Cosmopolitan Education and Moral Education:
Forging Moral Beings Under Conditions of Global Uncertainty

Matthew J. Hayden

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ABSTRACT

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The accelerating pace of globalization places an imperative on formal schooling to figure out how to educate students for the rapidly changing world that today reaches even into the smallest towns and regions of our shared globe. This project attempts to respond to that imperative by examining the moral component of schooling, and specifically, what might be the best way to provide moral education. I begin from a premise that prevalent existing moral education constructs fall short of this task because they consist of either pre-determined morals that students are expected to learn and adopt or they teach *about* morality systems without analyzing their merits, preventing the development of the important skill of judgment. In a world of significantly different cultures and ways of living, such forms of moral education are simply incapable of providing the kind of education in morality that can withstand and accommodate the diversity that exists and the new forms of life that are yet to come.

Cosmopolitan education, based in cosmopolitan philosophy, is posited as a possible answer to this question. Beginning with cosmopolitanism's grounding in the principle of shared humanity I show how cosmopolitan education might offer a more mutually beneficial response to evolving global conditions. This project uses conceptual analysis to examine the concepts of an education in morality and Hannah Arendt's work on *natality*, *thinking*, *action*, and the *public* space of politics to show that an education in morality is public and political. As a result, cosmopolitan education can use the processes found in Thomas Nagel's epistemological restraint, Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics, and Chantal Mouffe's agonistic pluralism to help students acquire a disposition that both

promotes active and flexible engagement in moral inquiry, as well as in other educational experiences, and embraces plurality and diversity by recognizing the positive contribution that others can make in one's life. Shared humanity emerges as a collective possession of what Arendt calls 'the human condition,' which is essentially a collection of the human conditions of plurality, natality, action, and one that I add, the condition of uncertainty. Through a cosmopolitan lens, these conditions frame the way political processes can be utilized in an education in morality to encourage the development of a disposition that I call 'moral agonism,' which equips students to inquire into and participate in the development of morality in the face of constantly evolving and uncertain conditions in the world.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

You are wrong. That is immoral. Anyone who thinks that is a complete fool. I know I am right because I just am. There is only one correct thing to do. That is pure evil. Statements such as these, and innumerable variations, are familiar to all of us. Strong, bold assertions of irrefutable fact or moral judgment may make good headlines and argument starters, and may also be effective in arousing at least a momentary interest, but rarely can any of them hold up to critical scrutiny. Humans utter these statements, and we humans are fantastically flawed. Our perceptions are easily confused, our logic susceptible to twists, and even the smallest of appeals to sentiment can thwart our reason. Our judgments of right or wrong in human affairs are historically and notoriously corrupt, at times bravely and boldly consistent and at other times craven and self-serving. From Socrates' condemnation—an example of the latter—and subsequent acceptance of his own 'wrongful' execution—an example of the former—to the actions of villagers in Chambon, France, during World War II, complex moral dilemmas present themselves and demand a response.

As flawed humans, we are often left to judge without criteria, without grounding, "without a banister"[1] with which to steady ourselves on a staircase that will either lead us up toward moral clarity and 'rightness' or down to moral failure and degradation. We have yet to find the 'true' moral guide, the infallible decision matrix that can deliver for us the perfectly appropriate moral decision for every conceivable moral event. Making matters worse, even if we were to find such a device, our flaws make it likely that we would misinterpret, misread, or simply fail to understand it. Socrates thought he had found a steadying precept, one those French

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[1] Melvyn Hill, ed., *Hannah Arendt and the Recovery of the Public World*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 336-337.

villagers would surely have understood if not consciously articulated; a belief that it is better to suffer harm than to do it.[2] Socrates paid for this principle with his life and subsequent generations of moral thought have attempted to determine if it was a worthy price. Perhaps we are determined to hopelessly struggle in our attempts at moral progress.

Yet, we may look at our history and think that we have made progress. It is safe to say, now, that ending chattel slavery in United States was something we got right. At one point a critical mass of citizens thought that enslaving certain people was a morally good thing to do, that indeed, the slaves benefitted from it. Most of us now think that is not the case. It may be said that fewer men than ever before believe it is morally just to beat their wives or children simply because they will not do as they are told. Despite our flaws, we have neither given up on the notion of morality nor have we been complete failures at it, as these and other examples suggest. There is some room for optimism; we might indeed be more moral or get morality right. Some attempts to achieve this have gone the route of dogmatism or appeals to supernatural authorities. These have even been effective for some, but rarely so for those who fall outside the various religious or group membership domains from which they have sprung, and thus are inefficient, if not incapable, of universally delivering the kind of moral function and utility both desired and needed.

It is into this gap that this dissertation steps. While framed within an educational context, and one aligned with formal schooling at that, the essential problem this dissertation addresses is that which has plagued humans for centuries. How are we supposed to act and live with each other? And now, with accelerating globalization, how can we educate students to live in this world with each other and those they have not yet met? Human groups have constantly and

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[2] Plato, "Gorgias" in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, II, (London: Oxford University Press, 2009): 281-418.

consistently formed rules and codes of conduct to govern their relations, whether through questions of how to distribute the meat procured through a group hunt, or what to do with the group member who has taken from another (which contains within it the question of whether or not a person can actually possess property independent of other people).

Presupposing all of these questions is the idea that there are some things that people ought to do and some things they ought not do, particularly in relation to each other. Much has been written about what exactly those things are, and only a little bit less has been written about how one is to teach those things to people. This dissertation, however, will not necessarily add to those to stacks. Instead, this dissertation wants to understand not what is moral and how to teach morals to people, but instead what it is that we are actually doing when we talk about or attempt to create morality, and how ought we pursue this endeavor in a way that is itself moral. Further, it is not interested how one group of people, one culture, or one nation, can grapple with this problem, but instead how can all of us do so together? The global context mentioned earlier is not going away. This is a problem for everyone and the solution matters to all of us; we cannot reasonably conclude that some of us will figure it out and apply it to everyone else. From the beginning, then, morality is inherently normative and this is a problem that must be grounded in a global perspective. It is for this reason that cosmopolitan philosophy will be the starting point as I attempt to offer a mode of education that can facilitate this ancient inquiry.

1.1 Key Elements of Cosmopolitanism, Morality, and Agonism

This dissertation begins from a position that finds the current forms of moral education to be lacking in morality and educational value. Thus, the essential foundation of this dissertation is that first, moral education ought to be conceived as an education in morality rather than instruction in morals, and second, that cosmopolitan philosophy, through cosmopolitan

education, provides the philosophical and educational means to do so. Put as a question, *should the field of moral education be reconceived under the auspices of cosmopolitan philosophy in general, and cosmopolitan education in particular*? After answering that question in the affirmative, a second question is begged: *How can moral education be moral and educational—particularly in preparing students for a world that is constantly changing—and not violate its own conditions of morality?* Answering the first question requires understanding cosmopolitan philosophy and education and an education in morality, while answering the second question requires looking at processes in education and morality.

This project aspires to help both researchers and teachers rethink what they take to be moral education and the available options for conducting it. While lacking substantial prescriptive features for adoption in the classroom, this dissertation does hope to offer a way to conceive of moral education that can remain flexible and dynamic enough to be utilized as needed and as an ongoing process rather than a fixed result. It is for this reason that cosmopolitan education is considered. As a philosophy, cosmopolitanism is highly reflective, educative, and active, but also non-dogmatic. While early practitioners of cosmopolitan philosophy were prescriptive to a point, these prescriptions were always known to be subject to the vagaries of human experience, and are themselves responses to problems in lived experience that focus on both the self and that self in relation to others. Education has historically been concerned with educating the person in the context of social life; the development of both the individual and the individual as a member of society are concurrent and mutually dependent goals. For cosmopolitan philosophy, living in the world demands attention to oneself and others, and the adjustment of one's actions to those considerations.

An important trait of cosmopolitan philosophy, and an integral assumption in this

dissertation, is the admittance of human fallibility and the importance of rectifying its results. To be in error is human and inevitable, but one ought to attempt to correct it when it happens. As Marcus Aurelius explains:

> If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance.[3]

Epictetus and Aurelius, both considered cosmopolitan philosophers, wrote extensively about what one ought to do, or mused about what is done, but did so by way of the recognition of their own errors and in order to pursue the questions of life that these errors signified. They certainly made pronouncements, but they were always ready to revise them and showed a reluctance to be dogmatic. For instance, Aurelius' books are written as meditations rather than rules, and as such, were titled 'Meditations,' not 'The Rules.' Instead, they are collections of observations and questions about the world in support of more accurate and complete understanding. Due to the anti-dogmatism inherent in cosmopolitan educational philosophy, one cannot lay down a concrete pedagogy and say "There, now go do this." Instead, I will use concepts and processes found in political theory to show how cosmopolitan education could work. Before I present this outline, however, I must explain why I am using political theories for a treatise on morality.

Essentially, and per the theorists used in this dissertation, politics is the (sometimes) shared, public space in which communities gather to create and enforce the rules that govern their associations. Conceived this broadly, politics then encompasses laws, institutions, customs, and mores that are developed through this association. Rules that are not developed in the public sphere and are instead developed in the private realm of the personal, the home, or the family,

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[3] Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* trans. George Long, Vol. 12, 29th ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987), 276.

are not applicable to anyone else, at least in any enforceable way. This is rather straightforward. What is at issue is in which of these two sets of rules, the private or the public, do rules of morality lie? I claim that morality is public and not private for two reasons. First, morality involves issues of 'ought,' which, by their very nature, are utterances that are universal and therefore apply to everyone; one makes such a statement because one thinks everyone should comply, and thus the utterance is of public interest.

The second reason is very similar to the first; the questions prompted in morality are social in nature. Bernard Williams notes that the traditional question of ethics is *How should I live?* and though other people certainly will factor into the answer to this question, the fact that the question is put to the same 'I' that asks it attempts to make it a wholly subjective, non-social question. However, in the process of answering that question one inevitably encounters the existence of others, prompting a set of questions regarding one's own actions as they relate to and affect of others. These are the questions of morality. The existence of people prompts the asking of moral questions, or rather, questions relative to the domain of morality. *Should I do x? Is it right or wrong to do x? What factors should I use in order to determine this?* In this view, ethics could be seen as encompassing the large domain of human life, experience, and action wherein morality circumscribes a portion of that domain that is specifically called into existence by the existence of other people. Their existence demands of the ethical question a further question about one's relation to those other people and the evaluation of the interactions that transpire between them and us.

Since morality is to be taken up in this dissertation from the perspective of cosmopolitanism, which rests on the shared humanity of all people and thus entails the essential consideration of everyone in human action, the ethical question becomes *How should* <u>*we*</u> *live?*

This question is directed both outward and inward; it is asked of everybody about everybody. This makes morality fundamentally social. Even if the question appears to be one that is self-directed, one asks it in response to the fact that there are other people in the world. If there were no other people in the world, one would not ask the question. Similarly, if there were no other people in the world, there would be no need for political organization to govern human associations, making questions of these associations just as much about morality as they do about politics. It is for this reason that Arendt is a part of this project; the condition of human plurality forces both politics and morality upon all of us. The cause of politics and the cause of morality are essentially the same, and both are located and enacted in the public sphere.

Though I will bring politics into morality, I have no intention to bring morality into politics. Chantal Mouffe decries the 'moralization' of politics in which political opponents in the 'we v. they' construction of politics is converted into 'good v. evil.'[4] Though I share this concern regarding politics, it does not negatively affect this project because my intention is the opposite, to 'politicize' morality, so to speak. By this I mean to say that I intend to bring some of the processes and concepts of politics into the moral domain, but only those that accrue logically from the fundamental conditions of shared humanity and human plurality such as democratic participation and consideration of all others in deliberations. Therefore, specific realizations of political mechanisms are not my aim; I am not asking that we subject morality to a vote. I am, however, asking that we make explicit what has been implicitly true of morality all along; that it is a product of social (public) forces that has incidentally managed to work its way into private structures and public organizational structures, and that it is generally amended, adapted, and reworked with micro-level intention but macro-level accident. Morality *is* as much a part of

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[4] Chantal Mouffe, *On The Political* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 75.

pubic life as politics is, and thus our approach to it ought to reflect this fact.

One of the more significant and important steps I take in this project is the semi-equivocation of 'shared humanity' with the Arendtian human conditions of plurality, natality, and action, or rather the infusion of Arendt's thinking to give more support to the idea of shared humanity. The concept of shared humanity has long animated the work of cosmopolitan theorists and actors. However, the concept occupies a rather ambiguous space. Is 'humanity' a noun or an adjective? Does it indicate a disposition of inherent 'goodness' in human nature or does it encapsulate a set of characteristics that in total make one a 'human'? In Chapter 2, I will offer conceptual clarity for 'shared humanity' that removes much of the common and subjective meaning with which it has been imbued, and instead identify it with a broader understanding of humanness. I will offer Arendt's conditions of human plurality, natality, and action to indicate what it is we humans actually share. It is these conditions of human existence that bind us together rather than some ephemeral sense of human goodness or behavioral optimism. These conditions are offered as more conceptually clear and theoretically sound bases from which to launch the cosmopolitan moral educational efforts, and also make possible the use of Arendt's conceptions of thinking and public space to further advance key cosmopolitan educational points especially in relation to morality.

Another important concept for this project is that of *agonism*, a term that describes a political concept that I bring into morality as a step toward making morality an explicitly public action. For one, bringing agonism into morality takes the violent and dogmatic edge off of the typical labeling of persons and actions as 'good' or 'evil,' which is the opposite effect that morality has had in politics.[5] Agonism in morality aims to replace 'good' and 'evil'

[5] Ibid.

categorizations, such as those found in the labeling of ‘others’ as ‘enemies,’ with the concept of ‘adversaries’ who compete to determine the best option rather than to eliminate or destroy each other. The moralization of politics, wherein terms such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ have entered into political arguments, has served to polarize and intensify disagreements and reduced opponents to ‘enemies’ that deserve less consideration and respect as persons than does the appellation of ‘adversary.’ Morality has had a long history of this kind of ‘demonization’ and could use an infusion of agonistic, ‘adversarial’ relations to replace the antagonism often found in everyday moral discussions. Further, the antagonism often found in moral relations has played a role in the movement toward more ambiguous, non-judgmental, and relativistic approaches to morality wherein judgment is avoided in order to avoid the conflict of antagonistic relations. Agonism will be offered as a way to repair and strengthen discourse in morality so that judgments can be made, but respectfully, inclusively, and without antagonism.

Since I will not call upon transcendental, religious, or otherwise traditional authority and received morality to inform the content of an education in morality, I will not be able to say what, exactly, morals are or what specific behaviors are in fact moral. As will be shown, education in morality in cosmopolitan education is primarily a process that results in the acquisition of a disposition toward a certain kind of process, and morality is constitutive of that process; morality as a product and morality as a process cannot be separated. Politics is essentially a set of activities and processes by and through which the governance of associations take place. Since both politics and morality are animated by the same cause—the existence of other people—and since politics and education in morality are both essentially processes (rather than content) to formulate governance of human relations, I can use politics to help guide us to a process in education in morality that can be sustainable, ongoing, and non-dogmatic.

I will unveil these processes by examining a number of different mechanisms, each offering a crucial, and some times overlapping, feature necessary in cosmopolitan education. Philip Kitcher's *ethical progress* provides a general model of the ongoing deliberations that are required in a cosmopolitan education in morality. Thomas Nagel's conception of *epistemological restraint* provides a mechanism by and through which those with strongly held private beliefs might still participate in public morality while preserving a type of impartiality that can lead to valid, inclusive, and justifiable collaboration. Jürgen Habermas's *discourse ethics* provides a more concrete example of how to achieve justification through deliberative democratic processes, while sharing with cosmopolitanism the acceptance of key principles of shared humanity, democratic inclusion, and dynamic engagement. Mouffe's *agonistic pluralism* provides a way to move beyond the perceptions of the flawed dream of consensus in discourse ethics while admitting the ineradicable conflict that arises from the human condition of pluralism. Agonism provides the 'grist for the mill' of public morality, subjecting it to contestation for refinement and improvement, a process that emerges as a public good.

Arendt's conceptions of the human conditions of natality, plurality, and action, along with her thoughts on thinking and the necessity of the public sphere in human action, will serve as both the bridge between Habermas and Mouffe and that which unifies the components of cosmopolitan education, education in morality, and the political processes described. Taken together, they form the necessary space of morality, what I call *moral agonism*. Moreover, where Arendt is hoping to bring politics back into the public realm, I hope to do the same with morality; to remove it from the exclusively and traditionally private realm and put it squarely into the *polis*, so that agonism can be inhabited, and a more efficacious, and dare I say 'moral,' process may result.

1.2 Moral Education

Before proceeding, I must make clear some technical terms as they will be used in this project. The nature of the terms to be used and the lack of suitable available synonyms that would make things clearer sets before me a rather difficult task; I must make important distinctions between very similar terms and concepts. First, when I wish to refer to the field of moral education as it is commonly understood, I will write *the field of moral education*. This phrase will then refer to the most common conceptions of moral education, the various moral systems used, and the diverse practices therein. For the most part, anything that anyone might choose to call moral education could be included as a referent of the phrase. When I use the term *morals education* I will be referring to the types of education *for* specific morals (as determined by religion, ideology, or politics, among others) that dominate *the field of moral education*. These are attempts to teach students a specific set of morals or traits that are part of a bounded morality system.[6] When I use the term *moral education* I will be referring to a kind of education that is moral in its application, methods, or pedagogies such that it is not immoral. In this sense, 'moral' is an adjective describing the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of the education. This does not describe the content of the education (as does *morals education*), but rather indicates a moral judgment of the education as implemented (and thus depends upon a judgment about what is moral). Lastly, *morality education* and *education in morality* will be used to indicate the kind of

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[6] The use of the term 'morality system' comes from Bernard Williams's use to refer to systems of morality such as Utilitarianism, deontology, or virtue ethics, as well as those derived from religious beliefs or bounded ideologies, to name only a few. More specifically, Williams crafted a set of nine 'theses' as criteria for describing a morality system. To describe and give adequate treatment to these theses takes more time and space than can be allotted here and would distract from my purpose, but suffice it to say that a system of morality that purports final answers or authority that can speak to specific traits and behaviors without reference to particulars would be a 'morality system.' See Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 174-196 in particular. For an excellent, and succinct, explanation of these theses see Timothy Chappell, "Bernard Williams," edited by Edward N. Zalta, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/williams-bernard/.

education that is an inquiry into what morality is and means such that the inquiry forms the content of the education and equips the student with the necessary tools and methodologies to conduct the inquiry (§4.2 will deal at length with this concept). Essentially I will position *education in morality* as the replacement for *morals education*, and the two should be seen in this project as competing forms in the *field of moral education*, though an education in morality should be seen as a richer, fuller, more inclusive, and better way to conceive the field of moral education. A more thorough description of some of these key terms is as follows:

Ethics – I follow Bernard Williams' interpretation and use this term in regard to the 'original question' of ethics: *How should I live*? Ethical dilemmas, then, are dilemmas concerned with this question. I will not use this term to deal with the question of whether how a way to live is right or wrong, good or bad; for this I will reserve the use of the word 'moral.' However, ethics will be used often when referring to questions about *how* one should or might live, or the kinds of decisions one might make in trying to decide the activities and behaviors that will constitute one's life.

Education in Morality – Chapter 4 is devoted to the explanation of this term, but it can be briefly understood to refer to an education in the forms of life required for an inquiry into the human practices and behaviors that are judged to be right or wrong. An education in morality will not provide an answer to the question *what should I do?* but it aims to provide the tools for doing so. It engages students in the activities and process by and through which morality is developed, thus equipping them with the skills to do so and make their own judgments.

Morality – I will apply the Latin use of the word as customs and mores that have attempted to answer the first question of ethics (*How should I live?*) with an emphasis on what is right or wrong, wherein the question then becomes *what should I do?* Morality is essentially a

field or domain of study, the object of an *education in morality.* John Wilson refers to this form of use as 'logical' in that it is a category rather than a description. In this sense, morality is a compatible, but not necessary, part of Ethics; it is not a necessarily required participant in the attempt to answer the original question. It is, however, an object of study in the attempt to understand what is meant by the question *what should I do?* as well as an attempt to answer it. In this sense, morality education *may* be a component of Ethics, but it is a part of the process enacted by a cosmopolitan education *ethos* and becomes one's answer to the original question.

Moral Education – 'Moral' is used as an adjective that refers to an evaluation, a moral evaluation, of the education itself. Thus, a 'moral education' is one that meets general criteria for education that is not bad, corrupt, or corrupting, and one that meets the criteria for fulfilling a set of moral principles. This use of 'moral' can be applied to different morality systems. One could say that a particular education program is a 'moral' one, as opposed to an 'immoral' or 'corrupting' one. This is also the form of use that John Wilson refers to as 'sociological' as opposed to 'logical.' This term, 'moral education,' will be used rarely.

Morals Education – I will use 'morals' as an adjective to describe the content of the education. In this project, it refers to an education that teaches, or teaches about, specific morals as described by a morality system. A morals education might teach students about character traits or desirable virtues, or how to bring about consequences that provide the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. A morals education ultimately seeks to inculcate predetermined behaviors (or morals) or skills such as 'moral reasoning' that are generally demonstrable through either some form of evaluation process or observation of student behavior. The successful participant of a morals education is thought to possess a discrete set of skills, traits, morals, or even habits that can be deliberately implemented and consciously called upon. A 'morals

educator' is what I will name someone who attempts to bring about this outcome.

Morality Education – In this case I will use 'morality' as an adjective to describe the object of the education described. Morality education, then, is an education that attempts to bring about a full and as-complete-as-possible understanding of the concept of 'morality' (see previous entry Morality). It could be said that 'morality education' is an education that inculcates the understanding of the customs and judgments of agent intentions, actions, and consequences, but not necessarily the skills or habits of 'being moral.' Such an education does not equip a student with specific morals, but rather a general morals knowledge that is capable, but not necessarily so, of influencing moral action. This understanding of 'morality' is not restricted to one system or ideology, and in fact, it is hoped that it might contain all of them and more, resulting in a full and rich conception. My use of this term will correspond most closely as a replacement of the traditional and common usage of 'moral education.' This substitution is necessary in order to distinguish the systemic reference with the descriptive reference as defined in the 'moral education' entry.

Morality System (or 'system of morals') – I intend to invoke the meaning of this term to be synonymous with its use by Bernard Williams. It refers to a system or theoretical perspective that is prescriptive, proscriptive, and bounded. A morality system is comprised of moral principles, logically (or seemingly so) integrated and interdependent, that form a single coherent (again, apparently) system. Utilitarianism is a morality system, as is Virtue Ethics, or Kantian Ethics. It is not necessary for these systems to be completely 'airtight' – for example, within Utilitarianism you will find both Rule Utilitarianism and Act Utilitarianism. It is important to remember that a defining characteristic of a system is that it is bounded and therefore includes some things and excludes others, usually determined in advance through tradition or some form

of hierarchical authority.

1.3 Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of two general parts. In Part I, Chapters two through four primarily deal with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan education, and moral education, essentially laying out the existing theories and concepts to be utilized and challenged. In Part II, Chapters Five and Six introduce the procedures by and through which the kind of cosmopolitan education in morality I envision could take place, all of which develops an educational space for morality I call *moral agonism*, which also doubles for the name of a kind of disposition that results.

Chapter 2 begins with a look at the historical origins and contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitan philosophy by identifying and describing prevalent typologies. I then describe a general sense of what a cosmopolitan education might consist of and be concerned with, while concluding that it contains a process-centric orientation. Chapter 3 continues with the process-centric nature of cosmopolitan education and examines this idea in more detail, using moderate and strong forms of cosmopolitanism as a way to highlight the importance of processes in education. It concludes with a look at the concept of *ethical progress* which conceives of ethics as a democratic and ongoing deliberation about how to live together, and offers an illustration of the kinds of aims a cosmopolitan education in morality could have. Chapter 4 investigates the concept of an education in morality, as distinct from 'morals education,' that, in light of Chapter 3's conclusion about processes and results shows that an education in morality aims to produce individuals with the skills to participate in moral inquiry and not only be capable of adhering to pre-determined moral strictures. An examination of Hannah Arendt's conception of *natality* in education in the second half of Chapter 4 will underscore this point. It becomes clear that any

education in morality must entail the preservation of the opportunity and creative potential for subsequent generations to challenge, revise, amend, or accept existing moral frameworks as well as develop new ones.

Chapter 5 begins the second part of the dissertation and involves the introduction and explanation of key processes, some borrowed from politics, by and through which cosmopolitan education in morality could take place. First, epistemological restraint is used to show private belief can be suspended, though not ignored, to create the public space necessary for justificatory processes to take place. Then Habermas's discourse ethics is used to more specifically delineate the kinds of dialogic dispositions and processes that can be invoked to initiate and maintain publicly collaborative deliberations about morality. Mouffe's agonistic pluralism is then explained as a way to remove the status quo maintaining affects of consensus in deliberations and to show the ineradicability of pluralism in human interactions. These pluralistic interactions are then shown to create the space in which agonism can allow for the collaborative and mutually beneficial affects of contestation of morality. Chapter 6 begins by examining Arendt's thoughts on thinking in morality and the public/private distinction that ensues. Then Arendt is used to provide a synthesis of discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism that combine in moral agonism, a concept that I hold represents an educational disposition produced by cosmopolitan education in morality.

What follows is essentially a vision of a type of education that describes a guiding approach to education that is not only applicable in the field of moral education. In fact, another significant assumption made here—one that has no direct bearing on any of the arguments and could be true or false without affecting the processes I will offer—is that education is a moral endeavor regardless of subject area or discipline. Thus the pedagogical philosophy embodied by

the kind of education that will be described is one upon which the more specific disciplinary content of formal schooling can be built and delivered. A chemistry teacher can be a cosmopolitan educator in morality equally as well as a music teacher, or, should such a school exist, even the ethics teacher, without ever talking about morality, per se. The threshold of cosmopolitan education lies mostly in *how* the chemistry teacher teaches chemistry and how she can bring the relevant life of the subject area into the learning experience of the students. I will use the words *cosmopolitan education*, *cosmopolitan moral education*, and *cosmopolitan education in morality* at different times depending on either the specific point I am trying to make or which conceptual clarifications have been made thus far, but it is my intention to suggest that by the end of the dissertation I might write 'cosmopolitan education,' but one will read 'cosmopolitan education in morality,' or even 'moral education.' The goal is to show that a cosmopolitan education is not only an education in morality, but also an education that is itself an embodiment of what morality is. The most important lesson taught in cosmopolitan education is *how* to live and interact with others as one collaborates with others to live, work, and learn in and about the world.

Chapter 2

Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Education

Cosmopolitanism has recently experienced a revival and the increase in global communication and mobility is but one reason among many. During a similar time of global expansion in the 18th-century Immanuel Kant implored his contemporaries "to step from the lawless condition of savages into a league of nations… [wherein] even the smallest state could expect security and justice."[7] His idea, rooted in cosmopolitan philosophy, was based on the hope that humans could find ways to improve their conditions and interactions. Kant's cosmopolitanism has strongly influenced contemporary cosmopolitan thought and has found an emphasis in scholarship on educational institutions where the next generation might be transformed into the kind of people and society imagined by Kant.[8] It is my assertion that cosmopolitanism's grounding in the fundamental fact of shared humanity offers moral education the best hope for the discovery of acceptable, justifiable, and unifying principles to guide human interaction.

Most of the prevalent forms of morals education do well enough for what they do. They indicate the kind of traits or behaviors that are desirable and attempt to inculcate these in students. If students were to acquire these traits then we might be able say the world has gotten 'better' insofar as these behaviors would be likely to translate into improved interpersonal interactions that might reflect an improvement in morality. However, upon closer inspection,

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[7] Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* edited by Lewis White Beck, 2nd ed., (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1997), 19.

[8] See Tom G. Palmer, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Personal Identity," *Ethics & Politics*, no. 2 (2003); Klas Roth, "Good Will: Cosmopolitan Education as a Site for Deliberation," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (April 2010); Jørgen Huggler, "Cosmopolitanism and Peace in Kant's Essay on 'Perpetual Peace'," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

these model's machinations look like those of liberal economics, which professes to benefit everyone as a consequent of individual thriving and it essentially treats each person as the fundamental unit of a utilitarian and Pareto-like moral happiness rather than as an individual moral unit of a larger group. For liberal economists, for example, if the rich get richer and the poor get less poor, then everything is working as it ought. In typical morals education, the belief is that if we can get individuals to see themselves as individual moral agents who should act a certain (prescribed) way and we can get them to act that way, they will create a more moral world as a collection of morally acting and interacting individuals.

It should be said that there has been work in a model of morality that is similar to the one that will be proposed. Cosmopolitan education in morality is largely relational, and there have been many, mainly feminists, who have focused on morality relationally. This work traverses a wide range of scholars from Carol Gilligan's groundbreaking work to contemporary theorists such as Nell Noddings and the field of ethics of care. Gilligan found that young girls presented with moral dilemmas often viewed the situation in regard to the relationships they would have with the persons in the dilemma construction, whereas young boys tended to view the dilemma as one based largely on rationally logical or consequentialist impulses.[9] Noddings has written about a form of "ordinary conversation" that takes place between adults and children wherein one's "conversational partner is recognized to be more important than the topic, argument, or conclusions."[10] A very clear affinity with the relational approach in cosmopolitanism can be seen in Noddings's statement, particularly the subordination of the result to the processes that achieve it, but even more importantly, the recognition that the other person in conversation matters at

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[9] Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* 29th ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 28-31.

[10] Nel Noddings, "Conversations as Moral Education," *Journal of Moral Education* 23, no. 2 (1994):107.

least as much as oneself.

The work in this field is a rich and interesting, but will not be investigated here. First, since the cosmopolitan moral education model will be inclusive, such relational models will ultimately have a home in this philosophy. Second, these models are situated in highly contextualized environments and the overall scope of my project is broader and more abstract. Cosmopolitan morality is certainly more relational than not, but it is not wholly so. Further, its relational qualities lie primarily in the processes by and through which morality is undertaken, not necessarily decided. Ultimately, cosmopolitan education in morality includes the examination of many models and systems in morality, including relational models of morality, allowing for flexibility in the appropriate application of one or another, or where the combination of experience and judgment dictate. The goal of cosmopolitan approaches is to ensure that all the tools for understanding and enacting morality are at our disposal.

Cosmopolitan education sees each person as the fundamental moral unit of the larger society, and the point of departure for morality is each person's relationship with others. Most morals education systems treat the social component as a secondary beneficiary of the individual moral agent's actions. Other traditional moral conceptions start from a point of individual moral agency with the goal of becoming connected through moral actions. By starting with the individual, independent of the social living conditions, it then becomes possible to justify self-interest in the guise of moral action. In cosmopolitan moral education, the individual and society are not positioned as competitors for a limited good or in a unidirectional morally causal relationship. Instead, the individual sees himself as a moral agent in a world of other moral agents and as part of a social fabric, the threads of which connect every person morally. This connectedness is the cosmopolitan moral education starting point, not the goal. We start out

connected and the goal is to conduct ourselves with that in mind.

Across society, an education system is typically representative of the socio-economic, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups that society contains. Educational institutions bring children into direct contact with diversity that can inform their learning as they attempt to be more at home in the world in which they live and will inherit. H.B. Danesh points out that "the universal presence of conflict and war in human history has always necessitated that priority be given to education for conflict management and war preparation, and for the preservation of the larger community."[11] It is with these thoughts in mind that the following section will first provide an overview of cosmopolitanism, and then a general definition of cosmopolitanism education, followed by a discussion of some main strands of cosmopolitan education. The third section will discuss a key dilemma facing the implementation of cosmopolitan educational processes, a dilemma that requires a choice, the choosing of which indicates the positive contribution of cosmopolitan education in morality.

A note about dispositions

The educational goal of a cosmopolitan education is the development of a particular type of disposition (or rather a set of dispositions), often reflected in discussions about 'character' and 'traits' in education (though the cosmopolitan project should not be confused or equated with the moral education program called Character Education). This link betrays cosmopolitanism's origins in Stoic philosophy, which was interested in the normative dimensions of human behavior.[12] This original Stoic model is more prescriptive than modern conceptions that require

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[11] H. B. Danesh, "Towards an integrative theory of peace education" *Journal of Peace Education* 3, no. 1 (March 2006): 55.

[12] See Mark A. Holowchak, "Education as Training for Life: Stoic Teachers as Physicians of the Soul," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 41, no. 2 (April 2009).

flexibility and communication, wherein collaborative dialogue and engagement are utilized to develop the capacities that help the student come to understand how she is to regard and interact with others in everyday life. Cosmopolitan education is inherently reflective and deliberative and is therefore well positioned to affect the dispositions of a student through the rational faculties because the deliberative nature of humans is directly responsible for character formation.[13] Having the "moral strength or virtue to fulfill" one's duty is the determinant of character,[14] in this tradition, but formalist and subjectivist accounts of character education offer too little for students to learn, and more expansive and inclusive accounts offer too much that becomes contradictory in its plurality.[15] This is only a problem, however, for educators who are led to believe that it is *specific morals, traits, or principles* that should be taught. For the cosmopolitan educator, inhabiting some uncertainty and 'morals confusion'[16] is vital since its challenge provokes inquiry and will find its expression and procedural solution in moral agonism. Further, it is through dispositions that the link between the social life and ethical life is made manifest by virtue of their existence in dispositions.[17] Cosmopolitan education's greatest, and least challengeable, characteristic might be its fairness or sense of justice in allowing space for people

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[13] Roth, "Good Will," 6.

[14] Ibid.

[15] See Kristjan Kristjansson, "In Defence of 'Non-Expansive' Character Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 36, no. 2 (May 2002).

[16] This is not to say that some kind of functional or 'operational' certainty is not desired nor acquired, but only that expressions of absolutism about morals are not made. The way in which 'working moral rules' are acquired will be discussed in Chapter 5.

[17] In fact, Williams basically equivocates the two when he states, "In this sense, social or ethical life must exist in people's dispositions. It is the content of the dispositions, their intelligibility and their degree of particularity, that differs between societies and is at issue between different interpretations of modern society." The "or" between "social" and "ethical" is not there to indicate exclusivity (i.e. one or the other), but rather indicate the identical nature of the concepts. The social life and the ethical life are the same thing. See Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 201.

to share freely ideas about morality (moderate) rather than delineating specific morals to acquire (strong). The dispositions required to abet this approach are key to the formation of cosmopolitan and moral dispositions, as is the process by which they are acquired.

2.1 Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism's philosophical roots can be found in Stoic philosophers such as Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and their Cynic precursor, Diogenes. Cosmopolitanism can be traced first, to Socrates' claim that he was not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world,[18] and second, to Diogenes' assertion that he was a 'citizen of the world.'[19] The basis for these statements is the idea that all humans are part of the same human family, participants in a shared humanity, and interconnected and interdependent for flourishing.[20] Whether flourishing is perceived as best achieved through moral introspection, political institutions, economic activity, or cultural exchange, the core is the same: the fundamental presumption of shared humanity. Cosmopolitanism does not assume that the practical unity of humans is easily achieved, or even desired, in practice; it only suggests that the fact of our shared humanity compels us to attempt to create some kind of unified fact 'on the ground.'[21] As the Cynic philosophers determined, moral obligation is actually allegiance to humanity.[22] This allegiance requires attention and cultivation.

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[18] Plutarch, "Of Banishment, or Flying One's Country," in *Plutarch's Morals, Vol. III*, edited by William W. Goodwin, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1878): 19.

[19] Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, "Cosmopolitanism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Spring 2011).

[20] See Aurelius, *Meditations,* 264. "If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do: if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members?"

[21] Of what the unity consists will be touched on in section §3.2, and elaborated upon throughout the chapters that follow.

[22] See David T. Hansen, "Curriculum and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Inheritance" *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 40 (2008). See also Epictetus, *The Works of Epictetus. Consisting of His Discourses, in Four Books*, *The*

The concept of shared humanity offered here requires some explanation. First, what it is not. It is not a clear, complete, and closed conception of human *nature*. There are many competing offerings of what humans are like insofar as how they behave and the psychological characteristics they possess, but they are not at issue here. There are also numerous descriptions of the biological and physiological characteristics of what is entailed in being a 'human.' Others, including philosophers, have defined humans as possessing a rationality that sets them apart from other sentient beings. While these latter descriptions are certainly germane in a reductive sense, my conception of humanity is not limited only to the physiological, biological, psychological, and cognitive elements of being human. Instead, the conception that matters, the only conception we can use with any real consistency, sees humanity as what Arendt called the *human condition.* For Arendt, there are different parts of the human condition including, but not limited to, the human conditions of plurality and natality.[23] It is these conditions of human existence that I have in mind, and these conditions will be elucidated later where they have a specific bearing on the education in morality I propose. Thus, 'humanity' represents a set of human conditions that, together, represent a condition of 'humanity.'

This condition encompasses much of what is produced in the previously mentioned perspectives, but also the capacities of humans. For instance, take the quasi-psychological conception of 'humanity.' In this case, I refer to the use of the word to indicate a positive trait of sorts. An example would be when someone says that something is 'humane' or that one should

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Enchiridion, and Fragments, trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1865), 428. "A person once brought clothes to a pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the severity of the weather; then carried him to his house, and furnished him with all necessaries. Being reproached by some one for doing good to the evil; "I have paid this regard," answered he, "not to the man, but to humanity.""

[23] See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). These concepts will also be examined in more depth in Chapters Three and Six.

summon one's 'humanity' in one's dealings with other persons. I take seriously Sharon Todd's analysis of the difference between the concept of 'humanity' and its typical adjectival use to denote something good or to represent 'goodness' in opposition to 'inhumanity,' which is something bad and 'evil.'[24] In this sense of the word I take 'humanity' to be that human-ness that is possessed by all human beings, including good, evil, and the combinations in between. I do not propose to define human nature, nor even assert that there is one, beyond repeating Terence's observation that "I am a man; I deem nothing that is human to be foreign to me," nor to any other person.[25] Humanity as it is conceived in this project in regard to such use represents all that is human, from benevolence to violence, compassion to indifference, moments of beauty and grace to acts of cruelty and self-destruction. In this case one would be 'rolling the dice' when asking someone to summon her 'humanity' in her interactions with another person because doing so could bring forth any possibility in the entire range of human action. To possess the potential for all actions known to be within the capability of a human, as well as the potential for all actions not yet known to be possible by a human, essentially frames the human condition that serves to represent what 'humanity' means.

Regarding that which is 'shared' I only mean to say that the conditions of human existence are contained in each person's existence, possessed by each. Humans do not share 'humanity' in the way that one would share a loaf of bread, but rather they share in common conditions of human existence in the way that those sharing the bread might each posses individually the same need to eat. Thus, the need to eat is a need that is shared by all humans; all

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[24] See Sharon Todd, *Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, Rethinking Cosmopolitanism*, (Paradigm: London, 2009).

