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osition and poses a challenge to the Berkowitz model (Averill; Clore, Ortony, Dienes, and Fujita; Forgas; Martin, Achee, Ward, and Harlow; Oatley; and Parrot).

In anticipation of this, Berkowitz notes that most construal-based research on emotion has relied way too heavily on correlational and self-report methods in contrast to well-controlled experimental investigations examining precisely defined cognitive processes and observable manifestations of affect. This call would do well to be heeded by researchers in the area, given that well-controlled experimental research enabling causal inference is not common currency in this research tradition. On the other hand, it would also seem clear that the Berkowitz model would benefit from a more sophisticated conceptualization of cognitive structures and processes, so as to expand its range, applicability, and coherence.

Howard Leventhal, a well-known theorist whose own theoretical work is very similar to that of Berkowitz, contributes a commentary to the volume that provides a useful point of comparison. He notes areas of agreement between the theories, both in their multistage structure and in their network level of processing. He also notes that his model encompasses the same kind of schematic processing seen in the Berkowitz model, based largely on hardwired and conditioned responses. For Leventhal, however, this schematic processing is defined as cognition, whereas for Berkowitz it is not. Leventhal therefore urges Berkowitz to further elaborate the conceptual level of processing in the model, and, interestingly, endocrinological level as well because, he argues, the "neural network is bathed in a dynamic endocrine system" (Leventhal, pp. 143; suggested also in the commentary by Lang).

Returning to the cognition-affect debate, a major strength of the Berkowitz model is that it provocatively argues that aggressive behavior should very often be noninstrumental in nature, that is, not necessarily directed toward any actual source of the harm done or the wrongdoing perpetrated. If this is true, it suggests that aggressive behavior may not be mediated by a wrongdoing construal, even though this is the mechanism suggested by most cognitive theorists; if such behavior were so mediated, it would tend to be appropriately directed. Both the theoretical framework and the data Berkowitz offers on this account are compelling and ought to give some pause to

researchers and theorists otherwise uninterested in integrating various potentially noncognitive processes into models of emotional experience.

In summary, this volume attests to the continued seriousness of research and scholarship directed toward the interplay between cognitive and noncognitive mechanisms in the emergence of emotional responses. The Berkowitz model makes an important contribution to the field, not only by provoking stimulating discussion but perhaps also by increasing the focus on actual social behavior as it is linked to emotion. One unparalleled strength of the Berkowitz model is its

solid link to behavior, a link in social cognition that continues to be underspecified and understudied. All in all, then, the volume presents ideas that are important to ponder and is a very worthwhile read.

#### References

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## The Tension Between Power and Dialogue

Edward E. Sampson  
**Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature**  
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.  
207 pp. ISBN 0-8133-1941-2  
(hardcover); 0-8133-1942-0  
(paperback). \$55.00 hardcover; \$19.95  
paperback

Review by  
Hubert J. M. Hermans

*Edward E. Sampson, dean of the Saybrook Institute (San Francisco, California) and professor of psychology at California State University (Northridge), is author of Social Worlds, Personal Lives and Justice and the Critique of Pure Psychology. ■ Hubert J. M. Hermans, professor of personality psychology at the University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands), is first international associate of the Society for Personology. Hermans is author, with H. J. G. Kempen, of The Dialogical Self: Meaning as Movement and author, with E. Hermans-Jansen, of the forthcoming Self-Narratives: The Emergence of Meaning.*

As a prolific writer of a series of articles in the *American Psychologist* in the last two decades, Sampson has manifested himself as one of the main critics of Anglo-American psychology today. The present book again launches an attack on Western culture's and psychology's preoccupation with a contained, individualistic, monologic self, expressing the (White and male) American ideal. This basic criticism is elaborated in an extremely thought-provoking, scholarly, and well-written book, filled with many clarifying examples.

In fact, the book is a mixture of political commentary and (empirical) social-scientific document. From a political point of view, Sampson is concerned with the relation between the dominant and subordinated groups in Western society.

The dominant groups (male, White, educated, and of the higher social classes) have given priority to their own experiences and have constructed serviceable others (e.g., woman, African Americans, members of the Third World). These others are constructed to be of service to the dominant groups' own needs, values, and interests. In this way social dichotomies are created, defining the master term (e.g., male or self) as possessing particular properties whereas its opposite (e.g., woman or other) is negatively defined. That is, the opposite becomes defined by the fact that it lacks the positively defined properties rather than being defined in its own right. In this sense there is a monological celebration of the self of the dominant groups instead of a dialogical contact with the others as

valued in their specificities and particularities.

