



Jaïr van der Lijn

Walking the Tightrope

Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?

Walking the Tightrope

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Sierra Leone, Kailahun, (Liberian border), October 2003 Unamsil Pakbatt VII camp (United Nations mission Sierra Leone, Pakistani battalion number 7)

A Pakistani soldier walking through the camp.

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Walking the Tightrope

Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable
peace?

een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Managementwetenschappen

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADP	Accelerated Demining Programme
ALIR	Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda
ANC	African National Congress
ANS	Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste
ANSP	Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAII	Creative Associates International Inc
CCF	Cease-fire Commission
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force
CD	Convergencia Democratica
CDR	Coalition pour la defense de la république
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVS	Comisión Internacional de Verificación Seguimiento
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CNA	National Commission on Administration
CNE	National Elections Commission
CNN	Cable News Network
COMINFO	National Information Commission
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission
COPAZ	Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz
CORE	Reintegration Commission
CPAF	Cambodian Peoples Armed Forces
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CPP	Cambodian Peoples Party
CRAF	Cambodian Royal Armed Forces
CSC	Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
DAN	Anti-Narcotics Division
DIC	Division of Criminal Investigations
DMZ	De-Militarised Zone
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ENCOP	Environment and Conflicts Project
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ERP	Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
EU	European Union
FADM	Mozambican Defence Force
FAES	Fuerza Armada de El Salvador
FAM	Forças Armadas de Moçambique

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FDR	Frente Democrático Revolucionario
FEWER	Forum for Early Warning and Early Response
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberacion Nacional
FPL	Fuerzas Populares de Liberación
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertação de Moçambique
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GN	National Guard
GNP	Gross National Product
GPA	General Peace Agreement
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Committee
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System
HRFOR	Human Rights Field Operation
ICORC	International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation Force
IJA	Interim Joint Administration
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KPNLAF	Khmer People's National liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
MDR	Mouvement démocratique républicain
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSAL	Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MMWG	Mixed Military Working Group
MNR	Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOST	Management of Social Transformations Programme
MOULINAKA	Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchéa
MRND	Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement
MRNDD	Mouvement républicain national pour le développement et la démocratie
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIOD	Netherlands Institute for War Documentation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NMOG	Neutral Military Observers Group
NRP	National Reconstruction Plan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OAS	Organisation of American States

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUSV	United Nations Office of Verification in El Salvador
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD	Occupational Skills Development programme
P-5	5 Permanent Members of the Security Council
PCN	Partido de Conciliación Nacional
PDC	Parti démocrate chrétien
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PIOOM	Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
PH	Treasury Police
PL	Parti libéral
PN	National Police
PNC	National Civil Police
PR	Peoples Republic
PRE	Programa de Reabilitação Económica
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute in Oslo
PRK	Peoples Republic of Kampuchea
PRM	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
PSD	Parti social démocrate
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
RN	Resistencia Nacional
RPA	Rwandese Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme
RTLTM	Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SIU	Special Investigations Unit
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
TSE	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
UEA	Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Operation

UNCC	United Nations Consular Commission
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOHAC	United Nations Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOVEN	United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNPSG	United Nations Police Support Group
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
UNSCERO	United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Assistance Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Operation
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	Value Added Tax
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANLA	Zimbabwean National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe Africa National Union

One night in Rwanda I explained the subject of my research to Daniel, our gardener/security guard. He looked at me with glassy, and later puzzled, eyes. After a while he dared to tell me that he found the topic of my research utterly ridiculous, after all, the answer was already bright and clear: Peacekeeping operations are all irrelevant, they cannot do a bad or good job and they cannot be improved on. Only if God wants it to be peace, will it be peace. As long as God wants it to be war, it is war. Of all the possible answers to my research questions, I would never have come up with this one. After my first astonished moments, thinking “that is also a way of looking at it”, I started to wonder why that would not result in an acceptable thesis. After all, surely this should be an admissible answer at a Catholic university?

If one traces back the string of events that led to the eventual completion of this research and thanks everybody involved in it, one could of course start by thanking ones ancestors – and for obvious reasons. I will start however with my former brother-in-law, Ronald Klomp, who brought me into contact with peacekeeping operations. As a Dutch marine he was deployed in UNTAC in Cambodia and without him I would probably never have visited that country. From that moment on, my interests in conflict and peacekeeping were aroused. During my subsequent study of history, these interests were only further consolidated by Professor Jan-Geert Siccama and John Kleinen, both of whom were also kind enough to supervise my Master’s thesis. During one of his classes, Professor Jan-Geert Siccama spoke of an internship at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Strangely enough, I was the only one who reacted. I was even further amazed when, after the interview at ‘Clingendael’, I was asked when I could let them know whether I was willing to do the internship.

After my graduation, I sent off a number of application letters. As my name was still known at ‘Clingendael’, one of these letters resulted in a temporary job at the institute’s library. This, in turn, led to a position at the Conflict Research Unit. At the same time, under supervision of Professor Jan-Geert Siccama and Professor Georg Frerks, I drafted a PhD proposal for a thesis on the success of peacekeeping operations. When my contract at ‘Clingendael’ ended, I decided to travel for two months in Southeast Asia. Just two hours before I left for the airport, I received a letter from Jan Rood, the research director at ‘Clingendael’, who was kind enough to refer me for a vacancy for a PhD researcher at the University of Nijmegen on a subject which was remarkably similar to my proposal. Without a computer at my disposal and at great speed I penned an application letter by hand, which I later also sent by e-mail from an internet café on Khao San road in Bangkok. And it was also here that I heard I had been invited to an interview. The selection committee chose me above all the other candidates. I was allowed to start the job. Any other decision by myself or anyone else in this chain of events would most likely have resulted in a totally different future for me. This has left me wondering many times: what if....? What if my then brother-in-law had not been a marine? What if I, like all my other classmates, had decided not to take the internship? What if Jan Rood had not been kind enough to send me the information about the vacancy? Et cetera.

The process of working and writing on the research was to me nothing more than the continuation of my hobby. Of course, it was not always easy, but I never experienced what some call ‘dissertation depression’. And for this I also have to thank the many people who helped me.

Of course, first of all, I think of my ex-girlfriend An Van Herck, who probably never really actually understood why I did it. And my parents, who were always eager to hear about the latest developments.

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All the critical remarks Edwin Bakker made during his period in Nijmegen enabled me to improve my work considerably. It was sometimes something of an effort to get him started, but once he took up that little red pen, then little space on the paper kept its original colour. Moreover, our lunches were always a bit special and noisy. Ben Schennink also helped me a lot throughout the process. He was not only always very friendly but he was a very careful reader with a lot of knowledge.

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Last, but certainly not least, of course, I have to thank the members of the manuscript commission, Professor Willem Van Genugten, Professor Bob Lieshout and Edwin Bakker who gave their positive verdict.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and key concepts

Hopeful declarations and prospects in the early 1990s envisaged a future in which a 'new world order' was possible. With the shadow of nuclear holocaust lifted and a new spirit of superpower co-operation in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and elsewhere, the road towards durable peace was no longer deemed a bumpy one. These hopes already ring hollow. The world has a long way to go before we can consign large-scale deadly conflict to history. To widespread disappointment and concern, the expectations have been disproved by new and persisting patterns of violent conflict. Nowadays, it is often said that while great power confrontations have eased, international stability has in fact eroded since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although this is not entirely true, one can say that not only long-running conflicts have persisted since the end of the Cold War, but 'new' chaos has erupted in places such as the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and the former Yugoslavia. The international community has, for a long time, been searching for answers to these conflicts. One of the answers is the so-called peacekeeping operation. These operations already existed during the Cold War, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall two important new developments attract attention.

The first development is the frequency of operations. The international community embodied by the United Nations started to take a more active stance towards ending violent conflict. This increase in activity is, amongst other things, reflected in the fact that, in the 15 years since 1989, 44 UN peacekeeping operations have been established¹. This is a marked change compared with the 44 preceding years during which only 15 UN peacekeeping operations were established². In addition, under the authorisation of the Security Council, regional organisations, such as NATO, the CIS and the EU, have started to deploy their own peacekeeping operations in situations where the United Nations is deemed incapable, or was unwilling or unable to do the job. It seems that with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is better able to attempt to perform one of the goals as envisaged for the United Nations when it was established "to maintain international peace and security"³.

The second development is the kind of conflict in which the operations are involved. It is not always easy to distinguish between interstate and intrastate conflicts. Some intrastate conflicts have an international dimension, while actors in interstate conflicts sometimes employ intrastate tactics. Overall, however, one trend catches the eye: although the total number of conflicts has decreased since 1989, during the post-Cold War era the relative number of intrastate conflicts has increased compared with the number of interstate conflicts⁴. This shift is caused by the trend towards the near disappearance of international war⁵. Although it is premature to celebrate the end of interstate conflict, it can be expected that, at least in the near future, intrastate conflict will remain the most common type of conflict. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations, being the most appropriate as well as one of the best-suited organisations, reacted to this trend by directing a lot of its attention towards intrastate conflicts. Up to 1989, only three peacekeeping operations involved what are generally regarded to be intrastate conflicts⁶. Since then, this number of newly established operations is much higher: 39 operations which constitute 89 percent of the total⁷. In other words, the

United Nations has seen its task change drastically. Moreover, it is likely that in the near future the United Nations will remain involved primarily in intrastate conflicts.

1.1.1 The goal of UN peacekeeping operations

Asserting the goal of UN peacekeeping operations is a difficult task. By reviewing the existing debate, one can see that scholars and politicians disagree on such a basic thing as what peacekeeping operations aim to achieve. The United Nations itself is not all that clear about its goals. Moreover, it is well known that the political goals of peacekeeping operations change over time and per mission. However, some general observations can be made.

The official goal of each peacekeeping operation is the fulfilment of its mandate. A mandate is the authority under which a peacekeeping operation is conducted. It can be subject to change and periodic renewal. Because it is the result of a negotiation process, it is often a document of compromise and drawn up in vague terms. It is formulated in a resolution of either the Security Council or the General Assembly in which a peacekeeping operation is authorised and defined. Sometimes it originates from a resolution from another international or regional organisation, or stems from a treaty, accord or agreement, that requests the United Nations to provide a peacekeeping operation. It normally sets out the political objective of the operation and the end-situation it is pursuing. Mandates usually include the following subjects: the role of the operation, its mission, the tasks or functions to be performed, the size and organisation of the force or mission, the appointment of the commander, any special mediator, and their terms of reference, the nomination of the office responsible for supervising the operation, general arrangements for financial and logistical support, the division between United Nations and national responsibilities, the time limit of the mandate, the terms or conditions the host nation intends to impose on the presence of the force or mission, and statements on the rights and immunities of force or mission members.⁸

The fulfilment of its mandate is, however, not the only aim of a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping operations pursue a goal on a higher level and the result at this metalevel contributes to the assessment of its result. The Secretariat of the United Nations states that peacekeeping operations are part of the broader comprehensive strategy of activities aimed at fostering peace and security. These activities cover the principle areas of peacemaking (including preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building (see table 1 for their definitions).⁹ These activities taken together have also been labelled peace operations.¹⁰

The activities within this comprehensive strategy are intertwined and may be performed simultaneously and in parallel.¹¹

“Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out, peacemaking and peace-keeping, and sometimes peace enforcement, are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.”¹²

The aim of this comprehensive strategy originates from the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Although there is no direct reference to either

peacekeeping operations or peace operations in the Charter, article 1.1 of the Charter states that the purpose of the United Nations is:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”¹³

It is also this article that the United Nations Secretariat refers to when it refers to the aims of peace operations.¹⁴

Neither do important scholars in the field of peacekeeping operations, such as Diehl, Durch, Fetherston, Johansen and Ratner, give a single goal for peacekeeping operations and they disagree about how the operations should be evaluated. They also stress criteria that range from the implementation of the mandate, to goals on a metalevel such as “world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering.” Nonetheless, most attach importance to evaluation in terms of the contribution to “containing conflict and its underlying causes” and to “positive peace”.¹⁵

Following both the reasoning of the United Nations secretariat and the scholars in the field, UN peacekeeping operations have a two-layered goal, the fulfilment of the mandate as well as a metalevel goal. Although this metalevel goal is described in many different ways, it seems that, in one way or another, what they often have in common is a contribution to the end of violence and the prevention of its recurrence. Moreover, especially when a peacekeeping operation includes peace-building aspects it is not only expected to attain peace, but also to preserve it and to make it lasting. Such operations aim to go beyond the simple deployment of military or police personnel to maintain a status quo and have the clear intention to “address the root causes of conflict” and “to prevent the recurrence of conflict and to foster the consolidation of a peace process, thereby laying the foundation for sustainable peace.”¹⁶

Table 1 – Principle areas of activities aimed to foster peace and security

1 Preventive diplomacy: “is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 20.)

“The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones”. (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 23.)

“The United Nations monitors carefully political developments around the world to detect threats to international peace and security, thereby enabling the Security Council to carry out or to foster preventive action. Envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation throughout the world to help reconcile parties in conflict. In many cases this work is undertaken in close cooperation

with regional organizations”. (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, p. 70.)

2 Peacemaking: “is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”. (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 20.)

“Peace making refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. The United Nations provides various means through which conflicts may be contained and resolved, and their root causes addressed. The Security Council may recommend ways to resolve a dispute or request the Secretary-General’s mediation. The Secretary-General may take diplomatic initiatives to encourage and maintain the momentum of negotiations”. (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, p. 72.)

3 Peace-keeping: “is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 20.)

4 (Peace) Enforcement: “Under chapter VII of the United Nations charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures range from economic sanctions to international military action.” (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, p. 77.)

“It involves peace-keeping activities which do not necessarily involve the consent of all the parties concerned”. (A/DEC/48/405, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 10 September 1993, 278.)

5 (Post-conflict) Peace-building: is “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 21.)

“Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.” (A/47/277 - S/24111, *Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992, 55.)

“Today, peace and security are measured not only in terms of the absence of conflict. Lasting peace requires economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament and respect for human rights. Peace can be durable only if economic and social development are guaranteed. In the aftermath of a conflict the United Nations system is thus often called upon to carry out peace-building – actions to support structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace. Areas of activity include military security, civil law and order, human rights, elections, local administration, health, education and reconstruction.” (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, p. 77.)

“A peace-building process normally begins with the signing of a peace agreement by former warring parties and a United Nations role in facilitating its implementation. This may include a continued diplomatic role for the UN, to ensure that difficulties are overcome through negotiation rather than resort to arms.” (UNITED NATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2004), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, p. 78.)

“Peace-building involves actions to prevent the resurgence of conflict and support structures and practices that strengthen and solidify peace. *Preventive peace-building* involves the broad range of long-term political, institutional and developmental activities seeking to address the root causes of conflict. *Post-conflict peace-building* encompasses all efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict and to foster the consolidation of a peace process, thereby laying the foundation for sustainable peace.” (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, pp. 78-79.)

1.1.2 Key concepts used in this study

Two concepts, which have already been used above, are of key importance in this study as a whole and require further explanation. These are: UN peacekeeping operations and ‘durable peace’.

UN peacekeeping operations: In this study a UN peacekeeping operation is understood to be what the Secretariat of the United Nations understands it to be. When a peacekeeping operation is set up by the Security Council, it can be done on the basis of two chapters of the Charter of the United Nations. The first is Chapter VI *Pacific settlement of disputes*. Operations based on this chapter need the consent of the conflicting parties and are said to have a peacekeeping mandate. The second is chapter VII *Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression*. Operations based on this chapter do not necessarily need the approval of the conflicting parties and are considered to have a peace enforcement mandate. The mandate of a given operation can change over time from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and vice versa. A peacekeeping operation can even, as has happened, function with both a peacekeeping and a peace enforcement mandate simultaneously.¹⁷ One may consequently conclude that peacekeeping operations can be situated in the whole spectrum from chapter VI means to chapter VII actions. A further elaboration of what exactly this definition and concept are, is given in chapter 2. It suffices here to reiterate that in this study a peacekeeping operation is a peacekeeping operation once it is called a peacekeeping operation by the Secretariat of the United Nations.

‘Durable peace’: The word ‘peace’ can have many different meanings and connotations. It can refer to anything from ‘peace of mind’ to ‘the absence of violence’.¹⁸ One can think of ‘negative peace’, defined by Galtung as the “absence of personal violence”. However, the broader term ‘positive peace’ can also be considered. ‘Positive peace’ is defined by Galtung as the “absence of structural violence” or social justice. Such ‘positive peace’ is much broader than ‘negative peace’ as it also means the egalitarian distribution of power and resources or what Galtung refers to as ‘vertical development’.¹⁹ The kind of ‘peace’ that peace operations aim for is very much comparable with the absence of ‘violence’, similar to ‘negative peace’.

The operationalisation of the adjective ‘durable’²⁰ is much more complicated. It is one thing to research the extent to which a certain kind of violence has ceased; it is a different thing to survey whether one expects this to be durable. Several concepts do, however, pay attention to these expectations. One could, for example, analyse the extent of ‘positive peace’. It can, after all, be reasoned that ‘positive peace’ is a prerequisite to ‘negative peace’. Another possibility is to research the extent of ‘conflict potential’. ‘Conflict potential’ is defined by

Schmid as “Structural elements of a latent conflict situation that determine the risk of escalation into violence.”²¹

In this study ‘durability’ is determined through the extent to which the ‘causes of conflict’ are addressed. It is assumed that every conflict has its causes and that these causes result in conflict if they are not sufficiently addressed.²² The concept of ‘causes of conflict’, which is further elaborated in chapter 4, has been chosen for two main reasons. First, international agencies themselves, like the United Nations, point at the importance of addressing the causes of conflict within a ‘holistic’ approach.²³ Amongst others, the report of Secretary-General Anan of the United Nations on “*the causes of conflicts and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*” is a result of this awareness.²⁴ But, also in the field of development co-operation, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) states:

“We need to . . . analyse risk and causes of violent conflicts in partner countries at an early stage, and to identify opportunities for aid efforts to help address these root causes. The overriding objective of this work is to enhance the capacities of partner countries themselves – civil society and government at all levels – for peacebuilding and conflict prevention.”²⁵

Moreover, the importance of the causes of conflict in the process towards ‘durable peace’ is also recognised in scholarly literature. As Baechler argues:

“It is obvious that conflict management dealing with the conflict dynamics alone cannot lead to success. It gets stuck in a fight against symptoms.”²⁶

Second, the literature on the ‘causes of conflict’ is more evolved than on any of the other possible concepts.

In short, in this study the operationalisation of ‘durable peace’ is:

- the extent to which violence is absent;
- the extent to which the ‘causes of conflict’ are addressed.

1.2 Problem definition and research questions

1.2.1 Problem definition

It follows from the above that peacekeeping operations are expected to contribute to ‘durable peace’, especially when they intend to build peace. When judged on this goal, the results of these peacekeeping operations sometimes prove to be more positive than in other cases. For example, in Angola after a peace agreement had been signed and elections had been held, the conflict continued in spite of the presence of a peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects. Also in Haiti, the more recent need for a new peacekeeping operation shows that the operations following the Governors Island Agreement of 1993 did not bring long lasting stability. On the other hand, in the case of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL seems to have contributed to the positive developments. Not only have peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects been reviewed as having had mixed results, but they may even have more fundamental problems. Peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are generally based on a peace agreement that has been negotiated by the parties in the conflict.²⁷ However, figures collected by Licklider show that intrastate conflicts that are ended following negotiations have a greater chance of sliding back into violence than intrastate conflicts ended by military

means.²⁸ In spite of the seemingly problematic history of the UN with peacekeeping and peace-building, they have become important instruments for third parties in dealing with intrastate conflicts. Moreover, in addition to the United Nations, a variety of other international organisations, such as NATO and the EU, have also become involved and deploy their own peacekeeping operations. This gives rise to the research questions of this study.

1.2.1 Research questions

The main research questions addressed in this study are as follows:

- ***To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?***
- ***How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?***
- ***How can these results be explained with reference to factors for success or failure?***

1.3 Relevance of this study

1.3.1 Scientific relevance

The scientific relevance of this study must be seen in the light of the scarce attempts to obtain more insight into the contributions of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects. Diehl, Druckman and Wall concluded that “changes in peacekeeping operations have not been matched by alterations in the way that scholars analyze them. The standard study of peacekeeping operations remains one of a single case study, in which description is a primary goal.”²⁹ Similarly, as late as 2000, Fetherston observed that “in essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness and success of peacekeeping. This can be attributed to the lack of theoretical underpinnings for the field.”³⁰ Although some scholarly works and multiple case studies exist on peacekeeping operations in general, as well as on certain aspects of these operations, they rarely go beyond a collection of descriptions of singular case studies. Comparative and especially structured comparative case studies are uncommon.³¹ This research is a first attempt at making a comparative case study on peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects by applying the method of structured, focused comparison developed by George (see chapter 3). The aim of the research is to contribute towards an orderly and cumulative development of theory and knowledge about the phenomenon in question.

Furthermore, this study aspires to provide a methodological framework to improve the objectivity and comparability of the assessment of the results of peacekeeping operations and to make their evaluation more lasting. Assessing whether and to what extent a peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects has delivered a positive contribution to ‘durable peace’ is not as easy as it might initially seem. We still lack a full understanding of the way conflict processes work. In many cases, what seemed to be (more or less) a successful peacekeeping operation ended up as just the next phase in a conflict from which new violence sprang. One can, for example, think of the case of Cambodia, which was generally deemed to be a successful operation after the organisation of the 1993 elections, but following the 1997 coup became regarded by many as a failure. In addition, parties in a conflict are likely to make their own subjective evaluation based on

their own goals and different definitions of success. The United Nations benefits from a positive evaluation and is likely to make an assessment based on the criteria that bring about this result. A practitioner may do the same for career reasons. In this jungle of subjectivity, the scholar faces the problem of finding criteria that are as objective as possible. As a result, for example, some view UNOSOM II in Somalia as a total failure because the conflict continued. Others assess the result more positively as the operation did put an end to famine.³² Moreover, different operations are often judged on different criteria, varying from successful elections, and the end of violence to the end of humanitarian suffering. This lack of standard yardsticks leaves little room for comparison because in order to do that the same criteria have to be reviewed. By using conflict indicators, this study hopes to give an assessment of the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to 'durable peace', which takes into account the conflict process as a whole. The United Nations Development Programme,³³ as well as individual scholars³⁴ and academic centres for conflict prevention, such as the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, have underlined the need for valid conflict indicators and their monitoring.³⁵ The utilisation of conflict indicators in a framework for comparison can serve as an operationalisation of what Stern and Druckman consider to be a possible solution to the problem of defining success through the definition of "multiple criteria" and the judgement of "the effectiveness of and intervention separately against each criterion."³⁶ The framework for comparison used in this study can hopefully satisfy the need for a better methodology, which can also be used in future studies. The empirical relevance of this study in the end is given with the results of the case studies.

1.3.2 Social relevance

As the international community does not currently have many more feasible and better alternatives for the peacekeeping operation in many situations, one can expect that it will continue to be one of the more important conflict management instruments in the near future. As a result of the renewed increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations, the United Nations again faces the same sort of problems it also faced during the mid-1990s. The Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Guehenno, fears again "growing too fast or spreading [] too thin."³⁷ In large parts of the world the United Nations is likely to remain the most important organisation to implement these operations. Nonetheless, for regional organisations, such as NATO and the EU, one may also expect peacekeeping operations to remain of value or even to become more important. In recent years, millions of people have died as a consequence of violent conflicts.³⁸ Nearly one million civilian police and military personnel have served in UN peacekeeping operations,³⁹ and nearly 2,000 of them have given their lives 'in the name of peace'.⁴⁰ It is because of these high stakes that improvements are continuously sought by the United Nations in policies on peacekeeping operations. Some of the more recent achievements within this scope are the High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, and the Brahimi report.⁴¹ Individual operations were analysed in the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the Report of the Secretary-General regarding "The fall of Srebrenica".⁴² A more continuous lessons-learned

capacity within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN Secretariat is the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. Within the Dutch context these endeavours include, amongst other things, the reports of the parliamentary Srebrenica inquiry, the Temporary Parliamentary Commission for Political Decision-Making on the Sending of Troops Abroad (the Bakker Commission) and the NIOD "Srebrenica, a 'safe' area"⁴³. This study hopes to contribute to this growing pool of knowledge on UN peacekeeping operations, which may also aid organisations such as NATO and the EU in their quest for better operations.

In doing so, this study hopes to contribute to the ongoing process of learning lessons from the past. As decision makers, through their interventions and peacekeeping operations, attempt to change the course of history, they need to know what went wrong in past operations. Evaluating these previous attempts may provide decision makers with a more solid basis for their choices. This may, in turn, lead to the improvement of future peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the importance of the judgement of decision makers should not be underestimated. The analogy made by Stern and Druckman expresses the relevance of evaluations of past experiences. A physician relies on biological science in diagnosis to tell what symptoms, test results and signs are the best indicators for the nature of his patient's disease. To make an accurate diagnosis he or she must, however, still use case-specific knowledge and judgement⁴⁴. The lessons learned in this study and the recommendations that follow from them aspire to contribute to the body of knowledge that functions in the way biological science does for a physician. It hopes to assist decision makers in thinking through the decisions they make.

In this way this study indirectly hopes to contribute to a better political decision-making process within the United Nations and its member states by aiming to advance understanding of conflicts and their remedies, whether and why the latter succeed or fail. Through the use of conflict indicators, conflict processes may be made clearer and specific problem areas in such a conflict process may be pointed out. This may contribute to more reliable definitions of situations present and possibly also to more reliable predictions for the developments in the short term. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the chances that the right decisions are made with respect to actions to be taken do actually improve. As a result, decisions on peacekeeping operations can hopefully be made in a more well-founded way and their results can be better monitored. If it succeeds, it may, in certain cases, possibly help prevent the United Nations and the international community from failing in the future. Drawing the right conclusions about a conflict where there has been intervention is of major concern in the light of the developments in both the short and the long term. Better conclusions may spare the civilian population concerned a lot of suffering. But the United Nations and the international community could also avoid a lot of frustration and possibly the necessity of a renewed intervention.

Moreover, a more objective definition of success and failure may contribute to good governance and democracy, in which civilians have the right and the government the obligation to get, and to present, respectively, a clear picture of the 'true' state of affairs. Finally, the strategy and method used in this study aim to afford the opportunity to answer the question whether and to what extent peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace' and are therefore conflict preventive. If the latter question can be answered in the affirmative, studies such as these may add to the legitimisation of these

peacekeeping operations and those who carry them out the United Nations, as well as development corporation institutions, and the national police and armed forces involved

1.4 Structure of the study

This study comprises three parts. The first part (chapters 2 to 4) deals with the concept of peacekeeping operations, as well as the existing theoretical body on the causes of violent intrastate conflict and their management, and the methodology used in this study. The second part consists of case studies. The third part makes a structured, focused comparison of the case studies, draws general conclusions, and provides general policy recommendations.

The following chapter starts with the history and conceptualisation of the study object of this research. It outlines the history and context of peacekeeping operations, in which special attention is given to their development and evolution. In doing so, it places the case studies of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects into a historical context. Moreover, it shows the way in which the concept of peacekeeping operations has expanded. Next, it examines the question: what exactly constitutes peacekeeping operations nowadays and how is it operationalised in this study? Finally, it gives an overview of factors for success and failure given in the existing body of scholarly literature.

The third chapter elaborates on the methodology used in this study. The method of structured, focused comparison is further explained and aligned for the assessment of the extent to which peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace'. This calls, amongst other things, for a data checklist with general questions to be asked for each case study. Based on several criteria, a number of case studies are selected. Attention is then given to how this study deals with problems such as the availability and collection of data and information.

In order to guide the case studies the fourth chapter elaborates on the existing body of scholarly literature on intrastate conflict, conflict causes and conflict management. It distinguishes eight clusters of causes of violent intrastate conflict in the literature. It develops a theoretical framework, which formulates eight hypotheses on the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to 'durable peace' in intrastate conflicts, and which guides the case studies in this study. Next, in order to operationalise this theoretical framework, all conflict indicators used in the existing body of applied theory are clustered. These clusters of indicators that are distinguished from existing models and indicator sets are compared with the clusters of the causes of conflict according to the literature. Subsequently, based on these clusters of causes and indicators, a checklist of general questions is developed that guides the data collection necessary for the comparison of the case studies in this research.

The second part of this study consists of chapters 5 to 8, which apply the method of structured, focused comparison and the framework developed in the previous chapters to four case studies of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects. These studies are on Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador. The United Nations was active in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993, where it was involved in two operations: the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was, between 1992 and

1995, the contribution of the international community to the solution of the conflict in that country. With that same aim, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was dispatched in 1993, until it was pulled out in 1996. Finally, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) operated between 1991 and 1995 in this Central American country. Each of these case studies assesses the contribution of each peacekeeping operation to 'durable peace' in the conflict process concerned. The sources required for these case studies were obtained through a literature study, field research and interviews with people and experts involved.

Part three of this study draws conclusions from the case studies discussed in chapters 5 to 8. Chapter 9 makes a focused, structured comparison of the case studies. This chapter examines the question of the influence of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects on conflicts and the extent to which they contribute to 'durable peace'. Moreover, it looks at the conditions needed for these peacekeeping operations to obtain the best result. In addition, it presents several recommendations to improve the likelihood of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contributing to durable peace.

¹ Peace-keeping operations started in or after 1989 are the following: MINUGUA, MINURCA, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, MIPONUH, MONUA, MONUC, ONUB, ONUCA, ONUMOS, ONUSAI, UNAMIC, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNASOG, UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNCRO, UNIKOM, UNMEE, UNMIBH, UNMIH, UNMIK, UNMIL, UNMISSET, UNMOP, UNMOT, UNOCI, UNOMIG, UNOMIL, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNPREDEP, UNPROFOR, UNPSG, UNSMIH, UNTAC, UNTAES, UNTAET, UNTAG, and UNTSMIH

² Peace-keeping operations started prior to 1989 are the following. DOMREP, ONUC, UNDOF, UNEF I, UNEF II, UNFICYP, UNGOMAP, UNIFIL, UNIMOG, UNIPOM, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNSF, UNTSO, UNYOM

³ Charter of the United Nations, art 1 I

⁴ ERIKSSON, M. & P. WALLENSTEEN (2004), "Armed conflict, 1989-2003", *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(5), pp 625-636

⁵ WALLENSTEEN, P & M SOLLENBERG (1996), "After the Cold War: emerging patterns of armed conflicts", *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(3), pp. 345-360

⁶ Peace-keeping operations which were started before 1989 and that involved intrastate conflicts are the following: ONUC, DOMREP, UNFICIP.

⁷ UNASOG, UNIKOM, UNMEE, UNOCA and UNOMUR are the only peace-keeping operations that started in or after 1989 and involved interstate conflicts. One may also consider UNOCA and UNOMUR to have been involved in internationalised intrastate conflicts. In that case the figures would be even higher: 41 operations or 93 percent.

⁸ AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION CENTRE (2003), *Peace ops multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting peace operations (FM 3 07-31)*, <<http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/300454-1/FM/3-07.31/FM3-07.31.HTM>>, p I-I.

⁹ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, pp. 67-68.

¹⁰ This was done for the first time in Boutros-Ghali's 1993 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization: UN DOC A/48/1, 10 September 1993, 278

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 410.

¹² *Ibidem*, 278

This description is the same as the one given in the Agenda for Peace, except for the fact that in this report peace enforcement was added and that the concept was labeled peace operations.

¹³ Charter of the United Nations, art 1 I

¹⁴ UN DOC A/48/1, 10 September 1993, IV.

¹⁵ DRUCKMAN, D & P STERN (1999), "Perspectives on evaluating peacekeeping missions", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 4(1), <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol4_1/druckman.htm>.

¹⁶ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, New York, pp. 78-79

- ¹⁷ RATNER, S.R. (1995), *The UN peacekeeping building peace in lands of conflicts after the Cold War*, New York, p 10
- ¹⁸ REYCHLER, L. [with the cooperation of VERTONGEN, N.] (1995), *Een wereld vrij voor conflict handboek vredesonderzoek*, Leuven – Apeldoorn, p. 136 and p. 143; and SCHMID, A.P. (2000), *Thesaurus and glossary of early warning and conflict prevention terms*, Leiden, pp. 58-59.
- ¹⁹ GALTUNG, J. (1969), "Violence, peace, and peace research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), pp. 167-191, on p. 183.
- ²⁰ The choice for a more uncommon adjective was deliberate, as many other adjectives have unwanted connotations. 'Sustainable', for example, is often linked with 'positive peace'.
- ²¹ SCHMID, *Thesaurus and glossary of early warning and conflict prevention terms*, p. 26.
- ²² Consequently, it can be expected that there are cases where a lot of causes of conflict are present, but that they are sufficiently addressed not to lead to conflict.
- ²³ PFETCH, F.R. & C. ROHLOFF (2001), *Global change, conflicts and conflict research*, paper presented to the panel on 'new data on armed conflict' at the 42nd annual ISA convention, Chicago, IL, 20-24 February 2001, <http://www.uni-duisburg.de/institute/INEF/Intra/debate_Rohloff_Pfetsch.htm>
- ²⁴ ANAN, K. (1998), The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council, 16 April 1998, <<http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sreport/>>.
- ²⁵ OECD-DAC (May 1997), *Conflict, peace and development: co-operation on the threshold of the 21st century*, policy statement, <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/epcdc.pdf>>, p. 4.
- ²⁶ BAECHLER, G. (1998), "Why environmental transformation causes violence a synthesis", in: *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, 4, pp. 24-44, on p. 38.
- ²⁷ In this study the addition 'with peace-building aspects' is only used if it is necessary to distinguish between those UN peacekeeping operations that do involve these aspects and those that do not.
- ²⁸ In 15 percent of the military victories between 1945 and 1993 the same parties renewed the conflict; during the same period this number was 50 percent for negotiated settlements.
- LICKLIDER, R. (September 1995), "The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993", *American Political Science Review*, 89(3), pp. 681-690, on pp. 683-685
- ²⁹ DIEHL, P.F., D DRUCKMAN & J. WALL (1998), "International peacekeeping and conflict resolution: a taxonomic analysis with implications", *Journal of conflict resolution*, 42(1), pp. 33-55, on p. 34.
- ³⁰ FETHERSTONE, A.B. (2000), "Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding a reconsideration of theoretical frameworks", in: WOODHOUSE, T. & O. RAMSBOTHAM, eds., *Peacekeeping and conflict resolution*, London – Portland, pp. 190-218, on p. 191.
- ³¹ A very important step was taken only very recently by the Rand Corporation with the publication of its study: DOBBINS, J., et al (2005), *The UN's role in nation-building: from the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica; Rand Corporation
- ³² Interview Bergstrom, New York, 1998.
- ³³ UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (1994), *Human development report 1994*, Oxford, p. 38.
- ³⁴ DOOM, R. (2001), "Conflictpreventie", in: VAN DER LIJN, J & A. PAUWELS, eds., *Conflictonderzoek in het Nederlandse taalgebied problemen bij onderzoek naar het ononderzoekbare?*, Nijmegen, pp. 89-116, on pp. 94-95.
- ³⁵ CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT (1998), *Preventing deadly conflict, Final report*, New York, pp. 43-45
- ³⁶ STERN, P.C & D. DRUCKMAN (2000), "Evaluating interventions in history the case of international conflict resolution", in: STERN, P.C & D. DRUCKMAN, eds., *International conflict resolution after the Cold War*, Washington DC, <<http://books.nap.edu/books/0309070279/html/38.html>>, pp. 38-89, on pp. 45-46, and pp 63-64.
- ³⁷ GUEHENNO, J.M (31 January 2005), *Opening Remarks of Mr Jean Marie-Guéhenno, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*.
- ³⁸ SICCAMA, J.G & A. OOSTINDIER (1995), *Veranderingen in het conflictpatroon na de koude Oorlog misverstanden en feiten*, Den Haag.
- ³⁹ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2004), *United Nations peacekeeping meeting new challenges frequently asked questions*, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/qa_english.pdf>.

⁴⁰ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SITUATION CENTRE, *United Nations peacekeeping in the service for peace*,

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/totals_annual.htm>.

⁴¹ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2004), *A more secure world our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*; UN DOC S/2004/616, 23 August 2004; and UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

⁴² UN DOC A/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; and UN DOC A/54/549, 15 November 1999.

⁴³ PARLEMENTAIRE ENQUETE COMMISSIE SREBRENICA (2003), *Missie zonder vrede*, 's-Gravenhage; TUDELIJKE COMMISSIE BESLUITVORMING UITZENDINGEN (2000), *Vertretpunt Den Haag rapport van de Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen*; and NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE (2002), *Srebrenica een 'veilig' gebied: reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een safe area*, Amsterdam

⁴⁴ STERN & DRUCKMAN, "Evaluating interventions in history", pp. 41-42.

2 THE HISTORY AND CONCEPT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

The research subject in this study is the UN peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects. However, these operations have to be seen within the context of UN peacekeeping operations in general. What follows is therefore not only a discourse on those operations with peace-building aspects but also on UN peacekeeping operations in general. There is consensus about the fact that peacekeeping operations are developed and employed mainly by the United Nations. There is, however, little agreement on both their origins, as well as their exact definition. This chapter examines both problems. It shows, within a historical context, how the concept of peacekeeping operations has changed over time and how its scope of activities has widened. What is considered nowadays to be part of a peacekeeping operation is so broad that for this study, taking "a collection of 'policy tools'" as a working definition of peacekeeping operations can be justified.¹ This chapter develops a standard inventory of policy tools that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute towards durable peace and concludes with an overview of factors for success and failure given in the existing body of scholarly literature and lessons learned.

2.1 The history of peace-keeping operations

Some scholars trace the origins of peacekeeping operations back to the time before the League of Nations.² Others regard the early UN monitoring missions, such as the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in Greece, or the United Nations Consular Commission (UNCC) in Indonesia, as the real start of UN peacekeeping operations.³ The official history, according to the United Nations, actually starts later. The organisation argues that three years after the establishment of the United Nations, the international community discovered a lacuna in the Charter of the organisation. A fragile truce in the Arab-Israeli war was in need of supervision by a UN field presence and the Charter did not provide for such a possibility. It was for this reason that in 1948 the Security Council used its powers for the maintenance of international peace and security to establish the first UN peacekeeping operation - the United Nations Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) in the Middle East. A few months later, another military monitoring mission, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) followed in Jammu and Kashmir.⁴

In the following years, during the Cold War, the Security Council was often paralysed due to a lack of consensus between the superpowers, who frequently used or threatened to use their veto powers. As a consequence, (binding) resolutions of the Security Council regarding the establishment of peacekeeping operations were rare. The General Assembly, however, seized the right to establish or extend peacekeeping operations should the Security Council be paralysed.⁵ Nowadays, nevertheless, peacekeeping operations are generally established by the Security Council.

The following overview of the history of peacekeeping operations adopts the approach of 'generations' of peacekeeping operations. Although such a categorisation always has its weaknesses, the 'generational' approach is helpful

here as it is not just another way to slice the pie, but allows one to distinguish a general development of peacekeeping operations over time. The term 'generation' therefore not only focuses on the period in which the operations took place, but also on the nature of the operations deployed during that period. Several 'generations' of peacekeeping operations have existed side by side, but the heyday of each may be found in a different period.⁶

2.1.1 The 'first generation' classical and traditional

The first 'golden age' of peacekeeping started in 1956 when the first armed peacekeeping operation, the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), was established by the General Assembly and deployed in the Middle East. The following 18 years, until 1974, saw the birth of nine additional peacekeeping operations. Thereafter, only one more operation was to be established before the end of the Cold War.⁷ The peacekeeping operations during the Cold War have often been labelled traditional peacekeeping operations, or 'first generation'. At that time, peacekeeping operations were defined by the United Nations as

"[A]n operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict."⁸

Nowadays, these 'first generation' peacekeeping operations are generally defined as

"The stationing of UN military personnel, with the consent of the warring parties, to monitor cease-fires and dissuade violations through interposition between competing armies."⁹

Peacekeeping operations in the Cold War years did not act and create, but tended to be reactive and play the role of referee. They were an instrument to stabilise the battlefield, to protect an existing status quo and to freeze the conflict.¹⁰ They were generally based on six principles attributed to former Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. Each peacekeeping operation should

1. Have the full consent of the parties, and especially that of the host-state where the operations were to be deployed,
2. Have the full backing of the international community embodied by the Security Council,
3. Be under UN command, under control of the Secretary-General and under the authority of the Security Council,
4. Be multinational in composition,
5. Abide by the principle of the non-use of force except for self-defence,
6. Be impartial at all times.¹¹

These principles were first articulated in the report of Secretary-General Waldheim regarding the establishment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).¹² They constrained UN peacekeeping operations from being deployed in every type of conflict at any given time.

There were three other characteristics of first generation peacekeeping operations. First, in order to ensure the support of the Security Council, the participating nations within the peacekeeping operation had to represent a balance of regional interests. For that same reason, the permanent members of the Security Council refrained from participating except for the provision of logistical support.¹³ As a

consequence, the major troop contributing countries were mainly medium-sized developed countries such as Austria, Australia, Canada and the Nordic countries. Second, peacekeeping operations were all conducted in developing countries (predominantly the Middle East).¹⁴ Third, they mainly addressed interstate conflicts.

The principles of peacekeeping attributed to Hammarskjöld were already challenged during the Cold War. Shortly before his death in 1961, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was authorised to use force in two instances: to prevent the outbreak of civil war,¹⁵ and to take action against foreign mercenaries.¹⁶ Twelve years later, in 1973, the report of the then Secretary-General Waldheim on the establishment of UNEF II gave, for the first time, a broader definition of self-defence:

“The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”¹⁷

It is considered that this definition of self-defence also covers subsequent peacekeeping operations. Although this was a change in policy, it did, nevertheless, not lead to a change in practice. Until after the Cold War there was not generally a forceful response to violent challenges preventing the fulfilment of mandates.¹⁸

In spite of their restraints, several successes were booked by different peacekeeping operations, which eventually won UN peacekeeping operations the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. As these successes were achieved, the above restraints came to be seen as the major strengths of peacekeeping operations. Being lightly armed and impartial, the peacekeeper could move freely, but protected, through the battlefield, while at the same time, as the peacekeeper was not a threat to any of the parties, negotiations could be furthered.¹⁹ This was the job the United Nations knew well and continues to do well. Where parties agree to end their conflict, where the consent and co-operation of the parties can be assumed, where risks are low, and where the use of force is unnecessary and impartiality unchallenged, it is here that the ‘basic bread-and-butter skills’ of any army often result in success for a UN peacekeeping operation.²⁰

2.1.2 The ‘second generation’ peacekeeping with peace-building aspects added

After the end of the Cold War, not only the nature of international politics, but also the character of peacekeeping operations changed drastically. With a new spirit of co-operation in the Security Council, the opportunities for peacekeeping operations increased. The operations took on a wider range of activities in many different dimensions.²¹ This turning point in peacekeeping history was heralded in 1989 by the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Many more ‘second generation’ peacekeeping operations followed, including the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).²²


The first change was that the aims of peacekeeping operations were widened. The limited goal of classical ‘first generation’ peacekeeping operations of stabilising a cease-fire was expanded to include guiding peace processes. Many newly

established operations were not only directed at maintaining the status quo, but were also aimed at building peace and moving towards ‘durable peace’.²³ Peacekeeping operations took on peace-building aspects. In addition to the classical tasks of truce supervision, cease-fire monitoring and military observation, peacekeeping operations were charged with tasks such as demobilisation and the reintegration of former combatants, disarmament, humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance, human rights promotion, civilian police, and mine clearance.²⁴ Consequently, the nature of peacekeeping operations changed, and moved away from “a job only a soldier can do” towards a much more civil mandate.²⁵

Secondly, the activities of peacekeeping operations expanded not only in breadth, but also in depth. They became more intrusive and more interventionist. As the principle of national sovereignty lost ground, the focus of peacekeeping operations changed from interstate war to internal conflict. Many new ways were opened up for the United Nations to help end intrastate conflicts and to assist in the implementation of peace agreements.²⁶ In several cases the United Nations even took over the task of governance in a ‘collapsed state’: a scenario that former British Foreign Secretary Hurd called ‘painting a country blue’.²⁷ Moreover, the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement became ever more blurred, and the consent of the parties was in some cases even ‘lost’ during the operation.²⁸


Thirdly, there was a remarkable increase in the number of peacekeeping operations deployed. This number practically quadrupled within a few years (see figure 1).

Figure 1 - Number of (new) peacekeeping operations deployed, per year



(source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>)

Figure 2 - Number of military personnel and civilian police deployed in peacekeeping operations



(source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>)

Fourthly, together with the growing number of peacekeeping operations, the number of military personnel and civilian police also grew (see figure 2) This increase was even steeper than the growth in the number of peacekeeping operations, as the number of civilian police and military personnel deployed grew nearly eight times Peacekeeping operations therefore became more than the 'few' military monitors of the traditional 'first generation' peacekeeping operations, and came to encompass entire battalions

Fifthly, peacekeeping operations became much more of a global activity as many new operations were conducted in Africa, the Americas and Europe Furthermore, the composition of the peacekeeping forces also became much more global as a number of smaller developing countries such as Nepal, Ghana and Fiji became involved Before 1989 only 26 countries participated in peacekeeping operations, by 1994 this number had already risen to 76²⁹

Despite these changes, classical 'first generation' operations remained active and new ones were also established Moreover, one should not overlook the fact that such expanded peacekeeping was not new as such ONUC, as well, had a very intrusive mandate under chapter VII of the Charter This operation in the Congo was also an operation in a collapsed state where the United Nations took over government Furthermore, the civil components in ONUC were also substantial Finally, ONUC also encountered troubles in the twilight zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and was the first and, until UNOSOM, the only operation to make the transition³⁰

2.1.3 The 'third generation' humanitarian intervention, the middle or 'muddle ground'

The perceived success of "Operation Desert Storm" sanctioned by the United Nations, as well as the perceived success of many of the 'second generation' peacekeeping operations, gave the international community confidence The Cold War was over and it now seemed that peace could be enforced Media images of human suffering, as shown on CNN, were only a helping hand in focusing public attention It was now felt that if "something had to be done" a UN peacekeeping operation could be called in and peace would be restored A new 'generation' of peacekeeping operations resulted from this new attitude This 'third generation' had to implement humanitarian assignments and were given mandates under chapter VII of the Charter to do so³¹

Whereas the 'second generation' was mainly concerned with addressing Cold War proxy conflicts, the 'third generation' of peacekeeping operations was chiefly directed at those conflicts that had been suppressed during that same Cold War There was no peace to keep in these conflicts Rather, the international community felt obliged to secure humanitarian support, while it attempted to get a possible peace process back on the rails The aims of these peacekeeping operations were less broad compared with the 'second generation' It was not so much the brokering of extensive peace settlements in order to build peace, but rather the single objective of delivering humanitarian aid that was the goal of this 'generation' of peacekeeping operations For this purpose, the consent of the parties was considered convenient but not a necessity As a result, they became 'middle ground' operations somewhere between peacekeeping and peace enforcement The most well-known examples of this 'generation' are the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)³²

The bulk of the 'third generation' peacekeeping operations is generally regarded to have failed. Where there was no peace to keep, the United Nations was not able to enforce it. Several times the organisation tended to find itself in the awkward position of one or more parties coming to regard the operation as partisan. The result was that peacekeepers were taken hostage in Yugoslavia and killed in Somalia. The former Special Assistant to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Tharoor described the problem in the following manner:

"Impartiality is the oxygen of peacekeeping: the only way peace keepers can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping lines of communication open. The moment they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as the 'enemy', they become part of the problem they were sent to solve."³³

2.1.4 The 'fourth generation': subcontracting the military component

The fall of Srebrenica and the dragging of dead American soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu gave many countries, politicians and scholars the impression that peacekeeping and peace enforcement should be kept strictly apart.³⁴ Some argued that UN peacekeeping should go 'back to basics', while others even questioned whether the United Nations was the most qualified organisation to perform peacekeeping operations.³⁵ With Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) the Clinton administration decided that United States' participation in UN peacekeeping operations was to be restricted and to meet more stringent conditions. These 17 preconditions were not only used to limit United States' participation in UN peacekeeping operations. They also seemed to have the objective of limiting the number of UN missions because the Pentagon feared that Washington would be called upon to save failed operations.³⁶

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali argued that sub-contracting the military component of a peacekeeping operation might be a possible solution for the problem that UN peacekeeping operations were not well suited to situations in which a negotiated settlement could not be achieved.³⁷ His successor Annan concluded:

"The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under present conditions, *ad hoc* Member States coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict. [...] The Organization still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. Troops for peace-keeping missions are in some cases not made available by Member States or made available under conditions which constrain effective response. Peacemaking and human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations."³⁸

The criticism together with the unwillingness of the member states to contribute military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations led to what has been called "the 'crisis' in UN peacekeeping".³⁹ This crisis was, however, not fully reflected in the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations on the ground. Although there was a minor decrease in their number, this decline was not large compared with the second 'golden age' in the first half of the 1990s (see figure 1). What happened was that a 'fourth generation' of UN peacekeeping operations got the upper hand. Peacekeeping operations within this 'generation' were not always fully under the

flag of the United Nations. In several conflicts the military components of peacekeeping operations were not delivered by the United Nations, but by regional organisations. The Security Council provided these military components both with peacekeeping as well as peace-enforcement mandates. The operations as a whole sometimes aimed to build peace and in other cases to maintain the status quo.

The trend towards subcontracting is expressed in the decreased number of military and civilian police personnel under United Nations command since 1995 (see figure 2). If one were, however, to add the number of military personnel of the military components under the command of the regional organisations, then the number of military personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations would not fall, but increase slightly.

Well-known examples of these regional military peacekeeping forces, which provide the military components for 'fourth generation' UN peacekeeping operations, are the NATO led operations IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia which aided the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and KFOR that supplements the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Others are ECOMOG for the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and the Commonwealth of Independent States for the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In these cases the UN peacekeeping operation delivered a military component to monitor the regional peacekeeping force, or civil components for the peacekeeping operation, or a combination of both.⁴⁰

These regional peacekeeping forces have not always proved successful. In Liberia, ECOMOG is generally regarded to have become a party in the conflict. But also in other cases, where the results were more positive, one can often question the motives of the intervening parties. As a consequence, fresh criticism questioned whether the 'fourth generation' of UN peacekeeping operations actually bore the solution to the problems of the United Nations. They argued that the sub-contracting of peacekeeping operations not always proved to be successful and may sometimes even have eroded the moral primacy of the Security Council.⁴¹

2.1.5 The 'fifth generation' robust 'integrated mission' or 'second generation' plus?

In 2000 a panel led by Brahimi published a report on United Nations peace operations, in which a large number of recommendations were made for improving the operations.⁴² From this moment on, the United Nations slowly emerged from the so-called "'crisis' in UN peacekeeping". The organisation remained the primary entity involved in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, more and more military personnel were involved again in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations flag. The number of military personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations was at its lowest in 1998. This number has increased since then (see figure 2). Although by the end of 2002 about 50,000 peacekeepers were deployed by organisations other than the United Nations, some 39,000 already were.⁴³ This is, amongst other things, the consequence of the appearance of yet another 'generation' of peacekeeping operations. It is the sort of robust and integrated peacekeeping operations conceived of by the Brahimi panel.⁴⁴

"There are many tasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. [...] For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations has discovered repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built."⁴⁵

Examples of this 'fifth generation' of UN peacekeeping operations are the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) after its mandate was revised. In essence, the 'fifth generation' of UN peacekeeping operations is a more robust form of peacekeeping operations of the 'second generation' kind. Both are mainly directed at building peace. Moreover, the consent of the conflicting parties is still needed at the start of the operation, in contrast to 'third generation' peacekeeping operations. However, the threat of peace enforcement should prevent the parties from withdrawing their co-operation during the operation. In this way the United Nations hopes to retain the initiative and not to cede it to possible attackers.⁴⁶ In other words, the 'fifth generation' is peacekeeping under a peace enforcement (Chapter VII) mandate.

This form of peacekeeping operations does more than just offer more security to the peacekeepers, it also has the potential to provide better guarantees to the conflicting parties and may help them overcome their security dilemmas. Its role is not so much that of a referee, but rather that of a parent, able to punish the children if they do not listen, but preferring not to impose a penalty at all. If successful, this sort of peacekeeping does not result in Chapter VII activities at all.⁴⁷ It is also in this way that Annan interprets the Brahimi report:

"The Panel's recommendations regarding the use of force apply only to those operations in which armed United Nations peacekeepers have deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. I therefore do not interpret any portions of the Panel's report as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force. The Panel's recommendations for clear mandates, 'robust' rules of engagement, and bigger and better equipped forces must be seen in that light. They are practical measures to achieve deterrence through strength, with the ultimate purpose of diminishing, not increasing, the likelihood for the need of last resort."⁴⁸

In addition to robustness, the Brahimi report also stressed an integrated approach for peace-building, both during the planning phase and during the deployment of peacekeeping operations. For this purpose it recommended the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces.⁴⁹ Moreover, in such integrated missions the coordination of the military, political, humanitarian and development aspects of peacekeeping are placed under the command of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.⁵⁰

The recovery of the importance of UN peace operations can be explained by a combination of four factors. Firstly, although the Security Council no longer saw the United Nations as the primary and most capable organisation to take on peace enforcement operations, it did not mean that it could not carry out the many other necessary operations. In fact, it was still regarded as the primary organisation for this purpose. The United Nations was called upon to do the job where a

transitional authority was needed, in operations, such as, for example in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone Secondly, it soon appeared that not every regional organisation was sufficiently capable of implementing peace operations In many cases the institutional alternatives proved to be even less capable and consequently the Security Council had to turn again to the United Nations Thirdly, not only were regional organisations sometimes involved for perhaps 'suspicious' reasons, but the United Nations also remained the single organisation with the most legitimacy to deal with conflicts⁵¹ Fourthly, after 2001, the United States needed support for its adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq In exchange for this it was no longer able to oppose peacekeeping operations in the rest of the world.⁵² Especially on the African continent the United Nations became very actively involved again in peace operations. Although regional organisations still implemented some peacekeeping operations, African peacekeeping operations basically became United Nations missions⁵³

By 2005 the United Nations was once again the main peacekeeping organisation It regained confidence and retook the initiative it had lost during the 1990s Although most enforcement actions were regarded to be better off in the hands of coalitions of the willing acting under the authorisation of the Security Council, and the organisation faced several scandals, including accusations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, the United Nations remained the primary global organisation best-equipped and with the most legitimacy to implement complex integrated peace operations⁵⁴

2.2 Creating clarity in the conceptual chaos

2.2.1 The proliferation of a concept

The historical overview in section 2.1 shows how UN peacekeeping operations have changed and expanded over time from cease-fire monitoring to comprehensive operations incorporating many different tasks This development has also influenced the denotation of the concept of peacekeeping operations Although, as mentioned earlier, the practice of peacekeeping operations originated in the late 1940s, the term itself only gained currency in the 1960s⁵⁵ Since the end of the Cold War the analytical concept of peacekeeping operations has been stretched to its limits According to Weiss

"recent UN military operations are so different in scope and mandate that they can be characterized as 'peacekeeping' only by stretching analytical categories to the breaking point"⁵⁶

According to Evans, the fact that several operations that were established under a Chapter VII – peace enforcing – mandate are treated as peacekeeping operations, is really for budgetary, as well as for administrative reasons⁵⁷ James argues that

"Institutions are not overly committed to logic, especially if, as in this matter, there is some benefit to employ a tried and appealing terminology After all, 'peacekeeping' has a splendid resonance Thus it could be that the UN (and others) have been putting an old label on a new type of activity They may, in other words, have been engaged in political smuggling"⁵⁸

Indeed, as Tharoor points out "peacekeeping was an activity the United Nations has been politically reluctant to define" He gives the example of the Special

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations⁵⁹, which has often considered making a definition of the concept, but has refrained from doing so on the grounds that “to define peacekeeping was to impose a strait-jacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument of the world organisation.”⁶⁰

This leeway has made it possible for peacekeeping operations to become a catch-all phrase for activities that not only embrace traditional peacekeeping but also a wide range of other ‘policy tools’, including the organisation of elections and the repatriation of refugees.⁶¹

2.2.2 *The concept as used in this study*

It was decided in chapter 1 that the definition of the subject of this study is borrowed from the United Nations. However, what follows from the above is that no unambiguous definition actually exists. Nevertheless, although the United Nations secretariat has been reluctant to define the concept of peacekeeping operations, only a limited number of operations and actions of the United Nations are referred to as such by the organisation. On what grounds this is done is less transparent. Therefore it is clear what a UN peacekeeping operation is, but it is unclear why. The organisation has contributed to the confusion by proliferating ‘blue speak’ terms like ‘peace operations’, ‘peace support operations’, ‘integrated missions’ and ‘political and peace-building operations’. It has further aggravated this chaos by applying the term peacekeeping operations in cases where such an operation does not operate under a peacekeeping mandate, but rather under a peace enforcement mandate. As a consequence, a peacekeeping operation may not necessarily be involved in ‘peacekeeping’ as such. Therefore, the United Nations does not really contribute to a clear definition of the concept, but rather to a semantic erosion of the concept.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Department of Public Information gives a description of general peacekeeping operations:

“Peacekeeping operations and their deployment are authorized by the Security Council, with the consent of the host government and usually of the other parties involved. They may include military and police personnel, together with civilian staff. Operations may involve military observer missions, peacekeeping forces or a combination of both. Military observer missions are made up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or ceasefire. The soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defence”⁶²

It emphasises that the concept of peacekeeping operations is “constantly evolving in the light of changing circumstances.”⁶³ As already noticed, this evolving character of the concept also appears from the historical overview. The Department of Public Information describes the tasks discharged by peacekeeping operations over the years as including:

- *Maintenance of ceasefires and separation of forces* By providing “breathing space,” an operation based on a limited agreement between parties can foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiations.
- *Preventive deployment.* Deployment before conflict breaks out, an operation can provide a reassuring presence and a degree of transparency which favour political progress.
- *Protection of humanitarian operations* In many conflicts, civilian populations have been deliberately targeted as a means to gain political ends. In such situations, peacekeepers have been asked to provide protection and support for humanitarian

operations. However, such tasks can place peacekeepers in difficult political positions, and can lead to threats to their own security.

- *Implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement* Complex, multi-dimensional operations, deployed on the basis of comprehensive peace agreements, can assist in such diverse tasks as providing humanitarian assistance, monitoring human rights, observing elections and coordinating support for economic reconstruction.⁶⁴

It stresses that this catalogue cannot possibly be exhaustive. The organisation points at the necessary freedom to further evolve the concept in order to face future challenges.

“Future conflicts are likely to continue to present complex challenges to the international community. An effective response will require courageous and imaginative use of the tools of peace.”⁶⁵

In the working definition of peacekeeping operations, these ‘tools of peace’, or so-called ‘policy tools’, play an important role. The concept of peacekeeping operations is, as shown above, a pragmatic ‘tool’ of the ‘international community’, through the United Nations, and its concept is flexible. What nowadays is considered to be part of a peacekeeping operation is so broad that for this study it is justified taking the following as a working definition of peacekeeping operations: *a collection of ‘policy tools’ that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace*.

Reychler compares peace-building with architecture. Indeed, if one wants to assess the quality of a house that is built, it does not suffice to look only at the performance of the tools used in their specific tasks. A hammer may have correctly hit many nails into a board, but if that board did not constitute a part of what we call a house, the hammer did not contribute to the building of the house. In such a case one also needs to review whether the architectural plan envisaged a house and not just a pile of wood.⁶⁶ One can, however, also define what an ideal house looks like, and then assess whether the hammer used contributed to the building of it. Also in this research, ideal peace is first defined and subsequently whether the implementation of the policy tools and the quality of their work has contributed to ideal peace is examined. It might then also be better to review whether the (architectural) peace plan was sufficiently adequate. Although one still has to be aware that a peacekeeping operation may be more than the sum of these tools, for the purpose of this analysis it has been chosen to accept the limitations that follow from this decision. (See also chapter 3)

2.3 ‘Policy tools’ and their standardised inventory

The above working definition leads to the question: what exactly is meant by a ‘policy tool’? A ‘policy tool’ is the means used or the intervention technique. There is a wide range of such techniques, programmes and methods that can be used during the different phases of a conflict. They can support actions from conflict prevention, through conflict mitigation to peace-building. Their success depends very much on the phase and nature of the conflict in which they are implemented. Lund is the scholar who is the main developer of the concept of ‘policy tools’. According to him

“Policy tools can comprise several projects, procedures, programs, policies, or mechanisms. Each tool operates on a conflict’s sources and manifestations by manipulating different kinds of influence — ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks.’”⁶⁷

In order to operationalise the working definition of peacekeeping operations - “a collection of policy tools” - a standardised inventory of ‘policy tools’ needs to be developed. The ‘policy tools’ drawn up in this standardised inventory of the existing ‘tools’ constitute, in different combinations, that which is referred to as peacekeeping operations. The standardised inventory makes it possible to make a more structured comparison of the peacekeeping operations in the case studies.

In the literature, these ‘policy tools’ have already been placed in so-called ‘toolboxes’. Nonetheless, no comprehensive toolbox exists specifically for UN peacekeeping operations. They are often not directed at the United Nations, but at other types of organisations ranging from international organisations to national governments. The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) developed a toolbox for the EU.⁶⁸ The Sanctions Working Group of the United States State Department Committee on International Economic Policy constructed one for the US State Department.⁶⁹ The Practitioner’s Guide to Conflict Prevention and Mitigation produced by the private consulting firm Creative Associates International, Inc. for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative aimed to support the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁷⁰ Additionally, different toolboxes have different levels of analysis. The toolbox of the Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat deals with the measures at a macro level and is not very comprehensive.⁷¹ The Early Warning and Preventive Measures Project of the United Nations Staff College and the London School of Economics, on the other hand, describes the tools at a micro level.⁷²

A new toolbox had to be drawn up in the absence of a cut-and-dried toolbox for UN peacekeeping operations that is sufficiently comprehensive to include all the possible policy tools that can be used in peacekeeping operations nowadays. In order to create this standard inventory of ‘policy tools’ that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace, all the relevant ‘policy tools’ from the ‘toolkits’ mentioned above were compiled and clustered. The result is presented in table 2. This standard inventory is not only illustrative of what sort of ‘policy tools’ peacekeeping may comprise, but also facilitates a more structured comparison of the case studies in this research.

Table 2 - Standard inventory of ‘policy tools’ that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace

- **Cease-fire monitoring:** This policy tool can consist of activities such as truce supervision, military observation, demilitarisation, and confidence-building and security measures. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Cantonment and demobilisation:** Activities covered by this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organisation of the cantonment and demobilisation of armed forces. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Disarmament:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organisation of disarmament processes and arms control. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and to increase the strength of the state with regard to its monopoly on violence.

- **Reintegration of ex-combatants:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organisation of the reintegration of ex-combatants, including income generation for demobilised military personnel, and reintegration and vocational training. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Institution building:** This policy tool can consist of activities to strengthen the state within a variety of fields. Activities within this policy tool in the military field also intend to contribute to negative peace and can range from the monitoring of to the actual restructuring or integration of military forces; professionalisation or reform of armed forces; military aid; and military-to-military programmes. In the field of internal security and judicial and legal issues, this policy instrument consists of activities that also aim to contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as civilian police reform; civilian police training and capacity building; judicial/legal reforms; support for legal institutions; support of indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions; civic society development; and human rights institution-building. In the field of governance this policy instrument consists of activities which again may also contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as political party-building; political institution-building; training of public officials; and government reform and strengthening. In addition, these institutions can be reformed to become more neutral and credible to contribute to the legitimacy of the state.
- **Verification of foreign forces withdrawal:** This policy tool can consist of monitoring, verification and supervision activities with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the country where the operation is conducted. As such it aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and the removal of external causes of conflict.
- **Winning the hearts and minds of the local population:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the establishment of UN television and radio; the promotion of alternative information and communication sources; the provision of civic and peace education; and broad-based political participation/stimulation of democracy. It may be used to win the population for negative peace, but it can also be targeted at decreasing tension amongst the population and improving inter-group relations.
- **Diplomacy:** This policy tool can consist of a wide variety of activities, including mediation; negotiations; conciliation; good offices; informal consultations; peace conferences; dialogue facilitation; high level consultation and diplomacy; fact-finding missions; special envoys; "friends" groups; and statements by the Security Council and Secretary-General of appeal or condemnation. It is aimed to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and in the case of international diplomacy also to address the external causes of conflict.
- **Sanctions verification:** This policy tool can consist of diplomatic, cultural and economic sanctions or moratoria. An example is also market closure for warlords. It aims to contribute to negative peace.
- **Civil administration controlling:** This policy tool can consist of the monitoring, supervision, verification and controlling of the civil administration at all levels of government. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and good governance, and to the addressing of state unwillingness.
- **Civilian police monitoring:** This policy tool can consist of the monitoring and verification of the civilian police, as well as the investigation of complaints and their possible correction. It aims to contribute to the establishment of good governance, and to the addressing of state unwillingness.
- **Border monitoring:** This policy tool consists of border monitoring in order to verify or enforce, amongst other things, arms embargoes or blockades; to prevent illicit arms trade; and to control arms proliferation. It may be aimed to contribute to negative peace and/or the addressing of external causes of conflict.

- **Providing pay to the newly-formed national army:** This policy tool consists of the funding of the army and/or civilian police, to enable these institutions to pay their employees. It aims to contribute to the strength of the state.
- **Repatriation:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organisation of the repatriation process for refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. It aims to address demographic pressures.
- **Reintegration of refugees:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organisation of the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, including income-generation projects and vocational training. It aims to address demographic pressures.
- **Mine clearance:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the supervision of to the actual clearing of mines, both in the short term, emergency demining, and in the medium to long term. It aims to address demographic pressures and economic decline.
- **Humanitarian aid:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual provision of humanitarian assistance, relief and food aid to refugees, IDPs and others in need. It aims to address demographic pressures.
- **Providing law and order:** This policy tool consists of activities to secure the presence of law and order. These activities can range from limited military intervention to safeguarding the provision of humanitarian aid to the restoration or maintenance of public law and order, and securing the safety of important political leaders and politicians. Depending on these goals, the aim of this policy instrument is to address demographic pressures, state weakness, or state unwillingness and to stimulate good governance respectively.
- **Society building:** This policy tool consists of activities aimed to address state weakness and strengthen the cohesion and integration of society. These activities may range from minor development programmes and aid to civil society in an attempt to restructure the organisation of society.
- **Rehabilitation:** This policy tool consists of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities, such as, amongst other things, healthcare improvement, and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. It aims to address state weakness and in some cases also unemployment and economic decline.
- **Human rights verification:** This policy tool consists of the monitoring and verification of human rights, as well as the investigation and correction of human rights violations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Human rights education:** This policy tool consists of the educational, training and awareness raising activities with regard to legal, judicial and human rights issues for both government personnel, as well as the public at large. It also consists of activities for the promotion of good governance and transparency. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Truth commissions:** This policy tool consists of assistance to, or verification of or the actual organisation of a variety of activities ranging from truth commissions to war crimes tribunals. The objective of these activities is both to deal with the past and to improve inter-group relations, as well as to end impunity and state unwillingness, and to contribute to good governance.
- **Organisation of elections:** Activities within this policy tool can range from providing assistance and support for the organisation of elections to their actual organisation. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Election monitoring:** This policy tool consists of election monitoring activities by the United Nations itself or assistance to monitoring activities by other organisations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

Some of these policy tools may be part of a peacekeeping operation while they are implemented by other agencies, programmes, funds or institutions of the United Nations. For example, although the repatriation and reintegration of refugees is often part of a peacekeeping operation, this task is generally implemented by the UNHCR. In addition, diplomacy is often supported by the Secretary-General and the UNDP is also often involved in the implementation of other parts of the operation. They can, however, still be considered to be part of the peacekeeping operation if they originate from its mandate.

2.4 Factors for success and failure

Although it is only in the last ten to fifteen years that peacekeeping operations in general have become a more common subject for scholarly research, several factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations have been defined in the theoretical and policy literature. The following nine factors are the most common factors presented in this body of scholarly literature.⁷³

2.4.1 The parties are willing and sincere and the operation is impartial and applies the principle of the non-use of force

The United Nations secretariat states that the genuine desire on the part of combatants to resolve their differences peacefully is a prerequisite for the success of an operation.⁷⁴ The consent of the parties alone is, however, not regarded to be sufficient, as support from the majority of the population is also needed. Consent is viewed to be important because if it is not there, or is lost, then the operation can only implement its mandate through military force. This would, nonetheless, mean that it would lose its peacekeeping character and that would necessitate a different mandate.⁷⁵ This is exactly what went wrong in the third generation operations, many of which became caught up in the middle ground between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Nowadays, the thinking is again that a peacekeeping operation needs to remain impartial and has to be regarded as impartial, because otherwise it runs the risk of losing the consent of the parties.⁷⁶ The Brahimi report concludes that the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence “should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping”.⁷⁷

Doyle and Sambanis found that an operation has the best chance of success if the parties have underlined their genuine desire for peace with a formal peace agreement.⁷⁸ However, according to many scholars, the presence of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict alters the situation on the ground. It forces the belligerents to re-assess the dangers and opportunities as a result of the introduction of the new factor. They argue that each party will question whether the ‘road of peace’ still best serves its interests. The answer to this question depends largely on the belligerent’s momentum and military position. Each party will also question whether it views the United Nations as the best vehicle to travel the road it has chosen. Therefore, the parties may view a peace process accompanied by a peace operation as a desirable alternative to war, but they can also see the mission as a threat to their security and interests. Nonetheless, even if an uncooperative party, or spoiler, chooses war, it may view the operation as an opportunity to manipulate the situation or to recuperate. In such a case, parties may be insincere and break their promises later on. The choices parties make are thought to depend, to a considerable extent, on the design, type and configuration

of the mission. If the operation offers realistic peace they would be likely to react differently than if it is merely a token force.⁷⁹

Sincerity at the time a peace agreement is signed is, however, not regarded to be sufficient by many scholars. They point out that peace agreements often bring tensions within parties to the surface; the unity that was maintained for the sake of war can easily be lost once peace breaks out. Peace can then frustrate the aims of certain parts of a coalition, providing reasons for splinter groups to break away. Moreover, even if a party sincerely intended to reach peace, it most often does not do so unconditionally and may become disappointed. Subsequently, it is often difficult to distinguish disappointment from insincerity. In addition, such a condition does not necessarily have to be publicly and explicitly stated in a peace agreement. For example, UNITA in Angola expected to win the elections and only for that reason did it agree to sign the peace accords. When this condition was not met, it was disappointed and rekindled the conflict.⁸⁰

The Brahimi panel also noticed that local parties can agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation with insincere intentions, that they can always withdraw consent once a peacekeeping operation no longer serves their interests, and that although the leadership may agree to the deployment of an operation, the fighting forces may be under loose control and oppose it.⁸¹ It is exactly for this reason that the Brahimi report tones down its own statement on the importance of the consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force. It acknowledges that if parties withdraw their consent once an operation is deployed, it should also be able to defend its mandate. Impartiality in that case is defined as “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.” The non-use of violence is also, in some cases, abandoned because it is not only regarded as “operationally justified” but also as “morally compelled”. Peacekeeping operations should, according to the report, be willing to use force in order to defend, amongst other things, the mandate and civilians.⁸²

2.4.2 The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties, and is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties

The United Nations secretariat also names strong political support by the international community and the provision of the resources necessary to achieve the operation’s objectives as prerequisites for the success of an operation.⁸³ Several scholars also found that the chances of success of a peacekeeping operation are greater if the “international community” embodied by the permanent members of the Security Council and the troop contributing countries fully support the operation and back it with funds and resources.⁸⁴ Bratt points in particular at the importance of support from the United States.⁸⁵ According to Evans and Pushkina, it is also essential that outside backers and suppliers of the conflicting parties end their support of violent means and stimulate the non-violent resolution of the conflict.⁸⁶ Wesley and Bratt even argue that the link of member states with the belligerents is potentially one of the most important mechanisms for influencing a peacekeeping operation. Member states often have or have had such a sponsoring link with the internal conflict parties. If these member states feel they have an interest in using their links to restrain their clients, it provides the peacekeeping operation with enormous leverage over the protagonists. It is argued that the more dependent the protagonists are on these links, the greater the chance of co-operation.⁸⁷

The reports of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda and the Secretary-General on Srebrenica clearly show that an important reason why the United Nations failed in these cases was the lack of political will.⁸⁸ In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali also warned that a lack of political will, and following on from this, the lack of finances with the United Nations to implement the tasks assigned to it, is “dangerous”.⁸⁹ A peacekeeping operation must after all be adequately resourced in order to implement its mandate. The reason for this is, amongst other things, that tasks such as the disarmament and demobilisation of parties require sufficient strength to guarantee the security of the parties.⁹⁰ Strong external third-party involvement is also key in what Hampson calls ‘fostering ripeness’. He describes ripeness as a “fostered, not inherited condition.”⁹¹ Parties must perceive the intervention as sustained, committed and credible. Carment and Rowlands point out that the chances of success increase considerably if the parties see that the third party is willing to enforce the settlement.⁹² According to the Brahimi report, military components of peacekeeping operations “must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate.”⁹³ This is a broad concept of self-defence, as it includes the possibility that peacekeeping operations might have to use force and should be prepared to do so against those who target civilians or deny humanitarian access to civilian populations. What follows from this is that peacekeeping operations should not be prepared for best-case scenarios, but for worst-case scenarios. The Secretariat has, however, in the view of the Brahimi report, often applied “best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour.”⁹⁴ Generally speaking, this lesson has been implemented in fifth generation peacekeeping operations.

2.4.3 The operation is based on a clear, appropriate and achievable mandate

The United Nations secretariat gives a clear mandate as a further prerequisite for the success of an operation.⁹⁵ The objectives stated in a mission’s mandate are generally regarded to be of enormous importance to the success of a peacekeeping operation. A clear, appropriate and achievable mandate is even a condition for participation of Dutch forces.⁹⁶ The Brahimi report also views a clear, credible and achievable mandate as very important.⁹⁷ The extent to which mandates are achievable and appropriate to the situation on the ground depends on the diagnosis of the conflict on which the objectives are based. Therefore, good planning is regarded as a necessity. Further problems are thought to arise as a result of the vagueness of some peace agreements, which are, most of the time, diplomatically phrased compromises at the end of a negotiating process. Moreover, disagreement within the Security Council may also lead to ambiguous mandates.⁹⁸ The report of the Secretary-General on the fall of Srebrenica stated that:

“with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the United Nations made flowed from a single and no doubt well-intentioned effort; we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep. [...] we tried to create – or imagine – an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping – agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality – could be upheld.”⁹⁹

Since the problematic third generation peacekeeping operations, it is now generally acknowledged that if one intervenes in a conflict, one must realise that every phase and every level of a conflict requires different ‘policy tools’ to influence the course of the conflict, and that one cannot unthinkingly and

indiscriminately apply every sort of intervention in each phase or at each level of conflict. Although it is not necessarily the case that specific interventions are fixed to specific phases or levels of conflict, the international political, as well as scholarly, community has arrived at the conclusion that too free an interpretation may lead to disaster. Peacekeeping, for example, is regarded to be a rather dangerous business if a conflict has reached the level of war, as in most cases of the third generation operations. In addition, in such a situation it is also a rather useless tool as there is no peace to keep¹⁰⁰. Furthermore, Doyle and Sambanis found that more extensive mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping operations are “highly significant determinants” and “positively and significantly correlated” to successful peace-building¹⁰¹.

2.4.4 The operation is deployed in good time and at the right time

Although there is a tendency to pay attention to conflicts only once they have reached the level of crisis or even war, intervening at such a late stage significantly decreases the possibilities for outside actors. This reduction in potential is, according to the Conflict Prevention Network, brought about in two respects. First, at a stage of high intensity the ‘policy tools’ to positively influence the course of a conflict are limited. Second, since at such a late stage there is only little time to analyse the causes of conflict, there is a tendency to react to events, rather than to follow a proactive policy. It has, consequently, generally been acknowledged that the best prospects for successful outside intervention in a conflict is at the level of both stable and unstable peace, either during the pre- or the post-conflict phase. Additionally, many consider the pre-conflict phase to be the most suitable phase for intervention, as a wide variety of measures are still available to address the root causes of the conflict and the conflict has not yet acquired its own dynamics¹⁰². As the saying goes “an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure.” Similarly, it is also thought that if conflict can be prevented many costs can be avoided, not only in terms of human lives, but even, according to Brown and Rosecrance, financially¹⁰³. Indeed, Heldt found that statistically speaking, the longer the period from the start of the conflict to the deployment of the operation, the greater the chance of continued warfare¹⁰⁴.

Doyle and Sambanis had contradictory statistical findings. According to them, it seems that the longer a conflict has raged before the United Nations appears on the scene, the greater the chance of success. They explained their findings by arguing that it is likely that war-weariness strengthens the parties in their desire for peace¹⁰⁵. Indeed, many scholars argue that in order for negotiations to even have a chance of being successful, a conflict needs to be, what Zartman calls, ‘ripe’. According to these scholars, the dynamics of a conflict must have produced a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ on the battlefield and the parties must be sufficiently exhausted in order to consider a political solution to the conflict – a new equilibrium must exist. If such a deadlock is too painful and a victory is not in sight, parties perceive negotiations as a way out. Such a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ should, according to Zartman, be seen in the light of a simple cost-benefit analysis. The costs of negotiations perceived by the parties should be less than the costs of continuing the fight. As a result, the moment of ‘ripeness’ can appear and reappear throughout the whole period of a conflict and it can be seized, as well as passed by. The concept does, however, imply that the success of conflict resolution depends to a large extent on factors intrinsic to the conflict.

process and third-party involvement plays a less important, more accommodating role.¹⁰⁶

Once the parties agree to the deployment of a peace operation, rapid deployment is often viewed as essential. The Brahimi report argues that the first twelve weeks following a peace agreement or cease-fire are of enormous importance because the belligerents assess the ability and credibility of an operation to implement its mandate most often at the start of the mission. Therefore, it is thought that if an operation does not manifest these capacities during this period, the consent or co-operation of the parties may be affected. At the same time, the slow deployment of a peacekeeping operation may mean the momentum for peace might be lost.¹⁰⁷

2.4.5 The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

Diehl points out the importance of effective command structures to enhance the chances of success.¹⁰⁸ The Brahimi report went as far as to say that “the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.” However, not only the leadership of an operation is regarded as important. Military and other personnel also contributed by the member states are expected to be sufficiently trained and equipped for the job.¹⁰⁹

2.4.6 The operation has a sufficiently long duration

Heldt found that missions of longer duration have a greater chance of success than shorter operations.¹¹⁰ Chesterman argues that although “a lengthy international presence” does not ensure success “an early departure guarantees failure”.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of peacekeeping in general, Evans maintains that the United Nations has to establish a clear termination point or set of clear termination criteria. To ensure that the renewal of mandates does not become routine, milestones for measuring the progress and explicit sunset clauses can be included in mandates. It is, according to him, however, not always best to take a single event as a signal for departure. For example, the successful organisation of elections may not be sufficient for peace to take root.¹¹²

2.4.7 Within the operation and externally the different ‘policy instruments’ are co-ordinated

Co-ordination and co-operation, both internally and externally, are regarded as very important for peacekeeping operations to succeed. Externally, according to the Brahimi report, operations must be embedded in a broader comprehensive strategy to resolve the conflict and to build durable peace. For this purpose the operation is expected to coordinate with organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNHCR to solve the underlying causes of the conflict. In this respect, a single country approach is viewed to be insufficient as most often the stabilisation of a whole region is necessary to end the conflict.¹¹³ Internally, co-ordination and coherence is also viewed as a means for enhancing the chances of success. According to Evans, it is, for example, necessary for the peace makers and the political leadership of the operation to make peace in order for the Military Component to keep it. Without such co-ordination, if the peacemakers fail, the peacekeepers may become trapped between the parties.¹¹⁴

2.4.8 *The operation provides 'ownership'*

Ownership is one of the major buzzwords in the peacekeeping business. Its meaning is not fully clear, but includes the consent of and accountability to the local population. In essence, the local population should feel that the result of the operation is what it wanted and that the country has not become a trusteeship occupied by a foreign military force. Nonetheless, Chesterman notes that ownership can only be the end and not the means of the operation. After all, if the countries where peace operations are conducted were capable of ownership, they would not need an international presence. He argues that it is exactly the absence of consensus over strategies and the resultant conflict that calls for a peacekeeping operation to intervene. However, during the process of political normalisation, opportunities for more accountability develop and the failure to establish mechanisms to do so may also create frustration amongst the local parties and population.¹¹⁵

2.4.9 *The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth:*

In order to prevent the resumption of conflict, addressing the underlying causes of the conflict is deemed to be important. Efforts at reconstruction may be doomed if these causes persist. For example, several observers of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina expect a resumption of the conflict once the international peacekeeping force leaves.¹¹⁶

Summary

This chapter placed UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects in the context of UN peacekeeping operations in general. A working definition has been developed: a collection of 'policy tools', and a standard inventory of policy tools that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace, was created. In addition, an overview of factors for success and failure given in the existing body of scholarly literature and lessons learned, has been reviewed. Having looked more closely at the object of research, the next chapter elaborates on the methodology used to study what its contribution to durable peace is.

¹ Strictly speaking the UN organisation does not have its own policy. The United Nations forms an intergovernmental organisation that implements the policies of its member states. One can argue that the UN organisation is actually a 'policy tool' of the member states. Nevertheless, once the organisation has been given the task to carry out a peacekeeping operation, then it has a wide range of 'policy tools' at its disposal to perform this task. As a result, the organisation does have some room to develop its own policy, irrespective of the limitations.

² ARNOLD, T.F. & H.R. RULAND (1996), "The 'prehistory' of peacekeeping", in: BENTON, B. (ed.), *Soldiers for peace. fifty years of United Nations peacekeeping*, New York, pp. 10-23

³ LIU, F.T. (1994), "Evolution of UN peacekeeping operations", in CLEMENTS, K. & C. WILSON (1994), *UN peacekeeping at the crossroads*, Canberra, pp. 60-75

These operations are, nevertheless, not considered to be UN peacekeeping operations by the United Nations itself as their personnel was not under the auspices of the United Nations but under national command.

⁴ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1985), *The blue helmets a review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, New York, pp. 3-8; and UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1996), *The Blue Helmets a review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, third edition, New York.

⁵ KOOLMANS, P.H. (2000), *International publiekrecht in vogelvlucht*, Deventer; 8th edition, pp. 175-176.

- ⁶ Although the concept of generations in peacekeeping operations is widely used and also applied in this study, one has to be aware of its downside. First of all it implies a development over time. This is certainly not always true. Some of the early operations anticipated later generations and as such were ahead of their time. At the same time, generations have (so far) not died out. Peacekeeping operations of older generations still continue today. Moreover, during the heydays of younger generations, older generations were still established. Second, one might even question whether all peacekeeping operations should, indeed, be referred to as 'peacekeeping'. Humanitarian intervention or peace enforcement might in some cases be better. The United Nations itself does, however, still cling to the term peacekeeping operation and as long as it remains the lingua franca this study follows their definition of peacekeeping operations. See: RATNER, *The UN peacekeeping*, pp. 16-21; BOUTROS-GHALI, B. (1996), "Introduction", in: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 3-9; and DOYLE, M. W. (1995), *UN peacekeeping in Cambodia. UNTAC's civil mandate*, Boulder – London, pp. 76-80. For some critical reviews of the concept see amongst others: CHOPRA, J. (January-March 1998), "Introducing Peace-Maintenance", *Global Governance*, 4(1), pp. 1-18, on p. 6; and JAMES, A. (September-November 1994), "Is there a second generation of peacekeeping?", *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 110-113.
- ⁷ GOULDING, M. (1993), "The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping", *International Affairs*, 69(3), pp. 451-464, on p. 452.
- ⁸ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1985), *The blue helmets*, p. 3.
- ⁹ RATNER, *The UN peacekeeping*, p. 10.
- ¹⁰ MACKINLAY, J. & J. CHOPRA (Summer 1992), "Second generation multinational operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, 15(3), pp. 113-131, on pp. 114-115.
- ¹¹ EVANS, G. (1993), *Cooperating for peace: the global agenda for the 1990s and beyond*, St. Leonards, p. 104.
- ¹² UN DOC S/11052/rev. 1, 27 October 1973, 3 and 4.
- ¹³ MACKINLAY & CHOPRA, "Second generation multinational operations", pp. 114-115.
- ¹⁴ MALAN, M. (1997), "A concise conceptual history of UN peace operations", *African Security Review*, 6(1), pp. 16-27, on p. 18.
- ¹⁵ UN DOC S/RES/161 (1961), 21 February 1961.
- ¹⁶ UN DOC S/RES/169 (1961), 24 November 1961.
- ¹⁷ UN DOC S/11052/rev. 1, 27 October 1973, 4d.
- ¹⁸ ROBERTS, A. (Winter 1995-1996), "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: the UN and the use of force", *Survival*, 37(4), pp. 7-28, on p. 14.
- ¹⁹ MACKINLAY & CHOPRA, "Second generation multinational operations", pp. 114-115.
- ²⁰ THAROOR, S. (Winter 1995-1996), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", *Survival*, 37(4), pp. 52-64, on p. 53; and THAROOR, S. (1996), "The changing face of peacekeeping", in: BENTON, B. (ed.), *Soldiers for peace: fifty years of United Nations peacekeeping*, New York, pp. 209-223, on p. 210.
- ²¹ MALAN, "A concise conceptual history of UN peace operations", pp. 22-23.
- ²² CHOPRA, "Introducing Peace-Maintenance", pp. 1-18.
- ²³ MALAN, "A concise conceptual history of UN peace operations", pp. 22-23, and EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, pp. 104-106.
- ²⁴ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (October 1998), *UN peacekeeping 50 years 1948-1998*, New York, pp. 14-15.
- ²⁵ RATNER, *The UN peacekeeping*, p. 22.
- ²⁶ JAMES, "Is there a second generation of peacekeeping?", p. 111.
- ²⁷ GOULDING, "The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping", p. 452-453.
- ²⁸ ROBERTS, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo", pp. 7-28.
- ²⁹ FINDLAY, T. ed. (1996), *Challenges for the new peacekeepers*, SIPRI research report, 12, Oxford, p. 2.
- ³⁰ GOULDING, "The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping", pp. 452-453.
- ³¹ MALAN, M. (1998), "Peacekeeping in the new millennium: towards 'fourth generation' peace operations?", *African Security Review*, 7(3), pp. 13-20, on p. 15.
- ³² MALAN, M. (March 1996), *Surveying the middle ground: conceptual issues and peace-keeping in Southern Africa*, Occasional paper, 2; and MALAN, "A concise conceptual history of UN peace operations", p. 23.
- ³³ THAROOR, "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", p. 58; and THAROOR, "The changing face of peacekeeping", p. 217.

- ³⁴ MALAN, "Peacekeeping in the new millennium", pp. 17-19.
- ³⁵ THAROOR, "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", pp. 52-64; and THAROOR, "The changing face of peacekeeping", pp. 209-223.
- ³⁶ RYAN, S (2000), "United Nations peacekeeping: a matter of principles?", *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), pp 27-47, on p 30-31.
- ³⁷ BOUTROS-GHALLI, B. (1996), "Preface: the evolution of peacekeeping policy", in: BENTON, B (ed), *Soldiers for peace fifty years of United Nations peacekeeping*, New York, pp. 2-4.
- ³⁸ UN DOC A/51/950, 14 July 1997, 107-109.
- ³⁹ ROBERTS, A (1996), "The crisis in UN peacekeeping", in: CROCKER, C A. & F.O. HAMPSON, with P. AALL, eds., *Managing global chaos sources of and responses to international conflict*, Washington DC, pp. 297-319.
- ⁴⁰ GRIFFIN, M (1999), "Blue helmets: assessing the trend towards 'subcontracting' UN peace operations", *Security Dialogue*, 30(1), pp. 43-60, on p 47
- ⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp 43-60
- ⁴² UN DOC A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
- ⁴³ BELLAMY, A.J. & P. WILLIAMS (2004), "Conclusions: what future for peace operations? Brahimi and beyond", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), p. 183-212, on p. 184.
- ⁴⁴ UN DOC A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000
- ⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, 1 and 3.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibidem*
- ⁴⁷ LIJN, J. VAN DER (1998), 'Een bevredigend resultaat? Het succes van VN-vredesmissies van de tweede generatie: UNTAC (1991-1993) nader bekeken' (Master's thesis University of Utrecht)
- ⁴⁸ UN DOC A/55/502, 20 October 2000, 7(e).
- ⁴⁹ UN DOC A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 198-217
- ⁵⁰ UN DOC A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 99-100
- ⁵¹ BERDAL, M. (2003), "Ten years of international peacekeeping", *International Peacekeeping*, 10(4), pp. 5-11, on pp. 10-11.
- ⁵² Interview Nieuwenhuis, New York, 27 January 2005.
- ⁵³ NORBERG, A H. (2003) "Challenges of peace operations", *International Peacekeeping*, 10(4), pp. 94-103, on pp. 96-97.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 96-97.
- ⁵⁵ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1985), *The blue helmets*, p 3
- ⁵⁶ WEISS, T G (September 1993), "UN military operations after the Cold War. some conceptual problems", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 23(1), pp 5-8, on p. 6.
- ⁵⁷ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, pp. 99-103.
- ⁵⁸ JAMES, "Is there a second generation of peacekeeping?", p. 110.
- ⁵⁹ The General Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations through its resolution 2066 (XIX) of 18 February 1965 and provided it with the mandate to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping.
- ⁶⁰ THAROOR, "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", p. 56.
- ⁶¹ THAROOR, "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", p 54; and THAROOR, "The changing face of peacekeeping", p. 212
- ⁶² UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2000), *Basic facts about the United Nations*, p. 73.
- ⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 76.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 76
- ⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 77.
- ⁶⁶ REYCHLER, L (1999), *Democratic peace-building and conflict prevention the devil is in the transition*, Leuven, pp.39-56; and REYCHLER, L. (2001), "Vredesarchitectuur", in: VAN DER LIJN, J & A PAUWELS, *Conflictonderzoek in het Nederlandse taalgebied: problemen bij onderzoek naar het ononderzoekbare?*, Nijmegen, pp 75-88
- ⁶⁷ CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC (1997), *Conflict prevention a guide*, Washington DC, <http://www.caii.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDataBase/resources/ghai/default.htm>
- ⁶⁸ These are: 1) Awareness raising; 2) Stimulation of public debate; 3) Strengthening of professional standards; 4) Capacity building; 5) Strengthening of the role of political and public institutions; 6) Improvement of the performance of public services; 7) Access to basic needs and public services; 8) Monitoring and controlling; 9) Development of domestic systems of

accountability; 10) Re-establishment of trust and reconciliation; 11) Creation of opportunities for dialogue; 12) Alternative dispute resolution; 13) Political dialogue; 14) International incentives and sanctions, 15) Demobilisation and reintegration; and 16) Elections.

CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK (June 1999), *Peace building & conflict prevention in developing countries a practical guide (draft document)*, Brussels - Ebenhausen.

⁶⁹ BAKER, P.H. & A.E. WELLER, (1998), *An analytical model of internal conflict and state collapse: manual for practitioners*, Fund for Peace; Washington DC, p. 54.

⁷⁰ CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC, *Conflict prevention: a guide*

⁷¹ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *UN peacekeeping. 50 years 1948-1998*, pp. 14-15

⁷² UNITED NATIONS STAFF COLLEGE, EARLY WARNING AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES PROJECT (22 March 1999), *Typology and survey of preventive measures. Rolling EWPM project reference document*; and COCKELL, J.G. (2003), "Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive action", in: CARMENT, D. & A. SCHNABEL, *Conflict prevention path to peace or grand illusion*, London, pp 182-206.

⁷³ Although some research points out that factors such as the duration and intensity of the conflict, the number of factions, the type of conflict (ethnic, identity, language, etc.) and the level of democracy and economic development in the country are of great relevance to the chances of success, the overview does not look at these endogenous factors. For good statistical research on these factors, see: FORTNA, V.P. (2004), "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war", *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(2), pp. 269-292, DOYLE, M.W. & N. SAMBANIS (2000), "International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis", *American Political Science Review*, 94(4), pp. 779-801; DOYLE, M.W. & N. SAMBANIS (27 December 1999), *Building peace: challenges and strategies after civil war*, <http://econ.worldbank.org/files/13206_DSBuildingPeace.pdf>; and HELDT, B. (2001), *Conditions for successful intrastate peacekeeping missions*, Stockholm, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/conferenses/Euroconference/heldt_paper.pdf>, pp 32-33..

⁷⁴ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *Basic facts about the United Nations*, p. 75.

⁷⁵ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, pp 111-112; PUSHKINA, D. (2004), "Towards successful peace-keeping: remembering Croatia", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(4), pp. 393-415, pp. 405-406, BRATT, D. (1997), "Explaining peacekeeping performance: the UN in internal conflicts", *International Peacekeeping*, 4(3), pp 45-70, on pp 47-48; RATNER, *The UN peacekeeping*, pp. 37-41; and DOYLE, M., I. JOHNSTONE & R. ORR (1997), "Strategies for peace: conclusions and lessons", in: DOYLE, M., I. JOHNSTONE & R. ORR, eds. (1997), *Keeping the peace: multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge, pp 369-391, p. 378.

⁷⁶ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, pp. 110-111.

⁷⁷ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 48

⁷⁸ DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, p. 25.

⁷⁹ WESLEY, M. (1997), *Casualties of the new world order the causes of failure of UN missions to civil wars*, Basingstoke, pp. 23-26, PUSHKINA, "Towards successful peace-keeping", pp. 409-410; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, p. 9; CARMENT, D. & D. ROWLANDS (1998), "Three's company. evaluating third-party intervention in intrastate conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(5), pp 572-599, on p 580, SMITH, D. (2000), "Trends and causes of armed conflicts", in: ROPERS, N., et al., eds, *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation*, <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/smith_handbook.pdf>, p. 3; STEDMAN, S.J (Autumn 1997), "Spoiler problems in peace processes", *International Security*, 22(2), pp. 5-53; and STEDMAN, S.J. (2000), "Spoiler problems in peace processes", in: STERN, P.C. & D. DRUCKMAN, eds., *International conflict resolution after the Cold War*, Washington DC, <<http://books.nap.edu/books/0309070279/html/178.html#pagetop>>, pp. 178-224.

⁸⁰ WESLEY, *Casualties of the new world order*, pp. 23-26; PUSHKINA, "Towards successful peace-keeping", pp. 409-410; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, p. 9; CARMENT & ROWLANDS, "Three's company", p. 580; SMITH, "Trends and causes of armed conflicts", p. 3; STEDMAN, "Spoiler problems in peace processes", pp. 5-53, and STEDMAN, "Spoiler problems in peace processes", pp. 178-224.

⁸¹ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 48.

⁸² UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 49-51 and 62.

⁸³ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *Basic facts about the United Nations*, p. 75.

- ⁸⁴ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, p. 104; BRATT, "Explaining peacekeeping performance", pp. 51-57; and DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, pp. 10-11
- ⁸⁵ BRATT, "Explaining peacekeeping performance", pp. 67-60.
- ⁸⁶ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, p. 113; and PUSHKINA, "Towards successful peace-keeping", pp. 405-406.
- ⁸⁷ WESLEY, *Casualties of the new world order*, pp. 26-27; and BRATT, "Explaining peacekeeping performance", pp. 60-62.
- ⁸⁸ UN DOC S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; and UN DOC A/54/549, 15 November 1999.
- ⁸⁹ UN DOC A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, 35.
- ⁹⁰ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, p. 110; PUSHKINA, "Towards successful peace-keeping", pp. 393-415, on p. 400, PARIS, R. (2000), "Broadening the study of peace operations", *International Studies Review*, 2(3), pp. 27-44, on p. 29; WALTER, B.F. (1999), "Designing transitions from civil war: demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace", *International Security*, 24(1), pp. 127-155, on pp. 154-155; HAMPSON, F.O. (1996), *Nurturing peace Why peace settlements succeed or fail*, Washington DC, pp. 209-214; and CARMENT & ROWLANDS, "Three's company", p. 591.
- ⁹¹ HAMPSON, *Nurturing peace*, p. 210.
- ⁹² CARMENT & ROWLANDS, "Three's company", p. 580.
- ⁹³ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 49
- ⁹⁴ UN DOC A/55/305- S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 51 and 181 It is actually shameful that the Brahimi report had to make a large point putting emphasis on the importance of a well-resourced and structured planning process. It seems obvious that the planning of an operation has to be of the highest possible quality. In 2000, however, the Secretariat lacked the necessary personnel to do the job. At that moment 27,365 military personnel and 8,641 civilian police officers were deployed, supported by only 32 military and 9 civilian police officers at Headquarters. No national government would ever deploy its military and police forces with so little support and planning
- ⁹⁵ UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *Basic facts about the United Nations*, p. 75.
- ⁹⁶ According to the Toetsingskader 2001, see: TWEDE KAMER, vergaderjaar 2000–2001, 23 591 Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden 26 454 Besluitvorming uitzendingen, nr 7 Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie
- ⁹⁷ UN DOC A/55/305- S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 56-64
- ⁹⁸ WESLEY, *Casualties of the new world order*, pp. 22-23; and EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, p. 109.
- ⁹⁹ UN DOC A/54/549, 15 November 1999, 488
- ¹⁰⁰ CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK (June 1999), *Peace building & conflict prevention in developing countries a practical guide (draft document)*, Brussels - Ebenhausen, pp. 19-23; UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (1995), *General guidelines for peacekeeping operations*, Turin, p. 6; A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; ADVIESRAAD VREDE EN VEILIGHEID (1996), *Verloren onschuld Nederland en vredesoperaties*, The Hague; and DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, pp. 26-27.
- ¹⁰¹ DOYLE & SAMBANIS, "International peacebuilding", pp. 790-791.
- ¹⁰² CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK, *Peace building & conflict prevention in developing countries*, p. 23.
- ¹⁰³ BROWN, M E. & R.N. ROSECRANCE (1999), *The costs of conflict. prevention and cure in the global arena*, Lanham.
- ¹⁰⁴ HELDT, *Conditions for successful intrastate peacekeeping missions*, pp. 32-33.
- ¹⁰⁵ DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *Building peace*, pp. 24-25.
- ¹⁰⁶ ZARTMAN, I.W. (2000), "Ripeness: the hurting stalemate and beyond", in: STERN, P.C. & D. DRUCKMAN, eds., *International conflict resolution after the Cold War*, Washington DC, <<http://books.nap.edu/books/0309070279/html/178.html#pagetop>>, pp. 225-250; and HAMPSON, *Nurturing peace*.
- ¹⁰⁷ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 87
- ¹⁰⁸ DIEHL, P.F. (1994), *International Peacekeeping with a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia*, Baltimore -London, pp. 67-69.
- ¹⁰⁹ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 92 and 108
- ¹¹⁰ HELDT, *Conditions for successful intrastate peacekeeping missions*, pp. 32-33
- ¹¹¹ CHESTEMAN, S. (2004), *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration and state-building*, Oxford, p. 246.

¹¹² EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, pp 113-114

¹¹³ UN DOC A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 280

¹¹⁴ EVANS, *Cooperating for peace*, p 110

¹¹⁵ CHESTEMAN, *You the people*, pp 152-153 and pp 241-243

¹¹⁶ SMITH, D (2000), "Trends and causes of armed conflicts", in ROPERS, N , et al , eds , *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation*,
<[http //www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/smith_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/smith_handbook.pdf)>, p 3

3 METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALISATION

Like any 'social' phenomenon, armed conflict is concerned with multiple causality the same outcome can be caused by combinations of different independent variables¹ The concept of multiple causality, and the fact that several categories of causal variables exist, places considerable pressure on research, the collection of data, and on the purpose of data collection inference As there is still a great deal that needs to be known about such a complex social phenomenon as conflicts, it is no trivial task to provide insight into its workings and its remedies One way of data collection is the single case study However valuable case studies may be for description purposes, they do not easily lend themselves to structured comparison and the orderly cumulation of theory If the explanation of a phenomenon, to be more specific of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects, remains restricted only to a single case it might handicap the development of theory 'Theory' attempts to absorb the lessons of a variety of historical cases within a single analytical framework This raises the question "How then can historical experience be utilised to better understand and to deal more effectively with contemporary situations that bear a certain resemblance to past historical cases?" According to George, the answer to this question lies in "stating lessons in a systematic and differentiated way from a broader range of experience that deliberately draws upon a variety of historical cases" If properly executed in this way, comparative case studies can yield valid inferences This does, therefore, mean the data collection has to meet certain standards and procedures²

3.1 The method of structured, focused comparison

In order to properly perform the comparative case studies, this research uses the method of structured, focused comparison This method was first explicitly used in studies on deterrence and further developed by George³ It is 'structured' in that the same set of general questions is asked for each case in order to guide the data collection In this way the same information – with regard to the same variables and the same indicators - is collected in a systematic manner across carefully selected cases The data requirements of the case studies are standardised and defined by formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case The method is 'focused' in that it deals selectively with only certain aspects of each reviewed case The analysis of each case is directed by a selective theoretical focus⁴ Through the structure and focus of the method, the objective of the comparative case studies in this research is to cumulate to theory

3.1.1 General problems and the method, and this study

An initial common problem when performing comparative case studies is the risk one runs of being overwhelmed by all the information available Many factors contribute to conflict, as well as to 'durable peace' In a structured, focused comparison, being selective and focused when examining the cases is a prerequisite The method borrows the procedure of asking a set of standardised, general questions from statistical research This set of general questions functions to define and standardise the case studies to be undertaken They ensure that the acquisition of data is conducted in a comparable manner⁵ The method therefore

requires discipline in the way data are collected. Without prior theories, or at least proto-theories, it is impossible to select which of the thousands of facts about cases must be analysed for purposes of comparison or within-case analysis.⁶ In accordance with the theoretical and practical interests of this study, the aspects of the cases to be singled out for description and explanation have to be defined. It concentrates on what, according to the literature and theory, are key factors or key indicators of conflict. Chapter 4 develops a theoretical framework that is formulated into hypotheses which it also operationalises. In this manner the case studies in this research are planned under the impetus of theory rather than the accumulation of whatever data happen to turn up.

A second common problem when performing comparative case studies is what Lijphart calls “many variables, small n ”.⁷ He acknowledges that statistical analysis is only possible by either increasing the number of cases or by reducing the number of variables.⁸ The small n in a structured, focused comparison is not necessarily representative of the whole universe of cases.⁹ However, it need not be representative in a statistical sense in order to contribute to theory development. In a structured, focused comparison it is not numbers but variety that guides the choice of cases – cases that belong to the same class but differ from each other. The method seeks to “identify the variety of different causal patterns” that occur in the cases. Moreover, it attempts to identify “the conditions under which each distinctive type of causal pattern occurs,” rather than “how often” a certain outcome occurs or can be expected to occur.¹⁰

Some scholars, often historians, object to the procedure used in the method of structured, focused comparison, to transform a rich and detailed historical explanation into a more abstract and selective construction of theoretical concepts. Decision makers are sometimes also suspicious when confronted with so-called ‘scientific’ generalisations. Both groups point out the ‘uniqueness’ of each case. Indeed, some unique qualities of the historical explanation are lost in the process as a consequence of the simplification inherent to theory formulation. In addition, the adage that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is also likely to be true for peacekeeping operations. It is therefore not unlikely that the contribution of a peacekeeping operation is more than the contribution of the sum of its policy tools. This loss of information, however, does not jeopardise the validity of the conclusions drawn from the cases and the utility of that theory. George and Bennett justify the practice by emphasising that “the task of the political scientist who engages in historical case studies for theory development is not the same as the task of the historian.” One should, nevertheless, remain cautious and avoid getting trapped in the pitfall of oversimplification. Finding the right balance between a rich ‘historical’ description of the developments in the case and the theoretically focused explanation is what must be attempted.¹¹ This balance is very important, because it can be very difficult to place the theoretical conclusions of a structured, focused comparison into the proper context without a historical description. For this reason, the historical explanation has not been omitted in this study. The application of the method of structured, focused comparison is accompanied in each case by a conflict analysis that follows the guidelines by Reychler. These guidelines include a chronological description of the conflict history, a portrayal of the parties involved, their opportunity structures, their strategies, and the points at issue.¹² If a peacekeeping operation appears to be

more than the some of its parts, this will also be dealt with in the post-presence description of a case

Finally, if properly performed, the method of structured, focused comparison is, according to George, particularly suited to

“developing ‘rich, differentiated theory’ which, in contrast to a general explanatory theory, is cast in the form of contingent generalizations and has the capacity for more discriminating explanation”¹³

3 1 2 Phases, tasks and this study

The method of structured, focused comparison consists of three phases during which several tasks are executed. These phases and tasks constitute a consistent and integrated whole. They should be seen as interrelated and interdependent.¹⁴

3 1 2 1 Phase 1

The first phase involves the formulation of the design and structure of the study. It consists of 5 tasks.

Task one The first task in this phase is to specify the research problem and research objectives. This has been done in the first two chapters of this study. The research problem and objectives were presented in the first chapter. Chapter two elaborated further on peacekeeping operations and the research problem.

Task two The second task is to specify the elements (conditions and variables) that enter into a controlled comparison of instances (cases) of the class of events in question. In other words, the dependent (or outcome) and independent (intervening) variables that comprise the theoretical suppositions and framework of the study have to be defined. In order to capture the major elements of the historical explanation, the theoretical framework must be sufficiently broad. The set of independent and intervening variables has to be adequate to capture and record the essentials of an account of the outcome of a case. The dividing line between what is “essential” and what is not is whether that aspect of the process is expected or found to be active across the entire class of cases.¹⁵

This research studies the relationship between the independent variable – peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects – and the dependent variable – ‘durable peace’. A peacekeeping operation as defined in chapter 2 is considered here to be a collection of ‘policy tools’. The ‘standard inventory of ‘policy tools’ that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace’, as compiled in chapter two, serves as the independent variable(s) under review. ‘Durable peace’ is considered to be built-up from the absence of violence and the absence of conflict causes, both measured through conflict indicators. A further specification of these dependent variables is given in chapter 4. The independent variable – the peacekeeping operation – is held constant and the dependent variable – the result of the operation – is allowed to vary. Consequently, cases of both ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are studied in order to identify the conditions and variables that would seem to account for this difference in the outcome.

Task three The third task in the first phase of the method of structured, focused comparison is the choice of cases to be studied. This is explained and further elaborated on in section 3 2.

Task four: The fourth task in the first phase of the method of structured, focused comparison is the consideration of ways in which variance in the dependent variable (outcome) and independent variables can best be described in order to further theory development.

This study looks at aspects of peacekeeping operations – ‘policy tools’ - and at specific elements of ‘durable peace’ – the absence of violence and causes of conflict, measured through conflict indicators. It therefore surveys the influence of just a small unit upon another small unit by posing the question: what is the influence of a certain ‘policy tool’ on a certain variable of durable peace? The three main reasons why this is done are:

- First, by breaking up the analysis into specific sub-questions an attempt is made to create a more structured survey in which the influence on the outcome of the assessment of the, for the purpose of this study, less relevant intervening variables is restricted. In other words, by dividing the analysis into specific sub-questions this study tries to manage the influence of the intervening variables that are not part of the policy of the United Nations.
- Second, the break-down of the analysis of both peacekeeping operations, as well as of the conflict itself, makes it possible to review the extent to which individual ‘policy tools’ contribute both to ‘durable peace’ at metalevel and to their individual goals upon specific variables of conflict. This strategy therefore creates not only the opportunity to evaluate ‘policy tools’ in a more structured manner, but also in a more detailed way.
- Third, as different individual peacekeeping operations often have a very different nature this method makes it possible to survey what makes one peacekeeping operation more successful in contributing to ‘durable peace’ than another.

As the ‘policy tools’ used by the United Nations differ in minor ways each time they are applied in a mission, the ‘tools’ are selected from the “Standard Inventory of ‘policy tools’ that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace” - as drawn up in chapter 2. The conflicts and their variables are described by using conflict indicators as elaborated on in chapter 4. Every ‘policy tool’ used by the United Nations in the peacekeeping operation under review is therefore assessed with regard to its influence on the indicators in order to discover a relationship between the application of that ‘policy tool’ and changes in the variables of durable peace. An assessment is made at metalevel to determine the extent to which a peacekeeping operation has contributed to ‘durable peace’.

Filter out the irrelevant: by following the above strategy the whole grid of the matrix is researched. However, not every ‘policy tool’ used by the United Nations is relevant for each variable. Similarly, not all variables are relevant for each ‘policy tool’. For this reason an attempt has been made to increase the clarity and ‘surveyability’ by omitting the irrelevant variables for each ‘policy tool’. The choice of whether a variable is deemed either relevant or irrelevant for a ‘policy tool’ is based on the three criteria. It is deemed relevant, if:

- According to the **mandate** and the goals given in it, the objective of the ‘policy tool’ is to influence the variable. For example, the mandates of peacekeeping operations that organise elections often state that this is done with the *intention* to promoting democracy.
- According to existing general **theoretical scholarly literature**, the ‘policy tool’ is *expected* to influence the variable of durable peace. For example,

according to theory, human rights verification can influence the variable of state unwillingness and good governance.

- According to the research on the case, the 'policy tool' influences the variable in **practice**. For example, the practice of the 'policy tool' of demobilisation proves that it has side effects that were not intended by the policy and neither were these side effects foreseen in scholarly theory.

Should a variable not be deemed or considered relevant for a 'policy tool' that variable is not reviewed for that 'policy tool'. Should a 'policy tool' be considered important for a variable of durable peace, a review is conducted of whether, to what extent, and how the changes in that variable are related to the use of the 'policy tool' by the United Nations.

The time horizon: the right expectations have to be set when making an assessment of peacekeeping operations. How much change can be expected within how much time? If a peacekeeping operation's goal is to build peace and to contribute to 'durable peace', should we expect it to have been achieved when the operation is terminated? Should we not be satisfied when an operation has merely contributed to a process towards 'durable peace', rather than reaching it? And, within what period should this goal be achieved? This latter question is relevant as it influences the assessment. What looks like a failure may turn out to be a success and the other way around. A classic example of the latter is the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which for a long time was deemed successful in bringing peace to Europe, until it came to be known as one of the causes of the Second World War.¹⁶

As the time horizon of effect is broad for a peacekeeping operation, the conflict indicators in this study serve as interim indicators. Therefore, the indicators serve to point at the direction in which the variables and the conflict are going. A trend in the direction of 'durable peace' is what is needed. If the indicators point at a trend in the opposite direction, then an operation can be called a failure. Nonetheless, should nothing change, one may consider a peacekeeping operation to be a failure if it was originally intended to build peace and to contribute directly to 'durable peace'.

The assessment of the influence of 'policy tools' on the variables of durable peace is conducted in three periods: ante-presence, presence and post presence of the United Nations.

- The first period of ante-presence of the United Nations consists of the time from the beginning of the conflict to the start of the peacekeeping operation. Assessing the conflict during this period is important in order to review whether and to what extent which factors and causes of conflict in the case under review are relevant at the time that the UN peacekeeping operation was established. Moreover, during this period one can observe whether any case-specific factors and causes of conflict are present that must be researched throughout all three periods. Furthermore, it presents the opportunity to assess the general direction of the course of a conflict, in order to apprehend the contribution of the peacekeeping operation to 'durable peace'.
- The second period is the time during which the United Nations is present. The study of the measurements taken during this period constitutes the core of this research.

- The third period is the post-presence period, which has been set at five years. During this period the measurements continue in order to determine whether the possible influence of a peacekeeping operation on the course of the conflict is in fact durable or not.

Limits to causality: conflicts are complex processes in which causation often works indirectly. A policy tool may influence a certain variable of conflict through addressing a second different variable, which in turn affects the first variable. For example, as a result of monitoring a cease-fire, negative peace may be strengthened in a country, as a result of which in turn the economy may blossom again. One might therefore argue that cease-fire monitoring contributes to economic growth. In this research, however, it has been decided that these indirect causal links will not be assessed because that would not only serve to extend the number of possibilities immensely, but more importantly the links would be weaker and therefore even harder to prove. As a result, because only the direct links are studied as in this example, this research does not go into the indirect link between cease-fire monitoring and economic growth. Nonetheless, one has to be aware that as a result of this choice part of the explanation of a case may be lost.

Product and process evaluation: This research is a combination of both process and product evaluation. The first strategy coincides with the first research question and the second strategy with the second and third research questions. Product evaluation is a research strategy directed at determining, after the intervention, whether and to what extent it had the intended result. However, since most of the time an intervention is not a complete success and there is a need for improvement, this analysis is often complemented with a process evaluation. This research strategy aims to explain why a certain intervention works or does not work. It looks at how an intervention is implemented and searches for the 'causal linkages' to explain the result. It aims to find which element of the intervention is crucial and what conditions are necessary for a positive result. For this purpose, as there is insufficient theory available, it may be helpful to follow the intervention in detail. Generally, the aim of process evaluation is to provide feedback to the practitioners of the intervention on how to modify or improve it.¹⁷

Task five: The fifth task of phase one of the method of structured, focused comparison is the formulation of data requirements to be satisfied in the analysis of the cases – i.e. the general questions to be asked of each case in the structured, focused comparison. These general questions serve to standardise the data requirements so that comparable data are obtained in each case. Obviously the theoretical framework and therefore the data requirements must be comprehensive enough to capture the major elements of the historical explanation. The formulation of these general questions into data checklists is done in chapter 4 based upon the hypotheses. Once again it has to be reiterated that, as George notes:

'Asking the same question of each case does not prevent the investigator from asking specific questions of each case as well to bring out idiosyncratic features that are of possible interest in and of themselves, if not also for theory development.'¹⁸

3 | 2 | 2 Phase 2

The second phase of the method consists of actually carrying out the structured, focused comparison of the case studies under the guidance of the general questions of the conflict indicators. Each of the cases singled out for comparison in section 3.2 is studied from the standpoint of the requirements identified in chapter 4. The value - or outcome - of the dependent and independent variables is established through standard procedures of historical inquiry. This is expressed in terms of the specifications for describing the variance in the dependent variable determined in task 4 – the variables of durable peace. On this basis a historical explanation for the outcome(s) in each case is developed, again utilising the method of historical inquiry. This time, however, the specific explanation is transformed into the concepts comprising the conditions, the independent and the intervening variables of the theoretical framework specified in task 2 – the policy tools. As this is a matter of historical analysis one has to realise that multiple weak inferences, rather than one single strong inference, buttress conclusions.¹⁹

Although the case studies are guided by the requirements, one has to bear in mind a certain amount of ‘within-case’ explanation. Each case is unique and, although theory can point out the most important factors and causes of conflict, indispensable case-specific factors or causes may be at work. Too strict an application of the method of structured, focused comparison may very well overlook and disregard these important sources of information. A flexible use of the method is thus needed to facilitate insight into individual cases that might have been missed by the general questions.²⁰ Should such a case specific factor or cause be at work, it is consequently introduced into the ‘within-case’ analysis. If it distorts the comparison of the cases, such a factor or cause must also be taken into consideration at this higher level.

The ‘within-case’ analysis is made through the method of ‘process-tracing’.²¹ This method makes causal inference by attempting to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain or causal links – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variables.²² It can be considered to be the qualitative analogy of quantitative time-series data analysis.²³

In seeking to formulate an explanation for the outcome in each of the cases, the method of causal imputation is employed. An explanation is deemed plausible if it is consistent with the existing data, and if it can be supported by relevant generalisations. It remains like this as long as no alternative explanation is found more consistent with the data, and/or is better supported by the available generalisations. Effectively this means that, should more than one explanation for the outcome in a case be plausible, both have to be taken into account in the theoretical part of this study (phase 3 of the method).²⁴

The historical explanations of the cases and as a result the theoretical conclusions drawn from them in this study are, consequently, not to be considered “definite”. They must be viewed as having a provisional character and might be reassessed in the future. This is, for example, necessary should new historical data bearing upon the cases become available and challenge the explanations. The same should be done if the historical explanations in this study are challenged by others because relevant data might have been overlooked or the importance of it might be misunderstood. The provisional nature of the historical explanations implies that the theory developed from them also has to be provisional. This is something that is inherent to the method of structured, focused comparison.²⁵

3.1.2.3 Phase 3

The theoretical implications of the case studies are drawn in phase three of the method. Chapter nine of this study undertakes this structured, focused comparison. In doing so it is as much interested in the differences among the cases as in their similarities. Each case differs from the other cases and is used to identify a variation, a different causal pattern, within the system of variables that form the initial theoretical framework. Consequently, each case is treated as if it were a 'defiant' case. Using each case to generate possibly a different causal pattern it is expected that this study will contribute to the gradual development of a fuller 'typology' theory²⁶ of the phenomenon of peacekeeping operations. Once again, it has to be reiterated and recognised that the cumulation of theory in this fashion is open-ended. Each case study contributes to the cumulative refinement of contingent generalisations on the conditions under which particular causal paths occur, and fills out the cells or types of a more comprehensive theory. The study of additional cases may therefore very well identify new causal patterns, or variants of patterns already identified.²⁷ This approach is referred to as a 'building block' procedure. One can consider the study of the different possible combinations of 'policy tools' as a 'building block' in the development of a typology theory on peacekeeping operations. The component provided by each 'building block' is a contribution to theory in itself. Though its scope is limited, it addresses the main research questions of this study. The generalisations are more narrow and contingent than those of the 'covering law' variety, but they are more precise and may involve relations with higher probabilities.²⁸

3.2 Choice of cases

The third task in the first phase of the method of structured, focused comparison is the choice of cases. The method stresses that this task should not be taken lightly, as it is, according to George, "essential [. . .] to select the appropriate cases for intensive analysis."²⁹ The subject of this study is UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects in intrastate conflicts since 1989. As this study attempts to develop a 'building block' for an explanatory theory on this class of phenomena, the class has to be well defined. In this section, the universe of possible cases is reduced step by step based on the application of four criteria. If a possible case does not qualify for a certain criterion it is eliminated from the universe of possible cases. Each time the criterion on which the cases are selected is first further elaborated upon, and then the consequences for the choice of cases in this study are presented. A schematic outline of the requirements and consequences is given in table 3.

The whole universe of UN peacekeeping operations has to be taken as a starting point. Therefore, to start with, a possible case is a conflict in which, according to the United Nations, one or more UN peacekeeping operations was or were deployed for a continuous period which started in or after 1989. This universe of possible cases consists of 25 cases.³⁰

- *Criterion 1 the conflict has, at the establishment of the operation, the nature of an intrastate conflict*

This criterion is operationalised in two ways

The first step towards filtering out the operations in interstate conflicts is by only looking at operations that, according to the United Nations, were or are mainly deployed in a single country

*Consequence of the 25 possible cases, 21 qualify for this first step requirement*³¹

The second step towards filtering out the operations in interstate conflicts is made by determining the nature of the conflicting parties who signed the treaty on which the operation is based. In order to qualify as an intrastate conflict at least one sub-state entity or grouping has signed the accord.

This second step is necessary because, although several operations dealing with interstate conflicts were filtered out by the first step of this criterion, some intrastate conflicts may remain. In several cases, operations have been deployed mainly in a single country while the conflict would typically be categorised as an interstate conflict. A typical example of such a mission is a verification mission for the withdrawal of an occupying or colonial force. If the operation is deployed mainly in one country and the parties have not signed an agreement, the nature of the parties and therefore of the conflict is left undetermined. Determining the nature of the conflict is, in such a case, not necessary as it does not qualify for the second criterion.

*Consequence of the 21 remaining possible cases 18 qualify for this first requirement*³²

- *Criterion 2: the goal of the (first) operation is to end the intrastate conflict and to build peace*

Although peacekeeping operations are part of a comprehensive strategy to foster international peace and security, not all operations aim to build peace. Some peacekeeping operations merely attempt to maintain the status quo. Such a more limited goal may in the end indeed contribute to 'durable peace', but this is not directly aimed for. It would, therefore, be unfair to assess such a peacekeeping operation on the wider goal of contributing to 'durable peace'. That would be an unrealistic yardstick. In order to operationalise this requirement this study looks only at operations whose mandate is based on a peace accord signed by the conflicting parties. This means that peacekeeping operations based on a cease-fire do not qualify. A peace accord is supposed to end conflict and support 'durable peace', whereas cease-fires only require the maintenance of the status quo.

In practice, however, it is not always clear whether an accord is intended to be a peace settlement or a cease-fire or only the first step towards either. For example, in the case of Central Africa, the Bangui agreements included "the necessary elements for a comprehensive settlement"³³. In the case of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the operation was established in accordance with the so-called "settlement proposals"³⁴. Too strict an application of this requirement would disregard possible operations based on agreements that, although not explicitly stated as such, have the character and intention of a peace agreement. For this reason, the definition of a peace accord is applied here in a broad sense. Should there be any doubt about the nature of the agreement, the case is not eliminated from the universe of possible cases.

Although parties may sign a peace agreement, it is of course possible that they did so without the intention of actually sticking to it. However, this distinction is not made here as the United Nations should assume, in the first instance, that the conflicting parties are sincere and consequently bases its policies principally on this assumption. Moreover, it is possible that a peace process is derailed, and that the mandate of the peacekeeping operation is

adapted, or even that a whole new operation is established under a different type of mandate. Such a case would be of particular interest to this study as it might signal a failure and must therefore not be excluded. Consequently, this study monitors cases where at least the commencement of the peace process originates in a peace settlement on the basis of which a UN peacekeeping operation is established. As a result, in order to qualify, not every change in the mandate of an operation or each subsequent operation has to be based on a new peace accord.

*Consequence of the 18 remaining possible cases: 10 cases qualify for this second requirement*³⁵

- *Criterion 3: the operation ended before 1997*

This requirement provides the opportunity to collect data that are not immediately released or publicised. Moreover, it is necessary to take a period of five years into consideration, with the aim that based on the further developments in the conflict process, the medium-term influence of the peacekeeping operation can also be assessed.³⁶ The choice for a period of five years is based on the fact that many international organisations usually apply a five-year post-conflict period during which reconstruction and rehabilitation aid is given, followed by a return to 'business as usual' – development aid. Moreover, the process towards durable peace is a slow one and some problems or improvements only arise after several years have elapsed. Many scholars, like Paris, argue that peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects might even have to last seven to nine years in order to be successful.³⁷

*Consequence of the 10 remaining possible cases: 4 qualify for this third requirement*³⁸

- *Criterion 4: the United Nations is at the start of the operation the only important intervening actor in the conflict process*

This requirement is necessary in order to limit the influence of other intervening actors. As this study assesses the extent to which UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace', the activities of other intervening actors might influence or distort the research. In order to operationalise this requirement, only those operations have been selected in which the United Nations had a military presence on the ground and was the sole organisation responsible for this military component. The military component of an operation is chosen to be the measurement of importance as the military presence is often the most sizeable component of all. In case neither the United Nations nor another organisation has deployed a military component, then the civilian police component is taken as the benchmark.³⁹

*Consequence of the 4 remaining possible cases: all qualify for this fourth requirement*⁴⁰

The 4 remaining cases are Cambodia (UNAMIC and UNTAC 1991-1993), El Salvador (ONUSAL 1991-1995), Mozambique (ONUMOZ 1992-1994), and Rwanda (UNAMIR 1993-1996).

Table 3 - UN *peacekeeping*-operations established since 1989, until 2002

<i>Conflict/country operation</i>	<i>intrastate conflict</i>	<i>peacekeeping operation (type accord^d)</i>	<i>date of termination</i>	<i>military component United Nations</i>
Angola				
UNAVEM I ^c	-	P	1991	+
UNAVEM II	+	P	1995	+
UNAVEM III	+	P	1997	+
MONUA	+	P ^b	1999	+
Bosnia Herzegovina				
UNPROFOR ^c	u	-	1995	+
UNMIBH	+	P	2002	-
Cambodia				
UNAMIC	+	P	1992	+
UNTAC	+	P ^b	1993	+
Central Africa				
MINURCA	+	P	2000	+
Central America				
ONUCA	-	P	1992	+
Chad-Libya				
UNASOG	-	P	1994	+
Congo				
MONUC	+	C	-	+
Croatia				
UNPROFOR ^c	+	C	1995	+
UNCRO	+	C	1996	+
UNMOP	+	C ^b	2002	+
UNTAES	+	P	1998	+
UNPSG	+	P ^b	1998	-
East-Timor				
UNTAET	-	P	2002	-
El Salvador				
ONUSAL	+	P	1995	+
Ethiopia-Eritrea				
UNMEE	-	C	-	+
FYROM				
UNPROFOR ^c	u	-	1995	+
UNPREDEP	u	-	1999	+
Georgia				
UNOMIG	+	C	-	-
Guatemala				
MINUGUA	+	P	1997	+
Haiti				
UNMIH	+	P	1996	+
UNSMIH	+	P ^b	1997	+
UNTMIH	+	P ^b	1997	+
MIPONUH	+	P ^b	2000	+
Iraq-Kuwait				
UNIKOM	-	-	2003	+
Kosovo				
UNMIK	+	P	-	-

Liberia					
UNOMIL	+	P	1997	-	
Mozambique					
ONUMOZ	+	P	1994	+	
Namibia					
UNTAG	-	P	1990	+	
UNAVEM I ^c	-	P	1991	+	
Rwanda					
UNAMIR	+	P	1996	+	
UNOMUR	-	-	1994	+	
Sierra Leone					
UNOMSIL	u	-	1999	-	
UNAMSIL	+	P	-	+	
Somalia					
UNOSOM I	+	C	1993	+	
UNOSOM II	+	C ^b	1995	+	
Tajikistan					
UNMOT	+	C	2000	-	
Western Sahara					
MINURSO	+	P	-	+	

u undetermined as the operation was not established on the basis of an accord signed by the parties

^a c = cease-fire accord; p = peace accord

^b based on the further execution of (parts of) the same accord on which the preceding operation was based

^c is a peacekeeping operation that is involved in more than one conflict

3.3 The sources

A wide variety of different sources was used for this study. Chapter two on peacekeeping operations and chapter four on the causes of conflict are based mainly on a study of the existing scholarly literature. The four case studies in this research are based on United Nations documents, documents from other organisations, countries and NGOs, scholarly literature, journal articles, and interviews. These interviews were held in, amongst others, the countries that are the subject of the case studies and in New York. They were held with 'key-players', important government and opposition members, scholars, representatives of NGOs, countries and international organisations; personnel in the United Nations system, and former members of personnel of the UN peacekeeping operations under review. In order to check the conclusions and deepen the recommendations that follow from this study, further interviews were held in New York with, amongst others, policy makers from the United Nations secretariat, UNDP, UNHCR and academic institutions. In addition to these interviews, recent reports from the United Nations and the literature on their implementation also served as a basis to review which lessons had already been learned and what still needed to be recommended. In all cases the sources were checked according to standard academic procedures, such as triangulation.

Several problems arose with regard to the sources as a result of the fact that the case studies involved conflict processes. These problems were not insurmountable, but they were borne in mind and one should remember the restrictions they place on the results of the research.

The first problem was a lack of sources. As conflict escalates, sources become less accessible. As a result, the amount of available information decreases. The information that can still be gathered is selective both in terms of subject and region. The further one moves away from the urban centres, the less information there is to be gathered and the more figures have to be estimated. For example, in the case of Rwanda, statistical information was sparse for 1994, full of gaps or simply unavailable due to the erosion of the state and the poor to non-existent relations with international organisations. At the same time, the following rule applied: the more conflict escalates and sources become sparse the harder it becomes to make reliable estimates.⁴¹ In practice these problems meant, for example, that solid empirical economic data from these conflict-ridden countries was often not available. This reflects the fact that either the local government is not capable of collecting data or that accurate data are considered counterproductive or even dangerous. The data that were available could not always be considered reliable as, for example, the available data failed to include the informal illegal or criminal activities that tend to flourish during conflict.⁴² However, the argument in the other direction was sometimes also valid: the increasing and more-sophisticated means of gathering, processing and analysing information has ensured that detailed information about actual conflicts is available. A lot of information was available on, for example, the Rwandan genocide. Thoolen even points at the existence of an 'information overkill'. He argues that information is at hand, but that it is poorly managed.⁴³ Indeed, to a certain extent there was no lack of data on certain subjects, but rather an overkill of information. However, the lack of data was still relevant for several important issues. In many cases information was also very diffuse. This meant that many sources had to be consulted in order to obtain a more complete picture.

A second problem was the reliability of sources. At an advanced stage of conflict, deliberate and strategic disinformation is generally a great obstacle. It may also have hampered this present research and stood in the way of a correct and easy determination of the course of events. For example, in several cases interviewees gave clearly contradictory and in some cases clearly false information. Several arguments can be put forward as to the reasons why.

- First, actors in conflicts do not always want the truth to be known. For example, some military operations are secret in nature. Publicising these actions would do them harm. Another example is that the publication of certain facts may influence international public opinion in an unwanted manner – consider genocide.
- Second, telling the truth may be dangerous. In Rwanda, for example, finding a good source or a source from the opposition was extremely difficult as no-one was willing to be killed or jailed as a result of speaking out. This became very apparent when, on the very same day as my interview with Mbonigaba, the editor of the Rwandan newspaper Umuseso, he was jailed because an article and a cartoon in his paper were considered to 'incite divisions and discrimination'. One possible step towards the solution is to make use of anonymous sources. In this research it was possible to find and use different sources that were able to confirm the sources that could better remain anonymous.
- Third, sources often say what the researcher wants them to say. Actors in conflicts copy concepts and terms in order to sell their story and by doing so

attempt to influence the opinion of the researcher and public opinion in the “western world”. Interviewees may make a prior assessment of what the interviewer wants to hear and what will bring about the most positive result.

- Fourth, sources, especially organisations and people who are active in the theatre, cannot be regarded as impartial and objective. They either represent a certain group or party, or are a member of such a group or party. Moreover, international organisations and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are not free of subjectivity. They also have their own aims and are sometimes willing to bend the truth in order to further these goals.
- Fifth, propaganda is a very old tool of war. It is also applied in modern day intrastate conflicts.⁴⁴

As this research was not dependent on one single source, but is based on many, it was, however, possible to work around many of these problems. In addition, the unreliability of sources as a consequence of subjectivity must not only be interpreted as a ‘bad’ thing. So-called ‘coloured sources’ do reveal important, if not crucial, information and understandings on the causes of conflicts and their dynamics.⁴⁵ A researcher must, however, not be ‘colour blind’. One must be aware of the extent of subjectivity and also be able to place the source within its context. By making a considered mix of both more objective and less reliable (subjective) sources it was possible to get the best insight into the conflicts.

A third and final problem was that United Nations personnel were often hesitant to give interviews on the record. If an interview was on the record the outcome was very often much more positive with regard to the United Nations than if it was off the record. In addition, ‘on the record’ often meant that it was the official UN-line that was presented. It was typical that the ‘off the record’ part after an ‘on the record’ interview, most often provided much more interesting and critical information. This can be explained by two factors. First, UN personnel fear that critical expressions may diminish career prospects. Second, the United Nations does not allow its personnel to express any other line on the record than the official one. It is unfortunate that this is the case, as independent and critical thinking is needed to learn lessons and improve future operations. Fortunately, most interviews with UN personnel in New York were held at the stage of the research when the findings had to be checked and interviews could therefore be held in an unquoted and un sourced manner.

Summary

This chapter elaborated on the methodology applied in this research, the structured, focused comparison method. Based on four criteria, four cases were selected for the implementation of the case studies in the research. In addition, the sources used were discussed. Before turning to the actual case studies, however, the next chapter standardises the collection of data in order to make the case studies comparable. For this purpose, chapter four sets out the theoretical framework for the structured, focused comparison of the case studies and the data requirements to be satisfied in the analysis of the cases.

¹ GOOR, L. VAN DER, K. RUPESINGHE & P. SCIARONE, eds (1996), *Between development and destruction an enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states*, Hampshire, pp 1-32

² GEORGE, A L (1979), "Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, focused comparison", in: LAUREN, P.G. ed., *Diplomacy new approaches in history, theory, and policy*, New York – London, pp. 43-68, on pp. 42-43.

³ GEORGE, A L. & R. SMOKE (1974), *Deterrence in American foreign policy. theory and practice.*, London – New York

⁴ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, p 61-62; and BENNETT, A. & A.L. GEORGE (1997), *Research design tasks in case study methods*, <<http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/bennetta/RESEDES.htm>>, p. 2-4.

⁵ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, p. 3.

⁶ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, pp. 50-51.

⁷ LUPHART, A (September 1971), "comparative politics and the comparative method", *American Political Science Review*, 65(3), pp. 682-693.

⁸ LUPHART, A. (July 1975), "The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research", *Comparative Political Studies*, 8(2), pp 158-177.

⁹ For a more detailed discussion on case selection in small *n* studies see: COLLIFR, D. & J MAHONEY (October 1996), "Insights and pitfalls: selection bias in qualitative research", *World Politics*, 49(1), pp 56-91.

¹⁰ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, p 60.

¹¹ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, pp 23-25

¹² REYCHLER, *Een wereld veilig voor conflict*, pp. 216-285.

¹³ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, p. 59.

¹⁴ The following elaboration follows the structure of the framework George gives in: GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, pp 54-59; and BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, pp. 4-39.

¹⁵ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, p. 23.

¹⁶ STERN & DRUCKMAN, "Evaluating interventions in history", p 46 and p. 58.

¹⁷ SWANBORN, P.G. (2002), *Evalueren het ontwerpen, begeleiden en evalueren van interventies een methodische basis voor evaluatie-onderzoek*, Amsterdam, pp. 48-52.

¹⁸ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, p. 62.

¹⁹ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, p 22

²⁰ STERN & DRUCKMAN, "Evaluating interventions in history", p. 73

²¹ See: GEORGE, A.L. & A. BENNETT (1997), *Process tracing in case study research*, <<http://www.georgetown.edu/bennett/PROTCG.htm>>.

²² BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, pp 24-25

²³ For a further discussion on process tracing see GEORGE & BENNETT, *Process tracing in case study research*; and STERN & DRUCKMAN, "Evaluating interventions in history", p. 46 and p. 58.

²⁴ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, p. 22.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

²⁶ For an elaboration on the development of 'typology theories', see: BENNETT, A & A L GEORGE (1997), *Developing and using typological theories in case study research*, <<http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/bennetta/typo.htm>>

²⁷ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, pp 58-59

²⁸ BENNETT & GEORGE, *Research design tasks in case study methods*, p. 7.

²⁹ GEORGE, "Case studies and theory development, p. 50.

³⁰ These cases are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central Africa, Central America, Chad-Libya, Congo, Croatia, East Timor, El Salvador, Ethiopia-Eritrea, FYROM, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq-Kuwait, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara.

The selection was made at the start of 2002 and therefore the universe does not include UNMISSET, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH, and ONUB.

³¹ The following cases do not qualify on the basis of this requirement: Central America, Chad-Libya, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Iraq-Kuwait.

³² The following cases do not qualify on the basis of this requirement: Angola, Eastern Timor, and Namibia.

³³ UN DOC S/1998/61, 23 January 1998.

³⁴ UN DOC S/RES/690 (1991), 29 April 1991.

³⁵ The following cases do not qualify on the basis of this requirement: Congo, Georgia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

³⁶ The selection of the cases was made with the aim of starting the last case study at the start of 2002.

³⁷ PARIS, R. (Fall 1997), "Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism", *International Security*, 22(2), pp. 54-89, on p. 88.

³⁸ The following cases do not qualify on the basis of this requirement: Angola, Central Africa, Congo, East Timor, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Western Sahara, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo.

³⁹ In spite of this requirement it is likely that the conclusions drawn in this study also apply to peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects implemented by other organisations or with military components from other organisations. See also: DOYLE & SAMBANIS, "International peacebuilding", p. 793.

⁴⁰ The following cases do not qualify on the basis of this requirement: Georgia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Kosovo.

⁴¹ DOOM, R. & K. VLASSENROOT (28 February 2005), "Early warning and conflict prevention Minerva's wisdom?", *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a022.htm>>

⁴² See also: CARBONNIER, G. (March 1998), "Conflict, post-war and the economy: a critical review of the literature", *WSP occasional paper*, 2, <<http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/pop2/toc.htm>>

⁴³ THOOLEN, H. (1992), "Information Aspects of Humanitarian Early Warning", In. RUPESINGHE, K. & M. KURODA, eds., *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, New York, pp.166-180

⁴⁴ STROBEL, W.P. (2001), "Information and conflict", in: CROCKER, C.A. & F.O. HAMPSON, with P. AALL, eds., *Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict*, Washington DC, pp. 677-693

⁴⁵ BORCH C. VAN DER & J. DEMMERS (2001), "Dilemma's bij conflictonderzoek", in: LUN, J. VAN DER & A. PAUWELS eds., *Conflictonderzoek in het Nederlandse taalgebied: Problemen bij onderzoek naar het ononderzoekbare?*, Nijmegen, pp. 42-49, on pp. 42-45

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDISED DATA COLLECTION

This chapter starts with an outline of the existing body of scholarly literature on intrastate conflict. In doing so the context is created for the survey of the literature on the causes of conflict that follows. This survey distinguishes clusters of causes that are generally regarded as important in the literature on the causation of violent intrastate conflict. These clusters plus negative peace are then rephrased into hypotheses, which function as the theoretical framework for the structured, focused comparison of the case studies. Subsequently, in order to formulate data requirements in a data checklist of general questions to be satisfied in the analysis of the cases, a survey is conducted of the existing body of applied theory, applied theoretical models and conflict indicator sets. This results in a modal set of indicators, developed from the existing models and indicator sets. In this modal indicator set clusters of indicators can be discerned. These clusters of indicators in applied theory are then compared with the clusters retrieved from the literature. Finally, based on both, the general questions for the collection of data are developed. These data requirements are formulated in general questions to be asked of each case in the structured, focused comparison. This exercise serves to standardise the collection of data in order to obtain comparable data in each case.

4.1 General theory on violent conflicts

If one seeks to prevent violent conflict, or, failing that, to end the violence as soon as possible, and if one intends to maximise the opportunity for 'durable peace', one must first be sure that violent conflicts and their causes are properly understood. As already said, this study researches the extent to which peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace' and it therefore examines the extent to which these aspects secure negative peace and address the causes of violent conflict. Negative peace was defined in chapter 1. The causes of violent conflict have not yet been considered in this study. A survey of the literature on the causes of violent intrastate conflict is presented in the following sections. The objective of this survey is to distinguish clusters of the causes of conflict in the literature. Together with negative peace, these clusters form the framework of analysis for the structured, focused comparison of the case studies on the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to 'durable peace'. However, before turning to clusters of the causes of conflict distinguished in the literature, a number of issues first have to be addressed regarding the general theory on violent conflict.

The study of intrastate violent conflict is relatively young. Despite the fact that since 1945 intrastate conflicts have been more common than interstate conflicts, prior to 1990 most scholars focused on interstate conflicts. It is argued, by Singer, that during that period scholars were too preoccupied with their own confrontation i.e. the Cold War, to see the tragedies often unfolding on the periphery.¹ Indeed, the few exceptions are the works by, amongst others, Davies and Gurr.² However, since 1990, the literature on intrastate conflicts and their causes has proliferated.

4.1.1 General theory on violent conflict

Violent conflicts arise from multiple causes and run through different stages of escalation and de-escalation. In order to grasp their dynamics, conflicts are often moulded into a 'life-cycle of conflict-model' to describe and analyse the different phases and levels. In such a model, the phase or stage of a conflict describes the dimension in time and is situated on the horizontal axis, while the level of conflict is situated on the vertical axis and is an expression of the intensity of the conflict. There is a wide variety of these kinds of models, each with its own categorisation and number of conflict phases or stages.³ Some of these models are very helpful, but others tend to blur the distinction between the phase or stage of a conflict and the level of conflict intensity.

The Dutch NGO PLOOM (the Dutch acronym for Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations) has developed a five level model of conflict escalation. It is largely fatality based, as the levels of conflict are defined by the number of fatalities in a twelve-month period. The model distinguishes:

- the peaceful stable situation (0 fatalities);
- the political tension situation (0-25 fatalities);
- serious or violent political conflict (25-100 fatalities);
- low intensity conflict (100-1000 fatalities); and
- high intensity conflict (more than 1000 fatalities).

The model includes two thresholds. The first is the political crisis, which results from destabilising strains in the political system that encourage violence. This is situated between the political tension situation and serious or violent political conflict, and is the threshold of violence. The second threshold is humanitarian crisis, which results from the further deterioration of the political system and is the threshold to high level conflict in which the politico-military struggle affects the lives of large sections of the population; opposed to the violence in a political crisis that only occasionally affects small segments of society.⁴ The major strength of the model i.e. its simplicity to categorise conflicts, is also its major weakness. The number of casualties is obviously an important indicator of violent conflict, but it is not the only one. Other indicators include the existence of further consequences of conflict such as refugees, casualties, destruction of the infrastructure, as well as the presence of the causes of conflict.


Another model has been developed by Lund and Creative Associates International for the United States Agency for International Development (see figure 3). It distinguishes three stages in the life-cycle of a conflict: early stage, mid-conflict and late stage. These stages are similar to the most common three-phased model: pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict. It sets out six different levels of conflict, which vary in the degree of co-operation and hostility. Conflicts may always arise, yet the level of confrontation differs along a scale from peaceful to violent. The model arranges these levels of interaction in conflicts along a continuum from total harmony of interests to sustained all-out war. These gradations are a kind of barometer for peace and conflict.⁵ This model, just as any other model, has its weaknesses, as follows:

- First, in reality the different levels of conflict are not sharply demarcated. They are rather matters of degree, which shade gradually from one to another. In specific situations a conflict may even manifest several different levels. Consequently, it is often difficult to define the moment at which a certain level

has transformed into another level. Being able to distinguish these gradations may therefore have several practical implications. Although every conflict can be moulded into the model, one has to be aware that it may lead to the loss of important information. For example, in conflict-ridden countries one can still find “pockets of peace” and in more or less peaceful states “pockets of conflict” may exist.

- Second, the gradations suggest that conflict and peace rarely, if ever, arise suddenly, shift quickly from one status to another, or end suddenly. Indeed, relations between groups do not move from total peace to total war without going through intermediate stages. However, neither do they develop linearly along these stages. They tend to move back and forth between the stages described and sometimes even miss one out. A clear progression from a state of peace to a state of open conflict is the exception rather than the norm.⁶
- Third, in addition to conceptual problems regarding the vertical direction of the model, the horizontal or time dimension is not problem free either. There is little agreement on when conflict has come to a definite end. Formal peace agreements do not necessarily imply a return to peace and normalcy. Such a process can easily be disrupted by the recurrence of violence. Such violence may continue, but on a lower level. As a consequence, the distinction between pre-conflict and post-conflict appears to be fading.⁷ It is even recognised that the continuation of violence during the post-conflict phase of a conflict is utilised by the opposing parties for leverage in the political reconciliation process.⁸ Moreover, one might even question whether conflict and not peace is to be regarded as normalcy.

Figure 3 - Life cycle of a conflict⁹ (source: CAII, *Conflict prevention: a guide*, <http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/understanding.htm>)



Accordingly, the above graphical representation of a conflict is merely an ‘ideal type’ conflict. In reality one can expect the life cycle of a conflict to be less steep and with much more fluctuation. Nevertheless, the CAII model does have heuristic

value because it facilitates the making of useful distinctions between different interventions that relate to different levels and phases of conflict

4.1.2 Problems with regard to understanding the causes of conflict

Four problems have to be taken into account when one attempts to understand the causes of violent conflict

- 1 It has to be borne in mind that theories on the causes of conflict are essentially based on nothing more than statistical generalisations to which an exception can always be found. For example, although poor undemocratic countries are particularly prone to armed conflict, some of these countries are peaceful. On the other hand, there are countries that are rich and have a low level of repression, yet have experienced conflict.¹⁰
- 2 Countries in conflict go through a dynamic process. If one hopes to contribute to 'durable peace', it most often does not suffice to address the initial causes that led to the onset of the conflict. The dynamics of conflicts create additional causes that also have to be addressed. Each conflict has its own unique dynamics, but general patterns can be discerned. First, as conflict weakens a country's economy, it often highlights the economic causes of the conflict. Second, conflict often weakens the state and makes state weakness as a cause of conflict more eminent. The not uncommon reaction of state repression only forms an additional cause for further conflict. Third, conflict only enhances perceptual differences between groups and makes it a more persistent cause of conflict.¹¹
- 3 The decision to take up arms is often a complex process that involves many different actors, conditions and circumstances. The analysis of the causes of conflict involves multiple, interrelated and interfering variables. Moreover, there are only a few necessary conditions for war and very many sufficient conditions of which only a few may apply in any single conflict. Therefore, it is difficult to know which factors to stress.¹²
Scholarly literature often focuses on the search for the most important cause of conflict. However, in most cases this is a misleading quest as conflict is a dynamic process in which several interacting causes lead to the same outcome. Therefore, as Smith does, it is more pertinent to ask the question "How do the different causes interact?"¹³ As a result, a forced choice, like the one between either economic or political causes in the greed versus grievance debate, should not be made. It may be the case that a leader is guided by greed, while the people he mobilises are led by grievances, and both are just as important.¹⁴ Moreover, in one case a certain cause may be of great importance, where in another case that same cause may be irrelevant and other causes have more explanatory value. Since there is not a single group of causes that can be said to be 'the most important one in general', a broad multidisciplinary approach, as preferred by many social scientists,¹⁵ is applied in this study.
- 4 A broad range of causes can be reviewed within a multidisciplinary approach. Nevertheless, not all are relevant for the purpose of this research. Not all the causes of conflict make a distinction between 'durable peace' and violent conflict. They tend to be necessary conditions rather than causes. Moreover, it cannot be expected that all causes of conflict are removed by peacekeeping operations. In order to distinguish the causes that are relevant for the purpose of this study, the causes of conflict are categorised in sections 4.2 to 4.9

Those categories that are less relevant have been omitted from the literature survey on the causes of violent conflict

4.1.3 *The many levels of analysis*

A major problem when attempting to properly understand the causes of violent conflict is that one not only distinguishes a variety of causes, but also a wide range of different types and levels of causes can be observed. This in turn calls for different levels and types of theory on, and analysis of, the causes of conflict¹⁶. The potential explanations for the causes of conflict vary from poverty or ideology to the individual ego. The broad multidisciplinary approach used in this research does not encompass *all* the causes of conflict. As there are many different possible causes of conflict a further categorisation is needed, so that the causes that are irrelevant for the purpose of this study can be abandoned.

At the individual level, one might claim, as Van Creveld does, that war is fought for women, and tension in the sense of amusement¹⁷. In his explanation of international war, Waltz refers to this level of analysis as the first image: war as the consequence of the nature and behaviour of man. If mankind were not evil, war would not exist¹⁸. Or in his words:

“The evilness of men, or their improper behaviour, leads to war, individual goodness, if it could be universalized, would mean peace”¹⁹

It is the causes of war that Waltz refers to as the second and third images, i.e. the state and the international system respectively, that are the causes. Peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects hope to address in order to contribute to durable peace. These two images are therefore highlighted in the present study.

The omission of Waltz' first image is, however, not sufficient if one looks for the causes of conflict that can be addressed in order to contribute to durable peace. A generally applied further categorisation of causes and types of causes is a four-part typology, which is used by, amongst others, Smith²⁰, the Clingendael Institute²¹, and to a large extent by Lund²². Generally speaking, this typology has the following categories:

- 1 *Structural causes*: This first category consists of the background, or systemic causes, channels, pivotal factors or structural conditions. These are usually the very pervasive fundamental problems and conditions behind conflict. They are mainly found at group level and affect large numbers of people. They can be found in almost every stage of the life cycle of a conflict and may be considered to lie at the very root of conflict. As a consequence, these causes are very important when it comes to policy-making, as, in order to solve the problem, a remedy needs to be found for them. However, their influence on the probability of conflict is exerted only very slowly. Consequently, policies with a view to influencing these causes can be expected to bear fruit only in the long term, rather than them having immediate effect.
- 2 *Mobilisators*: The second category comprises the mobilisation strategy, the targets, or mobilising factors. Mobilisators refer to the issues or processes around which the actors in the conflict are rallied. They are both the objectives as well as the strategy to fulfil these objectives. Both the conceptualisation and the presentation are relevant in this respect, as these factors reflect the causes for which people fight and how they understand their cause. In each stage of a conflict's life cycle, the mobilisation and, as a consequence, these factors can take on a different shape.

- 3 *Catalysts* The third category is made up of catalysts, or aggravating factors, that affect the intensity and duration of the conflict. They may be internal, such as the internal military balance, or external, such as foreign intervention. They may include natural phenomena, like the terrain, or the tactics of the parties involved. Finally, they can be material, such as the availability of arms or spiritual, as well as cultural, like views about whether, when and how war should be waged. These factors can also differ per phase of the conflict. They are often important with regard to the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. For example, the armament or disarmament of the conflicting parties.
- 4 *Triggers* The fourth category consists of so-called triggers or immediate causes. This is the most visible category. They are events that trigger conflict, but are neither necessary, nor sufficient to trigger the conflict itself. In doing so they influence the timing and the onset of a conflict. They are often actions or events that restrict the opportunities for a peaceful solution, and make violent conflict more attractive. The most famous example of a trigger is the 'starting shot' fired at Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the streets of Sarajevo, which triggered the First World War.

The above four-part typology does not cover what one might consider to be the obvious: the 'underlying root-causes'. One might, for example, consider the existence of humanity and weapons, or the presence of two groups in the same area to be an 'underlying root-cause' of conflict. Addressing such 'underlying root-causes' can, however, not be expected to be the goal of a peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects and they are, therefore, not examined in this research. The typology also makes a distinction about what may be considered a cause of conflict. Some factors may give rise to the causes of conflict but they are not included in the survey. Furthermore, of the four categories of the causes of violent intrastate conflict, the root-causes, the mobilisators and the accelerators are relevant if one attempts to analyse the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to durable peace. However, one cannot expect the United Nations to address the triggers of conflict. Moreover, triggers in themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient, and only build on other causes of conflict. For these two reasons, triggers are not considered in the following survey of the literature on the causes of conflict.

In the following eight sections each cluster of the causes of conflict as distinguished in the existing body of scholarly literature is further elaborated upon. Each of these eight clusters contains several sub-groupings, called factors, which are also discussed.

4.2 Environmental causes

The first cluster of the causes of conflict distinguished in the literature is the cluster of environmental causes. The environmental or 'green' movement has succeeded in giving the world a new lens to look through with regard to security issues. The concept of 'environmental conflict' emanates from this new agenda.²³ Three research groups in particular have contributed to the effort to survey possible environmental causes of conflict: the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Toronto, led by Homer-Dixon, the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) in Zurich and Bern, and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

The project led by Homer-Dixon studies environmental scarcity, a broad subject that includes environmental change, population growth, and the unequal distribution of scarce resources. This subject is meant to encompass all the factors that affect the availability and quality of natural resources. Homer-Dixon started with the hypothesis that there is a causal link between environmental degradation and acute conflict.²⁴ After his initial research, he had to water down his conclusions to state that the influence of environmental scarcity is underlying, sub-national and diffuse.²⁵

The ENCOF team drew more modest assumptions by merely claiming that 'environmental conflicts' "are traditional conflicts *induced by an environmental degradation.*"²⁶ The team assumed that environmental effects do not lead directly to conflicts, but tend to produce several causally interrelated social effects. In turn, these effects may cause specific types of violent conflicts.²⁷ In the research, environmental change also appeared to be a distant underlying background variable that, through other more prominent variables, influences and intensifies conflict.²⁸

The research projects that have identified relations between environmental degradation and conflict have been strongly challenged by, amongst others, Deudney,²⁹ Levy,³⁰ and Gleditsch³¹, who have depicted these projects as speculative and anecdotal.³² Moreover, in the most comprehensive comparative global research on the environmental conflict thesis by Hauge and Ellingsen of PRIO, it was found that there was little evidence from empirical data. Although deforestation, a lack of fresh water and land degradation were positively correlated with conflict, it increased the possibility of conflict by less than 1.5 percent. This is much less than the economic and political factors that form the context of 'environmental conflict'. In particular, the Toronto group of Homer-Dixon has come under fire. His project is said to overlook the relevance of other factors and does not place environmental factors in perspective. Another criticism on the works of the Toronto group is that political and economic factors affect the environment and should therefore not be ignored.³³ The ENCOF project concluded that environmental degradation:

"may be a factor leading to channelling or cleavages along lines between distinct groups, and it may even be a triggering factor to a conflict dynamic. However, passing the threshold of violence definitely depends on sociopolitical factors and not on the degree of environmental degradation as such"³⁴

Subsequently, after further research, Homer-Dixon also had to tone down his argument even further. First he put more emphasis on the contextual factors,³⁵ and later claimed that there are certain conflicts whose causes cannot be understood without reference to environmental degradation. He wrote:

"Scarcity's role in such violence [...] is often obscure and indirect. It interacts with political, economic, and other factors to generate harsh social effects that in turn help produce violence. Analysts often interpret these social effects as the conflict's principal causes, thus overlooking scarcity's influence as an underlying stress."³⁶

An explanation why environmental factors do not cause violent conflict is given by Goldstone. He points out that, although environmental factors do cause conflicts, these conflicts are settled peacefully. The reason, according to him, is straightforward: war is neither a solution to the problem (it does not make the

environment healthier), nor is it an efficient way to redistribute resources (it is cheaper to pay more for a resource than to go to war over it). Conflict is just not a viable way to solve the problem.³⁷

Nevertheless, the existing body of research has led to the finding that environmental change is related to conflict through conditions of inequality and impoverishment. The conclusion of the OECD-DAC puts this finding into perspective:

“The environment-security nexus is but one example of how various factors and threats are coupled with the structural features of inequality and impoverishment.”³⁸

In other words, environmental decline causes or aggravates the causes of conflict. It is therefore neither a trigger, a catalyst, or a mobilisator, nor a structural cause of conflict, but rather an ‘underlying root-cause’ that may induce structural causes.

4.3 Inter-group relations

Bad relations between groups can be a cause of conflict and form the second cluster of causes. The causes in this second cluster are most often the mobilising causes of conflict. Before conflict is possible, groups must, after all, be mobilised. For a group to mobilise it first needs an identity.³⁹ Every individual identifies with some sort of image, being: religion, age, gender, social class, ethnicity, nation, ideology et cetera.⁴⁰ If a group has such an identity, then it can perceive differences, and it is along these lines of difference that groups are mobilised for conflict. These differences exist or are created, and may be honed in order to make them more effective as a source of conflict and mobilisation.⁴¹ If the interests of groups clash, then conflict along these identity lines may result. During the Cold War, ideology and social class were the most important source of identity. Thereafter, ethnic antagonism in particular has come into the spotlight. This current latter type of identity does indeed seem to be the most common type of identity along which conflict is mobilised. It may, however, be the case in the future that other kinds of identity become more important.

Three factors can be distinguished in the literature with respect to the cluster of inter-group relations: objective and subjective inequality between groups, communal hegemonism, and group-state relations.

4.3.1 Objective and subjective group inequality

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of inter-group relations is objective and subjective group inequality. Objective group inequality, the institutionalised exclusion of certain groups from the political and economic decision-making process and the denial of opportunities, may, according to the UNDP, lead to discontent and eventually to conflict. This institutionalised exclusion has often taken the form of traditional customs and mores and flows from ethnic, communal, or tribal inequalities or prejudices. They sometimes crystallise into legal and constitutional provisions through, amongst other things, property rights and laws.⁴²

With regard to subjective group inequality, the ‘relative deprivation’ theory developed by Gurr explains conflict based on a group’s perception of discrepancy between its value expectations and its value capabilities. Value expectations are conditions and goods to which people feel rightfully entitled. Value capabilities

are the conditions and goods they are capable of getting and keeping. In other words, 'relative deprivation' is the perception of a group that it does not have access to the wealth, prosperity and power it is entitled to. With regard to the financial and economic aspect of this theory, one might also refer to this as the 'perception of being poor' as opposed to 'being poor', which is termed 'absolute deprivation' – and is not necessarily felt to be unjust.⁴³ Relative deprivation works in two ways: people feel deprived of something they had, but lost, and they feel deprived if others have gained relative to themselves. It is the latter part of this theory that is elaborated upon here. The first part of the theory is dealt with in section 4.8 *Unemployment and economic decline*.

Horowitz, like Gurr, acknowledges the importance of privilege and dominance. His group-entitlement theory does, however, place more emphasis on the economic factors that accompany the political and ethnic factors. His modernisation theory entails the belief that ethnic groups modernise at differential rates, and therefore groups compete for benefits. Consequently, the uneven distribution of economic and educational resources is an important source of group tension. He argues that internal civil conflict between ethnic groups may be the result of a 'modernisation gap' and the role of elite ambitions.⁴⁴

Theories on regional differences, like the centre-periphery theory, are also helpful in the analysis of intrastate conflicts, especially in third world states. In many countries a relatively small core area, comprising the political centre or capital and some industries or services, is home to the bulk of the formal economy, and as such the bulk of economic and political power. These centres benefit most from the allocation of resources in the countries they govern where the rural hinterland forms the periphery. Such highly skewed spatial patterns reinforce the geographic cleavage between rich and poor. It forms the basis for claims of relative deprivation by groups living in the periphery.⁴⁵ It should be noted, by the way, that it is not necessarily the relatively deprived who instigate conflict. The privileged may do so in order to defend their position. For example, those in power may use violence to suppress opposition.⁴⁶ Or, the people with economic power are no longer willing to pay for the poorer people and plead in favour of secession, as was the case with Slovenia in the Yugoslav Federation in 1991.

Conflict, in some theories, such as those of Gurr and Horowitz, is regarded to be between the have-nots - who are disadvantaged and seek equal resource distribution by attacking the existing status quo of resource distribution - and the haves - who hope to defend this status quo of distribution. As the haves possess the power and the will to defend the status quo, it is hard for the have-nots to gain influence and, as a result, they see violence as the only way out. However, the greater the economic inequality, the more the rich have to lose. Therefore, although the poor may be more envious, the rich will intensify their actions in order to suppress these feelings. Therefore, several scholars argue that economic inequality does not breed conflict, but tends to prevent it. Mitchell and Parvin combine these visions and suggest the pattern of an inverted U-shape.⁴⁷

One has to put the relevance of relative economic deprivation into perspective. Although most studies believe that distributional issues do lie at the heart of conflicts, their results often contradict one another.⁴⁸ Muller and Seligson, for example, argue that relative deprivation only leads to conflict when 'urban professional revolutionaries' support the cause.⁴⁹ Gissenger found no relationship whatsoever between violent conflict and relative deprivation.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, a

quote by Midlarsky summarises the problem of group inequality and discrimination

“rarely is there a robust relationship discovered between the two variables. Equally rarely does the relationship plunge into the depths of the black hole of nonsignificance [Rather one may] assume that the relationship between inequality and political violence is context-specific.”⁵¹

4.3.2 Communal hegemonism

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of inter-group relations is communal hegemonism. Byman and Van Evera describe communal hegemonism as “the aspiration of ethnic, religious, clan or class groups for hegemony over other groups.” If these hegemonic groups attempt to impose their will on other groups, violence is no longer unthinkable. These attempts are often embodied in claims on, for example, the official language or religion of a country. If a group with a well-developed identity subsequently considers its way of life threatened, conflict often arises. Peace is best guaranteed when groups have a live-and-let-live attitude. Hegemonism causes conflict in two ways. First, it triggers defence mechanisms in other communal groups. If such a group feels threatened because its identity is affected, it may defend itself by force. Second, communal groups sometimes hope to pre-empt such a threat by attacking other groups. Such hegemonism does not always lead to violence, groups can also live peacefully side-by-side. Conflict is, however, rendered more likely especially when there is a history of past bloodshed, a strong sense of identity, or progress on minority rights elsewhere.⁵²

Furthermore, ethnic dominance may also engender conflict in a more passive way. The original ethnic dominance theory claims that the large dominant group gives rise to coups as smaller groups are excluded from political power. More recent works, nevertheless, challenge this theory and have proven that ethnic dominance can even reduce the risk of coups taking place, as it reduces the challenging capacities of smaller groups by creating more ethnic homogeneity. Ethnic dominance would, however, stimulate mass political violence. According to Auvinen, the chances of conflict seem to be the greatest if two groups are roughly the same size.⁵³ (see also section 4.4 *Group demography*)

4.3.3 Government-group relations

Government-group relations are the third factor distinguished in the cluster of inter-group relations. According to Gurr, it should be “obvious that state responses to communal grievances are crucial in shaping the course and outcomes of minority conflicts.”⁵⁴ It is especially relevant that governments give minority groups the opportunity to express their interests and that these groups can also participate in leadership selection. If this is not the case, then the risk of conflict increases. Muller and Weede expect the relationship between group repression and violence to be an inverted U-shape. Where there are high levels of repression, there is no rebellion because of the high costs of failure. Where there are low levels of repression, peaceful means are more rational, as the channels for expression and representation are open.⁵⁵

4.4 Group demography

The third cluster of causes derived from the literature includes demographic pressures. According to Nichiporuk, these demographic pressures and population movements as such do not directly cause violent conflicts, but rather the demographic shifts they bring about. If these shifts take place in an already tense environment, then they may provide the spark that could cause the situation to flare up into conflict. What then are these demographic problems that are relevant in the causation of conflicts? Nichiporuk defines them as consisting of two main areas: population composition and population dynamics. Population composition describes the characteristics of the given population in terms of parameters such as size, age distribution, geographical distribution, ethnic, religious or tribal makeup, and the level and distribution of human capital and resources. Population dynamics are the changes over time in these parameters of population composition. These changes can take place in both the absolute size, as well as in the relative proportions of the different sub-groups. These changes may result from a natural decrease or increase as a result of death and birth rates, or from international migration.⁵⁶ These two factors can also be distinguished in the literature with regard to the cluster of group demographics and are discussed below.

4.4.1 Population composition

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of demographic pressures is population composition. It has been suggested by Engene, amongst others, that multiethnic states run a greater risk of conflict. Ethnic groups in such states would be more interested in protecting their own identity and rights than in preserving the state they live in. As a consequence, multi-ethnic states would have more problems with defining their people than homogeneous states and would therefore have more legitimacy problems.⁵⁷ Population diversity or heterogeneity is, nevertheless, in itself not a cause of war. If that were the case, then the most war-prone states would also be the most ethnically diverse. However, according to Smith this is not true.⁵⁸ Collier and Hoefler argue that ethnic and religious diversity even seems to reduce the risk of conflict because it makes rebellion more difficult.⁵⁹ A rebellion group needs organisational cohesion and motivation in order to be strong enough to fight the government. This is harder in heterogeneous societies in which rebelling groups that are coherent are often too small.⁶⁰

At the same time, Auvinen argues that if it excludes smaller groups from the decision-making process, a large and homogeneous group in a country may provoke conflict. If all the power is concentrated in the hands of one large group, it may lead to frustration and aggression on the part of smaller groups. Following this line of argument, homogeneous countries are more conflict prone.⁶¹ It can, nonetheless, be expected that if the largest group is close to 100% then the minority group is too weak for resistance. According to Ellingsen, both hypotheses are complementary. Her empirical data seem to prove that the relationship between the size of the largest minority group and conflict is shaped as an inverted U-curve.⁶² Sambanis confirms this parabolic relationship, but does point out that this is for the overall incidence of conflict. He stresses that his findings on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict show a positive correlation.⁶³

Several other links have been uncovered between population composition and conflict. First, Sambanis proved, for example, that there is a correlation between

populous society and ethnic conflicts⁶⁴ Second, Nichiporuk argues that ethnically intermixed patterns of population settlement have an inherently greater risk of conflict compared with a situation where a minority group is concentrated in a particular area Should government weaken in a state with such an intermixed settlement pattern, then there is a risk that a security dilemma may develop⁶⁵

4.4.2 Population dynamics

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of demographic pressures is population dynamics Rothchild points out that the form and existence of ethnic political activity depends on the balance between the different groups within a state These groups form a status quo which, if changed, may endanger peace⁶⁶ According to Crighton and MacIver, there are two mechanisms whereby population dynamics, through differential population growth, can lead to conflict First, a faster-growing population of a relatively greater size means that a group can exert more conventional military, economic and political power It may want to exercise more political privileges or claim more land Such a group may feel that it can win a quick and decisive victory if it attacks the slower-growing group Second, a slower-growing group may feel threatened because the faster-growing group may, in the future, be too strong In order to prevent this from happening, the slower-growing group may launch a pre-emptive strike⁶⁷ These two subdivisions can also be distinguished in the literature on the factor of population dynamics

Population growth The first subdivision that can be found in the literature on the population dynamics factor is population growth Demographic pressures resulting from population growth can cause conflict in different ways Homer-Dixon argues that when the quantity of scarce resources does not keep pace with the population growth, the amount of scarce resources per capita will decrease Such an absolute decrease may lead to conflict This is often further intensified as the decline in scarce resources may lead to changes in access to these resources, which was often not equally distributed from the start⁶⁸ According to Baechler, in some cases this has led to a hardening of interethnic relations, as in Rwanda The repeated sub-division of arable land into smaller and smaller inheritable agricultural plots is an indication of such connections It may lead to declining yields per capita and finally drive poor peasants to the city where the potential for conflict gradually builds up⁶⁹ Moreover, if as a result of a growing population the agrarian population is in need of more land and smallholders see adjacent land in the hands of, or even being expanded by, large landowners, then Goldstone considers conflict to be even more likely He finds that confrontations about land between large landowners and peasants have, throughout history, prompted rural upheaval and rebellion⁷⁰ But, as Hazarika points out, land maldistribution and landlessness may also result in conflict in a more indirect way Less available agricultural land may in turn lead to migration, as in the case of Bangladesh where migrants left for India, which eventually led to conflict⁷¹ Prosterman regards landlessness as the single most salient cause of political conflict and a very predictive indicator of revolution⁷² Muller and Seligson affirm this, but add that they cannot find an empirical correlation between land maldistribution and conflict⁷³ Neither should the importance of land-ownership be overestimated As Huntington points out

“Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide a viable living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering revolution is likely, if not inevitable unless the government takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions. [...] In countries which have reached a high level of economic development, agriculture has a relatively minor role, and consequently even highly inequitable patterns of land ownership do not pose substantial problems of social equality and political stability.”⁷⁴

In addition to increasing landlessness and diminishing amounts of land per capita in rural areas, population growth, especially in poorer societal segments in urban areas, may, in Kahl's opinion, lead to increased unemployment and to the further marginalisation of the urban poor.⁷⁵ Furthermore, as Nichiporuk contends, population growth often leads to a skewed national age distribution in favour of the younger citizens. Such a youth bulge puts pressure on education and health care etc. and as such is an important factor that leads to turmoil. Moreover, in countries where the national age distribution is in favour of the 18- to 24-year-olds, the emergence of structural unemployment often leads to considerable support from these young unemployed for radical political alternatives. Nichiporuk gives the example of Algeria where structural unemployment in combination with a large youth bulge led to civil violence mobilised through radical Islamic ideologies.⁷⁶ The principle is, however, as Goldstone shows, much older. He proves that the French Revolution can partly be explained in terms of large youth cohorts that were a burden on society.⁷⁷ This phenomenon is only magnified if the large youth bulge is highly educated. In such a situation the cohort feels even more frustrated as it is not possible to practise the profession they have studied so hard for. This, in combination with a relatively closed structure of elite positions, can lead to discontent as social and economic mobility is obstructed.⁷⁸

Population movement: The second subdivision that can be distinguished in the literature on the population dynamics factor is population movement, such as migration, refugees and urbanisation. These migrants can come to a country or region as a result of either push or pull factors, or both; it is either so bad in a particular area that people have to leave, or it is better somewhere else. Migration can be either controlled or uncontrolled. Uncontrolled refugee flows leave their habitat because of famine or civil violence. Controlled flows stem from government policies, such as removing troublesome groups from important or strategic regions, exerting pressure on neighbouring countries, and preserving or creating cultural homogeneity (ethnic cleansing).⁷⁹

The possible implications of refugee flows for the home countries or regions are covered in section 4.9 *External relations*. In this section the implications for the host country and regions are discussed. In many ways the security of the host country can be threatened. Nichiporuk gives five possibilities. First, if the refugee population are ethnic brethren of the population in the receiving region of the host country, the refugees may tip the balance in that region and support its separatist claims. Second, if the refugee influx is large enough to change the ethnic balance in the host nation, the population of the host nation may see its identity threatened. Third, if the refugee population is large enough, the host nation may fear colonisation. Fourth, refugees are a burden for the host country. They cause economic hardship, exploit natural resources and infrastructure, and might be a threat to law and order in the region.⁸⁰ Fifth, the presence of ethnic diasporas:

refugees can also be a destabilising factor because they can be used as a strategic asset on which their home countries or territories can draw in their pursuit of regional politico-military goals⁸¹

In the literature, urbanisation is also often linked with conflict. The evidence for a causal relationship is, however, found to be inconclusive by De Shirbinn⁸². Urbanisation in itself does not seem to be a cause of conflict, but rather an effect when refugees turn to the cities. However, it can, as Brennan maintains, serve as an accelerator, because just as the population is physically concentrated, so too are their problems also more concentrated. Massive violent urban public protests and riots have, in recent years, been triggered by political upheavals and the concomitant economic consequences (i.e. lack of food, currency devaluation)⁸³. Moreover, urbanisation can significantly increase a sense of relative deprivation. The benefits of urban life do not generally trickle down to the poorest urban groups. At the same time, there is more information available on the riches and wealth of other urban residents which, as Kahl argues, leads to resentment and in the end to violence⁸⁴. Such violence is often further channelled or mobilised through ethnic and communal tensions, which are also concentrated in the cities. Brennan concludes that if left unattended, this concentration of problems in cities may become very harmful because cities are often very important for, amongst other things, the political stability and economic progress of nations⁸⁵.

4.5 State weakness

The fourth cluster of causes comprises state weakness. Huntington argues that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government”⁸⁶. Benson and Kugler define such degree of government as “the government’s ability to extract human and material resources from the available pool to implement the policy chosen by the political elite and to respond to pressures of the international and domestic environment”. Their conclusion from empirical data is that countries with such politically inefficient governments are much more likely to see violent conflict than countries with capable governments⁸⁷.

In the literature, weak states are generally seen as an important cause of war. What is meant by weak states are, as Job points out, states that are unable to meet the economic needs of their population, have a weak identity and lack social cohesion, and/or cannot provide the internal security⁸⁸. The Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law define a failing state as a state which

- “is unable to control its territory or large parts of its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens, because it has lost its monopoly on the use of force,
- is no longer able to uphold its internal legal order,
- is no longer able to deliver public services to its population or create the conditions for such delivery”⁸⁹

State collapse is an extreme case of state weakness: governance problems or excessive burdens on governance capacity. A collapsed state is defined by Zartman as a state where

“[T]he basic functions of a state are no longer performed, as analysed in various theories of the state”⁹⁰

According to Zartman a state has collapsed when:

“As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance between inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives support from nor exercises control over its people, and it is incapable of providing supplies.”⁹¹

Kaplan describes the collapsed state in terms of states where basic infrastructure has broken down, leaving anarchy in its wake. Political power in such a state is not in the hands of conventional political regimes, but outlaw warlords who rely on criminal activities to support their armies and power.

“A pre-modern formlessness governs the battlefield, evoking the wars in medieval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in the era of organized nation-states.”⁹²

The distinction between a weak state and a collapsed state is a matter of degree, not of difference. Similarly, it is also a matter of degree between state weakness and the normal difficulties of exercising authority over a state and meeting the demands of its population.⁹³

Both democratic governments, as well as authoritarian regimes, can have the capacity for effective rule and thus not to be a weak state. Holsti argues that authoritarian regimes build their capacity largely on fear and force, whereas democratic governments found their capacity on both horizontal, as well as vertical legitimacy.⁹⁴

Byman and Van Evera give two ways in which the weakening of states influences the probability of conflict: firstly, it decreases the state’s coercive power, and secondly, it reduces the state’s capacity to co-opt opposition or rival groups. The weak coercive power of a state affects the likelihood of conflict in a dual manner. On the one hand, if a state is too weak to be coercive, then it is also too weak to deter possible opposition groups from using force. On the other hand, once violence has broken out, the lack of coercive power on the side of the state diminishes its ability to defeat the violent opposition group. An unpopular regime can remain in power as long as it has enough resources at its disposal to overwhelm the opposition. At the same time, weak states have fewer resources to buy off potential opposition.⁹⁵ Moreover, according to Benson and Kugler, the weaker the state is, the more opportunities there are for the opposition to acquire the necessary resources to challenge the government. Especially in situations of power parity between the government and the opposition, such state weakness can lead to severe conflict. The government is then too weak to deter or defeat the opposition and vice versa.⁹⁶

The conflicts that follow from state collapse have been called ‘new wars’ by Kaldor⁹⁷ and ‘post-nation state conflicts’ by Duffield⁹⁸. However, in essence, they are not a new phenomenon or recent development. As Doom points out, this sort of violence which stems from the collapse of the state is rather old. Amongst other examples, he gives the example of China during the interbellum when warlords despoiled the country. That conflict, and others, are not far removed from the ones being waged nowadays in Africa.⁹⁹

Three factors can be distinguished in the literature with respect to the cluster of state weakness: socio-economic weakness, socio-political weakness and the weakness to provide security.

4.5.1 *Socio-economic weakness*

The first factor in the cluster of state weakness is socio-economic weakness. The relevance of this factor should not be underrated, as 15 of the 20 poorest countries in the world have experienced substantial periods of conflict during the past decade. Over half the low-income countries are either currently embroiled in conflict or are going through a transitional process towards peace. These poor countries have governments that cannot, or do not want to, comply with all the demands of its population, and the result is discontent and conflict.¹⁰⁰

The collapse of the revenue base of a state may seriously harm its strength. This may happen, as Saikal points out, through, for example, the loss of foreign aid or a domestic source of income. Such a loss of revenue shrinks the state's potential for expenditure, on amongst other things, social welfare, education and health, which, in the end, leads to a greater potential for social and political unrest.¹⁰¹ The UNDP contends that in many third world countries the loss of revenue also obstructs development activities. These countries face low tax revenues, while at the same time they have to meet the recurrent wages and costs of their government employees. In many cases these expenses exceed 80 percent of the total government budget. Such states become very dependent on development aid in the form of grants and loans. However, they often still face a huge revenue shortage which entails severe underemployment and pay scales that make secondary employment and incomes for government officials a necessity. The resulting corruption undermines, amongst other things, the legitimacy of both the government and the state.¹⁰²

At the same time, according to Benson and Kugler, such a loss of revenue cripples the capacity of the state to defend itself against political unrest, which in turn facilitates challenges by force.¹⁰³ The fiscal transactions of a state are particularly relevant as an indicator of state weakness, as it measures both the state's capacity to retrieve taxes, as well as the funds at the disposal of the government in the battle against the opposition. Benson and Kugler maintain that, in sum, tax extractions determine whether governments can govern.¹⁰⁴

The 'cures' for these socio-economic weaknesses may, however, also be dangerous. Socio-economic transition raises many problems. Economic transition is painful and economic austerity programmes, such as those of the IMF and World Bank, sometimes even threaten peace processes. From a liberal point of view, it may be necessary to stimulate a market economy, but in practice, David argues, these programmes can result in the serious deterioration of the standard of living which in some cases has led to the resurgence of violence. So-called shock therapies in particular may be very dangerous.¹⁰⁵ Financial cutbacks and policies aimed at reducing the budgetary burdens of governments within the context of structural adjustment programmes may, for example, reduce the wages of government officials. This, in turn, may result in more corruption, a brain drain and the demotivation of qualified personnel. And this, in turn, may lead to the public losing its confidence in the government, as it can be seen by the public as being incapable of handling the economic problems.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, according to Paris, the capitalist market economy aimed at in these transitions stimulates competition and inequality. Unlike the Western world where there are forms of welfare and regulations, war-torn societies do not have the institutions to channel these conflicting forces. As a result, he contends, a market economy often becomes a form of exploitation, which heightens social tensions and can become a new cause for conflict.¹⁰⁷

4.5.2 Socio-political weakness

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of state weakness is socio-political weakness. Hauge and Ellingson found that the more political stability there is, the less the chance of civil conflict. Once a country is in conflict one year, it is very likely to be in conflict the next year.¹⁰⁸ Countries with a history of conflict are more conflict prone. Auvinen explains this as the process where people learn to adapt to a certain level of violence. Cultures of conflict have been created throughout history. These cultures differ from country to country in their form. In one country it manifests itself in coups, in other countries in insurgencies. Past violence lowers the threshold to renewed violence and makes it more justifiable.¹⁰⁹ Such political instability or even a vacuum combined with other conditions of conflict can lead to the deterioration of law and order which in turn can result in an increase in both petty crime and violent crime. In combinations with militia or military personnel who, like other government officials, may be insufficiently paid, this may often lead to incidences of armed robbery, hold ups, and road blocks.¹¹⁰

The theory of military centrality postulates that in countries where the military are strong they tend to intervene in politics through, amongst other things, coups. In many cases the military are even the most efficient force in the country and military interventions in political affairs have therefore been frequent in Africa and Latin America. Such interventions often take place in periods of economic disorder and are often legitimised by the need to re-establish law and order amid social unrest.¹¹¹ Although military expenditure increases during conflict, Auvinen and Nafziger claim that military expenditure tends to indicate the centrality of the military in society.¹¹²

These socio-political weaknesses are worse in newly independent states. Imperial collapse may leave successor states with enormous problems. Byman and Van Evera name five of these problems. First, these states often have illegitimate regimes as the old elites depended on their ties with the metropole for their legitimacy. After the imperial collapse they find themselves without a popular mandate and challenged by rival elites. This lack of legitimacy often attracts rebellion by minorities as they fear for their position in the smaller unit. They often accepted their (subordinate) position within the heterogeneous empire, but fear domination within the smaller successor state. Second, the new states are often too weak to defend their population or to deter hostile populations from rebelling. This weakness is often a consequence of purges, reforms or even the creation of a new security system in the successor state. Third, new states often have contested 'artificial' borders, as they do not relate to the local geography, and have not been settled by formal agreements. As a result, these borders sometimes create ethnic enclaves or bisect national groups. Fourth, successor states often have mixed hostile populations which intermingled during the imperial times and whose proximity breeds violence. Fifth, and finally, in the international arena such a country is often the battleground in the struggle for spheres of influence as these zones are often undefined. Both the former metropole - clinging on to the optimum of the old influence - and other external powers - pursuing new power as much as possible - often attempt to obtain the largest share of influence in the new state.¹¹³

However, not only newly independent states have to cope with these kinds of instability problems. The transition from autocracy to democracy also provides stumbling blocks for peace and stability. Jagers and Gurr, for example, find from

empirical data that it is this transition in particular that is dangerous. In order to substantiate their argument, they point to the examples of the mass murders in Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994), both preceded by international efforts in those countries to forge democracy.¹¹⁴ Indeed, Hegre et al. found that democratisation can actually lead to war.¹¹⁵ To a considerable extent, this is, as Huntington observes, because of the cultural, political and economic obstacles to democratisation which have to be addressed in the process. According to him, although not insurmountable, a non-western culture does have a negative influence on the likelihood of stable democracy. Democratising states lack democratic experience and their leadership is often only weakly committed to democratic values. Moreover, as economic development is needed, poverty is a principal obstacle for democratisation. Economic development and political leadership are key factors that determine the future political stability of the democratising state.¹¹⁶ In the long run, however, Hegre et al. found that democracies tend to be more stable than autocracies.¹¹⁷

Byman and Van Evera give four more reasons why democratisation may spawn conflict. First, old elites may attempt to crush democratic forces in an attempt to either gain, or remain in, power. They sometimes inflame or manipulate 'ancient hatreds' in order to reach their goal. Second, in particular in new democracies still in the process of democratisation, majority rule is held to be sacrosanct. These 'majoritarian democratic rules' cast all the power to the majority and if this group is 'tyrannical' then minorities may see no other way other than violence to make their voices heard. This sort of resistance may also break out before the democratisation process is shaped, because minorities may fear that the elected majority will not give them a voice in the decision-making process. At the same time, democratisation may lead to violence as it gives space to hardened groups that cannot be appeased by power-sharing and, instead, use the democratic freedoms to organise for conflict. Fourth, after the democratic transition, the victors may struggle for the division of the spoils.¹¹⁸

Several scholars point to the dangers of the policies of international organisations to stimulate democratisation. According to them, a democratic transition consists of more than the organisation of elections. Similarly, they point to the mistake of many 'proponents of democratic peace' who, according to David, amongst others, wrongly "equate democracy with peace."¹¹⁹ They view democracy as a way of life, which cannot be created overnight.¹²⁰ The basis of this argument is the idea, expounded by Paris, that democracy as a political system needs the willingness of the people to accept an elected government as a way of solving conflict. In countries where this willingness does not exist, democracy may, because of its competitive nature, even stimulate conflict.¹²¹ As Kumar argues, free and fair elections: "do not necessarily transform a society's deep-rooted political structures and culture."¹²² A 1996 Berlin workshop on post conflict peace building came to the following conclusion:

"The UN is putting too much emphasis on elections. Elections within a fragmented society lead to further fragmentation. What is required are models of power-sharing, like governments of national unity. Western style democracy will not work in developing countries."¹²³

Zakaria puts it even more bluntly: "the introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war."¹²⁴ According to Paris, the blind transplantation of the liberal model of market

democracy encounters unforeseen obstacles at best, and at worst jeopardises the established peace. He argues that the international community overlooks an important feature of democracy: it encourages conflict and competition. Democracy stimulates the public expression of conflicting opinions. In established democracies these conflicts are channelled through the existing democratic institutions; in war-torn states these institutions are often absent.¹²⁵

4.5.3 Weakness to provide security. Anarchy and security dilemmas

The third factor distinguished in the cluster of state weakness is the weakness to provide security. The absence of regulatory mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts may lead to situations in which groups, which may feel, or are actually, discriminated against, see no other way than to take up arms in the hope of settling the dispute with violence.¹²⁶ This is worsened, as Byman and Van Evera argue, by the spread of modern small arms, which has seriously hampered the state's monopoly on violence in many countries. The capacity of states to curb violence has shrunk as it is easier for the opposition to take up arms.¹²⁷ As David elaborates, in addition to possible opposition forces, societal groups can also obtain arms and become a factor of either security or insecurity. Once central authority in a state has collapsed, these groups can no longer be tamed and controlled. An anarchic system, like the international one, may then replace the national system. In such a collapsed system, national groups behave like states do in the international system and provide their own security.¹²⁸ Especially neorealist and structural realist scholars argue that in such situations a concept that originates from international relations theory, the security dilemma, becomes relevant. Just as with interstate war, anarchy then becomes a permissive cause of intrastate conflicts.

As Posen argues, in a situation of 'emerging anarchy' "groups must pay attention to the first things that states have historically addressed – the problem of security – even though many of these groups still lack many of the attributes of statehood."¹²⁹ As a result, in a collapsed state the concept of a security dilemma becomes relevant. As in the international system, where states protect themselves in ways that unintentionally may lead to war, national groups in a collapsed state may arm themselves which can then lead to internal conflict. As Lake and Rothchild argue:

"intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and security dilemmas take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflicts become more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together these between-group and within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into murderous violence."¹³⁰

Roe combines the concept of the security dilemma with that of societal security to introduce the (inter-)societal security dilemma. In such a dilemma one society feels that its societal security (identity) is threatened, and tries to strengthen it. This causes a reaction in a second society, which sees the action taken by the first society as a threat, which again weakens the societal security of the first society.

In this type of security dilemma there is not so much a military trigger as an identity trigger – threatened language, religion, history, etc. Instead of arms, ethnic nationalism is used as a defence to strengthen the societal identity. Only once a society feels its very existence is threatened and its societal security can no longer be defended by political-legal means, might this dilemma then turn violent¹³¹

Lake and Rothchild, amongst others, see no permanent resolutions for these dilemmas, only temporary “fixes”¹³². Walter, as well, holds out little hope for negotiations in such cases. Unlike in the case of interstate conflict, it is impossible for parties in intrastate conflicts to retain separate independent armed forces, if they agree to settle their differences. As a result, they have to relinquish important fall-back defences in an anarchic system, whereas states in the same kind of system can always secure themselves with their armies. As most parties do not want to go through a period of such intense vulnerability and they are not able to enforce an agreement or to survive exploitation, they often opt to stick to their guns¹³³

4.6 State unwillingness and good governance

The fifth cluster of causes of violent conflict embraces state unwillingness and good governance. Good governance is defined by the UNDP as “governance that is effective, participatory, transparent, accountable, and equitable and promotes the rule of law.” This definition not only encompasses the state as such, but also civil society and the private sector¹³⁴. The absence of such good governance can result from state collapse. In such a case, governance is no longer effective. In this section not so much the effectiveness of, as the willingness to practise good governance, is examined.

In many countries the lack of good governance takes the form of a winner-takes-all attitude in politics. As a result of this attitude, conflicts may arise in those countries. Once in power, a regime considers itself, and often becomes, the winner-of-all, with regard to wealth, resources, patronage, and the prestige and prerogatives of office. This is often heightened by highly centralised and often personalised governance. Leaders are frequently insufficiently accountable, governance lacks transparency, the rule of law is not adhered to, there are insufficient checks and balances, and human rights are generally not respected. In such situations political power becomes excessively important, something one has to nourish and people have to cling to. As a result, the change or replacement of leadership is rarely peaceful¹³⁵.

In the scholarly literature on the cluster of causes of conflict regarding state unwillingness and good governance, four factors can be distinguished. First, so-called ‘bad leadership’, which benefits politically from conflict and becomes a spoiler in peace processes. Second, the polity of a state. Third, the lack of human rights. Fourth, actors for whom not political, but rather economic gains, are the rationale for conflict.

4.6.1 Bad leadership and the spoiler problem

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of state unwillingness and good governance is bad leadership and the spoiler problem. Conflicts are often regarded to be the result of ‘bad leadership’. According to Brown, most conflicts have so-called underlying causes. However, without ‘bad leaders’ these conflicts would

not turn violent. He feels that although underlying causes are needed for a conflict to erupt, 'bad leadership' provides the actual trigger.¹³⁶

Related to this concept of 'bad leadership' is the concept of the spoiler. A spoiler is, according to Stedman, a by-product of peace. Spoilers are:

"leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" ¹³⁷

Leaders may attempt to exploit peace agreements, disgruntled followers may see peace as the betrayal of key values, and excluded parties may seek to alter the peace process or destroy it altogether.

According to Stedman, international actors who wish to end a violent conflict should anticipate possible violent challenges from spoilers:

"Instead of thinking generally about the possible threats to peace, they must ask, 'who are the threats to peace?' The custodians of peace must constantly probe the intentions of warring parties: they must look for evidence that parties that sign peace agreements are sincere in their commitment to peace, and they must search out and make good use of intelligence about warring parties' goals, strategies, and tactics. [...] International consensus about norms and coordination behind a strategy of aggressive management of spoilers can provide the difference between successful and failed implementation of peace agreements."¹³⁸

It is, however, highly arbitrary to determine who the spoiler is. For example, both parties in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can be considered to be spoilers in the eyes of the international community. However, according to the Palestinians, Israel should be considered to be the spoiler in the peace process while, on the other hand, according to the Israelis, the Palestinians fulfil this function. This disagreement is the result of the different definitions of peace used by both parties, as well as the international actors. As a result, it is inherent to ask the question 'who are the threats to peace?' in a conflict. Consequently, the answer to the question is partisan and subjective.¹³⁹

4.6.2 *The polity of a state*

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of state unwillingness and good governance is the polity of a state. Kant argued in his *Perpetual Peace* that states with a republican constitution would tend to be peaceful with one another.¹⁴⁰

More recent research in international relations studies has proven this hypothesis - that democratic states almost never go to war with each other. Levy even describes this conclusion as "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."¹⁴¹ In addition, it is claimed by Rummel that democracies tend to have less violent internal conflicts.¹⁴² He argues that in democracies discrimination is less likely because they give more rights to the people, and every citizen or group has a potential say in the political decision-making process. Consequently, he contends, violent conflict in democracies is less likely. Where autocracies are expected to impose their will on the population by force, democracies are expected to solve their conflicts through voting, negotiations and compromise.¹⁴³ Additionally, many conflicts find their roots in what Byron and Van Evera call 'aristocratic intransigence'. They view that such a refusal of elites to share power and wealth has triggered many recent civil wars. Since the end of the Cold War it has, nevertheless, become harder for such elites to survive, as they

have often lost their foreign backing. Moreover, in international public opinion democracy has become more and more important and these elites were also forced to moderate their behaviours.¹⁴⁴

However, research by, amongst others, the Clingendael Institute, has also proven that democracy does not seem to be a guarantee against conflict. Conflict may erupt especially when populist rhetoric is allowed to dominate the political agenda and majorities champion exclusionary policies. Minorities may then feel that the only way to voice their discontent is through violence.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the claim that democracy brings peace is also challenged by the resource mobilisation theory. This theory postulates that the more democratic a regime is, the greater the chance of political conflict. It is based on the assumption that, on the one hand, openness in a political regime encourages political action.¹⁴⁶ Simultaneously, on the other hand, it builds on the idea that highly autocratic regimes have more power sources at their disposal, so that they can suppress possible (armed) opposition more easily. Such oppression makes it harder for opposition groups to mobilise.¹⁴⁷ It has also been argued by Eckstein and Gurr that chronic low-level conflict is “the price democracies have to pay for freedom.”¹⁴⁸

Statistical research in particular presents the degree of democracy and civil violence as an inverted U-curve. This is also the relationship with the most support.¹⁴⁹ The rationale behind the inverted U-curve relationship is that under an authoritarian regime the cost of rebellion is too high, and, that in a democratic polity, peaceful opposition is more attractive, but that under a semi-repressive regime the costs of mobilisation are not too high, while peaceful action is ineffective. In other words, there may be considerable grievance in autocratic regimes, but there is no opportunity to rebel. In a democracy there is the opportunity to rebel, but there is no grievance. But in a semi-autocracy there is grievance and there is an opportunity to rebel.¹⁵⁰ As Eckstein hypothesised, polities with a coherent and internally consistent authority pattern outlast and outperform those polities that do not.¹⁵¹

4.6.3 Lack of human rights

The third factor distinguished in the cluster of state unwillingness and good governance is a lack of human rights. Apart from whether a polity is repressive in nature in general, being either autocratic or democratic, one can also distinguish, what Muller and Seligson describe as the extent to which a regime employs, on occasion, acts of coercion that entail the use of negative sanctions to suppress the activities of dissident groups. The political authority in a democratic country may also, on occasion, engage in such coercive acts against dissident groups that it deems to be a danger to internal security. If these actions do not become structural in character, the regime may remain non-repressive. Therefore, the coercive behaviour of a government varies more or less independently of the structural repressiveness.¹⁵² Human rights violations are, nevertheless, more common in autocracies than in democracies. However, as Davenport found, the number of violations often increases amidst regime change. The direction of such a change, either towards democracy or autocracy, does not matter.¹⁵³

The extent to which law is enforced and human rights are observed is seen in the literature as an important factor in the causation of conflicts. Stern and Druckman argue that sometimes the violence of a civil war has been greatly reduced through the imposition of a repressive dictatorial regime. Zaire in the 1960s is a good example of such an achievement of negative peace without or perhaps at the cost

of positive peace¹⁵⁴ More often, however, the opposite is argued According to the UNDP, for example, the suppression of human rights such as free speech, and association, as well as dissent, may harm the orderly resolution of conflicts As peaceful ways are forbidden, violence may become the means to express dissent and disaffection¹⁵⁵ Tilly also concludes that violent and coercive responses by a political authority to illegal but peaceful dissident groups, has often escalated peaceful protest into violent conflict¹⁵⁶

In political practice, the attention for human rights has been reflected in the establishment of war tribunals like the ones in The Hague and Arusha¹⁵⁷ One might, however, question whether the choice for human rights is always the right one In some cases, as in Cambodia, one of the reasons that the Khmer Rouge continued fighting was to avoid prosecution In such a case the choice for human rights may become a choice for war, instead of peace¹⁵⁸

4.6.4 Conflict inc the fight for resources

The fourth factor distinguished in the cluster of state unwillingness and good governance is the fight for resources Several old conflicts from the Cold War era have continued, although they have lost their ideological basis These conflicts have created a logic of their own The fight is no longer about what originally caused the conflict, but has tended to shift towards what has been called the commercial business of Transnational Criminal Enterprises¹⁵⁹ In such greed-driven conflicts, society as a whole suffers economically from the conflicts However, small identifiable groups do well out of it They may be economic entrepreneurs, criminals, companies, traders, but also the rebel leaders They have economic incentives, like the sale and taxation of primary commodities and illegitimate exports, and have an interest in the initiation, perpetuation and renewal of conflict Economy is also what drives the individual rebel, as for him the conflict is a source of income and the rebel leader, his employer According to Collier, rebels keep their true character of greed low profile and discourse on grievances, because grievance to them is what image is to business In reality, it would be greed not grievance that makes them fight their conflicts Collier even argues that this is a general characteristic of civil conflict and that rebellion is more like a form of organised crime¹⁶⁰

4.7 State/government legitimacy

The sixth cluster of causes of violent conflict is lack of legitimacy Conflicts can stem from a legitimacy crisis Such a crisis can be rooted in both a lack of legitimacy of the government, but also of the state itself

4.7.1 Government legitimacy

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of lack of state and government legitimacy is government legitimacy The lack of government or regime legitimacy has been defined by Byman and Van Evera as a regime that is “broadly believed by the public to have lost its right to rule because of its perceived failure to provide for the common good” This factor has been important in the causation of many civil wars both during and after the Cold War¹⁶¹ In this context, Job warns that a government that relies on coercion to suppress groups should not too easily be seen as a strong state The use of force instead of legitimate authority implies government weakness¹⁶²

The loss of government legitimacy has often sprung from four causes.

- *First, political deprivation that occurs when a regime excludes other groups from the decision-making process and obstructs social mobility.* This participation can be prevented by law or by repression. In fact, as Auvinen argues, the constant use of repression indicates a lack of legitimacy.¹⁶³ Conflict often arises when, as Byman and Van Evera maintain, a rising middle class is denied access to the government.¹⁶⁴
- *Second, corrupt or incompetent government policies as a result of the lack of government accountability.* Such a legitimacy deficit follows, according to Clingendael, when military or authoritarian regimes only serve those in power or their friends and allies. Sometimes, these kinds of regimes even turn into predatory states that extract resources and exploit the population. Such policies not only undermine the legitimacy of the regime but ultimately the state itself may also be called into question.¹⁶⁵
- *Third, stagnating or declining economies* Byman and Van Evera contend that economic performance is often directly related to the extent of support for and opposition against regimes.¹⁶⁶ Auvinen argues that if a regime can deliver the economic goods, it can at least temporarily gain support and prevent economic deprivation.¹⁶⁷ System legitimacy is, therefore, in the view of Homer-Dixon, a critical intervening variable between economic decline and violent conflict.¹⁶⁸
- *Fourth, the collapse of similar, even more distinct regimes, which may discredit one's own system and thus reduce its legitimacy.* Byman and Van Evera give the example of the effects the collapse of communism had on authoritarian regimes in general.¹⁶⁹

According to Auvinen, the risk of conflict is especially real when both political and economic deprivation lead to a lack of regime legitimacy.¹⁷⁰ These legitimacy crises produce violence both when a regime tries to suppress dissent, as well as when it intends to regain legitimacy. Byman and Van Evera label this 'the reform trap'.¹⁷¹ This concept is close to what Huntington labels the 'king's dilemma'. A traditional leader may seek to modernise his society in order to strengthen his position, but this may inadvertently create instability, which might possibly lead to the collapse of the traditional order.¹⁷² On the other hand, hunkering down may not be the solution either, as Byman and Van Evera point out. In order to stay in power, a regime may consider that it is better to rely on a narrower support base. It may, therefore, increasingly lean on only small groups and sectors within the society, such as ethnic groups or the military sector. Although this strategy, as Byman and Van Evera argue, can provide a short-term remedy and may serve to survive challenges to the regime, in the end it only stimulates the resistance against the repression. As a consequence, it does not alter the original legitimacy crisis, but tends to aggravate it in the long term.¹⁷³

4.7.2 State legitimacy

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of lack of state and government legitimacy is state legitimacy. This factor is a major source of conflict. According to Clingendael, if a state's people do not accept the concept, idea or existence of that state, then conflict about its future remnants may arise. Citizens in a state generally consider themselves to be citizens of that state and represented by its central government. If certain groups feel that they are politically excluded, or in fact are, then they may regard autonomy or secession as a possible solution to

their problem. The legitimacy of the state then starts to erode as members of such groups no longer feel that they are citizens of the state and that they are represented by its government.¹⁷⁴ In this way, it may be argued that certain conflicts stem from artificial borders and political geography that do not reflect the traditional patterns of living or human interaction, because often, in such cases, the state is not regarded as legitimate.¹⁷⁵

Saikal maintains that especially the loss either of traditional mechanisms of legitimisation and the ability to institute a viable alternative, or, of a charismatic leader, can make a state conflict prone. An example of the former is Afghanistan, where, following the communist coup of 1978, the Grand Council (*Loya Jirgah*) - the traditional mechanism for legitimisation of the elites and the settlement of their disputes - broke down, which left that country without a mechanism for legitimisation. An example of the latter is Yugoslavia. Following the death of Tito, the country was left without its binding factor and therefore entered into a legitimacy crisis.¹⁷⁶ Separatism on regional, ethnic and religious grounds is often a direct consequence of such a lack of state legitimacy.

4.8 Economic causes

The seventh cluster of causes of conflict comprises economic causes. Stavenhagen concluded that economic factors play a crucial role in ethnic conflicts and the nation state. He observes, however, that such economic factors need tribal, ethnic, religious or invented enmities to legitimise and justify the violence and that they are therefore not sufficient causes of conflict. According to him, only when social and regional disparities in the distribution of economic resources coincide with ethnic cleavages, do economic factors fire ethnic conflicts.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, it is important to realise that economic decline and poverty can both be a cause, as well as a consequence of conflict. Many conflicts have had devastating effects on the local economies of the countries where they have taken place. In some countries, these negative effects on the economy have even driven parties back to the negotiating table.¹⁷⁸ In the literature on the economic causes of violent conflicts, one can distinguish two factors: absolute, as well as relative deprivation. Gurr defines absolute deprivation as a discrepancy between what people need and what people have. Relative deprivation occurs when people do not get what they think they deserve.¹⁷⁹ Relative deprivation with regard to inter-group relations has already been addressed in section 4.3 *Inter-group relations*. Here, the two factors of absolute deprivation and relative deprivation in time, are further reviewed.

4.8.1 Absolute deprivation

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of economic factors is absolute deprivation. Countries with higher economic development seem to be less vulnerable to domestic conflict. This has been proven by Ellingsen¹⁸⁰ and Hegre et al., amongst others.¹⁸¹ As the Project Ploughshares points out, countries in the lower half of the UNDP's Human Development Index are almost three times as likely to fall into conflict in comparison with those states in the top half.¹⁸² Hauge and Ellingson found that the higher the GNP per capita, the less likely civil war is and the lower the number of battle deaths in civil war.¹⁸³

Hauge and Ellingsen explain this relationship between absolute deprivation and conflict by pointing at the fact that poor and underdeveloped countries are often mono-cultures or countries that are dependent on only a few export commodities,

which renders their economies very unstable. If the prices of such a commodity on the world market fall it may have severe implications for the economy as a whole, and lead to economic decline and political instability.¹⁸⁴ Collier shows that countries that have a substantial share of their GNP generated from the export of primary commodities are, indeed, statistically radically more at risk of conflict.¹⁸⁵ One can, however, argue that the relationship between primary commodity dependence and conflict is not so much an effect of poverty, but rather of economic instability.

Too great a dependency on primary commodities not only causes economic instability. These primary commodities are also very profitable and that has, according to Collier, another effect.¹⁸⁶ Collier and Hoeffler argue that one can view violent conflict as an economic activity, which occurs when the incentives are sufficiently large relative to the costs. The incentives for rebellion depend on the expected capacity of the expected future rebel government to reward its supporters. These must outweigh the cost of rebellion. The latter includes, amongst other things, the cost of rebel labour, the cost of destruction, and economic losses as a result of the conflict and the costs of the co-ordination of the rebel group or organisation. All these costs can be expected to be higher in high income countries and be lower in poor countries. At the same time, the expected income is likely to be the same in both high and low income countries. Following this argument, in low-income countries the incentives for conflict for rebel groups are therefore higher than in high-income countries.¹⁸⁷

The absolute deprivation hypothesis that poverty leads to social upheaval is, however, according to Kahl, highly problematic. After all, it overpredicts the possibility of conflict. If people rebelled as a result of poverty or deprivation then a large part of the world would see many more conflicts. There are, nevertheless, enough poor countries that can be referred to as peaceful countries. Moreover, although the hypothesis intends to explain a political phenomenon, the explanation is apolitical. It ignores political institutions and the activities of political elites, although these factors have proven to be relevant.¹⁸⁸ Neither did research by the Clingendael institute observe any persistent relationship between poverty and conflict.¹⁸⁹

Jones finally comes to the conclusion that: "The simple social science exercise of mapping the poorest countries in the world against the countries which have experienced conflict shows that poverty is a frequent correlate of conflict but not so frequent as to support the idea that poverty actually causes conflict. [...] Poverty does not cause war, but it helps make it possible."¹⁹⁰

4.8.2 Relative deprivation: today's earnings are less than yesterday's yields

The second factor distinguished in the cluster of economic factors is relative deprivation with regard to the past. Marx and Engels presented a theory of revolution and rebellion. According to this theory, after progressive degradation, the industrial working class would finally reach the point of despair and inevitably had to revolt. Most other scholars, like Carbonnier, also regard factors such as unequal or negative growth, competition for scarce resources, abrupt shifts in income and wealth, a lack of regional economic integration as important contributors to violent conflict.¹⁹¹ Gurr and Duvall found that short-term economic decline is directly linked to political conflict.¹⁹² At the same time, Londregan and Poole found that high rates of economic growth reduce the chances of violent conflict.¹⁹³ The decrease of real income is what, according to

Avuinen, causes the conflicts to arise. Therefore, he argues, inflation induces uncertainty and conflict as it reduces purchasing power¹⁹⁴. Indeed, inflation as measured through the annual percentage change in the consumer price index has proven to be an indicator of conflict¹⁹⁵. In addition, during periods of economic decline, income disparities often increase. Such an increase frequently aggravates the existing inequality and exclusion from access to opportunities¹⁹⁶. Tocqueville found that the opposite of relative deprivation also seems to cause conflict. Rebellions often take place when the yoke becomes lighter. Scholars like Connor also argue that modernisation and economic progress stimulate, rather than undermine, ethnic divisions. According to them, modernisation brings together ethnic groups that were previously isolated and suddenly find themselves competing for the same economic niches. Therefore, rather than stimulating integration, modernisation stimulates interethnic competition that may heighten ethnic conflict¹⁹⁷. Davies combined the above two theories in the thesis that revolutions and rebellions are more likely to occur when a sharp economic decline sets in after a period of sustained economic growth. He explains that in periods of progressive degradation people do not revolt as their wealth and power is too little to win their goal. "When it is a choice between losing their chains or their lives, people will mostly choose to keep their chains." On the other hand, he contends that in periods when yokes become lighter, people do not revolt because they already expect their situation to improve. According to Davies, the most important factor is therefore the state of mind of frustration when the manifest reality breaks away from the anticipated reality¹⁹⁸. Such frustration-aggression theories presuppose a direct relationship between material motives and mass mobilisation and as such between poverty and conflict.

4.9 External relations

The eighth cluster of causes embraces the external factors. Although in nearly all conflicts in recent history external involvement was present, the extent of it varied considerably¹⁹⁹. Internal causes of conflict are often paralleled or even driven by external sources. Both the depth and breadth of disruption, as well as the intensity of the conflict, seem too severe when external factors accompany the internal ones. In such cases, resolution of the conflict is, according to Saikal, often more difficult as the disruption is more persistent and resistant to solution²⁰⁰. However, one has to realise that external causes of conflict are never a sufficient cause. They may, as Clingendael argues, aggravate existing internal causes and possibly even help crossing the line towards violence, but without internal causes no conflict can erupt²⁰¹.

Three factors can be distinguished in the literature with regard to the cluster of external relations. First, the intended interference in the internal affairs of the country in conflict by a foreign government or group. Second, the unintended destabilisation from events occurring elsewhere²⁰². Third, the effects of past foreign occupation or colonialism.

4.9.1 Outside interventions and bad foreign relations

The first factor distinguished in the cluster of external causes is outside intervention and bad foreign relations. This consists of a broad spectrum of intervention ranging from the funding of rebels to direct military invasion. In many conflicts, Prakash argues, external powers are involved as arms traders,

military trainers, political advisers, financiers, and mediators²⁰³ Such activities may have strong destabilising effects. The relationships between political elites and leaders of countries may, as Clingendael maintains, indicate possible conflict areas. Animosity between them may at the beginning or during the course of a conflict lead towards overt and covert support, thereby aggravating the conflict.²⁰⁴ There is, however, only weak empirical support for the idea that countries that are involved in an interstate conflict have a higher chance of intrastate conflict. This represents the ambiguous findings in the literature. On the one hand, it is likely that groups seize the opportunity to rebel. On the other hand, interstate war is an effective means for governments to unite the country against the foreign enemy.²⁰⁵ In addition to interventions by governments, refugees and ethnic diasporas may also be an external factor that influences conflicts. These diasporas tend to follow the developments in their home countries and, as Nichiporuk contends, in contrast to the era prior to modern communication and transportation methods, they can nowadays try to influence their course. Therefore, they may use their host state as a springboard for political or military opposition activities. They can try to start international public relations campaigns to slander opponents, exert pressure on the governments of the host countries to turn against their enemies, and raise funds for the purchase and funnelling of arms.²⁰⁶ It is not only diasporas that can stimulate conflict, external support for groups by kin-groups can also contribute towards violence. Gurr gives the example of the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria who have supported and sustained each other's movement in times of need.²⁰⁷ Ethnic, regional or religious groups may hope to separate from the country they live in if that country loses legitimacy. This can be stimulated by irredentist policies of neighbouring states. The size of such a minority may, according to Carment, not necessarily reflect its true size, as that group may be the majority in a neighbouring country. This also influences the identification by such a group.²⁰⁸ Lake and Rothchild argue that such transnational affinities between a minority group and ethnic kinship abroad play an important role in the development of ideology and political support.²⁰⁹ These ethnic affinities, however, tend to be over-exaggerated as the race, language or religion that represents the ethnic group in one country does not necessarily represent the group within another. Ellingsen, for example, cannot find an empirical relationship between ethnic affinities with foreign countries and the likelihood of domestic conflict.²¹⁰

4.9.2 Regional instability

The second factor in the cluster of external causes constitutes not so much the neighbours, but the whole 'neighbourhood' a country finds itself in. A correlation between instability in neighbouring countries and the outbreak of conflict in a specific country cannot be established by Hegre et al. However, regional instability as such can have a substantial impact as several conflicts, as those in the Balkans have proven.²¹¹ Just as cities have neighbourhoods where one would prefer not to live or walk the street at night, the world also has its 'bad neighbourhoods' that it would be better for a state not to find itself in.²¹² In regions of the world where most countries have strong political institutions there is less chance of conflict. In 'bad neighbourhoods', on the one hand, countries have weak political institutions with little domestic control, which may cause conflicts. Moreover, in 'good neighbourhoods' countries may help their neighbouring states to overcome their problems by means of, for example,

mediation, while in bad neighbourhoods neighbours may try to exacerbate grievances abroad. The finding of Sambanis, that a high level of democracy in the region has a moderating influence on the probability of ethnic conflict in a country, is particularly robust.²¹³

Additionally, Weiner points to the influence of regional instability on the availability of arms. In regions where conflict is common, it is easier to acquire weapons, which, in turn, lowers the threshold for either government or opposition to resort to violence. In particular in regions where international borders are porous, military equipment flows without many problems into a country when conflict erupts, and outward to neighbouring countries when the conflict is over. Weiner gives the example of the arms that were imported into Afghanistan from amongst other countries Pakistan and the former Soviet Union, and which nowadays pass into the hands of rebels in Kashmir and Tajikistan.²¹⁴

Finally, Saikal mentions the massive influx of refugees and the increased apprehension on the part of minorities as they witness ethnic discrimination elsewhere.²¹⁵ The possible consequences of such an influence have been elaborated on in section 4.4 *Group demography*.

4.9.3 *The end of empires, the end of their struggles*

The third factor distinguished in the cluster of external causes concerns the effect of past foreign occupation or colonialism. In the literature, both colonisation (imperialism), and superpower competition for influence (the Cold War), have been given as causes of conflict.

The UNDP argues that the end of the colonial age left many countries in a position of weakness. The European colonisers left the mostly traditional African societies with European style administrative, judicial and political structures and models alien to their cultures. This often resulted in the functioning of parallel systems next to each other; an official and a traditional one. Alongside the parallel structure, the ongoing quest of modernisation meant that none of the above systems could fully function, which weakened many societies. The elites of the newly independent states were often unprepared to govern their countries. They often lacked the necessary education. Moreover, in many cases, colonial powers had privileged particular groups, ethnicities or tribes in education so that after independence many countries saw unequal inter-group relations. Additionally, the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers gave rise to further problems. Traditional commercial relations have been or were broken and groups found themselves divided by borders or as minorities in a different country.²¹⁶

During the Cold War, some third world countries became the battlegrounds of the superpower conflict. These were the places where the Cold War became hot and where the superpowers fought their wars by proxy or intervened directly to support their clients. In doing so, Byman and Van Evera contend that they often magnified an existing conflict, but sometimes they can even be considered to be the cause of conflict.²¹⁷ The end of the Cold War has, at the same time, also been cited as a cause of conflicts, since it left large parts of the third world and other regions as objects of neglect rather than competition. Many regimes in Africa lost their economic and political support and were left to fend for themselves.²¹⁸ The so-called ethnic conflicts that sprang up in, for example, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union can also be explained on the basis of the end of the Cold War. It has been argued that the end of the communist 'empires' meant the lifting of the 'totalitarian lid'. This authoritarian rule had suppressed ancient grievances.

Once the lid had been lifted and the grievances were unchecked, they could finally be settled.²¹⁹

Although in the literature, colonialism and the Cold War are often regarded as important causes of conflict, all the aspects discussed here can also be categorised in other clusters. The end of colonialism and the Cold war have produced, among other things, weak states. The effects of the Cold War itself can also be viewed as outside interference. It is only the era of imperialism and the Cold War that clusters these causes not the mechanism in which they work. As a consequence, this sub-section is the odd one out.

4.10 A framework for the guidance of the case studies

If peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to durable peace they must address both *negative peace*, as well as the causes of conflict. This literature study has produced eight clusters of causes of conflict, as follows: *environmental causes*; *inter-group relations*; *group demography*; *state weakness*; *state unwillingness and good governance*; *state/government legitimacy*; *unemployment and economic decline*; and *external relations*. It shows that some clusters or parts of them have been widely theorised upon, have been researched and have proven to be less relevant or did not have general support amongst scholars. These causes are not included in the theoretical framework for the guidance of the case studies. For this reason, although it has been the subject of many research projects, the cluster of *environmental causes* has proven to be too distant and indirect in comparison to the other seven clusters of causes. It tends to be an 'underlying indirect cause' and is therefore not included in this study.

Except for the environmental cluster, all the other clusters have general support and prove to be relevant for the further progress of this study. These seven clusters are:

1. The cluster of causes regarding *inter-group relations*: is generally regarded to be relevant especially as a mobilisator.
2. The cluster of causes regarding *group demography*: cannot be ignored. One must, nevertheless, be cautious with respect to the relationship between the static population composition of a country and its 'cure'. After all, one cannot and even may not expect peacekeeping operations to change it, as this may coincide with ethnic cleansing.
3. The cluster of causes regarding *state weakness*: may also be problematic to address as strengthening the state may also result in grievance. In other words, many of the solutions for this cluster can potentially also serve as a cause of conflict themselves.
4. The cluster of causes regarding *state unwillingness and good governance*: is relevant but some parts, like spoilers, have to be treated with caution in their management as they may be subjective or sensitive to subjective interpretation. Part of the solution of aspects of this cluster may therefore involve partiality in the conflict.
5. The cluster of causes regarding *state/government legitimacy*.
6. The cluster of causes regarding *unemployment and economic decline*: is not accepted amongst scholars in its entirety. Absolute deprivation as a cause of conflict is not only problematic, but it can also not be expected to be solved by peacekeeping operations. For this reason, the static factor of absolute deprivation is omitted for further treatment in this study. The dynamic aspects

of the *unemployment and economic decline* cluster, including relative deprivation, are, nevertheless, dealt with in this research.

7. The cluster of causes regarding *external relations*: is generally supported except for the time-related aspects – regarding colonialism and the Cold War. The latter are therefore not included in this study as they work through other aspects of the cluster of *external relations* or through other clusters.

Table 4 - Hypotheses

Peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects:

1. contribute positively to *negative peace*.
2. contribute positively to *inter-group relations*.
3. contribute positively to *group demography*.
4. contribute positively to *state weakness*.
5. contribute positively to *state unwillingness and good governance*.
6. contribute positively to *state/government legitimacy*.
7. contribute positively to *unemployment and economic decline*.
8. contribute positively to *external relations*.

These seven clusters of the causes of conflict as distinguished in the literature are applied in this research on whether and to what extent peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace'. They are applied with all their internal inconsistencies and vagueness. After all, they are clusters of the causes of conflict. For example, within the cluster of *state unwillingness and good governance*, autocracy, democracy and the semi-repressive middle are included as possible explanations, as long as they apply in some cases. For the purpose of obtaining a framework to guide the case studies in this research, the eight components that together draw up durable peace - *negative peace* and the seven clusters of the causes of violent conflict - are rephrased into hypotheses regarding the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to 'durable peace'. This produces the list of hypotheses, as shown in table 4.

4.11 Existing models and indicator sets

In order to survey the hypotheses posited in the theoretical framework and to obtain the general questions to be asked of each case study, theory with regard to the causation of conflicts has to be applied. More specifically: in order to research the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects in a structured manner, data requirements have to be formulated in a data checklist. Conflict indicators are utilised for this purpose. As a body of applied theory, including conflict indicators, already exists, it is not necessary here to reinvent the wheel.²²⁰ For this reason, the conflict indicators that are used in applied theoretical models and indicator sets serve to fulfil this task.

For the purpose of this study the following models and indicator sets have been reviewed: those of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),²²¹ the Project Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar Oorzaken van Mensenrechtenschendingen (PIOOM),²²² the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN),²²³ the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS),²²⁴ the State Failure Project,²²⁵ the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER),²²⁶ the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP),²²⁷ the Fund for Peace,²²⁸ the Management of Social Transformations Programme (MOST) of UNESCO,²²⁹ and the set developed

by Cockell for the United Nations Staff College.²³⁰ Models and indicator sets that only deal with specific types of conflict were not taken into account. This avoids later distortion of the distillation of indicators, because otherwise certain indicators are overrepresented in the modal set and then aspects of specific types of conflict may be given extra attention. The Accelerators of Genocide project,²³¹ the Minorities at Risk project,²³² and RAND²³³ only deal with conflicts along ethnic lines. Consequently, they were eliminated from the list. Although several other models and indicator lists say they describe only a specific type of conflict – ethnic, communal, et cetera - the range of their definitions of what they describe is sufficiently broad to include all sorts of intrastate conflicts. For this reason, these models and indicators were not removed from the list. Examples of these are MOST and the Fund for Peace model.

Several conclusions can be drawn from a review of applied theoretical models and indicator sets. First, of all the models and indicator sets only few are operational; most are merely work-in-progress. As a result, some indicator sets are illustrative, potential and tentative, and do not form a finished whole within an accompanying model. Both practitioners and scholars are still in the process of developing and designing both models and indicator sets.

Second, each model or indicator set assesses in different ways - early warning, risk assessment, et cetera - each on different subjects - genocide, politicide, state failure, ethnic conflicts, et cetera – and each uses different definitions. These definitions are not always explicitly defined, so it is not always completely clear what exactly is being measured. However, although these models and indicator sets formulate their areas of attention differently and their definitions differ, in essence all models do measure the same thing: the presence of the causes of violent intrastate conflict. The lack of uniformity should not prevent one from making comparisons: the models and indicator sets have more in common than they differ.

Finally, it is regrettable that in all but a few models and indicator sets the choice of indicators is not substantiated in a thorough scholarly manner. Even if some are based on brainstorming sessions, it does not mean that the assumptions and ideas need not be grounded and annotated. This general lack of references to the literature makes it hard to retrace the decisions made and may consequently disturb a thorough scholarly discussion about these choices. At the same time, the models reviewed for the purpose of this study reflect the current theoretical body of knowledge on the causes of conflict. Even though not every decision is retraceable and annotated, it would therefore seem that these models are based on implicit theoretical knowledge. They can therefore still serve as the basis for the choice of indicators to be reviewed in the case studies of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects in this research, within the context of the formulation of the data requirements in the data checklist according to the structured, focused comparison method.

4.12 A modal indicator set

In order to research what indicators of the causes of conflict are regarded to be the most important in applied theory, they have been distilled from the existing sets and models. A modal set of indicators was created for this purpose. In this modal set, clusters of indicators can be distinguished that are generally regarded to be of importance in applied theory.

4.12.1 The selection of the relevant models and indicator sets

Only those models and indicator sets that are comprehensive and which measure intrastate violent conflict through indicators of their causes, were selected for further treatment. In other words:

A first requirement was that the indicators deal with the causes of conflict, not with the consequences, unless it in turn could be a cause.

The consequences of conflict are examined by surveying ‘negative peace’, and therefore, models measuring (amongst other things) the consequences of conflict, such as death tolls, etc., had to be separated from those measuring the causes. Moreover, this research intends to establish a relationship between the scores on a conflict indicator and the policy aimed at the management of that indicator. If a consequence is measured if one expects to measure a cause, then it might lead to an erroneous picture. It might then be possible to perceive that the presence of the causes of conflict decreases, while in fact the causes actually remain, but only its consequences are repressed. For example, child mortality can be a conflict indicator because more children die as a result of conflict. A policy directed at diminishing child mortality through vaccination programmes would, nevertheless, not eliminate the causes of the conflict. Causes that stem from the consequences of a conflict, however, should obviously not be omitted. As a result of this requirement, the State Failure project was removed from the list as this purely statistical indicator list consists of both causes and consequences.

A second requirement was that the indicator sets should be sufficiently comprehensive so that they include enough indicators to explain the causal patterns.

This is a prerequisite for the application of the structured, focused comparison of the cases. For this reason, the UNDP and HEWS were eliminated from the list.

One more set was eliminated from the list for a totally different reason: the CIPF indicator set. Including this set would mean that its indicators were used twice as it is an operationalisation of the FEWER framework. If one seeks the most important conflict indicators, the CIPF indicators therefore had to be eliminated as otherwise the FEWER indicators would have been counted twice. Of the ten models reviewed, six indicator sets fulfilled the requirements to guide the further selection of indicators. These were: PIOOM, CPN, Cockell’s set, FEWER, the Fund for Peace and MOST. A schematic outline of these choices and consequences is shown in table 5.

Table 5 – Nature of the models and indicator sets

Model is/deals with	Cause oriented	Comprehensive
UNDP	Y	N
PIOOM	Y	Y
CPN	Y	Y
HEWS	Y	N
State Failure	N	Y
FEWER	Y	Y
CIPF	Y	Y
Cockell	Y	Y
Fund for Peace	Y	Y
MOST	Y	Y

4.12.2 *The clustering of the indicators*

All individual indicators from the selected sets were put together in a large collection. It contained a wide variety of indicators, in total 601. Such a large number of indicators would be unworkable if all of them were used in a set. Therefore a selection had to be made. Although the definitions and extent of specification of these indicators in the collection seemed to vary widely at first sight, they actually differed only in minor ways. Regarding the definition, for example, what the one set called poverty the other referred to as economic deprivation. Regarding the level of analysis of the indicators, for example, what the one indicator set called economic decline was called growing unemployment, decreasing production, et cetera, by another set. Although indicators were different, clusters and categories could be identified and distilled.

In the collection of indicators, four broad groups of clusters were distinguished in which each indicator fits. Seven clusters can be distinguished in these groups of clusters. Each cluster can accordingly also be subdivided into categories. These categories consist of actual indicators. The modal indicator set distilled in this manner consists of the indicators that are generally regarded as the most important indicators according to the six sets. This modal set is shown in table 6.

4.13 Comparison and the list of general questions for data collection

The clusters of indicators retrieved from applied theory can be compared with the clusters of the causes of conflict, which were distinguished in the literature. Although the body of applied theory is rarely fully substantiated and annotated, it seems that it does resemble the existing body of theoretical literature. This is striking as it shows that, although not explicitly presented, the applied theory is based on implicit theoretical assumptions or even a framework.

In both applied theory, as well as in the literature, the same clusters are regarded as being relevant. Both regard environmental and time-related external causes, such as colonialism and the Cold War, as too indirect, and therefore both leave them out. The indicator sets, like the literature, assess the indicators regarding economic deprivation and demographic pressures in a dynamic manner. This corresponds with conclusions drawn from the theoretical literature, which questions the relevance of such static pictures. There are some minor differences in the outcome of both clustering processes in the categorisation at the lower levels of analysis. This is, however, more a problem of classification in the clustering process than of discordance between the literature and applied theory. As a consequence, the clusters and categories in the modal set of indicators can be used to draw up the data requirements needed to guide the structured, focused comparison of the case studies in this study. This means that the modal set of indicators as developed in this chapter and presented in table 6, serves in this research as the data checklist of general questions to be asked of each case.

Table 6 - Modal indicator set/data checklist

SOCIAL

1 Inter-group relations

- a Objective and subjective inequality
- b Inter-group intolerance
- c Group-government intolerance/discrimination

- 2 **Group demography**
 - a Pressures from refugees, IDPs and migration
 - b Demographic pressures

POLITICAL

- 3 **State weakness**
 - a State inability to provide security, law and order
 - b State inability in social affairs
 - c State inability in economic affairs
 - d Socio-political instability
- 4 **State unwillingness and good governance**
 - a State unwillingness to provide human rights, security, law and order
 - b Lack of democracy and good politics
 - c Corruption and abuse of power
- 5 **Government/state legitimacy**
 - a Existence of separatism/irredentism
 - b Disapproval of government
 - c Existence of opposition

ECONOMIC

- 6 **Unemployment and economic decline**
 - a Unemployment
 - b Economic decline

EXTERNAL

- 7 **External relations**
 - a Regional instability
 - b Outside interventions/bad foreign relations

Summary

This chapter elaborated further on the dependent variable of this study as required by the second task in the first phase of the method of structured, focused comparison and also fulfilled the fifth task of the same phase – the formulation of data requirements to be satisfied in the analysis of the cases. For the purpose of the first, clusters of the causes of conflict were distinguished in the existing body of scholarly literature on the causation of violent intrastate conflict. These clusters plus *negative peace* serve in this study as the dependent variables of durable peace. They were rephrased into hypotheses, which function as the theoretical framework for the structured, focused comparison of the case studies. Subsequently, the existing body of applied theory, applied theoretical models and conflict indicator sets were surveyed. They were used to develop a modal set of indicators to formulate data requirements in a data checklist of general questions to be satisfied in the analysis of each case in the structured, focused comparison. This exercise serves to standardise the collection of data in order to obtain comparable data in each case. It is now time to turn to the second phase of the structured, focused comparison: the actual case studies themselves.

¹ SINGER, J.D. (1996), "Armed conflict in the former colonial regions: from classification to explanation", in: GOOR, L. VAN DER, K. RUPESINGHE & P. SCIARONE, eds., *Between development and destruction: an enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states*, The Hague, pp. 35-49, on p. 35.

² DAVIES, J.C., ed. (1971), *When men revolt and why: a reader in political violence and revolution*, New York – London; and GURR, T.R. (1970), *Why men rebel*, Princeton.

³ REYCHLER, *Een wereld veilig voor conflict*, pp 296-300.

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¹⁵ STAVENHAGEN, R. (1996), *Ethnic conflict and the nation-state*, New York, p. 294

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
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5 THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC)

5.1 The history of the conflict

5.1.1 *The context of the Cambodian conflict and the Vietnamese invasion*

Ever since the fall of the ancient Khmer empire of Angkor, Cambodia had been the battleground of the Thai and the Vietnamese. Both neighbours attempted to gain influence in Cambodia at the cost of the other. In the process, Cambodian territories shrunk and its elites were divided. At the end of the nineteenth century the country was, for the time being, little more than a buffer state between its powerful neighbours. This process was only temporarily stopped by the French colonisation and restarted when in 1953 King Norodom Sihanouk led his kingdom to independence. Two years later he left his throne to his father in order to become Chief of State. As the leader of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum party, the now Prince Sihanouk walked a tightrope to keep his country neutral in the Vietnam War. In 1970 he was toppled in a coup by General Lon Nol and started a life in exile. With Lon Nol the right wing republicans seized power in Cambodia and the country was renamed the Khmer Republic. The new government sided with the United States in the Vietnam War and plunged Cambodia into a civil war that finally brought the Khmer Rouge to power.¹

The Khmer Rouge renamed Cambodia - Democratic Kampuchea. During its four-year reign, the Khmer Rouge aimed to build an autarchic Maoist republic and in that process it sacrificed nearly 2 million lives. In addition, the Khmer Rouge stood for an expansive and xenophobic Khmer nationalism, which was anti-Vietnamese. In line with this ideology, it hoped to reconquer former Angkorian territories in Vietnam and challenged the Vietnamese borders with military infiltrations. Simultaneously, the Khmer Rouge ally China cornered Vietnam from the north. The developments in the international diplomatic arena subsequently determined the alliances in the coming Cambodian conflict. Although Washington considered supporting Hanoi, it decided to play the China card and consequently Vietnam had to seek support from Moscow. At the end of 1978 Vietnam felt it needed to pre-empt a war on two fronts, was not against the expansion of its sphere of influence, and invaded Cambodia.²

5.1.2 *Chinese 'lessons' and international diplomatic resistance*

In response to the Vietnamese invasion, Beijing hoped to teach Hanoi a so-called 'lesson'. However, the Chinese 'didactic' attack of 1979 on the northern Vietnamese border proved to be disastrous. At the cost of 20,000 lives, it was little more than a pinprick to Hanoi.³ In the Cambodian theatre, the Vietnamese invasion and the subsequent attacks weakened the Khmer Rouge and discipline within that organisation broke down. Together with the Khmer Rouge, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled before the advancing Vietnamese forces. Moreover, the war ruined the 1978-1979 harvests, leading even more hungry refugees to seek food on the Thai border. The United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) met the needs of these refugees. At the same time, it also provided a cover under which the Khmer Rouge was able to regroup and regain strength, faith and morale.⁴

In order to increase the legitimacy of its invasion, Hanoi had provided a Cambodian 'government' that called in the help of Vietnam. By early 1979 the Khmer Rouge was largely defeated and the new Cambodian regime was installed in Phnom Penh. This was the beginning of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The new regime remained heavily influenced by its Vietnamese protectors. It was bound up with Hanoi by a peace and friendship treaty and part of the *Solidarite Indochinoise* together with Laos. Through this agreement the Vietnamese forces on Cambodian soil were further legitimised.⁵

Vietnam had presupposed that most members of the international community would not shed a tear about the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge. Although, perhaps surprisingly, Hanoi was wrong. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became the core of the global opposition within the United Nations against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Thailand was the most active anti-Vietnamese member state of the ASEAN. The ASEAN strategy aimed to move the struggle as far as possible into the diplomatic arena, where international support against Vietnam was the strongest. Starting in 1979, the ASEAN annually proposed a resolution to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was adopted every time with a growing majority. This resolution repeatedly asked for the withdrawal of all foreign (Vietnamese) troops from Cambodia. The same call was made in 1981 at the International Conference on Kampuchea organised by the United Nations. At the same time, the PRK saw its requests to represent Cambodia in the General Assembly of the United Nations blocked, leaving the credentials in the hands of the Khmer Rouge.⁶

5.1.3 The emergence and unification of the Cambodian resistance

In the following years, in addition to the Khmer Rouge, anti-Vietnamese resistance groups sprouted up along the Thai border. The fact that the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) managed to unify the republican remnants of the Lon Nol regime in 1981 proved to be a catalyst for the resistance. Shortly afterwards, the royalist *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent Neutre Pacifique et Cooperatif* (FUNCINPEC) was founded. Nevertheless, the non-communist resistance remained militarily weak.⁷

Paradoxically, it was the Vietnamese power that forced the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF to unite. After heavy losses in early 1982, international support for the Khmer Rouge faded away, because there seemed to be no further point in supporting a weak and inhumane group. Subsequently, the resistance against the PRK and the Vietnamese needed a more human face, in order to prevent countries from recognising the PRK. Under pressure from China, the United States and the ASEAN, the three resistance factions united in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Sihanouk (FUNCINPEC) fulfilled the function of its president, Khieu Samphan (Khmer Rouge) of its vice-president entrusted with foreign affairs and the representation at the United Nations, and Son Sann (KPNLF) of its prime minister.⁸

On the battlefield the coalition proved to be merely a political fiction, occasionally fighting more often than not amongst themselves than against the common enemy. The CGDK was only united around the joint hatred of the Vietnamese occupier, on other subjects their opinions differed widely. The strategy of the CGDK was one of attrition. The Cambodian resistance argued that time was on its side. It hoped that if it continued its struggle against Vietnam,

Hanoi would repent and withdraw. It assumed that the subsequent struggle against the PRK could be won.⁹

5.1.4 Vietnamese withdrawal and Cambodian weariness

When, in 1989, Vietnam did indeed withdraw its last forces from Cambodia, it had, however, left behind a credible government army. As subsequently the regime in Phnom Penh had to stand on its own feet, it decided to give itself an internationally more acceptable face. It moved away from communism and changed its name to the State of Cambodia (SOC). Its armed forces were also renamed the Cambodian Peoples Armed Forces (CPAF).¹⁰

The assumption of the CGDK that it was able to defeat the regime in Phnom Penh if it was not assisted by Vietnam proved to be wrong. After the Vietnamese withdrawal, the status quo between the SOC and the CGDK remained. The SOC governed some eighty percent of Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge controlled about 10 to 15 percent of the country, in which only about 5 percent of the population resided. The KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC controlled the remaining isolated areas. Moreover, the morale of all Cambodian factions waned, there were food shortages and desertion became more frequent. In addition, the payment of soldiers left much to be desired. Most of what they obtained was through theft, banditry and extortion. As a consequence, the call for peace grew.¹¹

5.1.5 The negotiations and the Paris Agreements

Based upon a French invitation, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was held in July-August 1989, in order to reach an internationally guaranteed peace settlement. Although progress was made at the conference, it had to be concluded that it was not yet possible to reach an agreement. The main reason was that the SOC was not willing to fully demobilise. However, the permanent members of the Security Council continued to negotiate in New York and Paris and the Cambodian parties remained in dialogue in Jakarta and Tokyo. At the sixth meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council, in August 1990, a breakthrough was reached. At that session a framework agreement was drawn up. At the Jakarta Informal Meeting, which was held the following month, the Cambodian parties accepted this framework as the basis for an agreement. It was decided that only 70 percent of the armies were to demobilise, which made the framework acceptable to the SOC. Moreover, the Cambodian parties agreed to establish the Supreme National Council (SNC), an organ within which during the transitional period the four Cambodian parties were represented to enshrine the unity and sovereignty of Cambodia. At a meeting of the SNC in June 1991 the Cambodian parties decided to declare an immediate cease-fire. Moreover, they agreed not to accept foreign military aid any longer, and that all foreign troops should leave the country. At the following session in July, Sihanouk was chosen to preside over the Council as its president and it was recognised that control over the agreements by the United Nations was a necessity.¹²

A second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia was held from 21 to 23 October 1991. The Paris Agreements were signed at this conference. These agreements included: the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; the Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. It was decided in the agreements that the United Nations was to

function as a transitional authority. The transitional period started once the agreements came into effect and was to end once, in line with the agreements, the newly elected Constituent Assembly approved a new Cambodian constitution and transformed itself into a National Assembly. The agreements provided UNTAC with a formidable and broad mandate which ranged from human rights to rehabilitation (see table 7).¹³

Table 7 – UNTAC’s mandate

<i>Human rights:</i>	to foster an environment in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are ensured through the oversight of general human rights; investigation of human rights complaints; and the establishment of a human rights education programme.
<i>Elections:</i>	to create a legal framework with respect to elections; establish a voter education programme; register voters and parties; create a neutral political environment for elections to take place; organise actual elections and the count of votes; and monitor these elections.
<i>Military affairs:</i>	to verify the withdrawal of the foreign forces present in Cambodia; oversee the cease-fire and supervise the demobilisation process; control the disarmament; and clear mines.
<i>Civil authority:</i>	to directly supervise those governmental bodies that can influence the elections; investigate complaints in this respect; and monitor the civilian police.
<i>Repatriation:</i>	to repatriate the refugees living abroad; and reintegrate them into Cambodian society.
<i>Rehabilitation:</i>	to rehabilitate the Cambodian economy; and contribute to the reconstruction of the country’s economic and social structures.