[25] Terence, in David T. Hansen, "Cosmopolitanism and Education: A View From the Ground," *Teachers College Record* 112 (2008): 16.

humans similarly share the set of qualities and conditions of human existence. This does mean that they all realize their desires or even manifest all of the same needs, but that at birth, by virtue of being a human, there is a subset of general conditions of human existence that frames their lives, from limitations—such as external limitations on human movement like gravity—to capacities—such as the potential for new thought or the development of new concepts. Thus each of us is a participant in a shared humanity. We co-inhabit a set of conditions that are necessary extensions of our existence. It is this co-habitation, this 'sharing,' of the conditions of human existence that sits at the base of cosmopolitan philosophy.

One last point about shared humanity and the human condition is one that has far reaching implications in morality. If we understand shared humanity to include the bad as well as the good, it forces us to see wrongdoers differently, and can help us distinguish between the merely 'bad' and the truly 'evil.' When we only think of humanity as consisting of those 'good' characteristics that we may possess and express, then those who do not do those things are excluded from humanity. We hear it in common language every time someone suggests something is inhumane or that someone has 'lost his humanity' by acting against prevailing norms of conduct. However, if one human is capable of an immoral act, it is quite possible that another person is. We can find commonality with others not only in our good, saint-like acts of kindness and compassion, but in our darkest moments, too.

Recognizing 'all-in-one' does two things. First, it prevents us from excluding others and denying their humanity as a result of their transgressions. In cosmopolitan shared humanity, we cannot deny them this; if shared humanity is deemed sufficient when things go well, then it must be enough when they go awry. Secondly, it opens a door for us to see not only the often tenuous lines that separate 'good' from 'bad,' but allow us to engage with questions about what is wrong

to do, why it is wrong, and to what degree various wrongs go wrong. The type and severity of 'wrong' behavior matters, especially in a society that metes out punishments and constraints on persons whose behavior offends or threatens. Including both bad and exemplary actions in morality retains the grounds for a principle of shared humanity, and protects us from subjection to a tyranny of our own making in which we would lock ourselves in the past and prevent ourselves from moving forward.[26] It requires of us, through a commitment to non-exclusion, to construct something like forgiveness in order for us to let go of the past instead of maintaining old grudges. It allows us to move on from what has happened to instead focus on what might happen or begin again.

Often cited as an historic originator of cosmopolitanism, Diogenes' positive contributions to cosmopolitanism were in living in accordance with nature and resisting all forms of convention that erect obstacles to doing so.[27] For the Third Century Stoics, goodness involved serving one's fellow human beings as well as possible and doing so required political engagement, an engagement that might extend beyond one's own *polis*. Roman Stoics found it easy to be cosmopolitan given imperial *pax romana*. If the entire 'known' world is part of Rome and each of these parts is connected, then all are citizens, both literally and figuratively, of the 'world.' Operating under such imperial constructs under relatively peacefully conditions, but *not* offering justification for them, provided clear intellectual sailing for cosmopolitan ideas to

[26] The redemptive potential found in this conception lies at the root of forgiveness, a significant component of social, political, and moral goods as identified by Arendt in a number of her works. See Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 236-242. See also Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1964), particularly the Postscript. The concept in Arendt is intriguing, but not necessary for this project. It is used here only to show one benefit of a more comprehensive conception of 'humanity' and the implications therein.

[27] See Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism." My reference to Diogenes is for historical and origin purposes only and though he certainly possessed many traits of a cosmopolitan as I see one, I do not offer Diogenes as an exemplar of a cosmopolitan.

develop and spread. The terms 'cosmopolitanism' and 'world citizenship' began to evolve in the eighteenth century to describe an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality, and to indicate "someone who was not subservient to a particular religious or political authority, someone who was not biased by particular loyalties or cultural prejudice."[28] In this context, a cosmopolitan was an erudite and objective individual, a conception that still remains in many perceptions of cosmopolitanism.

Stoic-based characterizations of cosmopolitanism focus on the universal nature of shared humanity and contemporary examples are often associated with the work of Martha Nussbaum.[29] Cosmopolitanism has also been approached from a cultural perspective, focusing on the shared traditions, languages, and social structures that constitute different groups of people such as is found in the work of Jeremy Waldron.[30] Other conceptions of cosmopolitanism orient toward 'sensibilities' and the understanding that life itself, and the experiences derived, constitute one's cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education.[31] Still others, such Kwame Anthony Appiah, have approached it in a way that includes all of these distinct approaches.[32] Kleingeld and Kleingeld and Brown[33] described various typologies of cosmopolitanism, in addition to Cultural

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28 Ibid.

29 See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, "Symposium on Cosmopolitanism Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero's Problematic Legacy," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000); and Martha Nussbaum, *For Love of Country*, ed. Joshua Cohen, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).

30 See Jeremy Waldron, "Teaching Cosmopolitan Right," in *Education and Citizenship in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities*, edited by Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg, (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).

31 See Hansen, "Cosmopolitan Inheritance."

32 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006).

33 See Pauline Kleingeld, "Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no. 3 (1999); and Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism."

cosmopolitanism, such as Economic, Legal, Moral, Political, and Romantic/Utopian; this work is often referenced in regard to these typologies.[34] These prevalent categories of cosmopolitanism illustrate the different understandings of cosmopolitanism, and may be useful in attempts to understand what cosmopolitan education is and how it might be best understood. I will now briefly describe the predominant Kleingeld and Brown typologies as a way to illustrate common expressions of cosmopolitanism that will have resonance with that which I develop in this paper.

2.1.1 Moral Cosmopolitanism

Moral cosmopolitanism focuses on the shared humanity of all human beings.[35] It grants universal rights of human dignity, security, rights of person, etc., not *legally* but morally, and is primarily based on Kant's categorical imperative.[36] This form of cosmopolitanism emphasizes universalized ethical and moral conduct and treatment of all people, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, gender, and culture.[37] In particular, moral cosmopolitanism claims that one is obligated to deliver aid (when possible) to any person regardless of their nationality. Some cosmopolitans state that this aid is never to be subject to preference toward one's fellow citizens over a citizen

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[34] See M. Victoria Costa, "Cultural Cosmopolitanism and Civic Education," *Philosophy of Education Society* (2005); Huggler, "Cosmopolitanism and Peace."

[35] See Kleingeld, "Six Varieties"; Gerard Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory," *The British Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 1 (March 2006); Torill Strand, "The Making of a New Cosmopolitanism," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010); Troy Jollimore, and Sharon Barrios, "Creating Cosmopolitans: The Case for Literature," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 25, no. 5 (2006).

[36] See Kleingeld, "Six Varieties"; Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination"; Klas Roth, "Good Will."

[37] See Jollimore and Barrios, "Creating Cosmopolitans"; Strand, "New Cosmopolitans"; Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination"; Kleingeld, "Six Varieties"; Marinus Ossewaarde, "Cosmopolitanism and the Society of Strangers," *Current Sociology* 55, no. 3 (May 2007); Thomas W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," *Ethics* 103, no. 1 (October 1992); Marianna Papastephanou, "Arrows Not Yet Fired: Cultivating Cosmopolitanism Through Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education (GB)* 36, no. 1 (2002); Leonard J. Waks, "Reason and Culture in Cosmopolitan Education" *Educational Theory* 59, no. 5 (December 2009); and Ylva Bergström, "The Universal Right to Education: Freedom, Equality and Fraternity" *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

of a different country while others admit some form of duty and obligation to one's compatriots is extant and may have priority over obligations toward non-compatriots. This issue illustrates *strong* (the former) and *moderate* (the latter) camps within moral cosmopolitanism (see section 2.1.7). Critics of moral cosmopolitanism argue that morals or values education on the part of schools[38] could take the form of indoctrination[39] or of hegemonic oppression[40] and in this way would be in conflict with most types of cosmopolitanism.

2.1.2 Cultural Cosmopolitanism

Cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on acceptance, celebration, and embracing of the 'other' and his/her way of living originating in cultural practices. Ideally cultural cosmopolitans advocate creating bridges of understanding and encourage cultural diversity and creations.[41] It supports universal human rights[42] such that they are available to all cultures, but at the same time may not be 'forced' upon them[43]. Individuals are free to reinforce their cultural norms, transform them, or assimilate.[44] Cultural cosmopolitanism hearkens to intercultural exchange,

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[38] See W.K.B. Hofstee in Willem L. Wardekker, "Schools and Moral Education: Conformism or Autonomy?" *Journal of Philosophy of Education (GB)* 35, no. 1 (February 2001); Kristjansson, " 'Non-Expansive' Character Education."

[39] See Derek Heater, "Does Cosmopolitan Thinking Have a Future?" *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 05 (August 2001); Kristjansson, "In Defence."

[40] See Leszek Koczanowicz, "Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

[41] See David T. Hansen, "Education Viewed Through a Cosmopolitan Prism," *Philosophy of Education Society* (2008).

[42] See Kleingeld, "Six Varieties"; Zelia Gregoriou, "Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of Cosmopolitanism: From Nussbaum's Concentric Circles of Humanity to Derrida's Aporetic Ethics of Hospitality" *Philosophy of Education Society* 3, no. 3 (2004); Dina Kiwan, "Human Rights and Citizenship: An Unjustifiable Conflation?" *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 39, no.1 (2005).

[43] See Waks, "Reason and Culture."

[44] See Kevin McDonough, "Cultural Recognition, Cosmopolitanism and Multicultural Education," *Philosophy of Education Society* 28, no. 5 (1997).

communication, dialogue,[45] and acceptance, as well as to an identity and affiliation that is fluid.[46] Most cultural cosmopolitan scholars admit the flexibility and adaptability of cultures and identities that follow.[47] Cultural cosmopolitanism can also be expressed in a form of hospitality that *is* the culture rather than merely possessing hospitable attributes that a cosmopolitan would possess.[48] Critics of cultural cosmopolitanism cite the problems of cultural pluralism that can arise through the mutual exclusivity of the *actions* of members of different cultures. For instance, it is one thing to accept someone's right to hold a *belief*, quite another to accept and condone another's *actions* that result from that belief. One answer to these critics is that cultural cosmopolitanism is not purported to be a solution to cultural conflicts, only a means by which coexistence can be maintained to provide the space for the engagement of constructive and positive dialogue.[49] It suggests an attitudinal perspective that can then facilitate more concrete and mutually beneficial solutions, even if it cannot immediately resolve the disagreement.

2.1.3 Political and Legal Cosmopolitanism

Kleingeld listed *political* and *legal* cosmopolitanism separately, but in recent years these forms have been blended together. In its most concrete forms this cosmopolitanism contains the goal of a one-world state[50] and a truly global citizenry[51] who possess concrete global legal rights

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[45] See Koczanowicz, "Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments," and Niclas Rönnström, "Cosmopolitan Communication and the Broken Dream of a Common Language," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (April 2010).

[46] See Yusef Waghid and Paul Smeyers, "On Doing Justice to Cosmopolitan Values and the Otherness of the Other: Living with Cosmopolitan Scepticism," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (December 2009).

[47] See Costa, "Cultural Cosmopolitanism and Civic Education"; James Donald, "Internationalisation, Diversity and the Humanities Curriculum: Cosmopolitanism and Multiculturalism Revisited," *Journal of Philosophy of Education (GB)* 41, no. 3 (2007); and McDonough, "Cultural Recognition."

[48] See Gregoriou, "Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication."

[49] See Rönnström, "Cosmopolitan Communication"; Fazal Rizvi, "Beyond the Social Imaginary of 'Clash of Civilizations'?" *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (April 2010).

[50] See Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism"; Huggler, "Cosmopolitanism and Peace."

and duties.[52] Cosmopolitan arguments focused on issues of justice that tend to legalism are often found in political and legal forms.[53] In some strong forms it may refer to a literal perspective on the traditional Stoic version of "citizen of the world."[54] The United Nations (UN) represents a manifestation of this type through which multilateral treaties apply laws of conduct and rights as universal and thus subject all people in its member-states to their mandates.[55] Similarly, the development of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as a form of 'civil society' has created a veritable non-government global community that often acts as an intermediary between citizens and their governments.[56] Human rights, in their empirical and legal forms, have found theoretical support in cosmopolitan thinking[57] while requiring political and statist structures for their protection and implementation in both policies and laws.[58] Conceptions of this kind also find expression in notions of citizenship education that attempt to fulfill the local demands of civic participation as well as their application to those beyond the immediate political or civic group.[59] This form of cosmopolitanism suffers from the criticism

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[51] See Thomas S. Popkewitz, Ulf Olsson, and Kenneth Petersson, "The Learning Society, the Unfinished Cosmopolitan, and Governing Education, Public Health and Crime Prevention at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 38, no. 4 (August 2006).

[52] See Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty"; Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2005).

[53] See Samuel Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism" *Utilitas* 11, no. 3 (1999).

[54] See Hansen, "Cosmopolitan Prism"; Klas Roth, and Nicholas C. Burbules, "Introduction: Cosmopolitan Identity and Education," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (April 2010); and Strand, "New Cosmopolitanism."

[55] See Muna Golmohamad, "Education for World Citizenship: Beyond National Allegiance," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 41, no. 4 (2009).

[56] See Walter Mignolo, "Cosmopolitanism and the De-colonial Option," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

[57] See Bergström, "Educational Freedom"; Kiwan, "Human Rights and Citizenship."

[58] See Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, *International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals*, 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

that it threatens the sovereignty of nation-states and may conflict or interfere with their civic and political practices (or, may also be seen as a supporter of the nation-state status quo in order to maintain the continued existences of states to protect and ensure human rights). It is less common now to find discussions of one world government in cosmopolitan theory, and even Kant eventually withdrew his support for it.[60]

2.1.4 Economic/Market Cosmopolitanism

For *economic/market* cosmopolitanism, the focus is on the economic imperatives of free trade, free movement of capital, and open markets with an emphasis on freedom of individuals and groups to exercise economic prerogatives without national or ethnic constraints.[61] In this conception, the marketplace is the ultimate peacekeeper by using the interconnectivity of markets, and thus the mutual dependencies they foster, to prevent violent conflict that would prove detrimental to the economic welfare of all. However, even though this version advocates for the loosening of national and ethnic constraints on labor mobility, it is clear that nation-states are reluctant to comply as immigration laws attest. Truly free markets have the potential to diminish state control by virtue of free markets themselves being free of state control[62] and thus pose a challenge to some of the political/legal supporters who see the nation-state as an important organizational component of their version of cosmopolitanism. This is complicated by a historical reflection on contemporary cosmopolitanism's roots in Kant by Mignolo[63] who concludes that cosmopolitanism, intentionally or not, has become an imperial support

[59] See Holowchak, "Education as Training."

[60] See Huggler, "Cosmopolitanism and Peace."

[61] See Kleingeld, "Six Varieties"; Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism."

[62] See Kleingeld, "Six Varieties."

[63] See Mignolo, "De-colonial Option."

mechanism for Western governments, economies, and thought, which places cosmopolitanism in a shared space of both political and economic cosmopolitanism. Generally, economic/market cosmopolitanism is finding less traction as the inefficacy of conflating globalization with cosmopolitanism becomes more of a known fact. This conflation often occurs, however unintentionally, in discussions of the similarities of cosmopolitanism with globalization.[64] It is important to distinguish between *globalization* as a set of empirical processes and facts and the thematic discourse about globalization which Papastephanou[65] terms *globalism*. If cosmopolitanism is to be invoked in any way alongside globalization, it is in the thematic discussion of globalism in which cosmopolitanism emerges as one form of that discussion, but neither as theoretical support *for* nor as a theoretical framework *of* globalism nor globalization.

2.1.5 Romantic Cosmopolitanism

Another type of cosmopolitanism is *romantic* (or "utopian") cosmopolitanism though it has largely fallen from contemporary favor. In romantic cosmopolitanism, the focus is on the human characteristics and concepts of love, emotion, and beauty. It opposes atomistic reductionism and the Enlightenment emphases on rational thought. Romantic cosmopolitans believe that we must create in each individual a love of his fellow man and an appreciation of the beauty of human existence and interaction. Other aspects of romantic cosmopolitanism have been incorporated into the other types. For example, moral cosmopolitans' emphasis on shared humanity could be a de-emotionalized version of the Romantic notion of 'love of humanity.' Some forms of peace education seek to educate for a way of peaceful living, absent legal laws

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[64] See Catherine Lu, "The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (June 2000).

[65] See Marianna Papastephanou, "Globalisation, Globalism and Cosmopolitanism as an Educational Ideal," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 37, no. 4 (August 2005).

and external proscriptions; this is consistent with a cosmopolitan desire for peace that ranges from Kant[66] to Papastephanou.[67] Jollimore and Barrios critique those they call "sentimentalists" and their assertions that cosmopolitan goals can be better achieved through the encouragement of emotional responses that support a given moral framework.[68] They reject this approach and its refusal to account for the important role of cognitive faculties in moral education, arguing that judgment is a cognitive virtue and therefore cannot be derived from sentiments. Despite critics who decry its alleged utopianism an argument could be made for romantic cosmopolitanism being highly pragmatic from the perspective of mutual survival and avoidance of war. Gur-Ze'ev highlights this perspective in describing Dewey's conception wherein he "identified peace with the elevation of humanity and the development of rational and pragmatically enlightened human capacities" ultimately leading to peace.[69] In this rare case the Romantic notion of cosmopolitanism manifests itself in a highly utilitarian and pragmatic form.

2.1.6 Instrumental Cosmopolitanism[70]

Some forms of cosmopolitanism manifest themselves in terms of personal interest, gain, achievement, or success, a category I will call *instrumental*. These forms focus on tangible, concrete, quantifiable and discreet outcomes wherein cosmopolitanism becomes a "functionalist

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[66] See Huggler, "Cosmopolitanism and Peace."

[67] See Marianna Papastephanou, "Arrows Not Yet Fired: Cultivating Cosmopolitanism Through Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education (GB)* 36, no. 1 (2002).

[68] Jollimore and Barrios, "Creating Cosmopolitans."

[69] Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, "Philosophy of Peace Education in a Postmodern Era," *Educational Theory* 51, no, 3 (September 2001): 316.

[70] This is not a category of cosmopolitanism identified by Kleingeld or Kleingeld and Brown, but instead a category created by me to encompass types of cosmopolitanism that put an emphasis on instrumental, pragmatic, and utilitarian uses. This category may include the concepts of and from the other categories, and is developed mostly to identify the contemporary phenomenon of cosmopolitanism as a 'good' that has economic or cultural capital value.

instrument" or means to an end.[71] Cosmopolitanism in this light is a technique, a skill, or even an application that produces a desired effect.[72] This instrumentalism was identified in a study of the cosmopolitan aspirations of 67 international schools that found that over 82% of these schools admit cosmopolitan education goals in their mission statements.[73] These schools are confronted with significant educational incentives to promote a global or cosmopolitan educational curriculum, incentives made manifest by demands of parents and students. Weenink found that local populations rather than expatriates fueled the growth of international schools in the Netherlands. The demand for these schools was driven by the practical reasoning of parents who saw the international school as a better means to educate their children for an increasingly competitive and globalized world and for the acquisition of cosmopolitan attributes.[74] A majority of these parents (referred to as "pragmatic cosmopolitans") maintained that the skills and competencies—akin to 'cosmopolitan capital'—obtained would be of great material benefit, while only a minority of parents (referred to as "dedicated cosmopolitans") cited the attention of these schools to such characteristics as open-mindedness, flexibility, and the willingness to understand and identify with people across borders and boundaries.[75] Cultural capital acquisition supports Nerland's identification of a growing need to develop one's place within a global professional network of knowledge workers who require "skills in reflexivity and self-

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[71] Hansen, "View from the Ground," 23.

[72] See Strand, "New Cosmopolitanism"; Waghid and Smeyers, "Cosmopolitan Scepticism"; Popkewitz, Olsson, and Petersson, "The Learning Society"; Jollimore and Barrios, "Creating Cosmopolitans"; and Monika Nerland, "Transnational Discourses of Knowledge and Learning in Professional Work: Examples from Computer Engineering," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

[73] Matthew J. Hayden, "Mission Statement Possible: What Do International Schools' Mission Statements Reveal about Their Cosmopolitan Education Tendencies?" (Teachers College, Columbia University, 2008).

[74] See Don Weenink, "Cosmopolitan and Established Resources of Power in the Education Arena," *International Sociology* 22, no, 4 (July 2007).

[75] Strand, "New Cosmopolitanism," 232.

management," a conception that adds a 'tool bag' of cosmopolitan skills to go with the intangibles of cosmopolitan capital.[76] This instrumentality will be addressed in a discussion of process and results in Chapter 3.

2.1.7 Strong and Moderate Cosmopolitanism

Beyond the typologies identified by Kleingeld and supported consistently in the literature, there are also 'strong' and 'moderate' forms of cosmopolitanism that can be seen in any of the typologies and is reflected generally in the rigidity or flexibility, respectively, of cosmopolitanism's implementation.[77] Strong cosmopolitanism regards its tenets as non-negotiable or fixed, often holding extreme and inflexible positions.[78] Scheffler argues against extreme forms of cosmopolitanism which tend to be more legalistic while moderate versions emphasize the construction of the self.[79] External compulsion to cosmopolitan behaviors requires more 'force' because it needs to coerce or alter, whereas internally dictated cosmopolitan behaviors require only the appropriate self-regulated governance of the individual's will[80]—an important distinction in determining the kind of processes that are allowed. For example, a strong version might promote cosmopolitanism as *the* way to live, while a moderate version would not defend the cosmopolitan lifestyle, but rather serve to promote knowledge of culture, tolerance, respect, and understanding through education of similarities. This contrasts with another

[76] Nerland, "Transnational Discourses of Knowledge," 191.

[77] See Robert Audi, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization" *The Journal of Ethics* 13, no, 4 (2009); Costa, "Cultural Cosmopolitanism"; David T. Hansen, "Chasing Butterflies Without a Net: Interpreting Cosmopolitanism" *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010); Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism."

[78] See Costa, "Cultural Cosmopolitanism."

[79] See Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism."

[80] See Roth, "Good Will."

moderate version in which agonism found in difference and conflict should be explored for the same reasons.[81] Because many conflicts find their causes in irrational or emotional origins, they cannot be resolved simply through rational, cognitive, and deliberate negotiations. Therefore, agonism may not be the site of resolution, but rather a site of unsettled stasis, reflecting a more moderate stance. Regardless of the type of cosmopolitanism, the recognition of where one's conception rests on this strong or moderate 'mean' is necessary in order to understand how to inform educational processes. For instance, will an educator lay down a set of cosmopolitan traits the students must strive to achieve (strong), or will the educator take a more implicit route by modeling the cosmopolitan behaviors he wishes the students to acquire (moderate)?

Since this project is about cosmopolitan education and education in morality—the foundations and justification of which lie at the core of all cosmopolitanism—I will not treat these typologies individually in cosmopolitan moral education. Since my inquiry is about morality, there is nothing about it that cannot be drawn into the domain of these typologies, and as a concept, must exist genitively separate from them. The definition of cosmopolitanism I have exists prior to the branching out into various fields and conceptions, and in fact must exist as such. It should also be noted that I aim to develop cosmopolitan moral education as something separate from the typology of 'moral cosmopolitanism,' while allowing that some similarities and overlap will occur, as it will with the other typologies. The point is that cosmopolitan moral education springs from the fundamental core origins of cosmopolitan thought, not as a means to inculcate a specific variant or typology of cosmopolitanism. Additionally, given the historical origins of cosmopolitanism and the use of the world 'citizen,' I will argue neither for nor against a notion of 'citizenship' that is substantive, such that could be envisioned within a global or

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[81] See Sharon Todd, "Living in a Dissonant World: Toward an Agonistic Cosmopolitics for Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 2 (2010).

federative state. That kind of citizenship has no bearing upon that which I focus. Though I admit that in implementation cosmopolitan moral education arguments about citizenship, state sovereignty, and political participation may, or will, matter greatly, these issues are moot unless I can establish the theoretical conception I seek.[82]

Drawing from the common features of the Kleingeld and Brown typologies of cosmopolitanism results in the following list of cosmopolitan characteristics:

- Recognition of shared humanity
- World citizenship; 'citizen of the world'
- Membership in a global community
- Respect for others as people/humans and for other ways of living
- Multiculturalism, diversity, and cultural pluralism[83]
- Active pursuit and maintenance of peaceful interaction
- Tolerance
- Acknowledgement of the universality of certain basic human needs[84] and concepts of human interaction; not necessarily specific, prescribed traits, but rather the acceptance of abstract universal dispositions to act or treat each other in some way

Each of these characteristics exists in the social and collective domain. They are about being a person who lives among and with other persons, thus the ethical and moral component of

[82] There are many excellent resources for the debate about what 'citizenship' in cosmopolitanism means and/or entails. See Kimberly Hutchings, and Roland Dannreuther, *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (Macmillan Press, 1990); Will Kymlicka, "New Forms of Citizenship" in *The Art of the State: Governance in a World Without Frontiers*, ed. T.J. Courchesn and D.J. Savoie, (Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2003); Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty"; and Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[83] These terms are taken at times to be nearly synonymous with each other, and at other times as different from each other. For instance, while multiculturalism and cultural pluralism encourage and admit the uniqueness and diversity of different cultures, there are strands of multiculturalism that seek to preserve or protect the erosion or diffusion of cultural characteristics whereas cultural pluralism is often used in political contexts that focus more on political recognition and right to exist. Further, accepting diversity as a concept that accurately describes the world of cultures in which we live does not automatically entail that one would want to preserve that diversity.

[84] It might have been expected to see the word "rights" here rather than "needs," and there would certainly be precedent for doing so. However, when "rights" are invoked one immediately summons statist institutions and governing structures to ensure and protect them, and thus the discussion invariably transforms into a strictly political one, and the concept of universality becomes a concrete, legal issue. My goal is to reorient this concrete viewpoint, but doing so requires a specific abstract conception that is otherwise hindered by the legal implications of the current language of rights-based claims.

cosmopolitanism is clear; it is a moral philosophy. This non-exhaustive list is not intended for dogmatic instruction, nor does it constitute a checklist for assessing one's acquisition of cosmopolitan traits. The characteristics in this 'list' simply contain important links to the main strains of cosmopolitan thought, and they are not incompatible with the kind of cosmopolitan moral education that will emerge in this project.

2.2 Cosmopolitan Education

Cosmopolitan education is, simply put, an educational program designed to promote or inculcate cosmopolitan philosophy. To say on the one hand that there is cosmopolitan philosophy and on the other cosmopolitan education (or even "educational cosmopolitanism"[85]) is to say the same thing. In this study, I take philosophy to be a discipline, practice, or way of living that constitutes an educational project. Dewey states, "[i]f we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education."[86] It is the inherent nature of philosophy to inquire, unsettle, dislodge, critique, engage, investigate, discover, acquire, and ultimately grow. Cosmopolitanism, as a philosophy, is a way of being that is educative and educating. The Stoic application of the medical metaphor to matters of wisdom and ignorance—it is unhealthy to be ignorant, a condition that can be cured—meant that the cosmopolitan philosopher is a 'physician' who should be ever ready to provide the cure for those so afflicted.[87] So, too, the cosmopolitan philosopher should always be ready to educate the ignorant and lead them to the 'healthy' effects of wisdom. It indicates action or processes as

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[85] See Hansen, "View from the Ground"; Hansen, "Cosmopolitan Prism."

[86] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 328.

[87] See Holowchak, "Education as Training."

much as it might traits. To be a philosopher is to be an educator. To be a cosmopolitan philosopher is to be a cosmopolitan educator. What follows is an attempt to describe some of the characteristics of cosmopolitan education.

Cosmopolitan education starts from the most fundamental principle of cosmopolitanism: the fact of shared humanity. This fact, however simple, commands a stance from which one sees oneself as a person in a world full of other persons with whom one is connected by virtue of that shared humanity. Humanity is expressed in any number of ways, the most central being that, whether we like it or not, we live in a world with other persons. Shared humanity and the shared world require attention to these facts, attention through which we must figure out how to live with and alongside each other. In this conception of morality, individual flourishing does not depend *upon* group flourishing, but rather *exists through it*. In this way, cosmopolitan education is positioned primarily as an ethical and moral endeavor. The primary fact of shared humanity entails that the processes that erect rules, customs, or structures be subject to that primary fact of human existence. Thus the grounding of these governing implementations must involve the input of all of those who will be governed by them. For cosmopolitan education, this democratic impulse is derived not from liberal ideology nor from Plato's *Republic*, but rather as a logical extension of shared humanity.

The description of cosmopolitanism offered is not necessarily aligned or positioned within the 'moral cosmopolitanism' of the Kleingeld and Brown typology, but instead lies within cosmopolitanism in general and among all of the 'types' available. It adheres to a moral perspective because cosmopolitanism itself is a moral philosophy, not an economic, political, or cultural one. Cosmopolitanism offers a philosophy about how one should live in the world, an endeavor rooted in the ethical; the core principle of shared humanity makes the endeavor moral.

The political, economic, and other cosmopolitan types are outgrowths of the original principle of cosmopolitanism (shared humanity), not the fields—politics, economics, or culture—after which they are named. My conception of cosmopolitanism essentially takes the individual human as the fundamental unit of moral concern.[88] In moving from cosmopolitan moral philosophy to cosmopolitan moral education in schooling,[89] this moral cosmopolitanism becomes political by virtue of its placement in schooling. Moral education does not necessarily occur in nor imply only schooling, but since state-supported or public schooling is educational, it becomes political.[90] Since this is precisely what I am doing and advocating, my project becomes political as much as it is educational, and it invites comparisons to political life, processes, and theories. It is for this reason that I will examine some political theories in Chapter 5, particularly as they relate to democracy, in order to show how cosmopolitan moral education could work in schooling as both a socio-political process and an education in morality.

While I recognize the political nature of this project, I will also refrain from overt political construction. Socrates, while recognizing that his actions were political, attempted to avoid traditional political engagement as he went about examining himself and others.[91] While noting that one cannot separate education, ethics, and politics, the scope of political issues such

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[88] Tan, Justice Without Borders, 94.

[89] I recognize that education can and does occur independent from and outside of formal schooling. Throughout this project I will typically contextualize education as formal and most of the examples given will be the same, but this is done for the clarity of writing rather than to make a distinction that does not exist.

[90] John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education School and Community*, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1909), 1. “Education is a public business with us, in a sense that the protection and restoration of personal health or legal rights are not.”

[91] Plato, *Gorgias*, 521d 6-8. More to the point, Socrates essentially enacted through philosophical inquiry a process that could have served as a model for genuine politics though the resulting *aporia* of his methods would have ultimately undermined politics. I hope to show that a genuine inquiry in morality will lead to *aporia* of a kind, but not one that paralyzes like Socrates’ torpedo-fish, and one that not only is action, but produces action along with further inquiry.

as justice and equality, and to a lesser extent freedom and liberty, are too vast to be dealt with in this project. Where these concepts enter into the discussion, they do so only as markers of additional concern, but not as relationships to be explained or defended neither by nor through cosmopolitan moral education. For justice in particular, cosmopolitanism (to the extent that I will take it) does not say what is just, only that all those within its scope ought to be able to play a part in determining what is just. Therefore, the only claim about justice made by cosmopolitanism is that in order to determine what is just, it is just to allow everyone a chance to make his/her case about what is just. There will be times when justice may appear alongside or as a result of arguments about cosmopolitan moral education, but my goal is not to investigate cosmopolitanism as a theory of justice.

In the move from shared humanity to cosmopolitan morality, it becomes important to discern from whence the moral principles can be derived. If each of us is a human with moral agency, how are we to determine the shape and details of that agency? Further, how are we to justify such morality once it has been determined? These sorts of questions animated much of Thomas Nagel's work in ethics. While he was not a cosmopolitan philosopher, his 'view from nowhere' offers contemporary cosmopolitanism a place to begin. Nagel's 'view from nowhere' embodies and describes a perspective that combines the personal and impersonal standpoints in ways that retain the 'human' of local relationships and affiliation, yet curb the most self-interested impulses that spring from them by recognizing the nature and inescapability of living in a world with other persons and their interests.[92] Since this is the fact of our social existence, an inescapable 'human condition,' it becomes a fact of our ethical and political existence. However, moving into ethics and politics does not automatically separate us from this fact, so it must also

[92] See Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere: Knowledge Creation Diffusion Utilization*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1986).

be the starting point for ethical and political processes and considerations. The ethical component compels us to retain the recognition of the collectivity of flourishing, and the political must therefore operate to that end. We cannot figure out what the good is without being a 'we,' and this requires an inclusive, collaborative, democratic process.[93] In this section, these principles will be examined in looking at four correlates of shared humanity and inclusive deliberation: living with other people, dynamic engagement, openness and receptivity, and the lack of finality.

2.2.1 – *Living with Other People*

The cosmopolitan characteristics previously identified can easily be turned into statements about how one should live and interact with other people. Though doing so will go against the wishes of many cosmopolitanism proponents,[94] it is temporarily necessary in order to illustrate how I mean this to be. It can be said that one who holds a cosmopolitan disposition believes one ought to consider oneself a part of a larger, global community and possess recognition of the shared humanity of all people. One ought to respect others and their ways of living, and ought to exhibit tolerance for ways with which one disagrees. One ought to actively engage with diverse people and cultures when the opportunities present themselves. One ought to apply one's preferred treatment of oneself to all people of the world, and not just national brethren, thus making one a transnational ethical actor. These are simple examples of how a cosmopolitan might wish that people live with other people, but at a fundamental level exists the recognition that living is something that is done with other people. Thus purely self-interested motivations and living will not suffice.

[93] This does not commit me to the advocacy of democratic governments or institutions. It is possible to conceive of structures that would allow for the processes of ethical and political participation that I describe without the existence of liberal democratic governments or republican democracies.

[94] The Stoics were more willing to delineate specific attributes than contemporary cosmopolitans. One can find direct admonitions and instructions in Aurelius and Epictetus, but they are mostly in the form of aphorism, illustrations, or anecdotes rather than 'commandment-like' lists.

2.2.2 – *Dynamic Engagement*

Cosmopolitanism itself is not a static set of principles or characteristics, despite the provisional listing above. Rather it is a disposition, a bearing, and a way of engaging the world. A disposition is a power that finds itself in active properties such as capacities and tendencies.[95] These dispositions are powers that contain not only the capability to act, but also the motivations or origins of a *will* to enact them such that possessing the disposition is quite likely to produce the powers/actions. The characteristics previously listed are merely the outward manifestations of an ongoing dialectic of an individual's awareness of and interaction with his environment and are behavioral manifestations of dispositions. Dewey articulates my conception of this in the following passage, though the passage itself engenders much more than just this one aspect, and in fact embodies features of cosmopolitan education itself.

> Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever our instincts and ready-formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions. Then we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course of action. Unless we try to drive our way through by sheer brute force, we must modify our organic resources to adapt them to the specific features of the situation in which we find ourselves. The conscious deliberating and desiring which precede overt action are, then, the methodic personal readjustment implied in activity in uncertain situations.[96]

The individual who cultivates a cosmopolitan disposition is ready, willing, and able to conduct this process. In this passage the "brute force" phrase is recognizable as implying an ethical obligation. When confronted with a "novel condition" should I attempt to think and reflect on it and understand it? Or, should I disregard what it says, means, and who it might affect simply because I would rather not be troubled with the effort or fear that I might have to give up some previously held principle that now stands in opposition to newly discovered facts and conditions?

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[95] Luke Robinson, "Moral Principles as Moral Dispositions," *Philosophical Studies*, (2010): 3.

[96] Dewey, Democracy and Education, 348.

Recognizing that one is part of a process of dynamic, ongoing engagement with others and the environment can prevent one from cultivating a sense of settling or stasis that would encourage the erection of immutable certainty and a subsequent refusal to engage or adapt. In cosmopolitan education one acts, and does so in relation to and with others.

2.2.3 – *Openness and Receptivity*

There is not much distance from dynamic engagement to the cultivation of an open or receptive mind that is willing to engage with potentially principle-threatening experiences, yet the difference is important. One cannot participate in an experience if one is not open to it and what it might bring, nor can one engage with the "novel conditions" if one does not want to risk the danger of a challenge to current convictions. Yet even the word 'convictions' requires questioning. The cosmopolitan sensibility contains only a conviction of shared humanity, one that implies living in a world with other people. Mere observation of the world indicates that things change, including human interactions. These facts necessitate receptivity to the potentiality contained in new experiences, and not the defense of a library of immutable facts and principles. To live in the world is to receive an onslaught of new experiences and a constant unfolding of one's relationship to oneself, one's environment, and other people. Individuals can either be receptive to these experiences and this unfolding, or be resistant to them. However, if they are resistant and refuse to acknowledge and understand what there is to be gleaned from them, they will be ill-equipped to accurately and successfully adjust their actions and aims to fit current and emerging conditions, and doomed to count on chance for their acquisition of making improvements in their lives with others. Recognizing and accepting the dynamism of life and being receptive to what it brings while not discarding wholesale that which already exists is crucial to developing a cosmopolitan disposition and requires an intentional and delicate balance.

2.2.4 – *The Never Ending Process*

The recognition of living with other people, the need for dynamic engagement, and the necessity of being open and receptive to the world are states of mind and activities that are never completed. One does not 'do' this for a period of time, acquire the necessary bits of knowledge, and then stop. Cosmopolitan education instills in students the knowledge that there is always more to learn and that all conclusions are subject to revision. This practice is supported by any close inspection of human history. The world was indisputably flat until this knowledge was successfully disputed. The discovery of Newtonian physics transformed not only physics, but the basic structure of thought of the average non-physicist in the world. Yet, it is simply incapable of explaining such phenomena as electricity or the kind phenomena that have prompted the development of quantum physics, wherein the world is no longer seen as a collection of interacting objects, but rather an undivided whole containing faster and slower bits of energy. It was once believed that traveling faster than the speed of sound would incinerate or vaporize a person doing so, but Chuck Yeager certainly survived his experience.

Though these four characteristics are not unique to cosmopolitan moral philosophy, their emphasis and centrality in it play crucial roles in making the cosmopolitan orientation to the world what it is. They are not shuttled aside to conveniently make way for efficiency or instrumental self-interest, nor for the impressments of one individual. For instance, take one version of the classic 'Trolley Car problem' in which you could push the fat man off the bridge to stop the trolley car from killing five children further down the track. The traditional question inquires whether or not you are morally justified in causing the man's death in order to prevent the deaths of the five children. A cosmopolitan would immediately ask an important moral question that indicates a significant flaw in this, and other, typical dilemma constructions: can we

ask the man what he thinks? Can he, too, have a say in this and whether or not it is morally justified? Such relational methods of inquiry may also be found in feminist ethics, and most concepts in most moral and ethical systems will have resonance or similarities with concepts in others. Most systems share more than they differ, but what makes separates them are the ways in which they frame the problems that life presents us. Cosmopolitanism frames the moral problems of life so that shared humanity front, democratic inclusiveness, and these four dispositional characteristics can guide our considerations, while also leaving open the possibility that the framework will need to change.

