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WORKING-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM: EVALUATION OF A RESEARCH TRADITION AND AN EMPIRICAL TEST

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Introduction

In 1959 Seymour M. Lipset published an article that was to be a chapter in his famous book in 1960. He argued that the working class was more likely than the middle and upper classes to favour the ideology of anti-democratic movements. His study became a classic and an expanded edition was published in 1981.

His statements caused a great deal of controversy in the social and political sciences. The controversy resulted not only from the relatively complex nature of Lipset's loosely formulated theory but also from the lack of valid data to test it thoroughly. Lipset and his successors had to turn to data that were originally not collected to test his theory. Consequently, they ended up testing certain fragments of the theory while ignoring several other important parts of it.

We shall first conscientiously outline Lipset's original theoretical model. Next, we shall discuss the limitations and omissions of previous empirical studies on social class and authoritarianism. Then we shall test the core theory using data from a 1985 national Dutch survey.

Lipset's theoretical model

The ideology of the working class

Lipset first presented his theory at the 1955 conference on 'The Future of Liberty' in Milan, Italy. Those were the days of the Cold War. In the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy instigated a witch hunt for alleged communists. The Western democratic world feared aggressive expansionism of the communist Soviet Union. The Korean War was considered evidence of the international communist conspiracy to eventually dominate the whole world. These anti-communist sentiments also promoted U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (Calvocoressi, 1982). Within this political atmosphere,

Lipset (1959: 483; 1960: 99) stated that 'The threat of freedom posed by the Communist movement is as great as that once posed by Fascism and Nazism, and Communism ... is supported mainly by the lower levels of the working class'. He considered this view still accurate in 1981 (cf. Lipset 1981: 89).

Lipset (1981: 92) surmised that two ideological elements prevailed 'in the poorer strata everywhere'¹. The first element was a complex of attitudes he referred to as economic *liberalism*², i.e., the opinion that income, status, and power should be redistributed more equally in society, that government policies to establish this redistribution were desirable, that the government should introduce a graduated tax system, and that trade unions should become more powerful. The second element was another complex of attitudes that could be labelled *non-economic conservatism*, including the opinion that civil liberties ought to be restricted in general and for deviant groups in particular, that government policies should be anti-internationalistic and pro-nationalistic, and that the government should conduct a restrictive immigration policy. But his data to test this hypothesis were rather poor. In fact, he merely demonstrated that the working class was less likely to support a multi-party democratic system and that the working class was less tolerant with respect to civil liberties³. Hence, his crucial hypothesis was merely partially tested, as only fragmentary parts of his wide concepts were involved in the actual test.

The explanation of the working class ideology

Lipset proposed the concept of authoritarianism as an explanation and as an intermediating link between the social situation of the working class on the one hand and economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism on the other. Why?

The phenomenon of authoritarianism had been introduced by Adorno et al. (1950). They had described it as a personality syndrome considered to consist of a number of so-called sub-syndromes. The most important ones were: to conform rigidly to conventional norms, to submit to and identify with strong leaders, to reject those who violate conventional norms, to oppose the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded, to believe in mystical determinants of the individual's fate, to think in rigid categories. At one point Lipset was rather explicit about the concept of authoritarianism he defined as a set of attitudes and predispositions of individuals (1981: 92)⁴. But he hesitated strongly to consider authoritarianism a personality type. He rather considered it part of the unsophisticated perspective of the working class (1981, 108). This becomes clear if one takes into account the substantial affinity between the perspective of the working class as described by Lipset and the syndromes of authoritarianism as translated into survey statements

by Adorno et al. (1950). For example, Lipset (1981: 115) characterized the working class perspective in terms of a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms (People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong); impatience with talk and discussion (If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off); readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of evil forces (What this country needs most... is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith).

Adorno et al. had shown that authoritarianism explained the attraction to typical characteristics of Fascist ideology, i.e. ethnic prejudice, nationalism, and conservatism. As Lipset perceived some of these elements to be prevalent in the working class, it becomes comprehensible and plausible that he proposed authoritarianism as an intermediating link between the social situation of the working class and their ideological preferences. But he did not effectively test these implicit hypotheses, certainly not in terms of multivariate analysis.

The social situation of the working class

Lipset (1981, 100-107) sought to explain authoritarianism in terms of 'the typical social situation of lower class persons'. He speculated that their situation could be characterized by a number of other interrelated characteristics in addition to their actual occupational position, such as a poor education, non-participation in societal organizations (e.g., trade unions), infrequent reading, economic and psychological insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns. Lipset added that a number of these circumstances were also prevalent among small businessmen. He thus suspected fleetingly that this social class might also be authoritarian to some degree (1981: 105). But he paid less attention to this phenomenon, which he referred to as the extremism of the middle classes (1981: 131).

Why should all these characteristics contribute to authoritarianism? Lipset contended that these characteristics were indicative of a certain isolation from the dominant cultural and political values, which prevents people from acquiring a sophisticated and more complex view on social problems and their contexts. For this reason, the lower social strata were likely to prefer ideologies of political movements that proposed simple and quick solutions to complex social problems.