Source: UN DOC A/46/608-S/23177, The Paris Agreements, 30 October 1991.

5.2 Portrayal of the parties


The Cambodian conflict can be subdivided into three levels: Cambodian, regional, and global levels. At the time of the Paris Agreements, the conflicting parties at the Cambodian level were on the one side: the *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC); the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF); and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) (also called the Khmer Rouge). These three parties were united in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The conflicting party on the other side was the State of Cambodia (SOC). At the regional level of the Cambodian conflict, the CGDK was aided by Thailand and the ASEAN, while the SOC was supported by Vietnam. At the global level, the United States and China attempted to oppose the Soviet Union (see figure 4).

5.2.1 *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC)

In 1979, the first royalist organisation swore allegiance to Sihanouk after the Vietnamese invasion. It was, however, not until 1981 that Sihanouk himself joined the struggle against the Vietnamese and for the reestablishment of the monarchy, and became head of the FUNCINPEC. This step was followed a few months later by the establishment of a military branch of the organisation, the

Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS). Several royalist groups amalgamated with the FUNCINPEC.¹⁴

The FUNCINPEC was supported by China, the United States and Thailand. At the time of the Paris Agreements, the FUNCINPEC boasted that its forces totalled some 17,500 men, stationed in Northwest and Central Cambodia.¹⁵ During its presence, UNTAC estimated the size of the ANS to be only between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers.¹⁶ Although it was not manifest from the size of its army, the FUNCINPEC was a strong organisation which was very popular amongst the Cambodian population. In spite of the fact that prince Ranariddh had succeeded his father as head of the FUNCINPEC, the party still reaped the benefits of its image as ‘the party of Sihanouk’. Moreover, ‘Sihanoukism’ was the official party ideology. FUNCINPEC was aware of its popularity and strength in the political arena and its weakness in the military field, and therefore fully supported the peace process and the elections.¹⁷



5 2 2 The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)/Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP)

After the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, a number of non-communist republican opposition groups, which were the remnants of the Lon Nol government, emerged near the Thai border. Many of these groups thrived on illegal trade and smuggling and were mainly involved in the fight to protect their share or gain more of it. One of these groups was the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF). At the end of 1979, these armed forces were accompanied by a political branch, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), which was founded by the former Cambodian premier Son Sann. By 1981, the KPNLF had gained control over most of the republican resistance groups, provided them with a political line and attempted to curb their corruption. As a consequence, the republican opposition gained in strength and unity.¹⁸

Initially, the KPNLF only received support for its republican struggle against the Vietnamese from Cambodians living abroad. After 1981 the front also received support from Thailand, Malaysia and the United States. At the time of the Paris Agreements, the KPNLF argued that its forces totalled around 28,000 men, who were stationed mainly in Northwest Cambodia.¹⁹ During the presence of UNTAC, the United Nations estimated the size of the KPNLAF to be a mere third of this number.²⁰ During the transition period, the KPNLF split into several distinct factions, the main one of which being that of Son Sann. He transformed the KPNLF for the purpose of the elections into the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). Like the FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF/BLDP considered its chances of gaining power to be higher if elections were held, rather than by exercising the military option. Consequently, they also fully supported the peace process.²¹

5 2 3 The Khmer Rouge/Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)

After the Vietnamese invasion, the remainder of the Khmer Rouge consisted of the die-hards of the organisation, who were high on morale and discipline. However, as popular support for the Khmer Rouge waned, the basis of recruitment diminished as a result, and the organisation was doomed to become weak in the long run. Pol Pot, aware of his unpopularity, therefore resigned from his function as premier of Democratic Kampuchea. His successor, Khieu Samphan, worked to improve the image of the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, this change was merely cosmetic. Behind the scenes Pol Pot still pulled the strings of the organisation and continued to be commander of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).²²

At the time of the Paris Agreements, the Khmer Rouge hoped to win the hearts and minds of the population through nationalistic anti-Vietnamese rhetoric and policies. It argued that the SOC was only the 'tip' of a Vietnamese 'iceberg' – a Vietnamese network that was to be found throughout Cambodia. In addition, it hoped to rebuild its old power base in the Cambodian countryside by demonstrating its old aversion to the city, its population, and its decadence and by alluding to the corruption of the other parties. The Khmer Rouge did not see participation in the peace process as a necessity because it was not – unlike the other factions – dependent on financial support from outside. Its logging operations and gem mines yielded sufficient profits to allow the PDK to step out of the peace process and isolate its zone from the rest of Cambodia.²³

At the time of the Paris Agreements, the Khmer Rouge claimed to command a total of 27,500 men, encamped throughout Cambodia.²⁴ Calculations of the actual

number of Khmer Rouge soldiers differed widely. Nonetheless, it was beyond dispute that the NADK was the largest resistance army with the most weapons and ammunition at its disposal.²⁵ Initially, the NADK was a well-organised and disciplined force with considerable influence over the local population. Morale waned during the peace process, and desertion increased. In addition, the Khmer Rouge leadership in Phnom Penh was losing control over its units. The influence of local commanders increased and several parts of the Khmer Rouge organisation seemed to function semi-autonomously. It therefore appeared that the Khmer Rouge was not a monolithic organisation. Already at the beginning of UNTAC's presence the signs of a potential schism were starting to show. Ieng Sary and other members of the old cadre opted for a policy in which the search for a political solution was central. Others, including Pol Pot and the younger cadre, wanted to continue the fight. The 'doves' viewed the Paris Agreements as the only way to maintain power, whereas the 'hawks' were not really interested in the agreements as they obstructed a return to power. During the peace process, the power of the 'hawks' increased because the 'doves' also felt threatened by the SOC' and UNTAC's unwillingness or incapability to act against it.²⁶

5.2.4 The State of Cambodia (SOC)/Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP)

After the Vietnamese withdrawal, the regime in Phnom Penh learned to stand on its own feet. Its leadership consisted mainly of defected Khmer Rouge and Cambodian Vietminh who had lived in Vietnam since the 1950s and who had returned with the establishment of the PRK.²⁷ At the time of the Paris Agreements, the SOC claimed that its army – the Cambodian Peoples Armed Forces (CPAF) – amounted to 131,000 regular and 220,000 militia forces. These forces were stationed throughout the country. The CPAF was by far the largest army of all the factions in Cambodia. In addition, it was the best equipped - both qualitatively and quantitatively - and was the only faction with tanks and armoured personnel carriers and, although only small, an air force and a navy.²⁸

Two ideological groups could be distinguished within the SOC: the liberal democratic socialists and the hardcore Marxist-Leninists. The leader of the SOC, Hun Sen, was linked to the first group. Since at the time of the Paris Agreements the largest share of Cambodian territory was controlled by the SOC, it expected its political party – the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) - to win the elections. In addition, the CPP reasoned that it would be rewarded in the elections for the struggle of the PRK/SOC against the hated Khmer Rouge. It promised to continue protecting the population against the Khmer Rouge and for that purpose to fight them until the end. Since many Cambodians longed for peace, including peace with the Khmer Rouge, this strategy was to have the reverse effect.²⁹

5.2.5 Vietnam

Hanoi aimed to prevent a renewed threat from Cambodia and therefore it was determined to keep the Khmer Rouge from retaking power. During the 1980s, with this rationale in mind, it had regarded the occupation of Cambodia to be irreversible as long as the Khmer Rouge still existed and was supported by China. Complete termination of the Vietnamese occupation was, according to Hanoi, only possible once Beijing was ready to make peace and the PRK was strong enough to provide its own defence. As a consequence, Hanoi had to bear the costs of the military occupation. In addition, Vietnam became internationally isolated because many countries regarded the Vietnamese intervention as aggression.

Their governments broke off diplomatic relations with Hanoi and withheld development funds. Although as a consequence the Vietnamese economy was in an abominable state, the situation did not deteriorate because Moscow provided a helping hand. In addition, Indochinese co-operation – with Laos and the PRK – gave Hanoi a rather good political position in the regional arena.³⁰

By 1989 Hanoi was arguing that the PRK was sufficiently strong to counter the Khmer Rouge threat. In addition, Soviet aid sharply decreased, making the Cambodian expenses no longer bearable. Moreover, Moscow hoped to improve relations with both Beijing and Washington, withdrew its own forces from Afghanistan, and pressured Hanoi to do the same from Cambodia. As a result, Vietnam decided to withdraw its remaining forces from Cambodia in 1989. From that moment on Hanoi regarded the Cambodian conflict as an internal affair of the Cambodians.³¹

5.2.6 Thailand

After the Vietnamese invasion, Cambodia was in the sphere of influence of Hanoi, and Bangkok was deprived of its traditional buffer against Vietnam. The Thai government feared that if the Vietnamese were to invade Thailand “only Bangkok traffic could stop them.”³² However, the Thai could count on Chinese support if necessary. Additionally, they had the American guarantee, through the Manila pact, that Washington would take action should there be a Vietnamese attack. The ASEAN, of which Thailand was a member, also supported the Thai, and Bangkok used the ASEAN to influence the international diplomatic arena. In order to prevent a Vietnamese attack from being launched in the first place, Bangkok hoped to defend itself by supporting the Cambodian resistance against the Vietnamese and their protégés. Amongst other things, the Thai funnelled Chinese weapons along the ‘Deng Xiao Ping trail’ to the Cambodian resistance.³³

The objective of the Paris Agreements was to make Cambodia a neutral country, providing Thailand once again with a buffer against the Vietnamese. In addition, the aim of the agreements was also to solve Thailand’s refugee problem through the repatriation of the Cambodians on the Thai side of the border. In exchange, Bangkok promised its full co-operation with UNTAC. However, the Thai position towards the Khmer Rouge remained doubtful throughout the peace process. Moreover, even if Bangkok had chosen a firm policy against the Khmer Rouge, it was questionable whether it would have been able to implement it. The Thai government lacked full control over its military in the border region and these military in particular were often involved in the lucrative trade of gems, logs, oil and arms with the Khmer Rouge.³⁴

5.2.7 China

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia removed China’s ally, the Maoist Khmer Rouge, from power. China had been a firm supporter of the Khmer Rouge and not only for ideological reasons. The Khmer Rouge and to a lesser extent Prince Sihanouk were also aided for geopolitical reasons. This was the mere continuation of an age-old policy aimed to put pressure on Vietnam. In this way, China hoped to prevent Vietnam from becoming hegemonic in Indochina and to keep it from becoming too powerful a factor on the southern Chinese frontier. After the failed ‘lesson’ of 1979, Beijing pursued a tripartite strategy. First, it stationed a large military force on its southern border, putting pressure on both the Vietnamese and the Laotian borders. In order to defend these borders, 60 to 70 percent of the

Vietnamese army was restrained from the Cambodian theatre. Second, the objective of arming the Khmer Rouge was to wear out the Vietnamese force in Cambodia. Third, disrupting the Vietnamese economy was meant 'to bleed Vietnam white'.³⁵

At a global level, Beijing aimed to resist Soviet influence on its southern border, in order to prevent it from facing a future war on two fronts. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, relations between China and the Soviet Union were at a low. However, by 1982 they began to improve again. After Gorbachev had come to power in 1985, Sino-Soviet relations improved further still. However, Cambodia remained an obstacle. As a result, Beijing found an additional way to put pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia: through Moscow. After the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, Beijing remained suspicious of Hanoi and continued to support the Cambodian opposition. In the end-game, Beijing proved to be somewhat successful. The Paris Agreements guaranteed China Cambodian neutrality and independence from Vietnam, while at the same time its main Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, was included in the conflict solution.³⁶

5.2.8 The United States

During the Cold War, Washington hoped to balance the global Soviet influence. Initially the American struggle against communism had included China, but after a phase of détente in the early 1970s, both countries started to co-operate against the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1970s. Although Washington had considered aiding Vietnam in its struggle against the Khmer Rouge and China, the latter was considered more important as a strategic ally in the struggle against the Soviet Union. In addition, after the Vietnam War the United States still had a bone to pick with Hanoi. Subsequently, Washington supported the non-communist resistance (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) against Vietnam. The United States also secretly aided the Khmer Rouge, if not directly then indirectly. By the second half of the 1980s, American foreign policy moved away from the Khmer Rouge because public opinion, influenced, amongst other things, by the movie 'The Killing Fields', no longer tolerated any sort of co-operation. When the Cold War came to an end, the Cambodian theatre became less important to Washington. As a result, to the United States the Paris Agreements meant the end to one of its proxy wars.³⁷

5.2.9 The Soviet Union

At the time of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet Union was a firm supporter of Vietnam. During the 1970s, Moscow's most eminent goals in Southeast Asia had been to balance American influence and to surround China with pro-Soviet states. Vietnam was an ideal tool for this purpose. Fortunately, after Washington decided to play the 'China card', Hanoi was pushed into the arms of Moscow. Vietnam felt strengthened as it received Soviet support and guarantees with which it could deter China and feel confident to invade Cambodia. In return, the Soviet Union was allowed to make use of Vietnamese air and naval bases and thereby extend its military influence into the Indian ocean. During the Cold War, this was an advantage Moscow did not want to lose and was willing to pay 2 billion dollars a year for,³⁸ plus an additional 500 million for its Cambodian ally.³⁹ The end of the Cold War changed this situation. Not only was the struggle against the United States over, but the costs of maintaining a Soviet

ally far away from home were deemed to be rather high. Moscow regarded normalisation of the relations with China of overall importance and for that purpose Gorbachev was willing to put relations with Hanoi at risk. To Moscow the Paris Agreements served to end one of its proxy wars and to normalise relations with both China and the United States.⁴⁰

5.3 The history of a peacekeeping operation

5.3.1 UNAMIC, the delay of UNTAC and the start of destabilisation

The peacekeeping operation and its mandate that resulted from the Paris Agreements rode the wave of the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s the Security Council acted in a spirit of co-operation and established many peacekeeping operations in the assumption that they would lead the way to peace. However, although it had been clear by August 1991 that peace was at hand in Cambodia, the United Nations remained unprepared. The first day after the Paris Agreements had been signed, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to design an Implementation Plan for UNTAC. However, it was expected that some time would elapse before such a plan was drawn-up and UNTAC was established. In order to maintain the momentum for the period between the signing of the Paris Agreements and the establishment and arrival of UNTAC, the Secretary-General had already developed a plan to establish a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). In mid-October 1991, the Security Council had agreed to the Secretary-General's plan and UNAMIC was established. The first UNAMIC personnel arrived in Cambodia three weeks later and thus one week after the signing of the Paris Agreements.⁴¹

The first problems arose immediately upon their arrival. First of all, the Khmer Rouge viewed UNAMIC as illegitimate because it was not provided for in the Paris Agreements. Consequently, the PDK was not willing to fully co-operate with the mission. Secondly, the cease-fire was very unstable and often broken. Consequently UNAMIC was busy preserving the cease-fire rather than preparing for UNTAC. A third problem proved to be underestimated at UNAMIC's establishment: landmines. If not cleared, the millions of mines would become problematic for the repatriation of refugees under UNTAC. Therefore, the demining process, as well as the training programme, had to begin before the start of the rainy season, ahead of schedule. For this purpose the Security Council expanded the mandate of UNAMIC in January 1992.⁴² Nonetheless, UNAMIC remained ill-equipped and badly mandated to prepare properly for UNTAC. In the words of UNTAC's Force Commander Sanderson, UNAMIC: "staggered from one crisis to another as it attempted to react to circumstances for which it was ill-prepared, leaving it unable to execute the important task of planning for UNTAC."⁴³

In the meantime, the situation in Cambodia deteriorated further. The signing of the Paris Agreements left a power vacuum. As a consequence, there was leeway for the parties to attempt to get around the agreements. In November Sihanouk tried to build a coalition of both FUNCINPEC and SOC in order to sideline the Khmer Rouge. However, he abandoned this plan after the return of the Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan to Phnom Penh. On his return, the SOC staged a demonstration against the Khmer Rouge. When the mob ran amok and out of control they almost lynched the Khmer Rouge leader. This incident was one of the main reasons for the Khmer Rouge to end all forms of co-operation with UNAMIC. It also showed Sihanouk that the SOC had to be treated with care. As a result of the

deteriorating situation, the leaders of the four factions requested the United Nations in January 1992 to speed up its preparations and to enable a quick start of UNTAC.⁴⁴

At the end of February 1992, the Secretary-General determined in his Implementation Plan that UNTAC was to consist of seven components: Human Rights, Elections, Military, Civil Administration, Civilian Police, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation. These components were to implement the mandate of UNTAC given in the Paris Agreements. Beforehand, the net costs of the whole operation had been estimated to be 1,876 billion dollars.⁴⁵ It took until the end of February 1992 before the Security Council approved the Implementation Plan and decided to establish UNTAC. Its official commencement was on 15 March, but the start-up also lagged behind. During the first three months, only 20 percent of the staff was indeed present. It was not until July-August that UNTAC became fully operational.⁴⁶ The Secretary-General gave three reasons for the delay. Firstly, organising UNTAC was a difficult task as it was such a big operation. Secondly, it took a long time to obtain budget approval. Thirdly, as the Security Council had established the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia UNPROFOR only one week before UNTAC, member states were not very generous with forces and funds.⁴⁷

5.3.2 The struggle with the Khmer Rouge

With the signing of the Paris Agreements the first phase of the cease-fire came officially into effect. From that moment the parties were to refrain from the use of violence. The second phase of the cease-fire provided for the demobilisation and disarmament of their armies. It seems that initially all parties had been willing to co-operate with the United Nations. However, as result of UNTAC's late deployment, the parties opted for more reserved positions. Initially, the Khmer Rouge also seemed prepared to disarm and demobilise, at least in broad outlines. The first cracks in this willingness appeared after the attack on the Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan. Although the Khmer Rouge did not immediately abandon the peace process, its faith in the reliability of the SOC was seriously crippled.⁴⁸

A meeting of Khmer Rouge commanders in April 1992 marked the watershed in their position. From that moment on, the hard-liners had the upper hand. The Khmer Rouge saw three obstacles to the peace process. Firstly, it found UNTAC's control of the civil administration of the SOC deficient and argued that this reflected UNTAC's partisanship. Secondly, it argued that UNTAC did not co-operate sufficiently with the SNC and urged the United Nations to take more consideration of the wishes of the 'Cambodian people'. Thirdly, it was convinced that Vietnamese forces were still present in Cambodia. As long as these three obstacles remained, the Khmer Rouge commanders did not consider it safe to participate further in the peace process. As a consequence of this new position, the PDK denied UNTAC freedom of movement in its zone as of May. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge refrained from delivering the promised information about its troops and equipment, it lay new mines, and violated the cease-fire. In spite of the SNC's calls on the PDK to co-operate with UNTAC, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi, other senior UNTAC officials and the Secretary-General, the Khmer Rouge failed to comply. In addition, in resolutions 766 and 783 the Security Council called upon the Khmer Rouge to change its position.⁴⁹

At the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992, relations between the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations deteriorated further. At this meeting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi proposed giving the Vietnamese minority the right

to vote. In addition, at the press conference following the SNC meeting, he mentioned Chapter VII of the Charter in relation to the co-operation of the Khmer Rouge. The PDK saw its worst fears come true and argued that this only proved the biased position of UNTAC. A few days later, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi and Force Commander Sanderson were denied access to the Khmer Rouge zone in the so-called 'bamboo pole' incident. This incident proved that the Khmer Rouge position was irrevocable and UNTAC's reaction came to symbolise the rest of the operation: the leaders of UNTAC turned around when the road was blocked by a bamboo pole. In mid 1992 the Khmer Rouge started to re-arm, but its positions remained defensive.⁵⁰

With the Khmer Rouge's refusal to participate in the second phase of the cease-fire, the Security Council faced the choice of either continuing with or stopping the process of demobilisation and disarmament. It decided to continue where possible and hoped that the Khmer Rouge would give in. Although there were signs that this might possibly happen, it never did. The PDK argued that the implementation of the Paris Agreements was incorrect and partisan, and that therefore it was itself no longer bound to implement the agreements. When the Khmer Rouge persisted in its refusal to demobilise and disarm, the Security Council once again faced a choice: to continue or stop with the implementation of the Paris Agreements and the elections. The Security Council subsequently decided to continue the peace process without the Khmer Rouge and with an amended military mandate. Nevertheless, the possibility was left open for the Khmer Rouge to change its mind. Despite diplomatic efforts and the relatively small gap between the different positions, the Khmer Rouge felt that a 'common understanding' was missing. Being isolated, the PDK lost faith in the peace process because it felt that further implementation was a threat to its existence. From November 1992 the Khmer Rouge decided to reopen the offensive. The Vietnamese minority in particular, but also the United Nations, had to suffer from this new stance. The Khmer Rouge tried to demonise UNTAC and hoped to undermine its authority by taking UN personnel hostage. In addition, the Khmer Rouge hoped to undermine the unity of UNTAC by differentiating between 'good' and 'bad' national contingents.⁵¹

As the Khmer Rouge was largely dependent on earnings from its logging and gem industries, a moratorium on these products was viewed by UNTAC as a lever to tighten the economic pressure on the PDK to adhere to the Paris Agreements. At the end of November 1992, the Security Council adopted in resolution 792 a moratorium on logs, which was promulgated by the SNC. The resolution also called for measures to withhold petrol to non-co-operative parties. Additionally, the Council called for a moratorium on the export of minerals and gems. The SNC, in turn, responded in February 1993 with the promulgation of such a moratorium. However, effective control of the moratoria proved to be impossible. Moreover, they only confirmed the Khmer Rouge belief of the partisanship of UNTAC and intensified its operations against the United Nations.⁵²

Eventually, the Khmer Rouge did not register as a party for participation in the elections. At an SNC meeting in April 1993 Khieu Samphan officially declared that his party would not participate in the elections because, he claimed, that Cambodia was still occupied by Vietnam and because, in his opinion, there was no 'neutral political environment'.⁵³

5.3.3 *The elections and their aftermath*

The Khmer Rouge hoped to postpone the elections until a 'neutral political environment' had been reached. Threatening violence was the main strategy to reach this goal. On a number of occasions the Khmer Rouge sent word that it was going to disrupt the elections and that to this end it did not eschew the use of violence. Orders were actually sent out to attack polling stations in order to prevent Cambodians from voting. It was, nevertheless, stressed that civilian casualties were to be avoided. The Security Council responded by stating that UNTAC would react in an appropriate manner to every party that broke the agreements or used violence to disrupt the democratic process.⁵⁴

The Khmer Rouge was not the only party that doubted the neutrality of the political environment in which the elections were to take place. At the beginning of 1993, the 'weak' position of UNTAC - with regard to the political violence of the SOC and its attacks on party bureaus of both the BLPD and the FUNCINPEC - had already been sufficient reason for the leader of FUNCINPEC, Ranariddh, to end his co-operation with UNTAC. According to the prince, free and fair elections were impossible without stronger actions on the part of UNTAC against the political violence of the SOC.⁵⁵ His father, Sihanouk, had preceded him with the same manoeuvre. Although both were swift to restore their co-operation, their actions were not unsuccessful because UNTAC started to crack down on political violence. Nonetheless, UNTAC also had to admit that it was impossible to organise the elections in a fully 'neutral political environment'.⁵⁶

Nonetheless, the elections proceeded as scheduled because, as the Secretary General argued "UNTAC [] will be conducting the most impartial election that is possible in conditions that are not susceptible to its full control. It would be ingenuous to expect that a postponement would bring improved conditions - the contrary is more probable."⁵⁷ Polling was held from 23 to 25 May 1993, and mobile polling stations collected votes until 28 May. According to UNTAC, the elections were held in a tranquil atmosphere, without fear and practically no intimidation or violence. Only a few technical affairs were erratic, but UNTAC did not consider them significant.⁵⁸ Moreover, the disturbance promised by the Khmer Rouge did not materialise. The main reason for this was that a violent operation against UNTAC might have lost the little support the Khmer Rouge had. Therefore, it limited its actions to minor incidents, which at least proved it remained a factor to be reckoned with. In the end 4,267,192 Cambodians voted.⁵⁹ Initially, Hun Sen showed his gratitude for the way UNTAC had conducted the elections. However, once it became clear that the results for the CPP were less positive than expected, this party started to grumble, spoke of fraud and requested new elections be held in seven East Cambodian provinces. Nevertheless, UNTAC declined because there was no evidence of fraud, and where there was evidence it did not significantly influence the results of the elections. The final result of the elections was that FUNCINPEC acquired 58 seats, the CPP 51 seats, the BLPD 10 seats, and the MOULINAKA 1 seat in the Constituent Assembly.⁶⁰ UNTAC, and later the Security Council, declared that the elections had been conducted in a free and fair manner, although they were not considered to have been held in a 'neutral political environment'.⁶¹ Subsequently, part of the CPP, led by prince Chakrapong, declared the independence of the seven provinces in which the CPP had first requested new elections. This attempt to evade the election results lasted only a few days, after which the CPP also accepted them. However, it showed the power

of the CPP and pressured FUNCINPEC, in spite of the results of the elections, to share power⁶²

5.3.4 The start of the Constituent Assembly and the departure of UNTAC

On 14 June 1993, the Constituent Assembly met for the first time. At this meeting an Interim Joint Administration (IJA) under the leadership of Sihanouk was set up, in which all parties were represented that acquired a seat in the Assembly. Sihanouk became the Head of State and Hun Sen and Ranariddh served as co-chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Although this IJA was not part of the Paris Agreements, it served the stability of the country and therefore UNTAC supported its existence⁶³

Subsequently, the situation seemed to improve. The Khmer Rouge decided to recognise the results of the elections and initiated negotiations with the IJA on the subject of national reconciliation. However, small scale violations of the cease-fire still occurred. The leader of the PDK, Khieu Samphan, even said he was willing to integrate his army in exchange for an advisory role within a new government. Under pressure from France and the United States, Hun Sen and Ranariddh had to turn this proposal down. Both countries threatened to stop their aid to Cambodia if the Khmer Rouge played a role in the future government. After the integration of the CPAF, the ANS and the KPRLF into the Cambodian Armed Forces, this new army commenced a joint offensive against the Khmer Rouge⁶⁴

In mid-September, the new constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly. Five days later Sihanouk promulgated the constitution and was crowned king of the democratic Kingdom of Cambodia. The Constituent Assembly then transformed itself into a Legislative Assembly and King Sihanouk appointed Ranariddh to be the first co-premier, and Hun Sen to be the second. The effect of this was that the mandate of UNTAC ended and two days later the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi, followed by parts of the civil components of UNTAC, left Cambodia. In November the last military personnel left and UNTAC came to an end⁶⁵

Following the departure of UNTAC, the United Nations remained active in Cambodia through a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In addition, the Military Liaison Team in Cambodia was established to help with residual military matters. In the area of human rights the United Nations Centre for Human Rights and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General kept track of Cambodia's record. Finally, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) provided help in the field of mine clearance and awareness⁶⁶

5.4 The variables

5.4.1 Negative peace

In 1984-1985 Hanoi and Phnom Penh tried to accomplish the final removal of the resistance factions from Cambodia, but failed because the resistance continued to be able to infiltrate deep into the country. This proved to be an important turning point towards negative peace in Cambodia. As both sides started to realise that they could never achieve a full military victory, they started to search for a diplomatic settlement. The Vietnamese withdrawal of its forces in 1989 did not change this situation drastically as Phnom Penh managed to stand its ground. Subsequently, the conflict reached a mutually hurting stalemate in which the

parties only hoped to gain territorial control in order to improve their position at the negotiating table.

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *negative peace*:

- *Cease-fire monitoring*: With the signing of the Paris Agreements, the parties were to end hostilities. UNAMIC was to observe the cease-fire, but was quickly overtaken by events and ended up monitoring a new round of attacks rather than controlling the cease-fire. This was partly the result of the fact that it was only intended to be an interim solution, until the 15,900 members of the Military Component of UNTAC were deployed. However, this deployment was slow. Consequently, the United Nations was unable to maintain the momentum of the Paris Agreements and to prevent the disruptions of the cease-fire leading to feelings of insecurity amongst the factions. Moreover, once deployed, UNTAC was ill-equipped and ill-mandated to provide the factions, and the Khmer Rouge in particular, with the necessary guarantees to overcome their security dilemma. The PDK felt unable to implement the cease-fire agreement and in turn the SOC also ended its implementation of the cease-fire.

The monitoring of the cease-fire was further hampered by the fact that the planning and decision making at the United Nations headquarters was imperfect and divided over two different administrative units; communication between New York and the field was laborious and slow, and the extent of discipline of some national contingents was far below standard. This latter problem was only exacerbated by the fact that the compensations for the troops for the contributing countries were overdue, and consequently less wealthy countries were unable to disburse their soldiers pay on time. Furthermore, UN soldiers were paid considerably less than civilian personnel. These problems led to morale problems. Moreover, despite the same Rules of Engagement and the same Standard Operation Procedures, there were considerable differences in the way the different national contingents reacted to threats.

After the cease-fire collapsed, UNTAC opted to maintain strict neutrality between the factions and not to force them into compliance. In this way it hoped to avoid a situation as developed simultaneously in Somalia. This choice was made not in the last place because UNTAC was not equipped for peace enforcement and there was insufficient international support for such actions. Nonetheless, UNTAC might have contributed more if it had exerted more pressure without giving up its neutrality. As a result, cease-fire monitoring did not contribute to *negative peace*.

- *Cantonment and demobilisation*: According to the Paris Agreements, the Military Component of UNTAC was to assist and verify the regroupment, cantonment and demobilisation of the Cambodian armed forces. Initially all parties, including the Khmer Rouge, seemed to be willing to participate in the process. UNTAC's preparations were, however, far from ideal. Up to the signing of the Paris Agreements the parties were unwilling to provide information on their forces. Also during the presence of UNAMIC, the Khmer Rouge in particular was not inclined to assist in the preparations. After the establishment of UNTAC, the implementation of the process became increasingly uncertain because the Khmer Rouge remained unwilling to allow UNTAC into its zone. Consequently, the process could only start in June 1992

and the Military Component actually finished its planning only one week before the start. Subsequently, UNTAC was not able to provide for the needs of the cantoned forces.

Neither did UNTAC have the military strength nor the mandate to defend the parties against potential spoilers. It was therefore unable to provide the parties with sufficient security to overcome their security dilemma. Moreover, at the start of the cantonment, less than half the planned UNTAC infantry battalions were operational. As a consequence, the Khmer Rouge made it clear that it would not participate. It was subsequently discussed within UNTAC whether it would not be better to start cantonment after the rainy season. Not only was it deemed that it would be easier to implement the process then, but it was also hoped that the situation would have calmed down by then. Unfortunately the pressure to hold the elections in time proved to be stronger. Nonetheless, UNTAC was forced to set aside the original timetable for the demobilisation. As a result of this choice to proceed, parts of Cambodia were drawn into a power vacuum. The Khmer Rouge attempted to make use of this space and increased its military activities to expand its influence. The parties that did participate also felt the need to provide for their own security. Their leaders appeared to do everything in their power to make it look as though they were sticking to the agreements, while in fact they grasped every opportunity to circumvent them and only demobilised their weakest forces. Eventually, the demobilisation process resulted in the near demobilisation of the KPMLAF and the ANS, while the armies of the Khmer Rouge and the SOC remained practically untouched. As a result, the cantonment and demobilisation did not contribute to *negative peace* and actually was a temporary negative contribution to it.

- *Reintegration of ex-combatants* The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to aid the reintegration of ex-combatants after their demobilisation into civil society. Although as a result of the failed demobilisation process the group of ex-combatants to be reintegrated was smaller than planned, the reintegration process was far from complete when UNTAC left. The capacity to absorb these new community members especially in the rural areas was low. As a consequence, reintegration did not contribute to *negative peace*.
- *Disarmament* The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to start a process of arms control from the beginning of the second phase of the cease-fire. UNTAC was supposed to track down arms supplies that were not reported by the parties. A total of 50,000 weapons were placed under the control of UNTAC. Of a total estimated number of 300,000 weapons this was, however, a rather meagre result.⁶⁷ In addition, the best weapons were kept. Moreover, some of the weapons were returned to the factions so that they could defend themselves against the Khmer Rouge, and at the time of the elections more weapons were returned to enable the parties to secure the election process. At the same time, the PDK was well positioned to buy new arms in Thailand from the revenues of its trade. UNTAC was thus unable to substantially disarm the Cambodian parties. Just like the demobilisation process, the parties did not feel sufficiently secured by UNTAC to overcome their security dilemma and therefore the disarmament process might also have benefited from postponement. Nevertheless, as it proceeded, it did not contribute to *negative peace*.

- *Verification of foreign forces withdrawal:* UNTAC was mandated in the Paris Agreements to verify the withdrawal of the foreign forces and one would therefore expect that this 'policy tool' influenced *negative peace*. Nevertheless, since the Vietnamese army withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 this 'tool' was, in practice, not relevant to *negative peace*.
- *Winning the hearts and minds of the local population:* It was necessary for UNTAC to provide the Cambodian population with information on the Paris Agreements to establish some kind of credibility and to win the hearts and minds of the Cambodian population for peace instead of continued conflict. This became particularly important once the Khmer Rouge abandoned the peace process, and to a lesser extent the SOC also started to disseminate anti-UNTAC propaganda. United Nations personnel would be too decadent, they would misbehave, disrespect the local customs, and cause too many traffic accidents. Moreover, UNTAC was often blamed for not combating corruption, the Khmer Rouge and banditry. A Community Relations Officer was appointed to solve individual problems. Radio was the most ideal and the cheapest way to disseminate information on a wide front. From the end of 1992, Radio UNTAC started its own broadcasts. In the end, Radio UNTAC in particular is likely to have won the hearts and minds of the people and to have taken away the support for the SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF to wage war.⁶⁸ As a consequence, winning the hearts and minds of the local population made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.
- *Diplomacy:* UNTAC attempted to pressure the Cambodian parties into compliance through their international allies. They were the ones who were able to influence the factions into observing the Paris Agreements. China and Thailand in particular were in a position to exert pressure on the Khmer Rouge to co-operate with the United Nations, however, neither were willing to let their ally down. In addition, the Secretary-General utilised his travels to member states and conferences to obtain the support of the international community. The United Nations did not refrain from searching for diplomatic solutions also at the Cambodian level. Should parties clash, they were not separated on the battlefield, but called for conciliation under the directions of the Force Commander within the context of the Mixed Military Working Group. It is likely that these talks had a positive effect on tense situations. However, in the view of Akashi, Pol Pot implemented the strategy of 'talk and fight'.⁶⁹ An additional problem was that leaders of the four factions, with the exception of the SOC, did not have full control over their forces and communications were poor. Both in the national and the international arena UNTAC lacked sufficient carrots and sticks to make diplomacy work. As a consequence, at both levels diplomacy did not contribute to *negative peace*.
- *Sanctions verification:* It was not until the end of 1992 that the Security Council took measures against the Khmer Rouge. Paris hoped to establish sanctions against the PDK, but the ASEAN countries and China opposed them. Therefore, in resolution 792, the Security Council supported the moratoria on trading in logs established by the SNC, and requested the establishment of a moratorium on gems and called for a stop to the supply of petroleum products to parties that did not collaborate. The support of Thailand was indispensable for the implementation of these moratoria. In spite of diplomatic pressure, however, Bangkok did not allow United Nations control posts on its territory. As a consequence, the moratoria were not verified along the Thai border with

the PDK zone. Moreover, even if it had been allowed to implement its planning, UNTAC was not likely to have controlled the 800 kilometre-long Cambodian-Thai border completely. As a result, the moratoria were only verified in non-Khmer Rouge territory and therefore, rather than harming it, most likely favoured the PDK. Moreover, the moratoria only confirmed the belief of the Khmer Rouge that UNTAC was partisan and it therefore intensified its operations against the United Nations. As a result, the verification of the moratoria did not contribute to *negative peace*.

- *Civil administration controlling*: The Paris Agreements envisaged the role of civil administration controlling primarily in relation to *state unwillingness and good governance*. However, in practice this tool also affected *negative peace*. As the recruitment for the Civil Administration Component was sluggish - because most functions were highly specialised - and also the planning was very slow, the civil administration was only placed under the control of UNTAC at a late stage. As a result, it was unable to provide the Khmer Rouge with enough security in good time to start with the demobilisation and disarmament process, because a civil administration of the SOC, which was not placed under the control of UNTAC, remained in a position to influence the neutral political environment of the elections. Consequently, Civil Administration controlling did not contribute to *negative peace*.
- *Civilian police monitoring*: The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to supervise and control the civilian police of the Cambodian parties. This 'policy tool' was primarily directed at *state unwillingness and good governance*, yet in practice it also influenced *negative peace*. It was even of essential importance, especially to the Khmer Rouge, because the SOC police was more than simply a civilian police force, but rather a political armed force acting first and foremost in the interests of the SOC. In other words, strict control was deemed necessary, because otherwise the SOC would still have a second army left after the demobilisation. For this reason, the Civilian Police Component was to comprise about 3,600 police monitors deployed throughout Cambodia. In practice, however, each UNTAC police officer assigned to control had to monitor about 70 Cambodian officers, which was an unattainable task.⁷⁰ In addition, the Civilian Police Component had a slow start and was only fully deployed in January 1993. By that time, UNTAC's control of the Cambodian civilian police in relation to *negative peace* could only be characterised as too little, too late and the Khmer Rouge had decided to opt out. As a consequence, civilian police monitoring did not contribute to *negative peace*.

After the UNTAC left, three of the four parties made peace with each other. The conflict, nonetheless, still continued, but this time the confrontation was between the newly formed Cambodian Royal Armed Forces (CRAF) and the Khmer Rouge. Old foes had become friends and old comrades-in-arms had become enemies. In 1996 part of the Khmer Rouge, led by Ieng Sary, was willing to start negotiations with the Royal Government. After some infighting with the forces led by Pol Pot, Sary's group broke ties with the movement. While the Khmer Rouge seemed to wane, tensions over the division of their remnants arose between Hun Sen and Ranariddh and this led to armed clashes in late 1996 - early 1997. When Pol Pot was denounced by the Khmer Rouge in 1997 a new round of minor clashes between forces loyal to Hun Sen and forces loyal to Ranariddh eventually ended in a coup by the former in July. After some severe and bloody street fighting in

Phnom Penh, Hun Sen swiftly took the upper hand. Although the fighting continued into 1998, that year saw a turning point. In February Hun Sen accepted a Japanese peace plan and subsequently the violence between the Ranariddh and the Hun Sen forces came to an end. During 1998, the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders also defected to the Royal Government. 1999 proved to be the first year in decades in which violent conflict was absent and negative peace existed in Cambodia.

5.4.2 *Inter-group relations*

There was considerable distrust and hatred amongst the parties. These emotions and the violent history made national reconciliation difficult. The SOC, the KPNLF, the FUNCINPEC and large parts of the population had not forgotten the past and therefore did not want the Khmer Rouge to return to power. In addition, the SOC did not trust any party that had ever or that still co-operated with the Khmer Rouge. The SOC in turn was seen by all three resistance factions as a Vietnamese puppet. The FUNCINPEC conceived a hatred for the KPNLF because the republicans had brought the monarchy to an end. The KPNLF in turn had difficulties with Sihanouk, because in its view he had brought the Khmer Rouge to power. Moreover, all four parties had experienced the joy of power in the two decades preceding the arrival of the United Nations, and hoped to re-experience it by not giving in to the other factions.

During its presence the following ‘policy tools’ implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *inter-group relations*:

- *Diplomacy*: For the purpose of national reconciliation, the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) proved to be of unexpected importance. The force commanders of the factions within this organ got to know each other and learned to co-operate. This facilitated the integration of the armed forces of the SOC, the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. As a result, diplomacy made a positive contribution to *inter-group relations*.
- *Providing pay to the newly-formed national army*: After the formation of the Cambodian Armed Forces, UNTAC started operation ‘Paymaster’, through which the soldiers of the newly established army received their pay from the United Nations. It is likely that this operation improved the loyalty of the soldiers of the former SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF armies to the newly elected government. As a result, providing pay to the newly formed national army made an unexpectedly positive contribution to *inter-group relations*.

During UNTAC’s presence, the inter-group relations between the SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF/BLDP improved, but the Khmer Rouge continued to be isolated. Following the departure of UNTAC, the United Nations aimed to support further national reconciliation through the United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia. Moreover, Sihanouk stimulated negotiations with the Khmer Rouge, which failed. The schism within the Khmer Rouge brought new opportunities and in mid-1996 Ieng Sary’s faction decided to make peace with Phnom Penh. After the death of Pol Pot, as a consequence of the schism and war weariness, the little morale the rest of the organisation had left broke down. Nonetheless, although the inter-group relations had improved they remained tense, something that was illustrated by the renewed skirmishes surrounding the coup of 1997.

5.4.3 Group demography

The demography of Cambodia reflected the demographic structure of countries with a legacy of war. About 200,000 people were considered to be Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).⁷¹ Nearly half the population was under 15 years of age and an exceptionally large proportion of the population was female. Population growth was also high. At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the annual population growth was close to 4 percent.⁷² This meant that many more mouths had to be fed every year. Fortunately, although rice production had reached an absolute low in 1979, it caught up with the population growth by the end of the 1980s. There was, however, still a large potential for improvement as up to one third of the cultivated farmland of the pre-1970 period was uncultivated because of the presence of land mines, deficient irrigation, and a lack of agricultural resources such as tractors.⁷³ It looked as though Cambodia was going to overcome its demographic problems.

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *group demography*:

- *Repatriation*: In the Paris Agreements, the Secretary-General was asked to facilitate the repatriation of refugees, a task which was implemented by the UNHCR. The UNHCR determined that there were about 360,000 refugees and 200,000 IDPs.⁷⁴ Although the repatriation was delayed by four months, it was completed in April 1993, and the fact that all these people had been helped to return within one year was a remarkable job. The operation benefited from the fact that the UNHCR was already acquainted with the region; that the Khmer Rouge co-operated with the UNHCR because it regarded the UNHCR to be independent from UNTAC and 'politically neutral'; and that the repatriation was not wholly voluntary because the refugees knew they had to leave Thailand in the foreseeable future and could therefore better co-operate with UNTAC. Nonetheless, the influx of refugees made a negative contribution to demographic pressures in Cambodia. These pressures were to be removed by the process of reintegration, which was therefore of fundamental importance. The slow start and strict timetable for the repatriation, however, did not leave much room for the thorough preparation and comprehensive implementation of such a process.
- *Reintegration of refugees*: In order to build up a new life once they had arrived at their destination, the returning families and individuals were assured of short term aid by the Paris Agreements. It was expected that the majority would choose a plot of land. External factors such as problems with finding mine-free land, problems of land ownership, a lack of space in the towns, and delays as a result of the rainy season, in addition to the less co-operative position of the local SOC authorities, meant that the repatriation process progressed faster than UNTAC was able to reintegrate the returnees. The timetable of the repatriation/elections, however, required the refugees to be inside Cambodia at the time of the elections. Therefore, UNTAC decided to push through the repatriation in spite of the troubled reintegration and started to hand out money instead of land. This policy was heavily criticised because UNTAC and the UNHCR were said to have been merely handing refugees some money and subsequently transporting them to the other side of the border. The refugees were then said to have been left to their fate. In reply to these critics and bearing in mind the risk that returnees could obtain better positions than other Cambodians, UNTAC, the UNHCR and some NGOs launched a number of

small development projects - Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) – with the objective of helping entire villages. Many of these QIPs did well. When UNTAC left, the reintegration of the refugees and IDPs was, nonetheless, far from complete. Those who returned to rural areas often posed a big problem as the capacity of the local communities to absorb these newcomers was limited and they could not be sufficiently integrated into the Cambodian economy and society. As a result, the reintegration of refugees did not make a positive contribution to the negative impact of the repatriation on *group demography*.

- *Mine clearance*: Cambodia was littered with an estimated 10 million mines.⁷⁵ These mines covered the agricultural lands that were really needed to cope with the influx of repatriated refugees, the population growth and to prevent demographic stress. As UNTAC and the UNHCR were in desperate need of land to distribute among the returnees, they designated NGOs to clear mines. Moreover, UNTAC was mandated in the Paris Agreements to *assist* with the clearance of these mines. Nonetheless, most countries that had contributed troops regarded this task to be too dangerous a job for their soldiers. Therefore, UNTAC interpreted the meaning of ‘assist’ in a narrow manner: the training and supervision of Cambodians, and cleared hardly any mines itself. The solution for this personnel problem was the training of Cambodians, but as result of the failure of the demobilisation process, the recruitment base for this purpose was lost. Furthermore, the outcome of the courses was disappointing, because too few deminers were actually trained and those who did manage to qualify were only allowed to clear mines under the surveillance of a supervisor of whom UNTAC had far too few. It was not until the summer of 1993 that mine clearance actually got going and even then the percentage of mines cleared was less than half a percent of the estimated total number of mines present.⁷⁶ Moreover, more mines were laid than cleared as a consequence of the continued armed conflict during the presence of UNTAC. As mine clearance had to continue after the departure of UNTAC, demining had to be ‘Cambodianised’. For this purpose UNTAC aided the establishment of the CMAC. Mine clearance was, however, therefore not able to deliver sufficient land needed for the reintegration of the repatriated refugees. As a consequence, mine clearance did not make a contribution towards relieving demographic pressure.

When UNTAC left, Cambodian demographic problems seemed to have worsened. Three problems were of importance with regard to Cambodian group demography. First, as the conflict continued, by 1995 an estimated 150,000 Cambodians were estimated to have fled their homes again and to have become IDPs.⁷⁷ Second, the Cambodian population grew faster than its capacity to feed them. Later in the 1990s, the population of Cambodia grew by about 2.7 percent per annum, while rice production diminished as result of drought and floods, as well as the continued insecurity.⁷⁸ In addition, repatriation had brought back returnees whose stomachs also had to be filled. Consequently, the average annual paddy production was below the subsistence level of the average rural family. Third, the Cambodian labour force had to support a very large economically inactive part of the population; a part which was also on the increase. In 1993/1994 the Cambodian population was estimated to be about 9.1 million people, while the labour force was thought to be no more than 4.5 million. The main reasons for this were the large groups of disabled people, IDPs and children.⁷⁹

5.4.4 State weakness

Cambodian society had been unstable for the past few centuries. First, there was little coherence within the community, making it easy for conflict to erupt. Strong social bonds and contacts were uncommon outside one's own immediate group of relatives. Second, the elite had considerable influence over the rest of the population through a system of patron-client relations. If the elite were divided as a result of their quarrels, they often drew the rest of the population into their conflicts. Moreover, the geography of Cambodia provided a safe haven for dissident leaders to organise a resistance force from either a remote corner of Cambodia or from a neighbouring country.

After the reign of the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian state structures and social services were in shambles. Although the situation greatly improved as both the state structures and services were rebuilt practically from scratch, at the end of the 1980s – early 1990s considerable problems remained. The capacity of the Phnom Penh administration remained far too low and it carried the financial burdens of the large number of soldiers and security personnel, and its cumbersome public administration. In addition, the SOC struggled to get a grip on the economy as a result of the lack of a clear government policy, underqualified personnel, and the absence of a tradition of a civil service. Revenues of the state to improve the situation were little, because the aid from CMEA had virtually ended and tax incomes were rather meagre. Moreover, the SOC still did not have a well-functioning legal system and consequently the rule of law was largely absent in Cambodia. The infrastructure was badly damaged or simply non-existent. Furthermore, the newly rebuilt health system suffered from a lack of resources and health professionals. Access to clean and reliable sources of water remained far below the minimum and diseases, such as tuberculosis and malaria, were rife. As a consequence, life expectancy at birth was one of the worst in the world. The newly rebuilt education system also had a rather pale qualitative record and suffered from declining budgets.

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *state weakness*:

- *Disarmament*: In March 1993 an UNTAC directive prohibited the possession of arms and explosives by unauthorised persons. Up to that moment there had been a vigorous arms trade in Cambodia. The establishment of joint control posts by both UNTAC, as well as the local authorities, contributed to the fact that large numbers of arms were distrained. The directive proved to be highly effective as crime rates decreased. Nonetheless, although no accurate statistics exist on the number of arms that remained in circulation in Cambodia, it is clear that the numbers were considerable. Moreover, these weapons continued to be problematic to the security and crime situation in the country. As a consequence, disarmament made a positive contribution to *state weakness*, but much more still needed to be done in the following process.
- *Sanctions verification*: In particular gem mining and logging had a rapid and deleterious effect on the Cambodian environment. Although the moratoria on gems, logs and the sale of public property were not directly aimed at rehabilitation, they were in fact very effective because they prevented the selling-off of the Cambodian economy. As such it made an unexpectedly positive contribution to *state weakness*.
- *Providing pay to the newly formed national army*: It was not until after the election that UNTAC was in a position to act in a structural manner against

banditry, illegal checkpoints and the confiscation of land or harvests by members of the armed forces of the SOC in particular. From that moment on the United Nations, through operation 'Paymaster', guaranteed the military and police personnel of the factions sufficient income to eliminate their need to earn a living by resorting to illegal practices. However, after the withdrawal of UNTAC, in 1994 the Royal Government no longer had sufficient funds to continue the system. Providing pay to the newly formed national army therefore only made a temporary positive contribution to *state weakness*.

- *Providing law and order* After many years of civil war, for many Cambodians violence remained an easy means to achieve goals during the presence of UNTAC. Especially from the beginning of 1993 the law and order situation deteriorated and the occurrence of banditry increased. UNTAC was allowed to patrol in order to deter, but was definitely not mandated to enforce law and order. After the elections in particular, the main function of the Military Component was to protect the personnel and property of UNTAC and to supervise the security situation. Nonetheless, UNTAC was not able to provide law and order, because offenders were aware of the limited mandate of UNTAC. However, it did contribute to a sense of security. As such it made a limited positive contribution to *state weakness*.
- *Society-building* UNTAC tried to influence the Cambodian society in three ways. First, it regarded economic and social stability as essential for the development of democracy and peace. Part of this strategy of society-building was the reintegration of the refugees and internally displaced persons into Cambodian society. In addition, UNTAC's rehabilitation plan was to prevent the Cambodian population from living in unacceptable conditions. The opportunities to make immediate improvements to these conditions were countless, and ranged from the drilling of water sources to the construction of schools. Donors were, however, not very interested in small but efficient solutions, they preferred less practical, large visible projects. As a consequence, in spite of the attempts at 'society-building', the projects that formed an essential contribution to the unity and integration of Cambodia were often not implemented. Moreover, the actual society-building was planned for the period after the departure of UNTAC, during which the Cambodians were more involved in the rehabilitation of their country. Nevertheless, UNTAC did provide a Band-Aid. Secondly, UNTAC combated the Cambodian client-patron relations by attempting to depoliticise the civil administrations and armies of the factions. However, the Cambodians were unable to let go of their old patron-client relations, largely as a result of permanent economic insecurity. Thirdly, UNTAC indirectly stimulated the emergence of local NGOs and a culture of civil society. Although it was not a direct goal of the operation, it was an unwritten policy to aid NGOs and link them up with regional organisations. A secondary effect of the emergence of NGOs was that it created a sense of empowerment amongst the population. In spite of the repression after the withdrawal of the operation, these organisations remained very active. As a result, the positive contribution of society-building was a first step in the process in the direction of improvement with regard to *state weakness*.
- *Rehabilitation* The Paris Agreements mandated the United Nations system to assist with the rehabilitation of Cambodia. For this purpose an international reconstruction plan was drawn up and an appeal for contributions made. The

reconstruction of Cambodia was divided up into two phases: the rehabilitation phase and the reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase started after the departure of UNTAC, but the United Nations made preparations during its presence. It tried to secure the finances for the newly-elected government, amongst other means, through assistance to the resumption of official development aid through the newly-established International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC). This contributed to the long term process towards stability and reconstruction of the country. During its presence, in the rehabilitation phase, the short term problems had to be removed. The Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia of 1992 pledged 880 million dollars for this purpose and in 1993 another 119 million dollars followed.⁸⁰ Although the rehabilitation appeared to make a good start, several problems emerged. Firstly, the Rehabilitation Component of UNTAC, which was responsible for the rehabilitation, had numerous personnel problems. Secondly, the parties themselves squabbled in the SNC and were unable to reach a consensus with regard to the distribution of aid. The Rehabilitation Component did not really attempt to establish a co-ordinating body because, in accordance with its reserved strategy, it was decided that co-ordination would only mean the observance of assistance flows. The attempts that were made to direct aid failed because the Rehabilitation Component was only provided with the personnel for a clearing house function. The result was frustration, both among the donors and the Component. Thirdly, donor countries did not cooperate with the *Technical Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation*. They waited until after the elections and preferred bilateral aid with the SOC for the time being because the peace process stalled, and the implementation of UNTAC's rehabilitation mandate was not highly esteemed. Fourthly, although the Rehabilitation Component appealed for support for small scale projects, the donor countries were mainly interested in traditional large scale projects, which took more time. With the intention of obtaining quick results and of distributing the aid more evenly, UNTAC, UNHCR, UNDP and the individual contingents of the Military Component started so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and civic action programmes. These were the "physical proof that the war was over".⁸¹ The larger projects failed exactly on this point of visibility. Nevertheless, as a consequence of a lack of funds and personnel, as well as co-ordination and planning, neither were the QIPs as effective as they could have been. Fifthly, a side effect of the rehabilitation was that the stock of maintenance projects also increased, for which the Royal Government lacked additional funds. Nonetheless, the rehabilitation made a positive contribution to *state weakness*, although it was only the first small step in the process towards improvement of *state weakness*.

- *Institution-building*: UNTAC improved the quality of the Cambodian judicial and internal security structures. In September 1992 the SNC adopted several general principles, which were valid in the Cambodian legal system, criminal law and judicial procedures, and which came to be known as the Interim Penal Code. Although the Cambodians were to maintain law and order themselves, the country lacked effective implementing regulations and enforcement mechanisms as a result of corruption and a lack of training. From the end of 1992 onwards, the Civil Administration and Civilian Police Components trained personnel – especially judges, public prosecutors and other magistrates

- in the application of the Interim Penal Code. When UNTAC left, more than 10,000 police officers had been trained.⁸² As a result, institution-building made a positive contribution to *state weakness*.

After the establishment of the Royal Government, stabilisation and structural reform continued to be given high priority. Although structural improvements were made during UNTAC's presence, it was the weak support systems, the economic uncertainty and the unclear legal framework that continued to stand in the way of progress. Moreover, the Royal Government still lacked the domestic revenues for change. It did fill in the gaps in the legal framework established under UNTAC, but by 1997 the court system was again in need of substantial restructuring and its personnel needed urgent retraining in order to keep up with all the new developments. Furthermore, the size of both the public administration and the number of security personnel continued to grow because all parties had to be represented in the Royal Government. In order to pay for this, Phnom Penh kept its non-military expenditure to a minimum and consequently investments in infrastructure and education were limited. In addition, the salaries of civil servants were kept low and therefore corruption thrived.

Following the departure of UNTAC, the two problems of lack of societal coherence, and elite politics also remained. The CPP continued to be the most powerful party, notwithstanding the fact that FUNCINPEC had won the elections. Since the salaries of the army and public administration staff were low, it was hard to channel the loyalty of these people to the new government instead of to the old factions. Consequently, through its client-patron relations the CPP retained power over the state bureaucracy, while FUNCINPEC did not have sufficient funds and people to fill all its positions. Moreover, the Cambodian elites remained inclined to find violent solutions for their power struggles. This was illustrated by the conflict between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. After the coup, FUNCINPEC supporters once again fled to the Thai border to build a new resistance movement. Only this time King Sihanouk was able to unite the elites and the population of Cambodia, and as a result he was enormously important to the stability of the country.

5.4.5 State unwillingness and good governance

Cambodia had never known a tradition of democracy and human rights. The country was no exception in Southeast Asia: a region where authoritarianism has always been the general trend. After independence, in 1955 Sihanouk won the first and only free elections until those organised by UNTAC. Although the prince remained the most popular politician throughout the 1950s and 1960s he also leaned heavily on his secret police to protect his regime. Even then the human rights situation was far from perfect. For example, in 1967 Sihanouk's army is thought to have killed over 10,000 peasants during a revolt in Samlaut. The subsequent Lon Nol regime was far from democratic just like his predecessors and again the human rights situation left much to be desired. Thousands of Vietnamese civilians were killed near Phnom Penh just after the coup. The policies of the Khmer Rouge during their five years' reign need no comment. Finally, the Vietnamese 'liberation' and the subsequent civil war did not bring democracy and human rights either. In addition, when UNTAC arrived the country did not have a functioning legal system and additional institutions to maintain a constitutional state and the rule of law.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *state unwillingness and good governance*:

- *Civil administration controlling*: The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to control the civil administration in Cambodia to ensure that it functioned in a neutral political manner. For this purpose all administrative agencies, bodies and offices that were able to influence the outcome of the elections were placed under direct supervision or control. In addition, UNTAC investigated violations. Not only was direct control established over the central administration in Phnom Penh, but also over those of the provinces, the KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC. It seems that initially the SOC had been prepared to fully co-operate with the Civil Administration Component. However, UNTAC was unable to use this position because it was not fully deployed at that time. In addition, with a planned personnel size of 200, UNTAC's Civil Administration Component did not have sufficient personnel to control the SOC bureaucracy of 120,000 men.⁸³ By the time the Component was at full strength, after June 1992, the SOC had become less indulgent because UNTAC proved to be unable to include the Khmer Rouge in the peace process. Moreover, Phnom Penh started to question the impartiality of UNTAC, because as a result of the lack of personnel it directed its attention mainly to the SOC structures. Subsequently, UNTAC was forced to negotiate with the SOC about control over the civil administration, as it also negotiated with the Khmer Rouge about the demobilisation. Consequently, although UNTAC was mandated in the Paris Agreements to take corrective measures, it was not in a position to offend the most important remaining party in the peace process and its policy became detached. Moreover, it was hard for UNTAC to control and direct SOC officials, not only because they tried to evade control, but also because they were inherently corrupt. In addition, it was not until 1993 that UNTAC realised that important power within Cambodia lay with the provincial governors and that while it directed its energy towards Phnom Penh, the capital did not even have full control over the provinces. As a result, UNTAC controlled at best only what the SOC allowed it to control, and the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF could not be verified at all because they did not really have a functioning civil administration. When, by January 1993, the violations of the SOC threatened the neutral political environment of the elections, UNTAC was forced to act and established Control Teams and a Special Prosecutor. However, by then it was too little, too late. Consequently, civil administration controlling constituted only a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Moreover, this influence was only temporary because after the departure of UNTAC the improvements were reversed.
- *Civilian police controlling*: The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to supervise and control the civilian police of the Cambodian parties. Unfortunately, the quality of its officers was poor because many did not speak any of the official languages of UNTAC, did not have driving licenses, were badly trained and lacked knowledge of human rights. Furthermore, as a consequence of a lack of personnel and transport, UNTAC was unable to patrol independently, which obstructed effective control of the local police. Moreover, the planning of the Civilian Police Component was inadequate. It had anticipated a Khmer Rouge, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC civilian police force, but it barely existed if at all, and the SOC police force was not really trained for

civil tasks. For this reason, at the start of UNTAC, its officers did not know what to control, they became bored and their morale diminished. Some UNTAC police officers turned to corrupt practices and consequently the Civilian Police Component became UNTAC's "worst public relations problem."⁸⁴ Although the Civilian Police Component also conducted its own investigations and tried to fight crime, it did not make much progress because it lacked access to courts and the situation in the prisons was extremely bad. The United Nations was not in a position to fully control the police of the SOC and as a consequence UNTAC's influence went no further than cosmetic changes such as banning party insignias on police uniforms. Later during the mission, UNTAC became even less able to control the Cambodian police, because 60 to 65 percent of its police officers had to assist with the election process.⁸⁵ As a result, civilian police monitoring did not contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

- *Providing law and order* With the failure of the second phase of the cease-fire, UN soldiers were regrouped at the end of 1992 to secure the neutral political environment, to provide a general sense of security to the Cambodian population, and to secure the election process. An unwanted side effect at the start of this process was that individual UN soldiers became more vulnerable, and as a result several UN soldiers were taken hostage by the Khmer Rouge. UNTAC set up patrols and control posts to protect political parties and the houses of party officials against attacks from supporters of the SOC. From the start of the operation the number of politically motivated attacks decreased, only to slightly increase again when parties started to open offices at village level. From March 1993 onwards, safeguarding the elections received the highest priority and the patrols and control posts became less important. During the elections, in co-operation with the CPAI, the ANS and the KPNLAF, UNTAC secured the polling stations. It managed to provide sufficient security for the elections to be held, and as such this 'policy tool' made a positive contribution to the temporary improvement of *state unwillingness and good governance*.
- *Institution-building* It was agreed in the Paris Agreements that Cambodia was to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to adhere to international human rights treaties. When UNTAC left, Cambodia had become the country in Southeast Asia that had ratified the most human rights treaties. In addition, the new constitution stipulated that Cambodia was to be a multiparty democracy and that it recognised and respected human rights. Nevertheless, what was rather disturbing was that it granted these human rights only to the Khmer population and not to minorities like the Vietnamese. In addition, the United Nations attempted to build the institutions necessary to guarantee democracy and human rights. For this purpose UNTAC trained judges and lawyers in human rights with the aim of developing an independent legal system. It also stimulated and co-operated with several human rights organisations. However, although the institutions built during UNTAC appeared to be a great step forwards, in practice they proved to be rather fragile and looked better on paper than in reality. Many of the freedoms gained under UNTAC were lost again after its departure. As a consequence, institution-building proved to be only a temporary positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, while it had aimed to stimulate it in the long term.

- *Human rights verification* The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC during the transitional period to oversee the human rights situation in Cambodia, to investigate complaints and to take corrective measures if necessary. During its presence, UNTAC reported 440 murders of Vietnamese speaking Cambodians, 633 cases in which Cambodians were killed for political motives, and 200 Cambodians went missing.⁸⁶ The Khmer Rouge was mainly responsible for the first kind of human rights violations and the second were generally perpetrated by the police, army or supporters of the SOC.

Several problems arose immediately after the establishment of UNTAC. First, the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF did not have a legal system to be supervised and were therefore also unable to take legal action against human rights violations. Second, the parties, and the SOC in particular, did not always want to act against human rights violations and tried to deceive the supervision and often only made cosmetic changes. Third, investigations and statements from witnesses were often complicated by the “pervasive fear and mistrust in the local communities, often caused by continued harassment and intimidation by administrative authorities and the security forces”⁸⁷. Fourth, as a result of a lack of personnel, UNTAC could only direct its attention to certain aspects of human rights. Fifth, as UNTAC did not have enough courts of law at its disposal, its programme suffered. Sixth, the human rights verification was largely implemented by components other than the Human Rights Component, thereby overlooking the fact that a certain element of specialisation in human rights supervision was required. Seventh, the Human Rights Component and the Civilian Administration Component conflicted over the way to approach the parties. The first was more denunciatory, while the second aimed to address the problems behind the scenes.

The initial policy of UNTAC regarding human rights was to avoid confrontation in order to guarantee the co-operation of the parties in other fields. Only at the start of 1993, after Ranariddh as Sihanouk had threatened to end their co-operation with the United Nations at the height of the wave of violence, did UNTAC actually step up its efforts to create a neutral political environment. It started to arrest, detain and try people who had violated human rights and it appointed a Special Prosecutor for this purpose. As a result, the number of violent incidents and intimidations declined.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, by this time the parties were no longer open to UNTAC’s view on human rights and UNTAC’s policy remained frustrated because the United Nations remained dependent on the SOC structure to arrest, detain and try suspects. In addition, the Khmer Rouge was not restricted in its acts against the Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia, because UNTAC hoped to prevent Cambodian antagonism and to keep the door open for the Khmer Rouge to return to the peace process. In addition, UNTAC did not have the capacity to protect the Vietnamese. As a consequence, more than 20,000 Vietnamese speaking people were forced to flee the country and all UNTAC did was to escort them.⁸⁹ It is likely that UNTAC’s human rights verification would have yielded more results if the United Nations had initially emphasised human rights, instead of waiting until the parties were no longer open to UNTAC’s involvement. As a consequence, the positive contribution of the supervision and investigations of human rights violations to *state unwillingness and good governance* was flawed. Moreover, after the departure of UNTAC, the limited influence the United Nations may have had, ended with it. Consequently, in the long run human rights

verification did not make a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance* and its influence proved to be only temporary

- *Human rights education*: The human rights education programme of UNTAC intended to stimulate respect and understanding of human rights matters. The campaign trained police officers, administrators, local human rights organisations, teachers and school governors. Human rights became part of the curriculum at primary and secondary schools. UNTAC's education programme was something of a success. During its presence many Cambodians became aware of the existence of human rights and also started to appeal to them. The by-product of this new knowledge was, however, that they became aware of their own poor situation. Nonetheless, human rights education made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.
- *Organisation of elections*: The Paris Agreements mandated UNTAC to organise elections for a Constituent/Legislative Assembly. From the start the process was held up as result of strict acquisition rules, which delayed the arrival of such essential things as computers and telephones. Moreover, problems arose as the election law drawn up by UNTAC was opposed by the Khmer Rouge because it allowed Cambodians of Vietnamese descent to take part in the elections. Furthermore, parties and individuals increasingly failed to adhere to the code of conduct and the election law. Initially, UNTAC had only written letters warning the offenders. This had proven to be very effective up to a few weeks prior to the elections, but thereafter tougher action was required. UNTAC registered the participating political parties and a total of 4 77 million voters, some 95 percent of the total number of all enfranchised voters.⁹⁰ These voters were registered throughout Cambodia, with the exception of the Khmer Rouge zone. Voters in adjacent regions were registered under the security of the Military and Civilian Police Component. Refugees were also allowed to vote, but only if they had registered inside Cambodia. This put pressure on repatriation and even then special arrangements had to be made to register all refugees.

After considerable difficulties, all parties received access to the media facilities of the SOC and the radio stations of both the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. In addition, party programmes were broadcast by Radio UNTAC and TV UNTAC. Furthermore, UNTAC organised a voter education programme with a view to explaining to the population the benefits of elections and how they worked. Radio UNTAC became a very efficient and influential instrument for this purpose. The education programme proved to be very effective, which was expressed, amongst other things, by the fact that only 2.98 percent of the total votes were invalid.⁹¹ The 'Your vote is secret' campaign most likely contributed to the turnout of 89.56 percent.⁹² It made the Cambodian population feel confident to vote in spite of the fact that both the SOC and the PDK intimidated voters and the political environment was not particularly neutral.

Polling was planned to take place from 23 to 25 May 1993, but this period was extended for mobile teams until 28 May. Although the Khmer Rouge had threatened to disturb the elections and said it was prepared to use violence to do so, it remained relatively peaceful. Although several minor mistakes were made in the technical implementation of the polling process, it did not have a significant effect on the results. However, the mistakes did mean that the SOC rejected the results in the first instance. Eventually the elections proved to be a

visibly overwhelming success as some 4,267,192 Cambodians cast their vote⁹³

In order to successfully take this first step towards democracy in line with the timetable, two other important goals - the demobilisation and the repatriation of refugees - had to be speeded up. Moreover, in the end, the elections proved to make only a temporary positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Not only was the will of the people not fully implemented because the loser of the elections, the CPP, forced itself into the new government, but democracy also suffered in the following years. Based on the experience of the Civilian Administration Component, one could have known that the co-leadership might be circumvented by the CPP because its bureaucracy was able to change its structure.

- *Election monitoring* UNTAC was mandated by the Paris Agreements to monitor the election campaign, the casting and the counting of votes. The extent to which the elections were free and fair was assessed by UNTAC based on three criteria: the extent of violence and intimidation during the campaign and elections, the extent to which the CPP was advantaged as a result of the greater area of the SOC zone, and the quality of the technical implementation of the elections. Unfortunately, the violence and intimidation continued throughout the process and the SOC was very much advantaged as result of its larger territory. Therefore, if UNTAC had reviewed the elections only on the basis of its own three criteria, then it would have found that only the technical implementation was sufficient. Nevertheless, although UNTAC admitted that the election process did not take place in a free and fair environment, it argued that it was the minimum needed⁹⁴. It is not unlikely that this decision was influenced by the fact that the United Nations not only monitored, but also organised the elections. Consequently, UNTAC had an interest in 'free and fair' elections. Furthermore, it is questionable whether election monitoring actually contributed to more 'free and fair' elections. Nonetheless, it forced the CPP to accept defeat and therefore it made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

During UNTAC's presence the building blocks were laid for future governments to practice good governance, to be democratic and to respect human rights. In addition, the Secretary-General provided a United Nations presence after the departure of UNTAC through a United Nations Centre for Human Rights. Furthermore, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed to co-ordinate the contact between the United Nations and the Royal Government and to assist it with its human rights compliance. However, when UNTAC left, the prospects with respect to human rights and the rule of law quickly deteriorated. Physical human rights were frequently violated, mostly within the context of the continuing conflict by the Khmer Rouge. Also with regard to democracy and the respect of fundamental freedoms, the future proved not to be as bright as had been hoped. Parliament rarely met and the institutions and freedoms created and stimulated under UNTAC were curbed after its departure. After an alleged coup attempt in 1994, Cambodian democracy started to totter even further. A law was pushed through making the Khmer Rouge an illegal organisation. This law was used as a licence to arrest any critic on the pretext of being a member of, or co-operating with, the Khmer Rouge. In addition, the press was increasingly curtailed. Hun Sen and Ranariddh did not allow protests against this by their cabinet and parliament and consequently Sam Rainsy was forced to step down as

Finance Minister In 1996, democracy was further cornered as a consequence of the increased tension between Hun Sen and Ranariddh Co-operation between both co-premiers became difficult and subsequently the cabinet no longer met in addition to parliament Next, both co-premiers were able to conduct their power politics unrestrictedly After the coup of 1997, the CPP seized all power and gave no space for a free opposition campaign for the 1998 elections Only following international pressure was Ranariddh allowed to return and participate Although the elections proceeded, they lacked freedom from fear and equal access to the media Eventually, King Sihanouk's diplomacy and not the democratic process, succeeded in providing a new CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government

5.4.6 State/government legitimacy

The legitimacy of the state was never questioned in the Cambodian conflict, but the legitimacy of the government was On the domestic front, the SOC was highly disputed and often viewed as a Vietnamese puppet regime It was opposed by the CGDK in which three parties from three totally different political directions were united On the international front, the Phnom Penh regime was not recognised by most countries as the legitimate regime The CGDK was regarded by many to be the legitimate government because Sihanouk was its head He was the Cambodian who embodied the most legitimacy The CGDK was, nonetheless, not much more than a façade for the international community because it lacked power inside Cambodia Both governments were not able to provide the stability Cambodia needed the CGDK did not have the power, and the SOC did not have the legitimacy

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *state/government legitimacy*

- *Organisation of elections* Perhaps unexpectedly, it was not so much the contribution to democracy but the providing of legitimacy that became the most important positive contribution of the elections Those parties and people who took part in the elections and won were legitimised The newly elected Royal Government gained the political legitimacy that neither the SOC nor the CGDK were ever able to obtain The Khmer Rouge chose not to take part, was delegitimised and became vulnerable to the loss of both domestic as well as international support The elections provided China with a manner to distance itself from the PDK without losing face
- *Election monitoring* The elections were proclaimed 'free and fair' by UNTAC This meant the Royal Government had gained power in a legitimate way and in line with the will of the people Although whether the elections were indeed 'free and fair' may be questionable, the fact that election monitors did say they were, was a rubber stamp for the elections and consequently provided legitimacy to the newly elected government It therefore perhaps unexpectedly also made a positive contribution to *state/government legitimacy*

The new Royal Government was regarded as the legitimate regime both inside as well as outside Cambodia In addition, it not only had the right to govern, but also the ability to govern Moreover, the person with the greatest political legitimacy, Sihanouk, was given a political function within the Royal Government after the elections, and thus lent further legitimacy to it Subsequently, the Khmer Rouge lost its legitimacy both internationally as well as domestically because it had abandoned the peace process and had not taken part in the elections Nonetheless,

the legitimacy of the government received a severe blow with the 1997 coup from which it never fully recovered.

5.4.7 *Unemployment and economic decline*

Two decades of conflict left the Cambodian economy in a catastrophic state. The Khmer Rouge regime followed by the central planning economy of the PRK only worsened the situation. In 1991, the Cambodian GDP ranked 159 out of 160 countries in the world.⁹⁵ Its economy was mainly agriculturally based. The agricultural sector contributed more than half the GDP and about 85 percent of the population worked in agriculture. As crop yields were subject to the vagaries of the weather, the Cambodian economy was inherently unstable. A reform programme was started in 1985 and expanded in 1989. The objective of the programme was to liberalise the economy by making it market-oriented. It did, however, not fully generate the desired economic progress as a result of continued military strife. In addition, the reforms were frustrated by ill-advised and unclear government policies, as well as financial instability. Moreover, progress was nearly neutralised because the Cambodian government was deprived of its most important sources of income: trade with the CMEA and Soviet aid. At the same time, fiscal pressures mounted because state enterprise reforms and sustained military expenditures were a burden on the national budget. As a result, inflation was rampant.

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *unemployment and economic decline*:

- *Civil administration controlling*: The main aim of the Civil Administration Component was to create a 'neutral political environment'. However, in practice it also made an unexpectedly positive contribution to *unemployment and economic decline* because its control over the area of finances of the Cambodian administration, the banking sector, customs, state-owned enterprises and salaries, strengthened the Cambodian economic administration. In co-operation with the World Bank, the budget of the SOC was made more transparent. Additionally, an attempt was made to stabilise the exchange rate of the riel against the dollar. In spite of these measures, the riel devalued in March 1993 from about 2,500 to 4,000 to the dollar. At the same time prices increased threefold, or even fourfold.⁹⁶ In response, the IMF and the World Bank, in co-operation with the Civil Administration Component, introduced a policy package that focused on stabilising the Cambodian economy. Bank financing of the budget was virtually ended, the fiscal performance was improved and inflation was brought to a halt. When UNTAC left, Cambodia's budget situation looked better, but remained delicate as there was not a broad base for tax revenues.
- *Mine clearance*: UNTAC's mine-clearance programme did not succeed in freeing up the arable lands needed for the stable growth of the mainly agriculture-based economy. As a consequence, mine clearance did not contribute towards *unemployment and economic decline*.
- *Rehabilitation*: Following the Secretary-General's appeal in 1991 for aid to support Cambodia, in 1992 and 1993 the international community released a total of almost one billion dollars.⁹⁷ The distribution of rehabilitation funds was a problem for UNTAC. It argued that the SOC structures were of overall importance to the Cambodian economy and that therefore the SOC needed more aid. The resistance factions disagreed because they saw this as de facto

aid to the SOC and therefore the Khmer Rouge refused to co-operate any longer with the Technical Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation. As already mentioned under *state weakness*, this disagreement frustrated the disbursement of aid through UNTAC and consequently donors negotiated directly with the parties and channelled the largest share of their funds to the SOC. In spite of the fact that UNTAC's rehabilitation was intended to stimulate and develop the Cambodian economy, life for the average Cambodian only deteriorated during the United Nations presence.⁹⁸ In the short run, UNTAC's rehabilitation did not make a difference to *unemployment and economic decline*; in the long term it made a positive contribution to economic progress and macroeconomic stability and consequently to an improvement in *unemployment and economic decline*.

Economic progress accelerated after the formation of the Royal Government. UNTAC's sheer presence was a sign to foreign investors that Cambodia was safe again. Moreover, it stimulated particular sectors of the Cambodian economy. However, UNTAC also distorted the Cambodian economy: it led to inflation and created expectations that could not be sustained. Moreover, growth remained unstable as it was not equitably spread throughout society and was mainly concentrated in urban areas. The rampant inflation of 1992-93 was brought back to levels below 10 percent. This was partly due to the end of the habit of monetary financing of the budget deficit and partly as a result of more stable exchange rates of the riel. As the new Royal Government appeared to be rather stable, the depreciation of the riel against the dollar was brought to a halt. The Cambodian monetary policy was nonetheless still in its infancy, although the foundations were there. The new government aimed to obtain macroeconomic stability through fiscal restraint. Although expenditure was stabilised, it was primarily the result of the downsizing of civil expenses, while as a result of the ongoing struggle against the Khmer Rouge, defence and security expenditure remained extremely high. Considerable amounts of the expenses were financed through foreign assistance. Some efforts were undertaken to obtain more revenues, nonetheless, Cambodian tax revenues remained low. As a result, Cambodia's external debt increased at a very fast rate, until they were rescheduled through the Paris Club and bilateral negotiations. In late 1995, the debt problem seemed to be moving in the right direction.

5.4.8 External relations

After the downfall of the empire of Angkor, Siam/Thailand and Vietnam became Cambodia's more powerful neighbours, who, in addition to the fact that they both nibbled off parts of the former empire, also competed for influence over what remained. As a consequence, both countries were frequently drawn into Cambodian internal politics and conflicts, each supporting a different side. Both neighbours, but especially the Vietnamese, were hated by the Cambodians for this. This situation was only temporarily interrupted by the French colonisation. After Cambodia's independence, the pattern was restored and even intensified by the Cold War. The Vietnamese invasion initiated a new civil war, in which Thailand, the ASEAN, China and the United States supported the resistance factions against Hanoi's 'drive for expansion' and Soviet 'hegemonism'. The Soviet Union chose the side of Hanoi and PRK. In 1989, Vietnam said it had withdrawn all its forces from Cambodia.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNTAC influenced or were intended to influence *external relations*:

- *Verification of foreign forces withdrawal*: immediately after the Paris Agreements had come into effect UNTAC was to verify that all foreign forces, advisors and military personnel, including their weapons, ammunition and materiel, were withdrawn from Cambodia and did not return, and that all foreign aid to the factions ceased. This provision of the agreements was mainly aimed at the Vietnamese forces, which the Khmer Rouge thought were still present in the country, and aid. However, Hanoi stated that all Vietnamese forces had been withdrawn in 1989 and all Vietnamese aid had ceased, which was corroborated by UNTAC. Nonetheless, in response to complaints from the Khmer Rouge that UNTAC was not doing its job well enough, it announced in March 1993 that it had found several Vietnamese soldiers. Nonetheless, in order to do so, it was stretching the limits of the definition of members of a 'foreign armed force' because in none of the cases were the men under any control whatsoever of the Vietnamese authorities. Although UNTAC probably tried to show that it was sincere about the Vietnamese question, the fact that it detected so-called Vietnamese soldiers had the opposite effect because it showed the population that Vietnamese forces were indeed still active in Cambodia. At the same time, as a result of the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to allow UNTAC personnel into its zone, the United Nations was unable to verify matters along the Thai border. However, it was this border that was crossed by organised units of the Thai army. In addition, Thailand and Thai companies supported the Khmer Rouge both directly and indirectly. UNTAC did not act against it, probably because the Thai presence was not so much an issue, as opposed to the possible Vietnamese presence. At the same time, UNTAC did convince the international community that Vietnam had withdrawn, and consequently the verification of foreign forces withdrawal made a positive contribution to *external relations*.
- *Diplomacy*: The Security Council attempted through diplomatic means to coerce Thailand into complying with the Paris Agreement. It was, however, not successful. The Thai military and Thai companies continued to support the Khmer Rouge and the Thai government blocked the establishment of control posts on the border between Thailand and the PDK zone. As a result, diplomacy did not contribute to *external relations*.
- *Repatriation*: With the implementation of the repatriation process, Thailand was relieved from the large numbers of refugees living on its side of the border. Not only did this mean that diplomatic relations improved, but it also removed the support base of the Khmer Rouge and other potential rebel organisations. As a consequence, it made a positive contribution to *external relations*.

Once UNTAC had left, the conflict was nationalised. The superpowers had distanced themselves from their Cambodian protégés and no longer supported a continued fight. The situation remained more difficult within the region. Around mid-1994, China substituted its support for the Khmer Rouge for co-operation with the remaining communist or ex-communist regimes in Southeast Asia - Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In addition, it was not until mid-1994 that the Thai army and Thai companies gave in to Western pressure and distanced themselves from the Khmer Rouge. As both Vietnam and Thailand had withdrawn their support for their allies, rapprochement became possible and in 1995 Vietnam

acceded to the ASEAN. This, in turn, led to the demise of the Khmer Rouge and a quick end to new conflict between Hun Sen and Ranariddh because Bangkok and Hanoi became members of the same camp. In spite of the fact that both countries perhaps kept their different sympathies, they ended their military support and proclaimed the ASEAN point of view with one voice. The external relations therefore improved significantly. This improvement was due, to a considerable extent, to the sheer presence of the United Nations, because UNTAC had provided a symbolic end of the Cold War in Cambodia.

5.5 Within case conclusions

At the international level of the Cambodian conflict, the end of the Cold War and the detente between Moscow and Beijing allowed the three superpowers to bring their proxy wars to an end. Also in Cambodia they pushed their allies towards the negotiating table. At regional level, Vietnam, weary of the occupation and satisfied with the position of the Khmer Rouge, had already withdrawn its forces from Cambodia in 1989. At national level, the SOC and the CGDK (FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and Khmer Rouge) reached a stalemate. Although all four Cambodian parties were sincerely interested in the peace process, there remained considerable distrust and the Khmer Rouge in particular feared for its security if the Paris Agreements were not implemented according to its interpretation. This situation and these interests allowed UNTAC to make a positive contribution to both *negative peace* and the causes of conflict in Cambodia. From the research of the hypotheses it follows that

UNTAC made a limited positive contribution to negative peace. The force UNTAC deployed to monitor the cease-fire arrived too slowly and was too weak to help the Khmer Rouge overcome its security dilemma. In addition, civil administration controlling and civil police monitoring were unable to contribute to the sense of security of the Khmer Rouge. Although the Khmer Rouge subsequently stepped out of the peace process, the cantonment and demobilisation was not postponed, but continued, which had a temporarily negative effect on the stability of the country. Moreover, both with the demobilisation and disarmament, the parties that participated tried to evade the agreements. The reintegration of ex-combatants was far from complete even though their number was much lower than originally planned. Diplomacy was not able to decrease the tension. The moratoria that aimed to hit the Khmer Rouge and to force it back to the negotiating table were not able to persuade it. The largest contribution to *negative peace* came from winning the hearts and minds of the local population. It contributed to the call for peace, which only the Khmer Rouge could temporarily resist. Although UNTAC was also mandated to verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, in fact the Vietnamese forces had already been withdrawn in 1989. Consequently, the Vietnamese withdrawal could not be verified. After UNTAC left, the conflict continued, but this time between the Royal Government and the Khmer Rouge. With the Khmer Rouge becoming weaker all the time, the CPP and FUNCINPEC started to fight over what remained, which led to the coup and subsequent fighting in 1997. *Negative peace* was finally reached in 1999.

UNTAC made a positive contribution to inter-group relations. The distrust and hatred amongst the four parties was considerable and all had had a period in government in recent history. This made national reconciliation even more difficult. UNTAC contributed to national reconciliation through diplomacy at the

local level, where the former opponents got to know each other. In addition, the fact that UNTAC provided pay to the conflicting armies meant that their soldiers became more loyal to the institution that paid them, the new royal army, rather than to their old factions. After UNTAC left, relations between the FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC improved considerably, and the Khmer Rouge was isolated. Nonetheless, tensions remained, as was proven in the 1997 coup.

UNTAC made a negative contribution to group demography Population growth in Cambodia was high, and because large parts of the country were uncultivated and large groups of IDPs and refugees were on the move, it was hard to feed these extra mouths. In the late 1980s it seemed, however, that Cambodia was to overcome its demographic pressures. UNTAC repatriated the refugees from Thailand and also helped the IDPs to return home. This process was rushed in order to be finished in time for the elections. As a result, demographic pressure increased in Cambodia. Since little attention was given to the reintegration of the refugees, and because it was left unfinished, its contribution was not able to counterbalance these demographic pressures. Moreover, these pressures were also not relieved through the cultivation of much new land as mine clearance did not deliver land that was safe to work on in a sufficient manner. When UNTAC left the demographic pressures had therefore worsened.

UNTAC made a positive contribution to state weakness. Cambodia had never known strong social unity and the influence of the quarrelling elites over their clients was considerable. In addition, although the Cambodian state structures and social services had improved remarkably after the reign of the Khmer Rouge, they were still very weak. Institution building by UNTAC improved the quality of the Cambodian civil and legal administration and police. Disarmament also meant a decrease in the crime rate. The providing of law and order contributed to a sense of security, although the security situation deteriorated because Cambodians were still used to resorting to violence in order to reach their goals. As UNTAC provided pay to the conflicting armies, these armies and police forces no longer needed to rely on crime as a means to earn a living. However, this influence was only temporary, because once UNTAC had left, the system of payment collapsed again. The moratoria prevented the selling-off of Cambodia. The attempts of UNTAC at society building and rehabilitation were at best the start of a long process. Although after UNTAC had left, the Cambodian state structures improved further, they still remained rather weak. In addition, Cambodia continued to be troubled by its weak social cohesion and elite politics.

UNTAC made a largely temporary positive contribution to state unwillingness and good governance. Cambodia had never known a tradition of democracy and human rights. Civil administration controlling only become more intrusive once the neutral political environment became endangered, and by that time it was too little, too late. Moreover, its positive contribution was only temporary until UNTAC left again. With regard to civilian police monitoring, its influence on the Cambodian police was largely cosmetic. Institution building by UNTAC meant that when it left, Cambodian institutions and respect for human rights and democracy had made great improvements – at least on paper. However, many of the improvements were reversed again after its departure. With respect to human rights verification, the non-confrontational policy of UNTAC allowed human rights violations to continue. Although it did address several issues with respect to the neutral political environment, little of this contribution remained after UNTAC left. Human rights education did contribute to more awareness amongst the population,

but meant that people became increasingly aware of their own poor situation. The provision of law and order created a security situation which allowed elections to take place. The monitoring of these elections did not contribute to more 'free and fair' elections, but forced the CPP to accept defeat. UNTAC organised the elections itself and therefore had an interest in their positive evaluation. Although the elections organised by UNTAC were not really free and fair, they were a first step on the road to democratisation. In order to take this step, however, demobilisation and repatriation had to be rushed. It is therefore regrettable that the democracy regressed in the following years, to the extent that in 1997 Hun Sen even staged a coup. The human rights situation also remained feeble.

UNTAC made a positive contribution to state/government legitimacy. Although the CGDK did have legitimacy as a government, it did not have power, whereas the SOC did have power, but much less legitimacy. The organisation of elections by UNTAC was a very important contribution to the legitimacy of the government in Cambodia. Those parties that took part in the elections were legitimised, whereas the Khmer Rouge, which decided not to take part, lost legitimacy. The fact that the elections were monitored by UNTAC was an extra rubber stamp that the elections were indeed 'free and fair' and thus brought to power the legitimate winners. As a result, when UNTAC pulled out, it left a government in charge with full legitimacy. The coup of 1997, however, had a negative effect on this legitimacy.

UNTAC made a positive contribution to unemployment and economic decline. The Khmer Rouge and the conflict left the Cambodian economy in a catastrophic state. An important side effect of civil administration controlling was that UNTAC aided the government in creating a more solid and transparent economic administration. In co-operation with the IMF and World Bank, fiscal performance was improved. Although rehabilitation in the short term did not make much of a difference to the average Cambodian, it did contribute towards economic progress and macroeconomic stability in the long run. However, Cambodia remained largely an agricultural economy and mine clearance did not deliver the sufficient amount of arable land that was needed for stable growth. After the formation of the Royal Government, the Cambodian economy improved further. The sheer presence of UNTAC was a sign to outside investors that Cambodia was safe again. UNTAC was, however, also a disturbing factor as it caused inflation to increase. Nonetheless, after it left, the Cambodian economy slowly improved further.

UNTAC made a positive contribution to external relations. The regional power struggle between Thailand and Vietnam was further intensified by the Cold War. In 1989 Vietnam said it had withdrawn its forces from Cambodia. Since some in the international community still doubted the Vietnamese withdrawal, its verification by UNTAC was needed to convince them. The repatriation not only relieved Thailand of a refugee problem and opened the road to improved relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh, but also removed the support base of the Khmer Rouge. Although diplomacy was used to attempt to coerce Thailand into compliance with the Paris Agreements, Thailand continued to support the Khmer Rouge. Although after the departure of UNTAC the conflict was nationalised, it was not until mid-1994 that Thailand and China distanced themselves from the PDK. The nationalisation of the conflict facilitated rapprochement between Bangkok and Hanoi and in 1995 Vietnam even acceded to the ASEAN. The very presence of UNTAC had signalled the end of the Cold War and allowed *external relations* to

improve to the extent that after the 1997 coup it was no longer possible to restart a conflict.

Table 8 - Indication of the contribution of UNTAC's policy tools⁹⁹

	Cease-fire monitoring	Disarmament	Reintegration of ex-combatants	Institution-building	Verification of foreign forces withdrawal	Winning the hearts and minds...	Diplomacy	Sanctions verification	Civilian police monitoring	Civil administration controlling	Border monitoring	Providing pay to the newly-formed army	Reintegration of refugees	Reparations	Mine clearance	Humanitarian aid	Providing law and order	Society-building	Rehabilitation	Human rights education	Truth commission	Organisation of elections	Election monitoring	
Negative peace	0	0	0	0	0	++	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inter-group relations	0	0	0	0	0	++	0	0	0	0	0	++	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Group demography	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State weakness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State unwillingness...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State/government legitimacy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment and econ. dec.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
External relations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative contribution:	--																							
Limited negative contribution:	-																							
No contribution:	0																							
Limited positive contribution:																								
Positive contribution:																								
Temporary contribution:																								
Contribution to process:																								

Summary

UNTAC made a positive contribution to seven of the eight variables and in particular to *inter-group relations*, *state weakness* and *state/government legitimacy*. It is remarkable that UNTAC even had a negative influence on *group demography*. With regard to the other variables, the positive contribution was not always very great and sometimes it was only temporary. One of the spearheads of the operation - the one the United Nations uses to substantiate its own claim of success - the contribution to the variable of *state unwillingness and good governance*, is a good example of this. Soon after the departure of UNTAC, democracy and human rights were again endangered. In this respect, the elections and human rights ‘policy tools’ failed to be a durable contribution. UNTAC aided the circumstance in which it became possible for the CPP and the FUNCINPEC to join together in a government. Only the Khmer Rouge refused to take part in the peace process because it did not trust either the intentions of the SOC or the capabilities and impartiality of the United Nations. It became isolated, which would eventually lead to its decline. To actually implement its mandate in a more complete manner, UNTAC would have needed to help the parties overcome their security dilemma. For this purpose, a stronger peacekeeping force mandated under chapter VII (peace-enforcement), a stronger civilian police force and a larger civil administration component would have been helpful. In addition, UNTAC would most probably have been better able to address the remaining causes of the conflict in the fields of *inter-group relations*, *group demography*, *state weakness*, *state unwillingness and good governance*, and *unemployment and economic*

decline, if the period of its presence had been prolonged. Nonetheless, generally speaking UNTAC made a positive contribution to 'durable peace', as its contribution was sufficient to address the causes of the conflict in order to create the conditions in which negative peace developed in 1999.

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¹⁰ HERVOUET, *The return of Vietnam to the international system*, p. 20; and CHANDLER, *A history of Cambodia*, pp. 235-239.

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¹⁵ UNITED NATIONS SURVEY MISSION TO CAMBODIA, (24 December 1991), *Report of the UN military survey mission to Cambodia, 17 November - 16 December 1991*, New York, annex D, 3-4.

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¹⁹ UNITED NATIONS SURVEY MISSION TO CAMBODIA, *Report of the UN military survey mission to Cambodia*, annex D, 3-4.

²⁰ BERRY, *Cambodia - from red to blue*, p. 271.

²¹ CORFIELD, *A history of the Cambodian non-communist resistance 1975-1983*, pp. 16-17; EVANS & ROWLEY, *Red brotherhood at war*, p. 259; ETCHESON, C. (December 1992), "The 'peace' in Cambodia", *Current History* 91(569), pp. 413-417, on p. 417; and DOYLE, "War and peace in Cambodia", pp. 194-195.

²² MCBETH, J. (9 November 1979), "Awaiting the next round", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, pp.

40-41, on p. 41; and EVANS & ROWLEY, *Red brotherhood at war*, pp. 249-250

²³ SCHOONOORD, *De Koninklijke Marine in actie voor de Verenigde Naties*, p. 184 and p. 191, and UNIDIR, *Managing arms in peace processes*, p. 27, pp. 47-48 and p. 191.

²⁴ UNITED NATIONS SURVEY MISSION TO CAMBODIA, *Report of the UN military survey mission to Cambodia*, annex D, 3-4.

²⁵ BERRY, *Cambodia - from red to blue*, p. 243.

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²⁷ CHANDLER, *A history of Cambodia*, pp. 227-230.

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³¹ CHANDLER, *A history of Cambodia*, p. 235.

³² NATIONS, R. (2 February 1979), "Thailand prepares to think of the unthinkable", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, p. 8.

³³ LEIFER, M. (June 1982), "Balance of advantage in Indochina", *The world today*, 38(6), pp. 232-238, on p. 233; CHANDA, *Brother enemy the war after the war*, pp. 381-382; and NATIONS, R. (4 May 1979), "Kampuchea: escape to nowhere", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, pp. 10-11, on p. 10.

³⁴ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 23 October 1991; and "Document 43, Letter dated 27 July 1992 from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Cambodia", in: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1995), *The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, Blue books series*, 2, New York, pp. 206-208.

³⁵ HERVOUET, *The return of Vietnam to the international system*, pp. 26-27; and HERVOUET, "The Cambodian conflict", p. 267.

³⁶ ARMSTRONG, S.P. (1986), *The causes and implications of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea*, Ann Arbor, pp. 167-168; MCGREGOR, C. (March 1990), "China, Vietnam, and the Cambodian conflict: Beijing's end game strategy", *Asian Survey*, 30(3), pp. 266-283; and Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 23 October 1991.

³⁷ ARMSTRONG, *The causes and implications of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea*, pp. 175-179, and CHANDA, *Brother enemy*; and HAAS, M. (1991), *Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: the Faustian pact*, New York.

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⁴¹ UNIDIR, *Managing arms in peace processes*, p. 16; UN DOC S/RES/718 (1991), 31 October 1991; UN DOC S/RES/717 (1991), 16 October 1991; and UN DOC S/23218, 14 November 1991, 4.

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- ⁷⁷ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT, *Cambodia at war*, p. 27
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- ⁸⁷ INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (1993), *Report of IPU election observer mission, Cambodia 16 May-4 June 1993*, Geneva, p. 5.
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- ⁹⁰ UN DOC S/25784, 15 May 1993, 3-4
- ⁹¹ Most rejected votes were either turned down because they were blank or because the marking was not in the box of a party but next to the seal of UNTAC. See: INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, *Report of IPU election observer mission*, p. 13.
- ⁹² UN DOC S/25913, 10 June 1993, 5.
- ⁹³ *Ibidem*, 5, 8, 11 and annex 2.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.
- ⁹⁵ UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (1994), *Human Development Report 1994*, New York - Oxford, pp. 119-123
- ⁹⁶ UN DOC S/25719, 3 May 1993, 70-71.

⁹⁷ WORLD BANK, THE, *Cambodia from rehabilitation to reconstruction*, 2.22-2.23 and 2.25.

⁹⁸ PEOU, *Conflict neutralization in the Cambodia war*, p. 195.

⁹⁹ The presentation of the assessment of the contribution of a policy tool to a variable in a five point scale has inherently two disadvantages. First of all, it does not encompass all the nuances of description. Secondly, the danger of subjectivity is inherently greater because one is forced to make a choice without these nuances. Yet, sometimes the difference between, for example, a positive contribution and a limited positive contribution is not all that clear cut. Nonetheless, this table is given here to present a brief overview of the assessment of the contribution of the peacekeeping operation. One has to bear in mind, however, that it serves as an indication only. For the real and full assessment one has to turn to the description.

6 THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ)

6.1 The history of the conflict

6.1.1 *The context of the Mozambican conflict*

The *Frente da Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) drew support for its struggle against Portuguese colonial rule mainly from educated Mozambicans abroad and migrant workers residing in neighbouring countries. It was primarily an intellectual foreign-based party and its leadership originated mainly from southern Mozambique. FRELIMO adopted a dual strategy of social revolution and guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese. After ten years, the war of liberation brought FRELIMO the Lusaka Accords in 1974, followed by the Mozambican independence in 1975. This independence was, however, only partly won on the battlefield, because it resulted mainly from the fact that discontented elements within the Portuguese army no longer wanted to continue the colonial wars and turned against the dictatorial regime of Salazar in Lisbon. This led to the 'carnation revolution' in Portugal in April 1974, after which the road for Mozambican independence was opened. Subsequently, without any form of referendum or elections and only a nine-month interim government, the Lusaka Accords handed over power to FRELIMO. Straightaway, FRELIMO faced the problem that as a primarily foreign-based movement, it was relatively unfamiliar with the country, and to the majority of the people it was somewhat unknown. In addition, the intellectual elitist nature of the party meant that it was relatively closed towards criticism from the ordinary people and their traditional leaders. Furthermore, many people in northern Mozambique perceived FRELIMO as an organisation that was dominated by southerners, and which aimed to establish southern dominance over Mozambique. Moreover, the economic situation deteriorated rapidly after independence. This situation only worsened because FRELIMO declared itself to be a Marxist-Leninist party, thereby isolating itself from certain Western donors. At the same time, FRELIMO faced regional animosity because it chose the side of the resistance movements against white minority rule in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, and became a member of the frontline states.¹

6.1.2 *From Rhodesia to South Africa*

After independence, FRELIMO decided to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and closed the border with that country. As a result, Mozambique not only lost income from trade, amongst other things, but also became embroiled in a war with Rhodesia. The armed forces of FRELIMO, the *Forças Armadas de Moçambique* (FAM) provided direct military support to the Rhodesian resistance, the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of the Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU). Rhodesia responded by bombing refugee and resistance camps inside Mozambique, and, with the aim of destabilising and weakening its neighbour, it created the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO). RENAMO recruited primarily from people who, after Mozambican independence, opposed the rule of FRELIMO and had fled to Rhodesia. Under the guidance of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, Mozambicans who had served in Portuguese military units, FRELIMO dissidents, and splinter organisations were integrated into RENAMO. It became an important

tool in the Rhodesian struggle against the ZANLA. Nonetheless, during the first years, the FAM was reasonably successful in fighting the newly created rebels because RENAMO remained a military organisation without a political movement. With the fall of the Rhodesian government in 1979 RENAMO lost its patron and would probably have ceased to exist at all if South Africa had not revived it. Also in that year, Dhlakama won the struggle for power and established unity within the movement.²

The conflict entered into a new phase when Botha came to power in Pretoria in 1980 and started to implement 'total strategy', like Rhodesia. This strategy called for an economic, political and military offensive to destabilise the frontline states in order to preserve South African hegemony in the region, to defend the interests of the apartheid regime and to isolate the South African resistance organisation - the African National Congress (ANC). In line with the goals of 'total strategy', RENAMO aimed to destabilise the Mozambican economic and social structures, and the countryside in order to diminish the capacity of FRELIMO to support the ANC. In addition, South African support for RENAMO aimed to deny Zimbabwe, (formerly Rhodesia) access to the sea. Harare responded in 1982 by sending more than 10,000 soldiers to help FRELIMO protect the Beira corridor, which ran from Zimbabwe through Mozambique to the Indian Ocean. One year later, Tanzania followed with the deployment of its forces. Notwithstanding the assistance, the paralysis of the rural economy RENAMO brought upon Mozambique, and further aggravated by drought in the early 1980s, forced the Mozambican president Machel to change his policy towards South Africa. With the Nkomati Agreement of 1984, Mozambique and South Africa agreed to start a process of co-operation and to stop the support of armed insurrection in each other's countries.³

6.1.3 From South Africa to Malawi

The Nkomati agreement signalled a shift of alliances on the international scene. American opposition to the entry of 'socialist' Mozambique into the IMF and the World Bank was dropped and Mozambique became less isolated from the West. However, in spite of the agreement, the pledged South African economic involvement in Mozambique remained low and elements within the South African government continued to support RENAMO funnelling indirect and covert aid through Malawian territory to expand RENAMO's activities in north and central Mozambique. After the Nkomati Agreement, both RENAMO and South Africa, however, realised that RENAMO had to become an independent political organisation in order to survive. For this reason top politicians were recruited, enabling RENAMO to obtain a political structure inside Mozambique after 1985. Although RENAMO had produced a programme and manifesto in 1981, which aimed for democracy and a market economy, little was clear about its political goals. In order to win support, it mainly exploited latent conflicts, such as the conflict between FRELIMO and the traditional authorities. In spite of its vague policies, RENAMO became increasingly popular. Observers explained this by the fact that its defining feature was "that it was whatever FRELIMO was not."⁴ This same vagueness contributed to the absence of an objective to topple the existing government and to seize power. Instead, RENAMO hoped to pressure FRELIMO to adapt its policies, although it did not have clear alternatives.⁵

In 1986, in a combined effort of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia aiming to force Malawi to stop its support for RENAMO, presidents Machel, Mugabe and Kaunda went to Malawi to talk to President Banda and to exert pressure on him.

On his way back from this Lilongwe summit, Machel's plane crashed under suspicious circumstances inside South Africa. He was succeeded by Chissano. Later that year Malawi and Mozambique signed a treaty in which Banda promised to end his support for RENAMO, and in which it was agreed that the railway from Malawi across Mozambique to the Indian Ocean (the Nacala corridor) would be reopened. Nevertheless, before the agreement was signed, Malawi allowed thousands of RENAMO fighters to return to Mozambique. Subsequently, by early 1987, Malawian forces had to be deployed inside Mozambique to protect the newly opened Nacala railway from RENAMO sabotage.⁶

6.1.4 From Malawi to Rome

After its expulsion from Malawi in 1986, RENAMO activities increased in southern Mozambique, where it was easier to receive covert aid and supplies from South Africa. Nonetheless, it was left to its own devices to a great extent. As a consequence, RENAMO was no longer controlled by outside parties. Moreover, it was forced to further transform itself from a military into a political organisation in order to gain more support amongst the Mozambican population.⁷

By 1987, both FRELIMO and RENAMO started to feel the costs of the conflict. In that year, RENAMO offered to start talks with FRELIMO, but the latter argued that an organisation that committed atrocities could not be an interlocutor. At the same time, major changes were taking place in the international arena. The Cold War was coming to an end and the tide was also turning in South Africa. Subsequently, Pretoria became interested in more friendly relations with its neighbours, and South African security organisations that were involved in supporting RENAMO were constrained. In addition, Zimbabwe also started to feel the pain of RENAMO attacks and its involvement in the conflict.⁸

At a party congress in 1989, the RENAMO leader Dhlakama repeated his offer to start talks. At the same time, FRELIMO was pushed by its donors, such as the World Bank and the IMF, to start negotiations. In 1990 the party officially abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology and adopted a new constitution, ending one-party rule and facilitating the organisation of multi-party elections. In the meantime, the church took on an important role in the further peace process of Mozambique and convinced the parties that peace talks might be a better solution than continuing the fight. In 1989 Chissano allowed religious leaders to visit the heads of RENAMO in order 'to establish who they were, and what their aims and intentions were'. In addition, he requested Kenyan president Arap Moi and the Zimbabwean president Mugabe to function as intermediaries. The first indirect contacts were established in August 1989 in Nairobi. Both parties wanted to continue their talks, but RENAMO lost faith in Mugabe. Subsequently, the Sant'Egidio Community, a Rome based catholic organisation, jumped in and became the new intermediary.⁹

6.1.5 The negotiations and the General Peace Agreement (GPA)

The negotiating process to end the conflict in Mozambique was the product of a skilled balancing act on the part of its Italian mediators. Initially the talks were kept secret so as not to raise too high expectations and because scepticism was high both amongst Mozambicans and actors in the international arena. Moreover, it was hoped that this way would not exert too much outside pressure on the parties, leaving them to determine the pace of the process. The United Nations

were only represented from the second half of 1992 by a monitor, who kept the secretariat informed of the progress made¹⁰

The first phase of negotiations started on 8 July 1990 in Rome at the Sant'Egidio Community. It concluded on 1 December 1990 with the agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO that the Zimbabwean forces were to be concentrated in the Beira and the Limpopo corridors and that a cease-fire was to be imposed in these corridors¹¹

The second phase of negotiations was characterised by a collapse of momentum. It seemed that both parties had not yet written off the military solution and attempted to use victories on the battlefield to gain at the negotiating table. The result was that the Joint Verification Commission on the cease-fire in the corridors was loaded with complaints of violations. The only result during this phase was the 'agreed agenda' of May 1991. On the battlefield, the FAM became more effective in opposing RENAMO by gaining support amongst small farmers. It was further aided by the emergence of the *naparama* militia, who were followers of Antonio, a warrior priest who claimed to be immune to the bullets of RENAMO. As a result, RENAMO quickly lost ground. In order to preserve RENAMO from further losses, Dhlakama decided to leave the negotiations in order to personally lead the struggle against the *naparama* militia. Only after Antonio was killed and the stalemate returned at the end of 1991 did Dhlakama return to the peace process.¹²

During the third phase, which started in October 1991, pressure grew on Dhlakama to arrive at an agreement. In other parts of southern Africa, such as Angola, parties were also working towards peace. The drought brought RENAMO and the FRELIMO government further to the edge of collapse. An observer remarked that the drought "effectively moved the conflict from a stalemate to a 'hurting stalemate'."¹³ Three protocols were signed during this phase. The first protocol included "the fundamental principles", in which it was agreed that the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was to be supervised by the United Nations. The third protocol called for United Nations' assistance with regard to the electoral process. However, there was continued reluctance to put further cease-fire and demobilisation on the agenda and there was no sign of any further progress.¹⁴

The whole process only gained real momentum in the fourth and final phase, after May 1992. In a joint declaration in August 1992, FRELIMO and RENAMO reaffirmed the role of the United Nations in monitoring and guaranteeing the GPA and in particular the cease-fire and the electoral process. The United Nations secretariat in New York, however, remained hesitant. It was afraid of another large expensive operation, because it feared 'overstretch'. It dreaded 'overcommitment', but regarded a mission to Mozambique to be 'unavoidable'.¹⁵ Moreover, the negotiations began to falter in their final stages. Several disagreements remained until just before the agreements were signed. At the same time, the humanitarian situation was beginning to deteriorate. Still, RENAMO refused to open land routes to the areas under its control for relief operations. It feared that the FAM would abuse these routes for military operations. Nonetheless, both parties came to realise that if they did not make peace there would be no-one left to govern, as the drought led to mass starvation. On 4 October 1992 the GPA was signed in Rome. It consisted of seven protocols and four additional documents. It provided for a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which was to complete the peace process within one year (see table 9). This timetable was actually considered beforehand to be unrealistic.¹⁶

The GPA provided for the establishment of several commissions to implement the agreement. Four of them were to be presided over by the United Nations and to consist of both RENAMO and FRELIMO, as well as third countries. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was to supervise and monitor the implementation of the GPA and all other commissions functioned under its direct authority. The Cease-fire Commission (CCF) was to implement the demobilisation process, to verify the cease-fire and if necessary to investigate alleged violations. The Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAC) was to supervise and co-ordinate the distribution of humanitarian aid. The Reintegration Commission (CORE) was to effect the social and economic reintegration of the demobilised soldiers. Its structure was similar to the other three commissions, with the exception that representatives of international organisations were also members. In addition to these four, several other commissions were established in the GPA, in which the United Nations was not requested to take part: the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), the National Information Commission (COMINFO), the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), the National Elections Commission (CNE), and the National Commission on Administration (CNA). During the peace process, however, ONUMOZ was also requested to take on the chairmanship of the CCFADM.¹⁷

Table 9 – ONUMOZ’s mandate

<i>Political affairs:</i>	to facilitate the impartial implementation of the GPA.
<i>Electoral affairs:</i>	to provide technical assistance for and to monitor the electoral process.
<i>Military affairs:</i>	to monitor and verify the withdrawal of the foreign forces present in Mozambique; to monitor and verify the cease-fire, and the demobilisation and disarmament processes; to monitor and verify the disbanding of irregular armed groups; to authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and to provide security to United Nations and other international personnel.
<i>Humanitarian affairs:</i>	to co-ordinate and monitor all humanitarian operations, particularly those relating to refugees, IDPs, demobilised soldiers and the local war-affected population.


Source: UNDOC S/24635, General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 8 October 1992; and UN DOC S/24892, Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, 3 December 1992, 18.

6.2 Portrayal of the parties

The Mozambican conflict can be subdivided into three levels: Mozambican, regional, and global levels. At the time of the GPA, at the Mozambican level the conflicting parties were on the one side - the *Frente da Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and on the other side the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO). At the regional level of the Mozambican conflict, FRELIMO was aided by the frontline states of Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Malawi, while RENAMO was supported by South Africa. At the global level, the Soviet Union opposed the United States. (see Figure 5)

6.2.1 Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)

The history of FRELIMO proved it was open to major policy changes, without major changes in its leadership. As a consequence, during the 1980s under president Chissano FRELIMO had been able to turn away from its socialist policies and towards the Western world. After it accepted a free market economy and democracy it was preferred by many in the international arena above RENAMO, because the latter party was often pictured as the ‘brutal tool’ of Rhodesia and South Africa. However, these changes had not come easily and during the peace negotiations there was still strong vocal internal opposition to Chissano’s reforms. It was even feared that the left wing of the party might break away and form its own communist party. Nonetheless, also when in 1991 a right wing abortive coup was reported, FRELIMO remained a unified and stable party.¹⁸



Following independence, FRELIMO had turned its guerrilla army into a conventional one in order to face the military threat of Rhodesia. These *Forças Armadas de Moçambique* (FAM) subsequently had difficulty adapting to RENAMO’s effective guerrilla strategy of the 1980s. The FAM proved to be too

poorly trained and armed and too inexperienced to fight the guerrilla opposition effectively. In addition, the morale of its soldiers waned during the conflict, not only due to the fact that they were badly paid, but also because the logistics of the FAM were so bad that it was often unable to ship ammunition and food to operational areas. The concentration of its troops was often so low that individual forces felt isolated and vulnerable. As a consequence, at the time of the GPA, it was estimated that the FAM consisted of 72,000 forces who were not very motivated.¹⁹

FRELIMO preferred a small United Nations operation that was not too powerful. During the presence of ONUMOZ, it often argued that as the government of Mozambique it was to be treated as a member of the United Nations and not a Security Council protectorate. In spite of its doubts, several factors contributed to FRELIMO's decision to sign the GPA. First, regional support waned. Tanzania had already withdrawn its forces from Mozambique in 1988 and Zimbabwe wanted to do the same. Second, the poor morale of the FAM, which resulted in violent protests, mutiny and looting at the time of the GPA. Thirdly, Soviet military and economic aid, and therefore the capacity to continue the conflict, was severely curtailed after 1990.²⁰

6.2.2 Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)

Although during the first half of the 1980s RENAMO's military strategy had been one of terror, it changed its tactics during the second half of the 1980s, when it had to survive within Mozambique's borders. Armed camps were established, which were supported by the population from villages in the vicinity and 'captured' people who formed a sort of workforce. RENAMO slowly gained control over large areas in Mozambique. At the time of the GPA, it was estimated that RENAMO consisted of 20,000 forces.²¹ The fact that many soldiers remained loyal to RENAMO after the signing of the GPA and the elections, proves that terror and intimidation were not the only factors that made the organisation function.²²

RENAMO was supported abroad by a wide variety of right-wing organisations in the West, who often pictured RENAMO fighters as god-fearing anti-Communists, who carried their bibles into battle. Parts of the Malawian and South African establishment also supported the organisation. In addition, the Kenyan government started to aid RENAMO in the late 1980s. However, international support for RENAMO was severely reduced after the widely published accusation that it had massacred 400 inhabitants of the town of Homoine in July 1987. Negative accounts in a 1988 report commissioned by the US Department of State further worsened RENAMO's position within Washington.²³

It was often said that the coherence of RENAMO was low and that its leader Dhlakama did not have much authority within the party. However, by 1989 he had reorganised his organisation and addressed the tensions between the Mozambican leaders and the overseas representatives of RENAMO by sacking the latter for being disloyal. His authority proved to be high afterwards, amongst other things because the negotiation process for the GPA was highly dependent on him. For example, RENAMO negotiators in Maputo were not allowed to make any major decisions independently. Before Dhlakama moved to Maputo, relatively late during the presence of ONUMOZ, this dependency was to stir up irritation amongst diplomats and UN officials because they had to fly frequently to Dhlakama's headquarters in the interior of Mozambique, in Maringue. Later, after ONUMOZ had left, RENAMO

proved not to be as stable as it had hoped. Dhlakama was not able to keep all his party members inside and internal tension led to a split in 2000.²⁴

During the negotiating process, RENAMO had hoped for a Cambodian style peacekeeping operation with extensive political and administrative powers. Nonetheless, the best the United Nations could offer was the impartial chairmanship of the Commissions set up in the GPA, because the other options were deemed too expensive. In the GPA, in return for the privileges of political parties provided by law, RENAMO agreed to transform itself into a political party. Although it was not fully convinced of the benefits of the peace process, it signed the agreement as a result of international pressure, the concessions of FRELIMO and the humanitarian disaster in the countryside caused by drought. It was the drought in particular that threatened to challenge the support for RENAMO because the population increasingly realised that whoever it was they supported, they were in fact the main victims of the conflict.²⁵

6.2.3 South Africa

Although after the Nkomati Agreement in 1984, it was no longer an official South African policy to aid RENAMO, the Pretoria central government had done nothing to stop those branches of the South African security services from continuing their support. However, from 1988, and especially from 1989 when De Klerk came to power, the tide started to turn in South Africa. The ANC was no longer banned, and in 1994 the first democratic elections were held in South Africa. In the process, Pretoria became interested in more friendly contacts with its neighbours and subsequently relations with Mozambique changed for the better. Those security organisations that had supported RENAMO were curbed and agreements were signed on shared economic and military interests. The South African Foreign Minister Botha became closely associated with the peace process in Mozambique as did president Mandela later on.²⁶

6.2.4 Zimbabwe

Harare was one of FRELIMO's main allies. Since 1982 Zimbabwean forces had protected the Beira Corridor against RENAMO assaults. This rail and port link was regarded to be of vital importance to Zimbabwe, as it connected the landlocked country with the Indian Ocean. In addition, Zimbabwean forces were involved in both training FRELIMO forces and in joint operations with the FAM against RENAMO. In some cases the Zimbabwean forces were even the deciding factor, because they were better trained and better equipped than the FAM. By 1987, the costs for Zimbabwe were estimated to be as high as 1 million US dollars per day. However, the support and presence of 20,000 Zimbabwean soldiers in Mozambique became the object of growing criticism in Zimbabwe. Their efficacy was questioned as the costs were high and the RENAMO incursions into Zimbabwe affected Zimbabwean solidarity. As a result, at the end of the 1980s, Zimbabwe started to encourage peace talks in order to be able to withdraw. Mugabe established contact with RENAMO and facilitated talks between the two Mozambican parties. In the end, the last Zimbabwean forces were withdrawn during the presence of ONUMOZ.²⁷

6.2.5 Malawi

Up to 1987 Malawi co-operated intensely with Pretoria and was, according to some, reduced to a voluntary satellite of the apartheid regime. President Banda

allowed RENAMO to establish bases in Malawi and South Africa to support the movement. The reasons for Malawi's support to South Africa and RENAMO can be sought in both the fact that its economy was highly dependent on South Africa, and the claim of Banda that most of northern Mozambique belonged to the historically greater-Malawian empire. As a consequence of this support, Malawi was politically isolated within the region, while its economy suffered from RENAMO attacks on the Nacala corridor in Mozambique. This Nacala corridor was of vital importance to Malawi as it connected the landlocked country with the Indian Ocean. By 1987, pressure from the frontline states forced Malawi to break with its pro-South African foreign policy. From that moment on, Malawi even deployed forces inside Mozambique to protect the Nacala corridor. Nonetheless, throughout its presence in Mozambique, the Malawian army had little impact on the outcome of the conflict. In the end, it withdrew during the ONUMOZ presence.²⁸

6.2.6 Tanzania

During the war of independence, FRELIMO was already strongly supported by Tanzania. After independence, the friendship continued on a strong footing. From 1983 to 1988 Tanzanian forces were involved in joint operations with FRELIMO against RENAMO in northern Mozambique. These Tanzanian forces were not as well trained as the Zimbabweans and there were also fewer of them. In addition, Tanzania trained FRELIMO forces.²⁹

6.2.7 United States

In spite of the Reagan doctrine, according to which the United States was obliged to support those who fought Soviet expansion in the third world, RENAMO was the only anti-Communist rebel organisation that was not aided by Washington. The policy of the State Department towards the FRELIMO government was mainly one of economic pressure, while RENAMO was kept at a distance, in the hope that Mozambique could be tempted out of the Soviet bloc into a more non-aligned policy. At the same time, however, RENAMO was permitted to open an office in Washington, which allowed it to win the support and funds of conservative Christian organisations. After the negative publicity on RENAMO in 1987-1988, the right wing American organisations and senators also distanced themselves from it. Washington had already been an important force behind the Nkomati Agreement, but also played a valuable role during the negotiations for the GPA.³⁰

6.2.8 Soviet Union

Until 1989 the Soviet Union was the main provider of military aid and training to FRELIMO. Nonetheless, it never assisted FRELIMO to the extent that it aided comparable governments. Moscow had feared the Maoist tendencies in FRELIMO's ideology, which had been present until 1975. In addition, Mozambique was not thought to be as useful in geopolitical and economic terms as Angola. Not only did Mozambique lack resources, but it was also considered to be located on the stronger flank of the South African defence. However, Moscow still repeatedly requested a military base on Mozambican soil, but Maputo consistently declined. After 1989, Soviet aid was severely reduced as a result of the policy changes under Gorbachev. This contributed to FRELIMO's understanding that a military solution to the conflict was practically impossible.³¹

6.3 History of a peacekeeping operation

6.3.1 *The slow deployment of ONUMOZ and problems arise*

Immediately after the GPA had been signed, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, informed the Security Council and proposed a token force of observers to verify the cease-fire until the establishment of ONUMOZ. On 13 October 1992, the Security Council, in resolution 782 (1992), approved this plan. Two days after the GPA came into force, the newly appointed interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique, the Italian Ajello, and his team of military advisors, arrived in Mozambique. They immediately encountered a number of problems. Firstly, the parties were not able to agree on the membership of the commissions that were to be set up to implement the GPA. Additionally, RENAMO argued that it had not received logistical support from FRELIMO to move its headquarters to Maputo. As a result, its representatives did not arrive in Maputo and consequently the establishment of the commissions was delayed even further. It was not until November that the parties agreed on these modalities.³²

In December 1992, the Secretary-General determined that ONUMOZ was to consist of a Military Component, a Civilian Police Component, an Electoral Component, an Administrative Component, and an Office for the United Nations Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC). The objective of these components was to implement the mandate of ONUMOZ given in the GPA. Within two weeks the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and decided to establish ONUMOZ. The operation was to be led by Ajello, who became the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.³¹ At the same time, the Donors Conference for Mozambique was held in Rome, at which the sum of 450 million dollars was pledged.³⁴ At the follow-up Donors Conference in Maputo on 8 and 9 June 1993, another 70 million dollars were pledged.³⁵

In the meantime, the situation in Mozambique had deteriorated. The parties accused each other of violating the cease-fire. Moreover, RENAMO did not want to demobilise before the United Nations forces had arrived to replace the Zimbabwean troops that protected the Beira corridor. Since FRELIMO preferred a small UN operation and opposed any expansion of the ONUMOZ mandate, as it was thought to impede Mozambican sovereignty, it initially opposed the early deployment of Italian troops in the corridor. This, in turn, led RENAMO to state that it was not going to demobilise until 65 percent of the UN forces were actually present.³⁶

The situation continued to worsen when the deployment of ONUMOZ turned out to be slow. RENAMO felt insecure for a number of different reasons. Firstly, it was not agreed in the GPA that the FRELIMO police force would be controlled. Secondly, RENAMO claimed that FRELIMO was able to use development aid, which was not monitored under the GPA either, to reinforce its army. Thirdly, RENAMO argued that, because of the late deployment of ONUMOZ, the timetable for the peace process had to be amended in order to allow free and fair elections to take place. Dhlakama threatened not to take part in the elections if these problems were not solved.³⁷ At the same time, FRELIMO referred to the letter of the GPA arguing that *pacta sunt servanda* and that RENAMO attempted to go beyond the spirit of the agreement.³⁸ Additionally, it also accused the United Nations of a tendency to expand the size and mandate of ONUMOZ.³⁹

The slow deployment of ONUMOZ was, according to the Secretary-General, caused by administrative delays. Firstly, budget approval was slow in coming and only a

limited advance of 9.5 million US dollars was provided. As a consequence, the purchase of equipment and recruitment of personnel was delayed. Secondly, although it was agreed that office space and other basic services were to be provided to the United Nations without cost, ONUMOZ eventually had to negotiate on the open market. Thirdly, the signing of the status-of-forces agreement was held up. Fourthly, many of the timetables in the GPA proved to be totally unrealistic.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, these and other bureaucratic shortcomings were largely camouflaged as the parties were not actually ready to proceed with the peace process. From March to June 1993 RENAMO refused to be represented in Maputo. The main contested issues were accommodation for the RENAMO delegation and the funds for the party.⁴¹

6.3.2 Light at the end of the tunnel?

In April 1993, the Security Council hoped to lend additional momentum to the peace process and ONUMOZ. In resolution 818(1993), the Council called upon the parties to co-operate both with each other as well as with ONUMOZ, and upon the United Nations to further accelerate its deployment. By May 1993 funds were established to finance RENAMO's accommodation. Moreover, at the end of May all commissions as agreed to in the GPA were operational. Although RENAMO still obstructed political, social and cultural activities of FRELIMO on its territory, the FRELIMO and RENAMO leaders did agree to meet and light could be seen at the end of the tunnel. From July onwards the commissions started to get together on a regular basis and the peace process gained momentum. Part of the solution was the expansion of the ONUMOZ mandate through Security Council resolution 850 (1993) in which it was agreed that the elections would be postponed and that ONUMOZ was to assist with the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) (see table 10). In August there was a series of meetings between the leaders of RENAMO and FRELIMO at which the outstanding problems were discussed. This resulted, in September, in two major agreements which dealt with, amongst other things, the reintegration of RENAMO-controlled zones into the state administration of FRELIMO and a United Nations civil police monitoring task. The Security Council responded with resolution 863 (1993) that requested the Secretary-General to examine the possibilities.⁴²

Table 10 – First expansion of the ONUMOZ mandate

- To chair the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, and to provide effective secretariat services, on the strict understanding that this would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing the new armed forces.

Source: UNDOC S/26034, 30 June 1993, 10-11 and 26; and UN DOC S/RES/850 (1993), 9 July 1993.

Nonetheless, the parties were unable to agree on the composition of the commissions needed to implement the agreements on administration and the police. Furthermore, with regard to the formalities and new timetable for the demobilisation process, the new election law, and the composition of several important commissions, the parties were not able to break the impasse. Once again the negotiations became deadlocked.⁴³ When the Special Representative of

the Secretary-General set out his new timetable, the RENAMO delegation left Maputo. In August, Ajello accused both parties of “playing stupid games.”⁴⁴

6.3.3 *There seems to be a turn for the better*

At meetings with the Secretary-General, during his visit to Maputo in October 1993, Dhlakama and Chissano managed to overcome their differences and a new momentum was set in motion. Several agreements were reached and a new timetable for the peace process was also approved. In exchange, Dhlakama received extra funds. To prevent further delays and to maintain the pressure, the Security Council decided that although it extended the mandate of ONUMOZ, every three months it was to review whether the parties had made sufficient progress to continue the presence of ONUMOZ. In addition, the Security Council, through resolution 882 (1993), mandated ONUMOZ to deploy 128 civilian police officers as a contingency measure, until the Secretary-General submitted a further report on the possibilities of a UN civilian police monitoring task. The peace process seemed to be back on track; Dhlakama moved to Maputo and, in contrast to the period before, he met Chissano on numerous occasions. With the start of demobilisation, the peace process entered into a new phase, although several problems still remained.⁴⁵

In February 1994, in resolution 898 (1994), the Security Council approved the establishment of a Civilian Police Component, while at the same time keeping a hand on the purse strings (see table 11). It linked the police deployment with the drawdown of the number of military personnel “without prejudice to the effective discharge of its mandate.”⁴⁶ In this way, the Security Council aimed to prevent the costs of ONUMOZ from increasing. A little later, it was determined that the elections were to be held on 27 and 28 October 1994. Reluctantly, the Secretary-General implemented the will of the Security Council and performed his tasks with regard to the drawdown of forces. This reluctance was not unfounded since the situation continued to be unstable. The Security Council still had to urge the parties in resolution 916(1994) to co-operate with ONUMOZ and to allow the Civilian Police Component, as well as all political parties, access to all areas under their control.⁴⁷

Table 11 – Second expansion of the ONUMOZ mandate

- To monitor all police activities in the country, including those of PRM and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions are fully consistent with the general peace agreement.

Source: UNDOC S/1994/89/Add.1, 28 January 1994, 9-18; and UN DOC S/RES/898 (1994), 23 February 1994.

Although the peace process progressed, its outcome was far from decided. FRELIMO felt unfairly blamed for the problems, and argued that ONUMOZ was “acting as if its mission was to control and demand everything from the Government, and not to monitor the implementation of the GPA by the parties.” It warned that: “making unilateral demands and putting substantial pressure on the Government, while ignoring RENAMO’s non-compliance, can seriously jeopardize the peace process.”⁴⁸ As a reaction to the continued instability, the Security Council decided to send a mission to Mozambique in August 1994. This mission discussed with the parties how the full implementation of the GPA could be

guaranteed, and how the implementation could take place in good time. The mission noticed “a certain amount of friction between the Government and ONUMOZ.” It concluded that “ONUMOZ’ energy has lent it a high profile and led to some resentment, to which it should remain sensitive.” This resentment found its origins in the pressure by ONUMOZ to realise its mandate in a timely fashion. However, FRELIMO perceived this as being “overlooked, unconsulted, and even blamed for delays.”⁴⁹ Nonetheless, relations improved again after the visit of the Security Council mission. At the end of August 1994, the peace process seemed to be back on track, as the demobilisation was nearing an end and the formation of the FADM was progressing. However, the security situation became an eminent problem.⁵⁰

6.3 4 Not all is clear, but elections continue

The parties continued to be hostile and the situation before the elections remained tense. Notwithstanding all the progress that had been made, the Secretary-General was concerned that the parties might take up arms again. Although both FRELIMO and RENAMO had committed themselves more than once to the peace process and to the results of the elections, he once again called upon them to remain peaceful and democratic, and to respect the result of the elections.⁵¹ It was obvious that the Secretary-General wanted to prevent a second Angola, where the parties had taken up arms again over contested election results, shortly before. These fears were not without foundation. On the eve of the elections, RENAMO announced it was no longer going to participate because, it argued, the elections were riddled with irregularities. Irrespective of the uncertain intentions of RENAMO, the elections went ahead and in effect the boycott only left some confusion on the first day of the elections. However, after this first election day, and following substantial international pressure and the provision of guarantees, Dhlakama decided to continue to participate in the elections, in spite of his reservations and complaints. To make up for the possible confusion caused by the boycott, the elections were extended by one day and lasted from 27 to 29 October 1994. The elections eventually took place in a relatively peaceful manner without too much disruption or irregularities. On 19 November, the CNE announced the results. Over 5.4 million Mozambicans had cast their vote, which amounted to some 90 percent of the total number of registered voters. Chissano received 53 percent of the votes and Dhlakama 34 percent. Of a total of 250 seats in the National Assembly of the Republic, FRELIMO won 129, RENAMO 109 and the União Democrática 12. In spite of complaints by RENAMO, all the parties finally accepted the results.⁵² The Special Representative of the Secretary-General declared the elections “free and fair” and the Security Council endorsed the results through resolution 960 (1994).⁵³

6.3 5 ONUMOZ leaves

In resolution 957 (1994) the Security Council extended the mandate of ONUMOZ until the new government was in place. The newly elected National Assembly was installed on 8 December 1994. The newly chosen president Chissano was inaugurated and he appointed his government on 16 December. Consequently, the mandate of ONUMOZ ended and ONUMOZ was to withdraw all its personnel before 31 January 1995. The withdrawal went according to plan. In the end the total costs of the operation were estimated to be at least 700 million US dollars.⁵⁴ The Secretary-General concluded that two years after the signing of the General Peace

Agreement, the ONUMOZ mandate had been accomplished, and the peace process in Mozambique had come to a successful conclusion. Although the ONUMOZ mandate ended, the United Nations remained in Mozambique through the presence of its specialised organisations and programmes. With these organisations and programmes, the United Nations hoped to continue to assist and strengthen the Mozambican reconstruction, its new democratic institutions, and social and economic integration.⁵⁵

6.4 The variables

6.4.1 *Negative peace*

After the expulsion of RENAMO from Malawi in 1986, its activities increased significantly in the Mozambican provinces that bordered Malawi. This was the start of the bloodiest period in the Mozambican conflict, during which violence against the civilian population became a strategic tool. Although FRELIMO propaganda displayed RENAMO as the African Khmer Rouge which terrorised the Mozambican countryside, FRELIMO's strategy was in fact just as destructive. RENAMO gained control of zones throughout the Mozambican countryside which amounted to 25 percent of the entire country. It was even able to make its presence felt in more than 80 percent of the country. FRELIMO was only in firm control of the major towns.⁵⁶ By 1990 a stalemate emerged on the battlefield. Subsequently, negotiations led in 1990 to a partial cease-fire, in which the Zimbabwean forces were confined to the Beira and Limpopo corridors. This agreement allowed RENAMO to move its forces to the northern transport corridors with Malawi and it reopened the front in the Gorongosa mountains. As a result, although the partial cease-fire generally held, the Tete corridor came under attack from RENAMO in early 1991. At the same time, the Naprama militia, which emerged late 1989 – early 1990, began to inflict heavy losses on RENAMO. By 1992 both FRELIMO and RENAMO were weakened and war weary, while a stalemate re-emerged on the battlefield following the death of the leader of the Naprama militia.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence *negative peace*:

- *Cease-fire monitoring*: The United Nations was mandated in the GPA to monitor and guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire. It was to participate in and preside over the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), which was to verify the cease-fire and if necessary to investigate alleged violations. Although the Secretary-General was aware that the viability of the cease-fire depended to a large extent on the first few days, he was only able to deploy a token force of 25 members during the initial phase before the establishment of ONUMOZ.⁵⁷ Moreover, the establishment of the CCF was delayed because the RENAMO delegation was not yet present in Maputo. Within a week once the cease-fire had come into force, both parties complained about violations. However, without the CCF being established, it was impossible to monitor the situation. Nevertheless, after these initial violations a period of restraint did start – something that had been unprecedented in the preceding 16 years.

As the deployment of the Military Component of ONUMOZ was slower than the parties expected, further momentum was lost. The delay resulted from the fact that FRELIMO hoped to obtain conditions that were different from the usual conditions in the status-of-forces agreement; there was also disagreement

amongst the parties about the troop contributing countries, and the delay also resulted from the fact that both the troop contributing countries and the United Nations administration were slow to react. Finally, by April 1993, the first contingent - an Italian advance battalion - was fully deployed and by May 1993 all infantry battalions were deployed - a total of up to 6,100 personnel. Effective monitoring of the cease-fire and investigation of alleged violations was only possible after July 1993 when the monitors were fully deployed.⁵⁸ All violations were investigated and the results were approved by the parties. The complaints that were investigated were relatively few and posed no serious threat to the peace process. In total 95 complaints were filed with the CCF. It conducted 125 inspections and resolved 419 incidents, such as disturbances by rebelling soldiers and mutiny.⁵⁹

Cease-fire monitoring made a positive contribution to *negative peace* because it guaranteed the security of the parties by providing transparency. Nonetheless, in spite of this contribution, three issues could possibly have impaired this result. Firstly, as already elaborated upon, notwithstanding the fact that the timetable was unrealistic, or in the words of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General it was "nonsense", the deployment of the Military Component was too slow.⁶⁰ Secondly, the quality of the battalions from developed countries in ONUMOZ was good, but the quality of several other battalions was questionable.⁶¹ Thirdly, it is also dubious why ONUMOZ was not allowed to verify all military bases and installations, and both parties refused access to some of them.⁶² Although the Military Component has also been criticised for being too large, it was better to be on the safe side during the first phase when mistrust and uncertainty were rife.⁶³ A large Component was needed to build confidence and to provide the parties with a guarantee that the United Nations was able to intervene should there be renewed conflict.⁶⁴ Only during the second phase, when confidence was built, could the size of the Military Component have been smaller.

- *Cantonment and demobilisation* The GPA mandated the United Nations to assist the CCF with the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilisation process, which was to lead to the demobilisation of at least 80 percent of the total number of troops. Those forces which were not demobilised were to be integrated into the new army, the FADM. When the GPA entered into force, it seemed that both RENAMO and FRELIMO were anxiously awaiting the demobilisation process. However, friction developed as FRELIMO claimed it had demobilised some 16,000 soldiers without verification before the signing of the Agreement.⁶⁵ Although, according to the GPA, the demobilisation was planned to start in mid-November 1992. The implementation of the process was held-up due to several local problems: the delayed establishment of the commissions, neither party provided the United Nations with lists of their numbers of soldiers and weapons, it was a long time before the parties agreed to the precise proceedings of the demobilisation process, the assembly areas chosen by the parties were not selected because of their logistical suitability, but because of their importance for territorial control and accordingly the location of these areas had to be changed as they were unsuitable and inaccessible, for security reasons RENAMO linked its demobilisation to the deployment of ONUMOZ and insisted that it was only going to demobilise when at least 65 percent of ONUMOZ had been deployed, RENAMO linked its co-operation with regard to the demobilisation process to

the monitoring of the civilian police, and the disarmament and verification of militia and paramilitary groups; RENAMO argued that it could not run the risk of transforming itself into a political party without the means of doing so and consequently wanted to have its funds for transformation before it reduced its military strength; and finally the demobilisation of child soldiers. These problems only camouflaged the fact that the deployment of ONUMOZ was slow.

Only in October 1993 did Dhlakama and Chissano agree on a new timetable and procedures for demobilisation. However, assembly areas were still opened late. Moreover, both parties shrank from assembling their best forces and sent their forces of lesser quality first. At the same time, the parties were reluctant to demobilise until they both had assembled in large numbers and therefore kept their troops waiting in the assembly areas. As a result, several RENAMO areas were overcrowded (almost 420 percent of its capacity at one camp), a situation which was further aggravated by the delayed selection of soldiers to be integrated into the FADM.⁶⁶ Moreover, there were food shortages because FRELIMO did not always honour the agreement to supply the assembly areas, and the World Food Programme had to provide aid. As a result, tension rose in several assembly areas as troops awaited demobilisation. Finally, by March 1994, the actual demobilisation started. The process itself proceeded smoothly from a technical point of view, although its pace remained far too slow. The parties agreed in April to accelerate the process by allowing the soldiers themselves to choose between demobilisation and integration into the FADM. Most forces chose the first option, and the number of soldiers to be demobilised increased. When subsequently FRELIMO failed to meet the timetable, the parties agreed that unassembled soldiers, who were still to register in the assembly areas, would be allowed to register and demobilise *in situ*. The demobilisation was largely concluded by the end of August. In the end, ONUMOZ monitored and verified the assembly and registration of approximately 92,000 troops and the demobilisation of 78,000 of them. Of the remainder, about 12,000 troops were integrated into the FADM.⁶⁷ Several instances of fraud and irregularities came to light and some minor complaints were investigated by CCF.⁶⁸

The demobilisation process faced four important problems. Firstly, the planning of the process was not always very realistic and those involved were not aware of the local Mozambican situation. Secondly, ONUMOZ was too slow when it came to preparing the process. Thirdly, ONUMOZ allowed too much fluctuation in the numbers the parties provided with respect to the soldiers they were to demobilise. Although the variation was not a cause for major concern to the United Nations, it gave rise to serious mistrust amongst the parties.⁶⁹ Fourthly, several monitors privately acknowledge that the parties withheld forces outside the demobilisation process as a hedge against future problems. Estimates ran up to 5,000 FRELIMO soldiers and 2,000 RENAMO soldiers.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, in the end the cantonment and demobilisation made a positive contribution to *negative peace*. This can be attributed to a large extent to the financial Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), which delayed open conflict and kept ex-combatants attached to the peace process, while peace was imposing itself on daily life.⁷¹

- *Disarmament*: The GPA provided ONUMOZ with the mandate to control the arms of the demobilised soldiers. The United Nations expected to obtain 0.3 to

0.5 million weapons from the parties.⁷² Nonetheless, neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO felt it was in their interest to disarm. To RENAMO disarmament meant that it would lose its main bargaining power, while FRELIMO was only willing to disarm if RENAMO did the same. In addition, FAM soldiers were unwilling to disarm until they had received their outstanding pay. Nonetheless, with the start of the demobilisation process in November 1993, the disarmament did start as well. However, disarmament soon faced the problem that both the quantity and quality of the weapons handed in were too low. Both RENAMO and FRELIMO were widely believed to have stockpiled weapons in secret caches as hedges for the future, because they did not trust the intentions of the other.⁷³ In addition, the speed of the process was too slow as a direct result of the delayed demobilisation process. Further delays occurred in the disarmament of militia and paramilitary groups, which largely stemmed from the fact that these forces were scattered throughout the country, which, in turn, made the operation logistically complex. Additionally, ONUMOZ was not allowed on several occasions to collect and disable the weapons of soldiers who had demobilised *in situ*. In the end, as a result of this and the lack of time, the CCF and ONUMOZ were unable to verify 40 percent of the known RENAMO arms caches.⁷⁴ However, at those verifications they were able to conduct in time, they found large quantities of undeclared weapons and ammunition. When ONUMOZ left, 189,827 weapons had been collected from both parties, militia and paramilitary groups.⁷⁵ In total, 744 locations were verified (498 FRELIMO and 246 RENAMO, 603 declared and 141 undeclared). They were unable to verify 130 of the known undeclared caches.⁷⁶ Although the United Nations offered to use a small team to complete the weapons verifications following the end of the ONUMOZ mandate, the new government declined the offer.

It was clear that the verification of arms caches had never been a priority to ONUMOZ and was always something that was subject to negotiation. Additionally, only a limited number of weapons was destroyed, and the remainder were handed over to the newly established Mozambican armed forces, the FADM. Moreover, if one compares the number of arms actually collected with the number of arms that had initially been estimated that there were to be collected, one may conclude that ONUMOZ was unable to collect all the weapons in the hands of the parties. It left this task to an uncertain future and consequently disarmament only made a limited positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Reintegration of ex-combatants* The Reintegration Commission (CORE) was established under the GPA to implement the social and economic reintegration of the demobilised soldiers. It consisted of representatives of other international organisations, FRELIMO, RENAMO, and invited countries, and was presided over by the United Nations. The establishment of the CORE was also delayed, but in the meantime UNOHAC had developed several plans which at the time of the establishment only needed approval. The focus of UNOHAC was on economic reintegration, based on the assumption that the social reintegration of ex-combatants was dependent on securing their livelihoods. However, the donor community hoped to widen the reintegration process to include refugees, IDPs and persons affected locally, in order to prevent reintegrated soldiers from becoming a privileged group. It was not until mid-1993 when the cantoned soldiers started looting and taking hostages that the

donors realised that without special programmes the ex-combatants could become a disruptive and destabilising factor. From that moment on, donors and other UN organisations allowed UNOHAC to target its assistance. UNOHAC focussed mostly on reintegration through training and employment. However, since the Mozambican economy did not have the capacity to absorb the thousands of ex-combatants, the government provided severance pay for these ex-soldiers.

The reintegration programme faced six problems. Firstly, the reintegration was underfunded and supplies were slow to arrive as many of the funds were not yet earmarked for this purpose and there was very little equipment and supplies inside Mozambique. Secondly, a lack of information and other obstacles in the RSS payment scheme were an enormous burden to some of the ex-combatants, especially after the departure of ONUMOZ when it was implemented by the Mozambican government. Thirdly, a lot of the promised follow-up training and assistance never materialised and the integrated approach of the reintegration programmes was lost after ONUMOZ left since the co-ordination shifted from the United Nations to the Mozambican government. Fourthly, the courses ONUMOZ gave, within the context of the Occupational Skills Development programme (OSD), were not sufficiently well-thought through and did not rely enough on local expertise and analyses. As a result, ex-combatants often learned skills which they could not implement in their villages. Fifthly, ONUMOZ's reintegration strategy did not take sufficient account of what it was the Mozambicans themselves wanted and was often criticised for its lack of attention to the social and cultural aspects of reintegration. Sixthly, commanders in some RENAMO areas had made unrealistic promises to their forces, and consequently the reintegration packages did not meet the expectations of some soldiers who subsequently refused to demobilise.

In spite of these problems, the reintegration made a positive contribution to *negative peace*. It was the RSS payments in particular that encouraged ex-combatants to demobilise. When ONUMOZ departed it had integrated approximately 200,000 ex-combatants and their dependants and returned them to where they had originally lived. In addition, in co-operation with NGOs, ONUMOZ also mainstreamed the child soldiers back into society and into school. After a while it was no longer possible to distinguish ex-combatants from other groups of Mozambicans. Nonetheless, the main positive contribution of the reintegration to *negative peace* is the fact that the soldiers were allowed to reintegrate wherever they wanted to and were actually transported there. As a consequence, soldiers dispersed and military lines were broken, making future reestablishment of such lines and the re-formation of an army much more problematic.

- *Institution building* Both the processes of the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), and the transformation of RENAMO into a political party intended to influence *negative peace*. The GPA did not give the United Nations a role in the formation of the FADM which was to take place at the same time as the demobilisation process. In total, 30,000 soldiers were to be absorbed in the new army, half of which were RENAMO and half FRELIMO. Nonetheless, as the demobilisation process was delayed and therefore the formation of the FADM was also kept waiting, the Secretary-General offered assistance to accelerate the process. In response, the parties agreed to give the

United Nations the mandate to chair the Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM). Although by the second half of 1993 both parties sent soldiers for training and integration into the FADM, the training programmes themselves were slow. Moreover, they were designed to train only 15,000 soldiers at the time of the elections, while according to the GPA, the FADM was to comprise 30,000 personnel. What was considered to be a potential security threat, was the scenario that not all the non-demobilised soldiers had been integrated into the FADM at the time of the elections. Nonetheless, in the end, the problem solved itself, when, in 1994, the parties decided to allow the soldiers themselves to choose between demobilisation or integration into the FADM. As most soldiers chose to be demobilised, it was impossible to recruit 30,000 personnel and the parties became prepared to continue with the elections regardless of the number of personnel of the FADM and hoped to recruit the remainder later. The formal transfer of authority, equipment and infrastructure from the former armies to the FADM started in mid-July 1994 and was completed by mid-August. At the end of its mandate, ONUMOZ had assisted with the integration of close to 12,000 forces into the FADM.⁷⁷ The creation of the FADM made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

With regard to the transformation of RENAMO from a military into a political organisation, the GPA mandated the Mozambican government to seek international assistance to help RENAMO. A trust fund established by the United Nations proved to be insufficient for the purpose and by November 1993 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General arranged additional payments. Every month Dhlakama received 300,000 US dollars on condition that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had certified that RENAMO was not blocking the peace process. These expenditures did, however, not flow through United Nations channels because the secretariat did not want to offend FRELIMO and neither did it want to create a precedent.⁷⁸ In total Dhlakama received 3.9 million US dollars in this way.⁷⁹ The funds served as the carrots to keep RENAMO in the peace process and ensured its co-operation and consequently made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Diplomacy*: ONUMOZ was mandated in the GPA to take up chairmanship of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was to settle possible disputes between the parties. During the period that the establishment of the commission was still delayed, several informal meetings between RENAMO and FRELIMO were held to prevent further escalation of the cease-fire violations. Within the context of these talks, mediated by the interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the violations were dealt with and the parties agreed to establish the commissions. Although the CCF and CCFADM became forums for day-to-day monitoring and problem solving, and proved to be very helpful in keeping up the dialogue, by April 1993 further mechanisms were needed. Therefore, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General established informal tripartite working meetings on both political and military matters and from 1993 brokered a series of high level meetings between the leaders of RENAMO and FRELIMO, which dealt with the outstanding problems. Furthermore, the involvement of the Secretary-General through his meetings with the leaders of the parties in October 1993 proved to be essential to regain momentum in the peace process and to overcome differences. In addition, international diplomatic pressure on the parties was a key factor in pushing

them towards compliance. In addition to the Security Council resolutions, the Security Council Mission to Mozambique proved to be essential in stressing to the interlocutors the necessity of co-operation both with ONUMOZ and each other. Diplomatic pressure in particular was used to stress the importance of timely and full demobilisation, and it was also used to persuade those involved not to derail the elections and to stay within the peace process. Eventually, this pressure exerted on RENAMO by the Security Council, the ambassadors of individual countries and donors in the CSC, and the Secretary-General was very likely decisive, because Dhlakama decided, in spite of his reservations and complaints, to continue to take part in the elections.⁸⁰ In the end, ONUMOZ played an important role as a mediator in bridging the differences in the interpretation of the implementation of the accord, but only because the Mozambicans themselves wanted peace. Eventually, RENAMO was kept in the peace process through a combination of pressure and understanding. As a consequence, diplomacy prevented a relapse into conflict and therefore made a positive contribution towards *negative peace*.

- *Verification of foreign forces withdrawal*: The GPA mandated the CCF and ONUMOZ to supervise the withdrawal of the foreign (Zimbabwean and Malawian) forces from Mozambican territory, which had to be finished before mid-November 1992. Due to the delayed establishment of the CCF, a reconnaissance team consisting of observers had to be dispatched to verify the Zimbabwean withdrawal, which started within a week after the GPA entered into force. However, the withdrawal was halted because, as a result of ONUMOZ's slow deployment, a power vacuum was expected in the corridors if the Zimbabwean and Malawian forces were to leave according to schedule. Both parties agreed that the forces were to remain in Mozambique to protect the corridors for the purpose of humanitarian aid. By May 1993, ONUMOZ reached its full deployment making the foreign forces no longer a necessity and subsequently Zimbabwe and Malawi withdrew their forces. The verification by ONUMOZ of this withdrawal of the foreign forces made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.
- *Civilian police monitoring*: The GPA provided for the establishment of a National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), which was to verify that the actions of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) did not violate the legal order or the political rights of citizens. According to the GPA, ONUMOZ was not a member of this commission and had no civilian police role. As the deployment of ONUMOZ did not start until 1993, and RENAMO itself blocked supervision through the establishment of the COMPOL, RENAMO started to feel insecure. It claimed that FRELIMO had demobilised 15,000 soldiers and integrated them, together with 3,000 members of the security police, into the PRM police force.⁸¹ With the agreements of September 1993 between Dhlakama and Chissano, the United Nations was invited to send a civilian police contingent to monitor all police activities in Mozambique. In mid-October, Dhlakama even briefly linked the deployment of civilian police monitors directly to RENAMO's co-operation in the demobilisation process.⁸² During the visit of the Secretary-General to Mozambique in October 1993, the parties reached an agreement on the composition of COMPOL, after which the commission was finally established. Subsequently, the mandate of ONUMOZ was expanded to include the deployment of 128 civilian police officers as a contingency measure, and again later to include a Civilian Police Component

consisting of 1144 personnel. The Component was mandated to monitor all police activities in the country, including all the actions of private protection and security agencies. The deployment of the civilian police monitors went according to schedule, although the establishment in the outposts of Mozambique was delayed for logistical reasons. In spite of the fact that the monitors were not always allowed to visit all police units and installations and they did not monitor actively but merely visited police stations at regular times, they gave RENAMO a more secure feeling and built confidence. As a consequence, civilian police monitoring made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

During the presence of ONUMOZ, the conflict was ended and transferred to the political arena. After it left, the situation remained calm and peaceful. Both parties lacked the army structures needed for organised conflict and the national army was no longer willing to choose sides and fight. Nonetheless, RENAMO was not fully transformed and demilitarised into a political party. It still had soldiers or 'bodyguards' on its payroll and it still controlled many hidden arms. However, both issues increasingly became a burden from the past when RENAMO deemed it necessary to maintain them out of mistrust of FRELIMO and fear of losing power. The remaining bodyguards were not easily discharged because then RENAMO would lose support and the weapons were kept for sale.⁸³ Monitors did not expect the renewal of conflict, but they argued that social unrest was more likely to become violent in Mozambique than in other countries because there were still many small arms in circulation.⁸⁴ Indeed, social unrest increased every once in a while and came to a climax in 2000 when several RENAMO supporters were killed when they tried to free a companion from jail and more than 40 people were killed after some local authorities decided to put down demonstrations organised by RENAMO.

6.4.2 *Inter-group relations*

Three issues were important with regard to *inter-group relations*: ethnic/geographic divisions, the policies of FRELIMO, and unequal income distribution. With regard to ethnic/geographic divisions, although the Mozambican population is made up of various ethnic groups with distinct languages and traditions, ethnic rivalries did not play a major role in the conflict. The division between the supporters of FRELIMO and RENAMO was much more along regional lines: the northern, central and southern provinces. FRELIMO, however, described the divisions in Mozambique in terms of class differences and failed to recognise the geographic divisions. At the same time, in the eyes of many, FRELIMO was a southern organisation, dominated by the Shagane, an ethnic group who tried to establish southern dominance over the rest of Mozambique.⁸⁵ With regard to the policies of FRELIMO, it attempted after independence to combat the existing divisions with a policy of 'social integration'. Mozambique was to become one nation, and the national language - Portuguese, and the expression of ethnicity was discouraged. Furthermore, old chiefs, elders' tribunals and churches lost their influence. Moreover, FRELIMO's social-economic policy affected many small farmers, who constituted 80 percent of the population. They lost their land, which they had gained from the Portuguese, again to the socialist policies. The resentment of the small farmers, the religious and traditional leaders, and the many groups opposed and hindered by the social revolution of FRELIMO proved to be fertile ground for RENAMO, which became their champion. Nonetheless, by the

time of the GPA, FRELIMO had abandoned its socialist policies, rendering the fight against it no longer necessary. With regard to unequal income distribution, despite the fact that FRELIMO was a socialist government, this was a problem: 65 percent of households earned 25 percent of the income and the top 5 percent earned nearly 50 percent of the total income. In addition, the situation of the poorest strata of society, those employed in agriculture and urban dwellers worsened.⁸⁶ During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence *inter-group relations*:

- *Humanitarian aid*: Since aid was provided without consideration of the political coloration of the beneficiary, the former belligerents were forced to sit at the same table and reunify and reconcile. UNOHAC attempted to transform humanitarian aid into a pro-active tool for reconciliation and became the broker of concrete problems which had to be solved. As a result, communication channels between the parties were opened and cultivated and confidence was slowly built at local and provincial levels. Unfortunately, at the national level the gap between the parties remained too great. At the same time, humanitarian aid also had negative effects as it contributed to income polarisation, especially between urban and rural areas.⁸⁷ As a result of a lack of targeting, only a minority of people benefited greatly from the aid provided, while the majority of the population continued to be impoverished. As a consequence, humanitarian aid made an unexpectedly positive and negative contribution to *inter-group relations*.

Although ONUMOZ did not play a major part in reconciliation, when it left, the basic conditions were created for reconciliation to take place. Traditional cleansing and purification ceremonies helped to clear people of the deeds committed in their past and as a consequence they could no longer be accused of what they had done. These ceremonies not only helped the population in the villages to reconcile with their own history, but also with that of others.⁸⁸ The Mozambican leaders were less reconciled and had not yet found an alternative, less confronting political discourse. Both RENAMO and FRELIMO still distrusted each other and argued that although on paper they were reconciled, in practice they were not.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, there was less friction between the parties than their bellicose statements suggested. Their economic and social strategies were, to some extent, identical in that they plagiarised or claimed to plagiarise each other.⁹⁰

Once the United Nations had left, economic growth continued to be concentrated in the southern part of the country and mainly in the towns (Maputo). This region benefited most from foreign investments, which resulted mainly from decisions made by companies and not by the government. Nonetheless, they influenced the relationship between the north and south of Mozambique to the extent that Prime Minister Mocumbi warned that the "social inequalities and regional asymmetry could endanger the climate of peace, calm and social harmony."⁹¹ RENAMO continued to argue that FRELIMO favoured the south. However, since poverty was mainly concentrated in the rural areas both in the north and south, and the urban poor were better off than the rural poor, the north-south divide was rather subjective and the urban-rural divide more objective. Even so, this urban-rural gap was closing.⁹²

6 4 3 *Group demography*

The availability of food in Mozambique suffered as a consequence of the armed conflict and drought. The Secretary-General launched four international appeals to support Mozambique between 1987 and 1992 and a United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO) was present. However, the situation deteriorated even further as a result of the 1991-1992 droughts and failed harvests. Consequently, the estimated number of Mozambicans who were dependent on food relief grew from 1.8 million to 3.1 million at the time of the signing of the GPA.⁹³ The number of Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries rose to 1.8 million.⁹⁴ The number of IDPs was estimated to amount to some 3,700,000 at the time of the GPA.⁹⁵ These IDPs resulted in considerable and ever increasing pressure on the Beira and Limpopo corridors, the coastal regions and the urban centres. The IDP movements to the towns had caused rapid urbanisation and placed serious pressure on the urban infrastructure, housing institutions and social networks. With too many people on too little land, the excess population was forced to engage in marginal or semi-legal activities and the number of social conflicts increased. Rural areas also suffered from demographic problems. Although nearly all rural households had at least one plot of land and many farmers had unsold surpluses, these plots were small and the yields low. Moreover, in spite of the fact that of a total land area of 789,000 square kilometres, 45 percent was considered suitable for agriculture, and only 4 percent of Mozambique was used for that purpose.⁹⁶ In addition, fertile land with access to infrastructure was scarce. The presence of mines further intensified the pressure.

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence *group demography*.

- *Humanitarian aid* Humanitarian assistance provided temporary relief to the demographic pressures. In the GPA the parties agreed to establish the Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAC), presided over by the United Nations, to supervise and co-ordinate the aid distribution. Since the United Nations was already involved in Mozambican humanitarian affairs, it hoped to expand its assistance programme and gradually integrate it into the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.⁹⁷ ONUMOZ became the first peacekeeping operation with its own integrated humanitarian component. This United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHA) combined and co-ordinated the existing United Nations relief efforts in Mozambique. During its presence, largely due to natural causes and the end of the conflict, the humanitarian situation improved considerably. Nonetheless, as a result of a lack of rain, pest infestations and cyclone "Nadia" the reduction of relief efforts was less than expected. By 1993-1994 some 1.8 million people were still dependent on food aid. By 1994-95 this number had decreased to 1.1 million.⁹⁸

The provision of humanitarian aid was affected by four problems. Firstly, UNOHA had, from the outset, a hard time defining its own mandate as a result of inter-agency infighting. Shortly before the start of ONUMOZ, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs had been established in the United Nations secretariat in New York. This department was given control over the operation as a result of the pressure to provide it with its first big job. However, in Maputo a large degree of co-ordination had already existed. Moreover, the other organisations and programmes within the donor community were not ready for yet another

rival. The UNDP in particular was far from pleased and the two largest UN organisations present in Mozambique, the UNHCR and the WFP, remained independent of the co-ordination by UNOHAC. Secondly, the supply of humanitarian aid was slow and sometimes underfunded. The reason for this was the fact that donors failed to earmark their funds in time and UNOHAC suffered from the financial and bureaucratic restrictions of New York. Thirdly, the relationship with RENAMO was in some cases troubled. Several donor organisations had a long history of co-operation with FRELIMO and were not interested in co-operating with RENAMO. In addition, at the start of the operation, the delivery of aid to RENAMO areas was slow because of the reluctance and inexperience of RENAMO with international humanitarian organisations. Nonetheless, although at the end of 1992 the RENAMO areas seemed impenetrable, at the end of 1993 UNOHAC was active in the heartland of RENAMO territories. Fourthly, the operationalisation of the concept of humanitarian aid by UNOHAC was subject to criticism. UNOHAC attempted to link its relief with development. However, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, amongst others, reasoned that UNOHAC placed too much emphasis on long-term rehabilitation and too little on what was needed to be achieved within the timeframe of the GPA.⁹⁹ In spite of this struggle, UNOHAC was able to deal with immediate needs while keeping longer-term development in mind. Nonetheless, seen in this light, the transfer of the responsibility of the co-ordination of the humanitarian relief operations from UNDP to UNOHAC was questionable, because after ONUMOZ and UNOHAC left it was returned to the UNDP.

In spite of the problems, during the presence of ONUMOZ the humanitarian aid made a positive contribution to the relief of group demographic pressures. It benefited greatly from the fact that UNSCERO/UNDP had already been present in the field. In fact, the existing activities only had to be intensified and extended into RENAMO areas. It reaped the fruits of the co-ordination by UNOHAC, which made it possible that the aid, including that provided by NGOs, was monitored, allowing gaps to be filled and overlap prevented. The fact that it came under United Nations cover, provided weight and a sense of neutrality to individual projects. Finally, UNOHAC managed to perform a lot of duties because it was integrated into ONUMOZ and was able to use its facilities.

- *Providing law and order:* The Beira and the Nacala corridors in particular were of vital importance to the transport of humanitarian assistance needed to temporarily relieve the demographic pressures. ONUMOZ was mandated in the GPA to verify and ensure the security of these “strategic and trading routes”. Up to the arrival of ONUMOZ the corridors were protected by Zimbabwean and Malawian forces. Their withdrawal was delayed until an Italian advance battalion was fully deployed, because it was expected that if the corridors were unprotected, relief convoys could easily fall prey to bandits. From May 1993 onwards, the bulk of the Military Component forces was deployed to protect the corridors. Subsequently, the military situation in the corridors remained calm, but acts of banditry became rather persistent. The situation deteriorated further with the reduction of the Military Component, while the RENAMO and FRELIMO forces were still in the process of demobilisation. Although this gap was temporarily filled by a company of Brazilian infantry and ONUMOZ increased its patrols and set up checkpoints, it was not able to curb criminality and banditry. The military planners in New York had too

little attention for the ever-changing situation and needs on the ground. Moreover, the ONUMOZ force was too large, immobile and lacked the necessary air assets to protect the corridors. The emphasis had clearly been on the numbers and not with the quality of the troops. Furthermore, the location of the battalions was chosen more for logistical reasons than for the requirements of the operation. Smaller units with superior rapid reaction capabilities for the protection of the corridors would probably have been better.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, ONUMOZ's providing law and order made only a limited positive contribution, and less than hoped for, to the short term *group demography* pressures.

- *Repatriation*: In the GPA, FRELIMO and RENAMO sought the assistance of United Nations agencies to draw up and implement a plan for the repatriation of refugees from Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia to their areas of origin. Initially, it had been expected that a massive organised operation was needed to repatriate all the refugees. However, during the first few months after the signing of the GPA, IDPs and refugees returned 'spontaneously' and *en masse*, without the aid of the UNHCR. Although in June 1993, the UNHCR launched its repatriation programme, the number of returnees was relatively low and by that time the 'spontaneous' returns had also virtually stopped. This was the result of several factors: returnees feared for the future security and stability of Mozambique; many basic services were still not available in the areas to which returnees hoped to return; the funds for repatriation arrived late as, more often than not, they had not yet been earmarked; many humanitarian aid organisations, which had been restricted to RENAMO areas for a long time, were slow to establish themselves in these areas; and the UNHCR was understaffed and not adequately equipped at the beginning of the operation and it was not until mid-1994 that it was ready.¹⁰¹ After the April 1994 harvest and the progress made in the peace process, the repatriation of refugees and the return of the IDPs picked-up. Nevertheless, ONUMOZ proved to be unable to repatriate all the refugees in line with the timetable. At the end of the process, a total of 3 million IDPs and 1.1 million refugees had returned to their original areas of residence.¹⁰² In total, 150,000 refugees and 150,000 IDPs were transported by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM).¹⁰³ Nonetheless, most IDPs and about 80 percent of the refugees returned 'spontaneously', independently of the UNHCR system and without the help of any organisation.¹⁰⁴

Although the repatriation of refugees was concluded, most credit should go to the 'spontaneous' repatriation. The organised repatriation was far from perfect. Firstly, the quality of the repatriation was affected because some phases of the repatriation process were rushed in order to reach political deadlines, such as the elections.¹⁰⁵ Secondly, the sporadic cases in which food relief failed to materialise were, in the view of the refugees, the greatest deficiency in the repatriation operation.¹⁰⁶ Thirdly, the planning was based on wrong assumptions, and did not take account of the Mozambican context. Consequently it overlooked the fact that trans-border traffic was very common and many refugees did not want to return to Mozambique. In the case of South Africa, this led to a 'revolving door' phenomenon in which Mozambican workers in South Africa took advantage of free holiday travel. Fourthly, repatriation was not always entirely voluntary. In Malawi the discontinuation of food supplies, euphemistically referred to as 'food consolidation', forced

refugees to move to Mozambique to receive food aid. Fifthly, the co-ordination and co-operation between the Mozambican office of the UNHCR and the branch offices in the countries of asylum was often poor. Consequently, it could happen that the pace of the repatriation from Malawi was not always determined by the absorptive capacity of Mozambique.¹⁰⁷ In the end, although the repatriation alleviated demographic pressure from the towns and transport corridors, the country as a whole saw a huge influx of returnees whose negative contribution to demographic pressure was planned to be counterbalanced by the reintegration process.

- *Reintegration of refugees:* In the GPA, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to seek the involvement of the competent United Nations agencies and other organisations to “organise the necessary assistance” for refugees and IDPs. Reintegration was essential to prevent new demographic pressures as a result of the repatriation of refugees to Mozambique. In total, up to 5 million Mozambicans had to be reintegrated: 4.5 million were either IDPs or refugees and 0.5 million were soldiers and their families. A large part of this reintegration process was to be implemented by UNOHAC through the promotion of essential services at community and district levels. Mozambique was the first time the UNHCR had established a formal Repatriation and Reintegration Programme. This programme was comprehensive and ranged from short term needs such as food and shelter, to long term development through the reconstruction of basic infrastructure. In addition, the UNHCR financed Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) aimed at basic rehabilitation services. The reintegration was problematic. Firstly, it was behind schedule because funds for reintegration were not earmarked in time. Secondly, the humanitarian assistance was too limited to be able to deal with the full scope of the problem. Thirdly, not all refugees were given a plot of land to cultivate and those who did, did not always do so without conflict, because sometimes the people who had stayed behind had taken over the land belonging to the refugees or IDPs in order to cultivate it. Fourthly, the province that received the most IDPs was not even covered by the UNHCR programmes. In the end, the reintegration assistance was not able to deal with the full scope of the problem. As insufficient attention was given to the problem, the unwanted side effects of the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, as well as the demobilisation of soldiers, placed heavy demands on the capacity of Mozambican society. The social and economic situation worsened and became more unstable, as it proved very difficult to reintegrate all these millions of new members into society. Nonetheless, after five years the refugees and IDPs were integrated into Mozambican society, but largely as a result of their own actions, the communities and not so much as a result of ONUMOZ or the UNHCR.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, the reintegration of refugees was not able to contribute to the negative impact of the repatriation on *group demography*.
- *Mine clearance:* A major obstacle to the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and IDPs was the fact that there were many (uncharted) mines in Mozambique. Mines rendered many roads impassable for the returnees on their way home, they affected the availability of agricultural land, and the perception, rightly or wrongly, that an area was mined prevented resettlement. ONUMOZ, through the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), was mandated in the GPA to clear mines. Several projects of national governments to clear mines along important roads to support the repatriation and humanitarian relief were

implemented under the auspices of the United Nations. The management of these projects was given to UNOHAC. As a result of emergency demining operations, important bottlenecks for population movements were removed. In addition to the emergency demining operations, a national mine-clearance plan was developed with the objective of tackling the problem of the estimated 2 million mines throughout Mozambique.¹⁰⁹ Although the first funds for its implementation had already been available for half a year, it was not until late 1993 that the allocation of funds could be approved by the CCF. Once approved, the programme made a slow start because the selection of contractors proved to be a protracted affair. Although the UNDP had prepared tenders for demining roads, there were considerable delays caused by bureaucratic procedures between UNDP and the United Nations, as well as within UNDP itself. The Secretary-General intervened when donors threatened to withdraw their funds. In order to guarantee that the mine-clearance mandate of ONUMOS was successfully implemented, the programme was accelerated. The UNDP was told to award the road contract, after which the remainder of the programme and the accompanying funds were handed over to UNOHAC. An ONUMOS mine-clearance training centre was established in early 1994. The centre had difficulties attracting Mozambican trainees and lacked the necessary resources. In mid-1994, UNOHAC established the United Nations Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) which aimed to create a domestic mine-clearance capacity by strengthening the mine-clearance training centre, the training of Mozambican deminers, and the creation of a Mozambican mine-clearance authority. Donors in particular were concerned about this desire of UNOHAC to establish a mine-clearance training centre, because it reflected the assumption that the whole demining process was a long term process. As a result, only 450 Mozambican deminers and 20 team supervisors were trained.¹¹⁰ Moreover, continued demining operations were not guaranteed, as UNOHAC did not leave any administrative structures behind. In the end, only 40,000 square metres were cleared and about 550 mines were disabled.¹¹¹ Consequently, apart from the emergency demining, ONUMOS's mine clearance was not very successful. Although it made a limited positive contribution to improving the *group demography*, this was mainly the result of emergency demining.

The refugee and IDP problems were solved and when ONUMOS left, the situation was no longer disastrous, though many considerable problems remained or were newly created. As a result of the repatriation of the refugees, the Mozambican population increased by 22 percent over the 1991-1996 period.¹¹² As a consequence, the government had less revenue to spend per capita. At the same time, although the area of land under cultivation increased markedly, the government seemed unable to solve land conflicts between returning refugees and the population who had stayed behind. In addition, many IDPs chose to remain in the towns and as a result agricultural lands near urban centres remained scarce. Moreover, following demobilisation, tens of thousands of young men in the towns were alienated from society by the war, accustomed to the use of violence, and without money and unemployed. While all these refugees and ex-combatants had to look for a job, the World Bank was shrinking the state sector, making the absorption capacity of the society for integration smaller. The only way out was unsatisfactory work in the informal sector and that created a large pool of disgruntled young men.

6.4.4 State weakness

Throughout history, the Mozambican state was extremely weak. Consequently, there was no strong Mozambican identity and the country remained ethnically, culturally and linguistically heterogeneous. Mozambicans often lived in small, disintegrated social and political units. The tie with one's tribe or chieftain was generally stronger than with the central state. Banditry and warlordism were common phenomena, especially during periods of drought. The Mozambican economy was also marked by very low levels of integration, mainly directed at cross-border transport and the global market. The FRELIMO government, like its predecessors, had little control over both the economy and society. It had little personnel, experience and organisation, even in comparison with other sub-Saharan countries.¹¹³ Local leadership was severely weakened because FRELIMO failed to recognise the authority of local traditional leaders. The conflict made FRELIMO lose even more control, because in large regions of Mozambique the state was under attack or disintegrated altogether. Few administrative structures functioned, especially those outside the towns. If they operated, they did so from an executive capacity, implementing orders from the central authorities in Maputo, and this further intensified the sense of alienation and exclusion amongst the rural population. The total cost of the damage of the conflict inflicted on roads, bridges, hospitals, schools and the economy was estimated to be over 15 billion US dollars. The nascent infrastructure in the urban areas and in the main transport corridors was destroyed. The educational system was on the brink of collapse, as around 80 percent of primary schools were either closed or had been destroyed. The government health system was targeted by RENAMO. Consequently, the health situation had not improved since 1986 and infant, child and maternal mortality was high and disease rampant.¹¹⁴ This situation was aggravated even further by the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE), a 'structural adjustment programme' that aimed to improve the economic situation, which in the process weakened several important state facilities. Moreover, as a result of the cutbacks of the PRE, officials were often not paid and turned to corruption, and the army's morale was low and many became involved in banditry. At the same time, foreign aid disappeared into the hands of those who were able to get it, and not into the hands of those who needed it. The government was further weakened because it lost many of its best-trained personnel to NGOs and aid agencies, while migration led to a further brain drain.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOS influenced or were intended to influence *state weakness*:

- *Providing law and order*: Although ONUMOS was mandated by the GPA to verify and ensure the security of the corridors, and responsibility to ensure general security, law and public order lay with the Government, it affected the general security situation in Mozambique. ONUMOS solved several mutinies among FRELIMO soldiers who were awaiting outstanding payments and demobilisation. When criminal activities and banditry increased in both urban and rural areas, ONUMOS increased the frequency of its patrols and set up checkpoints, especially along the corridors. It was, however, not able to curb criminality and banditry. At the time of the elections, Mozambique still lacked a fully constituted and equipped army and neither were the police equipped to deal with public security. When the thousands of demobilised soldiers, in addition to groups of bandits, became a security threat, ONUMOS decided to play an important role in assisting the Government and stepped up its security

efforts. Subsequently, violent rioting ceased to be a problem, but banditry became even more widespread. The proliferation of weapons only exacerbated this situation. Moreover, ONUMOZ implemented its mandate only in a narrow sense and did not pursue incidents of criminal behaviour and banditry. In addition, the military planners in New York lacked flexibility when it came to the needs on the ground and continued to focus their attention on protecting the corridors, also after the foreign forces had left. Consequently, ONUMOZ's providing law and order only made a limited positive contribution to the short term strength of the state.

- *Disarmament*: Estimates of the numbers of weapons in Mozambique at the time of the GPA vary widely: from 500,000 to 6 - 10 million AK-47 assault rifles.¹¹⁵ ONUMOZ estimated that 1 to 1.5 million weapons were in circulation, of which about two thirds were unregistered and illegal.¹¹⁶ All these weapons were a threat to the state's monopoly on violence. With the establishment of the Civilian Police Component, special teams were created to collect weapons and ammunition surrendered by individuals and irregular forces. The widespread proliferation of weapons was, however, not stopped. Moreover, only a limited number of arms were destroyed, while the remainder were handed over to the FADM. Once ONUMOZ had left, soldiers of the FADM admitted they were selling guns from these arsenals as a way of earning a living.¹¹⁷ Moreover, both parties did not really show any interest in the verification of undeclared arms caches and therefore little progress was made. As a consequence, when ONUMOZ left, many weapons were still circulating throughout the country and this led to an increase in crime rates.¹¹⁸ These weapons were a potential danger to the stability and security of Mozambique, and the region as a whole. In spite of the problems, the merit of ONUMOZ was to start a disarmament process, which was not as durable as hoped for because ONUMOZ did not finish the process. Consequently, the disarmament by ONUMOZ did not contribute to *state weakness*. Although it would probably have been impossible to collect all weapons, more attention for the subject might have diminished the problems. In addition, ONUMOZ could have destroyed those weapons it did collect, and by not doing so, it did not remove the risk of future problems.
- *Institution-building*: ONUMOZ aimed to strengthen the Mozambican state by aiding RENAMO's transition towards a political party, the formation of the FADM and the strengthening of the state institutions. With regard to the first, in accordance with the GPA the Mozambican government sought and ONUMOZ found several million US dollars of international assistance to help RENAMO transform itself. In spite of this aid RENAMO remained rather weak. This was partly the result of the fact that there was no sufficient follow-up, but may also have ensued from the money being spent on things other than on improving the capacity of the party.¹¹⁹ As far as the formation of FADM is concerned, following a number of delays, the United Nations was given chairmanship of important commissions with regard to the formation of the FADM. This new army was to consist of 30,000 troops. However, due to the RSS payments, most soldiers chose to demobilise and to be reintegrated into civil society. Consequently, at the end of ONUMOZ's mandate, the FADM only consisted of close to 12,000 troops.¹²⁰ Moreover, the new army did not have sufficient military equipment and its infrastructure was poor; the army was also faced with both financial and logistical restraints. With regard to the strengthening

of state institutions, ONUMOZ attempted to improve the capacity of other governmental institutions. One of the tasks of the Civilian Police Component was to encourage the Mozambican civilian police to improve its capacity to protect citizens and property. In addition, UNOHAC aided the reintegration of RENAMO health and social services into the government structures and attempted to expand education in RENAMO areas. Nonetheless, not all the institutions were ready for the new ideas introduced by ONUMOZ. Altogether, institution-building made a limited positive contribution to *state weakness*, although some effects were not durable over a longer period of time.

- *Rehabilitation*: Although rehabilitation was not in the mandate of ONUMOZ, in practice UNOHAC hoped to link its own activities of humanitarian emergency aid with the medium- and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of the specialised agencies of the United Nations, the World Bank and bilateral donors. This resulted in the foundations on which rehabilitation and reconstruction could be built, but there were no firm commitments. To a certain extent UNOHAC managed to make its aid sustainable with regard to the social sector. RENAMO health workers were integrated into the national health system and health facilities were established in regions where previously there had not been any. An attempt was made to expand the number of water sources and rural school reconstruction was included in the reconstruction programmes. In addition, the UNHCR financed Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in areas where refugees returned, aimed to rehabilitate basic services and to target equally both the returnees and the receiving communities. As a result, in total more than 700 primary schools and 250 health facilities were constructed and more than 2,000 wells were rehabilitated.¹²¹ As a consequence, rehabilitation made a temporary positive contribution to *state weakness* because it lacked firm, long term commitments for the continuation of the process.

After ONUMOZ left, the Mozambican state was still not a unified whole, the political arena was still strongly divided, and the government administration still lacked strength and resources to govern effectively. Although ONUMOZ had left, the international donor community and NGOs remained behind and continued to provide large sums of money to aid rehabilitation. Moreover, the Mozambican state managed to consolidate the collection of taxes and increase tax income through the introduction of value added tax, and customs were reformed. Nonetheless, following the Washington consensus, Maputo was forced to economise further. Since Mozambique already had comparably few civil servants, the expenditure had to be curtailed by reducing salaries further. This, in turn, fuelled the trend that government employees took to corruption or acquired second jobs. Social expenditure, which accounted for 14.3 percent of total government expenditure, also suffered from further cuts.¹²² Although health and education became highly dependent on international support, about 60 percent of the population was not reached by these services and the quality of these services remained poor and there was a lack of resources and personnel.¹²³ In addition, the state remained too weak to maintain law and order and the FADM did not become the strong and disciplined army and institution that had been hoped for. Furthermore, as weapons were widely available and people needed to earn a living, violent crime became more frequent, especially in Maputo. By 1996 both Dhlakama and Chissano had become concerned with the presence of arms caches that were out of their control. Thereafter, the Mozambican and South African

governments started to combine their efforts in the so-called Rachel operations and disarmament was accelerated such that by 1998 the threat to internal security had been severely reduced

6.4.5 State unwillingness and good governance

The lack of good governance was a major cause of the conflict and was evidenced in four problems. First, the centralist party authority of FRELIMO was detached from the localities and tried to develop the countryside in ways the countryside disliked. FRELIMO's decision to prevent decentralisation and to exclude the local traditional authority structures from power alienated not only these leaders, but also a large segment of the population. Second, human rights were regularly violated. After independence, the security forces had received almost unlimited powers and arrested, detained and tortured, often on arbitrary grounds, suspected RENAMO members. Nonetheless, according to Amnesty International, the human rights situation in Mozambique had improved significantly by 1989.¹²⁴ Third, the judicial system was not independent and lacked the capacity to hold both politicians and civil servants responsible for their actions. This, in combination with low pay, meant that the police were reputed to be engaged in robbery rather than in protecting the people, and civil servants were corrupt, and none of them were prosecuted for their deeds. Fourth, since it had never existed in Mozambique, the idea of democracy was alien to Mozambican society. Decisions at local level were made by consensus, without parties. The concept of political parties and the idea that the majority can overrule a minority were not commonly accepted. Nonetheless, in the 1990 constitution, the FRELIMO government took major steps to establish the institutions needed to guarantee democracy and human rights for the population. Although RENAMO rejected this new constitution, it lost one of its important causes for struggle, since a constitution was one of its main demands.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence *state unwillingness and good governance*

- *Organisation of elections* In the GPA, RENAMO and FRELIMO agreed that one year after the signing of the agreement elections were to be held for both the president and the National Assembly. The Electoral Component of ONUMOZ was requested to guarantee the implementation of the electoral process, to participate in the electoral education campaign, to play a co-ordinating role with regard to technical assistance, and to provide logistical and material support. The actual elections - the whole process from the registration of the voters to the actual organisation of the polling itself - was the full responsibility of the Mozambican National Elections Commission (CNE). It did not take long, however, before it became clear that the elections could not be held according to schedule and had to be postponed by one year, until October 1994. Not only had the demobilisation process not been started, but essential equipment for the registration of documents had not arrived either. Moreover, disagreement on the composition of the CNE frustrated negotiations about the electoral law, which was only agreed upon in January 1994. In February 1994 a new timetable was set, after which the preparations went according to plan. A technical assistance trust fund was established, as well as an additional trust fund for parties, other than RENAMO, to enable them to conduct their electoral activities. The UNDP assisted in the training of all

Mozambican personnel involved in the organisation of the election. The registration period had to be extended, following delays as a result of the presence of mines, logistical problems stemming from the abominable infrastructure, the slow integration of RENAMO areas into the Mozambican civil administration, and the delayed demobilisation and repatriation processes. Initial technical errors in the registration were caused by insufficient experience and training, but the situation improved after instructions had been issued to the registration teams. 6,396,061 voters were registered, which represented about 81 percent of the estimated population eligible to vote. Moreover, 12 presidential candidates and 14 political parties participated in the elections.¹²⁵ Voter education was slow to start and was hampered by the late end to the repatriation process. Moreover, the quality of the education was questionable because Mozambicans only learned how to vote and not why. Nonetheless, it was reasonably effective if one considers the fact that the population was mostly illiterate, uneducated and inexperienced. Additionally, the campaign period was far from stable, it was full of inflammatory rhetoric, and violent disturbances to those campaigning.

In spite of the preparations and the fact that demobilisation had, more or less, finished in time, there was continued fear that the elections, under the wrong circumstances, might lead to the renewal of the conflict. The greatest fear was that matters would take a similar turn to those in Angola where the loser of the elections again took up arms. Although ONUMOZ and several Western governments hoped that the parties would agree beforehand to a power-sharing arrangement, Chissano was opposed to a future government of national unity and did not give in. In spite of the fears, the elections were in fact organised according to schedule because the Security Council no longer allowed any further delay. However, the day before the elections RENAMO and other opposition parties produced a list of serious complaints about election irregularities, and RENAMO announced that it was therefore not able to participate in the elections. Although it seemed that the population, even within RENAMO areas, did not adhere to the boycott, this decision led to considerable confusion on the first day of the elections. Early in the morning of the second election day, and only under heavy international pressure, did Dhlakama decide that RENAMO would continue to participate in the elections. It was agreed that the elections needed to be extended by one day - until 29 October. The actual polling took place in a relatively peaceful environment without any major irregularities. Votes were cast at close to 7,300 polling stations, at 2,700 different sites and turnout was massive - over 90 percent of registered voters turned out in a number of provinces.¹²⁶

Unfortunately the elections did not bring with them any democratic awareness. In some cases people were forced to vote and, as also shown by the regional voting patterns, people voted for the party they were 'supposed to vote for'.¹²⁷ The CNE blamed the voter education for not having explained the idea of democratic elections well enough. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General later admitted to having wondered several times whether it might not have been better had the elections been held after a longer transition period. In his eyes, the pressure of time had meant that the elections became an extension of the previously violent conflict and turned into a "war of words".¹²⁸ In the end, in spite of the preparations, one may consider it rather fortunate that RENAMO ended its boycott and that therefore

the elections could be successfully organised. Although the elections made a temporary positive contribution to the start of the process of democratisation, they might probably have contributed more to *state unwillingness and good governance*, if the process had not been rushed by the United Nations.

- *Election monitoring*: The Electoral Component of ONUMOZ was mandated to observe and verify the electoral process and to report irregularities and complaints to the electoral authorities. On its own initiative the component frequently checked, but also investigated complaints, the results of which it transmitted to the CNE for follow-up. After its establishment, the Civilian Police Component together with the other relevant ONUMOZ components also contributed to this task. The Secretary-General stated that his minimum conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections were: free and fair access by the CNE to each area of the country; the widest possible participation of all parties in the electoral process; free access to state media; full logistical support by the Mozambican government (FRELIMO) and the donor community; and commitment of the parties that they would adhere to the outcome of the elections. Nonetheless, by July 1994, access to several RENAMO areas was still obstructed and there were no clear rules for access to state mass media. Furthermore, several parties, including RENAMO, complained about false identification, the registration of minors and foreigners, embezzlement of electoral funds and propaganda aimed at discrediting opponents. Nonetheless, ONUMOZ concluded that most of these complaints proved to be unsubstantiated.¹²⁹ During the elections, a total of 2,300 United Nations elections observers were present. These observers co-operated with observers from the EU, the OAU and several other international organisations. In addition, observers from the parties themselves were trained to be present at the polling stations. Their participation in the observance was regarded to be "the most effective way to enhance the credibility of the elections."¹³⁰ ONUMOZ investigated all complaints filed by the parties and concluded that in spite of the problems that occurred, the irregularities recorded and the disruptions that had taken place, the elections were 'free and fair.'¹³¹ This judgement allowed little room for RENAMO to continue to claim that the elections were not 'free and fair' and subsequently it accepted its defeat. It is, however, not unlikely that ONUMOZ had, as an assistant to their organisation, an interest in a positive judgement of the elections. Moreover, it is questionable that the monitoring of the elections had a considerable influence on their quality. As a result, election monitoring only made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.
- *Civilian police monitoring*: In the GPA, the parties agreed to establish the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) to verify the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM). Although the GPA did not provide for a United Nations role in COMPOL and did not request civilian police monitors, the matter was reopened at the initiative of the Secretary-General.¹³² After the parties agreed to a United Nations role in police affairs, the first advance civilian police monitors started their investigations in January 1994. The Civilian Police Component was to monitor all activities of all Mozambican police agencies and although the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order remained with the Mozambican police, it was allowed to conduct parallel investigations. Initially, the Civilian Police Component faced obstacles in attempting to implement its mandate, particularly with regard to

access to information and visits to prisons and police stations of the FRELIMO government. After February 1994, co-operation improved and the civilian police monitors were now in a position to undertake extensive patrols, visit prisons and police stations and investigate complaints. After investigations, several complaints were referred to the COMPOL, which subsequently failed to adjudge these cases. In addition, FRELIMO delayed ONUMOZ verification of the Presidential Guard and the Rapid Reaction Police until only two weeks before the elections. When ONUMOZ left, the civilian police monitors had investigated a total of 511 claims.¹³³ Although the presence of police observers may have had some preventive effect on violations, it did not contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*. This resulted first and foremost from the fact that no disciplinary or preventive actions were taken following complaints which were transmitted to the COMPOL. Secondly, the emphasis was with the numbers of civilian police monitors and not with their skills and competence levels. Knowledge of Portuguese was dropped as a requirement for selection, which impaired communication with both the Mozambican police and the population. Knowledge of the working languages was often insufficient, which caused internal communication problems. In addition, monitors often had very limited driving skills, a varying level of training and sometimes little knowledge of human rights standards.

- *Human rights verification*: The GPA did not provide for human rights verification by ONUMOZ. However, the Civilian Police Component was mandated to “monitor the respect of rights and civil liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country.”¹³⁴ The civilian police monitors investigated some 61 human rights-related violations. Their ability to investigate was hampered by the lack of monitors who were able to communicate in Portuguese and due to the fact that they “consciously avoided investigating” human rights violations.¹³⁵ The fact that relations between the civilian police monitors and the Mozambican police were not very good only made things worse. ONUMOZ forwarded several complaints to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), but they did not lead to any corrective or preventive measures by the Mozambican authorities. Nevertheless, although human rights monitoring only made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, it did start off a long process.
- *Human rights education*: Although ONUMOZ was not really mandated to provide human rights education, it was expected to familiarise police officers with basic human rights standards, if needed. In addition, ONUMOZ distributed materials on human rights, such as human rights charters, within government institutions and political parties. Nonetheless, most Mozambicans knew just as little about the concept of human rights after ONUMOZ left, than before it came and thus human rights education only made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Its main contribution was in fact that it indeed did start a process.
- *Institution building*: ONUMOZ attempted to influence *state unwillingness and good governance* through changes in civil-military relations and the creation of fair opportunities for political opposition parties. First, the training of the soldiers of the FADM by Western European countries was not able to make the army consistent with the requirements of a democracy. Not only was the number of volunteers for the new army a barrier, but the ‘leadership courses’ were also poor in quality. Nonetheless, when ONUMOZ left, the civil-military

standards of the FADM had improved because it was no longer politically affiliated. Second, it was hoped that the creation of the trust fund for the support of political parties by the United Nations would make it possible for opposition parties to compete with FRELIMO in a more equal manner. This was necessary because most of the 'unarmed opposition' parties were almost bankrupt. As a consequence, however, it became a 'trend' to establish 'your own party' for the sake of the funds.¹³⁶ Moreover, there was no follow-up once ONUMOZ left, not only for the 'unarmed opposition' but also for RENAMO. As a consequence, institution building only made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

After ONUMOZ left, the international donor community and NGOs remained and continued to provide large sums of money to help with good governance projects. Although the situation in Mozambique was good compared with the situation in many surrounding countries, the country still faced the same four problems that had existed prior to the presence of ONUMOZ. Firstly, the opposition was further alienated as a result of the highly centralised administrative system under the control of the president. Since the president only appointed FRELIMO governors and mayors, and far too little room was left for the regions, allegations were heard that regions where RENAMO enjoyed a lot of support were not assisted to the same extent as other parts of the country.¹³⁷ Moreover, the traditional authorities were still not fully accepted. Secondly, although some sort of free press and freedom of speech existed, human rights were still violated mainly as a result of the fact that the police were ill-equipped and trained to deal with the pressure of the increased crime rates. In addition, many supporters of RENAMO complained about unequal access to education and employment in comparison to FRELIMO supporters.¹³⁸ Nonetheless, human rights awareness improved amongst the population, mainly as a result of the civil society. Thirdly, the separation of powers was incomplete, because too much power was in the hands of the executive, the president. The judicial system remained underdeveloped, and lacked trained personnel and infrastructure and applied antiquated laws. It was also highly corrupt, which meant that the perpetrators of corruption were not prosecuted. At the same time, corruption became increasingly more prevalent. This was the result of the budget cuts promoted by the IMF, whereby civil service wages dropped below the poverty line. At the same time, police officers became more heavily involved in crime and high level government officials used their public functions to protect and aid their private position as entrepreneurs and to benefit from privatisation. Fourthly, Mozambican democracy remained troubled. Off and on, RENAMO boycotted parliamentary meetings, while, at the same time, Chissano kept the door to power-sharing firmly shut and appointed only FRELIMO governors. The 1998 municipal elections were boycotted by RENAMO and although they were held, they were chaotic and the turn-out was less than 15 percent. There were several serious incidents during the 1999 national elections, and it was questionable whether the elections were in fact 'free and fair'.¹³⁹ As the gap between FRELIMO and the RENAMO UE was unexpectedly close, Dhlakama argued that FRELIMO had stolen his victory for the second time and that, in fact, he was the winner.¹⁴⁰ Opposition parties other than RENAMO remained weak, underfunded, often corrupt and not anxious to co-operate. Moreover, FRELIMO was in full control of the pace of the further democratisation process and the separation between state and FRELIMO structures remained questionable. The democratic system remained as alien to Mozambican society as it ever had been. People often voted because they were

obliged to and they were not always aware that their vote was secret. Moreover, while the party elites quarrelled in Maputo, they lost contact with their grassroots in the provinces. To many of the villagers, democracy did not bring them anything and many of their problems had only worsened.¹⁴¹ In spite of all the problems, Mozambique was in fact making progress. It was not able to change overnight into a fully-fledged democracy, but that was not to be expected. Mozambique had entered into a transitional process, in which it was only slowly making progress.

6.4.6 State/government legitimacy

As the aim of the FRELIMO policies was to eradicate tribal differences, religion and traditional chiefs and had little room for family farmers, they resulted in a dislike of FRELIMO. Since FRELIMO was equated with the state, the state was also delegitimised. RENAMO fought against this state and everything it represented. For this reason, even the schools and healthcare facilities provided by the state were attacked. At the same time, as a result of the conflict, the FRELIMO government was unable to respond to the economic and social problems, amongst other things, and consequently people lost confidence in the state structures and tended to identify much less with the central state. FRELIMO's attempt to solve the economic problems by embracing the World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programme only served to make things worse. The government had to severely cut its expenditure, while simultaneously foreign aid was funnelled outside government channels. Subsequently, the responsibilities previously reserved for the state were being taken on by NGOs, donors and foreign consultants, who did deliver, while government officials attempted to increase their income through corruption. As a consequence, domestic authority was eroded and the FRELIMO government was further delegitimised.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence state/government legitimacy.

- *Organisation of elections* Just as in Cambodia, and perhaps unexpectedly, it was not so much the contribution to democracy but the provision of legitimacy that became the most important positive contribution of the elections. They gave the party that won the vote the right to govern and provided that party with political legitimacy. Although RENAMO claimed that the provinces were 'boiling' because of the so-called 'stolen elections', in reality the population was not particularly bothered by the complaints of RENAMO. In fact, the elections made a positive contribution to the national and international legitimacy of the FRELIMO government.
- *Election monitoring* It was hoped that the monitoring of the elections by ONUMOZ would contribute to better elections. In addition, however, it also lent credibility to the electoral process both nationally and internationally. As a result, the elections were not challenged by the vast majority of the population and RENAMO also gave in within a short period of time. The fact that the elections were monitored provided extra credibility to the elections, which perhaps unexpectedly further strengthened their positive contribution to the legitimacy of the newly-elected government.
- *Institution building* The attempt to transform state structures, such as the FADM and the civilian police, into political neutral institutions made a limited positive contribution to the legitimacy of the government. However, this was more successful with regard to the FADM than for the civilian police. The restructuring of the armed forces and the establishment of the FADM was

essential if the armed forces were to be perceived by the public as politically neutral. With the aid from ONUMOZ, this transformation by the armed forces was successful. The influence of the Civilian Police Component was not as great as that of the Military Component. The Mozambican police force remained primarily FRELIMO based and below standard. Although it did its best to look politically neutral, RENAMO and several observers claimed that the situation was otherwise.¹⁴²

As the majority of the population judged the legitimacy of the government on its performance and on what it delivered, the newly-elected FRELIMO government was mainly felt to be legitimate in urban areas and less so in rural areas. Discontent was on the increase in rural areas, which could also be seen in the changes of the polling results between the 1994 and the 1999 elections. Others questioned the legitimacy of the government, because they were not sure that the government was rightfully elected. The continuous call of RENAMO, especially after the 1999 elections, that the elections were not free and fair and in fact 'stolen', started to affect the legitimacy of the government. In addition, corruption developed to such a level that it became an important factor in the delegitimation of the state, the government and the political elite, and people lost faith in government institutions, such as the judicial and police systems.

6.4.7 Unemployment and economic decline

According to UNDP figures, during the 1989 - 1993 period, Mozambique was the poorest country in the world, with a GNP per capita of between 70 and 90 US dollars per year.¹⁴³ Although these statistics fail to capture a large segment of the Mozambican economy, they do speak for themselves. The economy had never really overcome the shock of independence, which was the result of the sudden withdrawal of Portuguese capital and settlers. The history of civil war, lost trade relations with South Africa and Rhodesia, floods and drought had only aggravated the situation. The effects were disastrous for the trade balance. As a result, in the period up to 1993 Mozambique accumulated such a burden of debt that it became a highly indebted state. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, the Mozambican economy had become highly dependent on foreign aid to the extent that 70 to 80 percent of its GDP came from ODA.¹⁴⁴ In addition, FRELIMO's economic policies had undermined traditional patterns of production and consumption, and marginalised the family farmers. Robbery became a way of life, and was used as a means to sustain oneself. By 1987, FRELIMO decided to reform its policies and negotiated a Structural Adjustment Programme with the IMF, the so-called *Programa de Reabilitação Económica* (PRE). The results of the PRE were positive. The economic growth and external competitiveness of the country improved and foreign investments increased. However, a large share of the economic growth resulted from the increased amount of foreign aid. Moreover, these improvements were obtained at an enormous social cost, because unemployment rose, inflation was rampant - running from 163 percent to 30 percent from 1987 up to 1992, and large groups were no longer able to earn enough for their daily bread.¹⁴⁵ The situation was further exacerbated by the return of migrant workers and students from Eastern Europe, who also needed jobs and school places. As a result, by 1990 economic growth had stopped and was once again in a downward spiral, while the drought of 1992 only made matters worse. Consequently, although real wages had increased from 1987 to 1989, they decreased significantly from 1990 to 1995.¹⁴⁶

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUMOZ influenced or were intended to influence *unemployment and economic decline*

- *Rehabilitation* In spite of the fact that rehabilitation was not in the mandate of ONUMOZ, UNOHAC did make preparations for the rehabilitation process. Although this did not have a direct significant effect on *unemployment and economic decline*, the preparations made did make an important positive contribution to the rehabilitation process that followed after ONUMOZ's departure.
- *Mine clearance* Mines affected economic development in Mozambique and for example obstructed the progress of development projects. During the presence of ONUMOZ little progress was made beyond emergency demining, and consequently it did not contribute to the improvement of *unemployment and economic decline*.
- *Repatriation of refugees* The free distribution of food and seeds to returning refugees and IDPs had an unintended negative effect on prices and temporarily disrupted the cereal market to the disadvantage of local producers. At the same time, the repatriation of refugees had a primarily positive effect on the Mozambican economy, because a large share of the GDP growth after 1995 can be attributed to production by the repatriated population¹⁴⁷. As a consequence, the repatriation of refugees made an unexpectedly positive and temporarily negative contribution to *unemployment and economic decline*.
- *Humanitarian aid* In some cases the cause of hunger was not the lack of food, but the lack of resources to buy the locally-produced surpluses. As a result, food aid sometimes distorted the local markets. Cases are known of in which food aid was shipped in, while at the same time locally produced grain was transported out. Cash aid would, in those cases, probably have been more useful. As a consequence, humanitarian aid made an unintended temporarily negative contribution to *unemployment and economic decline*.
- *Cantonment and demobilisation* The demobilisation process meant that large groups of ex-combatants poured into the labour force. The Mozambican economy was not fully able to absorb these groups on its own. As a result of the lack of reintegration, this negative effect could not be addressed and consequently unemployment rose¹⁴⁸. Since its unintended side effects were not addressed, demobilisation made a negative contribution to *unemployment and economic decline*.

With the departure of the United Nations, certain elements of the Mozambican economy suffered because the two year boom in the service industries came to an end. However, two years after ONUMOZ had left, the economy looked healthier again. The end of the conflict, in combination with the economic policy reforms, such as deregulation and privatisation, attracted a lot of foreign investment. Peace enabled the government to implement its reforms more thoroughly and effectively, both in depth and in regional breadth. In addition, inflation was brought back to 17 percent in 1996 and even to single digits by 1997, and the exchange rate of the metical against the US dollar stabilised¹⁴⁹. As a result, real wages increased again after 1996, which was something that was felt in the agricultural sector in particular. As a consequence, during the period from 1991 to 1996, the percentage of households living in absolute poverty in Maputo fell from between 28 to 52 percent to between 17 to 32 percent¹⁵⁰. Privatisation increased Mozambican efficiency, which improved the country's competitiveness and attracted foreign investment. Growth figures of 7 to 8 percent, higher export

levels, and foreign investment made Mozambique a 'success story' in the eyes of the World Bank and the United Nations¹⁵¹ However, the country remained desperately poor and unemployment was inordinately high Moreover, although agricultural growth was high during the mid-1990s, this growth was mainly connected to the return of refugees and policy reforms As a consequence, the IMF did not consider these high growth figures to be sustainable¹⁵² Furthermore, economic growth was primarily concentrated in the southern part of the country and mainly in the towns There were reasons for concern, and also for the long term Infrastructure was still virtually missing and those with capital were mainly interested in speculation and not so much in production

6.4.8 External relations

A lot of attention is given in the literature on the Mozambican conflict to *external relations* The role of Rhodesia and South Africa in the creation and support of RENAMO was so great that some even argued it was a problem that had been externally created¹⁵³ The FRELIMO government in turn received aid from the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) whose aim was to decrease the dependency of its member states on South Africa and thus to thwart the 'total strategy' of South Africa Although the conflict was never drawn into the Cold War, as other third-world conflicts had been, South Africa depicted the conflict in Mozambique as part of a greater Soviet scheme to change the white-minority regimes into communist states In the same way, FRELIMO hardliners argued that the influence of the 'capitalist pawn' South Africa was the reason why Mozambique should turn to Moscow for aid The situation in southern Africa started to change for the good, as a result of the end of the Cold War and the different position of South Africa when De Klerk came to power in 1989 However, the southern African region remained far from stable The peace process in Angola had derailed after the elections in 1992, and in South Africa the situation also continued to be uncertain In addition, the severe drought of 1992 threatened the whole of the southern African region

During its presence the following 'policy tool' implemented by ONUMOZ was intended to influence *external relations*

- *Verification of foreign forces withdrawal* The GPA mandated the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) and the United Nations to supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from Mozambican territory In the Agreement this withdrawal was planned to be finished 30 days after the 15 October As within a week after the GPA entered into force, the Zimbabwean forces started to withdraw and since the CCF was not yet established at that time, a reconnaissance team consisting of observers had to be dispatched to verify the situation However, because both Zimbabwe and Malawi were requested by both parties to stop their withdrawal and protect the corridors until the full deployment of ONUMOZ, their forces were not withdrawn by the agreed time The presence of foreign forces inside Mozambique was actually no longer seen as a major obstacle Only by April 1993 was Zimbabwe able to withdraw its forces, followed by Malawi in June These withdrawals were fully verified by ONUMOZ, which was a confidence-building measure for RENAMO As such it made a positive contribution to *external relations*

Although the southern African region remained far from stable and was plagued by arms trade, violent crime and conflict, it became more stable as a result of the developments in South Africa In August 1994, the former international

adversaries became members of the same camp, when South Africa acceded to the successor organisation of the SADCC, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The members of the SADC proved to have sufficient coherence to pressure the Mozambican parties not to return to armed conflict. Their ultimate threat of military intervention proved to be rather effective. South Africa in particular attached importance to a stable Mozambique and did not want another Angola on its doorstep.

6.5 Within case conclusions

At the national level of the Mozambican conflict, by 1992 a stalemate re-emerged on the battlefield between FRELIMO and RENAMO while the drought lay further claims on the parties. Although there was continued mistrust, both parties became genuinely interested in the peace process. At the regional level, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa meant the struggle of the Front line states was ended. At the international level, the Cold War had come to an end. This situation allowed ONUMOZ to make a positive contribution to both *negative peace* and the causes of conflict in Mozambique. From the research of the hypotheses it follows that:

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to negative peace. Before the presence of ONUMOZ the Mozambican conflict was particularly violent. With the arrival of ONUMOZ, cease-fire monitoring guaranteed the security of the parties because it provided them with transparency. Civilian police monitoring, which was later added to ONUMOZ's mandate, proved to be an important confidence-building measure to RENAMO. This allowed the parties to demobilise and disarm. With regard to the latter, this 'policy tool' contributed less to *negative peace* because the parties were not as interested in it and ONUMOZ did not have time for it. The reintegration of the ex-combatants managed to break the old communication lines of the former armies. Institution building created a new army, the FADM, supported RENAMO in the transformation towards its existence as a political party, and provided it with the necessary 'carrots' to continue with the peace process. Aided by the mediation of ONUMOZ and, where needed, diplomatic pressure, the parties managed to overcome several concrete problems. Moreover, the withdrawal of foreign forces was verified. During the presence of ONUMOZ the conflict was ended and moved to the political arena. Although social unrest did arise every once in a while, after its departure, armed conflict was not likely to restart.

ONUMOZ did not contribute to inter-group relations. Before the presence of ONUMOZ many of the 'socialist' policies which had caused resistance amongst parts of the population were ended. The north-south divide and the unequal income distribution, however, remained. The process of national reconciliation was mainly executed by the Mozambicans themselves. Nevertheless, the distribution of humanitarian aid forced the parties to sit at the same table and face concrete problems, which in turn contributed to better relations between the parties. At the same time this humanitarian aid increased income inequality. After the departure of ONUMOZ many of the old problems remained, but the population had become reconciled.

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to group demography. The conflict and droughts made millions of Mozambicans dependent on humanitarian aid. In addition, millions of IDPs placed a heavy burden on the transport corridors and

towns. ONUMOZ provided humanitarian aid and put an end to a humanitarian disaster. This achievement was reached, although ONUMOZ was not fully able to provide law and order in the corridors and most IDPs and refugees returned 'spontaneously'. The emergency demining opened roads for repatriation. However, there was no further mine clearance during the presence of ONUMOZ and consequently mines continued to be a problem. Moreover, the repatriation of refugees created new problems, which emerged because reintegration was not well taken care of and therefore was unable to counterbalance them. After ONUMOZ left, the capacity of society to absorb the large numbers of refugees and ex-combatants remained too low. The inability to deal with these demographic pressures was only further aggravated by the shrinking state sector.

ONUMOZ made a limited positive contribution to state weakness. Throughout history the Mozambican state had been weak both in terms of identity and in terms of what it delivered. The conflict and the structural adjustment programme had only further weakened the state. ONUMOZ provided a little in law and order, and mainly in the corridors. Disarmament was not a priority and the abundance of arms remained a threat to the strength of the state. Institution building contributed only partially and temporarily to the strength of the state, because it lacked a long-term perspective and was insufficient. Rehabilitation was not even really laid down in the mandate of ONUMOZ. Nonetheless, ONUMOZ started projects and although there were no firm commitments for the future, it always took sustainability into account. As a result, however, after ONUMOZ left Mozambique remained a weak state and some of the achievements proved not to be sustainable.

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to state unwillingness and good governance. Mozambique did not have a tradition of human rights and democracy. Its institutions were not neutral and the centralist government policies were not always in accordance with the wishes of the Mozambicans in the periphery. Some of the improvements with regard to this variable in Mozambique had already been set in motion before the presence of ONUMOZ. For example, the country had already received a democratic constitution, which had been the main goal of RENAMO. ONUMOZ's main 'policy tool' in the field of *state unwillingness and good governance* was the organisation of elections and this was able to have a short-term positive influence. The success of these elections was reached, in spite of the fact that the difference with failure was merely one decision by Dhlakama. One can only imagine what would have happened if RENAMO had persisted with its boycott. ONUMOZ was also mandated to monitor the elections and its final positive judgement proved to be an important factor in underlining to RENAMO that it had lost and that there was no way back to the jungle. It is, however, unlikely that it affected the conduct of the election. Later, civilian police monitoring was added to the mandate, but this did not contribute to good governance. Although ONUMOZ picked up human rights verification and human rights education, which were not directly mentioned in its mandate, it invested too little energy to make a significant contribution. However, both were the start of a longer process. ONUMOZ managed to achieve more with regard to institution building of opposition parties and the politically neutral army. Nevertheless, as there was no follow-up, sustainability became a problem. Consequently, although the situation had certainly improved, the same issues of human rights, democracy, institutions and centralist policies continued to be problematic.

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to state/government legitimacy. Several policies of the FRELIMO government lacked legitimacy to the extent that their

implementation even affected the legitimacy of the state. In addition, FRELIMO lacked legitimacy because it was unable to deliver. The organisation of elections provided FRELIMO with the necessary legitimacy and election monitoring provided credibility to these elections. In addition, ONUMOZ took up institution building, with the aim of creating politically neutral institutions. After the departure of ONUMOZ, the performance of the government remained poor and FRELIMO won the elections of 1999 in a questionable manner. As a consequence, its rule was delegitimised again, although not to the extent of prior to ONUMOZ.

ONUMOZ made both a positive and a negative contribution to unemployment and economic decline. The Mozambican economy was hit hard by the conflict, by lost trade relations, and droughts. A structural adjustment programme had been set in motion during the 1980s to strengthen it. The peace enabled the economy to grow further and the government to expand its reforms. In addition, UNOHAC lay the foundations for rehabilitation. In practice, the repatriation of refugees had a positive influence on economic growth. Simultaneously, mine clearance was unable to start in time to make a positive contribution. Moreover, the free food provided to the returnees and the humanitarian aid sometimes distorted the local market. In addition, since reintegration was insufficient, the demobilisation of soldiers increased unemployment. After an initial dip following the departure of ONUMOZ, Mozambique went through a period of further economic growth. Nonetheless, the country remained desperately poor and unemployment high.

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to external relations. Although the Southern African region remained far from stable, the end of the Cold War and the apartheid regime in South Africa meant the most important external causes of conflict had been removed by the time ONUMOZ arrived. As a consequence, its verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces was only the end of a chapter. After the departure of ONUMOZ, South Africa was further integrated into the South African region.

Summary

ONUMOZ made a positive contribution to six of the eight variables and especially to *negative peace* and state/government legitimacy. A large part of its contribution was, however, only temporary. In addition, many of the improvements with regard to the causes of the conflict were not the result of the presence of ONUMOZ, but of the end of the Cold War and FRELIMO's departure from Marxism. It is remarkable that ONUMOZ even had a mixed influence on *inter-group relations* and *unemployment and economic decline*. Moreover, ONUMOZ had little attention for some important causes of the conflict. In its mandate, *unemployment and economic decline*, and *inter-group relations* were not really touched upon, but also a long term approach for *state weakness*, and *state unwillingness and good governance* was missing. ONUMOZ seems to have been directed at short-term results. However, in order to obtain a more durable result, one might have expected more attention for national reconciliation, institution building, reintegration and rehabilitation, and human rights education. Nonetheless, ONUMOZ generally made a positive contribution to 'durable peace', as it managed to contribute to *negative peace* and sufficiently addressed the causes of the conflict to ensure that the negative peace lasted for longer than five years.

Table 12 - Indication of the contribution of ONUMOZ's policy tools¹⁵⁴

	Case-fire monitoring	Disarmament	Institution-building	Reintegration of ex-combatants	Winning the hearts and minds...	Civilian police monitoring	Sanctions verification	Diplomacy	Border monitoring	Providing pay to the newly-formed army	Reintegration of refugees	Reparations	Mine clearance	Humanitarian aid	Providing law and order	Society-building	Rehabilitation	Human rights education	Truth commission	Organisation of elections	Election monitoring		
Negative peace	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	
Inter-group relations																++/-							
Group demography																							
State weakness		0	+													+	+ ^t						
State unwillingness...					+				0										+ ^p	+ ^p	+ ^t	+	
State/government legitimacy					+																	++	++
Unemployment and econ. dec.		-									++ ^t	0 ^t											
External relations					++																		
Negative contribution:	--																						
Limited negative contribution:	-																						
No contribution:	0																						
		Limited positive contribution:																					
		Positive contribution:																					
		Temporary contribution:																					

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⁴ MANNING, "Constructing opposition in Mozambique", p. 178.

⁵ MANNING, "Constructing opposition in Mozambique", pp. 161-189; VINES, A. (1991), *RENAMO: terrorism in Mozambique*, London; NEWITT, *A history of Mozambique*, pp. 560-574; HERMELE, K. (May 1990), *Mozambican crossroads: economics and politics in the era of structural adjustment*, Report 1990(3), Bergen, p. 8; CAMMACK, D. (1987), "The 'human face' of destabilization: the war in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, 14(40), pp. 65-75; THOMPSON, C.B. (1988), "War by another name: destabilisation in Nicaragua and Mozambique", *Race & Class*, 29(4), pp. 21-44, on pp. 35-36; and NILSSON, A. (1993), "From pseudo-terrorists to pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, 20(57), pp. 60-71, on p. 67.

⁶ HERMELE, *Mozambican crossroads*, p. 8; CAMMACK, "The 'human face' of destabilization", pp. 65-75; NEWITT, *A history of Mozambique*, pp. 560-569; and THOMPSON, "War by another name", pp. 35-36.

⁷ THOMPSON, "War by another name", pp. 21-44, on pp. 35-36.

⁸ NEWITT, *A history of Mozambique*, pp. 569-574; and CAMMACK, "The 'human face' of destabilization", pp. 65-75.

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- ¹⁵ SYNGE, *Mozambique UN peacekeeping in action 1992-94*, p. 21.
- ¹⁶ SYNGE, *Mozambique UN peacekeeping in action 1992-94*, p. 15 and p. 52; UN DOC S/24635, General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 8 October 1992; "Document 11, Letter dated 29 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on United Nations involvement in implementation of the General Peace Agreement", in: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (1995), *The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, Blue books series*, 5, New York, pp. 102-104; and ALDEN & SIMPSON, "Mozambique: a delicate peace", p. 126.
- ¹⁷ General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, protocol I, 5; protocol III, VI, 1-i; protocol V, II-III, and protocol VI, I; and UN DOC S/RES/850 (1993), 9 July 1993.
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¹⁵⁴ The presentation of the assessment of the contribution of a policy tool on a variable in a five point scale has inherently two disadvantages. First of all, it does not encompass all the nuances of description. Secondly, the danger of subjectivity is inherently greater because one is forced to make a choice without these nuances. Yet, sometimes the difference between, for example, a positive contribution and a limited positive contribution is not all that clear cut. Nonetheless, this table is given to present a brief overview of the assessment of the contribution of the peacekeeping operation. One has to bear in mind, however, that it only serves as an indication. For the real and full assessment one has to turn to the description.



7 THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

7.1 The history of the conflict

7.1.1 *The context of the Rwandan conflict*

The population of Rwanda can be divided into three groups: Hutu (85 percent), Tutsi (14 percent), and Twa (1 percent).¹ These groups all speak the same language – Kinyarwanda, and share more or less the same culture. In the Hutu ‘social revolution’ of 1959, the Tutsi monarchy was abolished and Tutsi rule ended. It was said that the majority of the population – the Hutu – gained democratic control over their country at the cost of the former minority elite – the Tutsi. Many Tutsi fled their country and found refuge in neighbouring countries. After independence in 1962, the first republic under Kayibanda emphasised its Hutuness and the intrinsic value of being Hutu. In the following period until 1967, Tutsi refugees staged ten armed attempts to return. Each attempt was repressed by the Hutu, who then retaliated against the remaining Tutsi population. As a result, mutual hatred intensified. For example, 10,000 to 13,000 Tutsi were killed in the 1963 massacres.² As the threat of the Tutsi invasions diminished, it became increasingly apparent that Kayibanda lacked broad support. In 1972 he tried to revive his vitality by pointing to the developments in Burundi, where the Tutsi minority had massacred the Hutu in their struggle to cling on to power. Actions were organised against the Tutsi, but they did not receive massive support. Even worse, the strategy backfired as, quite apart from the ethnic context, people started to settle accounts. When unrest and violence were at their height in 1973, Major General Habyarimana seized power in a military coup d’etat. His second republic was ruled by the single party *Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement* (MRND). During his regime, a policy known as “establishing ethnic and regional balance” was institutionalised. Under this policy, large sections of Rwandese political and social life were dominated by quotas established according to ‘ethnic proportions’. In addition, the north of the country, where Habyarimana originated from, was favoured above the rest of the country. Although the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry continued, this period was a relatively non-violent period.³

7.1.2 *The conflict and negotiations*

The tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi arose again after Habyarimana announced in 1990 that a process of democratisation was to be started. In October of that year, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which consisted mainly of Tutsi refugees, launched an invasion from Uganda. As a consequence of this attack and government propaganda, all the Tutsi in Rwanda were labelled as RPF supporters. It was this linkage that created the environment for the massive genocidal killing of civilians in 1994. The war itself was of rather low intensity. The first attack by the RPF in 1990 was a failure. A subsequent attack on Ruhengeri was successful as that town was held for one day. In the following period, the fight settled down into typical guerrilla style hit-and-run operations by the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) in the north of the country. It slowly managed to gain control over some ‘liberated’ lands in this region, but neither the RPA nor the *Forces Armées*

Rwandaises (FAR) managed to gain the upper hand. With little chance of a quick victory for either side, the time was ripe for negotiation.⁴

The first phase of the negotiation process between the RPF and the Rwandese government was distinguished by the hope of the Habyarimana regime to isolate the RPF and Uganda and to give the conflict and its solution a regional rather than a national character. During this period, Tanzania and Zaire functioned as mediators between Rwanda and Uganda. Within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) several initiatives were undertaken to end the conflict. In October 1990, at a meeting of presidents from the Inter-Lacustine region in Zaire, an agreement in principle was reached to deploy a Neutral Military Observers Group (NMOG) of the OAU as a confidence-building measure. After the Rwandese government agreed, again in principle, to a cease-fire at the beginning of 1991, President Mobutu of Zaire was appointed as mediator. This resulted in the N'Sele cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1991. It was in N'Sele that the Rwandese government spoke directly with the RPF for the first time. By July 1991, in response to the call for further democratisation, the MRND changed its name to *Mouvement républicain national pour le développement et la démocratie* (MRNDD). As part of the democratisation process, from April 1992 onwards four opposition parties, the *Mouvement démocratique républicain* (MDR), the *Parti libéral* (PL), the *Parti démocrate chrétien* (PDC) and the *Parti social démocrate* (PSD) joined the MRNDD in the Rwandese government. These opposition parties received half the ministerial posts and the post of Head of State. However, under the constitution of June 1991 real power remained with the president of the republic, Habyarimana, who controlled the army and the police. Consequently, many actions of the prime minister and his ministers were obstructed by the MRNDD.⁵

The mediation attempts entered into a second phase during the Arusha peace process under the direction of Tanzania. Tanzania used the N'Sele cease-fire agreement as a blueprint for further negotiations. At a meeting held in Arusha in mid-July 1992, the RPF and the Rwandese government agreed that a truce was to come into effect a week later, followed by a cease-fire at the end of the month, which was to be verified by NMOG. Further peace talks started at the end of the month within the framework of a Joint Political Military Commission at the OAU secretariat in Addis Ababa. By the beginning of 1993, the RPF and the Rwandese government had signed several protocols on, amongst other things, the rule of law and the establishment of democracy, and power sharing during the transitional period. At the start of February, however, Habyarimana threatened to leave the talks and simultaneously Hutu extremist militia, the so-called *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*, increased their activities and the number of massacres. In reaction to these massacres, the RPF resumed hostilities, because, it argued, the Rwandese government continued to violate human rights. Its forces managed to advance to almost 30 kilometres from Kigali and doubled the size of territory under its control. This time, only the assistance from French forces and foreign pressure saved the Habyarimana regime. After a frequently violated truce mid-February, both parties confirmed a cease-fire, which did hold. At a high-level meeting in Dar-es-Salaam from 5 to 7 March, the parties talked about the further consolidation of the cease-fire and the resumption of peace negotiations. These negotiations resulted in an agreement that the government forces were to remain in their positions of 9 March, while the RPF forces were to retreat to their positions of before the resumption of the fighting on 8 February. The monitoring of this

withdrawal and the policing within the remaining buffer zone was to be implemented by NMOG. As the area to be monitored by NMOG under the latest agreement was enlarged in comparison with the July 1992 agreement, the size of NMOG also had to be expanded. For this reason, at the start of August, NMOG was to be replaced by the larger NMOG II. The peace talks in Arusha were resumed in mid-March 1993.⁶

In the meantime, the Ugandan government feared that the conflict would spread onto its own territory and wanted to head off future accusations of Ugandan involvement in the Rwanda conflict. For this reason, Kampala, together with Kigali, requested the deployment of a United Nations monitoring mission to observe that a buffer zone between the two countries was not infiltrated from either side of the border. In response, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to investigate the possibilities of such a deployment and the further possible role of a United Nations force for the verification of a cease-fire and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the OAU requested the United Nations to assist NMOG II, but the Secretary-General preferred to await the outcome of the Arusha peace process. Within a month, however, the talks in Arusha reached an impasse and it was feared that the conflict would flare up again. Nonetheless, a breakthrough was reached on 11 June 1993 when the Rwandese government and the RPF agreed on the deployment of the United Nations as a Neutral International Force. Subsequently, they requested the United Nations to prepare a force to be deployed as soon as a peace agreement was signed. In the meantime, the Security Council had agreed to the Secretary-General's advice to establish the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) to monitor the Ugandan-Rwandese border and to verify that no military aid was provided across the border. The mission was deployed by mid-August and reached its authorised strength by mid-October.⁷

On 4 August 1993, the Rwandese government and the RPF signed the Arusha Peace Agreement, which consisted of six protocols and the N'Sele cease-fire agreement. It was extremely detailed in order to mitigate as much fear, distrust and hatred as possible. The parties agreed to a transitional period of 22 months. A Broad-Based Transitional Government was to be set up on 10 September 1993 in which the MRNDD, the four internal opposition parties, the MDR, the PL, the PDC and the PSD, as well as the RPF, shared power, and, of which Twagiramungu was to become prime minister. NMOG II was to function as an interim measure until the deployment of the Neutral International Force, UNAMIR (see table 13).⁸

Table 13 – UNAMIR's mandate (including UNOMUR)

<i>Military aspects:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali; <i>inter alia</i>, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city; to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarised zone and other demilitarisation procedures; to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate, leading up to the elections; to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes; and
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	to investigate at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative, instances of alleged non-compliance with the provision of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General.
<i>Civilian police:</i>	to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.
<i>Humanitarian assistance:</i>	to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner; and to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.
<i>Administrative aspects:</i>	to provide information to the general public on the activities of the mission, through, amongst other things, access to an established radio station.
<i>UNOMUR:</i>	to monitor the Ugandan-Rwandese border and to verify that no military aid was being provided across the border

Source: Peace agreement between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Arusha, 4 August 1993; UN DOC S/26488, 24 September 1993; UN DOC S/RES/846 (1993), 22 June 1993; and UN DOC S/RES/872, 5 October 1993.


7.2 Portrayal of the parties


The Rwandan conflict can be subdivided into two levels: a national and an international level. At the time of the Arusha Agreement, at the national level the conflicting parties were on the one side the Government of Rwanda and the *Coalition pour la défense de la république* (CDR) and on the other side the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). At the international level of the Rwandese conflict, the government was aided by the Zaire, Kenya and France, while the RPF was supported by Uganda (see Figure 6). In addition, both Belgium and the United States were of enormous importance to the events.

7.2.1 Government of Rwanda

The government of Rwanda consisted of the old regime of Habyarimana and his MRNDD as well as the parties that were labelled the internal opposition, the former non-RPF opposition parties. Rwanda was represented in Arusha by a delegation that did not represent the effective power holders in the zones it controlled, as the negotiators were drawn mainly from the internal opposition parties and the moderate wing of the MRNDD. Real power, however, lay first and foremost with the clique surrounding president Habyarimana, the so-called *Akazu* (see below). The Presidential Guard became more or less their extension. This military unit was heavily involved in the war against the RPF and had a leading role in the establishment of the *Interahamwe* militia. Relations between the Presidential Guard and the regular army, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), were not good. The FAR was at the time of the peace agreement estimated to consist of 23,100 personnel, mainly located in the greater Kigali area and the northern part of the country. The government gendarmerie consisted of 6,000 personnel mainly deployed on the frontline.⁹ Their pay was low and as a result of the haste with which the recruits had been integrated into the army, their training suffered. In

addition, their discipline was very poor and during the genocide in 1994 it would become even poorer. Looting became commonplace.¹⁰





7.2.1.1 Mouvement républicain national pour le développement et la démocratie (MRNDD)

The MRNDD was divided between moderates who stood behind the Arusha peace process and Hutu extremists who viewed the Arusha Agreement as a “sell-out imposed by outsiders.” The latter group argued that the outcome of the process, the fact that the RPF was able to obtain the same number of ministerial posts as the MRNDD, 40 percent of the army personnel and half the officer corps, was “surrender to blackmail.”¹¹ Habyarimana followed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, he tried to maintain power through, amongst other things, the establishment of militia and attempts to delay and decelerate the peace process. On the other hand, he appeared to co-operate with the international community in negotiations and the implementation of the Arusha agreement. During the presence of UNAMIR, this strategy would become increasingly impracticable, as both legs of the strategy were no longer compatible. The *Akazu* or ‘little house’, which had started to organise itself in the early 1990s, had managed to dominate the most strategic positions in both national and regional governments by the time of the Arusha Peace Agreement. It was this group of Habyarimana’s household - Hutu from the north-west of the country - concentrated around his wife, that wanted to retain power and started to thwart the strategy. In order to avoid responsibility they contracted out the violence against the Tutsi and channelled it through irregular groups and militia such as the youth organisation of the MRNDD, called the *Interahamwe* - ‘those who attack together.’ Even prior to the 1994 genocide, this militia was able to impose a reign of terror and was involved in

massacres. The regular security forces did not prevent them from doing so and members of the presidential guard and members of the FAR even trained them.¹²

7.2.1.2 The internal opposition parties

Four opposition parties were included in the Government of Rwanda at the time of the Arusha Peace Agreement. These parties were a third pole in the Rwandan party system, located between MRNDD/CDR and the RPF. Nonetheless, during later events, all but one of these internal opposition parties split, with factions choosing the Hutu extremist line, referred to as 'Hutu power', and other factions moving more in the direction of the RPF.

