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Social conditions, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism: a theoretical model of the early Frankfurt School updated and tested

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ABSTRACT To explain ethnocentrism in the Netherlands, a classic model derived from theoretical notions of prominent members of the Frankfurt School is updated and tested with data of a national sample of Dutch respondents (N = 1799). It appears that authoritarianism is a far more important predictor of ethnocentrism than predictors related to one's social condition, although the latter are not insignificant. In turn, authoritarianism is predicted by education, age, social class, church involvement and status-anxiety.

INTRODUCTION

International comparative research to explain (aspects of) ethnocentrism is still urgent because the phenomena of prejudice and racism are present within all European countries (Evrigenis, 1986). Results of elections recently held in West Germany and France, accentuate the fact that right-wing parties attract voters with slogans involving both an unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities and a favourable attitude towards the national ingroup. In a country like the Netherlands, known for its traditions of hospitality and tolerance towards immigrants, ethnocentrism was ascertained to exist within a substantive portion of the population (Scheepers, Felling and Peters, 1989).

In order to explain ethnocentrism, we seek alliance with theoretical ideas put forward in *The Authoritarian Personality* by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950). Felling, Peters and Scheepers (1986) discovered 35 worldwide studies in which the relationship between the central concepts of the study (i.e. authoritarianism and ethnocentrism) was confirmed; only a few exceptional falsifications were found. These findings illustrate the fruitfulness of the central thesis of Adorno *et al.* that '... an adult's outlook or ideology (i.e. ethnocentrism) is an aspect of her or his

personality and is strongly influenced by deeper (psychodynamic) aspects of personality (i.e. authoritarianism) . . .' (1950/1982, preface). But practically no attention has been paid to another central thesis of the study: 'Personality is not, however, to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinant . . . personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the social totality within which it occurs' (1950/1982: 5). These sociological determinants were mentioned but not systematically elaborated in the original study. This also holds for the predominantly psychological studies that appeared afterwards (cf. overviews by Brown, 1965; Goldstein and Blackman, 1978; Hagendoorn, 1982). And although sociologists following Lipset (1959) ascertained an empirical relationship between social class and education on the one hand and phenomena related to authoritarianism on the other hand, they failed to interpret this relationship from a consistent theoretical perspective, with some exceptions (cf. overviews by Dekker and Ester, 1987; Scheepers, Eisinga and Van Snippenburg, 1989).

In this contribution, we will explicate the social conditions that bring about authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. We will reconstruct a model according to theoretical ideas derived

from contributions of members of the early 'Frankfurt School' who had laid the foundations for the eventual study on authoritarianism. Next we will complement it with recent contributions. Then, we will test this model empirically with survey data from a national sample of the Dutch population in 1985.

THEORETICAL MODEL

Social determinants of authoritarianism

The members of the Institut für Sozialforschung, known as the Frankfurt School, witnessed the socioeconomic crisis of the 1920s in Germany in which the lower social classes suffered much hardship. They expected these classes to offer resistance. This expectation was based on a prediction by Marx and Engels (1848/1974) that classes in circumstances of *Verelendung* would rise up against their exploiters. But Hitler lured the discontented masses from all classes of society (Kater, 1983: 51-72) to vote for his party, which eventually came to power in 1932. As a consequence, Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933. Fromm, one of the principal researchers of the Frankfurt School, already foresaw the outcome of these events in 1929, based on data from an empirical study (1929/1983).

These events forced the Frankfurt School to modify and refine their basic theoretical axioms. Until then, they had subscribed to a simple materialistic model in which a linkage was postulated between social being (*Sein*) and social consciousness (*Bewusstsein*). They had translated this relationship primarily in terms of social class and ideology. From this perspective, political attitudes and behaviour were explained as rational outcomes of one's class position. As they could not explain political choices, particularly those of the lower classes, by means of this model, they sought to complete it with reference to emotional drives within the personality (Jay, 1973; Billig, 1982; Bonss, 1983; Samelson, 1986; Kolakowski, 1978/1987). Fromm had already laid the foundations for this line of research (1929/1983). And Horkheimer (1931/1972), as director of the Institute, had encouraged his staff to elaborate this line. The Frankfurt School then became centrally concerned with the question of why so many people, especially in the

lower classes, had not risen up but instead had submitted themselves blindly to anti-rational authorities, personified by Nazism (Jay, 1973; Baars, 1987).

As a consequence of these theoretical developments, Fromm tried to synthesize the simple materialistic model with Freudian psychoanalysis (1932). In fact, he laid the foundations for a model in which ideological preferences were predominantly, if not entirely explained in terms of personality characteristics, which in turn were assumed to be moulded by socioeconomic conditions, that is, by belonging to a social class. This basic model was elaborated by Fromm in an article in a collection to which most of the members of the Frankfurt School contributed, *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, edited by Horkheimer (1936). In this contribution he tried to answer the crucial question of why so many people submit themselves to authorities and what the consequences are.