Summary of hypotheses

We derived three sets of hypotheses from the previous propositions⁵. *Hypothesis 1A*: the working class is more likely to be liberal on economic issues. *Hypothesis 1B*: the working class is more likely to be conservative on non-economic issues. *Hypothesis 2A*: authoritarianism has a positive effect on economic liberalism. *Hypothesis 2B*: authoritarianism has a positive effect on non-economic conservatism. Authoritarianism is determined by a working-class occupational position (*hypothesis 3A*), by a middle-class occupational position (*hypothesis 3B*), by a low educational level (*hypothesis 3C*), by non-participation in trade unions (*hypothesis 3D*), by infrequent reading (*hypothesis 3E*), by economic insecurity (*hypothesis 3F*), by psychological insecurity (*hypothesis 3G*), and by authoritarian family patterns (*hypothesis 3H*)⁶. We will set out to test these hypotheses thoroughly.

Figure 1. Graphic Summary of Lipset's Hypotheses




Figure 1 presents a graphic summary of these hypotheses as a path model. Unfortunately, we were not able to test hypotheses regarding two concepts of Lipset's theoretical model: on psychological insecurity (hypothesis 3G) and on authoritarian family patterns (hypothesis 3H). That is why these hypotheses are in parentheses in Figure 1.

Limitations and omissions of previous research

We compiled an overview of previous research on working-class authoritarianism, presented in Appendix 1. This previous research is limited in at least three respects.

First, past research was confined to the explanation of conservative attitudes on non-economic issues, like restrictions on civil liberties, intolerance of protests and demonstrations, nationalism, and unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic and racial outgroups. Only a few studies incorporated attitudes pertaining to economic liberalism (Felling and Peters, 1986; De Witte, 1990). Hence, Lipset's hypothesis that the working class favoured economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism simultaneously has seldom been tested.

Second, none of the researchers made a distinction between authoritarianism as a syndrome of personality traits and the ideological elements favoured by authoritarian people. Consequently, Lipset's hypothesis of authoritarianism affecting both economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism has in fact never been tested.

Third, none of the studies conducted so far examined whether all of the characteristics Lipset assumed to be typical of the lower class situation would contribute to the explanation of authoritarianism. Past empirical research examined, next to socioeconomic class position, only education or income as predictor variables of authoritarianism. Exceptional cases are the studies of Dekker and Ester (1986, 1987) and Middendorp and Meloen (1989), which also incorporated respondents' subjective class position. Hence, Lipset's hypothesis that authoritarianism is affected by a low socioeconomic position, a poor educational level, non-participation in trade unions, infrequent reading, economic and psychological insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns has never been completely investigated by way of multivariate analysis.

In addition to these empirical omissions, it should be noted that virtually all the studies not only employed ill-defined but also different and therefore non-comparable indicators of socioeconomic class. Until 1980, most researchers in this tradition used a simple working versus middle-class dichotomy. These studies concluded that working-class people were more authoritarian than middle-class people, with the understanding that education reduced class differences in authoritarianism. Inspired by Wright's (1979)

stratification theory, Grabb (1980b) was the first researcher to utilize a refined typology of socioeconomic class, based on the criteria of control over the means of production (self-employed versus wage dependent) and the authority over the labour of others. Dekker and Ester (1986, 1987), who used a revised version of Wright's (1985) class scheme, showed that it was not the members of the working class but small proprietors who were the most authoritarian, which was confirmed by Middendorp and Meloen (1989). Taking account of these results, it might be speculated that the definition of socioeconomic class employed by researchers determined to some extent their empirical findings. Studies using a gross measure of working versus middle class found the former to be more authoritarian, whereas more elaborate class typologies refuted this finding. Moreover, Dekker and Ester (1987) pointed out that in this line of research, hardly any serious consideration has been given to the operationalization of socioeconomic class. Hence, empirical research on working-class authoritarianism is likely to benefit from the inclusion of a measure of socioeconomic class that is based on sociological theory, well-defined, reliable and suited for cross-national comparison.

Data and measurements

Data were taken from the national Dutch survey 'Social and cultural developments in the Netherlands' conducted in the autumn of 1985. These data resulted from a two-stage random sample. In the first stage, a number of municipalities were selected in such a way that the distribution of regions (North, East, South and West) and the degree of urbanisation (ranging from small villages to big cities) would be represented proportionately to the national distribution. In the second stage, people aged from 18 up to 69 were randomly selected from the registers of the selected municipalities. About 56 per cent of the respondents approached were willing to be interviewed (n=3003). This sample turned out to be representative of the Dutch population regarding sex, age and marital status as well as the combination of these characteristics. Readers who wish further information on the survey design and sample are encouraged to consult the documentation of Felling et al. (1987: 9-10).

