

Making of a Voiceless Youth: Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Higher Education

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2012

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ABSTRACT

MAKING OF A VOICELESS YOUTH: CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA'S HIGHER EDUCATION

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This research has analyzed a set of structural elements, procedures, and behaviors within Bosnia and Herzegovina's (thereafter, "Bosnia" or "B&H") higher education that have jointly created an encouraging space for the increasing and self-serving utilization of higher education by the country's post-war elite. Of the particular interest is this elite's impact on the forms of educational corruption, which have shifted away from standard bribing processes and moved toward more complex favor reciprocation networks. This process has ensured that today's corruption is perceived as a norm in Bosnia's higher education. Its prevalence has disrupted existing social mobility mechanisms and created a duality in the social mobility process so that the unprivileged still work hard to obtain their degrees while those with social connections are reliant on Turner's (1960) sponsorship model.

The analysis goes beyond dissecting corruption's impact on modes of social mobility by redefining Hirschman's (1970) notions of voice, exit, and loyalty within higher education and expanding his theoretical framework to adequately capture and understand the unique set of coping mechanisms that has emerged within Bosnia's corrupt higher education. I reinterpret the voice mechanism that Hirschman sees as a political tool capable of bringing about change as, ironically, severely diminished in its power when observed within a corrupt environment. I further reformulate the notion of exit and contextualize it within the corrupt Bosnian educational system by differentiating amongst various types of exit. In the process, the study finds that Bosnian students often

remain in the same educational institution despite the high level of perceived corruption. By ignoring their immediate surroundings and rather than departing physically as Hirschman would expect, students choose to *exit mentally* from the corrupt operational framework in which they continue to function *physically*.

Lastly, with hard-work and morality marginalized, the question remains open on when the youth will push the educational system in Bosnia toward a tipping point, regain their voice, and transform from an indolent mass to an active reformer. Projects requiring greater transparency of the exam and grading procedures, enhancing external support, and providing spaces for disclosure and adequate management of incidences of corruption, when and if detected, would constitute a meaningful starting point that would help incentivize change. In the absence of concern with the current level of educational corruption, however, the dominance of the incompetent elites will only continue to dilute the effectiveness of the aid being poured into the EU's broader nation-building agenda for post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my dissertation committee members and patience and love of my family. First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation adviser, Professor Henry Levin, for his invaluable guidance over the past six years, as well as for humbly sharing his intellectual genius while, in the process, inspiring and teaching me how to navigate each and every obstacle I encountered during this challenging yet immensely fulfilling journey. Professor Levin's unwavering support, patience, and encouragement have been critical to the successful completion of this study. I extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Gita Steiner-Khamsi, as I greatly benefited from her distinguished mastery of both theoretical and policy-based knowledge and our continuous intellectual dialogue that emerged as I embarked on the path of pursuing research on the educational corruption phenomenon. Professor Steiner-Khamsi's doctoral seminar provided me with a unique venue where my ideas emerged and evolved, and her classes on comparative education issues ignited my passion for educational research. I am also grateful to Professor Monisha Bajaj for her partaking in the dissertation review process as her extensive expertise in peace education and international humanitarian issues was essential to enhancing the quality of my work. I extend special thanks to Professor Francisco Rivera-Batiz for his willingness to take on the role of the University Chair, as well as for introducing me to the linkages between education and economic development in the early years of my academic pursuits at Teachers College. I am particularly thankful to Professor Michael Doyle for serving on the committee, as I have had an enormous appreciation for his work in the area of international conflict since my early days at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, where I attended Professor Doyle's presentations on peacekeeping operations and conflicts in Bosnia and elsewhere.

I am forever indebted to Bosnia's students who chose to participate in my research and in the process provide invaluable insights into the workings of educational corruption in post-war and developing Bosnia. I express my gratitude to those university and faculty administrators, as well as professors, who opened the doors to their faculties and classrooms, giving me an opportunity to research the issues surrounding educational corruption in the country's higher education. Special thanks are due to both the International Research and Exchange Board and Columbia's Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European Studies for their financial support of my doctoral research.

I wish to thank my parents, Mehmed and Dilista Sabic, whose passion for education and concern for the less fortunate instilled my heart with perpetual desire to work toward the betterment of education in the developing world. My father's life was cut short and my mother's hearing impaired by the circumstances of war, and their lives taught me the meaning of compassion. One of my parents' most valuable lessons that continues to guide my engagements in Bosnia and elsewhere is that what we experienced as a family and people during the 1990s war in Bosnia should not be an impediment to my life's dreams but a source of inspiration to work harder toward improving the lives of others. I thank my brother and my best friend, Dino Sabic, whose words of encouragement follow my every step. Where I am today would not have been possible without the guidance and generosity of the late David Pincus, who helped me make my American dream possible. Last but not the least, I express immense gratitude to my husband, Tamer El-Rayess, for his support over the years, as well as my children, Jannah and Dinah El-Rayess, who – since their arrival in this world – have excitedly accompanied me on this quest for understanding educational corruption and its impact on Bosnia's youth.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Relative to the developed states, where it remains more of an exception, corruption¹ in the developing world is systemic and critical in stalling the economic and political progress of societies. Most researchers have supported the widely accepted claims that corruption is deeply damaging and costly to economic growth and development (Krueger, 1974; Myrdal, 1968; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), while others have embraced an unconventional argument that corruption can enhance development in particular and limited cases (Heckelman, 2008; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985). The exact volume and extent of corruption, as well as its effects on the economic, social, and political functioning of a society, remain difficult to decipher: an unlikely few countries will admit – for the record – to being corrupt, while a majority will likely point to corruption as an insurmountable obstacle to their society's advancement. Consequently, academics and practitioners alike have rarely been exposed to the information that would enable them to fully understand the intricacies and depths of the phenomenon.

The analysis that follows is focused on understanding the educational corruption that occurs in the developing world, as this phenomenon plays more prominently among

¹Herein, corruption is broadly defined as the usage of one's public authority, through acts perceived as illegal or immoral, to unjustly privilege oneself or an organization/group one may be affiliated with.

the weaker states. Among the developed nations, the instances of corruption are more sporadic and often exposed to sanctions if, and when, discovered. In stark contrast with the governments of the developing countries, developed nations often take action, investigate, and publicly disclose their findings of corruption (Altbach, 2004). Bennett and Estrin (2006) have appropriately cautioned that the impact of corruption, particularly in the developing world, has to be analyzed within the broader context of relevant factors.

This study undertakes an analysis of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina's system of higher education to examine the structural and behavioral enablers of educational corruption. Though corruption as a topic can lure one into a potentially vast area of research, I build my inquiry around two key questions on corruption and remain focused on the empirical examination of this phenomenon in the educational sector in Bosnia. Firstly, the analysis investigates structural, procedural, and power elements within Bosnia's higher education that may collectively act as enablers of corruption within the country's institutions of higher education. In doing so, the analysis simultaneously scrutinizes the influence of the European Union, the "EU-nionizing" forces as they collide with a domesticated practice of educational corruption. In the context of Bosnia, there is a need to delineate those factors and forces that perpetuate corruption, particularly as they continue to prevent Bosnia from joining an expanding and EU-nionizing educational space.

Secondly and throughout the analysis, I examine students' perceptions of and reactions to various forms of corruption. Specifically, I look at students' perceptions of and reactions to the elements of horizontal immobility in higher education, which I broadly define as any contextual factor or behavior that helps preclude the seamless circulation of students within the national system of higher education. Similarly, I go on to analyze, in detail, students' reactions to and perceptions of vertical or social immobility, where the elements and behaviors that stall vertical mobility in education are seen as at least partly responsible for maintaining the power of the socially privileged

circles. Overall, I delve into the specifics surrounding the students' perceptions of and reactions to mobility issues within education and how they relate to the emergence of educational corruption in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For the research that follows, Turner's (1960) pioneering work on sponsored and contest-based mobility exhibits a particular relevance as it explains differing and pertinent modes of social mobility in education. In Bosnia's higher education, for instance, questions relating to educational corruption and mobility modalities are indirectly raised when students label professors as "untouchable" (Svevijesti, 2008, n.p.). Tanovic observes (Svevijesti, 2008, n.p.) that the enclaves of powerful professors are often comprised of unqualified members, yet exclusive and closed to outside talent. In contrast, Turner's (1960) concept is that contest-based mobility is an open contest with elite status being merit-based. Others have also viewed meritocracy as a way "to promote efficiency, social mobility, and social justice" (Goldthorpe & Jackson, n.d., p. 2).

In stark contrast with contest-based mobility and possibly more in line with the Bosnian model, the notion of sponsored mobility suggests that not all have equal access to potential rewards, and elite status may be granted rather than earned. Turner's (1960) notions of contest-based and sponsored mobility help examine the complex social nexus within Bosnian higher education, determining whether the two modes of mobility possibly coexist or whether one form of mobility marginalizes the other. Similarly, I question the elements and behaviors within Bosnia's higher education that help make corruption possible and continuous, thereby precluding the country from fully endorsing an arguably more meritocratic system of social mobility that is espoused by the EU model of education.

Next, being concerned with students' ability to cope with potentially significant exposure to educational corruption, this dissertation analyzes the manner in which students react to and navigate through inefficient and corrupt organizational spaces. Thus, in addition to enhancing the overall understanding of this social phenomenon

characterizing many developing nations, this exercise may improve our knowledge of student populations and their behaviors in the systemically corrupt educational systems. I work towards uncovering the ways in which corruption-related experiences transform the plans, actions, and motivations of the young individuals being processed through corrupt educational systems. More concretely, I look into how students react, where they go, and how they cope when they are cornered into dysfunctional organizational spaces and possibly faced with educational corruption. Answering these and similar questions on the dominion of corruption over the educational processes in a developing, post-conflict, and post-socialist country is precisely where the social and intellectual significance of my research rests.

To provide a theoretical interpretation of students' coping mechanisms, I employ Hirschman's (1970) theory of voice, exit, and loyalty within organizations. By extending this theoretical framework into the educational milieu, one can capture and analyze reactions of stakeholders to the failing organizations: in this case, reactions of students to corrupt and ineffective universities. According to Hirschman, there are two reactive responses to the failure of an organization: the firm's clientele will either opt to "exit" their relationship or will "voice" their dissatisfaction with the defective organization. Further, Hirschman points out that with a greater exodus from a defective organization, the presence of voice lessens.

While claims of widespread corruption within Bosnia's higher education are frequently made, little scholarly research has been done to validate such claims. This study begins by looking at how widespread the educational corruption is in the post-conflict and developing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how its presence affects the behaviors of the students encountering it. In Chapter I, I review the main issues raised in this study and list the key research questions, with a focus on the specific systemic elements, issues, and behaviors that I view as most relevant to educational corruption in post-war Bosnia. I then review the most pertinent literature in Chapter II, with the main

focus on Turner's (1960) social mobility theory and Hirschman's framework on voice and exit as reactionary mechanisms to failing organizations. The third chapter is where I link Bosnia's particular circumstances to the noted theoretical frameworks to present what I theorize is happening with educational corruption in Bosnia. Here, I pay particular attention to the post-war elite formation, social mobility, coping mechanisms, and their interactions with the corrupt structures in Bosnia's higher education. I deepen my discussion by taking on the task of modeling the mechanics of social mobility and coping mechanisms' adaptations to and interactions with Bosnia's corrupt higher education.

In Chapter IV, I provide a thorough discussion on the qualitative and quantitative methods that this study has utilized in data collection, as well as the sampling process both for the survey- and interview-based data collection. In doing so, I discuss the practical challenges of the sampling process, as well as elaborate on the content of the interview guide and survey document. In addition, Chapter IV reviews the overall data analysis approach utilized in this inquiry by presenting and discussing a research-questions matrix that points to the specific method used to answer each research question individually.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of this dissertation report the key findings and aim at specifically answering each of the three research questions, respectively. I conclude this study with the eight and final chapter, which summarizes this study with a particular focus on the key findings and limitations of this study, as well as the agenda for future research. Though there were challenges in researching corruption, Bosnia's higher education has provided me with a valuable opportunity to broaden the existing research on educational corruption by understanding its links to social mobility and students' coping mechanisms in the newly forming post-war and post-socialist educational setting. Studying structural malfunctions, procedural obstacles, and corruption-driven traditions in Bosnia's universities has helped in deciphering the ways in which the country's largely inefficient universities can be misused and monopolized by particular groups,

undermining the possibilities for an emerging nation and its youth to effectively join the competition-based and EU-nionized space of higher education.

Relevance of Research: Educational Corruption in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

Background and Organization of Bosnia's Education

The downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s brought instability to post-Tito Yugoslavia – at the time a Yugoslav federation consisting of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia as republics, and Kosovo and Vojvodina as autonomous provinces. With the beginning of the 1990s, the political instability grew in much of Yugoslavia, and all attempts to peacefully resolve political differences between the Yugoslav republics and the militarily dominant Serbia failed. As Stipe Mesic, President of Yugoslavia in 1991 and later President of Croatia, noted: “Two of the republics [Serbia and Montenegro] had expressed their preference for ‘a federation and socialism,’ and four republics [Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia] desired a confederate, ‘union of sovereign states’” (Mesic, 2004, p. 21). As was the case with Slovenia and Croatia and irrespective of Bosnia's proclaimed independence on March 3, 1992, Milosevic's army and its supporters in Bosnia proceeded to militarily implement their ideological agenda of ethnically cleansing Bosnia. Bosnians who once found pride in their multiethnic society were now subjected to ethnic cleansing, war crimes, concentration camps, massive displacement, and organized rapes.

The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in November of 1995, ended violence in Bosnia and ethnically divided the country into two main entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serb Republic) and a third administratively separate unit called Brcko District. The Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accord continues to serve as the country's

Constitution. While the Serb Republic, largely comprised of Bosnian Serbs, has no other smaller organizational units due to its homogeneous ethnic population, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further divided into 10 Cantons based on ethnic lines of division between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Cantonal governments, for the most part, independently run their educational sectors and implement related policies. Each Canton has its own Ministry of Education. In addition, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own Federal Ministry of Education that supports the work of all 10 cantonal ministries.

On the Serb Republic side, however, there are no cantons and therefore no cantonal ministries of education but only one ministry of education at the entity level: Serb Republic's Ministry of Education and Culture. This ministry acts independently from the Federation's Ministry of Education. At the national level, the country has the Ministry of Civil Affairs with one of its sectors being "in charge of coordination of activities at the level of BiH, enforcement of international obligations in the area of education, harmonization of plans of governmental bodies of Entities and strategy development concerning science and education" (UNDP, 2010, p. 22). Despite the existence of the section within the Ministry of Civil Affairs that deals with the overall coordination of education at the national level, the key organizational and procedural powers are in the hands of the local actors. This is best illustrated by the fact that, according to the Assistant to the Minister of the Civil Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are instances where diplomas from one entity are not recognized in another but also cases where the Bureau of Employment does not recognize diplomas coming from certain institutions (Slobodna Evropa, 2011). The existence of such cases points to the problems of coordination and harmonization within the educational sector in Bosnia.

In short, Bosnia's education is governed by an elaborate and decentralized structure, which has led to inconsistencies and variations throughout the country. For instance, Doris Pack, Chair of the European Union Committee on Culture and Education, remarked

that the manner in which Bologna Process has been implemented in Bosnia has not been seen elsewhere; Pack further noted that the Federation should have only one Ministry of Education that would ensure a harmonized and standardized implementation of the Bologna Process (Slobodna Evropa, 2011). As an example, the length of the study in the Serb Republic is based on the 4+1 rule – it takes four years to obtain Bachelor's and one year to obtain Master's – while the Minister of Education in the Federation, Damir Masic, noted the length of the study in the Federation varies from 3+1, 3+2, 4+1, to 4+2 (Slobodna Evropa, 2011).

In terms of enrollment, only 9.9% of Bosnian children attended preschools in 2009 while the net primary school enrollment rate in 2006 was at about 97.9% (UNDP, 2010). The enrollment rates for the secondary education increased since 2001, and are presently estimated to be above 80% (UNDP, 2010). The higher education enrollment rates have “almost doubled” over the past decade while, from 2001 to 2007, the graduation rates from the higher education institutions in Bosnia have tripled (UNDP, 2010). Of the entire population aged 15 to 24, 99.2 % were found to be literate in 2009 with the comparable adult literary rate being at 97.6% (UNDP, 2010). Furthermore, the unemployment remains high and, for 2010, amounts to 42.7% while the government continues to provide limited investment in education as only 4.51 of the country's GDP is spent on education (UNDP, 2010).

In Bosnia, it seems, a contextualized version of a decentralization model in the post-war educational system has created a fragmented educational space that is characterized by high costs and a lack of transparency. The fragmentation of Bosnia's system of education is clearly evident in the absence of a ministry of education at the national level and the presence of multiple ministries of education at both the entity and cantonal levels. The educational sector is also known for its highly fragmented budgetary structure: there are two entity-based budgets, 10 cantonal budgets, and 1 budget for the District of Brcko (UNDP, 2010). Similarly, the 2010 Conference of Ministers of

Education for Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that there are over 50 schools in the present-day Bosnia fitting the profile of “two schools under one roof”, where - within one physical location - operate two separate schools that may have adopted ethnicity-based segregation practices (UNDP 2010, p. 25). While this analysis by no means suggests that decentralization is not desirable in educational settings, it does suggest that no educational or governing model can be successfully and uniformly generalized to any and all settings.

Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Higher Education

Since the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans in mid-1990s, the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and most recently Montenegro and Kosovo have worked, to varied extents, toward ethnic reconciliation, infrastructural reconstruction, and a transition from formerly socialist to more market-driven capitalist economies. Their economic and political development has progressed at different levels, with Slovenia joining the European Union (“EU”) in 2004, while the remaining countries in the region are still in the process of applying or being reviewed in preparation for their membership. In particular, an ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to face challenges with internal and post-war reconciliation, while half of the population lives in or close to poverty: 19.5% of the population remains below the poverty line, and another 30% are only slightly above the line (Devine & Mathisen, 2005). The country’s unemployment rate remains high at 43.6% for 2009 (Center for Public Employment Services of Southeast European Countries, 2011). According to the International Monetary Fund’s Country Report (2010) and of those employed, most Bosnians are working in the public sector given the country’s highly decentralized government structure that suffers from significant redundancies. The public sector salaries are significantly above those in the private sector, making the government employment particularly attractive (International Monetary Report, 2010). Furthermore,

the International Monetary Fund's Country Report (2010) indicates that "the share of public sector in total employment in B&H is among the highest in Europe" (p. 15) with only France and Belgium ranking above of Bosnia.

Characterized by a weak and complex governing structure that is largely dependent on international guidance, Bosnia continues to face a vast array of development-related challenges, including broad societal corruption, as well as corruption specific to the educational sector. In comparison to the pre-war state of corruption, the overall perceptions of corruption as being significantly present in Bosnia and Herzegovina have increased over time (Transparency International, 2004). According to Transparency International's (2004) research on corruption perceptions, only 10% of the sampled population in the Federation was of the view that corruption was significantly present in the pre-war period while slightly above 20% of the Serb Republic sample thought that corruption was notably present during the same period. Transparency International has recorded an increasing trend in terms of perceived corruption in both entities of the country, and a shocking 85% of the surveyed population in the Federation perceived corruption as significantly present while over 90% of the surveyed residents in the Serb Republic shared the same view as of 2002. This notable difference between the levels of perceived corruption pre-war and post-war is suggestive of a significant increase in corrupt activities in the post-war period.

Even though all of the newly independent states in the Balkans have dealt with different types and gradations of corruption in their economic, political, and educational systems, Slovenia's economic and political development has been accompanied by the least amount of corruption. In 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted its first Anti-Corruption Strategy, but it has consistently failed to attract foreign direct investment and provide a business-friendly regulatory framework (UNDP, 2010). According to the 2007

Corruption Perception Index (“CPI”),² Slovenia was ranked the highest and holds 27th place out of 179 countries (with a CPI of 6.6 out of 10), while other former republics of Yugoslavia have found corruption to be a salient obstacle to their economic, political, and social progress. For instance, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were ranked at 64th (with a CPI of 4.1), 79th (with a CPI of 3.4), and 84th (with CPI of 3.3) places, respectively (Internet Center for Corruption Research, 2007). In fact, Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perception Index for 2011 has placed Bosnia even lower than previously: for 2011, Bosnia took 91st place in the world with its CPI of 2.9 (Dimitrova, 2011). As to the educational corruption that is of the primary interest herein, Chapman (2002) similarly finds that 31%, 38%, and 42% of students in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, respectively, believe that corruption is widespread among university professors.

In 2005, Transparency International B&H organized an anonymous corruption disclosure campaign during which it received a large number of complaints about educational corruption together with numerous complaints referring to the administrative bodies of the local government. Of the total number of complaints, 25% pertained directly to educational corruption and came both from professors and students while the rest referred to corruption in other sectors of the society (Knezevic, 2005). As an indication of the extent of societal corruption, Bosnians were found willing to participate in bribing to secure employment; ensure best medical care; avoid high taxes; obtain electricity, water, or phone; win a court case; obtain better grades; secure return of one’s property; and avoid traffic tickets (Transparency International, 2004).

Another collaborative study conducted by the University of California and the University of Sarajevo evaluating current state of the country’s justice system confirmed

²CPI scores represent the perceptions of the level of corruption in a specific country as perceived by businessmen/businesswomen and analysts. The highest score of 10 suggests that the country in question is “highly clean,” while a CPI score of 0 suggests that the pertinent country is “highly corrupt.” The CPI is published by Internet Center for Corruption Research and is available at http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2007.html.

that corruption is present in the justice system, as well as that the professional status of the justice-related jobs is in deterioration (Center for Human Rights at the University of California and Center for Human Rights at the University of Sarajevo, 2000).

Furthermore, Dzihanovic-Gratz was noted for her recent research confirming corruption in the post-war privatization process of Bosnia's public companies (Mujkic, 2010) while the frequency analysis of corruption-related articles in Bosnia's media found that, only for the period from August 15th to August 28th of 2011, 135 articles were published on the topic (PrimeCommunications, 2011). Though Bosnia has made a first step towards addressing the corruption issue by forming the Agency for Prevention and Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption, its head, Sead Lisak, has stated that, in Bosnia, the issue is vast as Bosnians "bribe even for a 'good' cemetery location" (Magazin Plus, 2011). Thus, corruption remains one of the key obstacles to Bosnia's post-war development.

In the past, Transparency International B&H has evaluated the state of corruption at Bosnia's universities. Using a representative sample of 500 students from the University of Sarajevo, Transparency International B&H found that 60.2% of the sample thought "that there is a great presence of corruption at the [Sarajevo] University" (Knezevic, 2005, n.p.). The surveyed students found "bribery in the examination process and admission to the faculty, as well as the insistence on purchase of obligatory reading materials" to be the most common manifestations of educational corruption (Knezevic, 2005, n.p.). More recently, research conducted at the University of East Sarajevo (in the Serb Republic) showed that 55% of the surveyed students believe that corruption is the one of the most pronounced problems in education (Café.ba, 2011). The research was conducted at five faculties and relied on a sample of 450 students (Café.ba, 2011). To note and in line with this research, corruption was defined beyond bribery and included reliance on social networks (Café.ba, 2011).

As to the recent initiatives in the region, Croatia's Minister of Education and Sport, Mr. Dragan Primorac, has signed a Declaration on Cooperation, Safety, and

Responsibility in Education (Javno, 2008). Primorac vehemently announced that he would not make any exceptions for any perpetrators of educational corruption, and further added that the financing of this new anti-corruption initiative would be provided through the Trans-European-Mobility Scheme for University Studies (“Tempus”) (Javno, 2008). Importantly, Tempus financing provides some insight into the source of Croatia’s recent decision to halt the longstanding corruption in the country’s educational system. Briefly, Tempus aims at developing and reforming higher education of the South Eastern European countries in accordance with the Bologna Declaration, which hopes to create a unified higher education system in much of Europe.

As Croatia stands in line for its admission to the EU, the government has felt external pressures to speed up the process of synchronizing its higher education with that of EU members. Recently, the European Commission has researched the state of corruption in Croatia and has publicly labeled Croatia as more corrupt than African countries (Dnevnik, 2008a). Similarly, Nenad Stazic, a prominent politician from the Social Democratic Party (“SDP”), has repeatedly stated that the Croatian government continues to provide necessary infrastructure and laws that ensure continued corruption (Krnetic, 2010).

Facing the threat that the widespread corruption in the country and its educational system could jeopardize or delay its entry into the EU, Croatia’s government has moved toward implementing anti-corruption policies. Cleansing higher education of corruption is portrayed by the governing elite as a solid exemplification of Croatia’s willingness to achieve compatibility with the more transparent educational institutions of the European Union. Whether for window-dressing purposes or with an intent to make a real change, on September 18, 2008, the Croatian police raided four faculties at Zagreb University, taking away more than 20 professors, their assistants, and other administrative personnel that are believed to have been involved in corruption (Dnevnik, 2008b). In the process, computers, cell phones, and documents of those educational personnel were confiscated

and searched for evidence of corruption (Dnevnik, 2008b). While students of those faculties remarked that the corruption had been going on for the past ten years, it was only recently that Croatia's police raided Zagreb's faculties and professors' offices to verify claims that admissions could be bought for 9,000 Euros and passing exam grades purchased for 400 to 2000 Euros. This meaningful shift in political attitudes potentially stems from Croatia's desire to join the European Union and differentiate itself from often politically looked-down-upon Balkan states.

Affected by the recent events in Croatia, *Svevijesti.ba*, a popular news website in Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly called Bosnia and Herzegovina's citizenry to mimic anti-corruption initiatives from Croatia by taking action against corruption practices in education. References to public disclosure and discussion of educational corruption were made by Bosnia's media outlets, including both television and online sources (Dnevnik, 2008c, 2008d; 24satainfo, 2008). However, the entity and cantonal ministries of education, as well as higher educational institutions, remained officially silent on the issue.

Unexpectedly, this initiative resulted in a widespread grassroots reaction and anonymous, yet public, sharing of experiences of educational corruption: over a period of several days, about 100 students and parents posted their letters and comments on the *svevijesti.ba* website and disclosed specifics about the corrupt faculties and professors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a first-of-its-kind call to students, parents, and others throughout Bosnia to publicly declare what forms of corruption they had encountered and to name corrupt professors (Svevijest.ba, 2008). Participants powerfully wrote:

Corruption in the faculty of sport in Sarajevo (sic) has been going on since the end of the war ... it is a public secret that an exam with prof. dr (sic) Ivan Hmjelovjeca [costs] 500 KM [equivalent to circa 365 dollars as of September 19, 2008] while I and others like myself have spent two years trying to pass the same exam.... (Student under code name "Jasa")

Faculty of Philosophy in Tuzla, as you already know, has so many corrupt professors. Here, immediately, I can say that the head of faculty, prof. dr. Azem Kozar, is one of the key [corrupt professors]. He asks for money for the admissions, sells exams to lazy students, and does not run away from sexual services, especially [those of] the blondes.... As rumor has it, to **his “loyals”** [emphasis added], he writes master theses and doctoral dissertations for 20,000 and 30,000 KM, respectively [equivalent to circa 14,637 US dollars and 21,955 US dollars, respectively, as of September 19, 2008]. (Student under code name “Nije Bitno”)

For years now, ... public stories [circulate] about corruption in universities, corruption with the admissions, corruption with the exams, corruption with administrative processing of diplomas, etc. etc. [sic] How much of corruption is there and is it there [at all]? Lots of people claim that there is [corruption], but those responsible to do something [about it] say that they do not have the evidence [and] that the students and other witnesses are not willing to share their evidence or declare someone as corrupt. Corruption is usually understood as a student giving a professor some amount of money to, without demonstrated knowledge, receive a [passing] grade for the subject in question. However, corruption in the universities is more than buying “special treatment” monetarily or even in some other way. I think that an equally damaging and dangerous corruption is the one that exists with the Master theses and dissertations’ defenses, which are not based on an adequate scientific research. One form of corruption that is almost never talked about outside of the university setting is the form [of corruption] that exists among the members of the teaching cadre. In other words, the standards and norms to advance professionally ... are so “flexibly defined” that it is possible with the election of new people or with their advancement promote candidates that do not have adequate qualifications. That is, I believe, not done only because of money but because of **some other relations** [emphasis added]. Those can be familial relations, can be “love relationships” or can be “no conflict” relations. What does [no conflict] mean? That means that there may be a department where there are people without the adequate qualifications for the university professions, but they partake in the commissions that ensure **they promote each other, in style of “you to me - me to you”** [emphasis added]. Such environments are then totally closed – they do not allow for the entry of new, young and quality people. They do everything in that tight circle, and this is a very dangerous form of corruption in higher education. Therefore, corruption is much more than buying exams, which would be difficult to occur unless it was for these other forms of corruption. (Professor Lamija Tanovic, University of Sarajevo)

A claim that corruption is systemic and well-organized in highly corrupt settings (Altbach, 2004; Chapman, 2002; Waite & Allen, 2003) is additionally affirmed by the

death threats that the organizers of this public campaign received: “[y]ou [Svevijesti.ba] wrote today and from now on you listen and be ready to fly into the air” (Dnevnik, 2008c, 2008d; 24satainfo, 2008). The campaign has also unveiled a high level of sophistication in the workings of corrupt institutions and individuals in higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the political and educational leadership has defended the functioning of the country’s higher education by the absenteeism of the formal complaints against corruption, Denis Camdzic, from the Union of Students of Federation B&H, stated that educational corruption is so well-ingrained in the structure of the higher education that students do not trust anyone and would not publicly or officially acknowledge the existence of corruption (Dnevnik, 2008c).

Recent events in Bosnia and neighboring Croatia suggest that the elites of developing countries often lack the will to substantively minimize and properly sanction educational corruption because it is the powerful elite circles that benefit from corruption in education and beyond. To fully examine this proposition, Turner’s sponsored and contest-based mobility models are later introduced into the analysis and contextually applied to help examine the relationship between the patterns of social mobility and educational corruption present in Bosnia. As Tomusk (2000, p. 240) interestingly states, “power is legitimizing itself through the educational systems”, and one may add that, in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s context, power is legitimizing itself through educational corruption. Particularly powerful and illustrative are students’ labels of professors as “untouchable” (Svevijesti, 2008a, n.p.), as well as Tanovic’s observation (Svevijesti, 2008a, n.p.) that circles of powerful professors are often unqualified, yet closed to outside talent. To elaborate, key administrative and teaching positions are often held by politically-backed individuals who may not necessarily possess the adequate qualifications for their positions. Though they may lack adequate qualifications, these professors are loyal to each other, and collectively control and, at times, unwelcome the new and potentially more qualified members of the academia. To illustrate, in 2005, a

law student of Tuzla University submitted an official complaint to the Anti-corruption Commission of Tuzla Canton stating that law professors were demanding sexual favors for passing grades (Svevijesti, 2008b). The complaint was disregarded until an independent investigation into a prostitution chain stumbled across evidence against the law professors (Svevijesti, 2008b). Several years later, Bosnia's police closed down a prostitution chain in Tuzla region and unveiled that professors from Sarajevo and Tuzla's Law Faculties were forcing female law students to engage in sexual acts in exchange for passing grades (Svevijesti, 2008b). Specifically, the head of the Sarajevo Law Faculty, Fuad Saltaga, and Professors Bajro Golic, Zdravko Lucic, and Sanjin Omanovic were under investigation (Svevijesti, 2008b). The University of Sarajevo banned Professors Golic and Lucic from teaching until the age of 70 because they "sexually exploited students at the Law Faculty in Tuzla" while Professor Omanovic was temporarily suspended from teaching (Hadzovic, 2011, n.p.). They are, however, still faculty employees and "are only excluded from teaching and scientific processes" (Hadzovic, 2011, n.p.). More importantly, despite their conduct, these professors can still teach at other universities within Bosnia (Hadzovic, 2011). For about four years, those students who were providing sexual services to Omanovic, Golic and Lucic were given the exam questions that could then be sold to other law students with the help of Jasmin Masic, who drove female students to locations where sexual encounters would take place (Hadzovic, 2011). Masic was sentenced to two years in prison (Hadzovic, 2011).

Here, one must note the relevance of Waite and Allen's (2003) inquiry into the neglected topic of power and corruption in higher education. In Bosnia's context, one of the first professors who spoke of powerful and established corruption in the country's higher education was Meho Basic from the Faculty of Economics at Sarajevo University (Avdic, 2008). He presently claims that the corruption model has become only more complex as the professors involved are well-aware that their behavior has become socially acceptable and, therefore, bears no punishment (Avdic, 2008). While Basic has

not elaborated on the specifics of such complexities, anecdotal evidence suggests that Bosnia's professors have gone as far as to never directly ask for bribes, but do so indirectly through their administrative liaisons. Simply, the elite status and political power of the professors allows for the perpetuation of the *status quo* and further deterioration of youths' morale in Bosnia. The existence of various forms of educational corruption is likely to have deeply damaged the central purpose of Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education: Bosnian youths are no longer taught that hard work equates with achievement and instead are being trained in and adapting to the complex workings of widespread corruption, which remains a dominant feature of their war-torn country.

An important background element in the analysis of educational corruption is the role of the Bologna Process, which has been sporadically and selectively introduced into Bosnian higher education. In the words of a Bologna promoter, Bologna is supposed to be "all about – mobility, recognition, efficiency, competitiveness and attractiveness of European [h]igher education" (Adam, 2007, p. 2). Though Bosnia adopted the Bologna Declaration in 2003, the institutions of higher education often continue to practice the old approach to education, where students enjoy only limited mobility; where learning is equated with the factual memorization of books; and where young Bosnians are not given practical opportunities to apply their knowledge and to gain a competitive advantage over students elsewhere. The Bologna Process and goals, if seriously implemented, would arguably introduce a different type of higher education in Bosnia that would structurally be more transparent, organized, and student-centered, preventing corruption from flourishing as at present. One would hope that the introduction and acceptance of the Bologna Process would be accompanied by clearer performance measurements, a common credit system, a defined process of accreditation of universities, and accomplishable student assignments. Such changes would likely help reorganize Bosnia's

educational system, possibly allowing for earlier detection of non-transparent deviations within the system.

The current situation at Bosnian colleges is further complicated by the monopolistic power that each faculty within a particular university holds, a status which somewhat conflicts with the need for a solidified and shared strategy toward implementing the Bologna Process. The post-war ethnic division allowed for extensive decentralization of power within the educational system. While this analysis by no means suggests that decentralization is not desirable in educational settings, it does suggest that no educational or governing model can be successfully and uniformly generalized to any and all settings. In Bosnia, it seems, a contextualized version of a decentralization model in the post-war educational system has created a fragmented educational space that is characterized by high costs and a lack of transparency. The fragmentation of Bosnia's system of education is most evident in the absence of a ministry of education at the national level and the presence of multiple ministries of education at both the entity and cantonal levels. The country itself is divided into two entities: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serb Republic. While Serb Republic has no other smaller organizational units largely due to its homogeneous ethnic composition, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further divided into 10 Cantons based on the ethnic lines of division within Federation. Following the cantonal borders within Federation, cantonal governments, for the most part, independently run their educational sectors and implement related policies. Each Canton has its own ministry of education. In addition, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own federal ministry of education that supports the needs of all 10 cantonal ministries. On the Serb Republic side, however, there are no cantons and therefore no cantonal ministries of education but only one ministry of education at the entity level. This ministry acts independently from the Federation's ministry of education.

Furthermore and within the country's higher education, each of Bosnia's faculties remains highly independent within their corresponding universities. To illustrate, Hasib Gibanica, from the Canton of Sarajevo's Ministry of Finance, noted that communication between his Ministry and faculties financed through his Ministry is "poor" (Center for Investigative Reporting, 2004a, n.p.). Gibanica further remarked that, even though the faculties the Ministry finances were obliged to share their financial information with the Ministry, the Ministry was limited in its ability to verify these financials (Center for Investigative Reporting, 2004a). Faculties also generate revenues independently of Ministry funding, while a proper set of guidelines and regulations to oversee revenue spending by the faculties is absent (Center for Investigative Reporting, 2004a).

It may be the independence of Bosnia's individual faculties that partly accounts for their excessive control over their students and for the lack of synchronized and successful EU-nionization of Bosnia's higher education institutions. Therefore, and as noted earlier, it is important to determine whether there are structural complexities and procedural inefficiencies within Bosnia's higher education that play a significant role in supporting corrupt behaviors. Simply, what elements and behaviors within Bosnia's system of higher education make corruption possible? For instance, some institutions of higher education in Bosnia may continue to make it excessively laborious for students to transfer to other universities, which is why the concept of credit transfers or spending a semester elsewhere is often unknown to many Bosnian students. Other faculties, however, have taken first steps toward bridging the gap between the current state of Bosnia's higher education and the EU-propagated model of education. An appealing research setting for an examination of the current status of EU-nionization in Bosnia's higher education has been created by variation at the faculty level in moving toward the EU model. Such a setting also provides salient insights into corruption-related behaviors and reactions that may have been instigated by the organizational and structural changes brought about with the Bologna Process. For instance, the Faculty of Economics at Sarajevo University

(2009) offers a new component in its educational setup that is based on the ECTS system (“European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System”). Its Summer School helps students “... compensate for a poor performance in a previous semester ... [and] spreads a heavy workload during the Fall and Spring semesters” (n.p.). The Faculty of Economics has further introduced a Quality Assurance System that evaluates professors and teaching assistants, but the question remains whether these changes that bear some resemblance to the structures and organizational patterns of the European Union’s universities have a significant effect on changing corrupt behaviors, if any, and whether the exchange of favors and bribes continue to exist and possibly dominate. Similarly, the Faculty of Economics in Sarajevo has reshaped its academic program into a “3+2+3” system in the 2004-2005 academic year, where a Bachelor’s degree is obtained in three years, and an additional two years of studies are needed to obtain a Master’s degree, while another three years of studies will yield a PhD diploma (Faculty of Economics in Sarajevo, 2009).

It is however challenging to implement the Bologna-related organizational and policy changes to reflect the arrival of the EU into the Balkans region parallel to addressing the issues of bribes, personal connections, and social networks may still be employed to obtain degrees of higher education. It may be that the EU-influenced changes in higher education continue to function simultaneously with the existing corruption practices that linger throughout Bosnia and possibly other countries in this formerly communist region. The example of Romania may be particularly notable here, as the country faced EU sanctions over corruption. Romania joined the EU on January 1st of 2007, but has been threatened with EU sanctions over widespread corruption that has infiltrated the highest political levels in the country (EurActiv.com, 2008).

Often seeing that morality leads to marginalization within a corrupt system, students in corrupt educational systems who fail to engage and accept corrupt behavior may exit the system simply because they were either unable or morally unwilling to engage in bribes or other forms of immoral behavior. The question also emerges as to the

coping mechanisms employed by those students who, after their exposure to educational corruption, remain seemingly loyal to the system even as they continue to maneuver through all of its structural inefficiencies. For those students who have participated in bribery or other corrupt behaviors during the course of their studies, one can expect to see them internalize and accept corruption as a legitimate manifestation of social interactions in their society.

As the case of Croatia exemplifies, it is only when external pressure is present and political power of the elites is threatened that the elites are willing to sacrifice their control and frequent abuse of higher education. In contrast, and as the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests, when such political decisiveness is absent and governing elites fail to act, any and all efforts to end educational corruption are limited. Thus, Bosnia provides an opportunity to research the parallel universes where claims of higher education's EU-nionization representing mobility, effectiveness, and transparency coexist with claims of corrupt behaviors, limited horizontal and vertical mobility, and ineffective institutions of higher education. In developing my dissertation through the upcoming chapters, I hope to unveil ways in which these two universes co-exist or which one dominates over the other.

Research Questions

To examine the current corruption and social mobility trends in Bosnia's post-socialist and post-war higher education, this dissertation answers three key questions. First, the analysis asks students about the most frequently occurring facilitators and forms of educational corruption. This question looks at a basic set of trends that enables one to begin discussion on corruption. Second, this study moves on by looking into differential experiences and behaviors between various social groups and their relation to corruption. The goal of the second group of questions is to dig deeper into the ways in which corruption impacts and relates to social mobility mechanisms in Bosnia's education and

beyond. The third group of questions explores students' reactions, presuming that a significant level of educational corruption is found to exist in Bosnia. These questions aim at expanding the existing understanding of behaviors and reactions of students in highly corrupt educational settings. They look into students' visions and interpretations of what is presently occurring in Bosnia. This dissertation gives a voice to the youth impacted by educational corruption while also working to solidify our understanding of complex interactions between highly popularized EU-nionization processes, coping and mobility mechanisms, and corruption in Bosnia's higher education.

1. Facilitators and Manifestations of Educational Corruption
 - a. What is a reasonable definition of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education? What is the perceived level of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education?
 - b. What are some of the key facilitators of educational corruption: specifically, which procedures, behaviors, organizational settings, and structural elements of the educational system support corruption?
 - c. What specific forms does educational corruption take in Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education?
2. Impact of Educational Corruption
 - a. Is there any differentiation between educational corruption's impact on students of lower socioeconomic status versus those who are well-connected and members of higher echelons in the society? Is there any difference in the perception of corruption levels between students of different ethnicities and/or different socioeconomic backgrounds?
 - b. What is the relationship between educational corruption and social mobility: specifically, how are the mechanisms of upward mobility affected by educational corruption?
3. Ways to Cope with Educational Corruption

- a. When university students are faced with corruption, how do they respond? What are their views on exiting, remaining loyal, and/or voicing their dissatisfaction over educational corruption?
- b. Do these students' views in any way differ from those of students who believe corruption is absent or minimal?
- c. Are students' views (i.e., on corruption, exit, voice, loyalty) in any way affected by the ongoing EU-nionization of Bosnia's higher education?