As a fundamental thesis, he put forward that submission to 'do's' and 'don'ts' is intrinsic to social life in general. From an early age on, a child submits himself to the authority of the father. And later he also submits himself to other socializing authorities. The individual internalizes all these 'do's' and 'don'ts' in his so-called super-ego. Eventually, the super-ego not only contains a personal consciousness but also societal norms about what is and what is not allowed, as well as societal values about what is and what is not worth striving for (cf. Laplanche and Pontalis, 1986).

In spite of this thesis, Fromm speculated that there was some variation in the degree to which people submit themselves to authorities. This variation is associated with the degree of repression of spontaneous impulses out of the id: that part of the psyche in which wishes, desires and sexual urges are located. Repression of spontaneous impulses is regulated by ego: that part of the psyche that represents reason. If one lives in circumstances that produce anxieties, ego is hindered in fulfilling this function. The weaker ego is, the more help it needs from super-ego to repress these impulses. Fromm labelled a personality that is characterized by a relatively weak ego counterbalanced by a relatively strong super-ego as authoritarian.

Authoritarianism manifests itself by a willingness to submit to authorities and by a simultaneous need to subject weaker others to one's own authority. Fromm assumed that both the degree of repression as well as the degree of anxiety from which authoritarianism originates were associated with the social class to which one belongs: 'Die abhängige Klasse muss in stärkerem Masse als die herrschende Klasse Triebe unterdrücken' (1936: 101). And: 'Der Betrag an Angst ist bei den unteren Schichten naturgemäss grösser als bei denen, welche über gesellschaftlichen Machtmittel verfügen' (1936: 103). But he did not have sufficient empirical data to test his hypothesis. We derive our *first hypothesis* from Fromm's study: the lower social classes are more inclined to authoritarianism than other social classes. The reason for this inclination is that the lower classes live in poor conditions that call for repression and produce anxieties. Considering the socioeconomic events witnessed by Fromm, we suspect that he probably referred to the class of unskilled workers who found themselves in such conditions.

Such grinding poverty was probably even more strongly present among the unemployed. That is why employment status (being employed or unemployed) might also be of relevance in this context, next to social class. From this speculation we derive our *second hypothesis*: the unemployed are more inclined to authoritarianism than employed people.

From these theses we infer that Fromm explained authoritarianism primarily in terms of one's objective social condition. In addition, he proposed that subjective experiences of anxiety as such, could also produce repression of spontaneous impulses that would bring about authoritarianism. But until recently, no theoretical notions were provided concerning the matters to which these anxieties might refer. In a previous study (Felling *et al.*, 1986), we argued that these anxieties might refer to the fear of not being able to fulfil values internalized in the super-ego and thus considered worth striving for. Although Fromm did not mention these values explicitly, we infer from his examples that he referred to traditional bourgeois values. And, indeed, in the Netherlands it was ascertained that there is a general consensus concerning

these values (Felling *et al.*, 1983a; 1983b). One of the most central is the achievement of social and material status. We will explicate these ideas in order to add them to the previously explicated determinants of authoritarianism.

If one has recently failed to achieve the means from which one subjectively derives status, feelings of status-frustration arise. And if one is in a state of uncertainty about the future achievement of the means from which one subjectively derives status, feelings of status-anxiety arise. Both status-frustration and status-anxiety imply a discrepancy between, on the one hand, values considered worth striving for and, on the other hand, the fulfilment of these values. This discrepancy brings about reactions. One tries to achieve the desired status in the future by postponing the satisfaction of needs. This implies that wishes out of the id are repressed and are actually submitted to the fulfilment of commands of the super-ego. The result of this reaction is a personality which submits itself predominantly to the 'don'ts' of the super-ego as expressed by authoritarianism. We derive our *third hypothesis* from these theoretical considerations: both status-frustration and status-anxiety bring about authoritarianism.

Apart from these phenomena, there are other factors that might explain authoritarianism. In a previous study by Eisinga and Scheepers (1989) a number of these factors were eliminated, including sex, income, degree of urbanization and membership of political parties. And it was shown by Scheepers *et al.* (1990) that some of the factors suggested by Lipset (1959), like non-participation in trade unions and lack of sophistication, are non-significant predictors of authoritarianism. This does not hold for education. On the contrary, there is abundant empirical evidence that education reduces authoritarianism (cf. Adorno *et al.*, 1950/1982; Christie, 1954; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Quinley and Glock, 1979; Dekker and Ester, 1987). The most sophisticated interpretation of this relationship stems from Gabennesch (1972). He argued that education broadens the social perspective of people through which the transcendent power ascribed to authorities is put in perspective and dereified. Age might also be a factor predictive of authoritarianism, as was