There were two main questionnaires in this survey. In a first interview, questionnaire A was randomly submitted to about half of the respondents, the A-respondents (n=1520). These respondents were questioned on themes like family and education. Questionnaire B was submitted to the other randomly selected half of the respondents, the B-respondents (n=1483). These respondents were questioned on the theme under consideration. Then there were two complementary questionnaires submitted to respondents in a second interview, approximately one week later. A number of randomly

selected A-respondents were approached to fill in questions taken from the original B-questionnaire (n=309) and a number of randomly selected B-respondents were asked to fill in questions taken from the original A-questionnaire (n=316). So we ended up with 1799 respondents questioned on authoritarianism (Felling et al. 1987: 2-7). In this research we only included respondents who had no missing values on any of the variables employed and who were in the labour force, because Lipset's theory only pertains to these people.

To cover *economic liberalism* three scales were used, presented in Appendix 3. The first scale encompassed a set of three items on the desirability of reducing status and income inequalities. It was constructed by probabilistic scalogram analysis (H=.54; rho=.74). The other two measurements were additive scales. One combined the responses to two items dealing with the desirability of government intervention to reduce income inequalities (Cronbach's alpha=.48) and the other scale contained two items on the desirability of tougher trade union policies (Cronbach's alpha=.58).

Non-economic conservatism was measured by three scales, presented in Appendix 2. The first scale was constructed by a probabilistic scalogram analysis (Mokken, 1970) of six items that measured the extent to which respondents felt that civil liberties ought to be granted to individuals or restricted. These items were found to yield a unidimensional scale (H=.47; rho=.74). The remaining two scales consisted of a set of eight Likert items measuring a favourable attitude towards the national Dutch ingroup (Cronbach's alpha=.81), and a set of ten Likert items covering an unfavourable attitude towards Holland's ethnic minorities (Cronbach's alpha=.91). Both scales appeared to be related strongly (Pearson r is .58). This classic phenomenon is referred to as ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906; Scheepers et al., 1990). Both scales were constructed by a principal axis extraction technique (SPSS^x, PA2). The construction of these scales has been previously documented (Scheepers et al. 1989, 1990).

Although these measurements of both ideological dimensions may be not exhaustive, we feel that we have covered the core elements mentioned by Lipset. But do these elements constitute empirically consistent dimensions? To answer this question, the three scales of economic liberalism and the three scales of non-economic conservatism were submitted to a factor analysis. An initial test for eigenvalues greater than one, the discontinuity in the eigenvalue plot (scree test), and the KMO measure of sampling adequacy suggested a two-factor solution. The resulting matrices were then rotated to simple structure. Table 1 contains a summary of the results along with the reliabilities of the two sets of scales.

Table 1. Factor Pattern Matrix of Economic Liberalism and Non-Economic Conservatism

Measurement Scales	Factor Pattern Loadings ^a		h ²
	I	II	
I <i>Economic Liberalism</i> (Cronbach's alpha = .74)			
1 Reduction of Class Differences	.75	—	.58
2 Government Intervention in Income Differences	.80	—	.63
3 Tougher Trade Union Policy	.58	—	.33
II <i>Non-Economic Conservatism</i> (Cronbach's alpha = .71)			
1 Restriction of Civil Liberties	—	.44	.21
2 Unfavourable Attitude towards Ethnic Outgroups	—	.82	.66
3 Favourable Attitude towards National Ingroup	—	.80	.62
Total Percent of Explained Variance: 51.0			
Factor Intercorrelation: .04			

^a Factor pattern loadings less than .15 are not reported.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, a cursory examination of the factor pattern loadings indicates that all scales have a substantial loading on the factor they are assumed to measure. Together with the quite acceptable reliabilities, this finding indicates that the scales represent two ideological dimensions that are relatively consistent in themselves. Second, the two obliquely rotated factors are virtually unrelated to each other, which confirms previous findings of Felling and Peters (1986) and De Witte (1990), although they used slightly different indicators of both dimensions.

Authoritarianism was conceptualized by Adorno et al. (1950) as consisting of nine sub-syndromes, i.e. authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, conventionalism, projectivity, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, and exaggerated concern with sexuality. Each of these was measured by a single original F-scale item derived from Adorno et al. (1950), presented in Appendix 4⁷. Factor analysis of the items yielded a one-factorial solution (Cronbach's alpha=.78). The factor appeared to have quite acceptable properties in terms of the explained variance, the items' communalities and factor pattern loadings, except for the item incorporated to measure projectivity. This item was therefore excluded from the final scale.

The operationalization of *socioeconomic class* was derived from Erikson et al. (1979, 1983). Each respondent was categorized into one of ten nominal occupational categories according to four criteria, namely labour sector, required skills, self-employed versus wage-dependent, and authority over the labour of others. This classification was designed for cross-national comparisons and has already been applied in 35 countries all over the world (Ganze-

boom, Luykx and Treiman, 1989). Moreover, in the Netherlands it has been shown to be a better predictor of various social attitudes than socioeconomic status variables like occupational prestige, controlling for other predictors like education, age and income (Kraaykamp et al., 1989). Table 2 shows the resulting class categories with labels adopted from cross-national research (Ganzeboom et al., 1989).