- *Mouvement démocrate républicain (MDR)*: The largest opposition party was the MDR, which had a broad populist approach, but was mainly supported by the old power base of Kayibanda in central Rwanda. The moderate faction was led by the designated prime minister Twagiramungu and prime minister Uwilingiyimana. The Hutu power faction would become one of the driving forces of the genocide in southern Rwanda.¹³
- *Parti libéral (PL)*: The PL was mainly an urban party with support throughout the country. Its ethnic stance was liberal and therefore it attracted many children of urban mixed marriages and richer Tutsi, but also businessmen. Its leader wanted to join 'Hutu power', while many of the party members - especially the Tutsi - did not agree.¹⁴
- *Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC)*: The PDC was a Christian Democratic party, which had difficulty in establishing itself as the church and the Christian Democratic International both supported the MRNDD. It was the smallest of the four major opposition parties.¹⁵
- *Parti social démocrate (PSD)*: The PSD was the only one of the four major opposition parties to remain united. It drew its main supporters from the southern region, which was historically milder in 'ethnic' terms. The PSD mainly attracted teachers, civil servants and professionals.¹⁶

7.2.2 Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR)

The CDR was very close to the extremist wing of the MRNDD. As both had the same agenda and in fact, to a certain extent, the same membership, co-operation was not unheard of. Although the number of supporters of the CDR was relatively small, its influence and power were significant. However, the CDR and other Hutu extremists were neither co-opted nor neutralised in the peace process. As a consequence, they had nothing to lose and remained in a position to derail the peace process. Moreover, they were able to use the period of the Arusha negotiations to prepare for genocide and also to turn the CDR youth organisation into a militia, called the *Impuzamugambi* - 'those who have a single aim.' The path of genocide was chosen because, with to a certain extent events in Somalia in mind, they did not expect any international intervention to put an end to it.¹⁷

7.2.3 Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)

The RPF was non-ethnic in its principles, and had clear visions and goals. Its organisation was united and disciplined, its leadership was of high quality, and its negotiating team in Arusha was a strong one. In the end, the RPF signed the Arusha agreement under pressure from, amongst others, the parties guaranteeing its implementation, the United Nations, France, Belgium and the United States. In the view of the RPF, they were to assume responsibility for the implementation of

the whole Arusha agreement in a broad sense; not only the cease-fire, but also the protocol on the rule of law had to be guaranteed. As human rights and elections were an important part of this protocol, it expected UNAMIR to verify human rights and the elections. Moreover, the RPF argued that the guarantors had to stick to their promises, if necessary by force. Nonetheless, Habyarimana was, even beforehand, not expected to co-operate and it was anticipated that the guarantors would not fulfil their job. However, the RPF could, for self-defence purposes, fall back on its military branch, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), which consisted of 20,000 men at the time of the Arusha Agreement and was mainly concentrated to the north of the DMZ.¹⁸ Initially in 1990, the army had consisted of 4,000 to 7,000 Tutsi refugees many of whom had served before in the Ugandan armed forces.¹⁹ Although the recruitment of the RPF benefited from the increasing dissatisfaction amongst the population with the lack of good governance in Rwanda, the main reasons why the RPF had become so strong were that it had received decisive political and military support from Uganda, and as a result of 'involvement by victimisation' it had benefited from the attacks on and the massacres of the Tutsi population. The soldiers were well trained and battle hardened, had high morale and a sense of purpose, and obeyed a strict code of conduct.²⁰

7.2.4 Zaire

Zaire, governed by President Mobutu, was a long time supporter of the Habyarimana regime. Not only did the country provide weapons, but also the manpower to conduct operations against the RPF. These forces were provided immediately after the start of the conflict in 1990, but were later withdrawn when the conflict raged on, not in the first place because their undisciplined deeds were of little help.²¹

7.2.5 Kenya

The Habyarimana regime and Kenya, under President Arap Moi, maintained friendly relations and Kenya supported Kigali in its struggle against the RPF. This was done partly because both presidents were known to be friends, but also because Arap Moi mistrusted the intentions of Museveni's Uganda.²²

7.2.6 France

Even before the start of the civil war in 1990, the French government was an important supporter of the Habyarimana regime. This aid within the context of the French politics of *francophonie* was not so much directed by commercial or strategic interests, but much more by prestige and international stature. Moreover, relations between the Rwandan regime and France were strengthened by the personal and business connections between their leaders and their families, e.g. between the sons of Mitterand and Habyarimana. French military aid also continued after the conflict started, and during February 1993 some 680 French soldiers were essential in halting the RPF advance. In addition, many witnesses have confirmed that France trained the militia. In addition to this 'hard track' support for the Habyarimana regime, France also followed a 'soft track' and pushed the government and Habyarimana towards negotiations. However, these two tracks were far from complementary, because, as a result of the hard track, the Rwandan government had little incentive to pursue the soft track negotiations. This support continued even well into the period of genocide, when French forces

established the safe 'zone Turquoise' and referred to it as a success, because they had drawn "a line in the sand" against the advancing rebel forces²³ After the genocide, Paris also continued to be one of the main opponents of the RPF government and obstructed support for the new government, including support in the EU²⁴

7 2 7 Uganda

The RPF was publicly supported by the Ugandan president Museveni and received either direct or indirect military and financial aid through Ugandan state structures The RPF offensive in 1990 was organised from Ugandan territory mainly by Tutsi émigrés residing in that country By the start of the Rwanda conflict, they and their children amounted to some 200,000²⁵ Many of these émigrés had fought in the Ugandan National Resistance Army of Museveni and had helped to bring him to power in 1986 Once in power, Museveni was criticised because, although the émigrés were still regarded as foreigners, many of them acquired high positions within the Ugandan government and security system His support for the RPF was to bring the Rwandans home in order to counteract this criticism In addition, some Ugandans genuinely supported the RPF cause and supported the Tutsi émigrés out of a feeling of gratitude Others supported the RPF out of self-interest, as they blamed the Rwandans for a lack of land and few employment opportunities, and hoped to safeguard their jobs from their competition by aiding them²⁶

7 2 8 Belgium

Until the start of the civil war in 1990, the former colonial power of Belgium had been the main supplier of military aid to the Rwandan government When the conflict started, Brussels soon sent 535 troops in order, it was said, to protect Belgian nationals, but it was a public secret that these troops also aided the Habyarimana regime However, in contrast to the French, the Belgian forces were later withdrawn as Brussels was not allowed to provide lethal aid to countries at war Belgium merely continued to provide uniforms and military training Nonetheless, the RPF remained suspicious of the Belgians when they returned to Rwanda to form the backbone of UNAMIR²⁷

7 2 9 United States

The United States was reluctant to intervene in Rwanda One of the main reasons for this was that public opinion was somewhat hesitant about peacekeeping operations after the TV coverage of the debacle in Mogadishu, in which United States servicemen had been dragged through the streets of the Somali capital On 3 May 1994, well into the period of genocide, President Clinton even signed policy directive PPD-25 which stated that peace operations were not and could not be the centrepiece of American foreign policy The deployment of UN peace operations had to be more selective and effective, because only properly conceived and well-executed peace operations could be regarded as a useful element in serving America's interests²⁸ Up to the moment that it became impossible to refute it was even American policy to avoid the term genocide altogether since the term would have implied an obligation to intervene After 1994, perhaps out of shame, Washington was to become one of the RPF's staunchest supporters, both politically and militarily²⁹

7.3 The history of a peacekeeping operation

7.3.1 High hopes, rising tension

At its establishment, there were high hopes for the future of UNAMIR. The United Nations had been severely criticised over Somalia and Bosnia and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations hoped that the successful outcome of the operation in Rwanda might improve their image.³⁰ Within the Belgian army the operation was even jokingly referred to as 'Club Med.'³¹ However, below the surface, and unbeknown to most decision makers, there were signs that UNAMIR would not be an easy nut to crack. One week after the peace agreement was signed, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions reported on his latest mission to Rwanda. Although he argued it was not for him to pass judgement, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide might be considered to apply to the cases of inter-communal violence in Rwanda.³² Nonetheless, his report seems to have been ignored or overlooked by the key players in the United Nations system.³³

In Arusha the parties had agreed that on 10 September, less than 6 weeks after the signing of the agreement, the Broad-Based Transitional Government was to be set up. Before its installation, however, the neutral international force had to be deployed, the foreign forces had to be withdrawn from Rwanda, and the RPF had to deploy a battalion in Kigali. It was, nonetheless, explained to the parties that it was impossible to deploy the forces by the agreed date, due to the decision making process within the United Nations, amongst other reasons. The Secretary-General was, however, concerned about the consequences that a delay in establishing the Broad-Based Transitional Government would have on the peace process. The Security Council approved the establishment of UNAMIR, and integrated UNOMUR administratively into it, only two days after 18 United States soldiers were killed in Mogadishu and American reservations about peacekeeping operations increased. In addition, several member states argued that the United Nations was already over-committed with 70,000 troops in the field and Rwanda received only low priority. It was for these reasons, amongst others, that the Security Council did not explicitly include the disarmament of armed gangs in the mandate and also weakened the security guarantee as provided for in the Arusha peace agreement.³⁴

The deployment of UNAMIR commenced at the end of October and on 1 November NMOG II was integrated into the operation. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General Booh-Booh immediately faced a troubled situation. After the *coup d'etat* in Burundi on 21 October there was a flow of refugees to Rwanda, which was followed by allegations of cross-border military movements. According to the Secretary-General, this created a "potentially destabilizing situation."³⁵ In addition, the situation in the DMZ was very unstable, and UNAMIR investigations revealed that a well-armed group operating in the area aimed to derail the peace process. As a result, tension mounted, leading to incidents in November and December. In order to monitor the DMZ, it was decided to deploy one battalion earlier than planned. In addition, with a view to diffusing the tension, a meeting was organised in December in Kinyihira at which the RPF and the government of Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to the peace agreement and agreed to set up the Broad-Based Transitional Government before the end of 1993. Later that month, the Kigali weapons-secure area was established and the RPF security battalion arrived.³⁶

7.3.2 Deadlock and early warnings

Not only did the military situation destabilise after the *coup d'etat* in Burundi, but the whole political landscape also started to change radically. Reacting to the massacres in Burundi, extremists from both the government and the internal opposition parties met and declared that Rwandese Hutu should unite in the 'Hutu power' movement to join their Burundese brothers in the battle against the Tutsi. Subsequently, the political system changed from tripolar to bipolar. Up to that moment, internal opposition had been between the RPF and the MRND. Thereafter, the internal opposition parties split into two wings, one siding with the RPF and one with the MRND. As a result, the internal opposition was no longer in a position to play its de-escalating role, and in this new bipolar situation the peace process was no longer a matter of course. On the one hand, the RPF might lose the elections because it could no longer count on the support of the entire opposition. The MRND, the CDR and the Hutu extremists, on the other hand, were sure to lose ground in the elections as they were forced to share power with the RPF. Subsequently, in spite of the agreement of Kinshasa, the Broad-Based Transitional Government was not set up by 31 December 1993 because the parties were not able to agree on the modalities. On 5 January 1993, only Habyarimana was sworn in as President of the Republic. The deadlock in the formation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government directly affected the timetable of both the peace process and UNAMIR and led to a further deterioration of the political climate.³⁷

In January, an analyst from the CIA predicted that as many as half a million people might die should there be renewed conflict. This prediction was, however, not regarded as credible and was buried in the agency's piles of paper.³⁸ On 11 January 1994, the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Dallaire, sent a fax to New York in which he disclosed that a "very very important government politician" – who later proved to be the designated Prime Minister Twagiramungu – had put him in contact with an informant who had revealed to him a plan to provoke renewed civil war. The plan included killing a number of Belgian peacekeepers in order to guarantee the Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. The informant disclosed that he had been ordered to register the names of all the Tutsi, who, he thought, had something to do with their extermination. He expected that the plan was to commence when the political deadlock had ended. Dallaire informed New York that he was going to seize the arms caches and needed guidance on protecting the informant.³⁹ To the surprise of Dallaire, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Annan, replied that disarmament was not part of the mandate and that UNAMIR was to take no action other than to inform the president that the United Nations was aware of the plans and to insist that he would take the appropriate measures. It was underlined that "the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions."⁴⁰ Accordingly, Habyarimana was informed, and he subsequently denied all knowledge of the plans and promised to investigate them. The Secretary-General later commented that "such situations and alarming reports from the field, though considered with the utmost seriousness by United Nations officials, are not uncommon within the context of peace-keeping operations."⁴¹ On 3 February DPKO authorised UNAMIR to assist the Rwandese Government with the recovery of illegal arms caches. On 28 February UNAMIR was also authorised to redeploy 200 men from the northern DMZ to Kigali.⁴² In February, several attempts were made to establish the Broad-Based Transitional government on 14 February, but they all failed. Diplomatic

interventions by UNAMIR, the OAU, observer states to the peace process, and governments in the region, and Tanzania in particular, were all unable to break the deadlock. After a number of political leaders had been assassinated, political tension intensified.⁴³ The security situation in Kigali in particular worsened. The parties did not respect the weapons-secure area established in and around the city.⁴⁴ At the same time, the rumours of militia stockpiling arms became much more widespread. Some Rwandese leaders even acknowledged that further continuation of the political deadlock could result in an “irreversible explosion of violence.” The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Claes warned that “UNAMIR might find itself unable to continue effectively its basic mission of playing a major supporting role in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.”⁴⁵ In March the Hutu extremist newspaper *Kangura* predicted the assassination of President Habyarimana, followed by massacres.⁴⁶ In his cables to New York in the weeks before the 1994 genocide, the Force Commander of UNAMIR repeated the phrase “the situation is deteriorating rapidly” eleven times.⁴⁷

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General warned the parties that “the UN’s patience is running out. If war breaks out again, the UN mandate would be seriously compromised and we would have to pull out.”⁴⁸ In his progress report of 30 March, the Secretary-General advised the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for another half a year. However, he believed it was necessary for the transitional institutions to be established within two months. If this was not the case, and if by then no further progress had been made in the implementation of the peace agreement, he advised the Security Council to review the situation, “including the role of the United Nations.”⁴⁹ The Council, in turn, decided to extend the mandate by four months, with a six-week review provision. There was increased pressure on Habyarimana to stop his delaying tactics and to start implementing the Arusha Agreement. Oddly enough, these threats were counterproductive because it was precisely those people who frustrated the power-sharing who dreamed of the United Nations’ withdrawal.⁵⁰

By the end of March, the impending genocide had become an open secret. This was possible partly because bald statements were rare and rumours appeared to be ‘crying wolf.’ After all, the boy had cried ‘wolf’ so many times before. The predictions of an ‘apocalypse’ simply seemed to be implausible. Moreover, the average Tutsi was too busy with day-to-day survival. Had the Tutsi known in advance, then they would certainly have fled the country. It is true, however, that in March 1994 many human rights activists evacuated their families from Kigali, fearing for their safety. Many people did expect more massacres along the lines of the massacres of the 1990-1993 period. They did, however, not expect the genocide that followed.⁵¹ Without the benefit of hindsight, it would seem that predicting genocide was not as easy as is often suggested.

7.3.3 *Apocalypse*

On 6 April 1994, both Habyarimana and the president of Burundi Ntaryamira were present at a regional summit meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam. At this meeting Habyarimana gave in to international pressure and promised to speed-up the transitional process. It is said that Habyarimana had instructed his administration to draw up a communiqué on this matter and that now the *Akazu* felt forced to act in order to prevent the possible implementation of the Arusha Agreement, including its power-sharing arrangements.⁵² That night, when both presidents were returning together to Kigali, their plane crashed after being fired upon. Both

presidents were killed. The government-controlled radio attributed the shooting down of the plane to the RPF and the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR. Who exactly did shoot down the plane has never been established, though many allegations were made – the French, the *genocidaires* led by the *Akazu*, the Belgians, the RPF, or white mercenaries. Although initially the *genocidaires* were the main suspects, investigations were started by the ICTR into possible RPF involvement.⁵³

The following period was one of extreme violence. There are two scenarios of exactly what happened after the plane was shot down. The first is given by the Secretary-General, the Commission of Experts and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. They argue that immediately after the plane had been shot down, the Presidential Guard started to kill civilians in the vicinity of the airport. Within 30 to 45 minutes, before the news could be spread on national radio, militia aligned to the MRNDD and the CDR, the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi* respectively, aided by the gendarmerie and the FAR, set up road blocks at which identity papers were checked, Tutsi were taken aside and killed. During the night of 6 to 7 April, the violence spread throughout the city. Members of the Presidential Guard, the armed forces and militia went from house to house killing civilians, including women and children. The massacres were carried out in a carefully planned and concerted manner and in conjunction with radio stations which broadcast hate speeches and also incited ‘normal’ civilians to ‘crush’ the Tutsi *inyenzi* - ‘cockroaches’. Some of the perpetrators were seen using old maps and lists of victims compiled from data from the 1992-1993 census, which provided, amongst other things, information about the ethnic background of the citizens of Rwanda. The massacres were horrific. Victims were bludgeoned to death with machetes, axes, iron bars et cetera. No-one was spared, not even babies. And if anyone tried to escape they were hunted down even in churches, orphanages and hospitals.⁵⁴ The explanation that this exceptionally swift pace of events was attributable to a spontaneous reaction following the death of the popular president was deemed to be “hardly convincing” by the Commission of Experts. It argued that when the killings started, news of the crash had not yet actually been disseminated.⁵⁵

Nonetheless, the second explanation maintains that although the killings were perhaps planned in advance, their timing had been unknown. This explanation therefore places the start of the massacres not within half an hour, but after FAR Colonel Bagosora had returned from a meeting on the situation with, amongst others, the UNAMIR Force Commander. It was only after this meeting that he was able to organise the Presidential Guard to kill the most important people needed to keep up the peace process. After half-past-five in the morning, the prime minister Uwilingiyimana, the chairman and vice-chairman of the parliament who were in a position to succeed the prime minister, the judges of the Supreme Court, who were needed to swear in a new prime minister, and ten members of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR were all murdered. According to this explanation, it was only later that morning that the militia started their part of the job, as described above. In this explanation, the roadblocks mentioned in the first explanation, were the normal roadblocks which, at that time, were set up each night in Kigali.⁵⁶

Both explanations again exhibit similarity having informed UNAMIR it felt compelled to protect the lives of the Tutsi population, the RPF battalion in Kigali broke out and engaged the FAR and Presidential Guard on 7 April. The new strategy of UNAMIR was to secure a cease-fire agreement in Kigali and to promote the establishment of an interim political authority to fill the political vacuum.

These efforts were, however, without result. Subsequently, the governments of Belgium and France organised an operation to evacuate foreign nationals, as well as the civilian staff of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel. During the following days and weeks the killings spread throughout the country. In the early hours of 7 April, killings had already been reported from such major towns as Gisenyi and Kibuye. In Butare it was not until 19 April that the killings started. All these killings involved not only Tutsi Hutu moderates who had or who were viewed to have associated themselves with the Tutsi, were also seen as traitors to their own 'ethnic' group. This latter group of victims consisted mainly of human rights activists and members of the internal opposition. Within two weeks the total number of deaths was estimated to be in the tens of thousands.⁵⁷

On a political level, the high command of the FAR and the gendarmerie set up a 'crisis committee'. This committee called on the five political parties that formed the transitional government to meet in search of solutions to the problems. Members of the five parties did indeed agree to establish a 'provisional government', which was sworn in on 9 April and was headed by Prime Minister Kambanda. In addition, the committee called upon the RPF to sign a cease-fire agreement for Kigali. Not surprisingly, the RPF rejected this. The members of the 'provisional government' were close associates of the Habyarimana regime and were heavily involved in the massacres and unfolding genocide. Nonetheless, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General gave them at least his tacit support. In the meantime, RPF units moved from the DMZ to Kigali and joined the battalion that was already there. Authority in Kigali collapsed and the 'provisional government' was forced to flee on 12 April after some of its members were killed and it started to disintegrate. The fights between the FAR and the RPF only intensified.⁵⁸

In response to the killing of 10 of its troops, Belgium decided to withdraw its forces as it viewed the threat to be unacceptably high, and a continuation of UNAMIR under the existing mandate to be pointless. Subsequently, the Security Council faced some tough decisions on the future of UNAMIR. The Secretary-General did, however, not find it necessary to end his tour of Europe early. In his absence, the Security Council was informed by officials from the secretariat who did not show a lot of dedication or sense of emergency and were non-committal. Moreover, as a member of the Council, the 'provisional government', which at home was responsible for the genocide, kept the other members in New York apprised of the situation. At the same time, it received inside information on the discussions within the Council with regard to the future of UNAMIR. As a result, the members of the Council had little information and very little was done to stop the genocide, which finally resulted in the deaths of some 800,000 people.⁵⁹

7.3.4 UNAMIR has to adapt

Before continuing, it must be stressed that it was not at all clear at this stage whether what was happening in Rwanda was indeed genocide. For example, on 17 April, Des Forges from Human Rights Watch wrote an article in the Washington Post in which she mentioned the words 'civil war' and the 'systematic elimination of political opponents', but she did not use the term 'genocide'. Neither did she mention the likelihood of genocide, although Human Rights Watch later claimed that informed observers must have known what was happening from the outset.⁶⁰ By mid-April 1994, genocide was, in the words of Uvin, "by no means the only possible interpretation of the events."⁶¹ The International Panel of Eminent

Personalities of the Organization of African Unity concluded “that the international community knew the following that something terrible was under way in Rwanda, that serious plans were afoot for even more appalling deeds, that these went far beyond routine thuggery [] That does not mean that the world knew that by 1993 or 1994, genocide was systematically being planned and organized. In fact it seems to us likely that hardly anyone could bring themselves to believe this was the case”⁶² It was only at the end of the second week of the genocide that well-informed NGOs started to use the term ‘genocide’ which forced governments and the United Nations to debate whether that term was indeed applicable⁶³

As it became impossible for UNAMIR to continue the tasks within their remit, the mission dedicated itself to securing a cease-fire agreement followed by political negotiations, protecting United Nations civilian staff, protecting, as far as possible, both foreign and Rwandese nationals, negotiating a truce to enable the evacuation of expatriates, assisting in the evacuation, rescuing individuals and groups trapped in the fighting, and providing humanitarian aid to IDPs under the protection of UNAMIR. One week following the start of the genocide, based on the assumption that a cease-fire agreement would be reached, the Secretary-General put forward two options for UNAMIR to the Security Council. The first option was to retain UNAMIR for a period of three weeks, during which the parties had to arrive at an agreement to retain the Arusha process, otherwise UNAMIR was to be withdrawn. The second option was to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR for an indefinite period until a political agreement had been reached. However, by 20 April the Secretary-General had to conclude that there were no prospects in the short term for a cease-fire agreement and a return to the peace process under the Arusha agreement. Again, he provided the Security Council with alternatives, this time three of them. The first was the immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change of both the mandate and equipment to coerce the parties under chapter VII of the Charter into a cease-fire, to end the killings and to make the way clear for the provision of humanitarian aid. This alternative was preferred by both the ‘provisional government’ and the surrounding countries. The second alternative was to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR and to retain a small group to assist in the negotiations for a cease-fire and to assist in the resumption of humanitarian aid. The third alternative was the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.⁶⁴ The United States government was an advocate of the full withdrawal of UNAMIR and initially opposed continuation of the operation. It argued that “the Security Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation”⁶⁵ Although, partial or full withdrawal was not favoured by the regional governments and the OAU, these options in particular were contemplated in the Security Council. On 21 April, the Council decided to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR (see table 14) and to reduce the size of the force to 270 personnel.⁶⁶

Table 14 – UNAMIR’s adapted mandate of 21 April 1994

- a) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;
- b) To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and
- c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with the Mission

Source: UN DOC S/1994/470, 20 April 1994, 15-18; and UN DOC S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994.

In the meantime, the situation had deteriorated even further both in and outside Kigali. Kigali was split into two sectors: one sector was government controlled, and the other RPF controlled. The massacres continued apace in and outside the city. The revised mandate did not enable UNAMIR to bring the massacres to a halt, and both parties started to express their lack of confidence in UNAMIR. As the massacres continued and started to become a threat to the international security of the region, the Secretary-General requested the Security Council to re-examine the mandate given to UNAMIR. The United States, nonetheless, opposed increasing the size of UNAMIR and deemed the present size incapable of protecting refugees. It resisted referring to the events in Rwanda as: ‘genocide.’ It feared that the use of the ‘g-word’ would commit the United States government to ‘do something’, because it would be obliged to intervene under the Genocide Convention.⁶⁷ Only in his statement of 30 April did the President of the Security Council refer indirectly to genocide for the very first time. He spoke of “serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict”, but did not point out who the guilty were, and remained neutral.⁶⁸ Although the United States supported and sought an arms embargo, it had envisioned beforehand that its impact would not be significant because “machetes, knives and other hand implements have been the most common weapon.”⁶⁹

Both inside Rwanda and in Arusha, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of UNAMIR tried to bring about a new cease-fire agreement. However, their efforts were to no avail. Although such a cease-fire agreement was a necessity for the reactivation of the Arusha peace process, according to the Secretary-General, it was essential to consider in the meantime what measures could be taken before such a cease-fire was achieved.⁷⁰ It was only in a cable on 6 May that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General changed the priorities of UNAMIR away from the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and requested in the first place that UNAMIR was to be enabled to stop the killing and only in the second place to continue the efforts to reach a cease-fire.⁷¹

7.3.5 UNAMIR II

Although the Secretary-General remained convinced that the Arusha peace agreement was the solution to the crisis and both parties still claimed that they accepted the agreement, there was no cease-fire on which the implementation could be built. Until such a cease-fire was agreed to and implemented, provisional measures were needed to tackle the humanitarian crisis. In response to intense media coverage of the human suffering, the tide started to turn and the United States, amongst others, started to consider the developments in Rwanda as part of

their own ‘national security interests.’⁷² By mid-May, the Secretary-General set out his plans for an expanded mandate of UNAMIR II, which was to support and provide safe conditions for IDPs and other groups in need in Rwanda, and to assist humanitarian organisations with the provision of assistance. The rules of engagement did not provide for enforcement actions and the mission “would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks.” A credible, well-armed and highly mobile force of 5,500 troops was deemed necessary to implement the mandate. The force was to be at full strength within one month from 17 May 1994, the date when the resolution authorising this expanded mandate was adopted (see table 15). In addition, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.⁷³

Table 15 – UNAMIR’s expanded mandate from 17 May 1994

- a-c) see table 14;
- d) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and
- e) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

Source: UN DOC S/1994/565, 13 May 1994; and UN DOC S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994.

By 19 May it was clear that the death toll was in the hundreds of thousands of civilians, including women and children. It was also obvious that torture had been practised on a large scale and that millions of civilians had been forced to leave their homes. The United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights called it a “human rights tragedy of unprecedented dimensions.”⁷⁴ Finally, six weeks after the start of the genocide and three weeks after the start of debate on the applicability of that term to Rwanda, the United States permitted the use of the ‘g-word’.⁷⁵ International organisations and countries, as well as the ‘provisional government’, called for a cease-fire. Although the RPF agreed that a cease-fire was needed, it argued that it could only be considered if the killing of civilians came to a stop, if human rights violations were to be investigated, and humanitarian assistance was to be given to those in need. However, the ‘provisional government’ claimed it was unable to control the militia and their ‘excesses.’⁷⁶

The Secretary-General acknowledged at the end of May that the Arusha process had broken down after 6 April. Although both parties still declared that the principles of the Arusha agreement remained valid as a framework, each stated that certain parts of the agreement had to be renegotiated as a result of the new situation.⁷⁷ The adaptations of the mandate of 21 April and 17 May had been made with at least the hope of return to the Arusha peace process. However, these chances were fading and it became increasingly clear that all that was left for UNAMIR was to clean up the humanitarian mess. The fate of the implementation of the Arusha Agreement was only sealed when the RPF gained full control over Rwandan territory except for ‘Turquoise’ - a French humanitarian zone.

Although a further description of UNAMIR II would certainly enrich the empirical findings of this case study, an important criterion in the case selection of this study is that the peacekeeping operation has a peace-building aim and that the mandate of the peacekeeping operation studied is based on a peace agreement. This was no longer the case with the new mandate of UNAMIR. In addition,

although the mandate of UNAMIR II could be translated into ‘policy tools’, they would not match the ‘tools’ used in other operations. It would, therefore, not serve the comparison between the cases in the structured, focused comparison as it is too deviant. For these reasons, UNAMIR II will not be included in the structured, focused comparison. Therefore, this chapter deals with UNAMIR I in the post-presence description and with UNAMIR II in the post-presence description. In this way, as UNAMIR II played an important role during the post-presence period of UNAMIR I, not all empirical findings are lost. Moreover, extra attention is given to UNAMIR II in the description of the post-presence period.

7.4 The variables

7.4.1 *Negative peace*

Initially in 1990 the RPA’s strategy was one of conventional warfare. However, the result of the invasion was devastating and within a month the remnants of the RPA were forced to flee back to Uganda or hide inside Rwanda. However, within another month, under the new leader Kagame, the RPA managed to regroup and shifted to a guerrilla strategy. It obtained safe sanctuaries amongst the Tutsi population, which led the government to take harsh measures. Tutsi civilians fell victim to attacks by the *Interahamwe* and the Presidential Guard. Rwandan society became militarised through the expansion of the army and the Presidential Guard, and the establishment of militia. The two Rwandan parties became entangled in an arms race. In its struggle against the RPF, the government distributed weapons amongst the population and to the militia throughout the country. The conflict, however, was confined to the north and north-east. It is therefore not likely that the build-up of these forces throughout the country was driven only by the need to fight the RPA. On 12 July 1992, a cease-fire was agreed in Arusha, but the diplomatic process stagnated and Hutu extremists were even more bent on massacring Tutsi. Reacting to these massacres, the RPF resumed hostilities in February 1993. This time the attack was very successful, as the RPA forces advanced to almost 30 kilometres from Kigali and doubled the territory under their control. Only the assistance from French forces and foreign pressure prevented them from going on. Later that month, both parties confirmed the cease-fire and adhered to it.

During its presence the following ‘policy tools’ implemented by UNAMIR influenced or were intended to influence *negative peace*:

- *Cease-fire monitoring*: Even before the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, the parties requested the United Nations to prepare for the tasks assigned to it in the agreement. They requested the deployment of a Neutral International Force of the United Nations to monitor the observance by the parties to the cease-fire and to neutralise Kigali. Should the cease-fire be violated, this Neutral International Force was to “track down the perpetrators.”⁷⁸ The operation commenced on 5 October 1993 and on 1 November NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. Although the Arusha Peace Agreement had requested the Neutral International Force to neutralise Kigali, the Security Council had given UNAMIR only the mandate to ‘contribute’ to the security of the city. This task was implemented by the establishment of the weapons-secure area at the end of December 1993. With the arrival of the RPF battalion in Kigali, all the military tasks of UNAMIR from before the start of the demobilisation process were completed. Moreover, the presence of UNAMIR initially resulted in a

feeling of stabilisation, as the parties were more restrained and the militia less violent. The cease-fire was generally respected until the end of 1993, though tension mounted. The *coup d'état* in Burundi was followed by the emergence of a flow of refugees to southern Rwanda, and allegations of cross-border military movements. Initially observers were deployed early on, but later an extra military sector was established in order to deal with the situation. At the same time, in November, in and around the DMZ, civilians were killed in a number of separate incidents. Investigations by UNAMIR revealed that a well-armed group operating in the area aimed to derail the peace process. For this reason, the Security Council approved the early deployment of a second battalion to promptly acquire full capacity to monitor the region. The presence of 1,000 troops in the zone increased the ability to monitor and provided security and consequently the number of cease-fire violations decreased.⁷⁹ The deadlock in the formation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government not only affected the timetable of the peace process, but also the security situation in the country and the peace process as a whole. By the end of March 1994, although the UNAMIR was already at peak strength, it could not continue the further implementation of its timetable.

With the start of the genocide the cease-fire was no longer feasible. The RPF engaged the 'provisional government' in Kigali and advanced its forces from the DMZ towards the capital. As a consequence, UNAMIR not only faced the genocide, but also a renewed civil war. Simultaneously, following the attack and death of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, the Belgian withdrawal weakened UNAMIR's capacity. Within six weeks, estimates of the death toll ranged from 200,000 to half a million civilians, so there was not much negative peace left.⁸⁰ Although initially in the short run UNAMIR's cease-fire monitoring may have made a positive contribution to *negative peace*, eventually it did not in the medium and longer terms. Several factors contributed to this result.

Firstly, although the United Nations had made it clear that, if approved, the deployment of the force could take up to three months, the parties feared that any delay in establishing the transitional Government might lead to the collapse of the peace process and therefore decided to adopt an "over-optimistic" timetable for rapid deployment within one month.⁸¹ As a result, although UNAMIR was deployed relatively quickly for a peacekeeping operation, it did not reach the time set by the Arusha Agreement. As the implementation of the Arusha Agreement depended on trust and confidence between the parties, which had to be maintained through the adherence to the timetables, this was a severe blow.

Secondly, both parties had hoped for a large and strong United Nations operation. Military experts from the UN argued they needed 8,000 and a minimum of 5,000 troops to do the job.⁸² However, the Secretariat believed that the Security Council would never agree to such numbers, and eventually the Security Council only approved the 2,548 military personnel the Secretary-General recommended.⁸³ In the first months of 1994, the Force Commander requested reinforcements and ammunition to cope with the increasing violence, but to no avail. He cabled that the situation was a "disgrace" because UNAMIR did not have any fuel, barbed wire, sandbags and petty cash, and had only one working armoured personnel carrier left.⁸⁴ As the force was only planned, equipped and dimensioned for a best-case scenario, it lacked the capabilities for the proactive and assertive action needed in a worst-

case scenario During the worst-case scenario that developed, the operational strength and equipment was not increased, but even received a further blow with the decision to withdraw the Belgian contingent The Force Commander later argued that the FAR was terrified at first and that a promptly deployed well-trained force of 5,000 men who were already in the region for, amongst other reasons, the evacuation of the foreigners, would have been sufficiently intimidating to do the job⁸⁵ The choice to withdraw the peacekeepers bolstered the confidence of the Hutu extremists, who were aware that they were being given a free hand to continue and expand the implementation of their genocide⁸⁶ Later, the Security Council reduced the size of UNAMIR even further Not only was no country willing to contribute troops to an expanded UNAMIR, but the Security Council also faced the dilemma between its duties in Rwanda and the protection of the lives of peacekeepers The latter were deemed more important as it was reasoned that more fatalities would undoubtedly bring more criticism and fewer resources to future UN peacekeeping operations⁸⁷

Thirdly, the quality of the force was at times questionable In particular, the Bangladeshi logistical base and medical support were extremely weak, because, amongst other things, they lacked the necessary tools to function, as it was believed the United Nations would provide them with the necessary supplies In addition, command and control, especially during the first hours of the genocide, was poor Units were scattered and communication between them was hampered The force lacked the intelligence needed to provide it with the necessary direction Within days the Belgian contingent fell under the command of the national evacuation troops and the Bangladeshi contingent no longer responded to orders from UNAMIR command In addition, any previous harmony amongst the contingents was lost Moreover, during the genocide, co-ordination between the forces on the ground and the secretariat in New York was seriously frustrated The impression of representatives at the Security Council was that either the secretariat was insensitive to or overwhelmed by the escalating violence⁸⁸

Fourthly, the rules of engagement of the UNAMIR force left a lot to be desired The Force Commander never received formal approval of his rules of engagement These draft rules of engagement were covered by chapter VI and they were weak The use of violence was only allowed in self-defence They did, nonetheless, include a section that did permit the use of force in cases of crimes against humanity Senior members of UNAMIR thought that the rules of engagement never conformed to reality and ignored them⁸⁹ Moreover, UNAMIR was driven far too much by the aim to maintain its neutrality Neither in the face of genocide did it want to be associated with the RPF, and tried to negotiate instead

- *Cantonment and demobilisation* The FAR had a total of around 43,000 troops and 6,000 gendarmes Under the Peace Agreement, all forces of the RPF and the FAR not to be retained as part of the new National Army and the new National Gendarmerie, i.e. about 31,000 soldiers and 4,000 gendarmes, were to be gradually demobilised⁹⁰ UNAMIR was to aid, monitor and supervise this cantonment and demobilisation process For this purpose forces were to be deployed at the assembly sites Nonetheless, at the time of the genocide, the process had not yet started and neither could it be implemented afterwards Nevertheless, it is obvious that one major deficiency of the demobilisation

process was that its mandate was too narrowly defined. The militia were excluded from the Arusha Agreement and overlooked by UNAMIR. This was a mistake, which would become 'fatal' during the genocide'.⁹¹

- *Disarmament* In the Arusha Peace Agreement, the parties agreed to dispose of their heavy, light and personal weapons and to store them at cantonment points and assembly areas. UNAMIR was requested to monitor the inventories of arms and munitions of the parties and to guard the cantonment points and assembly areas. In addition, UNAMIR supervised the demilitarisation of Kigali into a weapons-secure area, in which forces moved only with the minimum of arms and were escorted. Nonetheless, even before the genocide, the security situation in Kigali deteriorated, as the parties increasingly lost respect for the weapons-secure area. Moreover, UNAMIR was very much aware of the fact that the Rwandese government was rearming. In January and February it learned of the secret unauthorised landing and unloading of planes loaded with arms. Those deliveries to the FAR of which it became aware were stopped by UNAMIR by placing the weapons under joint Rwandese-United Nations supervision. UNAMIR was not able to stop arms deliveries to the RPF battalion in Kigali. In the end, in spite of its attempts, disarmament did not contribute to *negative peace*.
- *Reintegration of ex-combatants* Although in the Arusha Peace Agreement the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration was made responsible for the reintegration of the demobilised soldiers into socio-economic life, the Secretary-General promised assistance from United Nations programmes and agencies. Although a comprehensive programme catering to the needs of the demobilised soldiers was studied, the programme never crystallised due to the genocide.
- *Institution building* The Arusha Agreement provided for a restructured National Army in which about 13,000 soldiers of both parties were to be integrated and a new National Gendarmerie of some 6,000 forces. The RPA was to contribute 40 percent of the troops and 50 percent of the officer corps.⁹² This provision was unacceptable to the extremists in the CDR and MRNDD, and was one of the reasons why they eventually chose the path of genocide. UNAMIR was requested to assess the implementation and make recommendations for the formation of the new army and *gendarmerie*. In addition, it was asked to develop a training programme for the new armed forces. Nonetheless, in the end the genocide made the implementation impossible.
- *Diplomacy* In the international arena, the United Nations and UNAMIR were unable to place Rwanda on the agenda. At the start of the genocide, the Secretary-General did not exert pressure on the Security Council to call them to action and there was no sense of emergency. A 'business-as-usual' atmosphere prevailed at the secretariat in New York and initially it provided the Security Council with sketchy and noncommittal comments and evaluations. The picture provided to the Security Council gave no hope of success, which in turn played into the hands of those who supported the withdrawal of UNAMIR. In fact, until the end of April, when the Secretary-General took charge, the proposals of the DPKO were directed at preventing failure (i.e. the prevention of the loss of personnel).⁹³ In the Rwandan arena, although in accordance with the altered mandate, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of UNAMIR attempted to

bring about a new cease-fire agreement, their efforts were to no avail. The RPF argued that a cease-fire could only be considered if there was an end to the killing of civilians, if human rights violations were investigated and humanitarian assistance was given to those in need. However, the government claimed it was unable to control the militia. Moreover, the RPF regarded the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Booh-Booh to be biased and not to be a serious partner, because he wanted to continue negotiations, while the RPF wanted action against the genocide.⁹⁴ As a consequence, diplomacy did not contribute to *negative peace*.

- *Border monitoring*: Even before the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 22 June 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was deployed opposite the area of the border controlled by the RPF. The mandate of UNOMUR was to monitor and verify the transit and transport of lethal weapons, ammunition and other military equipment across the border. It was to consist of 105 personnel, including 85 military observers. After the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the tasks implemented by UNOMUR were still seen as a necessary stabilising factor and therefore the Security Council integrated UNOMUR into UNAMIR. After the renewal of the conflict, the RPF gained control over the entire Rwanda-Uganda border and UNOMUR operated along its entire length. In spite of the accusations of the 'provisional government' also during this period, UNOMUR did not detect any cross-border movement of armaments and personnel. With the establishment of the arms embargo against Rwanda on 17 May 1994, the Security Council reasoned that there was little rationale for UNOMUR to remain operational. By the end of September 1994, the operation had been terminated. UNOMUR was not able to stop the cross-border operations of the RPF because the border was too porous.⁹⁵ As a consequence, border monitoring did not contribute to *negative peace*.

The renewal of the conflict saw an expansion of the territories under the control of the RPF, as its forces advanced westward beyond the buffer zone towards the forces that were already in control of parts of Kigali. By 4 July Kigali had fallen, and in the following days the RPF gained control over most of the country. The FAR forces retreated in disarray largely into Zaire and could no longer be considered to be an organised fighting force. By mid-July only a humanitarian protected zone in the south-west of the country, established by French forces in 'Operation Turquoise', was not under the control of the RPF. In the meantime, the Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. On 18 July, the RPF declared a unilateral cease-fire. Although after the cease-fire the fighting all but ceased, the military situation remained relatively calm. However, armed elements of the FAR had sought refuge in the 'zone Turquoise'. Moreover, the involvement of covert agents in 'operation Turquoise' drew suspicion that the French intervention was largely directed at maintaining its sphere of influence. Nonetheless, once UNAMIR II had taken over the responsibilities of 'operation Turquoise' in August and its troop strength increased, the security situation and the stability in the country further improved. At the end of 1994, the conflict flared up when an insurgency campaign was started from refugee camps in Zaire. The security situation also deteriorated for the IDPs. Not only were they forced into insurrection by Hutu hard-liners, but the RPA also used disproportionate levels of violence to control them. This culminated in an incident in April 1995 in the Kibeho camp, when a large number of IDPs were killed. Moreover, relations

between the Rwandese government and UNAMIR II deteriorated, as Kigali felt its sovereign authority was being impeded. At the end of November 1995, Kigali terminated its mandate for UNAMIR II and as the approval of the host-government was not forthcoming, the Security Council decided to withdraw the operation before the end of April 1996.

During 1996, the security situation worsened even further, as the insurgents infiltrated deeper into Rwanda and their activities became more frequent and more destructive. In October of that year, Rwanda and Uganda invaded Zaire to destroy the bases of the ex-FAR and Hutu militia and they enabled rebel leader Kabila to march up to Kinshasa and overthrow the Zairian president Mobutu. At the same time, the RPA used force to repatriate the Rwandan refugees from Zaire. As a result, many fighters (*infiltrés*) who had been recruited into the so-called *Armée pour la libération du Rwanda* (ALIR) returned home. Consequently, Rwanda imported a renewed conflict. Initially the government tried unsuccessfully to win the war through a fierce counter-insurgency campaign. However, as resistance increased in 1998, the RPA strategy shifted towards a combination of policies to win the hearts and minds of the population in Rwanda and the use of force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This combination proved to be successful and by 1999 Rwanda became rather stable and the insurgents severely weakened. Although the ALIR was supported by Kabila, it was no longer a significant threat as it only consisted of 4,000 ill-equipped forces which lacked the support of the Hutu population.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, the presence of the Rwandese forces in the DRC became part of the wider Congolese war, in which many countries in the region became involved. Negative peace in Rwanda was achieved possibly at the expense of negative peace in the DRC. Moreover, as a result of the ongoing war against the Hutu extremists and the Rwandese presence in the DRC, Rwanda continued to be a military society.

7.4.2 *Inter-group relations*

Most scholars agree that although perhaps originally the identity of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' may have been 'ethnic', in the pre-colonial time the meaning of these two words changed over time and became increasingly dictated by politics and occupation and less by ancestry.⁹⁷ The leadership and herdsmen were regarded to be Tutsi and farmers were regarded to be Hutu. Even though the Tutsi minority were dominant, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was not clear cut. Both groups spoke the same language and shared the same culture and religion. Moreover, there was social mobility between both groups. This situation changed with colonial rule. The German and later the Belgian colonisers imposed European racial classifications upon Rwandan society. The Tutsi were regarded to be Hamites, the Hutu an inferior Bantu race, and the Twa were considered to be the lowest of all. The Rwandans themselves accepted this racial classification; the Tutsi came to believe they were born to dominate and the Hutu felt more inferior than ever. Finally, when the Belgians introduced identity cards, which stated the 'ethnicity' of their owner, the previous existent flexibility and mobility were lost and the distinction became a rigid caste-like structure. Moreover, the Belgians gave all privileges to the Tutsi and concentrated all power in their hands. As the Tutsi implemented the colonial policies, they became regarded by the Hutu majority as ruthless oppressors. As a result, the fight for independence was one not only against the distant Belgians, but also against the Tutsi. In 1959 the Hutu 'social revolution' ended monarchy and Tutsi dominance, and after independence

under president Kayibanda discrimination against the Tutsi became institutionalised. Ethnicity became an important mobiliser of political support. Educational and employment opportunities were largely ruled by the system of 'équilibre ethnique', i.e. quota based on the statistical size of the groups. After the 'social revolution', Rwandan history had its share of violence and massacres. In the period between 1959 and 1973, between 250,000 and 600,000 people lost their lives.⁹⁸ Only between 1973 to 1990 did ethnic tensions lay dormant. During this period, there was little social difference between Hutu and Tutsi on the hills and both socially and culturally there were many unifying factors. It was only if a Tutsi wanted to develop beyond the average that he or she was held back. It was at such moments that the Tutsi felt the institutionalised discrimination against them.

Wealth was relatively equally distributed between the urban and rural areas. However, Rwanda was still characterised by substantial relative deprivation, which increased at such a pace that the increase in inequality was clearly perceptible. In 1994, the richest 10 percent of the population earned 52 percent of the national product, whereas previously this had been only 22 percent in 1982.⁹⁹ Although this relative deprivation was non-ethnic in nature and on average the Hutu and Tutsi were equally poor, there was a general feeling amongst the Hutu that the Tutsi were richer. In fact, during the 1980s, while the Hutu masses became poorer, the *Akazu*, the Hutu elite, prospered at the expense of the Hutu masses. In addition, this dividing line between the haves and the have-nots was regional in character, i.e. between northern Hutu and southern Hutu. Therefore, the main opposition parties found their supporters primarily in the southern and central regions of the country. The start of the conflict with the RPF only served to intensify the animosity between both groups of Hutu.

The generally static situation described above became dynamic after the start of the conflict. With the RPF attack, the idea amongst Hutu extremists to fight the Tutsi was rekindled and the division between the Hutu and the Tutsi was recreated, as the threat of the RPF was extended to include all Tutsi. All Tutsi were regarded as allies of the RPF on the grounds that they were to gain from its success. The situation received further new dynamics as a result of the new political parties introduced during the democratisation process. The *Akazu*, afraid of losing power, tried to cling on to it by playing the ethnic card and mobilised support by fuelling anti-Tutsi hatred. Although Tutsi and the RPF were the main objects of their actions, the Hutu opposition parties which went into dialogue with the RPF, were also accused of being traitors. The structural adjustment of the government sector and the democratisation were interpreted in ethnic terms. Giving more importance to the private sector, in which the Tutsi were perceived to be stronger, and including Tutsi in the government, also meaning they would claim their share of state patronage, meant that Hutu in the government sector feared for their jobs. Subsequently, rumours, myths and violence created a climate of mistrust. The Tutsi increasingly feared annihilation, whereas the Hutu feared the restoration of the monarchy and Tutsi hegemony, and a renewal of oppression. The rural Hutu population was receptive to these claims as it breathed new life into the fears and conflicts from the past. Hutu extremists claimed to be acting out of self-defence, arguing that the Tutsi were planning genocide. The best defence, it was thought, was the extermination of the Tutsi. Certain elements of the government were directly or indirectly involved in the planning and organisation of the massacres of Tutsi from 1991 to 1993 and co-ordination at higher levels

was suspected. At the same time, the RPF was also accused of massacres in the territories under its control, although not to the same level as the Hutu violence. The resulting pervasive psychological sense of insecurity cultivated by the violent conflict, massacres and reprisals engendered in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. Radio broadcasts were an important factor in further exacerbating the hatreds, spreading rumours and instigating violence. Radio Rwanda, which was controlled by the president, and Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which was also closely linked to the government, became infamous for their hate speeches.

During its presence the following ‘policy tool’ implemented by UNAMIR was intended to influence *inter-group relations*:

- *Winning the hearts and minds of the local population*: Although the plan was to provide information to the general public about the activities of the mission through established radio stations, until the genocide UNAMIR had not been able to make progress in this area. As a consequence, hate radio broadcasts by Radio Rwanda and RTLM could become an important factor in instigating massacres.

After the genocide, *inter-group relations* became even more complex because identities such as Hutu-Tutsi-Twa and north-south were supplemented with new identities such as Anglophone-Francophone and *rescapé*, Hutu who stayed, old refugees and new refugees. The tensions in relation to these identities differed province by province. However, the main division remained between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Both Hutu and Tutsi wanted national reconciliation, but on different terms. Many Hutu in the refugee camps regarded national reconciliation to be a return to their houses and their old positions. Many Tutsi *rescapé* viewed it as some kind of compensation for their losses. The new government claimed it meant, amongst other things, that ex-FAR soldiers and administrators of the former regime who had not participated in the genocide were to be reintegrated in the new government structures. UNAMIR II was mandated to assist the government and community leaders in promoting national reconciliation. For this reason, amongst others, in February 1995 Radio UNAMIR commenced broadcasting. In addition, the Security Council acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations established for this purpose the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). One may, however, question the contribution of the Tribunal as little was known about the ICTR inside Rwanda and it was largely regarded to be distant and irrelevant. In spite of the progress made by the new government, it was not enough. The process received a severe blow when in 1995 the Hutu prime minister Twagiramungu left office and was joined by members of his cabinet, as well as several senior civilian and military officers.

After the departure of UNAMIR II, the reconciliation process took further steps in the right direction, although its completion would be a long-term process. Moreover, there was a big difference between the extent of reconciliation in the hills and between the elites. While, in spite of their problems, Hutu and Tutsi in the hills were forced to live with each other, the elites were still very much divided. Consequently, a large section of the Hutu elite lived abroad. Furthermore, the extremism of the past did not suddenly disappear. The solution of the RPF government was the creation of national unity in a slow and controlled process of ‘nation-building’, creating Rwandans and erasing identities such as Hutu and Tutsi. Nonetheless, ‘ethnic’ awareness continued to exist amongst the population and its denial by the RPF government only meant it remained a dormant mobiliser

for conflict. In fact, resentment amongst Hutu grew over the years, as the reconciliation process was defined by the RPF and left little room for dissenting views, the Hutu and non-RPF parties in the government were seen as window dressing, and many Hutu rejected the generalised guilt for the genocide and criticised the lack of public debate on RPF massacres, amongst others, in the DRC. They sometimes minimised the scale of the genocide or even denied that the 1994 genocide had taken place. Moreover, the slow process of justice affected the national reconciliation. In total, some 140,000 Hutu were held in custody for their suspected role during the genocide and therefore this group was unequally affected by justice.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, justice was particularly important to the reconciliation process because most Tutsi were not able to become reconciled unless justice for the genocide had been done. The Rwandan government faced a formidable dilemma. To punish all the guilty would be socio-politically dangerous, but an amnesty would uphold the impunity. As classic justice would not do the job, the government adapted the traditional justice system of *gacaca* in the hope that it would stimulate national reconciliation. With regard to relative deprivation, the new government recognised that economic inequality had contributed to the conflict, and attempted to distribute income and employment opportunities more equitably. Nonetheless, after the genocide most wealth was concentrated in Kigali, and a rift developed between the urban and the rural areas. Furthermore, there were also significant income differentials in the urban areas.¹⁰¹

7.4.3 Group demography

The somewhat bipolar ethnic balance in Rwanda has often been blamed for the violence, because mobilisation against the 'others' is thought to be easier.¹⁰² Moreover, with an area of 26,338 square kilometres and a population of over 7 million, Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in the world and *the* most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa. This density only increased because, at the start of the 1990s, the annual population growth was 3.5 percent.¹⁰³ Throughout history, Rwandan governments managed to cope with the demographic pressure by offloading the excess population to neighbouring countries. By the mid-1980s, however, all Rwandan land reserves had been brought under cultivation and immigration to neighbouring countries was increasingly curbed. Urbanisation was not a way out as government policies made migration to the city practically impossible. Although attempts were undertaken to increase the productivity and intensity of Rwandan agriculture, it basically remained low yield traditional cultivation. As a result, an excessive agricultural population worked very small fragmented and overfarmed land and inherited ever smaller plots. This resulted in a frustrated youth bulge and in ever more conflict about land, and the traditional structures were unable to correct the failures. As coffee prices fell, farmers were forced to produce more coffee to make up for their income losses, at the direct expense of food production. Consequently, famines flared up throughout Rwanda. Moreover, until February 1993, some 350,000, and after the renewal of the fight nearly one million people became IDPs.¹⁰⁴ As a result of the exodus from the northern fertile lands, harvest yields dropped dramatically. The Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal to meet the needs of the IDPs. After the signing of the peace agreement, an estimated 600,000 IDPs returned home, leaving another 300,000 people still in need of humanitarian aid.¹⁰⁵ In addition, some parts of the (Hutu) population feared that the demographic pressures would only be exacerbated following the repatriation of the 400,000 to

500,000 (Tutsi) refugees.¹⁰⁶ This idea was fuelled by the Habyarimana regime which feared the return of the refugee leadership. Altogether, Rwanda suffered from immense demographic pressures, which stretched society to its limits. Although the hard Malthusian argument that demographic pressures unavoidably lead to conflict does not fully apply to Rwanda, because the conflict was definitely not monocausal, a soft Malthusian position definitely holds ground. Demographic pressures did play a role, mainly in accelerating and intensifying, but cannot be understood without considering the other causes of the conflict. During the genocide, it was in particular people who owned a lot of land that were targeted and it provided in an ideal opportunity to settle land conflicts. Moreover, it was those young men who had no chance of inheriting a reasonable plot of land in the future, who perpetrated the genocide.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNAMIR influenced or were intended to influence *group demography*:

- *Humanitarian aid*: The 300,000 IDPs who remained displaced after the signing of the peace agreement needed the provision of humanitarian aid to be continued.¹⁰⁷ The humanitarian assistance already provided by humanitarian agencies was co-ordinated by the United Nations Resident Coordinator until the deployment of UNAMIR and was to continue during the transitional period. The situation deteriorated, however, as during the presence of UNAMIR 375,000 refugees from Burundi fled the violence and drought in their own country and arrived in Rwanda.¹⁰⁸ Although, as a result of international aid provided by the United Nations, amongst others, the mortality and malnutrition figures in camps dropped by December 1993, these figures remained, according to the Secretary-General "unacceptably high."¹⁰⁹ Moreover, due to a shortage of seeds and the drought, famine threatened hundreds of thousands of Rwandese.¹¹⁰ As a consequence, although humanitarian aid made a positive contribution to *group demography*, it did therefore not lead to an improvement due to factors beyond its scope. The contribution proved to be temporary due to the genocide.
- *Providing law and order*: In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties requested the United Nations to maintain security during the distribution of humanitarian aid. UNAMIR escorted humanitarian convoys and secured storage depots and distribution points. In the course of time, these security measures were stepped up because the security situation was deteriorating. Nonetheless, as such, the provision of law and order made a temporary positive contribution to *group demography* until the genocide.
- *Repatriation*: In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties agreed to set up a Commission for Repatriation, with the mandate to finalise and implement the repatriation of the returnees. Within six months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the repatriation had to be prepared and within nine months the repatriation was to start. The Security Council mandated UNAMIR to monitor the repatriation process of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. The Military Component immediately started monitoring the 'spontaneous' return. However, due to the genocide, the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs according to the Arusha Peace Agreement became obsolete.
- *Reintegration of refugees*: In the Arusha Peace Agreement, the Commission for Repatriation also received the mandate to finalise and implement the reintegration of the returnees. The international community was requested to

provide assistance to the returnees in terms of food aid, domestic items, farming tools, building materials, health and education. Furthermore, the Commission was to develop settlement sites for the Rwandese refugees, which were to be provided with basic socio-economic infrastructures such as schools, health centres, and access to water and roads. The spontaneous returnees, however, immediately posed a problem, because they often lay claim to temporarily vacated land, as well as land and other properties that they themselves had, in some cases, left behind years ago. Humanitarian relief agencies warned that these developments caused or exacerbated tension in communities and that if these developments were not addressed, they might have a deleterious effect on the smooth and safe conduct of the repatriation and rehabilitation operations, amongst others.¹¹¹ In the end, however, the reintegration programmes never went beyond the planning stage before the genocide.

- *Mine clearance* In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties requested the United Nations to engage in mine-clearance operations in collaboration with the Army Command High Council. Mine clearance was particularly important for the safety of IDPs and to provide direct access for humanitarian agencies to areas in need. Emergency demining was either to be executed by an engineering unit within the Military Component, or by professional mine-clearance companies should it be deemed too dangerous. Furthermore, the threat of mines was expected to increase once refugees and IDPs returned to their villages and started to work again on their plantations. Therefore, in addition to the emergency demining, a mine-clearance programme, including a mine-awareness campaign, a mine-clearance training programme and a mine survey, was to be developed. The Security Council emphasised that mine clearance had to be assisted primarily through training programmes.¹¹² At the beginning of 1994, the FAR continued, in spite of protests by UNAMIR, to mine roads to, amongst other places, the Ugandan border. After meetings on this issue at the highest level between UNAMIR and the government, these mines were removed and the roads cleared. By the end of March the planning of a mine-clearance programme was well advanced. However, the genocide made its implementation impossible.

The FAO estimated that 800,000 people died in the genocide, and the new RPF government put the number at one million.¹¹³ With the start of the genocide, an enormous flow of IDPs and refugees developed. Initially this flow consisted mainly of Tutsi on the run from the massacres. However, as the tide turned on the battlefield, some 2 million people, mainly Hutu, fled the RPF advance, stirred up by the radio broadcasts from RTLM in particular. At first many of these people became IDPs but as the RPA came down from the Ugandan border at the end of April 1994, a first wave of about 300,000 Rwandan refugees fled to Tanzania within a two-day period.¹¹⁴ As a consequence of the genocide and the subsequent flight of people, agricultural and pastoral activities were severely disrupted and humanitarian aid was desperately needed. However, the security situation was abominable. UNAMIR II was given the mandate to establish humanitarian areas to ensure the security of as many civilians under threat as possible, and to provide security for humanitarian relief operations as required. Its deployment was, however, not as prompt as hoped for, because governments did not immediately dispatch sufficiently well-equipped forces, and neither was their eventual dispatch unconditional. Until the full deployment of UNAMIR II, France offered to command

a temporary multilateral operation under chapter VII of the Charter to guarantee the security and protection of civilians and IDPs. The Security Council authorised this French 'Operation Turquoise', which Newsweek magazine referred to as "nice idea, wrong army"¹¹⁵. The United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) was established to co-ordinate the humanitarian efforts of all United Nations special agencies and programmes, UNAMIR, bilateral donors, as well as NGOs. In spite of the difficulties of working in anarchic conditions, some humanitarian aid did get through. UNAMIR assisted these efforts in the Kigali area and the UNHCR took care of the refugees in the neighbouring countries. However, the situation became worse as a result of the intensified fighting. France established the safe humanitarian 'Zone Turquoise' to help the IDPs. Only by the end of July had forces and equipment of sufficient quality been found to enable the French 'Operation Turquoise' to withdraw in August and to have its functions taken over by UNAMIR II. In response to this outlook, in mid-July a second wave of approximately 1.4 million refugees fled to Zaire¹¹⁶. Humanitarian organisations were overwhelmed by these enormous numbers and had to struggle to provide the refugees and IDPs with food and drinking water. Their attempts were further hampered as victims and perpetrators of the genocide stayed together in the camps, and the security situation in the camps deteriorated and serious food shortages and threats of epidemics arose. These extraordinary conditions led the UNHCR and the donor community to improvise and innovate. Although some 50,000 refugees still died, many more would have died if NGOs, donor governments, and United Nations humanitarian agencies had not co-operated and co-ordinated their efforts¹¹⁷. However, faced with an immense humanitarian catastrophe, humanitarianism filled the political vacuum. Aid became more important than justice and the separation of killers and 'innocent' civilians was not a high priority. As a result, the former Rwandese government, the FAR and the militia regained control over the refugee population and became an increasing problem for the distribution of humanitarian aid and the security situation inside the camps. Massive assistance was given to killers, who used this support to launch incursions into Rwanda.

At the end of 1994, the emphasis in Rwanda gradually shifted from humanitarian emergency assistance to rehabilitation and reconstruction. With the humanitarian situation under control, it was time to repatriate the IDPs and refugees. By mid-December 1994 there were still 300,000 IDPs living in some 90 camps inside Rwanda. In addition, several hundred thousand people were displaced outside the camps¹¹⁸. Although the presence of UNAMIR II improved the security situation in and around the camps, criminal elements and Hutu militia raided areas around the camps and robbed people as they returned home. Although most IDPs did not want to return home, the government decided in 1995 to close the camps because of the security threats to the regions where they were located. With *Operation Retour*, UNAMIR II made a contribution, in an interagency effort, towards facilitating the safe return of these IDPs. The closing of the Kibeho camp in April 1995 became a drama, however, because the anxiety among its inhabitants in combination with escalating actions by militia and criminal elements caused panic. As a reaction, the RPA opened fire and killed a large number of IDPs. Furthermore, the repatriation of refugees commenced only slowly and suffered as a result of five factors. Firstly, the refugees were prevented by force from returning to Rwanda by the militia and FAR, and were deterred by the horror stories they heard about what had happened inside Rwanda. Secondly, up to 1 million mines were littered

throughout the land where the returnees were to settle, and a national demining programme was only established in July 1995. Thirdly, a disproportionate amount of attention was given by donors to the refugees abroad at the expense of the IDPs, which complicated the task of the new authorities to rebuild the country and provide internal security. Moreover, as the IDPs were a sort of vanguard of the refugees, as long as they did not feel safe, the refugees did not return. Fourthly, when refugees and IDPs returned they often found their land occupied by so-called first caseload refugees - who had left the country between 1959 and 1993 - and a government that was incapable or unwilling to act against them. Fifthly, Rwanda lacked the capacity to absorb all the refugees as, in spite of everything, the solutions undertaken by the government, international organisations and private institutions were far from adequate.

During November 1996, after the departure of UNAMIR II, the RPA and Zairian rebels closed the refugee camps in Zaire and more than 800,000 refugees were forcefully repatriated. This was followed by the same number who were forced to leave Tanzania.¹¹⁹ This mass return of refugees challenged Rwanda and seriously destabilised the country during 1997-1998. Demographic pressure continued in Rwanda for five years after the genocide. Some 600,000 first caseload refugees had returned.¹²⁰ In addition, returning Tutsi rebels had produced a baby boom after the genocide. Furthermore, although the returning Hutu refugees in Zaire and Tanzania had lived in a situation that was far from ideal, the death rates in the camps had been far below the birth rates and many more refugees returned than had left. The IMF established that diminishing land resources, low agricultural productivity, severe environmental degradation as a result of overexploitation, and rapid population growth all continued to be a problem, and as a result demographic pressure remained high.¹²¹ Many Rwandans produced too little food for their own needs, but were also unable to receive sufficient income to buy food at the market. Without major land and agriculture policy reforms Rwanda might face a disaster in the future.

7.4.4 State weakness

During the 1970-1980s Rwanda developed remarkably. An impressive road network was built, and schools and health facilities were established. To its donors Rwanda was a model of development, an example of how resource-poor countries could improve their livelihoods. However, although the economy had diversified, Rwanda remained largely dependent on a single commodity: coffee export, which provided more than 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings and was responsible for a large share of government revenue. A large part of those earnings was earmarked for debt servicing. As a consequence, the collapse of the coffee commodity prices in the mid-1980s caused a crisis in the country's public finances and public services deteriorated. Austerity programmes contributed to the further collapse of the state administration and public services. At the same time, the costs of these facilities for citizens increased, which in turn contributed to social tension. As a result of the desolate position of large segments of the population and the availability of weapons, crime became increasingly more common and violent. The Rwandan state did not embrace the whole population, but only that part of the population that the elite thought necessary to embrace. Nonetheless, although this description gives the impression that Rwanda had become a weak state, this argument is not entirely valid. In spite of its weaknesses, Rwanda was a highly centralised totalitarian state where subordinates

generally followed orders from their superiors effectively and quickly. Central government was in direct control of many events up to the lowest unit of governance, the *nyakumi* - a unit of 10 families. As a result, central government was able to execute the genocide in such an effective way that, if quantified in terms of speed and numbers, the Rwandan genocide surpassed the holocaust in 'efficiency'.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNAMIR influenced or were intended to influence *state weakness*

- *Disarmament* In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties requested the United Nations to assist in the search for arms caches in Rwanda and to participate in the recovery of arms distributed to, or illegally acquired by, the civilian population. With the disaster in Somalia in mind, the United States refused to disarm and neutralise armed gangs. Therefore the Security Council watered down the mandate to "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, *inter alia*, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city" (emphasis added by the author)¹²². In a fax of 11 January 1994, the Force Commander informed the United Nations Secretariat of the plan to raid arms caches to be used in the extermination of the Tutsi. The Secretariat responded that such an operation would go beyond the mandate and that instead the Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should contact the president to inform him of their awareness. This was a blunder. Not only might exposure have sufficed to get the *Interahamwe* and other extremists to back down, but the choice not to take decisive action signalled to them that UNAMIR was not going to stand in their way in the event of genocide. In the following month UNAMIR received more reliable information that arms were being stockpiled by the militia, to be distributed later on. On 3 February DPKO authorised UNAMIR to assist the Rwandese Government with the recovery of illegal arms caches. The Force Commander continued to push for a more active disarmament role, but the Secretariat in New York persisted in its refusal. In the end, the weapons in the arms caches were distributed to the militia and used in the genocide, and thus disarmament did not contribute to *state weakness*. However, if there is a lesson to be drawn from Rwanda, it is that arms control is more than firearms control alone. Three or four months before the start of the genocide, Rwanda received a very large shipment of new machetes from China. Machetes were considered essential in Rwandese agriculture. Nobody ever dreamed of any other possible use for these tools.
- *Providing law and order* In the Arusha Peace Agreement, the parties requested the United Nations to guarantee overall security in the country and to monitor, in particular, the way in which the competent authorities and bodies maintained public order. More specifically, the United Nations was requested to assist with securing the safety of the civilian population, to assist with the neutralisation of armed bands, to ensure that the rules of discipline were obeyed both inside and outside the assembly areas, and to guarantee the security of the transitional institutions in Kigali. As already said, the Security Council had decided to minimise risks and provided UNAMIR with the mandate to contribute to the security of Kigali¹²³. During the first quarter of 1994, UNAMIR was, however, not able to contribute to law and order in Kigali, as the security situation in that town worsened rapidly. To deal with the situation, 200 Ghanaian forces were transferred from the DMZ to the city to monitor the

gendarmerie and to assist in the maintenance of security in the city. Nonetheless, the *gendarmerie* proved to be unable to deal with the increased tension. Violent demonstrations, assassinations and roadblocks became increasingly more common and culminated in the assassination of two politicians and the ambush of a UNAMIR-escorted RPF convoy. Only during March did the security situation begin to stabilise due to the assistance from the Military and Civilian Police Components and the tightened security measures were slackened again. With the start of the genocide, law and order were further away than ever. As a consequence, providing law and order only made a temporary limited positive contribution to *state weakness*.

- *Institution building*: In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties requested the United Nations to establish a training programme for the new armed forces and to assess the implementation and to make recommendations on the formation of the new army and *gendarmerie*. However, due to the premature end of the peace process, institution building did not develop beyond the planning stage.
- *Rehabilitation*: The Secretary-General deemed it essential for the implementation of the mandate of the operation to have an engineering company to restore basic infrastructure, such as roads and bridges.¹²⁴ However, little crystallised due to the short period of time before the start of the genocide.

In the turmoil following 6 April 1994, the entire government structure fell apart. Public enterprises, the administrative system, institutions and public services either collapsed or were severely damaged. Most trained personnel were either killed or fled the country, and the number of civil servants fell by 40 percent.¹²⁵ Assets and financial resources were either destroyed or stolen. On 19 July the 'provisional' government, which had fled, was replaced by a broad-based government of national unity. The contribution of the United Nations to the subsequent remarkable reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Rwandan state was limited. By September 1994, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) planned the first projects to start the rehabilitation of communities. During the second half of 1994, the new government went ahead with establishing its administrative structures throughout Rwanda. Electricity, water and communication facilities were also gradually re-established. However, the government lacked financial resources, personnel, and basic office resources. Nonetheless, by the end of the year, most ministries and the national bank were functioning again. During 1995, UNDP established programmes to assist the government to increase its capacity to govern at the local level. By April 1995, government programmes were established to improve the health and educational facilities. In the areas to which refugees and IDPs had returned, both the UNDP and UNHCR established programmes to meet the basic needs of these groups and the community as a whole. By mid-1995 much progress had been made with the reconstruction of the Rwandan physical infrastructure. By the second half of 1995, the government managed to pay all its civil servants. But the salaries of government employees had been frozen since 1980, which meant that many employees preferred to work for an NGO or that their morale suffered. Moreover, the government was not able to pay all its soldiers, which in turn influenced the security situation in the country. Of special importance to the Rwandan situation was the fact that the judicial infrastructure was also looted, damaged or destroyed, and consequently the penal system was not able to function. Initially, few of the

plans with regard to the rehabilitation of this system were attained by the government, because donors were slow to deliver their pledged funds. Although donors later invested heavily in the judicial system, the quality of justice remained poor. Moreover, although a lot of progress was made, the penal system remained incapable of coping with the enormous problem of dealing with so many perpetrators of genocide and massacre. As the entire justice system was focused on the genocide, it was no longer able to deal with other serious violations of law. From 1994 onwards, the Rwandese government tried to strengthen its capacity and institutions to manage the economy. Tax collection rates had fallen in 1994 to 3.6 percent of GDP, compared with an already low 9 percent for the 1992-1993 period. Since that year, it gradually improved again to 10.9 percent of GDP in 1998.¹²⁶ But this recovery was slow since it was necessary for the tax collecting institutions to be rebuilt. After 1998, the Rwandese government became less dependent on donor funds as its tax collecting capacity improved. Although the new government directed a lot of attention to decentralisation, since it viewed decentralisation as the main road towards breaking the culture of blind obedience to authority, the state structure remained heavily centralised, and most local structures depended on instructions from Kigali. After the departure of UNAMIR II, the United Nations Office in Rwanda continued to support the government in its efforts to strengthen the judicial system and to rehabilitate the country's infrastructure.

7.4.5 State unwillingness and good governance

Basically Rwanda was, up to 1990, a military dictatorship in which the MRND was the only political party allowed. Neither were there any democratic values. Regime change in Rwanda had never been peaceful and was traditionally followed by a winner-takes-all pattern, in which the losers were either killed or fled. There was no rule of law or respect for human rights. During the early 1990s, a democratisation process was started, but at the same time the number of massacres and human rights violations increased. The democratisation process was initiated by Habyarimana after President Mitterrand announced in 1990 that future French development aid to Africa would depend on democratisation. With the new wave of democratisation, the intensifying effects of electoral competition and democratisation upon the conflict in Rwanda became more evident. Reforms towards democracy were started within an authoritarian, ethnically polarised context, without a process of democratisation being started amongst the population. The process was essentially artificial, and supported mainly by the urban elites and barely affected the rural population.¹²⁷ Nonetheless, the elites and the *Akazu* in particular felt their position to be threatened. Since in Rwanda control over the state apparatus was essential in the distribution of wealth, 'ownership' of this (corrupt) state apparatus was a major stake in the political conflict. Therefore, the elite hoped to subvert the still fragile and burgeoning opposition and gain support through the ethnicisation of power. It used the newly gained freedoms to exploit fears of Tutsi domination and simultaneously got rid of opponents in decision-making positions through political assassinations and intimidation. The Arusha Agreements pushed the fears of losing power even one step further. In addition, the democratisation frustrated the peace process because it did not contribute to the unity of both the country and the government negotiating team. The human rights situation was deplorable in Rwanda. Immediately after the attack by the RPF in 1990, the government responded with

repression and human rights violations. If people did not support the government, then they were considered to be supporters of the RPF enemy. Between October 1990 and January 1993, a large number of killings and massacres, as well as arbitrary, extrajudicial and summary executions of unarmed civilians (Tutsi, opposition members and human rights activists) took place. In the combat zones these were mostly related to the security forces, but outside these areas, militia and government officials were also directly or indirectly involved. In August 1993, the United Nations was already aware that involvement went as high as circles around the president. The perpetrators of these acts remained unpunished, as a result of the failure of the judicial system to act, due, amongst other things, to a major lack of resources and training, but also due to a lack of political will to prosecute. However, the impunity was not new to the 1990s, because from 1959 to 1973 Tutsi had also been killed with impunity. In spite of the above, it seems that United Nations agencies which operated in Rwanda did not pay much attention to human rights and democracy. Neither did the organisation use its influence during the Arusha negotiations to include a United Nations verification role for the organisation of elections and the rule of law.¹²⁸

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by UNAMIR influenced or were intended to influence *state unwillingness and good governance*

- *Providing law and order* In spite of the mandate of UNAMIR "to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali", the number of politically motivated killings even increased, particularly in early 1994. Insecurity and political aggression were commonplace. Even in December 1993, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jonah, warned Habyarimana that the Secretary-General had information about plans to kill opposition members and that in such a case the United Nations would not stand for it. In response to increasing threats to the lives of important political leaders and civil servants, these people were given, in addition to their own armed bodyguards, armed UNAMIR escorts and guards. Nonetheless, two leading politicians were killed in March, and this was followed by a week of violence and killings. In addition, the number of ethnic and politically motivated crimes increased. The situation was regarded as worrisome by the Secretary-General, especially because the *gendarmerie* lacked personnel, equipment, training and the resources to address the problem. In response, at the end of March, the Security Council allowed an additional deployment of 45 monitors. However, UNAMIR still interpreted its mandate narrowly and did not really make a move to improve the security situation in Kigali. After the plane crash, UNAMIR again interpreted its mandate narrowly and responded only marginally. It was confronted with two increasingly difficult and conflicting tasks: not only was it supposed to protect the civilians, but it was also to defend its own lives. Some 25,000 people came under the protection of UNAMIR throughout Kigali, but at the same time ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed. Although it has been said that if UNAMIR had suppressed the first violence with prompt and firm action, the situation would certainly have developed differently, New York decided against amending the rules of engagement.¹²⁹ Worse still, the Belgian contingent withdrew, and most refugees who had been protected were massacred once the Belgians had left. As the militia were able to slaughter those people who had been under the protection of the United Nations, they were stimulated to continue. Although UNAMIR could not be considered guilty for what happened

and could probably not have prevented the genocide, it did the least it had to, and this was not enough. As a consequence, providing law and order did not contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

- *Civilian police monitoring*: In the Arusha Peace Agreement the parties requested the UNAMIR to ensure that law and order were maintained impartially and effectively. The civilian police unit of 60 officers, which was to be stationed throughout the country, was only fully deployed by January 1994, due to the fact that member states were slow to provide the necessary personnel. A Special Investigation Team dealt with 54 complaints, serious crimes, and allegations of human rights violations. A Liaison Section monitored special units of the *gendarmerie*, such as mobile intervention groups. It is worthy of note that in fulfilling the task to monitor and verify the activities of the *Gendarmerie* and the *Police Communale*, the Component worked closely together with both units. Moreover, the rapporteurs had a tough job as the civilian police force included a large group of demobilised soldiers who were later involved in the genocide. In addition, most of the time the monitors arrived late at the scene of a violation and as a consequence there was no time to act or report. Nonetheless, the civilian police monitors did provide data for the reports, warning of potential genocide, but without co-operation from both the Rwandese government and the relevant United Nations organs, it was to no avail. As a consequence, civilian police monitoring did not contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

The absence of international intervention to stop the genocide did certainly not contribute to an early cessation of the massacres. Even worse, it probably only stimulated the *genocidaires*. By the end of May, the Secretary-General formally used the 'g-word' for the first time when he reported that "on the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group." He concluded, however, that "procedures in the United Nations do not lend themselves to immediate action in such circumstances."¹³⁰ Both a Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Rwanda from the United Nations Commission of Human Rights and a Commission of Experts concluded that there was sufficient evidence of acts of genocide in a planned, systematic, concerted and methodical manner by Hutu elements against the Tutsi population. Crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law were committed by both sides in the conflict. There was, however, no evidence that these crimes by the Tutsi elements were perpetrated with the intention of decimating the Hutu population.¹³¹

The newly installed broad-based government of national unity gave the impression that the idea of power-sharing was being re-established, but the RPF left no doubt as to who was really in charge. The new government aimed to end the culture of impunity and wanted justice. For this reason it requested aid to rebuild the judicial system. The United Nations reacted with three measures. Firstly, the Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR) was established to investigate the genocide and other human rights violations, to monitor the present situation and to prevent future human rights violations by promoting a climate of confidence through its training, monitoring and assistance programmes. The HRFOR was deployed late, lacked funding and was unable to move outside Kigali. It left in July 1998 after its relations with the Rwandan government had seriously deteriorated. Secondly, UNAMIR II received a civilian police component to assist in

the establishment and training of a new and integrated police force Thirdly, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to bring to justice those who violated international humanitarian law committed in 1994 However, the tribunal was troubled by financial and administrative difficulties which resulted in delays in the actual start of the proceedings of the court Although the international community increasingly called upon the new government to provide for good governance and nation-building activities, Kigali became increasingly frustrated with the lack of funds provided by donors to do so Rwanda's judicial system had to handle caseloads of genocide-related trials Although HRFOR and the UNHCHR tried to assist the Rwandan government, the lack of judges, magistrates in the judicial system, trained personnel to investigate cases, and prosecutors, all congested the judicial system, while by mid-1998 the prisons were overcrowded with up to 140,000 suspects awaiting trial¹³² Moreover, thousands of guilty people were still free, while at the same time, the Minister of Justice and the prosecutor for Kigali both estimated that at least 20 percent of prisoners were incarcerated on the basis of false charges¹³³ By 1999, the judicial system had been restored to the old level and about 1,000 people had been brought to trial However, if the trials were to continue at the same speed, it would be some 160 years before all the suspects had been brought before the court Kigali faced a dilemma adhere to justice according to western standards or compromise some of these principles in order to be able to finish the job? Its solution was extraordinary Gacaca processes which intended to have the local communities decide on the fate of those accused of the lesser offences were put in place, and this involved the majority of prisoners The court system continued to try serious offenders

The RPA itself violated human rights on a massive scale, especially during the civil war until 1998, and in the DRC in 1998 and 2000 When the refugee camps were cleared in 1996, the RPA pursued those refugees who refused to return on their flight westwards all the way as far as Congo-Brazzaville The civil population in north-west Rwanda was deliberately targeted by the *infiltrés*, and was often caught up in the middle of the conflict In the meantime, as a reaction to the increasing tension in Burundi in 1995, civil society and democracy came under fire and political party activity was banned Although political parties retained their seats in both the parliament and the government, they were placed under the control of the Forum for Political Parties Subsequently, Prime-minister Twagiramungu of the MDR left office, the MDR split and the RPF managed to divide the remnants of the party In addition, the human rights situation deteriorated After the genocide, the RPF government had a strong pretext to silence its opponents, they were demonised as *genocidaires* A transitional period was deemed necessary to 'sensibilise' the population to accept democracy and the concomitant responsibilities Although the government committed itself to democracy, it was in no hurry because it wanted to diminish "sectarian rivalry" Several observers characterised this as window dressing, because, in practice, real power in Rwanda remained in the hands of the inner circle of the RPF, the army, and the Department of Military Intelligence The RPF, on the other hand, recruited openly and systematically and was present in all parts of the country Donors were hesitant, nonetheless, to pressure for human rights and democratic elections and accepted the argument of the RPF government that the time was not yet ripe The local elections of 1999 were not secret and were supposed to be non-political, as political parties were not allowed The United Nations Resident-Representative,

however, declared the elections transparent and fair, and a significant achievement for the Rwandan context¹³⁴ From 2000 onwards, politicians, civil society and the media were increasingly forced into a straightjacket, and real power came openly in the hands of the RPF Important Hutu politicians left the government and Kagame became the new president of Rwanda

7 4 6 State/government legitimacy

The Habyarimana regime sought to legitimise itself on the basis of two arguments through development and through 'ethnicity' First, the Habyarimana regime assumed that all problems could be solved through development and therefore the sole purpose of the state became the economic advancement of the masses This strategy gave the regime sufficient legitimacy until the mid-1980s The economic situation worsened with the decline of coffee prices, but the continued funding of the Rwandan government by its donors may have temporarily enhanced the regime's legitimacy Nonetheless, as the government channelled few funds to the southern and central parts of the country, the legitimacy of the government in these regions started to crumble and opposition parties grew stronger Secondly, the legitimacy of the Habyarimana regimes was based on the 'social revolution' it was government by the majority of the people, a Hutu government and therefore anti-Tutsi The 'Tutsi' invasion of the RPF temporarily stimulated the legitimacy of the Habyarimana government, as it emphasised the need to defend the Hutu majority Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the Habyarimana regime declined during the 1990s as the opposition parties gained support and grew stronger This created its own dynamics As Habyarimana lost power to the opposition parties and the CDR and the *Akazu* in particular, the legitimacy of his regime declined, leading to a further loss of power In addition, as the war continued without success, the legitimacy of the Habyarimana regime was further affected and especially after he decided to start talks with the RPF, the regime went into a downward spiral as the extremists dropped him Nonetheless, internationally the Rwandan government was still regarded as legitimate and was even a member of the Security Council at the time of the genocide Even during the genocide, the legitimacy of the representative of the interim government in the Security Council was never questioned During its presence UNAMIR did not implement any 'policy tools' that influenced or were intended to influence *state/government legitimacy*

The new RPF government obviously gained legitimacy with the new Tutsi elite and the Ugandan refugees Nonetheless, the majority of the population did not support the RPF government for the first few years and felt their country was under occupation by Ugandan Tutsi At the end of the 1990s, the RPF government also gained legitimacy amongst the general population This generally stemmed from the fact that it provided the basic needs of the rural population and that it managed to bring peace, security and stability Nonetheless, the RPF government only gained legitimacy because there were no serious alternatives

7 4 7 Unemployment and economic decline

The Rwandese economy was primarily agricultural and generally depended on foreign aid Coffee, tea and tin accounted for almost all Rwanda's exports Nonetheless, between 1985 and 1992 the income generated by these commodities declined sharply as a result of lower prices on the global commodity markets As a result, export earnings between 1987 and 1991 declined by 50 percent¹³⁵

Consequently, GDP growth declined from an average of 0.4 percent per year between 1981 and 1986, to -5.5 percent during from 1987 to 1991.¹³⁶ Surveys conducted in the period between 1990 and 1992 in areas unaffected by the civil war showed that 75 percent of the population had seen their income decline by 35 percent.¹³⁷ Poverty levels in Rwanda increased from 40 percent in 1985 to 53 percent in 1993.¹³⁸ The already deplorable economic situation deteriorated even further as a result of the armed conflict. After 1990, the defence budget increased to 40 percent of the total budget.¹³⁹ Although this was partly made up of development aid and military aid, it did constrain the budget. Financial aid, like balance of payments support from donors, such as the World Bank, was intended to relieve the social pressure on the population and in doing so to decrease social tension. However, it is highly likely that some of these funds found their way elsewhere for corrupt or military purposes. At the same time, a Structural Adjustment Programme was launched. Only six weeks after the start of the conflict, an IMF sponsored devaluation of the Rwandan franc by 50 percent intended to boost coffee exports.¹⁴⁰ This devaluation, however, contributed to the start of inflation and the fall of real earnings. The benefits of the devaluation for the coffee farmers were neutralised by the simultaneous reduction of state subsidies. Moreover, the privatisation, which was executed at the height of the conflict, led to dismissals of large numbers of personnel and, amongst others things, to higher electricity prices. The Structural Adjustment Programme consequently only weakened the already exhausted economy. The economic deterioration was an important factor in creating an environment in which genocide could be perpetrated. The government was able to scapegoat the Tutsi for the economic situation as many Hutu were receptive to the idea that the others, the Tutsi, were to blame for the crisis. Absolute poverty played an intensifying role in the conflict and genocide in Rwanda. Many of the soldiers fighting for the FAR and the RPF were unemployed urban youngsters, who enlisted in order to earn a living. Their numbers had grown dramatically with the collapse of the coffee market. Those who implemented the genocide, the members of the Hutu militia, were also recruited from this group. Moreover, the genocide created opportunities for personal gain: cows, money and the Tutsi land.

During its presence, UNAMIR did not implement any 'policy tools' that influenced or were intended to influence *unemployment and economic decline*.

The Rwandan economy, expressed by GDP, shrank in 1994 to 50 percent of the previous year. Livestock herds were almost completely wiped out. Exports were disproportionately hit, with a drop in volume of 60 percent, and simultaneously imports increased by nearly 30 percent as a result of the humanitarian aid. As a consequence, consumer price inflation rose to 64 percent.¹⁴¹ This inflation was also caused by the presence of UNAMIR and other international organisations. Until the genocide, their presence had only had little influence on the economy, but afterwards their relative size could no longer go unnoticed in the economy. As the weakness of the Rwandan economy and the lack of public revenues frustrated efforts to stabilise the Rwandan situation and the causes of the conflict remained unaddressed, the World Bank and the IMF started projects to strengthen the government capacity to manage economic, financial and human resources. In 1995-1996, in order to stimulate the private sector, the authorities liberalised the economy, including imports. Inflation declined, because, amongst other reasons, the government decided not to finance the budget deficit through monetary creation. By mid-1995 production reached pre-crisis levels. The economy in 1995

recovered with a GDP growth of 35 percent¹⁴² In 1996, growth continued at 10.4 percent, while in 1997 and 1998 growth also remained strong¹⁴³ Nonetheless, the renewal of the conflict in the north-west of the country in combination with bad weather caused weak growth in the primary and food producing sectors and the return of refugees caused temporary food price inflation of 49 percent in 1997¹⁴⁴ Economic growth until 1998 was, nonetheless, rather superficial as it was mainly dependent on rehabilitation and reconstruction, the influx of refugees, and the injection of aid funds After 1998, economic growth became more internally based Although the growth subsequently declined, it did remain rather high However, some fundamental problems remained The detainees, approximately 100,000 of them, represented an economic potential that remained unavailable to the country and which indeed posed a heavy financial burden on their families and on Rwandan society in general Moreover, export earnings continued to be unstable as they remained dependent on too narrow a basis, with the bulk derived from coffee and tea Stagnating coffee export meant that Rwanda continued to be very dependent on external assistance to finance its imports Subsequently, at the end of 1997, Rwanda was still heavily indebted, with its external debt estimated at 1.2 billion US dollars, the equivalent of 63 percent of the country's GDP¹⁴⁵ The war in the DRC, however, did not weigh heavily upon the national budget because, as Kagame said, it was 'self-financing'¹⁴⁶ Finally, although the real per capita GDP had surpassed the pre-war level by 2000, most people were worse off than before the war The genocide had increased poverty levels from 53 percent in 1993 to 70 percent in 1997 However, there are indications that this trend did take a turn for the better after 2000¹⁴⁷

7.4.8 External relations

Unlike Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador, the conflict in Rwanda was not connected with the Cold War Indirectly, however, there was an influence, because after the Cold War Rwanda's donors rediscovered democracy and put the government under pressure to start the democratisation process that contributed to the polarisation and intensified hatred Pressure from abroad also pushed the parties to reach an agreement in Arusha which they otherwise might not have reached, and the rigid aid conditionality that accompanied its implementation left some extremists no other way out than a 'final solution' At the same time, those international actors who exerted the pressure, such as the United States and the United Nations, saw Rwanda not as a priority and were therefore not willing to pay the country too much attention or to plough resources into it Nonetheless, the parties signed their Arusha Agreement based mainly exactly on the assumption that this willingness was present In addition to international pressure, the situation in Rwanda was historically very much influenced by the political relationships of the Rwandese government with its neighbours, Burundi, Zaire and Uganda Historically, political events in Burundi strongly influenced the political situation in Rwanda and the other way around Tensions in one country stirred up tensions in the other country For example, the 'social revolution' in Rwanda stirred up tensions in Burundi, and an abortive coup in Burundi in 1972, in which 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu were killed, was followed by the coup of Habyarimana in Rwanda The regimes in Rwanda always pointed to Burundi to prove their racist ideology The assassination of the newly elected Burundese president, the moderate Hutu Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993, served a similar function It plunged Burundi into a civil war and so-called 'creeping genocide', in which the

government supported by Tutsi extremist militia was engaged in an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Hutu majority and Hutu 'armed gangs' attacked both the army and the Tutsi minority population. Again, the situation in Burundi and the refugees originating from this country would provide fertile ground for extremists to play upon. The situation in Uganda was also of great influence on the conflict in Rwanda. The Tutsi diaspora in Uganda had staged ten attempts to return between 1962 and 1967 and in the most recent attempt they were supported by Museveni. Finally, Zaire was a time bomb just waiting to go off. In Zaire the state was increasingly weakened, as its activities slowly waned, allowing conflicts to emerge and social and economic infrastructures to deteriorate. The most important government influence was its repression and violations of human rights. As a consequence, the neighbourhood in which Rwanda found itself was 'bad' and becoming worse.

During its presence the following 'policy tool' implemented by UNAMIR was intended to influence *external relations*

- *Border monitoring* The United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was a useful confidence-building mechanism and made a positive contribution to the stability of relations between Rwanda and Uganda until the genocide.¹⁴⁸ However, it was not so much the border with Uganda that needed monitoring, more significant danger lurked from Burundi. The assassination of the Burundese president Ndadaye in October 1993 was followed by allegations of cross-border military movements. Arms in the area were readily available and the already existing ethnic tensions were exacerbated by the influx of refugees. Although UNAMIR sent military observers tasked with monitoring the area, some 200,000 Burundese Hutu brought with them horror stories about how one should "never trust a Tutsi".¹⁴⁹ When the RPF came into power there was no longer a need for confidence-building measures between the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. As a consequence, border monitoring made a temporary limited positive contribution to the improvement of *external relations*.

The Security Council and the United Nations remained passive in the face of genocide. However, a lack of political will was not the only explanation. France was partisan and supported the 'provisional government' well up to ten days into the genocide.¹⁵⁰ The Zairian government also aided the Hutu militia and the FAR, both passively and actively. Not only did it provide a safe haven for the Hutu militia and FAR forces, but it also trained and armed the ex-FAR.¹⁵¹ A mission to monitor the arms embargo was prevented by Rwanda's neighbours. Nonetheless, the Security Council did establish an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the reports of violations of the arms embargo. In addition, in 1995 the arms embargo against Rwanda was lifted to enable the government to defend itself better. The sanctions against non-government forces were, however, continued. Furthermore, the Secretary-General appointed Jesus as his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. From mid-1995 onwards, bilateral relations between the countries in the region improved. At the same time, the Rwandese government opened up the country and participated in regional economic integration initiatives. However, the presence of Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries had serious repercussions on the Great Lakes region as a whole. They destabilised neighbouring states through overpopulation, the spilling-over of political and ethnic tensions, and insecurity. This instability was further aggravated because the parties had easy access to firepower due to the

proliferation of small arms, which was facilitated by networks of arms traffickers and alliances between resistance movements or governments within the region. As a result, the bad neighbourhood in which Rwanda found itself only became worse. After 1994, the situation in Burundi degenerated consistently. A “creeping coup” resulted in 1996 in the takeover of power by the Tutsi Major Buyoya. The ‘creeping genocide’ continued, and by 1997 more than 150,000 people had been killed.¹⁵² In Zaire, Mobutu was not willing to send the more than 1.5 million refugees back to Rwanda and neither did he want to move them deeper into Zaire. As a result, the disgruntled refugees remained at the border with easy access for the militia to Rwanda and possibilities to destabilise it. Nonetheless, the refugees also escalated tensions in Eastern Zaire between the Hutu and Tutsi (Banyamulenge) from that region. When in 1996, the ex-FAR massacred a number of Banyamulenge and Mobutu did not take any action against it, the Banyamulenge led by Kabila resorted to arms and rebelled against Kinshasa. In October, in co-operation with Kabila, Kigali cleared the refugee camps. The rebellion, however, triggered the destabilisation of the whole of Zaire. With the aid of Uganda and Rwanda, Kabila managed to ride the wave of anti-Mobutism, marched his forces through the whole of Zaire and toppled Mobutu in 1997. Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In mid-1998 relations between Kabila and his Ugandan and Rwandan patrons became decidedly frosty and the Rwandese armed forces were expelled. Subsequently, a rebellion erupted in east DRC, which was aided by Kigali and Kampala. The Hutu militia joined the Congolese government in the fight. Both Rwanda and Uganda again sent their troops into the DRC to fight their domestic rebels and the Congolese regime of Kabila, which supported them. Consequently, the destabilisation of the region mainly resulted from the fact that Rwanda destabilised the DRC in its own quest for security. In addition, officers in both the Ugandan and Rwandan armies became involved in the plundering of Congo’s natural resources. In this latter process, both countries chose different strategies and ended up backing two rival rebel factions. Slowly their goals started to drift apart which resulted in shootings over the city of Kisangani in both 1999 and 2000.

7.5 Within case conclusions

Under pressure from the parties at the international level of the conflict, the Rwandan government and the RPF negotiated a detailed peace agreement. Both national parties, however, never fully backed the peace process. Hutu extremists feared that its implementation would mean a return to Tutsi suppression, whereas the RPF was afraid that incomplete implementation would mean the continuation of the massacres and violence against Tutsi. Moreover, the parties at the international level also made sure that their Rwandan allies would not get the worst and continued their supply of weapons. This situation and interests meant that UNAMIR would have a difficult job in making a positive contribution to both *negative peace* and the causes of conflict in Rwanda. From the research of the hypotheses it follows that:

UNAMIR did not contribute to negative peace The conflict in Rwanda had been a rather low intensity conflict, although an arms race had unfolded and both parties feared for their security. The monitoring of the cease-fire by UNAMIR did not contribute to *negative peace* as the force was not large enough and strong enough to provide the parties with the necessary security. In the absence of this security,

the parties felt unable to disarm and even perceived a need to rearm. UNAMIR's attempts to stimulate disarmament did not stop this process, UNOMUR's border monitoring did not prevent the influx of weapons and neither was diplomacy able to stop the road to a relapse into conflict and genocide. As a result of the genocide, UNAMIR was unable to start with the cantonment and demobilisation, reintegration of the ex-combatants and institution building of a new united army. After the RPF victory some resistance remained especially from Congo and in the regions neighbouring it, but by and large the RPF itself was able to bring negative peace through victory.

UNAMIR did not contribute to inter-group relations. Ethnicity was picked up by politicians and turned into a murderous weapon. Both extremes of the political spectrum came to fear for their very existence and eventually this led Hutu extremists to act. Although UNAMIR had planned to pay attention to *inter-group relations* by winning the hearts and minds of the population in radio programmes, these programmes never crystallised as a result of the genocide. After the genocide, inter-group relations in Rwanda only became more complex and the distinction between murderers and victims lay heavy claims on the relations between Hutu and Tutsi. Led by the RPF government, Rwanda only made some of the first steps on the road towards national reconciliation.

UNAMIR made a temporary limited positive contribution to group demography. Rwanda experienced demographic pressures that stretched society to its limits. Land and food were no longer sufficiently available and IDPs were on the move as a result of the conflict. In order to address the most immediate problems, UNAMIR provided humanitarian aid secured by measures to provide law and order. Although this made a positive contribution, the situation deteriorated even further as a result of the influx of Burundian refugees, and famine. Due to the genocide, this positive contribution was ended, the repatriation was not implemented and the reintegration of refugees and mine clearance, which was also intended to decrease demographic pressures, did not proceed. In spite of the fact that the genocide and the subsequent refugee flows temporarily decreased demographic pressures, the repatriation of both the first and second caseload refugees as well as the natural population growth brought Rwanda back to square one.

UNAMIR made a temporary limited positive contribution to state weakness. The Rwandan state had been remarkably strong until the start of the 1990s. Economic decline, austerity programmes and the conflict, however, severely weakened it. Moreover, it did not embrace its entire population, but only the Hutu. Nonetheless, the state remained highly organised and centralised, which meant that the genocide could be perpetrated so 'efficiently'. Until the genocide, UNAMIR managed partly to temporarily strengthen the state through providing law and order. Its attempts to disarm the population and the militia did not make a contribution because active disarmament was, according to the interpretation of United Nations Head Quarters in New York, outside the mandate. As a result of the genocide, UNAMIR could not start with rehabilitation and the institution building of the new army. The genocide caused the Rwandan state to collapse entirely. It is therefore all the more remarkable that the Rwandan state recovered within a few years.

UNAMIR did not contribute to state unwillingness and good governance. The country lacked a tradition of democracy, and since its independence, human rights had been violated and Tutsi massacred. The 'imposed' democratisation was feared by sectors in society who subsequently started again, with impunity, to massacre

Tutsi and violate human rights. From this perspective it is remarkable that the mandate of UNAMIR gave so little attention to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Human rights verification, the organisation of elections and election monitoring, three 'policy tools' the country desperately needed, were not even included in the mandate of UNAMIR. It only implemented two 'policy tools' in the field of *state unwillingness and good governance*. Providing law and order did not make a contribution, as politically motivated killings only increased and the civilian police monitors were unable to control the Rwandan civil police. As a result, the genocide could take place when good governance was nowhere to be found. The new RPF government improved the situation significantly, but human rights violations continued on a grand scale and the democratic system that was slowly introduced also remained questionable.

UNAMIR did not contribute to state/government legitimacy. After the mid-1980s, the legitimacy of the Habyarimana government declined as economic development no longer contributed to it. To the Tutsi, legitimisation based on Hutuism only made the government more illegitimate. Remarkably, UNAMIR was not mandated to implement any 'policy tool' to address *state/government legitimacy*. Neither was there even a plan for UNAMIR to monitor the elections. After the genocide, the RPF initially lacked legitimacy especially amongst the Hutu. Nonetheless, as it managed to provide security, and to improve state facilities and since there was no real alternative for it, its legitimacy grew.

UNAMIR did not contribute to unemployment and economic decline. The fall of coffee prices in the mid-1980s turned Rwanda's economy from an example of success in sub-Saharan Africa into a disaster. The conflict and the structural adjustment programme only intensified the pressure on the population. UNAMIR was not mandated to address the economic causes of the conflict. Although international financial institutions may be better equipped to address some of these problems, 'policy tools' such as reconstruction and rehabilitation might have contributed a lot. The lack of attention for these problems enabled the genocide to take place as absolute poverty played an accelerating role. After the genocide, the economy had shrunk by 50 percent. Although it made a remarkable recovery, the country remained impoverished and income differences considerable.

UNAMIR made a temporary limited positive contribution to external relations. Rwanda found itself in one of the 'bad neighbourhoods' of the world. Amongst other things, developments in Burundi had a devastating effect on Rwanda. In addition, outside pressure on the government to democratise, implement the peace process and restructure the economy resulted in the choice for some to opt for a 'final solution'. Border monitoring by UNOMUR contributed a little, but the RPF later admitted it was still able to receive weapons from Uganda. Moreover, the border with Burundi was not monitored. After the genocide, the 'bad neighbourhood' only became worse. The Zairian government, the ex-FAR, militia and later also the Congolese government were hostile towards Kigali. However, Rwanda itself was also responsible as it destabilised the region in its quest for security.

Summary

Although UNAMIR made a positive contribution to three of the eight variables, this influence was minor and only temporary. UNAMIR did not influence two of the variables - *state/government legitimacy* and *unemployment and economic decline*

- because it was not mandated to do so, in spite of the fact that such a mandate would have been a welcome addition. Moreover, as far as *inter-group relations* and *state unwillingness and good governance* are concerned, the mandate was too limited. As a result, generally speaking UNAMIR contributed far too little to durable peace. The limited positive contributions it did make, perished in the genocide. Of course one has to keep in mind that UNAMIR was unable to implement many of its planned 'policy tools' as a result of the genocide and many of its endeavours were therefore ended prematurely. In addition, as opposed to other recent operations, UNAMIR was designed more like a traditional peacekeeping mission, simply as an observer of a cease-fire. This resulted from the fact that the United Nations had not used its authority in the negotiating process in Arusha to ensure that the root causes of the conflict were thoroughly addressed. The Security Council even watered down the already narrow mandate. In the end, one may even blame UNAMIR and more specifically the member states of the United Nations for the fact that the genocide was not ended early. Although five years after the genocide and UNAMIR I left, negative peace was largely present, the conflict in Rwanda was still latent as the causes were still unaddressed.

Table 16 - Indication of the contribution of UNAMIR's policy tools¹⁵³

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election monitoring • Organisation of elections • Truth commission • Human rights education • Human rights verification • Rehabilitation • Society-building • Providing law and order • Humanitarian aid • Mine clearance • Reintegration of refugees • Repatriation • Providing pay to the newly-formed army • Border monitoring • Civilian police monitoring • Civil administration controlling • Sanctions verification • Diplomacy • Winning the hearts and minds... • Verification of foreign forces withdrawal • Institution-building • Reintegration of ex-combatants • Disarmament • Cautonment and demobilisation • Cease-fire monitoring 	
Negative peace	0		
Inter-group relations		*	
Group demography			
State weakness	0	*	
State unwillingness...			0
State/government legitimacy			
Unemployment and econ. dec.			
External relations			+ ¹
Negative contribution:	--	Limited positive contribution:	+
Limited negative contribution:	-	Positive contribution:	++
No contribution:	0	Temporary contribution:	¹
		Contribution to process:	^p
		Policy tool was envisaged, but not implemented:	*

¹ One has to treat figures on demographic distribution with suspicion. During the colonial times the Belgians used body height and the number of cattle owned as parameters for 'ethnicity.' However, these parameters could differ within families. Moreover, also after independence cases are known in which people changed their 'ethnicity.' Some even say that the number of Tutsi in Rwanda, according to the census of 1979, was as high as 25 percent, but this fact was concealed for obvious political reasons. See: Interview Shyaka, Kigali, 29 January 2003.

² UN DOC E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1, 11 August 1993, 12-17.

³ For a good overview of this history see: PRUNIER, G. (1997), *The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide*, New York.

⁴ UN DOC E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1, 11 August 1993, 19; and PRUNIER, *The Rwanda crisis*, pp 135-136.

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
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¹⁵² UN DOC E/CN.4/1996/69, 15 February 1996, 4-6; and NEWBURY, "Irredentist Rwanda: ethnic and territorial frontiers in Central Africa", p. 211.

¹⁵³ The presentation of the assessment of the contribution of a policy tool on a variable in a five point scale has inherently two disadvantages. First of all, it does not encompass all the nuances of description. Secondly, the danger of subjectivity is inherently greater, because one is forced to make a choice without these nuances. Yet, sometimes the difference between, for example, a positive contribution and a limited positive contribution is not all that clear cut. Nonetheless, this table is given to present a brief overview of the assessment of the contribution of the peacekeeping operation. One has to keep in mind, however, that it only serves as an indication. For the real and full assessment one has to turn to the description.



8 THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL)

8.1 The history of the conflict

8.1.1 *The context of the El Salvador conflict*

With the integration of El Salvador into the global economy, land and power in El Salvador became concentrated in the hands of an oligarchy, which came to be known as the 'fourteen families'. This process led to several peasant revolts of which the 1932 'la Matanza' is the most well known and infamous, because the security forces crushed it at the cost of 30,000 lives. 'The Slaughter' set the stage for the following 50 years, during which the oligarchy and the military shared power. It made clear that any challenge to either the political or economic status quo would be answered with severe repression. During the 1960s, however, a new process of mobilisation of the lower classes was sparked by the Catholic church and its 'liberation theology'. Subsequently, newly emerged political parties challenged the position of the oligarchy and the military, which requested political participation, as well as economic and political reforms. Nonetheless, these demands were ignored and the political organisations repressed. Electoral fraud in 1972 and 1977 led to widespread frustration and disillusionment about the opportunities for peaceful opposition and reform, and five leftist guerrilla groups emerged at the end of the 1970s, which went along the road of armed opposition. At the same time, death squads also became increasingly more active during 1970s.¹

Only three weeks after Somoza was toppled in Nicaragua, in October 1979, the Salvadoran government of General Romero was overthrown by a Revolutionary Junta. These junior military officers hoped to halt the crisis in their country and invited centre and centre-left politicians to join them. The political struggle between certain military sectors and civilians then intensified. By January 1980, the Junta found itself in a state of crisis as its civilian members, along with nearly all ministers, resigned. That same month, the largest demonstration ever organised in El Salvador was violently repressed, and many demonstrators were either killed or wounded. In March, the government nationalised large estates in order to start agricultural reform. That same month, Archbishop Romero, who preached peace, was assassinated during Mass. When a few days later thousands of people attended his funeral, they were shot at, and many were killed. At the end of the year Duarte became president of the provisional government. However, in reality the army remained in control. At the beginning of 1981, with virtually all peaceful channels for opposition closed and supported by the knowledge that in Nicaragua the Sandinista had been victorious, the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN), a front of the five leftist guerrilla groups, launched its 'final offensive'.²

8.1.2 *The conflict and Duarte*

The conflict was immediately drawn into the East-West confrontation of the Cold War. Washington viewed El Salvador as a "textbook case of armed aggression by communist powers" and provided military and economic aid to the government.³ Its doctrine of low-intensity warfare was intended to combine military force with political and economic reforms to win the hearts and minds of the population.

Following this doctrine, Magaña was elected in 1982 as president and a Government of National Unity was established, aimed at democracy, peace, human rights and economic recovery. However, as a result of the lack of agreement amongst the participating parties and the pressures deriving from the armed conflict, few reforms were actually achieved. Nonetheless, in 1983 a new constitution was drafted instigated by the Reagan administration. Subsequently, funds were poured via the CIA into the 1984 presidential elections and the Duarte campaign of the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC). It was hoped that in this way the victory of the moderate Duarte could be guaranteed over D'Aubuisson who represented the party of the oligarchy and the military, the *Alianza Republicana Nacionalista* (ARENA). Duarte was expected to provide the government with a more human face than D'Aubuisson, who was known to have ties with some of the death squads. The elections indeed resulted in Duarte's victory, and he became the first elected civilian president in 50 years. He immediately started talks with the FMLN, but to no avail. With the 1985 elections, the PDC also gained control over the Legislative Assembly and the municipalities, but as the war dragged on and the economy deteriorated, it was increasingly viewed to be incapable of solving the problems of the country. At the same time, the electoral loss of ARENA resulted in the realignment of that party, and D'Aubuisson was dropped for the more friendly face of Cristiani.⁴

8.1.3 The Contadora involvement and Esquipulas

A first bid to achieve peace in El Salvador was attempted by the Contadora group - Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia – which was later aided by the Lima support group - Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. Although under their auspices the FMLN and the government met twice in 1983, these talks did not have any positive outcome. Thereafter it even remained impossible to bring both parties together. A second attempt to achieve peace originated from the Costa Rican president Arias, who in 1986 in Esquipulas stimulated El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica to affirm their commitment to peace, co-operation and national sovereignty. In 1987, the presidents of the five Central American nations met again and signed the Esquipulas II Agreement in which they promised to start a process of national reconciliation and democratisation, to bring about a cease-fire and to end their aid to resistance movements in neighbouring countries. In order to verify the follow-up of these objectives they established the *Comisión Internacional de Verificación Seguimiento* (CIVS). The CIVS was, however, not a recipe for success, because it was much too diverse and as a consequence divided and ineffective. By February 1989, this led the parties to request, in their Costa del Sol declaration, the involvement of the United Nations in the verification of Esquipulas II security commitments. In the same declaration the government of Nicaragua invited the United Nations to observe the elections in Nicaragua, which led to the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (UNOVEN).⁵

8.1.4 1989: the year of change

National and international conditions combined made 1989 a turning point in the El Salvador conflict. In the national arena, the elections for the Legislative Assembly and municipal councils of 1988 had already resulted in a victory for ARENA, but in March 1989 Cristiani was also elected president of El Salvador. As a result, the administration finally came into the hands of the real protagonists on

the side of the government Cristiani had more room for manoeuvre than his predecessor who always had to bear in mind the position of the conservative army. In the international arena, the end of the Reagan era and the rise of perestroika enabled the superpowers to settle their differences and created a climate favourable to the settlement of Cold War conflicts. Relations between the Central American governments also slowly started to relax. With the August 1989 Tela declaration, the Nicaraguan peace process was strengthened and the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS) were invited to aid the Nicaraguan peace process, and a UN peacekeeping force was requested to verify the termination of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements operating in the region, and non-use of territory for attacks on other states. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established in November 1989. In this new atmosphere of detente following the Tela declaration, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN decided to initiate a dialogue to end their conflict by political means. The subsequent meetings were observed by Assistant Secretary-General De Soto, who was appointed Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central American peace process. In addition, the OAS and the Catholic Church also observed the negotiations.⁶ During these meetings the government demanded the unconditional surrender of the guerrillas and an immediate cease-fire. This increasingly led the FMLN to believe that the government was not serious. After the bombing of the office of the labour union FENASTRAS, the FMLN suspended the talks. On 11 November, it started its largest offensive ever, in which it managed to attack important parts of San Salvador. Perhaps in retaliation for the offensive, during this period six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were murdered by members of the army, the *Fuerza Armada de El Salvador* (FAES). The fighting raged until 12 December, but none of the parties proved to be able to win the battle. It was this offensive that led the parties to believe that they had reached a 'mutually hurting stalemate' and that the path of negotiations was likely to be more productive.⁷ The FMLN realised this when it saw that even this offensive could not spark a popular rebellion. At the same time, the military and the government realised that the FMLN was far from defeated and was even able to control important parts of the capital. The peace process that followed was born from the 1989 violence. Moreover, the ill-fated visit of the Secretary-General of the OAS to San Salvador at the height of the skirmishes undermined the credibility of that organisation. With the OAS out of the picture, the road was open for the United Nations.⁸

8.1.5 The deeper involvement of the United Nations

In November 1989 the Security Council allowed the Secretary-General to use his good offices in the Salvadoran peace process. In their San Isidro de Coronado declaration of December 1989, the five Central American presidents pressured the FMLN to resume talks with the government. In addition, in November 1989 and January 1990 respectively, both the FMLN and president Cristiani separately requested deeper involvement of the United Nations in the mediation of the further settlement of their conflict. This led to several bilateral consultations of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General de Soto with both parties. In April 1990, at a first round of direct talks between the parties under the auspices of the Secretary-General in Geneva, the parties agreed to a negotiating process to end the armed conflict, to promote human rights and democracy, and to reunify the country. The "initial objective" was to achieve a political agreement to halt the

armed confrontation and establish human rights verification by the United Nations. Next, the Caracas agenda set goals for agreement on the following issues: armed forces, human rights, the judicial system, the electoral system, constitutional reform, economic and social issues, and verification by the United Nations. The talks continued in Mexico and Costa Rica, but became deadlocked on the issue of the armed forces. At this time, in the words of De Soto, the United Nations “pulled out of a head” a human rights agreement to maintain momentum.⁹ At the end of July 1990, the parties approved this San José Agreement on Human Rights, in which they guaranteed respect for human rights in El Salvador and agreed that the deployment of a United Nations human rights verification mission was the start of a package of yet to be negotiated political agreements. Nonetheless, the issue of the armed forces remained a stumbling block. In response, the FMLN started a new offensive for which it was heavily criticised by the presidents of the five Central American countries. While it was initially intended that the United Nations human rights mission was deployed once a cease-fire had been reached, in the light of the continuing conflict the parties decided to drop this provision. In December 1990, pending the conclusion of the other agreements, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of the human rights verification component of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).¹⁰

8.1.6 Continuing negotiations, while ONUSAL is established

In April 1991, a new round of negotiations started in Mexico, at which it became apparent that constitutional changes had to be made to reach an agreement. These changes had to be approved by two consecutive legislatures, but the then current legislature left office on 30 April. This deadline placed pressure on the negotiations. The talks resulted in the Mexico Agreement of 27 April 1991, in which it was agreed to reform the constitution on the issues of the armed forces, the judicial system and human rights, and the electoral system. In addition, it was agreed that a Commission on the Truth would be established to investigate the “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980.”¹¹ Immediately after the signing of the Mexico agreement, the outgoing Legislative Assembly approved almost all the amendments. The new Assembly also adopted most reforms but left those with regard to the armed forces pending while awaiting the result of the negotiations. In the words of the Secretary-General, the question of the armed forces became the “Gordian knot”.¹² In the meantime, in spite of the possibility of extremist groups resorting to intimidation against members of ONUSAL, a preliminary mission advised them to establish a Human Rights Component at the earliest feasible date. The Secretary-General did not want to link the approval of the operation to the success of the negotiations, partly because he hoped it would act as a positive impetus to the negotiations. On 20 May 1991, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).¹³ (see table 17)

Table 17 - Mandate of ONUSAL


- Active monitoring of the human rights situation in El Salvador;
- Investigations of specific cases of alleged violations of human rights;
- Promotion of human rights in El Salvador;
- Recommendations to eliminate violations of, and to promote respect for, human rights; and

- Report to the Secretary-General and through him, to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Source: UN DOC A/44/971-S/21541, 16 August 1990; UN DOC S/22494, 16 April 1991, 8; and UN DOC S/RES/693 (1991), 20 May 1991.

8.2 Portrayal of the parties

The Salvadoran conflict can be subdivided into two levels: a national and an international level. At the time ONUSAL was established at the national level, the conflicting parties were, on the one hand, the Government of El Salvador and on the other hand the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN). At the international level of the Salvadoran conflict, the government was aided by the United States, while the FMLN was supported by Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union. (see Figure 7)



8.2.1 Government of El Salvador

In 1989, Cristiani of the conservative party ARENA succeeded Duarte as president of El Salvador. The military, the *Fuerza Armada de El Salvador* (FAES), were an important and rather independent factor within the government.

- *Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA)*: ARENA was established in 1980 by D'Aubuisson. It was strongly opposed to any challenge of the status quo and opposed both the FMLN, and the reformist officers who seized power in 1979 with their Christian Democrat allies. The party saw itself as the main defender against communism from outside and within the country. It formed the backbone of the death squads together with elements of the security forces. Over the years it gained a cross class political machine, which was broader than the elite that financially supported the party. Although all its members were deeply conservative, a distinction could be made between the moderates, often industrialists and businessmen, and violent reactionary extremists. Cristiani, who was elected president in 1989, represented the first group. This wing no longer supported the further continuation of the war after the November 1989 offensive of the FMLN. Not only had the army been incapable of protecting the homes of these economic elites in the wealthy Escalón district of San Salvador, but they also hoped to prevent their government from becoming an international pariah. Subsequently, ARENA opted to negotiate.¹⁴ Under the close guidance of Cristiani, his negotiating team handled the burden of the negotiations, while he personally intervened at critical moments. He allowed members of the armed forces to formulate the compromises on security issues, committing them to the agreements. The economic policy of macroeconomic stabilisation and economic adjustment, which the ARENA government started in 1989 in line with the Washington consensus, was clearly not up for negotiation. By the time of the 1994 elections, ARENA would gain support amongst large sections of the population, because it had promised peace and economic revitalisation, and was not tainted by accusations of corruption. It was a strong organisation with a lot of members, and had many trained people, funds and the entire government structure at its disposal. Only after the elections would ARENA lose its unity and quarrel about the distribution of wealth.¹⁵
- *Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (FAES)*: From 'la Matanza' in 1932 onwards, the army played an important role in national politics, leading a series of rightist military juntas until 1979. It protected both its own interests, and the interests of the oligarchy. After the 1979 coup by reformist officers, a process towards more civilian control over the military started, and in the 1983 constitution the military were formally placed under civilian rule. Nonetheless, the military maintained a rather independent position and even grew in power as a result of the military aid from the United States. In spite of this aid, the FAES never became the professional army Washington hoped for and remained corrupt, disrespecting human rights and involved in death squads. Until 1992, the FAES was responsible for both internal and external security. It included the internal security forces, the National Guard (GN), the National Police (PN) and the Treasury Police (PH). By 1987 the Salvadoran army consisted of 56,000 men.¹⁶

8.2.2 Legal opposition

The most important legal opposition parties were:

- *Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN)*: The PCN was the most important political party in the 1960s and 1970s. It was allied to the military and represented the traditional rightist interests of the military and the oligarchy. After 1979, the party continued to be a force that survived through cooperation with both ARENA and the PDC.¹⁷
- *Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)*: The PDC was the first modern political party of El Salvador. It was centrist, positioning itself as an alternative to revolutionary leftism and reactionary rightism. In the 1960s the party was the first challenge to the military-oligarchic hegemony. For a long time the party was led by the charismatic leader Duarte. After the party's heyday in 1985, it was often perceived as a corrupt party which was unable to close its ranks. Nonetheless, by 1994 it would still have a solid power base in the middle class and well-organised worker and peasant organisations.¹⁸
- *Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) and Convergencia Democrática (CD)*: The FDR was the unarmed leftist opposition and was established in 1980. It was a moderate leftist umbrella organisation of several smaller parties and breakaway elements of the Christian Democrats. In 1981, the FDR established formal ties with the FMLN and it agreed with, but did not get involved in the armed struggle. When its leaders Zamora and Ungo returned from exile in Mexico they contributed to the establishment of the *Convergencia Democrática* (CD). The CD helped the FMLN to overcome many hurdles including its transition to a civil organisation. In the 1994 elections in some municipalities, the CD and FMLN ran a single slate and for the presidential elections Zamora was the combined CD and FMLN candidate.¹⁹

8.2.3 Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)

The FMLN consisted of five armed opposition groups, which propagated a wide variety of ideas ranging from Marxist-Leninist to social democratic. They had their share of infighting, but were strongly united in their fight against their common enemy. Their members were very disciplined and often joined because of their political conviction, and/or because of the fact that poverty was the only alternative and/or personal experiences with the repression of the army. In addition to the weapons the FMLN obtained from friendly regimes, such as Nicaragua and Cuba, it also managed to buy weapons from corrupt officials in Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.²⁰ The end of the Cold War and the stop of Soviet aid to Nicaragua and Cuba influenced the possibilities for the FMLN. It was forced to drop its revolutionary perspective and become less radical. At the negotiating table the FMLN transformed itself into a force for reform, placing concrete proposals on the table to change what it thought wrong. In doing so, it applied the double strategy of talking and fighting, thereby maintaining pressure during the negotiations. Elections were an important part of its strategy, as the FMLN felt confident that with the registration of almost three million eligible voters, it would be able to change the voting pattern of the previous elections. After the end of the conflict, the FMLN would face the difficulties involved in the transition from a resistance movement to a political party. Firstly, it lost contact with its rural basis as a result of the fact that many of its middle and upper cadres moved to the capital to carry out political tasks, amongst other things, for their organisations. As a consequence, the rural basis of the organisation felt abandoned

by the FMLN and its leaders in San Salvador. Secondly, the deteriorating human rights situations at the end of 1993, during which two leaders of the FMLN were assassinated together with numerous political activists, may have affected the ability of the FMLN to find candidates and campaign activists. Thirdly, after the achievement of the peace agreement, the FMLN had to make a choice about its future. In this debate it proved that the front was not always united and conflicts arose over leadership and power. The main struggle was between the more social democratic *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP) and the *Fuerzas Populares de Liberación* (FPL) whose objective was a more traditional Marxist party. This struggle was to reach a climax over the choice of the presidential candidate. Eventually the ERP won when Zamora was chosen. After the elections these differences would only widen and eventually lead to a split. In this split in December 1994, the moderate ERP and *Resistencia Nacional* (RN) separated from the three other more radical parties of the FMLN.²¹

8.2.4 *United States*

Throughout history, the guiding principle of United States foreign policy was to prevent foreign influence in its backyard, in El Salvador and the rest of the Western hemisphere, whether British, Spanish or Soviet. This was preferably achieved through democracy, but if necessary dictatorial regimes were supported. The Cold War only intensified this inclination as Soviet presence in Central America and another communist revolution was a direct threat to the motherland. From the start of the conflict in 1981, the United States was the largest military and economic donor of the government. The escalation of the support under Reagan became essential in the financing of the enormous cost of the war. The combination of the aim of the Reagan administration to defeat the communist revolution with the strong opposition of congress to both an alliance with the ultra-right or a military intervention ruled out a victory for either the government or the FMLN. The Reagan administration therefore promoted the drafting of the 1983 constitution and poured funds into the elections to guarantee the victory of Duarte. Subsequently, the moderate face of Duarte was used to pour aid into the war against the FMLN, while the military were pressured to improve their human rights record. After the murder of the six Jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter, congress was no longer willing to support the military. Moreover, after the United States' 1989 invasion of Panama and Chamorro's victory in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, the communist threat was no longer a rationale for United States' support to El Salvador. It was clear that aid levels would be lowered in the future and under the Bush administration the aim of United States' policy gradually shifted towards a negotiated settlement. In 1990 and 1991, Washington maintained a low profile behind the scenes, putting pressure on both parties to negotiate. The threat of large cuts in military aid were key in forcing the military to renounce power. However, only after the 1991 Mexico Agreement was it clear to the United States government that the FMLN was willing to end the war and confidence in the United Nations and negotiations grew. Thereafter, it further increased pressure on the government to reach a peace agreement.²²

8.2.5 *Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union*

During most of the Salvadoran conflict, both Cuba and Nicaragua were led by socialist-Marxist regimes. Both regimes were supported by the Soviet Union and

the Eastern bloc According to United States intelligence, both Cuba and Nicaragua provided training, cash and explosives to the FMLN²³

8.3 A history of a peacekeeping operation

8.3.1 Overcoming the Gordian knot

On 26 July 1991, one month following approval from the Security Council, ONUSAL was launched. In the meantime, although several meetings had been held, the negotiations made little progress in the crisis over the 'Gordian knot' the position of the armed forces. Moreover, the FMLN feared for the safety and security of its members and demanded a cease-fire arrangement that kept its military capacity intact, or merged with the army. This was unacceptable to the government. Under the Geneva Agreement and Caracas Agenda, the subject of the armed forces would only have been taken up during the post cease-fire negotiations. In order to overcome these problems, the Secretary-General aimed to compress the negotiations into one phase, in order to establish the necessary conditions for the reintegration of members of the FMLN before the cease-fire. A letter from the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States added extra momentum to the peace process and strengthened the position of the Secretary-General when talks continued in New York. In the New York agreement, which followed, it was decided that a process of purification of the armed forces was to start, that they were to be reduced, that they were to become governed by the rule of law, non-partisan and subordinate to the constitutional authorities, that the National Police (PN) was to be purified, certain units disposed of and restructured, and that economic and social questions were to be addressed, amongst other things through the redistribution of land to those farmers and peasants who were without land. In addition, a new agenda was adopted for so-called 'compressed negotiations'. As a result, the 'Gordian knot' was untied. In New York it was further agreed that the *Comision Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz* (COPAZ) would be established. This Commission was to consist of members of the government, the FMLN and the political parties in the Legislative Assembly and was to be observed by ONUSAL and the Archbishop of San Salvador. While ONUSAL became responsible for overseeing the implementation of the political agreements, COPAZ was to become the mechanism for the monitoring of, and the participation of, civilian society in the peace process²⁴

8.3.2 A return ticket Mexico-New York-Mexico

The new deadline for the negotiations was 31 December 1991, the date Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was to leave office, because it was expected that the next Secretary-General would be less interested in El Salvador. Pressure mounted after talks in Mexico stalled in December and the Secretary-General invited the parties again to New York to give the negotiations a decisive impetus. Finally, just before the start of the New Year and after considerable pressure and persuasion, these talks resulted in the New York Act, which stated that the parties had concluded several further agreements and that after a final round of talks, a final peace agreement was to be signed in Mexico City on 16 January 1992. Three days before the peace agreement was to be signed, the last remaining obstacles were removed and the talks were finalised with the New York Act II²⁵

In the light of the peace accord and the expansion of the mandate of ONUSAL (see table 18), the Secretary-General provided, in advance of the signature of the agreement, a plan aimed at the rapid enlargement of ONUSAL, in the hope that it could be in a position to fulfil its responsibilities at the time of the start of the cessation of the armed conflict on 1 February. In addition to the Human Rights Division, which was already present in the country to verify the San José Agreement, ONUSAL was enlarged with a Military Division and a Police Division. All divisions were placed under the control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Riza. On 14 January, in advance of the signing of the agreement in Mexico, the Security Council enlarged the mandate of ONUSAL, and two days later at Chapultepec castle in Mexico City the peace agreement was signed.²⁶

Table 18 - Expansion of the mandate of ONUSAL

The verification and monitoring of the implementation of all the agreements once these are signed in Mexico City between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN, in particular the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on the establishment of a National Civil Police. This included:

- To verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of forces
- To monitor the maintenance of public order during a transitional period while the new National Civil Police (PNC) is set up

Source: UN DOC S/23402, 10 January 1992, 8; and UN DOC S/RES/729 (1992), 14 January 1992.

8.3.3 ONUSAL's expanded mandate and its troubled implementation

Initially the situation took a turn for the better. The COPAZ and several other commissions were established, and a broad amnesty was adopted by the Legislative Assembly enabling members of the FMLN to return to the country. However, the parties remained very suspicious of each other and used breaches of the agreement by the other party to justify breaches by themselves. There were disagreements about issues such as the concentration of forces, the arms inventories of the FMLN, the reintegration of FMLN ex-combatants, the synchronised disbandment of PN units, and the legalisation of FMLN. As a consequence, by May 1992 the timetable as established in the Chapultepec peace agreement was behind schedule. The problems were not only caused by suspicion, but also by the fact that the parties had contradictory interpretations of some of the provisions of the agreements. This combination led the parties to accuse each other, rather than work together and ONUSAL in the middle was sometimes perceived of as choosing sides. It was within this context that threats against the mission recurred.²⁷

In mid-June 1992, the parties, with the aid of ONUSAL, finalised an agreement in which they overcame their differences and adjusted the timetable for the first time. A second adjustment was agreed on by mid-August. The purpose of these timetables was to adjust the demobilisation of the FMLN to take into account the delays in the implementation of the land transfer programme and the police projects, but they retained 31 October as the date on which the demobilisation was to be completed. However, by October, it appeared that as a result of further delays in the land transfers, the demobilisation of the FMLN was no longer feasible by the end of that month. In the so-called '13 October agreement' the parties

agreed to a proposal of the Secretary-General for an 'arms-for-land' deal, which supplemented the Chapultepec agreements and was also to be verified by ONUSAL. Subsequently, the timetable was adjusted for the third time to complete the demobilisation and the cessation of conflict on 15 December. According to the new timetable, the compliance with a certain point on the calendar by one side was to be contingent on certain actions by the other side.²⁸

8.3.4 The conflict officially ends and the commissions publish

On 14 December 1992, the FMLN was formally legalised as a political party and accordingly received the concomitant rights and obligations. One day later, at a ceremony, the last FMLN soldiers were demobilised and the armed conflict was officially ended. However, the peace process remained troubled by incomplete compliance. The government failed to meet the deadline for the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces. The FMLN, in turn, did not complete the destruction of its arms in time because it linked its compliance to that of the government. When, on 15 March 1993, the Commission on the Truth presented its report, it went beyond what many human rights organisations had expected. It attributed blame to the state in 85 percent of the cases reported to it and only in 5 percent of the cases to the FMLN. In addition, where proof was incontrovertible, the report named the names of those responsible, even if it involved people with the most senior positions in the military. Several important sectors in society, such as the High Command of the armed forces, the President of the Supreme Court, and segments of the media, publicly rejected the findings and recommendations. In addition to harsh criticism of the United Nations, anonymous threats were once again made against ONUSAL. Moreover, one week after the report was published, the Legislative Assembly adopted a general amnesty, which lacked the support of the FMLN, amongst others. However, the fact that many of the names that had appeared in the report of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces also appeared in the report of the Commission on the Truth gave weight to the recommendations of the first and forced the government to act. In April the government implemented all the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission and in turn the FMLN completed the destruction of its weapons. On 25 May, the Secretary-General published a report that included the Secretary-General's analysis of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth accompanied by the measures he regarded necessary to implement them.²⁹

8.3.5 The explosive road to the elections

In March, Riza had left as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and was succeeded in April by Ocampo. At the start of 1993 the government of El Salvador officially requested ONUSAL to verify the 1994 elections. The Secretary-General supported this idea and the Security Council agreed to his proposal to establish an Electoral Division, which received the mandate to verify the electoral process (see table 19).³⁰

Table 19 - Second expansion of the mandate of ONUSAL

- to verify the electoral process before, during and after the elections

Source: UN DOC S/25812, 21 May 1993, 88.

Shortly afterwards, the confidence and trust of both the government and ONUSAL in the FMLN were severely shaken, when an explosion at an automobile repair shop in Managua, Nicaragua, led to the discovery of an arms depot of one of the constituent groups of the FMLN, the FPL. This group immediately made known it was willing to assist ONUSAL in the disposal of the arms in Managua and in indicating the location of other arms caches in Nicaragua. In total, four of the five constituent groups of the FMLN had feared they might not be able to hold the government to its promises and therefore kept arms as a 'last negotiating card'. However, the discovery of the weapons only backfired and created more distrust on the government side. Some sectors of society even wanted to suspend the FMLN as a legal political party, which would have further increased the distrust of the FMLN. Finally, at the end of August 1993, all the weapons were destroyed and the discussions on the legality of the FMLN as a political party faded. According to the Secretary-General, thanks to the competent and speedy reaction of the FMLN and the restraint exercised by President Cristiani, this potentially disastrous problem was overcome.³¹

However, several issues, such as land transfer and the deployment of the PNC, still continued to suffer serious delays. At a meeting in September between the parties and ONUSAL, the parties agreed to "sweep the table clean" before the start of the electoral campaign in November 1993. A timetable was devised by ONUSAL and working groups were established to reinforce the implementation. However, as this progress was being made, the human rights situation deteriorated dramatically. Threats, violent attacks and murders became much more common and at the end of October two leading members of the FMLN were assassinated. This was followed by more murders of members of FMLN and ARENA, and a resurgence of the so-called death squads. In December, the Minister of Health, Sosa, was attacked, and national institutions, diplomatic missions, as well as ONUSAL were intimidated.³²

At the end of the year the peace process lost momentum because of a certain amount of fatigue in the government, amongst other things, but also because the Cristiani administration gradually lost control at the end of its term and during the electoral campaign. As there was continued disagreement on several issues, positions on them became polarised during the campaign, while the government lost its ability to exert pressure on reluctant officials to implement the unwanted multi-interpretable agreements. Just prior to the elections of 20 March 1994, there were still several important provisions of the peace agreement that had not yet been fully implemented. For example, the deployment of the PNC and the phasing out of the PN was still not complete; the process of constitutional reform with regard to the judiciary as recommended by ONUSAL and the Commission on the Truth was still not started; and the reintegration of ex-combatants and the land transfer programme remained seriously delayed. The human rights situation, however, improved again.³³

Election day itself was not 100 percent peaceful, but 94 percent peaceful. Despite several serious flaws in the transparency and organisation of the elections, ONUSAL regarded them to be acceptable. The result was that ARENA won both the election for the Legislative Assembly and the mayoralties. Moreover, it received 49 percent of the votes for the presidential elections, the coalition of CD, FMLN, MNR 25 percent and the PDC 18 percent. As none of the presidential candidates won an absolute majority, a second round had to be held. This round saw fewer major incidents and was much better organised, and the atmosphere improved. In

the second round the ARENA candidate Calderon Sol won 68 percent of the vote and the coalition candidate Zamora 32 percent. The decisions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) regarding complaints were not challenged and the Secretary-General considered the results to be final³⁴

8.3.6 After the elections

In the meantime, on 1 April 1994, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ocampo left and was succeeded by Ter Horst. After the elections, two aspects of the agreement still required the presence of ONUSAL because their implementation was delayed: the deployment of the PNC and the demobilisation of the PN, and the land transfer programme. For this reason, according to the Secretary-General, the presence of ONUSAL had to be extended beyond the original plan. However, during this period he wanted the strength of the operation to be reduced. On 19 May, the parties agreed to a new "Timetable of the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements."³⁵

On 1 June, Calderon Sol was installed as president of El Salvador. Despite further delays, progress was made with the implementation of the peace agreements and the 19 May timetable. The new government allocated too few funds for the implementation of the peace process, and as a result, peace-related programmes, such as land transfer, had considerable deficits. In August, the Secretary-General started the phase-out process of ONUSAL. On 4 October, the parties signed a joint declaration reflecting their determination to fully and urgently implement and comply with the peace agreements by no later than 30 April 1995. By November, the Secretary-General, aware of the fact that the parties were not able to fully implement all the agreements before that time, presented his plan to withdraw all military and civilian police personnel, but to maintain the required verification mechanisms after that date. Indeed, by 30 April 1995, several commitments made in the Chapultepec agreement had not yet been fully implemented. Although the Secretary-General seriously considered advising the Security Council to extend the mandate of ONUSAL to after 30 April in order to further monitor the process, he refrained from doing so because members of the Security Council had indicated that it was time to bring ONUSAL to a close. The Security Council did agree to his proposal to maintain a group of eight professionals with support staff to provide good offices and verify the outstanding points of the peace process. This Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador (MINUSAL) was replaced on 1 May 1996 by the United Nations Office of Verification in El Salvador (ONUV). From 1997 onwards, the UNDP and a small group of experts took over the last remaining tasks.³⁶

8.4 The variables

8.4.1 Negative peace

In 1981, the FMLN started its first large scale 'final' offensive and gained control of a large number of mainly rural districts in northern El Salvador. In the following year, it also stepped up its activities in urban areas and even in San Salvador. As a result, it gained control of much of the countryside and was able to occupy major towns for several days. The military responded with a harsh counter-insurgency campaign and implemented a 'scorched earth policy' in the areas where the FMLN was concentrated. In their attempt to 'drain the sea to leave the fish', crops, livestock and houses were destroyed and the inhabitants killed,

resulting in widespread displacement. The war was fought in a 'conventional' manner. In the meantime, the capacity of the FAES was heavily increased with US funds and backed by the GN, PN, PH and irregular forces, as part of the strategy to triumph over the guerrillas through the fielding of overwhelming force. Nonetheless, this did not immediately pay off on the battlefield, because the FMLN was much more effective. The year 1985, however, was a watershed in the conflict. The use of air power in particular became destructive to FMLN and in response it dispersed into the hills. It was forced to change its tactics from quasi-conventional to a guerrilla strategy of protracted conflict. In addition to the guerrilla units in the countryside, the FMLN established clandestine urban cells that abducted opponents and carried out bombing raids. Although victory was far away, the new strategy meant that it was even further away for the government. Consequently, the FAES was forced to expand even further towards a force of 56,000 personnel in order to fight the 6,000 to 8,000 combatants of the FMLN.³⁷ The conflict remained very violent until, at the end of the 1980s, progress was made in what the international community phrased "the humanization of the conflict".³⁸

The United States openly considered military intervention when, in 1989, the FMLN started its largest offensive ever in which it occupied the wealthy Escalón district of San Salvador for two days. At the same time, hundreds of civilians died as a result of government aerial rocket attacks on working class neighbourhoods in San Salvador. The FMLN offensive was beaten off, but the 'mutually hurting stalemate' that emerged led the parties to the negotiating table. Whenever these talks became deadlocked the FMLN stepped up its military activities in order to exert military pressure on the negotiating process. At the same time, in 1989 the United Nations became involved in addressing the negative peace in El Salvador, as it was requested to verify the fulfilment of the sections of the Esquipulas II agreement on the termination of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements operating in the region, and the non-use of territory for attacks on other states. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established for this purpose. The armed conflict also continued after the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL was established in 1991. After the FMLN announced in November 1991 a unilateral secession of offensive operations, the situation took a turn for the better because the government also cut back its actions. As a result there was a significant decline in the fighting.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *negative peace*:

- *Cease-fire monitoring*: In the Chapultepec agreement, ONUSAL was requested to verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of forces, and to investigate any alleged violation. In the period between the signing of the agreement and the start of the cease-fire on 1 February the parties were to observe an informal cease-fire. ONUSAL was deployed during this period. A separation of forces was to follow in order to build confidence and to allow ONUSAL to verify the parties' compliance. The Military Division of ONUSAL was to consist of 244 military observers, with an additional 128 military observers during the 30-day period of the separation of forces.³⁹ As the mandate of ONUCA was being terminated, personnel and equipment were transferred from this operation to El Salvador. The separation of forces was completed without any incident. The size of the Military Division was, however, maintained greater than originally planned in order to be able to

monitor additional activities. Once the focus of the mission of the Military Division shifted away from purely military monitoring towards institution building and reintegration of ex-combatants, the number of monitors was steadily reduced. ONUSAL encountered few problems in carrying out this task, except for the fact that many of the military observers arrived in El Salvador without knowing what the situation in the country was, and they were also unfamiliar with the contents of the ONUSAL mandate, they were often unable to speak Spanish, and were rotated frequently. Nonetheless, the role of ONUSAL in monitoring the cease-fire has generally been considered positive.⁴⁰ Its size, strength and credibility was generally regarded sufficient to give confidence and proved to be a sufficient guarantee.⁴¹ As a result, not a single serious violation of the cease-fire was reported and therefore cease-fire monitoring made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Cantonment and demobilisation* The Chapultepec agreement mandated ONUSAL to verify the cantonment and demobilisation process. In addition, the FMLN requested logistical assistance for the concentration of troops. Although difficulties arose over the definition of the designated locations for the two parties' troops, both parties accepted the delimitation determined by the Chief Military Observer of ONUSAL. A bigger problem was the fact that, under the Chapultepec agreement, the Treasury Police (PH) and the National Guard (GN) were to be abolished and their members were to be integrated into the army or discharged. These forces therefore also had to be concentrated at the designated points. However, they remained in their Headquarters, thereby contributing to the failure to conclude the concentration of forces on 1 March 1992. On that day the government announced that the organisations were to be converted into the Military Police and Frontier Guards. Distrust was further raised by the government when the Assembly adopted legislation that did not clearly abolish the PH and GN. The FMLN denounced the law as a violation of the Chapultepec agreement and refused to complete the concentration of its forces. After negotiations, on 17 June, the problems were overcome and the timetable was adjusted for the first time. The concentration of forces was largely completed by 25 June.

Problems also arose over the disbandment of the military structure of the FMLN. It did not comply with the provision of the peace agreement to have 20 percent of its forces demobilised by 1 May. It justified its failure to do so by pointing out that the government had failed to facilitate the reintegration of FMLN members into civilian life, and this was linked to the formation of the PNC, land and the political activity by the FMLN. After the first adjustment of the timetable, the FMLN complied with the 30 June deadline to demobilise the first 20 percent of its forces, but failed to comply with the 31 July deadline to demobilise the second contingent of 20 percent, as it again suspended the process. Only after the second reprogramming of 19 August, did the FMLN demobilise 40 percent of its forces.⁴² Nonetheless, once again the FMLN suspended further demobilisation until a date had been set for the start of the land transfers and other aspects of the peace process, which had fallen behind schedule. As a consequence, 31 October, which had been set as the final date for demobilisation, could not be attained. Only after the timetable had been adjusted for the third time was the final phase of the dismantling of the FMLN military structure indeed finished on 15 December. The disbandment of the paramilitary units was completed by the end of June 1992. Reducing the

strength of the FAES was also initially carried out in accordance with the timetable. On 28 October 1992, however, president Cristiani announced its temporary suspension pending the clarification on the issues of the weapons inventory of the FMLN and the schedule for the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces. The process was resumed at the beginning of December after the FMLN had issued its final inventory and had started the destruction of its weapons. At the end of 1992, the FAES decided to accelerate the process and by 31 March 1993 the whole process was completed. Moreover, the reduction was greater than had originally been planned – it was now 54.4 percent instead of the original 50.2 percent.⁴³ This reduction was, however, not reflected in the military budget, which remained about the same as before.⁴⁴

The demobilisation process was not an easy one, but was eventually completed successfully. First of all, the implementation of the demobilisation process was used by the FMLN as a bargaining chip in order to maintain pressure on the government to further implement the peace agreement. It was aware that it was in a better position to have its demands fulfilled when armed rather than unarmed. A second problem was the linkage with the troubled reintegration process. Armed bands of ex-combatants emerged from both the FMLN and the FAES. These were young men who were not successfully integrated into civilian life and were engaged in criminal activities. A third problem was that the concentration points were planned on the basis of political and strategic considerations and too little consideration was given to such practical issues as logistics and sanitation. As a consequence, the whole operation turned out to be more expensive than planned and this led to a shortage of resources. A final problem was that because the demobilisation was a phased process, those who were demobilised last had to stay too long in their cantonments. In spite of these problems, ONUSAL eased the process and as a consequence cantonment and demobilisation made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Disarmament*: In the Chapultepec agreement ONUSAL received the mandate to verify the disarmament process and to ensure that the parties were not supplied with additional lethal articles. All paramilitary bodies were disarmed, in accordance with the agreement, by the end of June 1992. From 15 to 31 October 1992, the FMLN was to destroy all the weapons under its control. For the purpose of verification by ONUSAL, the parties were to have provided detailed information of their weapons. However, ONUSAL doubted the accuracy of the reports from the FMLN, and the FAES handed in its information late. Initially, ONUSAL considered the number and quality of weapons handed over by the FMLN troops to be insufficient. However, during the demobilisation process, the condition of the weapons handed over improved. Nonetheless, by October 1992 the Secretary-General spoke of “continuing suspicions that significant quantities of arms held by FMLN were not included in the inventories.”⁴⁵ In accordance with the second adjusted timetable, the FMLN provided ONUSAL with a final inventory of weapons, which was regarded by ONUSAL to be satisfactory. Subsequently, the destruction of weapons of the FMLN inside El Salvador was expected to be finished at the end of 1992. However, at the end of December, the FMLN suspended the destruction of arms because it set certain conditions for continuation on the implementation by the government of complementary commitments. By mid-

January 1993, after diplomatic pressure, the process was resumed, but again failed to meet the deadline. Only after a new agreement did the FMLN restart the process, in accordance with which all arms stored inside the concentration areas in El Salvador were destroyed by 11 February, followed by those outside El Salvador on 1 April. However, it came to light that, in the words of the Secretary-General, “the inventory presented to ONUSAL by the FMLN was grossly inaccurate and failed to include large quantities of warlike *matériel*”⁴⁶. An explosion at an automobile repair shop in Managua, Nicaragua, led to the discovery of an arms depot, which raised questions of confidence and trust. According to the FMLN, the purpose of the weapons had been “to keep a last negotiating card in order to guarantee peace and the conclusion of the agreement.” It said it had no intention of resuming the conflict, reaffirmed its commitment to the peace process and made it known that it was ready to “clean up its house”⁴⁷. Subsequently, four of the five constituent groups of the FMLN handed over *materiel* and informed ONUSAL of other secret arms caches⁴⁸. Subsequently, in August all arms were promptly destroyed in the presence and with the collaboration of ONUSAL monitors. In total, an additional 119 arms caches were uncovered in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. Of the total FMLN weapons and equipment verified and destroyed by ONUSAL 70 percent was destroyed before the Managua incident and 30 percent afterwards. In total 10,230 arms and over 4 million rounds of ammunition were destroyed⁴⁹. In the end, the verification by ONUSAL made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Reintegration of ex-combatants* For the purpose of reintegrating the ex-combatants, the Chapultepec peace agreement required that arrangements be made for the transfer of land to the demobilised soldiers of the FAES, the ex-combatants of the FMLN and the landholders – the *tenedores* – who lived on the lands of others in the conflict areas. COPAZ, and not ONUSAL, was to monitor the implementation of the agreement through a special commission. The Chapultepec agreement was, however, rather vague about the land transfer programme and it was interpreted differently by the various players. Conflicts arose over both the number of beneficiaries and the application of the ‘market prices’ at which land was to be bought. In addition, essential credit facilities and training programmes were nonexistent. This made the FMLN combatants rather insecure about their future. In February and March 1992 various peasant groups seized land, only to be evicted again by the public security bodies and in some cases the army. In response, the FMLN suspended its demobilisation process and in effect held up all other processes contingent on this. As a consequence, the situation threatened the entire peace process. As COPAZ was unable to come up with a solution, ONUSAL was requested to provide its good offices to tackle the problems. Subsequently, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Goulding was sent to El Salvador. He assisted the parties in reaching an agreement, in which it was decided that the seizures and evictions had to be suspended and that consultation mechanisms between the parties were to be established with the good offices of ONUSAL. On the further reintegration of ex-combatants, the parties negotiated mid-1992 three main tracks in addition to reintegration into the PNC and political activities: reintegration into agriculture, vocational training after which credit facilities would be available to start ‘micro-enterprises’, and, for approximately 600 mid-level commanders and leaders of

the FMLN, special training and credit facilities to start their own enterprises, or to join existing ones. For the first two tracks there were parallel, but separate, tracks for both the ex-combatants of the FMLN and the FAES. In addition, demobilised FAES soldiers also received one year's pay. To ex-combatants the land programme was the most attractive path of reintegration because, in addition to the promised credit facilities and training, the beneficiary also received a plot of land. ONUSAL and UNDP helped with short term assistance programmes and training for ex-combatants.

At the end of September 1992, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations had to be sent again to El Salvador, together with a team of agrarian specialists, to solve the problems of the land transfer programme. Subsequently, the Secretary-General came up with a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the parties to further solve the problem. Terms and conditions were set out in this proposal for the transfer of land to former combatants and for the formalisation of the land-tenure system, or if necessary the relocation of the *tenedores*. The parties agreed to this so-called '13 October agreement', which supplemented the Chapultepec agreements and was also verified by ONUSAL. It established a phased framework in which first the 7,500 ex-combatants of the FMLN received priority, followed by the 15,000 ex-combatants of the FAES.⁵⁰ The process of land transfer was officially started at the end of October. Nonetheless, they continued to take more and more land which almost jeopardised the cease-fire in October. Subsequently, the implementation of the '13 October agreement' did proceed, albeit slowly. Although by August 1993 the government presented an acceleration plan for the transfer of land, which was supplemented in November 1993 with operative guidelines, by April 1994 the number of distributed land titles had still not risen beyond 24 percent of the total. Moreover, the FMLN expressed disapproval of the acceleration plan as several aspects were significantly different from those in the '13 October agreement'. After the 1994 elections, in the "Timetable of the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements" the new government and the FMLN eventually agreed to the further implementation of the plan and the goal to implement it before 30 April 1995. By February 1995, however, only 53 percent of the former FMLN combatants had received land. The ratio for the demobilised FAES soldiers was even lower at 30 percent. In absolute numbers, only 17,000 of the 47,000 potential beneficiaries had received what they had been promised.⁵¹ Moreover, those who had received their land were still encountering problems with credit facilities, training programmes and technical assistance. Consequently, after the departure of ONUSAL, the United Nations arrangements were to provide further good offices for the implementation of reintegration programmes, as well as to verify them.

The continuing delays in the land transfer programme were mainly the result of a lack of political will. Firstly, the titling process was very cumbersome and although it could easily have been changed, the government took the bureaucratic approach that all beneficiaries should go through the full process of land titling. Secondly, the FMLN was unable to produce a reliable list of beneficiaries. This was both the result of the inadequacy of the organisation of the FMLN and the fact that after the end of the war there was increased mobility amongst people living in the countryside. As insecurity over access to land following the delays increased mobility of potential beneficiaries, a

vicious circle was created.⁵² The FMLN subsequently came along with inflated claims of people who wanted to make use of the land transfer programme.⁵³ The problems with the reintegration and the land transfer programme led to frustration amongst the supporters of the FMLN, and these problems became even worse as the delays in implementation meant that several successive planting seasons were being missed. This resulted in severe social tension and instability, and several times disgruntled ex-combatants organised takeovers of the Legislative Assembly and held legislators from various parties hostage. During the negotiations, the complexity of the land transfer process was underestimated. It was thought the process would take one year to finish, whereas in practice it would eventually take more than 8 years to be completed.⁵⁴ In order to prevent a culture of dependence, it was also thought that credit programmes were more desirable than subsidies. However, the credits were chronically delayed and therefore not directly linked to the technical assistance programmes. As a result, the latter only reached a quarter of the beneficiaries.⁵⁵ Moreover, the land programme suffered as a result of legal problems with regard to ownership rights. The beneficiaries initially received a *promesa* which said they had received part of a plot of land together with other beneficiaries. Only in the second instance could this claim be individualised. This second step, however, proved to be very difficult. Furthermore, without formal ownership and the concomitant insecurity, the beneficiaries did not invest in their land to develop it, and they often, as it were, ate the credits they received. Besides, the lack of 'official' land titles precluded potential beneficiaries from credit facilities from banks. Additionally, the majority of beneficiaries were not able to generate sufficient income on their plots to cover the basic needs of themselves and their families. Training and technical assistance were essential to make agricultural production sustainable, but they came late and were insufficient. It was therefore questionable whether most beneficiaries would ever be able to pay back the credits and mortgages to the banks. In addition, the short-term assistance programmes and training for ex-combatants were also a problem as they were not synchronised with the demobilisation process and did not start at the same time; they also lacked a general strategy, which affected their planning and design; there was no overall planning and the same mistakes were repeated in different programmes; furthermore, these short-term assistance programmes were not in line with the medium-term programmes – such as housing, credit for micro-enterprises and scholarships – as a result of the delays in the medium-term programmes, which led to scepticism amongst the beneficiaries who had to look for other ways of earning their living.⁵⁶ More fundamentally, one must say that the Chapultepec agreement was not creative enough with regard to reintegration, as the focus on land was too limited. During the conflict, El Salvador had gone through a process of urbanisation and had become less agriculture oriented. Many ex-combatants no longer wanted to become a *campesino*, but hoped to migrate to urban areas or preferably to the United States.⁵⁷ For this reason, ex-combatants often used the land to make this transition.⁵⁸ Moreover, the land transfer programme was implemented in an unfavourable political environment, in which the government in the following years chose to abandon the agricultural sector to invest in other sectors.⁵⁹ In addition, for many, the step from military life to civilian life was a big one, because they had only learned to be soldiers. This

is often viewed to be an important factor in the countrywide crime wave⁶⁰ Nonetheless, reintegration was definitely not a total failure The short term programmes contributed to respect for the cease-fire⁶¹ The land transfer programme also fulfilled its political objective to buy the much needed time for peace Ex-combatants were not thrown out on the streets, but received aid to make the transition into civil life As a consequence, reintegration was perhaps far from ideal, but made a positive contribution to *negative peace*

- *Institution building* During the negotiations, the FMLN had shown considerable concern for the safety of its members after their reintegration into social and political life In order to demobilise and disarm with confidence, it needed some assurances for the future Initially, it had proposed abolishing the military, but this proved to be unattainable in the negotiations The solution in the Chapultepec agreement was that the armed forces were purified and confined to national defence and that a new police force was to be placed in charge of public security issues An Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces was to evaluate every member of the armed forces on his or her past performance The purpose of this operation was partly to ensure that the worst adversaries of the FMLN and threats to their lives were removed from the army The investigations by the Ad Hoc Commission were, however, hampered by the fact that it consisted of only 3 members and only had 3 months to do the job Therefore, it limited its investigations to the top 230 army officers and recommended dismissal or transfer for about half of them, including the High Command and the Minister of Defence The recommendations were published in September 1992 and were to be implemented before the Commission on the Truth published its report in March 1993 Nonetheless, the government only started to fully implement them after the publication of the report of the Commission on the Truth The fact that many of the names appeared in both reports gave weight to the recommendations and forced the government to act At the end of June the government had rectified the problems As a consequence, the FMLN felt sufficiently secure to demilitarise and thus institution building made a positive contribution to *negative peace*
- *Diplomacy* During the implementation of the Chapultepec agreement, negotiations between the parties also continued It was agreed in the New York Agreement that ONUSAL was to observe the meetings of COPAZ In addition, in practice ONUSAL used its good offices by promoting and attending meetings between the parties Although the structure of COPAZ was hoped to broaden the involvement in the peace process to include, amongst other things, NGOs, in the end the dynamics of the negotiating process prevailed COPAZ was unable to develop into the broad mechanism to monitor and participate in the implementation of the peace agreements equal to ONUSAL The dominance of the two parties in the end sidelined the other actors As a result, ONUSAL was increasingly called upon to offer its good offices in the course of the operation, as the parties needed help to overcome the difficulties that arose during the implementation of the agreements Gradually the practice of a tripartite process developed, in which the parties negotiated with the mediation of ONUSAL If this failed, the deliberations were to be continued on the highest level under the auspices of the Under Secretary-General, who flew in from New York The assistance also became increasingly intrusive, since in addition to the promotion of dialogue, the mission was requested to elaborate

proposals to overcome the differences. As a consequence, the function of ONUSAL was expanded beyond the verification role envisaged in the original mandate. This “carefully-chosen, constructive ‘mission creep’” allowed ONUSAL to play an important role in the negotiations.⁶² Its good offices, especially with regard to the calendar, has been viewed by the parties as very helpful.⁶³ As a consequence, diplomacy made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

- *Human rights verification*: Although in the Chapultepec agreement human rights verification and *negative peace* were not linked, the verification of human rights was important to the FMLN with regard to *negative peace*. It viewed human rights verification laid down in an agreement as an important guarantee that its forces would not be massacred once they had been disarmed and demobilised. Its implementation managed to build sufficient confidence amongst the FMLN to demobilise and consequently made a positive contribution to *negative peace*.

The United Nations arrangements after the departure of ONUSAL – MINUSAL, UNEV and later UNDP - provided further good offices for the implementation of the land transfer programmes, as well as verified them. In spite of all the problems, one may say that eventually the land transfer programme was a notable achievement, in which, by mid 1998, land had been legally transferred to nearly 35,500 beneficiaries.⁶⁴ In 1998-1999 the 51,000 former paramilitaries again requested a demobilisation fee. These requests could not be met by the government as it lacked the funds. Subsequently, a number of shootings followed between paramilitaries and the police. Nonetheless, after the departure of ONUSAL, El Salvador was largely demilitarised. The armed structure of the FMLN was no more and its combatants were integrated into civil society along with more than half the combatants of the FAES. The armed forces respected their role and nature as agreed to in the Chapultepec agreement and, since the signing of the peace agreement, no sector of Salvadoran society took up arms as a form of political action.

8.4.2 *Inter-group relations*

The homogeneity of the Salvadoran population has prevented conflicts from being fought along ethnic lines, such as in Guatemala where there is a significant ‘genuine’ indigenous population. The Salvadoran population speaks Spanish and is mixed-race or *mestizo*. By the mid-1900s this group comprised more than 90 percent of the population.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, *inter-group relations* are important because one of the underlying causes of the conflict was social and economic inequality, whose roots were to be found in the colonial period. At the end of the 1970s, despite three decades of economic growth, the inequality between the majority of the mainly rural population and the elite remained large.⁶⁶ Nearly all observers argue that the income inequality in El Salvador resulted from the structure of land tenure. The highly skewed land distribution meant there was a high proportion of landless and rural poor, who placed considerable pressure on the unskilled labour market, which in turn suppressed the incomes of these labourers. In spite of the land reforms of the early 1980s, the land distribution remained skewed. As a result, by the mid-1980s, 1 percent of landowners held 50 percent of the land, while 95 percent of the landholders owned 30 percent.⁶⁷ Throughout the country’s history the government had used violence to maintain this inequality and to oppress or control civil society. Numerous uprisings of

peasants and indigenous people were put down with violence. 'La Matanza' in 1932 is the most well known uprising. The history of the death squads can be traced back to the early 1900s. At the end of the 1980s, El Salvador and its civil society were more polarised than at any time during the conflict. One camp strongly supported the elite and the government and the other supported the poor and the FMLN. This polarisation continued during the negotiations for the peace agreement. Both the history of the decades prior to the arrival of ONUSAL, as well as the ten years of violent conflict, had created a climate of violence in El Salvador which had generated social intolerance. ONUSAL was aware that, in the space of a few months, it would not be able to eliminate the "consequences of a turbulent past, where social tensions were resolved by confrontation and conflict rather than through dialogue and cooperation."⁶⁸

The peace agreements were not intended to address the social economic inequality. The FMLN left this subject to the end of the negotiations and only its civilian and military supporters were allowed to profit from the programmes to address inequality through the land transfer programme. Nonetheless, during its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *inter-group relations*:

- *Institution building*: During its first six months the PNC was seen as one of the most effective instruments for national reconciliation because ex-FMLN, ex-PN and civilians learned to work and live together.⁶⁹ As a consequence, institution building made an unexpected positive contribution to *inter-group relations*.
- *Truth commission*: The Commission on the Truth was intended to be an instrument for national reconciliation. However, one week after it published its report, the Legislative Assembly adopted an amnesty, consequently prematurely ending the debate on the past. There has been wide discussion about this amnesty and its impact. Some say that without the prosecution of those who committed human rights violations, national reconciliation is impossible. Others say that without the amnesty, national reconciliation would have been even further away, because the army would not accept prosecution and it would lead to charges from both sides thereby perpetuating the hatred. It is likely that the less ethical option of an amnesty without prosecution would have contributed most to national reconciliation, but only after a debate and a process had taken place in which El Salvador came to terms with its past.⁷⁰ As a consequence of the premature amnesty, the truth commission made a limited positive contribution to national reconciliation and *inter-group relations* by making the past 'objectively' known, but its potential would have been greater if the amnesty had been adopted later, allowing El Salvador more of a reconciliation process.

At the Chapultepec ceremony, Boutros-Ghali had compared the signing of the peace agreement with a "revolution achieved by negotiation."⁷¹ However, in practice, the agreement paid little attention to socio-economic measures. This was largely the result of the fact that the FMLN gave priority to security sector and democratic reform; the government resisted any talks on its economic policy; and both parties were reluctant to get involved in detailed talks on socio-economic issues as they might result in the negotiations petering out. The Forum for Economic and Social Consultation established in the agreement did not become the forum for discussion on socio-economic issues amongst employees, the government and employers as had originally been envisaged, because the latter in particular lacked interest. The forum paused its work during the election campaign

and never resumed it. Consequently, regional exclusion and marginalisation remained unaddressed. Statistics showed that in 2003, nearly 70 percent of the country's production was based in San Salvador and La Libertad provinces.⁷² In addition, neither were social exclusion and marginalisation dealt with. By 1995, the economic stabilisation had even exacerbated poverty, worsened income inequality and fuelled the social tensions that had given rise to the armed conflict.⁷³ After 1995 the economic inequality remained stable, mainly as a result of remittances from abroad. It was estimated that one in three families in El Salvador had a family member working in the United States and their remittances were assessed to boost the incomes of poor urban and rural families by one third.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, income inequality remained grave, as a UNDP study showed that the top 20 percent of the population earned 18 times more than the poorest quintile.⁷⁵ One can, however, say that as a result of the Chapultepec agreement, the extreme elements of the political spectrum were reintegrated into the state. Especially during the presence of ONUSAL it had seemed that there was a certain amount of genuine reconciliation between at least certain sectors of the elites of the formally warring parties or at least an acceptance of the status quo. However, the many problems, such as with regard to the Forum and the land transfers, showed that there was still a long way to go. Even worse, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups (*Grupo Conjunto*) even concluded in 1994, that in spite of the national reconciliation there was still an inclination amongst some people to resort to violence to solve political differences.⁷⁶ Much of the culture of hostility between left and right, rich and poor, and civilians and the military remained. After ONUSAL left, the atmosphere of co-operation that had existed faded away again. Consequently, at the national level El Salvador remained highly polarised, because, amongst other things, the peace process did not lead to institutionalised practices for consensus building. Nonetheless, although the Chapultepec agreement had mainly been an elite pact and especially in regions where the conflict had been intense reconciliation had been difficult, after a wave of revenge and crime, people learned to live with the past. In contrast to the national level, the local communities accepted the political fragmentation and accepted their differences in order to direct their attention at addressing the immediate socio-economic needs.

8.4.3 Group demography

With 350 people per square kilometre of cultivable land, El Salvador was the most densely populated country in Latin America.⁷⁷ This pressure only increased due to rapid population growth. Between 1960 and 1978 the population grew by 3 percent per year. Although in late 1980s the population growth dropped to 2.7 percent per annum, the country continued to have one of the highest growth rates in Latin America.⁷⁸ This was all the more important because the country was very much directed at agriculture, and land was unevenly distributed. As a result, there was not enough land to satisfy everybody. Faced with this problem and aware of the opportunities elsewhere, even before the start of the conflict, farmers, migrated out to, amongst other places, the centre of El Salvador and to cities. Furthermore, squatting and the invasion of poor land became frequent. After the Soccer War in 1969, the traditional escape valve of migration to land-rich Honduras came to an end. The forceful repatriation of some 300,000 Salvadorans from Honduras only exacerbated the situation as they had to be reintegrated into the Salvadoran economy.⁷⁹ At the start of the conflict, more than half the farming

community was without land, while 2 percent of the population owned 57 percent of the land.⁸⁰ The percentage of landless farm families only climbed and a considerable number of those who possessed a plot owned less than one hectare.⁸¹ As a consequence, instances of malnutrition and infant mortality rates increased to high levels, and inadequate housing turned into a serious problem.⁸² The 1983 constitution addressed the land problem, through a land reform. However, these reforms redistributed about 295,000 hectares of land, which only corresponded to about one fifth of the country's stock of arable land.⁸³ Subsequently, only 17 percent of the population benefited and the constitution blocked any further reform.⁸⁴ The agrarian problem was widely perceived to be one of the main causes of the armed conflict and only intensified as a result of it.⁸⁵ The rural areas in the north and east of the country saw an absolute population decline. These people often migrated to south-west El Salvador and San Salvador where the population grew in absolute terms. As a consequence, rural poverty became concentrated in the south-west and land became even more scarce in this region.⁸⁶ In addition, urbanisation greatly accelerated, and the growth of San Salvador in particular was dramatic. The capacity of the towns to absorb these newcomers was limited and San Salvador in particular faced problems which were only aggravated as a result of the earthquake of 1986. Only from the mid-1980s onwards did some IDPs, who had moved from their original farmlands, return to their own farmland or occupied the land others had abandoned.⁸⁷ During the height of the conflict in the 1980s, as many as 250,000 Salvadorans were refugees.⁸⁸ However, at the end of the 1980s, most refugees were repatriated by the UNHCR from Honduras back to El Salvador. The mostly illegal emigration to the United States greatly accelerated during the conflict. According to demographic statistics, during the 1980s some 550,000 Salvadorans left the country, compared with 250,000 during the 1970s and 100,000 during the first half of the 1990s.⁸⁹ As a result, by the end of the conflict, both the conflict and economic circumstances had stimulated some 18 percent of Salvadorans to reside abroad. About 84 percent of this group lived in the United States.⁹⁰ However, in 1992 only about 45,000 Salvadorans were registered as refugees and about half a million were IDPs.⁹¹

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *group demography*:

- *Reintegration of ex-combatants*: The land transfer programme was an 'arms-for-land' deal, only meant to help the supporters of the FMLN, both armed and civilian, and was clearly not intended to be a land reform programme. One could even go one step further and argue that the agreements were, in a sense, an attempt to buy off the combatants, who were, after all, only a minority of the population. If the programme had been fully funded and implemented, it would have had some 47,500 potential beneficiaries and could only have solved the lack of land of some 70,000 adults. With some 370,000 adults owning little or no land, the programme was therefore clearly not sufficient to solve this problem.⁹² Moreover, the land transfer programme was troubled because it did not have the full support of the government of El Salvador and the main financier of the programme, the United States. Nonetheless, if fully implemented, the transfer of land would have accounted for 12 percent of the Salvadoran farmland, a little more than half the amount of land distributed during the agrarian reform of the 1980s.⁹³ Although the amount of land to be transferred was pared down and eventually only 35,500 beneficiaries remained, the programme can still be viewed as an "extra phase in the land

reforms of the 1980s⁹⁴ As a consequence, reintegration made an unintended, limited positive contribution to *group demography*

- *Mine clearance* Although it was not mentioned in the peace agreement, ONUSAL was also given the co-ordination of a government plan for the removal of mines ONUSAL collaborated with the planning of the mine-clearance process and co-ordinated and controlled the clearing of the minefields Under the supervision of ONUSAL, the explosives and mines were destroyed by a civilian company that co-operated both with ex-combatants of the FMLN and members of the FAES In addition, ONUSAL observers helped to overcome several problems The process, which started on 15 March 1993, was concluded at the end of January 1994 In the process, 425 minefields were cleared of some 9,500 mines⁹⁵ The mines were, however, never a big problem and after the whole mine-clearance operation, it ceased to be a national issue Nonetheless, mine clearance made a positive contribution to *group demography*

After the departure of ONUSAL, the share of the labour force employed in agriculture also remained at 34 percent, although diminished in size it was still large⁹⁶ However, people dependent on agriculture still often belonged to the poorest strata of society Consequently, in spite of escape valves in the form of migration and expansion of the informal economy, to a large extent the lack of land and its distribution remained a cause of social tension Land distribution remained a theme on the Salvadoran political agenda As it became increasingly difficult to make a living from the land, the Salvadoran urban economy lacked sufficient absorption capacity, and Salvadorans lost any hope of improving their future inside El Salvador, growing numbers left the countryside to seek their fortunes in urban areas, and preferably in the United States Migration served as an escape valve allowing land pressure to decrease Most IDPs did not return to the places they originated from and often stayed where they had fled to, making large scale replacement programmes unnecessary Although some IDPs were helped, as they were *tenedores*, only after Hurricane Mitch did the government and the international donor community pay them more attention

8 4 4 State weakness

El Salvador was a fragmented society in which powerful families acted with impunity The Salvadoran civil bureaucracy was weak and as the military bureaucracy was superior, the civil administration was unable to exert control over the military Moreover, the legal and regulatory framework of El Salvador was often outdated and imposed burdensome requirements This had a negative influence on, amongst other things, the opportunities for economic investment and growth The socio-economic situation was also weak Life expectancy was below 60 years of age Only 20 percent of the school-age population attended secondary school and about 45 percent of the population older than 15 was illiterate The GDP per capita was slightly higher than 600 US\$ per annum⁹⁷ The state was only further weakened as a result of the conflict It caused the public finances to deteriorate as tax revenues decreased Subsequently, during the 1980s, total public sector investment not only declined, but the emphasis also shifted to national defence As a result, government social expenditure in real terms declined even more sharply⁹⁸ Still, although low, and in spite of declined social expenditure and the war, education statistics remained stable and health statistics even improved during the 1980s⁹⁹ In addition, El Salvador lacked a well-developed and well-

maintained infrastructure, which it needed because its intention was to have an export-led market economy. It was estimated that the conflict caused some 1.5 billion dollars worth of damage to Salvadoran infrastructure.¹⁰⁰ The impact of the 1986 earthquake and the 1.2 billion dollars required subsequently for repair or replacement, served as an additional shock, and only added to the effects of the conflict.¹⁰¹ The capacity of the state was the lowest in the rural areas. It was in these regions in particular that healthcare, housing, water supply, sanitation, education, and also infrastructure were insufficient to provide the basic needs of the population. In conflict areas the army assumed the responsibilities of the state. However, it was not only the war and the economic crisis in particular, but also the fiscal adjustment at the end of the 1980s, that weakened the state. As a result of economic measures, institutional resources decreased and the government administration lacked qualified personnel. Those policies that were implemented often lacked effective control mechanisms. This institutional weakness was only exacerbated as a result of decentralisation and privatisation policies. ONUSAL arrived in a country in which history and the conflict had undermined its institutions, which in turn had generated a culture of violence and general scepticism towards the rule of law.

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *state weakness*:

- *Disarmament*: During the conflict the FAES had distributed huge stocks of weapons to civilians and the paramilitary. In the Chapultepec peace agreement it was agreed that private individuals were not to bear arms that were for the exclusive use of the armed forces. Those who did were to be disarmed and the weapons recovered. This process was to be completed by 28 October 1992. As a consequence of the frequent delays, what should have been an urgent project became, in fact, a rather slow one. This in turn contributed to the maintenance of arms proliferation, which in turn contributed to the high crime rates. By the end of the mandate of ONUSAL, the Secretary-General had to conclude that there was a problem with the large number of weapons of which there was no record. Moreover, the number of weapons that were returned through voluntary surrender was negligible.¹⁰² After the departure of ONUSAL, the Salvadoran Ministry of Defence and MINUSAL estimated that 200,000 to 300,000 weapons were still in circulation amongst the population.¹⁰³ As a consequence, disarmament did not contribute to *state weakness*.
- *Cantonment and demobilisation*: As a result of the demobilisation and the insufficient attention for reintegration of ex-combatants, tens of thousands of men whose skills amounted to no more than being able to handle a gun, were dumped into the general workforce. Jobs were not always easy to come by. Poverty and unemployment combined with easy access to weapons created an explosive mix. At the same time, the fact that the PN, the army and the FMLN were demobilised while the PNC was not yet a strong organisation, created conditions in which crime involved fewer risks, thereby enabling a wave of organised crime and armed robbery to develop. As a consequence of the lack of reintegration, cantonment and demobilisation made a temporary negative contribution to *state weakness*.
- *Institution building*: ONUSAL played a role in building the judiciary, the police force and the restoration of the public administration and other services in the former conflict zones. ONUSAL supported the judicial authorities in improving the procedures to protect human rights and to increase respect for the rules of

the due process of law ONUSAL began a substantial programme to assist the judicial institutions mainly after the election of the judges of the new Supreme Court However, by that time ONUSAL was already downsizing and lacked sufficient personnel With regard to the police force, the drawdown of the PN and the creation of the PNC left the country temporarily vulnerable to crime, due to the problem of 'sequencing' The resolution of the conflict required the transformation of the security regime, but because this took place in an environment of poverty, a profusion of arms and a history of violence, the capacity of the government was compromised During wartime, public security had been maintained by some 70,000 men, and during the transitional period their number dropped to some 6,000 After the transitional period the number of PNC personnel increased again¹⁰⁴ With regard to other institutions, the UNDP was requested to support the reconstruction of El Salvador through the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) Furthermore, the UNDP provided advice on a wide variety of issues Part of the NRP was the restoration of public administration in the former conflict zones Once the cease-fire agreement had come into force, public administration in the former conflict zones was gradually re-established with the aid of ONUSAL In the second reprogramming of the timetable, ONUSAL received the mandate to fully prepare a programme for the restoration of public administration The pace at which problems arose and the number of problems for the return of judges, mayors, et cetera, differed per region Not only opposition to their return, but also the lack of infrastructure posed a problem in this process At a meeting of the Consultative Group in Paris in April 1993, donor countries responded generously to the request for funds by the government for its NRP for the 1993-1996 period However, donors showed clear preferences for certain kinds of projects Sufficient funding was found for projects supporting infrastructure and the environment, but funds for good governance and peace-supporting projects, such as the reintegration of ex-combatants, were not forthcoming Moreover, aid was slow to be confirmed Many donor governments wanted stronger commitments on the part of the government before they were willing to disburse their assistance In spite of this hesitance, by November 1994, virtually the whole public administration in former conflict zones was restored However, education, healthcare and other basic services were still missing in several areas As a consequence, institution building made a positive contribution to *state weakness*, although the aid for the judiciary was late and the transformation of the police even temporarily weakened the state

After the departure of ONUSAL, the trend of increasing violent criminality and lack of public security continued and crime became an immense problem to El Salvador and its population Crime levels shot up to such an extent that its annual number of fatalities exceeded the annual death rate of casualties during the conflict as result of the war¹⁰⁵ However, the crime wave reached a peak in 1995 and from then on murder rates, amongst other things, slowly declined¹⁰⁶ Social indicators also improved further Adult literacy rates dropped from 30 percent in the early 1990s to 17 percent in 2000, and, on average, the length of the period that school was attended was extended by one year¹⁰⁷ Infant mortality rates dropped from 41 per 1,000 births during 1988-1993 to 35 per 1,000 during 1993-1998 Access to clean drinking water increased from 54 percent to 66 percent of the population¹⁰⁸ Most probably these improvements mainly resulted from the fact that government expenditure on health and education increased in proportion

to GDP. Government revenues to further raise its capacity were, however, scarce as a consequence of the lack of capacity of the government. The tax base was narrow, the administration weak and compliance lacked enforcement. The role of the World Bank in the co-ordination and mobilisation of assistance for post-conflict reconstruction was important. It convened four Consultative Group meetings from 1991 to 2000. At these meetings the Salvadoran government was able to obtain more support amongst the donor community beyond the United States. Unfortunately, while still in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, El Salvador was set back by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and two major earthquakes in 2001.

8.4.5 State unwillingness and good governance

El Salvador lacked a history of real democracy. Elections were only rarely of influence on the nature and policies of the government. In the 1970s popular dissatisfaction grew. Although the elections of 1972 and 1977 were the most competitive ever, the results were obviously fraudulent. The slow opening up of the political system could not stay ahead of popular demand and forced some to take up arms. After the coup of 1979 and the repression of 1980, many who had believed in peaceful opposition no longer saw it as an option. In spite of the 1983 democratic constitution and the 1984 and 1989 elections, the country could not be called a democracy because the influence of the military remained considerable and the leftist FMLN and FDR, which represented a substantial portion of the electorate, were excluded from participation. In spite of the fact that the elections in the 1980s were an improvement compared with the elections of the 1970s, they only gave a semblance of democracy. Moreover, although in theory the 1983 constitution brought all the institutions and mechanisms needed for a society to function under the rule of law, in practice the military establishment stayed in control of the civilian authorities. It was directly responsible for the maintenance of public security through the police, the militarised security forces and paramilitary organisations, who implemented this job through a regime of terror and intimidation. The police force was explicitly political and ideological, and of poor quality and badly trained. The judiciary was intimidated and became increasingly corrupt. Power within the judicial system was concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Council, which itself was a tool in the hands of the government. The whole judicial system was severely underfunded and partisan, allowing government officials and the rich to act with impunity. Nonetheless, although the constitution of 1983 did not bring full democracy and did not separate powers, it did open the political arena and weaken the position of the military, a process of transformation was started.

The Commission on the Truth used the term 'tragedy' to describe the human rights situation.¹⁰⁹ During the early 1980s, the human rights violations and violence – such as indiscriminate attacks, mass executions and actions by death squads – became systematic. Everybody who expressed views that differed from the government line ran the risk of being eliminated through extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearance or murder. The government said that organisations that criticised the government were working for the guerrillas. The population living in the areas of the country where the FMLN was active were automatically suspected of belonging to or collaborating with it. Counter-insurgency operations by the military were intended to terrify the peasant population into obedience with the aim of depriving the guerrilla forces of their

sources of information and supplies. The FMLN, although to a lesser extent, was also responsible for its share of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. In addition, the FMLN was guilty of forcible recruitment, and resorted in several cases to abduction in order to exhort the payment of 'war tax'. If one uses the report of the Commission on the Truth as an indication, in 60 percent of all the complaints the armed forces were accused, in 20 percent of the cases military escorts or civil defence units, members of death squads in more than 10 percent, and finally the FMLN only in 5 percent of cases.¹¹⁰ In spite of the high number of human rights violations, very few were investigated, and few people prosecuted or punished, which contributed to a widespread perception of impunity. Nonetheless, and perhaps because of this, both the United Nations and the OAS paid a lot of attention to El Salvador. Moreover, the situation seemed to be changing. As a result of the Mexico Agreement, El Salvador found itself in a transitional period during which constitutional reforms on such issues as the judicial system and the armed forces had to be ratified and implemented. As a consequence, the legislative branch was in the midst of major institutional reform. In addition, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights noted, in 1991, a reduction in the number of human rights violations and efforts being made by the parties to improve the human rights situation.¹¹¹

During its presence the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *state unwillingness and good governance*:

- *Institution building*: ONUSAL aimed to contribute to the building of a wide range of institutions: the judiciary system, the armed forces, the National Public Security Academy, and the PNC.

The San José agreement mandated the United Nations human rights verification mission to support the judicial system to improve the procedures to safeguard human rights and to increase the respect for the rules of the due process of law. The judicial reforms were not as strong as the military reforms, partly because the FMLN lacked expertise on the subject and also failed to see their importance during the peace talks. Nonetheless, ONUSAL adopted a very strong position because it regarded the failings of the judicial system to be acute as the population lacked confidence in the system. It viewed the initiatives developed with respect to reforms by the Ministry of Justice to be a good start, but concluded that the justice system "as a whole should be completely overhauled."¹¹² The level of competence of judicial personnel was addressed at the Judicial Training School and the National Council of the Judiciary started a slow and limited process of purification. ONUSAL supported the Human Rights Ombudsman by giving advice and seeking funds. It was hoped that this new institution would progressively become able to take over the tasks of the mission and to make the improved human rights situation a lasting one.¹¹³ However, reforming the judiciary was a difficult process because there was strong institutional resistance to change, a new institutional culture had to be created and new judiciary trained. This could not be done overnight. Nonetheless, ONUSAL started a process which would have been stronger if the purification and reforms of the judicial system, including a time schedule, had been better addressed in the accord.

With the Chapultepec peace agreement, the armed forces became subordinate to the constitutional civilian authorities, non-partisan and only an instrument in the maintenance of internal peace and public security in very exceptional

cases. The armed forces and the security forces were separated and placed under different ministries. Two existing security bodies – the National Guard (GN) and the Treasury Police (PH) - were to be disbanded and a third – the National Police (PN) - was to be phased out over time, while at the same time the new PNC was to be established separate from the Ministry of Defence. In addition, ONUSAL verified the disbandment of the National Intelligence Department and the creation of the National Intelligence Agency. Moreover, the armed forces were purified of those members who were not able to function in a democratic society, or who did not have a blameless human rights record. The Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces produced recommendations on who was to be dismissed. The purpose of the purification process was to demonstrate that no individual, group or institution was above the law and that therefore, in the future, the rule of law would apply in all cases. The military accepted the new conditions and their new position in society without much protest.

In the New York and Chapultepec agreements, the parties agreed to establish a new *Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (ANSP) to replace the old public security forces. The ANSP was to train the personnel of the PNC in co-operation with and under the supervision of the international community, co-ordinated by the United Nations. Due to the importance of the police reform to the further implement the peace agreement, the time schedule for the establishment of the ANSP was over-ambitious. As a consequence, the project was delayed from the start. In addition, during 1992 ONUSAL came to realise that UNDP, which had been made responsible for the task, was either not willing, or not able, to oversee the creation of the ANSP. UNDP had primarily working relations with governments; it had a long-term modus operandi; and the Resident Representative until July 1993 did not favour making exceptions to the above rules. Subsequently, ONUSAL assumed responsibility for the observation and verification of the process. Moreover, at the same time, several differences between the government and the FMLN had to be cleared up by ONUSAL. Furthermore, a kind of stalemate developed as the government failed to provide funds, the army was not co-operative, and the international community did not want to pay for the lack of government commitment. Finances remained problematic. In the end, the Academy started its activities on 1 September 1992. ONUSAL monitored the academy's admission, and it provided advice on, amongst other things, training courses on human rights. However, only after early 1993 was it allowed to monitor the meetings of the Academic Council. Early in 1994, the Police Division criticised the Academy on the "barracks discipline" for recruits and the deficient training in legal matters and the use of force. ONUSAL argued that these problems could jeopardise the civilian nature of the PNC and contribute to the rise in the number of human rights violations.¹¹⁴ They were largely addressed afterwards. In spite of the problems, the Academy trained all 5,700 police officers by the 1994 deadline as set out in the Chapultepec peace agreement and by the beginning of 1996 their number had even grown to some 9,000 officers.¹¹⁵

In the negotiations, the United Nations became the driving force behind the idea of an apolitical, national and professional police force, which initially had only been introduced by the FMLN as a security guarantee. The New York and Chapultepec agreements determined that the PNC was to be civilian controlled and the majority of its personnel was not to have participated in the conflict.

Later, in June 1992, it was agreed that 20 percent of the entrants to the police force were to be from the FMLN, 20 percent from the PN and 60 percent was not to have participated at all in the armed conflict¹¹⁶ Personnel from the PN was only allowed to join the PNC after their conduct had been evaluated This process was to be implemented in co-operation with and under the supervision of the international community, co-ordinated by the United Nations Again, it was originally anticipated that the UNDP was to oversee the process, but for the same reason as with the ANSP, this task was taken up by ONUSAL The implementation of the agreements was seriously delayed from the start Not only was the establishment of the PNC behind schedule, but the delay also resulted from the slow start of the ANSP Moreover, from the start, government co-operation was far from ideal On the grounds that it needed to do so for public security reasons, the government transferred large numbers of personnel from the GN and the PH to the PN The FMLN was forced to allow the reinforcement of the PN under pressure from public opinion In addition, until early 1993, a number of former members of the FAES, the GN and PH were admitted into the PNC, because neither the FMLN nor ONUSAL were represented at the Academic Council of the ANSP Although during the first half of 1993 government co-operation improved, the PNC was gradually deployed thereby replacing the PN, and ONUSAL started to evaluate and provide technical advice and logistical support to the new police force After the appointment of Peña as Deputy-Director, relations between the PNC and ONUSAL deteriorated sharply In spite of the fact that the PNC had become heavily dependent on support from ONUSAL, this relationship was ended and the deployment of the PNC was even more behind schedule Moreover, ONUSAL was obstructed in the verification of the recruitment of the PNC, which dramatically worsened the human rights situation¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the government provided far too few funds and equipment to the PNC Even by May 1994, the budget of the PN remained larger than that of the PNC, while the financial situation of the new police force was such that officers lacked basic equipment such as fingerprinting tools and handcuffs¹¹⁸ Although the military and the PN did possess the necessary equipment, they were unwilling to provide it In addition, the international community was, in practice, less generous than expected, because although the Salvadoran government had been promised substantial international funds to create the PNC and the new academy, donors did not have budgets for police assistance and, due to budgetary regulations, were often not allowed to finance it in other ways Additionally, donors were dissatisfied with the commitment of the Salvadoran government and increasingly raised questions as to why they should continue to contribute resources to the PNC All this had serious consequences for the capacity and legitimacy of the PNC to fight crime, which in turn provided further rationale to maintain the PN Moreover, finding sufficient numbers of non-partisan personnel was a problem, initially because of a lack of publicity, but later also because of the low salaries In response to the increased crime rate and the resultant public concern, but in violation of the peace agreement, the government started 'plan vigilante', in accordance with which some 3,000 soldiers were deployed to deter criminality As the plan was very popular amongst the population, the FMLN felt unable to publicly criticise the government on the issue¹¹⁹ Early in 1994, as the government delayed the drawdown of the PN to the extent that some feared it wanted to hold on to it

indefinitely. ONUSAL even feared remilitarisation of the police force.¹²⁰ By April 1994, however, as a result of international criticism, Peña was replaced by a civilian.¹²¹ In May 1994, after the elections, the PNC and the government became more co-operative. The position of the PN became impossible after the second-in-command Lt. Coreas was videotaped in June 1994 committing armed robbery from a car.¹²² In response to the public outcry, president Calderón Sol brought the final demobilisation of the PN forward from March 1995 to December 1994.

In the end, an entirely new police force was successfully deployed and equipped within a two-year period. It was, however, still seriously under-resourced and its capacity was far too low, as it was expected to police a country of 5 million inhabitants with a force of only 5,940 officers.¹²³ Although its number rose to some 7,000 by March 1995, it was still incapable of dealing with the country's crime wave.¹²⁴ Moreover, the number of former PN officers was eventually higher than originally agreed as a result of the integral integration of the Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA) and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) into the PNC, as well as the agreement between the FMLN and the government to allow an additional 1,000 former PN officers to join if not enough civilians could be recruited.¹²⁵ Although the co-ordination of training provided by ONUSAL was poor, the fact that its officers provided on the spot assistance where needed, tutored PNC officers and identified gaps in their training, meant the Division made a substantial contribution to the development of the PNC.¹²⁶ Moreover, ONUSAL was essential in overseeing the selection of candidates for the PNC.¹²⁷ Nonetheless, the process of replacement of the old security forces with the new PNC was definitely not easy and faced many problems. Not in the last place, UN supervision was troubled by the fact that the government tried to flout the rules. The main feature of the PNC that made it so promising - the fact that it was a new institution - was also its largest obstacle to success. It was hoped that a new institution would leave behind the history of human rights violations and that a new culture could be created. However, this meant that a large investment was needed to create it, for which both the government and the international community lacked finances or did not want to spend funds on. At the same time, the old system was already being dismantled, leaving a vacuum in the maintenance of public security. Moreover, its creation would have been a tough job in a country where a well-developed criminal justice system was present, but in El Salvador these institutions were also undergoing a difficult process of reform. In spite of this, ONUSAL's contribution to the building of the PNC contributed a lot to the fact that El Salvador did get a better police force which had gained the trust and support of the population after the mission left.

Institution building made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance* as it established or reformed the judicial system, the armed forces, the ANSP, and the PNC. When ONUSAL left the process was, however, certainly not finished.

- *Civilian police monitoring*: In the New York Act the parties agreed that ONUSAL was to monitor the maintenance of public order during the transitional period, while the PNC was established. This included in particular the monitoring of the operations and conduct of the existing PN. The purpose of the monitoring was to "deter intimidation, reprisals or other violations of the civil rights of all sectors of the population, as well as to promote the impartial

and non-discriminatory enforcement of laws and regulations.”¹²⁸ In close coordination with the Human Rights Division, a Police Division consisting of some 631 observers was to be deployed throughout El Salvador.¹²⁹ It was to be phased out in accordance with the progressive reduction of the strength of the PN. The deployment of the Police Division started in February 1992 and continued during the following months. Even once the PN operated under UN supervision, it committed far more human rights violations than the PNC. Throughout the transition process, the PN remained responsible for arbitrary executions, torture, ill treatment, the use of excessive force, the abuse of authority, arbitrary arrests and it regularly threatened citizens.¹³⁰ Moreover, members of the PN became increasingly involved in criminal activities. This showed both how brutal the PN was and how incapable the ONUSAL civilian police monitors were of preventing it. It would eventually force President Calderón Sol to advance the date of the demobilisation of the PN. At the end of 1993 and start of 1994, also with regard to the PNC, an increasing trend of violations occurred, which affected its positive image and assistance from the population. The integral integration of two former PN units, the UEA and the SIU, contributed to this situation. Their officers were soon placed in many high positions within the PNC and severely affected the civilian character of the PNC. Subsequently, ONUSAL detected four main weaknesses in the PNC: 1) the lack of clear guidelines regarding procedures, 2) insufficient co-ordination between the police and the Academy, 3) a lack of co-ordination between the police, the judiciary and human rights institutions, and 4) a lack of co-operation with and training by ONUSAL. In May, after the 1994 elections and the removal of Peña, the PNC became more co-operative and the government allowed the members of the SIU and UEA to be screened and removed from positions outside their specialisation. Moreover, the appointment of an Inspector General for internal discipline contributed to the improvement of the standards of the new force. The phasing out of the Police Division started at the end of August 1994. Nonetheless, this did not mean that the situation had sufficiently improved. The Division of Criminal Investigations (DIC) and the Anti-Narcotics Division (DAN) – formerly the SIU and UEA - continued to operate with excessive autonomy within the PNC, and it appeared that the PNC was increasingly being confronted by disciplinary problems, combined with continued deficiencies in training and gaps in the legal framework. Only early in 1995 were the last members of the DIC and DAN forced to take courses at the ANSP. When these members refused and went on strike, the government accepted mass resignation in exchange for ample indemnification. Moreover, the PNC was slow to implement ONUSAL’s corrective recommendations and the Minister of Public Security Barrera even undermined the chain of command as set out in the Chapultepec agreement.¹³¹ Eventually, the Police Division was not able to perform its task of verification of the PN and the PNC satisfactorily due to the lack of co-operation by these organisations. Nonetheless, the United Nations itself was also responsible, because many of the civilian police monitors arrived in El Salvador without knowing the language, the situation in the country and the mandate of ONUSAL and co-operation between the Civilian Police Division and the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL was not optimal. As a consequence, civilian police monitoring did not contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

- *Human rights verification:* In July 1990, in the San José Agreement on Human Rights, the parties agreed that the United Nations was to deploy a human rights verification mission in El Salvador. In May 1991 the Security Council decided to establish the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL, in advance of a cease-fire and peace agreement. The Human Rights Component was to consist of some 70 to 90 human rights professionals. Up to 66 civilian police monitors were to accompany the Division.¹³² Once present, ONUSAL concluded that human rights violations were continuing and that although not all were related to the armed conflict, the tense situation it created was of great influence.¹³³ Due to the fact that the human rights operation started before the end of the conflict, it faced several complications: ONUSAL decided that it would not deal with cases directly related to the hostilities and thus interpreted its mandate narrowly, in spite of the fact that a broader interpretation would have been possible; as other agreements on issues related to human rights, such as the judiciary and the armed forces, were lacking, not only the military context, but also the institutional context was different from what had been intended; certain extremist groups were openly hostile towards ONUSAL and even threatened the mission, which meant that protection was necessary; parts of the population had extremely high expectations, as they expected ONUSAL to prevent and at least punish human rights violations; and, in the atmosphere of continuing armed conflict, it was difficult to establish the facts with regard to human rights violations and incidents.

With the cessation of the armed conflict at the start of 1992, the human rights situation improved and the Human Rights Division was able to function within the context envisaged in the San José agreement. However, the government still lacked the capacity to guarantee the rule of law and the effective and independent administration of justice. The Human Rights Division of ONUSAL issued dozens of recommendations, which were regarded to be the “main means of instigating actions by the parties available to the Mission”¹³⁴ The mission followed-up the response to these recommendations by, amongst other things, organising working meetings, training courses and seminars and workshops. ONUSAL argued that this direct dialogue helped to build trust.¹³⁵ An evaluation of the follow-up by the parties, however, showed that “the Mission’s recommendations appear so far to have been complied with in a piecemeal rather than a systematic manner and to have led to the resolution of individual cases rather than to general and qualitative transformations.”¹³⁶ As ONUSAL lacked any mechanism for enforcement, by mid-1993 it had established consultative mechanisms for a more systematic follow-up to the recommendations, which proved to be satisfactory. They enabled ONUSAL not only to stimulate the full implementation of the recommendations, but also to review the entire human rights situation.

The human rights situation deteriorated dramatically between August and October 1993. Politically motivated violence became more open, and the murders of leading members of the FMLN and ARENA raised fears of the resurgence of the so-called death squads. In December the parties agreed to establish a Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups (*Grupo Conjunto*), in which the Director of the Human Rights Division was to take part. The *Grupo Conjunto* concluded that the political violence and assassinations in El Salvador at that time were different from the violence in the 1980s in the sense that this violence no longer answered to the

political and social situation. Although some people still used the old structures for criminal activities or “private political violence”, the majority of the population had redefined its role in society choosing the way of democracy instead of violence. In order to change the situation, the *Grupo Conjunto* formulated several recommendations.¹³⁷ The Human Rights Division came to the same conclusion.¹³⁸ From December 1993 onwards, the number of political murders and intimidations decreased again and El Salvador reasserted itself in the process towards a better human rights situation. In the hope of ending impunity, ONUSAL pressed through its set of recommendations on constitutional amendments to decentralise the functions of the Supreme Court of Justice, which were needed in order to guarantee the independence of the judiciary, amongst other things. Eventually some constitutional reforms were approved by the outgoing Legislative Assembly, but they failed to overhaul the judicial system as recommended by the Commission on the Truth, COPAZ and the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL.¹³⁹ During the remainder of 1994, and until the termination of ONUSAL the number of complaints to the Human Rights Division declined.¹⁴⁰ This was not only the result of the improved human rights situation, but also because this task was slowly transferred to the Human Rights Ombudsman.

ONUSAL faced three problems in its human rights monitoring mandate: Firstly, its continued role as mediator during the implementation phase sometimes conflicted with its role as executor of Chapultepec Agreement. The first task needed understanding for both parties, while the second task required strong wording in cases of human rights violations. ONUSAL chose not to undermine the perception that it was objective and neutral, and took the less confronting path. Secondly, organisational and personnel difficulties caused internal problems within the Human Rights Division.¹⁴¹ Thirdly, operational problems developed as a result of a lack of standard procedures and methodologies to monitor human rights. In spite of these problems, the fact that ONUSAL was allowed to communicate with whoever it wanted and move to wherever it wanted without prior notice provided the operation with unprecedented strong powers and gave it some leeway. The freedom of movement in particular had a ‘dissuasive’ or ‘preventive’ impact.¹⁴² Moreover, the size of the operation and its deployment throughout the country, as well as its prestige and moral authority, made the parties wary of criticism.¹⁴³ Consequently, in spite of the problems, human rights monitoring by ONUSAL is generally regarded to have been very positive.¹⁴⁴ Its impact, however, should not be overestimated, since the end of the armed conflict has also been a major factor in the decline in violations.¹⁴⁵ Nonetheless, human rights monitoring made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

- *Human rights education*: The San José agreement mandated the United Nations human rights verification mission to plan and carry out a national campaign on human rights. ONUSAL aimed its programmes at national governmental and non-governmental bodies, and at the public at large. It was, however, slow to start its educational activities. With the signing of the Chapultepec agreement, human rights education, publicity and promotion were stepped up. Nonetheless, only a few resources were devoted to this task. Eventually, a human rights education programme was established for members of the FAES, the security forces and the FMLN, and later on for civilians, such as teachers. However, although ONUSAL would have had the

capacity to do so, no programme was started in schools and the educational system. In spite of the fact that ONUSAL lacked a strategic vision with regard to human rights education, the Salvadoran population was made more aware of human rights issues. Nonetheless, they never became fully consciously aware what constituted a human rights violation and what not. ONUSAL would have needed to stay longer than three years if it was to have completed the difficult task of creating a human rights culture. Now it was only the start of a process. As a result, although human rights education made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, it did not live up to its full potential.

- *Truth commission* In order to investigate the human rights violations between 1980 and the establishment of ONUSAL, the Mexico Agreement established a Commission on the Truth. The report, presented in March 1993, went beyond what many human rights organisations had expected as it clearly attributed most violations to the government or related forces. In addition, in cases of incontrovertible proof, the report named the names of those responsible. This even involved people in the most senior positions in the military. Moreover, the Commission published several binding recommendations. Four of these recommendations were that all officials and military named in the report were to be removed from office, those who were responsible for human rights violations were to be banned from public office for ten years, the death squads were to be investigated, and the judicial system was to be reformed and the Supreme Court was to resign.¹⁴⁶ The report was not well received by all parties. Although the FMLN largely embraced its conclusions, the right of the political spectrum and ARFNA in particular criticised it bitterly.¹⁴⁷ The Human Rights Division of ONUSAL gave “top priority” to the verification of the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission.¹⁴⁸ In spite of the accusations that the Commission had exceeded its mandate, the government promised to implement the recommendations. Nonetheless, one week after the report was published, the Legislative Assembly adopted a general amnesty, which lacked the support of, amongst others, many members of the FMLN. Amnesty International warned that the amnesty maintained the impunity, because again none of the perpetrators were punished.¹⁴⁹ In response to the reactions to the report of the Commission, the Secretary-General reported his analysis of the recommendations and the measures and their timeframe to implement them. He concluded that only one recommendation could not be implemented and that all the others were within the mandate of the Commission.¹⁵⁰ The parties were, however, far too slow with the implementation and only decided to step up their efforts aimed at “sweeping the table clean” before the start of the electoral campaign of 20 November. After the elections of April 1994, in the “Timetable of the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements”, it was again agreed that the Legislative Assembly was to implement the remaining recommendations of the Commission on the Truth.¹⁵¹ When ONUSAL left, the recommendations were, however, still not fully implemented. Nonetheless, in the end, the Ad Hoc and Truth Commission reports breached the wall of impunity surrounding the armed forces and beyond. As a result, the truth commission made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.
- *Organisation of elections* In the Chapultepec agreement ONUSAL did not receive a formal mandate with regard to the elections. After requests by several member states and COPAZ, at the beginning of January 1993 the

government officially requested ONUSAL to verify the 1994 elections. The Secretary-General subsequently proposed establishing an Electoral Division, which consisted of 38 international and 7 local staff, which during polling itself was to grow to 900.¹⁵² In spite of the fact that the UN technical mission had been aware of the fact that the registration of voters would be a formidable task, the Electoral Division only opened a preparatory office in June 1993 and began operations in September 1993. It was estimated that at the time of the peace agreement, some 775,000 Salvadorans had to be registered. The lack of registration was particularly urgent in the former war zones, where people had not been able to or did not want to register during the 1980s, and where birth certificates and other documents had often been destroyed during the war.¹⁵³ The registration process was archaic and complex and the TSE lacked the massive logistical support needed to implement its own electoral plan. ONUSAL took upon itself the task of providing logistical and technical support for the registration of voters, and pushed the TSE to implement the Chapultepec agreement. In addition, ONUSAL provided assistance with the drawing up of the electoral roll. The Electoral Division held regular meetings with, amongst others, the parties and the TSF. Furthermore, it set up a procedure to receive and process allegations of violations of the electoral code. On election day, 20 March 1994, elections were held for the Presidency, the Legislative Assembly, the mayoral districts and all the posts in the municipal corporation, and the deputies for the Central American Parliament. The presence of 900 ONUSAL observers made it possible to solve countless problems that arose with regard to the organisation of the polling. An estimated 1.5 million voters eventually participated in the elections, which amounted to 55 percent of all the 2,722,000 registered voters.¹⁵⁴ The elections for the Legislative Assembly, the mayoralties and the presidency were won by ARENA. However, with regard to the latter, a second round had to be organised as none of the candidates won a simple majority. Subsequently, ONUSAL advised the TSE on ways to improve the elections during the second round, on the prevention of irregularities, the number of polling stations, the transport of voters, guidance and training of electoral officials and electoral publicity. Consequently, the second round was better organised. The result of the second round was that ARENA won 68 percent of the vote and the FMLN coalition 32 percent.¹⁵⁵ In the end, some argue that ONUSAL's Electoral Division "saved the election process from certain disaster".¹⁵⁶ ONUSAL's help with organising elections certainly made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

- *Election monitoring* The Electoral Division received the mandate to verify the electoral process before, during and after the elections.¹⁵⁷ ONUSAL observed the extensive registration campaign. This process was distorted due to the conflict, migration and death of the registered voter. Moreover, registration as a voter was often rather expensive and tiresome, which certainly contributed to the fact that some 300,000 cards were eventually not retrieved.¹⁵⁸ In addition, some 74,000 applications were rejected, partly because the ARENA authorities resisted registration and strictly observed the rules.¹⁵⁹ ONUSAL monitored the election campaign, which started off with several minor incidents. During the whole campaign period, some 300 complaints were filed with ONUSAL. Most of them dealt with illegitimate or arbitrary action by public authorities, acts of intimidation, destruction of propaganda materials,

aggression and murder¹⁶⁰ As a result, two months before the elections, a stunning 74 percent of the respondents in a poll said they feared expressing their political opinions in public¹⁶¹ On election day ONUSAL arranged information kits for some 2,000 observers from various organisations ONUSAL itself mobilised 900 monitors, and observed each of the 355 polling centres¹⁶² The voting centres were badly organised, staff were insufficiently trained and voting was cumbersome Moreover, the electoral role was not optimal, as an estimated 25,000 to 75,000 people were unable to vote because their names did not appear on it¹⁶³ Fortunately, however, election day was peaceful The massive presence of observers and the ease with which they could report to United Nations observers, made it difficult for irregularities to occur without their being noticed by ONUSAL The counting of the votes was monitored by 40 ONUSAL observers Only eight reports of serious incidents were filed, of which, according to the Secretary-General, none was intractable or had a significant effect on the result of the elections¹⁶⁴ No party challenged the provisional count for the presidential elections However, the provisional count for the municipal elections was challenged in 40 mayoral districts¹⁶⁵ With regard to the second round of the presidential elections, observers were assigned to monitor issues regarded to be important by the candidates, such as the electoral roll The campaign for the second round was short and activities were attended by fewer people Initially the campaign took place in a tense atmosphere of intimidation, vote buying, and violations of the electoral propaganda rules Later this improved, when both presidential candidates joined efforts to stop the violations On 24 April the second round was again monitored by 900 ONUSAL observers¹⁶⁶ This time the polling was much better organised, many of the problems of the first round had been remedied and the day proceeded with virtually no major incidents This also resulted from the fact that the voter turnout was lower because of the problems in the first round, amongst other reasons However, again there were many minor incidents about which complaints were filed and again a considerable number of citizens were unable to vote

Looking back, one may wonder to what extent the elections were free and fair The opposition talked of irregularities and technical fraud, while even the TSE spoke of 'anomalies'¹⁶⁷ In the end, more than 2 35 million Salvadorans had been registered and received a voting card This amounted to 85 percent of the voting-age population¹⁶⁸ However, if one were to add up all those voters who were unable to register, who did not receive their voter card or who were not allowed to vote, this number may have amounted to some 20 percent of the number who did cast their vote¹⁶⁹ Not only would this be a significant minority, but also one that would disproportionately represent the poor¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, other issues may have affected the vote, such as the show of force on election day by the PN and the army, the financially advantaged position of ARENA, the lack of enforcement of the campaign rules, and the assassinations of prominent political figures which, it was suspected, were linked with 'death squads' Typically all the complaints by the FMLN were rejected by the TSE, while the one single complaint by ARENA was accepted¹⁷¹ ONUSAL concluded that both the submission of complaints and the decisions on their validity by the TSE were tainted by procedural flaws It concluded that given the political importance of the challenges and the need for transparency in the elections, this was not a very wise idea¹⁷² Nonetheless, the Secretary-

General concluded that the irregularities did not constitute ballot-rigging and did not have an impact on the results of the elections. Only in the municipal elections, he argued, might they have affected the results, as the electoral constituencies were smaller¹⁷³. However, also in the case of one or two deputies, the race was close enough to possibly be affected by the irregularities, which in turn might have tipped the balance between an ARENA dominated and a centre-left dominated Assembly¹⁷⁴. Nonetheless, even the major participants believed in the end that the electoral irregularities and fraud were not of a sufficient magnitude to have dramatically altered the election results. In addition, they believed ONUSAL's monitoring contributed to this. The massive presence and good communications of the election monitors on polling day indeed made it difficult to commit fraud without being noticed and helped to minimise the number of 'anomalies'. As a consequence, election monitoring made a limited positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*. However, attention was primarily given to the election days and very little to the whole electoral process. It is not unlikely that more attention to the rest of the process would have improved the quality of the elections.

- *Providing law and order* In the Chapultepec agreement the parties decided that, immediately after the signing of the agreement, special security measures were to be taken to protect any FMLN leader who might require such protection. ONUSAL was to verify the adoption of these measures. The main leaders of the FMLN had returned to El Salvador by February 1992 and on their return they were protected by the PN and bodyguards. The security measures enabled the leaders of the FMLN to return and participate in the electoral process and as such made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

When ONUSAL left, the constitution was reformed, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state were separated, and national defence and public security issues were dealt with by two separate institutional structures both submissive to the civil government. Furthermore, a popular awareness of and respect for human rights developed. Moreover, after its departure, MINUSAL and later UNEV and UNDP verified and provided good offices for the further implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth. In addition, they provided further good offices and verified the institutional reform. However, in spite of the start of a reform process of the judicial system towards independence and impartiality, these reforms and purification were not sufficient. In addition, training and capacity were lacking. As a consequence, the judicial system unfortunately remained deficient, slow and corrupt, which in turn contributed to a lack of credibility¹⁷⁵. Moreover, the positive influence of the Human Rights Ombudsman diminished as the government authorities were not receptive to it and resisted most of its recommendations. In addition, as it did not control its own resources and budget, it was susceptible to budget cuts and heavily dependent on the UNDP. Consequently, it became an isolated institution. The PNC was increasingly publicly criticised from 1995 onwards for brutality and incompetence, and although its human rights record was still superior to that of the PN, it did deteriorate to the extent that practices from the past recurred. In addition, the PNC suffered from a 'corruption problem' and officers who were involved in criminal activities. After evaluations of PNC agents in 2000, some 1500, of a force of then over 17,000 officers, were purified, mostly on suspicion

of bad behaviour¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, in spite of the criticisms, the PNC was an improvement over the PN, highly dedicated and suffered vastly more casualties than, for example, the United States police forces Although human rights violations still occurred sometimes, it was at a much lower level than during the 1980s and no longer government policy However, although the rule of law was beginning to take hold, a mixture of organised crime and death squads remained present at a lower level Furthermore, the addressing of social and economic rights remained superficial Although corruption started to become a problem in El Salvador, in comparison with the rest of Latin America, the presence of the phenomenon was remarkably low¹⁷⁷ The institutes created and stimulated by ONUSAL continued to evolve Although they had improved a lot, in the end one may wonder whether enough of the institution building process has been conserved The different institutions were in continuous conflict with each other and were unable to co-operate effectively Moreover, the new and reformed institutions were placed in an environment that remained the same The government had taken the path of minimal compliance and had succeeded After 1994, support shifted away from ARENA towards what was in essence a two party system of ARENA and FMLN, who reached a tie in the following parliamentary and municipal elections The 1999 presidential elections were, however, won by the ARENA candidate Flores without a second round Nonetheless, the fact that ARENA lost its majority in the Legislative Assembly meant the party had to seek new ways of finding support for its proposals Its solution was what Zamora called 'clientelism' In exchange for the support of the PCN, ARENA shared pieces of the state and supported that party financially¹⁷⁸ Although the peace process had created the basis for democracy and the conditions of the elections had improved after 1994, El Salvador was still not a fully-fledged pluralistic democracy In the aftermath of the 1994 elections, further plans and recommendations were made to revise the electoral system, but they were never implemented The passivity of the TSE only underlined the fact that it needed to be restructured and separated from the influence of the political parties The registration process remained cumbersome and difficult, especially for the poor In rural El Salvador client-patron relations continued to be important In addition, the grassroots of the parties became increasingly sceptical of politics and abstention in elections increased progressively¹⁷⁹ As a result of crime, large portions of the population felt insecure and began to question the use of democracy and wondered whether a dictatorship would not be better¹⁸⁰

8 4 6 State/government legitimacy

Historically, power, influence and efficiency in El Salvador were pseudo-institutional or lay outside the institutional framework Elections during the 1960s and early 1970s were fraudulent, but this was something that was passively accepted This changed with the fraud in the elections of 1972 because people had hoped for change As a consequence, the government lost legitimacy The 1983 constitution and the following elections provided the government with the veneer of legitimacy Indeed, although the FMLN was excluded from participating in these elections, during these war years paradoxically the population generally accepted the governments as being more legitimate Moreover, Duarte was a charismatic leader who had many supporters However, his legitimacy in power declined when he proved to be unable to solve the problems of the country Moreover, supporters of the FMLN and the left were excluded from the democratic process

and therefore a large part of the population regarded the system to be illegitimate. In practice, governments were only chosen by a small proportion of the population. President Cristiani, for example, received his mandate in elections in which only 25 percent of the eligible voters took part. Nonetheless, he won legitimacy during his presidency because he became the 'president of peace'. Still, the system had lost its legitimacy to the extent, that in a February 1994 poll on the question of whether civilians can influence government, 52 percent of the respondents answered "never", a further 12 percent said "almost never", and only 23 percent said "sometimes"¹⁸¹

During its presence, the following 'policy tools' implemented by ONUSAL influenced or were intended to influence *state/government legitimacy*

- *Institution building* The aim of the institution building process of, amongst other things, the judicial organs and the PNC was to recreate state institutions in the hope that these institutions would be regarded as legitimate. It was hoped that these new institutions and new rules could provide the Salvadoran democracy with a sense of credibility. For this purpose, the institutions had to be strong, because otherwise there might be the temptation to deal with issues the way they used to be dealt with i.e. outside the system. The newly created or strengthened institutions made a positive contribution to the legitimacy of the government. Nonetheless, one may wonder whether the institutions will be sufficiently credible in the long term.
- *Election monitoring* The careful monitoring of the elections provided legitimacy to the newly elected Calderon Sol government. ONUSAL provided the guarantee that the elections were reasonably fair and therefore that the government was indeed rightfully chosen. Even in 2003 people wanted the United Nations to monitor the 2004 elections in order to provide the necessary transparency. As a consequence, election monitoring made, perhaps unexpectedly, a positive contribution to *state/government legitimacy*.

The Chapultepec agreement saw the height of legitimacy for the Salvadoran government. However, after ONUSAL left, the state institutions lost credibility, because, amongst other reasons, in particular those institutions that were to control the state, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, were weakened. Moreover, in 1997 the transparency of the elections and consequently the legitimacy of its results were still not anchored in an institutional framework, such as an apolitical TSE. In addition, political parties lost contact with civil society and as a consequence these parties became a power unto themselves and politics lost the trust of the population. The Legislative Assembly was seen by many as the "garbage dump of corrupt clowns"¹⁸². The political system was unable to address such issues as crime and poverty, which were regarded as the most important by the population. As the system was not considered to be effective by a large section of the population (60 to 65 percent) their participation in that system declined, and it lost legitimacy. This resulted in the decreasing voter turn-outs and increased incidences of tax evasion. Moreover, Salvadorans gained more trust in their regional administrations than in the national government. One should, however, not exaggerate. This inertia and contempt of politics was not a typical Salvadoran phenomenon, but could be found throughout Latin America. Furthermore, the government was perceived to be much more legitimate than before. Nobody fought against it and in polls the president was not seen as being bad.

8.4.7 Unemployment and economic decline

During the 1970s, the process of rapid import substitution-based industrialisation of the 1960s started to face structural problems. As a consequence of the conflict with Honduras, El Salvador lost its second largest export market and access to others. The economic crisis throughout the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the oil crisis further depressed Salvadoran economic growth. After 1979, the economy suffered further from the war. As a result of the conflict and political instability, capital fled the country and investments waned, and the Salvadoran economy became increasingly protected and isolated from the world economy. Consequently, the GDP per capita dropped by 27 percent between 1978 and 1982 and the decrease in income of the lowest quintile of the income distribution was even more dramatic at 67.2 percent.¹⁸³ Although economic stability was partially restored after 1982, the economy could not be reactivated and grew only at the same rate as the population growth.¹⁸⁴ During this period open unemployment fell, but underemployment rose. At the end of the 1980s unemployment remained stable.¹⁸⁵ Although there is no reliable data on poverty during the 1980s, the World Bank and the Ministry of Planning argued that poverty increased substantially during this period.¹⁸⁶ This poverty proved to be severe and predominantly rural. The country was able to survive the economic decline mainly due to the inflow of funds, generated by both official US transfers and an increased flood of remittances from refugees in the US. These inflows allowed the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, raised both the national income and national savings levels, and cushioned the fall in real wages. Unfortunately, at the same time this inflow of US dollars caused a classic case of 'Dutch disease', as the colón became overvalued. This had a negative influence on the export sector and led to high inflation and monetary instability.¹⁸⁷ In addition, the country was hit by the collapse of the price of its main export product – coffee, and a boycott in its principle market the United States.¹⁸⁸ In response, the economic elites were forced to diversify and to explore new sectors. As a result, the economic interests of these elites shifted from land to peace, allowing moderate politicians such as Cristiani to rise to power.¹⁸⁹ From the end of the 1980s onwards, when Cristiani implemented a structural adjustment programme, the Salvadoran macroeconomic policies were guided by the "Washington consensus". Unfortunately, there were no social programmes to compensate vulnerable groups and consequently these groups were hit hard. Nonetheless, during the negotiations for the peace agreement, the government insisted that its macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment programme was not up for discussion. The FMLN placed its emphasis on the military and political aspects. As a consequence, economic issues were only discussed at the latest possible moment and even then only with regard to aid distribution and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

During its presence ONUSAL did not implement any 'policy tools' that influenced or were intended to influence *unemployment and economic decline*. However, the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions and international donors on the peace process and their co-operation with ONUSAL was very important and needs to be touched upon. Firstly, the IMF and World Bank were involved in the structural adjustment of El Salvador's economy. As a large part of the funds for the peace process had to come from domestic sources, this would impede these policies of the IMF, the World Bank and President Cristiani. During the planning of the peace process, there was, however, minimal coordination and co-operation between the

Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations secretariat. As a consequence, during the implementation of the peace agreement, the government of El Salvador faced a dilemma: either to continue with economic adjustment and drop the peace process, or to continue the peace process and to drop the economic adjustment. Both processes could not be sustained independently and there was a need to harmonise them. De Soto and Del Castillo compared the situation as if “a patient lay on the operating table with the left and right sides of his body separated by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side.”¹⁹⁰ The government did not want to lose the macroeconomic gains it had made since 1990. As a consequence, peace-related programmes were under-financed and even peace came under threat when the FMLN stopped demobilising because of the delays in the arms-for-land programme. Only from 1993 did the IMF become more flexible and were more structural meetings held between the Bretton Woods institutions and ONUSAL on a more integrated and co-operative approach. Nonetheless, the Salvadoran government was in fact “more royalist than the king.”¹⁹¹ Secondly, the Bretton Woods institutions have been criticised for the fact that they did not push soon enough and aggressively enough to make the government reallocate resources for the purpose of domestic resource mobilization.¹⁹² At the time, the Bretton Woods institutions, however, argued that this was a political conditionality and as apolitical organisations they were not allowed to have such a political agenda.¹⁹³ Nonetheless, aid conditionality as a policy tool might have been used more and more aggressively to force the government to implement and fund important parts of the peace agreement, such as the programmes on the transfer of land and the PNC. Thirdly, in addition to domestic resources, international donors also allocated resources to the peace process. Although they did support it, they did have clear preferences for certain projects, because projects that focused on infrastructure and environment attracted markedly more attention than peace-related projects, such as the creation of the PNC, the reintegration of ex-combatants and the promotion of democratic institutions.¹⁹⁴ After ONUSAL left, the market economy was fully embraced and the Calderon Sol government launched an ambitious reform programme aimed at making the Salvadoran economy more open and privatised. The reconstruction of El Salvador and its economy, in combination with the structural adjustment, allowed the economy to grow and to reintegrate into the global economy. After the signing of the peace agreements, the Salvadoran economy grew at a rate of 4 to 5 percent per year.¹⁹⁵ In addition, the steady inflow of workers’ remittances provided sufficient international reserves for a solid monetary policy. Inflation was brought under control. Where it had still been some 20 percent in 1992, it fell below 10 percent in 1994 for the first time in two decades, only to rise briefly to double digits again after the increase of the VAT rate in 1995.¹⁹⁶ In 1996 the GDP growth per annum temporarily slowed because the consumption bubble and the construction boom after the civil war came to an end, and the external competitiveness of El Salvador declined. Nonetheless, in 1997 the economy picked up again as real GDP grew by nearly 4 percent, inflation dropped below 2 percent and exports increased sharply.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the lower inflation led to a decline in appreciation of the colon. Export did, however, not fully recover from the deterioration of the 1980s caused by the civil war.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, although unemployment declined between 1995 and 1999, from 9 to 7.6 percent, and also underemployment decreased, it remained rather high.¹⁹⁹ Economic growth had improved, but the GDP per capita remained below pre-war levels.²⁰⁰ The poverty rate did decrease from 65.7 in

1991 to 47.5 percent in 2000 and was below pre-war levels, yet remained high.²⁰¹ Moreover, one of the main reasons for the decline in poverty levels was migration, as some 1 million poor left, and the remittances they sent back helped those who stayed behind.²⁰² In addition, the economy was hit hard by hurricane Mitch at the end of 1998; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stimulated factories to go to Mexico instead of El Salvador; the 2001 earthquakes; and droughts.²⁰³ As a consequence of the economic slowdown, social unrest and the number of strikes increased. The average Salvadoran did not benefit much from the economic growth, and the rich became richer and the poor became poorer.²⁰⁴ However, donors, such as USAID, still regarded the macroeconomic adjustment to be successful, although much of its success depended heavily on the inflow of remittances from abroad. By 1994 and 1995, remittances totalled some 1 billion, and increased to 1.9 billion US\$ in 2001.²⁰⁵ As a result, the country became increasingly dependent on them. They not only aided the adjustment, providing the necessary foreign exchange, but also cushioned its side effects by augmenting the incomes of the poor.²⁰⁶ According to several observers, the remittances prevented the Salvadoran economy from collapsing.²⁰⁷ A negative side effect of the remittances was that they continued to contribute to the appreciation of the colón. As a result of measures taken to combat this, the domestic interest rate increased.²⁰⁸ In order to address these effects, to fight inflation, reduce high interest rates, to prevent devaluation and to allow economic growth and investments through the further opening up of the economy by creating a stable exchange rate, the government decided to dollarise the economy. In 2001 the dollar was allowed to circulate side-by-side with the colón and the government stopped printing colónes. Eventually the plan was for the colón to cease to be legal tender.

8.4.8 External relations

Up to around 1987 the Central American region was governed by undemocratic regimes, which either depended on the United States or on the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan revolution had been the detonator for war in El Salvador. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the FMLN through the Sandinistas and on the other hand Reagan feared communism would spread and hoped to stop the communist drive. Foreign support served as an aggravator of conflict, largely because during the Cold War both the government and the FMLN had no reason to believe they could lose the support of their superpower. However, at the end of the 1980s, during the twilight hours of the Cold War, the whole Central American region saw a trend towards demilitarisation. The power of the military began to crumble and the idea of civilian control over the state gained momentum. The region became less strategically important to the superpowers, allowing them to decrease their aid. As a consequence, the financial and resource flows from the Soviet Union and Cuba to the FMLN dried up. The end of the Cold War also enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to co-operate in Central America and exert pressure on both parties to work towards peace. In the months following the Esquipulas II Agreement, relations between El Salvador and its neighbours improved. The problems of individual countries in Central America were increasingly regarded by their governments to be regional in essence. Moreover, the conflict in Nicaragua, which claimed 30,000 lives, came to an end. UNOVEN successfully monitored the February 1990 elections, after which power was transferred from the Sandinista Front of National Liberation of President Ortega

to the National Opposition Union of the new president Chamorro. By the end of June, ONUCA had demobilised all 22,400 members of the Nicaraguan resistance and destroyed their weapons²⁰⁹. With the end of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the FMLN lost an important ally, which drove it to the negotiating table²¹⁰.

During its presence ONUSAL did not implement any 'policy tools' that influenced or were intended to influence *external relations*.

After the departure of ONUSAL the relations of the countries in the Central American region continued to improve, especially with regard to economic co-operation. The Salvadoran economy opened up its borders, especially for trade. El Salvador joined GATT and later the WTO, aimed to reactivate the CACM and signed free trade agreements with countries such as Panama, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. In addition, in 1996 Guatemala and El Salvador signed an agreement to start a customs union. At the same time, the dependency of the Salvadoran economy on the remittances from the United States forced the Salvadoran government to tow the Washington line. As a consequence, Salvadoran foreign policy became reactive and followed the United States.

8.5 Within case conclusions

At the international level of the Salvadoran conflict, the Soviet Union, its allies and the United States were no longer willing to support the conflict after the end of the Cold War. At the national level, the government and the FMLN reached a mutually hurting stalemate in 1989 and both parties became sincerely interested in a peace process. This situation and interest allowed ONUSAL to make a positive contribution to both *negative peace* and the causes of conflict in El Salvador. From the research of the hypotheses it follows that

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to negative peace. Although in 1989 the parties had already reached a 'mutually hurting stalemate', they continued the fight to gain at the negotiating table. This did not change after the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL arrived. However, once ONUSAL was fully deployed after the signing of the Chapultepec agreement and started to address *negative peace*, it contributed to the fact that *negative peace* was reached. Through the implementation of the 'policy tools' of cease-fire monitoring, institution building and human rights monitoring, the security of the parties and especially the FMLN was sufficiently guaranteed to continue with the cantonment and demobilisation, and disarmament. The reintegration of ex-combatants and diplomacy helped to smooth the process towards *negative peace*.

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to inter-group relations. The peace process made it possible to reintegrate the extremes of the political spectrum into the state. ONUSAL aided this process, although its influence was not very great. As far as the PNC was concerned, institution building meant that ex-combatants had to reconcile and work together. The truth commission also contributed, although less than expected due to the premature amnesty, to national reconciliation and the improvement of *inter-group relations*. The elites and society at large, however, remained polarised. Moreover, social marginalisation and economic inequality were left unaddressed as the government had resisted talking about these subjects during negotiations. As a result, an important cause of the conflict would still have been strong if it had not been alleviated by the remittances from Salvadorans overseas.

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to group demography. Demographic pressure was initially one of the main causes of the conflict and was, in spite of the land reforms and the fact that the country became less dependent on agriculture at the end of the 1980s, still very important at the time of the Chapultepec Agreement. Although the land programme of the reintegration of ex-combatants was not intended to be a land reform, it did have a similar, although limited, effect. It allowed, just as mine clearance did, which was only of limited importance, that a group of landless peasants, both the ex-combatants of the FMLN and the *tenedores*, received land. Nevertheless, the demographic pressures still remained important and only did not reach pre-conflict levels due to the escape valve of migration.

ONUSAL made a temporary negative contribution to state weakness. The Salvadoran state had been weakened as a result of the conflict, economic crises and fiscal adjustment. The peace process meant that tens of thousands of ex-combatants were dumped into the general workforce. In addition, the disarmament was unable to address the problem of arms proliferation in El Salvador, and institution building did strengthen several institutions but temporarily weakened the internal security system. Subsequently, as a result of the far from sufficient reintegration of ex-combatants, unintended demobilisation affected the state strength negatively. Ex-combatants were often unemployed, had easy access to arms and were not restrained by the weakened police force, which resulted in a temporary crime wave. Only after 1995, when the police force was sufficiently strong, could this problem be better addressed and the situation slowly took a turn for the better.

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to state unwillingness and good governance El Salvador was characterised before the presence of ONUSAL by the absence of respect for human rights and the presence of, at best, only a semi-democracy. ONUSAL paid a lot of attention to the variable of *state unwillingness and good governance* and contributed to its improvement. The organisation of elections, the providing of law and order through the security measures necessary to enable the FMLN to participate in these elections and their monitoring by ONUSAL to ensure that the elections were free and fair, meant that in the short term the democratic nature of regime change in El Salvador improved. The truth commission, human rights verification and human rights education ensured that human rights violations were sufficiently dealt with, with respect to the past, the present and the future, and impunity ended. Human rights education was, however, only the start of a process. Institution building guaranteed that El Salvador received a solid foundation for a process towards a culture of democracy and respect for human rights, which had to be completed by future governments and generations. However, it was the government that was not fully committed and consequently some results were affected. This was already visible with respect to civilian police monitoring that could not contribute because of the government attitude. Five years after the departure of ONUSAL the government still did not fully live up to its tasks with regard to the newly created institutions.

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to state/government legitimacy The 1983 constitution and the following elections had provided the government with only a veneer of legitimacy. Institution building and the monitoring of the elections by ONUSAL contributed to the legitimacy of both the government and the state as the newly created institutions were perceived to be more legitimate and the government was seen to have been legitimately elected. Five years after the

departure of ONUSAL, government legitimacy was, however, slightly regressing, as the performance of both the government and the institutions left room for improvement.

ONUSAL did not contribute to unemployment and economic decline. Due to economic crisis and the conflict, the Salvadoran economy collapsed at the start of the 1980s. When ONUSAL arrived this situation had improved a little. The subject was, however, barely touched upon in the peace agreement and ONUSAL was not mandated to contribute. ARENA made clear that its economic adjustment programme was not up for negotiation and the FMLN did not find it opportune to pick up the subject and hoped to address the problems through democratic governance after the elections. Nonetheless, because the conflict ended, and, due to the structural adjustment programme and more importantly the remittances, the economic situation improved.

ONUSAL did not contribute to external relations. The Salvadoran conflict was a typical Cold War conflict in which the government was supported by the United States and the FMLN by the Soviet Union and its regional allies. ONUSAL was not mandated to contribute to *external relations*. However, as a result of the end of the Cold War and the regime change in Nicaragua, this was also no longer necessary. After the departure of ONUSAL the region increasingly started to co-operate.

Table 20 - Indication of the contribution of ONUSAL's policy tools²¹¹

	Cease-fire monitoring	Contingent and demobilisation	Disarmament	Reintegration of ex-combatants	Institution-building	Winning the hearts and minds... Verification of foreign forces withdrawal	Diplomacy	Sanctions verification	Civilian police monitoring Civil administration controlling	Border monitoring	Providing pay to the newly-formed army	Reparation	Reintegration of refugees	Humanitarian aid	Providing law and order	Society-building	Rehabilitation	Human rights verification	Human rights education	Truth commission	Organisation of elections	Election monitoring	
Negative peace	++	++	++	++	++		+																
Inter-group relations					++																		+
Group demography					+									+									
State weakness		+	0	++/- ^t																			
State unwillingness...				++						0					++					++ ^p	++	++	+
State/government legitimacy				++																			++
Unemployment and econ. dec.																							
External relations																							
Negative contribution:	--																						
Limited negative contribution:	-																						
No contribution:	0																						
Limited positive contribution:																							+
Positive contribution:																							++
Temporary contribution:																							^t
Contribution to process:																							^p

Summary

ONUSAL made a positive contribution to five of the eight variables and in particular to *negative peace* and *state unwillingness and good governance*. It did not contribute to two variables, because it was not mandated to do so. Although such a contribution might not have been necessary in the case of the *external*

relations, it definitely was with regard to the economic causes of conflict. Moreover, the mandate was also too limited with respect to *inter-group relations* and *group demography*. It is remarkable that ONUSAL even had a negative influence on *state weakness*. Nonetheless, generally speaking, ONUSAL made a positive contribution to 'durable peace', as it managed to contribute to *negative peace* and addressed many causes of the conflict. These contributions by ONUSAL in combination with, amongst other things, the important influence of migration and the remittances, meant that the causes of the conflict were sufficiently addressed to ensure that the negative peace lasted for more than five years.

¹ BOYCE, J.K (1995), "Adjustment towards peace an introduction", *World Development*, 23(12), pp. 2067-2077, on pp 2072-2073, RYAN, J.J (1997), "Democratic transition and consolidation in a polarized system: the role of the center in El Salvador", *Party Politics*, 3(2), pp. 169-188, on p 173; and MIDLARSKY, M.I & K. ROBFRTS (June 1985), "Class, state, and revolution in Central America: Nicaragua and El Salvador compared", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29(2), pp. 163-193, on pp 168-170 and p 177.

For good books on the conflict in El Salvador see MONTGOMERY, T.S. (1995), *Revolution in EL Salvador from civil strife to civil peace*, second edition, Boulder - San Francisco - Oxford; SUNDARAM, A. & G. GELBER (1991), *A decade of war El Salvador confronts the future*, London - New York; and BYRNE, H. (1996), *El Salvador's civil war: a study of revolution*, Boulder - London.

² UN DOC S/25500, 1 April 1993, annex, III, I; HEMISPHERE INITIATIVES (2001), *From Elections to Earthquakes Reform and Participation in Post-war El Salvador*, Washington DC; Washington Office on Latin America, p 11; RYAN, "Democratic transition and consolidation in a polarized system", p. 173, BOYCE, "Adjustment towards peace", p. 2073; and CALVERT, P. (1998), *The democratic transition in Central America Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama*, *Conflict Studies*, 307, London, pp. 6-7.

³ BOYCE, "Adjustment towards peace", p. 2073.

⁴ RYAN, "Democratic transition and consolidation in a polarized system", p. 183 and p. 180; UN DOC S/25500, 1 April 1993, annex, III, I-II; KARL, T.L. (1992), "El Salvador's negotiated revolution", *Foreign Affairs*, 71(2), pp. 147-164, on pp. 149-150; and DILLON, "Dateline El Salvador", p. 161.

⁵ SPENCER, D. (February 1997), *Demobilization and reintegration in Central America*, BICC paper, 8, Bonn, <<http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper08/paper8.pdf>>, pp 7-8; UN DOC S/25500, 1 April 1993, annex, III, II, Declaración de Esquipulas I, 25 May 1986, Esquipulas, <http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/1/declarar.htm>; Acuerdo de Esquipulas II: procedimiento para establecer la paz firme y duradera, Guatemala, 7 August 1987, <<http://www.procesodepaz.gob.gt/pdf/negociaciones.pdf>>; STAHLER-SHOLK, R. (Winter 1994), "El Salvador's negotiated transition: from low-intensity conflict to low-intensity democracy", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 36(4), pp 1-59, on p. 3; WHITFIELD, T. (1999), "The role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: a preliminary comparison", in C.J. ARNSON, *Comparative peace processes in Latin America*, Washington DC, pp. 257-290, on pp. 261-262, SPENCER, *Demobilization and reintegration in Central America*, p. 9, Declaración conjunta de los presidentes centroamericanos emitida en Costa del Sol, 14 February 1989, Costa del Sol, <http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/iv/declarar.htm>, and UN DOC A/44/344/Add.1-S/20699/Add.1, 9 October 1989, 2.

⁶ SULLIVAN, J.G. (Winter 1994), "How peace came to El Salvador", *Orbis*, 38(1), pp 83-98, on p. 85; UN DOC S/25500, 1 April 1993, annex, III, III-IV; WHITFIELD, "The role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala", pp. 262-263, MONTGOMERY, T.S. (Winter 1995), "Getting to peace in El Salvador the roles of the United Nations secretariat and ONUSAL", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 37(4), pp. 139-172, on pp 140-141, UN DOC A/44/451-S/20778, 9 August 1989, UN DOC A/44/344/Add.1-S/20699/Add.1, 9 October 1989, 6-11, UN DOC S/RES/644 (1989), 7 November 1989; and UN DOC A/44/886-S/21029, 21 December 1989, 9-10.

⁷ WHITFIELD, "The role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala", p 263; UN DOC S/25500, 1 April 1993, annex, III, IV, UN DOC A/44/872-S/21019, 12 December 1989; GARCIA, J.Z. (January 1990), "Tragedy in El Salvador", *Current History*, 89(543), pp. 9-12 and pp. 40-41; BOYCE, "Adjustment towards peace", p. 2073, and MESSING, B. (2000), "El Salvador", in GREENBERG, M.C., J.H. BARTON & J.E. MCGUINNESS, eds., *Words over war mediation and*

arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, Lanham – Oxford, pp. 161-181, on pp. 164-165 and pp. 165-168.

⁸ WHITFIELD, “The role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala”, p. 263.

⁹ KARL, “El Salvador’s negotiated revolution”, pp. 147-164

¹⁰ UN DOC S/RES/644 (1989), 7 November 1989; UN DOC A/44/872-S/21019, 12 December 1989, UN DOC A/44/971-S/21541, 16 August 1990, UN DOC A/45/706-S/21931, 8 November 1990, 5-28, annex I and annex II; UN DOC S/22031, 21 December 1990, 8-9 and annex, and UN DOC A/45/906-S/22032, 21 December 1990, annex, appendix

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9 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Since 1948 the United Nations has intervened in conflicts through peacekeeping operations. Not only were these operations often different in nature and type, but time and again the context in which they were deployed also differed. In this study, four cases of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects have been compared in a structured, focused manner. These four cases are Cambodia (UNAMIC and UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and El Salvador (ONUSAL). In these four cases the United Nations was the lead organisation in a peacekeeping operation deployed after the signing of a peace agreement in an intrastate conflict during the period 1989 to 1997. The purpose of the study is to provide answers to the following three research questions:

- 1. To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?**
- 2. How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?**
- 3. How can these results be explained with reference to factors for success or failure?**

While taking into consideration the limitations elaborated upon in chapters two and three, one can draw several conclusions with regard to these three research questions. Next, the first research question (to what extent do they contribute?) is dealt with. Subsequently the second research question (how do they contribute?) and the third research question (how can factors for success and failure explain these results?) are examined. The conclusions with regard to these latter two questions are followed each time by a brief outline of what, if anything, has changed since the operations under review. In every case, this is followed by recommendations on how the policy tools or factors for success and failure can hopefully be further improved. Although these recommendations are not a necessary part of, and inherently not a ‘purely’, scholarly exercise, they follow directly from the scientific conclusions. Moreover, they are an important aspect of the societal relevance of this study and allow the findings of this study to be placed in the wider discussion on how to improve peacekeeping operations. It was decided not to present the recommendations separately in an additional chapter as that would hamper the natural flow of their argument. Finally, having answered the research questions, both the scientific and societal relevance of the findings of this research are discussed and reflected upon.

9.1 To what extent do they contribute?

Durable peace in this research is defined as the extent to which violence is absent and the extent to which the ‘causes of conflict’ are addressed. In chapter 4, durable peace was divided into eight variables, *negative peace* and seven clusters of the causes of conflict: *inter-group relations*; *group demography*; *state weakness*; *state unwillingness and good governance*; *state/government legitimacy*; *unemployment and economic decline*; and *external relations*. Subsequently, eight hypotheses were formulated to provide the basis for a structured, focused comparison of case studies of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building

aspects and their contribution to durable peace. The results of this comparison and the hypotheses are presented in table 21.

Table 21 - Hypotheses*

Peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects make a positive contribution to:

	Cambodia	Mozambique	Rwanda	El Salvador
1. Negative peace	+	++	0	++
2. Inter-group relations	++ ^b	+/- ^b	0	++
3. Group demography	--	++	+ ^a	+
4. State weakness	++	+ ^a	+ ^a	+/- ^a
5. State unwillingness and good governance	+ ^a	+ ^a	0	++
6. State/government legitimacy	++ ^b	++	0 ^b	++
7. Unemployment and economic decline	++	+/-	0 ^b	0 ^b
8. External relations	++	++	+ ^a	0 ^b
+ Minor positive contribution	+/- Not clearly negative or positive contribution			
++ Positive contribution	0 No contribution			
-- Minor negative contribution	^a Contribution was only temporary			
- Negative contribution	^b Variable was not intended to be addressed			

Opposed to the tenor of public opinion, the conclusion of this research with regard to the first research question is that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects do make a positive contribution to durable peace. Firstly this is the case for the individual operations. In El Salvador, the contribution of ONUSAL to durable peace was positive in many areas. Those areas where it did not contribute, it was also not intended. The operation made both a minor positive and a minor negative contribution to the variable of *state weakness*. The negative contribution, the lack of capacity of the police force to combat the crime wave, was temporary, while the positive contribution was more durable. Also in Mozambique the contribution of ONUMAZ to durable peace was positive. It was remarkable in this case that, although it was not intended, the operation made both a minor positive and a minor negative contribution to the variable of *inter-group relations*. In Cambodia, it was significant that the contribution to the two variables that were not intended to be addressed by UNTAC was positive. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the operation made a negative contribution to the *group demography* variable. Even in the worst case, Rwanda, a minor though far from sufficient and only temporary positive contribution was made. The fact that the

* The presentation of the assessment of the contribution of a peacekeeping operation upon a variable in a five point scale has inherently two disadvantages. First of all, it does not encompass all the nuances of description. Secondly, the danger of subjectivity is inherently greater, because one is forced to make a choice without these nuances. Yet, sometimes the difference between, for example, a positive contribution and a limited positive contribution is not all that clear cut. Furthermore, in this table the combined contribution of all individual policy tools is given and therefore it inherently weights their results. Nonetheless, this table is given to present a brief overview of the assessment of the contribution of the peacekeeping operation. One has to keep in mind, however, that it only serves as an indication. For the real and full assessment one has to turn to the description.

contribution was only temporary resulted from the genocide and its aftermath. As most critics of UNAMIR argue, the reason the contribution of the operation was only minor and temporary was not because the operation did not have a positive influence, but rather the opposite - more was needed a larger, stronger, tougher and more comprehensive operation.