shown by Hill (1984). Although there is no clear-cut interpretation of this relationship, it might be argued that one grows less inclined to oppose authorities and more inclined to submit to authorities over the years as disappointment with social and political events grows. Religion might also be one of the phenomena that explain authoritarianism because it implies submission to superhuman authorities which in turn might be generalized to submission to human authorities, as was suggested by Adorno *et al.* (1950: 208–221). Whereas only minor and inconsistent differences between Christian denominations regarding authoritarianism have been ascertained, major and consistent differences have been reported on the basis of church involvement (cf. the overview by Eisinga, Felling and Peters, 1988). From this combination of recent empirical findings and theoretical considerations, we derive our *fourth hypothesis*: church involvement and age produce authoritarianism, whereas education reduces it.

Thus far, we have derived a model to explain authoritarianism. But the relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism was also not systematically explicated in *The Authoritarian Personality*. In the next section we focus on this relationship.

Consequences of authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was conceptually considered by Adorno *et al.* as being a characteristic of personality. Personality was defined as 'a more or less enduring organisation of forces within the individual' (1950/1982: 5). And ethnocentrism was considered as being an aspect of ideology. Ideology was defined as 'an organisation of opinions, attitudes and values—a way of thinking about man and society' (1950/1982: 2). Although Levinson and Stanford emphasized in the preface to the abridged edition (1982) that all four authors shared the axiom that one's ideology would be strongly influenced by characteristics of personality, one hardly finds traces of this conviction. One casually finds that 'scores on the former . . . (the ethnocentrism-scale) . . . can be predicted with fair accuracy from the scores on the latter . . . (the authoritarianism-scale) . . .' (1950/1982: 191). Although all four authors put forward rather

complex interpretations of this relationship, these were not synthesized into one consistent theory. And this crucial hypothesis was not tested effectively, anyhow. We will test this relationship that has been advanced so often. But, first, we will pay some attention to the concept of ethnocentrism as it was put forward in the original study; then, we will briefly mention some recent contributions concerning ethnocentrism.

Adorno *et al.* derived the concept of ethnocentrism from Sumner who had introduced it in 1906 (1906/1959). They adopted his central notion that there is an association between one's attitude towards the ingroup and one's attitude towards outgroups. Adorno *et al.* found that people who felt attracted to ethnocentrism, had high respect for the ingroup, its norms and values, whereas they rejected outgroups in general. This general rejection was not necessarily based on knowledge of outgroups: ethnocentric people showed their rejection without having had any actual contacts with particular outgroups. This rejection was evidenced by the stereotypical perception of characteristics of outgroups: ethnocentric people perceived outgroups as being dirty, aggressive, lazy, untrustworthy and bad-mannered, whereas the ingroup was perceived as being clean, unaggressive, hard working, honest and well-mannered.

These theoretical contributions were both thorough and fundamental because no other essential elements have been added in recent contributions (cf. Brown, 1986; Felling *et al.*, 1986). Levine and Campbell (1972) merely elaborated the notion concerning the stereotypical perception of outgroup characteristics. They stated that characteristics of other groups are always perceived stereotypically if the customs and norms of the other groups deviate from one's own group. In the recent studies of Tajfel and Turner (1979; cf. Tajfel, 1981, 1982a,b; Turner, 1982) the fundamental drive to perceive one's ingroup as being superior to outgroups is explicated. These authors suggest that the individual has a permanent need for a positive social identity. That is why people socially categorize others as inferior, compared with their own group. In turn, Eisinga and

Scheepers (1989) explicated the mental processes, labelled social identification and social contra-identification, by means of which people establish this positive social identity. Social identification was defined as the selective perception of predominantly favourable characteristics among members of the ingroup. And social contra-identification was defined as the selective perception of predominantly unfavourable characteristics among members of outgroups. The result of these mental processes is a favourable attitude towards the ingroup and an unfavourable attitude towards outgroups.

Adorno *et al.* speculated that people with authoritarian attitudes would strongly subscribe to ethnocentrism. Why? Characteristic of authoritarian people is a relatively weak ego counterbalanced by a relatively strong super-ego to fulfil the repression of unacceptable desires and urges out of the id. This characteristic is manifested by a willingness to submit themselves to stronger authorities, such as strong leaders, higher commands and conventional norms and values; and by a simultaneous need to subject weaker others to their own authority. As a consequence, authoritarian people feel a stronger need for non-ambivalent norms, clear goals worth striving for and favourable characteristics that are considered applicable to their own personality, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, they tend to perceive unfavourable characteristics of weaker others. That is why authoritarian people are particularly inclined to social identification accompanied by social contra-identification. The result of both mental processes is ethnocentric attitudes. We therefore founded our *fifth hypothesis*, that authoritarianism brings about ethnocentrism, on recent theoretical contributions derived from Tajfel (1982b), Turner (1982), and Eisinga and Scheepers (1989).

