Such an arrangement would foster cohesion fairly simply and without the active exercise of power. Alternatively, discipline and monitoring by a central organizational leader may have been more continually applied, if the different pressures of different constituencies pulled representatives in different directions. This would entail more application of the subtle tools available to citywide organizations and their leaders, such as rearranging electoral slates, weakening incumbents or allowing challenges. The first possibility is widely assumed; the second would be very difficult to see. It is likely that both realities obtained in different circumstances and combinations, as Snowiss (1966) observed late in the urban interlude.

The broader theoretical contribution of this analysis is to identify a set of institutions that are

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[59]Key votes are votes of particular importance to cities as identified in Congressional Quarterly weekly reports. See Caraley (1976).

external to the formal, ideal models of representation that focus on factors internal to the congress (like national party affiliation) or to a particular constituency (like demography). The city and related institutions "should be" irrelevant to national representation; but something about cities foster cohesion among their representatives to an extent the usual suspects cannot fully explain. Such institutions linking several constituencies who have something in common at the local level (membership in a common political community and/or in a local political organization whose primary aims are focused at the local level), despite differences in the building blocks of politics, contribute to their commonality at a higher level as well.

## 4.7   Conclusion

The large cities upon which the urban political order was built were famous for fractious (and recurrently violent) politics at home, but they are notable for the cohesive way they represent themselves in national politics, on domestic issues in particular. More, differences in overall cohesion among city delegations are related to the institutional configuration of the cities themselves: cities with traditional party organizations are also more cohesive in national politics, in part because they elect more members from the same party. By creating such cohesive representative units, institutions of horizontal integration foster *vertical* integration as well: they transmit a disciplined, cohesive style of city politics into the higher legislature, making the effects of their local institutions felt in national legislative politics.

Beyond the parties themselves, it is certainly possible that other informal, extracameral local institutions may serve similar functions in places where traditional parties were not (or are no longer) present. In midcentury Detroit, for instance, the nominally nonpartisan local politics were often dominated by CIO unions, notably the UAW.[60] In many formally nonpartisan cities, reform-style regimes may have integrated politics at the times when they held political "monopolies" (as described in Trounstine (2008)), though the foregoing analysis indicates that nonpartisan cities

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[60]Mayhew (1986), p.157

tended to be more divided than those with partisan institutions in general.[61] The precise institutions can change or adapt over time as well. In contemporary Chicago, for instance, local politics have been formally nonpartisan since the late 1980s, but there has been little experiential doubt of the continued power of the machine there, or of its sustained organizational ties up and down the chain of political authority.

The cohesive force of city delegations complicates Tip O'Neill's famous observation that "all politics is local." We usually understand this to mean that a politician will be responsive to his or her constituency's interests, and potentially resistant to a national party line when the local conflicts with the national. This is true to a point, but we must be careful about how we understand "local," at least for city politicians. The cohesion of big-city delegations indicates that city representatives are responsive to the *city*, including the part that they do not formally represent, as well as to their own particular district within the city. In each case, from the relatively weak ties of jurisdictional integration to the stronger bonds of organization-based linkages, the ultimate point is that for city representatives, important local politics can happen outside a representative's district, even though they are still "local."

These facts—that cities foster cohesion even though their component parts are very different from each other, and that particular constellations of local institutions, especially parties, further amplify it—present both a puzzle and a key insight for understanding the role of cities in national political institutions. These city delegations, heterogeneous rivals at home but united in the nation, form the backbone of the "Blue" alignment of the Democratic Party today, making up the cross-city alliance described in the previous chapter. The next chapter addresses a key area in which the cohesive forces of institutions of IHIs were particularly important: the advance of civil rights for African Americans during the urban interlude. This development, shaped by local institutions, restructured American partisan politics and reinforced the place of cities within the Democratic Party.

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[61]Additionally, the "reform" cities of the West and Southwest usually had smaller city delegations because of the timing of their development in national history. This does not mean their politics could not possibly be horizontally integrated, but it makes it more difficult to appreciate empirically.

# Chapter 5

# Anti-racism without Anti-racists: City Representation and Racial Realignment

Lynching is called an American institution...They protected life and property, at least in a way, and made those sections of the country, where there was no organized government, very safe sections in which to live.

Rep. Hatton Sumners (D-TX), 1934[1]

The frontier days are gone, and few of us familiar with the rigors of living in that era are likely to bewail its departure.

Rep. John Rooney (D-NYC), 1949[2]

The only genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent.

Mike Royko, *Boss*[3]

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[1]"Punishment for the Crime of Lynching," Hearing of Subcommittee on S. 1978, Judiciary, HRG-1934-SJS-0003, p.237
[2]"Federal Fair Employment Practice Act," Hearing of Special Subcommittee on Fair Employment Standards Act, HRG-1949-EDL-0005, p. 8
[3]Royko (1971), p.139

In the previous chapters, we have seen that the consolidation of the urban political order during the New Deal provided a base of support for national state interventions in the economy. City representatives were notable for their liberalism in such matters. City representation in national politics is also marked by cohesion related to institutions of horizontal integration, which foster unified representation from local polities that are heterogeneous and fractious at home. One dimension of difference that has always been particularly divisive in American politics is race. Throughout the long New Deal era, conflicts within the parties over these issues created a "second dimension" in American politics, on which the usual alignments did not hold. Today's political alignment reflects the parties' resolution of those conflicts, such that the sides in conflicts over the role of government in the economy and about race overlap. Neither of these dimensions of conflict has disappeared, but rather the two reinforce each other. The role of place character and local institutions of horizontal integration in bringing the two dimensions together is the subject of this chapter.

The New Deal realignment was marked by a major, lasting shift of city constituencies to the Democratic Party, and this bloc supported an agenda generally congenial to big-city interests, among others. The Democrats quickly became the party of the cities.[4] This bloc of blocs, however, did not enter a void. Democrats had dominated politics in Southern states since the region's re-entry after Reconstruction, and had long been the core of the national Democratic Party. Deeply conservative on racial and cultural matters, and wary of any centralization of power that might threaten their regional racial order and political economy, representatives from the South made it clear early on that this would be a central dimension of conflict in the expanded New Deal coalition.

Managing this sectional conflict within a large and heterogeneous coalition demanded skill and compromise, and eventually the ties that bound the alliance would fray. In the end, the sectional wings parted ways, and after a long process of sorting out, the contemporary partisan divide—with the South as the "Red" base of the GOP and cities as the heart of "Blue" Democratic support—represents the full flowering of the seeds sown in the New Deal realignment of 1928-

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[4]Mayhew (1966)

1932.

Most accounts of this partisan change focus on the transition of conservative Southern Democrats to the Republican fold, the most estranged of the strange bedfellows coalition of the New Deal. Southern elites were infamously racist, and the re-emergence of racial civil rights on the national agenda understandably alienated them from the party of white supremacy they had built. In this chapter, however, I focus on the other wing of the party, the cities outside the South, where race was also a deeply divisive issue, and the source of great contention, but where local circumstances and institutions fostered durable support for racial liberalism in national politics.

## 5.1 Racial Realignment

The 1960s is sometimes identified as the key moment of political change over race, but in truth it is more of a midpoint, because the process of Democratic decay took place over decades. The southern and urban wings of the party were never natural ideological allies, on race or much else, and signs of southern frustration with urban Democrats were apparent even before the New Deal elections of the 1930s consolidated Democratic strength in the cities. In 1928, several southern states "defected" from the Democratic column for the first time since the Civil War, when the party chose an urbanite, Alfred E. Smith, the Catholic former mayor of New York City, as its presidential nominee. This was a conflict as much over city-country differences as about section.[5] The Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, in which Strom Thurmond led a southern protest against Truman's civil rights platform, followed 20 years later, and a more durable departure by Southerners from the Democrats took place in the 1960s, as the heart of the South went for Goldwater, and then for Wallace, Nixon, and Reagan. Today, the South is the baseline of the Republican strategy to win the White House.

In Congressional seats, the southern transition to the GOP began later, with some erosion of

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[5]Key (1955*b*) identifies 1928 as a "critical" election in his early contribution to realignment theory, and Andersen (1979) also includes it in her key period of urban party transformation. In addition to (or perhaps as a corollary of) being Catholic, Smith was also a proponent of prohibition repeal, long an issue that divided rural and urban constituencies, not just offended the South (Buenker (1973).

**Proportion of House Southerners in Democratic Party**



Figure 5.1: Share of Southern House seats held by Democrats, post-Civil War congresses. (Census Regional Definition)

southern "solidity" taking place in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1990s that a majority of southern members of Congress were Republicans (See Figure 5.1). Today, there are fewer Southern Democrats in the House than at any point since the end of Reconstruction.[6] The existence of this intraparty cleavage is well-known, but the party's internal conflicts were not only sectional—the New Deal coalition included some of the strangest bedfellows imaginable. In the Democratic electoral base, white southerners were joined principally by polyphonous industrial cities, where organized labor, African Americans, and newly mobilized ethnic whites had deeply felt conflicts of their own at the mass level. Among urban Democratic elites, the decades-long rivalry between machine-style party organizations and their local opponents (often self-described as reformers) continued, now sometimes manifest at the national level, as in the 1932 nomination battle between New Yorkers Franklin Roosevelt and Al Smith.[7] Because the partisan electoral realignment unfolded slowly and unevenly across decades, it is not entirely clear precisely when the realignment "took place" and scholars are still debating its mechanics.[8] There is considerable scholarly

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[6]And most of those who remain come from minority-majority districts, reflecting the region's continuing extreme racial polarization.

[7]Dorsett (1977), Buenker (1973), Mayhew (1986)

[8]The strongest versions of realignment theory identify critical elections as moments of rapid, generational change in political alliances.Key (1955*a*), Burnam (1970), Mayhew (2002) If we allow for a more fragmented or syncopated process of national political change, rather than one in which an outdated system fractures sharply and re-forms durably and coherently, a softer version of realignment theory can help us understand the more gradual shift that was initiated by

consensus as to *why* it occurred, however: race. The conflicts in America and within the Democratic Party over the Civil Rights movement made obvious the incoherence of a political alliance whose most stalwart elements included both the beneficiaries of the southern racial order and African Americans.

The classic narrative of how race undid the previous national alignment focuses on key, visible moments around 1960 and after. In their account of "issue evolution" and partisan realignment, Carmines and Stimson (1989) focus on the role of contingency and elite political choice in describing how Republicans came to embrace racial conservatism. In this telling, the critical moment is the Republicans' presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater, a non-southerner who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by articulating a racial conservatism based on non-interference by federal authorities in local matters. Goldwater wooed the South (if no other states) with this strategy, and subsequent Republican candidates have had national success building on it.[9] Carmines and Stimson see this move by the GOP as a reversal—prior to this moment, they contend, the Republicans were still the "Party of Lincoln," and on aggregate the more liberal of the two parties on racial issues—and thus this account of political change focuses chiefly on strategic decisions made at that historical moment by Republican leaders seeking to escape permanent minority status by driving a racial wedge into the Democratic Party.

A more recent literature has revived the closer investigation of the intraparty dynamics that led to the Democratic schism, however, and complicated the story of how the parties were oriented toward controversial racial issues during this epoch.[10] While Carmines and Stimson focus on the two parties in aggregate for evidence of realignment and party positioning on race, and see the partisan evolution of race as highly contingent, the alternative approach disaggregates the Democratic Party during the long New Deal and sees more long-term forces at work, shaping party decisions and dispositions well before 1964. Scholarship in this area identifies an essentially tripartite system throughout the era, with the southern and non-southern Democrats deeply di-

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the New Deal alignment and not fully mature until seventy years later. This shift was the growth of the urban-rural divide as a powerful organizing principal in national politics and political ideology.

[9]See, for example, Edsall and D. (1991).

[10]Eric Schickler and Ira Katznelson, working separately with several coauthors, have been central in this growing literature. See, for instance, Feinstein and Schickler (2008), Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010),Katznelson and Kryder (1993), Katznelson and Farhang (2005), Katznelson and Mulroy (2012).

vided and operating as separate blocs on many crucial issues. [11]

One side of this tripartite account of congressional politics focuses on the development of racial conservatism as a political force, well before the 1960s. A conservative coalition consisting of southern Democrats and Republicans emerged as early as the 1930s, and became more frequent in appearance and successful in its opposition to progressive legislation during World War II and in the postwar era.[12] While the southern "defections" from the developing suite of non-southern Democratic positions were most dramatic on explicitly racial issues such as anti-lynching legislation, the conservative coalition also stymied a range of policy initiatives held dear by the urban wing of the party, including those having to do with housing, urban redevelopment, labor conflict, and political economy.[13] Racial conflict and the divergence of the partisan wings were present and important much earlier, and spread to a broadening set of ostensibly non-racial policy areas.[14].

This alternative account provides a background for Carmines and Stimson's critical moment around 1960, when national Republicans explicitly embraced racial conservatism as a core issue. When we see race at the roots of the recurrent conservative coalition, it changes our understanding of the apparent dramatic reversals of the 1960s. The proper evolutionary metaphor for the racial realignment may not be punctuated equilibrium (with an emphasis on rapid, unpredictable bursts of change) but of more gradual, less dramatic "Darwinian" change. Looking more closely at the dynamics of race over the long New Deal era leaves a far less important role for contingency and elite strategy in the 1960s.[15]

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[11]The conservative coalition between southerners and Republicans was no secret at the time, and has been used to explain other policy outcomes as well (see Sitkoff (1978), Mollenkopf (1983), but placing this constellation of congressional alliances at the heart of the realignment story is a relatively recent analytical connection.

[12]Sitkoff (1978)

[13]Biles (2011), Mollenkopf (1983), Katznelson and Farhang (2005)

[14]Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)

[15]Feinstein and Schickler (2008)

### 5.1.1 Urban Strange Bedfellows

The recurrent conservative coalition in Congress was crucial for the later national partisan re-alignment, but a focus on Southern racial pathology only goes halfway to explaining how race could transform American politics during this era. After all, the importance of the existing racial order to southern whites was no secret, and throughout the Long New Deal these Southern Democrats viewed many issues through a racial lens, altering or rejecting proposed policies that even hinted at a threat to their regional racial order, and national party elites worked hard to keep race from collapsing the coalition.[16] This racial conservatism was not a change, of course—southern Democrats had worked since the Revolutionary War to strengthen white supremacy, and to insulate its southern version from federal intervention, and they had been particularly successful in the late 19th and early 20th century. After the Southern "redemption" after Reconstruction, race and civil rights had been remade into a regional issue, and was basically absent from the congressional agenda for the first three decades of the 20th century, when the general trend was to reinforce white supremacy, or at least ignore its ugliest regional manifestations.[17]

For national Democratic elites, then, the decision to embrace racial liberalism was far from automatic or hasty. The position Southerners held within the Democratic Party, especially in Congress, and their intransigence on race, made any policies or agenda that would undermine white supremacy both difficult to enact and politically risky. The push to change that demands explanation is how the exponents of racial egalitarianism could become a compelling enough political force that the northern wing of the Democratic Party would embark down the road to civil rights, consciously alienating a large part of their governing coalition in a strategic move that seems unpromising in a majoritarian system.

The rise of racial liberalism during this time has been explored mainly as a function of dedi-

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[16]Katznelson (2005), Lieberman (2001)

[17]Katznelson (2012), Smith and King (2005), Woodward (1955)) Beyond the usually-noted black-white racial divide, specifically Anglo-Saxon white supremacy specifically was a prominent theme in discussions of immigration and domestic policy as well, and a core theme in the age's scientific understanding of humanity and society. See, eg. Ngai (N.d.), **?**

cated activists and partisan constituents fighting for anti-racist goals against long odds.[18]    But the strategic moves to embrace racial liberalism and foreseeably alienate the south should not seem so simply a function of constituency pressure, because another main thread of political science, engaged with local urban politics, holds that even outside the south the core elements of the Democratic alliance were hardly what we would call antiracist. While "union leaders, African Americans, ADA liberals, and Jews" were important members of the coalition, it is not obvious that this collection of liberal ideologues is the group that "northern Democrats most depended upon for votes and activist support" in the party's key urban strongholds,[19] because these very same cities, and the most important Democratic organizations within them, were often the site of strong racial hierarchies themselves. New York and Chicago, pre-eminent within the hierarchy of cities and Democratic organizations during this era for their importance in winning seats in Congress and two vital swing states, were places where such "programmatic liberals" were important members of the Democratic Party, but they were hardly dominant in the local organizations crucial to electoral victory.

In addition to these important groups, there were other important (ie, numerous and/or organizationally powerful) members of the coalition, even outside the south, who were not natural members of the pro-civil rights coalition. Rank-and-file union members themselves were loyal partisans, but throughout the midcentury era the weight of the evidence is that they were at least split on race, if not generally hostile to racial egalitarianism.[20] For instance, in the 1952 American National Elections Study, only 25 percent of white, non-southern union members supported federal fair employment legislation, a central element of the civil rights agenda at that moment.[21] Overlapping significantly with, but not identical to, union members in northern cities were the legions of "ethnic" whites, a massive group that probably made up a plurality of the nonsouthern urban Democratic electorate and were the *most* important constituency mobilized for the massive

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[18]See, for example, Sitkoff (1978), Sugrue (2008)

[19]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010), p. 688

[20]Frymer (2007), Nelson (2001),Boyle (1998)

[21]Author's tabulation of responses to 1952 ANES variable V520047. This is roughly consistent with preliminary analyses of polling from a decade earlier, when white non-southern FDR supporters were split on federal fair employment (41 percent in favor, 39 percent opposed) while white non-southern Republicans were strongly opposed, 27 percent in favor, 59 percent opposed. See Schickler (2009), p.50.

Democratic gains of 1932-1936.[22] These groups were mobilized for the Democrats, but they were never noted for their racial progressivism, as veteran Chicago reporter Mike Royko argued in the quote at the beginning of this chapter; indeed, to the extent that they shared common identity, it was often articulated in terms of the fact that they were *not* black, and eligible for the privileges of white status in the United States at that time.[23] In countless instances, members of or subsets of this heterogeneous group were the antagonists in the racial conflict that periodically beset almost all cities throughout this era, and over time their bloc loyalty to the Democrats would erode.[24]

If the mass of the urban Democratic base was not mobilized for racial liberalism, not all non-southern Democratic elites should be counted as staunch ideological supporters of racial comity, either. At the local intersection between the electorate and institutional politics in many important Democratic cities sat traditional party organizations, the "bosses" and their political kith. While they may have been past their prime in local politics, this was the heyday of urban traditional party organization in the nation: never before or since have so many city representatives come from such organizations.[25] These autonomous organizational leaders, famous for being almost *by definition* non-programmatic about much of anything, were not typically dependent on African Americans or ideological racial liberals for their position; their relationships with such groups were varied and complex.[26] By their liberal contemporaries and in hindsight, the traditional parties were often judged conservative, corrupt, and unresponsive.[27] While some of these party chieftains reached out to African Americans as they arrived in massive numbers during the waves of the Great Migration, these moves were usually interpreted as pragmatic (not part of an antiracist ideological agenda) political moves. The often tribal nature of big-city politics did not leave much room or resources for new coalition members, and politicians accustomed to trading in material goods were understandably averse to wading into divisive "cultural" issues like race,

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[22]Andersen (1979)

[23]Roediger (2005). It was perhaps ironic that this white identity for these descendents of "new stock" immigrants was forged at least in part by the ambitious statism of New Deal programs, filtered through the racialized Southern lens.

[24]Sugrue (1996), Biles (1995)

[25]See Figure 3.4, Chapter 3.