Education was measured by the respondent's highest educational attainment. The seven-point scale ranges from primary school to university. To measure *non-participation in trade unions*, respondents were asked whether or not they were a member of a trade union. *Infrequent reading* was measured by asking respondents whether or not they read a regional or national newspaper every day.

To measure *economic insecurity*, two indicators were utilized, i.e. status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration, presented in Appendix 6. The status-anxiety scale was constructed by a probabilistic scalogram analysis ($H=.39$; $\rho=.76$) of six items revealing the respondent's insecurity with respect to his/her social prestige and financial prospects. The socioeconomic frustration scale consisted of two items (Cronbach's $\alpha=.51$).

Analysis and results

For descriptive purposes we performed three separate oneway analyses of variance to assess the bivariate relationship between socioeconomic class and authoritarianism, economic liberalism or non-economic conservatism. Table 2 contains mean factor scores per class category (grand mean is 500, standard deviation is 100).

Table 2. Mean Factor scores of Class Categories on Authoritarianism, Economic Liberalism and Non-Economic Conservatism

	<i>Numbers per category</i>	Authorita- rism	Economic Liber- alism	Non- Economic Conservatism
Higher Controllers	97	477.37	442.66	484.68
Lower Controllers	213	443.98	486.18	434.51
Routine Non-Manual Workers	212	474.87	492.06	485.68
Small Proprietors with Employees	24	468.63	437.83	555.17
Small Proprietors without Employees	21	502.38	498.05	520.00
Farmers	20	547.10	434.80	546.65
Supervisors of Manual Workers	27	526.89	490.89	528.51
Skilled Manual Workers	52	491.58	528.33	516.40
Semi- and Unskilled Manual Workers	140	518.16	534.98	527.70
Agricultural Workers	9	513.78	505.00	546.77
F-Ratio		11.38	8.29	16.00
P		.00	.00	.00

To examine the hypotheses presented in Figure 1, multiple regression analyses were applied to two equations with economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism as the dependent variables and all the other variables as predictors and to one equation with authoritarianism as the dependent variable and all the others, except economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism, as predictors. Since socioeconomic class, non-participation in trade unions, and infrequent reading are nominal variables, we constructed dummy variables for the categories of each of these variables. Of each of these variables, one category was omitted as a reference category. We chose the reference categories in such a way that we could conclude directly whether the working class, people who do not participate in trade unions, and people who do not read newspapers are more strongly authoritarian, liberal on economic issues and conservative on non-economic issues than their antipodes, controlling for other predictors in the model.

We checked whether or not assumptions of regression analysis (like linearity, additivity⁸, homoscedasticity and lack of multicollinearity⁹), were disproved by the data. As these assumptions were not refuted, we proceeded with the estimation of the equations.

Table 3 presents the estimated regression coefficients. In the upper part of this table there are only unstandardized regression coefficients of the dummy variables, as standardized coefficients for dummies make no sense. In the lower part of Table 3 there are both unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) regression coefficients of education, status anxiety, socioeconomic frustration, and authoritarianism.

Hypothesis 1A states that the working class is liberal on economic issues. It appears from the bivariate analysis (Table 2) as well as from the multivariate analysis (Table 3) that skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers are the most liberal people on economic issues. Hence, *hypothesis 1A* is supported by the data. It also appears that the classes of lower controllers and routine non-manual workers are fairly liberal in this respect (Table 3). Hypothesis 1B states that the working class is conservative on non-economic issues. It appears from Table 2 that this hypothesis can not be rejected on a bivariate basis. But from Table 3 we can conclude that preference for this ideology is not due to belonging to the working class as such. In fact there are hardly any differences between the social classes. Only the class of lower controllers is significantly less conservative than the reference category, controlling for the other predictor variables¹⁰. Hence, the working classes can not be considered less tolerant of civil liberties, more prejudiced against outgroups or more nationalistic or anti-internationalistic. This means that *hypothesis 1B* is refuted by our data.

Having ascertained that belonging to the working class as such does not

Table 3. Regression of Authoritarianism, Economic Liberalism, and Non-Economic Conservatism on Social Class Dummy Variables and Other Predictor Variables: Unstandardized and (Standardized) Regression Coefficients (N=815)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables		
	Authoritarianism	Economic Liberalism	Non-Economic Conservatism
Intercept	524.17	483.82	229.77
Socioeconomic Class Dummies ^a			
Lower Controllers	-33.05 *	37.85 *	-28.58 *
Routine Non-Manual Workers	-24.68 *	40.61 *	-3.48
Small Proprietors with Employees	74.97 *	-1.69 *	10.77
Small Proprietors without Employees	-.3.82	40.87	15.41
Farmers	38.66	-15.50	12.99
Supervisors of Manual Workers	16.40	37.72	6.71
Skilled Manual Workers	-27.96	67.69 *	13.68
Semi- and Unskilled Manual Workers	-2.43	78.14 *	7.84
Agricultural Workers	12.72	48.33	21.43
Nonmember of Trade Unions	10.11	-15.57 *	12.29 *
Read No Newspapers	1.84	29.85 *	13.47
Education	-16.22 *	-5.57 *	-4.72 *
	(-.28) *	(-.09) *	(-.08) *
Status anxiety	2.76	8.19 *	-1.43
	(.04)	(.13) *	(-.02)
Socioeconomic Frustration	6.20 *	2.74	-.32
	(.11) *	(.04)	(-.01)
Authoritarianism	Ø	-.10 *	.60 *
	Ø	(-.10) *	(.60) *
Adjusted R ²	.18	.11	.49

^a The class of higher controllers is the reference category (n=97)

* p < .05.