Alongside these hypotheses, one could derive other hypotheses from theoretical ideas scattered all over the original study and other studies published afterwards (cf. Eisinga and Scheepers, 1989). But in the present study we restrict ourselves to what we perceive as the core of the theoretical model of principal members of the early Frankfurt School.

SAMPLE AND MEASUREMENT SCALES

Within the framework of a research project, 'Social and Cultural Developments in the Netherlands, 1985' a two-stage random sample of the Dutch population was constructed. In the first stage, a number of municipalities were selected in such a way that the distribution of regions (North, East, South and West) and the degree of urbanization (from small villages to big cities) would be represented proportionately to the national distribution. In the second stage, people aged from 18 up to 69 were randomly chosen out of the registers of the selected municipalities. About 56 per cent ($N = 3003$) of the approached respondents were willing to be interviewed, during the winter of 1985–86, for one and a half hours, out of which 1799 respondents were questioned on authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. This sample turned out to be representative of the whole Dutch population regarding sex, age and marital status as well as the combination of these characteristics (cf. Felling *et al.*, 1987).

Taking the theoretical notions of the Frankfurt School into account, we considered the operationalization of *social class* as designed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983) most appropriate in the context of this study. Moreover, this nominal typology of social classes was shown to have more predictive power regarding attitudes in the Netherlands as compared to occupational prestige, controlling for other predictors like education, age and income (Kraaykamp, Van Snippenburg and Ultee, 1989). This typology was applied to Dutch professions by Ganzeboom *et al.* (1987). Originally, it contains ten categories which, given the nature of the sample survey, were reduced to five categories in conformity with a scheme proposed by the original designers.

Employment status was ascertained by asking respondents whether they were presently employed. Employed respondents were distinguished from those who are available for work outside of the household but were temporarily dependent on social welfare. Other respondents who were not available for work, such as housewives, students and retired persons, were excluded from the analysis.

The operationalization of *status-anxiety* was

carried out with six items that refer to a subjective uncertainty concerning one's future socioeconomic position as well as one's future social status. We constructed a scale by means of probabilistic scalogram analysis (Mokken, 1970). Its reliability (ρ) amounts to 0.76 and its scalability (H) is 0.39. Appendix 1 provides the concrete items.

The operationalization of status-frustration was carried out with items that refer to a recent loss of both one's socioeconomic position and social status. Only the items that measured the loss of one's economic position, and the degree of dissatisfaction with this loss, were associated statistically such that construction of a scale was justified (see Appendix 1). We labelled this scale *socioeconomic frustration*. Although its reliability is rather low (Cronbach's alpha is 0.51), we use it because of a lack of other valid scales.

Education was measured by the highest educational level that respondents had completed. This variable has seven categories varying from having finished only primary school to completion of university. *Age* was simply represented by respondent's year of birth.

Church involvement was measured according to a typology derived from Felling *et al.* (1982). It is based on questions referring to church attendance and participation in ecclesiastical activities. Felling *et al.* distinguished non-members (second generation non-members, first generation non-members and ex-members), marginal members (those who attend mass only on special occasions), modal members (those who attend mass at least once a month), and core members (those who attend mass fairly regularly and participate in church activities).

Authoritarianism was conceptualized by Adorno *et al.* (1950/1982) as consisting of nine subsyndromes: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, conventionality, projectivity, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotyping, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynism, and concern about sexual matters. Each of these subsyndromes was operationalized by translation of an original F-scale-item (cf. Adorno *et al.*, 1950/1982). We performed principal factor analysis (FACTOR, PA2 of SPSSx; Nie, 1983) on these Likert-type

items (see Appendix 2). We found one empirical dimension. We considered the communalities and factor loadings of all items sufficient (cf. Kim and Mueller, 1978, 1984), except for one item designed to measure projectivity. This item was excluded from the scale (see Appendix 2). The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the scale amounts to 0.78.

The operationalization of *ethnocentrism* was carried out according to the theoretical notions of Sumner (1906/1959), Adorno *et al.* (1950/1982) and Levine and Campbell (1972). We refer to Scheepers *et al.* (1989) and Eisinga and Scheepers (1989) where a more extensive account of the operationalization of these theoretical ideas into items is presented. We performed principal factor analysis (FACTOR, PA2 of SPSSx; Nie, 1983) on these Likert-type items (see Appendix 3). We found two clearly distinct empirical dimensions: one representing a favourable attitude towards the Dutch national ingroup and the other representing an unfavourable attitude towards several outgroups, such as people from a former Dutch colony, Moroccans, Turks, gypsies and Jews. The former dimension refers to favourable stereotypes concerning the Dutch, such as being likeable and hard working. It also refers to nationalistic feelings. The latter dimension refers to unfavourable stereotypes concerning outgroups, such as laziness, backwardness and hot-temperedness. We found a relatively high positive correlation between the two dimensions (Pearson's r is 0.58). The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the favourable attitude towards the ingroup is 0.82; and the reliability of the unfavourable attitude towards outgroups amounts to 0.92. We calculated factor scores for the authoritarianism scale and for both dimensions of ethnocentrism (by means of the default procedure of FACTOR of SPSSx; Nie, 1983). We transformed these standardized scores such that the mean of each scale is 500 and its standard deviation is 100.