Not only do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute positively to the different cases, but it has to be noted that they generally also make a positive contribution to the different variables of durable peace, *negative peace*, and the causes of conflict. In other words, the eight hypotheses formulated in the first part of the study are confirmed. The extent of the positive contribution to the variables does, however, differ. The contribution proves to be particularly positive with respect to the legitimacy of the state and government. The contribution to *negative peace* and the improvement of *external relations* is also clearly positive. Operations contribute the least to the addressing of economic causes and demographic problems. Nonetheless, UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects often do not intend to address the economic causes, although, if they are mandated to do so, they generally prove to be relatively successful. The poorer results with regard to the variable of *group demography* result mainly from the fact that if repatriation is not followed by the sufficient reintegration of refugees, it can increase demographic pressure. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the contribution of operations with regard to the addressing of the weakness of the state and the stimulation of good governance is sometimes only temporary. Finally, it is rather rare that an operation as a whole contributes negatively to the developments with regard to one of the variables of durable peace. It is, however, more common that individual policy instruments make negative contributions to the variables of durable peace, but in such cases these contributions are generally compensated by the positive contributions of other policy instruments.

9.2 How do they contribute?

Having found the answer to the first research question that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects do make a positive contribution to durable peace, it is time to answer the second research question: how do they do it? The operations contribute or their mandates intend to contribute through the policy tools implemented in the operations. In the four case studies surveyed here, 25 different policy tools were used. In this study the relationship between a policy tool and a variable of durable peace was only reviewed if the policy tool was *intended* to contribute to durable peace according to the mandate of the operation, if it is *expected* to contribute according to the literature (see table 2, pp 24-26) or if in practice it contributed while this was *unintended* by the mandate or *unexpected* according to theory (see pp 39-40). Not all of the 25 different policy tools were implemented in each operation and if they were they did not always have the same contribution to durable peace. Nonetheless, in the four case studies, a total of 115 times a relationship or intended relationship between an implemented policy tool and a variable of durable peace existed. The structured, focused comparison of the cases leads to conclusions with regard to these relations and the contribution of the policy tools and therefore on how UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to durable peace. Per tool, the conclusions of this research are followed by an outline of the further

developments since the operations under review. Subsequently, again per tool, one or more recommendations are given.

Cease-fire monitoring

This 'policy instrument' proves to be of enormous importance to *negative peace*, which in turn is a prerequisite for addressing the causes of conflict. It was applied in all cases to make a positive contribution to *negative peace* and was able to do so in El Salvador and Mozambique, while this contribution was missing in Cambodia and Rwanda. The main factor explaining these different outcomes is the extent to which the monitoring force is able to aid the parties to overcome their security dilemma. It can do so by providing them with a sufficient sense of security. This can be done by providing transparency on the actions of opponents. Such transparency is generally, however, not enough. It seems that if a party is sincere in its willingness to implement a peace accord, it feels more secure if it knows or is at least under the impression that, should an opponent violate the agreement, it will be defended and preferably aided by a United Nations force. This perception of security can be provided through the strength, quantity and quality of the monitoring force, as well as a robust mandate and rules of engagement. In El Salvador and Mozambique, although the parties had secretly stockpiled arms to hedge their bets, in the end they perceived their security to be sufficiently guaranteed. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge did not feel secure enough to continue with the demobilisation and disarmament processes because UNTAC was unable to control the SOC. In Rwanda, both parties felt that UNAMIR was unable to guarantee their security and that they needed to help themselves. Therefore, they rearmed.

This need for security is particularly important during the initial phases of the cease-fire, when the parties are still armed to full capacity. For this reason, in all cases the parties requested a rapid deployment of the monitoring force. In El Salvador the deployment of ONUSAL was prompt, because its Human Rights Division was already present and troops were easily transferred from the closing operation in Nicaragua. In Cambodia and Mozambique the force was deployed too slowly and momentum and trust were lost, which, in both cases, resulted in instability. In the first case, the Khmer Rouge started to question its security and the role of UNTAC as a result, after which it decided to leave the peace process. In the second case, it took considerable diplomatic effort to keep RENAMO in the peace process. Although the deployment of UNAMIR in Rwanda was relatively fast, the parties had hoped for and based their agreement on even faster deployment and consequently the first deadlines were not reached. The adherence to timetables, as in the case of Rwanda, is, however, important for the generation of sufficient trust and confidence to implement the peace agreements. As a result, even though the deployment of UNAMIR was relatively fast, it was too late and the trust and confidence of the parties in both UNAMIR and each other received a severe blow.

The need for robust mandates was one of the centrepieces of the Brahimi report, which, after the report, also received more attention in fifth generation peacekeeping operations. Although the Brahimi report and many others have also noticed the need for rapid deployment, thus far the United Nations has not been able to act upon it. All proposals, like the 1997 one of the then Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Van Mierlo, to create an individually recruited standing rapid deployment brigade, never received sufficient support from the member states.

- *In spite of the improvements, the perception of security amongst the parties still needs to be further improved by providing operations with sufficient strength, quantity and quality of the monitoring force, as well as a robust mandate and rules of engagement, which also have to be implemented as such*
- *If the Council chooses to economise on its troops, it must be aware that a smaller or weaker force can and should also implement fewer tasks. Time and again the Security Council, however, deploys operations with insufficient capacity to implement their mandate. The secretariat should resist this tendency. It should have a less reserved position on the subject and should provide clear and frank information on the matter.*
- *Although the United Nations does not lack potential military personnel, it does lack personnel from developed countries. In spite of improvements, in order to persuade these governments to contribute military personnel, more and faster information on operations is still needed. For this purpose, it needs to be reviewed whether and to what extent the planning of western countries and/or organisations can be better integrated into the United Nations structure.*
- *As the need for security and maintenance of the momentum for peace is particularly important during the initial phases of the cease-fire, and rapid deployment of the monitoring force allows for a faster start to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes allowing, in turn, a faster drawdown of the force, ideally a force should be deployed immediately after the signing of a peace agreement. Even if the United Nations deploys relatively rapidly, it is often still too late. It seems, nevertheless, to be politically impossible for member states to provide the United Nations with rapid deployment capabilities, like a standing army. A strategic reserve – forces that are earmarked for rapid deployment with commitment from the troop contributing country – is, however, needed.*
- *The United Nations needs more high-tech equipment for, amongst other things, logistics and transport capacity to facilitate better rapid reaction and communication of developing countries. If developed countries are unwilling to provide it, it may have to be acquired.*
- *Non-UN interim forces can also be a solution for rapid reaction. The EU and NATO rapid reaction forces, if indeed also deployed in areas outside Europe and especially in Africa, and the AU standby force may be an important possible contribution to prevent destabilisation in the period between the signing of peace agreements and the deployment of UN forces. De facto these forces may serve as a UN standing army.*
- *The deployment of a separate advance mission, as in the case of Cambodia, should be avoided. This is a dangerous solution, because it hands potential spoilers the tool of non-cooperation. After all, such an advance mission is most often not what the parties agreed on. Therefore, even if in the short term only an advance force can be deployed, it is wise to treat and name this force as part of the eventual operation. Thus, also non-UN interim forces should be integrated into the UN peacekeeping force, in order to prevent them from being perceived as two different operations.*
- *Above all, political will is the most important ingredient. If the member states want it, the United Nations can deploy within 72 hours. After all, ONUC did not need more time in 1960.*

Cantonment and demobilisation

In all cases this 'policy instrument' was applied to contribute to *negative peace*. It seems that in order for parties to demobilise they need to overcome their security dilemma and feel sufficiently secure to actually give up their defences. As a result, the process in Rwanda never started. In Cambodia, although the Khmer Rouge felt too insecure and decided not to participate and the other major belligerent, the SOC, also kept its forces more or less intact, it was largely implemented with regard to the KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC. In Mozambique and El Salvador, the demobilisation was eventually fully implemented, but there it was also a lengthy and troubled process. In the hope of ensuring their safety, the parties at least initially try to evade the agreements by demobilising their weaker or non-existent forces first. In addition, demobilisation is used as a bargaining chip in the negotiations, in order to maintain pressure to guarantee the implementation of the peace agreements. Moreover, due to the continuous renegotiations and fears that the others will not demobilise, the parties keep their forces in their cantonments for a very long time. In Mozambique this even led to several mutinies. It seems that demobilisation makes a positive contribution to *negative peace* following a successful political process and not the other way round. Three additional remarks must be made here. Firstly, in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador the linkage between the demobilisation process and the reintegration of the ex-combatants was generally poor. As a result, ex-combatants often ended up unemployed and sometimes even involved in criminality. This may also endanger the *negative peace*. Secondly, the fact that parties chose their cantonments based on strategic considerations instead of logistics meant that the processes were often more expensive than necessary. Thirdly, in Cambodia, the demobilisation process was started before UNTAC was fully deployed and continued without the participation of the Khmer Rouge. As a consequence, the continued demobilisation made a temporary negative contribution to *negative peace* because it created a power vacuum from which the Khmer Rouge hoped to gain.

As a result of their battle to militarise a country, demobilisation processes also have unintended negative side-effects outside the field of *negative peace*. As a consequence of a completed demobilisation process, tens of thousands of men who have no more skill than being able to handle a gun are dumped into the general workforce. If these men are not sufficiently reintegrated into civil society, then serious problems may arise. In Mozambique, as a result of insufficient attention to the reintegration of the ex-combatants, demobilisation made a negative contribution to economic growth and unemployment through an increase in unemployment. For the same reason, demobilisation in El Salvador made a temporary negative contribution to *state weakness* because a large group of those ex-combatants who became unemployed chose the path of criminality, which in turn resulted in a crime wave. Therefore, much depends on the reintegration process to address these unintended negative effects of demobilisation.

- *Financial incentives for combatants to demobilise should not be turned down beforehand. They can work effectively, as in the case of Mozambique. Nonetheless, they should be dealt with very cautiously and only used if it is very unlikely that the combatants may want to return to war. Otherwise, financial incentives may pay for the continuation of the conflict*

- *In order to prevent instability and power vacuums, demobilisation processes should only start once the operation is fully deployed and only if all parties participate*
- *Again, as cantonment and demobilisation is not likely to be successful without it, peace operations need strength and robustness to impart the perception of security*
- *The United Nations needs to prevent parties from choosing their cantonments based on strategic considerations instead of logistics. This can improve the cost-effectiveness of the process*
- *In order to keep the costs of the cantonment and demobilisation process as low as possible and to forestall possible mutiny, it is best to keep the forces in their cantonments for the shortest possible time*
- *One has to become more aware of the negative side-effects of demobilisation processes and tailor reintegration solutions to counter them. For this reason the linkage between the demobilisation process and the reintegration of the ex-combatants needs to be further improved (see also reintegration of ex-combatants)*

Disarmament

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases. Like cantonment and demobilisation, the contribution of disarmament to *negative peace* depends heavily on the extent to which parties are enabled to overcome their security dilemma. This can be seen from, amongst other things, the fact that in all cases, and at least initially, the parties tried to hedge their bets and commenced the process by handing in their low quality, old and rusty weapons. In Rwanda beyond the Kigali weapons-secure area, the disarmament process never started, and the genocide was even preceded by rearmament. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge did not feel secure enough and opted out and consequently, although the disarmament process was continued, it did not contribute to *negative peace*. In Mozambique and El Salvador, the demobilisation and the disarmament process remained subject to negotiations, because the parties used them as a bargaining chip to ensure the full implementation of the peace process. In both cases the parties also kept weapons behind in secret arms caches, because they did not trust the intentions of the other and hoped to use them as a last negotiating card or as a last means of self-defence. The main factor explaining the different outcomes in these two cases is, however, the attention the subject received at the end of the peace process. In Mozambique the disarmament was not a priority issue to both the parties and the United Nations and consequently many weapons remained in secret caches. In El Salvador, on the other hand, after an explosion in Managua, Nicaragua, exposed the fact that the FMLN had kept secret stocks, the disarmament was fully completed including all secret caches. It seems that, like demobilisation, disarmament makes a positive contribution to *negative peace* following a successful political process and not the other way round. Moreover, it only seems to be possible to make a positive contribution if it is part of a larger process in which not only the parties and ex-combatants are disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated, but also the influx of arms and the arms trade, as in Rwanda, is stopped.

In all cases disarmament was also applied to make a positive contribution to *state weakness*. Nonetheless, only in the case of Cambodia was UNTAC able to partly curb the arms trade and disstrain large numbers of weapons. In the other three

cases the operations were not able to stop arms proliferation amongst the civilian population at all. With the exception of Rwanda after the genocide, in all cases the state monopoly on violence was or remained endangered and crime flourished. Disarmament of the civilian population is often seen as a relatively low priority issue, both by the parties and by the United Nations. In Rwanda, the position towards the disarmament of civilians was the most passive, because the United Nations feared a renewed debacle as had happened in Somalia, where the disarmament of the militia ended in large scale violence. Nonetheless, it was also here that the results were the most destructive, as weapons in the hands of the militia were later used to implement the genocide. It seems that the main problems with regard to the disarmament of the civilian population are the huge amounts of arms present in the countries and the fact that ex-combatants keep weapons behind in order to use them in the future as a means to earn a living.

- *The importance of the two disarmament processes – both of ex-combatants and of the civilian population, should not be underestimated. Both need to receive higher priority and both should not be bungled or neglected.*
- *In order to make a durable contribution to negative peace and to prevent conflicts from flaring up again, disarmament needs to be seen as part of a larger package to deal with the problem of arms proliferation. This calls for a two-pronged strategy in which first, again, the perception of security and the sufficient reintegration of ex-combatants are sufficiently addressed, secondly, arms traffic is also curbed to prevent new arms from easily re-entering a country.*
- *Although cash payments to ex-combatants to hand in their weapons may produce more yields, it also allows them to buy newer and better arms, especially if arms traffic is not curbed.*

Reintegration of ex-combatants

In all cases this ‘policy instrument’ was applied to contribute to *negative peace*. In order to ensure that ex-combatants find alternative lives and end their military careers, reintegration is meant to provide an alternative way to make a living. In Rwanda the genocide, however, prevented the implementation of a reintegration process. In Cambodia, although the number of ex-combatants was much smaller than originally planned due to the failure of the demobilisation process, the reintegration was far from complete and did not contribute to *negative peace*. Although in Mozambique and El Salvador the reintegration was also far from ideal, in these cases it did make an important contribution to *negative peace*. In Mozambique, reintegration was, because of the financial incentives, so attractive that not enough soldiers were willing to integrate into the new army. The different outcomes for the reintegration processes can be explained by three factors. Firstly, a reintegration process follows the political process, so without a successful political process the chances for reintegration to succeed are slim. Secondly, the more resources that are available, the more likely reintegration contributes to *negative peace*. Thirdly, the timely start of a reintegration process is needed to provide soldiers with perspectives for an alternative future which allows them to demobilise. If there is a gap between the demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants, the incentive to demobilise is less. Without a sufficient positive contribution of the reintegration to *negative peace*, demobilisation and disarmament are not likely to succeed either. Not only does successful reintegration of ex-combatants demilitarise a country, but, as in Mozambique, it

may also break the old communication lines of the former armies. In addition, as in El Salvador, it may contribute towards respect for the cease-fire and buy time for the implementation of the peace process.

In spite of the fact that in El Salvador the reintegration of ex-combatants through the land transfer programme was not intended to have the character of a land reform, it did have a similar unintended minor positive contribution with regard to *group demography*.

Insufficient or late social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society may also result in the insufficient addressing of the unintended negative consequences of the demobilisation process. In such cases, the poverty and unemployment combined with easy access to weapons can create an explosive mixture. Such insufficient reintegration is quite often the result of the fact that resources are too few and come too late. The case of Mozambique in particular shows that although one should prevent antagonism of the civil population and should try to reintegrate on a community basis, ex-combatants are, as a category, different from the average population and need special programmes to prevent them from becoming a destabilising factor.

Generally nowadays, it is seen best not to separate the integration of the ex-combatants from other reintegration processes and to use a community-based approach to prevent tension. Within such an approach the main aim is to enable the communities to absorb their new members. Ex-combatants are then only provided with a short-term reintegration package, transport and an occupation

- *Ex-combatants are, as a category, different from the average population and need special programmes to prevent them from becoming a destabilising factor. The most important factor is, nonetheless, that they immediately need an alternative way to make a living. Such alternative ways include demining (see also mine clearance), and (border) police officers, but also need to include agricultural professions, since many societies where peacekeeping operations are deployed are basically agricultural.*
- *Reintegration may also be aided by the provision of financial aid to ex-combatants. Nonetheless, generally in poor environments the funds are quick to disappear and stimulate crime, while in insecure environments they are likely to be used for new weapons.*
- *The different possible reintegration options have to be explained well to the ex-combatants.*
- *In order to guarantee that the right reintegration paths are chosen for the ex-combatants, the rank and file of the parties need to be involved in the planning of the process. They have to become more than just the subject of the process.*
- *Although thus far there has been, in many cases, little political will to rapidly provide sufficient funds and resources for reintegration, in the end it is the most cost-effective solution. After all, in situations of unfinished integration the chances are greater for a return to war, which in turn is more expensive to deal with. For this reason, at least the start-up costs of reintegration processes need to be funded from assessed contributions.*
- *Joint planning and funding of reintegration processes by peacekeeping operations, UNDP and the World Bank is essential, because after the departure of an operation these organisations will be involved in the continuation of the process.*

- *For the purpose of improved co-ordination, and exchange of information and knowledge on reintegration of ex-combatants, a reintegration support group similar to the mine action support group may be helpful*

Institution building

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases and intended to contribute to several different variables. In Mozambique, Rwanda, and El Salvador it was intended to contribute to *negative peace* through the rebuilding or in the latter case restructuring and purifying of the national army. In Mozambique and El Salvador this was an important contribution to *negative peace*, because it created a neutral national army, which provided security to the opposition forces to demobilise and disarm. This process was never started in Rwanda because of the genocide. An additional and very important contribution to *negative peace* in the case of Mozambique was the aid to RENAMO to transform itself into a political organisation. These positive financial incentives served as the carrots to keep the party in the peace process and secured the co-operation of its leaders. It is likely that it would have the same contribution in different cases, because it allows rebel leaders to become less dependent on natural resources and provides them with an alternative income other than an income from war.

In all cases, institution building was also applied to strengthen the state. Nonetheless, in Rwanda, the army and police force were not strengthened due to the genocide. In Mozambique the newly created army, FADM, was aided, the RENAMO health and social services were integrated into the government structures, and RENAMO and other opposition parties were strengthened. In this case the results were, however, not very significant. In Cambodia judicial and internal security structures were strengthened and staff trained. On the other hand, in El Salvador, institution building with respect to the judicial structures and the reintegration of public administration and other services in the former conflict zones made a positive contribution to *state weakness*. The fact that in Mozambique the contribution of institution building to strengthen the state was less sustainable has to do with two factors which were, to a lesser extent, also present in Cambodia. First, once an operation is withdrawn, the availability of resources becomes more problematic, and second, over time the training provided becomes outdated. In El Salvador sufficient national funds were present also after the departure of ONUSAL, while in Mozambique in particular, but also in Cambodia, financial aid diminished after the departure of the peacekeeping operation. In El Salvador not all institution building strengthened the state. The restructuring of the civilian police had, as an unintended side effect, that it temporarily weakened the state, as it meant that a temporary vacuum was created in the internal security system during the transition from the old to the new police force.

In Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador institution building was also applied to contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Indeed, in Cambodia, many judges and lawyers were trained, human rights treaties signed, and NGOs supported. Nonetheless, although the improvements appeared to be a big step, they were largely only on paper or only temporary, because they were not sustainable or reversed by the government once UNTAC had left. In Mozambique training for the army did not make it more consistent with the requirements of a democracy. Furthermore, the support for the opposition did not deliver more credible opposition parties. In addition, there was no follow-up and subsequently

here the sustainability of the contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance* was also limited. In El Salvador the results were much more impressive and durable. The restructuring and purification of the army, the creation of a new National Public Security Academy (ANSP) and the PNC greatly improved the internal security institutions, and ONUSAL also started a process with regard to the judicial system. The difference in outcomes can be explained by the fact that a lot more attention was given to institution building for the purpose of good governance in El Salvador than in Cambodia and Mozambique. This was, amongst other things, possible because in El Salvador many more national resources were available than in Cambodia and Mozambique. In addition, the results in Cambodia and Mozambique were less sustainable due to the fact that, after their training, personnel returned to their much more defunct and corrupt institutions compared with those in El Salvador.

In the case of Mozambique and El Salvador, institution building also made a positive contribution to *state/government legitimacy*. In El Salvador the recreation and restructuring of the PNC and other judicial and human rights institutions provided the democracy with increased credibility and meant that the state institutions were perceived to be more neutral and non-partisan. The police force in Mozambique never really lost its FRELIMO connotation, but the FADM in particular was perceived as being neutral. It seems that more neutral and better functioning institutions contribute to more legitimacy for both the government and the state.

In the case of El Salvador, institution building also unexpectedly contributed to *inter-group relations*, because in the newly created PNC the former members of the FMLN and the PN learned to work together and reconcile.

Good governance institution building in particular has received a lot of attention in recent years in fifth generation peacekeeping operations. This attention also resulted in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.

- *As the state itself is often in the hands of one the parties and/or is not perceived to be neutral, it should be forced to involve other parties and civil society in the institution building process. The institutional settings for this purpose may have to be created.*
- *In order to make institution building more sustainable, in addition to more financial aid, follow-up aid and training are needed to continue and build upon programmes started during the presence of peacekeeping operations, after their departure.*
- *Training alone does not suffice, because trained personnel then return to their defunct and corrupt institutions. A more thorough restructuring or rebuilding of institutions is necessary and they have to be maintained through oversight mechanisms, codes of conduct, anti-corruption policies and last but not least sufficient resources. With regard to the latter aspect it is important that a sufficient income for government officials is guaranteed.*
- *'Enabling resources', as used in the Mozambican carrot and stick approach of paying RENAMO to "transform itself into a political party", should at least be kept open as a positive incentive. It is likely they have also been applied in other cases. This has, however, been kept low profile, because it is not an approach the United Nations wants to advocate widely.*
- *In order to make the human rights efforts more durable it is essential to establish a local institutional framework and to build capacity for local*

human rights organisations to continue monitoring the human rights situation after the departure of the peacekeeping operation.

- *With regard to capacity building for civilian police, more attention should be given to rule of law institutions in general, such as the judicial system and prisons.*
- *A global consolidated fund is necessary for rule of law institutions and police building. This would not only make sure that capacity building for the civilian police is no longer dependent on bilateral ad hoc funds, but would also enable better co-ordination of these bilateral efforts. Such co-ordination is needed because, as a result of the fact that each national civilian police contingent often has its own approaches, the current civilian police capacity building strategy generally lacks coherence.*
- *One has to be very careful with vetting police officers. Not only is it often problematic because in many post-conflict situations records are missing and like demobilised soldiers, police officers will need a pension or some other form of reintegration, but as the Salvadoran experience has taught us, if no alternative police force has already been installed a vacuum may also arise in which crime can flourish. For this reason, unless the United Nations itself takes up policing tasks, one cannot start a new police force from scratch.*

Verification of foreign forces withdrawal

This ‘policy instrument’ was applied in the cases of Cambodia and Mozambique. In both cases it made a positive contribution to *external relations*, but also in both cases it was little more than the closing of a chapter, a final rubber stamp that all foreign forces had been pulled out. In Cambodia the foreign forces had actually already been withdrawn and in Mozambique they were even requested to remain longer in order to provide security in the transport corridors. The verification of the withdrawal of the foreign forces in Mozambique contributed to *negative peace* because it made their departure easier. Since the Vietnamese forces were no longer present in Cambodia, verification of their withdrawal did not contribute to *negative peace*. Both cases made it clear, however, that the verification of foreign forces withdrawal is a difficult task if the border is long and densely forested.

- *Developed countries need to provide the necessary high-tech equipment to facilitate better and more watertight border monitoring.*

Winning the hearts and minds

This ‘policy instrument’ was applied in Cambodia and Rwanda. In Cambodia, through radio broadcasts in particular, it was a large and important positive contribution to *negative peace*, because it stimulated the population’s call for peace and democracy, which only the Khmer Rouge was able to resist temporarily. In the Rwandan case it was intended to make a positive contribution to *inter-group relations*, but the genocide prevented the plans from being implemented.

- *The use of radio should be standard in peacekeeping operations. Preferably an established local radio station instead of a United Nations radio station should be used for broadcasts, to make sure that even after the departure of the operation the capacity for information dissemination is maintained.*

Diplomacy

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases to contribute to *negative peace*. In the case of Rwanda, diplomacy was not able to prevent a relapse into armed conflict. The continuous attempts of the United Nations during the genocide to re-establish a cease-fire even endangered the perception of its neutrality. Neither in Cambodia did diplomacy in both the national and international arenas make a contribution. In Mozambique and El Salvador diplomacy was much more effective. These differences can be explained by three factors. First, in the case of Rwanda, the conflict was not high on the international agenda, because it was not regarded to be of importance to international peace and security. The other three cases received much more attention in the light of the end of the Cold War. Second, in Mozambique and El Salvador diplomacy was a very important policy tool in crisis situations, which, compared with the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia, kept the peace process on track. This contribution stands or falls with the leadership of the operation, which in the latter two cases was less assertive and less suited for the job. Third, in both Cambodia and Rwanda the peacekeeping operation lacked carrots and sticks, while in the case of El Salvador and Mozambique all the parties had an interest in ending the war because, amongst other reasons, they could no longer sustain it. As a result ONUMOZ and ONUSAL were able, through diplomatic pressure, mediation and good offices, to aid the parties to bridge their differences in the interpretation of the peace agreements.

In the case of Cambodia, diplomacy was also applied to contribute to *external relations*, but Thailand was not receptive to international pressure to end its aid to the Khmer Rouge. An unexpected result of diplomacy in Cambodia was that it made a positive contribution to *inter-group relations*, because at the regular working meetings between officers at the local level, the former opponents got to know and trust each other. This would eventually facilitate the integration of the non-Khmer Rouge armies.

- *As diplomacy stands or falls with good leadership, this subject needs to be addressed. (See the sixth factor for success and failure The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures).*
- *Renegotiations are most often needed and allow the United Nations to address faults and improve both the peace process and its role in it. Nonetheless, one has to keep in mind that it is better to have finished all renegotiations before election campaigning starts, because often during these campaigns, as in El Salvador, the parties take polarised positions which makes it harder to compromise in negotiations.*
- *If one exerts pressure on parties it provides them with expectations. If one is not willing to live up to these expectations one has to think twice before putting pressure on the parties as they may sign their agreement under the wrong assumptions. In Rwanda, for example, this had a detrimental effect.*

Sanctions verification

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of Cambodia. Moratoria were declared to force the Khmer Rouge back to the negotiating table. They did, however, not contribute to *negative peace*, because the Khmer Rouge was not affected by them due to the weak verification at the borders of its zone. Nonetheless, the verification was much better in the other zones, which allowed the moratoria to unexpectedly contribute to the strength of the state, because it

prevented its sell-off. The ability to effectively monitor the borders therefore seems to be crucial for moratoria and for sanction monitoring to make a positive contribution.

- *Just as with verification of foreign forces withdrawal, monitors need better equipment to help them do their job better and to verify sanctions effectively*

Civil administration controlling

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of Cambodia. Although not mentioned as such in the peace agreements, it was intended to contribute to the sense of security of the Khmer Rouge. Nonetheless, it was unable to contribute to *negative peace*, because its late and weak implementation could not provide the Khmer Rouge with a sufficiently adequate sense of security. The firmer control towards the elections did, however, make a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, but this result was not durable after the departure of the operation. Civil administration controlling contributed unexpectedly positively to economic decline, because the economic administration was made stronger and more transparent.

- *Control over civil administration should be established as soon and as firmly as possible, to ensure cooperation by the parties and to help them overcome their security dilemma by providing them with a sense of security.*

Civilian police monitoring

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases to contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*. However, in all cases it did not or nearly not contribute to it. One of the main reasons for this was the fact that the civilian police monitors often did not have a driving license to participate in patrols, and were frequently badly trained, unable to speak the local or official language of the operation, and in some cases they were even corrupt and unaware of human rights. Moreover, governments often did not co-operate with the Civilian Police Components and failed to react to complaints and the results of investigations. As a result, most changes to *state unwillingness and good governance* made as a result of civilian police monitors were only cosmetic and temporary. It would appear that without cooperation from the parties, this policy instrument seems to be unable to work effectively. In addition, the case of Cambodia showed that civilian police monitors cannot function in a context where the institutions necessary for the rule of law, such as judges and prisons, etc. are missing.

In both Cambodia and Mozambique civilian police monitoring was also, although not mentioned as such in the peace agreements, applied to contribute to the sense of security of the Khmer Rouge and RENAMO respectively. As such, civilian police monitoring can contribute to *negative peace* in countries where the opposition regards the government police force as a paramilitary reserve force, which can be used as a second army after demobilisation. In Cambodia, due to the slow deployment of the Civilian Police Component, it did not contribute to *negative peace*, but in Mozambique it did.

With the second generation of peacekeeping operations, civilian police monitoring became an integral part of peacekeeping operations. Although many member states still deal with their civilian police affairs through their military advisors, nowadays the secretariat has a separate Civilian Police Unit. The United Nations, however, argues that it no longer 'monitors' civilian police officers, but endeavours to 'mentor' them. It regards 'monitoring' to be too

unclear, which in turn is said to have caused problems in the past. 'Mentoring' is supposed to be more directed at capacity building and proactively teaching or aiding civilian police officers to change and improve their way of policing. Nonetheless, for the purpose of 'mentoring' one also needs to 'monitor' to see what has to be changed. In addition, after advice has been given, the implementation needs to be 'monitored' and reported upon and where necessary there should be follow-up or changes should be made. In other words, 'mentoring' is meant to be broader and more lasting than 'monitoring'.

- As civilian police monitoring/mentoring provides a sense of security both to the population and to the parties, fast deployment is needed. For this reason, civilian police officers should already be integrated into the negotiations and a standing capacity core group of civilian police officers should be created. Both may also create a better basis for the further operation.
- Although the problems with regard to insufficiently trained, incapable and unqualified civilian police monitors have largely been dealt with, there is still a shortage of qualified personnel. Nowadays, potential officers must take pre-deployment tests, which more than 60 percent fail. In addition to these language, shooting and driving skills tests, however, other policing skills and attitudes should also be included. The remaining problems with regard to 'lesser engagement' of officers, who are mainly involved for the money, should be addressed with better supervision and evaluation. The shortage of qualified personnel should be dealt with by the developed countries, which need to contribute more monitors. They may also consider adopting police units in developing countries for the purpose of UN deployment. Moreover, one should consider a standing United Nations civilian police capacity. Such a capacity might provide officers with career opportunities beyond single year contracts and is likely to receive less resistance than a standing military capacity.
- Civilian police monitoring needs to be part of a broader strategy with respect to the rule of law. For example, civilian police monitoring/mentoring is not likely to contribute much if there are not enough prisons and judges to deal further with suspects.
- Civilian Police Components need to actively work together with human rights monitors. This also prevents the likelihood of civilian police monitors being too friendly with the local civilian police. After all, although it is perhaps easier for monitors to identify with their colleagues, they should actually maintain a distance in order to be in a position to implement their task better.

Border monitoring

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of Rwanda, where until the genocide it contributed a little to *external relations*. It was, however, unable to monitor the complete cessation of arms deliveries and therefore did not contribute to *negative peace*. It seems that if the border is relatively long, porous and densely forested, this policy tool is rather ineffective.

- Just as with verification of foreign forces withdrawal and sanctions, the necessary high-tech equipment is needed.

Providing pay to the newly-formed national army

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of Cambodia. It was intended to and actually made a temporary positive contribution to the strength of

the state, because it removed the need for the military and police officers to earn a living by turning to crime. Nonetheless, there was no long-term commitment, and therefore the result was not sustainable. Unexpectedly, in Cambodia it also strengthened *inter-group relations*, as it weakened the ties of military and police officers with their own factions and shifted their loyalty towards the new state institutions that paid them.

- *Applying this policy tool in more cases should be considered and in a broader field than only with regard to the conflicting armies and police forces, but also to aid other government institutions; and for a longer period of time*

Repatriation

This 'policy instrument' was applied in the cases of Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda. In Rwanda, because of the genocide, the actual implementation of the repatriation never went beyond the planning stage. Although theoretically repatriation is supposed to improve the situation with regard to *group demography*, only in the case that IDPs are supported to return does this seem to be the case. In fact, in Cambodia and Mozambique the influx of huge numbers of returning refugees proved to make a negative contribution to *group demography*. Much seems to depend on the further implementation of the reintegration of the returnees to counterbalance the demographic pressure exerted by the repatriation. Nonetheless, because both in Cambodia and Mozambique the repatriation processes were rushed, little room remained for the non-priority issue of the reintegration of the returnees.

Repatriation can potentially address demographic pressures in host countries and may as such also provide a positive contribution to *external relations*. In the case of Cambodia, the repatriation not only relieved Thailand of the refugee problem and opened the road for the normalisation of relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh, but it also meant that the Khmer Rouge lost its support base at the Cambodian border. In addition, it can also be an unintended contribution to economic growth and unemployment. As in Mozambique, this effect is positive if the repatriated population contributes to GDP growth. The economic contribution is negative if, as in Mozambique, the distribution of food and seeds to returnees temporarily distorts local markets.

Nowadays, in the fifth generation of peacekeeping operations, the UNHCR is better integrated into peacekeeping operations as it is a member of the UN country team, represented by the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. As a result, the timetables for repatriations are better fit into the broader schemes of peace processes.

- *The repatriation and reintegration of refugees or IDPs should be anchored in both the peace agreement and the mandate of the peacekeeping operation.*
- *It is important not to rush the repatriation for the purpose of, for example, elections, because that may have negative consequences for the reintegration process.*
- *An organisation is needed within the United Nations system that has a mandate to address the problems of the IDPs. Although the UNHCR and OCHA increasingly provide aid on an ad hoc basis and start to look beyond borders and more to communities, it is something that should become structural. However, fearing for their sovereignty, countries are not eager to transfer responsibility for their IDPs to an international organisation, such as the UNHCR. In addition, this would also mean an enormous additional task for the*

UNHCR, which perhaps would need to increase its budget up to five times, while in reality funds are likely to remain scarce.

- *One has to make sure the aid to returnees does not distort local markets. In some cases it is better to provide cash or locally purchased food etc. instead of goods from outside.*

Reintegration of refugees

This 'policy instrument' was applied in Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda. In the Rwandan case, because the repatriation could not be implemented, the reintegration of refugees did not proceed either. In both Cambodia and Mozambique, reintegration proved to be necessary to counterbalance the negative influence that repatriation and the influx of hundreds of thousands of returnees was having on *group demography*. In both countries the capacity of local communities to absorb these newcomers was very limited. In both cases the lack of attention for the process, due to the fact, amongst other things, that the repatriation was rushed because of the elections, meant that large groups of returnees were not socially and economically reintegrated. The reintegration that did go ahead was too little, and too late. In addition, returnees sometimes needed or hoped to receive aid that was different from the aid that was actually provided. It seems that if the reintegration of refugees is not taken seriously and is not treated as a long term process that needs long term commitment, it is allowed to lay heavy claims on society. In that case, the potential positive contribution of the reintegration does not counterbalance the negative side-effects of the repatriation on *group demography*, amongst other things.

- *In order to close the gap between the repatriation and the reintegration of refugees it is necessary to start planning the reintegration early.*
- *Since refugees vote with their feet, it is important to make sure that their repatriation is voluntary and that their reintegration makes their return durable. For this reason it is important that land is available and that the political context is stable. With regard to the latter condition, one has to think of minority rights, citizenship, amnesty and the existence of the rule of law.*
- *One has to listen to the subjects of the repatriation to know what they want and what their preferences are.*
- *One has to become more aware that reintegration is a long term process, which therefore also needs a long term commitment of resources. As a result, the problem is not only a humanitarian one, but also a developmental one. Consequently, the donor structures and the UN system need to overcome the bureaucratic problems between both approaches and governments also have to start viewing the problem in developmental rather than humanitarian terms.*
- *As with the reintegration of ex-combatants, it is generally regarded best not to separate the integration of the refugees from other reintegration processes and to use a community-based approach*

Mine clearance

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases. In particular in agriculturally oriented developing countries with a high population density it has the potential to make a positive contribution to *group demography*. The clearing of mines allows arable land to be cultivated and relieves demographic pressure. In Rwanda the mine-clearance programme was, however, not implemented as a result of the

genocide. In Cambodia, and to a lesser extent in Mozambique, it did not free up enough land. Only in El Salvador, where the mine problem was much smaller, was it solved during the presence of the operation. This leaves the impression that mine-clearance operations to free up land in heavily mined countries is too big a job and too time-consuming to be implemented within the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. For this reason, both in Cambodia and Mozambique, local capacities were established to continue the mine clearance process. Further explanations for the sometimes disappointing results must be sought in the slow start of demining programmes, the lack of effort - both personnel and resources - and bureaucratic rules and infighting. Nonetheless, so-called emergency demining contributes to *group demography* in the short term, if it allows humanitarian aid and the repatriation of refugees to take place. This emergency demining also contributed a little bit more in Mozambique than in Cambodia.

Furthermore, mine clearance may make a positive contribution to *unemployment and economic decline* either if important economic institutions or infrastructures are demined, or if it delivers arable land in a largely agricultural economy. In both Mozambique and Cambodia, ONUMOZ and UNTAC respectively were unable to make this contribution.

Nowadays, after the Brahimi report and in the fifth generation of peacekeeping operations, the Security Council commits more funds to demining within the context of peacekeeping operations, assessed contributions in addition to the voluntary contributions. Mine clearance has become an integral part of peacekeeping operations, with the objective of fulfilling mission goals. In many cases it even starts before the deployment of operations to ensure faster and less costly deployment. Such early deployment is possible as a result of a mine action trust fund, standby arrangements with contractors and standard mechanisms. Mine clearance is nowadays also better co-ordinated and more focused. A lack of resources has led to prioritising. As a result, the focus has shifted from the numbers of mines to be cleared to addressing their negative impact. Such community impact priorities focus on people instead of mines. Consequently, in some cases there is even a preference for providing education rather than for clearing the mines. Furthermore, mine clearance has been integrated into the broader development and humanitarian perspective as part of the reconstruction of a post-conflict country. Finally, a long term local civil mine-clearance institution, like the CMAC in Cambodia and ADP in Mozambique, has become a model for other operations.

- *More funds are still needed.*
- *Mine clearance should become a standard part of reintegration processes for ex-combatants. Its importance in this field should, however, not be overestimated as the number of deminers will never be much more than a few hundred people.*
- *The nationalisation of the mine-clearance process should take place as rapidly as possible. It is, however, important to build the institution, its integrity and its durable financial basis, before the deminers are trained. Not only are corrupt or defunct institutions unable to retain their personnel, but they also lose their funds from donors. In some cases it may be preferable to build the local mine-clearance capacity separately from the peacekeeping operation to ensure its independent continuation if the operation itself faces problems with parties. For reasons of continuity, long-term attention with*

regard to such institutions should also remain with the UNDP, the organisation which also stays behind after the peacekeeping operation is withdrawn

- *More attention should be given to personnel affairs. Qualified personnel are still scarce, as international mine trainers are not necessarily good capacity builders and managers. Moreover, even qualified personnel need continuous training. Furthermore, for the purpose of emergency demining, developed countries should consider adopting demining contingents from developing countries*

Humanitarian aid

This 'policy instrument' was applied in the cases of Mozambique and Rwanda. In Mozambique ONUMOZ had its own humanitarian component UNOHAC. Although such a component was absent in UNAMIR, this operation was also to co-ordinate the provision of humanitarian aid. In both cases it made a positive contribution to *group demography* because it relieved the demographic pressure from IDPs and victims of drought. In Mozambique it clearly ended a humanitarian disaster in the transport corridors and towns. In Rwanda the contribution was, however, temporary because it was cancelled out by the influx of refugees from Burundi and later the genocide.

In Mozambique, humanitarian aid also contributed unexpectedly to *inter-group relations*. This contribution was positive, because its distribution forced the parties to sit together at a single table and deal with concrete problems. At the same time, it was also unintentionally negative, because it was badly targeted and increased income inequality. In addition, humanitarian aid in Mozambique also made an unintended temporary negative contribution to *unemployment and economic decline* because its influx distorted local markets.

With the fifth generation of peacekeeping operations, after the Brahimi report the United Nations opted for so-called integrated missions in which humanitarian aid also became more embedded within the structure of the peacekeeping operations.

- *The aid provided needs to be targeted in such a way that income inequality and distortions of local markets are prevented.*
- *Should food be available, but the population not have the money to buy it, it is better to hand out cash rather than to ship in humanitarian aid.*
- *It is wise to include the local population and the parties in the decision making process on humanitarian aid. The discussions on the planning and distribution of aid can provide the initial contact between the parties after the conflict and the joint effort to deal with the humanitarian problems often increases social cohesion and starts the reconciliation process.*
- *In the co-ordination of the provision of the humanitarian aid, it may not be ideal to place the United Nations at the centre of the humanitarian universe, which is dominated by NGOs and bilateral donors, while the United Nations itself is only one of the secondary actors. However, more co-ordination is needed. The absolute baseline should be to ensure that aid does not undermine the state and institution building process, as well as the political peace process. The humanitarian agencies and NGOs will have to step beyond their fear of losing their independence and neutrality and their fear of being associated with the 'military' of the peacekeeping operation. At the same time their independence and fears should be respected. A sort of clearing house co-ordination that keeps track of what goes where and that indicates gaps in the provision of aid and prevents overlap should become standard in the*

provision of humanitarian assistance. With regard to additional steps, one will always have to walk a tightrope. Top-down coordination in which the United Nations tries to dominate NGOs will, however, not work.

- The position of the humanitarian component should be decided upon dependent on the perceived position of the peacekeeping operation and the situation on the ground. Although the integration of the humanitarian component into a peacekeeping operation generally does not end the disagreement between the sectors, and both are still funded from different resources, it can provide humanitarian aid with extra possibilities and powers, and allows for better co-ordination. On the other hand, it should not affect the neutrality of humanitarian organisations in situations where they need to remain neutral. For example, in Mozambique the United Nations flag over UNOHAC provided it with extra weight, while in Cambodia the UNHCR was able to continue to co-operate with the Khmer Rouge due to its independence from UNTAC. Therefore, in cases where an operation is likely to face few problems with regard to the consent of the parties, a more integrated approach should be aimed for. On the other hand, in a situation where the consent of the parties may be in doubt, it is better to ensure the public image of independence of humanitarian aid. In such cases it is best to keep OCHA formally outside the structure of the peacekeeping operation, but in close contact with it, in order to maintain the co-operation of NGOs.
- The gap between the peacekeeping effort, and the humanitarian and development effort is not purely conceptual. One of the main problems is the funding of both activities. Peacekeeping operations are financed with assessed contributions, while humanitarian and development effort are funded by voluntary contributions. However, with regard to this latter channel, pledges are often disbursed late or not at all and as a consequence the combined effort is not coherent. If humanitarian, reconstruction and rehabilitation aid were financed with assessed contributions many problems would be reduced. Nonetheless, this is not very likely and also less radical proposals such as a special trust fund face tough resistance. Again, the realisation that in the end a combined integrated effort is more cost-effective still needs to develop further.

Providing law and order

This 'policy instrument' was applied in all cases. In Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda, the operations were able to contribute a little to the public security situation and as such to *state weakness*. In Mozambique and Cambodia the mandate was limited to deter and not to enforce. Although in Rwanda the mandate was more robust, it was not implemented as such. As a result, criminality persisted in Cambodia and Mozambique, and in Rwanda political violence could not be stopped. Moreover, the limited contribution the operations made was only temporary until the departure of the operation, or in the case of Rwanda until the genocide.

In Cambodia, Rwanda and El Salvador, providing law and order was also applied to contribute to *state unwillingness and good governance*. In Cambodia political parties, political events and the elections were secured and as such providing law and order contributed to the temporary improvement of *state unwillingness and good governance*. In Rwanda, UNAMIR was not able to stop political assassinations and was increasingly confronted with the dilemma between the implementation of

its mandate and providing its own security, in which it eventually chose the second option. As a result, it was unable or unwilling to contribute to the situation in Rwanda. In El Salvador, where the task was limited to ensuring the security measures needed for the safe return of FMLN leaders, it allowed these leaders to participate in the elections. As such it was a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*.

In Mozambique and Rwanda this 'policy instrument' was also applied to secure humanitarian aid and consequently to contribute to *group demography*. Until the genocide in Rwanda, the humanitarian aid was better secured than in Mozambique. In the first case the contribution proved to be temporary until the genocide, while in the latter case the contribution was limited because the long corridors were guarded by units that were too large and that acted too slowly.

- *If a local policing capacity is lacking, the United Nations should pick up the task of providing back-up support for the local police as soon as possible, because otherwise crime flourishes in the vacuum.*
- *If the provision of humanitarian aid needs to be protected, it is more important to have small but high quality rapid reaction forces than to emphasise the numbers of forces.*
- *In the protection of politicians and civilians, it is necessary to further pick up the 'responsibility to protect', because future genocides ought to be prevented.*
- *Robust mandates need to be implemented as such.*

Society building

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of Cambodia. Aimed at contributing to *state weakness*, a Band-Aid was provided in a process which was to take much longer than the presence of the operation. However, as a result of a lack of visibility, donors were less interested in funding these projects. It did, however, stimulate a culture of civil society which also lasted after the withdrawal of UNTAC. As such it was a small contribution to the process of strengthening the state in Cambodia.

- *Civil society should be used more often by peacekeeping operations. Society building, including civil society organisations not only allows operations to better comprehend what the population wants, but also aids the purpose of national reconciliation.*

Rehabilitation

This 'policy instrument' was applied in the cases of Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda to contribute to *state weakness*. All three operations were not intended to go beyond the start of a process of rehabilitation, through its planning and the start of smaller projects. The actual rehabilitation processes were to be implemented after the departure of the operation. Little crystallised in Rwanda due to the genocide. In Cambodia and Mozambique the rehabilitation process was not ended prematurely and although the population did not see any direct results, *state weakness* was strengthened a little. In Cambodia a process of rehabilitation was started. In Mozambique this process was not continued and its positive contribution proved to be only temporary due to a lack of sustainability. Since in both cases economic foundations were created by rehabilitation, it also made a positive contribution to a process that improved *unemployment and economic decline*. These contributions were, however, far from sufficient, but a first step in

the right direction In Mozambique, however, again sustainability became a problem because there were no long-term commitments

- *There is still insufficient awareness of the importance of rehabilitation for peace processes However, as rehabilitation is one of the main instruments to address the causes of conflict more attention and resources should be addressed to this policy instrument*
- *Rehabilitation needs to start as soon as the security situation allows it and has to become more durable and sustainable in order for peace to take root For this reason more long-term commitment is needed*

Human rights verification

This 'policy instrument' was applied in the cases of Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador The absence of this instrument in Rwanda contributed to the fact that the United Nations was largely unaware and unprepared for the human rights violations and the genocide that took place Consequently, it was unable to address any of the problems which would later cause the deaths of so many This is particularly striking because Rwanda was a country with a troubled human rights history and the United Nations should therefore have been warned

In those cases where human rights verification was applied, in El Salvador and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, the contribution of human rights verification to *state unwillingness and good governance* was higher than in Mozambique This contribution depends firstly on the amount of attention and number of resources invested in the verification In the case of Mozambique, little attention was directed towards the instrument, while in El Salvador human rights verification lay at the heart of the operation Secondly, human rights verification faces the dilemma that an operation in its role as verifier needs strong wording in cases of human rights violations, while at the same time it needs to be perceived as being impartial and understanding for the purpose of mediator in the process towards *negative peace* In all cases the operations opted for a non-confrontational policy, which allowed human rights in the end to be out in second place In Cambodia this even allowed the Khmer Rouge to commit hideous human rights violations Thirdly, the sustainability of the positive contribution to the human rights situation depends on the further implementation of the process by future governments The government in El Salvador showed much more readiness to do so, than in Cambodia and Mozambique Consequently, human rights verification in El Salvador made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, while this positive contribution was merely temporary in Cambodia In Mozambique the little attention was only the start of a process

In the case of El Salvador, although not mentioned as such in the peace agreements, human rights verification was also applied to contribute to *negative peace* as well It was able to build sufficient confidence and provided the FMLN with a sense of security that its forces would not be massacred after it had disarmed and demobilised Consequently, it seems that in some cases human rights verification also serves to guarantee the sense of security of parties

Since Rwanda, human rights have become a standard element of peacekeeping operations

- *Human rights monitoring still needs more attention and resources and last but not least more political support*
- *Human rights should not only be the subject of a separate component of an operation, but should also be an integral part of each component Co-*

operation of the Human Rights Component with other components is therefore essential to address the problems

- *The position chosen in the dilemma between denouncer and peacekeeper affects the results of the verification. One has to use human rights verification as an instrument of correction, not of denunciation. One should only blame in the last possible instance, if everything else has not helped. Still too many Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are, however, afraid to offend host governments and endanger their co-operation in the peace process if they pick up the subject of human rights. Also in New York human rights remain on the sidelines of the system and are viewed as troublesome. However, a more active approach would also boost the morale of the monitors.*
- *Better training of monitors and higher recruitment standards are still needed.*
- *Human rights verification can become more sustainable if it is done jointly with local civil society organisations or human rights institutions. In addition, the local civilian police should be involved in the process to stimulate the change in mindset. Not only should the civilian police learn to respect human rights, but also an example has to be set to the local population that one can turn to the police if one has a problem.*

Human rights education

This 'policy instrument' was applied in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador. It is again typical that in Rwanda, which also had had a troubled human rights history, the operation did not receive a mandate for human rights education. Although it is perhaps unlikely that this policy instrument would have prevented the genocide due to the short time involved, it cannot be denied that the country was in need of it. In all other cases, except for Cambodia, the amount of attention and number of resources directed at this 'policy tool' was too little to make a large contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*. Although in Cambodia human rights education made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, in that particular case attention and resources were also too little and too few. In Mozambique and El Salvador it led to more human rights awareness amongst the population and was the start of a new process. Nonetheless, it may also take a while before human rights education programmes percolate down to the local population. Moreover, one may wonder to what extent such a contribution is lasting if the government does not pick it up, as in Cambodia. In such a case it may only lead to disappointment, because the expectations of the population are not lived up to.

- *If one wants to create more human rights awareness and establish a culture of human rights, more attention and resources for human rights education are needed.*

Truth commission

This 'policy instrument' was only applied in the case of El Salvador. It contributes to *inter-group relations*, if on the basis of the 'truth' it discovers a process of national reconciliation is allowed, finalised by an amnesty. However, in El Salvador the amnesty came prematurely and ended the process early. Yet, the truth as found by the commission made a positive contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, not only because its binding

'recommendations' meant the manner of governance had to be changed, but also because it breached the wall of impunity surrounding the military

After El Salvador, UN peacekeeping operations have no longer been involved in truth commissions. Nonetheless, some recommendations, also for others, can be made

- *An amnesty should not prematurely end the reconciliation process started by the truth commission*
- *In addition to the international members of a truth commission, it is necessary to have local members to better root the outcomes of the commission in the national society*
- *A truth commission has to be prevented from becoming a negotiating table for the distribution of condemnations*

Organisation of elections

This 'policy instrument' was applied in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador. Again typically this instrument was not envisaged in Rwanda. This is strange because democratisation and the lack thereof were both very important in the causation of the conflict and of the genocide. One can, however, of course not attribute the genocide to the absence of a United Nations role in the organisation of elections. In Cambodia, UNTAC actually organised the elections, whereas in Mozambique and El Salvador the United Nations role was much more restricted to assistance. The United Nations is very well able to organise or assist the organisation of the actual elections. It seems, however, that much depends on the extent to which a culture of democracy is already present. People in El Salvador were already familiar with elections. In Cambodia people were starting to learn about democracy, but in Mozambique little was known about it. One might say that in these latter two countries the elections actually came too early to give democratisation a well-founded start. In addition, it seems that elections are only a first step in a democratisation process that has to be further implemented by the newly elected government. This largely depends on the attitude of the elites and their willingness to share power. In Cambodia and Mozambique the governments did not pick up this challenge and therefore the organisation of elections provided only a short term improvement of *state unwillingness and good governance*. In El Salvador the newly elected government did not frustrate the democratisation process and consequently in that country the contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance* was more lasting.

In countries that lack experience with elections, like Cambodia and Mozambique, the largest contribution of the organisation of elections seems not to be to *state unwillingness and good governance*, but unexpectedly to the legitimacy of the government. In these countries it is the first time that the population can actually choose its leaders. Those parties that participated and win are subsequently legitimised, whereas the parties that opt out lose legitimacy. As a result, the newly elected governments in Cambodia and Mozambique gained, while the Khmer Rouge clearly lost legitimacy. In the case of El Salvador, where elections were common, this contribution was not there.

- *Although peacekeeping operations should work towards elections, they should not be rushed or imposed. They have to be part of a process and need to produce a power-sharing solution which is acceptable to all parties. For this reason, in fact, one should seriously consider power-sharing or governments*

of national unity as an initial temporary solution before pushing elections in an environment which is not yet ready for it

- *If it is hoped that elections reflect the will of the people, instead of the possession of power, the population has to be aware of at least the basic notions of democracy For this purpose a well-organised campaign may be needed, which includes the use of mass media, such as radio*
- *The context of the elections has to be taken into account in both the decision when and how to organise them In the first instance the local actors should determine this timetable*
- *As elections rarely bring an end to discord, the fact that they have been organised cannot serve as an exit strategy*

Election monitoring

This 'policy instrument' was applied in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador In Rwanda this instrument was again not envisaged for the planned elections It would, however, have been strange if the Rwandan elections were eventually not also monitored by either the United Nations or other organisations Although generally, according to the literature, it was expected that this 'policy tool' is mainly a contribution to *state unwillingness and good governance*, in practice in all cases its influence on this variable was not very great It is questionable whether election monitoring actually contributes a lot to better elections and whether it is able to prevent fraud In addition, the limited contribution it has to *state unwillingness and good governance* is largely temporary as it does not contribute to the conduct of future elections that are not monitored by the United Nations Moreover, particularly in the case of Cambodia, where UNTAC was to monitor the elections organised by itself, but also in other cases where the United Nations assisted in the organisation, one may wonder whether the United Nations does not have an interest in the elections being judged as 'free and fair' After all, a negative judgement also reflects on the work done by the United Nations to organise or assist in the organisation of the elections

Perhaps unexpectedly, election monitoring is much more important with regard to *state/government legitimacy* In all cases, the fact that the elections were monitored and judged 'free and fair' by a peacekeeping operation, which was generally perceived to be neutral, provided a rubber stamp of credibility on the election results and the fact that they brought the legitimate winner to power As a result, it generally forces the loser of the elections to accept defeat, such as in Mozambique and Cambodia, and provides legitimacy to the winner

Whereas election monitoring used to be observing proceedings on polling day, at present monitoring has become more than that and also includes monitoring the context in which the elections take place For this purpose observers already start in the weeks before the polling and also stay after the polling to observe the aftermath UN peacekeeping operations are, however, no longer directly involved in election monitoring Although a liaison office still assists observers, the actual monitoring is nowadays done by organisations such as the OSCE and the EU One of the main reasons for this is that the objectivity of the United Nations could indeed be called into question Nonetheless, one recommendation, also for others, can be made

- *Although elections should be free and fair, in some cases it is better to accept less free and fair elections for the sake of stability In such cases elections may*

serve to legitimise the status quo and end conflict while they do not serve democratisation much

General policy tool conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn that surpass the level of the policy tools and are concerned with the operation as a whole

The areas of attention The policy tools used in UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are mainly directed at the military, the strength of the state and governance issues, and the immediately visible demographic consequences of conflict. They are much less directed at social, economic and external causes of conflict.

It is remarkable that of all 25 instruments implemented more than half contributed or intended to contribute to *negative peace*. Of the total of 115 times that a relationship or intended relationship between an implemented policy tool and a variable of durable peace existed, in more than a quarter of the cases this variable was *negative peace*. Furthermore, many policy tools contribute or intend to contribute to the variables of *state weakness*, and *state unwillingness and good governance*. Although not many policy instruments contribute or intend to contribute to the variable of *group demography*, those instruments which do – mine clearance, repatriation, and reintegration of refugees – are frequently implemented. Consequently, operations also have relatively a lot of attention for this subject. Only few instruments contribute or intend to contribute to *inter-group relations*, *state/government legitimacy*, *unemployment and economic decline*, and *external relations*. The positive or negative contributions of the implemented policy tools to these variables are even often not intentional.

The proportion of attention and results The fact that a certain terrain receives a lot of attention does not mean that they are also the areas where the contribution is most positive. The terrain where, according to this study, UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects score the best, the legitimacy of the state and government, receives, if at all, only the attention of a few policy tools. This positive contribution of the operations as a whole is therefore borne by only a small number of policy instruments. This underlines the importance of those instruments: institution building, organisation of elections and election monitoring. This is also the case with the few instruments that are implemented to improve *external relations*. At the same time, it is remarkable that, if one keeps in mind how much attention is provided to positively influence *negative peace*, the contribution of the policy instruments is actually relatively small. Finally, it is striking that the results in another field that receives a lot of attention, *group-demography*, are actually the least positive.

The most striking instruments The instruments that have the greatest chance of delivering a positive contribution are not implemented the most frequently. The instruments which, based on this study, have the greatest chance of making a positive contribution in general are reintegration of ex-combatants, institution building, verification of foreign forces withdrawal, winning the hearts and minds of the local population, providing pay to the newly formed national army, human rights verification, human rights education, truth commissions, the organisation of elections, and election monitoring.

With regard to the most successful relations between the implemented policy instruments of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and the variables of durable peace, it has to be said that none of the policy tools was implemented in all four cases with a positive result. Only the relationship between election monitoring and the variable of *state/government legitimacy* was, in all three cases that the instrument was implemented, positive. Although also very positive, the relations between the organisation of elections and institution building with *state/government legitimacy*, the verification of foreign forces withdrawal with *external relations*, humanitarian aid with *group demography*, and institution building with *negative peace* are less frequent.

It is not uncommon for a policy tool to be implemented with the aim of making a positive contribution, but in fact does not do so. The instrument that catches the eye in this respect is civilian police monitoring, which was applied four times with the intention of contributing to the improvement of *state unwillingness and good governance*, but failed to do so all four times. The contribution of disarmament to the strengthening of the state does not perform much better.

Finally, it is striking that policy instruments sometimes make a negative contribution to the variables of durable peace. Important examples of such negative relations are, if not followed by sufficient reintegration of the ex-combatants and the refugees respectively, the contribution of cantonment and demobilisation on the variables of *state weakness* and *unemployment and economic decline*, and of repatriation on the variable of *group demography*. This only emphasises the need to improve these tools.

9.3 How can factors for success and failure explain these results?

Nine factors for success and failure can be distilled from the structured, focused comparison to explain the differences in contribution by the UN peacekeeping operations with peace building aspects. The probability that such an operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace increases if it meets these factors. Per factor, the conclusions are followed, if there are, by an outline of the further developments since the operations under review. Subsequently, again per factor, one or more recommendations are given.

The parties are willing and sincere

In theory it was found that the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force are important conditions for success or failure. From the comparison it seems that, indeed, only if the parties have the sincere intention to arrive at peace can a peacekeeping operation with peace building aspects contribute to durable peace. In Mozambique and El Salvador this sincere intention was present amongst all parties. In Cambodia it probably also was, but the Khmer Rouge lost it when it started to regard UNTAC as too weak an alternative. In the case of Rwanda the implementation of the Arusha Agreement was not in the interests of the Hutu extremists, who subsequently started the genocide. It seems that a party may be unwilling to implement a peace agreement simply because it was not sincere when signing, or factions within this party may not agree. In such a case they still see an alternative road of conflict, which is preferred above the peace process. For the conflicting parties to be sincere, they must view the continuation of the conflict as an unwanted possibility and the durable peace as provided by the peacekeeping operation as the best alternative. This was clearly the case in El Salvador and

Mozambique, but not in Rwanda and Cambodia. The reason why willingness and sincerity are needed is that, not even taking into account the discussion as to whether peace enforcement can work, peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects, like the ones in Rwanda and Cambodia, are neither mandated nor prepared, equipped and sized for peace enforcement actions. Moreover, one can start building peace, organise elections, rebuild state structures, et cetera, but if the parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leave, the results cannot be lasting. The intention is therefore necessary to provide a sound basis on which to build further.

- *Unfortunately the options to influence the willingness and sincerity of the parties are limited for UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects. Nonetheless, as parties are likely to be more willing and sincere if the prospects for the continuation of the conflict are regarded as being worse than the alternative provided by the operation, one can try to influence these prospects. Peace enforcement is, however, out of the league of peacekeeping operations. For this reason it is necessary to further improve and enlarge the possibilities to use carrots and sticks. The case of Mozambique, and also to a lesser extent El Salvador, has shown that aiding former rebel organisations in their transition to a political organisation provides a positive incentive. In addition, diplomatic pressure can help as a stick.*

The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties

In theory it was found that the security of the parties is an important condition for success or failure. It seems that indeed even if good intentions are present amongst the conflicting parties it does not necessarily mean that durable peace will in fact be reached. A short term danger is lurking at the start of the operation, because, although the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the road towards that future will be perceived and is often a bumpy one. The conflict and the history of the time far before the conflict have often created a perception amongst the parties that the other party is not to be trusted and that one has to provide for one's own security against the threat of the other. The parties often face a security dilemma, in which they have armed themselves for the purpose of self-defence. In order to stop this spiral, to break this security dilemma and to facilitate disarmament and demobilisation, an operation needs to provide alternative sources for a sense of security. Parties generally perceive their security to increase through cease-fire monitoring, in which a credible, large, well-trained and well-equipped, and robustly mandated force increases the probability of a positive contribution to *negative peace*. This research found that in addition civilian police monitoring, human rights monitoring, and civil administration monitoring can also provide this sense of security. In Rwanda, UNAMIR was unable to provide such a sense of security and both parties even rearmed. In Cambodia, one party, the Khmer Rouge, still felt insecure and continued the conflict. In El Salvador and to a lesser extent in Mozambique, the operations were much better able to provide the needed sense of security and there they made a positive contribution to *negative peace*. These outcomes show the enormous importance of this factor for success and failure. After all, if an operation is unable to provide a sufficient sense of security there is little on which to build a peace process, the causes of conflict cannot be sustainably addressed and the conflict is likely to continue.

Since the Brahimi report, with the fifth generation of peacekeeping operations, mandates of operations have generally become more robust and often received the responsibility to protect. As a result, parties are generally provided with a higher sense of security and spoilers can be better deterred.

- It has to become a general rule that peacekeeping operations are robust and receive the responsibility to protect. As a rule, peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects need to receive chapter seven mandates.
- Robust mandates also need to be implemented robustly and in many cases this is something that troop contributing countries still resist.

The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth

Although this factor receives little attention in the literature and theory it is very important. Durable peace is still not certain once the parties have the intention to reach it and *negative peace* is addressed. To ensure durable peace, the causes of conflict also have to be sufficiently addressed. One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of conflict persist, there is a great chance that it will eventually flair up again. At the same time, neither does paying attention solely to the causes end a conflict, because the dynamics of conflict require that the parties need assistance in overcoming their fears. The probability that an operation contributes sufficiently to the addressing of the causes of the conflict increases if more of these causes are addressed – the breadth – and if more attention is given to each cause – the depth. In El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique more attention was given to the causes of conflict than in Rwanda. It is not unlikely that this explains the different outcome for Rwanda. Moreover, in El Salvador this attention was more thorough than in Cambodia and Mozambique, which contributed to a more stable situation.

Since the causes of conflict are multiple, interrelated and interfering, and only few are necessary, but very many sufficient conditions exist, all causes need to be addressed and focussing on particular problem areas is not sufficient. If not all causes receive sufficient attention, they are not only likely to lead to a resumption of the conflict, but may also intensify the causes that were addressed and therefore undo the work that has already been done. In the short term, however, in particular *state unwillingness and good governance*, and *state/government legitimacy* are generally important causes of conflict to be addressed. In El Salvador these causes of conflict in particular were addressed in depth. In Mozambique and Cambodia this was also done, although to a lesser extent. In Rwanda, while exactly these two causes lay at the very heart of the conflict, UNAMIR barely touched upon *state unwillingness and good governance*, and there was definitely no intention to address *state/government legitimacy*. Nonetheless, the other causes of conflict also need to be addressed. Although the cluster of *unemployment and economic decline* is an important cause of conflict, it most often receives very little attention, or is not even intended to be contributed to. The same applies to *inter-group relations*, although national reconciliation in particular is often the basis for durable peace. The variable of *state weakness*, which encompasses the institutions especially needed for stability in the long-term, also all too often receives too little attention.

- A political strategy is necessary not based on the available resources, but on what is needed. One cannot focus on particular problem areas and give readymade solutions. Although policymakers would often like to hear what the

most important policy tools are in order to be able to save resources on the others, it is consequently not possible. One has to realise that in the short run peace does not come on the cheap. Simultaneously, in the long run addressing the full scale of the causes of conflict is more cost-effective, because the chances that conflict will erupt again are reduced.

- *It is important that attention for inter-group relations, reconciliation at all levels of society, is increased. Fault lines are often deepened or covered during conflict and need to be addressed after the end of the conflict to prevent regression into violence. For this purpose a larger civil affairs component is needed.*
- *The economy needs more aid, as do those groups in particular that are economically deprived*
- *The strength of the state needs to be addressed more.*
- *Since little or no attention to good governance and the legitimacy of the new government can have detrimental effects, attention for physical safety and rights in particular is important. Although democratisation and political rights are also very valuable, they are not a first priority.*

The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties

In theory it was found that external support, political will and resources are important conditions for success or failure. It seems that, indeed, without the co-operation of neighbouring countries, and regional and international powers, the chances for a positive contribution by a peacekeeping operation to durable peace strongly decreases. The support of the P-5 in particular is important, because unity in the Security Council is not only needed to accept the necessary resolutions to provide the operation with the necessary mandate and resources to implement that mandate, but may also be needed to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring countries is also essential because these countries often support one of the parties and, for example, the monitoring of the border or the verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces requires their assistance. In Mozambique and El Salvador, as a result of the end of the Cold War, the international conflict ended, but the regional conflict was also terminated. In Cambodia, although the Security Council and Thailand had formally agreed to the Paris Agreement, in practice the co-operation of Thailand and China with UNTAC was not optimal. In the case of Rwanda, this country lacked the characteristics of the other three conflicts in that it was not a Cold War proxy conflict. Non-partisan external actors remained uninvolved, because they lacked interest, while countries such as France, Uganda and Zaire continued their support for the parties.

- *All external actors and parties need to stop aiding their allies and proxies in order to enable UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to address durable peace. This is not only a moral call upon countries in the regions, but also upon the permanent members of the Security Council.*
- *The Security Council needs to provide the operations it establishes with an adequate mandate and the adequate means to implement this mandate.*
- *The Security Council needs to support the operations it establishes unequivocally, not only in words, but also with resources. Awareness still has to develop further that peace does not come cheap.*

The operation is timely deployed and at the right time

In theory it was found that the right timing and rapid deployment of an operation are important conditions for success or failure. It seems that factors intrinsic to the conflict process are indeed very important for the possible contribution of an operation. In El Salvador and Mozambique the conflicts were ripe for resolution and both parties saw the future likelihood of their continuing the conflict diminish. Although a mutually hurting stalemate had also appeared on the battlefield in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge remained in a position to continue for a few more years. In Rwanda the conflict was not ripe at all, as both parties still saw possibilities for the continuation of the conflict. They were, however, forced to the negotiating table. It seems that if the timing is right, a UN peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects can aid and play an accommodating role. If the conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation is much more limited, because UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects seem to be less able to ripen conflicts.

It seems that, indeed, after the signing of a peace agreement, the deployment of the operation should be as fast as possible. The interval between signing and deployment should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain the momentum for peace. The fact that in Rwanda the deployment of UNAMIR was later than the parties planned contributed to the loss of trust between the parties and in the deadlines of their agreements. In Cambodia and Mozambique, the slow and late deployment of the operations also contributed to the instability. In El Salvador the human rights division was already present before the signing of the peace agreement and the military component was transferred immediately from ONUCA. As a result, the situation here remained more stable.

- *UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects can best be deployed when the time is ripe for resolution. It is, however, not easy to detect when a conflict is ripe for resolution. It is actually easier to detect a ripe moment when it has already passed again and was either picked up or not. Nonetheless, one has to realise that if a lot of pressure is necessary to force the parties to sign a peace agreement, there is a big chance that the moment is not yet ripe.*
- *When the time is ripe and a peace agreement has been signed it is essential to deploy the operation as rapidly as possible*
- *It is essential that the secretariat is involved at an early stage in the peace negotiations. This allows it to provide the negotiating parties with the necessary information about what can realistically be expected from a peacekeeping operation and allows it to prepare better and at an earlier stage.*
- *A larger DPKO staff is still necessary to enable it to start contingency planning. Nowadays, even if a peace agreement can be expected, the secretariat is often unable to anticipate. Although since the Brahimi report DPKO has received more personnel, the number of operations has also increased again. Their number is not likely to decrease in the near future. Consequently, if nothing changes it is not likely that the UN secretariat will become a less sluggish institution.*
- *The Security Council needs to accelerate its decision-making process because it remains sluggish and still needs too much time to agree on a resolution.*

- *It is best to appoint the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as soon as possible in order to enable him to form his team and start the planning early.*
- *Although strategic deployment stocks and pre-mandate commitment authority have enabled operations to deploy faster, streamlining is still needed.*

The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

In theory it was found that good leadership and personnel are important conditions for success or failure. It seems that leadership is indeed particularly important with regard to the continuing mediation role during the presence of the operation. In Mozambique, Ajello managed to pull the peace process and ONUMOZ through some critical moments, especially at the time of the elections. In El Salvador the leadership of Riza, Ocampo and Ter Horst aided by Goulding was essential in the continuous renegotiations. This leadership was missing in Rwanda where Booh-Booh was not respected and not taken seriously by the parties. Although Akashi in Cambodia skilfully managed to continue the peace process in spite of all the problems, one may wonder whether a stronger approach on his part might have prevented these problems altogether. Furthermore, competent personnel is indeed the basis for each policy tool. Incompetent military are not only a danger to a peace process, but also to United Nations personnel themselves. Incompetent military and civilian police officers often prove to be a public relations problem, but also other policy tools suffer from incompetence. Moreover, command structures are also important, especially in extreme situations. For example, a lack of clarity and friction between Kigali and UN headquarters in New York caused UNAMIR and New York to make the wrong decisions during the genocide.

- *The secretariat needs more personnel to support and plan its operations. The United Nations still deploys forces in the field backed-up by a field-headquarters ratio which no other organisation would ever accept. The present ratio means that the Secretariat is overstretched, at the cost of the co-operation between the military components and the other components and agencies.*
- *Operations need more country experts as part of their personnel. A better roster should be developed, which includes country experts to prevent ad hoc assignments. Unfortunately, peacekeeping operations can only give contracts for a short period of time, which does not stimulate participation in an operation.*
- *It is important that operations have more good mediators at their disposal. They need to be more politically savvy than technocratic.*
- *A consensual style Special Representative of the Secretary-General should be preferred to a more authoritarian style.*
- *Although it is an advancement that the Resident Coordinators are integrated into peacekeeping operations as deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, most of them have no knowledge of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid. This means that they also need to be selected and trained in a wider range of skills than only developmental issues.*

The operation is part of a long term approach

In theory it was found that a sufficiently long duration of the operation is an important condition for success or failure. It seems that, indeed, in order to

contribute sufficiently to *negative peace* and especially to the addressing of the causes of the conflict, time is needed. Addressing *negative peace* often depends on the deployment of an 'expensive' military force. Based on considerations of cost, the Security Council therefore tries to keep the duration of the deployment to a minimum. As a result, the drawdown of operations is frequently started before the situation on the ground allows it. In Mozambique this led to a deteriorated security situation and the premature end of the disarmament process. The security situation also deteriorated in Cambodia. In Rwanda the United Nations even threatened to withdraw its forces and later partly did so at a time when those who committed the genocide could only applaud it. El Salvador was the only case where the military component stayed sufficiently long to implement all its tasks. Moreover, often the addressing of the causes of conflict consists of long processes which cannot be dealt with within a two-year time span. National reconciliation and the process of gaining trust between the parties is not easy. Rebuilding and strengthening a weak state and improving an economy takes time, as one can also observe from the developmental process in countries that did not go through a period of conflict and devastation. Democracy and respect for human rights can best be described as a culture that took several centuries to be established in Europe. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that many of these processes may be started by a peacekeeping operation, but cannot be finished within the period of its presence. In all four cases much was left to the follow-up, which is, however, not always sufficient. In many cases the short period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root and in such a situation the contribution often proves to be only temporary.

All too often peacekeeping operations are still not embedded and after they leave the responsibilities shift from DPKO to the other agencies. Moreover, DPA frequently establishes a whole new operation.

- *Either a longer presence of an operation or more and better follow-up by the capable organisations to finish the job allows more time to get processes on track and therefore increases the probability that the causes of the conflict are positively contributed to and that negative peace is established. Generally, however, a peacekeeping operation will not stay until all the causes of the conflict have been sufficiently addressed and it is only present for a limited period. For this reason, it is essential to embed the operation into the long-term approach of the UN country team and other agencies that are already present on the ground before its arrival and stay after its departure. This can also prevent operations from sometimes being derailed or overlapping the work of the UNDP.*
- *To better embed the operations, it is necessary to integrate the Resident Coordinator at an early stage into the planning process of the peacekeeping operation, and especially on the subjects of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, and the rule of law.*
- *During this planning process it would be best to survey first what has to be done, and subsequently which organisation can manage this best in the long run and place it under this organisation.*

Within the operation and externally the different 'policy instruments' are co-ordinated

In theory it was found that internal and external co-ordination and coherence are important conditions for success or failure. It seems that, indeed, the

implementation of many policy tools depends on the implementation of other policy tools. Co-ordination between them is essential for optimum implementation. There are two main problems in this respect. Firstly, important processes are sometimes rushed in order to be completed in time to make way for another. In such a case, the quality of the first has to suffer for the timely implementation of the second. The best example of this is the fact that in order to be in time for the elections in Cambodia and Mozambique the operations had to rush the demobilisation and the repatriation processes, amongst other things. Secondly, two complementary policy tools fail to link up with each other, and consequently too much time elapses between these two linked processes. In such a case the quality of the implementation of the second tool suffers. This problem is particularly common in all the cases that include the links between repatriation and reintegration of refugees, and demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. External co-ordination is indeed another important factor. Again there are two main problems. First, during the operation other organisations do not retreat from the action. For example NGOs, the international financial institutions, et cetera continue to be active. If all these actions are insufficiently co-ordinated they may thwart each other. The most famous example of this is the case of El Salvador, where De Soto used the analogy of two doctors working on a patient without knowing what the other one was doing in order to describe the co-operation between the World Bank and the peacekeeping operation. Second, after the departure of the operation, some results of policy instruments have to be maintained, whether it is a newly built bridge or the improved human rights situation. Lack of co-ordination with the organisation that is to take over this task may badly affect the sustainability of the contribution. Especially the co-ordination with UNDP is important in this regard as it is often the organisation to continue good governance, disarmament and reintegration programmes.

Since the Brahimi report integration between the different departments, funds and programmes of the United Nations has improved. This is expressed in the fifth generation of peacekeeping operations in which integrated missions are spoken about. In such operations, the Resident Coordinator is the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. However, at present, there is still a lot of infighting and overlap within the UN system. In spite of the fact that the system increasingly acts more in unison, most cooperation is still on a case-by-case basis. Such co-ordination between the different parts of the operation and the UN system still depends, to a large extent, on the leadership

- *The awareness still has to develop further that a durable peace only grows out of a combined effort of the 'politicians', the 'military', the 'humanitarians' and the 'developers' and that an integrated, co-operated and co-ordinated approach is needed. Furthermore, it is simply more cost-effective.*
- *It is important that interventions with the aim of making a contribution to durable peace are regarded as an integrated and inter-linked approach to address both the causes of the conflict and negative peace. Since they are interrelated and interfere with each other, there is no room for sequencing activities. It is not the best option to first address negative peace followed by the causes of conflict, exactly because the causes of the conflict cause the absence of negative peace. Therefore, the idea that first the military would have to do their job, next the humanitarians and followed eventually by the developers should be abandoned. The other way round is also to be avoided as violence aggravates many causes of conflict. An integrated, co-ordinated*

approach is best, ideally where everything is, as far as possible, done simultaneously. Although for security reasons, in some cases the military will have to start ahead of the others, it is important that addressing the causes of the conflict and the recovery start at the earliest possible moment

- *Already from the start of the planning process, during the development of the mandate of the operation before the resolution of the Security Council, the efforts have to be combined and co-ordinated to enhance the harmony between the different components that make up the operation and the different instruments it implements*
- *Co-ordination does not necessarily mean placing the responsibilities with DPKO. Moreover, DPKO often views its lead function as exerting control, which is then often disliked by other departments or organisations. Such 'authoritarian' co-ordination under DPKO may have negative consequences for the long term perspective, especially because after the departure of the operation the UN country team takes over again. For this reason such co-ordination should be consensus based*
- *The co-operation between peacekeeping operations and the external actors should be further improved. Although nowadays the co-operation between peacekeeping operations and UNDP, and the World Bank is intensifying, it does not mean their relations are more harmonious. These struggles can often be compared with growing pains, but the World Bank is also sometimes too slow as a result of regulations that are too rigid*
- *Organisational infighting between the different parts of the UN system still needs to be further addressed. Although little room is left for such battles at the level of the leadership of the different organisations, there still is at the middle level. For this purpose more guidance is needed from the top and a strong zero-tolerance policy should be applied*
- *Co-operation with external actors should not only encompass United Nations organisations, programmes and funds, but should be broader and also include NGOs and bilateral donors. After all, donor countries still allocate their funds individually*
- *A peace-building commission as proposed by the High Level Panel and further worked out by the Secretary-General in his "In large freedom" report may work to aid the co-operation between the different actors in peace-building and assist the integration of long-term planning. However such a commission needs to be mainly case oriented, and country experts and the international financial institutions need to be involved in it, and it needs to be not only New York based, but include the institutions already active on the ground. It should, however, be prevented from becoming just another layer of decision making and receive a more advisory and information sharing role*
- *The budgetary restraints on further co-operation need to be removed. Peacekeeping operations are funded with assessed contributions, while the more development related instruments are paid for with voluntary contributions. It is not likely that many of the more development-related instruments will be financed by assessed contribution in the near future. A standing fund may help to bridge the gap between assessed and voluntary contributions*
- *In the end, removing the budgetary constraints of different forms of allocation alone will not be sufficient, more resources are needed*

- *It is necessary that both peacekeeping operations and development related instruments are presented as a more integrated package, because that increases the likelihood that donors are willing to contribute voluntarily.*

The operation provides 'ownership'

In theory it was found that 'ownership' is an important condition for success or failure. It seems that indeed something like 'ownership' is needed to ensure that the contribution made by the operation is sustainable. This 'ownership' is important both during and after the presence of the operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to decide for themselves what they together deem necessary in order to ensure that the operation does indeed deliver what they require it to. However, particularly at the start of operations they are reluctant and quite often actually unable to cooperate. If this was not the case, the operation would not have been necessary in the first place. However, their willingness and ability increases during a successful operation. Moreover, putting parties at the same table to deal with concrete problems works towards reconciling their problems. In Mozambique the talks on humanitarian aid and in Cambodia the talks on day-to-day military affairs contributed to this. Nonetheless, in all cases, parties complained that they felt they were not sufficiently involved in decisions on what should be done and what was important. In Mozambique in particular this left them with the impression that some solutions were imposed upon them, which undermines their intentions to take care of the outcomes. This leads to the fact that also after the departure of the operation the former conflicting parties and the population must view and feel the contribution to be something they want to maintain. However, newly elected governments tend to view the improvement of *state unwillingness and good governance* in particular not to be their own. Parties often tend to fall back into their habits of lack of good governance and state unwillingness. Cambodia and El Salvador show that involving civil society in the changes made enhances 'ownership' for the future. In those cases human rights organisations were incorporated and aided to counterbalance the governments.

- *Operations must create the conditions for peace as they cannot impose or enforce an outside solution to take root and become durable. Ideally, a peacekeeping operation should listen to the local parties and population like a father should listen to his children. It is necessary to know what they want, to ensure that the peace that is built is also maintained by the parties and population after the departure of the operation and to prevent funds from being wasted.*
- *The level of local involvement is low at the start of the operation, but will have to grow during its presence alongside the capacity of a country to deal with its own problems in a non-violent manner.*
- *Ideally, local involvement should start as soon as possible.*
- *It is best to civilianise the operation as soon as possible in order to prevent the potential feeling of occupation.*
- *Although through the integration of the UN country team into peacekeeping operations a better link with local civil society has been established, local NGOs need to be further incorporated into peace processes. One of the main problems is, however, that not only the parties but most often also civil society is highly polarised during and immediately after a conflict and that local civil society is often not representative.*

Comparison with the literature

A comparison of the clusters of factors for success and failure as gathered from the literature with those obtained from the research shows that this research confirms five of the nine factors found in the literature: 'The operation is timely deployed and at the right time', 'The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures', 'Within the operation and externally the different 'policy instruments' are coordinated', 'The operation provides 'ownership'', and 'The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth'. With regard to this last factor, the importance of addressing the causes of the conflict, it has to be said though that this research found that it is of utmost importance, while in the literature it is relatively underexposed. With regard to the other factors, there are four important differences between the factors as found in the literature and those in this research that require further elaboration.

The first difference is that this research found that, contrary to the literature, only the first part of the factor 'The parties are willing and sincere and the operation is impartial and applies the principle of non-use of force' is important, or even fundamental. The second part of the factor, with regard to the principle of non-use of force, is, according to this research, not relevant to the success or failure of an operation. It tends to be the opposite: the use of force or at least the threat of it may be important to ensure success. This is clearly the case in Rwanda, as the use of force might have prevented the genocide and also in Cambodia one may wonder whether a tougher stance might not have improved the result.

This leads to the second difference. In the literature 'The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties, and is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties' was clustered as one factor for success or failure, of which the second part on the sense of security was regarded to be a function of the first part. This research found that the second part is relatively underexposed in the literature and that both parts are actually both very important and should form two separate factors for success or failure. Returning to the first difference on the non-use of force, the factor 'The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties' depends precisely on the credibility of the threat of the use of force. Parties feel more secure if they know that if the others in the peace process do not keep up their part of the bargain they will be defended against them. This may include the use of force.

The third difference is that this research rephrased the factor as found in the literature 'The operation has a sufficiently long duration' into 'The operation is part of a long term approach'. The underlying argument is the same: a long period of international involvement is indeed necessary to increase the chances of success. The difference is, nevertheless, that this involvement does not necessarily need to be an operation with a long duration. In fact the long deployment of a foreign military force might even have very negative effects and is generally regarded to be too costly. Many of the policy tools that need to be implemented for a longer period can be done very well by other organizations in the field, such as UNDP, the World Bank, UNHCR, etc.. For this reason, however, an operation needs to be embedded into the long-term approach of those organisations.

Finally, the fourth difference is that although in the literature the factor 'The operation is based upon a clear, appropriate and achievable mandate' is regarded to be of great importance for the implementation and success of an operation, this study does not necessarily confirm this. The Arusha peace agreement is one of the

most detailed agreements, but was not able to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. At the same time, in the case of El Salvador, it was precisely the vagueness of the Chapultepec agreement that allowed ONUSAL to slowly grow and direct the peace process. As a result of the need to continue the negotiations during the presence of the operation, ONUSAL could create a “carefully-chosen, constructive ‘mission creep’”. However, it has to be said that in the case of Cambodia, the Paris Peace Agreements were sufficiently vague to allow mistrust to percolate down. Consequently, the role of clarity of and detail in mandates is still not clear. It seems, however, that half-hearted or compromise mandates are inherently dangerous. This is especially relevant with regard to the mandate that is finally negotiated in the Security Council. If the permanent five disagree or only reluctantly agree, it may provide operations with an inadequate mandate or with inadequate means to implement mandates. This was the case in Rwanda and to a certain extent in Cambodia, but much less so in the other two cases. Such half-hearted compromise Security Council mandates and inadequate means seem to be much more the crux of the problem. Nonetheless, this has already been dealt with under the fourth factor of success and failure – ‘The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties’.

9.4 Scientific relevance

The scientific contribution this study aims for must be seen both in the light of its aspired contribution to the body of knowledge on the subject of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and in the light of the methodology developed to cumulate to this. With regard to the first, the empirical relevance of this study is given with the case studies, the theoretical relevance with the results of the structured, focused comparison. This research found that some policy instruments make contributions that were not intended in their mandate and some make contributions which in the literature and theory are unexpected or still underexposed. The contribution of civilian police, civil administration controlling and human rights monitoring to *negative peace*, and of repatriation to *external relations*, may perhaps have been silently intended by the United Nations, but this was not mentioned as such in the mandates. The contribution of the organisation of elections and election monitoring to *state/government legitimacy* seems to be less expected, according to theory. The contribution of institution building, diplomacy, providing pay to the newly-formed national army and humanitarian aid to *inter-group relations*; the contribution of the reintegration of ex-combatants to *group demography*; the contribution of sanctions monitoring and demobilisation to *state weakness*; and the contribution of demobilisation, civil administration controlling, repatriation and humanitarian aid to *unemployment and economic decline* were even more unexpected. Another conclusion of this study is that policy tools sometimes make negative contributions to the variables of durable peace. Little research has been done on this subject so far. Repatriation can make a negative contribution to *group demography*; and cantonment and demobilisation can to *state weakness*, and *unemployment and economic decline*, especially if the reintegration of the ex-combatants and the refugees respectively does not receive sufficient attention. In addition, humanitarian aid can make a negative contribution to both *inter-group relations*, and *unemployment and economic decline*. Furthermore, institution building, and the reform of police forces, can make a negative contribution to *state weakness* as it may temporarily

leave society unprotected against crime. Finally, under the wrong conditions, cantonment and demobilisation can also make a negative contribution to *negative peace*. Both the unintended and unexpected, and the negative contributions of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects as found by this research definitely need further research.

The theoretical conclusions drawn in this study should not to be considered “definite”. First of all, new historical data may become available or relevant data may have been overlooked or misunderstood as a result of which the explanations of the four case studies might be challenged. The provisional nature of the historical explanation of the cases implies that the theory developed from them is provisional as well and may have to be reassessed in the future. Secondly, the cumulation of theory in a structure, focused comparison is inherently open-ended. Each new case study will contribute further to the cumulative refinement of the contingent generalisations on the conditions under which particular outcomes occur. This study aims to serve as what George and Bennett call a ‘building block’ in the development of a typology theory on peacekeeping operations. Since 1997 new peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects have ended and therefore the population has grown. Moreover, peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are only one variety of peacekeeping operations. Other ‘building blocks’ range from peacekeeping operations in the traditional first generation sense to peacekeeping operations with peace enforcement mandates. Further research into these new and other types of operations using the same structured, focused comparison may identify new patterns, or variants of patterns already identified. They can complement this present study and provide more and further insight into and additional information on the contribution of peacekeeping operations to durable peace under different conditions.

The methodological framework for analysis of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects as developed and applied in this study provided insights into how operations contribute to durable peace. It reduced complexity without simplification. In addition, the methodological framework allowed a further step towards more objective and comparable assessment of the results of peacekeeping operations and made their evaluation more lasting. An assessment of the contribution of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to durable peace which takes into account the conflict process as a whole was made possible by the use of conflict indicators in the framework for comparison. In addition, it permitted a judgement on their contribution on the basis of separate multiple, but established criteria. Nonetheless, two choices that were made are worth reflecting on.

Firstly, it has to be said that the choice to operationalise a peacekeeping operation as a collection of policy tools had one disadvantage: an operation proves to be more than the sum of its parts. Peacekeeping operations seem to contribute more to durable peace than one might expect based on the contribution of the individual policy tools. This is a rather impalpable additional contribution which can best be described as the simple presence of a peacekeeping operation. This simple presence may signal to outside investors that the war is over; it may allow outside actors to disengage from the conflict without loss of face; it may signal the end of an old period and the start of a new; but the simple presence of large groups of relatively rich military and civilian personnel from abroad may also destabilise the economy, cause high inflation, and stimulate prostitution. The signal function of an operation causes internal actors – like civil society – and external actors – like

the 'international community' - to respond and contribute. The presence of personnel who implement or constitute policy tools also has implications for the area in which they are stationed and therefore also makes a contribution. Both types of contribution, however, cannot be allocated to an individual tool, as it is the combined signal of the presence of all tools or the combined presence of all personnel that constitutes them. Although the description of this contribution could not be included in the description of the instruments, it has been caught in the description of the pre- and post-presence periods of the variables within the individual case studies. In the structured, focused comparison of the UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects it could, however, not be taken into account. Unfortunately this aspect of the contribution of peacekeeping operations had to be sacrificed and excluded for the purpose of orderly cumulation of theory. Further research into this subject is, nonetheless, certainly needed.

Secondly, the time horizon of five years seems to be satisfactory. Although the five year ante-presence period often needed a further historical introduction, the five years before the deployment generally needed the most emphasis. The five year post-presence period was sufficient. A shorter period would not have given enough time to analyse the developments with regard to the causes of the conflict. In addition, the five-year post-presence period was needed to establish whether continued warfare was the further continuation of the conflict or the last remnants of a past era. Both in Cambodia and Rwanda the latter proved to be the case. If the post-presence period had been shorter this analysis would have been more difficult. A longer post-presence period was not necessary because, between the end of this period and the time the research was finished, four to five years later, the situation did essentially not change much.

The methodological framework for comparative case study research developed in this research may hopefully serve more often as a yardstick, allowing room for broader comparisons of peace operations. However, like the theoretical conclusions drawn in this study, the methodological framework should also not be considered "definite". Ongoing research with respect to conflict indicators and new insights into the causes of conflict may make it necessary to adapt it. In such a case, the theoretical conclusion may also have to be revised. However, to the knowledge of the author this is, thus far, not necessary.

9.5 Societal relevance

The societal relevance of this study is to a large extent given by the conclusions and recommendations that follow from it. This study shows that many of the recent studies and recommendations, such as the High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change; the 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all' report of the Secretary-General; his report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies; and the Brahimi report are on the right track. It confirms the importance of robust forces and mandates to provide parties with a sense of security. It also confirms the enormous importance of an integrated approach. Both were main issues in the Brahimi report. Although these studies have helped the United Nations to further improve peacekeeping operations and the fifth generation is indeed a big step further on the road to perfection, one cannot conclude that all lessons have been learned. Of course it is up to the decision makers to pick up the knowledge generated by studies like this and allow themselves to be assisted to think better

through the decisions they make and to do right what went wrong in past operations. The knowledge and recommendations of this study hope to provide decision makers with a more solid basis for their choices, than the lessons learned from their (own) last intervention that they still too often practice in their political decision-making process. Much remains to be done to improve UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and the job is certainly not yet finished.

This study on the basis of conflict indicators is hopefully a new step towards a more clear analysis of peacekeeping operations, which, in the end, will better enable one to indicate the problem areas, and to assess how these variables need to be addressed by the policy tools used in these operations. As a result of more reliable definitions of situations, it is hopefully now easier to choose which instrument to implement and to predict what its contribution will be in the short term. Consequently, there is a better chance that the right decisions will be made with respect to the actions to be taken. In addition, the contribution of policy instruments can be better monitored, which may keep peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects from failure. Hopefully this study has developed a more objective definition of success and failure and therefore allows the presentation of a clearer picture of the 'true' state of affairs. Furthermore, it shows that peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects make a positive contribution to 'durable peace'. This conclusion may add to the legitimisation of these operations and their executors - the United Nations, as well as the civilian police and armed forces involved - as well as development assistance that funds them. After all, if they do contribute, why not invest more in them?

The findings and recommendations that follow from this study should not be seen as being relevant only to the United Nations and only with regard to peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects. The knowledge, lessons and recommendations of this study may also be applicable to different sorts of UN operations that implement the same policy instruments. Within this context one can, for example, think of humanitarian aid within the framework of a peace enforcement operation. In addition, the trend is for the number of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects to continue to grow. Although regional organisations, such as the AU, the EU with its Petersburg tasks and NATO, are increasingly involved and the United Nations is no longer the only organisation in the business, it is still the primary one, especially in Africa. In spite of fact that the involvement of other organisations releases a bit of the pressure from the United Nations, it is again almost over-stretched and has little room for additional operations. For this reason, the call upon the other organisations to establish operations is also growing. Fortunately, although these organisations may have less experience in many aspects of peace operations, the lessons learned with regard to policy tools implemented in UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are also likely to be relevant to policy tools in similar operations deployed by other organisations. As such, these organisations may hopefully also benefit from some of the conclusions of this study when they are called upon. And as such, this study may hopefully also aid these organisations in their quest for better operations in their aspiration to contribute to durable peace.

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SUMMARY

Walking the Tightrope: Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?

Since 1948, the United Nations has intervened in conflicts by means of peacekeeping operations. Not only were these operations often different in character, but time and again the context in which they were deployed also differed. Nonetheless, one can distinguish a 'generational' change of peacekeeping operations throughout history, not in the last place because the United Nations does learn from the lessons of the past.

The purpose of this study is to provide answers to the following three research questions:

- 1. To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace'?**
- 2. How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable peace'?**
- 3. How can these results be explained with reference to factors for success or failure?**

The first part of the research develops a methodological framework for the evaluation of peacekeeping operations. By cutting-up the units of analysis it allows a more structured and focused comparison. A UN peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects in this research is defined as a collection of 'policy tools' that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace. These tools can range from cease-fire monitoring to the organisation of elections. Durable peace is defined as the extent to which violence is absent and the extent to which the 'causes of conflict' are addressed. It is divided into eight variables: negative peace and seven clusters of the causes of conflict - *inter-group relations*; *group demography*; *state weakness*; *state unwillingness and good governance*; *state/government legitimacy*; *unemployment and economic decline*; and *external relations*. These clusters are distilled from the literature and are analysed through the use of conflict indicators.

Within the methodological framework for the evaluation of peacekeeping operations, the developments with regard to each variable are reviewed through the periods of ante-presence (five years), during presence and post-presence (again five years) and subsequently an assessment is made of the extent to which and how the policy tools contributed to these developments. The relationship between a policy tool and a variable of durable peace is only reviewed if the policy tool was intended to contribute to durable peace according to the *mandate of the operation*, if it is *expected to contribute* according to the *literature*, or, if *in practice* it contributed while this was unintended by the mandate or unexpected according to theory. Subsequently, for the purpose of the structured, focused comparison of the case studies eight hypotheses were formulated, in which it was expected that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute positively to the eight variables of durable peace.

The cases

The second part of the research compares four cases of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects – the second generation of peacekeeping operations - in a structured, focused manner. These four cases are Cambodia (UNAMIC and UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and El Salvador (ONUSAL). The four selected cases meet the following criteria: the United Nations was the lead organisation in the peacekeeping operation; the operation was deployed between 1989 and 1997; the operation was based on a peace agreement; and the operation was deployed in an intrastate conflict.

Cambodia: From 1991 to 1993 the United Nations was present in Cambodia with two operations, UNAMIC and UNTAC. Both operations aimed to implement the Paris Agreements between the Khmer Rouge, the Phnom Penh regime, the royalist FUNCINPEC and the republican KPNLF. The Cold War had come to an end and the major powers supported a solution for the Cambodian conflict in order to be able to distance themselves without loss of face. Unfortunately, the deployment of the operation was sluggish and its implementation too weak according to the Khmer Rouge, which led this party to withdraw from the peace process. The remaining parties decided to continue, which resulted in the more or less full demobilisation and disarmament of the republicans and royalists and the successful organization of elections. Although the royalists won the elections, the Phnom Penh regime managed to retain its position in government through the threat of violence. The resulting coalition government continued to struggle for some years against the Khmer Rouge, but without the support of China, Thailand and the population, this organisation was eventually doomed to waste away. Nowadays Cambodia is a peaceful, albeit very weak democracy.

Mozambique: ONUMOZ was deployed from 1992 to 1994. The aim of the operation was to assist in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, which was signed in Rome by the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. Although the conflict in Mozambique had only partly been related to the Cold War, the peace process was able to ride the wave of its end. More importantly, however, was the fact that in the meantime the apartheid regime in South Africa had come to an end and Pretoria started to cooperate with Frontline States, such as Mozambique. As a consequence, RENAMO lost an important cornerstone of its strength. Nonetheless, even until after their start, the participation of RENAMO in the elections remained uncertain. The demilitarization of the country was eventually nearly complete. Though Mozambique would certainly not become a textbook example of a well-functioning democracy, the struggle between RENAMO and FRELIMO was in the end continued within the political arena.

Rwanda: In 1993 UNAMIR was deployed on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF was very detailed on many aspects, but did not provide the United Nations with a role on many essential issues such as human rights and elections. In addition to France, no other major power was interested in the developments in Rwanda. This expressed itself in the size

and mandate of the operation. At the same time, although President Habyarimana had signed the agreement under heavy pressure from the international community, a large share of his supporters fiercely opposed it. After the civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi flared up again in neighbouring Burundi, relations in Rwanda also polarized sharply. When subsequently President Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down, the Hutu elite, out of fear of losing their position and overwhelmingly supported by the Hutu population, started to perpetrate genocide on the Tutsi. Next, UNAMIR and the rest of the international community stood by and watched from the sidelines when about 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered and eventually the genocide was only ended by the RPF, when it took over power. In spite of the fact that UNAMIR remained in Rwanda until 1996, with the genocide it lost its aim to implement the Arusha Agreement. Under the authoritarian regime of the RPF, the tensions between the Tutsi and the Hutu were not removed, but merely suppressed. Nonetheless, there is relative negative peace in Rwanda for the time being, albeit at the cost of stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

El Salvador: ONUSAL commenced in 1991 before the 1992 Chapultepec Agreement was reached. In addition to the human rights component, the rest of the operation was also deployed after the signing of this agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN. Although there was no confidence between the parties for a long time and the implementation of the accord had to be continuously renegotiated, in the end El Salvador was demilitarised. This result was reached in spite of the fact that during the process secret arms caches of the FMLN were discovered and some on the right wing found it difficult to leave the era of the death squads behind. In 1995 ONUSAL was eventually closed, after the FMLN had successfully made the transition from rebel organisation to political party, which participated fully in a peaceful and democratic country.

To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?

The third part of the research consists of the actual comparison of the cases, the conclusions and recommendations that follow from them.

Opposed to the tenor of public opinion, the conclusion of this research with regard to the first research question is that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects do make a positive contribution to durable peace. Firstly, this is the case for the individual operations. In El Salvador, the contribution of ONUSAL to durable peace was positive in many areas. Those areas where it did not contribute, it was also not intended. The operation made both a little positive and a little negative contribution to the variable of *state weakness*. The negative contribution, the lack of capacity of the police force to combat the crime wave, was temporary, while the positive contribution was more durable. Also in Mozambique the contributions of ONUMoz to durable peace was positive. It was remarkable in this case that, although it was not intended, the operation made both a minor positive and a minor negative contribution to the variable of *inter-group relations*. In Cambodia, it was striking that the contribution was positive to the two variables which were not intended to be addressed by UNTAC. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the operation made a negative

contribution to the variable of *group demography*. Even in the worst case, Rwanda, a minor though far from insufficient and only temporary positive contribution was made. The fact that the contribution was only temporary resulted from the genocide and its aftermath. As most critics of UNAMIR argue, the reason the contribution of the operation was only minor and temporary was not because the operation did not have a positive influence, but rather the opposite, more was needed: a larger, stronger, tougher and more comprehensive operation.

Contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects

	Cambodia	Mozambique	Rwanda	El Salvador
1. Negative peace	+	++	0	++
2. Inter-group relations	++ ^b	+/- ^b	0	++
3. Group demography	--	++	+ ^a	+
4. State weakness	++	+ ^a	+ ^a	+/- ^a
5. State unwillingness and good governance	+ ^a	+ ^a	0	++
6. State/government legitimacy	++ ^b	++	0 ^b	++
7. Unemployment and economic decline	++	+/-	0 ^b	0 ^b
8. External relations	++	++	+ ^a	0 ^b
+ Minor positive contribution	+/- Not clearly negative or positive contribution			
++ Positive contribution	0 No contribution			
- Minor negative contribution	^a Contribution was only temporarily			
-- Negative contribution	^b Variable was not intended to be addressed			

Not only do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute positively to the different cases, but it has to be noted that they generally also make a positive contribution to the different variables of durable peace; negative peace and the causes of the conflict. In other words, the eight hypotheses formulated in the first part of the study are confirmed. The extent of the positive contribution to the variables does, however, differ. The contribution proves to be particularly positive with respect to the legitimacy of the state and government. The contribution to negative peace and the improvement of *external relations* is also clearly positive. Operations contribute the least to the addressing of economic causes and demographic problems. Nonetheless, UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects often do not intend to address the economic causes, although, if they are mandated to do so, they generally prove to be relatively successful. The lesser results with regard to the variable of *group demography* result mainly from the fact that if repatriation is not followed by the sufficient reintegration of refugees, it can increase demographic pressure. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the contribution of operations with regard to the addressing of the weakness of the state and the stimulation of good governance is sometimes only temporary. Finally, it is rather rare that an operation as a whole contributes negatively to the developments with regard to one of the variables of durable peace. It is, however, more common for individual policy instruments to make negative contributions to the variables of durable peace,

but in such cases these contributions are generally compensated for by the positive contributions of other policy instruments.

How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to ‘durable peace’?

The different peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute or intend to contribute through the policy tools implemented in the operations. In the four case-studies surveyed, 25 different policy tools were used. Not all of these different policy tools were actually implemented in each operation and if they were they did not always have the same contribution to durable peace. In the four case studies, a total of 115 times a relation or intended relation between an implemented policy tool and a variable of durable peace existed.

The areas of attention

The policy tools used in UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are mainly directed at the military, strength of the state and governance issues, and at the directly visible demographic consequences of conflict. They are much less directed at the social, economic and external causes of conflict.

It is remarkable that more than half of all the 25 instruments implemented contributed or intended to contribute to negative peace. Furthermore, many policy tools contribute or intend to contribute to the variables of *state weakness*, and *state unwillingness and good governance*. Although not many policy instruments contribute or intend to contribute to the variable of *group demography*, those instruments that do – mine clearance, repatriation, and reintegration of refugees - are implemented frequently. Consequently, operations also have, relatively speaking, a lot of attention for this subject. Only a few instruments contribute or intend to contribute to *inter-group relations*, *state/government legitimacy*, *unemployment and economic decline*, and *external relations*. The positive or negative contributions of the implemented policy tools to these variables are even often not intended.

The proportion of attention and results

The fact that a certain area receives a lot of attention does not mean that they are also the areas where the contribution is most positive. The terrain where, according to this study, UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects score the best, the legitimacy of the state and government, receives, if at all, only the attention of a few policy tools. This positive contribution of the operations as a whole is therefore borne by only a small number of policy instruments. This underlines the importance of those instruments: institution building, the organisation of elections and election monitoring. This is also the case with the few instruments that are implemented to improve *external relations*. At the same time, it is remarkable that, if one keeps in mind how much attention is provided to positively influence negative peace, the contribution of the policy instruments is actually relatively small. Finally, it is striking that the results in another field which receives a lot of attention, *group-demography*, are actually the least positive.

The most striking instruments

The instruments that have the greatest chance to deliver a positive contribution are not implemented most frequently. The instruments which, based on this study, generally have the greatest chance to make a positive contribution are reintegration of ex-combatants, institution building, verification of foreign forces withdrawal, winning the hearts and minds of the local population, providing pay to the newly formed national army, human rights verification, human rights education, truth commissions, the organisation of elections and election monitoring.

With regard to the most successful relations between the implemented policy instruments of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and the variables of durable peace, it has to be said that none of the policy tools was implemented in all four cases with a positive result. Only the relationship between election monitoring and the variable of *state/government legitimacy* was, in all three cases, where the instrument was implemented, positive. Although also very positive, the relations between the organisation of elections and institution building with *state/government legitimacy*, the verification of foreign forces withdrawal with *external relations*, humanitarian aid with *group demography*, and institution building with negative peace are less frequent.

It is not uncommon for a policy tool to be implemented with the aim of making a positive contribution, but in fact does not do so. The instrument that catches the eye in this respect is civilian police monitoring, which was applied four times with the intention of contributing towards the improvement of good governance, but failed to do so all four times. The contribution of disarmament to the strengthening of the state does not perform much better.

Finally, it is striking that policy instruments sometimes make a negative contribution to the variables of durable peace. Important examples of such negative relations are, if not followed by sufficient reintegration of the ex-combatants and the refugees respectively, the contribution of cantonment and demobilisation on the variables of *state weakness* and *unemployment and economic decline*, and of repatriation on the variable of *group demography*. This only emphasises the need to improve these tools.

How can factors for success and failure explain these results?

The study distils nine factors for success and failure from the structured, focused comparison to explain the differences in contribution by UN peacekeeping operations with peace building aspects. The probability that such an operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace increases if it meets the factors given below.

The parties are willing and sincere: For the conflicting parties to be sincere they must view the continuation of the conflict as an unwanted possibility and the durable peace as provided by the peacekeeping operation as the best alternative. The reason why willingness and sincerity is needed, is that peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are neither mandated nor prepared, equipped and sized for peace enforcement actions. Moreover, one can start building peace, but if the parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leaves, the results cannot be lasting.

The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties: A short term danger is lurking at the start of the operation, because although the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the road towards that future will be perceived and is often a bumpy one. The conflict and the history of far before the conflict have often created a perception amongst the parties that the other party is not to be trusted and that one has to provide for one's own security against the threat of the other. In order to stop this spiral and to enable disarmament and demobilisation, an operation needs to provide alternative sources for a sense of security. Parties generally perceive their security to increase if the cease-fire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and robustly mandated force.

The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth: One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of conflict persist, it will eventually flair up again. The probability that an operation contributes sufficiently to the addressing of the causes of the conflict increases if more of these causes are addressed – the breadth – and if more attention is given to each cause – the depth. If not all causes receive sufficient attention, the chances increase that the conflict resumes, and the causes that were addressed also intensify again and therefore undo the work that has already been done. In the short term, however, especially *state unwillingness and good governance*, and *state/government legitimacy* are generally important causes of conflict to be addressed.

The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties: In particular, the support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important because they need to accept the necessary resolutions and mandate, and may also need to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring countries is essential because these countries often support one of the parties and the implementation of some policy tools requires their assistance.

The operation is timely deployed and at the right time: If the timing is right, a UN peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects can aid and play an accommodating role. If the conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation is much more limited because UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects seem to be less able to ripen conflicts. Furthermore, the interval between the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of the operation should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain the momentum for peace.

The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures: The leadership is especially important with regard to the continuing mediation role during the presence of the operation. Furthermore, competent personnel is the basis for each policy tool. Moreover, command structures are also important, especially in extreme situations.

The operation is part of a long term approach: In order to contribute sufficiently to negative peace and especially to the addressing of the causes of the conflict, time is needed. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that many of these processes

may be started by a peacekeeping operation, but cannot be finished within the period of its presence and therefore need to be embedded in a wider approach. In the absence of sufficient follow-up, it is likely that the short period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root and in such a situation the contribution is likely to be only temporary.

Within the operation and externally the different 'policy instruments' are co-ordinated: The implementation of many policy tools depends on the implementation of other policy tools. Co-ordination between them is essential for optimum implementation. There are two main problems in this respect. First, important processes are sometimes rushed in order to be completed in time for another. Second, two complementary policy tools fail to link up with each other, and consequently too much time may elapse between these two linked processes. External co-ordination is indeed another important factor. Again there are two main problems. First, if all these actions are insufficiently co-ordinated with other organisations present in the field they may thwart each other. Second, lack of co-ordination with the organisation which is to take over the task after departure of the operation, may badly affect the sustainability of the contribution.

The operation provides ownership: 'Ownership' is important both during and after the presence of the operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to decide for themselves what they together deem necessary in order to ensure that the operation does indeed deliver what they require it to. After the departure of the operation, the former conflicting parties and the population must view and feel the contribution to be something they want to maintain.

Although UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects thus contribute to durable peace, there is, in addition to the individual policy tools, also with regard to the above factors for success and failure, still room for further improvement. This study hopes that with the recommendations that emanate from the conclusions, it can do its bit in this process.

SAMENVATTING

Balanceren op het slappe koord: Dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties eigenlijk wel aan duurzame vrede bij?

De Verenigde Naties intervenueert sinds 1948 met behulp van peacekeeping-operaties in conflicten. Deze operaties verschilden niet alleen zelf steeds van aard, maar telkens weer was ook de context waarin zij ontplooid werden anders. Toch kan er een 'generationele' verandering gedurende de geschiedenis worden onderscheiden, die niet in de laatste plaats het gevolg is van het feit dat de Verenigde Naties wel degelijk lessen uit het verleden trekt.

Het doel van deze studie is antwoorden te verschaffen op de volgende drie onderzoeksvragen:

1. **In hoeverre dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten bij aan 'duurzame vrede'?**
2. **Hoe dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten bij aan 'duurzame vrede'?**
3. **Hoe kunnen deze resultaten worden verklaard onder verwijzing naar factoren van succes en falen?**

In het eerste deel van het onderzoek wordt een raamwerk voor de evaluatie van peacekeeping-operaties ontwikkeld. Door de eenheden van analyse op te delen in kleine stukjes wordt een meer gestructureerde vergelijking mogelijk. Een VN-peacekeeping-operatie met peace-building aspecten wordt in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als een verzameling van 'beleidsinstrumenten' die kunnen worden gebruikt in VN-peacekeeping-operaties om bij te dragen aan duurzame vrede. Deze instrumenten kunnen uiteenlopen van het waarnemen van een staakt-het-vuren tot de organisatie van verkiezingen. Duurzame vrede is gedefinieerd als de mate waarin geweld afwezig is en de mate waarin de 'conflictoorzaken' zijn weggenomen. Zij wordt verdeeld in acht variabelen: *negatieve vrede* en zeven clusters van conflictoorzaken – *inter-group relations* (relaties tussen groepen); *groepsdemografie*; *staatszwakte*; *onwilligheid van de staat en goed bestuur*; *staats-/regeringslegitimiteit*; *werkloosheid en economische achteruitgang*; en *externe betrekkingen*. Deze clusters zijn ontleend aan de literatuur en worden geanalyseerd aan de hand van conflictindicatoren.

Binnen het methodologische raamwerk voor de evaluatie van peacekeeping-operaties worden de ontwikkelingen aangaande iedere variabele voor de periode van vijf jaar voor de aanwezigheid, gedurende de aanwezigheid en tot vijf jaar na de aanwezigheid van de operatie geobserveerd en vervolgens wordt de mate waarin en wijze waarop de beleidsinstrumenten aan deze ontwikkelingen bijdragen, beoordeeld. Relaties tussen een beleidsinstrument en een variabele van duurzame vrede worden alleen onderzocht indien een beleidsinstrument volgens het *mandaat van de operatie* bedoeld was aan duurzame vrede bij te dragen, als een bijdrage volgens de *bestaande literatuur* wordt verwacht, of, als er in de *praktijk* een bijdrage is hoewel deze volgens het mandaat onbedoeld en volgens de literatuur onverwacht was. Vervolgens, worden met als doel een *structured, focused comparison* van casestudies mogelijk te maken, acht hypothe-

sen geformuleerd, waarin wordt verwacht dat VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten positief aan de acht variabelen van duurzame vrede bijdragen.

De cases

In het tweede deel van het onderzoek worden vier cases van VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten – de tweede generatie van peacekeeping-operaties – op een gestructureerde wijze met elkaar vergeleken. Deze vier cases zijn Cambodja (UNAMIC en UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR), en El Salvador (ONUSAL). De vier geselecteerde cases voldoen aan de volgende voorwaarden: de Verenigde Naties was de meest belangrijke organisatie in de peacekeeping-operatie; de operatie vond plaats gedurende de periode 1989 tot 1997; de operatie was gebaseerd op een vredesakkoord; en, de operatie werd ontplooid in een intrastatelijk conflict.

Cambodja: Tussen 1991 en 1993 was de Verenigde Naties in Cambodja aanwezig met twee operaties, UNAMIC en UNTAC. Deze operaties hadden tot doel de Parijse Akkoorden tussen de Rode Khmer, het Phnom Penh-regime, de royalisten en de republikeinen uit te voeren. De Koude Oorlog was beëindigd en de grote mogelijkheden steunden een oplossing van het conflict om zonder gezichtsverlies afstand ervan te nemen. De ontplooiing was echter redelijk traag en de implementatie was volgens de Rode Khmer te zwak, wat deze partij deed besluiten uit het vredesproces te stappen. De overige partijen besloten wel door te gaan met als resultaat dat de republikeinen en royalisten min of meer volledig ontwapend werden en er succesvolle verkiezingen werden georganiseerd. Hoewel de royalisten de verkiezingen wonnen, wist het Phnom Penh-regime door te dreigen met geweld vervolgens toch een positie in de regering te behouden. De coalitieregering die hieruit volgde streed nog enige jaren met de Rode Khmer, maar zonder steun van China, Thailand en de bevolking, was deze uiteindelijk gedoemd weg te kwijnen. Tegenwoordig is Cambodja, hoewel vredig, een zeer gebrekkige democratie.

Mozambique: ONUMOZ was gestationeerd van 1992 tot en met 1994. Deze operatie had tot doel om te helpen bij de uitvoering van de *General Peace Agreement* die door de FRELIMO-regering en de RENAMO-rebellen in Rome was getekend. Hoewel het conflict in Mozambique slechts gedeeltelijk een Koude Oorlog-conflict was, lifte het vredesproces wel mee op het einde ervan. Belangrijker was echter dat intussen het apartheidsregime in Zuid Afrika was beëindigd en Pretoria met voormalige frontlijnstaten, zoals Mozambique, ging samenwerken. Daarmee verloor RENAMO een belangrijke steunpilaar. Tot na het begin van de verkiezingen bleef de deelname van RENAMO eraan echter onzeker. De demilitarisering werd uiteindelijk vrijwel geheel voltooid. Hoewel Mozambique uiteindelijk verre van een schoolvoorbeeld van goedwerkende democratie werd, werd de strijd tussen RENAMO en FRELIMO uiteindelijk binnen de politieke arena voortgezet.

Rwanda: Op basis van het Akkoord van Arusha werd in 1993 UNAMIR ontplooid. Deze door de Rwandese regering en de RPF-rebellen getekende akkoorden waren op veel punten zeer gedetailleerd, maar gaven de Verenigde Naties op essentiële terreinen als mensenrechten en verkiezingen geen rol. Naast Frankrijk was geen andere grote mo-

gendheid in de ontwikkelingen in Rwanda geïnteresseerd. Dit uitte zich ook in de omvang en het mandaat van de operatie. Tegelijkertijd, hoewel president Habyarimana onder druk van de internationale gemeenschap de akkoorden had getekend, was een groot deel van zijn achterban hier fel op tegen. Nadat in buurland Burundi de burgeroorlog tussen de Tutsi en Hutu weer oplaaide, polariseerden ook de verhoudingen in Rwanda sterk. Toen daarna president Habyarimana omkwam nadat zijn vliegtuig werd neergeschoten, startte een deel van de Hutu-elite uit angst de eigen positie te verliezen en met overweldigende steun van de Hutu bevolking een genocide op de Tutsi. UNAMIR en de rest van de internationale gemeenschap keek vervolgens slechts van de zijlijn toe hoe circa 800.000 Tutsi werden omgebracht en uiteindelijk de RPF de genocide beëindigde door de macht over te nemen. Hoewel UNAMIR tot en met 1996 in Rwanda bleef, verloor zij met de genocide het doel om de Arusha akkoorden uit te voeren. De spanningen tussen Tutsi en Hutu verdwenen niet onder de autoritaire RPF-regering, maar werden slechts onderdrukt. Niettemin kent Rwanda (voorlopig) ten koste van de stabiliteit in de Democratische Republiek Congo een relatieve negatieve vrede.

El Salvador: ONUSAL vond zijn aanvang in 1991 voor de ondertekening van de Chapultepec Akkoorden van 1992. Pas na de ondertekening van deze akkoorden tussen de regering van El Salvador en de FMLN-rebellen werd naast de mensenrechtencomponent ook de rest van de operatie ontplooid. Hoewel het vertrouwen tussen de partijen lange tijd afwezig bleef en continu over de uitvoering van de akkoorden moest worden verder onderhandeld, werd El Salvador uiteindelijk gedemilitariseerd. Dit resultaat werd behaald ondanks het feit dat werd ontdekt dat de FMLN wapens had achtergehouden en ook van rechtse zijde sommigen moete hadden de tijden van doodseskaders los te laten. Uiteindelijk werd ONUSAL in 1995 beëindigd, nadat de FMLN een succesvolle transitie van een rebellenorganisatie naar een politieke partij had gemaakt, die volwaardig meedraait in een vreedzaam democratisch land.

In hoeverre dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten bij aan 'duurzame vrede'?

Het derde deel van het onderzoek bestaat uit de vergelijking van de cases, de conclusies en de aanbevelingen die hieruit volgen.

Hoewel het tegen de teneur in de publieke opinie in gaat is de conclusie van dit onderzoek dat het antwoord op de eerste onderzoeksvraag is dat VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten een positieve bijdrage leveren aan duurzame vrede. Dit geldt allereerst voor de afzonderlijke operaties. In El Salvador was de bijdrage van ONUSAL aan duurzame vrede op vele terreinen positief. Daar waar het niet bijdroeg, was dit ook niet beoogd. De operatie leverde zowel een kleine positieve als kleine negatieve bijdrage aan de variabele *staatszwakte*. Deze negatieve invloed, het gebrek aan capaciteit van de politie om de criminaliteitsgolf te lijf te gaan, was tijdelijk, het positieve effect was blijvend. Ook in Mozambique was de bijdrage van ONUMOZ aan duurzame vrede positief. Opvallend in deze case was dat, hoewel niet beoogd, de operatie toch zowel een klein positieve als een kleine negatieve bijdrage aan de variabele *inter-group relations* leverde. In het geval van Cambodja springt in het oog dat UNTAC juist aan de twee variabelen waar het niet beoogde een bijdrage te

leveren deze positief was. Daarnaast is het opmerkelijk dat de operatie negatief bijdroeg aan de variabel *groepsdemografie*. Zelfs in het slechtste mogelijke geval, Rwanda, werd een kleine, hoewel verre van voldoende en slechts tijdelijke positieve bijdrage geleverd. Het feit dat die bijdrage tijdelijk was, komt voort uit de genocide en de nasleep daarvan. Zoals ook de meeste critici van UNAMIR echter stellen, de operatie stelde niet teleur omdat zij geen positieve invloed op het conflict had, maar juist het tegenovergestelde, zij was niet voldoende en er was meer van nodig: een grotere, sterkere, robuuster en meer uitgebreide operatie.

Bijdrage van VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten

	Cambodja	Mozambique	Rwanda	El Salvador
1. Negatieve vrede	+	++	0	++
2. <i>Inter-group relations</i>	++ ^b	+/- ^b	0	++
3. Groepsdemografie	--	++	+ ^a	+
4. Staatszwakte	++	+ ^a	+ ^a	+/- ^a
5. Onwilligheid van de staat en goed bestuur	+ ^a	+ ^a	0	++
6. Staats-/regerings-legitimiteit	++ ^b	++	0 ^b	++
7. Werkloosheid en economische achteruitgang	++	+/-	0 ^b	0 ^b
8. Externe betrekkingen	++	++	+ ^a	0 ^b
+ Kleine positieve bijdrage	+/- Zowel kleine negatieve als positieve bijdrage			
++ Positieve bijdrage	0 Geen bijdrage			
- Kleine negatieve bijdrage	^a Bijdrage was slechts tijdelijk			
-- Negatieve bijdrage	^b Niet beoogd om de variabele te beïnvloeden			

Niet alleen dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten aan de afzonderlijke cases positief bij, maar er moet geconstateerd worden dat zij doorgaans ook positief bijdragen aan de afzonderlijke variabelen van duurzame vrede; *negatieve vrede* en de conflictorzaken. Met andere woorden de acht hypothesen die in het eerste deel van het onderzoek werden geformuleerd worden bevestigd. De mate waarin positief wordt bijgedragen aan de verschillende variabelen verschilt echter. Het blijkt dat operaties vooral bijdragen aan het vergroten van de legitimiteit van de staat en regering. Ook de bijdrage aan *negatieve vrede* en het verbeteren van de *externe betrekkingen* is duidelijk positief. Operaties dragen het minst bij aan het wegnemen van economische oorzaken en demografische problemen. VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten beogen echter vaak ook niet economische oorzaken aan te pakken, terwijl als zij hiertoe het mandaat hebben redelijk succesvol blijken. De mindere resultaten op het gebied van de variabele *groepsdemografie* komen grotendeels voort uit het feit dat in het geval dat repatriëring niet door een voldoende reïntegratie van vluchtelingen wordt gevolgd, dit de demografische druk kan verhogen. Verder is het opvallend dat de bijdrage van operaties met name bij het wegnemen van de zwakte van de staat en het stimuleren van goed bestuur soms tijdelijk is. Ten slotte is het uitzonderlijk dat een operatie als geheel negatief bijdraagt aan het verloop van een van de variabelen van duurzame vrede. Dit is alleen het geval in Cambodja. Het komt

echter wel vaker voor dat individuele beleidsinstrumenten negatief bijdragen aan de variabelen van duurzame vrede, maar in dergelijke gevallen wordt deze invloed meestal door de positieve bijdragen van andere beleidsinstrumenten gecompenseerd.

Hoe dragen VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten bij aan 'duurzame vrede'?

De verschillende VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten dragen bij of beogen bij te dragen door middel van de beleidsinstrumenten die zij inzetten. In de vier bestudeerde casestudies werden 25 verschillende beleidsinstrumenten ingezet. Niet ieder instrument werd echter in iedere operatie ingezet en zij droegen niet altijd in dezelfde mate bij aan duurzame vrede. In de vier casestudies was in totaal in 115 gevallen sprake van een relatie of beoogde relatie tussen de ingezette beleidsinstrumenten en de variabelen van duurzame vrede.

De aandachtsterreinen

VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten zijn met name gericht op militaire zaken, de kracht van de staat, goed bestuur, en de zichtbare demografische gevolgen van conflict. Zij zijn veel minder gericht op de sociale, economische en externe conflictoren.

Het is opvallend dat van alle 25 ingezette instrumenten meer dan de helft aan de variabele *negatieve vrede* bijdroeg of beoogde bij te dragen. Daarnaast dragen veel beleidsinstrumenten bij of beogen zij bij te dragen aan de variabelen *staatszwakte* en *onwilligheid van de staat en goed bestuur*. Hoewel niet veel verschillende instrumenten bijdragen of beogen bij te dragen aan de variabele *groepsdemografie*, worden de instrumenten die dat doen – mijnenruimen, repatriëring en reïntegratie van vluchtelingen - wel veelvuldig ingezet, waardoor de operaties relatief toch veel aandacht voor dit onderwerp hebben. Slechts weinig instrumenten dragen bij of beogen bij te dragen aan de variabelen *inter-group relations*, *staats-/regeringslegitimiteit*, *werkloosheid en economische achteruitgang* en *externe betrekkingen*. De positieve dan wel negatieve bijdragen van de ingezette beleidsinstrumenten op deze vier variabelen zijn zelfs vaak niet beoogd.

De verhouding aandacht en resultaten

Dat aan een bepaald terrein veel aandacht wordt geschonken, houdt niet in dat dit ook de gebieden zijn waar de meest positieve bijdrage wordt geleverd. Het terrein waarop VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten volgens deze studie het beste scoren, de legitimiteit van de staat en regering, krijgt, als het al aan de orde komt, van slechts enkele beleidsinstrumenten aandacht. Deze positieve bijdrage van de operatie als geheel wordt derhalve gedragen door slechts een klein aantal beleidsinstrumenten. Dit onderstreept het belang van deze instrumenten: de opbouw van instituties, de organisatie van verkiezingen en het waarnemen van verkiezingen. Ditzelfde geldt voor de weinige instrumenten die voor het verbeteren van de *externe betrekkingen* worden ingezet. Tegelijkertijd is het opvallend dat, als men in ogenschouw neemt hoeveel aandacht er aan het positief beïnvloeden van *negatieve vrede* wordt besteed, de bijdrage van de verscheidene beleidsinstrumenten relatief klein is. Ten slotte is het opmer-

kelijk dat op een ander terrein dat veel aandacht krijgt, de demografische druk, de positieve invloed het kleinst is.

De meest opvallende instrumenten

De instrumenten die de meeste kans op een positieve bijdrage hebben, worden niet het meest ingezet. De beleidsinstrumenten die op basis van dit onderzoek in het algemeen de meeste kans maken op een positieve bijdrage zijn de reïntegratie van ex-combatanten, de opbouw van instituties, de verificatie van de terugtrekking van buitenlandse troepen, het winnen van de 'hearts and minds' van de lokale bevolking, het verschaffen van soldij aan het nieuw gevormde nationale leger, de verificatie van mensenrechten, mensenrechteneducatie, waarheidscommissies, de organisatie van verkiezingen en het monitoren van verkiezingen.

Wat betreft de meest succesvolle relaties tussen ingezette beleidsinstrumenten van VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten en de variabelen van duurzame vrede moet gesteld worden dat geen van de beleidsinstrumenten in alle vier de cases werd ingezet met een positief gevolg. Alleen de relatie tussen het waarnemen van verkiezingen en de variabelen *staats-/regeringslegitimiteit* was in alle drie de keren dat dit instrument werd ingezet, positief. Hoewel ook zeer positief, zijn de relaties tussen de organisatie van verkiezingen en de opbouw van instituties, en de variabelen *staats-/regeringlegitimiteit*; de verificatie van de terugtrekking van buitenlandse troepen en de variabelen *externe betrekkingen*, humanitaire hulp en de variabelen *groepsdemografie*; en, de opbouw van instituties en de variabelen *negatieve vrede*, minder frequent.

Niet zelden is het resultaat van een beleidsinstrument niet een positieve bijdrage, maar het uitblijven van een bijdrage. Het instrument dat hierbij in het bijzonder opvalt, is het monitoren van de civiele politie dat in alle vier de case studies werd ingezet om bij te dragen aan een verbetering van goed bestuur, maar in alle vier de gevallen hierin faalde. De bijdrage van ontwapening aan het verbeteren van de sterkte van de staat scoort niet veel beter.

Ten slotte is het opvallend dat beleidsinstrumenten soms negatief bijdragen aan de variabelen van duurzame vrede. Belangrijke voorbeelden van dit soort negatieve relaties zijn in het geval dat zij niet gevolgd worden door een voldoende reïntegratie van respectievelijk de voormalige strijders en de vluchtelingen, de bijdrage van de cantonering en demobilisatie aan de variabelen *staatszwakte* en *werkloosheid en economische achtergang*, en van repatriëring aan de variabelen *groepsdemografie*. Dit benadrukt slechts de noodzaak om deze instrumenten te verbeteren.

Hoe worden deze resultaten met factoren voor succes en falen verklaard?

De studie ontleent aan de *structured, focused comparison* negen factoren voor succes en falen die de verschillen in bijdragen van VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten verklaren. De kans dat een dergelijke operatie positief bijdraagt aan duurzame vrede neemt toe wanneer zij aan de volgende factoren voldoet.

De partijen zijn bereid en oprecht: Voordat de conflictpartijen oprecht aan een vredesproces kunnen deelnemen, moeten zij voortzetting van het conflict als een ongewenste optie zien en de duurzame vrede die een peace-building operatie kan verschaf-

fen als het beste alternatief beschouwen. De voornaamste reden dat bereidwilligheid en oprechtheid een vereiste zijn voor het slagen van een operatie is dat peace-building operaties noch gemandateerd, noch voorbereid en toegerust zijn op peace enforcement acties. Bovendien kan men wel beginnen met vrede op te bouwen, maar als de partijen hopen het conflict weer te laten oplaaien zodra de Verenigde Naties zich heeft teruggetrokken, dan kunnen de resultaten niet blijvend zijn.

De operatie is in staat om te voorzien in een voldoende gevoel van veiligheid: Op korte termijn schuilt het gevaar erin dat, zelfs als de partijen het vooruitzicht op duurzame vrede als het beste alternatief zien, zij de weg daar naartoe nog vol met valkuilen zien. Het conflict en de geschiedenis van vaak ver voor het conflict hebben meestal bij de partijen een perceptie gecreëerd dat de andere partij niet te vertrouwen is en dat tegen deze bedreiging in de eigen veiligheid moet worden voorzien. Om deze spiraal te stoppen en ontwapening en demobilisatie mogelijk te maken, moet een operatie in een alternatief gevoel van veiligheid kunnen voorzien. Partijen ervaren doorgaans dat hun veiligheid door het monitoren van de wapenstilstand groeit, waarbij de waarschijnlijkheid van een positieve bijdrage aan duurzame vrede toeneemt als de waarnemersmacht voldoende groot, geloofwaardig, getraind, uitgerust en robuust gemandateerd is.

De operatie heeft zowel in de breedte als in de diepte voldoende aandacht voor de conflictorzaken: Hoewel men wellicht *negatieve vrede* kan bereiken zonder de conflictorzaken weg te nemen, zal hun blijvende aanwezigheid het conflict uiteindelijk opnieuw doen oplaaien. De kans dat een operatie voldoende bijdraagt aan het wegnemen van de conflictorzaken wordt groter wanneer – in de breedte – meer oorzaken aandacht krijgen en wanneer – in de diepte – meer aandacht aan iedere afzonderlijke oorzaak wordt gegeven. Als niet alle oorzaken voldoende aandacht krijgen, is de kans op een hervatting van het geweld groter, en kan dit ook de oorzaken die wel worden aangepakt intensiveren, waarmee het bereikte werk ongedaan wordt gemaakt. Gesteld kan echter worden dat met name de afwezigheid van goed bestuur en de legitimiteit van de regering en staat belangrijke conflictorzaken zijn die op korte termijn moeten worden weggenomen.

De operatie verkrijgt de medewerking van de belangrijke externe actoren en partijen: Met name de steun van de permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad is bijzonder belangrijk, omdat eenheid binnen de Veiligheidsraad niet alleen nodig is om de benodigde resoluties voor de vereiste middelen en het mandaat voor een operatie aan te nemen, maar kan ook nodig zijn om druk uit te oefenen op lokale bondgenoten. Daarnaast is de medewerking van buurlanden ook van belang omdat zij vaak betrokken zijn in het conflict door een van de conflictpartijen te steunen en omdat de implementatie van sommige beleidsinstrumenten hun assistentie vereist.

De operatie wordt tijdig en op het juiste moment ontplooid: Als een operatie op het juiste moment wordt ontplooid kan zij helpen en een ondersteunende rol spelen. Echter, als een conflict niet rijp is, dan is de rol van een operatie veel beperkter, omdat VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten niet goed in staat lijken te zijn om conflicten te laten rijpen. Verder dient de periode tussen de ondertekening

van het vredesakkoord en de ontplooiing van de operatie tot een minimum te worden beperkt om het momentum in een vredesproces te handhaven.

De operatie beschikt over competente leiders en personeel, en duidelijke commando-structuren: Het blijkt dat leiderschap in het bijzonder van groot belang is bij het bemiddelen bij de onderhandelingen die ook gedurende de aanwezigheid van een operatie doorgaan. Verder is competent personeel de basis voor ieder ingezet beleidsinstrument. Daarnaast zijn goede commandostructuren belangrijk, vooral in extreme situaties.

De operatie is deel van een langetermijnaanpak: Voor het bewerkstelligen van *negatieve vrede* en vooral het voldoende bijdragen aan het wegnemen van de conflictoorzaken is heel wat tijd nodig. Dientengevolge moet het niet als een verrassing komen dat deze processen wel door een vredesoperatie kunnen worden opgestart, maar niet gedurende de periode van aanwezigheid voltooid kunnen worden en derhalve in een bredere aanpak moet worden ingebed. In het geval dat de benodigde *follow-up* achterwege blijft, is het niet onwaarschijnlijk dat de korte periode van aanwezigheid onvoldoende blijkt om duurzame veranderingen te verankeren en is de kans groot dat de bijdrage van operaties slechts tijdelijk zal zijn.

Binnen de operatie en extern worden de verschillende ingezette beleidsinstrumenten gecoördineerd: De implementatie van veel beleidsinstrumenten is van de uitvoering van andere beleidsinstrumenten afhankelijk. Coördinatie tussen deze beleidsinstrumenten is essentieel voor hun optimale implementatie. Op dit gebied spelen twee problemen een grote rol. Allereerst worden om op tijd voor het begin van een ander proces of gebeurtenis te zijn voltooid belangrijke processen soms overhaast afgewikkeld en afgeraffeld. Ten tweede sluiten complementaire beleidsinstrumenten vaak niet op elkaar aan, waardoor een te grote tijdspanne tussen deze met elkaar verbonden processen kan ontstaan. Externe coördinatie blijkt ook een belangrijke factor, waarbij opnieuw twee problemen een rol spelen. Ten eerste als alle activiteiten niet voldoende worden gecoördineerd met die van de reeds in het veld aanwezige organisaties, kunnen zij elkaar tegenwerken. Ten tweede een gebrekkige coördinatie met de organisatie die na het vertrek van de operatie de taken moet overnemen, kan voor de duurzaamheid van de bijdrage zeer nadelige gevolgen hebben.

De operatie voorziet in ownership: 'Ownership' is niet alleen van belang gedurende maar ook na de aanwezigheid van een operatie. Om te verzekeren dat de operatie uiteindelijk doet wat de partijen zelf wensen, moeten zij in staat worden gesteld om zelf te beslissen wat zij samen nodig achten. De voormalige conflictpartijen en de bevolking moeten ook na het vertrek van de operatie de bijdragen ervaren als iets dat zij ook wensen te onderhouden.

Tot slot

Eindconclusie van deze studie is dat VN-peacekeeping-operaties met peace-building aspecten aan duurzame vrede bijdragen. Er is echter zeker nog ruimte voor verdere verbetering. In het hoofdstuk 9 *Conclusions and recommendations* worden per be-

leidsinstrument en per factor voor succes en falen, aanbevelingen gedaan. Met deze aanbevelingen hoopt deze studie aan deze mogelijke verbeteringen een steentje bij te dragen.

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Curriculum Vitae

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In addition to peace operations, his current research includes other forms of conflict prevention and management, the economic aspects of conflict, the causes of conflict and 'new security threats'.

The media generally tend to focus in particular on the failures of UN peacekeeping operations. Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica all received considerable attention and the horrors surrounding these operations are widely known. In *Walking the Tightrope* Jaïr van der Lijn draws a different conclusion. He argues that UN peacekeeping operations that are to build peace once a peace agreement has been signed do contribute to durable peace. He concludes that even in the worst case: the failure of Rwanda – there was a contribution, albeit a contribution that was far too small and only temporary in nature.

By analysing the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador in a structured, focused comparison, this book shows how UN operations do have a contribution to make.

To conclude, the book formulates a number of factors for success and failure. What is most important is that the conflicting parties are willing and sincere, that they have the impression that their security is sufficiently well safeguarded, and that the UN peacekeeping operation pays sufficient attention to the actual causes of the conflict.

Jaïr van der Lijn received his PhD from the Radboud University Nijmegen, where he currently works as an Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management. He graduated from the University of Utrecht with an MA in the History of International Relations. Until he started his PhD research he worked at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

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DIE WEGHE DER CONSTE
VERKENNINGEN IN EN ROND
DE EERSTE ALLEGORIE
VAN HET GRUUTHUSE-HANDSCHRIFT

(contextuele studie, editie en interpretatie)

*Hi hiet mi
drincken
rechte voort*

*Dranc, die
men daer dreef
hiet confoort*



*Die mi
duer ghinc
dat herte
mijn*

*Ende uut mi
der
Wonden pijn.*

KEES LASSCHE

DIE WEGHE DER CONSTE

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KEES LASSCHE

Voor Geertje, Kees en Marieke

Manuscriptcommissie:

Dr. B.A.M. Ramakers

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op woensdag 23 januari 2002, des namiddags om 3.30 uur precies

door

Kees Lassche
geboren 28 mei 1927 te Haarlem

Kees Lassche
Ommen 2002

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
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Hieronder:

Het eigendomsmerk van Loys van Gruuthuse in het Gruuthuse-Handschrift



VOORWOORD

*Dat selve datmen mit arbeiden wint.
Van naturen men dat mint*

Deze studie vindt haar ontstaan niet enkel door de belangstelling die ik al tijdens mijn docentschap aan de Noordelijke Leergangen voor het Gruuthuse-Handschrift koesterde, maar bovenal door de aanmoedigende woorden van Paul Wackers na mijn doctoraalscriptie over de tweede allegorie.

Die belangstelling is tijdens de studie overgegaan in grote bewondering voor de dichter Jan Moritoen, de vermoedelijke maker van veel liederen en gedichten, in mijn ogen een begenadigd kunstenaar.

Deze studie is vooral gericht op de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie. Ik heb gepoogd Heeroma's 'raden naar een bedoeling' te vervangen door een plausibele verklaring. Mijn uitgangspunt is dat het handschrift in zijn totaliteit zelf veel materiaal aanbiedt om duistere plaatsen op te helderen. De onderlinge verbondenheid tussen de teksten blijkt vaak zeer groot te zijn. Het raadplegen van literatuur uit dezelfde periode die dezelfde problematiek behandelt, is soms zeer verhelderend geweest. Inzichten die gegrond zijn op juridische, ethische, moraaltheologische, medische en andere navorsingen, maakten vaak een meer bevredigende interpretatie van bepaalde fragmenten mogelijk. Dit interdisciplinaire aspect maakte de studie bijzonder attractief. Daarnaast bestaat op het gebied van de middeleeuwse liefdesliteratuur een niet meer te overzien aantal werken over liefdesconcepties, stijlmiddelen en tekstoorten, waarvan ik wel gebruik moest maken.

Bijzondere dank ben ik Paul Wackers verschuldigd voor de bijna tienjarige ondersteuning op allerlei gebied. Ik ben zeer onder de indruk gekomen van zijn vakmanschap en de wijze waarop hij promovendi begeleidt. Ze krijgen alle vrijheid, maar ongemerkt worden er toch strakke wetenschappelijke regels gehanteerd die zijn kandidaten dwingen tot kritisch denken en bovenal oproepen tot een zo deugdelijk mogelijke argumentatie. Zonder zijn ondersteuning, bemoediging en daadwerkelijk meedenken en meewerken was dit proefschrift niet tot stand gekomen.

Dank ook aan prof. F. Willaert die de voorlopige eindversie van kritisch commentaar voorzag, zodat nog enkele storende fouten verbeterd en enkele aanvullingen aangebracht konden worden. Prof. J. Reynaert gaf tevens een aantal nuttige aanwijzingen.

Gerard Sonnemans liet zijn waakzaam oog gaan over de tekst voor deze naar de drukker ging en maakte een aantal behartenswaardige opmerkingen.

De studie werd bemoeilijkt door het werken ver van de twee dichtstbijzijnde universiteitsbibliotheken, wat veel gereis noodzakelijk maakte, en bovendien door de vele ziekenhuisopnames. Verder ontbraken gesprekspartners die in het onderwerp enigszins ingevoerd waren, waardoor vaak de werkwijze van een hink-stap-springende zelfkazer noodzakelijk was.

Steun, toeverlaat, verzorgster, critica en inspiratrice van uitzonderlijk niveau is steeds mijn lieve vrouw Geertje geweest. Dankwoorden schieten te kort, de studie wordt haar in het bijzonder opgedragen.

LIJST MET AFKORTINGEN EN VERWIJSTEKENS

afkortingen

Gr Hs	Gruuthuse-Handschrift
G	gebed uit het eerste deel
Hs	handschrift
L	lied uit het tweede deel
Mnl	Middelnederlands
nnl	nieuw Nederlands
otr	oud Frans
r	regel
Romeins cijfer vet	gedicht uit het derde deel
Symb	symbool of symboliseert
v	volgende regels
znl	Zurd-Nederlands

verwijstekens

◦	verwijsteken in de tekst naar de vermelde emendaties
•	verwijsteken naar woorden in register 'belevingswereld'
××	verwijsteken naar besproken personificaties
(#)	verwijsteken naar het thematisch register
[]	vertaling verklaring of verwijzing
()	nadere mededeling

tijdschriften en woordenboeken

DVjs	Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte
MNW	Middelnederlandsch woordenboek (Verwijs/Verdam 1885)
NTg	De nieuwe taalgids
SpL	Spiegel der letteren
TNTL	Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse taal- en letterkunde
TVNM	Tijdschrift Vereniging voor Nederlandse Muziekgeschiedenis
VMVA	Verslagen en mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Akademie voor taal- en letterkunde
ZfdA	Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur
ZfdPh	Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie

ALGEMENE INLEIDING

1.0 Inleiding

*Die rude en weet hoe verre hoe bi
Den rechten loon der consten zi!
Dus willic minen waghē mennen
An die de weghe der consten kennen,
So sal mijn pine in den fijn
Na rechter werde vergouden zijn.*

De dichter van de eerste Gruuthuse allegorie kondigt in dit fragment uit de proloog aan dat zijn gedicht alleen voor een select publiek begrijpelijk is. De inhoud zal voor de niet gecultiveerden duister blijven. Na zes eeuwen is het aantal niet deskundige *ruden* [niet-ontwikkelden] uiteraard aanzienlijk toegenomen. Ook de hedendaagse mediëvist kan zich door het grote aantal raadsels in de tekst deels tot deze groep rekenen. Trouwens, dit geldt niet enkel voor deze allegorie, maar ook voor meer werk in het Gruuthuse-Handschrift (Gr.Hs.). Het is een convoluut dat omstreeks 1400 is samengesteld en drie nauw verwante handschriften telt. Het eerste deel bevat een zevental gebeden, het tweede 147 liederen en het derde 16 tamelijk lange gedichten.

Dit onderzoek richt zich op de eerste allegorie (gedicht I in het derde deel). Ondanks enkele pogingen om tot een aanvaardbare interpretatie te komen, is een volkomen bevredigende en verdedigbare verklaring nog niet gegeven.

Het onderzoek wordt bemoeilijkt door het ontbreken van een verantwoorde, moderne uitgave van de gebeden en gedichten. De uitgave van Carton (1848/9) is vrijwel niet beschikbaar en zeer onvolkomen. Wel is onlangs de 'CD-rom Middelnederlands' (1998) verschenen, waarop naast het MNW, ook vele Middelnederlandse proza- en poëzieteksten te vinden zijn. De teksten uit het eerste en derde deel uit het Gr.Hs. zijn geciteerd (met toegevoegde nummering) volgens de uitgave van Carton (met zijn vele fouten). Het tweede deel, die het liedboek bevat, is gebaseerd op de goede uitgave van Heeroma (1966a).

Heeroma was de eerste die een serieuze aanzet gaf tot een onderzoek van de eerste allegorie. Erné probeerde correcties en aanvullingen te geven, maar Heeroma wees deze af. Hij bleef vasthouden aan zijn door velen niet geaccepteerde uitgangspunt, dat het werk in het tweede en derde deel van het Gr.Hs. een sterk autobiografisch karakter draagt. Hij meende dat uit het werk een persoonlijke, tragische liefdesgeschiedenis af te lezen valt en dat de eerste allegorie een soort sleutelroman is. Het kernthema zou de rehabilitatie als dichter van de vermeende auteur Jan Moritoen zijn. Heeroma bewees zijn hypothesen onvoldoende en wijzigde zijn mening voortdurend. De discussie werd zo zeer moeilijk. Na zijn dood in 1972 kwam er een eind aan het onderzoek. Er viel een soort windstilte in. De liederen kregen nog wel de nodige aandacht, vooral wat betreft de formele aspecten. De literatuur hierover vindt men in het thematisch register.

Onlangs wijdden Reynaert (1999) en Willaert (2000) aandacht aan enkele inhoudelijke aspecten van de eerste allegorie, deze worden in 3.2. kort besproken.

Er zijn aanwijzingen dat het handschrift waarin deze allegorie zich bevindt, heeft gefunctioneerd in een elitaire Brugse gemeenschap. Deze groep van muzikaal en literair goed ontwikkelde personen was waarschijnlijk samengesteld uit leden van de geestelijkheid, de aristocratie, de stadsadel en de koopmanstand.

De onderwerpen die de kring rond het Gr.Hs. bezighielden zijn zeer gevarieerd. Allerlei aspecten komen naar voren. Men musiceert samen, produceert en bespreekt gedichten, draagt literair werk voor en stuurt elkaar wensen met nieuwjaar. Daarnaast viert men feest, biedt in groepsverband geschenken aan, gaat ter kerke en trekt met elkaar op bedevaart. Ouderen vermanen de jongeren maat te houden. In deze actieve kring, waarin ook de dames een rol spelen, zullen ook sociale betrekkingen, verliefdheden en meer fundamentele verhoudingen tussen man en vrouw onderwerp van gesprek geweest zijn. Liefdesverhoudingen gevat in een hoofds kader lijken daarbij een rol gespeeld te hebben. Discussies over de daaruit voortvloeiende problematiek zijn op diverse plaatsen in het handschrift aanwezig. De geestelijkheid, die mogelijk ook in de kring vertegenwoordigd was, deed hierbij tevens een duit in het zakje. Oudere leden van de groep zullen een vermanend woord gesproken hebben tegen een al te vrijmoedig gedrag, waarbij vooral de jeugd op de korrel genomen werd.

Ook de algemeen maatschappelijke en godsdienstige normen moeten aan de orde gekomen zijn. De aanwijzingen voor deze veronderstellingen vinden we overal in het handschrift verspreid. Inhoudelijk is het werk ingebed in een geheel van grotendeels traditionele conventies, met als basis een groot gevoel voor eer. Deze grondslag moet slechts voor een bepaalde en beperkte doelgroep herkenbaar, begrijpelijk en functioneel geweest zijn. Er is nog altijd een onderliggende feodale ideologie, al is deze aan het verzwakken (Reynaert 1999, 204).

De eisen die gesteld worden aan het ethisch handelen zien we op vele plaatsen in het handschrift vermeld. Kluizenaars, oudere mannen, wijze vrouwen en een priester geven gedragsvoorschriften. Opmerkelijk is dat de oorspronkelijke boodschap van het 'hoofse' leven nieuwe aspecten krijgt. De sociaal-culturele veranderingen in het stedelijke Brugge leggen een gewijzigde gedragscode op. Het zesde hoofdstuk behandelt dit onderwerp.

De gevaren van de verliefdheden en de daaruit voortvloeiende, niet acceptabele gedragingen, worden herhaaldelijk ter sprake gebracht, evenals de ongewenstheden van het ongebreideld feestvieren en het uitleven van genoegens. Minnaars dienen zich aan stringente maatschappelijke gedragsregels te houden om tot een duurzame relatie te komen. Hechte verbintenissen zijn kennelijk in de stedelijke gemeenschap zeer wenselijk. Opmerkelijk is dat de huwelijks staat nergens expliciet ter sprake komt.

Als de minnaar meent dat hij zijn plichten getrouw en op eervolle wijze vervuld heeft, verwacht hij 'loon naar werken'. Niet precies te achterhalen is welke inhoudelijke invulling men aan dit begrip moet geven.

Voor de vrouw roept de liefdesverhouding ook verplichtingen op. De noodzakelijke eisen waaraan zij moet voldoen bij de toenadering van de mannen, worden in het Gr.Hs. zowel direct als allegorisch breed uitgemeten. De dame blijkt een gelijk berechtigde partner te zijn. Zij kan zelf bepalen met wie zij een relatie aangaat.

Men gaat over allerlei aspecten van de liefde nadenken en stelt nauw omschreven gedragsregels op. Zij die zich daaraan houden, zijn de liefde waardig. Trouw en maat houden zijn zeer

belangrijk in de onderlinge betrekkingen. De minnaars in de eerste, tweede en derde allegorie slagen niet in hun toenaderingspogingen. Zij negeren de mores.

Een groot aantal thema's komt bij de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie – die in deze dissertatie centraal staat – aan de orde:

- de eisen die gesteld worden aan dichter en publiek
- de dolage van de minnaar in een omgeving die trekken van een *locus amoenus* vertoont
- het verkeren tussen hoop en twijfel bij het verwerven van de wederliefde van de vrouw
- het feestvieren
- het produceren en bespreken van liederen
- het voordragen en gezamenlijk zingen
- het formuleren van algemeen geldende gedragsregels
- de hoofse liefdesverhouding met de specifieke eisen die aan de minnaar gesteld worden
- de toenaderingspogingen van de minnaar
- de liefdesverlangens van de vrouw met de restricties in haar omgeving en in zichzelf
- de verliefde man die nu eens vertwijfeld dan weer hoopvol gestemd is
- de te grote vrijmoedigheid van de minnaar
- de afwijzing door de vrouw, omdat de minnaar zijn 'dienst' onvoldoende vervuld heeft
- de wroeging en de naweeën bij de aanbieder, die door eigen schuld is afgewezen

De lectuur van deze allegorie wordt bemoeilijkt door de vele personificaties en het grote aantal ding-allegorieën en symbolen. De auteur veronderstelt dat hun betekenis bekend is en licht deze meestal niet toe. De in die tijd in zwang komende liefdesverhoudingen en -voorschriften botsen klaarblijkelijk met meer traditionele opvattingen. Het is vaak niet duidelijk aan welke regels men precies gebonden is. De symboliek en het taalgebruik leveren op diverse plaatsen moeilijkheden op. De gemaakte toespelingen zullen voor de kring rond het Gr.Hs. – die zich met haar geheel eigen register van begrippen en beeldspraak probeert te profileren ten opzichte van de *rude* buitenwereld – duidelijk geweest zijn, wij kunnen soms slechts naar de betekenis raden.

1.1 De doelstelling

Deze dissertatie doet een poging de eerste allegorie te interpreteren. Het onderzoek van de metaforiek waarvan de auteur zich bedient, is noodzakelijk om de teksten te begrijpen. Het hoofse register, de symboliek, de gebruikte personificaties en de typerende kenmerken van de allegorische opzet vragen daarbij de aandacht. Ook de bestudering van de normen en waarden uit die tijd die voor de inhoud relevant zijn, de opvattingen over de 'hoofse liefde' en het verschijnsel van de melancholie dienen aan de orde te komen

Het uitgangspunt bij dit alles is, dat dit gedicht benaderd moet worden vanuit de totaliteit van het Gr.Hs. De gangbare tendens, die de allegorie als een totaal op zichzelf staand werk beschouwt, heb ik verlaten. Daarnaast mogen delen van de tekst geen verklaringen krijgen die geen verband houden en soms zelfs strijdig zijn met de strekking van het geheel.

Zoals in alle middeleeuwse allegorieën wil de dichter een boodschap overbrengen. Het werk moet daartoe de elementen bevatten die bewerkstelligen dat tussen hem en de recipiënt een

communicatie ontstaat. Inhoudelijk zal er een netwerk van onbewust gedeelde waarden en normen moeten bestaan die de voorwaarde vormt om de strekking herkenbaar en acceptabel te maken. Daarnaast zal de vormgeving, die geladen is met veel metaforen en symboliek, begrepen moeten worden om de receptie te laten slagen.

Kennelijk acht de auteur voor het begrijpen en waarderen van zijn werk een zekere mate van literaire vorming noodzakelijk, zoals blijkt uit het citaat waarmee deze inleiding opent. Het lijkt erop dat hij betwijfelt of iedereen de noodzakelijke vaardigheden bezit.

Het begrip van de moderne mens voor deze tekst wordt daarnaast bemoeilijkt door het feit dat de ervaringswereld van de middeleeuwse mens uitgaat van het principe dat de zichtbare dingen niet enkel een reëel ervaringsgegeven zijn. Ze verwijzen vaak naar abstracte zaken¹. Dit komt niet enkel in de godsdienstig-ethische literatuur tot uiting, maar ook op vele plaatsen in de 'wereldlijke' literatuur. Het Gr.Hs. bestrijkt beide terreinen en de genoemde instelling is er ruimschoots in terug te vinden. Het begrijpen van menige passage ervaren wij derhalve als problematisch.

Het eerste deel met de gebeden geeft de minste knelpunten, maar de liederen in de tweede en de gedichten in het derde deel – met name de allegorieën – leveren veel interpretatieve moeilijkheden op. Vooral de eerste allegorie spant daarbij de kroon. Allerlei literaire en metaforische procédés worden aangewend, die vaak enkel begrijpelijk zijn voor de ingewijde middeleeuwse doelgroep. We kunnen dit opmaken uit de woorden van de auteur, die zijn wagen ment voor die de *waghen der consten* kennen. De overigen, waartoe ook de moderne lezer behoort, stelt hij voor heel wat problemen.

De praktijk leert dat de teksten in de drie delen van het handschrift een grote coherentie in het taalgebruik tonen. Ze zijn naar alle waarschijnlijkheid in hetzelfde Brugse discours ontstaan. De gebruikte metaforiek is voor ons soms echter moeilijk te duiden, omdat de context geen afdoende verklaring geeft. Raadpleging van ander werk in het handschrift waarin vergelijkbare taaluitingen te vinden zijn, brengt vaak verduidelijking. Ik ben tot de overtuiging gekomen dat deze werkwijze noodzakelijk is, na de lezing van Rens' artikel (1980) over Lied 140, waarin een m.i. verkeerde interpretatie werd gegeven door de onbekendheid met het overige werk in het handschrift. Mijn artikel in *Spiegel der Letteren* (Lassche 1994a) probeert dit te bewijzen. Het poogt met behulp van gegevens uit andere teksten in het convoluut een aannemelijker verklaring te geven.

Ook het werk van Heeroma toont aan dat het te weinig op elkaar betrekken van de diverse werken in het handschrift tot verkeerde interpretaties² kan leiden. Een duidelijk voorbeeld is

¹ Van de overvloedige literatuur over deze materie noem ik Fletcher 1964, Lewis 1969, Blank 1970, Kelly 1978, Brinkmann 1980, Hong 1982, Ohly 1983, Ribard 1984 en Schnell 1985 (Teil III)

² Men krijgt de indruk dat Heeroma veel Gruuthuse teksten leest met de intentie zijn postulaat over een driehoeksverhouding tussen drie personen, nl Mergriete, Egidius en Jan Moritoen tot elke prijs te willen bewijzen. Jan Moritoen zou in diverse werken van deze verhouding getuigen. De dood van Egidius en Mergrietes intrek in een klooster, spelen daarbij een grote rol. Op het autobiografische aspect komen we in hoofdstuk 3 kort te spreken. De hoofse Gruuthuse-poezie roept bij uitstek de spanningen op tussen *internal* en *external* lezen. Enerzijds de interpretatie van de tekst op zichzelf met de gerichtheid op de persoon van de auteur(s), anderzijds het culturele productieveld om de auteur heen. Instructief is Heynders (1995), met daarin ook vermelding van literatuur rond de problematiek.

zijn steeds wisselende opvatting over de moeilijk te duiden eerste allegorie in het derde deel van het convoluut.

Bij de motieven en de literaire vormgeving speelt de traditie in overig soortgelijk werk een grote rol. Het werk in het handschrift is geen op zich/zelf staand fenomeen van een groepje geïsoleerde Brugse kunstminnaars, maar is onderdeel van een netwerk dat interlokaal georiënteerd is. De daarmee samenhangende intertekstuele relaties tussen het werk van verschillende auteurs dient ook in de beschouwingen aandacht te krijgen.

Deleu (1961/2) was de eerste die wees op de grote betekenis van de onderlinge lexicale samenhang van de teksten voor de tekstinterpretatie. Hij deed dit in een baanbrekend, instructief artikel over het achtste gedicht, waarin hij aandacht besteedde aan zowel de vormgeving als aan de onderlinge samenhang van allerlei teksten¹. Zijn werk heeft helaas weinig inspirerend gewerkt.

Heeroma (1966a) verwijst, net als Geerts (1909), voortdurend naar de literaire coherentie in het handschrift. Hij heeft daarbij evenwel voornamelijk aandacht voor de auteursaspecten en doet weinig met het tekstmateriaal bij de interpretatie van de teksten zelf. Ook in zijn latere tijdschriftartikelen is dit het geval. De soms onaangename discussies met vakgenoten die door Heeroma's onvoldoende argumentatie, speculatieve instelling en felle reacties ontstonden, hebben het Gruuthuse-onderzoek waarschijnlijk voor lange tijd tot stilstand gebracht. Aarzelend is het na lange tijd weer op gang gekomen, het accent is daarbij erg op bepaalde vorm- en deelaspecten komen te liggen. De inhoudelijke interpretatie van de teksten die gevat zijn in de totaliteit van het handschrift, is nog niet erg uit de verf gekomen.

In deze dissertatie wordt bij de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie uitgegaan van het 'register' zoals dat in het handschrift wordt gehanteerd. De onderbouwing van deze werkwijze wordt in hoofdstuk 4 beknopt gegeven. Zowel het letterlijke als figuurlijke taalgebruik komen aan de orde. Helaas moeten daarbij beperkingen in acht worden genomen, gezien de grote omvang van het lexicaalsemantische materiaal in het handschrift.

Het zal duidelijk zijn dat een keuze gemaakt moet worden uit de rijkelijk aanwezige inhoudelijke problematiek. Ik beperk mij tot de verkenning van een aantal facetten als eerste aanzet. Ik ben me bewust dat deze keuze een subjectief karakter draagt.

Aan de hand van de verkregen gegevens wordt vervolgens gestreefd tot een bevredigende tekstuitgave en interpretatie van de eerste allegorie te komen. Allerlei problemen zullen niet worden opgelost, maar de mogelijkheid wordt geboden te discussiëren op grond van feitenmateriaal.

¹ Bij de interpretatie van het achtste gedicht constateert Deleu dat hij bij verschillende woorden getroffen wordt "door de nauwe verwantschap, zo naar inhoud als naar versie en woordgebruik, tussen deze versgroepen [Lassche nl van het achtste gedicht] en de strofische gedichten" en dat het thema van de minneklacht en het verzoek om te *helen* "in zijn zeer specifieke toonaard voorgedragen, steeds weer geluiden laat opklinken, waarmee ons de liederen uit het Gruuthuse-handschrift vertrouwd maaken" (p. 273). Op veel plaatsen in zijn artikel maakt Deleu de lezer dan opmerkzaam op de parallelle.

1.2 De opbouw

Het proefschrift bestaat uit de volgende hoofdstukken:

Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een korte beschrijving van het handschrift. Daarna volgt een korte karakterisering van het werk uit het eerste en tweede deel, met respectievelijk de gebeden en de liederen. In de laatste paragraaf van dit hoofdstuk komen de inhoud en vormgeving van de teksten in het derde deel aan de orde. Zij zijn – met uitzondering van gedicht VIII (Deleu 1961/2) – te raadplegen in de vrij zeldzame uitgave van Carton (1848/9) en de *CD-rom Mid-delnederlands* (1998).

Het derde hoofdstuk is gewijd aan de opvattingen ten aanzien van de eerste allegorie in de oudere onderzoekingen. Het is zeer verleidelijk in te gaan op de ideeën van Heeroma en de discussies rond zijn publicaties. Ik doe dit in principe slechts incidenteel. Heeroma heeft zeer veel bijgedragen tot een grotere bekendheid en een beter begrip van het handschrift. Zijn benaderingswijze roept echter veel vraagtekens op. Zijn steeds wisselende opvattingen en het gebrek aan bediscussieerbare argumentatie bemoeilijken een bespreking. Veel aandacht besteden aan zijn opvattingen zou zoveel ruimte vergen dat de verwezenlijking van mijn eigen doelstelling op de achtergrond zou raken. Door Heeroma's opvattingen over het autobiografische karakter van het werk, kwam er een discussie op gang die door het gebrek aan gegevens niet tot bevredigende conclusies kon komen. Verder hielden Heeroma's zich nogal wijzigende interpretaties van de allegorieën in het derde deel van het Gr.Hs. te weinig rekening met de 'registrale' woorden in het gebruikte taal materiaal. Het in de inleiding van zijn lieduutgave vermelde materiaal is vooral gericht op dichterlijke denkpatronen en stilistische en thematische kenmerken. Het doel daarvan was zoveel mogelijk teksten aan slechts twee auteurs toe te kennen. Hij bracht interessant materiaal bijeen, maar vele neerlandici betwijfelden zijn conclusies. Overigens hadden de opponenten in hun replieken eveneens weinig oog voor het lexicale register. De algemene tendens is dat men het handschrift in zijn totaliteit weinig kent.

Aan het slot komen recente publicaties van Reynaert en Willaert aan de orde. Zij bespreken daarin onder andere enkele liederen uit de eerste allegorie. Zij besteedden aandacht aan de vormgeving en enkele inhoudelijke facetten.

Het uitvoerige vierde hoofdstuk bespreekt een aantal registrale en intertekstuele aspecten die opheldering moeten geven over de intenties van de auteur. Aandacht wordt besteed aan de plaats van handeling, de domificatietechniek, de verschillende soorten metaforiek en symboliek enz. In de bijlage vindt men een overzicht met vindplaatsen van het gebruikte woordmateriaal.

De veelvuldig optredende personificaties vervullen een wezenlijke rol in alle allegorieën. Een aantal van de meest belangrijke wordt hoofdstuk 5 besproken. De keuze van de daar besproken personificaties hangt af hun belang in de tekst of hun problematische duiding. Een overzicht van alle personificaties met de vermelding van hun vindplaatsen, vindt men in de bijlage.

Aangezien in het Gr.Hs. discussies over allerlei normen en waarden herhaaldelijk naar voren komen, besteedt het zesde hoofdstuk aandacht aan de problematiek die daaruit voortvloeit. De invulling die in het Gr.Hs. aan het begrip 'hoofs' gegeven wordt, krijgt de nodige aandacht.

De term 'melancholie' komt in de liederen en de eerste twee allegorieën met diverse betekenissen voor. De diepere achtergrond van deze gemoedsgesteldheid toont een aantal aspecten die de aandacht verdienen, om tot een betere interpretatie te komen. Hoofdstuk 7 gaat hierop in.

De interpretatie van het gedicht volgt in het achtste hoofdstuk

De tekstuitgave met verklarende aantekeningen vult hoofdstuk 9. Daarin zijn ook enkele opmerkingen over de uitgave van Carton en het taalgebruik gemaakt.

Het tiende hoofdstuk geeft een aantal conclusies die uit het onderzoek getrokken kunnen worden weer.

Het slot wordt gevormd door de summary, de bibliografie en een thematisch register. Dit thematisch register geeft een overzicht van de literatuur over het tot nu toe verrichte onderzoek naar het Gr.Hs. Het is uitgesplitst naar thema's.

In de bijlagen vindt men overzichten van het gebruikte woordmateriaal. Deze woorden hebben betrekking op enkele registrale aspecten en de personificaties.

1.3 De wijze van citeren en het vermelden van de literatuur

Wegens de onbetrouwbaarheid van Cartons uitgave van het handschrift (1848/9), heb ik gebruik gemaakt van mijn eigen afschriften van de gebeden en gedichten in het eerste en derde deel. Ze zijn gemaakt aan de hand van fotokopieën en microfiches. In de studie vermeld ik niet wanneer mijn lezing afwijkt van die van Carton. Aan het begin van de tekstuitgave van de eerste allegorie geef ik echter wel een overzicht van de afwijkingen tussen zijn editie en de mijne. Voor het citeren van de liederen volg ik de betrouwbare uitgave van Heeroma (1966a).

De geciteerde teksten zijn van een moderne interpunctie voorzien. De afkortingen zijn zonder vermelding opgelost. De spelling van de *i*, *j*, *u* en *v* en het plaatsen van hoofdletters is aangepast aan het huidige gebruik. Wanneer in een citaat meer dan één vers wordt geciteerd, worden de versgrenzen niet aangegeven. Tekstverklaringen in citaten staan tussen rechte haken [...]. Eveneens tussen rechte haken staan de verwijzingen naar bepaalde paragrafen in dit boek.

De nummering van de teksten uit het derde deel, zoals Carton en de *CD-rom Middelnederlands* die geven, heb ik gehandhaafd. Ik heb het als zeer hinderlijk ondervonden bij de bestudering van Heeroma dat men voortdurend rekening moet houden met de verschillen tussen zijn nummering en die van Carton. Om toch te laten uitkomen dat er een tekst meer is dan in de beschikbare tekstuitgaven aangegeven is, heb ik het derde gedicht gesplitst in A en B. Bij deze oplossing ondervindt de 'niet-ingewijde' minder moeilijkheden bij het onderzoeken van de gegevens die verstrekt worden⁴. Hij hoeft bij het opzoeken van tekstfragmenten

⁴ Carton werd bij de nummering waarschijnlijk misleid door de lacune veroorzaakt door het ontbreken van folio's tussen het derde en vierde gedicht. Beide bezitten een overeenkomende 13-regelige strofenindeling waardoor Carton gedacht heeft dat de tekst doorliep. Hij komt zo tot 15 teksten. Inhoudelijk is er echter na de onderbreking duidelijk sprake van een nieuw gedicht. Ook de tweeregelige kapitaal bovenaan folio 69R wijst op het begin van een nieuwe tekst. De werkwijze van Heeroma (1966, 16) "ik tel de beide fragmenten na het tweede als afzonderlijke eenheden mee" volg ik dus niet. Hij benoemt **IIIB** als no. 4 en komt bij de volgende allegoricon, gebeden, moralisaties e.d. in het derde deel na **IIIB** steeds een nummer hoger uit dan Carton. Glier neemt Heeroma's werkwijze over. Haar schemaatje (1971, 270) is echter onvolledig. Oosterman (1992, 87, verwijzend naar noot 8, p. 378) sluit zich bij Heeroma aan. Rierink (1991) volgt Cartons nummering. Daar we nog steeds maar één fundamentele tekstuitgave bezitten, sluit ik me bij Cartons

in de uitgaven met bij 13 teksten een omrekening te maken. Alle getalaanduidingen zijn gelijk gebleven en sluiten aan bij de bestaande tekstitgaven. Bij de aanduiding A en B wordt de lezer direct herinnerd aan de splitsing. Dit vergemakkelijkt het zoeken.

Een lijst met de gebruikte afkortingen en tekens vindt men na de inhoudsopgave.

De literatuurverwijzingen in de tekst en in de voetnoten vermelden de achternaam van de auteur en het jaar van verschijnen van de publicatie. De volledige titelbeschrijving is in de bibliografie achter in het boek te vinden. Bij meerdere uitgaven van een auteur in hetzelfde jaar volgt de gebruikelijke toevoeging a, b, c, enz. bij het jaartal.

nummering aan Ten aanzien van het fragmentarische karakter van **IIIB** meent Gerritsen (1969, 199) dat het begin van **IV** (mijn **IIIB**) ontbreekt Ook Reynaert (1999, 232) gaat van die onvolledigheid uit Gezien de tweeregelige kapitaal waarmee elk nieuw gedicht (en nooit een nieuwe strofe) begint en ook **IIIB**, lijkt me dit onjuist

HET HANDSCHRIFT ALS GEHEEL

2.0 Inleiding

De doelstelling van de dissertatie – zoals in paragraaf 1.1 is beschreven – is gericht op de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie in het Gr.Hs. Er rijzen hierbij veel problemen. Om deze op te lossen, wordt het convoluut – dat in velerlei opzicht een eenheid vormt – in zijn totaliteit gebruikt. Het lijkt mij daarom wenselijk dat de lezer ter introductie of ter opfrissing van het geheugen, een globaal overzicht krijgt voorgeschoteld van het handschrift. Het veelvoud aan vragen dat bij allerlei onderdelen naar voren kan komen, wordt zo verminderd. Indien ik een onderwerp bespreek dat in het thematisch register is vermeld, geef ik dit aan door middel van het teken (#).

Dit hoofdstuk geeft eerst enkele summere opmerkingen over het handschrift, de auteursproblematiek en het transcript van Carton. Bij de dan volgende beschrijving van de inhoud van het Gr.Hs. dat uit drie in één band verenigde gedeelten bestaat, ga ik uitvoeriger in op de inhoud van de gedichten in het derde deel. Deze gedichten zijn minder bekend dan de liederen, die door Heeroma (1966a) zijn uitgegeven. De inhoud en betekenis van de gebeden in het eerste deel staan in Oostermans dissertatie (1995) centraal. Concentratie op het derde deel lijkt mij daarom gewenst.

2.1 Het handschrift (#)

Het op tamelijk zwaar perkament, eenvoudig uitgevoerde Brugse verzamelhandschrift uit het laatste decennium van de veertiende eeuw, is in het bezit van de Belgische familie Van Caloen. De teksten zijn zeer waarschijnlijk ontstaan in de kring van een Brugse broederschap die zich vermaakte met musiceren, zingen en dichten. Absolute zekerheid over het ontstaansmilieu (#) bestaat evenwel nog steeds niet.

Het convoluut dankt zijn naam aan Lodewijk van Brugge (1422 - 1492), Heer van Gruuthuse, een patriciër wiens wapen in het handschrift voorkomt. Hij heeft het waarschijnlijk ten geschenke gekregen en in zijn uitgebreide bibliotheek (#) opgenomen. De mogelijkheid dat hij het convoluut erfde, kan ook niet worden uitgesloten.

Over de exacte datering (#) bestaat geen overeenstemming. Waarschijnlijk geschiedde het afschrijven van de teksten tussen 1385 en 1400.

Het convoluut bestaat nu uit 85 bladen en kent geen miniaturen of randversieringen. Twee liederen en twee gedichten in het derde deel zijn niet af. Een zevental liederen en het slot van het derde gedicht in het derde deel ontbreken door het verloren gaan van folio's. De bladgrootte schommelt rond 252 x 187 mm. Een aantal bladen, vooral die van de eerste allegorie, is slecht leesbaar. De volgorde van enkele folio's is bij het opnieuw inbinden verstoord geraakt. Gerritsen (1969, 190) geeft een zeer overzichtelijk schema van de verdeling der teksten over de folio's. De Vreese (1940, 243) schat dat de nieuwe band rond 1840 aangebracht is.

Het eerste deel bevat 7 berijmde gebeden (fol. 2r - 10v), het tweede 147 liederen met muzieknotatie (fol. 11r - 58v), het derde een zestiental gedichten met een gevarieerde inhoud (fol. 59r - 85r). Een korte beschrijving van de inhoud wordt in de volgende paragrafen gegeven. De Vreese (1940) geeft een uitvoerige beschrijving van het handschrift. Hij onderscheidt twaalf verschillende handen. De teksten zijn in een paars gekleurde Gotische boekletter geschreven. De bladen bevatten op een enkele uitzondering na twee kolommen van 50 regels. Zeven bladen met tekst ontbreken. In het tweede deel zijn 2 liederen fragmentarisch overgeleverd en zijn ongeveer 15 liederen verloren gegaan. In het derde deel is gedicht IIIA slechts gedeeltelijk overgeleverd.

Wie de opdracht voor het vervaardigen van het handschrift gegeven heeft, is onduidelijk. De eigendomsaantekeningen (#) zijn van latere datum. De 'krabbels' (#) onder bepaalde gedichten in het derde deel suggereren een bepaalde afwijkende volgorde. Zij vormen een probleem. Heeroma trok uit hun aanwezigheid verregaande conclusies over de volgorde van ontstaan, het auteurschap en het autobiografische karakter van deze teksten. Zijn opvattingen ondervonden ernstige kritiek (#). Codicologische literatuur vindt men vermeldt in het thematisch register.

Reynaert (1999, 213-227) geeft een zeer overzichtelijk resumé met veel informatie over het handschrift, waarbij hij onder andere de samenstelling van de codex, het schrift en de versiering, de ontstaansgeschiedenis, de vroege inscripties, de sporen van gebruik en 'de verdere geschiedenis' bespreekt.

2.2 Het transcript van Carton

De teksten in het Gr.Hs. zijn tot nu toe één keer volledig uitgegeven, in twee delen. Het initiatief daartoe lag bij Charles-Louis Carton. Gezien zijn drukke werkzaamheden als directeur van een dovenschool, schakelde hij daarbij een hulp in die de teksten kopieerde. Een groot deel van de werkzaamheden werd daarnaast verricht door de ongetwijfeld deskundige Ph. Blommaert. Deze voorzag de tekst van een interpunctie en corrigeerde talloze foutieve lezingen. Hij keek de drukproeven na, rangschikte diverse onderdelen en schreef de inleiding, daar Cartons pen – volgens diens eigen woorden – stokte bij het schrijven van Nederlands. Op 22 november 1847 bewerkten de editoren onleesbare plaatsen in het handschrift met een reactief. Vooral de eerste allegorie is daardoor op verschillende plaatsen onleesbaar geworden. In augustus 1848 ontvingen de leden van de *Vlaemsche Bibliophilen* het eerste deel. In mei 1849 volgde het tweede deel van de editie, voorzien van een voorwoord voor de hele uitgave (gegevens ontleend aan Biervliet 1986).

De uitgave is in latere jaren sterk bekritiseerd wegens de vele onnauwkeurigheden in de tekstweergave. Verschillende artikelen met tekstverbeterende aantekeningen (#) zijn inmiddels verschenen. Het grootste aandeel in de fouten wordt gevormd door kleine spellingwisselingen tussen s/z, ee/e, e/ee, e/i, ij/i, c/e, weglatingen of toevoegingen van letters enz. [9.2]. Veel van de zo ontstane fouten komen mijns inziens voor rekening van de editoren. De weergave in het handschrift is meestal zeer duidelijk. Mijn ervaring is dat als men een afschrift maakt, de inconsistentie van de spellingvormen zeer belemmerend werkt op het precies weergeven van de

tekst. Men moet steeds uiterst alert zijn⁵. Kennelijk behoren de vele spellingvarianties tot het 'spel' van de auteur(s); binnen één tekst wisselen de spellingvormen vaak onverwacht en veelvuldig. Verdam (1890) geeft tekstverbeteringen op grond van zijn kennis van het Middelnederlands. Hij beschikte daarbij niet over het convoluut. Ze zijn vaak verkeerd, omdat hij geen rekening hield met de varianties. Ook de zetter zal ongetwijfeld moeite ondervonden hebben met het sterk wisselende spellingbeeld. Door tijdgebrek (waarover beiden klagen) zal de correctie van de drukproeven door Carton en Blommaert op zeer onvolkomen wijze hebben plaatsgevonden. Ik zoek hierin de oorzaak van het ongekend grote aantal, meestal kleine fouten. Fouten in complete woorden komen zelden voor en berusten meestal op de slechte leesbaarheid van bepaalde plaatsen. De daaruit voortvloeiende moeilijkheden worden – waarschijnlijk door Blommaert – meestal bevredigend opgelost. Een troostrijke gedachte. Door het grote aantal nu niet meer leesbare plaatsen in het handschrift zijn we sterk op de uitgave van Carton aangewezen.

2.3 De auteursproblematiek

Het auteursprobleem blijft tot de dag van vandaag de gemoederen bezig houden, zonder dat men tot een sluitende oplossing komt. Aannemelijk lijkt het bestaan van een literaire kring waarin de dichters Jan van Hulst en Jan Moritoen een dominante rol vervulden. De gebeden, liederen en gedichten zijn grotendeels anoniem. Een enkele keer geeft een acrostichon een mogelijk uitsluitsel over de auteur. Zo tonen de gebeden 4 en 5 en het 10de gedicht het acrostichon 'Jan van Hulst', het 12de gedicht dat van Jan Moritoen.

Door deze werken als uitgangspunt te nemen, heeft Heeroma (1966a), in navolging van Geerts (1909), gepoogd ook ander werk aan deze auteurs toe te kennen. Hij onderzoekt daartoe overeenkomende stijkenmerken, die door hem 'gidskenmerken' worden genoemd. Gerritsen (1969, 201-204) en andere critici leveren fundamentele kritiek (#) op deze methode. Ondanks hun bewondering voor het indringende, intuïtieve leesvermogen van Heeroma vinden ze de werkwijze wetenschappelijk onvoldoende onderbouwd. Uitspraken over het auteurschap (#) zijn in vele publicaties aanwezig. Ik kom op deze kwestie in 3.1 terug.

Niet geheel duidelijk is voor welk publiek het handschrift geschreven is, maar in de literatuur over de gebruikssfeer (#) nemen de ideeën hierover wel steeds vastere vormen aan. Men denkt aan een gemêleerd Brugs aristocratisch publiek met vele contacten op allerlei gebied. Namen die in dit verband vallen zijn die van het gilde van Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe van de Droge Boom en het genootschap van De Witte Beer.

2.4. De inhoud van het convoluut

Het eerste deel (fol. 2 r^oa-9 r^ob) bevat 7 berijmde gebeden, het tweede (fol 11 r^oa-38 v^ob) 147 liederen. De meeste zijn voorzien van een muzieknotatie, die met kleine verticale streepjes op een notenbalk met vijf lijnen is geplaatst. Het slotdeel (fol. 39 r^oa-85 r^oa) bevat 16 gedichten,

⁵ Heeroma 1966a, 9 "zelfs een Scharpé en een De Vreese bleken, nog al wat fouten te hebben gemaakt, en niet eens zulke hele kleine"

waaronder twee gebeden, een aantal moralistische gedichten en allegorieën, de laatste meestal opgezet als een droom. De eerste twee bezitten ook liederen met een muzieknotatie.

Hierna volgt een korte typering van het eerste en tweede deel. Het (derde) deel met de langere gedichten wordt uitvoeriger besproken.

2.4.1 De gebeden (#)

Het convoluut opent met een deel dat zeven gebeden bevat. Oosterman wijdt zijn proefschrift (1995) aan het genre van de berijmde gebeden, en die uit het Gr.Hs. krijgen daarbij ruime aandacht⁶. Arnold en De Vreese waren hem in hun publicaties over het *Salve Regina* vorgegaan. Het welvarende Brugge was het belangrijkste centrum in de overlevering en productie van schitterend uitgevoerde, berijmde gebeden- en getijdenboeken. De gebeden in het Gr.Hs. daarentegen zijn zeer sober uitgegeven.

De eerste twee gebeden concentreren zich op schuld en boete. Het derde gebed stelt de levensgeschiedenis van Johannes de Doper centraal. In de laatste zeven regels wordt Johannes' bemiddeling ingeroepen om het hemels heil te kunnen bereiken⁷. Evenals dat bij sommige andere gebeden het geval is, is de vormgeving complex.

De nummers 4, 5 en 7 zijn Mariagebeden. Gebed 4 is geschreven door Jan van Hulst. Het vermeldt in de opeenvolgende strofen, via acrostichons, de namen van twaalf *peilgrinen* [pelgrims] *ter eere van onser Vrouwen*. Waarschijnlijk spelen deze twaalf ook in ander werk in het Gr.Hs. een rol; hun namen komen soms ook elders in acrostichons (4.11) voor. In de laatste strofe vernemen we de vermoedelijke naam van de auteur via het acrostichon IAN HVLST.

Het vijfde gebed is gericht tot *Maria Sonder smette zaliche roze*. Het is, een parafrase van het *Salve regina* en is volgens een acrostichon eveneens geschreven door Jan van Hulst. Het gebed bevat tevens het acrostichon *Salve Regina*. De 23 kunstige strofen van 13 regels tellen maar twee rijmklanken per strofe.

Het zevende gebed is een glossenlied op het *Ave Maria*, waarin zeer nadrukkelijk de hulp van Maria wordt ingeroepen. Haar bijstand wordt gevraagd om de duivel te bestrijden, de mens te behoeden voor ziekten, zonden, onreine gedachten enz.

Gebed 6 beschrijft uitvoerig het lijden van Christus volgens de getijden van de Passie. Het eindigt met een roep om genade.

In enkele allegorische gedichten uit het derde deel van het Gr.Hs. komen soms als tussenvoegsel lange, berijmde gebeden voor. Bovendien zijn in dit deel twee zelfstandige gebeden opgenomen. Men zie hiervoor paragraaf 2.4.3.5.

2.4.3 De liederen (#)

⁶ O.a. op de pagina's 88-93 en vooral op 127-152. Zijn register vermeldt gedetailleerd op welke plaatsen de afzonderlijke gebeden besproken worden.

⁷ Deleu (1959, 89) oppert de mogelijkheid dat Johannes als de patroon van Jan van Hulst of Jan van den Gruuthuse beschouwd kan worden. Buiten de maagd Maria en Johannes de Doper worden geen andere heiligen met een lofdicht of gebed bedacht. Aard en toon van het Mariagedicht - en de plaats in de codex voor twee religieuze lofliederen van Jan van Hulst - brengen hem ertoe het gedicht aan Van Hulst toe te schrijven.

In het tweede deel van het handschrift zijn 147 liederen overgeleverd. Daarnaast moeten ongeveer 15 liederen verloren zijn gegaan. Vellekoop vermoedt dat drie teksthanden de muzieknotaties hebben verzorgd. Hij beschrijft de 'lijnen en streepjes' en constateert dat "de melodien - gezien de verschillende handen, de correcties en alternatieve versies - bekend zijn geweest bij verscheidene personen".

Heeroma heeft de liederen op voorbeeldige wijze uitgegeven (1966a)⁸ en van verklarende aantekeningen voorzien. Voor het muzikale gedeelte kreeg hij de medewerking van Lindenburg. In zijn inleiding beperkt Heeroma zich niet enkel tot de liederen, maar bespreekt hij ook min of meer uitvoerig werk uit de beide andere delen. De inleiding van de bloemlezing *Egidius waer bestu bleven* van Janssens c.s. (1992) geeft een instructieve, vooral op de liederen gerichte oriëntatie.

Het liedboek toont een gemêleerde inhoud. Reynaert geeft een beschrijving van de thematische genres en types (1992; bewerkt: 1999, 85-104) waarbij de nadruk valt op de 'onhoofse liederen'. De hoofdmoot bestaat uit liederen met een hoofs karakter waarin de *ic* op vele wijzen zijn liefde op indringende wijze betuigt. Daarnaast vinden we werk dat de liefde ironiseert en dat al of niet blasfemisch getint is. De aan *Egidius*' gewijde liederen (L98 t/m 101) (#) zijn zeer bekend. Enkele Maria-gedichten, drinkliederen en nieuwjaarsliederen, benevens twee lofdichten aan de waard, onderstrepen de verscheidenheid van de collectie. Prachtig is het *Aloette, vogel clein* (L125) (#). Grote bekendheid geniet ook het *Kerelslied* (L85) (#). Een eenstemmige interpretatie van deze twee laatste liederen is nog niet bereikt.

Na Heeroma's uitgave met de daarmee gepaard gaande discussies, kwam het accent vooral te liggen op een minder interpretatief vlak. De genres (#) in het liedboek, een mogelijke indeling en de veronderstelde buitenlandse beïnvloeding (#) werden in een aantal artikelen en boeken besproken. Aan de metriek en de rijmtechniek (#) van de 147 liederen werden ook enige studies gewijd.

Er is in het liedboek sprake van een zich tot meer complexe vormen ontwikkelende dichttechniek. Men veronderstelt dat de toenemende aandacht voor de vormgeving aan de bakermat ligt van de rederijkerstraditie. Van de drie liedvormen (#), het rondeel, het chanson en de ballade, neemt de eerste vorm een overwegende plaats in. De muzieknotatie en de muzikale presentatie (#) vormen een interessant studieobject dat al vroeg een ruime belangstelling kreeg.

De Duitstalige vormen (#) – het zogenaamde potjesmiddelhoogduits dat ook voorkomt in het Haagse Liederhandschrift en andere werken rond 1400 – vormen een probleem. Tot een voor het Gr.Hs. bevredigende, sluitende verklaring is men nog niet gekomen. De Haan (1999) geeft naast een overzicht van de bestaande theorieën ook een aantal interessante mogelijkheden. De Duitse kleuring in het Gr.Hs. acht zij een stilistisch middel dat nauw verbonden is met het hoofse minnelied (57). Zij constateert daarnaast dat in het liedboek een toenemende vaardigheid in het gebruik voorkomt. Op grond daarvan meent zij tot één auteur te kunnen besluiten (57).

2.4.3 Het derde deel met verschillende genres

8 Een verslagje van zijn activiteiten in 'Spiegel Historiae' (Heeroma 1966) Van Oostrom (1988) geeft een samenvattende beschouwing over Heeroma's vermeende triomf en de faillietverklaring van zijn methode door de medevakgenoten. Verdere literatuur in het thematisch register

Een samenvattend overzicht van de gedichten is onlangs door Reynaert (1999, 231-238) gegeven. De inhoud wordt slechts summier weergegeven. Cartons uitgave van het volledige handschrift lenen de bibliotheken niet meer uit. Soms is een fotokopie beschikbaar. De *CD-rom Middelnederlands* staat niet tot ieders beschikking. Ik geef daarom een enigszins uitvoerige beschrijving van elk van de zestien gedichten. Men krijgt zo tevens een indruk van de diversiteit van het werk in het derde deel en het geestelijk klimaat waarin het handschrift functioneerde. Enige kennis van de gedichten is noodzakelijk, omdat ik deze geregeld in de beschouwingen betrek. In de bijlage 'thematisch register' vindt men de secundaire literatuur vermeld, gespecificeerd voor de afzonderlijke gedichten.

Het derde deel bevat een zestiental teksten. Alleen het eerste en het achtste gedicht kregen wat ruimere aandacht in de vakliteratuur. Heeroma bespreekt in zijn inleiding bij de liederen op verschillende plaatsen een aantal gedichten. Hij doet dat in het kader van de auteursproblematiek en het autobiografisch karakter dat hij meent te herkennen. Hij kent met behulp van de in 3.1 beschreven techniek, de nummers **I**, **II**, **V**, **VI**, **VIII** en **XII** toe aan Jan Moritoen. De overige zouden door Jan van Hulst geschreven zijn. De gedichten **XIV** en **XV** lijken onvoltooid.

Ik geef in mijn bespreking de vindplaatsen in het convoluut en in Carton weer, de afwijkende nummering van Heeroma, het aantal versregels, de strofenbouw en de rijmvorm(en) worden vermeld.

De afschrijver markeerde het begin van een nieuwe tekst telkens door ruimte voor een tweeregelige kapitaal te reserveren. De invulling daarvan geschiedde enkel in **IIIB**. In **XI**, **XII** en **XIII** is van de ruimte slechts één regel benut. Niet ingevuld zijn de open plaatsen in **IIIA**, **IV**, **V**, **VI**, **VII**, **IX**, **X**, **XIV** en **XV**. We vinden in deze teksten slechts een kruisje of een representant aan het begin. Gedicht **I** opent als openingsgedicht met een vierregelige versierde kapitaal. Bij gedicht **II** wordt een zelfde ruimte gereserveerd, maar er is slechts een kruis ingevuld. Gedicht **VIII** kent geen kapitalen of open ruimtes. In het deel liederen vinden we vaak een tweeregelige aanvangskapitaal, maar ook éénregelige komen voor. Ze zijn daar echter altijd ingevuld. In het deel met de gebeden is geen systematiek in deze rubricering te herkennen. G2 heeft een niet ingevulde ruimte aan het begin van twee regels, verder is er altijd wel een aanvangskapitaal in diverse vormen aanwezig.

Als we het werk van de rubricator in het derde deel van het handschrift beschouwen, zien we dat deze zeer willekeurig te werk is gegaan. Kennelijk is er sprake van een zeer haastig uitgevoerde arbeid. No. **IIIA** telt slechts 33 regels, daarna zijn één of meer folio's weggevallen. Carton heeft dit in zijn collatie wel onderkend, maar houdt geen rekening met de mogelijkheid dat het daarop volgende gedicht – dat grote vormovereenkomsten toont – wel in zijn geheel bewaard gebleven is. Hij beschouwt het fragment **IIIA**, zij het door stippeltjes gescheiden, samen met het volgende gedicht als één nummer. Ik onderscheid hier twee gedichten, omdat er aan het begin van **IIIB** een open ruimte voor een kapitaal van twee regels hoog staat. Ik noem het eerste fragment met **IIIA** en het volgende (volgens mij complete gedicht) met **IIIB**. De aansluiting in nummering met de bestaande tekstuittgaven wordt zo behouden.

De teksten in het derde deel zijn niet heel coherent. Er is dus geen sluitende classificatie mogelijk. Overigens vertonen bepaalde teksten duidelijke overeenkomsten, zodat het wel mogelijk is groepen of 'genres' te onderscheiden. Hier volgen nu eerst de groepen die ik onder-

scheid en daarna een bespreking per tekst. De ordening geschiedt naar de aangebrachte indeling.

Op inhoudelijke gronden kom ik tot de volgende verdeling:

- Een vijftal 'droom'-allegorieën (de nummers **I**, **II**, **V**, **VI** en **XII**) die alle de hoofse liefde als thema hebben. Trouwens ook in het niet allegorische achtste gedicht – Deleu (1961) kenschetst het als een 'schilderij'-gedicht – is dit het geval. Het is evenwel geen allegorie. Het vierde gedicht doet een aantal opmerkelijke uitspraken over de hoofse liefde, maar dit werk reken ik gezien de opzet, toch tot de volgende rubriek.
- Een aantal gedichten met een godsdienstig-ethische strekking. Een drietal, namelijk de nummers **IV**, **XIV** en **XV**, confronteert de tijdelijke aardse met de eeuwige goddelijke liefde. **IIIA** en **IIIB** nemen de mens *verdooft in erdscher weilde* en de aardse rijkdom van de grote heren kritisch onder de loep. Ook in **IV** hekelt de dichter het gericht zijn op bezit. In **X** spreekt de dichter allerlei bevolkingsgroepen aan die zich moeten beteren. Het achtste gedicht bevat de weergave van een Paaspreek van pastoor Jan Lyoen.
- Gedicht **XIII** neemt een geheel eigen plaats in en handelt over het aanbieden van een geschenk. Enige kritisch moralistische opmerkingen zijn ook hier aanwezig. De dichter becritiseert en prijst Brugge.
- **IX** en **XI** zijn berijmde gebeden.

2.4.3.1 De groep droom-gedichten

De allegorische gedichten **I**, **II**, **V**, **VI** en **XII** sluiten aan bij de vermaarde middeleeuwse droomgeschriften van Guillaume de Lorris en Jean de Meun, Guillaume de Machaut, Jean Froissart enz. Deze groep bevat veel overeenkomstige elementen:

- de auteur gebruikt een droomtopos als legitimatie voor een fictief allegorisch verhaal.
- de droom is het raamwerk waarbinnen de naratio geplaatst is.
- de kennismaking met de geliefde, al of niet gekoppeld aan het dolage-motief.
- de traditionele kleuren- en bloemensymboliek, de fontein, de roos en de egelantier die vaak in nauwe betrekking tot de geliefde vrouw staan. We zien de vrouw onder andere voorgesteld als een duif, een roos, een burcht of een fontein.
- het via de ogen getroffen worden door de 'liefdespijlen', waarna de minnaar in een melancholische toestand geraakt met rillen, treuren en peinen.
- de zintuigen die herhaaldelijk genoemd en gepersonifieerd worden. Die zijn zeer belangrijk in de liefdesbeleving.
- het ronddolen in het lieflijke landschap - voorzien van bron of fontein, rozenstruiken, geurende bloemen, priëlen, eik en dergelijke - dat beëindigd wordt door een al of niet aangename gebeurtenis, die echter nimmer een rechtstreeks contact met de geliefde inhoudt.
- de weerstand die de vrouw biedt, vaak gekoppeld aan het wachter- of hoedermotief.

- het onderricht in de minnevoorschriften en vaak ook in de algemeen maatschappelijke deugden die de minnaar moet betrachten Dit leidt tot het raadplegen van kluzenaars, wijze vrouwen of lessen door een schoolmeester
- De minne, die in samenhang wordt gezien met godsdienst naastenliefde en de door de vrije wil geleide rede
- het belang dat aan de *rede* of de *vroescap* wordt gehecht Dit leidt tot een tweespalt tussen *amor* en *ratio*
- het open einde met een minnaar die in hoopvolle verwachting blijft zij het dat hij het in I wel heel erg bedorven heeft In VI lijkt alleen de kans te bestaan op een vereniging in het hiernamaals daar de geliefde haar leven aan Christus heeft gewijd
- de 'letterspelletjes' die door de auteur(s) met plezier worden toegepast
- de melancholische toestand waarin de minnaar verkeert door de vertwijfeling die is opgeroepen door de jaloezie of de afwijzing door de geliefde Deze toestand is waarschijnlijk gekoppeld aan het produceren van poëzie
- het prijzen van de geliefde in allerlei superlatieven en de toepassing van op haar betrekking hebbende personificaties
- het gevaar van de *nide's quantelaeren* en *clappers* die noodzaken tot *helen* [zwijgen over de geliefde]
- het besef van het minnen *bi mate* met de noodzaak de hartstocht te temperen
- de overtuiging door eigen schuld te falen vaak met de verzekering voortaan trouwer te zijn

Gedicht I (#) (folio 39r^a-42v^b en 51r^a-58v^b, Carton 233-313, Heeroma I)

Deze allegorie is met zijn in gepaard rjm geschreven 2360 verzen de langste tekst in het Gr Hs De structuur is door het gebruik van wit en kapitalen weergegeven

Er treden veel allegorische figuren op en ook het aantal dingallegorieën is zeer groot Acht liederen met muzieknotatie en zeer gevarieerde rijmschema's zijn in de tekst genterpoleerd Ze zijn zinvol in de handeling opgenomen en dragen deze deels ook Interessant is dat het lied van de door de 'ik-minnaar-auteur' gehate, conservatief ingestelde *Hoede* een lied uit de 'oude doos' genoemd wordt

Centraal in de proloog staan een uiteenzetting over de dichtkunst en de eisen die aan de recipient gesteld worden Het traditionele gebed ontbreekt in de proloog

De *ic* droomt dat hij terwijl hij door een lieflijk landschap wandelt, een licht aanschouwt dat uit de vensters [de ogen van de geliefde] van een burcht komt De burcht is de allegorische verbeelding van een dame De dichter-dromer wordt nu een verliefde minnaar Hij gaat op weg naar de geliefde Terwijl hij onzeker ronddoelt in de schitterende natuur, wordt hij bij een linde overvallen door *Twifel* en opgesloten in diens kasteel Met hulp van *Hope* ontsnapt hij Na een aantal verwickelingen komt hij met haar in de portierswoning van de burcht Hij hoort hoe *Juecht* [een aspect van de dame] een liedje schrijft, waarin ze de kernpunten van een toekomstige verhouding met hem weergeeft De liefde moet rein, eervol en duurzaam zijn Met deze edele gezindheid zal zij van begin tot eind *ghenuecht* brengen De burchtgemeenschap bediscussieert het lied uitvoerig de auteur vindt het van zo'n belang dat hij het lied – als enige in het handschrift – in een apart kader plaatst (afbeelding p 251) De *ic* legt enkele dichtproeven af Een afgekeurd gedicht vereert *Hope* Het volgende getuigt meer van zijn liefdesverwachtingen, en bezorgt hem uiteindelijk toegang tot de burcht De portiersvrouw

Versiene onderwijst hem een groot aantal ethisch getinte leefregels en hij ontvangt uit haar handen de tampons *helen ende swighen* en *ghestadicheit*.

Daarna neemt *Melancolie* hem 'in dienst' en introduceert hem in de minneburcht, dat wil zeggen dat hij toegang krijgt tot de dame. De liederen die door *Juecht* en de *ic* gemaakt zijn, spelen daarbij een grote rol. In de benedenzaal van de burcht resideert *Suverheit* [het geslachtelijke element], in de bovenzaal de *Burchtheer* [het regulerende hart van de dame]. Op voorspraak van *Melancolie* en *Versiene* accepteert de *compagnie* de minnaar. Hij ontvangt ondanks de felle tegenstand van *Hoede* en haar aanhang de sleutels *Trauwe*, *Eere* en *Antieren*. De livreeën van de vier humoren krijgt hij aangeboden. Zij zullen hem in een meer evenwichtige emotionele toestand moeten brengen. Waarschijnlijk garanderen zij een juiste menging van de lichaamsvochten.

Tijdens een verblijf dat meer dan een jaar duurt, misdraagt hij zich steeds meer. Hij is beslist op *weelde* en gedraagt zich overmoedig. Tenslotte wordt hij door *Hoede* en haar aanhang – met instemming van de *Burchtheer* – het kasteel uitgeworpen. In een sombere, ommuurde tuin betreurt hij zijn gedrag. Hij is weer in de macht van *Twifel*.

Vervolgens ontwaakt de dromer en is hij 'van de wonden ziek'.

Deze tekst is wellicht het meest becommentarieerde van alle teksten in dit intrigerende handschrift. Men is evenwel niet uit de moeilijk oplosbare problematiek gekomen. Heeroma kent aan het gedicht een belangrijke plaats toe in een conflict waarin de dichter zijn kwaliteiten wil bewijzen. Daarnaast onderkent hij een persoonlijke liefdesgeschiedenis. Hij meent dus dat het werk een sterk autobiografisch karakter draagt. De uitleg van Heeroma en zijn reacties op een aantal kritische artikelen (#), trokken sterk de aandacht.

Het gedicht geeft veel interpretatie problemen en staat centraal in mijn beschouwingen. In *Is Brugge groot?* vertellen De Haan en Oosterman (1996, 92-135) het gedicht in nnl. proza na.

Gedicht II (#) (folio 59r^a-68v^b. Carton 314-380. Heeroma II)

Deze allegorie heeft 1924 verzen met gepaard rijm. Twee liederen (zonder notenbalk) met ingewikkelde rijmschema's zijn erin opgenomen. Het eerste vat de minneproblematiek samen als afsluiting van het gesprek met een *hermite* [kluizenaar]; het tweede lied sluit de allegorie af met een klacht over de steeds weer terugkomende *twifel*. Slechts in het gesprek met de kluizenaar en rond de eerste liednotatie, is gebruik gemaakt van wit en kapitalen. De tekst loopt daarna zonder visuele structurering door (1565 regels, inclusief het slotlied). De ruimte aan het begin is opengelaten voor een vier regels hoge kapitaal, maar toont slechts een kruis dat 2½ regel hoog is. Na de gebedsproloog vangt het verslag van de droom aan.

De *ic* vertelt in een arcadisch getint landschap aan een kluizenaar hoe hij verliefd geworden is en hoe hij daarna aan jaloezie en vertwijfeling lijdt. Het gesprek eindigt vruchteloos. De kluizenaar begrijpt zijn jaloezie en gebrek aan doortastendheid niet. De minnaar wil niet biechten en neemt afscheid na de zegen te hebben ontvangen. Bij een preeel hoort hij dat Venus een rechtszitting houdt voor geplaagde minnaars die menen onrechtvaardig behandeld te zijn. De *ic* dringt, ondanks het drukke gewoel, door tot de rechtszaal en vindt de advocaat *Redene* bereid zijn zaak te bepleiten. *Jalosie* en de zijnen worden aangeklaagd. De baljuw *Nau-Merc* blijkt een oom van *Jalosie* te zijn.

Bij het rechtsgeding komt de vraag ter sprake of de beide laatstgenoemden met hun aanhang het recht hebben de minnaar zo te kwellen. Het blijkt dat dit bij een 'normale' verliefd-

heid hoort en in opdracht van Venus geschiedt. Het accent komt vervolgens te liggen op de vraag of de minnaar voldoende minnediensten [*arbeit*] verricht heeft om zijn loon te mogen ontvangen. Twee groepen met ieder zes 'hofdames' adviseren Venus. Nadat ook enkele getuigen gehoord zijn door een paar vooraanstaande raadsdames, velt de liefdesgodin op autoritaire wijze haar vonnis. De minnaar moet in gezelschap van een aantal hem kenmerkende gepersonifieerde eigenschappen bijgeschoold worden in de liefdesschool van *Getemperdhede* en zijn vrouw *Mate*. Een aantal absoluut ongewenste eigenschappen wordt verbannen uit Venus' *lande*. Als de *ic* aan het slot uit de droom ontwaakt, zingt hij een lied waarin hij zijn verlangen uit om van de vertwijfelende jaloezie – die als *Twifel* alweer aan de deur klopt – verlost te worden.

Gedicht V (folio 71r^oa-72r^oa, Carton 396-402, Heeroma VI)

Dit werkje telt maar 192 gepaard rijmende versregels. Er is geen structurering door gebruik van wit of kapitalen. De ruimte van twee regels hoog voor een aan te brengen beginkapitaal is niet ingevuld.

In de proloog richt de *ic* zich tot Venus en beklagt *zich* over de *niders* die kwaad spreken en over zijn groot minneverdriet. Hij droomt dat hij in mei in een lieflijk landschap ronddoelt om zijn treurnis te vergeten. Hij aanschouwt een liefelijke, bloeiende *eglantier* [wilde roos]. De doornen lijken niemand te kwetsen. Hij ontmoet de wijze vrouw *Redene*. We vernemen dan wat er geschied is: een duif [de geliefde] zat onbekommerd in de *eglantier* die haar beschermen moet. Buiten *zijn* schuld verschrikt de minnaar haar en bij het opvliegen prikt een doorn haar. Een vriendin vertelt haar het exempel van een boom vol rotte vruchten, een indirecte beschuldiging aan het adres van de minnaar. De vrouw verbreekt de relatie. *Redene* is zeer kwaad omdat *zij* niet geraadpleegd is. Zij wijst de minnaar op het feit dat elke boom naast slechte ook goede vruchten draagt. Zij draagt de minnaar op dit aan *zijn* geliefde te vertellen. Hij doet dit in de vorm van dit gedicht en hoopt op Gods *zegen*. Ook bidt hij om Maria's voorpraak, opdat hij en zijn geliefde *met vruechden bliven tzamen*.

Gedicht VI (#) (fol. 72r^oa-73v^oa, Carton 403-413, Heeroma VII)

Een nieuwjaarsgedicht dat gericht is aan Mergriete. Het telt 24 strofen van 13 regels (312 verzen) en bezit het kunstige rijmschema aabaabcbccdd. Dit schema wordt ook aangetroffen in het derde gebed en L128. De strofen zijn niet door wit gescheiden. De bedoeling was ze in de open gelaten ruimte aan te geven door éénregelige kapitaaltjes. De rubricator heeft deze echter niet ingevuld. Ook de twee regels hoge ruimte aan het begin is niet van een kapitaal voorzien, maar slechts van een klein kruisje.

De dichter richt zich in de proloog tot God en Maria om zijn geest te sterken ten einde het dichten succesvol te doen verlopen. Hij verzoekt tevens om gezondheid voor zijn geliefde en hemzelf. Hij vertelt dan zijn droom.

Hij heeft een bloem aanschouwd die hem geheel van streek maakte. Een niet met name genoemde *vrouwe* [*Redene*?] spreekt hem aan en de dolende minnaar vraagt haar om advies. Zij raadt hem aan de bloem [de dame] niet te vaak te zien. Indien haar kleuren worden besmet, zal God wraak nemen. De kleuren zijn groen, wit en rood. Deze spelen in de hoofse liefdesliteratuur een belangrijke rol spelen, maar krijgen hier een godsdienstige lading. Groen betekent *duecht* en deze dient eervol betracht te worden om de hemelse zaligheid te verwerven.

Wit is de kleur van *zuiverheden* en *reinicheit*. Men mag die niet schenden op straffe van Gods toorn. Rood is de kleur van de *minne* tot God, die nodig is om *crone te spannene in zijn rijc*.

De naam van de geliefde telt negen letters, die elk de beginletter vormen van een deugd. Het zijn *Miltheit, Eere, Redelicheit, Goedertierheit, Remcheit, Jonstelicheit* [goedgunstigheid], *Edelheit, Trauwe* en *Eewicheit*. De geliefde *Mergriete* heeft haar leven aan Christus gewijd, de minnaar zal haar met rust moeten laten.

In de slotstrofe belooft hij dat hij alles zal nalaten wat in haar nadeel is, opdat zij samen het eeuwige leven zullen verwerven.

Dit gedicht vormt de basis van Heeroma's theorie over de autobiografische inslag van veel werk in het handschrift. Jan Moritoen zou de schrijver zijn. Hij deelt indirect aspecten van zijn liefdesverhouding mee. De vrouw is in deze theorie de geliefde van zijn gestorven vriend Egidius.

Gedicht XII (#) (folio 43r^b-46v^a, Carton 456-478, Heeroma XIII)

Deze onregelmatig opgebouwde minneallegorie telt 661 verzen. Het is waarschijnlijk een nieuwjaarsgroet, die de minnaar aan zijn geliefde zendt. We zien een inleiding van zeven strofen die door wit gescheiden zijn. Zij tellen negen regels en tonen het rijmschema ababbcbcb. De inleiding is gericht tot de *overvloeiende fonteine* Maria. Het eigenlijke verhaal is geschreven in gepaard rijm⁹. De laatste 11 versregels (aabaabaabba) tonen het acrostichon 'Jan Morjtoen'.

In zijn droom komt de *ic* bij een fontein die bewaakt wordt door een oude wachter. Zij voelen sympathie voor elkaar en knopen een vriendelijk gesprek aan. De bewaker krijgt de aanzegging dat hij sterven moet en draagt zijn taak over aan de dichter-dromer-minnaar. Deze ziet dan een schitterende beeldengroep met aan het hoofd de koningin *Vroescap*. Uitvoerig worden de beelden, die de vijf zintuigen representeren, beschreven. *Horen, Zien, Rieken, Smake* en *Bevoelen* krijgen een morele functie toebedeeld. De fontein is afgesloten met zuivere, ivoorkeurige sleutels. Als de *ic* haar beziet, gaan twee vensters open. Het uitstralende licht raakt zijn hart en brengt hem buiten zinnen. Terwijl hij als een dwaas ronddoolt, komt hij in een bekoorlijk landschap. Terwijl hij Christus en Maria aanroept om bijstand, loopt hij verder door de prachtige omgeving. Hij aanschouwt dan een zingende vrouw, die een klavertje vier zoekt. Hij vraagt haar hulp en zal haar de oorzaak van zijn smart meedelen, mits zij belooft te zwijgen.

Nadat hij over de fontein en de hoeder zeer uitvoerig verteld heeft, ontvangt hij de gevraagde lering. De fontein, geheten *Confoort* wordt gevoed door *zes adren*. Het zijn *Troost ende Toeverlaet, Remicheit, Omoet, Vriheit, Vriendelicheit ende Wijsheit* en *Eere*. De beginletters van hun namen vormen samen het woord *Trouwe*. Altijd moet de minnaar bedacht zijn op de *eere* der fontein en niets ondernemen dat *contrare den live ende ooc der zielen* is. Dit belooft de minnaar om *confoort te crighene*.

⁹ Hierbij zij opgemerkt dat dit gedicht geenszins de titel *Ghebedt an den h Maria* draagt zoals Oosterman (1992, 190) en Reynaert (1999, 236, n. 87) menen. De titelgeving is een vrijheid die Carton zich veroorloofde. De aanduiding komt slechts voor op de linkerzijde van het folio op de open ruimte onder het voorafgaande Maria-gedicht (gedicht XI) en maakt onderdeel uit van een veel later ingeschreven tweetalige notitie, die grotendeels een eigendomsaanduiding ten name van Margrite van Borsele bevat. Volgens De Vreese (1940, 246, vervolgnoot) is deze mogelijk pas in de eerste jaren van de 18e eeuw aangebracht. De aanduiding slaat op dat voorafgaande Maria-gedicht, dat aanvangt met *Maria moeder ende zuver maecht*.

Na het uitspreken van de wens *een zalich jaer moeti hebben* en de belofte van de *ic* zich te hoeden voor *vilonie* [trouweloosheid], verdwijnt de vrouwe.

Een bede tot Maria, *de fonteine vrye*, hem te bewaren voor onrein *gepeins* en *dorpernie*, beëindigt het gedicht.

2.4.3.2 Het 'schilderij'-gedicht

Gedicht VIII (#) (fol. 75r^a-76r^b, Carton 425-436, Heeroma IX)

Dit gedicht handelt over 35 personen. Ieder van hen voert in een strofe het woord. De 35 strofen hebben verschillende regellengtes en een grote afwisseling in de rijmschema's. We vinden tien keer het rijmschema ababb, dertienmaal aabaabb, twee keer aab, twee keer abab, twee keer aabccbb, driemaal aabccbb, één keer aabcbb, één keer ababbcc en eenmaal ababbccddcdee. Schema's die in verschillende liederen, zowel in het liederendeel als in gedicht I en II, terug te vinden zijn. Het werkje telt 218 verzen.

Het centrale thema is de hoofse liefde. De overeenkomsten met de gedichten die ik samenvatte in de rubriek droomgedichten, liggen voor het grijpen. Allerlei thema's komen aan de orde: het *helen*, de *niders* en *wrougers*, de *minne-brant*, de *minlike* manieren, het minnegepeins van de melancholisch gestemde minnaar, het groene prieel, de liefdestrouw, het lijden door de jaloezie, de geliefde als prille rozenknop, het hart van de minnaar als rozenstruik, het rode liefdesgewaad en het afscheid van de geliefde met de hoop op spoedig weerzien. Verder zien we een jongeman die gewaarschuwd wordt door een oudere man. Hij moet op zijn hoede zijn, een ander neemt zijn vrouwe *biden kinne* [een traditioneel liefdesgebaar].

'Volkse' scènes wisselen de 'hoofse' tafereelen af. Een waard ruziet met zijn knecht, omdat hij het eten te laat brengt. Een tuinman zoekt tevergeefs naar de liefde. Het is een speels gedicht bij een picturale voorstelling van een schilderij, miniatuur of tapijt. Mogelijk ook een soort rollenspel bij een *tableau vivant*.

In *Is Brugge groot?* (De Haan, Oosterman 1996, 140-147) is het gedicht in nnl. proza naverteld.

2.4.3.3 De godsdienstig-ethisch getinte groep

De aansporingen in het handschrift om een goed maatschappelijk en godsdienstig leven te leiden, komen op allerlei plaatsen voor. Als de minnaar in gedicht I bij het betreden van de liefdesburcht een aantal raadgevingen ontvangt, verwachten wij adviezen die gericht zijn op de 'minne'. Zij hebben echter betrekking op maatschappelijk en godsdienstig gebied. Een zeer uitgebreid aantal adviezen trekt in deze groep gedichten aan ons oog voorbij, ze worden in de nu volgende beschrijving van de gedichten grotendeels vermeld.

Het onvoltooide IIIA (#) (fol. 68v^b, Carton 380-381, Heeroma III)

Enkel de 33 beginregels van dit gedicht zijn bewaard gebleven. Het gedicht bestaat uit strofen van zeven regels. Zij bezitten het rijmschema aabaabb. De praktisch geheel jambische

verzen met een staccato ritme zijn kort. Er is geen wit gebruikt, de strofenaanduiding geschiedt tweemaal door een kapitaaltje en twee keer door inspringen. De ruimte voor de tweeregelige aanvangskapitaal is niet ingevuld. De verzen van de tweede strofe – alle met mannelyk rijm – tellen zes, die van de overige strofen meestal zeven lettergrepen.

De dichter droomt van een man *verdoolt in erdscher weilde*. De dood kruipt in zijn vel. Hij heeft zijn tijd *verroukeloost*, Hij klaagt en roept om de nabijheid van zijn vrienden en verwanten. Zij laten hem in de steek. In zijn omgeving kunnen ze niet meer gedijen. We zien hier een motief dat ook in de *Elckerlijc* uitgewerkt wordt.

IIIB (#) (fol 69^ra-69^vb, Carton 381-386, Heeroma IV)

Ook dit gedicht kent strofen van zeven regels met het rijmschema aabaabb. De verzen met mannelyk rijm tellen doorgaans vier, de vrouwelyke vijf lettergrepen. Zij bezitten twee heffingen, meestal met een jambisch inslag. Net als in IIIA draagt het ritme een staccato karakter. Het is een zelfstandig gedicht dat 154 versregels telt. Het begin ontbreekt niet, zoals men wel gemeend heeft. Het gedicht begint namelijk met een tweeregelige kapitaal, hét openkingskenmerk van de meeste Gruuthuse-gedichten in het derde deel en van de liederen uit het tweede [2.5.3].

De dichter keert zich tegen de aardse rijkdom en de grote heren. De hemelse Vader moge ieder in zijn strijd bijstaan. De vijf wonden van Christus dragen elk de beginletter van Latijnse woorden die samen het woord *LIDEN* vormen. Christus droeg *van desen viven een cleet om ons kavnien hi daer in street*. *Lis* [stryt, wreet en fel], *Ictus* [slach es de cri], *Denudare* [maect Desolare, ontcleeden die weilde leeden], *Egestas* [aermoede] en *Necessitas* [noot es de gaet]. De mensen die dit 'kleed' van *liden* dragen, overwinnen de *weilde* en verblijden God. De nederigen worden verheven, de overwonnenen ontvangen genade. De hemelse Vader behoede ons voor het kwaad, want wij zijn blind voor het goede.

Gedicht IV (#) (fol 69^vb-71^ra, Carton 387-396, Heeroma V)

Er is geen strofische indeling in dit 278 regels tellende gedicht, het is geschreven in gepaard rijm. Naast de open plaats voor de beginkapitaal van twee regels hoog (met een klein kruisje en een kleine J), zijn er geen visuele aanduidingen voor een tekstindeling.

De dichter (*arem van trooste maer vyc van minnen*) begint deze minnerede met een groet aan de geliefde. Hij verzekert dat hij haar altijd trouw gediend en in gedachtenis gehouden heeft.

De aangename, maar tijdelijke aardse genietingen van de broze mens worden afgezet tegen het eeuwige heil. Aards goed geeft zorgen en verhindert de mens op gepaste wijze van het leven te genieten. De overdreven Venusdienst leidt tot ontgoocheling. God schiep de mens naar zijn gelijkenis, men dient zich daarnaar te gedragen. De *sotte juecht* moet in het minnegebeuren een aantal deugden betrachten. Het zijn *scamelheit, miltheit, jonst ende eere, aerbeit, trauwe, werdicheit en duecht*. De mens bezit een vrije wil. Een edele geest dient zich te schamen om het loon der liefde enkel in het vlees te zoeken. De oudere mens zal de aardse liefde achter zich laten en denken aan de eeuwige, onvergankelijke minne. Men dient zijn verstand te gebruiken en niet naar tijdelijke, maar naar de eeuwige vreugde te streven.

Dit is een belangrijk gedicht, dat in *wezen* een ethisch levensprogramma bevat. De aardse liefde wordt niet afgewezen, maar wel gerelativeerd en aan restricties gebonden. In het

menselijk leven dient een verschuiving in het beleven van de liefde plaats te vinden. De aardse component moet plaats maken voor de goddelijke.

De tekst heeft op woordniveau veel overeenkomsten met I en ook de thematiek is gedeeltelijk verwant, zo zeer zelfs dat de gedichten complementair lijken. Daarom wijd ik wat extra aandacht aan dit gedicht.

Heeroma (1969g) ziet op grond van zijn 'gidskenmerken' sterke overeenkomsten tussen I en IV. Volgens hem is het vierde gedicht een reactie van Jan van Hulst op Moritoens eerste allegorie. Het gedicht toont dezelfde stijkenmerken, maar heeft een ernstiger toonzetting. In Heeroma's artikel 'Jan van Hulst geeft antwoord' geeft hij het auteurschap van Van Hulst echter niet prijs. Als argumentatie voert Heeroma aan dat deze om didactische redenen dezelfde stijl gebruikt. De terechtwijzing zou zo meer indruk op Jan Moritoen maken. Logischer zou het m.i. zijn de beide gedichten aan één auteur toe te schrijven. De gedeeltelijk overeenkomstige, maar enigszins anders uitgewerkte thematiek steunt deze hypothese. De nog niet gerijpte minnaar slaagt niet in zijn pogingen de dame te veroveren. Ook in het tweede gedicht treedt het onvoldoende gevormd zijn van de *ic* sterk op de voorgrond.

Gedicht X (#) (fol. 76v^ob-78r^ob, Carton 440-450, Heeroma XI)

Dit ABC-gedicht, een *goet exempel* bij *desen goeden nieuwen jare*, telt vijftientig strofen, met het rijmschema ababbcbddd. De twee laatste strofen beginnen na de Z respectievelijk met een T en een C (afkortingen voor *et* en *con*). Voor de kapitalen heeft de afschrijver ruimte open gelaten, slechts zes maal zijn ze door de rubricator ingevuld. Er is steeds wit tussen de strofen.

De tekst bevat geen proloog. Als stijlfiguur wordt geregeld de apostrophe toegepast. De rechtstreekse aansprekingen tot allerlei bevolkingsgroepen verscherpen het persoonlijke standpunt van de auteur en vergroten de indringende werking. De op twee maal na terugkerende stokregel *elc zie wel voor hem hoe hi vare*, geeft nog eens een extra klemtoon. De twee andere slotregels zinspelen op hetzelfde thema: *Ten si dat men wel vorwaert vare* (strofe 9) en *Daer niement uutten weghe en vare* (strofe 25). De negende strofe van dit nieuwjaarsgedicht toont in de beginletters het acrostichon IAN VAN HVLST. Het gedicht is een tijdsklacht en maakt gebruik van veel abstracte termen.

De dichter richt zich eerst tot de *studenten vierich*, met hun kennis bereiken zij de hemel niet. Daarna worden andere groepen aangesproken: hoge klimmers vallen, stoute zwemmers verdrinken, hoge prelaten worden niet gespaard. De rijke zoekt loon als hij werkt, dit is eerloos. De prinsen *door geboorte edel*, zijn ook naakt geboren en als de stem van de waarheid klinkt, blijkt ook hun eer besmet: hoge geboorte helpt niet. De machtige Alexander *temmerde op een hijs* [bouwde op het ijs] en moest sterven. De gierige rest niets anders dan een linnen doodskleed, hij schenke zijn geld weg om tot klaarheid te komen. Keizers, koningen, graven, zij zijn slaven van hun bezit, bij het sterven wordt dit in rekening gebracht. De *musers van alle consten* moeten meer devotie tonen in hun werk. *Venus scolieren* verspillen hun tijd: als het lichaam aftakelt, bemerken ze te laat het nutteloze van hun gedrag. De vreugde van de minnaars is groot, maar loopt op niets uit en is van lage aard: de wijn raakt op als men te gulzig is. Men moet slechts klinken op wat zalig maakt. Smakelijke eters dienen te bedenken dat de vette zwijnen het eerst geslacht worden. De vette lichaamsdelen zijn van geen nut na de dood. De aanmatigende dapperen missen net als Samson de wijsheid. De zotten leven zonder vrees. Er volgen nog waarschuwingen aan hen die meer willen zijn dan hun burenen, aan de avonturiers,

aan de jongeren die dansen en springen Ook de lediggangers, de levensgenieters en de drinkers, die in de hel de rekening gepresenteerd krijgen, worden gehekeld

Ieder dient zich te beteren Wie de schoen past trekke hem aan, dan pas zal men zich onder de engelen kunnen scharen

Gedicht XIV (#) (fol 48r^a-50v^b en 79r^a-80r^b, Carton 489-517, Heeroma XV)

De titel van dit 691 regels tellende gedicht is later bijgeschreven *Van eenen joncchelmghe ende van eenen ermite* Het werkje begint met 161 door wit van elkaar gescheiden kwatrijnen met het rijmschema aabb Na de 74ste strofe is een sextet ingevoegd met het rijmschema aabbcc Het slot telt 42 gepaard rymende regels De strofen zijn niet door wit gescheiden Het gedicht eindigt tamelijk abrupt en is waarschijnlijk onvoltooid Hiervan schijnt ook de door een andere hand bijgeschreven regel *Finis est et [erit]* te getuigen

Er is een proloog van zestien regels waarin de dichter de situatie schetst waarin de handeling plaats vindt Een jongeman, *vul der werelt luste*, zoekt ontspanning in een wandeling en ziet een kluzenaar waarmee hij een vriendelijk gesprek begint

Het gelaat van de jongeling ziet er betrokken uit, echter niet door het vasten, maar door het *waken, brassieven en gheselschap goet* In de stad staat men aan deze zondige zaken bloot, maar hij zal zich proberen te onthouden van deze slechte levenswijze

De heremiet vindt dit onvoldoende Men moet *vasten aelmoesen ende bedinge lesen ende dikwile te zermoene gaen* De jongeling wil niet biechten en preken aanhoren de prediking is zo streng dat hij in zeven jaar geen vreugde meer zou kennen Hij wil wel luisteren naar iemand die hem van zijn [liefdes]kwaal kan genezen, maar niet naar de sermoenen van priesters die zelf ook geregeld zondigen Trouwens "God laat de berouwvolle zondaar in zijn laatste uur niet in de steek"

De kluzenaar wijst hem erop dat hij zijn *brieven* [verantwoordingsstaat met goede werken] zal moeten laten zien De jongeman erkent die niet te bezitten, maar Magdalena had die ook niet en kreeg toch vergeving Hijzelf heeft Gods roepen niet gehoord Zodra dit gebeurt, zal hij zijn leven beteren

Dan volgt een exempel van een stervende kluzenaar Deze wijst er zijn medebroeders op dat berouw in het stervensuur te laat is Men moet God reeds tijdens het leven indachtig zijn

De jonge man kan God echter niet liefhebben, hij bemint een schone dame en zal niet rusten voor hij bij haar is De anachoreet verwijt hem dat een liefje zo tot een afgod wordt De jongeling werpt tegen dat hij *zijns* gelijke bemint en zich verder ook niet schuldig maakt aan de zeven hoofdzonden Hij somt ze op *vul hoerden ghenich, overudich, vertraecht licht verstoort en gulzich sijn* en tenslotte 'onreine liefde *elken wive ghemeine* bedrijven' De kluzenaar heeft dan 375 regels nodig om op spitsvondige wijze in een socratisch opgezet leergesprek, duidelijk te maken dat de jongeman wel degelijk zondig is op de genoemde punten

Voor het laatste gedeelte waarin de minnaar zegt wel *amoueux* maar niet *luxurieux* te zijn, vraagt met ongeveer 155 verzen veel ruimte De minnaar geeft toe wel eens begerig [*luxurieux*] naar andere vrouwen te kijken De heremiet wijst erop dat Eva Adam – door toedoen van Lucifer – verleidde, hij verbrak zo Gods geboden Tot troost zij gezegd dat Christus, geboren uit een maagd, aan het kruis sprak dat alle dingen wel zijn gedaan God maakt, maar breekt niet Als de jongeling wil weten of Adam nog *cione int paradijs* droeg, eindigt het

gedicht met *Jai kint ... Coninc was hi, maer niet ghecroont. Dat wart¹⁰ bi redenen di ghe-toont*. De 'redenen' volgen echter niet.

Gedicht XV (#) (fol. 82r^a-85r^a, Carton 518-540, Heeroma XVI)

Dit werkje telt 600 verzen en is misschien onvoltooid gebleven. Er is een regel bijgeschreven die vermeldt: *minre nu merc dan tander blat*. Er volgt echter geen vervolg. Het gedicht toont een merkwaardige bouw. Er zijn 17 door wit gescheiden tekstgedeelten met verschillende lengtes. De tekst begint met een kapitaal van twee regels hoog.

Het gedicht is gericht tot de *mimmers des onzeker's tijts*. Daarna volgen gebeden tot God en Maria. Vervolgens zijn er vijftien strofen van vijf regels met Ave Maria's (*15 bloumen uut-vercoren*), daarna komen er twee passages die een recapitulatie bevatten. De inhoud correspondeert met deze tekstverdeling. De voor de kapitalen open gelaten ruimtes zijn niet ingevuld. De lange tekstgedeeltes tonen gepaard rijm, de oneven fragmenten eindigen met drie rijmende regels, of kennen overlopend rijm met de volgende strofe (407-408, 467-468). De Ave Maria's zijn niet door wit gescheiden zoals Carton aangeeft, de scheiding vindt plaats door het boven plaatsen van de woorden *Ave Maria* of *Ave*. De vijf regels tellende strofen bezitten het rijmschema ababb.

In een proloog vertelt de *arem rudaris Jan* waarom hij het gedicht schreef. De dolende mens heeft geestelijk voedsel nodig om volhardend voort te gaan op zijn levensreis en zijn begeerten te overwinnen. Hij richt zich specifiek tot de minnenden. Zij hebben van God verstandelijk inzicht, gevoel en een vrije wil meegekregen. Liefde komt tot stand *van horen secghen ...* of van ziene. *Vooral het laatste zet het hart in vlam*.

Negen punten moet men betrachten: *reinicheit* bezitten van binnen en van buiten, gene-genheid laten zien, zedig, eensgezind en vredelievend zijn, rustgevende hoop koesteren, iemand op aangename wijze tot dienst zijn en een bereidwillige dienstbaarheid tonen. Op de on-vernijdelijk onenigheid gevende *invidia* [jaloezie] zal de dichter nader terugkomen. Als laatste wordt de noodzaak van een zinvolle tijdsbesteding genoemd.

Een tussen geplaatste oproep volgt en is gericht aan hen die van de juiste weg zijn afgedwaald. Een vast geloof is de beste reiswijzer en sterkt de door zonden verzwakte benen. De schede waarin het zwaard steekt is de ootmoedigheid, het zwaard zelf de gerechtigheid¹¹. De wijze zal men om raad moeten vragen. Men moet niet de menselijke natuur volgen, maar het goede betrachten en op zijn hoede zijn zonder roekeloos te zijn. Belangrijker dan de aardse leeftocht zijn het brood uit de mond der wijzen en de wijn van Christus.

Dan volgt een nieuwe reeks aanbevelingen voor de minnaars: 'wereldlijke minnaars, ziet naar de hemelse roos die gekruisigd werd, hij geeft de weg aan en dient het schild te zijn! Minnaars, waar zijn uw aalmoezen, uw tranen, uw vasten, uw gebeden, uw ootmoed en gerechtigheid? Wandel in het licht, keer u af van de duisternis der aardse liefde! Ik bid Maria om

¹⁰ *wart* gebruik van een imperfectum in de zin van een presens (Stoett. § 248) ter omschrijving van een futurum (Stoett § 243, opm. IV) Mogelijk ook een imperfectum waarbij de 'redenen' in de tekst verborgen liggen

¹¹ Vergelijkingen berustend op oorlogsattributen vindt men ook in de preek van Jan Lyoen (gedicht VII).

haar voorspraak.' Opnieuw begint de dichter met zijn boodschap aan de Minners. We vinden dezelfde gedachten, de bewoordingen zijn echter iets anders (311-388).

Dan volgen gebeden tot God (389-407) en Maria. Het laatste kent een inleiding van 30 regels, waarna vijftien keer vijf Ave Maria's volgen vol Maria-metaforiek, veertien keer over de vreugde, en eenmaal over de droefheid.

Hierna wordt de minnaar weer aangesproken. Hem wordt geleerd welk gebed hij uit moet spreken. Ten slotte volgt de raadgeving de negen genoemde punten indachtig te zijn.

De compositie schijnt zo rond te zijn. Waarop de losstaande toevoeging *o minre nu merc dan tander blat* slaat, is niet duidelijk. Het is mogelijk dat bedoeld wordt op een ander gedicht dat oorspronkelijk gepland was, maar niet is opgenomen of overgeleverd.

Het *EYNDE* is niet afkomstig uit het oorspronkelijke handschrift, het is vermoedelijk in 1462 of nadien toegevoegd om aan te geven dat er geen ander blad volgt¹².

2.4.3.4 De aanbieding van een geschenk

Gedicht XIII (#) (fol.46v^a-48r^a, Carton 479-488, Heeroma XIV)

We zijn getuige van het aanbieden van een geschenk (een maquette of afbeelding waarop Brugge wordt weergegeven) aan de *coninc van den Witten Bere* te Brugge. Dit geschiedt onder het uitspreken van 270 aaneengesloten verzen met gepaard rijm.

Na een korte proloog gericht aan *Dalmoghende God Emanuel*, vertelt een kluizenaar *arem, rud, stomp, cranc, houd van daghen* aan de *coninc van den Witten Beere* en de leden van het *Blomkin van Brugghe*, dat hij de stad Brugge verlaten heeft. Hij was onthutst door het gebrek aan naastenliefde als het minder met iemand gaat. Tevens was hij ontstemd over de kwaadsprekerij over geliefden, zelfs over de vrouwen die zich in gezelschap voorbeeldig gedragen. Toen hij bovendien het nutteloze en vergankelijke van al het aardse bezit inzag, heeft hij zich teruggetrokken in het 'foreest'. Met twee 'wilde' jongelingen die hij daar ontmoette en christelijk opvoedde, keert hij nu naar de stad terug (waarschijnlijk op Driekoningenavond) om de koning van het toernooigezelschap een geschenk aan te bieden dat zij gemaakt hebben.

