



Columbia University

*Department of Economics
Discussion Paper Series*

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Discussion Paper No.: 1213-08

Department of Economics
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New York, NY 10027

November 2012

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October 17, 2012

Abstract

As a textbook model of contingent markets, horse races are an attractive environment to study the attitudes towards risk of bettors. We innovate on the literature by explicitly considering heterogeneous bettors and allowing for very general risk preferences, including non-expected utility. We build on a standard single-crossing condition on preferences to derive testable implications; and we show how parimutuel data allow us to uniquely identify the distribution of preferences among the population of bettors. We then estimate the model on data from US races. Within the expected utility class, the most usual specifications (CARA and CRRA) fit the data very badly. Our results show evidence for both heterogeneity and nonlinear probability weighting.

*This paper was first circulated and presented under the title "What you are is what you bet: eliciting risk attitudes from horse races." We thank many seminar audiences for their comments. We are especially grateful to Jeffrey Racine for advice on nonparametric and semiparametric approaches, and to Simon Wood for help with his R package `mgcv`. Bernard Salanié thanks the Georges Meyer endowment for its support during a leave at the Toulouse School of Economics. Pierre Andre Chiappori gratefully acknowledges financial support from NSF (Award 1124277.)

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1 Introduction

There is mounting experimental evidence that risk attitudes are massively heterogeneous. To quote but a few examples, Barsky et al. (1997) use survey questions and observations of actual behavior to measure relative risk aversion. Results indicate that this parameter varies between 2 (for the first decile) and 25 (for the last decile), and that this heterogeneity is poorly explained by demographic variables. Guiso and Paiella (2006) report similar findings, and use the term ‘massive unexplained heterogeneity’. Chiappori and Paiella (2011) observe the financial choices of a sample of households across time, and use these panel data to show that while a model with constant relative risk aversion well explains each household’s choices, the corresponding coefficient is highly variable across households (its mean is equal to 4.2, for a median equal to 1.7). (Distributions of) risk aversions have also been estimated using data on television games (Beetsma and Schotman, 2001), demand for insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007) or risk sharing within closed communities (Bonhomme et al. 2012, Chiappori et al. 2012). These papers and many others indicate that attitudes towards risk and uncertainty are widely heterogeneous, and that recognizing this heterogeneity may be crucial to understand observed behavioral patterns.

The various attempts just mentioned share a common feature: they all rely on data on individual behavior. Indeed, a widely shared view posits that microdata are indispensable to analyze heterogeneous attitudes to risk. The present paper challenges this claim. It argues that, in many contexts, the distribution of risk aversion can be nonparametrically identified, even in the absence of data on *individual* decisions; we only need to use the (aggregate) conditions that characterize an equilibrium, provided that these equilibria can be observed on a large set of different “markets”. While a related approach has often been used in other fields (e.g., empirical industrial organization), to the best of our knowledge, it has never been applied to the estimation of a distribution of individual attitudes towards risk.

Specifically, we focus on the case of horse races, which can be seen as a textbook example for financial markets, and for which large samples are available. The races we consider use parimutuel betting; that is, those lucky bettors that have bet on the winning horse share the total amount wagered in the race (minus the organizer’s take)—so that observing the odds of a horse is equivalent to observing its market share. The intuition underlying our approach can be summarized as follows. Assume that, for any given race, we can simultaneously observe both the odds and the winning probability of each horse. Clearly, the relationship between these two sets of variables depends on (the distribution of) bettors’

attitudes toward risk. To take but a simple example, with risk neutral bettors odds would be directly proportional to winning probabilities. As we shall see, a linear relationship of this kind is largely counterfactual. But a basic insight remains: the variation in odds (or market shares) from race to race as a function of winning probabilities conveys information on how bettors react to given lotteries. If we observe a large enough number of “markets” (here races) with enough variations (here in odds and winning probabilities), and under the assumption that the population of bettors has the same distribution of preferences in these markets, we may learn about the characteristics of this distribution from the sole observation of probabilities and resulting odds on these different markets.

This leads to two fundamental questions. One is testability: can one derive, from some general, *theoretical* representation of individual decision under uncertainty, testable restrictions on equilibrium patterns—as summarized by the relationship between probabilities and odds? The second issue relates to identifiability: under which conditions is it possible to recover, from the same equilibrium patterns, the structure of the underlying model—i.e., the distribution of individual preferences?

While additional restrictions are obviously necessary to reach this dual goal, we show that they are surprisingly mild. Essentially, three assumptions are needed. One is that, when choosing between lotteries, agents only consider their direct outcomes: the utility derived from choosing one of them (here, betting on a given horse) does not depend on the characteristics of the others. While this assumption does rule out a few existing frameworks (e.g., those based on regret theory), it remains compatible with the vast majority of models of decision making under uncertainty. Secondly, we assume that agents’ decisions regarding bets are based on the *true* distribution of winning probabilities. An assumption of this kind is clearly indispensable in our context; after all, any observed pattern can be rationalized by a well chosen distribution of ad-hoc, individual beliefs. Note, however, that we do not assume these probabilities are used in a linear way; on the contrary, we allow for the type of probability (or belief) distortions emphasized by modern decision theory, starting with Yaari’s dual model or Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory. In other words, we accept that a given probability can have different “weights” in the decision process of different agents; but, for parsimony, we choose to model this heterogeneity as individual-specific deformations of a common probability distribution.¹ Our last assumption is related to the form of preference heterogeneity among agents. Specifically, we assume that it is one-

¹Of course, such a formulation implies some restrictions on observed behavior. For instance, most probability deformation functions are monotonic; using one of these therefore implies that individual deformations cannot reverse the probability ranking of two events.

dimensional, and satisfies a standard single-crossing condition. Note that the corresponding heterogeneity may affect preferences, beliefs (or probability deformation) or both; in that sense, our framework is compatible with a wide range of theoretical frameworks.

Our main theoretical result states that, under these three conditions, an equilibrium always exists, is unique, and that the answer to both previous questions is positive: one can derive strong testable restrictions on equilibrium patterns, and, when these conditions are fulfilled, one can identify the distribution of preferences in the population of bettors.

We then provide an empirical application of these results. In practice, we introduce the crucial concept of *normalized fear of ruin* (NF), which directly generalizes the fear or ruin index introduced in an expected utility setting by Aumann and Kurz (1977). We argue that this concept provides the most adequate representation of the risk/return trade off for the type of binomial lotteries under consideration in our context. Intuitively, the NF measures the elasticity of required return with respect to probability, along an indifference curve *between lotteries*; as such, it can be defined under expected utility maximization (in which case it does not depend on probabilities), but also in more general frameworks, entailing for instance probability deformations or various non-separabilities. We show that the identification problem boils down to recovering the NF index as a function of odds, probabilities and a one-dimensional heterogeneity parameter. We provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a given function to be an NF; these provide the testable restrictions mentioned above. Also, we show that, under these conditions, the distribution of NF is non parametrically identified.

Finally, we estimate our model on a sample of more than 25,000 races involving some 200,000 horses. We derive a new empirical strategy to non parametrically identify the relationship between the NF index and its determinants (i.e., odds, probabilities and an heterogeneity parameter). Since the populations in the various “markets” must, in our approach, have similar distributions of preferences, we focus on races taking place during weekdays, on urban race fields. We show that our restrictions regarding both the one-dimensional heterogeneity and the single crossing conditions fit the data well, at least in the regions in which heterogeneity can be identified with enough power. Last but not least, we derive a non parametric estimation of both a general model (involving unrestricted non expected utility with general one-dimensional heterogeneity) and several submodels (including homogeneous and heterogenous versions of expected utility maximization, Yaari’s dual model and rank-dependent expected utility).

Our empirical conclusions are quite interesting. First, we confirm that the role of het-

erogeneity is paramount; even the most general models perform poorly under homogeneity. Second, both the shape of individual utilities and its variations across agents are complex. For instance, under our preferred specification, a significant fraction of bettors are risk averse for some bets and risk loving for others. This suggests that the parametric approaches adopted in much applied work should be handled with care, at least when applied to the type of data considered here, as they may imply unduly restrictive assumptions.²

An obvious limitation of our study is that it considers a selected (although quite large) population, namely individuals betting in horse races. Clearly, this subpopulation may not be representative of the general public. Still, we believe that gathering information about the distribution of preferences in this population may provide interesting insights on individual attitudes to risk in general. Moreover, even though the details of our approach are case specific, the general idea—recovering attitudes to risk from equilibrium patterns observed on many markets—can and should be transposed to different contexts.

1.1 Related Literature

The notion that the form of a general equilibrium manifold may generate testable restrictions is not new, and can be traced back to Brown and Matzkin (1996) and Chiappori et al. (2002, 2004)—the latter in addition introduce the idea of recovering individual preferences from the structure of the manifold. But these papers have not, to the best of our knowledge, lead to empirical applications. Our contributions here are most closely related to the literature on estimating and evaluating theories of individual risk preferences, and also to the literature on identification of random utility models. There is now a large literature that tests and measures theories of individual risk preference using laboratory methods (see e.g., Bruhin et al (2010) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) for two recent contributions.) There is also a sizable literature that directly elicits individual risk preferences through survey questions (see e.g., Barsky et al (1997); Bonin et al (2007); Dohmen et al (2011)) and correlates these measures with other economic behaviors. The literature on studying risk preferences as revealed by market transactions is much more limited. The primary avenues that have been pursued are insurance choices (see e.g., Cohen and Einav (2007); Sydnor (2010); and Barseghyan et al (2011)) and gambling behavior (see e.g., Andrikogiannopoulou (2010)). However all of these studies fundamentally exploit individual level demand data to

²For instance, under such commonly used representations as CARA or CRRA preferences, any given individual is either always risk averse or always risk loving.

estimate risk preferences and document heterogeneity.