From the standpoint of a social scientist, Sampson builds many of his insights on the classic theories of Mead and Bakhtin and on a variety of recent empirical investigations. Given this mixture of an emancipatory goal and a social-scientific analysis, Sampson finds himself in the delicate position of taking the theories of Mead and Bakhtin as a firm basis for his analyses and at the same time criticizing them as "ignoring issues of gender and race as well as the dimension of power and domination" (p. x). Apart from the fact that this criticism is not entirely correct (see Gregg's [1991] analysis for the role of power in Mead's work), Sampson seems to arrive at a bifurcation point. One option is to devote a thorough treatment of the work of theorists such as Mead and Bakhtin to examine the role of gender, race, and power, including the theoretical implications if these factors are ignored. Another possibility is to continue the critical analysis of contemporary psychology and culture with theories at hand that do not satisfactorily serve the author's purpose of analyzing power differences. Sampson has chosen the latter possibility with the result that the notions of gender, race, and power, that are such central issues in his thinking, have a rather weak theoretical basis. For the analysis of power structure in contemporary society, Sampson relies on a different set of theoretical statements, that is, on recent contributions from feminist theorists (e.g., Irigaray, MacKinnon, Braidotti, Gatens). The contributions from Mead and Bakhtin on the one hand and the feminist theorists on the other hand are not combined, however, in a well-integrated theoretical framework.

In the light of the preceding remarks, it strikes me that Sampson has presented two entirely different conceptions of the self that serve different purposes in different parts of the book. The first one is the *self as a container*, a conception in which the boundary of the individual is coincident with the boundary of the body. With this definition, Sampson argues that the container self is found today primarily in the Western world, and it is by no means a universal understanding. This self is described as a separating self par excellence: "Whether we erect a firm line separating self from other or construct a safely serviceable other, the message about the self-other relationship remains much the same: the other is a potentially dangerous threat" (p. 37). A

second conception arises when Sampson discusses the phenomenon of interior conversations. In describing these conversations, he emphasizes that the presence of others is invariably involved. Interior conversations are fully social and based on a publicly shared culture: "The conversational framework is sustained whether we focus on external conversations held with others or on internal conversations held with one's self" (p. 138). This second conception seems to contradict the first as far as the relation between self and other is concerned. Whereas the first conception assumes a separation between self and other and is of a monological nature, the second is explicitly dialogical. In the context of the book as a whole, the first conception seems to correspond with the political implications of domination and power, the second fits well in Meadian social-scientific theory.

The opposition between monologue and dialogue is one of the cornerstones of the book. Whereas monologue is based on the self as a container, continuously protecting and affirming itself by constructing other people as serviceable, dialogue is based on alterity and otherness, thereby celebrating the other. Conceived in this way, monologue and dialogue are treated as categories, functioning in mutually exclusive ways. When there is monologue, there can be no dialogue and vice versa. The implication is that dialogue becomes an ideal, an almost unreachable form of communication, particularly in a culture that is considered

to be monological. An alternative, perhaps more viable, view would be to conceive intersubjective communication and power as two intrinsic features of dialogue. Thinking along those lines, one can distinguish between dialogues that are more or less subjected to power differences. Dialogues then may differ on a continuum varying from symmetrical to asymmetrical communication (for social power as a defining aspect of dialogue, see Linell, 1990). Somewhere in the middle of this continuum, an argument between two disagreeing friends, even when they differ in sex or race, can clear the air and deepen their ongoing dialogue. Such an alternative conception certainly does not dismiss the valuable and necessary analyses provided by Sampson, but it allows for more sensitivity to the complex ways dialogue and power coexist in real life.

Taken altogether, this book is impressive as a bold and sophisticated criticism of power issues in our culture and psychological discipline. Although the scope of the book is broad and multifaceted, this is at the expense of theoretical integration.

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## How to Catch a Liar

Gerald R. Miller and James B. Stiff  
**Deceptive Communication**  
Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993.  
131 pp. ISBN 0-8039-3484-X  
(hardcover); 0-8039-3485-8  
(paperback). \$22.50 paperback

Review by  
Perri B. Druen

*Gerald R. Miller, deceased, was University Distinguished Professor at Michigan State University (East Lansing), past president of the International Communication Association, founding editor of Human Communication Research, and editor of Communication Monographs. Miller was coauthor, with J. B. Stiff, of the chapter "Applied Issues in Studying Deceptive Communication" in R. S. Feldman (Ed.) Applications of Nonverbal Behavioral Theories and Research and coeditor, with M. E. Roloff, of Interpersonal Processes: New Directions in Communication Research. ■ James B. Stiff is associate professor of communication at Arizona State University (Tempe). ■ Perri B. Druen, doctoral candidate in social psychology at the University of Louisville (Louisville, Kentucky), is recipient of an American Psychological Association Dissertation Research Grant (1993).*