[26]Mayhew (1986), Keiser (1997)

[27]Buenker (1973)

which cannot be quite as easily negotiated or apportioned as can city jobs or similarly material benefits.[28] More often than full incorporation, African Americans were subordinated within or excluded from local political organizations, a major exception to the tradition of new-group incorporation chronicled by optimistic pluralist urbanists such as in Dahl (1961).[29] And at times these local partisans certainly practiced politics with "a sharp racial edge."[30] All of this racial conflict is in keeping with the prevalent theory of racial "threat," which holds that relations between groups will tend to get worse when a new group arrives, grows, and competes for status or resources with previous residents.[31] Given this tendency to division and racial domination on the streets and in city hall, the decision to support racial liberalism in national politics was not an obvious one, and we might expect city Democrats to be as likely to oppose racial liberalism as to support it.

The potential foundations of support for racially liberal policies by non-Southern Democrats in Congress were further complicated by urban spatial demography. The most straightforward explanation for non-southern Democrats' resilient support for civil rights legislation might be a direct electoral connection between racial liberalism and black constituents. On controversial issues, when legislative parties are split, constituent pressure and the pursuit of re-election are often cited as important predictors of a representative's behavior.[32] On racial issues during this era, we might expect civil rights liberalism by non-southern representatives to emerge as a response to African American constituents. Indeed, the Great Migration saw the black populations in northern cities increase quickly, and areas like the South Side of Chicago and Harlem eventually gained black representatives in Congress, who were leaders in bringing civil rights issues to the fore. Other black representatives followed in the early 1960s.

Today we think of "urban" districts generally as naturally sympathetic to minority groups' concerns because these districts usually include disproportionate numbers of voters from such groups. But this was not the case before the 1960s. Throughout the eras of Great Migration (and

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[28]Erie (1988), Snowiss (1966), Keiser (1997)

[29]Pinderhughes (1987)

[30]Sugrue (1996)

[31]Indeed, this period provided some of the best evidence and examples upon which this theory is based.Sugrue (1996),Roediger (2005)

[32]Mayhew (1974)

after), exclusionary and discriminatory housing policies and realty practices created high levels of residential segregation, concentrating almost all the new black arrivals in particular areas, usually the places with the oldest and worst housing stock.[33] These patterns of racial separation meant that most city congressional districts—even those in cities with relatively large, rapidly growing African American populations—remained almost entirely white. For representatives of these districts, whose constituents would have little reason to clamor for racial justice, the electoral connection was not so clear.

To better understand this pattern, consider the stark and very important example of Chicago in 1945, just as race was ascending the national agenda. Chicago had been the first city to send an African American to Congress, the Republican Oscar DePriest in 1927. By the 1940s, Chicago's black South Side had become a Democratic stronghold in local and national politics. William L. Dawson, himself a convert to the party of Roosevelt, was the only black member of congress, and sat at the head of a strong local sub-organization, holding senior positions in congress and in the local party leadership. Migration, policy, and practice made Chicago the most segregated large city in America, and almost all of the city's black residents lived in or near the First Congressional district.[34] Figure 5.2 shows the percent black at the census tract level in 1940 in Chicago, with lines demarcating Congressional district boundaries for the 58th through 80th Congresses.[35] The dark area on the map just south of downtown represents an area of extreme concentration of African Americans; though only about 11 percent of all Chicagoans were black, more than three out of four in this area were. In most of the rest of the city, where this map shows white, the local population was less than one percent black. This residential concentration was transmitted to the political system, as we can see in Figure 5.3 at right. When we aggregate from the tract level to the district

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[33]Massey and Denton (1993) is a definitive chronicle of these demographic patterns across many American cities. See also Rae (2003) for a fluent institutional account.

[34]Massey and Denton (1993)

[35]Illinois Congressional district boundaries were unchanged from 1903 to 1949. Schickler et al (2010) use data from Adler (2012) to estimate congressional-district level demography. However, Adler's otherwise very valuable demographic measures are based on county-level data, and therefore do not account for spatial variation across districts within the same county. Thus in that data, the percent black for all ten Chicago districts is the Cook County average, about 11 percent. This is problematic especially during the urban interlude, when population was highly concentrated within central cities—so many congressional districts were within the same county—but unevenly distributed along racial and class dimensions within those cities. Using census-tract level data from the National Historic Geographic Information Systems website, www.nhgis.org, we can get better estimates of the demography of these city districts. Details on this process are found in Appendix 2.

level, we can see that in terms of representation, Chicago was starkly divided in its political as well as social demographics (Note that the color scale of this map is different than the tract-level map). The First Congressional District (between the Ninth and the Second on the lakefront) was majority black; the Third was five percent black; and the Fifth was twelve percent black. In none of the other seven Chicago districts did the percent black surpass five percent, and in several it was less than one percent. Thus residential segregation created several intradistrict racial dynamics: a majority-black district, with a black representative; a few districts with significant and increasing black populations but white representatives; and five essentially all-white districts. Other large cities, including New York and Los Angeles, showed similar residential patterns during this era, though most did not have a majority-black district until much later.

This pattern of demography meant that the internal pressures for racial liberalism that might create an electoral connection were likely very uneven across these districts. In the heavily black first, we would expect pressure for civil rights to be quite strong, and by most indications it was (so strong that Dawson was typically attacked from the left for not being assertive enough on racial issues). In the marginally black districts surrounding the First, however, pressures might cut both ways. Significant (but far from numerically dominant) black populations pressuring for progressive racial policies might be offset by "threatened" whites within the same areas.[36] Though the racial strife associated with school desegregation and large-scale riots of the 1960s are more famous, earlier eras were emphatically not eras of racial peace. These are the areas most famous for turf defense by white residents, where Langston Hughes was beaten up for walking down the wrong street and where a young Richard J. Daley cut his political and organizational chops as a president of the Hamburgs street gang, who were largely responsible for the escalation of an infamous 1919 race riot on the South Side.[37] At the time depicted in these maps, "from 1944 to 1946, incidents of arson, bombings, and vandalism occurred at forty-six residences newly occupied by black residents" as whites defended the areas around Chicago's "Black Belt."[38] In the all-white districts of the North Side, there was certainly little grassroots pressure for racial liberalism. Rep-

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[36]The Fifth also had a significant Hispanic population at this time, for which reliable Census measures are not available in 1940.

[37]Biles (1995) p.21-22,Royko (1971)

[38]Biles (1995) p.10

Figure 5.2: **Chicago, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census.** African Americans were heavily concentrated within cities like Chicago.

Figure 5.3: **Chicago, Percent black in congressional districts, 1945** Residential segregation led to political segregation: few congressmen had many black constituents.

resentatives of these white areas did not have any black constituents to respond to, and the best

evidence (along with conventional wisdom and later experience) indicates that their white ethnic

constituents were not particularly liberal on matters of race, with racial antipathy continually on

display over decades as African Americans moved into new neighborhoods or made other gains

against a resistant white majority.[39]

As time went by, local racial strife intensified in these places, and at times virulent "racial conservatism" would be on display at the local level wherever the newest threatened urban "border" areas were, as well as in the all-white bastions. The best opinion data available from this time does not show strong support for liberalism by these city residents on the most contentious racial issues

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[39]Keiser (1997), Royko (1971)

of the day. The ANES poll cited above found weak support for fair employment legislation among white union members in 1952. Though Schickler (2012) finds strong*er* support among Democratic voters than among Republicans, especially in cities, it is unclear how important civil rights were to these individuals, and the level of support is far from overwhelming in any case. Outside the south, majorities were for anti-lynching legislation, but non-southern white Democrats were split on fair employment and other issues more directly relevant to northern communities, and expressed frankly racist views on social contact with African Americans.[40] In short, these constituencies were not natural allies, a fact that local politicians were aware of and which the GOP would later exploit.[41] Even among local liberal activists within the local Democratic Party at the time, racial justice does not seem to have been a priority, as they preferred to focus on less divisive issues and attack the machine's organizational structure.[42]

While Chicago's racial segregation was particularly stark, the general pattern of political separation was present at the congressional district level in most large cities in the 1940s. In New York City, 7 out of 28 districts were more than 5 percent black, and none with a majority until the mid-1940s; the other three quarters of districts were less than five percent black. In Philadelphia and Detroit, the pattern was less stark, but black populations were still concentrated. Four out of six Philadelphia districts had black populations between 10 and 25 percent black, though none with a majority; the other two were less than 5 percent. Detroit's distribution was more even, with 3 districts (out of six total) with more than 5 percent black and none with more than 25, but the other 3 were less than five percent black. The pattern was recurrent throughout the large cities that made up the heart of the New Deal coalition: even in cities with a relatively large city-wide black population, racial residential segregation meant that most city congressional districts were essentially all-white.

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[40]Schickler (2012)
[41]Biles (1995), ch. 3-5
[42]Wilson (1962)

### 5.1.2 Urbanicity, City Delegations, and Cohesive Racial Liberalism

Given these different patternings of likely constituent pressure from these urban districts, we might expect some division in the way these places were represented in national politics. The different racial compositions and preferences of these city districts were not reflected in national racial politics, however. To the contrary, these cities, so divided on race at home, represented themselves as cohesively liberal on race in national politics, and were *more* liberal even than other non-Southern Democrats.[43]

Rather than (or alongside) a straightforward electoral connection, the bases of which are hard to find, the distinctive character of cities and city political institutions may have been an important factor to the growth of racial liberalism during this era, fostering unity in political representation despite division in social relations. One dimension of urbanicity, heterogeneity, has in the American experience entailed a refreshed diversity of groups from all over the country and world within the dense political space of our cities. These cities have not been without racial or ethnic strife, but the simple fact of diversity within a common political community has meant that cities have been forced to find ways to deal with this phenomenon, and institutions of horizontal integration have been important vehicles for mediating and mitigating group conflict. During the half century before and including the New Deal, traditional party organizations served an important political function of incorporating new groups into a citywide order, and creating a political space, flawed though it may have been, in which conflicts might be resolved.[44]

By the time of the urban interlude, in almost all cities the Democrats had become the party in which such culturally pluralist political group incorporation took place, if it were to take place at all, while the Republicans had tended to reinforce their ties to forces of Anglo-Saxon homogeneity and dominant-culture assimilation, showcased in showdowns over temperance and immigration in the 1920s.[45] Leaders and members of these local parties, often members of the same "ethnic white" groups frequently noted for their racial *conservatism*, played key roles in promoting racial

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[43]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
[44]Dahl (1961)
[45]Buenker (1973), but see Dahl (1961) for a notable counterexample of Republican incorporation of Italian-Americans as a competitive response to Irish control of the local Democratic Party.

liberalism in national debate, and were resolute in their behavioral support for civil rights during this era. In doing so, they seemed to be promoting not so much the perspective of their districts (where support for racial liberalism would be rather weak, and not worth the sacrifices), but attending to a citywide position (under which African Americans were valuable coalitional partners in citywide politics, and in which norms of pluralism help sustain social order in a dense, heterogeneous local society). By again disaggregating the Democratic Party—first by section, as the revisionists of the racial realignment have done, and then again by place character—we can gain insights not only on the dynamics of this political change, but also on the effects of cities and their institutions in national politics.

## 5.2 "Urbanizing" Race

Urban Democrats' support for racial liberalism, and their apparent strategy to pursue it in national politics, resembles the "urbanizing" strategy theorized by Burns et al. (2009). Knowing they would be opposed by their copartisans from the South on an issue that would obviously divide the party, they needed to persuade their disinterested sectional allies that race was an urban issue and that there was an urban position on this issue, and that non-urban representatives should defer to that urban perspective.

The support for racial liberalism among urban representatives, especially urban Democrats, during this era, is evident on multiple fronts, including roll-call behavior and discourse. First, the expressed justifications for racial liberalism—for supporting issues of central importance to African Americans, but not to other key elements of the Democratic coalition—take on an urban tone during this era. This rhetorical shift promoted a distinctive vision of American society and politics that was pluralist and multicultural, which was rooted in the urban experience characterized by high levels of group heterogeneity. As such, racial liberalism was framed as an issue relevant for many groups (not just African Americans), who were themselves largely city-dwellers. State action and regulation of behavior, again an urban disposition, was proposed as an important

spur to progress in this area. Second, urban representatives, especially from places with the kinds of party organizations that have been the common vehicle for groups' political incorporation, were more likely to support these racially liberal policies throughout the urban interlude. Even though race was controversial at home, these places—especially those with strong institutions of horizontal integration—represented themselves as unified, making racial liberalism an urban position in national politics.

### 5.2.1 Urban conceptions of racial liberalism, 1920-1963

Over the course of the urban interlude, race became associated with cities in political discourse. That racial issues were not particularly "urban" before this time is understandable, because until this historical era African Americans (the typical referent group when dealing with national "racial" questions) lived mainly in the South, and mainly in rural areas. With the arrival of millions of African Americans to cities outside the South in the first half of the 20th century, however, binary racial conflict took on local importance in these places as well, even though African Americans still constituted a relatively small proportion of the local population in most cities. As black Americans became a significant presence in urban places, the arguments made in defense of racial liberalism took on an urban character that was not present in earlier discussions of the issue. To illustrate how the defense and advance of the liberal position developed, we can turn to the record of congressional hearings on race during the urban interlude, with attention to statements made by members of congress—especially those from cities. These hearings can provide richer context for the ideas behind more discrete actions such as roll call votes. Because they require extra effort (to appear, but also typically to prepare a statement), participation in hearings can be a sign of members' priorities. And the give-and-take structure of these meetings can reveal attitudes by congresspersons toward others who hold views they agree or disagree with, and can afford opportunities for candid, spontaneous exchange. Unlike flor debate, hearings also include participants from civil society (representatives of various groups or private citizens), and this adds further information as well.

There were many hearings on explicitly racial issues during this time period, an indication that such issues, and which particular policy proposals, were salient enough to draw national attention. At first, civil rights hearings were about anti-lynching legislation; later they focused on the poll tax, fair employment, and broader civil rights legislation as well. With increasing force and in increasing numbers, urban representatives articulated a support for the racially liberal position on proposed legislation rooted in urban concerns and urban experience.

At a glance, we can see that participation in these hearings during the New Deal was often the domain of Southern and city Democrats. These hearings represent instances when participation seems to have been particularly meaningful, as relatively few representatives chose to participate.[46] In these hearings, members expressed their support for or opposition to civil rights legislation in prepared or spontaneous statements. Members appearing before the committee typically made their position quite explicit; if they were not interested in taking a position, they did not need to appear. Table 5.1 tallies testimonies for or against civil rights legislation by members of the House over 1926-1949, well before the "switch" identified by Carmines and Stimson (1989).[47] We can see that the conservative position was almost invariably taken by southerners (almost all of whom were Democrats). The liberal position on these issues was disproportionately urban (a majority in each category, though city representatives were never a majority of chamber members overall even outside the South), and disproportionately city Democrats during this era. This is consistent with Feinstein and Schickler (2008)'s observation that the conversation on race seems to have been between two factions of the Democratic Party, with the Republicans more apt to maintain the silent status quo. While this table includes only members of the House and how they represented their districts, these hearings of course included many more witnesses who were not members of congress as well. Especially on Fair Employment, the issue that would most directly affect places outside the South and which had the longest list of total witnesses, the overwhelming majority of these witnesses were liberal urbanites.

A closer reading reveals that even these numbers mask the extent to which urban New Deal-

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[46] As opposed to the hearings for omnibus civil rights legislation in the late 1950s, when dozens of members appeared.

[47] Further codings forward and backward are in progress, and the pattern continues, though more non-urban Republicans appear in support of the legislation in the late 1950s.

**Who testifies? MCs at hearings on race, 1926-1949**

| Subgroup | FEP | Polltax | Lynching | Overall |
|----------|-----|---------|----------|---------|
| Conservative position | 6 | 13 | 12 | 31 |
| Southern Dem | 5 | 13 | 12 | 30 |
| Liberal position | 19 | 11 | 24 | 54 |
| City | 16 | 8 | 15 | 39 |
| City Dem | 15 | 6 | 12 | 33 |
| Total | 25 | 24 | 36 | 84 |

Table 5.1: Number of MCs testifying in hearings about race from 1926-1949. Substance of testimonies typically along sectional lines. Nearly all non-congressional testimonies from urbanites.

ers were assertively engaged with southerners on these issues. The modern thread of national race and civil rights legislation began with anti-lynching legislation that would be considered repeatedly but never passed into law over the ensuing decades. The original bill was introduced by Leonidas Dyer, a St. Louis Republican whose district included many African Americans and which was the site of a major race riot in 1919. In the 1920s, several members of Congress appeared before hearings in support of anti-lynching legislation. Most were from cities outside the South, and they were mostly Republicans: Dyer, from St. Louis; Frederick Dallinger and Peter Tague, from Boston/Cambridge; Merrill Moores, from Indianapolis. Most support for anti-lynching legislation at this point was articulated in terms of a universalist understanding of rights and African Americans' worthiness of full rights and citizenship. In a typical argument in favor of the anti-lynching law, Sen. William B. McKinley (R-IL)[48] argued in 1926 that

> "Although he [the African American] has been in possession of (political and civil rights) for relatively so short a time he has shown himself to be worthy of them. As a free man he has always been amenable to reason and persuasion; as a citizen he has uniformly been a patriot, and as a voter he has consistently aligned himself with the intelligence, the efficiency, the administrative ability, and the forces that stand for order and property. What can be said of any other group of our fellow citizens?" [49]

This argument, which appeals to abstract principles of citizenship in defense of African American rights and full protection by the state, does not make reference to a lived environment in

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[48] At this point, the Illinois Republican Party had probably incorporated black voters more fully than any other organization in the country, especially in Mayor William Thompson's Chicago coalition, which relied heavily on the black bloc. It was the first organization to send a black member to Congress in the post-Reconstruction era.

[49] "To Prevent and Punish the Crime of Lynching," Hearing before Subcom on S. 121, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb.16, 1926. p.4 [HRG-1926-SJS-0003]

which rights or citizenship may be exercised. Similarly, at a 1921 hearing about the Ku Klux Klan, Bostonian Peter Tague argued (after a trip through the South) that

> "the rights of citizens throughout that section of the country...had been violated, and they had not been protected in those rights which are allowed and given to them under the Constitution of the United States." [50]

Arguments about rights, citizenship, and the constitution can be made without reference to place, and they might reasonably resonate in similar ways even among audiences of very different backgrounds and with different lived experiences. Another set of arguments was developing in parallel, however. This set of arguments includes several elements rooted in the experiences of city life and would resonate more powerfully with audiences in cities. These arguments focussed on group-based pluralism, government as regulator of social forces, and the relationship between social peace and economic production, and they were distinctively urban in their framing. By making arguments that stake out racial liberalism as the urban position on an urban issue, city representatives were pursuing a particularly effective "urbanizing" strategy for convincing copartisans to come along on a potentially divisive issue.[51] In this case, the copartisans in question may have been non-southern, non-urban Democrats, most of whom had little skin in the civil rights game (representing neither the African American proponents nor the demonstrative white supremacists of the South), who they wanted to pull to their side in this intraparty struggle over race. The racial division present in the streets at home was downplayed in the way cities represented themselves in Congress, and a set of distinctively urban justifications for racial liberalism were made.