Ø Not entered into the regression equation.

contribute to the explanation of non-economic conservatism, hypothesis 2B becomes all the more interesting. This hypothesis states that authoritarianism positively affects non-economic conservatism directly. The effect of authoritarianism on non-economic conservatism is indeed positive and quite strong (.60), indicating that *hypothesis 2B* is corroborated: authoritarianism appears to be the main source of non-economic conservatism. Hypothesis 2A states that authoritarianism has a positive effect on economic liberalism. However, this effect appears to be negative (-.10). Hence, *hypothesis 2A* is rejected.

The third set of hypotheses predicts that a low occupational position and

a middle-class position, a poor education, non-participation in trade unions, infrequent reading, and economic insecurity all increase authoritarianism. Table 3 shows that education has a significant negative effect (-.28) and that socioeconomic frustration has a significant positive effect (.11) on authoritarianism. These findings support *hypothesis 3C* and part of *hypothesis 3F*. The effects of non-membership in trade unions, no newspaper reading, and status anxiety, however, do not reach significance and do not corroborate *hypotheses 3D, 3E* and part of *hypothesis 3F*.

But the most important question in this context is whether belonging to the working class (*hypothesis 3A*) or to the middle class (*hypothesis 3B*) contributes to the explanation of authoritarianism. Although the categories that could be regarded as belonging to the working class seem to be authoritarian in Table 2 on a bivariate basis, it appears from Table 3 that none of these categories differs from the reference category, controlling for other predictors. Hence, *hypothesis 3A* is rejected: the extent of authoritarianism in the working class is not due to their socioeconomic position as such but due to related circumstances. We can safely conclude however that *hypothesis 3B* is supported by our data, as the degree of authoritarianism of small proprietors with employees is striking (in Tables 2 and 3): this category differs significantly from the reference category and is by far the most authoritarian¹¹. There are also significant differences between lower controllers and routine non-manual workers and the reference category: the former categories are significantly less authoritarian.

Finally, some findings concerning economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism may be noted here. Table 3 shows that education has a negative, albeit weak, effect on both economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism. Status anxiety appears to have only a positive effect on economic liberalism. With respect to the participation in trade unions, non-members are found to be less liberal on economic issues but more conservative regarding non-economic issues than the reference category. Newspaper reading has no effect on non-economic conservatism. People who do not read newspapers, however, appear to be more economically liberal than those who do.

Conclusions and discussion

Our results show that Lipset's core theoretical model was refuted on some aspects but corroborated on others.

First, it appeared that the working class, i.e., the class of unskilled and skilled manual workers, was indeed more in favour of economic liberalism (*hypothesis 1A*). This also held true of lower controllers and routine non-manual workers. They all desire smaller income inequalities, government inter-

vention to reduce these inequalities, and a tougher trade union policy. We consider this result quite plausible, since economic liberalism could serve the interests of these classes: they would probably benefit from a government that put these liberal views into practice. The working class also seemed to favour non-economic conservatism as indicated by restrictions on civil liberties, anti-outgroups and pro-nationalistic attitudes, as was surmised by Lipset (*hypothesis 1B*). But we rejected this hypothesis: the fact that the working class subscribes to this ideology is not due to their class position as such. In fact, we ascertained merely minor differences between social classes regarding non-economic conservatism. This finding may be interpreted in the framework of the Dutch political climate where democratic values are widely shared, regardless of one's position in society.

Second, authoritarianism did not appear to have a positive effect on economic liberalism as surmised by Lipset (*hypothesis 2A*), but a negative albeit weak effect. This means that authoritarian individuals oppose trade unions and economic interventions by the government, which implies that they favour a laissez-faire economy. Next, authoritarianism had a rather strong positive effect on non-economic conservatism, in conformity with Lipset's theory (*hypothesis 2B*). This means that authoritarianism still appears to be a major source of pro-nationalistic, anti-outgroups and anti-democratic attitudes, as was discovered by Adorno et al. in 1950. As this has been ascertained so often – Felling et al. (1986) mentioned 35 studies world-wide – it may be considered one of the persistent patterns in the social sciences.