ANALYSIS

We performed multiple regression analysis (by means of REGRESSION of SPSSx; Nie, 1983) to test our five hypotheses. Prior to this analysis we checked whether or not the statistical

assumptions of regression analysis were violated by our data (cf. Berry and Feldman, 1985). These assumptions were not violated except for the nominal variables: social class, employment status and church involvement. That is why we dummified them (cf. Lewis-Beck, 1980): the original variable is broken down into as many variables as it contains categories, minus one that serves as a reference category. We chose as reference categories: white-collar workers for social class; employed people for employment status; and non-members for church involvement.

First, we specified a full regression model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{AUTHO} &= a + b_1\text{SE} + b_2\text{FA} + b_3\text{SW} + b_4\text{UW} \\ &\quad + b_5\text{UNEMP} + b_6\text{MAM} + b_7\text{MOM} \\ &\quad + b_8\text{COM} + b_9\text{EDUC} + b_{10}\text{AGE} \\ &\quad + b_{11}\text{STANX} + b_{12}\text{FRUST} + e \\ \text{UNOUT} &= a + b_1\text{SE} + b_2\text{FA} + b_3\text{SW} + b_4\text{UW} \\ &\quad + b_5\text{UNEMP} + b_6\text{MAM} + b_7\text{MOM} \\ &\quad + b_8\text{COM} + b_9\text{EDUC} + b_{10}\text{AGE} \\ &\quad + b_{11}\text{STANX} + b_{12}\text{FRUST} \\ &\quad + b_{13}\text{AUTHO} + e \\ \text{FIN} &= a + b_1\text{SE} + b_2\text{FA} + b_3\text{SW} + b_4\text{UW} \\ &\quad + b_5\text{UNEMP} + b_6\text{MAM} + b_7\text{MOM} \\ &\quad + b_8\text{COM} + b_9\text{EDUC} + b_{10}\text{AGE} \\ &\quad + b_{11}\text{STANX} + b_{12}\text{FRUST} \\ &\quad + b_{13}\text{AUTHO} + e \end{aligned}$$

where:

a	= intercept
SE	= self-employed people
FA	= farmers
SW	= skilled workers
UW	= unskilled workers
UNEMP	= unemployed people
MAM	= marginal church members
MOM	= modal church members
COM	= core church members
EDUC	= completed education
AGE	= age
STANX	= status-anxiety
FRUST	= socioeconomic frustration
AUTHO	= authoritarianism
UNOUT	= unfavourable attitude towards outgroups
FIN	= favourable attitude towards ingroup

Second, we estimated this full model. The estimations of unstandardized regression coefficients are presented in Appendix 4. We considered coefficients that have a t-value smaller

than 1.96 ($p < 0.05$, $N > 120$) as non-significant. We excluded these non-significant predictors from the model¹ and re-estimated the coefficients of the restricted model. In Table 1 we present coefficients that represent the unstandardized direct effects of variables on each of our three dependent variables.

Next, we standardized these coefficients.² We present the standardized regression coefficients in Table 2.

Now that we are provided with all necessary information to test our hypotheses, we turn to a description of our results.

RESULTS

According to our *first hypothesis*, the class of unskilled workers is more inclined to authoritarianism, controlling for other predictor variables. To ascertain whether or not this hypothesis is falsified, we take a closer look at the coefficients below authoritarianism in Table 1. These coefficients represent predicted scores of class categories on authoritarianism as deviations from the predicted score of the reference category, controlling for other predictors in the equation. We ascertain that unskilled workers are, as expected, significantly more authoritarian than the reference category. This does not hold for skilled workers. But farmers and self-employed people beat the lot: their authoritarianism is significantly higher. This means that our first hypothesis is partially falsified: unskilled workers are indeed relatively authoritarian but the classes of farmers and self-employed people are even more authoritarian.