What we come to know as facts are constantly changing over time, and this is even more evident in human and social interactions. Laws change and are amended repeatedly, customs and norms fade out and re-emerge, and what counts as ethical or moral has been in constant development for as long as humans have attempted to make such judgments. It is to this last point that cosmopolitan education is oriented. It is in the nature of the natural sciences to inquire, investigate, and constantly test and challenge findings, but in ethics and morality many humans have acquired a curious habit of deliberate inertia. Though the demonstration of human history exists as a stark statement to its futility, many people still want to claim that the ethical systems they have or the moral behavior they exalt is *the* final and correct judgment on the matter, and for some, to the degree that they refuse to investigate further.

Cosmopolitan philosophy brooks no finality in such matters and actively supports the constant investigation into the ways in which people ought to live together, which includes examining past and present ways of living. Philip Kitcher gives the example that “very few people…have retained exactly the constellation of attitudes towards sexual behavior that were

originally passed on to us by parents and other ethical teachers."[97] Whether such changes in individual and societal values are 'good' or 'bad' is a different point, and the process of determining that is to be taken up in Chapter 3. Even within the confines of religious systems there has been change and alteration to accede to the realities of the changing world.[98] This fact renders incomprehensible any assertions to the contrary. The only fixed truth in ethical systems is that *they* change over time. The recognition of human fallibility is a key part of cosmopolitan education. Aurelius would remind us "It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things to subsist in consequence of change."[99] The cultivation of a cosmopolitan sensibility creates in the individual an acute awareness of the constant diffusion of ways of living and the dynamic nature of multiple forms of ways of living to form a dynamic, growth-oriented disposition to the world.

Cosmopolitan education, in a very general sense, is an education that attempts to prepare an individual to live in the world as a reflective and active participant. It is an education that eschews dogmatism and absolutes and sees the educational process as without end. It is 'transnational' in that it does not educate for a particular nation-state, but rather for citizens of the world at large. The primary characteristics of cosmopolitanism are, on the one hand, largely behavioral pathways indicating how to live with other people and, on the other hand, actions by and through which to live with other people. There have been formalized attempts at producing students with these characteristics, with an emphasis on transcending national boundaries

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[97] Phillip Kitcher, *The Ethical Project*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011): 330. Kitcher's work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

[98] Examples abound, and they range from the practice of local Catholic Bishops giving dispensation during Lent for congregants who eat various traditionally Lenten-banned foods such as corned beef or capybara, to Martin Luther and the Reformation.

[99] Aurelius, *Meditations*, 267.

through education. Moravian bishop John Amos Comenius, in the 17th century, called for the "establishment of a 'Pansophic College' where learned men from the nations of the world would collect and unify existing knowledge towards 'international understanding'."[100] In 1817, Marc-Antoine Jullien wrote about the need to "collect information about educational activities throughout Europe,"[101] which could then be used to as a means to understand and create institutions of education. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) expresses a cosmopolitan stance when it defines an international education "as a process resulting from international understanding, cooperation and peace" and one that "is education for international understanding."[102] Despite these examples, cosmopolitan education need not take place on the 'global stage.' One can possesses a cosmopolitan disposition without ever having left one's hometown. For instance, when dealing with difference or racism, cosmopolitanism does not require that one travel to a distant land to learn or to adapt to different people and traditions. Most people actually acquire much of these cosmopolitan tendencies locally, whenever "they confront racial boundaries in their daily lives."[103] Difference is experienced locally by most people every day, and how one negotiates it plays a large role in developing a cosmopolitan disposition. Since cosmopolitanism originates in a something shared by all (shared humanity), the dispositions developed are accessible by all as well and we need not go to extreme lengths, or distances, to find the formative experiences that do so.

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[100]Robert Sylvester, "Framing the Map of International Education (1969-1998)," *Journal of Research in International Education* 4, no. 2 (August 2005): 96.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Juan Ignacio Martínez, *What is International Education? UNESCO Answers* (San Sebastian, 2004), 5.

[103] See Michéle Lamont and Sada Aksartova, "Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Racial Boundaries Among Working-Class Men," *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, no. 4 (August 2002): 2. This is to say that dealing with racism is about dealing with 'difference,' not necessarily racism qua racism. Learning how to deal with difference and diversity are both important cosmopolitan educational endeavors.

The emphasis on *understanding* is crucial to engaging in the kind of process cosmopolitan education requires. One cannot understand another unless one engages that person; true engagement of this kind cannot take place without the aim of the engagement centered on articulations of the visions of *each* party's interests, not only one's own, which is in direct consequence of recognizing that we live in the world *with* other people. In many public schools, particularly in the U.S. during the latter-half of the 20th century, there was a movement to 'internationalize' education by teaching about other countries, teaching about cultures, and teaching foreign languages, and was primarily motivated by the political and economic strategic interests of the U.S. government.[104] The larger aim of this was not in the interests of both parties, but rather in the interest of one party's (the United States') dominion over and/or protection from the other. This kind of education is a means to an end that has as its aim self-aggrandizement or the marginalization of another, something clearly not in the other's interest. The motivation for this education will influence the instruction and what is learned, such that, for example, a student would be interested to speak with and understand her counterpart from a different country so that she can create advantage in some competitive way and not for mutual benefit. Not only is this type of education contrary to cosmopolitan education, it stands in opposition to it.

A quote by Charles Gellar illustrates a conceptualization of cosmopolitan education that moves away from this personally instrumental version:

> Not so much curriculum, but what takes place in the minds of children as they work and play together with children of other cultures and backgrounds...that cooperation, not competition, is the only viable way to solve the major problems facing the planet, all of which transcend ethnic and political borders.[105]

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[104] See Mary Hayden and Jeff Thompson, "International Schools and International Education: A Relationship Reviewed," *Oxford Review of Education* 21, no. 3 (1995).

[105] Charles Gellar in Hayden and Thompson, "International Schools and International Education," 337.

This characterization is neither non-national nor transnational orientation that, rather than being a specific philosophy, pedagogy, or curriculum, describes a disposition or state of mind. One will not find examples of such an orientation in a lesson plan or by tabulating test scores, but rather in the approach taken by the instructor or the institution in its educational and, more importantly, interpersonal practices. This quote also illustrates the dynamic quality of cosmopolitanism and its relevance to moral education. Working and playing together forms a disposition in the minds of children, and the meeting of these activities signifies the moral dimension.[106] It is not sufficiently acquired by reading about how others work and interact together. It is not static, and, more importantly, the disposition itself does not form if the individuals do not interact meaningfully with each other. Thus the nature of the interaction, and the process by and through which it occurs, is of ultimate significance. The schools, teachers, and pedagogies that invoke the ways of living with each other, the dynamic method of engagement, and the openness and receptivity described are enacting a cosmopolitan education; the students are learning to cultivate a cosmopolitan disposition. But in what ways might educators do this? To what might they turn to evoke the experiences necessary?

2.2.5 – *Thematic Tensions in Cosmopolitan Education*

Cutting across and through the cosmopolitan typologies previously listed, educators recognize important areas of tension and interest in cosmopolitanism. *Identity*, for example, has garnered interest as a point of entry in cosmopolitan education. "The Stoics argued that people's identities as humans and cosmopolitans are more fundamental than their local or conditioned

[106] These children are 'disclosing/revealing' themselves to each other as they negotiate the rules that will govern their interactions. They are in a *polis* as moral and political actors, a recognition that will be relevant to Chapters Five and Six.

identities,"[107] and this non-nationalist conception is still present in contemporary cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan education is also found to recognize that all cultures change over time, and we should not assume fixed identities within them.[108] Increased mobility and migration seem to demand that individuals develop multiple identities[109] to match their past, present, and evolving circumstances. For example, there are 'third culture' international school students who are not immersed in any one culture for long yet still manage to create an identity through constant interactions with other students in similar circumstances.[110] There is also reasonable criticism of the popular 'clash of civilizations' narrative that purports to explain the source of geo-political conflict as cultural rather than ideological or economic and instead proposes a pedagogical approach that "highlights both the cognitive and ethical dimensions of intercultural learning, and suggest[s] that learning about others requires learning about ourselves."[111] Conceiving of a cosmopolitan orientation as open-ended and evolving allows for the creation of hybrid identities that "weave together a variety of disparate cultural 'fragments,'"[112] but we "must pay attention to the complex situational factors of particular and unique cases."[113] This poses a challenge to cosmopolitan proponents of universalism in the

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[107] Roth and Burbules, "Cosmopolitan Identity," 1. Or other ascribed identities as shown by Epictetus' 'Pirate' example in chap. 2, note 22.

[108] See Costa, "Cultural Cosmopolitanism."

[109] Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey, "Learning for Cosmopolitan Citizenship: Theoretical Debates and Young People's Experiences," *Educational Review* 55, no, 3 (November 2003).

[110] See Kevin Gunesch, "Education for Cosmopolitanism: Cosmopolitanism as a Personal Cultural Identity Model For and Within International Education," *Journal of Research in International Education* 3, no, 3 (December 2004).

[111] Rizvi, "Beyond the Social Imaginary," 10.

[112] McDonough, "Cultural Recognition," 130.

[113] Ibid., 134

context of diversity.

Justifications for universalism usually begin with the core cosmopolitan tenet of shared humanity and spread into conceptions of the human capacity for rational thought, human rights, the interdependency of humans and groups, and the global benefits of peace and harmonious co-existence. Some cosmopolitan scholars, such as Martha Nussbaum, are proponents of a universalized cosmopolitanism wherein the fundamental component of our shared humanity compels us to accept and create mechanisms by which compassion for compatriots can be extended, with strength and consistency, to those persons beyond nation-state borders.[114] Strand suggests that universalism illustrates "a dilemma between an abstract universalism from above versus a concrete moral commitment from below,"[115] in which the tendency toward universalization in cosmopolitanism must be reconciled with specific, local moral dilemmas. This has influenced attempts in cosmopolitan education to "formulate the universal conditions (political, legal, and/or moral) through which coexistence can be made more democratic and more harmonious."[116] Criticisms of universalism point to the near infinite particulars of life that make the application of universals almost impossible. A theory of living that promotes the "right to rights" that would require people to accept a universal claim with which they disagree might in fact violate that theory's own condition of the right to one's rights.[117] At its most strident, whether in politics, economics, culture, or morality, universalism implies a one-size-fits-all

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[114] Nussbaum, *For Love of Country*, xiii. I also want to block an objection that such universalization requires a person to set aside their local and personal relationships in favor of distant 'others.' Nussbaum notes that cosmopolitans have always allowed for a privileging of personal and familial relationships, not because "the local is better *per se*, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do good" (in Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism," 259).

[115] Strand, "New Cosmopolitans," 233.

[116] Todd, "Living in a Dissonant World," 216.

[117] Bergström, "The Universal Right to Education," 179.

ideology. Proponents of universality believe that the same rights, government, customs, or morals can be applied to everyone while opponents adhere to the primacy of the particular nation, culture, or religious system to make those determinations.[118] This type of strong cosmopolitanism was identified earlier in this chapter and will be rejected in the chapter that follows.

It is possible to reconcile the competing tensions in universalism. Hansen illustrates this tension in comparing the views of Nussbaum and Appiah. Nussbaum has a much stronger emphasis on "universal moral fealty," whereas Appiah grounds his "rooted cosmopolitanism" in the recognition of one's particular local and familial relationships and allegiances.[119] Appiah's moderate version allows for the acceptance of a positive partiality as opposed to a negative or exclusionary one. Hansen's moderate position goes on to show that cosmopolitanism does not exist in opposition to localized values, but instead encourages "reflective (rather than naïve) openness to the new with reflective (rather than dogmatic) loyalty to the known."[120] Such an educational project aims to help students identify the values embedded in their local existence, understand the origins and applications of these values, and then apply these same processes to understanding the values of those living different local existences.

The subtle way in which this tension in cosmopolitanism is situated in education can be seen by Hansen's distinctions between it, liberalism, and multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism are distinct from each other by virtue of their respective points of organization. Multiculturalism begins with culture and community, a point that has already categorized

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[118] See Koczanowicz, "Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments."

[119] Hansen, "Chasing Butterflies," 154.

[120] Ibid, 157.

humans and therefore separated them; cosmopolitanism starts with humanity as 'becoming' and thus grouping everyone together by virtue of this shared state. Similarly, liberalism is distinct from both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism because it organizes itself around the individual. Simply put, cosmopolitanism "presupposes individual *and* community diversity."[121] Hansen's conception is one of the individual and community as in the process of 'becoming,' a place that is between the individual and the community. Hansen's strain of moderate cosmopolitanism attempts to bridge the gap that these sharply defined paradigms create, and this distinction about the points of organization is fundamentally crucial to the construction of cosmopolitan moral education.

Sharon Todd, too, finds space in the debate for a more nuanced understanding of universalism. It is not necessary for universalist claims to "trump" local traditions in every case, as most of the critics of cosmopolitan universalism charge. It is conceivable that the universalism itself is open to revision upon particular experiences. "This means that claims to universality (human rights, humanity, rational communication) are themselves subject to translation as they come into contact with a new set of cultural and linguistic practices."[122] Indeed, as will be demonstrated later, what is universal about cosmopolitan moral education is the way that the process is informed by shared humanity, and as Todd notes, cosmopolitan education is really about "how one adjudicates between universals and particulars against the horizon of our 'cosmopolitan existence.'"[123] Here we see a 'moderate' conception of universalism, such that its own meaning can be adapted rather than indelibly and dogmatically forced.

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[121] Ibid, 156.

[122] Todd, "Living in a Dissonant World," 222.

[123] Todd, Toward and Imperfect Education, 6.

In contrast to, but concurrent with, the struggle with universalism is the concept of diversity. Dewey believed "diversity of perspectives is essential for growth"[124] and diversity plays the same role in cosmopolitan education. Diversity, along with unity, identity, and social cohesion, is a global concern[125] and a school that explicitly hopes to produce students who will acquire "an appreciation of, and respect for, diversity" must also recognize that both universalist/global and particularist/local claims are susceptible to absolute claims about their unity or impermeability.[126] Diversity permeates individual cultures and universal unities and blurs the lines used to draw around each. Additionally, a cosmopolitan education emphasizes the importance of an "integrative society" that consists of citizens who respect unity in diversity and maintain relationships that are collaborative and consultative rather than hierarchical.[127] This kind of an education aims for growth and integration and would welcome the collaboration of diverse ideas, opinions, and ways of thinking that promote creativity, all of which would increase the capability of students to be socially cohesive while retaining what is meaningful to them. To accept this exposes both the necessity of establishing the omnipresence of dialogue in order to navigate these tensions fruitfully and peacefully, and the agonism inherent in cosmopolitanism because not all tensions can be resolved.

Cosmopolitan education requires prioritizing dialogue, which promotes engagement, interaction, understanding, and respect. Hansen, et al, classifies dialogue among the cosmopolitan "arts of living" that "enable people to gain reflective distance from their values

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[124] Kathy Hytten, "Deweyan Democracy in a Globalized World," *Educational Theory* 59, no. 4 (November 2009): 398.

[125] See Golmohamad, "Education for World Citizenship."

[126] Donald, "Multiculturalism Revisited," 290.

[127] Golmohamad, "Education for World Citizenship," 478.

even while remaining attached to them,"[128] a distance that is necessary to suspend judgment long enough to learn about and understand the other and helps to produce "working criteria for reaching judgments reflective of everyone's input."[129] Koczanowicz takes the dialogue-as-bridge further and suggests a "dialogical cosmopolitanism"[130] that requires rethinking universalism that exists in the openness and willingness to listen and communicate rather than in the particulars heard or stated, a process that contrasts with examples of dialogue that are used as a means to 'win' an argument and dominate the other[131] rather than to understand. It is vital for cosmopolitan education to communicate the idea that dialogue is a collaborative process of growth rather than a competitive process of conquest. This moderate cosmopolitanism does not aim for a predetermined outcome, but rather to uncover an emerging reality that can help construct a more full, inclusive, whole.

Cosmopolitan dialogue requires "a capacity for agonistic respect"[132] wherein agonism helps people maintain distance, while respect invokes self-limits that govern interactions. This 'distance,' also used by Hansen, is an important concept in the way that cosmopolitanism eschews final judgments but also rejects relativism. This distance is found and maintained in

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[128] David T. Hansen, Stephanie Burdick-Shepherd, Cristina Cammarano, and Gonzalo Obelleiro, "Education, Values, and Valuing in Cosmopolitan Perspective," *Curriculum Inquiry* 39, no, 5 (December 2009): 509. See also Hansen, "View from the Ground" and Nagel, "The View from Nowhere." Something similar also occurs in Nagel's discussion of objectivity in morals. The objective 'seer' is viewing and evaluating his subjective self, while at the same time containing the subjective character that influences the objective 'seeing.' This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

[129] Hansen, "Chasing Butterflies," 162.

[130] Koczanowicz, "Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments," 148.

[131] See Hytten, "Deweyan Democracy."

[132] Donald, "Multiculturalism Revisited," 295.

agonism and supports a moderate, flexible cosmopolitan education.[133] Agonism plays a central role in the cosmopolitan moral education I conceive and has the potential to increase understanding through examination of conflict and difference by focusing not only on conflicts in education but in real, everyday issues faced by students and societies. The kind of agonism most expressive of this kind of cosmopolitanism is described by Mouffe's distinction between 'antagonism' as conflict between enemies and 'agonism' as conflict between adversaries.[134] Both take place within a political relationship, but the goal is to convert the former into the latter, and thus redefine the conflict as one that is more democratically collaborative even if the difference remains. The agonism found in cosmopolitanism also recognizes that some conflicts (or better yet, contestations) are not substantively resoluble, but that does not mean that it necessarily devolves into violent conflict; there might still be positive influences available in the contestation. In this sense, agonism is "in fact [democracy's] very condition of existence."[135] It is to this kind of agonism we will return in Chapters 5 and 6, and upon which the crucial moral work of cosmopolitan education turns.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitan philosophy as a way of living, and as an educational construct, cannot help but embark on a moral educational project, but what can it say about morals and morality? Whatever cosmopolitan moral education can say about morals or morality can only be derived from its core tenets: shared humanity and our subsequent living with others. What can we derive

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[133] It is important to remember that this conception of dialogue does not rest exclusively on interpersonal conversation through the use of verbal language. Cosmopolitan dialogue can take many forms as long as the communication is open and honest, and aims to inform, present, share, enlighten, and provide a medium for intended understanding.

[134] See Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox New York*, (New York: Verso, 2000).

[135] Ibid., 16.

from these? First, it should be clear that cosmopolitan moral education cannot prescribe predetermined morals. There is nothing in the concept of shared humanity that can automatically generate a moral principle without first being clear about the implications of this fact. It does, however, indicate a starting point for inquiry. If we recognize our shared humanity and the fact that we all live in the world together, there is no basis upon which to exclude others from the conversations about how we ought to go about living with each other.[136] Therefore, any subsequent cosmopolitan inquiry in or about morality should include those whose lives are affected by the results of the inquiry. This is the first condition of a cosmopolitan moral education and inquiry. Since inclusion is a principle from the outset, exclusion cannot be introduced later without conflicting with cosmopolitanism's own initiating conditions, and is therefore prohibited. Thus, at is barest level, cosmopolitan moral inquiry is an inclusive, democratic process of inquiry into morality.

Once these conditions are set it is difficult to say with any certainty where the inquiry will lead. The participants may choose to disband the democratic proceedings if they wish, but they must start from somewhere and that somewhere must be consistent with the two principles stipulated. Additionally, if the participants in the inclusive, democratic processes decide to eliminate the inclusive and democratic nature of the processes, they may choose to do so, but they may only choose to do so for themselves or for those participating and not for others. This would also cover subsequent generations of people such as their children.[137] This would mean

[136] I will suspend any discussion or exploration of what capacities are required for full and legitimate participation in the deliberations. For instance, there might be some persons who possess certain cognitive impairments that make their participation impossible, and yet they are persons who deserve equal consideration. Though this is an important question to resolve, it cannot be resolved in the context of the present project.

[137] The issue of 'preserving' or 'renewing' the world lies at the center of Hannah Arendt's thoughts on human 'natality,' a condition which contains the potential for each generation to renew the old world and/or create a new one. Arendt's natality will be examined in Chapter 4. For more on natality see Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in

that even if the parents chose to eliminate inclusive democratic processes, those processes would need to be available to their children so they, too, have the opportunity to partake in the decision-making processes that will govern their moral lives. The reason for this comes from cosmopolitan education's construction, one that is both flexible and non-negotiable.

Education," in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1961). See also Arendt, *The Human Condition*.

Chapter 3

Cosmopolitan Education Processes, Results, and Progress

The previous chapter discussed cosmopolitan philosophy and identified cosmopolitan educational traits, but what does it do? Cosmopolitan education, like any education, has aims. For instance, vocational education aims for the development and mastery of marketable skills, usually with a specific occupation or activity in mind, such as carpentry or metalworking. An engineering program aims to train students to be capable engineers. They learn the crucial components of the practice and duties of engineering, and the tools and methodologies necessary for that practice. Cosmopolitan education aims to produce individuals who are proficient in morality and socially contributive citizens in the world community. These aims include the transmission of the essential approaches or forms of life, and the tools and methodologies required, in order to competently participate in morality. It does not aim to produce prime ministers or marketing executives, though its students may certainly occupy these positions. The aims of cosmopolitan education are neither economic nor industrial, but rather philosophical and moral. Cosmopolitan theory has, over its long history, provided us with a picture of what the ethical and moral characteristics desired might be, though its contemporary forms tend to not be as prescriptive in this area as the Stoics were. Despite this lack of prescription, there are two characteristics that cosmopolitanism implicitly offers up as required traits. The first has been related repeatedly: the recognition of shared humanity as a fundamental fact of human existence and as a motivating guide for behavior. I will now introduce the second, more controversial of the two, that is directly related to the first: democratic process.

I do not mean democratic in the sense that we think of 'democracy' as a political system.

Nor do I necessarily mean that everyone gets to vote, though there is certainly something to be said in favor of that idea. Instead, democratic processes in cosmopolitanism mean that because every person shares with every other person in the world a common humanity all governing rules derived from that association ought to be amenable to all over whom the derivations govern. At the very least everyone should have some opportunity to participate in the processes that determine what those rules will be. Put more simply, the formation of rules that govern everyone ought to involve everyone. There is a political necessity for such, since the laws that create institutions and governments also carry with them sanctions and punishments; one might want to have a hand in how and which consequences are derived. While many moral judgments are inscribed in laws, not all are, and yet these morals still carry a governing force in the lives of people through social coercion and sanction. Ought not these governing principles be subject to the same democratic scrutiny as the others? The idea of democratic processes in cosmopolitan education is one in which the core principle of shared humanity is sufficient for requiring that all humans be allowed to participate in the making of the rules that govern their lives. Cosmopolitanism asks *How ought we live?* and cosmopolitan education attempts to facilitate the answering of that question. But how does it go about that facilitation? What processes are required? What result does cosmopolitan education seek? How will it know if the result has been achieved?

3.1 Cosmopolitan Processes and Results

In this section I will examine more closely the important distinction to be made between strong and moderate forms of cosmopolitanism and show that only the moderate form can result in a cosmopolitan moral education. This distinction is of vital importance because it rests on the difference between *processes* and *results*. While there is no doubt that cosmopolitan educators

are interested in the results of their educational processes, there is a greater emphasis to be found on the process, even in the face of results that are less than satisfactory, and furthermore, the result sought is embodied by the process. Cosmopolitan education aims to create a living process that can be the penultimate 'result' to the next 'result' that saturates the ongoing process. I will show that for cosmopolitan education to be a moral education and meet its own moral standards, it must adopt the moderate, process-oriented version of itself. In this chapter I will explore a model of deliberative ethics offered by Philip Kitcher that provides an illustration of what cosmopolitan moral education might look like insofar as it addresses the four main components of cosmopolitan moral education disclosed in Chapter 2.

3.1.1 Empirical and Methodological Morality

I first identify two general ways in which moral education could be evaluated by offering two distinctions: *empirical* morality and *methodological*[138] morality. Empirical morality consists of behaviors that are *actually* moral in the ways in which people live with and treat each other and meets standards of moral behaviors that have been set or determined. Empirical morality is identified by the results of moral education. Moral lessons are taught, behaviors are affected, and the intended outcomes occur or they do not. The challenge for *empirical* morality is to be able to make a truth claim that certain behaviors *are* moral, the individual in question knows that, and that what counts as moral is actually being done.[139]

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[138] This does not mean a 'method' in the rigid sense of something like the scientific experimental method or others like it, though it could mean that. This 'method' is meant to represent whatever process, criteria, and steps are used to facilitate the morality desired. In one society this process could be highly prescribed and rigid, while in another it could vary widely and be revised frequently. In Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 170, Dewey states, "[s]uch matters as knowledge of the past, of current technique, of materials, of the ways in which one's own best results are assured, supply the material for what may be called general method," but one is not restricted to these. Originality, creativity, and experimentation with new ideas are also part of the method of education.

[139] See Kitcher, *The Ethical Project*; Marc D. Hauser, *Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong Psychology*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2006). Kitcher explores this primarily through anthropological and historical investigations whereas Hauser uses contemporary research in psychology and neuroscience. Also see

Methodological morality is the name I have given to the *deliberations, discussions, and adjustments* that are involved in moral inquiry. In contrast to empirical morality, it may be that the actual outcomes of the moral education (i.e. the actual actions) have less bearing on morality learned than the manner in which they were derived. Clarifying the morality of the process lies at the heart of some debates about moral education's efficacy and is where the battle lies for *methodological* morality.[140] How are these morals determined, who determines them, and to what degree is this process itself a moral one?

This brings me to the more contentious point between empirical and methodological morality: is it still morality if the means or processes have taken on more ethically inclusive characteristics even if the results are not seen (by some) as moral or if the question of morality is still open? Is it moral if deliberations and debates are more inclusive, more tolerant, than preceding top-down mandates, even if those previous, autocratic mandates resulted in actual, tangible moral behaviors and widespread morality? It is this question that is put to cosmopolitanism and one that I think must be answered in the affirmative for cosmopolitan education.

3.1.2 Cosmopolitan Morals

As stated earlier, cosmopolitanism generally avoids prescription, a point in its favor as a non-doctrinal moral education, but a formidable obstacle in descriptive research. It involves the

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Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review* 108, no. 4 (2011) for a moral intuitionist view of the perception of the outcomes of behaviors and ethical 'improvements.' I am not concerned with *which* morals are actually 'moral,' only that the group in question has a working conception of morality, they try to achieve it, and that they can determine whether or not they have done so.

[140] I resist the temptation to use the word 'ideal' to signify this concept because it is my contention that there is no ideal ethical system, and thus it would be misleading to use this term in any way in this discussion.

acceptance of uncertainty,[141] but does not suggest a permanent state of ambiguity. Cosmopolitan education encourages inquiry that recognizes that what is known today may ring false tomorrow, but involves acting on one's best knowledge while allowing for further exploration and inquiry. This inquisitive disposition (or set of dispositions) is the 'product' of cosmopolitan education, but one that is not quantifiable or measurable because it is dynamic. Dispositions are not static, concrete, or fixed, but rather undergoing constant adjustment and adaptation.[142] The judgments that result are not indelible and final.

Cosmopolitan education is an inquiry that brings students into an act of thinking and being that is both philosophical and lived. This cannot be done by simply teaching *about* content, or about morals, but should involve the students in the crucial act of generating knowledge through inquiry, analysis, and deliberation of the content itself. The process is one of action. Cosmopolitan education is a way of educating without a definite and absolute end in mind or with pre-set answers, but is instead an embodiment of a philosophical inquiry into morality. To *do* cosmopolitan philosophy is to participate in your own education, one that is intellectual and moral.

Cosmopolitan theory has been periodically offered as a theory that can serve to make either tangible improvements in the lives of people (e.g. the management of conflict or difference), or to offer adherents the cultivation of an orientation to the world that is an improvement in everyday life derived more exclusively through their own lived experience. Historically, cosmopolitanism's popularity seems to ebb and flow with the expansion and

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[141] See Donald, "Multiculturalism Revisited"; Thomas S. Popkewitz, "Alchemies and Governing: Or, Questions About the Questions We Ask," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 39, no. 1 (2007).

[142] Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*; 197-202. See also Bernard Williams, *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), particularly Chapter 6, "The Primacy of Dispositions," pp. 67-75.

contraction of global movements, reappearing during times of increased contact, local instability due to foreign influence, and fear and confusion about the future. Thus cosmopolitanism implies, however softly or unintentionally, a means to inquire into moral questions that beset groups of people. But what is it that cosmopolitanism offers by way of morality? Does it hold the promise that it will deliver morality empirically[143] through newly legislated behaviors, forms of governance, and correct moral behaviors, or does it offer a way to produce a disposition in an individual that has the motivational properties necessary to thus make moral improvements in behaviors and processes that can contribute to morality?[144] Some conceptions of cosmopolitan educational theory purport to cultivate a disposition wherein the emphasis is on certain types of ethical discourse,[145] and thus implicitly support *methodological morality* in absence of any assurance of immediate empirical morality. In order to determine where empirical and methodological morality fit in cosmopolitan education, I must revisit the distinction between strong and moderate cosmopolitanism.

3.1.3 Strong and Moderate Cosmopolitanism, Again

As with many concepts, one can adhere to a type of cosmopolitanism that contains strict criteria and rigid controls for behavior, responsibilities, and obligations, or one can hold a more

[143] See Pradeep A. Dhillon, "A Kantian Conception of Human Rights Education," in *Education in the Era of Globalization*, edited by Klas Roth and Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, 51-64, (Springer, 2007); Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Experiments in Ethics*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Walter Parker, "Is there Space for Cosmopolitanism in Today's 'International Education' Movement in U. S. Schools?" in *American Educational Research Association*, 1-27, (San Diego, 2009). These authors articulate versions of Cosmopolitanism that take root or emphasis in the actual outcomes of human interactions and empirical manifestations of a Cosmopolitan 'actor.'

[144] See Hansen, "A View from the Ground"; and Gunesch, "Education for Cosmopolitanism." These authors are only two of many that methodologize cosmopolitanism as a disposition or orientation rather than a set of prescriptive traits or rules.

[145] In cosmopolitanism see Donald, "Multiculturalism Revisited"; and Koczanowicz, "Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments." There are political theories that operate similarly, such as discourse ethics, deliberative democracy, transcendental pragmatism, and agonistic pluralism, some of which will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 5.

nuanced and flexible position. This dichotomy is omnipresent in conceptions of cosmopolitanism. Whether a strident version of universality or a nuanced conception of "unity in diversity,"[146] this tension is one of which scholars and educators must be aware. As mentioned earlier, strong versions might promote cosmopolitanism as *the* way to live, but such a stance would conflict with cosmopolitan theories that one should be open and accepting of other ways of living. In the moderate version there would be no active endorsement of a cosmopolitan way of life in schools; doing so would devalue non-cosmopolitan lifestyles. Furthermore, moderate cosmopolitanism can be defended with mutually beneficial, society-wide reasons such as the need to eliminate prejudices or promote cooperation and respect by focusing on the similarities between cultures rather than their differences.[147]

Strict forms of cosmopolitanism, with their assertions of specific traits to acquire, would require methods of assessment that would yield empirical data to determine if the morals were acquired or not. Such assessments and the processes that support them would involve external structures or influences (i.e. laws or rules), unlike moderate cosmopolitanism, which is more interested in what is going on inside the individual (i.e. internal dispositions). An individual exhibiting a more moderate cosmopolitan disposition possesses an approach or way of engaging the world that is open and elastic and not one that imposes or 'requires.' The extreme forms of cosmopolitanism are given concrete form in prescribed behaviors and organizational structures which would be inscribed in laws or rules in order to facilitate the kind of behaviors and interactions that best suit a cosmopolitan way of life.[148] In the moderate version, individuals

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[146] See Golmohamad, "Education for World Citizenship."

[147] However, to focus on similarities is only one of multiple approaches, another of which is the educational benefits of focusing on difference and diversity, all of which have a place in cosmopolitan education.

[148] I do not want, at this point, to go into the specific details of what this might be, but rather try to describe the theoretical or paradigmatic dichotomy involved.

attempt to live in a certain way. In the more extreme or strong version, external structures and environments are erected to facilitate and encourage those ways of life.[149]

Thus the educational consequences are brought into relief. Will an educator lay down a set of cosmopolitan traits the students must strive to achieve, or will the educator take a more implicit route by modeling the cosmopolitan activities, behaviors, and processes he wishes the students to acquire, or model ways of inquiring into what behaviors ought to or might be adopted? How can one's understanding of the ranges, limits, and flexibility within cosmopolitan educational philosophy inform the most useful and effective approach? I am now able to develop my distinction between *structural* and *dispositional* cosmopolitanism

3.1.4 Structural Cosmopolitanism

To build on my previous distinction between empirical and methodological morality, I now distinguish between two types of cosmopolitanism;[150] the first kind is that which concerns itself with terms such as *structures*, *entities*, *politics*, *nationalism*, *laws*, and *nation-states*, among others. I call this *structural* cosmopolitanism, and it is the type of cosmopolitanism that provokes a great deal of criticism. Political and legal conceptions of cosmopolitan would find their manifestations in structures and institutions erected to facilitate the enforcement of some of the cosmopolitan characteristics noted earlier. Critics point to the legal and logistical difficulties with codifying 'world citizenship' and determining the explicit civic obligations therein, or they point to the ill-fated League of Nations or the hit-or-miss activities of the beleaguered behemoth

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[149] I recognize the inevitable interplay between the two, and in effect, there is a necessary conjunction that must be obtained in order to maintain equilibrium. The point of the dichotomy is to show the origins of emphases for structures or dispositions that might come, and why I advocate for an emphasis on dispositions.

[150] These types are similar to, and influenced by, Scheffler's distinctions between two strands of cosmopolitanism: one a doctrine about justice, and the other a doctrine about culture and the self. See Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism." My 'structural' and 'dispositional' categories loosely correspond to these, respectively, though there is more similarity in the former than the latter.

that is the United Nations as evidence that such manifestations of cosmopolitan theory are flawed, or simply impossible and utopian.

Most of these critics have as the objects of their criticism the empirically realized versions of the aforementioned cosmopolitan theories and treatments. Surely it is clear in many instances that these structural and otherwise tangible implementations of cosmopolitan theory have failed to perform as promised or intended, but why? Is it simply because the theories are wrong or that their aversion to prescription leaves large, vague holes in which to find fault? Is it because human nature does not fit a cosmopolitan paradigm? Is it because human psychology simply cannot wrap itself around the apparent contradictions contained in cosmopolitanism? Or is it because the most crucial element of the cosmopolitan paradigm is missing in these structural models? In defense of critics, non-strong cosmopolitans *are* vague or in disagreement about what they can or do promise, which allows space for critics to insert themselves. It is quite possible that the second part of my distinction is in part a response to these criticisms and is an attempt to blunt or deflect them as well as an attempt to offer a positive, if modest, account of what cosmopolitanism can offer.

3.1.5 Dispositional Cosmopolitan

I believe that the most significant problem that presents itself in structural cosmopolitanism is that the crucial element is missing: what I call *dispositional* cosmopolitanism. Dispositional cosmopolitanism is the kind of cosmopolitanism that emphasizes individual attitudes and dispositions and finds no fundamental imperative to depart into reconciliations with national identities nor debates about the tensions between local and global loyalties (at least initially), or how to cope with adhering to structural mandates. In dispositional cosmopolitanism the individual stands central in relation to his or herself not as a participant in a

structure or framework, but rather as a participant in morality with other participants. Dispositional cosmopolitanism begins from the standpoint of the person who lives with other persons, whereas structural cosmopolitanism begins from the standpoint of the external entities designed to influence the person. Instead of adopting the structural cosmopolitan point of view that begins with external structures designed to impart codes and behaviors from without, codes and behaviors determined independent of the person who must conform to them, dispositional cosmopolitanism adopts a position from inside or 'alongside' the person that then extends out into a local, regional, and global web of interactions.

I assert that the failures of structural cosmopolitanism cited by its many critics can be tied to the lack of dispositional cosmopolitanism in the populations of which the structures are comprised. In effect, the critics of structural cosmopolitanism are probably justified, not because of something wrong with cosmopolitan, but rather due to something wrong with the implementations they cite. That 'something' is the lack of a sufficient number of cosmopolitan-disposed people contained within or constituting the populations governed by the structures. Stated more frankly, the structural cosmopolitans are guilty of placing the cart in front of the horse. You cannot sustain a cosmopolitan institution unless the people who exist within its domain and governance have cosmopolitan dispositions.[151] It is analogous to the argument that democracy cannot be imposed (top-down), it must come from the people (bottom-up). Cosmopolitanism is no different. If one of the core tenets of cosmopolitanism is to require the inclusion of those whom social policies will affect, then cosmopolitan policies or social action

[151] One could ask why this is not a 'chicken and egg' issue. I grant that a specific disposition is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy implementation; holding a disposition does not automatically result in disposition-derived action or implementation. I do, however, assert that first, a certain disposition to *X* is more likely to result in policies that reflect *X* than a disposition to *Z* will result in *X*, and second, policy *X* (or policy *Z*, for that matter) is more likely to be successful, be maintained, and receive broader support if the people 'governed' by it contain dispositions that comport with it.

cannot be imposed on a population that has not been involved in the decision.

3.1.6 Structural and Dispositional Cosmopolitanism and Morality

Using the distinctions constructed, I pair empirical morality with structural cosmopolitanism and methodological morality with dispositional cosmopolitanism. Empirical morality, and its emphasis on the transmission of specific morals and actual moral behaviors that result from the education, forms the content of the morality sought. Because empirical morality requires morals that are discrete and specific and evaluations and corrections of behaviors that are explicit and measurable, these results manifest themselves in governments, laws, regulatory agencies and agents, as well as in non-codified, but equally structured, social stigma and sanctions. Methodological morality, like dispositional cosmopolitanism, cannot be measured in the results but rather in the process, and finds its manifestation in the attitudes, dispositions, and forms of life of those in whom it resides. Empirical morality might be able to point to dispositions, too, as an origination point, but since it relies upon observable behaviors it cannot be certain of, nor prioritize, the origins of the manifested behaviors. Structural cosmopolitanism will certainly welcome dispositions that result in behaviors it is designed to produce, but will not be so welcoming if the dispositions are not manifested. As Table 1 indicates, dispositional cosmopolitans are more interested in *how* the morals are derived, who gets to be involved, and whether or not all options are democratically 'on the table.' This edges close to the questions of justification. When asked what justification there is for either empirical or methodological morality, the former must work much harder to produce it whereas the latter has but two steps: shared humanity and the logical consequence of collaborative deliberations. Structural cosmopolitanism *might* be effective but only if it is preceded by realized methodological morality supported by widespread dispositional cosmopolitanism. The structural/empirical form

ultimately puts the conclusion first and the method second. Put another way, the structural/empirical forms start from a point of fixed morals and fixed actions and then work to force others to comply.