The literature on estimating risk preferences from market level data has almost exclusively used a representative agent paradigm. Starting with Weitzman (1965), betting markets have served as a natural source of data for representative agent studies of risk preferences due to the textbook nature of the gambles that are offered. In the context of racetrack betting, Jullien and Salanié (2000) and Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) provide evidence showing that a representative agent with non-linear probability weighting better explains the pattern of prices at the racetrack as compared to an expected utility maximizing representative agent. Aruoba and Kearney (2011) present similar findings using cross sectional prices and quantities from state lotteries. These representative agent studies of betting markets stand in contrast to a strand of research that has emphasized belief heterogeneity as an important determinant of equilibrium in security markets. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2010) and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2011) argue that heterogeneity of beliefs and/or information of risk neutral agents can explain the well known favorite longshot bias that empirically characterizes betting market odds, and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial furthermore estimate the degree of belief heterogeneity revealed by the odds. In contrast, our aim here is to fully explore the consequences of heterogeneity in preferences. Our paper is the only one to date that nonparametrically identifies and estimates heterogeneous risk preferences from market level data. Furthermore, while our theoretical framework excludes heterogeneity in beliefs, it allows for heterogeneity in probability weighting across agents; and our nonparametric approach allows us to compare this and other theories (such as heterogeneity in risk preferences in an expected utility framework.)

Finally, our paper makes a contribution to the identification of random utility models of demand. Random utility models have become a popular way to model market demand for differentiated products following Bresnahan (1987), Berry (1994), and Berry et al. (1995). A lingering question in this literature is whether preference heterogeneity can indeed be identified from market level observations alone. Along with Chiappori, Gandhi, Salanié and Salanié (2009), our paper shows that a non-parametric model of vertically differentiated demand can be identified from standard variation in the set of products available across markets. In particular we exploit a one dimensional source of preference heterogeneity that satisfies a standard single crossing condition consistent with vertically differentiated demand. We show that the identification of inverse demand from the data allows us to non-parametrically recover this class of preferences. This stands in contrast to recent work by Berry and Haile (2010), who use full-support variation in a “special regressor” to show

that an arbitrary random utility model can be recovered from inverse demand³. We instead show identification of random utility without a special regressor by exploiting the additional restriction that random utility satisfies the single crossing structure.

We present the institution, assumptions, and the structure of market equilibrium in section 2. In section 3, we explain the testable restrictions on observed demand behavior implied by the model, and we show that these restrictions are sufficient to identify preferences. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy. We describe our results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Theoretical framework

Parimutuel We start with the institutional organization of parimutuel betting. Consider a race with $i = 1 \dots n$ horses. The simplest bets are “win bets”, i.e. bets on the winning horse: each dollar bet on horse i pays a net return R_i if horse i wins, and is lost otherwise. R_i is called the *odds* of horse i , and in parimutuel races it is determined by the following rule: all money wagered by bettors constitutes a pool that is redistributed to those who bet on the winning horse, apart from a share t corresponding to taxes and a house “take”. Accordingly, if s_i is the share of the pool corresponding to the sums wagered on horse i , then the payment to a winning bet of \$1 is

$$R_i + 1 = \frac{1 - t}{s_i} \tag{1}$$

Hence odds are not set by bookmakers; instead they are determined by the distribution (s_1, \dots, s_n) of bets among horses. Odds are mechanically low for those horses on which many bettors laid money (favorites), and they are high for outsiders (often called longshots)⁴. Because shares sum to one, these equations together imply

$$\frac{1}{1 - t} = \sum_i \frac{1}{R_i + 1} \tag{2}$$

Hence knowing the odds (R_1, \dots, R_n) allows to compute both the take t and the shares in the pool (s_1, \dots, s_n) .

³See also Gautier-Kitamura (2012) on the binary choice model.

⁴According to this formula odds can even be negative, if s_i is above $(1 - t)$ —it never happens in our data.

Probabilities We now define a n -horse *race* (\mathbf{p}, t) by a vector of positive probabilities $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_n)$ in the n -dimensional simplex, and a take $t \in (0, 1)$. Note that p_i is the *objective* probability that horse i wins the race. Our setting is thus compatible with traditional models of decision under uncertainty, in which all agents agree on the probabilities, and these probabilities are unbiased. Such a setting singles out preferences as the driving determinant of odds; it accords well with empirical work that shows how odds discount most relevant information about winning probabilities⁵. It is also consistent with the familiar rational expectations hypothesis (in fact we will later show that a rational expectations equilibrium exists and is unique in our setting). It is important to stress, however, that our framework is also compatible with more general models of decision uncertainty. In particular, it allows (among other things) for the type of *probability weighting* that characterizes many non-expected utility functionals (whereby the actual decision process may involve arbitrary functions of the probabilities). Moreover, these probability deformations may, as we shall see, be agent-specific. In other words, our general framework encompasses both “traditional” models, in which agents always refer to objective probability and heterogeneity only affects preferences, and more general versions in which the treatment of the probabilities is heterogenous among agents. As we shall see, the only strong restriction we put is on the *dimension* of the heterogeneity under consideration, not on its nature.

Following the literature to date⁶, we endow each bettor with a standardized unit bet size that he allocates to his most preferred horse in the race. In particular, we do not model participation, and bettors are not allowed to opt out. Therefore the shares (s_i) in the pool defined above can be identified to market shares. Any bettor looks on a bet on horse i as a lottery that pays returns R_i with probability p_i , and pays returns (-1) with probability $(1 - p_i)$. We denote this lottery by (R_i, p_i) , and call it a *gamble*. By convention, throughout the paper we index horses by decreasing probabilities $(p_1 > \dots > p_n > 0)$, so that horse 1 is the favorite.

Risk neutrality as a benchmark As a benchmark, consider the case when bettors are risk-neutral, and thus only consider the expected gain associated to any specific bet⁷. Equi-

⁵See Sung and Johnson (2008) and Ziemba (2008) for recent surveys on the informational efficiency of betting markets.

⁶See Weitzman (1965), Jullien and Salanié (2000), Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), among others.

⁷Clearly, a risk neutral player will not take a bet with a negative expected value unless she derives some fixed utility from gambling. The crucial assumption, here, is that this “gambling thrill”, which explains why such people gamble to start with, does not depend on the particular horse on which the bet is placed—so that, *conditional on betting*, bettors still select the horse that generates the highest expected gain.

librium then requires expected values to be equalized across horses. Since bets (net of the take) are redistributed, this yields:

$$p_i R_i - (1 - p_i) = -t$$

which, together with (2), gives probabilities equal to

$$p_i^n(R_1, \dots, R_n) = \frac{1}{R_i + 1} = \frac{1 - t}{1 + R_i} = s_i. \quad (3)$$

By extension, for any set of odds (R_1, \dots, R_n) , the above probabilities p_i^n will be called the risk-neutral probabilities. These probabilities are exactly equal to the shares s_i in the betting pool, as defined in (1) and (2). Many stylized facts (for instance, the celebrated *favourite-longshot bias*) can easily be represented by comparing the “true” probabilities with the risk-neutral ones—more on this below.

2.1 Preferences and single-crossing

Preferences over gambles We consider a continuum of bettors, indexed by a parameter θ . In our setting, a gamble (a horse) is defined by two numbers: the odds R and the winning probability p . To model individual choices, we assume that each bettor θ is characterized by a utility function $V(R, p, \theta)$, defined over the set of gambles and the set of individuals. Thus, in a given race, θ bets on the horse i that gives the highest value to $V(R_i, p_i, \theta)$. Since we treat V nonparametrically, we can without loss of generality normalize the distribution of θ so that it is uniform on $[0, 1]$. In the end, we therefore define V on $\mathbb{R}^+ \times [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$.

Note that V is a utility function defined *on the space of gambles*. As such, it is compatible with expected utility, but also with most non expected utility frameworks; a goal of this paper is precisely to compare the respective performances of these various models for the data under consideration. As usual, V is defined only ordinally, i.e. up to an increasing transform. Finally, the main restriction implicit in our assumption is that the utility derived from betting on a given horse does not depend on the other horses in the race; we thus rule out models based for instance on regret theory⁸, and generally any framework in which the valuation of any bet depends not only on the characteristics of the bet but also on the whole

⁸See e.g. Gollier and Salanié (2006).

set of bets available⁹.

We will impose several assumptions on V . We start with very weak ones:

Assumption 1 V is continuously differentiable almost everywhere; and it is increasing with R and p .

Differentiability is not crucial; it just simplifies some of the equations. Our framework allows for a kink at some reference point for instance, as implied by prospect theory. The second part of the assumption reflects first-order stochastic dominance: bettors prefer bets that are more likely to win, or that have higher returns when they do.

The Normalized Fear of Ruin (NF) When analyzing individual behavior under risk, a fundamental notion is the trade-off between risk and return; one goal of the present paper is precisely to identify this trade-off from observed choices. Technically, the trade-off can be described in several ways. One is the marginal rate of substitution¹⁰ w :

$$w(R, p, \theta) \equiv \frac{V_p}{V_R}(R, p, \theta) > 0$$

Since the utility function V is only defined up to an increasing transform, the properties of w fully determine the bettors' choices among gambles. In practice, however, we shall focus on a slightly different index, that we call the normalized fear-of-ruin (NF):

$$NF(R, p, \theta) \equiv \frac{p}{R+1} \frac{V_p}{V_R}(R, p, \theta) = \frac{p}{R+1} w(R, p, \theta) > 0$$

Using NF rather than more traditional measures of risk-aversion has several advantages. It is unit-free, as it is the elasticity of required return with respect to probability on an indifference curve:

$$NF = - \left. \frac{\partial \log(R+1)}{\partial \log p} \right|_V.$$

As such it measures the local trade off between risk and return. Moreover, it has a “global” interpretation for the type of binomial lotteries we are dealing with. Indeed, for a risk-neutral agent the NF index is identically equal to one. An index above one indicates that the agent is willing to accept a lower expected return $p(R+1) - 1$ in exchange for an increase in the probability p . Conversely, if an agent with an index below one is indifferent between betting

⁹We could accommodate characteristics such as the origin of the horse, as long as they are in the data.

¹⁰Throughout the paper subscripts to functions indicate partial derivatives.

on a favorite (p, R) and a longshot ($p' < p, R' > R$), then it must be that the expected return on the longshot is below that on the favorite. For instance, in a representative agent context, the favorite-longshot bias is explained by the representative agent having a NF index below one. Remember, however, that our approach entails heterogeneous bettors; as such, it is more general, and can accommodate the existence of bettors with different NF indices.