Chapter II

LITERATURE REVIEW ON EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION

An increasing interest in the topic of educational corruption has grown among both practitioners and academics, motivating the two camps to embark on understanding corruption and its impact in the developing as well as the developed world. In recent decades, the World Bank and other international organizations have labeled corruption as one of the key barriers to the sustainable development of poor nations. Therefore, the literature review geographically gravitates toward the literature on educational corruption in the developing world, as this phenomenon weighs more prominently among the weaker states rather than the developed nations. In the latter, instances of corruption are more often than not linked to the individuals responsible and frequently sanctioned if and when discovered.

Facilitators and Manifestations of Educational Corruption

Appearing in various forms, this literature review first argues that educational corruption is a systemic and chronic process with a profound societal impact on developing countries. The complexity of the impact can best be understood by unveiling the key facilitators of educational corruption, as well as the varied forms in which corruption emerges within the institutions of higher education. Thus, I set the stage for the review by looking into the forms in which corruption in highly corrupt developing societies might appear. In such settings even the process of defining educational

corruption may appear elusive, largely due to the acceptability and prevalence of the phenomenon in developing countries. In line with Waite and Allen's (2003) and Sayed and Bruce's (1998a) views, this review espouses an inclusive definition of educational corruption that refers to educational corruption as all immoral acts employed by individuals in the educational system for either personal or collective benefit of a group, class, and/or organization. The study employs the broader and more inclusive definition of educational corruption, as developing countries may not necessarily have proper guidelines, laws, and/or regulatory frameworks that elaborate on what constitutes educational corruption.

In their perceptive analysis, Waite and Allen (2003) assert that there are in fact two distinguishable approaches to defining corruption: one is a social perspective that labels as corrupt all acts that are deemed immoral, and a second approach is restrictive and reserved only for illegal acts. Sayed and Bruce (1998b) thoughtfully recognize that taking a social perspective toward defining corruption allows a researcher to include in his/her definition "what is commonly meant by corruption, it places the emphasis on morality and has its roots in classical conceptions of corruption which sought not so much to identify behavior, but to judge the overall political health of a society and its institutions" (p. 3). While Sayed and Bruce's (1998b) definition of corruption as seen through a social lens holds great appeal, one ought to be cautious with using this generalizable and only morality-based definition of corruption, as societal acceptance of corruption as a norm may, over time, redefine what is moral and immoral (Waite & Allen, 2003). Specifically, in some developing countries, it may be socially acceptable to give gifts to teachers, but such gestures might calculate into teachers' behaviors and possibly translate into a tendency to privilege some students at the expense of others. An alternative approach to this social definition of corruption is a legal one: all illegal acts that benefit one or more individuals or groups can be defined as corruption (Sayed & Bruce, 1998b; Waite & Allen 2003).

In emphasizing the differential between developed and developing states, educational corruption degrades developing societies economically, morally, and socially, further preventing them from catching up with the developed world. In stark contrast with the governments of developing countries, Altbach (2004) rightly posits that developed nations often take action, investigate, and publicly disclose their findings of corruption in an attempt to control and limit corruption if and when it arises. While Rumyantseva (2005) and Waite and Allen (2003) do not share their insights into the differences between the educational corruption in developing versus developed nations, Altbach (2004) furthers this discussion by characterizing educational corruption in the Western world as sporadic rather than systemic. Altbach saliently observes that if “malfeasance is detected, it is usually publicly exposed and the perpetrators [are] disciplined. The academic system itself is not corrupt, and efforts are made to cleanse the institutions” (p. 1).

To exemplify, the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has initiated an investigation into “diploma mills,” which GAO’s Office of Special Investigations (OSI) “defined ... as nontraditional, unaccredited, postsecondary schools that offer degrees for a relatively low flat fee, promote the award of academic credits based on life experience, and do not require any classroom instruction” (Statement of Cramer before the Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness, Committee on Education and the Workforce, September 23, 2004, p. 2). During their investigation, the GAO’s investigators bought two degrees from an Internet-run “diploma mill” and even successfully set up another “diploma mill” to test the rigor of the process for setting up an accredited higher educational institution in the US. While incidents of corruption may occur in any educational system – including those as sophisticated and developed as that of the US – such incidents remain sporadic and isolated in the developed world.

In line with the view that corruption in education in many developing states is habitual and extensive in nature, Altbach (2004) rightly observes that “well-connected

applicants or those who bribe or otherwise influence the academic authorities responsible for admissions, or those who can manipulate the admissions process gain entry regardless of their academic qualifications” (p. 1). Similar to Heyneman et al. (2007), Altbach (2004) lacks an extended doctrine on why this profound, collective, and habitual manipulation of academic processes is permissible and continuous. However, Altbach does share some important insights on the contextual traits of the developing countries that can help explain why educational corruption occurs: perpetually poor societies where university personnel are not adequately compensated for their work; societies where politics prevails in all decision making, including the academic arena; and those non-Western societies whose social structures may not be compatible with the Western organization of most universities throughout the world.

A major danger of corruption in the developing world rests in its systemic and habitual nature, which benefits the elites by allowing them to, instantly turn unqualified members of their networks into seemingly qualified candidates for a particular job. As Shaw (2008) perceptively observes, it is only when schools are functioning efficiently that the most qualified candidates are matched with the most demanding and growth-enhancing positions in a country’s economy. When educational corruption is present, the most capable individuals may not be allocated to jobs that require their talents; in other words, “the misallocation of talent ... is accelerated in countries that do have corruption in education” (p. 32). In his work, Shaw looks at the determinants of a student’s educational corruption, and he finds that the student’s perception of the practice and acceptability of educational corruption at his/her school affects the student’s willingness to bribe. The author goes on and finds that women, relative to men, are more likely to bribe their professors. In determining the facilitators of corrupt behavior, Shaw further illustrates that students’ views on what constitutes corruption are significant in determining how likely these students are to offer bribes. Those students who think of bribing as a crime are certainly less likely to succumb to corrupt behavior than those who do not see bribing

as a criminal act. Similarly, Shaw observes that those students whose fathers are businessmen show greater propensity toward bribery relative to other students. Students' proneness to corruption is also dependent on students' perception of corruption in the educational institution they attend. In some ways, it appears that the perception of the extensiveness of corruption becomes a perpetuator of corruption: when students believe corruption is widespread, they do not resist the system but try to fit in by being more likely to engage in corruption.

Raised to the forefront of development agendas, practitioners and academics alike have begun to look into the types, causes, and consequences of corruption. Existing research on the topic has aimed at creating typologies and gradations of corruption in order to understand its effects on academia and beyond (Altbach, 2004; Chapman, 2002; Heyneman, 2004; Romyantseva, 2005; Sayed & Bruce, 1998a; Transparency International, 2007; Waite & Allen, 2003). Some, however, have gone further in quantifying it. Among several of their notable works on the topic, Heyneman et al. (2007) have written a seminal piece on the costs of educational corruption. In the process, Heyneman et al. first evaluate the perceptions of corruption in higher education in several countries of Central Asia and Europe, including Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, where large numbers of students surveyed noted the presence of educational corruption and some depicted it as a "norm" (p. 5). One identifiable similarity among the abovementioned countries is that bribery is often driven by market forces: more desirable professions have the greatest likelihood of bribery taking place (Heyneman et al., 2007).

Heyneman et al. (2007) continue by validating the following viewpoint: the weakening of the USSR and the breakup of the central monitoring system, relative to the past, yielded an educational structure prone to corruption. The authors further argue that the decentralization and privatization processes created a fertile ground for corruption, exacerbating the difficulties of transition. They then elaborate on the mechanisms of

corruption in education by noting that the sellers and buyers of bribes may vary depending on a specific type of corruption. For instance, in the case of procurement and accreditation activities, the authors observe that the bribe is given by an educational institution and sold by the government. In the case of the teacher-student relationship, Heyneman et al. point to a student as the seller of a bribe and the teacher as the buyer of it. Knowing more about typologies of educational corruption and quantifying the corruption or the perception of it is a salient and still evolving research area in education, but understanding how educational corruption functions to help perpetuate failed states and power of their elites is another area in educational research that calls for further inquiry.

Broadening the research agenda on educational corruption, Waite and Allen (2003) were among the first to inquire into the unexplored interplay between power and corruption in education, and ways in which seeking a collective benefit for a group can become an instigator of corruption and possibly allow for the perpetuation of corruption. In their notable piece on the topic, the authors look into “an ethnology of corruption and abuse of power in educational administration” (p. 281). The limitation of current research on educational corruption, as they see it, is immediately evident in the widely accepted definition of corruption earlier noted: corruption is often and generally defined as an individual’s abuse of public position for his/her own good (Palmer, 1992, in Sayed & Bruce, 1998b). While educational corruption is viewed as an immoral act that is most often pursued for individual benefit, Waite and Allen (2003) expand this definition by referring to Sayed and Bruce’s (1998b) notion of collective benefit when defining corruption among the police. Waite and Allen (2003) build on this expanded definition of corruption as “any use of power or position through discrete acts or behavior(s) that benefit an individual, group, or organization” (p. 282). The authors further recognize the salience of differentiating not only between individual and collective forms of corruption, but also “between haphazard and more systemic forms of corruption” (p. 289), wherein

Waite and Allen claim that a subtle or haphazard type of corruption is perfectly embodied in the case of an uninformed member of the educational administration who has repeatedly used a university computer for personal activities.

Other education researchers have also worked to define and classify corruption and to determine the facilitators of corruption-related behaviors (Chapman, 2002; Heyneman, 2004; Romyantseva, 2005). In his effort to classify corruption within educational systems, Chapman (2002) looks into educational corruption as occurring at any level of the educational governance: at the ministry level, school, region, classroom, and among international agencies. To illustrate, Chapman interestingly lists forms of corruption transpiring at the ministry level, including manipulation with construction and supply contracts, favoritism in promotions and hiring, misuse and stealing of national and international funds, charging illegal fees, requesting bribes in exchange for procedural approvals, and forcing the purchase of specific materials produced by family and friends.

By introducing a new set of actors in corruption, Chapman (2002) adds value to corruption research by pointing to the possible corruption schemes among the international actors that are, often and almost instinctively, presumed to be benevolent actors in education. He continues by soundly purporting that the types of corruption are diverse and will depend on the socio-economic, political, and cultural context in which they occur. Additional examples of the corrupt activities taking place within the international agencies, per Chapman, include bribes, making excessively high payments that are unnecessary but aimed at obtaining certain services or information, siphoning funds away from projects, and making decisions on the allocation of projects not based on the objective evaluations but based on social, family, or business connections.

Chapman's full list of forms that educational corruption can take is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Chapman's Classification of Forms of Corruption by Level

Governing Level	Form of Corruption
Central Ministry	Kickback on construction and supply contracts; Favoritism in hiring, appointments, and promotions decisions; Diversion of funds from government accounts; Diversion of funds from international assistance funds; Ghost teachers and employees; Requiring payment for services that should be provided free; Withholding needed approvals and signature to extort bribes (e.g. gifts, favors, outright payments); Directing the location of construction and services to locations that offer opportunities for gain by oneself, family, or friends; Requiring the use of materials as a way of creating a market for items on which oneself, family or friends hold an import or production monopoly.
Regional/District	Overlooking school violations on inspector visits in return for bribes or favors; Diversion of school supplies to private market; Sales of recommendations for higher education entrance; Favoritism in personnel appointments (e.g. headmasters, teachers)
School Level	Ghost teachers; Diversion of school fees; Inflation of school enrollment data (in countries in which central ministry funds are allocated to school on basis of enrollment); Imposition of unauthorized fees; Diversion of central MOE funds allocated to schools; Diversion of moneys in revolving textbook fund; Diversion of community contributions.
Classroom/Teacher Level	Siphoning of school supplies and textbooks to local market; Selling test scores and course grades; Selling of change grade; Selling grade-to-grade promotion; Selling admissions (especially to higher education); Creating the necessity for private tutoring; Teachers' persistent absenteeism to accommodate other income producing work.
International Agencies	Payments of bribes; Payment of excessive or unnecessary fees to obtain services; Skimming from project fund; Allocating (or acquiescing in the allocation of) project related opportunities on the basis of candidates connections rather than on merit.

Source: Chapman (2002). Sectoral perspectives on corruption: Corruption and the education sector, MSI, Table titled "Illustration of common forms of corruption in the education sector, by level of the education system," p. 10.

Rumyantseva (2005) contributes to this discussion by suggesting that educational corruption emerges in various forms, including, but not limited to, "favoritism in procurement, favoritism in personnel appointments, ghost teachers, selling admissions and grades, private tutoring, and skimming from project grants" (p. 84). She also comments insightfully that the types of corruption occurring within the administration do

not impact the values, beliefs, and future life path of students as directly as the types of corruption most explicitly involving students. Rumyantseva offers a rich overview of types of corruption, but she focuses on the individual gains and consequences rather than collective benefits and shared motivations of those involved in the corrupt activities. Using a different rationale than that of Heyneman (2004), Rumyantseva (2005) further enriches the typology research in educational corruption by dividing educational corruption into: “corruption in selection, corruption in accreditation, corruption in procurement, professional misconduct, and corruption in educational property and taxes” (p. 85).

At times, corruption may intangibly and subtly affect the creation of social hierarchies; thus, it is important to recognize the diversity of variables that may drive and shape corruption in education. To name a few, some relevant facilitators of educational corruption in war-torn countries such as Bosnia may include poverty, ethnicity, wealth, political affiliation, personal character, and other individual traits. Depending on the social, political, and economic context, some or all of these factors may play an important role in how educational corruption develops in a particular setting. Confalonieri, Leoni, and Picci (2007), for instance, note that one’s proneness to corruption is often impacted by one’s willingness to risk his/her reputation being tainted in the eyes of the public. Confalonieri et al. go on to propose that the internet-based disclosure of information, particularly for public projects, can help improve transparency, because individuals involved in these projects will be more cognizant of their behavior, as people generally desire to maintain their good reputation.

Though it is indispensable to achieving a deeper understanding of educational corruption, literature on the interplay between power, social mobility, and corruption in the educational sector, in particular, has been conspicuously missing. It was only a few years ago that Waite and Allen (2003) pioneered such an effort. If a society embraces non-merit-based mobility, it arguably accepts corruption-related behavior, since some

other mechanism rather than meritocracy plays a key role in determining social standing in a society. Those who have the power will likely remain in power, and educational corruption may partly be credited with the maintenance of this elite status continuation.

Thus, the elites of developing countries where favors are often exchanged through social networks may not be predisposed to adequately sanction educational corruption because of the benefits of power reinforcement that it provides to their social classes and closed circles of power. A version of this corruption-preserves-class-power notion emerges from Chapman's (2002) writing, wherein he purports that "gatekeepers' ... motivation is often economic – to supplement income – but may also be an effort to *extend* [emphasis added] their status or power" (p. 8). Unfortunately, Chapman's decoding of the intricate interplay between corruption and the power of gatekeepers in educational institutions is limited to these brief remarks and buttressed only by an extensive discussion of typologies of educational corruption. Chapman sees the gatekeepers of educational institutions as separate entities from the top political leadership. In doing so, he fails to recognize the linkages that exist between elites in the political and educational leadership of the developing countries and the benefits of corruption to them, which make opposition to educational corruption unlikely in the absence of a fundamental political change or massive external pressure. However, Chapman still properly rationalizes that "when top leadership is corrupt, they lack the moral platform to demand honesty in others" (p. 11). Therefore, corruption at the political top, either directly or indirectly, signals the approval of the educational corruption; in other words, political corruption is likely to facilitate further expansion and perpetuation of educational corruption. Indeed, it is unlikely that extensive educational corruption would ever be viable in the presence of uncorrupt political leadership, underlining the earlier point that the connections among corrupt leaders in all spheres often exist and are maintained through mutual support and tolerance of corrupt behaviors.

Together with other forms of social, economic, and political power, educational corruption in the developing world has gradually become a systematic and acceptable behavior that allows utilization of educational institutions for the maintenance of social inequalities and for turning universities into likely mechanisms of elite status preservation. To keep themselves in power and secure reciprocation of favors by others holding equivalent positions in other sectors of society and economy, the academic elites have often fostered or not opposed activities in universities where exams and diplomas can be obtained with good connections and in matters of days. It is not uncommon to exchange favors by passing friends or relatives within the elite circles.

While Heckelman (2008) eloquently argues that corruption can indeed be beneficial to growth and development, his view clearly does not apply to all forms of educational corruption. For instance, giving out diplomas to incompetent economists, doctors, engineers, and/or attorneys can only have severely negative consequences for the growth of a developing country. Heckelman intelligently observes that corruption can be beneficial to those societies where corruption helps entrepreneurs circumvent inefficient rules; in his own words, “if a first best solution of ‘good rules’ is unavailable then corruption that avoids some of the restrictions created by bad rules becomes second best solution and alternative path to growth” (p. 1).

Though Altbach (2004) recognizes that educational corruption by special and privileged groups is tolerable in countries with a general deviation from meritocracy-based mobility, neither Heyneman et al. (2007) nor Altbach (2004) explicitly explore a notion that corruption, as one of the dominant features of the educational systems in the developing world, has gradually evolved into a practice supported by the upper classes and operating in their interests. It is this self-interest of the elites that likely undermines their, and therefore the government’s, motivation to halt corruption in education and elsewhere. Such elite networks likely serve as some of the key perpetrators of educational corruption. Even research institutions concerned predominantly with the

pragmatics of corruption-related activities inadvertently acknowledge the underlying pressure of self-reproduction that prevents the elites and governments from opposing corruption. In many cases, doing so would likely be in conflict with the elites' interests to secure their children's future and position in the society.

Indeed, the course of corruption development can be usurped only if prominent and influential community members are actively involved in countering it: those with "necessary skills and *social status* [emphasis added] to stand up against corruption" (Transparency International, 2007, p. 3). Along the same lines, Chapman (2002) rightly asserts that "commitment of top leadership to honest operation" (p. 12) in the educational infrastructure is essential to the diminishing of corruption. However, Chapman does not state that obtaining this commitment is virtually impossible without significant external pressure or shifts in political interests of the elites. Chapman, in agreement with Hallak and Poisson's (2005) suggestions, talks about a "clear code of conduct" and "clear, workable accountability system" as some of many preconditions for the lessening of educational corruption (Chapman, 2002, p. 12). While there exists an obvious value to having a set of transparent procedural guidelines, as well as the standards that guide teachers and professors in their work, many norms, anti-corruption policies, and declarations exist only in obscure regulations and rarely make the next step toward implementation. Unless the most prominent and powerful decision-makers are collectively dedicated to halting corruption, any internal force shy of a broad communal consensus would not suffice to end corruption.

Impact of Educational Corruption

To expand this discussion beyond the drivers and forms of educational corruption, this literature review seeks to understand the complexities of the impact educational corruption has on the students involved. Though a frequent form of educational

corruption, bribes are not the sole form of corrupt behavior in the educational sector. Often, trading of favors occurs and largely transpires under the veil of either explicit or implicit understanding that favors are reciprocated among the privileged. Therefore, educational corruption may have complex implications for the models of social mobility. Those who employ their social networks or leverage their family's social standing to move up may see educational corruption as highly beneficial while others who have a disadvantageous social standing may find educational corruption serves as an obstacle to their aspiration of merit-based achievement. While the efforts of the corrupt to conceal their activities make a delineation of "who benefits" from "who suffers" difficult, Lomnitz (2002) was first to find that "[m]aterial payment in return for favors is graft. It means the absence of any possibility of personal relationship of having friends in common. Accepting a bribe is an acknowledgement of social inferiority, like accepting a tip or gratuity" (p. 175). Projecting Lomnitz's conception of the relationship between power, social class, and corruption onto the educational arena, one would suspect that money is never or rarely paid for passing grades, obtaining of diplomas, or undeserved professorships among the privileged, while those of unprivileged social backgrounds would be the ones to engage in offering bribes.

In his pioneering work on upward mobility in education, Turner (1960) compares two types of social mobility within educational systems: the educational system in the US, where mobility is contest-based, and that of the UK, where he views mobility as sponsored. Turner focused on simplified yet salient differences that existed between the US and UK educational systems at the time of his writing. Such differences often are more subtle in developing countries, further complicating any study of social mobility in such settings. For Turner (1960), "the most conspicuous control problem [in the society] is that of ensuring loyalty in the disadvantaged classes toward a system in which their members receive less than a proportional share of society's goods" (p. 859). On the one hand, Turner (1960) saw the American educational system as allowing anyone who is

hard working to move upward socially and become a part of the elite. In this model, importantly, the elite is a fluid concept, as Turner (1960) argued that one's belonging to the elite can be changed at any point in time and as a result of an open contest.

On the other hand, Turner (1960) characterized the UK educational system as sponsored because a few are chosen early on by the elites and later sponsored to go to the best schools based on some appearance of merit. For Turner (1960), "under sponsored mobility elite recruits are chosen by the established elite or their agents, and elite status is given on the basis of some criterion of supposed merit [i.e. entry examination] and cannot be *taken* by any amount of effort and strategy" (p. 856). He compares such a system to belonging to a private club, where the membership is allowed only if the existing members deem the potential entrants similar in their traits to the established members; in other words, no price, no effort, and no ability will secure the club's membership without the explicit sponsorship of the existing members. With sponsored mobility, differentiation among different classes via education is accomplished through their segregation into schools for the elites and non-elites. The elites are then given the sense of ownership over the others because of their superior status in their society (Turner, 1960).

It is important to note that Turner (1960) wisely elaborated that the models he presented are "the ideal types [that] are not fully exemplified in practice since they are normative systems" (p. 856). Rightly so, he emphasized that "no normative system can be devised so as to cope with all empirical exigencies" (p. 856). Turner understood the importance of the normative formulation of upward mobility models in education, as well as the limitations of the same. In doing so, Turner allows one to contextualize and flexibly apply his normative vision to better understand the phenomenon of social mobility in a corrupt higher educational system of a developing country, such as that of Bosnia. Turner did not address the idiosyncrasies of developing countries' educational

systems, but he recognized the shortcomings of his normative visions and encouraged researchers to utilize them as the basis for further inquiry.

Morgan (1990) notes that the comparison between the British and American systems of education has remained relevant several decades after Turner's (1960) initial piece on mobility in education of the two countries. Morgan (1990) concurs that the American system of education continues to propagate the suitability of higher education for all, while the British system remains largely selective and sponsored: "The elite themselves, and their agents, are the judges of whether ... [the] ability is present, and they select, recruit and train their successors rather than allowing them to emerge at the end of a mass competition" (p. 39). She further underscores that, in England, "the sponsored mobility norm favours controlled selection rather than a prolonged open contest," and the vast majority is directed toward "form[ing] more 'realistic' plans" (p. 40). Interestingly, Morgan goes as far as to build predictive models for higher education entry in the US and England and expectedly finds that it is easier to predict entry into the higher education in England than is the case in the US. In the US, one's ability on standardized exams is only one among many factors predicting one's entry into the system of higher education, while the entry tests devised and utilized by the British elites to determine who gets their sponsorship for higher education have the key predictive value. One should also note that others have challenged Turner's (1960) theory of mobility by suggesting that, despite the increasing relevance of achievement in determining social mobility, even in the American society, the ascribed qualities, such as the social status, of an individual continue to have an effect on one's social mobility (Kinloch, 1969).

Though the application of Turner's (1960) notions of sponsored and contest-based mobility have been revisited by other researchers (Baker, 1982; Kinloch, 1969; Morgan, 1990), this analysis aims at uniquely reexamining these notions of social mobility as they relate to corruption in higher education. Heyneman et al. (2007) invaluable point to the devaluation of education in a corrupt society, and it is worth noting that they also

inadvertently reinforce one of this dissertation's key arguments. Heyneman et al. concretely show that highly educated individuals in corrupt societies do not benefit from their education as much as do those who reside in more transparent societies. If a merit-based system is in place, one's education should correlate with one's social status and income level, as it is reasonable to expect that an individual's superb academic performance and/or obtaining of a master's or doctoral degree would be generally reflected in the higher income and social standing relative to those of individuals with less education or unremarkable academic performance. However, as Heyneman et al. suggest, income is not always reflective of one's academic credentials, particularly if the individual in question resides in a highly corrupt society. In deepening this argument, Turner's (1960) renowned work on sponsored and contested mobility comes into play, as it clearly differentiates between the contest-based mobility that welcomes the merit-based participation of all in an open contest for the highest standing in a society, and the sponsored mobility that emerges in social settings where elite status is handed to the privileged and is not necessarily earned through a commitment to hard work.

In the context of a developing country such as Bosnia, students who are entering colleges may be persistently exposed to the demands of corrupt professors. Demands to engage in corrupt behavior may be implicitly signaled by professors failing students repeatedly, despite their demonstrated knowledge, or explicitly by professors demanding bribes for passing grades or by making sexual advances until a student enters an intimate relationship or exits the academic milieu. However, educational corruption may also come in the form of social connections and the reciprocation of favors, which assures the elites' upper hand in deciding who will occupy the key positions in their society and the world of academia.

Consequently, most students who operate in a highly corrupt setting soon realize that moving up the academic ladder is not necessarily correlated with one's hard work and commitment to learning but rather exchanging of favors or buying mobility in the

society. For some, such type of academic life deflates the motivation and discourages them from fully participating in the educational system. Others begin to search for ways to become a part of the corruption process. Murphy et al. (1991) have made a significant contribution by unveiling the rationale behind “rent seeking” behavior and why sometimes even the most capable individuals may opt to engage in corruption. While in the organized societies the most gifted individuals may start businesses that would earn them the greatest return on their investment of time and effort relative to working for the government or military, there are countries where entrepreneurship is not a path toward highest earnings (Murphy et al., 1991). Instead, it is the “ability to solicit bribes . . . for the benefit of one’s family and friends” (p. 505) that drives the most talented people, in some less functional societies, to disregard innovative and entrepreneurial jobs and seek those with government or military for their own benefit and the benefit of their closest networks.

If a society persistently tolerates corruption, its attitude may help tilt the balance toward a sponsor-based rather than competition-based mobility, with the consequent and associated patterns arguably spilling over into other domains of social activity. In other words, one could expect that the upward mobility model that society, intentionally or unintentionally, preaches through its educational outlets is what the young eventually adopt and, later, promote through their own actions, attitudes, and behaviors.

Interestingly, Turner (1960) also underlines the salience of another prerequisite for the sponsored mobility model to evolve: the sponsored mobility model emerges where there is “a social structure that fosters monopoly of elite credentials” (p. 858). While Turner envisions the “monopoly of credentials ... typically [as] a product of societies with well entrenched traditional aristocracies employing such credentials as family line” (p. 858), Turner’s analysis does not take into account developing countries where monopolies over production of credentials can fall into the hands of a few following shocks to structural settings such as wars. This can occur even when the rising elites are not equivalent in

their aristocratic establishment to those Turner refers to in the UK. For instance, in the context of Bosnia, where most faculties lack clear guidelines as to the award of doctorates, the decisions on who obtains the highest academic degrees in the society are in the hands of those who have monopolized the individual faculties and who often sponsor the award of degrees to the members of their close circles. To account for the complexity of the social hierarchies and manners in which they are formed, Turner wisely posits that the models he portrays are guided by the “principles ... [which] are assumed to be present at least implicitly in people’s thinking, guiding their judgments of what is appropriate on many specific matters” (p. 856).

To exemplify the severity of educational corruption’s impact in a society and its relation to the notions of power and social standing, Waite and Allen (2003) depict an extreme example of a corrupt school in China, where 41 children and adults were killed when a school exploded due to the firecrackers children were forced to make during their lunch break in order to generate additional revenue for the school and for Communist Party officials. Notably, Chinese officials offered an alternative story for the events that took place, protecting the corrupt activities that led to the children’s deaths. By using this example, Waite and Allen powerfully illustrate how the common interests of elites overshadowed their motivation to cease the immoral behaviors in education, even when the costs of such activities were measured in children’s lives. A parent devastated by a loss of two children simply yet powerfully stated: “In China officials help officials. No one is helping us” (p. 285).

Unlike Waite and Allen’s (2003) attempt to unravel the particulars of the linkages between power and corruption, Heyneman et al. (2007) narrow their focus on the impact corruption can have over income generation: to reiterate, they validly observe that educational corruption affects academic success in that it does not translate legitimate educational attainment into an individual’s economic gain in the form of income. To expand on Heyneman et al.’s observations, one’s educational qualifications do not weigh

in as heavily in the employers' decision-making processes, not only because the quality of education is distorted or uncertain, but also because the job applicants' social predispositions and membership in a dominant and socially well-entrenched class often prevail. In line with this argument and returning to the notion of mobility, Altbach (2004) fittingly states that even "academic posts are often 'sold' in the sense that those seeking appointments to lectureships or professorships must curry favor with selection committees" (pp. 1-2). While professors move upward by belonging to the right social networks and irrespective of their research or teaching accomplishments, which sometimes can be equated to plagiarized works of others, some students enter and graduate from universities thanks to bribes and connections (Altbach, 2004). These corrupt processes, therefore, profoundly affect the educational systems and processes by deviating from the initial purpose educational systems have purportedly emerged to serve.

An understanding of the impact of corruption in education requires recognition of another, socially broad consequence: corruption in education involves youth and teaches young women and men immoral behavior (Heyneman et al., 2007). In a similar fashion, Chapman (2002) and Rumyantseva (2005) underline that corruption in institutions of higher education trains young students to accept and adopt corruption as tool to forward their personal careers. Chapman (2002) further believes that youth is "mis-educated" by being taught the prevalence, methods, and apparent legitimacy of corruption rather than to work hard; nonetheless, the author limits his interpretation of the consequences of mis-education to noting that systemic and widely spread educational corruption "instills a value that is highly destructive to the social and economic development of a country" (p. 2).

While Heyneman et al.'s (2007) work does not fully address the complexities of corruption in the educational systems of developing countries, it quantitatively captures the potential impact of corruption on the earnings of highly educated individuals. Using

Transparency International's 2005 data on 55,000 people from 69 countries, Heyneman et al. rely on two different regression models to look into the question of corruption: the first of their models estimates whether an individual will have high income, and in that version income is coded as a dummy variable, with high income being coded as 1 and low or medium income being coded as 0. They then follow with another regression model, where low income is predicted and coding is reversed from the previous model: low and medium income is now coded as 1, and high income is coded as 0.

Through their organized and compelling argument, Heyneman et al. (2007) predict income based on corruption-related and other independent variables. To note, Heyneman et al. do not utilize any data on the direct involvement of the surveyed individuals in corruption, as no such questions were asked in the survey. Instead, a categorical variable that captures the subjects' perception of corruption within education is used to predict income. Other predictors were utilized in the regression models and included age, gender, region, higher education, secondary education, and interaction terms between education and corruption. They then arrive at an important conclusion: the economic benefit of higher education declines with an increase in the perception of educational corruption. In other words, Heyneman et al. uncover an identifiable similarity among the poorer countries examined: the highly educated are more likely to report low income if educational corruption is present than the highly educated who perceived their communities as not educationally corrupt. However, one should be cognizant of the upward bias here, meaning that those lower income groups may have a tendency to place the blame on corruption even when there is no direct evidence that the cause of their low incomes is corruption.

Given the complex nature of corruption, one way of evaluating the presence of corruption and its impact is to look at the quality of education and to what extent education serves as a signaling tool for employers. This notion first introduced by Michael Spence (1973) was then applied by Heyneman et al. (2007). Heyneman et al.

believe that the variance of degree quality at corrupt educational institutions is high. As for the employers, degrees from corrupt educational institutions, the authors further claim, may not help in gauging whether a job candidate should be hired or not. Consequently, if employers always seek to hire the most qualified candidates – whether one assumes that education provides needed on-the-job skills or that it only signals to employers which candidates have the raw set of qualities that predetermine them for success – those that bought their degrees would eventually lose their jobs or at the least fall into the least desirable positions over time. Generally, the preceding views on how corruption distorts the quality of education and interferes with the hiring process are convincing, but they do not encompass a more socially embedded educational corruption that often takes place in developing countries.

In short, the underlining assumption of the Heyneman et al.'s (2007) work is that those in need of workers are indeed looking for the best candidates, and educational corruption gets in the way of properly labeling who those candidates are. In the functioning societies, this assumption is firmly valid; however, its application to the developing world becomes somewhat limited. Some employers in developing countries may desire to hire candidates based on their political affiliation or their belonging to a dominant social class rather than their academic success. Hiring politically well-connected individuals, irrespective of their level of competence, may curry favor for government contracts and help in circumventing government regulations. It is not a rarity that those who are well-connected socially end up in the top positions in society despite their poor academic success, or their degrees or exams being obtained without merit. In such instances, it may have not mattered whether a degree signaled a particular set of skills or basic raw intelligence, but rather that it obtained social justification to the elites for the hiring of the pre-selected individuals. In others words, Turner's (1960) model of sponsored mobility may extend beyond education into the hiring arena, a notion that calls

for further inquiry into the complex interlinkages between power, educational corruption, and social mobility.

Educational Corruption: Ways to Cope through Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Third, in focusing on corruption in higher education, which often allows for the persistent and unmerited obtaining of diplomas or professorships, I further posit that the purposeful acceptance of corruption by the elites in control of individual faculties profoundly affects students. Often, they accept educational corruption as a norm, which in turn allows corruption in the educational systems to continue. Furthermore, this continuous exposure to the lack of merit and immorality that is associated with educational corruption likely produces complex behaviors and reactions to corruption that are yet to be fully examined and understood.

As earlier noted, particularly appealing and pertinent to the argument of this paper is Waite and Allen's (2003) work, which would agree that the minimization or cessation of corruption is difficult to achieve because those in power can partly credit the maintenance of their elite status to the perpetuation of corruption. In all their eloquence, Waite and Allen realistically contest: "Corrupt systems are difficult, if not impossible, to challenge and change from within, especially since the power operant in such systems is self-protective and self-perpetuating" (p. 294). In further agreement with Waite and Allen, constraining corruption to the notion of personal benefit appears immune to the elements of educational corruption that benefit a social group or class. Thus, I reiterate the salience of defining educational corruption as the usage of one's public authority to unjustly privilege, often, not only oneself but also a group of individuals one may belong to. In their contribution to the research on education and corruption and influenced by Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, and Parris's (2000) view of corruption, Hallak and Poisson (2005) assert that the relationship between power and corruption in education is

fundamentally important; specifically, they believe that “monopoly power and lack of accountability mechanisms favor the development of corrupt practices in the education sector” (p. 2). However, later on in their discussion on the linkages between corruption and education, they choose to focus on successful anti-corruption policies, which include forming adequate regulatory systems and the improvement of management processes.

Importantly, once students realize that the socially connected flow through the system and the exchanges of favors among social equals affect the social mobility model, further questions arise as to students’ reactions and behaviors within such a system. Do these students choose to exit, remain loyal, or voice their dissatisfaction? In lieu of bribe-selling, some of those who are already limited by their financial means would likely opt to exit the university settings when they are subjected to repeated calls for bribes.

Drawing on the renowned work of Albert Hirschman (1970) seems particularly valuable here. Hirschman’s analysis is largely economic in nature and mostly directed toward the functioning and performance “lapses” of business organizations (p. 23). For Hirschman, these temporary deviations from typical performance are “lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behavior” (p. 4). His broad definition of lapses from typical performance clearly includes actions that may be deemed as illegal, potentially referring to the inclusion of corruption and other forms of illegal business behavior. However, Hirschman does not elaborate on non-law-abiding forms of performance lapses but elaborates more on quality or efficiency problems that, in his view, are “repairable lapses” (p. 4). For Hirschman, a perfect institution, regardless of how perfect it may seem, simply does not exist in the real world. In fact, all institutional players may fall back in their quality or efficiency at some point in time, but mechanisms of a competitive market may help them rebound to the initial position of efficiency and functionality.

According to Hirschman (1970), while exit is deeply economic in nature, voice as an alternative form of action is highly political. Once customers exit the company’s

customer pool, their reaction directly affects the company's business through declining revenues, unless the demand is inelastic and the price per unit of the goods or services provided is increased to compensate for the loss of volume. Hirschman sees voice as a form of political activism and perceives it as particularly "messy," as customers would voice their dissatisfaction in different forms and with varied intensities: from simple complaints to massive public protests. In re-evaluating Hirschman's work, Klein (1980) looked into the notions of voice and exit, and rightly noted that the model of reacting through exit or voice is not sufficiently complex.

Specifically, Klein (1980) sees Hirschman's (1970) assumption of somewhat mutually exclusive exit and voice mechanisms as overambitious because human behavior tends to be characterized by the political lethargy rather than activism. Additionally, Klein (1980) underlines that voice is much more informative relative to exit. Simply, voice provides details as to the consumer's dissatisfaction, while exit, in the form of a simple and abrupt departure, may continue to puzzle the company as to why the consumer left. For Hirschman (1970), whether customers opt to exit or voice their dissatisfaction will ultimately be a function of the level of loyalty the customers feel toward the company: more loyal customers will complain but remain with the company, while others will exit. There is also a possibility that consumers become dissatisfied with the institutional performance and choose neither to exit nor to voice their views. For critic Klein (1980), this is the situation Hirschman (1970) explains by resorting to the notion of consumer loyalty; in Klein's (1980) view, Hirschman (1970) sees loyalty "as a residual" (p. 419), because he uses it to explain why some consumers may remain with a particular firm without resorting to the exit or voice mechanisms. Also, there may be multiple transaction costs associated with changing institutions. The area of transaction costs has been a particular focus of Oliver Williamson (1981), who rightly believes that human nature and relationships formed with a particular supplier will, over time, affect the

economics of the transaction in question. In other words, Williamson believes in the importance of human nature in economic dealings.

One may add that students in highly corrupt educational systems may opt for a no-voice-no-exit path due to fear of voicing their views combined with the lack of alternative educational opportunities that would adequately respond to their needs. Therefore, staying put often seems as the best choice given the circumstances. In addition, Klein (1980) insightfully brings up the point that it is very possible to exit the institution in question and then decide to voice one's dissatisfaction. In the case of educational corruption in Bosnia, this would include those students who have exited due to corruption but chose to voice their views in the virtual setting through, for instance, the earlier discussed *Svevijesti.ba* campaign against corruption in Bosnian universities.

To further elaborate, Hirschman (1970) logically observes that a sizeable exit by customers can push the firm into bankruptcy. In the educational sector examined here, the public universities in developing countries often act as if they are immune to the presence of private competition and operate under the presumption of perpetual existence. In some ways, they simply remain immune to a massive exodus of students. In fact, Klein (1980) similarly disputes Hirschman's (1970) "assumption of producer responsiveness" (p. 417). For Klein (1980), Hirschman (1970) is disregarding the issue of "professional dominance" or "bureaucratic dominance" in various institutions (p. 417). Even Hirschman himself accepts that variations of his theory may exist in different sectors. For instance, he recognizes that in the case of the public education, the exit of students for alternative schools may lead to a further decline in the quality of public education. Herein, he argues, political activism rather than exit would prove more beneficial in pushing for the improvement of public education.

Hirschman (1970) additionally finds that firms may at times increase their price to increase revenues, which can motivate some consumers to exit. This presumes that the demand for the good or service is inelastic so that clients are unable or unwilling to exit

in response to increased prices. So, with inelastic demand, the loss of customers is proportionally less than the gain in revenues, and such exit would not necessarily instigate change on the part of the firm because the loss of revenue due to some customers' exit could be compensated by the revenues gained via a price increase. In education, various factors clearly complicate the exit mechanisms or ways in which students choose to cope, as well as the reactions of educational institutions. Consideration of price-influenced exit is important in academic settings, since exit could occur due to the increased cost of education. The motivating factor for this exit would not be educational corruption *per se* but an increase in the price of schooling. However, it is worth noting that students and their parents may be informally calculating the cost of bribery into their calculations of schooling costs, especially when students attend public universities.

When the price of a particular service increases due to a bribe, the poor are more likely to exit relative to the wealthier segments of the population. This was shown in the research of Donald Heller (2001), who finds that providing financial aid to the poor may help overcome "the existing low-tuition and fees [that can] still act as a barrier to college enrollment" (p. 30). While not directly related to the educational sector, Kaufmann, Montoriol-Garriga, and Recanatini's (2008) logic seamlessly aligns with the notion that educational corruption affects more profoundly those of lower socio-economic status; indeed, Kaufmann et al. rightly assert that bribes have a greater effect on poor families not only because they must sacrifice a more substantial portion of their already meager incomes, but also because the poor select out from even seeking public services due to their awareness of the need to pay additional bribes to obtain desired services. Generally, the price elasticity of the poor is much higher than that of the wealthier segments of any population; in other words, with changes in price, the poor's consumption of the goods in question will decline while that is less likely to be the case for the wealthy (Hohnen, 2000). Ironically, the poor, who undeniably need public services more than the wealthier

segments of developing societies, simply opt out of the system due to the massive financial burden that bribes represent to their families. Even relatively low-tuition can be a “price-barrier” for the poor (Heller, 2001, p. 27).

When contextualized into the educational sector and modified to account for the question of social mobility, students who enter faculties without “proper” socioeconomic background may be – similar to what Kaufmann et al. (2008) see occurring in the broader public sector – opting out of the highly corrupt educational system because of their inability financially, and likely socially, to address continuous exposure to corruption in Bosnia’s higher education. Others, however, may simply adjust to paying the higher price. In turn, the additional revenues obtained by faculty members would likely offset some losses that may have occurred due to the exit of some students. This ability of the faculty to easily compensate for the lost revenues would likely create no incentives for faculty members to change their corrupt behavior.

For poor students, coming to terms with lifelong poverty or belonging to the lower class may be more easily rationalized than navigating through the corrupt educational system that, even if diplomas are obtained, may not guarantee employment due to the necessity of social networking and connections in order to obtain an adequate job after college. Existing research on educational corruption has rarely looked deeply into these intricate relationships of power, exit, voice, socio-economic status, mobility, and bribery in educational corruption, which is precisely why this analysis employs both Turner’s (1960) and Hirschman’s (1970) works to pursue the topic in depth in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s higher education. Lastly, the lack of a comprehensive look at the reactions of students who witness social mobility being defined by corruption and social networks rather than meritocracy is the primary instigator behind my decision to enter this abundantly appealing area of educational research.