TABLE 1. Pairings of Distinctions of Cosmopolitanism

Strong cosmopolitanism	**Moderate cosmopolitanism**
Empirical Morality External, measurable products and outcomes approaches	*Methodological Morality* Internal, unquantifiable attitudes and
Structural cosmopolitanism External laws and structures to guide or coerce	*Dispositional cosmopolitanism* Internally developed dispositions
Strategic, instrumental motivation Dependent upon external conditions for maintenance	*Universal, communal motivation* Dependent upon internal grounding of shared humanity
Externally compelled	Internally motivated
Indifference to methods?	Indifference to results?
Leads to direct instruction or for maintenance	Leads to collaborative facilitation

If, as in structural cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan education is primarily concerned with the actual output of moral education and morality is determined by these outcomes, then the moral evaluation of structural cosmopolitanism rests on these outcomes. It would also mean that the evaluation of a cosmopolitan education would rest on the outcomes of its products (student behaviors) and the subsequent results of their activities in moral life. We would ultimately evaluate both the students and the education they received by calculating the sum of their moral productivity/lives. The difficulty of assessing such a program is addressed in traditional

criticisms of Consequentialism and Utilitarianism.[152]

More importantly, however, the significant weakness of the empirical morality/structural cosmopolitan educational program lies in that it is primarily oriented toward educating for existing moral codes and structures since it takes as its point of emphasis and its goal only that which currently exists or the navigation of structures rather statically obtained. Empirical morality/structural cosmopolitanism predetermines the moral outcome in order to prescribe actions and assign criteria to adjudicate the morals acquisition of its students. For an approach that focuses on the results there can be no other way to assess the success of such a morals education program; it must determine what is moral before the morals education has taken place. Thus any moral inquiry that is held within such system is not a true inquiry – the dataset (which morals) is constrained and what constitutes morality has been fixed; the answer already known.

I admit that one must start from somewhere. We are all socialized into forms of life from the time we are born until we are old enough to begin making our own judgments, and these forms of traditional morals judgments will likely be our starting point. That does not, however, mean that we must begin with these received morals as our fixed destination; doing so will also make it increasingly difficult for empirical morality/structural cosmopolitanism 'graduates' to participate in future deliberations of morality in greater society since they have been 'trained' only for externally imposed, top-down, received morals, not for taking part in a collaborative inquiry or negotiation. Educating students in this way effectively condemns them to a future of moral alienation since, as noted earlier, ethical codes and constitutions of morality are subject to change over time, these students will be ill equipped to participate in these that change them.

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[152] There are numerous critiques of utilitarianism and Consequentialism. I hew more closely to those found in Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, or John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Revised, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).

If, as in dispositional cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan education is primarily concerned with the process by which the deliberations of and inquiry into morality occurs, then one can assess it (the process) by examining the types of dispositions required for the kinds of deliberations that would be necessary for an inclusive inquiry into morality. Thus a cosmopolitan education of this type would require a greater emphasis on the morality of the methods of instruction in order to deliver a process-centric education in lieu of one that simply trains moral habits and behaviors regardless of method. A program that relies on the outcomes could be justified in using such techniques as negative reinforcement, threats of violence, coercion, and other forms of habit-inducement that should give us pause. The empirical morality/structural cosmopolitan program essentially attempts to guarantee pre-determined behavioral outcomes rather than be engaged in the deliberations over what outcomes *might* be morally preferable given the problems students are liable to face in their unknown future, and increasingly less likely to inquire into, and about morality in general. Methodological morality/dispositional cosmopolitans see the manner in which decisions are made to be of utmost importance, such that they are more likely to be able to accept, however temporarily, an undesirable result as long as they agree with the process that obtained it.[153]

Why should this matter to cosmopolitan education? If I am going to posit cosmopolitan education as an education in morality I need to know which scheme of cosmopolitanism under which I will operate in order to understand what educational options are available and in what ways the process of cosmopolitan education might run afoul of its own principles. The cosmopolitan who prefers the empirical-structural approach must accept that s/he is essentially

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[153] This foregrounds a position to be argued in Chapter 5 wherein participants can inhabit a position of 'epistemological restraint,' a concept developed by Thomas Nagel. See Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," *Philosophy* 16, no. 3 (1987).

resigned to a kinder, gentler version of Consequentialism, and the variable is which set of morals will s/he attempt to teach. The cosmopolitan who prefers the methodological-dispositional approach must accept the fact that s/he is not teaching morals—and that there will be tensions when (alleged) moral procedures do not produce the desired results—but is instead attempting to equip students with the skills and dispositions necessary to participate in a collaborative moral inquiry that is the most inclusive process available.

My conception of cosmopolitan education requires that one recognize the fundamental fact of shared humanity, and this fact compels us to consider moral questions from a truly socially and communally aware perspective; we recognize that the moral question is *how should* *we regard and interact each other?* and the 'we' in these questions demands a collaborative inquiry to answer. Cosmopolitan education requires active engagement with the world and those in it and an openness and receptivity to learn from that which the world and experience contains and creates. The objects, or rather persons, who deserve our consideration in these matters, consist of everyone, not only our locally defined familiars. The cosmopolitan participant does not shy away from difference or conflict, but inhabits the ambiguity found in new ideas and the erosion of old ones and the possibility that a previously held conviction might have been morally incorrect.

3.2 Toward Ethical Progress

Cosmopolitanism's contemporary iterations have emerged in part due to the recognition of an increasingly 'smaller' and more interconnected world. Human history has shown a consistent and technologically induced acceleration of increased global and cross-cultural contact that suggests the inevitability of more of the same, which erects an imperative for the examination, possible expansion, and combination of multiple conceptions of the good and what

counts as moral. Doing so encourages the development of an ethical process in which we are confronted with a pragmatic question of how the people of the world are to live and survive together in the face of these inevitable contacts and changes. Though not for the intentions of cosmopolitanism, Philip Kitcher presents an approach to ethics he calls 'pragmatic naturalism' that stresses the need for ongoing deliberations of ethical progress, and the deliberations he envisions may serve as a model for cosmopolitan moral education. In this section I will show that cosmopolitanism provides a theoretical and practical home for the kind of ethical inquiry described by Kitcher, and that these 'ethical deliberations' embody a cosmopolitan moral inquiry. Conversely, it could also be said that the process described by Kitcher is, however unintentionally, a cosmopolitan one.

In *The Ethical Project*, Kitcher describes and argues for an approach to ethical progress that he calls "pragmatic naturalism" wherein existing ethical codes stand as responses to altruism failures that have been experienced.[154] The ethical project was 'invented' by our ancestors and subsequent humans have been amending them ever since. Simply put, (psychological) altruism occurs when a person's actions in a given context are the result of his recognition of the desires of another person such that those actions produce the outcome desired by the other and without a primarily instrumental desire to procure benefits for oneself. The failure of a person to act in such a way in a situation in which it would be appropriate to do so is an 'altruism failure.' Kitcher provides the example of a hungry person alone in a room with food. He is hungry and desires to eat the food; all of it. Now consider that this person is in the same room with the same food except there is now another hungry person in the room who desires the food. In this case, an altruist would now have the desire to see an outcome in which both himself and the other hungry

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[154] See Kitcher, *The Ethical Project*, 3-12, where he introduces the term, concept, and relationship with ethics.

person are able to share the food. "Here your desire responds to your perception of the needs and wants of someone else, so that you adjust what you might otherwise have wanted so as to align your desire with the wants you take that other person to have."[155] Ethical progress requires a purposeful deliberation about altruism failures and how to best remedy them: Where have things gone wrong and how can we do better? Rather than a discussion about what those 'better ways' *are*, societies must engage in ethical discussions to determine what those 'better ways' *might be*, and though decisions must be made, they are decisions 'for now' that are open to adjustment as the principles and criteria derived from deliberations evolve.

According to Kitcher, the core of ethics consists of "relatively imprecise and vague, ethical statements"[156] that give us a sense of where it is we want to go and how we are to get there. These ethical statements orient us to the 'correct' behavior, and the deliberations result in an orientation and a disposition to act. The traditional question of ethics is about how *one* ought to live in the world. Cosmopolitanism is about how *we* ought to live and act. Both are primarily interested in *how* one/we ought to live, not necessarily or only the 'what' that results from living. Fundamentally, ethical pragmatism is an educational process that prepares its newest members for physical and social survival. Its chief lessons are, regarding physical survival, about how to stay alive and in social survival, about how to live with other people. "The one thing every individual must do is to live; the one thing that society must do is to secure from each individual his fair contribution to the general well being and see to it that a just return is made to him."[157] Ethics is a mix of habits and reflective deliberations that are socially mediated. Social mediation

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[155] Kitcher, *The Ethical Project,* 21. For a thorough discussion of psychological altruism see pages 17-25.

[156] Ibid., 246.

[157] Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 215. Kitcher draws from Dewey as well as the work of Charles Peirce and William James.

and the survival imperative require that the deliberations of what constitutes ethical progress should be a society-wide conversation that is as democratic as possible, and, as such, as many members as possible should be involved.[158] Kitcher asserts that in such ethical deliberations we should be aware of past and present circumstances that have resulted in the ethical judgments we have inherited. Additionally, those involved in the deliberations should be willing to experiment, test, and evaluate the conclusions or ideas of the ethical discussions.[159] The scientific method, as conceived by Dewey, informs this process. "Science represents the office of intelligence, in projection and control of new experiences, pursued systematically, intentionally, and on a scale due to freedom from limitations of habit. It is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress."[160] It is in this scientific account of progress that notions of ethical progress find a cognate.

In looking at transitions and changes among ethical codes, one can see if they have been progressive.[161] Ethical codes contain conceptions of the good, and these ethical codes change over time. Thus conceptions of the good change as well. As a result, final conceptions of the good that contain concrete and distinct characteristics find difficulty holding up over time. The good does not change on its own; people make alterations to it, and they do so as a result of a combination of social tensions arising from altruism failures, attempts to resolve them and

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[158] Kitcher, *The Ethical Project*, 181. "Since I shall conclude that realist truth about ethics cannot be sustained in any of its guides, it is best to be inclusive about the possibilities allowed."

[159] See ibid., 207, note 29 in which Kitcher notes that for Dewey, this was of significant importance. "Dewey is optimistic that ethics can find its own analog of scientific method," Dewey himself writes "[t]he coincidence of the ideal of progress with the advance of science is not a mere coincidence. Before this advance men placed the golden age in remote antiquity. Now they face the future with a firm belief that intelligence properly used can do away with evils once thought inevitable" (Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 224).

[160] Dewey, Democracy and Education, 227.

[161] Kitcher's use of the term 'progressive' is not synonymous with 'Progressivism' or the school of thought known as 'progressive education.' For Kitcher in this case, 'progressive' is merely an adjectival form of 'progress.'

provide remedies, and the adoption of new remedies and behaviors to do so. It is vital that the conversation about them continue and not cease once a remedy has been found; it is crucial that there not be an essentialized, *a priori* conception of the good because then the focus is on adhering to the conception of the good rather than what the situation requires for a just outcome, as well as what can be done to achieve it. According to Kitcher, *a priori* attempts to conceive the good must be rejected and instead there should be a conversation about the good that builds concepts and suggests proposals of the good rather than *defining* it. This creates a dynamic picture of the good and ethics that is necessary to making them better, or progressive. One would not attempt to make improvements to something one does not conceive as capable of changing. A fixed, *a priori* conception of the good, no matter how flawed, would never be altered or corrected, and thus ethical progress would be impossible. However, by recognizing the dynamism of the ethics, more intelligent changes can then be made. There is no promise of the elimination of all tensions that surround the difficulties and conflicts over the good and ethics, but there is hope that some of the tensions we experience from known altruism failures can be remedied.

No ethical system is truly static; all have changed over time. Even within the confines of religious systems there has been change and alteration to accede to the realities of the changing world and our evolving understanding of it.[162] This fact renders incomprehensible any assertions to the contrary as well as any attempts to brand all changes in existing formulations as dangerous or unethical. The only fixed truth in ethical systems is that *they* change over time. Since the conception of the good is ever evolving and all of society's members have an interest in what that good is, then it is only reasonable that all members of society participate in the deliberations

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[162] For one instance, it is no longer blasphemy in the Roman Catholic Church to assert that the world is round and that Earth revolves around the Sun.

regarding the good and how it can be obtained. We must engage in the world around us, and that includes other people.

However, Kitcher admits the practical impossibility of one-hundred-percent global participation in these deliberations. The obstacle presented here is not insignificant. Our social groups have grown so large that global-communal deliberations are impossible in a formal sense. In another sense, we simply may not always be directly cognizant of the existence of certain altruism failures. The 'invisibility' of the results of these failures and the distance between ourselves and the 'victims' means that the most efficient motivating influences (e.g. their anger, our empirical observation of their plight) for remedial deliberation become at best abstract and faint echoes. In such societies a citizen loses "the ability to perceive oneself as playing a role in joint projects, conceived by each participant as directed towards a common good. The shared ethical life begins to disappear," and most obviously in a large society.[163] If we think of the global society we cannot get much bigger, and thus cosmopolitanism is faced with serious practical problems vis-à-vis democratic and inclusive, ethical deliberations. There are further difficulties in understanding what or where 'community' is to be drawn. 'We' are diverse and geographically jumbled, yet our interactions are so interconnected that neither boundaries nor accurate delineations can be drawn between or around 'us' particularly because 'we' are part of so many different groups all at the same time.[164] I do, however, assert that informal global deliberations take place every time people from different parts of the world interact and must negotiate ways to live together, for however brief a period of time. In this regard increased contact and interaction can continue to force an evolution of ethical practices, perhaps in

[163] Kitcher, *The Ethical Project*, 298.

[164] Save for one: humanity, but that does not solve the practical problem of who 'we' are and how that identification affects the way I conduct myself on the street.

temporary and microforms that can be transmitted and incorporated into local systems. This diffusion itself may or may not be deliberate, but the ethical deliberations they contain will still be similar processes.

Kitcher's solution to the impossibility of one-hundred-percent participation is to understand the dynamic nature and different layers of community. A community is not to be thought of as an innermost circle in a series of concentric circles, expanding outward, so much as a hodgepodge of overlapping communities marked by relationships and associations of our daily lives, and within each community is a different, or dominant, code of ethics that governs them. All of these communities make up the 'world community' for each person, and it is unlikely that any two are ever identical. This denies "that all ethics is local," but instead indicates that "[w]herever there is a failure to respond to the desires of another person, with respect to whom there is the potential for interaction, *we have a contemporary analog of the problem that underlies the original function of ethics.*"[165] Thus a 'world community' of ethical actors and thinkers exists through multiple layers of interactions and deliberations. I hold this conception to be similar to and compatible with the fundamental nature of shared humanity as conceived by cosmopolitanism, and both conceptions stand as consequents of the human conditions of natality, plurality, and action that will be discussed in the following chapters.

There is a temptation to evaluate ethical progress, its existence, and efficacy by suggesting we have failed miserably as evidenced by the altruism failures that occur with more frequency than one can identify, or instead to hold up some idea of an ethical system and evaluate ethical progress by it. In the latter case one commits an immediate error upon assuming there is an ideal system to which the idea of ethical progress can be compared. In the former, one

[165] Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 304.

assumes we have failed or that we should have eliminated them all by now. Why are there still such altruism failures? Why have we not eliminated them if we, as humans, have been at it so long? One of the reasons for repeated altruism failures and thus the failure to reduce all social tensions in societies is that there has not been the kind of democratic, inclusive deliberation Kitcher seeks. Instead, *a priori* conceptions of the good (such as those derived from religious or cultural authority), or conceptions that are socially reifying and thus designed primarily for the benefit of the hegemonic powers or socio-political elite, are perpetuated, resolving nothing. Thus 'in' and 'out' groups are delineated by boundaries conceived to be impermeable without capitulation, resulting in the creation of unbridgeable gaps over which communication becomes impossible.

At any moment throughout human history, existing ways of addressing altruism failures have never been completely adequate for addressing the social tensions that arise from new conditions presented by increased contact with those from different cultures and ethical systems. Dewey can be helpful here. Events that entail the interaction between people and their environments constitute 'experience.' These experiences often present problems, such as altruism failures, and our attempts at resolution constitute inquiry. These are the moral problems of our lives, and they constitute the inquiry that forms the process of ethical deliberations. Moral inquiry springs from real-world experiences that present themselves as problems to us (i.e. contemporary struggles with increased inter-cultural and inter-ethical contact). We encounter such problems every day when we puzzle about the reasons why someone cut in front of us in the line or stole our parking space or, more existentially, why in some societies there is so much suffering amidst so much capacity to alleviate it, transforming these ethical questions into

political ones as well. The "unsolved problem [is] the stimulus for thought."[166] Remove the problem through tradition or dogma and there is no reason to reason further.

And so we continue to challenge and amend our ethical practices. Critique lies at the very foundations of competing traditions or conceptions of the good. Those that are not simply received or delivered dogmatically automatically require a critical eye (assuming they are not identical to the traditions already practiced). Hanan Alexander points out that dogmatic traditions (in ethics) undermine their own attempts at making "ethical discussions or debates…meaningful altogether—that within reasonable limits people are the agents of their own beliefs, behaviors, and desires."[167] It is not possible for someone who is the agent of his own actions to be infallible, so it is possible that he is wrong. If he was not capable of incorrect actions he could not very well be held responsible for them.

> Ethical traditions that provide genuine standards of assessment must therefore be dynamic not dogmatic, embracing ideas that represent the best available formulation of the good, at least as we are given to understand it for now, but assuming that there could always be a better way or a more compelling perspective.[168]

For Alexander, knowledge (and our beliefs about ethics an morals) is rendered temporal, contextual, linguistic, cultural, historical, and imperfect, but does consist of something that exists independently and outside of a person's experience. As a result, ethical ideals would need to lie, at least partly if not wholly, beyond our own experience and be embedded in culture, history, and traditions, placing our knowledge and our viewpoint, not to mention the discussions, deliberations, and adjustments of them, in the public sphere where they are discussed and

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[166] Philip H. Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum," *Teachers College Record* 73, no. 2 (1971): 279.

[167] Hanan A. Alexander, "A View from Somewhere: Explaining the Paradigms of Educational Research" *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 40, no. 2 (May 2006): 214.

[168] Ibid.

debated.

During the current period of increasing regional and global contact, people and societies are confronted daily with numerous situations and experiences that must be sorted out. However modified the experience vis-à-vis one's traveling or one being 'traveled to,'[169] the intellectual or imaginative trip, the cosmopolitan experience, results in the same need; to find a way to make sense of the new experience and situate it in one's condition, locale, and ethical understanding. This dynamic has caused people to require a reframing of their world into a new conceptual framework, and issues a challenge to moral educators to prepare students for such a dynamic, ongoing reframing. Kitcher's ethical deliberations outline a democratically inclusive, communicatively active discourse community through its many particular perspectives and acceptance of the open-ended search for the non-predetermined good as well as the recognition of the irresoluble tensions that result. I will take a closer look at these processes in the chapter that follows, as well as examine one of the more entrenched challenges to such an inquiry; that of belief based on received tradition or that which does not admit reasons beyond the belief itself.

Conclusion

Building upon the four correlates of cosmopolitanism described in §2.2, and the importance of the moral educational process discussed in §3.1, cosmopolitan moral education begins to take shape. Recognizing that one lives in the world along with other people forestalls purely self-interested morals pursuit. One will respect others and their ways of living, and possess tolerance for ways with which one disagrees. One will not exclude those who are different based upon that difference. One will apply one's preferred treatment of oneself to all

[169] Given the prevalence and availability of emerging technologies, one need never leave the town of one's birth to have access to significantly jarring influences from around the world, or to have such influences 'visit' you without reaching for them.

people of the world, and not just national brethren. Living *with*, and not only among, others brings to the fore the necessity of engaging with them. Since the world contains dynamic systems of change, both in environments and people, moral engagement with others reflects that reality, and is adaptive and growth-oriented rather than fixed and settled. Maintaining this moral engagement requires a commensurate openness and receptivity that emerges as part of this moral process. One cannot engage without being open to the engagement and receptive to what the experience brings. And finally, the cosmopolitan moral education is never complete. There is always another experience to have, another person with whom to inquire or deliberate, another moral riddle to be solved. As Kitcher's analyses show, moral judgments and ethical systems have always changed over time, and there is no reason to think they will not continue to do so. Thus the cosmopolitan moral inquiry will continue, as well.

Such a philosophical perspective is destined to be unsettling as one grapples with the uncertainty derived. Each stage in this moral inquiry will result in a temporary conclusion, a judgment 'for now' that can inform one's actions in morality, and every conclusion in morality is contestable, too. The discussions, the contestations, will continue. It is for this reason that morals education is inherently incapable of being a moral inquiry, and in fact, is not an inquiry at all. Morals, predetermined, are taught as traits to acquire and are presented as static, fixed modes embodying morality. Morality is seen as merely acquiring morals, and once one has appeared to do so, one's moral growth is complete. The danger in this approach is that an individual who acquires such perceived-as-fixed morals will be incapable of (or at least less proficient in) making whatever adjustments are necessary over time. The lack of capability to participate in the collaborative inquiry into morality will alienate him from the 'findings,' and will more than likely serve to dogmatize his convictions in the received tradition of morals and morality into

which he was indoctrinated.

We now arrive at the most difficult position a cosmopolitan must accept: one may not get what one wants. Moral/ethical progress, as perceived by the individual, will not always appear to be progressive, and at times, simply regressive. By adopting a cosmopolitan disposition to moral inquiry, one must recognize that because of a commitment to a process that comports with the core principles of cosmopolitanism, it is possible that adherence to these processes may result in outcomes that do not match what one intended. Instead, one's preferred outcomes may not be those adopted or accepted by those with whom one lives and with whom one collaborates. What then? How can one go from a moral inquiry to lived morality when one does not agree with the conclusion of what counts as moral? How can one put oneself in a position to continue engaging with other people morally while being constrained by what morality is? What mechanisms or processes are available?

Chapter 4

Education in Morality and Natality

Now that I have marked out the relevant territory of cosmopolitan education, its core tenets, entailments, and situation as a process of inquiry, it remains for me to explain what kind of inquiry it will be while retaining the characteristics sketched. This chapter turns to the field of moral education in general, and an education in morality in particular. Wide-ranging debates in the field of moral education focus on such themes as which morals or morality system to teach, teaching morals v. teaching *about* morals, how to teach morals morally (i.e. education v. indoctrination), the cognitive limits of moral education, the physio-neurological limits (if any) of moral reasoning, how to measure moral reasoning, the use of role-models or exemplars, and the most appropriate pedagogies to use depending upon one's answer to these debates. But what is it exactly that we are talking about when we talk about or endeavor to implement 'moral education?' A small portion of the literature in the field of moral education does identify a dearth of scholarship in this area, and more precisely, on what John Wilson called "the first steps" in moral education.[170] These steps consist largely in undertaking a conceptual analysis of morality so that it can become fundamentally clear what it is that educators in the field of moral education are talking about when they talk about morality; before we can inquire into the nature of morality, we must have an idea of what morality is. It is only then, once we have an idea of what morality is, that we can talk about how to conduct education in morality. This chapter will focus on these steps, but it will first be necessary to make a finer point about what morals education is and why it is not sufficient for the purposes of education in morality. Then I will investigate what

[170] See John Wilson, "First Steps in Moral Education," *Journal of Moral Education* 25, no.1 (1996).

Wilson's "first steps" might be in order to better understand what the necessary conceptual components of morality education are. I will then follow with an examination of Hannah Arendt's conception of natality in education and why it is necessary for an education in morality, at which point the challenge for cosmopolitan education can be more clearly set.

4.1 Morals Education

The field of moral education is large and shifting. From the outset, distinctions must be made between the practices of morals education; the empirical study of morals education and development; and the theoretical analyses of morality, moral development, and the aims of such an education.[171] This project is more concerned with the last of these three, though the first two will be present throughout. To get a sense of the research trends in the field of moral education, I performed a content analysis of article titles and abstracts from the *Journal of Moral Education*, the main English-language scholarly publication for moral education. This research found that from 1970 to 2010, articles about *Kohlberg*, *psychology*, and *cognitive developmental moral psychology* outnumbered articles about *Aristotle*, *Kant*, *Dewey*, *philosophy*, and *virtue ethics* or *character education* by a ratio of almost 2:1 (1.7:1, n263:n153).[172] The research in the field of moral education is clearly dominated by psychology and empirical research and Kohlberg is the dominant figure and may "be regarded as the most significant influence on moral education of the post-war period."[173]

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[171] Matthew Sanger and Richard Osguthorpe, "Making Sense of Moral Approaches to Education," *Journal of Moral Education* 34, no.1 (March 2005): 58.

[172] *Kohlberg*, *psychology*, and *cognitive developmental moral psychology* are most associated with moral psychology, while *Aristotle*, *Kant*, *Dewey*, *philosophy*, and *virtue ethics* or *character education* are more likely to be associated with moral philosophy, and their methods and data reflect these disciplinary origins. See Appendix A, Table 2.

[173] David Carr, "Moral Education and the Perils of Developmentalism," *Journal of Moral Education* 31, no. 1 (March 2002): 14.

Research about *moral reasoning* has also been dominant and it has an equal emphasis in both moral psychology and moral philosophy. However, within the competing pedagogical traditions in moral education *cognitive developmentalism*, a psychological concept derived primarily from the work of Kohlberg, continues to maintain the strongest role while philosophical-based concepts such as *character education, virtue ethics,* and *citizenship education* have seen slight, recent increases in research.[174] *Citizenship education* has eclipsed *cognitive development* in the last decade, has been seen as an emerging avenue for moral education, and also indicates a link between morality and politics in the field of moral education. The concept *values*, like *moral reasoning*, sees significant crossover between psychology and philosophy while the concept *cognitive,* which has been hitherto dominant in the field, has only recently been passed by *character* and *citizenship*[175] in usage in moral education articles.

What these iterations of the data show is that the field of moral education has been dominated by psychology, empirical research, and the psychologized pedagogies thusly derived. Emler warned that “the dominance of Kohlbergian [and psychology] theory in moral education research risks confusing evidence that interventions have worked as intended with the conclusion that they have effects on relevant outcomes” and that there is still no “clear causal link from moral reasoning to conduct”[176] in morals education. Despite the presence of decades of morals education through such popular and influential approaches as ‘character education,’ ‘values clarification,’ Kohlberg’s cognitive developmentism, and ‘ethics of care,’ there does not seem to

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[174] See Appendix A, Table 2.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Nicholas Emler, “How Can We Decide Whether Moral Education Works?” *Journal of Moral Education* 25, no. 1 (1996): 125.

be any 'performance based' difference among them.[177] Thus the field is left in a tug-of-war between moral education systems, with constantly shifting emphases, but no over-arching or syncretic goal.

As with other educational aims, many in morals education find it critical to determine the validity and reliability of evaluations of morals education programs, and much progress has been made in evaluation of the most popular forms of morals education (i.e. programs from Kohlberg's developmental theories) mostly because these models lend themselves most easily to assessment.[178] However, this does not solve the problem of deciding how to measure success in morals education. An assessment may tell us if a particular trait has been exhibited by a student, or a form of thought has been internalized by the student such that the student can identify it as a form of reasoning that could be used to confront a particular moral problem, but the assessment cannot tell us whether that trait is desirable or not, nor whether the student's actions will be influenced by this knowledge. Further, even if we are satisfied with the desirability of the trait, we have no way of knowing whether the student sees its exhibition as moral or instead as merely an answer to a question put to him. What matters is whether or not these types of morals education are actually morally instructive and not merely capable of measured description. Complicating the morals evaluation picture further, there is a significant difference between the results of *quantitative* assessments of moral judgment in pre-service teaching candidates and

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[177] The field of moral education has produced a plethora of research on these approaches. For general descriptions of each see Larry Nucci and Darcia Narvaez, *Handbook of Moral Education,* edited by Larry Nucci and Darcia Narvaez, (New York: Routledge, 2008); and F. Clark Power, *Moral Education: A Handbook* edited by F. Clark Power, Ronald J. Nuzzi, Darcia Narvaez, Daniel K. Lapsley, and Thomas C. Hunt *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol. 4, (Westport: Praeger, 2008). Other books, articles, and taxonomies are too numerous to enumerate here. A particularly insightful review of these dominant moral education approaches can be found in Jose Mesa, *Moral Education in the Age of Individualism*, (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2008).

[178] See Emler, "How Can We Decide?"

qualitative evaluations of the moral judgment of these same candidates, which reveals the difficulty in accurately assessing dispositions and calls into question the use of either quantitative or qualitative assessments of moral judgment as the basis for determining the efficacy of a morals education program, as well as the efficacy of assessing moral judgment at all.[179] It is one thing to attempt to discover or reveal moral traits or judgment empirically, quite another to determine *what is moral* through these same methods. Such work temptingly invites one to confuse the determination of what *is* with the determination of what *ought* to be.

Most work in morals education carries on in opposition to the claim that in the field of moral education there are no definitive answers.[180] Much morals education involves quite clearly stated answers to questions in morality though it is not necessary to produce them. Even though "empirical questions about laws governing human activity do not have definitive answers," that does not mean that some idea of a "better or worse understanding, a more or less efficacious response, cannot still be reached in particular cases. Such understanding is achieved through philosophy and the study of the humanities."[181] Empirical research may show us what *was* or *is*, but can only suggest *possibilities* for reasons or as predictions of future outcomes.[182] It cannot provide definitive answers for questions of human behavior and conduct—either before or after it happens—but, more importantly, it cannot tell us what morals are actually moral. Even

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[179] See Lisa Johnson, "Teacher Candidate Disposition: Moral Judgement or Regurgitation?" *Journal of Moral Education* 37, no. 4 (December 2008).

[180] See Robin Barrow, "The Poverty of Empirical Research in Moral Education: Beyond John Wilson" *Journal of Moral Education* 29, no. 3 (September 2000).

[181] Barrow, "Beyond John Wilson," 313.

[182] See Gert Biesta, "Why 'What Works' Won't Work: Evidence-Based Practice and the Democratic Deficit in Educational Research," *Educational Theory* 57, no. 1 (2007).

Kohlberg himself avers such: “Science, then, can test whether a philosopher’s conception of morality phenomenologically fits the psychological facts. Science cannot go on to justify that conception of morality as what morality ought to be.”[183] Such ambiguity prompts the question whether it is better to *not* talk about morality in schools at all.

Graham Haydon refers to Williams’ assertion that we would be better off without the “peculiar institution”[184] (of morality systems) and opposes Wilson’s claim that moral education is an indispensable necessity in education.[185] Haydon argues that morality in education should only be pursued by taking the social conception of morality in a narrow sense. That is to say that morality as a social institution, as a public morality of action, “can be publicly acknowledged and shared, and thus can have in the public realm a life of its own apart form underlying “states of the soul” which may or may not be shared.”[186] Society has an interest in taking morality seriously and as an attempt to live by publicly agreed upon norms of actions. In cosmopolitan education it would not be enough that the norms are there to be followed, but that the individuals are disposed to enacting them. Acting is the key. Such a position echoes Williams’ claim that ethical values lie in dispositions, and “the replication of ethical life lies in the replication of dispositions.”[187] The connection between moral education, cosmopolitan education, and the

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[183] Lawrence Kohlberg in Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* Translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), 39.

[184] See Williams, “Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.”

[185] See Graham Haydon, “John Wilson and the Place of Morality in Education,” *Journal of Moral Education* 29, no. 3 (September 2000).

[186] Haydon, “John Wilson and the Place of Morality in Education,” 363.

[187] Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 75.

development of dispositions takes place, or 'replicates,' in education in morality.[188]

Additional problems for morals education arise as a result of the diversity of moral life in families, which requires a very careful balance between honoring family rights to their own morals education and "the right of schools to teach the "shared" values of the broader society…and the right of children to develop into autonomous moral agents."[189] This forces open the question of which morals to teach, which recognizes the complexity of morality rather than blindly establishing a simplified version. Typical approaches in morals education tend to oversimplify by using binary analytic schemes to what are complicated and complex issues. Sanger and Osguthorpe argue for "the development of theoretical tools for understanding" the field of moral education "by more systematically, comprehensively and explicitly identifying the variety of assumptions" made by most approaches to morals education.[190] Critically understanding any approach to morals education requires understanding its constitutive parts and that which determines them. This requires a critical analysis of the assumptions behind our choices of morals education methods and the morality systems they represent.

The problem with morals education might simply be that it cannot achieve its goal while embedded in education; it might just be that morals education is not good enough because education is not moral enough.[191] The claim is based on the idea that morals education should

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[188] I concede that this 'education' may take place formally or informally; schooling is not a necessary condition for it. However, in the context of this dissertation, education through schooling or by an individual who is conscious of his/her educative efforts will suffice. Thus, the *intention* to educate is the important factor.

[189] J. Mark Halstead, "Moral Education in Family Life: The Effects of Diversity," *Journal of Moral Education* 28, no. 3 (September 1999), 267.

[190] See Sanger and Osguthorpe, "Making Sense," 58. This is an issue that speaks directly to both Williams' criticisms of morality systems and the assumptions they contain and the role that cosmopolitan education can play in developing and being the "theoretical tools for understanding" desired by Sanger and Osguthorpe.

[191] See Adam Niemczynski, "Moral Education is Not Good Enough Because Education is Not Moral Enough," *Journal of Moral Education* 25, no. 1 (1996).

not aim to form individuals in the manner and desires of a particular church, state, or system, but rather to create moral individuals. Nonetheless, one must still have an idea of what a moral individual looks like or what traits and dispositions she possesses, and what behaviors are expected. Doing so requires a "compassionate balancing of the perspectives of all participating parties…each party being responsible for the good of each other party"[192] which contains elements of universalism, diversity, agonism, and dialogue found in the themes in cosmopolitan education.

The balancing act required connects cosmopolitan education and morality education with Mesa's exploration of what he calls the Creative Tensions Account (CTA) which provokes a creative resolution of the core tensions between the individual and the community, what he terms "the modern predicament."[193] Mesa's CTA is designed to inhabit the space of conflict between the individual and community, but not to see this space as static. It is a dynamic tension wherein significant movement, contextually based, is not only allowed, but also seemingly required. The primacy of contextualization is similar to Thomas Bender's account of the historical struggle between the individual and the community, but one that has gone on for centuries while always managing a temporal solution. At one point Bender conjectures "how will people manage to live, simultaneously, in radically different social worlds: one communal, and the others associational, or perhaps even entirely abstract[?]"[194] My approach to education in morality will not be restricted to only this "modern predicament," but there is affinity with Mesa's approach to

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[192] Ibid., 112.

[193] Jose Alberto Mesa, "Reassessing Moral Education from the Perspective of the Predicament Between the Individual and the Community," (Teachers College, Columbia University, 2003), 1-2.

[194] Thomas Bender, *Community and Social Change in America*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978),

difference, agonism, and disposition formation encountered in both education in morality and cosmopolitan education. If an understanding of cosmopolitan education is to occur, and if my assertion that cosmopolitan education is education in morality is correct, then what is morality education? One is still left to begin where Wilson indicated: what are the first steps in morality?

4.2 Education in Morality

The first step Wilson suggests is that we understand moral education as *education in morality*. This rather simple formulation is extremely important. If Wilson had said “education in morals” then there would be nothing left to do but to pick the system or morals one prefers and then to indoctrinate the student. That is not to say that we begin from nothing; there is a ‘starting place.’ I recognize that we are socialized into forms of life from the time we are born. However, the ‘starting place’ must be only that and subject to critique and revision. Schooling can do both.[195] Morals are specific, discrete traits of behavior, action, or ways of thinking that one can acquire through certain specified processes. Morality, as distinct from ‘morals,’ is similar to other subjects we might teach in that it represents a form of life. For example, in science one educates, or initiates, students into using the ‘scientific method,’ which in turn teaches students how to think about scientific problems. One does not have ‘morality’ any more than one might have ‘science.’ Instead one might have acquired the appropriate tools and skills to conduct a moral inquiry much as one might be able to conduct a scientific experiment using the appropriate skills and methods as practiced by the scientific community. As Wilson states, “we do not (a) simply hand them ‘right answers’ on a plate, nor (b) suggest that there are no such things as right answers—that it is all ‘relative’ or ‘a matter of taste.”[196] In administering education in morality

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[195] John Dewey wrote at length about these dual roles of schooling. See Dewey, *Moral Principles of Education*, specifically Chapter 2, and Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, chapters 1 and 2.

[196] Wilson, “First Steps in Moral Education,” *Journal of Moral Education* 25, no. 1 (1996): 86.

one provides students with the means to conduct their inquiry with the best available tools, tools that help them participate in morality by inquiring into it and what morals there might be.

This 'equipping,' of course, contrasts sharply with morals education, in which one starts from a point of 'right answers' and then sets about getting the students to 'learn' or adopt them. An education based upon receiving and adopting pre-determined morals within a closed and bounded system of morality does not actually educate one in morality and only equips those instructed with the skill to adopt a morality system that is provided for them. In fact it is this characterization of morals and transmission of morality that has been criticized by both Nietzsche and Arendt, the latter of whom found that such an approach reduces morals to simply 'values' that are "as easily interchanged as money."[197]

Wilson sees great value in scrutinizing the crucial terms in this field. For Wilson, 'moral' is a descriptive term that classifies an action as either 'moral' or 'not moral,' and has different criteria for use. He identifies two general types: one 'sociological,' and the other 'logical.' The 'sociological' sense of 'moral' describes what various groups determine to be 'moral' or 'not moral'; right or wrong. These are primarily concerned with *mores* and such use provokes judgments such as 'that is wrong to do' or 'that is a moral action.' However, the invocation of 'moral' sentiment or judgment may only be applicable in one social group and not in another. 'Moral' in this context refers to a custom or norm that is bounded and defined differently by different groups. It is this form of 'moral' that often provokes an authoritarian 'we are right and everyone else is wrong' stance about morals, or a less certain, but certainly more confusing, 'all things moral are relative to one's specific group' attitude. Additionally, this use of 'moral' fits

[197] Suzanne Duvall Jacobitti, "The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah Arendt and Political Morality," *International Political Science Review* 12, no. 4 (1991): 283. In both *Eichmann in Jerusalem* and *Responsibility and Judgment*, Arendt discusses at length the issue of such easy adoption of 'new' moral systems.

with the conception of empirical morality as described in Chapter 3.