The expected utility case In an expected utility framework, the NF index has a simple expression. Indeed, normalizing to zero the utility $u(-1, \theta)$ of losing the bet, we have that:

$$V(R, p, \theta) = pu(R, \theta)$$

and therefore

$$NF(R, p, \theta) = \frac{1}{R+1} \frac{u}{u_R}(R, \theta)$$

so that the NF index is independent from the probability p . The ratio u/u_R was called the *fear of ruin* (FoR) index by Aumann and Kurz (1977). Geometrically, $NF(R, p, \theta)$ is the ratio of two slopes on the graph of the utility function: that of the chord linking two points, $(-1, 0)$ (which represents losing the bet) and $(R, u(R))$ (winning), and that of the tangent to the utility graph at $(R, u(R))$ (see Figure 1.)

The properties of the NF index in the expected utility case are well known (see Foncel and Treich, 2005). A sufficient condition for an agent to have a higher NF index than another agent at all values of R is that the former be more risk-averse than the latter¹¹. Consequently, if the agent is risk averse, then his NF index is larger than 1; if he is risk-loving, it is smaller than 1. Lastly, while the NF index need not be monotonic in R , specific functional forms may generate additional properties. For example, an agent with constant absolute risk-aversion is either risk-averse (so that her NF is above 1 and increasing) or risk-loving (and then her NF is below 1 and decreasing). The same “fanning out” holds in the generalized CRRA case, for which

$$u(R) = \frac{(W+R)^{1-\gamma} - (W-1)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

where $W > 1$ is the agent’s wealth.

¹¹Recall that u is more risk-averse than v if there exists an increasing and concave function k such that $u = k(v)$. Given our normalization $u(0) = v(0) = 0$, this implies that k is such that $k(x)/x$ decreases with x . This property is equivalent to the fact that u has a higher NF index than v , at any value of R (see Foncel and Treich, 2005).




Figure 1: Normalized Fear-of-ruin NF under Expected Utility

These results suggest that simple parametric forms should in this context be handled with great care, as they may turn out to be unduly restrictive. It is often argued that CARA or CRRA can be considered as acceptable approximations of more general utilities. This claim, however, appears quite debatable when one considers the NF index, which is the crucial determinant of choices in our context. As we shall see, our nonparametric estimates show NF indices that tend to fan in rather than fan out, and can cross the $NF = 1$ line.

Single crossing assumption We now introduce two additional requirements. The first one will be used when proving the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium:

Assumption 2 For any θ , R , $p > 0$:

- for any $p' > 0$, there exists R' such that $V(R, p, \theta) < V(R', p', \theta)$;
- for any R' , there exists $p' > 0$ such that $V(R, p, \theta) > V(R', p', \theta)$.

Assumption 2 is very weak: it requires that any higher return can be compensated by a lower probability of winning, and vice versa. The next assumption is crucial: it imposes a single crossing property that drives our approach to identification.

Assumption 3 (*single-crossing*) Consider two gambles (R, p) and (R', p') , with $p' < p$. If for some θ we have

$$V(R, p, \theta) \leq V(R', p', \theta)$$

then for all $\theta' > \theta$

$$V(R, p, \theta) < V(R', p', \theta').$$

Given first-order stochastic dominance as per Assumption 1, if θ prefers the gamble with the lowest winning probability ($p' < p$) then it must be that its odds are higher ($R' > R$), so that the gamble (R', p') is riskier. Assumption 3 states that since θ prefers the riskier gamble, any agent θ' above θ will too. The single-crossing assumption thus imposes that agents can be sorted according to their “taste for risk”: higher θ 's prefer longshots, while lower θ 's prefer favorites.

If we slightly strengthen Assumption 1 to require that V be differentiable everywhere on some open set \mathcal{O} , then Assumption 3 has a well-known differential characterization, which we state without proof:

Lemma 1 *Assumption 3 holds on \mathcal{O} if and only if, for any (R, p, θ) in \mathcal{O} , the marginal rate of substitution $w(R, p, \theta)$, or equivalently the normalized fear-of-ruin index $NF(R, p, \theta)$, is decreasing in θ .*

The precise scope of this condition can be better seen on a few examples.

1. Expected utility: as above, we normalize to zero the utility of losing the bet, so that

$$V(R, p, \theta) = pu(R, \theta).$$

Single-crossing holds if and only if the normalized fear-of-ruin is decreasing in θ . A sufficient condition is that lower θ 's be more risk-averse at any value of R . For instance, in the CARA case, consider a population of bettors indexed by their absolute risk-aversion λ :

$$u(R, \lambda) = \frac{\exp(\lambda) - \exp(-\lambda R)}{\lambda}$$

where λ follows a distribution with c.d.f. Φ . Then it is easily seen that

$$NF(R, p, \theta) = \frac{1}{R+1} \frac{u}{u_R} = \frac{\exp(\lambda(1+R)) - 1}{\lambda(1+R)}$$

increases with λ . If we define θ as $1 - \Phi(\lambda)$, then by construction θ is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$, and NF decreases in θ , so that Assumption 3 holds. A similar result holds for CRRA functions for instance.

2. Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory RDEU enriches the previous framework by allowing for a deformation of probabilities. It requires that there exist two functions G and u such that the utility V can be written

$$V(R, p, \theta) = G(p, \theta) u(R, \theta).$$

For Assumption 1 to hold, the probability weighting function G must increase in p and the utility function u must increase in R . In general, both functions may vary with θ .

For the power specification

$$G(p, \theta) = p^{c(\theta)}$$

it is easily seen that one is back to the expected utility case by raising V at the power $(1/c(\theta))$. This implies that in the RDEU case, one can only identify variations in the elasticity of G with respect to probability p . To see this differently, the NF index is a product of two terms:

$$NF(R, p, \theta) = \frac{p}{R+1} \frac{V_p}{V_R} = \frac{pG_p}{G} \frac{1}{R+1} \frac{u}{u_R}. \quad (4)$$

The second term is the NF index for an expected utility maximizer with utility u . The first term is the NF index that would obtain if u were linear in R for all θ , as in the “dual expected utility” model of Yaari (1987):

$$V(p, R, \theta) = G(p, \theta)(R+1),$$

in which agents are heterogeneous in how they weigh probabilities. For Yaari-like preferences the NF index is independent of R ; and single-crossing requires that G_p/G , which is positive, be decreasing in θ . In words, this means that larger θ 's overestimate small probabilities more (or underestimate them less) than smaller θ 's. Again, this allows us to account for some heterogeneity in beliefs.

Note that since Yaari's model sets the elasticity of u to one, we can identify the elasticity of G and its variations with θ in this more restricted model. More generally, our empirical approach will allow us to elucidate the heterogeneity in both terms of (4).

3. Robust control Our framework is also compatible with more complex settings; in particular, it is compatible with ambiguity. For instance, Hansen and Sargent (e.g. in their 2007 book, or Hansen 2007) model an agent with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u who recognizes that the true probability distribution over outcomes $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_n)$ is uncertain and may differ from \mathbf{p} . In our simple setting, the utility from betting on horse i becomes

$$\min_{\mathbf{m}} [m_i u(R_i) + a(\theta) e(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{p})]$$

where $e(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{p})$ is the relative entropy function that penalizes distortions from \mathbf{p} :

$$e(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{p}) = \sum_j m_j \log\left(\frac{m_j}{p_j}\right)$$

The positive coefficient $a(\theta)$ measures how much better θ pays attention to probability distortions. In our static case, such a departure from the standard expected utility framework amounts to considering an expected utility maximizer with beliefs p and preferences

$$\bar{u}(R, \theta) = 1 - \exp(-u(R)/a(\theta))$$

which is a special case of heterogenous expected utility as the “reference utility” u is the same for all agents.

It is easy to see that the normalized fear-of-ruin index associated to \bar{u} is

$$NF(R, \theta) = \frac{\exp(u(R)/a(\theta)) - 1}{u(R)/a(\theta)} \frac{u(R)}{u'(R)(R+1)};$$

it increases with θ if and only if a increases with θ . Hence single-crossing obtains under this simple condition on a .

4. Others Many other families of preferences, such as cumulative prospect theory, also fit within our setting—although the single-crossing condition becomes more complicated. Others may only be accommodated under some restrictions. For instance, the reference-dependent theory of choice under risk of Köszegi and Rabin (2007) characterizes a bettor with a utility index m and a function μ applied to deviations with respect to reference outcomes, so that perceived utility in a state in which r was expected and w obtains would

be

$$u(w|r) = m(w) + \mu(m(w) - m(r)).$$

Simple calculations show that in their choice-acclimating personal equilibrium¹², the bettor would focus her bets on horses i that maximize (still normalizing $m(-1) = 0$)

$$V(R_i, p_i) = p_i m(R_i) + p_i(1 - p_i) (\mu(m(R_i)) + \mu(-m(R_i))).$$

For $\mu \equiv 0$ this is just expected utility. Now Köszegi and Rabin take the function μ to be increasing with a concave kink in zero; then the factor $\mu(m(R_i)) + \mu(-m(R_i))$ is negative and if it becomes large, this choice functional may violate stochastic dominance.

Limitations Our approach has two main limitations. First, we require agents to only pay attention to consequences. As mentioned above, some models of decision under uncertainty relax this assumption (a classical example being the notion of regret); these are not compatible with our setting. Second, we only allow for one dimension of heterogeneity. On the one hand, the single-crossing assumption excludes, strictly speaking, the case of a fully homogeneous population considered in Jullien and Salanié (2000): when V is independent of θ , the strict inequality in the assumption cannot hold. Nevertheless, homogeneity is easily dealt with as a limiting case, as we shall see. More damaging is the opposite restriction—namely, we do not consider models involving a richer representation of heterogeneity. For instance, while our approach is compatible with models involving heterogeneity in both preferences and beliefs, these two dimensions must in our context be governed by the same parameter, which obviously restricts the generality of our approach. Multidimensional nonparametric heterogeneity is a very difficult (although not necessarily hopeless) problem, which is left for future work.

2.2 Market Shares and Equilibrium

The winning probabilities are assumed exogenous and characterize the race. In contrast, the odds are endogenous: the bettors' behavior determines market shares, which in turn determine odds through the parimutuel rule (1). In such a setting, it is natural to rely on the concept of rational expectations equilibria: agents determine their behavior given their anticipations on odds, and these anticipations are fulfilled in equilibrium. We now show that

¹²See Definition 3 on page 1058 in Köszegi and Rabin (2007).

for our framework, a rational expectations equilibrium exists. Moreover the characterization of the equilibrium condition in terms of the single crossing assumption will provide the key link to identification of preferences (proofs for this section are relegated to Appendix 1).