Chapter III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL MOBILITY AND COPING MECHANISMS

This chapter presents a comprehensive picture of the corruption in public higher education in Bosnia. I begin by discussing the emergence of corruption while focusing on the role that the post-war elite re-creation played in the process. One of the goals of this chapter is to review the manner in which infrastructural elements, behaviors, and procedures can create an encouraging space for the elite to engage in corrupt activities. Here, I specifically argue that the post-war elite have allowed for various structures, organization, behaviors, and procedures within Bosnia's post-war educational system, as these permit the elite members to use the educational system to their individual and collective advantage.

The primary purpose of the corruption analysis and those systemic elements that enable corruption to occur in Bosnia's higher education is to help conceptualize ways in which social mobility and students' coping mechanisms have consequently been affected. In doing so, the chapter employs and also expands on Hirschman's (1970) and Turner's (1960) earlier discussed work to show their theoretical relevance and applicability to the educational systems in the new post-conflict and post-socialist geo-political frameworks. This is then followed by concluding thoughts that only significant sanctions against the current way of doing business that permits and encourages corruption, allows sponsored-

mobility, and dis-empowers youth in Bosnia's higher education have the potential to diminish ongoing and systemic corruption.

The Elite Re-creation and its Relation to Corruption

The country's longstanding elite dissipated as a consequence of the communist system's disintegration that, together with the 1990s war, brought about the overall structural and political fall of the country. To compensate for the lack of the communist and educated elite that departed the country prior to the war or were marginalized due to the political shift from communism toward nationalism, those who most actively engaged in the organization of life and defense during the war were now emerging as Bosnia's new and generally more nationalistically driven elite. As Andreas (2004) elaborates in his work on political economies and criminal activities in the war-time Balkans:

In the Bosnians capital of Sarajevo, for example, the city's social structure has undergone a metamorphosis as a consequence of the military siege and its aftermath. While many of the best-educated professionals fled abroad, many residents who were previously on the margins of the society have experienced rapid *upward mobility* [emphasis added] through their wartime roles and political connections. The daily Sarajevo newspaper *Oslobodjenje* lamented during the siege "Before our eyes, the new class is being born in this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all former 'marginals.'"³ (p. 5)

For the new elite, the first step in the post-war period was to legitimize what was gained by illegal activities that took place during the 1992-1995 war. The local politicians, war profiteers, and military leaders, aka Bosnia's new elite, worked toward justifying their newly gained positions of power. While the international community propagated war amnesty, referring only to "dodgers and deserters" (Andreas, 2004, p. 5), the new elite worked to secure its new economic and social standing by ensuring that the

³As quoted in Munir Alibabic, *Bosna u Kandzama KOS-a* (Bosnia in the Claws of KOS), Sarajevo: NIP Behar, 1996, p. 73.

amnesty “include[ed] such crimes as illegal commerce, tax evasion, and illegal use of humanitarian aid. The amnesty cover[ed] January 1991-December 22, 1995, a time period that closely corresponds to the rise of nationalist political parties” (p. 5). I label this legalization of the war-time acquired wealth as the Phase 1 (see Figure 1 below) of the Elite Legitimization process entered in and espoused by the political newcomers, who were often closely tied to the military leadership, as well as the underground economy of the Balkan wars, and who felt an urgent need to legitimize their newly acquired economic, social, and political prominence.

Figure 1: New Elite Legitimization Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina



With the post-war reorganization of the country came re-invention of the country’s educational system as well. Revamping the higher education system according to the new ethnic and political frameworks and in the intense and corrupt political environment led

to many organizational challenges, obstacles, and inefficiencies within the educational system, which consequently created a system conducive to corruption. For instance, ethnic fragmentation and political partitioning of the country into smaller governing units spilled into the educational setting, leading to an uncoordinated and disorganized educational system that has resisted consistent efforts to adopt the EU-based educational model. The EU-nionized educational terrain in the rest of Europe and its official acceptance by the Bosnian government may have in fact only exacerbated the existing problems due to higher education's systemic inability to properly adopt and follow through the requirements of the Bologna Process.

While so much of the still evolving higher education in post-communist Bosnia remains unknown and in flux, the systemic pattern of corruption in higher education has become a prominent feature of Bosnia's education. With the departure of the decades dominating elite of the post-WWII Yugoslavia and with Bosnia's newly found independence, there was a need to create the new organizational structures to portray the semblance of a functional society and to process the incoming reconstruction and reconciliation aid from the Western world. Bosnia lacked an educated elite, with the elite vacuum becoming particularly evident once the war ended and the country entered its reconstruction stage.

The emerging elite largely profited from war-time activities and took over the political scene, but also felt a need to complete legitimization of its political and social standing through education. In what I call the Second Phase of the Elite Legitimization (see Figure 1, p. 54), I argue, the newly forming elite felt compelled to finalize the elite legitimization process by obtaining the educational degrees that its members often lacked in order to maintain legitimacy for their socio-economic prominence and justify their long-term hold of political power.

While educational legitimization may have first began as a form of compensation to those who served the newly emerging Bosnian society under extraordinary war

conditions, the chaotic circumstances that characterized Bosnia immediately in the post-war allowed for the abuse of the educational system to expand significantly and to incorporate many of those individuals who rose to their prominent political standing during the war but lacked significant educational pedigree to justify and support their socioeconomic and political status long-term. No longer was Bosnia at war and cut off from the rest of the world, but now it became the center stage for a massive influx of foreign aid, organizations, and experts who were in need of development partners, which only placed further pressure on many new and rising elite members to buttress their sudden shift from the margins of society into the social limelight via fake diplomas. In the context of Bosnia, where the educational system was partitioned along political lines, with no authoritative state-level institutions to monitor educational practices and processes, instantaneous production of educational credentials for the new political and economic elite became feasible. Therefore, the primary beneficiary of corruption in higher education became the new elite, who seized the opportunity to obtain educational pedigrees as the war came to an end and continued to espouse corruption in the years that followed with the ultimate goal of securing their legitimacy and consequently their positions of power long-term.

What is of particular interest to me as the researcher is this elite creation's impact on forms of corruption, which have shifted away from standard bribing and moved toward more complex organizational processes favoring reciprocation networks among the elite. First, I argue, these educational corruption patterns, as played out in Bosnia, have pushed the social mobility mechanisms away from Turner's merit-based and more toward his sponsored mobility model. Second, the severity of educational corruption's impact is ultimately reflected in the ways in which youth manage and cope with their perceptions and experiences of corruption. I view educational corruption as being part and parcel of the *de novo* post-war elite legitimization process, as having had a significant impact on the society at large through distortion of the social mobility and

corruption-coping mechanisms in Bosnia's higher education. Not only is the social mobility process altered, but youth are emerging increasingly convinced that they are disempowered by such a system and helpless to change the *status quo*.

Bosnia's higher education is still being crafted, but without substantial international community engagement, the system will continue to play a part-time role as a diploma-making mechanism for the corrupt circles. Paradoxically this phenomenon is occurring in conjunction with the internationally rooted expectation that the educational system will serve as the basis for creating an improved, capable, and more mobile workforce for a new Bosnia. Caught between the two worlds – one proposing meritocratic mobility, harmonized, and EU-integrated educational space and the other holding onto the sponsored mobility model that has served the *de novo* elite well – emerged a hybrid system that is uncoordinated, chaotic, inconsistent, and susceptible to the ongoing corruption-related practices and behaviors. The increasing utilization of higher education to benefit the new elite members has signaled to the public the Bosnian leadership's acceptance of educational corruption as an acceptable form of behavior that bears no consequences.

Sponsored and Merit-Based Mobility: Life on Loan?

In the post-war period, new Bosnia and Herzegovina had to position itself as an equal partner in its communication with the West, which involved re-creating the state from physically, morally, and organizationally leveled institutions. In the process and with the rise of new institutions, more opportunities for corruption emerged than would have in more stable times. While Tito's communist vision had well over four decades – of peace – to institutionalize itself by the time former Yugoslavia began to unravel, the post-communist and post-war Bosnia was to become Europe's partner in peace and development without sufficient time, resources, and support in the implementation of all

the international community had envisioned for the new Bosnia, including, more recently, Bologna-inspired reform of higher education.

To be clear, this dissertation does not idealize the past, nor does it directly or indirectly claim that the pre-war communist system did not face the issues of corruption, reliance on personal connections, and immorality. However, this research does imply that the general operational framework and quality of education notably differ from the pre-war organization where decades were invested into establishing and maintaining the pre-war educational system, its infrastructure, and quality standards. As Zdravko Grebo, a law professor from the University of Sarajevo, confirmed in an interview with Peter Andreas,⁴ the elite creation process is decades long elsewhere, but in the Bosnian war, it was the get-rich-overnight approach that created the new elite.

Emerging in such complex circumstances, the Bosnian higher education experience presently takes on one of the two generalized scenarios: either students of insignificant social backgrounds obtain diplomas through a struggle and extraordinarily hard work as this social group lacks personal relationships or through the ability to bribe authorities in a system whose laws and rules' applicability is a function of one's socio-economic status; or with relative ease as one's social network, political status, and material wealth are appropriately leveraged during the educational process. In other words, corruption has become an integral part of Bosnia's social fabric, and while the lower socioeconomic groups may see it as a barrier and a form of exclusion, the elite members view it as an opportunity to help propel each other's professional status by reciprocating favors.


Steadily, Bosnians have come to understand that with political and social prominence comes the ease of mobility in higher education. Educational corruption now fairly consistently benefits the new elite and their immediate family members and friends.

⁴Peter Andreas interview with Zdravko Grebo, Sarajevo (July 15, 2002). Please see bibliography for P. Andreas for further details.

Given that the war ended about a decade and a half ago, children of those who took the positions of power in the new Bosnia have in most cases reached college-appropriate age, thereby further complicating the elite's favor-reciprocation process and emerging modes of social mobility.

The elite's favor-reciprocation principle is crucial to the post-war distortion of the social mobility mechanisms in Bosnia's higher education. It is a behavioral standard that I define as often unspoken yet mutual understanding between two or more parties in the educational or any other setting where an expectation exists that a favor by party A to party B would, in some form and at some point in time, be reciprocated by party B (see Figure 2 below). Simply asking for a favor of someone else is effectively asking for a loan that will be presumably repaid later on in life. This is assumed to be occurring only when party A and party B have an underlining understanding that they are of somewhat equivalent social standing or are mutually aware that they can be beneficial to each other.

Figure 2: Elite's Favor Reciprocation Process



In the educational sector, this could translate into party A engaging in a conversation with party B about, for instance, passing party A's child on an exam. In response, party B will evaluate party A's social standing and relevance, as well as party A's power to reciprocate the favor in the future. In many cases, the form in which the favor is going to be reciprocated is unspecified at the outset and the expectation may never be verbalized, but understanding that party A's favor obliges party B to reciprocate is almost always present (refer to Figure 2 above).

As presented earlier, Lomnitz (2002) was the one who noted that “[m]aterial payment in return for favors is graft. It means the absence of any possibility of personal relationship of having friends in common. Accepting a bribe is an acknowledgement of social inferiority, like accepting a tip or gratuity” (p. 175). This suggests that Lomnitz would support the view that bribes rarely take place between social equals for passing grades, obtaining of diplomas, or undeserved professorships because of the parties’ embarrassment due to the awareness of their comparable social standing or mutually beneficial relationship. Based on the educational legitimization of the new elite in Bosnia, I further expand on Lomnitz’s view and theorize that it is not necessarily shame associated with accepting the bribe from a social equal, but that it often *is* the understanding that a one-time bribe is a more narrowly defined and appropriate form of corruption for the poorer and less influential individuals because their social and political power to reciprocate favors is simply limited. In other words, when elites engage in corrupt processes, they share a mutual understanding that the favor exchanges have much greater potential and may have much greater value than a bribe taken at one point in time and for a finite value. For instance, a hospital director may ask a professor to pass a director’s son during an exam and the professor may do so with the awareness that he may one day end up fighting for his life in the hospital run by the doctor in question. This is an example that illustrates how poorly defined, largely unspecific, yet highly effective favor-reciprocation processes may be in tailoring the social mobility process to the needs and requirements of the new Bosnian elite. The example also reinforces how difficult it may be to quantify the impact of corruption in education onto a society at large.

In short, with the educational and political system lacking a unified apparatus for regulating and overseeing the public universities, the educational space has turned into a system where distortions to both horizontal and vertical mobility are highly pronounced. Herein, horizontal immobility is a defined term that signifies the difficulty or impossibility of student transfer among state faculties and universities. Similarly, vertical

immobility is a defined term where de-linking of the competence and academic and professional success has occurred. In fact, it is being replaced by linking movement up the academic ladder to one's social and political connectivity rather than to academic merit. Vertical mobility is what is typically referred to as social or upward mobility, but awareness of difficulties with the horizontal mobility of students and within the public system is equally important when analyzing settings prone to educational corruption.

While a merit-based model of social mobility is still possible in Bosnia's system, sponsored mobility as defined by Turner (1960) continues to occur as well and is possibly becoming the dominant model in the country's higher education. While both modes of social mobility are still visible within Bosnia's emerging higher education, the extent of disorganization at the national level has likely tipped the balance in favor of sponsored mobility as the increasingly dominant *modus operandi* in higher education in Bosnia. The elite's continuous acceptance and support of sponsored mobility mechanisms jeopardizes the country's prospects for development and will likely continue to marginalize the meritocracy principles and behaviors that are crucial for effective functioning of the country's educational system. At the present time, the country is unable to ensure that the new generations of doctors, teachers, economists, and lawyers are properly trained and not a product of the continuous favor-reciprocation process. The new post-war elite, however, do not seem to be intimidated by the negative implications of their collective behavior and, as my research illustrates in later sections, continue to enjoy the benefits of the academic legitimization and sponsored mobility secured by the educational corruption processes of Bosnia's higher education.

Lastly, in the less developed world, educational corruption has played a salient role in discouraging the lower socioeconomic groups from higher education participation and completion while supporting the influential to move up in society by obtaining the degrees necessary to legitimate to the lower classes the social dominance of the elites. In comparison, students in the developed world, for the most part, enter universities to

obtain skills and knowledge that will improve their careers and overall welfare, while educational corruption, if known, is discouraged and sanctioned. The elites and the wealthy of the developed world send their new generations to the most competitive universities to ensure their children's future success in the society. In contrast, for the elites of the developing world, diplomas can often be only a necessary formality that socially justifies why a particular member of the elite would land an otherwise unmerited position in the society.

Knowledge on educational corruption is dispersed through a vast body of literature on educational systems in developing countries. The importance of my approach is to undertake comprehensive research examining the processes of educational corruption in a presumably highly corrupt educational system and their consequences on the mobility and coping mechanisms of the students in higher education institutions. I hope my examination and application of earlier discussed theoretical concepts to the sector of education will prove profoundly valuable in the ongoing quest of academia, policymakers, and practitioners to better understand corruption and its broad impact on development.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Re-visited

Many insights shared in Hirschman's (1970) work on exit and voice may prove invaluable in analyzing the Bosnian students' consideration of exiting the institutions of higher education versus remaining loyal to the corrupt system or possibly voicing their dissatisfaction with the quality of education as affected by educational corruption. When applied to Bosnia's higher education, exit is a complex notion, and Hirschman himself points out that the mechanics of exit are not always simple or well understood. A frequent expectation that failure of a firm in providing a quality product will lead to an immediate decision to exit resides on an assumption that the firm in question is operating in a highly

competitive market. However, in Hirschman's view, the firm of interest possibly "enjoys some latitude as both price-maker and quality-maker – and therefore, in the latter capacity, also as a quality-spoiler" (p. 21).


As Hirschman (1970) views it, the firm may serve a mixture of "alert" and "inert" customers. The voicing of complaints by alert customers would possibly give the firm an incentive to improve its performance, while the inert customers would remain loyal, allowing for sufficient time for the firm to work toward improving its performance (p. 24). The transaction costs of shifting to another provider may be too high and affect the reaction of the customers: in the educational sector, this could translate into an individual not being willing to transfer to another university because it takes too much time or not voicing his/her dissatisfaction with corruption as that may bear negative consequences for a student operating in a corrupt environment.

I revisit Hirschman's (1970) notions of voice, exit, and loyalty in the context of education and build upon his theoretical framework to better understand the unique set of coping mechanisms that has emerged in Bosnia's higher education. I reinterpret the voice mechanism that Hirschman sees as a political tool capable of bringing about change, as, ironically, severely diminished in its power when situated in an intensely corrupt environment. In most cases, I argue, an operating framework involving a high perception of corruption impacts the manner and magnitude in which students voice their dissatisfaction with corruption. I, in essence, theorize that a predominantly corrupt setting dis-empowers voice as a political tool.

Voice mechanisms in a corrupt setting can be indications of an unhealthy environment in which students operate; in other words, they cannot really function effectively in such an environment. For instance, a student complaint may simply be dismissed without proper investigation. Had it not been for fear of repercussions brought about by a corrupt, dysfunctional, and unregulated system of higher education, the students' voice would likely be as powerful as Hirschman (1970) would expect it to be.

This research therefore devises a new and education-specific framework with a range of outcomes for the voice mechanism. Specifically, voice can happen *in lieu of exit*, *post-exit*, and *prior to exit* (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: Educational Corruption's Impact on Forms of Voice



When voice occurs *in lieu of exit*, it can be an *official*, *public*, and *internal voice* (see Figure 3 above). The *official voice* is defined as the articulation of complaints shared with the official university bodies or simply individuals working in an official capacity within the university setting. Whether complaints are pursued by contacting official committees, if such are established to address the corruption concerns, uncorrupt professors, or corrupt professors allows us to differentiate among the *loud*, *moderate*, and *low voice*, respectively. The magnitude of voice, depending on its effectiveness in addressing the institutional lapses as Hirschman (1970) would see them, is classified as *loud*, *moderate*, or *low*. In the case of higher education in Bosnia, I see lapses as the behaviors, procedures, and systemic traits that are facilitating or are part of the corruption process.

Contacting the official bodies within the faculty has the potential to result in a *loud voice*, as such a reaction is most likely to instigate an official inquiry into the student's complaint and arguably result in an official follow-up and visible attempt to correct the corrupt behavior within the university in question. While potential for change is greatest when a *loud voice* is used, it should be noted that it does not guarantee a substantive change or correction of the existing behavior or lapse in the system. If students are cautious and fear potential consequences following their complaint, the *loud voice* is an unlikely course of action. Instead, they may be more inclined to express their dissatisfaction by speaking with the uncorrupt professors, what I label as a *moderate voice*. Here, the impact is likely moderate due to a limiting potential for change relative to the *loud voice*: the power of the uncorrupt faculty over the corrupt circles of professors is especially limited in settings where corruption is systemically present. In other words, the likelihood of corruption-related correction following communication between an uncorrupt faculty member and a student is less likely than when the official path or recourse is taken; therefore, the power of this particular voice is limited. As compared to other forms of voice mechanism, students' *low voice* is least effective in substantively changing corruption processes and largely serves as an emotional outlet for students rather than as a corrective and politically capable tool as Hirschman (1970) would see it. Voice is low when students limit their reaction by informally complaining to a corrupt professor or a powerless staff member, who is unlikely to take any form of action on behalf of the student. Such voice is often an emotional reaction on the part of the student that will generally have a limited impact on improving the circumstances within the system. Direct communication and complaining to a corrupt professor are more likely, however, to result in further repercussions for the student rather than in correction of the corrupt behavior or practice that led to the complaint.

In addition to the *official voice*, there is also what I call a *public voice* that is often correlated with a highly dissatisfied student body in search of change and could be

synonymous with the voice Hirschman (1970) sees as a political tool (Figure 3, p. 64). *Public voice* is generally classified as a loud response because it has a greater potency to shake up the existing system and lead to a correction of the behavior in question. For instance, dissatisfied but active students may organize public protests – thereby manifesting their *loud voice* – or approach media outlets to openly and more aggressively address corruption issues. This classification of *public voice* as loud, however, does not mean that it will, with certainty, impact correction in corruption-related behaviors. Rather, I argue that of all the potential reactions a student or group of students may choose, *public voice* has the greatest potential to instigate a change. This is particularly the case when such protests start occurring on a regular basis, and, over time, continuous public pressure creates sufficient momentum, placing all actors involved under public pressure to address the inefficiencies and problems that are a source of contention. It is only with an external voice that is loud and reaches popular masses who can protest, that a change can occur.

Lastly, in *lieu of exit*, students could react with their *internal voice*, which is generally classified as a *low voice* (see Figure 3, p. 64). When it comes to the *internal voice*, the impact is minimal as a result of students often sharing their dissatisfaction with their family members and peers only. An internal voice is powerless within a corrupt institution. Such an internal and minimally invasive form of activism can only help secure continuation of the corruption in Bosnian higher education rather than disrupt the *status quo*.

If *voice post-exit* occurs, it likely manifests itself either as *public voice* or *internal voice*, where public manifestations are typically loud, as they occur either through media outlets, public protests, or possibly even as court proceedings. *Internal voice*, however, is of low volume and low impact, as it continues to involve communication limited to conversations between students and their family members, friends, and peers. *Exit post-voice* can also occur, especially in those cases where the students' concerns remain

unaddressed; when a student has been intimidated through the educational process (i.e., repeatedly failed, told to leave); or when students' activism has led to pressuring a student to leave the faculty in question (see Figure 3, p. 64).


Similar to my adaptation of Hirschman's (1970) notion of voice to a corrupt educational setting, I reformulate exit and contextualize it to the corrupt Bosnian educational system. While, for Hirschman, customers sensitive to what he labels as "performance lapses" (p. 24) will react by exiting that firm's customer base, they are likely to remain in the market for the same or similar product offered by another company. For Hirschman, exit is parting with a specific company in question and likely replacing it with another competitor in the market. This dissertation expands on that concept of exit by looking more deeply into the types of exits from a particular institution while assuming that a similar form of replacement will not always follow.

I differentiate between various types of exit that students may make due to educational corruption (see Figure 4, p. 68). First, some students may physically remain in the same institution but mentally check out or exit due to the presence of corruption and the lack of merit they witness on an ongoing basis. In other words, they make motivational exit either by losing motivation to work hard or by continuing to pursue their degrees while exiting mentally from their corrupt surroundings. Though Hirschman (1970) in his work introduces the notion of customers' loyalty to a particular firm, herein, remaining within the same corrupt university is not due to loyalty to a particular faculty and understanding of the occasional lapses but more likely due to the students' awareness of the systemic presence of corruption and the individual disempowerment that stems from the setting in which they operate.

Second, I also posit that students may transfer within the nation to another faculty, program, or university, and such transfer is generally classified as transferring within the nation. Here, I am not as much interested in the locality of transfer, but the rationale

behind the transfer (see Figure 4 below). In other words, the issue of significance is not whether the student changed his/her major from English to Economics or transferred

Figure 4: Educational Corruption's Impact on Forms of Exit



from one university to another, but rather whether the student opted to transfer because of corruption. For instance, students who are at less corrupt institutions may transfer to more corrupt institutions to take advantage of faster graduation. This transfer can occur from one faculty/department to another faculty/department within the same institution or can extend to transferring to entirely different institutions and, in many cases, into ghost private institutions, which are schools that often exist on paper but lack proper infrastructure to teach students (see Figure 4 above). To give an example, a particular faculty within a university may have a greater concentration of corrupt teachers, motivating some students to transfer in order to graduate quicker, or a private university

within the sector that is entirely unregulated and unsupervised may emerge where diplomas are obtained in an already discussed overnight fashion.

Those who are in discord with the immoral behavior, however, may seek to transfer to less corrupt institutions domestically – be it within the same university or to another university (see Figure 4, p. 68). Some students may exit by leaving to go abroad for work or study; and others may simply exit all forms of higher education, both domestically and internationally, due to the pressures of educational corruption (see Figure 4, p. 68). To note here and based on the report by the International Organization for Migration, the estimates for the number of Bosnians who presently live abroad are very high. Though unknown how much of it may have resulted from youth's dissatisfaction with the educational system in the country and prospects for the merit-based mobility, the estimates range from the Bosnia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007 estimate of 1.34 million to the World Bank Remittance Migration and Remittances Factbook's estimate of 1.47 million (International Organization for Migration, 2007). As a percentage of the total population, almost 38% of Bosnia's population has left the country with most emigrants living in the US, Australia, Croatia, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden, and France (International Organization for Migration, 2007). Though exact numbers are unknown, International Organization for Migration (2007) estimates that "there has been a depletion of the skills of the population over recent years" (International Organization for Migration, 2007, p. 36).

Much of the research conducted on corruption often and inexplicitly presumes that students are upset with the educational corruption in their universities, and this research does so to a certain extent. It is also important to recognize the form of exit that is made by students who espouse educational corruption and take advantage of it by purposefully looking for the more corrupt colleges in order to obtain their diplomas in a matter of days or months. In general, Bosnian students know which faculties and/or universities are more or less corrupt, and therefore know where they can obtain their degrees easily. This

particular trait of educational corruption allows me to expand on the framework set by Hirschman (1970) simply because, in the context of customers of business organizations, a customer would be unlikely to replace one inefficient company with a more inefficient business organization. Unfortunately, it may well be the case that such behavior is presently practiced in the higher education systems of developing countries and, therefore, should be accounted for. In other words, exit can be motivated not only by the desire to alert the institutions in question of quality or, in this case, non-transparency problems but also by the desire to take further advantage of the ongoing corruption by departing the less corrupt and joining the most corrupt institutions.

In the context of the educational sector, the exit mechanisms are complex. In countries such as Bosnia, members of the student body population often claim that corruption is widespread; yet large numbers of students keep the universities in business by appearing to continue to function normally and remaining loyal to the same universities they label as corrupt. As some have already noted, the majority of those enrolled drop out of Bosnia's faculties in the first year of their university studies (Pitkanen, 2008). With the mechanics of exit, I am particularly interested in understanding why those who stay in the highly corrupt system remain inert and how they continue to cope with corruption for those years that remain. Inertness in Bosnia, I argue, may be occurring due to the extent of educational corruption and the students' realization that their individual exits or voices would not instigate a systemic change. In some cases, students may also be inclined to stay put as the transaction costs of transferring or being repeatedly failed, thus, losing years at a time, may simply be too high. As the preceding discussion suggests, more intricate work on corruption's impact on students and their consequent reactions is needed, and I try to initiate this much needed discussion by suggesting that in an overall corrupt setting, both exit and voice are almost always context-specific and generally adapted to the coping needs of those involved.

In sum, Chapter III outlines ways in which Bosnia's higher education became an integral component of the post-war elite legitimization process. More importantly, the Chapter takes the next step and theorizes that, gradually, corruption expanded beyond the initial and limited top leadership's legitimization and became entrenched in Bosnia's higher education. Today, I argue, corruption is perceived as a norm in Bosnia's higher education, and its prevalence has disrupted the social mobility mechanisms and created duality in the social mobility process so that the unprivileged still work hard to obtain their degrees while those with social connections are reliant on the sponsorship model. Though plausible, I further test these arguments in the upcoming Chapter IV. I begin Chapter IV by outlining the research methodology relied upon in this study as well as the rationale behind specific methods used to test presented theoretical framework in hope of painting a clearer picture of the interaction taking place between corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms in Bosnia's present-day higher education.

Chapter IV

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the overall research design used in the study while, first, outlining the methodological framework that aims at successfully and comprehensively answering the research questions and, second, at elaborating on the sampling approach used to arrive at the findings of this research. The chapter begins with a Methodological and Analytical Approach sub-section's brief overview of the qualitative and quantitative approach in social sciences and builds on that to provide a rationale as to why the mixed research is chosen as an optimal tool to collect and analyze data on the issues of corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms in Bosnia's higher education. I also detail on the methods used to analyze data, including the binary logistic regression and the model comparison approach as important elements of the quantitative component of the mixed-methods strategy I undertake. Here, I present a matrix of the research questions and methods applied to answering them while illustrating concretely how I link this study's research questions to specific sections of surveys and/or interviews that have helped answer them.

I continue by concisely reviewing the content analysis as the qualitative component of the mixed-methods approach. Importantly and throughout the Methodological and Analytical Approach sub-section, I elaborate on the rationale behind my decision to utilize each method in answering earlier posed questions. I do so by discussing the relevance of each method to the context I study and questions I ask, as well as by

exemplifying earlier use and applicability of the selected methods to research in education. I end Chapter IV with the sub-section on Sampling, where I detail on the sampling process and data collection instruments as well as on linking them through the set of variables to the research questions and theoretical framework examined here. This section, however, does not analyze the data or present findings, but outlines the overall research strategy as a prelude to the findings-related chapters.

Methodological and Analytical Approach

Rationale for Mixed Methods Framework

The study's analysis of corruption-related procedures and behaviors in academia provides an opportunity to decode the ways in which the newly formed elites have transformed and monopolized inefficient universities precluding Bosnia and its youth from effectively joining the EU-unionized space in higher education. The mixed methods approach is well-suited to decoding and analyzing such complex trends because it allows me to ask the same questions from multiple angles and, therefore, develop a multifold perspective on the issues of concern. Opting for quantitative research only, with this topic in mind, would exclude some of the most invaluable insights shared by the students in one-on-one interviews. Similarly, relying solely on interviews would not provide a sufficiently large sample size, which is preferable when looking for the key trends in Bosnia's higher education, such as for instance finding out what is the most frequently occurring form of corruption or most frequently adopted corruption coping mechanism. While the quantitative approach's advantage rests in its ability to segregate important and generalizable patterns in large samples (the what), quantitative research lacks explanatory power as to the particularities of local cultures and complex contexts (the why and how). Over the years, both methodological approaches have gained validity and today remain invaluable in helping researchers understand various social science phenomena. Gorard

et al. (2004) simplify differentiations between quantitative and qualitative research, noting that an essential difference between the two is that the narrative nature of the latter allows the researcher simply to ask direct questions, while quantitative methods seek more complicated and indirect ways to answer the same research questions. However, Gorard et al. additionally underscore that, though qualitative work may be narrative and in-depth by its definition, it is not the sole authority on examining and understanding meanings of things, cultures, people, phenomena, or societies. In fact, Hammersley (1996) alludes to the usage of in-depth interviews to, at times, help in the formulation of surveys, illustrating that one methodological approach can be informed by the other.

This study aims at comprehensively analyzing the corruption's impact on the student population, as well as its relationship with the mechanisms of social mobility and respondents' coping abilities. To analyze these issues within the earlier formulated theories empirically, the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the mixed-methods approach validates its applicability and suitability to this research. Simply, quantitative methods allow me as a researcher to examine, for example, whether the perceived level of corruption is high or low and whether corruption trends are tilting towards the bribing framework or favor-for-favor exchange mechanisms. However, the deeper understanding of why, for instance, students perceive corruption as existing or how the favors are being exchanged amongst the members of the social elites can only be enhanced by qualitative methods that allow the more complex and intricate information to enter the analysis. Therefore, this research chose to rely on the additive value of mixed methodologies by combining multiple methods to reveal additional information. Combined qualitative and quantitative methodology, or mixed methods research, was initially used in 1959 by Campbell and Fisk (Creswell, 2009), while Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) argue that such an approach was used as early as the beginning of the 20th century. Others have traced this methodological approach, in sociology, to as early as 1855 (Erzberger & Prein, 1997).

To briefly review the broader methodological landscape, Creswell (2009) notes that social scientists can conduct three types of research: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research. For research using a quantitative approach, Creswell points out the frequently used survey or experimental design where “experimental research seeks to determine if a specific treatment influences an outcome” is significant while survey research collects data on a sufficiently large sample with the goal of detecting the common patterns that then can be generalized onto the population of interest (p. 12). The list of possible strategic approaches in qualitative research is somewhat longer and includes: ethnography, grounded theory, case studies, phenomenological research, and narrative research. Among these varied qualitative strategies, case studies have been frequently applied in educational research, as they allow researchers to examine the subject of the study in depth.

Today, mixed methods research continues to evolve, but some initial strategies have already emerged and continue to be popularized. Three key approaches to mixed methods research are sequential mixed methods, concurrent mixed methods, and transformative mixed methods (Creswell, 2009). While sequential mixed methods sequence the research so that the outcome of one stage facilitates the articulation of the next phase, concurrent mixed methods occur at one point in time with the goal of using data together to gain more profound knowledge of the phenomenon studied. As the title reveals, research that applies transformative mixed methods chooses a theoretical background that guides and informs methods and data collection, allowing for changes and transformations along the process.

This study used the concurrent mixed methods approach, where the data on students’ perceptions on corruption, social mobility, and EU-nionization were collected via interviews and surveys simultaneously and analyzed accordingly. As others would agree (Creswell, 2009; Newman & Benz, 1998), the blend of the qualitative and quantitative methods is complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and the primary

goal of using such an approach here was to merge the information obtained via different methods and give a fuller picture of the educational corruption processes and trends in post-war and developing Bosnia. In the process, I have recorded and analyzed any crossover of similar or identical findings arrived at via quantitative and qualitative methods, as I have done with any significant differences. Informed by a pragmatic worldview, I am in favor of drawing on a theoretical foundation or method of data analysis to ensure the most optimal understanding of the research problem (Creswell, 2009). Such flexibility is required herein due to the complexity of interactions examined in the world of educational corruption, social mobility, and students' coping mechanisms.

Application of Mixed Methods Framework

The salience of combining the qualitative and quantitative methods in this particular case is magnified because of the interactive and intricate nature of corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms. Here, the concurrent mixed methods approach helps bring the research questions, proposed theories, and overall methodological design together by creating an optimal path to answering the posed questions. In Bosnia's post-war context where very little to none research has been previously conducted on educational corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms, it was particularly important to provide students with multiple opportunities to voice their views on these important issues. Providing multiple questions that, in different formats, address the same research question provided me as a researcher with a comprehensive source of information that has helped examine and validate my answers to the posed research questions. It has also allowed this study's participants multiple opportunities to engage in the research and share their insights relating to corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms. To illustrate, for research question 2, which is principally concerned with how mobility mechanisms may be affected by educational corruption (see Table 2, pp. 78-79), I note that a set of items from the survey seems relevant in addressing this

question and are further complemented by two sections in the interview guide titled Socio-Economic Differences and Coping with Corruption (see Appendix B for further details).

I had designed the survey and interview-guide sections with the mixed-methods approach in mind and with understanding that almost each question studied could be approached and asked in multiple ways helping to prompt the study participants to share their perceptions on corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms in higher education of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As specified in Table 2 (pp. 78-79), most questions in the interview guide and survey were centered around the concepts this study embarked on understanding, including social mobility, perceived corruption, coping mechanisms, procedural/organizational/behavior traits that facilitate corruption, forms of corruption, and EU-nionization process. For example, question 3 per Table 2 (see pp. 78-79), focuses on the impact of educational corruption and its relation to coping mechanisms among students and the EU-nionization of Bosnia's education.

Similarly, the first research question (see Table 2, pp. 78-79), is addressed in the survey, where data on the level and facilitators of corruption come from questions such as Survey item #16, which asks participating students how widespread corruption is. Further, item #17 is as relevant in answering the same research question, as it lists most frequently observed forms of corruption in Bosnia's higher education, including but not limited to: buying passing grades, buying diplomas, publishing plagiarized books, inappropriate relationships between students and members of faculty, passing exams because of social connections, obtaining diplomas in an excessively short period of time, passing exams because of influential parents, and others. In addition, the Student Interview Guide (Appendix B) includes a section covering the issues of perceived corruption, corruption facilitators, and rationale behind the persistence of the same, providing another significant source of data for answering the first research question.

In short, Table 2 (see pp. 78-79) provides a summary of the mixed methods research as applied to this study. Comprehensiveness of the mixed-methods data collection approach has allowed for discussion of many questions under various sections of the survey and interview guide, providing several opportunities for multiple types of data analysis on a similar set of issues. This approach benefits the study in that it provides multiple formats in which the findings of this study can be linked back to the study's conceptual framework on corruption, social mobility and coping mechanisms.

Table 2: Coverage Matrix of Research Questions and Concepts

Research Questions	Minimum Sample Size	Instrument	Factors/ Concepts	Item #
<u>Question 1a:</u> <u>PERCEIVED</u> <u>CORRUPTION</u> What is the level of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education? How would you define corruption in Bosnia's higher education?	≥ 500	Student Questionnaire: Appendix A & Interview Guide: Appendix B	Perceived Corruption	16, 17, 25, 26 & Open Ended Interview Questions
<u>Question 1b:</u> <u>SYSTEMIC</u> <u>FACILITATORS OF</u> <u>CORRUPTION</u> What elements and behaviors within Bosnia's system of higher education facilitate emergence and encourage continuation of corruption?	≥ 500	Student Questionnaire: Appendix A & Interview Guide: Appendix B	Procedural / Organizational/ Behavioral Traits	12, 13, 14, 15 & Open Ended Questions in Interview Guide (Appendix B)
<u>Question 1c:</u> <u>FORMS OF</u> <u>CORRUPTION</u> What forms does corruption take in Bosnia and Herzegovina's higher education?	≥ 500	Student Questionnaire: Appendix A & Interview Guide: Appendix B	Forms of Corruption	17 & Open Ended Questions

Table 2 (continued)

Research Questions	Minimum Sample Size	Instrument	Factors/ Concepts	Item #
<u>Question 2 (a & b):</u> <u>IMPACT OF CORRUPTION</u> What is the impact of educational corruption on different socioeconomic groups and associated upward mobility mechanisms, and on different ethnic groups?	≥ 500 ≥ 10	Student Questionnaire: Appendix A & Interview Guide: Appendix B	Sponsored Mobility Contest Mobility	10, 11 & Open Ended Questions
<u>Question 3 (a, b & c):</u> <u>COPING MECHANISMS</u> When students are cornered into dysfunctional organizational spaces, where do they go: exit, voice or remain loyal? Has EU-nionization played any role in changing students' views on corruption, exit, voice, and loyalty?	≥ 500 ≥ 500	Student Questionnaire: Appendix A & Interview Guide: Appendix B	Exit Voice No Exit no Voice Loyalty EU-nionization	18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 & Open Ended Questions

Rationale for and Application of Logistic Regression

In line with its overall mixed-methods approach, this study uses survey and/or interview questions when they directly answer the research questions and analyzes various descriptive statistics as they help in uncovering current corruption trends in higher education in Bosnia. Where pertinent, the research also applies another statistical method to further examine variables stemming from the surveyed students' responses. While many statistical methods avail themselves to the survey data analysis, I chose the binary logistic regression as a preferred statistical method for several reasons. First and foremost, the binary logistic regression allows for the analysis of dichotomous outcomes,

such as questioning whether there is perceived corruption or not in Bosnia's higher education. As an alternative approach, probit regression could have also been used but which one is used is often a function of researcher's preference as both generally produce very similar results (Gill, 2001; Greene, 1997).


The key assumption of the binary logistic regression is that the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes on either a value of 1 or value of 0 with each of these two values having its corresponding probability that is a function of the independent variables used in the model (Cabrera, 1994). As Cabrera notes: "The application of binary logistic regression in higher education to deal with dichotomous dependent variables is not new. Its use can be traced back to the late '60s and early '70s" (p. 226). Educational research has applied the binary logistic regression to the study of numerous topics, including issues such as "college persistence, transfer decisions, and degree attainment" (p. 226).

Secondly, binary logistic regression is often deemed flexible, having lesser number of assumptions that ought to be satisfied relative to some other statistical methods (Norusis, 2009). The specific advantage of binary logistic regression is that it provides flexibility in terms of distribution of the predictor variables relative to, for instance, the often used linear regression models. Logistic regression does not make any specific assumptions about the distribution of the predictor variables (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 2005). In other words, binary logistic regression provides the flexibility to work with a mixed predictor pool including both categorical and continuous variables that need not be "nicely distributed" (Wuensch, 2009).

While many variables may resemble a normal distribution – defined as a frequency distribution where many observations gravitate toward the mean or the center of the distribution while the rest move away from the mean and decline in frequency – that may not be always the case. Specific to this research and given the number of variables derived from 39 survey questions, the study chose binary logistic regression to allow for inclusion of various variables without the constraint of the normal distribution

assumption. For instance, the student's ethnicity captured by the ETHNICITY variable (see Figure 5 below) does not have the bell-shaped curve typically seen with normal distribution, which would mean that this predictor could not be used within those regression models that assume the independent variables are normally distributed. In short, whether a variable has normal distribution or not is not problematic for logistic regression, allowing for indiscriminate use of predictor variables in that regard.

Figure 5: Student's Ethnicity Distribution



To be specific, research question 2a (please see Table 3, pp. 86-93) hypothesizes that there is a differential in perception of corruption degree between students of different ethnic backgrounds. To allow for the use of ETHNICITY as a predictor, the logistic regression is used and, in the base model, student's ethnicity is the only predictor, while in the expanded model, other independent variables were added reflecting, for instance, household income levels and father's employment. The rationale behind including these two predictors is that household income levels and family influence, being reflective of the father's employment and social standing, arguably have an effect on students' perception of corruption.

In addition, it should also be noted that the student survey consisted of 39 questions and, where appropriate, I collected data through categorical variables in order to capture

the gradation amongst different responses. Later on and as needed, I also recoded some of the categorical variables into binary variables. For instance, the variable called `CORRUPTION_DEGREE` measures the level of perceived corruption amongst students who are placed into various groups: those who thought corruption was “highly widespread” (1), “widespread” (2), “neither widespread nor absent” (3), “somewhat absent” (4), and “completely absent” (category 5). While analyzing this variable has resulted in several important observations on the perceived level of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education, I had also recoded this categorical variable into the binary variable called `CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL` (CDF) that measures whether corruption is perceived as present to any degree (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). This binary dependent variable was used for the ethnicity-related models where I wanted to differentiate between those students who thought corruption was absent and the rest.