In the 'logical' form one speaks of the different uses of 'moral' or the different actions that make up the content of what is considered moral. There is a concept in which something is judged to be 'moral' or not, and then there is a concept in which one thinks about all of the various kinds of moral systems and moral judgments that are made from one group to another as well as what it might be that the word 'moral' signifies. "The chief difficulty…is the assumption that 'morality' must have a particular *content*."[198] This 'logical' form is not interested in the *content* of the moral judgment or code of mores, but of what all of this activity consists. It "mark[s] out a particular kind of human thought and action," and is logical and conceptual rather than particularly specific about what *is* moral or not.[199] It is this second, 'logical,' sense of moral that constitutes thinking about or inquiry into morality, and informs what 'morality' means for this project. Additionally, it is this kind of 'moral' that best combines with the conception of methodological morality as described in the previous chapter.

Dewey has a similar, though not identical, dichotomous construction that might be helpful. For Dewey, there is a distinction between teaching "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality." The former was primarily the result of direct instruction with the intention to bring about specific actions, and is similar to Wilson's conception of received or traditional morals education. The latter involves the discussion of ideas about morality that were indifferent or non-moral and were not intended to bring about moral actions, but rather an understanding of what morality is. Teaching 'moral ideas' and primarily through direct instruction "even at its very

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[198] John Wilson, *The Assessment of Morality*, (Rochester: NFER Publishing Company, Ltd., 1973) (emphasis in original).

[199] Ibid., 6.

best, is *comparatively* small in amount and slight in influence."[200] For both Wilson and Dewey the specific moral details are not important, nor useful or effective. Instead the emphasis is on the understanding that one has about morality and its connections to both one's thoughts and actions in social life. The content of an education in morality is one's life experiences, not specific morals.

Conceived thus, 'morality' is not the same as 'virtue' or 'moral.' The question 'What is morality?' is a very different question than 'What is virtuous?' or 'What is moral?' Socrates may have searched in vain for a satisfactory answer to his question about virtue, but our question about morality is easier. For instance, asking the questions 'What is science?' or 'What is literary criticism?' is very much like our question 'What is morality' and differ only in subject. Science is identified by specific methodologies, tools, and domain of inquiry, as is literary criticism. Education in morality can be identified similarly, but it takes some effort. We must shed from morality the detritus of doctrine and dogma it has acquired and strip it down to its most essential components: its specific mode and domain of inquiry.

In thinking of morality as one might about science, the content-free conception commits one to neither absolute authoritarian dogmatism nor wide open relativism. In science, there may be currently accepted 'facts,' but due largely to the derivation of them from the tools and methodologies appropriate to scientific inquiry. To work on a scientific problem is to use the tools and methodologies developed, but also "to acknolwedge the possibility of error, to be eager to scrutinize the evidence, [and] engage in critical discussion."[201] These conclusions are not delivered as the immutably correct answers, but rather as 'provisional.' Both of the morality-as-

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[200] John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1909), 4.

[201] Samuel M. Natale and John B. Wilson, *Central Issues in Moral and Ethical Education*, Vol, 2, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 45.

content options focus on the 'right answers,' the one professing to have them and the other denying that there can be any. Both miss the important work of what morality education is. As Wilson states, the respecability of science and other fields "is not that we can feel incorrigibly certain of particular answers—on the contrary, we cannot— but that we can feel resonably certain of the procedures."[202] The conceptual confusion about morality in the field of moral education, a confusion that is often elided, is the result of our not having made clear what these concepts and procedures are. "Until we are clear about these criteria, we cannot start educating at all…[these] first steps are philosophical."[203]

In an explicit response to his own analysis, Wilson has developed a list of "moral components" that a teacher could use in an eduation in morality. Originally consisting of five general areas, these components have grown to four general areas with a total of seventeen components, due to the subdivision of some of the original ideas. These four general components are: PHIL–the degree to which one can identify with other people; EMP–insight into one's own and other people's feelings; GIG–the mastery of factual knowledge; KRAT–the ability to translate these principles into action.[204] Two of his original components—DIK and PHRON which refer to the rational formulation of a set of rules or moral principles to which one commits oneself, relating to other people's and one's own interests—have been removed from the general categories and are now subsumed within these four. For example, "the degree to which one can identify with other people" is a general description of the PHIL category, but the specific capacity of "having the concept of a 'person'" is identified as PHIL(HC), which is different from

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[202] Ibid., 46.

[203] Wilson, "First Steps," 86.

[204] Roger Straughan, "Revisiting Wilson's Moral Components," *Journal of Moral Education* 29, no. 3 (September 2000): 367.

"claiming to use this concept in an overriding, prescriptive, and universalized (O, P and U) principle," identified by Wilson as PHIL(RSF)(DO and PO).[205]

Wilson's components have had a tepid reception from researchers, most likely because it may not always be obvious what the components are supposed to identify, be it moral behavior or moral decision-making, among others reasons.[206] Wilson's components do, however, give name and form to areas of specific inquiry, something that should not be out of line for a domain of inquiry as conceived by Wilson. For example, what does it mean for moral relations for an individual to have developed an ability to understand what another person thinks or feels? This is a question one can attempt to answer—which can be done without saying that one *must* develop such a skill—that might shed light on what morality is. This view of morality is the result of our social realities and conditions, and one of those realities is that there appears to be something valuable to human flourishing when we understand what another person thinks or feels. Getting to the heart of why that might be is the goal of an education in morality.

Though I introduce these components here, I do so only to provide an illustration of one possible conception of specific procedural components that could be utilized in education in morality. These components could be included in a cosmopolitan morality education, but I do not claim that they *ought* to be included. It is not my present purpose to prescribe what exactly a 'moral component' is; at most one might offer possibilities as Wilson does, and further, the inquiry into them and their efficacy would itself be an important way to participate in morality. However, saying 'these are the components' puts me directly in the path of my own critique of morals education. It is enough for me that these components are not at odds with the essence of

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[205] John Wilson, *A New Introduction to Moral Education*, (London: Cassell Educational Limited, 1990), 130-131.

[206] Straughan, "Revisiting Wilson's Moral Components," 367-370.

the processes described in the previous chapter and to be described in the chapters that follow, and thus serve as examples both of what I accept about Wilson's understanding of education in morality as well as possible concrete steps toward pedagogical content. Further, Wilson's emphasis on *reason* (i.e. the capacity for rational, logical thought) is not to be mistaken with my emphasis on *reasons*, which are merely the products of the ability to provide publicly justifiable and defensible evidence and arguments.

That there has been significant resistance to this step which Wilson suggests independent of his answer to it through his moral components might be due to either the authoritarian desire to indoctrinate or 'sell' a particular moral content or the relativistic aversion to any prescription or answer to moral questions.[207] Most of these arguments are, Wilson claims, rooted in psychological issues of comfort, fear, and familiarity that manifest themselves in a reflexive 'need' for an 'authority' upon which moral claims can then be founded. Wilson has consistently reminded the field of moral education of:

> …the importance for research and teaching in moral education to be conducted in the light of, and governed by, a clear account of "the moral" and of the morally educated person, the need to introduce students to the "form" of morality rather than to any particular substantive content, and the vital importance of securing a coherent overall approach to the area.[208]

To educate requires a "change in the direction of reason,…in which the main weight is placed upon the basic criteria of reason and not on any specific content."[209] Ultimately, what we decide

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[207] See Wilson, *A New Introduction to Moral Education*; as well as Natale and Wilson, *Central Issues in Moral Education*. Arendt, too, notes the psychological effects of the loss of authoritative certainty in the truth of things that led/leads to an overwhelming desire (Wilson would say 'neurosis') to find stability in certainty through the objectivity of the sciences. See Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 277-278.

[208] Terence McLaughlin and J. Mark Halstead, "John Wilson on Moral Education," *Journal of Moral Education* 29, no. 3 (September 2000): 247.

[209] Wilson, "First Steps," 86.

we ought to do comes down to the "key feature of moral thinking—that is, what counts as a good reason. We can teach this to our pupils."[210] Going back to science, students are not initiated into accepting as fixed the conclusions derived from Newtonian physics, but rather that in Newtonian physics there are certain foundational theories, formulas, and expectations of how to go about 'proving' (justifying) the conclusions of their experiments and measurements; in particle physics there are others. But in both the basic tools of inquiry are the same.[211] Other reservations toward Wilson's conception might be due to the perception that it is too scientific, too based in logic and rationality. Such criticism is valid, to a point, and that point is the place at which rational moral thought becomes one mode among many in discerning morality and the obligations it contains, which is what a broader, more inclusive education in morality such as would be found in cosmopolitan education.

Wilson is not alone in questioning the 'morality' of morals education, and in particular its pre-determination of morals. David Carr criticizes developmental models of morals education or moral formation, alleging that such models that trace or follow moral growth across stages of cognitive, conative and/or affective growth, are inherently normative, and therefore evaluative rather than descriptive.[212] Nonetheless, he also believes that there is no reason for these moral norms to be empirically based since they merely state how one ought to act as opposed to how one does act. Further, these developmental models persist despite the lack of mutual consistency from one model to the other, thus the efficacy of these models remains unclear.[213] Simply put, to

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[210] Ibid.

[211] This is not to suggest that the sciences do not have their dogmatic adherents, but rather that the methods and tools used in science are that which form the activities of science education and forms of life for scientists.

[212] Such as those found in Rousseau, Piaget, and Kohlberg. See Carr, "Perils of Developmentalism."

[213] Carr, "Perils of Developmentalism," 5.

say that we ought (prescriptive) to do something does not require proof that people actually do that something. However, to say what we actually do (descriptive) does require empirical proof. Herein lies the quandary for morals education based on psychology and developmental models; they are rooted in empirical inquiry, and can therefore make no prescriptions except those that have predetermined ends.

Straughan notes that despite the volume and insightfulness of Wilson's work that questions the foundations of the field of moral education, his work not been as influential as one might expect.[214] First, because Wilson was more interested in what morality 'means,' he refused to approach his questions from within existing theories and methodologies, and thus his work has been isolated outside the prevailing debates that have taken place *between* and *among* theoretical perspectives and morality systems. Secondly, as suggested by Straughan, Wilson's 'list' of moral components might be either too complex or not prescriptive enough for teachers.[215] On the one hand teachers complain that they do not have the time to develop curriculum from Wilson's work, and on the other hand teachers are becoming accustomed to being told what to teach, and Wilson resists the temptation to do so, though his components are a step in that direction. Additionally, many teachers simply may not possess the professional (teaching) knowledge about moral education even thought they might be sufficiently interested and motivated to teach it. These observations are important cautions for this project, especially given the extra-systems approach that will be offered and the lack of prescription to be issued.

To move beyond these "first steps" requires that we continue to be clear about what

[214] See Straughan, "Revisiting Wilson's Moral Components."

[215] See both Wilson, *A New Introduction to Moral Education* and Wilson, *The Assessment of Morality* for detailed definitions of the moral components. The latter book, in particular, contains specific strategies for assessing the presence of the components in students. For Straughan's suspicions, see Straughan, "Revisiting Wilson's Moral Components."

morality is and what we are doing in our attempts to find out. Since we, as humans, possess "certain concepts, certain interests, and therefore certain roughly demarcated fields of enquiry which necessitate certain rules of procedure,"[216] and we have successfully done this in other fields, we should be able to do this in morality, and particularly in education in morality. We need not have all the right answers, but we do need to think that we can find them. Any hope for progress in morality education relies on our ability to be clear about morality and sort out what our concepts mean and, for Wilson, what our criteria are for assessing the basics of human action in morality. Education in morality becomes progressive because it is educative, and it builds upon what we know in order to learn more. To do this, we need to know what it is that counts as morality in action. That is not to say only the manifest content of moral actions, but rather what it is that humans do, the processes in which they participate, when they participate in actions that are constitutive of morality.

Education itself, then, not ideology and neither authoritative nor relativistic desires, forms the basis of education in morality; not pre-existing morals or those received from some blindly accepted 'authority.' Education involves the pursuit of learning about the world as truthfully and honestly as possible with what skill, resources, and expertise one can bring to bear, and education in morality requires the application of the same to an inquiry in morality. In deciding the approach to education in morality, one asks "'What rules will best help our pupils to *learn* more?' not 'What rules best instantiate or promote our particular ideological (moral, religious, political) values?'"[217] The goal in education in morality must be similar to the general goal of education: to provide students skills and tools that initiate them into a form of life that is

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[216] Natale and Wilson, *Central Issues in Moral and Ethical Education*, 48.

[217] Wilson, *A New Introduction to Moral Education*, 72.

educative and one that allows them to grow, adapt, and learn more—in the various and intended fields of inquiry—over time. Wilson's aims, however, necessarily lead us to ask, what procedures will best help our pupils to participate more in the practice and emergence of morality?

Education in morality must involve the transmission of a way of life that equips students with the tools to make reasoned, thoughtful judgments. It must equip them with the skills to reflect upon their actions even when such actions were not the result of reasoned and thoughtful judgments. It must be an education in a form of life that entails procedures and activities that allow one to make distinctions and determinations about those things which are included in its domain. Neuroscientists do not do work on plant fibers, and for good and obvious reasons; such activity lies outside of their expertise as well as their professional and practical domain. The domain of morality consists of the ways that human beings regard and treat one another, which is another way of saying how we live with each other. The social realities of human life and the inherent sociability of morality require that neither the inquiry nor the judgments that result take place completely and soley in some kind of individualized vacuum; it must take place 'in the world.' This is an admittedly large domain, but its size does not make us less responsible for the task. Nor can such an education take place without some kind of knowledge about what kind of judgments have been made or are currently in a place of guidance. Education in morality requires that we not be immutably restricted to the dictates or beliefs of any religious, moral, or poitical ideology, "but by the notion of education itself."[218] And therein lies the key point of separation of education in morality from morals education. It cannot be education worthy of the name if it is designed to restrict or inhibit the growth or limit the possibilities of the student. Pre-determined,

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[218] Ibid.

fixed morals presented for compulsory adoption cannot be genuinely educational, nor can a mere survey of differently held notions of morality and morals. Without inquiry, without the use, practice, and implmentation of the tools of inquiry into the the foundations of what morality is and means, no student can 'learn' or be educated in morality.

However, all of this presupposes a belief in or desire for the 'new' or to admit the permissible possibility of it. To promote an inquiry that is an education in morality means that there is more to morality than we currently know or understand. This not to say that there is some final morality that is yet to be discovered, but rather that humanity has not yet finished with morality. As long as there is genuine inquiry and conceptual clarification, there exists the possibility for morality to be more than it currently is. In Chapter 3 I gave an example of ethical progress that is quasi-evolutionary; it grows, it regresses, and is in constant flux. Each generation or set of 'deliberators' has at their disposal the opportunity to reflect and revise the ethical codes they have inherited, and seemingly without fail, they do just that. Certainly there are pieces that seem to never go away (i.e. judgments about murder), and yet the ceaseless revision suggests an ethical rebirth and compulsion for the exploration of possibilities that underpin both education and morality in a way that binds them together through an almost identical philosophical understanding and urge.

4.3 Education in Natality

For many people who are committed to the field of moral education their general goal is to teach young persons how to treat others morally and how to be moral persons in the world. One of the appeals of traditional morals education in which students are compelled to accept and adopt predetermined morals is the perceived increased probability that such morals, and their attendant behaviors, will be adopted and manifested by students thusly taught. Traditional morals

education provides a certain level of comfort and less unease with the future. There is a belief that telling students what, specifically, the morally correct thing to do in all given situations will at least point them in the appropriate direction and make it *more likely* that they will do so, and thus provide comfort or the illusion of certainty about possible preferred outcomes. This is precisely one of the problems to which Wilson alludes in his critique of traditional received morals indoctrination, but I find that it speaks to the broader compulsion, or perhaps 'neurosis' as Wilson might call it, to attempt to eliminate uncertainty and struggle against the breakdown of comforting and familiar norms and ways of living. Closed, fixed systems that dictate what is 'right' and what is 'wrong' provide an illusion of stability and predictability in a world that is wildly uncertain and constantly changing.

To come to grips with this problem and its relationship to an education in morality, Arendt's notion of *natality* in education is useful. Arendt's approach to natality, as well as other fundamental conditions of human life such as plurality, labor, work, and action, is highly abstract and comes from her belief in the fundamental equality of all humans.[219] Natality, in direct contrast to mortality, is the condition which grounds our ability to insert ourselves in and become part of the world.[220] Arendt's conception of the 'world' underwent a transformation after she wrote *The Human Condition*, in which she conceived of the world primarily as the space of politics. As she stated in an interview in 1964 with Günther Gaus, "I comprehend it now in a much larger sense, as the space in which things become public, as the space in which one lives and which must look presentable." I see this public space as commensurate with the one in which

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[219] Dana R. Villa, *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt Online*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 80-81.

[220] Hannah Arendt, "'What Remains? The Language Remains': A Conversation with Günther Gaus" in *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, trans. Peter Baehr, (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 19.

moral speech actions are disclosed. We are all born into the world; an involuntary act on our part, and for most of the early parts of our lives our natality is dormant or unexercised. Once in the world, in this space in which things become public, Arendt says that at some point we have a "second birth" as a result of our saying 'yes' or 'no' to something.[221] We begin to understand that we can *act* in the world, and our yes/no decision is a form of communication to the world. It is, in a sense, our first 'speech act.' I will discuss Arendt's conception of *action* in more detail in Chapter 6, but it is the connection between natality and action that exposes the communicative nature of natality and thus its place in politics and morality, as well as an education in morality.

For Arendt, natality is the very essence of education because of "the fact that human beings are *born* into the world"[222] and each person born represents unknown actions and possibilities, finite in person but infinite across humanity as actions and possibilities stretch into the future. This natality unleashes an incalculable unpredictability in the world, and in human action it opens up a range of possibilities that cannot be enumerated, and in morality, outcomes that cannot be prefixed. In contrast to attempts to curtail the possibility of education through fear of the unknown, Arendt sees education as a fundamental necessity of human society because such society constantly "renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new human beings."[223]

> With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before. It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have

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[221] Villa, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 189.

[222] Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education" In *Between the Past and Future*, 173-196, (New York: The Penguin Group, 1961), 174 (emphasis in original).

[223] Ibid., 187.

happened before.[224]

Education is a process in which 'beginners' are also 'beginnings' and with each unique origination of action brings something new into the world.[225] Such action as beginning presents the potential to express the human condition of natality, and the human condition of plurality, a plurality that cannot be eliminated nor constrained, through the bringing forth (or 'birthing') of the new. It is this condition that education is to preserve, but it cannot do so if we get in our own way.

In "The Crisis of Education" Arendt identifies three "assumptions"[226] that prevent education from accomplishing this task. The first is the mistaken belief that children ought to be allowed to exist in a 'children's world,' free from the authority of adults. This leaves them subject to a tyranny of the majority that is far worse than any autocracy of an individual adult: the tyranny of other children. Adults are left to merely encourage the child to do as she desires whilst preventing serious harm. This relationship is constructed in defiance of the actual relationship between child and adult in the world, in which a genuine relationship of adult to child, or authority to subject, exists, and instead children are banished from the world of adults from which they could otherwise learn. The second assumption is that teachers ought simply to be teachers, independent of content. This does not mean there is no content and only methods, but rather that the teacher is to become a mere technocrat with little or no expertise in his/her subject area. The role of the teacher is to merely guide or instruct, not to know or dispense. Essentially the only expertise a teacher would have is in pedagogy or methods. This leads to the

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[224] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 177-178.

[225] Ibid., 177.

[226] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 180-184.

third assumption that one can only learn and understand what one has done oneself. This assumption is easily derived from the previous; if the teacher is not a master of the subject then s/he can clearly pass nothing on to the student, but should instead be guided and driven by the student's interest in play rather than work.

Arendt asserts that the last assumption's over-emphasis on child-centered learning and the de-emphasis of the adult-teacher's authority and expertise forces children into a world of only children which prohibits children from having contact with the adult world they will inherit and thus leave them unprepared for it. This situation is somewhat similar to that of a position of relativism in which there is no compass to guide them and they are left to whatever forces assert themselves (i.e. tyranny or popular culture). When at home, they are under the authority of their parents through the private life of the family, which protects the child from the world (and the world from the child). This domestic protection is necessary but cannot alone suffice to adequately instruct the child in and about the world since, the child having been removed from the world and under the dictates of the parents, this protection lacks the necessary freedom to learn and is supplanted instead only by the compulsion to learn from the unquestioned authority of the parents. This situation is akin to that of the student who receives a traditional education of direct, received moral instruction. Without 'world' contact the child will know nothing of the world he will inherit, and therefore have no understanding or capacity to engage it intelligently.[227] Arendt feels that teachers are responsible for the continuance of the child and the continuance of the world. They must occupy both of these worlds at once and serve as the bridge between them: the one that is and the preparation of the persons for the world that will become.

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[227] I admit that it may be possible, to an extent, to indoctrinate so completely that the indoctrinated might be 'inoculated' adequately enough to prevent an 'intrusion' or corruption of the child by the world, but this would require an almost permanent removal from the world; not physically, but politically. One so inoculated would never engage in a true interaction with another and so never really 'be' in the world.

It is at this juncture that Arendt's conservatism plays a role.

For Arendt, the whole of education is a conservative venture. Its task is to protect "the child against the world, the world against the child, the new against the old, the old against the new."[228] Far from being only a backward looking conservatism, the most important part of this protection requires the protection of the natality inherent in human life, in beginnings and becomings, in the capacity for unique persons to disclose unique selves in an old, existing world in which the very action of disclosure changes the world and brings forth something new. Arendt makes the distinction between conservation in education and conservation in politics; its action in the latter is to only preserve the world as it is, destroying or rebuffing natality. If the world is to survive, humans must endeavor to alter or create what is new and not only preserve what is old. The conservation that education involves is to preserve natality, the capacity for human creativity in forms of life. Education means introducing students to the adult world they will one day be in position to alter. It involves protecting them from that world and concurrently preventing the students from hiding or burying their creative capacities that will allow them to act in it. As teachers who simultaneously live and act in the world, we educate students to be beginners and conservators in their own right to reflect their own natality.

Arendt writes that we "are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is the basic human situation."[229] Everything is temporary, from our governing institutions to our own personal understandings and beliefs. Education's goal is to ensure the

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[228] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 192. Many authors have written about Arendt's educational 'conservatism,' but have fallen pray to an equivocation with the political notions of conservation. Additionally, there is a common misreading or perhaps selectivity, that omits the clear intention of Arendt in 'conservation' that aims to protect all of the inherent qualities extant in the students (their natality and uniqueness), the teachers (their own natality and desire to convey an understanding of an old world to new inhabitants that will alter that world and make it their own), and the world (apprising children of the 'old world' without allowing the old to subjugate the natality of the 'new' in the students/children).

[229] Ibid.

conditions under which the world might be 'set aright' without guaranteeing that such 'aright-ing' will occur. "It is the task of the educator to mediate between the old and the new,"[230] and a challenge is to maintain authority in education while moving through a world without structural authority nor binding tradition. It is an odd place and no small challenge for the teacher-adult, "to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world,"[231] a world that will quite likely not be lived in by the one who has educated someone else for it.

4.4 Natality and Morality

Thusly conceived, the paradigm that pits conservative education against progressive education cannot continue to stand. Conservation is *required* for progression. To possess a notion of progress implies the concurrent awareness of something extant and something that is not; something that can be improved upon by something else that is not yet. Progress builds on what is there, sifting and choosing from the existing world that which can aid the move to make what is there 'better.' One does not need to know where one is going, or to have a predetermined object, in order to determine that one thing can be better than another. Arendt's conservation preserves the conditions under which such progress lies in potentiality, lying in wait for the appropriate action upon the existing conditions.

Despite the logic of this conception of education, as preservative and progressive, it is resisted primarily because of the destabilizing nature of natality, and especially so in morality. Natality is inherently destructive to stability and predictability. When Arendt's nascent 'actor' utters his first 'no' he has halted the movement of the previously existing action—or at least its movement in his sphere of the world. The 'no' is a declaration of an insertion in the world, and

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[230] Ibid., 194.

[231] Ibid., 196.

the insertion itself is unpredictable, as are the consequences that follow. As genuine speech or communicative action, the 'no' implicitly contains an alternate vision of what ought to be done in opposition to what *is* or has been previously proposed and carries with it an implicit conception, as perceived by the 'speech actor,' of something that is 'better' or something that can improve the current state of affairs.[232] Natality brings forth the possibility of progress, and that possibility requires the paradoxical protection of conservation.

But can this be done in the face of what Natasha Levinson calls the "paradox of natality"?[233] A complicating feature of natality is that each of us is attempting to bring something new into the world while others do the same. Each of our 'beginnings' bumps up against the 'beginnings' of others so that "our efforts to initiate the new take place always in the midst of other acting beings whose very presence mitigates against our actions coming to fruition."[234] This milieu of natality is constitutive of Arendt's condition of plurality, though it by no means determines the actuality of pluralism. Natality is a precondition of action, but action may or may not take place. A person can go through the day without 'acting,' and it is in this possibility of inaction that the importance of educations emerges. Education must foster and promote the conditions of natality, but in doing so it also fosters frustration: the inevitable recognition that one's actions have been mitigated by the actions of others. Arendt identified this frustration as a cause of human inaction, of the tendency for humans to relieve themselves of the frustrating effects of other actions and actors and the disappointment with the unpredictability of the results of action.

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[232] It is quite possible that the insertion might not be 'genuine' and merely obfuscating for the sake of obfuscation, but such insertion would not meet Arendt's standard of 'action.'

[233] Natasha Levinson, "The Paradox of Natality" in *Hannah Arendt on Education: Renewing our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 11-36, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 2001), 13.

[234] Levinson, "The Paradox of Natality," 14.

Here we see how Arendt's thoughts connect to education in morality and cosmopolitan education: the plurality that obtains from the successful efforts of the teacher to preserve, promote, and foster the condition of natality is the condition that defines the challenge of natality in action, but also demands the facilitating process of morality. By 'mid-wifing' natality into action the teacher creates conditions of plurality under which students must find their way. Doing so puts students into each other's 'beginnings' and forces open questions of morality as they attempt to act and re-act to and with each other. Natality is actualized in an explosion of action and social activity, all of which is unpredictable and unstable, and is particularly dangerous to the status quo. Received morals are thus under threat of assault or even irrelevance, but the real danger arises from total resistance to those potential threats: this danger arises "out of the desire to find results that would make further thinking unnecessary."[235] Arendt focuses on the use of politics to govern the association of people in this chaotic milieu of action, but it also contains the emergence of an agonistic morality that gestures toward the political in a demand for processes qualified to operate in morality; both our shared sameness in the human condition of natality and our differentiating uniqueness in the human condition of plurality combine to compel inquiry, analysis, deliberation, and judgment from us in order to 'get on' with each other.

Arendt's conception of the role of natality and its reconfiguration of education in morality stands alongside cosmopolitan education in attempting to maintain a "receptivity to the new *and* loyalty to the known."[236] Both Arendt's teacher and my cosmopolitan must stand in two worlds, one that is in danger of dying and changing and one that is emerging and unknown: one that has the illusion and comfort of certainty and one that is unpredictable and unsettling. Such

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[235] Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 176.

[236] Hansen, "View from the Ground," 23 (emphasis in original).

an individual must be conditionally satisfied with the knowledge of what she knows and be eager to engage with that which is yet to come. Further, she must be prepared to join others "in assuming the effort of persuasion and running the risk of failure" rather than relying upon "dictatorial intervention, based on the absolute superiority of the adult, and the attempt to produce the new as a *fait accompli*."[237] The teacher is essentially a midwife, using the ways from the old and existing world to facilitate the 'birth' of something new and unpredictably indeterminate, while also purging the unexamined opinions and assumptions that prevent new thoughts, new actions, and new becomings that arrest the inherent natality of education.[238] The 'new' here is not only that of unique events or widely influential actions, but may also include the "quotidian but nonetheless surprising moments in which individuals initiate relationships and thereby attempt to forge new social realities."[239] In maintaining natality and involving oneself in the development of and participation in an education in morality, one engages with and meets other people at the cusp of constructing new social relations and realities with them. The combustible aspects of the competing actions play out socially among the actors and the beginners, all of which requires the maintenance of the space to act. Violent reactions to actions have a chilling effect on further action and thus the maintenance of this political space compels governance. Governance of the political space is a result then of an answer to the question *How shall we act together?* For Arendt, acting *is* living, and thus the question invokes morality by asking *How shall we live together?*

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[237] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 176. In such cases the new is not new, but rather prefigured.

[238] Hannah Arendt, "Tradition and the Modern Age" in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought*, 17-40, (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1961); and Hannah Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture," *Social Research* 38, no, 3 (July 15, 1971). The 'midwife' metaphor is another recurring theme in Arendt's exploration of Greek life and of the Socratic dialogues.

[239] Levinson, "The Paradox of Natality," 17.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided terms and distinctions between morals education and education in morality. Morals education attempts to educate for specific morals and fixed outcomes, while education in morality takes as its content the examination of morality itself. Education in morality keeps its focus first, on education as a growing, progressive activity, and second, on morality as a form of life (skills, tools, methodologies) with a specific domain, in which the education aims to initiate the students. In support of this conception of education in morality I examined Arendt's natality in education, a conception which provides the catalyst for growth, discovery, and a tradition-trumping newness, which acts as a stepping-stone to speech action, public action, and pluralism to be taken up in Chapter 6, and to the progressivity of the mediating processes of the plurality of natality and action.

In order to properly educate in morality and to show that cosmopolitan education does this, we must understand the processes by which this education in morality exists. Humans possess a concept of morality primarily because of other humans. "[M]en, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world"[240] and practical requirements of living force us to engage in the considerations and deliberations about what their presence means to and demands of us, individually and collectively. From the fact of shared humanity and its obligation toward democratic inclusion, to Arendt's acknowledgement of the necessity for "assuming the effort of persuasion"[241] which might fail, and the "task of renewing a *common* world,"[242] we arrive at a critical juncture in the formation of cosmopolitan moral education: getting from 'here to there'

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[240] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 7.

[241] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 176.

[242] Ibid., 196. Emphasis mine.

with other people. How can we actually live (action and preserved natality) together? Arendt's natality both exemplifies our shared humanity and provokes the necessity for morality to make possible the mediation of infinite 'beginnings' and the preservation of the conditions of natality. Education in morality requires the collaboration and participation by oneself with other people, which creates complexity, unpredictability, and compounded uncertainty. You are here, and I am here, so now what? Our utterances of what should be, how things should go, and what each of us should do in relation to each other are moral utterances by the very fact that they are intended to govern our (yours and others) behavior and actions. The sociability of these facts forces us into considering morality as social, not isolated, beings. But how? How are we to go about this task of education in morality with others, preserving the natality of each, while fomenting a community of collaborative action? How can we begin to stand on the ground of shared humanity, preserve democratic inclusion, and continue to live with each other amidst all of this turmoil, all the while sharing in morality?

Chapter 5

Epistemological Restraint, Discourse Ethics, and Agonistic Pluralism

The previous chapter provided a conception of education that exists as an inquiry in morality that preserves the capacity for natality and action present in each unique human person. That chapter was preceded by the description of a conception of cosmopolitan education that automatically entails a moral component. Taken together, cosmopolitan education stands as an education in morality that seeks to prepare students to become participants in an inquiry in morality that starts from shared humanity and actively maintains the potential for both understanding existing morality and the capacity to develop it further. The conception of cosmopolitan education offered suggests that we cannot reasonably deny the fact that we are all in the world together and cosmopolitanism understands this fact at its core. As a result, cosmopolitan education does not exist as a solution to all of the problems produced or encountered as a result of this fundamental sociability, but instead orients us to the fact so that we may do something about it. Kwame Anthony Appiah has said that "cosmopolitanism is the name not of the solution, but of the challenge"[243] that faces us, and I will now turn to the challenge of identifying the processes by and through which cosmopolitan education can work. This chapter will focus on processes that can maintain the key components of cosmopolitan moral education: the recognition of shared humanity and its subsequent entailments of living together, dynamic engagement, openness and receptivity, and never-ending processes. These processes involve (1) the prioritization of moral inquiry over moral belief and action without completely dismissing their potential contributions, (2) the necessity of inclusive and democratic

[243] Appiah, *Ethics in a World of Strangers*, xv.

dialogue, and (3) the acceptance and use of the inevitability of pluralism in moral inquiry.

Each of these processes possesses characteristics that can be found in non-cosmopolitan theories or activities that I will use as models for the processes cosmopolitan moral education could contain. First, I will mine the concept of epistemological restraint to address the prioritization of moral inquiry over moral belief and action. Second, I will show that discourse ethics provides support for addressing the necessity of inclusive and democratic dialogue, and then I will offer the concept of agonistic pluralism to offset the implications of the inevitability of pluralism in an inquiry in morality.

5.1 Inquiry Over Belief

In order to conduct a genuine cosmopolitan moral inquiry in which a critical examination of both existing and possible understandings of morality is undertaken, one must prioritize inquiry over belief. Cosmopolitan moral education is offered as a means to inquire into and about morality without indoctrination or the predetermination of morals, and as shown in §3.3 it must be oriented to a moral process rather than a particular moral result. Education in general, and particularly in schooling, is an ethical endeavor (insofar as a formal education system is a manifestation of how a society thinks its newest members should live), is filled with rules about how we should treat each other, and therefore embodies activity in morality whether explicit or not.[244] We need to find a sustainable position for educators that allows for a process that is not divorced from the community in which they teach, one that considers the personal values and morals of the teacher, the students, and the local community, but still makes room for negotiating different values and morals from well beyond the local borders and in particular, for those not

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[244] See Matthew G. Sanger, "Talking to Teachers and Looking at Practice in Understanding the Moral Dimensions of Teaching," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 33, no. 6 (2001); and Matthew N. Sanger, "What We Need to Prepare Teachers for the Moral Nature of Their Work," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 40, no. 2 (2008).

yet encountered. It must prepare them for future moral inquiry as the result of as-yet-encountered moral problems as well as those in the present.

The goal of cosmopolitan moral education is not epistemic, though a certain degree of epistemology factors into everything we do. It is not about whether or not what we believe to be moral actually is moral. Rather, the goal is to construct a process of inquiry in morality to determine how we can justify our claims of morality such that they can be entered into an inclusive and democratic discussion about morality. What justification might we have for the claims of morality we make and how can we make them in a moral inquiry? This concern is motivated by the diversity of asserted morals, some of it derived systemically, and some through individual experience. Some morals and morality systems conflict with other morals and other morality systems and cause paradoxes and confusion, problems we must confront and sort through. This project assumes that the truth-value of moral knowledge is impossible to determine with absolute certainty society- and worldwide, so we must find agreeable means of justification for the morals we assert and the inquiry we undertake. We must find a way in which we can approach or enter into moral inquiry that can help us reach some kind of agreement about what is counted as permissible justification. Given the process-centric version of cosmopolitanism offered, I will not (cannot) appeal to traditional moral educational theories because of either their pre-determined morals or their emphasis on the behavioral outcomes produced. However, such a constraint cannot be allowed to dismiss out of hand traditions or beliefs that one might choose to submit to deliberations. The 'products' of those traditions or beliefs may be put forward, but they must meet the justificatory standards of a socially mediated and inclusive process.

What is required of a person who holds a belief about morality, but inhabits a socio-political environment that may or may not share one's belief? How are we to be certain that

others are not merely parroting received or indoctrinated beliefs or that we are not subjecting others to ours? These questions suggest that in order to find justification for both our conclusions and our processes, we must be certain that our claim of justification meets some kind of criteria for legitimacy, and this claim must achieve some level of impartiality. Therefore, justification and impartiality must be found before we can justify the prioritization of inquiry over belief. In an example of a similar search for impartiality, in this case, for justice, Rawls erected what he called the 'veil of ignorance'[245] to create conditions under which he felt an impartiality about justice could be attained, and thus that which followed could be justified. Behind the 'veil of ignorance' one does not know what characteristics or advantages each person possesses. This compels each to think self-interestedly, but in an abstract way that includes an impersonal viewpoint while retaining the personal one. We want what is best for ourselves, but since we do not know what that would be because we do not know what our situation is, we must assume that we might be anywhere on a continuum such that we could be anyone else insofar as she sits at a place in the world that could be much worse than we would desire, and so we would choose goods, and a distribution of them, that would be equitable.

However, behind the 'veil,' each agent is not allowed to possess knowledge of the good and such knowledge is necessary to moral thought and action.[246] Rawls aims for justice via reasonable justification, but his veil allows for a liberal conception of the good to steer the 'deliberations' toward a conception that is highly individualistic. It reduces the good to that which can only be obtained by pursuing one's self-interest (granting certain conditions)[247] and

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[245] See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, particularly Chapter 3 for his description of the 'original position,' and section 24 for the 'veil of ignorance.'

[246] While I agree with Nagel that knowledge of the good is vital to moral action and thought, I do not think such *certain* knowledge is possible, and thus I am even more critical of Rawls' veil of ignorance as a result.

[247] Thomas Nagel, "Rawls on Justice" *The Philosophical Review* 82, no. 2 (1973).

systematically sets up the privileging of liberal conceptions of the good over other conceptions, thus negating attempts at impartiality through its own devices. Similar criticisms are leveled by feminists who identify the reinforcement of male-dominated theories of morality found in such liberal conceptions that may seem impartial, but the very assertion of impartiality in existing conditions allows for the maintenance of the status quo.[248] Further, applying Rawls's 'veil' to morality results in a utilitarian system whereby the good for all is determined by one's own self-interest, confined to an extension of a 'liberal' morality, and thus erasing an objective or impartial morality. Thus, neutrality can be a problem, particularly for liberals because they are so concerned about the neutrality of governing institutions in morality. To 'save' impartiality requires something other than principles; it requires processes that can be agreed upon by all even if the substantive determinations cannot. This is where the important moral framework for democratic deliberation lies; in the mutual, possibly universal, agreement of all appropriate, legitimate, and otherwise capable members that the fundamental value of deliberative democracy is in the processes by and through which it functions.

In order to achieve such a condition we need something else; a mechanism that can suspend prior judgments or beliefs that obscure impartiality in order to accommodate inquiry. The concept of "epistemological restraint" [249] allows one to hold beliefs that one feels it unreasonable to force on others through public policy *simply, or solely, based* on those beliefs. The beliefs that one might have are admissible in deliberations, but in the same way as any other reasons; they must be capable of being understood and accepted as reasons, and might be

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[248] See Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), particularly the Introduction "Woman as Other"; and Lorraine Code, *What Can She Know?* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), whose entire book deals with this issue.