Het cadeau beeldt de zeven Brugse poorten, muren, torens en vestingwerken én de *bewares der bloumkine* [waarschijnlijk Maria] uit. Steeds wordt iedere poort aan twee deugdvolle be-grippen gekoppeld. Zij vormen samen het woord *Brucghe*. Het zijn de deugden *Broederschap en Bliscap, Recht en Rede, Vroescap en Vriheit, Cracht en Confoort, Gonst en Goedertierheit, Hope en Heil* (dit bij de poort naar het Zwin) en tenslotte *Eendrachticheit en Eere*. Brugge wordt met deze deugden de ideale stad.

Als de koning nu de wijn laat inschenken, zullen ze gedrieën *metter spoet* teruggaan naar de hermitage om het volgende jaar terug te komen.

In *Is Brugge groot?* (De Haan, Oosterman 1996, 84-91) is het gedicht in nnl. proza naverteld.

12 De Vreese 1940, 243, vermeldt het opnieuw inbinden en het "naderhand wel beschreven zijn met kleinigheden" Dat dit tot verlies van bladen en omzettingen geleid heeft, doorzag hij blijkbaar niet.

De Paaspreek (gedicht VII) van Jan Lyoen is één van de weinige overgeleverde preken in het Middelnederlands die naar een orale bron wijst (Sonnemans 1995, 195). De beginregel kent ruimte voor een kapitaal van twee regels hoog, maar deze is niet ingevuld. Voor de aanduidingen *eerste point*, *ander point*, enz. is ruimte overgelaten voor een (niet ingevuld) kapitaalje. Nergens wordt wit gebruikt in de 309 regels met gepaard rijm.

De dichter begint met de constatering dat men niet zonder de genade van God tot de ware godsdienstige instelling kan komen. Christus stierf en herrees uit de dood om de zonden der mensen te boeten. Dit alles hoorde de dichter in een preek van Jan Lyoen, die hij met zijn *ruut* begrip *rudelic* [grofweg] zal trachten in ruimer kring bekend te maken.

De grondslag van de preek wordt gevormd door vier *condicien* [de vier vreugden van Pasen]. Het eerste *point* handelt in 36 regels over het weerstaan van de duivel. Men zal niet opnieuw in *der zonden dans* treden als men het heilig avondmaal heeft ontvangen. De meeste aandacht krijgt de volgende *expocisie*, 181 verzen groot, waarin de wapenrusting van een strijdende ridder en de harp van David allegorisch geduid worden. Een deugdzame ridder strijdt op zijn paard om heil te verkrijgen. Zijn uitrusting bestaat uit sterke teugels, scherpe sporen, een gepunte lans en een zwaard. Hij is gekleed in een goed pantser dat overtrokken is met een wit kleed. Het paard zal ons de weg der menselijke natuur doen gaan, de teugel en de sporen verhoeden dit. De lans zal weren wat de mens vroeger deerde. Mocht de lans breken, dan dient men het tweezijdig scherp snijdend zwaard van Gods woord te trekken. Dit zwaard dient door te snijden waar de menselijke vleeselijke natuur teveel aan hecht: de ziel dient gescheiden te worden van het vlees. Men zal trouw naar de kerk gaan om de ziel rein te houden. De tien geboden vormen het pantser dat vast en gesloten moet zijn. Een klein gaatje velt de mens, gelijk een sterk kasteel valt als een onnozelen deurtje openstaat. Het beeld van de harp dient om de gedachte verder uit te werken. Boven is zij wijd als de uitgespreide armen van Christus aan het kruis, vanonder smal als de voeten. De snaren geven een heerlijke klankrijke melodie. Het derde punt (21 verzen) behelst de eendracht *in rade en dade*. Het vierde (18 regels) de aanwijzing dat men ook als men in een hoge maatschappelijke staat verkeert, altijd het beeld van Christus en Maria voor ogen dient te houden.

In 19 slotregels verzekert Lyoen ieder dat men een zalig mens is, als men zich aan de geopenbaarde regels houdt en leeft *in Gode*. God zal deze mens in zijn rijk brengen.

2.4.3.6 *De twee gebeden* (#)

Waarom deze gebeden niet in het eerste deel zijn opgenomen, is onduidelijk. Zij dragen een zelfde karakter als de teksten in dat deel, met name het tweede gebed. Het eerste toont wel veel moralistische trekken, net als trouwens het tweede gebed uit het eerste deel.

Gedicht IX¹³ (#) (fol. 76r^ob-76v^ob, Carton 436-439, Heeroma X)

Dit gebed telt zeven clausules, de dertien regels hebben het daarbij passende rijmschema: aabaabaabaabb. De open plaatsen voor de aanvang van de strofen zijn niet benut. Een kruisje vult de open ruimte op aan het begin van de eerste twee regels.

Opmerkelijk is de opbouw van deze tijdsklacht: drie strofen zijn gericht tot Maria, de middelste spreekt God aan, de laatste drie stellen vertwijfelde vragen aan Christus.

In de bede tot Maria horen we dat het volk in weelde leeft en belust is op geld. Het verstand is op hol geslagen, gerechtigheid is afwezig. Ieder belaaft de ander. Men is op weg naar de hel.

In de middelste strofe (40-52) vraagt de dichter wat het loon van Christus' kruisdood is. De man zoekt zijn behagen in *wilde wiven, paerden scone* en *telergie te crighen es ghewone* [kennis verwerven].

De laatste drie strofen vragen wanhopig aan Christus waar de geboden van de Paus zijn en waar de goddelijke springbron van de evangeliën is, die de mens op de rechte weg voert. 'Waarom laat God ons verloren gaan, nergens is troost. Men dient de florijn, Reynaert is tot Paus gekozen. Onze boom staat verdord, we gaan gebukt onder zonden. Wees ons genadig, voor onze ziel vergaat', aldus de tekst. Een toespeling op het gezelschap van de *Droge Boom*, wier dames de dichter in de tweede allegorie begroet.

Gedicht XI (#) (fol. 78r^ob-78v^ob en 43 r^oa, Carton 451-455, Heeroma XII)

Het tweede gebed is in zijn geheel een Maria-gebed en een vertaling van het *Obsecro te*. Het telt 140 regels in gepaard rijm en is visueel niet gestructureerd. De beginregel toont een 'vette' kapitaal van één regel hoog, de ruimte die de tweede regel biedt, is onbenut gelaten.

De aanspreking van Maria geschiedt met de bekende metaforen als moeder, zuivere maagd, dochter van de opperste koning, draagster van de *hemelse crone*, fontein van *ontfermigheit* enz. Men doet een beroep op haar goedertierenheid, ootmoedigheid, volmaakte minne en haar verhevenheid boven de engelen en aartsengelen. De kruisiging van Christus wordt aangehaald en het leed dat zij, de bloem der vrouwen, daarbij heeft geleden. Zij moet hulp en raad bieden in angst en nood, gratie en bescherming geven, en de mens bewaren voor zonden en hem heilige gedachten in de geest zenden. De vijf zintuigen moet zij besturen, helpen om de tien geboden te houden, en hulp bieden om de zeven hoofdzonden te vermijden. De dichter spreekt de hoop uit dat zij de gelovige op zijn laatste dag mag bijstaan, troost zenden en het hemelse leven schenken.

¹³ Het is niet duidelijk waarom Oosterman (1995) dit gedicht niet opneemt in zijn opsomming van berijmde gebeden. Het voldoet geheel aan de criteria die hij noemt in zijn eerste hoofdstuk (17-44). Dit klemt te meer daar hij bij de begripbepaling van 'gebed' kiest voor een meer "rekkelijke opvatting" (44). Heeroma zegt onomwonden: "Het "is een betrekkelijk kort strofisch gebed - het had - even goed in het gebedenboek kunnen staan" (1966, 39).

BALANS VAN HET ONDERZOEK NAAR DE EERSTE ALLEGORIE

3.0 Inleiding

Na Blommaerts opmerkingen in de uitgave van Carton (1848/1849) is Van Mierlo (1940, 39-40) de eerste die iets over de inhoud van de eerste allegorie zegt. Hij vermeldt de verwantschap met de Franse *Roman de la Rose* door de allegorische inkleding en het gehele spel van allegorische personages. Hij wijst verder op onderdelen als de droom, de locus amoenus, de fontein, de minnepijlen die afgeschoten worden uit vensters [de ogen van de dame] en een burcht die moeizaam betreden kan worden. Opvallend vindt hij de ironische ondertoon. Hij acht het een wonderlijk gedicht waarin Jeugd een koddig liedje zingt dat niemand begrijpt. Het gaat er alleszins potsierlijk aan toe: men kijkt er door spleten en verricht er allerlei belachelijke dingen. Naar de bedoeling kan men slechts raden, aldus Van Mierlo.

Ruim een kwart eeuw heerst er dan stilzwijgen rond de eerste allegorie, totdat Heeroma op verzoek van de zoon van Willem de Vreese het tweede gedeelte van het convoluut met de liederen uitgeeft. Hij doet dit in een jubileumuitgave van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde (1966), die hij als in een roes, in de betrekkelijk korte tijd van ongeveer een jaar tot stand brengt. In de inleiding beperkt Heeroma zich niet enkel tot het liedboek, maar maakt hij ook vele opmerkingen over de rest van het convoluut. Na deze editie verschijnt er nog een aantal publicaties van Heeroma die verschillende facetten van het Gr.Hs. onder de loep nemen. De meeste aandacht wijdt hij aan de eerste allegorie. Alleen Ern  reageert uitvoerig met het schrijven van een artikel. Ruim dertig jaar heerst er daarna stilte rond de nog niet bevredigende interpretatie.

Bij de verschillende studies die aan de liederen in het Gr.Hs. gewijd zijn, worden die in de eerste en tweede allegorie meestal over het hoofd gezien. Lassche (1994) wijst op de grote overeenkomsten tussen L140 en het slotlied van de tweede allegorie. Reynaert en Willaert hebben in 1999 en 2000 enkele uitspraken gedaan over het lied van Jeugd en de introductielieder van de minnaar.

3.1 De opvattingen van Heeroma en Ern 

De uitgave van de liederen met tekstverklarende aantekeningen door Heeroma (1966a) waardeert de vakpers vanwege zijn filologische degelijkheid in het algemeen zeer. De inleiding echter ondervindt zware kritiek op grond van de vele niet bewezen, of niet te bewijzen hypothesen. De werkwijze van Heeroma is een zeer bijzondere. Deze is in hoofdzaak geba-

seerd op twee principes: de invoelende, intuïtieve benadering en het onderzoeken en vergelijken van stilistische kenmerken in teksten¹⁴

Het eerste uitgangspunt van Heeroma berust op de gedachte dat hij als dichter beschikt over een bijzonder invoelend intuïtief leesvermogen. Hij is daardoor in staat zich zodanig in de roerselen van een andere dichtsterlijke ziel te verplaatsen, dat hij allerlei uitspraken kan doen over diens diepere bedoelingen en prive-leven, ook al geven de teksten daar geen directe expliciete informatie over. Op die manier destilleert Heeroma met hulp van zijn 'luisterend oor' uit de teksten in het Gr Hs een tamelijk uitgebreide biografie van de dichter Jan Moritoen. We kunnen op deze wijze kennis maken met een driehoeksverhouding tussen twee vrienden en een vrouw. Nadat hij door een geliefde afgewezen is, richt de ene vriend (Jan Moritoen) zijn avances op een andere vrouw (Mergriete) die verloofd is met Egidius. De toenaderingspogingen bereiken een hoogtepunt als de laatste gestorven is. Helaas voor Jan Moritoen gaat de vriendin een klooster in, waar hij haar nog zijn liefde laat blijken. Een verdere veronderstelling van Heeroma is dat de bundel met liederen bestaat uit twaalf cycli die gedeeltelijk de fases in het liederleven van Jan representeren.

Het tweede uitgangspunt is dat Heeroma in het convoluut op zoek gaat naar zogenaamde stilistische 'gidskenmerken'. Dit zijn typerende stilistische eigenschappen, een markante verteltrant en een terugkerende thematiek. Verder rekent hij ertoe een bijzonder woordgebruik en de toepassing van bepaalde rijmklanken.

Een aantal teksten is voorzien van een acrostichon dat de naam van een auteur onthult. Heeroma vergelijkt de gidskenmerken in een tekst die van een acrostichon voorzien is, met die in een anonieme tekst. Geerts (1904) was Heeroma met deze werkwijze bij haar onderzoek van het Gr Hs al voorgegaan. Als de naamloze tekst dezelfde 'gidskenmerken' vertoont als een gesigioneerde, is dat een bewijs dat hij van dezelfde auteur is. Nieuwe 'gidskenmerken' uit deze anonieme tekst kunnen vervolgens gebruikt worden om weer andere teksten aan dezelfde auteur toe te schrijven. Bij deze werkwijze neemt Heeroma het hele convoluut in ogenschouw en komt zo tot twee auteurs: namelijk Jan Moritoen en de wat oudere Jan van Hulst. Elke tekst uit het eerste en derde deel kent hij aan een van beide auteurs toe. Elk krijgt zo een steeds uitgebreider corpus toebedeeld. Op grond van zijn bevindingen meent Heeroma dat het gehele liedboek door Jan Moritoen geschreven is.

Aangezien al de hypothesen rond Moritoen niet met voldoende wetenschappelijke argumenten onderbouwd werden, kwam er veel kritiek. Men wees intuïtie als uitgangspunt voor het onderzoek af. De autobiografische lading achtte men, door het ontbreken van duidelijke argumenten, niet bewezen. Ook de gebruikte tekstvergelijkende methode vond men niet waterdicht. Heeroma heeft zich in verschillende artikelen hardnekkig, en tenslotte nogal verbitterd, verdedigd. De 'vakgenoten' heeft hij evenwel niet kunnen overtuigen. Bij de bespreking van deze publicaties onderkent Gerritsen (1987, 17) een groot inlevingsvermogen en een benijdenswaardige intuïtie. Hij ziet echter een zekere gretigheid in het oprichten van litterair-historische constructies, ook als het noodzakelijke filologische funderingswerk nog niet is uit-

14 Een procedé dat hij al eerder met succes toepaste bij het identificeren van losse anonieme tekstfragmenten die hij op grond van zijn intuïtie en stilistische en andere overeenkomsten kon bundelen tot de boekuitgave van *De tweede rosc* (1958). Heeroma paste de onderzoeksmethode ook toe in artikelen rond de *Lantsloot vande Haghedocht*.

gevoerd. Deze werkwijze heeft Heeroma's Leidse leermeester in de codicologie Lieftinck samengevat onder de term 'Avontuurlijke wetenschap' (1967).

Eigenlijk weet men nog steeds niet wat men precies aan moet met Heeroma's bevindingen. In *Handgeschreven wereld* (Hogenelst en Van Oostrom 1995, 246) stellen de auteurs de intrigerende vraag "was Heeroma een falende wetenschapper of een miskend genie?" Zij vermelden hierbij dat latere onderzoeken Heeroma steeds meer gelijk lijken te gaan geven, al blijven zijn gedurfde speculaties over de leden van het Gruuthuse-gezelschap discutabel. De moeilijkheid bij zo'n generaliserende uitspraak is dat niet gezegd wordt op welke punten dit eventuele gelijk slaat. Heeroma heeft zoveel tegenstrijdigs gezegd dat men nooit weet welke uitspraak men nu precies voor 'waar' aannemen moet. Het is bijvoorbeeld ondoenlijk Heeroma's beweringen ten aanzien van de eerste allegorie als uitgangspunt voor een onderzoek te nemen, omdat zij voortdurend wisselen.

Literatuurvermeldingen met betrekking tot deze kwesties vindt men in het thematisch register.

In de inleiding van het liedboek kent Heeroma de eerste allegorie aan Jan Moritoen toe. Opmerkelijk is dat een aantal allegorieën in Heeroma's uiteenzetting gelden als representanten van het liefdesleven van Jan Moritoen, maar dat de eerste en de tweede allegorie daar buiten vallen en op dit punt betrekkelijk weinig aandacht krijgen. Heeroma meent aanvankelijk zelfs dat de eerste allegorie niets met liefde te maken heeft, maar gezien moet worden als een dichterlijke poging van Jan zich te rehabiliteren in een dichtkring waaruit hij verstoten is. Later laat Heeroma de mogelijkheid open – met tegenzin lijkt het – dat de liefde toch ook een rol speelt.

Heeroma publiceert daarna een aantal artikelen over de eerste allegorie met haar vele problemen. Uitgangspunt daarbij is steeds het vermeende autobiografische karakter. De dichter Jan Moritoen wil toegang verkrijgen tot de in het gedicht centraal staande burcht, een 'dicht'-burcht, en wel één die een Brugs dichtgezelschap symboliseert waaruit hij verwijderd is. De eerste allegorie concentreert zich zo op het dichterschap van Jan Moritoen en de juiste wijze van dichten en heeft dus geen betrekking op de liefdesdriehoek Egidius-Mergriete-Jan. Natuurlijk komt ook op deze beschouwing kritiek en we zien dan hoe Heeroma tamelijk geërgerd zijn standpunten geheel of gedeeltelijk herziet, dan weer opneemt en met steeds andere 'bewijzen' naar voren komt (die de vakgenoten als kaarten in een kaartenhuis beschouwen). Tenslotte komt hij toch weer grotendeels op zijn oude interpretatie terug en legt weer het accent op de rehabilitatie van Jan als dichter, die probeert toelating te verkrijgen tot de dichtburcht.

Het is zeer moeilijk een juist beeld te krijgen van de, een sterk jojo-karakter bezittende hypothesen, en de daaraan verbonden 'bewijzen'. Oude standpunten worden verlaten, dan weer geheel of gedeeltelijk opgenomen, nieuwe worden ingenomen en weer verlaten of gedeeltelijk gehandhaafd.

Bij het lezen van Heeroma's artikelen krijgt men af en toe grote bewondering voor zijn leesvaardigheid en interpretatievermogen. Een bewondering die afgewisseld wordt door een grote verwondering over de vele voorbarige conclusies of veronderstellingen en de niet te volgen gedachtesprongen. Literaire studie beschouwt Heeroma (1970) als 'lees oefeningen' Misschien stonden deze oefeningen rond de eerste allegorie in dienst van de geplande Gruuthuse-uitgave die gewijd zou zijn aan het derde deel, maar die nooit is verschenen.

Meer concreet denkt Heeroma (1969b) aanvankelijk dat **I** over *const* gaat, omdat in de proloog geen dame genoemd wordt. De burcht slaat niet op een dame, is slechts decor en moet beschouwd worden als een burcht van *rhétorique*. De dichtkunst is het centrale motief en de kaproen die de dichter van *Melancolie* ontvangt, is een soort lidmaatschapsbewijs van de *compagnie* [een dichtgezelschap]. De dichter handelt verkeerd en wordt verwijderd. De allegorie is een zelfrechtvaardiging in een kritieke levenssituatie. Heeroma erkent dat dit alles slechts "raden naar de bedoeling" is.

In een vervolgartikel (1969c) legt Heeroma het accent iets meer op de *minne*. De dichter wil de *compagnie* omvormen tot een 'minnekring'. *Minne* is nu niet een *Vrou Rhétorique*, maar een niet nader te bepalen poëtische existentie. De kring weet niet wat minne is, in tegenstelling tot de dichter die een speciale wijding heeft ontvangen. Hij drinkt uit de bron, krijgt pijlen in het hart en *Verziene* verzorgt hem en verstrekt hem voorschriften. De dichter heeft de opdracht tot dichten – dit is minnen – van God ontvangen. Er is dus een religieuze achtergrond. Heeroma beweert dit op basis van de constatering dat het woord 'God' veelvuldig is gebruikt.

De allegorische figuren zijn in dit artikel een soort sleutelfiguren geworden. Het zijn vermomd optredende kringleden. Heeroma suggereert bijvoorbeeld dat *Suverheit* misschien wel Moritoens vriendinnetje is. Ze is hoogstaand en het middelpunt van de kring. De dichter heeft een intieme verhouding met haar. Zij is mogelijk de inspiratie voor het 'dichten is minnen'. *Suverheit* zou overigens ook wel eens familie van de burchtgraaf kunnen zijn. Dat zou dan de reden zijn waarom de liefde ongeoorloofd is.

Dan volgt een artikel van Ern , genaamd 'Een liefdesdroom' (1970). We bespreken zijn visie eerst, ter wille van de chronologische volgorde, voor we met Heeroma verder gaan. Veel invloed heeft Ern s visie overigens niet op Heeroma's laatste artikel gehad, ongevoelig als de laatste was voor de argumentatie van opposanten.

Ern  maakt bezwaar tegen Heeroma's opvatting dat hij als begenadigd indringend lezer ontheven zou zijn van de plicht zijn beweringen te bewijzen of te beargumenteren en dat hij meent te kunnen volstaan met 'raden'. Hij erkent de mogelijkheid dat de dichter met zijn allegorische figuren bepaalde personen uit zijn omgeving op het oog had, maar dat het gedicht het karakter van een sleutelroman heeft, acht hij niet bewezen. Het autobiografische aspect is niet hard te maken.

Het lied van Jeugd (een projectie van de jeugdige dame die de grenzen van het toelaatbare stelt) is tot vrouwen gericht, het lied van de dichter tot mannen. Beide vullen elkaar aan. De burchtheer stelt de dame voor met de in haar levende krachten. Zij beoordeelt niet de po tische gaven, maar neemt de minnaar als mens onder de loep. De aanbevelingen gedaan door *Verziene* en *Melancolie* zijn doorslaggevende factoren. Enkele figuren kunnen ook invloeden zijn vanuit de omgeving van de vrouw. Mogelijk is de verdeeldheid in de burcht [het binnenste van de vrouw] alleen maar verlevendiging.

Ern  vindt het een typisch mannenverhaal. We zien aan het slot geen deernis met de vrouw, wel zelfbeklag van de * c* die de mores overtreden heeft en zichzelf schuldig verklaart. Hij heeft gezondigd tegen de hoofsheid, de ootmoedigheid, de simpelheid enz. De eer van *Suverheit* is echter bewaard gebleven. Er zijn in de tekst drie niveaus: de auteur vraagt in de proloog waardering voor zijn werk, de dichter ziet in de inleiding de droom als een waarschuwing en de dromer/minnaar vertelt het verhaal.

Na het verschijnen van Ernés artikel maakt Heeroma (1971a) een vergelijking tussen I en de “Brabantse vertaling” van de *Roman de la Rose*, die hij heeft “gelezen in een Vlaams afschrift”. Hij ziet een aantal evidente tekstovereenkomsten en gaat ervan uit dat Moritoen die tekst goed gekend heeft (125)¹⁵. Hij vindt dat Erné evenveel raadt als hij. Het is opmerkelijk dat Heeroma niet op de argumentatie van zijn opponent ingaat. Hij wil uit de ‘raden-raden’-cyclus komen door iets onbekends te benaderen door middel van iets bekend.

Hij acht de bedoeling van de dichter van de *Roman de la Rose* bekend en wil nu nagaan met welke opzet Jan Moritoen heeft overgenomen, weggelaten, toegevoegd, verschoven en geaccentueerd. Heeroma noemt deze wijze van handelen ‘dichterlijk reïnterpreteren’. Er vinden allerlei verschuivingen plaats in de proloog en de epiloog. De dame wordt een groep kunstenaars, de rivier een fontein. Het drinken uit de fontein legt het accent zodanig op de mond dat Heeroma aan dichten denkt. De minne-eenheid *Jonckheit-Vrient* wordt de dicht-en-zing-eenheid ‘Jeugd-Lust’. De leergierige minnaar uit de *Roman de la Rose* verandert in een be-gaafde dichter. Het doel is niet het kussen van de rozenknop, maar de eenwording met de burchtgraaf.

Daarnaast verwacht Heeroma op grond van onderzoek naar de visuele structurering van de tekst de bedoeling van de dichter te kunnen verduidelijken. Hij meent dat door een specifiek hoofdlettergebruik en het aanbrengen van wit tussen de regels markeringen zijn aangebracht die een significante betekenis hebben. Heeroma onderzoekt deze nu in zijn artikel en meent zo een degelijke grondslag voor de interpretatie te geven. Hij roept op tot een discussie. Niemand heeft echter gereageerd op deze nogal cryptische onderzoeksmethode.

Hoe gevaarlijk Heeroma’s werkwijze is, blijkt uit zijn artikel ‘Jan van Hulst geeft antwoord’ (1969g) over het vierde gedicht. Hij behandelt hierin de overeenkomsten van dat gedicht met I. Beide werken hebben zoveel ‘gidskenmerken’ gemeen dat men zou verwachten dat Heeroma beide aan Jan Moritoen zou toekennen. Ook inhoudelijk zijn er opvallende parallellen. Op grond van niet duidelijke – waarschijnlijk intuïtief gefundeerde – gronden kent Heeroma het gedicht desondanks toch aan Jan van Hulst toe. De methode geeft dus tegenstrijdige uitkomsten. Heeroma lost dat op door Van Hulst een dichterlijke waarschuwing te laten schrijven in dezelfde stijl – om meer indruk te maken – als zijn jongere vriend. De waarschuwing heeft duidelijk betrekking op de ‘lustige’ neigingen die aan de jeugd worden toegekend. Hoe dit dan verband houdt met gedicht I dat – volgens Heeroma – inmiddels alweer vooral op het dichterschap betrekking heeft, vermeldt hij niet.

Zoals gezegd kom ik in deze dissertatie slechts een enkele maal terug op Heeroma’s methode en zijn opvattingen, waarmee ik het grotendeels oneens ben. Aan de andere kant is Heeroma wel degelijk een heel goed lezer. Hij en ik komen op verschillende punten wel tot overeenkomstige conclusies. Maar veel duidelijker dan Heeroma plaats ik met Erné het gedicht in het kader van de hoofse minnellyriek. Er zijn bovendien veel aspecten die het gedicht een plaats geven in het complexe sociale discours van het Brugge van omstreeks 1400.

¹⁵ Men ziet hier de typische werkwijze van Heeroma. Hij gaat uit van een aantal niet bewezen hypothesen en gaat dan een heel betoog opbouwen.

3.2 Reynaert en Willaert over de liederen

Met het noemen van de rol die de jeugd speelt, komen we bij Reynaerts boek *Laet ons voort vrolyc maken zanc* (1999), dat vooral aan de lyriek in het Gr.Hs. is gewijd. Reynaert besteedt als één van de weinigen ook aandacht aan de liederen in I. Speciale notitie neemt hij van het lied van Jeugd, dat de handeling in de burcht een grote impuls geeft en dat niet enkel gezongen, maar ook bestudeerd wordt.

Reynaert (169) merkt op dat het ontstaan van het Gr.Hs. valt in een periode waarin de klassieke minne-ideologie “beconcurrereerd en soms openlijk gecontesteerd wordt”. Hij sluit zich aan bij de opvatting van Ranawake (1976) dat de liederen meer gecomponeerd worden om “gehoord” te worden dan om “begrepen” te worden. Ze zijn niet meer dan “ein Schatz verfügbare Formeln”. Op pagina 144 noemt Reynaert de kenmerken die Brunner toekent aan dit soort liederen. Ze bezitten geen belevenisgehalte noch didactische bedoelingen. Banale topoi worden steeds herhaald. De betrekkelijke informatieleegte veroorzaakt een soort blanco, een gladgestreken taaloppervlak, waar de muzikale ontroering zonder haperen overheen glijdt. De consumptie wordt bevorderd door de herhaling van vlot gekende thema's en motieven.

Opmerkelijk is het dat hij vindt dat het lied van Jeugd naar de intentie van de auteur op zijn minst raakpunten vertoont met het schlager-model (170 v.). Het is een samenraapsel van lyrische banaliteiten die Jeugd om zich heen hoort. De totaal onpersoonlijke inhoud begrijpen de leden van het gezelschap wel, maar de zin ontgaat hen. Jeugd noemt zichzelf tweemaal. Reynaert vindt dit zelfingenomen en redundant. Hij constateert een kinderlijke rijmnoed. Ze zingt zo maar wat en weet niets van het gelukkige ‘einde’. Het kan Jeugd niets schelen wat ze zingt, als het maar klinkt. Deze inhoudloos-zingende lyriek is gericht op entertainment.

Jeugds lied, dat te beschouwen is als een schlager, leidt tot een welhaast potsierlijke drukte. Het is een belangrijk gespreksthema en wordt zelfs bestudeerd. De zin kan men niet ontcijferen. Jeugd wordt ter verantwoording geroepen door de Burchtheer. Ze zegt dat ook zijzelf de betekenis niet weet. Het lied heeft echter wel een bewustzijnsproces op gang gebracht.

De minnaar kan nu met zinrijkere teksten voor de dag komen. Zijn persoonlijke minneverwachting uit hij, met de steun van *Hope*, in levende poëzie. Zijn eerste introductielied wordt afgekeurd, waarschijnlijk vanwege het prijzen van *Hope* in haar nabijheid. Het volgende lied heeft welgekozen sententia's: *Die vroilic mint mach vroilic leven* (1394) en *Uut minnen es al arch verdreven* (1400).

Ik heb de visie van Reynaert uitvoerig weergegeven. Het is de eerste serieuze poging sinds decennia om het lied van Jeugd te verklaren. Naar mijn idee blijft echter veel onduidelijk in de interpretatie van Reynaert. Ik volg meer de lijn van Erné en zie het lied als een fundamentele vrouwelijke mededeling over haar liefdesverwachtingen. De burchtgemeenschap besteedt niet voor niets veel aandacht aan het lied en in het handschrift eordt haar lied in een speciaal kader geplaatst (afbeelding op p. 251). In het vervolg van mijn werk ga ik nader op enkele punten in. Het moralistische werk in het Gr.Hs. veroordeelt op vele plaatsen het *vroilic leven* dat de minnaar propagandeert. Deze heeft overigens merendeels oog voor zichzelf en niet voor de dame.

In een lezing (2000) bespreekt ook Willaert het lied van Jeugd. Hij wijst erop dat de liederen in de Franse *dit*s de thema's soms benadrukken en becommentariëren. Ze vormen zo een

essentieel onderdeel van de plot. Hij kent Jeugds lied kennelijk deze rol toe en komt tot een totaal andere conclusie dan Reynaert.

Hij benadrukt de sterke vormgeving in tegenstelling met Reynaert. Het rondeel telt aan het eind twee complete strofen, elk gevolgd door een refrein. Het lied toont een gecompliceerd rijmschema: ABBab AB abb ABB abb ABB. Het gezelschap in de burcht leest, kopieert en zingt het lied van het blad. Het bevat de geruststellende boodschap aan Zuiverheid dat de liefde aan haar eer geen afbreuk zal doen.

Dan ineens horen we dat het lied geen diepere betekenis heeft, omdat het die niet bevat. Willaert stelt dat mogelijk voor Jeugd een lied vooral zang is en amusement moet bieden, terwijl voor Melancholie een lied vooral een tekst is die iets wezenlijks over de liefde moet vertellen. De minnaar is ervan overtuigd dat hij zich van alles moet afwenden wat hem van de trouwe liefde afleidt. De ware minnaar is de ware dichter (14, 15). Melancholie vindt de minnaar de perfecte dichter en de perfecte minnaar.

Ik kan het met de punten in de voorlaatste alinea eens zijn, met die in de laatste volstrekt niet. De boodschap aan Zuiverheid telt kennelijk ineens niet meer. De eisen die zij nadrukkelijk stelt aan een verhouding opdat die geluk brengt – rein, eervol, edel van zin, vreugdevol, geluk brengend – zijn zo maar zonder betekenis? De frasen van de minnaar die veelvuldig in het liedboek aanwezig zijn, getuigen van een waar dichterschap? De dichter spreekt volgens Willaert van trouwe liefde. Ik vind die getuigenis nergens, hij betuigt zijn trouw zeer egoïstisch aan *Hope*. Deze is echter een aspect van hemzelf, niet van de vrouw. Hij wil vrolijk leven en minnen, de vrouw wordt nauwelijks genoemd. *Melancholie* vindt de dichter een perfecte dichter. Ja, maar hij gaat nergens in op de zin van de gedichten. Ze worden niet echt 'bestudeerd', maar kritiekloos aanvaard en gezongen. *Hoede* en *Versiene* betwijfelen de trouw van de dichter. De eerste door haar botte afwijzingen, de tweede door reeksen voorzorgsmaatregelen.

Voor verdere toelichtingen op mijn ideeën verwijs ik naar de volgende hoofdstukken, waar ik de liederen beter in hun context kan plaatsen..

4

REGISTRALE ASPECTEN UIT DE BELEVINGSWERELD VAN DE MINNAAR

4.0 Inleiding

Het werk in het Gr.Hs. besteedt veel aandacht aan het innerlijk van de ik-personages. Dit is vooral het geval in de liederen, maar ook in de allegorieën. De dichters brengen verslag uit over allerlei belevenissen en zielservaringen. Hierbij treden steeds traditionele inhoudelijke en prosodische aspecten naar voren, waardoor de teksten een sterk clichématig karakter bezitten. Het zal de lezer bij de kennismaking met het tweede en derde deel van het Gr.Hs. opvallen dat veel woorden en begrippen regelmatig terugkeren.

De meeste studies over het Gr.Hs. zijn gewijd aan het Liedboek en stellen vast dat de inhoud tamelijk clichématig is. Willaert (2000b, 238-239) zegt dat er gegrossierd wordt in hoofse minneclichés, typische wendingen en woorden. Ze worden evenwel meesterlijk en subtiel toegepast, waardoor de mogelijkheden van het genre ten volle worden uitgebuit.

Het tegenwoordige onderzoek ziet het clichématige meestal als een algemeen aspect van de middeleeuwse minnepoëzie. De terugkerende elementen duidt men sinds de publicatie van Willaerts dissertatie (1984) meestal aan met de term 'register'¹⁶. Willaert (1984, niet de handelseditie, 22-25) bracht het verschijnsel in zijn studie over de poetica van Hadewijch als volgt onder woorden: "Er is een gesloten netwerk van lexicale, syntactische en prosodische procédés en mogelijkheden, dat zowel door de auteur als de recipiënt gekend wordt. De eerste om het spel met raffinement te spelen, de tweede om het te kunnen genieten, waardoor het dichtwerk in een beperkte fictionele, 'bovenpersoonlijke' ruimte gaat functioneren. Clichématige sleutelwoorden concretiseerden een ideale wereld waarin men moet geloven voor de duur van het kunstwerk. Bij de toepassing werden de extra-registrale en autobiografische elementen beperkt. Willen we deze werken begrijpen, dan zullen we de *topoi* moeten kennen".

Willaert toetst de hierboven genoemde hypothese aan een aantal hoofse minneliederen en daarna aan de 'Strofische gedichten' van Hadewijch. In zijn 'Algemeen besluit' (1984, 388-391) constateert hij dat het onderzoek zijn veronderstellingen bevestigt. Dit betekent niet dat er geen nieuwe variaties op de bekende thema's zijn toegepast. De grondvoorwaarde is echter steeds dat er een groep mensen is die 'bewogen' wordt door een zelfde ideaal. Willaert ziet als belangrijk verschil tussen Hadewijchs poëzie en de klassieke wereldse minnelyriek dat bij de mystica sprake is van een reële, persoonlijke, diepgaande minnebeleving. Zij veronderstelt bij haar toehoorders minimaal de bereidheid daartoe. De *minne* moet met de liefde voor God geïdentificeerd worden. In zijn slotzin spreekt Willaert de verwachting uit dat de gebruikmaking van het concept *register* ook voor de studie van onze overige Middelnederlandse lyriek nieuwe perspectieven biedt.

Het is overduidelijk dat er in het Gr.Hs. ook sprake is van een register dat, zoals de dichter in **I** zegt, alleen bevattelijk is voor hen die de *weghe der consten* kennen en niet voor de *ruden*. Dat

¹⁶ De term 'register' werd door Zumthor ingevoerd. Deze omschrijft het register als een "répertoire d'affinités sélectives, d'oppositions et de similarités aspirant à se lier dans la contiguïté d'un texte" (1972, 239-240). Het is de taak van de dichter om met dit beperkte materiaal op een zo inventief mogelijke wijze een nieuw en verrassend kunstwerk te scheppen. Michel Foucault (volgens Rakel 1986, 104-105) heeft dit als volgt samengevat: "er is sprake van "eine etablierte Rede, in der nur über bestimmte Gegenstände und nur in bestimmter Weise in einem bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Rahmen und nur von hierzu berechtigten Personen gesprochen werden kann, wobei dieses Reden auch noch die eigentliche Existenzbedingungen jenes gesellschaftlichen Rahmens bildet".

minnepoëzie registrale poëzie is, is heel wel begrijpelijk. De begrensde problematiek centraliseert zich rond een al of niet bestaande beminde vrouw. Het aantal thematische mogelijkheden voor de dichter is niet zo groot. Hij opereert immers in een qua omvang beperkt 'taalgebied' als een gedicht. Hij beschrijft de goede eigenschappen van de vrouw en betuigt zijn aanhankelijkheid, trouw en dienstbaarheid. De minnaar verwacht op enigerlei wijze een beloning voor de betoonde liefde. Als deze uitblijft, beschrijft hij zijn beklagenswaardige vertwijfeling en jaloersheid. Op de achtergrond blijft toch steeds de hoop op een goede afloop. Een geregeld bijkomend motief is de vrees voor de achterklap van naijverige en op roddelen beluste lieden. Hun lasterpraat kan tot verlies van de eer leiden, of tot verlies van de geliefde.

Tussen de voorstellingspatronen en de gebruikte woordenschat ligt uiteraard een nauw verband. Hoe meer het gebied van de percepties zich afbakt, des te kleiner zijn de variaties in de uitingsmogelijkheden voor de dichter. Bij de hoofse minnepoëzie spreekt men in dit verband vaak over de 'beperkte' van het register. Het omvat een eng omgrensd aantal karakteristieke woorden en voorstellingspatronen¹⁷.

Mijn onderzoek naar het register in het Gr.Hs. sloot aanvankelijk aan bij Willaert. Bij Hade-wijch komen antithetische isotopieën voor als vreugde-verdriet, hoop-vrees, kwelling-hulp, licht-duisternis, zoet-bitter/zuur, licht-zwaar, gevangenschap-vrijheid, leven-dood, genieting-begeerte, wonden-helen, overwinning-nederlaag en jong-oud. We vinden ze ook in zeer hoge frequenties in de Gruuthuse liederen en in het achtste gedicht. Daarnaast komen trouw en ontrouw in allerlei bewoordingen zeer vaak ter sprake.

Geleidelijk bleek echter tijdens het werken aan de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie dat een nader onderzoek van de bovengenoemde isotopieën niet zo belangrijk was, voor de interpretatie Allegorieën hebben een verhalend karakter dat de betekenis van bepaalde elementen tamelijk nauwkeurig bepaalt. Dit geschiedt soms direct, zoals met de bovengenoemde isotopieën, meestal echter door een symbolische laag. Dit laatste aspect bleek voor de betekenisoverdracht veel problematischer. De moeilijkheden bij de duiding van de allegorieën liggen vaak in de verborgen achtergronden van metaforisch gebruikte woorden. Ze hebben betrekking op de beleving van de hoofdpersoon en de uitbeelding van de omgeving. De bestudering van dit materiaal is van fundamenteel belang en bepaalt de inhoud van dit hoofdstuk.

Het gebruikte woordmateriaal is ontleend aan objecten op organisch, animaal, vegetatief en anorganisch terrein en komt geregeld terug in alle delen van het handschrift. Het Gr.Hs. bezit ook op dit punt een typerend register. In de allegorieën kennen de woorden vaak een metaforische geladenheid. We vragen ons herhaaldelijk af waarom bepaalde bloemen op de kleding afgebeeld staan of waarom de dichter de bloemen in het landschap expliciet vermeldt. Daarnaast leveren elementen als de kleur van de kleding, de betekenis van het hoeden vlechten en het ronddolen in het landschap problemen op. De auteur geeft meestal geen nadere toelichting en veronderstelt de betekenis en bedoeling bekend. Het is ook mogelijk dat hij ervan uitgaat dat deze uit de context af te leiden is.

De teksten in het Gr.Hs. blijken een sterke onderlinge samenhang te bezitten. Daarnaast zien we connecties met andere teksten uit het discours van de hoofse minne. Wel veroorzaken tijdsverschillen en het ontstaan in een stedelijk milieu soms afwijkingen ten opzichte van die andere teksten. Vaak zijn nadere verduidelijkingen van moeilijk te interpreteren plaatsen te

¹⁷ Men zie o.a. Willaert 1982 en 1984 (hoofdstuk I) en de daar genoemde literatuur

vinden in het handschrift zelf. Ook het zoeken in gelijksoortig werk kan een nadere verklaring geven. Rekt men de term 'register' in deze zin op, dan zou men ook van intertekstualiteit kunnen spreken. In zijn meest ruime omschrijving is intertekstualiteit "de relatie tussen teksten, tekstvormen en spreekwijzen" (Mertens 1990, inleiding). Van Iersel (1989) merkt op dat er in allerlei werken veelvuldig verwijzingen, citaten, allusies en associaties naar eerder bestaande teksten voorkomen. De lezer dient een actieve instelling te bezitten, waardoor de tekst een zekere meerwaarde krijgt. Ik ga verder niet in op de voor- en/of nadelen van het gebruik van de begrippen 'register' en 'intertekstualiteit' en ook niet op de verfijning van dat laatste begrip¹⁸. Het doel van dit onderzoek is niet theoretisch gericht. Ik wil slechts de eerste allegorie interpreteren tegen de achtergrond van alle teksten in het Gr.Hs. en aanverwante literatuur in ongeveer dezelfde periode. Dit laatste slechts indien het noodzakelijk is.

De gegevens over de wijze waarop de dichter de beleveniswereld uitbeeldt en de symbolische lading waarmee dit vaak gebeurt, bied ik in twee stappen aan. Eerst in een overzicht van de woordenschat, daarna meer gedetailleerd in enkele afzonderlijke paragrafen.

4.1 Enkele opmerkingen bij het overzicht van de woordenschat in bijlage A

In bijlage A geef ik een overzicht van de vindplaatsen van de belangrijkste woorden. De aanbieding van de woorden geschiedt in alfabetische volgorde met een genormaliseerde spelling. Het materiaal is gelemmatiseerd. Daarna volgen de vindplaatsen met – in de meeste gevallen – een korte aanduiding van de symbolische betekenis. Deze strekking geldt overigens vanzelfsprekend niet voor elke vindplaats. Een asterisk achter een lemma duidt aan dat het begrip in een meer structureel verband terugkomt in de bespreking in dit hoofdstuk.

De opbouw van dit hoofdstuk is als volgt: eerst komen het landschap en de onderdelen daarvan, zowel de natuurlijke als de door mensen gemaakte, aan de orde. Daarna volgen de belevingen en gevoelens. 'Losse' rubrieken die betrekking hebben op getallen, kleuren en opmerkelijke – maar niet classificeerbare dingallegorieën – krijgen daarna de nodige aandacht. Letterwoorden en acrostichons sluiten het overzicht af.

Ik houd bij de opsomming geen rekening met het letterlijk of figuurlijk gebruik van de woorden. Een term wordt nu eens letterlijk, dan weer metaforisch gebruikt. Dit bij elke vermelde plaats na te gaan, is praktisch ondoenlijk. Woorden als *weg* en *pad* bijvoorbeeld worden afwisselend letterlijk of figuurlijk gebruikt, een kleur als *groen* evenzo. De bijlage bevat een groot aantal woorden. De lezer heeft zo voor eventueel eigen onderzoek een handig overzicht. Bij de bespreking in dit hoofdstuk komen uiteraard de woorden aan de orde die een duidelijk overdrachtelijk karakter dragen en van belang zijn voor het onderzoek.

De symboliek van alle in het overzicht vermelde fenomenen bespreken, is niet mogelijk. Dat zou teveel ruimte vragen. Meestal geef ik wel een korte aanduiding. Ik beperk me tot het figuurlijke taalgebruik dat een diepere zin heeft in het contextuele verband van het Gr.Hs. Ik

¹⁸ Ik verwijs voor de onderverdelingen en de verschillende soorten van het begrip intertekstualiteit naar Sonnemans (1995, hoofdstuk 2) en Besamusca (1993, 10-21). Zij geven heldere uiteenzettingen over de gehanteerde begrippen en toepassingen. Daarnaast verstreken ze ook achtergrondliteratuur.

streef slechts naar een zekere volledigheid bij de woorden die functioneren in de eerste allegorie.

4.2 De tekening van het landschap

We zien in de allegorieën veel beschrijvingen van landschappen waarin gedroomde handelingen plaats vinden. In de liederen dragen deze meestal een meer realistisch karakter. In de droomgedichten maken de landschapsdescripties deel uit van de epische handeling. Ze zijn meer dan een stoffering. Zij bezitten vaak een symbolische geladenheid. Door de proloog of korte inleiding weet de in het genre ingewijde recipiënt in welk kader hij het gefantaseerde landschap moet plaatsen.

Hoe sterk handeling en beschrijving een eenheid vormen, blijkt bijvoorbeeld bij de uitbeelding van de diverse *fonteinen*. De *ic* bewondert de schoonheid ervan, drinkt, wast de handen, wordt ontroerd door het beeld dat hij in het water aanschouwt, moet de fontein bewaken enz. Van de natuur gaat in de *locus amoenus* een weldadige werking uit. Het vogelgezang beurt de hoofdpersoon volledig op, de geuren zouden zelfs een zieke genezen en verdrijven de kwade 'lust'. De schoonheid die hij ziet, imponeert de minnaar. Hij prijst de paradijselijke toestand. In de ommuurde, sombere tuin gebeurt het omgekeerde. Steeds wordt alles beleefd door en betrokken op de vertellende en het avontuur belevende *ic*.

De toehoorders ervaren op deze wijze het gebeuren intensiever dan bij de louter verstandelijke systematische weergave die in veel Latijnse poëzie aanwezig is. Thoss (1972, 96) vindt dit één van de karakteristieke verschillen tussen de "volksprachliche" en de "lateinische Beschreibungen". Janssens (1994, 185) zegt dat er in de Latijnse natuurbeschrijvingen sprake is van een gestileerde uitwerking die nogal geïsoleerd in de context staat, "zodat er in die passage(s) een merkwaardige retorische densiteit ontstaat". Hij merkt op dat er, naast de invloed van de antieke retorica, ook sprake is van idyllische beelden ontleend aan het bijbelse paradijs (186). Beide karakteriseringën gelden voor het Gr.Hs.

Opmerkelijk is dat alle vijf zintuigen worden ingeschakeld bij de beschrijvingen van het landschap, zodat de zintuiglijke percepties steeds deel uitmaken van de natuurbeleving. Herhaaldelijk onderstrepen de teksten het belang van de 'zinnen'. In XII worden de vijf waarnemingssoorten zelfs als beeldengroep nauwkeurig beschreven. Ze staan daar overigens onder toezicht van 'koningin *Vroescap*'. In de eerste allegorie komen alle zintuiglijk gewaarwordingen in kort bestek herhaaldelijk aan de orde: *de soonste trade die mijn oghen nie aensaghen, mettien so cam daer uut gheslaghen roke van soeter gore* (70-73). *Die voghelkine jonc ende hout hoordic zinghen* (78-79). En als de *graszoiden verwaermet waren So gaven zi de zoerste lucht* (88). Het water van de fontein was *coel ende so zoete ende jolijc* (117). Het zintuiglijk kenvermogen maakt de waarneming van fysieke voorwerpen in de buitenwereld mogelijk, maar speelt ook een grote rol bij liefdesbeleving, voortplanting, voeding en groei en moet derhalve met wijsheid gehanteerd worden (Decorte 1994, 208-209). Zo kunnen we de soevereiniteit van *Vroescap* verklaren. De middeleeuwer beschouwt de aardse schoonheid onder een typisch perspectief, tegen één en dezelfde zaak kan zowel nee als ja gezegd worden. Het zinnelijk genot als op zichzelf staand fenomeen is verdacht, het aardse moet bij voorkeur naar iets bovenaards of onzinnelijks verwijzen.

In alle gedichten die op een of andere wijze over de liefde handelen, zien we de minnaar 's ochtends uit wandelen gaan. Kinable (1995, 324) merkt op dat zo'n wandeling technisch gezien een handig uitgangspunt is. In de rust van de wandeling kunnen de personen op zichzelf terugvallen, waardoor een ideaal kader ontstaat voor beschouwingen. In het Gr.Hs. komt het aspect van de introspectie ruimschoots aan de orde. Ik meen dat het motief van de wandeling anderzijds het realiteitskarakter verhoogt, omdat toch steeds verslag wordt gedaan van de observaties van de omgeving.

In **V** ontmoet de afgewezen minnaar in een schone natuur de wijze vrouw *Redene*, die hem onderricht geeft. De beschrijving van het landschap komt dan niet meer aan de orde. In het tweede gedicht ontmoet de *ic* tijdens de met natuurbeelden geardeerde wandeling, een kluizenaar. Hij slaat diens raadgevingen evenwel in de wind. Een noodzakelijkheid, want anders had het verhaal niet verder verteld kunnen worden. De lezer is er echter indirect wel op gewezen dat er vanuit het godsdienstige standpunt bepaalde inhoudelijke bezwaren aanwezig zijn tegen de levenswijzen en de liefdesopvattingen van de wandelaar. De tegenstellingen tussen de gevestigde godsdienstige opvattingen en de hoofse minneconceptie komen in het derde deel voortdurend aan de orde. Na een hernieuwde aanduiding van de schoonheid van de idyllische natuur, neemt het eigenlijke verhaal over de gerechtelijke procedure onder leiding van Venus een aanvang en komt de dichter niet meer op de natuur terug.

In de eerste allegorie doortrekt de beschrijving van de natuur en de attributen die zich erin bevinden een groot deel van het gedicht. De dichter tekent de geliefde zelfs als een onderdeel van het landschap door middel van de burchtmetaforiek. De *locus amoenus* en de handeling zijn vervlochten en worden stap voor stap geactualiseerd. Het liefelijke landschap staat steeds in verbinding met de hoofse liefde. Aan het slot is de minnaar afgewezen. De verbanning in een troosteloze tuin symboliseert dan zijn geestelijke gesteldheid.

Ook in de minneallegorieën **VI** en **XII** vindt de handeling in een landschap plaats. Het gesprek met de kluizenaar in het godsdienstig-beschouwende gedicht **XIV** staat in het kader van een wandeling in de vrije natuur. Er is hier sprake van de volgens Blank (1970, 149 v.) in de minnereden vrij zeldzame "Spaziergangseingang".

De aanduiding van de vogels, bloemen en bomen wordt veel minder geconcretiseerd en uitgewerkt dan in de geestelijke tuinallegorieën (vgl. Lassche 1996). De genoemde soorten komen louter in de eigen omgeving voor. Cipressen, olijfbomen, fenixen enz., die in de op het Latijn gebaseerde literatuur en in de mystiek getinte Nederlandstalige literatuur te vinden zijn, vinden we in het Gr.Hs. niet terug. De dichter gebruikt bij de uitwerking van zijn beelden dingallegorieën en kleuren. Als ze betrekking hebben op zaken van organisch niveau, is de aanduiding zeer vaag en blijft beperkt tot het leveren van een stemmingsbeeld.

In het Gr.Hs. zijn de twee traditionele middeleeuwse landschapstypes in hoofdtekken aanwezig. Aantoonbaar is de reeds in de antieken gebruikelijke antithese '*locus amoenus*' tegenover de '*locus terribilis*'. De laatste komt voor aan het slot van **I** in de vorm van een ommuurde tuin met vruchtbomen die bittere vruchten dragen. De sombere sfeer roept bij de minnaar doodsgedachten op. De beelden zijn zoals bij alle fantasieën ontleend aan de empirie, maar worden op een zodanige wijze verwerkt dat er duidelijk geen concreet landschap geschilderd wordt. De *locus amoenus* en de *locus terribilis* bespreek ik hieronder.

4.2.1 De *locus amoenus*

In de eerste allegorie is de *locus amoenus* het meest geïntegreerd in de handeling, de minnaar vertoeft er relatief lang door zijn dolage. De boom *Waerscu* splitst haar in twee duidelijk te onderscheiden delen. In het eerste deel vindt de dolage plaats. De minnaar is niet zeker van zijn zaak, *Twifel* beheerst het gebeuren. De minnaar verkeert in grote onzekerheid over het welslagen van zijn toenaderingspogingen tot de geliefde. De invloed van *Twifel* vermindert na het passeren van de 'grenspaal' [de linde *Waerscu*] en die van *Hope* neemt toe. Geleid door het licht en *Vrau Hope* arriveert de minnaar tenslotte bij de burcht [de vrouw].

Het landschap in **I** bezit een specifiek karakter. Het onderscheidt zich van dat in de andere gedichten, waarin de tekening van de natuur overigens telkens een eigen signatuur draagt.

In **II** speelt het landschap slechts een figuratieve rol en maakt niet zo geïntegreerd deel uit van de handeling als in **I**. De summiere uitbeelding heeft vooral betrekking op de plaats waar het gesprek met de heremiet plaatsvindt. Zij bezit wel de kenmerken van het liefelijke landschap, die we in de vijf droomallegorieën – handelend over de liefde – aantreffen. Direct na het gesprek met de kluzenaar ziet de *ic* een heraut die het door lelies omringde prieel verlaat en die de rechtszitting aankondigt. Aan de andere zijde van het prieel ziet hij een rozier met rode rozen en hoort hij een nachtegaal zingen. Hij aanschouwt dan het kasteel van Venus. Na zijn binnenkomst horen wij niets meer over het landschap en valt de volle aandacht op het proces.

Het natuuraspect in **V** beperkt zich tot gekwetste duif [de geliefde] die in de rozier zit. De minnaar loopt in de maand mei in een *vergier* en ziet een slanke wilde roos met rode rozen. De geur is *lidens medecvne*, de doornen prikken niet (53-61). Hij ontmoet een dame die hem advies geeft. We vinden geen nadere explicatie van de natuur. Wel blijkt een andere *eggentier* een persoon aan te duiden wiens identiteit als bewaker van de dame [hier een duif] moeilijk te duiden is. Een doorn [de minnaar] heeft de dame gekwetst. Het gebruik van de diverse beelden vereist nog nadere studie.

Ook in **VI** vinden we geen uitvoerige natuurbeschrijving, een *rozier* symboliseert de geliefde. *Als ic aensach die bloume zoet, Bezief ic dat mir herten bloet Beroert wart, des ic wart vervaert Ende al verdarent* (40-43). In het vervolg komt even de heerlijke geur van de roos ter sprake, maar verder worden vooral haar kleuren besproken, namelijk groen, wit en rood.

De stoffering van de natuur in **V** en **VI** schaars is, hoewel deze met een wezenlijk deel van de handeling vervlochten is.

Geheel anders opgezet is **XII**. Wel staat de fontein die de vrouw symboliseert centraal in de handeling, maar er is toch meer aandacht voor de aankleding van het landschap. De winter is voorbij, de zon doet de natuur ontwaken. *Des couts vernoilicheit* [onaangename omstandigheden] behoren tot het verleden en de tijd van de *vroilicheit* breekt aan. Het natuurbeeld dient vooral om de tegenstelling tussen het vrolijk makende, ontwakende natuurgebeuren en de sombere gemoedsstemming van de minnaar te tekenen en de ligging van het prieel te karakteriseren. De fontein symboliseert de geliefde. Ze is omgeven door vijf beelden (64-86). Als de minnaar haar nauwkeuriger beziet (223 v.), komt het melancholisch getinte liefdesproces op gang. De dolende minnaar arriveert dan in een *locus amoenus* en tekent de tegenstelling tussen zijn droeve gemoedsstemming en de opwekkende natuur. Er is een door rode rozen omgeven prieel, van *verren bleckende* [in het oog vallend]. Vogels zingen, het *zoete cruut* en de wilde rozen bloeien en geuren heerlijk. Na een kort gebed tot Maria vervolgt de

minnaar *zijn* tocht langs een groen pad. Bij het prieel ontmoet hij een wijze vrouw die hem uitvoerig adviseert.

In **XIII** tekent de dichter de tegenstelling tussen de ethische onvolkomenheden van de stad en de zuiverheid van het *foreest*. De aanbieder van het geschenk heeft de stad verontwaardigd verlaten en vestigt zich in het bos. Hij komt even naar de stad om het geschenk aan te bieden, maar haast zich met zijn twee gekerstende leerlingen direct weer terug naar zijn *hermitage*.

De natuurbeschrijving ontbreekt in **XIV**, de mogelijkheden hiertoe waren volop aanwezig. De jongeling gaat ten zuiden van Brugge wandelen om zich te ontspannen en de verderfelijke invloeden van de stad te ontvluchten. Het accent komt echter geheel op de lering van de kluisenaar te liggen.

Naast de 'fontein' die ruime aandacht krijgt, komt ook het 'prieel' in **I**, **II** en **XII** ter sprake. We moeten dan uiteraard niet denken aan ons 'tuinhuisje', maar aan een luthof, een aangelegde tuin al of niet met bomen of bloemen omgeven. Ook de ruimere interpretatie 'liefelijk oord' is mogelijk (MNW VI, 628-63). In L21 treedt de dichter een *prieel* binnen dat het liefelijke decor is voor de ontmoeting van *twee ghelieven* die elkaar hun trouw betuigen (*met cussene bleven si ghemeine*, 38). L48 spreekt van een *rozengeerde*, een aangelegde schone (liefdes)tuin. Een jonge vrouw biedt een oudere man een rozenkrans aan als blijk van haar liefde. De kwade, jonge en jalouse minnaar wordt ontrouw verweten. Hij vertrappt de *hoet* op onhooftse wijze.

In de coïtusliederen komt het geslachtelijke aspect van de liefde naar voren. Als de natuur als ontmoetingsplaats genoemd wordt, is er geen liefelijk decor aanwezig. Het prieel komt daarvoor niet in aanmerking. L16 noemt als plaats van samenkomst *dat groene Bachten Daverloo* (16-17). In L86 ziet de *ic* op een wandeling een openstaande boerenschuur waar zuster *Lutte* en broeder *Lollaert* de liefde bedrijven. De *capelaen van Hoedelem* en de *scamel mersener* gaan hun gang (resp. in L17 en L27) in een burgerlijke woning. Als in de liefde niet-geslachtelijke aspecten een rol spelen, zien we een meer op de *locus amoenus* gebaseerde omgeving.

We bezien we nu als illustratief voorbeeld de presentatie van het 'liefelijke' landschap¹⁹ de tweede allegorie.

Dochte mi dat ic cam there stede,
So scone nie gheen ghesien en was,
Daer ne wies no loof no gras,
Maer vyoletten ende acoleyen,
Daer mocht men vroylic in gaen meyen (42-46)

De dichter vervolgt geheel in de geest van de traditie:

Die bomen bloeyden al over al.

¹⁹ Curtius (1958, p. 202) noemt als attributen van de *locus amoenus* een moot beschadwd plekje, een of meer bomen, een weide, een bron of beekje, zingende vogels, bloemen en bij volstrekte volledigheid ook nog een zacht koel windje. In de late Middeleeuwen heeft de beschrijving zich al volgens zo'n vastliggend patroon ontwikkeld, dat veel afwijkingen niet meer zijn toegestaan

Daer ne was van voghelen gheen ghescal
 Dan van der nachteghalen sanc
 Ic cam daer eene fonteine spranc
 In sach nye borne so over claer
 Een preeel so sach ic daer
 Met eenre haghē van lelyen reyne (47-53)

De omheining die elke tuin per definitie bezit, wordt hier gevormd door lelies. Het adjectief *reine* is bijna overbodig, accentueert slechts. De witte lelie is de verpersoonlijking van de reine, maagdelijke en glanzende liefde in vertrouwen en geloof bewaard. Het ingewijde publiek zal die relatie onmiddellijk leggen.

De minnaar hoort als hij verder loopt de leeuweriken, nachtegalen en *cockuden* [koe-koeken] te *stride* zingen. De mooie bloeiende bomen en zoetste kruiden *zijn groener dan enich groen mach zijn*. De zonnewarmte doet de zoetste geuren opstijgen, ze zouden een zieke genezen. Vioelen en akoleien, zingende nachtegalen, de fontein en het preeel met de witte leliehaag ontbreken evenmin (42-53). Het gebruikte beeldmateriaal verwijst naar de lente (Wijngaards 1964, 103), traditioneel de tijd voor de ontluikende liefde.

4.2.2 *De locus terribilis*

Dragen de natuurbeschrijvingen in de vorige paragraaf een opgewekt karakter, geheel anders is het gesteld aan het slot van de eerste allegorie. De sombere ommuurde tuin waarin de minnaar verbannen wordt, is *besloten met steenen* *ver vast gheghoten* (2215b-2216). De *ic* klaagt *Hongher, cout, angst ende vaer* *Cam mi menichfouden aen* (2212-2213). Hij zal dag en nacht moeten *versuchten* en *pensen* over het verloop der dingen.

Het letterwoord *sceiden*, gevormd uit de eerste letters van de onaangenaam smakende vruchten die aan de bomen hangen, vertolkt de straf. De zeven letters van dit woord preciseren de geestelijke toestand van de afgewezen minnaar: *ziecheit/zwaerheit/suerheit, crancheit/claghe, ellende/eenicheit, iammer drooufheit ende druc, eyghen eerde* [figuurlijk een koekje van eigen deeg] en *noot*. De auteur sluit aan bij een traditie. De symbolische toepassing van de vruchten vinden we ook bij Jan Praet (Bormans 1872, 77, vs. 1855 v): *Hoverde es boom van sulken aerde, die quade vruchten draecht altoos haer wortelen strecken duer die aerde tote in de helle grondeloos, met VI leden van quaden telghen*. Deze boom heeft in tegenstelling met de gebruikelijke zeven, maar zes takken: *Nijt ende Ghierchede, Vrecheit, Gulsichede ende Luxurie ende Gramscap fel*. *Hoverdie es fundament van alle def[n] vu hoofdzonden*. Hier wordt de boom getekend als een soort grote tak en symboliseert kennelijk de hoofdzonde *Hoverdie*, waaruit alle kwade eigenschappen ontspruiten. Tegenover de hovaardigheid stelt Praet de ootmoed: *Omoet es liebaert ende lam fonteine ende boom van alre vrome[n], daer ons eerst de gracie of quam dat wi den viant waren ghenomen*. In 2753 vervolgt Praet dat de boom zoveel *telghen hevet in can tghetal niet weten*. Hij geeft dan voorbeelden van 'ootmoedigheid' en *scamelhede* (2765). Hij werkt het beeld dan verder uit met de vruchten die de *telghen* dragen. Deze boom zal ons voedsel geven.

De Gruuthuse-auteur gebruikt ook in gedicht V het *exempel segghen(de) bi eenen boome* (158-1710) met dezelfde achterliggende gedachte.

De opbouw bij de *locus terribilis* is in principe gelijk aan die van de *locus amoenus*. We vinden echter geen natuurlijke begrenzingen van *roziers* en lelien, maar een sombere, met ijzer versterkte muur die ontvluchten onmogelijk maakt. De dichter geeft ons weinig gedetailleerde beschrijvingen, maar hij tekent wel een stemmingsbeeld dat de negatieve gevoelens van de hoofdpersoon beklemtoont.

4.3 De flora

De floriografie is wijd verbreid in de westerse beschaving. Veel bloemen staan in verband met een grote verscheidenheid van menselijke emoties, ideeën, hoedanigheden en gebeurtenissen. Over de rol die de flora in het Gr. Hs. speelt, hebben we in het voorgaande reeds gesproken.

Bij de bloemen moet men in gedachten houden dat de symbolische betekenis van een bloem wordt bepaald door de naam, de eigenschappen en de verschijningsvorm. Brinkmann (1980, 100) wijst erop dat de kleuren bepaalde aspecten in het liefdesgebeuren kunnen uitdrukken. Groen duidt op de aanvang, rood op de vurigheid, blauw op de standvastigheid, wit op de hoop en de reinheid, geel op het liefdesloon en bruin op het met elkaar verbonden zijn. Bij de bespreking van de kleuren komen we hier nader op terug.

Hieronder volgt de toelichting op enkele woorden.

ACOLEI Uit haar bast bereidde men een geneesmiddel tegen de geelzucht. Zij was het zinnebeeld van de genezing van de begeerte. In de Germaanse tijd zou de akolei aan Freya gewijd zijn. In de middeleeuwse paneelschilderingen treedt ze op als attribuut van Maria en komt voor in de vijf Maria-bloemen die tezamen de volmaakte deugd vertegenwoordigen. In het tweede gebed lezen we over Maria: *Sonder smette saliche roze Acoleve piecose* [voortreffelijk] *Lehe vulder zuverheit* (1-3). Zowel bij Jan Praet (Reynaert 1983, 8, r. 129-137) als in het Hulthemse-Handschrift (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 225, r. 49-56) symboliseert de akolei de ootmoedigheid. In het laatste werk vinden we: *Si bughen daer si staen Joncfrouwen die dit wel verstaen, so moghen daer doghet an bekinnen*.

BOOM De boom stofteert in gedicht II het idyllische landschap. Zijn bloei wijst op het voorjaar, de traditionele tijd van de ontluikende liefde.

Later in het gedicht blijkt dat de dames van *Den Drogen Bome* tot het publiek behoren. *Goeden dach ende goeden nacht Moet haer gheven die waerde dracht Der vrouwen van den Drogen Bome, Om wien dat ic in desen drome Hebbe vertoocht haer mijns gepens* (1870-1874). De term 'droge boom' zou slaan op het feit dat de leden van het gezelschap zich zondig voelden en hun devotie wilden ontwikkelen; de naam wordt geassocieerd met Marias onbevleete ontvangenis. De dichter in XIV klaagt over de misstanden in de wereld en de onvolkomenheid van de individuele mens: *Ons boom so zeere verdorret steit Van duechdeliker zalicheit!* Een beeld dat ons herinnert aan Lucas 23, 31 waar Jezus tot de vrouwen spreekt die om hem treuren: "Want indien zij dit doen aan het groene hout, wat zal met het dorre geschieden? Gods genade blijkt als de boom tot wasdom komt en vrucht draagt. Prachtig is het beeld in de *Roman der Lorraine* waar de in de grond gestoken speren de volgende morgen *Vray ende groene hadde gestaen, Dat hadde god onse here gedaen Bi miraculen om dat hi Tonen woude Datsi streden in sive heren* (CD-ROM 1998, 585-590). Nadere informatie over

het vooraanstaande 'Gilde van Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe van de Droge Boom' vindt men onder andere in Strohm (1990, 70-74) en Hogenelst, Van Oostrom (1995, 248-249).

Ook in **V** komen we een boom tegen die vruchten draagt. Eén van de vruchten van de boom [de jonge man] heeft de geliefde een keer geschonden. Haar vriendin insinueert dat de vruchten van deze boom *vart van keeste* [verrot in de pit, dus binnenin] zijn *hoe scone ʔ stonden* (162). Het meisje wil niets meer van de minnaar weten. De wijze vrouw met wie de minnaar spreekt, is hierover zeer verontwaardigd: de boom draagt ook goede vruchten. De allegorie roept op het punt van de symbolische uitwerking vele vragen op.

Lied 139 toont ons de minnaar als een rozenboom, hij strooit zijn rozen als bliken van zijn liefde, voor de geliefde uit. Als de dame hen niet aanvaardt, zal hij de boom *of hauwen, Daer ne sal nummer roze anstaen, Des strovens willic avelaen* (23-25). Mijns inziens vinden we in dit beeldgebruik een verklaring voor het raadselachtige beeld in **V**: de duif [de geliefde vrouw] zit in een eglantier [wilde roos, zinnebeeld van de minnaar]: *Sijn rosen hi alte male ont dede Omme haer te ghevene confortelichede. Sijn dornen heift hi ghestelt ter steke Omme haer te houdene te ghereke Voor nidens, clappers of boze vileine* (113-117). De beschermer van de duif doet haar onverhoeds opvliegen, waarbij een doorn haar verwondt (met het hierboven vermelde gevolg). In wezen is het de schuld van de 'hoeder'. De boom staat echter nog altijd bloeiend uitgespreid *verchiert met rechter stadicheit* (140) om de duif te ontvangen. Zie verder bij *rozier*.

CLAVER De minnaar ontmoet in **XII** een wijze vrouw die *recht ghesedich was Van manieren ende int gras Zochte met haren vingheren zoet Of daer eniche clavere stoet Met bladen viere* (332-336). Zij is op zoek naar het geluk, net als de minnaar. Men moet fortuinlijk zijn om er één te vinden. De symboliek van het klavertje kan mogelijkwijs, zoals Forstner (1961, 274) veronderstelt, samenhangen met de kruissymboliek van Sint- Patricius' staf. Hij steekt deze in de keelholte van een slang. Langzamerhand werd dit kruis tot een klaverblad hervormd. Het driebladige klaverblad was het symbool van de Drie-eenheid, het vierbladige van het kruis. Klaver gold (al bij Plinius) als een tegengif tegen beten van slangen en schorpioenen.

CORSOUDE [madeliefje], **MARGARIETE**. De bloem [bij Kiliaen onder andere *kerssouwe, maetelieve*] wordt in de proloog van **I** genoemd in een kunstig woordspel. Domme recipiënten gelijken op zwijnen voor wie men vruchteloos *corsouden* zaait. Een fraai staaltje van intertekstualiteit, de bijbelse uitspraak dat men geen parels voor de zwijnen moet zaaien, wordt hier meesterlijk geassocieerd met het Middelnederlandse spreekwoord *En worpt uwe margariten nit vor de swijn* (MNW IV, 1170). De grondbetekenis van *margarite is parel* waardoor het verband met de bijbel voor de goede verstaander is gelegd. Waardevolle geschriften brengt men in verband met de bloem, bijvoorbeeld in de uitspraak *Die costelike margrete der heiligher ewangelien wel te bewaren* (MNW IV, 1170-1171).

Jan Praet (Bormans 1872, 6, r.130 v.) noemt de bloem als één van de vijf Mariabloemen, ze symboliseert de goedertierenheid, in andere geschriften ook de lijdzaamheid. De symbolische aanduidingen met betrekking tot Maria worden ook vaak toegepast op de geliefde. In het Hulthemse-Handschrift no. 161 (Brinkman/Schenkel 1999, 830-831) vergelijkt de minnaar zijn geliefde met een *kersoude: hoves suver ende fijn ende wael bekant: si es suver wit ende rem*. In de morgen bij zonsopgang ontplooit de bloem zich en volgt *den troen der sonnen ganc*. Dit laatste is in de christelijke symboliek een verwijzing naar het openstaan om Gods gaven te ontvangen (Biedermann 1991, 60). Het vergelijken van het madeliefje met de geliefde is niet zo vreemd, het kan berusten op het vervormen van *Maria lieve* (maagdenbloem) of van

dialectische vormen als *meghet lieve* en dergelijke (Franck, Van Wijk 1949, 408-409) Zie verder 8 | 1

CRUUT *Hope* stopt de minnaar *cruut* in de mond (I 654), als hij bijna bezwijmt bij het zien van het licht dat uit de vensters ('de ogen' van de vrouw) straalt Zo komt hij weer tot zichzelf Het *cruut* bezit ook in L83 23 een genezende en welhaast bovennatuurlijke werking Figuurlijk gebruikt betekent het een bron van vreugde voor de mens *Minne t edel cruut* (I 1018), *Die strate was alomme vercheiet Met blommen en crude jolys* (I 202-203) In G5 247 vraagt degene die bidt *Toocht ons na dit leven Eewelic des hemels cruut* De *niders boos* noemt de dichter van L83 *quaet cruut* (9, 27)

DOORN Vaak hebben de doornen – net als een dikke haag – een beschermende functie Zij sluiten de *hortus conclusus* van de buitenwereld af Zij versperren de toegang tot de geliefde of de weg naar haar toe (I 700)

In V behoeden de doornen van een rozier de geliefde *omme haer te houdene te ghereke Voor niders clappers of boze vleine* (115) Dit lijkt niet geheel te kloppen met 60 *Sine doornen ne daden niemen pine* De dichter doelt dan evenwel op de beschermende functie voor degene die zich in of achter de doornen verschuilt Als de geliefde *vrotlic in den doornen* (119) van de rozier zit, zegt de dichter dat de doornen *ne waren noit ghemaect omme dat de duve* [de geliefde] *zoude zien gheraect* (131) In L99 is een *edele bloume* in de *rozengaert* [si] *blovet sonder doren* (15-17)

Een doorn in V verwondt de duif in haar gemoed als ze verschrikt opvliegt (126) We moeten erop verdacht zijn dat 'doorn' in het Westvlaams ook 'zonde' en figuurlijk 'al wat iemand kwetst of schendt' kan betekenen *Enen den doren planten* kan zelfs betekenen dat een vrouw onteerd wordt (MNW II, 351)

In I zien wij dat doornen netelen en bramen het benedendeel van de burcht, de benen [*twee pilaren sonderlinghe*], beschermen Evenals in de *Roman van de Roos* geschiedt dit om de eerbaarheid van de vrouw te waarborgen Maria is in L 99 een *edele bloume* *zaert* in de *rozengaert*, die *blovet sonder doren* (15-17)

EIK In de Germaanse mythologie was de eik het raakpunt tussen de mensen- en godenwereld In de Middeleeuwen bleef iets van die sacraliteit, doordat de eik werd gekerstend Er waren in de Nederlanden veel Maria-eiken De heremiet in II huist in een eik De Brugse auteur zal verhalen gekend hebben over de heilige kluizenaar Bavo van Gent, die voor zijn verblijf in Gent in een holle eik bij Beila vertoefd zou hebben Trouwens ook bij Hieronymus Bosch en zijn navolgers zien we dat kluizenaars eiken bewonen

FRUIT In I eet de verjaagde minnaar het fruit van de zeven bomen in de ommuurde tuin, maar hij ontdekt dat *dat mi niet goet en was* (2370) De beginletters van de zeven fruitsoorten vormen het woord *scieden* Hij constateerde tevoren dat het zijn hoogmoed was die hem ten val bracht (2162-2167) De thematiek vinden we ook bij Jan Praet (Bormans 1872, 7, r 1855 v) *Hoverde es boom van zulken aerde, die quade vruchten draeght altoos*

GOUDSBLOEM Deze bloemen bevinden zich in het kleed van *Suverhede* op de plaats van haar schoot (I 799-801) Het MNW II, 2082/3 verklaart "In de Middeleeuwen in aanzien, Maria wordt er vaak mee vergeleken het is waarschijnlijk een klein soort zonnebloem" De bloem is ook het symbool voor de brandende liefde tot God In *Vanden vergiere van suverheden* staat *De goudbloeme es wel mijn gherief Haer schoenheit verschiert den boemgaert al Dats satmen dat minlic eenich lief Altoes int herte draighen sal* Ruusbroec zegt *Goutbloemen, daer wi mede verstaen ghehoorsamheit want alse die sonne opgeet in orienten so ontploct*

hare de goutbloeme jegen die raeien der sonne. In *Van den gheesteliken boemgarde* (Beuken 1936, 277-280) symboliseert ze dat de mens *Gods minne sal hebben lief ende EEUWELIC in 't herte draghen sal* (51-52). De versie in het Hulthemse-Handschrift spreekt van *ALTOES in therte draghen* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 540, r.52).

De goudgele kleur "deutet auf Gewährung der Liebe hin" (Brouwer 1930, 186). Brouwer haalt het volgende voorbeeld uit een volksliedje aan: "Waarom zou moeder jou schelden, waarom zou moeder jou slaan? Gij hebt de geele goud roosjes voorwaar geen leed gedaan, gij hebt uw eertje al zo wel behouwen"

Sittig (1987, 80) noemt geel als teken van het hoogste geluk en ijverzucht: Pastoureau (1986, 40) als de kleur van "richesse" en "noblesse foi". Het is vooral de geel-gouden glans van de *goutbloeme* die haar symboliek bepaalt. Bij Jan Praet betekent de goudsbloem *ghe-trouwichede*. (Bormans 1872, 6, r. 135).

De goudsbloemen in het met rozen versierde liefdeskleed van *Suverhede* en de dringende waarschuwingen van *Hoede* duiden op de noodzaak de 'eerbaarheid van haar schoot' te bewaren. Alleen de getrouwe minnaar mag de 'roosjes plukken'. De *ic* in **I** komt er niet aan toe, dat loon zal hij niet ontvangen.

LELIE De lilies in **II** vormen de omheining die elke tuin per definitie bezit. Het epitheton ornans *reynne* (53) is bijna overbodig, accentueert slechts. "De witte lelie wordt de verpersoonlijking van de reine liefde, de maagdelijke liefde, de glanzende liefde, in vertrouwen en geloof bewaard" (Wijngaards 1964, 103).

De zuivere en reine lelie is het symbool bij uitstek voor Maria, voor de louter geestelijke liefde of voor de maagdelijkheid. Ook in het Gr.Hs. blijkt telkens hoe nauw deze christelijke symboliek verweven is met de hoofse liefde. In *Den hoet van minnen* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 224-227, r. 57-612) laat de besmette lelie *hare blader sincken*. *Hier omme souden jonc-frouwen dincken ende souden altoes scamel sijn*.

LINDE Deze boom met zijn hartvormige bladeren is een heilige boom, waaronder openbare plechtigheden plaatsvonden, waarschijnlijk ook echtverbintenissen. Minnenden zochten haar schaduw. Van Maerlant spreekt over *die minlixste boom ist van scaden entie scoonste ooc van bladen* (MNW IV, 650-651). Het MNW geeft een aardig bloemlezinkje over de functie die zij vervult: op de boom zingt een nachtegaal van de hefde; de geliefden spelen het minnespel: daar lagen *si twee verborghen die lieve langhe nacht* enz.

De linde in **I** doet dienst als grenspaal tussen het land van *Twifel* en dat van de geliefde vrouw. De 'grenspaal' symboliseert de scheiding tussen twee gemoedstoestanden. De eerst onzekere en weifelmoedige minnaar gaat nu hoopvol, gericht en met een zekere manmoedigheid op weg naar de geliefde. Langs een smal, onbetreden pad (de maagdelijkheid van de vrouwe aanduidend) komt hij bij de burcht. *Hope* is de begeleidster van de minnaar.

ROOS De roos is het zinnebeeld voor de verheven schoonheid, in de godsdienstige literatuur het symbool voor Maria. Zij is de *Roze, vul van tsemels dauwe* (L97: 8), die de belangrijke eigenschappen *reynicheit, omoet* en *zuverheit* vertegenwoordigt (L101: 7 en 37).

In de liefdeslyriek representeert zij de aanbeden dame. In het Berlijnse Liederhandschrift wordt de dame toegesproken met *miin zuetz rosen gaerdeltin* (Berl. 922, L 3, 6 en 22), kennelijk is de aanduiding met roos alleen niet voldoende en wordt de dame gelijkgesteld met een gehele rozentuin. In **VIII** verzekert de minnaar [*de rudder metten hoede**] de vrouw [*metten hoede*] dat zij de roos is, die hem in haar macht heeft: *Ghi zijt de roze ... die nemmermeer verdeluwen* [verdorren] *mach* (140-146).

In L48 maakt de dame van rozen een *hoet*, die zij aan de man overhandigt met de woorden: *so gevic mi*. Dit roept associaties op met 'het plukken van de roos', een algemene aanduiding voor de geslachtelijke eenwording. In *Den hoet van minnen* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 226, r. 70-73) staat: *Die roke die en es niet bose die van her comt ... Die rose draecht soe menich man*. Willen de jonkvrouwen deze prijs ontvangen, dan moeten ze *wesen onderdanich* (77-78).

In L139 strooit de minnaar zijn rozen *van smetten reyn* (9) uit voor zijn dame. Accepteert zij die niet, dan zal er nooit meer een roos groeien aan zijn boom.

ROZIER. Deze neemt in het vijfde gedicht een bijzondere plaats in. De minnaar in een *vergier* ziet in het bijzonder *een rozier, dat men met rechte wel prisen mach* (34-35). In deze rozenstruik zit nu geen schitterende roos als symbool van de geliefde, maar de geliefde zelf, verbeeld als een duif. Als ze door een niet genoemde verkeerde handelwijze van de minnaar opschrikt, verwondt ze zich aan een doorn.

4.4 De fauna

BEER: De beer is in sommige culturen een symbool van kracht, soms als een vertegenwoordiger van de machten der duisternis. Ern  (1972) probeert te achterhalen waarom in Brugge een gezelschap dat jaarlijks een ridderlijk steekspel organiseert, zich benoemt met de naam 'de Forestiers van den Witten Beer'. De bronnen die het gezelschap noemen, verwijzen naar het jaar 1320 (114) Ern  komt niet tot een bevredigende verklaring van de naam. Hij vermeldt wel dat zich bij de prijzen die de winnaars ontvangen een uit hout gesneden beer en een hoorn bevinden (resp. voor die van 'binnen' en die van 'buiten'). Snuffelend in Van Maerlants *Der naturen bloeme* vond ik (in het gedeelte 'Urus-tot het slot' in de C.D.-rom Middelnederlands) een beschrijving van de witte beer. In 4487-4492 lezen we hoe de beer zich op de rug van een wilde stier werpt, hem bij de hoorns vat en dood bijt. De Bruggelingen kenden uiteraard het werk van Van Maerlant. De witte beer die op een dier rijdt, hem bij de hoorns vat en dan doodt, zou mogelijk de bron kunnen zijn voor de naamgeving en de hoorn als prijs kunnen verklaren. Het witte hert dat in de geschiedenis van Liederic van Buc genoemd wordt, lijkt niet waarschijnlijk als bron voor de naamgeving.

COCKUDE De *cockude* is een voorjaarsvogel. Zo citeert het MNW (III, 1657): *Men leset dat die cukuut pleghet, dat hi al den winter leghet in sinen plumen*. De winter is definitief afgelopen als men leest: *Si had den kuckuc opten meyendach vijf werven horen roepen*. In het spel *Vanden winter ende vanden somer* speelt de koekoek een belangrijke, traditionele rol.

DUIF De dichter stelt in het vijfde gedicht de geliefde voor als een duif. Misschien staat dit onder invloed van het Hooghed: "Maar enig is zij, mijn duif, mijn volmaakte" (6: 9). Een doorn schendt de vrouw door het onoplettende gedrag van de hoeder en waarschijnlijk een abrupte handeling van de minnaar.

ZWIJN Het wilde zwijn is een symbool van de onverschrokken moed. De auteur in het Gr.Hs. doelt op het varken. Dit dier duidt daarnaast symbolisch vaak de hoofdzonde van de gulzigheid aan, zoals in XIV: *Hi mest hem zelve als een zwijn* (491). In L12 wordt geappelleerd aan de domme onwetendheid van het zwijn (21). In I komen in de proloog beide aspecten in zekere zin samen. Voor de *ruden* is de allegorie die volgt gelijk *corsouden* [liefdesbloemen] die men voor varkens zaait.

4.5 Burcht en domificatie

Het verwijkskarakter van de dingen roept voorstellingen op die een eigen leven leiden. De betekenis komt niet altijd uit het ding zelf voort, maar moet geïnterpreteerd worden. Als in **I** in een allegorisch verband over 'burchten' gesproken wordt, zijn deze het symbool voor de vrouwen die de dichter voor zijn geestesoog ziet. Bepaalde betekenis-kernen van het gebezigde begrip blijven bewaard, zoals de veronderstelde grote weerbaarheid en de grote moeite die de man moet opbrengen bij de verovering. Het veroveren van de dame wordt vaak voorgesteld als het belegeren en innemen van een kasteel.

De burcht is een centraal gegeven in de eerste allegorie. In de burcht die hij wil veroveren huizen allerlei psychische functies van de geliefde. Dames die de minnaar onderweg ziet, worden eveneens voorgesteld als kastelen die verspreid staan in het landschap. Het zijn *een Grote menichte van casteelen, Scone poorten, oghe torrelen, Bevest, bemuert ende al besloten* (177-179). Ze zijn alle schoon, want *Die maetselrie was so reene, Ende so jolij's ghewrocht, In wist waer ic was gherocht* (182-184). Er is maar één dame waarop hij bovenal de blik gericht houdt om *den rechten ganc toter claeheit, die ic sochte* (198-199) te maken. Het is deze dame die uitvoerig met behulp van de architectonisch-allegorische metafoeriek wordt beschreven. De schoonheid van de vrouw weerspiegelt zich in de burcht.

De wezenlijke bestanddelen van de schoonheid zijn volgens Thomas van Aquino de *claritas*, de *perfectio* en de *debita proportio*. Goede maatverhoudingen spelen daarbij een belangrijke rol. De dichter constateert dat het licht dat uit de vensters 'vloeit' *zo clae is al hadt ghesijn int paradijs* (222-224). Het licht doet hem de pijn vergeten: *Claelic wast mi daer verclaert Ghelije twee zonnen int ghesichte* (242-243). Nadrukkelijk vermeldt de *ic* de juiste maatvoering bij de *machelrie* [metselwerk] en *ainsteringhe ende mate adde verchiert al de zate* [(goede) ingevingen en proportionering hadden de burcht tot stand gebracht] (495-499).

Het hele gedachtencomplex komt bijeen in de beschrijving in de regels 596-611. We zien in dit fragment hoe – naar de middeleeuwse opvatting – schoonheid gepaard gaat met zuiverheid en smetteloosheid. *Tpalais stont up enen pilaer Van albaestre wit ende clae, Sonder smette, zuver, reine, Daer die juuste mate alleine So meesterlic was toe ghebracht. Daer was vergadert ende ghesacht* [in elkaar gezet met sluitstukken en inkepingen] *Dat niemen tsegghende soude bestaen, Het es aldus of also ghedaen. Hi was wel waert van groten prise.* De bouwers kan men nooit naar waarde belonen, omdat zij *so meesterlic ordineerden, ende so meesterlic avizeerden* [bouwden en advies gaven] *Na mate ende ooc na werkens aert.*

Van Mierlo (1940, 39) wees op de domificatie-metafoeriek bij Ruusbroec. Ramondt (1944, 62-69 en 71-72) verwees naar Augustijnken van Dordt. Heeroma (1968a) beschreef de mogelijke invloed van *La Tour Amoureuse* (uitgegeven in Langlois 1902), dat hoofdzakelijk het uiterlijk van de vrouw beschrijft. De laatste (1968a) wijdt in een apart artikel aandacht aan de drie gedichten en hun overeenkomsten met de burchtmetafoeriek in gedicht **I**. Voor de interpretatie van het gedicht hebben deze beschouwingen niet zoveel betekenis, voor de details verwijs ik naar Heeroma's artikel. Opmerkelijk is dat de dichter van **I** deze metaforisering tot in de details doorvoert. Naast de steeds vermelde vensters, vindt men nadere omschrijvingen in r. 563-614 en 688-700.

Ook in ander werk dat de dichter gekend kan hebben, vinden we deze metafoeriek terug. Zo staat in het Hulthemse-Handschrift *Ene claghe tot ver Venus der goedinnen* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 531-534). Een teleurgestelde minnaar vraagt vrouw Venus om raad. Zij ver-

zekert hem dat, al valt de tijd soms lang, *goeden dienst en blef niet verloren al int leste moet sijn [de geliefde] hem weten danc*. Kennelijk is hij niet tevreden gesteld en brengt naar voren: *Die minclike sartse reine es vaster in haer behoet dan eneghe borch die es soe goet*. Venus verzekert hem dat de burcht bij volhouden zal vallen, waarbij men moet bedenken *dat men die borch niet prisen en mach die men wint op den iersten dach*. De minnaar wenst *stonde mi des huus een poertier te sme, drueven, liden ende alle pine ware van mi dan verseten*. Maar hij is er nu van overtuigd dat, hoe sterk de burcht ook is, hij met veel geduld en trouw zal slagen. *Ik hebbe ghenomen in mijn ghemere [oordeel] dat vrouwen herte es gheen steenwere*.

4.6 Begrippen op anorganisch niveau

[EDEL]STENEN Om aan te duiden dat dit bijzondere stenen zijn, gebruiken wij de bepaling 'edel', de middeleeuwer gebruikt 'diere' of 'dierbaer'. Stralende stenen op de kroon [van Venus] of het 'vat' [waarin de liefdesdrank wordt aangeboden] verhogen het effect en de uitdrukingskracht. Zo ontstaat de betrekking met een hogere wereld. De edelstenen beklemtonen de vreugde en de roem van de liefde.

GOUD/GULDEN Goud, een edel metaal, straalt een morele waarde uit van volmaaktheid. Het 'zonnemetaal' wordt geassocieerd met de zuivere liefde. Gouden voorwerpen dragen een sacraal karakter, ook heersers dragen gouden kronen. Dat *Suverheit* in een gouden stoel zit (**I**: 808), bewijst hoe belangrijk de rol is die zij vervult en hoe beduidend de eigenschappen zijn die zij vertegenwoordigt. Ook andere toevoegingen ondersteunen haar rol; het zijn voorwerpen, bloemen en kleurbeschrijvingen die de burchtheer opvallend genoeg mist. Edelstenen en goud versieren het kleed dat Venus in **II** draagt (505) en de torens van haar kasteel zijn van goud, *ghelijc der sonnen* (451). Hoofsheid draagt in **I** een gouden kleed (788) en *Vroescap* is als beeld van *finen goude* (**XII**: 152, 451). De vijf vrouwen die onder haar staan (164-165) zijn *ghecleet met witten ende al bezait met guldine zonne*. Een hernieuwd bewijs hoe belangrijk de zintuigen in het liefdesproces zijn. Het gouden vat waarin de welkomdrank in **I** wordt aangeboden, onderstreept het sacrale karakter van de handeling (2022). De op liefdesgebied deskundige *Sangwijn* heeft een mouw *ghewrocht van peerlen en van goude* (941).

Uiteraard is goud een kostbaar metaal en wordt daarom als geschenk aangeboden aan de dame (L48: 28). Het is een begeerd object voor de gierige (L1: 29).

Men zie ook onder geel en goudbloem.

4.7 Werkingsbegrippen en zintuiglijk gewaarwordingen

4.7.1 De licht- en vuurmetaforiek

De lichtmetaforiek speelt een belangrijke rol in de middeleeuwse geschriften. Minna Jacobsohn (1915) heeft in haar boekje 60 pagina's nodig om allerlei lichteffecten in verschillende ridderromans te beschrijven. Grimm geeft in zijn *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (1854/1984, VI, 861-877) vier lichtkringen met als bronnen: de hemellichamen, de God-Christus-Maria-weergave, het oog en tenslotte het kunstlicht. Zij komen alle in het Gr.Hs. voor. Het is opmerkelijk dat in de Middelnederlandse literatuur niet enkel God, Christus, de Heilige geest en Maria als bron van licht en *clærheit* optreden, maar in de hoofse minnewerken ook de aardse geliefde. De

hiërarchie blijft gerespecteerd. Is Maria boven het 'echte' licht verheven, de gewone geliefde is meer aards, maar bezit toch een verheven karakter. Zoals we in de volgende paragraaf zullen zien, staat het licht van de vrouwe (de blikken die zij uit de vensters werpt) in het westen, het religieuze licht staat daarentegen altijd in het oosten.

De frequentie waarmee met lichtmetaforiek gewerkt wordt is in het Gr.Hs groot en ook het aantal gebruikte begrippen is omvangrijk. Antithetische licht-isotopieën die voorkomen zijn *licht, claer, verclaren, verlichten, strale, sterre, raye, mane, scijn, dach en sonne* contra *doncker, deemster, deemsterheit* en *nacht*. Ook de *oghen* treden soms als lichtverspreiders op. Het zijn in I de *veinstren* van de burcht [de vrouwe] die door hun lichtschijn de minnaar zeer beroeren. Ook de zintuiglijk waarneembare eigenschappen die als gevolg van de lichtstraling naar voren komen, treden op in de beeldspraak als glans, weerspiegeling, lichtdoorlaatbaarheid en helderheid. In dit verband komen woorden als *bescinen, bescijn* en *bescijnte* [schijnsel], *glovende, gleinsteren* en dergelijke voor.

Reynaert (1981, 55-97) wijdt een speciaal hoofdstuk aan het onderwerp. Hij wijst erop dat hevige emoties een merkbare verhoging van de lichaamstemperatuur tot gevolg kunnen hebben. De psychosomatische beleving kan het metaforisch taalgebruik tot gevolg hebben gehad, anderzijds kan het suggestieve woord ook emoties en ervaringen oproepen. Reynaert geeft literatuur aanwijzingen en spreekt over een ware 'bezetenheid' met betrekking tot het licht in de Middeleeuwen, ook bemerkbaar bij Hadewijch.

Lichteffecten zijn niet altijd nauwkeurig te scheiden van de vuurverschijnselen, deze zijn ook visueel waarneembaar en verspreiden licht. Een samengaan zien we in L104: *Veel claerre dan doet der zonnen licht, So vonct in mi der minnen vier, Dat mi verbrandet herte ende zin* (7-9). En in II: *Ik besief int soete ghesichte, Mijn herte metten wederlichte Ontsteken vierlijc als een brant* (172-174). Willaert (1984, 119) meent dat het licht een meer intellectuele, het vuur een meer affectieve en dus genotvoller en pijnlijker component vertegenwoordigt. Het vuur heeft een ambivalente betekenis in de metaforiek. Enerzijds verwarmt en verlicht het, anderzijds verteert en verwoest het. De Heilige Geest wordt middels vlammentongen over de apostelen uitgestort, de zondige mens wordt door de reinigende vlammen in het vagevuur gezuiverd. Zeker is dat men in de Middeleeuwen het oorzakelijke verband tussen licht en vuur sterk voelde. Rond boetvaardigen en geesteszieken liep men in de Middeleeuwen met fakkels in de hand, opdat deze hun geest zouden verlichten. Ook in het Gr.Hs. komt de vuurmetaforiek voor, zowel in de beelden met betrekking op de verhouding van de mens tot God en Maria, als in de verhouding tot de geliefde. *Vader goedertiere, Ontsteict mijn herte met dinen viere* (G1: 199).

In L139 (56-60) verzucht de minnaar voor het geval de vrouwe hem niet 'in haar hoede' neemt: *in mi rijst des twifels vier, So wart dijn boom verbrandet scier, Want ic bem, vrouwe goede, Bescout van tswifels gloede*.

In de hierna volgende uiteenzetting beschouw ik het licht in verband met Maria en vervolgens met betrekking tot de geliefde dame. Als het licht en de lichtverspreiders op niet-overdrachtelijke wijze voorkomen, noem ik dit niet. Ik wijdt twee aparte paragrafen in dit gedeelte aan de vuurmetaforiek. Ook *strale, scicht* en *scote* krijgen enige aandacht. Meestal hebben deze woorden de betekenis van 'pijl', maar verschillende malen in het Gr.Hs. zijn zij intermediair gebruikt als overbrengers van licht en vuur. Ook *spaerke* vraagt enige aandacht.

Maria is als moeder van Christus vaak een 'lichtende' Zij wordt vergeleken met de zon, maan of sterren In de Gruuthuse gebeden *Licht, der zonden deumsterheit, Ic groete u, blomme der zuiverheit* (GIV 1 v), *Maria mijn sin verlichte ende pure* (60), *Ewich licht gloriose Rave vulder helicheit* (GV 5 v), *Claerheit, dies niemant can verzaden* (GV 31), *Raven daer alle zoetheit es inne, Ende licht daert al bi es verclaert* (GV 67 v), *Steine zidi, die den nacht Ons ten lichten daghe hebt bracht Claerheit vul van shemels dauwe* (GV 170 v), *Raewe, daer dheliche gheest in sceen Vrouwe, ende wilde vleesch ende been Claerlyc bin uwen live ontfaen* (GV 209 v) En in XI over Maria in de bede *Vulmaecte minne ende omoedicheide Die sgodlics vaders ghenaden staelde* (29)

Maria als zon *O vrouwe die zijt boven der manen, Sonne die in elcker banen Met uwer raven besinct grate In dit allendiche dal van tranen* (G5 157-160) In overtreffende trap *Dijn alre minlijcste aenghesicht, claeire dan der zonnen licht* (XV 127 v) Verder dient de moeder Gods de *donkere sinnen* te verlichten met haar *gracien zoet* (G1 125, XV 455)

De beeldspraak is dus multifunctioneel Maria biedt zelfstandig verlichting, hulp en steun als het beste schepsel dat ooit geboren is Daarnaast is ze ook bemiddelaarster en helpster bij het verkrijgen van de verlossing biedende genade van God

4712 De geliefde als 'lichtende'

De dichter vergelijkt de geliefde in het liedboek met de zon of de maan *Een edel, werde reine vrucht Claeire dan der zonnen licht Boven allen vrouwen* (L29 1-4) En verder *Mijn inghelic scijn vor alle zonnen* (L141 1) en *Huer scoont vroeucht meer dan zonnen licht* (L141 24) Vergelijkingen met een ster komen evenwel niet voor

Het licht speelt een grote rol in de eerste allegorie Tot het moment dat *Hope* aan de poort van de burcht klopt, wordt het tijdens het dolen van de minnaar tien keer genoemd Als de minnaar het licht ziet, gaat het goed met hem Wordt het zwakker of verdwijnt het, dan vergaat het hem slecht Gedicht I is de enige tekst in het Gr HS waarin het licht op een zo systematische wijze gebruikt wordt

De minnaar stapt uit zijn bed en kleedt zich aan om zich daarna in de schone natuur te vermeien Hij wordt *Vrolic, licht ende al gherust* (75-78) Dan ziet hij *Van verren een bescinte clare* [verspreid door de ogen van de vrouwe die een helder schijnsel uitzenden] *of daer de zonne vet risen mochte* (144 v) Het licht wijst hem de weg en beurt hem op Het is zo *claer al hadt ghesijn int paradyt* (222-224), het doet hem de pijn vergeten *Claerlic wast mi daer verclaert, Ghelyc twee zonnen int ghesichte* (I 242-243) Hij gaat zelfs door het licht *melancoleren* (240) *Twifel* voert hem met zich mee en het licht verflauwt (311), hij lijdt grote pijn (329) Na de bevrijding uit de kerker met hulp van *Hope*, ziet hij het licht weer en kan weer lachen (451) Telkens ziet hij het licht (492, 566), dat een genezende werking heeft De opbeurende werking van het licht blijkt bijvoorbeeld in het fragment waarin een liefdespijl de minnaar treft (649) *Hope* verlost hem van de pijn, maar de minnaar verkeert in een ellendige toestand Hij knapt echter snel op, want hij ziet weer de *scone veinstien, Dat licht begonste up mi gleinstren, Ende nam tpemsen van der wonden* (680 v)

Rondkijkend tijdens het ronddolen aanschouwt hij de zon in het oosten maar de *besvante clacite* bevindt zich in het westen *Mijn -innen daer of niet ne scieden Altoos ic up tlichte ghinc* (156 v) De nadrukkelijke vermelding dat het licht zich in het westen bevindt duidt er waarschijnlijk op dat het geen goddelijk licht is maar een werelds licht Janssens wijst op de secundaire symboliek bij de lichtinval in de koren van de kerken die naar het oosten gericht zijn om een maximale lichtinval te verkrijgen bij het celebreren van de ochtendmis Het oostelijk licht wijst niet enkel naar Christus en het goddelijk licht de *sol salutis* maar ook naar het begin van de schepping en het begin van de verlossingsgeschiedenis

Door 'het licht in het westen' hoopt de minnaar te worden verlost uit zijn (aardse) liefdeslijden De ogen hebben een innerlijk verborgen licht dat ze kunnen uitstralen Zij hebben meer dan enig ander zintuig een binding met de ziel, want zij drukken zichtbaar alle gedachten en gevoelens uit

Niet alleen de dame waarop de dichter verliefd wordt zendt licht uit alle dames (gesymboliseerd door de vele aanwezige burchten) stralen een helder schijnsel uit *Uut elcker venster sach ic risen een claei bescimen naturael dat docht mi scinen als een stael* (517-518) Uiteraard heeft de minnaar slechts oog voor het ene heldere en stralende licht dat straalt uit de burcht die hij later betreden zal

In de portierswoning kijkt de minnaar door de spleet naar Jeugd en *Suverhede* met *haer aenscijn claei dan cristael* (804) Belangrijk is te constateren dat er bij beide personificaties geen sprake is van een lichtschijnsel Beide personificaties vertegenwoordigen slechts deelaspecten van de geliefde De hypothese van Heeroma (1969b) dat *Suverhede* een adellijke geliefde kan zijn lijkt mij alleen daarom al ongegrond

Als *Melancolie* en *Juecht* in de portierswoning komen vlucht de *ic* naar buiten in *een groen stede* die zich tot de poort uitstrekt *so verre dat mi wart verclaert Int up waert zien dat zoete licht Daer ic uut ontfinc den scicht* (1497 v) Opmerkelijk is het *verre* De auteur heeft zich de situatie goed ingebeeld tegen de muur staande kan men het licht uiteraard niet aanschouwen De minnaar raakt weer geheel van streek Bleek en bevend haast hij zich naar *Hope* De beide burchtbewoners zien en accepteren hem

Wanneer de *ic* heer en meester van de burcht is zien we hem naar buiten gaan om het paleis met de twee vensters en de kolommen al *omme ende omme* te bekijken *daer dat licht So meesterlyc up was ghesticht* (283 v) De dichter benadrukt het naar buiten gaan *daer ic van buten moeste ontfaen Lucht [licht] van also soeter aert Die de burchgrave sende upwaert Aller specien onghelyc Die men vint up eiderijc die lucht hadde mi ghenesen Hoe mochtic leeden beten leven'* (2094 v) De minnaar vertoeft binnen in de nabijheid van de burchtheer maar deze vertegenwoordigt slechts innerlijke eigenschappen die geen licht uitzenden Hij moet naar buiten gaan om de geliefde vrouw [de burcht!] in haar uiterlijke schoonheid te bezien en te ondergaan De dichter houdt zich streng aan het allegorische beeld Aan het eind van de allegorie is de minnaar opgesloten in de hoog ommuurde sombere tuin en hij aanschouwt het hoopgevende licht niet meer In de *locus terribilis* treurt hij, omdat hij het licht niet meer ziet Hij wordt *razende uut ende* in als hij denkt aan al het geluk in de burcht *ende om dat licht* (2339, 2343) De tranen lopen hem over de wangen (2351)

Ook in **XII** functioneert het licht als representant van de geliefde Als de verliefde dichter in de tontein kijkt ziet hij hoe *Twe venstren claeilic open gaen Een lichte so zach ic daer uut slaen Dies herte ende zin ende ooc mijn moet Wait beroert ende al mijn bloet Ende vechte voort in tzelve licht So bezief ic als een scicht Een scote tot in my herten gront* (242-248) Als

gevolg van deze gebeurtenis lijdt hij aan zware melancholie en vraagt hij God om bijstand, genade en troost.

Het licht kan vertroostend werken, maar ook tot geestelijke verwarring en een melancholische toestand leiden. Opwekkend werkt het licht bijvoorbeeld in L30: *Lucht [licht] des edels wivelics aert, Als ik di zie, ic bem verclaert, Vroilic in de zinnen mijn* (1-3).

Soms wordt de geliefde vergeleken met de zon. Het 'zonnemotief' klinkt door in enkele liederen. Zelfs de zon verspreidt niet zoveel licht en warmte als de vrouw: *Veil claerre dan doet der zonnen licht, So vonct in mi der minnen vier, Dat mi verbrandet herte ende zin* (L104: 7 v.) en *Troostlijc lieflijc aenghezicht, Als ich dir zie, so brant mijn zin, Claerre dan der zonnen licht So es mijn hertze ende du daer in* (L112: 20 v.).

Inspirerend zal het Hooglied (6: 10) gewerkt hebben: "Wie is zij die opgaat als de dageraad, schoon als de blanke maan, stralend als de gloeiende zon, geducht als de krijgsscharen?"

4.7.1.3 Vuurmetaforiek: de godsdienstige component

In de godsdienstige sfeer vinden we de vuurmetaforiek in het eerste gebed dat zich richt tot God, de vader: *Sent in mi dijnre minnen gloet* (283) en *Vader goedertiere, Ontsteict mijn herte met dinen viere, Ende maecter of hu majesteit* (198-200). Ook in G6 wordt gevraagd het hart met de goddelijke minne te ontsteken (24).

Beuken (1936, 238, r. 27-30) geeft een mooi voorbeeld van de vuurmetaforiek: *Laet die luchtende carbonke Schieten vuerighe langhe vonke Dat dat ganse lant ontsteke Ende een vghelic hert in vroechden queke* [vrolijk zij]. In het tweede Egdiuslied moet *elc also labuere Eer therte scuere, Dat wij ontgaen der hellen gloet* (L100: 38-40).

DAUW Dauw is een antinomie van vuur. Het is een blussende en zalvende instantie, brenger van leven, vruchtbaarheid en bloei (Willaert 1984, 140). Het zondige hart in G6 dient met tranen zo 'bedauwd' te worden dat het open komt te staan voor Gods vuur (18-24). In G1 moet alle kwaadheid door deze 'dauw' verdwijnen. Neutraler in VIII: *Dominus tecum met shemels dauwe* (438). Maria is in G5 de *sterre* die de nacht tot dag maakt met haar *Claerheit vul van shemels dauwe* (170-172). G7 ziet haar rijkelijk voorzien van *des hemels dauwe* (25).

In de liefdespoëzie is het gebruik van het woord al oud. Zo vinden we in het eerste minnedicht 'Ter Doest': *wilt nv corten minen rauwe ende laet mi met solace leuen sturt wt van der minnen dauwe* (Liefstinck 1954, 137). In L64 doet een verliefde een beroep op de *troosteliken dauwe* van de vrouw (11) en in L136 vraagt een minnaar aan de liefdesmaand met *doe up mi dauwen Een lieflic woord van trauwen* (25-26).

4.7.1.4 Vuurmetaforiek: de component van de aardse liefde

Bij het oplaaien van de liefdeshartstocht spreekt men van een verzegend vuur. Venus draagt bij haar symbolen niet voor niets de fakkel.

De geliefde in Lied 104 heeft de volgende uitwerking op de minnaar: *Veel claerre dan doet der zonnen licht, So vonct in mi der minnen vier, Dat mi verbrandet herte ende zin* (7-9). De oud geworden minnaar in IV beseft dat in hem *faelgiert der minnen gloet Die vier sproocte [aanwakkerde] inden lustichen moet* (217-218). In het vijftiende gedicht ontstaat de liefde

(*dese bedwelemden onghemake*) via twee stadia (72-86). In de eerste speelt het 'horen zeggen' (men vergelijk de geschiedenis van Gloriant) een rol. Men ontvangt een *spaerke* dat *tonrusten zal bliven* [de gemoedsrust zal verstoren]. In de tweede zal door het 'zien' *die spaerke vlamme toghen, ontsteken blivende ... men caens te wille blusschen niet*. In L129: 12 spreekt de dichter van *Venus' brant*. Bij het aanschouwen van de geliefde *brant mijn zin* (L112: 19), in dezelfde situatie brandt in L134 de minnaar *in der vruechden gloet* (21). In II wordt het hart bij het aanschouwen van de geliefde *ontsteken vierlijc als een brant* (171-173). Als Venus geen haast maakt met het uitspreken van haar vonnis, wordt het hart van de minnaar *Vele meer ontsteken dan te voren* en hij valt bijna in zwijm (1701-1702). De dame in L53 (1-34) raadt in de dialoog de minnaar aan: *Ghi sult u houden Vrolic, ende verbouden* [moed scheppen] *Inder minnen gloet Al souddi u bescouden* [verzengen]. Ook het verlangend denken aan de dame kan een brand veroorzaken: *Du [Ghepeins] haens ghebrant met onbesceit Mijn herte ende al mijns zannes cracht* (L140: 8, 9). Het *minnevier* kan meestal niet geblust worden (XV: 80).

De ongunstige betekenis vindt men duidelijk in XIV: *Sijn herte is om al thebbene vierich* (292) en *Dijn boom* [symbool van de liefde voor de dame] *verbrandet scier, vrouwe goede, Bescout van twifels gloede* (L139: 60).

Het gevaar van de 'vurige', brandende liefde wordt vooral onderkend in de derde fase van het liefdesproces, men zie in de rubriek 'kleuren' onder 'rood' en de interpretatie bij de regels 2065-2115 in het achtste hoofdstuk.

De lippen van de geliefde zijn in de burchtsymboliek *gloende root* (I: 574).

4.7.2 Enkele afzonderlijke woorden

LUCHT In de middeleeuwse geneeskunde neemt de (frisse) lucht een belangrijke plaats in. Jansen-Sieben (1994, 257) zegt hierover dat de lucht in de leer van Avicenna wordt beschouwd als een genezende factor die niet voortkomt uit het lichaam zelf. De gedachte van de genezende werking komen we in het Gr.Hs. geregeld tegen, bijvoorbeeld in I. Het wordt warm in de hortus *Ende als die graszoiden verwaermet waren So gaven zi de zoetste lucht. Rauwe, droufheit, vaer no ducht verdriet, smart, vrees noch angst Ne deerde hem twijnt, diet mochte rieken* (88-91). De minnaar komt buiten de burcht, hij ruikt de *Lucht van also zoeter aert, Die de burchgrave sende upwaert. Deze lucht gaat alle specerijen ter wereld te boven*. Ten slotte: ook als de *ic* alle pijnen van de wereld gehad had, *Die lucht die hadde mi ghenesen* (2093-2103). We begrijpen nu ook hoe belangrijk de taak van het gepersonifieerde zintuig *Rieke Lucht* is: zuivere lucht is essentieel voor de gezondheid!

In het zesde gedicht wordt gezegd dat *Die lucht die zoe* [de geliefde] *te ghevene pliet Die es hem* [de minnaar] *zeere bequamelic* (72-73). Aan het einde: *ic biddu bloume, reine vrucht, Bidt vor mi met zoeter lucht Met desen goeden nieuwen jare* (300-302).

In de liederen vinden we *Lucht des edels wivelics aert, Als ic di zi, ic bem verclaert, Vroilic inde zinnen mijn* (L30: 1-2). In L119 horen we: *Haer oghen claer, haer minlic zien, Haer mont zoet meer dan balzems lucht, Daer mi al heil of mach gheskien Vor al dat men mi gheven muecht* (5 v.).

Een moeilijkheid bij de bespreking is dat de spellingvorm 'lucht' ook 'licht' kan betekenen. Duidelijk is dit het geval in X waar staat *Wat baten oghen zonder lucht* (86). Onduidelijk is de betekenis onder andere in L116. Als de minnaar als een nachtuil door de straten zwerft, zegt

hij: *Ic blive di minlic onderdaen. Troutzaerte vrucht, Wilt gheven lucht den huwerhaen!* (42-45). Bij het rondzwerfen denkt men aan 'lucht', bij het nachtelijk duister aan 'licht'.

SPAERKE In **XV** komt meer de vuurmetaforiek naar voren. De wereldlijke liefde hoeft niet alleen tot stand te komen door het zien, maar een voorbereidende fase is vaak het 'horen en zeggen', daarna volgt die van het 'zien'. Het gevolg is dat een *spaerke* [vonkje, schitterinkje] zal *tonrusten bliven, ontstekende bliven, men caens te wille bluscchen niet* (79 v.).

STRALE, SCICHT, SCOTE EN RAYE Het gebruik van de eerste drie woorden ligt aan de rand van de metaforische toepassingen, alle drie hebben ze in de letterlijke betekenis betrekking op pijlen die afgeschoten worden. De betekenis ervan is sterk afhankelijk van de context. We hadden hen ook bij de dingallegorieën kunnen behandelen, maar gezien hun licht/vuureffecten doen we dit hier. In dezelfde betekenisfeer blijkt ook 'raye' te liggen, al ligt het accent hier meer op het licht. Misschien gaat Freudenthals (1931, 127) uitspraak te ver dat "Licht ist zunächst einmal nichts anders als Feuer, wie seiner physikalischen Natur nach, so auch im Kult und Volksbrauch". Zeker is dat men ook in de Middeleeuwen het oorzakelijk verband sterk voelde en dat de effecten die de pijlen teweeg brengen op beide aspecten betrekking hebben. De pijlen van de liefde treffen het hart pijnlijk en zetten het in vlam. Het MNW (VII, 2256-2258) geeft onder punt 5 bij het woord *strale* de aantekening dat het in het Vlaams-Brabants der Middeleeuwen de moderne betekenis 'straal' zeldzaam had. Het gewone woord hiervoor was *raeye*, vooral in verband met zon en maan. Toch lijkt me de associatie met het nnl. 'straal' niet denkbeeldig.

In de godsdienstige sfeer zien we hoe Maria en Christus *rayen* uitzenden. Het blijken in het Gr.Hs. echter geen echte pijlen te zijn, ze hebben betrekking op de liefde uitgaande van Maria en Christus die het hart treft. In het vijfde gebed is Maria *clærheit* (31) en *Rayen daer alle zoetheit es inne, Ende licht daert al bi es verclaert* (67-68). Verdam (1890, 280) wil in plaats van het slecht leesbare *Raye* [in verband met het uitvoerige acrostichon] *laeye* lezen met de betekenis 'gloed'. *Lade* is ook mogelijk, een eventuele vleinaam in de geest van suikerdoosje, maar gloed en zoetheid passen niet erg bij elkaar. In **XV** vraagt degene die naar eigen woorden niet waardig is Gods glorie te zien: *Sciet den schicht in mine memorie Die du scoots bi haren weene Int herte der helicher Magdalene* (383-384). In **XI** wordt gesproken van de *Vulmaecte minne ende omoedichede Die sgodlics vaders ghenaden straelde* (28-29). Ook Christus' liefde heeft een uitstralende werking (**XV**: 374, 382).

Als de aardse liefde ter sprake komt, is de uitdrukking *Ic ben ghescoten, ic moet verdraghen* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 293, r. 23) al voldoende om een hevige verliefdheid uit te drukken. Meestal zien we dat de harten van de minnaars getroffen worden door de vurige blikken van de vrouw en door de passie opwekkende pijlen van Venus en de lasterpraatjes die door *Begrijp* verspreid worden.

Venus bezit in **II** één oog, maar geen fakkel. Wel heeft ze *enen boghe, Met .III. stralen scaerp van sneden* (502 v.), waarmee zij naar traditioneel gebruik de minnaars verwondt in het oog en/of het hart. Dat de 'stralen' voor onze dichter ook hier verband houden met 'in brand zetten' blijkt uit het feit dat hij Venus in zijn beschrijving niet de traditionele fakkel geeft, maar wel beschrijft hoe zij *beschijnt de ruden* en de *reinen* met haar *rayen* (1821 v.). Het blijkt dat haar *III. stralen scaerp van sneden* (503) hun werk goed gedaan hebben. De minnaar is getroffen in de ogen (bij het zien van de geliefde) en in het hart: *ic besief int soete ghesichte. Mijn herte metten wederlichte Ontsteken vierlijc als een brant. Mids desen so ward mi onbekand Mijns sins ende alder weerelt mede. Mijn oghen hilden vaste hare stede* (166 v.).

Uiteraard zendt de geliefde met haar ogen de nodige boodschappen uit. De *ic* in **XII** ziet als hij in de fontein kijkt twee 'vensters' [de ogen] *claelic* open gaan en hij vertelt: *Een licht zo zach ic daer uit slaen Dies heite ende zin ende ooc mijn moet Wart beroeit ende al mijn bloet Ende rechte voort in tzelve licht So bezief ic als een sacht Een scote in mi herten gront Nye zident bezief ic mi ghezont* (243-249). Zowel geestelijk als lichamelijk voelt de minnaar de uitwerking bliksemsnel in zich. De wijze vrouw zegt dat hij beter niet in de fontein had kunnen kijken. De naam van de fontein is *Trouwe*, de eigenschap die het geheim is voor de genezing: *Hi moet ghenesen alder quale Die commen mach uter veinstren strale* (528-529). Bij *strale* denk ik gezien de context aan een 'lichtstraal', die hem in vuur en vlam zet. Het licht dat uit de ogen (de *veinsters*) van de vrouw straalt, is een leidmotief in de eerste allegorie.

Ten slotte kunnen de 'stralen' betrekking hebben op lasterpraatjes. We horen in de tweede allegorie via de getuigenverklaring van *Hope* dat de minnaar gekwetst is door een 'strale'. Wie hem heeft afgevuurd weet ze niet. Wij weten het wel: het is een pijl afgeschoten door de bastaard en knecht van de baljuw, namelijk *Begrijp* met zijn *moortboghe ende daer toe stralen snel* (639). Beide figuren staan in dienst van Venus. De 'stralen' slaan hier op de venijnige kletspraatjes van de *niders* die de intense jalousie van de minnaar opwekken zodat hij tot melancholie vervalt. Tijdens het proces horen wij de schout *Nau Meic* verklaren dat de minnaar op deze wijze op de proef gesteld wordt. Hij moet bewijzen dat hij tegenover zijn geliefde al zijn verplichtingen is nagekomen. Helaas slaagt hij hierin onvoldoende en hij kan derhalve zijn 'loon' niet ontvangen.

4.8 De getallensymboliek

In het Gr Hs komen de traditionele getallen herhaaldelijk voor zonder dat ze een zodanig bijzondere rol spelen dat de interpretatie van de teksten erdoor bemoeilijkt wordt. Wel is het opmerkelijk hoe vaak de met symboliek geladen getallen gebruikt worden zoals uit de nu volgende korte toelichting moge blijken. De numerologie behoorde tot de kennis van de ontwikkelde middeleeuwer.

EEN Niet alleen telwoorden duiden dit begrip aan, we zien ook verwijzingen als *eenicheit*, *allene*, *anders gheen geen ander* en dergelijke. In de hoofse poëzie verzekert de minnaar de aanbedene herhaaldelijk dat zij de enige is. Hij gebruikt ook omschrijvingen als *Tot u wil ic mi geel bereiden* (L30 29), het zich voegen eewich *an eene vrouwe goet* (L20 3) waarin het veel voorkomende gevangenschapsmotief doorklinkt.

DRIE In veel godsdiensten een heilig getal dat de schepping, het zijn en de vernietiging symboliseert. Biedermann (1991, 133) wijst op de sacrale aard van de getallen. De schepper-god als 'oereenheid', die zich openbaart door tot een tweeheid te worden. Uit these en antithese ontstaat vervolgens de synthese van de drieheid. Elk drievoud is volmaakt (driehoek, drievuldigheid, triade) waarvan onder andere onze spreekwoorden getuigen driemaal is scheepsrecht, alle goede dingen bestaan uit drieën enz. In het Gr Hs wordt de triniteit herhaaldelijk aangeduid direct of met een omschrijving, zoals *eenichede God eeniche drievoudichede* (G2 71 v) of *O Heere drievoudich God in een* (G5 44), *Drie persoon een wanich God* (XV 563). Maria wordt de tempel der *drievoudichede* genoemd (G5 44). In L97 (28) wordt de drieenheid genoemd die neerdaalt: *Drie raven endende in eenen pas* [plaats].

Augustinus ziet drie soorten volk (XIV: 187) en Christus hangt met drie nagels aan het kruis (G4: 124).

In de rechtszitting in II neemt het getal drie een belangrijke plaats in: driemaal wordt de vrede aangeboden, even zo vele malen roept de baljuw de vierschaar uit en hij bant met drie slagen met de roede plechtig de zitting. Drie raadvrouwen overleggen in de raadskamer.

De dag dient men in het dagelijks leven in drieën te verdelen (II: 1787 v., IV: 69) met slapen, werken en ontspannen. Drie redenen nopen de heremiet in XIII de stad Brugge te verlaten.

Ook in het minneproces speelt drie een rol. In I ontvangt de minnaar drie sleutels die hem de heerschappij over de burcht geven. *Suverheit* heeft drie gezelschapsdames. In VI worden de drie kleuren besproken die in de liefde een beslissende rol spelen. Meer verborgen speelt de driedeling een rol die ook in de hoofse ridderromans aanwezig is: de toestand voor het avontuur, de catharsis door het avontuur, de toestand na afloop. We zien deze driedeling in II, waar de eerste fase culmineert in het gesprek met de kluzenaar, de tweede in het proces en de bijscholing met de gewenste catharsis. In de derde blijkt die zuivering echter nog niet ingetreden te zijn. Ook in I zijn de drie fasen te herkennen: de toestand van de minnaar voor de toelating tot de burcht, het verblijf in de burcht, de toestand na de verwijdering. De derde fase wordt in beide allegorieën maar kort aangeduid, de verwachte catharsis is niet tot stand gekomen.

ZEVEN Een symbolisch zwaar geladen aantal. We denken aan de zeven planeten, de zeven scheppingsdagen, de zeven kleuren in de regenboog, de zeven tonen in de toonladder, de zeven hemelsferen, de zeven planeten enz. Men moet zeven maal zeventig maal vergeven, in het boek Openbaring vinden we het aantal zeven herhaaldelijk terug: zeven kerken geleid door zeven engelen, zeven hoornsignalen, zeven heuvels, zeven koningen enz. Het tijdsverloop in de geschiedenis is verdeeld in zeven eeuwen. Aan Maria worden zeven *bloemen* [deugden] toegekend, er wordt gesproken van de zeven *bliscappen*, haar hart wordt doorboord met zeven pijlen enz. De menselijke ontwikkelingsgang wordt meestal geschetst in opeenvolgende periodes van zeven jaar. Santing (1994, 77-78) geeft een aantal minder bekende aspecten rond de voortplanting, het aantal kinderen en de ontwikkeling van de baby. Na zeven maanden kreeg de baby tanden, na tweemaal zeven maanden begon een kind te lopen en na drie maal zeven maanden kon het praten.

Ook in het Gr.Hs. komt het getal zeven herhaaldelijk voor. Zeven getuigen worden in II opgeroepen. De zeven werken van barmhartigheid worden in XI en G2 genoemd, evenals de zeven korven met overgebleven voedsel na de spijziging door Christus in XI. De *hoedere* in gedicht XII dient zeven deugden te bezitten, en uitvoerig worden de zeven hoofdzonden in XIV besproken. Hoewel bekend is dat Brugge toentertijd meer poorten telde, bespreekt de kluzenaar er in XIII maar zeven. In de *locus terribilis* in I zijn er zeven bomen die *kade* vruchten dragen. Zeven maal klinkt het dringende verzoek *Vaer wech!* in L140 als de dichter het gepeins verwenst. Ook in het Hulthemse-Handschrift komt zeven in de minnedichten voor: in de Venusboom van Jan Dille zitten zeven koninginnen (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 540, r. 52), uit het minnewapen ontspruiten zeven bloemen die minnedeugden presenteren (tekst 44), de volmaakte *hoet van minnen* telt zeven verschillende bloemen (tekst 12) en de *boem van minnen* (tekst 34) telt *vii telgen in goeder manieren*, die men in het minneverkeer in acht moet nemen voor een gelukkige verbintenis. Het zijn trouw, wijsheid, ootmoedigheid, mildheid, deugdzaamheid en reinheid van gemoed.

4.9 De kleurensymboliek

De toepassing van de kleurensymboliek was op vele gebieden zeer gangbaar in de Middeleeuwen. We moeten er steeds op bedacht zijn dat kleuren niet zomaar genoemd worden. Gelukkig is er sprake van een bepaalde traditie die het voor ons mogelijk maakt de betekenis van het gebruik te duiden.

De literatuur biedt vele illustratieve voorbeelden, zoals in *Dit is van .VI. Vaerwen ende XII. Outheyden* (Blommaert 1851, 124-127). De dichter past de zeven kleuren (wit en zwart maken grijs, dat derhalve ook meedoet) toe op de zeven *etaten* [levenstfasen] van de mens. Bij elke leeftijdsfase hoort een kenmerkende geestelijke eigenschap die een bepaalde kleur toebedeeld krijgt. Op 48-jarige leeftijd, als men *op den hoechsten graet* staat, overziet de mens met de volgende samenvatting *sinen etaet*:

- 1-12: [wit] *Sijn selver merct hi der kintsheit*, de onschuld, de reinheid
13-24: [groen] *Sijn groen cynopre* [benaming van een kleur, hier groen, soms rood] *der vrolijcheit*, het ontluikende leven en het zoeken van vertier
24-36: [rood] in de man met de *bernende gloede der coenheit*, *Sijn rode keel van starker cracht*; in de vrouw de *scamelheit*
37-48: [blauw] *Sijn blauwe asure dat heefden bracht* *Dat hi wijslic sal oversien* *Wat hem namaels mach gheschien de ghestedicheit*.

De volgende levensfasen worden gekenmerkt door:

- geel/goud: eer en deugd, maar ook ziekte en traagheid
zwart: simpelheid en het schuwen van de hovaardij
grijs: penitentie in *grauwen ermijn*.

De samenvatting stelt: *Wildi duechdelic becliven ende die varuwen cleiden leeren*. Er worden dan allerlei associaties gelegd tussen de kleuren en de kleding.

Sittig (1987, 80) merkt op dat in de loop van de veertiende eeuw het gebruik van de kleurensymboliek opkomt om de liefdesverhouding te typeren. Deze voor de Duitstalige literatuur geldende opmerking, lijkt ook op de Nederlandstalige van toepassing. In de hoofse ridderromans en in het lyrische werk van hertog Jan I van Brabant en Hendrik van Veldeke is het symbolische kleurengebruik nog vrijwel afwezig, maar in het Gr.Hs. komt de kleurensymboliek frequent voor.

Brinkmann (1980, 100) verwijst naar onderzoeken van Walther Gloth. Deze memoreert het gebruik van kleuren in de kleding, waardoor de stand van zaken in het liefdesproces wordt aangegeven: "Grün den Anfang der Liebe, Rot die brennende Liebe, Blau die Stetigkeit, Schwarz Trauer über Verlust, Weiß Hoffnung (und Keuschheit), Gelb den Liebeslohn, Braun die Liebesbindung, Grau die Unterwerfung". Het motief van de kleding die fasen in het liefdesgebeuren uitbeeldt, vinden we mooi weergegeven in het Berlijnse Hs. 922: *want ich diene in blauwe und in wijs und bliben wil bis in mijn zijt, dair zu so wil ich vurich roit dragen zu*

dem oirden mijn of dijn genade, mijn wiffliche schijn (Lang 1941, 16, r. 909-913). Het gevaar bestaat steeds dat we gaan generaliseren en tijds- en plaatsverschillen over het hoofd zien. Gloth wijst op het onderscheid tussen de wereldlijke en geestelijke "minnigliche" kleuren-symboliek en Huizinga in zijn hoofdstuk over het schoonheidsgevoel, op de verschillen in modebewustzijn (1999, 298-301). Er zijn echter toch wel duidelijke, algemene, ook internationale, overeenkomsten te herkennen. Ook in het Gr.Hs. komt kleurensymboliek in de kleding voor, we komen hier bij de bespreking van de afzonderlijke kleuren op terug.

Kleuren hebben niet altijd een vaste betekenis. Zo geeft Wackernagel (1966, herdruk van uitgave 1872, 238-240) een mooi overzicht van de veelzijdigheid van de symbolische betekenis der kleuraanduidingen. Naast een positieve, bezitten de kleuren vaak ook een negatieve zin. Zo kan geel naast het hoogste geluk in de beloning der liefde, ook naijver en nijd aanduiden. Een instructief schematisch overzicht geeft Pastoureau (1986, 40).

Kleurencombinaties hebben vaak een specifieke betekenis. Zo kan de verbinding /zwart-bruin discretie en geheimhouding symboliseren. De minnaar in lied LXXIX van het Berlijnse Hs. 922 (Lang 1941, 41, r. 100) is voor eeuwig verstrikt in *groen, roet, wijs*, kleuren die de innerlijke gesteldheid uitdrukken van reinheid, getrouwe liefde en de hoop op tegenliefde van de vrouw. De genoemde drie kleuren spelen in het Gr.Hs. een grote rol in gedicht VI, waar ze omstandig worden uitgelegd. De kleuren rood en groen komen in combinatie ook voor in het 'schilderij-gedicht (VIII), met betrekking tot de aangeboden kersen en de gedragen kleding. Verder vinden we kleurencombinaties enkel in de kleding van de humoren in I. Ieder draagt zijn eigen hem typerende kleur, maar daarnaast ook grijs, de kleur van onderwerping en dienstbaarheid.

De vindplaatsen van de gebruikte kleuraanduidingen vindt men in bijlage A. We zien dat de kleuren grijs/graauw (6 en 14 maal), wit (21 keer), rood (17 keer) en groen (14 maal) dominant zijn. Zwart komt 5 keer, blauw 2 keer en geel slechts eenmaal voor.

BLAUW Blauw is de kleur van de trouw en bestendigheid (Wackernagel 1872, 204; Sittig 1987, 117). De laatste noemt bijvoorbeeld *das trag (ich) plawb on wandels var* (226). Het Berlijnse Hs. Mgf. 922 geeft een nadrukkelijke verzekering van trouw in een nieuwjaarswens met de woorden: *gestricket in blauwen vaer, umb, das ich sulde gestedich sijn* (Lang 1941, 15, r. 860-861, lied XXVIII).

Blauw komt in het Gr.Hs. niet veel voor. Het is de kleur van *Vrouwe Ghestadicheit*. Haar kleding wordt echter in het Gr.Hs. niet beschreven. Een aanduiding in deze richting vinden we wel in het Hulthemse-Handschrift, namelijk in *Van suveren cledren te dragen allen vrouwen: ...een blau sorcoet [wijd overkleed] ... gheheten eest Ghestedicheit* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999 571-573, r. 17-24). In *Dit is van .VI. Vaerwen ende .XII. Outheyden* (Blommaert 1851) komt blauw ook voor met dezelfde zinnebeeldige achtergrond.

Blauw is met grijs aanwezig in de kleding van *Sangwijn vaehant* [hooggeplaatst, edel] (I: 938-939). Dit blauw wordt verklaard bij de humoren [5.3]; de combinatie van deze kleuren bij 'grijs'.

GEEL Geel staat in de volkssymboliek voor de jaloezie en de nijd (Biedermann 131), misschien door de associatie van geel met het cholersche temperament. Als voorbeeld geeft Sittig (117) *Ghele verwe, die hayt den zede das zi gavr eryloughen zi*. Waarschijnlijk is deze zinsnede te verstaan als een verwijzing naar de onoprechte, naijverige *niders/klaffers*.

Wackernagel (1872, 204) noemt in zijn samenvatting over de symbolische betekenis van de kleuren, geel ook als kleur van het hoogste geluk. Zingerle (1863, 498) wijst in zijn nog altijd

instructieve artikel op het verband met goud (we zagen het ook in *Dit is van .VI. Vaerwen ende .XII. Outheyden* (Blommaert 1851)) en hij spreekt over de "vervulde, ingewilligde liefde". Zo antwoordt een 'hij' op een vraag van een 'zij' over de betekenis van de gedragen kleding: *Daz ist der minne solt, daz riche minnikliche golt kundet, daz er so gewert was er an sinem lieb ie begert*. Geel in de zin van 'de vervulde liefde' komt in het Gr.Hs. niet voor. In het kleed van *Suverheit* zitten gele *goudblomen* (I: 801), deze bloemen hebben vaak dezelfde symbolische betekenis als de enkelvoudig gebruikte kleur geel, namelijk van het hoogste liefdesgeluk. Sittig (1987, 80) noemt geel als teken van het hoogste geluk en ijverzucht; Pastoureau (1986, 40) als de kleur van 'richesse' en 'noblesse foi'. Men zie verder onder 'goud' [4.6] en onder 'goudsbloem' [4.3].

GRIJS/GRAUW Grijs symboliseert met zwart vaak de treurnis. Deze symboliek is ook in het Duitstalige gebied gangbaar. Sittig (1987, 294) vermeldt uit het Lochamer-liedboek: *O swarz und graue farbe* (vs. 13), als de minnaar zijn treurnis uit over de scheiding veroorzaakt door de *klaffern*. Bij Hätzlerin vinden we: *schwarz vnd graw, volgt laid der lieb nach* (II, 9) en *graw bedeutet minne guot Daby adel und hohen muot* (II, 19)]. Dezelfde symboliek vinden we in L36 van het Gr.Hs., waarin de gemoedsgesteldheid van een teleurgestelde minnaar wordt getekend. Hij is vol van *sorghen, peinsen* en is vervuld van een *hope* die *es al een twifel sneven*. Dan klinkt het: *Een ordine hevet mijn herte up heven Dats zwart, een graeu doet soe daer binnen cleven, Dit heift zoe ernelic ontfaen* [uitdrukking uit de rechtssfeer: 'voorgoed, als onvervreemdbaar bezit'] (16-19). Het hart vol zorgen kan daarvan niet bevrijd worden, want *zwart es rauwe ende graeu arbeit* (21). Onder *arbeit* wordt in het Gr.Hs. de 'onderdanige minnedienst' verstaan die de minnaar verricht in de hoop zijn 'loon' te mogen ontvangen (de thematiek van II). De minnaar in I wiens hoop en troost zijn vergaan, wordt verbannen in een *locus terribilis* en verzucht: *Graeu es die oordene mijn Ende dat blijft mijn cleit, In graeu moetic gheduerich sijn, In graeu vindic al arebeit, Dats mi anscijn...* (2309-2314).

Grijs komt voor in de kleding van de vier *humoren* in I. We vinden bij de figuren de volgende aanduidingen: 'Melancolie': *Graeu ende groen was sijn abijt* (899), 'Sangwijn': *Sijn abijt was hemel blaue Met eenre mouwen die was graeu, Ghewrocht van peerlen ende van goude* (940), 'Fleumaet': *Wit ende graeu so haddi an* (953), 'Collorijn': *Sijn abijt was graeu ende root* (959). Dit kleurgebruik verklaar ik in het overzicht van de personificaties. Het waarom van het grijs in de kleding van de *humoren* is niet geheel duidelijk. Huizinga (1999, 301) vermeldt dat grijs veel in de feestkledij voorkomt, het had als kleur der treurigheid waarschijnlijk een meer elegische nuance dan bruin. De kleurencombinaties in de kleding van de *Humoren* vinden we terug bij Hätzlerin van wier liederenverzameling Geerts (1909, 35) zegt: "Überraschend ist die Übereinstimmung zwischen den höfischen Minneliedern der deutschen Sammlungen und der flämischen... sie stehen auf der gleichen Stufe". In deel II worden als combinaties genoemd *weiss und graw vil frad pringet, wem aber hocher lieb gelinget; graw und grön, minn adel und schön; graw und plaw stäts hohen müit, mit fug es niemant schaden tüt; graw und rot wol erchennet, sein lieb sei ze hoch genemmet*.

Als *Melancolie* de minnaar beveelt zijn *caproen Graeu so was hi van coluere* (1616) op te zetten, zal dit slaan op het feit dat grijs ook het dienstverband uitbeeldt en de minnaar in dienst van *Melancholie* treedt. Misschien ook op het feit dat hij zijn *arbeit* nog moet verrichten om zijn minneloon te kunnen ontvangen. Het werd hierboven immers al geciteerd: *In graeu vindic al arebeit*. Het grijs onderstreept de dominantie van de melancholie.

Misschien duidt het grijs in de kleding van de andere humoren op de onontkoombare dienstbaarheid die de minnaar moet betonen om zijn temperament (dat de humoren bepalen) bij de dame aan te passen. De humoren staan allegorisch in dienst van de dame.

GROEN Deze kleur symboliseert in het algemeen de hoop op of de vreugde over een beginnende liefde, een internationaal voorkomend gebruik. Ott (1899/1977, 14) verklaart in zijn studie over kleurnuances bondig: "La langue n'a pas cherché à exprimer la couleur verte par un nombre considérable de nuances différentes. Mais dans le domaine symbolique, vert dédommage pour ce qui lui manque au point de vue lexicologique. Il est l'emblème de tout ce qui prospère, de la fermeté, de l'espoir, comme de la foi." Biedermann (1991: 142) vermeldt dat in de volkssymboliek groen de kleur van de hoop is. Het kruis van Christus [de hoop] wordt vaak groen voorgesteld, de graal smaragdgroen.

Ook in het liefdesgebeuren verbeeldt groen de hoop en staat zo in verband met de maand mei met het ontwakende gevoel van vreugde en de component van het seksuele liefdesverlangen. Het Berlijns Hs. Mgf. 922 zegt: *Groen ist der minnen anemanc* (Lang 1941, 36, LXX r 2048). Hatzlerin spreekt in haar liedboek van *gron is der minn am anfangk* en *gron ist am frolich anvangk, wa man hatt heben gedanck* (resp. II, 19 en II, 20, 97). Vrouw Liefde draagt vaak een groen kledingstuk. In het Gr. Hs. verwijzen verschillende plaatsen naar de hoop op de gunstige afloop van een beginnende liefde: *Der vruedchen vrauwe, edel plein* [lusthof vol genot > bron van vreugde], *Groen du verblyts de zinnen myn Saltu mi laetzen?* [afwijzen], *truwen nein!* (L103: 6-8). In hetzelfde lied: *Cleitstu mir zwart* [kleur van de droefenis] - *groen es so fijn!* - *Sone condic nummer vrolic sijn* (15-16). In VI staat *Groen es der vruedchen ommeleit* (124), een zin die grote overeenkomst vertoont met *Dann gron ist am frolich claid* in Hatzlerin's Lied 20 over de *Gronen varbe* (Haltaus 1840: 167, r. 66).

Tijdens een gesprek tussen *de vrauwe metten kersen* en *de man metten kersen* in VIII (147-160) worden de kleuren niet genoemd, maar aangeduid. De man zegt: *elc kersekin bi evn syn ghecoluert na mijn abijt, naer hu abijt de stalen* [stelen] *revn Aldus zo sijn wy twee in een ghebonden talre tijt*. De beeldspraak is duidelijk, voor de rode kleur zie men onder *root*. In L140 lezen we: *Ach, groen nu zi mijn Ommeleit*. Want *ich mi me so moede en vacht* (15-16). Dat Rens (1980, 103) hier denkt aan groen als symbool van krankzinnigheid lijkt mij niet aannemelijk, ook hier zal de gewone betekenis van toepassing zijn. Een uitvoerige beschouwing over dit lied vindt men in SpL 36 (Lassche 1994a).

Bij Hildegard van Bingen heeft groen betrekking op de *viriditas* groenheid, kiemkracht, de ochtendkleur als alles fris en groen is (Biedermann 1991, 142). Hatzlerin vermeldt *Gron ist am lust dem hertzen*. *Gron vertreibet schmerzen* (Haltaus 1840: 103).

Het hoopvolle lustgevoel zien we steeds bij de minnaars in de Gruuthuse teksten optreden. Als de minnaar in sombere stemming in het liefelijke landschap komt, voelt hij zich direct al een stuk beter. In I zien we de minnaar rondlopen: *Die scoonste boomen die zoetste cruden, Groener dan enich groen mach sijn, Sach ic* (82-84a). Een sterke accentuering van het groen – gekoppeld aan vogelgezang, zonneschijn, bloeiende bloemen en heerlijke geuren – brengt de minnaar tot de uitspraak: *Daer ic dus blide ghinc alleine* (95). Groen overheerst het voorjaar. Na de barre wintertijd is de lente dé tijd voor de liefde. Geleid door het licht uit de *venstren* [de ogen] van de geliefde, komt hij bij een weg waarvan hij meedeelt: *Aldus so cam ic in een strate, Scone groene, wijt ende lanc* (196-197). De gedachte speelt mee dat de *strate* de *wech* is *toter claeinheit*. Een verwachtingsvol, hoopvol aspect dat nog geaccentueerd wordt door het 'groen'. Ook in r. 1495 is sprake van *een groen stede* waarschijnlijk met de symbolische

achtergrond dat de minnaar 'het licht' weer gaat zien. In **XII** horen we dat de minnaar *spelen ginc int groene alleine* (394), in zijn hoopvolle verwachting ziet hij *van verren een fonteine*, bewaakt door een vriendelijke 'hoeder'. De fontein symboliseert de vrouw, wiens *hoedere* hij later wordt. In **XII** lezen we *Dus ghinc ic in den groenen pade Duer bloume ende duer zoete gras Toten priele dat zoete was* (317- 319). Ook hier is het pad weer groen. Merkwaardig is de synesthetische toevoeging van *zoete* zowel bij gras als het prieel. Het citaat heeft een hyperbolisch karakter dat een sterke aandoening verraad.

We vinden groen ook geassocieerd met het prille, ongerepte, maar ook met het gevaar van onbezorgdheid dat tot bezoedeling kan leiden. Jan Praet verwoordt dat als volgt: *als zoë [noch] jonc es ende groene, dat soe haer eere behouden mochte* (Bormans 1872, 27, 658-659). Ook dit aspect vinden we in het Gr.Hs. terug. In **VI** vinden we een uiteenzetting over de kleurensymboliek van groen, wit en rood in de *bloume* [de geliefde]. De wijze vrouw gaat de kleuren verklaren, kleuren waarvan de minnaar opmerkt: *Haer coluer es gheplant in mien* (110): ... *beneden tgroen Betekent juecht ende vruechdelicheit [blijheid] groen es der vruechden ommeleit ... zonde brinct alle droufheit Ende jaecht vrihede in scalkernien ... men zoudt di tien [verwijten andere minnaressen te hebben (MNW VIII, 320)] Verdeluwestu der blomen vruecht ... Die tgroen moet houden bi der duecht ... Vruecht in duechden, ende anders niet* (119-138). Utingen in dezelfde sfeer horen we als Redene zegt: *Daer staet een eggentier ende bloyet Van roken zoet, van bladen groen!* (**V**: 106-107). Dezelfde achtergrond vinden we in **VIII**, waar de *vrauwe metten hoede*, sprekend over de wat verlepte rozen die haar minnaar aanbiedt, mededeelt: *ic hadde vele lievere cnoppen groen, juechdicke cnoppen sijn best ghetruct ... Onze minne blijft altoos int saysoen!* (135-138). De heer antwoordt dat zijn hart een rozier is, *die dach ende nacht bloyet, Met groenen bladen menichertier* (141-143).

De traditionele liefdesboom de 'linde' heeft *telghen* met groenen bladen overdekt (**I**: 232), ook in dit decor ziet de minnaar weer *den vreemden lichten scine*, en gaat over tot *melancoleren*. Een toestand vol vertwijfeling en hoop die vaak leidt tot het schrijven van lief-despoëzie.

In **VIII** wil de knaap met de *jonfrauwe int prieel*, want ook zijn *meester es wel, hi zidt int groene* (94-95). De priëlen zijn in trek, want in **XII** ziet de dolende minnaar van *verren bleckende een prieel* [lustoord] *Daer an dat menich groen torreel* (MNW VIII: 562: "een struik in piramidevorm geleid?") *Ghewassen stont van roden rozen Daer te gane dat was mijn glozen* (268-271). Als hij dan over *den groenen pade*, zuchtend van liefdesverdriet *ten priele cam*, ontvangt hij van een wijze vrouw de nodige adviezen. Wandelen en 'spelen' *int groene* geschiedt hier om *te cortene minen tijt* en om *ruste te zoeken* (391-392).

Het *groene* krijgt in L5 een meer seksueel getinte achtergrond. *Hi nam de scone smale Voeren up sinen scoot. In een groenen dale Voer hi met ghenouchten groot* (37-39). In dit lied vertrouwt het meisje op de beloften van de jongeman, de minnaar houdt zich aan zijn belofte, zij trouwen en worden gelukkig: *Hi bleef haer al sijn leven Ghetrouwelike bi* (44-45). Maar in het ironische en sterk erotisch getinte L16 horen we *ic leedse in dat groene Bachten Daverloo*. Daar zijn dan beide *in vruechden vro, Soe leerde mi scieten na de ka* 16-21). Speelt de minne in de vrije natuur, dan is dit een teken dat zij op sex gericht is. Een erotische inslag zit ook waarschijnlijk in L5, maar daar wel in meer hoofse sfeer. Liefde bedrijven in de natuur, maar met een huwelijk in het vooruitzicht!

Het groen in de mantel van *Melancolie* in **I**: *Graeu ende groen was sijn abijt, Sijn mantel was lanc ende wijt* (899-900) wordt besproken bij de humoren [5.3].

ROOD Rood is een veelgebruikte kleur met een rijke symboliek. Biedermaann (1991, 312-314) noemt als symbolische eigenschappen: de kleur van het leven (het bloed), de agressiviteit en vitaliteit, de strijd op leven en dood, de liefde, het leven, de woede, het gevaar, het brandende, het scheppende (in polariteit met wit: het menstruatiebloed met het witte sperma). Er is steeds een sterke verwantschap met het gevoelsleven.

De liefdessymboliek vinden we in *Roeder verwen bin ich holt, des wil ich gherne yr dienre ziin*. (Sittig 1987, 117). Geliefd zijn de rode lippen met het wit-blanke gelaat: *ir mundlin ist rosenfar; ir mundlein recht als ein (rot) rubein* (Sittig 1987, 210). Met een variatie in **I**: de burcht was van maten fijn, *Elc colomme was een robijn Gloiende root an elcker zide* [de lippen]. Het is dus niet zomaar dat de minnaar vermeldt dat hij hier met vreugde gewag van kan maken (572-574). Sittig (22) meent dat rood en blauw symboliseren dat liefde en trouw in het hart van de minnaar zijn ingeplant. Vrouw Liefde draagt vaak een rood kleed. De kleur van de kleding verraaft de innerlijke gesteldheid: *Rôt ûzen daz sol innen/ ein brünstic herze haben/das muot und herze brinnen*. In het Berlijnse Hs. 922 verzekert de minnaar dat hij *virich roit* zal dragen *zu dem oirden mijn* (Lang 16, r. 912). In het Hulthemse-Handschrift vinden we een meer indirecte zingeving in *Enen roc.. hi es roet ... ende es gheheten ... Scamelheit, die billic moet ghedragen sijn tot allen hoven* (Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 572, r. 11-16). Nu is *scamelheit* een positieve eigenschap in het liefdesgebeuren, zoals Van Buuren in zijn opstel over *Dat scamelheit thoehste poent es van minnen* aantoot (1984) en zoals de ridder in het verhaal ook moet erkennen. Ook in *Der minnen loep* wordt deze eigenschap geloofd in de derde (rode, brandende) fase van de liefde als *elck den andren lieflic ruyrt Met arm, met mond, mit lieflic drucken ... alst vuer is in sijn heetsten branden ... dat die brant gheen schade en doe ... [men] sal teghen der sinnen ane vechten [en] een bannier op rechten Die van schamelheit is ghemaect* (Leendertz 1845-1847, 206, r. 2267-2289).

In het Gr.Hs. komt rood vele malen voor. De roodheid van de mond die een grote aantrekkelijkheid suggereert, vinden we in **V**: 43, L5: 41 en L21: 34. In **VI** geeft de wijze vrouw een uiteenzetting over de kleuren groen, wit en rood in de *bloume*. Rood *wiens werdicheit wi met rechte loven* (168) is *Tcoluer dat upperst es ghestaen, Dats root als de robijn ghedaen; Minne es daer betekent bi* (170-172). In het 'schilderij'-gedicht schenkt de *scinkere* de rode wijn in: *Sijn varuwe wijst alsoot sal zijn Dat in mijn herte dier minnen brant Branden zal alt leven mijn* (**VIII**: 23-25). De man met de kersen geeft aan dat *elc kersekin bi eyn Sijn ghecoluert na mijn abijt* (155-156). Zijn kleding verraaft zijn gemoedsgesteldheid. Het rood in de kleding van *Colorijn*, van wie in verband met Jalosie in **II** gezegd wordt: *Van complexien colorijn Heet van bloede, int anschijn root* (656-657), behandel ik bij de humoren [5.3].

Het verband tussen rood en de veelvuldig genoemde rozen, staat in de rubriek 'flora' vermeld. Rood als nadrukkelijke vermelding bij het bloed van Christus, staat waarschijnlijk in verband met de levenssymboliek: *De heere ghebood: Ganc winnen tbroot, Dat leven gheeft. Merc mijn bloet root Di van der doot Verresen heift* (**IIIB**: 1-6). Ook in *Ende dat ghine wonden zaecht tien stonden, Ende dor de fointen* [het uitstorten] *sijns bloets root* (**XI**: 66-67). Uiteraard wordt rood ook geassocieerd met brand en vuur, zoals we in enkele reeds genoemde citaten gezien hebben.

WIT Wit is de kleur van de hoop, de matiging, de zuivere liefde, de schoonheid en het geloof. Wackernagel (1862, 161), Zingerle (1863, 32 v.) en Sittig (1987, 117 en 226 v.) geven vele voorbeelden om dit te illustreren.

Wit als kleur van het geloof en het reine zuivere geweten vinden we in de preek van broeder Jan Lyoen in **VII** als hij spreekt *vander jacken wit Daer bi verstaetstu onbesmit Eene zuivere concienctie reine die men moet dragen met vaster minne* (196-200) Ook de wachtters in **I** dragen witte kleding als bewijs van hun betrouwbaarheid en wijsheid *rechtich [voortreffelijk] waren zi taller tijt Suver wit dat was haer habijt* (582-583) In G1 vinden we *ic worde ghezuijt in dat dopen Du zuls mi dwaen danne wordic mee Ghezuvert wit ja boven den znee* (121-123) De baljuw in **II** heeft *I langhe witte roede in de hant* (1062) De vijf zintuigen die de mens voor al het schadelijke moeten behoeden, zijn *Ghecleet met witten ende al bezait Met guldme zonnen uut gherait* (**XII** 164-165)

Bij het noemen van de kwaliteiten van de geliefde dame komt de kleur wit geregeld voor L34 is gewijd aan Violette, zij is *zuver wit Juehdich soete ende amoueus omoedich simpel onbesmit* (1-3) De witte kleding beklemtoont de lichamelijke reinheid van de vrouw, zoals bij *Suverheit suver wit was haer parure [sierlijke feeststooi] al bezait met rozen root* (**I** 797) In **VI** zien we een combinatie van geestelijke en lichamelijke reinheid De minnaar moet de (witte) *coluer* van zijn dame *van blamen weren* *Werdt haer coluer besmedt* door hem, *Des heeren wrake die stater bi* Tevens moet hij *zuver leven leeren Om te ghelikene der bloumen scoon* *Dat ghi te zamen in den troon Noch croon ontfanghen moet huerna* (154-164)

De toenadering tot de dame moet in alle zuiverheid geschieden De sleutels die de toegang tot de dame [de *fonteyne*] ontsluiten zijn dus wit Zij is *met menighen slotel reine ghesloten als een tresoor* *Elc slotel wit als een voor Deen an dander juist ghepast Daer mede zo was ghesloten vast* *Dat zoete lievelic conduut* (**XII** 225-230)

Bij de tekening van de dame als burcht in **I** neemt wit een belangrijke plaats in De neus tussen *der zoeter venstren twee* stond *wit als een snee als een wit pilaer recht van aelbastre* (566-568) De benen *zende daer beneden, Waer tpalais stont up enen pilaer* waren *Van albaestre wit ende claei Sonder smette zuver reine* (595-598) Het paleis lijkt uit de verte van *albaestre scone ende wit* (289)

Het kasteel waarin Venus in **II** huist is een van de *rikelijxste gestichte, Dat noit eer cam in mans gesichte* *Van witten maerbei al dorhauwen*, de torens zijn *finen goude ghelijc der sonnen* (447-451) De combinatie van wit en goud hebben we in de kleding al eerder gezien, ook bij Zuiverheid komen de goudgele *goudbloumen* voor op een zuiver witte *parure* (**I** 797-801) Tevens toont een van de mouwen van de – volgens de traditie – in de liefde deskundige *Sangwijn* deze kleurencombinatie *van peelen ende van goude* (943), als we aannemen dat de paarden een witte glans hebben

Het wit met grijs in de kleding van *Fleumaet* wordt bij de humoren besproken [53] *Fleumaet* is door de dichter opmerkelijk neergezet *Bleec so was sijn oghe-upsiaan Evelachtich [nargeestig] ende onghedaen [ziekelijk]*, *Wit ende graeu so haddi an* De ironische toevoeging *Het moeste wesen een wijs man, diese stelde entzamen brochte* (**I** 951-955) is dus terecht Het ziekelijke uiterlijk past kennelijk niet met de reinheid van het wit

In L2 wordt de tegenstelling wit/zwart gebruikt om het contrast tussen trouw/ontrouw en *stede/onstede* te markeren (1-3) Zwart betekent *zorn und leit wîz daegenen guot gedanc* (Lang 1941 resp r 2063-2064 en 2071-2072)

Brugge heet in **XIII** de stad *des Witte Beere*, het geschenk wordt aangeboden aan de *coninc van den Witten Bere* (129 en 31) Wit kan hier een *epitheton ornans* zijn, het is ook mogelijk dat de symbolische betekenis van 'rein zuiver' meespeelt Witte beren zullen in het Brugge van 1400 wel zeldzaam geweest zijn [44]

ZWART Internationaal gezien is zwart ook in het liefdesgebeuren de kleur van de droefheid. Een sprekend citaat vinden we bij Hätzlerin, sprekend over de symboliek in de kleding zegt een minnaar *Schwartz ist ain grym(m)e watt* [grimmige kleding], *Wee im, der des geclaidet gat* (Haltaus 1966, 165, L19, 17-18). Sittig (1987, 117) noemt *Lief, nu lavs much zwerts ontberendes brinck tsorn onde leyt*. Soms dient de zwarte kleding om de *klaffers en niderts* te misleiden en de geheimhouding te verzekeren. Sittig (335-336) geeft als voorbeeld: *Mein hertz das ist vmgeben gantz mit swartz vnd auch in eytel gut*. De vrouw hoopt een zwarte krans te krijgen; ze zal die dragen, de *klaffers/niderts* zullen de naam van "Wohlgemüt" [de minnaar] op deze wijze nooit vernemen. Het zich tonen in zwart zorgt ervoor dat zij zich over haar *ere* geen zorgen hoeft te maken.

De zinspeling op zwarte kleding komt in het Gr.Hs. tweemaal voor. In L36 heeft het hart van de minnaar dat *in zorghen bleven is een ordine* [ordekleed] *up heven, Dats zwart* (8 en 16-17). De dichter benadrukt de uitspraak nog met *zwart es rauwe ende graeu arbeit* (22). In L103 klinkt het: *cleitstu mir zwart - groen es so fijn!* (15). Een neutraler gebruik vinden we in I, als *Vrou Hope* de minnaar de pijn uit het lichaam trekt, zegt hij: *Van pinen wardic bleec ende zwart* (669). In L2 spreekt de dichter over *Wit ende zwart, dat es een snede contrarie int gheliken* [twee dingen die niet bij elkaar horen] (1-2), net als *trouw/ontrouw, stede/onstede en arem/rike*.

4.10 Nog niet genoemde dingallegorieën

CLEIT (ook OMMECLEIT, (H)ABIJT, LIVREIE, OORDENE EN PARURE) De kleding representeert in alle tijden een bepaalde waarde. In de Middeleeuwen wordt die vaak bepaald door de kleur. Men zie daarvoor de paragraaf over de kleuren [4.9], waar ik veel citaten geef van kleding die een bepaalde kleur bezit. We merken op dat de kleuren in de kleding onder andere een bepaalde stand in de liefdesverhouding aan kunnen duiden, waarbij het zelfs mogelijk is door een 'verkeerde' kleur te kiezen, de *niderts* om de tuin te leiden. Personeel draagt kleding in de kleuren van de werkgever of heer. Ook kan de kleur een bepaalde geestesgesteldheid aanduiden. Combinaties van kleuren komen voor die elk afzonderlijk of in een bepaald samengaan een zinnebeeldige betekenis bezitten.

Naast de kleurensymboliek die in het Gr.Hs. voorkomt, zien we voorbeelden in het reeds genoemde *Dit is van .VI. Vaerwen ende .XII. Outheyden* (Blommaert 1851, 124-127). Verder is bijvoorbeeld illustratief Van Akens *Van den coninc Saladin ende van Huyghen van Tabaryen* (beschouwing onder andere Van der Poel 2000) of een wat decadent voortbrengsel uit latere jaren *Den triumphe ende tpalleersel van de vrouwen*, een deugdenleer gebaseerd op 25 geallegoriseerde dameskledingstukken (Pleij en Raue 1990b en Raue 1993). In deze studies staan ook uitgebreide literatuuropgaven.

FONTEIN/BRON Het woord *fonteine* komt met zijn nevenvormen 46 keer in het Gr.Hs. voor, praktisch altijd in overdrachtelijke zin. Het heeft o. a. betrekking op Maria (twaalf keer), op de geliefde Vrouwe (direct of indirect 27 maal) en zowaar een keer op Brugge. Zes maal komt het voor in het eerste gedicht bij de landschapsbeschrijving.

Janssens (1963, 229-230) geeft een overzicht van de bijbelse vindplaatsen van het woord. Zo vinden we in Gen. 2: 6: "Maar een bron steeg op uit de aarde, die geheel de aardbodem drenkte" en in Gen. 2: 10: "In Eden ontsprong een rivier, die de tuin bevloede en zich ver-

derop in vier takken splitste Het Hooglied vermeldt (4 12 en 15) 'Een gegrendelde hof is mijn zuster mijn bruid Een gesloten wel een verzegelde bron, een bron in de tuinen een wel van levend water dat van de Libanon stroomt (vaak met Maria in verband gebracht de kerkvaders duiden meestal op deze tekst) Het beeld van de bron en de rivier lopen door elkaar heen Bij de latere kerkelijke schrijvers komt het accent op de bron te liggen Maria wordt de bron die uit de aarde die vol duisternis en ellende is ontspringt (door geboorte of hemelvaart) en die de ganse aarde met genaden, gunsten en heerlijkheid besproeit Volgens Albertus Magnus is zij een kleine bron die aanzwol tot een grote stroom Zij is de bron die ontspringt uit de aarde van onze menselijke natuur en die voor ons de 'stroom' Christus uitstort

Maria is de draagster van vele eigenschappen reinheid en zuiverheid een bron van gaven en gunsten De moeder Gods die als fontein van hoge waarde Jezus droeg, die een stroom van deugden overal ten toon spreidde en aan anderen meedeelde Zoals Jacob van Maerlant zegt *eene fonteyne van gioten prise quam uten eidschen paradysse Die ghaf natheit in geere tyt Al om ende om der warelt wyt Die Fonteyne bediet Marien Die droech Ihesum den viien Diet al met doechden maecte nat* (Rijmbijbel CD-Rom Middelnederlands 1998 r 413-419)

In het Gr HS vloeien uit Maria als fontein de volgende deugden een fontein van *ontfeimighet* (G2 126 VI 9 en XV 408) een bron van onze hoop (G5 91) en van de reinheid in (G2 126) Ook is zij de fontein van hete tranen (door het leed ten gevolge van de droefenis over de bloedende wonden van Christus) die de mens te hulp komt (XV 61-73) In gedicht XII wordt in de monoloog gesproken van *overvloende fonteyne Van graciën ende van alle ghenaden* (1-2) Een opsomming van haar deugden vinden we in XI *Fonteyne van salcheden ghemeine Fonteyne van duechdeliker graciën Fonteyne van alre jubilaciën Fonteyne der goedertierhede Van trooste ende verlavenessen mede* (12-16)

Bezien we nu hoe de fonteinmetaforiek op de geliefde dame wordt toegepast, dan vinden we de hierboven genoemde beelden (omslotenheid, reinheid, het verzegeld en bevoeiend zijn, het tot leven roepende) terug maar de interpretatie ligt niet zo eenvoudig als bij Maria

Het meest frequent geschiedt de aanwending in XII (24 keer) De minnaar wandelt in het voorjaar buiten Brugge en ziet een liefelijke fontein door God gemaakt van *albaestere* be waakt door een oude *Hoede* De grijsaard moet sterven en de minnaar neemt de bewaking van de fontein over Naderbij tredend ziet hij dat zij omgeven is door zes beelden die *Vloescap* en de vijf zintuigen voorstellen Het *zoete hevelic conduut* is afgesloten met ivoren sleutels Melancholisch kijkt hij naar der *fonteynen reinicheit* Dan schijnt hem een licht uit twee vensters in de ogen en dringt in zijn hart door als een pijl Hij is totaal ontdaan en doolt rond Hij vertelt zijn verhaal aan een wijze vrouw (*Redene*) Zij wijst hem erop dat *der fonteynen vrouwe* de naam draagt van *Trouwe* met de zeven eigenschappen *troost/toeverlaet reinicheit, omoet vrheit* het duo *viendelicheit en wijsheit* en tenslotte *eere* Het zijn de sleutels die de *bonne claei, die heet Confoort* als een *tresore* goed gesloten houden De *fonteyne* is hier duidelijk de maagdelijke geliefde die alleen veroverd kan worden in trouwe niet in *doerperlike* dienst

In I komt de *fonteyne* zes maal voor in het begin van het gedicht Na een natuurbeschrijving (met vogels, bloemen, bomen en heerlijke geuren) komt de *ic* in een *valeie* bij een klare fontein die *maecte sinen nederdael spreedende in dat zoete gras daer menich boomkin nat of was* (100-102) Ondanks de angst de bron te besmetten, wast hij zijn onreine handen ogen gezicht en mond Dan drinkt hij het water *van so soeter coken* [smaak ten gevolge van een heerlijke toebereiding] (122) De bron is omgeven door geurende *ciuden rozegaerden ende*

eggentieren bloemen van menighe manieren (een flora die nauw verbonden is met de liefdessymboliek) Zij houden de bron zuiver onbevlekt en schaduwvrij De interpretatie van deze fonteinmetaforiek is moeilijk Heeroma vindt hier één van de bewijzen voor zijn opvatting dat allegorie **I** over 'dichten' gaat, het spoelen van de mond zou hierop wijzen Deze verklaring dunkt me gezocht Het lijkt mij toe dat de fontein-scène een zuivering beschrijft (niet alleen de mond wordt gespoeld) De relatie tussen fontein en zuivering komt ook voor in G2 getuige de smeekbede *laet mi sceppen ute dier [Maria] fonteyne, so vele dat ic mach maken veine mijn ziele mijn herte ende mine V sinne* (126-128) Een beeld dat grote gelijkens toont met wat ons in gedicht **XII** (en ook elders in het Gr Hs) verteld wordt Slechts hij die met zuivere bedoelingen en met een rein gemoed, de geliefde benadert, maakt een kans op wederliefde De fontein is nauw geassocieerd met de liefde, maar verbeeldt in **I** mijns inziens niet de geliefde zelf Het beeld van het 'drinken en reinigen' lijkt mij daarmee in tegenspraak zo'n beeld zou wijzen op de schending van de geliefde Eerder gaat het erom dat de fontein net als Maria in **VI** (9) *de aerme cranke sinne* kan versterken en kan aanzetten tot eerbaar gedrag

Ook in gedicht **II** (45-54) vinden we een *fonteyne* (driemaal genoemd) De beschrijving is zeer summier, ook nu weer het noemen van de 'klaarheid', de *lelyen veine* en de ligging in een liefelijk landschap (*voletten, acoleven*, bloeiende bomen en *nachteghalen sanc*) Na het gesprek met de kluisenaar zingt de *ic* een liefdeslied bij de fontein *Lovende upte scone fonteyne Hu theeren mijn lieve, soete veine* (328-329)

De associaties met de geliefde zijn in **I** en **II** duidelijk aanwezig, maar de volkomen gelijkstelling van de fontein met de geliefde is hier niet zo pregnant als in **XII**

De beeldspraak van de van deugden overvloeiende fontein zien we terug in de karakterisering van de stad Brugge *dese wide vermaerde stat die vuerchdenlike fonteyne* (**XIII** 41)

Het synoniem *borne* komt in **I** vier keer, in **II** eenmaal en in **XII** zes keer voor In **XII** wordt *borne* twee keer in verband gebracht met *clae*, tweemaal met *veine*, eenmaal met *confoot* en ten slotte met de zeven aderen in de grond (een beeld dat verbonden is met het uitgewerkte letterwoord *nouwe*) In de drie andere gedichten komen deze begrippen terug In **I** beklemtoont *mijn aenschijn dwaen* de reinigende werking

Opmerkelijk is dat de beide woorden 'fontein' en 'borne' niet voorkomen in de liederen Ook in het Berlijnse handschrift (Mgf 922) komen ze niet voor Ze hebben kennelijk geen sterk verband met lyrische liefdesuitingen en worden in de liefdespoëzie kennelijk bij voorkeur gebruikt in ruimer allegorisch verband

Fontein als beeld van Maria sluit gemakkelijk aan bij de in de bijbel gebruikte beelden en behoeft door de grote bekendheid geen nadere toelichting Maria is een overvloeiende fontein waaruit geschept kan worden om te reinigen *Mijn ziele, mijn herte ende mine V sinne ende ooc mijn moet* (**XII**) De beelden 'kuisheid' 'reinicheit' en 'eren' die ook in de minnepoëzie zo'n belangrijke rol spelen, vinden we mooi verbeeld in *Maria's moederweelde Het* [Christuskind] *wart entfangen in Kuscheit, He wart geborn in allei Reinicheit Dat temede wol unsem leven Heren, Dat hi worde geborn in groten Eren* (uit *Dat Hartebok*, de verzamelbundel van een groep waarschijnlijk Hamburgse 'Flanderfahrer', eind 14e eeuw (Beuken 1936, 284 en 398))

Een nader onderzoek naar het gebruik van de fonteinsymboliek in de Middeleeuwen lijkt mij zeer gewenst

HART Het woord komt ongeveer 141 keer in het Gr Hs voor Vaak geeft het de trouw en afhankelijkheid aan zowel God als de geliefde aan Kennelijk gaat dit bij God moeilijker, gezien de vaak geuite wens *Mijn herte al gheel te di waert nemt* (G1 252) Bij de geliefde is

de minnaar zekerder van zichzelf: *Di alleene zo willic gheven Mijn herte* (XV: 400-401). Zij oefent trouwens een dwingende invloed op hem uit: *Bedwonghen haet een zalich wijf Herte ende zin, ziele ende lijf* (L82, 1-2).

Een rein hart is belangrijk: *Scep een reyn herte in mi, myn God* (G1: 171). In de middeleeuwse liefdeslyriek wordt het hart geromantiseerd en met aardse en mystiek-hemelse liefde in verband gebracht. De woordkeuze die daaraan inherent is, zien we in het Gr.Hs. geregeld terugkomen: *Dies herte ende zin ende ooc mijn moet Wart beroert ende al mijn bloet* (XII: 244-245), *Bedwonghen haet een zalich wijf Herte ende zin, ziele ende lyf* (L82: 1-2). Vooral de combinatie *herte ende zin* vloeit de auteurs als het ware automatisch uit de veder. Het hart als zetel van het verstand (potentieel symbool van de wijsheid) is typisch een middeleeuwse voorstelling (MNW III, 391, ad b). De *Burchthere* [het hart van de dame] in I heeft nadrukkelijk een raad van *vroeden* als adviseur die hem *staande houdt* (641). Als men iemand wil prijzen, dan noemt men hem *vroet*.

In de bijbel is het hart het symbool van de 'innerlijke' mens (1 Sam.16: 7): "De Here ziet het hart aan". De *Burchtheer* in de eerste allegorie vertegenwoordigt het innerlijk van de geliefde dame.

HOED/KRANS Beide worden van bloemen gevlochten en zijn verwant met de kroon, maar meer vergankelijk. Ze worden lang niet altijd als hoofdtooi gedragen, aangezien ze vaak als gave bedoeld zijn. De cirkelvorm staat voor duurzaamheid (Biedermann 1991, 202-203).

De minnaar in I vlecht een *hoet* als bewijs dat hij op minneavontuur is. Een *hoet* wordt gevlochten om de dame aan te bieden als bewijs van liefde, ook het omgekeerde komt voor zoals in Lied 48. Hier kan men lezen welke functie zo'n *hoet* in het minneverkeer vervulde. De dichter komt overigens in I niet terug op deze krans, de betekenis is genoegzaam bekend en hij speelt verder geen rol. Er zijn waarschijnlijk reminiscenties met de rozenkrans bidden, in XV (543-545) maakt de minnaar *desen hoet ter eeren der zuvere rozen zoet* [Maria], vaak tonen deze producten de zeven Mariakleuren. De vergelijking tussen de geliefde en Maria duikt in de beeldspraak wel vaker op. Reynaert (1999, 204-208) geeft er een aantal voorbeelden van. Etty Mulder (1978, 115) wijst in haar dissertatie op het dooreen vloeien van muziek, hofse liefde en Mariaverering bij Guillaume de Machaut, een dichter die in de Brugse kringen, met hun handelsrelaties en de invloed van het hof van de graaf van Vlaanderen, zeker niet onbekend zal zijn geweest. Zijn invloed lijkt ook in de vormgeving van de Gruuthuse liederen te bespeuren.

Het vlechten van een *hoet* [krans] is als minnesymbool internationaal bekend. Sittig geeft in haar boek vele voorbeelden. Vaak wordt de krans van violen gevlochten (blz. 157, 206, 223, 224, 362; vgl. ook *Een liedeken vanden hoede* in Brinkman, Schenkel 1999, 940-941). Het bloemen plukken en het kransje dragen zijn volgens Sittig (1987, 221) conventionele metaforische verhullingen voor de seksuele vereniging.

Dit seksuele aspect lijkt mij een rol te spelen in L16 met het *wielende* [heupwiegende] oude hoertje (*hoe mochte haer lusten mans!*). In de slotstrofe staat *Als ik sach haren ganc, Spien ic der vruechden crans* (58-59). Heeroma (1966, 265) verklaart de uitdrukking *spien der vruechden crans* met "zette ik mij de krans der vreugde op het hoofd". Dit lijkt me niet goed, *spien* in de betekenis van 'opzetten' lijkt vreemd. De interpretatie van Heeroma past niet in de context. Het ligt meer voor de hand hier in *crans* een vaginasymbool te zien, zoals wel meer voorkomt (Sittig 1987, 220).

De traditie van het kransen/hoeden vlechten en aanbieden is ook later nog aan Hooft bekend en wordt door hem onder andere in *Sal nemmermeer gebeuren* als liefdessymbool gebruikt.

KROON Venus heeft *Up haer hooft ... een crone, Beset met meneghen dieren steene* (II: 508-509). De kroon waarvan Biedermann (1991, 206-207) zegt dat zij het hoofd van de drager schijnbaar verlengt en hem boven zijn medemensen verheft. Stralende edelstenen, ook in de kleding, verhogen het effect en de uitdrukingskracht. Hun uitstraling doet denken aan de zon, reden ook waarom kronen vaak vervaardigd zijn van het zonnemetaal goud. De kroon symboliseert de grote macht, de vreugde en de roem van de liefde. Zo wordt Venus gelegitimeerd als een bovenmenselijk wezen dat betrekkingen onderhoudt met de hogere wereld.

Merkwaardig is het gebruik in I (803-804): *Suverheit* houdt een kroon vóór haar gezicht en draagt deze niet óp haar hoofd. Dit is geen toeval. Ik ga er bij de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie nader op in.

WONDE Veertien maal heeft het woord een letterlijke betekenis en heeft betrekking op de wonden van Christus.

Zeventien keer zijn het figuurlijke kwetsuren die de minnaar tijdens de liefdeshandelingen oploopt. Vijf maal zijn het de pijlen uit de ogen van de vrouw die hem verwonden, acht maal zijn de wiken *helen ende swighen* en *ghestadichede* de oorzaak van het lijden. In de slotzin hebben de wonden betrekking op de totaliteit van de situatie waarin de minnaar zich bevindt. De wonde van de duif in V blijft duister, maar zal ongetwijfeld te maken hebben met ongepast gedrag van een minnaar. Twijfel c.s. brengen de minnaar in II driemaal verwondingen toe.

4.11 Acrostichons en letterwoorden

De acrostichons die in alle drie de delen van het Gr.Hs. voorkomen, hebben aanleiding gegeven tot vele speculaties. Uiteindelijk kunnen alleen Jan van Hulst en Jan Moritoen met enige zekerheid getraceerd worden als auteurs van enkele werken [2.1]. Over de eerste auteur is meer bekend dan over de tweede. Literatuurverwijzingen over deze kwestie vindt men in het thematisch register.

Het spel met de letterwoorden komt veelvuldig voor. Vaak vormen de beginletters van regels of strofen een naam of spreuk. Bepaalde eigenschappen, de namen van metaforische figuren of bomen worden eveneens gebruikt. In XII voeden zeven *adren* de 'liefdesbron' *Confoort*, hun beginletters vormen het sleutelwoord *TROVWE*. De dichter heeft echter in wezen aan die zeven letters niet genoeg om de vereiste eigenschappen die de ware liefde kenmerken te schetsen, de T krijgt namelijk de eigenschappen *Troost* en *Toeverlaet*, de V *Vriheit* en *Vriendelicheit* toebedeeld. De beginletters van het fruit dat in de eerste allegorie aan de zeven bomen hangt, vormen het sleutelwoord *SCEIDEN*, de oorzaak van de erbarmelijke toestand waarin de minnaar zich bevindt. De letters zijn ook hier gekoppeld aan meer begrippen. De S staat voor *zicheit*, *zwaerheit* en *suerheit*; de C voor *Crancheit* en *claghe*; de E voor *allende* en *enicheit*; de I voor *jammer*; de D voor *droufheit* ende *druc*; de N voor *Noot*.

DE PERSONIFICATIES IN HET GRUUTHUSE-HANDSCHRIFT

5.0 Inleiding

Dit hoofdstuk is uit drie delen opgebouwd. Het eerste deel geeft een karakteristiek van de wijze waarop de personificaties in het Gr.Hs. worden gebruikt. Het tweede geeft enkele aanwijzingen voor het gebruiken van het overzicht in bijlage B, dat alle personificaties uit het Gr.Hs. met een korte typering beschrijft. Ten slotte bespreekt in het derde deel een aantal personificaties die van bijzonder belang zijn voor de interpretatie van de droomgedichten. Hierbij wordt onder andere aandacht besteed aan hun fictieel handelen, de namen die vaak tekenend zijn voor hun gedrag, de door hen gedragen attributen in ruime zin en andere gegevens die aan deze personages reliëf en een bepaalde betekenis geven²⁰.

5.1 Algemene kenmerken

Personificaties nemen in de literaire vormgeving van de droomallegorieën en enkele liederen een belangrijke plaats in. Zij vormen een essentieel onderdeel in de literaire uitdrukingsmiddelen naast die welke in het vorige hoofdstuk zijn besproken. Enerzijds stellen zij het wezen van de liefdesproblematiek aan de orde, anderzijds de concrete liefdesbetrekkingen tussen de twee geliefden.

Het liefdesleven is een bijna onbegrijpelijke, sterk beleefde ervaring, berustend op een algemeen gevoelde aandrift die verschillende gemoedsgesteldheden oproept. Men probeert deze aanschouwelijk te maken in een groter allegorisch verband. Tevens pogen de auteurs de vraag te beantwoorden hoe men zich in zo'n situatie moet gedragen.

De literaire presentatie is een complex geheel, waarin allerlei figuren door hun samenspel een bepaalde boodschap brengen. In de tweede allegorie bijvoorbeeld zien we hoe *Vrouw Venus* het ongrijpbare liefdesgebeuren verbeeldt door middel van haar traditionele attributen als pijl en boog. De fakkel ontbreekt, maar de minnaar wordt wel getroffen door pijlen die zijn hart in brand zetten. Het zijn de lasterpraatjes van *Begrijp* [de knecht van de schout] die bij hem de vertwijfeling en jaloezie laten ontstaan. De godin wordt geflankeerd door een twaalftal hofdames, die de aspecten van de liefdesaangelegenheden aanschouwelijk maken. De schout, die in haar dienst staat, moet nauwlettend toezien of de minnaar de minnedienst naar behoren vervult. De rechtsdienaar wordt daarbij bijgestaan door een groep gepersonifieerde 'familieleden', die ertoe bijdraagt dat de minnaar tot allerlei onoorbare handelingen wordt gebracht. Er ontstaat een heel gecompliceerd netwerk, waarin de psychologische gesteldheid van de minnaar en zijn gedrag geanalyseerd en zichtbaar gemaakt worden. De opgeroepen problematiek wordt in een uitvoerig rechtsproces gewogen

²⁰ Bij deze paragraaf is o.a. gebruik gemaakt van de volgende literatuur. Ranke 1933, Gruenter 1957, Fletcher 1964, Lewis 1969, Blank 1970, Rakel 1986, MacQueen 1970, Bloomfield 1970 en Whitman 1987

en bediscussieerd. Door de op elkaar botsende en elkaar aanvullende uiteenzettingen krijgt het geheel leven en worden de problemen en de mogelijkheden om die op te lossen veraanschouwelijkt.

De psycho-somatische personificaties die in de Gruuthuse allegorieën grotendeels de handelingen bepalen, zijn in veel gevallen personages die een enkelvoudig aspect van de protagonist(en) vertegenwoordigen. Tezamen representeren zij een gecompliceerd innerlijk leven. Ze zijn de dragers van verborgen neigingen, gevoelens en impulsen. Door deze ludieke presentatie zien we in de hoofse allegorieën de verschillende psychische fasen in het liefdesproces bij de minnaar (en in de eerste allegorie vooral ook de dame), die zich openstelt, twijfelt, mislukt of afwijst. De liederen verwoorden deze processen meestal op een meer directe wijze.

De personificaties vormen een systeem met vaste onderlinge betrekkingen. Ruim gesteld kunnen we zeggen dat psychische vermogens, verabsoluteerde waarden, verkeerde neigingen en abstracte gedachten op zintuiglijk waarneembare wijze uitgebeeld worden in een tekst, die een gesloten eenheid vormt. De fantasie van de recipiënt aanvaardt deze geabstraheerde – slechts uit didactisch oogpunt bezield – wezens als krachten die vaak een dwingende invloed op de mens kunnen uitoefenen. Het feit dat de mens een *wille vry* heeft, zoals Venus in II (1696) opmerkt, wordt daaraan ondergeschikt gemaakt. De zich voor de hoofdpersonen als chaotisch voordoende verschijnselen worden uitgesplitst en concreet voorgesteld, in de verwachting zo meer grip op de wereld te krijgen. De gebeurtenissen moeten enigszins voorspelbaar en beheersbaar gemaakt worden. Wij daarentegen ervaren de opgeroepen wereld als een volstrekt irrationele.

De allegoriserende, waarvan de personificaties een onderdeel vormen, zijn een in een lange traditie geworteld 'ken- en leermiddel'. De beschreven verschijnselen mogen niet gezien worden als een persoonlijke belijdenis van de ervaringen van de verteller²¹.

De zinnebeeldige figuren proberen met grote energie hun invloed uit te oefenen. Ze vertegenwoordigen steeds één bepaald idee dat gekarakteriseerd wordt door hun naam, hun functie, hun gewaad of door de attributen die zij bij zich hebben. Hun karaktertrekken veranderen in het handelingsverloop van de allegorie niet en passen in een min of meer dwangmatig handelingsverloop. Er is een vastliggend systeem van onderlinge betrekkingen, waarin iedere personificatie een stereotiep karakter bezit.

Door de personificaties leren we het innerlijk leven van de hoofdpersoon kennen. Dit innerlijk leven laat wel wisselende gemoedstoestanden zien, maar maakt geen echt groei-proces door, zoals dat in de psychologische beschrijvingen van modernere literaire werken voorkomt.

De reacties van de protagonist, die weinig autonomie bezit, zijn in hoge mate voorspelbaar en bezitten een grote consistentie. Zo krijgen wij bijvoorbeeld het idee dat de hoofdfiguur in de eerste allegorie, ondanks de spijt die hij aan het slot betuigt, de volgende maal weer zo zal handelen. In de tweede allegorie blijkt dat overduidelijk: ondanks de meege-maakte gebeurtenissen en de ontvangen lessen in de school van *Getemperthede* meldt *Twijfel* zich aan het slot weer bij de *ic*. De geschiedenis kan zich zo herhalen.

²¹ Heeroma is deze mening kennelijk niet toegedaan en interpreteert de teksten als vertolkingen van de liefdesbelevissen van de auteur. We hebben hieraan in hoofdstuk drie enige aandacht besteed.

De personificaties beïnvloeden elkaar niet. Ze blijven statisch, ondanks het samenspel, de onderlinge discussies en de eventuele strijd, waardoor de recipiënt zich hun typische eigenschappen goed bewust wordt. Opmerkelijk is de enorme vechtpartij die in **I** tussen de minnaar steunende en weerstrevenende figuren uitbreekt. De behoudende, argwanende vermogens verliezen, maar aan het slot van de allegorie worden ze gerehabiliteerd. Ze verwijderen de verliefde jongeman uit de burcht. Alle figuren dragen nog steeds hetzelfde karakter. In het leven van de minnaar kunnen *Hope* en *Twifel* – alsof er niets gebeurd is – hun onderlinge strijd opnieuw beginnen. Er is een streng geordend systeem dat niet verandert.

Publiek en dichter kennen de gecanoniseerde allegorische motieven en personen. Ondanks het beeld dat de recipiënt tevoren vaak al heeft van de betekenis van een figuur, is het toch belangrijk dat de personificatie zich handelend profileert. Is dat niet het geval, zoals in de tweede allegorie, waar veel in het verhaal nog niet genoemde ‘personen’ door Venus uit haar land verbannen worden, dan blijven deze een schimmig karakter houden. Daarnaast zijn er personificaties die in **II** tijdens het proces handelend optreden of bediscussieerd worden. Zij zijn duidelijke dragers van het allegorische idee dat in de context van de esthetische inkleding op beeldende wijze verlevendigd en gekarakteriseerd wordt.

Enkele personificaties dragen een sterk intermediair karakter. Zij vertegenwoordigen een hogere macht, waardoor met hen niet valt te discussiëren. Ze zijn de dragers van vastliggende deugden waar het mensdom zich aan dient te houden, of vertegenwoordigen eigenschappen waar niet aan te ontkomen is. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval bij de twijfel en de hoop die de minnaar tijdens het liefdesproces beheersen. Heel duidelijk en zelfs letterlijk komt dit tot uiting in **II**, waar een rechtbank onder leiding van Venus, bijgestaan door twaalf raadvrouwen, uitspraken doet over het gedrag van de minnaar. De raadvrouwen discussiëren en er worden door hen ook getuigen gehoord. Venus echter oordeelt, zonder dat ze met de diverse meningen van de dames rekening houdt of zelfs de verklaringen van de door haar opgeroepen getuigen kent. Zonder motivatie verklaart ze dat de minnaar zich niet aan de mores heeft gehouden. Ze laat hem bijscholen in de school van meester *Getemperthede* en zijn vrouw *Mate*.

In **I** wordt deze scholing op voorhand door *Vorsienicheit* gegeven. Zij houdt de minnaar voor het betreden van de liefdesburcht een reeks maatschappelijke gedragsregels voor. Een goede minnaar behoort deze te volgen. Abstracte vertegenwoordigers van geïdealiseerde en onveranderlijke denkbeelden zijn ook de wijze vrouwen in **V** (*Vrau Redene*), **VI** en **VII**. Zij geven richtlijnen voor een goed, aangepast gedrag. Opmerkelijk is dat in **I** de vrouwelijke figuur *Wijs-van-rade* (*Radewijs*) niet handelend optreedt. Zij vertoeft wel in het gezelschap van de burchtheer [het hart van de dame], maar de actieve, adviserende rol van de rede wordt hier vervuld door *Versiene*.

Een speciaal aspect vraagt bij dit alles om wat meer aandacht. In de eerste allegorie ziet de *ic Hoede* als een onsympathiek persoon met verouderde opvattingen Haar muzikale en dichterlijke prestaties worden [door de minnende dichter] laag aangeslagen. Haar lied typeert hij als *Een liedeken van eens jaers* (1270) [van de oude stempel, uit de ‘goede’ oude tijd]. Ook harmonieert haar voor hem niet-sympathieke innerlijk, volgens algemeen middeleeuwse opvattingen, met haar voorkomen. Het verschrompelde oude uiterlijk van *Hoede* wijst niet enkel op haar voor hem onwelgevallige standpunten over de verhouding tussen man en vrouw, maar tevens op haar verouderde opvattingen over de dicht- en liedkunst. Zij is dus een voorbeeld van het feit dat gebaren, kleding, mimiek, haar- en baarddracht samenhangen met het innerlijk, zowel wat positieve als negatieve eigen-

schappen betreft. Hahn (1977, 401 v) drukt dit als volgt uit: "die körperliche Erscheinung eines Menschen [ist] zunächst etwas Materielles mit bestimmtem ästhetischen Wert, also *res* in dem Sinn, daß etwas sich selbst bedeutet. Darüber hinaus kann mit der Körpergestalt und ihren variablen Eigenschaften eine durch Konvention gegründete, also gesetzte Bedeutung verbunden sein". Uiterlijke schoonheid bijvoorbeeld zal volgens deze zienswijze op innerlijke schoonheid wijzen. Zij is aldus een symbolisch teken en niet enkel een loutere kenschetsing van het uiterlijke voorkomen. Negatieve eigenschappen worden ook door het uiterlijk gerepresenteerd. We zien dit bij diverse personificaties naar voren komen. *Rouckeloos* is daarvan een sprekend voorbeeld. Als de minnaar de geliefde in **I** als een zeer schone burcht tekent, zal haar karakter naar zijn mening daarmee in overeenstemming zijn. Hoezeer de waardering van de uitgebeelde eigenschappen meespelen in de tekening van het uiterlijk blijkt ook bij *Fleumaet* (**I**: 949/56), de voor de minne meest ongeschikte van de vier *humoren*, heeft fletse ogen, kijkt somber, ziet er slecht uit, zijn uiterlijk is zo dat een *saventier* [beunhaas] beter werk zou afleveren.

Zowel de innerlijke krachten als de hoofddeugden kunnen op veel manieren literair verbeeld worden. Naast de genoemde personificaties kunnen ook voorwerpen en verschijnselen uit de werkelijkheid dienen. In **I** wordt gesproken van de sleutels *Trouwe*, *Eere* en *Antieren*. In **XIII** symboliseren de zeven poorten deugden als *Broederschap* en *Bliscap*, *Recht en Rede*, *Vroescap* en *Vriheit*, *Cracht* en *Confoort*, *Gonst* en *Goedertterheit*, *Hope* en *Heil*, *Eendrachticheit* en *Eere*. In **VI** betekenen de kleuren groen 'jeugd en blijheid', wit 'zuiverheid' en rood de 'minne tot God'. De beginletters van de naam *Mergriete* vertegenwoordigen alle een deugd. De zeven stroompjes die de fontein [de dame] in **XII** voeden, representeren *Troost* en *Toeverlaet*, *Reinicheit*, *Omoet*, *Vriheit*, *Vriendelicheit* en *Wijsheit*. We zien deze deugden in **I** en **II** daarentegen weer vaak gepersonifieerd optreden. De vijf beelden in **XII** verbeelden de vijf zintuigen die onder leiding van *Vroescap* staan, maar in **I** treden de zintuigen op als trouwe wachters van de burcht en maken als *hoochste toeverlaet* deel uit van de *raet* van de burchtheer.

Er worden steeds verschillende literaire technieken gebruikt om psychische en fysiologische verschijnselen uit te beelden. Bij de behandeling van een aan ieder bekende stof trad er kennelijk een spanningsmoment op dat bepaald werd door de vraag "hoe zal dit nu weer verwoord worden?" Zij die de *weghe der consten* (de eis die de dichter stelt aan het publiek in de proloog van **I**) kenden, schiepen hierin duidelijk een groot vermaak²².

Komen er in een allegorie meerdere hoofdpersonen voor die door subkarakters getypeerd worden, dan worden de onderlinge verhoudingen soms onduidelijk. In de eerste allegorie sluiten bepaalde personificaties duidelijk aan bij de minnaar (*Hope*, *Twifel*) of de geliefde dame (*Suverheit*, *Hoede*, de *Joncheren vijf*, de *Wachters*, *Juecht*, *Cuusscheit*, de *Humoren* enz.). De minnaar voelt sommige van deze laatst genoemde personificaties als een ernstige belemmering in zijn streven. Deze figuren worden dan negatief getekend. Dit komt duidelijk naar voren bij *Hoede*, *Envie* en *Orghelieus*. Figuren als *Jalosie*, *Hovesscheit*, *Onsien*, *Ledicheit* en dergelijke dragen echter een meer algemeen karakter, al treden ze op in de burcht [de dame]. Het zijn ook exponenten van de mannelijke minnaar, van de minnenden

²² "Allegory is outspokenly reticent, proclaiming that it has a secret, while other techniques tend to conceal the fact" (Whitman 1987, 2)

in het algemeen. Het is in deze allegorie niet mogelijk de onderlinge betrekkingen alle precies vast te stellen.

Een personificatie als *Twifel*, die nauw verbonden is met de jaloezie en de melancholie, toont een demonisch karakter. De minnaar ervaart zijn liefde alsof hij volkomen de slaaf is van deze dwingende passie, die hem geheel in bezit genomen heeft en volledig bepaalt wat hij doet. Ondanks de bijscholing in II komt hij niet los van deze fatalistische macht, het lot bestuurt hem. Duidelijk wordt dit verwoord in II als het leven *na der minnen aert* gekarakteriseerd wordt met *Hebbe ende vloet, nu suete, nu suere, Gheeft minne, als twiel der aventuere dat ewelike loopt ende omme drayt* (22-25). Het is Venus die de minnaar erop wijst dat dit een onjuiste instelling is. Zij maakt onderdeel uit van een streng geordend en niet te veranderen systeem. De minnaar evenwel heeft van God *leven ende .V. sinnen, verstantesse, wille, den gheest daerbinnen* gekregen (1691-1692). Venus accentueert dit met *Du hebs dinen wille vry; Waaromme so ontweechstu di?* [ga je de verkeerde weg op] (1696-1697).

De zintuigen en het verstand spelen in het Gr.Hs. een belangrijke rol en worden gepersonifieerd, de wil echter niet. Nergens zijn wilsbepalingen aanwezig die tot een werkelijk aangepast nieuw gedrag leiden. Vreemd eigenlijk, want in de middeleeuwse zedenleer wordt de vrije wil van de mens nadrukkelijk beklemtoond. Het lijkt erop dat de wil buiten het liefdesdiscours staat, wie kiest voor 'hoop en liefde', blijft in dit circuit ronddwalen. Liefde maakt blind. De opvatting van De Ventadorn [6.3.2 ad 7] speelt kennelijk nog door. Het lijkt erop dat de vrouw in de eerste allegorie een meer door de wil gericht handelen tentoonspreidt. Als de minnaar niet aan haar stringent gestelde eisen voldoet, wordt hij afgewezen. Dit is des te opmerkelijker, omdat men dit bij een zo jeugdig persoon niet zou verwachten.

In de visie van Fletcher (1964, 40) is ook *Twifels* antipode *Hope* zo'n demonische kracht. Hij vat het woord *demon* op als een kracht zowel ten goede als ten kwade. *Hope* doet de minnaar steeds weer belanden in het tot vertwijfeling leidende minnecircuit. Ook jaloezie en vertwijfeling zijn sterk aan elkaar gekoppeld. Ze worden in het liefdesproces versterkt als de minnaar twijfelt aan de trouw, oprechtheid en reinheid van de vrouw. De hoop speelt daarbij haar dubieuze rol.

Via veel personificaties wordt een morele strijd uitgebeeld tussen de deugden en de ondeugden. Steeds zweeft de vertellende *ic* een ideaalbeeld met een absoluut karakter voor ogen. De dichter spreekt over de ideale liefde, een juist maatschappelijk gedrag, een goede godsdienstige instelling. Opmerkelijk is dat de onbaatzuchtige hoofse liefde, als losstaand fenomeen, in de liederen en het derde deel van het Gr.Hs. een gepasseerd station is. De minnaar verwacht na de fase van betoende trouw, reinheid en goed maatschappelijk gedrag loon naar werken te ontvangen. Wat dat loon precies inhoudt, wordt niet omschreven. Voor de hand ligt dat dit de seksuele vereniging is, al of niet door een huwelijk beklonken. Het uitblijven van dit loon leidt in de tweede allegorie zelfs tot een rechtsproces. *Twifel* is de hoofdbeklaagde.

In het Gr.Hs. komt een zeer uitgebreid aantal personificaties voor. Naast karaktereigenschappen worden ook bezigheden van de hoofdpersoon gepersonifieerd. Deze bezitten meestal een negatief karakter dat voortvloeit uit een gedrag dat men afkeurt. Het zijn personificaties als *Lach-vele*, *Gheerne-comen*, *Vri-begheren* en dergelijke die in II door

Venus verbannen worden. Ook in **I** komen veel van deze personificaties voor. Men krijgt de indruk dat zij gedeeltelijk dienen om het milieu waarin de minnaar verkeert te typeren. De jongeling in **XIV** is *vul der werelt luste*, losbandig viert hij feest. Diverse gedichten in het derde deel bevatten waarschuwingen tegen een te frivool leven.

Opmerkelijk in het handschrift zijn de onderlinge betrekkingen tussen de personificaties, die tot uiting komen in de groeperingen. De clustervorming is vooral aanwezig in de eerste en tweede allegorie. Rond *Venus* bevinden zich twee groepen hofdames, die op een niet toevallige wijze gepositioneerd zijn. De baljuw vormt de kern van een groep die de minnaar op allerlei wijzen belaagt. De personificaties die uit *Venus' lande* verbannen worden, tonen onderlinge verwantschappen. De samenhang tussen de zintuigen blijkt uit de bundeling in een beeldengroep als wachters of kamerlingen. Rond *Hoede* zien we een bepaald cluster van figuren optreden, net als rond *Hope*. Bij de laatste is de groep sterk lokaal gebonden. Familiebanden bestaan niet enkel tussen *Hope* en *Twifel* (de *bastart*), maar ook tussen *Hope* en de bewaking in de voorburch (*Kila*, *Verziene* en *Orghelieus*). Deze bewakers staan in dienst van de dame en vormen de schakel in een overgangsgebied tussen een buiten- en een binnenwereld.

De vier humoren en de zintuigen vormen een samenhangende kring rond de Burchtgraaf. De eerste groep verbindt zich tijdelijk met de minnaar, die hun livret mag dragen om hem van een gelijke *complexie* te voorzien. Als de aanbieder faalt, distantieert de vrouw zich van hem.

Niet altijd zijn de personificaties voor ons duidelijk te verklaren. Evenals bij de symbolisch geladen woorden die bijvoorbeeld kleuren, bloemen, kleding enz. aanduiden, treden ook bij het horen van de namen der personificaties allerlei associaties op bij het ingewijde publiek. Foucault heeft dit als volgt samengevat: er is sprake van een "etablierte Rede, in der nur über bestimmte Gegenstände und nur in bestimmter Weise in einem bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Rahmen und nur von hierzu berechtigten Personen gesprochen werden kann, wobei dieses Reden auch noch die eigentliche Existenzbedingung jenes gesellschaftlichen Rahmens bildet" (citaat in Råkel 1986, 104-105). Dit moet wel zo zijn, anders is het niet te verklaren dat bijvoorbeeld aan het slot van de tweede allegorie allerlei in het gedicht niet existierende allegorische personen uit *Venus' land* verbannen en anderen naar de minneschool verwezen worden. Het publiek kent deze personages, omdat ze een rol speelden in het eerste gedicht, of omdat zij op de een of andere manier een plaats innemen in hun voorstellingswereld. Ook uit ander – ons onbekend – werk en door onderlinge gesprekken, heeft men waarschijnlijk kennis opgedaan over reeksen allegorische voorstellingscomplexen. De betekenis daarvan ontgaat ons soms. Er bestaat een reeks 'constanten' die in het Gr.Hs. en elders in allerlei liederen en gedichten voorkomt.

Ter verheldering betrek ik in mijn beschouwingen over de functies van de personificaties ook niet-overdrachtelijk gebruikt woordmateriaal. Dit kan dienen als middel tot ontsluiting van voor ons soms onduidelijke overdrachtelijke voorstellingen. Als bijvoorbeeld de personificatie *Juecht* ter sprake komt, eist ook het niet-overdrachtelijke woordveld rond *juecht* onze aandacht. We krijgen zo een indruk van een aantal negatieve aspecten die rond dit woord aanwezig zijn. De tegenstand die *Hoede* biedt tegen de avances die jeugd tegenover

de minnaar betoont worden zo duidelijk. 'Melodie' kent in het Gr.Hs. veel betekenisnuances, de personificatie vertegenwoordigt daarvan slechts een enkel aspect.

5.2 Enkele opmerkingen bij het overzicht in bijlage B van de personificaties die in het Gr.Hs. voorkomen

In bijlage B staat een overzicht van de in de allegorische gedichten en liefdesliederen optredende personificaties. Door de ruime toepassing die de auteurs maken van dit uitdrukingsmiddel zijn er vele namen.

Eigenschappen worden vaak personifiërend benoemd. Zo horen we in L32 de wanhopige minnaar klagen *Waen en Twifel sijn mijn gaste* (14) en in L140 *Vaer wech, Ghepeins! God gheve dir leit* (1). Dit soort aanduidingen heb ik niet in het overzicht opgenomen als ze niet in een uitgewerkt allegorisch verband voorkomen. De begrippen moeten in zintuiglijk waarneembare gedaante al of niet handelend optreden.

Vaak is de grens evenwel moeilijk te trekken en moet een keuze gemaakt worden of een figuur een personificatie is of niet. Ik reken de kluizenaar in **II** niet bij deze groep, omdat men zo'n figuur buiten lijfelijk tegen kon komen. Een 'hoeder' bij een fontein [de dame] reken ik wel tot de personificaties. Deze figuur is zinnebeeldig, want in werkelijkheid zit niemand in het landschap een fontein te bewaken tot hij sterft om dan die taak aan een minnaar over te dragen (**XII**).

In het overzicht zijn van alle personificaties de vindplaatsen vermeld. Men krijgt zo een indruk van de frequentie en de plaats waarin zij in allegorische gedichten voorkomen. Duidelijk blijkt dat er in de liederen praktisch geen personificaties voorkomen. Een uitzondering zien we in lied 146, waarin *Vrouw Ghenuecht* in een soort schaakspel de taak krijgt *Twifele* het leven zuur te maken.

De figuren zijn geordend naar geslacht of naar het geslacht waarop ze betrekking kunnen hebben. Een enkele keer is dit moeilijk uit te maken. In dat geval heb ik de figuur bij de mannelijke personificaties opgenomen. Zij die de personificaties vanuit het genderperspectief willen benaderen, zullen een eigen classificatie moeten maken.

In verband met de in 5.1 aangegeven onderlinge betrekkingen tussen de personificaties treft men in de opsomming van zinnebeeldige personen soms verwijzingen aan naar andere personificaties. Door de alfabetische ordening staan de figuren niet bij elkaar en zal men als lezer dus wel eens moeten 'springen'.

Opvallend is dat in **I** (965-966) een vrouwelijk personificatie voorkomt, welgemanierd en schoon gekleed, die niet met name genoemd wordt. Er bevinden zich in de burchtzaal meer 'ongenoemden' (964) en deze dame is kennelijk een van hen. Zij nemen niet fundamenteel deel aan de handeling en personifiëren kennelijk aspecten van de dame die in de context van het verhaal niet van belang zijn.

Het overzicht bevat naast de vindplaatsen slechts korte typering. De dubbele asterisk achter een naam geeft aan dat de personificatie elders in paragraaf 3 of 4 uitvoeriger wordt besproken.

5.3 De bespreking van enkele mannelijke personificaties

ACHTERSPRAKE: Het MNW (I: 37) geeft als woordverklaring: 'achterklap, laster'. Het optreden als personificatie wordt niet vermeld. In gedicht **II** wordt hij/zij (?) zonder een rol te spelen in het verhaal met *Overmoet*, *Breede-scande*, *Spreec-goet* en anderen door Venus uit haar lande verbannen. Het gepersonifieerde gedrag is vergelijkbaar met dat van *Envie*, *Clap-al*, *Begrijp*, de *niders* en de *quantelaers* (L147: 3). Dit grote aantal duidt erop dat de onhebbelijke eigenschap vaak voorkomt. De werkwijze van deze lieden wordt kernachtig beschreven in het 'stede'-gedicht **XIII**: [*Si*] *Begonsten uut rechte nide hovaerdich Beniden der goeder lieder staet Ende spraken achter den oghen quaet* en met betrekking tot de geliefden: *Saghen si die minden in trauen reine, St spraken recht of als dorpers vileme* (77-94).

BEGRIJP: Begrijp is in **II** een actieve figuur, die voorzien is van *een moortboghe* (639) met *sinen sichten*, *Die hem altoos ten dienste stelt* (873-874). Hij verspreidt kwaadaardige praatjes die de minnaar jaloers maken en hem met zijn geliefde in een kwaad daglicht stellen. Hij staat in dienst van *Twifel*, die hem beveelt: *Spant den boge, Ende stel de stralen alle ter vloghe Up avonturen wat ons toe valt* (641-643). Wat *Begrijp* nu precies bij de minnaar teweeg brengt, licht de dichter niet toe. De ingewijde toehoorders weten het echter precies. De functie van *Begrijp* wordt duidelijk als we andere tekstfragmenten in de allegorische gedichten erbij halen, onder andere het achtste gedicht. Een man zegt tot zijn geliefde: *Ik wilde dat mochten Ghelieve spreken sonder vaer, Sonder begrijp van quaden ghedochten* (48-50), dat wil zeggen 'zonder dat men aan- of opmerkingen maakt die wij geliefden te duchten hebben'. Bij de minnaar brengt *Begrijp* vertwijfeling en jaloezie teweeg, zo ontstaat de melancholie. In de hoofse poëzie zijn het uiteraard de met *Begrijp* verwante *niders* die de kletspraatjes rondstrooien. In **XII** komt de vrees voor de laster ook duidelijk tot uiting in ongeveer dezelfde bewoordingen (381-383). Of zoals **XV** het zegt: *Nu merct of minne draecht sulken ducht Van buten voor begrijps gherucht* (595-596). De minnaar verzoekt de dame bij wie hij zijn hart uitstort zijn ontboezemingen te *helen*, opdat hij daarna *Verwijt, no gheen begrijp ontfa*. Later herhaalt hij dit verzoek (485-488). Hij zou liever sterven dan dat er *begrijp van woorde quame*. In **II** vat de advocaat Redene dit mooi samen als hij de minnaar voor *Begrijp* waarschuwt: *Stout, vreeseloos ende ombescaemt Recht wroughere [verrader] es hi van natueren, Hi es besich tallen hueren ... Om te legghene nauwe laghe, Jalousien te brijnghen mare* (716-718). De zorgen die *Begrijp* de minnaar bezorgt zijn groot, de lasterpraatjes over zijn geliefde komen ook hem ter ore. De toch al bij hem bestaande vertwijfeling neemt uit jaloezie steeds meer toe en hij vervalt in *melancolie*. In het slotlied van **II** horen we *Begrijp, du maex vele quader nachte* (1918), maar de minnaar troost zichzelf met de gedachte dat de deugdzaamheid van zijn geliefde groot is: *Dijn duecht verjaecht Begrijp met crachte* (1920). Zie ook *Clap-al*.

BUERCHTGRAEVE: De naam van deze personificatie wordt op vele wijzen gespeld: *B(o)orchgrave*, *buerchgraaf*, *burchgrave* enz. Hij komt alleen voor in de eerste allegorie en is de verpersoonlijking van het hart [de regulerende factor] der geliefde. In het thematisch verwante *Dits van der vrouwen borch* (Kossmann 1940, 122-124) wordt gezegd dat we bij de burchtgraaf moeten denken aan het 'hart': *Haer hert reyn ende ombesmit Is die borggrave daer binnen* (168-169).

De allegorie handelt over de toenaderingspogingen van de minnaar tot een vrouw. Zij wordt voorgesteld als een burcht waarin twee hoofdcomponenten te onderscheiden zijn: de

'regerende' Burchtgraaf die het hart representeert en Zuiverheid die het geslachtelijk aspect symboliseert. Uiteindelijk is het de minnaar om de coïtus begonnen, voor hem het belangrijkste aspect in de verhouding. De burchtgraaf vertegenwoordigt de gemoedsaandoeningen, de levenskracht, hij is de zetel van de liefde, die de handelingen reguleert. Deze 'regent' zal uiteindelijk toestemming moeten geven of er van een duurzame verhouding sprake kan zijn. We zien dat allerlei adviserende 'personen' [innerlijke krachten, functies in de dame] het al of niet eens zijn over de toelating van de minnaar tot de burcht. Symbolisch uitgedrukt wil dit zeggen dat hij 'in dienst komt' van de Burchtgraaf, met andere woorden dat het meisje ermee instemt dat de *ic* met haar omgaat. Op het punt van de beslissing over de toelating en de regels die daarbij moeten gelden is de Burchtgraaf de belangrijkste figuur. Deze regels worden in letterlijk verhaalde voorschriften door *Verziene* gegeven en door tampons en sleutels gesymboliseerd. Als het echter gaat over de aard van de ontmoeting staat Zuiverheid centraal, zoals dat in de traditie van de *Roman de la Rose* betaamt.

Opmerkelijk is dat de Burchtgraaf in de bovenzaal verblijft en Zuiverheid in de benedenzaal. Deze lokaliserende onderstreept nadrukkelijk hun plaats in het menselijk lichaam. De *Grave* heeft de minnaar vooral in dienst genomen op voorspraak van *Melancolie*, die de *camerlinghen* 'bewerkt' had (1109-1112), de waarschuwingen van *Hoede* en het verzet van een deel van de bewoners ten spijt. Als het grootste deel van de bewoners zich later tegen de *ic* keert wegens zijn *verwaenthede* (2124) en hij *Trouwe ende Eere* uit het oog verloren heeft (2128) en zelfs geheel kwijt is (2139), ontzegt de *Borchgrave* de minnaar het recht hem nog langer onder ogen te komen (2148). Bij de toegang 'tot alle vertrekken' is de eer van Zuiverheid [het geslachtelijke aspect] gelukkig nog niet geschonden (2116), al is de minnaar in verschillende opzichten op het randje gegaan in de vierde fase van het liefdesproces [hoofdstuk 8, r. 2065-2115], hij heeft het *mate* betrachten [6.3.2 ad 7] uit het oog verloren. De verbanning naar de ommuurde tuin is het uiteindelijke lot van de vrijer.

Het burchtmotief wordt nader besproken in 4.5.1. In de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie (hoofdstuk 8) komen we nog uitvoerig op de *Burchtgraaf* terug.

Gezien de adviesraad van de vijf zintuigen is duidelijk dat we bij 'hart' vooral aan het kenvermogen moeten denken dat de handel en wandel van de burchtgraaf [de vrouwe] moet reguleren. Jan Praet formuleert: *Die herte die heeft .IIJ. Vogheden goet... die hare van doolne maken vroet ... dat es Verstannesse ende Zin ende Ghedinkenesse.* (Bormans 1872, 26, r. 639-644).

CAMERLINGHEN: Een wat onduidelijke, niet nauw omschreven groep. In 1091, 1229, 1835, 2029 zijn het de vier humoren^{***} die ertoe behoren. In een latere fase van de allegorie noemt de minnaar zich *upper-camerlinc* (2029). In 1108 en 1310 rekent de dichter de vijf gepersonifieerde zintuigen tot de *camerlinghen*, terwijl ze in 626-627 *als hoogste toeverlaet* tot zijn *raet* gerekend worden. In 2035 kan de aanduiding zowel betrekking hebben op de zintuigen als op de humoren.

Ik bespreek de zintuigen op deze plaats. Hun taak is het scherp waarnemen van de omgeving. In **I** komt dit tot uiting in 1310-1325 als de oprechtheid van *Juecht* ter sprake komt. Uitvoeriger dan in **I** worden de zintuigen beschreven in **XII**. Ze vormen daar een beeldengroep met aan het hoofd *Vroescap*. Ook in Augustijnken van Dordts *Dits van der vrouwen borch* (Kossmann, 122-124) komen deze vijf wachters als bewakers en kamerlingen van de burchtgraaf *Reynhout* met ongeveer dezelfde namen en eigenschappen voor.

Hieronder volgen de vijf gepersonifieerde *camerlinghen*, die de burchtheer dag en nacht behoeden voor wat hem deren kan (I: 636-637).

1. Hoor-na [Hoortnaer]: De burchtheer dient te luisteren naar zijn raad, maar *Juecht* voldoet volgens hem in ieder geval niet aan die eis, *Mids dat haer lusticheit es so groot ... ten enen hoor uut, ten andren in* (1310-1316). Kennelijk begrijpt hij de intenties van *Jeugd*'s lied niet volkomen [vandaar al die 'studies'. In XII vertegenwoordigt één van de beelden van *Vroescap* het zintuig. Van hem wordt dan gezegd: *Toot allen duechden uut-vercooren Bescoopt vor alle vremde lette, Wel bewaert van alre smette, Van allen quade wel behoedt* (169-172). De functie beschermt tegen alle auditieve mededelingen die nadeel kunnen bezorgen. Een belangrijke functie als we denken aan de ellende die de lasterpraatjes van *Begrijp* c.s. teweeg kunnen brengen.

2. Licht-Ghevoel: Ook hier kunnen we weer het best een typering uit XII nemen: *Bevoelen doet in allen keere Tleven staen in groter eere* (206-207). Gunstige werkingen zijn het bevorderen van de ootmoed, het vernieuwen van de deugd, de inleving in het leed van vrienden, het liefhebben van God en de naaste enz. In I wordt als functie van deze personificatie genoemd dat hij de *Burchtgraef* altoes *ter vlucht staat* [altijd ten dienste staat] (631). Daarnaast is het gevoel een primair zintuig, "de tastzin is door zijn onmiddellijk contact met de primaire kwaliteiten van de elementen het meest materiele van alle zintuigen, dat voorwerp en waarneming verbindt" (Decorte 1994, 208-209).

Augustijnken van Dordt zegt van *Licht-ghevoel*: *in rechter maten voecht hij sijn dinc*. Hij weet precies hoe hij zijn heer op kan beuren en beter maken als hij zich niet prettig voelt (*Dits van der vrouwen borch*, Kossmann 1940, 124, r. 121-136).

3. Nieuwe-Sien: Gedicht I omschrijft zijn functie niet nader. Dit gebeurt wel in XII, waarin hij als één van de beelden van *Vroedschap* fungeert. Heel pregnant wordt gezegd: *Wat mi messit* [misstaat, niet voegt] *of mach messcien An mi, antmine, an niemant el, Saghe elc alzo, so saghi wel, So waers ghepait* [tevredengesteld] *de makere* [schepper] *zijn* (177-180).

4. Rieke-Lucht: Eén van de vijf raadsheren van de *Burchtgrave*. Hij verbeeldt het zintuig van de reuk. De geliefde vrouw in I verspreidt een welriekende lucht. De minnaar neemt deze waar als hij zich buiten de burcht begeeft (2095). De lucht heeft zo'n genezende werking dat hij constateert: *al haddic alle de pijn Allene ghehadt int herte mijn, Die in de werelt mochte wesen, Die lucht hadde mi ghenesen* (2199-2002). In L119 treffen we dit motief ook aan: *Haer mont zoet, meer dan balzems lucht Daer mi al heil of mach ghescien* (5-6). Ook de winden in een heerlijk ruikende natuur hebben deze eigenschap: *So gaven zi de zoetste lucht. Rauwe droufheit, vaer no ducht No deerde hem twijnt* (I: 39-41).

Een onwelriekende geur wordt met zieken in verband gebracht. Zo vermeldt de dichter in XII bij de naam van het beeld *Rieken*: *Ik heete Rieken, Ghesonde lucht niet als de zieken, Die rieken anders faute een mul* [door de schuld van droge stof] *Ende zijn mesquamen vul* [buiten hun schuld volkomen ongelukkig] (182-185). In II ruikt het *rosier* zo heerlijk *Dat mi verblide mijns hertsen bloet* (442). Het vertoeven in gezonde, droge lucht is een remedie tegen de melancholie (zie aldaar).

Bij Augustijnken heet deze personificatie *Her Rukaert-Gode-vrucht*. Hij verdient van de vijf zintuigen *den meesten prijs* en behoedt zijn heer voor *quade locht, noch onrevne* (*Dits van der vrouwen borch*, Kossmann, 123-124, r. 98-107). Ook in I is men extra alert op *stanc* (585), die naar middeleeuwse opvattingen ziekmakend kan zijn.

5. Smakelij: Eén van de vroede heren in de raad van de *Burchtgraaf*, uiteraard één van de vijf zintuigen. De smaakfunctie heeft in XII (weergegeven als beeld onder het toezicht van

Vroescap) kennelijk een ruimere werkingssfeer dan de smaakzin alleen. Zij is hier door *Redene met eere ende werdicheit toe bereit* [uitgerust], zodat men gevrijwaard wordt van *onneeren ende van blamen* (192-202). De smaakzin is in de middeleeuwse psychologie verbonden met het voedingsvermogen, dat noodzakelijk is voor de instandhouding van het lichaam. In het Gr Hs dient men in de moralistische gedichten het genot van lekker eten en drinken strikt in de hand te houden. Een illustratief voorbeeld vinden we in **X**, waar tegen de *Pioniers van delcater smake* gezegd wordt dat de ziel door culinaire geneugten niet gediend wordt en dat men zich daardoor veel ziekten op de hals haalt. Bovendien is de duivel in het spel: hij *maect de zine ghestent* [brengt zijn volgelingen tot aanzien]. *Alzo de vleeschauwre doet de zvine*. *De vette die smaken stersens pine*. *Man spaert den magheren hodevaire* [ooievaars] (155-164). De heremiet veroordeelt in **XIV** de gulzigheid als een van de hoofdzonden (462-522). Ook op minnegebied leidt deze eigenschap tot niets. *Een gulzich dats een recht glottoen* [schoelje, smeerlap] (466). *Smakelyn* heeft de functie de eetlust en de dranklust te matigen en tevens de burchtheer [de dame] te behoeden voor onreine spijzen en drank.

CLAP-AL Een in kwaad daglicht staand figuur. Venus bant de verklikker in de tweede allegorie *ute vrou Venus lande* (1674). De auteur heeft echter dankbaar gebruik van zijn diensten gemaakt om te rechtvaardigen dat hij weet wat zich tijdens de beraadslagingen in de raadskamer van Venus afspeelt. De observerende verteller mag niet in die kamer aanwezig zijn, maar toch weet hij – dankzij *Clap Al* – wat er gebeurt. *Clap-Al* vertelt namelijk alles aan de advocaat *Redene*, ondanks de voorzorgsmaatregelen van de raadvrouwen. [zij] *sloten die duere vaste toe*. *Watsi daer spraken men oordes niet* (1512-1513). *Maer redene wiste wel al tbediet Van Clap-Al die hem dicwile toe brochte*. *Vele dynx dies hi niet vele en rochte* (1514-1516). *Clap-Al* is de listige bespieder voor wie niemand veilig is. Het oordeel over de *clappers* is niet mals.

De *reine minners* in **IV** zetten hem in het rijtje van *dorpeis quade vileine nijt en gramschap* (167-169). De minnaar in **V** zegt: *Wat niders clappen ic bem bedacht* (2). In L19 klinkt het gebed: *Here God hoet ons vor de vileine, Die aeygher clappen dan si zien* (19-20). Lied 83 is geheel gewijd aan de *niders* die *clappen*. *Aeygher cruut nie zonne besceyn* (27). Lasterpraatjes verspreiden geschiedt ook door de *quantelicghen ende quantelaers* (L147-3), de op veel plaatsen genoemde *niders* en de mannelijke personificatie *Begrijp*. Deze veelheid van personen duidt aan dat hun handelingen een centraal gegeven in het minnegebeuren zijn. In **XIII** vormen zij voor de aanbieder van het geschenk aan de *Coninc van den Witten Bere* een van de drie aanleidingen om de stad voorgoed te verlaten, want zij *beniden der goeder lieden staet*. *Ende spraken achter den oghen quaet* (79-80).

De rol van verspreider wordt in **I** vervuld door *Envie*.

CONST Een veelzijdig begrip in de Middeleeuwen. In de proloog van **I** heeft het woord duidelijk betrekking op de dicht- en liedkunst. De dichter beoefent beide op uiterst kunstvolle wijze. Thomas van Aquino meent dat God de mens de ‘kunsten’ heeft geschonken om hem uit zijn onwetendheid te verheffen en hem tot een beter leven te brengen. Didactische doelstellingen zijn aan de eerste allegorie niet vreemd, maar daarbij ontbreken religieuze aspecten. Deze komen wel in het liedboek bij het gebruik van het woord *const* naar voren (Reynaert 1999, 126).

Const is als personificatie aanwezig in **II**. Meestal dekken de begrippen in **I** en **II** elkaar, maar *Const* in **II** is een raadselachtige figuur die bijgeschoold moet worden in *Ghetem perthede*'s minneschool. In **II** wordt de liedkunst alleen beoefend in de twee opgenomen

liederen Nergens blijkt dat deze liederen of de allegorie van de dichter niet goed genoeg zouden zijn waardoor de opname van *Const* in de minneschool te verdedigen zou zijn Dat de dichter zijn eigen dichtwerk veroordeelt (indien men uitgaat van de waarschijnlijk juiste veronderstelling dat **I** en **II** door dezelfde dichter geschreven zijn) door *const* te laten bijscholen lijkt ook niet waarschijnlijk In **I** is hij trots op zijn kunstenaarschap Het gedicht is zelfs uitdrukkelijk bestemd voor hen *die de weghe der consten kennen* (38)

Meer voor de hand liggend is dat *const* in **II** slaat op het bezit van kennis om op de juiste wijze hoofs te minnen *Ghetemperthede* geeft immers alleen aanwijzingen op liefdesgebied Op dit gebied hebben de *u*-figuren in de droomallegorieën nog heel wat te leren want hun oppervlakkige handigheidjes bij de liefdesbenaderingen zullen een diepere *u* moeten krijgen Zo zal de bijscholing van *Const* in de minneschool wel verklaard moeten worden

DANGIER(E) Tien maal noemt de dichter deze in **I** handelend optredende figuur Het MNW (II 58-59) geeft als betekenissen onder andere 'macht geweld' (ad 1) en 'tegenwerking verzet' (ad 3) Het woord komt in het Gr Hs vaker voor in **VIII** met de betekenis *macht geweld* (144) In G4 wordt gesproken van Lucifers *dangier* (19) In het tweede gedicht zegt de minnaar dat hij in de minneschool zal leren *Twifels dangier* te ontlopen (1744) In L137 is het hart van de minnaar in *dangier* van de gelietde (36) net als in **VIII** 143 De betekenis van *Dangier* als personificatie geeft het MNW weer met 'Een persoon die op onhebbelijke wijze van het aan hem opgedragen gezag gebruik maakt' (**II** 58)

In *Die Rose* vinden we onomwonden *Een doirper een vilain lach daer gebogen in dat plain gheheten so was hi Dangier Dese barbelaen hoedde den rostet* (Verwijs 1868 46 vss 2883 2888) Als karaktereigenschap van *Dangier* in **I** komt ook de trots en hoogmoed naar voren Hij is daar gehuwd met *Goedertue* zijn tegendeel Het zijn echtelieden *die zelden hadden pavs te zamen* (973) *Dangier* wordt in **I** in een adem genoemd met *Envie Overmoet Jalousie* en *Hoede* (1892 2038) Hij doet *ter poorten bestiet* (1712) Het zijn dus krachten die ten nadele van de minnaar werken Zijn rol komt overeen met die in de *Roman de la Rose* waar hij de rozenknoppen bewaakt Net als *Hoede* heeft hij een grote hekel aan vreemdelingen want *Als die vreemde onnosele clemmen [in aanzien stijgen] Siet men dickent dat si gremmen [bits bejegenen] Uut scalkeinten diese leeren Daer si haer vrienden bi onneeren Ic wordet eer omme onthijft Dan dat si hier binnen bleve* (1931-1937) We zien hem dan ook met grote argwaan de bewegingen van *Melancolie* en *Juecht gadeslaan* (1479-1486) Hij speelt een actieve rol bij het verwijderen van de minnaar uit de burcht *Envie ende Dangier Gaven mi menichen quaden pier* (2187-2188) aldus de minnaar

DANSE-WEL *Ghetemperthede* schoolt deze figuur bij in **II** De jeugd geeft zich met veel overgave over aan de dans in de Brugse feestcultuur In **X** klinkt het vermanend *Hoort ghi zotten die tuwen jaren sijt commen ende scuwt der vrienden raet Dansers springeis die scoon ghelaet Belijmt maect om te vanghen mede* (222-226) In de moraliserende gedichten wijzen de heremieten herhaaldelijk op het gevaar van het feestvieren We krijgen het idee dat het gezelschap in **I** zich bezighoudt met zang en dans als *Melancolie* de kamer binnentreedt waarin zijn broers zich bevinden (**I** 932 v)

GHEER-ALTOOS In **II** zit ook *Gheer altoos* in de minneschool Hij is waarschijnlijk op een lijn te stellen met *Vrebegheeren/Naubegheeren* Deze laatste kan echter als belangrijk familielid van *Twifel* en de *zijnen* die in dienst staan van Venus niet aangepakt worden door verbanning of bijscholing *Gheer Altoos* brengt samen met zijn familielid *Willemijn* de minnaar aan de drank als medicijn De wanhopige krijgt *soete ghepens* maar *het smaecte*

hem [zo] wel dat hij *bi drancke* geraakt, met alle gevolgen van dien. Door toedoen van beide heren 'huurt' hij dan het land *Duchte, mir vrouwen* [Venus] *leen*. Wat hij daar precies uitspookt, weten we niet. Gezien de bewoordingen *Die van goeden werken verandert Ende om argher te crighene wandert* (1315-1316) zal dit niet erg eervol zijn geweest. De associaties met 'vrij begeren' en 'eigen wil doen' versterken deze indruk. Zeker is dat het zo belangrijke ethische principe *met mate* te handelen, niet nagekomen is.

GHETEMPERTHEIT/GHETEMPER(T)HEDE: De leermeester van de minnaar in de tweede allegorie draagt de naam *Ghetempertheit*. Hij is gehuwd met *Mate*, een nauw verwante psychische functie. Hij doet een sterk beroep op het verstand. Als de hartstochten te hoog oplopen, zoals zich dit onder andere uit in *tghepeins* (VI: 2250), dan dient *Redene* de mens op het smalle, goede pad te houden. Voor de lessen van *Ghetempertheit* verwijs ik naar hoofdstuk 6 over de normen en waarden in het Gr.Hs. [6.3.2 ad 7].

GHEPEINS: De minnaars in het Gr.Hs. *peinsen* heel wat af, maar slechts eenmaal leidt dit tot een personifiëring. In L140 wordt *Ghepeins* hartstochtelijk verwenst: *Vaer wech, Ghepeins! God gheve dir leit Du hens ghebrant met onbesceit Mijn herte ende al mijns zinnes cracht* (8-9). Aan dit lied en aan de oorzaak van het ondraaglijke *ghepeins* besteed ik in het hoofdstuk over de melancholie ruim aandacht. *Ghepeins* heeft een sterk causale binding met de *jalousie* en vooral met de *melancolie*. Zie ook de opmerking bij *Ghetempertheit*.

HUEDERE/HOUDE: In enkele droomgedichten heeft de vrouw een beschermer of beschermster. We vinden deze functie in diverse gepersonifieerde gedaanten terug, niet altijd met de naam 'hoeder/hoedster'. De functie van deze figuur wordt kort en bondig beschreven in V: *De duve* [de geliefde vrouw] *te hoedene voor messcien* (123). Wie de hoeder is in V is overigens niet geheel duidelijk. De 'hoeder' heeft trouwens niet goed opgepast, de *duve* is door de doornen van de *eggientier* [de liefdesboom] gewond geraakt. De bewaking is nodig, omdat de man geneigd is zich op velerlei wijzen tijdens het liefdesgebeuren te misdragen. Het tweede en derde deel in het Gr.Hs. geven daarvan vele bewijzen. De duidelijkste exponent is wel de tweede allegorie. Zo is de raadgeving van *Ghetemperthede* – *Gheeft uwe nature bi wiser hoede* – aan de *Joncman moedich, vul der juecht, Die u der minnen niet wachten muecht* – verklaarbaar (1772-1774). In XII vinden we *een houde die lach Levende an de fonteine* [de vrouwe] *clær* (91-92). Als deze man moet sterven, geeft de *houde* zijn taak over aan de minnaar, die zijn vertrouwen gewonnen heeft. In tegenstelling tot de vrouwelijke *Hoede* in I wordt de mannelijke *hoede* in XII positief geschilderd. Geen wonder, want hij is de minnaar ter wille. De taak van de hoeder wordt in dit gedicht verklaard door een *vrouwe* die een klavertje vier aan het zoeken is en die de verliefde openbaart wat de zeven noodzakelijke eigenschappen zijn van een goede hoeder: *troost ende toeverlaat noch mee... reinicheit... omoet... vriheit scalkernuen scu... vriendelicheit ende wijsheit... en eere* (531-543). Eigenschappen overigens die de minnaar in de diverse gedichten en liederen niet met grote volharding tentoon spreidt. In een gebed gericht aan Maria, of ook zij de *fonteine in behoet* wil nemen, vernemen we dat *onrein ghepeins, dorpernie* en *frenesie* [zinsverbijstering] ongewenste eigenschappen zijn. Het is duidelijk dat de minnaar ook hier raadgevingen gekregen heeft over de wijze waarop hij zijn dame moet *hoeden*. Ook in VI geeft een *vrauwe* zo'n reeks raadgevingen.

HUMOREN: De complexie [menging van de vier lichaamsvochten] slijm [*flegma*, gerelateerd aan het element water], bloed [*sanguis*, lucht], zwarte gal [*melancholia*, aarde] en gele

gal [*cholera*, vuur] in het menselijk lichaam, bepaalt voor de middeleeuwen grotendeels het menselijk karakter en dient vaak als grondslag voor de behandeling van ziekten²³.

De vier humoren treden in de eerste allegorie gepersonifieerd op als broers. Ironisch zegt de dichter over de tegenstelling tussen *Sangwijn* en *Fleumaet*: *Het moeste wezen een wijs man Diese stelde ende tamen brochte, Want noit saventier* [schoenlapper, maar ook een beunhaas die zijn vak niet verstaat] *sulc weerc wrochte* (954-956). De tekening van de vier broers is geheel volgens de leer van de Hippocratische school die door Galenos verder uitgewerkt werd, wat aanleiding gaf tot allerlei ingewikkelde constructies en onderlinge betrekkingen²⁴, zodat een complex geheel ontstond met elementen als lichaamssappen, windrichtingen, sterrenbeelden, temperaturen, vochtigheidsgehalte, menselijke leeftijden enz.

In I vertegenwoordigen de humoren eigenschappen van de dame. Kennelijk verkeert zij door de aanwezigheid van alle vier de humoren, in een evenwichtige toestand. Om gelijkheid van complexie te verkrijgen, treedt de minnaar ook bij hen in dienst. We zullen zien dat dit - net als bij de aanbidding van de sleutels - niet veel resultaat afwerpt voor het welslagen van de verhouding.

De kleuren die in de kleding van de humoren voorkomen, zijn in overeenstemming met de bij hen behorende 'comparerende' elementen: *Melancolie* is groen, elders zwart, de aarde; *Sangwijn* is hemels blauw, de lucht; *Collorijn* is rood, het vuur; en *Fleumaet* is wit, het water. De kleur grijs komt in de tunieken van hen allen voor. Zij duidt waarschijnlijk op de dienstbaarheid die de minnaar de dame moet betonen en die gepaard gaat met *arbeit*. Zie hiervoor het gedeelte over de kleurensymboliek.

Hierna volgen enkele opmerkingen over de vier afzonderlijke humoren.

1. Melancolie: In de eerste allegorie de belangrijkste van de vier humoren, maar moeilijk exact te verklaren. Hij is dé adviseur op het gebied van de lyrische hoofse dichtkunst en doet zich hier uit dien hoofde ook voor als een - door zijn broer *Sangwijn* overigens op bedekte wijze in twijfel getrokken - kenner van de liefde. Vreemd is wel dat hij het lied van *Juecht*, dat de liefde als uitgangspunt heeft, niet kan of wil verklaren.

In overeenstemming met de pseudo-aristotelische melancholieconceptie, waarin alle belangrijke mensen in de categorie van de melancholici vallen (Heger 1967, 43), lijkt *Melancolie* in de eerste allegorie meer op een diepzinnige kunstkenner - speciaal op het gebied van de dichtkunst en de muziek - dan op een deskundige op liefdesgebied. Hij neemt de minnaar in persoonlijke dienst na kennismaking met zijn liederen, onder andere door hem zijn *caproen* aan te bieden. *Melancoli is scoen van rade vroet, up sijn hoofd so stoet een hoet, graeu ende groen was sijn abijt ... sijn anschijn merkel* [opmerkzaam] (I: 897-899). Later introduceert hij de minnaar bij de burchtheer.

In de eerste helft van de veertiende eeuw krijgt de melancholie een nieuwe rol. Men ziet de melancholie als oorzaak van de liefde en de daarbij horende depressieve en sluimerachtige toestanden als de lyrische *ic* getroffen is door de liefde. We treffen dit aspect onder andere aan bij Machaut (Heger 1967, 74-75). Overigens ligt er tussen de beide concepties

²³ Er is veel literatuur over deze materie. Recent is Jansen-Sieben 1994. Zie over de toepassing van de ideeën in literair werk o.a. Van Buuren 1979, Werkgroep 1972, 1983, Jansen-Sieben 1985, Van der Poel 1989, Puschmann 1983.