The key rationale behind this approach is that I wanted to both extract information from the categorical variables through descriptive statistics to capture gradations in the student answers. At the same time, I wanted to further analyze the same set of relationships through the binary logistic regression to see the impact of various independent variables on the occurrence of a certain event – in the case existence of perceived corruption – or not. Other research has also relied on recoding categorical variables into the binary dependent variables. For instance, Straus and Sweet (1992) looked at the occurrence of verbal aggression amongst US families. Even though they tracked the numbers of yelling incidences occurring in the family during a year, they noticed that data provided them with many families that did not yell and others that yelled frequently. So, Straus and Sweet (1992) opted to use logistic regression and recoded the numeric variable so that all those families that experienced at least one or more yelling incidents a month were deemed aggressive (coded as 1) and those who did not experience a yelling incident were deemed non-aggressive (coded as 0). The key

however with the binary dependant variable's recoding is that categories are "mutually exclusive" (Sweet & Grace-Martin, n.d., p. 159), a rule that this study followed.

In line with the study's rationale for the mixed methods research, I break some of the research questions into multiple hypotheses, which are then evaluated by specific logistic regression models, content analysis of the questions from the interview guide, and/or descriptive statistics of the directly provided answers from the survey questions. Whenever the logistic regression approach was used, each proposed hypothesis (as illustrated in Table 3, pp. 86-93) was tested with two models using the model comparison approach (Judd & McClelland, 1989).

Question 2b, which looks into social mobility mechanisms, is analyzed from several different perspectives (see Table 3, pp. 86-93). First, the survey question asks directly whether merited promotion amongst the faculty members is typically seen within higher education, but the issue is further analyzed by building a logistic regression model to determine how best to predict when students will perceive merited promotion as occurring or not. With Hypothesis 2 for question 2b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), I specifically hypothesize that students' satisfaction with the state of their faculty and teaching affects students' perception of the mobility mechanisms within that faculty. Arguably, students who are more satisfied with the manner in which their faculties are run and ways in which they are taught will be more inclined to ascribe their teachers' upward mobility to Turner's (1960) contest-based model. With greater teaching and procedural satisfaction, I would expect to find that mobility is perceived as merit-based rather than not. Similarly, with greater dissatisfaction, students would perceive mobility as sponsored rather than merit-based.

I tackle this hypothesis with the base model, where the binary dependant variable of whether the faculty is perceived as being promoted based on merit or not is predicted by the level of procedural satisfaction at the faculty. The model is then expanded to include other predictors, including whether the program is part of ECTS (The European

Credit Transfer and Accumulation System) or not, the level of teaching satisfaction, and students' years of studying. Whether students perceive their program as being part of the ECTS is an important predictor, as that will be telling of the extent to which the Bologna-based EU-nionization efforts are relevant in affecting merit-based mobility as applied in Bosnia. Similarly, length of studies is another predictor included in this model, as it is presumed to affect students' view of merit-based mobility, with those studying longer being increasingly more aware of corruption issues and therefore seeing the mobility process as sponsorship- rather than merit-based. Lastly, it is assumed that the level of satisfaction with teachers and teaching processes would have a significant impact in forming students' perceptions of merit-based mobility.

The macro theoretical framework proposed in this research suggests a linkage between the post-war elite formation process and a shift in social mobility away from the merit-based model and toward sponsored mobility, and Hypothesis 3 for question 2b tests this claim (see Table 3, pp. 86-93). I theorize that students' social and political involvement affects whether they perceive promotions as merit-based or not. In this case, the base model is built so that the perception of merited promotion in academia is predicted with the variable measuring the level of participants' sociopolitical involvement, where sociopolitical involvement is used as a proxy for the elite status in Bosnia's society. Arguably, the person who is active socially and politically in his/her community is generally deemed to be of a higher social status. In the expanded and more complex model testing of Hypothesis 3 for question 2b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), additional predictors include variables measuring the level of teaching satisfaction, procedural satisfaction, years students are studying, and whether their program is part of ECTS or not.

When it comes to the question of horizontal mobility within the system, which is addressed as part of question 2b, Hypothesis 5 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93) assumes that student transfer is limited due to corruption. This issue is directly addressed with the

survey question (Item #30) on reasons for non-transfer. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), which helps address the research question 2b analyzing whether Bosnia's higher education espouses contest-based versus sponsored mobility, hypothesizes that vertical mobility mechanisms are clearly dysfunctional, as the best are often not the first to graduate. This question, however, does not necessitate the application of logistic regression because it is directly answered in the survey Item #10.

For research questions 3a and 3b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), which are tasked with examining an earlier introduced claim that corruption is an important element in students' decision to exit their faculties, Items #28 and #29 (Hypothesis 1) provide direct responses to this question. As to voice and coping mechanisms, several hypotheses are presented, including Hypothesis 2 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), which proposes that a safe and anonymous system would help students voice their dissatisfaction with corruption. Under the same sub-heading, Hypothesis 3 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93) points to a consensus among students that, even if voicing mechanisms were in place, student complaints would not lead to an effective and systemic change. In the context of a highly corrupt environment, such behaviors and perceptions are expected to emerge from this research as a norm because of the environment of mistrust in Bosnian higher education. As to coping mechanisms, Hypothesis 4 (see Table 3 below) is there to claim that students cope with corruption differently and the carefully crafted survey questions directly address that claim. In fact, a number of sub-questions stemming from research questions 1 and 3 can be directly answered through analysis of data collected via surveys. As to research question 3c (see Table 3 below), which questions whether the introduction of the ECTS-based programs had any effect on changes in corruption, a simple means of descriptive statistics is sufficient to answer this question. Further contextualization of this and other sub-questions is also provided by the content analysis of the interview transcripts in order to complement the survey-based findings.

Table 3: Coverage Matrix of Proposed Hypotheses and Data Analysis Tools

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
<u>1a:</u> <u>Corruption</u>	Presence of corruption in higher education in Bosnia is significant.	Corruption_Degree (CD) Item # 16	Survey/ Interview	
<u>1b:</u> <u>Corruption</u>	Students face different types of corruption.	Corruption_Types (CTs) Item # 17	Survey/ Interview	
<u>1c:</u> <u>Corruption</u>	There are various elements and behaviors within Bosnia's system of higher education facilitate emergence and encourage continuation of corruption.		Interview	

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2a: <u>Impact of Corruption</u>	Students who are ethnic minorities perceive corruption as often occurring within their faculty relative to ethnic majority.	Corruption_Degree_Final (CDF)	Binary Logistic Regression ⁵ / Interview	<p><u>Ethnicity Base Model:</u> Ethnicity Final (ETHF): Bosniaks=1, Non-Bosniaks=0</p> <p><u>Ethnicity Expanded Model:</u> ETHF</p> <p>Household Income_500 (HI500): 500 KM or less=1, all else=0; Household Income_1500 (HS1500): 500-1500 KM=1, all else=0); Household Income_2500 (HI2500): 1500-2500 KM=1, all else=0; Household_Income_3500 (HI3500): 2500-3500 KM=1, all else=0</p> <p>Father_Position_Worker (FPW): Worker=1, all else=0; Father_Position_Intellectual (FPI): Intellectual=1, all else=0; Father_Position_Executive (FPE): Executive=1, all else=0</p> <p>Exams_Completed_Final1 (ECF1): 1st year=1; Exams_Completed_Final2 (ECF2): 2nd year=2; Exams_Completed_Final3 (ECF3): 3rd year=3; Exams_Completed_Final4 (ECF4): 4th year=4</p> <p>Years_Studying_Final (YSF) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+</p> <p>Born_Final (BF) 1988, 1989...</p> <p>Sex_Final (SF): Male=1, Female=0</p>

⁵Binary Logistic Regression was utilized after appropriate recoding of both dependent and independent variables.

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2b: <u>Contest</u> <u>versus</u> <u>sponsored</u> <u>mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 1: Often, professors/ teaching assistants are not promoted based on their qualifications but rather connections.	Merited_ Promotion (MP) Item #11	Survey/ Interview	
	HYPOTHESIS 2: Student satisfaction with the state of their faculty and teaching affects their perception of the mobility mechanisms within faculty.	Merited_ Promotion (MP)	Binary Logistic Regression / Interview	<i><u>Merited Promotion Base Model:</u></i> Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 (PSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 (PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 (PSF3): neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 (PSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2b: <u>Contest</u> <u>versus</u> <u>sponsored</u> <u>mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 2: Student satisfaction with the state of their faculty and teaching affects their perception of the mobility mechanisms within faculty.	Merited_Promotion (MP)	Binary Logistic Regression / Interview	<p><u>Merited Promotion Expanded Model:</u></p> <p>Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 (PSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 (PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 (PSF3): neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 (PSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0</p> <p>Teaching_Satisfaction_Final1 (TSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; Teaching_Satisfaction_Final2 (TSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; Teaching_Satisfaction_Final3 (TSF3): neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1, all else=0; Teaching_Satisfaction_Final4 (TSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0</p> <p>Competent_Graduate_Final1 (CGF1): always=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final1 (CGF2): almost always=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final3 (CGF3): often=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final4 (CGF4): rarely=1, all else=0</p> <p>Exams_Completed_Final (ECF): 1st year=1 2nd year=2 3rd year=3 4th year=4</p> <p>ECTS_final (ECTSF): ECTS=1, all else=0</p> <p><u>Years Studying_Final (YSF)</u> 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+...</p> <p>Sex_Final (SF): Male=1, Female=0</p>

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2b: <u>Contest</u> <u>versus</u> <u>sponsored</u> <u>mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 3: Students' social and political involvement affects whether they perceive promotions as merit-based or not.	Merited_Promotion (MP)		<p><u>SocioPolitical Involvement</u> <u>Impact Base Model:</u> Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 1 (SPIF1): highly involved=1, all else=0; Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 2 (SPIF2): somewhat involved=1, all else=0; Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 3 (SPIF3): neither involved nor uninvolved =1, all else=0 Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 4 (SPIF4): somewhat uninvolved =1, all else=0</p> <p><u>SocioPolitical Involvement</u> <u>Impact Expanded Model:</u> Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 1 (SPIF1): highly involved=1, all else=0; Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 2 (SPIF2): somewhat involved=1, all else=0; Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 3 (SPIF3): neither involved nor uninvolved =1, all else=0; Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final 4 (SPIF4): somewhat uninvolved =1, all else=0</p> <p>Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 (PSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 (PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 (PSF3): neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1, all else=0; Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 (PSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0</p> <p><u>Years Studying Final (YSF)</u> 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+...</p>

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2b: <u>Contest</u> <u>versus</u> <u>sponsored</u> <u>mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 3: Students' social and political involvement affects whether they perceive promotions as merit-based or not.	Merited_Promotion (MP)		Teaching_Satisfaction_Final1 (TSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; Taching_Satisfaction_Final2 (TSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; Teaching_Satisfaction_Final3 (TSF3): neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1, all else=0; Teaching_Satisfaction_Final4 (TSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0 Competent_Graduate_Final1 (CGF1): always=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final1 (CGF2): almost always=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final3 (CGF3): often=1, all else=0; Competent_Graduate_Final4 (CGF4): rarely=1, all else=0 Student_Type_Final1 (STF1): Excellent=1, all else=0; Student_Type_Final2 (STF2): Very good=1, all else=0; Student_Type_Final3 (STF3): good=1, all else=0 Exams_Completed_Final (ECF): 1 st year=1 2 nd year=2 3 rd year=3 4 th year=4 ECTS_final (ECTSF): ECTS=1, all else=0 Sex_Final (SF): Male=1, Female=0 Born_Final (BF) 1988, 1989...

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
2b: <u>Vertical Mobility:</u> <u>Contest</u> <u>versus</u> <u>sponsored</u> <u>mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 4: Vertical mobility mechanisms are dysfunctional as the best are often not first to graduate.	Competent_ Graduate (CG) Item # 10	Survey / Interview	
2b: <u>Horizontal Mobility</u>	HYPOTHESIS 5: Students do not transfer within national system because of corruption..	Reason_No- Transfer (RNT) Item # 30	Survey/ Interview	
3a & b: <u>Exit</u>	HYPOTHESIS 1: Corruption is an important consideration when thinking of exiting faculty.	Corruption_Exit (CE) Item # 29 Leaving_Faculty (LF) Item # 28 Formal_Mechanisms (FM) Item # 20	Survey/ Interview	
3a: <u>Voice</u>	HYPOTHESIS 2: If a safe and anonymous system was in place students, would be more likely voice their dissatisfaction with corruption.	Anonymous_Mechanisms (AM) Item # 23	Survey	

Table 3 (continued)

Research Question	Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Method	Independent Variable(s)
<u>3a: Voice</u>	HYPOTHESIS 3: Widespread corruption has led to a general consensus among students that, even if voicing mechanisms were in place, student complaints would not necessarily lead to an effective and systemic change.	Effective_ Change (EC) Item # 24	Survey	
<u>3a: Coping</u>	HYPOTHESIS 4: Students cope with corruption differently.	Coping_ Mechanisms (CM) Item # 18 & Item # 19	Survey	
<u>3c: Organizational Change</u>	Introduction of ECTS has not brought about changes in transparency level/ corruption.	ECTS_ Transparent (ECTST) Item # 9 Bologna_ Impact (BI) Item # 10	Survey	

Now that the key areas of this research where the logistic regression will be applied have been outlined, it should be noted that the simple binary logistic regression model takes the form where it predicts “the logit, that is, the natural log of the odds of having made one or the other decision” (Wuensch, 2009, p. 2). The formula for simple binary logistic regression is shown in Figure 6 (p. 94).

Figure 6: Simple Binary Logistic Regression

$$\ln(\text{ODDS}) = \ln\left[\frac{Y_{\text{hat}}}{(1-Y_{\text{hat}})} \right] = a + bX$$

Source: Wuensch, 2009, p. 2

Herein, $\ln(\text{ODDS})$ stands for the natural log of the odds of one of the two possible events, while Y_{hat} stands for the predicted probability of the event coded as 1 (i.e., for instance, corruption is present), while $(1 - Y_{\text{hat}})$ would then represent the predicted probability of the other event that is coded as 0 (i.e., corruption is absent). In other words, the dependent variable is the *logit*, where *logit* is defined as the natural log of the odds. $\text{Log}(\text{odds}) = \text{logit}(p) = \ln(p/1-p)$. *Logit* can also be called a *log* of the odds that a particular event will occur: it is the probability of one or an event occurring versus probability of zero or the event not occurring.

The logistic regression's coefficients are expressed in log-odds units, but they are always converted into the odds ratios in order to be easily interpreted. The odds ratio is simply the natural log base 'e' raised to the power of B or coefficient.⁶ Going forward, the interpretation of the binary regression logistic results is focused on interpreting the odds ratios, where for categorical variables, for instance, the odds ratio represents the difference in odds of the event happening between the category in question and the reference category for that particular variable. It is important to note that while the binary logistic regression does not make any assumptions about the predictors' distributions, it does presume that there is a linear relationship between the *logit* of the dependent variable and the predictor variable.

⁶ The odds ratios are labeled as 'Exp(B)' in SPSS Statistics 19, which was used in this analysis.

Testing this linearity assumption is necessary only when the independent variables are continuous or ordinal but not with categorical, interval, or dummy variables. To do so, this analysis relies on the Box-Tidwell Transformation test, which requires that, for each of the continuous or the ordinal variable predictors (i.e., X) in the model, a new variable is created, where X is multiplied with the natural log of X (i.e., $X \cdot \ln(x)$). Such a transformed variable, created for each predictor X of interest, is then included in the logistic regression model. If the coefficient(s) for the transformed variable(s) turn out to be significant, the assumption of linearity is violated.

As to the categorical variables, research has supported using “Likert scales” – such as the ones used herein with five levels including values such as, for instance, “very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied,” “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” and “very dissatisfied” – as the interval variables, especially when they have at least five categories (Jaccard & Wan, 1996). The rationale behind it is that the intervals or differences between different values of the variable in question are equivalent. For instance, differences between “very satisfied” and “satisfied” versus “very dissatisfied” and “dissatisfied” are assumed to be equal to each other. With ordinal variables, those differences are not necessarily the same, and the focus is instead on the rankings of various values of the ordinal variable in question. For all categorical variables, this study uses the Indicator contrasts, where the reference category is always the last category of the categorical variable and is presented by codes of zeros in all other categories. To exemplify, if there is a variable with categories coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the category coded as 5 would be the reference category to which all others are individually compared.

Even in the event that the logistic regression model contains variables with the nonlinearity present between the independents and the *logit* of the dependent, the predictor can be reformulated to create categories for a continuous variable and use the newly recoded variable within the logistic regression model. This is a standard resolution

and approach to non-linearity in binary regression modeling. To also note, all categorical variables are recoded using Indicator coding, which effectively transforms each category into a dummy variable. For the logistic regression to be reliable, small or absent measurement errors are desired in combination with small numbers of missing cases. In the data collection here, a large survey-based sample was drawn minimizing the percentage of not applicable or missing answers, as well as their impact on the overall findings. With the sufficiently large sample available for analysis for each of the models presented herein, the missing values were nearly negligible.

To note, the independent variables selected for each model serve as the set of indicative predictors and will be relied upon only if multicollinearity is absent in each model. In the course of this analysis, I test for multicollinearity by calculating Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each model, where VIF determines whether the multicollinearity is inflating the variance of each relevant coefficient. The reciprocal of VIF is tolerance, and “a tolerance of less than 0.20 is cause for concern; a tolerance of less than 0.10 almost certainly indicates a serious collinearity problem” (Menard, 2001, p. 76). Conversely, VIF of 10 or greater indicates presence of multicollinearity.⁷

To sum up and as earlier exemplified, the logistic analysis in this study follows a general format in two steps, with simple logistic regression being conducted first, followed by an expanded model with more than one predictor (i.e., X_1 , X_2 , X_3 ..., etc). This model comparison approach (Judd & McClelland, 1989) allows for a comparison of the two models and consequent determination of which model has greater predictive value in answering the question posed. By using a model comparison approach for data analysis,

⁷ SPSS does not provide, within logistic regression calculations, VIF and tolerance values for each predictor, but these values are calculated as part of the linear regression models within the SPSS. Though linear regression is not used here, it is calculated for each model in order to obtain VIF and tolerance levels. VIF and tolerance levels are not affected by the relationship between the dependant variable and independent variables as they measure multicollinearity among *independent variables only*. This approach of measuring multicollinearity in the logistic regression models is widely adopted as the standard approach in testing multicollinearity. For further details on VIF and logistic regression please see Scott Menard's 2001 *Applied Logistic Regression Analysis: Second Edition* in Series on Quantitative Applications in Social Sciences.

Judd and McClelland (1989) have illustrated the applicability of regression modeling in social science research. A process of model building is utilized in order to determine a set of explanatory variables that best predict the dependent variable and help shed light on the relationships this research argues exist between educational corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms utilized by the student body in Bosnia's higher education.

Rationale for and Application of the Content Analysis Method

In addition to the logistic regression whose exact application to the research questions was discussed in the previous sub-section, I utilize qualitative methodology as well. The primary rationale behind adding a qualitative methodological approach into the mix is that logistic regression, being a quantitative tool, cannot get as specific in analyzing the contextually finer issues as the qualitative approach can. Therefore, the data collected via in-depth surveys are analyzed and merged with the data analysis from surveys. The main tool utilized to collect data qualitatively is the Student Interview Guide (see Appendix B). The guide consists of four general subsections outlining those key questions that guided the in-depth interviews with Bosnian students. The four sections include: "Perceived Corruption, Corruption Facilitators, and its Persistency"; "Socio-economic Differences"; "Coping with Corruption"; and "EU-nionization."

Qualitative research is of essence in uncovering the contextual idiosyncrasies of educational corruption that can be missed through exclusive reliance on data collection methodologies characteristic of quantitative analysis. Not focusing on a particular method, Marvasti (2003, p. 88) underscores the relevance of three different stages in every type of the qualitative research; Huberman and Miles (1994) have labeled these stages as: "'data reduction,' 'data display,' and 'conclusion: drawing/verifying.'" In the data reduction stage, the pool of information obtained via interviews is downsized in order to manage and simplify all of the data collected. As to the data display process,

researchers often review the interviews and write some overarching and summarizing notes (Marvasti, 2003). In the quantitative methodology, this would be equivalent to looking for overall trends or patterns in the data by using statistical analysis. The last stage of qualitative research is focused on drawing conclusions.

This dissertation applies the content analysis method by, in essence, reducing detailed interview-based data to relevant themes and looking for patterns and repetition of certain concepts. The content analysis method was first developed by Gottschalk and Gleser (1969). It is generally defined as “the manual or automated coding of documents, transcripts, newspapers, or even audio or video media to obtain counts of words, phrases, or word-phrases clusters” for further analysis (Garson, 1998, p. 1). For this research, the individual student interviews were first transcribed in detail, then analyzed for any potential patterns that could further inform the quantitative analysis and complement other findings. For those questions not addressed via logistic regression, analysis stems from the content analysis of the interview transcripts and/or descriptive statistics derived from the surveyed sample. For instance, Research Questions 1a and 1b (please see Table 3, pp. 86-93) are addressed directly in the survey questions, while additional insights are also provided based on the interview data analysis. In the process, the analysis applied “a quasi-statistical approach to counting responses, in order to establish patterns” (Gorard et al., 2004, p. 6), which in essence means that any recurrent trends and patterns became part of the findings of this study and are presented in a table format, when appropriate. Gorard et al. saliently observe that even qualitative analysis, in searching for patterns, rests on some type of frequency labeling. Here, particular attention was paid to those notions that were repeatedly discussed and brought up by various students, explicitly and implicitly, and as such are included in this study.

Sampling Approach

Setting

According to Bosnia and Herzegovina's last census of 1991, the country's population totaled 4,377,033, of which 3.7%, or 122,967 individuals, were college educated. In the post-war period, the census has not been performed, and the exact number of those attending and later graduating from both private and public colleges remains unknown. The remnants of the educational system inherited from the former Yugoslavia have undergone a significant metamorphosis in the post-communist and post-war period due to the mushrooming of new, private, and often unregulated higher-education institutions; to name a few: Banja Luka College, Panevropski Univerzitet Apeiron Banjaluka, Univerzitet za Poslovni Inzenjering i Menadzment Banja Luka, Univerzitet Sinergija Bijeljina, Internacionalni Univerzitet "Philip Noel Baker" Sarajevo, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, Internacional University of Sarajevo, Otvoreni Univerzitet Apeiron Travnik, Univerzitet u Travniku, and Americki Univerzitet u Bosni i Hercegovini Tuzla and others. The number of students is increasing from year to year: in the fall semester of the 2009-2010 academic year, 71,082 students enrolled in the higher education institutions only in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HercegBosna.org, 2010). This is a 4% increase over the prior year. According to the Bureau for Statistics of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the public universities in the Federation, some of the largest ones include: University of Sarajevo with the student population totaling 32,343 students; University of Tuzla with 13,896 students; University of Mostar with 12,909 students attending either the Bosnian or Croatian branch; University of Bihac with 5,008 students; and University of Zenica with 4,463 students.

Even though the private universities and colleges often came up during interviews with students, the focus of this research is the public institutions in higher education of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout the interview process, many of the participants, either current or former, labeled their public faculties as corrupt but still less corrupt and more rigorous relative to the private institutions. Surveys, an integral part of the data collection process, were conducted at the public institutions. Similarly, the interviewed students were either students or recent graduates of public institutions.

There are eight public universities and an unknown number of unregulated and unaccredited private institutions of higher education in Bosnia. Each university consists of multiple faculties that operate fairly independently from the university itself. This study surveyed students from six public faculties and interviewed students from a similarly diverse group of public faculties, aiming at collecting data from several different faculties to allow for as diverse a sample as possible. The primary focus of this study, however, is to analyze corruption trends irrespective of faculty type.

In general, contact with the faculties was established by meeting with the relevant university rector, followed by meetings with his/her faculty deans. The rector of the university supported the research being conducted and in writing communicated with and called on the faculty deans to cooperate and provide necessary support for my research. This approval at the university-level was followed by a meeting with each of the relevant deans to discuss the logistics of conducting research at their faculties. Even though written approval was obtained for eight faculties, six deans provided their support, while two deans ultimately decided their faculties would not participate in the research because of the delicate nature of the topic studied. This process in itself unveiled the challenging nature of conducting research on corruption, as well as the extent of the independence and control individual deans have at their faculties as each faculty dean's relationship with the university rector is partly dependent on the strength of the personal relationship between the faculty dean and his/her rector. This points to the potential bias in the sample as the faculties included in the study were not randomly selected. Instead, the faculty selection was a function of my ability as the researcher to gain access and permission to

conduct research at a specific faculty. For instance, while the sample size utilized in this research is relatively large, allowing for a detailed analysis of a number of trends discussed throughout this research, the survey-based sample itself was collected only at those institutions that had agreed to allow their student population to be surveyed. As one might expect, the management of the most corrupt faculties would have likely resented the idea of allowing research on corruption to take place, deciding not to participate in this research. In other words, this research could have excluded the most corrupt institutions from its pool of faculties. Assuming that the institutions most sensitive to the research on corruption are also most corrupt, there is a possibility that the outcomes could have differed if the two institutions that refused to participate in the research due to the topic explored were part of the sample. However, to caution, without the ability to survey students from what would have arguably been more corrupt institutions, I cannot establish with certainty whether inclusion of these two institutions would have altered the outcomes of this study in any meaningful way.

Those deans that welcomed my research also lent necessary support in that they provided access to various class schedules and classrooms where surveys would be conducted. They also made introductions to the relevant faculty and administration members. Once I obtained each dean's support, I was able to survey any and all students throughout the faculty in question. The student selection process, at that point, was in no way constrained except for ensuring that my surveying was cognizant of the ongoing educational processes. The selection of the students was not random as it was a function of the activities taking place in the classroom as well as the class schedules. For instance, I often surveyed students while they were taking a break between two parts of one long lecture. In the process, I had made every effort to compensate for these sample selection limitations by collecting a large sample at each of the faculties to ensure its representativeness.

Importantly, students' participation, both for those interviewed and those surveyed, was voluntary. Of those invited to participate, the vast majority of students chose to participate in the survey, likely due to the novelty of the experience as well as the relevance of this particular topic to students' daily lives. It should also be noted that the students may have participated because they may be studying at the less corrupt institutions. Had I conducted research at those institutions that declined to take part in the study, the student participation may have been lower.

Lastly, this research looks deeply into the issues of corruption that can, in Bosnia's often politicized environment, be misused for political and non-academic purposes. Thus, I kept the locations and names of the respective faculties coded, further ensuring absolute anonymity or confidentiality, as appropriate, of the subjects involved. In doing so, I had detached this research from the political tensions and complexities of the localities in question and, instead, focused on answering key questions raised in this study. Such an approach added an additional layer of comfort and sense of safety for me as the researcher in discussing the corruption-related findings.


Sample Structure

Given that the study uses a mixed methods approach, it was important that the sampling process reflects the needs of such an undertaking. In other words, data were collected based on the surveyed sample of students in combination with data collected through interviews of other students. A sample of Bosnian students was surveyed and another was interviewed to collect data on students' perceptions of corruption, social mobility, and the EU-nionization process. While the surveys obtained information through mostly close-ended questions, in-depth and open-ended questions (Creswell, 2009) guided the inquiry during the student interviews. The interviewees and surveyed students both came from a variety of public faculties. The data were collected concurrently, where a portion of the researcher's time was dedicated to conducting

surveys when large groups of students were available, while the remaining time was spent on in-depth interviews.

As noted in Figure 7, an attempt was made to both survey and interview students at each of the public faculties involved. However, given the limitations of the sample size with those who were interviewed, not all of the interviewed students came from faculties where students were surveyed. More importantly, all of the interviewees did come from public universities in Bosnia. Furthermore, this research sampled data independently. Non-independent samples are those that are repeatedly approached through, for instance, before-after samples or pre- and post-treatment. The type of sampling further reinforces the applicability of the logistic regression to this study. The binary logistic regression modeling presumes that the sample is drawn via independent sampling.

Figure 7: Sampling



Data collected via surveys involved obtaining a representative and random sample from all six public faculties, where a sub-sample at each of the four faculties exceeded 100 surveys. To be specific, the upcoming findings chapters of this dissertation rely on both survey- and interview-based data gathered from a sample of 762 surveyed students from 6 different faculties and 15 student interviews with students who either graduated or are currently studying at the public faculties in Bosnia. This study initially aimed at applying “stratified random sampling” (Muijs, 2004, p. 39) within each faculty with the

goal of obtaining a representative sub-group of students from each year of study (circa 75 freshmen, 75 sophomores . . . , etc.). However, this sample design could not be utilized due to the fact that some faculties did not have a graduating class sufficiently large to make that subset comparable to others.

In addition, high dropout rates reduced subsequent classes in most Bosnian faculties, so it was relatively easy to survey 100 to 200 first- or second-year students given that the introductory courses have the highest enrollments and attendance and, in most cases, are mandatory. It was, nonetheless, more difficult to obtain equivalent sub-samples among students in their third or fourth year of studies. Thus, I focused on obtaining a sizable random sample. Another issue that came up during the data collection stage is that not all faculties had comparable enrollment rates; thus, one faculty did not have 75 or more students, not only in their senior year of studies, but also in earlier years. In other words, an equivalent subset of students per each year of study could not be obtained at each faculty due to the enrollment variation among the faculties and by year. In most cases, however, the number of first-year students was substantively greater than that of those graduating.

Also, perfect stratification was not possible, as in many cases a sophomore, for instance, may have been attending the lecture for a course typically taught during the first year of studies because he/she was re-taking an exam he/she failed during the first year. This made differentiation between students by seniority more difficult and therefore unreliable. In short and in line with the mixed methods research framework, I have adapted my approach to the availability of data in the field by collecting a sizable random sample at each of the six faculties visited in an attempt to obtain a substantive amount of data across all participating faculties.

A set of sub-samples was collected for each year of study and across various faculties (please see Table 4, p. 106): 366 students (48.0% of the sample) were completing their first year of studies; 251 students (32.9% of the sample) were second

year students; 89 students (11.7% of the sample) were in their third year; 51 students (6.7% of the sample) were near completion of their senior year in college, and 5 students (0.7% of the sample) did not provide any information on their completion status. In order to maximize their comfort and ensure the full confidentiality of all interviewed and the full anonymity of all surveyed participants, the faculty type, if needed, will be referred throughout the dissertation by its coded name. Specifically, out of a total of 762 students, at Faculty F1, 102 students participated in the study; at faculty F2, 68 students participated in the study; at faculty F3, 201 students participated; at faculty F4, 167 students participated; at faculty F5, 195 students participated; and at faculty F6, 29 students participated. As earlier noted, faculty F6 had a small population, thus limiting the sample size. Further, 64% of the participants were females, 2% did not indicate gender, and the rest were males (Table 4, p. 106). As to the ethnic composition, 96% were Bosniaks, 2% were Croats, and only 1 student (less than 0.01%) was a Serb (Table 4, p. 106). Also, about 2% of the sample either declared themselves as Bosnians and Herzegovinians or did not provide their ethnic affiliation (see Table 4, p. 106).

Herein, it should be noted that the sampling took place in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so the ethnic composition is consistent with the regional and geographic setting in which surveying took place. It should also be remarked that one of the key limitations and challenges of the sampling process is that it did not include the Serb Republic as the other entity of the country, where there has been much talk of educational corruption as well. Instead, I focused on obtaining substantive samples at those institutions where I was able to obtain access to students and logistic support for the research.

Table 4: Sample Composition

VARIABLE	% OF STUDENTS	# OF STUDENTS
SEX		
Female	64	488
Male	34	259
No answer/Not applicable	2	15
ETHNICITY		
Bosniaks	96	732
Croats	2	15
Serb	0.01	1
Bosnians	2	14
YEAR IN SCHOOL		
1 st year students	48	366
2 nd year students	32.9	251
3 rd year students	11.7	89
4 th year students	6.7	51
No answer/Not applicable	0.7	5
FACULTY COMPOSITION		
F1	13.4	102
F2	8.9	68
F3	26.4	201
F4	21.9	167
F5	25.6	195
F6	3.8	29
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (HI)		
HI < 500	21.5	165
500 < HI < 1500	57.2	438
1500 < HI < 2500	14.0	107
2500 < HI < 3500	2.3	18
3500 < HI	2.6	20
No answer/Not applicable	2.3	18

Source: Surveys

Next, interview-based data on Bosnian students were obtained via purposeful sampling through my personal and professional contacts. Specifically, the analysis relied on extreme-case sampling (International Development Research Center, 2009), which again may not have been possible in the case of the Serb Republic, where my personal contacts among the younger population that is the subject of this study were limited, diminishing the needed sense of comfort for those who would have potentially participated in the study. While a comprehensive representativeness of the entire student population was unattainable using extreme-case sampling, this dissertation benefits from

the in-depth data collected from the individuals willing to speak openly of educational corruption, particularly as such interviews may not have taken place with students at Bosnian universities as of yet. In total, 15 interviews were conducted with students from various state faculties.

The unique and “extreme case” feature that was common to all of the interviewees was their agreement and willingness to speak about the educational corruption, and to ensure such openness, I drew a sample from a pool of personal contacts with my colleagues, family members, and friends. A trusted personal relationship served as the additional assurance that the information shared during these interviews would be treated with the highest level of confidentiality. Given that educational corruption may often be a controversial and politically charged topic in Bosnia, this research’s ethical priority was to ensure that “the principal of ‘no harm’” is respected at all times (Bloor, 2006, p. 77). Extreme-case sampling is the sampling methodology that secured the necessary level of comfort, but also openness of the individuals involved in the interview process.

Though the research might have benefited from opportunistic sampling focusing on interviewing a few professors or members of the faculty administration, fruitful and pertinent data on educational corruption, however, are likely to be shared by faculty members only if they are individuals interested in fighting against educational corruption. As anticipated, in the case of Bosnia, some professors and administration members have often downplayed the presence of educational corruption, or, if they acknowledged it, they noted their personal non-involvement in the corruption processes. Given the wealth of information on corruption in education collected from students and given the difficulty in evaluating whether faculty members were or were not objectively portraying corruption, in-depth interviews of administrative members were not conducted, and the student population took center stage in the data collection process.

To sum up, having methodological flexibility when engaging in research on a complex topic such as corruption has enabled me as a researcher to adapt to the

challenges of the field research on corruption, to better address the educational corruption trends, and to rely, for instance, either on surveys or interviews or both depending on what data collection or data analysis tool appeared more fitting to answering a particular question. As others would agree (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007), this research should arguably result in a more comprehensive analysis than it would had it relied solely on one data collection approach.

Rationale for and Classification of Variable Categories

To connect the theories I propose and the data sought to test them, I categorized survey-derived variables that I deemed essential to obtaining the information needed to respond to the research questions of this study. According to the Table 5 (p. 109), I created and classified the key variable categories that individually or collectively address the research questions. The categories include: Demographics, Education, Mobility, Mobility & Coping, Mobility & Voice, Mobility & Exit, EU-nionization, Ethnic-fragmentation, and Socio-economic Background.

While Demographics category does not directly answer the proposed research questions, it helps in gaining some basic level of knowledge about the sample, such as for example, its gender composition. Similarly, Education Category provides further insight into the student's educational background, as, for instance, the student's length of study. A number of other variables' categories play more prominently in directly or indirectly addressing the questions raised in this research and thus help in testing and validating the hypotheses I earlier proposed in the overall corruption, social mobility and coping mechanism framework.

Table 5: Variable Categories

CATEGORY	SURVEY QUESTIONS	FACTORS/CONCEPTS
Demographics	1-3	Students' background
Education	4-10	Educational background Students' perceptions of education
Mobility & Corruption	10,11-17, 25-27, 30	Impact of corruption Forms of corruption Sponsored mobility Contest mobility Perceived corruption Procedural/organizational/behavioral traits
Mobility & Coping	18-20	Coping mechanisms Formal coping mechanisms Difficulty coping
Mobility & Voice	21-24	Voice mechanisms Voice mechanisms' effectiveness
Mobility & Exit	28, 29, 31	Exit mechanisms Corruption and exit
EU-nionization	32	Effectiveness of Bologna
Ethnic-fragmentation	33	Ethnic fragmentation & corruption
Socio-Economic Background (Elite Membership Proxy)	34-38	Income Father's background Socio-political involvement

As to the Mobility Category, it contains a number of variables that were directly derived from the survey and pose relevant questions on students' perceptions of corruption, social mobility, and students' view on the role one's socioeconomic status plays in determining the types of corruption in Bosnia's higher education (Table 5). Mobility & Coping, Mobility & Voice, and Mobility & Exit categories further build on the Mobility Category, and pose elaborate questions on the manner in which students cope when faced with corruption.

Given the importance of the mobility and coping mechanisms as the key components of the earlier theorized view that post-war elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina has used higher education to legitimize its position of power, the Mobility-related categories of questions create an important link between the theoretical framework and data that holds answers to the study's research questions. Though lesser of a focus, the

EU-nionization and Ethnic-fragmentation sections play a role in determining the impact of the EU-instigated policies on the corrupt behaviors and processes within Bosnia's higher education. Therefore, these two sub-sections focus on determining if the surveyed students perceive the EU-pushed Bologna framework as effective and if the ethnic-fragmentation is in any way relevant to the emergence of the post-war educational corruption.

Socio-economic Background Category has served as a proxy for the student's socioeconomic status and socio-political involvement that would help in determining his/her position within the country's socio-economic hierarchy and therefore his/her status' impact on the student's perception of corruption in higher education, his/her coping mechanism, and his/her view of mobility mechanisms in higher education. Lastly, I further elaborate on each of the sections by enlisting all relevant variables that are derived from 39 questions on demographics, education, mobility issues, coping mechanisms, view of EU-related processes in education, and socio-economic background as they, for the most part, have been used in this research (see Table 6, pp. 112-116).

Lastly, the survey-derived variables are often recoded for the purpose of further analysis in this study. Once recoded and when appropriate, they are relabeled by adding word FINAL to indicate that they have been adequately recoded and are ready for use in further analysis. Also, Indicator contrasts are used throughout the analysis as the default form of the categorical coding, which means that the reference category is the highest category (i.e. out of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 5 would be the reference category) and is presented by codes of zeros in all other categories. All missing and inapplicable responses are recoded as missing.

In summary of Chapter IV and given the intricacies of corruption-related behaviors, complex student reactions, and potential organizational triggers of corruption, employing both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore students' reactions and experiences with educational corruption was crucial for an improved understanding of

educational corruption in Bosnian higher education. On the one hand, the consumers of statistics-driven research often lack a full understanding of the survey findings unless they are introduced to the specific contexts within which the data were collected and later analyzed (MacKenzie, 1999). On the other hand, qualitative research has its own disadvantages, namely, it is highly time-consuming and therefore logistically harder to implement, as well as more difficult to present and reduce to simple trends that are often easier to detect with the survey-based analysis.

Therefore, this chapter provided the rationale for the application of the comprehensive mixed-methods approach. It has also presented the key components of the methodological and sampling approach relevant to the study's collection and analysis of the data on students' perceptions of corruption, social mobility, and EU-nionization in Bosnia's higher education. Lastly, this section of the study is a thorough prelude to Chapter V, in which the focus shifts from understanding the research framework to its implementation to the context of Bosnia's higher education and consequent discovery of the relevant and significant findings.