[249] Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," *Philosophy* 16, no. 3 (1987): 229.

rejected or accepted as such. An individual would not offer his belief as the *sole* reason for enacting public policy or for the construction of moral norms, but rather attempt to offer reasons that everyone can understand and participate in. This does not mean that they are accepted, but only that they might be accepted *as reasons.*

There are two ways to approach epistemological restraint. In the first, one can admit a type of skepticism about knowledge of the world. It is possible to hold a position about which one has doubts, but also know, having done due diligence on alternatives, that it at least appears to be the best option. Similarly, it is also possible to hold a belief about which one may be certain, but feel uncertain about one's fallible capacities, and thus possess a reticence to enforce upon others policies based only on that belief.[250] In this view, epistemological restraint is guided by the idea that there are ideas about which it is impossible to determine the truth, and this skepticism should prevent us from forcing others to comply.[251] In the second, the desire for impartiality is motivated not by an internalized "skepticism about our *own* views, but rather by a desire to justify fundamental political principles to *others*."[252] Such a process is the result of a

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[250] This becomes much more difficult when dealing with those who believe their beliefs to be infallible such as those who believe God speaks directly to them. I am not sure what to do with them other than to invite them to join the deliberations. Here we might appeal to what is reasonable for them to expect others to accept as reasonable evidence, or, rather that which it is reasonable to reject, though we should not expect them to practice epistemological restraint. Rawls offers an argument that this is possible in a footnote to his discussion of 'reasonable rejection.' He cites the argument of Cardinal Bernadin, "The Consistent Ethics: What Sort of Framework?" *Origins* 16 (1086): 345, 347-350, wherein Bernadin "grants that not all moral imperatives are to be translated into prohibitive civil statutes." John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), liv.

[251] This skepticism would hold even in the case that I *know* X to be true, but have no way of overcoming reasonable disbelief that it is true.

[252] Jonathan Quong, "Political Liberalism Without Scepticism," *Ratio* 20, no. 3 (September 2007): 320. See also Terry L. Price, "Epistemological Restraint—Revisited," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 3 (September 2000). While this is an oft-used argument in favor of such restraint in liberalism, the adoption of such restraint does not necessarily commit one to liberal ideology. This is merely the case of commonality in an affect (impartiality) between liberalism and cosmopolitanism, but not evidence that they are one in the same or oriented to the same conclusion or ends.

desire to enter into "fair terms of cooperation" with others.[253] One engages in epistemological restraint not because one cannot be certain about the truth of a belief, but rather because adopting policies about which reasonable people disagree would be to base one's project upon something about which reasonable people reject:[254] skepticism about the ability to know what the good life is. Essentially, this second approach avoids skepticism because it folds the skepticism back into the project itself. Reasonable people disagree about what the good life is, so that disagreement becomes the point of focus and the attempts to resolve it form the content of what is to be done.[255] As Jonathan Quong notes, it is "permissible to endorse epistemic restraint for sceptical reasons – Rawls only needs to show that the reasoning leading to epistemic restraint does not require acceptance of skepticism."[256]

For cosmopolitan moral education, it is important to not privilege reasonable non-belief over reasonable belief, but to instead admit that both have something to contribute to the conversation. In Rawls's attempts to overcome the skeptical argument (an argument which essentially cripples any attempt to construct a decision-making procedure) he appeals to the need for some decision making process: some legitimate form of arbitration. "Granting that God's will

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[253] John Rawls in Quong, "Political Liberalism Without Scepticism," 336.

[254] This phrasing, "about which reasonable people disagree," and alternately, "reasonable disagreement," is as posed in Quong in his gloss on Rawls. Thomas McCarthy [in "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," *Ethics* 105, no. 1 (1994): 58] writes that Rawls uses the phrase "on terms all can accept," but then connects it to Scanlon's formulation "the basic desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject." See Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000: 153. Scanlon, in a note to this statement, acknowledges Derek Parfit in helping him formulate this statement instead of the alternative "that everyone could reasonably accept." This is no small matter, for the alternate version requires consensus of acceptance whereas the previous statement only requires non-rejection. I am not convinced, as McCarthy appears to be, that one can so easily 'connect' the two.

[255] See Brian Barry, "John Rawls and the Search for Stability," *Ethics* 105 (1995); Brian Barry, *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Graham Long, *Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004); and Steven Wall, *Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) for examples of the skeptical critique.

[256] Quong, "Political Liberalism Without Scepticism." 322.

should be followed and the truth recognized does not as yet define a principle of adjudication."[257] The issue is not the validity of the truth claim itself, but rather in what way a reasonable decision can be made.[258]

Epistemological restraint offers an answer. That is, as Nagel says, "the distinction between what is needed to justify belief and what is needed to justify the employment of political power depends on a higher standard of objectivity, which is ethically based."[259] Nagel appeals to what he calls a "highest-order framework of moral reasoning" wherein we transcend our personal viewpoint and take position in the impersonal viewpoint, or, rather, the 'view from nowhere.' The impersonal viewpoint is not that which has lost the personal interest, but rather one that has combined the personal viewpoint with the view of all the other viewpoints. This impersonal viewpoint will not only contain our particular reasons for justifying our belief, but also all the other possible reasons for withholding justification. It is 'impersonal' because it is not solely 'personal.' When we view our beliefs from the impersonal viewpoint it becomes clear that appeals to the truth of our beliefs "must be seen as merely appeals to our beliefs, and should be treated as such," unless they can be justified from this impersonal viewpoint. In essence, in justificatory contexts, a line is drawn between the private and public domains; one can separate one's belief from the thing believed.[260] Nagel's epistemological restraint is different from Rawls' 'veil of ignorance' because it not only allows those behind the veil to consider conceptions of the good, but it admits the deliberations about such conceptions as the activity of primary

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[257] Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, 214-215.

[258] A more thorough and detailed examination of this issue can be found in Joseph Raz, *Authority* (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

[259] Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," 229.

[260] Price, "Epistemological Restraint—Revisited," 401-407.

importance.

Joseph Raz points out that epistemological restraint could threaten ideologies or belief systems through the influence of external doubts such as secular notions of religious belief.[261] However, it is possible to address this concern. It is not cosmopolitan education's aim to either preserve or erode systems of belief, but rather to provide people with the space necessary to learn. Cosmopolitan education's use of epistemological restraint is a way to respect the beliefs of others without privileging any. Were cosmopolitan education to uphold such an objection it would result in reducing an educational endeavor to indoctrination; it would strip away the actual 'education' part of the activity. Human history is marked by nothing if not continual change in beliefs, ethics, morals, and governing structures. In short, the objection is primarily a political-structural one, and as such is not sufficient to upend the cosmopolitan moral educational project. Admittedly, schooling is not immune to these structural and political issues, but cosmopolitan moral education is not dependent upon formal institutional educational structures to exist, and therefore cannot necessarily stand in the way of their rise or fall, but merely exists as a process by and through which debates about their rise and fall might take place.

It is not necessary for epistemological restraint to be used within a process that has as its focus a particular political implementation: it need not produce anything except reflection.[262] The point is that one can keep epistemological restraint free from the culpability of the erosion of beliefs if one prioritizes the legitimacy of the presumptively objective claims and the primacy of the legitimating processes over the results of the process. In cosmopolitan education the inquiry

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[261] Joseph Raz, "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence," edited by Joseph Raz *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no, 3 (1990). Nagel felt that this concern was substantial enough to back away somewhat from his position on epistemological restraint in a footnote in Thomas Nagel, *Equality and Partiality Philosophy & Public Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 163, but retained his conclusion.

[262] This is in direct relation with Arendt's notion of thinking as being 'invisible' and that there is no actual concrete result of thinking.

into morality does not lie in the identification of specific morals to be adopted, accepted, and enforced. Instead the inquiry ought to be conducted in a democratically justifiable way, and in doing so, provides the legitimacy required for an education in morality. Such a justified education might be found in the processes of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics, or even more so, as I will suggest, in moral agonism.

In criticism it might be said that this view intrinsically values democratic processes, and thus a core principle is un-debatable, acting as received knowledge. I can offer two answers. First, in cosmopolitanism, and due to the primacy of shared humanity, everyone *must* be invited to contribute to the construction of the mores, codes, laws, and customs that will govern their lives. This claim lies at the core of cosmopolitan philosophy, and my conception of cosmopolitan education. Justice, equality, and morality are tied together in this valuing of process, but the execution of the process is the defining characteristic, and primary guarantor of its morality. The second answer lies in the process and its founding presuppositions of argumentation and discourse, and will be examined in the following section.

If we are to have shared ethics, morals, and laws, it is reasonable to prefer a process that seeks to include the arguments, opinions, and beliefs of as many members of the to-be-governed group as is possible, and even when it might not be 'reasonable,' but rather irrational or purely emotional, it still appeals to the undeniable fact of our human and shared existences. Is it possible that the perfectly collaborative group will come up with a terrible answer? Yes. Is it possible that democracy will choose the 'wrong' option? Yes; Hitler was elected through an ostensibly democratic process after all. However, inclusive democratic deliberation provides recourse for correction. It provides the unsuccessful lobbyists with another opportunity to persuade others, as well as the possibility that their efforts may never be successful. Here the

choice is clear: a world in which one gets one's way regardless of the manner in which something is done and thus quite likely to enact its moral ideas in an immoral way, or a world in which one may not get one's way but the manner in which the other choices are chosen is, itself, a moral one (or at least not immoral). Such a process also requires that the participants of democratic deliberation be *persuadable*, too, but yet impervious to demagoguery. Maintaining a reasonable and autonomous place here requires deftness and skill. Those that 'think' are less likely to be persuaded to immoral or evil action and thus underscores the importance of an education in morality, in the tools of critical thinking and inquiry that go into examining what is moral and what is not.[263] Learning how to accept received morals only equips one with the skills to adopt whatever one is asked to adopt. Education in morality entails learning how to critically examine what is presented as 'moral.'[264] One must be open to the possibility that the status quo or the position one holds could be incorrect. One must accept that a deliberative, inclusive, and democratic process might produce a result with which you are unhappy. One must willingly accept two very difficult constraints; the world may not conform to one's conception of the good, and one's conception of the good just might be wrong. What we do in this case will form the content of Chapter 4, but what exactly we do, the kind of argument we have, forms the content of a cosmopolitan dialogue in morality.

5.2 Discourse in Morality

The process by and through which education in morality are to take place requires a scheme that comports with the conception of cosmopolitan education offered in Chapters 2 and 3, confronts the reality of our ever-changing understandings of ethics From Chapter 3, and

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[263] The importance of thinking in morality will be examined in Chapter 6.

[264] See Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*; and Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*.

allows for the holding of beliefs as well as the space in which to proffer them as reasons, when appropriate, as well as the compulsion and space to withhold them in the interest of impartiality as discussed in the previous section. We need to find a form of dialogue about morality that is inclusive and democratic and can allow its participants to maintain the legitimacy of their work while also maintaining the work itself, and the concept of *discourse ethics* offers a model.

Before proceeding further, however, I must make a note about the discussion of Jürgen Habermas's theories that follows. In his arguments for communicative action and discourse ethics, Habermas makes a distinction between ethical and moral questions and treats them separately in his explanations. [265] In brief, Habermas places morals in the same domain as questions of justice, questions whose answers can be universalized, whereas ethics lies in the domain of plans for one's life which are culturally conditioned and not possible to answer universally. Habermas sees the question of *How should I live* as either an ethical or a moral question, but not both at the same time.[266] However useful this distinction is for his purposes, it is not relevant for mine. Cosmopolitanism is interested in the question *How should we live (together)* and therefore the ethical question and the moral question are combined. In the quotes and explanations derived from Habermas' theory I will use the words as he uses them. For my purposes it will not matter whether the specific concern is 'ethical' or 'moral' in the way that discourse ethics applies to cosmopolitan moral education.

Further, I will be taking discourse ethics as it is, and not providing a full treatment of 'deliberative democracy,' an umbrella conception under which discourse ethics is often placed. Deliberative democracy has a broad reach and rich intellectual history, but is both too broad and

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[265] This distinction is taken up at length Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics,* trans. Ciaran Cronin, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993).

[266] Ibid., 1–17.

too rich for my purposes, and entails certain empirical and concrete characteristics from which I wish to maintain distance (per arguments in Chapter 3). There certainly are similarities, and deliberative democracy is generally designed to deal with moral disagreements in politics.[267] It is a system that requires justification of claims that are mutually acceptable and can be understood by all, with the goal of determining conclusions that are applicable to everyone, but can be challenged or amended at a later date.[268] All of these characteristics are compatible with cosmopolitan education. However, deliberative democracy is often primarily associated with very specific processes of government and may involve the erection of institutions and relatively static structures for its implementation.[269] As was made clear in Chapter 3, I would like to stay clear of such manifestations of such concrete models for cosmopolitan education. Deliberative democracy has potential as a limited piece of a larger cosmopolitan puzzle, but it often comes in the form of a concrete, tangible implementation that serves predetermined and prescribed ends, and all within confines of liberalism, and is not broadly applicable enough to offer a complete model for my project.

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[267] See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[268] See Gutman and Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, 7, for these characteristics. For other variations see Seyla Benhabib, *Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) which contains essays by Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Iris Young, Jean Cohen, and Gutman, all of which defend deliberative democracy, but with different emphases. For instance, in Joshua Cohen's essay, he asserts the necessity of procedural democracies to protect autonomy through stronger protections and the guarantee of social and economic rights, but this would lead to a certain amount of concentration of centralized power in a government. In contrast, Benhabib offers a vision of a de-centered model, reducing the role of a centralized arbiter and increasing localized networks of deliberation. I utilize the Gutman-Thompson characteristic because of their lack of specificity and compatibility with other conceptions of deliberative democracy.

[269] See, for instance, James Fishkin, *When the People Speak* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) has explored the practical implementations and results of applied deliberative democracy by analyzing a series of deliberative democratic polling activities in different parts of the world. His results show that people are generally interested in influencing public policy when given the opportunity, and that they are capable of changing their minds after reasonable dialogue and the acquisition of new information. This suggests that much of contemporary political discourse could be influenced through more widespread use of such processes. Through his research at the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, Fishkin has obtained interesting results using pre- and post-dialogue surveys. See http://cdd.stanford.edu for a series of projects and results.

Fundamentally, discourse ethics are grounded in the 'ought' of ethics. When we make statements such as '*one ought not physically injure someone else*' we do not intend the prescription be applicable only to the person who holds this view; we expect it to apply to everyone. Our intention is to assert what we believe to be a moral norm, or at least what we believe ought to be a moral norm, and the assertion is a presentation of an argument. For Habermas, since morals are normative, and a person in isolation cannot determine moral norms, then the justification of a norm depends upon the mutual understanding between two or more persons.[270] Moral norms, as public artifacts must be publicly generated. Habermas concludes that, unlike Kant's deontology, moral deliberation cannot take place in the privacy of one's mind, and in fact the nature of morality (as a norm that ought to apply to everyone) dictates that such deliberation take place in public, with others.[271] The moral viewpoint is not contained in self-legislated *a priori* principles, but rather within a community of people, in which the deliberations of the good and morality contain participants who are fully cognizant of the desires and perspectives of others, however foreign or competitive.[272] Taking a position in such a process, a position similar to the constraints of belief in favor of impartiality found in epistemological restraint, enables the "impartial standpoint [that] overcomes the subjectivity of the individual participant's perspective without becoming disconnected from the performative attitude of the participants."[273] Without such restraint, real communication, genuine argumentation about values, cannot occur. Habermas asserts that "the understanding of self as a

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[270] This use of 'isolation' is compatible with Hannah Arendt's distinction between 'isolation' and 'solitude' which will be of significance in Chapter 6, though Habermas's use of the word is not intended to gesture to Arendt.

[271] Moral *thought*, however, can take place in the privacy of one's mind.

[272] The internal dialogue and self-legislation, as in the Kantian tradition, is vitally important, but it constitutes only one-half of the entire process of morality. This will be covered in more depth in Chapter 6.

[273] Habermas, *Justification and Application*,13.

person and as a member of a community simultaneously…is preserved in the communicative presuppositions of moral argumentation. Just this structure compels each participant in argumentation to adopt the perspective of all others."[274] For discourse ethics, there is no need to construct reasons for why one should adopt the perspective of others; it is automatically entailed in engaging in argumentation.

In defining what can be derived from the attempts at such mutual understanding between persons, a number of 'presuppositions' are automatically entailed. "[A]rgumentation leaves participants without a choice; just in virtue of undertaking to engage in such a practice as such, they must accept certain idealizations in the form of presuppositions of communication."[275] These presuppositions are not obligations we must accept *in order to* engage discursively, but instead "they *make possible* the practice that participants understand as argumentation."[276] These presuppositions of communication are:

a) That it is possible for participants to communicate and understand the meaning of what they communicate,

b) …there is full and equal inclusion of everybody and all relevant arguments and reasons,

c) …the only force exerted is that of the better argument, and

d) …all participants are sincerely and genuinely interested in finding the better argument.[277]

These presuppositions in discourse ethics are compatible with cosmopolitan education because

[274] Ibid., 24, 48.

[275] Ibid., 31.

[276] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[277] 'Finding the better argument' is connected to the inherent aim of education as a process. It is essentially progressive in that it builds upon and from that which it begins in the interest of growth, requiring evaluation and improvement.

they do not privilege or rest on a particular way of life or conception of the good, they are the conditions that make communicative action possible, they do not exclude anyone who wishes to take part, and they are automatically involved in argumentation.[278]

What deliberation provides is important for Habermas. We must enter into real discussions and not speculative ones. "We cannot anticipate the outcome of *real* discourses concerning proposed principles of justice among those potentially affected by their observance."[279] Only the affected deliberators themselves are appropriate agents for justifying their claims, whereas philosophers can only take part in "reflective analysis of the procedure through which ethical questions *in general* can be answered."[280] It is a process by which ways or forms of life and conceptions of the good get public and democratic airing, and it is minimally intended to be universal insofar as it does not reject participants on bases of ethnicity, nationality, or any other ascribed characteristic. Persons may exclude themselves by refusing to take part, but they cannot be forced or prevented from participating if they so choose.

Discourse ethics works in many other ways with cosmopolitanism. In discourse ethics, the moral point of view must be that which detaches "itself from the egocentric (ethnocentric) perspective of each individual's (or our) way of life and demands that interpersonal conflicts be judged from the standpoint of what *all* could will in common."[281] But the moral point of view also requires that one "*transcend* the social and historical form of life and particular community

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[278] For my purposes there is little difference between argumentation as constructed by Habermas and deliberation. Both are intended to refer to discussions that take place between two or more persons who have gathered to consider the reasons for or against something.

[279] Ciaran Cronin in Habermas, *Justification and Application*, xviii. This is in contrast to Rawls, for instance, for whom the veil of ignorance provides a speculative space in which to make impartial decisions about justice (and morality, for Habermas).

[280] Ibid., 75.

[281] Ibid., 24.

and adopt the perspective of *all* those possibly affected."[282] This gestures to Nagel's 'view from nowhere.'[283] They both offer a view of the world as well as oneself contained in it. Both offer more than the limited subjective/local perspective does, and not completely disembodied as an absolutely objective/universal perspective would be; one has not lost oneself in the search for a vantage point of the world that contains more than just the subjective and local self. The test for education in morality is how well it accommodates the juxtaposition of these perspectives and whether everyone can acknowledge that the juxtaposition is generally valid.[284]

Any education in morality, short of indoctrination or moral relativism, must be an inquiry, must occupy concurrently, or rather must consider the reasonable desires of, the impersonal/universal and the personal/local viewpoints. The world does not only consist of you, nor does it *not* contain you in it. You are there and all that matters to you is there as well, and everyone else is there along with everything else that matters to them. If the worlds never collided or connected, it would not matter, but they do collide and they are inter-connected. This requires that, much like weighing evidence for making a judgment about any non-moral act, you must take into consideration all that is available to you to consider in moral action and that includes other viewpoints. In the ongoing inquiry and determination of morals and morality this requires the consideration of all available options, lives, and experiences even when one's beliefs and reasons conflict with the material purposes of the discussion.

In examining moral dialogue, there is a distinction between the moral behavior required to conduct the dialogue and what behavior counts as moral as determined *by* the dialogue. It is

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[282] Ibid. (emphases in original).

[283] See Nagel, *The View From Nowhere*.

[284] Ibid., 13.

the first of these to which both cosmopolitan moral education and discourse ethics are oriented. Discourse ethics does not "say what the answers should be, only how we should find them,"[285] and is not only for a particular community or for people who possess a certain ideology. As Thomassen writes, "[g]iven the pluralism of moral views that exist in today's societies, Habermas believes that an ethics for modern societies cannot give substantive answers to moral questions."[286] Instead, discourse ethics provides a procedure for answering moral questions and, as shown in Chapter 3, this is cosmopolitan education's goal as well. However, this pluralism is at once a motivation and a problem for discourse ethics. "Once moral theory breaks out of the investigative horizon of the first-person singular, it encounters the reality of an alien will, which generates problems of a different order."[287] Pluralism is thusly problematized by discourse ethics and necessarily complicates an unreachable goal: consensus.

Consensus is thwarted by many practical issues, not the least of which is basic social organization. Because it is impossible to get everyone involved in any given discussion of morality, one must generate local outcomes and test them with and against other outcomes produced elsewhere, and these should be entered into the local discussion.[288] In discourse ethics, the best we can hope for is partial justification for the norms that result, which are not justified by 100% consensus, but are also supported by reasons that cannot be completely and reasonably rejected. Discourse ethics appreciate the contributions to morality that can be made from both particular and broader (i.e. cultural or traditional) origins. The kind of discourse encouraged by

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[285] Lasse Thomassen, *Habermas: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (New York: Continuum, 2010), 87.

[286] Ibid., 86.

[287] Habermas, *Justification and Application*, 2.

[288] Discourse ethics also includes an understanding that there are people for whom a moral inquiry is extremely important but they are not able to participate in the deliberations. An example would be a patient in a coma, with brain damage, or similarly incapacitated.

discourse ethics combines the possibilities of individually constructed thought and disclosed assertions as well as those which have developed in concert with local cultural and communal norms that have influenced them.

The problematization of pluralism by Habermas is a point of departure for my project from his, and this is no insignificant juncture. For Habermas, the goal of discourse ethics is consensus. His conception of ethics is universalist, which would seem to work, too, with cosmopolitan education, but it does not. Habermas sees discourse ethics as a means to reach a consensus about ethics. If cosmopolitan education adopted the goal of consensus it would then have a fixed goal, one that could be empirically assessed. On the one hand, to form such a consensus might create the substantive moral decisions that are supposed to be elided by the construct of discourse ethics in the first place, and thus his assertion that discourse ethics could not be oriented to producing substantive answers to moral questions is in doubt. On the other hand, in light of epistemological restraint and impartiality, the key formulation of what counts as justification is *that which others could not reasonably reject*, not *that which everyone could reasonably accept,* the latter oriented to positive consensus. Discourse ethics can still provide a procedure for the utilization of epistemological restraint, but it cannot be oriented to consensus of acceptance, only an acceptance of the presuppositions of argumentation (and such acceptance need not be universal, but rather accepted by those engaged in the argument).[289] What results from these arguments is beyond the purview of a cosmopolitan educational process; deciding ahead of time what the result should or will be removes the justification for creating the inclusive

[289] As Habermas noted, entering the argument entails acceptance. Those who do not accept these presuppositions will not join the argument. However, adopting epistemological restraint is essentially an act of accepting the presuppositions because epistemological restraint entails that one recognize that one's beliefs could be reasonably rejected even though you may not at all agree with the potential reasons for such rejection. In doing so, you have already acquired the presuppositions necessary to participate in the deliberations/arguments.

processes through which to come to a decision. Such concern with consensus, in the face of so much moral pluralism, dooms an inquiry into morality to undermining its own justification. It is to that inevitable pluralism I now turn.

5.3 Agonistic Pluralism

Morality is predicated on an implicit acceptance of the fundamental conditions of our lives: our social lives. We would not need morality, as Arendt notes, "if men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would not need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood."[290] If we were all identical there would be no need to assert how one ought to act toward another. It is this distinctness, this fundamental difference in the 'who' that each of us is that prompts the desire and need for morality. Pluralism and morality are thus inextricably linked, and even though Habermas, consensus-oriented as he is, understands the ineradicable nature of moral pluralism, he draws from this the conclusion that "finding a solution to these few more sharply focused questions becomes all the more critical to coexistence, and even survival, in a more populous world."[291] While his answer is to continue seeking consensus, others suggest accepting its impossibility and instead encourage focusing on the management of pluralism. To this end I will now examine the concept of *agonistic pluralism* and then show that the move to consensus is unnecessary.

Agonism is derived from *agon,* the Greek word for struggle, contest, or conflict, and in Greek drama *agon* refers to the pitting of the protagonist and antagonist against each other. Most uses revolve around competition and contestation and involve discipline, endurance, tenacity,

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[290] Arendt, The Human Condition, 175.

[291] Habermas, *Justification*, 91.

and struggle.[292] In Greek athletic contests it was not only about defeating your opponent, but also in competing well and with respect toward the competition itself as well as your opponent, without whom you cannot compete nor excel. Further, the more challenging or capable your opponent, the greater the respect and gratitude toward him because it is the formidable opponent who makes excellence possible. The focal point was the *contest*, not the outcome. A champion who wins badly or without struggle is no champion. A true champion excels because of the contest, because of the struggle, and it is in the struggle that the Greeks placed human drama and value.

In Greek culture *agon* was the key dynamic force through which excellence (*arête*) was achieved. For the Greeks *agon* was largely a public affair. Contests often took place as formal events with spectators, but *agon* also animated daily Greek cultural life. These struggles may have begun as some individual trial in which a citizen proved his excellence, but *agon* grew to encompass cultural accomplishment and continuity, permeating all aspects of community life, from the Olympic games to the politics of the *polis*.[293] *Agon* has less communal value when only a private affair. Whatever has been produced or tested privately can only truly come into being and 'prove' its value through public struggle and contestation. One may have the Socratic conversation with oneself, a necessary dialogue to be sure, in order to produce legitimate thought, but those thoughts are not 'in the world' until they have been disclosed through human action which must be public. I will address this characteristic in more detail in Chapter 6.

In political theory agonism refers to the theory that recognizes that not all conflicts can be

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[292] Edward L. Kuhlman, Agony in Education: The Importance of Struggle in the Process of Learning (Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1994), 30.

[293] "The agon was a cultural tour de force which initially involved personal gain and accomplishment but eventually was generalized to cultural accomplishment and continuity." Kuhlman, *Agony in Education*, 35.

resolved in such a way as to eliminate further conflict, and in fact there is potential for positive effects of such conflict by approaching the conflict discursively, and not to find a 'winner' (though there may be temporal winners and losers in normative, legislative, and policy conflicts). Agonists deny the possibility of universal harmony, and, for the most part, universal anything except universal conflict. However, the production of an outcome does not mean the conflict is over, it merely signifies a new point to contest. Agonism is a state if being in which contestation occurs. In political life, usually democratic but not exclusively, and as illustrated quite clearly in many ideological debates, agonism appears to be the constant; laws are passed, policies enacted, but the contestation over them continues, with further amendments to laws and policies over time. Beyond the structurally instantiated normative we see that opinions, beliefs, and other convictions are contested as well.

Proponents of agonism are often critics of Habermas and discourse ethics and often deny both the importance and possibility of consensus, and of dialogue to reach it, primarily based upon the plurality of human life. Chantal Mouffe is one of the most vocal of these. Her opposition to both Habermas and cosmopolitanism lies in the respective perceived aims of consensus and universalization. She asserts that it is impossible to achieve a fully rational consensus and that her model of agonistic pluralism not only deals with current democratic challenges, but is in fact the operant condition of democracy.

For Mouffe, the constitutive concept of politics is power, power is constitutive of the social, and thus the goal is to formulate politics that constitute forms of power that are more compatible with democratic values. In order to do this, one must recognize the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political.' Mouffe defines 'the political' as the intrinsic antagonism of human relations that emerge in our social relations. 'Politics' consists of the practices,

discourses, and institutions that order our coexistence. In ordering our coexistence, it is not only normative but also moral because that ordering sets goals, limits, and prescriptions for how we are to coexist. Thus, "only when we acknowledge the dimension of 'the political' and understand that 'politics' consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations"[294] can we approach the task at hand. That task is not to reach consensus, per Habermas, because doing so would eliminate 'the political.' Instead the task is one in which we "establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy."[295]

Mouffe's 'politics' aims to perceive the 'other' not as an enemy, but as an adversary whose right to defend his ideas is not abridged. One's "adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of…liberty and equality."[296] The 'ethico-political' principles exist through conflicting interpretations, leading to what Mouffe calls "conflictual consensus."[297] These contestations consist of different conceptions of the good, not consensus per se, and thus become the embodiment of democracy through "a vibrant class of democratic political positions."[298] This conception admits that antagonism will likely remain, rational discussion may not resolve it, and deliberation may prove equally as futile. However, "[t]his does not mean of course that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has

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[294] Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 101.

[295] Ibid.

[296] Ibid., 102.

[297] Mouffe, On The Political, 56.

[298] Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104.

been eradicated," and compromises are possible as well.[299]

This distinction between 'antagonism' as conflict between enemies and 'agonism' as conflict between adversaries is vital. Both take place within a political relationship, but the goal is to convert the antagonism into agonism, and thus redefine the conflict as one that is more democratically collaborative even if the difference remains. Agonism is, as Mouffe states, 'in fact [democracy's] very condition of existence," and offers a regulative service.[300] Echoing Laclau, Mouffe notes that any consensus reached in agonistic pluralism is a temporary stabilization of power that "always entails exclusion," always leaving some 'other' on the outside.[301] Thus antagonism survives, 'the political' re-engages, and the domesticating services of 'politics' are required yet again. Bonnie Honig writes that "to affirm the perpetuity of the contest is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimension of contestation."[302] The avoidance of conflict is the driving force behind most political theories, but agonism can play a role in disrupting these hegemonic tendencies.[303] In agonism, no decision will be closed on the edges of 'the political.' It will "always be open to question and answer, demand and response, and negotiation."[304] The criticality that is inherent in education in morality is alive and well in agonism.

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[299] Ibid., 102.

[300] Ibid., 103.

[301] Ibid., 104.

[302] Bonnie Honig, "Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home" in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. Seyla Benhabib, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15.

[303] See Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[304] James Tully, "The Agonic Freedom of Citizens," *Economy and Society* 28, no. 2 (1999): 166-167.

Despite Mouffe's opposition to cosmopolitan democracy, agonistic pluralism is not incompatible with the model of cosmopolitanism I offer.[305] Cosmopolitan education easily incorporates Mouffe's agonistic pluralism, which plays a large role in my formulation of moral agonism. In order to remain in an agonistic state, rather than an antagonistic state, requires "a capacity for agonistic respect"[306] wherein a 'distance' is maintained within and among people to allow them to see themselves as actors within a larger group of actors, all of whom have the same right of participation. Each participant's view is from 'somewhere,' but is so by invoking both a personal and impersonal standpoint concurrently. By inhabiting agonism, one keeps the personal and includes it in the impersonal that governs the interpersonal interactions. The deliberations that take place do so in this context, one in which judgments might be made, but it is understood that they are the judgments 'for now' and are subject to alteration in the future. By eliminating the finality and permanency of judgments, the agonist state can maintain the processes of democratic deliberation, collaboration, and contestation. In essence, adversaries collaborate to contest each other's ideas, externalizing the personal standpoint (this matters to me) while internalizing the impersonal viewpoint (that matters to you).

Mouffe contends that the ideal speech situation envisioned by Habermas could never take place because "no deliberation could ever take place without impediments to free and unconstrained public deliberation."[307] In Mouffe's view, Habermas' presuppositions rely on

[305] The core of Mouffe's criticisms of cosmopolitanism is similar to those she holds of Habermas and discourse ethics: the perceived orientation toward and organization for consensus.

[306] Donald, "Multiculturalism Revisited," 295.

[307] Eva Erman, "What is Wrong with Agonistic Pluralism?: Reflections on Conflict in Democratic Theory," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 35, no. 9 (2009): 1042. Erman criticizes Mouffe's view, maintaining that Mouffe requires consensus around the 'ethico-political' principles she assumes, and that her argument for agonistic pluralism cannot proceed without such consensus, and thus Mouffe is as dependent upon consensus as Habermas. See also Chantal Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism," *The Political Science Series* (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2000): 13.

conditions so ideal that in order for them to obtain, the conflict they are summoned to mediate must be eliminated, thus precluding the need for the dialogue. She quotes Wittgenstein saying, "we have got on slippery ice where the is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk: so we need *friction*."[308] Every conclusion of deliberation that results in a decision always excludes other possibilities that could have been chosen, possibilities ostensibly proffered in the deliberation, and sometimes not. We need the friction of 'the political' in order to gain the traction necessary for 'politics' to be of any value. Agonism is not necessarily 'grist for the mill' of politics—which is supplied automatically by the pluralism of human and social life—but rather the competing streams of water that make the wheel turn.

Conclusion

While agonistic pluralism and discourse ethics battle it out over the capabilities and possibilities of each other, impartiality and epistemological restraint observe with patient impunity, and ethical/moral progress simply waits for agonistic pluralism and discourse ethics to realize that they are merely two parts of the same progressive and regulative process.[309] Why care about agonistic pluralism or discourse ethics at all if there was not some compulsion that was more important than them both? The reason for deciding about how to deliberate about ethics and morals, and to determine the terms and guiding principles under which the deliberations will take place, is to make things 'better.' The compulsion in both agonistic pluralism and in discourse ethics is to improve the way politics, or public action, are done. Both recognize that the manner in which deliberations about what we ought to do are conducted truly

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[308] Ludwig Wittgenstein in Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, 98.

[309] At this point I will switch from Kitcher's use of 'ethical' to reflect his emphasis on ethics to 'moral' to reflect my emphasis on 'morality.'

matters in morality as much as it does in political and public legitimacy.

The fundamental grounding of our moral lives in our shared humanity, in our shared forms of life in action, and in our universal capacity to insert our pluralistic selves into the world community make it incumbent upon us to share in an equally shared moral inquiry. One in which all may participate, with genuine interest in the inquiry over personal desires and beliefs, and with the real aim of improving our shared conditions of living at no other person's expense. This is what a cosmopolitan moral education seeks to instill and how it could do so. However, this only gets us halfway to the 'punch' of cosmopolitan education in morality and moral agonism. If the process is prioritized over the results while still maintaining that results are not irrelevant, then where can we go from here? How can agency be justified beyond procedural obligations? In the following Chapter I will draw on Hannah Arendt's work on 'action' to provide the space in which the procedural obligations can be enacted while still preserving the non-dogmatic and unpredictable results of cosmopolitan education in morality, a space governed by moral agonism.

Chapter 6

Public Action in Moral Agonism

The previous chapter showed that both Habermas and Mouffe understand the inevitability of the need for political public interaction. Habermas cannot conceive of human life without communication, and Mouffe cannot conceive of human life without pluralism.[310] Habermas's response is to focus on justifying a specific set of procedures through which communication can occur and produce justified results. Mouffe's response is to frame subsequent responses to pluralism within the context of agonism. Habermas's communication, or 'communicative action,' cannot get by without experiencing Mouffe's pluralism and needs her agonism to be better. In the cosmopolitan education I envision, practitioners of discourse ethics need to see that consensus in an outcome is not only impossible, but also unnecessary. Practitioners of agonistic pluralism need to see that politics works, however futilely, as either a consensus seeking process or a process that finds its consensus in the shared agreement that some 'coming together' is required, even if it is to argue and deliberate. In order to bridge them, this chapter will consider Hannah Arendt's conceptions of action, plurality, the public, and the importance of thinking in morality. This will be followed by another look at agonism before Arendt is summoned again to draw together discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism on a cosmopolitan foundation to reveal what I call 'moral agonism.'

As discussed in Chapter 4, morals education exists primarily to educate a society's newest members into the existing moral norms of society, typically through *specific* morals,

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[310] This is not to suggest that Habermas does not recognize plurality. He does. However, he emphasizes communication as though communication can be enough to eradicate or mediate pluralism, and that may not always be possible.

whereas an education in morality seeks to provide students with the form of life that morality represents as a field of inquiry. Cosmopolitan education embodies the acknowledgment of the practicality of educating new members for existing moral norms as morals education does, but also the necessity of educating them for the moral norms that are not yet extant. Thus cosmopolitan education acknowledges the necessity of providing society's new members with the tools and processes to develop morals by engaging in deliberations about morality. Educating only for existing morals is more likely to impede the progressive movement toward an understanding of future morality as well as the ability of individuals to participate in its development. Cosmopolitan moral education presumes, and quite rightly in light of known human history, that morality and many accepted morals will change over time and it admits the rationality of preparing for those changes as well as the ability to initiate them. The ability to be an influential and meaningful participant in morality is contained in each person through his or her natality, and if that natality is not preserved, meaningful participation or action will not happen.

It is one thing to be capable of change—humans have needed adaptable capacities since human time began—and yet quite another to be an agent who initiates or participates in change meaningfully. In the context of ethics and morals, the normative guidance for doing so is tremendously important and requires a stance that is appropriately disposed to an understanding of what has counted in morality before, what counts currently, and the processes by which future morality can be engaged; these dispositions are cultivated in an education in morality. I have already shown the importance of Arendt's conceptions of natality and conservation in education to these processes. In the previous chapter I offered a view of some processes of discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism as mechanisms that are compatible with cosmopolitan education that can

preserve natality and produce an education in morality. Now I wish to offer more substantial theoretical support for this project by examining Arendt's conception of thinking and its relation to morality. I will then show how natality exists in the thinking about morality and is manifested through public action, and thus morality is ultimately made to be public. I will conclude by showing that such a public morality needs to be supported by a disposition toward morality that admits shared humanity, plurality, and uncertainty, and is progressive as well. I call this disposition moral agonism, and it is the 'product' of a cosmopolitan education in morality.

6.1 Making Morality Public

In the Introduction to *The Human Condition*, Jerome Kohn writes that for Arendt, "when moral and religious commandments are pronounced in public in defiance of the diversity of human opinions they corrupt both the world and themselves."[311] Due to the *self*-reflective nature of morality, as opposed to the *world*-directed nature of politics (because action can only take place with others), the split between the two seems rather clear. However, Arendt recognizes that actions that result from morality, ostensibly the products of thought and natality, are as much other-directed as they are toward our self. In essence, our thoughts are ours alone while our actions are for everyone. The intent of our actions might be wholly self-regarding, but the outcomes of our actions are not only ours and, once unleashed into the world, are determined by the world and the others persons in it.