²⁴ Jansen-Sieben 1985 (162) geeft een instructief schema en een literatuuropgave. Ook Delumeau 1983 (192) geeft in een schematisch overzicht een aantal karakteristieke eigenschappen overzichtelijk weer.

wel een verbindende schakel: ernstige studie en diep nadenken kunnen de oorzaak zijn van de melancholie en de begeleidende symptomen naar voren laten komen. In allerlei afbeeldingen zien we Melancholie in diep gepeins verzonken.

Hoede geeft Melancholie's functie aan met ghi Die regement hier binnen zt [een met een bepaald gezag bekleed bestuurder] (I: 1945-1946). Zijn gezag blijkt ook uit de opmerking dat het hele gezelschap na zijn binnenkomst zich stelde(n) in zijn ghebod (999). Hoede is het in geen enkel opzicht met zijn handelwijze eens: er is sprake van een vreemt upset (1191), men stelt zich uit uwen [de burchtheer] bevele (1169), met als gevolg dat ghi worter selve bi ontzet (1172). Het lijkt misschien allemaal maar onschuldig, maar Een cleene quaet... als men dat tantierne pleicht, soot ouder wart, soot voorder grovt (1197-1202). Het is trouwens niet onmogelijk dat zowel de geliefde als de minnaar tot de melancholici behoren. Beiden genieten de bijzondere aandacht van Melancholie. Er is dus aanleiding tot een liefdesverhouding²⁵, want gelieven met dezelfde complexie worden tot elkaar aangetrokken. De melancholie krijgt in het zevende hoofdstuk speciale aandacht.

2. Sangwijn: Hij is *vaeliant* [voortreffelijk], *Sijn abijt was hemel blaue Met eenre mouwen die was graeu, Ghewrocht van peerlen ende van goude. Thaer dat wies up die moude [schedel], Dat docht mi witter dan een vlas. Sijn oghen clarer dan een glas, Sijn anschijn bluesende ende ront, Te lachene so stont zijn mont (938-946).* Een positief beeld dat ongeveer aansluit bij de gegevens die Delumeau geeft: "De la nature de l'air chaud et humide, plutôt tempère; doux., médiocre Il nourrit principalement les parties musculaires. est distribué par les veines et artères et donne chaleur à tout le corps" (1983, 192). Deze warmbloedige figuur is traditioneel bij uitstek tot de liefde in staat. Hij is het die zich kritisch opstelt ten opzichte van de minnaar, niet opstaat bij zijn binnenkomen en hem als laatste in dienst neemt door zijn livrei te schenken. Kennelijk ziet hij als deskundige op minnegebied niet zoveel in de jongeman. Gezien de afloop van het verhaal blijkt hij gelijk te hebben.

3. Collorijn: Hij wordt als volgt omschreven: *[hi] docht mi heetst van bloede zijn. Sijn abijt was graeu ende root, Sijn haer was scoon, sijn leden groot. Sijn anschijn manlic int bescau, Stout was hi, nieuwer flau [laf] (958-962).* Het *heetst van bloede* correspondeert met de traditioneel aan hem toegekende kleur rood.

4. Fleumaet/Flumat: De flegmaticus heeft een temperament dat geassocieerd wordt met de winter, het noorden, het water en de ouderdom. Hij is *simpel, swaer was sijn ghelaet, Bleec so was sijn oghe up slaen. Evelachtich [naargeestig] ende onghedaen [er slecht uitzierende], Wit ende graeu so haddi an (950-953).* Het is overduidelijk al met al een uitmonstering die zijn volledige ongeschiktheid voor liefdesavonturen onderstreept. Hij speelt derhalve geen belangrijke rol in **I**.

JOLIJT: Het begrip *jolyt* heeft in het Gr.Hs. meestal een positieve betekenis, zoals bijvoorbeeld in L139: *De hoochste staet der vrolycheit Om jolizelic te leven Dats minne vul der reinicheit (1-3). Suverheit is een vrouwe jolijs (902)* en bij de beschrijving van de burch horen we over de *maetselrie die zo jolijs gewrocht is (182-183). Mei is de over zoeter tijt waarin elc minre heift jolijt (L45: 19-20).* Dit sluit aan bij de vreugdevolle constatering in **I** dat *Jueghet, Lust en Jolijt* met de minnaar meegaan als hij volledig door de burchtheer geaccepteerd wordt (2030).

²⁵ Men zie bijv. Van Gijsen 1984. Het bezitten van dezelfde complexie is volgens een gangbare middeleeuwse opvatting een voorwaarde én een verklaring voor het bestaan van liefde tussen hen (107-108).

Maar de *jolyt* is in het minneproces wisselvallig en dus ook *Heer Jolyt*. Als *Rouckeloos* opmerkt dat het lied van de minnaar hem niet interesseert staat *Jolyt* aan de zijde van de *ic* en brengt de cynicus tot zwijgen. In 1718 zit *Jolyt* nog naast *Omoedichede*, *Simpelheit* en *Ghedoochsamichede*. In 2120-2121 zien we echter een geheel ander koppel optreden. Als de minnaar zich grote vrijheden veroorlooft is iedereen verontwaardigd, behalve *Jolyt*. *Oveymoet ende heer Dangier*, *Jolyt* bevindt zich nu in een zeer ongunstig gezelschap met eigenschappen die de minnaar naar de ondergang voeren. Van de *minne* *vul der reinheit* van L139 is kennelijk geen sprake meer en de *jolyt* krijgt een zeer negatieve tint. Als de minnaar aan het slot verbannen is in de sombere ommuurde tuin, doet hij een vergeefs beroep op *Jolyt*. *Die mi so vrienthout* [hulpvaardig goed gezind] *plach te sine*. *Dat hi mi van uter pine Entchens verlossen mochte* (2318-2320).

Zoals bij de bespreking van de melancholie in het zevende hoofdstuk blijkt, is de *jolyt* een manier om de melancholie te bestrijden. In II wordt de manier waarop de minnaar de *jolyt* zoekt negatief afgeschilderd. Hij zoekt het in feestvieren en de drank en vergeet de vereiste matiging. De figuur wordt in de *Roman de la Rose* niet genoemd maar hij is in de *Vlaamse Rose* de gelukkige minnaar, die aan *Groter Quale* zijn geschiedenis vertelt. **LUST** *Jonckhere Lust* krijgt een belangrijke rol toebedeeld in de eerste allegorie. Ook in het overige werk in het convoluut neemt het begrip een belangrijke plaats in. Er zijn verschillende met dit begrip samenhangende aspecten te onderscheiden. Die bewegen zich van een negatieve tot een meer positieve waardering.

Het negatieve aspect hangt nauw samen met de seksuele drang in de mens. In IV lezen we als de tijd is voortgegaan *Dat juecht haer jonghe lusticghe cracht*. *Heift versleten int reine ghedacht*. *Dienende na der minnen danc*. *Ende dat natuere haer zelve cranc*. *Beghint ghevoelen* (211-215) en *Ende dan faelgiert der minnen gloet*. *Die vier sprooete in den lustichen moet*. *Bi welken hi vor al begheerde*. *Om eere om prijs ende al te werde*. *Van zinen ghemunde te sine bereit*. *Minlic in allen aerbeit*. *Met gansen vermueghene* (217-223). In I wordt *lusticheit* beschouwd als een eigenschap van de niet sympathiek getekende figuren *Heer Licht-ghevoel* en *Heer Smakelijc* (1311-1313).

In XIV zien we dat *Een jonghelinc* *vul der werelt luste*. *Zochte eens in wandelinghen ruste* (1-2). Op een vraag van de heremiet antwoordt deze jongeman *Vader God weet dat mach niet zijn*. *Want tjonghe lusticghe leven mijn*. *Ne mach der weerelt deiven noch* (38-39). De teleurgestelde minnaar zegt, als hij spreekt over zijn gelietde *Gheen wijf te weerelt ne ghenoughen mi*. *So wel als ic peirse om mine minne*. *De lust en steijf te stappans toe* (532-534). Hij erkent overigens iets verderop dat de begeerte wel eens toeslaat als hij een aardig vrouwtje ziet. De heremiet wijst de minnaar erop dat er duivelse krachten in het spel zijn. *De viant heeft Eva aangeziet*. *Adam te verleiden, zij Deit dat zijn herte in luste ontstac*. *Dus quaemt dat hi tgebod verbrac* (XIV 651-652).

We hoeven ons er niet over te verwonderen dat *Lust* in de minneschool van *Ghetem peithede* naast *Wilthede*, *Rouckeloos* en *Jonchede* zit om bijgeschoold te worden (II 1754-1756). De gepersonifieerde *Lust* geeft in II dus de wellust, de aardse begeerte weer. In een erotische scene met waarschijnlijk een hoer zegt de dichter *Hoe mochte haer lusten mans* [trek hebben in een man] (L16 61). De negatieve gevoelswaarde is sterk gekoppeld aan de opvatting dat de mens zich onvoldoende kan beheersen, omdat hij geen *mate* kan betrachten.

De lust doet ons ook begeren naar aardse bezit. *Nemt nochtans vulte van uwen luste*. *Van al daer ghi of zijt de slave*. *Alwaer ghi keiser coninc of grave*. *Nochthan heift zorighe in hu*

haer cheins (91-94). Dit aspect wordt niet uitgebeeld door de personificatie in de minneallegorieën.

Uiteraard komt het neutrale gebruik van *lust* ook vaak voor: *Die sprekens luste was daer ghehoort* (II: 519). Een van de getuigen in II *lach te sinen luste in huus ende sloop* (1486). In VIII gebiedt de vrouw de vrijer: *Scinct, heere, want mi drinkens lust* (15). Over de dagindeling in drieën wordt gezegd: *gheeft u zelven gheheel ter ruste. So dattu sanderdaechs werkens luste. Wildi u niet also bestieren, U werken salre bi faelgieren* (II: 1798-1801).

We zien in L36 een van minneleed en zorg vervulde, peinzende minnaar, die belijdt dat hij niet de vreugde kan vinden, *Si sijn mi verre ende onghereit. Gheen dinc vor lust ende vroilicheit* (4.7.14 en 22). Welke inhoud de beide laatste begrippen precies hebben, vermeldt de auteur in het Gr.Hs. niet.

De rol van Lust in de eerste allegorie toont een enigszins afwijkend patroon van hetgeen hiervoor geschilderd is. *Lust* is de mannelijke opperzangmeester van de 'compagnie'. Hij vertolkt de liederen op een meesterlijke wijze. Dichten en componeren doet hij echter niet. Opmerkelijk is weer de opstelling in de grote zaal, die ons aan de opstelling in de minneschool in II doet denken: naast *Lust* staan *Jolijt*, *Overmoet* en ... de verklikster *Envie*, kennelijk om een oogje in het zeil te houden, zodat zij tweedracht kan zaaien (I: 990). Groeperingen hebben in de allegorieën steeds een zinvolle betekenis.

De invloed van *Luste* op musicaal gebied is groot, het musiceren schenkt kennelijk een groot genot. Zijn aanwezigheid wordt noodzakelijk geacht om *Juecht*'s lied in de kring van *Suverheit* ten gehore te brengen, *zijn accoord vulbringhet al* (I: 820). Hij heeft bovendien een zeer innemend voorkomen (829-832). Het lied brengt hij tot volle tevredenheid ten gehore, maar hij geeft niet thuis als het serieus verklaard moet worden. Kennelijk representeert hij hier het wat oppervlakkige, vrolijke en aangename gezelschapsleven met zang en dans. Zijn invloed op *Juecht* is zeer groot: hij *was haer stael* [model] (I: 1436). Het publiek vraagt zich door de vele dubbele bodems in het handschrift mogelijk af: "alleen op het gebied van de liedkunst of voelt zij ook anderszins genegenheid voor hem?" Niet alleen de man wordt tot het andere geslacht aangetrokken, ook de vrouw.

Mannen zijn *lustich*, maar als vrouwen *lustich* genoemd worden, dan slaat dit op lichtzinnige vrouwen, die *lusten mans* (L16: 51). We zien in het Gr.Hs. in deze tekening een perfecte spiegeling van de werkwijze in hoofse geschriften. Er is dus op de achtergrond wel een veronderstelde, maar niet uitgesproken, seksuele neiging bij de vrouw. Er schuilt een kracht in haar, waardoor zij tot de liefde wordt aangetrokken, zoals ook blijkt uit het lied van *Juecht*. Bovendien is de vrouw meer dan de man gericht op blijvende emotionele verhoudingen, met eer en trouw. Wordt de seksuele neiging openlijk en niet omfloerst uitgesproken, dan gaat het om een hoer. De veelvuldige waarschuwingen van de wijze personen in de diverse gedichten tegen het gevaar van onder andere het feestvieren, de onbezonnenheid van de jeugd en de vleselijke lust, zijn de recipiënten natuurlijk niet onbekend.

Lust wordt in II niet verbannen. Hij wordt blijkbaar als een noodzakelijke eigenschap beschouwd, evenwel met de restrictie dat hij met mate betracht moet worden.

MELODIE / MELODYE: Het woord komt 16 keer voor in het convoluut, met verschillende betekenisuances. Als personificatie komt *Melodie* enkel in II voor, waar *Ghetemperthede* en *Mate* hem moeten bijscholen.

Het meer frivole aspect komt tot uiting in L26: met *Der minnen spel si beide plagen Met groter melodien* (8-9); of in XIV, waar gesproken wordt van *der naturen melodie* [zucht naar lichamelijk genot] die de mens *ter scalkernie* brengt (573-574).

In het hoofse woordgebruik bezit *Melodie* een meer positieve zin. In **IV** is de geliefde *trezoor* en *melodie* (113) van de minnaar. In het fragment *Mijn ruste, mijn vrucht, mijn melodie es weck, maar [door] zwaar Melancole, Treuren, zuchten, clashen, waken...* is het hart van de minnaar zwaar gekwetst (**XII**: 474-481).

Ook in de godsdienstige sfeer wordt het woord gebruikt. In **XII** is Maria *alre bedructer melodie* (652), in **II** is Christus *heerscip vul melodien* (33), in **XIV** wordt gesproken van *dhemelsghe melody* (188). Het MNW geeft de betekenis 'rijke stof tot vreugde' (**IV**: 1366). In L101 staat: *Bi den here so was Muzike In hemelrike, Eer hi Adame tlijf in blies* (22-24). Zijn in deze betekenisreeks associaties met de muziek reeds aanwezig, duidelijker komt de verbondenheid tot uiting in het tweede Egidiuslied: *Musike ende alle melodien Minnestu met herten pure* (L100: 22-23). In **I** heeft het gezelschap in de burcht *ghespeelt Met vruechden ende met melodien* (996-997). Hoe dat in zijn werk gaat, heb ik beschreven in *SpL* 36 (329-333). In de preek van Jan Lyoen wordt de harp [Christus] getypeerd met *Snaren der melodyen vol* (221).

Op de *melancole* heeft de 'melodie' een genezende werking. In **II** zoekt de minnaar *eeniche melodye om te verdrivene melancole* (75-76). In **I** gaat dit echter verkeerd en wordt de minnaar *buten sinne* gebracht door Jaloezie, Twijfel en *Begriyp, Met sanghe, met spele en melodien* (1202-1225). Een passage die verklaart waarom *Melodie* bijgeschoold moet worden in de minneschool.

Met deze citaten is het gehele betekeniscomplex evenwel nog niet gedekt. Een afwijkende betekenis zien we in *Zo comt in mijn ghedacht Bi twivele eene melancole Ende destrueert mijn melodye* (**VIII**: 79-81). De mogelijkheid bestaat dat de dichter, lid van een ontwikkelde broederschap, met het woord diepere bedoelingen heeft gehad. Ik ben geneigd te vertalen met 'geestelijk evenwicht', een individueel aspect dat ook te vinden is in **XII** (57-58), waar de geest van de minnaar tegen de 'zoete dageraad' *melodye* vindt in de slaap. Bij de *heers[c]ap vul melodien* in **II** (33) is te denken aan de 'harmonie der sferen', een kosmisch aspect. We komen dan in de sfeer van de ethosleer van de antieke muziekbeschouwing, onder andere beschreven in Mulder (1983). Naast *deze musica mundana* en *humana* komt ook de *musica instrumentalis* in het convoluut naar voren als in het tweede Egidiuslied gesproken wordt over *Musike ende alle melodien* (L100: 22). Het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat de 'kring' door Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae* goed op de hoogte was van de theorieën over de 'harmonie', die samengevat werd in het beginsel van muzikale proporties. "Zij is samenklank, tegelyk echter een toestand van evenwicht, een vorm van orde en maat, en als zodanig de grondwet van het universum, zoals dat zich spiegelt in de mensenziel die haar onophoudelijk zoekt, zowel in als buiten zichzelf" (Mulder 1984, 8-9). Assunto beklemtoont in een paragraaf over "Theorie und Allegorik der Musik" (1982, 92-94), dat de *musica animalis* "Mäßigung und Harmonie der Sinne bedeutet". De muziekwetenschap berust volgens de opvattingen van Augustinus en Boethius op de verhoudingen tussen de getallen. De muziek weerspiegelt de harmonie van het door God - de grootste musicus - geschapene. Zie hierover verder onder de vrouwelijke personificaties *Mate* (de echtgenote van *Ghetempertheit*) en onder 'burcht' in de afdeling over de dingallegorik [4.5].

Opmerkelijk is dat in **II** de personificatie, evenals dat met *Const* en *Jolijt* het geval is, een negatieve laag vertegenwoordigt. Alle drie moeten zij bijgeschoold worden. Er is kennelijk sprake van een 'wankel evenwicht', dat door de onevenwichtige gedragwijze van de minnaar naar de verkeerde kant is doorgeslagen.

NAUWE-MERC: Ook gespeld als *Nau-maerc*, *Nau-meerc* of *Nauw-merc*. Deze figuur let nauwkeurig en gestreng op anderen en krijgt derhalve in **II** de rol van baljuw toebedeeld. Naam en functie passen uitstekend bij elkaar. De in dienst van Venus staande gerechtsdienaar brengt met zijn dienaren de minnaar tot grote wanhoop. Hij wijst Venus nadrukkelijk op het onstandvastige gedrag van de *ic*-figuur. Hij roept de vierschaar plechtig bijeen en is dan een soort openbare aanklager. Als gerechtsdienaar dient hij de door *Paisier* drie maal gevorderde vrede te ondersteunen. Zijn 'dienaar en magen' weigeren die echter. In de ontstane dubieuze situatie zegt hij niet te zullen vechten, maar wel de zijnen met raad en daad bij te staan (838-843). Hij voert zelfs het woord voor hen tijdens het proces. Eigenlijk is dit in strijd met de gebruikelijke gang van zaken, want meestal sluit de baljuw zich aan bij de klager, hoewel hij niet op eigen gezag mag dagvaarden. Hij kiest hier evenwel de zijde van *Jalositie* en *Twifel*, omdat deze hun handelingen hebben verricht om de minnaar aan te zetten tot een beter minnegedrag. Zij handelden dus in het belang van de klager. *Nau-Merc* vindt dat hij op zijn beurt handelde in het belang van Venus. Als zij het eens is met zijn standpunt, dreigt hij ontslag te nemen. Men zie over de 'vrede' verder onder *Paisier*.

ONTZEGH: *Ontsech* zegt de vrede op en verklaart de oorlog. In **I** is hij een medestander van *Vrau Hoede*, die de minnaar de toegang tot de burcht wil ontzeggen. *Bi-ziende als die qualic zach, Thooftso lusti* [schuddend scheef houden] *alden dach, also noch sceluwe lieden pleghen* (977-979). Een goede observatie van de auteur. Bepaalde slechtzienden houden het hoofd vaak schuin, omdat het gezichtsveld scherper wordt als men de objecten door de ooghoeken aanschouwt. Volgens middeleeuwse traditie wordt deze figuur negatief getekend. Hij is de minnaar niet welgezind. Het is niet toevallig dat hij in een groepje staat met *Jalousie*, *Overmoet* en *Roukeloos*. De functie van *Ontsech* komt tot uiting in het slotgedeelte, als hij de minnaar uit de burcht verwijderd: *Stappans cam mijn heer Ontsegh Ende ghegreep mi biden gheere* [slijp van de mantel] *Ende leede mi vor sinen heere, Die mi leleke bezach* (2140-2143). Merkwaardigerwijze vervult hij later geen actieve rol bij de definitieve uitzetting, die onder leiding van *Hoede* en vooral met hulp van *Dangier* geschiedt.

ORGHELIEUS: De 'meester' *groot van machte* (**I**: 737). Hij treedt niet sprekend op, maar geeft als meerdere van *Kila* wel toestemming de minnaar in de voorburcht binnen te laten. Het MNW vermeldt "van ofra. *orguillos, orguillous*" en geeft als betekenis "trots, hovaardig, laatdunkend" (**V**, 1969, ad 2). Delumeau (1983, 477) noemt daarnaast de eierzuchtige, de op de voorgrond tredende, maar ook de op "l' amour propre" gerichte. Vandaar waarschijnlijk zijn functie als hoofd van de bewaking. *Kila* zegt over *Orghelieus*: *overmoedich es sijn zin* (741). Opmerkelijk is dat hij in **II** in één adem genoemd wordt met *Overmoet* bij de groep te verbannen figuren. In **II** (752) komt het woord *orghelieus* ook voor als bijvoegelijk naamwoord om de ongunstig getekende, maar wel moedige en machtige figuren *Willemijn* en *Vry-begheeren* te typeren.

De karaktertrek komt als dingallegorie met de naam *Orguelz* voor in de *Roman de la Rose*. Hij is de eerste van de tweede groep van vijf zwarte pijlen van de *God van liefde*. Deze lelijke, minnaar-vijandige pijlen zijn "orguias, vilenie, honte, desesperance" en "noviaus pansers" [ontrouw] (Strubel 1992, 954-976). De naam *Orghelieus* komt niet voor in de twee Nederlandstalige *Rose*-teksten. Zou de Gruuthuse dichter een Franse versie gekend hebben en de eigenschap, die gesymboliseerd werd door een pijl, getransformeerd hebben tot een personificatie? Het is uiteraard ook mogelijk dat hij de pijl direct heeft opgevat als een personificatie, zoals Luria (1982, 131), mijns inziens ten onrechte, ook doet. Het

is in **I** uiteraard een eigenschap van de dame. Zij geeft uiteindelijk de toestemming de minnaar al of niet binnen te laten.

De eigenschap is blijkbaar een zeer negatieve in het minnegebeuren, want hij legt de minnaar veel belemmeringen in de weg. *Orghelieuse* kan niet eens bijgeschoold worden in Venus' school, want zij verbant hem met anderen *ute vrou Venus lande* (1674). Zoals zo vaak worden allerlei meespelende factoren in het minnegebeuren beoordeeld naar de maatstaven van de man. *Orghelieus* is een factor in **I** die buiten het innerlijk van de man speelt. De hovaardigheid in hem wordt in het Gr.Hs. gepersonifieerd door *Overmoet*.

OVERMOET: De zorgeloze, onnadenkende, hoogmoedige. Hij reageert plotseling en denkt niet aan hogere belangen. Ook één van de figuren die Venus in **II** uit haar gebied verwijderd en die het geluk van de minnaar in de weg staat. In **I** zegt de minnaar als hij op het punt staat uit de burcht gebracht te worden: *Die sijns selves gheluc verdult Met onbesceedichen* [buitensporige] *overmoede, Ic rade dat hem elc man hoede, Die int geluc van minnen zi* (2169-2169). *Overmoet* geeft de minnaar *twee oghen in onwerde* [kijkt de minnaar minachtend aan] (**I**: 1754). Hij vertoeft steeds in gezelschap van *Jaloestie, Dangier, Envie* en andere ongunstig getekende figuren. Hij wordt in de opsomming van de in de burchtzaal aanwezig mannelijke figuren twee maal genoemd, de tweede keer om hem te koppelen aan *vrou Envie* [de afgunstige], getuige de uitlating *Dat docht mi wezen een partie* (992). De minnaar maakt zich schuldig aan overmoed, ondanks het feit dat *vrou Verziene* hem op het hart gebonden had *Overmoets suldi u wachten. Al sidt rijc ende groot van machte* (**I**: 1662). Bij de tekening van het gezelschap in de volgende passage valt nog op: *Rouckeloos sat, maer Overmoet Dochte mi datter bachten stoet, Jalouzie die stont hem bi* (1714-1716). De overmoed leidt tot roekeloosheid; als dit via de *clappers* de geliefde ter ore komt, volgt de uitwijzing en gaan de jaloezie en de twijfel weer een belangrijke rol spelen.

PAISIER: In **II** de dienaar van advocaat *Redene*, die de minnaar verdedigt. Zijn naam is karakteristiek voor het streven van het stadsbestuur in de latere Middeleeuwen om de 'vrede' te bewerkstelligen om zo tot een verzoening te komen en een einde te maken aan de bloedige vetes. Van Caenegem (1954) besteedt in zijn boek veel aandacht aan dit aspect in het middeleeuwse stedelijke recht. De stedelijke gemeenschap moest solidair kunnen optreden tegen onrust stokende elementen en streefde naar een samenleving waarbinnen vrede en vriendschap heersten. Van Caenegem omschrijft het doel van de 'vrede' als volgt: "De treuga is de wapenstilstand tussen de strijdende partijen gesloten, die voorlopig de wraakdadens van de vrede schorst en gelegenheid moet bieden tot ongewapende, vreedzame onderhandelingen over de tot stand te brengen definitieve verzoening" (249). Het vredegeven is in de middeleeuwse stad een gewichtige zaak. Deze weigeren is een ernstig misdrijf, dat tot hoge boetes kan leiden (Van Caenegem 1954, 258-260). De familiale solidariteit met de mentaliteit 'allen voor één' bracht mee dat de wraakneming kon ontaarden in een terroristie die haar doel voorbijschoot. Er bestond geen evenredigheid tussen de wraak en het gewroken onrecht (234). Van 'vrede-geving' komt in **II** niet veel terecht. De familiebanden zijn zeer sterk. Zelfs de baljuw (die in het stadsrecht een 'vrede' kan eisen) is één van aanstichters tot onvrede en kiest de kant van zijn verwanten die de 'vrede' weigeren. Hij houdt zelfs een pleidooi voor hen. In het proces tussen de minnaar en *Twifel* c.s. – dat bijna geheel volgens de stadsrechtspraak verloopt – biedt *Paisier* de tegenpartij driemaal de 'vrede' aan. In de zo ontstane tussentijd moet men dan onderling een regeling treffen. Driemaal wordt het verzoek afgewezen, waarna het proces daadwerkelijk een aanvang neemt. Men lette op het getal drie, dat ook bijvoorbeeld bij de rechtspraak in

de *Revnaert* een belangrijke rol speelt. Overigens is drie in de Middeleeuwen in veel situaties een heel significant getal [4.8].M

ROU(C)KELOOS: De zorgeloze, die niet denkt aan hogere belangen. De figuur treedt veelvuldig op en bergt veel kwalijke eigenschappen in zich. Het MNW (VI: 1505) wijst erop dat de betekenis van het woord in de Zuid-Nederlandse dialecten negatiever is dan in de Noord-Nederlandse. De figuur wordt in **I** dan ook karakterologisch ongunstig en de minnaar vijandig gezind getekend. Hiermee hangt ook de tekening van de kleding samen. Hij ziet er onverzorgd uit (982-986). *Al verclontert was sijn haer, Sijn caproen was al verdrayt, Sijn cousen dochten mi ontnayt* [met losgegane stiksels], *Sinen kerel* [lange overkleed] *was al beslict, Als die sins selves niet en mict* [bekommert om]. Herhaaldelijk wordt in het convoluut gewezen op de noodzaak zich zorgvuldig en rein te kleden! De tekening van *Roukeloos* doet ons sterk denken aan de beschrijving van de boeren in L85: *Haer cleedren die zijn al ontnait. Een hoedekijn up haer hooft ghecapt, Tcaproen staet al verdrayt. Har cousen ende haer scoen ghelapt* (5-8). *Roukeloos* gedraagt zich in **I** plomp en onbeschaafd. De figuur staat in nauwe samenhang met *Overmoet*, zie aldaar.

Ghetemperthede in **II** moet *Roukeloos* in de minneschool onderwijzen. Ook buiten het minnegebeuren is de roekeloosheid een slechte eigenschap: *O glorieuse, almoghende God. Ic roukelos zondelic worm, glod* [smeerlap], *Scame mi...* (G2: 1-2). In **XV** staat de wijze les: *dickent den roukelozen verdriedt Dies de vorzienich wel gheniedt* (215-216).

TIWJFEL: *Twifel, stwifel, tswifel, twifel* enz. In de diverse spelling-, verbuigings- en vervoegingsvormen komt het woord (niet enkel als personificatie) 111 keer voor. Dit geeft een idee van de belangrijkheid van het begrip in het liefdesgebeuren. Het heeft een sterk pejoratieve gevoelswaarde, wat onder andere blijkt uit de combinatie met woorden als *pijn, slaghen, laste, gloede, vanghen, zwaert, swaer verdriet, ghepeins, dans, vier, vaer, quetsen, destrueirt, vruechden clein* en *ween*, om er maar enkele te noemen. We concentreren ons hier vooral op het begrip als personificatie: in het hoofdstuk over de melancholie ga ik verder op de term in.

In **II** staat de koppeling met *jalosie* centraal. De minnaar is zeer onzeker over de toegankelijkheid van de dame (mede door toedoen van de *clappers*). Tijdens zijn dolage wordt de twijfel tot vertwijfeling: *Maer alte gheerne* [spoedig] *so warics vroet Of Twifel es Jalosien man* (688-689). De minnaar ontdekt dat er sprake is van *Twifel ende sijn geslachte* (1802). De geestelijke ontreddeering brengt hem in de macht van *Twifels* clan. Naast *Jalosie* horen daartoe onder andere *Nau-Begrijp, Willemijn, Vrvbegheeren* en *Nau-Merc*. De daden waartoe de minnaar komt maken hem in de ogen van de geliefde onacceptabel en de minnaar klaagt zijn tegenstrevers aan. *Venus* geeft hem geen gelijk, omdat hij handelt uit eigen vrije wil. Hij krijgt nog een kans na de bijscholing. Aan het slot komt *Twifel* echter alweer om de hoek kijken.

Opmerkelijk is dat in **II** de antipode van de vertwijfeling *Hope* getekend wordt als een zeer zwakke figuur. Zij is *Venus' lande* heel erg verzwakt uit gevlucht, een symbolische uitdrukking voor: de minnaar heeft het vertrouwen in een gunstige afloop geheel verloren.

In **I** ligt de zaak echter geheel anders. Dé antipode van *Twifel* is een kordate *Hope*. Zij verlost de minnaar uit de kerker van *Twifel* en verschaft hem toegang tot de liefdesburcht. Na het passeren van de 'grenspaal' *Waerscu*, die het gebied waar de minnaar ronddoolde scheidt van het nauwe pad dat naar de geliefde voert, speelt *Twifel* geen rol meer. *Hope* neemt een belangrijke plaats in (tot de minnaar haar verwaarloost, omdat hij hoogmoedig meent dat zijn doel bereikt is). Als de geliefde hem uit de burcht verwijdert, komt hij weer

in de macht van de vertwijfeling Cryptisch uitgedrukt wordt de tegenstelling weergegeven in L36 met *Mijn hope es al een twifel sneven* [onzekere vertwijfeling], *Dus moet de vliecht aen wanckel staen* (10-11) Duidelijker is L10 met *Mijn hope es sonder twifel waen* (11)

De tegenstelling tussen hoop en twijfel is traditioneel Zo horen we in het Haagse Liedboek (Kossmann 1940) in lied 6 *Smt ich hoeffin irst becorde, So was zwivel mir berevt* Dit geschiedt eveneens in een tweegesprek in Berlijn 922 no 16 (Lang 1941, 9, r 508-520), waarin Twijfel vreest dat de minnaar uiteindelijk zal sterven, maar Hoop denkt dat 'trouw dienen' de verlossing kan brengen De tweede allegorie in het Gr Hs is op deze thematiek gebouwd

In de gesprekken met de kluzenaars (in II, XIV en XV) blijkt dat deze de vertwijfelende wanhoop met lede ogen aanzien De geestelijke en lichamelijke gevolgen van de ontstane *melancolie* zijn desastreus Bovendien is de *naturen staet Broosch ende cranc van eidscher minne* (XIV 609-610) Ik kom op de melancholie uitvoerig terug in het zevende hoofdstuk **WACHTERS** De wachters [de witte tanden] bewaken de burcht [dat wil zeggen de gedomificeerde dame] in hun smetteloze witte gewaden Zij doen dat op een zodanige wijze dat zelfs de *wijste vroede vergadert van al erdeijc* (580-581) hen niet kunnen verschalken *Si en mochten jeghen ghenen* [zij verdragen geen] *stanc, Noch tjeghen gheen onreunichede* (585-586) *Rieke-Lucht* vooral krijgt de taak de dame te behoeden voor de stank [naar middeleeuwse opvatting een bron van ziekten] Wij associeren de stank met de neus, waarom de verbinding met de tanden gelegd wordt, is mij niet duidelijk Zie verder onder *Camerlinghen*

5.4 Bespreking van enkele vrouwelijke personificaties

BESCEEDICHEIT Ze treedt als personificatie alleen in I op Zij is daar een van de gezelschapsdames van *Suverheit* en krijgt geen rol van betekenis Men kan haar zien als degene die met het oordeel des ondersheids, met redelijkheid, handelt Het begrip duikt een paar maal in het handschrift op In I *Vrou Hope nam den scaepen spiet Wiselike bi besceede* [op verstandige, inzichtelijke wijze] (665-666) Het is kennelijk niet enkel een typische eigenschap nodig in het minnecircuit *Vorzienne* geeft in de reeks gedragsvoorschriften die gelden voor het algemeen maatschappelijke verkeer en vermeldt daarbij *men moet spreken met besceedicheden* (1648) Zij houdt zichzelf hieraan ook getuige *Vorzienne sprac bi besceede* (1528)

In II ligt de toepassing wel meer in de minnesteer *Verteert besceedelijc uwen loon, Al dyncti u soete ende daertoe scoon, want wat men mint, spaert me[n] in eeren* (1834-1836) Het *mezura*-principe wordt besproken in 6 3 2, punt 8

CUUSSCHEIT, VROU In I komt zij éénmaal voor We moeten bij deze figuur niet denken aan 'reinheid van zeden', want deze rol is weggelegd voor *Suverheit* De term 'kuis' (in zedelijk opzicht) komt in het handschrift bijna niet voor, steeds wordt dan vooral gesproken van *reim* en slechts een enkele maal van *suver* We moeten bij deze personificatie vooral denken aan reinheid van uiterlijk, hygiene en goede lichamelijke verzorging

In het Gr Hs is een goede zorg voor de kleding van belang Ze vervult bovendien vaak een symbolische functie De plomphheid van de 'kerels' in L85 wordt onderstreept door hun slecht verzorgde uiterlijk De minnaar in I gaat zich zeer zorgvuldig *cleeden, cousen, scoijen* (55) *Roukeloos* personificeert het tegendeel met zijn onverzorgde kleding en uiter-

lijk Als de auteur dit in I (985-986) constateert wordt in de volgende zin direct *Vrou Cuuscheit* ten tonele gevoerd met de vermelding *Vrou Cuuscheit was daer in den rinc Een pluumkin niet an haer hinc so suverlic was haer abijt* De tegenstelling onderstreept zinnvol het onverzorgde uiterlijk van *Roukeloos*

DUECHT, VRAU Het woord *duecht* komt met diverse nevenvormen ongeveer 110 keer in het GrHs voor De eigenschap wordt toegekend aan Maria en de geliefde maar zij is uiteraard tevens wenselijk voor ieders geestelijk welzijn De mensheid moet *duechdelic werc doen naer Gods behaech* (VII 102), want *Ons boom so zeeere verdoi ret steit Van duechdeliker zalicheit* (IX 85-86) Helaas is de mens *van duechden naect* (G2 43) Natuurlijk is de geliefde *in duechden rijch* (onder andere L4 28 en L93 10) en *van allen duechden so volmaect* (II 553) Maria is *Moeder des weesen vul alie duecht* (XV 448) Zelfs Brugge, waarop de kluisenaar in XIII toch zoveel kritiek heeft looft hij als *de goede stede Die ic uut duechden blomkin nome* (8 9) Het begrip wordt hier al een *passe-partout* zoals in begroetings- en afscheidsformules *Hi die van al die waerheit weet Moet hu verlenen duecht ende vruecht* (I 362 363) en *Adieu Kila Hu duecht es mi altoos ghereet* (I 721-722) Als dankwoord voor een bewezen dienst *Dese duecht die lone hu God* (I 750)

Vrau Duecht is een van de raadvrouwen van Venus in II Haar naam *was wide vermaert* (393-401) Zij speelt een actieve rol en komt voor in de groep van *Juecht ter lichter side* van Venus, zij is *doutse* van de twaalf raadvrouwen die *emmer te paise* adviseert (1007-1010) Haar raad vervliegt in de wind want tot de vrede wordt niet besloten In de tweede adviesronde merkt zij op *so men wrct so sal men lonen* (1437) Dat is niet verwonderlijk, want slechts de deugdzame mens ontvangt het loon van Gods gratie (G1 128 130) en naar analogie natuurlijk ook de gunsten van de dame

In het slotlied van II verjaagt de deugdzaamheid van de vrouw *Begrijp [de niders en clappers]* (1920) Bij *Suverheit hadde al de duecht* (I 2116) kan men denken aan het op *gheneucht* gerichte gedrag van de minnaar, die alleen ten opzichte van *Suverheit* handelt volgens goede en edele beginselen, zodat haar eer bewaard blijft Voor nadere uitleg van het meer ethische aspect zie men onder *Suverheit*

EEREN, VRAU Eer is een sleutelbegrip in de middeleeuwse ethiek Kenmerkend is de opmerking van de broer in *Het lied van Heer Halewijn* *Is my aleens waer dat g3 gaet Als g3 uw eer maer wel bewaert En g3 uw kroon naer re3ten draegt* In veel minneallegorieen zijn *Vrouw Trouwe* en *Vrouw Ere* de belangrijkste figuren In ons gedicht ontvangt de minnaar uit handen van de burchtheer drie sleutels [die noodzakelijk zijn om toegang tot de vrouwe te krijgen] *Deen heet Trauwe dander Ere Die derde slotel hiet Antteien* (2016-2017) De eigenschap wordt in de tweede allegorie gepersonifieerd De naam van de geliefde [*Mergriete*] in VI telt negen letters de tweede 'E' betekent *Ere* In het twaalfde gedicht voeden zeven 'aderen' de bron [de vrouwe] een van die aderen waardoor de bron kracht ontvangt is *Eere*

Er bestaat een nauwe samenhang met het begrip trouw, bij de koppeling van de twee begrippen wordt de trouw meestal als eerste genoemd In II zien we bij de opsomming van de raadvrouwen van Venus (383-384) dezelfde koppeling Ook in XII komt het tweetal in de genoemde volgorde voor (612) Ook bij het gebruik als naamwoord zien we de verbinding vrij frequent Achtereenvolgens noem ik VI *Trauwe heift ende hadde ovt ommaer Sonder daer duecht ende eere an claf* (266), II *Haer eere bewaert in rechter trauen* (231) *Trouwe noch Eere en beeschdic niet* (2128) en L88 *Want ghi hebt vast be-eten Trauwe*

eere ende omoedicheit (10). In **XII** is *Eere, die gelijc der zee Vloeiende es in alre duecht*, een van de hoedsters van de bron [de dame].

In *De ghelassen sale* (De Bree 1992) is *Trouwe, boven ghestaen. Vore alle dander sagicse comen* (53-54). Direct naast haar in gouden kleed staat de met de eerbaarheid van de vrouw zo nauw verbonden *Vrouwe Ere* (61). In lied 55, 2^{de} afdeling van Hätzlerins *Liederbuch* (Haltaus 1840, r. 226-230) draagt *Frau Ere* in een minneproces onder leiding van Vrouwe Venus een geel kleed, en geel beduidt volgens lied 19 *mvn angedanck* [het steeds in gedachtenis houden] (Haltaus 1840, 165, r. 10). Geel en goud hebben in de kleuren-symboliek vaak dezelfde betekenis.

ENVIE: Het is weer een van de figuren die in **II** niet actief optreden, maar zij is voldoende bekend om zonder nadere toelichting uit Venus' land te worden verbannen. Het MNW (II, 672) noemt als ongunstige karaktereigenschap: het op twist, onenigheid en afgunst gericht zijn.

De gepersonifieerde afgunst treedt in de burcht (**I**) op in het gezelschap rond de *Buerchgrave*. Ze verkeert steeds in de nabijheid van *Hoede, Overmoet, Dangier en Jalouzie*. Als verklikster informeert zij *Hoede* wat er in de burcht plaatsvindt. Haar uiterlijk wordt als volgt getekend: *Envie die docht mi vrolic zelden. Haer anschijn stont recht omme scelden, Bleec, verrompelt, ende al verqueelt* [uitgeteerd] (992-995). Uiteraard is haar onaantrekkelijke voorkomen volgens de middeleeuwse traditie in overeenstemming met haar karakter. In de *Roman de la Rose* komt zij voor op de schildering die zich bevindt op de muur die de tuin van *Déduit* [de vrolijkheid] omringt. Zij is één van de eigenschappen die in de hoofse liefde ongewenst zijn. Ze maakt liefdesbanden stuk, verheugt zich in het ongeluk van anderen, en probeert met gemene lasterpraat ieders reputatie te vernietigen.

GESTADE, VRAU: *Ghestadicheit* is in **II** één van de raadvrouwen van Venus. Ze vertegenwoordigt een karaktereigenschap die nauw verwant is met 'trouw' en essentieel is in het liefdesgebeuren, maar ook in het dagelijks leven. In de eerste adviesronde wijst zij erop hoe kwalijk het is een afgesproken vrede te breken. Het woordveld rond *gestade* komt in het Gr.Hs. meer dan 100 keer voor. In de hoge minne is de trouwe, gestadige liefde belangeloos, maar in het Gr.Hs. komt het loon-naar-werken-motief nogal eens om de hoek kijken: *Jont mi recht loon na pijn Ende ic wil u ghestade zijn!* L22: 15-16) en *Toocht mi ghenaden, wijflic schijn Ende ic wil u ghestade bliven* (L30, 9-10). Een pikante vraag is hoe ver die 'genade' gaat. Nergens in het Gr.Hs. wordt die vraag opgehelderd, wel vinden we hier en daar aanwijzingen dat de minnaar zich niet altijd honderd procent 'netjes' gedraagt. Zie onder *Suverheit* en *Ghenadicheit*.

GHEDOOCHSAMICHEDE: Deze personificatie komt ook voor onder de naam *Ghedoochsamicheit* of *Ghedochzamicheit*. Zij verkeert in het gezelschap van de *Buerchgrave*. Ze speelt geen actieve rol. Het begrip 'gedogen' komt in **I** voor met de betekenis 'dulden' (426 en 1951). *Hoede* en haar volgelingen moeten *swighen ende ghedoghen* (2043) en tegen hun zin lijdzaam aanzien dat de minnaar zich overeenkomstig hun voorspellingen niet al te netjes gedraagt. Ook op een negental andere plaatsen in de gedichten en gebeden heeft het begrip de betekenis van 'lijdelijk ondergaan'.

GHENADICHEIT, VRAU: Eén van de raadvrouwen van *Vrau Venus*. Uiteraard pleit zij in de eerste adviesronde voor het sluiten van vrede, opdat een verzoening tot stand kan komen. In het gesprek over de beloning komt haar karakter eveneens tot uiting. Ook al is het liefdeswerk maar half geschied, zij vindt dat de minnaar voor zijn verrichte arbeid een passende beloning moet ontvangen.

Het begrip 'genade' speelt in de moralistische gedichten en de gebeden uiteraard een belangrijke rol met de betekenis 'goedgunstig gezind zijn'. Van Maria wordt gezegd *Ghy zyt ghenadich, Nem ziele ende lijf in dijn bestiet* (G4 75-76), *Minne grote ghenaden zonder ghetal* (G1 268) Van God *O Vader ghenadich* (G6 210)

Ook de geliefde moet vaak haar genade tonen, bijvoorbeeld in *Toocht mi ghenaden beilde zoet'* (L39 15), *Ik roupe ghenaden, beilde zoet'* (L131 30), *Ghenaden, lieve vrouwe mijn, Vor al der werelt uit vercoren* (L4 1-2) In L7 schenkt de vrouw de man genade *Ik wille dijs al ghenadich zijn, Du blijfs mijn eighin vri* (21-22)

De voor-wat-hoort-wat gedachte, die in het Gr Hs zo duidelijk naar voren komt in het loon-naar-werken-motief, horen we doorklinken in *Toocht mi ghenaden wijfluc scijn, Ende ic wil u ghestade bliven* (L30 10-11) Na langdurige kennismaking met het handschrift komt bij de lezer toch langzamerhand de vraag naar voren of alles wel zo puur hoofs is als het schijnt. De inspelingen in de tweede allegorie, de uitpattingen van de minnaar in I, de indringende vermaningen van de kluzenaars en wijze vrouwen, ze doen ons wel eens twifelen aan de eerbaarheid van het gemeenschapsleven van de specifieke doelgroep waarvoor het werk bestemd is. De hoofse liefde lijkt een tragische hartstocht en niet een veredelend sentiment. Maar duidelijke bewijzen zijn er niet. Janssens betoogt in zijn proefschrift dat in gesprekken over de liefde misschien sprake is van een dubbelzinnig woordgebruik, met een incongruentie tussen het bedoelde en het uitgedrukte. Er wordt gesproken op twee vlakken, waarbij men de bedoeling van de minnaar kan ignoreren. Er is dus geen sprake van het formuleren van duistere metaforen (1976, 553 v). Hij wijst onder andere op de conversatie tussen Pollidamas en Helene in het *Prieeel van Troje*, waarin de eerste de vrouw om 'genade' verzoekt, daarna bezwijmt om vervolgens, na een vermaning, van *mesdade* te spreken. Hij bekent *Ik minne u voer alle die leven* (395). Er is waarschijnlijk een incongruentie tussen het bedoelde en het uitgedrukte. "De liefdesbekentenis is dus een soort spreken op twee vlakken, waarbij de geliefde overigens steeds het bedoelde, de intentie van de minnaar, kan ignoreren. De verhulde, ambigue woorden bieden de aangesprokene namelijk een soort ontsnappingsmogelijkheid op het 'talig' vlak" (Janssens 1976, 58). De hoofse spreekwijze is voor de betrokkenen te begrijpen en bestaat voor hen niet uit het formuleren van duistere metaforen.

GHENUECHT, VRAU In L146 is zij de tegenhangster van *Twifel* die de *melancolve* in de minnaar teweegbracht. Men gaat in *vruuechden zwinne* [de heldere bron van de vreugde] zonder weifeling *vrouhjc maken zanc, met rechter vruuecht*. Het gevolg is dat het *nueien* dan *minne* gemaakt en *Twifele mat* gezet wordt. Het maken van plezier is één van de geëigende methodes om de melancholie te verdrijven. Reynaert (1999, 47-49) meent dat het in dit lied gaat om de typische zwaarmoedigheid van de melancholie "zonder duidelijke aanleiding", omdat een duidelijke minneachtergrond in de context niet wordt geïmpliceerd. Dit geschiedt inderdaad niet rechtstreeks, zoals zo vaak in het Gr Hs, maar de verwijzing naar *jongher jeucht* in regel 3 is wel betekenisvol en een indirecte aanwijzing dat het wel degelijk om de liefde gaat.

Het woord *ghenuecht* komt in diverse vormen wel 70 maal in het Gr Hs voor, zowel in positieve als negatieve zin en meestal in minneverband. Het wordt nogal eens in verband gebracht met de losbandige genoegens van de jeugd en heeft zo dikwijls een pejoratieve betekenissteer rond zich hangen. *Juecht* zegt in I *Wie zal verbieden mi minen ghenuecht* (1303). Wat daar precies onder verstaan moet worden laat zich raden. Als we letten op de

tegenstand die *Hoede* c.s. bieden beantwoorden haar opvattingen niet aan de traditioneel gangbare

Gedicht **IV**, dat over de jeugd handelt, geeft enkele aanwijzingen *Goet gheselschap, spel ende jolijt* (110), en bij trouwe liefde *Blyscap ende vrie vruucht multheit, weidicheit ende duecht meinderheit scamelheit* (171-173). Een duidelijk voorbeeld dat deze voorstelling van zaken wel eens te idealistisch kan zijn toont **I**, waar de minnaar (na alle hoopvolle verwachtingen van *Juecht*) wegens wangedrag uit de burcht verwijderd wordt. De louter op eigen lust en 'weelde' ingestelde *ic* becommentarieert zelf *In myn ghewelt wast altemale Vrouw Hopen haddic al vergeten Nieuwe of en wildic weten Dan te souckene mijn geneucht* (2112-2115). Hij heeft de uitspraak uit **IV** vergeten *dat Venus dienie nemmermeere van reinen dienste bedhoghen en werdt* (131-132). Het gevolg van die verwijdering is, dat de minnaar in een ommuurde tuin gevangen zit en hij *truerende ghinc hier ende daer* (2223). Hij vertoont een reeks ziekteverschijnselen, kenmerkend voor de melancholie. Deze wordt prachtig vertolkt in L146 *Melancolye hadde mi ontwuecht Des cam mi truerien inne* (13-14).

Een nadere toelichting met voorbeelden over *ghenuecht* geef ik in hoofdstuk 8 bij de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie in verband met het tekstgedeelte 835-848. De melancholische verschijnselen worden besproken in de uitleg bij de drie tekstgedeeltes die de regels 2209 tot 2317 omvatten en bovendien in hoofdstuk 7.

GOEDERTIER, VRAU In **I** doet deze edelmoedige, zachtaardige vrouw met *Hovescheit* een goed woordje bij haar man *Dangier*, ten gunste van de minnaar (1913-1914), en brengt samen met haar de drank *confoort* naar de minnaar (2023). *Goedertierheit* is een goede eigenschap van de vrouwe *Troost mir du best so goedertier, So mach ic vrolic leven* (L137 41-42). Ook van God wordt gezegd *goedertiere, o moghende vader* (G1 111). Van waarschijnlijk *Redene* getuigt de minnaar *So sat ic neder in dat groen Bider vrouwe goedertiere* (**XII** 362).

In de gedragsregels voor iedereen komt de eigenschap ook als wenselijk voor in **XIII** (227) en tevens in **VI** (216 en 221) *Si goedertiere ende daertoe zocht*. In **II** kent *Scoonghelaet* de minnaar de eigenschappen *hovesch en goedertiere* toe en verzoekt derhalve *Venus Gheeft vrede den minre desen dach* (1022-1023).

HOEDE, VRAU Soms ook *Hode* genoemd. Gepersonifieerd in **I** en **II**. Vergelijk ook de mannelijke *Hoede* in **XII**.

De woorden uit het woordveld 'hoeden' komen op veel plaatsen voor in het handschrift. *Hoede* speelt een van de hoofdrollen in de eerste allegorie. Ze wordt daar getekend als een stiekem oud vrouwtje, dat voorlopig het onderspit moet delven als het haar mislukt de minnaar buiten de burcht te houden. Haar kleding en uiterlijk zijn in overeenstemming met de afwijzende, dus verwerpelijke rol die ze ten opzichte van de vertellende *ic* speelt. Haar uiterlijk voorkomen wordt in **II** niet nader aangeduid. Ze is een van Venus' *conghunnen* (380) en haar dracht zal daar met haar rang in overeenstemming zijn.

De rol van *Hoede* loopt parallel met die van *Dangier* [Gevaar] in de *Roman de la Rose* (2811, 14820 v.), die de rozenknoppen moet beschermen. Evenals *Hoede* ligt *Gevaar* min of meer verborgen op de loer om te zien of iets de rozen zal kunnen schaden en hij springt op het juiste moment te voorschijn om zijn beschermende taak op zich te nemen. Evenzo is in **I** *Hoede* de bewaakster van de maagdelijkheid van *Suverheit*. Uiteraard komt zij er bij de *ic*-minnaar-auteur niet zo best af. Geen wonder, een vriendin van een op avontuur zijnde minnaar, die als *ic* zijn belevenissen vertelt, kan ze niet zijn. Zij houdt niet van *Avonture*.

(1898) en noemt zijn activiteiten *toverie* (1981) Bij het zingen van de liederen raakt ze *uten kere* (1232) en spreekt van *plondering* [onbeduidende kleine zaken] (1079) die inhoudelijk *scalkermien* (1933) bevatten Bijgestaan door een aantal gelijkgezinden raakt ze in gevecht met de in haar ogen lichtzinnige partij van Melancholie Jeugd Lust c s Er wordt *ghescolden ende ghevloect Hoede die was daer ghehouct* [in een hoek gedrongen] *Wat si vochten en help hem niet* (1064-1067) *Si moesten swighen ende Hoede die was al verscroven* [verkeerde in een ellendige toestand] *Ende lach daer up tpavement* [plaveisel] *Van den slaghen ende steken blent* (975-977) Hoede trekt zich terug maar eerst voegt ze *Suverheit* nog toe *Verwaert U Mijn wachten es hu voort ontzeit Met gheen oghe can ic ghezien'* (1987-1989) Helaas reageert haar beschermeling niet

Ook in II waar ze optreedt als een van de raadvrouwen van Venus wordt ze niet sympathiek getekend Ze heeft *een felle vu* [blik] en spreekt met *eenre scaerpen tale* Eigenschappen die ook de baljuw *Nau merc* kenmerken Beiden dienen ze hun omgeving nauwkeurig gade te slaan Ze staat ter linker zijde van Venus in de nabijheid van *Juecht* die blijkbaar – ook hier – haar speciale aandacht krijgt Ze doet resolute voorstellen in de geest van 'erop los, geen vrede, schep klaarheid zachte heelmeeesters maken stinkende wonden' en staat in haar mening diametraal tegenover *Juecht* Uiteraard zijn beiden geen vriendinnen van elkaar

In I is ze op verschillende plaatsen aan het observeren op de wenteltrap (1072) weggedrukt in de zaal *an den weech als dongheloofde* [aan de wand als iemand waarvan men geen notitie neemt] (1264-1265) Verder op onbestemde plaatsen *ende emmer ghinc Viau Hoede naer Ende bezach wat menre bedreef* (1332-1333) Als haar iets ontgaan is bewijst de verklikster *Enve* wel haar waarde

In I ontketent ze een groot gevecht tussen de voorstanders en de tegenstanders van de 'nieuwe orde' Haar agressieve instelling blijkt overigens ook in II waar haar standpunt er weer niet om ligt *Beter es een oorloghe rike Dan pais en aermoede ewelike* (979-980)¹ Eenzelfde onverzoenlijk standpunt vertolkt ze in I *Wat bater hier omme veel ghekijft Ic worder eer omme ontlijft Dan dat hi* [de minnaar] *hier binnen bleve* (1935-1937)

Het blindheidsmotief in I waarin *Hoede* blind geslagen wordt, waardoor de toegang tot de vrouw open komt te liggen, vinden we ook bij Jan Praet (Bormans 1872 r 3112) Hier is het *Scamelhede* [zij die voor hooft, rein gedrag moet zorgen] die *es so blent dat soe lettelt vement kent*

Rond de *Buerchgrave* zijn diverse gordels opgetrokken die de vrouw moeten be hoeden de kwieke jongelingen (zintuigen) buiten de burcht *Verstene* en de haren in de poortwoning, de vier humoren en de *camerlinghen* (opnieuw de vijf zintuigen maar nu binnen de burcht) De minnaar doorbreekt alle barrières Aanvankelijk ruimt hij ook *Hoede* (de laatste) uit de weg maar de minnaar gedraagt zich zo slecht, dat *Hoede* iedereen kan overtuigen dat de minnaar niet deugt

HOPE Zij is in alle hoofse minnepoezie een sleutelfiguur die de minnaar de kracht geeft het minneavontuur aan te gaan Zij is de tegenhangster van de *twifel* die opkomt als de mens over de genegeheid en de trouw van de geliefde in het onzekere verkeert

In de eerste allegorie is zij steun en toeverlaat van de minnaar Zij verlost hem uit de kerker van *Twifel* en door haar toedoen komt hij in de burcht Hij wordt haar ontrouw door zijn overmoed *Tpalais cameren vouten* [gewelven] *ende zale In mijn ghewelt wast alte-male Vrouw Hopen haddic al vergeten* (2111-2113) Als hij verbannen is en de *wieke Ghe*

stadicheit verloren heeft (2230), verzucht hij: *Vrou Hope die was mi ontgaen, Twifel hiltse mi ghevaen. Allene was ic int verdriet* (2387-2389).

In **II** is *Hope* één van de getuigen. Zij verklaart dat de minnaar verliefd werd en getroffen door een ijzeren pijl [van *de moortboghe van Begrijp*, de dienaar van *Twifel*] zo'n kabaal maakte, dat zij op de vlucht geslagen is. Als de pijlen [uit de ogen van de vrouwe] in **I** de verliefde jongeling treffen en hij bezwijmt, toont *Hope* zich heel wat daadkrachtiger. Zij ondersteunt en vermaant hem 'een kerel te zijn'. De minnaar heeft zich herhaaldelijk verheugd over haar uitgelaten: *Ne ware Vrau Hope, ic souder om sterven* (**II**: 570-571), als *Hope verdroocht*, wil hij sterven (242-244). In tegenstelling met de *Hope* in **I** die de minnaar steunt, vlucht de *Hope* in **II**. Misschien is de oorzaak de andere herkomst van de pijlen, tegen de laster van *Begrijp* is ze niet opgewassen. Het kan ook zijn dat er een andere situationele behoefte is, voortkomend uit de handeling. Door haar aftocht verliest de minnaar het laatste sprankje hoop en is er een gereede aanleiding voor het proces.

In het slotlied van **II**, dat de titel van lied 140 zou kunnen dragen *Vlye, Twifel, vlie!*, klinkt het: *Vrau Hope die doet mi leven sachte* (1906). Het lijkt of de verhaalde gebeurtenissen met een vertwijfelde, jaloerse en wanhopige minnaar zich zo weer zullen kunnen herhalen. *Twifel* kijkt weer om de hoek. De lessen in de minneschool hebben kennelijk niet veel bijgedragen om te leren zich beheerst te gedragen.

De rol die *Hope* in het liefdesgebeuren speelt, vinden we herhaaldelijk terug in de liederen. In L139 wordt *Hope* geregeld aangesproken: *Vrau Hope, ic bem mire rosen quijt*. Zij wordt om hulp gevraagd in de strijd tegen de vertwijfeling: *ic bem, vrouwe goede, Bescout* [verschroeid] *van tswifels gloede* (59-60). Andere voorbeelden die haar rol vertolken: *hope es sonder twifel waen* (L10: 11), *Hope es al een twifel sneven* [onzeker weifelen] (L36: 10), *Hope nu hebt mijns leven danc* (L96: 29), *Hope dats mijn hoochste aenvanc* [schat] (L135: 52), *Hope dats een vroylic cleit. Dat willic draghen al mijn jaer* (L91: 29-30).

HOVESSCHEIT: *Hovesscheit* is de eerste die de *ic* in de eerste allegorie aanschouwt, als hij door de spleet in de toegangsdeur van de burcht kijkt. Zij is één van de hofdames van *Suverheit*: *Van finen goude was haer cleit. Haer te pointe wel gheleit* [mooi opgemaakt], *Haer anschijn was eens inghels haer* [rein als van een engel] (787-790). In **II** is zij de raadvrouwe van *Venus*: *dat was een van die scoonste creature Die leift in alder werelt breit* (785-786).

Het feit dat deze, in een gouden kleed gehulde, allegorische figuur met het uiterlijk van een engel, in **I** als eerste genoemd wordt, toont aan hoe belangrijk het hoofse gedrag is. De minnaar had daar al een proeve van ondervonden toen zijn eerste 'introductie'-lied werd afgekeurd, omdat hij *Hope* in haar bijzijn prijst: *En es gheen hovesscheit daer ment doe, Wat goet es prijst sijns selves waerde* (1382-1383). Wat dit zich hoofs gedragen precies inhoudt, wordt in het Gr.Hs. nergens gedetailleerd toegelicht.

In Berlin Mgf 922 (Lang 1941) komt de term drie maal voor, in 28: 870 en 29: 888 wordt gesproken van een *hoibesch/hoesbesch gebaer* dat de geliefde kan maken, in 25: 771 hoopt de dichter op de *hovelijchen troest* van de vrouwe. Veel wijzer maakt ook dit ons niet. In het Haagse Liedboek (Kossmann 1940) komen in 4B een aantal vereisten voor hoofs gedrag voor. *Her Erentrijch* noemt: *zwigen stille*, niet doen wat de *doget is onbequeme*, weldoen in naam van de vrouwe, vriendelijk lachend en mild de problemen oplossen. Opmerkelijk is dat in de liederen van het Gr.Hs. *hovesch* en de aanverwante vormen weinig voorkomen. In L53: 3 is de 'reine vrouwe' *hovesch ende vroet*; in de nieuwaarswens van L75 is er sprake van een *hovesch minnerlijn* (1). Ook in de gedichten komt de term weinig voor. In **I** noemt

de *ic Hope een hovessche vrouwe vroet* (469). Bij het rijtje goede eigenschappen van de minnaar vermeldt *Verziene: Hi es alre eeren waert, hovesch so es hi ende vroet* (I: 1545-1546) en verder roemt ze hem als zijnde *hovesch, scone, wijs van rade* (1858) en *ghestade ende hovesch van zeden* (1919). In 1881 staat dat de minnaar *Uut duechden ende uut hovescheden* in de burcht gekomen is. In II spreekt de minnaar de heremiet zo *hoofschelijc als ic mochte* (64) aan. *Scoon-gelaet* vindt dat de minnaar *vrede up desen dach verdient, want hi es hovesch ende goedertiere* (1022-1023). *Twifel* argumenteert om vertrouwenwekkend over te komen *hoofschelijc* (1153), maar de dichter doorziet dit: het is een *geveinsder sprake*. In VI is de raadgevende vrouwe *edel ende van hoofscher aert* (45), net als in V: *Ik weet der hoofscher vrouwe danc* (178).

De term slaat blijkbaar zowel op het dagelijkse sociale gedrag (men denke ook aan de voorschriften die *Verziene* geeft (I: 1629-1671)), als op een specifiek op de minne gerichte houding. Men kan de term plaatsen in samenhang met een beschaafde levensstijl op ieder gebied, die zich afzet tegen dorpers gedrag. Opmerkelijk is dat het begrip vaak gebruikt wordt in samenhang met *vroet* en *scoon van rade*.

In het zesde hoofdstuk komt het begrip 'hoofsheid' uitgebreid ter sprake.

JALOSIE/ JALOUZIE/ JALOSY/ JALOZIE: Een vrouwenfiguur die zowel in I als in II een zeer actieve rol speelt. De ijverzucht ontstaat door het geroddel van *Begrijp* en de *niders*. Zij heeft het fatale *ghepeins* tot gevolg. Het uiteindelijke resultaat is een melancholische toestand die de verliefde in een verlamdende greep houdt. Het proces wordt getekend in de tweede allegorie. *Ghetempertheit* en *mate* zijn als remedie noodzakelijk, waarbij de *Rede* een belangrijke rol speelt. In de hoofdstukken over de 'normen en waarden' (6) en melancholie (7) behandel ik deze problematiek uitvoeriger.

JUECHT/ JUEGHET: In II is zij één van de koninginnen van Venus. In I vergezelt *die edel jonchere Lust* haar meestal (I: 824). Ze is de maakster van het minnelied dat de bewoners van de burcht in grote beroering brengt. In principe weet Jeugd niet veel van de minne af, ze heeft echter wel zo haar verlangens waarvan de burchtgemeenschap vermoedt dat zij in het lied tot uiting komen. Jeugd kent de minne slechts van *Hier daer segghen, achter voren*. In *vraechde nou om el bediet* (I: 873-874). De medebewoners van de burcht kunnen het lied niet goed verklaren, maar denken er toch kennelijk het hunne van. Tot duidelijke uitspraken komt het van hun kant evenwel niet. Ook de 'studie' die *Melancolie* c.s. aan het lied wijden geeft geen verheldering. Jeugd zelf verklaart tot tweemaal toe het lied niet goed te begrijpen. De burchtheer twijfelt echter aan haar oprechte bedoelingen (1308), maar de zintuiglijke personificaties – die uiteraard door hun waarnemingsvermogen goed op de hoogte zijn – verdedigen haar onschuld (1312-1325). De seksuele geneigdheid van de jeugd die 'zot en blind' is, ziet de dichter van IV als een onvermijdelijk biologisch gegeven, dat min of meer autonoom verloopt, dus buiten de wil van de mens om. Op latere leeftijd komt men pas tot bezinning.

In het Gr.Hs. krijgen we op verschillende plaatsen een indruk van de betekenisnuances rond het begrip 'jeugd' door de veelvuldigheid van de teksten waarin het woord voorkomt. De koppeling met *ghenuecht* zien we in: *Ik danc u jonstelijc, vrouw Ghenuecht, Met herten ende met zinne, Dat ghij mi liet in jeucht Ghebruken uwer minne* (L146, 1-4). Een sterk verband tussen minne, jeugd en gebrek aan verstandig overleg zien we in IV: *Niemen die redene wil verstaen. Ende als de tijt voort es ghegaen Dat juecht haer jonge lusticghe cracht Heift versleten ...* (209-212).

Het niet vatbaar willen zijn voor redelijkheid blijkt ook duidelijk uit uitspraken van *Juecht zelf*: *Wie sal verbieden mi mune ghenuecht?* (I: 1303). Gebiedend klinkt het in IV: *Nature ne doe de redene wiken, want Nature faelgiert* (144-145). Er wordt geconstateerd dat de jeugd wel aan de wereld moet cleven, maar men verwacht dat God de mens spaart *die jongelic leeft, toot redene vois int capitel heift* (161-163). Het gevaar dat de vrouw loopt zien we in L54, waarin verhaald wordt dat een jonge vrouw een kind verwacht. De vrijer is blijkbaar gevlogen. Het meisje in L5 gebruikt haar verstand. Pas na de plechtige verzekeringen van de ridder geeft zij aan zijn seksuele verlangens toe, waarna een goed huwelijk volgt. *Juecht is in IV de zotte blende [die] Tware ne kent, no noit en kende* (159-160). *Ze is broosch ende cranc* (92). In de jeugd is *der minnen gloet, Die tvier sproocte inden lustichen moet* (217-218). Tenslotte tempert de minnegloed en kiest men *de uppersten, diet al heift in hant ende loon gheift... in eewicher glorien heersepie* (248-251).

Bij de behoudende krachten als *Hoede* en *Envie* heeft *Juecht* uiteraard een slechte naam: *Juecht, Die altoos om beroerte poocht... Dan [dat en] sal niet langher sijn ghedoocht* (I: 1083-1084).

De minnaar in I constateert *wilt doe was doe in haar gelaat* (877). *Juicht doe mi als dochten So wilt, so leesstuk ende so clous* (892-893). Haar luchthartigheid na een ernstig gesprek, waarin ze bekent het door haar geschreven gedicht ook zelf niet te begrijpen, wordt onderstreept door de verzen *Joncfrau Juecht van danen sciet Ende liep spelen in de zale* (I: 874-875). Haar onbezorgdheid is groot. Bijna voortdurend zingend loopt ze in I door de burcht. Haar worden trouwens nog een paar 'slechte' eigenschappen toegekend: *Licht so waer si en rebel* (I: 1451). Het MNW geeft bij *licht* "lichtzinnig, waarop geen staat te maken is" (IV, 464, ad 4). Ook de rebelseheid is geen goede eigenschap, want L43 vermeldt nadrukkelijk van de uitverkoren 'schone': *So nes no wreet no stuer no fel, Maer wivelic ghefigureirt* [Heeroma: minzaam van gelaatsuitdrukking], *Ghestadich, minlic, niet rebel* (5-7). Het MNW (VI: 1073) verklaart *rebel* met "eigenzinnig, moeilijk aan orde en tucht te wennen". Prachtig tekent de auteur het karakter van Jeugd in I, ogenschijnlijk bedeesd verzekert zij de burchtgraaf dat het lied spontaan in haar opgekomen is en dat zij als het 'onwaardig' is, spijt heeft en het lied meteen zal verscheuren. Als zij echter de zaal verlaat, zegt zij in zichzelf dat als het lied afgekeurd wordt, zij direct een nieuw lied zal maken waarvan de noten niet gekraakt kunnen worden (1287-1303). De burchtgraaf voelt nattigheid en vraagt zich af of Jeugd zich niet anders voordoet dan zij zegt te zijn (1304-1309). Sommige raadsheren ontkennen zijn gedachte: haar *lusticheit* is wel groot, maar liegen doet zij niet. Wel gaat bij haar wat gezegd wordt het ene oor in en het andere uit (1310-1318). Een van hen onderstreept haar onschuld (1325). Jeugd is koppig, want ondanks de gerezen bezwaren zingt zij haar lied nog in r. 1423.

Er zit kennelijk een addertje onder het gras. Het lijkt erop dat Jeugd – een aspect van de verliefde vrouw – toch iets geleerd heeft van de vele morele lessen die zij in haar omgeving gehoord heeft. In haar lied wijst ze er nadrukkelijk op dat de liefde rein, edel en eervol moet zijn. Dan pas zal ze van begin tot eind voedsel tot geluk brengen. Ze zegt nadrukkelijk dat dit haar mening is. Het lijkt erop dat de burchtgemeenschap perplex staat en dit van een zo jeugdige niet begrijpen kan. Het vervolg van het verhaal leert dat zij zich aan haar woorden houdt. De minnaar wordt uiteindelijk afgewezen.

Het lied van jeugd blijkt een discussiepunt te zijn. De opvattingen van Reynaert en Willaert staan vermeld aan het slot van het derde hoofdstuk. In het kort komt mijn tegenstelde visie op het volgende neer: Het lied van Jeugd is geen betekenisloze schlager, maar

vormt een essentieel onderdeel van de intrige van de allegorie. Het bijzondere kader waarin het lied in het handschrift geplaatst is (p. 251) bevestigt dit. Jeugd formuleert de verwachtingen van de jonge vrouw in een liefdesverhouding. Zij stelt gelijk een aantal eisen. Het belang van het lied blijkt uit de grote aandacht voor de inhoud die het lied op verschillende momenten krijgt en die honderden verzen in beslag neemt. Dit zou niet kunnen als het zo weinig betekenis heeft. Er wordt een spel rond het lied gespeeld door het 'niet begrijpen'. Men begrijpt de inhoud best, maar men neemt een groot voorbehoud in acht. Blijkbaar staat men voor een deel achter de inhoud, maar vreest men de discussies met *Hoede*, die tot dan een dominerende rol heeft gespeeld en handel en wandel in de burcht bepaalde. Een vrees die terecht is, gezien het gevecht dat later uitbreekt. *Hoede* spreekt van *niefuwe] costume*, die niet te dulden zijn.

Later blijkt ook de Burchtheer aarzelingen te hebben. De oprechtheid van Jeugd wordt zelfs betwijfeld. Zij kan immers uit zijn op vluchtige pleziertjes, maar de raadsheeren verdedigen haar in dit opzicht en onderstrepen haar oprechtheid. Men moet bedenken dat Jeugd een aspect van de vrouw zelf is. Zij twijfelt dus of ze de amant zal aanvaarden.

Het eerste lied van de minnaar wordt door *Verziene* afgekeurd. Er wordt alleen over *Hope* gesproken, eigenlijk geheel ongepast, nu de vrouw die haar vurige blikken door het venster heeft geworpen, haar gedachten heeft geformuleerd en de minnaar daar geen enkel respons op geeft. Hij is in hoofdzaak bezig met zichzelf.

Het tweede lied beaamt in grote lijnen de gedachten van de vrouw en wordt goedgekeurd. Het stuk draagt een sterk didactisch karakter. Algemeen maatschappelijke eisen worden geformuleerd door *Verziene*, maar ook de liefdesmoraal komt aan de orde. De minnaar voldoet, gezien zijn gedrag, niet aan de eisen, de 'reine' minne verzaakt hij door zijn leven in 'weelde' en hij wordt tenslotte afgewezen.

Hoewel Jeugd al meerdere gedichten geschreven heeft, laat zij zich er nergens op voorstaan een groot dichteres te zijn. De aanbieder beroept zich wel op zijn dichtelijke kwaliteiten, die vooral in de vormgeving tot uiting komen. Bij Jeugd en *Hoede* gaat het in de eerste plaats om het inhoudelijke aspect. De dichter stelt de poetische eisen hoog, maar verwaarloost de liefdesethiek. Bij de dame ligt de zaak omgekeerd.

Jeugd betoogt dat ze niet weet wat ze geschreven heeft en dat ze het gedicht wel wil terugnemen. Kennelijk wil ze al te fel geredetwist vermijden. Bij het verlaten van de burchtzaal, echter, na het verhoor door de burchtgraaf, beweert ze (voor zichzelf) venijnig dat ze nog wel hardere noten wil kraken. Gezien de weerstanden die er zijn, verwoordt door *Hoede*, past ze er voor zich al te veel bloot te geven.

De mening van Heeroma dat 'minnen' 'zingen' is [en omgekeerd] onderbouwde hij met weinig overtuigende argumenten. De strekking van het gedicht is mijns inziens juist aan te geven dat minnen meer is dan zingen'. De minnaar beseft dit niet en mislukt schromeloos.

Ook in de *Roman de la Rose* komt een figuur voor die op Jeugd lijkt, namelijk Joinece/Jeunece, een van de vrouwelijke baronnen van de God der Liefde (1258 v.). Ze is erg jong, blij, vrolijk en vol jolijt, wil altijd spelen en is zonder schaamte. Ze kust in het openbaar uitbundig haar niet met name genoemde danspartner, die haar stevig beet heeft.

In het tweede gedicht behoort *Juecht* tot de kring advies gevende raadvrouwen. In de twee adviesrondes komen geen specifieke eigenschappen van haar duidelijk naar voren. Haar resolute en wat ongeduldige karakter komt misschien tot uiting als ze wenst dat het verloop der dingen bespoedigd mag worden: *est gheluc est ongheval* (102). Wijsgerig klinkt haar uitspraak *Tleide comt vrouch thieve spade* (103). Ze is zich dit waarschijnlijk

ook bewust als ze haar lied schrijft. De rangschikking en de keuze van de dames rond Venus lijken me niet geheel willekeurig. *Juecht* zit aan de linkerkant, omringd door *Hoede*, *Scoon-ghelaet*, *Vreese*, *Ontsien* en *Duecht*, een groep die wel zinvol bij elkaar schijnt te horen. Aan de rechterzijde van de liefdesgodin zitten de meer algemene en vanuit de minne-ethiek gezien misschien wel 'hogere' deugden bij elkaar. Opmerkelijk is dat ook in gedicht **I** *Juecht* de speciale aandacht heeft van *Hoede*.

Aan het slot van **II** geeft de leermeester *Ghetemperhede* nog een voor de jeugdigen behartenswaardig advies: *Joncman moedich [overmoedig], vul der juecht, Die u der minnen niet wachten muecht, Gheeft uwe nature bi wiser hoede Onder tbedwanc van mijnre roede (1772-1775).*

De geraadpleegde vrouw [waarschijnlijk *Redene*] in het zesde gedicht spreekt over de *bloume* die de aanbidder zo in beslag neemt, dat hij verzucht *nacht ende dach, spade ende vroe, Es haer coluer geplant in mien*. Zij doet een dringend beroep op de jongeling zich niet aan jeugdige onbezonnenheid over te geven. Dat brengt ongeluk en nog erger: *Vruecht in duechden, doestuut niet, metten keytven Saltu gherekent sijn hier naer!* (135-138). *Zonde brinct alle droufheit ende jaecht vrihede in scalkernien* (127).

MATE: *Mate* treedt in de tweede allegorie in Venus' minneschool op als echtgenoot van de leermeester *Ghetemperhede*. Slaat de laatstgenoemde eigenschap vooral op de tempering der hartstochten, de zelfbeheersing; de eerste heeft een uitgebreidere betekenis. In de middeleeuwse ethiek wordt bij de hoofddeugden naast de wijsheid, de dapperheid en de gerechtigheid steeds de noodzaak van het maat houden genoemd. Maat houden zowel op lichamelijk als geestelijk gebied. Thomas van Aquino concludeert in zijn *De Regimine principum*: "Zij die teveel genomen of gegeven hebben, bederven hun gezondheid; zij die de juiste maat gehouden hebben, vinden het heil" (Schipperges 1990, 135).

Het woord *mate* komt in het Gr.Hs. 22 maal voor. In L60 moet de geliefde de minnaar niet 'haten', tenzij hij *buten maten* is gegaan (28). In 6.2. en 6.3.2. ad 7 gaan we nog nader op deze term in.

Mate is belangrijk in een stadsgemeenschap met nauwe intermenselijke relaties op allerlei gebied. Men moet harmonisch met anderen samenleven en eigen emotionaliteit, primaire onbezonnen reacties en heftige, onstuimige gevoelens de baas blijven (*zie onder Paisier*).

Ook in de architecturale beeldspraak speelt het begrip een rol: de burchten in **I** (de dames die de minnaar niet zijn door de meesters *verchiert* [uitgedacht] met *mate* [in de juiste verhoudingen] (498-499). De burcht waar de handeling om draait [de geliefde vrouw] is *Sonder smette, zuver, reine, Daer die juuste mate alleine So meesterlic wast toe ghebracht* [tot stand gebracht]. *Zie over de achterliggende gedachte de uiteenzetting bij 'burcht' onder de rubriek dingmetaforiek [4.10].*

Op de rol van de muziek om innerlijk tot de *juuste mate* te komen, ga ik in het hoofdstuk over de melancholie nader in. Ook het begrip *melody*, door een mannelijke personificatie gesymboliseerd, hoort in deze samenhang thuis. In *Der minnen loep* (Leendertz 1845-1846) heet het: *Minne sal sijn te maten heet, te maten cout* (boek I: 1865).

ONTFAERMICHEIT: Als personificatie komt ze alleen in **I** voor. Ze spreekt *Hoede* aan en wijst erop dat de minnaar vanuit de burcht beschoten is en zonder *Vorziene's* hulp niet geheel genezen kan worden (1925-1929). Verder wordt alleen haar aanwezigheid vermeld.

Het begrip *ontfermigheit* komt in het handschrift vele malen voor, vooral in de gebeden gericht tot God en Maria. Zij moeten zich over de mens ontfermen. De term wordt ove-

rigens nergens in verband gebracht met de minne ook niet door een verzoek aan de dame om zich over de minnaar te ontfermen

REDENE, VRAU Een zeer belangrijke personificatie in het handschrift In **I** vervult zij een bijrol in het burcht-*geselschap* In **V** is zij de raadvrouw bij allerlei liefdesperikelen *Soe sceen wel sijnde van machte rike Want costlic waren haer ghewaden* (68-69) Ook in **XII** treedt zij op na het gebed van de verliefde om hulp, al wordt haar naam niet genoemd De kern van haar advies luidt houd op met klagen en *Versteict Twivel ooc wat hu gebreict Ende leift up Hope* (347-350) In **II** zou men haar verwachten als een van de raadvrouwen van Venus maar de *taelman Redene* draagt haar naam al Haar rol wordt overgenomen door *Wijs van rade*

Het belang van haar rol beschrijft gedicht 7 in het Haagse Liedboek waar ze een *edel voghedinne* genoemd wordt Jan Praet voert haar op als *Sapientia*, de *wilde Vrouwe* die een volledige serie voorschriften geeft Zij stemmen overeen met die van *Vrou Redene* in het Gr Hs (Bormans 1872 120 r 3100-3125)

Het is de *Rede* die de mens maat doet houden en op het goede pad houdt

SCOON-GHELAET In **I** blijft haar actieve rol beperkt tot het met anderen aanspreken van *Hoede* en het haar instemming betuigen met het gesprokene Ook brengt ze samen met anderen het vat met de drank *confoort* De minnaar drinkt eruit bij de toelating tot de burcht In **II** is ze een van de raadvrouwen, uiteraard geschaard aan de zijde van *Juecht* Ook zij adviseert Venus twee maal steeds als laatste van de twaalf vrouwen Zou dit een aanwijzing kunnen zijn dat zij niet zo belangrijk is? Zij valt *Vrau Duecht* bij in het verzoek de minnaar 'vrede te geven', maar in de tweede adviesronde staat ze afwijzender tegenover de aanbieder hij krijgt geen loon voor het werk [de minnedienst], tenzij dit volledig afgerond is

SIMPELHEDE Een van de drie raadvrouwen van *Suverheit* Met *Hovesscheit* knielen *Simpelhede* en *Omoedichede* voor *Suverheit* *Simpel* als eigenschap wordt behalve in L13 L34 L119 en L124 ook aangeprezen in de gedichten bijvoorbeeld *Terde es in elken zeere ghepresen Dat es een zedich simpel wesen dat ziet elc gheime* (**XV** 101-103) De betekenis van het woord fluctueert nogal Het MNW geeft 'eenvoudig oprecht, onschuldig, betrouwbaar, zachtaardig" (**VII** 1123-1124)

SUVERHEIT Gezien de aard van de toenaderingspogingen van de minnaar is *Suverheit* met de *Buchgiave* een sleutelfiguur in de eerste allegorie De rolverdeling tussen beide personificaties heb ik besproken in het gedeelte over de Burchtgraaf Als personificatie komt *Suverheit* enkel voor in **I** merkwaardig genoeg niet in **II** bij de raadvrouwen van Venus Waarschijnlijk past *Suverheit* niet zo goed in het gezelschap van de liefdesgodin We hadden haar anders wel als beschermende factor kunnen verwachten in de groep die min of meer om Jeugd gegroepeerd is

In de *Roman de la Rose* is *Chastee/Chastae* de personificatie die de rozen moet beschermen *qui dame doit estre Et des roses et des botons Ere asaillie des glotons Si qu ele avoit mestier d'aie* (Strubel 1992 r 2844-2847) Venus (die de zinnelijke liefde verbeeldt) drijft de kuisheid in het nauw Gelukkig staan *Rede*, *Schaamte*, *Afgunst* en *Vrees* haar dan bij

Suverheit is in **I** de personificatie wier uiterlijk voorkomen de meeste aandacht krijgt De beschrijving van haar uiterlijk en haar verblijfplaats acht ik uitermate belangrijk voor de interpretatie van deze allegorie In de verzen 797-808 staat

Suver wit was haer parure [tooi]

Al bezait met rozen root,
 Sonder voren an haren scoot
 Wat daer an stont, willic hu nomen.
 Een maniere [soort] van goubloemen.
 Haer anschijn clarer dan cristael
 Een crone [krans] hilt zoe... vor haer anschijn,
 die zoe besach so minnentlic...
 recht offer haer ghenouchte ansonde
 in enen gouden stoel doe zat

In deze descriptie komen opvallende elementen voor die ik achtereenvolgens kort zal bespreken: de aanduidingen wit en 'zuiver', de kleding bezaaid met rode rozen en die op de plaats van haar schoot goudsbloemen toont, het gelaat helderder dan kristal, de kroon die zij vóór haar gezicht houdt en de gouden stoel waarop zij zit. Uitvoeriger komt de symboliek van deze verschillende deelaspecten ter sprake in de afzonderlijke paragrafen die nader op de symboliek ingaan. Aan het slot wijd ik een opmerking aan haar verblijfplaats.

Wit [4.9] is haar kleed, het is de kleur van het heldere licht, vanouds van de kuisheid, de zedelijke reinheid en zuiverheid. Wit wordt vaak in verband gebracht met de lelie. Een bloem waarmee ook Maria vaak vergeleken wordt.

Het begrip 'zuiver' wordt zonder allegorisering in het Gr.Hs. vele malen in de gebeden gebruikt met betrekking tot de maagdelijkheid van Maria en haar onbevleete ontvangenis. Een bloemlezing: *Puer ende suvre als te voren* (G5: 85); *Maecht vor de baersinghe, zuver, claer, Maecht in de baersinghe, ende maecht daer naer* (XI: 9); *dijn omoediche zuver lijf* L97: 23; *in drome een zuver maecht, hebbende een kint up haren scoot* (in II: 30; G7: 18; XI: 670; G4: 2; L101: 37; en L101: 6-9). In de liederen wordt de reinheid van de aanbedene en van Maria met de synoniemen *rein* en *suver* zo'n 150 keer vermeld! Zeer duidelijk komt deze betekenis naar voren in L54, waar een meisje haar nood klaagt over het feit dat ze zwanger is geraakt. De vriendin antwoordt: *Ghespele, ic wil u claghen. Waer es dijn zuver ommeleit?* (39-40).

Het aspect van de maagdelijkheid is duidelijk, maar de overige symboliek behoeft meer toelichting en tevens wat bewijspplaatsen uit ander werk. De symbolische tekening van *Suverheit*'s verschijning toont veel overeenkomsten met een fragment uit het werk van Jan Praet (Reynaert 1983, 8, r. 129-137). Ik citeer dit fragment, omdat de symboliek daarin enigszins toegelicht wordt. Dit kan ons tot steun zijn bij de interpretatie van de plaats en die zo-even genoemd zijn.

bi dezen blommen mach men merken
 .v. punten van vulmaecter dueght
 in exempelen ende in ghewerken,
 commende, vrouwe, uut uwer jueght:
 an die corsoude goedertiere,
 omoedichede ande acoleyte
 ande goudblomme ghetrauwichede,
 ende zuverhede ande lelye vrye,
 ende ande roze goede minne.

Het grotendeels met rozen (symbool van de goede minne) 'bezaaide' zuiver witte liefdeskleed van *Suverheit* toont op de plaats van haar schoot *een maniere* [soort] *van goud-*

blomen. Deze symboliek is door Heeroma en Ern  in hun artikelen, die ik noemde in het derde hoofdstuk, volledig over het hoofd gezien. De kleding [4.10] heeft vaak een symbolische betekenis die afhankelijk is van de kleur, de aard van de stof en de aangebrachte versieringen.

De roos is aanvankelijk in de Middeleeuwen de paradijsbloem. Daarnaast zijn er associaties met gemartelde heiligen. Later echter wordt zij het symbool van Maria, ten slotte ook van de maagdelijke vrouwe in de hoofse minnepo zie. Het plukken van de roos heeft betrekking op de coitus. Veel toelichting behoeft dit punt niet. Het voorkomen van de roos in het convoluut wordt onder de symboliek van de flora besproken [4.3].

De in de Middeleeuwen hoog gewaardeerde goudsbloem [4.3] is het symbool van de trouw, niet enkel bij de hierboven aangehaalde Jan Praet, maar ook bij andere auteurs. De goudgele *goudsblommen* op de plaats van *Suverheits* schoot, wijzen mijns inziens naar het feit dat deze schoot alleen beschikbaar is voor degene die 'trouw' en niet 'dorpelijk' is. Alleen zo'n persoon mag de roos plukken en het hoogste geluk smaken.

Het gelaat van *Suverheit* is helderder dan kristal. In de christelijke symboliek is het kristal een materie die niet zelf licht geeft, maar het licht van de zon stralend weerkaatst. Het is een symbool voor Maria. Door de doorschijnendheid vertegenwoordigt zij de "onlichamelijkheid in het lichamelijke" (Biedermann 1991, 205). Zoals zo vaak in het Gr.Hs. past de dichter de gangbare Maria-symboliek ook toe op de geliefde vrouwe.

Opmerkelijk is verder dat *Suverheit* geen *crone*  p het hoofd heeft, maar die v or haar *anschein* houdt, *dat meerctic wael* [!] *die zoe besach so minnentlyc, als soe plach offer haer ghenouchte ansonde*. De gebruikte bewoordingen doen sterk vermoeden dat hier geen sprake is van een gewone kroon, zoals men zou kunnen denken, maar dat net als bij *hoet* en *krans* aan een liefdessymbool gedacht moet worden. Vandaar het *minnentlyc* aanschouwen. Het MNW (III: 2129-2130) wijst onder andere op de kroon/krans als symbool van de maagdelijke reinheid, vandaar ook de voorstelling dat bruid en bruidegom *ene crone dragen*. Degene die een *crone* ontvangt is de uitverkorene en wordt getooid met het zinbeeld van de overwinning. Sittig (1987, 86: 221, 224) ziet in de "krenzelin-Metaphorik" een sterk erotisch verlangen naar lichamelijke liefdesvereniging. Wackernagel (1872, 222) beschouwt "das Laubgr n [in zo'n krans] als Liebessinnbild". Als schrille tegenstelling zij vermeldt dat een 'gevallen' meisje een krans van stro krijgt te dragen. Voor meer toelichting zie 4.10.

Als laatste punt valt op dat *Suverheit* in een *gouden stoel* zit. Dit bewijst hoe belangrijk de rol is die zij vervult en hoe beduidend de eigenschappen zijn die zij vertegenwoordigt. We zijn *gouden* al een paar maal tegengekomen. Goud [4.6] straalt een morele waarde uit van volmaaktheid, het zonnemetaal wordt geassocieerd met de zuivere liefde.

De innerlijke krachten in *Suverheit* doen haar naar liefde verlangen. We zagen het ook al gesymboliseerd in de rozen, verwerkt in haar kled. Als we het nog niet begrepen hebben, de dichter zegt het onomwonden: *Suverheit, die vrouwe jolijcs, Die sat in haar majesteit* (902-903). Het MNW moge dan wel voor *jolijcs* "vrolijk, opgewekt" geven (III: 1057 ad. 1), maar beter en zinvoller in deze context lijkt me "vatbaar voor liefde" (ad. 2). Lied 34 gebruikt niet voor niets in een reeks lofprijzingen over de geliefde, met bewoordingen als *onbesmit, edel, reine, trouwe* en dergelijke het woord *amoreus*.

Het is opmerkelijk dat *Suverheit* uitsluitend in de *benedenzaal* van de burch [het lichaam van de dame] vertoeft, de plaats van het geslachtsdeel. Zij begeeft zich nooit naar de hoger gelegen vertrekken, waar het gezelschapsleven in hoofdzaak plaatsvindt en waar de

Burchgrave [het hart] resideert. Deze verplaatst zich overigens ook nooit en verblijft steeds in de burchtzaal in de bovenverdieping. Geslachtsdeel en hart bezetten vaste plaatsen in de burcht. De overige figuren verplaatsen zich vrijelijk. Opmerkelijk is de plaats die *Hoede* inneemt. Zij bevindt zich vaak op de wenteltrap die beneden- en bovenzaal scheidt en verbindt.

Het geheel overziende kom ik tot de conclusie dat – zoals zo vaak bij de Gruuthuse personificaties – het gedrag van *Suverheit* (de maagdelijkheid symboliserend, één van de gewenste eigenschappen van de beminde) niet volledig consistent is. Er zijn signalen die niet enkel naar de kant van de seksuele kuisheid wijzen. De specifiek aan *Suverheit* gerichte raad van de blind geslagen *Hoede* klinkt zeer nadrukkelijk: *Verwaert u... Mijn wachten es hu voort ontzett, Met gheen oghe can ic ghezien* (1987-1989). Het is opmerkelijk dat zij de waarschuwing van de verslagen *Hoede* volkomen negeert, getuige de opmerking *Suverheit en slouchs gheen gade* (1993). Een houding die misschien kan duiden op een niet geheel ongenegen zijn tot een geslachtelijke vereniging, mits de omstandigheden volkomen eerbaar en *ghestedich* zijn. Pas als de beginvoorwaarden vervuld zijn, gaat het slot van Jeugds lied in vervulling *Int ende en es geen onghenuecht* (842).

Ondanks *Suverheit*'s nonchalance bij de waarschuwing van *Hoede*, zal onze minnaar niet slagen in zijn avances. De verliefde jongeling gaat overigens niet tot het uiterste in zijn toenaderingspogingen. Niettegenstaande zijn uitlating *Trouwe noch Eere en beeschdic* [heb ik in acht genomen] (2128) en het feit dat *de tampons Trouwe ende Eere wech waren* (2139), verzekert hij dat *Suverheit* ongeschonden is (2116).

TRAUWE: De trouw is een zeer gewaardeerde eigenschap. Zij is niet alleen raadvrouw van Venus (in II). Haar functie is via de dingmetaforiek mooi omschreven in VI: *De zeghel die God den meinsche gaf Van zynre werden, dat es zyn trouwe* (267-268). In XII is de naam *der fonteynen vrouwe... gheheeten Trauwe*, zeven 'aders' voeden deze trouw en houden de vrouw rein. Het zijn *Troost ende Toeverlaet, Eenicheit, Omoet, Vriheit, Vriendelicheit ende Wijsheit* [de twee huwen dobbel tsamen] en *Eere*. De tweede allegorie vangt aan met *Trauwe, die werkere es in minnen, Doet dat ic dichtens wille beghinnen Haer theeren* (1-3). In veel minneallegorieën zijn *Vrouw Trouwe* en *Vrouw Ere* de belangrijkste figuren. In gedicht I ontvangt de minnaar uit handen van de burchtheer drie sleutels, die toegang tot de vrouw geven: *Deen heet Trauwe, dander Ere, Die derde slotel hiet Antieren* (2016-2017).

VENUS: Uiteraard in een handschrift met minnepoëzie een belangrijk allegorisch persoon, haar *name es wide vermaart* (II: 293) en zij resideert als een machtige koningin in haar kasteel. Zij is het symbool van de wereldomvattende onontkoombare invloed van de liefde. Ze geeft een geconcretiseerde verklaring van het psychische proces bij het ontstaan van een liefdesverhouding. Schnell (1985, 193-194) haalt Ludwig Wolff aan die wijst op het fundamentele onderscheid tussen de moderne psychologische verklaring van de liefde en die van de middeleeuwse dichters, die de geweldige macht van de liefde in mythische beelden probeerden vast te leggen. De inkapseling van het hart door de liefde zagen ze als de inwerking van een hogere, buitenmenselijke macht die in het beeld van een godheid werd vastgelegd, die een wonderbaarlijke kracht bezit die de macht van de mensen en het menselijk begrip te boven gaat. "All das, was an der Liebe als Besonderes, wie eine 'neue Offenbarung' erfahren wurde: die Plötzlichkeit, die Unbegreiflichkeit, die Widersinnigkeit vom Standpunkt menschlicher Vernunft, die Allgewalt, die Auslösung des Eigenwillens, die Erschütterung und Umformung bis ins Körperliche. Kurzum die Irrationalität, die man so

stark empfand konnte überhaupt nur im mythischen Bilde zureichenden Ausdruck finden. Man was zutiefst davon durchdrungen, dass es in rationaler Weise nicht zu fassen ware, und nur darum griff man so begierig nach den mythischen Bildern, die die Antike darbot: von Venus, Amor und Cupido. De magische, onontkoombare, snel tot stand komende macht die Venus uitoeft, wordt weerspiegeld in de attributen die ze draagt en die de dichter ook figuurlijk gebruikt om de toekomstige minnaar tot minneslaaf te maken.

De tekening van haar uiterlijk vinden we in **II** waar zij zitting houdt en oordeelt over de dienstvaardigheid van de minnaar, namelijk of die zo groot geweest is dat hij het minneloos mag ontvangen: *tabijt van boven toten beneden Was goud ende steenen dat si adde an Al wildict prisen ic en can So rikelijc wast ende so dor scone Up haer hoofd adde soe een crone Beset met meneghen dieren steene* (504-509). Verder zegt de ic van haar: *zij sach met enen oghe soe hult enen boghe met iij stralen [pijlen] scaep van sneden* (**II** 501-503). Zij is niet erg spraakzaam (1080, 1135 v.), *lettel spiekens dat es haer zede* (1348).

Zij is onpartijdig en objectief in *recht te doene ende wet* (421), wat samenhangt met haar intermediaire functie. In een rechtsformule ontleend aan het burgerlijk stedelijk recht stelt zij *dan salic na mijn gelieven Vonnesse sonder tmeeste gieven Rechtelike wisen an elke zide* (1647-1649). Zij is barmhartig. Hoewel de minnaar zijn aerbeit onvolkomen verricht heeft, veroordeelt zij hem niet: *Ze geeft hem de kans zich te laten bijscholen om zich te beteren want hi bi onnoselheden Comen es in onvreden Want al mach de getrauwe dolen Wanneer hi mi te dienen kiese In wille niet dathi hem verliese* (1711-1718).

Haar trouw komt in **IV** ter sprake: *Want Venus dienre nemmermeere Van reinen dienste bedroghen en werdt* (130-131). De dichter in **V** dankt haar voor haar *soete cracht* (1) hoewel de verliefden door haar *in rauwen leven* en hun dagen doorbrengen met *peinsene ende met droefheden* (44-47). Hierbij sluit aan *So wie in Venus ordin leit Ghevanghen Hem mach wel na sijn vrolicheit Verlanghen* (L92-8-11). In het volgende lied horen we dan toch weer: *Venus danc hebbe dijn zuerste cracht* (L93-13). Haar *scolieren die dienen der meestericghen [meesteres] blint* (**X** 112-113).

Venus is tijdens het gericht in **II** omringd door twaalf *joncfrouwen*. De *conighinnen* (380) en *vrouwen van haven state* (429) aan haar rechterzijde zijn *Trauwe Eere Vorvriechheit Ghenadicheit Gestade* en *Wijs van Rade Hoede Vreeve Ontsien Juecht Duecht* en *Scoon-ghelaet* aan de andere kant (onder andere 382-401). Een groot aantal van hen treedt ook in **I** op. Verder heeft zij in haar dienst onder andere *Jaloste* (844-845) die werkt *Bi der cracht die mi Venus ghegheven heeft Twifel U dienre als ghetrauwe subgijt* [onderdaan die aan Venus rechtsmacht is onderworpen] (857-858). Verder *Naumeric die baelvu Als also fel hadde hi de vu [blik]* (815-816) hij dient de minnaars nauwlettend te observeren. Hij is zich zijn waardigheid bewust, want hij dreigt zelfs – als zijn neef *Twifel* veroordeeld zou worden – het dienstverband met Venus op te zeggen (1238-12410). De rechtvaardigheid van Venus wordt wel vaker verlangd zoals wanneer de praatjes verkopende knoeisters in *Venus land* ter sprake komen: *Wanneer zals Venus nemen wike Dat men haer weerck dus corruppeit [vervalst]?* (L147-5 en 22-23).

De gebruikelijke symboliek bij de uitbeelding van Venus is in **II** gedeeltelijk aanwezig. Zij is aan een oog blind, want bij de liefde is de objectieve verstandelijke controle vaak geheel afwezig. Bovendien wordt ongeacht de stand ieder door de liefde getroffen. De boog met drie pijlen dient de toekomstige minnaar te verwonden. In het Gr.H's geschiedt dat meestal via de twee ogen en het hart. Traditioneel zijn er vijf pijlen, die dienen om de vijf


zintuigen te treffen. Dikwijls bezit Venus ook een fakkel. Hoewel deze in het Gr.Hs. ontbreekt, wordt wel veel aandacht besteed aan de brand die het minnevuur ontsteekt. Venus draagt op haar hoofd *een crone, Beset met menighen dieren steene* (II: 508-509). De kroon waarvan Biedermann (1991, 206-207) zegt dat zij het hoofd van de drager schijnbaar verlengt en hem boven zijn medemens verheft. Stralende edelstenen, ook in de kleding, verhogen het effect en de uitdrukingskracht. Hun uitstraling doet denken aan de zon, reden waarom kronen bovendien vaak vervaardigd zijn van het zonnemetaal goud. De kroon en diamanten van Venus symboliseren de grote macht, de vreugde en de roem van de liefde. Het goud van de kleding straalt een morele waarde uit van volmaaktheid. Door de veelheid van symboliek wordt Venus gelegitimeerd als een bovenmenselijk intermediair wezen, dat betrekkingen onderhoudt met de hogere wereld [5.2].

VERZIENE, VRAU: *Vorsienicheit* of *Vrau Vorziene* is in I de echtgenote van Kila, de portier. Zij verzorgt de 'wonden' van de minnaar en zorgt uiteindelijk dat hij de burcht kan betreden door voor hem in te staan. Bovendien geeft zij hem uitvoerige instructies hoe hij zich gedragen moet. In het tweede gedicht is zij een van de raadvrouwen van Venus, nu *Vorsienicheit* geheten. De eindconclusie van haar betoog luidt: *Hi es vroet die weerct na wisen rade* (935), een duidelijke verwijzing naar haar adviezen in I, waar de minnaar zich tot zijn schade niet aan deze regel houdt.

Het MNW (IX, 1081-1083) vermeldt onder *voresienicheit* onder andere "vooruitziendheid, doorzicht, scherpzinnigheid, verstand". Verder "bedachtzaamheid, behoedzaamheid; het nemen van voorzorgsmaatregelen waarin men iets voorziet, vooruitziende zorg; vooruit beraamd plan, opzet". Deze betekenissen zijn alle min of meer op Kila's vrouw van toepassing. Zij zal vooruit moeten kunnen schouwen om te zien of de door haar man toegelaten personen geen onheil in de burcht zullen veroorzaken.

In *Dat bouck der bloemen* (Schoutens 1904, 39) vernemen we: *Ende sorghe is vorzienich te wesen ende doen dat goet ende betamelijck is ende in laten dat ongheorloeft ende quaet is, wat rade ghedaen wort, plecht gherne een goet eynde te hebben. Vorzienicheit* wordt omschreven als een onderdeel van de wijsheid met *gedenckenis ende memorie, verstandenisse*. De drie staan weer gefundeerd op *raet ende op sorghe*.

VROESCAP: De *coninghinne* met deze naam komt enkel voor in **XII**. De vijf zintuigen staan in haar dienst. De *vroescap* speelt in het leven en ook in het minnegebeuren een belangrijke rol. *Mate hout den eersten graet, wijsheit den anderen*, zegt Potter in zijn *Minnen Loep* (II: 2087). *Hoede* beroept zich op haar *vroescap* op minnegebied als zij de *Buerghgrave* advies geeft (I: 1174-1176). Ook van de *houde* van de fontein in **XII** wordt gezegd dat hij *vroede* is (550). *Ghetemperthede* raadt de minnaar aan altijd *bi vroede rade* te werken (II: 1643). De combinatie van *vroet* met *raet* komt in de Middeleeuwen veel voor, bijvoorbeeld in de *Reynaert*. In **XIII** constateert de aanbieder van het geschenk dat Brugge door *vroescap* en *vriheit* in hoge eer staat (207-211). Het begrip *vroet* verschijnt 65 keer in het Gr.Hs., in diverse woordvormen.



136^o **H**elen es in theere minn
 A n hopen stiet mijn troost allene
 I e ben ontgaen des twifels pijn
 D es mi min troeghen cleme

136^s **G**hevont heift mi een wistlic seijn
 D en wondt en heddic me ghetre
 I n mach mer wondre hope syn

Helen es in theere minn d e

Ie wart mi leger ouer min
 D an in twifels wene
 137^o I n hopen stelic mi eighen
 A lcos in vrouwen rene

Helen es mit hie minn d e

Het eerste introductielied van de minnaar

NORMEN EN WAARDEN IN HET GRUUTHUSE HANDSCHRIFT

6.0 Inleiding

Een opvallend aspect in de Gruuthuse-teksten is de grote rol die normen en waarden spelen. Het normenpatroon is opmerkelijk, omdat daarin drie gebieden - het religieuze, het adellijke en het stedelijke of algemeen pragmatische - niet alleen naast elkaar, maar ook vaak door elkaar heen voorkomen. Raadgevingen aan een minnaar bijvoorbeeld kunnen van maatschappelijke aard zijn zonder dat de liefde zelf een opvallende rol speelt.

Dit hoofdstuk is aan de moraliserende aspecten gewijd. Het opent met een korte historische terugblik. Dan worden achtereenvolgens de kerkelijke, adellijke (met grote nadruk op het hofse) en stedelijke normen besproken. In de afronding wordt op de vermenging ingegaan.

6.1 Historische terugblik

Aan het eind van de elfde eeuw begon een groot beschavingsoffensief van "Sozialdisziplinierung und Konfessionalisierung" (Prinz 1992). Een drietal factoren speelde daarbij een belangrijke rol.

In de eerste plaats waren de clerici zeer actief om het grote ideaal van een christelijke cultuur te realiseren. Grote leraren, die putten uit de schatkamer van de bijbel en de tradities van de oude kerk, formuleerden normen en waarden. Zij putten daarbij ook uit de antieke beschaving, die vooral na de Ottoonse periode (ca. 950-1050) een *revival* beleefde (Janssens 2000, 143). Een in omvang zeer beperkte stand van clerici kon de idealen enigszins verwezenlijken, maar voor het dagelijks praktische handelen van de leken waren ze door hun strenge eisen moeilijk te realiseren. Toch zijn er vele geestelijken geweest, opgeleid in de ethiek van hun leermeesters, die door hun eigen leefwijze en prediking het 'gewone' volk trachtten in de juiste leer op te voeden. Zij maakten daarbij onder andere gebruik van legenden, waarin exempla stichtelijke voorbeelden geven van een beter zedelijk leven. De erin voorkomende heiligen waren prototypen van volmaakt deugd/zame mensen. Dit 'offensief' van onder andere de bedelmonniken, duurde tot in de late Middeleeuwen en de vroeg-moderne tijd. Het volk moest tot plichtsgetrouwe, goed onderrichte en gehoorzame gelovigen omgevormd worden. Een institutioneel initiatief van bovenaf (Mulder-Bakker 1997, 5-6).

In de tweede plaats vonden er in de ridderlijke wereld belangrijke ontwikkelingen plaats. De kruistochten brachten belangrijke nieuwe beschavingsimpulsen. Daarnaast noodzaakten nieuwe sociale en feodale veranderingen de krijgers van weleer zich om te vormen tot ridders met bestuurlijke verplichtingen. Een nauw contact met de hoven was daarvoor noodzakelijk. De bundel opstellen *Curialitas* (Fleckenstein 1990) geeft van deze ontwikkelingen een zeer gedetailleerd beeld. De riton rond de verheffing tot ridder spiegelen de idealen van deze stand en hoewel zij niet altijd werden nagekomen, droegen zij toch een

sterk normatief karakter die het ethische bewustzijn van de ridders deed toenemen. Orth (1990, 167-168) beschouwt de ceremonieën rond de verheffing tot ridder zelfs als een sleutel tot het beter begrijpen van de sociale, gerechtelijke en politieke ontwikkelingen. Hoewel de ridderidealen beperkt bleven tot een kleine aristocratische klasse, hadden de daaruit voortvloeiende mentaliteitsveranderingen een langdurige en brede nawerking. De hoofse ridderromans speelden een belangrijke rol in de vorming van de adel tot geciviliseerde deelnemers aan de gemeenschap.

Ook adellijke dames speelden reeds in de twaalfde eeuw een rol bij deze veranderingen. De ontwikkeling begon aan de vorstenhoven en zette zich later ook voort bij de lage adel. De kruistochten speelden een belangrijke rol. De vrouw kreeg – naast de leidende rol in de huishouding die zij al had – door de afwezigheid van de man tevens een belangrijke taak in het behartigen van politieke en economische belangen. Die verplichting nam later weer in betekenis af, maar haar voornamelijkste functie bij de regeling van de hofhuishouding bleef bestaan. Bij de grote feesten aan de hoven stonden de vrouwen in het middelpunt en drukten een stempel op de beschaafde gedragsvormen. Bij de toernooien droegen zij bij tot fair en dapper gedrag. In het cultuurleven waren ze de aandachtige toehoorders. Dichterlijke en muzikale manifestaties vonden vrijwel altijd in aanwezigheid van de vrouwen plaats. De vrouw werd mede de grondlegster van een nieuwe cultuur die een welgemanierd gedrag vereiste. Er ontstonden ideeën over een veredeld ridderschap, de eminente dame en de voortreffelijke ridder. Het waren idealen die soms ver van de realiteit afstonden. Ze werkten desondanks nog eeuwen door op de beschavingsnormen. De tegenstelling tot de 'dorper' met zijn plompe, boerse gedrag, werd sterk beklemtoond²⁶.

Parallel met de in de vorige paragraaf geschetste ontwikkeling zien we als derde fenomeen de voorstelling van de 'hoofse liefde' ontstaan. Een ideaalbeeld van de liefde, waarvan een grote beschavende invloed uitging. De hoofse liefdesconceptie heeft een lange voorgeschiedenis, beginnend bij Augustinus, het neo-platonisme en de mystiek. Zij zet zich voort tot in de late Middeleeuwen. De troubadourslyriek, de hoofse ridderromans en later onder andere de minneredes spelen een grote rol bij de heel langzaam optredende mentaliteitsverandering. Er bestaat op verschillende punten een tegenstelling tussen de innerlijke normen die de hoofse liefde eist en de gedragscodes die in de adellijke gemeenschap in zwang waren.

Het is moeilijk te omschrijven wat men precies onder deze 'hoofse liefde' moet verstaan. Er zijn vele definiëringen die allerlei facetten beklemtonen. De verschillende opvattingen over het wezen van de 'hoofse liefde' lopen in allerlei geschriften door elkaar, nu eens wordt het ene aspect beklemtoond, dan weer een ander, maar een alomvattende omschrijving is er niet. Schnell (1990) probeert wat orde te brengen door een aantal fundamentele kenmerken te beschrijven. We zullen zijn typering als uitgangspunt nemen om zo een aantal facetten te onderzoeken die in het Gr.Hs. naar voren komen.

Algemeen maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen versterkten de drie summier geschetste beschavingsimpulsen, die uitgingen van de clerus, de adellijke samenleving en de hoofse literaire kunst. Jöckel en Wunderli noemen in dit verband de intensivering van de handel, de

26 Een interessante beschouwing over deze ontwikkelingsgang vindt men in Rosener (1990) en verder ook in Janssens (2000) die tevens een literatuuroppgave geeft voor verdere studie

opkomst van de steden met handelslui en handwerkslieden, de opkomst van het geldverkeer, de toenemende bevolking de betere agrarische technieken en een grotere mobiliteit

De opkomst van de steden waarin grote groepen mensen op een beperkte oppervlakte samenwoonden en allerlei economische activiteiten bedreven, bracht noodzakelijkerwijs een nieuwe regelgeving met zich mee. Er kwam een grote nadruk te liggen op orde en gezag. Van Caenegem (1954 en 1956) beschrijft hoe dit van grote invloed was op het strafrecht en het strafprocesrecht in Vlaanderen. Uiteraard speelde dit alles een belangrijke rol in de gemêleerde Brugse samenleving van rond 1400. De behoefte aan regelgeving die daarvan het gevolg was, is ook duidelijk te bespeuren in het Gr Hs.

6.2 De kerkelijke normen

Het standpunt van de geestelijkheid komt in het Gr Hs zeer duidelijk naar voren. De invloed van de kerk is uitermate groot in de Brugse stadsgemeenschap, met zijn vele kloosters en kerken. Er zullen ongetwijfeld uitvoerige discussies hebben plaatsgevonden tussen de meest ontwikkelde patriciers, stadsadel en geestelijkheid in de diverse 'genootschappen' die op gezette tijden bij elkaar kwamen. In verschillende Gruuthuse-gedichten komen de kerkelijke standpunten uitgebreid naar voren in de gesprekken die de *ic* voert met kluzenaars en oude mannen. Ik heb het werk waarin deze gedachten naar voren komen samengevat onder de godsdienstig-ethisch getinte groep gedichten in 2.4.3.2.

Ik werk in het nu volgende allerlei kerkelijke opvattingen niet uit, maar beperk me tot de aanrakingspunten met de 'minne'. De dichters in het Gr Hs bespreken deze vooral in verband met de levenswijze van de jeugd. Het is opmerkelijk dat geen uitspraken worden gedaan over de wijze waarop mensen op meer gevorderde leeftijd met de liefde om moeten gaan. Blijkbaar behoren zij niet tot de doelgroep van het convoluut of hebben de verhoudingen zich bij hen al voldoende uitgekristalliseerd. Het is ook mogelijk dat gedacht wordt dat oudere mensen veel minder 'in de fout gaan' omdat bij hen *vedene voirs int capitel heeft* (IV 162).

Interessant zijn de opvattingen van een jeugdige persoon die in gedicht XIV naar voren komen. De minnaar erkent dat hij *zich* niet houdt aan vasten, aalmoezen geven, bidden en regelmatig naar de preek gaan. Hij is *vul der weerelt luste* (1), en *waken, brasseren, gheselschap goet* (27) schenken hem voldoening. Hij denkt op oudere leeftijd zijn godsdienstige plichten wel na te zullen komen om de hemelse zaligheid te verkrijgen. Uitgebreid maakt de kluzenaar hem duidelijk dat dit geen juiste manier van leven is. De jonge man denkt dat zijn levenswijze wel door de beugel kan. Als zijn gesprekspartner hem vertelt dat hij zich schuldig maakt aan overtredingen met betrekking tot de zeven hoofdzonden, wil dit er bij hem niet in. De kluzenaar maakt hem duidelijk dat hij 'hovaardig' is vanwege de mooie kledij die hij aantrekt ter wille van de geliefde vrouw. Hij is haar slaaf. Hij dient zich echter aan God te onderwerpen, zich bescheiden te kleden en met de armen zijn overmatige kleding te delen. Hij is gierig, omdat hij niet ophoudt na te streven wat hij wenst en als hij de liefste uiteindelijk voor *zich* gewonnen heeft, zal hij haar niet willen afstaan. Hij is afgunstig en jaloers, omdat hij niet zal toestaan dat zijn geliefde een ander liefheeft. Hij zal zijn rivaal zelfs haten. Hij is lui en traag, daar hij geen profijt elders zal zoeken en steeds bij zijn lief blijft. Als kwaad van zijn aanbedene gesproken wordt, is hij toornig en vol

gramschap Gulzig is hij, omdat hij van de minne nooit genoeg krijgt, zij regeert zijn leven. Hij kijkt met begeerte naar andere mooie vrouwen, daarom is hij *luxurieux* [wellustig] en een *onrein minnekijn*.

Ook in de tweede allegorie komt het nachtwaken, *braseren* en verkeren in goed gezelschap (de term zal ironisch gebruikt zijn) ter sprake. De kluizenaar wijst ook hier op de noodzaak van het biechten, maar evenals in XIV wil de jongeman dit niet. In II staat overigens een nuttige aanwijzing over de dagelijkse praktijk: men moet zijn dagen goed en evenredig in drieën indelen met slapen, arbeid en genoegen.

Dat de nadruk sterk op de *luxurie* valt, lijkt niet vreemd. In het Gr HS komt de wellust herhaaldelijk als de meest kwalijke eigenschap van de minnaars naar voren. Uiteraard wordt het hoereren niet rechtstreeks genoemd en duidelijk omschreven, maar op veel plaatsen zijn er aanwijzingen die op de veroordeling van zo'n gedragspatroon duiden. De *u* in II is niet zuiver op de graat, de verleidingspogingen van *Vii-Begheren* *cs* zijn niet zonder succes in het 'land' dat de minnaar van Venus gepacht heeft. De aanbieder in de eerste allegorie houdt een *lotzang* op de *weelde* die hij geniet, zonder daarbij expliciet te maken wat dit inhoudt.

De dichter in gedicht IV spint dit alles breed uit. Hij wijst op de natuurlijke neigingen van de jonge, jeugdige 'zinnen' (50-54) die zich *broosch ende cranc* [zwak van geest en vlees] (92) in Venus' dienst stellen. De verliefden zouden zich beter kunnen houden aan de *reine minne* (130-131). De jeugdigen worden 'zotte blinden' genoemd, ze leven *jonqelic* ze kleven in de minne teveel aan het wereldse (159-163). Zij moeten beter indachtig zijn wat *reine minne* inhoudt. Als eisen worden gesteld: trouw, waardigheid, mildheid, deugd, nedengheid en *scamelheit* [eerbaarheid in ruime zin] (172-173). Noodzakelijk is het iemand te kiezen van gelijke complexie (26-31), een gedachte die we ook terugvinden in *Vander feesten een proper dinc* (Vekeman 1981). Vreugde moet gepaard gaan met eer, liefdedienst moet niet gericht zijn op seksueel loon. Men dient boven het lijden aan de liefde te staan, die leidt tot melancholie. Steeds weer komt naar voren dat de menselijke natuur zot, blind en ziek is (170-185). De vrije wilsbeslissing is zeer belangrijk. God heeft *de ziele gemaect vii* (190), wij zijn *vrie zielen* (198). Het verstand kan daarom de natuurlijke geneigdheid tot bezit en aardse liefde temperen en die tot God doen toenemen (onder andere 162 en 244). Tegenover de tijdelijke aardse liefde staat Gods eeuwige liefde. Zij die *reimlic minnen* kunnen de hoop hebben op te klimmen naar de hemelse kroon (272-278). In het gedicht worden duidelijke eisen gesteld aan de jeugd *met haer jonge lustighe cracht*, waardoor zij over de schreef dreigt te gaan. Deze thematiek komt ook duidelijk tot uiting in de eerste allegorie.

In de eerste allegorie komt het godsdienstige aspect niet expliciet naar voren, maar het zal op de achtergrond ongetwijfeld meegespeeld hebben. De factoren die bij het hoofse liefdesproces een rol spelen, komen nadrukkelijk naar voren. De 'wulpsche' jeugd is vertegenwoordigd in de figuren van *Juecht* en *Suverheit* van vrouwelijke zijde, van de mannelijke zijde is de minnaar de representant. Men krijgt de indruk dat de minnaar zich redelijk kan beheersen (*Suverheit* behoudt haar eer). Waarom de vrouw hem tenslotte toch afwijst, is niet geheel duidelijk. Hijzelf spreekt van *over grote weelde* en *overmoet*. Duidelijk is wel dat zijn liefde niet volkomen *reim* is, noch voldaan heeft aan de gestelde eisen. *Versiene's* les in sociaal-maatschappelijk gedrag zal hij ook niet succesvol in praktijk gebracht hebben. Opmerkelijk is dat de vrouwelijke *Juecht* zich getuige haar lied wel degelijk bewust is van

de noodzaak van een *reine minne* [een eis in **IV**], waarin men 'trouw' is en een 'edele zin' heeft. Indien men zo mint, zingt zij, is minne *soet in den beghinne. Int ende en es geen onghenuecht* (841-842) en als men zo liefheeft, heeft de liefde *soet voetsel inne*. Kennelijk is de minnaar niet verder gegaan dan de *amor purus*, waar bij de seksuele contacten de reinheid niet verloren gaat (Fischer 1985, 268), een opvatting in de Middeleeuwen waarop ik nog terugkom. Opmerkelijk is een uitlating van een Italiaan naar aanleiding van een bezoek rond 1435 aan Brugge. Hij beschrijft hoe de Bruggelingen buitengewoon weelderig en luxueus leven en van al wat de wereld brengt genieten. Mannen en vrouwen gaan samen in bad en vinden dat zo gewoon dat ze ook samen ter kerke gaan. Luxe heeft een grote macht (Bonneure *v.j.*, 18-19).

Speciale aandacht in het Gr.Hs. krijgt de waarschuwing tegen het verglijden van de tijd en de broosheid van het bestaan. Het fragmentarische gedicht **III** is geheel aan dit thema gewijd. Het is gebouwd rond het 'Elckerlijc'-thema: zij die verwanten zijn en zij die vrienden heten, bekommeren zich niet om de stervende *vruechden kiezer*. In **IIIB** krijgt de zondaar aan de hand van het letterwoord *liden*, de raad op allerlei wijzen te strijden tegen de 'weelde' en zich nederig op te stellen. Twee ideeënwerelden worden in stelling gebracht tegen de *minnen gloet* (217): de noodzaak God boven alles te minnen en de leefregels die de 'hoofse minne' voorschrijft. 'Mate' en 'reinheid' spelen daarbij een grote rol.

6.3 Beschavingsnormen in de adellijke sfeer

6.3.1 Enkele algemeen geldende principes

Aan het eind van de elfde eeuw schreef Bonizo van Sutri zijn invloedrijke *Liber de Vita Christiana*, met voorschriften voor de vazallen en ridders die in de sterk gedifferentieerde feodale gemeenschap in dienst stonden van een wereldlijke heerser. Deze gedragsregels, door latere schrijvers bewerkt en enigszins aangepast, legden de nadruk op de dienst aan kerk en christendom. Christenen mochten gebruik maken van hun wapens en zelfs doden, tot welzijn van hun heer en de staat. In het tweede boek geeft Bonizo de voorschriften voor de feodale gemeenschap. Men moet in trouwe dienst voor de heer strijden, zonder tegen de voorschriften van het geloof in te gaan. Men mag geen buit maken en rooftochten organiseren. Men dient met het leven in te staan voor zijn heer en men moet de ketters bestrijden. Armen en weduwen horen beschermd te worden. Meeneed is verboden en men mag de naam van God niet ijdel gebruiken. Alanus van Rijsel wees er rond 1200 op dat de kerkelijke regels van de heilige vaders als norm dienen, want men moet niet alleen uiterlijk, maar ook innerlijk volwaardig strijden in het leger van God. De dienstbaarheid zag men ook als een soort versterving door de vele ontberingen die de strijders op de veldtochten leden.

De ridderwijding stamde uit een Duits wereldlijk gebruik. Aanvankelijk was de *zuwaard-omgording* volstrekt beperkt tot de kinderen van de hoge adel. Later verbreidde het gebruik zich ook in andere landen, en vervolgens werden ook de ministerialen ingewijd en omkleedden kerkelijke formules en eden de initiatie.

De bemoeienis van de kerk met het adellijk gedrag kwam ook voort uit de bestrijding van de vaak voorkomende bloedige vetes tussen de adellijke geslachten. Ondanks synodes en grote aandrang vanuit de kerk bleek de veteloosheid niet geheel mogelijk. Het gebruik om

geschillen met geweld te beslechten, beperkte men tot enkele dagen per jaar. Bij de naleving van de Godsvrede moesten noodzakelijkerwijs gewapende ridders ingeschakeld worden. Door de invloed van het klooster Cluny kwam een beweging tot stand die een innerlijke hervorming van de lekenwereld tot doel had. Zwaardomgordingen gingen langzamerhand gepaard met kerkelijke inzegeningen en plechtige eden en vaak werd het zwaard neergelegd op het altaar om het te zegenen. We zullen de ontwikkelingen niet verder volgen, een overzichtelijke beschrijving vindt men in Van Winters *Ridderschap* (1976) en in *Curialitas* (Fleckenstein 1990).

Het is onmiskenbaar dat deze ontwikkelingen een duidelijk beschavende invloed bezaten en ook langzamerhand op allerlei andere gebieden buiten het krijgsbedrijf opgang maakten. Uiteraard bleef er tussen ideaal en werkelijkheid vaak een grote afstand bleef bestaan.

Het leven aan de hoven nam een steeds gecultiveerder vorm aan, mede door de reeds besproken dienst aan de dame. De invloed van dit gedragspatroon strekte zich langzamerhand ook uit tot de 'lagere' bevolkingslagen en doet zich op allerlei wijzen gelden in het Gr.Hs. Soms is dit slechts zijdelings bemerkbaar.

Zo zijn de adellijke veroordelingen van de 'dorperlijke' mentaliteit duidelijk merkbaar in het Kerelslied (L85) en de proloog van de eerste allegorie. In **IV** worden de *dorpers* tot de categorie van de *clappers ende quade vileine* gerekend (168). De *dorperen in de minne* zien alleen het luchthartige liefdesspel en bedrijven de minne *fel* (**X**: 140 en 168). Ze verbreiden zelfs lasterpraatjes over oprecht en rein minnenden (**XIII**: 87-88). In **XII** mag een dorper niet uit de liefdesbron drinken (547) en wordt *onrein gepsins* met *dorpernie* geassocieerd (655).

Eigenschappen als de juiste maat weten in geven en nemen, zich mild en hoof's gedragen, eer betuigen en dankbaarheid tonen aan hen die dat verdienen, zijn prijzenswaard. De antipoden gierigheid, ondankbaarheid, in schande leven - met de *shame-culture* op de achtergrond, onder andere beschreven door Van Oostrom (1987) - dient men te vermijden. We komen hierop terug in de volgende paragraaf over het burgerlijk ethos.

Het feodale aspect van de dienstwillige en trouwe dienaar vinden we in de houding tot de geliefde dame terug. Aansprekingen als gebiedster, koningin, soevereine en dergelijke wijzen in deze richting.

De noodzaak van goede, beschaafde manieren worden uitvoerig beschreven in de boekjes van hoofse zeden waarover Meder uitvoerig heeft geschreven (1992, 1994a en b). De verschillende voorschriften corresponderen met een bepaalde maatschappelijke structuur. Ze zijn ingebed in de levensvormen van het toenmalige bestaan, zoals Elias (1982, 99) terecht zegt in zijn paragraaf over de omgangsvormen in de Middeleeuwen. In **X** zien we een fraaie veroordeling van de feestende jeugd: *dansers, springers, die scoon ghelaet Belijmt* [opgesierd om te verlokken] *maect* (225-226). De heremiet verwijt de minnaar dat hij hovaardig is, *gezien* de fraaie kleding waarmee hij *den toy* maakt (327-318). De aandacht voor de kleding blijkt ook in **I** als de *ic* zegt dat hij zich kleedt *also zuverlic als ic mochte* (65). Aan het slot van **XV** vernemen we dat de minnaar niet enkel van binnen maar ook van buiten rein moet zijn. Zijn kleding moet prima passen en goed staan, kosten noch vakmanschap mogen gespaard worden. Bovendien mag er geen pluimpje aan zitten. Losse naden (denk aan *Rouckeloos* in **I**) moeten terstond genaaid worden. In handel en wandel moet de minnaar smetteloos zijn, evenals in zijn taalgebruik. Verder dient hij beheerst te reageren op de kletspraatjes van de *niders*.

Het verzet tegen de bloedvete en de daarmee gepaard gaande vijandigheden vinden we vertolkt in de tweede allegorie. *Pausier* biedt de partijen tot driemaal toe vrede aan en stelt een aantal afkoelingsdagen voor om zich te bezinnen. Dit voorstel wijzen de vijanden van de minnaar af. In veel steden leidde zo'n houding tot zware straffen, de *paisiermeesters* hadden een grote macht.

De feestelijke bijeenkomsten van de adel vinden we in I weerspiegeld in het feestelijk bijeenzijn in de burcht, met het maken van liederen, zingen en misschien ook wel dansen (Lassche 1994b; Willaert 2000). Huizinga wees gedetailleerd op "de zucht naar schoner leven", die zich op allerlei wijzen uitte, aanvankelijk in het hofleven (1997, 35-55) maar later ongetwijfeld ook in de feestelijke bijeenkomsten van de maatschappelijke bovenlagen in de steden. Het vrolijke gezelschapsleven, gepaard gaande met musiceren, komt ook in de liederen duidelijk naar voren.

Het aspect van de jacht dat in veel liefdespoëzie voorkomt, vinden we in het Gr.Hs. niet. Blijkbaar paste deze niet in het levenspatroon van de stedelijke Brugse patriciërs en sprak de jachtsymboliek onvoldoende tot hun verbeelding.

6.3.2 *De gedragsnormen berustend op de hoofse traditie*

Het is opvallend dat de normen die in de hoofse traditie een rol spelen en het gebruikte taal materiaal om deze te beschrijven, vele eeuwen een zelfde registraal aspect laten zien. Bij de in de hoofse traditie wortelende mystica Hadewijch (Willaert 1984) vertoont het register grote overeenkomst met dat in het Gr.Hs. Verschillen worden hoofdzakelijk veroorzaakt door de omvang van het materiaal en de neiging tot 'spelen met de taal' in het Gr.Hs. De terminologie is daardoor meer gedifferentieerd. In dit hoofdstuk is ruimschoots gebruik gemaakt van de in het Gr.Hs. gebruikte registrale termen.

De omschrijving van het begrip 'hoofse liefde' ondervindt zoveel moeilijkheden dat sommige onderzoekers de term maar liever willen afschaffen. Meder (1998, 223) meent zelfs dat er geen eenduidige set van basiskenmerken is en dat men er nooit toe zal kunnen komen die op te stellen. Er zijn vele beschouwingswijzen over de hoofse liefde die berusten op deelaspecten. Een kleine keuze: de 'zedelijke vervolmaking' door de liefde, de echtbrekende liefde, de hardvochtige liefdesdame, de almacht van de god Amor, de alles vullende liefde, de liefde op afstand, het ridderlijk avontuur in dienst van de dame, de liefde in de troubadoursliederen, de overmatige lofprijzingen voor de dame, de liefde à la Andreas Capellanus enz. De opsomming is niet compleet en zou 20 à 30 soorten hoofse liefdes kunnen bevatten.

Schnell (1990) noemt enkele oorzaken van de verwarring en probeert een aantal centrale waarden in de 'hoofse liefde' te omschrijven. Hij verwaarloost allerlei kleine verschillen en nuances om zo een solide basis te geven voor discussie en onderzoek. Hij gaat uit van de twaalfde en dertiende-eeuwse literatuur. De ontwikkelingen in de hoofse literatuur zijn in een zeer traag tempo gegaan, daarenboven komt de stedelijke navolging nog wat achterop. Toch vinden we de acht door hem onderscheiden basisprincipes merendeels in het Gr.Hs. terug. We moeten hierbij bedenken dat de kenmerken vaak niet alle tegelijk optreden in een werk, dat er bij diverse auteurs onderlinge verschillen zijn, dat de lokale en tijdsaspecten een rol spelen, dat de recipienten waarop de auteurs zich richtten verschillend zijn enz. Als corpus neemt Schnell de troubadourslyriek, de Noordfranse Arthurromans en de

Provençaalse minnetraktaten tot uitgangspunt Wij zullen nagaan in hoeverre in het Gr Hs de door Schnell onderscheiden kenmerken aanwezig zijn

Een hulpmiddel bij dit onderzoek is het woordmateriaal in het gehele convoluut Oorspronkelijk wilde ik een uitvoerig hoofdstuk wijden aan allerlei typerende woorden in het register, waarbij tevens de frequenties aangegeven zouden worden De hoeveelheid materiaal nam echter zo'n omvang aan dat ik mij noodzakelijkerwijs beperk tot een tamelijk summere weergave van de verzamelde gegevens Bovendien heeft Reynaert (1999) ook een dergelijk onderzoek verricht, waarvan hij melding maakt in onder andere zijn paragraaf over het 'register' (161-169)

Ik heb de liederen die de liefde in hoofse zin tot onderwerp hebben (ook die in I en II) én het 'schilderij'-gedicht (VIII) als uitgangspunt genomen Reynaert beschouwt enkel de liederen uit het tweede deel, inclusief de onhoofse Ik plaats de door mij geselecteerde woorden overigens ook in een ander kader dan hij, namelijk dat van de acht basisprincipes van Schnell

1 *Het uitsluitende karakter van de liefdesbetrekking is een wezenlijk kenmerk De ware liefde laat geen andere liefdesverhoudingen toe*

In het Gr Hs verzekert de minnaar de vrouw herhaaldelijk dat zij de enige, is in een rijke variatie aan bewoordingen De liederen 53, 68 en 90 laten zelfs een discussie over dit thema zien Uiteraard is de eis nauw verweven met het trouw-zijn dat in het volgende punt aan de orde komt

Herhaaldelijk verzekert de minnaar dat de minne, de vrouwe, de zeden enz *rein* zijn iets wat het uitsluitende karakter van de liefdesverhouding impliceert Herhaaldelijk bezweert de minnaar dat er *anders ghem(e)* is (L14 4, L23 2, L94 9, L114 8), dat er *ni ghem in mi stoet* (L122 9), dat *mi nes niet anders in den zin* (L128 8) Uiteraard gaat er niets boven de liefde voor de ene 'vrouwe' (L107 16, L128 8, L130 12, L131 9) Alleen zij heeft macht over hem (L134 6-7), kan hem troosten (L137 21) of *verheugen* (L129 7) Verder betuigt de minnaar dat ook al zou alles op de wereld hem toebehoren, *zij de liefste zal zijn* (L137 11-12) Dit is slechts een kleine bloemlezing uit de gevarieerde bewoordingen waarin de dichter/minnaar zijn afhankelijkheid garandeert

Verder is er sprake van een bewuste keuze voor de geliefde op grond van vergelijkingen met andere vrouwen (L3 19-20, L4 4, L10 7, L30, 11, L69 4, L76 21) Vanzelfsprekend zijn materiele zaken als geld, grondbezit, en ook macht en kennis niets waard in vergelijking met de gunsten van de uitverkorene (L78 13-14, L08 22, L112 3-4 L133 5-7 en 15-20)

De minnaar zelf is wel eens wantrouwig ten opzichte van zijn geliefde *Du begheers der trauwen heit Maer dune does selve gheine* (L89 15-16) Deze boude beweringen komen echter niet vaak voor

2 *De bestendigheid in de liefdesverhouding is een belangrijke conditie.*

We vinden deze eis zowel in de hoofse romans als in de lyriek. Het is een gemeenzaam ideaalbeeld dat we kunnen beschouwen als een literaire utopie, gezien de vele middeleeuwse klachten over ontrouw.

Bijna alle liederen betuigen de trouw in een scala van bewoordingen: *trouw*, afwezigheid van *ontrouw*, *getrouwelijk*, *stede*, *stad*, *gestadigheid*, *eeuwig*, *immer*, *altoos*, *gevangen of onderdaan zijn*, *dienen*, *dienaar*, *dienst*, *eigen zijn/blijven*, *in bedwang*, *in steiden orden staen*, *zonder verganc*, *anders geen*, *in dijn ghewald sijn* enz. In het Gr.Hs. komen ze honderden keren voor. Het is opmerkelijk dat deze trouwbetuigingen naarmate men het eind van het liedboek nadert, anders vertolkt worden dan in het begin. Het *in bedwanc sijn* en het *ghevanghen sijn* nemen bijvoorbeeld in frequentie toe. We letten daarbij natuurlijk alleen op de liederen die een sterk minne-element bevatten. Hoe groot het 'palet' van de dichter is, blijkt bijvoorbeeld uit het nieuwjaarslied 76 dat in allerlei woordschakeringen de trouw bezingt: *Du aens mijn hertze, Up erde en anich liever gein Dan du allein, Dus blijfstu in mijn hertzen bloet, In dijn behoet Dijn eighin moetic bliven, So blivic dir ghestade, Liever ledic liden zwaer Dan ich di ontrauwe dade*. Ook in L9, een loflied op de beminde, staat het thema 'trouw' geheel in het middelpunt, net als in de liederen 25 en 84.

Ook als de minnaar zich op afstand bevindt, is hij trouw, zoals blijkt uit de liederen 22, 81 en 142. In dit laatste vinden we bijvoorbeeld de plechtige verzekering: *Bin ich hier varre, bin ich huer naer, Van huer comt al de vruechden mijn* (13-14).

Soms ook twijfelt de minnaar of zijn trouw wel vruchten af zal werpen. De vrouw belooft hem niet, hoe trouw, hoofs en standvastig hij haar ook dient (L58).

Zoals reeds aangeduid drukken termen uit de feodale verhoudingen soms het trouw-zijn uit. Een kenmerk van de feodaliteit is de loyaliteit, die bekrachtigd wordt door een eed van trouw. De leenman verwacht van zijn kant ook de steun en bijstand van de soeverein. De dichter gebruikt in het Gr.Hs. zeer vaak beeldenreeksen berustend op deze wederzijdse loyaliteit. De minnaar beschouwt zich als dienaar (L7, 11, 15, 78, 91, 93, 114, 115 en 128; **II**: 559, 563, 861, 1357), onderdaan of lijfeigene (L9, 10 en 65), leenman (L 64) of gevangene (L14: 75, 81, 105, 109, 116, 117 en 128). Hij ziet de dame als keizerin (L50, 60, 75, 84 en 146; **I**: 838), koningin (L23: 61) en soevereine (L70, 93, 117 en 137). Hij schildert zich als de 'arme' man in tegenstelling tot de 'hoge' dame (L8, 53, 78, 82, 117, 131 en 135). Hij staat met hart, *zin*, lijf, ziel en *moet* ten dienste van de vrouwe (L28, 82, 93, 113 en 117; **XII**: 656). Van zijn kant verwacht de minnaar dan heil of troost in enigerlei vorm (L12, 13, 29, 31, 34, 37, 46, 57, 59, 61, 68 70, 75, 77, 79, 80 enz.) of loon na bewezen dienst (thema van **II**; ook in L13, 22, 48, 90, 105, 126, 126 en 132).

Formuleringen met verzekeringen in de geest van *op minen heit* [eed] komen frequent voor (L7, 28, 33, 68, 70, 81, 85, 89, 93, 96, 115, 137, 138 en 139).

3. *Men mag geen liefde voorwenden om seksuele wensen vervuld te zien.*

De ware liefde is een van binnenuit komende kracht die geen veinzerij toelaat. Ook in de *Roman de la Rose* (1237, v. 4389-97) wordt dit genoemd.

De minnaar in het Gr.Hs. beklemtoont herhaaldelijk de oprechtheid en de duurzaamheid van zijn liefde in allerlei bewoordingen, zoals bij de overige punten duidelijk naar voren komt. De vrouw staat echter vaak wantrouwig tegenover de avances, zoals in lied 48. Zij kiest een oudere man als minnaar, want *Ghestadich hout hi herte ende zinne. Hu minne* [die

van de jonge man] *es hoon* Over het algemeen stelt de *ic* in het Gr Hs zich nogal ongedurig op en verlangt nadrukkelijk zijn 'loon', een beloning die waarschijnlijk op het seksuele vlak ligt. Hij spreekt dit niet rechtstreeks uit, maar het is wel te veronderstellen. In II vormt het loonmotief het hoofdthema tijdens de 'liefdeslessen' na het proces hoort de minnaar *Minre die in minnen beclive ende den loon ontfaet van minnen Verteert bescheedelyc uwen loon, Al dijct u soete ende daertoe scoon, want wat men mint spaert men in eeren* (1831-1836). Het venijn voor de minnaar zit in het *becliven*. Hij heeft daartoe vaak het geduld niet en faalt tijdens de minnedienst. Het schijnt ons ook de oorzaak toe van de verwijdering van de minnaar in I uit de burcht.

4 *Opofferingsgezindheid wordt geeist waarbij men afziet van direct profijt voor zichzelf*

Belangrijk is het winnen van innerlijke waarde en het innerlijk vreugde beleven aan de liefde. Dit brengt een grote spanning bij de gelieven met zich mee. De/ze opofferingsgezinde liefdesgedachte toont een groot verschil met die in de Ovidiaanse vagantenpoëzie waar bij uitstel toch aan uitgesteld seksueel genot gedacht wordt.

Het hooftse discours tracht vaak wel een verzoening te bewerkstelligen tussen de extreme posities (rein, seksueel, geduldig afzien van tegenover 'het loon ontvangen'). De minnaar mag de eer van de dame niet schenden en toch wil hij het genot niet prijsgeven. De dualiteit tussen beide tracht men door verstand en zedelijke idealen te thematiseren en te controleren. Misschien is het niet verder gaan dan 'de derde fase', waarbij men bijvoorbeeld wel elkaar mag bevoelen maar niet tot de coitus mag overgaan om de 'eer' niet te verliezen, in dit licht te bezien. We komen hierop uitgebreid terug in de interpretatie van de eerste allegorie bij de verzen 2065-2115 [8 | 5].

De grenzen in het Gr Hs komen niet naar voren maar het spanningsveld tussen het verlangen naar 'loon' en de wensen van de vrouw zijn wel duidelijk aanwezig. *Als huer gheleeft mach si mi gheven Loon om allen aerbeit* (L127, 8-9). Het uitblijven van de vrouwelijke gunst brengt de minnaar tot vertwijfeling, wanhoop en zoals in II tot een losbandige levenswijze. Deze brengt hem in een vicieuze cirkel, zodat de vrouw hem het 'loon' in het geheel niet meer geven kan. Minder duidelijk vinden we deze gang van zaken ook in I, waarin het lied van de minnaar de 'weelde' uitbundig prijst (2055-2064). Dit wijst nu niet bepaald op een ingetogen leven.

Bewoordingen in literair werk die deze eis min of meer indirect beklemtonen, komen bij de overige punten ter sprake, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij punt 6.

5 *De wederkerigheid in de liefdesbetrekking dient de basis te zijn*

De klacht over een onbeantwoorde liefde is kenmerkend voor de liefdespoëzie van alle tijden, zij hoort bij het genre. Er is een grote spanning tussen de polen van het begeren en het onvervuld blijven van de wensen. Vaak valt in de Middeleeuwen bij de beschrijving van het liefdesgebeuren het accent op de fase van de liefdesverwerving, met alle niet weegbare en duistere factoren, wisselende stemmingen en innerlijke conflicten. De psychische functies 'hoop' en 'vertwijfeling' beelden deze spanning in het Gr Hs continu uit. Ze zijn zelfs gepersonifieerd [5 | 4 en 5 | 3].

De wens om 'een te worden' verwoordt de minnaar in L113 12-13 *Nu laat ons bliuen dan gemeen Minlic elc in anders zjn* De vrouw drukt dit fraai uit in L21 (27-28) met *Waer trouwe met trauwen es ghepaert Dat es een recht ghestade minne* Bij een duurzame verbintenis is sprake van twee 'gebonden' harten, *Eendiachtich sonder sceiden* (L52 15-16) Ook de uitdrukking 'gemeen zjn/blijuen' duidt meestal op een gewenste wederzijdse verbondenheid (L14 24, L21 39 L70 3.11, L113 12, L138 12)

6 *Het principe van de vrijwilligheid en het in acht nemen van de gevoelens van de ander is belangrijk*

De vrije wil is beslissend in alle hoofse liefdesliteratuur, dat is onomstreden Vrijheid, verantwoordelijkheid, de wilsbeslissing berustend op de liefde waarbij men niemand schade aandoet, moet gepaard gaan met wijsheid, dapperheid om onaangename zaken te verdragen, matiging van de begeerten en de rechtvaardigheid ieder het zijne te geven Augustinus heeft deze richtlijnen duidelijk verordend (De Graaf 1964, 24-36) Eeuwenlang zijn ze verkondigd Vrijwilligheid is een wezenlijk element in het zedelijk handelen sedert Aristoteles en na Cicero's *amicitia* ideaal Ook in allerlei religieuze geschriften is ze van beslissende betekenis Alleen handelingen uit vrijwilligheid begaan verdienen een ethische beoordeling Het grote ideaalbeeld is respect voor de ander, waarbij men niet eist wat de ander niet wil Er is op dit punt een wezenlijke tegenstelling tussen de Noordfranse en de Provençaalse liefdesopvatting De laatste lijkt meer vroeg-middeleeuws ingesteld te zijn, met onderwerping in het huwelijk De eerste heeft meer respect voor de geliefde Schnell (1990, 262) veronderstelt dat hier een belangrijke invloed van de geestelijke stand aan te wijzen is De hoofse dichtkunst aan de Noordfranse hoven getuigt hiervan

De minnaar verwoordt het medeleven met de gevoelens van de ander in L142, met de uitspraak dat als zijn geliefde lijdt, *Gaer ganslich lyt mijn hertze also* (19-21)

Gedicht IV handelt over de liefde, tweemaal beklemt de dichter dat de ziel *vr̄ es* (190, 198) In VI wordt verzekerd dat ook Adam een *wille vr̄* (16) gekregen heeft, dat wil zeggen dat de mens volgens eigen wil en inzicht kan handelen en dus verantwoordelijk is voor zijn daden Zeer helder is de formulering *Minne es in haer zelven vr̄ Niement haer bedwinger z̄* (XIV 571-572) Venus wijst de minnaar op het feit dat zij gehouden is aan kosmische regels, die haar geen vrijheid van handelen toelaten, maar dat hij [de minnaar] uit eigen vrije wil kan handelen (II 1691-1697) Dit heeft de consequentie dat hij niet bij Venus zijn beklag kan doen over zijn minneleed, hij heeft alles aan zichzelf te wijten (1814-1815) Dat niet ieder dit erkent, blijkt uit L92 (17-18) *Venus es hem [de verhefde] sculdich spoet [voorspoed] Te gheuen*

Het woord *vr̄* komt ook diverse malen voor in de verzekering *lc blive altoos dijn eighn vr̄* (in diverse gevarieerde vormen in L17, 30, 68 78 en VIII, 172) De gebruikte terminologie kan de gedachte weergeven dat de vrouwe over de minnaar de volkomen vrije beschikking heeft Hij is als het ware een lijfeigene, een onderhorige In hoeverre dit *vr̄* nog geassocieerd is met 'uit eigen vrije wil' is niet duidelijk

De hypothese van de vrije wilsbeslissing staat in tegenstelling met de opvatting dat de liefde onontkoombaar is Zoals ook bij de vorige punten zijn de bewoordingen die de onontkoombaarheid uitdrukken op verschillende van de besproken rubrieken toepasbaar De minnaar moet de aanbodene wel liefhebben, hulpwerkwoorden van modaliteit als 'moeten'

en kunnen drukken dit in zeer grote getale uit Ook dwingen komt voor bijvoorbeeld in L112 *Du dwincs so sere die hertze mijn* (12) De termen ghewaldt en bedwanc zijn we reeds tegen gekomen De pijlen uit de ogen van de dame die het hart doorboren spelen een belangrijke rol in I, de minnaar kan er niets tegen doen Ook op andere wijzen wordt zijn machteloosheid uitgedrukt, bijvoorbeeld *Mijn hertze en van di nicht ontgaen* (L10 5), of *Want ich en wil noch ich en caen Ghesceiden hoochste troost van dich* (L80 2-3)

De liederen zijn sterk geconcentreerd op de gevoelens van de man Die van de vrouw komen nauwelijks ter sprake De man wil troost weelde loon' vreugde en rust ontvangen Van een wat minder oppervlakkige wederkerigheid getuigt *Die liefste jonst dats minne Van twee die bleven eens ghelyc Van zinne* (L78 1-4)

7 Maat (mezura) en verstand zijn zeer belangrijk om excessen te vermijden

Maat kan slaan op diverse activiteiten gecultiveerd fijnzinnig spreken zich verstandig gedragen, beheersen van de gevoelens maar ook architectonisch de juiste proporties in het oog houden, wat God bij het scheppen van de vrouw ook gedaan heeft als ze *scone* is

In overeenstemming met de christelijke leer dient men zich te beheersen door middel van het verstand Gedicht IV vat dit kort samen in de zin *Nature ne doe de vedene wiken* (244) Een man als De Ventadorn vindt echter dat verstand met de liefde niets te maken heeft liefde kan een allesbeheersende macht zijn die de mens van het verstand berooft Ook andere minnezangers zijn die mening toegedaan

Als wezenlijk kenmerk van seksueel begeren noemt de kerk de *sensualitas* die de *ratio* overwint Door de liefdesdwaasheid raakt het verstand onder de heerschappij van het vlees Door de seksuele begeerte verlangt men naar een snelle bevrediging zonder dat de ware liefde aanwezig is Amor is niet de schuldige, maar de wensen en gedachten van de liefhebbers Men moet de impuls tot lichamelijke vereniging buiten werking zien te stellen Bij de troubadours vinden we een streven naar de gesublimeerde gunst van de dame, zonder seksualiteit Andere wetten dan in de gewone samenleving gelden in deze lijdzame ontberingsrijke liefdesbetrekking De minnaar zelf meent geen dwaasheid te begaan, hij is volkomen introvert en zo door liefde bevangen dat de buitenwereld niet echt meer existeert Dit geschiedt ook als er geen tegenhelfde te verwachten is en de buitenwereld hem voor zot verslijt Sensualisme en driftbevrediging worden verbannen Men heerst over de vleselijke liefde de mens staat boven de *cupiditas* Troubadours nemen dus een ander standpunt in dan de kerk die de dame als verleiding tot vleselijke zonde ziet Bij hen is liefde niet slechts *amor carnalis* ze overstijgt het normale menselijke rationele denken door het 'afzien van' Deze ideeën van de troubadours zijn in het Gr Hs niet aanwezig wel de meningen die de kerk verkondigt

Het principe van het 'maathouden' wordt in het Gr Hs sterk naar voren gebracht in de liefdesschool in II waar de onderwijsgeevenden de namen *Ghetempertheit* en *Mate* dragen Ik wijs verder nog op de toelichting op de verzen 2065 2115 in hoofdstuk 8 Het begrip *scamelheit* en de vier fasen in de lichamelijke omgang komen daar ter sprake

8 De bereidheid en het vermogen tot lyden is noodzakelijk

Liefde over een lange periode die geen spoedige seksuele bevrediging geeft, eist van de minnaar de bereidheid tot lijden. Dit lijden maakt de liefde volkomen en vormt de mens. Een bijkomend verschijnsel hierbij is het dienstethos. Tussen de eerste toenaderingspogingen en het verwerven van het loon schuilt een lange lijdensstijd, waarin de minnaar zijn dienstbaarheid moet tonen. Het lijden door de vertwijfeling leidt tot veel geklaag en getob, met in het Gr.Hs. wel als hoogtepunten lied 140 (*Vaar weg Gepeins! God geve dir leit*) en de gevangenisscènes in I. Uit *Twifel's* kerker kan de minnaar slechts door *Vrouw Hope* verlost worden. In de ommuurde tuin ziet hij geen enkele uitweg meer en raakt in een depressieve toestand. Het thema komt ook naar voren in L143 met het motto *Ich moes verbeiden*. Het valt de *ic* zeer moeilijk zijn vertwijfeling te onderdrukken, maar hij constateert: *Ich leer verbeiden, truwe man, Men heift niet al dat men beghert!* Meestal vindt men deze berusting in het Gr.Hs. niet en is de minnaar zeer ongeduldig. De gejaagdheid komt uitgebreid in II tot uiting. De minnaar kan niet wachten op het moment dat hij uiteindelijk zijn 'loon' voor de bewezen liefdesdienst mag ontvangen. De raadvrouwen van Venus bediscussiëren de problematiek uitvoerig, waarbij de meningen sterk uiteen lopen. Venus houdt echter geen rekening met hun opvattingen. Soeverein oordeelt ze dat de minnaar bijgeschoold moet worden om zijn liefdesdiensten beter te kunnen bewijzen. Hij moet dus wel geduld hebben.

Deze paragraaf is niet volledig zonder de vermelding van de liefdeslessen die op bevel van Venus in de minneschool in de tweede allegorie gegeven moeten worden. Kort samengevat behelven ze het volgende:

1. De jeugd die de minne niet kan ontlopen, dient zich te onderwerpen aan de roede van *Ghetempertheit* en *Mate*.
2. Men zal meer aandacht aan de geestelijke liefde tot God moeten schenken dan aan de aardse liefde tot de beminde vrouw.
3. De dag dient men evenwichtig in te delen met slapen, werken en ontspanning (waaronder het minnen).
4. Venus beschijnt net als de zon iedereen. Heeft men tegenspoed in de liefde, wijt deze dan niet aan Venus, maar aan uzelf, want *tvat gheeft uut dat in heeft* (1825).
5. Als men standvastig is in de liefde en het loon ontvangt, verteer het met moeite gewonnene dan in bescheidenheid. Doet men dit niet, dan leidt dit tot gebrokenheid en geklaag [het 'mate'-principe dus].
6. Minnaars moeten hun liefde verzwijgen [*helen*] en zullen daarvoor dank ontvangen.
7. Als het liefdeswerk door de zwaarte teveel wordt, roep dan de steun van een vertrouwd iemand in. Beter echter is het de pijn alleen te dragen.

6.3.3 Enkele nog niet genoemde facetten in de liefdespatronen in het Gr.Hs.

Enkele aspecten zijn in het voorgaande niet of nauwelijks aan de orde gekomen. Enige aanvullingen lijken mij gewenst, zonder dat daarbij naar volledigheid gestreefd wordt.

Voor beide geslachten wordt de *juecht* met de daarmee verbonden *lust* (gepersonaliseerd in I en II) als een zeer gevaarlijk stadium gezien. Er is evenwel troost, omdat God zijn

pappenheimers kent: *Maer omdat Juecht, de zotte blende, tware ne kent, no noit en kende, Spaert God den mensche die jongelic leeft, Toot redene voois int capitel heift. Wel klinkt direct daarop de waarschuwing dat al moet Juecht an de werelt cleven, Kieze doch niet haers ghelijc te leven!* (IV: 159-164). Op vele plaatsen klinken woorden die aansluiten bij deze waarschuwing, vooral in de bespiegelende gedichten en de moralisaties van de heremieten. We bespraken die reeds in paragraaf 6.2. Een belangrijke eigenschap is uiteraard *mate* [6.3.2, punt 7], die de noodzakelijke remmingen op kan leggen.

Een meisje in lied 54 verkeert in een deerniswekkende toestand, nadat zij aan de lusten van haar vriend toegegeven heeft. Misschien heeft zij een voorbeeldfunctie. We hebben op diverse plaatsen aandacht gewijd aan de spanning die optreedt tussen de door de gemeenschap gevraagde matiging en de wulpsheid van de jeugdigen.

Kwamen in het voorgaande de gewenste of veronderstelde eigenschappen van de man aan de orde, ook de vrouw moet voldoen aan een aantal criteria om haar functie in het minnediscours te vervullen. Opmerkelijk hierbij is de grote overeenkomst met de eigenschappen die aan Maria worden toegekend. De aanduiding *fonteme* [4.10] wordt in het convoluut voor Maria 12 maal en voor de vrouw 27 keer gebruikt. Reynaert (1999, 204-210) bespreekt in dit kader de typisch 'mariale aspecten' die ruimschoots in het Gr.Hs. aanwezig zijn. Hij meent dat de geliefde in de richting van Maria geïdealiseerd wordt en zo voor een deel de rol op zich kan nemen die de Heilige Maagd bij uitstek heeft, namelijk van troosteres en helpster in uiterste nood of wanhoop (207). Reynaert geeft de vindplaatsen van "evident religieuze metaforen" die aan de vrouw toegekend worden als *cheraphun*, *hemelrijch*, 'boven alle vrouwen', *engel* en *inghelijc scijn*. In mijn concordantie vind ik 114 woordvormen rond *troost* die betrekking hebben op Maria of de geliefde, in de tweede allegorie wordt 'Troost' zelfs gepersonifieerd, wat haar belang in het minnegebeuren onderstreept.

De vraag 'waarom op de dame zoveel Maria-metaforiek wordt toegepast', heb ik nooit beantwoord gezien. Misschien ligt het antwoord in het feit dat men de vrouw nooit als een volwaardige partner gezien heeft. Men mist zodoende de uitdrukkingsmiddelen om zijn afhankelijkheid te betuigen.

Een mooie samenvatting van de deugden die de fonteinmetaforiek toekent aan de geliefde, vinden we in XII. De wijze vrouw wijst de minnaar erop dat de *fonteynen vrouwe* de naam draagt van *Trouwe* met de zeven eigenschappen *troost/toeverlaet*, *reinicheit*, *omoet*, *vriheit*, *vriendelicheit* en *wijsheit* en tenslotte *eere*. Het zijn de sleutels die de *borne claer*, die heet *Confoort* als een *tresore* goed gesloten houden. De *fonteyne* is hier duidelijk de maagdelijke geliefde die alleen veroverd kan worden in trouwe, niet *dorperlike*, dus *reine* dienst. Veel van de genoemde hoedanigheden wijst men ook aan Maria toe. De kenschetsing met *glorieus* (L34) vinden we ook in de Maria-metaforiek terug (in G2 en G5, VII: 283 en XI: 5).

Een ander beeld zien we in VI. De eigenschappen van de vrouw symboliseren de wijze, adviserende vrouw met de kleuren groen, wit en rood. Deze krijgen naast een hoofse, ook een religieuze betekenis. Groen betekent (119-140) jonkheid en blijheid, met de godsdienstige lading deugd- en eervol (eigenschappen die nodig zijn om het eeuwig heil te bereiken). Wit (141-166) is de zuiverheid, die niet geschonden mag worden op straffe van Gods toorn. Het rood (167-182) van de roos is naast de kleur van de aardse liefde ook de

kleur van de 'minne' tot God. Steeds zien we in het Gr.Hs. een menging van religieuze en hoofse motieven.

Herhaaldelijk prijst de gepassioneerde minnaar de deugden van zijn geliefde. Vaak vervalt hij daarbij in tautologische herhalingen. In verschillende liederen vinden we een reeks positieve eigenschappen in één adem opgesomd. Zo lezen we in L13: *Omoedich, simpel, goedertiere, Minlic wesende in alre manier es die over scone figure. Reynicheit es in elcker ure ghefondeert in haren persoon* (1-5). Ook in het korte L34 zien we een opsomming van de deugden van de aangesproken vrouwe: *Violette, zuver wit, Juechdich, soete ende amoreus, Omoedich, simpel, onbesmit, Lievelic, scone, gracieus, Edel, reine, glorieus. Trouwe ende stede ghi bezit. Troost hem dien ghi maect penseus, Ende u wil dienen in al dit* (1-6). De zo belangrijk geachte hoofsheid en wijsheid vinden we terug in L53: *Een wijf van reinen zeden, Vulmaect van allen leden, Hovesch ende vroet* (1-3). De 'eer' wordt vermeld in L88: *Want ghi hebt vast bezeten Trauwe, eere ende omoedicheit* (9-10). Naast de genoemde deugden voegt L119 hier nog aan toe *scaemte, wijsheit* en *const*. Een kleine inventarisatie van deugden die de minnaar toekent aan de geliefde levert in de liederen en het achtste gedicht de volgende aantallen op: *goedertiere* 15 keer, *ootmoet* 2 keer, *rein* 77 keer, *scaemte* 3 keer, *soete* 56 keer, *vroet* 11 keer en *wijs* 7 keer. Met het voorafgaande 'mijn': *heil* 39 keer, *hemel* 18 keer, *troost* 64 keer, *uutvercoren* 5 keer.

De eer van de vrouw is zeer belangrijk. In XII bijvoorbeeld mag de man niets ondernemen wat deze eer kan schaden. In V lijkt het erop dat de minnaar de eer van de dame 'verstoord' heeft buiten zijn schuld. Het wordt hem door *Vrau Redenen* vergeven, echter nog niet door de geliefde die door een vriendin opgestookt wordt de betrekkingen niet te hervatten.

De man mag niets doen wat de vrouw kan schaden. In I neemt *Versiene* daartoe een reeks maatregelen. Ik Verwijs hiervoor naar de interpretatie van gedicht I. De lessen die de minnaar krijgt in II zijn reeds ter sprake gekomen.

6.4 Algemeen maatschappelijke gedragsvoorschriften

In het derde deel van het Gr.Hs. zijn in bijna alle gedichten de ethische onderrichtingen en de veroordelingen over niet-gepast gedrag in ruime mate aanwezig en dat niet alleen in het kader van de minneproblematiek. De gedragscodes voor de burgers worden zowel letterlijk als figuurlijk onder de aandacht gebracht. Bij de laatste methode wordt gebruik gemaakt van personificaties, symbolen en 'ding-allegorieën'. Een enkele maal komen ook in de liederen ethisch getinte opmerkingen voor.

Globaal kunnen we (zonder te letten op de hiërarchie van de beschreven normen en waarden) de volgende grondgedachten onderscheiden. De achtergrond bij veel ethische aanwijzingen is dat men moet streven naar een lofwaardig leven en een eervolle dood. Men behoeft dan niet te vrezen voor het sterven en men zal de hemelse zaligheid bereiken. Het aardse bezit is vergankelijk en broos, men moet zich hoeden voor de grillen van het lot en zich gedragen in overeenstemming met de leeftijd. De mens is zelf verantwoordelijk voor zijn daden en dus voor het eigen zielenheil. Hij moet zich houden aan Gods geboden en de zeven hoofdzonden vermijden. Het motto daarbij staat vertolkt in VI: *Men vint gheen droufheit in de duecht, Keer in tijts oftu best ontwuecht* [zedelijk te gronde gericht] (49-50).

Bij dit alles mag de mens geen misbruik maken van macht en dient hij goede vrienden te kiezen

Een verzameling van gedragsnormen vinden we in gedicht **XIII** De aanbieder van een geschenk aan de *coninc van den Witten Bere* is Brugge ontvlucht wegens het ontluisterende gebrek aan naastenliefde, de frequente kwaadsprekerij en het streven naar aardse bezit Een aantal maatschappelijke deugden worden voor een goed functionerend leven in Brugge noodzakelijk geacht De schrijver beeldt dit uit door de zeven stadspoorten telkens twee symbolische namen te geven die aanbevelingswaardige deugden vertegenwoordigen broederschap en blijdschap, recht en rede vroedschap en vrijheid, kracht en comfort, gunst en goedertierenheid, hoop en heil, eendracht en eer In 2 4 3 3 staan de nadere gegevens over dit gedicht, waarbij tevens gewezen wordt op de voosheid van het aardse bezit

Meer indirect komt de onverzoenlijkheid van de mensen in de tweede allegorie naar voren De advocaat van de minnaar draagt de naam *Paisier* [vredestichter], een figuur die in de steden een belangrijke rol vervult Hij tracht tussen twee elkaar bestrijdende partijen onderhandelingspauzes te bewerkstelligen, waardoor de tegenstanders overeenstemming kunnen bereiken Deze handelwijze is gebaseerd op het uitbannen van bloedige vetes die vanouds in de stad voor grote onrust zorgden Nadere informatie in de afdeling over de droomgedichten [2 4 3 1] en bij *Paisier* in de rubriek mannelijke personificaties [5 3]

Als de minnaar in **I** instructies ontvangt van *Verstene* die hem voor het maken van grote fouten in de liefdesburcht moeten behoeden, krijgen we tot onze verwondering geen minnecodes te horen, maar een aantal algemeen maatschappelijke mores voor een middeleeuwse stadsbewoner Een opsomming van de vele zeer beknopt (1628-1671) gegeven regels moge hier volgen, ze kunnen ook voor de dag van vandaag gelden

Leef deugdzaam Wreek je niet op hen die afgunstig zijn en blijf steeds rustig Los problemen op door overleg, zonder ruzie te maken Zwijg en observeer Werk met wijs overleg Wees eerlijk en verzoeningsgezind Ben sp een ander niet en ga met mensen om die zedelijk beter zijn dan jezelf Spreek bescheiden en behoud een rein gemoed Matig je in het eten en drinken Houd vrienden te vriend en laat ieder in zijn waardigheid Vergeld geen kwaad met kwaad Kleed je netjes, benijd een ander het geluk niet en wees tevreden met wat je hebt Wees standvastig in het goede en vermijd het kwade Wees voorkomend, oprecht en standvastig Verdraag geluk of tegenslag, winst of verlies, op gepaste en gematigde wijze Neem en geef met mate Een indrukwekkende lijst *Mate* wordt herhaaldelijk genoemd, conflictbeheersing en harmonie zijn belangrijk in de middeleeuwse maatschappij

Ook in de tweede allegorie worden vele aanwijzingen voor een goed gedrag gegeven De personificaties die uit het land van Venus verwijderd worden of in de liefdesschool moeten worden bijgeschoold door *Ghetemperthede* en *Mate*, duiden deugden of ondeugden aan die betrekking hebben op meer dan enkel liefdesrelaties We zien een parallel met de eerste allegorie

Een minnaar moet een algemeen gerespecteerd gedrag tonen De recipienten dienen zich met hem te kunnen identificeren Ik noem de persoonsverbeeldingen, uit hun naam kan men dan zelf afleiden welk gedrag ze symboliseren Nadere informatie vindt men in de paragrafen over de personificaties Veel eigenschappen gelden ook voor algemeen maatschappelijk gedrag

De lijst van verbannen luidt: *Roum, Verwaenthede, Envie, Clap-Al, Nijt, Quatheit, Atye, Orghelieuse, Overmoet, Ledicheit, Wrake, Spreec-goet, Achter-sprak* en *Breede-Scande*. Naast de minnaar moeten worden bijgeschoold: *Scieloos, Roukeloos, Wilthede, Lust, Gheer-altoos, Jonchede, Rijchede, Const, Melodie, Vrye-Jonst, Haestichde, Node-Verbeiden, Gheerne-Comen, Node-Scheiden, Danse-Wel, Blide-Moet, Lach-Vele* en *Onna-Vroet*.

Zij vertegenwoordigen een bont gezelschap eigenschappen die we al zijn tegengekomen of die gemakkelijk uit de naam af te leiden zijn. Opmerkelijk is dat de vaak ter discussie gestelde eigenschappen van de jeugd die in het voorgaande besproken zijn, niet verbannen worden. Men accepteert ze kennelijk als ze zich 'getemperd' en 'met mate' manifesteren!

Tenslotte vermelden we nog gedicht X. Het ABC-gedicht stelt met behulp van de stijlfiguur de apostrophe het ontbreken van vele deugden aan de kaak. Naast de groep van de studenten die teveel redetwisten, worden onder andere ook de hoge prelaten, de rijken, de adel, de gierigen, de kunstenaars, de minnaars, de mensen met een 'dorperlijke' aard, de gulzigen, de 'verwaanden', de avontuurlijke zeevaarders die op rijkdom belust zijn en de zotte jonge feestvierders terechtgewezen. Ieder zal rekenschap moeten afleggen van zijn daden.

Hoewel een aantal leden van de literaire kring achter het Gr.Hs. vermoedelijk sterke bindingen met de handel- en zeevaart had, is het aantal morele toespelingen daarop niet groot. Reynaert 1990 (197-204) wijdt een aparte paragraaf aan de "sociaal-economische aspecten" in de liederen en wijst op het gebruik van de term *ghewin* en geeft daarvan één voorbeeld. Er zijn er evenwel veel meer te geven. Termen rond het woordveld 'winnen' komen 48 maal in het convoluut voor, in allerlei betekenisuances, zoals bijvoorbeeld in L79, 44 waarin de minnaar *Vor al ghewin* de aandacht van de vrouwe probeert te krijgen, en *Mochtic haers troost noch doen bekin, Daer voren coric gheen ghewin* (L59: 15-16). Een geregeld terugkomende grondgedachte is *Ende hoet ons vor de vrec altoos, die niet ne geert dan gelt ghewin* (L28, 27-28). We vinden dit motief, rijkelijk breed uitgewerkt in gedicht IV (61-131): de gierigen zijn gericht op tijdelijk goed en worden *al bedroghen in den hent*, maar de dienaren van Venus *nemmermeere van reinen dienste bedroghen en werdt* (130-131). De klemtoon in dit gedicht ligt uiteraard wel op *reine* dienst.

De raadgevingen van vrouw *Verziene* die we zojuist gehoord hebben, zijn uiteraard ook toepasselijk in het handelsverkeer. Vooral de nogal cryptisch geformuleerde eis *Also tghewin, also de scade. Sijt niet te drouwe om gheen verlies, No niet so blide, ghine wacht u dies, Ghi en peinst hoe wel dat met u ga, Tghewin, tverlies en comter na* (1665-1669) valt op. Verder weegt de moralist het menselijke gedrag wel vaak af in de terminologie van het bezitten van een batig of negatief saldo. De termen rond *verlies* (ongeveer 84 keer) worden dikwijls gebruikt, ook als zedelijke of godsdienstige zaken aan de orde komen. De *winst* komt er bij de zedepredikers natuurlijk veel bekaaid af (zo'n 15 keer). Bij de stadspoorten in XIII komt het handelsaspect even naar voren als de *Speipoorte* wordt genoemd, die *twee pointen int zeil* bezit, namelijk *Hope* en *Heil*. Dank krijgt *dat zaliche Zwin* én God die gaf, geeft en geven zal (234-242).

Tenslotte nog even de Paaspreek van broeder Jan Lyoen (VII) waarin hij vier *condicien prouft*. Naast het bijstand verlenen aan de verdrukten, zal men in de strijd om een goed leven de menselijke natuur moeten beteugelen en in het goede spoor houden door boetedoening en een op het goede gerichte wil. Het tweezijdig snijdende zwaard van God dient

de menselijke op zonden gerichte aardse natuur en de ziel van elkaar gescheiden te houden. De ziel zal men ongeschonden houden door de godsdienstige plichten te vervullen en zich aan de tien geboden te houden. Op deze wijze zal als de *tijt vulcomen* zi de mens door God in zijn rijk gevoerd kunnen worden.

6.5 Conclusies

Het geheel overziende krijgen wij een verrassend totaal van regels voor een deugdzaam bestaan op allerlei levensgebieden. Zij worden geheel in de lijn van het handschrift op een zeer gedifferentieerde wijze aangeboden. Dikwijls bestaat er een groot spanningsveld tussen het *diesseitige* profane leven en de door de kerk verkondigde altruïstische, op het *Jenseits* gerichte levenswijze.

De juiste wijze van leven wordt in het Gr Hs door figuren van diverse plumage, vaak los van de narratio, aan de recipienten voorgehouden. Een zekere vervlechting vindt wel plaats in enkele minneallegorieën, een wijs personage geeft raadgevingen (vaak opmerkelijk losstaand van het eigenlijke minnegebeuren) die de minnaar moet toepassen in de benadering van de gehefde vrouw. Door zijn falen wordt aangetoond hoe moeilijk het is de vereiste mores in de praktijk te brengen. Didactisch gezien is dit voor het identificatieproces niet zo'n goed uitgangspunt om de toehoorders te inspireren het dagelijkse leven in goede banen te leiden. Van *happy endings* is geen sprake. Aan het eind van de verhaalde geschiedenissen is de minnaar weer even ver als aan het begin en het lijkt er niet op dat hij veel van het beleefde heeft opgestoken.

Duidelijk is dat de verkondiger van de ethiek nog denkt in de schema's van de theologen" (Reynaert 1994, 35), wat grote weerstanden oproept bij - in dit handschrift althans - de jonge mensen. Allerlei aspecten in de liefde en een vreugdevol amusant leven acht deze groep belangrijker. Daarnaast zijn er echter ook veel regulerende uitspraken die getuigen van een realistische levenskijk die, zoals bij alle normen, doortrokken is van een zeker idealisme. Zoals in alle tijden bouwt men op het idee dat Gods schepselen het vermogen bezitten het goede te doen en het kwade te laten.

Voortdurend komt de noodzaak van de overgang naar voren van de "vom außen zum innen geleiteten Menschen" (Riesman 1961), een instelling die op alle gebieden een grote zelfdiscipline eist.

DE MELANCHOLIE

7.0 Inleidende opmerkingen

Er zijn in het Gruuthuse convoluut veel verwijzingen naar de melancholie waaraan de minnaar door zijn liefdesverdriet bij tijd en wijle lijdt. De term 'melancholie' wordt tamelijk zeldzaam gebruikt. Aanwijzingen dat er van melancholische verschijnselen sprake is, zijn evenwel in grote aantallen aanwezig. We vinden het woord 'melancholie' in diverse vormen en betekenissen slechts op de volgende plaatsen:

Melancholye (VIII: 80); *Melancoleerde* (I: 241); *Melancolie* (I: 896, 916, 1021, 1035, 1047, 1050, 1110, 1127, 1234, 1260, 1335, 1449, 1452, 1517, 1525, 1566, 1587, 1620, 1707, 1731, 1799, 1840, 1853, 1875, 1902, 1945, 1969, 2032, 2324; XII: 56, 475; L23: 1, 21); *Melancolien* (I: 998, 1190, 1472, 1604, 1739, 1758, 1885, 1047; II: 240); *Melancolve* (V: 76; L146: 13); *Melancolyen* (XII: 240).

Herhaaldelijk wordt echter aangeduid wat de uitwerking van de depressie is op de lichamelijke en geestelijke toestand van de minnende *ic* en wat als remedie aanbevolen of toegepast wordt. Dit is blijkbaar voor de ingewijde recipiënten voldoende om het verband met de melancholie te leggen. Kennis van de symptomen die deze psychopathologische toestanden kenmerken en die uitvoerig in de medische wetenschappelijke literatuur worden omschreven, zijn noodzakelijk om de teksten beter te begrijpen. Ik beschrijf dus eerst de symptomen om pas daarna over te stappen naar de teksten in het handschrift.

De eerste paragraaf bespreekt kort de moderne opvattingen over de manisch-depressieve psychose (tot voor kort wel met de algemene term melancholie aangeduid), om zo een vergelijking te kunnen maken met de middeleeuwse inzichten die ik in de tweede paragraaf behandel. Ik kom daarbij tot de conclusie dat er een verrassend grote mate van overeenstemming is tussen de diagnoses en de geneesmethoden in beide tijdvakken.

In de derde paragraaf volgt een uitgebreide beschouwing over de beschrijvingen van de melancholische verschijnselen en de suggesties om ze te genezen, zoals die in het Gr.Hs. worden weergegeven. De eerste en tweede allegorie dienen daarbij als uitgangspunt, omdat de vertwijfeling en de daarmee gepaard gaande melancholie daarin centraal staan. Ook enkele liederen en enige van de overige gedichten krijgen daar aandacht.

De volgende paragraaf gaat in op de drie zeer specifieke betekenissen in het woordveld rond *melancolie* en *melancoleren*. Zij komen naar voren bij de dichterlijke activiteiten van de minnaar, bij de naam van de allegorische figuur *Melancolie* die op geestelijk niveau specifieke kwaliteiten schijnt te bezitten en bij de beschrijving van de geestelijke toestand van de minnaar. Ten slotte komt de opvatting ter sprake dat er in het Gr.Hs. een gedeprimeerde stemming tengevolge van een algemene existentiële vertwijfeling, een *desperatio*, als diepere onderlaag en zingevende constante (Reynaert 1999, 50-51) aanwezig

zou zijn. Deze uit zich in een melancholische stemming die genezing zoekt in de muziekbeoefening, die een ruime plaats in het convoluut inneemt (121-125)²⁷.

We beperken ons nadrukkelijk niet tot de liederen in het middendeel, maar beschouwen ook het derde deel, waarin de melancholieverschijnselen vaak en dikwijls op meer expliciete wijze tot uiting komen. We zien ook op dit punt het Gr.Hs. als een eenheid die - zoals reeds eerder is betoogd - een intratekstuele benadering rechtvaardigt. Er zijn betekeniscomplexen in de teksten waarvan men niet bepaalde delen geïsoleerd kan bekijken. Een dergelijke beperking leidt onvermijdelijk tot een vertekening van de interpretatie.

7.1 Hedendaagse opvattingen over de melancholie

De gedragspatronen en de lichamelijke verschijnselen die voortvloeien uit het melancholische lijden zijn in het Gr.Hs. tamelijk uitvoerig beschreven, zoals we in 7.3 zullen zien. Zoals reeds gezegd is het interessant - ter vergelijking - te bezien hoe de moderne geneeskunde over de ziekte oordeelt. Opgemerkt moet wel worden dat de hedendaagse psychiatrie de term de laatste decennia niet meer frequent gebruikt (uitgezonderd in Amerika). De verschijnselen worden nu aangeduid met 'manisch-depressieve psychose', waarbij men dan vooral denkt aan de exogene en psychogene varianten die makkelijker te genezen zijn dan de endogene. Ik heb een medische encyclopedie geraadpleegd (Corthals 1984) en een artikel van Schmitt (1990), die geschreven zijn in een tijd waarin de terminologie 'melancholie' nog gangbaar was. Uiteraard is het volgende overzicht beknopt en niet volledig. Bovendien weten de psychiaters volgens Schmitt ook nu nog niet precies wat men onder 'melancholie' moet verstaan. In Amerika geeft men een andere invulling aan het begrip dan in Europa. Een algemene consensus is dat het een psychopathologisch symptomencomplex is, een syndroom, een cyclotieme ernstige depressie met panische reacties. Er is een uitgesproken gevoel van onbehagen, lusteloosheid en verlies van initiatief. Allerlei 'wanen' zijn aanwezig met ondergangsgedachten, schuldgevoelens en hypochondrie. In de lichamelijke functies treden storingen op als slapeloosheid en gebrek aan eetlust.

Men constateert een geleidelijk ontstaan van de ziekte, met als eerste symptomen vermoeidheid en slapeloosheid. Daarna gaan de bovengenoemde verschijnselen optreden. Vaak zijn er psychologische oorzaken als bijvoorbeeld onverwerkte rouw, gevoelens van verlatenheid of afwijzing, ongunstige arbeidsomstandigheden, grote persoonlijke teleurstellingen, pensionering of financiële moeilijkheden. Bij uitzondering zijn er lichamelijke (infectie, operatie, zwangerschap) of toxische oorzaken.

Er zijn duidelijke uiterlijke ziekteverschijnselen, zoals een grauwe kleur, een ingevallen oud uiterlijk, het ontbreken van spontaan gedrag, trage bewegingen en het urenlang zitten in

²⁷ Er is een uitgebreide literatuur over de melancholie. Geraadpleegd zijn o.a. Lewis 1964 (1985), Poirion 1965, Huizinga 1999, Heger 1967, Beek 1969, Werkgroep 1972, Delumeau 1983, Klibansky 1989, Mulder 1978, Rens 1980, Werkgroep van Utrechtse Neerlandici 1983, Cerquiglini 1985, Pleij 1985, Schnell 1985, Van Gijzen 1989, Boulton 1990, Schipperges 1967 en 1990, Hogenelst, Rierink 1992, Besamusca 1994, Lassche 1994a, Reynaert 1999, Willaert 2000, Boogaert 2001

een pijnlijke houding met gebogen hoofd. Men geeft monosyllabische antwoorden, steunt en zucht. Soms is er een uitgesproken angstcomplex dat gepaard gaat met een sterke motorische opwinding, mismoedigheid en een treurige gedrukktheid zonder hoop, die zich uit in een grote vertwijfeling.

Er treden vitale storingen op met een bedrukt gevoel in borst, hoofd en buik, benauwenis in de hals en een zwaar gevoel in de ledematen. Kenmerkend zijn ook depersonaliteitsbelevissen waarbij men denkt niet meer te bestaan. Er vindt een soort verwijdering van zichzelf plaats. Vaak is er een derealisatie, men raakt vervreemd van de werkelijkheid. Er zijn psychische remmingen met als gevolg een trage gedachtegang en onvoldoende geneigdheid om na te denken. Bovendien treden problemen in het geheugen op. De patiënt is ongeconcentreerd bij het luisteren en lezen en pikt uit de omgeving alleen datgene op wat het gevoel van ellende nog versterkt. Er is een vertraagd tijdsbeleven en een geredde wilsfunctie, die tot een volstrekte willoosheid kan leiden. Naast de vertraagde activiteit worden de lichamelijke verzorging en kleding verwaarloosd. Vaak is er een volstrekt verstoord gevoelsleven, niets raakt de patiënt. Er is geen doelgericht, gepland handelen, men is fantasieloos, verengd en weinig gevarieerd in de gedragspatronen. Het handelen en denken geschiedt dwangmatig.

Bij de heersende depressie wordt de belevingswereld beperkt tot fundamenteel verdriet, spijt en wanhoop. Niets beurt op. Een extreme vermoeidheid met een leeg hoofd en een algemeen onbehagen gaat dikwijls gepaard met darmkrampen, benauwdheid, verspreide pijnen en verhoogde onlustgevoelens. De patiënt ziet zichzelf als onwaardig en neemt geen beslissingen meer. Zelfbeschuldigingen en overdreven zondegevoel geven een gevoel van ongeneeslijk ziek zijn.

In extreme gevallen zien we een sterk doodsverlangen en suïcidaal gedrag. Men beschouwt de dood als een verplichting, als een uitweg, de omgeving is dan bovendien 'verlost'. Soms neemt men ook nabestaanden mee om hen te 'verlossen'. De lijder weigert drank en voedsel (vroeger een belangrijke doodsoorzaak). Sommige melancholici hebben uitgebreide fantasieën over zelfmoordpogingen. Het blijkt evenwel dat maar vijftien procent op deze wijze sterft. Bij het gebruik van medicijnen bestaat een concreet risico dat men een overdosis inneemt. Enkele patiënten denken vaak wekenlang aan niets anders, bereiden de dood zorgvuldig voor en laten zich door niets weerhouden. De gedachte kan evenwel ook plotseling opkomen. De zelfdoding is zelfs in een moderne psychiatrische inrichting niet altijd te voorkomen. Het aantal zelfmoordgevallen is echter bij niet-melancholici procentueel groter.

Naast de reeds genoemde lichamelijke symptomen zien we ook storingen in het bioritme met moeilijkheden bij het inslapen en doorslapen. De vierde, diepe slaapfase is sterk ingekort en ook ritmeverstoringen treden op in de diverse slaapfasen. Vaak zijn er spijsverteringsstoornissen. We zien een uitdrogen van de huid en kouwelijkheid. Er is een afgenomen geslachtsdrift en een wegblijvende menstruatie. Sterke dagschommelingen bij de verschijnselen geven de verplegende personen onzekerheid, omdat ze niet weten wat ze te verwachten hebben.

Het verloop van de ziekte kan een spontane genezing tonen, meestal na zes tot zeven maanden. Een maand ziekenhuisopname is echter vaak noodzakelijk. Eerst komt er een toenemende activiteit en eetlust, daarna verdwijnen de depressies langzaam. Het terugkeren van de slaap is een teken van herstel. Men is genezen als er weer levensblijheid is (Lied

140: *Help God om vroilicheit!*). Vaak zijn er slechts schijnbare genezingen, attentie blijft vereist.

Er zijn diverse klinische varianten. De eenvoudige vorm waarin de bovengenoemde verschijnselen in een verzwakte vorm voorkomen, is de stuporeuze melancholie, die bij onvoldoende behandeling kan uitgroeien tot een 'gewone' melancholie. Bij de geagiteerde melancholie treedt een onafgebroken opwinding, rusteloosheid, gejammer, angst en een benauwdheids- en verstikkingsgevoel op. Soms draagt dit alles zo'n theateraal karakter dat de depressieve achtergrond wordt miskend. De vierde vorm is de hallucinerende melancholie, met sterk negatief gekleurde waanbelevingen op allerlei gebied. De patiënt is rotsvast van de wanen overtuigd, er is een toename van schuldgevoelens, onwaardigheids- en zondewanen. Kleine zonden worden doodzonden, er zijn achtervolgingswanen en men beschouwt de ziekte als een straf voor begane wandaden. De laatste vorm die men onderscheidt is de gemaskerde agressie. We zien vervormde klachten, meestal beperkt tot een bepaald somatisch systeem als spijsvertering, maagpijn, slapeloosheid, benauwdheid, hartklachten, kortademigheid, flauwvallen en landerigheid.

Algemeen wordt erkend dat de symptomatologie van een melancholie kan variëren van cultuur tot cultuur. De ziekteverschijnselen die altijd en overal teruggevonden worden, zijn de depressieve stemming, het initiatiefverlies, de vermindering van eetlust en libido, en de slaapstoornissen. Sterk cultuurafhankelijk zijn de schuldgevoelens, de waanideeën en zelfmoordneigingen. In sommige culturen overheersen de remmingen en de lichamelijke klachten.

7.2 Opvattingen in de Middeleeuwen

Ik maak eerst een aantal opmerkingen over de diagnoses en de geneeswijzen van de melancholie in de Middeleeuwen. In de volgende paragraaf wordt dan onderzocht in hoeverre het gedrag van de minnaar en de in de tekst genoemde therapieën overeenstemmen met de vermelde karakterisering en de vorige paragraaf.

Als uitgangspunt neem ik het werk van Schipperges (1967 en 1990) en Beek (1969). Ik ontleen daaraan gegevens, zonder steeds de bron en de bladzijden te vermelden. Beide auteurs beschouwen de melancholie in de middeleeuwse geschriften als een verzamelbegrip voor allerlei waanvoorstellingen.

7.2.1 *De melancholie als 'complexie'*

In alle tijden is veel over somatisch-psychische ziekten geschreven, waarbij opvalt hoeveel verschijnselen vermeld worden, zonder dat die nauwkeurig omschreven kunnen worden. De tegenwoordige verfijningen in de diagnostische terminologie en de daarmee verbonden therapie, kende men vroeger nog niet. Voor een juist begrip zal het nodig zijn teksten uit de hoge Middeleeuwen nauwkeurig te analyseren en te interpreteren.

Al in 1080 werd een Arabisch geschrift²⁸ over de melancholie in Monte Cassino in het Latijn vertaald. Via de universiteit van Salerno kwam dit geschrift in Chartres en Parijs. Daarnaast hadden ook de opvattingen van Aristoteles grote invloed.

Melancholie vond volgens de klassieke opvatting haar oorzaak niet in het gemoed, maar werd gezien als een effect van de afscheiding van bepaalde stoffen in het lichaam. Deze 'temperamentenleer' beruiste op de werking van de vier lichaamssappen: bloed, slijm, gal en zwarte gal. Aristoteles meende dat de melancholici op grond van de wisselende eigenschappen van de zwarte gal van nature bijzonder labiel en kwetsbaar zijn. Ze zijn echter anderzijds op allerlei gebieden zeer begaafd. Bij deze opvattingen vinden we dus een volkomen gesloten model, het beheerst de fysiologische en pathologische denkbeelden van de Arabische, Joodse en Latijnse artsen²⁹. Bij storingen in het systeem van de lichaamssappen treden somatische verschijnselen op die ook de geest beïnvloeden. De kwalijke sappen zijn werkzaam in het lichaam en stijgen naar het hoofd. In de naamgeving van 'hypochonder' speelt deze opvatting illustratief door. Met *hypochondria* wordt namelijk bedoeld op de zijdelingse weke delen onder het kraakbeen van de ribben, de zwaarmoedige zou lijden aan overmatige afscheiding van de zwarte gal die daar gelokaliseerd werd.

Blank (1990, 31-32) wijst erop dat volgens andere opvattingen niet zozeer het overheersen van de afscheiding van de zwarte gal de oorzaak van de verstoringen in het psychische evenwicht is, maar de temperatuur van de zwarte gal zelf. Als die de juiste maat heeft, is de melancholicus tot grote prestaties in staat. Er dient een evenwicht te zijn, bij afwijkingen dreigt apathie of waanzin. De zwarte gal kan dus zowel positief als negatief werken. De ommekeer naar extreme uitersten, als het verkeren in een diepe depressieve toestand of het komen in een manische vervoering, dient vermeden te worden. Dan pas is de melancholicus tot het allerhoogste in staat en bereikt hij als enige van de vier temperamentstypen de nabijheid van het goddelijke. Deze opvatting wordt meer door de theologen en filosofen aangehangen dan door de medici. Bader (1990, 31) verduidelijkt dit als volgt: "Melancholie ist also dipolar: wenn zu kalt, entstehen Apoplexie [beroerte] und Athymie, wenn zu heiß, Euthymie, Gesang, Ekstase". Wordt deze toestand "konstitutionell dann ergreift die Melancholie auch den Charakter, und zwar so, daß bei zu großer Kalte Stumpfheit und Verblödung, bei zu großer Hitze Liebestollheit entstehen".

Het verband met de planeet Saturnus (die het dichtst bij het Goddelijke staat) bespreken we hier niet [uitvoerige informatie vindt men in Klibansky c.s. 1989]. In het Gr.Hs. wordt dit verband niet rechtstreeks gelegd, al wordt in het vierde gedicht wel op de invloed van de planeten op het menselijke gedrag gewezen. In de tweede allegorie maakt Venus een allusie in deze richting.

De besproken opvattingen werken in de geneeskunde zeer lang door, zelfs tot in de renaissancetijd.

7.2.2 De veronderstelde melancholische ziekteverschijnselen

²⁸ *De melancholia* is vertaald door Constantinus Africanus, nadere toelichting in Schipperges, 1990, 119-121

²⁹ Men zie o.a. Klibansky c.s. 1979, Jansen-Sieben 1985, Gijzen 1989, Bader 1990 en Blank 1990.

Als algemene oorzaak van de melancholie werd aangenomen dat de zwarte gal zich - door welke oorzaak dan ook - in te grote hoeveelheid door het bloed mengt en de werking van de hersenen en het hart nadelig beïnvloedt. In willekeurige volgorde noemen we een aantal verschijnselen die middeleeuwse artsen tot de uitingsvormen van de melancholie rekenen. Er treedt een diepe zwaarmoedigheid op, met als gevolg de afstoting van geliefde vrienden. Ook het tegengestelde komt voor: een sterk toegenomen genegenheid voor vrienden en verwanten.

De patiënt wordt overvallen door voorstellingen die in werkelijkheid niet bestaan. Daarnaast ontstaat een grote argwaan, waaruit vrees en droefheid voortkomen.

Het oordelingsvermogen en het verstand worden aangetast, waardoor men niet begrijpt wat men begrijpen moet. Bovendien wordt het onderscheid tussen werkelijkheid en fictie niet goed meer onderkend, noch de juiste proporties van allerlei zaken. Allerelei voorstellingen van niet bestaande verschijningen plagen de patiënt, meestal zijn het angstwekkende gestalten in allerlei vormen. Waanvoorstellingen nemen bezit van hem. Men is bang voor alles wat zwart is, men ziet er duivels, wolven of demonen in. Men denkt dat men slangen of wormen in zich heeft en er is een grote angst voor vergiftiging. De patiënt meent van glas te zijn en te breken bij aanraking. Verder wil hij niet eten, omdat de hemel dan aan stukken valt. Men legt zichzelf onwezenlijke opdrachten als rivieren indammen of kerken bouwen op.

Tengevolge van de ziekte ontstaan allerlei lichamelijke mankementen: het lichaam wordt zwartgroen, er is een vermagering en een daling van de potentie. Grote onlustgevoelens door slapeloosheid plagen de zieke. Men constateert storingen in de spijsvertering, hoofdpijnen, flikkeringen voor de ogen, druk op de ogen, een rondwalende blik, een grote afschuw van eten of juist een ziekelijke eetlust. De zieke wil steeds slapen, omdat de zwarte gal op de hersenen drukt. Indien de gal de hersenen sterk verhit, wordt steeds geweend.

Niet alleen het oordelingsvermogen vermindert, maar ook allerlei karaktereigenschappen veranderen. Het rechtsgevoel neemt af, men maakt zich druk over onbelangrijke zaken. Er is een grote begeerte naar medicijnen, die men dan echter weer afwijst of niet op de juiste wijze inneemt.

Opmerkelijk is een sterk wisselende gemoedsstemming waardoor de verschijnselen nu eens niet, dan weer wel optreden. De patiënt beweegt zich traag en is zwaar op de hand, zoekt dikwijls eenzaamheid en afzondering in het donker.

Andere patiënten zoeken juist zonnige plaatsen, gaan paardrijden, luisteren naar verschillende soorten muziek en willen praten met verstandige, onderhoudende mannen. Deze groep rekent men niet tot de ernstig gestoorden, omdat niet het hart, maar alleen het verstand is aangetast.

Zelfkastijding neemt extreme vormen aan: men wil zichzelf slaan en bijten. Ook zelfdoding komt voor.

Alom bekend was de *amor hereos*, een vorm van ziekelijke liefde. De Werkgroep van Utrechtse Neerlandici (1983, 35) merkt over deze liefde op dat dit niet zomaar een verliefdheid is. De Arabische medicus Avicenna beschreef reeds dat zij die door deze ziekte gekweld werden, grote kans liepen te sterven of gek te worden (vergelijk L140). Ook is het

mogelijk over te gaan tot de vreselijkste daden om de verlangens te bevredigen of erin onder te gaan³⁰

Bij de *hereos*-variant geeft Beek (108 v) de volgende bijzonderheden. Men richt zich geheel op Goddelijke zaken en is hevig geboeid door de schoonheid van vormen en figuren. Men wil zich vereenzelvigen met de geliefde, uiteraard zonder dat dit mogelijk is en de lijder denkt dat de geliefde vrouw de beste, schoonste en heiligste is die bestaat. Als de verliefde denkt aan de geliefde is er een geregelde afwisseling tussen lachen en verrukt zijn, gevolgd door het bedrukt en droevig zijn met een gevoel van vereenzaming. De lijder ondervindt veel lichamelijke kwellingen als slapeloosheid, smart, kwijnen en wegteren. De ogen liggen diep en zijn droog en er is een frequent knippen met de ogen. De ademhaling is onregelmatig en de pols snel. Er zijn kleur- en motorische veranderingen.

Opmerkelijk is het grote aantal overeenkomsten met de moderne diagnoses van de melancholische verschijnselen. De observaties van de middeleeuwse artsen zouden we bijna 'fenomenologisch' kunnen noemen. We behoeven voor een dergelijke benadering kennelijk niet te wachten op de renaissance met zijn andere 'wetenschappelijke' aanpak. Als een van de oorzaken van de uitvoerige en nauwkeurige middeleeuwse opsommingen van de ziekteverschijnselen, ziet men het beschikbaar zijn van veel observatietijd voor de artsen. De verschijnselen kwamen veel voor bij de adel die zich prive-artsen kon veroorloven.

7.2.3 Middeleeuwse therapieën voor de melancholische kwalen

Schipperges noemt een aantal therapieën "die zeer verscheiden zijn daar er vele vormen van melancholie zijn". Als algemene geneeswijze acht men een evenwichtige levensstijl zeer belangrijk. Eten en drinken, het ritme van slaap en waken, arbeid en ontspanning dienen veel aandacht te krijgen. Een regelmatige toediening van spijsen is belangrijk, ze moeten vochtig, vet en fijn geprakt zijn, een aangename geur is aan te bevelen. Scherpe en zure spijsen zijn verboden, alleen jong vlees, gegist brood en weinig zout zijn geoorloofd. Verboden is het eten van vissen uit stilstaand water en hersenen van dieren. Melk en oude kaas worden ontraden. Het geregeld met mate wijn drinken verheugt de ziel, bant de angstcomplexen uit en verjongt en verzacht het verharde gemoed. Misbruik is echter schadelijk.

Klimaat en de luchtzuiverheid zijn belangrijke factoren (vergelijk Van Gijzen 1989, 101). Het wonen in een huis dat open ligt naar het oosten, raadt men aan vanwege de gelijkmatigheid van de klimatologische complexie en de milde lucht.

Zeer belangrijk vindt men natuurlijk het weer in evenwicht brengen van de werking van de lichaamssappen. Het volledige scala van de antiek-middeleeuwse wetenschap wordt daartoe in werking gezet. Noodzakelijk is het steeds kalm en verstandig toespreken van de patient. Een behandeling met baden en goede muziek is gewenst. Daarnaast is het beoefenen van sport en een regelmatige coitus raadzaam. Zeer aan te bevelen is het wandelen bij zonsopgang over een zanderige bodem of paardrijden met een lege maag. Deze activiteiten

³⁰ Zie o.a. Van Gijzen 1989, hoofdstuk 7; Lewis 1964 (1985), 156-161 (Sensitive and Vegetable Soul); Schnell 1985, 15-52 (Ambivalenz mittelalterlicher Liebesdichtung).

moeten gevolgd worden door een overgieting met geneeskrachtige vloeistoffen of door baden. Een inzalving houdt vervolgens de lichaamssappen vast. Ook bij slapeloosheid worden zalvingen toegepast. Verder heeft het overgieten van het hoofd met vrouwenmelk een genezende werking, evenals het bevorderen van niesbuien.

Een zeer uitgebreid scala van medicijnen en kruiden wordt beschreven om kwade stoffen los te weken en te verdrijven.

Zeer nuttig vindt men een chirurgische shocktherapie als het diep inbranden ter hoogte van de knieën. Het plaatsen van een brandijzer op het hoogste punt van het hoofd en dergelijke weinig vrolijk makende ingrepen vormen geen uitzondering. Purgeren en aderlaten, het plaatsen van bloedzuigers, het opwekken van de menstruatie, reukmiddelen met de geur van bloemen, een heldere ziekenkamer, wiegen van de zieke, nasalia gedrenkt in opium om te doen slapen, het is allemaal nuttig en gewenst.

Beek noemt bij de specifieke behandeling van de *amor hereos* het belang dat men hecht om aan de weet komen waar de zieke naar verlangt. Kennis van de geliefde draagt bij tot de genezing. De geneesheer voelt de pols en noemt de zaken waarvan hij vermoedt dat ze wensobjecten zijn (een soort Freudiaanse divantherapie in de Middeleeuwen, dus met de pols als leugendetector!).

Vermaningen door het woord, geselen en het zitvlak bewerken met roeden zijn belangrijk, alsmede het overbrengen van droeve berichten over de geliefde. Verre reizen zijn nuttig en bovenal hard werken, want 'spitters en werkers hebben deze ziekte niet'. Veel van de geneeswijzen die ik hierboven noem kunnen alleen kapitaalcrachtige lieden bekostigen die niet gewend zijn de handen uit de mouwen te steken.

Het samenbrengen met een oude vrouw wordt aanbevolen. Zij moet zeggen dat ze een bedplasser, een dronkaard en een epileptica is en bovendien vol vergroeiingen zit. Als dit niet helpt, moet haar menstruatiedoek bij het gezicht van de lijder gebracht worden, terwijl men uitgilt: 'zo eentje is jouw vriendin!'

Daarnaast wordt toch algemeen aangenomen dat seksuele vereniging met de geliefde vrouw genezend werkt.

De ziekte dient men te behandelen voor deze zich 'vastzet'. speciale aandacht krijgen daarbij de symptomen. Men moet die goed kennen voor men tot een causale behandeling kan overgaan.

Pleij (1985, p. 34) wijst nog op de door hem aangetroffen opmerkingen over de genezende werking van vrolijke toneelstukjes, lachen, musiceren en het aanhoren van goede vertellingen.

Ook wat de therapie betreft, zien we weer frappante overeenkomsten met een aantal moderne medische inzichten, al zijn sommige excessen uiteraard niet meer gebruikelijk, althans als men de huidige elektrische shocktherapie geen exces wil noemen. Modern lijken de aanwijzingen voor hygienische leefgewoonten en gezonde behuizingen, het volgen van een goed dieet en het zoeken van ontspanning. Ook de natuurlijke geneeswijzen en waterbehandelingen deden opgeld. Zelfs de causaal ingestelde Freud met zijn hypnotische werkwijze komt aan zijn trekken, het verbaal opsporen van de oorzaken met gebruikmaking van een soort divantherapie.

Ik vind de bovengenoemde beschrijvingen over de diagnose en therapie zeer interessant. In de vele studies over de minnepoëzie en de minnereden wordt mijns inziens met te weinig achtergrondkennis over het gedrag van de minnaar in kwestie geschreven. Men verwondert zich over het gedrag en de soms theatrale uitingen en daar blijft het bij. Een uitzondering vinden we bij Van Gijsen (1989, 95 v.) die op de melancholische verschijnselen ten aanzien van Colijn van Rijssseles *Spiegel der minnen* diepgaand ingaat. Ik heb de gegevens van haar onderzoek in de gegeven overzichten in de voorgaande paragrafen niet genoemd. Ze corresponderen grotendeels met de inzichten van Schipperges en Beek. Zij schrijft: "De beschrijving van Dierick's symptomen, de behandeling ervan en het uiteindelijk fatale verloop van zijn ziekte, blijken volgens de medische opvattingen van Colijns eigen tijd juist buitengewoon realistisch". Daar dit stuk bijna honderd jaar na het Gr.Hs. verschenen is en de melancholische verschijnselen bijna volledig congrueren, zie ik hierin een bevestiging van mijn stelling dat de melancholische verschijnselen en behandelingsmethoden in onze westerse cultuur de eeuwen door grote overeenkomsten vertonen, zelfs tot in onze eigen tijd.

In het Gr.Hs. ziet men veel elementen uit de middeleeuwse medische wetenschap terug. We hebben dit reeds in de eerste paragraaf gezien, ze zullen ook in het vervolg ter sprake komen. De melancholie is geen puur literair verschijnsel, maar een element uit het concrete leven. Gangbare medische opvattingen over de mens bestaan in de literatuur.

7.3 Contextuele gegevens rond het woordveld 'melancolie' in het Gr.Hs.

Nu volgt een aantal illustratieve vindplaatsen die van een melancholische geestestoestand bij de *ic*-figuren getuigen, met een korte toelichting. Het woord *melancolie* zelf wordt door de dichter(s) zelden gebruikt.

Een zeer illustratief tekstgedeelte waarin de melancholie naar voren komt, is het slot van de eerste allegorie. De minnaar is uit de burcht verwijderd, omdat hij zich niet aan de strenge eisen van de minnecode gehouden heeft. Hij komt in een ommuurde tuin die het karakter van een *locus terribilis* draagt [4.2.2] en waarin bomen groeien met vruchten waarvan de eerste letters het woord *sceiden* vormen. De situatie wordt beschreven in de regels 2209-2357 en is door mij in het achtste hoofdstuk becommentarieerd. Om de gedeprimeerde gemoedsgesteldheid te tekenen, gebruikt de dichter een groot aantal termen. Deze zijn (zoals we in een vorige paragraaf hebben gezien) volgens de middeleeuwers kenmerkend voor de melancholische verschijnselen. De moderne psychiatrie gebruikt ze - zij het in wat modernere bewoordingen - nog steeds.

We vinden de volgende aanduidingen: dolen, koude rillingen, angst, suïcidale gedachten, de handen wringen, zichzelf niet kennen, buiten zinnen geraken, *vrees*, *ziecheit*, *zwaerheit*, *suerheit*, *crancheit*, *claghe*, *allende*, *eenicheit*, *jammer*, *cranc-ghehuc*, *droufheit*, *verleden vrolicheit*, *druc*, *noot*, *wenen*, *ghepeins*, *onverdullicheiden*, *mi selven niet en kennen*, *lide*, *leit*, *graeu oordene*, *hope en troost sijn wech*, *niemens raet helpt*, *weene*, *flau en mat*, *cracht en macht ontghingen*, *tende den rade*, *besuldich voelen*, *berau*, *staerf van pinen doot*. Dit alles staat in nadrukkelijk verband met de afwijzing door de geliefde vrouw. Het zijn verschijnselen die de *amor hereos* kenmerken.

Ook in de tweede allegorie staat de psychische vertwijfeling die de minne teweegbrengt centraal. Uit het gesprek dat de minnaar over zijn liefde met de kluizenaar voert (62-322), licht ik een aantal treffende passages. De heremiet ziet al direct aan zijn gezicht dat de verliefde geen rust kent. De minnaar raakt meteen in een gepeins, zodat hij - zoals zo *dicwile* - vergeet wat hij wilde zeggen. Bovendien wil of kan de minnaar moeilijk de communicatie onderhouden (*sat immer vaste en sweeg* (73). Hij kan zichzelf niet meer zijn en hij *cant ghebetren niet*, want hij gaat *pensende nacht ende dach* (84-87). Hij is rusteloos (77) en lijdt aan een macht die hem te boven gaat (80). Dit alles gaat gepaard met een enorm zuchten dat hem niet meer loslaat (189). Ook de ondergangsgedachten en het stervensverlangen (onder andere in 242) en het niet of slecht slapen, drinken of eten (247) zijn opvallende kenmerken van zijn depressieve toestand.

We horen een opeenstapeling van kenmerkende woorden als de minnaar zijn liefdesverdriet aan de kluizenaar kenbaar maakt: *verdriet*: 7, 28, 237; afwezigheid van *bliscap*: 12; negatie van de *hope*: 19, 244; *twifel*: 21, 236, 264, 333, 353; *jalosie*: 25, 292, 294; geen *troost*: 35; *ghepeins/pensen*: 70, 87, 193, 241 *bedruet leven*: 137; *lyden*: 78, 82, 83, 252, 307; *rouwe*: 237; *leet*: 246; *no vruecht*: 89, 91; *sucht/versuchten*: 186, 189; *vreese*: 308; *trueren*: 198, 241; *toren*: 237; *rouwe*: 237; *tgoede vergheten*: 239; *bederven/sterven/sneven*: 241, 242, 306, 307; *melancolien*: 240.

Na het zien van de geliefde die hem heeft *gevaen*, richt de minnaar zich op *Hope* voor een voorspoedige afloop. Maar ondanks zijn overtuiging dat zij trouw is, bekent hij zijn waanvoorstellingen en de passie die hem niet meer loslaat: *Jalosie die comt stappans Ende leet mi an des twifels dans, Rauwe, verdriet ende drouven toren Sal ic daer moeten sijnghe voren. Tgoede vergheten ende pensen tquade. Melancolien roupic te rade, Ic peinse, ic truere, ic wil bederven, Ende rechte vort zo wiltc sterven... Sal ic dan slapen, drincen, eten? Twifel ne laet mi niet vergheten Der dijnc, daer haer mijn herte in moeyt!* (235-249).

Op vragen van de verwonderde heremiet bekent de minnaar dat het zijn *Twifel* is die hem zo terneer drukt. Hij beseft dat de geliefde die hij hoog ophemelt, geen enkele blaam treft. De anachoreet kan niet begrijpen waarom de minnaar zichzelf op deze wijze in zo'n beklagenswaardige toestand brengt. Hij zou in die situatie anders handelen. Uiteindelijk kan de kluizenaar de minnaar, die niet wil biechten, niet helpen. Hij geeft hem echter wel zijn zegen.

Ook in de beschrijvingen van zijn geestestoestand die de *munre* aan de *taelman* geeft, vinden we een reeks bewoordingen die de sombere melancholische gemoedstoestand beschrijven. Later zullen deze bij monde van deze pleiter bij de aanklacht in de rechtbank van Vrouwe Venus, opnieuw aan de orde komen. Ook hier is duidelijk dat de minnaar aan de *amor hereos* lijdt.

Merkwaardige rollen spelen *Willemijn* (de egocentrische trek, het alleen de eigen zin willen doen en zich niet ondergeschikt kunnen maken) en *Vrybegheren* (de drang tot seksuele passie, waarbij opgemerkt moet worden dat alleen al de gedachte aan de 'vrijheid' voor een schuldbewuste minnaar een bewijs van ontrouw dient te zijn). Beide personificaties willen de minnaar verleiden tot onverantwoordelijk gedrag, wat ten dele lukt. Zo neemt hij het *Land Duchte* dat aan Venus behoort zonder haar toestemming in leen. De vertwijfeling door het besef van eigen falen zal daardoor nog toenemen. Hij gaat zich aan de 'bezittingen' van Venus te buiten.

Vrau Vorstene leidt het getuigenverhoor in II dat een reeks symptomen geeft die op de melancholische toestand wijzen waarin de minnaar verkeert. De keuze van de getuigen is typerend, zij vertegenwoordigen geestelijke vermogens van de minnaar die allemaal gekwetst zijn door *Jaloesie*, *Twifel* en *Begrijp*. Zij hebben de minnaar verlaten en moeten door bodes opgespoord worden. *Vrau Hope* verklaart dat zij de minnaar na de kwetsuren die zijn aangebracht door *Begrijp* verlaten heeft. *Trooste* is niet meer bij zijn positieven. *Vrvhede* is door *Nyt* en *Quat-Bet* [*Quatheit?*], die de minnaar in slecht gezelschap brachten, zijn vrijheid kwijt geraakt. *Vruecht* is bij de minnaar verdwenen. *Solaes* treurt, want hij heeft geen plezier meer. *Jalosie* en *Twifel* belagen *Ruste* dag en nacht door. Aan slapen, eten, spelen en drinken komt ze niet meer toe. *Pais* tenslotte heeft door de voortdurende strijd tussen de minnaar en *Twifel* de eerste verlaten.

Een tegenstrijdigheid zien we bij *Hope*'s verklaring, de advocaat *Redene* heeft tijdens zijn pleidooi (II: 1180-1227) voor Venus verklaard dat als *Hope* er niet geweest was, *De minre ware langhe uut sinen sinne*. Dat de uitspraken van *Hope* en *Redene* elkaar tegenspreken is hier niet zo belangrijk, wel de constatering van de advocaat dat het gevaar van 'buiten zinnen' raken steeds reëel aanwezig is, en dat is nu weer precies een kenmerk van de melancholische toestand.

De therapieën krijgen ook de aandacht. Allereerst bij de consultatie bij de heremiet die de minnaar verzoekt de diepste roerselen van zijn hart mee te delen (151). De raadpleging mislukt. De minnaar denkt als gepassioneerde teveel aan één ding: de minne die hem plaagt. De rationele aanbevelingen om dingen die verdriet doen te *laten staan* en te *scuwen* (257 en 265), de jaloezie te laten varen (282-283) en te biechten (301), zijn uiteraard te simplistisch.

Later in de allegorie zien we dat de *ic* gaat drinken om in *zoet gepeins* te geraken, maar dit loopt uit op een overmatig gebruik [*hi wart bi drancke*] (1307). De verliefde ziet de noodzaak om *Sanghe*, *spele*, *melodien* (1219) te beoefenen, maar het gezelschap waarin hij vertoeft, speelt met hem als een kat met een muis (1225-1226). *Mate* kan de minnaar ook hier niet opbrengen.

In de minneschool horen we een reeks raadgevingen. Men dient zich te houden aan de regels van de soberheid en te zorgen voor een geregelde dagindeling (*deelen in drien den dach*) met slapen, werken en ontspanning. Als men zwaar lijdt, kan men steun zoeken bij een goede vriend, maar draagt men het leed alleen, dan is dat beter (hier speelt de kwestie van de verplichte geheimhouding natuurlijk op de achtergrond mee en de angst voor het *clappen*). Niet verwezenlijkte minneverlangens zal men niet aan Venus wijten, maar enkel aan zichzelf. Als algemene regel geldt dat men spaarzaam dient te genieten van een beantwoorde liefde. Wie het zuur verdiende te snel soupeert, is tot klagen gedoemd. We vestigen de aandacht in dit verband nog even op de namen van de docenten *Ghetempertheit* en *Mate* [zij worden besproken in 5.3 en 5.4].

Capellanus onderstreept in *De amore* het belang van matiging. Vekeman (1981, 55-57) vertaalt dit hoofdstuk, dat handelt over de minne bij klerken, integraal. Aan minlustige dames geeft Capellanus de raad dat ze een *clerc* moeten verkiezen boven een adellijke heer, omdat de klerk behoedzamer en wijzer is dan de leek. Hij legt meer beheersing aan de dag en verstaat de kunst met vakkundige matigheid alles in evenwicht te houden. Duidelijk is dat beheersing en gematigdheid belangrijke eigenschappen zijn voor de beoefenaars van de liefde [zie 6.3.2 punt 7]. Die eis wordt in het Gr.Hs. geregeld verkondigd. De keuze van juist deze gepersonifieerde karaktereigenschappen als leermeesters dunkt me zeer zinvol.

Gedicht VIII toont een staalkaart van woorden die de beklagenswaardige toestand van de minnaars uitdrukken. De man (74b-81), *sittende up twater, pensens bi zinen lieve*, spreekt over de wonderlijke kracht van de minne, *sone doet [geeft] den zinnen dach no nacht remedy van haerre meestrie* [een middel tegen haar macht]. Hoewel hij nu rustig bij zijn geliefde zit, constateert hij het aanwezig zijn in zijn gedacht *Bi twifele eene melancholye, Ende destrueirt mijn melodye* [ruïneert mijn geestelijk evenwicht, zie de beschouwing onder *Melody* in 5.3]. Het zijn de mannelijke personen van hogere stand in het gedicht die *quelen* [lijden] (5), *pijn* lijden (26, 195), *verdriet* hebben (56), lijden onder *twifele* (80) en *trueren* (85). Het peinzen als begeleidend verschijnsel komt in het opschrift *Van een peinsende* (53a) duidelijk naar voren. Verder zien we dat de man *metten kersen* peinst (154) en één der vrouwen ziet *na de peinsere* (191a). Peinzen, lijden, vertwijfeld zijn, de vreugde verliezen, verdriet hebben, treuren; praktisch alle minnaars in het gedicht zijn ermee behept. Zij die meer actief zijn, zoals *de cussere*, de man die *bi der kinne* neemt [een liefdeshandeling] en de afscheid nemende, hebben er (nog?) geen last van. Aan het slot wordt in verband met een noodzakelijk afscheid van de vrouw, gesproken over *Penst varinc om een weder keer*. Het kan zijn dat het gebruik van ‘peinzen’ hier tamelijk neutraal is. Heger (1967, 80) wijst er echter op dat bij De Machaut en anderen een melancholische toestand het gevolg kan zijn van de “Sehnsucht nach einem nicht gegenwärtigen Objekt”. In het achtste gedicht vol melancholisch peinzende minnaars kan het woord *melancholye* bij de recipiënten wel eens deze gevoelslading gehad hebben. De mannen van lagere stand in het gedicht worden gespaard voor de melancholische gevoelens. Daarbij spelen hun meer realistische instelling en hun drukke dagelijkse bezigheden waarschijnlijk een rol.

In XII wordt de minnaar *Seere ghequetst van stwifels slaghen So onghetrooste minners pleghen* (52-53). In de slaap vindt zijn geest *melodye*, maar tegen de dageraad doet de *zwaerrere melancolie* hem ontwaken en gaat hij buiten Brugge in de ontwakende voorjaarsnatuur wandelen om vertroosting te zoeken. Hij komt bij een *fonteine van zoeter aert... zonder lac* en hij ziet *De grote schoonheit die ghelach Ander fonteynen reinicheit*. Deze is van dien aard dat hij zegt: *Peinsende up mijn cleinicheit* [nietswaardigheid, onbeduidendheid], *verstaert* [starend] *recht in melancolven, Hebbic een deel bet up ghesien twe veinstren* [de ogen van de geliefde] *claelic open gaen* (239-242). *Dies herte ende zin ende ooc mijn moet Wart beroert ende al mijn bloet*. Een pijl uit haar ogen treft hem en *Flau, bescaemt ende zeere vervaert So tart ic weder achter waert, Ende ginc al ghesconfiert* [ontsteld] *van dan Recht als een verwonnen man* (250-253). Later horen we: *Mijn ruste, mijn vruecht, mijn melodie Es wech; maer zwaer melancolie Trueren, zuchten, claghen, waken. Sien, horen, bevoelen, rieken, smaken, Dat heift verloren zeere de cracht In mi...* (474-479). *Mijn herte geghequetst of bi wat zaken Dat icx ghenese vander doot* (481-482).

We zien hier een merkwaardige ontwikkeling. De dichter bevindt zich al in een melancholische stemming vóór hij de dame gezien heeft. Er wordt zelfs gesproken van een ‘zware’ melancolie. We kunnen hierbij echter denken aan de vier fasen die de middeleeuwer in het liefdesproces veronderstelt. De eerste fase waarvan *arem rudaris Jan* in XV vermeldt: *eenichen persoon, diet noit en sach, het zal ontfaen nu, up dien dach, van horen secghene ende onghesien, sulc een spaerke, het zal bi dien tonrusten bliven*. Van de tweede fase, die van het zien, wordt gezegd: *so moet die spaerke vlammen toghen, onsteken blivende... mens caens te wile bluschen niet. Horen ende zien, die beede sijn sake*

van *desen bedwelemden onghemake* (71-86), een ongemak dat gevoed wordt door jaloezie en twijfel.

We wezen aan het eind van 6.2.1 op het wankele evenwicht dat bij de melancholicus aanwezig is. De melancholie is continu als positieve eigenschap aanwezig, maar kan op elk moment, zowel voor, tijdens, als na het liefdesproces verhevigd de kop opsteken en zich extreem uiten.

Tijdens zijn wandeling volgt de kennismaking met de dame en als gevolg uit zich de melancholie (net als daarvoor) met treuren, klagen, zuchten en waken. Nu neemt de middeleeuwer het niet zo nauw in zijn literaire beschrijvingen ten aanzien van tijd en afstand (men zie bijvoorbeeld Van Es 1955), maar het is ook mogelijk dat het 'melancholie'-begrip zich aan het verwijden is. Heger (1967, 74-75) wijst erop dat bij de Noordfranse dichters in de veertiende eeuw de melancholie als oorzaak van de liefde genoemd wordt en als "depressiver und schlummerartiger psychischer Zustand, in dem sich das lyrische Ich vor dem Betroffensein durch die Liebe oder beim Fehlen von Fröhlichkeit und Verliebtsein befinden kann".

Reynaert (1999, 50) is blijkbaar een andere mening toegedaan. Hij stelt dat op de meeste plaatsen in het Gr.Hs. waar *twifel* optreedt in de tekstuele omgeving geen aanwijzingen te vinden zijn waarover de *ic* dan zou moeten twijfelen. In het voorafgaande en ook in het volgende betoog blijkt echter dat de samenhang tussen melancholie en de liefde steeds aanwezig is. Het woord *pleghen* in gedicht XII (52), dat in het hierboven gegeven citaat voorkomt, doet vermoeden dat de samenhang tussen *twifel* en *minne* in het Gr.Hs. als een soort axiomatisch gegeven wordt beschouwd. Heel duidelijk in dit opzicht is ook de tweede allegorie, voor de eigenlijke narratio (het verslag van het proces) een aanvang neemt, zegt de minnaar in het gesprek met de kluzenaar heel duidelijk: *Jalosie die comt stappans Ende leet mi an des twifels dans, Rauwe, verdriet ende drouven toren Sal ic daer moeten sijnghen voren. Tgoede vergheten ende pensen tquade. Melancolien roupic te rade.*

Ook het slot van de tweede allegorie toont duidelijk deze samenhang. Na de lessen in de minneschool komt *Twifel* weer om de hoek kijken en uit de minnaar zijn vertwijfeling in een lied dat zo'n grote overeenkomst toont met lied 140 uit het tweede deel, dat beide zelfs verwisselbaar zijn.

De minnaar in V is van herte zwaer en zegt: *Dies zocht ic eeniche melodye Om te verdrivene melancolve* (74-76).

Opmerkelijk is ook de grote aandacht die de minnaar in I heeft voor schone vormen en figuren (in het vorige gedeelte genoemd bij de kenmerken van de *amor hereos*) bij de beschrijvingen van de burcht(en) [dat wil zeggen de aanschouwde dames]:... *Die maetselrie was so reene Ende so jolijks ghewrocht, In wiste waer ic was gherocht* (182-184), enkele andere voorbeelden: uit de eerste allegorie: .. *Maer wonder sach ic em allein. Dies alle wondren waren klein, Die ic daer voren hadde ghesien* (281-283); ... [wat] *ic daer sach dat mi ghenouchde. Die de machelrie vouchde Dien willic meester hoghe vermaren Voor alle die meester die ye waren* (494-497).

Het is opvallend dat, hoewel in het liedboek veel Duitstalig gekleurde woorden voorkomen (zoals bijvoorbeeld *tsaer, ich, hertzen, minnentlich, hemelrijch*), met betrekking tot het melancholie-complex meest Franse leenwoorden gebruikt worden als *pensuus, melancolye, melodye, destrueirt*. In de Franse literatuur van die tijd komt de melancholie

meer aan de orde dan in de Duitstalige³¹. De melancholie met betrekking tot de liefde is ook in Duitsland echter wel bekend, zoals Blank (1990) voor Wolframs *Parzival* en Jackson (1971) voor de *Tristan* van Gottfried von Strassburg aantoonde.

Arem, rudaris Jan vat het melancholieproces kernachtig samen met *Peinsen hoe di dijns liefs ghesichte Int herte scoot met sulken scichte Du ne mochts den quetse niet ghenesen* (XV: 373-375). De *ic* wordt verliefd bij het zien van de vrouwe. Hij is zeer aangedaan. Hij wordt al snel jaloers en wantrouwig. *Niders en clappaerts* spelen daarbij hun rol door het verspreiden van lasterpraatjes. De minnaar is lichamelijk en geestelijk van streek. De vertwijfeling neemt bezit van hem, hij voelt zich gevangen. Voortdurend vervalt hij in een mistroostig gepeins en kan zich niet meer goed vermaken. Dit laatste is voor de *jonghelinc vul der werelt luste* (XIV: 1) - vervuld van *Danzen, hoveren, drinken, heten* (XIV: 46) - kennelijk een ernstige zaak, gelet op de vele vormen van ontspanning die in het Gr.Hs. aan de orde komen. Zij weerspiegelen zich in de namen van de mannelijke personificaties in gedicht II die uit het land van Venus verbannen worden of bijgeschoold moeten worden. Ook L146 getuigt van de behoefte zich te ontspannen, *Vrouw Ghenuecht* krijgt alle hulde. Zal de lofzang van de verliefde in I waarin hij het 'vrolijk' minnen en de 'weelde' prijst, ook in dit verband gezien moeten worden?

De discussies over de hoofse liefde en de begeleidende onaangename verschijnselen komen in allerlei vormen in het handschrift naar voren. De minnaar moet met anderen over zijn hoopvolle liefde en zijn vertwijfeling spreken. De heet/koud-problematiek [4.7.1.4] tipt *Hope* aan met *Noch en es hu niet messciet, Ghi en muecht ghedoghen heet no cout* (I: 507-508). Zij doet dit op het moment dat de minnaar de burcht aanschouwt waaruit het licht schijnt. Later - als de melancholie hem overmeestert - verkilt hij in de ommuurde tuin: *Hongher, cout, anxst ende vaer Cam mi menichfoudich aen* (I: 2234-2235).

Tot slot nog drie voorbeelden uit het deel met de liederen.

In lied 23 verzekert de minnaar zijn *hertzen coninginne* van zijn reine, bestendige trouw en verzoekt haar aan hem te denken. In de refreinregels klinkt het *Melanchole dwinct mi de zinne, Allein up ein ende anders gein*.

Vrouw Ghenuecht kijkt toe hoe haar vazallen (de minnaars) in lied 146 de strijd aanbinden met aartsvijand *Twifel*. De minnaar is er treurig aan toe: *Melancolve hadde mi ontwuecht, Des cam mi trueren inne* (13-14). Dankzij *Vrouw Ghenuecht, mijn coninghinne, Mijn keyserinne, Mijn hoochste vruecht zonder verghanc* gaat het toch weer beter met hem. Hij constateert tenminste: *Mijn trueren makic dinne* (16-19). Het medische inzicht dat ontspanning verlichting kan brengen, klinkt hier duidelijk door. Ik zie in dit lied niet het verband met een algemeen depressieve stemming, zoals Reynaert (1999, 48-49). Ook al niet omdat in de gedichten in het derde deel *Vrouw Ghenuecht* steeds in verband wordt gebracht met de naar onbezonnen liefde verlangende jeugd [onder andere vermeld in 5.3].

Lied 42 verhaalt hoe de dichter 's nachts rusteloos door de Brugse straten loopt. Hij vergelijkt zich met een *huwerhane* [nachtuil]. Ook in L116: 45 komt de vergelijking met een nachtuil voor. Gijsen (1989, 104) noemt als één van de symptomen van de *amor hereos* het 'rasende achter straten lopen' van de minnaar, deze kent geen rust door de ongeremdheid

³¹ Men zie hiervoor o.a. Huizinga 1966, Cerquighini 1985, Boulton 1990, Klibansky 1975, Poirion 1965, Heger 1967, Mulder 1978 en Reynaert 1999

van zijn bewegingen. Het flauwvallen van de *amant* in **I** wijst ook op een verminderde coördinatie van lichaamsdelen.

De melancholische gevoelens zijn in veel teksten aanwezig en worden uitvoerig beschreven, ook al wordt de term *melancolie* door de dichter niet veel gebruikt. Een toetsing van de door de auteur gegeven beschrijvingen over de geestestoestand van de *minre* aan de in de paragraaf 7.2. genoemde symptomen, wekt de indruk dat de auteur de medische boeken van zijn tijd prima kent.

7.4 De drie specifieke betekenissen rond het woordveld ‘*melancolie*’

In het voorgaande bespraken we de depressieve toestand waarin de *ic* verkeert door zijn verliefdheid. Maar het woord *melancoleren* (in de diverse spellingvarianties) wordt ook gebruikt in een betekenis die niet enkel samenvalt met het in een vertwijfelde psychotische toestand verkeren tengevolge van liefdesverdriet, er spelen soms andere betekenisnuances door. De *ic* in **I** gaat onder de linde zitten en ziet het licht uit de vensters [de ogen van de geliefde] waarna hok *melancoleerde* en *studeerde* (241-242). Verder wordt in dit gedicht gezegd: *Melancolie doet mi waken, Sanc van minnen minlic maken* (1799-1800). In beide gevallen dringt de betekenis ‘dichten en componeren terwijl men zich in een melancholische toestand bevindt’ zich aan ons op.

In de eerste allegorie speelt de personificatie *Melancolie* een belangrijke rol. Hij is alles behalve een lijdende melancholicus, maar welke rol speelt hij dan? De tweede subparagraaf is aan deze vraag gewijd.

In de derde subparagraaf bespreek ik niet zozeer een betekenisverschil, als wel een veronderstelde oorzaak die aan de melancholie ten grondslag ligt. Reynaert (1999, 122) veronderstelt dat in de liederen melancholische toestanden worden verwoord zonder dat de oorzaak expliciet vermeld wordt. Men kan de hoofse poëzie “met recht als een verzet, een strijdmiddel tegen wanhoop en melancholie” interpreteren. Deze uitspraak berust niet op concrete bewijspplaatsen in het Gr.Hs.

7.4.1 *Het aspect van het dichten en componeren*

In **I** komt de minnaar - geleid door *Ticht dat uter straten vloyde*, terwijl hij *zeer penseus* is - na het zien van het licht uit de vensters en na de dolage, bij de ‘scheidspaal’, de linde. Hij constateert dat zijn *zinnen worden so ghewade* [meegaand] *van den vreemden lichten scine* dat hij zich niet bewust is van de *vaer, rouwe of pine* die dreigt van de aanstormende *Twifel*. Als de *ic* uitrust in het gras onder de linde, vervolgt het verhaal met: *Met dat ic dus melancoleerde, Ende up dit licht sach ende studeerde, So sach ik comen up een paert Een, die mi dochte van felre aert.* (241-244). Het is de gevreesde *Twifel*. Wat zijn de betekenissen van dit *melancoleerde* en *studeerde*?

Het MNW (V, 1356) geeft ‘mijmeren, somber gestemd zijn’. Het lijkt mij ook mogelijk dat de betekenis ‘in melancholische stemming dichten’ is. Huizinga (1999, 37) wijst erop dat in Frankrijk “in het woord melancholie de betekenissen van droefgeestigheid, ernstig

nadenken en fantasie meenvloeren' Heger (1967 76-77) constateert dat in de Trouverelyriek van de eerste helft van de veertiende eeuw de melancholie reeds verschijnt als 'depressieve und schlummerartiger psychischer Zustand' en dat deze voorafgaand aan de verliefdheid kan optreden, misschien ook met de functie dat de 'vorausgesehene Freude in einem intensiveren Licht erscheinen soll' In de middeleeuwse iconografie vinden we 'die typische Pose des tief in seine Gedanken versunkenen Dichters' die zeer geliefd is (Heger, 127) Ieder kent de in vele publicaties afgebeelde in diepe gedachten verzonken figuur van *Melancholia* zoals Albrecht Durer die afbeeldde (onder andere afgedrukt in Huijzinga 1999 39)

Janet van der Meulen (1992 105-108) merkt op dat de melancholie als dichtelijke pose al bij Jean de le Mote in *Li regiet Guillaume* (1339) voorkomt Zij wijst erop dat de melancholie als een gemoedstoestand die op de eigen dichtelijke activiteit wordt betrokken - of zelfs als dichtelijke pose (al dan niet in combinatie met dromen en verliefdheid) - in drie werken van De Machaut voorkomt Ook bij Froissart en Deschamps is het gebruik van het woord in deze betekenis bekend

Bij Froissart komt bij een minnaar in diepe slaap al 'melancholeiend' een liefdeslied op In een ander werk van hem brengt een droom *merancolie* teweeg De dichter komt zo tot een dichtelijke verkenning van hel en paradijs

Jean de le Mote beschrijft een 'concours de ballades' aan het hof van Alexander de Grote Iedereen peinst melancholeert en bestudeert het opgegeven thema en varieert daarop De een ligt de ander zit Zo maken zij groot plezier met hun ballades Hier vinden we dus een voorbeeld van melancholie als een dichtelijke pose In een ander gedicht zit de verliefde minnaar onder een boom en denkt aan zijn geliefde In een toestand van *merancolie* maakt hij een gedicht om het vervolgens de geliefde te sturen Een situatie sterk gelijkend op die in de eerste allegorie als de minnaar onder de linde *melancoleert* Froissart en ook tijdgenoten van hem maken van dit motief gebruik Zo laat een diepbedroefde romanheld zich in melancholische gemoedstoestand neer aan de voet van een boom en slaat aan het dichten Typerend in het hierboven door ons geciteerde fragment is ook het woord *studeerde* (I 242) het wordt ook gebruikt als de burchtbewoners gedichten nader moeten bekijken (I 1010 en 1043)

Bij Charles d'Orleans vinden we in rondeau CCCXXV de gedachte "Ou puis parfont de ma merencolie L'eau d'Espoir que ne cesse tirer, Soit de Confort la me fait desirer Quoy que souvent je la treuve tarie" (Kelly 1976, 220-222) Slechts in de diepte van de melancholie is de Hoop te vinden die kan leiden tot vertroostend *confort*, alhoewel de bron vaak droog is Bij Charles zijn drie abstracte componenten aanwezig de bron van de melancholie, het water van de hoop en het vurig verlangen naar vertroosting Het water kan van helder in troebel veranderen en symboliseert de veranderlijkheid van de hoop De verbeelding kan zo allerlei stadia doorlopen 'Leave the mind to think on dream on apply and return to the well of melancholie for new sustenance new inspiration' De melancholie is de bron van de inspiratie voor het schrijven van literair werk gewijd aan de hoofse liefde In het Gr Hs speelt in enkele allegorieen de bron een belangrijke rol In XII heet de *boine* zelfs *confort* (518 en 559) en wordt gesproken van *confort te drunkene* (624) In I zien we hoe de minnaar een drank aangeboden krijgt *die men daer huet confoort Die mi duer ghinc dat herte mijn Ende uut dreef der wonden pijn* (2026-2028)

Directe inhoudelijke invloed van de Noordfranse dichters is in het Gr.Hs. zelden aantoonbaar. Wel zijn er allerlei overeenkomende thema's en motieven aanwijsbaar. De opvatting van Glier (1971, 269 v.) is dat het derde deel in het Gr.Hs. aansluit bij de *Roman de la Rose*-traditie, met name bij latere vertegenwoordigers als De Machaut en Froissart. Ook Reynaert (1984, 36 v.) die zich in hoofdzaak tot de dichtvormen beperkt, is deze opvatting toegedaan. In later werk (1999) ziet Reynaert ook meer thematische overeenkomsten.