Let us assume that the families \mathbf{p} and \mathbf{R} are given, and known to all agents. Each agent then optimizes on which horse to bet on, and a simple consequence of the single crossing condition is the following:

Lemma 2 *Suppose that \mathbf{p} and \mathbf{R} are such that all market shares are positive: $s_i > 0, i = 1, \dots, n$. Then there exists a family $(\theta_j)_{j=0, \dots, n}$, with $\theta_0 = 0 < \theta_1 < \dots < \theta_{n-1} < \theta_n = 1$, such that:*

- for all $i = 1, \dots, n$, if $\theta_{i-1} < \theta < \theta_i$ then bettor θ strictly prefers to bet on horse i than on any other horse;
- for all $i < n$ we have

$$V(p_i, R_i, \theta_i) = V(p_{i+1}, R_{i+1}, \theta_i) \tag{5}$$

In words: under single crossing, if we rank horses by increasing odds, we have a partition of the set of bettors into n intervals, each of them gathering bettors who bet for the same horse. The bounds of the intervals are defined by an indifference condition; namely, for $i = 1, \dots, n - 1$, there exists a *marginal bettor* θ_i who is indifferent between betting on horses i and $i + 1$.

As a simple corollary, because the distribution of θ is uniform the market shares s_i for horse $i = 1, \dots, n$ can be expressed as

$$s_i = \theta_i - \theta_{i-1}$$

or equivalently

$$\theta_i = \sum_{j \leq i} s_j$$

Recall that odds are determined from market shares as in (1) and (2), so that in equilib-

rium one must have $\theta_i = \theta_i(\mathbf{R})$, where

$$\theta_i(\mathbf{R}) \equiv \frac{\sum_{j \leq i} \frac{1}{R_j+1}}{\sum_j \frac{1}{R_j+1}} \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (6)$$

We can now define a market equilibrium. We want bettors to behave optimally given odds and probabilities, as expressed in (5); and we want odds to result from market shares, which is what the equalities $\theta_i = \theta_i(\mathbf{R})$ impose. This motivates the following definition:

Definition 1 Consider a race (\mathbf{p}, t) . $\mathbf{R} = (R_1, \dots, R_n)$ is a family of equilibrium odds if (2) holds and

$$\forall i < n \quad V(p_i, R_i, \theta_i(\mathbf{R})) = V(p_{i+1}, R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R})) \quad (7)$$

We then prove existence and uniqueness. The result is in fact a particular instance of a general result in Gandhi (2006), but its proof in our setting is quite direct (see Appendix 1):

Proposition 1 Given a race (\mathbf{p}, t) , there exists a unique family $-t < R_1 \leq \dots \leq R_n$ of equilibrium odds.

Hence to each race one can associate a unique rational expectations equilibrium, with positive market shares. Such a result gives a foundation to our assumption that bettors share common, unbiased beliefs. From an empirical viewpoint, however, the odds are directly observable, while probabilities have to be estimated. Fortunately, probabilities can be uniquely recovered from odds:

Proposition 2 For any \mathbf{R} ranked in increasing odds ($-1 < R_1 < \dots < R_n$), there exists a unique (\mathbf{p}, t) such that \mathbf{R} is a family of equilibrium odds for (\mathbf{p}, t) .

As already observed, the value of the take t is in fact given by (2), and results from the rules of parimutuel betting. On the other hand, the relationship between odds and probabilities result from preferences. The function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R}) = (p_1(\mathbf{R}), \dots, p_n(\mathbf{R}))$ implicitly defined in Proposition 2 thus conveys some information on the underlying preferences of bettors. This function is continuously differentiable, from our assumptions on V . Since choices are fully determined by the marginal rates of substitution $w = V_R/V_p$, we shall say hereafter that $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ characterizes market equilibria associated to the family V , or equivalently w or NF .

3 Testable implications and identifiability

In what follows, we assume that we observe the same population of bettors faced with a large number of races (\mathbf{p}, t) . In each race individual betting behavior leads to equilibrium odds and market shares, which are observable; we also observe the identity of the winning horse for each race. We assume for the time being that the relationship between winning probabilities and equilibrium odds $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ has been recovered from this data—we will show how to do it in Section 5, thanks to a flexible, seminonparametric approach.

We focus here on the empirical content of the general framework developed above. Specifically, we consider two questions. One is testability: does our setting generate testable predictions about observed behavior? In other words, does the theory impose testable restrictions on the form of the function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$? The second issue relates to identifiability: given $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$, is it possible to uniquely recover the distribution of individual preferences, i.e. in our setting the normalized fear-of-ruin $NF(R, p, \theta)$? We shall now see that the answer to both questions is positive.

3.1 Testable implications

We start with testability. Since V increases in p , we can define Γ as the inverse of V with respect to p :

$$\forall R, p, \theta \quad \Gamma(V(R, p, \theta), R, \theta) = p$$

One can then define a function G as

$$G(R, p, R', \theta) = \Gamma(V(R, p, \theta), R', \theta) \tag{8}$$

In words, $G(R, p, R', \theta)$ is the winning probability p' that would make a gamble (R', p') equivalent, for bettor θ , to the gamble (R, p) . Now we can rewrite the equilibrium conditions in Definition 1 as

$$\forall i < n \quad p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R}) = G(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R})) \tag{9}$$

where $\theta_i(\mathbf{R})$ was defined in (6). We immediately obtain several properties of G :

Proposition 3 *If $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ is the characterization of market equilibria associated to some family V , then there exists a function $G(R, p, R', \theta)$ such that*

- i) G is continuously differentiable, increasing with R and p , decreasing with θ if $R' > R$, and decreasing with R' ;
- ii) G_p/G_R is independent of R' ;
- iii) $G(R, p, R, \theta) = p$;
- iv) (9) holds for any family $R_1 < R_2 < \dots < R_n$.

Properties i), ii), iii) derive from our assumptions on V , and the definition of Γ and G . As an illustration, recall that the single-crossing assumption states that for all $R < R'$ and $\theta < \theta'$

$$V(R, p, \theta) \leq V(R', p', \theta) \quad \Rightarrow \quad V(R, p, \theta') < V(R', p', \theta')$$

This is equivalent to

$$p' \geq G(R, p, R', \theta) \quad \Rightarrow \quad p' > G(R, p, R', \theta')$$

and thus G must be decreasing with θ , as required in property i).

Of the four properties in Proposition 3, (ii) and (iv) are the main restrictions that our theory imposes on observed odds and probabilities. Property (iv) states that the winning probability $p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R})$, which could depend on the *whole family* of odds (R_1, \dots, R_n) , can be computed from only four numbers: the pair of odds R_i and R_{i+1} , the index of the marginal consumer $\theta_i(\mathbf{R})$ (which can be directly inferred from market shares, as argued above), and the probability $p_i(\mathbf{R})$ of the horse ranked by bettors just before $(i + 1)$. Hence $p_i(\mathbf{R})$ and $\theta_i(\mathbf{R})$ are sufficient statistics for the $(n - 2)$ odds that are missing from this list. Moreover, G does not depend on the index i , on the number of horses n , nor on the take t . Finally, property (ii) dramatically restricts the variation in G . These and the other two properties of G listed in Proposition 3 will provide directly testable predictions of our model.

3.2 Exhaustiveness and identification

We now consider identification. Take some function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ that satisfies the conditions we just derived; this implies that the regression of $p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R})$ on the four other variables $(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R}))$ has a perfect fit, and allows to recover G . We now show that the four properties in Proposition 3 are sufficient: the knowledge of a G function that satisfies all

four properties allows us to recover a function $NF(R, p, \theta)$, such that $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ characterizes the market equilibria associated to any risk preferences V whose normalized fear-of-ruin is NF . As a consequence, preferences are non-parametrically identified. We get:

Proposition 4 *Suppose that the function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ satisfies the restrictions in (9) for some function G . Let S_4 be the domain over which (9) defines G , and assumes that properties (i)-(iii) in Proposition 3 hold for G over S_4 . Define S_3 to be the set of (R, p, θ) such that (R, p, R', θ) belongs to S_4 for some $R' > R$.*

Then there exists a unique (up to increasing transforms) function $V(p, R, \theta)$ defined on S_3 such that $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ characterizes the market equilibria associated to V .

Moreover, V verifies the single-crossing property, and its normalized fear-of-ruin NF is

$$NF(R, p, \theta) = \frac{p}{R+1} \frac{G_p}{G_R}(R, p, R', \theta).$$

Proof: Using property (ii) of Proposition 3, we can define a function w by

$$w(R, p, \theta) = \frac{G_p}{G_R}(R, p, R', \theta)$$

which is positive by property i) in Proposition 3. Now, choose some V whose marginal rate of substitution V_p/V_R is equal to w . We can impose $V_R > 0$ and $V_p > 0$. Since

$$\frac{V_p}{V_R}(R, p, \theta) = \frac{G_p}{G_R}(R, p, R', \theta)$$

there must exist a function \tilde{G} such that

$$G(R, p, R', \theta) = \tilde{G}(V(R, p, \theta), R', \theta)$$

Then i) implies that \tilde{G} is increasing with V . Moreover, from iii) it must be the case that \tilde{G} is the inverse of V with respect to p . Let us now prove that V verifies the single-crossing assumption. Assume that $V(R, p, \theta) \leq V(R', p', \theta)$, for $R < R'$. Since \tilde{G} is the inverse of V , we get

$$\tilde{G}(V(R, p, \theta), R', \theta) = G(R, p, R', \theta) \leq p'$$

Since from property i) G is decreasing with θ when $R < R'$, we obtain that for $\theta' > \theta$

$$\tilde{G}(V(R, p, \theta'), R') = G(R, p, R', \theta') < p'$$

Since \tilde{G} is the inverse of V we get

$$V(R, p, \theta') < V(R', p', \theta')$$

so that V verifies the single-crossing assumption, as announced. Finally, since \tilde{G} is the inverse of V property iv) can be rewritten as

$$\forall i < n \quad V(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), \theta_i(\mathbf{R})) = V(R_{i+1}, p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R}), \theta_i(\mathbf{R}))$$

which is exactly the set of equilibrium conditions in Definition 1. Thus $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ characterizes the market equilibria associated to V . *Q.E.D.*

From an empirical viewpoint, Proposition 4 proves two results. Firstly, the properties i)-iv) stated in Proposition 3 are in fact sufficient: since they are strong enough to ensure the existence of a family V satisfying our assumptions, no other testable implications can be found. Secondly, the MRS function w is uniquely identified. Indeed for (8) to hold, it must be that

$$\frac{V_p}{V_R}(R, p, \theta) = \frac{G_p}{G_R}(R, p, R', \theta) \text{ for all } R',$$

which property (ii) of Proposition 3 makes possible. This defines w (and NF) uniquely, and consequently the family V is identified up to an increasing function of θ . Strikingly, aggregate data are enough to recover a family of heterogeneous individual preferences without any parametric assumption.