In Arendt's attempts to isolate moral principles, she finds it necessary to abandon both transcendental and traditional received (e.g. religious) morality, because these require knowing the conscience of men and no one can know that. Conscience itself, thought Arendt, is suspect and largely the product, in contemporary understanding, of an alteration of meaning from its

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[311] Jerome Kohn in Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, xxi.

origins. This alteration she traced to Paul of Tarsus and Augustine, and the meaning and role of conscience became almost exclusively that as determined by religious use in Christianity. Since we cannot rely on religious or received morality, we must find morality somewhere else. In her examination of conscience she determined that in Christian terms it involves simply whether one will or will not obey God; in secular terms the conflicts of conscience are "nothing but deliberations between me and myself."[312] As a result, Arendt begins in morality from what she determines to be the only two secular moral principles that one can positively assert, and both are from Socrates: (a) that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm, and (b) that "multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, *being one*, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict *me*."[313] In exploring these two propositions she reveals the importance of thinking in morality.

6.1.1 Thinking Morality

Arendt organizes her conception of thinking in morality around Socrates' assertion that when considering the morality of an action, one must be in agreement with oneself; the "two-in-one" must be in accord.[314] In other words, if one wants to be able to live with oneself, there are some things one must not do.

> For nothing can be itself and at the same time of itself but the two-in-one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato translated into conceptual language as the soundless dialogue between me and myself…Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly

[312] Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," 108.

[313] Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture," 439. In Plato the 'suffer harm' section is in 469 (Stephanus), the 'harmony' section in 482. Arendt discusses these two propositions in many of her writings, but does not take up the third proposition, that it is better for the tyrant that he be punished than to go unpunished, and neither shall I. See also Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy."

[314] Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations," 441-442. Arendt has explored this concept many times. See also Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 179-192, (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1978); and Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy."

> that man exists *essentially* in the plural than that his solitude actualizes his merely being conscious of himself, which we probably share with the higher animals, into a duality during the thinking activity. It is this *duality* of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. [315]

The deliberation of what those things are takes place in a dialogue with oneself and this deliberative dialogue constitutes *thinking*. Arendt concludes that in this dialogue the criterion of right and wrong ultimately does not rest on habits or customs shared with others nor on some transcendent or divine moral law but rather in regard to an agreement with oneself: "I cannot do certain things, because having done them I shall no longer be able to live with myself."[316] One must be able to live with oneself in order to find internal moral harmony; one does not want to live with a 'criminal.' Establishing harmony in the relationship with oneself is substantially different than doing so in one's relationship with others. A person can disagree with other people and merely remove himself from their presence to get away from them and their ideas, but he cannot get away from himself. He is always there, waiting to pass judgment on himself. There is only one way to avoid the judgment of oneself and that is by *not* thinking.

According to Arendt, we can have this dialogue, can only *think*, when we are alone, with ourselves, in private. Private in this sense does not necessarily mean total absence of something 'public,' but rather that one is not in the public realm of action.[317] One has removed oneself from

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[315] Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 185.

[316] Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," 97.

[317] There are those who criticize Arendt's private/public distinction, particularly through the concept of language, but it is not relevant here. Arendt agrees with Wittgenstein that there is no exclusively private language. "In all such reflecting activities men move outside the world of appearances and use a language filled with abstract words which, of course, had long been part and parcel of everyday speech before they became the special currency of philosophy" (Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 78). What is essential for me is that granting that the solitude is essentially private in content if not language construction. The thoughts formed in solitude, as a result of the two-in-one's dialogue, are unknown to others until they are disclosed publicly.

acting in public and has acquired solitude. Arendt distinguishes between *solitude* and *isolation*, the former being the kind of separation from human action that allows one to have a dialogue with oneself, the latter a state of being in which one is not involved in inter-action with others nor in a dialogue with oneself, but instead "concerned with things of the world."[318] For instance, reading a book may require that you not be disturbed by others, but may not require a dialogue with oneself; one needs the isolation to accomplish the task, but there is no guarantee that thinking is taking place.[319] The dialogue with oneself requires that one cease acting in the world and instead that one ask questions of oneself about one's experiences. "Thinking is an inquiry into human experience,"[320] which includes claims about morality wherein the two-in-one attempts to find internal agreement about these claims. The relationship that one has with oneself in answer to the question 'can I do this and still live with myself?'—a question put to oneself—is posed in relation to others; it automatically takes up the question as a social problem and is a question that would not be asked without the presence of other people.[321] The presence of other people takes on additional weight when one is living with, as opposed to living among, other people. 'Living with' supposes a situation in which genuine action, spurred by natality and thinking, is taking place with others, not mere activities undertaken without thought.

Arendt's conclusions that first, thinking can only be done in solitude and second, that

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[318] Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," 99.

[319] Ibid., 98-100. One could draw many parallels to countless educational activities that fall under this category: activity but no thought.

[320] Jacobitti, "Political Morality," 285.

[321] See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1979). Arendt very carefully shows how creating the absence of the presence of others, essentially creating a multitude of people isolated from each other, provides totalitarianism with the space to re-create politics and political life, to say nothing of morality and morals, to suit its own design for the maintenance of its (totalitarianism's) continued existence.

morality is the result of human plurality, have important implications for teachers. For instance, Eduardo Duarte has concluded that a popular pedagogy, cooperative learning, actually prevents the learning sought.[322] Ostensibly, cooperative learning attempts to create mini communities of learning in classrooms and foster “positive interdependence” and teamwork.[323] Arendt determined that solitude is necessary for real thought to occur, and solitude requires the withdrawal from the presence of others, and in particular, the cessation of action. However, Duarte points out that cooperative learning forces students into a public community of action in which solitude is impossible. Duarte says that proponents of cooperative learning “move forward from the unquestioned assumption that *thinking* is a socially mediated process.” [324] It might be that ‘learning’ is socially mediated as long as learning requires some combination of thinking with action, but thinking itself cannot be socially mediated. The conception of morality offered in my project is one that is socially mediated, but the thinking behind it is not. I will assert that we must act on our thoughts in public, but the thoughts that arouse or guide our actions must be done in solitude (even if they are influenced by social life and interaction). In light of this, a teacher must provide her students with the socially mediated dialogue that facilitates the active declarations of their thoughts, but she must also task and provide them with the opportunity for solitary reflection on the public action in which they have partaken.

The thought-dialogue that results from the self-questioning initially takes place in ‘solitude,’ but its reason for being is that there are other people about whom one must consider in contemplating how one will act and interact. Thus, the question put to oneself cannot only be

[322] See Eduardo Duarte, “The Eclipse of Thinking: An Arendtian Critique of Cooperative Learning,” in *Hannah Arendt on Education: Renewing our Common World Critique*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 2001).

[323] Ibid., 204.

[324] Ibid., 205.

posed as a matter of self-interest. When one says to oneself "This I can't do,"[325] it is not only or simply because one takes issue with the action, and not only or simply because of the net result, but because of the placement of oneself in a world in which one (oneself) does something that acts on another person in some way; the 'yes' or 'no' that one gives to oneself is based upon the combination or interaction of oneself with others in the world. Thus one's thinking about one's actions in the human condition of plurality forces the moral question and makes *thought* the integral internal mechanism by which morality is derived and constructed. Essentially, without thought one does not have morality, but might only have acquired 'morals.'

Engaging oneself in this dialogue is not harmless, however passive it may appear. Thinking is dangerous even in light all of its benefits, though Arendt reminds us that discrete thoughts themselves are not dangerous, and even though thinking plays a central role in the development of morality it is also a destroyer of morals. "[T]hinking has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria…on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics."[326] Such destructive thinking does not destroy morality, for the compulsion to judge right and wrong stays with us, but it can destroy specific morals; existing judgments can be rejected. For whichever morals have been accepted in morality, they will represent a morality of the old, while new members capitalizing on their natality, and in reaction to the human condition of plurality, may critically examine the morals they have inherited and thus subject them to potential modification or even eradication. Thinking puts everything in the world of morality in jeopardy while concurrently assuring that morality will stay in the world. Thinking (infused by natality) allows for the possibility that anything we currently know or believe about

[325] Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," 78.

[326] Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations," 434.

morality could be found false or moot. The very conception of morality itself might be upended as the result of action informed by thinking. It recognizes that all of our moral convictions could be questioned.

That Arendt says that thoughts themselves are not dangerous indicates a crucial point about thinking. Thinking puts morality in a position to be 'born' into the world; thought alone is not enough to create morality. A dangerous thought causes no more harm than a magnanimous thought does good. No matter how much thinking one has done and no matter how rigorously harmonized one is with oneself, the 'yes' or 'no' that has been discovered or self-legislated does not yet represent morality. Since moral thought finds its origination in the world in consideration and as a result of the existence of other humans, it must also find its actualization there. It is still, at this pre-action point, entirely subjective (since it only exists in thought-form in the subject), and has not yet taken any form of life in the world. It is, at best, nascent morality and remains to be 'born' into the world. Whatever conclusions have been drawn are as yet unknown even in some ways to the one who has drawn them, because even one's actions can be surprising to oneself. If the thought-morality has any being at all, it is in its pregnancy, or natality. If one is to produce a moral act and insert anything into the domain of morality, one's thoughts must be disclosed and thrown out into the world as action.[327] The internal, reflective deliberations undertaken in thought by the "two-in-one" do not constitute morality until they have been converted into action and disclosed in the public realm in which they find their object and relevance.

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[327] I use the world "thrown" here because it best suits the idea I have in mind, of thoughts being cast into the public realm. It is not used in order to conjure Heidegger, as some of his more ardent readers might be inclined to do. Arendt's natality-inducing action does have many similarities with Heidegger's 'throwness' (geworfenheit) and 'thrown projection' (geworfer Entwurf). For Heidegger, humans are 'delivered over' to the world, through both activity and passivity, as we are 'delivered' at birth (passive for the one being born), underscoring the clear affinity of the midwife and birth concepts in Arendt. For those who wish to pursue this connection, Arendt would encourage a close reading of Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1962).

6.1.2 Morality in Action

Arendt asserts that we can only think when we are alone and that we can only *act* in the presence of others, in public. For Arendt, the 'public' is constituted when "individuals come together in a particular way around an issue or object of common concern."[328] Individuals coming together to collaborate and deliberate in order to determine better ways of living together would seem to qualify as an issue of common concern. The previous section showed that thinking is necessary for morality, but thinking alone is not sufficient. Disclosure of the thinking about morality is necessary for morality to 'come to life,' because according to Arendt, without 'God' handing down moral laws or demonstrable eternal truths (as opposed to what Arendt identifies as eternal truths that are simply un-provable) we are forced to live our lives "without a banister."[329] Her examination of Socrates' propositions leaves two general alternatives in locating morality; morality and moral life exist either in the private thoughts of the individual or are found in the interactions between people in public.

If morality exists only in private thoughts, one person could investigate and exercise moral judgment in conversation with oneself. The dialogue would be undertaken, the harmony with oneself found (or not), and that would be the end. According to Arendt (and Habermas) this is untenable because other people live in the world, not only oneself.[330] "The plurality of the

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[328] Aaron Schutz, "Contesting Utopianism: Hannah Arendt and the Tensions of Democratic Education" in *Hannah Arendt on Education: Renewing our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 93-126, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 2001), 99.

[329] Aaron Schutz, "Creating Local 'Public Spaces' in Schools: Insights from Hannah Arendt and Maxine Greene," *Curriculum Inquiry* 29, no. 1 (1999): 90.

[330] "Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world." Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 7. See also Habermas, *Justification and Application*, 51.

human condition" places a fundamental *moral* limitation on politics.[331] For the two-in-one to be in harmony one must be able to 'live with oneself.' For the two-on-one to be in harmony *with the world*, one's actions must comply with one's thought-determined morality *and* must then be disclosed through public action. The inner-conversation is taken up due to one's relation to others or in thought-reaction to the presence of others in the world. It is one's in-the-world-interactions with other persons, not one's musings about 'what if' one was to interact with other persons, that drives moral questions. The fact of interaction forces upon one the need to think about those interactions. Morality happens in the world and the inter-actions within it. It does not *only* happen in one's own mind or actions (though it certainly exists by and through them). Since morality has no existence or presence in the world while still hidden in thought, this first alternative is not enough. Morality needs action, which leads to the second alternative for morality: that it exists in the public actions and disclosures of the internal moral self into the external world along with other persons' insertions of themselves.

Morality is constructed through the public disclosure of one's self via previously private thoughts about morality and the public, interactive arguments and negotiations that follow. One may have a dialogue with oneself and it is through this dialogue that thinking occurs, but morality does not take form until one enters a public dialogue with others about morality through the disclosure of the moral self. Morality exists in the public disclosure of internally constructed judgments that are then tested, debated, negotiated, and sometimes instantiated in public laws or in social behaviors. One thinks and then one acts by disclosing those thoughts to the world, primarily through speech action.[332] Chris Higgins notes that Arendt seems to both vacillate and

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[331] Jacobitti, "The Public, the Private, the Moral," 287.

[332] Or, alternatively, one observes another's actions, thinks about them, and then responds through action of one's own. These linear formulations are heuristic and not meant to illustrate the only viable processes.

equivocate between 'action' and 'speech' and he points out that though a chapter in *The Human Condition* is titled "Action" it contains mostly thoughts about speech. He ultimately decides that Arendt "knits them together closely enough,"[333] citing Arendt's passage that "[w]ithout the accompaniment of speech…action would not only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject."[334] Nonetheless, not all action, and moral action at that, requires explicit speech. Arendt writes that some Germans, who under Nazi rule rejected the Nazi form of life by refusing to obey Nazi laws, came to this refusal by asserting "This I can't do," rather than, "This I ought not do," which reveals first, an important difference between these two formulations, and second, the manifestation of two important results.[335]

First, the formulations matter. The "can't" is self-referential; 'I could not live with myself if I did this.' The "ought not" is social in that I should not or ought not do this because, though it might be possible for me to live with myself if I did so, others with whom I live would not want to live with me (or some other less dramatic consequence). With the "can't" the directive originates internally, but it develops because of others. With "ought not" the directive originates externally and develops because of others. However this may be conceptually, the way the self-referential 'can't' plays out in the world makes it part of a social process. By asserting 'I can't' and then by acting out that refusal, the insertion in the world becomes a suggestion to others about how one might, or even perhaps ought, act and therefore becomes a part of the public discussion of morality.

The formulations then manifest two results that show their importance in public morality.

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[333] Chris Higgins, "The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 44, no. 2-3 (2010): 284.

[334] Arendt, in Higgins, "The Good Life of Teaching," 284. Original in Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178.

[335] These formulations are from Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," 78.

First, The non-cooperating Germans' inaction became an action. By refusing to unthinkingly and uncritically comply with the Nazi's new laws, they disclosed themselves to the world and thus inserted an action, however passively, by essentially say 'no.' Secondly, they kept alive the natality that is required for action. Their passive-actions of non-cooperative dissent eliminated the chance of consensus and natality-killing authoritarian control of morality by the Nazis, enacting and preserving the condition of plurality along with natality. By refusing to comply they retained the potential for an alternative version of Nazi morality. The Nazis turned previously existing morality on its head, first, because they presented new morals that simply replaced the old ones, and second, because the coercive mandate of the new morals essentially undermined morality by eliminating the public processes by and through which morality exists. These activities had a devastating effect on the characteristics of the pre-Nazi world, but the potential for something new and better than the Nazi world remained possible and ever-present through the non-cooperative passive-action of some citizens, despite the action-crushing world created by the Nazis. In this way an old-world morality (pre-Nazi morality) was preserved and lived on through the (in)actions of the dissenters, which could in turn help influence the creation of a post-Nazi new-world morality.

Such passive action, and particularly under such conditions, is rare and can become necessary. More optimal for Arendt are the kind of conditions that are born when each person who enters the public dialogue truly thinks about what is being said and then re-discloses a new thought through speech action. This requires that one remove oneself from action in order to have the dialogue with oneself in solitude, and then return to disclose the (new) thoughts in public. Each public disclosure leads to a private dialogue in which the initial disclosure is treated with the thinking of an entirely different and unique individual who then discloses his thoughts

on that which has been disclosed by another. The second person's response becomes a disclosure *if* the second person has thought by virtue of having had a genuine dialogue with himself. However, if the second person merely sends out exactly, and without thought, what was previously disclosed, this response is neither disclosure nor action; at best it is merely a *re-disclosure* of someone else who has already been disclosed, and thus adding nothing to the deliberation. If, however, the re-action is new, and is followed by other genuine actions, the participants are constantly presented with new actions to inform new thoughts, creating a sequence in which each participant participates and combines with the others to learn something new with each subsequent disclosure and publicly participate in the development of morality.

A person who is a thinker and an actor, whose thoughts and actions are constitutive of his inherent natality, must enact morality in the public realm. "With word and deed we insert ourselves in the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth."[336] Doing so allows morality to become the public dialogue that it must become, and that public realm is constitutive of a political, social, and moral process. The questions one asks oneself arise out of the problems of living in the world with others, putting morality squarely in public, existing in engagement with others through self-disclosure. The engagement is one of action and reaction, revelation and response, creating public dialogue in morality. It is also uncertain. By entering the public dialogue in morality one throws one's lot in with others, one's community, and all of humanity. It is a choice to not force or coerce, and, as Christine Korsgaard puts it, "to share, to trust, and generally speaking to risk your happiness or success on the hope that [others] will turn out to be human," too.[337]

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[336] Arendt, The Human Condition, 176.

[337] Christine M Korsgaard, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations," *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, no. Ethics (1992): 306.

6.1.3 The Unfinished Uncertainty of Morality

The interplay between thinking and acting must occur in order for something moral to be going on. Neither received tradition nor non-judgmental relativism requires such thought. In fact, relativism merely conditions one to never think nor make judgments, while accepting received judgments entails not thinking and the re-disclosure of judgments already made, providing nothing new. Such inertia exists in defiance and opposition to human plurality and requires an almost deliberate artificiality or denial of the human condition.[338] Lev Yakubinsky claims that dialogue is a natural consequence of social life. Language and communication grew out of social living by necessity. Dialogue takes place with interruptions and unpredictable twists and turns, reflecting the plurality of humans involved. Monologue, however, can exist only with suppression of interruption, sometimes internally regulated, but usually regulated by rules placed upon participants so as to constrain their natural impulse to participate. It is for this reason that ideological morals that are presented for acceptance without argument cannot suffice for public consideration; doing so would not be a public action. Further, most of these received morals are re-disclosed by people who themselves have not thought about them, thus their disclosure of them is not a true disclosure, but rather a re-disclosure and therefore not a public action. In contrast, accepting a challenge to one's moral disclosure, considering it in examination of life experience, and responding with a new disclosure are actions born of natality, require thought and action, and need both the private and public realms.

What makes this process difficult is that the consequences of action or the re-actions that follow our (moral) disclosures are infinitely unpredictable; we can have no way of knowing the consequences of our actions, which Arendt says are boundless, before they are unleashed. This

[338] See Lev Petrovich Yakubinsky and Michael Eskin, "On Dialogic Speech," *PMLA* 112, no. 2 (1997).

fact does not stop people from attempting to deny the fact of unpredictability, or to rein in the uncertainties of an uncertain world. For most people uncertainty is unsettling and makes it difficult to know what to do in the face of so many contingencies. People want some way of determining indeterminate outcomes to soothe anxieties: thus the appeal of received morals based on authority and tradition. They provide both a pre-approved guide for action that eliminates the fear of 'doing the wrong thing' and the perception of stability and predictability in how actions—and the actions of others—will be received and approved. This need for reassurance might also be a sign that we lack confidence in our own capabilities for action.[339] It may result from a direct knowledge of our limitations, and thus the desire to protect ourselves from the potential failure of what we do. The problem with restrictive models is that action, through the establishment of relationships, exceeds limits and boundaries,[340] including the boundaries of received, bounded systems of morals. Alternately, this uncertainty may arouse a fear of using and possessing judgment because doing so implies the admission that if one is capable of judging one might also possess responsibility.[341] Human action and genuine natal disclosure will eventually blow apart any preconceived limits or constraints placed upon it and render the received morals unreliable in the face of both thought and action.

It might be that no one has any responsibility. Arendt identifies a seed of this perception in noting, "behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has

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[339] See Honig, Bonnie, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Honig suggests that such reassurances were sought by the revolutionaries of the American Revolution through their resurrection of ideas, processes, and thoughts from ancient thinkers in order to support their wholly radical project.

[340] Arendt, The Human Condition, 190.

[341] Korsgaard, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends," 323-324.

done."[342] If it can be shown that human actions are the result of unseen factors or psychological influences caused by external conditions or actors, one can more easily evade culpability with either oneself or others. Psychologists and sociologists can provide alibis for us by citing such behavior-modifying factors as parental influence, peer group pressures, or, in some instances, genetics. However, if we accept any of these alibis as absolution for our actions, then we cannot hold others accountable for theirs, all of which results in the elimination of the possibility of possessing moral judgment of others and convinces ourselves that none can be made of us, either. This is the refuge of relativism. Further, it is quite possible that if unseen factors have the kind of interference posited then we are even more responsible for what we do, obligating us to take steps to offset the corrupting influence of these unseen factors.[343] However, responsibility, both yours and others', is entailed in cosmopolitanism. In order to hold someone responsible we must regard him as a 'person' who is free and autonomous. Admitting shared humanity brings others into the domain of 'persons' and grants them both consideration and responsibility, thus admitting them into the domain of responsible persons. Assigning responsibility means they cannot also be excluded from considerations and deliberations of morality because this would push him outside of the circle of shared humanity, something a cosmopolitan cannot do. Second, wielding judgment, especially under the auspices of some authority, logically and implicitly subjects oneself to the same precepts. In this way cosmopolitanism escapes relativism and preserves the capacity for judgment through responsibility.

Arendt would also recognize, in this context, that a search for consensus in morality,

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[342] See Hannah Arendt, "Personal Responsibility Under a Dictatorship" in *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 17-48.

[343] It is also possible that the distinction between a 'reason' and a 'cause' is being lost here. There are many causes for human actions and behaviors, very few of which individuals themselves might count as reasons.

while ostensibly noble, would ultimately undermine its own value and would only be successful in creating the conditions under which evil could emerge. First, such a thing would be impossible in a world of unique human beings, flush with natality, plurality, and potential for action. Second, if something approaching consensus could be found, it would wipe out action, which would eliminate the need for thinking—what would one need to think about if all was agreed upon and nothing new was brought into the world to challenge the old world?—and without thinking there would the be loss of a crucial barrier to tyranny (of the single authoritarian or the majority, it would not matter which) and thus usher evil through the front door.[344] Third, and contemporaneous with the second point, if consensus was found how would those who found the consensus protect it from future challenge by new members born into the society, dangerously brimming with natality? The 'old guard' would have to constrain human action, perhaps even violently, denying the natality inherent in human life, and prescribe all parameters and constraints, thus taking the direct route to an ultimately illegitimate coercive state of the world, leading to the same world-destroying conditions of the second point.

Arendt finds that "life without speech and without action…is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men."[345] Living a life in speech and action among others automatically entails morality, however uncertain its content. To live a human life that contains the human conditions of natality, action, and plurality, one must accept the inherent unpredictability contained in each of these conditions. What makes each person unique, what enables action, and what preserves natality is the unavoidable unpredictability, and therefore uncertainty, of human life. Morality, as an always-emergent

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[344] This does not preclude a sense of temporary consensus in both process and result, but instead is to deny a final, immutable consensus.

[345] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178.

product of human plurality and action, finds its place in the world as a result of these conditions and occupies a central role in human life. I would add this concept to Arendt's list of human conditions: the human condition of uncertainty, a condition whose inevitable presence logically demands an understanding of life and morality as unfinished—or, rather, *never* finished—business. The acceptance of the ineradicability of pluralism and uncertainty encourages thinking and action and disposes one to be prepared to inhabit an agonistic state of morality.

6.2 Discourse Ethics and Agonistic Pluralism

Discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism need not maintain a mutually exclusive relationship in cosmopolitan education, and one can bring them together by thinking with Arendt. Arendt's conception of power is situated in the public sphere, where people engage in collaborative action, though they may actually be acting in opposition to each other as they might in moral contestation. Where Arendt has 'power,' as derived from collaborative public action, Habermas has "common convictions," which "create the legitimate power for which strategic actors then *compete.*"[346] That competition is the contestation of 'the political' in 'politics' per Mouffe. Arendt's 'power' is action, and action creates relationships with the world and others in it by exceeding limits and boundaries.[347] Those relationships introduce the moral component of life by provoking consideration of what those limitations and boundaries are or ought to be.

In this context, action is the disclosure of the moral self in public which affects one's relationships in the world. While Arendt asserts that human action is universal and public (insofar as all humans are potential actors) which affirms Habermas, each human behind each

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[346] Jane Mansbridge, "Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity" in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, edited ed. Seyla Benhabib, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 51. Emphasis in original.

[347] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 190.

action is unique and the way in which one inserts one's self into the human world is a representation of that uniqueness, thus admitting the ineradicable nature of plurality which affirms Mouffe. The production of Habermas's "common conviction" lies in the manner in which communication can take place and the processes by and through which the participants act with each other to deliberate. For Arendt that potentiality lies in 'power' which is the actualization of natality through action. According to Arendt, power requires "the living together of people,"[348] —'living' in the sense in which Arendt means that human 'life' occurs in 'action.' Though people may all live on the earth, and in doing so share humanity in common, they cannot act unless in the presence of others, and it is only through public action that morality has life. It is not enough to act *as though* or *because* there are other people; in such cases morality is a secondary consideration to one's acts. Instead, action in the world occurs *with* other people and thus they become not only a primary consideration, but also an actualized component of our actions and morality.

To maintain the conditions for human action people must remain in contact with each other. Arendt credits cities and the 'organization' within them with keeping people together after action has passed, a period during which people can and do withdraw to both their private lives as well as the solitary nature of 'thinking.' Discourse ethics can help provide 'organization' by and through which further action can take place by contributing a structure and process that invites everyone to participate in action in order to progress. The acceptance of the preconditions of communication and the democratic principles that undergird them provide a consistent public space in which individual speech action can take place.

It is in these preconditions where Mouffe's agonism can find a space to enter without

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[348] Ibid., 201.

disrupting the process. There are preconditions that can even be preconditions of Habermas's preconditions. For instance, Erman notes that there can "be no conflict without deliberation" and "conflict is dependent on some shared idea of what is at stake"[349]—the conflict must be about something that the different parties have in common, something as simple as a dislike of the status quo even if the reasons are different. Essentially they must at least agree about what the disagreement is about. Or, they might disagree about what the disagreement is about but agree that there is a disagreement. Thus a consensus is formed among the participants in the conflict, but by no means necessarily as a permanent or immutable consensus; it is not monolithic. For Erman, the "shared idea" is an 'impediment' to Mouffe's rejection of a form of consensus in the ethico-political principles of politics because it represents a consensus; if Mouffe holds that conflict due to plurality is inevitable, then Mouffe admits consensus. However, for Mouffe "the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility, since the particular forms of life which are presented as its 'impediments' are its very condition of possibility."[350] Thus the difference here is largely about *where* the consensus lies and not in consensus, per se. Further, Erman takes consensus narrowly: those engaged in conflict. Mouffe takes consensus more broadly, including everyone who *could be* engaged in the conflict. Two different 'populations' are at issue, and thus the two conceptions of consensus are not comparable.

The forms of life for Mouffe that exist as impediments are a result of plurality, and such plurality is opposed to a moral consensus consisting of an impartiality that is impossible to attain. The shared idea, or the 'that' which is at stake, is that people will continue to relate with and to

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[349] Erman, "What is Wrong with Agonistic Pluralism?" 1047.

[350] Mouffe, *Democratic Paradox*, 98.

each other, through deliberations of morality, and is the active process of inhabiting agonism. The shared idea is that there is something to be done or changed; there is a better way or outcome to be pursued. Conflict itself can form a precondition of communication. The omnipresence of human plurality guarantees that conflict, or antagonism, will always be present and serve as a compulsion for adjudication. Preserving the natality of each person's potential for contributing to the alterations that come from joining in the adjudication is essential for morality to continue its role in human life, despite the conflict or hostility that may be provoked.

The 'domestication' of hostility by 'politics' that Mouffe invokes is a process that recognizes the multiple conceptions of the good and the conflicts therein—the results of the condition of human plurality—but also recognizes that each is allowed its place in speech action (Arendt) or communicative action (Habermas). The domestication of hostility and the actions that cause it are one in the same; human speech and action mean, "to take an initiative, to begin, to set something into motion."[351] The human condition of plurality ensures that 'hostility' or antagonism will obtain, and thus what remains is for action to emerge. Speaking or acting introduces one into the world. When one recognizes another's action one admits acceptance of the other person as another human and the act of acting among others is an act of being human. Re-acting to another person's speech act with one's own introduces the conflict, tension, and agonism of two humans interacting as well as the means by which the conflict can be transformed from antagonism of eliminative violence to collaborative inter-action. The action here is a dialogue of disclosures—of one's self into the world as well as into the argument/interaction with the other person—that admit concurrent possibilities. One set of possibilities might include the interest in the actions such as an issue, argument, topic, policy, or

[351] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 177.

morality, while another set might include the interest in an improvement regarding that which governs our interactions such as policies, procedures, or morals. Yet another possibility might lie in an interest in seeing the thing through or in legitimizing the process by and through which we act by finding some ground upon which to contest each other.

In a move similar to Arendt's distinction between 'work' and 'action,' Habermas makes a distinction between 'work' and 'interaction,' wherein *work* refers to instrumental and strategic activities and *interaction* involves the negotiation of behaviors[352] that guide certain norms, particularly those involving coordinated, concurrent, or otherwise shared activities.[353] The dialogue of action that occurs in this agonistic, yet democratic, state is vital to the formation of morality. The actual contestation of the ideas that are disclosed by participants tests the substance of each disclosure. Participants receive the disclosures of others in a milieu of disclosure and response, thinking and reflection, as each moves back and forth from the private to the public to think and act. Participating in this process puts one in the middle of a shared morality as well as a shared inquiry and education in morality. Its public nature entails its placement in the moral domain and as (potential) public actors each of us is an agent of morality.[354]

6.3 The Educational Value of Moral Agonism

Agonism sits at the intersection of plurality and unpredictability and at the cusp of

[352] For Arendt 'behaviors' are merely the imitation or repetition of activities that have been learned by rote or indoctrination and are not the result or embodiment of 'action' as she conceives it. The sense of 'behavior' used here is intended in a broader sense than Arendt would abide, but does not run afoul of previous or coming invocations of 'action.'

[353] See James Bohman and William Rehg, "Jürgen Habermas" ed. Edward N. Zalta *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (2009).

[354] An 'agent of morality' is formulated in opposition to 'moral agent' in order to indicate our capacity and potential for moral action and not to imply that each of us is qualitatively a moral agent (i.e. not immoral agents), something that could very well be false.

education. Gert Biesta asserts that plurality is "the condition of education itself,"[355] and education should be "first and foremost concerned with the opportunities for human beings to come into the world,"[356] but in order to be so it must entail interaction with others, not merely being among them. Education is an endeavor that is often organized with and for certainty, confidence, and a presumption of its merits. The content is presented to students, usually without alternatives, and they are then assessed to see if they have learned it. The assessments are also used to determine if the methods used to teach the students have been effective. If not, they are redesigned in order to increase the likelihood, attempting to approach certainty, that more students will learn the content next time. Teachers are encouraged to engage in this kind of 'reflection' on their activities all for the sake of *ensuring* that more and more learning takes place. Educational content is an explicit admission of what the designers of it desire the learners to know; the organizing principle of certainty is an implicit admission that the process by which this is done is secondary.

But how can we be certain that certainty will be achieved in the face of so much plurality and natality? One popular and widely enacted answer is the implementation of standardization in education. The aforementioned efforts to achieve certain predetermined outcomes are all designed to adhere to a standard, a fixed set of content and criteria designed to ensure that every educational effort has the same aim, goal, assessment, and relative measurement for each student. Standardization is one dominant response to the quest for certainty that fulfils the aims and capabilities of a technical and instrumental approach to education. Standardization provides a familiar, common, easily articulated set of discrete educational goals that eliminate educational

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[355] Biesta, "Why 'What Works' Won't Work," 94.

[356] Gert Biesta, *Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future*, (Boulder: Paradigm, 2006), 70.

and intellectual variation that might otherwise produce unforeseen and unpredictable outcomes. Standardization adds further efficiency and certainty to educational efforts by making it easier to deliver, administer, and assess those efforts.

However, the injection of agonism into such an educational world disrupts those determinate and determining efforts. Agonism cannot be meant to understand learning as the acquisition of that which already exists in the world, but instead as a response to what exists and to new insertions. Biesta writes that someone has learned "*not* when she is able to copy and reproduce what already existed, but when she responds to what is unfamiliar, what is different, what challenges, irritates, or even disturbs."[357] The acquisition of forms of knowledge or logic admits us into a 'rational community,' which is a community of people who are connected by *what* is said and whether it is justified. However, there is another community, the 'other' community, which is constituted by those not circumscribed by the rational community. This 'other' community is different and it challenges the rational community and disturbs it. In a rational community, since what matters is only *what* is said and its justification, anyone can say it, and therefore everyone becomes interchangeable. Biesta states that we need to maintain the 'other' community because if it disappears, so does the world. Maintaining the possibility of difference and challenge in the world is vital. Such experience forces us to confront agonism head-on and is a first step in reversing the natality-destroying trends of certainty and standardization. These certainty and standardization efforts in education seek to make teaching, learning, education, and even life, 'easier,' but as long as thinking and natality can be preserved, they will not.

Rather than seeking ways to make education easier we need to make it harder in order to

[357] Ibid., 68.

make it better, by restoring the tempering effects of *agon* in forging educated beings. Agonism is vital for an education in morality in particular, and education in general. Agonistic pluralism may appear to make it more difficult to resolve moral differences and even harder to say something definitive about morality, but those difficulties must not be avoided. It is easier to flail about aimlessly in moral relativism or to fall back upon some 'authority' to defend your moral choices for you in a received moral tradition, but such retreats limit the educational value of the efforts. The real work in education, the gain and growth, takes place when students challenge the boundaries that have been previously drawn, both in ability and conception, and the real work in education in morality lies in the same. One may have the conversation with oneself, a necessary dialogue to be sure, in order to produce legitimate thought, but those thoughts are not 'in the world' until they have been disclosed through human action which must be public and most effectively through speech action. Revealing one's moral self is risky and making one's moral thoughts public can be daunting, but this must be done if one is to have any kind of input in the life of morality. Others doing the same may oppose or contradict what one discloses, but one must be revealed in order to renew the world of morality and to keep morality meaningfully relevant to those new members of the 'world,' the space in which revelations become public.[358]

Earlier, it was suggested that agonism appeared to be the contemporary norm and constant state of affairs because of the ongoing contestation of existing norms, policies and laws. Yet in these contexts, the desire of most parties is to 'win' the policy argument, implement the winning policy, and then keep that policy in perpetuity. Alas, for such aspirants in a democracy, and particularly in those examples we presently have, it is extremely difficult for such designs to withstand constant and evolving opposition. In these empirical cases agonism (which, more

[358] See Arendt, "A Conversation with Günther Gaus," 19.

accurately, is merely antagonism) persists only because the 'winners' of these debates are unable to implement their policies permanently. As stated before, most of those interested in specific morals and moral norms are not hoping to revise their judgments or open them to debate, but are instead seeking to compel others to accept and obey them. Agonism does not seek contest in order to determine a 'winner' or specific outcome, but rather to test and improve the mettle of that which is being contested. A good contest is one that is contested well by all participants, not one that has simply produced a result. Further, if both participants are there to contest the better idea, and if the contest is well executed, neither loses. In fact both participants win because a well-contested bout will result in a more accurate determination of the better idea, something from which both contestants can benefit.

The kind of educational world that utilizes discourse ethics and agonism while couched within the framework of cosmopolitan education guided by cosmopolitan philosophy describes a state of being in education in morality that I call *moral agonism*. Cosmopolitan education, as an education in morality, asks the participants to stand in spaces in between dueling certainties, dogmas, traditions, and received knowledge. It is a signpost for processes that are based on our shared humanity—which essentially stands for the shared conditions of being human—and neither a medium of specific answers nor a roadmap of directions. It does not solve the 'problem' of plurality, but rather embraces it by inhabiting agonism in morality. Using Mouffe's phrasing, cosmopolitan education attempts to convert the antagonism in morals education into the agonism of an education in morality. It is firmly rooted in our humanness, in the hard facts of the conditions of human life that define, inform, and constrain us, from plurality to natality and from thought to action. It asks us to transcend fallible and largely arbitrary boundaries erected by humans, but by doing so it is an almost explicit replacement of transcendent impulses for

concrete, dialogic, and pragmatic ones. We live in a world with other people and each one is unique, a characteristic that is shared by all. None of us can predict, nor hope to control, what will arise when any or all of us choose to act in the world and yet each of us that does so in the context of morality will do so because we want to make the world better in the face of the uncertainty that it will actually become so. By inhabiting moral agonism one can participate in a cosmopolitan education in morality despite impulses for certainty.

The desire for certainty in morality leads educators in the field of moral education into all kinds of trouble. When education is organized to deliver 'true knowledge' there is no need to pay attention to anything that is not 'true.' There is no need to question or investigate, and nothing to compare to that which has been given.[359] In contrast, moral agonism takes the uncertainty of moral 'truth' as a starting point, and the unpredictability of what might replace it as the only certainty. Moral agonists cannot rely on the 'truth' of moral claims, only on their justification via *agon* in public disclosure. Education in general is the process by which someone enters "into a community of thought and action,"[360] and such a community governed by the principles of discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism as offered here, as well as thought and action as conceived by Arendt, and concerning itself with morality, brings one into communion with others through moral agonism.[361] Education, not unlike morality, cannot allow itself to suffer from a lack of thought in order to produce action; this would doom us to either re-creating under the guise of the new, or of unthinkingly accepting the old, and thereby be devoid of genuine

[359] Carsten Ljunggren, "Agonistic Recognition in Education: On Arendt's Qualification of Political and Moral Meaning," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 1 (2010): 20.

[360] Ljunggren, "Agonistic Recognition in Education," 19.

[361] By 'communion' I mean an act of sharing, of intimate fellowship and rapport in a deliberative dialogue of mutual interpretation. It does not have to be harmonious nor conflict free, but in the coming together for a particular purpose in a form of public and communicative action one forms a 'community' within which one lives in action, however briefly.

action. Further, we must take care to avoid overemphasis on simple communication (of opinions, or moral claims) with a concurrent lack of emphasis on thinking about them.