First, this perspective entails recognition of the plurality of groups, and the importance of group identity as opposed to a strictly liberal individualism of rights. This argument involved the use of analogies with other groups with experiences common to African Americans even thought they were not the real target of the legislation under consideration. Thus attacks on lynching and the Southern racial order included references to other groups—particularly religious minorities

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[50] "Ku-Klux Klan", Hearing before House Committee on Rules, Oct.11, 1921. p.3-6. [HRG-1921-RUH-0001]
[51] Burns et al. (2009)

such as Jews and Catholics—who were generally less exposed to lynching but who might find common cause with African Americans because they faced common prejudices from the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant mainstream. Thus as early as 1921, Thomas Ryan (R-NY, NYC, later a Democrat) argued against the Klan that

> Any organization that is anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti-Jew, and against the foreign element in this country, which comprises over 25 per cent of the voting strength of the country, is really a menace to the community.[52]

Ryan includes Catholics and Jews in the same list as African Americans, even though at this point these groups had relatively little in common besides their relatively marginal status within American society. While Tague's argument above might resonate with a conservative because of its reverence for the Constitution and individual rights, Ryan's would have been more controversial outside of the polyglot cities. After all, for those who successfully sought to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) at exactly this time, including the Klan itself, the transformation of American demography afoot through immigration was itself a primary "menace to the community." Ryan is thus articulating a particular vision of community, ostensibly one that includes distinct groups.

Reference to other "different" groups would become a recurrent theme in the urban argument for fair employment in the 1940s. Arguing for FEP, Adolph Sabath (D-IL, Chicago) noted that

> While the Jews, colored, and foreign born are the most numerous, minority groups in wide variety exist in sections, states and cities throughout the country. All are the victims of unjustified local prejudice, oftentimes of actual discrimination.[53]

Thomas Scanlon (D-PA, Pittsburgh), a career union official, had earlier introduced his FEP legislation by declaring that

> Bad as it is, descrimination against a man because he belongs to a union is not nearly

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[52][HRG-1921-RUH-0001]

[53]"Federal Fair Employment Practice Act," Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act, House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p.88 HRG-1949-EDL-0005

as evil as discrimination because a man is a Negro, a Jew, a Catholic, or because his ancestors came from another country.[54]

Later in that hearing, Arthur Klein (D-NY, Manhattan) had the following friendly exchange with William L. Dawson (D-IL, Chicago), who had also authored the bill.

> *Klein*: I agree that the Negroes today are the outstanding victims of economic persecution, but you will admit…there are other minorities as well who are also subjected to the same sort of thing.
> *Dawson*: I do, but I feel that when the day comes that we are broad enough to encompass the Negro within the confines of the Constitution all other minority problems will be solved.
> *Klein*: I agree with you wholeheartedly. I simply wanted to point out that all other minorities would probably gain from an act such as this.[55]

A decade later, Victor Anfuso (D-Brooklyn) also emphasized pluralism (as opposed to straightforward racial justice) as Americanism when defending broad civil rights legislation.

> Our country is comprised of people who come from all races, religious beliefs, and national origins. All of them have made important contributions toward the development of the US as a great Nation and toward shaping its destiny…I do not believe in the superiority of one race or one nationality group over another. As soon as we encourage second-class citizenship, we open the door for discrimination and bigotry.[56]

Each of these city representatives, coming from a local traditional party organization, and each having local black allies (but very few black constituents themselves), articulate a view of racial liberalism that is multicultural, inclusive, and tied to the experiences of non-black marginalized groups concentrated in the cities. These statements seemed aimed at audiences that may be ambivalent about racial equality but who might identify themselves as the object of similar discrimination. Of course, the permanent national FEPC was not instituted despite these urbanites' efforts,

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[54]"To Prohibit Discrimination in Employment." Hearing before House Committee on Labor, June 1, 1944. HRG-1944-LAH-0002, p.13

[55]"To Prohibit Discrimination in Employment." Hearing before House Committee on Labor, June 1, 1944. HRG-1944-LAH-0002, p.25

[56]"Civil Rights," Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcomm. No. 2. July 14-24, 1955. HRG-1955-HJH-0007, p. 206

so in the 1960s, as omnibus civil rights bills were under consideration, Chicago represented itself in Congress much the same way it had when Rep. Sabath and Mayor Kelly headed up the local Democrats. At a hearing held in Chicago on discrimination in employment, Mayor Daley appeared on behalf of the law, arguing that

> Chicago is a melting pot city, as you know. Chicago was built by the people of many lands, of every race, creed, color, and ethnic origin...Negroes are not the only segment of our population that has benefited from the city's [fair employment] policy, for nationality and religious groups benefit when the employer adopts fair employment practices.[57]

Roman Pucinski (D-IL, Chicago) added that in Chicago

> 8 out of 10 workers suffer some form of discrimination...therefore this committee is trying to look at this problem along a four-front approach, rather than just the one area of racial discrimination, tragic and lamentable as racial discrimination may be.[58]

In this articulation of anti-discrimination, potentially controversial legislation benefiting African Americans is again understood to benefit religious and national-origin minorities as well. Daley seems additionally concerned about workers over 40 as well, further expanding the class of potential beneficiaries of such a policy. This urban understanding of difference, in which almost everyone is importantly "different," and the cities' historical experiences in dealing with new groups, made racial liberalism the city position on these issues and softened the potential downside for taking what might have been riskier positions if articulated as strictly black-white racial issues.

In addition to highlighting their cities' experiences with diversity, urban representatives cited previous successful experiences with federal intervention as evidence that such intervention was desirable and could be effective in areas where local officials were unable or unwilling to act. Prohibition aside, support for social regulation was a distinctly urban position; ruralites and southerners were wary of such adventures, but analogies to other areas of regulatory intervention and

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[57]"Equal Employment Opportunity," Hearing before Special Subcom on Labor, House Committee on Education and Labor. HRG-1961-EDL-0029, p.3
[58]HRG-1961-EDL-0029, p.19

the power of legislation to shape behavior and change minds were often made by city representatives, ostensibly because they found them persuasive. Dyer argued back in 1920 that

> Congress has exercised its rights in enacting legislation with reference to child labor in the various states [and] intoxicating liquors. If congress has felt its duty to do these things, why should it not also assume jurisdiction and enact laws to protect the lives of citizens of the United States against lynch law and mob violence? Are the right of property, or what a citizen shall drink, or the ages and conditions under which children shall work, any more important to the Nation than life itself?" [59]

For Dyer, federal passage and enforcement of lynching laws was appropriate because corrupt or inept local and state officials were either unable or unwilling to do so, just as federal intervention to regulate other social practices was important.[60] Similar arguments were made by later urbanites on the efficacy of government action to reduce prejudice itself. Anti-lynching legislation had become the provenance of congressional Democrats by 1934, when Senators Robert Wagner (D-NYC) and Edward Costigan (D-CO, Denver) introduced legislation similar to the Dyer Bill. Just as important as federal action, these urbanites held, was an official position taken against lynching, to help establish new norms on race. Wagner argued that

> Legislation alone cannot quench the fires of intolerance and hate. But the speedy passage of the federal antilynching bill will rally and sustain all the forces of enlightenment in the US and nowhere more than in the areas where right-thinking people have been hoping and pleading for reinforcement in their courageous battle against the scourge of lynching in their midst.[61]

A similar argument was later extended from lynching to employment discrimination. In 1949, Sabath (D-IL, Chicago) argued that the conservative argument that education could serve as a substitute for FEP laws "fallacious":

> Prejudice of course cannot be eliminated by legislative act or edict, but discrimination– the outward social manifestation of prejudice—can be corrected by legislation and per-

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[59]"Segregation and Antilynching," Hearing before House Committee on Judiciary, Jan. 15, 1920, p.17 [HRG-1920-HJH-0004]

[60]Though in hindsight, federal regulation of consumption of intoxicating liquors was not a great success.

[61]"Punishment for the Crime of Lynching," Hearing before Subcom on S. 24, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb. 14, 1935, p. 15 [HRG-1935-SJS-0001]

haps only by legislation... Although a constantly increasing percentage of the adult population is the product of (education), both prejudice and discrimination are very much in evidence. FEP legislation does work.[62]

Five years later, the young Peter Rodino (D-Newark) made a similar case for civil rights legislation:

It has been argued that civil rights cannot be legislated, that their preservation and extension are essentially a moral problem that only education, not law, can cope with. This can hardly satisfy the many thousands, even millions, of Americans who live in the shadows of second-class citizenship... for example,it is certainly true that many people find their rights sharply curtailed by laws. There is surely no reason why we cannot do something by law to combat these evils. Secondly, civil rights are often infringed upon or jeopardized by antisocial actions which can be curbed by law. Finally, the enactment of civil-rights legislation can engender the idea and atmosphere of freedom in which the rights of men can grow and prosper.[63]

His colleague Victor Anfuso (D-Brooklyn) from across the Hudson added an argument focusing on the power of legislation to change social norms and ratify social practice:

Law is an effective instrument for changing social conditions and law acts as a powerful factor in preventing discrimination. It fosters the conviction that discrimination is wrong by fixing standards which are respected by the majority of the people. Because people as a rule are law-abiding, their behavior tends to create customs which are in harmony with the law.[64]

Again, city representatives, coming from traditional party organizations, representing cities, but not necessarily districts, with sizeable black populations, voiced faith in the power of state interventions to alter norms in favor of pluralism. These arguments also explicitly added to the earlier emphasis on universal rights, but the link to changing norms in society was equally important.

Most Southerners, in arguing against civil rights legislation, said they were wary of such legislation generally and preferred education as the key to the gradual elimination of prejudice and racial conflict. But this was not an exclusively Southern position; it was also a rural one. Clare

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[62]"Federal Fair Employment Practice Act," Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act, House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p.88 HRG-1949-EDL-0005

[63]"Civil Rights," Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcomm. No. 2. July 14-24, 1955. HRG-1955-HJH-0007, p. 204

[64]ibid, p. 206

Hoffman (R-MI), representing a largely rural district, was less than sanguine about the prospects for legislation as social transformer—not only because he doubted the power of the legislation, but because he opposed its goals as well.

> In truth and in fact, while the avowed purpose of the [FEP] bill is to end discrimination, give equality of opportunity in employment, another objective is to bring about, though Federal legislation, a social intermingling (and some advocate intermarriage) among the races...Everyone should be treated fairly and equally and have equal opportunity. But I do not believe in agitators or self-appointed apostles of righteousness...taking over the proposition. I have seen so little discrimination in my community that it is difficult for me to realize that some of the statements made by advocates of this sort of legislation are factual.[65]

Hoffman went on to call for stricter oversight of segregation. These positions by a rural northerner are particularly striking because of the reversal they entail—Hoffman himself had introduced FEP legislation during the war, but now declared it could not be effective. Discussions of this issue revealed important differences (or at least professed differences) between the city Democrats' and the conservative coalition's attitudes about the possibility for social change through legislation; the urban approach was active and involved, while the opponents of the legislation, cynically or not, argued that lawmaking was an inappropriate tool for changing social attitudes.

Finally, the urban perspective on the relationship between racial liberalism (or at least non-discrimination) and the basic good of public order was different from that voiced by southerners and ruralists. Hoffman was worried that "indiscriminate bathing" on Michigan beaches by black visitors from Chicago would lead to trouble,[66] and used this as an argument against broader reforms of race relations such as FEP. Southerners emphasized the importance of segregation for maintaining social peace, as Charles Bennett (D-FL) argued in 1949:

> They are not perfect, but I personally feel that race relationships are better in the South than they are anywhere else in the country. I believe that the people get along better there. You will find a lesser percentage of race riots, less hard feeling, and less misunderstanding in the section of the country where I live than anywhere else in the

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[65]"Federal Fair Employment Practice Act," Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act, House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p. 12-18 [HRG-1949-EDL-0005]

[66]Not a wild hypothesis, even given Chicago's own history.

> country. . . I think colored people have pride of race. It does not mean that they look down on the white people; it means that they prefer to be among themselves as general rule. They like to associate among themselves.[67]

Such arguments, even when we see through their claims of African Americans' satisfaction with the existing state of affairs, reveal a speaker's basic belief that public order was actually *more* compatible the prevailing arrangements of racial domination—that the Southern status quo, as it had been developed since Reconstruction, could be maintained. In urban spaces, with their continual upheaval and dense populations, this was not an argument to be taken seriously. There, deep discontent was understood as tantamount to a time bomb, and when riots did occur, they were far more costly than would be the case in a less densely populated area. Accordingly, state regulation of group behavior and enforcement of non-discrimination was seen as necessary for keeping social peace, not for upending it. Representatives from cities' own local FEP boards (several cities and states, including Chicago and New York State, had implemented their own permanent boards for addressing discrimination in employment by 1949) advocated on behalf of a national law, adding to the previous arguments the idea that FEP was an important measure to keep the "powder keg" of race from exploding in their cities. James Sheldon, chair of the New York Metropolitan Council on Fair Employment Practice argued that

> If people were permitted to discriminate against others because of their skin color or religioun in a city like New York, the whole structure of life would soon break down. . . In an urban area like that for which I speak here, it is more than desirable, it is basically necessary that government should provide safeguards so that all Americans may enjoy equal opportunities regardless of their race or their religious beliefs. [68]

Clarence Anderson, the Executive Secretary of Detroit's Metropolitan Detroit FEP Council, was even more direct:

> We [in Detroit] get the jitters. We feel that we are sitting on a powder keg. Our race riot of last summer is still fresh in our memories. . . . Whatever measure of racial harmony

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[67]"Federal Fair Employment Practice Act," Hearing of House Committee on Education and Labor, Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act, May 10, 1949. HRG-1949-EDL-0005, p.44

[68]"Fair Employment Practices Act," Hearing of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Aug 30, 1944. HRG-1944-EDS-0004, p. 122

> we enjoy today in our industrial racial relationships in Detroit is largely attributable to the work of the present FEPC…more important than mere civil society and union cooperation.[69]

These two may have overstated the importance of their own organizations, but their perspective was clear, and clearly urban: state regulations against discrimination, and institutions to oversee their enforcement, help resolve intergroup conflicts. And the previous statements by elected representatives of these cities arguing for the desirability of such legislation fits with this perspective. This resolution is much more important in urban areas, where violence is more severe, and more costly. Coming up with ways to deal with an inexorably changing status quo, rather than trying to reinforce a more static one, reveals another urban tendency on race.

Finally, one important "non-observation" should be noted. In the national legislature, urban racial conservatism was absent. The record of hearings about civil rights during this era reveals no city representative from outside the south opposing the liberal position on the issue in question, though many of their constituents were at least ambivalent about the important changes afoot in national race relations. These representatives, and their local allies, articulated a position that would manage racial conflict by likening African Americans, at least rhetorically, to other newcomer groups and would seek to establish and sustain institutions to manage potentially explosive social conflict. They also redefined racial issues in ways that were directly relevant to urban life—focusing on the plurality of groups, on the usefulness of new rules for changing social norms, and of the grave danger of not finding ways to manage the inevitable change (as opposed to trying to resist social change, or relying strictly on privately or individually evolving attitudes to deal with changes that do arise). This liberalism became the core of the city position on racial issues during this era, which would be reflected in their voting on controversial issues, and in the later "Blue" alignment dominated by city representatives.

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[69]ibid, p. 87

## 5.3   Urbanicity and Roll Call Voting

If city representatives were urbanizing the liberal position on race, we would expect them to be cohesive on these issues, despite the obvious conflicts they experienced at home. That was true in the discursive forum of the congressional hearing. Turning to blunter forms of behavior, analysis of roll call voting shows that urban division was similarly absent, and city representatives were cohesively liberal on these issues. In the broadest terms, we can see that city representatives tended to be more liberal than their non-urban counterparts on racial or sectional issues during this era. One common measure of congressional ideology is the DW NOMINATE scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). These scores incorporate information from all Congressional roll calls and estimate legislators' overall ideology. For much of American history, Congressional ideology and conflict seems to revolve around a single partisan dimension, which Poole and Rosenthal describe as having to do with "the role of government in the economy", or statism. At times, however, their NOMINATE technique reveals a second dimension of conflict upon which legislators seem to organize some of their voting behavior. This dimension, they argue, has to do with race and region, and it operates most frequently when race is a salient issue in national politics. The long New Deal was just such a moment: the recurrent split within the Democratic Party between southerners and the rest fed a second dimension in congressional conflict. Looking closely at the relationship between these NOMINATE scores and urbanity, however, reveals that they are not "just" race and region: urban representatives were on average much more liberal on this dimension than non-urban representatives.

Figure 5.4 illustrates this reality. DW-NOMINATE scores range from -1 ("Liberal") to 1 ("Conservative") for different groups using the USR scores. We can see immediately that urban representatives are more liberal on this measure, even when we exclude the South. Especially early in the period when the second dimension is most powerful (the late 1930s to late 1970s), urban representatives were on average more liberal than their non-urban counterparts. Later in the period, it seems that the dimension captures more purely regional differences, but non-southern urbanites were well below the other groups from 1930-1960. Again, Democrats always constituted a strong

Figure 5.4: **Group means on DW-NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores, 1930-1970.** In the chamber as a whole, and outside the South, city representatives were more liberal on average.

majority of this group during this time.

This gap persists, or even grows, when we account for partisan affiliation and other factors. Table 5.3 shows results of a linear regression of NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores over the long New Deal. While being a Southerner or a Democrat is associated with an increase in the measure (ie, a tendency to align with the conservative side of this dimension), representing an urban constituency makes one far more likely to support the liberal position. On average, urban representatives are about .15 to the left of a suburban representative from the same section and party (about a third of a standard deviation), and .25 to the left of rural representatives on this measure. Urbanicity is thus associated with broad-brush racial liberalism on this measure, even when we account for party and section.

Because these NOMINATE scores incorporate information from virtually all votes, however,

Table 5.2: Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE second-dimension scores

| Variable (#categories) | Coeff. | (Robust Std. Err.) |
|---|---|---|
| Urbanicity(7) | -0.053 | (0.029)* |
| Democrat(2) | .353 | (0.018)* |
| South(2) | .524 | (0.021)* |
| Intercept | -.166 | (0.013)* |

Table 5.3: **Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE 2nd Dimension scores, 1930-1970.** City representatives were on average more liberal than suburban or rural representatives. (*$p < .01$, N=6313, R-squared=.70)

they are noisy, and substantive judgments about the content of the ideological dimensions they describe are inductive and *a posteriori*. To focus more precisely on the relationship between urbanicity and support for civil rights liberalism in roll call voting, we can examine particular roll call votes from this era that were substantively about civil rights and analyze representatives' behavior on these votes. [70]

Using the substantive issue codes from the AIP, we can identify roll call votes about Civil Rights in the House of Representatives over time. Over the course of the Long New Deal, from 1933 to 1963, there were 35 votes about African American Civil Rights in the House (See Table 5.4). Most of these votes related to proposed legislation about lynching, fair employment, and general Civil Rights. Using data from these votes, we can investigate how different groups of legislators voted, what factors were associated with support for racial liberalism, and add to the evolving picture of how race came to rise on the agenda during this era.

One straightforward way to determine the "liberal" position on these civil rights bills is to estimate the position of the African American community, who were the driving force behind them and were understood to be the chief beneficiaries.[71] To this end, we can identify what position

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[70]Two different teams have approached the substantive coding of roll call votes, the American Institutions Project (Described in Katznelson and Lapinski (2007)) and the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, see http://www.policyagendas.org/). Though the Policy Agendas Project only provides codes for the postwar era, the two coding schemes generally agree on which roll calls can be identified as having to do with civil rights for Congresses they both code. Because the AIP dataset covers the entire long New Deal era, votes it identifies as about "African American Civil Rights" are used for the subsequent analyses; because they identify largely the same votes for the relevant category, using the data from the Policy Agendas project yields very similar analytical results for the era covered by that data.