This conclusion should however be qualified in one respect: identification only holds on the support S_3 of the random variables that we defined. This has an important consequence in our setting. Assume that no race has more than n horses. The favorite in each race, by definition, has the largest market share, and so we will always observe $\theta_1 > 1/n$. Since identification relies on boundary conditions in the θ_i 's, it follows that we cannot hope to recover the family of functions $V(., ., \theta)$ for $\theta < 1/n$. (More formally, the set S_3 contains no

point (R, p, θ) with $\theta < 1/n$.)

3.3 The case of expected utility

The analysis can be specialized to the case when V is a family of expected utility functionals. Normalizing again the utility of losing a bet to be zero,

$$V(R, p, \theta) = pu(R, \theta), \tag{10}$$

the indifference condition in Definition 1 becomes

$$p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R}) = p_i(\mathbf{R})u(R_i, \theta_i(\mathbf{R}))/u(R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R}))$$

and a new testable implication obtains:

Proposition 5 *If V is of the expected utility form (10), then $G(R, p, R', \theta)$ is linear in p .*

Reciprocally, if (i)-(iv) hold in Proposition 3, then linearity in p implies:

$$G(R, p, R', \theta) = pH(R, R', \theta)$$

From ii) we obtain

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial R'} \left(\frac{H_R}{H} \right) = 0,$$

or equivalently

$$H(R, R', \theta) = A(R, \theta)u(R', \theta)$$

for some functions A and u . From iii), $A(R, \theta)u(R, \theta) = 1$, therefore:

$$G(R, p, R', \theta) = p \frac{u(R, \theta)}{u(R', \theta)}$$

and thus $p'u(R', \theta) = pu(R, \theta)$, so that u is the required von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Once more, this function is uniquely identified (up to a multiplicative constant) from the knowledge of G .

In fact, say that we normalize $u(R_m, \theta) \equiv 1$ for some R_m . Then it is easy to see that the whole family of vNM functions can be recovered by the simple (but not very practical)

formula

$$u(R, \theta) = E \left(\frac{p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R})}{p_i(\mathbf{R})} \mid R_i = R, R_{i+1} = R_m, \theta_i(\mathbf{R}) = \theta \right).$$

4 Data and Estimation Strategy

4.1 Data

Our entire analysis up to now has assumed a stable family of preferences $V(R, p, \theta)$ across the races in the data. This family of preferences can change with observable covariates X , and thus we should interpret the analysis up to now as being done conditional on X . In collecting the data, we are thus interested in getting information on relevant covariates at a race that could shift the distribution of tastes.

First we collected the race data, which consist of a large sample of thoroughbred races (the dominant form of organized horse racing worldwide) in the United States, spanning the years 2001 through 2004. The data were collected by professional handicappers from the racing portal paceadvantage.com, and a selection of the race variables that they collect were shared with us. In particular, for each horse race in the data, we have the date of the race, the track name, the race number in the day, the number of horses in the race, the final odds for each horse, and finishing position for each horse that ran. Excluded from the data are variables that the handicappers use for their own competitive purpose, such as various measures of the racing history of each horse.

For the present analysis, we focus on a single year of data, namely the year 2001. The 2001 data contain races from 77 tracks spread over 33 states. There were 100 races in which at least one horse was “purse only” meaning that it ran but was not bet upon and hence was not assigned betting odds. In 461 races two horses were declared winners; and in 3 races there was no winner. After eliminating these three small subsamples, we had 447,166 horses in 54,169 races, an average of about 8.3 horses per race.

Figure 2 shows that almost all races have 5 to 12 horses. We eliminated the other 606 races. We also dropped 44 races in which one horse has odds larger than 200—a very rare occurrence. That leaves us with a sample of 442,636 horses in 53,523 races.

Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. The betting odds over horses in the data range from extreme favorites (odds equaling 0.05, i.e., horses paying 5 cents on the dollar), to extreme longshots (odds equaling 200, i.e., horses paying 200 dollars on the dollar). The




Figure 2: Number of horses in each race

	Number of horses in race	Odds	θ
Min	5	0.05	0.145
P25	7	3.70	0.623
P50	8	8.10	0.851
P75	10	18.80	0.964
Max	12	200.00	1.000

Table 1: Characteristics of the sample




Figure 3: Distribution of odds, $R \leq 100$

mean and median odds on a horse are 15.23 and 8.10 respectively: the distribution of odds is highly skewed to the right. In our sample, 18.3% of horses have $R \geq 25$ (odds of 20 or more), 6.2% of horses have $R \geq 50$, but only 0.7% have $R \geq 100$. Also, the race take (t in our notation) is heavily concentrated around 0.18: the 10th and 90th percentile of its distribution are 0.165 and 0.209.

Figure 3 plots the raw distribution of odds up to $R = 100$. It seems fairly regular, with a mode at odds of $R = 2.5$; but this is slightly misleading. Unlike market shares, odds are not a continuously distributed variable: they are rounded at the track. We illustrate the rounding mechanism on Figure 4: for odds below 4, odds are sometimes quoted in twentieths but tenths are much more likely (e.g. $R = 2.1$ and $R = 2.2$ are much more likely than $R = 2.15$). For longer odds the spacing of odds becomes coarser, but the same pattern still obtains (e.g. $R = 26.25$ is much less likely than $R = 26.0$ or $R = 26.5$.) As we will explain later, this is of no consequence except in so far as it constrains our choice of econometric methods.

We used two 0-1 covariates to see whether our results differed across subsamples. The first covariate uses the date at which a race was run to separate weekday and weekend races. To build our second covariate, we hand-collected the zip code of each racetrack, and we used it to classify each track on an urban/rural scale, thanks to the 2000 Rural-Urban




Figure 4: Distribution of odds, $R \leq 5$

	Weekday	Weekend
Rural	42,027	31,663
Urban	216,802	152,144

Table 2: Number of horses in each subsample

Commuting Area Codes classification of the Census Bureau. Thus our two main covariates for a race are Weekend/Weekday and Urban/Rural. Table 2 shows that most races are run in an urban setting, and slightly more on weekdays than on weekends. In order to focus on a relatively homogeneous sample, the results we report in the rest of this paper were obtained on the largest subsample: the 26,525 races run on weekdays in an urban setting, with 216,802 horses.

4.2 Estimation Strategy

The fundamental equation of our model indicates that each probability may be expressed as a function of four other variables:

$$\forall i < n \quad p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R}) = G(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R})) \quad (11)$$

Remember that, in this relationship, the R s and the θ s are directly observable; our estimation strategy aims at recovering both the probabilities and the function G . If the function G was known (up to some parameters), then for each race these equations would allow us to compute the winning probabilities, and the likelihood of the event that the observed winner has indeed won the race. Maximizing the likelihood over all races then would yield estimates of the parameters in G . This approach was adopted by Jullien and Salanié (2000), in a setting where bettors were homogeneous, so that the indexes $\theta_i(\mathbf{R})$ disappears from (11). Such an approach allows for the simultaneous estimation of probabilities and of the parameters in G . Note that the resulting function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ is obtained without any a priori restriction; but on the other hand, one has to adopt a parametric form for the function G , thus imposing some restrictions to the class of preferences one may consider. For example, Jullien and Salanié (2000) focused on parametric forms for some classes of EU (CARA, HARA) and non-EU (RDEU, CPT) functions.

Since our main contribution bears on the identification of preferences, we shall instead follow a two-step strategy, that allows us to recover preferences in a nonparametric way. First, we estimate the function $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ from the data on races just presented. This simple step only involves choosing a flexible specification for $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$, which we do in the next section. Once $\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{R})$ is recovered, we can then set up (11) as a nonparametric regression, that we perform using Generalized Additive Models (GAMs); details are given in section 6.

A general advantage of our two-step strategy is that the estimation of the probabilities does not rely on the theoretical framework described before; in this sense, it is fully agnostic vis a vis the conceptual underpinnings. The testable restrictions implied by our general framework—and by any of its more specialized versions—only bear on the function G , as described by Proposition 3.

5 Estimating Probabilities

In order to estimate the probabilities $p_i(\mathbf{R})$, we resorted to a flexible, seminonparametric approach. Without loss of generality, we can write

$$p_i(\mathbf{R}) = \frac{\exp(P_i(\mathbf{R}))}{\sum_{j=1}^n \exp(P_j(\mathbf{R}))}. \quad (12)$$

for some functions P_1, \dots, P_n . Moreover, the dependence of each P_i on \mathbf{R} is restricted by the nature of the problem: it must depend on the odds $(R_j)_{j \neq i}$ in a symmetric way. To incorporate this restriction, we specify the P functions as

$$P_i(\mathbf{R}) = -\log(R_i + 1) + \sum_{k=1}^K a_k(R_i) T_k(\mathbf{R}), \quad (13)$$

where the T_k 's are symmetric functions of all odds \mathbf{R} . To get an intuition for this expansion, note that if the terms of the right-hand side sum were all zero, then each $p_i(\mathbf{R})$ would equal the *risk-neutral probability*

$$p_i^n(\mathbf{R}) = \frac{1}{R_i + 1} \sum_j \frac{1}{R_j + 1}$$

of the benchmark case where individuals are risk-neutral. The purpose of the terms in the sum is precisely to capture, in a flexible way, the deviations from the risk-neutral probability reflecting the distribution of individual attitudes toward risk. In practice, we allowed for $K = 7$ basis functions T_k : $T_1(\mathbf{R}) \equiv 1$; $T_2(\mathbf{R}) = \sum_i 1$, which is the number of horses in that race; and for $k = 3, \dots, 7$, $T_k(\mathbf{R}) = \sum_i (1 + R_i)^{2-k}$. We also defined the terms $a_k(R_i)$ as linear combinations of the first 15 orthogonal polynomials in $1/(1 + R_i)$.