Our *second hypothesis* states that unemployed people are more inclined to authoritarianism. In Table 1 we ascertain that this hypothesis is falsified: the unemployed do not differ significantly from the reference category. As this is not due to a low number of unemployed people ($N = 155$) in our sample, there has to be another explanation for this astonishing result. The most plausible explanation we can think of relates to the relatively heterogeneous composition of this category in the Netherlands. It contains unemployed from all ranks of society with a wide variety of income levels—because the income of

TABLE 1 *Unstandardized regression coefficients of the restricted model (N = 965)*

Independent variables	Authoritarianism	Dependent variables	
		Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups	Favourable attitude towards ingroup
Intercept	441.48	237.73	250.93
Self-employed people	49.17*	23.14*	33.79*
Farmers	33.58*	6.45	19.38
Skilled workers	12.39	22.40*	18.10*
Unskilled workers	24.06*	12.58	13.25
Unemployed people	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Marginal church members	16.53*	n.s.	16.78*
Modal church members	24.39*	n.s.	22.30*
Core church members	-10.93	n.s.	16.83
Education	-16.53*	-6.62*	-6.83*
Age	2.11*	n.s.	0.54*
Status-anxiety	5.40*	n.s.	n.s.
Socioeconomic frustration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Authoritarianism	(not specified)	0.56*	0.47*
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.42	0.37

*=significant relationship ($p < 0.05$)

TABLE 2 *Standardized regression coefficients of the restricted model (N = 965)*

Independent variables	Authoritarianism	Dependent variables	
		Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups	Favourable attitude towards ingroup
Social class	0.14*	0.09*	0.10*
Employment status	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Church involvement	0.12*	n.s.	0.10*
Education	-0.29*	-0.11*	-0.12*
Age	0.24*	n.s.	0.06*
Status-anxiety	0.09*	n.s.	n.s.
Socioeconomic frustration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Authoritarianism	(not specified)	0.56*	0.47*
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.42	0.37

*=significant relationship ($p < 0.05$)

the unemployed is, for a period of time, a fixed percentage of their latest earned income. This composition might reduce differences between the categories of unemployed and employed.

Our *third hypothesis* states that subjective experiences of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration, as such, also bring about authoritarianism. The necessary information for this hypothesis is contained in Table 2. We ascertain that the direct standardized effect of status-anxiety on authoritarianism, controlling for other predictors, is significant though relatively weak (0.09). But the effect of socioeconomic frustration is not significant. We infer from Table 2 that the standardized effects of objective indicators on authoritarianism are in general relatively stronger than the effects of subjective experience, like status-anxiety. This means that our third hypothesis is partially falsified.

Our *fourth hypothesis* states that church involvement and age bring about authoritarianism whereas it is reduced by education. We see from Table 2 that the direct standardized effect of age on authoritarianism is positive (0.24) whereas the effect of education is negative (-0.29). These results lend support to our theoretical expectations. The differential effects of church involvement deserve more attention. In Table 1 we find that marginal and modal church members are significantly more authoritarian than the reference category, whereas core members are less authoritarian, although this difference is not significant. Thus, we recognize a curvilinear pattern between church involvement and authoritarianism (cf. Eisinga, Felling and Peters, 1989). This implies that our fourth hypothesis is not falsified as far as age and education are concerned. Regarding church involvement, our hypothesis is partially falsified because core church members are less authoritarian than was expected.

Our *fifth hypothesis* states that authoritarianism brings about both an unfavourable attitude towards outgroups and a favourable attitude towards the ingroup. In Table 2 we can see that the standardized effect of authoritarianism on the former attitude is 0.56 and the effect of authoritarianism on the latter is 0.47. This means that our fifth hypothesis is not falsified.

Apart from these predicted effects, there are

also non-predicted effects, especially on ethnocentrism. From Table 2 we find that the standardized effects of predictors related to the individual's social condition on both components of ethnocentrism are not insignificant, though they are weak (ranging from -0.12 to 0.10), certainly compared to the effects of authoritarianism on both components of ethnocentrism (0.56 and 0.47 respectively). Table 1 contains more specific information on these relationships. It appears that self-employed people and skilled workers hold a stronger unfavourable attitude towards outgroups as well as a stronger favourable attitude towards the national ingroup than does the reference category. This does not apply to farmers and unskilled workers who do not differ significantly from the reference category. And whereas categories of church members do not differ from the reference category regarding the unfavourable attitude towards outgroups, there are differences regarding the favourable attitude towards the national ingroup. In fact, the curvilinear pattern re-emerges as marginal and modal church members hold this attitude significantly more strongly, whereas core members do not differ from the reference category. We will discuss these findings in the last section.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

From theoretical ideas put forward by members of the Frankfurt School, we derived and explicated a model to explain authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. This model implies that ethnocentrism is determined by authoritarianism. And, indeed, it appears that the effects of authoritarianism on both components of ethnocentrism are relatively strong. In turn, it was supposed that authoritarianism is determined by predictors related to the individuals' social condition, like social class, employment status, status-anxiety, socioeconomic frustration, education, age and church involvement. And, indeed, this hypothesis is in general not falsified, although employment status and socioeconomic frustration appeared to be non-significant predictors of authoritarianism.