Table 6: Variable List

#	GROUP	NAME (ABBREVIATION)	VALUE
1	Demographics	Born (BO)	1975, 1976...
2	Demographics	Sex (SEX)	Female=0, Male=1
3	Demographics	Ethnicity (ETH)	Bosniak=B, Serb=S, Croat=C, Other=O
4	Education	Student type (ST)	Excellent (mostly As)=1, Very good (mostly Bs)=2, Good (mostly Cs) =3, Poor (mostly Ds) =4
5	Education	Exams completed (EC)	Some 1 st year=1, Some 2 nd year=2, Some 3 rd year=3, Some 4 th year=4
6	Education	Years studying (YS)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5...
7	Education	Repetition cause (RC)	No Studying=1, No time=2, No interest but can't transfer=3, Professors keep failing=4, No connections/bribe money=5, No motivation bc outdated studies=6, Studying no relevance=7, Other=8
8	Education	ECTS (ECTS)	Yes=1, No=2, Don't know=DK
9	Education	ECTS Transparent (ECTST)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
10	Education	Competent Graduate (CG)	Always=1, Almost always=2, Often=3, Rarely=4, Almost never=5, Never=6
11	Mobility & Corruption	Merited Promotion (MP)	Always=1, Almost always=2, Often=3, Rarely=4, Almost never=5, Never=6
12	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Satisfaction (TS)	Very satisfied=1, Somewhat satisfied=2, Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=3, Somewhat dissatisfied=4, Very dissatisfied=5
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction1 (TD1)	Think about dropping out=1, Do not=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction2 (TD2)	Discriminated against bc ethnicity=1, Not discriminated against bc ethnicity=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction3 (TD3)	Fail exams though sufficient knowledge=1, Do not fail when sufficient knowledge=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction4(TD4)	Some professors do not explain material=1, Some professors explain...=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction5 (TD5)	Some professors do not know subject well enough=1, Some professors know...=0

Table 6 (continued)

#	GROUP	NAME (ABBREVIATION)	VALUE
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction6 (TD6)	Professors do not show up their lectures=1, Professor show up... =0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction7 (TD7)	Professors do not seem qualified=1, Professors seem qualified=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction8 (TD8)	Professor treat faculty as personal property=1, Professors do not treat... =0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction9 (TD9)	Professor promoted bc of connections not qualification=1, Professors promoted NOT bc of connections but qualifications=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction10 (TD10)	Professors pass students bc bribes or connection=1, Professors do not pass... =0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction11 (TD11)	Professors push for book-buying=1, Professor do not push...=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction12 (TD12)	Professors enter inappropriate relationships with students=1, Professors do not...=0
13	Mobility & Corruption	Teaching Dissatisfaction13 (TD13)	Additional comments
14	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Satisfaction (PS)	Very satisfied=1, Somewhat satisfied=2, Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=3, Somewhat dissatisfied=4, Very dissatisfied=5
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction1 (PD1)	Would like to transfer to another faculty=1, Indifferent/would not like to transfer...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction2 (PD2)	Would like to take a course at another faculty=1, Indifferent/would not like...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction3 (PD3)	Would like to change major=1, Indifferent/would not like...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction4 (PD4)	Wish exams broken into smaller sections=1, Indifferent/do not wish...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction5 (PD5)	Wish there were more opportunities to take exams=1, Indifferent/Do not wish...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction6 (PD6)	Wish grading was more objective=1, Indifferent/do not wish...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction7 (PD7)	Wish there was more access to faculty members=1, Indifferent/do not wish...=0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction8 (PD8)	Wish could get graded exams back=1, Indifferent/do not wish...=0

Table 6 (continued)

#	GROUP	NAME (ABBREVIATION)	VALUE
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction9 (PD9)	Wish there were better student support services=1, Indifferent/Do not wish... =0
15	Mobility & Corruption	Procedures Dissatisfaction10 (PD10)	Additional Comments
16	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Degree (CD)	Highly widespread=1 Widespread =2, Neither widespread nor absent =3 Somewhat absent=4 Completely absent=5
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type1 (CT1)	No corruption=1, Other=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type2 (CT2)	Buying passing grades=1, No buying... =0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type3 (CT3)	Buying diplomas=1, No buying...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type4 (CT4)	Publishing plagiarized books=1, No publishing...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type5 (CT5)	Inappropriate student-faculty relations=1, No inappropriate...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type6 (CT6)	Passing exams bc social connections=1, No passing...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type7 (CT7)	Diplomas in excessively short period of time=1, No diplomas...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type8 (CT8)	Passing exams bc of influential parents=1, No passing ...=0
17	Mobility & Corruption	Corruption Type9 (CT9)	Additional comments
18	Mobility & Coping	Difficulty Coping (DC)	Very easy=1, Easy=2 Neither difficult nor easy=3 Difficult=4 Very difficult=5
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism1 (CM1)	Keeping up with required work=1, Missing/NA...=0
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism2 (CM2)	Talking with family/friends=1, Missing/NA...=0
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism3 (CM3)	Planning to leave/transfer from faculty=1, Missing/NA...=0
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism4 (CM4)	Bribing/looking for connections to pass=1, Missing/NA...=0
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism5 (CM5)	Complained about it within faculty-1, Missing/NA...=0
19	Mobility & Coping	Coping Mechanism6 (CM6)	Other/Additional comments

Table 6 (continued)

#	GROUP	NAME (ABBREVIATION)	VALUE
20	Mobility & Coping	Formal Mechanism (FM)	Yes=1, No=0
21	Mobility & Voice	Complaint Satisfaction (CS)	Very satisfied=1, Somewhat satisfied=2, Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=3, Very dissatisfied=4,
22	Mobility & Voice	Reasons No-Complaint (RNC)	No particular reason=1, Scared=0
23	Mobility & Voice	Anonymous Mechanisms (AM)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
24	Mobility & Voice	Effective Change (EC)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
25	Mobility	Corrupt Faculty (CF)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
26	Mobility	Corrupt Faculty Level (CFL)	0-20%=1, 20-40%=2, 40-60%=3, 60-80%=4, 80-100%=5
27	Mobility	Transfer Mobility (TM)	Very easy=1, Easy=2, Neither difficult nor easy=3, Difficult=4, Very difficult=5
28	Mobility & Exit	Leaving Faculty (LF)	Always=1, Almost always=2, Often=3, Rarely=4, Almost never=5, Never=6
29	Mobility & Exit	Corruption Exit (CEX)	No way =1, Partly corruption=2, Mostly corruption=3, Only bc corruption=4
30	Mobility	Reasons No-Transfer (RNT)	Too complicated=1, Too expensive=2, Other schools non-transparent=3, Unknown paperwork=4, Other=5

Table 6 (continued)

#	GROUP	NAME (ABBREVIATION)	VALUE
31	Mobility	Studying Abroad (SA)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
32	EU-nionization	Bologna Impact (BI)	Yes=1, No=0
33	Ethnic-fragmentation	Fragmentation and Corruption (FC)	Definitely=1, Probably=2, Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5
34	SES	Household Income (HI)	Below 500=1, 500-1500=2, 1500-2500=3, 2500-3500=4, Above 3500=5
35	SES	Father Education (FED)	Primary=1, Secondary=2, Two-year Academy/Associate Degree=3, College=4, Masters=5 PhD=6
36	SES	Father Employment (FEM)	Yes=1, No=2, Unemployed=3, Retired=4, Other=5
37	SES	Father's Position (FP)	Worker=1, Intellectual but not executive=2, Executive of a company=3, Head of company=4,
38	SES	Socio-political Involvement (SPI)	Highly involved=1, Somewhat involved=2, Neither involved nor uninvolved=3, Somewhat uninvolved=4, Uninvolved=5
39	NA	Additional Comments	Descriptive

Chapter V

CORRUPTION: ITS PRESENCE, FORMS AND FACILITATORS

This findings section brings all methodological and theoretical elements together with the goal of providing a cohesive and insightful analysis of the educational corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms present in Bosnia's higher education. Given the extensive nature of the data collected and analyzed, this study's findings are separated into three chapters, where each chapter addresses one of the three research question posed earlier. I begin with Chapter V, where focus is on answering the opening research question that examines, first, whether corruption is present in the higher education of Bosnia; second, how it manifests itself; and, third, whether its emergence is in any way helped by the contextual factors such as the organizational structure of the educational system.

The Chapter is further divided into three sub-sections addressing each of the above listed sub-questions (see Table 7, p. 118). Discussion begins by first defining corruption and reviewing levels at which students perceive corruption as existent in Bosnia's higher education. It is then followed by an elaborate review of different forms of corruption that this research uncovered in Bosnia's higher education. Chapter V ends with an analysis of all behavioral and organizational elements within higher education that the study participants perceived as inefficient and contributing to the current state of Bosnia's corrupt educational system.

Lastly, throughout Chapter V, I present this study's findings in line with the earlier introduced mixed methods approach. All relevant findings, whether they are sourced from interviews or surveys, are introduced concurrently to more comprehensively answer each research question. In other words, the organization in the findings-related chapters is theme-based. For example, under the Presence of Corruption sub-section of this chapter, I present findings that are survey-based, such as for instance trends extrapolated from the Corruption Degree (CD) variable that captures surveyed students' perception on how widespread corruption is in Bosnia's higher education (see Table 7 below). In other words, the Presence of Corruption sub-section addresses 1a Research Question (see pp. 22-24). Similarly, the next two sub-sections of Chapter V review this study's findings as to the forms of corruption and facilitators of corruption, addressing Research Questions 1b and 1c (Table 7 below). In addition and where they add value, I use a content analysis of the interview transcripts to further enhance the findings relating to the presence, forms, and facilitators of corruption (Table 7 below). This format is closely followed in all other chapters.


Table 7: Chapter V - Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections

SECTION TITLE – RESEARCH QUESTIONS	HYPOTHESIS	DATA SOURCE
<i>Presence of Corruption – 1a</i>	Presence of corruption in higher education in Bosnia is significant.	Corruption Degree (CD); Interview Transcripts
<i>Forms of Corruption – 1b</i>	Students face different types of corruption.	Corruption Types (CT1-CT9); Interview Transcripts
<i>Facilitators of Corruption – 1c</i>	There are various elements and behaviors in Bosnia's higher education facilitating corruption emergence and continuation.	Interview Transcripts

Presence of Corruption


Following the above theme-based organization of Chapter V, I begin by presenting the study's findings on the presence of corruption in Bosnia's higher education. Of the total surveyed sample, I find, 8.5% of students view corruption as "completely absent"; 12.1% of the surveyed sample think of corruption as "somewhat absent"; 45.4% of the sampled student body stated that corruption is "neither widespread nor absent"; 22.3% of the sampled population believe that corruption is "widespread"; 8.9% view corruption as "highly widespread"; and 2.8% view corruption as "missing" (see Figure 8 below). In sum, of 762 surveyed students, only 8.5% view corruption as "completely absent," while a significant portion of the sample, 88.7%, believes corruption is present to some degree (Figure 9, p. 120). Based on the survey data, only 2.8% of the surveyed participants did not answer the question that asked about the educational corruption level in their faculty.

Figure 8: Extent of Corruption in B&H's Higher Education



Source: Surveys

Figure 9: Presence vs. Absence of Corruption in B&H's Higher Education



Source: Surveys

Similarly, the interviewed group overall agreed that corruption was present in the educational system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The extent and presence of corruption was also discussed with the pool of 15 interviewed students. One of the interviewed students noted that while educational corruption does not take a spotlight on a daily basis in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is a daily occurrence in the educational process (Interviewee 6C). The issue, in one student's view, partly rests with the institutions' implicit endorsement of corrupt behavior: it is not in the interest of the universities to disclose the information on the presence of corruption and its extent (Interviewee 1C).

In defining corruption within Bosnia's higher education, only 2 interviewed students perceived corruption as "the criminal activity that involves the acceptance or giving of bribery," while the remainder defined it more broadly as a cluster of activities ranging from bribery to reciprocation of favors among the social elite (Table 8, pp. 122-123). Among those who defined corruption more broadly including the forms of non-monetary exchanges as well, interviewee 9C estimated that favor exchanges comprise about 80% of all corruption-related activities in

higher education, while about 20% is left to the bribing process (Table 8, pp. 122-123).

Notably, the two interviewed individuals who believe that corruption is limited only to the bribing process were also politically active in their community. Interviewee 1C not only opted for the more limited definition of corruption but underlined that favor reciprocation is a form of nepotism not solely linked to the elites but is also culturally practiced. Interviewee 1C also remarked that professors look at the politically involved student “more seriously and with different eyes.” The student further attributed his own personal success to hard work, reiterating that he has had no problems or barriers in the course of his studies. Furthermore, the three interviewees who stated they were socio-politically “highly involved” were also on the lower-end of the student estimates as to the extent of corruption. Specifically, interviewees 1C, 11C, and 15C remarked that “30-40% of professors” are corrupt; corruption is “present, but not widespread”; and “50% of professors” are corrupt, respectively.

Those students who declared they were less involved socio-politically within their communities often gave higher estimates of how widespread corruption is than those who claimed to have been “highly involved”. The study finds that 2 out of 3 students who remarked they were “somewhat involved” estimated that 70% of their professors are corrupt (see Table 8, pp. 122-123). Also, the “somewhat uninvolved” student who graduated from a public university and later got a job as a teaching assistant at a different university stated that corruption was even more widespread: the student perceived 90% to 95% of faculty members as corrupt (see Table 8, pp. 122-123). Though the sample size of 15 students is a limiting factor here, the patterns extrapolated from the available transcripts are suggestive of the previously hypothesized notion that corruption is perceived as less widespread by the most politically and socially prominent students who are

also the ones most likely to benefit from their access to the social elites and their ability to leverage the elites' social networks. In the next sub-section of this chapter, the study continues to probe this notion indirectly by examining the types of corruption most frequently observed in Bosnia's higher education.

Table 8: Corruption Definition and Presence Matrix

Code	Socio-Political Involvement	Corruption perceived as bribery	Corruption perceived as bribery, favor reciprocity, other immoral behavior	Perceived extent of corruption
1C	Highly Involved	✓		30-40% of professors
2C	Uninvolved		✓	Highly widespread
3C	Uninvolved		✓	Very frequent
4C	Uninvolved		✓	Highly widespread
5C	Uninvolved		✓	Highly widespread
6C	Somewhat Involved		✓	70%
7C	Uninvolved		✓	80%
8C	Somewhat Involved	✓		70%
9C ⁸	Somewhat Uninvolved		✓	Increases during the exam period. About 90-95% are corrupt. This is based on the faculty where I work.
10C	Uninvolved		✓	90%
11C	Highly Involved		✓	Present, but not widespread
12C	Uninvolved		✓	70%

⁸After graduation, this interviewee obtained a job as a teaching assistant at another public faculty.

Table 8 (continued)


Code	Political Involvement	Corruption as bribery	Corruption as bribery, favor reciprocity, other immoral behavior	Extent of Corruption
13C	Uninvolved		✓	Only began studies and cannot evaluate
14C	Somewhat Involved		✓	Present
15C	Highly Involved		✓	Present, about 50% of professors
TOTAL	Uninvolved	2	13	

Further, when looking to compare differences in corruption perception, if any, between the wealthiest segment in the surveyed sample and the rest of the sample, this research finds that only 2.6% of the total surveyed sample or 20 students stated that their household income was above 3,500 Convertible Marks. Looking at the distribution of answers within this subgroup, I find that 30% thought that corruption is “highly widespread” while 10% of this elite sub-group was of the view that corruption was “completely absent” (see Figure 10, p. 124). When comparing this finding to that of the overall sample, it is interesting to note that the percentage of those who thought corruption was “completely absent” was similar in both groups: 10% of the wealthiest segment and 8.5% of the entire surveyed sample. However, when comparing percentages of those who thought corruption was “highly widespread”, the values differed: 30% of the wealthiest sub-group thought corruption was “highly widespread” while that was the case for only 8.9% of the surveyed sample.

To the contrary of the finding that the interviewed students of higher socio-political involvement thought corruption was less widespread, surveyed students from the highest income category were of the view that corruption is more widespread than the rest of the sample. This differential of views may partly stem

from the fact that, in surveys, the household income was used to differentiate between the wealthiest category and others while the interviewees' status was approximated based on the interviewees' direct sociopolitical involvement in their respective communities. The discrepancy may have emerged due to the small sub-samples in both the case of interviewed and the surveyed students of the highest socioeconomic status, but it may also be partially attributed to the fact that the surveyed students feel more detached from the information shared when writing, which is in contrast with the interviewed pool. If so, the survey-based finding (see Figure 10 below) may be explained by the fact that the wealthiest students have greater knowledge of the corruption activities possibly due to their socioeconomic status, and were more inclined to share their views given their anonymity in the process.

Figure 10: Perceived Corruption by the Wealthiest Students



Source: Surveys

Forms of Corruption

Now that the presence of corruption in higher education in Bosnia is clearly established, this sub-section of Chapter V is focused on providing an exhaustive list

of corruption forms that are presently practiced in Bosnia's higher education. This sub-section specifically addresses Research Question 1b (see Table 7, p. 118) theorizing that students face various types of educational corruption. As the case with earlier section of Chapter V and in line with the mixed-methods methodology, I build a comprehensive picture that discusses various types of corruption in Bosnia's higher education. In doing so, I draw on the most relevant survey- and interview-based data.


As noted in the literature review, corruption in education can take on various forms. Herein, both interviewees and surveyed students confirmed the existence of diverse types of corruption as manifested in Bosnia's higher education. Of 762 surveyed participants, 8.8% of the sample was of the view that corruption appears in no form within Bosnia's higher education while the two most frequently occurring forms of corruption involve passing exams by relying on personal connections and influential parents (Figure 11, p. 127). While the impact of corruption beyond educational sector was not the topic of this dissertation, some evidence emerged to suggest that the social exchanges amongst the privileged remain a relevant social dynamic even after graduation and especially when it comes to the public sector employment. According to a Bosnian public faculty graduate who sought to work as a teaching assistant post-graduation, she met with the dean of her faculty and expressed her interest in staying on as a teaching assistant. Given her exceptional performance as a student, she expected that the faculty dean would be interested in discussing employment opportunities with her. However, this faculty's dean rejected her by saying: "I do not employ social cases ... your parents are unemployed" (Interviewee 4C). The dean effectively stated that he would not associate himself or his faculty with a family of no social significance or financial backing. This coincidental finding helps validate the relevance of social networking that continues post-graduation and beyond educational sector, as well

as this study's hypothesis that relationship leveraging is utilized only when the two sides involved recognize their mutually equivalent social and political status.

Further, 339 students, or 44.5% of the sample, also said corruption takes the form of "purchased passing grades," while a smaller segment of the sampled group, 19.2%, stated that corruption manifests itself in the form of "purchased diplomas" (see Figure 11, p. 127). At times, professors may insist on getting their bribes by repeatedly failing a student, signaling to the student that he/she needs to pay to pass, even though doing so may involve significant financial sacrifice for the family. In fact, "it is normal that students who are of the worst economic circumstances are having [a] harder time passing their exams. They do not have or do not know where to pay for their exams; thus, they are forced to study" (Interviewee 1C).

Repeatedly failing an individual of social importance, however, would rarely occur. In other words, "connections and acquaintances are the key" to one's success, and it may often be the case that "the poor *have to pay* [emphasis added] while those with higher status only use their connections" (Interviewee 5C). In short, Bosnia has both students who work hard and those who are well-connected socially and continue to advance post-college at the expense of the hard-working individuals by taking what should have been their jobs (Interviewee 5C).

Figure 11: Forms of Educational Corruption



Source: Surveys

To add, of the total surveyed group, 18.6% considered “publishing of plagiarized books” by their professors as a recurring form of corruption (Figure 11 above). At the same time, 12.5% saw corruption as manifesting itself in the form of the “inappropriate student-professor relationships” (Figure 11 above). About 10.4% of the students surveyed thought corruption can take on the form of diplomas obtained in an “excessively short period of time” (Figure 11 above).

Lastly, while this research confirms that there are various forms of educational corruption in Bosnia, corruption here is approximated by the students’ perceptions of the same. For instance, when asked whether they physically know anyone who paid for a passing grade, 7 out of 15 interviewed students answered affirmatively (see Table 9, pp. 128-129). When asked if they knew anyone who relied on social connections to pass, 10 out of 15 students stated they did know one or more students who leveraged their personal connections (see Table 9, pp. 128-129).

Others hesitated and some noted that the process is often so clandestine that for those who lack connections and instead wish to pay for a passing grade, it may take some effort to find out who the professor’s liaison in the bribing process may be (Interviewee 4C). When asked directly about his knowledge of specific

individuals, one student responded, “I don’t know as I do not have any evidence [to back up my claims]” (Interviewee 1C). At the same time, however, this particular participant estimated that 30-40% of Bosnian higher education faculty is corrupt. In fact, much of the interviewed pool implicitly or explicitly suggested that despite the high-level of perceived educational corruption in higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Table 9 below), witnessing of the corruption processes is rare and often shielded by those participating in corruption.

Table 9: Perceived versus Actual Corruption

Code	Know anyone who bribed to pass? How much? How frequently?	Know anyone who relied on family/social connections to pass? How frequently?
1C	Not sure.	Not sure.
2C	I didn’t see anyone give a bribe.	Yes.
3C	A fellow student once said he never took an exam, and came only to pick up his diploma.	Yes, but relationships count beyond passing, and include ensuring a full-time status even when a student is not eligible. This ensures avoidance of fee payments associated with part-time studies.
4C	Informal stories, mostly focused on most desired diplomas (i.e. economics rather than technical faculties) where an exam costs from 100KM to 500KM. ..but these are informal claims.	All would agree that it is widespread, but people do not like to name anyone. I think that all of that takes place under the highest level of secrecy. No one will say that they passed in such a manner.
5C	Yes, about 10 who looked for connections or “asked” to pass.	Yes, 5-6.
6C	Entry into college is all about connections. For exams, a typical price is 500 KM but varies depending on the exam difficulty.	Yes, a girl who is related to one of the deans.
7C	I do know. The talk is that cost of an exam is 5,000KM, which can be afforded only by the rich or the poor who took a loan out to bribe for the exam.	No one told me personally,...All of us know that it is a public secret. Those who are a bit more important in the city, their Moms and Dads ‘fix’ exams and that is it.
8C	I do not know personally. Some students suggest that price lists exist.	I know a girl who went the elementary school with me. She failed the entry exam, but was admitted.

Source: Interviews

Table 9: (continued)

Code	Know anyone who bribed to pass? How much? How frequently?	Know anyone who relied on family/social connections to pass? How frequently?
9C	For money, I do not know. I should say again that I cannot say for sure, but there is a story that dean of my faculty received money for a student. But I do not know. I did not see it, so maybe he did not.	Yes, I do. Favor for favor is always there and does not change. There is tendency relative to the period when I just started working not to ask, but now that I have been there for [several] years, because now they know me, so they feel more comfortable to ask mesomehow with experience, the favor for favor concepts grows. This behavior is more frequent [than bribing].
10C	I know students who transferred from [one faculty] to [another] without entry examination and even though there is no between the exams. They either paid or are politically connected.	I know that there are many of them in my faculty.
11C	I know few tens of students from first year. Few exams each.	I do, again few tens.
12C	A friend of mine paid 600KM for the exam I failed 20 times. I did not know that professor is asking for money, and then new professor came and I got 9. It depends, with some professors it is around 1,000KM per exam. My mom would need to take a loan out to pay for a passing grade, and higher grade is more expensive	I know of few girls whose fathers are influential. . . Another friend has to pass 7 exams, but for 3-4 she needs not to worry . . . She does not even show up, but gets 7-8. This I know for sure because she told me and she does not see anything bad in it.
13C	I do not know.	Yes, I do. I think this occurs more often.
14C	Yes, I do know someone who paid to be admitted into college.	I do not know, and I suspect those students mostly go into law, economics, and medicine.
15C	500 Euros one [person], one 250 Euros, but they were stuck. That was wiser than failing all the time, and I shouldn't even start talking about part-time students. They work and don't have time, so that's how they pass...	There is a lot of that...

Source: Interviews

Reciprocity of Favors

As hypothesized earlier and based on the trends that emerged from the survey analysis, the most frequently noted form of corruption in Bosnian higher education does not involve monetary exchange but rather the reciprocity of favors: more specifically, a significant majority or 62.1% of the student body (473 of

surveyed students) thought that corruption appears in the form of “passing exams because of one’s social connections” (see Figure 11, p. 127). The data collected via interviews similarly suggest that the reciprocity of favors is one of the key articulations of educational corruption in Bosnian higher education and, in the view of some, certainly the dominant one. Often, direct exchanges of money in the educational system to secure grades or diplomas are seen as less frequent relative to favor exchanges (Interviewee 4C; Interviewee 5C; Interviewee 7C). As one of the study participants was told by a student with connections: “I have the privilege to enter college without any criteria” (Interviewee 14C).

Consequently, students now perceive corruption as no longer involving tangible goods but exchanges of jobs, favors, and promises. Out of 15 interviewed students, 9 students believe that corruption in higher education is a result of interconnectedness and in service of an elite described as, for instance, “local power-holders” (Interviewee 1C), “local leaders” (Interviewee 2C), “people with political power” (Interviewee 3C), “those who are politically suitable” (Interviewee 4C), and “people in power” (Interviewee 8C). It is precisely this evolving nature of corruption resulting from the interconnectedness between the educational and political elite that makes comprehensive verification, detection, and proper quantification of corruption highly complex and virtually impossible. Therefore, this study relies solely on student perception as indicative proxy of what may be taking place in actuality and within the country’s higher education.

Drawing on the analysis of students’ perceptions regarding various forms of educational corruption, the study confirms that materialistic exchange is not the sole source of corrupt behavior. Indeed, “favor-for-favor” is another form of corruption, producing a college-educated cadre among which some are believed to have never even taken an exam (Interviewee 3C). As another student observed, when going through the admissions process, it is important to have someone who

will “speak on your behalf as grades do not speak for themselves” (Interviewee 15C). So, the student’s background may turn out to be the most relevant factor in the admissions process, diminishing the importance of grades as a measure of student’s performance. One of the interviewed students surprisingly noted that a teaching assistant openly talked about his child not being interested in studying but him still wanting his child to have a college-degree. This prompted the father to “fix him/her a diploma” (Interviewee 2C). To note here and unlike the case in the United States, where teaching assistants are often graduate students that are expected to graduate from their programs within a specified timeframe, teaching assistants in Bosnia are often full-time employees that frequently hold their posts indefinitely. While some teaching assistants pursue doctorates others may never obtain their doctorates and instead remain in their teaching assistantship posts for the rest of their professional careers. Also, given the general lack of the adequate cadre, teaching assistants are not necessarily in the graduate program at all but may be employed by the faculties in question because they have a prior degree or some experience in the field they are selected to teach in. Within Bosnia’s institutions of higher education, teaching assistants are more comparable to the lecturers in other educational systems, but do not hold doctorates and often do not advance into more established teaching positions.

While the political elites operate based on the principle of “I do it for you, you do it for me,” those who lack strong connections “work hard and repeat years endlessly until either one or the other gives up [professor or the student] ... or they will take a loan to bribe the professor or if the student is female, she will sleep with the professor” (Interviewee 7C). Even the professors who reject corruption and wish to differentiate themselves from the corrupt circles are frequently forced to take part in the corrupt process: they “pass students against their [professors’] own will. It is all systemically connected” (Interviewee 3C) and those that reject or

resist corruption may be deemed unsuitable for their positions. They are often politically marginalized and replaced by “little [gods] that listen” (Interviewee 4C). Here, one’s list of academic publications is irrelevant relative to one’s political suitability (Interviewee 4C).

The second most frequently occurring form of corruption helped validate the hypothesis that the reciprocity of favors plays a crucial role in complicating educational corruption: 50.8% of the surveyed sample believe that educational corruption appears in the form of “passing because of one’s influential parents,” which reflects a very similar notion as does the earlier noted statistic that 62.1% of the surveyed student thought corruption appears in the form of “passing exams because of one’s social connections” (see Figure 11, p. 127). This finding not only confirmed that students perceive favor-for-favor exchanges as corruption but has also tested one of the key premises of this research: it confirmed the importance of favor reciprocity and consequent implications for the social mobility mechanisms stemming from the students’ perceptions of favor-for-favor exchanges as corruption.

Though the literature on educational corruption often focuses on bribery, the notion that this dissertation wants to bring into the limelight is the complexity of behaviors and interactions that occur in the form of favor exchanges, making educational corruption even more of an intractable activity than it might have been initially perceived as. Even with bribery that could arguably be traced, there are rarely direct exchanges of money; instead, the exchanges frequently include multiple steps designed to veil those involved. For instance, one participant witnessed an incident where “a student walked in during the S [code for the course] exam, and said to the professor, ‘Dad said you should stop by to pick it up,’ and

professor replied, ‘Give me your indeks⁹’ to [presumably] write in the grade for the exam that was in session” (Interviewee 2C). This exchange occurred and was uninterrupted in front of the entire class.

Here, it is important to note that interviews with the participants have provided additional insights into the diversity of educational corruption forms. A teaching assistant who was depicted by a study participant (Interviewee 2C) as incompetent requested that the participant provide all notes and literature required for the teaching assistant’s child. In exchange, the teaching assistant offered a passing grade in another subject from the faculty’s curriculum. The participant stated that he refused to cooperate, but that the teaching assistant’s child completed the course of study and obtained a diploma equivalent to that of the study’s participant despite the entire class’ awareness that this individual passed the required coursework only thanks to the parent’s connections. This exemplifies the variety that exists in corruption-related proposals and interactions within the educational system, but it also reflects the workings of social mobility mechanisms within Bosnia’s society. Specifically, the study participant underlined the notion that the teaching assistant in question was highly incompetent himself, which is why he requested from a competent, yet repeatedly failed student, advice on the literature and knowledge required for an exam that was a part of the standard curriculum at the faculty where the teaching assistant was employed.

Further, teaching assistants in Bosnia are in a different position than the teaching assistants who are graduate students in the US or other educational settings. With the continuing lack of educated cadre, Bosnia’s teaching assistants are often individuals with some level of expertise in the field they teach but are not necessarily students in a graduate program of their faculty. For instance, an

⁹ Indeks is a gradebook in Bosnia.

accounting professor may not have a PhD in accounting, but may be an experienced accountant. While it is assumed that these assistants will eventually become professors after obtaining their doctorate, they often do not. Also and in line with other corruption-related behaviors, some obtain their positions because of their socio-political connections. In the process of conducting this research, one teaching assistant shared about a colleague of equivalent status,

My colleague is completing a doctorate in Croatia with one of the, supposedly, prominent names in the field. He is constantly dining with the professor from Croatia. I suspect that that is how he is getting his doctorate. I, on the other hand, have been working for years on my doctorate, and everyone is surprised that I want to do it legitimately and that I am taking so long to complete it. (Interviewee 9C)

This statement illustrates the severity of educational corruption whose negative implications ultimately affect the country as a whole. Bosnia's role, if any, in being a part of the European and global economy and providing a functional, reliable, and educated workforce is, at best, in question given the manner in which personal connections and social status have overshadowed the salience of merit-based achievement in academia's upward mobility framework and beyond.

Diplomas as Credits for War-time Achievements

The form of corruption that was discussed earlier and in the context of post-war and post-communist elite formation is the process of diploma awards that took place immediately after the war. The Bosnian Army leadership during the war was comprised of very few formally trained military officials who left the Yugoslav Army to join the Bosnian Army. So, to reciprocate for one's war achievements and heroic participation, many high-level military officials received diplomas. As a research participant openly stated, the participant's father, who played a prominent role in military leadership during the war, was awarded a diploma from a higher

education institution “because of his participation in the war” (Interviewee 3C). Soon after the war ended, the members of the new elite were frequently rewarded for their war-related efforts or their participation in the nationalistic politics during and after the 1990s war. Further confirmed by another study participant, a prominent individual in the participant’s field of study was a former war hero who, prior to the war, had only a high school diploma, but immediately following the cessation of violence obtained several college degrees and now heads a prominent public company. As the interviewee further notes, “this is a public secret.... I never saw him at the [faculty] ... where one percent graduates in time [meaning graduating within 4 years] and he was one [of them]. Others who graduate in time usually do so with a damaged nervous system” (Interviewee 4C).

In sum, the leaders of the war-time armed forces were self-driven individuals who rose to their positions during the actual fighting with Serbia’s army and the war-time army of Serb Republic. However, following the cessation of violence, many of these newly emerged leaders entered a post-war era in which construction of the new and multiethnic Bosnian Army was guided by the international community. In the process, certain requirements were placed upon the military leadership in terms of their education and academic qualifications, which in many cases the military officers from Bosnia lacked. To resolve the dichotomy between actual competence in the field shown during the war and the lack of formal academic and military training, many members of the military were helped in the process of obtaining their higher education diplomas: “With the lack of other awards, some individuals were awarded diplomas in appreciation for their war achievements” (Interviewee C4). While this form of privilege given to the war leaders and heroes could be justified with the award of honorary degrees, this privileging of some versus others later spread beyond a few selective cases. To help understand the reasons and complexities due to which the corrupt behavior has

spread beyond this initial war-related legitimization, the study here transitions into the last section of Chapter V that reviews, in detail, a number of the contextual factors that have helped facilitate expansion of corruption within Bosnia's post-war higher education.

Facilitators of Corruption

The educational processes in Bosnia suffer from inconsistencies and inefficiencies that have opened up various opportunities in which the authority of professors and administrators can be inappropriately exercised over the students and, in indirect ways, their families. An interviewee under code name 6C depicts the situation in Bosnia's colleges as "catastrophic" in terms of its organizational structure: "everything takes months, ...our exam applications are lost, and exam periods are frequently postponed, often prolonging the length of studies, or professors simply do not show up for their scheduled exams, often causing students to repeat a year." Consequently, a number of organizational, behavioral, and procedural traits of Bosnia's higher education are now perceived as conducive to corruption. Some issues emerged more frequently than others and included: absenteeism of professors; lack of exam periods; problems with exam application, paperwork, laws and rules; lack of faculty access; grading and teaching inconsistencies; and culture of fear. The summary of behavioral and systemic elements that potentially help enable corruption is presented in Table 10 (pp. 139-140).

Absenteeism of Professors

Often, Bosnian professors do not show up for their lectures and/or exams (see Table 10, pp. 139-140), consequently delaying students in the completion of

their studies and prompting them to think of ways to circumvent the system to compensate for the lost time and systemic inefficiencies. To be specific, one-third of the interviewed students noted absenteeism was a problem (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). The survey-based data confirmed that the faculty absenteeism is a notable issue. Of the surveyed student body, 36.6%, or 279 students, stated that some professors do not show up for their lectures or exams. To elaborate on the broader contextual setting enabling faculty absenteeism, Bosnian faculties lack sufficient teaching cadre. As a result, some professors are hired as consultants from neighboring countries (Croatia and/or Serbia), and they generally tend to arrange day-long teaching sessions over the weekends or on specific dates so that the content of an entire course can be covered in greatly compressed periods relative to what would be seen as a typical weekly schedule. For these outsourced courses, locally hired teaching assistants often compensate for the lack of face-to-face time with professors by holding weekly practice sessions.

According to an interviewed participant, some professors show up so rarely that one group of students at the participant's faculty complained to the dean about a professor being always absent. In response, the dean appeared uninformed and, in turn, stated that the professor in question was paid "5,000 KM [over 3,000 US dollars]" but the dean was visibly surprised to learn that the professor showed up only twice (Interviewee 7C). The interviewed student went on to suggest: "Most of these professors have other jobs, and this is their side activity...." (Interviewee 7C). Whether this behavior is perceived as corrupt, unprofessional, or irresponsible may be dependant on one's definition of corruption; however, such observation enhances a student's perception of an inconsistent and *ad hoc* setting that consequently opens itself up to the various forms of systemic abuse.

What is also worth noting here is that another dissatisfaction students checked off in their surveys is the overall "lack of knowledge" by the faculty:

34.6% of the surveyed sample shared such a view, likely stemming from the inconsistent teaching stream and having to shuffle and change the consultancy-based teachers. Not only do the students get frustrated and discouraged with professors who seldom appear, but such an *ad hoc* approach to college education creates inconsistencies in both students' and professors' expectations, discouraging many students from participating at all but also encouraging others, both students and professors, to take the advantage of the circumstances. Furthermore, in such settings, teaching assistants often largely dominate the teaching process and try to act as gatekeepers to the professors, limiting direct and continuous interaction between students and professors. While this study does not delineates significantly between professors and teaching assistants and generally lumps the two into the teaching cadre at Bosnia's faculties, it ought to be noted that teaching assistants are as likely as other faculty members to take advantage of their positions.

Table 10: Frequency of Systemic Corruption Facilitators

Code	Politically Active	Income	Absent Professors	Grade book/ Indeks	Issues with Exam Timing/ Exam Applications/ Paperwork/Laws and Rules	Lack of Faculty Access	Grading Inconsistencies	Teaching Inconsistencies	Culture of Fear
1C	✓	500-1500 KM			✓		✓	✓	✓
2C		600 KM			✓		✓	✓	✓
3C		1000-2000 KM		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
4C		Under 500 KM			✓		✓	✓	✓
5C		2,500-3,500KM			✓		✓	✓	✓
6C	✓	1,500-2,500KM	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
7C		Don't know	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
8C	✓	Below 500KM	✓		✓		✓		
9C	✓	500-1500KM			✓				

Source: Interviews

Table 10 (continued)

Code	Politically Active	Income	Absent Professors	Grade book/ Indeks	Issues with Exam Timing/ Exam Applications/ Paperwork/Laws and Rules	Lack of Faculty Access	Grading Inconsistencies	Teaching Inconsistencies	Culture of Fear
10C		500-1,500KM			√		√	√	
11C	√	1,500-2,500KM			√				
12C		500-1,500KM	√		√	√	√		
13C		1,500-2,500KM			√		√		
14C	√	500-1,500KM			√				
15C	√	1,500-2,500KM	√		√		√	√	
TOTAL	7		5	1	15	3	12	9	5

Source: Interviews

Student Gradebook (in Bosnian "Indeks")

In continuing the review of corruption facilitators, problems in Bosnia's higher education often stem from the continuous use of the paper-version of the students' gradebook or, in Bosnian, "indeks" (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). This gradebook is physically carried by students into each of their exams and given to professors to write in their grades. The book is a *de facto* transcript that evidences student's progress. It makes visible, to each professor, all of the grades that student has previously received, as well as students' basic familial information such as place and date of birth and father's name. The Indeks has to be brought to each exam and is the main proof, in various administrative settings within and outside the university, of one's student status. Providing professors with information on the student's family background, such as father's name, can prompt a discussion with the student on his or her social background, but even without any such discussion allows a professor to evaluate the student's potential to bribe or ways to leverage the student's connections and family's political or social position.

The Indeks also has the power to enable corruption in the most mechanical ways: it allows for bribes to be physically exchanged between the professor and student during the exam itself. The interviewee 1C stated that it is difficult to track the extent of corruption as "the exchange of money happens through liaisons rather than directly". One of the potential physical liaisons, though not explicitly mentioned by the Interviewee 1C, is a grade book that every student directly hands to a professor at the onset of every exam.

Furthermore, by being able to view all of the grades, professors may account for student's previous performance in their grading process. According to the study participant, if a student received a grade 6 (out of 10 and with 5 being a failing grade) at his/her last exam, it is likely that the next professor will give a 6 regardless of the

student's answer (Interviewee 3C). To further complicate the grading process, some professors who want their exams to be perceived as difficult to pass will give a lower grade than other grades in the Indeks book; again, this occurs irrespective of the knowledge the student has shown during the actual exam that is being graded (Interviewee 3C).

As particularly relevant to the courses taught by professors from abroad, assistants frequently perform most of the teaching and grading tasks, limiting professors' interaction with students. Consequently, many students are often making multiple attempts to contact their professors to get their grades officially written into their indekses. At times, indekses are shipped to a professor at another location, subjecting students to additional risks of losing their gradebooks or not getting them back in time for another exam.

Lack of Access to Professors

With the lack of an adequate teaching cadre within some faculties, student access to professors is limited. At the same time, teaching assistants tend to take on the role of liaisons between students and senior faculty members. In doing so, the status of teaching assistants is elevated, even though their educational backgrounds and experiences do not always merit their substantive control over their teaching and grading responsibilities. As one of the interviewed students said, the main obstacle to one's success is that the relationships count because teaching is often done by assistants who are not necessarily capable of transferring knowledge (Interviewee 6C). In total, 3 out of 15 interviewed students brought up the lack of access to professors as one of the systemic problems. Similarly, 20.9% of the surveyed sample is of the view that some professors are not qualified, whereas, at some faculties, the full-time professors who qualify to teach in their field – as perceived by students – could be as low as one (Interviewee 7C). The remaining professors are labeled as “outside consultants” who, for instance, travel from

Croatia and teach when they can make it to the faculties in Bosnia (Interviewee 7C). According to the same participant, one of the best professors at her faculty was an outside consultant who, in only two days, covered the material for the entire semester, while others generally come every other weekend and hold lectures (Interviewee 7C). This particular participant transferred from one faculty to another within Bosnia and suggested that even differences between faculties within the country are enormous: one faculty had regular weekly schedules, while the one she currently attends holds lectures when professors are available (Interviewee 7C).

A lack of consistent scheduling on a week-to-week basis goes hand-in-hand with infrequent in-person contacts with the actual professors, who tend to delegate all or most of their teaching to their locally hired assistants, further diluting the quality of the teaching process and placing authority over the teaching process into the hands of their, less qualified, teaching assistants. Specifically, 23.9% of the surveyed student sample would like to have better access to their faculty members, which would ensure more transparent and direct communication with faculty members, but also tip the imbalance of power and authority that some teaching assistants practice in the absence of more qualified faculty members.

Lacking and Poor Harmonization of Rules, Laws, and Procedures

Given the existing and politically charged division of the country into ethnic entities, the educational sector in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is under the jurisdiction of the cantonal ministries, including implementation and formulation of laws governing higher education. The politicalization of legal frameworks coincides with the ethnic division between the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the extensive subdivision in the country maintained by a government-budgeted and heavily loaded administration was envisioned as a way to improve a participatory approach to the governance of Bosnia, but instead serves to complicate the

establishment of laws and policies that would better define, inform, and guide educational standards and behaviors within cantons. This is exemplified in the case of the Una-Sana Canton's discussions on the passage of the Law on Higher Education. One of Bosnia's political parties, Democratic People's Union (Demokratska narodna zajednica), requested that the Law permit the use of the cantonal budget for the funding of private institutions in higher education. In essence, DNZ asked for the privatization of higher education at the expense of the public budget, justifying it as a need for higher educational alternatives in the disciplines in which the public sector has failed to provide sufficient opportunities. Regardless of whether the DNZ's argument about educational diversity currently available to the Bosnian population is valid or not, what is clearly emerging from this request is the sense of entitlement that a political group may feel toward leveraging public institutions and funds to pursue its agenda. Even more concerning is that such requests are perceived as legitimate and are adequately debated and discussed while public institutions themselves already lack sufficient funds to fulfill the requirements of the Bologna Process.

Another phenomenon that characterizes the social and political movements within the country and that allows for the upkeep of corruption-enabling mechanisms is the interconnectedness between the political and educational elites, which has provided fertile ground for educational corruption. Per one of the interviewed students who has completed her studies: "Much is under the control of politics. The Minister of Education is a political figure and is a government member who has a boss, and the boss is the head of his political party. Politics dominates and steers all" (Interviewee 3C).

This scenery is complicated by the addition of private and unregulated institutions of higher education into the mix. The study participants have openly categorized these faculties and universities as diploma mills: "Financial lobby is very important here. The owners of private higher education institutions are wealthy and they ensure that, within

the state parliament, laws are passed to minimize control over private institutions in higher education” (Interviewee 1C).