To decide which terms should be included, we used two alternative model selection criteria, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In both cases we started from the most parsimonious model with all a_k 's zero and we used an "add term, then drop term" stepwise strategy until we could not improve the model selection criterion.

The estimated models are rather different (see Appendix 2 for precise results). The model that yields the best value of the AIC has fourteen parameters: 8 on T_1 , 3 on T_3 , 2 on T_4 and 1 on T_5 . Two of these fourteen parameters do not differ significantly from 0. As usual, the

BIC-selected model is more parsimonious: it selects two terms for T_1 , one for T_3 and one for T_4 . These four parameters very significantly differ from 0, with $p < .001$.

The finite precision of the estimates of the a_k 's generates estimation errors on our estimated probabilities $\hat{p}_i(\mathbf{R})$, with accompanying standard errors which we denote $\hat{\sigma}_i$. Since our entire method relies on exploiting the deviations of these estimated probabilities from the risk-neutral probabilities p_i^n , we need these deviations to be large enough, relative to the confidence bands for our estimated probabilities. In order to check that this is the case, we ran nonparametric regressions of the ratios

$$\frac{\hat{p}_i}{p_i^n} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\hat{p}_i \pm 1.96\hat{\sigma}_i}{p_i^n}$$

on the neutral probability p_i^n ; and we plotted the result on figure 5. The central, blue curve is the fitted value of \hat{p}_i/p_i^n at the 5%, 10%, ..., 95% quantiles of the distribution of p_i^n ; and the 95% confidence bars (also in blue) measure the estimation error.

To evaluate the dispersion of estimated probabilities \hat{p}_i relative to risk-neutral probabilities p_i^n , we ran a nonparametric regressions of \hat{p}_i on p_i^n to obtain an estimate $\hat{E}_i = \hat{E}(\hat{p}_i|p_i^n)$; and a regression of the squared relative deviation

$$\left(\frac{\hat{p}_i(\mathbf{R}) - \hat{E}_i}{p_i^n} \right)^2$$

on p_i^n to obtain a squared dispersion \hat{v}_i . Finally, we plotted two red dashed curves that represent nonparametric fits of $(\hat{E}_i \pm 1.96\sqrt{\hat{v}_i})/p_i^n$. All of these nonparametric fits are estimated very precisely, given the large sample size.

Figure 5 shows that while the AIC and BIC models give somewhat different pictures, especially for outsiders (horses with longer odds, that is smaller neutral probabilities), in both cases the dispersion of the estimated probabilities is much larger than their imprecision. This is a reassuring finding.

The figure also retraces the ubiquitous finding that neutral probabilities overestimate the probabilities of a win for outsiders—the favorite-longshot bias. However, the top and bottom dashed curves clearly show that there is much more going on in the data: even with the parsimonious estimates of the BIC model, our estimated probabilities of a win for many outsiders are *larger* than the neutral probability. More generally, equilibrium odds do not only reflect probabilities, but also the distribution of individual attitudes to risk; and this is




Figure 5: Dispersion of estimated probabilities of winning

what we will use to estimate that distribution.

In the rest of the paper we will rely on the probabilities estimated with the specification selected by the BIC criterion. Since this specification is the more parsimonious one, we feel that by doing so we are less at risk of over-interpreting small deviations from the neutral probabilities.

6 Results

We now move to the heart of our investigation: using our estimates of the winning probabilities, recovering the G function that describes individual attitudes to risk. Recall (9):

$$\forall i < n \quad p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R}) = G(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R}))$$

Remember also that the expected net return from a bet is $E_i = p_i(R_i + 1) - 1$. If bettors were risk-neutral, E_i would equal minus the take t on every horse in every race; therefore

its variations in the data contain the information we need about preferences; in addition, by construction, $E_i + 1 = p_i(R_i + 1) = (1 - t)p_i/s_i$ measures how market shares deviate from probabilities. Accordingly, we choose our dependent variable to be

$$e_i(\mathbf{R}) = \log \frac{1 + E_{i+1}(\mathbf{R})}{1 + E_i(\mathbf{R})} = \log \frac{p_{i+1}(\mathbf{R})(R_{i+1} + 1)}{p_i(\mathbf{R})(R_i + 1)},$$

and we run the regression

$$\forall i < n \quad e_i(\mathbf{R}) = \bar{G}(R_i, p_i(\mathbf{R}), R_{i+1}, \theta_i(\mathbf{R})).$$

which is formally equivalent to our theoretical formulation above, with

$$G(R, p, R', \theta) \equiv p \frac{R + 1}{R' + 1} \exp(\bar{G}(R, p, R', \theta)).$$

Note that if bettors were risk-neutral, the left-hand side variable $e_i(\mathbf{R})$ would be identically zero (since t is constant within each race, risk-neutral bettors would result in odds (plus one) being inversely proportional to probabilities). Thus using e_i allows us to focus on deviation from risk-neutrality.

Since the above regression is valid for all horses but the last one in each race, from the 215,802 horses in our data we keep 190,277 observations; and after dropping the horses for which $R_i = R_{i+1}$ which bring us no useful information, we end up with 185,409 horses. Figure 6 gives the density of our LHS variable e_i . Most of the distribution lies in the positive region, reflecting the favorite-longshot bias: with higher expected returns on favorites, E_i is usually larger than E_{i+1} . Still, 11% of the observations have a negative e_i .

We estimated all of our regressions from this point using generalized additive models (GAMs), which we describe in Appendix 3. Regressing e_i on the four arguments of \bar{G} gives a generalized R^2 of 0.878. Property (iv) of Proposition 3 requires an R^2 of one, which is clearly too much to ask. The very good fit of this first regression is a first indication that our model explains a major share of the variations in the expected returns of bets—considering that the R^2 of a theory based on risk-neutral bettors would be zero in this regression.

We still need to check predictions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3; prediction (iii) holds by construction since $\hat{p}_i = \hat{p}_{i+1}$ whenever $R_i = R_{i+1}$. To examine predictions (i) and (ii), we first compute G from the estimated \bar{G} ; then we simply evaluate numerically its first-order derivatives with respect to all variables. The derivatives with respect to p_i , R_i and R_{i+1} have




Figure 6: Density of the LHS e_i

the right signs in no less than 99.7% of the sample.

The derivative with respect to θ is more problematic. Property (i), which results from our single crossing Assumption 3, implies that G should be decreasing in θ . In this first, unrestricted regression 48% of the observations generate a positive derivative G_θ . This sounds like a discouraging result. However, further analysis leads to qualify this negative judgment. Indeed, the vast majority of these apparent violations of our theory come in two regions of the space of gambles. One is the region $\theta_i < 0.4$, in which most horses are favorites in their race ($i = 1$). Remember that, by construction, $\theta_1 = (1 - t)/(R_1 + 1)$ for favorites. Conditional on R_1 , any variation in θ_1 must come from variations in track take t . Since, as noticed above, there appears to be little variation in track take in the sample (most takes being around 18%), the distribution of θ_1 conditional on R_1 is very concentrated, which leaves little hope of estimating heterogeneous preferences in this region. This problem relates to an obvious limitation of our study, already mentioned above: it is quite difficult to estimate the bottom part of the θ distribution, since most of these agents systematically behave in the same way—i.e., bet on the favorite.

The second region where violations of single crossing abound correspond to the other end of the θ distribution (namely, $\theta_i > 0.95$, corresponding to the least risk-averse 5% of

bettors.) Since our data is selected on horses and not on bettors, about 20% of the horses in the regression sample have a $\theta_i > 0.95$. As we will see, the derivative with respect to θ is actually close to zero in this region.

We will document these facts in section 6.1; for now we ask the reader to bear with us.

Finally, we need to check property (ii)—that the marginal rate of substitution G_p/G_R is independent of R' . To do so, and in view of applying our study to various classes of preferences, we first compute the normalized fear-of-ruin index

$$\widehat{NF} = \frac{p}{R+1} \frac{G_p}{G_R}$$

at each observation¹³ $(R_i, p_i, R_{i+1}, \theta_i)$. Then we regress \widehat{NF} on the three variables (R_i, p_i, θ_i) , excluding R_{i+1} . Using GAM once more, we obtain a rather good fit since the R^2 of this regression is 0.827. This is reported on the first line of Table 3; since this corresponds to the most general class of preferences that fit in our model, we take it as our estimate of heterogeneous, non-expected utility (NEU) preferences.

Next, we can test a series of specific models, all of which are nested in the general NEU specifications. Specifically, we consider an homogeneous version of NEU (whereby all agents have the same attitude toward risk), and both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous version of more restrictive frameworks: expected utility (EU), rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU), and Yaari’s model. In all cases, the strategy is to explain \widehat{NF} by a subset of variables and check how these restrictions affect the fit of the regression.

In practice, we first note that if preferences were homogeneous, then the representative bettor with preferences $V(R, p)$ would have to be indifferent between all horses in any given race; and we would have

$$\text{for all } i < n, \quad V(R_i, p_i) = V(R_{i+1}, p_{i+1}).$$

This is the equation used by Jullien-Salanié (2000) to estimate V . In order to accommodate homogeneous preferences in our framework, we just drop the argument θ_i . In the NEU regression, this amounts to letting NF only depend on R and p . In a similar way:

- heterogeneous expected utility (EU) obtains by excluding p , so that NF only depends

¹³We only kept the observations that had a value of \widehat{NF} between the P0.5 and P99.5 quantiles. This excludes in particular the small number of observations for which G_R or G_p have the wrong sign.

Model	R^2	
	Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
NEU	0.555	0.827
EU	0.379	0.511
RDEU	0.469	0.748
Yaari	0.321	0.549

Table 3: Fit for various models

on R and θ

- homogeneous EU obtains by excluding both p and θ , so that NF only depends on R
- for heterogeneous rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) we first use (4) to write

$$\log NF = \log \frac{pG_p(p, \theta)}{G(p, \theta)} + \log \frac{1}{R+1} \frac{u(R, \theta)}{u_R(R, \theta)};$$

we run this regression as a GAM $\log \widehat{NF} = a(p, \theta) + b(R, \theta)$ and we compute the R^2 on the transformed estimates;

- for homogeneous RDEU we exclude θ in this log-regression
- finally, for Yaari’s dual theory the second term above is identically zero; we only have to regress \widehat{NF} on p and θ for the heterogeneous specification, and on p only for the homogeneous specification.