[71]Of course, "African Americans" were not a monolith during this era, and several important groups often disagreed

**Civil Rights Roll Calls, Long New Deal**

| Year* | # of votes | Subject(s) |
|---|---|---|
| 1937 | 4 | Anti-lynching |
| 1939 | 2 | Anti-lynching |
| 1945 | 3 | School Integration |
| 1949 | 11 | Fair Employment |
| 1951 | 1 | ** |
| 1957 | 6 | Civil Rights Commission, Act |
| 1959 | 7 | Civil Rights Commission, Act |
| 1961 | 1 | Civil Rights Commission |
| Total | 35 | |

Table 5.4: Number of House roll call votes about Civil Rights for African Americans, by Congress. *Year Congress began. **Unclear from AIP data what civil rights dimension of this appropriations roll call was. *(Source: AIP data)*

was taken by the majority of African American members of congress on the votes themselves as a shorthand for the "black" or "pro-civil rights" position on the particular roll call. For the urban interlude, this black position on Civil Rights is quite easily identified, because there were so few black members of Congress.[72] Throughout the era under investigation, whenever there is more than one black member voting on the same roll call, they agree, indicating that there is some consensus on the black position. Before 1927, of course, there were no black members of Congress. There were also few votes on black civil rights during this time, but for votes that pre-date DePriest's appointment, I identify the position taken by a majority of Southern Democrats on these Civil Rights issues (explicitly, the Southern positions were opposition to a memorial for Frederick Douglass and opposition to federal intervention in lynching cases). The opposite of this Southern position is assumed to be the African American position. Having identified the position taken by black members as the "liberal" position, we can evaluate the tendencies of other groups of Representatives to agree with that position.

Figure 5.5 describes the average support for racial liberalism by different blocs of legislators,

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on the broad philosophy of whether and how the black community should integrate with the dominant white polity. On the issues that reached the national agenda, however, and in congressional testimony on these issues, it is reasonable to identify a fairly broad consensus among African Americans in national politics.

[72]The Illinois First district was for nearly two decades the only constituency in the country with a black representative in Congress. The first was Oscar DePriest, a Republican, and later Arthur Mitchell and William L. Dawson, both Democrats. In the 1940s, Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) joined Dawson in Congress to create a black caucus of two for the next decade. These two had different profiles, but did not disagree on any of the roll call votes examined here; both also tended to agree with major advocacy groups on national racial policy, strengthening the argument that their position on these votes reflected the generic "black" position, rather than an idiosyncratic district-level preference (Wilson 1960).

and from these two graphs we can see changes over time. In each figure, the proportion of a group of legislators agreeing with the black members' position is plotted over time. Each point represents the proportion from that group taking the liberal position on a given roll call (any African American members are dropped from the analysis). The lines represent the smoothed average for the bloc. First, we can see that by the mid-1940s non-Southern Democrats were indeed more likely than Republicans to support racial liberalism, though each of these groups were far more likely to vote liberally than southern Democrats. The sets of votes from before 1937 are included in this analysis to show where the parties were coming from: in 1899 and 1920, Republicans were nearly unanimous in their support for the black position on civil rights votes (these particular votes are to approve a memorial for Frederick Douglass in 1899 and a series of votes on the Dyer Anti-lynching bill in 1921). By the 1930s, they still tended to support this liberal position on average, but the average Republican support for civil rights declined slowly beginning in the 1940s and then rapidly in the late 1950s. There are some instances in which Republicans were quite divided on these issues. Southern Democrats were consistent in their opposition to racial liberalism, though their solidity ebbed over time. By the 1960s almost one in five southern Democrats was taking the liberal position on civil rights. The tripartite story does reveal a large change among non-southern Democrats, however. Inconsistent but fairly evenly split in their voting on the Dyer bill, this group was fairly solidly in favor of the black position on civil rights votes by the time anti-lynching legislation returned to the agenda in 1937, and they were more consistent than Republicans in their support for racial liberalism from the 1940s on. Even more telling, however, is who was leading this group, and seemingly powering the progressive racial agenda of the time. In the righthand figure, the top/blue line shows that non-southern urban Democrats were essentially unanimous in their support of racial liberalism throughout the New Deal, while non-southern non-urban Democrats were almost as supportive as their urban copartisans by the end of the period, but certainly split early on. Their support was always more tenuous and at certain moments subject to deep division, as we can see from the two outlier points after 1960. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, however, it certainly appears that urban Democrats are the most consistently in agreement with the African American position on these racial issues. This is con-

**Civil Rights Liberalism**  **Civil Rights Liberalism, NS Dems**



Figure 5.5: **Proportions of legislators supporting liberal position on House civil rights votes, 1900-1963:** At left, while Republicans and Democrats were opposed on civil rights votes in 1900, nonsouthern Democrats had changed their position by the late 1930s and were more likely that Republicans to support civil rights by the mid-1940s. At Right: Among non-southern Democrats, city representatives were more likely to support civil rights earlier, and they were more supportive later.

sistent with a previous finding that support for racial liberalism in Congress was associated with urbanicity, though the disaggregation of the non-southern Democrats is clearer here.[73]

This relatively strong support for racial liberalism among non-southern Democrats stems not only from urban representatives, but especially from urban representatives who came from places with strong institutions of horizontal integration, especially those local organizations that most fully incorporated African Americans. Chicago and New York (and later, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Los Angeles) were the homes of local Democratic Parties that included their growing African American voting blocs fully enough that they sent black representatives to Congress. From even before the New Deal, local politicians in these cities had courted black voters, who were often quite cohesive as a group and at times may have been pivotal in city- and statewide elections

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[73]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)

(Keiser 1997). In Chicago especially, black political leaders were seen as a key part of electoral strategy for both Republicans and Democrats until the mid-1940s.[74] Participation in local governing coalitions meant that African Americans had a place at the table, albeit typically a "junior" position. Nonetheless, being part of a local organization that included African Americans meant that even representatives from all-white constituencies had black local partners and were at least somewhat reliant on black votes for the maintenance of their organization's power, which in turn had effects on their own access to resources and position.

Was urbanicity associated with racial liberalism? Were representatives from strong local parties more supportive of racial liberalism? Were representatives with city delegation partners who were black more likely to support racial liberalism? In this section, I use a multivariate regression model to test hypotheses about the effects of cities and city delegations while simultaneously accounting for the common alternative explanations—that support for racial liberalism is explained by region, party, and constituency composition. If local institutions and organizations nudge representatives to support racial liberalism, then the presence of these factors—in this case, traditional party organizations and black partners in a city delegation—should be positively correlated with taking the liberal position on racial issues, even beyond the other explanatory factors.

The analysis includes the following data and variables (and the results are listed in Table 5.5). The dependent variable is the same as used in Figure 5.5, a binary indicator of agreement with the "African American" position on civil rights votes. Again, the African American congresspersons, whose votes were used to construct the dependent variable, are excluded from the analysis, so this analysis estimates the relationships between white representatives' support for racially liberal positions and several key explanatory variables. We are particularly interested in the variables measuring political factors associated with the representative's home jurisdiction. First, the ordinal USR score is included. I expect high urbanicity scores to be associated with racial liberalism in representation, in keeping with the results above and the implications of urbanicity for elite preferences outlined in Chapter 2. In addition to this district-level attribute, two measures of characteristics of city delegations are included. The first is an indicator for whether a white repre-

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[74]Gosnell (1937), Keiser (1997)

sentative is part of a city delegation with a black local copartisan. For instance, a white Democrat from Chicago would have a 1 on this measure after the election of Arthur Mitchell in 1935, while a Republican from Chicago would have a 1 from 1928-1935, when Oscar DePriest represented the first district. Representatives not from cities, from cities without a black member, or from locally partisan cities with a black member in the other party, get scores of zero on this measure. If having a black member fosters racially liberal voting in the rest of a city delegation, the coefficient on this measure should be positive.

The city delegation measure of IHIs included is a measure of local party strength, a key institutional variable associated with fostering cohesion in city delegations. As in Chapter 4, this measure of organizational IHI strength is adapted from David Mayhew's (1986) "traditional party organization" scores, which measure the strength of local party organization in controlling nominations at midcentury. [75] Because Democrats had local partners (African Americans and racially liberal unions such as the CIO) pushing for civil rights and because the Democrats themselves were much more closely associated with traditional party organizations by this time in almost all parts of the country, I also hypothesize that the relationship between traditional party organizations will be stronger among Democrats than Republicans, so I include a variable interacting partisanship and local party organization (TPO*Dem).[76] The relationship between local organization and racial liberalism should be stronger for Democrats than for Republicans if this hypothesis is correct.

In addition to these variables associated with urbanicity and local political organization, I include alternative explanations that we know to be importantly associated with positions ultimately taken on race during this era. Section is a key variable, so I include an indicator for whether

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[75]TPO scores are shifted to range from 0 to 4, instead of Mayhew's 1 to 5. Mayhew's scores were given at the state level, but he includes information about localities within the states to justify his judgements. In most states, his score is based on information about city organizations, so in states where no reference is made to traditional organizations existing outside of cities, I infer that Mayhew's score should be applied to the cities he describes, and I reduce the TPO score for districts representing portions of that state that do not include a city mentioned by Mayhew as having a strong organization by a half. The magnitude of this reduction is somewhat arbitrary, but is meant to reflect his observation that traditional parties were strongest in the cities, but parties outside of cities in these states typically bore "family resemblance" to each other (Mayhew 1986, p.23).

[76]Buenker (1973) also notes that traditional organizations, especially those Irish-led parties that incorporated the "new stock" immigrants, were predominantly in the Democratic fold, p. 11., so Republicans from TPO states may not have had actually ties to such organizations.

a representative is from outside the South.[77] The emerging literature indicates that nonsouthern Democrats were taking the lead on these issues, so I include an indicator for non-southern Democrat.

Finally, support for civil rights may be prompted by large African American populations in a member's district—the "electoral connection" hypothesis. Though the population patterns described above meant that there were relatively few districts where African Americans were a large share of the voting population (and some of those are excluded from this analysis because they had black representatives), this is still an important potential explanation for racial liberalism, so I include an estimate of the share of the Voting-Eligible Population that was black. Available data from Adler (2012) provide good measures of the proportion of the population identified as black at the congressional district level for all districts that encompass at least one entire county going back to the 78th Congress.[78] For city districts which are subdivisions of a county, however, a finer-grained measure is necessary because of residential segregation, so I develop measures for these districts using the GIS technique outlined earlier in this chapter and in Appendix 2. Data for this variable at low levels of aggregation is limited to decennial census years in cities with Census tracts (only select counties had them in these years–fortunately these include most cities with more than one congressional district), so I estimate each of these districts' black population based on the data from the 1940 Census.[79] For districts in the South, where the vast majority of African Americans could not vote during this time, the percent of the electorate that was black is zeroed out; it is clear that southern representatives were not responsive to this group, even the few who could vote, given their records and the exclusionary all-white primary instituted in many of these states during this time. I expect the coefficient on percent black to be positive if pressure from black constituents prompts responsiveness and racial liberalism. Conversely, a negative coefficient may indicate some evidence of racial threat, as in Key (1949).

All of the votes on civil rights during this formative era are pooled in this analysis. Sepa-

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[77]Following Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), this analysis employs a 17-state definition of the South, which uses "Jim Crow"-style legal segregation rather than secession as the indicator of Southernness. The results are robust to other definitions of seciton.

[78]For the few votes in this analysis before the 78th congress, I simply apply Adler's value for the 78th backward for now.

[79]Again, while still imperfect, these estimates are an important improvement on available data.

rately, analyses excluding anti-lynching legislation votes, which did not really have important implications in northern cities, yielded substantively similar results to those presented below; the patterns of voting were common to all subsets of the civil rights agenda in congress. The model presented below is estimated using fixed effects for each roll call to account for general fluctuations in support for the liberal position on particular votes, and robust standard errors are grouped by legislator because some individuals voted on many of these roll calls, making for some particularly non-independent observations.

**Logit regression: Agreement with African American position on civil rights**

| Variable (#categories) | Coeff. | (Robust SE) | Mfx |
|---|---|---|---|
| Urbanicity(7) | .14** | (0.039) | .020 |
| Blackpartner(2) | *** | ** | – |
| TPO*Dem(5) | .99** | (0.20) | (Fig. 5.6) |
| TPO(5) | -.10 | (0.13) | – |
| Non-South Dem(2) | 3.23** | (.46) | .29 |
| Dem(2) | -2.31** | (.43) | -.31 |
| BlackVEP(%) | 13.13** | (4.80) | 1.91 |
| Union(%) | 8.18** | (1.19) | 1.19 |
| South17(2) | -1.09** | (0.46) | -.17 |
| East | .686* | (.37) | .090 |
| Midwest | -.13 | (.29) | – |

Table 5.5: **Civil Rights Liberalism, 1933-1963.** City representatives and those with a black partner in their city delegation were more likely to support civil rights. Local black partnership was perfect predictor of support, those observations dropped from this model. Exclusion of the variable does not reduce the magnitude or significance of the other predictors of interest. (*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$ N=8868, Psuedo-R-squared=.57. Estimated with an intercept and robust standard errors, clustered by legislator. )

These results support the key hypotheses about urbanicity and city delegations. First, urbanicity was positively and significantly associated with racial liberalism during the long New Deal. A representative from a city district was on average about 6 percent more likely to support the racially liberal position than an otherwise similar representative from a suburban district, and 12 percent more than a representative from a rural district. Representatives with a local black partner were uniformly in support of the racially liberal position; having a black partner appears to reach the level of sufficiency as characteristic of those supportive of civil rights liberalism during this time. Again, for much of this time this indicator would only apply to Democrats from Chicago

**Traditional Party Organization and Support for Civil Rights by Party**



Figure 5.6: **Racial liberalism by TPO (Interaction interpretation).** While Republicans from high-TPO states were no more likely to support the racially liberal position during the Long New Deal, Democrats from strong party organizations were more than 18 percent more likely to take such a position than their copartisans from places with weak local parties.

**City Delegation Cohesion, Civil Rights Votes (1940-1970)**



Figure 5.7: **Average City Delegation Cohesion on Civil Rights Votes.** City delegations with strong IHIs were more cohesive on civil rights issues.

and New York, two central elements of the Democratic urban order. But these two pillars of the Democratic party, riven by race at home, were completely cohesive on civil rights during the urban interlude. The relationship between local party organization and racial liberalism is more complicated to interpret, but the expectations above are supported by the data. Figure 5.6 illustrates how likely Democrats and Republicans from different local partisan contexts differed in their support for racially liberal positions on these roll calls. Moving across the horizontal axis, local party strength increases from left to right. The lines on the graph represent the predicted probability of support for the racially liberal position for members of each party.[80] Among Republicans, the relationship between local party organization and racial liberalism is weak, and statistically insignificant. Among Democrats, however, the relationship is quite strong: a Democrat from a strong local party (ie, TPO=4, on this shifted scale) was approximately 14 percent more likely to support the racially liberal position than one from a place without parties (ie, TPO=0), even when we account for other factors.[81] This result supports the theory that the relationship between local party organization and racial liberalism was stronger among Democrats, because of the party's more enduring relationship with that organizational form, and because their African American coalitional partners were the principal proponents for racial liberalism during this era.[82] These racial issues were the heart of the intraparty conflict; they define the second dimension of political conflict in the House.[83] But cities themselves, despite the potential for division posed at home by rapid influx of African Americans, were very likely to support the racially liberal position on these issues, even as they threatened to destroy the basis for their national alliance with the South. This was especially true of those Democrats coming from cities with strong partisan institutions. These cities' politicians, even if they did not represent African Americans themselves, were politically linked at home and in the nation to those who did, and as the products of strong parties they may have been more sensitive to the demands of their broader subnational party organization—those

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[80]The other variables in the model were held at their mode, median, or mean values, as appropriate, to represent an otherwise statistically "typical" member.

[81]The 95 percent confidence intervals (not pictured) do not overlap, indicating that we can be confident that this relationship does indeed exist among Democrats. Predicted values generated with Stata praccum procedure, following Long and Freese (2006), Section 9.4.

[82]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)

[83]Poole and Rosenthal (1997)

who needed black votes at a citywide or state level.

How did these statistical relationships actually play out in Congress? A companion analysis of city delegations shows a similar relationship between party structure and cohesion on civil rights issues in congress. As in Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4, 5.7 shows the cohesion on civil rights votes for the four largest city delegations from the 1930s-1960s. Just as on the set of all domestic roll call votes, the cities with strong IHIs were more cohesive on civil rights. Los Angeles, with its weak local partisan institutions, was the first to show signs of fracture as race claimed the national spotlight in the early 1960s, and when all cities showed division later on, Los Angeles was the most deeply divided on civil rights.[84]

## 5.4   Discussion

The results of the roll call analyses above support the growing consensus that non-southern Democrats were indeed the party of racial liberalism throughout the urban interlude, despite the obvious threat that such a position would pose to the strength of their national coalition, but that their national alliance with staunchly conservative southerners made this harder to see. Local factors, however, were also important even when we account for section and party, as we can see from the multivariate regression analysis above. First, having a local black copartisan made representatives completely reliable on race; such representatives supported the liberal position every time, even though their constituents (likely all white) held much more conflicted views on such matters.

By the same token, Democrats from places with strong local party organizations were more likely to support racial liberalism, ostensibly responding to pressures from within their party—from across town or from up the chain of command. Democrats whose districts were more atomistic, less connected to other constituencies through organizational IHIs, were less likely to support the racially liberal position. These findings provide support for the broadest theoretical claim of

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[84]Of course, on civil rights votes today, all of these cities are again cohesive and liberal; but this seems unsurprising given how much demographics have changed—none of them is a majority white city any longer, after decades of white flight, and in-migration by African Americans and new arrivals from abroad. Today, "urban" is a euphemism for "not white" in some contexts. But in 1970, all four of these cities were still majority white, and more to the point over half of their districts were still overwhemingly white.

city delegation theory, that local institutional factors color national representation, fostering political cohesion despite social fracture. In the case of race, city representatives were cohesively liberal, beyond what might be predicted based on district characteristics or simple national partisan affiliation.

Other findings of this regression analysis may be worth noting here. First, while Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010) find no support for an electoral connection between local black population and support for racial liberalism, the inclusion of refined measures of district-level black population for city districts gives a different result: a representative's support for racial liberalism was indeed related to his or her district's racial demography. This difference in results merits further investigation. In keeping with previous findings, union membership (though measured imprecisely, at the state level) does also seem to be an important determinant of representatives' votes, providing support for a possible alternative or complementary mechanism (with the party IHI) forging a cohesive liberal bloc on these issues.