Frustration with the lack of organization in Bosnian universities, extensive bureaucracy, and complex procedures is clearly present among Bosnian students. Of the total number of the interviewed students, all 15 have at one point or another talked about the problems with their tests, organization, and procedures at their faculties (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). Some indeed perceive the Bosnian educational system as one where the interest of the “student is least important” (Interviewee 3C). For instance, Bosnian students are required to file an application each time they take an exam. Students often end up standing in line for several hours in order to sign up for an exam. In many faculties, they are unable to submit their applications online or drop them off collectively and pick them up individually at a later time. In doing so, both students and administrators processing exam applications are frustrated and overwhelmed, prompting administrators to lose applications and students to attempt to circumvent the process. The administrators interacting with students are often reluctant to engage in resolving student problems and are, therefore, depicted by students as “totally passive” (Interviewee 3C). Notably, 39.1% of the surveyed students would like to have a better support network at their faculties. As one of the interviewed participants specified:

Usually you can submit the exam application on Mondays and Wednesdays from 10am to noon, and during those times thousand of students come in at once. For the rest of the times and days, the Student Services Office simply does not work, and around 10am they often take a break. (Interviewee 2C)

Another student agreed that at his faculty, disorganization is a significant problem, as the Student Services Office works only two hours each day; when the exam grades need to be stamped by the Student Services Office, about 150 students wait in line for their turn during the two-hour-window (Interviewee 14C).

Students also noted the tendency for exam applications to be lost, which results in students having to re-apply and pay the fee for the exam again. Even when the initial

application is found, the funds received from multiple applications for the same exam often remain with the Student Services Office, and the issue of multiple charges remains unaddressed (Interviewee 2C). In general, each document that is needed by students for various administrative purposes has an associated fee with it, which is not consistently affordable by all students given the poor standard of living in Bosnia (Interviewee 1C). Moreover, inconsistencies of various types - which are a repeated characterization of higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina - exist even in terms of the fee that faculties charge for exam applications. For instance, one of the interviewed participants in the study transferred from one public faculty to another. She commented on the differences between the two schools, stating that her initial school charged only half of 1 KM for the exam application while her current faculty charges 20 KM and 3 KM for part-time and full-time students, respectively (Interviewee 7C).

Inefficiencies and lack of consistency across faculties are not limited only to the exam application process. What is even more worrisome is the fact that students are often forced to re-take the same exams, even when they previously passed them; this is done mainly due to the lack of clear procedures and guidelines on how a student transfers from one program to another. Re-taking of already passed exams occurs even when the transfer takes place within the same faculty but the student moves from one program to another. Frustration with the dysfunctional and undefined system is explicitly echoed in the statement of a student who notes:

There are cases where students decided to enroll into the 4-year program with the same major instead of only a 2-year program so that they can obtain a 4-year-college diploma. Some professors still make students take the same exams even though they already passed them as a part of their 2-year-program study on the same subject and at the same faculty. (Interviewee 2C)

For example, if a student who is enrolled in a two-year-program at the Economics faculty and passed a course in Mathematics decides to pursue a four-year-degree, he/she may be required to re-take that same exam in Mathematics.

Similarly, a study participant who remained in the same program but transferred from one faculty to another was asked to start from the beginning, even though she had successfully completed 1.5 years of study in her first school (Interviewee 7C). Both faculties were public and in the same field. Once she re-took and successfully completed the exams for the entire first year, one of the administration members asked her why she bothered re-taking exams she had already taken at her initial school (Interviewee 7C). While the facts of this particular case unveil the surprisingly low level of coordination, guidance, and consistency that students should be able to rely on in the course of their studies, an equally concerning element of this particular situation is the fact that the student in question simply accepted to spend 2 years virtually repeating the same curriculum. No serious attempts were made to request acceptance of her transfer credits within the new faculty. Along the same lines, another interviewee explained how during his course of study, courses were abruptly added and subtracted from the school's curriculum, emphasizing the lack of organization by noting that one of the courses was simply taken off the student schedule midway through the semester due to the lack of faculty (Interviewee 7C). According to the same student, students can suddenly be told, "You do not have that subject, you have something else" (Interviewee 7C). Under such circumstances, Bosnian students often fail to respond with any kind of demands. Such an attitude is not solely characteristic of this participant's experience but is a commonality encountered in speaking with the interviewed participants whose persistence and desire to get through the system translated into an acceptance of both corruption and disorganization, even when it exposed them to illogical, longer, and to some degree abusive behavior on their paths toward the completion of their degrees.

Students also often complained about the lack of exam periods, which again prolongs the time needed to complete a college degree and results in the frustration of many students and their increasingly negative perception and dissatisfaction with the system. This issue, combined with the fact that professors at times schedule one exam

period during a semester and then do not appear for the exam, plays a significant role in delaying students by a semester, if not by a year or longer. Of the entire surveyed sample, 25.5% would like to have exams broken into multiple pieces. What frequently occurs in Bosnia is that students take a semester-long course and then have a final exam at the end of the semester, which does not give them multiple ways to earn their grade as it is often done in the US. While some professors have made attempts to diversify grading process by splitting one exam into two or engaging students in some sort of presentations, the formality of students being delivered knowledge that ought to be memorized and recited either verbally or in a written format is still the dominant form of teaching in Bosnia's higher education. Consequently, the previously noted statistic where 1 in 4 students would like to have their exams broken into multiple exams is not surprising. In fact, even a greater group of 301 students, or 39.5%, would like to have more opportunities to take the exams.

As is presently the case and irrespective of whether students are part-time or full-time, surveyed students often have courses where professors are coming from abroad to teach a course in a compressed time. At times, these visiting professors will teach during the weekends or, if their schedule allows, they will come and teach for a week at a time. Then they will return to their primary location of work and re-visit the faculty-in-question at another time of convenience to the visiting professor's schedule. In this process, many students feel the opportunities for interaction with their professors are limited, especially when it comes to the opportunities to take an exam. For instance, even if the student is unable to attend due to illness or some other justifiable reason, there may not be an opportunity to take a make-up exam. Instead, student may simply fail the exam, and have to spend another semester or longer re-taking the same exam.

In fact, the lack of procedural definition and clarification is a mirror image of what happens in the country overall. On the Federation side, 10 cantons act as largely independent administrative units with much of the power to define legal frameworks

when it comes to the educational sector. On the Serb Republic side, there are no cantons; instead this entity acts as a *de facto* state. In 2010, the Serb Republic passed the referendum law in an attempt to set the stage for the Serb Republic's secession from Bosnia, a move that has drawn international criticism because it is in discord with the Dayton Accords, whose Annex 4 serves as the country's Constitution. A study participant noted: "It so happens that in our law-making bodies work illiterate people and we have problems with the law for higher education where the illiterate try to block the passage of the law. An individual with only 8 years of schooling is requesting an amendment to the law on higher education" (Interviewee 1C).

Overall, Bosnia needs a supervisory system to ensure the accountability of professors and faculty leadership, but doing so appears impossible given the political power over higher education and consequently the dominant mindset of higher education institutions and their personnel. Simply put, "professors do what they want and fail who they want based on impulses and not some systemic approach. Even if there are laws and procedures in place, they are not applied" (Interviewee 2C). Interviewee 3C agrees that the questionable effectiveness of professors, lack of control over their teaching and grading, and lack of implementation of rules and guidelines, if such exist, make it permissible for professors to fail students, even when they show sufficient knowledge on an exam. Every step taken by the educational system is seen as unpredictable and random, often due to the vaguely defined procedures, lack of guidelines or poor implementation (Interviewee 2C).

Grading Inconsistencies

In a setting of often absent professors, teaching assistants who dominate the grading and teaching process, inconsistent timing of lectures and exams, Indeks-related use and abuse, and lack of access to faculty, grading approaches vary greatly. The key consistency detected in Bosnia's current system is an overall lack of fairness and

uniformity when it comes to grading. This poorly synchronized educational system has resulted in only 18% of the surveyed students being “very satisfied” with the procedures in their faculties. In the US-based university, it would be safe to assume that one would earn a letter grade of A or A- if more than 90% of the test were completed correctly. However, in the Bosnian examination system and irrespective of the accurately completed percentage on the exam, one can either pass or fail depending on a set of other circumstantial variables that go into the professor’s grading decision. For instance, a professor may fail or disallow a student from taking an exam if a student comes in wearing knee-high pants (Interviewee 2C). No specific guidelines as to the dress code existed at the time of this particular incident at the participating public institution (Interviewee 2C).

More broadly, no grading policies or guidelines are applied across the board to ensure the fair treatment of all students at all times; in fact, 35.4% of the surveyed sample would like the grading process to be more objective. Of the 15 interviewed students, 14 have remarked on the issue of grading inconsistencies (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). In some cases, grades are obtained easily, while in other cases, it is virtually impossible to pass an exam (Interviewee 7C). This extends to teaching quality as well, where some professors talk about topics unrelated to the course, and others are excellent teachers (Interviewee 6C). For instance, one study participant was told to “write as much as possible since professor does not read the exam anyway” (Interviewee 7C). In this course, virtually all students passed (Interviewee 7C).

As discussed earlier, there is a high saturation of outside consultants at some of Bosnia’s higher education institutions, which makes the acquisition of knowledge in a highly disorganized setting difficult. In one case, an outside consultant came and covered an entire course in two days, and then graded the exams, with only 20 out of 80 students passing (Interviewee 7C). At the second exam given to the remaining group of about 60 failed students, only 10 more students passed (Interviewee 7C). Due to the lack of

professors, some faculties make extreme and even abrupt changes to the curriculum depending on available faculty members; for instance, one of the study participants said that “we did not have at all one course “ and consequently will be offered the same exam later when and if the appropriate professor can be hired (Interviewee 7C).

This randomness in grading and teaching makes it very difficult to decipher why a professor may be failing or passing a large group of students. In other words, the grading process, as seen in Bosnia, may prompt students to wonder as to whether the passing grade is a function of corrupt behavior, either favor-for-favor exchanges or bribes. Students are not only graded in ways that are not transparent, but they are at times unable to follow up with professors who are not present in their geographic vicinity except on select dates. As a result, even if the grading approach and a particular grade could be justified, the opportunities for the transparent and direct professor-student interactions are infrequent. Thus, students are often left to wonder whether the students who pass do so due to bribes or their connections.

The grading practices in Bosnia allow professors to grade subjective, if they wish to do so. Professors are not held accountable by their students simply because students themselves are ambiguous as to how the grading process works and what they can and cannot expect of their professors. What is telling of the grading-related perceptions is that 20.7% of the surveyed students would like to have their graded exams returned to them, an opportunity not always offered or given to students in Bosnia’s higher education. In other words, students are unable to get a physical confirmation of the grading process where they could see the logic behind the lost points and compare their exam books with the correct answers. In most cases, professors publicly post a list of students and their grades but often do not return exams to the students or provide further feedback on why a certain grade was received. This behavior raises questions as to why professors would feel compelled to disallow students from seeing their own work. One of the interviewed students provided some additional insight into the issue. According to the student, who

has now graduated (Interviewee 2C), a professor once failed him, even though the student was certain he answered most, if not all, questions correctly. When the study participant went to the professor's office and insisted on seeing the exam, the professor disclosed that he, in fact, never looked over the exam in question because it was at the bottom of the exam pile (Interviewee 2C). The professor graded the exam on the spot, passed the student, and freed him of the oral exam requirement under the condition that no information on the issue of giving out grades without grading exams would be disclosed to the rest of the class. This behavioral trend suggests that professors may not feel accountable for their actions, which allows them to abuse their authority in this manner, consequently prolonging the degree completion time of Bosnia's youths. In some instances – and despite students' complaints about failing the exam – professors will still disallow students from reviewing their exams and will continue to provide a rationale as to why they have failed their students. According to one student, "the exams are always designed to be sufficiently hard so that no one can complete 100% of the exam in the time allotted for the test" (Interviewee 2C). With an imperfect score and the lack of grading standards, the failure of a student can always be rationalized.

With the possible motivation to prolong studies, professors will often look over the Indeks book and note the timing when the student passed previous exams. If the time period between the exams is short, professors may fail the student, rationalizing that insufficient time was spent between the two exams to adequately prepare for passing both. Therefore, the gradebook clearly helps facilitate decisions that lead professors to abuse their position of power and subjectively grade. Professors may, in fact, purposely discourage hard work and thwart those students who invest more of their time and effort studying to complete their studies in time. In the words of one study participant and a recent college graduate,

A professor failed me when I completed everything, stating I had one wrong answer. I knew my answer was correct, but the professor failed me because I

passed another exam earlier that day.... He would not let me pass. Next time, I did less than the first time and I got 9 [out of 10]. I completely lost interest for the subject. (Interviewee 3C)

The randomness of the examination process is further exacerbated by those teaching assistants who apply grading methods hardly seen elsewhere. There are teaching assistants who calculate exam grades by subtracting the number of incorrect questions/points from the number of correct questions/points. So, if a student takes an exam with 10 questions each worth 10 points and answers 5 correctly and 5 incorrectly, the student's incorrect answers will in essence nullify the correct ones. In other words, instead of earning 50% as the final grade on the test, the teaching assistant will subtract lost points from the earned points and come up with the final grade of 0 points on the test (Interviewee 6C).

One of the key systemic corruption enablers that has emerged from this discussion is clearly the lack of a consensus on grading standards and continuation of individually devised approaches. This vagueness in evaluating a student's level of knowledge and competence, in return, provides a space in which grades can be easily produced, modified, and manipulated, permitting faculty full freedom over the decision about who passes and who fails. In such a grading environment, students are continuously perplexed as to what constitutes a passing grade. At the same time, this ambiguity enables professors to manipulate the grades and abuse the system according to their personal interests. As one of the interviewed students noted, professors go as far as to directly ask students where their parents are employed, underlining the relevance of one's social prominence in society perhaps even more so than the knowledge demonstrated by the student at his/her exam (Interviewee 4C).

As estimated by one of the study's participants, "about half of grades are fairly earned and the other half are not" (Interviewee 6C). Another interviewee stated: "There is no concrete rule as to which percentage means passing" (Interviewee 2C). The level of confusion among Bosnian students is well illustrated through the presentation of what is

often perceived as the typical outcome of an exam: “100 students take an exam, 2 pass, and 5 pass *conditionally* [emphasis added], yet all 100 work on the exam for three hours” (Interviewee 2C). A particularly appalling and irresponsible grading that reflects the blunt abuse of the official authority is a situation where:

a professor praised my work on the written exam, but failed me. I never asked for that exam, but others have asked for theirs and the professor showed them my exam [sharing the student’s name] to exemplify how the work was to be done, but the professor failed me on that very exam!
(Interviewee 2C)

In the context of Bosnia, it appears that the grading process is individually tailored to each student, his/her socioeconomic background, and a particular moment in which professor finds himself/herself; failing a student with a successfully completed test bears no consequence for the professor, while it elevates the sense of loss and helplessness on the part of the student. To illustrate, a participant stated:

In my first year, a professor failed me on a SM [coded name of the course] oral examination even though I knew even the page number of the correct answer I provided. It is the most I ever studied. Next time, when I took the same examination, I provided the same answers, and got 8 [out of 10]. As I was walking out, I said, “Thank you and good bye.” The professor started to scream at me saying that I have no reason to say thank you to him, that I have nothing to thank him for. I was speechless and confused. (Interviewee 2C)

In sum, the grading process’ ambiguity is porous, allowing subjective factors reflective of one’s social background to possibly take the front row in the decision-making process. In such a setting, a grade is more easily purchased or secured via connections, as the manner in which the grades are obtained cannot be reviewed against an accepted norm or compared to an established set of guidelines. In Bosnia, students have no expectations going into exams in terms of the match between their level of knowledge and the grade they may earn, which is why professors - without raising an alarm within their faculty or beyond - can easily award passing grades for minimal performance or failing grades for maximum performance.


Teaching Inconsistencies

Another trait of Bosnia's higher education that acts as the corruption facilitator is the variation and inconsistency in the quality and manner of teaching. Bosnia's higher education is lacking in its ability to track professors' performance and ensure that the individual performance does not deviate from a certain minimum standard of teaching quality, knowledge, and qualifications that is expected at a university level. Of the surveyed students, 20.9% think that professors lack adequate qualifications, which is similar and in line with 18.3% of the student body stating that professors are promoted without merit (please see Figure 12, p. 156). This finding was validated by some of the interviewed students as well: of the 15 interviewees, 9 were in agreement that there are teaching inconsistencies within Bosnia's higher education. One of the participants, for instance, compared his computer science professor's inability to speak English to "driving a bus without knowing how to ride a bicycle" (Interviewee 2C). Another interviewed participant demonstrated frustration with the inconsistency in the difficulty of subjects taught by Bosnian professors, where some of the subjects were at the level of "elementary school" while others were not "passable" (Interviewee 7C). She added that, for this reason, there are students who in their senior year of college may not have the basic knowledge in some of the subjects they studied (Interviewee 7C).

Students are most dissatisfied with the lack of actual teaching and explanations of the covered material by the professors; almost half of the surveyed sample, 48.5%, thought that professors do not explain their material sufficiently (see Figure 12, p. 156). In fact, the inconsistencies between the lectures and exam materials are a reflection of another systemic deficiency that students specifically point to as problematic: "Professors may never mention a topic, but will put it as an exam question failing most students" (Interviewee 6C). In the process, the students who have studied the covered material may fail, while those who have had insight into the exam questions through the professor or teaching assistant pass the exam.

These inconsistencies have only helped build negative perceptions of higher education in Bosnia. In fact, 41% of the surveyed students (see Figure 12 below) believe that there are students who pass their exams because of corrupt activities they engage in. Similarly, 26.4% or almost a third of the surveyed student population believes that they are being failed on their exams even when they know the subject (see Figure 12 below). Furthermore, 36.8% of the surveyed participants were dissatisfied with professors not showing up for their lectures or exams, while 34.8% of the participating students believe faculty members lack knowledge on the subject they teach (see Figure 12 below).

Figure 12: Forms of Teaching Dissatisfaction



Source: Surveys

In sum, there are a number of dissatisfactions pertaining to the teaching process in Bosnia's higher education, creating opportunities for different forms of power abuse to emerge as the authority and control over the educational processes are often in the hands of a poorly prepared and disorganized teaching cadre.

Book Purchasing

Often, professors require students to purchase the books they authored, which – given the scarcity of academic literature in the post-war Bosnia – would be appropriate if it were not for the professors’ tendencies to disallow the purchase of used books and insist on students purchasing the new books. In other words, some Bosnian professors simply take this mandatory reading requirement to an entirely new level by making these book purchases a significant source of income for themselves. To elaborate, each student is required to purchase a new book directly from the professor or a specific bookstore rather than buy a used one from another student or possibly borrow it from the library. To make sure that each student has purchased his/her own book, professors, at times, demand that each student bring a book to an exam, at which time professor autographs the book and thereby marks it as un-sellable to another student at a later time. Signed books are effectively unauthorized for future use, ensuring that each student purchases a book for himself/herself. In such cases, a decision not to buy a new book is a sure fail on the exam despite a student’s knowledge or competence, which is likely why an astounding 45.3% of the surveyed sample stated that “book purchases” is one of their primary dissatisfactions with the teaching process (see Figure 12, p. 156). While this is not a practice used across the board by all professors, its frequency certainly reflects an overall sense of immorality that permeates higher education in Bosnia. As based on the surveyed population data, the mandatory book purchases are second in line on the list of reasons for students’ dissatisfaction with teaching practices in the country’s educational system (Figure 12, p. 156).

Culture of Fear and Entitlement

In a politically tense setting, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, educational issues cannot be observed nor analyzed in a vacuum and away from contextual pressures. Many of the administrative roles in the educational system of Bosnia are decided by

political factors rather than merit, due to which many students see politics as not only being intertwined with educational processes but also as being in control of them (Interviewee 2C, Interviewee 3C, Interviewee 4C). Some study participants have emphasized both their own fear of the corrupt and dominant circles but also the fear felt by those professors or teaching assistants who face threats because they demand knowledge regardless of one's political or social status. There are instances where professors have had to "pass a student because the professor was afraid" (Interviewee 3C). The same study participant further suggested that "there are professors who would do as they should but cannot say no to politics and are forced to pass ... regardless of their own moral and ethical principles" (Interviewee 3C). Others reiterated that "favor for favor, you will need me later" is the *modus operandi* of Bosnia's corrupt educational system, while political pressure and threats are also utilized when the members of the academic cadre seem less obedient (Interviewee 4C).

Some of the most persistent professors who try hard to distance themselves from the corrupt echelons go as far as to require a student to find a witness for an oral exam to send the message to the student population and faculty administration that a passing grade for their exam cannot be bought or awarded via connections. One of the participants faced such a situation where a professor refused to examine the candidate without at least one student witness to listen in on the exam (Interviewee 3C). So the participant had to walk around the faculty building looking for a student who would be willing to volunteer and listen in on the exam. This approach is certainly a logistical burden on a student, but, more importantly, reflects the extreme measures taken by the uncorrupt professors in their attempt to differentiate themselves from the corrupt circles. Moreover, it is further indicative of the systemic lack of support for those professors who wish to separate themselves from the corrupt and dominant elite.

Another element of the higher education and the post-socialist culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina is its inherited mentality of control and dominance. The sense of social

importance and control over something or somebody is highly pronounced in this post-socialist system, where those who are socially relevant seek some type of control and frequently feel compelled to reiterate their own self-importance (Interviewee 4C). In academia, this exhibitionist behavior often takes the form of referring to the inferiority of others. The sense of inferiority, combined with the fear of taking action against corruption publicly, ensures that students “only talk but do little” (Interviewee 5C). Young students can easily be subjected to the exercise of authority and power, so the university is a suitable setting for applying the socialist mentality still present within the system. In other words, “we in the post-socialist society suffer from the syndrome of having the need to show power in order to please ourselves ... and professors manifest this syndrome by exercising their power and authority through their professorships and their grading“ over the susceptible and vulnerable student population (Interviewee 4C). Another prevalent source of fear is students’ awareness that the mechanisms or committees to punish the perpetrators of corruption are either absent or devised by the individuals likely involved in corruption themselves (Interviewee 4C, Interviewee 5C). Consequently, the verbal and systemic intimidation ensures students’ obedience and silence in dealing with the ongoing corruption and immorality in higher education in the country.

In summary and as theorized earlier, inconsistencies and inefficiencies of Bosnia’s higher education provide a setting that enables corruption to deepen and spread within the institutions of higher education. More importantly, this chapter also confirms the presence of educational corruption, as well as the dominance of non-monetary forms of corruption over bribery. With these findings, Chapter V provides a prelude to a more extensive discussion on the notions of corruption and sponsored versus contest-based social mobility in the next chapter. In Chapter VI, this study looks at the corruption’s elaborate societal impact as manifested through the elite’s use of higher education for self-legitimization and self-perpetuation. The newly formed and still forming post-war

elite in Bosnia remains in flux, and some without established social backgrounds certainly make it through the higher educational system. For the poorer segments of the society, obtaining higher education for their children is a difficult struggle and involves tolerance of the system's unfairness and corruption within it. It is these students' personal drive and determination to succeed that brings them over the finish line. For the elites, as next chapter argues, it is their networking that secures their success academically and beyond.

Chapter VI

CORRUPTION'S IMPACT

The impact of various forms of educational corruption is highly complex, and many aspects of its broader influence will not be discussed in this dissertation due to the limitations of the information that can be captured through the data on students' perceptions, as well as this work's specific focus on its key research questions. As Table 11 (p. 162) indicates, Chapter VI is divided into three distinct sub-sections on corruption's impact. The chapter begins by discussing the impact, if any, corruption has had on various ethnic groups within Bosnia. This first sub-section directly answers research question 2a. I then move on in detail to findings relating to research question 2b by re-evaluating and re-contextualizing Turner's concepts (1960) of sponsored versus contest-based mobility within Bosnia's corrupt higher education. In its third and last sub-section, Chapter VI provides a brief review of the findings relating to corruption's impact on horizontal mobility within Bosnia's higher education. Chapter VI continues to follow the thematic organization of the previous chapter, so the findings arrived at using qualitative and quantitative methodologies are combined under the relevant sub-sections.

Table 11: Chapter VI – Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections

SECTION TITLE – RESEARCH QUESTIONS	HYPOTHESIS	RELEVANT VARIABLES
<i>Differential Impact on Ethnicities – 2a</i>	Students who are ethnic minorities perceive corruption as often occurring within their faculty relative to ethnic majority.	Y= Corruption Degree (CD); X ₁ =Exams Completed (EC); X ₂ =Years Studying (YS); X ₃ =Household Income (HI); X ₄ =Father’s Position (FP); X ₅ =Ethnicity (FP); X ₆ =Sex (S) X ₇ =Born (B) Interview Transcripts
<i>Impact of Corruption: Contest versus Sponsored Mobility – 2b</i>	HYPOTHESIS 1: Often, professors /teaching assistants are not promoted based on their qualifications but rather connections.	Y=Merited Promotion (MP);
	HYPOTHESIS 2: Student satisfaction with the state of their faculty and teaching affects their perception of the mobility mechanisms within faculty.	Y=Merited Promotion (MP); X ₁ =Procedure Satisfaction (PS); X ₂ =Teaching Satisfaction (TS); X ₃ =Years Studying (YS); X ₄ =ECTS X ₅ =Exams Completed (EC); X ₆ =Sex (S) X ₇ =Competent Graduate (CG)
	HYPOTHESIS 3: Students’ social and political involvement affects whether they perceive promotions as merit-based or not.	Y=Merited Promotion (MP); X ₁ =Sociopolitical Involvement (SPI); X ₂ =Procedure Satisfaction (PS); X ₃ =Teaching Satisfaction (TS); X ₄ =Years Studying (YS); X ₅ =Competent Graduate (CG) X ₆ =ECTS X ₇ =Sex (S) X ₈ =Born (B) X ₉ =Exams Completed (EC); X ₁₀ =Student Type (ST);
	HYPOTHESIS 4: Vertical mobility mechanisms are dysfunctional as the best are often not first to graduate.	Y=Competent Graduate (CG); Interview Transcripts
<i>Impact of Corruption: Horizontal Mobility – 2b</i>	HYPOTHESIS 5: Students do not transfer within national system because of corruption.	Y=Reason No-Transfer (RNT); Interview Transcripts

The forthcoming discussion confirms that the process of fully quantifying the implications of favor-reciprocity among the elite for the broader development of the country is complex, especially if one is aiming to determine the full impact of the inadequately educated individuals who may be in control of influential and decision-making positions in the country's healthcare, media, government, and educational systems. Consequently, Chapter VI also finds that educational corruption impacts Bosnia's youth in multiple ways, particularly focusing on the manner in which corruption influences the elites versus non-elites. As discussed earlier, the elite vacuum in post-war and post-socialist Bosnia was followed by the need to legitimize the country's new elite. Not always, but often, obtaining diplomas served to legitimize members of the newly emerging elite was then followed by the expansion of corruption practices more broadly throughout the educational system.

Over time, Bosnia became tolerant of a distorted value system that rewards personal relationships and political prominence rather than hard work and meritocratically achieved success. In the words of a study participant: "Consequence of the war time are distorted moral norms because into the elite came corrupt individuals and they believe that it is OK to arrive [into the highest social status] via corruption" (Interviewee 5C). The fundamental contradiction that the study has worked to draw attention to has emerged as a theme throughout this chapter: the wealthy typically do not bribe to pass because they often have, at their disposal, a menu of personal and political connections that, if they wish to, they can leverage to obtain passing grades, while the poor are more likely to be subjected to the bribing process. In sum, distinctively clear differentiations may exist between the haves and have-nots as to their experiences and perceptions of corruption processes, and this chapter makes every effort to unveil the manner in which these differences manifest themselves in Bosnia's corrupt higher education.

Differential Impact on Ethnicities?

Bosnia's educational and political system is premised on the notion of representation, which goes as far as to ensure that the country is presided over by three ethnic members: one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The efficiency, functionality, and implementability of ideas are secondary to the notion of representation. As expected, ethnic affiliation plays an important role in all spheres of life in Bosnia. Interestingly, however, this study finds that while some interviewees (e.g., Interviewee 5C) thought that belonging to a particular ethnic group would affect the student-professor relationship, others thought that those who are minorities were actually more protected and given greater attention by the internationals (Interviewee 4C). Specifically, "since there are a lot of Bosniaks [in the geographic area where the research was conducted], then it is easier for it [corruption] to be more discreet and invisible" if Bosniaks are involved than would have been the case with minority populations (Interviewee 4C).

In addition, a vast majority of the surveyed sample, 72.7%, did not think ethnic division stands as a barrier in resolving the issue of corruption in higher education, suggesting that corruption as an overall societal problem can be de-linked from the ethnic issue that dominates Bosnia. This finding may also be a reflection of the students' desire for educational corruption to be resolved without complicating it or associating it with the notion of ethnicity. To further exemplify, one interviewed participant stated: "Serb, Croat ... can pay for the exam. There is absolutely no obstruction as far as ethnicity is concerned. I am not aware of a case that someone was failed because of their ethnicity" (Interviewee 1C).

Other students are of the view that the reality of ethnic discrimination within the country as a whole is indisputable. A study participant illustratively exemplified the presence of ethnic tensions by sharing her observations of her classmates' reactions when asked by their professor in which language they studied (i.e., Bosnian, Croatian, or

Serbian). She noted that there was a group of students, from the Serb Republic (likely Serbs), who raised their hands for each language because people who come from the “Serb Republic into [the Federation] are scared because of ethnic tensions [against them]” (Interviewee 7C). Similarly, she further shared that “a friend of hers from Banja Luka [Serb Republic] who is a Bosniak and whose father was killed during the war was constantly harassed, so he slept with a knife while studying.” Another participant brought up the often neglected group of Bosnian Roma (Interviewee 3C). The ethnic tensions within the country characterizing political relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs overshadow the issue of the Romas’ exclusion from the mainstream society and deflect from the fact that “Romas are at no faculty” (Interviewee 3C).

One curious finding that arose and was not anticipated by this research is that there is significant – though atypical in the Bosnian milieu – inter-ethnic cooperation between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a predominantly Bosniak and Croat entity, and the Serb Republic, a largely mono-ethnic Serb entity, when it comes to educational corruption. Specifically, a number of participants shared that students from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (mostly Bosniaks and Croats) often travel to the Serb Republic (mostly Serbs) to obtain their diplomas, as

there are more private universities in the Serb Republic, where each village has a faculty. Students from here [Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina] go and pay 2,000-3,000 KM for each year, which enables them to obtain a college degree quickly and keep their [government] jobs. (Interviewee 1C)

The interviewee here is referring to the individuals already holding government posts and wanting to cement and legitimize their positions by obtaining diplomas quickly.

Ethnicity Base and Expanded Models

Furthering the analysis, the study embarked on examining whether students who are ethnic minorities perceive corruption as more widespread within their faculty relative to the ethnic majority. Assuming that ethnic discrimination is present to some degree, I

expect to find that the minority students are subjected to some form of corruption by the professors of other ethnicities. So, I examined whether the perception of corruption (CORRUPTION DEGREE_FINAL or CDF) as present (coded as 1) versus absent (coded as 0) is affected by students' ethnicity (ETHNICITY_FINAL or EF) in the base model, and whether – in the expanded model – CDF is affected by students' ethnicity and other variables reflective of a student's gender, his/her academic performance, and the father's background. To note, variables are often recoded and then relabeled by adding the word FINAL to indicate that they were recoded for further application. For instance, ETHNICITY is recoded into ETHNICITY_FINAL, where 1 and 0 are codes for Bosniaks and non-Bosniaks. Similarly and as earlier explained, CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL is CORRUPTION_DEGREE, where 1 and 0 are assigned to corruption being present to any degree and absent, respectively. All other missing and inapplicable responses were re-coded as missing. The model specifically included student's year of birth (BORN_FINAL or BF), number of years spent studying (YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL or YSF), status of the exam completion (EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL or ECF) indicating whether student was completing 1st year, 2nd year, 3rd year, or 4th year of her/his studies, and student's gender (SEX_FINAL or SF). The expanded model also included the variables reflecting father's position at work, as well as a set of dummy variables reflecting different household income levels. However, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis of all independent variables determined that multicollinearity was present, as VIF for HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_1500 was greater than 10 (see Table 12, p. 167). If VIFs are higher than 10, multicollinearity is presumed to be high (Kutner et al., 2004). Consequently, the expanded model was revised by excluding the independent variables reflecting different levels of household income.

Table 12: VIF Analysis of Independent Variables for Ethnicity-related Models

MODEL NAME/ DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	VIF
EXPANDED ETHNICITY MODEL/ CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL	BORN_FINAL	1.39
	EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL	2.92
	YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL	3.12
	FATHER_POSITION_WORKER	3.27
	FATHER_POSITION_INTELLECTUAL	1.69
	FATHER_POSITION_EXECUTIVE	2.62
	HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_500	9.12
	HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_1500	12.11*
	HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_2500	6.47
	HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_3500	2.21
	ETHNICITY_FINAL	1.03
	SEX_FINAL	1.05
REVISED EXPANDED ETHNICITY MODEL / CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL	BORN_FINAL	1.39
	EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL	2.92
	YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL	3.12
	FATHER_POSITION_WORKER	2.97
	FATHER_POSITION_INTELLECTUAL	1.67
	FATHER_POSITION_EXECUTIVE	2.57
	ETHNICITY_FINAL	1.02
SEX_FINAL	1.05	

* Multicollinearity is present due to VIF being higher than 10.

In addition and as discussed in the research methodology chapter, YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL and BORN_FINAL, continuous variables, and EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL, an ordinal variable that categorized students by the academic seniority within their faculties, were tested to determine whether the linearity assumption between the CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL's logit and each of these individual variables was violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test determined that the coefficients for LN_YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (LN_YSF) and LN_EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL (LN_ECF) are insignificant ($p\text{-value} > \alpha = .05$); thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. However, the coefficient for LN_BORN_FINAL was significant ($p\text{-value} < \alpha = .05$), so the linearity assumption was violated and the variable was excluded from the analysis.

The surveyed sample consists of 762 cases in total, of which 732 students declared themselves as Bosniaks and 30 students declared themselves as non-Bosniaks. The binary

logistic regression initially finds that the Base Ethnicity Model is not significant, confirming that student's ethnicity alone does not help in predicting whether corruption is present in Bosnia's higher education (Table 13, p. 169). The Expanded Ethnicity Model, which in addition to student's ethnic affiliation contained dummy variables reflecting different positions that students' fathers held professionally, as well as a number of other variables relating to the student's academic background and gender, examined whether students' ethnic affiliation and other predictors would be helpful in predicting the perceived presence of corruption in Bosnia's higher education. However, the model overall proved insignificant in predicting students' views of educational corruption, confirming that students were not seeing the issue of corruption in higher education through the ethnic lens as may be the case with a number of other issues in the country.

This finding may suggest that students perceive educational corruption as important to the point that their corruption-related views are not overshadowed and influenced by the ethnic tensions that may continue to play a significant role in other arenas of their lives. In other words, whether a student belongs to the ethnic majority or minority in their faculty is not a factor through which students filter their corruption-related perceptions. Similarly, the Expanded Ethnicity Model suggests that students' perceptions of corruption are being formed irrespectively of their fathers' positions at work. This finding is contradictory to this study's expectation that students' socioeconomic background, which is approximated here by the father's position at work, would likely lead to the differentiations of views among students on whether or not corruption is present. It is possible that students may have felt compelled to evaluate the presence of corruption, irrespectively of their socioeconomic background and the degree to which they personally may have benefited from corruption.

Table 13: Effects of Ethnicity and Other Independent Variables on Perceived Corruption

Variable	Basic Model Exp (B)	Expanded Model Exp (B)
ETHNICITY_FINAL Bosniak=1 Non-Bosniak=0	0.444	0.369
FATHER_POSITION_WORKER Worker=1 All else=0	NA	1.147
FATHER_POSITION_INTELLECTUAL Intellectual =1 All else=0	NA	0.868
FATHER_POSITION_EXECUTIVE Executive =1 All else=0	NA	0.771
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 1 st year=1; All else=0	NA	4.070
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 2 nd year=1; All else=0	NA	1.968
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 3 rd year=1; All else=0	NA	0.557
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL	NA	2.286**
SEX_FINAL Male=1 Female=0	NA	0.586
Constant	23.000	3.431
Chi-square, df	0.798, 1	15.504, 9
% of Cases Correctly Predicted	91.2	91.8

* = p<.05, ** = p<.01

Impact of Corruption: Contest versus Sponsored Mobility

The key premise of this study is that, in highly corrupt educational settings, different sets of rules, behaviors, and mobility mechanisms within the same educational system apply to students depending on their social categories. To examine this linkage between social mobility and corruption, the study embarks on testing multiple hypotheses of this study's Research Question 2. In the process and in line with the mixed methods approach, the findings are organized thematically.

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Faculty Competence and Upward Mobility

To explore relationship between competence and upward mobility, the study examines Hypothesis 2 (see Table 11, p. 162) of Research Question 2b, which looks into whether the probability of faculty promotion, being based on merit or not, can be predicted by a number of student-related variables. The expectation here is that the less satisfied students are with the teaching and procedural processes, the more likely they are to perceive their educational institutions as lacking merit-based mobility. I expect to find that the lesser the student satisfaction, the greater the perception of the non-merited promotions within their faculties.

By measuring the level of perceived merited promotion amongst faculty members, this study directly answers to the question raised in Hypothesis 1: only 13.7% of the surveyed students believe in merited promotion occurring always; 28.5% are of the view that it occurs almost always; and 29.0% think that it often happens. Interestingly, 23.2% of the surveyed sample believe that the competent rarely graduate first, and only 2% think it almost never happens. Lastly, 1.0% see it as never happening, and the rest did not provide answers. These findings suggest that about 1 in every 4 surveyed students continues to doubt meritocracy as the basis of the social mobility model in higher education while, at the same time, a large group sees social mobility as associated with competence. Such findings may point to the presence of a dual social mobility system.

To move to testing Hypothesis 2 and further examine social mobility issues, the Base Model assumes that the best way to predict the likelihood of whether students perceive faculty promotion as reflective of individual qualifications or not is by looking into students' satisfaction with the procedures at their faculties. In the process, the Base Model predicts the effects of PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL (PSF), where each of its categories is turned into a dummy variable, on MERITED_PROMOTION_FINAL (MPF) that captures students' perceptions of whether or not professors are

promoted based on their qualifications.¹⁰ So, while the PSF-related variables capture different levels of student satisfaction with the procedures at their faculties, the MPF reflects the students' perception of the upward mobility mechanisms as manifested through the promotion of faculty members (Table 14, pp. 173-174).

According to Table 14 (pp. 173-174), the Base Model is significant, indicating the importance of procedural satisfaction among students in affecting their perception of upward mobility mechanisms. This finding suggests that existent procedures within Bosnia's higher education may help the upward mobility of incompetent professors. In addition, there exists a significant and inverse correlation between MPF and PSF ($r = -0.284$, at $\alpha = .01$): as the level of satisfaction with faculty procedures increases (i.e., with the categories declining from 5 to lower values, actual satisfaction increases), students' perception of faculty promotions shifts away from *not often* seeing merit-based promotion to *often* seeing merit-based promotion. In other words, the study finds that knowing how students perceive procedural transparency and efficiency within the faculties helps with the research's overall ability to predict the manner in which the upward mobility mechanisms operate in higher education.

Looking into the significance of specific variables and per Table 14 (pp. 173-174), PSF1, PSF2, and PSF3 are significant. Significant PSF1 suggests that when students are 'very satisfied' with the procedures at their faculties, the odds of students perceiving 'merited promotion as occurring *often*' are 5.922 times greater as compared to those students who are 'very dissatisfied.' For PSF2, the odds ratio of 3.972 means that the students who are 'satisfied' are 3.972 times more likely, relative to those students who are 'very dissatisfied,' to perceive promotion within their faculties as being merit-based

¹⁰The MERITED_PROMOTION_FINAL is a recoded MERITED_PROMOTION variable where categories of 1, 2, and 3 ('always,' 'almost always,' and 'often,' respectively) are recoded into 1 (promotion at least *often* occurring based on merit), while 4, 5, and 6 ('rarely,' 'almost never,' 'never') were recoded into 0 (promotion *not often* occurring based on merit).

rather than not. Similarly, PSF3's odds ratio suggests that students who are 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' are 2.091 times more likely to see their faculty members' promotion as merit-based relative to those students who are 'very dissatisfied.' These findings suggest that in the educational systems where dissatisfaction with the system's procedures is significant, the likelihood of students' perceiving the merit-based mechanisms of mobility in academia as failing is likely to increase. The policy implications of such findings are significant in that the elimination of some of the key students' dissatisfactions with the educational system in Bosnia could help in reducing the perceptions of corruption.

The next step in the analysis is inclusion of additional predictors into the Expanded Merited Promotion Model to determine whether the predictability of the model could be improved. For instance, ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF) is included to determine whether the faculty's ECTS membership would in any way affect students' perceptions of the level of merited promotion in Bosnia's higher education (see Table 14, pp. 173-174). Similarly, YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (YSF) is added to determine whether the number of years studied helps predict whether faculty promotions are perceived as merit-based or not. The Expanded Merited Promotion Model also includes TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL (TSF) as an interesting predictor that captures the level of student satisfaction with the teaching processes. This study theorizes that TSF may impact students' perceptions of merited promotion: as their satisfaction with teaching practices grows, I expect students to be more likely to perceive promotions of their faculty members as merit-based. Lastly, the predictor of COMPETENT GRADUATE_FINAL (CGF) also plays a role in the Expanded Merited Promotion Model under the assumption that students' perceptions of who graduates first are also likely to impact students' perceptions of whether the upward mobility mechanisms amongst faculty members are merit-based or not. Additionally, students' gender (SEX_FINAL) and students' progress in terms of exam completion (EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL) were included.