Third, having ascertained that authoritarianism still is a major source of anti-democratic attitudes, it is relevant to note that authoritarianism was not induced by belonging to the working class as such, as was surmised by Lipset (*hypothesis 3A*). This means that the working class in the Netherlands is not the social basis for anti-democratic sentiments. Instead, the results indicated that the highest levels of authoritarianism are found within the class of small proprietors with employees (*hypothesis 3B*). This finding may be interpreted as a second persistent pattern: it was the lower middle class that was rather active in the Nazi Party from the twenties on to the end of World War II, as was ascertained by Kater (1983, 264), based on exhaustive studies of Nazi archives. Why is this class of small proprietors with employees more authoritarian? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. We suspect that one answer could be derived from the intrinsic aspects of their class position. Their position is in between: taking orders from customers, who have to be treated as authorities, and giving orders to subordinates. It may be argued that this class position moulds people who are willing to submit to authorities but have a simultaneous need to subject others to their own authority. These are precisely the core characteristics of authoritarianism.

Fourth, predictors like non-membership in trade unions (*hypothesis 3D*)

and infrequent reading of newspapers (*hypothesis 3E*) did not contribute to the explanation of authoritarianism. Apparently, these conditions do not necessarily induce authoritarianism, possibly because nowadays there are mass media through which one can acquire a more sophisticated view. And it appeared that the fear of losing status also did not contribute to authoritarianism whereas having experienced severe financial losses did induce authoritarianism just as feelings of socioeconomic frustration indeed affected authoritarianism, as put forward by Lipset (*hypothesis 3F*).

Fifth, we found that authoritarianism indeed prevailed on the low educational levels (*hypothesis 3C*). There is abundant empirical evidence on this finding as well as sophisticated interpretations. In fact, Lipset's interpretation of authoritarianism as an unsophisticated world view was elaborated by Gabennesch (1972). He stated that authoritarianism reflects a simplistic world view, a narrow breadth of perspective, which is typical of people who lack the abilities for more complex points of view. And this world view, in turn, accounts for anti-democratic attitudes in general, according to Gabennesch. This interpretation is supported by our data as it appeared that the effect of education on conservative attitudes regarding non-economic issues is strongly mediated by authoritarianism. This interpretation was recently supported more directly by the empirical findings of Bobo and Licari (1989). They found that the effect of education on political (in)tolerance was strongly mediated by cognitive sophistication. Now, in view of these parallel results, we would conclude that Lipset's interpretation of authoritarianism as an unsophisticated world view is basically not refuted.

The effects of education on this type of political attitudes have been shown to vary across cultures (Simpson, 1972). Simpson presumed that education would reduce authoritarianism 'only when the educational system emphasizes cognitive rather than rote learning or is manned by non-authoritarian teachers' (1972, 223). Quite a different interpretation was formulated by Weil (1985), who hypothesized that the effects of education vary across cultures according to the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form, and the degree of religious heterogeneity. These two theories are not necessarily contradictory, as the educational system of a country is apt to be related to its regime form. But we note that the effect ascertained in our study occurs in a country like the Netherlands that has a long democratic history and a great deal of religious heterogeneity. As such, these results are consistent with Weil's theory, that in such countries the effect of education is fairly strong. We feel it would be worthwhile to do cross-national research on this relationship in other types of countries that have shorter democratic histories and less religious heterogeneity.

All in all, we have demonstrated that Lipset's theory contains some flaws, especially when it comes to explaining the plausibility of authoritarianism as

an intermediating link between one's social situation and one's political views. Yet, we consider this view valuable as authoritarianism appears to be the main source of anti-democratic sentiments, i.e. non-economic conservatism. This element of Lipset's theory is not refuted. But his theory is refuted on another crucial aspect: it is not the working class but the class of small proprietors with employees that is a breeding ground for anti-democratic sentiments.

APPENDIX 1**Empirical studies on working-class authoritarianism**

Year of Study	Author(s)	N	Scope of Sample	Social Class ^a	Indicators of Authoritarianism
1965	Lipsitz	500	U.S.	M vs. W.	Original Authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950)
1967	Zeitlin	210	Cuba	W	Admission Civil Liberties
1971 1972	Korpi Hamilton	4862	Sweden several U.S.samples	W, Income several categories	Communist Vote Admission Civil Liberties, Attitudes Towards Blacks
1972	Ransford	477	Los Angeles	M vs.W	Admission Students Protest, Anti-Blacks
1975	Hopple	84 119	U.S.Teachers U.S.Unionists	M vs. W	Admission Protest
1979/ 1980a	Grabb	1499	U.S.	M vs. W, Education, Income	Admission Civil Liberties
1980b	Grabb	2164	U.S.	Wright, Robinson & Kelley ^b Education, Income	Admission Civil Liberties
1982	Ray	95	Sydney	M vs. W	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale, Directiveness, Social Desirability
		100	London, Glasgow	M vs. W	Conservatism, Directiveness
		100	Johannesburg	M vs. W, education	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale
		101	Los Angeles	M vs. W	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale
		170	New South Wales	M vs. W, Education	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale
		300	Queensland	M vs. W	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale
		100	Philippines	M vs. W	Balanced Authoritarianism Scale
1986	Felling and Peters	1000	Netherlands	Class Position	Economic Liberalism Non-Economic Conservatism
1986/ 1987	Dekker and Ester	4000	Netherlands	Wright ^b Education Income Subjective Class Position	Original authoritarianism Scale, Admission of Civil Liberties, Political Distrust, Admission Protest, Women's Liberation, Tolerance of Outgroups, Anomie, Nationalism