Previous accounts of the dissolving Democratic party have spotted a break between southern and non-southern Democrats on race building over the course of the urban interlude. The important insights from these analyses have shown that the range of issues upon which two wings split grew over time, as Southerners interpreted a growing swath of substantive policy areas as potentially threatening to their racial agenda and repeatedly sided with Republicans to form a conservative coalition on a number of priorities for non-southern Democrats.[85] At the same time, the non-southern Democrats began to shift to the left on racial issues, providing stronger support for civil rights policies relative to their local Republican rivals. At the state level, Democrats outside the South began to position themselves as more supportive of Civil Rights than their intrastate Republican rivals.[86] In Congress, non-southern Democrats, especially those from cities, became the most likely and consistent advocates of civil rights by the mid-1940s, while Republicans adopted an ambiguous posture or worked to weaken civil rights provisions when they did

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[85]Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), Biles (2011)
[86]Feinstein and Schickler (2008)

arise on the agenda.[87]

Taking full stock of the deep roots of the positions taken by the two major parties on race in the mid-1960s forces an important re-evaluation of what is driving politics and partisan change. Carmines and Stimson argue that national party elites have a great deal of discretion to adopt new positions in forging coalitions and recasting new conflicts in national politics in the search for political success. Schickler et al (2010), on the other hand, looking more closely at non-southern Democrats, argue for a causal role for coalitional partners—they credit progressive labor unions and African Americans, but many other groups within the New Deal coalition outside the South were no doubt important. The real action in this account is not among national elites associated with presidential campaigns but with the party's middle level: activists and civil society groups closely associated with the party, who articulate a program and mobilize the mass base. From this perspective, the "ultimate break-up of the New Deal coalition was built into the structure of the alignment that emerged during Roosevelt's administration," not contingent on reactions to events in the early 1960s.[88]

This important claim—that the key building blocks of the Democratic Party outside the South were strong proponents of racial egalitarianism during this critical era, and that this commitment ultimately undermined the broader coalition—fits a broader narrative in which southern pathology is marginalized over time and non-southern racial egalitarianism is naturally ascendant. Schickler et al (2010) argue that, having achieved a majority within the Democratic Party, programmatic liberals could fight southern racism and and embrace racial as well as economic liberalism. This is characteristic of the Manichaean understanding of race in American political history, pitting recalcitrant white supremacists against idealistic "transformative egalitarians."[89]

When we look closely at those non-southern coalitional partners of the Democratic alliance— many of whom were not naturally predisposed to civil rights liberalism and are often criticized for racist practice in other contexts—we should pause and see that the story is more complicated. Were the political forces associated with the rise of 20th century racial liberalism all ideologi-

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[87]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
[88]Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
[89]Smith and King (2005)

cally committed to "transformative egalitarian" racial policies?  At the local level, the bedfellows were just as strange as they were in the national alliance, with racial domination a frequent and apt descriptor of political organizations at the city level.  But *representatives* of these cities, especially those from cities with strong traditional party organizations (and in these congresses such representatives were themselves generally the products of those local organizations), were consistently liberal on race in national politics, even when they themselves had essentially no black constituents, and the constituents and organizations with which they did have formal ties had mixed records on race at best.  The same institutional players seem to have been simultaneously on different "sides" on race at different levels of politics, if the idea of two "sides" is to be understood in its strongest sense.

This cohesive racial liberalism from representatives of constituencies and organizations that were not dedicated to racial egalitarianism— who were often in direct conflict with the black newcomers in their cities—muddies the water on our understanding of racial orders in American politics and the "Tocquevillian" picture of an naturally ascendant, *ideological* anti-racism becomes much less compelling.  There is no doubt that idealist, activist groups played a crucial role in keeping elite attention on these issues, but organizational dynamics seem to have contributed as well, keeping representatives from cities with strong IHIs (which would link the representative of apathetic, ambivalent, or hostile whites with crosstown members of the same organization or political community) more closely attuned to a citywide position of racial liberalism. From a normative perspective, this is encouraging for those who would promote the rights of unpopular numeric minorities, for such institutional links may help provide support for such changes without reliance on saints or altruists. The programmatic anti-racists played a key role, but their power was worked through institutions that were not themselves programmatically anti-racist, merely politically pragmatic and united as a city bloc.

The most dramatic events of the racial realignment took place in the mid-1960s and beyond: Goldwater's embrace of racial conservatism, the GOP's Southern Strategy, the backlash to central-city riots, and the beginnings of the transition of the white southern electorate to the GOP that was more or less complete by the 1990s. The groundwork for this change, however, was laid much ear-

lier, when racially liberal representatives from cities articulated a new, distinctively urban position on the racial issues of the day. When Hatton Sumners tried to defend lynching as a kind of traditional frontier democracy (as quoted at the beginning of this chapter), he was making an argument that would not have been accepted in a city. In cities, such spontaneous, popular violence sometimes did erupt, often in defense of the established racial order. But under conditions of urbanicity, such acts were seen from above as a significant threat to the community's well-being, not a defense of it. John Rooney, young mainstay of the Brooklyn Democratic Organization, said seemingly in reply (though 15 years later) that few would bewail the passing of the frontier days. In an America seemingly obsessed with the mythologies of the rugged frontiersman, such a statement entails at least a little controversy. In that instance, he was arguing on behalf of fair employment legislation, which (like city Democrats' efforts at anti-lynching measures) would fall before Southern obstruction in Congress. Rooney argued that the interdependence of modern urban life made the institutions and practices of the frontier obsolete, that it was time to embrace the city perspective, including the pluralism and rules it entailed. In this respect, he voiced a city position, on a city issue, in support of members of his city delegation.

Rooney and his colleagues from similar local traditional organizations that were the heart of the urban political order, and of the New Deal Democratic Party, brought a new style and idea of community to national politics. Their continued cohesion in the face of potentially divisive issues like race (which are thought to undermine support for "economic" liberalism) was crucial for the development of "double liberalism." By welcoming many groups, the "new stock" politicians of the cities' Democratic organizations built a cultural tradition and political brand of group accommodation and bargaining that was expansive enough to include the African Americans as well—and their socialization to prioritize local ties and organization made their commitment to group pluralism strong enough to withstand the racist pushback within their national party (and within their cities). It was from this traditional-party impulse toward identity-based appeals, logrolling, and concern for the local that the urban political order now known as "Blue America" was born.

# Chapter 6

# Conclusion: Notes for an Urban Political Order

"New York City…where more than seven million people live in peace, and enjoy the benefits of democracy."

-WNYC Radio 1930s-era station identification

"Let me say…that I know very little about New York, and if I never know any more I will be just as happy."

-Rep. Graham Barden (D-NC),
Chairman of House Committee on Education and Labor[1]

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[1] *Congressional Record*, April 24, 1952, p. 4382. Quoted in Mayhew (1966)

From the North Side of Chicago, home of the Gold Coast, the Miracle Mile and a famously vertiginous skyline, it is a short drive down Lake Shore Drive to get onto Interstate 57, heading south through the largely poor, largely African American South Side. Nine hours later you will head into the broad plains of the Mississippi Delta, horizon to horizon, home to many of the richest and poorest Americans during the middle of the 19th Century. Generations of Americans travelled this route in the 20th Century's Great Migrations, but in the opposite direction: from South to North, from agricultural semi-feudalism to industrial urban inequality, from flat fields to vertical towers.

This path down the middle of the country is also an axis upon which America's racial politics have turned. Five of the six African Americans ever to serve in the U.S. Senate have come from either Mississippi or Chicago, although a century of political exclusion interrupted their seatings. In 1963, as racial tumult beset the South and just a year before LBJ's signing of the Civil Rights Act, these very different places had much in common politically. Mississippi was represented by five white Democrats in the House of Representatives (no one *other* than white Democrats had been elected, or voted, really, in Mississippi in the 20th century). Chicago's North Side, part of a strong local machine organization for a generation, also sent five delegates to the House, also all white Democrats. Each was a consistent, archetypal element of the New Deal Democratic coalition— the urban machine and the South—and both places had profited from this relationship with the national government, bringing home pork and having outsize influence on many policies from positions of seniority.

In both places, moreover, a clear racial hierarchy was in place. In Mississippi, white supremacy was sustained by law and private violence. The story of the strongest bastion of Jim Crow is well-known. In Chicago, America's most racially segregated large city, hierarchy was more subtle, and less obviously violent, but still real. The hegemonic local Democratic organization practiced a politics "with a sharp racial edge," marginalizing black political forces or co-opting their leaders as lieutenants of the dominant city-wide order.[2] Everyday white Chicagoans were not focused on building post-racial utopia, either: for the Chicago reporter and columnist Mike Royko, the "only

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[2]Sugrue (1996), Keiser (1997), pp.44-64, Biles (1995), ch. 4.

genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent."[3] Entrenched patterns of racial segregation were strengthened first by neighborhood vigilantes, then by law and regulation (such as redlining), and later by discrimination and strong cultural norms.[4]

However, the early 1960s was the last moment that these places were both, for all intents and purposes, stable white polities within the Democratic fold. The way that racial politics played out in these two kinds of places is perhaps the most important political development in the 20th century United States. In both Chicago and in Mississippi, an essentially all-white electorate was transformed from the outside into one in which there were many African Americans. In Chicago, as in other northern cities, the Great Migrations of the first half of the twentieth century brought hundreds of thousands of black immigrants to the city from the South. From 1910 to 1940 to 1970, Chicago went from 0 percent black to 8 percent, to about 33 percent. By the 1970s, there were about four times as many black Chicagoans as there were total residents in all of Mississippi's cities combined.

In Mississippi, court cases and voting rights legislation reintroduced African Americans rather more swiftly into that state's formal political processes as Jim Crow institutions were dismantled, so the electorate became about 35 percent black quite quickly (up from close to zero). The reaction by white Mississippians—almost all of whom (at least those who had participated) had been Democrats—was partisan exit. What had been a one-party Democratic state became a Republican stronghold. Over the next five decades, Mississippi would become one of the reddest states in America, with 56 percent of all Mississippians (and 88 percent of all *white* Mississippians, a group that voted almost unanimously for Democratic candidates throughout the century between the Civil War and Civil Rights Act) voting for John McCain in 2008.

Chicago would also see decades of local racial tumult, with recurrent conflict between groups of citizens and deep contention among elites. But unlike Mississippi, the city continued to represent itself as staunchly Democratic, and liberal, in national politics. In 2008, Barack Obama won Chicago's Cook County by more than a million votes, winning three votes for each one cast for

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[3]Royko (1971), p. 139
[4]Sugrue (1996), Keiser (1997), Pinderhughes (1987), Erie (1988), Massey and Denton (1993)

McCain.[5]  This continued liberal representation of the city, despite the divisive potential of race, was partly attributable to the fact that Chicago's representatives were from a city, but also partly attributable to the fact that Chicago's representatives were from the *same* city; the local institutions of a common political community and strong local party organization made Chicago's representatives more likely to agree on all issues, especially those most relevant to the city. For Chicago's (and other cities') delegation in national politics, race wound up looking like other issues, and the institutions that kept diverse coalitions together weathered the storm.

## 6.1 Urbanicity and Two-dimensional liberalism

The powerful New Deal coalition built upon the always tenuous alliance between representatives of urban and Southern constituencies has vanished completely, famously riven by racial conflict, accelerating in the 1960s with the struggles and successes of the civil rights movement. Elite political conflict in twentieth century America turned primarily on two substantive axes—statism and race—and in the contemporary polity these dimensions of conflict overlap: in Congress, conservatism on one tends to coincide with conservatism on the other to an extent unprecedented in the modern era.[6]  While urban and Southern representatives were once able to reach an accord on the first dimension but divided on the second, they are now very divided on both. Today in Congress—the distillation of these places as political communities within the nation—Mississippi and the rest of the South are mostly doubly conservative, while Chicago and most large cities are doubly liberal.[7]  Double liberalism on political economy and intergroup politics has come to sweep other issues into its portfolio, such that elite positions have also become sorted on a host of seemingly unrelated issues such as those about Christian values and abortion, with partisans in

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[5]Each of these 2008 figures is from CNN exit poll data. The margin was almost certainly higher in Chicago proper, as suburban portions of Cook County are more Republican than the city itself.

[6]Poole and Rosenthal (1998); McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)

[7]Mississippi now has only four seats in the house, and its representatives are doubly conservative *except* for Rep. Bennie Thompson (D), who represents a majority-African American district that includes Jackson. The state is more consistently Republican in Presidential politics than in Congressional seats, but the transition among other southern states as well has made the South into a Republican stronghold.

the electorate sorting close behind.[8]

What is less clear is *why* issues as potentially unrelated as tax rates, labor regulation, racial equality, immigration, and abortion have become linked in American politics. The connections between the party positions on these issues are not logically necessary, and alternative sets of positions could be just as easily defended based on the principles elaborated by libertarianism, communitarianism, dogmatic Catholicism, or some other ideology. But the extant liberal-conservative divide—with a "Blue" pole favoring statist intervention in markets, the centralization of power, a social safety net, the pursuit of social equality for various minority groups, and social permissiveness countered by a "Red" pole espousing the virtues of markets, lower taxes and generally restrained government (especially at the national level), and the promotion of traditional/Christian social mores and increasingly conservative in its position on race—has hardened and spread over the past decades. If we think about the relationship between place character and some of these issues, however, the role of urbanicity in helping to shape political conflict is compelling.

The epigrams above, revealing American attitudes about New York City, are representative of an important conversation about the place of cities in the American experience. In these pages, I have argued that place character, and the distinctive governance challenges of urban communities, are at the heart of contemporary modern political polarization because place character is related to governance—related to the shape and character of the state, and the ways that groups are treated in politics. The doubly liberal set of positions taken up by representatives of "Blue" America is a distinctly *urban* set of positions, an idea alluded to in the popular discourse on the Red-Blue divide but usually attributed to state or regional culture. No doubt the ideas, particular histories, climate, and contingencies of states and regions matter for citizens' political consciousness; however, material conditions and lived experience on a human scale—the kinds of built environments we navigate, the varieties of persons we interact with, and the manner in which these things change, or not—are also important shapers of worldview and political outlook. Statism and group pluralism, the hallmarks of double liberalism, are more important features for sustaining order in urban political communities than they are in other contexts. Traditional "American" values, as

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[8]Shapiro and Bafumi (2009)

elaborated by Thomas Jefferson and his allies in the republic's early days, were firmly rooted in the soil of an agrarian civilization and predicated upon the continual expansion of the nation's territory. The massive transformation of the Industrial Revolution, and the associated development and growth of urban forms gave rise to a host of new governance demands and institutions developed to deal with them. These solutions for urban life were transferred into national politics with the Democratic Party's progressive liberal wing in the New Deal. Thus the main commitments of the long New Deal—statist intervention in the economy through regulation, redistribution, and public goods provision; the recognition, tolerance, and accommodation of group difference; and state-institutional adjustment to new social conditions generally—are urban commitments, made national by the Democratic Party's new urban bloc-of-blocs in the 1930s, even as their local polities were episodically riven by deep racial, class, and social conflicts. This is the spirit conveyed by the WNYC station announcement above, which is still used to describe a certain kind of community to which the urban bloc aspired. These commitments made a marriage of convenience with the South—which often preferred not to "know any more" about such communities—less and less convenient as time wore on. Local development patterns, and local political institutions and arrangements, not simply demography, constituent ideology, or Southern pathology, played a key role in these divergent outcomes of Chicago and Mississippi. The contemporary full flowering of the Blue-Red, urban-rural ideological and partisan cleavage has deep roots in the New Deal.

This study describes the urban-rural cleavage and how it has contributed to our current state of polarization. It identifies the roots of today's "Red-Blue" moment within the Democratic Party of the New Deal, in an urban wing that "moved first" in developing distinctive policy goals and norms that would foreseeably overwhelm the national alliance with a Southern wing that never fully supported the statism or group pluralism that were the defining elements of the progressive liberal order. In doing so, the project contributes to our understanding of an historical puzzle at the heart of the New Deal's dissolution, positing that cities and local political institutions, by fostering cohesive representation in support of positions that would enhance a city's organic "health," played a perhaps unexpected role in bringing issues of racial equity to the national legislative agenda. This change was the basis for the mutually reinforcing dimensions of conflict we have

today.

These many complex subjects—the political dynamics of the New Deal, the development of liberalism, the conversion of the white South from Solid Democratic to Red Republican, the increasing polarization of contemporary American politics—are obviously important and they have received an appropriately large amount of scholarly attention. This study aims to link these important subjects by attention to urbanicity and the manner in which cities represent themselves in the broader polity. Cities and their leaders reshaped the content of American politics to meet their special, urgent governance demands, which are best managed at a supralocal level. These demands, which include significant interventions in economic behavior and adjustment to changing social conditions, including the inclusion of new groups, fostered the development of progressive liberalism, an approach to politics developed at the local level and later in national politics as well. Despite the many challenges of diversity, cities represented themselves as unified in national politics.

## 6.2   Re-"Urbanizing" American Politics?

Over the course of the urban interlude, faith in the capacity of progressive liberal policies to address the challenges of modernity was high, and the mood for cities was of a general optimism for the future. Of course, the intervening decades eroded that optimism and tempered the power of city forces in national politics. Structural changes to the economy (especially the decline of Fordist manufacturing) and population shifts to the suburbs and Sunbelt left many urban centers hollowed out. It is not uncommon for Rust Belt cities to be half as large as they once were, and the communities that remain sometimes struggle to provide even the most basic forms of order; contemporary Detroit is the most shocking example of this phenomenon. Some of the largest cities have now regained their midcentury populations in absolute terms, but relative to their metropolitan areas and the nation as a whole they are much smaller. New York City once sent 26 representatives to congress; today, that number is down to eleven, even though the city itself

is still home to "more than seven million people," as WYNC bragged in the 1930s.[9] The city can no longer claim to be the part that stands in for the whole of American society. At the same time, fewer city representatives come from places with strong local party traditions (and these parties have mostly become weaker where they do persist). The potential for forging unity presented by institutions of horizontal integration has diminished over time, because fewer representatives come from places with strong local parties, and those places have fewer representatives than they used to.

Politically, the maturation of the urbanicity divide and the consolidation of the (white) Republican South mean that the pivotal political force in American politics is clearly suburban.[10] The political implications of this fact, which Gainsborough (2001) identifies as the "suburbanization" of American politics, are still being negotiated. Cities were always the strongest force in support of market interventions and "big government," because such policies are important for making cities work. In the 1930s, they formed an alliance to pursue these policies at the national level. But they needed allies to forge a majority, and those allies would occupy a pivotal position in national politics. Under the initial alliance of the New Deal, cities could pursue a logroll with their pivotal rural allies, many of whom represented particularly poor, underdeveloped parts of the country. Thus, because the cities wanted relief, the South was made habitable. But they could not logroll the kinds of social regulation required to keep cities peaceful and productive, on labor and race. The cities' new coalitional partners, as the urbanicity cleavage has matured, have become the "next most urban" places: suburban areas.[11] While settlement patterns are shifting to change the demography of the suburbs in favor of populations that may be more Democratic than they once were, the local political organization of these places is not. In some sense the *point* of suburbs is their high level of political fragmentation, but as more Americans live in such small places this may continue to undermine the possibilities for national liberalism on "first dimension" policies, a fact that needs to be considered in ongoing policy debates and outcomes.[12] On the other hand,

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[9] The city's population is actually more than 8 million as of the latest Census.

[10] During the Long New Deal, the pivotal political force was typically the Southern Democratic bloc. See Katznelson and Mulroy (2012).

[11] As well as rural areas with large minority populations, and places where smaller "ex-cities" are close enough to be represented together.

[12] Gainsborough (2001)

the frank racism of the Old South is no longer acceptable to these new pivotal communities, but with continued residential segregation patterns, and no institutions of horizontal integration to bind heterogeneous constituencies together, the prospects for "sharing" seem more dismal, and the problems for public goods provision in diverse contexts may become more severe. Thus the suburbanization of American politics, especially at an historical moment when immigration is increasing salient, may entail not only the policy and political centrality of relatively affluent, relatively white suburban communities, but also a heightening of the fragmentation of identities and weakening of integrative institutions—institutions that allow us to get over the factors that make us less likely to share with people who are different, and foster reinvestment in national and regional public goods.[13]

From a policy or political perspective, three promising possibilities for reducing political fragmentation and reinvigorating the power of local IHIs seem apparent, though none seem particularly likely to occur in the short term. The first is to redraw the meaningful lines of political division. Taking the metropolitan area as the functional social and economic unit, many scholars and planners have promoted a metropolitan political agenda.[14] Such an agenda aims to strengthen institutions for making planning and resource allocation decisions at a regional level, incorporating both central city and suburbs and effectively expanding the actors included within an important jurisdictional IHI. If regional governance is essentially nonexistent, representational cohesion may be as well. Coordinating across municipal boundaries, getting municipalities to cede their "sovereignty" to a broader authority (likely to be dominated by the central city) seems difficult, but the pursuit of rational solutions to our problems continues.