Discourse ethics and agonism, through the framework of cosmopolitan education, offer similar functions for moral inquiry. The payoff is not in the product, but in the process. The product does matter; morality education is, after all, a quest to find potentially prescriptive behaviors to address problems we encounter through experience and it is nothing if not an attempt to improve our lives. However, it is not only about producing outcomes, but also about aligning *ourselves* with the outcomes and part of our alignment comes from the process that gets us there. The two-in-one questions itself to find out if they-he can live with themselves-himself and the process they-he have engaged. Socrates concluded that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm and cosmopolitan education carries with it this barest of prescriptions by implicitly prescribing that one consider one's fellow human beings in action. Acting in the world is a responsibility and cannot be taken lightly nor without skilled deliberations. Our shared humanity and living space bring such concerns to the forefront of every action we take; we must not only be in harmony with ourselves, but also with those whom our very contemplation serves to consider. The double-edged sword of morality cuts both ways, provoking our actions and thoughts to constantly adjust and triangulate between each of them and others, though without a final certainty or fixed destination.

For moral agonism, having or maintaining agonism is not enough. Agonism involves not only contestation, but also contestation for the appropriate reasons; to test and improve, often as a reaction of dissent or disapproval, and sometimes passively rather than actively. In moral agonism the desire is to encourage the contestation, and therefore deliberations, in order to improve the existing understanding of morality, to make what understanding we have clearer,

stronger, and more efficacious. Moral agonism, in short, is an educational mechanism. In attempting to transform antagonism in deliberations of morality into agonism one transforms the processes utilized. Processes such as those that adhere to non-thinking, non-participatory principles or static traditions lie outside the moral domain and are antagonistic, and need to be transformed into agonistic processes that take place within the domain of morality and have as their object inclusive participation and improvement of its own processes as well as its products, such as morals. Further, these agonistic processes are utilized to strengthen and improve what they contact such as the policies they produce, the reflective and active methods of morality they encourage, and the skills in morality of those who participate. Shared humanity, democratic inclusion, infinite human pluralism, and ethical progress are combined in a process of constant disclosure, action and reaction, inquiry and evaluation, natality and growth.

Conclusion

This chapter began by examining the important role that thinking plays in morality wherein thinking is a process by and through which one has a dialogue with oneself and attempts to come to an agreement with oneself about morality. This agreement, however sound, is not enough to suffice for morality until it produces an action, usually through speech and in the public sphere. The action produced, if a product of the individual's natality and genuine thought, is a disclosure of the self and an insertion of something 'new' into the world. The human condition of plurality provokes an onslaught of actions and re-actions, or interactions, that for morality produce the content of a public dialogue in morality to be challenged and tested through agonism. Cosmopolitan moral education engages students in public acts, or deliberations, of morality, pressing individuals to inquire about morality, think about their moral choices, and publicly justify them. The ineradicability of the human condition of plurality and the

preservation of natality ensure that morality is never complete or ‘finished,’ but instead continues to emerge from the ‘old’ world into the ‘new,’ constantly renewing itself. Cosmopolitan education requires that one recognize the benefits of agonism whilst in the throes of public insertions about morality, resulting in the inhabiting of a political, moral, and dialogic educational agonistic morality.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

7.1 A Review: Looking Backward

The preceding chapters were organized around large, self-sustaining concepts that were brought together: a chapter on cosmopolitan philosophy and education and another on cosmopolitan processes and ethical progress; a chapter on the field of moral education and education in morality; a chapter on political processes in dialogue; and finally a chapter primarily about the work of Hannah Arendt in thinking, plurality, and public action. This project could have instead been a treatise on cosmopolitan philosophy and education wherein I could have summoned the various other contributions—discourse ethics here and moral thought there—as specific pieces of the cosmopolitan education in morality puzzle were assembled. However, since it was made clear in Chapter 3 that process matters, it did not 'feel right' to throw the pieces together to merely serve the end of creating a picture of cosmopolitan education in morality. Doing so would have felt like a contradiction of my statement in Chapter 1 in which I stated that due to cosmopolitanism's inherent non-dogmatism one cannot simply prescribe a pedagogy and say, "There, now go do this." Instead, this project required that each piece be taken through its own processes and justifications so that the value of each could be revealed. Such a process is not at all unlike a cosmopolitan educational model in which each person is provided the opportunity to contribute something of value to morality.

The model embodied by the project also possesses a challenging characteristic; there is no absolute or perfect starting point in connecting these apparently disparate ideas. I could have started with any of these points and worked through the others. I could have begun with politics and finished with the field moral education. Or instead I could have started with natality, a

beginning that would be thematically appropriate, and concluded with a gathering under the cosmopolitan umbrella. This flexibility is indicative of functional elasticity rather than formlessness, and the locus of that flexibility is on the nature of cosmopolitan philosophy and education. I began with cosmopolitanism because of its framing characteristics. It lays down a few 'ground rules' that are derived from seemingly incontrovertible principles in order to then dispose what follows to certain processes. The chief ground rule, that we humans are connected through the fact of our shared humanity, is well worn and time tested, but it suffers from some conceptual confusion. Is it only our 'good' characteristics that count as 'humanity' and bring us together? Can someone be *inhuman*? If a human can do something unspeakably bad, how can that *not* be a part of what it means to be human? It is for this reason that Arendt was brought in to bridge the gaps between the other pieces and offer support for shared humanity. Arendt provides a bookend to cosmopolitanism and provides cosmopolitan philosophy with a stronger foundation in shared humanity through her conception of the human condition. Taken this way, the political processes described in the middle chapters serve as planks on the bridge that connect the support pilings of cosmopolitanism and Arendt, and they form a partnership in an education in morality.

The processes of epistemological restraint, discourse ethics, and agonistic pluralism were invoked as a synthesis of means for people to engage in moral dialogue, contribute to ethical progress, and maintain democratic inclusiveness essential to shared humanity in recognition of all person's inhabitation of the human condition. The human condition of human plurality forces upon us issues of morality. Our actions in the world as responses to that plurality make us all participants in politics and morality, through which the human condition of natality prevents us from ever knowing what is going to happen as a result of our actions. These Arendtian human conditions are more formal and conceptually clear articulations of what our shared humanity

actually shares. It also accommodates a more expansive and inclusive conception of humanity by retaining the inclusion of those who violate morality. Possessing the potential to do something 'bad' is as much a part of the human condition and natality as it is to have the potential to do something 'good.' Natality shows us that it is the potential that initially binds us. Recognizing this prevents 'badness' from becoming grounds for exclusion from humanity. Our failings, moral and otherwise, are a part of what we share and thus the cosmopolitan principle of shared humanity is truly shared, from top to bottom and from best to worst.

Chapter 2 framed the project with cosmopolitanism. From the principle of shared humanity to the logical consequent of democratic inclusiveness, the parameters for what followed were set. The recognition of living with other people, the necessity of openness and receptivity to the world, and the concurrent need to engage dynamically with it circumscribed a general attitude that could help maintain a commitment to shared humanity and the democratic impulses therein while also recognizing that there is always a new understanding to be had. Chapter 3 underscored the importance of process in cosmopolitan education in morality in light of the framing conditions set in Chapter 2 such that even though human actions are undertaken for certain ends, the processes by which they are attained contain valuable and formative characteristics in morality. Philip Kitcher's ethical progress provided a historically grounded description and vision of ongoing processes of collaborative ethical deliberation that fall within cosmopolitan parameters, and are able to accommodate the political processes outlined in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 developed the concept of education in morality and distinguished it from other prevalent forms of moral education. Education in morality—as a process-centric, democratically inclusive, non-dogmatic inquiry grounded in the principles of what education is—is suited to accommodate an education in natality, which protects in students both the

intrinsic unique potential for creative action in the world and protects the world from their inevitable false starts. Education in morality and natality combine to place the student in a position to understand morality and participate in its development through the political processes examined in Chapter 5. With the cosmopolitan and educational tone thusly set, the political processes of epistemological restraint, discourse ethics, and agonistic pluralism were mined for their contributions to a cosmopolitan educational dialogue and inquiry in morality. Epistemological restraint creates a rational and publicly shareable space for those with contrasting beliefs to continue to deliberate meaningfully with others. Discourse ethics provides a method by which interested parties can collaborate in deliberation with genuine interest, while agonistic pluralism shows that even though difference is ineradicable it is also necessary to active and democratic life. Chapter 6 synthesized these process and the cosmopolitan conditions that framed them through Arendt's conceptions of thinking, action, and the public realm of politics and morality.

Wilson's critique of moral education exposes the importance of the processes, criteria, and methods through which we come to understand and participate in morality. Wilson is correct, I think, in seeing that scientific methods have something to offer moral philosophers and educators, namely that all theories, results, and conclusions must be tested and retested and verified, and then re-examined again when new information comes to light. Where Wilson goes wrong is in presuming to offer criteria that are only descriptive and based upon very rationalistic principles. His criteria are an interesting place to begin; they are a 'conversation starter,' but should not be seen as a resting place. Science is at its best and most accurate when it is

descriptive; in prediction it merely plays the percentages and often falls apart.[362] For instance, climatologists go to great lengths to understand and describe climate patterns and effects. Within the field there is very little dissent about the descriptive effects of climate change in the past century and very few climatologists who have concluded that there has been no such change. Most of the controversy about climate change exists outside of the field and revolves around prescriptions for what to do about it. Climatologists may offer prescriptions for how to slow or reverse human-influenced climate change, and these prescriptions are likely to be better than those of non-scientists for achieving the goals intended, but they are based on probability models on *what they currently know* from the descriptive data. In morality it is similar. For example, the Defining Issues Test might identify certain types of moral reasoning and the processes by and through which they develop.[363] It might also be able to make prescriptions for how to duplicate or prevent the same processes and development, but these, too, will be based on probabilities of what we know, and more importantly, will not tell us what morals we *ought* to have.

There is, however, a crucial difference; whether or not one agrees that human-influenced climate change is occurring, most people agree that it is best to not harm the world's climate. This is why those who oppose climate change theories attempt to discredit the science. The moment they accept that human activities are inducing climate changed they cannot reasonably oppose any attempts to slow or reverse this process. In morality, the issue is not so clear. It is not only a questions of whether or not a particular behavior is moral, but also a question of what

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[362] Prescription is hard to conceive in meteorology unless one considers climatologists' prescriptions for how to slow or reverse human-influenced climate change, or how to avoid getting wet when it rains—bring an umbrella or a raincoat.

[363] Defining Issues Test (DIT), is a test of moral reasoning and development constructed by James Rest. It consists of five moral dilemmas about which subjects are asked to provide responses using a Likert scale, thus providing quantitative data for analysis. See "The Center for the Study of Ethical Development," 2008, http://www.centerforthestudyofethicaldevelopment.net/.

exactly morality is. Climatologists generally have a clear idea about what counts as relevant data and how to collect it, though they are always interested in exploring news ways to improve these methods. In morality we are still, and always, engaged with the fundamental step of figuring out what the domain itself is and what it is that counts as moral. In climatology and most other sciences the question of what 'climate' is has been settled, leaving only the descriptive aspects to pursue, and there are few if any debates about climate is. In morality, however, the answer to the descriptive question does not tell us what morality is nor what ought to be moral.

Further complicating matters is that this moral business is social. Social forces have created in each of us a type of subjective foundation. I cannot help to deliberate from 'some place,' from some position in and among the things I am evaluating. Williams concluded, "I must deliberate from what I am."[364] Nevertheless, what I am is not always so clear and the origins and influences that make up what I am are so numerous and non-discrete that reductivist attempts at clarification become downright silly in their futility. Least of all 'I' cannot be reduced only to the experiences I have had because those are constantly happening or being revealed, and so many more are yet to come. However, I can remain open to potential influences by the things that are not part of my historical and experiential background. I am who I am precisely because I can change and be changed, influence and be influenced. If this were not the case I would not be me. I would instead be you and everyone else and we would all be exactly the same. Human plurality condemns us to both being who we are and to becoming another version of ourselves. As a human, the ability to influence and to *act* in the world must necessarily be accompanied by the potential to be *acted upon* and influenced. And just as one might choose to *not* act, one might also choose to not be acted upon. However, if we are to take Arendt's assertion seriously, that

[364] Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 200.

one who chooses to not act, to not live among others, has chosen a life that has "ceased to be a human life,"[365] then it becomes clear that we must be open to either both possibilities or neither of them.

> How truthfulness to an existing self or society is to be combined with reflection, self-understanding, and criticism is a question that philosophy, itself, cannot answer. It is the kind of question that has to be answered through reflective living. The answer has to be discovered, or established, as the result of a process, personal and social, which essentially cannot formulate the answer in advance, except in an unspecific way.[366]

In seeking to educate in morality we cannot simply say 'here it is, learn it, be it, live it.' Instead we need to think about it ourselves, determine whether or not it is something we can countenance, and then bring about our actions in living in a manner that reflects those thoughts. Through our actions in life we make our morality public, subjecting it to the judgments and reflections of others. Our actions are both items to judge and points to consider and they come back to us, perhaps differently, as they are re-transmitted into the world by others. Whether we humans possess the capacity for 'universal moral grammar' or whether we are merely self-interested utility-maximizers, the processes of justification, verification, and adjudication take place through personal *and* social processes and are the only way in which morality can exist. Ideologically distinct and bounded forms of life may call themselves morality, but they are instead non-political, non-moral constructions that deny the dynamism, pluralism, and natality of human existence.

In a simplistic way cosmopolitanism does contain an acceptance of the idea of a universal

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[365] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 176.

[366] Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 200.

moral grammar.[367] It recognizes the importance of social environments and individual autonomy, and it accepts what should be obvious; humans have the capacity to conceive of and develop morality. This can be seen in the same way that humans can conceive of and develop language. The first language each of us speaks is almost entirely determined by our social environment, but that does not mean we cannot develop the capacity to think and speak in other languages. Sometimes one language is more suited to our communication needs than another (e.g. schadenfreude) and thus possessing the capacity—and on a continuum, a realized capacity that is closer to proficiency than mere potential—to access or learn other languages is beneficial. Similarly, cosmopolitanism enables recognition of the contribution that other forms of life and morality can make to our own lives. Having the capacity to deeply consider and reflect upon multiple ways of living and multiple conceptions of morality is likely to evoke a more steadfast disposition to respect, engage, and collaborate with them in the further development of morality.

This latter characteristic is the other tine in the fork of cosmopolitan education's flexible orientation to change that most bounded systems of morality do not have. One is encouraged to expand and develop morality, not merely take it as it is. Words and concepts are added to languages all of the time, and other words and concepts fade into disuse, obscurity, and even obsolescence, and it has been no different for morality nor is it likely to be. There is an expectation that one will be capable of both accepting and initiating change. The importance of agency in the development of morality is a kind of inoculation against becoming a passive recipient of moral principles and strictures.

We are left with a human condition in which morality is active, public, unpredictable, and ever changing, a conception that renders fixed systems of morality incapable of responding to

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[367] See Marc Hauser, *Moral Minds*; and John Mikhail, "Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 11, no, 4 (2007).

new conditions that emerge in the world. A person who hopes to be a moral actor and developer must be educationally disposed to the unpredictability of morality. This disposition involves the inhabitation of moral agonism, a space wherein mutually respectful adversaries who are genuinely interested in finding the best idea contest their ideas. This disposition requires the acceptance of unpredictability and the inevitability of change, the desire for improvement, the humility of recognized fallibility, the necessity of democratic inclusion, and the daunting awareness that the moral project will never be finished.

7.2 The Implications: Looking Around Us

The results of this project have a few implications for education, morality, and research. Due to the recent increase in interest in cosmopolitan philosophy in education, this project attempts to lay down a path for exploring cosmopolitanism's potential in the field of moral education. I hope to offer moral educators a wider range of options and a more flexible framework for introducing education in morality to students in light of increased global intercultural contact. This education in morality does not abandon moral judgment, but it does leave behind the antiquated notion that morals and morality are permanently fixed. This admission leaves open the possibility of amendment to moral constructions and enables an individual to more competently adapt to new understandings of the world and developments in morality. Individuals so disposed will also be more likely to possess the capacity to participate in the development of morality rather than be a passive recipient of received or predetermined moral knowledge.

In this project, the work of Hannah Arendt emerged as an excellent resource for thinking about cosmopolitan education and its role in an education in morality, and though other scholars have leaned on Arendt in order to think about cosmopolitan education, few if any have given her

work so large a role.[368] The affinity between 'shared humanity' and 'the human condition' aside—and no insignificant affinity, either, since the former is the most fundamental principle in cosmopolitan thought—Arendt's conceptions of thinking, natality, and action, as well as important concepts not explored in this research such as forgiveness and promise-making, may offer cosmopolitan education thinkers deep philosophical, political, and conceptual clarity for increasing not only the strength of their arguments, but in providing another language with which to think and converse about what cosmopolitan education is and could be. While Arendt could not be called a cosmopolitan in the sense that such a person is the adherent of a free standing cosmopolitan-'ism,' she has articulated conceptions of the purpose of various political and social activities that sound very cosmopolitan.

> If the solidarity of mankind is to be based on something more solid than the justified fear of mans demonic capabilities, if the new universal neighborship of all countries is to result in something more promising than a tremendous increase in mutual hatred and a somewhat universal irritability of everybody against everybody else, then a process of mutual understanding and progressing self-clarification on a gigantic scale must take place.[369]

Perhaps the 'demeanor' of Arendt's work, a demeanor that might be commonly called too 'realistic' if not a little melancholy, is too hard-edged or depressing for the more optimistic cosmopolitan proponents. I see in Arendt's starkness and cold stare at the human condition an offset to most cosmopolitan thought and also additional tools of investigation. It seems fitting that a scholar whose work has been so difficult to categorize or situate within dominant ideological and theoretical perspectives has much to offer a philosophy that avoids dogmatic prescription. It is my recommendation to cosmopolitan educational theorists to engage Arendt's

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[368] See Biesta, *Beyond Learning*; Todd, *Toward an Imperfect Education*.

[369] Hannah Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World," in *Men In Dark Times*, ed. Mary McCarthy West, 81-94, (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 84.

work more fully so that cosmopolitan education and educators can move beyond simply justifying their claims to the crucial step of enacting their claims in the political and policy-related arenas for development of cosmopolitan educational processes.

An exciting implication of this research is that cosmopolitan education can contribute to moral education in schooling without a specific or dedicated program of moral education curriculum. Since it is the process and the disposition toward inquiry, growth, and the new that matters most, and since cosmopolitan education in morality is established in education rather than in morality, this orientation can find space in any subject area. It can implement the processes of democratic inclusiveness, openness and receptivity, mutual respect, agonistic contestation of ideas, acceptance of fallibility, and necessity of improvement to engage in examination of any content in formal schooling. Whether in a world history class or a chemistry class, cosmopolitanism's openness and recognition of the unsettled and uncertain nature of the world can beget a curiosity in what currently appears to be and in what might come next. Curiosity in education might simply be a differently formed conception of natality since it is a catalyst for inquiry and as a desire to *learn*, as opposed to a desire to *know*, it instigates a process of discovery, comparison, and judgment that can be undertaken regardless of the content.

The critical approach to education in cosmopolitanism encourages attention to differentials and orients one to the spaces of incongruence as much as similarities. Sometimes this means the places where competing ideas conflict and sometimes this means the places in which one idea falls short. It encourages the identification and questions of assumptions. This inherent criticality can be threatening to some because cosmopolitanism holds that all knowledge is open to revision and our most stubborn 'facts' ought to be reviewed periodically. Even our certainties should be vetted and contested, or in agonistic terms, should be tested by the new

challengers that emerge. In education the new challengers take the form of new students, new ideas, and new methods. Cosmopolitan education helps students reconceive these threats as challenges and opportunities to reinforce, improve through revision, or replace what is known with something that might be better.

The deliberate utilization of moral agonism as part of and resulting from a cosmopolitan education in morality suggests a number of benefits. An agonistic orientation in education and in morality is less susceptible to manipulation and rhetoric and hence indoctrination and demagoguery. One so disposed is less likely to accept things at face value or fall prey to clever persuasion. Since moral agonism is grounded in a recognition of the public space of morality and politics it would also increase sensitivity to the instrumental uses of public knowledge and power for unjust individual or private benefit and therefore be a 'canary in the mine' in detecting threats to democracy or justice. A moral agonist would understand morality relationally, as things done with and in consideration of other people. She would understand that collaboration is ever-present and necessary for public moral goods, even in the form of contestation. Others, including adversaries, would be seen as partners in seeking improvement in the rules, customs, structures, and institutions that order social relations. This kind of collaboration would not be a zero-sum game; moral agonist participants would see that even if one's own proposal 'loses,' we all gain from the knowledge of the better idea or way.

The conception of cosmopolitan education developed in this project could serve as a unifying set of principles for the field of moral education. There are many different ideas and forms of moral education and many different theoretical foundations supporting them. The inclusive nature of cosmopolitanism, both in theory as well as in education, could serve to gather together the different moral theories and programs and do two things. First, it could present them

as the content of the conversation or deliberation of morality in education. Cosmopolitanism does not say that one system is good and another bad. It does, however, offer a way to discuss competing forms of moral education that is less about which is 'the one' and more about what each has to offer an education in morality. There may very well be times in which a utilitarian perspective might be 'better' and other times in which a virtue approach would be more compelling. The value of a cosmopolitan education in morality is that, in the spirit of Terence, no morality systems known to man are foreign to it: they all have a place at the table.[370]

Second, the basic principles of cosmopolitanism could be used to sift through the other morality systems to find the compatible components of each and bring them together under one roof. In this case, rather than taking each of the morality systems in total and moderating the 'discussion' between them as it might in the first instance above, it would effectively stand as the mediating set of principles or criteria for what might be included in the discussions. For instance, any prescription found in another morality system that allowed for the implementation of a rule to prevent subsequent generations from amending the moral codes set by the present generation would quite obviously run afoul of a cosmopolitan orientation to morality. Thus, such future exclusion could not be part of the cosmopolitan mediated discussion.

This development leads to yet another potential research question: what would an education in morality look like or consist of if one were to apply the kind of cosmopolitanism offered in this project to all of the existing moral education theories and programs currently in use? What would the field of moral education look like if it were 'filtered' by cosmopolitanism? My current project contemplated cosmopolitan education in morality, itself, as a means of education as a moral education, not as a submission of yet another competing version. However,

[370] See Terence in Hansen, "View from the Ground," 16. See also chap. 2, p. 25.

it might be useful to understand how the application of cosmopolitan education processes would work specifically in existing morals education constructs. In a quick survey of 134 articles in leading English language journals of moral education, articles that were specifically about morals education methods, content, or programs, I could find only four that include cosmopolitan philosophy or cosmopolitan conceptions of either education or morality.[371] Clearly, this dissertation is only a start in re-conceiving the field of moral education using a cosmopolitan lens, and in particular a lens that utilizes a more public and political approach. Perhaps this project can help provide justification for more research as well as a language for teachers to be more deliberate and articulate in their cosmopolitan educational intentions even in the absence of systemic implementations.

The emphasis on the political form of morality and education in morality suggests room for inquiry in what should seem rather obvious by now: the influence that cosmopolitan education could have on the development of civically engaged citizens. Given the inherent democratic impulse that results from the concept of shared humanity and the disposition to public action, engagement, and deliberation that would be found in moral agonism, cosmopolitan education would appear to be poised to contribute to the civic education of its students. It would be interesting to see to what extent, if any, cosmopolitan education might influence the civic dispositions of students as either compared to traditional civic education programs or in addition to them. My suspicion is that it would have a greater influence on the civic participation of those who are members of multiple political communities or who have more transient civic experiences. It would seem reasonable to think that those who have had traditional civic

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[371] These articles were originally isolated for their content on various morals education theories and programs such as character education, values clarification, ethics of care, and Kohlbergian cognitive development models, among others.

education—that is to say those who have been educated for a specific political system or set of civic processes—would be less likely to participate in communities in which they are either part-time or transient members, whereas those who have had a cosmopolitan educational experience might be more willing to engage with those new or only partially-familiar constituencies.

As things presently stand, there are Montessori schools, Waldorf schools, and International Baccalaureate schools, each with their own specialized curriculum, methods, and training for teachers. There is no system of Cosmopolitan schools, though this is no cause for pessimism in proponents of cosmopolitan education. One could think of progressive education and see that there are very few schools with 'progressive' in the title though they might espouse a progressive orientation school-wide. And there are many teachers who one might be able to label 'progressive teachers' despite being surrounded by non-progressive educators. There are certainly educators who embody some combination of the traits or dispositions of a cosmopolitan educator, and it is quite likely that few of them even think of themselves as such. But one does not have to identify as a cosmopolitan to be one.

A 2008 study of international schools' mission statements found that while international schools show a dominant emphasis in cognitive and academic development, they also contain a significant number of cosmopolitan characteristics and an orientation toward the development of attitudes and emotional development that aid in intercultural understanding and cosmopolitan ways of being. These cosmopolitan characteristics appear to be both incidentally embedded in traditional educational practices as well as deliberately cultivated in the general educational ethos of international schools. There is a school in Berlin, Germany, called the Berlin Cosmopolitan School that professes to "help students become enlightened and responsible citizens of the world

who will be able to confidently shape their own lives."[372] On the ground, so to speak, it is not necessary for a teacher to identify with cosmopolitanism or as a cosmopolitan teacher in order to be one. As the quote by Charles Gellar in Chapter 2 shows, children engage in open, receptive, and critical inquiries requiring the negotiation of personal and 'other' motives, desires, and beliefs every day.[373] Teachers elicit these processes, too, and others found in the description of cosmopolitan education offered in this project. However, in the same way that a cosmopolitan education in morality involves the public disclosure of oneself as a means to suggest a better way for people to live together, the deliberate disclosure and efforts of a teacher to embody the processes of a cosmopolitan education contributes to the public debate about what ways of education might be better.

7.3 The Project I: Looking Forward

What this dissertation suggests in rethinking the field of moral education using cosmopolitan philosophy and education is in many ways a return to a conception of education in which the educational, political, and moral are all part of the same process and aim. For humans education is part of the process of survival and we have chosen to formalize this process as a result of group formation. Schools are one component of the ordering of our social existence and through schools other forms of life and their governing social and institutional structures are communicated to our newest members. Because these forms of life and institutions are developed by us and then influence us, they come up for moral consideration. Or, as Thrasymachus unpleasantly (to him) discovered, a public assertion of what is 'right' or just can

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[372] Berlin Cosmopolitan School, Berlin Germany, "Mission Statement" (2009): http://www.cosmopolitanschool.de. The statement continues, "We focus on academic achievement, multilingualism and the development of social and intercultural skills."

[373] Gellar in Hayden and Thompson, "International Schools and International Education," 337. See also chap. 2, p. 51.

be put to public scrutiny. And here is our point of return.

A cosmopolitan educator, an educational agonist, and a moral agonist—be they separate or one in the same—essentially employ the same tactics in the same process as Plato's Socrates. Our contemporary educators seek to inform and enlighten, yes, but also to equip students with the ability to take more ownership of their own educational processes over time, which, in the social realms of morality and politics, requires the ability to participate with others in the exploration and contestation of what we think we know and believe. It requires shining a light on assumptions and assertions to find out whether or where we have gone astray in our thinking. This kind of educator is a torpedo fish, a gadfly, a mediator, a shield, a catalyst, and a midwife for bringing learning and thought into the lives and forms of living of students. My conjuring of Plato's Socrates identifies the process by which Socrates chose to *be* in the world—as an Arendtian participant in the space of politics in which things become public and where one lives and must look presentable—and his choice of subject: justice, or what is right for one to do in the ordering of society and in our actions within it. 'Doing' in Socrates' world is the same as 'acting' in Arendt's, and one's actions carry implicit moral consequences.

This kind of education requires teachers who are up to the task and it will not be easy. Though being a catalyst for thought and action might require some 'sting' we must avoid numbing or shocking others too much. Diogenes reportedly walked with a lamp during daytime claiming to be searching for an honest man and Socrates' met his end as a result of perception that he was 'corrupting' the youth. Questioning assumptions can problematic for some and education is a field that is riddled with assumptions of expert knowledge and closed, received traditions of morality are even more steeped in the certainty of the knowledge they possess. Schools are seen as places of knowledge acquisition and skill development. The kind of certainty

symbolized by schools and education is seen in the expectations people have of them. Recent schooling reform movements in the United States have been driven largely by a perception that our schools and teachers are not doing what they should. However, what it is schools and teachers should be doing is as diffuse as the U.S. population is diverse. In general, schools and teachers are supposed to produce people who can contribute to the general welfare of society—where 'general welfare' is defined in a multitude of ways—but today what it comes down to is this: what do the students get from their time in school and the expense of their parents' tax dollars? Can they get jobs or get into colleges?

A teacher who is focused on the process of learning and whose aim is to teach someone how to learn and how to prepare for uncertainty will engage in methods that will appear counter-intuitive to those on the outside. Testing as a measure of learning is popular because it provides a concrete result to a concrete demand. And make no mistake—many of the demands made of schools are concrete: produce law abiding, appropriately skilled, and employable citizens. It will be very difficult for many people to see how engaging students in seemingly unanswerable questions with temporary answers can in any way guarantee a concrete set of skills and capacities, particularly those that might be measured for assurance of their proficiency. Cosmopolitan educators must embody the traits and dispositions they hope to instill. They have to be willing to forego easy answers and quick fixes in order to attain the long-term goal in education. They will need to swim against the current in which outcomes are known in advance and uniform, standardized tasks are undertaken to achieve them. They must be creative when others conform, and leave things unfinished and untidy when others will race to finish and sew up every last hole in the curriculum. Most difficult of all, they will need to repeatedly attempt to engage those who do not want to engage, to contest pedagogies with pedagogues and parents

who to not want to do so, and continue to include those who reject them.

7.4 The Project II: Rolling Up Our Sleeves and Sharing Morality

By now an obvious question might be this: What are we to do? What might this cosmopolitan education in morality look like? Since there is neither a tangible programmatic example nor a pedagogical instructional manual, how can I illustrate what I have taken great pains to describe? Fortunately, there are some real world examples. In "The Emergence of a Shared Morality in a Classroom," David Hansen reports on his observation of a sixth grade classroom wherein he identified four characteristics of what he called a "shared morality."[374] First, shared morality is a shared good in which everyone is a part of its construction and maintenance even though they might have different values. Second, it is an enabling good because "it enables meaningful interaction to occur, a shared morality at the same time constrains behavior."[375] The shared morality that emerges must be one that enables continuous emergence of newly negotiated standards of action, and thus indicates the third characteristic; it is an emerging good. It is not a predetermined morality wherein the teacher cleverly guides the students to the predefined ends of behavior. Instead it is a continuously developing dynamic that flows from the aspirations of the participants. Fourth, it is fragile. It is subject to the gains and losses in its membership as people enter and leave the 'community,' thus altering and influencing its constitution. Further, if attention and participation by its members wanes, its continued existence is imperiled. It requires consistent and continuous input and support or it will disappear. These characteristics bear a striking resemblance to the four correlates of shared humanity I presented in Chapter 2: living with other people, openness and receptivity, dynamic

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[374] David T. Hansen, "The Emergence of a Shared Morality in a Classroom," *Curriculum Inquiry* 22, no. 4 (1992): 347.

[375] Ibid.

engagement, and the never-ending process of all three together. The following examples, none of them radical, fit within the framework of both shared morality and cosmopolitan education based on shared humanity.

Hansen observed the sixth grade classroom of a teacher, Kathy, who began the year by using standard expectations of student conduct and the students' own conceptions based on their own lived experiences.[376] As the weeks progressed she brought them into contact with the mechanisms by and through which they could participate in developing preferred standards of conduct with each other. For instance, students are often overly eager to answer questions by blurting out their answers, shouting over the answers of others, or interrupting their classmates. Kathy 'corrected' this behavior not by stating that the rule in the class is to wait until called upon, but by reminding them that others have a right to respond, too. Kathy's goal in this was to help students understand their relation to the others in an environment in which they must all participate. For content learning, Kathy's queries to reluctant or unprepared students involved keeping the student 'on the hook,' so to speak, but allowing the opportunity to call on a fellow student to out or provide an alternative response. Students invited to help were then encouraged to respond to the classmate that called on them rather than to the teacher, fostering a dialogic learning environment in which the good of learning is also shared. This stands in marked contrast to traditional forms of learning in which the individual is attempting to out-learn or out-shine his classmates.

An example in which Kathy dealt with misbehavior is instructive. When a student is off task she does not tell the student what he should be doing, but instead asks the student what he ought to be doing. He is then positioned to think about not only the 'correct' answer to that

[376] Ibid., 346.

question—where ‘correct’ means the standard of conduct for students in that class—but his conception of it, too. He must think about how that standard—listening to his classmate, for example—fits in with his competing desire—passing a note to his friend. Peer activation is useful, too. Kathy asks the other students to contribute suggestions to the list of things the distracted student should do. This is an important way to not only share morality as understood by one another, but to also have the students share in the responsibility for it rather than leave it to the teacher to be the instigator and final arbiter of class code violations. Hansen notes that these ways of teaching help the students develop relationships in morality with their classmates rather than only their teacher.

These examples provide a brief glimpse at how some of these cosmopolitan education aims can be accomplished in a classroom while also helping students engage in an education in morality as both subjects and developers of it. I now want to add uncertainty to the process. One strategy Kathy uses is to have students take turns leading the class through activities or assignments. In these cases an individual student will take on the role of the teacher or leader of the activity, a strategy that means that Kathy, the teacher, will remain mostly on the sideline. Throughout the year Kathy will model the expected procedures and behaviors that range from keeping students attentive to the activity to pushing students to give more complete and thoughtful answers that include reasons so students know what to do. Let us think about this teaching choice. We can be reasonably certain that the students will not be as efficient or skilled in running these activities as Kathy nor can we expect that everything will get ‘covered.’ Kathy is hardly putting her feet on her desk and taking a nap; she is fully present, engaged, and ‘in control,’ but the variable represented by the students is a highly unpredictable one. Kathy cannot know where the class will end up, how long it will take, or if it will even work at all (though she

can have some predictive proficiency since she knows the individual students' capabilities). Kathy is 'letting go' of control over the tangible results and discrete knowledge imparted in order to prioritize a process that is important, educative, and autonomously empowering for the students.

Where is the agonism in this series of illustrations? It is directly in front of us. The students in the class bring with them their own uniqueness, their own values, and their own desires or preferences. The mix of student experiences, expectations, and desires are likely to contain the most plurality during the first weeks of the class since they have yet to negotiate standards with each other. It will also be brimming with natality as each student brings with her a multitude of possible thoughts and actions that will contribute to the class's ethos. As Kathy slowly brings the students into the development of classroom standards of conduct, students' public declarations of what ought to be done will be put to a constant test, with each new idea or questionable act going under the light of justification. It is also important for agonism that Kathy's method of behavior correction is interrogative rather than declarative. She does not say to a student that X is not right to do. She instead asks him what he thinks he should be doing instead of X. The student is put in the position to inquire into questions about her conduct and the conduct of others. This inquiry is partly information-seeking, partly expectation-meeting, and partly standard-making. The interrogative method employed by the teacher means that assumptions are questioned and existing standards, while held as legitimately authoritative for now, are up for discussion. They are tested by the class and accepted, rejected, or assimilated, thus becoming part of a new or existing standard that will soon be challenged and tested again. Kathy progressively increases her demands for student participation in and responsibility for the emerging shared morality, which conditions students to prepare for the expanded role and

obligations of adulthood. As adults the students will need to fully inhabit these processes 'for real.' In this way Arendt's conception of natality, and the dual role of education as conservator and creator, can be more clearly understood.

The teacher protects the students from the 'outside world' by carefully bringing them into the participation in and development of classroom morality rather than instituting irrevocable rules. Such external rules are adult rules and are of the world of adults, not children. These 'world-based' rules would encroach upon the ability of the students to develop their own in a meaningful way, essentially obstructing or destroying their natality. The teacher also protects the outside world from the children. She monitors their skills and development and carefully constructs the educational world of activities appropriately to facilitate the exercise of their natality in morality. One does not give kerosene and a lighter to a 7-year-old, and one does not have a 12-year-old re-write the section of a school's bylaws that govern student conduct. The teacher begins from the existing standards of the school and the experiences of her new students, and then creates a space for them to examine, discuss, challenge, and amend them as the students acquire and become more efficient in forms of self- and social-governance.

It would be fair to point out that there is nothing specifically transnational or global in what I have presented in these examples. However, there need not be any for cosmopolitanism to remain relevant. There is nothing that has been described that cannot be done in a highly diverse classroom containing students from different socioeconomic, religious, or cultural backgrounds. Admittedly, such a highly dialogic classroom requires the sharing of at least a rudimentary common spoken and written language. Regardless of how one might choose to impart or create a common language, some people might perceive it as an attack one's beliefs or own personal standards of morality through the forced acquisition of something that might cause them to think

differently about their own langue or the culture from which it comes.[377] This, too, I admit is possible. Nevertheless, we cannot abandon those who wish to engage any more than we can force people to acknowledge that morality is public and shared; we can only publicly share the processes by which it is developed and invite everyone to join in.

And here the project has come full circle. Everyone is invited, our humanity and our human conditions are shared, and the morality we develop is shared as well, even when it conflicts. We deliberate with each other in a contest of mutual respect in order to manage and improve the ways in which we will live with each other. Further, having classrooms that include significant diversity and operate in the way envisioned might be our best hope for the future of human interaction and morality. The more creativity born from natality that can be utilized to propose newer and better ideas to be contested agonistically, the seemingly greater our chances for improvement. A cosmopolitan education in morality recognizes the potential value of unique contributions that each of us could make to each of our lives. In this way, a cosmopolitan education in morality is truly cosmopolitan; it grants all of us citizenship in the world of morality.

[377] I am thinking here of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language is necessary for thought. If this hypothesis is true, then the kind of language people have acquired will determine the kind of thoughts they have which in turn will determine their conceptions of morality. Those influenced by this theory could conclude that forcing their children to learn a new language is an assault on personally held beliefs.

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APPENDIX A

TABLE 2. Variables found in article titles and abstracts: Number of articles containing variables (yearly frequencies and totals).

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	Total
Philosophy Variables					
Philosophy	12	28	17	38	95
Character Education	4	0	5	17	26
Dewey	2	0	4	6	12
Aristotle	0	0	2	9	11
Kant	1	2	0	4	7
Virtue Ethics	0	0	0	2	2
	19	30	28	76	153
Psychology Variables					
Kohlberg	36	33	25	34	128
Psychology	12	15	26	35	88
Cognitive Developmentalism	12	11	10	14	47
	60	59	61	83	263
Pedagogical Variables					
Moral Reasoning	26	34	43	44	147
Cognitive Developmentalism	12	11	10	14	47
Character Education	4	0	5	17	26
Citizenship Education	0	0	3	23	26
Values Clarification	5	8	1	0	14
Virtue Ethics	0	0	0	2	2
	47	53	62	100	262
Concept Variables					
Values	25	42	73	75	215
Cognitive	20	21	26	38	105
Character	7	10	18	41	76
Citizenship	0	2	17	43	62
	52	75	134	197	458