APPENDIX 1: (continued)

Year of Study	Author(s)	N	Scope of Sample	Social Class ^a	Indicators of Authoritarianism
1989	Middendorp and Meloen	3330	Netherlands	Wright ^b Education, Income, Subjective Class Position	Original Authoritarianism Scale, Admission of Civil Liberties, Political Distrust, Admission Protest, Women's liberation, Tolerance of Out-groups, Anomie, Nationalism
1990	De Witte	135	Belgium	Class Position, Education	Economic Liberalism Non-Economic Conservatism

a M = Middle class or white collar workers, W = working class or blue collar workers.

b The classification schemes of Wright (1979, 1985) and Robinson and Kelley (1979) are based on the following two criteria: control over the means of production (self-employed versus wage-dependent) and authority over the labour activity of others.

APPENDIX 2

Measurements on non-economic conservatism

Restrictions on civil liberties

Respondents were asked whether they felt that the civil liberties mentioned below ought to be restricted or granted to everybody. We report the percentage of people who felt that there liberties ought to be restricted (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in the scale (Hi).

	difficulty	Hi
To say whatever one wants in public	.22	.47
To write whatever one wants in public	.29	.45
To demonstrate in favour or against a cause	.26	.46
To criticise the Royal House in public	.46	.50
To refuse military service	.41	.40
To occupy buildings in order to enforce justified demands	.72	.55

Ethnocentrism: items, percentages, factor analysis

Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups	Frequencies (%)			h ²	loadings	
	agree	neutral	disagree			
Foreigners who live in Holland should take over Dutch customs.	42.8	32.0	25.2	.—	.—	.—
Most Moroccans are rude people.	2.5	10.1	87.4	.45	.68	.—
Holland should not have let in foreign labourers in.	21.8	24.3	53.9	.—	.—	.—
Foreigners have all kinds of dirty smells.	7.8	16.9	75.3	.53	.74	.—
Gypsies drive around in big caravans at the expense of the National Assistance Department.	21.6	30.0	48.4	.59	.74	.—
With Moroccans you never know for certain whether or not they are going to be aggressive.	11.3	17.5	71.2	.65	.82	.—
Most people from Surinam work quite slowly.	21.8	23.1	55.1	.53	.72	.—
Gypsies are never to be trusted.	18.6	26.0	55.4	.66	.80	.—
Most Turks are easy-going	10.6	22.1	67.3	.63	.80	.—
People from Surinam are short-tempered.	17.2	26.2	56.6	.56	.74	.—
Turks have so many children because they are slightly backward.	15.5	21.8	62.7	.44	.66	.—
When you deal with Jews, you have to be extra careful	18.1	15.9	66.0	.49	.67	.—
<hr/>						
Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups	Frequencies (%)			h ²	loadings	
	agree	neutral	disagree			
Everywhere in the world Dutch people are liked.	13.5	29.6	56.9	.25	.—	.46
We, the Dutch people, are always willing to put our shoulders to the wheel.	32.9	32.6	34.5	.38	.—	.62
Generally speaking, Holland is a better country than most other countries.	49.0	23.4	27.6	.26	.—	.51
We, the Dutch people, have reason to be proud of our history.	37.6	32.7	29.7	.50	.—	.71
Other countries can learn a lot of good things from our country.	29.6	42.3	28.1	.30	.—	.53
We should give foreigners who want to reside in our country a hearty welcome.	23.3	45.9	30.8	.—	.—	.—
If Dutch customs were to be taken over by all other countries, that would lead to the end of all wars.	7.2	17.7	75.1	.—	.—	.—
Every Dutchman ought to pay honour to our national symbols like the national flag and the national anthem.	51.8	22.6	25.6	.34	.—	.57
When the striving for international co-operation, we have to take care that no typical Dutch customs get lost.	40.8	32.0	27.2	.37	.—	.60
I am proud to be a Dutchman.	61.7	26.8	11.5	.51	-.11	.77
explained variance = 46.9%						

APPENDIX 3

Measurements on economic liberalism

Desirability of income and status equalization

The items below were used to measure the extent to which respondents favoured the equalization of social inequalities. We present the percentage of people who agree with the items (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in the scale (Hi).

	Difficulty	Hi
The differences between classes ought to be smaller than they are at present.	.83	.55
The differences between high and low incomes should be smaller.	.62	.62
Workers still have to struggle for an equal position in society	.83	.46

Desirability of government intervention

We present the percentage of respondents who agreed with the items below.