A second possibility is to shift not the lines but the people. The sprawling population patterns that have accelerated over the past century as American life has been organized at automobile-scale has pushed us far beyond the boundaries of central cities, past the lines that once collected many, many Americans in the same local polities.[15] This sprawl has been encouraged by technology and preferences, but also by the state policies that intersect with them. Municipal fragmenta-

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[13] Habyarimana et al. (2009), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)

[14] Orfield (1997), Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004)

[15] Many Americans still live in these central cities, of course, but relatively more and more live outside of these lines than was the case in the urban interlude.

tion has been a side effect and accelerant of the phenomenon.[16] Among sprawl-financing policies we might include publicly-funded road-based transportation networks, low taxes on energy (especially gasoline) relative to comparable countries, and subsidies for home ownership (loans were more easily available and property costs lower for purchases outside the central city), and a system of primarily local financing for public schools, among others.[17]

In planning and policymaking circles sprawl is seen as a cause of all ills, so fighting it is often seen as a sort of panacea. Changes to the calculations involved in how people make their residency decisions are possible insofar as those calculations are driven or shaped by policies. If people lived closer together, there are reasons to believe many personal and social ills would be diminished, from greenhouse gas pollution to income inequality to obesity. Of course, other problems might fill the void—everyone knows that living in a densely populated space can have its serious aggravations. But if membership in the same political community fosters common interest, at least among elites, then reducing sprawl may actually foster something like liberalism, by strengthening institutions that help to overcome the "diversity problems" we face that complicate sharing and statism.

## 6.3 Cities on the Hill

The biblical image of a shining "City upon a Hill" has often been employed to describe or justify America's status as an exceptional nation. The phrase was a favorite of Ronald Reagan's, who employed it frequently over decades. In his televised farewell address, Reagan devoted several paragraphs to describing the city upon a hill of his mind as

> a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls

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[16] A side effect because people's decisions to move, even if they choosing to move out of the central city, may not be about municipal fragmentation *per se*. Because suburbs usually have density-prohibiting zoning laws, the shift to these areas has accelerated sprawl, because land "fills up" faster, in a legal sense, when it cannot be developed as intensely.

[17] Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004) , pp.111-125; Rae (2003), Frank (2007)

had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That's how I saw it, and see it still.[18]

This imaginary city has been adopted as a touchstone of Reagan's legacy, and the idea of the United States as a model community is closely linked with the concept of "American exceptionalism," which has come to approximate extreme patriotism in its common usage, and is most commonly associated with conservative causes and the Republican Party. In this study, however, I turn to a relatively exceptional period in American history, when cities had important successes on the Hill—Capitol Hill—and self-consciously promoted an example of politics and society markedly different from that of today's Party of Reagan. The cities sponsored the New Deal political order, characterized by a multidimensional progressive liberalism that orients one pole of American politics today. This monograph describes the development of that political order, and theorizes what made it possible.

But the idea of American exceptionalism itself is rooted in the paradox that prompted Werner Sombart to ask why there was "no socialism in the United States" in 1906.[19] This alleged absence demanded explanation, from a Marxian perspective, because of Americas advanced capitalist development. From a further remove, we can see other important exceptional features of the United States that relate to Sombart's question. As Lieberman (2009) notes, the United States has always seemed to have a deep unease with cities and the kind of citizens and society they engender. This has certainly been manifest in our national mythology, but also in our political institutions, which have always privileged place over people.[20] The result has been a general weakness on the part of cities in national politics that is "exceptional" by international standards.[21] In other modern democracies, a larger share of the population lives in large cities, and there is often a single metropolis that dominates the cultural, economic, and political life of the nation. Not so in the United States. However, there have been moments where cities have had their say in national

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[18]Ronald Wilson Reagan Farewell Address, Jan 11, 1989. Available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3418

[19]Sombart (1976). See Foner (1984) for a critical review of many answers to Sombart's prompt.

[20]The improvements to the rules of representation of the 1960s notwithstanding, the Senate (and to a lesser extent the electoral college) continues to ignore the political principle of equality in representation, in keeping with its constitutional mandate.

[21]Lieberman (2009), p. 27.

affairs. The urban interlude was one of these exceptional (for America) "moments of urban triumph" in which a cross-city political alliance moved the needle of American politics significantly to the left.[22] This alliance, anchored by a diverse urban coalition that included large numbers of "white ethnics," unions, and African Americans, promoted and passed the major social welfare legislation that would prove to be as close to "socialism" or workers-party leadership that the U.S. would see to date.

But this "urban triumph" and the political forces that gave it muscle present a potential theoretical puzzle for Sombart and his interlocutors. Many plausible explanations for this absence have been proffered in the century since Sombart's question, and among the most frequently recurring have been variations on the theme of division within the working class, as "the complex web of backgrounds from which the American proletariat emerged is often seen as rendering unity along class lines all but impossible."[23] Such a perspective argues that group diversity—particularly diversity in salient identities that cannot be easily changed—undermines the potential for what we think of as liberal politics, or socialism, in Sombart's vocabulary.[24] Diversities of background and interest are particularly heightened in cities, where all sorts of differences are both magnified and compressed within physical space, and where principles of toleration and democracy are tested most seriously.[25] As we might expect, city politics have never been easy or consensual, especially at the local level. But the broader truth is that significant national moves to the left, for several generations now, have been powered by these hodgepodge alliances from such heterogeneous places. Today, a "liberalism" that is "supposed" to be undermined by diversity seems in some ways to be driven by it, the party of the diverse cities supports social welfare provision to individuals, more substantial public goods provision, the imposition of rules to govern large institutions, and generally inclusive norms for managing the pluralism that is unavoidable in our contemporary polity. Even if they do not win all the time, if the most diverse places are the most ardent supporters of

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[22]Even if they did not move it as far as Sombart might have expected or hoped. Lieberman (2009), p.19; Ethington and Levitus (2009).

[23]Foner (1984), p.66-70.

[24]A permutation of this argument in modern political economy refers to the difficulty of coordinating across ethnic-group lines for maintenance of collective action and the provision of public goods as in Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Habyarimana et al. (2009).

[25]Katznelson (2009)

such a politics, this prompts a re-examination of how diversity affects the politics of statism and group relations, perhaps with attention to how social and political experiences that differ by place character have real, important effects far from where they are developed.

The assignation of a "city on a hill" to the American experiment is typically attributed to John Winthrop, a Puritan minister who was in Reagan's words "an early freedom man."[26] But freedom as Reagan typically meant it—individual unencumbrance by the state—was not a theme in Winthrop's text. The Puritans, after all, were not noted for their commitment to individual freedom.

In his now-famous "Defense of Christian Charity" of 1630, Winthrop likened the new Puritan colony in Boston to a city on a hill, as their American experiment's success or failure would be closely followed by those back in England, and ostensibly attributed to the righteousness and faithfulness with which the Puritans followed their holy path. Winthrop was himself alluding to the Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus exhorts his followers to lead exemplary lives of good works as a model for others.[27] The exemplary conduct of those in Jesus's hilltop "city" would be marked by Christian love and reciprocal obligation under the guiding advice of the Golden Rule, and a selflessness worthy of sainthood. For Winthrop, the path to be followed by the Puritans, was not one of openness or individual liberty; rather, he conceived of their mission as one which could only be pursued in a closely knit community in which individual desires were subordinated to the common good of the community. Winthrop emphasizes these ties of mutual obligation:

> we must be knit together, in this work, as one man. We must entertain each other in brotherly affection. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of other's necessities...For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.[28]

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[26]Reagan (1989), though the path from Winthrop to Reagan led through some 19th- and 20th-century interpretive shifts of emphasis, and 20th century readers seem to have found vastly more importance in Winthrop's text than any 17th-century Puritans did. In fact, there is no evidence that anyone ever heard or read the "sermon" in Winthrop's day. Reagan added the "shine" to the city. See Peterson (forthcoming)

[27]Matthew 5:14-16 (KJV): "Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven."

[28]Winthrop (1630), Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1838, 3rd Series, 7:31-48. Hanover Historical Texts Project, http://history.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html. Archaic spellings modernized by author.

Winthrop preached unity in pursuit of the common cause presented by external threats, and urged exemplary conduct in the name of Christian love and charity, but mainly in the name of their community's survival. He couched this approach in the context of apparent concern about why within the band of colonists "some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in power and dignity; others mean and in submission." Theorizing how a diverse community (his emphasis is on differences of wealth and status among the group of settlers) can remain unified (especially against outsiders), Winthrop argues that "diversity" of wealth was a good to all, because under such conditions "every man might have need of others, and from hence they might be all knit more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection." It was his worry that the success of the colony was far from assured, given the many perils of the New World.[29] It was his hope that divisions could be overcome in the name of common cause, in the interest of the city itself.

We do not need to venture into Ronald Reagan's imagination to see American communities self-consciously seeking to lead the world and exemplify a new, distinctive vision of political community. This study explores the distinctive character and substance of city representation in national politics—how the cities represent themselves on Capitol Hill. Actual cities have lived up to Winthrop's aspiration better than political scientists might predict: in the face of diversity and crisis, they became quite cohesive in establishing and developing an urban political order that would come to define one of the main poles of American politics, first in conflicts within the Democratic Party and then between the national parties.

Just as Winthrop's Pilgrims were faced with an external threat that was to bind them together despite their differences, so too did the urban political order create a cohesive bloc out of disparate parts when faced with the extreme crises of modern capitalism during the Depression and the subsequent era of suburbanization and capital flight. Within- and across-city unity was forged even though the cities themselves had long faced (and continued to face) the deep threat of internal disorder, as economic and cultural heterogeneity made consensus more difficult and raised the stakes of politics. These internal struggles did not go away, but in national politics they were subordinated to common interest against the structural threats to cities presented by the 20th century.

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[29]Peterson (forthcoming)

The member cities of the urban political order faced deeper divisions—in terms of class, region, race, religion, and national origin—than Winthrop would have been able to imagine. These polyglot communities fostered an approach to politics that grappled with difference and recognized it (even if only symbolically at times) while seeking to bring these new members into an existing political framework and preserve the health of their cities. The result was an imperfect but inclusive compromise, which was not made on equal terms for all groups but which nonetheless allowed for progress to be made even as local conflicts remained deep and dire.

This is how city leaders saw themselves during this era. When WNYC announced that its listening audience were members of a community where "more than 7 million people live in peace and enjoy the benefits of democracy," and when Chicago's Anton Cermak described his ascendant Democratic machine as "a house for all peoples," they were attempting both description and inspiration. The progressive liberalism developed in these cities and supported by their representatives in national politics re-shaped America's self-presentation in the world. These cities sought to spread their brand of politics—doubly liberal, pluralist in cultural and political approach, with faith in limited statist intervention as a way to soften capitalism's rough edges and strengthen the bonds of membership in the national community—to the nation, and eventually to the world in the aftermath of World War II. They met with mixed successes, of course, but their political project shifted national domestic politics, nudging the doubly conservative South away and strengthening the power of the urbanicity cleavage over time.

These city leaders, speaking in the moment of metropolitan metonymy, sought to apply a politics developed in cities to a nation that had seldom been comfortable with urban life, and would soon have reason to be extremely concerned with the dramatic urban crises the 1960s. They were speaking in the center of the national political conversation, on Capitol Hill, referring not only to the grand ongoing experiment of domestic city democracy but also to a world beset by different visions of how to deal with the crisis of modernity. Illiberal models were ascendant in many places, but leaders in American cities advanced a set of policies and political commitments that took democracy as a premise. In a world of constant threats and increasingly global economic insecurity, the City Upon the Hill—the American political solution to economic modernity, and

cultural diversity that Reagan saw as a beacon of hope for the world—was built by the cities, on the Hill.

# Part II

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# Part III

# Appendices

# Appendix A

# House USR Scores

As described briefly in Chapter 3, the quantitative analyses in this study are based on an original dataset of measures indicating the place-character of congressional districts, or USR scores. These USR scores differ from the urbanicity scores used by Mayhew (1966) and Wolman and Marnicki (2005) because they are available across a wider stretch of time (because they do not rely upon the availability of district-level Census data, which has been the standard approach in previous studies) and because they begin with the premise that urbanites are members of large political communities. For each of these reasons, the USR codes are more theoretically useful for study of the urban-rural divide over time.

## A.1 Previous Approaches: Census-driven

Previous analyses of city representatives' power or behavior in the House have begun with district-level census data to identify districts. Mayhew, in his pioneering study of cross-cutting pressures on legislators from different kinds of places, uses a census-based approach, combined with an accounting of percentage in the district who rented their homes. He relies on a Congressional Quarterly from 1962, and then applies the measures for those congresses forward and backward over his time period. He is thus restricted to a relatively few postwar congresses based on data availability.

Wolman and Marnicki (2005) (hereafter "W-M") adopt a similar approach, but because they wrote in 1998 they are able to include more congresses over time. They begin with census data for the congresses just after the decennial census and reallocation of seats (1963, 1973, 1983, 1993). This data allows them to determine the proportion of a district's residents living in central cities, the proportion living outside of central cities but in metropolitan-area counties, and those living in counties outside metropolitan areas. If a majority of the district's residents fell into one of these categories, they coded the district urban, suburban, or non-metropolitan, respectively. Districts that did not have a majority from one place-type were coded as "mixed."[1]

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[1]Caraley (1976) apparently adopts the same approach for Congresses in 1968 and 1973.

Each of these census-based analyses identifies districts by place-character for their analyses, but there are several shortcomings of these approaches. The most obvious is the time constraint: because these approaches rely on available census data, they are restricted to a few congresses. This limits the scope of questions they can ask. For a study concerned with the changing place of cities in American political development, a few recent congresses, even over three decades, limits the things we might see. Another approach, less dependent on the availability of (relatively limited, before 1960) census data, would be helpful.

Beyond this main time-limitation, each selection process includes potentially limiting choices in categorizing city districts. Mayhew is not concerned with the full range of urbanicity: his analysis is primarily concerned with city representatives, so he labels representatives on a binary measure, either city, or non-city. City representatives are those with very few non-metropolitan residents and lots of renters. This purposefully excludes representatives from areas of cities with relatively high rates of homeownership, prioritizing land tenure over political membership in conceptualization of what counts as urban. In practice, this means including districts from smaller, perhaps more working-class, places where there are lots of renters, and excluding more affluent areas of some cities, often nearer to the edge of the city/suburban border. Because size is a key characteristic of urbanicity, membership in the large political community of the center city (and thus inclusion in its institutions of horizontal integration) is meaningful, so over the long run the opposite choice seems more appropriate for identifying city districts. Relying on political boundaries, rather than proportion of rentals, may be more appropriate over time as well, if the rental rate varies significantly over time or across cities.

W-M's selection and coding does rely primarily on municipal boundaries in determining whether a district is primarily city, suburban, or non-metropolitan. Their approach is limited in two ways, however. First, they do not attempt to characterize "mixed" districts, those without a majority from one of the three place-types. It is likely that for most of these some judgement can be made about the balance, for instance a predominantly urban-suburban mix, or a predominantly rural-suburban mix. Their approach is unnecessarily pure, and leaves out potentially useful information from this "in-between" category. More than 50 seats in each of their congresses go essentially un-

categorized.

Second, and probably less importantly in practice, it does not distinguish between large and small cities, even though central cities can in practice be quite small, and not fit our intuitions of what a "city" is. For most districts, this is not a problem, because a small city's population will not make up a majority of a congressional district, but if a district contains several small cities, and is drawn in an idiosyncratic way, it might; again, membership in a common political community is meaningful in this study, so distinguishing districts in which most members live in the same city from those in which they come from different local political communities is useful.

## A.2   USR codes: Size-driven

For this study, I attempt to develop measures of district place character that are consistent and applicable over time, that are sensitive to the full spectrum of place-character (not just binary), and that resulted in outcomes that fit well with our intuitions of what a city is. Because urban forms have changed so much over time, focussing on rental rates or other lifestyle characteristics may not be flexible enough. Instead, I adopt the approach taken in Lieberman (2009), which gives priority to place size relative to the nation in determining what a city is, and measures the urbanicity of a congressional district based on its spatial relationship with such cities. This approach has the advantages of being consistent over historical time and not privileging one kind of city over another, apart from the large over the small.

The USR measures are developed as follows. I begin with Lieberman's (2009) list of cities with more than .1 percent of the national population in a given decennial census (hereafter referred to as "large cities"). This standard was identified in Lieberman as a useful definition for cross-time comparisons. It enjoys face validity insofar as the list of cities fits an intuition of which kinds of places should be included in a set of cities, and the character of the places is allowed to vary over time. More rigorously, .1 percent is just shy of one-half of one congressional district under conditions of equal apportionment, so such places would be theoretically be able to exert significant

control over at least one congressional district.[2] There were 59 places from 29 states in the U.S. that met this size standard in 2000 (used here as a proxy for 2008). The set of cities in this list has become more varied geographically over time, as illustrated by the maps in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1. From a concentration in the North and East, the set of cities has spread South and West, and the number of cities in the set has increased over time.

### A.2.1 USR codes: scoring procedures

With Lieberman's list in hand, each congressional district is assigned a series of scores based on its position in time and space relative to that list. The first (USRnum) is an indicator of whether a district has significant spatial overlap with a city on the list for that decade. If a district overlaps a current city, it is given a score of "City." If it overlaps with a large city that was on the list but has dropped off the list within two decades, it is labeled as a "Former City." This is because such communities will no doubt retain some of their political importance, even if their relative (or absolute) size has declined, and to distinguish such formerly city districts from those which have never been part of a big city. If it overlaps with a city that joins the list in the next decade, it is labelled "Future City" to mark cities that are growing and may have actually reached the threshhold but have not been remeasured by the Census yet. Districts which do not overlap with a city or former city are given a "Noncity" label.

Each district is also given a more qualitative measure describing the character of their district. These scores were developed by carefully examining each district's geographic extent and evaluating its mix of place characters. For recent congresses, GIS maps of the districts are readily available, and can be overlaid on a large city's boundaries to determine to what extent the district is enclosed within the large city. Older congresses were scored using maps available in the

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[2]In a 435-member congress, under conditions of equal representation, each district should have about .22 percent of the national population (though in fact there is some variation between districts, even after the enshrinement of one person-one vote as a principle for representation). Thus a more rigorous standard for a population threshold would be .11. In practice, this distinction does not matter: in the 20th century, there are no cities that were included by the .10 threshhold that would not have been using the .11.

congressional atlas series, and congresses before 1983 were scored using maps and district descriptions from Martis and et al. (1982), an invaluable source. Districts that were entirely within a city from Lieberman's list are coded as "U", wholly suburban districts are coded as "S", and those that do not overlap with a large city (or its suburbs) coded "R." Coding mixed districts is less straightforward. While W-M lump many of these into a single category and effectively discard them, USR codes attempt to give a more informative qualitative description of where a district falls on the place-character continuum. A district that is primarily within a large city but also includes significant suburban areas is coded "U/S." A district that is predominantly suburban but also includes some significant portion of a large city is coded "S/U," and so on. Once these qualitative USR codes are given, districts are also given a quantiative measure on an ordinal USR scale ranging from 1 (Noncity/Rural) to 7 (Entirely city/Urban) with predominantly suburban or mixed districts falling in between. It is this ordinal variable (USRord), or a three category simplification of it, that is included in most of the regression and quantitative analyses in the empirical chapters.[3]

In addition to USR scores ranging from Urban to Rural, "City" districts are given a further qualitative coding reflecting the shape of the district. Every ten years, we are reminded that re-drawing the boundaries of Congressional districts is an important strategic game played by politicians at the local and state level; much of the action in this game seems to lie near the edge of the city. In developing USR scores for each district, it became apparent that a few types of city districts recur, and the actual geographic form of a district may have dramatic implications for its partisan status.