In zijn vierde lied in I zegt de minnaar *Melancolie doet mi waken, Sanc van minnen minlic maken* (1799-1800). Een duidelijk oorzakelijk verband tussen de melancholische gemoedstoestand en het maken van gedichten. Ieder kan een liefdeslied maken, maar pas als men hevig aangedaan is, kan men met behulp van de inspirerende *melancolie* het lied *minlic* maken. Waarschijnlijk zullen wij ook in deze zin moeten opvatten *Rauwe, verdriet ende drouven toren, Sal ic daer moeten sijnghe voren, Tgoede vergheten ende pensen tquade, Melancolien roupic te rade* (II: 237-240). De dichter zoekt zijn troost dan in het maken van een gedicht, al of niet vergezeld van een toonzetting.

Blank (1990, 36-37) wijst erop dat de melancholicus zijn concentratie van de buitenwereld geheel naar die van de innerlijke wereld kan verplaatsen, hij sluit zichzelf af om zich volledig te concentreren, diep na te denken, waardoor hij tot diepgaande gedachten kan komen en zijn gevoelens en wensen verwoorden. Uiteraard kan hij de daarbij opkomende gedachten in een gedicht vastleggen. Het schijnt ons toe dat deze situatie enkele malen in het convoluit geschetst wordt.

7.4.2 *Het aureool van de 'begenadigde'*

Santing (1994, 73) bespreekt uitvoerig de symboliek in Dürers bekende kopergravure *Melancolia*, die tal van verwijzingen bevat naar magie en mathematica. De vrouw is bijvoorbeeld omringd door meetkundige instrumenten en symbolen. Zij maakt een mistroostige indruk.

In de eerste allegorie speelt de personificatie *Melancolie* een belangrijke rol. Uit zijn functioneren blijkt geen enkel verband met de voorstelling van 'een in gepeins verzonken, mistroostige persoon'. Integendeel, hij neemt initiatieven, wordt te hulp geroepen bij het beoordelen van kunstzinnige voortbrengselen en brengt de minnaar binnen de burcht. Hij bezit groot gezag. Misschien is hier sprake van een "Relikt der pseudo-aristotelischen Melancholiekonzeption, nach der alle bedeutenden Menschen in die Kategorie der Melancholiker einzuordnen sind". Heger (1967, 431) wijst erop dat dit concept niet enkel bij de geleerden speelde, maar ook in "volkstümlichen" teksten tot uiting komt en geeft daarvan voorbeelden. Hieruit kan de opvatting voortvloeien dat de 'begaafde' ook de dichterlijke prestaties kan beoordelen.

Opmerkelijk is dat *Melancolie* niet veel verstand van liefdeszaken heeft, gezien de afloop na zijn misplaatste introductie van de minnaar in de burcht. Hij ziet in de minnaar een begaafd dichter en herkent diens temperament, redenen om hem zijn livrei te schenken. Hij beoordeelt de *ic* niet als minnaar, maar als dichter. Hij slaat de waarschuwingen van *Hoede* in de wind en denkt te weinig aan de eer van de burchtheer [het regulerende aspect van de dame] (1947-1948). Ook *Versiene* is niet geheel gerust op de gesteldheid van de minnaar.

Ze geeft hem regels waaraan hij zich moet houden en allegorische attributen die zijn gedrag moeten reguleren. *Sangwijn* – volgens de traditie een liefdesdeskundige – blijft zitten als de *ic* binnenkomt, hij geeft hem geen hand en biedt pas na veel aarzeling zijn *lieverye* aan. Duidelijk is dat *Melancolie het regement* (1946) vertegenwoordigt. Hij zet zijn zin door. Ten onrechte, zoals later blijkt.

7.4.3 *Het lyden aan de barre existentie*

Poirion besteedt in het vijftiende hoofdstuk van zijn boek (1965, 547-577) aandacht aan de “*mélancolie*” en de “*nonchaloir*” in de hoofse poëzie aan het eind van de veertiende eeuw. De *joie* en de hoop worden vervangen door “*la douleur et le désespoir*”. “*L’inspiration ne traduit plus la libre ambition, mais le lourd destin du poète*” (547). De overgang wijt Poirion aan een crisis in de hoofse gemeenschap, die gepaard gaat met de ellende van de honderdjarige oorlog (1338-1453).

Huizinga (1999, 37) merkt op dat Philips de Goede (1430-1467) bij de dood van zijn éénjarige zootje zegt: “had het God behaagd dat ik ook zo jong gestorven ware, ik zou mij wel gelukkig achten”. In deze tijd vloeien de betekenissen van het woord melancholie in de zin van droefgeestigheid, ernstig nadenken en fantasie ineen. Deschamps (circa 1346-1406) zegt van iets wat in lelijkheid de verbeelding te boven gaat: “geen schilder is zo ‘*mérencolieux*’, dat hij het zou kunnen schilderen”. In deze tijd heerst levensmoetheid en verwacht men de nadering van het wereldeinde. In het laatst van de veertiende eeuw leeft het volksgeloof dat niemand na het grote schisma nog in het paradijs opgenomen wordt. Er bestaat een grote afkeer van de ijdele schijn van het hofleven. De zucht evenwel om het leven van de wereld te versmaden staat veraf van het wezenlijke godsdienstig besef. Er is niet alleen levensmoetheid, maar ook levensbangheid, men schrikt terug voor het leven met de onvermijdelijke smarten. Een bange afkeer voor zorg, ziekte en ouderdom beheersen de gedachtewereld. De gedichten van Deschamps vloeien ervan over.

De overgang in de opvattingen over een verheffende hoofse liefde naar een minder idealistische, is duidelijk te zien in de *Roman de la Rose*. “The inversion of Guillaume de Lorris’ progress from rage to love involves a concomitant lowering of the quality of Imagination to the farce, of the quality of courtly love to Jean de Meun’s vision. The lowering or sinking of Imagination is represented as idle fantasy or melancholy disturbance”, constateert Kelly (1978, 196) als hij het werk van Chaucer bespreekt. “The transposition into the domain of Imagination entails the abandonment of the gross and material, when Chaucer, in imitation of Boethius, leaves in dream the world in its cloud and mists for the clear realm of thought visible in dream vision” (297). In zijn werk wordt net als bij Christine de Pisan (1365-1430) de trouw benadrukt “because fidelity distinguishes *fyn lovng* from other kinds of love”. Het accentueren van de trouw en de *ghestedicheit* komt ook in het Gr.Hs. voor.

In het Gr.Hs. bestaat veel twijfel over het hoofse ideaal, denk bijvoorbeeld aan de gesprekken met de kluzenaars. Het accent hierin ligt echter steeds op de veroordeling van de overmatige aandacht die de minnaar aan de aardse liefde schenkt, waardoor de godsdienstige plichten vergeten worden. Anderzijds zijn er ook gesprekken met *Redene* of een ‘wijze vrouwe’ als component en verdedigster van de aardse liefde. Er wordt daarbij

steeds gewezen op de noodzakelijke matiging en het bewaren van de eer van de vrouw. Van een hoofse liefde in de 'oude' stijl kan ook hier niet gesproken worden, allerlei burgerlijk-maatschappelijke deugden staan centraal in de beschouwingen.

De melancholie correspondeert met een *twifel*, die ongeveer gelijk staat met 'vertwijfeling'. De *twifel* en de *hoop* staan in sterke oppositie tot elkaar en lossen elkaar in de geest van de minnaar regelmatig af. Geregeld komen de verzuchtingen voor over het rad van fortuin, de willekeur van eb en vloed in het liefdesleven. Voortdurend wordt een beroep gedaan op de geliefde vrouwe om vertroosting.

De mogelijkheid zou kunnen bestaan dat de melancholie in het Gr.Hs. soms veroorzaakt wordt door het lijden aan de ellende in deze wereld. Er is aan dit aspect aandacht besteed door Rens (1980) naar aanleiding van Lied 140. Hij associeert hierin het *ghepeins* en de roep om *vrolicheit* sterk met "het negativisme in de kijk op de wereld en de toekomst" (93). In mijn artikel in Spiegel der Letteren (1994a) heb ik uitvoerig aandacht besteed aan deze problematiek. Op grond van intratekstuele gegevens kom ik tot de conclusie dat dit negatieve maatschappijbeeld in het Gr.Hs. niet met tekstuele gegevens aantoonbaar is. De intermenselijke verhoudingen in kleiner verband staan voortdurend centraal.

Tenslotte nog een korte opmerking over Rens' opvatting dat de uitdrukking *helf God om vrolicheit* in Lied 140 een verzoek aan God is om zijn genade deelachtig te worden en zo verlost te worden van de door hem vermeende melancholie. Het is Rens blijkbaar niet bekend dat de 'vrolijkheid' een van de tien minnegeboden is. Eberhard von Cernse geeft in zijn *Der Minnen Regeln* (Heger 1975, 283-288) tijdens de gebruikelijke droomwandeling het woord aan Venus. Deze openbaart hem dan tien geboden en dertien voorschriften voor een goede minne. Naast de negen alom bekende geboden (*Tzucht, Truwe, Stetcheit, Duldikeit, Milde, Lust, Kuscheit, Bequemmeit* en *Helen*) noemt hij als tiende *Frolikeit* (de zevende in zijn opsomming):

Daz Sibete auch uns lernen wil.	
Wi wirj sullen sin gemú.	
Frolikeit ist allir tziickir ein tziil.	<i>tziickir</i> geruzie
Vnde gar alles leides bud.	
Di minne die wil frolich sin.	
Wa si wil ein hertze stigen.	want zij wil dat een hart zich verheft
Wer mid trucren vlegit hin.	wie in droefenis voortleeft
Frolikeit kan her nicht gekrigen	

In het Gr.Hs. wordt de terminologie *vroilic(h)*, *vroilichhede(n)* en *vroilicheit* 62 keer gebruikt, bijna voortdurend in verband met de liefdesproblematiek, geen enkele maal duidelijk aantoonbaar met maatschappelijke toestanden.

Zoals ik uitleg bij de interpretatie van I [hfst. 8, 835-848 en 1394-1403], in het zesde hoofdstuk over de ethiek en bij de betekenis van de vrouwelijke personificaties [5.4], dient men vrouwe *Ghenuecht* in lied 146 niet te associëren met genoegens die men zoekt om de ellende van het barre leven te vergeten, maar met de jeugd die sterk op *ghenuecht* gericht is. Dit is een houding die volgens de zedenmeesters in het convoluut aan banden gelegd moet worden. Steeds wordt op matiging aangedrongen. We wijzen daarbij bijvoorbeeld op het voor de liefdesproblematiek zeer instructieve gedicht **IV: Reine minne van creaturen Souct levens solaes in allen uren** (107-108), waarbij inherent is *Goet gheselschap, spel ende jolijt*

(110). *Als men met trouwen na minnen staet, So eist al blijscap ende vrie vruecht, Milthet, werdicheit ende duecht, Meinderheit, scamelheit* (170-172).

In de kring waarin gedicht I zijn ontstaan vond, is de vrolijkheid een wezensbestanddeel van het minnen, en trouwens ook van het samenzijn met muziek en dans, getuige onder andere L101. In de eerste allegorie vinden we in het zevende lied (2293-2316): *Die vrolyc mint mach vroilic leven; Wies mach hem verdrieten, Als hem die minne loon wil gheven*. Een speurtocht in het handschrift zal ongetwijfeld meer van dit soort citaten opleveren.

Ook in L140 dunkt me de uitroep *Help God om vrolichheit!* niet een dringend verzoek om een godsdienstig-geestelijke verlossing, zoals Rens veronderstelt (1980, p. 102, 103 enz.), maar als een bede van de dichter om tekenen te verkrijgen van de aanhankelijkheid en trouw van zijn geliefde, zodat hij de *jone* deelachtig kan worden en zijn diepe smart vermindert. Het is opmerkelijk dat Rens bekent het Gr.Hs. slecht te kennen, zich oriënteert op de veel later publicerende Burton, een vreemd gebruik maakt van de theorieën van Freud en dan toch tot zo'n uitspraak komt ten aanzien van de totale conceptie van het handschrift. Hij meent dat de dichter in dit lied een beroep doet op God om hem van zijn melancholie te verlossen. Een vreemde veronderstelling. Het gehele handschrift door blijkt dat de minnaars het geloof naar een latere fase in hun leven verplaatsen en andere belangen hebben. In de moralistische gedichten wordt herhaaldelijk op dit feit gewezen. Uit niets blijkt dat lied 140 in een andere sfeer is ontstaan.

Het is niet te verwachten dat de jeugdigen in de van leven bruisende handelsmetropool Brugge lijden aan het pessimisme van een elite van "verzadigden, ontgoochelden en vermoeiden", zoals Huizinga de stand typeert (1999, 38). Die moet men vooral zoeken bij de zeer hoge standen.

7.5 Conclusies

Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat het woord 'melancholie' in het Gr.Hs. een sombere stemming aanduidt die veroorzaakt wordt door liefdesperikelen. Er wordt een scala aan woorden gebruikt om de/ze gemoedsgesteldheid aan te duiden. De beschreven psychische en fysieke toestanden van de minnaar zijn in overeenstemming met de middeleeuwse medische opvattingen. Ook is er in menig opzicht een verrassende overeenkomst met de moderne medische inzichten.

Een tweede betekenisveld schijnt te duiden op de melancholie als dichterlijke inspiratiebron, een derde op de oude Aristotelische opvatting, waarin aan de melancholicus hoge geestelijke bekwaamheden worden toegekend, zoals Dürer in zijn bekende kopergravure met behulp van allerlei attributen illustratief uitbeeldt.

Voor de betekenisnuance 'lijden aan de crisissituaties in de wereld' lijkt mij in het Gr.Hs. geen grond te bestaan. Voorzover die betekenis op vroegere perioden toepasselijk is, heeft die betrekking op zeer hoge adellijke personen en de geestelijkheid. De burgerij in bloeiende handelssteden als Brugge wordt in de mij bekende literatuur niet vermeld als groep waarin men lijdt aan maatschappelijke onlustgevoelens. Gezien de onlusten en de strijd met de Gentenaren zou dit evenwel niet vreemd geweest zijn, hoewel... melancholie is niet voor de spitters en de wroeters.

Uiteraard kan men veronderstellen dat het overmatig voorkomen van verschijnselen op het lichamelijke en geestelijke vlak, die sterk melancholische trekken vertonen, een modeverschijnsel is. Invloed van de Franstalige lyriek is daarbij niet onwaarschijnlijk.

In alle tijden speelt de vertwijfeling bij veel mensen een rol, zonder dat dit tot zwaar melancholische depressieve toestanden leidt. De liefdesproblematiek, die fundamenteel behoort bij het mens-zijn, is veel vaker de veroorzakende factor. Duidelijk is dat dit laatste in het Gr.Hs. zeer domineert.

Zoals de term in het Gr.Hs. meestal wordt gebruikt, is het een soort geestestoestand (al of niet veroorzaakt door een verstoring tussen de afscheiding van lichaamssappen) die zich kan manifesteren als een depressief-manische toestand. Deze kan naast grote terneergeslagenheid ook leiden tot een toestand met een verhoogde inspiratie op geestelijk gebied. De manie - die men nu beschouwt als een tegenhanger van de depressie - wordt vaak in één adem genoemd als zijnde een aspect van hetzelfde ziektebeeld.

DE GEDETAILEERDE INTERPRETATIE VAN DE EERSTE ALLEGORIE

8.0 Inleidende opmerkingen

Het gedicht wordt in het volgende hoofdstuk uitvoerig geannoteerd uitgegeven. Bij de interpretatie van het gedicht geef ik eerst een beknopte inhoud van het te bespreken gedeelte. Bij de schematische indeling heb ik mij meestal laten leiden door de tekstpresentatie die in het handschrift wordt gegeven middels initialen, gekleurde hoofdletters, paragraaftekens en wit tussen de regels. De tekst is op deze wijze door de auteur of afschrijver over het algemeen op overzichtelijke wijze ingedeeld. Bij de weergave wijk ik af van Carton (1848/9) die in zijn uitgave geen rekening hield met de grafische structurering van het handschrift zelf. In mijn weergave van de tekst heb ik de typografische aanduidingen van het handschrift wel opgenomen als structureringsprincipe, maar ik heb enkele grenzen toegevoegd om een meer overzichtelijke indeling te krijgen.

De tekst in de nu volgende bespreking is in zeven hoofddelen gesplitst, voornamelijk op grond van de lokalisatie van de gebeurtenissen. De diverse fasen van het minnegebeuren vallen daarmee grotendeels samen. Over de indeling is uiteraard te twisten. De delen 3, 4 en 5 kunnen eventueel samengevoegd worden, het is mogelijk deel 6 nog tot het burchtgedeelte te rekenen enz. De personen en gezelschappen verplaatsen zich opmerkelijk vaak. Een uitzondering vormen Zuiverheid en de Burchtheer. Zij zijn volstrekt plaatsgebonden, een uitvloeisel van hun functie als zinnelijk en regulerend aspect.

- I Thuis bij de minnaar: de proloog over het dichterschap en het publiek, de vermelding van de droom, het gebed en het aankleden (1-65).
- II Het dolagebied: de eerste (visuele) kennismaking met de dame, het verblijf in de kerker bij *Twifel*, de bevrijding door *Hope*, de grenspaal *Wuerscu* en het verdrijven van *Twifel* (66-561).
- III Het buitengebied van de burcht: de tweede visuele kennismaking met de schoonheid van de dame en de vermelding van enkele leefomstandigheden, verder de geslaagde poging om toegelaten te worden (562-758).
- IV De voorburcht: het binnentreden, de behandeling van de 'kwetsuren', het lied van *Juecht* en de pogingen in de burcht de betekenis te achterhalen. Het verzet van *Hoede*, de activiteiten van *Versiene zoals* het aanbrenge van de 'wieken' en het onderricht in de noodzakelijke maatschappelijke en hoofse omgangsregels. Het maken van twee liederen door de minnaar als toenaderingsmiddel. De bemiddeling van *Melancolie* (759-1738) die zeer onder de indruk van de minnaar is.
- V De burcht: het binnentreden met de daarmee gepaard gaande moeilijkheden door het verzet van *Hoede*, de verwelcoming door de burchtheer en het genieten in 'grote weelde'. Daarna de verwijdering ten gevolge van oneervol gedrag (1739-2208).
- VI De ommuurde tuin: de verbanning met de gevolgen voor de geestelijke en lichamelijke toestand van de verdrevene (2209-2357).

VII Thuis bij de minnaar: de korte vermelding van het einde van de droom en de naweeën daarvan (2358-2360).

Wil men een beknopte indruk van de inhoud hebben, dan kan men eerst de inspringende gedeeltes in dit hoofdstuk doorlezen. Bovendien staat er een beknopte samenvatting in paragraaf 2.4.3.1. Uiteraard kan men het beste eerst de geannoteerde tekst doornemen die in hoofdstuk 9 is opgenomen.

Tussen vierkante haken vindt men verwijzingen naar de paragrafen die de betreffende passages bespreken. Bij de personificaties is dit niet altijd gebeurd, omdat men ze in hoofdstuk 5 gemakkelijk kan opsporen door de alfabetische ordening aldaar. Voor een goed begrip is het noodzakelijk dat men eerst kennis neemt van de nadere bijzonderheden die in dat hoofdstuk over hen vermeld zijn. De personificaties treden handelend op, hun rol is voor het begrijpen van de tekst van primair belang, hun allegorische betekenis is niet altijd uit de tekst op te maken en vereist vaak enige voorkennis.

Bij de interpretatie wordt vaak gezinspeeld op dieper liggende achtergronden die niet in extenso worden besproken om het geheel overzichtelijk te houden.

8.1 De interpretatie

8.1.1 r. 1-65

1-40: De proloog opent met een uitweiding uit over de kunst, die velen op niet deskundige wijze benaderen en waarderen. Deze heden gelijken op *zwijnen* voor wie madeliefjes als voedsel gezaaid worden. Noodzakelijk zijn goede verstaanders *die de weghe der consten* kennen en de dichterlijke inspanning op de juiste waarde schatten.

41-52: Een zeer bijzondere droom blijft de dichter in gedachten. Deze vermelding is belangrijk, want *Drome pleghen wel te ghesciene*. Hij kan niet rusten voordat het gedroomde berijmd op papier staat ter ere *daer* [van haar waar] *ic den slaep om began*.

53-65: De dromer staat op en bidt tot God om zich in zijn hoede aan te bevelen. Daarna kleedt hij zich om op weg te gaan.

De dichter geeft een uiteenzetting van zijn taak. Hij stelt een aantal eisen aan het dichterschap: kunstvaardigheid, een grote mate van betrokkenheid, doorzettingsvermogen met een sterke wil tot produceren, bedachtzaam overleg en de wil te proberen het altijd beter te doen. Zijn opmerkingen impliceren dat hij meent aan de gestelde voorwaarden voldaan te hebben. Aan zijn creativiteit en vakmanschap mag men niet twijfelen. Wil het moeizaam tot stand gekomen eindproduct op rechtvaardige wijze op zijn waarde geschat worden, dan dient ook het publiek aan bepaalde eisen te voldoen. Het moet zich openstellen voor de tekst en een zekere mate van ontwikkeling bezitten, in het bijzonder op het gebied van de dicht- en liedkunst.

De ogenschijnlijk traditionele proloog valt op door de meesterlijke bewoordingen. Het spel in de tekst met het woord *const* getuigt van een speelse geest. Een goed *gramarijn* zou Van Boendale hem, met zijn perfecte taalbeheersing, genoemd hebben. We moeten bij *const* overigens niet alleen aan de dichtkunst denken, maar ook aan de muzikale aspecten die in de allegorie bij het componeren en zingen van de liederen naar voren komen. Op sommige

plaatsen in het liedboek draagt *const* zelfs de betekenis van het musiceren Reynaert legt daar wel zeer de nadruk op (1999, 126) Men kan evenwel veronderstellen dat ook het 'maken' van liederen en gedichten onder het begrip *const* valt Thomas van Aquino meent dat God de mens de kunsten geschonken heeft om hem goede eigenschappen te doen verwerven en de menselijke natuur tot een hogere zedelijke staat te verheffen Een doelstelling die in de allegorie zeker tot uiting komt Meer over het in meerdere betekenissen gebruikte begrip *const* kan men vinden onder de personificaties [5 3]

De proloog verdient verder nog wel de nodige aandacht Sonnemans (1995, 281) stelt "Veel prologen uit het Gruuthuse handschrift spreken het beoogde publiek aan op een bijzonder persoonlijke, voor niet-ingewijden nogal cryptische wijze" De proloog heeft een sterk receptie-sturende functionaliteit

De onbeschaafde domkoppen gelijken op varkens waarvoor men madeliefjes gezaaid heeft, zij zullen de teksten niet begrijpen en geestelijk niet beïnvloed worden Het MNW vermeldt de uitdrukking niet Opmerkelijk is dat niet de paarden voor de zwijnen geworpen worden (Matth VII 6), maar dat er madeliefjes gezaaid worden Sonnemans (1995, 184, noot 37) wijst erop dat het woord 'margaritas' in dit vers ("neque mittatis margaritas vestras ante porcos") zowel 'parels' als 'margrietten' kan betekenen Willaert heeft in dit verband ook gewezen op het spreukenschilderij van Bruegel Het madeliefje is een bekend symbool in de minnelyrik [4 3] en over die minne handelt het gedicht Overigens wordt met *margarite* [madeliefje] ook wel een parel aangeduid en worden belangrijke geschriften ook wel met *margrietten* [parels] vergeleken Zo wordt onder andere gesproken van de *margriten der ewangelien woort* en de *costelike margrete der heilighen ewangelien woort* (MNW IV 1170) Onze dichter speelt hier dus wel een heel subtiel woordspel De narratio is bedoeld voor een wijs, goed en hoofs publiek Het is waarschijnlijk dat met de *coisouden* [4 3] metaforisch vooral geduid wordt op de hoofse liederen die in het gedicht voorkomen De *dorperlyken* zijn zo dom dat wat gezaaid wordt, door hen niet eens geoogst kan worden Slechts zij die *de weghe der consten* kennen, zullen uiteindelijk de dichter op rechtvaardige wijze voor zijn goede werk waarderen en belonen

De associatieve gedachte dat dom publiek met beesten vergeleken kan worden, vinden we al bij Benoît de Sainte-Maure in de proloog van de *Roman de Troie* Hij verzekert dat "without collective cultural memory men would all live like beasts" (Brownlee 1984, 10)

De hoofse literatuur is een uitdrukkingsvorm van een gezelschapskunst die zich de gehele tekst door manifesteert en een ingewijd publiek verlangt De 'dorpelijken' zullen het niet begrijpen en er niets aan vinden

De *captatio benevolentiae* waarmee de auteur bij zijn toehoorders de juiste receptiehouding wil verwezenlijken, is bijzonder zinvol Hij schrijft namelijk een allegorie, een indirecte uitingswijze die bijzondere communicatievaardigheden en literaire kennis van het publiek vraagt Er moet zowel bij de auteur als de recipienten een stilzwijgend weten aanwezig zijn over hetgeen wel verteld, maar niet expliciet vermeld wordt [4 0] Noodzakelijk is een homogeen publiek met besef van de hoofse uitdrukkingswijzen waarin sprake is van *allos + agoreuein*, dat wil zeggen "anders als offentlich spreken" (Kurz 1979, 17-18)

Bij dit alles moeten we ook bedenken dat de recipienten die de allegorie gehoord of gelezen hebben, het gevaar lopen tot de categorie van de onwijzen en *ruden* gerekend te

worden als zij ongefundeerde kritiek uiten. Dit tekstgedeelte heeft ook een prospectief karakter. *Rouckeloos* zal in de allegorie als zo'n *rude* optreden (1009 v.).

Bezien we de proloog verder. De dichter introduceert zijn stof. Hij plaatst de inhoud in het kader van een intens doorleefde droom die hem niet loslaat. Geheel in de dichterlijke traditie bezitten de dromen voor hem een groot waarheidsgehalte. Het toposkarakter van het droommotief is door de Franse *Roman de la Rose* in de minneallegorieën ingeburgerd. Steynmeier (1963, 16-17) plaatst dit soort dromen onder de rubriek "fysiologisch-psychologischen Gegebenheiten". De verschijnselen worden opgeroepen door een door psychische onrust verstoord slaappatroon. Het is in tegenstelling tot de door God gezonden dromen een type dat volgens de kerkvaders zonder betekenis is, maar dat door de grote ontvankelijkheid van de middeleeuwers en het geloof in het openbaringskarakter van de droom, een grote invloed uitoefende. Misschien is de opmerking *Drome plegghen wel te ghesciene* wel op te vatten als een knipoog naar het publiek. Ironie is immers in het convoluut niet onbekend. De middeleeuwer kent uteraard de bijbelse dromen die wel uitkomen, maar ja, ieder weet dat de in de allegorie verwerkte dromen geen goddelijke boodschappen bevatten. Er was trouwens een permanente discussie gaande of de droom een door God gewild middel was om in de toekomst te schouwen en dus een transcendentiaal karakter bezat. Bernard van Clairvaux waarschuwt ernstig de dromen niet al te kritiekloos te aanvaarden. De verschillende opvattingen zullen in de Brugse broederschappen niet onbekend geweest zijn. De medici verkondigden steeds de opvatting dat de droom een bewustzijnstoestand was die op louter psychische of fysische oorzaken was terug te voeren en die op zichzelf geen betekenis in zich droeg.

We komen met de droom in een irreële wereld met eigen wetten. De droom geeft het verhaal het karakter van een belangrijke boodschap. Dat het om een droom gaat is echter in het verhaal zelf niet steeds duidelijk waarneembaar. Slechts aan het begin en einde geeft de dichter expliciet aan dat het verhaalde gedroomd is. De dichter komt geen enkele maal op de gecreëerde droomsituatie terug tijdens de beschrijving van de gebeurtenissen. Ook in de andere droomallegorieën is dit het geval, slechts aan het begin en aan het eind vinden we een vermelding. Die aan het begin is meestal iets uitvoeriger.

Droom en allegorie hangen nauw samen door de indirecte zeggingswijze die een nadere interpretatie verlangt. Het immateriële wordt met behulp van concreta benaderd. Er treedt een tweeledig realiteitsbesef op met een dubbelzinnig spel tussen voor- en achtergrond. We worden geïnformeerd over de psychische toestand van de ik-figuur voor het avontuur begint en komen dan langs traditionele fasen tot het gedroomde liefdesobject. We maken op allegorische wijze kennis met allerlei psychische functies die bij de minnaar én de bewonderde vrouw een rol spelen.

De droomsituatie is wel van essentieel belang, omdat veel van de opgeroepen taferelen in het dagelijks leven niet mogelijk zijn. De dichter droomt zich het geluk de gunst van de geliefde te verwerven. Zijn wensdroom leidt echter tot een hevige ontgoocheling. Hoe sterk de droomwereld en de reële werkelijkheid op elkaar betrokken zijn, blijkt uit de constatering aan het slot van het gedicht dat de in de droomwereld opgelopen *wonden* de minnaar-dichter-dromer na het ontwaken nog steeds pijn doen.

Opmerkelijk in dit 'droomgedicht' is het ontbreken van de in veel andere Gruuthuse gedichten in de directe rede voorkomende bede tot God, Maria of Venus. Wel vermeldt de

minnaar dat hij, voor hij op weg gaat, tot God bidt om bescherming. Dit tekent hem als een positief persoon en maakt de toehoorders duidelijk dat er iets belangrijks gaat gebeuren. Ook versterkt het bidden het sacrale karakter, de spanning wordt gewekt. Het kan zijn dat deze interpretatie 'te zwaar' is en dat we dit gebed als een gewoon schietgebedje moeten beschouwen. De minnaar wordt tijdens het handelingsproces in het verhaal min of meer gezuiverd om zijn 'werk' beter te verrichten. In ons gedicht is van een uiteindelijke katharsis echter geen sprake. Integendeel, de *ic* is aan het slot lichamelijk en psychisch zwaar gekwetst.

Aan het eind van de proloog kondigt de dichter op zeer korte wijze aan dat het gedicht zal handelen over degenen die hij liefheeft en waarvan hij 's nachts droomt. De mededeling *Ter eeren daer [van haar waar] ic den slaep om began* vereist voor de interpretatie wel een ingewijd publiek dat deze wat cryptische uitspraak op waarde weet te schatten; *verstaen* en *merken* zoals de dichter het noemt. Het is opmerkelijk dat Heeroma (1969b, 6) meende dat er "geen aanduiding van een of andere dame aanwezig is" en dat de droom blijkbaar niet direct iets met minne te maken heeft. Voor hem staat het weer tot de dichtgemeenschap toegelaten te worden centraal.

Direct na het gebed wordt ons meegedeeld dat de ik-figuur 'zwaar van moede is' (60). Dit is een toespeling op de melancholische stemming die het gehele gedicht door telkens opduikt. Dit alles sluit prima aan bij de proloog waarin al werd gezegd dat de droom de verteller-dromer-minnaar *in dole* houdt (41). Het onontkoombare karakter van wat gaat geschieden en waarbij de dichter-minnaar het intuïtief al verloren heeft, blijkt uit de uitspraak *dat hi [de droom] mi droomde*. Volgens een traditionele opvatting is er een intermediaire macht buiten de minnaar [5.1] die hem voortstuwt en in de 'gevangenschap' van *Amors* brengt, waardoor het hem onmogelijk wordt zich aan diens heerschappij te onttrekken. Een gebondenheid die in het Gr.Hs. door de klui/enaars en de 'oude wijze mannen' wordt veroordeeld [zie 6.2].

De allegorie zal dus over een dame gaan. De dichter heeft het publiek duidelijk gemaakt dat hij *zich* tot het uiterste ingespannen heeft en dat ook aan de recipiënten hoge eisen gesteld worden.

8.1.2 r. 66-561

66-94. De minnaar loopt somber gestemd in de vroege morgen een smal pad af. Hij komt in een prachtig landschap. Op slag is dan zijn stemming verbeterd. *De zoetste lucht* zou een zieke genezen, *Rauwe, droufheit, vaer no ducht Ne deerde hem twijnt*.

De dichter/minnaar gaat op weg over een smalle weg, dit is symbolisch een moeilijke weg, alleen voor enkelingen begaanbaar. Het is één van de signalen die het begin van het verhaal het karakter van een initiatieritueel geven. Als de minnaar later tot 'klarheid' komt, wordt de weg 'wijd en lang' (197). De mededeling dat de zoete geuren van de kruiden in het landschap een zieke zouden kunnen genezen, past geheel in het middeleeuwse medische denken. De medici kennen een ruime plaats toe aan de aangename geuren bij de genezing van ziekten, waaronder ook de melancholie [7.2.3]. *Stanc* kan schadelijk voor de gezondheid zijn, zoals we later zullen zien. Het is de taak van het zintuig *Rieke-Lucht* (630) de burchtheer te vrijwaren voor de ziekmakende stank. Onze dichter weidt er niet over uit,

zijn mogelijke voorbeeld Augustijnken van Dordt (Kossmann 1940, 123-124, r. 99-107). des te meer De *stanc* komt ook ter sprake als er gesproken wordt over de *wachters*, met hun *suver wit abijt* [de tanden], van wie gezegd wordt: *si en mochten jeghen ghenen stanc, noch tjeghen gheen onremichede* (578-595). Het verband dat met de tanden gelegd wordt, doet enigszins vreemd aan. Misschien denkt de dichter aan onrein, onwelriekend voedsel.

Ook de wandeling in de frisse lucht is een remedie, onder andere door de bevordering van de menging der lichaamsvochten, wat genezend werkt. Bij de beschrijving van het landschap hebben alle vijf zintuigen een functie en ze worden ingeschakeld bij de waarneming en beschrijving. De landschapsbeschrijving voldoet geheel aan het *locus amoenus*-concept en draagt een sterk symbolisch karakter [4.2.1]. Het mooie landschap is tevens de aankondiging dat er belangrijke gebeurtenissen op komst zijn. De kleur groen is de kleur van de hoopvolle, prille, ontwakende liefde [4.9]. De minnaar dwaalt nog wat rond. De juiste weg naar de geliefde heeft hij nog niet gevonden. Misschien kan hier al van een dolagemotief gesproken worden.

95-128: De minnaar verfrist zich bij een prachtige fontein en drinkt het water *van so soeter roken*.

In het Gruuthuse convoluut is de fontein [4.10] meestal het symbool voor Maria of de geliefde. In de eerste allegorie is hiervan echter niet direct sprake. Wel functioneert zij hier in een soort inwijdingsproces: *dat borne maecte mi zuver ende reine*. Hierbij kan behalve aan het lichamelijke aspect (*mijn aenschijn dwaen*) ook aan het geestelijke gedacht zijn (*ic wilde mi suveren*): klaar voor het liefdesavontuur waaraan men met een 'rein' gemoed moet beginnen. Er zijn naast het vogelengezang ook andere traditionele aanduidingen die naar de minnesfeer wijzen, zoals de *rozegaerden* en *eggentieren* [4.3] die zonder *smette* zijn. Ook het vlooienkruid (*pollioen*) [4.3] dat hij onderweg ziet, heeft in de traditie een symbolische waarde. Het bezit volgens de middeleeuwer een sterk reinigende werking.

129-409: Verder dolend tussen de bloemen ziet de *ic* een lichtschijsel in het westen, de *zon* staat in het oosten. Onder vogelgezag gaat hij in de richting van het licht. Van geplukte rozen maakt hij een *hoet* [krans]. Dan komt hij bij een lange nog nooit betreden straat, *scone, groene, wijt ende lanc*, begrensd door een sterke doornhaag die rechtstreeks naar het licht voert. Aan het eind van de weg rust hij en *melancoleert* op het gras bij een linde. Plotseling verschijnt de barbaars uitziende ruiter *Twifel*, deze werpt zijn lans in de linde, bindt de *ic* vast en sleurt hem achter zijn paard aan naar onbekende bestemming. Even ziet de minnaar het licht weer, dat komt uit twee vensters van een witte burcht. In een grijs kasteel wordt hij opgesloten in een kerker en ziet achter een klein deurtje *Hope*. Zij vertelt dat hij de gevangene is van beider vijand *Twifel*. *Hope* verzekert de wanhopige minnaar dat *ze* zullen ontsnappen. Hoopvol gestemd zingt hij een opgewekt lied.

Het dolagemotief komt veel voor in de middeleeuwse literatuur. De verwarde psychische toestand van de minnaar wordt hierdoor concreet uitgebeeld. In ons gedicht loopt hij, na het waarnemen van het licht in de verte [de blikken uit de ogen van de dame], opgewonden rond in een geestvervoering waarin *van vrucheden therde speilde*.

De kennismaking met de dame verloopt geheel volgens middeleeuws recept, alleen de eerste fase (het horen noemen) is niet aanwezig, althans wordt niet vermeld. Waarschijnlijk heeft de dichter al kennis gemaakt met de dame in het dagelijks leven, hij zal over haar hebben horen spreken en haar gezien hebben, anders zou hij niet over haar gedroomd hebben. Het visuele aspect wordt nu geïntensiveerd door de vurige blikken die *zij* hem

toewerpt. In gedicht XV (57-86) wordt het ontstaan van de minne, *desen bedwelemden* [bedwelvende] *onghemake* beschreven. Als de vrouw (of man) *bescauwt es metten oghen, so moet die spaerke vlammen toghen... men caens te wille blusschen niet*. De traditionele Venus-symboliek [5.4] die deels in de tweede allegorie aanwezig is, is op deze voorstellingswijze terug te voeren. De pijlen in haar hand zijn de vurige blikken die de geliefden op elkaar richten, de toorts in haar hand is de gloed die de harten doet ontbranden en de blinddoek voor één oog duidt aan dat de liefde blind is en zonder aanzien des persoons ontstaat en dan ongevoelig is voor de waarschuwingen van de omgeving. Dit laatste aspect zullen we in ons gedicht uitgebeeld zien als zowel *Suverheit* als de *Burchgrave* de waarschuwingen van *Hoede* c.s. in de wind slaan.

De minnaar in spe vlecht een *hoet* [4.10] als bewijs dat hij op minneavontuur is. Zo'n krans is meestal samengesteld uit meerdere soorten bloemen die elk een symbolische betekenis hebben. Een *hoet* wordt gevlochten om aan de dame aan te bieden als teken van liefde, ook het omgekeerde komt voor, zoals in lied 48 waar het meisje een oudere man de *hoet* aanbiedt. Er zijn waarschijnlijk reminiscenties met de rozenkrans. In XV (543-545) maakt de minnaar *desen hoet ter eeren der zuvere rozen zoet* [Maria]. Metaforiek met betrekking tot Maria wordt ook vaak toegepast op de geliefde dame. Nergens echter blijkt hier dat de *hoet* voor Maria gevlochten wordt.

Het smalle pad voert naar de geliefde. De juiste paden zijn traditioneel altijd smal, net als in de bijbelse beeldspraak. De minnaar mag zich geen misstappen veroorloven, zoals uit het vervolg blijkt. Het *uten weghe gaen* is een gevaarlijke onderneming. Dat het pad onbetreden is, symboliseert de maagdelijkheid van de geliefde, die nog nooit door een man seksueel benaderd is.

De linde, de liefdesboom [4.3], blijkt de grens te markeren tussen het dolagebied, waarin de minnaar nog vol twijfels ronddoelt en de contreien van de geliefde. In dit laatste gebied zal de minnaar een vaste koers moeten aanhouden. In hoopvolle verwachting, maar toch ook met grote twijfels in het hart, *melancoleert* de minnaar onder de boom. *Melancoleert* lijkt mij hier een polyinterpretabele term. Dit is uitvoerig beargumenteerd in hoofdstuk 7. De minnaar verkeert in een uiterst labiele geestelijke toestand. Hij voelt zich uitermate onzeker en vertwijfeld en overdenkt zijn toestand. Droefgeestigheid, ernstig nadenken en fantasie vloeien in het woord 'melancholie' vaak ineen (Huizinga 1999, 37). Minnaars zetten zich dan vaak tot het maken van een minnelied. Zo lezen wij: *Melancolie doet mi waken, Sanc van minnen minlic maken* (1800-1801). Deze betekenis van *melancoleren* is in de Franse lyriek bekend. Vaak hebben de dichter-zangers de zangen 'in voorraad'. Het publiek denkt bij het ten gehore brengen echter dat ze spontaan zijn opgeweld: *Als dit liet ghescreven was, Elkerlic diet zach ende las, Dien docht grote vreimthede Dat ic, up so corte stede, Hadde ghemaect dustaen een liet. Elc te wondre up mi ziet* (1817-1822). De komst van *Twifel* maakt een einde aan het *melancoleren*.

In de psychische verwarring waarin de *ic* nu verkeert, gaan de personificaties die het innerlijk gebeuren veraanschouwelijken, een rol spelen. Het allegorische procédé neemt nu in alle uitvoerigheid een aanvang.

De minnaar heeft de blikken van de vrouw gezien, maar verkeert in grote twijfel over de oprechtheid, ogen kunnen immers bedriegen: *Oghen vliegghen hier ende daer, Maer herte en can niet lieghen, Een oghe upslaen es wandelbaer* (L95: 4-6). De verliefde wordt ten gevolge van zijn droefgeestige overpeinzingen zo door twijfel overmand dat hij letterlijk in

de macht van *Twifel* [5.3] komt. Door de twijfel geraakt hij steeds van de geliefde af, hij ziet geen toekomstperspectief meer. De wanhoop kapselt hem in. De personificatie die deze geestelijke toestand verbeeldt, sleurt hem mee naar zijn kasteel en kerkert hem. De letterlijke uitwerking van het feodale motief van 'het gevangen zijn'. In deze toestand zal hij aan het eind van het gedicht weer verkeren. Na de afwijzing door het *herte* [de Burchgrave] vertoef hij in de hoog onmuurde sombere tuin.

Gelukkig is vrouwe *Hope* [5.4] in de kerker aanwezig. Dit is niet toevallig, zij is de tegenvoeter van *Twifel*. Waar de één is, is de ander, althans in de eerste fase van het liefdeverwervingsproces. Als de minnaar in een later stadium langdurig in de onmiddellijke nabijheid van de geliefde verkeert, is *Twifel* afwezig en verwaarloost hij zelfverzekerd en hoogmoedig - tot zijn schade - *Hope*. Zo gauw de minnaar aan het slot 'verbannen' is, is *Twifel* er ook weer. *Hope* is dan spoorloos.

Er blijkt bloedverwantschap tussen *Hope* en *Twifel* te bestaan, echter met dien verstande dat *Twifel* volgens *Hope* een bastaard is (387). Ze drukt daarmee haar minachting voor hem uit. Zij spreekt de minnaar in zijn afzondering opbeurend toe. Hij ziet weer perspectief en uit dat in een lied.

410-422: Het lied van de minnaar stelt: als *Twifel* mij onder zijn hoede neemt ondervind ik pijn en zorgen. Daartegenover staat: *Hope doet mi vrolic zijn* (Lied 1)

Het lied geeft uiting aan de toestand tussen hoop en vertwijfeling die een minnaar doormaakt. Zal zijn liefde beantwoord worden? De twijfel is groot, slechts de hoop kan hem vrolijk stemmen. *Twifel* en *Hope* blijken duidelijk een twee-eenheid te vormen. De twijfel brengt hem tot wanhoop. De onzekerheden kunnen uitgroeien tot een zwaar depressieve toestand zoals later zal blijken.

Liederen komen in de Franse 'minneredes' regelmatig voor. Er is een speelcultuur rond poëzie en minnedienst in het gezelschapsleven die ook uit het Gr.Hs. af te leiden is. De muzikale uitingen met veel groepsliederen passen uitstekend in de Brugse kring waarin het stuk ten gehore zal zijn gebracht. In het tweede deel van het convoluit komt in de liederen overduidelijk naar voren dat zingen en musiceren belangrijke elementen in het gezelschapsverkeer zijn.

Het lyrische intermezzo onderbreekt op een zinvolle wijze de handeling. De voordracht van de allegorie zal er door verlevendigd zijn. De tekst werd ongetwijfeld gezongen, getuige de muzieknotatie.

Het lied is bij uitstek geschikt om gevoelens te uiten en biedt daarbij tevens mogelijkheden het inzicht in het handelingsverloop te vergroten. De acht liederen in de eerste allegorie zijn geheel in de tekst geïntegreerd. De het rijm aan het begin sluit zelfs aan bij de slotregel van de voorafgaande tekst (zoals bij de liederen 1 en 3) of loopt aan het eind door naar de beginregel van de verder gaande vertelling.

De liederen hebben overigens hun eigen ingewikkelde rijmschema's en wijken derhalve af van het gepaarde rijm in de epische gedeelten. Deze bezitten een meer rationeel karakter. Terloops zij hier opgemerkt dat de opvatting van Heeroma dat de eerste allegorie door Jan Moritoen gemaakt is in de vroege fase van zijn dichterschap, niet strookt met de complexiteit van de toegepaste rijmschema's in deze allegorie. Het liedboek toont ingewikkelder schema's naarmate men het eind nadert, een teken dat de volgorde van de

liederen bepaalt wordt door hun ontstaansdatum. Deze ontwikkeling heeft waarschijnlijk te maken met de groeiende vaardigheden van de auteur(s).

De liederen geven uiting aan de gevoelens die de hoofdpersonen beheersen. In het algemeen kunnen we zeggen dat de zanger een unieke, waardevolle belevenis accentueert, die de toehoorders kunnen begrijpen indien ze kennis bezitten van de conventies op het inhoudelijke en poëtische vlak. In de lyrische liefdesbeschouwing komen algemene thema's terug als troost, hoop en twijfel. Daarnaast het loven van de minne, de deugden die de liefde vereist, het gewenste loon en dergelijke. De mogelijkheid bestaat dat de soms voorkomende refreinen het publiek de gelegenheid geven te antwoorden op de strofe die door de solist gezongen is.

In de liederen in het gedicht is de vrouw als object van beschrijving meestal afwezig. De meeste handelen over de abstractie die de minne vormt, zo wordt in dit lied de hoop tegenover de vertwijfeling gesteld. We vinden tevens een dankbetuiging aan *Hope* die een mogelijke verlossing kan brengen³². Daarnaast bespreekt de mannelijke *ic* de eigen gevoelens.

Het zo dadelijk te bespreken lied van *Juecht* vormt op deze regel uiteraard een uitzondering. *Juecht* formuleert nadrukkelijk de eisen die zij aan de komende liefdesverhouding stelt.

De liederen zijn vervat in een hoofds minneregister, waarin de auteur kennelijk op speelse wijze experimenteert met vormen, woordvariaties en rijmschema's. Zumthor (1972, 270 v.) acht dit een kenmerk van de laat-middeleeuwse lyriek.

Frappant is dat in de acht liederen, in afwijking van die in het tweede deel van het handschrift, weinig Duits gekleurde woorden voorkomen. Eenmaal vinden we *twifel* (lied 4, r. 1362).

Aangezien we ons beperken tot de inhoudelijke aspecten, verwijzen we voor de vormaspecten van de liederen naar de literatuuropgave in het thematisch register.

423-561: *Hope* prijst het lied. De gevangenen zijn snel vrij en gaan op het licht af. Bij de Linde vertelt *Hope* dat de boom *Waerscu* een grenspaal is. Zij waarschuwt voor het *buten onsen* weghe gaan. De minnaar ziet de schoonheid van de burcht en wordt *memorloos*. *Hope* ondersteunt hem en verzoekt hem een kerel te zijn. Hij ziet opnieuw het licht uit de vensters, wordt bleek en zucht. Hij steunt opnieuw op *Hope*. *Twifel* verschijnt weer. Na *Hope's* doeltreffende verweer, keert hij scheldend en onverrichterzake terug.

Nadrukkelijk prijst *Hope* het lied om de zangkunst van de minnaar, over de inhoud zegt ze niets. Tweemaal zegt de minnaar: *Hope doet mi vroylic zijn*, terwijl *Hope* erbij is. Later herhaalt hij de lof op *Hope* in het vierde lied (het tweede lied dat de *ic* in de voorburcht maakt). Dat lied wordt afgekeurd door *Verziene*, omdat men niemand mag prijzen. *Daer hij selve hoorde toe* (1380-1381). Inhoudelijk is dit ook een gebrek in het 'kerker'-lied. Het is

³² Reynaert (1984, 43) typeert dit genre lied als een "uiting van een nieuwe sensibiteit, waarbij de amoureuze omgang vanuit de teruggeplooidheid van het individu op zichzelf, vanuit een in zwaarmoedigheid verblijvende eenzaamheid wordt belicht". Op p. 49 zegt Reynaert dat de melancholie niet een gevolg is van een afwijking in de liefde en dat het thema niet in de minncproblematiek ingekapseld lijkt te zijn. In hoofdstuk 7 ga ik uitvoerig op dit verschijnsel in.

voor de goede verstaanders een bewijs dat de minnaar nog heel wat moet leren op het gebied van de mores.

Het *memoriloos* zijn, het bleek worden en zuchten zijn typerende uitingen van het verkeren in een melancholische toestand. We hebben de verschijnselen uitvoerig beschreven in hoofdstuk 7. De symptomen leiden het weer letterlijk opdagen van *Twifel* in. De hoopvolle verwachtingen doen de twijfel echter weer op de achtergrond verdwijnen. De personificatie, die als een soort *deus ex machina* verschenen is, kan weer verdwijnen. Ook in het vervolg zal blijken dat *Hope* een krachtdadige figuur kan zijn.

De optimistische uiting van de minnaar *Nemmer en namic sijns goom* [ik lette niet meer op hem, ik zag hem nooit meer terug] (561) zal het publiek wel met een korreltje zout genomen hebben. Een sterk karakter heeft hij niet getoond. Als hij later vol vertwijfeling in de ommuurde tuin zit, functioneert deze opmerking als retrospectief aspect.

Het gedrag van de minnaar heeft voor de ingewijde recipiënt nog een andere betekenis. Hij beheerst zijn gevoelens zeer slecht. Hij moet tot twee maal toe ondersteund worden door *Hope*. Volgens de middeleeuwse opvattingen speelt het *mate* betrachten een belangrijke rol in het menselijk gedrag. Men moet zich beheersen door middel van het verstand om de gevoelens onder controle te houden. Ook in het Gr.Hs. komt de eis om zich te matigen frequent voor. Het zal duidelijk zijn dat deze voorwaarde in alle hoofse liefdesliteratuur een groot spanningsveld oproept tussen het noodzakelijk geachte beheerste gedrag en de verwarde geestestoestand die ontstaat door de allesbeheersende macht van de liefde. Deze berooft de mens van het verstand. Men zie voor nadere informatie over *mate* onder andere 6.3.2 ad 7 en 5.4.

Zeer nadrukkelijk vermeldt de dichter dat het licht in het westen aanwezig is en niet in het oosten. Een oostelijk licht heeft een sterk godsdienstige lading, het natuurlijke licht is een symbool van Gods heil. Men denke hierbij aan de *corsoude* die zich 's morgens ontplooit en *den troen der sonnen ganc* volgt, dat wil zeggen zij staat open om Gods gaven te ontvangen. [4.3]. Hier gaat het om een aards getinte lichtbron. Ik beschouw deze kwestie uitvoeriger in 4.7.1.2.

8.1.3 r. 562-758

562-614: De minnaar en *Hope* vervolgen hun tocht. De dichter beschrijft uitvoerig het *rikelike palas* waar het licht uitstraalt. Hij gebruikt daartoe architectonische symboliek. Een zuivere, reine, witte pilaar van albast staat op een burcht die bestuurd wordt door vijf jonkheren.

De burchtmetaforiek [4.5] is het episch raam waarop het gedicht is gebouwd. De dame is al vagelijk als een burcht geïntroduceerd als de minnaar door het landschap doolt en vele *casteelen* ziet. Het is een symbolisch beeld voor het dagelijkse leven waarin de *ic* in zijn omgeving allerlei schone dames ziet (175-184). Eén ervan bekoort hem in het bijzonder, zij werpt hem haar vurige blikken toe [het licht dat uit de vensters straalt]. Zij is de dame waarvan hij droomt en zijn toenaderingspogingen worden in de allegorie gesymboliseerd. Hij tekent nu haar uiterlijk zinnebeeldig met behulp van de vele bouwonderdelen die in een burcht aanwezig zijn. Ze zijn op zeer harmonische wijze door de maker [God] samengevoegd.

Haar innerlijk wordt later uitvoerig getekend door het handelend optreden van vele personificaties in de burcht. Het gedicht krijgt dan een levendiger karakter, geraakt als het ware in een stroomversnelling.

De domificatietechniek die het uiterlijk van de dame beschrijft, is in een aparte paragraaf behandeld [4.5]. De ogen, de neus, de lippen en tanden, de hals, de romp en de handen komen alle min of meer uitvoerig aan de orde. De schoonheid en de kunstige architectuur krijgen daarbij een bijzonder accent. De juiste mate waarin men zich aan de juiste proporties houdt, zijn consequent aanwezig.

615-642. *Hope* vertelt dat een *borchgrave* de regent van de burcht is. Hij wordt bijgestaan door vijf raadsliden [de vijf zintuigen: *Heer Nouwe-Zien*, *Heer Smakelijc*, *Mijnheer Rieken Lucht*, *Heer Lucht-Gevoel* en *Mijn heer Hoor-Na*].

We maken voor het eerst kennis met het innerlijk van de dame. De burchtheer is de regent die het geheel onder zijn heerschappij heeft. Hij verbeeldt het 'hart' dat volgens de middeleeuwse opvatting naast de lichamelijke processen ook de geestelijke eigenschappen als gevoel, wil en verstand reguleert. De verbindende schakel met de buitenwereld wordt gevormd door de vijf zintuigen. Zij staan als raadgevers de schrandere heer op oplettende, bekwame en standvastige wijze bij.

643-700: Een uit de burcht afgeschoten pijl doorboort het hart van de *ic*. *Hope* stopt de verdwaasde minnaar een versterkend kruid in de mond Zij verwijt hem *zijn ghecrute en verzike*. De domificatiebeschrijving wordt na dit intermezzo hervat. De benen (*twee pilaren sonderlinghe*) zijn omgeven door doornen, netels en bramen.

Tot dusver waren het enkel de bliken die, gesymboliseerd als lichtflitsen, het hart van de minnaar beroerden. De dame gaat nu van meer substantiële middelen gebruik maken. Een pijl treft het hart van de minnaar. Een pijl heeft uiteraard een geringere reikwijdte dan een lichtflits, het dichterbij komen wordt dus zinvol uitgebuit. De vertwijfelde minnaar beheerst zich weer niet en raakt bijna buiten zinnen. *Hope* maakt gebruik van een toverkruid en trekt de pijl voorzichtig uit zijn hart. Waarschijnlijk komt er nog een soortgelijk wondermiddel aan de orde als in r. 2026 de minnedrank *confoort* als welkomstdrank aangeboden wordt, deze doet ons aan het verhaal van Tristan en Isolde herinneren. De recipiënt zal zich het *Tristan en Isolde* verhaal herinneren. De minnaar lijdt veel pijn, maar het licht uit de vensters helpt hem toch over het ergste heen nu hij door *Hope* 'behandeld' is.

Opvallend is de beschrijving van de benen van de vrouw. Ze worden uitgebeeld als het benedendeel van de burcht. De doornen duiden symbolisch aan dat de dame niet zomaar te benaderen is. Doornen, netelen en bramen vormen de traditionele allegorische bescherming van de 'roos', het geslachtsdeel van de dame. Opmerkelijk is dat de benen pas na een intermezzo, dus gescheiden van de omschrijving van het bovendeel van de burcht, als zelfstandig, belangrijk element, geschilderd worden. Ik bespreek de zin hiervan bij het fragment r. 775-1341 nader. Ook in de burcht blijven beide facetten van de vrouw streng gescheiden tijdens het handelingsverloop.

De dichter maakt geregeld gebruik van pro- of retrospectieve verwijzingen. De recipiënt zal zich aan het slot, als de minnaar na zijn ontwaken zegt *Noch bem ic van der wonden*

stec, kunnen herinneren dat dit hier al aangekondigd wordt met *Noch dinct mi dat ic bem mesmaect Int ghedncken der quersue* (647-648)

700-758 *Hope* klopt aan de poort van de burcht en vraagt de portier *Kila* om toegang. Zijn meester *Oghelheus* geeft desgevraagd toestemming. Als ze binnen gelaten zijn in het portierskamertje ontmoeten de beide nieuwkomers *Kila* s vrouw *Verziene*.

Als *Hope* aangeklopt heeft, komt de familieverwantschap met *Kila* en diens meester *Oghelheus* haar goed van pas. Ze mag met de *ic* naar binnen. Op het belang van de clustervorming en de familieverwantschappen heb ik in mijn inleiding bij de behandeling van de personificaties [5-1] gewezen.

Hope heeft als sleutelfiguur in het liefdesproces veel relaties met allerlei psychische functies. Haar familieleden bieden de helpende hand om de minnaar toegang te verschaffen. *Twifel* werkt haar tegen, maar dat is dan ook een bastaard, van hem kun je niet anders verwachten!

814 | 759-1738

759-834 *Verziene* verzorgt de pijlwond van de minnaar met de tampon *Helen*. De dromer mag door een spleet in de burchtzaal kijken en ziet *Vrouwe Hovesscheit* in een gouden kleed. Zij knielt met *Simpelheit* en *Omoedicheit* voor *Suverheit*. Deze zit op een gouden troon. Ze draagt een wit kleed bezaaid met rozen, op haar schoot extra versierd met goudsbloemen. Voor haar gezicht houdt ze een *clone* die ze met welgevallen beziet. *Hovesscheit* brengt een brief met een lied van *Juecht*. De te hulp geroepen jonkheer *Lust* leidt het gezang.

De eerste stap in het domein van de dame is gezet. Het betekent echter nog niet dat de minnaar zomaar toegang tot haar krijgt. Er zullen nog verschillende voorbereidingen de revue passeren voor de werkelijke toelating een feit is. *Verziene* verzorgt de pijlwond en brengt de tampon *Helen* aan. Dan pas kan de eerste fase in het proces van de kennismaking volgen. In het minneverkeer is geheimhouding verplicht. Het aanbrenge van de tampon is noodzakelijk om de eer van de dame te waarborgen. Voortdurend maakt de dichter gebruik van dit soort 'aanschouwingsmiddelen' als hij psychische functies of bepaalde gedragswijzen wil aanduiden.

Nu volgt een zeer essentieel moment. De minnaar krijgt een eerste blik op één van de meest heimelijke aspecten die de vrouwe eigen is: het benedendeel. Hij kan *Suverheit* en haar kompanen observeren. In dit verband is het benadrukken van de noodzaak tot zwijgen (via het beeld van de tampon *Helen*) buitengewoon zinvol. Gezien de vlotte wijze waarop men de minnaar toestemming geeft, vertrouwt men er blijkbaar op dat de tampon *helen* zijn werk zal doen en dat de minnaar zich aan zijn zwijgplicht zal houden.

In het handschrift maakt men kwistig gebruik van allerlei visuele ordeningsmiddelen om markante plaatsen te scheiden. Merkwaardig genoeg zien we hier geen duidelijke markering. Men zou die wel verwachten op deze plaats waar sprake is van een essentiële verwisseling van plaats. Een meerdere regels beslaande lombarde, een paragraafteken of regels wit zouden niet misstaan hebben.

De eerste die de *ic* aanschouwt, is *Hovesscheit* [5-4]. *Een van die scoonste creature Die leeft in alder werelt breit* (II 785-786). Deze in een gouden [4-6] kleed gehulde allegorische figuur met het uiterlijk van een engel symboliseert de betekenis van hoofds gedrag. De

minnaar maakt direct met haar kennis, bijzonder zinvol. 'Hoofsheid' slaat zowel op de dagelijkse sociale handelwijzen als op een specifiek op de minne gerichte houding waarbij een speciale gedragscode geldt. Men kan de term plaatsen in samenhang met een 'beschaafde' levensstijl, die zich op ieder gebied afzet tegen 'dorpers' gedrag. *Hovesscheit* staat in de directe omgeving van *Suverheit*. Dit is niet toevallig. Een groot deel van de problematiek die het fenomeen 'hoofse liefde' oproept, is geconcentreerd rond de *suverheit* van de vrouw, de geslachtelijke verhouding tot de hoofse minnaar. De 'hoofsheid' doet een beroep op een idealistische houding van de minnaar. Deze staat meestal in schrille tegenstelling tot de realiteit [6.3.2 ad 3 en 4].

De term 'hoofs' gaat vaak samen met het gebruik van de woorden *vroet* en *scoon van rade*. De rede is het uiterst belangrijke regulerend psychische vermogen, zoals we reeds in het voorgaande geconstateerd hebben. In het hele convoluut speelt *Vrou Redene* een belangrijke rol. In het vervolg komen we hierop uitgebreider terug [zie ook 6.3 7].

Wanneer *Verziene* zegt *Ende eist dat ghi u wilt versumen, Thof zo sullen wi moeten rumen* (1674-1675), roept dit spanning bij de toehoorders op. Men weet dat de verliefde *ic* - gezien zijn gedragingen - een labiel karakter heeft. Het nakomen van de regels zal hem moeilijk vallen. De woorden van *Verziene* zal men zich later herinneren bij de verwijdering van de minnaar uit de burcht. De verwijdering van *Verziene* komt dan evenwel niet ter sprake. *Hope* blijkt wel uit de burcht verdwenen te zijn.

Met *Hovesscheit* knielen *Simpelhede* en *Omoedichede* voor *Suverheit*. *Simpel* als eigenschap, duidt op oprechte, zachtaardige onschuld. *Omoedichede* is een uitermate belangrijk persoon. De minnaar veronachtzaamt de eisen die zij stelt door zijn hoogmoed. Dit leidt tot zijn val. Ook de dame zal, door de minnaar op te nemen tegen het advies van *Hoede* in, overmoedig zijn. Het loopt voor haar met een sisser af. Voor nadere informatie verwijzen we naar de paragraaf over de vrouwelijke personificaties [5.4].

Suverheit is met de *Burchgrave* de belangrijkste persoon naast de minnaar. De liefdesmoraal in het Gr.Hs. beklemtoont steeds dat de minnaar de maagdelijkheid van de dame dient te eerbiedigen en zich niet 'dorperlijk' mag gedragen. Het lijkt me niet toevallig dat het laatste deel van de beschrijving van de dame de benen apart noemt en dat een haag van doornen hen beschermt. De sensuele gedachten van de minnaar, die ongetwijfeld aanwezig zijn, doen - na de aantrekkingskracht uitgeoefend door de schoonheid van de dame - de aandacht uitgaan naar het geslachtelijke aspect. De haag met doornen beschermt de dame op symbolische wijze. *Suverheit*, die symbolisch verblijft in de benedenzaal van de burcht, vertegenwoordigt het geslachtelijke aspect van de dame. Aan het slot zal de minnaar verzekeren dat hij *in grote weelde* van alles heeft uitgehaald, maar dat *Suverheit* gespaard gebleven is. De figuren *Suverheit* en de *Burchgrave* zijn strikt van elkaar gescheiden door de wenteltrap die beneden- en bovenzaal scheidt. Als bewaakster zit *Hoede* op deze verbinding tussen het zinnelijke en het regulerende deel van de dame.

Ik acht een goed begrip van de functie van *Suverheit* van essentieel belang voor de interpretatie van de allegorie. In het hoofdstuk over de personificaties heb ik veel aandacht aan haar besteed. Zij wordt uitvoeriger beschreven dan de *Burchgrave*. Zij is voorzien van sprekende symbolische attributen en heeft drie belangrijke 'raadvrouwen', die steeds in haar onmiddellijke nabijheid vertoeven. Zij krijgt de liederen het eerste te horen. *Hoede* waarschuwt haar expliciet en Melancholie staat in haar dienst.

De dichter bouwt zijn beschrijving van de dame chiastisch op. Bij de tekening van het uiterlijk van de burcht beschrijft hij eerst het bovendeel (562-614). Pas nadat de *ic* getroffen is door de liefdespijn en de als bewakers optredende zintuigen beschreven zijn (615-686), komt de weergave van het onderste gedeelte (687-700). Bij de kennismaking met de bewoners van de burcht maken we echter eerst kennis met *Suverheit* in de benedenzaal en pas later met het andere aspect van de dame namelijk de *Burchgrave* [het regulerende 'hart'] in de bovenzaal. Hoewel de gepersonifieerde figuren zich nogal eens verplaatsen, blijven beide hoofdfiguren strikt op de hen fysiologisch toebedeelde plaats.

In de achtste dialoog van Andreus Capellanus' *De amore* zien we eenzelfde tegenstelling tussen onder- en bovendeel, vergezeld van een vergelijkbare uitwerking. Er vindt een gesprek plaats tussen een dame van hoge adel en een ridder die in stand gelijk staat. De vraag komt ter sprake welke keuze hij zou maken. Een dame heeft twee vrijers, de een geeft de voorkeur aan haar benedendeel, de ander aan het bovendeel. De man antwoordt dat het enkel kiezen voor het benedendeel de mens doet gelijken op een dier (vooral de hond wordt genoemd) en dat daarentegen geen man moe wordt van de vertroosting die van het bovendeel uitgaat. Het lichamelijke deel is wel aantrekkelijk, maar uiteindelijk niet het meest bevredigend. Het louter behagen scheppen in het geslachtelijke gaat snel tegenstaan en men raakt vol schuldbesef over deze eenzijdige houding.

Suverheit vertoeft symbolisch in de benedenzaal en de *Burchgrave* in de bovenzaal. Het is volkomen logisch dat geen van beiden zich door de burcht verplaatst, zoals de andere personificaties. Mijn verklaring impliceert niet dat ik veronderstel dat de auteur met zekerheid het geschrift van Capellanus kent, wel dat er sprake kan zijn van een 'hoofs discours' waarin deze ideeën gangbaar zijn.

Suverheit zit op een troon en bezit een kroon die zij, zeer opmerkelijk, vóór haar gezicht houdt (804) en niet óp het hoofd draagt. De dichter brengt dit nadrukkelijk onder de aandacht met *dat meerctic wael*. In r. 903 wordt ten overvloede nog opgemerkt dat zij *sat in haer majesteit*, wat het bezit van een kroon rechtvaardigt.

Melancolie, waarvan *Hoede* zegt dat hij in de burcht *regement* voert (1945), knielt in r. 906 voor *Suverheit* neer *up sine knien* als bewijs van zijn onderdanigheid. Hij toont zo haar belangrijke positie in de burcht aan. Zij voert de heerschappij in het benedendeel van de burcht, de *Burchgrave* in het bovendeel.

Het is natuurlijk geen toeval dat juist *Hovesscheit* het lied van *Juecht* aan *Suverheit* overhandigt. De zang- en liedkunst behoren tot het beschaafde amusement van een groep mensen die de wellevendheid op grote prijs stellen. De komst van *Lust* vergroot het plezier aanmerkelijk. Hij brengt door zijn vaardigheden de juiste stemming. De noodzaak van een *reine, eervolle minne* die het nu volgende lied van Jeugd beklemtoont, is in het bijzonder belangrijk voor *Suverheit*, zoals we later zullen zien.

835-848: Het lied van *Juecht* (lied 2) met de hoofdgedachte:

Gheen dinc ghepijst voor rene minne
Want si bewijst den vrouwen vrecht
Ik edel sin in haer verhuucht
Minne es zoet in den beghinne
Int ende en es gheen onghenucht

Dit lied van *Juecht* [3.2 en 5.4] is de aanzet tot grote activiteiten in de burcht en een wezenlijk aspect van de komende activiteiten. Het is een lied dat de gevoelens van het jeugdige aspect van de dame [*Suverheit* en de *Burchgrave* samen] weergeeft. *Juecht* is een van haar gepersonifieerde eigenschappen.

Het lied stelt de 'bewoners' voor een serieuze en diep menselijke problematiek en activeert *Hoede* en haar aanhangers tot groot verzet. De vrouw weet dat er een minnaar op komst is. Ze heeft hem immers met haar blikken in liefde doen ontvlammen en de weg gewezen. Ze geeft haar gevoelens en verwachtingen in het lied bloot, deels onbewust, zoals in het vervolg voorgewend wordt.

In wezen geeft zij de eisen weer die zij stelt aan een goede liefdesverhouding. Er moet sprake zijn van een trouwe, reine liefde die voortkomt uit een edel gemoed. Zo'n verhouding geeft van begin tot eind levensgeluk. Nadrukkelijk vermeldt zij dat het eind *gheen onghenuecht* geeft. Kennelijk veronderstelt 'men' dat het einde dikwijls niet zo *zoet* is. *Hoede* en haar aanhang kan men in ieder geval tot die 'men' rekenen. Minnaars hebben immers dikwijls kwalijke oogmerken.

Zoals zo vaak in het Gr.Hs. moet men raden naar de precieze bedoeling. Zeker is dat er twee opvattingen in de burcht zijn. De ene aanvaardt de liefde tamelijk kritiekloos als een natuurlijk en de jeugd eigen gebeuren, de andere heeft haar bedenkingen vooral als de vrouw de minnaar te snel accepteert. De twee stromingen botsen in het vervolg nadrukkelijk op elkaar. De vrouw twijfelt of zij de minnaar zal accepteren.

Er is hier nadrukkelijk sprake van een weergave van de vrouwelijke gevoelens (hier *Suverheit* en de *Burchgrave*). De aandacht hiervoor is in de hoofse minnetraditie niet zo gebruikelijk. De man staat meestal in het centrum van het psychologische perspectief. In de eerste allegorie ligt een sterke nadruk op de processen die in het innerlijk van de vrouw plaatsvinden tijdens het liefdesproces. De meeste personificaties representeren belangrijke facetten van haar persoonlijkheid.

Het amoureuze, in wezen dieptepsychologisch gefundeerde lied van *Juecht* vormt het vertrekpunt voor de handelingen in de burcht. Het geeft de diepste intenties en verlangens van de dame ten aanzien van de liefde weer. Het nogal vrijmoedige lied wordt niet voor niets eerst aangeboden aan *Suverheit* en niet aan de *Burchgrave*. Het lied brengt een schok teweeg in de burchtgemeenschap. Het wil in feite zeggen dat de dame met haar jeugdige *sotte* geaardheid (waartegen in allerlei gedichten uit het derde deel gewaarschuwd wordt), verlangt naar de minne. Dit verlangen laat zich uiteindelijk niet onderdrukken.

Jeugd doet voorkomen of zij – net als de gemeenschap! – het lied niet begrijpt. Waarschijnlijk begrijpt ieder het lied best. De overwegingen waarvan sprake is, gaan niet zozeer over de interpretatie van de tekst, zoals men heimelijk doet voorkomen, maar over de consequenties van het toegeven aan drang tot minne. Het leven van de vrouw zal zich radicaal wijzigen.

Juecht weet natuurlijk niet uit ervaring wat ze neergeschreven heeft, ze kent de liefde slechts van *Hier daer segghen, achter voren* en *In vraechde noit om el bediet* (873-874). Uiteraard heeft ze als jonge vrouw blijkbaar zo haar biologisch en psychisch verankerde verlangens die bij de jeugd in alle tijden aanwezig zijn.

Die edel jonchere Lust vergezelt Jeugd geregeld (824). Zijn rol is volgens Heeroma tamelijk onschuldig beperkt tot opper/angmeester van de 'compagnie'. Het is de vraag echter of het geïntendeerde publiek niet meer achter deze figuur zoekt. In II moet de

ongetwijfeld jeugdige *Lust* niet voor niets bijgeschoold worden in de minneschool Men zie de opmerkingen over deze figuur in de paragraaf over de mannelijke personificaties [5 3]

Juecht legt een koppeling tussen de minne en *ghenuecht* Dat dit verband problematisch is, blijkt uit een aantal plaatsen in het handschrift zoals in L146 1-4 *Ic danc u jonstelyc vrouw Ghenuecht Met herten ende met zinne Dat ghij mi liet in juecht Ghebruken uwer minne* Het woord *ghenuecht* in combinatie met *ghebruken* roept bijvoorbeeld de vraag op of die 'genoegens' van de jeugd altijd wel zo eerbaar en verstandig waren Een sterk verband met een gebrek aan verstandig overleg legt de dichter in **IV** *Nemen die redenen wil verstaan Ende als de tyt voort es ghegaen Dat juecht haer jonge lusticghe cracht Heeft versleten* (209-212) *Die vier sproocte inden lustichen moet* (218) dan pas komt de bezinning Dat *Juecht* niet erg vatbaar is voor redelijkheid blijkt ook duidelijk uit uitspraken van haar zelf *Wie sal verbieden mi mine ghenuecht'* (1303)

Bij de behoudende krachten in de burcht (zoals onder andere bij *Hoede* en *Enie*) heeft *Juecht* een slechte naam In de paragraaf over de personificaties [5 4] zijn we uitvoerig op haar ingegaan Ze is een zotte blinde, wild, rebels, op lust belust, waarschuwingen gaan het ene oor in en het andere uit Ze is luchthartig en opstandig kan moeilijk aan orde en tucht wennen Haar onbezorgdheid is groot voortdurend zingend loopt ze door de liefdesburcht Een waarschuwing voor degene die *horende doof en ziende blind* is, horen we in het zesde lied in onze allegorie (1815) Joldersma en Van der Poel wijzen erop dat diverse wereldlijke liederen toespelen op het feit dat vooral jonge mensen zich moeilijk van de aardse verlokkingen af kunnen wenden (2000 118) Dit gegeven wordt hier meesterlijk uitgewerkt

Ook al brengt Jeugd in haar lied een aantal restricties aan, *Hoede* doorgrondt de dreigende gevaren van het toegeven aan de minne *Sanzijn* neemt een aarzelende houding aan (1749-1752) Jeugd staat achter haar gedicht zij maakt voor zichzelf de opmerking *Wie sal verbieden mi mine ghenuecht'* (1303) Ze deelt mee dat zij het gedicht verscheuren zal als het onbetamelijk is Dit gebeurt niet De mededeling dient waarschijnlijk om de tegenstanders zand in de ogen te strooien

Een nadere verklaring over de *reine minne* die *int ende gheen onghenuecht* geeft vinden we in **IV** *als men met trouwen na minne staet So eist als blyscap ende vrie vruecht Multheit weidicheit ende duecht Memderheit scamelheit dits de minne* (170-173) van *alle minners reine* (167)

849 925 *Juecht* moet voor de raad van *Suverheit* verschijnen om nadere uitleg te geven Zij zegt de tekst ook niet te kunnen verklaren De *waerdeme* van de burcht verschijnt de oude wijze kleine gerimpelde *Hoede* Iedereen vertrekt want men waardeert haar komst niet Alleen *Suverheit* blijft (noodgedwongen) in de benedenzaal *Melancolie* komt en ontvangt de brief [een blad met een korte tekst] waarop het lied geschreven is Ook hij begrijpt de tekst niet en zal zijn drie broeders raadplegen

De raet voert in r 878 het gemeenschappelijk overleg bij *Suverheit* In deze *raet* zitten heel andere personen dan in de *raet* van *camerlinghen* rond de *Burchtgrave* (r 626 en 641) Kennelijk bezitten de twee aspecten van de dame ieder hun eigen raad *Melancolie* is een soort verbindende schakel

In *Suverheits* adviesorgaan zitten *Hovesscheit* (de belangrijkste) *Simpelhede* *Omoedichede* (waarschijnlijk zij die zich soepel opstelt en medelijden met de minnaars

heeft) en zangmeester *Lust*. De *raet* ondervraagt de lichtzinnige *Juecht*. Ook de *raet* van de *Burchgrave* zal dat later doen. Bij beide gelegenheden spreekt Jeugd zich niet duidelijk uit.

Hoede heeft ongetwijfeld op haar favoriete plek, de wenteltrap die onder- en bovenzaal verbindt, alles aanschouwd en beluisterd. Zij begrijpt de intentie van dit alles. Met haar zeer conservatieve instelling wijst zij de 'hooftse liefde' en de daarmee gepaard gaande gedragsregels en gedragingen af. De aanwezigen weten dit uiteraard. Als ze verschijnt, verdwijnt ieder schielijk, uitgezonderd *Suverheit*, die plaatsgebonden is.

Hoede is een representant van de behoudende opvattingen die in het convoluut herhaaldelijk naar voren komen. Ook de kluzenaars en *Viou Redene* dienen als woordvoerders van deze stroming. Vooral in gedicht XV klinken de afwijzingen heel sterk. Dit gebeurt bijvoorbeeld in 289-291: *keer dyn minne te lichte waert [naar God] Want werlike minne altoos begaert Donker te zme ende onghemeict*. Men krijgt trouwens de indruk dat zo tussen de regels door in veel dichtwerk van het Gr Hs het dispuut weerklinkt tussen de voorstanders en de tegenstanders van de aardse liefde. Er blijft overigens een waas hangen over wat nu precies de wereldlijke minne behelst. Het is mogelijk dat men het wat triviale, opgewekte en feestelijke getinte gezelschapsleven in de hooftse gemeenschap met al zijn spelvormen veroordeelt. Het is ook denkbaar dat men de uitspattingen, waaraan volgens enkele teksten vooral de jeugd zich schuldig maakt, op de korrel neemt. De houding van de religieus georiënteerden komt ter sprake in 6.2.

Het is overigens zeer merkwaardig dat men in dit stedelijke handschrift nergens duidelijke aansporingen vindt die in de richting van een wettelijk huwelijk wijzen. Het lied van Jeugd zou in deze richting kunnen wijzen. Ook in de liederen is tussen de regels door soms te lezen dat een duurzame verhouding, gebaseerd op *trouwe*, voor de vrouw het uiteindelijke doel is. De aanbidding van een *hoet* en een *ring* lijken op een belofte tot een meer permanente verbintenis te duiden (resp. lied 48 en 75), maar volstrekt overtuigend is dit niet. In verschillende 'ouderdoms'-gedichten en -liederen klinkt de veroordeling van een wulps leven sterk door, maar ook hierin wordt niet gesproken over een huwelijksband. In hoofdstuk 6 over de ethiek zijn we op deze kwestie uitvoeriger ingegaan.

926 1000 *Hoede* wil *Melancolie* op de wenteltrap tegenhouden, maar hij beveelt haar te zwijgen. In een bovenzaal is een groot gezelschap personificaties bijeen met *groot geschal* en met *vuechden ende met melodien*. Dan treedt *Melancolie* binnen.

Hoede zit op haar sleutelpositie, de wentelende verbindingstrap tussen *Suverheit* en de *Burchgrave*, dat wil zeggen tussen het strikt plaatsgebonden zinnelijk en het meer algemeen psychisch-regulerende aspect van de dame. Opmerkelijk is dat het gezelschap verkeert in één van de bovenzalen waar de *Burchgrave* niet aanwezig is.

Driemaal vermeldt de dichter dat het burchtgezelschap gezamenlijk met veel plezier zingend (en misschien ook wel musicerend) bijeen is. Dit is naar alle waarschijnlijkheid een weerklink van bedrijvigheden die in het normale gezelschapsleven ook plaatsvinden. Het gezamenlijk musiceren komt bijvoorbeeld in de Egidius-liederen (L98 en 99) duidelijk naar voren. Het laatste lied prijst bovendien de vrolijkheid die men daarbij beleeft. Het woord *melodie* kent in het Middelnederlands een betekenisverruiming tot 'genoegen'.

1001-1040 *Melancolie* presenteert het door hem niet begrepen lied *Rouckeloos* laat zich minachtend uit. *Jolijt* wijst hem terecht. Ook de broers *Sangwijn*, *Colorijn* en *Fleumaet* kunnen of willen het lied niet doorgronden.

We zien hier de geraffineerde uitwerking van de toespeling in de proloog over de *ruden* en de *corsouden*. De figuur die absoluut niets van de dichtkunst begrijpt, is *Rouckeloos*. Dit blijkt uit zijn opmerking: *Wat roucke mi van uwen zanghe, ic souder up studeren langhe Eer icker of te vroeder ware. Vraghet enen vedelhare! Heer Jolijt* snoert hem de mond met: *Swijcht ter quader tijt*. Dat het juist Heer *Jolijt* is die hem terechtwijst, bewijst het plezier dat men bij het dichten en zingen beleeft. De *dorpers* kennen dit genoeg niet.

1041-1100: Iedereen gaat (na het maken van een kopie) *nacht ende dach* aan de studie van het lied *Melancolie* brengt verslag uit aan *Suverheit*. *Hoede* verneemt ondertussen de gang van zaken van *Envie*. Beide vrouwen gaan naar de bovenzaal om de 'kamerlingen' te waarschuwen.

Blijkbaar wordt literair werk in de Brugse gemeenschap overgeschreven en daarna gezamenlijk – na individuele bestudering – besproken. Ook in de regels 1818-1819 vinden we deze vermelding. Daarna gaat men de liederen met elkaar zingen. Het is al gememoreerd dat het onwaarschijnlijk is dat men het lied inhoudelijk niet begrijpt. De inhoud betekent een volledige doorbraak van het conservatief getinte leefpatroon in de burcht. De 'studie' zal vooral betrekking hebben op de consequenties die het aanvaarden van de strekking van het lied, voor de levenswijze van de *compagnie* [het persoonlijk leven van de dame] zal hebben. De modernistische, meer liberale opvatting van *Juecht* en de haren, botst met de meer conservatieve van *Hoede* c.s.

Suverheit is de meest belanghebbende, men houdt haar nauwkeurig op de hoogte. De strekking van het lied staat nauw in verband met haar wel en wee, zoals we reeds besproken hebben. Helaas moet *Melancolie* verklaren dat hij nog geen opheldering kan geven.

Envie fungeert in het gedicht als spionne, kennelijk passen de burchtbewoners voor haar niet zo op hun tellen als voor *Hoede*. Zodra *Hoede* verschijnt, verwijderd iedereen zich. *Envie* doet haar reputatie als stiekeme lasteraarster en verklikster overigens alle eer aan.

1101-1181: *Hoede* en *Envie* passeren knielend en buigend de *Burchtgrave* Als ze de andere zaal binnenkomen, zien ze de vijf kamerlingen al met *Melancolie* in gesprek. De kans om tweedracht te zaaien is voorbij. Beiden gaan alsnog naar de burchtgraaf om hem - na enig aandringen van zijn kant - alles met veel geveinsde schroom te vertellen. *Hoede* doet dit bedekt met toevoegingen als "wie nu een vriend is, kan daarna een vijand zijn, die niet meer gehoorzaamt"

Het is niet duidelijk waarom de dichter het over 'vijf' kamerlingen heeft, want tot nu toe traden de vier humoren als zodanig actief handelend op. Uit de context blijkt dat er nu sprake is van de vijf zintuigen. Bij de beschrijving van de burcht behoorden ze overigens al wel tot de *raet* (626, 641) die de *Burchtgrave* ondersteunt. Zij laten - als receptieve kenmiddelen - alleen die indrukken toe die niet schadelijk zijn. *Melancolie* staat midden in het groepje om de problemen te bespreken. Uiteraard zal daartoe ook het lied van *Juecht* behoren.

Het lag niet in de bedoeling van *Hoede* de 'burchtgraaf' rechtstreeks en in directe bewoordingen over deze zaak in te lichten. Ze is daartoe nu echter wel gedwongen. De dichter vertolkt de grote aarzelingen die ze daarbij aan de dag legt heel aanschouwelijk.

Hoede popelt *bin den monde* om alles te vertellen maar de moed zinkt haar in de schoenen als ze overweegt dat ieder zich tegen haar zal kunnen keren

1182-1271 *Hoede* bekent dat *Envie* haar de gang van zaken verteld heeft Zij vertolkt haar behoedzame opvatting "Een klein kwaad kan zo uitgroeien dat men het niet meer in zijn macht heeft" Ze verzoekt om geheimhouding om de verhoudingen met de overige burchtbewoners niet al te zeer te verstoren De kamerlingen komen binnen om het lied te presenteren *Hoede* trekt zich mokkend terug De burchtgraaf is verwonderd dat het door zijn geheime raad geïntroduceerde lied zo schadelijk zou kunnen zijn als *Hoede* beweert *Juecht* wordt voor uitleg gehaald *Hoede* ging van danen sonder segghen in eene *halveinster legghen*, een 'ouderwets' liedje zingend

Door het aanbrengen van allerlei nuances beschrijft de dichter meesterlijk de aarzelingen die *Hoede* voelt om haar bezwaren rechtstreeks aan de burchtheer voor te leggen Zij begint nadrukkelijk haar verdiensten en trouw te schetsen Daarna beschuldigt zij *Melancolie* van het beramen van een boosaardig plan dat tweedracht zal zaaien en de goede orde zal verstoren De burchtbewoners verzwijgen bepaalde zaken voor haar slechts via *Envie* weet ze ongeveer wat er gaande is Het gevoel voor jurisprudentie dat de dichter in de tweede allegorie overduidelijk toont, komt ook hier tot uiting De aanklacht van *Hoede* liegt er niet om Als blijkt dat Jeugds lied de oorzaak is van mogelijke onrust, moet zij als aangeklaagde gehoord worden Het is opmerkelijk dat Venus zich in II in tegenstelling tot de *Burchtheer* van de adviezen van haar raadgevers door haar intermediair karakter niet veel aantrekt De laatste is heel wat minder zelfverzekerd Tot dan toe leidde hij een onbezorgd leventje De problematiek heeft betrekking op hemzelf, is discutabel en van fundamenteel belang voor de toekomst

Hoede trekt zich zwijgend en mokkend terug We zouden haar graag als aanklaagster een ferm betoog hebben zien houden Dit was een gelegenheid om haar principes krachtig naar voren te brengen Haar houding is nu niet sympathiek De minnaar-schrijver past het echter haar zo te laten handelen Het oude vrouwtje komt zo extra geniepig en onsympathiek over Zij handelt nog steeds achterbaks Het lied dat zij gaat zingen horen de aanwezigen blijkbaar niet Het is de voorbode van de uitbarsting die zal volgen (zie r 1884-1912)

1272-1279 (Lied 3) *Die tsorghen staet moet zoorghen plien* In dit rondeel bezingt *Hoede* dat ze haar taak niet naar eer en geweten kan uitvoeren

Ook dit lied is weer belangrijk voor het handelingsverloop Het verwoordt de heftige verontwaardiging van *Hoede* die geleid heeft tot haar protesten bij de burchtheer Opmerkelijk is dat alleen de dichter/minnaar dit lied hoort De andere in de burcht gezongen liederen zijn 'openbaar' Ze worden afhankelijk van de omstandigheden gelezen, besproken beoordeeld en/of bewonderd

Hoede is de woordvoester van de groep die de muzische en de hoofse *conste* van de minnaar veroordeelt Zij is de bewaakster van de aloude tradities en bovenal van de eer en goede naam van de vrouwelijke aspecten die vertegenwoordigd worden door de *Burchgrave* en *Suverheit* Zij veroordeelt de lichtzinnige liedkunst van de minnaar en *Juecht* Ze maakt en zingt zelf een lied 'uit de oude doos' [*Een liedeken van eens jaers*, 1271] De

vormgeving is ouderwets, bijvoorbeeld door het ontbreken van een refrein en het eenvoudige rijmschema (aab aa aab). Zij veroordeelt indirect ook de gedachten die in de hoofse liederen worden weergegeven: *Mi en mach so, leider, niet gheschien, Mochtich noch zien Minen wil, in waer ghenesen* (1272-1274).

1280-1303: *Juecht* komt binnen, ze is rebels: *Wie sal verbieden mi mine ghenuecht? Ze kan [of wil?!] geen uitleg geven over het lied.*

We hebben de rol van *Juecht* in het voorgaande en in het hoofdstuk over de personificaties reeds uitvoerig beschreven. Het heeft de schijn dat ze wel degelijk weet heeft (of voelt) wat de zin is van het geschrevene. De betekenis van *ghenuecht* [5.3] is polyinterpretabel, enerzijds het gemeenschappelijk plezier hebben in het maken en muzikaal vertolken van liederen, anderzijds het beleven van de genoegens tijdens een (hoofse, eventueel onbedachtzame) liefdesverhouding. Genoegens die volgens *Hoede* uiterst gevaarlijk zijn als men onvoldoende op zijn hoede is.

1304-1341: De *Burchtgrave*, die tot dan toe altijd onbekommerd heeft geleefd, peinst over de *lusticheit* van *Juecht*. Drie kamerlingen verwijten *Juecht* haar oppervlakkigheid: *Ten eenen hoor uut, ten andren in. Ze twijfelen echter niet aan haar oprechtheid. Weer gaat iedereen aan de studie. Vrouw Hoede houdt hen nauwlettend in de gaten.*

Er is blijkbaar iets in de *Burchtgraaf* wakker geschud. Hij [een aspect van de vrouw] peinst niet over het lied *an sich*, maar over de *lusticheit* waardoor haar nog simpele en onbekommerde levenswijze aardig aan het wankelen wordt gebracht. Hij begrijpt dus wel degelijk de achtergrond van het lied. Het 'spel' van veinzerij en van het 'niet begrijpen', gespeeld door de kamerlingen en de overige bewoners, doorziet hij wel. *Juecht* is in de onderhavige situatie slechts schijnbaar oppervlakkig. Ze heeft met de strekking van haar lied een diepere laag geraakt. De gevaren die zo voor de vrouwelijke eerbaarheid dreigen, tasten de geestelijke rust behoorlijk aan.

De mededeling over de oprechtheid van *Juecht* (1325) is niet zonder betekenis. Ze kan betekenen dat men niet twijfelt aan de intenties van het lied, wat zou inhouden dat *reine minne* van begin tot eind *elc edel zin... met eeren... verhuecht* en dan aan het slot *gheen onghenuecht* geeft. Een opvatting die diametraal staat tegenover die van *Hoede*, die beweert dat alles *ontvoucht* (1168) zal worden. Het kan echter ook impliceren dat men de jeugdige gesteldheid niet veroordeelt als zijnde een natuurlijk biologisch gegeven. Deze opvatting komt onder andere in IV naar voren. Men hoopt dat in de loop der jaren de minnegloed vermindert en plaats maakt voor een meer op God gerichte liefde. De waarschuwing tegen mogelijke kwalijke gevolgen klinkt echter steeds duidelijk door.

In verschillende ethisch getinte gedichten in het derde deel komen *Juecht* en *Lust* er niet zo goed af. Ze zijn een gevaar voor de eer. Hun gesteldheid is in strijd met de godsdienstige ethiek, een opinie die ongetwijfeld door het 'behoudende' deel van de burgers gedeeld zal zijn. We kunnen ervan uitgaan dat de problematiek die in de allegorie naar voren komt, ook deel uitmaakt van de discussies die in het Brugse gezelschap gevoerd zijn. De gedichten in het derde deel kunnen daarbij geschikte uitgangspunten geweest zijn.

Mate (een term die in het handschrift toegepast wordt met betrekking tot verschillende gebieden) ziet men als een belangrijke regulerende factor. Die eigenschap spreidt de rebelse *Juecht* nu niet bepaald ten toon. Volgens de mores moet *Mate*, als één van de hoofddeugden, ervoor zorgen dat goede eigenschappen niet in het tegendeel omslaan (Berendrecht 1994, 57 en 61). De juiste verhoudingen te vinden lijkt in de Brugse kring een heet item te zijn.

1342-1359: De minnaar brengt verslag uit aan *Verziene* en *Hope*. De laatste raadt hem aan een lied te maken.

De verslaggever vertolkt de beroering die het lied teweeggebracht heeft. De intenties van *Hope* klinken enigszins verdacht, zij wil *Hoede* c.s. *verdullen!* Zang en woord van het lied dat de minnaar moet maken zullen zo 'zoet' moeten smaken dat de bestaande weerstanden weggenomen worden. De oprechtheid van de minnaar stelt ze niet als een belangrijke voorwaarde. Niet alleen *Twifel* maar ook *Hoede* rekent *Hope* kennelijk tot haar vijanden. *Hope* is een personificatie die op de minnaar betrekking heeft. Hier wordt indirect aangegeven dat de bedoelingen van hem niet voor honderd procent zuiver zijn.

1360-1373: (Lied 4, afgebeeld op p. 121) *Helen es in therte mijn*. In dit rondeel vinden we twee strofen en een driemaal terugkerend refrein. *Hope* en *Twifel* worden weer (net als in lied 1) tegenover elkaar gesteld. De dichter prijst *Hope* en betuigt haar zijn eeuwige trouw.

1374-1394: *Hope* prijst het lied, maar *Verziene* keurt het af. Snel schrijft de minnaar een nieuw rondeel.

De liederen 4 en 5 [3.2] vormen een belangrijk element bij de toelatingspogingen van de minnaar. Zij beschrijven zijn liefdesperspectief, waarbij het accent op 'vrolijk minnen' ligt. Na enkele pogingen laat men hem vanwege zijn dichterlijke vermogen en schone verzekeringen tot de burcht [de dame] toe. *Verziene* en de kunstkenner en intellectueel *Melancolie* spelen daarbij een grote rol. De intenties van de verliefde zijn moreel niet geheel acceptabel. Uit het *verdullen* van *Hope* is dit reeds enigszins gebleken is. Het vervolg levert het duidelijkste bewijs.

Hope vindt het lied prachtig, maar *Versiene* keurt het af. Waarom wordt niet duidelijk onder woorden gebracht. De redenen zouden kunnen zijn dat het lied een tweeslachtig karakter bezit. De minnaar zwaait aan het eind *Hope* op hoofse wijze lof toe. Hij doet dat in bewoordingen die men alleen gebruikt (althans in het Gr.Hs.) ten aanzien van de geliefde (*stellic mi eighijn in trouwen reine*). Zo'n belofte leg je niet voor je eigen *Hope* af, maar voor de vrouw die je bemint. Ook de 'troost' dien je van de geliefde te ontvangen. Dit is bij uitstek aan de orde in het Gr.Hs., waar het 'loon' zo centraal staat [6.3.2 ad 4]. De onwaarachtigheid van de minnaar blijkt uit het vervolg. Hij belooft *Hope* trouw. Eerst geeft hij haar uit eigen belang veel geschenken, maar later wordt ze volkomen verwaarloosd. Een bijkomende factor waarom het lied geen goedkeuring krijgt, is het feit dat men iemand in diens bijzijn niet zoveel lof toezwaait onder de vermelding van zijn naam. Het is een handeling die in strijd is met het 'helen en zwijgen', terwijl het lied in een ruime kring

verspreid zal worden. De dichter spreekt zichzelf tegen, want hij heeft zelf in het refrein verzekerd: *Helen is int harte mijn*.

Het lied is niet erg tactisch. De minnaar rept slechts één maal over het *wijfflic scijn* dat hem gewond heeft in een mate die hem nog niet eerder was overkomen. Een ik-gerichte opmerking. Met geen woord rept hij over de schoonheid of andere positieve eigenschappen van de vrouw. Over liefde spreekt hij niet. De vrouw die hem vanuit de 'vensters' zulke verleidelijke blikken heeft toegeworpen wordt als het ware doodgezwegen.

De minnaar spreekt wel over trouw, maar die wordt gereserveerd voor *Hope*. Pas het volgende lied corrigeert deze fout door over het hoopvolle aspect, een vrolijk leven vol deugden, te spreken. Het enkel noemen van het woord *duechden* is een schamel en indirect antwoord op het lied van Jeugd.

1394-1403: (Lied 5) *Die vroylic mint, mach vrolic leven*. Het 'loon'-motief komt naar voren. De pijnlijke 'beschietingen' uit het voorgaande, zijn nu *zoete*. Indien men deugdzzaam (!) mint, wordt alle pijn verdreven.

Eigenlijk is het vreemd dat *Versiene* dit lied wel goedkeurt. Het is op grond van de inhoud geen wonder dat later *Sangwijn* en *Hoede* sceptisch tegenover de minnaar staan. De 'vrolijkheid' [praktisch synoniem met de niet zo gunstige *Ghenuecht*, die ook in dit lied geprezen wordt] is nogal *lustich*. Ook nu wordt de vrouw nauwelijks genoemd en niet verheerlijkt. Een ongebruikelijke gang van zaken in een minnelied. Dit alles doet niet verstandig aan en roept weerstanden op. Misschien ligt hier de oorzaak van de afwijzende houding van *Sangwijn*. In ieder geval komt *Hoede* fel in verzet.

Een goede hoofse minnaar leeft slechts op beperkte wijze 'vrolijk'. Het 'loon' mag hij pas ontvangen, nadat hij grote zelfbeheersing heeft getoond. Een eis die grote innerlijke spanningen oproept en tot vertwijfeling leidt [6.3.2 ad 8]. De minnaar lijkt zich dit niet bewust te zijn. De noodzaak van deze instelling zal in het vervolg gesymboliseerd worden door de aangebrachte *wieken* en de verstrekte 'sleutels'. Zij hebben tot taak de eer van de dame te beschermen, *mate* te betrachten en zwijgzaam te zijn tegenover de buitenwereld. Bovendien dient de minnaar steeds op de juiste wijze te handelen en trouw te zijn. Ook de livreien die hij van de humoren ontvangt, zullen hem moeten aanzetten tot een beheerst en evenwichtig gedrag. Deze eisen komen ter sprake in de paragraaf over de hoofse ethiek [6.3.2]. Uit r. 2127 kunnen we opmaken dat juist de *Vruecht* [de vrolijkheid] de minnaar van de juiste weg afgevoerd heeft.

Interessant in deze context is L146. De dichter brengt *Vrauw Ghenuecht* [5.4] dank dat hij in zijn jeugd haar minne heeft mogen gebruiken. De melancholie heeft daarna roet in het eten gegooid en vertwijfeling gebracht. *Ghenuecht*, de *keyserinne* en brengster van *vruecht zonder verghanc*, kijkt vanaf de tinnen van haar kasteel toe hoe de dichter de strijd met Twijfel aanbindt.

De thematiek van de ongeduldige minnaar die zijn liefde niet snel beantwoord ziet en zijn neiging dan maar in luchthartig vermaak verstrooiing zoekt, komt in allerlei variaties in het convoluut terug, onder andere in II.³³

1404-1565: *Versiene* legt het lied op een opvallende plaats neer. *Juecht* vindt het op haar wandeling. Zij klopt op de deur van de portierswoning, maar niemand doet open. Ze wandelt terug. Het gezelschap in de benedenzaal zingt het lied, alweer met medewerking van *Lust*. *Melancolie* krijgt het lied en wil de dichter (*die meer van minne weet dan wi*) leren kennen. Met *Juecht* gaat hij naar *Verziene*. De minnaar ontsnapt door een achterdeurtje naar buiten. Hij aanschouwt weer het licht, bezwijmt, raakt onder de invloed van *Twifel* en vlucht ontdaan naar binnen. *Verziene* vertelt dat *Hope* en de minnaar familieleden zijn, die na de gevangenschap hulp behoeften. *Juecht* accepteert de minnaar. Ze vertrouwt op de geloofwaardigheid van *Verziene*'s aanbevelingen.

1566-1589: *Melancolie* bekijkt de jonge man kritisch. *Verziene* prijst de 'neef' buitensporig: hij is *alre eeren waert, hovesch, vroet, wetende ende subtyl van zinne, ghestade en vul der vruecht*. Hij kan bovendien hoofs dichten en goed zingen. *Melancolie* verneemt dat het lied door de *ic* gemaakt is en spreekt zijn vertrouwen uit.

Het lied van de minnaar volgt dezelfde route door de burcht als eerst het lied van *Juecht*. Het wordt gepresenteerd in de benedenzaal met zang onder leiding van *Lust*. Via *Melancolie* komt het pas aanmerkelijk later in de bovenzaal. De humoren bespreken het daar eerst.

Ook nu ontvangt *Melancolie* het lied als eerste. Hij is onder de indruk en samen met *Juecht* gaat hij op pad om de dichter te achterhalen. De minnaar mag zich niet laten zien. Buiten aanschouwt hij het licht opnieuw en wankelt dan aangeslagen de portierswoning binnen. Hij moet nu wel voorgesteld worden. *Verziene* is blijkbaar door de charmes van de minnaar zeer beïnvloed. In strijd met de haar alom toegekende, vooruitziende bedachtzaamheid, dicht ze hem allerlei eigenschappen toe die hij later niet blijkt te bezitten. *Juecht* en *Melancolie* kunnen niets anders doen dan zo'n ideale minnaar binnen halen.

Melancolie, de 'kunstkenner' bij uitstek, is zeer geïmponeerd door de artistieke kwaliteiten van het lied. Hij heeft geen oog heeft voor de kwalijke inhoudelijke kanten van het lied en accepteert de minnaar volledig. De 'liefdeskundige' *Sangwyn* en *Hoede* zullen later wel hun bezwaren uiten. De eerste weigert een hand te geven en aarzelt zijn livrei aan te bieden (1777-1778). De tweede biedt fel verzet.

1590-1628: *Melancolie* neemt de minnaar in dienst. Deze ontvangt als teken diens tweekleurige *levreie* (*graeu* en *groen*), benevens een *caproen*. Als *Melancolie* en *Juecht* vertrokken zijn, krijgt de minnaar een uitgebreide moralistisch getinte les van *Verziene*.

De kleuren van de kleding zijn in de liefdesliteratuur van groot belang, vaak symboliseren zij de fase waarin het liefdesproces zich bevindt. Dit gebruik bespreek ik nader in 4.9. De

³³ Ik breng lied 146 - in tegenstelling tot Reynaert (1999, 48-49) - in direct verband met de minne, op grond van de intertekstuele gegevens die het Gr Hs op diverse plaatsen verstrekt. De woorden *ghenuecht* en *ghenoucht* komen in diverse vormen tientallen malen voor in verband met de liefde

levreie is *graue* en *groen* van kleur. De eerste kleur heeft in het Gr.Hs. de functie de moeizame arbeid aan te duiden die in de liefdesdienst noodzakelijk is. Groen is de kleur van de hoopvolle verwachting, van de jonge ontluikende liefde. *Grau* duidt op *arbeit* die in trouwe liefdesdienst verricht moet worden.

Verziene heeft de minnaar volop geprezen, maar acht het toch wel raadzaam hem een groot aantal leefregels [6.4] mee te geven.

1629-1704: Allerlei gedragsregels, die op meer slaan dan enkel minnesituaties, komen ter sprake. De minnaar dient in alle omstandigheden zijn eer te behouden. Als hij zich niet aan de mores houdt, zal *Versiene* ongeloofwaardig overkomen en uit de burcht verwijderd worden. De minnaar belooft de voorschriften na te komen. Daarna verzorgt *Versiene* nogmaals, kennelijk voor alle zekerheid, de verwonding rond *Helen*. Zij brengt de *wieke Ghestadicheit* aan. De minnaar kijkt voor de tweede maal door de spleet.

Het is opmerkelijk dat de gegeven regels niet slaan op voorschriften die gerelateerd zijn aan de minne. Ze zijn vooral gericht op het sociale leven in het algemeen. Men kan blijkbaar geen goed minnaar zijn, als men ook deze regels niet in acht neemt. Misschien komt dit element voort uit de stedelijke cultuur, die duidelijke en ordenende regels stelt. Hendrik van Veldeke en Jan I van Brabant roeren dit aspect in het geheel niet aan. Ik bespreek de regels in 6.4.

De specifieke leefregels voor een minneverhouding zijn reeds of worden later verstrekt door het insteken van de *wieke Ghestadicheit* en het verzorgen van de wond, veroorzaakt door de scherpe stok *helen* (reeds in r. 770 aangebracht). De minnaar krijgt later in de burcht nog de sleutels *Trauwe*, *Eere* en *Antieren*. Ook deze voor de minne noodzakelijk geachte eigenschappen worden uitvoeriger besproken in het zesde hoofdstuk.

Het in de Middeleeuwen zo belangrijke motief rond 'eer en schande' komt hier duidelijk naar voren. De vereiste voorbereidingen zijn getroffen. De minnaar heeft een aantal aanwijzingen ontvangen. De noodzakelijke attributen zijn aangebracht of worden later overhandigd. Fase voor fase vordert de minnaar. Bezwaren om door de spleet nader kennis te maken met de overige personen in de burcht, zijn er niet meer. De minnaar neemt er rustig de tijd voor. Hij neemt er een stoel bij. Het zal inderdaad blijken dat de observatie lang zal duren. Het proces rond de besluitvorming neemt bij de dame veel tijd in beslag.

1705-1738: Verschillende aanwezigen, die rond *Suverheit* verenigd zijn, worden genoemd. Men zingt het lied in de benedenzaal en prijst het uitbundig. Nadat ieder zijn bewondering heeft uitgesproken, haalt *Melancolie* de dichter op.

We horen de namen van de aanwezige personificaties. Nadere bijzonderheden verstrekt de dichter nog niet. Opmerkelijk is de groepering: de personificaties die later stelling nemen tegen de minnaar of die eigenschappen tonen die hem te gronde richten, staan bij elkaar. Ze vormen clusters. *Hoede*, *Envie* en *Dangier* zijn niet aanwezig, zij doen dienst bij de poort. *Rouckeloos* en *Overmoet* vormen een eenheid. Overigens staan of zitten ook de humoren in elkaars nabijheid. Weer zingt men gezamenlijk, iets wat later (1844 v.) enigszins gedetailleerder is beschreven. De verteller onderstreept de kwaliteit van het gezang met de opmerking dat de stemmen paradijselijk klonken (1725-1726) en dat ieders stem op die van

een engel geleek (1848-1849). Met weinig woorden tekent hij duidelijk het plezier dat men in de Brugse kring beleefde aan het gezamenlijk musiceren. Het gebeuren doet denken aan de feestcultuur die aan de hoven bestond. De hogere Brugse burgerij kan hiervan rechtstreeks kennis genomen hebben via het hof van de graaf van Vlaanderen en de hoge adel in de stad [zie Lassche 1994b en Willaert 2000].

8.1.5 r. 1739-2208

1739-1791: *Colorijn* en *Fleumaet* ontvangen de minnaar enthousiast. *Sangwijn* echter geeft hem geen hand en biedt pas na veel aarzeling zijn *lievereye* aan. Zijn broers hebben dit al eerder spontaan gedaan. Het gezelschap gaat zingen. Tenslotte zingt de minnaar tot ieders genoegen alleen.

De aarzelingen van *Sangwijn* zijn reeds ter sprake gekomen in het voorgaande. De kleuren van de livreeën passen bij de traditionele symboliek [4.9 en 5.4]. Het aanbieden van de livreeën zal geschied zijn om te waarborgen dat de minnaar zich op volkomen waardige wijze gedraagt. Hij kan alle goede eigenschappen van de vier humoren combineren tot een harmonisch geheel.

Weer komt het plezier dat men in het zingen heeft naar voren. De minnaar blijkt niet alleen een goed dichter en componist te zijn, zijn natuurlijke geaardheid heeft hem ook tot een goed zanger bestempeld. Men is zo geïmponeerd dat hij solo mag zingen. De *ic* maakt een nieuw lied. Men bekijkt, leest en zingt het lied. Iedereen is vol bewondering over het snelle ontstaan.

1792-1816: (Lied 6) *Wat pinen men van minnen lijt, Hope smeinschen zin verblijt. Hope* krijgt weer veel aandacht. De liefde voor haar eist trouw om het leed te vergeten. Een melancholische gezindheid bevordert het maken van minneliederen: *Melancolie doet mi waken Sanc van minnen minlic maken*. Men dient elke 'dorperlijkheid' te vermijden en trouw en eervol de minne te bedrijven.

Het lied (afbeelding p. 260) tekent flauwtjes de houding die van de minnaar verlangd wordt en beklemtont dat hij zich eervol (althans in het begin!) en standvastig moet gedragen. De aandacht gaat weer meer naar de met name genoemde *Hope* uit. De vrouw wordt als bemind wezen op geen enkele wijze aangeduid. Het blijft bij vage verzekeringen.

Op de melancholische toestand die het minnegebeuren oproept, is reeds herhaaldelijk gewezen. Deze komt ook nog ter sprake als de minnaar uit de burcht verwijderd is. De betekenissen rond het woordveld *Melancolie* lopen in elkaar over. Enerzijds aanschouwen we het door het liefdesverlangen verkeren in een wakende toestand, met daarmee gepaard gaand een 'droefgeestig peinzen'. Anderzijds de bevordering die van die gemoedsgesteldheid uitgaat om gedichten te gaan maken [hoofdstuk 7].

1817-1883: De aanwezigen bewonderen het lied en men gaat naar de burchtgraaf (zonder de minnaar). Men leest en zingt het lied in koor. De *Burchtgrave* hoort het verslag van de gebeurtenissen en de aanbevelingen aan. Hij verneemt dat *Melancolie* de minnaar uit

decaden ende uit hove scheden in dienst genomen heeft De *ic* is bij *Suverheit* gebleven om haar te vermaken

Merkwaardig is weer het vooraf *lesen* van het gedicht Wat dit precies inhoudt, is niet geheel duidelijk Het lied zal men waarschijnlijk voor het zingen voorgelezen en kort gezamenlijk besproken hebben Ook de *Burchtgrave* is onder de indruk *Melancolie* neemt bij zijn aanbeveling kritiekloos de lofprijzingen van *Verziene* over en prijst ook de dicht- en zangkunst van de minnaar Nadrukkelijk looft hij diens *wetentede* [een woord met veel betekenissen onder andere beschaving, kennis, trouw, hoofsheid, schoonheid en wijsheid] Als bijzonder positieve factor gelden de *wieken Helen* en *Ghestadicheit* De vrouw kan dus gerust zijn de handhaving van haar integriteit is gewaarborgd

Het alleen achterlaten van de minnaar bij *Suverheit* is tamelijk gewaagd *Melancolie* deelt echter geruststellend mee dat de minnaar binnengelaten is *uit duechden ende uit hovescheden* Later verklaart de minnaar dat *Suverheit* haar deugd bij al zijn handelingen behouden heeft

1884-1912 *Melancolie* moet de dichter ophalen Er ontstaat een woordentwist met *Hoede Dangier Jaloezie* en *Envie Hoede* bezweert *Ghine maect ons gheen nieu costume* [gewoontes, gedragspatronen]

Het luidruchtige gezelschap verwelkomt de minnaar Misschien gewaarschuwd door het lawaai komen de tegenstanders ook opdagen *Hoede* doorziet de dreigende gevaren onmiddellijk en met de haren komt ze in fel verzet Zij ziet dat de nieuweling zelfs al het livret van *Melancolie* draagt Ze begrijpt dat de minnaar reeds door hem geaccepteerd is *Melancolie* wordt onder vuur genomen en krijgt het verwijt te horen *Dit es toverie*

1913-2003 *Hovesscheit* en enkele anderen proberen het geschil te sussen Dit lukt niet Er ontstaat een fel handgemeen tussen de partijen *Hoede* verliest haar gezichtsvermogen Voor ze verdwijnt, vermaant ze *Suverheit* nog goed op haar tellen te passen Deze reageert niet Het opgewonden gezelschap leidt de minnaar naar de bovenzaal voor de *Edel Here*

De medestanders nemen de positieve beoordelingen van *Verziene* en *Melancolie* over Ze stellen kennelijk volledig vertrouwen in hun oordeel *Verziene* prijst vooral de innerlijke kwaliteiten van de minnaar, *Melancolie* de dichterlijke Het nieuwe aspect van vrolijkheid en minnevreugd is meer verlokkelijk dan wat uit de opvattingen van *Hoede* voortvloeit *Hoede* verwijt *Melancolie* dat hij geen rekening houdt met de eer van de *Burchtgrave* Haar verwijt draagt een sterk prospectief karakter *Dangier* krijgt ook gelijk als hij zegt dat hij overvleugeld dreigt te worden door *enen knecht* De minnaar horen we later zeggen *Mijn ghebodt was al ghedaen* (2081), *in mijn ghewelt wast altemale* (2112) Hij verzekert bovendien dat ieder hem dient *bi daghe bi nachte* (2092) De partij van *Hoede* meent dat de minnaar teveel macht zal krijgen *Jalostie* geeft met de kreet *Maken wi partie'* (1928) de aanzet tot het gevecht

Men kan zich voorstellen dat de beeldende schildering van het handgemeen zeer tot het amusement heeft bijgedragen Ook in de *cluten* is zo'n treffen een geliefkoosd fenomeen

De burchtgraaf [de dame] lijkt toe te geven en *Hoede* krijgt het zwaar te verduren Haar alles bespiedende ogen verliezen het gezichtsvermogen, ze trekt zich terug De weg voor de minnaar ligt vrij

Een zeer significant detail is het feit dat *Hoede* zeer nadrukkelijk *Suverheit* waarschuwt opdat zij zich *verwaert* [voor haar eer zorgt] Tevergeefs Verliefde jonge mensen luisteren niet naar goed bedoelde waarschuwingen van meer ervaren ouderen Lied 4 van het Gruuthuse liedboek verwoordt de regelrechte averij die men kan oplopen Het zwangere meisje vertelt *ic ghinc mettem spelen* De ongewenste gevolgen bleven niet uit In lied 53 verzekert (waarschijnlijk) *vrau Redene* *Quaet aeste es al ontspoet*

2004-2054 In de bovenzaal aanvaardt de *boorchgrave* de minnaar als bewoner met de verzekering *mine jonst die ghevic di* De minnaar ontvangt de sleutels *Trauwe Eere* en *Anteren* Hij krijgt te drinken uit een met edelstenen versierd vat, de drank heet *confoort* De minnaar is geheel van de 'wonden' genezen Hij wordt *upper camelinc* en *overhooft* en geniet volop in *deser over groter weelde* *Hoede* c s zijn tot zwijgen gebracht en *elic stont na [sijn] ghebod* De minnaar maakt menig *soete minlic liet* Met één ervan zullen we zo dadelijk kennismaken

De aanvaarding door de *boorchgrave* houdt in dat de dame de *ic* als minnaar accepteert Er vindt een uitgebreid welkomst- en inwijdingsceremonieel plaats Met het aanbieden van een aantal symbolische voorwerpen probeert men wel zekerheid in te bouwen Aan het slot van het verhaal is echter alleen de *wieke helen* en *swighen* (2229) - zij het erg loszittend - nog aanwezig Het is duidelijk dat de 'vriendschap' een zeer besloten niet publiekelijk karakter draagt en niet in details aan de gemeenschap is meegedeeld We moeten ons steeds goed realiseren dat de in de burcht aanwezige figuren representanten zijn van de psychische functies van de beide hoofdfiguren, vooral van de dame

De drank *confoort* is opmerkelijk Het woord *confoort* komt in het Gr Hs in diverse woordvormen 20 maal voor We geven enkele voorbeelden Maria is de *conforteyghe* [die hulp en bijstand verleent] *der zondaren* (G4 68), en die *Wijn te nuttene conforteert* (XV 227) De Kruispoort van Brugge geeft *conforte* door de bijdrage aan *Eendrachticheit ende Eere* (XIII 243-245) In de liederen voelt de minnaar *confoort* als de geliefde hem ziet (L13 20), in lied 110 geeft de minne *confoort van soeter rusteliker vrame* [geluk] De gedichten VIII en XII noemen *confoort* ook in liefdesverband, echter alleen in XII (612-613) wordt het verband met *trauwe ende eere* gelegd Iets verderop is sprake van *confoort te drinkene al zulk een tueghe dat zi van binnen moeten ghenesen gans ende fijn* (624-626) De veronderstelling lijkt me niet gewaagd dat in onze passage met de drank een heilbrengend panacee wordt aangeboden De minnaar zal op trouwe, eervolle en hoofse wijze en binnen bepaalde grenzen, de minnedienst moeten bewijzen Uiteraard zal het aanbieden van de drank ook een welkomstfunctie gehad hebben

In de eerste allegorie neemt de 'introductieperiode' ruim 2000 regels in beslag Het duurt lang voordat de minnaar toegang tot de dame krijgt De spanning tussen begeren en onvervuld blijven is de belangrijkste component in het liefdesproces De beschrijving van de afwijzing door de *burchgraefe* telt maar ongeveer 150 verzen, terwijl de 'proefperiode' toch meer dan een jaar [dat wil zeggen een geruime tijd] beslaat (2108) Ook in ander literair werk ligt het

accent op de periode die aan de vereniging vooraf gaat. De dichters hebben grote aandacht voor allerlei niet weegbare factoren, duistere momenten, wisselende stemmingen en innerlijke conflicten tussen begeren en afwijzen. We horen bijvoorbeeld in L53, dat als leidmotief *Quat haeste es al onspoet* heeft, de vrouw zeggen: *Ghi sult u houden Vrolic ende verbouden Inder minnen gloet, Al souddi u bescouden* [verzengen]. De minnaar zegt in de slotstrofe: *Die tpaert heift binder stalle, verware sijn slotelkijn*, ook al doet het verlangen pijn. Een wijze raadgeving waaraan de minnaar in I zich blijkbaar niet gehouden heeft.

Het hoofse minneverkeer vraagt een periode van beheersing. In hoeverre de minnaar door zijn gedrag deze eis heeft veronachtzaamd, deelt de auteur niet duidelijk mee. We komen maar weinig te weten over de oorzaken van de uiteindelijke scheiding, het blijft bij vage toespelingen. Daarentegen zijn de gevolgen van de scheiding in ongeveer 200 regels uitvoerig beschreven. Drie dagen verblijft de minnaar in de ommuurde tuin.

De *ic* maakt een *minlic* lied. Het begrip *minlic* komt vele malen in het convoluut voor en staat als bepaling bij *trouwe, beilde, gonst, groet, herte, onderdaen, ort, spreken, troost, vrouwe, zien, zucht, wijf, vrouwe, groet, sien, spreken, manieren, aerbeit, salute, conste, tijcortinghe, aenghesicht* en *ziecten medicine*. Als bijwoordelijke bepaling bij *groeten, bi der hant nemen, maken, gheven, aenscauwen, groeten, salueren, scieten, scincen, ontspringhen, spreken, gevanghen, verzaemen, zien, bidden* en *oghen upslaen*. In G1 (38) is het woord van toepassing op het *ghedweghen* (gereinigd, geheiligd) worden van de biddende *ic* door Maria's *helichen bloede*. Het is waarschijnlijk dat we onder een *minlic liet* een lied moeten verstaan dat inhoudelijk voldoet aan de eisen die de hoofse liefde stelt en dat qua vormgeving de poëtische voorschriften eerbiedigt. Tegen beide uitgangspunten biedt de 'conservatieve' geleiding in de burcht weerstand.

2055-2064: (Lied 7) *Weelde, weelde es al sijn zanc! Weelde nemmermeer verganc. Hope is de hoochste aenvanc*, zij kan vreugde brengen. Het loon-werk-motief wordt verkapt aangegeven door de frase *so wie dient om der minnen danc*.

Dit loflied (afbeelding p. 80) [3.2] is het resultaat van een langer verblijf in de burcht, het deelt door het beklemtonen van het 'weelde'-aspect de werkelijke intenties van de minnaar mee. De goede raad aan het eind van het vorige lied is hij vergeten. Hij blijkt zelf horende doof en ziende blind te zijn. Het vrolijke leven geniet hij in alle omvang, de tijd vliegt voorbij. De eis van het *mate houden* staat in de ijskast. Hij verlangt nog steeds naar het loon (de *danc*) en vestigt daartoe voortdurend zijn hoop op *Hope*, een indirect bewijs dat de eer van *Suverhede* nog niet geschonden is. Eigenlijk kondigt hij met dit lied voor degenen die de *conste* kennen zijn komende ondergang aan. De recipiënt voelt –als hij dit nog niet eerder bemerkt heeft – dat de waarschuwingen van *Hoede* niet voor niets geklonken hebben.

Het is niet precies duidelijk wat we onder *weelde* moeten verstaan. In 2107 wordt bevestigd dat de minnaar *menich dach, meer dan een jaer in weelden groot* vertoefde. Hij kan overall komen, alles is in zijn macht, maar *Suverheit* blijft gespaard. Zover als Adam die *uit groter weelden in pinen cam* (XIV, 602), komt het dus nog niet.

Weilde komt het meest ter sprake in IIIA en IIIB. De dichter veroordeelt de aardse rijkdom en de genoegens die men zich kan veroorloven. De liefde voor het aardse goed voert weg van een deugdzaam leven (IV). Zij belet ook de *reine minne* die vooral een privilege van de jeugd is, als deze zich tenminste weet te beheersen. Uit het vervolg van de geschiedenis blijkt één

ding wel duidelijk, namelijk dat de verzekering *Du best allein mijn hoochte welde* (L81: 9) niet bepaald toepasbaar is op de minnaar in I.

Reynaert (1999, 175) denkt bij *weelde* aan vrolijk zingen. Ik denk dat de minnaar daarom niet in de burcht vertoeft. Hij wil *der minnen danc*, de weelde waarvan hij in 2107 spreekt. De minnaar verklaart daar dat hij meer dan een jaar doet wat hij wil, hij bezit immers de sleutel *Antieren*. Hij komt in alle vertrekken, dat wil zeggen hij veroorlooft zich ten opzichte van de dame erg veel vrijheden. Daarom verwijderen de personificaties die de beschermende functie vertegenwoordigen hem uit de burcht. Niet omdat hij zo vrolijk zingt [zie ook de verklaringen bij 759-834 en 2065-2115].

Hope is nog zijn grootste toeverlaat, maar naarmate de zekerheid over de toenaaderingsbereidheid van de vrouwe toeneemt, vermindert de afhankelijkheid van *Hope*. Ten slotte verwaarloost hij haar volkomen. Psychologisch is dit zeer goed gezien van de dichter. Eerst wordt *Hope* nog met schatten overladen (2075), maar na enige tijd is zij geheel vergeten en is de zelfverzekerde minnaar alleen nog maar op eigen genoegens uit (1213-1215). Later, in de ommuurde tuin, is *Hope* nergens meer te bespeuren.

De regel *Wie dient om der minnen danc* lijkt mij polyinterpretabel. Men kan denken aan het dienen tot lof en roem van de liefde, dus om niet, zoals één van de hoofse minnecodes voorschrijft [5.4]. Daarnaast dringt zich de gedachte op dat er bij *danc* sprake is van een meer egoïstische betekenis. Het MNW (II, 61) vermeldt bij *danc* onder andere "iemand zorgvuldig dienen zodat dit reden tot tevredenheid geeft en men er zelf dankbaarheid voor inoogst". Het dienen van de dame zal tot dankbaarheid en vervolgens tot vreugde, vrolijk zingen en 'grote weelde' leiden. De minnaar spreekt dus op deze wijze uit dat hij bepaalde genietingen van het liefdesavontuur verwacht [zijn 'loon'], zonder dat het precies duidelijk wordt wat dit inhoudt. Belangeloos dienen is dit allerminst. Gezien het voor de minnaar teleurstellende einde van de verhouding, zal hij op de een of andere wijze over de schreef gegaan zijn. Voor het tot een echte beloning komt, verwijdert de dame hem uit de burcht.

Aan de problematiek van de dienstbaarheid en de verwachting van een beloning is de tweede allegorie geheel gewijd. Er vindt een proces plaats waarin de minnaar zijn loon [een vorm van *danc*] opeist na zijn 'dienst'. Venus oordeelt dat hij de 'dienst' moet voortzetten. Hij heeft de minneregels veronachtzaamd. *Mate* en *Ghetempertheit* zullen hem eerst dienen te onderwijzen. Zo bezien kan de tweede allegorie als een logisch vervolg op de eerste beschouwd worden.

2065-2115: De minnaar is nu zeer bevriend met de burchtheer, hij belooft *Hope* en *Verziene* rijkelyk. Hij gaat met behulp van de ontvangen sleutels vaak *ten palause* om het licht te zien. Ook snuift hij dan de sterk genezende *lucht van also zoeter aert* op, die de *Burchtgrave* opzendt. Meer dan een jaar zoekt hij enkel zijn *genuecht* en is in *weelden daer*. *Vrou Hope* is hij vergeten, alles is in zijn *ghewelt*.

De auteur houdt zijn opzet strak vol. De minnaar vertoeft in de burcht, dat wil zeggen dat hij volop kennis maakt met de dame. In het voorgaande zijn de schoonheden van de dame uitvoerig beschreven door middel van de domificatietechniek. De auteur komt niet op die schoonheden terug, zij worden bekend verondersteld. We horen dat de minnaar als hij in de burcht vertoeft en zo ook kennis maakt met de psychische eigenschappen van de dame, haar geur kan opsnuiven. Alles was *ondaen* [ontsloten]. Hij ervaart dat die lucht nog meer dan welriekende genezende kruiden een sterk genezende werking heeft. Al de pijn die op de wereld aanwezig is en zich in het hart van de minnaar verzameld zou kunnen hebben, zou

ogenblikkelijk verdwenen zijn. Ook in de 'moderne' menselijke belevingswereld is de geur nog een primaire ervaring. Op het belang dat de middeleeuwer aan de geuren hecht, hebben we al gewezen bij de bespreking van *Rieke-Lucht* in 5.3. De genezende werking werd trouwens al vermeld in het begin van de allegorie als de minnaar op weg gaat om de geliefde te zoeken (91 v.).

In dit verband is het misschien interessant te wijzen op het 'orgaan van Jacobson' dat in de neus zetelt en dat bij dieren speciaal is afgestemd op geurstoffen die afgescheiden zijn door dieren van de eigen soort. In 1991 werd het ook bij mensen aangetoond. De zenuwcellen staan in verbinding met het gedeelte in de hersenen dat betrokken is bij seksuele voorkeuren. Liefde op het eerste gezicht zou hiermee een zekere samenhang kunnen bezitten. Een "chemistry" die een euforie teweegbrengt die soms aan de rationele controle ontsnapt (Watson 1999). Bij dit alles moet in de gaten worden gehouden dat door het grotendeels ontbreken van zeep, parfums en dergelijke de geur van de mensen vroeger pregnanter geweest zal zijn dan nu het geval is.

Ik sprak reeds even over de vermelding *menich dach, meer dan een jaer*. Kennelijk is er een langdurige kennismakingsperiode. De minnaar dient daarin zijn integriteit te bewijzen. Hij verblijft in de burcht, maar verder gaan dan de derde fase (die ik bij het volgende tekstgedeelte zal bespreken) is niet toegestaan voor de proefperiode is afgelopen. Er bestaat een spanning tussen de twee extreme uitgangspunten. De minnaar wenst het seksueel genot te ontvangen, maar tevens mag hij de eer van de dame niet schenden. In de minneredes worden de nieuwe gedragsverhoudingen gethematiseerd. Verstand en zedelijke idealen moeten de minnaar zo civiliseren, dat hij de innerlijke vreugde van het beleven van de liefde leert waarderen. De *ic* in onze allegorie die zo de 'grote weelde' en het loonmotief (*met der minnen danc*) beklemtoont, is daar blijkbaar - waarschijnlijk evenals veel andere Bruggelingen - nog niet aan toe. Traditioneel vinden we het thema in de meeste hoofse ridderromans terug. De ridder moet zijn trouw, volharding, moed en belangeloze dienstvaardigheid *op aventure* bewijzen. In een stadsgemeenschap is dit echter op deze romaneske wijze niet mogelijk.

Als de minnaar bij de *Burchtgrave* is, kan hij kennelijk op allerlei wijzen met zijn geliefde omgaan. Hij verzekert immers: *In mijn ghewelt wast altemale*. We zullen *ghewelt* wel met 'macht' mpoeten vertalen, maar het is moeilijker te begrijpen wat hij met 'weelde' bedoelt. Een misschien niet relevante hypothese is dat we hierbij kunnen denken aan de eerste drie fases in het liefdesproces. Deze berusten op de onderscheidingen in het topos van de *gradus amoris*: het zien van de geliefde (*visus*), het gesprek (*alloquium*), de aanraking (*tactus*), de kus (*osculum*) en tenslotte de coïtus (*factum*). Van der Poel (1989, 173) verwijst voor nadere achtergronden naar Friedman (1965). Deze gedachten zijn waarschijnlijk ook in Vlaanderen bekend. Van der Poel veronderstelt dat de Vlaamse bewerker van de *Roman de la Rose* de topos heeft gekend³⁴.

³⁴ Ook Potter onderscheidt fasen in het minneproces in *Der minnen loep* (Leendertz 1845, boek II, r 2049-2324 en boek IV, r 167-210) De derde fase kenmerkt zich doordat de twee gelieven *tsamen legghen bemuyt Ende elck den andren heftic vuet Met am, mit mond mit heftic drucken* (2267-2269) Hier is sprake van een intiem lichamelijk contact, zonder dat men tot de coïtus overgaat *Als het vuet is in sijn heetsten branden salmen een bannet op rechten Die van scamelheit is ghemaect blyschap ende schamelhede Dat sijn die cleden van verwen toet Die starcheit draghen in der noot* (2275-2296)

Verder dan de een na laatste fase zijn de avances in de eerste allegorie blijkbaar niet gegaan (2116), de laatste fase met geslachtelijk verkeer is niet ingegaan Ik veronderstel dat ook deze auteur op de hoogte is van de gang van zaken die de topos schildert Het is ook mogelijk dat de dichter het in de noot geciteerde werk van Potter kent Werk uit de kring van het Beierse hof zijn hem waarschijnlijk bekend Bij de domificatiebeschrijving zijn sterke overeenkomsten met die van Augustijnken van Dordt Verder is bekend dat Willem van Hildegarsberch ook reizen naar Brugge ondernam

Een term die dezelfde restricties inhoudt is *scamelheit* In het Gr Hs komt de term voor in **IV** *Miltheit werdicheit ende duecht meinderheit scamelheit dits de minne* (172-173) Daartoe is trouw vereist Dan volgt de opmerking *Scamelheit leicht ten tunne bereit Nature es cranc vorwaer geseit sot ende blent* (1839-1840) Van Buuren (1984) bespreekt de term *scamelheit* Deze heeft een veelheid van betekenissen waaronder kuisheid afzien van alles wat iemand in de ogen van anderen kan verlagen, eerbaarheid en dergelijke In *Dat scamelheit thoechste poent es van minnen* blijkt dat het tot omhelzingen en kussen kan komen maar verder mag de minnaar niet gaan Uiteraard speelt hierbij het *mate* betrachten [onder andere besproken in het zesde hoofdstuk] een belangrijke rol Potter spreekt over de *starcheit* en *scamelheit* als *sv twee tsamen legghen benuert Ende elck den anderen lieflic ruevt Met arm mit mond, mit lieflic drucken* (Leendertz 1844-1846, 205-205 Minnen Loep II 2260 en 2267-2269)

Aanwijzingen over hoe ver de geliefden kunnen gaan, vinden we ook in de reeds genoemde achtste dialoog in *De amore* De pure liefde is er een van het hart [hier de burchtheer] Zij kan gaan tot en met de kus, de omarming en een nog eerbaar contact met de naakte geliefde De uiteindelijke bevrediging is niet toegestaan in de fase van de 'pure' liefde Een treffende overeenkomst met de opvattingen van Potter Er schijnt een discours van standpunten te zijn geweest, waarvan we de verbreiding, maar ook de inhoud niet precies kennen Duidelijk is wel dat hier een ideaalbeeld geschetst wordt De minnaar dreigt onder de 'weelde' te bezwijken en men verwijdt hem uit de burcht waar de 'eer' schendende handelingen plaats kunnen vinden

Er is een zekere tegenstelling tussen het gedrag van de minnaar in de beide voorafgaande passages De minnaar gaat naar buiten (!) om de dame in haar totaliteit lichamelijk te aanschouwen en haar geur op te snuiven wat een grote genieting geeft Daarnaast heeft hij blijkbaar geestelijk en lichamelijk contact met haar Hij gaat zich net niet te buiten naar de gangbare opvattingen Het gaat niet enkel om *ghenuecht* maar ook om 'dienst' en psychische vreugde De minnaar lijkt dan de fout in te gaan Hij wil enkel maar lol en wordt nonchalant Dit leidt tot zijn verwijdering

In het stadium waarin de minnaar verkeert is hij zo zeker van zijn zaak dat hij geen beroep meer doet op *Hope* Hij verwaarloost haar hoogmoedig en eigengereid

2116-2147 De *ic* bewijst enkel aan *Suverheit* de *duecht* en zijn *verwaenthede* is groot Met *Anticline* ontsluit hij alles waarvan maar te genieten valt De weerstand tegen zijn gedrag neemt in de burcht toe De sleutels *Trouwe ende Eere* verliest hij door toedoen van onder andere *Rouckeloos* De tegenpartij roert zich *Ontsech* leidt hem voor de burchtheer deze is ontstemd Iedereen keert zich tegen hem

In de voorafgaande beschouwingen heb ik duidelijk proberen te maken wat men onder 'enkel de deugd bewijzen aan *Suverheit*' zou kunnen verstaan de minnaar gaat net niet te ver in de

vrijrij, *Rouckeloos*, die geen oog had voor de fijnzinnige hoofse poëzie, maar ook niet voor beschaafde omgangsvormen, doet zijn naam eer aan. Hij blijkt nu ook een negatieve invloed te hebben op het hele gebeuren in de burcht. De negatieve eigenschap blijkt zowel bij de dame (die de raadgevingen van *Hoede* in de wind sloeg), als bij de minnaar aanwezig te zijn. De *trouw* van de geliefden vormt een hoofdthema in het Gr.Hs. Er is geen essentieel verschil met de ook nu nog bestaande idealistische opvatting dat men niet vreemd moet gaan. Met *eer* is het anders gesteld. Het is niet wenselijk dat de relatie algemeen bekend wordt. De angst voor de *klappers* is groot, in het roddelcircuit is de eer, vooral die van de vrouw, in een oogwenk aangetast. Misschien heeft de minnaar zich een enkele maal in zijn kennissenkring laten voorstaan op de verhouding met de *Burchgrave*, voordat er van een officiële verhouding sprake was. Vaak kan dat niet gebeurd zijn, de *wieke Helen* is er nog, maar zij zit wel erg los. Geheel zuiver op de graad is de minnaar kennelijk op dit punt ook niet geweest.

Naar wat er nu precies allemaal mis is gegaan, kunnen we slechts raden. De minnaar behoort duidelijk tot de groep van de *vruechden kiezers* (IIIA, 23). De *ic* constateert zelf dat hij niet trouw geweest is en de 'eer' bezoedeld heeft (2128). Verder is duidelijk dat aan de zeer belangrijke eis van het *mate houden* ook niet voldaan is. Deze voorwaarde wordt voor de Brugse kring op verschillende plaatsen in het convoluut besproken. Niet voor niets heten de onderwijsgeevenden in de minneschool in de tweede allegorie *Ghetempertheit* en *Mate!* Ook in de meer godsdienstig-ethisch getinte gedichten eist de kerk in zijn moraalleer matiging en beheersing. De nadruk ligt daarbij op een door de ratio bepaald gedrag. Een beteugeling die gebaseerd moet zijn op vrijwilligheid, een vrijwilligheid die ook Venus in de tweede allegorie sterk beklemtoont.

2148-2208: De minnaar valt in ongenade. Hij heett zich niet aan de regels gehouden. *Hoede* is genezen en smijt *Hope* de burcht uit. *Twifel* staat haar al op te wachten. De minnaar moet de ontvangen kleding teruggeven aan de vier broers, de temperamenten, die in hoge mate zijn gedrag hadden moeten bepalen. Met het koord *Ondanc* worden zijn handen gebonden, met de sleutel *Verdriet* wordt de deur *Zuere* geopend. Hij ontvangt zijn verdiende loon en belandt onder de verwensingen van *Hoede* in een hoog ommuurde tuin.

De passage behoeft weinig toelichting. *Twifel*, de antipode van *Hope*, kan zijn onaangename rol weer gaan vervullen. De drang tot allegorisering wordt streng volgehouden, zoals blijkt uit de namen van de voorwerpen die bij de uitwijzing een rol spelen. De ethische lessen van *Verziene* worden gememoreerd. Eén hoofdzonde staat centraal: de hoogmoed waardoor *hi daelt*, *Die hem hoger wil verheffen Dan redenen gheift in zijn bezeffen* (2162-2164). *Overmoet* en *Rouckeloos* hebben hun werk 'voorbeeldig' gedaan, de minnaar is door zijn eigen schuld ten onder gegaan.

De ommuurde tuin waarin de minnaar terecht komt is onder het hoofd *locus terribilis* besproken in 4.2.2.

8.1.6 r. 2209-2357

2209-2272 Veel onheil daalt nu op de minnaar neer: de muur is hoog en hecht, ontsnappen is niet mogelijk. De wonden van de *wieke Ghestadcheit* bloeden, de *wieke Helen ende swighen* is er nog wel, maar zit los. Treurig loopt hij rond, hongerig, koud, angstig en vol vrees. Er zijn zeven bomen waarvan hij de vruchten eet. Hun beginletters vormen het woord *scieden*.

Het dolen begint weer, treurnis overvalt hem. Hij neemt geen spijzen tot zich, koude rillingen overvallen hem. Hij is angstig, vol vrees en hij vervalt weer in een toestand vol vertwijfeling. De vruchten van de bomen die hij eet, geven alle gemoeds- en lichamelijke symptomen weer van de melancholische mens [men vergelijkte de gegevens met die in hoofdstuk 7]. De auteur geeft een reeks kenmerken van die geestestoestand, waaruit eens te meer zijn medische kennis blijkt. Het is moeilijk alle gemoedsgesteldheden door een hedendaags synoniem te vervangen, de intentie van de opsomming is echter duidelijk. Het is een reeks eigenschappen die een melancholicus typeren. Ik heb ik me bij de vertaling zoveel mogelijk gehouden aan het MNW, dat bij het geven van synoniemen vast niet gedacht heeft aan de moderne melancholische terminologie rond de depressies. Ik heb daardoor *hinem interpreteren* trachten te voorkomen. De volgende zeven 'vruchten' komen aan de orde:

1. Ziekte, lusteloosheid en wrange tegenspoed (*Ziecheit, Zwaerheit, Suerheit*).
2. Onmacht en jammerklachten (*Cranchheit ende Claghe*)
3. Rampspoed en eenzaamheid (*Allende ende Eenicheit*)
4. Grote smart (*Jammer*)
5. Ongelukkig gevoel, dat een angstige benauwdheid veroorzaakt (*Cranc-gheluc, Droufheit ende Druc*)
6. Krachteloosheid door gebrek aan zelfkennis (*Eighin-Eerde*)
7. Zieleleed dat grote kommer geeft (*Noot*)

Met opzet heb ik een volledige opsomming gegeven. Het is treffend dat de omschrijving van de toestand waarin de minnaar verkeert zo volledig overeenstemt met de moderne fenomenologische omschrijving van de melancholie. Wolfram Schmitt (1990, 14-18) kenschetst deze in een instructief artikel. De middeleeuwse artsen hebben deze psychische toestand reeds zeer nauwkeurig beschreven en de auteur is blijkbaar op de hoogte van deze kennis. Ik ben op de melancholie in het zevende hoofdstuk uitvoerig ingegaan, ook aan de hand van andere bronnen.

Overigens komen in de nu volgende gedeelten nog andere belangrijke kenmerken naar voren. De minnaar wenst te sterven, maar zijn levensdrift is nog wel zo groot dat zich dit lot niet aan hem voltrekt. Het is bekend dat de melancholicus vaak zelfmoordneigingen heeft en daaraan uiting geeft. Het percentage zelfmoorden ligt echter lager dan bij de groep niet-melancholici. Kennelijk is dit aan de auteur bekend, als hij vermeldt dat de levenslust zo groot is dat de gedachte niet in daden wordt omgezet.

Als een aangeschoten stuk wild doolt de minnaar rond, zonder vreugde en hoop, volkomen in de macht van de vertwijfeling. Hij is weer gevangen door *Twifel* en zingt *wenende, uut ghepeinse van droufheden ende met onverduldicheden* [een toestand van droefgeestige melancholie] een refreinloos lied. Net als bij het lied van *Hoede* (1272-1279) verwacht de dichter niet dat de toeschouwers meezingen. Hier vindt een louter individuele emotie haar verwoording, geen algemeen thema over de liefde.

2273-2316 (Lied 8): De beklagenswaardige toestand waarin de *ic* verkeert, kan door niemand verzacht worden. Hij is in zijn leed en tegenspoed teruggeworpen op zichzelf. *Die mint ende hem sein hope ontgaat Hi mach wel claghen*. Zijn situatie is nu werkelijk uitzichtloos. Door de pijn van het minnelijden moet hij in grote dienstbaarheid een zware beproeving doorstaan. Alle hoop is

vervlogen *Hope* bevindt zich weer in de gevangenschap van *Twifel*, ook haar hulp moet hij ontberen. Grijs is zijn kleed, alleen lichamenlijk en geestelijk verdriet resten hem.

Ook hier constateer ik weer de combinatie van het in een melancholische toestand verkeren en het maken en zingen van een lied.

Opmerkelijk is het beeld *graeu es die oordene mijn... in graeu moetic gheduerich zijn*. De kleding heeft ook hier een symbolische betekenis. Er zijn nog andere plaatsen in het Gr.Hs. waar dit het geval is. De kleuren in de kleding van de humoren hebben we reeds genoemd. In L36 is de *ic* ten prooi gevallen aan *sorgen*, *peinsen* en is zijn hoop door de twijfel aangetast. Hij klaagt: *Een ordene hevet mijn harte up heven, Dats zwart... een graeu doet soe daer binnen cleven... want zwart es rauwe ende graeu arbeit*. We vinden de gedachte ook terug in lied 140: *Vaer wech, Ghepeins! God gheve dir leit*, dat ik in een artikel uitvoerig besproken heb (Lassche 1994a). We zien dat de minnaar zich een *groen Ommeleit* toewent, want hij *zich nie so moede en vacht*. Ook in het slotlied van de tweede allegorie vinden we een soortgelijke klacht. In L115 houdt de minnaar van een *minlics hertzen ommeleit* (4). Ook hier dus weer een dingallegorisering. De kleuren van de kleding spelen in allerlei minneliederen en -allegorieën een belangrijke rol [4.9]. Grauw en zwart staan symbolisch voor moeizame 'arbeid' en een zorgzame toestand vol rouw (L36: 16, 17 en 21). Bij 'arbeid' moeten we denken aan de liefdesverplichtingen en -beproevingen waarvoor de minnaar ten slotte 'loon' hoopt te ontvangen.

2317-2357: Met weemoed denkt de minnaar terug aan de *compagne* en aan haar die hij alle goeds toewent. Hij wringt krachteloos de handen en raakt uitgeput buiten zinnen. Hij kent zichzelf niet meer. Ten slotte erkent hij zich volledig schuldig en bidt God om genade. Hij knielt en meent - overmand door angst - te sterven.

Ook hier weer maakt de auteur gebruik van medische terminologie om de melancholische toestand te tekenen. Ik vestig de aandacht nog even op het zodanig ten einde raad zijn, dat *ic mi selven niet en kende*. Men spreekt bij dit verschijnsel tegenwoordig over depersonaliteitsgevoelens. Deze 'nihilistische waan' kan zover gaan dat de lijder de eigen existentie (en soms ook die van anderen) niet meer volledig beleeft. Ook de overmatige en intense schuldgevoelens zijn kenmerkend voor de waantoestand waarin een patiënt zich kan bevinden. Het lijkt wel of de auteur medische handboeken bij de hand gehad heeft. Misschien heeft hij een medicus geraadpleegd. Mogelijk ook is de melancholie gespreksstof geweest in de Brugse kring. De veronderstelling dat hij zelf medicus was, is in strijd met de mogelijkheden die in verband met het auteurschap zijn geopperd.

Vreemd is de opvatting van Reynaert dat het thema van de melancholie in het Gr.Hs. geenszins ingekapseld is in de minneproblematiek. In de tekstuele omgeving zouden geen aanwijzingen aanwezig zijn waarover getwijfeld moet worden (1999, 49-50). Hij acht het een 'zwaarmoedigheid' zonder duidelijke aanleiding, een soort "grübeln" à la Froissart en Deschamps. Deze opmerkingen worden gemaakt in verband met het liederendeel, maar men kan ze alleen handhaven als men de relatie tussen de verschillende delen van het convoluut ontkent. Een dergelijke handelwijze lijkt echter niet verantwoord. Trouwens ook in het liedboek lijkt nergens sprake te zijn van een diep gevoel van maatschappelijke onvrede.

De door de auteur geschetste gemoedsgesteldheid wordt getypeerd door duidelijk melancholische verschijnselen, die in verband staan met de mislukte liefdesverhouding.

2358-2360 De minnaar schrikt wakker *Noch bem ic van der wonden -tec*

De droom is wel zeer abrupt ten einde. De *ic* bevindt zich weer met beide benen op de grond. De kring sluit zich, net als in de tweede allegorie. In beide allegorieën is sprake van een droom die de minnaar sterk beroerd heeft. In beide gaat de hoofdpersoon op pad en verkeert in een melancholische toestand. In het verloop van beide stukken wordt die min of meer overwonnen door allerlei hoopvolle verwachtingen, maar aan het slot is de *ic* weer op het punt aangeland waar hij begon. De strijd tussen de vertwijfeling en de hoop op een eventueel succes kan weer een aanvang nemen. We zien dit in de eerste allegorie. In II zijn de lessen in de liefdesschool nog maar net afgelopen of *Twifel* klopt al weer aan de deur.

8.2 Samenvatting

Het gedicht beschrijft een liefdesrelatie die negatief afloopt. De *ic* zoekt – na een periode van aarzeling – contact met de dame waarop hij verliefd is. Na een innerlijke strijd accepteert zij hem, nadat zij hem uitdrukkelijk op zijn plichten heeft gewezen. Bij de minnaar ligt het accent zo op het ‘vrolijk’minnen’, ‘vrolijk leven’ en het ontvangen van ‘loon’, dat de vrouw hem uiteindelijk niet kan accepteren. Zij wijst hem na de kennismakingsperiode af. Aan het slot erkent de *ic* dat hij verkeerd gehandeld heeft. Hij voelt zich opnieuw zeer ongelukkig.

In tegenstelling tot de meeste allegorieën besteedt de dichter veel aandacht aan de innerlijke processen die het gedrag van de dame bepalen. Zeer veel personificaties in de burcht beelden haar innerlijke strijd bij het al of niet aanvaarden van de minnaar uit. Het aantal personificaties dat de psychische functies bij de minnaar verzinnebeeldt, is geringer in aantal. In de tweede allegorie, waarin het accent meer ligt op het innerlijk van de minnaar, is dit aantal groter. Zij spelen daar echter niet zo’n actieve rol. Het psychische gebeuren in de minnaar is heel wat simpeler dan bij de vrouw. In het Gr HS wordt de jonge man – zowel in de liederen als in de gedichten – getekend als een figuur *vul der werelt luste*. Dit blijkt duidelijk uit het aantal karaktereigenschappen van hem dat uit *Venus lande* verbannen moet worden.

De jeugdige vrouw stelt haar eisen in het lied van *Juecht* (reinheid, eervol zijn, een edele gezindheid bezitten, met als doel een blijvend levensgeluk). Verder eist zij een goed maatschappelijk gedrag (lessen van *Verstene*), zwijgzaamheid (de tampon *Helen*), trouw, gepast gedrag en nogmaals zich eervol gedragen (de sleutels *Trauwe*, *Anteren* en *Eere*). Gelijkheid van *complexie* (het aanbieden van de livreeën van de humoren) moet daarenboven nog zorgen voor een evenwichtige verhouding. Waarschijnlijk heeft het aanbieden van een welkomsdrank ook een functie in het verstevigen van de verbintenissen. Alle voorzorgsmaatregelen blijken vergeefs. De op *weelde* beluste minnaar, die geen maat kan houden, faalt en wordt door de behoedende krachten in de vrouw uiteindelijk afgewezen. Haar eer blijkt niet geschonden te zijn en de verhouding is betrekkelijk geheim gebleven (de tampon *helen* is nog aanwezig al zit hij tamelijk los). De innerlijke strijd in de vrouw wordt verbeeldt door twee tegenover elkaar

staande partijen. Aan de ene zijde *Melancolie* en *Juecht*, aan de andere *Hoede* en de haren. *Versiene* tracht door allerlei maatregelen een bevredigende verhouding tot stand te brengen.

Opmerkelijk is dat twee lokaal duidelijk van elkaar gescheiden hoofdpersonages de dame vertegenwoordigen. In de benedenzaal zetelt *Suverheit* op haar troon, in de bovenzaal regeert de *Burchtgrave*. De minnaar geniet in *volle weelde* van de nabijheid van de dame. *Suverheit* wordt door hem echter ontzegd. Zij symboliseert het geslachtelijke aspect en haar eer wordt niet geschonden. Blijkbaar overwint de *scamelheit*.

De hoop op een gunstige afloop van het liefdesavontuur blijkt een sterk genezende kracht te bezitten. De minnaar betreedt verwachtingsvol de burcht. Hij blijkt echter sterk tekort te schieten in zijn plichten. Lichtvaardig en hooghartig springt hij met de liefde om. Hij heeft alleen oog gehad voor het 'vrolijk minnen'. Hij houdt zich niet aan de voorschriften die hem door *Verziene* en indirect door de symbolische *wieken* en sleutels zijn verstrekt. De livereien die hij van de vier humoren ontvangen heeft, hebben zijn handelen niet ingrijpend beïnvloed. Zijn jeugdige en onbesuise karakter zal nog een ontwikkeling tot verantwoordelijkheid moeten doormaken. Hij is zich wel degelijk van zijn schuld bewust. In hoofdstuk 10 geef ik nog een korte samenvatting van het verloop van het liefdesproces.

De uiterlijke schoonheid van de dame beschrijft de dichter via de burchtmetaforiek. Opvallend hierbij is dat hij het benedendeel van het vrouwenlichaam apart beschrijft. De traditionele rozensymboliek speelt mee door het beeld van de doornen en bramen, die bescherming bieden aan de benen.

Het hart, de *Burchtgrave*, treedt als 'regent' regulerend op. Het accepteert eerst de minnaar, maar wijst hem later af. Deze psychisch regulerende functie moet uiteindelijk *Suverheit* beschermen tegen een al te vrijpostige minnaar. Het is niet duidelijk wat de dame de minnaar precies verwijt, maar evident is dat hij zich niet aan de hoofse regels en voorschriften gehouden heeft en tot de grens van het toelaatbare is gegaan. Zijn onvermogen *mate* te houden zal daarbij een grote rol gespeeld hebben.

Bij de humoren speelt *Melancolie* de hoofdrol. Het begrip 'melancholie' heeft veelvoudige betekenissen, die niet geheel bevredigend te duiden zijn. Er bestaat een duidelijke binding met de lyrische kunst. Kennelijk is er sprake van een eigenschap die zowel het meisje als de minnaar eigen zijn. Melancholie brengt ze door de liederen tot elkaar. Als zij eenmaal verenigd zijn, lijkt zijn rol uitgespeeld. De samenhang tussen hevig verliefd zijn en de psychische onevenwichtigheid blijkt bij de *ic* bijzonder groot te zijn. De dichter is uitstekend op de hoogte te zijn van de verschijnselen die bij de *amor hereos* horen. De vertwijfeling en de hoop krijgen in de personificaties *Twifel* en *Hope* een belangrijke plaats toebedeeld.

De auteur heeft oog voor de lokalisering. De minnaar loopt wat verward rond tot hij de linde passeert. In het gebied rond de burcht vindt hij – met behulp van *Hope* – het smalle, onbetreden pad naar de geliefde. Zijn toegang tot alle vertrekken, schijnt alleen op de bovenzalen betrekking te hebben. Na de afwijzing vertoeft hij in een zeer sombere tuin, die zijn goedsgesteldheid weergeeft. Het geslachtelijk deel van de dame – *Suverheit* – vertoeft alleen in de benedenzaal, het regulerende 'hart' – de *Burchtgraaf* – uitsluitend in één van de bovenzalen. *Hoede* zit meestal op de trap, die beide gedeeltes in de burcht verbindt. De overige personificaties bewegen zich vrijelijk door de burcht.

Het aantal personificaties is, vergeleken met de tweede allegorie, niet overmatig groot. Velen van hen treden handelend op. Mannelijke personificaties representeren sommige eigen-

schappen van de vrouw. Dit doet ons vreemd aan, maar misschien speelt de traditie hierbij een rol. Ook de gebezigde burchtmetaforiek elders (bijvoorbeeld bij Boendale, Augustijnken van Dordt en *La tou amoureuse*) kan haar invloed hebben doen gelden.

Belangrijk is de rol van de liederen. De acht liederen dragen deels de handelingen en geven uiting aan de gemoedsgesteldheden van de personages. Bovendien verlenen zij aan het geheel een levendig karakter. Vaak kunnen de toeschouwers het refrein meezingen, wat in sterke mate de betrokkenheid verhoogt. Het lied van jeugd heeft een initierende functie. Het eerste en laatste lied van de minnaar geven zijn stemming weer. Aan het begin overheerst de hoop, aan het eind de volslagen vertwijfeling. Zijn tweede en derde lied zijn introductielieder. Ze dienen toegang te verschaffen tot de dame. Ze staan vol frasen en *Hope* wordt meer geerd dan de dame. Het vierde lied is nog enigszins complimenteus voor de geliefde. Het vijfde bewijst de verkeerde instelling van de minnaar. *Hoede* geeft de gevaren weer die aan een eventuele verbintenis kleven.

Een meer uitgebreide samenvatting vindt men in het tiende hoofdstuk.

DE TEKST VAN DE EERSTE ALLEGORIE

9.0 Inleiding

Carton gaf de tekst uit (1848/9) met nogal wat afwijkingen van de weergave in het handschrift. Helaas echter kan een nieuwe uitgave niet zonder meer gebaseerd worden op het handschrift zelf, want de leesbaarheid daarvan is sedert Carton op een aantal plaatsen aanzienlijk verslechterd. Mijn tekst is dus in eerste instantie gebaseerd op het handschrift, maar maakt noodgedwongen mede gebruik van Carton en de op basis van zijn editie door anderen voorgestelde emendaties. De volgende paragraaf beschrijft de relaties tussen de tekst van het handschrift, Cartons uitgave en de mijne. Eerst worden de plaatsen gegeven waar Carton van het handschrift en van mijn editie afwijkt. Daarbij wordt eerst de lezing van Carton gegeven en vervolgens de mijns inziens juiste. Daarna worden onzekere en geemendeerde plaatsen besproken. Ten slotte worden de thans onleesbare plaatsen vermeld, waarbij ik onderscheid maak tussen die plaatsen die voor Carton nog wel leesbaar waren (daar volgt mijn editie dus noodgedwongen de zijne) en die welke ook in zijn tijd niet meer ontcijferd konden worden.

Het taalgebruik is uiteraard Middelnederlands. Ik zal in paragraaf 9.2 enige opvallende afwijkingen van het moderne Nederlands in de eerste allegorie beschouwen. Enkele Westvlaamse vormen vermeld ik apart. Hierbij streef ik niet naar volledigheid, de bedoeling is enkel de niet met het Middeleeuws bekende lezer enige richtlijnen te geven.

In paragraaf 9.3 komt na de inleidende opmerkingen de tekststructurering in de eerste allegorie kort ter sprake.

Vóór de editie van de tekst met verklarende aantekeningen vermeld ik enige bijzonderheden rond de tekstitgave.

9.1 Opmerkingen bij Cartons uitgave

9.1.1 *Tekstverbeteringen bij Cartons editie*

30: /oude> soude; 33: die> wie; 35: rade> rude; 37: wagen> waghē; 41: Een> EEn; 55: scoijen> scoyē; 65: suverlic> zuverlic; 87: ghijnc> ghinc; 88: die verwaerment> die gras[zoden?] verwaermet; 98: dat was> dat [water] was; 130: soete> zoete; 145: wordic> werdic; 146: bescynte> bescijnte; 147: prayerie> prayerye; 150: de> die; 167: therte>therde; 191: soo> so; 192: soete> zoete; 198: ghanc> ganx; 210: voorder> vorder; 216: elcken> elcke; 223: zoo> so; sach> lach; 258: hy> hi; 265: aersoē> aertsoē; 286: lich> licht; 297: heeft> heift; 299: zonder> sonder; 302: sochte> zochte; alleene> allene; 319: wonderlike> wonderliker; 333: in> int; 342: ijsere> ysere; 363: moest> moet; 429: met> niet; 431: Twifel> Twivel; 447: nieuwe> nieuwer; 473: dezen> desen; 481: stwifels> tswifels; 482: sijnen> sinen; 575: dinke> dincke; 583: habijt> abijt; 592: wi enich erch hadde> wie enich erch hade; 639: tzyne> tzine; 649: scoote> scote; 650: Twifele> twifele; 668: tswifels> Tfwifels; 672: Vrouwe> Vrouw; 710: is> es; 713: gangen> ganghen; 754: aen des paleis> an des palaeis; 757:

duer> duere; 784: der> ter; 785: creature> creatuere; 796: vor> voor; 799: aen> an; 800: u> hu; 805: soe> zoe; 807: vor> voor; 840, 844, 848: enz.> *etcetera*; 852: jonckvrouw> joncfrau; 902: jolliis>jollijs; 907: dede> deit; 923: enen> eenen; 965: vrouwe> vrouwe; 969: ontfaermicheit> Ontfaermicheit; 970: besceedicheit> Besceedicheit; 971: goedertier> Goedertier; 992: wezen> wesen; 1000: loven> lonen; 1030: dusdanich> dustanich; 1033: so> soe; 1042: souden> zouden; 1053: antwoorde> andwoorde; 1060: antwoorde> andwoorde; 1066: Mi> Nu, joncheere> jonchere; 1099: cozen>coren; 1105: weder> neder; 1116: dees> dese; 1125: deze> dese; 1166: in> int; 1173: tfienst> tsienst; 1177: mi> nu; 1182: buerchgrave > buerghgrave; 1225: wel> nyet; 1302: zoudze> soudze; 1304: burchgrave> buerggrave; 1327: peinzen> peinsen; 1343: vriendinnen> vriendinne; 1352: Hoede> Hoeden; 1367, 1372: enz. *etcetera*; 1392: Twelke> Twelcke; 1399 en 1403: enz.> *etcetera*; 1459: hietze> hietse; 1484: commen> comen; wy> wij; 1486: ghinghen> ghinchen; 1493: zi> si; 1575: gestade> ghestade; 1585: hadde> adde; 1627: Vrouw> Vrou; 1641: bozer> boser; 1669: compter> comter; 1678: brocht> brochte; 1689: van> voor; 1706: amoureuse> amoreuser; 1714: zat> sat; 1728: zijn> sijn; 1742: Twelke> Twelcke; 1747: Flumaet> Fluemaet; 1766: algemeene> algemeene; 1776: zaghen> saghen; 1787: Enich> Eenich; 1812: nemmermeere> nemmermere; 1921: buerchgraeve> borchgrave; 1924: Schone-ghelaet> Scone-ghelaet; 1926: heift> heifti; 1928: ghenezen> ghenesen; 1934: onneeren> onneren; 1937: zi> hi; 1950: rauwen> rouwen; 1991: gherocht> gherochte; 1992: soe> zoe, crocht> crochte; 2003: buerchgrave> buerghgrave; 2010: zouden> souden; 2013 en 2014: zi> si; 2016: heet> hiet; 2033: ze> zi; 2039: zach> sach; 2044: aen> an; 2051: menichen> menighen; 2052: Dicken> Dickent; 2058: tijt mach> tijt ne mach; 2060 en 2064: enz.> *etcetera*; 2067: hiltse> hatse; 2076: hadden> hadde; 2077: Vorziene> Verziene; 215: souckene> soukene; 2133: worden> werden; 2177: coorden> coorten; 2229: swighen> Swighen; 2238: sonderlinghen> zonderlinghen; 2245: zwaerheit> Zwaerheit; 2252: crancheit> Crancheit, claghe> Claghe; 2253: moetic> moet ic; 2258: allende> Allende, eenicheit> Eenicheit; 2263: cranc-gheluc> Cranc-gheluc; 2266: eyghin-eerde> Eyghin-eerde; 2286: nu> mi; 2288: mi> nu; 2360: wynden> wonden.

9.1.2 Onzekere lezingen en emendaties (in de tekst aangegeven met een rondje)

8: *namen*: boven de *n* lijkt een *r* geschreven Als men *ramen* leest, zou dat ‘het beoogde, nagestreefde doel’ kunnen betekenen; **87:** *verclaren*: slecht leesbaar; Carton leest *verlaien* (hapax). Gessler 1940, 44; *verlaren* (hapax) zonder interpretatie. MNW VIII, 1967 vermoedt *verbaren* [openbaren]; **88:** Een door correcties onduidelijke regel. Verdam 1890, 287 emendeert: “Ende als die winde verwaerment wajen”, het onderstreepte is onjuist geëmenteerd; *graszoiden*: *gras* staat boven bijgeschreven; *zoiden* slecht leesbaar (gissing van Gessler 1940, 44); **98:** *dat water*: het hs. heeft enkel *dat*, emendatie op basis van MNW III, 1456, (Verdam 1890, 287); **221:** *bloyden*. het hs. heeft *vloyden*, emendatie op basis van Verdam 1890, 283; *bloyden* i.v.m. de al genoemde struiken; **226:** *ghungic*, het hs. heeft *ghinic*; **231:** MNW V, 2317, stelt een omzetting van 231 en 232 voor; **306:** *ic*, het hs. geeft *in*; **349:** *als enen rouc*: het hs. heeft *als men rouc*, emendatie op grond van MNW VI, 1503. Eventuele betekenis van *als men rouc*: zoals men [van zo’n figuur] zou verwachten; **368:** hs.: hu, MNW III, 850; *ghi u*; **372** hs. *Allerne*, een schrijffout voor *alleene*; **437:** *war*: emendatie MNW X,

1198, het hs. heeft *dat*; **457**: ic: het hs. heeft *hi*; **498**: *avisterighe*: emendatie van MNW I, 297. Het hs. heeft het onbekende *amsternighe*; **535**: *togheden*, discongruentie, tenzij ook het paard boos kijkt; **600**: *was*: ook MNW III, 1084, het hs. heeft *wast*; **766**: *soene*: emendatie op basis van Verdam 1890, 287, het hs. heeft *soe*; **867**: *bet*: een onleesbare plaats in het hs. Het MNW I, 1016, stelt (*h*)iet voor, Carton geeft *het*, mij lijkt *bet* het meest acceptabel; **1068**: *hu*: het hs. heeft *Ik*; **1095**: *icse*: het hs. heeft *hise*; **1147**: *baudiceirt*: nu onleesbare plaats. Carton geeft *bandiceirt*. MNW VII, 124, veronderstelt *tebaudiceert* [onbeschroomd]. Het supplement geeft onder *baudicheit* "brutaliteit, vermetelheid"; **1200**: *wartmer*: (nu onleesbaar) op basis van MNW VIII, 2155, Carton heeft *warter*; **1233**: *deersen*: op grond van Carton, nu onleesbaar, vgl. de (discutabele) voorstellen in MNW II, 101; **1253**: *besien(e)*: onleesbaar, Carton geeft *bezien*, MNW V, 2275, stelt *besien(e)* voor; **1254**: *hoe*: (onleesbaar), een voorstel van MNW V, 2275, ook Verdam 1890, 287; **1269**: *waniewaers*: (onduidelijk en slecht leesbaar) op basis van MNW IX, 1530, Carton geeft *waenicwaers*, zie ook MNW VI, 845 en Verdam 1890, 295-296; **1289**: *versteicr*: (onleesbaar) op grond van MNW IX, 42, Carton geeft *verseict*; **1304**: *ghevuecht*: emendatie Verdam 1890, 278, het hs. geeft twee keer *ghenuecht*; **1544**: *ghaert*: er zit een vlek op het woord, Carton geeft *gheert* (ook dit is mogelijk, *ee*-vormen rijmen wel vaker op *ae*-vormen); **1566**: *dan* achteraan bijgeschreven; **1589**: *ghenaert*, [=gheneert], de *ae* ter wille van het rijm (MNW II, 1412); **1593**: *dochte*>*dochte mi*; **1635**: *onghier*: (nu onleesbare plaats), emendatie volgens MNW V, 558. Carton geeft *ongher*; **1658**: Cartons *gheluchichede*>*gheluckichede*, 'k' slecht leesbaar; **1702**: *ic*: het hs. geeft *hi*, een verschrijving? Mogelijk is dat de plotselinge wisseling in vertelstandpunt de middeleeuwen niet stoorde; **1802**: *diet mi*: het MNW V, 2218, veronderstelt een verschrijving voor *doeti*, 't' zou dan de minne of de hoop kunnen zijn. Het hs. toont een zeer dun streepje na *doet*. Verdam 1890, 287 emendeerde *doet hi*; **1960**: *ne*: onduidelijk boven geschreven, mogelijk *in*; **2030**: *Jolyt*: onduidelijke plaats door onduidelijke invoeging en wegstreping; **2076**: *hadde*: onleesbaar, Carton geeft *hadden*; **2129**: *Int*: De 'I' staat enigszins in de kantlijn, de staart staat voor de 'E' van de volgende regel, blijkbaar een opvallende typografische aanduiding voor het einde van het verblijf in de burcht; **2266**: *gaf*: het hs. heeft *af*, mogelijk kan bedoeld zijn *gaf* als in 2264. Verdam 1890, 283 emendeert *zesten af*>*zeste gaf*; **2320**: *si*: Carton geeft op de nu onleesbare plaats *hi*, *si* lijkt aannemelijker; **2360**: *wonden*: onduidelijke plaats met tussengekriebelde *i*. Verdam 1980, 283 en MNW VII, 2621 emenderen *wonden*, Carton heeft *wynden*. De Haan, Oosterman 1996, vertalen met het enkelvoudige "wond".

Enkele opmerkingen:

53: lombarde door rubricator niet ingevuld; **556**: de regel begint niet met een kapitaal en springt in; **809**: verspringen van de nummering der folio's door verkeerd inbinden in latere tijd.

9.1.3 Nu onleesbare plaatsen waarvan Cartons lezing is gevolgd

727: de twee eerste twee letters van *hier*; **728**: *dat ic*; **808**: *in*; **809-899**: door het verkeerd inbinden in een latere periode bevindt dit gedeelte van het verhaal zich op een latere plaats in het convoluut. F51Ra is op veel plaatsen onleesbaar. Carton heeft meer kunnen ontcijferen dan ik. Geheel onleesbaar zijn nu gedeelten van **810-811**, **838-839**, **846** en grote delen van **853-899**; **974**: Carton geeft *gheerne*, indien juist dan is dit door de auteur sarcastisch bedoeld;

1116-1205: op F52Va en b veel plaatsen. Carton heeft de tekst kennelijk redelijk kunnen lezen, uitgezonderd het eerste woord van **1137**; **1117:** nu onleesbare plaats, waarschijnlijk heeft er een ontkenning gestaan (Carton geeft *deze* niet); **1191:** *vreemt* nu onleesbaar; **1201-1205:** uitgezonderd *quaet* onleesbaar; **1231:** *gh...*; **1233:** *staen deersen*; **1234:** *colie neech*; **1243-1250:** de meeste woorden, geheel of gedeeltelijk onleesbaar (37 stuks); **1253-1256:** 14 woorden; **1277-1299:** vele woorden onleesbaar of vaag; **1500:** *beroert*; **1515:** *vare*; **1517:** *tsnoer*; **1520:** *mijns*; **1529-1533:** veel woorden; **1544:** *ghaert*; **1547:** *om*; **1583:** deel van *onverzienlicken*; **1610:** *nu zie*; **1616:** *graew*; **1628:** *maer*; **1635:** eerste vijf woorden; **2069:** *buerchgrave*; **2071:** *de*; **2072-2077:** het slot van de regels; **2295-2328:** veel woorden zijn nu onleesbaar of slechts nog gedeeltelijk te lezen.

9.1.4 Onleesbare plaatsen ook door Carton niet ontcijferd

Het juiste aantal letters of woorden is meestal niet te bepalen.

887: laatste woorden; **887, 894** en **895:** enkele woorden tegen het einde van de zinnen; **1137:** eerste woord; **1281:** vijfde woord, waarschijnlijk bestaand uit vier letters; **1297:** vijfde woord; **2312:** de meeste woorden; **2322:** eerste woord.

9.2 Het taalgebruik

9.2.1 algemene opmerkingen

Ik beschouw hier alleen de eerste allegorie en niet het gehele convoluut. De spelling is zeer wisselend. Uiteraard waren er nog geen spellingregels. Misschien is er ook sprake van een spelelement gezien het grote aantal wisselingen op korte afstand. Waarschijnlijk is de systeemloosheid door de afschrijver nog verergerd. Algemeen veronderstelt men dat er een kopiïst tussen de autograaf en de overgeleverde versie zit. Dezelfde klank wordt regelmatig op verschillende wijzen weergegeven: *Buerchgrave*, *Buerchgraeve*, *Burcghraven*, *Burcgrave*, *Buergrgrave*, *Buerghgrave*, *Burchgrave*, *Tswifel*, *Twifel*, *Twiffele*, *Tzwifel*, *Stwifel*, *Ghedoochsamichede*, *Ghedoochsamicheit*, *Ghedochzamicheit* enz. Veel variaties zien we in de medeklinkers: *peinsen-peinzen*, *doe* (toen), *zo-so* (zij), *ic-ick*, *vrou*, *vrouw*, *vrau*, *vrauw*; *trouer*, *trauwe* enz.

Er is slechts één Duitstalige vorm, namelijk *hertze* (410) en wel in een lied. Vooral in het tweede deel met de liederen komen dit soort woorden veelvuldig voor, zie voor literatuur het thematisch register.

9.2.2 Enkele bronnen voor de studie van het Middelnederlands

Voor een orientatie raadplege men eventueel de inleiding van Bouman (1948), Van den Berg (1971), Van der Horst (1981) of de instructiegrammatica van Van de Ketterj (1980). Voor dieper gaande studie kan men terecht bij onder andere Franck (1910), Stoett (1923), Van Loey (1949 en 1955) en Le Roux, Le Roux (1967).

9.2.3 Enkele Vlaamse eigenaardigheden

In een Brugs geschrift vinden we uiteraard Westvlaamse vormen, waaronder ingvaeoonse (voorkomend in de kustdialecten). Literatuur hierover Heeroma (1958), Van Loey (1949), Schönfeld (1969), Van Sterkenburg (1982) en Berteloot, met literatuuropgave (2000). Opmerkelijk is dat Van Loey, die veel Vlaamse geschriften aanhaalt, het Gr.Hs. niet geraadpleegd heeft. Ik geef slechts enkele vormen Ook Heeroma (1958) geeft veel gegevens in zijn uitgave van *De tweede rose*.

- Rekking van a en e voor r + consonant: scaerp (scherp), meercte (merkte); maar ook van de o: zoorghen (zorgen), boorch (borch, burcht).
- Ontronding van de uu>ie: bestiert, diere (dure), vier (vuur) enz.
- Ontronding u tot i: dinct, littel (=luttel), dinne (dunne).
- De vernauwing van a tot o: dacht>docht; bracht>brocht; af>of.
- De palatisering van de o>u: up, burchtgraaf, busch (bos), vul, durste (dorst), verdullen, upzet; maar toch ook const, borch.
- Vaak ee voor ei: cleene, leeden (leiden), bereet (bereid), gheine-gheene, spreeden (spreiden).
- dure voor door.
- e in plaats van i: emmermeer, lettell (littel), mesdaet, lechamen, clemmen, nemmermeer, messcien; esser (is er); maar ook dinke (denk), inghel (engel).
- Wegval van de stembandklapper h voor vocalen: aestelike, addic, art (hard), abijt (habijt), oghe (hoge), eer (heer), arde (harde); als reactie hypercorrectie: hu (u), huwe (uw).
- Onze oe aangeduid door ou: (Franse invloed?) : drouve, vouchde, drouchse, ghenouch, slouch, Roukeloos, roupen, roum, bouc, bouf (behoef), houc (hoek).
- Vormen met ei voor de langgerekte ee: cleine, cleiden, vreimd, weilde, weirelt, weiten, deil, destrueirt.
- De gerekte lange ee wordt ook wel met ei weergegeven: weiten, deise, heift.
- Het ontbreken van ge- in het deelwoord: die waren comen, ic heb vonden, die heeft leden pijn.

9.3 De tekst

9.3.1 Inleidende opmerkingen

De tekst is licht kritisch weergegeven [9.3.3]. In de rechtermarge staan de folionummering in het handschrift vermeld en de bladzijden waar de tekst bij Carton voorkomt, dit laatste omdat in het MNW de vindplaatsen van de woorden zo aangeduid worden.

We hebben voor de weergave van de tekst gebruik gemaakt van de films en de daarvan gemaakte afdrukken die zich in de bibliotheek van de Katholieke Universiteit in Nijmegen bevinden. Op diverse plaatsen is de tekst onleesbaar. Ik heb daar de uitgave van Carton en Blommaert geraadpleegd. Zij hebben de slecht leesbare plaatsen bewerkt met chemicaliën die hen vaak in staat stelden de tekst te ontcijferen. Later zijn deze plaatsen onleesbaar geworden. De emendaties lijken meestal inhoudelijk verantwoord, de onnauwkeurigheden in de uitgave

hebben vooral betrekking op de inaccurate weergave van de spelling, zoals verwisselingen tussen s en z, f en v e.d. Ik moet overigens wel op Carton en Blommaert vertrouwen, bij gebrek aan iets anders. Voor de interpretatie van de tekst is dit niet van essentiële betekenis.

Voor nadere literatuur over de uitgave verwijzen we naar de literatuuropgave in het thematisch register.

9.3.2. De tekststructurering

Er staanslechts enkele wat willekeurig geplaatste paragraaftekens in deze tekst. Wel zijn er functionele initialen en witregels, die een structurering aangeven als de verhaal- of vertelsituatie zich wijzigt.

De tekst begint met een vijfregelige initiaal en wordt verder gestructureerd door lombarden. Ze zijn één of twee regels hoog en worden in de teksteditie vet weergegeven. De lombarden geven de structuur van het handlingsverloop aan. Opmerkelijk is de **I** in de kantlijn van r. 1590. *Melancolie* neemt daar de minnaar in de arm. Het is het moment dat het dichterschap van de *ic* erkenning vindt en in wezen over zijn toelating wordt beslist.

Er volgen geen hoofdletters op de lombarden. In het handschrift ontbreken de lombarden nogal eens. De kopiïst rubriceerde zijn eigen teksten niet, maar liet wel een kleine ruimte open voor de grotere hoofdletters. De rubricator is in het handschrift niet zo zorgvuldig te werk gegaan gezien de vele niet ingevulde lombarden. Overigens is dat nog niet het geval in de eerste allegorie, waar dat slechts één maal gebeurt.

In het gedicht zijn 68 'beginsignalen', te weten één grote vierregelige versierde initiaal, 22 'inspringende' gekleurde hoofdletters met een hoogte van twee regels. Verder een voor de kantlijn staande zes regels hoge **I**, 44 gekleurde hoofdletters van één regel hoog, waarvan er echter één niet is ingevuld door de rubricator. Op enkele essentiële plaatsen, bijvoorbeeld bij de intrede in de burcht en als de minnaar de eerste blikken in de burcht mag werpen, is er geen markering opgenomen. Uiteraard heb ik op die plaatsen wel een scheiding aangebracht bij de schematische indeling in hoofdstuk 8.

9.3.3 Enkele opmerkingen over de weergave van de tekst

1. Afkortingen zijn cursief weergegeven.
2. Tekstverklaringen worden zoveel mogelijk naast de tekst weergegeven. Bij de verklaringen heb ik geen hoofdletters gebruikt, ook niet bij de directe rede.
3. Kapitalen worden vet weergegeven. De hoogte correspondeert met het aantal regels dat in het handschrift in beslag genomen wordt. In r. 53 en r. 418 heeft de rubricator de kapitaal niet ingevuld, ik gebruik daar cursieve kapitalen. *Got* en *Gode* zijn met een hoofdletter geschreven, net als de namen van de personificaties. Driemaal komt een paragraafteken voor (r. 629, 631 en 632), dat ik heb weergegeven met het teken ¶.
4. De tekst is van een moderne interpunctie voorzien om de leesbaarheid te bevorderen. Een nadeel is wel dat men daardoor een enkele maal aan een bepaalde interpretatie gebonden wordt.

5. Daar de onderscheiding in het handschrift van *i* en *j* en *u* en *v* geen tekenwaarde weergeeft en enkel een grafische variatie is, heb ik ze door de moderne schrijfwijze vervangen.
6. Plaatsen waar sprake is van een onzekere lezing of een emendatie die besproken wordt in 9.1 zijn aangegeven met een rondje.
7. Het MNW haalt de geciteerde plaatsen aan naar de paginanummers van Cartons uitgave en voegt zelf regelnummers toe. Om deze reden heb ik in de tekstuitgave de bladzijnummering van Carton vermeld met C. De tekst loopt bij Carton van pagina 233 tot en met 313. Bij de aanduiding van de folionummering van het handschrift zal men opmerken dat de nummering na 42Vb verspringt naar 51Ra. De oorzaak van deze wisseling in de nummering wordt veroorzaakt doordat de katernen bij het opnieuw inbinden in latere tijd niet goed na elkaar gelegd zijn. Men zie hiervoor onder andere het schema van Gerritsen (1969, 190).
8. Een vrije vertaling in modern Nederlands proza vindt men in De Haan, Oosterman 1996, 92-135.

9.3.4 De tekst met de verklaringen

F39a C233

<p>C 1 onst, cracht, wille zonder daet. 2 Daer of en comt goet no quaet. 3 Ende hoge daet, zonder wise raden, voortreffelijke daden verrichten zonder bedachtzaam overleg</p>	<p>kunstvaardigheid, geest- en wilskracht zonder daadkracht</p>
<p>4 Dats een recht beghin van scaden Met wisen rade const beleit. Dats een behouden aerbeit. Ende cracht met wizer const te zamen</p>	<p>Dat is een wezenlijke aanzet tot schade in zedelijk opzicht wijs beleid geeft kunst de juiste richting <i>behouden arbeid</i> werk waarvan men de vruchten plukt</p>
<p>8 Dat brinct tweerc te zire namen Nochtan en doocht cracht no const Sonder wille ende zonder jonst! Wat sal dan cracht, const, wille ende moet,</p>	<p><i>te zire namen</i> tot de laam die van het werk uitgaat <i>doocht</i> helpt zonder wilskracht en toegenegenheid, ijver <i>moet</i> verheven gemoedsstemming die tot scheppen inspireert als men ze niet daadwerkelijk inschakelt</p>
<p>12 Of ment niet te werke en doet? Ende wat salt al te werke ghedaen Voor de gone die niet verstaen? Dats recht besceyt als daer men zaeyt</p>	<p>voor degenen die voor de dichtkunst niet ontvankelijk zijn <i>recht besceyt</i> verstandige constatering; <i>daer</i> waar</p>
<p>16 Daer men nemmermeer en mayt. Daer men verliest pine ende coren. Aldus blijft menich const verloren. Maer hets beter verloren pine</p>	<p>waarbij men zowel arbeidsenergie als koren verliest C234 <i>const</i> kunstwerk <i>verloren pine</i>: dat men vergeefse moeite doet</p>
<p>20 Dan const daer pine in pleicht te zine, Want aerbeit sonder const in daden Dan can den zinnen niet ghescaden: Maer aerbeit ende const te zamen</p>	<p>dan moeizame handarbeid te verrichten want arbeid die niet gericht is op het maken van kunst die kan niet schadelijk zijn voor de geest maar kunstzinnige arbeid</p>
<p>24 Beroert zinnen ende lechamen Ende als ment al beroert int werken Door hem dies niet verstaen no merken.</p>	<p><i>beroert</i> werkt in op, mist haar uitwerking niet <i>merken</i> aandachtig beschouwen</p>

Daer wert des aerbeits loon vergouden
28 Als voor zwinen ghezait corsouden
Const si doch const met consten loonen
So en soude hem niemen connen becronen!
Maer rude up twerc no up loon ne ghissen

32 Dies moet men loon der const ghemissen.
Wie werct in dustanicher hopen
Si suller lettelt mede copen
Die rude en weet hoe verre hoe bi
36 Den rechten loon der consten z!
Dus willic minen wagen mennen
An die de weghe der consten kennen,
So sal mijn pine in den fijn
40 Na rechter werde vergouden zijn.

EEn droom di mi hout in dole,
Ende die mi gheen tijt uter mole
Noch uten zinne can gheraken,

44 Dien willic hier in rime maken
Ter eeren daer ic den slaep om began,
So ic best can, niet so ict jan.
Want sint der tijt dat hi mi droomde
48 Ic nie up ander dinc en goomde.
Drome pleghen wel te ghesciene!
Ende mi droomde, so selziene,
Dat icken moet na dichtens luste
52 Vulbringen, eer ic van herten ruste.
Mi dochte daer ic lach ende sliep
Dat ic uut minen bedde stiep,
Ende ghinc mi cleeden, cousen, scoyen,
56 Want mi begonste zere vernoyen
Dat ic so langhe te bedde was.
Mijn bedinghe dat ic te Gode las
Ende beval mi in zyn hoede.
60 Mettien wardic so zwaer van moede,
Addic mi niet so na ghecleet
In hadde, om lief no om leet,
Van minen bedde niet ghesceiden

64 Ic maecte moet om mi te cleiden
Also zuverlic als ic mochte.
Voort waert was al mijn ghedochte:
Een cleene padekin ic ghinc,

68 An beeden ziden ic bevinct
Int ende van dien smalen pade
Daer cam ic in de soonste trade
Die mijn oghen nie aensaghen.

72 Mettien so cam daer uut gheslaghen
Roke van zoeter gore,
Die mi dor ghinc de leden dore,
Verdrivende al mine quade lust.

daar wordt de moeite even weinig beloond
als wanneer men voor varkens madeliefjes zaait
konden zij toch kunst met deskundig inzicht waarderen
becronen: beklagen
Maar domkoppen (onwetenden) denken niet na over het dicht-
werk, noch zijn zij gericht op het genot dat de kunst schenkt
derhalve moet men de beloning voor zijn kunst derven
wie te werk gaat met een dergelijke verwachting
lettelt mede copen weinig van opsteken
de onbeschaafde weet volstrekt niet hoe
het kunstwerk beloond moet worden

andte voor hen
dan zal mijn inspanning uiteindelijk
op rechtvaardige wijze vereffend zijn
in dole: in een verwarde toestand
uter mole, uit het hoofd

daer van degene waar [de geliefde vrouw] C235
jan gaarne zou willen
want sinds de tijd dat de droom zich aan mij opdrong
goomde aandacht schonk
te ghesciene te gebeuren
selziene zeldzaam F39Rb
dat ik de droom door dichterlijke begeerte gedreven moet
op schrift stellen, voordat ik geestelijk rust krijg
ik verbeeldde mij daar ik lag te slapen
stiep, stapte
cousen, scoyen: kousen en schoenen aantrekken
want het begon mij zeer te verdrieten

mijn gebed richtte ik tot God
beval: toevertrouwde
direct voelde ik mij zeer onaangenaam
na: nauwgezet
m ic ne: om lief no om leet om niets ter wereld

zuverlic fraai
voort waert: op de toekomst gericht

ic bevinct kon ik het omvatten [zo smal was het]
in de soonste trade: op de schoonste wandelplaats
nie oot
dadelijk kwam daaruit aandrijven
een welriekende geur

quade lust: ongenoezen

C 236

- 76 Vrolic, licht ende al gherust
Wardic van herten menichtout.
Die voghelkine jonc ende hout
Hoordic zinghen daer te stride.
- 80 Even vast in elcke zide:
Lewerken, nachtegalen, cockuden.
Die scoonste bomen, die zoetste cruden,
Groener dan enich groen mach zijn.
- 84 Sach ic; ende tsonne scijn
Began bescinen de scone contreie.
Doe cam ic gaende in een valeie
Daer haer de zonne in ghinc verclaren .
- 88 Ende als die graszoiden verwaermet waren
So gaven zi de zoetste lucht.
Rauwe, droufheit, vaer no ducht
Ne deerde hem twijnt, diet mochte rieken
- 92 Bi mi weinschedic alle zieken.
Mi dochte zi hadden wel ghenesen
Hadden si, daer ic was, moghen wesen.
Daer ic dus blide ghinc alleine.
- 96 Daer sach ic springhen ene fonteine
Uut eenen graeuwen steene ront.
Dat <water> was tote in den gront
Claerrere te ziene dan een cristael,
- 100 Ende maecte sinen nederdael
Spreedende in dat zoete gras
- 104 So ic meer sach ende ghinc naerre,
Der fonteynen cam ic bi.
Ic peinste dat ic wilde mi
Suveren ende mijn anschijn dwaen.
- 108 An deen zide so ghinc ic staen
Ende vinc den borne int overvloyen.
Het docht mi scade soudic mi moyen
Mijn handen te doene besmet, onreine.
- 112 Bin den borne der fonteine:
Dat borne was so over claer.
Mijn hande dwouch ic ende daer naer
Oghen, anschijn ende mont.
- 116 Mettien wart mi de smake cont
So coel ende so zoete ende so jolijs
Ic gheve der fonteynen prijs
Boven allen eerdschen dinghen.
- 120 Twater, dat ic zonderlinghen
Bin minen tanden hilden beloken,
Smaecte van so soeter coken
- Dat mi daer of soude hebben ghegruwet
- 124 Haddict weder uut ghespuwet.
Ende ic dranc in waert altemale.
- licht* opgewekt
- hout* oud
te stride: om het luidst (als in een wedstrijd)
vast volhardend
cockuden koekoeken
- contreie* landschap
in ghinc verclaren: haar licht in deed schijnen
- verdriet, smart, vrees noch angst
deerde hem, die het kon ruiken, in het geheel niet
- daer* op de plaats waar
springhen ontspringen
graeuwer grijze
- F39Va
aangezien ik meer zag, terwijl ik dichterbij kwam
leek zij mij steeds meer helder
- C237
Mijn anschijn dwaen mijn gezicht wassen
- en ving het uit de bron overstromende water op
moven ertoe overgaan
mijn handen in vuile, onreine toestand te verplaatsen
bin in de onmiddellijke begrenzing
want .
dwouch ic reinigde ik
- tegelijk daarmee werd ik de smaak gewaar
jolijs: aangenaam
prijs alle eer, de erepalm
- zonderlinghen* apart, afgezonderd
beloken opgesloten
had de smaak van een zo goede keuken, smaakte zo
voortreffelijk

- Twelke mi becam so wale,
 Dat ics mine becomte dranc
- 128 Al te met dat over spranc.
 Dese fonteyne was omme loken
 Van cruden, die zoete roken,
 Rozegaerden ende eggentieren.
- 132 Bloemen van menigher manieren
 Haddense so wel bedect,
 Suver houdende, onbevlect
 Van hitten ende van allen scaden,
- 136 Daer en mochte gheen smette an laden¹
 Mettien sciedic van der fonteyne.
 Dat bome maecte mi zuver ende reine.
 Margelleine ende polhoen
- 140 Moestic betreden in dat groen,
 Het stont so vul, in mocht niet missen.
 Dat deder mi te min up ghissen
 Die grote schoonheit die ic sach,
- 144 Ende datter gheen wech in lach.
 Dus dolende werdic gheware
 Van verren ene bescynte clare
 Int ende van der prayerye,
- 148 Der ghelike en sach ic nie.
 Stille stondic ende dochte
 Of daer die zonne yet risen mochte.
 Mijn oghen hetic omme gaen
- 152 Ende sach de zonne int ooste staen,
 Ende dese clareheit was int west.
 Mijn oghen bleven daer up ghevest,
 Wonder hebbende int bedieden.
- 156 Mijn zinnen daer of niet ne scieden,
 Altoos ic up tlichte ghinc
 Om vroet te werdene van der dinc.
 Ic sach daer chierheit sonder nummer.
- 160 Al haddic alre herten commer
 Int herte mijn ghehadt alleine,
 Ic hadze vergheten groot ende cleene
 Die voglen zonghen even ghedichte.
- 164 Ende emmer ghinc ic up dat lichte
 Merghende in dat zoete cruut,
 Die mi gaven sulc virtuoet
 Dat mi van vruechden therde speilde
- 168 Nie man cam in sulker weilde
 Als mi dochte dat ic was,
 Van den rozen die ic las
 Om te makene enen hoet.
- 172 So waer ic stelde minen voet,
 Ic tart up blommen of up rozen.
 Dier wasser so vele, in const gheglozen
 Prieelen stoeden hier ende dare
- becomte* bekomst [zoveel ik wilde]
zoveel van hetgeen [water] dat over de rand vloeide
omme loken: omgeven
- rozenperken en struiken met wilde rozen [symbool van de
 liefde]
 vele soorten bloemen
so op dusdanige wijze
- an laden* aankleven
- maecte mi* had mij gemaakt
 margoleinen en vlooiencruud [symb met reinigende werking]
- in mocht missen* ik kon het niet ontwijken
 dat gaf mij des te minder aanleiding te overdenken
- bescynte clare*: helder schijnsel [de ogen van de geliefde]
prayerye heilijke streek
- vet* wellicht
- terwijl dit licht uit het oosten scheen
ghevest gevestigd
 het wonder niet geheel begrijpend
- up* in de richting van
 om meer te weten te komen van het verschijnsel
chierheit sonder nummer: ontelbare pracht
 al had ik al de smart van de wereld
- groot ende cleene*, alles
ghedichte onophoudelijk
- meighende* mij verlustigende
virtuoet: geestelijke en lichamelijke vreugde
 dat ik vreugdevol gestemd was
weilde gelukzalige toestand
- las*: verzamelde
hoet krans [een teken van liefde]
stelde neerzette
tart trad
 die waren er zo vele dat ik het niet verklaren kon
prieelen: fraai aangelegde lusthoven

C238

F39Vb

C239

- 176 Int ende so wardic gheware
 Grote menichte van casteelen.
 Scone poorten, oghe torrelen.
 Bevest. bemuert ende al besloten
- 180 Men hadze niet so wel ghegoten
 Van mommaertere ende van steene.
 Die maetselrie was so reene
 Ende so jolij's ghewrocht,
- 184 In wiste waer ic was gherocht.
 Daer en mochte niemant ute no in.
 Maer ic hadde emmer minen zin
 An dat licht gheleit so vast,
- 188 Al dat ic zach was mi gast
 So zere dooldic in dat scenen.
 Mi selven dedic vele pinen
 Omdat so lanc was eer ict vant
- 192 Maer tover zoete vreimde lant,
 Daer ic in ghinc met weelden groot,
 Dede dat mi te min verdroot.
 Daer stont so menich scone ghezate.
- 196 Aldus so cam ic in een strate,
 Scone, groene, wijt ende lanc,
 Dat docht mi den rechte ganc
 Toter claerheit, die ic sochte
- 200 Ic danckte Gode dat ic gherochte
 In enen wech die mi bestiert.
 Die strate was al omme verchiert
 Met bloumen ende met cruden jolij's.
- 204 Stap no tret, no voets bewijs
 Ne constic in den wech ghescouwen.
 In wiste niet wies mi betrouwen
 Als icken onghetreden sach.
- 208 Ic peinsde: "sal ic al den dach
 Hebben ghedooft om stille staen?
 Neen!, ic sal vorder gaen!"
 Mettien tardic ter straten inne.
- 212 Alf stout, alf bloot, met wanklen zinne,
 Als een die wille ende niet en dar.
 Die voglen waren so ghewar,
 So claer int luut, zo soete int horen.
- 216 An elcke zide so stont een doren
 Scaerpe ende dicke, ende so dorvlochten,
 Het waren meesters diese wrochten,
 Want si waren vaster dan een muur.
- 220 Ooc drouch si zoete ende zuer.
 Over al stond'ri ende bloyden .
 Tlicht, dat uter straten vloyde,
 Dat was so claer na mijn avijs.
- 224 Al hadt ghesijn int paradijs
 So wast daer also gracieus.
- in de verte aanschouwde ik
 oghe *toirelen* hoge torens
 versterkt en door muren beveiligd
 men had ze [elders] niet zo goed vervaardigd
 met cement [of pleisterwerk] en stenen
maetselrie: metselwerk
jolij's ghewrocht keurig gemaakt
 ik wist niet waar ik [tot mijn geluk] was gekomen
mochte: kon
 maar ik had mijn zintuigen voortdurend
 was mi te gast, was mij vreemd, ging buiten mij om
 zo zeer dwaalde ik rond in dat schijnsel
 ik deed mijzelf veel leed aan
eer ict vant eer ik de bron van het licht vond
maer tover zoete maar het overzoete
weelden grote vreugde [vgl. r. 2049]
 veroorzaakte dat het mij geenszins onaangenaam was
ghezate ridderlijk verblijft, kasteel C240
- wijt breed
den rechten ganc de juiste weg, richting
- gherochte*: geraakte
bestiert: tot het doel brengt F40Ra
al omme: aan beide zijden
jolij's schoon, welriekend
no voetsbewijs aanwijzing van gebruik door voetstappen
ghescouwen overzien waarheen hij leidde
 ik wist niet waarop ik me moest verlaten
 toen ik zag dat hij nooit betreden was
- om stille staan* om in het geheel niet te vorderen
- tardic* betrad ik
 deels dapper, deels bevreesd, in een onzekere gemoedsstem-
 ming
 als van iemand die wel wil maar niet durft
 waren *ghewar* waren druk in de weer
- doren*: doornstruik
dorvlochten: dicht meengestregeld
wrochten tot stand brachten
vaster hechter
zoete ende zuer zoete en zure vruchten
 overal stonden ze te bloeien
- na mijn avijs* mijns inziens
- gracieus* aangenaam C241

- So langhe ghinc dus penseus,
 Datic sach in der straten ende
 228 Eene die alre scoonste lende
 Die mijn oghen nie an saghen!
 Haer telghen stoeden over slaghen
 Ende hadden den wech bedect
 232 Met groenen bladen over trect.
 In cam noyt daert so scone was.
 Ic ruste neder in dat gras
 In der zoeter lenden scade.
 236 Mijn zinnen worden so ghedwade
 Van den vreemden lichten scene,
 Niet vaer onziende, rouwe of pine,
 Die mi daer toe comen mochte.
 240 Nochtan dat ic met wille zochte.
 Met dat ic dus melancoleerde
 Ende up dit licht lach ende studeerde,
 So sach ic comen up een paert
 244 Een, die mi dochte van felre aert:
 Ghecleet recht als een messagier
 Sijn ghelaet was so fier,
 Al hadde gheweest an hem belanc
 248 Alder werelt om bevanc,
 Alsoot sceen an sine contenanche.
 In sijn hant voerdi een lanche
 Met eenen ysere, breet ende scaerp.
 252 Duer die lende dat hise waerp
 Om te grievene van den live.
 Ic riep: "Ghenaden eer! ic blive
 Ewelike hu prisoner!"
 256 "Allendich man, wat daetstu hier?"
 Dat dochtic vast int herte mijn.
 Hi sprac: "Vilein, waer wiltu zijn?
 Gheeft hu up, ghi zijt ghevaen!"
 260 Hu waen, die hu dit doet bestaen,
 Die salt hu langhe doen bezuren.
 Wie sal betalen hu verburen?
 Di selven hebs du hier vercocht!"
 264 Een coorde so haddi gecnocht
 An sijn aertsoen, die hi ontbant.
 Hi nam mi fellic bi der hant
 Ende bandt mi om de middewaert.
 268 Daer moestic lopen achter tpaert.
 In dorste segghen quaet no goet,
 Van vare walde mi mijn bloet,
 Mijn leden warden mat ende traghe.
 272 Over busch ende over haghe
 Mochtich des lopens niet cessen.
 Metten sach ic mijn conforteren.
 Des lichts beschijn, so over claer.
- penseus* in gedachten verzonken
dat, totdat
lende: linde [de liefdesboom, hier ook grenspaal]
nie nooit
 haar takken stonden wijd uitgespreid
bedect: overschaduwd
over trect bedekt

scade: schaduw
ghedwade zacht gestemd

 niet beducht voor angst, grote droefheid of ontbering
 die mij daarbij overkomen kon[den]
 wat ik echter uit vrije wil [met heel mijn wil] opzocht
melancoleerde mijmerde in een melancholische stemming
 en over dit lichtschijnsel lag te peinzen
so toen [voortzetting van het verhaal]
 iemand die mij een hardvochtig karakter leek te bezitten
messagier, gezant, boodschapper
 zijn uterlijk voorkomen was zo hooghartig
 alsof in zijn macht zou zijn
 al wat de wereld bevatte
contenanche houding, uterlijk

 met een ijzeren, brede en scherpe punt

 om het [mijn] lichaam te verwonden F39Rb
eer: Heer
prisoner gevangenc C242
 ellendeling, wat doe je hier
vast dapper [ironisch: maar zonder het hardop te durven
 zeggen]
vilein verachtelijke schurk
up over
 uw liefdeswaan die u dit doet ondergaan

 wie zal het losgeld betalen voor uw wandaden
vercocht in het verdert gestort
gecnocht geknoopt
aertsoen zadelboog, *ontbant* losmaakte
 hij nam mij op meedogenloze wijze in zijn macht
 en bond mij om het middel vast

m ic ne (negatie)
 van vrees kookte mijn bloed
 mijn ledematen raakten uitgeput en slap
 door struiken en kreupelhout
 ik kon het lopen niet doen ophouden
 op dat moment zag ik mijn troost
 het schijnen van het licht, enorm helder

- 276 Daer bi verlosic anxst ende vaer.
 Mi en deerde niet des lopens pijn.
 So voorder voort so clarer scijn'
 Tote ic cam alter straten uut.
- 280 Daer en hoordic gheen gheloot.
 Maer wonder sach ic ein allein.
 Dies alle wondren waren clein
 Die ic daer voren hadde ghesien.
- 284 Wonder docht mi sijn van wien
 Dat bi naturen was ghewrocht.
- C243
- Dat licht, dat ic dus hadde ghesocht,
 Dat mochtic claerlic daer bescouwen.
- 288 In enen tor, so stont ghehouwen
 Van albaestre, scone ende wit.
 Voor al bescouwen docht mi dit
 Alre hoogst des prisens waert:
- 292 Claerlic wast mi daer verclaert,
 Ghelijc twee zonnen int ghesichte.
 Ne waer de man met sinen scichte,
 Die mi verketste metten sporen.
- 296 In hadde niet gheweinscht daer voren
 Al dat die weerelt heift bevaen.
 Ende ic daer hadde moghen staen
 Den tor bezien sonder begriyp.
- 300 Maer nu dedi mi sulc gheniyp
 Metter corden die mi enochte.
 Wanneer ic daer waert sach of zochte
 Ende ic vergat mijn achter draven.
- 304 Die coorden mi sulcke trecken gaven
 Dat icker niet up mochte letten.
 Ic moeste mi te lopene zetten
 Ende laten mine ghenouchte om tzure;
- 308 Lopende al die wegghen dure.
 Waer hi wilde, ic moeste naer.
 So langhe liepic hier ende daer
 Dat ic verloos des lichts bescouwen.
- 312 Doe begonstic al verflouwen
 Ende verloos al minen moet.
 Mettien so camen wi daer stoet
 Een tor ghemaect van grawen steene
- 316 In een water wijt allene
 Een brugghen liet men neder dalen.
 Doe cam ghelopen uter zalen
 Volc van wonderliker maniere.
- 320 Onziene, lelic ende putiertiere.
 Elc hadde ene ghesele in der vuust.
 Si waren ruut ende onbesuust.
 De langhe brugghen si passeerden.
- 324 Haren heere si salueerden,
 Die mi hadde in sijn bedwanc.
- daer bi verlosic* daardoor verloor ik
des lopens pijn: de pijn veroorzaakt door het lopen
so voorder voort so hoe verder gevorderd des te
al: geheel
- maar ik zag een uniek wonder
 daarbij [vergeleken] waren alle wonderen klein
 die ik daar tevoren had gezien
 wonderbaarlijk scheen het mij toe door wie
 dat [wonder] geheel naar de aard van de natuur was gevormd
- dus* aldus [op de hiervoor beschreven wijze]
- in een toren stond het [wonder] uitgehouwen
albaestre, geaderd marmer
 boven alles wat aanschouwd kan worden leek mij dit
 het prijzen het allermeest waard
clerlic duidelijk; *verclaert*: getoond
 alsof ik twee zonnen waarnam
 indien de man met zijn werpschicht er niet geweest was
verketste voortjoeg
 ik zou daarvoor in de plaats niets gewenst hebben
 van al hetgene de wereld bevat
ende: wanneer .. om
sonder begriyp, zonder lastig gevallen te worden
 maar nu kneep hij mij zo pijnlijk
enochte: gebonden hielden
daer waert derwaarts [de plaats van het licht]
ende: terwijl
- trecken*: rukken F40Va
 dat ik er [op het licht] geen acht op kon slaan
- om tzure*: terwille van de benarde toestand
dure door
ic moeste naer: ik moest hem achterna
- dat ik het licht uit het oog verloor
al verflouwen geheel krachteloos te worden
- daer* op de plaats waar C244
tor toren, *grawen*: gruze
 alleen staand in een groot water
- volk met een afstotelijk uiterlijk
 onooglijk, lelijk en kwaadaardig
ghesele, touw met knopen
 zij waren onbeschaafd en onbehouwen
 zij kwamen de lange brug overlopen
- bedwanc* macht

- Van den paerde dat hi spranc
Ende gaf mi over metter line.
- 328 Doe dochte mi dat mi naecte pine,
Want tlicht dat was mi uten oghen,
Dat ic te zoekene wilde poghen
Ende dat ic hadde begonnen zien.
- 332 Ende moeste daer, in weet met wien.
Met onghenaden sijn int strec
Deen riep: "Sla!" dander: "Stec!"
Dus liepic ten torre binnen..
- 336 In conster niemen ghekinnen.
Want icse noit met oghen aensach.
Si leeden mi sonder verdrach
In eenen pit, die was so diep
- 340 Dat icker node binnen stiep.
Alwast mi leet, het moeste zyn.
Die duere was van ysere fijn,
Die was vor mi ghesloten vast.
- 344 Een splete stont daer so ghepast
Dat men niet wel sach der duere.
So dicke was die tor van muere.
Ende twater was so over wijt
- 348 Hem ne derde niemens nijt.
De castelein leefde als enen rouc.
Doe sach ic staen in enen houc
Een duerkin utermaten clein
- 352 Daer binnen zat ene vrouwe allein.
Recht of soe hadde zitten beiden
Naer yet dat van haer was ghesceiden.
Als soe mi sach so louch haer mont..
- 356 Aestelike soe up stont.
Soe sprac: "Ghi zijt hier welcomen,
Huwe comst sal ons beeden vromen.
Ic weet ons beeden goeden raet."
- 360 "O", seidic, "Vrouwe, mijn toeverlaet
Es mi nu verre ende onghereet.
Hi die van al die waerheit weet
Moet hu verlenen duecht ende vruecht!
- 364 Van ere tideliker ghenuecht
So bem ic comen int allende."
Soe sprac: "Wi sullens hebben ende.
Sijn wi met trouwen twee in een,
- 368 Maer vindic dat ghi u wert; neen,
Nemmermeer sidi verlost
In zate hier niet aldus vermoost,

Adde mi yement ghezijn dus bi.
- 372 Maer alleene ne mach ic mi
Niet hulpen sonder hulpen mee.
Goddanc nu zyn wi hier, wi twee.
Dies bem ic blide ende het es recht."
- naecte* dreigde [naderde]
- m ic ne* (negatie)
op hardvochtige wijze in een benarde toestand zyn
stec: breng een steek toe
dus onder deze omstandigheden
m. ic ne (negatie)
want ik had hen nooit eerder gezien
leeden sonder verdrach brachten zonder uitstel
pit: put
dat ik er met tegenzin binnenstapte
- fijn* zuiver [dus sterk]
was werd
een spleet was op zo bekwame wijze aangebracht
met wel: nauwelijks C245
die tor van muere de muur van de toren
over wijt buitengewoon breed
dat hem de afgunst van niemand deerde
de kasteelheer leefde volstrekt onbekommerd [als een kraai]
- daer binnen*: daar achter
precies alsof ze had zitten wachten
- toen zij mij zag kwam er een lach om haar mond F40Vb
aestelike: haastig
- vromen* baten, voordeel brengen
ik weet wat voor ons beiden redding brengt
toeverlaet: nl. de geliefde
is niet bij de hand om mij hulp te bieden
[God]
- door een kortstondige aangename stemming
allende treunge toestand
zij sprac we zullen er een einde aan maken
op voorwaarde dat wij een waarachtige eenheid vormen
maar bemerk ik dat gij u verzet. nee
dan zult u nooit bevrijd worden
ik zou hier niet op deze wijze in verlegenheid [lett in het
shk] zitten
indien iemand in mijn gezelschap was geweest
mach kan
niet redden zonder bijstand van een ander
- recht*. in alle opzichten juist C246

- 376 Ic seide: "Vrouwe, ic bem u knecht,
Met trouwen nu ende tallen daghen
Maer ic bidde u, wilt mi ghewaghen:
Hoe heet die here, die mi vinc?"
- 380 Es hi grave of coninc?
Waer up eist dat hi hem draghet?"
Soe sprac. "Dats niet quaet ghevraghet,
Want ict hu gheerne segghen wil.
- 384 Hi ende ic, dats een ghescil,
Ende heift gheweest van ouden tiden.
Comen es hi van onser ziden,
Maer zijt des vroet, dat hi es bastaert:
- 388 Van vreemder wijs so es sijn aert.
Orloghe, so es al sijn begheren.
Ende om dat ict wilde beweren,
Ende niet en ghere dan ruste ende pays.
- 392 So vinc hi mi vor sijn palais,
Daer hi noit mochte comen in.
Anders en soucli gheen ghewin
Dan discoort, warringhe ende strijt.
- 396 Ende hier omme hadde hi up mi nijt.
Sijn viant bem ic onverdient,
Ooc en bem ic niet sijn vrient.
Maer doch in hebbe hem niet mesdaen,
- 400 Daer hi mi dus om hout ghevaen,
Van mi en weet hi ander blame.
Twifel es sijn rechte name
Ende Hope so es de name mijn."
- 404 Als ic dat hoorde in mochte niet zijn
Blider daer ic voor haer stoet.
Vruecht so verhief mi den moet
Dat ic niet langher beiden conste.
- 408 Met bliden zinne ic doe begonste
Te zinghene een vroylic liedekijn.

met trouwen waarlijk, voorzeker
ghewaghen vermelden

waarop beroept hij zich rechtens
quaer verkeerd

ghescil onderscheid
stammend uit een ver verleden
hij is van onze afstamming, met ons verwant
[*bastaert* heeft een zeer ongunstige gevoelswaarde]
zijn karakter toont een vreemde geaardheid

beweren: beletten
ghere, wens, *pays*: vrede

een plaats waar hij nooit had mogen komen
hij is op niets anders uit
dan onenigheid, tweedracht en strijd
en daarom was hij op mij verbitterd
onverdient buiten mijn schuld
ooc ook al
m' ic ne (negatie)
daer op grond waarvan
van mij kent hij geen enkele zonde [geestelijke smet]
rechte juiste

m mochte: ik kon niet

moet het gemoed [als zetel van het gevoel]
beiden wachten

C247
F41Ra

notenbalk met melodie

- Twifel dwinct die hertze mijn,
Dats mi anschijn,
- 412 In can hem, leider, niet ontvlien,
Dies blivic nu in zoorghen.
Hope doet mi vroylic zijn
n trouwen fijn,
- 416 Hope doet mi vroylic zijn.
Twifel, etcetera.
Twifel neimt mi in hoede dijn
So vindic pijn,
- 420 Van hu mach mi gheen vruecht ghescien.
Hope sal mi verboorghen.
Twifel, etcetera.

dat is mij aan te zien
leider helaas

fijn: volmaakt

[indien dan]

verboorghen redden, staande houden

V Rau Hope sprac: "Men moeten worghen *moeten*: moet hem

- Die hout ghevanghen sulken man,
 Die also vroylic zinghen can
 Din mach niet langher zijn ghedoocht!
 Nu radic hu dat ghi hu poocht
- 428 Ten zaken, die ic wil bestaen,
 Ghetrouwelic ende niet ontgaen.
 Al hebben wi nu ontgaens beghin,
 Ghecreghe ons Twifel weder in.
- 432 Hi soude ons maken al te zure. C248
 Daer ons toe porrede ye nature.
 Sijn ergheit es sonder ghetal.
 Minen wille es in den uwen al!"
- 436 Dat seidic weder tot vrou Hopen.
 "So wat ghi voort durret nopen.
 Dat es dat ic taengripene ghere."
 Soe sprac so. "Set hu dan ter were.
- 440 Hier en es no duere no slot
 Wine sulre uut commen, wilt God!"
 Met goeden moede ghinghen wi doe,
 Duere ende muere braken wi doe,
- 444 Mi dochte ic hadde Samzoens cracht
 So vele daden wi bin der nacht
 Dat wi met allen camen uut.
 Wi en hoorder nieuwer gheen gheruut.
- 448 Twifel lach in slape vast,
 Met hem menich sassaem gast
 Die onser namen crancken goom
 Dat dede, si laghen in haren droom,
- 452 Dan conste ons lieden niet ghescaden.
 Doe ghinghen wi met liever laden
 So verre voort dat ic *versach*
 Des lichts schijn; der vruetchden scach
- 456 Gaf ic, so dat vrou Hope vraghede
 Of ic yet sach dat mi beiaghede.
 Soe sprac: "Hets beter hier dan daer.
 Twifel hebbe een drouve jaer!"
- 460 "Trouwen, vrou Hope, ic segghe amen.
 Hets recht datic hu eighin ben,
 Want ghi mi tleven hebt ghehouden.
 Van mi so werdet hu vergouden
- 464 Up dat mi God spaert van der doot."
 So sprac: "Hier of en es gheen noot,
 Vele dinx bewiset crancke munne."
- Met deser talen camen wi inne
- 468 Ter straten, daer die lende stoet.
 Doe seidic: "Hovessche vrouwe vroet,
- din mach niet: dit kan niet*
dat ghi hu poocht: dat gij uw best doet
 ten aanzien van de zaken die ik wil ondernemen
ontgaen: bezwijkend
 al staan wij nu aan het begin van de ontsnapping
 [indien]
- waartoe wij van nature steeds geneigd zijn³⁵
 zijn slechtheid is mateloos
- wat gij verder onder handen durft te nemen
 is wat ik (ook) tot uitvoering wens te brengen
 zij sprak aldus: maak u voor de strijd gereed
- of wij zullen er uitkomen, als God het wil
- mi dochte* het scheen mij toe
- met allen* beiden
 wij hoorden nergens enig geluid
- sassaem* ongemanierde
 die ons bijna geen aandacht schonken
dat dede: dat kwam omdat
dan: dat en (negatie)
met liever laden op ons gemak F41Rb
versach: weer in het oog kreeg
des vruetchden scach een schaterlach van vreugde
- beiaghede* iets prettigs dat ik nastreefde
daer: nl. de gevangenis van Twijfel
 [verwensing die niet aan tijd gebonden is]
nouwen voorwaar
hu eighin uw dienstwillige dienaar
ghehouden gered C249
 door mij wordt u ervoor beloond
up dar indien
 zij zei dat hoeft niet [daaraan bestaat geen behoefte]
 veel geschenken zijn een teken van een onstandvastige
 liefde
- toen zei ik welgemanierde wijze vrouw

³⁵ Waarschijnlijk wordt bedoeld dat men tijdens de verliefdheid steeds heen en weer geslingerd wordt tussen hoop en [vertwijfeling brengende] vrees. Een neiging waaraan men probeert te ontsnappen

- Hier onder so was ic ghevaen.
Mach hier niemant onderstaen.
- 472 Hi esser of ghecalengiert?"
Soe sprac: "Die desen boom bestiert,
Dats Twifel, die ons beeden dwanc.
Nochtan ne weets hem niemant danc
- 476 Die int casteel te zine pleghen.
Die boom es pael tusschen tween weghe
In openbaren wederdeele.
Tusschen hem ende den castele.
- 480 Waerscu es de name zijn.
Om vri te gane tswifels pijn,
Want wie in sinen wech gheraect
Lichtelike wert hi mesmaect.
- 484 Hier voren sal elc nemen hoede!
In onsen wech wert niemant moede
- Dien te rechte comen an.
Es hi wijf of es hi man.
- 488 Die buten onsen weghe gaet,
Neme dats hem te hebbene staet.
Voor hem en doe ic gheen bezoorch "
- Doe camen wi gaende vor de boorch
- 492 Daer tlicht up was gheordineert.
Doe wordic al ghecontorteert.
Want ic daer sach dat mi ghenouchde.
Die de machelrie vouchde,
- 496 Dien willic meester hoghe vermare
Voor alle die meesters die ye waren.
Avisieringhe ende mate
Adde verchiert al de zate,
- 500 Dat ic mi selven al verloos
Int zien, ende werd memorilooos,
In wiste wat ic hoorde of zach
Vrou Hope, die mijns altoos plach,
- 504 Die nam mi minlic bi der hant
Ende vraechde wies ic mi bewant.
"Sijt een man of sites niet,
Noch en es hu niet messciet,
- 508 Ghi en muecht ghedoghen heet no cout.
- Wat dochte een man hine ware stout,
Met hem ne willic niet bestaen!"
Met scaemten wordic doe bevaen,
- 512 Ic sprac: "Vrou Hope, ic bem ghezont."
Daer sach ic in den torre ront
Twee veinstren so over scone.
Hi en es levende onder den trone
- 516 Diese te rechte mochte vulprisen.
Uut elcker veinstren sach ic risen
Een claeer bescinen naturael,
- was werd
- op straffe van dat hij ervoor wordt aangeklaagd
- niemand neemt het hem evenwel in dank af
- pael*: grenspaal
zoals bekend juist op de helft
- om de pijniging van Twijfel te ontlopen
- gemakkelijk wordt hij ongelukkig gemaakt
- indien men onze weg op de juiste wijze [rechtstreeks] volgt
zal niemand afgemat het doel bereiken
- [maar.], die wie
dient te aanvaarden wat hem overkomt
voor hem doe ik geen moeite
- waarop het licht was aangebracht
ghecontorteert: bemoedigd
ghenouchde: vreugde bezorgde
wie het metselwerk aanbracht (ordende)
die wil ik buitengewoon als meester roemen
- juist uitgedachte proporties en verhoudingen
hadden de gehele burch zo opgeluisterd
dat ik geheel in de war raakte
memorilooos: buiten me zelf
in ic en (negatie)
vrouw Hope die zich steeds om mij bekommerde
minlic liefdevol
- en vroeg wat ik van plan was
- messciet*, iets kwaads overkomen
gij kunt niet tegen wisselende omstandigheden [hitte noch kou]
wat voor waarde heeft een man als hij niet flink is
bestaen: vertoeven, in gezelschap verkeren
- ghezont* genezen van mijn zwakheid [de melancholie]
torre ront: ronde toren
- niemand leeft op aarde [onder het uitspansel]
die hen op de juiste wijze naar waarde kan roemen
- een helder door de natuur gevormd lichtschijnsel

C250

F41Va

	Dat docht mi scinen als een stael.	<i>als een stael</i> als een voorwerp van staal [dat licht weerkaatst]	
520	Beroerende al de zinnen mijn. Bleec so werdic int anschijn. Een zwaer verzuchten mi ontghinc. Mijn herte van den scine ontfinc.	<i>zinnen</i> : geestelijke en lichamelijke vermogens <i>anschijn</i> gezicht	C251
524	Hitte, die onghetimpert was, Dies ic bin langhen niet ghenas. Mijn oghen waren al bezwerct. Vrou Hope heift dit ghemerct.	<i>onghetimpert</i> ongetemperd, niet gematigd waarvan ik gedurende lange tijd niet genas <i>bezwerct</i> beneveld <i>dit</i> [de zojuist genoemde verschijnselen van de melancholie'] naar beste kunnen verzorgde zij mij toen moest ik tegen haar aanleuendend verademing zoeken <i>ghedoochde</i> toestond <i>versike</i> : toestand vol vrees en beven (vgl. 675 en 1507)	
528	Ghetrouwelijke nam soe mijns ware. Doe moestic rusten tjeghen hare. Dat soe ghedoochde vriendelike. Met dat ic stont in desen versike		
532	Altoos ziende neder waert. Doe cam ghereden up sijn paert Twifel onder den boom Waerscu. Die ons togheden enen lelicken vu.	die ons een lelijke blik toewierp	
536	Stille so hilti ende sprac "Vrou Hope, die mi dus ontbrac Met foortzen ende met finen crachten. Haddic hu bin minen grachten	<i>dus ontbrac</i> op deze wijze ontsnapte met vertoon van kracht en kloekheid van geest	
540	Ghi en ontghinghes nemmermee!" Als icken sach wart mi so wee Van vare, in durste niet voorder gaen. Twifel sprac te mi weder zaen,	toen ik hem zag werd het mij zo droef te moede van angst, dat ik niet verder durfde te gaan <i>zaen</i> , snel <i>lozer talen</i> onbetrouwbare bewoordingen	
544	Grommende met lozer talen: "Keert weder nu binnen der zalen, Hu en sal ghebreken niet." "Dat sceen wel, doe hi van hu sciet!"	u zal het aan niets ontbreken dat bleek wel toen hij u verliet! [ironisch]	
548	Dit was dandwoorde van vrou Hopen, "Keert weder, wi zijn hu ontcropen, Bedi ghi comt een dracht te spade. Wi zijn, Goddanc, uut uwer trade	<i>ontcropen</i> heimelijk ontkomen daarom komt ge een wijle te laat <i>trade</i> : voetspoor, machtsgebied	
552	Ontcomen, ende uut uwer smerte." Twifel barst wel na van perte, So vul nijts wies hem sijn moet. Hi beette neder daer te voet:	<i>smerte</i> : smartelijke gevangenschap <i>perte</i> kwaadheid zo veel nijd vervulde zijn gemoed <i>beette neder</i> steeg af	C252
556	"Elc hoede hem voort van mi; Dat mi dese ontronnen zi, Dat sal een ander zwaerlic ghelden!" Van verren hoorden wine scelden	ieder dient voortaan voor mij op te passen omdat mij deze [twee] ontsnapt zijn <i>zwaerlic ghelden</i> duur betalen <i>wine</i> , wij hem	F41Vb
560	Onder Waerscu, den sconen boom. Nemmeer en namic sijns goom. Ic bezach dat vor mi was. Omtrent dit rikelike palas	nooit zag ik hem weer terug [vgl. echter . 2283 v] voor dit weelderige paleis	
564	En was ghespaert no cost no stont. Die tor daer ic in vant den vont Des lichts der zoeter veinstren twee. Daer tusschen stont wit als een snee	<i>no cost no stont</i> geld noch tijd <i>vont</i> onverwachte verrassing <i>veinstren twee</i> [de twee ogen]	

568 Een wit pilaer, recht van albaestre,
 Diene maecte en was geen aestre.
 Hi was ghewrocht na ghenoucht.
 Daer onder sach ic staen ghevoucht

572 Een palays van maten fijn.
 Elc colomme was een robijn,
 Gloiende root an elcker zide.
 Noch dincke mi dat ic verblide

576 Om dat ic hier of doe ghewach.
 Daer binnen docht mi dat ic zach
 Wachters, die daer daden hoede.

Al waren al de wijste vroede

580 Vergadert van al erderijc,
 Si en ordineerden niet tghelijc,
 So rechtich waren zi tallertijt
 Suver wit dat was haer abijt,

584 Even groot ende even lanc.
 Si en mochten jeghen ghenen stanc,
 Noch tjeghen gheen onreinichede,
 Elkerlijc hilt daer sijn stede.

588 Wie den palayse wilde deren.
 Met crachten plaghen sijt te weren
 Tjeghen hem was niemant machtich,
 Mids dat zi waren so eendrachtich.

592 Wie enich erch hade in den zin
 Dien en lieten si uut noch in.
 Tpalays so hilden si in vreden.

596 Waer tpalays stont up enen pilaer
 Van albaestre, wit ende claer,
 Sonder smette, zuver, reine,
 Daer die juuste mate alleine

600 So meesterlic was toe ghebracht.
 Daer was vergadert ende gheschacht
 Dat niemen tsegghene soude bestaen.
 "Het es aldus of also ghedaen."

604 Hi was wel waert van groten prise.
 Desen pilaer stont bi avise
 Ghewrocht uut eenre boorch so scoon

Na waerden en hadden zi noit loon,

608 Diese so meesterlic ordineerden
 Ende so fijnlic avizeerden,
 Na mate ende ooc na werkens aert.

Dese boorch was wel verwaert

612 Van v joncheren an elcker ziden.
 Die altoos waren even blide
 Doende, gay, rasch ende even quich:
 Als ic dit sach so vraechdich

616 Vrau Hopen, die daer bi mi stoet:
 "Die boorch die men daer so hoet

pilaer [de neus], *albaestre* soort geaderd marmer
 die hem gemaakt had was geen sukkel [*aestre* ekster]
 hij was gemaakt naar [volle] tevredenheid

een gewelfde ruimte [de mond] in de juiste proporties
colomme zuil [de wangen]
gloiende root gloeiend rood [blosjes op de wangen]

doe gewach melding maak

wachters [de tanden, vgl. 611-612, daar andere
wachters]

de wijste vroeden de meest kundige verstandigen
 van de gehele aarde bij elkaar zijn
 zij overlegden niet op gelijke [verstandige] wijze
rechtig voortreffelijk in hun soort C253
abijt kled

stanc kwade of onaangename reuk [bron van ziekte]
onreimichede [zedelijke] verdorvenheid
hilt sijn stede bleef op zijn plaats, week niet

plaghen: waren gewoon
machtig bestand
mids omdat
erch: kwaad

pilaer: [de hals]

waar de nauwkeurige verhouding [vgl. r. 572] geheel en al
 op meesterlijke wijze was aangebracht
 daar was zodanig constructief in elkaar gevoegd
 dat niemand zou kunnen zeggen
 het is zus of zo gedaan

hij verdiende bijzondere lof
bi avise na welberaden overleg
uut eenre boorch: boven een burcht [het lichaam]
 F42Ra

de beloning kon nooit overeenkomstig de verdienste zijn
 [voor hen] *ordnenden* tot stand brachten, bouwden
fijnlic avizenden: volmaakt ontwerpen
 uit het oogpunt van maatgeving en het karakter van het
 werk

deze burcht stond onder uitstekende bewaking
 [2 x 5 vingers aan elke hand] C254
blide, opgewekt
 bedrijvig, levendig, snel en in gelijke mate kwiek

hoet beschermt

Van den joncheren al omtrent,
 Esser inne negheen regent.
 620 Daer zi of houden lant of leen?"
 Vrou Hope, daer noit aersch in sceen.
 "Regent? Entrouwen. jaet", soe sprac,
 "Een boorchgrave onder lac.
 624 Wat hier boven es of beneden
 Dat es in sire mueghenteden.
 Vijf heren sijn in sinen raet,
 Die sijn sijn hoochste toeverlaet:
 628 Heer Nouwe-zien dat esser een,
 ¶ Heer Smakelij, naest desen twee
 So volghet mijn heer Rieke-lucht.
 ¶ Die vierde staet altoos ter vlucht,
 632 ¶ Licht-ghevoel es zine name,
 Ende mijn heer Hoor-na, sonder blame.
 Hier zijn ghenoomt de heren vive
 Die sijn tes buerchgraven live
 636 Altoos wackre, nacht ende dach,
 Jeghen so wat hem deeren mach.
 Sijn lant hout hi van hem selven,
 Niemen en mach hem tzine ontdeven,
 640 Stedich, lustich, niet ontgaende.
 Sinen vroeden raet die houten staende,
 Wetende es hi ende subtijl."
 Met dat zoe dit sprac, so cam een pijl
 644 Ghevloghen, in weet van wien,
 Of wien scoot, of wiene spien,
 Maer emmer was ic daer gheraect.
 Noch dinct mi dat ic bem mesmaect
 648 Int ghedincken der quetsure.
 Die scote vlooch mi therte dure,
 Van twifele was ic doe vervaert.
 Ic begonste dalen achterwaert,
 652 Want ic verloos zin ende cracht
 Vrou Hope die mijns vallen wacht,
 Stac mi een cruut in minen mont,
 In wiste niet wie bi mi stont
 656 Voor ic te mi selven cam.
 Ic sprac: "Mijn liefste vrou lofzam.
 Nu moet ic hu mijn liden claghen.
 Wildi mi niet dat helpen draghen
 660 So en wetic mijns ne gheen beraden."
 Vrou Hope sprac: "Sonder ghenaden
 So en was ic noit, so en werd ic nu.
 Hoe soudic moghen laten hu,
 664 Want sonder mi so en waerdi niet."
 Vrou Hope nam den scaerpen spiet
 Wiselike bi besceede.
 Noit dinc en dede mi so leede,

door de jonkheren aan alle kanten
regent: [allegorisch het regulerende hart]
 waarvan zij land beheren of de leenmannen zijn
 Vrouw Hope in wie geen enkel kwaad scheen te zijn
entrouwen jaet: inderdaad, ja het is zo
 een burchgraaf [het hart] zonder smet

alles heeft hij onder zijn heerschappij
vijf heren [nl de vijf zintuigen]
toeverlaet, steunpilaren

Rieke-lucht hij die goed geuren ruikt
 de vierde is altijd direct beschikbaar

sonder blame onberispelijk
hier hiermee

die beschikbaar zijn voor het lijfsbehoud van de
 burchgraaf

wackre waakzaam

van hem selven: in zijn eigendom
ontdeven ontroven

standvastig, bekwaam, oplettend

schrander is hij en tijnbeschaafd

C255

in weet van wien ik weet niet van wie afkomstig
 of wie hem schoot of wie de boog spande

emmer: in elk geval

mesmaect ernstig toegetakeld
 als ik terugdenk aan het letsel

vlooch dure: doorboorde

door vertwijfeling was ik toen ontsteld

ik viel langzaam achterover

zin geestelijke vermogens

Vrouw Hope, die mijn vallen waarnam

vrou lofzam eerwaardige vrouw

F42Rb

indien u mij niet helpt het [lijden] te verdragen

dan weet ik mij geen raad

ghenaden onverplichte vertroostende raadgevingen

was ik nooit en zal het ook nu niet zijn

laten: in de steek laten

waerdi niet ben je nergens

scaerpen spiet scherp gepunte werpspies

op voorzichtige en verstandige wijze

nooit deed iets mij zo'n pijn

668 Noch Tfwifels vanghen, al wast mi art.

Van pinen wardic bleec ende zwart.
Des tastens mocht ic niet ghewesen.
"Ay lacen, hoe sal ic ghesenen

672 Vrouw Hope, ic duchte nemmermee!"

Soe sprac: "Ghi en muecht no wel no wee.

In quam noit an uwes ghelike
Met uwen ghecite, met uwen verzike,
676 Ghetroot hu coenlic up mijn woort."

Doe sach ic weder ende voort
Up des boorchs behagelhede.
Ende up die pretieuse stede.

680 Daer ic aensach de scone veinstren.

Dat licht begonste up mi gleinstren
Ende nam mi tpeinsen van der wonden.
Ende help mi weder ter ghezonden.

684 Ic sprac: "Nu bem ic bet daer an."

Soe sprac: "So sijt in vruechden dan
Hout hu an mi, ghene hebt gheen noot "
Daer sach ic dat mi niet en verdroot.

688 Die gracieuse borch vorsproken,

Die was so meesterlic beloken,
Men mochter niet an correnghieren.
Ende recht beneden ant flackieren.

692 Daer sach ic die vergaderinghe

Van twee pilaren sonderlinghe,
Even groot, so docht mi elc
Men conste niet gheweten welc

696 Meest of minst was van hem twee.

Maer alsoot te ziene sceen
So hadden si even vele bevaen.
Een muer was hier omtrent ghestaen

700 Van dornen, netelen ende bramen.

Die poorte daer wi voren camen
Die was wel vast ghesloten doe.
Vrouw Hope die ghinc cloppen doe.