Table 3 reports the generalized R^2 s of these various regressions. A first conclusion is that whatever the family of preferences we consider, heterogeneity matters: homogeneous preferences just do not fit the data well at all. Even allowing for heterogeneity, expected utility barely manages to explain half of the variation in the normalized fear-of-ruin; the dual specification (Yaari) performs about as well. Combining nonlinear probability weighting and nonlinear utility indices, as in RDEU, takes the fit much closer to “heterogeneous NEU”; but non-additive probability weights (ruled out by RDEU) also seem to play a role.

The next sections give more information about the estimated shape of preferences in each case.

6.1 Expected utility

We start with the simplest version, based on expected utility. Figure 7 plots the estimated normalized fear-of-ruin NF , as a function of odds R .

Homogeneous EU We may first consider the homogeneous EU case, represented by the solid black curve; here, NF is a function of R only, and the circles indicate the nine deciles D1-D9 of odds in the sample. The hypothetical representative bettor with EU preferences would be risk-averse for low-return, safe bets, and risk-loving for all other bets.

Also represented on the Figure is the NF reconstructed from the EU preferences estimated in Jullien and Salanié (2000) (“JS 2000” curve). Our estimates dramatically differ from JS2000. The explanation for this discrepancy is that Jullien and Salanié took a *parametric* approach; they only considered HARA preferences, and found that within that class a risk-loving CARA function fit their data best. Our nonparametric approach shows that assuming a specific functional form is dangerous. For instance, HARA preferences imply a “fanning out” patterns for NF : it increases in R if and only if it is larger than 1. But our estimated NF is non monotonic and crosses the value 1: the data clearly rejects the HARA framework.

Heterogenous EU The five Pxx solid curves plot $NF(R, \theta)$ as a function of R for the heterogenous EU preferences that correspond to the quantiles P10, P25, P50, P75 and P90 of the distribution of θ in the sample. These quantiles are collected in Table 4. As Figure 8 makes clear, the distribution of θ in our sample is much more skewed to the right than the distribution of θ among bettors, which is normalized to be uniform over $[0, 1]$. There are very few small θ 's: in fact, since none of our races has more than 12 horses, we cannot observe any θ_i below $1/12$. More generally, our observations correspond to the edges of “market share” intervals; and there are many more for outsiders, whose market share by definition is smallest.

The distribution of odds R conditional on θ of course varies a great deal with θ . This is the reason why the Pxx curves move to the right as the quantile of θ increases. As in the homogeneous version, the circles indicate the D1-D9 deciles of the (now conditional) distribution of odds. For the $P10$ curve the lower deciles of R are almost confounded; we will return to this point below.

The Pxx curves in Figure 7 are very nicely ordered for odds lower than 15: holding




Figure 7: Homogeneous and heterogeneous EU

Quantile	Value of θ
P10	0.375
P25	0.600
P50	0.821
P75	0.938
P90	0.976

Table 4: Quantiles of θ_i




Figure 8: Density of θ

odds R constant, the normalized fear-of-ruin increases with θ (going from the P10 curve to the P90 curve.) Once again, none of these curves is consistent with the fanning out implied by HARA. For higher odds (outsiders), the NF curves are almost confounded with the homogeneous EU curve: there is little evidence of heterogeneity. Note, however, that for this range of odds θ is mostly in the 0.93 – 1.00 range, so that we are looking at the preferences of the 7% most risk-loving bettors. The range from P10 to P75, which comprises the core of bettors, exhibits much more heterogenous preferences; and their NF decreases with θ , validating Assumption 3 over this range.

This last finding may seem surprising, given our earlier evidence that the derivative of G in θ often has the wrong sign; but in fact these two observations are easily reconciled. With EU preferences, we get fewer observations with a positive derivative G_θ ; but they still represent a full third of the sample. Figure 9, which plots separately the densities of the θ distributions for positive and negative values of the derivative G_θ respectively, explains why we don't see these violations of Assumption 3 in Figure 7. As discussed above, the observations with a positive G_θ (which reject single crossing) are concentrated in two regions, $\theta < 0.4$ and $\theta > 0.9$. The former mostly includes agents betting on the favorite; R and θ are then very tightly dependent, and our estimate of G_θ (or indeed of any heterogeneity) is very shaky in




Figure 9: Density of θ for subsamples by sign of G_θ




Figure 10: Density of θ for subsamples by value of G_θ

this region.

This interpretation is confirmed by Figure 10, which plots $1/(1+R)$ against θ (each point represents an observation.) For $\theta < 0.4$, most points group along a line of slope about 0.8, which is the average value of $(1-t)$; and violations are numerous in that region. Figure 10 also shows that in the other regions where positive derivatives G_θ are found, their value is not very large. These are points in which G is basically flat in θ ; they correspond to the part in Figure 7 where the NF curves are almost confounded. With derivatives close to zero, violations should be expected in that region, but they are not economically significant¹⁴.

Conversely, in the regions where there is enough variation in θ conditional on R to estimate the derivative, negative derivatives predominate greatly except for the riskiest bets. This is a satisfying finding: while Assumption 3 does not apply to all of our sample, it seems to be a reasonable approximation.

Since the generalized additive models we use fit the data using flexible local functional forms, the failure of Assumption 3 to hold everywhere should not contaminate our estimates on the rest of the range. We checked this directly by fitting the models to the subsample of horses such that $\theta_i > 0.4$; our conclusions hardly changed.

6.2 Yaari’s dual model

Yaari’s 1987 model is a natural entry point into the very rich class of non-expected utility models. Comparing the nonlinearity in odds $V(p, R) = pu(R)$ of expected utility to nonlinearity in probabilities $V(p, R) = G(p)(R+1)$ as in the dual theory nicely frames the question in Snowberg and Wolfers (2010): what matters most, preferences or perceptions? By comparing choice patterns across types of bets, they found that a representative “dual” bettor explained the data better than a representative expected-utility bettor. In our richer framework, we can benchmark these two theories using only win bets; and more importantly, we can allow for one dimension of (single-crossing) heterogeneity in each of these two classes.

With a functional $V(p, R, \theta) = G(p, \theta)(R+1)$, the normalized fear-of-ruin does not depend on odds: it is simply

$$NF(p, \theta) = \frac{pG_p(p, \theta)}{G(p, \theta)},$$

the elasticity of the probability weighting function G with respect to p .

¹⁴The exception is bottom right corner in Figure 10, which corresponds to a small subpopulation of horses with the longest of odds.




Figure 11: Homogeneous and heterogeneous Yaari

As shown in Table 3, the dual theory fits the data about as well as expected utility. Figure 11 plots the estimated NF as a function of p for the five usual quantiles of θ , in addition to the estimate for the homogenous case in which G does not depend on θ . Just as in Figure 7 for expected utility, the normalized fear-of-ruin is a nicely decreasing function of θ on this graph, except for low probability bets (which were high odds bets in Figure 7) for which preferences appear to be close to homogeneous. And as in the case of expected utility, for low θ 's there is too little variation to estimate heterogeneity in preferences.

Since the normalized fear-of-ruin coincides with the elasticity of the probability weighting function G , our estimates in both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous models suggest that bettors tend to overestimate small probabilities (G is concave), while underestimating larger ones (G becomes convex.) The point in which G has an elasticity of one is around a probability of 0.3. Laboratory experiments concur that this is roughly the location of the “crossing point” where $G(p) = p$. Since for a concave-then-convex function from $[0, 1]$ to $[0, 1]$ the crossing point must be to the left of the unit-elasticity point, our results suggest a crossing point somewhat smaller than in experimental data.

6.3 The general, non expected utility model

Our estimates of heterogeneous non-expected utility preferences are difficult to summarize. Even testing for popular specifications like cumulative prospect theory,

$$V(p, R, \theta) = G^+(p, \theta)u^+(R, \theta) + G^-(1 - p, \theta)u^-(\theta)$$

is not easy without recurring to parametric specifications, which we have strived to avoid in this paper. We will only discuss here our estimates for the homogenous non-expected utility model, in which the normalized fear-of-ruin can depend arbitrarily on both odds R and probability p . We found that the best way to summarize our results was to plot our estimated NF as a function of R (as in Figure 7), with three curves¹⁵ that give p the values of the three quartiles of the conditional distribution of p given R .

With expected utility, the three curves would be confounded since NF cannot depend on p . Figure 12 therefore measures the quantitative importance of nonlinearity in probabilities over and above nonlinearity in wealth within the homogeneous model. Note how the curves cross for odds of about ten to one. For shorter odds (safer bets), the normalized fear-of-ruin increases with p ; and for longer odds (riskier bets) it decreases with p . It is easy to see that if preferences were rank-dependent,

$$V(p, R) = G(p)u(R)$$

then this pattern suggests that the elasticity of G with respect to p is U-shaped, just as in Figure 11 for dual expected utility. Once again, this points towards a probability weighting function that is concave then convex, as one would expect from the experimental literature (see e.g. Wakker (2010).) We find it very encouraging that results from such different approaches, and from empirical specifications that are a priori so different converge towards similar conclusions.

7 Concluding remarks

Our empirical work therefore lead to several conclusions. First, the most general model (involving heterogeneous, non expected utility) fits the data quite well. This is an inter-

¹⁵Probabilities are closely linked to odds in the data; choosing unconditional quantiles of p as we did in Figures 7 and 11 would not be very enlightening.




Figure 12: Homogeneous NEU

esting message. Given our empirical strategy, estimated probabilities (the right hand side of equation (11)) should in principle depend on the whole set of odds and market shares. The theoretical restriction, which imposes that it only depends on four variables, thus has a real bite. That the four variables distinguished by the theory explain 87.8% of the variance is a very encouraging result. One goal of the paper was to show that a general theoretical approach, based on general attitudes toward risk and allowing for heterogeneity among betters, could generate strong, testable implications on observed data. It does; moreover, these restrictions seem to fit data fairly well.