Table 14: Effects of ECTS, YS, PSF, CGF, TSF, SF and ECF on Merited Promotion

Variable	Base Model: Exp (B)	Expanded Model: Exp (B)
ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF) Member=1 All else=0	NA	0.697**
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (YSF)	NA	0.820
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 (ECF1) 1 st year=1; All else=0	NA	2.573
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL2 (ECF2) 1 st year=1; All else=0	NA	1.256
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL3 ((ECF3) 1 st year=1; All else=0	NA	1.841
SEX_FINAL (SF) Male=1 Female=0	NA	1.151
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (PSF1) Very satisfied=1 All else=0	5.922**	1.828
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (PSF2) Somewhat satisfied=1 All else=0	3.972**	1.632
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (PSF3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 All else=0	2.091**	1.527
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (PSF4) Somewhat dissatisfied=1 All else=0	0.908	0.652
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL1 (CGF1) Always=1 All else=0	NA	43.831**
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL2 (CGF2) Almost always=1 All else=0	NA	6.228
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL3 (CGF3) Often=1 All else=0	NA	6.867
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL4 (CGF4) Rarely=1 All else=0	NA	2.087

* = p<.05, ** = p<.01

Table 14 (continued)

Variable	Base Model: Exp (B)	Expanded Model: Exp (B)
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (TSF1) Very satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	24.407**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (TSF2) Somewhat satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	5.410**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (TSF3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	3.602**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (TSF4) Somewhat dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	1.990
Constant	1.245	0.276
Chi-square, df	65.440**, 4	195.426**, 18
% of Cases Correctly Predicted	73.1%	80.6%

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$

To ensure that there are not any multicollinearity issues among the independent variables incorporated into the model, the VIF tests were first performed, confirming that multicollinearity is not an issue, as VIF values were much lower (see Table 15, p. 174) than the suggested cutoff value of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004).

Table 15: VIF Analysis of Independent Variables for Expanded Merited Promotion Model

MODEL NAME/DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	VIF
EXPANDED MERITTED PROMOTION MODEL/ MERITTED_PROMOTION_FINAL	ECTS_FINAL	1.02
	YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL	3.10
	PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL	1.24
	COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL	1.07
	TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL	1.31
	SEX_FINAL	1.04
	EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL	3.11

Additionally, as discussed in the research methodology chapter, YSF is a continuous variable and as such was tested to determine whether the linearity assumption

between the MPF's logit and YSF is violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test was performed within the Expanded Merited Promotion Model, and it determined that the coefficient for LN_YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (LN_YSF) is insignificant (p-value $> \alpha = .05$); thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. Similarly, the Box-Tidwell Transformation test was performed to determine whether the linearity assumption holds between the MERITTED_PROMOTION_FINAL's logit and EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL, an ordinal variable. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test confirmed that the coefficient for LN_EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL is insignificant (p-value $> \alpha = .05$); thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. Consequently, both EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL and YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL were included into Expanded Merited Promotion Model. Most importantly, this research finds that the Expanded Merited Promotion Model is statistically significant in predicting the presence of merit-based promotion among professors and assistants (see Table 14, pp. 173-174).

As to the individually significant predictors, TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL(3) (TSF3) is significant, and the odds of students perceiving merited promotion as occurring rather than not are 3.602 times higher for respondents who are 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' with the teaching practices than those of the students who are 'very dissatisfied' (see Table 14, pp. 173-174). As the level of student satisfaction with teaching practices increases, this study finds the odds of students perceiving upward mobility amongst their faculty members as merit- rather than sponsorship-based increase significantly as well. For the independent predictor of TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL(2) or TSF2, the odds of 'merited promotion occurring *often*' relative to 'merited promotion *not* occurring *often*' are 5.410 times higher when students are 'satisfied' than when they are 'very dissatisfied' (see Table 14, pp. 173-174). These odds of seeing merited promotion amongst faculty members occurring continue to increase even more so as the students' level of satisfaction increases: TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (TSF1) shows that the odds of students' perception of faculty promotion as being

competence-based rather than achieved through connections for those students who are ‘very satisfied’ are an impressive 24.407 times the odds of those students who are ‘very dissatisfied’ with the faculty’s teaching practices (see Table 14, p. 173-174). These findings are in line with the study’s expectation that, with the increased overall satisfaction amongst students as to the teaching processes within their universities, the students’ perceptions of their professors do become increasingly positive and have a potential of reigniting students’ belief that upward mobility amongst their faculty members is based on merit rather than faculties’ social standing and connections to political elites. This analysis also finds that number of years students studied, their satisfaction with faculty procedures, their gender, and how far they have advanced in terms of exams they are completing are not significant factors for whether or not they perceive promotion as merit based.

Also, COMPETENT_GRADUATE(1) (CG1) is a significant predictor and indicates that the odds of students perceiving merited promotion as often occurring are 43.831 times higher than odds of merited promotion not occurring often when students believe that the competent ‘always’ graduate first relative to the reference category of competent students ‘never’ graduating first. This indicates that with the belief in students’ competence as a deciding factor in determining graduation timing comes students’ perception of faculty-related promotions as merit-based. For ECTS_FINAL(1) (ECTS1), the odds of ‘merited promotion occurring *often*’ as compared to ‘merited promotion *not* occurring *often*’ are increased by a factor of 0.697 when the respondent believes that the system is ECTS-based compared to not knowing at all whether or not the program is ECTS-based. In sum, these findings collectively suggest that students’ perceptions of the state of their faculties – be it in the form of their views about the teaching practices, graduating students’ competence, or faculty’s espousal of the Bologna-instigated ECTS framework – are valuable predictors of the type of upward-mobility mechanisms espoused by their faculties. While evaluating students’ perceptions has its limits in terms

of my inability as the researcher to evaluate what is perceived to be occurring against what is actually occurring, the consistency of the trends observed pointing to students' dissatisfactions within the system is telling of the possible direction in which educational reforms should take place to deflate students' negative perceptions of Bosnia's higher education. The lesser perception of unmerited forms of upward mobility within Bosnia's higher education would arguably be indicative of the improved state of Bosnia's higher education.

Hypothesis 3: Effect of Sociopolitical Involvement on Merited Promotion

I test the impact of students' sociopolitical involvement on subjects' perceptions of the upward mobility mechanisms within their faculties, and I do so under the assumption that students' sociopolitical involvement would play a significant role in improving the model's predictability of the subjects' views on merited promotion. This sub-section specifically focuses on addressing Hypothesis 3 of Research Question 2b (Table 11, p. 162).

In the Base Sociopolitical Involvement Model, MERITED_PROMOTION_FINAL (MPF) as a dependent variable is regressed on SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL (SPIF), as this predictor embodies the level of a student's and his/her family's involvement in sociopolitical activities in the community. The Base Sociopolitical Model is overall significant, but the only predictor of significance is SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL(4) (SPIF4) (see Table 17, pp. 180-181). The odds of 'merited promotion occurring *often*' are 0.522 times the odds of 'merited promotion *not* occurring *often*' when the respondent is 'somewhat uninvolved' compared to being 'uninvolved.' Interestingly, this finding suggests that even a slight change in moving towards sociopolitical engagement may improve the odds of students perceiving faculty promotions as merit- rather than sponsorship-based.

For the Expanded Model, I examine for any multicollinearity issues between two or more predictors. The VIF tests were conducted and confirmed that no multicollinearity is present (see Table 17, pp. 180-181). To account for other variables potentially pertinent in predicting whether the faculty promotion is merited or not, this study expands the base model by adding the following variables: EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL, YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL, BORN_FINAL, COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL, TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL, ECTS_FINAL, SEX_FINAL, PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL, and STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL.¹¹ The new predictors reflect students' past and present academic performance, their satisfaction with teaching and procedures at their faculties, views of the Bologna Process within their faculties, their gender and age.

Table 16: VIF Analysis for Expanded Sociopolitical Involvement Model

MODEL NAME/ DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	VIF
EXPANDED MERITED PROMOTION MODEL/ MERITED_PROMOTION_FINAL	BORN_FINAL	1.33
	EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL	3.15
	YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL	3.33
	SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL	1.02
	TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL	1.32
	ECTS_FINAL	1.03
	SEX_FINAL	1.05
	PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL	1.24
	STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL	1.03
	COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL	1.07

Source: Surveys

¹¹ Box-Tidwell Transformation Tests were conducted for YSF and BF as continuous variables and ECF and STF as ordinal variables to ensure that the linearity assumption between the *logit* of the dependent, MPF, and each of the relevant predictors is not violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation Test confirmed no linearity assumption was violated.

In the Expanded Sociopolitical Involvement Model, there are several statistically significant predictors, including TSF1, TSF2, TSF3, CGF1, and ECTSF (Table 17, pp. 180-181). To begin with the interpretation of TSF1, the odds of ‘merited promotion occurring often’ are 22.255 greater than the odds of ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ if a study participant is ‘very satisfied’ relative to being ‘very dissatisfied.’ Similarly, TSF2 has a 4.870 odds ratio, which tells us that the odds of ‘merited promotion occurring often’ are 4.870 times greater than ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ for those students who are ‘somewhat satisfied’ relative to those who are ‘very dissatisfied.’ To note, the higher the teaching satisfaction, the greater the odds of observing the merited promotion model amongst the faculty members. Further, TSF3 is also statistically significant, with an odds ratio of 3.263, which tells us how much greater are the odds of seeing ‘merited promotion occurring often’ over ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ among those surveyed students who are ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ with teaching processes relative to those who are ‘very dissatisfied.’

Another variable that is statistically significant is CGF1; its odds ratio shows that the odds of perceiving ‘merited promotion occurring often’ relative to ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ are 41.738 times greater for those who believe that the competent graduate ‘always’ relative to those who believe that the competent ‘never’ graduate first. Again, while sociopolitical involvement did not improve the overall prediction of the expanded model, the analysis confirmed that the increased experience within the faculty, positive views regarding teaching practices, and belief that those who graduate first are the most competent students significantly improve the likelihood of students’ seeing their faculty members’ promotions as based on achievement rather than political affiliations and sponsorship.

Table 17: Effects of Independent Variables (ECTSF, PSF, TSF, SPIF, CGF, YSF, SF, BF, STF and ECF) on Merited Promotion

Variable	Base Model: Exp (B)	Expanded Model: Exp (B)
ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF) Member=1 All else=0	NA	1.794**
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (PSF1) Very satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	2.052
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (PSF2) Somewhat satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	1.692
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (PSF3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	1.555
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (PSF4) Somewhat dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	0.704
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (TSF1) Very satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	22.255**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (TSF2) Somewhat satisfied=1 All else=0	NA	4.870**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (TSF3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	3.263**
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (TSF4) Somewhat dissatisfied=1 All else=0	NA	1.824
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 (ECF1) 1 st year=1; All else=0	NA	2.532
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL2 (ECF2) 2 nd year=1; All else=0		1.251
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL3 (ECF3) 3 rd year=1; All else=0		1.852
SEX_FINAL (SF) Male=1 Female=0	NA	1.209
BORN_FINAL (BF)	NA	1.103

* = p<.05, ** = p<.01

Table 17 (continued)


Variable	Base Model: Exp (B)	Expanded Model: Exp (B)
SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL1 (SPIF1) Highly involved=1 All else=0	1.553	1.331
SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL2 (SPIF2) Somewhat involved=1 All else=0	0.932	0.839
SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL3 (SPIF3) Neither involved nor uninvolved=1 All else=0	1.394	1.174
SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL4 (SPIF4) Somewhat involved=1 All else=0	0.522*	0.641
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL1 (CGF1) Always=1 All else=0	NA	41.738**
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL2 (CGF2) Almost always=1 All else=0	NA	5.785
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL3 (CGF3) Often=1 All else=0	NA	6.619
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL4 (CGF4) Rarely=1 All else=0	NA	1.974
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (YSF)	NA	0.928
STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL1 (STF1) Excellent (mostly As) All else=0	NA	6.363
STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL2 (STF2) Very good (mostly Bs) All else=0	NA	4.870
STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL3 (STF3) Good (mostly Cs) All else=0	NA	6.056
Constant	2.622	0.003
Chi-square, df	9.496*, 4	200.750**, 26
% of Cases Correctly Predicted	73.0%	80.7%

* = p<.05, ** = p<.01

Hypothesis 4: Student Competence and Upward Mobility

One of the key questions that emerges from this research is whether the mechanisms of social mobility are affected by the presence of educational corruption in Bosnia. As earlier theorized in Hypothesis 4 of Research Question 2b (see Table 11, p. 162), this study sees vertical mobility mechanisms as dysfunctional within higher education affecting the composition of the graduating class, so that the best students are not always the ones to graduate first. Based on the surveyed population, this analysis confirms that only 8.4% of the surveyed participants believe that the most competent students are “always” the first to graduate (see Figure 13 below). In other words, less than 1 in 10 surveyed students is of the view that the most competent students are always first to graduate, which is in line with the study’s argument that the social mobility mechanisms have, at least in part, shifted toward the sponsored-mobility model. In fact, one of the interviewed students directly responded to a question on “who are those that will first graduate in your generation” by saying: “Boys from SDA [Party of

Figure 13: Frequency Table for Competent Graduate First



Source: Surveys

Democratic Action] and then those who are from SDP [Social Democratic Party] and then those holding ... positions in the government” (Interviewee 4C). To specify further, if not *more* relevant, corruption is seen as at least as relevant a factor in determining one’s potency for upward mobility as is academic success (Interviewee 3C).

At the same time, however, the number of those surveyed students who believe that the most competent students “almost always” graduate first is significantly larger and amounts to 31.3% of the surveyed students (see Figure 13, p. 182). This large jump may be explained in part by the fact that the country’s educational system simultaneously espouses two modes of social mobility. As this study earlier theorized, the sponsored-mobility and merit-based social mobility models are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary and in the case of Bosnia, both mobility mechanisms may be present but are applicable to two different populations within Bosnia’s universities: there are the elites, who leverage their connections to graduate, prompting only 8.4% of students to share the view that the most competent are “always” first to graduate. There are also the poor, who can only experience upward mobility thanks to their hard work, prompting close to a third of the surveyed population to suggest that the most competent “almost always” graduate first. About 37.6% of the surveyed students stated the most competent students are “often” first to graduate, while 17.8% felt this occurs rarely. Lastly, 1.2% of the surveyed participants felt that the most competent students “almost never” graduate first, while “other” answers represented 3.8% of the surveyed students (see Figure 13, p. 182).

There are also specific barriers in the selection process for upward mobility that can be better understood through the data collected via interviews. The repetitive and often unfounded failings are perceived by students as student filter: “there has to be one or two courses that are so hard to filter through the student population and cut the number of the students. That takes away several years of life for an individual student” (Interviewee 4C). One of the study participants was failed 11 times on the same exam, eventually prompting her to transfer to another faculty (Interviewee 7C). In the

participant's initial faculty, the student reached a point where she realized that, regardless of the level of demonstrated knowledge, she would never pass (Interviewee 7C). She passed the same exam at her new faculty.

Given the high unemployment in post-war Bosnia, many high-school graduates enroll in college without seriously intending to complete their studies, often resulting in a greater student population initially and a significant decrease later on (Interviewee 5C). While some of the massive entry into higher education can be understood, given the particulars of the country's environment, of interest here is the trend of repeatedly failing students, even when they demonstrate knowledge that warrants a passing grade. By failing deserving students, only the most persistent ones join the well-connected individuals in moving up through the system. In one participant's own words: "You have to work as hard as a horse and take M [coded name for the course] 100 times to pass ... while a student who did not know basics passed after the first try" (Interviewee 2C). So, Bosnia's graduating classes likely consist of the students that have taken vastly different paths to arrive at their ultimate goal of graduating: this dual system is precisely what is at the heart of students' disenchantment with the system that has deviated from the basic merit-based mobility model and has allowed the sponsorship mobility mechanism to propel the connected elites. As the interview participants noted, there are two very different, though not mutually exclusive, groups of individuals: first, those who graduate only by working hard and, second, those who are not in a rush and can afford to study (Interviewee 1C, Interviewee 2C, Interviewee 3C). Such findings suggest that one's social positioning is indispensable in helping determine who gets selected and moves upward within the system.

The interviewed students further suggest that those who study the longest are "the poor who have no connections and those who are *disliked* [emphasis added] by the professors" (Interviewee 3C). In this process – and largely responsible for the length of some students' studies – are professors who feel "more free ... to fail" those who do not

have connections and are not members of political parties (Interviewee 4C).

Consequently, students who complete their studies on time are “*in small percentages* [emphasis added] the most capable students and mostly the corrupt ones” (Interview 1C), creating graduating classes that fuse the two extremes: the hardest workers who have no political affiliations and connections and those who rely on their political circles to ensure continuation of the elite’s political lineage and to legitimize the position of power and authority often already reserved for the well-connected (Interviewee 4C).

Next, to ensure the upward mobility of their affiliates, particularly relevant is the process involving political parties pressuring members of academia to pass “party members” (Interviewee 4C). State institutions have failed in containing and minimizing corruption, “perhaps because they are significantly involved in all of that” (Interviewee 5C). Understanding that familial and political relations play an important role in constructing the political and educational scenes in Bosnia, an economically disadvantaged student stated:

No, academic work is not the determining factor. There are other factors.... You don’t have to be always prepared as long as you work hard in *other areas* [emphasis added], such as being involved with other organizations. It is then that the professors take you *seriously* [emphasis added].... Since I got involved, both professors and the political elite *look at me differently* [emphasis added]. (Interviewee 1C)

Furthermore, the participant went on to rightly observe:

People here do not understand democracy and they are afraid of the political elites who are working to prevent [change]. Here, our people are still frightened by the war, and whoever has a job sees having a job as a family treasure ... simply people have accepted the illogical situation. We are in a collective fear. Everyone complains and talks about bad situation and we all are aware of it, but no one dares to publicly speak up because fear lives in our people. (Interviewee 1C)

While the marriage of upward mobility and corruption in education clearly exists, it was also repeatedly brought up in the post-graduation context, where moving upwards in unmerited ways largely continues (Interviewee B3). Students who work hard to obtain

their diplomas and lack connections are often firsthand witnesses to the privileges given to the politically involved and interconnected classmates during and beyond their studies. One of the study participants, who graduated from the public higher education institution in Bosnia, explicitly confirmed that upward mobility is achieved through political influence rather than intellectual capability and academic effort:

Once I was taking an oral exam together with a political figure [and two other students]. Our professor asked the political figure about politics and, others about the exam material.... I also had a classmate who came to each exam with his father. Now he has only one more exam to get a graduate degree in our field. His father obtained higher education diploma in the same manner. That man [the father] works in a ... government-based institution, which is why he got his diploma in the first place. For instance, we would take the exam and the father would leave with the professor for a coffee break. (Interviewee 3C)

A fact emerges from the findings of this study, which is: academic effort is not crucial in determining whether and when one will graduate, but “knowing certain people personally” is of direct relevance (Interview 4C).

While not the primary concern of this research, it should be noted that it is difficult to decipher the good quality private higher education institutions from the ghost universities due to the lacking supervision, accreditation, standards, and regulation. Private faculties, whether internationally or locally funded, often lack sufficient levels of regulation and supervision. Consequently, it is difficult to ensure a standardized level of educational quality across all private institutions and, even more so, across all universities in Bosnia. However, one of the most prominent foreign universities in Bosnia that has worked toward providing better education to Bosnian students and has harmonized its processes with Bologna requirements is American University, which was established in 2005 in partnership with the State University of New York (SUNY) (American University, 2011). It presently operates in four localities: Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, and Tuzla (American University, 2011).

In addition, the International University of Sarajevo was established in 2004 and is run by the representatives of the Turkish and Bosnian business communities (International University of Sarajevo, 2011). Similarly, the International Burch University, established in 2008, is a part of the private Turkish educational institutions group that consists of primary, secondary, and higher education institutions throughout Bosnia (Today's Zaman, 2011). What is interesting to note is that these reputable foreign universities in Bosnia are also known for having high numbers of foreign students; for instance, the International Burch University has 50% foreign students (Today's Zaman, 2011). Esmir Ganic, from the American University in Bosnia, noted that the greatest number of foreign students in Bosnia comes from Turkey (Al Jazeera, 2011).

While the establishment of these few reputable higher education institutions constitutes a positive development for Bosnia's higher education, there have also been a number of private institutions that have taken advantage of the unregulated and unsynchronized higher education space in Bosnia. According to the Chair of the Rectors Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mitar Novakovic, the state of Bosnia's higher education is further complicated by private universities, "whose number is impossible to determine because of the licenses that they obtain without any criteria" (Slobodna Evropa, 2011). For instance, after the Center for Investigative Journalism published an article about the Century University – which, in the past, had described itself as an American university in Bosnia – questioning the validity of the Century University diplomas in the US and Bosnia, the named university closed its Sarajevo office, and the phone of its representative to Bosnia was disconnected (Center for Investigative Journalism, 2008). Furthermore, Century University did not have the permit of the Ministry of Education of the Sarajevo Canton where it operated, nor was the Assistant to the Minister of Education for the Sarajevo Canton, Almir Masala, familiar with this particular institution (Center for Investigative Journalism, 2008). Furthermore, Century University is not one of the US-accredited higher education institutions, even though it

acted as the US-based educational institution and priced a college diploma at about US 4,600 dollars (Center for Investigative Journalism, 2008). Though this behavior is not the case with all foreign or private universities in Bosnia, participants in this research pointed out that there are private faculties serving those individuals who are “already employed in government [and] who are, by law, required to have certain qualifications that they do not have. They quickly finish and obtain their degrees at such [private] institutions” (Interviewee 1C). With few notable exceptions, the private higher education institutions are frequently perceived as the locations where many government employees purchase college diplomas. This enables those in need of diplomas to officiate and legitimize their positions, often within government-run institutions.

In discussing private higher education institutions and their relative standing and role as compared to public institutions, the impact of these institutions in affecting upward mobility in the post-war period has also been seen as significant. Private faculties, with the lack of regulation and tradition in the previously communist regime, are unlike private institutions in Western countries. As often pointed out, they “are places for people already employed in governmental institutions who are, by law, required to have certain qualifications that they do not have. They quickly finish and obtain their degrees at such [private] institutions” (Interviewee 1C). Thus, the private higher education institutions are widely perceived as the locations for the purchase of diplomas by government employees who work in ministries or run government institutions and whose positions require sound qualifications and college diplomas. With few exceptions, private higher education institutions are usually turned to for obtaining diplomas in a matter of weeks or months so that one’s existing position of power and authority or promotion within the government structure could be officiated and legitimized.

Interestingly, while private and unregulated institutions of higher education serve as diploma mills for those already employed, those who lack the connections and security of government jobs would likely not revert to buying diplomas because of public

awareness about the local diploma mills, whose degrees – in the absence of social connections – would only increase one’s un-employability in the job market (Interviewee 1C; Interviewee 5C). In other words, if one is strongly connected to the existing circles of power, then it does not matter where they obtained their diplomas, as their career path and mobility will often be ensured (Interviewee 5C). However, if the poor and socially marginalized wish to enter colleges and graduate from them, their employability would be nullified by attending most of the private schools, assuming they would be able to afford them in the first place. Therefore, the wealthy and connected can study either at private faculties, where financial backing of the student can expedite completion of the desired course of study, or they can opt to attend public institutions where they can leverage their relationships and again finish with significantly fewer obstacles and frustrations than the rest of the student population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To sum up, public institutions are where professors and faculties work for the elite “pro bono. For them they work pro-bono” (Interviewee 3C).


In sum, these findings suggest that Bosnia has an educational system with two parallel universes espousing different social mobility mechanisms. One’s individual wealth and social status play a prominent role in the degree completion process, as there are those students who are “mom and dad’s sons” and have the “privilege of passing irrespective of *our* [emphasis added] knowledge relative to *them* [emphasis added]” (Interviewee 14C). This study confirms the existence of dual social mobility models as devised by Turner (1960): those in Bosnia’s higher education who greatly leverage their societal prominence to advance academically rely on Turner’s sponsorship mobility model, while another group within the student population continues to rely on contest-based mobility and hard work as means to academic success.

Impact of Corruption: Horizontal Mobility

Following the thorough review of the findings relating to the upward mobility mechanisms, this study moves onto testing the Hypothesis 5 of Research Question 2b (see Table 11, p. 162). This particular claim theorizes that students within Bosnia's educational system do not transfer from one faculty to another because of corruption. The study confirms this claim and finds that students, even though they may view their faculties as corrupt, still opt to stay at their schools because corruption is present at other faculties as well. Based on the survey data, students chose corruption as the key reason for not transferring: specifically, 18.5% of the surveyed respondents do not wish to transfer because other schools are corrupt as well (see Figure 14 below).

The second most frequently cited individual cause of not-transferring is students' view that the process of transferring is "too complex": 16.6% of students thought it was the complexity of the administrative processes that precluded them from transferring (see Figure 14 below). Third in line is the cost of transferring: 13.6% of students viewed the transfer process as too expensive, while 3.3% were discouraged by the paperwork involved (see Figure 14 below). Lastly, almost half of the surveyed respondents, or 45.6%, said that two or more of the above listed factors jointly affected their decision not to transfer (see Figure 14 below).


Figure 14: Frequencies for Reasons behind not Transferring Faculty-to-Faculty



Source: Surveys

I also evaluated the ease with which mobility occurs horizontally and within the national framework. Students answered the question on how easy it is to transfer (TRANSFER_MOBILITY) within the higher education system. The study finds that almost half of the surveyed students felt it was ‘neither difficult nor easy’ to transfer (332 students or 43.3%) (see Figure 15, below). However, 21.8 % of the surveyed sample was of the view that it is ‘difficult’ to transfer, while 14.0 % thought that it is ‘easy’ to transfer (see Figure 15, below). Of the total sample, 8.1 % believe that it is ‘very difficult’ to transfer; to the contrary, 10.1% of the sample view the transfer process as ‘very easy’ (see Figure 15, below). In reconciling the finding that a substantial portion of the sample views transfer as somewhat easy while others view it as difficult to a certain degree, it may be that those students who have the financial means to pay for private education find it relatively easy to navigate the administrative procedures and exit public universities so that they can enter even less regulated private institutions, while those with lesser financial backing find the transfer process much more complex, expensive, and harder to navigate.

Figure 15: Frequencies for Difficulty of Transferring Faculty-to-Faculty



Source: Surveys

In closing, Chapter VI largely examined corruption's impact through the vehicle of social mobility, validating the presence and relevance of Turner's (1960) models of social mobility in Bosnia's educational setting, as well as pointing to the limitations of horizontal mobility partly stemming from the high transaction costs and presence of corruption throughout much of higher education in Bosnia. Here, I proceed with Chapter VII, engaging in discussion on the coping mechanisms adopted by students in Bosnia's corrupt higher education.

Chapter VII

COPING MECHANISMS: VOICE, EXIT, AND LOYALTY

Bosnian youth's compliance and tolerance has allowed for the uninterrupted continuation of corruption in higher education. When and if professors behave inappropriately, students tolerate and accept it, only providing further reassurance that the immoral behavior can remain inconsequential. Understanding the coping mechanisms that Bosnian students have adopted over the years is the focus of Chapter VII, which is divided into three distinct sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews the forms of corruption coping practices students have adopted, aiming at understanding how the prevalence of educational corruption has impacted students' coping abilities (see Table 18, p. 194). This sub-section addresses Question 3a and hypothesizes that students have adopted a variety of ways in which to cope with corruption.

The study then transitions into a discussion on the extent to which corruption has become a pertinent factor as students decide whether or not to exit their faculties (see Table 18, p. 194). While working toward answering Research Questions 3a and 3b, this sub-section subtly incorporates Hirschman's (1970) interpretative framework and its expanded notions of exit, voice, and loyalty as contextualized into the Bosnian setting.

With its third and last sub-section on EU-nionization's effect on corruption, Chapter VII brings the study's findings discussion to an end by reviewing any and all findings relating the Bologna process and how its ECTS system has affected students'

perception of corruption in Bosnia's higher education (see Table 18 below). In doing so, this last sub-section of Chapter VII directly answers Research Question 3c.


Table 18: Chapter VII - Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections

SECTION TITLE – RESEARCH QUESTIONS	HYPOTHESIS	RELEVANT VARIABLES
<i>Different Forms of Coping Mechanisms – 3a</i>	HYPOTHESIS 1: Students cope with corruption differently.	Y=Coping Mechanisms (CM)
<i>Coping Mechanisms: Corruption and Exit – 3a & 3b</i>	HYPOTHESIS 2: Corruption is an important consideration when thinking of exiting faculty.	Y=Corruption Exit (CE) Y=Leaving Faculty (LF) Y=Formal Mechanism (FM)
<i>EU-nionization Effect: Organizational Change and Corruption – 3c</i>	Introduction of ECTS has not brought about changes in transparency level/ corruption.	Y=ECTS Transparent (ET)

Different Forms of Coping Mechanisms

There exists an indisputable tolerance toward corruption in Bosnia's higher education, and this tolerance is seeded in the students' fear of their faculty's control over their futures. One of the study participants articulated: "Most of the complaints [on corruption] were never resolved within the university senate, court or the public. Some processes were started but were never resolved. I do not know a situation where a professor was left without a job because of corruption" (Interviewee 5C). Consequently and as this research has shown, 58.5% of the surveyed sample copes with corruption by "keeping up with the required work" (see Figure 16, p. 195).

Figure 16: Forms of Coping




Source: Surveys

Low Voice

The second most frequent coping mechanism was “talking with family and friends,” which was chosen by nearly half, or 44.8%, of the surveyed students. As interviewees had repeatedly stated, it is the “persistent” (Interviewee 3C) ones rather than those who are politically vocal about corruption that ultimately graduate. Understanding this behavior within the earlier introduced and then expanded Hirschman’s (1970) voice framework, the study proves that Bosnian students largely exercise their *internal* or *low voice*. In doing so, Bosnian youth is ineffective in substantively changing their corrupt circumstances. Though Bosnian students’ *low voice* helps students release their frustrations with corruption as they converse with their family members and friends, more importantly and in its present form, their *low voice* fails to serve as the corrective and politically capable tool Hirschman (1970) envisioned it to be. A study participant confirmed that stories of educational corruption are often told “when we [friends] sit down for coffee and then start talking about who bought what [exam]” (Interviewee 7C). Another study participant added, “We have no one to complain to as all is connected among the personnel at the faculty. Doing so could cost you a [lost] year or the entire college education” (Survey, Code Name 464).

Responding to a question about whether a student had a friend who had complained about corruption and how satisfied or not the friend was about the process, out of 220 students (28.7% of the sample), 129 students or 58.6% of the sub-sample said their friend was ‘very dissatisfied’ (see Figure 17 below). While 14.5% stated their friend was ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ and 17.3% were ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,’ only 1.2% of the entire surveyed sample or 4.1 % of the sub-sample that answered this question stated that their friends were ‘very satisfied’ with the manner in which the complaint was processed (see Figure 17 below). Similarly, 12 students or 1.6% of the entire sample said that the level of satisfaction would best be depicted by ‘somewhat satisfied’ (see Figure 17 below).

Figure 17: Level of Student Satisfaction after Complaining



Source: Surveys

This hesitance with disclosing one’s grievances is associated with a fear of repercussions, since corruption has infiltrated the country’s educational system. To further elaborate, only 9.6% of the surveyed students (see Figure 16, p. 195) would complain within their faculty. Though such a *loud* or *moderate voice* may potentially lead

to an official inquiry into the student's complaint, it also increases potential for students' exposure to further abuse and marginalization. Consequently, fearing repercussions following their complaint, Bosnians generally opt for the *low voice*. As one of the participants put it: "Students are talking but *not loudly* [emphasis added]. No one is courageous to speak up publicly" (Interviewee 1C).

Interestingly, 23.8% of the surveyed participants were unwilling to completely ignore corruption and chose to cope by 'looking for connections or giving bribes to pass' (see Figure 16, p. 195). To re-phrase, instead of fighting against it, approximately every 5th student in Bosnia's public higher education seeks ways to find connections or bribe professors (Figure 16, p. 195). This process ultimately leads to a fundamental change in the manner in which students understand and pursue academic and, arguably, professional achievement. Even the student union, an organization formed to represent and protect the interests of students, rarely uses its voice effectively; instead, students look "after themselves without having a broader perspective" (Interviewee 3C). When the student union acts, "it is usually for someone's hidden agenda to be achieved through the union" (Interviewee 3C).

Corruption and Exit


The fear of authority has impaired Bosnia's student body from exercising its potentially reformative and political power. Most students have come to terms with the conditions in which they operate. As earlier noted, 18.5% of the surveyed respondents do not wish to transfer because they see other schools as corrupt as well (see Figure 14, p. 191). Therefore, the broad presence of corruption within higher education in Bosnia is an important consideration as students decide whether or not to exit their faculties. This finding confirms the validity of the earlier hypothesized claim that corruption is a salient factor in deciding whether to exit the existing institution or not. To re-validate the finding (Figure 14, p. 191) of the surveyed students who *have* thought or *are* thinking of

transferring at some point in their college career, 35.7% view other schools as “equally non-transparent,” while 31.9% think that the transfer process is “too complicated” and are, therefore, not transferring.

Despite this evident dissatisfaction with corruption and corruption-related behaviors, very few students are willing to leave the system because of corruption. The rationale for this decision, however, does not rest with students’ conviction that they are at a transparent institution but rather relies on the students’ awareness that other faculties are equally corrupt and the costs of transferring to another faculty clearly outweigh the benefits of the same. Therefore, widespread corruption is a relevant factor that deters students from transferring nationally and makes students more accepting of the corruption at their existing faculties. When asked if they would leave their faculty due to corruption, 59.1% of surveyed sample or 453 students replied with “No way,” while 29.2% or 224 said they would leave “partly” due to corruption (see Figure 18, p. 199). In line with this study’s expectations, only 3.4% and 4.3% of the surveyed sampled would consider leaving their faculties “mostly because of corruption” and “only because of corruption,” respectively (see Figure 18, p. 199).

Going through Bosnia’s higher education, students have built a certain level of ignorance and resilience concerning their repetitive exposures to educational corruption. While one would expect that those in disagreement with the ongoing immoral behavior within their faculties would look for alternatives, the students often stay put. Though it may seem counterintuitive, one of the study participants classified staying at the corrupt faculty as a form of resistance to the ongoing corruption (Interviewee 1C). Departing from the faculty would be a preferred reaction for those who wish to eliminate competition from the capable and hard-working students: “The only way to fight against the uneducated is to educate oneself” (Interviewee 1C).

Figure 18: Exit Due to Corruption



Source: Surveys

Mental Exit


With the lack of transfer alternatives and students' low voice, there exists a general tendency to endorse the *status quo*: a participant underlined that “[corruption] does not affect motivation ... all students are aware of it but stubbornly choose not to pay attention to it” (Interviewee 1C). Looking through Hirschman’s (1970) modified lens, students, in effect, remain loyal to the system. For instance, even though 26.2% of the surveyed students believe that they fail an exam despite demonstrating sufficient knowledge, only 8.5% (Figure 16, p. 195) think of leaving their faculty. While remaining within their universities, in Hirschman’s jargon, signals loyalty, this behavior is more likely to point to the existence of what I had previously labeled as *mental exit*. When students mentally exit, they physically remain in their faculties despite their dissatisfaction with the issues at hand. In the process and within the context of educational corruption, such findings show that students have gradually accepted the shift away from merit-based and toward sponsorship-based mobility.

In fact and as earlier noted (see Figure 16, p. 195), 23.8% of the surveyed students seek ways to become part of the corrupt circle rather than to resist corruption and pursue hard work as a mechanism of academic achievement. In a highly corrupt educational

system, while appearing loyal to a particular faculty, students do not remain within their faculties because of their loyalty or their belief that occasional lapses can happen and be rectified at any institution. Instead, it is the students' awareness of the systemic corruption and their realization that the power of their voice is negligible and unlikely to produce a fundamental change that lead them to tolerance or endorsement of the *status quo*. By now, educational corruption has largely been accepted as a norm in Bosnia's cultural mind, and 38.5% of the surveyed sample believe that dealing with corruption at their faculty is 'neither difficult nor easy' (see Figure 19, p. 201).

In December of 2011, findings of the research on educational corruption conducted by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Serb Republic similarly confirmed that students are unwilling to react to cases of corruption, if and when they witness them (Srna, 2011). Specifically, research by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights was conducted at five faculties in the Serb Republic, where a shocking 53.2 % of the 450 surveyed students would not react or do anything if they "knew about a concrete case [of corruption at their faculty]" (Srna, 2011, n.p.). In agreement with this study's findings, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights unveils that the barrier to students' greater engagement is that the "vast majority of students think of corruption as a normal occurrence" (Srna, 2011, n.p.). It should also be noted, however, that this study found that 29.4% and 16.3% of the surveyed students, respectively, believe that it is 'difficult' or 'very difficult' to cope with educational corruption. So even though corruption is widely accepted, with little tendency amongst Bosnia's students to resist or demonstrate against this behavior, there is still a significant number of those students who have a very difficult time dealing with it (see Figure 19, p. 201). At the same time, only 5.7% and 4.8% of the sample was of the view that it is 'easy' or 'very easy' to cope with corruption, respectively (see Figure 19, p. 201).


Figure 19: Difficulty of Coping with Corruption



Source: Surveys

The significant presence of reactive indifference on the part of the student population as to the presence of corruption helps maintain the *status quo*. When looking at the patterns on students' intent to leave their current faculties (see Figure 20, p. 202), this study finds that only 6.0% of students 'always' think about leaving their faculty, while only 3.8% of students think of it 'almost always.' However, a significantly larger percentage, 27.9%, 'often' thinks of leaving, while 24.8% of the sample 'rarely' thinks of leaving their faculty; at the same time, 8.9% students 'almost never' think of leaving, while 25.8% 'never' think of leaving their faculty (see Figure 20, p. 202). The fact that more than half of the surveyed sample does not entertain the thought of parting with their faculties may be due to the earlier noted issues of cumbersome transfer, lack of transparent and affordable alternatives, and a general sense of inability to change the *status quo* as pertains to the level of educational corruption at Bosnia's faculties. In other words, what Hirschman (1970) would have characterized as loyalty in the case of Bosnian corrupt educational institutions could be relabeled as youth's tendency to *mentally exit* their educational institutions, which directly stems from a broadly corrupt organizational setting that continues to resist change.

Figure 20: How Often Students Think of Leaving their Faculties?



Source: Surveys

Public-Private Crossover and Exit

For the most part, public institutions are seen as the government-associated places where the linkages to social and political personas can assure one's completion of higher education or help along with any significant obstacles. However, in the private sector, there is some level of irrelevance of social and political relationships as the individuals cross ethnic lines in search of their academic validation: students from the Federation will cross into the Serb Republic where the number of private colleges and universities has grown, in some estimates, at greater rates than in the Federation. Students from the Federation opt to go to even more corrupt universities in the private sector, as doing so "enables them to finish quicker" (Interviewee 3C). This may be the case especially with those students who are not as politically connected and have faced obstacles in passing some of the filter courses in public universities, where either superb knowledge or superbly strong political ties are necessary.

Additionally, there are also students who, despite their possible political connections, do not want to waste any of their time studying at the public institutions as they know ahead of time that their jobs are secured. These students need diplomas to


legitimize their positions and are not intending to obtain jobs based on merit. They transfer or begin their studies at the private schools located in the Serb Republic to obtain degrees faster. It is salient to note that the multiethnic cooperation that is hardly achievable in any other sphere of life throughout the country and between the Federation and the Serb Republic is practiced daily at the private institutions of higher education in the Serb Republic: financial gain for the private institutions in the Serb Republic and the conservation of time for students from the Federation outweigh any ethnic tensions that may otherwise be present. In the context of Bosnia, employers are generally knowledgeable of which institutions are corrupt. Therefore, those students who lack social backing and cannot easily obtain jobs simply do not consider transferring to the private institutions at all because the lack of connections, coupled with a degree from an unreliable institution, would make it very difficult for a non-elite member to obtain a job. Simply, Bosniaks and Croats attend private schools in the Serb Republic and, as ethnic minorities, complete their studies without much obstruction and by engaging in bribery at the private institutions in the Serb Republic. So, if one has the funds to complete his/her studies or has already secured a job, completion of a degree will be relatively quick and without any barriers within the private sector either in the Serb Republic or the Federation. This may not be the case with the public institutions that still hold some standards for the non-elites and generally remain more reliant on the political and social relevance of their students and their families.

Formal Mechanisms of Voice

While this research recognized students' limited reactions in the form of voice and exit, the finding may not be as surprising when analyzed within the context of the absence of infrastructure that would allow students to voice their views on corruption. When the surveyed pool was asked whether there are any formal committees where students' concerns about corruption can be addressed, a vast majority or 84.5% (647

students) responded that there were no committees of such type; only 11.3% were aware of the formal committees' existence (see Figure 21 below).


Figure 21: Formal Mechanism Frequency Table



Source: Surveys

Further confirmation that the current environment impacts students' perceptions and behaviors is the finding that a vast majority of students would be inclined, at least to some degree, to voice their dissatisfaction with corruption if they could do so safely and anonymously. A surprisingly high portion of the surveyed sample or 78.4% stated that, if they could complain anonymously, they would do so: specifically, 35.9% said they would 'definitely' complain; 21.9% stated they would 'probably' complain; and 20.6% said they would 'maybe' complain. However, even if anonymity were secured, 8.1% would not complain, while 9.8% were not sure (see Figure 22, p. 205).

Figure 22: Anonymous Mechanisms Frequency Table



Source: Surveys

EU-nionization Effect: Organizational Change and Corruption

EU-nionization Effect and Coping Mechanisms

Though many of the study's participants recognized the salience of the Bologna Process for Bosnia's EU membership, this study finds that the students' perceptions about the corruption processes in Bosnia's higher education, to some degree, remain unaffected by the Bologna Process ("Bologna"). As one of the students said: prior to Bologna, the exam prices were in "convertible marks [Bosnian currency] and now they are in Euros" (Interviewee 6C). The Bologna Process aims at achieving comparability of the educational institutions and systems regardless of their geographic location. However, the institutional inability to define and implement adequate rules and procedures makes change difficult in Bosnia's context.