Four basic ideal types of urban districts are often drawn. Though particular districts may not fall clearly or perfectly into one of these categories, for the most part the judgements of type are fairly straightforward. Adding this qualitative layer beyond the simple urban-suburban-rural trichotomy will be useful in future analyses of city districts, though they are not used much in the foregoing chapters. Once a district has been identified as "urban" or "mixed urban," I assign it

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[3]In the empirical chapters 3 through 5, USRord is included as an explanatory variable in regression analyses. For graphical clarity, Figures with a tripartite Urban/Suburban/Rural distinction ("USR3") are developed using a recoding of USRord in which scores greater than 5 are coded "urban", scores lower than 3 "rural", and scores in between "suburban."

a categorical type indicator, USRtype, ranging from 1 to 4.  These types are illustrated in Figure A.1.  In each of the subfigures, an abstracted metropolitan area is divided into rural, suburban, and urban (central city) components.  District lines drawn by state legislatures may reflect these different kinds of place characters or they may combine different kinds of places.  Here are brief descriptions of the city district types:

- **Type 1: Core.** Core districts are those districts that are nested within a city, or coterminus with the city's boundaries.  Most core districts are one among several within a large city— New York's districts, which almost all run along city boundaries and are nested within the city, are the paradigmatic examples.

- **Type 2: Metropolitan.** These districts are mixed Urban and Suburban (and sometimes rural as well), encompassing all of the central city and at least a substantial portion of the suburban and/or rural hinterland. Many small cities, and many malapportioned districts before *Baker v. Carr* fall into this category.

- **Type 3: Sliced.** These districts combine urban residents with suburban and/or rural residents, typically in a way that makes the city look like a pie that has been sliced up. If a city is large enough to merit more than one district, this is often a main alternative to creating districts that are more internally homogeneous with respect to urbanicity.  Many districts that resulted from the forced redistricting following *Baker* look like this, as do many of the districts that result from court enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.

- **Type 4: Spillover.** These "remainder" districts combine urbanites with residents outside the central city, most often because there is some area of the city left over, or geographically anomalous, and cannot be fit into a more urban district. There are not many spillover districts, and for a a district to qualify as type 4, it must be from a city that has at least one Core district, to illustrate that the spillover is not just one of many pie slices.

These sub-types of city districts have not yet been thoroughly analyzed, beyond the figure in Chapter 3.

**Metro Area**



Urban

Suburban

Rural

**Type 1: Core**

**Type 2: Metropolitan**



**Type 3: Sliced**

**Type 4: Spillover**



Sliced U/S

Sliced U/S/R

U/S
Spillover

S/U Spillover

Figure A.1: Illustrations of ideal urban district-types.

Figure A.2: Congressional Districts, Colorado, 2003-2013.

Finally, during the coding process the large city with which the district is associated (as a city or suburban district) is noted, and in the case of very large cities, the part of the city represented is also noted (for instance, the South Side of Chicago, the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles, or the neighborhood of Manhattan in New York City). Recording the city allows for city delegation-level analyses as well as analyses of metropolitan-area and suburban delegations, as in Chapter 3, and as a handy referent when identifying the constituencies of representatives in other contexts.

## A.2.2 USR codes: examples

It may be useful to examine how this coding works with a few concrete examples. For instance, Figure A.2 uses the very straightforward example of districts in Colorado from 2003-2012. The first district traces the Denver city limits (marked by shading, though it's hard to tell in this map because the boundaries track each other so closely) unusually closely, and thus is coded as "City" on USRnum, "U" on USR, "7" on USRord, and "1" on USRtype. Districts 2, 6, and 7 include significant suburban and rural elements, and are each coded "Noncity" on USRnum, "S/R" on USR, and "3" on USRord. Because they do not include any portion of a large city, they do not receive a USRtype score.

Figure A.3: Congressional Districts, Chicago area, 2003-2013.

Because congressional district boundaries usually do not track municipal boundaries at all, and because cities are usually not almost perfectly sized for a congressional district, the scoring usually involves more judgements than it does for Denver. Figure **??** illustrates how congressional districts overlapped with the city of Chicago from 2003-2012. None of the districts is entirely within the city boundaries (again indicated by the shaded area), though the territory of the gerrymandered Fourth is effectively inside Chicago. All of the other districts that overlap Chicago have significant suburban components, and some are primarily suburban. Thus while the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth are all coded "City" on USRnum, they vary between "U/S" and "S/U" on USR, with USRord scores from 5 to 7, depending on the balance of the city/suburban mix.

Such elaborate and complicated district-drawing schemes have become more common over the past decades, as cities have been accorded fewer districts and lines must often be drawn with considerations other than contiguity in mind. The phenomenon of suburban sprawl also complicates these judgements. Before the 20th century, few cities had satellite communities that could reasonably be called suburbs: Cambridge (MA), Brooklyn, and some of the neighborhoods that are

now part of Philadelphia were a few notable exceptions.[4] For most cities, suburbanization became noticeable politically around the 1930 census, when there come to be medium-sized congressional districts outside the central city's boundaries. This is when I begin coding more suburban districts for many cities. Of course, in practice many of these included city, suburban, and rural components, sometimes older cities like Lowell (MA) become functional suburbs, sometimes suburbs like Brooklyn get incorporated into their central cities, and it is often very difficult to tell where the development line between "suburban" and "rural" ends for both historic and contemporary congresses. I have done my best to code these accurately, using historical streetmaps where available and knowledge of the development patterns of these cities and states. For most districts, however, geographic extent serves as a good indicator of population density, given the assumption of relatively equal district sizes mandated by law since the 1960s, and the fact that central cities are almost always more densely populated than their suburbs (if not necessarily as densely populated as *other* cities and *their suburbs*) helps in coding the suburban and mixed districts.

## A.3   Conflicts: Comparing USR and census-driven measures

As a test of concept and measurement validity, it is worthwhile to compare the USR scores with the previous standards where possible. Below I compare the USR codes to those developed using census measures of central city, suburban, and rural populations in Wolman and Marnicki (2005) and Mayhew (1966).

From this table we can see a few things. First, the USR total is the same as Mayhew for the 1950s. This is very encouraging, though we know that the two methods include slightly different sets of representatives because of the use of rental housing as a selection criteria in Mayhew's set. Compared with W-M, the aggregate figures for the USR categories roughly track those based on the census-based approach when we account for the fact that USR3 forces mixed districts into one of the three categories. Distributing the 66 "mixed" districts from 1963 in the Wolman and

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[4]Though before merging with New York, Brooklyn itself was a large enough city to be included in the dataset.

| Source | Year | City | Suburban | Rural | Mixed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayhew | 1950s | 140 | | | | City v Non-city |
| USR | 1953 | 140 | 63 | 227 | | USR3 |
| W-M | 1963 | 94 | 94 | 181 | 66 | |
| USR | 1963 | 143 | 88 | 205 | | USR3 |
| Wolman Marckini | 1973 | 103 | 131 | 131 | 70 | |
| USR | 1973 | 135 | 132 | 168 | | USR3 |
| W-M | 1983 | 88 | 191 | 93 | 63 | |
| USR | 1983 | 122 | 158 | 153 | | USR3 |
| Wolman Marckini | 1993 | 84 | 214 | 83 | 54 | |
| USR | 1993 | 141 | 144 | 148 | | USR3 |
| W-M | 2007 | 92 | 235 | 71 | 62 | Estimated |
| USR | 2007 | 140 | 152 | 143 | | USR3 |

Table A.1:  Comparing USR Scores with Census-based scores. *Source:* USR, Wolman and Marnicki (2005), Mayhew (1966), 2007 American Community Survey

Marckini table and the categories would be fairly closely matched in that year.  There do seem to be sizeable systematic differences, however:  the USR scores tend to have many more rural districts, and fewer suburban districts, than W-M, even when we assume that their mixed districts could be forced into one of the categories. But how different are the two systems of categorization, and what is driving this difference?  I looked closer by applying W-M's coding system to the 110th Congress, and comparing it district-by-district to the 7-category ordinal USR scores for that congress. The cross-tabulation is presented below in Table A.2.

| | USRord | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **W-M Category** | R | RS | SR | S | SU | USR | US | U | Total |
| Nonmetropolitan | 56 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 67 |
| Suburban | 50 | 0 | 47 | 65 | 12 | 20 | 26 | 0 | 220 |
| Urban | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 42 | 29 | 88 |
| Mixed | 41 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 60 |
| Total | 150 | 1 | 66 | 65 | 13 | 41 | 70 | 29 | 435 |

Table A.2:  Comparing USR Scores with the W-M method, 110th Congress*Source: USR, U.S. Census*

From this table, we can see the implications of using the different systems of identifying city districts and measuring district-level place character and a potential source of conflict for the USR scores. While most of the districts on which the W-M method is decisive in the 110th lie on or near the correct diagonal (from top-left to lower-right, in the top three rows), indicating that the USR score is in agreement with W-M's data for most districts, there is one major area where the scores disagree: the USR's use of only large cities as central cities makes them likely to score districts as

rural even if they do in fact include large suburban or "urban" populations *from small cities that do not account for .1 percent of the population*. There are 50 districts labelled as Rural in the USR but as Suburban using the W-M method, 41 more that they would find to be mixed, and 3 more that W-M would call urban but that USR calls Rural (or, really, "non-city"). This is troubling at first shot.

Looking closer, however, these are all districts that include small cities and/or their suburbs: cities such as Pensacola (FL), Erie (PA), and Rockford (IL) are among the largest cities in these districts, while most of them are more like the South Carolina 5th district, which runs along the border with Georgia and includes a few very small central cities in one loosely connected metropolitan area complex.

This closer look reveals that researchers should not adopt the Census Bureau's definition of central city uncritically for all analyses, because it does not have a high threshold for what is considered a metropolitan area. The Census definition of a central city is tied to that of a metropolitan area:

> The general concept of a metropolitan area (MA) is one of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social integration with that nucleus. Some MAs are defined around two or more nuclei ... An MA must contain either a place with a minimum population of 50,000 or a U.S. Census Bureau-defined urbanized area and a total MA population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New England)... In each metropolitan statistical area and consolidated metropolitan statistical area, the largest place and, in some cases, additional places are designated as central cities under the official standards.[5]

Our contemporary settlement patterns blur the lines between populated and unpopulated areas, and also between city and suburb. Over 262 million people (just over 85 percent of the national population) live in the 525 metropolitan areas identified by the the census definition of a metropolitan area.[6] A category of "city" that broad may be useful in differentiating and categorizing zones of economic activity, but it is not appropriate for assessing the strength of cities in national politics, because not all "central cities" are really cities—the Census definition does not

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[5]Census Geographic Definitions, www.census.gov/geo/www/geo_ defn.html#MA

[6]An additional 8 million live in the 152 additional "micropolitan" areas; it is unclear how these are treated by W-M.

sufficiently attend to size as a key component of urbanicity. These smaller places may be relative centers of local activity, but there are real differences in kind and degree that obviously differentiate them from places like New York, Chicago, which have been on the Lieberman list for a long time, but also from even smaller cities that have dropped out of the large city category such as Syracuse (NY) or Providence (RI). A list of cities that includes Anderson (SC), Pascagoula (MS), and Benton Harbor (MI) is too inclusive for a study of cities in national politics, and misses the importance of size as a dimension of urbanicity. And while the residential character of some of these districts that include the smaller cities and their surrounding areas may include developments like those in the suburbs of the larger cities, they are not the same political dynamics of the ideal-type metropolitan area—one large polity (large enough to merit representation in the nation) surrounded by many smaller ones, bound by economic activity but separated by political geography.

These districts, by and large, are best understood as consisting of small towns and their fringe areas; their inclusion as suburbs and cities in W-M and the census is an artifact of a census category, the central city, that is outdated (because the threshold size for central cities was decided when the national population was much smaller) and mostly intended to track economic and social variables, not political ones. The disparity between the W-M data and the USR ultimately hinges on one's answer to the question: can you have suburbs without a city? These are not classically rural communities, but most Americans are no longer cowboys or farmers in any case. These communities are sparsely populated areas far from a major city. I have adopted the vocabulary of rurality, which fits most of them even using W-M's categories, but their label of "non-metropolitan" may be just as appropriate—even if they are in census metropolitan areas. Once we look more closely at the districts with apparently too-low USR scores and see that they really are not associated with major cities, the utility of the USR scores becomes clearer, as they attend to the changes in place character representation over time.

Beyond this issue of suburban rurality, the USR approach has other potential issues as well, of which I have been conscious throughout the coding, and I have tried to minimize their potential distorting effects. The method is more subjective at the margins than a blind reliance on outside

census figures, and might be potentially distorted by a coder's differential knowledge about different places or their subjective interpretations of the maps. For instance, if a coder knew more about developmental patterns in some cities than in others, he or she might be able to more precisely gauge the balance between urban and suburban character in those places. These errors can be minimized with attention to history and cartography, and subjective interpretations are mitigated to a great extent by the use of textual legal descriptions of districts in addition to maps. However, the advantage afforded by not being limited to recent congresses for which census data are available, and which may distort what we mean by city representation in any case, is considerable, and outweighs this pitfall for historical analyses.

Second, this definition of "city," remains essentially neutral beyond a population threshold. It may therefore be appropriately exclusive of some small cities, and allow the kinds of communities that count as cities to evolve over time, but it also excludes some places that may be considered more "urban" by certain conventional understandings of the term than those in the set. For instance, Gary, IN, is never included in the set; though it seems to have a self-conceptions as a city, its built environment is recognizably "urban," and it has been the subject of at least one important study of urban politics,[7] it was never big enough to merit inclusion as a city large enough to represent itself in national politics. Santa Ana (CA) and Mesa (AZ) are included after 2000, on the other hand, even though they are basically large suburbs of sprawling late-20th century cities. Indeed, one could quite reasonably argue that Gary is a more "urban" community than even Phoenix, even though the latter includes almost 20 times as many members. That is basically Mayhew's approach. But this is as much a function of American social and economic development as a problem with social scientific classification, and fixes on a perhaps nostalgic or outdated conception of what a "city" is or should be. Any list of major cities over time has to adjust for changing patterns of development, and using size as an ultimate yardstick seems the best way to do this. This is an acknowledged conceptual hazard of the USR method of classification, and analyses bear it in mind.

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[7]Crenson (1971)

# Appendix B

# City District Demography

Legislative behavior is a function of intracameral and extracameral influences, though political scientists may not all agree on their relative importance. Intracameral influences include congressional parties, institutional incentives such as rules, committee assignments, and prestige.[1] Extracameral influences include some mix of personal preferences and ideology and constituency preferences and pressure.[2] In evaluating the role of constituency pressure in shaping legislative behavior, district-level demography is an important source of information—this is often used as helpful heuristic for identifying which legislators might be concerned with particular issues, or may be faced with cross-cutting pressures.[3] In analyses of the Senate and contemporary House of Representatives this is straightforward, as there are a wide range of readily available measures at the state level from the Census and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Because this study is particularly concerned with place character, and most variation on this dimension takes place within states, the House is the more interesting chamber. House district-level demography is trickier, because it is a less-used unit of analysis than states or counties. For the most recent congresses, the Census bureau has tabulated good measures on a number of variables at the district level, and these are available on the census website. For older Congresses a researcher must rely on the somewhat idiosyncratic collections made by other scholars for their own purposes. Some of these are readily available, and have become invaluable public goods. For Congresses 87-104 (1961-1997), Census data have been gathered by Lublin (1997), as well as by Adler (2012), who goes back even further, to 1943.[4]

Analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 in this study focus on the urban interlude/Long New Deal, including the 1930s, as a time period of important political change, and these older congresses are trickier, because Census data are not available at the district level. Mayhew (1966) uses *Congressional Quarterly* data from 1962 to conduct his study of city districts, combined with the *Congressional District Data Book* released by the Census bureau in 1961.[5] He then traces these districts

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[1]Mayhew (1966), Aldrich (2011)

[2]Mayhew (1966), Mayhew (1974), Krehbiel (1998)

[3]Mayhew (1966)

[4]On their own, in data that do not seem to be available, Wolman and Marnicki (2005) generated district-level measures of place character using Census data going back to 1963.

[5]p. 60

backward across fifteen years to identify the city districts in his study of 1947-1961. But his study of housing issues does not take any demography apart from homeownership into account, and includes no other demographics. Adler (2012) has created a very valuable dataset going back further, to 1943, using county-level measures to create congressional-district measures. This dataset includes such variables as percent African American, union households (at the state level), and percent blue-collar, an important resource, but for a study of city districts over the Long New Deal it is insufficient in two respects. First, 1943 is not quite far enough back to study the 1930s. We could apply values from the early 1940s to the 1930s and be reasonably confident that they would be related, but the 1940s was a particularly "mobile" period for many Americans, especially black Americans leaving the South for the cities of the North during wartime mobilization, in what we know as the Second Great Migration. So especially on race, measures from the mid-1940s are likely significantly higher than those from the 1930s. This may be true on other measures as well.

Second, and more important from an analytical perspective, because Adler's data is based on county-level measures, aggregated to make congressional districts, it works very well for rural districts but not city districts. Using this approach, Adler's recipe states that "Urban counties that contained multiple congressional districts were divided geographically and demographically according to the respective number of districts."[6] This means that for city districts within the same county, the county-wide measures are applied to each district (or divided equally, in the case of raw totals). This is as good as one can do with county-level data, but in densely populated places with high levels of spatial segregation (true of all major American cities during this period), this approach will mask cross-district heterogeneity, making it look as though populations are spread evenly across districts within a city delegation when they are not. This is especially important in racial segregation, which was stark, because equalizing the percent African American across districts gives a potentially misleading impression. For instance, in Adler's data it would appear that every district in Chicago had about 10 percent African American voters; in such a circumstance, every congressman might have the same incentive to respond to that black population's demands for reelection or renomination. In fact, as we saw in Figures 2 and 3 in Chapter 5, only

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[6] Adler (2012)

2 or 3 Chicago congressmen (out of 10) had significant black constituencies at this time because of residential segregation patterns. This pattern is well-known, but usually not accounted for in congressional studies.[7]

In this study, because I am particularly interested in racial dynamics and congressional representation, it is important to rule out the direct electoral connection between African American constituencies and city congressmen who do not represent them. I thus need more accurate measures of racial populations at the district level, not the county level. Fortunately, there are geographic techniques that can help us get better estimates of congressional districts below the county level for some cities in some congresses even before the 1960s. Analyses in chapters 4 and 5 use preliminary measures that reflect the true demographic heterogeneity of these districts during the 1930s-1950s. I develop the measures using the following techniques.

## B.1    Building district-level estimates in large cities

To create more accurate district-level demographics for city districts, we must build from lower levels of aggregation, not infer demographic evenness from the top-down. This is the approach Adler employs to construct rural district measures from their constituent parts (counties). To construct city districts from county data is akin to constructing all districts from state data: better than a completely naive estimate, but blind to within-area heterogeneity.[8] Census tracts are an appropriate sub-city level of aggregation for this: much smaller than congressional districts, and most fall within district lines. So I build my estimates of city district demography from the bottom up using tracts.