I am in favour of government intervention to reduce income differences.	.61
The government has to oblige enterprises to share the profit between employers and shareholders equally.	.37

Tougher trade union policies

Trade unions have to adopt a much harder line if they are to promote workers' interest.	.25
Trade unions have to advise their members to vote for the parties that promote workers' interests best.	.27

APPENDIX 4

Authoritarianism items, percentages and factor analysis (N=1520)

	Frequencies (%)			h ²	loadings
	agree	neutral	disagree		
People can be divided in two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.	36.9	19.2	43.9	.32	.56
Familiarity breeds contempt.	22.1	26.6	51.3	.28	.53
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up, they ought to get over them and settle down.	34.5	26.7	38.8	.38	.62
Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral, crooked and feeble-minded people.	17.4	17.3	65.3	.31	.56
What this country needs most, more than laws and political programmes, is a few courageous, fearless, devoted leaders people can put their faith in.	37.0	23.7	39.3	.38	.62
A person who has bad manners, habits and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.	42.3	30.0	27.7	.26	.51
Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.	46.9	25.3	27.8	—	—
Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment: these criminals ought to be whipped publicly, or worse.	38.4	19.7	41.9	.30	.55
If people would talk less and work harder, everybody would be better off.	35.5	27.1	37.4	.37	.61
	explained variance = 32.5%				

APPENDIX 5

Status anxiety and socioeconomic frustration

The items below were used to measure status anxiety. We present the percentage of the people who agreed with the questions (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in the scale (Hi).

	Difficulty	Hi
Are you never afraid that your present situation will get worse in the near future?	.53	.41
Do you think you won't be able to afford as much luxury as you have now in the near future?	.53	.41
Do you think you will have to curtail your housekeeping money in the near future?	.58	.47
Are you ever worried about the possibility that people of lower status will come to live in your street?	.10	.37
Are you ever worried about the possibility that the status of your neighbourhood will decline?	.20	.30
Are you never worried that you will have to change your lifestyle?	.36	.30

The items below were combined to measure socioeconomic frustration. After the answers are the percentual frequencies of the people who gave the answer.

Please compare your contemporary situation with the situation of five years ago. In what way has the income before taxes of the household you belong to changed?

(strongly) decreased	38.1
stayed the same	25.8
(strongly) increased	36.1

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your present income?

(very) dissatisfied	17.1
neutral	20.0
(very) satisfied	62.8

NOTES

1. It is quite confusing that Lipset used several terms to refer to the categories where these ideological elements were prevalent, like: the poorer strata, the working class, the lower levels of the working class, the lower classes, the lower strata and lower status groups. We will consistently use the term working class: to refer to people employed to perform manual labor.
2. The meaning of this concept may be quite confusing to European readers, because it has different meanings in different countries. In the context of the United States, 'liberalism' refers to the opposite of conservatism. In England, 'liberalism' is often referred to as radicalism. And in the Netherlands, the concept of 'liberalism' is best referred to as 'progressiveness'. Hence, in the Netherlands, liberalism does not refer to the ideology of the classic liberal party (V.V.D.).
3. Other evidence for his thesis included the tough-mindedness of the working class as ascertained by Eysenck (1954) and to authoritarianism of the working class derived from Adorno et al. (1950) and successive studies.
4. What is confusing is that Lipset used authoritarianism to also refer to an extensive set of partly inconsistent social and political attitudes and values, e.g., anti-democratic sentiments, traditionalism, conservatism, and communism.
5. In addition to these hypotheses we mention, for the sake of completeness, another hypothesis developed by Lipset. He argued that members of the working class were also likely to convert to fundamentalistic and dogmatic religious movements. Taking the marginality of these religious movements in present-day Holland into account, however, this thesis was considered irrelevant to the present study.
6. Recently two other predictors of authoritarianism were discovered: church involvement and age (Scheepers et al., 1990: 21-23). We chose not to add these predictors to the model for two reasons. First, our primary aim was to test Lipset's original theory without any additional elements because this theory is complicated enough as it is. Second, these predictors are not necessarily related to Lipset's argument that authoritarianism could be explained by indicators of isolation from the dominant political values.
7. These items have been under suspicion of acquiescent response set since the appearance of the study by Christie and Jahoda (1954). Yet, others have found reasons to doubt it (Rorer, 1965; Meloen et al., 1988). We inserted these items in the questionnaire so as to avoid or at least reduce acquiescence by alternating them with items dealing with other substantial themes.
8. The possibility of non-additivity, hence of interaction between education and authoritarianism on non-economic conservatism as found by Hesselbart and Schuman (1976) was checked by adding a multiplicative term containing both original variables to the equation as proposed by Friedrich (1982). We ruled out this possibility by ascertaining that this multiplicative term did not reach significance ($p. < 05$).
9. The possibility of multicollinearity between some independent variables is ruled out by the relatively low associations between these variables: the highest association is the one between social class and education (Cramers $V=.28$).
10. Tests on Least Significant Differences (for multiple comparisons of pairs of means, which are not extensively presented here) revealed that this class differed significantly ($p. < 05$) from all other classes in this respect.
11. L.S.D.-tests revealed that the class of small proprietors with employees was significantly ($p. < 05$) more authoritarian than all other classes, except for the class of farmers, which resembles the small proprietors.

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