The model was falsified in one respect though. The relationship between ethnocentrism and

predictors relating to social condition was assumed to be spurious. But it is not spurious. Education and social class add up to the explanation of an unfavourable attitude towards out-groups; and education, social class, church involvement and age contribute to the explanation of a favourable attitude towards the national ingroup. But the predictive power of these variables is quite modest as compared to authoritarianism. In spite of this falsification, we consider that these empirical results lend support to the fruitfulness of the core theory, especially that of Fromm.

There are nevertheless some supplements to be added. A major one is that the classes that carry out manual labour are not the most authoritarian, but the classes of farmers and self-employed people. One interpretation offered by Kohn (1977, 1981) to explain authoritarianism out of the circumstances of daily work falls short for this empirical finding. Kohn assumes that authoritarianism is the result of work circumstances in which people are considered to submit themselves to orders imposed on them by chiefs and superiors. This interpretation might apply to unskilled workers but certainly not to farmers and self-employed people because they are relatively autonomous in their work, and are often superiors themselves.

Fromm's theory might be more fruitful to explain the degree of authoritarianism among farmers and self-employed people. In terms of Fromm's theory, the latter social classes suffer strongly from anxieties intrinsic to their objective class position as well as from subjective feelings of status-anxiety. In the contemporary context of the Netherlands, the anxieties of farmers and self-employed people could emanate from the relatively risky socioeconomic circumstances in which these classes find themselves. In terms of their livelihood, they depend like no others on factors that they can hardly manipulate, such as governmental policies concerning wages and prices that eventually have effects on their incomes as well. And for the farmers, especially the policies of the countries joined in the European Economic Community concerning the production of milk and meat are crucial.

These anxieties are also intrinsic to the class

position of unskilled workers in the socio-economic context of 1985. Wages had generally not risen. Many factories were shut down due to a lack of work. And the system of social security was seriously revised by the government. From this perspective it is rather remarkable that unemployed people do not differ from employed people regarding authoritarianism. We have speculated that this is due to the relatively heterogeneous composition of the category of unemployed.

Taking into account the predictive power of this classic model derived from the early Frankfurt School, updated with recent theoretical contributions and containing a class typology suited for cross-cultural comparisons, this model is recommended for comparative research to explain authoritarianism and ethnocentrism in Western societies.

NOTES

1. This convention only applies to predictors measured at interval or ratio level. Nominal or ordinal predictors that are dummified in regression analysis should only be eliminated if none of their categories differs significantly from the reference category (see Appendix 4).
2. First, the unstandardized regression coefficients for separate dummy variables are estimated, as presented in Table 1. Second, these coefficients are linearly combined into a new variable: $A = b_1 \text{dummy}_1 + b_2 \text{dummy}_2 + \dots + b_k \text{dummy}_k$. This new variable (A) replaces the dummy variables exactly and is inserted in a new regression equation. After estimation of this equation, an unstandardized coefficient results which by definition takes on a value of '+1'. After standardization of this coefficient, a regression coefficient results that indicates the magnitude of the relative effect of the joint dummy variables into which the original variable was broken down. The sign of this coefficient has no meaning at all. Estimates of coefficients of other variables in the equation remain identical before and after this procedure, as does the amount of explained variance. The adjusted explained variance increases somewhat after this procedure because a number of (dummy) variables is replaced by just one variable. For an explanation of this procedure, see Eisinga, Scheepers and Van Snippenburg (1989); and for empirical applications, Scheepers and Van Snippenburg (1989).

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APPENDIX 1 *Status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration*

The items below were used to measure status-anxiety (N = 1763). A scale was constructed by means of probabilistic scalogram analysis (Mokken, 1971). We present the percentage of people who agreed with the questions (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in the scale (Hi).

	difficulty	Hi
Are you ever afraid that your present situation will get worse in the near future?	0.53	0.41
Do you think that you won't be able to afford as much luxury as you have now in the near future?	0.53	0.41
Do you think you will have to curtail your housekeeping money in the near future?	0.58	0.47
Are you ever worried about the possibility that people of lower status will come to live in your street?	0.10	0.37
Are you ever worried about the possibility that the status of your neighbourhood will decline?	0.20	0.30
Are you ever worried about the possibility that you will have to change your present-day lifestyle?	0.36	0.30

The items below were combined to measure socioeconomic frustration (N = 1776). Behind the answers are the percentage frequencies of the people who gave the answer. The association between both items is 0.24 (Cramér's V).

Please compare your contemporary situation with the situation of five years ago. In what way has the income before tax of the household you belong to, changed?