Today, the entire country is divided into census tracts, but this was not always the case. When the tract was first introduced as an analytical unit in 1910, counties in only nine city areas were divided into tracts: New York City, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Pitts-

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[7]For example, Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010) seem to use Adler's data without adjusting for this, including using the race variable, though they do not make any strong claims based on this analysis.

[8]Except in states with only one district, where it would work fine.

burgh, Milwaukee, and St. Louis.[9] By 1930, 24 counties in 14 states had been tracted, by 1940, 74 counties in 29 states, and so on. Of course, not all of these counties need to be disaggregated into tracts to get better congressional district measures. Some, like Syracuse or Omaha, were too small to be divided into more than one district. Others, like Nashville or Memphis, were probably large enough for multiple districts but because of unequal districting (a practice most egregious in, but not exclusive to, the South) did not get them and were within a single congressional district. For each of these kinds of cities and their districts, Adler's method works better. The districts for which Adler's measures need improvement can be identified by the fact that they have equivalent measures for variables that are very unlikely to actually be equivalent: the number of black residents or blue collar workers, etc. These are the districts for which more sensitive measures need to be developed.

The remainder of this appendix describes how I developed the more accurate district-level measures, using the example of race in Chicago districts from the 79th Congress (1945-1947). To fix these measures, I first identify the districts that are given the same county-level "top-down" measures. All districts from the same state and congress which share equivalent measures of percent African American and median family income with at least one other district are considered candidates for revision. This indicates that they were assigned a county-wide value by Adler's technique. In the 79th Congress, there were 71 such districts, representing 13 cities in 10 states that were "split" among two or more congressional districts.[10] After identifying these districts as candidates for the bottom-up measures, the goal is to take advantage of GIS techniques to create a spatial match, combining information from census tracts that fall within a single congressional district. For this, we need census tract data, which can be found at the National Historical GIS

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[9]Here I say "city areas" because the metropolitan area was then not yet in use as a unit of aggregate measurement. The Census divided certain counties that included or were included in these cities into tracts for these early decennial periods. Not until 1970 was the preponderance of the nation's territory assigned census tracts. See chart at https://assets.nhgis.org/Tract-availability.pdf for availability of tract-level data.

[10]The "split" cities were New York City, Buffalo, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Detroit, Saint Louis, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. A closer look includes Boston in this list, bringing the total to 73 districts; its two predominantly Bostonian congressional districts also include other counties. These were the cities with at least 2 congressional districts within their county borders.

(NHGIS).[11] The closest census to the 79th Congress is the 1940 decennial census.[12] The Census data from NHGIS includes numeric and spatial components. The NHGIS data from Chicago, 1940 are shown in Figure B.1. When we map Chicago's census tracts from 1940, we can see that there are thousands of tracts across the city, at left. Adding in numerical data on race, we can see that black Chicagoans were heavily concentrated on the near South and near West Sides during this time. This is illustrated by the tract-level percent black subfigure, at right in B.1. The darker the shaded area on the map, the higher the percent black in that tract. Notice that almost every tract on the North Side is completely white (on the map and demographically), indicating that it was less than 1 percent black at this point, not 10 percent, as we would be led to believe if the county-wide average was used everywhere.

These census tract data are helpful, and from this we can tell that congressional district-level percent black will not be even across the ten Chicago congressional districts. To make more precise estimates, however, we need to construct maps of the districts, overlay them on top of the demographic data, and aggregate up from the census tracts to create district-level measures. For this, we need descriptions of what the congressional districts look like.

For recent congresses, the Census has GIS shapefiles that could be overlaid onto census tracts.[13] For older congresses, constructed these districts in ESRI's ArcMap software by hand using written and hand drawn descriptions from multiple sources. The canonical text of historical congressional geography is Martis and et al. (1982), an historical atlas of congressional districts going back to the first congress through the early 1980s. This text includes both images of congressional districts, including helpful insets for densely populated areas, and verbal legal descriptions in its Appendix. I use both of these as initial resources to construct shapefile maps of congressional districts for the "split" cities listed above. In the case of Chicago (as with other cities), legal congressional district boundaries often refer to streets or local political jurisdiction. Thus while the legal descriptions

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[11]https://www.nhgis.org/

[12]For now, information from the closest decennial census is used for the measures. In the future, linear interpolations between censuses will be estimated. These decennial estimates are still far preferable to the existing data.

[13]Though we have good congressional-district data for these, so such a procedure is not necessary

Figure B.1: **Left: Chicago census tracts 1940 Census. Right: Percent black in Census Tracts, Chicago, 1940.** The Northside and outlying areas were almost entirely white, while tracts on the South and near West Side were over 75 percent black.

of rural districts are usually lists of counties (the Illinois 17th in the 79th Congress is defined as "Ford, Livingston, Logan, McLean, Woodford" counties), city districts are usually slightly more complicated. William Dawson's First district was defined as

> City of Chicago [wards 1, 2, 3 (that part east of the center line of Stewart Ave.), 4 (that part lying east of the center line of Halsted St.), 6 (that part north of the center line of 43rd St.)]

Thus to draw the map of Chicago districts we need information about both streets and aldermanic districts.[14] Street information is available from the Census TIGER/Line Shapefiles page.[15] For

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[14]Thankfully (from a mapping, if not democratic, perspective), Chicago did not alter its Congressional district map between the 58th and 80th congress, instead adding at-large seats when the state's growing population merited it more representation. Chicago's aldermanic ward boundaries changed more frequently, every ten years.

[15]hrefhttp://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2011/tgrshp2011.htmlhttp://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2011/

Chicago, the very helpful Web site "A Look At Cook" has historical ward boundary maps.[16].

Figure B.2 shows excerpts from the historical ward map and street map (with the First District outlined in bold/Red) Thus from Martis's descriptions, and the available geographical referents, the old congressional districts can be re-mapped for merging with census tract geographies.



Figure B.2: **Left: Chicago aldermanic wards, 1940.** *(Source: A Look At Cook)* **Right: Street map of South Side, with 1940 First District.** Drawn from Martis and et al. (1982) and ward map at left. *Source: US Census TIGER/Line Shapefiles*

Having drawn the congressional districts using the historical descriptions, we are now ready to merge the census tract data into district-level estimates of the relevant variables. The safest way

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[16]For 1940 boundaries, see http://www.alookatcook.com/1940/hypermap.html

Figure B.3: Centroids in and around Illinois First District, 1940.

to do this without double-counting (census tracts do not perfectly line up with congressional districts) is to assign each tract to the congressional district in which its centroid lies.[17] The centroids for tracts in and around the Illinois First district are shown in Figure B.3. The Census tract variable for black is conveniently already in count form (as opposed to percentage, which would require an extra step before aggregating to the district level), so using the Spatial Join tool in ArcMap we can sum the number of African Americans in census tracts whose centroids lie within each district. Other attributes, such as number of blue-collar workers and total population, are summed as well.

The end result of the spatial join is a map that resembles Figure 3 from Chapter 5, with the pattern of census tract-level segregation from Figure B.1 amplified at the level of congressional districts. For the South Side, the pattern is shown up close in Figure B.4.

When we zoom out to see the pattern across all of Chicago, the concentration is even starker

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[17]The centroid is the geographical center of a shape.

Figure B.4: **Left:** Chicago South Side Districts, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census. **Right:** Chicago South Side Districts, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census.

(this is a re-presentation of Figure 3 in chapter 5). Finally, here are the spatial patterns for New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles in the 79th Congress. The color scale is the same across cities (but NOT quite the same between tract and congressional district), so we can see how residential segregation aggregates into representational unevenness. For each city the figure at left is census tract-level percent black, with bold red lines outlining city congressional districts. At right are the congressional districts, shaded according to the percent black. In each city, the Adler "top-down" data attributes the same value of percent black to each district in the city (or county, in the case of New York City, which includes all five counties); with that data, each entire city would be some shade of light grey—though the cities themselves would vary (Los Angeles would be lower than the others shown here). In each place, black residence was uneven, and there were a

number of representatives with virtually no black constituency, yet as shown in Chapter 5, these representatives were consistently cohesive and liberal on civil rights issues in the run-up to the 1960s.



Figure B.5: **Left:** Chicago, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census. African Americans were heavily concentrated within cities like Chicago. **Right:** Chicago, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census. Residential segregation led to political segregation: few congressmen had many black constituents.

States redraw their district boundaries sporadically, most often after the decennial census. For long stretches in the early 20th century, many district boundaries went unchanged. When they changed, I drew a new map for that area and recalculate the district-level measures.[18] The new estimates for the "split" city districts are then re-inserted into the dataset for analysis, better (though still imperfectly) reflecting the true district attributes, and ostensibly better estimates of this aspect of constituency pressure, at least according to our theories of how pressure might work if it is related to numbers. Overall, these fixes are most relevant to the percent black in city districts,

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[18]This process is still in progress for all congresses before 1940 and for some districts after; estimates based on the closest approximation in time and space are used for districts that have not been completed at this writing.

Figure B.6: **New York City (and surrounding urban areas), Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census.**



Figure B.7: **New York City, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census.**

which is typically the most unevenly spaced variable in these analyses (as well as the most theoretically important for the analysis in Chapter 5). The cities affected are New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Boston, Cleveland, Baltimore, Buffalo, Detroit, Cincinnati, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. I applied this fix to measures for the city districts in congresses ranging from the 75th (1937-1939) to 86th (1959-1961) Congresses, those that pre-dated Lublin's more accurate district-based census data.

Figure B.8: **Los Angeles, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census.**



Figure B.9: **Los Angeles, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census.**



Figure B.10: **Philadelphia, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census.**



Figure B.11: **Philadelphia, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census.**

# Appendix C

# Senate USR Scores

The analyses in this study focus on the House of Representatives. This is the typical approach adopted to study city representatives in national legislative politics, and with good reason: it is much more difficult to tell *a priori* whether a Senator "represents" a city (compared to a House member). The fundamental unit of representation in the Senate is the state, and the allotment of per-capita Senate representation is famously imbalanced, but usually this is considered at the state level. For instance, today the 720,000 Alaskans have as many senators as the 19.4 million residents of New York State. But if we think about cities as distinctive political communities within the nation, and within their states, there is even greater potential for representational imbalance within this chamber. For instance, there is no formal allocation of senate representation for New York *City*'s 8.2 million residents; they must vie with others within their state to have their views represented in this body. In the context of a strong place character divide, present in New York for decades and under which non-city forces are aligned against big cities, this kind of arrangement may be very dire indeed for the representation of cities in the Senate, because there have been so few statewide city majorities.[1] Given the distribution of seats and population, it is realistic that the Senate might be entirely composed of those indifferent or hostile to cities.

In reality, there do seem to be some Senators that we might consider to be a part of the city institutional order, but there are no studies I am aware of that try to estimate *a priori* which Senators are likely to be attentive to city concerns, or to look closely at the role of cities in the Senate. Nevertheless, with these challenges in mind it may still be useful to try to estimate city representation and power in the Senate. In this section, I briefly estimate the size and partisan character of representation in the Senate over time, in a similar fashion to how the history of the House was presented in Chapter 3. When I do, below, the patterns of temporal and partisan change that emerge in the upper chamber are far less pronounced.

The first step is to assign the equivalent of statewide USR scores. This is more complicated than House districts, because almost all states include significant city, suburban, and rural elements, so most states are mixed constituencies. Further, a state's city population is likely to be related to its suburban population in the 20th century, so the presence of a large city may not al-

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[1]Today, the residents of large central cities—those present in Lieberman's (2009) dataset—do not make up a majority of residents in *any* state.

ways mean strong net representation gains for that city.[2] Identifying city senators when no state median voters live in a large city might leave us with an empty set, but a closer look can give us more realistic estimates of which Senators are likely to be attentive to city concerns in national politics. For Lieberman (2009), representatives from states with large cities were candidates for being part of a bloc representing city interests in national legislative politics. The USR scores described above allow for a more fine-grained approach in the House, as within-state variation is an important feature of the place-character divide. For Senators, however, who each represent their entire state, Lieberman's approach is a more appropriate starting point, and one I adopt here.

A state is considered a "city" state, and its Senators given a USR score of at least 1, if it contains a city with more than .1 percent of the national population (those cities are identified in the Lieberman (2009) dataset). USR scores for Senate increase as the following secondary conditions are satisfied:

**a) "City-state":** More than 1/2 of the state's congressional districts are "city" districts (that is, they have a USR of at least 6 out of 7)

**b) "Party of cities":** Of the members of the House from that state, at least 1/4 are from a city, and of those city representatives, at least 3/4 are from the same party as the Senator.

**c) "State city caucus":** At least 1/2 of the state's representatives from the same party as the Senator are from cities

**d) "Former city Rep":** The Senator is a former (or, less common, future) member of the House representing a city district from the state.

If a Senator meets one or more of these secondary conditions, he or she is considered a "city" senator for the purposes of this analysis of city power in the Senate over time, and given a USR score

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[2]As a result, statewide demographic measures of "urban" population, as in Adler's (2008) dataset, are helpful but fuzzy, as that variable includes both central cities and suburbs in the percent urban. The statewide USR scores presented below are based mostly on the USR data from the House, rather than on direct census data. A further refinement that incorporates historical census data is a future step, but one which will likely not change these results substantially. This judgment is based on analyses incorporating direct demographics from recent censuses, which are more readily available.

**Conditions for USR scoring, Senate (1867-2011**

| USR Score | Description | % Overall | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | No city in state | 43 | 61 |
| 1 | State has city | 35 | 47 |
| 2 | State has city, and 1 of above secondary conditions | 11 | 21 |
| 3 | State has city, and at least 2 of secondary conditions | 11 | 19 |

Table C.1: **Definitions for USR scoring, Senate.** Senators are given USR scores based on a combination of state-level and personal factors. The third column indicates the percentage of Senators in this category overall, and the fourth indicates the the maximum historical proportion of the Senate in this category.

of 2 (out of 3). If more than 1 of the secondary conditions are met, the Senator gets a score of 3. For the sake of clarity, the Figures and analyses in this section combine Senators with USR scores of 2 or 3 into one category; we can think of these Senators, who represent states with large cities and have strong personal and/or political ties to those cities, as "core" urban Senators. There is less precision in these Senate measures, so Figure C.1 below is perhaps best interpreted as presenting a range of city power in the Senate over time: the high end of the lightly-shaded grey range represents the maximal city representation, if all senators from states with cities were attentive to big-city concerns. The low end is more restrictive, demanding that the senators meet at least one of the conditions above, indicating actual political or personal attachment to the city in his or her state.[3] No doubt the actual power of the city institutional order lies somewhere in between.

Figure C.1 illustrates trends in city power in the Senate and the partisan distribution of different kinds of Senators. The patterns are different from those in the House, as the partisan divide does not seem to be as strong in this chamber. From the subfigure on the left, it is apparent that the number of Senators with large cities in their states grew and then plateaued over the 20th century. This is a function of the same pattern of city dispersion we saw in Figures 3.1 and 3.4. However, this increase was not quite matched by the increase in Senators with actual political or personal ties to their states' cities (the darker shaded area on the bottom of the figure), those we might think

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[3]If the place character divide is real, and it seems to be, then it is important to take into account the fact that the presence of a city within a state may cut both ways, and as the central city and suburban components reach demographic parity the presence of a large city may not be as much of a political net gain for city forces. This seems particularly appropriate at the state level, where rivalries between city and country are often most evenly matched. In such a context, some Senators may be motivated by urban concerns and have their base in the city, while others may see the city as a political force to oppose, and draw strength from non-city areas. The secondary conditions above attempt to deal with this possibility, measuring indications of affinity for or political ties to the city.

## Senators, by urbanicity          Senators, by urbanicity and party



Figure C.1: **Senators by USR categories and Party** At left, overall city power in the Senate. The white area is Senators who represent a state without a city. The light grey area represents Senators with at least one city in their state, the dark grey area Senators with important connections to their city. At right, the partisan breakdowns of the same categories over time. *Source: USR data.*

of as "core" urban Senators. In fact, the number of Senators with political links to cities has actually fallen since the 1960s. This may have an impact on the substance of policymaking; if fewer Senators find their home-state allies in large cities, it may be more difficult for those interested in city concerns to navigate the arcane folkways of that upper chamber.

Because the USR constituency-representative link is conceived of differently for the Senate (the scores, at least those in the higher two categories, are a mix of state demographics and individual- and state-level political measures, so a state could move categories in a way that a House district could not), some Senators' placements on this scale may not perfectly reflect their

responsiveness to city issues.[4] With that in mind, we can nevertheless make a few observations.

In partisan terms, the pattern is similar to but weaker than that in the House over time: Senators who represent cities, at least those with observable ties to their cities, have become more closely associated with the Democrats over time. The bottom of the figure gets bluer, while the top gets redder, but less so than in the House. This began with the sharp shift in 1933, when Senators of all sorts, but especially those with ties to cities, became very blue. Almost all Senators with a large city in their state were Democrats early in the New Deal, an almost complete reversal from just a few cycles earlier, when city senators were largely (but not really distinctively) Republicans.

The shift to the GOP by non-city Senators was sharpest in the late 1970s through the early 1980s, at least a decade before the big shift in the House, which took place in the 1990s. One might think that this drop-off in rural Democrats was related to the partisan transformation of the South; this was a large part of the story in the House of the 1990s, when rural Southern districts shifted toward the Republican column. In the Senate, however, the drop is attributable to a shift to the GOP in the Mountain states. Most Southern states, after all, do have large cities (giving their Senators a USR score of at least 1; among southern states, only Mississippi, Arkansas, and South Carolina were city-less before 1990. Between them, only one seat shifted to the Republicans during this time period, as John Eastland gave way to Thad Cochrane in Mississippi.) By contrast, five Western states with no large cities, (Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, and Alaska) saw at least one reliably Democratic seat become reliably Republican in the late 1970s or early 1980s.

Indeed, partisan affiliation of Senators from states with no large cities falls along regional lines. The Democrats are mainly from the northeast and most are from "city remnant" states such as Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Jersey which used to have large cities but no longer do. Republicans are generally from the mountainous western states mentioned above.

While the extremes—Senators with no city to represent, and those with personal or political

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[4]For instance, if the city representatives from a state were split between the parties, or if the Senator was an urban-studies professor from a land-grant college with no apparent institutional ties to the city, the secondary conditions would not pick up their ties to the city; alternatively, if a ruralist from within a state with a city won office as an intra-party rival of city forces within the state, running against them, these conditions would not account for that anti-city animus. Alternatively, a Democratic Senator would be more likely to fall into the high-urbanicity category because the city districts in his or her state would likely be Democratic, given the historical changes in the House. An "equivalent" Republican Senator would likely fall into the central category, even if he or she was somehow elected with city support.

ties to the large cities in their state—have come to fit more neatly into the urban-rural partisan divide, the contested middle set of Senators with a city in their state but who do not meet one of the secondary conditions outlined above have been more volatile in their partisan affiliation. Though the overall trend seems to favor the Republicans, this group has been more subject to swings, and more evenly divided by party, than the strongly city Senators. As in the House, the "middle" category on the urbanicity continuum is the most contested, though their actual constituencies may not be and more homogeneously suburban than the bottom category. Looking closer, this category includes most of the key "battleground" states that have been closely contested in recent presidential elections: Florida, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Carolina, Colorado, and Virginia. These are states where the cities do not hold the balance of power, or where statewide outcomes (in terms of winning, not necessarily party vote percentages) are highly variable.