704 Soe dochte mi daer wel bekent.

Kila was na daer ghesent
Van sinen meester Orghelieus.
Met zoeten woorden gracieus

708 Andwoorde hem Hope: "Laet in! Laet in!"

Kila die scoof een veinsterkin.
"Wie wil daer in? En es gheen dach".
Vraghedi: als hi Hopen zach,

712 Hi seide: "En laet hu niet verlanghen,

Ic sal tot Orgelieusen ganghen,
Minen meester, ende bezien
Mocht ic enich zins bespien

716 Dat ic van hem creghe de slotelen,

ook de gevangenneming door Twijfel niet, al viel me dat
hard

bleec ende zwart vaalbleek, grau
het vastpakken [van de schicht] kon ik niet verdragen
avlagen: helaas

duchte vrees C256
zij sprak je kunt niet tegen iets goeds [het licht] of
pijnlijks

ik zag nooit iemand aan u gelijk
verzike: gezucht
coenlic: moedig
weder ende voort: opnieuw
behaagelhede sierlijkheid, pracht
pretieuse kostbare
veinstren [de ogen]

nam, ontnam

ic bem bet daer an ik ben er beter aan toe

[indien]

niet en verdroot: heel vreugdevol stemde

beloken: omsloten

correnghieren, verbeteren

ant flackieren aan de zijden van de burcht

die vergaderinghe het samenkomen
van twee afzonderlijk staande pilaren [de benen]

meest of minst de grootste of de kleinste

even vele bevaen een even grote omvang

[allegorische bescherming]

doe toen

C257

Kila: Qui (est) là?; *ghesent*: gezonden

Orghelieus, de Hooghartige

F42Va

andwoorde sprak toe

scoof: opende

['t] *en is geen dach* het is [toch] niet over dag

laet hu niet verlanghen: word niet ongeduldig

bezien overleggen

mocht ik ervoor kunnen zorgen

Ic soudze bringhen zonder rotelen.
 Ende om hu, Hope, de poorte ontsluten.
 Nu zijt so hemelic daer buten
 720 Dat niemen weet; adieu, ic ga."
 Vrou Hope sprac: "Adieu Kila,
 Hu duecht es mi altoos ghereet."
 Van pinen brac mi ute tzweet
 724 Van onbeseffelike anxst.
 Om te sprekene beidic lancst,
 Want soe began die tale voren:
 "Hier an muechdi horen
 728 Dat ic bekent bem hier omtrent.
 Die bode die ic hebbe ghesent
 Om de sloten van der poorte,
 Die es comen van onser soorten
 732 Sijn rechte orname es Vraghen.
 Ghewoont so heift hi hier al sijn daghen
 Ende heift mi utermaten lief.
 Voor mesval, vor erch, vor grief
 736 So es hi hier gheset ter wachte.
 Sijn meester es groot van machte,
 Orghelieus es hi ghenaeamt.
 Hem dinct dat niemen betaemt
 740 Te comen teser poorten in,
 So overmoedich es sijn zin.
 Van zijre zibben bem ic comen.
 Maer wat mi baten mocht of vromen,
 744 Duer mi en dadi, noch dor niemen."
 Mettien hoordic die slotel riemen,

 Ende twincket sach ic hopen gaen.
 Frau Hope die was daer wel ontfaen
 748 Ende ic van Kilaen, Hopen vriend.
 Ic sprac tot hem: "Dats onverdiemt,
 Dese duecht, die lone hu God!"
 Stillekine ontsloot hi tslot
 752 Ende drouchse zaen daer hise vant,
 Ende nam ons beeden bi der hant.
 Over brughe ende over al
 Ghinghen wi sonder ghescal.
 756 Ende recht an des palaeis beghin
 Stont ene duere, daer ghinghen wi in.
 Kila loocse weder an.
 Een wijf hadde hi, die vele can,
 760 Haer name was Verzien.
 Soe cam gaende tot ons drien
 Ende hiet mi wesen wellecome,
 Ende Hope, die ic voren nome.
 764 Soe sach mi zwaerlike ghequetst
 Ende van den scichte sijn gheletst.
 Mettien soene liselike uut trac.

rotelen rammelen [dus stil, ieder slaapt?]
om ter wille van
hemelic heimelijk, onopgemerkt

uw welwillendheid staat mij steeds ten dienste

onbeseffelike onbegrijpelijke, geweldig grote
beidic wachtte ik
 want Vrouw Hope begon als eerste te praten

behoort tot onze kring, ons geslacht
orname geslachtsnaam

C258

ter bescherming tegen ongeluk, boosheid, onheil

betaemt het recht toekomt

overmoedich hoogmoedig

zibben geslacht

vromen van dienst zijn

duer dadi ter wille van mij onderneemt hij niets

die slotel riemen: de sleutelriem [met rammelende sleutels]

Twincket klein deurtje in de hoofddeur

van door, *Hopen vriend*, de vriend van Hope
onverdiemt: zonder dat we het verdiend hebben
duecht: deugdzaame daad

tslot [waarschijnlijk een hangslot]

en bracht haar direct weer op dezelfde wijze aan

sonder ghescal: zonder geluid te maken

loocse weer an sloot ze weer

F42Vb

Verzien de vooruitziende, zij die voor alles zorg draagt

C259

zwaerlike: in hevige mate

soene zij hem, *liselike* voorzichtig

- Een wieke soe daer binnen stac,
 768 Gaende tot int herte mijn.
 Die was ghemaect van crude fijn.
 Van helene ende van zwighene mede.
 Uut harer goeder duechdelichede
- 772 Sat zoe minlic neven mi,
 Soe sprac: "Mijn vrient, hoe staet met di?"
 Ic seide: "Bet dant dede lanc eer."
 In minen oghen omme keer
- 776 Sach ic een splete daer men keec
 Ter zalen in, ende ic verzeec.
 Ende ic vraechde Kilaen ende Verziene,
 Als die hem duchte van messiene.
- 780 Of ic daer duere kiken mochte,
 Ende icker niemen mede verwrochte.
 Si andwoorden: "Ja, in trouwen,
 Wien ghi ziet en mach hu niet scouwen."
- 784 Deerste die ic sach ter duere
 Dat was een die scoonste creatuere
 Die leift in alder werelt breit
 Elc die noomde Hovesscheit.
- 788 Van finen goude was haer cleit,
 Haer te pointe wel gheleit.
 Haer anschijn was eens inghels baer.
 Twee vrouwen wandelden bi haer.
- 792 Die een die hiet men Sempelhede,
 Die andre Omoedichede.
 Tsamen ghinghen zi alle drie
 Ende boghen up haer lieder knie
- 796 Voor eene scone creature,
 Suver wit was haer parure,
 Al bezait met rozen root,
 Sonder voren an haren scoot.
- 800 Wat daer an stont willic hu nomen,
 Een maniere van goudblomen.
 Haer anschijn clarer dan cristael.
 Een crone hilt zoe, dat meerctic wael.
- 804 Vor haer anschijn, die zoe besach
 So minnentlic, als zoe plach
 Recht offer haer ghenouchte ansonde,
 Voor al dat men haren gheven conde.
- 808 In enen goudin stoel soe zat,
 Haer name men daer niet vergat.
 Elc die hietse Zuverheit,
 Ende weinscheden haer ghezondicheit
- 812 Ende seiden: "Hu welvaren es ons lief."
 Doe brochten zi enen brief,
 Beede ghenoot ende ooc ghescreven
 Een nieuwe liet dat zi up heven,
- 816 Met vreuden elc te zinghene gherde,
 Maer Sempelheide diet beweerde.

wieke bloedstelpende tampon

[genaamd.] *helene* geheimhouding
duechdelichede voortreffelijke vriendelijkheid
minlic hefdevol, vriendelijk

lanc eer enige tijd geleden
 terwijl ik mijn ogen rond deed gaan
 zag ik een spleet waardoor men kon kijken
ic verzeec ik gaf een diepe zucht

als iemand die vreesde een misstap te begaan

ende indien, *verwrochte*: mishaaigde
in trouwen waarlijk
mach . *scouwen*: kan u niet zien

die in de grote wijde wereld leeft

finen, zuiver
 voor haar op uitstekende wijze vervaardigd
 haar voorkomen was als dat van een engel
 twee vrouwen liepen bij haar rond
 de een noemde men S. [eenvoudige rechtschapenheid]

C260

haer lieder knie hun knieën

parure tooi [sierlijke, fraaie kleding]
 geheel bezet met rode rozen [symbolen van de liefde]
sonder uitgezonderd
 wat zich op deze plaats bevond zal ik u vertellen
 een soort goudbloemen [symbool van de trouw]
aenschijn: gelaat

met haar gebruikelijke minzaamheid op zodanige wijze
recht: alsof
voor boven alles

liet noemde

F51Ra^o

welvaren, geluk
brief: kort epistel op vel perkament
 zowel van tekst als van muzieknoten voorzien
up heven aanheven
gherde wenste
beweerde belette het

Soe sprac: "Hier niet ghesonghen zi.
Joncheer Lust en werter bi.
820 Want *zijn* acoort vulbringhet al."
Doe cesseirde dus tsanx ghescal.
Si ghinghen vor een duere staen
Cloppen, so dat quam ghegaen

824 Die edel jonchere Lust.
Hovesscheit hadden zaen ghecust
Ende leeden *gailic* bi der hant
Daer soe Suverheden vant.

828 Dien zoe bi haer zitten dede
Sijn anschijn ende sijn lachen bede
Dat was so *gracelic* te ziene.
M. jaer ende .x. waerf tiene

832 Haddict ghezien sonder verdriet.
Doe zonghen *zi* een nieuwe liet
Daer ic toe gaf herte ende zinne.

notenbalk met melodie

Gheen dinc gheprijsd vor reine minne,
Want si bewijst den vrouwen vrucht.
Elc edel zin in haer verhuecht.
Coninghinne, keyserhinne,
Met eeren ghi wel minnen muecht

weter bi: behoort erbij te zijn
want zijn meezingen laat het geheel tot zijn recht komen
toen staakte dus het geluid van de zang

C261

kuste hem direct
gailic in een opgewekte stemming

die hem eveneens bij haar (hen) liet zitten
anschijn uiterlijk voorkomen [ook gelaat]
gracelic aangenaam, innemend
oneindig lang

had ik het zonder tegenzin kunnen aanschouwen

waar ik met hart en ziel naar luisterde

840 **G**heen dinc gheprijsd vor reine minne. *etcetera*

Minne es zoet in den beghinne.
Int ende en es geen onghenuecht.
Hier of so es orconde Juecht

want zij brengt de droefgeestigen vreugde
zin gemoed

onghenuecht weerzin, verdriet
orconde: getuige

844 **G**heen dinc gheprijsd vor reine minne. *etcetera*

Daer es soete voetsel inne,

soete voetsel spijs voor levensgeluk

C262

Om dat haer minne wel ghenuecht.
Dit liedekijn dat maecte Juecht.

848 **G**heen dinc gheprijsd vor reine minne. *etcetera*

Suverheit sprac. ende niemen el:
"Seker, dats ghesonghen wel.
Maer niet en weetic wel *thediet*

F51Rb

852 Maecte joncfrau Juecht dit liet?"

"En trauwen jaes". seide zi.

"Doese comen tote mi

Dat soe mi segghe hier of den *zin* "

thediet de betekenis, strekking

inderdaad. ja, dat is zo, antwoordde zij [Hovesscheit']

856 Mettien cam Juecht ter zalen in.

- Die sere was ghewellecoomt.
 Meestricghe was soe ghenoomt
 Voor hem allen. diere waren
 meesteres werd zij genoemd
 voor door
- 860 Suverheit sprac: "Wilt mi verclaren
 Den zin van desen nieuwen liede.
 Ende wat ghi meent in den bediede.
 Dat soudic gherne weten al"
 in den bediede met de strekking van het lied
- 864 Juechet sprac: "God weet in sal,
 In weeter of no groot no cleen."
 Hoofscheit sprac. "In trauwen neen!
 Haddi in minnen bet beseven
 indien je in minnezaken meer ervaring had
 dit ende dat: het een en ander [de tekst van dit lied]
 waarin gij op deze wijze de minne roemt
 onghevijsst: impulsief
 mach kan
 achter voren: overal, hier en daar
 ik vroeg nooit om andere (nadere) uitleg: C263
 van .. sciet nam van daar [die plaats] afscheid
 spelen. al schertsend
- 868 Ghi en hadt niet dit ende dat ghescreven.
 Daer ghi dus in de minne prijst."
 Juecht antwoorde onghevijsst:
 "Wat wetic anders dan ic mach horen
- 872 Hier, daer segghen, achter voren?
 In vraechde noit om el bediet."
 Joncfrau Juecht van danen sciet
 Ende liep spelen in de zale.
- 876 Van haer en hadde men meer tale,
 So wilt was soe in haer ghelaet
 Met dat zi zaten in den raet
 So quam daer gaende de waerdeine
 wilt weerspannig
 in den raet in het gezamenlijk overleg
 waerdeine hoedster [wsch een titel]
- 880 Van al der boorch; al was soe cleine,
 Soe was so wijs, so hoghe van moede.
 Haer name die was vrou Hode.
 Van zeden was soe gherangiert
 hoghe van moede edel van gemoed (ook trots)
 Hode. Hoede
 gherangiert: uitstekend
- 884 Recht als een mijn heer Al-bestiert,
 Nochtan en waer si in der tijt
 Van haer comste niet verblijt.
 Ofgriselic hadzoe di...
 juist zoals hoort bij iemand die alles bestuurt
 nochtans was zij op het moment
 ofgriselic afschuw wekkend
 direct daarop ging het gezelschap uiteen
 minnentlyc: in goede, vredige verstandhouding
- 888 Mettien so sciet de compaengie
 Die daer so minnentlyc was gheseten.
 Elc die hadde gheern gheweten
 Wat dat liet bedieden mochte.
 bedieden: betekenen
 maar Jeugd leek mij toen
 zo weerspannig, uitgelaten en zo parmantig
 ghehets haer gedroeg zich [?]
 ombestiert: wsch uitgelaten, uit de band gesprongen
 [m b t Juecht]
 mettien op hetzelfde ogenblik
 van rade vroet: wijs in zijn raadgevingen
- 892 Maer Juecht doe mi also dochte
 So wilt, so lustich ende so clouc
 Soe gheliets haer als. . ouc.
 Ombestiert so... zie
- 896 Mettien so cam Melancolie,
 Een here scoen, van rade vroet.
 Up sijn hoofd so stoet een hoet.
 Graeu ende groen was sijn abijt,
 grijs en groen was zijn kleed
- 900 Sijn mantel was lanc ende wijt.
 Sijn anschijn merkel ende wijs.
 Suverheit, die vrouwe jolijs,
 merkel: opmerkzaam
 jolijs galant
 Die sat in haer majesteit.
 majesteit: hoogheid van haar gezag, op haar troon C264
- 904 Hi seide: "God groetu. Zuverheit,
 Hoet met hu staet, com ic bezien."
 Hi knielde neder op sine knien.

Vriendelic deit soene up staen,
 908 Soe sprac: "Here, ic bem ghevaen
 In een ghepeins dat mi te stoort.
 Joncfrau Juecht die heift ghehoort
 An onse lieden van hier binnen,
 912 Van enen prise, van ere minnen,
 Ende heifter of een nieuwe liet ghemaect.
 Woort, wise, redene wel gheraect,
 Maer wine connent niet ghegronden "

916 Melancolie nam tien stonden
 Den brief, die hi al over las,
 Maer den zin die daer in was,
 Verstont hi lichte mee dan zoe.

920 Al peinsende sprac hi doe:
 "Mijn drie broeders sal icken toghen
 Ende segghen dat zi hem poghen
 Na rechte dit te exponeerne."

924 "Ic biddu hier up tavizeerne",
 Sprac Zuverheit. "Up alle trouwe".
 Hi beloofdet der joncfrouwe
 Ende ghinc up eenen wendelsteen.

928 Daer vrou Hoede upsat ende green,
 Ende vraechde hem waer hi henen woude.
 Hi hiet haer dat zoe zwighen soude.
 Soe mide zijns, ende lieten liden.

932 In een camer daer beziden
 So vant hi sijn broeders al
 Van spele was daer groot ghescal,
 Als sine saghen wast al ghedaen.

936 Vriendelike so was hi ontfaen
 Van drien heren achemant.
 Deen was Sangwijn vaeliant.
 Sijn abijt was hemel blaue

940 Met eenre mouwen die was graeu,
 Ghewrocht van peerlen ende van goude.
 Thaer dat wies up die moude,
 Dat docht mi witter dan een vlas.

944 Sijn oghen clarer dan een glas,
 Sijn anschijn bluesende ende ront,
 Te lachene so stont zijn mont
 "Broeder", seidi, "Wildi yet,

948 Hets recht dat ghi an mi ghebiet."
 Dander broeder hiet Fleumaet,
 Simpel, swaer was sijn ghelaet,
 Bleec so was sijn oghe up slaen.

952 Evelachtich ende onghedaen.
 Wit ende graeu so haddi an.
 Het moeste wesen een wijs man
 Diese stelde ende tzamen brochte.

956 Want noit saventier sulc weerc wrochte.

soene: zij hem
ghevaen in bevangen door
te in hoge mate

an: van
 van een te prijzen zaak als de minne is
ei of: er over
 woordkeuze, melodie, de wijze van zegging goed gekozen
ghegronden doorgronden
tien stonden op dat ogenblik
 het geschrift dat hij geheel overlas

begreep hij evenmin als zij [Suverheit]

icken toghen: ik hem [de "brief"] tonen

deze op de juiste wijze te verklaren
tavizeerne, bedacht te zijn, aandacht te schenken
up alle trouwe op uw erewoord

wendelsteen stenen wenteltrap [in de toren]
up sat ende green: op zat te pruilen

hiet beval
 zij ontweek hem en liet hem passeren

door het vertier was daar een groot rumoer
sine zij hem
was werd
achemant: fraai gekleed
 de eerste was de edele Sangwijn [de sanguinicus]
abijt kleed [habijt]
graeu grijs

wies groeide, *moude* schedel
witter dan een vlas witter dan vlas
 zijn ogen helderder dan glas
bluesende: blozend
 zijn mond lachte graag

het is juist als u mij iets opdraagt
Fleumaet [de flegmaticus]
swaer: droefgeestig; *simpel*: ingetogen
 mat was de blik van zijn ogen
 naargeestig en ziekelijk

die hen [de kleding] vervaardigde en [deze kleuren] bij
 elkaar zocht
 want nooit maakte een beunhaas zulk werk

C265

F51Vb

Die derde broeder hiet Collorijn
 Die docht mi heest van bloede zyn
 Sijn abijt was graeu ende root.
 960 Sijn haer was scoon, sijn leden groot.
 Sijn anschijn manlic int bescau.
 Stout so was hi, nieuwer flau.
 Sinen broeder hi wellecoomde.
 964 Noch wasser menich onghenoomde:
 Een edel vrouwe³⁶, scoon van maniere,
 Hare ghewaden waren diere.
 Redene ende Ghedoochsamichede.
 968 Dese twee die waren mede.
 Daer was in Ontfaermicheit,
 Scoon-ghelaet, Besceedicheit.
 Een edel vrouwe Goedertier.
 972 Haers heren name was Dangier.
 Die zelden hadden pays te zamen.
 Soe en doen si alle diet *ghe...* namen.
 Maer dat en licht niet in onsen wech
 976 Jalouzie ende heer Ontzegh,
 Biziende als die qualic zach.
 Thooft so lusti alden dach
 Also noch sceluwe lieden pleghen.
 980 Overmoet die stont hem tjeghen.
 Roukeloos die stont daer naer.
 Al verclontert was sijn haer,
 Sijn caproen was al verdrayt.
 984 Sijn cousen dochten mi ontnayt,
 Sinen kerel was al beslcht.
 Als die sijns selves niet en mict.
 Vrou Cuusscheit was daer in den rinc.
 988 Een pluumkin niet an haer en hinc,
 So suverlijc was haer abijt.
 Daer na stont Lust ende Jolijt
 Overmoet ende vrou Envie
 992 Dat docht mi wesen een partie.
 Envie docht mi vroilic zelden.
 Haer anschijn stont recht omme scelden.
 Bleec, verrompelt, ende al verqueelt.
 996 Dese hadden daer al ghespeelt
 Met vruechden ende met melodien
 Si groeten heer Melancolien
 Ende stelden hem in sijn ghebod.
 1000 Hi sprac "Dat moet hu lonen God!
 Siet broeder, heer Sangwijn.
 Ende ghi, heer broeder Collorijn,
 Ende mijn broeder, heer Flumaet.

Collorijn [de cholericus, gecompareerd aan het vuur]
 die mij het meest hartstochtelijk toescheen

zijn gelaat mannelijk om te zien
 dapper was hij, in geen enkel opzicht laf

C266

noch bovendien
scoon van maniere welgemanierd
diere: kostbaar
Ghedoochsamichede [de lijdzame, lankmoedige]

Besceedichen [de redelijk oordelende]
Goedertier [de welwillende, een goede aard bezittende]
 de naam van haar man was Dangier [de hoogmoedige]
pays: vrede

zo doen zij allen die het elkaar onaangenaam maken [']
dat [hierover te spreken]

Ontzegh [hij die de vrede opzegt, zie r 2140 v]
 met half dichtgeknepen ogen als bij iemand die slecht ziet
 het hoofd schudt hij de gehele dag
sceluwe schele

Overmoet [de hoogmoedige] die stond tegenover hem
 R [de zorgeloze] stond daarnaast [in de rij]
verclontert samengeklit

zijn muts stond verdraaid op zijn hoofd
 zijn beenbedekking (broek) leek mij losse naden te
 bezitten

zijn lange overkleed was helemaal met modder bespat
 als van iemand die voor zichzelf geen zorg draagt
 Kuisheid [uiterlijke netheid] was daar in het gezelschap

Envie [zij die op twist en afgunst belust is]
een partie een schoon paar [ironisch]

C267

bleek, verrimpeld en uitgeteerd
ghespeelt: zich vermaakt
melodien: genoegen

en stelden zich te zijnen dienste

52Ra

³⁶ De enige figuur die wel genoemd, maar niet gepersonifieerd wordt

- 1004 Ende ghi alle die hier staet,
Hier es ghemaect een nieu liet,
Daer niemen of weet tbediet,
Ende ic souds gheerne wesen vroet!"
- 1008 Rouckeloos sprac metter spoet:
"Wat roucke mi van uwen zanghe,
Ic souder up studeren langhe
Eer icker of te vroeder ware.
- 1012 Vraghet enen vedelhare!"
Doe nooptene mijn here Jolijt
Ende seide. "Swijcht ter quader tijt.
Wi sullent horen eist jou lief."
- 1016 Sangwin nam den brief
Ende ghincne lesen over luut,
Hoe dat minne, tedel cruut,
Was gheprijsd met nieuwen zanghe.
- 1020 Hierup sweghen si alle langhe.
Mettien so sprac Melancolie.
"Wat seghdi hier of alle drie,
Wats minne, die men dus prijsd?
- 1024 Mach enich dinc zijn verjolijst
Voor ons gheselschap van hier binnen,
Wat es tbediet van deser minnen?
Het scijnt, wi moeten gaen ter scole!
- 1028 Juecht die heift ons ghemaect in dole
Met haren wonderleken bedrivene,
Soe weet wel dustanich dinc te scrivene,
Maer niet en can zoet compareren
- 1032 Ende wil men jeghen haer arguweren,
Soe es so wilt, soe en slaets gheen gade".
Mettien so ghinghen si te rade,
Melancolie ende Colorijn,
- 1036 Flumaet ende mijn heer Sangwijn.
Maer wat si seiden ofte spraken,
Si en consten niet ten zinne gheraken
Vander materien die si lasen.
- 1040 Elc dochte daer deen den andren razen.
Int ende droughen si over een
Dat si zouden alghemeen
Studeren, peinsen, nacht ende dach,
- 1044 Bezien, wiet eerst ghevinden mach.
Up dit woort si alle scieden
Ende dat elc pijnde om een bedieden,
Melancolie soude elcken gheven
- 1048 Coppie van datter was ghescreven
Doe so screef daer elc copie
Ende mijnheer Melancolie
- waarvan niemand de zin doorgrondt
maar ik zou daarvan graag de strekking weten
- wat bekommer ik me om uw gezang
- voor ik er wijs uit kon worden
vedelhare: vioolspeler
nooptene. nam hem onder handen [stootte hem aan]
ter quader tijt eindelijk [MNW voor de duivel]
eist jou lief of je wil of niet
brief tekst op vel perkament
en ging hem met luide stem lezen
tedel cruut: het tovermiddel met bijzondere werking [fig]
gheprijsd: geprezen
- zijn verjolijst*: aangenamer gemaakt worden³⁷
- wat is de betekenis van [deze tekst over] de liedde
- Jeugd heeft ons in de war gebracht
- dustanich* nl. wonderlijk
maar zij kan het niet verduidelijken
arguweren: redetwisten
zij is zo bandeloos, ze slaat er geen acht op
- zij konden de bedoeling niet vatten
materien de in het lied behandelde stof
elk dacht dat de ander raaskalde
ten slotte kwamen zij overeen
algemeen gemeenschappelijk
- wiet wie het [de verklaring]
met deze woorden gingen ze allen uit elkaar
opdat ieder zich kon inspannen de zin te achterhalen
- coppie* eensluidend afschrift

C268

³⁷

Het MNW VIII 1879 ad 2 geeft de betekenis is onduidelijk. Mogelijk kan er wel iets aangenamer gemaakt worden voor ons gezelschap: d w z hebben wij om ons nog aangenamer te stemmen de minne wel nodig?

	Cam neder al den wentelsteen.		
1052	Suverheit die zat alleen Ende verbeide na andwoorde Als soe den here comen hoorde, Vriendelike soe haer omme keerde.	en wachtte op antwoord	C269 FR52b
1056	Den here soe minlic salueerde. Hi knielde neder in omoede, Hi sprac: "God groetu, vrouwe goede, Uwe boodscap es ghedaen,	<i>soe</i> zij <i>minlic salueerde</i> groette minzaam <i>omoede</i> onderworpenheid <i>boodscap</i> : vererende opdracht <i>verstaen</i> vernomen	
1060	Maer ghene andwoorde hebbic <i>verstaen</i> . Ende wi en sijn ooc niet so vroet Dat yemen daer den zin verstoet. Wi sullen weten hoe dat gaet.	<i>verstaen</i> vernomen wij zullen de betekenis achterhalen maar laat het u nochtans niet te lang vallen [verdrieten]	
1064	Maer doch hu niet verlanghen laet, Eer enich van den drien rust." Soe sprac: "Nu segghet jonchere Lust, Dat hem niet laet verlanghen."	<i>drien</i> : [de drie broers] zodat het hem niet gaat vervelen	
1068	Hi sprac: "Ic salre gheerne ganghen Ende segghen hem den rechten zin." Doe ghinc hi daer, men lieten in Sonder clappen of robbat.	<i>rechten zin</i> : juiste bedoelingen <i>lieten in</i> liet hem in [het vertek waar Lust zich bevond] zonder gepraat of kabaal	
1072	Vrou Hoede, die up den steegher zat Ende desen toer al heift ghemerct, Vervroet, verwijst noch ooc <i>verclerct</i> , Sone mocht soe sijn van scalckernien.	<i>steegher</i> wenteltrap [vgl r 928] <i>toer</i> vreemde gang van zaken doorn wijsheid, slimheid, noch geleerdheid kon zij verschalkt worden bij bedrieglijke praktijken	
1076	Stappans ghinc soe tot Envien Ende vraechde haer stille watter briede. "Het was van enen nieuwen liede Van minnen, ende van plonderinghen."	<i>stappans</i> : op staande voet, direct <i>briede</i> op het vuur stond [fig : gaande was] <i>plonderinghen</i> allerlei andere zaken [lett. klein huisraad]	
1080	Hoede sprac: "Gaet men hier zinghen? Wanen comt ons die ghenuecht?" Envie seide: "Joncfrou Juecht Die altoos om beroerte poocht."	<i>wanen</i> : van wie die er altijd op uit is onrust te zaaien	C270
1084	"Doet?" "Jaes!" "Dan sal niet langher sijn ghedoocht! Is dat zo? Ja! Dat zal niet langer worden Wildi volghen mijn beraden, Wi sullen gaen met liever laden Ende draghen met ons tselve liet,	toegestaan <i>beraden</i> : advies <i>met liever laden</i> op ons gemak [hier onopvallend, stekem]	
1088	Ende ondersoucken al tbediet Daer boven in die hoghe zale, Ende vertrecken dese tale Des buergchraven camerlinghen.	en melding maken van [de inhoud van] het geschrift aan de kamerheren van de burchtgraaf	
1092	Si sullent vor minen here bringhen. Als hijt weet, het wert verboden, Of hi salre yemen doden!" Mettien sach icse te gader gaen	of hij zal iemand doden <i>te gader</i> : samen	
1096	Met grammen moede bevaen, Verstoort ende wel ghestelt Om te makene een ghescelt, Ende dies en coren si gheen ghewin.	kwaadaardig gestemd buiten zich zelve en geneigd onenigheid te maken maar daarmee konden ze geen voordeel kiezen [behalen]	

1100	Dus camen si ter cameren in. Als si den burcgrave saghen. Sonder yet daer of ghewaghen. Knielden z1 neder up die eerde	zonder [direct] hun boodschap te vertellen	
1104	Ende groetene met groter werde. Hi niech hem metten hoofde neder. Teenre camer ghinghen si weder. Daer vonden si staen in een beringhen	<i>met groter werde</i> : eerbiedig hij knikte met het hoofd [als wedergroet] <i>in een beringhen</i> : in een kring [vgl. r. 987]	F52Va
1108	Alle vive die camerlinghen. Ende in de middel der paertye So stont mijn heer Melancolie, Ende hadt hem lieden al gheseyt.	<i>paertve</i> : gezelschap en had de omstanders alles verteld	
1112	Doe wast verloren aerbeit, Verzuumt so hadden si haer canze. Die hadde ghezien haer contenance Hi en hadt vergheten nemmermee:	<i>aerbeit</i> : moeite [voor Hoede en Envie] <i>contenance</i> : uiterlijk <i>hadt</i> : had het	C271
1116	Lelic zagen dese twee Om dat zy en mochten doe ghedreven Discoort, warringhe ende kiven. Si peinsden noch om een verbeiden.	omdat zij niet konden teweeg brengen tweedracht, twist en strijd <i>verbeiden</i> : uitstel [een tweede kans biedend]	
1120	Van daer en consten si niet sceiden, Mids dat men haer gheware wart. Envie die daer voren voren tart Ende groete tgheselcap al.	<i>mids</i> : omdat <i>voren tart</i> : trad naar voren	
1124	Stille, sonder luut ghescal, So stonden tzamen dese zesse Bezich metter minnen lesse Die hem Melancolie brochte.	zich bezig houdend met het onderricht over de minne [vervat in de kopie die . .]	
1128	Vrou Hoede peinsde in haer ghedochte: "Al doe ic dese vaert om niet, Ghevallet so dat mi ghesciet Stede ende stont, ic salt so brauwen	al levert deze handelwijze [nu] niets op [maar] zijn de omstandigheden zo dat mij ten deel vallen [de juiste] plaats en tijd, ik zal het zo inrichten dat het iemand zal berouwen	
1132	Datter yemen om sal wrauwen! Maer ic sal noch beiden ende zwighen." Uter cameren ghinghen si nighen Der zalen in daer soe uut cam	maar [nu, eerst] zal ik nog afwachten en zwijgen <i>nighen</i> : buigend	
1136	Daer soe den burchgrave vernam, ... eindeliken in sinen staet. Haer moet was so vul ende so quaet, Dat soe niet langher zwighen conde.	<i>vernam</i> : gewaar werd <i>Staet</i> : de omstandigheden passend bij zijn rang haar gemoed was zo overvol en verontwaardigd	
1140	Popelende bin den monde, Daer zoe den buerchgrave leet: "Wisti", seide soe, "Dat ic weet, Het souder anders binnen gaen."	binnensmonds mompelende waarmee ze de burchtheer onaangenaam stemde <i>dat</i> : hetgeen	
1144	Niet wel consti haer verstaen. Hi vraechde waer of dat zoe sprac. Haer caproen dat soe of stac, Sere was soe te <i>baudiceirt</i> ,	de zaken zouden binnen anders verlopen	C272
1148	Want hi wilde verclareert Hebben dat Hoede seide haer te voren So stille, hi en mocht verstaen no horen	zij nam haar hoofddeksel af <i>te baudiceirt</i> : zonder vermetelheid [beschroomd] <i>verclareert</i> : duidelijk gemaakt <i>seide haer te voren</i> : voor zichzelf zei <i>mocht</i> : kon [zo rachtjes dat . .]	

- Langhe peinsde soe ende zweech
1152 Ende soe stupede ende soe neech.
Ende emmer so wijsde haer den moet.
Eist dat hijt mi segghen doet,
So worden si mi alle tjeghen,
1156 Die nu vrient te zine pleghen,
Ende lieghic ent een ander zeit,
Dat ware mi grote lelicheit.
Al de sculden mens mi gave.
1160 Noch so sprac die buerchgrave:
"Twī en doedi mi berecht,
Daer ic hu omme vraghe' seght!
Mi dincke dat ghi hu beghint veinsen!"
1164 Niet langhe en durste soe haer bepeynsen.
Si en moeste doen dat hi haer hiet.
Haer anschijn stoet int verdriet,
En serde: "Here, mi niet en wroucht.
1168 Het es hier binnen al ontvoucht.
Elc stelt hem uut uwen bevele,
Hets recht dat ic niet vor hu hele.
Heist dat ghijns niet in tijts belet
1172 Ghi worter selve bi ontzet.
Nu nemes ware, ic rade hu tsienst.
Ic hebbe gheweist in uwen dienst
Sint dat ic vroescap eerst gheloude.
1176 Alles men mi hier betroude.
Sonder nu, dat heift mi wonder.
Deen ruunt boven, ende dander onder,
Daer ic niet over bem ghelooft.
1180 Alomme bem ic of gheclooft,
In mach nieuwer mede gaen!"
Die buerghgrave, diet al heift verstaen,
Wonder hebbende deser reden.
1184 Hi sprac bi vorsienicheden:
"Vrou Hoede, ghi hebbet mi gheset
Van dinghen daer vele an leit,
Maer wat dinghe es den rechten zin,
1188 Daer dit gref soude ligghen in?"
Soe sprac: "Vraghet Envien,
Die hoordet ende Melancolien
Toghen in een vreemt up/et.
1192 Niemen en saltu segghen bet.
Maer na dat icker an versta
Eist dat voort niet en ga,
Daer sal een meerder achter risen.
1196 Bi redenen willic hu wisen:
Eene cleene quaet daer niet vele an leicht,
Als men dat tantierne pleicht,
Soot ouder wart, soot voordrer groyt.
1200 Int ende *wartmer* of *vermoyt*!
Dus en es gheen quaet so cleene
- en zij boog haar knieen en haar hoofd
en voortdurend waarschuwde haar het gemoed
dat als hij mij verplicht het te zeggen
dan keren zij zich allen tegen mij
F52Vb
nu nu [nog]
maar indien ik lieg en een ander zegt het
dat zou mij tot grote schande strekken
de gehele schuld zou men mij ervan geven
waarom geef je mij geen opheldering
over datgene waarnaar ik u vraag.. zeg het [mij]
ik denk dat ge begint uw mening te verbergen
haer bepeynsen: bij zichzelf te overleggen
hiet beval
en [zij] zei Heer, beschuldig mij niet
ontvoucht op losse schroeven gezet
hele, verberg
indien gij het niet op tijd verhindert
ontzet: ontzet uit uw ambt
tsienst, op de meest voordelige wijze
C273
vanaf het moment dat ik verstand gekregen heb
betroude toevertrouwde
uitgezonderd nu, dat verwondert mij
ruunt stookt kwaad
waardoor mijn goede naam schade lijdt
alom ben ik als onwaardig hoveling verworpen
ik kan niet meer meedoen
heeft zich verwonderd over deze uiteenzetting
hij sprak bedachtzaam
over zaken die van groot belang zijn
maar aan welke zaken precies
is deze onwaardige toestand toe te schrijven
ende namelijk dat
voor de dag komt met een boos plan
niemand kan het u beter vertellen
is het beter dat het geen voortzetting vindt
daar zal meer kwaad uit voortvloeien
met redenen omkleed zal ik het u aantonen
an leicht, aankleeft
tantierne regelmatig bedrijft
ten slotte gaat men eraan te gronde

	Wilt ment antieren en comt te weene.	indien men het wil bedrijven, men komt tot rouw	
	Ooc seit Catoon, dat cleene cose	<i>cose</i> : oorzaak	C274
1204	Dickent comt te groter nose.	<i>nose</i> : schade	
	Hier bi wilt u in tijts verzien."	<i>in tijds</i> , <i>bijtijds</i> ; <i>verzien</i> maatregelen nemen	
	Hi sprac: "Ghi steket up Envien,	<i>steket up</i> : noemt als bron	F53R _a
	Hoe sout soet weten bet dan ghi?"	<i>soet</i> : zij het	
1208	"Heer buerchgrave, so seit mi.	<i>so seit mi</i> , <i>zij zei het mij</i>	
	Anders en haddics niet gheweten.	wie men ook inlichtte, ik werd vergeten	
	Wie men vermaende, ic was vergheten.	hun plannen hielden ze voor mij verborgen	
	Haren raet si voor mi heilden!	want toen zij zich gezamenlijk muzikaal amuseerden	
1212	Want doe si alle te zamen speilden.	en met elkaar tot overeenstemming kwamen	
	Ende droughen haer dinc over een,	<i>wendelstem</i> wenteltrap [van de toren]	
	Doe sat ic up den wendelsteen.		
	Ende Envie die camt mi segghen.		
1216	Doe wildict hu voor oghen legghen	toen wilde ik het u onder het oog brengen	
	Om te lettene al meskief,	om zo al het onheil te beletten	
	Want hu welvaren es mi lief.	<i>welvaren</i> : welzijn	
	Maer wat ic tote hu hebbe gheseit		
1220	Dat blijft hier onder voet gheleit.	<i>onder voet gheleit</i> , verzwegen [onder ons beiden]	
	Van mine doet gheen ghewach."	maak van mij[n verklikkerij] geen melding	
	Noch vint mer up desen dach	nu nog vindt men lieden	
	Die werringhe, strijt ende discoort	die ruzie, strijd en onenigheid (vgl. r. 395)	
1224	Met woorden souden bringhen voort	met hun woorden zouden tweeg brengen	
	Updat niemen nyet ne wiste	als maar niemand zou weten	
	Dat si tbeghin sijn van den twiste,	dat zij de basis leggen van het gekrakeel	
	Hier toe drouch vrou Hoede moet	op deze wijze streefde Hoede [naar verwickelingen]	
1228	Met dat soe hier mede besich stoet,		
	So camen daer de camerlinghen		
	Ende hadden thiet beghinnen zinghen	<i>verblidene</i> : vrolijk te stemmen	
	Om te verblidene haren gh... here.	<i>uten kere</i> : uitzinnig	
1232	Doe wart Hoede uten kere	<i>deersen</i> [mogelijk 'pruilen'], <i>weegh</i> , <i>muur</i>	C275
	Ende ghinc staen deersen an de weech.	<i>neech</i> : boog	
	Heer Melancolie neech		
	Ende seide: "Hedel here, ziet,		
1236	Hier es ghemaect een nieuwe liet,	<i>voren</i> voor hem	
	Ghelievev hu, dat suldi horen."		
	Om dat si daer knielden voren		
	Peinsde de borchgrave om Hoeden.	volgens zijn oordeel en verstandelijk inzicht	
1240	Na sijn beseffen, na sijn bevroeden,	kon hij daar geen kwaad in zien	
	So en consti daer gheen erch in scauwen,	<i>upperste betrauwen</i> voornaamste vertrouwelingen	
	Want sijn upperste betrauwen	<i>secreetste</i> meest geheime, meest vertrouwd	
	Ende ooc sijn secreetste raet,		
1244	Dinct hem dat nu bi hem staet.	en hetgeen zij hem durven aan te bevelen	
	Ende wies si hem durren raden	<i>te durwaden</i> goed te volbrengen, te doorworstelen	
	Dat hoopti wel te durwaden.		
	Doe seidi: "Ghi sijt welcomen,		
1248	Nu wilt mi die waerheit nomen.	<i>vore oghen</i> te voorschijn	
	Wat dinghe eist dat ghi mi wilt toghen."	en lazen voor hem het loflied over de minne	
	Daer brochten zi den brief vore oghen	waaraan de burchgraaf zijn raadgeving	
	Ende lazen hem der minnen prijs;		
1252	Daer die burchgrave sijn avijs		

	Toegaf int besien(e) van overslane,	toevoegde dat zij het nog eens goed dienden te overpeinzen	
	Maer hoe si hebben te verstane	maar hoe zij moesten interpreteren	
	Daer die woorden of orconden	waarvan de woorden getuigenis aflegden	
1256	Dat en consten zi niet ghegronden. Hi sprac: "Wie heft dit liet ghemaect Van minnen, dat dus zoete smaect Ende dat mi te hoorne wel ghenuecht?"	dat konden zij niet doorgronden <i>liet van minnen</i> : lied over de liefde <i>zoete</i> hefelijk	
1260	Melancolie seide: "Juecht, Ende soe en weet niet selve twi." "Doese comen tote mi, Ende mi bedieden woort ende zanc."	<i>ende</i> : maar; <i>twi</i> waarom <i>bedieden</i> , duidelijk maken	C276
1264	Vrau Hoede, die daer stont ende dranc An den weech als dongheloofde, Stont en lutste metten hoofde Ende ghinc van danen sonder segghen	<i>stont ende ranc</i> drukte zich staande tegen de wand als iemand die men geen aandacht schenkt <i>lutste</i> : schudde <i>sonder segghen</i> , zonder een woord te zeggen	
1268	In ene traelie-veinster legghen Quansuus: "ic make den waeniewaers" . Een hiedeken docht mi zyn van eens sjaers Dat zonc zoe stille int uutwert zien:	op een vensterbank liggen denkende ik doe of ik onnozel ben, houd me dom <i>eens jaers</i> van lang geleden dat zong zij zachtjes, terwijl ze naar buiten keek	
<i>notenbalk</i>			
1272	MI en mach so, leider, niet gheschien. Mochtich noch zien Minen wil, in waer ghenesen.	<i>leider</i> helaas; <i>ghescien</i> te beurt vallen indien ik nog kreeg mijn zin, ik zou gelukkig zijn	
	Die tsorghen staet, moet zoorghen plien, 1276 Of eeren vlien.	wie zich bezorgd hoort te maken, moet zorg dragen of afstand doen van zijn eer	
	Menich zoorcht van tween te drien, Hi en weet om wien; Ic moeter een of wesen.	menigeen heeft zorg voor twee of drie om wie weet hij niet ik moet tot deze groep behoren	
1280	Dus sanc Hoede. Ende medesen Cam joncfrau Juecht in... haelde, Die daer voor haer selven taelde Ende groetede den borchgrave;	<i>medesen</i> te zelfder tijd, direct daarop <i>taelde</i> het woord voerde [in rechten optrad]	
1284	Die haer vraeghde twi zoe gave Sulc liet, of wiet haer brochte, Dat men niet verstaen mochte. Soe sprac: "Here, het cam uut mi,	<i>twi</i> waarom <i>cam uut mi</i> kwam spontaan in me op	
1288	Dinct hu datter yet in si Dat werdich es dat ment versteict ^f So eist recht dat ghi mi verspreict. In loghens niet, ic maecte tliet,	 dat van kracht is, zodat men het verwerpt <i>verspreict</i> : berispt <i>loghens</i> : ontken het	C277
1292	Maer elc en weet niet al tbediet Wat hi seit of wat hi scrijft Nochtan hi onversproken blijft. Hebbic ant maken yet verbuert.	maar niemand weet precies de betekenis [van] nochtans dient hij zijn goede naam niet te verliezen <i>verbuert</i> : misdreven	
1296	So mocht ment hebben van eerst ghescuert, dan kan men het vanaf het begin verscheuren		

- So en waer gheen... deser tale ”
 Doe ghinc soe weder uter zale,
 En seide al stille in haer ghedochte:
 1300 “Came datter of comen mochte,
 Soe soude sulke note maken,
 Men soudze niet gheconnen craken;
- Wie sal verbieden mi mine ghenuecht?”
 1304 Die buerggrave die niet dan ghevuecht
 Hadde gheantiert al sinen tijt,
 Van alre moeynessen quijt,
 Die begonste nu eerst peinsen
 1308 Of haer Juecht yet mochte veinsen,
 Ende dat soe mi seicht mach sijn waer.
 Die camerlinc, here Hoort-naer,
 Heer Licht-ghevoel, heer Smakelijn
 1312 Seiden dat wel mochte sijn,
 Mids dat haer lusticheit es so groot,
 So en heift soe gheens lieghens noot.
 Al vul vruechden es haer zin,
 1316 Ten eenen hoor uut, ten andren in
 Lettel soe up yement gloost,
 Wie haer vroomt of wie haer noost.
 Nemmermeer en machse dwinghen Hoede,
 1320 Want soe es ontgaen der roeden.
 Al haer solaes, ende al haer ruste
 Leicht soe in den zanc van Luste.
 Haer en rouct wat soe hem brinct
 1324 Ghescreven, up dat hijt bezinct.
 Hier in doe ic haer onschuld.
 Doe beval hi up sijn hulde
 Dat elc om peinsen soude poghen,
 1328 Diet eerst ghevroede came vor oghen,
 Dan wildijt van hem horen zinghen.
 Doe so sciet elc zonderlinghen,
 Deen ghinc hier, ende dander daer.
 1332 Ende emmer ghinc vrou Hoede naer
 Ende bezach wat menre bedreef.
- Die burchgrave in sijn ruste bleef.
 Melancolie die cam weder
 1336 Al den hoghen steegher neder,
 Ende ghinct vertrecken Zuverheden,
 Die in de zale zat beneden,
 Dat elc om peinsen was ghegaen.
 1340 Nu latic van hem leden staen.
 Ende wil u segghen hoe ic voer.
- A** ls ic hadde ghezien al den toer,
- want dan zou er geen [behoefte?] zijn aan dit gedicht³⁸
 en zei in gedachten stil voor zichzelf
 want er ook van komen mag F53Va
note: fig. muzieknoten [liederen]
craken. lett. kraken van de noot [tot een oplossing
 brengen]
ghenuecht: vreugdevolle genieting
ghenvuecht datgene wat men graag wil
gheantiert: bezig gehouden met
 zonder onaangename wederwaardigheden
nu eerst: op dat moment voor het eerst
 of Jeugd zich anders voordoet dan zij zegt te zijn
 ende en of. *seicht:* zegt, presenteert
- zeiden dat dit [haar woorden] welgemeend kon zijn
 omdat haar opgewekte levenslust zo groot is
 behoeft zij niet te liegen
 haar gemoed is geheel vervuld van blijdschap
- zij slaat geen acht op wie dan ook
 of hij haar tot nut is of haar schaadt C278
 Hoede kan haar nooit dwingen
ontgaen der roeden ontkomen aan het gezag
 geheel haar genoeg en ontspanning
- zij hecht niet veel waarde aan het geschrevene dat zij
 hem brengt als hij het maar zingt
 hiermee verdedig ik haar onschuld
 toen beval hij [burchtheer] op verbeurte van zijn gunst
 dat ieder er intens over zou nadenken
 wie het lied als eerste zou begrijpen moest verschijnen
- daarna nam men een voor een afscheid
- en steeds ging vrouw Hoede na
 en bekeek waarmee men zich bezig hield volgde ieder op de
 voet
- stegher:* wenteltrap
vertrecken mededelen
- om peinsen* aan het nadenken
 nu zwijg ik verder over hen
- toer* vreemdsoortig gedrag. vgl vs. 1073

³⁸ Indien men het in de rechtsfeer wil houden, slaat 'tale' op Jeugds 'pleidooi' voor haar onschuld

- Doe seidic Hopen, mire vriendinne, *Mire* mijn
- 1344 Hoe si beroert waren van binnen *beoert*: aangestoken, fig. ' in rep en roer geraakt
Om een liet dat Juecht verzierde, *verzierde* had uitgedacht
Dat niement daer en correngerde, *correngerde* bekriftiseerde
- 1348 No Juecht die selve vant den vont. *no* noch [zelfs niet], *vont* [letterkundige] vinding C279
Vrou Hope sprac: "Dits arde goet, *arde*: in hoge mate
- 1352 Dangiere ende Hoeden wel verdullen. *verdullen* verschalken F53Vb
Want ghi cunt zinghen *ende* maken
Sanc ende woort, die zoete smaken.
Bi minen rade so suldi *bi minen rade*: met mijn adviserende hulp
- 1356 Maken yet dat vroylic zi. *vroylic* verblijdend, van een opgewekte stemming
getugend
Wi sullent zinghen so dat clinct." *dat clinct*: dat het weerklinkt, weergalmt
Kila gaf mi penne *ende* inct
Ic screef met willen een liedekijn: *met willen* met opzet, met een bepaalde bedoeling
- notenbalk met melodie*
- 1360 Helen es in therte mijn. *helen*: het zwijgen over de geliefde
An Hopen staet mijn troost alleene. *alleene* van Hope kan ik hulp verwachten
Ic bem ontgaen des Twifels pijn, *ontgaen* ontsnapt aan
Des zijn mijn zoorghen cleine.
- 1364 Ghewont heift mi een wijflic scijn. *scijn* uiterlijk voorkomen, hier door het 'schijnsel'
Der wonde en haddic nie gheine, *der wonde* een dergelijke wond
In mach niet zonder hope zijn. *in*: ic ne (negatie)
- Helen es int herte mijn, *etcetera*
- 1368 Ic ware nu liever over Rijn *over* boven
Dan in Tzwifels weine. *dan* in de ernstige toestand van de vertwijfeling
In Hopen stelic mi eighijn, *ik stel mij als lijt eigene* in de dienst van Hope
Altoos in trouwen reine. *altijd met een zuivere* [onbesmette] trouw
- 1372 Helen es int herte mijn, *etcetera* C280
- D**it was bezonghen *ende* bescreven *dit was van noten en tekst* [volledig] voorzien
Vrau Hopen haddic zaen ghegeven, *die het van het begin tot het einde* [hardop] las
Die tende las ende ooc tbeghin.
- 1376 Ghenouchte groot so adde soe daer in. *begreep van*: maakte aanmerkingen naar aanleiding van
Maer Vorziene, diet lesen hoorde. *en voerde als bewijs het argument aan*
Begreep mi daer van eenen woorde,
Ende toochde redene int bewisen
- 1380 Dat ic niemen soude prisen, *[in het bijzijn van de geprezene nl Hope]*
Daer hijt selve hoorde toe; *en want, daer* indien
En es gheen hovesscheit daer ment doe.
Wat goet es, prijst sijns selves waerde
- 1384 *Ende* ooc uut quaet noit goet en baerde, *want uit het kwade is nooit iets goeds voortgekomen*

- Dus en heift elc gheens prisens noot.
Uut duechden soe mi dit verboot.
Al was ic een deel bescouden,
- 1388 Jans mi God, ic salt onthouden.
Ende om dat soe dit blameerde,
Rechte voort ic avizeerde
Up een ander vroilic liet
- 1392 Twelcke mi vrou Hope hiet,
Bi haren rade wast ghescreven;
- notenbalk met melodie*
- Die vroylic mint, mach vroilic leven.
Wies mach hem verdrieten
- 1396 Als hem die minne loon wil gheven?
- In een beschijn hebbic beseven
Een zoete minlic scieten.
Die vroylic mint *etcetera*
- 1400 Uut minnen es al aerch *verdreven*.
Want soe en machs niet ghenieten.
Alle duechden in haer cleven.
- Die vroilic munt *etcetera*
- A**ls zi dit saghen *ende bezaghen*
Begonst vrou Hopen wel behaghen
Ende vraechde vrou Verziene hoe
Men best soude bringhen toe,
- 1408 Dat men dit zonghe in de zale.
Vrou Verziene seide wale:
"Juecht comt onder wilen hier
Spreken jeghen den portier.
- 1412 Als soe hier comt, sonder vorsegghen,
Sal ict in haren weghe legghen
Rechte voort so sal zoet lesen,
Aldus so salt daer ghesonghen wesen.
- 1416 Gheen beter ic ghevinden can."
Vrou Hope sprac: "So neemt dan,
Ghi moet helpen dat comme voort "
Mettien so leide soet up een boort
- 1420 In den wech, daert lach onlanghe.
Juecht die cam met haren zanghe
Singhende met bliden zinne
"Gheen dijnc gheprijs vor reine minne!"
- 1424 So verre ghinc soe dat zoet sach
Waer den brief ghevouden lach,
Dien soe aestelike ondede
Daer las zoe haer ghenouchlichede.
- prisens noot* behoefte aan loftuigingen
uut duechden uit goedheid
al zou ik gedeeltelijk de treurige gevolgen ondervinden
[lett. verzengd worden]
jans mi God. indien God het mij toestaat
blameerde bekritiseerde, afkeurde
was ik direct bedacht op [verzon ik direct]
- hiet* beval [te maken] F54Ra
bi haren rade: op haar aanraden
- wie zal het betreuren
- terwijl het licht me bescheen. heb ik gevoeld
een liefelijke minnepijl C281
- aerch*: kwade gezindheid
want zij is daar niet gevoelig voor
alle deugden zijn nauw met haar verbonden
- bezaghen*: nog eens in overweging namen
begon vrou Hope er behagen in te scheppen
men het het beste aan zou kunnen leggen
- wale*. terecht
onder wilen nu en dan
- sonder vorsegghen*. zonder het aan te kondigen
terstond zal zij het lezen
- geen betere list kan ik bedenken
neemt neem het [lied]
gij moet helpen, opdat het voortgang vindt
boort kant
van de weg, waar het niet lang lag
- zoet* (< zo het) zij het [lied]
ghevouden opgevouwen [opgerold]
die zij haastig openvouwde [open rolde]
ghenouchlichede wat haar aangenaam stemde

1428	Soe sach al omme wane hi cam. Niement soe daer omtrent <i>vernam</i> . Het dochte haer boven maten wonder Soe sach boven ende onder.	<i>wane</i> : vanwaar zij beschouwde het als een groot wonder	C282
1432	Doe cloppede soe ter selver ure An den rinc van der dure. Wine spraken niet ende soe niet. Al lesende drouch soe tliet	wij spraken niet en zij [ook] niet	F54Rb
1436	Tote Luste die was haer stael Ende van sanghe naturael. Ende toochdet hem ten selven stonden. <i>Ende</i> seide. "Lust, dit hebbic vonden.	<i>stael</i> voorbeeld. patroon en die een natuurlijke aanleg voor de zangkunst had en toonde het hem terstond	
1440	Ic biddu, willet over zinghen." Hi sprac: "Wie mocht u hier an bringhen?" Dustanich en hebbic niet ghehoort. Maer hevet also zoete acoort	<i>over zinghen</i> : van het begin tot het einde zingen hij sprak wie was in staat het u te bezorgen maar als het net zo'n liefelijke toonzetting heeft	
1444	Als die woorden gheven zin, So esser vele duechden in." Doe ghinc hi maken een ghezinc. Daer elkerlic vruecht of ontfinc.	als de woorden een zinvolle betekenis bezitten dan is het heel goed	
1448	Juecht die sprac: "So wats gheschie. Ic toocht den here Melancolie." Lust die zeide: "Dat radic wel." Licht so waer si ende rebel.	<i>so wats gheschie</i> wat er ook gebeurt <i>toocht</i> : leg het voor aan <i>dat radic wel</i> . dat raad ik ten eerste aan <i>licht</i> lichtzinnig: <i>rebel</i> opstandig tegen het gezag	
1452	Ende ghinghen Melancolie soucken Beede in cameran ende in houcken, So verre dat soene vant int ende, Dise nouwelike ne kende.	<i>beede</i> zowel als zo afgelegen dat zij hem pas in een uthoek vond	
1456	So zere sat hi ende studeerde Up tliedekin, dat soe ordineirde. Vriendelike groete soe den here. Hi hietse welcomme wel zere	zo geconcentreerd zat hij te studeren <i>ordineirde</i> : schreef	C283
1460	Ende seide: "Ghi doet mi doleren, Mi en laet ghi gheen avizeren. In can gheweten niet den zin Dat icker of te vroeder bin,	<i>doet mi doleren</i> brengt mij in onzekerheid gij geeft me de kans niet de betekenis te achterhalen op een manier die me tevreden stemt	
1464	Hoe sere ic mi ghepense ende poghe." Juecht sprac: "Of ic u toghe Een nieu, ende ict u wille gheven, Bet ghenoot <i>ende</i> bet ghescreven	hoe zeer ik me er een denkbeeld over probeer te vormen Jeugd sprac: als ik u eens laat zien beter op muziek gezet en goed verwoord	
1468	Ende dat ghi selve sult orconden. In weet wiet maecte, maer ic hebt vonden Daer ic leet, in enen brief. Suld i mi dan hebben lief?"	<i>orconden</i> : verklaren <i>in ic ne</i> (negatie), <i>wiet</i> wie het <i>daer ic leet</i> waar ik ging	
1472	"Ja ic", sprac heer Melancolien. Doe gaf zoet hem ende liet hem zien. Doe wart hi peinsende int gheles: "Daer desen brief ghescreven es.	<i>Zoet</i> : zij het: <i>liet</i> liet het toen viel hij in gepeins n.a.v. de tekst	
1476	Daer es seker yement bi Die meer van minnen weet dan wi. Joncvrou Juecht, wilt mi daer leden."	daar is zeker iemand in de buurt <i>daer leden</i> . daarheen begeleiden	

	Des ghinghen zi onder hem beeden	derhalve gingen zij met hen beiden	
1480	Voor die duere des portiers. Met dat si leden vor Dangiers, So vraechde Dangier <i>waer</i> zi ghinghen. Si seiden: "Wi sullen varinghen	op het moment dat zij voorbij Dangier kwamen	
1484	Weder comen, wij en gaen niet verre."	<i>varinghen</i> . spoedig	F54Va
	Dangier mocht nu wesen erre Om dat si ghinchen voort <i>waert</i> uut. Als wi hoorden haer gheloot,	Dangier was nu nijdig <i>voort waert</i> vervolgens	
1488	Die in Kilaes camer waren, Begonstic flouwelic ghebaren Vrau Verziene hiet mi gaen Hiewer uut den weghe staen	begon de kracht mij te begeven <i>hiet mi</i> : beval mij ergens uit de buurt te gaan staan	C284
1492	Buten oghen, up avontuere Of si camen bin der dueren. Een achter duere soe ondede. Daer cam ic in een groen stede	buiten het zicht. voor het geval dat zij binnen zouden komen een achterdeurtje opende zij <i>groen stede</i> : [frisse] groene plaats, omgeving	
1496	Die strecte ter poorten waert, So verre dat mi wart <i>verclaert</i> Int up waert zien, dat zoete licht Dare ic uut ontfinc den scicht.	die zich tot de poort uitstreckte <i>verclaert</i> getoond	
1500	Beroert ende flau wardic om <i>therte</i> , Ende een vernieuwen van der smerte Bevinc mijn cracht, daer ic dus stoet, Ende ic verloos al minen moet.	waar ik uit ontving de minnepyl <i>beroert</i> in hoge mate aangedaan en een opnieuw optredende pijn <i>dus</i> : op deze wijze [de onmacht nabij]	
1504	Hope en was mi niet omtrent Als die en weet negheen belent, Stondic van groten vare bleec. Menich waerven ic <i>verzeec</i> .	Hope was niet in mijn nabijheid als iemand die geen uitweg weet <i>vare</i> : vrees, benauwdheid vele malen haalde ik met moeite adem	
1508	Hadde Twifel daer ghemoghen comen, Hi hadde mi weder up ghenomen, Maer hi was te verre vandan. Dat ic wel wiste; maer nochtan	indien Twifel daar had kunnen komen <i>up ghenomen</i> gevangen genomen	
1512	Was ic van Twifele so vervaert Dat ic mi haeste te Hopen waert. Bevende cam ic ende ondaen, Mijn bloet was mi van vare ontgaen.	<i>dat wat</i> <i>vervaert</i> bevreesd	
1516	Met dat ic cam daer up den vloer So trac Melancolie tsnoer, Ende joncfrau Juecht die was so scone, Dat soe mi dochte eens hemels wone.	van angst was het bloed uit mij weggetrokken op hetzelfde ogenblik dat ik in het voorhuis kwam <i>tsnoer</i> het koord verbonden met de deurklink	C285
1520	Hope die mijns ware nam, Wie datter blide om was of gram, Si en liet mi niet daer om tantierne. Als die mi wiste te bestierne,	<i>eens hemels wone</i> bewoonster van de hemel Hope die voor mij zorgde wie om [mijn gedrag] blij of boos was liet mij daar niet aan mijn lot over als iemand die mij onder haar hoede nam	
1524	Ghinc soe bi mire ziden staen. Melancolie sprac Vorziene aen, Ende Juecht die vraechde ooc haer Wanen dat wi camen daer.	<i>bi</i> aan	
1528	Vorziene sprac al bi besceede:	<i>wanen</i> vanwaar <i>bi besceede</i> : op verstandige wijze	

	“Het sijn mijn maghen alle beede, Siec es deen ende ongezont. Ende daer toe jammerlike ghewont	de een is ziek en uitgeput <i>daer toe</i> : bovendien <i>hi en weet</i> hij weet niet of door wie dat tot stand is gebracht <i>en ware</i> : als het niet zo was dat. . dan [zonder mijn hulp]	
1532	Van hier binnen. hi en weet hoe Of bi wien dat coomt toe. En ware allene die hulpe mijn. Hi hadde in meerder noot ghesijn		F54Vb
1536	Ende ooc mijn nichte. die daer staet. Die welcke heeft leden menich quaet Van Twifele. die noit dede wel. Hi vinctse ooc met moede fel.	<i>leden</i> geleden. ondergaan <i>moede fel</i> boosaardige inborst	
1540	Van danen camen si beede hier. Nu moet ic wesen haer bestier. Ende die hem helpen doen mi lieve. Nu dat hi comen es in griewe	<i>haer bestier</i> hun leidsvrouw en die hen helpen bewijzen mij een dienst <i>in griewe</i> in beklagenswaardige toestand <i>up dat hijs ghaert</i> op voorwaarde dat hij het verlangt <i>eeven</i> achtung	
1544	1544 Ic sal hem helpen up dat hijs ghaert , Want hi es alre eeren waert. Hovesch so es hi ende vroet. Niemen om niet duer hem en doet.	niemand doet tevergeefs iets terwille van hem hij is schrander en kunstzinnig	C286
1548	1548 Wetende es hi ende suptijl van zinne. Sanc ende woorde van der minne Can hi maken. ende bezinghen Wat men hem can te voren bringhen	minnemelodieën en -teksten <i>bezinghen</i> : voorzingen [als uitvoerend kunstenaar] wat men hem ook voorlegt hij is standvastig [trouw. innemend] en opgewekt	
1552	1552 Ghestade es hi ende vul der vruecht.” Mettien andwoorde joncfrau Juecht. Lachende seide zoe: “Vrau Verziene, Het es wel recht dat hi u diene.		
1556	1556 Hi staet so wel in uwen prijs. Ooc so kennic u avijs Een deel. so ic mi can beseffen Dat ghi niement sout verheffen.	hij staat wel bij u in de gunst <i>avijz</i> . zienswijze. mening <i>beseffen</i> begrijpen <i>verheffen</i> verheerlijken. in de hoogste steken	
1560	1560 Hi en ware te vullen prisens waerdich. Ende ware hi hyewer in overdadich. Of hadde hi ergheit in den zin. Ghi en hatten niet ghelaten in.	indien hij niet volledig het prijzen waard zou zijn of indien hij in enig opzicht onbehoorlijk zou zijn of kwaad in de zin hebben <i>hatten</i> had hem	
1564	1564 Ende tuwer eeren. up tgoede betrouwen. So wil wine gheerne bi u scouwen.”	als bewijs dat wij u hoogachten en goed vertrouwen <i>wine</i> wij hem	
1568	M elancolie mi dan aenzach, Sijn oghen gaven gheen verdrach 1568 An mi. van boven tote beneden. In een ghelaet van simpelheden Seide soe ¹⁹ : “Vorziene. uwe tale Es wel ghenomen altemale.	<i>gheen verdrach</i> geen pardon [dus waren zeer kritisch] <i>van.. beneden</i> . van kop tot teen met een onschuldige gezicht <i>soe</i> [zij= Jeugd]; <i>tale</i> . pleidooi [voor de minnaar] is zeer goed opgenomen [bevallen]	
1572	1572 Up u staet ons betrouwen al Noit en hadden wi mesval Bi uwen doene. bi uwen rade. Wat ghi doet. houden wi ghestade.	<i>mesval</i> : rampzalige ervaringen door uw toedoen of voorlichting wat gij doet. keuren wij goed	

¹⁹ Willaert acht een kopieertout mogelijk. misschien is het Melancholie die spreekt

- 1576 Die burchgrave u vor al betraut.
 Hi ontfaet dat ghi ghelaut.
 Nu biddic hu, doet ons ghewach
 Of hier yemen binnen zach
- 1580 Eenich brief daer voren legghen?
 Vorsiene sprac: "Ic sakt hu segghen.
 Den brief deidic te deser stat.
 Onverzienlicken icken vergat.
- 1584 Mijn hoochste neve, wel gheraect,
 Die gaffen mi, als hijt adde ghmaect
 Om mede te cortene minen tijt."

- Melancolie sprac. "Es hijt
 1588 Die dit maecte? Hi es wel waert
 Datti hem met ons ghenært " "
 n sinen aerm vriendelijc
 Nam mi die here, in vruechden rijc.
- 1592 Doe begonst een ander lesen.
 Dat dochte mi joncfrau Jueghet wesen,
 So soe meer las, meer soe vernam,
 Bet ende bet hi haer bequam.
- 1596 Doe sprac te haer mijn vrou Vorsiene:
 "Ghi en vont niet een onder tiene,
 Die so vele duechden weet
 Als hi doet, die daer bi u steet.
- 1600 Van minnen, duechden ende van eren.
 Dies mach men vele an hem leren,
 Want al eist minlic dat hi maect".
 "Nu sijn wi beede wel gheraect".
- 1604 Sprac mijn heer Melancolien,
 "Dat hem messciet sal mi messcien,

- Ic nemen voort an in mijn hoede."
 Hoe mochtic blider zijn van moede.
- 1608 So wel was ic in sijn greye
 Hi sprac: "Ic gheve u mijn levreie".
 "Nu zie dat hi hem also draghe
 Dat hem niemen sijns beclaghe.
- 1612 Want dat hi enich erchs verdiende.
 Nemmermeer en haddi ons te vriende."
 Doe gaf hi mi sijn caproen,
 Ende dat so hieti mi andoen.
- 1616 Graeu was hi van coluere.
 Hi hiet mi bliven bin der duere
 Tote hi weder came te mi.
 Met deser talen scieden zi
- 1620 Heer Melancolie ende Juecht
 Ghinghen wech met groter vruecht
 Ende lieten mi bi Hopen staen
 Blidelike sprac so mi haen:

hij neemt ter harte wat u deelachtig wordt [goedkeurt] C287
doet ons gewach meld ons
binnen: hier binnen verblijvend

het geschrevene legde ik op deze plaats
 uit onnadenkendheid vergat ik hem
 mijn meest voortreffelijke, begaafde neef

F 5 5 R 2
 (47a)

dat hij met ons omgaat
vriendelijc: welwillend

hoe meer zij las, des te meer zij begreep
hi hij [de liedtekst]
te, tot
een onder tien: een op de tien
 die kennis heeft van zoveel goede dingen

eren eervol handelen
mach kan
al, alles
wel gheraect zeer onder de indruk

wat hem schaadt, zal ik beschouwen als mijzelf
 overkomen
 ik neem hem voortaan onder mijn hoede

C288

greve gunst
levreie kleding behorend bij de meester (stad, vereniging
 etc)

sijns: over hem
 want indien hij iets slechts op zijn geweten zou laden

caproen: kap (met neerhangende slippen), mantel met kap

graeu grijs [kleur van de dienstbaarheid en arbeid]

verheugd sprac zij mij aan

- 1624 "Ghi muecht wel *zijn* een blide mensche.
Want ghi ghevaren hebt te weinsche
Leven muechdi sonder vaer"
Vrou Verziene sprac: "Hets waer.
- 1628 Maer eerst onthout dat ic u lere:
A l eist dat men comt ter ere
Ende mer niet in bliven can.
So cleefter groten lachter an.
- 1632 Ghi sult dus gaen *ende* poghen
Altoos in duechden om *verhoghen*.
Ende al heift yement up u nijt.
So *onghier* in thert niet en *zijt*
- 1636 Dat ghi u wreict met quaden daden.
Ghi sult verbeiden al met staden
Pijnt hoe ghi best *verdiene* muecht
Dat ghi den lieden wel ghenuecht.
- 1640 Ende der boser nijt verdriven
Al met duechden sonder kiven.
Swighen suldi ende merken
Ende bi vroeden rade werken.
- 1644 Warachtich sijn in uwe woorde.
Ompaers stellen in acoorde.
Niet begripen anders daet.
Altoos met uwen betren gaet.
- 164 Spreken met besceedicheden.
Wacht u van onreinheden
Hout mate in u voetsel nemen.
Met uwen vrient wilt niet *vervremen*.
- 1652 In node suldi hem staen bi.
Laet elcken wesen dat hi *zi*
Dinct u dat een ander mesdoet.
So wacht u dies ende peinst om goet
- 1656 Draecht uwe ghewaden suverlijc.
Sidi aerm. sidi rijc.
Benijt niemens gheluckichede .
Wat u es, sijt ghepait daermede.
- 1660 Sijt redenlic in u begheren.
Weest vrome in hu onrecht weren.
Overmoets suldi u wachten
Al sidi rijc ende groot van machten.
- 1664 Sijt meender, ghetrauwe *ende* ghestade,
Also tghewin. also de scade.
Sijt niet te drouve om gheen verlies.
No niet so blide. ghine wacht u dies,

C290

- 1668 Ghi en peinst hoe wel dat met u ga
Tgewin. tverlies en comter na.
Bi maten neemt. bi maten gheift.
Doet dat gheen onrecht an u cleift.
- 1672 Siet dat ghi die int herte vest,
Want het es u alre best

want het is u naar wens gegaan
vaer: vrees

maar onthoud in de eerste plaats wat ik u onderricht

mer: men er

dan gaat dit gepaard met grote schande

gij zult dus proberen te gaan

altijd op deugdvolle wijze om een waardig peil te bereiken

indien iemand afgunstig op u is

wees dan niet zo kwaadaardig

u dient dit alles geduldig te doorstaan C 289 F55Rb

bejver u hoe u op de beste wijze bereiken kunt

ghenuecht behaagt

en tevens de vijandschap van de bozen verdrijven kunt

geheel door deugdzaam gedrag zonder morren

gij zult zwijgen en opmerkzaam gadeslaan

en met wijs overleg te werk gaan

twist verzoenen door tot overeenstemming te komen

begripen: bentspen [wisch. in het openbaar]

ga altijd met uw [zedelijk] meerderen om

[u moet] spreken met verstandig overleg

hoed u voor onkuisheid

vervremen. in de steek laten

laat elk in zijn waardigheid

onthoud u hiervan en overweeg het goede [in de ander]

of ge arm of als ge rijk zijt

benijd niemand om zijn voorspoed

wees tevreden met wat u bezit

wees standvastig in het afweren van onrecht

wees voorkomend, oprecht en standvastig

zowel bij winst als bij verlies

wees niet te treurig gestemd bij verlies

en evenmin overmatig blij [bij winst], hoed u hiervoor

overweeg hoe goed het met u gaat

comter na volgt

doet dat handel zodanig dat

die. . . vest. die [regels] goed inprent

u: voor u

- Ende eist dat ghi u wilt *versumen*,
 Thof so sullen wi moeten ruumen,
 1676 Want elckerlic soud mi nu
 Witen also wel als hu,
 Om dat ic hu hier binnen brochte.”
- I**c sprac: “Die u *verwrochte*.
 1680 Vriendinne, hi dade onwijsheit.
 Aldat ghi mi hebt gheseit,
 Dat sal ic wel leeren onthouden,
 Niet verbreken bi minen scouden!”
- 1684 Hope sprac: “God gheift u gratie.
 Wi hebben hier nu langhe spatie
 Ghehad van misseliken zaken”.
 Verziene wilde mi *vermaken*,
- 1688 Mijn wonden ghinc zoe doe *bezien*,
 Die soe verwaerde voor messien.
 Soetelike soe die wieke uut trac
 Ende zuverde datter binnen stac,
 1692 Ende stac die wiecke weder in.
 Doe docht haer in haren zin
 Dat de wonde was ghewijt.
 Dies was zoe een deel *verblijt*
- 1696 Ende maecte daer ter selver stede
 Een wieke, die stac *Ghestadichede*.
 Ende stacse in der wonden gront.
 Doe so seide zoe: “Blijft ghezont,
 1700 Also langhe als ghi sult leven,
 Sullen hu de wieken bate gheven ”
 Doe ghinc ic ` weder zitten neder
 Ende keec duer die splete weder
- 1704 Ende sach wat men daer binnen dede.
Daer sach ic zitten Zuverhede
 Met eenre amoreuser partie:
 Juecht ende heer Melancolie,
- 1708 Fluemaet ende Colorijn,
 Daer toe mijn heer Sangwijn,
 Scone-Ghelaet ende Vorzienicheit,
 Goedertier, Ontfaermicheit.
- 1712 Hoede, Envie ende Dangier
 Daden ter poorten haer bestier.
 Rouckeloos sat, maer Overmoet
 Dochte mi datter bachten stoet.
- 1716 Jalouzie die stont hem bi.
 Daer na zat, dat dochte mi,
 Hovesscheit, Jolijt, Ormoedichede,
 Simpelheit, Ghedoochsamichede.
- 1720 Ende een deel werder vrouwen,
 Die ic hoorde nomen in trouwen
 Lust die hadse bi der hant,
 Den brief, die Juecht te voren vant,

- en indien ge een misstap wilt maken
 dan zullen wij het hof [de burcht] moeten verlaten
elckerlic: iedereen
witen: de schuld geven
- die u verwrochte*: die door zijn daden uw gunst verliest
- dat zal ik wel weten in het geheugen vast te houden
 niet moedwillig [de regels] schenden
God`gracie: God geve u genade
langhe spatie: voldoende tijdsruimte
 gehad voor uiteenlopende zaken
vermaken: verzorgen
- die zij vrijwaarde voor onaangename gevolgen
wieke: tampon, pluksel voor de wonde
zuverde: reinigde
- ghewijt*: wijder geworden was
een deel: enigszins [d.w.z. nog niet geheel]
- stac*: inbracht; *Ghestadichede*: volhardende trouw
der wonden gront: het diepste van de wond
- bate geven*: ten voordeel strekken
- vgl. r 776
- temidden van een lieflijk gezelschap
- daertoe*: bovendien
- hielden bij de poort de wacht
- bachten*: achter hen
stont hem bi: stond bij hem
- en tevens een deel van de achtenswaardige dames
in trouwen: waarachtig, voorzeker
se: [de brief]

F55Va

C291

- 1724 Die was ghelezen ende ghezonghen.
Die kelen daer so zoete clonghen.
Het docht mi sijn een paradij's'
Elkerlijc gaf hem prijs. C292
- 1728 Diet ordeneerde in sijn avijs
Dat liet te maken so jolij's
Doe vraechden daer die heren drie
Haren broeder Melancolie
- 1732 Wie dat hem gaf also ghemaect.
Of waer dat hier an was gheraect.
Het docht hem also zoete zijn.
Hi seide: "Het es de cnape mijn
- 1736 Die ic nieuwelic hebbe onthouden."
Si seiden dat si alle zouden
Sine cnapen gheerne zien.
Doe cam heer Melancolien F55Vb
- 1740 Daer ic zat, om mi te halen.
Omme mi te leeden bin der zalen,
Twelcke ic arde gheerne dede,
Maer vrou Hope moeste mede.
- 1744 Mijns meesters livreie ic drouch.
Als si dat zaghen, elc die louch.
Up stont heer Colorijn
Ende Fluemaet die broeder zijn,
- 1748 Ende hieten mi beede wellecome.
So dede Sangwijn, de vrome,
Maer hi bleef zittende daer hi zat.
In weet of hi tupstane vergat
- 1752 Of weder hijt al willens liet
Overmoet, die dit al ziet,
Gaf mi twee oghen in onwerde
Ende streec rechte voort sire vaerde.
- 1756 Maer ondanc hem, so was ic daer.
Elkerlijc, die trac mi naer
In deere van Melancolien.
Doe sat ic bi der *compaengien*,
- 1760 Ende elc met sanghe bliscap dreef
Metten brieve die ic screef.
Daer hoordic Lust ende vroylichede
Ende ic begonst te zinghen mede
- 1764 In een vroilic berueren
Uut grooten luste van natueren.
Als si dat hoorden algheemeene,
Lieten si mi den zanc alleene,
- 1768 So dat ic immer also sanc.
Elkerlijc gaf mi den danc.
Rouckeloos sprac dat hem en rochte
Wat hi gave ende hijt horen mochte
- 1772 Heer Colorijn ende heer Fleumaet
Namen eenen corten raet,
- prijs* de erepalm
die het [lied] vervaardigde overeenkomende met zijn
inzichten
om het lied zo galant [amoureu's] te maken
- wie hem dat op deze wijze gemaakte lied, gaf
hier hij er
hem hen
- die ik pas [formeel] in dienst heb genomen
- arde* zeer
maar op voorwaarde dat vrouw Hope mecing
- louch* zette een opgewekt gezicht
- de vrome*: de voortreffelijke
daer: op de plaats waar
ik weet niet of hij het opstaan vergat
of het integendeel expres naliet
- bekeek me op vernederende wijze
en sloeg onmiddellijk [geestelijk] een andere weg in C293
- ieder riep mij tot zich
ter ere van Melancholie
toen verkeerde ik met het gezelschap
- brieve* epistel, hier heb
daar hoorde ik [zangmeester] Lust en het vrolijke gezang
- in een opgewekte stemming
voortkomend uit een natuurlijke geaardheid
- zodat ik voortdurend op deze wijze [alleen] zong
iedereen prees mij
dat.. rochte, dat het hem niet interesseerde
wat hij [de zanger] bood en wat hij [R] horen kon
- overlegden kort

- Ende ghaven mi als vrient in scine
Elc die lievere y zine.
- 1776 Dat saghen zi alle die daer zaten:
Sangwijn en const niet ghelaten,
Hi en gaf mi concent sive cleedren.
Wie mochte mi doe verteedren!
- 1780 Hope stont up nu ende louch
Als die wel zach haer ghevouch.
Doe tart bet naerder Hope,
Hemelike gaf soe mi nope
- 1784 Ende ruunde, so dat niemen hoort,
Dat ic hiessche rechte voort
Penne ende inct, ende dat ic screve
Eenich liet dat redene gheve.
- 1788 Dat ic hiesch, dat was mi brocht,
Stappans haddic int ghedocht
Een liet met zoeten woorden claer,
Tselve dat hier volghet naer:

notenbalk met melodie

- W**at pinen men van minnen lijt:
Hope smeinschen zin verblijt.
Die haer wil betrauwen
Int scauwen
- 1796 Van trouwen,
So es hi alles leits ghequijt,
Ende hi moet vruecht ghelouwen.

- M**elancolie doet mi waken,
1800 Sanc van minnen minlic maken,
Daer ic mi in verblide.
Ghenouchlic pijn doeti mi smaken,
In zoeten overlide.
- 1804 Te tide
Elc mide
Van allen doorpren zaken,
Daer men hem om benide.

- M**inre, die met trouwen mint,
Als ghi te minnen eerst beghint
So peinst altoos om eere.
In minnen men gheen erch en vint,
- 1812 Noch en sal nemmermere.
Ic leere
Hu meere:
Horende doof en ziende blint,
- 1816 So sijt in allen keere.

als scine blijkbaar als vrient

Sangwijn kon niet achterblijven
hij gaf toestemming mij in zijn livree te kleden
wie zou mij toen blijder hebben kunnen stemmen

als iemand die aanschouwde wat zij gewenst had
toen trad Hope naderbij
heimelijk gaf zij mij een zet [hint]
ruunde fluisterde [in het oor]
dat ik direct zou verlangen

C294

een of ander lied dat toepasselijk zou zijn
wat ik verzocht, werd mij gebracht
stappans: terstond
een lied in zoete, begrijpelijke bewoordingen

F56Ra

Hope verblijdt het gemoed van de mensen
wie zijn vertrouwen in haar stelt
in het overwegen, overdenken
van de [liefdes]trouw
is [de minnaar] alle gevoelens van leed kwijt
ghelouwen deelachtig worden

waken, wakker blijven
minlic aangenaam, met een verrukkelijk resultaat
waarin ik vreugde schep
een voldoening schenkende pijn doet hij mij ondergaan
met een prettige afloop
op dit ogenblik
ieder dient af te zien
van laaghartige daden
waar men hem [de dader] vijandig om zal behandelen

eerst voor de eerste maal

dat zal nooit zo zijn

C295

u nog een les

zo is het in alle opzichten

- A**ls dit liet ghescreven was,
Elkerlic diet zach ende las,
Dien docht grote vreimthede
- 1820 Dat ic, up so corte stede,
Hadde ghemaect dustaen een liet,
Elc te wondre up mi ziet,
Mijn meesters alle viere
- 1824 Die mi hadden in bestiere,
Juecht ende Lust, ende Hovesscheit,
Goedertiere. Ghedoochsamicheit
Ende alle dandre die daer zaten,
- 1828 Begonsten hier in vruechden vaten, begonnen hierin vreugde te scheppen
Ende droughen over een
Den edelen buerchgrave reen
Te toghene dat zoete liet.
- 1832 In sacher niemant diet ontriet,
Doe ghinghen zi in dhoghe zale,
Daer zi vonden altemale
Des buerchgraven camerlinghen,
- 1836 Diese blidelike ontfinghen.
Doe gaven zi dat liet; daer naer
Ghinc ment lezen openbaer.
De woorden elkerlic wel becam
- 1840 Den brief Melancolie nam
Ende drouchen voor den grote here,
Diene willecomde zere.
Heer Smakelin die moesten lesen.
- 1844 Daer na moest bezonghen wesen.
Alle die daer waren comen
Ghinchen teenen hope dromen,
Ende songhen tliet met zoeten lude
- 1848 Daer en was gheen voers so rude,
Hi en was eens inghels voys ghelijc.
Die buerchgrave van machten rijk
Seide nu: "Secht mi tbediet,
- 1852 Wie heift ghemaect dit zoete liet?"
Doe andwoorde Melancolie:
"Here, hu wille hier in ghescie:
Een cnape hebbic in mijn onthout,
- 1856 Sijn wetentede es menichfout.
Ghetrouwe so es hi ende ghestade,
Hovesch, scone, wijs van rade,
Subtyl van dichte ende ook van zanghe
- 1860 Dies so en es niet leden langhe
Dat hem Twifel hilt ghevaen.
Bi eenre vrouwen es hi ontgaen,
Die scoonste die ic nie en sach,
- 1864 Ende die es bi hem al den dach,
Ende brochten voor onsen casteel.
Daer ontfinc hi een quareel,
- die vond het een zeer wonderlijke zaak
up . stede in zo'n korte tijd
dustaen zodanig, dergelijk
- in bestiere* onder hun hoede
- en waren eenstemmig in hun mening om
reen: voortreffelijk
tooghen laten zien
ik zag daar niemand die dit afraadde
dhoghe zale bovenzaal
altemale: alle
camerlinghen [de vijf zintuigen]
se hen
- openbaer* voor ieder duidelijk verstaanbaar
- drouchen* droeg [bracht] hem
diene die hem [de brief]
Heer Smakelijc moest hem voorlezen
daarna moest het lied volledig gezongen worden
- gingen* bijeen staan
zoeten lude: welluidende, aangename klank
er was geen stem zo grof besnaard
of hij geleek op de stem van een engel
van machten rijk: zeer machtige
tbediet, de zin, betekenis
- in mijn onthout* in mijn dienst [verschaf ik levensonderhoud]
- wetentede* kennis, beschaving
ghestade standvastig
- subtyl*: talentrijk
dies: derhalve
- met behulp van een vrouw is hij ontsnapt
nie en sach ooit aanschouwde
- brochten voor*: bracht hem naar
quareel pijl met korte, dikke, vierkante schacht

F56Rb

C296

- Daer hi de wonde noch of draecht.
- 1868 Jammerlike waer hi gheplaecht,
Waer hi an Kila niet gheraect.
Verziene, zijn wijf, heiften *vermaect*
Met twee wiecken, die soe hem gaf.
- 1872 Ooc so seide zoe mi, waer af
Dat zoe de wiecken heift ghewrocht
Daer die wonde bi es ghezocht.
Deen es Swighen ende Helen,
- 1876 Dese houtene sonder quelen,
Dander heet Ghestadicheit,
Die socht hem sinen aerbeit.
Nu hebbicken bi mi ghenomen
- 1880 Omdat hi es hier binnen comen
Uut duechden *ende* uut hovescheden.
Bleven es hi bi Zuverheden
Om te corten haren tijt.”
- D**ie buerchgrave sprac: “Ghi zijt
Sijn meester, heer Melancolien,
Haelten mi, ic wilne zien.”
Doe camen zi met bliden ghescale
- 1888 Neder van der zalen alle.
Mijn meester hiet mi met hem comen.
Mettesen hebben wi *vernomen*
Jalouzie ende Envien,
- 1892 Dangier. Hoeden. Van dier *partien*
Ne waren zi niet arde blide.
Hoede die sach arde wide.
So deden dandre. Elc die vraechde
- 1896 Wat ic sochte of wat ic jaechde.
Si saghen zere up mijn parure!
Hoede sprac: “Dits avonture,
Hoe comt dese aldus ghecleet,
- 1900 Wie hevet hier aldus bereet?
Trouwen, dit es toverie!”
“Icke”, sprac heer Melancolie,
“Het es mijns broeders *cnape ende de mijn.*”
- 1904 Hoede sprac: “Dat en sal niet zijn,
Gheens cnapen hebben wi te doene!
Twi sidi nu van uwen caproene
Milder dan ghi waert noyt eer?”
- 1908 Ghi muecht so doen, wi sullen meer
Der an *verliesen* dan der an winnen.
Wi zijn lieden ghenouch hier binnen,
Al maect ghi ons gheen nieu costume,
- 1912 Het dinct mi beter dat hi rume!”
- H**ovesscheit sprac ende Goedertiere
Vriendelic te Dangiere,
Ende Scoon-ghelaet ende Ontfaermicheit
- 1916 “Hier of en doet gheen noot gheseit.
Wi kennen wel so duechdelijc,
- of* van
beklagenswaardig zou hij gewond zijn
ware hij niet met Kila in aanraking gekomen
vermaect beter gemaakt, verzorgd
wiecken, bloedstelpend verbanden
waer af: waarvan
- waarmee de wonde is verzacht [gezezen]
deenes de ene is
deze houdt hem in een pijnloze toestand
Ghestadicheit Standvastigheid
die verzacht hem zijn [liefdes]dienst
icken ik hem
- gezien zijn deugzaamheid en hoofsheid
bleven gebleven
om haar te amuseren
- haal hem voor mij, ik wil hem zien
bliden ghescale opgewekt lawaai
- op hetzelfde ogenblik hebben we waargenomen
- van dier partien* de in *deze* groep verbondenen
waren ze niet erg blij gestemd
Hoede zette grote ogen op
so: evenzo
jaechde nastreetde
ze zagen aandachtig naar mijn fraaie kleding
avonture een hachelijke toestand
- wie heeft dit tot stand gebracht
voorwaar, dat is toverij
- met niemands bediende hebben we iets te maken
waarom zijt ge met het verstrekken van uw dienstkleding
goedgeefser dan dat ge ooit eerder was
indien. . dan
- wij zijn met voldoende lieden hierbinnen
zelfs al schiept ge voor ons geen nieuwe wetten
het lijkt mij beter dat hij het veld ruimt
- hierover hoeft geen woord gesproken te worden
kennen kennen hem

- Hi en doet ons nummer onghelyc.
 Hi es ghestade ende hovesch van zeden.
- 1920 Ghetrauwe ende ooc vol vroilicheden.
 Of hem die borchgrave wil *verkiezen*,
 Hoe mochten wi daer an verliesen,
 Want van den goeden comt gheen quaet.”
- 1924 “Ghi weet dan doet”, sprac Schone-ghelaet.
 Ontfaermicheit sprac Hoeden an:
 “Een wonde so heifti ontfaen.
 Die moet van binnen gheschoten wesen,
- 1928 Die spade soude ghenesen
 Ne dade Vorzienen goet bestier.”
 Hoede sprac ende ooc Dangier:
 “Als die vreemde onnosele clemmen.
- 1932 Siet men dickent dat *zi* gremmen
 Uut scalkernien diese leeren,
 Daer zi haer vrienden bi onneeren
 Wat batet hier omme vele ghekijft,
- 1936 Ic worder eer omme ontlijft
 Dan dat hi hier binnen bleve
 So langhe, dat hi ons *verdreve*
 Ende worde groot, ende maecte mi cleine.
- 1940 Die vroeden segghen: 'En es ne gheine
 Wijsheit, dat men love of prise
 Dinghen, die van nieuuten risen,
 Ten *zi* dat men eerst tende ziet
- 1944 Dan na den risene hem ghesciët'
 Heer Melancolie, ghi
 Die regement hier binnen zi,
 Haddi lief mijns Heeren eere,
- 1948 Ghi en dades nemmermere,
 Want men mach niemen betrouwen!”
 Dangier sprac: “Het sal ons rouwen
 Hier na, up dat men dit ghedoocht.
- 1952 In wil niet zijn *verhoocht*,
 No int tbedwanc van enen knecht!” *bedwanc*
 Envie seide: “Ghi hebt recht!”
 Overmoet die cammer mede
- 1956 Ende seide, dat mens niet en dede.
 Doe cam ghedronghen Jalouzie
 Ende seide: “Maken wi partie!”
 Doe so riepen zi over een
- 1960 “Hier en salre ne wonen gheen,
 Elc pine dat hijs te boven coomt!”
 Doe wart ghinder zere ghedroomt
 Ende ghescolden, ende ghevlouct.
- 1964 Hoede die was daer ghehouct
 Ende ghesteken ende gheslegghen.
 Overmoet die wasser tjeghen.
 Wat si vochten en help hem niet,
- hij zal ons nooit onrecht aandoen
ghestade standvastig
- of* indien
 hoe kunnen wij daar nadeel van ondervinden
- dan doet* dat dit [het ervoor gesprokene] zo is
- van binnen*: vanuit de burcht
 die slechts na lange tijd zou genezen
 indien Vorziene niet zo goed gehandeld had
- als de vreemde onnozelen van geest in aanzien winnen
 C299
gremmen: bits bejegenen
 uit boosaardigheid degenen die hen onderricht hebben
 waardoor ze hun vrienden in het verderf storten
- F56Vb
- ik zou liever mijn leven verliezen
- verdreve*: zal verdrijven, te gronde zal richten
- de wijzen zeggen het getuigt niet van
 wijsheid dat men looft of prijst
 zaken, die uit het niets te voorschijn komen
 tenzij men eerst de afloop [het resultaat] ziet
 dat na het tot wasdom komen hem ten deel valt
- die hierbinnen met bestuurlijk gezag bekleed zijt
 indien u de eer van onze heer belangrijk vindt
 zou gij dit nooit doen
 want men kan niemand vertrouwen
rouwen berouwen
up. . ghedoocht indien men dit toestaat
in ic en , *verhoocht*: overvleugeld
- bedwanc van* in de macht van
- cammer mede* deed ook instemmend een duit in het zakje
 en zei dat men het niet moest doen
ghedronghen: naar voren gedrongen
 en zei laten wij partij kiezen [een standpunt innemen]
over een: gezamenlijk [met dezelfde gedachte]
- ieder dient zich in te spannen, opdat hij zal winnen C300
ghedroomt: tegen elkaar aangedrongen
- ghehouct* in een hoek gedrongen
- Overmoet was in een zeer vijandige stemming

- Die hinghen zi an minen gheere. *gheere* gordel
- 2016 Deen hiet Trauwe. dander Eere.
Die derde slotel hiet Antieren. *antieren* de vaardigheid met iemand om te gaan
Dese hiet mi so bestieren *deze* beval hij mij zo te beheren
Dat ic negheen daer of verlore *daer of* daarvan
- 2020 Het ware mijns selves orbore
Datic se wel verwaren soude. *indien* ik hen goed zou bewaren C302
Doe so brocht mi van goude
Scoon-ghelaet ende Goedertiere
- 2024 Een vat bezet met steenen diere. een kruik bezet met kostbare edelstenen
Hi hiet mi drincken rechte voort *rechte voort* onmiddellijk [zonder omwegen]
Dranc, die men daer hiet confoort. *confoort* geneesmiddel met versterkende kracht [troost]
Die mi duer ghinc dat herte mijn *duer ghinc* doortrok, vervulde
- 2028 Ende uut mi dreef der wonden pijn
Dus was ic Upper-camerlinc,
Jueghet, Lust, Jolijt met mi ghinc!
Ende al die zoete compaengie en het gehele liefvallige gezelschap
- 2032 Dancten heer Melancolie
Van vruechden, dat zi hadden in mi. *vanwege* het plezier dat ze met mij beleefden
Minen here was ic bi. *ik* was in het gezelschap van mijn heer
Ende metten camerlinghen al en bij alle kamerlingen
- 2036 Was ic also lief ghetal. *was* ik op dezelfde wijze gezien
Altoos elc na mijn hulde stoet. *steeds* betuigde ieder mij zijn onderdanige trouw F57Rb
Dangier, Envie ende Overmoet,
Jalouzie, als elc dit sach,
- 2040 Si lietent hebben goeden dach *zij* verhinderden dit niet
Al souden zi daer omme ontzinnen. *ontzinnen* van het verstand beroofd worden
Haer overhooft was ic daer binnen, *overhooft* superieur
Si moesten swighen ende ghedoghen! *ghedoghen* toelaten
- 2044 Vrau Hoede ghedoochde an haer oghen,
Want soe en sach een steke niet. *ghedoochde* leed vreselijk
Tote mi wast al: "Wildt yet?" *steke*: punt [vgl. ons 7e zag er geen steek van]
Elc stont daer na mijn ghebod, *wildt vt.* wenst u iets
Ieder stond daar onder mijn gezag
- 2048 Dies jonste mi der Minnen God.
In deser over groter weelde, *dit* stond mij de god der minne toe
Die mi niet een twint verveilde, *groter weelde* zeer vreugdevolle toestand
Was ic onthouden menighen dach. *twint* geen moment [lett oogopslag, oogwenk]
was ic onthouden: verkeerde ik C303
- 2052 Dickent ic te makene plach
Menich soete minlic liet,
Also ghi een hier of ziet:

notenbalk met melodie

Weelde nemmermee verganc.
Wie minlic es in liefs bedwanc,
Hi mach wel vroylic zinghen!

wie op verrukkelijke wijze in de macht van de geliefde is
mach moet

- Gheen tijt ne mach hem drincken lanc
Weelde, weelde es al sijn zanc!
2060 Weelde nemmermeer verganc. etcetera.

geen ogenblik kan hem lang toeschijnen
weelde: bijzonder vreugdevol genot

So wie dient om der minnen danc.
Hope es sijn hoochste aenvanc
Want zoe can vruechden bringhen.

al wie dient omwille van het minneloon
aenvanc bezit. schat

2064 Weelde nemmermeer *verganc* etcetera.

- M**et dustanichen zoete lieden
Addic te vriende alle mesnieden
Ende hatse so an mi ghevest,
2068 Die mi dienden docthem best
Die buerchgrave die hadde mi
So lief, dat eens was ic ende hi
Sijn wille was also de mijn
2072 In mochte niet bet met hem sijn,
Mids dat ic so ghetrauwelijc
Regierde die drie slotelen rijc.
Vrou Hopen gaf ic ghiften groot,
2076 Nieuwer of en hadde soe noot.
Vrau Verziene ende Kila
Maectic rike. Cort daer naer
Wordic also wel gheloof.
2080 Alle namen si an mi hoofd,
Mijn ghebodt was al ghedaen.
Als ic wilde mocht ic gaen
Ten palaise, daer dat licht
2084 So meesterlijc up was ghesticht
Ten veinstre twee enter collomme.
Ende tpalais al omme *ende* omme;
Omdat ic die drie slotelen drouch.
2088 Elc dede mijn ghevouch,
Niemen mi daer wederseide
Daer ic mijn ghenoucht an leide.
Die int tpalais daden wachte
2092 Dienden mi, bi daghe, bi nachte.
Als icker cam, wast al ondaen.
Daer ic van buten moeste ontaen
Lucht van also zoeter aert,
2096 Die de burchgrave sende upwaert,
Aller specien onghelijc,
Die men vint up eerderijc.
Want al haddic alle de pijn
2100 Allene ghehadt int herte mijn,
Die in de werelt mochte wesen.
Die lucht die hadde mi ghenesen'
Hoe mochtic leeden beter leven.
2104 Al hadde mi God willen gheven
Van alle weinsche mijn verkiezen.
So en haddic niet willen verliesen.
Aldus was ic in weelden daer
2108 Menich dach, meer dan een jaer.
Ic ghinc boven ende beneden

lieden liederen
alle mesnieden: de gehele hofhouding
ghevest gebonden
docthem best: dachten er het best aan toe te zijn

dat mi dat hij en ik van hetzelfde gevoelen waren

ik kon niet hoger bij hem aangeschreven zijn
mids omdat
het bewind voerde met de drie invloedrijke sleutels C304
daarna had zij volstrekt geen zorgen meer

werd ik in zo'n hoge mate geprezen
dat zij mij allen als hun meerdere erkennen

mocht kon
ten: naar het [d w z buiten de burch]
op zo'n meesterlijke wijze was gecreeerd
op de plaats van de twee vensters, boven de kolom [hals]
terwijl ik telkens rond het paleis liep

ieder handelde naar mijn zin
wederseide: tegensprak
waar ik mijn genoegen aan beleefde
daden wachte: de wacht hielden

ontdaen ontsloten [nl de poorten]

onvergelijkbaar met alle andere welriekende kruiden

allene ghehadt: alleen had moeten dragen

[dan nog]
hoe zou ik een beter leven kunnen leiden

al wat mijn hart maar kon begeren C305
so: dan
aldus: wat op deze wijze

- Overzien die zoete steden.
Tpalais, cameren, vouten ende zale.
- 2112 In mijn ghewelt wast altemale
Vrou Hopen haddic al *vergeten*.
Nieuwer of en wildic weten
Dan te soukene mijn gheneucht
S uverheit hadde al de duecht,
Niemen en hadde els mijns coppie.
Envie ende Jalouzie
Begonsten baren haren nijt.
- 2120 Ende alle, sonder heer Jolijt
Overmoet ende heer Dangier,
Worden mi beniden hier.
So daden meest al dander mede
- 2124 Als si de verwaenthede
Van mi saghen also groot.
Met Antierne ic ontsloot
Al dat mi Vruecht ontsluten hiet.
- 2128 Trouwe, noch Eere en beeschdic niet.
Intⁿ ende cam Roukeloos
Ende dede so, dat ic verloos
Alle beede mine slotelen
- 2132 Doe mense niet en hoorde rotlen
Ende si der fouten werden gheware, *fouten* [mijn] zedelijke tekortkomingen
Elckerlic liep mi naere
Ende vraechde, *waer* ic hadde ghedaen
ghedaen: gelaten
- 2136 Die slotlen die ic hadde ontfanen.
Mettien so tastic metter hant,
Antieren ic allene vant,
Trouwe ende Eere waren wech.
- 2140 Stappans cam mijn heer Ontsech
Ende ghegreep mi biden gheere
Ende leede mi vor sinen heere,
D ie mi leleke bezach
Als hi hoorde haer gheclach.
Antieren was mi daer ghenomen!
Die mi beniden, camen dromen,
Elc wilde mi te vane poghen
- 2148 Die burchgrave ontseide mi sijn oghen.
Hoede die langhe hadde gheqweelt,
Van vruechden, nu haer herte speelt,
Haer oghen waren al ghesont.
- 2152 Doe liep soe ter selver stont
Daer zoe vrou Hopen vant allein,
Ende stac die werde vrouwe rein
Ter zalen uut, ter brucghen neder.
- 2156 In sachse noit sider weder,
Twifel vincse in sijn bespien.
Kyla ende zijn wijf Vorzien
- overzien* in ogenschouw nemen
vouten gewelven
ghewelt: macht
op niets anders wilde ik mijn aandacht richten
aan Suverheit werd mijn deugdzaamheid bewezen
voor niemand anders stond ik open
begonnen hun kwade gezindheid te uiten
sonder met uitzondering van
begonnen mij vijandig te behandelen
evenzo deden de meeste anderen
als zij de brooddronkenheid
van mij zulke proporties zagen aannemen
ontsloot opende
al datgene wat Vruecht mij beval te ontsluiten
beeschdic niet wendde ik niet aan
dede so handelde zodanig
rotten rammelen
fouten [mijn] zedelijke tekortkomingen
ieder benaderde mij
ghedaen: gelaten
stappans onmiddellijk
en greep me vast bij de slijp van mijn mantel
leleke op onheilsPELLende wijze
gheclach: gejammer, aanklachten
de mij vijandig gezinden groeften om mij samen
ieder probeerde mij gevangen te nemen
ontseide . *oghen*: ontzei mij het recht hem onder ogen te komen
Hoede die lang in een slechte toestand verkeerd had
kwam nu in een vrolijke stemming
al geheel
vant allein: alleen aantrof
stac stootte
sider nadien
in sijn bespien toen hij haar vanuit zijn hinderlaag
waarnam

F57Vb

C306

- Weenden utermaten zere.
- 2160 Haddic ghehouden hare lere
En hadde mi niet aldus ghefaelt.
Noch ziet men dickent dat hi daelt,
Die hem hogher wil heffen
- 2164 Dan redene gheift in zijn bezeffen.
Te rechte gheift men hem de scult
Die sijns selves gheluc *verdult*
Met onbesceedichen overmoede
- 2168 Ic rade dat hem elc man hoede.
Die int gheluc van minnen *zi*.
Mijn vier meesters namen mi
Die cleedren, die zi mi gaven
- 2172 Daer moest ic van den steegher draven.
Doe ghemoetic vrou Hoeden
Met eere groter scaerper roeden
Een coorde brochte soe in *haer* hant,
- 2176 Daer zoe mijn *handen* mede bant,
Ondanc was der coorten name.
Soe seide dat mi wel betame
In hadde ghenen so lieven vrient
- 2180 Hi en seide: "Dune hebs wel verdient!"
Hovescheit, Goedertierheit,
Scoon-ghelaet, Ontfaermicheit,
Ende alle dandre keerden weder,
- 2184 In sacher noit gheen zeder.
Te rechte mocht ic mi verspuwen.
Hoede ghinc mi *zere* verduwen,
Envie ende mijnheer Dangier
- 2188 Gaven mi menichen quaden pier,
Ende leeden mi neder uter zalen.
Een brughe liet soe neder dalen
Daer ic over moeste passeren.
- 2192 Hoede ghinc mi rampeneren,
Dickent seide zoe "Het es wonder
Dat ic hu niet verdrincke hier onder!"
Den anxst die mi int herte lach
- 2196 Dede mi ontglozen zo wat ic zach,
Maer emmer cam ic voor een duere,
Wies name was gheheeten Zuere.
Hoede langher *lette* niet.
- 2200 Enen slotel nam soe, die Verdriet
Was gheheeten, daer soe mede
Die staercke poorte open dede.
Fellike zoe mi der binnen stac,
- 2204 Mi dochte dat mi therte brac.
Die poorte sloot zoe weder toe
Ende lude riep zoe up mi doe:
"Blijft daer ende hebdi wel ghedaen,
- 2208 Ghi sult daer uwen loon ontfaen!"
Nu es mi nakende vele vernoys.
Mettien verlozic haren voys.
- indien ..
dan was het mij niet zo tegengelopen
noch: evenwel
die zich in een hogere staat wil verheffen
dan zijn verstand hem toestaat te doorzien
- verdult*, op dwaze wijze verknocit
door onverstandige hoogmoed
hem hoede zich [hiervoor] in acht zal nemen
die het minnegeluk deelachtig is
- vervolgens moest ik snel de wenteltrap afdalen
toen ontmoette ik vrouw Hoede
roeden staf [symbool van haar gezag]
- Ongenoegen was de naam van het touw
zij zei dat het mij goed zou toekomen
ik zou geen enkele zeer lieve vriend hebben
of hij zou zeggen je hebt hem (het koord) wel verdiend
- keerden weder* keerden zich van mij af
zeder sedert dien
terecht kon ik mijzelf verafschuwen
verduwen op harde wijze van zich stoten
- pier* harde klap, duivelse stoot
- rampeneren*: honend uitschelden
dickent menigmaal
- maakte dat ik niet goed onderscheidde wat ik zag
emmer: in ieder geval
- lette*: talmde
- kwaadaardig stootte ze me naar binnen
- wel *ghedaen*: [ironisch] goede daden verricht
dan zult ge op die plaats uw loon ontvangen
vanaf nu zal mij veel onheil overkomen [dacht ik]
direct daarop hoorde ik haar stem niet meer

C307

C308

Waer waert dat ic mi belende.	waarheen ik mij ook begaf	
2212 In sacher an beghin noch ende Dan een muer, die was so hooch, Daer en cam niemen uut hi en vlooch. So vaste was dat hof besloten	<i>hi en vlooch</i> tenzij hij kon vliegen	
2216 Met steenen, yser vast gheghoten Daerin was ic der daghen twee. Mettien besief ic dat mi wee De wonde dede die ic drouch.	<i>ysen vast gheghoten</i> zeer sterk vervaardigd <i>besief</i> voelde	
2220 Voor mijn herte mijn hant ic slouch Daer ic te voren die wicken taste Doe stacker eene entie onvaste. Dander wieke was verloren.	waar ik eertjds de tampons gevoeld had op dat moment prikte er één, omdat hij loszat	
2224 Die Verziene om mijn orboren Bi namen hiet Ghestadicheit, Doe zoe mi leerde wijsheit. Als soese mi int herte stac.	<i>om . orboren</i> : om mij tot nut te zijn <i>hiet</i> , werd het genoemd	C309
2228 Ic tastese, maer die wonde lac, Helen, Swighen wasser in, Maer Ghestadicheit wasser min, Dies ic ghedoochde pine zwaer.	ik tastte naar haar, maar de wonde bloedde [lekte] <i>wasser min</i> : ontbrak <i>ghedoochde</i> verduurde, onderging	F58Rb
2232 Truerende ghinc ic hier ende daer! Spisen was ic hier onnaer, Hongher, cout, anxst ende vaer Cam mi menichfoudich aen.	ik was ver verwijderd van voedsel overviel[en] mij herhaaldelijk	
2236 Doe sach ic bin den hove staen Seven bomen wel gheladen, Elc met zonderlinghen bladen, Daertoe met diverse frute.	<i>bin den hove</i> binnen de omheinde ruimte <i>wel beladen</i> overvloedig beladen <i>zonderlinghen</i> : ongewone, zeldzame met bovendien verschillende soorten fruit	
2240 Doe proefdic van wat virtute Doe was teerste, daer ic of tructe, Een tac, daer ic een rijf of plucte, Drie smaken hi mi gaf,	toen proefde [onderzocht] ik van welke eigenschappen de eerste, die ik afructe, voorzien was <i>rijs</i> takje [zijscheut]	
2244 Daer ic niet verblide af Zieheit, Zwaerheit ic ontfinjc, Suerheit, die daer mede ghinc Dese drie waren des fruits condicien	waarover ik niet blij kon zijn ziekte en lusteloosheid werd ik deelachtig <i>suerheit</i> wrange tegenspoed <i>des . . condicien</i> de eigenschappen van het fruit	
2248 In manieren van justicien, Om wrake van dat ic hadde verbuert. Dander boom die niet verzuert Mochte sijn van sinen draghe,	overeenkomstig de manier waarop het vonnis geregeld was bij wijze van vonnis [ter vergelding] <i>verzuert</i> onaangener smakend kon zijn wat betreft zijn dracht [vruchten]	
2252 Daer nuttic Crancheit ende Claghe. Dat moet ic cuwen nacht ende dach, Want ic niet wel teeren mach. Dien derden boom beghonstic prouven,	daarvan nuttigde ik Onmacht en jammerklachten <i>cuwen</i> : kauwen [fig. ter harte nemen] want ik kan [de vrucht(en)] niet goed verteren	C310
2256 Daer mi de smake of dede vrouwen Twee smaken desen frute ontgheit: Dat es Allende ende Eenicheit, Die mi dede zwaer riet.	waarvan de smaak mij deed gruwen dit fruit deed twee smaken van zich uitgaan dat zijn rampspoed en eenzaamheid	
2260 Die vierden boom vergat ic niet. Want sinen smac dede mi pine. Jammer was de name zine.	<i>jammer</i> grote smart [hartzeer]	

Ten vijfsten smaecte ic Cranc-gheluc.
2264 Hi gaf mi Droufheit ende Druc.
Al wast dat mi de vijfste deerde.
Die zeste [g]af mi Eyghin-eerde,

Daer of so wardic arde flau.
2268 Doe so dedic een bescau
Up den zevensten, daer ic las
Een fruit, dat mi niet goet en was
Noot was sijn rechte smac,

2272 Dies ic doghede onghemac.
Als ic dese .vij. adde gheprouft,
Doe wart mi den zin bedrouft,
Want ic en sach daer anders wat

2276 Dat ic nutten mochte, dan dat.
Ende altoos als ic voetsel nam,
Doe docht mi dat steerven cam.
Steerven was al mijn begheren,

2280 Nochtan moestic der doot ontberen
Also langhe als mine natuere
Leven wilde bin desen muere.
Dus wandeldic met groter pine

2284 Als een wilt in de woestine.
Al mijn vrucht haddic verloren,
Dit leven was mi angheboren.
Vrau Hope die was mi ontgaen,

2288 Twifel hiltse nu ghevaen.
Allene was ic int verdriet
Wenende sanc ic een liet
Uut ghepeinse van droufheden,

2292 Ende met onuldicheden:

notenbalk met melodie

Die mint ende hem sijn hope ontgaet,
Hi mach wel claghen,
Want hi van zoorghen leen ontfaet,

2296 Van drouven daghen
Hem en helpt no vrient, no maghen,
No niemens raet
Helpt zo hem niet sijn liden draghen,
2300 Die tleit verslaet.

Daer of en mach ic wel wesen ein daarom moet ik wel één zijn
Die liden moet.
Mijn hope es wech, mijn troost es clein
2304 Ende onder voet
So wat ic doe is jegenspoet
Ic bem allein!
Hope ende troost waer mi nu goet,

bij de vijfde proefde ik eerloos makend ongeluk
het veroorzaakte angst gevende benauwdheid

deed mij mijn eigen geardheid kennen [koekje van eigen
deeg]
arde flau. in hoge mate krachteloos
toen nam ik in ogeschouw. wierp ik een blik
las [lett verzamelde] plukte
dat.. was dat mij niet goed bekwam
zielenleed dat kommer gaf, was zijn juist omschreven
smaak
daarom verkeerde ik in een ongelukkige toestand

want ik zag daar niets anders wat
ik zou kunnen nuttigen dan dat

dan dacht ik dat ik begon te sterven
sterven was al wat ik wenste
ontberen: missen
net zo lang als mijn natuurlijke aandrift

F58Va

wandeldic: hep ik rond
als een wild dier in de wildernis

C311

dit leven was door het lot voor me geschikt

Twifel hield ze nu gevangen [dus voor mij onbereikbaar]

voortkomend uit droefgeestige overpeinzingen
en tevens vanuit een onverdraaglijke melancho-
lische toestand

ende terwijl

want hij komt door zijn verdriet in de macht [ontvangt als
leen]

drouven ellendige
hij wordt door vrienden noch familie geholpen
noch door iemands raadgeving[en]
als zij [Hope] hem niet helpt in zijn lijden
waardoor het leed overwonnen wordt

met degene die lijden moet

en onder de voet gelopen, machteloos
op alles wat ik doe, rust tegenspoed

waer... goet: zouden mij nu te pas komen

2308 Noch anich ghein.

Graeu es die oordene mijn.
Ende dat blijft mijn cleit.
In graeu moetic gheduerich zijn.

2312 mi zeit
In graeu vindic al arebeit.
Dats mi anschijn.
Mines niet aergher nie gheseit
2316 Van lidens pijn.

Hier mede cortic minen tijt
Ic weinschede haer ghehoort jolijt,
Die mi so vrienthout plach te sine,

2320 Dat si mi van uter pine
Enichsins verlossen mochte!
...den dat ic mi verwrochte
Die overzoete compaengic
2324 En burchgrave ende Melancolie.
Ende die lieden alle gadre
Dies juecht, zenuen ende adre,
Herte, zin, vleesch ende beene,
2328 Versliten in desen weene.
Mijn handen wranc ic ende wreef,
Van groten rouwe, die ic dreef.

Waer ic ghinc, zat of sliep,
2332 Mijn wonde van den bloede liep.
Flau so wardic ende mat
Van den frute dat ic hat,
Daer ic sulc voetsel of ontfinic

2336 Dat mi cracht ende macht ontghinc.
Langhe was ic int ellende
Dat ic mi selven niet en kende.
Ende wart razende uut ende in
2340 Als ic peinsde in minen zin,
Om die weelde ende om tsolaes,
Die ic hadde in dat palaes,
Ende om dat licht *ende* om de zale.

2344 Ende om die woninghe altemale,
Ende om verledene vroilicheit,
Die mi was worden aerbeit.
So wordic so tende den rade

2348 Dat ic badt Gode dor ghenade
Dat hi mi liete zijn verduldich.
Want ic kende mi beschuldich.
Die tranen liepen nu ghedichte

2352 Neder over mijn ansichte.

maar ik bezit geen van beide [*anich, hebbe ic*]

grijs is de kleur van mijn ordegevaad
cleit [boete]kleed [wegens zijn wangedrag]
in de zware dienstbaarheid moet ik standvastig blijven

arebeit verdriet door de zware beproeving
dat is mij duidelijk
mij is nooit iets ergers gezegd
over het minneleed

hiermee doodde ik mijn tijt
ik wenste haar⁴¹ plezier waarnaar men gaarne hoort
die mij zo goed gezind placht te zijn

C312

dat opdat
enigszins zou kunnen verlossen
vervrochte door mijn daden verbeurde

dies daarom

hebben te lijden in deze treurige toestand
mijn handen sloeg ik tegen elkaar en wrong ze
vanwege de grote rouw die ik bedreef [waaraan ik
utting gaf]

[vgl. r 2228]
krachteloos werd ik en uitgeput
hat at
[het fruit waar...]

zodat ik vervreemde van mijzelf
en [ik] raakte buiten zinnen
als toen
over de vreugde en het troostrijke vermaak

C313

en om de verblijfplaats in zijn totaliteit
verleden: voorbij
[vgl. o a r 2313]
ten slotte raakte ik zo ten einde raad
dat ik God om wille van zijn genade smeekte
verduldich: geduldig om mijn droeve lot te dragen
beschuldich schuldig
ghedichte: in grote mate

⁴¹ Het is niet duidelijk of hier Hope of de 'compagnie' bedoeld wordt

Hier mede cortic minen tijt
Ic weinschede haer ghehoort jolijt,
Die mi so vrienthout plach te sine,

- 2320 Dat si° mi van uter pine
Enichsins verlossen mochte!
...den dat ic mi verwrochte
Die overzoete compaengie
2324 En burchgrave ende Melancolic.
Ende die lieden alle gadre
Dies juecht, zenuen ende adre,
Herte, zin, vleesch ende beene,
2328 Versliten in desen weene.
Mijn handen wranc ic ende wreef,
Van groten rouwe, die ic dreef.

- Waer ic ghinc, zat of sliep,
2332 Mijn wonde van den bloede liep
Flau so wardic ende mat
Van den frute dat ic hat,
Daer ic sulc voetsel of ontfinc
2336 Dat mi cracht ende macht ontghinc.
Langhe was ic int ellende
Dat ic mi selven niet en kende.
Ende wart razende uut ende in
2340 Als ic peinsde in minen zin,
Om die weelde ende om tsolaes,
Die ic hadde in dat palaes,
Ende om dat licht *ende* om de zale,
2344 Ende om die woninghe altemalc,
Ende om verledene vroilicheit,
Die mi was worden aerbeit.
So wordic so tende den rade
2348 Dat ic badt Gode dor ghenade
Dat hi mi liete zijn verduldich,
Want ic kende mi beschuldich.
Die tranen liepen nu ghedichte
2352 Neder over mijn ansichte.
Therte was mi also flau,
In tbeweenen ende in tberau
Dat ic int knielen neder zeech,
2356 Daer ic pine bi ghecreech.
Midochte ic staerf van pinen doot!
Van vare ic uut den slape scoot.
Ic sach den dach als ic ontwiec,
2360 Noch bem ic van der wonden° ziec!

hiermee doodde ik mijn tijt
ik wenste haar⁴¹ plezier waarnaar men gaarne hoort
die mij zo goed gezind placht te zijn
dar opdat
enigszins zou kunnen verlossen
vervrochte door mijn daden verbeurde

dies daarom

hebben te lijden in deze treurige toestand
mijn handen sloeg ik tegen elkaar en wrong ze
vanwege de grote rouw die ik bedreef [waaraan ik
uting gaf]

[vgl r 2228]
krachteloos werd ik en uitgeput
hat at
[het fruit waar...]

zodat ik vervreemde van mijzelf
en [ik] raakte buiten zinnen
als toen

over de vreugde en het troostrijke vermaak

en om de verblijfplaats in zijn totaliteit
verleden voorbij
[vgl o.a. r. 2313]
ten slotte raakte ik zo ten einde raad
dat ik God om wille van zijn genade smeekte
verduldich geduldig om mijn droeve lot te dragen
beschuldich schuldig
ghedichte in grote mate

[vgl r 1500 en 2333]
beweenen betreuren
dat ik tijdens het knielen uitgeput neerzank
daer waar
van pinen door een pijnlijke dood
vare vrees, angst
ontwiec ontwaakte
nog steeds voel ik me door de wond[en] ziek

C312

C313

Onder de tekst staat een 'krabbel' in een andere hand 'tot hier teerste'.

⁴¹ Het is niet duidelijk of hier Hope of de 'compagnie' bedoeld wordt

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 Want hi is die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Ghehoort die ghelofte die u van ons ghegheuen
 die u van ons ghegheuen die u van ons ghegheuen

Het lied van jeugd, gevat in een opvallend kader.

SAMENVATTING

Omdat ik geïntrigeerd werd door uitspraken van Van Mierlo (een potsierlijk geheel) en Heeroma (men kan slechts raden naar de bedoeling), ben ik begonnen aan een onderzoek naar de zinrijkheid van de eerste allegorie.

Ik kwam al snel tot de ontdekking dat veel van wat onbegrijpelijk leek een oplossing kon vinden in het handschrift zelf en in contemporaine literatuur met dezelfde problematiek. Het bleek dat geen enkel ander uit diverse genres samengesteld middeleeuws handschrift in onze letterkunde een zo grote inhoudelijke samenhang toont als het Gr.Hs.

Niet alleen de droomgedichten laten een onderlinge samenhang zien, ook allerlei gedachten in de meer moralistische gedichten en de liederen tonen verwantschap. Terwijl de liederen en de moralistische gedichten op een tamelijk directe wijze uiting geven aan het gedachtegoed, zitten de allegorieën vol 'duistere' plaatsen, zoals dat trouwens aan dit genre eigen is. In de handen van een begaafde auteur kunnen allegorieën zeer gecompliceerd worden. En hier is een begaafd auteur aan het werk, of men hem nu Jan Moritoen wil noemen of niet. De niet-ingewijde moderne lezer kan zijn tekst slechts met grote moeite ontcijferen.

Het werk blijkt zeer vernuftig samengesteld te zijn. Alle details hebben een betekenis. Het begrijpen daarvan is voor een goed begrip van het geheel noodzakelijk.

Ik ben begonnen met een onderzoek naar het woordmateriaal en kwam toen al snel tot de ontdekking dat een aantal 'taalkringen' elkaar doorkruiste. Bij het onderzoek naar het 'gewone' hoofse register – zoals we dat vooral aantreffen in de liederen en het achtste gedicht – kon ik deels terugvallen op het materiaal dat beschreven werd door Reynaert en Willaert in hun Hadewijch-studies. Er bleek in de terminologie sprake te zijn van een al honderden jaren bestaande traditie. De begrippen die men op dit vlak ontmoet, heb ik kort besproken in het hoofdstuk over de 'Normen en waarden'. Reynaert (1999) heeft ook aandacht besteed aan dit hoofse 'register' in het Gr.Hs.

Veel meer dan dat bij dit registraal gebruikte woordmateriaal het geval was, bleek het zinnebeeldig taalgebruik moeilijkheden op te leveren. De gebezigde metaforiek ontleent zijn betekenis aan een traditie die net als het woordgebruik internationaal bepaald is. Ze is helaas voor het Nederlandse taalgebied eigenlijk nog niet goed onderzocht en derhalve moest ik herhaaldelijk terugvallen op buitenlandse bronnen.

In onze eigen verzamelhandschriften komen verspreid gedichten voor die bij de beeldspraak van hetzelfde symbolische woordmateriaal gebruik maken. Woorden die kleuren, bloemen, bomen, zintuiglijke gewaarwordingen, kleding enz. aanduiden, blijken vaak een dubbele bodem te bezitten. Een moderne lezer is zich hiervan niet zo bewust. Een mooi voorbeeld daarvan is de uitmonstering van Zuiverheid in de eerste allegorie. Allerlei attributen geven verkapt een bepaald aspect van de vrouwelijke hoofdpersoon weer. Zelfs een zo begaafd lezer als Heeroma heeft dit volledig over het hoofd gezien. Hij denkt zelfs dat deze personificatie, die de geslachtelijke component van de vrouw verbeeldt, een concrete persoon voorstelt. Een onderzoek naar de in die tijd gangbare symboliek bleek noodzakelijk om de ware bedoelingen te achterhalen.

Een aantal opvattingen in de eerste allegorie over het liefdesgebeuren en de eisen die aan de mens gesteld worden in het dagelijkse maatschappelijke leven, zijn ook terug te vinden in de groep moralistische gedichten. De noodzaak trouw en eerbaar te handelen, laster en hoogmoed te vermijden, komen herhaaldelijk ter sprake. Een ander centraal thema vormt het gevaar van een te losbandig leven, dat vooral de jeugd bedreigt.

In het Gr.Hs. hecht men tevens een grote waarde aan dichten, zingen en musiceren. De leden van de 'compagnie' brengen voor en met elkaar het geschrevene ten gehore, daarnaast vermenigvuldigen en bestuderen zij de geproduceerde teksten.

De eerste allegorie beschrijft in wezen een eenvoudige liefdesgeschiedenis met een sterk moralistische inslag. Een nog niet gerijpte en wat lichtzinnige minnaar probeert een maagdelijk meisje in te palmen. Na haar aanvankelijke toenaderingsbereidheid doorziet zij hem en hij krijgt de bons. We krijgen daarbij een blik in het gezelschapsleven van de 'compagnie', de wijze waarop men feestviert, liederen maakt, bestudeert en zingt. Het gebeuren is evenwel op een zo verholten en voor de hedendaagse mens ondoorzichtige wijze verhaald, dat de zin tot op heden - ongeveer 150 jaar na de publicatie in druk - niet bevredigend ontraadseld is. Ik denk thans - overigens na een zeer lange inlevingsperiode - redelijk te kunnen beschrijven hoe de allegorie in elkaar zit en welke betekenis bepaalde elementen bezitten. De verklaring in details van het achterliggende concept van het geheel dunkt me een waarborg te zijn voor de juistheid.

Overigens zou het verhaal zich ook in onze tijd kunnen afspelen. In de menselijke gevoelens is niet zo veel veranderd. Misschien zijn de zeden anno 2002 voor een deel van de westerse mensheid wat losser geworden, velen zullen echter de zaak nog zo beleven als door de auteur is uitgebeeld.

Ik beschrijf hierna in grote lijnen de essentie van het verhaal, dat een sterk didactische inslag bevat en dat men niet moet beschouwen als een verslag van een simpele gebeurtenis die zich in een kort tijdsbestek afspeelt. Ter oriëntatie geef ik zeer kort een enkele maal tussen vierkante haken aan hoe de auteur op zinnebeeldige wijze bepaalde fragmenten verwoordt. Nadere uitleg vindt men in de voorgaande hoofdstukken. Uiteraard is zo'n allegorisch vertelde geschiedenis geen tot in alle opzichten rationeel verantwoord verhaal. De middeleeuwer lette waarschijnlijk minder op puur rationele verbanden dan wij en veroorlooft zich meer vrijheden op het gebied van logica, plaats- en tijdsbeschrijvingen.

Een jongeman bemerkt tussen veel vrouwen één meisje [één burcht tussen vele andere] waar hij verliefd op wordt. Dat merkt ze. Hij ziet aan haar blikken [licht uit de vensters] dat zij hem niet ongenegen tegemoet zal treden. Na een bepaalde tijd, waarin hij 's nachts van haar droomt, besluit hij de stoute schoenen aan te trekken en zich bij haar te presenteren. Hij doft zich zo goed mogelijk op. Op weg naar haar [uitgebeeld door de dolage in een idyllisch landschap] en geleid door de blikken uit haar ogen die hem steeds voor de geest staan, wordt hij door twijfel overmand. Hij is geheel van streek door zijn emoties en zweeft tussen twijfel en hoop. Zal zij hem wel accepteren? Bij de 'grensmaal' Waarschuw moet hij een beslissing nemen over het voortzetten van de hofmakerij. De twijfel neemt de overhand. [Twijfel neemt hem gevangen en in de cel ontmoet hij de personificatie *Hope*]. Na veel innerlijke strijd overwint de hoop in hem. Hij schrijft haar ter ere een gedicht dat zij om de kunstvaardigheid

zeer bewondert Hij ontsnapt met de hulp van *Hope* uit de kerker [zijn beklemming] en herneemt zijn tocht

Hij arriveert opnieuw bij de grenspaal Waarschuw, een belangrijk moment De twijfel probeert hem weer te overmannen, maar de hoop op een goede afloop overwint Bij het verder lopen wordt hij gesteund door zijn moedige verwachtingen en door de verliefde blikken die de vrouw hem nog steeds vanuit de 'vensters' toewerpt Hij denkt daarbij ook aan haar lichamelijke schoonheid [de beschrijving van de volmaakte gebouwde burcht] en haar reinheid [de wachters die haar beschermen]

Het meisje is zeer aangedaan Ook zij is verliefd en weet dat de minnaar op weg is Zoals zo veel verliefden doen, schrijft de jeugdige vrouw een gedicht Ze spreekt haar onderliggende verlangens uit, zonder zich volledig bewust te zijn van haar diepste bedoelingen Zij schrijft op welke eisen zij stelt De liefdesband moet rein, eervol en vol 'edele zin' zijn wil hij van begin tot eind vreugde en levensgeluk brengen Haar gedicht wordt aan de personificaties in de burchtgemeenschap [de psychische functies van de vrouw] niet volledig duidelijk, ondanks de studie door Melancholie c s De gevoelens in het meisje zijn tegenstrijdig, wat blijkt uit de reacties op het lied van Jeugd

De vrouw weet niet goed raad met haar verliefdheid, wat wordt uitgebeeld door de vorming van twee kampen in de burcht Melancholie en Voorzienigheid zijn voor het toegeven aan de verliefde gevoelens Hoede c s zijn daartegen en waarschuwen voor ongewenste maatschappelijke consequenties en het verliezen van haar eer De minnaar probeert het innerlijke proces te beïnvloeden door het maken van twee gedichten in de 'moderne' stijl van het hoofse gezelschapsleven [zoals die ook veelvuldig in het tweede deel van het Gr Hs te vinden zijn] Zij moeten hem toegang tot de burcht [de dame] verschaffen Door hun vormgeving tonen zij een grotere kunstvaardigheid dan in de gedichten van Jeugd en Hoede naar voren komt Het eerste lied wordt door *Voorzien* afgekeurd, het tweede kan haar goedkeuring wegdragen De gedichten zitten vol frasen die ook in het Liedboek ruimschoots aanwezig zijn De minnaar besteedt meer aandacht aan *Hope* [een facet in hemzelf] dan aan de geliefde Als het woord 'trouw' valt, slaat dit op *Hope* en niet op de vrouw die hij het hof maakt Op de eisen die Jeugd gesteld heeft, gaat hij nauwelijks in [hij heeft haar lied wel gehoord als hij door de spleet loert] Het ben steeds 'ik' wat de klok slaat, hij is voortdurend gericht op eigen plezier Op tamelijk oppervlakkige wijze verzekert hij de geliefde van de zuiverheid van zijn bedoelingen door in de voorlaatste regel het woord *decaden* te noemen Direct daarop spreekt hij echter alweer van 'vrolijk minnen'

Het lied wordt te vondeling gelegd Jeugd ontdekt het en vindt het mooi Ze wordt aange trokken door de welluidende frasen die in het hoofse gezelschapsleven in de mode zijn Mischien stelt de verzekering van de minnaar dat in de liefde 'alle deugden zullen kleven' haar gerust Bovendien vindt de jeugd [zoals herhaaldelijk in de moralistische gedichten te lezen is] het 'vrolijk leven en minnen' zeer aantrekkelijk

Toch voelt de dame (waarvan Jeugd een aspect is), zoals het een maagd betaamt grote aarzelingen en maakt zij een periode door waarin allerlei krachten in haar enerzijds aanmoedigend anderzijds waarschuwend optreden Aan de ene zijde haar verliefdheid en de mooie hofmakerij met een kunstig lied vol schone beloften, met bovendien nog de aanbevelingen van Melancholie en Voorzienigheid Daarnaast echter de twijfel of dit nu wel de grote en geluk brengende liefde zal zijn

Bepaalde personificaties [psychische functies in de vrouw] vertrouwen de zaak niet. De jongeman wordt duidelijk gemaakt dat zo'n liefdesverhouding alleen mogelijk is, als hij ook maatschappelijk correct leeft [de lessen van Voorzienigheid] en tijdens de kennismakingsperiode geheimhouding betracht [het aanbrengen van de tampon *Helen*]. De voortdurende twijfel in het meisje wordt uitgebeeld door diverse personificaties [Sangwijn en Hoede c.s.]. Na een zware strijd [gevecht tussen Hoede c.s. en Melancholie c.s.] verliest de behoudende component in haar [Hoede wordt blind geslagen]. Zij stelt zich open voor de minnaar [na aanbevelingen van Voorzienigheid en Melancholie]. Een laatste waarschuwing van Hoede ten aanzien van haar eerbaarheid [Zuiverheid] legt zij naast zich neer.

Als waarborg voor een zuivere verhouding ontvangt de minnaar de livreien van haar vier humoren [gelijke 'complexie' bevordert een goede liefdesverhouding]. De kleur grijs in alle vier duidt op de 'arbeid' die hij zal moeten verrichten om haar genegenheid te winnen. Drie symbolische sleutels, namelijk *Antieren*, *Trouwe* en *Eere* moeten verder zijn gedrag bepalen.

De liefdesverhouding neemt een aanvang [een zuiverende welkomstdrank wordt ook nog aangeboden]. In de burcht [tijdens de omgang met elkaar] schrijft de minnaar nog twee liederen. Ze zijn zeer kunstzinnig en getuigen van een grote vaardigheid die door de burchtbewoners zeer bewonderd worden. Het meisje is erg gecharmeerd. De inhoud van de liederen – met hun vrijmoedige toon – belooft echter niet veel goeds. De minnaar wordt echter steeds vrijmoediger [het loflied op de weelde en het 'vrolijk' zingen en minnen duiden niet op een serieuze inslag] en de vrijage gaat al zeer ver [toegang tot alle vertrekken]. Toch voelt de minnaar de twijfel al opkomen, getuige het feit dat hij zegt *melancolie doet mi waken*. Hij verzekert dat men [!] 'dorperheid' moet vermijden, met trouw moet minnen en om de eer moet denken. Opvallend is dat hij daar de ik-vorm niet gebruikt. Hij wijst de omstanders erop dat ze goed moeten zien en luisteren.

De eer van Zuiverheid wordt nog wel bewaard. Misschien ligt aan het verloop van de gebeurtenissen de middeleeuwse opvatting van de vier fasen in de liefdesbetrokkingen ten grondslag. De *scamelheit* moet bewaard blijven. Het gedrag van de minnaar en waarschijnlijk ook zijn maatschappelijke levenswijze [Overmoed], blijken toch niet van dien aard te zijn dat de vrouw hem kan accepteren. De behoudende krachten in haar krijgen de overhand. Zij beëindigt de verhouding [verwijdering van de minnaar door Hoede c.s. uit de burcht].

De teleurgestelde minnaar is weer op zichzelf teruggeworpen en is verbannen in een ommurde tuin. *Hope* is afwezig, de twijfel overmunt hem weer. Hij is aangewezen op zeven 'kwade' vruchten, waarvan de beginletters het woord *sceiden* vormen. De melancholische gemoedstoestand waarin de minnaar verkeert wordt nauwkeurig weergegeven. De 'ic' erkent zijn schuld en voelt zich diep ongelukkig [*vander wonden zec*].

Allerlei hierboven beschreven fasen worden in de allegorie weergegeven op een zeer geraffineerde, zinnebeeldige wijze. De gebruikte symboliek, de opvattingen over het nut van de zintuigen, de achterliggende hoofse en algemeen maatschappelijke gedragscodes, de strijd van de gemoedsgesteldheden verbeeld door personificaties, de traditionele aspecten in de emoties en de opvattingen over het gedrag van de jeugd, de rol van de humoren enz., heb ik in aparte hoofdstukken uitvoerig toegelicht.

Het begenadigde kunstenaarschap van de minnaar speelt een rol in de zingeving van het geheel. Hij uit zijn emoties vooral in zijn eerste en zesde lied, waarin respectievelijk de hoop en de twijfel een grote rol spelen. Het tweede en derde lied zijn belangrijk bij de toena-

deringspogingen tot de dame, het derde lied zorgt voor de acceptatie. Het vierde en vijfde lied geven een kleine illustratie van zijn handel en wandel in de burcht.

De dichterlijke vaardigheden van Jeugd en Hoede bewegen zich op een lager peil, maar inhoudelijk zijn hun liederen van groot belang voor de plot.

Zowel de man als de vrouw zijn op de een of andere wijze verbonden met de 'compagnie', een gemeenschap waarin het dichten, zingen, musiceren en bestuderen van dichtwerk als een soort rederijkersactiviteit wordt beoefend. Het blijkt dat bij de toenaderingspogingen het geven van proeven van bekwaamheid op literair en muzikaal gebied een rol spelen. De neiging tot dichten wordt waarschijnlijk bevorderd door het *melancoleren*, waarbij sprake is van een grote gemoedsbewogenheid. De personificatie Melancholie – met zijn traditioneel erkende grote begaafdheid en emotionele bewogenheid – speelt daarbij een rol. Een dubbelzinnige rol, want door hevige verliefdheden wordt ook een psychische labiliteit opgeroepen, die met de term melancholie aangeduid wordt. De minnaar toont op diverse plaatsen een geestelijke gesteldheid die de kenmerken toont van wat men in de Middeleeuwen onder depressieve melancholie verstaat.

Al de deelaspecten in de allegorie voegen zich samen tot een zinvol geheel en ontlenen daaraan hun functie. Het geheel is bepaald door die delen, maar de totaliteit is meer dan de som van die delen. Werkelijk niets is overbodig of een loutere toevoeging. Hoede zit niet voor niets op de wenteltrap tussen Zuiverheid en de Burchtheer, Jeugd schrijft haar lied niet zomaar als betekenisloos schlagertje, figuren staan niet willekeurig gegroepeerd enz. Ongewijfeld is dit één van de beste allegorieën uit onze middeleeuwse literatuur en gezien de problemen die zij geeft, de moeilijkste.

Mocht men denken dat de problematiek die van een voorbije periode is, dan wijs ik op de beschouwing die Beets, – een psycholoog uit de Utrechtse fenomenologische school, – in zijn boek *De grote jongen* (1973, 199-200), geeft over de blik. De blik uit de ogen van de vrouw, die in onze allegorie zo'n belangrijke en steeds terugkerende aandacht krijgt. Beets schrijft:

“In het elkander-even-aanzien opent zich voor de jongen – en ook voor het meisje – ‘een nieuwe wereld’. Zoals iedere wereld een verte- en een nabijheidsfacet kent, zo ook hier. De blik van het meisje opent hem een nieuw gebied van verbondenheid, van bij elkaar horen en intimiteit, waarin tegelijkertijd de tot nu toe bestaande distantie aan het licht treedt. Pas nu ligt er ‘achter hem’ een ‘tijd’ waarin dit -wat-er-nu-is-, een verbondenheid, er niet was. De distantie tussen jongen en meisje die zo kenmerkend was, wordt ‘pas ontdekt’ op het moment – in het ‘ogen-blik’ – dat die distantie ‘overbrugd’ is. De ‘nieuwe’ wereld waarin de jongen zich nu bevindt is *de kwetsbare en voortdurend bedreigde wereld der tedere aandacht en intimiteit* die zich in de blik zowel verbergt als openbaart. In de blik blijft hij op eerbiedige afstand en is zeer nabij. Als hij ongemerkt naar haar kijkt, kan hij zich een wereld van ongestoord samen-zijn met haar *dromen*. Zijn dagdroom omvat haar en hem en sluit versturende krachten uit of rekt daarmee op bevredigende wijze af. In die dagdroom opent zich een nieuw verteperspectief. De dag van morgen neemt er gestalte in aan. Het ‘zien van de ander’ en het door haar ‘gezien worden’ richt de jongen naar een eigen verte, een eigen toekomst die daarmee een bepaalde gestalte krijgt. Die toekomst wordt ‘gedroomd’ en de gedachte

aan het 'uitverkoren' worden heft de jongen op uit zijn alledaags bestaan. Hij gaat niet meer volledig op in al zijn activiteiten, wel valt hij steeds uit zijn toekomst-biedende droom terug in de realiteit. De dagdroom van de jongen geeft een duidelijk toekomstperspectief, geeft gestalte aan het nieuwe en moet ook 'geduid' worden vanuit de relatie met het toekomstige en niet vanuit het vooropstellen van datgene wat vroeger eens was".

Deelaspecten van deze moderne beschouwing vindt men op zeer typerende wijze terug in de eerste allegorie, die ongeveer 600 jaar eerder geschreven is! Menselijke emoties veranderen in de loop der tijden niet wezenlijk, ook al geeft men daar soms op andere wijze uiting aan.

Opmerkelijk is dat de auteur de regels op het vlak van de liefde geheel symbolisch aanduidt. Voorzienigheid biedt daarentegen de praktische, dagelijkse en algemeen maatschappelijke gedragsregels rechtstreeks aan, zonder metaforische lading.

Op andere plaatsen in het handschrift worden voorschriften die betrekking hebben op de dagelijkse praktijk echter wel op zinnebeeldige wijze uitgebeeld. In de preek van Jan Lyoen (VII) en bij de aanbidding van het geschenk (XIII) vinden we zinnebeeldige voorstellingen om het menselijk gedrag te typeren. Ze zijn vaak op zichzelf al duidelijk, maar is dit niet het geval, dan volgt een toelichting.

Er bestaat een opvallende samenhang tussen deze allegorie en de overige gedichten in het Gr.Hs. Voor een goed begrip is het noodzakelijk zich in te denken in het geestelijk gebeuren van de gemeenschap waarin het handschrift functioneerde. Het handschrift getuigt hiervan in zijn totaliteit. Vooral in het derde deel bestaat er een verband tussen diverse allegorieën en ethische gedichten. Het centrale thema is de liefde en in verband daarmee een goed maatschappelijk en godsdienstig gedrag. In de eerste allegorie geeft Voorzienigheid veel regels, in de tweede *Ghetempertheit*, in de overige gedichten wijze vrouwen, kluzenaars en mannen op leeftijd.

De minnaar in II moet bijgeschoold worden (een vervolg op de lessen die in I door *Verziene* gegeven zijn, al valt in de school van Getempertheid en Mate meer het accent op het handelen in liefdesbetrekkingen). De noodzaak tot 'maat betrachten' (een herhaald voorkomend aspect in het Gr.Hs.) wordt sterk beklemtoond. Net als in I blijft de twijfel aan de minnaar knagen, wat hernieuwde aanvallen van melancholie tot gevolg heeft. Dit blijkt overduidelijk uit het slotlied.

Zeer belangrijk is het vierde gedicht. We vinden hierin voor een deel een handleiding hoe we de eerste allegorie moeten lezen. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld de noodzaak van een gelijke complexie genoemd. Zich 'met mate' gedragen is belangrijk.

Wordt de (hoofse) liefde in het tweede deel met de liederen onbevangen bezongen, in het derde deel komen allerlei restricties naar voren die op het maatschappelijke én godsdienstige vlak liggen.

Het is niet zoals in veel hoofse werken dat de vrouwendienst en vrouwenverwerving plaats vindt in een louter literaire context⁴², maar deze wordt hier geplaatst in een maatschappelijke realiteit. Dit element zien we ook in de eerste allegorie. Als de minnaar op het punt staat de geliefde te benaderen, krijgt hij van Voorzienigheid een groot aantal gedragsregels mee die met de hoofse liefde op zichzelf niet veel te maken hebben. Zij beschrijven hoe een geciviliseerd (koopman-)burger zich in een stadsgemeenschap dient te gedragen. Als men het liefdesavontuur begint, zal men zich blijkbaar ook op het maatschappelijke vlak als een beschaafd mens dienen te gedragen. Het jolige gedrag van de jeugd waarvan wij in het handschrift zo vaak getuige zijn, wordt indirect veroordeeld.

De problematiek van de liefde komt naar voren in het lied van Jeugd die niet voor niets vaak in het gezelschap van Lust getekend wordt. In haar lied komt een aspect naar voren dat in de latere gedichten veelvuldig ter sprake wordt gebracht: de neiging van de jeugd zich ongebreideld in het liefdesleven te storten. Zij benadrukt echter, ingaande tegen de kennelijk gangbare behoudende opvatting, de gedachte die ook in andere liederen in de eerste allegorie terugkomt, dat de reine liefde geen *onghenuecht* geeft. De minnaar van zijn kant verzekert ook dat er geen enkel gevaar dreigt en dat alles goed eindigen zal. In de burcht zijn tegenkrachten werkzaam onder leiding van *Hoede* en haar verklikster *Envie*, die een hindernis willen opwerpen om de veiligheid van de dame te verzekeren.

De dame wordt allegorisch gesplitst in twee hoofdfuncties, namelijk het geslachtelijke deel vertegenwoordigt door Zuiverheid en het bedachtzame, regulerende deel de Burchtheer. We zien deze beide aspecten lokaal streng gescheiden vertoeven in een beneden- en een bovenzaal die ze beiden niet verlaten. *Hoede* nestelt zich bij voorkeur op de wenteltrap die beide vertrekken met elkaar verbindt. De andere personificaties bewegen zich tussen beide locaties wel heen en weer. We zien dat Jeugd meestal vertoeft bij Zuiverheid en slechts bij de Burchtheer komt als zij op het matje geroepen wordt om rekenschap af te leggen.

Een belangrijk element is de dichtvaardigheid van Jeugd en de minnaar. Per slot van rekening worden de gedichten geschreven voor een gezelschap dat de lied- en dichtkunst beoefent. *Melancolie* is zeer gecharmeerd van de dichtelijke kwaliteiten van de minnaar. Zijn broer *Sangwyn* stelt zich heel wat kritischer op. Helaas wordt de reden van zijn afwijzende houding niet nader beschreven. *Hoede* schrijft een gedicht 'uit de oude doos'.

Bij de toelating van de minnaar vinden vooral zijn hoofse kwaliteiten waardering. *Vorziene* neemt deze tamelijk kritikloos aan op voorspraak van *Hope*. *Melancolie* op zijn beurt verlaat zich weer geheel op de woorden van *Verziene*. Al met al een wankel basis die geen stand houdt. Het regulerend deel van de dame [de Burchtheer] accepteert de minnaar onder het nodige voorbehoud [onder andere de poging tot zekerheid door het aanbieden van de sleutels]. Men bewondert zijn dichtelijke capaciteiten, maar zijn gedrag kan uiteindelijk geen waardering wegdragen. Hij faalt. Slechts de zwiijpplicht komt hij gedeeltelijk na [de tampon *Helen* zit al los]. Hij wordt uit de burcht verwijderd, raakt in grote vertwijfeling en zijn hoop is verdwenen.

⁴² Zoals hij, in veel werken met hofische Rollenlyrik, zonder Wirklichkeitsbezuie (Eisbrenner 1995: 81).

Aan de eis van Jeugd dat de liefde 'rein' moet blijven, schijnt wel voldaan te zijn. Zuiverheid is nog ongeschonden.

Uiteraard zal de auteur eigen ervaringen hebben verwerkt (een aspect waar Heeroma sterk de nadruk op legt), maar het autobiografische aspect staat geheel op de achtergrond. Voorop staan existentiële, algemeen menselijke problemen die met bepaalde gedragscodes benaderd dienen te worden. De stadscultuur heeft behoefte aan goed geformuleerde regels.

Misschien zou het feit dat de vijf droomallegorieën een cyclus vormen, kunnen wijzen op persoonlijke ervaringen. In de eerste komt de mislukking van de minnaar aan de orde. De optredende personificaties beelden vooral het innerlijk leven van de vrouw uit. In de tweede probeert de afgewezen minnaar 'loon naar werken' te krijgen. Venus wijst zijn eis af. Venus symboliseert vooral het seksuele aspect, het 'loon' zal dus wel op dat vlak gezocht moeten worden. De personificaties hebben in II betrekking op de man. In de derde allegorie heeft de man het meisje verwond. Zij wijst hem om deze reden af. Op advies van *Vrouw Redene* zal hij een poging wagen met nieuwjaar haar gunst weer te verkrijgen. In het vierde droomgedicht krijgen we een reeks gedragsregels te horen die de minnaar in acht moet nemen. Ze zijn vooral godsdienstig getint. De geliefde is tot een kloosterorde toegetreden. Pas in het hiernamaals kan van een vereniging sprake zijn. In de vijfde droomallegorie gaat de minnaar, die vergeefs toenadering zoekt, zich te buiten aan het feestvieren (ook in het tweede gedicht al genoemd) en krijgt de les gelezen door een kluisenaar.

De godsdienstige componenten komen in het Gr H's geregeld ter sprake. In II wordt de religieuze problematiek rond de liefde naar voren gebracht in het gesprek met de kluisenaar aan het begin. Zeer scherp wordt deze daar nog niet gesteld (zoals wel bijvoorbeeld in IV) en de argumentatie blijft wat op de vlakte. De heremiet begrijpt de problemen van de minnaar niet volkomen. Het aanbod om via de biecht meer klaarheid te verkrijgen, wordt door de minnaar afgewezen, iets wat trouwens in XIV ook gebeurt.

De kluisenaar in de tweede allegorie waarschuwt ervoor de geliefde niet tot afgod te maken en God te vereren. De allegorie spitst zich dan toe op de vraag of de minnaar zich voldoende aan de minnevoorschriften gehouden heeft om loon naar werken, dat wil zeggen de liefde van de dame, te ontvangen. In het gerechtsgeding dat volgt vindt Venus dat dit niet het geval is (overeenkomst met I, waar de minnaar op dezelfde gronden afgewezen wordt, wat hij dus kennelijk in II middels een rechtszaak bij Venus betwist).

We vinden in IV een soort catechismus. De dichter geeft de wulpse neigingen van de jeugd wel een zekere speelruimte, maar wijst op de noodzaak met het klimmen der jaren bijtijds een meer contemplatieve houding aan te nemen, zodat men verzekerd is van de hemelse blijdschap. We zien ook in X dat Venus' scholieren, die volop van de aardse liefde genieten, moeten bedenken dat de wijn op raakt en dat men moet klinken op wat zalig maakt.

Er zijn het geheel overziende in het derde deel vijf hoofdonderwerpen, die een nader onderzoek verdienen.


– Het hoofse minnegedrag, met accenten op het bewaren van de eer en het betrachten van 'mate', waardoor de hartstochten getemperd worden.

– De wenselijkheid van een duurzame, trouwe liefdesverhouding die tot *genuecht* voert. Ook hier geldt weer de eis dat dit met mate geschiedt.

– De eis van een aangepast maatschappelijk gedrag zoals dat in een koopmansstad van geciviliseerde burgers verwacht wordt.

– De waarschuwingen in het derde deel tegen de gevaren van de ‘feestcultuur’ waaraan de jonge mensen zijn blootgesteld. Ook in het liedboek zijn van de overdadige jolijt nogal wat voorbeelden te vinden.

– Het godsdienstige aspect dat stelt dat er bij het vorderen van de leeftijd een verschuiving in het gedrag dient plaats te vinden. De accenten moeten van de aardse naar de hemelse componenten worden verlegd.



Wilt pinen men van minne liet
hoep menschen in verblift
1795 **D**ie haer wil betruwen
Ine scouwden
Van twouwen
So es hi alles bets ghequijt
Ende hi moet vuerde ghelouwen

Melancolie doet mi waken
1800 **S**ant van minnen minke maken
Daer ic mi in verblide
Sherouchlic pijn doet mi smaken
In zeden ouerlde
Ec tae
1805 **S**lemste
Van allen dorpen zeken
Daer men hem om beuie

Minre die met twouwen minne
1810 **I**s ghi te minnen eerste beghinne
So pinst altes om eere
In minnen maer ghecu arch en vint
Doch en sal nemmer more
Ic leete
In u meere
1815 **H**oeride doof ende zende blint
So sijn in allen keere

Het eerste lied dat de minnaar in de burcht zingt.

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Het jaartal van de uitgave is niet achter de plaatsnaam, maar achter de auteursnaam geplaatst.

Indien een artikel opgenomen is in een verzamelbundel, vindt men een bondige verwijzing naar die bundel zonder dat steeds alle gegevens vermeld worden. Wel zijn deze verzamelbundels met alle gegevens in de lijst opgenomen.

De gebruikte afkortingen zijn vermeld op blz. 5.

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SUMMARY⁴³

Originally, this dissertation was meant to be a general study of important aspects of the register (lexical, syntactic and prosodic processes) that is characteristic for the Gruuthuse Manuscript (GM). In the end, the investigation focused on an interpretation of the first allegory in the third section of this manuscript. Because it turned out to be useful, material from other parts of the manuscript was partly used in support of the interpretation. The GM originates from the last quarter of the fourteenth century. It is an important Middle Dutch miscellany from Bruges, consisting of three originally separate parts. The first part contains seven rhymed prayers; the second part 147 songs, the majority of which are accompanied by a musical score. The third part contains 16 poems, of which two are prayers and five allegories in which a lover discusses his amorous vicissitudes. These vicissitudes also come up in a description of amorous scenes. Besides the above, the manuscript also contains a report of a sermon and a text on the presentation of a 'model' of Bruges; both texts represent aspects of an urban society. The other poems are highly moralistic. They introduce mainly older people, including hermits, who warn against the frivolity of youth and the transience of life on earth, and stress the desirability of paying attention to religious aspects of life.

The manuscript is named after Lodewijk van Bruges, Lord of Gruuthuse, whose coat of arms occurs in the manuscript. The miscellany is private property and was published rather carelessly by canon Charles-Louis Carton in 1848/9.

Much of the miscellany is anonymous. Two names that clearly allude to authors are given in acrostics, viz. Jan van Hulst and Jan Moritoen. Because of the ingenious rhymes, the refrains, the allegories, acrostics and letter games, but also because the texts have functioned within literary societies, one can qualify this work as *rederijker* (rhetorician) art *avant la lettre*. There were relations between the group behind the manuscript and the guild of the Droge Boom (dry tree), a brotherhood with many leading members of society, which organized Masses and revered and praised Mary.

This dissertation gives an interpretation of the first allegory in the third part of the manuscript. The interpretation, which focuses especially on metaphor, is supported with evidence from other texts in the third part. The amount of similarity with the first allegory makes material from them very suitable for the interpretation of that text. The songs also contribute useful material. Material from comparable sources in French and German literature has only been used to a very limited extent. One reason for this is that the relations between this tradition and the GM have not been investigated in enough detail. Moreover, this decision was driven by the observation that many motives and images are used in a highly consistent manner in the GM, enabling the researcher to explain different parts of the manuscript with others. Such an internal explanation should precede an embedding into the larger literary tradition.

⁴³ Met veel dank aan Dr M. Haverkort, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.

The second chapter of this dissertation gives a brief overview of the content of the GM, paying most attention to the third part. The third chapter provides a sketch of the history of the research regarding the first allegory. Heeroma plays an important role in this sketch. Following his edition of the songbook, Heeroma dedicated a number of articles to the poem. He never reached unanimous conclusions, however. In his opinion, one could only guess what the meaning of the poem was. His edition of the songbook is generally lauded, but his interpretation of the texts on the basis of a large empathic ability and without sound proof led to wide criticism and the qualification of his work as 'adventurous science' (Liefstinck 1967).

Heeroma attributed the first allegory to Jan Moritoen but hardly used the text in the construction of his literary autobiography. In terms of its content, he characterizes the poem sometimes as a text about poetics and sometimes as a text with an amorous theme. Erne (1970) contains a number of interesting remarks about the poem but lacks an interpretation of the whole. Reynaert (1999) and Willaert (2000) looked at a number of songs from the allegory, but did not place them in the context of the whole. The content of the third chapter is supported by the thematic index in the back of the study, which opens up the research regarding the GM thematically.

Like other texts in the GM, the first allegory is characterized by a highly consistent register which fits in the tradition of chivalric literature. The fourth chapter investigates this register in relation to the manner in which the world of the lover (the main character of the allegory) is given shape verbally. It starts with an overview of the places where characteristic words are found, followed by a discussion of a number of core notions in terms of their classification. Attention is paid to the following: description of the landscape, flora and fauna, allegories for things, fire and light metaphors, color and number symbolism, among others.

Chapter 5 gives an overview of the places in the GM where personifications occur (about 110 in total) and discusses their function, paying special attention to the first allegory. Remarkably, most personifications occur in the first and second allegory and play a similar role in both. Comparing their occurrence and the role they fulfill in both allegories can lead to clarification. In the first allegory, Twifel (Doubt) and Hope (Hope) are important in the psyche of the lover. Hoede (Guard) and Melancholie (Melancholy) are important in the psyche of the woman. The gender aspect in the woman is represented by Suverheit (Purity), the more rational and instinctive/emotional aspect by the Burchtgrave (Viscount). This distinction is strictly maintained in terms of the localization in the castle: the former in the downstairs hall, the latter in the upstairs hall. Suverheit plays a key role in the plot, so much attention is paid to her in the analysis, in terms both of her place (on a throne in the downstairs hall), and of her attributes (crown and margolds).

Chapters 4 and 5 are a collection of materials. Hence both chapters contain much more data than strictly necessary for the interpretation of the first allegory. The background for this decision is that the materials demonstrate that the GM as a whole indeed has a unifying register and that these materials will thus turn out to be useful for the interpretation of

other texts in the same manuscript. The other chapters contain many references to these two.

The first allegory largely belongs to the courtly tradition. A description of the values and standards that are central to that tradition is given in chapter 6. The genesis in an urban society has apparently also had a considerable influence, as the poem pays much attention to the behavioral codes that held for town citizens. One gets the impression that the lover is not allowed to approach his love in a courtly manner unless he meets these standards. In other parts of the miscellany one finds a religious perspective on love. These urban and religious values and standards are also discussed in chapter 6.

Chapter 7 focuses on melancholy. The melancholic state of mind, which expresses itself in great exasperation in the 'ic' (lover, dreamer and poet of the text) plays a very prominent role in the poem. Melancholy takes shape by the opposition between Twifel and Hope, which is worked out in great detail by the author. The narrating 'ic' expresses this state of mind in a number of ways. The chapter also contains a comparison between medieval and modern views on melancholy, reaching the conclusion that there are striking resemblances. The author of the first allegory seems to have been well informed about the ideas that were current among contemporary doctors. Finally, the relation between melancholy and inspired man is briefly considered. Attention is also paid to the writing of poetry and musical composition.

Chapter 8 presents a detailed interpretation of the poem. The conclusion (chapter 10) gets back to this subject.

Chapter 9, finally, contains an edition of the text with a comment concerning characteristic properties of language use, especially of Flemish, as well as an extensive explanation of the text.

The dissertation concludes with a list of references and the already mentioned thematic index. Together, these open up the secondary literature concerning the GM.

Briefly summarized, the interpretation of the sophisticated and subtly composed text boils down to the following: A young man sees a girl [a castle] among others, with whom he falls in love. She notices that he is in love, something he concludes from the look in her eyes [light from the windows], indicating that she will meet him benevolently. After some time, during which he dreams of her, he decides to present himself to her. On his way [wandering in an idyllic landscape], guided by the looks from her eyes, he is overcome by doubt. He is very upset due to the emotions and hovers between doubt and hope. He has to come to a decision at the 'border post' Warning, where doubt takes over [Doubt takes him prisoner, but he is freed from his cell by Hope]. After an inner struggle, Hope wins, he escapes from the dungeon and he resumes his journey. Again, he arrives at the 'border post' Warning. This is an important moment: doubt attempts to overpower him again, but the hope for a good outcome wins. While he walks on, he is supported by hopeful expectations and by loving glances from the woman. He considers her physical beauty [the light from the windows and the description of the perfect castle] and her chastity [the guards who protect her]. The girl is touched; she is in love as well and knows that the lover is on his way. As many people in love, she writes a poem in which she expresses her deepest desires, without being conscious of her deepest intentions. The latter do not become clear to her [study by Melancholy c.s.]. Inner psychological faculties struggle over love and cheerful feelings. Two parties form: for and against acceptance of the lover. Among the first overtures of the

lover are the presentation of a poem [his second one, as his first attempt was rejected] in which he expresses his love and the integrity of his intentions. To her surprise, the girl notices that his thoughts correspond to her own: the necessity of a pure love is stressed, only thus can gaiety and a lasting happiness be achieved.

Befitting a virgin, she feels great hesitations, and goes through a period during which several forces, some encouraging, others cautioning her, occur. On the one hand there is her love, the pleasant courtship with a clever song, on the other hand there are big hesitations as to whether this will indeed turn out to be the big love of her life, bringing her happiness. The young man is told in no uncertain words that such a love is only possible if he behaves socially correct [the teachings of Providence] and observes secrecy [applying the pledge of 'healing']. The internal struggle in the girl is symbolized by a number of personifications. After a heavy battle [involving Guard c s and Melancholy c s], the conservative forces in her lose [Guard is struck with blindness]. She opens herself up to the lover [after a recommendation by Providence and Melancholy]. The last warning of Guard, regarding her chastity, she ignores. Before the relationship begins, the necessity of honour and faithfulness is once again stressed by symbolic keys.

The relationship begins, and a number of additional poems are written. The lover becomes more and more frank [ode to affluence], and the courtship develops pretty quickly [access to all rooms], only the woman's honor is preserved. The lover's behavior, and probably also his social way of life, does not appear to be such that the woman can accept them [Recklessness]. The conservative forces in her take over. She ends the relationship [Guard removes the lover from the castle]. The disappointed lover is thrown on his own resources [banned into the walled garden], he is very miserable [symbolized by seven 'evil' fruits, which have melancholical properties, and which form the word 'scheiden' (to separate)], he acknowledges his guilt.

In outline, the allegory is not very complicated, but due to the elaborate character and the varied ways of expressing the allegories, there are many places that do not immediately disclose their full meaning. As previous studies, this study has also not been able to solve all riddles.

THEMATISCH REGISTER

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HANDSCHRIFT

Codicologische informatie:

Carton 1848/9, De Vreese 1940, Gessler 1940, Heeroma 1966a, Liefinck 1967, Heeroma 1967a, Gerritsen 1969, Duinhoven 1970, Deschamps 1972, Reynaert 1993 en 1999, Oosterman 1995

Datering:

Carton 1948/9, Vreese De 1940, Heeroma 1966a, Reynaert 1987, 165-167, Willaert 1997, Strijbosch 1997, Reynaert 1999.

'Handen':

Carton 1848/9, Vreese De 1940, Heeroma 1966a en b, Liefinck 1967, Heeroma 1967a, Heeroma 1969d, Gerritsen 1969, Duinhoven 1970, Deschamps 1972, Reynaert 1987, 1993 en 1999.

Eigendomsaantekeningen.

Vreese De 1940 en Heeroma 1966a, Reynaert 1999.

Tekstverbeterende aantekeningen.

Arnold 1876, Op vele plaatsen in het MNW (Verwijs, Verdam 1885), Verdam 1890, Vreese De 1940, Geerts 1909, Gessler 1940, Vreese De 1946 (Salve Regina), Deleu 1958, Mak 1960, Deleu 1961 (Het achtste gedicht), Heeroma 1966a, Erné 1967, Heeroma 1969a.

TEKSTCOLLECTIE ALS GEHEEL

Auteurs en acrostichon-problematiek:

Willems 1841, Carton 1848/9, Arnold 1876, Kalff 1883, Winkel Te 1887, Geerts 1909, Van Mierlo 1940, Vreese De 1946, Deleu 1959, Heeroma 1966a, 1967a en 1969b, d, e en f, Liefinck 1967, Overmaat 1967, Erné 1967, Heeroma 1969a, b en c, Erné 1972, Reynaert 1987, 167-168, Janssens c.s. 1992, 13-16, Oosterman 1992a en b, Reynaert 1993a, Hogenelst en Oostrom Van 1995, Oosterman 1995, Reynaert 1999.

Ontstaansmilieu en gebruikssfeer (beperkte keuze):

Casteel Van de 1868, Gilliodts-Van Sseveren 1912, Ledoux jaar ?, Dieperink 1933, Werveke 1950, Heeroma 1966a, 1967b, 1969f, Blockmans e.a. 1972, Erné 1972, Heeroma 1972a, Carlier 1979, Blockmans 1980a en 1980b, Uytven 1982, Roose (red.) 1982, Blockmans 1983, Strohm 1983, Houtte Van 1983, Pleij 1987, Blockmans & Prevenier 1988, Strohm 1990, Oostrom 1992, Janssens 1993, Reynaert 1993a, Hogenelst en Oostrom Van 1995, Oosterman 1995, Haan De & Oosterman 1996, Reynaert 1999.

Stijl en taal in het algemeen:

Geerts 1909, Heeroma 1966a. *Vlaams:* Heeroma (1958), Van Loey (1949), Schonfeld (1969), Van Sterkenburg (1982) en Berteloot, met literatuuropgave (2000).

Duitstalige vormen.

Carton 1948-1949, Kalff 1884, Joncbloet 1889, Verdam 1890, Kalff 1906, Geerts 1909, Kalla 1909, Deleu 1959, Gerritsen & Schludermann 1976, Reynaert 1984, Winkelman 1990, Willaert 1994, Haan

De 1997, Oostrom Van 1992. Uitvoerige literatuuropgave met vaak korte inhoud van allerlei publicaties in Schludermann 1996. Haan De 1999.

Werkwijze Heeroma:

a. Weergave en verdediging eigen principes: Heeroma 1963, 1966a en b, 1967a en b, 1969b, 1970c.

b. Samenvattingen: Meertens 1972-1973., Oostrom Van 1988. Reynaert 1999.

c. Recensies en kritieken: Weisgerber 1966, Lief tinck 1967, Minis 1966-1967, Overmaat 1967, Ern  1967, Lief tinck 1967, King 1968, Gerritsen 1969, Duinhoven 1970, Oostrom Van 1988

GEBEDEN

Arnold 1876 en 1910, Verdam 1890, Vreese De 1940 en 1946, Heeroma 1966a, Lief tinck 1967, Gerritsen 1969, Heeroma 1971b, Deschamps 1972 (126-129), Reynaert 1993, Oosterman 1992b, 1993 en 1995, Hogenelst en Oostrom Van 1995

LIEDEREN

Inhoudelijke aspecten in het algemeen (waaronder genres).

Kalff 1884, Ern  1940, Heeroma 1966, Paepe De 1974, Flach 1992, Reynaert 1992, Janssens c.s. 1992., Reynaert 1999.

Vormgeving (danslied, rijmvormen, metriek, strofenbouw etc.):

Geerts 1909, Ern  1940 (8, 9, 15, 33, 35, 40, 42, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 77, 82, 84, 87, 89, 98, 103, 104, 112, 123, 125, 126); Wolf 1924, Ern  1940, Elslander Van 1953, Deleu 1961, Houtsma 1981 en 1982, Reynaert 1984 en 1987, Rierink 1989 en 1991, Willaert 1989 en 1994, Flach 1992 (beeldspraak), Reynaert 1999, Simon 2000, Willaert 2000a en b, Simon 2000.

Specifieke aandacht voor de liedvormen:

Ern  1940, Vreese De 1940, 1950, Wagenaar-Nolthenius 1952, Lindenburg in Heeroma 1966a, Lief tinck 1967, Heeroma 1967a, Randt Du 1968/9, Lindenburg 1973, Reynaert 1984, Reynaert 1987, Hogenelst & Rierink 1992, Vellekoop 1992, Reynaert 1999, Willaert 2000.

muzieknotatie: Wolf 1925, Lindenburg 1948, Biezen Van 1972 en 1973, Jammers 1975, Biezen Van & Vellekoop 1984, Strohm 1990, Vellekoop 1992, Hogenelst en Rierink 1992, Vellekoop 2000.

Vertolking:

Vellekoop 1992, Willaert 1992 a en b, Lassche 1996, Vellekoop 2000, Willaert 2000a.

Buitenlandse invloeden:

Lindenburg 1948 en 1959, Heeroma 1966a, Wagenaar-Nolthenius 1969, Jammers 1975, Willaert 1989, 1994, Haan De 1999.

Melodie en prosodie (tussen haakjes de besproken liederen).

Lindenburg 1948, 1950 (98, 125), 1966 (in Heeroma 1966a), 1973; Schelp 1966 (98, 125); Wagenaar-Nolthenius 1968/70 (14, 15, 33, 40, 42, 43, 59, 64, 66, 72, 73, 74, 77, 82, 84, 87, 104, 106, 123, 126, 133); Jammers 1975 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 79, 85, 86, 90, 98, 113); Biezen Van 1984 (27, 68, 74, 79, 85, 86, 90, 98, 113, 126).

Inhoudelijk apart besproken liederen.

Heeroma 1966, zeer vele, zie register op 585-588 van zijn boek, **1:** Paepe De 1974, **5:** Paepe De 1974; **7:** Paepe De 1974; **8:** Stutterheim 1975; **11:** Paepe De 1974; **12:** Paepe De 1974, **13:** Deleu 1961; **15:** Dewitte 1994, Reynaert 1999 (p 193); **16:** Gessler 1940; **17:** Stalpaert 1969, **18:** Paepe De 1974; **19:** Heeroma 1973; **20:** Arnold 1876, Stutterheim 1975; **21:** Deleu 1961; **22:** Arnold, Heeroma 1969e, Paepe De 1974, Willaert 2000; **23:** Arnold, Willaert 2000a; **24, 25** en **28:** Paepe De 1974, **27:** Flach 1992; **29:** Heeroma 1969e; **30:** Arnold, Paepe De 1974; **31:** Arnold; **33:** Heeroma 1969c; **34:** Arnold, Heeroma 1969c; **35:** Ern  1949, Heeroma 1969c; **36:** Heeroma 1969e; **37:** Deleu 1959; **39:** Arnold, Ern  1967; **41:** Heeroma; **44:** Arnold; **45:** Heeroma 1969e, Vellekoop 1992; **46:** Paepe De 1974; **47:** Arnold, **48:** Deleu 1961; **49:** Heeroma 1967a; **50:** Arnold; **52:** Heeroma 1967/68; **53:** Heeroma 1969e;

54: Joldersma 1984; **55:** Reynaert 1999; **66:** Heeroma 1969e. **70:** Paepe De 1974. **72:** Gerritsen 1969, Heeroma 1969. Heeroma 1969d. Paepe De 1974. **73:** Stutterheim 1975. **75:** Heeroma 1969e; **76:** Deleu 1959. **78:** Paepe De 1974. Stutterheim 1975. **82:** Willaert 2000b; **85:** Heeroma 1968c. Flach 1992.; **87:** Deleu 1959; **90:** Heeroma 1969; **91:** Heeroma 1969e. **94:** Paepe De 1974; **95:** Reynaert 1996 (1999); **96:** Paepe De 1974. **97:** Heeroma 1969d. 1971b; **98:** Kalff 1883. Schelp 1966. Ern  1967. Heeroma 1969a. 1969b. 1969c. 1969e. 1973; **99:** Kalff 1883. Heeroma 1969d en 1969f. Reynaert 1995 (1999). Gerritsen/Wilmink 2000; **100:** Kalff. Heeroma 1969d en 1969e. Coetzee 1969/70. Gerritsen/Wilmink 2000; **101:** Kalff 1883. Heeroma 1969d en f; Reynaert 1986 (1999); **109:** Paepe De 1974; **110:** Reynaert 1999; **113** en **117.** Heeroma 1969e; **122:** Gerritsen 1969, Heeroma 1969d; **125:** Schelp 1966. Heeroma 1967/8. Flach 1992. Bree De 1994; **135:** Heeroma 1969e; **139:** Paepe De 1974. **140:** Heeroma 1969E, Paepe De 1974. Rens 1980. Lassche 1994. **143:** Heeroma 1967a. 1969e; **144:** Heeroma 1967a. 1969d en 1969j. **145:** Heeroma 1967a. 1969d; **146:** Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1967a; **147:** Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1967a.

INTERPRETATIE VAN DE GEDICHTEN IN HET DERDE DEEL

I: Carton 1848/9. Kalff 1883 (259-260. 588-592). Geerts 1909. Mierlo Van 1940 (39-40. 91-92). Ern  1940. Lindenburg 1948. Deleu 1959. Heeroma 1966a. Ern  1967. Heeroma 1968a. Heeroma 1969b. c. g. Heeroma 1970. Duinhoven 1970. Ern  1970. Heeroma 1971a. Reynaert 1999 (Lied van Jeugd en introductielied van de minnaar). Willaert 2000a (Lied van Jeugd).

II: Geerts 1909. Ern  1940. Mierlo Van 1940. Lindenburg 1948. Heeroma 1966a. Deleu 1959. Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1969h. Duinhoven 1970. Lassche 1994 (slotlied).

IIIA: Mierlo Van 1940.

IIIB: Heeroma 1971 b.

III: Heeroma 1966a. 44 v.

IV: Heeroma 1966a en 1969c. Ern  1967. Heeroma 1969g. Glier 1971. 270. Reynaert 1999.

V: Heeroma 1966a maakt verspreid opmerkingen over dit gedicht (66-98). Gerritsen 1969, 205-210). Verder Heeroma 1967a. Ern  1967. Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1967a. 1968a, 1970.

VI: Heeroma 1966a. maakt verspreid opmerkingen. 1967a. Gerritsen (1969, 209-210). Oosterman 1995. 153.

VII: Heeroma 1966. 44 v

VIII: Winkel Te 1922. Mierlo Van 1940. Deleu 1961 (met een verbeterde tekst. interpretatie en uitvoerige rijmschema's). Heeroma (1966a. verspreid over 66-98). Liefinck 1967. Gerritsen 1969. Glier 1971. 271. n.. 194. Rierink 1991.

IX: Heeroma 1966a. 44 v., 1969a.

X: Deleu 1959. Heeroma 1966a. 44 v., Oosterman 1995. 144.

XI: Heeroma 1966a. Oosterman 1995. 137

XIII. Mierlo Van 1940. Heeroma 1966a (44 v.). Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1969f. g en h. 1971 b en 1972a. Liefinck 1972. Ern  1972. Reynaert 1999. 17-20. 38-39.

XIV: Heeroma 1966a en g. Ern  1967.

XV: Heeroma 1966a (o a 75. 83-90. 94-95). Liefinck 1967. Ern  1967. Liefinck 1967. Heeroma 1967a. 1968a. Heeroma 1969g en h. 1970. Gerritsen 1969. 205-208.

BIJLAGE A

Overzicht van de woordenschat bij hoofdstuk 4

(De asterisk bij een woord verwijst naar de bespreking in hoofdstuk vier
zie verder de toelichting onder 4.1)

De flora

akolei * II: 45; G5: 2 [Mariabloem, symb. de ootmoedigheid, geneest de begeerte].

allende I: 2257 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

averstro L56: 19 [symb. de nietigheid].

blad I. 232,2238. V. 58,107; VIII. 143. XII: 336; L122. 18 [symb. soms iets dat weinig voorstelt].

bloem I. 132,173,203; II: 1820; V. 8,52. VI: 38,40,57,65. 67. 85,107. 129,144,149. 152,162,185. 188,193,198. 285,288,300; VII: 286. XI. 62; XII: 312,318; XIII: 8,9,10,12,169. XIV: 667; XV 463. G4: 2; L41:25 [geld]; L48. 2,17; L97: 2; L99:16 [symb. in het algemeen de levenskracht en levensvreugde, ook Maria of de geliefde].

boom * I: 82,102,473,477,534,560,2237,2250,2255,2260; II: 47,56,58,1872; V:158,164; IX: 85; XIV: 5; G1: 365; L139: 23,58 [verwijst in het algemeen naar de cyclus van leven en dood, verrijzenis; de verdorde boom wijst naar de zondaar].

boon IX: 44; XIII. 257. [wie hem in het 'gebak' aantreft, is de gelukkige].

bos I: 272; IV: 38, L120: 8 [soms dezelfde functie als forest].

braam I: 700. XV: 167,170; G5 54; L110: 9 [symb. vaak een beschermende functie, vgl. 'doorn'].

claghe I:2352 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin]

claver *: XII: 335 [symb. de onzekerheid; driebladig blad: de drie-eenheid; vierbladig blad: het kruis, een geluksbrenger].

cnoppen VIII. 135 [symb. het ontluikende leven]

corsoude * I: 28 [Mariabloem, symb. de lijdzaamheid en goedertierenheid].

cranc-gheluc I: 2263 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

crancheit I: 2352 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

cruut * I: 82,130,165,654,769,1018; II: 1820; XII: 283,288; G5: 247; L83: 9,23,27 [vaak met genezende of opwekkende werking; ook wel de minne zelf].

doorn * I: 216,700; V: 50,115,119,126,131,133; XV: 483; G6: 143 [bezit symb. vaak een beschermende functie; duidt soms ook aan dat een vrouw een ontorende handeling ondergaat]

eenicheit I: 2257 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

eglantier * I: 131; V: 56,106,113,130, XII: 282 [wilde. roos, symb. de jonge liefde; de rozen symboliseren ook vaak de geliefde zelf].

eik * II: 57 [de. verblijfplaats van de kluzenaar, door het harde hout vaak symb. voor de onsterfelijkheid of duurzaamheid].

eyghin eerde I: 2266 [symb. het fruit van een boom in de ommuurde tuin: koekje van eigen deeg]

forest XII: 108; XIV: 19 [een plaats voor de kluzenaar om zich in contemplatie terug te trekken]

fructus (fructum): XV: 444, G5: 227, G7: 81.

fruit * I: 2239,2247;2257,2270,2334,2270; VIII: 177; XV: 444; G5: 227,238; G7: 81 [symb. diverse geestelijke en lichamelijke toestanden].

ga(e)rdelijn L122: 8 [een fallussymbool]; L129: 31 [de geliefde, in het hart van de minnaar geplant].

gewas V: 169.

goudsbloem * I: 801 [symb. de waardigheid en trouw].

gras I: 101,234; II: 44; V: 66; XII. 102,134,318,333; L97: 26 [door de groene kleur vaak een opwekkend aspect in het landschap].

graszode I: 88 [de bron van zoete lucht].

haag I 272, II 53 [de afsluiting van de *locus amoenus*].

het groen(e) I 83, V 89; VI 119,130,137, XII. 394.

jammer I 2262 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin]

Jhesminne G5: 220 [symb. de beminnelijkheid; een aanspreking voor Maria].

kruid I. 82,130,165,203,283,654,769,1018; II 1820; XII 283,288; G5: 247, L83: 9,23,27 [vaak met een genezende, opwekkende werking]

lelie * II 53,361; G4: 28, G5 357 [symb. de reinheid [charitas] en majesteit, vaak toegepast op Maria en de geliefde].

linde * I 228,235,252,468 [de liefdesboom *Waerscu* die het gebied van *Twifel* en de *Burchgrave* scheidt]

loof II: 44.

margelleine [marjolein] I: 139 [een zinvol element in het landschap als de minnaar op weg gaat; symb. van de vertroosting; een opwekkend zenuwmiddel].

netel I: 700 [bezit een afschermdende functie, bewaakt de zedelijke reinheid van de vrouw]

noot I. 2271 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

peer VIII: 161,168,175 [met een dieptepsychologische achtergrond: de vrouw: oermoeder Eva met de mensen als haar vruchten].

pollioen [vlooienkruid] I. 139 [de minnaar ziet dit kruid groeien als hij zijn moeizame tocht begint, zo'n middel tegen vele kwalen heeft hij wel nodig]

rank V 61.

rijs I. 2242; L122: 8-11, 13; L129: 34 [het mannelijk lid].

roos * I 170,173,798; II: 444; V 57,108,113,121; VIII. 128,133,140,145; IX. 63, XII 270; XIII: 4,10; XIV. 670; XV: 255,410,471,544; G5. 1,89,131, L97: 8,29; L99. 4,8,20,22,26,30; L101: 5,6,15,33,35, 36,37,46,51, L120. 50; L139: 1,9,13,16,22,24,35,39,46,55 [liefdesbloem; de verheven schoonheid, symb. Maria en de geliefde]

rozier * II 440; VI:35; VIII: 141; L139: 5 [de rozengarde of de roos zelf].

rozengarde I: 131; L48: 1; L99: 15 [de bloeiplaats van de egelantieren, een liefdesoord].

suerheit I 2246 [symb. het fruit van één der bomen in de ommuurde tuin].

stoc L121: 7, L38: 18 [het mannelijk lid].

stro L142: 18 ; L144: 11 [iets wat weinig voorstelt].

tac I. 2242, II: 1767

telg I: 230; V 110 [een tak van de rozier of van de linde]

viool [violet] II: 45; L34: 1 [symb. de nederigheid, bescheidenheid; tevens de voorjaarsbloem na de rauwe winter]

vrucht IV 86; V: 159,168,185,187; VI 214,300; X 83; XV: 40,214,444,445; G1: 127,365; G5: 224,227, G7 81; L29: 1,40, L68: 25; L116. 43, L119. 8 [soms aanduiding van Jezus, Maria of de geliefde].

wortel XII. 65; L97. 19.

zaad IV 228, X: 83; L95: 330; L97. 30.

Fauna [4.4]

De vogels [4.4.1]

cockude * [koekoek] I: 81 [een voorjaarsbode].

duif V: 109,111,118,123,132,134,145,155,174 [symb. de zachtmoedigheid en liefde -eigenlijk vreemd, want zo zachtmoedig is de duif als dier niet -: aanduiding van de geliefde].

lewerke [leeuwerik] I 81 [door het loodrechte opstijgen verkondiger van Gods woord].

nachtegaal I: 81; II. 49,445 [symb. de liefde en het smachtend verlangen].

nachtuil [*huwerhane*] L42. 2,7; L116: 45.

valk VIII: 205,212 [de overwinnaar van de zinnelijkheid]
vogel I: 78,163,204,214; II: 48; IV: 137; XII: 73,107, 278, L52 5; L125: 1,7,9,17.

De dieren [4.4.2]

beer* XIII: 31,129 [de Forestiers van den Witten Beer]
beest IV: 137; IX: 4; XIV: 467; G1: 97.
dier IV: 137; G5 363.
hond VIII: 90; G5 114.
kalf G1: 328; X 193.
koe X. 193.
lam VII: 264; G3: 61 [Christus], XIV. 446; L55: 40 [symb. de zachte geaardheid]
lyoen VII: 12.
mossel X: 173 [symb. iets van geringe waarde].
paard I. 268; II. 494; VIII: 188; L1: 5, L53: 54. In VII. 79,89,96,99,101,109 [symb. voor de tot misstappen geneigde menselijke natuur].
ros G5: 190 [der hellen ros = de duivel]
wild I: 2284.
wolf L55, 50 [symb. de hardvochtige geaardheid]
zwijn* I: 28; X: 62,246,261; IV: 491; L12: 21; L16. 39; L53. 38 [het varken, meestal pejoratief gebruikt].

Landschappelijke elementen en architectuur [4.5]

april L2: 27; L44. 10, L129: 8; L130. 6; L136. 5 [presenteert na de kille winter de hoopvolle verwachting].
berg IV: 138; G6: 100; L120: 8.
bloeien II: 47; V: 57,106,141; VIII: 142; XI: 83; XV: 410; L99: 17.
borne I: 109,112,113,138; II: 49,51; XII: 457,518,526,54 6,552,559; XII: 232 [zie fontein].
burcht/boorch* L49, 31 [gevangenis]; I: 491,606,611,617,678,688,880 [de geliefde dame].
casteel I: 177 [de jonge dames die de minnaar aanschouwt tijdens zijn dolage], 476,479,1865,2011, VII: 184.
contreie I 85.
conduut XII: 230,456,530,534,536,542 [voedingskanaal voor de bron, geestelijk: de presentatie van de liefdeseigenschappen].
corentas [opgetast koren] L71: 9, L86: 11 [een plaats voor seksueel getinte liefde].
dal V. 62; XIII: 112; XV: 417; G1. 92,331, G5. 160; G6: 26, G7: 36; L5. 39; L55: 36, L79. 23; L120: 8.
dolen/doleren I: 41,89,145,189,1028,1460; II: 314,1715,1889; III: 3; VI: 51,52; VIII: 189; IX: 28, X. 16,240; XI: 7; XII: 254,265; XIII: 119; XV: 21,122,266,268,379,395; G2: 19,100,110; L16: 33; L147: 16.
eb(be) II: 23; L35. 14; L100: 26; L128: 2 [in combinatie met 'vloet' symb. de wisselvalligheid van het lot].
fonteine* I: 96,105,112,118,129,137, II: 50,54,328; VI: 9; XI: 11,12,13,14,15,70; XII. 1,77,92,94,121,132,137,142,144,224,238,395,406,426,438,447,461,499,522,551,553,653,661,563, XIII: 41; XV 408; G2: 126; G4: 8, 53; G5: 91 [attribution in de *locus amoenus* en vaak een aanduiding voor Maria of de geliefde dame]

hemel I: 939; II: 551,1590,1690, III: 88,181; IV: 275, V:97; VII: 138,143,307; XII: 128,291; XIII: 270; XV: 255,410,468,471,538,539,546; G1: 79,141,369; G3: 11; G4: 37,52; G5: 247, 263; G6: 60; G7: 1,27,77, L99: 8,22,30, L112: 8
hof I: 1663,2215,2236, II: 647,674,883,1493,1663; IX: 41; X: 73; G6: 35.
kerk II: 1374, XV: 339; G1: 362
lucht [uitspansel] IV: 139; XV: 171,173; G1: 366; L29: 3.
maras [moeras] L97: 21 [symb. poel der zondigheid].
mei V: 54; L2: 27, L44: 10, L45: 19,22; L129: 13,18,24; L130: 6; L133: 1,12,23; L136: 1,13; L129: 3,4,34,35. [bloeimaand, maand van de ontluikende liefde].
muur I: 219,346,443,699,2231,2282; VII: 185; XIII: 168; G1: 309.
nest VI: 278; XII: 74
pade I: 67, 69; XII: 317
pael I: 477 [grenspaal, scheiding tussen het doleren en het gericht handelen, zie *linde*]; L62: 4.
paradijs I: 224,1726; XIV: 688; G3: 60.
planeet II: 1693; IV: 27; G1: 369.
ploegen III: 43, VI: 214; L85: 16
poort I: 178,300,701,718,740,1496,1713,2202,2205; VII: 185,188,191, XIII: 168,172, 173,179,190, 194,252; L85: 29 [in de droomallegorieën de toegang tot de vrouw].
prayerie I: 147 [hier: liefelijke streek].
prieel I: 175; II: 52,360,438; VIII: 94; XII: 268,319,324; L21: 1 [aangename plaats in de *locus amoenus*].
rivier IV: 138, G1: 364.
rozegaerde I: 131; L48: 1; L99: 15
seizoen V: 108; VIII: 38; XV: 128
slijk G5: 104; L101: 25; L120: 13 .
sneeuw I: 567; III: 129, X: 214; L65: 14; L100: 2.
strate I: 202, G5: 55 [zie *weg*].
stroom XII: 62; L46: 17, L120: 45.
toren/torreel I: 178,288,299,315, 335,346 [het onderkomen van *Twifel*], 513, 565 [het gezicht van de geliefde dame]; II: 450,1375, VII: 18; XII: 269; XII: 254; L106: 11
trade [landstreek; voetspoor] I: 70,551; XV: 159; G5: 38.
vallei I: 86; V: 53 [plaats in de *locus amoenus*].
vergiere/virgier II: 439; V: 55,65, VI: 33 [een lusthof in de *locus amoenus*]
veste VII: 185.
vloed II: 23, VI: 191; XI: 116; G1: 16,219, L35: 14, L53: 45, L100: 26; L124: 11; L128: 2 [zie onder 'eb']
waaien I: 88 [verspreid in de *locus amoenus* een zoete geur]
wald L120: 8.
wandelen I: 791,2283; V: 55,89; XII: 76,498; XIV: 22,28,73; XV: 294,586.
wandeling [maken] XII: 391; XIV: 2.
weg * I: 38,144,201,205,231,308,477,482,485,488,1413,1420,1491; II: 313,416,1076, 1085,1199, 1496; VII: 3; VIII: 188; IX: 61; X: 16,275; XI: 7; XV: 6,20,159,160, 213,266,272,397; G1: 222,349; G3: 86; G3: 42; G5: 259, G6: 222; L5: 3; L55: 2; L97: 10 [vaak symbolisch gebruikt in de zin van de smalle en moeilijke weg die naar het goede doel leidt, men moet het *buten weighe gaen* vermijden. De 'onbetreden' weg naar de burcht wijst op de maagdelijkheid van de vrouwe].
water IV: 138.
wijngaard L99: 5 [symb. toespeling op Maria].
wind G1: 366, L35: 13; L55: 47; L56: 26; L58: 4,24; L76: 18; L89: 4 [symb. de wisselvalligheid, onbegrijpelijke onbestendigheid].

wind G1: 366; L35: 13; L55: 47; L56: 26; L58: 4,24; L76: 18; L89: 4 [symb de wisselvalligheid, de onbegrijpelijke onbestendigheid],
winter XII: 64; XV: 126.
woestijn I: 2284; G3: 41.
zaaien I: 15; III: 41; XV: 39
zee IV: 138.
zomer XV: 126.

Begrippen op anorganisch niveau [4.6]

[edel]stenen I: 2024; II: 505, 509; L1: 29
ijzer I: 251, 2216; L71: 34
ivoor XII: 227, 520
glas L100: 2.
goud* I: 788, 801, 808, 941, 2022; II: 451, 505, IV: 140, XII: 85, 152, 451; L1: 29; L38: 15; L48: 28; L131: 12.
karbonkel L97: 4. Zie **robijn***.
marmer [albaestre]. I: 269, 568; [maerber] II: 449, 451
robijn* I: 573, VI: 171; L97: 4.
staal I: 519; L71: 34
topaas L97: 4
zilver I: 1532, 1696, 2152; IV: 140, 196; G6: 145; L1: 29, L38: 15; L48: 28

Enkele werkingsaspecten en zintuiglijke gewaarwordingen [4.7]

bernen/branden VIII: 24,25,160; XV: 484; L104: 8; L112: 19; L134: 21; L140:8.
beschouden L53: 32; L139: 60.
bescijn(en) I: 85,146,275,139; II: 1822; XII: 464; L9: 1,6, L83: 9,27, L97: 29, L138: 2.
bescout (verschroeid) L139: 60 ('*bescout van tswifels gloede*').
blecken(d/e) II: 450, IV: 275; XII: 85,268.
brant (zww) II: 173; X: 129, L129: 12.
claer I: 99,104,113,215,223,275,518,597,1790; II: 51; IV: 97,189, VI: 101,137; XI: 9,128; XII:85,92, 142,204,518, 546; G1: 328; G2: 117; G3: 95; G5: 184; 6: 47,183,200b; L119: 4, L86: 44, L94: 13; L95: 11, L29: 3; L39: 11, L98: 7; L104: 7; L112: 20.
claerheit * I: 153,199, G5: 31,172 [zie 'licht'].
claerlic I: 287,292, IV: 51; VII: 54; X: 23; XII: 242; XIII: 105, XV: 326; G5: 56,211,252
dach I: 208,636,710,978,1043,1222,1864,2040,2051,2092,2108,2253,2359; II: 58,87,198, 382,405, 418,558,598,648,719,781,796,868,893,998,1022,1075,1376,1382,1383, 1562,1617,1796,1869,1870; IV: 42,111; V: 23,91; VI: 109; VII: 67,204; VIII: 31,76,142,152,178; IX: 2,15; X: 148; XI: 129,131; XII: 314,337,479; XIII: 135,238, XIV: 6,47,386,424; XV: 68,72,152,162, G1: 48,83,212; G5: 171; G6: 60,208,237; G7: 60,83; L1: 8; L17: 41; L22: 1, L27: 13; L41: 15; L47: 1; L49: 21; L54: 1; L63: 1,6,10, L72: 5,18, L74: 9; L83: 5,14, L85: 10, L87: 4; L93: 20, L94: 20; L102: 10; L107: 26; L108: 4,24; L114: 5; L118: 51; L120: 5,18,26; L128: 7; L129: 4,35; L131: 8; L134: 3,36; L135: 18, L136: 5; L137: 19; L139: 38; L140: 7,14,21; L144: 8; L146: 12
dag(h)en I: 77,733,2217,2296; II: 61,606,847; XI: 79; XII: 50; XIII: 13,34, G1: 215; G2: 45, L65: 10.
dagheraet XII: 55.
geluid [maken] I: 215.

geschal [van vogels] II: 48. [zang] I: 821.934.1887; [geluid] I: 755.1124; II: 518. L17. 44; L86: 26.
geur(en) [lucht verspreiden] I: 73.89. XII. 82 [zie 'lucht'].
gleinstren I: 681.
gloet IV: 217; G1: 283; L53: 31; L100: 40; L134: 21; L139: 60 ('*bescout van tswifels gloede*').
gloien I: 574.
horen 125x voorkomend, niet gespecificeerd.
licht * I: 164.187.237.242.275.286.311.455.566.681.1498.2083; X: 86; XII: 247.464. XV: 292; XV: 289.294.473.; G4: 1; G5: 5.68.171 (adj.); L30: 1; L116: 44
lucht [licht] X: 86
lucht * [geur] I: 89.295.2102; VI: 72.301, XII: 183.282.322; L119: 5.
maaien XV: 40.
mane IV: 139.276; G1: 367; G3: 57; G5: 157, L9: 1.6.11; L42: 9; L86: 2.
minnevier L104: 8.
ontsteken. II: 173.1702; XV: 79; G1: 199; G6: 24.
proeven (algemeen) 23x, niet nader gespecificeerd.
raeye * II: 1824; G5: 6.67.159; L97: 26.28.
rayen (van de zon) L97: 26.28; G5: 159.
reuk /ruiken V: 73.91.130, V: 59.107, VIII: 128; 12: 182.184.284.286.477; L97: 7.24.31 [zie 'lucht'].
schaduw I: 235; L37: 7.
schicht * (minne-) I: 765.1398.1499; XV: 374 [doet het liefdesvuur ontstaan]; I: 294. II: 694.872. 1210 [lans, pijl]; XV: 382 [symb. de hemelse genade], XII: 247.465 [figuurlijk gebruikt].
schijn(sel) I: 237.278.523.1364.1774, II: 1242. VI: 57; G3: 11.50; L3: 6; L5: 7.35; L9: 4; L21: 14; L22: 7; L28: 12; L32: 10; L39: 11; L46: 20, L48: 19; L54: 22; L55: 70, L69: 4, L75: 10; L79: 7; L81: 6; L94: 8; L98: 7; L102: 8, L103: 2,10; L112: 3; L117: 32, L128: 12; L129: 28; L132: 4, L137: 14.33, L141: 1,15.29.43.
schijnen [van de zon] II: 1041,1818; L83: 9,27; L97: 85; L138: 23
schijnsel I: 189.278.455.519.523, VI:57; G3: 11.5 0, L141: 1,15.29.43
sciten (minlic-) I: 1398 [bron van het minnevuur].
scinen I: 189.519.1027; II: 1195; XII: 503, L51: 13; L147: 17
scote * II: 1191, XII: 248 [als schicht'].
smaak/smaken (algemeen) 24x, niet gespecificeerd.
son(neschijs) I: 84.87.150.152.293; II: 451,1041.1816; III: 178, IV: 139.276; VI: 101; XI: 128; XII: 66.165. G1: 367; G5:158, G7: 68, L9: 1.6.11; L29: 3; L37: 8; L39: 11; L42: 9; L83: 9.27, L97: 25; L98: 7; L104: 7; L112: 20; L120: 4.9, L138: 23; L141: 1,15.24.29.43
sonlicht IIIB: 138, XI: 128; L29: 3, L104: 7; L112: 20; L141: 24.
sonne II: 451; IV: 276; VI: 101, G5: 158; L9: 1.6.11; L39: 11, L141: 1,15.29.43 [soms symb. van Maria of geliefde].
spaerke * XV: 74.78 [niet te blussen liefdesvonk].
sproken IV: 218 [aanwakkeren van het vuur]
sterre V: 139; G1: 369; G5: 170 [soms symb. van Maria of de geliefde]
strale * II: 503.639.642.1536; XI: 29; XII: 261.529 [o a. blik uit de vensters (ogen van de vrouw)].
verbliden [n.a.v. de natuur] II: 442; XIV: 20; L47: 5
verbranden L104: 9; L139: 58.
verclaren I: 292.1148.1497; II: 155.511; XIII: 206.155, XIV: 474; G5: 68.287; L30: 2; L99: 18.
verclaren ['verhelderd' (=verhefd) worden door de blikken uit de ogen van de vrouw] I: 292.1497; G5: 68; L99: 18
verlichten XV: 455, G1: 125; G4: 60, G7: 59.
vier G1: 199.
vierlijke: II: 173.

vlam: XV. 78

voghelzanc XII 288 [aspect in de *locus amoenus*, onderstreept het gelukzalige gevoel].

voncken. L104: 8.

zang [v.d. vogels] II. 49,445.

zien (algemeen) 194x, niet gespecificeerd.

zingen [van de vogels] I: 79,163.

Antinomieën van de vorige rubriek

bedauwen G1: 61, G6: 21.

blusschen XV· 80

dauw · XV 439; G5: 172 en G7: 25 [Maria is 'shemels dauwe']; L64: 11; L97· 8; L136. 25 [symb. vaak 'verkwikking'].

dauwen L136: 25.

deimsterheit G4: 1; G6: 178.

donker(en) XV: 291,454; G1: 125; L99· 18

nach(te) I: 445,636,1043,2092,2253; II: 87,198,719,868,1617,1797,1870,1918; V: 23; VI. 109; VIII. 31,76,142,152; XI: 72; XII: 479; XIII. 238; XIV: 47,386,424; XV: 162. G1: 212, G4· 67; G5· 170; G6: 60,237; G7. 60. L42: 1,5,6,11; L47. 1, L49. 21; L63: 4; , L65: 10; L83· 5,14; L87: 4; L91· 4; L93: 20; L94: 20. L99 18; L102: 10; L107: 26; L108· 4,24; L114: 5; L116· 2; L120: 26; L128: 7; L129· 4,35. L131: 8; L134: 36; L135: 18; L137· 19; L140· 7,14,21.

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De getallen [4.8]

acht VIII: 59; XIV. 468,469; XV: 118. G4: 81, L11: 9, L41: 19,30; L54: 10, L55: 32,49, L60. 26; L89: 3,11; L93. 21; L116: 30, L144: 11

drie * I: 761,794,921,937,957,1022,1065,1277,1730,2014,2017,2074,2087,2243,2247,2255; II· 385, 397,398,773,789,1175,1484,1506,1520,1792,1796; IV· 69; VI: 111,209; XIII: 37,45,123; XIV: 190,201,293,507; XV: 494,563; G1: 341; G6: 124,208; G11: 150; L61: 13; L86: 37; L88: 1; L97· 28 [Drierande: XV: 187; Drievoudich(ede): G2: 74, G5: 44, G6: 29b].

duizend I. 831, XII. 590. L28: 22. L96: 24, L109. 18, L118: 18,21.

een * door het grote aantal geen vermeldingen.

honderd I: 831

negen XV· 570

tien I: 831,1597.

twee I. 293,367,374,477,514,566,629,693,696,791, 968, 1116,1127,1754,1871,2085, 2217, 2257; II· 90,167,469, 581,608,758,799,1182,1296,1309,1559,1860; VII: 124,172; VIII: 158; XII· 463,538; XIII: 127,134,185,196, 205,208,215,225,229,235, 238, 245,247; XIV: 189; XV. 59,64, 84,393,515; G5· 241, L21: 2,23; L37: 7, L44: 8, L52: 15; L5 4 3; L55: 1,9; L65: 2; L68: 37; L76: 34; L78: 3; L86: 5,6; L90· 5.

vier I· 631,1823,2170,2260; II: 386,398,1485; III· 125; VII: 22,25,273; XII: 191,336; XIV: 53,295, XV: 105; G4: 8 2; L61; 14; L104: 8; L139· 57.

vijf I. 612,626,2263,2265; II: 387,400,633,11481,1486,1490,1491,1495,1691; IV: 69; III· 132; XI: 114; XII: 201; XIII: 204,205; XIV: 297, XV: 109,515,516, G2: 128; G4 69; G6. 228; L61: 16; L120: 29.

zes I: 1125,2266; II: 970; XV· 113

zeven * I: 2269,2273; II: 160,1476; XI: 117,124; XII: 50,524,542; XII: 252; XIII: 176. 252, XIV: 108, 305,587. XV. 117,517, G2. 94; L71· 10.

De kleuren [4.9]

blauw * I: 939. L16: 46 [symb. de standvastigheid en trouw]
geel ~ L16: 46 [symb. deugd, aanzien, het hoogste geluk (overeenkomst met de kleur van het goud en de zon); evenwel ook najver en jaloezie]
grijs/ grauw * I. 97,232,315,899,940,953,959,1616,2309,2311,2313; II 522, 626; L36: 18,21; L48: 4,43; L86 30. L121: 5 (2x) [symb. treurigheid en zware arbeid]
groen * I: 83,140,197,899,1495. V: 58,89,107. VI: 112,119,124,130,137; VIII: 95,135, 143; XII: 269,317,361,394; XV. 126; L16: 16; L103 7,15; L140: 45 [kleur van de prille liefde, de vrolijkheid].
rood ~ I. 574,798,959; II: 657. III 37. V: 57; VI: 112,168,171; X. 172. XI 67; G5:131; L5. 41, L75: 43. L21 34; L10: 22,50 [brandende liefde, de begeerte].
wit * I: 289,567,568,583,597,797,943,953; II 449,1602; VI: 112; VII: 83,196; XII: 164, 227; XIII: 129; G1: 123; L2: 1. L16: 1, L34: 1; L86: 6 [symb. de reinheid en onschuld, ook de hoop].
zwart * I. 669, L2. 1, L36. 17,21; L103: 15 [symb. de treurigheid, het ongeluk, de rouw]

Nog niet vermelde dingallegorieën [4.10]

(h)abijt I: 583,899,939,959; II 61,523; VI: 229; VIII: 156,157 (zie 'cleit'*)
boog / moordboog I: 502. 639,641,695,2109 [wapen waarmee *Begrjip* lasterpraatjes verspreid].
breidel VII. 80,95 [de redelijkheid om de mens in toom te houden].
caproen. I: 983,1146,1614,1906; II: 256,1098,1330. XII:403; L16 51; L17: 4 [soms teken van de dienstbaarheid of bepaalde waardigheid].
cleit ~ I: 2310 [de kleur van de kleding symb. vaak de geestelijke (of soms lichamelijke) gesteldheid].
glavie VII: 111,115 [symb. harnas om de mens voor het kwade te behoeden].
harp VII: 212,216,220,225,229,237,243,247 [symb. het lichaam van Christus].
hart * komt 141x voor, vindplaatsen niet opgenomen. [symb. vaak de trouw aan Got of de geliefde]
hoet * I: 171,898; XIV: 7; XV: 46,543, L48: 2,40 [soms een gevlochten bloemenkrans als blijk van genegenheid].
jacke: VII: 83 [kleur en sterkte duidt de gesteldheid van het geweten aan].
krans * L16. 59, [zie hoed].
kroon * I. 803; II: 508, VI: 100,194; IX: 47; XI: 2; XII: 451; XIII. 258, XIV: 688; G6: 142; G7: 67,77. [teken van hoge waardigheid] Zie ook 'hoet'*.
land (van Duchte, van Venus) II: 1197,1310,1662,1664 [de minnedienst die bepaalde verplichtingen oproept].
livreie I: 1744,1775 (zie 'cleit'*).
leen II: 1877 [als 'land'].
maelge VII: 82,174 [ringetje van het 'pansier', symb. de bescherming tegen de zonden].
mouwe I: 940 [de kleuren hebben vaak een symbolische betekenis]
ommeCleit VI: 124; G4:5; L54:40; L115:4. L140. 15 [symb. soms een bepaalde geestelijke gesteldheid, zie *cleit**]
ondanc I: 2177 [het koord waarmee de minnaar geboeid wordt].
oordene I: 2309 [het grijze ordegewaad dat leed symboliseert] (zie 'cleit'*).
pansier: VII: 160,175,195 [symb. de tien geboden die de mens beschermen].
pijl II: 2169 [als 'straal']
raye *. II: 1824, G5: 6,67,159; L97: 26,28 [*drie rayen*, beeld van de Goddelijke drieenheid, zie 4.7.2]
roede II. 1095 [symb. de vereiste *Soberheit* tijdens de minnedienst].
schicht * II: 694 [als 'straal', zie 4.7.2]
schot ~ II: I 1191 [als 'straal', zie 4.7.2].

sleutel I: 300,716,745,2010,2014,2074,2087,2014,2131,2136,2200; XII: 225,227,304,459,515,520; L53: 55 [symb. ontsluit soms de toegang tot de geliefde als men over de vereiste eigenschappen beschikt].

sporen VII: 103,108 [symb. de wil om de mens in toom te houden].

straal * II: 503,639,642 [pjl. symb. de lasterpraatjes van *Begrijp*, zie 4.7.2].

tresoor G2: 125; IV: 113 [symb. het troostende hart].

verdriet I: 2200 [de sleutel die de deur *zuere* ontsluit].

wieke I: 767,1690,1692,1697,1871,1873,2223 [tampons in de wonden van de minnaar, symb. de minnedeugd van het helen].

wiel II 24 [rad van het noodlot, het avontuur].

wond I: 682,1365,1694,1698,1867,1874,1926,2028,2219,2228,2332,2360. II: 1169,1212; V: 145; VII: 43, XI: 61,65, 66; XII: 261; XIV: 114,127, XV: 521,552, G1: 100; G2: 44,121, G6: 156, L120: 29; L130.8 [symb. de minnesmart].

zuere I: 2192 [de toegangsdeur naar sombere ommuurde tuin].

zwaard VII 81,116,117,123,130,165,180 [symb. om tot zonde geneigde lichaam van de geest te scheiden]; XV: 165 [een afweermiddel tegen de zonden]

Letterwoorden en acrostichons [4.11]

adriaen G4: 46-52 [één der pelgrims]

brughe in V [de beginletters van zeven Brugse poortnamen die de maatschappelijke deugden symboliseren].

calle L31: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 5-regelige strofen]

cateline G4: 12-19 [één der pelgrims]

coppin G4: 68-73 [één der pelgrims].

gheraert G4: 20-27 [één der pelgrims].

ianniin G4 28-34 [één der pelgrims].

ianianianhvlst G4: 74-87 [één der pelgrims en wsch. de dichter]

ianvanhvlst G5: 287v.; X: 89-99 [wsch. de dichter].

ianm L131 [de beginletters van de 4 strofen, het refrein niet meegerekend].

ianmorjtoen XII: 651-661 [wsch. de dichter].

johannes G3 [de beginletters van de 13-regelige strofen].

.L. L43 [wsch. de beginletter van de naam van een geliefde].

lauwerette L30: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 10-regelige strofen]

liden 3B: 64 v. [het kleed van Christus, samengesteld uit de beginletters van de christelijke deugden]

liegae(u)rt L28: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 9-regelige strofen].

lievin IV :1-6 [één der pelgrims]

.M. herhaalde malen de eerste letter van een vrouwennaam in de liederen 44, 50, 65, 88 en 96.

maes L20: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 4-regelige strofen] Verwerkt ook in 1st en 3^{de} strofe L50.

maie L18 en L25: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 4-regelige strofen]. Verwerkt ook in 2^{de} strofe L50.

marie L22 en L23: 1-slot [de beginletters van de 5-regelige strofen].

makelare IV. 53-59 [één der pelgrims].

mey L44 1-slot [verwerkt in het lied].

mergrjete in VI: 97 v [vrouwennaam en de beginletters van de minnedeugden].

nanne L47: 1-5 [de beginletters van de regels in de 5-regelige strofe].

niete L107 en L114 [de beginletters van de 5-regelige strofen]. In L111 als **Niete, Ian, Nie, Niet, Niet**.

o merhgrith geeft mi danc L13: 1-20 [achtereenvolgens de beginletters van de regels]

rvebin IV: 40-45 [één der pelgrims].

salve regina G5: 1-11 [acrostichon aan het begin van het gebed gericht tot Maria, daarna het begin van de uitgespelde tekst van het *Salve Regina* die tot de voorlaatste strofe doorloopt].

sceiden I: 2236-2372 [gevormd uit de beginletters van de zeven 'kwade' vruchten in de *amoenus terribilis*].

soete G4: 7-11 [één der pelgrims].

trauwe XII: 523 [de beginletters van de *adren* die de liefde *voeden* en *confoort* geven en behoeden voor *vilonie*].

triceew L39 1-slot [de beginletters van de 7-regelige strofen].

trvde G4: 33-39 [één der pelgrims].

violette L34: 1-8 [de beginletters van de regels in de enige strofe].

vvillem G4: 53-59 [één der pelgrims].

BIJLAGE B

Overzicht van de woordenschat bij hoofdstuk 5

(De asterisken bij een woord verwijzen naar de bespreking in hoofdstuk vijf
zie verder de toelichting onder 5.2)

Vindplaatsen van de mannelijke personificaties

Achtersprake ** II: 1673.

Al-bestiert I 884 [subpersonage om een eigenschap van *Vrau Hoede* te typeren]

Atije II: 1670: [degene die haat en twist oproept, hij wordt verbannen uit *Vrau Venus lande*].

Begrijp ** II: 640, 715, 737, 799, 792, 872, 1065, 1112, 1159, 1209, 1268, 1887, 1918, 1920: [knecht van *Twifel*, vertegenwoordiger van de *clappers*], (zie ook **Nau-Begrijp**).

Blide-moet II: 1760 [een leerling in de minneschool].

Breedescande II: 1673, [verbannen door Venus uit haar *lande*].

Buerchgrave ** I: 635, 1091, 1101, 1136, 1141, 1160, 1182, 1208, 1239, 1252, 1283, 1304, 1334, 1576, 1830, 1835, 1850, 1884, 1921, 1995, 2003, 2069, 2096, 2148, 2324: [het hart van de geliefde vrouw in I]

Camerlinghen ** I: 1091, 1229, 1310, 1835, 2009, 2029, 2035: [de raadgevers van de *Buerchgrave*. Hiertoe kunnen gerekend worden de vier Humoren, de vijf zintuigen en later als *Upper-camerlingh* de minnaar zelf].

Clap-al ** II 151, 1670: [dubbelzinnige figuur, in I o.a. nuttig als verklapper van wat er in de geheime raadskamer tijdens het proces besproken wordt, elders te identificeren met de groep van de *nders* die liefdesverhoudingen verstoren]

Colorijn ** I: 957, 1002, 1035, 1708, 1746, 1772: [raadgevende **Camerlingh** ^, zie voor nadere typering onder **Humoren** ^+].

Const ** II: 1756: [leerling in de minneschool in II Gedacht moet worden zowel aan de dicht- als aan de liedkunst].

Dangier ** I: 972, 1352, 1481, 1482, 1485, 1712, 1892, 1914, 1930, 1950, 2038, 2121, 2187. [lid van het burchgezelschap].

Danse-wel ** II: 1760: [hij wordt bijgeschoold in de minneschool in II].

Fleumaet ** I: 949, 1003, 1036, 1708, 1747, 1772: [een raadgevende **Camerlingh** ^+, zie voor nadere typering onder **Humoren** ^+].

Gheer-altoos ^ II: 1755: [leerling in de minneschool]

Gheerne-comen II: 1759: [leerling in de minneschool].

Ghepeins ^ L88, 24, L140: 1: [de onrust en vertwijfeling gevende gedachte als gevolg van de onbeantwoorde liefde].

Ghetempertheit ** II: 1728, 1746, 1829: [de echtgenoot van *Mate* geeft les in de minneschool].

Haestichede II: 1758: [leerling in de minneschool].

Hoorna [Hoortnaer] I 633, 1310 [één van de vijf zintuigen, raadsheer van de *burchgrave*, zittend in zijn raad, zie onder **Camerlinghen** ^+].

Huedere ** XII: 92, 94, 486: [de bewaker van de fontein, de minnaar neemt zijn taak over als deze sterft].

Humoren ** [de *Camerlinghen* van de burchtheer, ze bepalen de 'complexie', zie verder onder **Melancolie**, **Colorijn**, **Fleumaet** en **Sangwijn** voor de vermelding van hun functie en de tekstregels waarin ze optreden].

Jolijt ** I: 990, 1013, 1718, 2030, 2120, 2318: [hij is in I de minnaar wisselend gezind].

Jonchede II: 1756. [de jeugdige onbezonnenheid, krijgt bijscholing in de minneschool].

Joncheren vijf I. 612, 618: [zij bevinden zich aan twee zijden van de romp, hiermee worden de vingers bedoeld, die steeds doende zijn het lichaam [van de vrouw] 'opgewekt, snel en levendig' te verzorgen].

Kila ** I: 705, 709, 721, 748, 758, 778, 1358, 1488, 1869, 2077. [de poortwachter in **I**, de naam is een volksetymologische verbastering van *Qui [est] là?* Zijn geslachtsnaam is *Vraghen*. Hij is gehuwd met *Verziene* en bevriend met *Hope*. Zijn meester heet *Orgelheus*].

Lach-vele II. 1761: [hij wordt bijgeschoold in de minneschool].

Ledicheit II. 1672: [Venus verbant hem uit haar *lande*]

Licht-ghevoel I: 632: [één van de vijf zintuiglijke raadsheren van de *Burchtgrave*, zie onder **Camerlinghen** **].

Lust ** I: 819, 824, 990, 1066, 1436, 1439, 1450, 1722, 1825, 2030; **II:** 1755: [de 'zangmeester' in **I**, in **II** wordt hij bijgeschoold in de minneschool].

Melancolie ** I: 896, 916, 998, 1021, 1035, 1047, 1050, 1110, 1127, 1190, 1234, 1260, 1335, 1449, 1452, 1472, 1517, 1525, 1566, 1587, 1604, 1620, 1620, 1707, 1731, 1739, 1758, 1840, 1863, 1885, 1902, 1945, 1969, 2032, 2324 [zeer belangrijke raadgevende **Camerlingh****, zie voor de nadere typering onder **Humoren****].

Melodie II. 1757: [één van de leerlingen in Venus' minneschool].

Nau-begheeren II: 1067: [aanwezig tijdens het proces om de minnaar te *deeren*, zie ook *Vri-begheeren*].

Nau-begrijp II: 792, 1065: [de knecht van *Twifel*, zie **Begrijp** **].

Nau-besouc II: 1466 [de gezaghebbend beambte van Venus die met *Snel-ghepens* de getuigen moet dagvaarden].

Nau-merc ** II. 742, 767, 815, 838, 876, 1048, 1131, 1156, 1176, 1228, 1659, 1889, 1907: [de baljuw in **II**, hij staat in dienst van Venus].

Ne-comen II: 1759: [leerling in de minneschool].

Nijt (Nyt) II: 1573, 1670: [hij verbeeldt een kwalijke eigenschap en wordt in **IV** door de *minners rene* in het rijtje gezet van *dorpers*, *quade vileine* en *gramschap* (167-169). Tijdens het proces in **II** beschuldigt de getuige *Vrheit* hem van het pijnigen van de minnaar. Venus verbant hem uit haar *lande*].

Node-scheiden II. 1758. [een kameraad van *Gheerne-comen* en leerling in Venus' minneschool].

Node-verbeiden II: 1758: [Wegens zijn gebrek aan geduld leerling in Venus' minneschool, samen genoemd met *Haestuhede*]

Nouwe-sien I: 628: [één van de vijf zintuiglijke raadsheren van de burchtheer, zie onder **Camerlinghen** **].

Onna-vroet II: 1761: [deze 'bij lange na' niet wijze persoon wordt samengenoemd met **Lach-vele** en moet plaatsnemen in Venus' minneschool].

Ontzegg ** I: 979, 2140: [de 'uitsmijter' van de burchtheer in **I**]

Orghelieus ** I: 706, 713, 738; **II:** 1671: [in **I** de 'machtige', die over de aanvankelijke toelating van de minnaar in de voorburcht beslist].

Overmoet ** I: 980, 991, 1714, 1753, 1955, 1966, 2038, 2121, **II.** 1671. [in **I** een groep vormend met *Jaloste* en *Rouckeloos*; Venus verwijdert hem in **II** uit haar *lande*].

Pais II: 1511, 1627: [hij is bij de minnaar weggevlucht en is getuige in het proces in **II**].

Paisier ** II: 777, 788, 830, 892, 1038, 1048, 1055, 1069: [de advocaat van de minnaar, hij is de 'vredestichter' die voorafgaand aan het proces in **II** aan *Twifel* c.s. driemaal de vrede aanbiedt. Zie ook onder **Redene**]

Quat-bet II: 1573: [de getuige *Vrvhede* beschuldigt hem tijdens het proces dat hij de minnaar op het slechte pad gebracht en ernstig gepijnigd heeft. Het woord is onbekend in het mnl. De Vreese veronderstelt een verschrijving voor *Quaetheit*. Venus verbant hem].

Quaetheit II. 1670 [zie **Quat-bet**].

Redene ** II: 595, 831, 891, 1069, 1109, 1138, 1158, 1181, 42, 1330, 1452, 1514, 1704: [de *taelman*, een wijze advocaat die de minnaar bijstaat in het proces in II. Hij is wijs, maar arm. In de overige gedichten draagt *Vrau Redene* zijn naam, niet in een rechtsproces, maar als de wijze adviserende dame in minne-aangelegenheden. Zie ook onder **Paisier**].

Regent I: 619: [symb hier het hart (de burchtheer) dat al het doen en laten van de dame (de burcht) reguleert. Alles is in *sire muecatheden* (625), d.w.z. alles heeft hij onder zijn 'heerschappij', zie verder onder **Buerchgrave** **].

Rijchede II: 1756: [hij moet de lessen in de *minneschool* volgen en is in het minnegebeuren wel belangrijk in verband met het geven van geschenken, maar dit moet wel *bi mate* gebeuren].

Rieke-lucht I: 630: [één van de vijf zintuiglijke raadsheren van de *Burchtgrave*, zie onder **Camerlinghen** **].

Roum II: 1669: [hij wordt verbannen uit Venus' lande].

Roukeloos ** I. 981, 1008, 1714, 1770, 2129: [hij gedraagt zich in I plomp, in II ligt de nadruk van deze slordig geklede heer op zijn aversie tegen de *conste*]

Ruste II: 1485, 1511, 1610, 1625: [een getuige in het proces met belastende uitspraken t.a.v. *Twifel* c.s. Hij heeft de minnaar noodgedwongen moeten verlaten].

Sangwijn ** I: 938, 1001; 1016, 1036, 1709, 1749, 1777: [één van de vier raadsheren van de *burchtgrave*, zittend als **Camerlingh** ** in zijn raad, zie onder **Humoren** *].

Scieloos II: 1754: [de 'onnadenkende', uiteraard een leerling in de minneschool].

Smakelij I: 629, 1311, 1843: [één van de vijf zintuigen, raadshere van de burchtheer, zie onder **Camerlinghen** **].

Snel-ghepens II: 1467, 1489: [de bode die de getuigen voor het proces met *Nau-besouc* in II moet dagvaarden. Hij dankt zijn naam waarschijnlijk aan de noodzaak snel beslissingen te moeten nemen als de getuigen niet thuis zijn, zoals in II. Als de getuigen niet verschijnen wacht hen in het stedelijk recht een zeer zware straf zoals het verbranden van hun woning]

Solaes II. 1485, 1511, 1593, 1596, 1608: [de derde getuige die tijdens het proces opgeroepen wordt. Tijdens het verhoor verklaart hij treurend dat hij de minnaar niet kon opbeuren toen deze in de macht van *Jalosie en haer gheslachte* kwam].

Spreec-goet II: 1672: [hij is door Venus uit haar lande verbannen omdat te veel praten een ondeugd is, men zie bijv. het advies van *Verziene* in I: 1642].

Troost(e) II: 1479, 1547. [de wat onwillige getuige in II die van niets weet. Eén van Venus' raadvrouwen in II heet ook *Troost*. Een vergissing van de dichter?].

Twifel ** I: 402, 410, 417, 418, 422, 431, 448, 459, 474, 481, 534, 543, 553, 650, 668, 1362, 1369, 1508, 1512, 1538, 1861, 2157, 2288; II: 236, 265, 461, 472, 481, 568, 609, 615, 617, 640, 658, 661, 675, 686, 689, 764, 791, 812, 822, 851, 854, 905, 914, 974, 1024, 1034, 1063, 1112, 1152, 1164, 1198, 1208, 1258, 1266, 1276, 1324, 1585, 1630, 1737, 1802, 1867, 1885, 1904: [zowel in I als II de grote vijand van de minnaar. Hij speelt zijn rol vaak op de achtergrond en wordt dan niet direct genoemd, ook elders in het convoluut belangrijk].

Verwaenthed II. 1669: [een kwalijke eigenschap, Venus verbant hem].

Vraghen I. 732. [de *ornaam* [geslachtsnaam] van poortwachter *Kila*].

Vri-begheeren/ Nau-begheren II: 749, 821, 826, 875, 1067, 1185, 1297: [de kameraad van **Gheer-altoes** **].

Vruecht I: 2126 [hij symboliseert het leven vol vertier. In II zou deze *Vruecht* naar de minneschool gestuurd zijn door Venus. Dat kan echter technisch niet, want een wat meer serieus getekende vrouwelijke *Vruecht* is getuige bij het proces in II].

Vryhede II: 1483, 1510, 1556, 1560, 1570: [één van de getuigen in het minneproces, hij noemt als de kwade verleiders van de minnaar *Quaet-bet* en *Nijt*. *Trauwe* die hem verhoort, verwondert zich hierover, omdat die 'personen' tijdens het proces nog niet genoemd zijn. Ook Venus vermeldt hen bij haar uitspraak niet]

Vrye-Jonst II: 1757. [hij die 'ongebonden genegenheid betoont', hij wordt bijgeschoold in Venus' minneschool waarschijnlijk om *mate* te leren].

Wachters I:** 578: [de vijf in het wit geklede jongelingen die de burcht moeten bewaken, ze vertegenwoordigen de zintuigen. Deze worden blijkbaar dubbel vertegenwoordigd, ze zijn ook de *camerlinghen*** van de *Buerchgrave*].

Willemijn II: 748, 823, 874, 1067, 1185, 1297 [de egocentrisch ingestelde en machtige heer die de baljuw van Venus, de aanklager *Nau-merc*, helpt].

Wilthede II 1755: [een eigenschap van de jeugd, wordt bijgeschoold in de minneschool].

Wrake II: 1672: [Een figuur die zeer ongunstige gedachten oproept door de nog heersende bloedwraak, waartegen men in het stedelijk recht scherpe maatregelen neemt. Zie **Paisier ****, Venus verbant hem uiteraard uit haar *lande*].

Vindplaatsen van de vrouwelijke personificaties

Besceedicheit I: 970: [zij treedt niet handelend op in **I** en **II**; het weloverwogen, verstandelijk optreden is een noodzakelijke eigenschap bij de *minne*].

Cuusscheit ** I 1987. [in **I** heeft de eigenschap betrekking op de goed verzorgde en schone kleding en niet zozeer op de zedelijke reinheid, deze wordt daar gepersonifieerd door **Suverheit****].

Duecht ** II: 400, 1006, 1020, 1431, 1439: [één van de raadvrouwen van *Venus*, één van de zeer noodzakelijk vereiste eigenschappen van de dame].

Eere ' (I: 2016, 2128, 2139); **II:** 384, 960, 1360, 1363: [een sleutelbegrip in de middeleeuwse ethiek, in **I** een 'sleutel' die toegang tot de vrouw geeft; in **II** één van de 'raadvrouwen'].

Envie ** I: 991, 993, 1076, 1082, 1122, 1189, 1206, 1215, 1712, 1891, 1954, 2038, 2118, 2187; **II:** 1669: [de 'nijdige' en 'afgunstige' verlikster in **I**, één van de dames in het *buerchtgeselschap*. In **II** natuurlijk uit het *land* van Venus verbannen zonder nadere toelichting].

Ghedoochsamichede ** I: 967: [een dame in het geselschap].

Ghenadicheit ' (II: 386, 919: [één van de 'raadvrouwen' van *Vrau Venus*].

Ghenuecht ** L 146: 1, 11, 17, 24. [de tegenhangster van *Twifel* in L 146. Min of meer ongunstige eigenschap omdat de minnaar zich in zijn vermaak weleens te buiten gaat].

Gestade [ook **Ghestadicheit**]: **II:** 387, 936, 1378: [een 'raadvrouw' van *Vrau Venus*], **I:** 1877, 2225, 2230 [de *wieke* [tampon] die *Vrau Versiene* bij de minnaar aanbrengt om ongelukken in de liefdesbetrekking te voorkomen, overigens een vergeefse poging].

Goedertier ** I: 971, 1711, 1826, 1913, 2023; 2181: [een dame in het burchtgezelschap, zij is ongelukkig gehuwd met *Dangier*].

Hoede ** I: 882, 928, 1072, 1080, 1128, 1149, 1185, 1227, 1232, 1239, 1264, 1280, 1319, 1332, 1352, 1712, 1892, 1894, 1898, 1904, 1925, 1930, 1964, 1976, 1986, 1990, 2044, 2149, 2168, 2173, 2186, 2192, 2199 [de door de minnaar veratschuwde beschermster van de *Buerchgraeve*], **II:** 396, 976, 1408: [één der 'raadvrouwen' van *Venus*, ze zit vlak bij *Juecht*].

Hope ** I: 403, 414, 416, 421, 423, 436, 456, 460, 503, 512, 527, 537, 548, 616, 621, 653, 661, 665, 672, 703, 708, 711, 718, 721, 746, 747, 748, 763, 787, 825, 1343, 1349, 1374, 1392, 1405, 1417, 1504, 1513, 1520, 1622, 1684, 1743, 1780, 1782, 1793, 2062, 2875, 2113, 2153, 2287, 2307; **II:** 570, 1213, 1223 1477, 1510, 1519, 1526, 1532, 1551, 1906, [zij vertegenwoordigt in de verhalende gedichten de verwachting op succes bij de minnaar, ze beurt hem op. Ze is de opponente van *Twifel*. In **I** verlost ze hem uit de cel en is de trouwe metgezel van de *ic* [tot hij haar verwaarloost]. In **II** is zij een getuige in het *minneproces*, afkomstig uit het *Lant van Duchte*. Ze vertoeft daar omdat de minnaar door de wondende pijlen van *Begrif* zo'n kabaal maakte dat ze moest vluchten].

Hovesscheit ** I: 787, 825, 1718, 1825, 1913, 2181 [Een eigenschap die bij de hoofse liefde zeer vereist is. Zij is één van de 'raadvrouwen' van *Suverheit*, in goud gekleed - met een gelaat rein als een engel - in gezelschap ook van de positief getekende *Omoedhede*, *Simpelheit*, *Ghedoochsamichede* enz.].

Jalosie ** I. 976, 1716, 1891, 1957, 2039, 2118, II. 235, 287, 292, (294, 461, 472, 481, 568, 609, 615, 652, 686, 689, 721, 764, 791, 844, 871, 1032, 1064, 1112, 1170, 1202, 1282, 1335, 1585, 1602, 1619, 1886, 1911: [in I niet zozeer, maar vooral in II en ook in het overige werk in het Gr.Hs., is de jaloezie vaak de bron van de twijfel die de minnaar ongelukkig maakt en tot melancholie drijft].

Juecht ** I. 847, 852 856, 864, 870, 874, 892, 910, 1028, 1082, 1260, 1281, 1308, 1345, 1348, 1410, 1421, 142 6, 1448, 1465, 1478, 1518, 1526, 1553, 1620, 1707, 1723, 1825; II 399, 998: [de wispelturige maakster van het minnelied in I, dat de bewoners van de burcht in ernstige beroering brengt door haar lied waarin ze - geheel tegen haar karakter in - zeer specifieke eisen stelt aan een eventuele duurzame liefdesverhouding; in II één van de 'raadvrouwen' van Venus met Hoede dicht in de buurt]

Mate ** II: 1729, 1746, 1766, 1805: [de vrouw van leermeester *Ghetempertheit*. Haar naam drukt de een essentiële eigenschap uit die het gedrag van de mensen moet bepalen, in het bijzonder dat van de minnaar].

Omoedicheit: I: 793, 1718. [één van de drie gezelschapsdames van *Suverheit*].

Ontfaermicheit * I: 969, 1711, 1915, 1925, 2182. [dame in I, ongelukkig gehuwd met *Dangier*].

Ont sien II 397, 990, 999: [één van de 12 raadvrouwen van *Vrau Venus*].

Radewijs (zie *Wijs-van Rade* **)

Redene ** I: 967, V: 88, 175, 181: [een dame in het *geselschap* in I; in V de wijze raadgeefster].

Ruste II: 1485, 1511, 1610, 1625: [een getuige in het proces contra *Twijfel* en *Jalosie*, ze representeert een eigenschap die de minnaar niet kent].

Scoon-gelaet * I: 970, 1710, 1915, 1924, 2023, 2182; II: 401, 1018, 1439: [in I een dame in het *gheselschap*, in II één van Venus' 'raadvrouwen'].

Simpelhede ** I. 792, 817, 1719: [één van de drie gezelschapsdames van **Suverheit****].

Suverheit/ Suverheit ** I: 810, 827, 849, 902, 904, 925, 1052, 1337, 1705, 1882, 1979, 1987, 2116 [de verpersoonlijking van de kuisheid van de Burcht [de dame] in I, met de *Buerchgrave* [het regulerende hart] een hoofdfiguur in I].

Trauwe ** II. 383, 952, 961, 1349, 1363, 1505, 1518, 1574, 1593, 1624, 1989: [de oudste van Venus' 'raadvrouwen': in XII: 523: *der fonteynen vrouwe*, de letters van haar naam vormen een sleutelwoord in het minneproces, opgebouwd uit zes hoofse kernprincipes].

Troost(e) II: 1512, 1547: [de slaperige getuige die niets gezien of gehoord heeft van het ontstaan van de ellendige toestand waarin de minnaar verkeert, zij kan dus niet helpen].

Venus ** II. 379, 393, 404, 416, 463, 500, 535, 574, 647, 711, 836, 845, 849, 853, 898, 900, 910, 943, 972, 1027, 1039, 1080, 1085, 1103, 1135, 1207, 1252, 1343, 1344, 1406, 1456, 1468, 1490, 1499, 1504, 1595, 1642, 1644, 1653, 1658, 1674, 1682, 1705, 1727, 1736, 1780, 1814, 1821, 1826, 1854: [zij leidt de rechtszaak en berecht de minnaar in II].

Versiene, zie **Verziene** ** I: 1259, 1377, 1525, 1528, 1570, 1627, 1710, 1929, 2077; II: 385, 928, 1362, 1444, 1546, 1610, 1683: [in II een 'raadvrouw' van Venus die ervoor pleit dat het werk volledig verricht moet worden om loon te kunnen ontvangen, zij verhoort ook de getuigen; in I gehuwd met *Kila*, instrueert de minnaar en beveelt hem aan bij Melancholie en zo indirect bij de Burchtheer].

Vreese ** II. 397, 985, 1418: [één van de 'raadvrouwen' van Venus in II, zij pleit voor een vreedzame oplossing. Zij keert zich tegen de strijdvarende *Vrauwe Hoede* die beweert: *Beter es oorloghe rike Dan pais ende aermoe ewelike* (979-980) met de niet mis te verstane bewoordingen: *Es yement die pais ende vrede beweert* [verhindert], *Hets jammer dathi es gelooft* (986-987)]

Vroescap ** XII 157, 160, 452, 513. [zij vertegenwoordigt één van de belangrijkste menselijke psychische functies (hier met een sterk zedelijke inslag), de vijf zintuigen – die de verbinding verzorgen tussen de uiterlijke verschijnselen en de innerlijke functies – die in dienst staan van de Burchtheer.

Vrucht II. 1483, 1510, 1580, 1584: [Eén van de getuigen in het proces die *Jalosie en Twifel* ernstig beschuldigt Logisch, bij de minnaar is geen vreugde meer zien].

Wijs-van-rade / Radewijs [~] II: 1335, 1394, 1409, 1424, 1505: [Eén van de 'raadvrouwen' van Venus in II Zij speelt daar de rol die elders in het handschrift *Vrau Redene* vervult. De andere naamgeving wordt waarschijnlijk veroorzaakt omdat de *taelman* in dit gedicht reeds de naam *Redene* draagt].

CURRICULUM VITAE

Kees Lassche is geboren op 28 mei 1927 te Haarlem. Hij behaalde het diploma 5-jarige HBS-B en – middels een spoedcursus – het onderwijzersdiploma. Na het behalen van de beide hoofdaktes en de akte handenarbeid volgden verspreid over een aantal jaren de M.O.-diploma's Pedagogiek (Amsterdam en Groningen) en Nederlands (Den Haag en Groningen). Na het onderwijzerschap in Assendelft en bij het slechtziende-onderwijs in Huis ter Heide (U) werd hij hoofd van lagere scholen in Zuidland en Amstelveen. In 1960 volgde de aanstelling als leraar Pedagogiek en Nederlands aan de Kweekschool (na vele naamwisselingen nu PABO geheten) in Appingedam. Later werd hij tevens docent aan de Noordelijke Leergangen te Groningen bij de opleiding Nederlands M.O.-A en M.O.-B (beide bij de letterkundige afdeling). Afgekeurd in 1982. Wegens toenemende invaliditeit, waardoor sportief georiënteerde bezigheden moeilijk werden, besloot hij weer te gaan studeren. Aan de Universiteit in Nijmegen werd het doctoraal examen met succes afgesloten in 1992 met een scriptie over de tweede Gruuthuse allegorie.