(strongly) decreased	38.1
stayed the same	25.8
(strongly) increased	36.1
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your present income?	
(very) dissatisfied	17.1
neutral	20.0
(very) satisfied	62.8

APPENDIX 2 *Authoritarianism: items, percentages and factor analysis (N = 1520)*

	Frequencies (%)			h ²	Loadings
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree		
People can be divided in two distinct classes: the weak and the strong	36.9	19.2	43.9	0.32	0.56
Familiarity breeds contempt	22.1	26.6	51.3	0.28	0.53
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but, as they grow up, they ought to get over them and settle down	34.5	26.7	38.8	0.38	0.62
Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral, crooked and feeble-minded people	17.4	17.3	65.3	0.31	0.56
What this country needs most, more than laws and political programmes, is a few courageous, fearless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith	37.0	23.7	39.3	0.38	0.62
A person who has bad manners, habits and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people	42.3	30.0	27.7	0.26	0.51
Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private	46.9	25.3	27.8	—	—
Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment: such criminals ought to be whipped publicly, or worse	38.4	19.7	41.9	0.30	0.55
If people would talk less and work harder, everybody would be better off	35.5	27.1	37.4	0.37	0.61
explained variance = 32.5%					

APPENDIX 3 *Ethnocentrism; items, percentages and factor analysis*

Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups						
	Frequencies (%)			h ²	Loadings	
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree			
Foreigners who live in Holland should take over Dutch customs	42.8	32.0	25.2	—	—	—
Most Moroccans are rude people	2.5	10.1	87.4	0.45	0.68	—
Holland should not have brought in foreign labourers	21.8	24.3	53.9	—	—	—
Foreigners carry all kinds of dirty smells around	7.8	16.9	75.3	0.53	0.74	—
Gypsies drive around in big caravans at the expense of the social security funds	21.6	30.0	48.4	0.59	0.74	—
With Moroccans you never know for certain whether or not they are going to be aggressive	11.3	17.5	71.2	0.65	0.82	—
Most people from Surinam work quite slowly	21.8	23.1	55.1	0.53	0.72	—
Gypsies are never to be trusted	18.6	26.0	55.4	0.66	0.80	—
Most Turks are easy-going	10.6	22.1	67.3	0.63	0.80	—
People from Surinam are short-tempered	17.2	26.2	56.6	0.56	0.74	—
Turks have so many children because they are slightly backward	15.5	21.8	62.7	0.44	0.66	—
When you deal with Jews, you have to be extra careful	18.1	15.9	66.0	0.49	0.67	—
Favourable attitude towards ingroup						
	Frequencies (%)			h ²	Loadings	
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree			
Everywhere in the world Dutch people are beloved	13.5	29.6	56.9	0.25	—	0.46
We, the Dutch people, are always willing to put our shoulders to the wheel	32.9	32.6	34.5	0.38	—	0.62
Generally speaking, Holland is a better country than most other countries	49.0	23.4	27.6	0.26	—	0.51
We, the Dutch people, have reason to be proud of our history	37.6	32.7	29.7	0.50	—	0.71
Other countries can learn a lot of good things from our country	29.6	42.3	28.1	0.30	—	0.53
We should give foreigners who like to reside in our country, a hearty welcome	23.3	45.9	30.8	—	—	—
If Dutch customs were to be taken over by all other countries, that would lead to the end of all wars	7.2	17.7	75.1	—	—	—
Every Dutchman ought to pay honour to our national symbols like the national flag and the national anthem	51.8	22.6	25.6	0.34	—	0.57
In striving for international co-operation, we have to take care that no typical Dutch customs get lost	40.8	32.0	27.2	0.37	—	0.60
I am proud to be a Dutchman	61.7	26.8	11.5	0.51	-0.11	0.77
explained variance = 46.9%						

APPENDIX 4 *Unstandardized regression coefficients of the full model (N = 965)*

Independent variables	Dependent variables		
	Authoritarianism	Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups	Favourable attitude towards ingroup
Intercept	434.18	226.77	261.90
Self-employed people	51.44*	22.76*	32.41*
Farmers	34.63*	6.42	17.99
Skilled workers	11.13	21.53*	19.01*
Unskilled workers	23.38*	13.52	14.66
Unemployed people	12.61†	-3.30†	-4.04†
Marginal church members	17.46*	2.57†	15.77*
Modal church members	25.65*	0.01†	21.24*
Core church members	-9.25	-7.32†	15.16
Education	-16.10*	-6.53*	-7.27*
Age	1.97*	0.42†	0.64*
Status-anxiety	4.27*	-0.76†	-1.76†
Socioeconomic frustration	2.12†	0.84†	-2.28†
Authoritarianism	(not specified)	0.54*	0.48*
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.42	0.37

*denotes significant relationship ($p < 0.05$)

†denotes insignificant relationship and thus eliminated from the full model