A second conclusion is that the role of heterogeneity appears to be paramount. Whatever the specific formulation, homogeneous models perform poorly, even when compared to the simplest versions of the heterogeneous framework. The general message, then, is that data stemming from the aggregation of (a large number of) individual behaviors cannot be adequately summarized by the fiction of a representative agent. From that perspective, the positive insight suggested by our approach is that the presence of heterogeneity does not preclude identification, even in a non parametric framework.

Clearly, this conclusion must be somewhat qualified. Admittedly, the way heterogeneity is introduced here is restrictive: it is one-dimensional and is required to satisfy a single crossing

property. These restrictions were introduced for identification purposes; non parametric identification of models entailing multidimensional heterogeneity, or even one-dimensional heterogeneity without single crossing, is a difficult problem well beyond the scope of the present paper. It should be noted, however, that these restrictions are testable, and that they seem to work quite well. Our rather parsimonious way of introducing heterogeneity makes a very significant difference in the quality of the fit. Moreover, the single crossing restriction can be checked from our estimates; and it is mostly consistent with them, at least in regions where the heterogeneity of preferences can be identified.

A final lesson from our estimates is that the shape of individual preferences is quite complex, and varies across individuals in a sophisticated way. Typically, the same individual may be risk-averse for some bets and risk loving for others; and for any given bet, a fraction of the population may behave in a risk averse way whereas another does not. In particular, parametric models, which tend to impose strong restrictions on the behavior of key indicators (e.g., fanning out of the normalized fear-of-ruin index), have to be used with great caution. Our non parametric estimates clearly indicate that the most commonly used parametric form (e.g., expected utility with HARA preferences) may grossly misrepresent the trade-off between risk and return. In that sense, our main message is twofold: a model of decision under risk involving general preferences and (one-dimensional) heterogeneity can indeed be non parametrically identified from the sole equilibrium conditions; but the whole richness of a nonparametric approach is needed to take into account the complexity of individual decision processes, although some simpler versions seem to perform reasonably well.

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Appendix 1: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 2: from the single-crossing assumption, the set of agents that strictly prefer horse i to horse $j > i$ is an interval containing 0. Similarly, the set of agents that strictly prefer horse i to horse $j < i$ is an interval containing 1. Therefore the set of agents that strictly prefer horse i to all other horses is an interval. The single-crossing assumption also implies that these intervals are ranked by increasing i ; and that the set of agents indifferent between horse i and horse $(i + 1)$ is a singleton. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1: from Definition 1, given a race (\mathbf{p}, t) we have to find a family \mathbf{R} such that, for all $i < n$,

$$V\left(p_i, R_i, (1-t) \sum_{j \leq i} \frac{1}{R_j + 1}\right) = V\left(p_{i+1}, R_{i+1}, (1-t) \sum_{j \leq i} \frac{1}{R_j + 1}\right)$$

From the first-order stochastic dominance assumption, the right-hand-side is increasing with R_{i+1} , and is strictly below the left-hand-side at $R_{i+1} = R_i$. Moreover Assumption 2 implies that the right-hand-side is strictly above the left-hand-side for R_{i+1} high enough. Thus this equality defines a unique R_{i+1} , such that $R_{i+1} > R_i$. The single-crossing assumption then ensures that the difference between the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side is growing in θ at the right of $(1-t) \sum_{j \leq i} \frac{1}{R_j + 1}$. Since in addition $V_R > 0$, this proves that R_{i+1} is an increasing function of R_i , and a non-decreasing function of each R_j , $j < i$. Iterating this remark, we get that each R_{i+1} is an increasing function of R_1 . Replacing in (2), we get an equation in R_1 which has at most one solution. Existence follows from the fact that (R_1, \dots, R_n) forms an increasing sequence, so that by setting R_1 high enough we get $1/(1-t) > \sum_j 1/(1+R_j)$; and from the fact that when R_1 goes to $-t$ we get $1/(1-t) < \sum_j 1/(1+R_j)$. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2: If we know the odds, then we know the take and the market shares, from (1) and (2); and we also know the indexes $(\theta_j(\mathbf{R}))$ of marginal bettors, from (6). There only remains to find a family \mathbf{p} solution to the system

$$\forall i < n \quad V(R_i, p_i, \theta_i) = V(R_{i+1}, p_{i+1}, \theta_i)$$

Let us focus on positive probabilities. From the first-order stochastic dominance assumption, the right-hand-side is increasing with p_{i+1} , and is strictly above the left-hand-side at

$p_{i+1} = p_i$. From Assumption 1, it is also strictly below the left-hand-side when p_{i+1} goes to zero: therefore p_{i+1} is uniquely defined, and $p_{i+1} < p_i$. Moreover p_{i+1} is an increasing function of p_i , and thus of p_1 . Finally p_1 is uniquely determined by $p_1 + \sum_{i < n} p_{i+1} = 1$ (existence follows from checking the cases $p_1 \rightarrow 0$ and $p_1 = 1$). Q.E.D.

Appendix 2: estimating probabilities

Recall that we estimate probabilities in a flexible way (see section 5), on a dataset with 216,802 horses and 26,525 races. In the AIC case (Table 5), the log-likelihood is maximized at $(-91, 989.28)$, for a model that retains fourteen parameters: 8 on T_1 , 3 on T_3 , 2 on T_4 and 1 on T_5 . Two of these fourteen parameters do not differ significantly from 0. We list the parameter values below, but they are hard to interpret given the flexible specification we used, and the fact that we recentered and rescaled the polynomial terms during estimation.

Names	Estimates	Standard Errors	(Student)
$T_1: 1$	0.137	0.023	(6.0)
$T_1: 2$	0.073	0.036	(2.0)
$T_1: 3$	0.180	0.035	(5.2)
$T_1: 4$	0.017	0.017	(1.0)
$T_1: 5$	0.049	0.009	(5.2)
$T_1: 6$	-0.040	0.010	(4.2)
$T_1: 7$	0.038	0.008	(5.0)
$T_1: 8$	-0.011	0.007	(1.5)
$T_3: 1$	-0.079	0.017	(4.5)
$T_3: 2$	0.049	0.023	(2.2)
$T_3: 3$	0.057	0.014	(4.0)
$T_4: 1$	0.379	0.072	(5.3)
$T_4: 2$	-0.165	0.043	(3.8)
$T_5:$	-0.394	0.090	(4.4)

Table 5: Coefficient estimates in the AIC model

As usual, the BIC-selected model (Table 6) is more parsimonious: it selects two terms for T_1 , one for T_3 and one for T_4 . These four parameters very significantly differ from 0, with $p < .001$. Now the log-likelihood is maximized at $(-92, 072.04)$.

Names	Estimates	Standard Errors	(Student)
$T_1: 1$	0.025	0.007	(3.5)
$T_1: 2$	-0.036	0.011	(3.3)
$T_3: 1$	-0.074	0.010	(7.5)
$T_4: 1$	0.072	0.014	(5.2)

Table 6: Coefficient estimates in the BIC model

Appendix 3: Generalized Additive Models

Generalized additive models (GAM) were introduced by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986). They model a variable y_i by assuming that its distribution around its mean belongs to the exponential family and by modeling the mean as a sum of smooth functions of subvectors of the covariates (X_i). More precisely, one writes

$$g(Ey_i) = \sum_{j=1}^J f_j(X_i^j) \quad (14)$$

where g is a user-defined smooth, monotonic link function, each X_i^j is a user-defined subvector of X_i , and the f_j are to be estimated; and the user also chooses the distribution of the error term ($y_i - Ey_i$) within the exponential family.

There are two main reasons why GAMs are attractive for our purpose:

- unlike kernel-based methods, they do not require that the covariates have continuous support; in our case X_i includes odds R_i , which have discrete support;
- restrictions on the form of utility functions often translate directly into restrictions on the components X_i^j that may appear on the RHS of (14).

To estimate our GAM models, we use the methods described by Wood (2006); we use his implementation in the `mgcv` package of `R`, which incorporates the improved algorithm of Wood (2008). Dropping the i index and assuming that the link function g is simply the identity, the GAM in (1) is

$$E(y|x) = \sum_{j=1}^J f_j(x_j)$$

with the x_j 's subvectors of x . Modeling starts by choosing a rich family of basis functions (typically splines) (b_{jk}) for $k = 1, \dots, K_j$, with a maximal order K_j chosen large enough.

We then represent $f_j(x_j)$ with

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K_j} \beta_{jk} b_{jk}(x_j).$$

This gives a linear model

$$E(y|x) = X\beta;$$

but fitting it by OLS would typically overfit; to avoid overfitting, we penalize “wiggleness” by choosing smoothing parameters (λ_j) . The algorithm then chooses β to minimize

$$\sum_i (y_i - X_i\beta)^2 + \sum_j \lambda_j w_j(\beta),$$

with $w_j(\beta)$ approximating $\int f_j''(x; \beta)^2 dx$.

For given λ this gives us an estimator $\hat{\beta}(\lambda)$; we still need to pick the smoothing parameters λ . The generalized Akaike Information Criterion would choose λ to minimize

$$\sum_i (y_i - X_i\hat{\beta}(\lambda))^2 + 2\tau(\lambda)\sigma^2,$$

with σ^2 an estimate of $V(y|x)$, and τ the number of “effective degrees of freedom”, which is the trace of the influence matrix¹⁶.

Using the generalized AIC may work badly because it tends to overparameterize, creating convergence difficulties and numerical instabilities, especially if some covariates are close to nonlinear functions of others—this is called “concurvity” in this literature. Wood prefers to choose λ to minimize

$$\sum_i (y_i - X_i\hat{\beta}(\lambda))^2 \left(1 + 2\frac{\tau(\lambda)}{n - \tau(\lambda)}\right),$$

which he justifies in his 2008 paper by a Taylor expansion of the (theoretically best but computationally demanding) cross-validation criterion. Since for a well-specified model we should have

$$\sum_i (y_i - X_i\hat{\beta}(\lambda))^2 \simeq n\sigma^2,$$

the criterion used by Wood leads to somewhat more parsimonious specifications than if the generalized AIC was used. Finally, the generalized R^2 's cited in the text are defined in the

¹⁶For a linear model this would be just the number of covariates; for a fully nonparametric model it would be the number of observations. It is not an integer for GAMs.

obvious way, as the ratio

$$1 - \frac{EV(y|x)}{Vy}.$$