The main challenge of the Bologna Process in Bosnia has been its inconsistent implementation across various faculties and even among different professors. Some professors have introduced and adapted to the interactive form of teaching, while others remain married to a largely uni-directional methodology of lecturing to students (Interviewee 5C). A study participant noted that, while she was a first generation Bologna

student at her faculty, “no one ever said what *that* [emphasis added] is” (Interviewee 7C). Another interviewee reaffirmed that the Bologna Process is being implemented without educating professors and students on what the Bologna Process “truly is” (Interviewee 1C). Moreover, about 1 in 3 surveyed students did not know if he/she were a part of the ECTS-based system or not; more specifically, 28.6% of the students did not know whether they were enrolled in an ECTS-based system or not. This statistic itself is reflective of the lack of knowledge about the Bologna Process among the students most directly affected by it.

Interviewee 7C also observed that, based on her understanding of Bologna, the option of part-time studying was going to be eliminated; however, there are now “parallel students” instead of “part-time” students, where the differences between what were previously called “the part-time” students and what are now called “parallel students” are minimal, as parallel students continue to pay the same tuition as the part-time students and have the same number of exam periods. The parallel students, though, are expected to attend lectures regularly, which the part-time students do not do (Interviewee 7C). In other words, “they [institutions] took from Bologna what suits them while also keeping from the old system whatever suited them before” (Interviewee 7C).


For some, the Bologna Process is equated to easing the educational process and turning exams into papers (Interviewee 3C, Interviewee 5C), which were not generally accepted practices in the past. Introducing papers as a course performance measure, however, has also had some negative side effects in the context of the corrupt educational system because many students deem it acceptable to plagiarize (Interviewee 5C). In an environment where students are exposed to professors who sell books that, at times, have been copied *verbatim* from already existing publications, students have been exposed to seeing the application of plagiarism without any consequences and, therefore, may not hesitate to replicate their professors’ behaviors.

The exam dynamic has also changed to some degree: some courses were previously taught for a year with the exams being offered at the end of the year, but now some courses have shortened to one semester and offer exams at the end of each semester (Interviewee 7C). Similarly, classroom participation, which earlier played no significant and consistent role in the grading process, is now gradually being incorporated into grading. If a student has a borderline grade between 6 and 7, if he/she is active during the class discussions, the final grade will likely be 7 (Interviewee 7C). While some students see these changes as positive improvements to the state of Bosnia's education, others believe they have only resulted in lower expectations and less knowledge among Bosnia's students (Interviewee 14C). Though this research clearly showed that some students lack awareness of the Bologna Process and what it exactly means for their education, a student who is more involved in its implementation within his faculty was quick to illustrate Bosnia's limitations relative to Bologna's requirements by juxtaposing the Bologna requirement of 12 square meters of the university space per student against what he approximated as only 1 square meter per student at his faculty (Interviewee 1C). To fully and successfully implement the Bologna Process, it is clear that more attention should be paid to the general social and financial circumstances of the country (Interviewee 1C).

Narrowing down to the most relevant aspect of the Bologna Process as it relates to this research specifically, the changes – whether they are consistent or not – that are taking place in Bosnia's higher education have had a somewhat positive effect on the students' perceptions of the transparency levels in their faculties relative to the pre-Bologna period. Of the total surveyed sample, 14.5% believe that the ECTS-based program is “definitely” more transparent than the old program, while 24.5% of the surveyed students perceive it as “probably” more transparent than the old program (see Figure 23, p. 208). Also, 26.4% of the sampled group are less convinced but still think that the new ECTS program is “maybe” more transparent than the old one (see Figure 23

below). In total, 65.4% of the surveyed students believe that, to some degree, the Bologna-based program, even with all of its limitations in the contextualized application within Bosnia's higher education, still helps improve transparency. However, 26.1% of the surveyed sample is "not sure" whether one program is more transparent than the other, while, interestingly, only 6.4% of the sampled students said "no" when asked whether the ECTS program is more transparent than the old program.

Figure 23: Transparency of ECTS-based vs. non-Bologna Programs



Source: Surveys

So, the study finds that the ECTS-based programs were generally deemed more transparent, indicating, more importantly, that Bosnian students can improve their perceptions of higher education in Bosnia. In contrast with their general passivity as illustrated through the previous findings of predominantly *low voice* and *mental exit*, Bosnian students seem to be trusting of the EU-instigated processes as to the *internal changes* within Bosnia's higher education. In part, a generalized sense of dependency on the international community post-war may be responsible for the students' localized expectation that the *internal changes* in Bosnia's education would be instigated, not by the dissatisfied student body, but by an *external source*.

Further, when students were asked if horizontal mobility across faculties, corruption, and corruption-related complaining processes have changed with the

introduction of the ECTS, 71.1% were of the view that these corruption-specific activities were not affected in any way by the introduction of the ECTS. It seems that Bosnian students have a different understanding of transparency and corruption, where corruption activities continue to be perceived as largely unchanged despite many students seeing ECTS-based programs as likely improving transparency. The source of this discrepancy may be that Bologna continues to be implemented selectively, and the Bologna-related changes are still not seen as course-changers for the educational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Interviewee 3C). Simply said, the dominant sentiment among Bosnian students is that the Bologna Process has had a limited impact on curtailing corruption, and corruption continues to be viewed as “independent of Bologna” (Interviewee 5C). What is too complicated, expensive, or difficult to achieve is often excluded from the implementation process, and, unsurprisingly, no consistency is observed across faculties.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

Summary of Guiding Theories and Findings

The main purpose of this research was to embark on the complex task of understanding the intricacies surrounding the presence and formulation of corruption in Bosnia's higher education, as well as its impact on the social mobility and coping mechanisms of Bosnia's students. With the lack of academic research exposing links between social mobility, coping mechanisms, and corruption in the higher education of developing countries, this dissertation had an opportunity to tackle a set of complex and challenging issues that are consequential to the emergence and prevalence of educational corruption, especially in the post-socialist setting.

While the study benefited from an extensive review of other relevant research on educational corruption, its theoretical framework rests on two guiding theories: that of Turner (1960), which differentiates between sponsored and merit-based social mobility, and that of Hirschman (1970), which captures reactions of stakeholders to failing organizations in the form of voice, exit, or loyalty. Turner's (1960) concepts were most helpful in analyzing the relation between educational corruption and social mobility and, once contextualized within Bosnia's setting, suggested that both sponsored and merit-based mobility can take root simultaneously in the post-war and newly forming educational settings so that the poorer segments of society still have the potential of

upward mobility through merit-based achievement, while the emerging elites increasingly rely on sponsored mobility to cement and legitimize their positions of power.

In addition to Turner's (1960) invaluable insights, the study also employed Hirschman's (1970) work on customers' responses to the failure of an organization, where, in this case, students would presumably exit their relationship with their educational institution, voice their dissatisfaction with the failing organization, or remain loyal to their university, especially if the lapses in organizational performance are seen as temporary and rectifiable. This theoretical framework and its valuable insights are contextualized, expanded, and adapted to Bosnia's corrupt higher education, informing the creation of an elaborate and education-specific reactionary framework with a range of new outcomes both for the voice and exit mechanisms. With voice mechanism, as contextualized to Bosnia's corrupt higher education, ranging from *official*, *public*, to *internal*, and with exit mechanism including *mental exit*, *transfer within the nation*, *international transfer*, and *full exit*, the study provides an elaborate interpretive framework for the survey- and interview-based data collected at the institutions of higher education in Bosnia. Using this interpretive framework, I found that the prevalent form of voice in Bosnia's higher education is *internal voice*, a minimally invasive form of voice, which fails Hirschman's (1970) presumption of voice as a powerful political tool. In the context of Bosnia, voice as a reactionary tool is disarmed from its potential for change, as it largely manifests itself through conversations with other students, friends, and family members and is, thus, characterized with low impact and continuation of the *status quo*.

As to the *exit* mechanisms, the *physical exit*, be it to more or less corrupt institutions, does not occur most frequently in Bosnia. Instead, it is the *mental exit* that dominates the educational setting. Most students, following realization that their individual exits or voices would not instigate a systemic change or that the transaction costs of transferring would be too high, either lose motivation to work hard or simply

ignore broader corruption and push through the system as if ongoing corruption in no way obstructs their path.

Coupled with the noted interpretative frameworks, the study also employed a comprehensive approach to data collection and analysis. With three research questions in mind – which addressed specifics surrounding corruption’s presence and formulation, its impact on social mobility, and its relation to the students’ coping mechanisms – this work aspired to provide a memorable contribution to the existing pool of research on the topic. The application of the mixed methods approach, both for data collection and analysis, meant the use of surveys, interviews, binary logistic regression, and content analysis. With this set of analytical tools in hand, the study embarked on data collection within Bosnian faculties, where approximately 750 students were surveyed and 15 students were interviewed on the issues of corruption, social mobility, and their coping mechanisms. This approach ultimately led to a discovery of a number of findings, including:

1. Prevalence of Corruption – The study confirmed that students perceive corruption as present in Bosnia’s higher education to various degrees and in numerous forms, but with non-monetary forms being prevalent over bribing. While it is difficult to fully quantify the implications of non-monetary forms of corruption, this confirms that the elite’s involvement in educational corruption has helped shape students’ perceptions of corruption and social mobility mechanisms, as well as affected students’ own ability to cope with the dominant forms of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education. While only 8.5% of the surveyed sample (see Figure 8, p. 119) thought there was no corruption in higher education, 62.1% and 50.8% of the same pool (see Figure 11, p. 127), respectively, viewed “passing exams via connections” and “passing exams solely due to having influential parents” as the most dominant forms of corruption. These findings proved the dominance of non-monetary forms of corruption, as well as the relevance of social status within Bosnia’s higher education.

2. *Favor Reciprocation* – In line with the findings that social and family connections are the most relevant factors in shaping corruption in Bosnia’s higher education, Bosnian students see favor reciprocation as dominant over other, though still significant and relevant, forms of corruption. With the earlier noted top two forms of corruption being “passing of the exams via connections” and “passing because of influential parents,” the social mobility trends that have emerged in post-war and post-socialist Bosnia clearly suggest that the favor reciprocation is becoming essential to the formulation of the social mobility model for the socially superior. This model’s emergence and expansion has gradually diminished the need for what Turner (1960) would label as merit-based achievement for these privileged elites.

3. *Students’ Upward Mobility and Competence* – In further examining corruption’s impact through the vehicle of social mobility, I find that Bosnia’s youth perceives competence as relevant but not essential to the upward mobility processes that take place throughout academia. More than a third of Bosnia’s students believe that the most competent students “often” graduate first, while only 8.4% believe it “always” occurs (see Figure 13, p. 183). Indeed, it is the poor who work hard to graduate in time while the well-connected need not do so and can rely on their social networks and their political party status – a finding that helps confirm the co-existence of both Turner’s (1960) sponsorship and merit-based social mobility models in Bosnia’s higher education.

4. *Teaching Satisfaction and Faculty’s Upward Mobility* – In addition, the study finds that knowing subjects’ satisfaction with teaching processes proved important in the study’s overall ability to predict the subjects’ perception of upward mobility mechanisms in academia. Also, when students were of the view that competent students always graduate first relative to those that do not believe it ever happens, the odds of merit-based promotion occurring in Bosnia’s higher education are

much higher relative to non-merit based promotion. Thus, students' belief in competence as a relevant factor impacting the timing of one's graduation also helps in predicting whether faculty members' promotion is merited or not.

5. *Low Voice and Mental Exit* – In examining Hirschman's (1970) theory of voice, exit, and loyalty within Bosnia's framework, I found that students' coping abilities have been impaired by extensive and systemic corruption. Students' fear of authority and the overall prevalence of corruption have not only deterred students from realizing their full educational potential but have also stripped the country's youth from its reformative and political power to change the *status quo* and move the country forward. Hirschman thought that, with a greater exodus from a failing institution, voice would lessen as the powerful political tool of change. In Bosnia, I discovered that, despite the presence of corruption and students' clear disenchantment with the system, very small numbers of students are thinking of physically exiting or planning to exit their faculties. The study confirms that exit in Bosnia is limited: if students are not filtered by the system itself, most students physically remain within their faculties despite a number of indicators reflective of the students' overall dissatisfaction with corruption and the systemic inefficiencies. Instead, I find, many students *mentally exit* either due to their lowered motivation to fully engage in the educational processes when the setting is corrupt or because they accept and ignore their corrupt setting and remain committed to the completion of their degrees. While Hirschman would have possibly explained this lack of students' exiting as occurring due to their loyalty toward the institutions in question, this form of loyalty does not stem from students' belief that the lapses occurring within their institutions are repairable or temporary but rather from the lack of alternatives and prevalent presence of corruption nationally.

At the same time, I find that the form of voice mechanism practiced by the students in Bosnia is highly disempowered and politically disabled. In Bosnia, powerful signals in the form of massive exit and loud voice are both absent.

In contrast with Hirschman's (1970) expectations, exit and voice are not necessarily inversely correlated to each other when the setting in which they emerge is highly dysfunctional and corrupt, as is the case with Bosnia's higher education. Here, the voice mechanism has taken a new form, which I label as a *low and internal voice*. This type of voice is used by the disengaged and fearful student body and has no political purpose but serves as an outlet for students' frustrations with the system. So, the extensive *low voice*, coupled with frequent *mental exit*, forms the most regularly relied upon coping framework utilized by Bosnian students as they adapt to functioning within a corrupt educational setting.

6. Horizontal Mobility – On the issue of horizontal mobility within the country's higher education, the study finds that students' views are split between those who see transfer as somewhat easy while others view it as more difficult, suggesting that there are likely those who are capable of paying to transfer to private faculties and those who find it much more difficult to exit the public school system because of the paperwork and expense associated with the transfer. In other words and as is the case with the social mobility mechanisms, the experiences of students may differ depending on their financial and social backing.

7. Corruption Enablers – Systemic traits such as inconsistent procedures throughout higher education at the national level preclude students from having a set of standards against which to measure the level of quality and reliability in current teaching, grading, and exam/course management practices. One of the key systemic corruption enablers is the lack of consensus on grading standards and continuation of individually devised approaches, allowing for a set of varied assessment practices and procedures to be used so that grades can be easily

produced, modified, and manipulated. In such a grading environment, students are not privy to the grading process and what would constitute a passing grade. To put it simply, professors in Bosnia operate in a setting where they can subjectively decide on a student's passing or failing status and are often seen as not being accountable for their actions. Consequently, abuse of authority can frequently occur and result in a delay of the degree completion plans of Bosnia's students.

8. EU-nionization of Bosnia's Higher Education – In an environment that provides duals paths of social mobility, additional complexity emerges with the EU's push toward implementation of the Bologna Process in Bosnia, which, as this research finds, has been only sporadically implemented. The analysis finds that 70.8% of the surveyed students believe corruption and mobility processes have not changed with the introduction of the ECTS. However, some hope emerges in the finding that 65.4% of the surveyed students think that overall transparency has improved, at least to some degree, with the introduction of ECTS. The finding is indicative of Bosnian students' hope that change within their educational institutions may be instigated by the external pressures, as has been the case in most other arenas of economic and political life in Bosnia.

Lastly and in the process of conducting this research, one of the most surprising elements of the research conducted herein was the fact that I was able to obtain access to Bosnia's faculties to the degree that I did. I expected that a higher proportion of the faculties approached would decline to participate given the delicate nature of the issues studied. My hope as the researcher is that this response rate, at least in part, is an indication of Bosnian faculties' gradual shift toward institutional willingness to study and ultimately rectify the problem of corruption. Regardless of whether this change in institutional mentality is self-induced or consequential to the long-term presence of international actors in Bosnia, the change within is a necessary prerequisite for reforms

that would ultimately work toward addressing the institutional inefficiencies and corruption in Bosnia's higher education.

I am also, to a certain extent, surprised by the degree of students' willingness to participate in the study. Given the indolence and acceptance of corruption that students have manifested in their behavior within Bosnia's universities, I did not expect the student participation rate to be as high as it was. In my estimation, of the invited students, about 90% in the study indeed participated. I suspect that the participants did so as this was both a novel and relevant experience in their daily lives. Another unexpected element of this research was learning that nearly all students at the faculties surveyed were Bosniaks.

Policy Implications of the Study's Findings

The findings of this study suggest that there are significant problems in Bosnia's higher education that have resulted from corruption. In my view, implementing policies that jointly help foster competence and meritocracy are likely to positively impact and shape students' views of upward mobility mechanisms and lesser corruption within their faculties. As earlier noted, this research has found that the odds of observing merit-based promotion were improved significantly when students were more satisfied with the teaching processes. While this does not establish causality between faculty members' promotions and students' satisfaction with teaching processes, it does have notable policy implications. Addressing students' dissatisfaction with the teaching practices and students' concerns about the relevance of competence may lessen the level of perceived educational corruption, ultimately helping shift students' views of the upward mobility process within their faculties toward a more merit-based modality. Some of the key forms of teaching dissatisfaction amongst students included having professors who do not explain, do not know their subject, lack qualifications, or simply do not show up for their

lectures. While policies that directly address corruption may be resisted given the prevalence of corrupt behavior in the country, addressing students' teaching dissatisfaction may be a more subtle and acceptable way of addressing the broader problem.

Given the earlier shared statistics of the International Organization for Migration (2007) that an estimated 38% of Bosnians live abroad, Bosnia's diaspora should be looked at as a potential source of a new and uncorrupt class of Bosnia's professors. Though even the returning diaspora members could arguably succumb to corruption pressures, the diaspora members – whose success within the more merit-based American or European educational systems was arguably secured through competence and hard work – are much more likely to value student's effort rather than his/her social standing. At the present time, Bosnia's higher education institutions often rely on contracting consultants from the neighboring countries rather than offering incentives to Bosnians educated abroad to return and teach at Bosnia's universities.

If Bosnia's faculties were able to retain some of the foreign-educated Bosnians as their full-time professors rather than contract Bosnia's education to foreign consultants, teaching processes would likely improve given the quality of the new faculty. Having Bosnians educated abroad within the country's public education would also help ensure that the exam-related processes are less cumbersome and exam topics are content-relevant, as the new faculty members would, consciously or not, bring the accountability, mentality, and teaching approaches they were exposed to while studying abroad. Having quality professors within Bosnia's public education would also lead to the local faculty's exposure to the grading standards, practices, and methodologies used by the foreign-educated faculty members. Over time, a new set of methods and behaviors could emerge and serve as a reference point, at least at the faculty-level, where the foreign-educated Bosnians teach. This would certainly aid in creating a more transparent educational space for Bosnia's students. Adequately covering the course curriculum and evaluating

students' knowledge fairly would help improve students' satisfaction with the teaching processes, consequently improving students' perceptions of upward mobility processes in academia.

There may exist some level of governmental and institutional resistance toward organizing such projects due to the fear of competition with the qualified members of Bosnia's diaspora, but this competition may be precisely what is needed to push the local institutions away from their reliance on favor-reciprocation processes and move them toward a merit-based modality. Recognizing the need for some level of cooperation on the part of local communities to allow for the re-engagement of the educated diaspora with higher education in Bosnia, a significant push and support from international actors for a successful implementation of the diaspora-engagement policy would be necessary for the viability of this solution as it relates to Bosnia's higher-education.

Noting the importance of continued international involvement, students' belief that their program is ECTS-based rather than not has also improved the odds of students seeing their faculty members' promotions as merit- rather than not merit-based. As to the policy implications, this finding is indicative of the continuing relevance of the external actors in Bosnia. In other words, the finding underlines that, despite the contextualized and partial implementation of the Bologna Process in Bosnia, Bosnians see the EU-sourced initiatives as relevant and important in moving Bosnia ahead.

The study has also confirmed the relevance of the international and EU-sourced involvement, influence, and support as Bosnia and Herzegovina pursues educational reforms. In light of the financial crisis the European Union faced in 2011, the likelihood of greater assistance to help modernize, organize, and standardize Bosnian education may be lower than before, but an effort should be made to maintain a greater international role in cost-effective ways. Both the EU and the US may be able to instigate a change on multiple levels and at a relatively low cost by directly funding a defined number of professorships at Bosnia's public faculties. The selection process for these professorships

should be publicized in Bosnia to illustrate the merit-based selection. Making this faculty selection process more transparent by involving students through the candidates' visiting lectures would assist in increasing Bosnian students' sense of ownership in the process.

Not only would exposure to better teachers help lessen opportunities for corrupt behaviors amongst Bosnia's students, but such policies may help alter the overall *status quo* by reviving Bosnian students' belief that change is possible. This initial change may ultimately have a significant and broader long-term impact on moving students toward being more vocal and active against corruption. In fact, this study confirmed that, despite students' current passivity, their voice can be empowered by introducing credible processes they can reliably use to complain anonymously. Specifically, 35.9% of the surveyed students would "definitely" complain if they were provided with the anonymous tools to do so, while 21.9% would "probably" and 20.6% would "maybe" complain (see Figure 22, p. 205). These findings collectively suggest that students' voice is amenable to change and can be empowered by providing a safe and secure place where students can share their views on the corruption-related problems within their educational system.

Continued involvement by the external actors coupled by the leveraging of the country's well-educated diaspora would be most effective if coupled with the elimination of the political parties' involvement, directly or indirectly, in faculty selections and nominations. This element of change that would have to come from within the corrupt system is least likely to occur independent of external pressure. Therefore, greater insistence by the international actors that faculty leadership and selection be based on academic credentials rather than political profiles would be necessary and, if successful, would have a crucial impact on students' perceptions of corruption and mobility mechanisms in Bosnia's higher education.

In conclusion, I hope this study has made a valuable contribution to the overall understanding of corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanism as applied to the

post-socialist and post-war developing contexts. While I used the well-established theoretical frameworks of Hirschman (1970) and Turner (1960), I have also expanded and adapted these guiding theories to the new and emerging contexts that need a continuing focus by researchers in education to broaden our knowledge base on one of the most important obstacles to progress in the post-conflict and developing settings – systemic corruption. Though this research confirms that corruption significantly impacts formulation of social mobility and coping mechanisms of students in higher education, it also points to several areas within the institutions of higher education in Bosnia where improvements could be made with the right set of policy applications. Bosnia's student base is disenchanted with the elite's dominance over higher education in the country, and, in its current state, Bosnia's youth is indolent and accepting of the *status quo*, but given the right tools to *voice* their dissatisfactions and right alternatives to which to *exit* from their currently corrupt institutions, Bosnia's education could be where change in Bosnia begins.

Research Limitations and Agenda for Future Research

Though this study made an effort to provide a comprehensive view on the issues of corruption, social mobility, and students' coping mechanisms, there are a number of research limitations to any case study, and those are possibly even more pronounced when faced with the topic of educational corruption. As noted earlier, two out of eight institutions invited to participate in the research declined participation. Assuming that the management of the most corrupt faculties would be least inclined to partake in this research, this research may be biased, as it has possibly excluded the most corrupt institutions within Bosnia's public education. Nonetheless, in the absence of broader data, I am unable to conclude whether inclusion of the two institutions that declined their

participation would have made a substantive and significant impact on the results of this study.

The faculties surveyed were in the localities where the majority of the population is Bosniak, but also with some visible presence of other ethnic groups. I suspect this over-representation of Bosniaks at the surveyed faculties may partly be explained by the fact that the ethnic minorities in this region of Bosnia may be more likely to attend universities where their ethnic group constitutes a majority, given the ethnic tensions that continue to linger throughout the country. For instance, those who are Bosnian Croats may be more willing to study at the University of Mostar (Bosnia), go abroad and study at the University of Zagreb (Croatia), or study elsewhere within the EU. Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs may be more likely than Bosniaks to hold dual citizenship with Croatia or Serbia and, therefore, have more options in terms of traveling and studying abroad.

As far as the sampling of the interviewed students is concerned, the study conducted interviews with a relatively small group of students, and those participants were not sampled randomly. Sensitivity of the corruption topic required a trusted relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee to allow for a reliable and unrestrained exchange between the interviewer and interviewee. While the interviewee pool was not extensive, the interviews were. Interviewed students had enough flexibility to share their views, observations, and concerns on the topic and any related issues they deemed of substance and relevance to this research. This insight, though limited by the lack of the sample's randomness, has enriched the survey-based findings and has, overall, helped in understanding the trends that have emerged from the survey-based data.

The study was conducted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which differs in its political structure of multiple cantons from the more unified Serb Republic. Given the sensitivity of the topic and my own comfort level as a researcher, I opted to conduct research in the Federation. In future research, however, it would be of value to

conduct a similar type of research in the Serb Republic and comparatively determine whether there are any significant parallels between the two major entities within the country. Throughout this research, a number of the interviewees claimed that many students from the Federation cross the entity border and obtain quick and questionable diplomas in the Serb Republic, which is a unique cross-ethnic phenomenon that this study was not tasked with exploring. The lack of cross-ethnic cooperation is often cited as a key barrier in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it would be of value to study the phenomenon of cross-entity and multiethnic cooperation when educational corruption and trading of diplomas are at work.

Another barrier that is not unique to this study is its limitation in time and funds to conduct broader and more extensive research, which is why I focused on the faculties where the research was logistically possible. Therefore, the findings of this study may not be generalizable and applicable to other countries that have experienced systemic corruption in education, as there may be a number of other significant variables that have not played an important role in the case of Bosnia or have not been considered in this study. However, the time involved, logistics required, and funds needed to conduct such a study comparatively across several countries would extend beyond the capabilities and funds available to me as a researcher at this time.

While the combined mixed methods research approach seemed a logical approach to me as the researcher, there are a number of other analytical angles from which this study could have been pursued. For instance, I have stayed away from pushing for the establishment of causality in this research because my research was based on the perceptions students have about corruption. I have relied on students as the source of information rather than directly and independently confirming the cases of corruption. This in fact is one of the key shortcomings, as is the case with most educational corruption research, because it is virtually impossible to verify the cases of corruption involving students and their professors. These are well concealed practices that

researchers unfortunately do not witness in real time, but instead have to devise other tools that will unveil the trends relating to corruption.

As for the thematic content of this research, I chose to focus on the issues of social mobility, students' coping mechanisms, and corruption in higher education. Each of these three concepts opens up a field of possible avenues I could have taken in the course of my research. Nonetheless, I tried to focus on the corruption, mobility, and coping in higher education but with an awareness that corruption may well be present at other educational levels as well. So, additional research into corruption at other levels of education would be invaluable. Furthermore, I have touched upon the linkages between social mobility and corruption, but I have not extended this discussion much beyond the educational setting, even though the implication of this work is that the impact of corruption on social mobility would extend beyond the educational venue. In other words, research looking into how corruption has shaped social mobility mechanisms and the extent to which they remain in place in students' professional careers post-graduation would possibly further validate and expand on the findings of this study. In closing, while this research did not aim at capturing every possible variable and addressing every issue stemming from corruption's influence on education, social mobility, and youth's coping potential, I do hope other researchers will be intrigued by this study and moved toward exploring more closely corruption's relationship to social mobility mechanisms and their collective impact on the coping mechanisms of the corruption-affected students in other developing countries.

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APPENDIX A

Teachers College, Columbia University

INFORMED CONSENT FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: You are invited to participate in a research study on processes relating to social mobility, corruption, and Bologna Process in higher education of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of this research is to examine ways in which educational corruption affects social mobility in higher education and how this plays out while the Bologna Process is underway. Another key purpose of this research is to examine student views and ways in which students cope with educational corruption. You will be asked to fill out a survey on an anonymous basis. The research will be conducted by Amra Sabic-El-Rayess. The research will be conducted at your faculty.

RISKS AND BENEFITS: The potential risk of participating in this survey is that you may feel discomfort when asked questions on corruption. The potential benefit of participating in this survey is that it provides you with an opportunity to share your honest views and experiences about corruption, social mobility, and Bologna Process at your university. Another potential benefit of participating in this survey is that you would be contributing to an academic study that makes an effort to understand the complexities of Bosnia's higher education. If you choose not to participate in this activity, you may feel free to leave the classroom or continue on with the tasks you were engaged in prior to the survey announcement.

DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: All surveys will be conducted on an anonymous basis. All surveys will be handled with the utmost care and securely locked in a file cabinet at all times. The results of this study will be used for professional purposes only and for doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), book(s), and presented at conference(s). The data will be used collectively and there will be no way to identify any of the participants in any publication or the presentation of results of this study.

TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will involve filling out a survey that will take approximately 20 minutes of your time.

HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED: As noted above, the results of the study will be used for doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), book(s), and presented at conference(s).

Teachers College, Columbia University

PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS

Principal Investigator: Amra Sabic-El-Rayess

Research Title: Social Mobility, Corruption, and EU-nionization in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Higher Education

- I have read and discussed the Research Description with the researcher. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.
- My participation in research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any time without jeopardy to future medical care, employment, student status or other entitlements.
- The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his/her professional discretion.
- If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the investigator will provide this information to me.
- Any information derived from the research project that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.
- If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can contact the investigator, who will answer my questions. The investigator's phone number is 011-203-355-9448 and email is as2169@columbia.edu.
- If at any time I have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or questions about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Teachers College, Columbia University Institutional Review Board /IRB. The phone number for the IRB is (212) 678-4105. Or, I can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY, 10027, Box 151.
- I should receive a copy of the Research Description and this Participant's Rights document.

Student Questionnaire

DISSERTATION RESEARCH SURVEY FOR STUDENTS IN B&H

IMPORTANT NOTE: Your participation is voluntary. Please read questions carefully and answer them honestly. All your answers will be analyzed on an anonymous basis. PLEASE do NOT include your name or names of others anywhere in the survey. Thank you very much for your participation.

A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. When were you born? _____
Year
 2. What is your sex: ___ Male ___ Female
 3. What is your ethnicity:
 - ___Bosniack
 - ___Croat
 - ___Serb
 - ___Other
- If other, please specify:_____

B. STUDENT EDUCATION

4. What kind of student you were in high-school:
 - ___exceptional (all As)
 - ___excellent (mostly As)
 - ___very good (mostly Bs)
 - ___good (mostly Cs)
 - ___poor (mostly Ds)
 - ___very poor (mostly Fs)
5. How many years have you completed:
 - ___ Some exams from first year
 - ___ All exams from 1st year
 - ___ All exams from 2nd year
 - ___ All exams from 3rd year
 - ___ Some exams from 4th year
6. How many years have you been studying in total:
 - ___ 1 year
 - ___ 2 years
 - ___ 3 years
 - ___ 4 years
 - ___ 5+ years
7. If you repeated one or more years, please check **ALL** statements that apply (otherwise, please proceed):
 - ___ Not studying hard enough
 - ___ Limited time to study
 - ___ No longer interested in the subject, but it is difficult to transfer to another faculty

- One or more professors keep failing me for no apparent reason
- Do not have connections or money to pay for a passing grade in some cases
- Outdated knowledge is no longer relevant for finding jobs
- Studying does not matter as much as having influential parents
- Other. Please explain below:

8. Is your program ECTS based (Bologna based):

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

9. Is ECTS program more transparent than the old program:

- Definitely
- Probably
- Maybe
- Not sure
- No

C. MOBILITY

10. Do most competent students graduate first from your faculty?

- Always
- Almost always
- Often
- Rarely
- Almost never
- Never

11. Are professors generally promoted based on their qualifications?

- Always
- Almost always
- Often
- Rarely
- Almost never
- Never

12. How satisfied are you with the teaching cadre?

- Very satisfied
- Somewhat satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Somewhat dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

13. If you are dissatisfied with the teaching cadre in your faculty, please check **ALL** that applies (otherwise proceed to the next question)?

- I think about dropping out
- I have been discriminated against because of my ethnicity
- I fail my exams though I show sufficient knowledge
- Some professors do not explain their material
- Some professors do not know their subject well enough
- Some professors do not show up for their lectures

- Some professors do not seem qualified for their positions
 - Some professors treat faculty setting as their personal property
 - Some professors get promoted because of their connections and not qualifications
 - Some professors pass students because of bribes or because of their connections
 - Some professors push for book-buying
 - Some professors enter inappropriate relationships with students
 - Other. please specify here: _____
-

14. Are you generally satisfied with the structures/procedures at you faculty (i.e. paperwork involved, opportunities to take exams, applications for exams, having access to faculty, getting your grades after the exam, having opportunity to repeat a failed exam, standardized grading, having resources within the faculty to ensure you succeed)?

- Very satisfied
- Somewhat satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Somewhat dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

15. If you are dissatisfied with the structures/procedures in your faculty, please check **ALL** statements that apply to you (otherwise, please proceed)?

- I wanted to transfer to another faculty but could not
 - I could not have credits transferred from elsewhere
 - I wish I could take classes at another faculty but I cannot do it
 - I wish I could change my major, but it is impossible
 - I wish exams were broken into smaller sections
 - I wish there were more opportunities to take exams
 - I wish grading was more standardized
 - I wish there was more access to faculty members
 - I wish I could get my graded exams back
 - I wish there were better student support services within faculty
 - Other: Please explain _____
-

16. How widespread is corruption?

- Completely absent
- Somewhat absent
- Neither widespread nor absent
- Widespread
- Highly widespread

17. Which forms does corruption take (please check all that applies):

- none
- buying passing grades
- buying diplomas
- publishing plagiarized books
- inappropriate relationships between students and members of faculty

- passing exams because of social connections
- obtaining diplomas in excessively short period of time
- passing exams because of influential parents

Other, please specify: _____

18. How difficult is it to cope with corruption in your faculty?

- Very easy
- Easy
- Somewhat easy
- Neither difficult nor easy
- Very difficult
- Difficult

19. How do students cope with corruption? Please check **ALL** that apply:

- keeping up with required work
 - addressing it through the faculty administration
 - talking with family and friends
 - planning to leave/leaving the faculty
 - bribing to pass
 - complained about it
 - Other. Please explain: _____
-

20. Are there any committees where students' concerns about corruption can be addressed?

- Yes
- No

21. If you know someone who has complained about corruption, were they satisfied with how the complaint was handled? (otherwise, please proceed):

- Very satisfied
 - Somewhat satisfied
 - Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 - Somewhat dissatisfied
 - Very dissatisfied
 - Other. Please explain: _____
-

22. If you think there is corruption and you did not complain about it, why not? (otherwise, please proceed):

- No particular reason
 - Scared
 - Other. Please specify: _____
-

23. Would you complain about corruption if the system would allow you to do it anonymously?

- Definitely
- Probably
- Maybe
- Not sure
- No

24. If you/your friends complained about corruption, would it lead to an effective change in your faculty?

- Definitely
- Probably
- Maybe
- Not sure
- No

25. Do students at your faculty face a corrupt professor during their studies?

- Definitely
- Probably
- Maybe
- Not sure
- No

26. How many professors in your faculty exhibit corrupt behavior?

- 0-20%
- 20-40%
- 40-60%
- 60-80%
- 80-100%

27. How difficult is to transfer to another faculty in B&H?

- Very easy
- Easy
- Neither difficult nor easy
- Difficult
- Very difficult

28. Do you think of leaving your faculty or transferring to another faculty in B&H?

- Always
- Almost always
- Often
- Rarely
- Almost never
- Never

29. Do you think about leaving your faculty or transferring because of corruption?

- Not at all
- Partly because of corruption
- Mostly because of corruption
- Only because of corruption

30. If you are thinking or have thought of transferring, why have not you done so? (otherwise please proceed).

- Too complicated
- Too expensive
- Other universities/faculties are also non-transparent
- Not familiar with paperwork required
- Impossible
- Other. Please explain: _____

31. If you had an opportunity to study abroad, would you go?
- Definitely
 - Probably
 - Maybe
 - Not sure
 - No
32. Has your thinking on corruption, leaving your faculty, or complaining about corruption been in any way affected by the changes introduced because of the ECTS (Bologna-based system)?
- Yes
 - No
33. Does ethnic fragmentation makes it more difficult to resolve issue of corruption in higher education?
- Definitely
 - Probably
 - Maybe
 - Not sure
 - No

SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND

34. Please indicate the average monthly household income?
- Below 500 KM/month
 - 500-1,500 KM/month
 - 1,500-2,500 KM/month
 - 2,500-3, 500 KM/month
 - Above 3,500 KM/month
35. What is the highest degree obtained by your father?
- Primary School
 - Secondary School
 - Two-Year Academy
 - College
 - Masters
 - PhD
36. Is your father working?
- Yes
 - No
 - Unemployed
 - Retired
 - Other. Please explain _____
37. Which is/was your father's highest position?
- Worker
 - Intellectual but not executive
 - Executive
 - Head of company/Owner of company

38. How involved are you or other members of your closest family (i.e. your spouse, father, mother, siblings) in socio-political activities in your community?

- Highly involved
- Somewhat involved
- Neither involved nor uninvolved
- Somewhat uninvolved
- Uninvolved

Please feel free to add any additional comments below, and I greatly thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX B

Teachers College, Columbia University

INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: You are invited to participate in a research study on processes relating to social mobility, corruption, and Bologna Process in higher education of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of this research is to examine ways in which educational corruption affects social mobility in higher education and how this plays out while the Bologna Process is underway. Another key purpose of this research is to examine student views and ways in which students cope with educational corruption. You will be asked to answer questions in an interview format and on a confidential basis. The research will be conducted by Amra Sabic-El-Rayess. The research will be conducted at a location mutually agreed upon by you and the researcher.

RISKS AND BENEFITS: The potential risk of participating in an interview is that you may feel discomfort when asked questions about corruption. The potential benefit of participating in the interview is that it provides you with an opportunity to share your honest views and experiences about corruption, social mobility, and Bologna Process in your country's higher education. Another potential benefit of participating in the interview is that you would be contributing to an academic study that makes an effort to understand the complexities of Bosnia's higher education. Without any consequences to you, you may choose not to participate in this activity.

DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: Your interview will be conducted on a confidential basis. All interview notes will be handled with the utmost care and securely locked in a file cabinet at all times. Researcher's interview notes will not contain any of your personal information. Researcher will only use code names to organize her interview data. There will be no way in which to link coded data to a specific individual. Once interview notes are emailed to researcher by the researcher, the original written notes will be destroyed. The results of this study will be used for professional purposes only and for doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), book(s), and presented at conference(s). The data will be used collectively and there will be no way to identify any of the participants in any publication or the presentation of results of this study.

TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will involve responding to questions in an interview format for up to 1.5 hours.

HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED: As noted above, the results of the study will be used for professional purposes only: for doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), book(s), and at conference(s).

Teachers College, Columbia University

PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS

Principal Investigator: Amra Sabic-El-Rayess

Research Title: Social Mobility, Corruption, and EU-nionization in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Higher Education

- I have read and discussed the Research Description with the researcher. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.
- My participation in research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any time without jeopardy to future medical care, employment, student status or other entitlements.
- The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his/her professional discretion.
- If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the investigator will provide this information to me.
- Any information derived from the research project that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.
- If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can contact the investigator, who will answer my questions. The investigator's phone number is 011-203-355-9448 and email is as2169@columbia.edu.
- If at any time I have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or questions about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Teachers College, Columbia University Institutional Review Board /IRB. The phone number for the IRB is (212) 678-4105. Or, I can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY, 10027, Box 151.
- I should receive a copy of the Research Description and this Participant's Rights document.

Student Interview Guide

1. Perceived Corruption, Corruption Facilitators, and its Persistency

- i. What is Bosnian higher education's biggest obstacles to becoming a more effective and transparent educational system?
- ii. What do you think of the system's organization/procedures (grading, transfer, admissions, exam applications, nostrifications)? Have you experienced any obstacles during your studies?
- iii. Have you faced any obstacles in terms of students/professors/administration members?
- iv. How prevalent do you think is corruption in Bosnia? How would you define corruption in higher education in Bosnia? If you think there is corruption, why do you think it occurs in higher education in Bosnia?
- v. Do you know someone who has bribed a professor/teaching assistant to pass? If so, how much was the bribe? How prevalent is this behavior in your faculty? Do you know someone whose parents called a friend or a family member in order to intervene with an exam? How prevalent is this behavior in your faculty? Would you classify such behavior as corruption? Or else?
- vi. What do you think should be defined as corruption in education?

2. Socio-economic Differences

- i. Who are the students that study the longest? Why that particular group? Who are the students that graduate in shortest time? Why this particular group?
- ii. What type of students do you think will graduate first in your class? Do you think academic performance is the key to graduating in time? If yes, what other factors contribute to in-time completion? If not, what other factors would you list as important to graduate in time?
- iii. Do you think that the student's ethnicity has any bearing on one's experience of corruption in education? How about student's socioeconomic background? Does one's background play any role in how one experience's corruption? Could you elaborate on your answer?

3. Coping with Corruption

- i. Have you ever spoke to your peers about corruption?
- ii. When? How often?
- iii. What do you think most students do when they face corruption?
- iv. Do you know students who complained about it?
- v. Would you ever leave your faculty because of corruption? Do you have friends who have complained or left because of corruption?

4. EU-nionization

- i. Do you know what Bologna Process (ECTS) represents? If you do, has it been introduced in your faculty?
- ii. If it has, do you think that Bologna/ECTS program has changed your program/faculty/higher education in Bosnia in any way? Have professors changed the way they teach/grade?
- iii. Has the organization of exams/admissions changed?
- iv. Did you enroll before or after ECTS system was introduced? If you enrolled before, do you wish you could switch to the ECTS system or it makes no difference? If you enrolled after ECTS was introduced, do you think you are better off than students from the “old” system? How about corruption, has it been affected, either positively or negatively, after the ECTS change?
- v. Now that the ECTS system has been introduced, are you in any way more likely to voice your grievances regardless of what those may be? Or are your attitudes towards speaking up about any dissatisfaction unchanged? Would you complain about corruption now?
- vi. Have your views in any way changed about your desire to exit your faculty after the ECTS change? Would you now leave your faculty to go to another faculty in your country if you could? Would you go abroad if you could?